* 
 
 ,^.»<« »* *' *'"'°9'"" *«,« 
 
 PRINCETON, N. J. 
 
 *^A 
 
 Shelf 
 
 BL 2780 .C42 1891 
 Chapman, C. 1828-1922. 
 Pre-organic evolution and 
 the Biblical idea of God 
 
PRE-ORGANIC EVOLUTION 
 
PRINTED BY MORRISON AND GIBB, 
 FOR 
 
 T. & T. CLARK, EDINBURGH. 
 
 LONDON, HAMILTON, ADAMS, AND CO. 
 
 DIJBLIN, GEORGK HERBERT. 
 
 NEW YORK, CHARLES SCRIBNER's SONS. 
 
PRE-ORGAmC EVOLUTION 
 
 AND 
 
 THE BIBLICAL IDEA OF GOD 
 
 an (Exposition antr a Criticism. 
 
 CHAKLES CHAPMAN, M. A., LL.D. 
 
 PRINCIPAL OF WKSTERN COLLEOE, PLYMOUTH. 
 
 " For the invisible things of Him from tlie creation 
 of the world are clearly seen, being understood by 
 the things that are made, even His eternal power and 
 Godhead."— St. Paul. 
 
 EDINBURGH: 
 :!LARK, 38 GEORGE STREET. 
 1891. 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 TT will soon be discovered, in reading the following- 
 pages, that I purpose therein not to treat of 
 Theism, as such, but only to discuss the teaching of 
 the advocates of Pre-organic Evolution, and pre-emin- 
 ently of Mr. Spencer, in its bearing on the conception 
 of God given us in the Bible ; and not, indeed, of the 
 entire representation of God to be found in the Bible, 
 but only that which is more nearly allied to the 
 implications found in the premisses from which the 
 Agnostic conclusion is supposed to be legitimately 
 derived. In pursuance of this end, I have endeavoured 
 to subject the Spencerian teaching, when logically 
 developed, to a series of criticisms which, I believe, 
 bring out its real character ; and, also, I have sought 
 to find out whether there is, in the data from whence 
 any valid doctrine of Pre-organic Evolution must 
 proceed, any solid ground for Agnosticism as a substi- 
 tute for such a belief in God, as a Living Personal 
 
vi , P7'eface. 
 
 Being, as is warranted by the language of Scripture ; 
 and, I may add, as Christian Theists maintain, warranted 
 by the exercise of our reason on all the facts placed 
 before us in the material, mental, and moral worlds. 
 In the structure of the argument I deal only with 
 sucli data as may be furnished by the condition of 
 things out of which any Evolution proceeds, if there 
 is to be a possibility of Evolution at all. 
 
 It will be seen, as the reader advances, that my 
 purpose renders it unnecessary to enter into some of 
 the representations of God contained in the Christian 
 Scripture on which properly so much stress is laid in 
 these days. I am confined, by the nature of the theory 
 of Pre-organic Evolution, to those primary representa- 
 tions of God wliich involve truths concerning Him 
 which it is the drift of the Spencerian philosophy to 
 deny, or to call into question, or to speak of as perfectly 
 unknowable. 
 
 Among the early pages I have introduced some 
 historical matter with a view to indicate the continuity 
 of thought on the subject of Evolution ; and to show 
 that the problem of our own time is but a modern 
 version of a very old problem, illustrated and illumined 
 by such superior light as may be obtained from the 
 advance in Science and Philosophy. Should it be 
 
Preface. vii 
 
 desired to pass over this portion and "begin at once 
 with the statement of the modern view of Pre-organic 
 Evolution, it can be done without serious detriment to 
 the intelligibility of the exposition and subsequent 
 criticism, though there will be lacking the interest of 
 seeing old friends with new faces. 
 
 When the reader comes to p. 120 and passages 
 referring to the topic there dealt with, I hope he will 
 refer to Note A in the Appendix, as it will present a 
 qualification which may be felt by some to be required. 
 
 While this work was passing through the press, I 
 met with, and read with much pleasure, a work entitled 
 Is God Knoioahle? by the Eev. J. Iverach, M.A. I 
 regret that I had not read it before ; as it raises a few 
 points on which I should have said something in the 
 following pages. I quite agree with the author that 
 the use of the abstract term Intelligence has tended 
 often to obscure the discussion of the real point in the 
 Theistic controversy. Still, I do not see how I could 
 have well abstained from its use in the present case ; 
 since it is employed by Mr. Spencer, and is so far 
 necessary to the argument. However, I trust no doubt 
 is left as to what is really intended by it here, especi- 
 ally as interpreted by the remarks I have made on 
 Personality. 
 
vlii Preface. 
 
 If what I have written should help, in any degree, 
 to clear away difficulties ; to confirm faith in the most 
 stupendous and vital of all our beliefs ; to pave" the 
 way for a candid consideration of Christian, as distin- 
 guished from Theistic, claims; and to induce, on the 
 part of those who unfortunately cannot rest in the 
 quiet assurance that there is around and above us all 
 One All- Wise God, a respectful regard for the judg- 
 ment of those who are so blessed, then, I shall be 
 abundantly satisfied — to say nothing of the pleasure 
 experienced in thinking out for myself the line of 
 thought herein pursued, and the calm conviction there- 
 l)y confirmed that I not only know, but am also 
 known, and am an object of interest and care, to the 
 Living God. 
 
 CHARLES CHAPMAN". 
 
 Western College, 
 
 Plymouth, 1891. 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 1. Exjjlanatory. 
 
 Distinction between the Areas of Evolution — 1, Inorganic ; 
 2, Organic ; 3, Mental ; 4, Moral ; 5, Social, 
 
 2. Historical. 
 
 Diogenes of Apollonia and Anaximander, 
 
 Anaxagoras and Heraclitus, 
 
 Pythagoras, .... 
 
 Leucippus and Democritus, 
 
 Leibnitz, Kant, and Laplace, 
 
 Professor Ball on the Nebular Hypothesis, 
 
 16 
 21 
 23 
 29 
 33 
 
 CHAPTER U. 
 Exposition. 
 
 A Question of both Process and Origin, . . . .44 
 
 The purely Mechanical School, ..... 46 
 
 The Spencerian School, ...... 48 
 
 The slow Process from a State of Primordial Simplicity, in the 
 
 Condition of Matter, to Complexity, . .54 
 
 The Method of Proof, Deductive and Inductive, . . 69 
 
 Congruity of Principles with observed Facts, . . .80 
 
X Contents. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 CRITICISM. 
 
 1. Scope of the Discussion. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Interest in the Question more than Academical, . . 88 
 
 The Mechanical Theory hriefly considered, . . .92 
 
 Discrimination of Phenomenal and Ontological Elements in the 
 
 Spencerian System, ...... 97 
 
 The Possibility of a Rational and Useful Treatment of the 
 
 Subject, ....... 102 
 
 The Fact of some Process of Inorganic Evolution conceded, . 110 
 The most debatable Question that of Origin, . . .116 
 
 The universal Range of tlie Theory no necessary bar to careful 
 
 Inquiry, ....... 119 
 
 Justification of the Sense put upon the wide Scope of Mr. 
 
 Spencer's System, . . . . . .130 
 
 2, The Minimum Simplicity. 
 
 The Nature of the Primordial Simplicity implied, . . 147 
 
 Evolution from the Implied Data impossible, . . .152 
 
 Mr. Spencer's Argument from the Instability of the Homo- 
 geneous, ....... 162 
 
 Weak Defence of the Argument, . .... 170 
 
 Tlie only alternative tends to Theism, . . . .175 
 
 3. Eternal Cycles. 
 
 Ilypotliesis of Eternal Series of Evolutions and Dissolutions, . 179 
 The Hypothesis insufficient for the Purpose, . . . 186 
 
 4. Relation of the Universe to its Eternal Cause. 
 
 The Eternal Coexistence of Matter with its Cause, . .190 
 
 The Doctrine of an Eternal Manifestation of the Reality, . 193 
 
 Bearing of the Doctrine on the Question of Minimum Simplicity, 194 
 Eternal Manifestation considered as a Substitute for Creation, . 196 
 The Conceivableness of Creation, . . . .198 
 
 Mr. Spencer's Concessions on the Question, . . . 207 
 
Contents. xi 
 
 5. Knowahiliiy of the Eternal Reality — God. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Comparison of the Philosophical Idea of Eternal Reality witli 
 
 the Biblical Idea of God, . . . . .212 
 
 Points of Agreement and Difference, .... 215 
 
 Causes tending to Agnosticism, Moral and Philosophical, . 217 
 
 In what respect Agnosticism is admissible, . . . 221 
 
 Two Methods of considering the Question, . . . 223 
 
 The Historical M"ethod, and its Results, . . . 242 
 The Knowability of God not rendered impossible by Modern 
 
 Speculations on the Nature and Origin of Atomic Matter, . 232 
 
 Restatement of the Question as the Result of Discussion, , 238 
 
 Manifestations of the Eternal Reality reveal an Eternal Reason, 239 
 
 6. Personallti/. 
 
 The Transcendental Doctrine of " Pure Being" inadmissible, . 241 
 Mr. Spencer's Doctrine of " Manifestations " implies a Rational 
 
 Being, ....... 244 
 
 The Principle of the Argument duly recognised by Mr. Spencer, 245 
 
 The Ascription of Personality to God not a " Degradation," . 248 
 Personal Power not as degrading as Impersonal Power ascribed 
 
 to Reality by Mr. Spencer, . . . . .253 
 
 " Personality" a Fit Term, . . . . .256 
 
 Objections to it based on Pure Speculation, . . . 258 
 
 Mr. Spencer's Anthropomorphism, .... 259 
 
 Theological and Vulgar Use of " Personality " distinguished, . 263 
 Theological Use does, not imply Mutability or Subjection to 
 
 Temporal Changes, ...... 270 
 
 ]\[r. Fiske's Attempt at Compromise, .... 281 
 
 Lotze's View of what Personality is, . . . . 285 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 SUMMARY OF RESULTS. 
 
 The Nature of the Results attained, and their Bearing on the 
 
 Possibility of Successive Revelations, . . . 287 
 
E 
 
 pre-okctAnic evolution. 
 
 CHAPTEK I. 
 
 INTKODUCTION. 
 1 . Explanatory. 
 VOLUTION is a word, in the modem use of it, of 
 
 very wide application, and, if regard be had to 
 its etymology, sometimes inappropriately applied. The 
 general ideas intended to be covered by it have been 
 familiar to the highest intellects of the world for 
 thousands of years, though modern zeal has identified 
 it chielly with one distinguished name. When Indian 
 sages and the pre - Socratic Greeks, looking out on 
 the great objective, sought for a principle that would 
 unify the ever-changing multiplicity and multiformity, 
 they were pursuing a course and yielding to an intel- 
 lectual bent precisely the same as those cliaracteristic 
 of the most gifted and adventurous of nineteenth 
 century speculators. The success which, during the 
 
 A 
 
2 Pre-Oroanic Eiwhttion, 
 
 present century, has attended investigations within the 
 domain of the different branches of physical science, 
 combined with the re-awakened thirst after unity of 
 conception, has afforded peculiar facilities for entering 
 afresh on the ancient quest ; while, at the same time, it 
 has given more precision to the results arrived at. 
 
 The modern disposition to set even the profoundest 
 thoughts of philosophy in a form suited to the un- 
 disciplined intellect, and to bring scientific methods 
 and conclusions within the reach of all, has created a 
 popular interest in Evolution, which, though suggest- 
 ive as a psychological study, and useful as a stimulus 
 to the ordinary intellect, is apt to make merely popular, 
 and, therefore, confused and imperfect, ideas pass current 
 for tlie real and entire truth. It would, doubtless, 
 afford no little amusement to great authorities on 
 the subject were it possible to set before them a 
 selection from popular works, embodying the actual 
 ideas of Evolution as they exist in the popular mind. 
 There is, however, no substantial reason why popular 
 conceptions should not be brought into essential 
 harmony with the main ideas of scientific and pliilo- 
 sophical investigators ; seeing that the governing prin- 
 ciples of human thought are tlie same in all men, and 
 that both science and philosophy, when consistently 
 
Introduction. 3 
 
 and thoroughly developed, issue in a recognition of 
 laws at once simple and comprehensive. Without 
 unduly anticipating the coming exposition, and leaving 
 out, for the present, all question of the primal cause of 
 all change and any being, it may suffice here to say 
 that the leading idea of Evolution — the gradual passage 
 of the simple into the complex, the rise of the differen- 
 tiated out of the undifferentiated, by the action of 
 purely natural causes — is well grasped by the majority 
 of reading men, and, in some degree, is apprehended 
 even by the indolent receivers of hearsay testimony. The 
 confusion of thought to which I have referred as pre- 
 vailing in some quarters, arises mainly from confound- 
 ing Evolution itself with the Method by which, in one 
 restricted area, the C)r<^^anic, it is believed to have been 
 wrought out, and from overlooking the distinct areas 
 of fact to which the term may apply, as also the 
 Methods respectively appropriate to those areas. 
 
 Xo one can enter on a consideration of the subject 
 of Evolution with the expectation of attaining to clear 
 ideas and relatively correct conclusions, unless he first 
 of all think of it as Cosmic, i.e. comprehensive, in its 
 operation, of the entire universe of matter and mind, 
 and throughout all time. I am speaking now not of 
 Evolution as studied by this or that specialist, in this 
 
4 Pre-Organic Evolution. 
 
 or that department of natural history or of mind, but 
 of Evolution as regarded in the works of its philo- 
 sophical expounders. Whatever opinions may be held 
 as to its precise nature and method, the fact we have 
 here to note is that, in its modern philosophical use, it 
 is held to apply to all that is, that has been, and that 
 will be, i.e. in all time and space. This remarkable 
 range of assertion is made to rest, as I shall show later 
 on, upon the application of principles to things which 
 transcend our experience. Not a point of space, nor 
 an atom of matter, nor moment of time, nor the veriest 
 shadow of a change exists, has existed, or will exist, 
 but that Evolution can be afifirmed in connection with 
 it. There is no shirking the logic of the principles 
 assumed, on the score of vastness of range in either 
 time or space. To suppose otherwise, is to construe 
 Evolution after some other fashion than that of its chief 
 modern expounder. As long as things phenomenal 
 have been in existence. Evolution has been a fact 
 affirmable of them. Indeed, it is held that thinofs 
 are eternal, and Evolution, as a principle in them, is 
 eternal. In primordial mists of atoms — and, strange 
 to say, in their antecedents — in visible and invisible 
 stellar systems, in our solar system, in the building 
 of our rocks, in the appearance of life, in the long 
 
hitroduction. 5 
 
 succession of animate forms that from the first to the 
 present have lived on the earth and in the sea, in the 
 appearance and intricate workings of consciousness in 
 brutes and in man, and in all the intricacies and 
 confusions as well as order of society, Evolution is 
 said to be present, giving direction, form, and relation 
 to everything. The movement of my .-pen in writing 
 these words, and the emergence of my thought as I am 
 now conscious of it, are, by an indescribable series of 
 minute changes, in unbroken continuity with the first 
 atom and first movement of that atom, if ever there 
 was a first, and, if not, with the eternal recession. 
 
 But Cosmic Evolution on its material side embraces 
 two kinds, or, more strictly, two great divisions of 
 Evolution — the Pre-organic and the Organic. There 
 are a few who, in their extreme view of the nature 
 and origin of life, would obliterate the distinction as 
 being unreal ; but without now staying to discuss the 
 soundness of this contention, it is enough for our 
 present purpose to note the distinction as one recognised 
 by those who are competent to form a judgment, and 
 as necessary, if we would follow and understand the 
 course of thought and exposition which, as a matter 
 of fact, has been worked out by the leaders of thought 
 in the present century. Each of these should be 
 
6 Pre-Organic Evolution, 
 
 considered separately ; though it may be found, when 
 we come to details, that, according to some authorities, 
 it is difficult to say exactly where one begins in the 
 course of the other. In tliis distinction all that is at 
 present assumed is, that there is somewhere in the 
 history of the universe a point where the evolution of 
 organic forms began, and that there are peculiarities in 
 the evolution of those forms which render it desirable 
 to separate it, as a subject of exposition and criticism, 
 from the course of evolution which antedated it, and 
 which, in part, is concurrent with it. 
 
 Pre-organic Evolution, then, is, as to range and 
 duration, the larger part of Cosmic Evolution on its 
 material side, as, also, the earlier. Orcfanic Evolution 
 is much more restricted in range, and can only begin 
 when Inorganic Evolution has reached a rather 
 elaborate stage in its history. Of course, we are not 
 in a position to make affirmations or denials respecting 
 the possibility and probability of life in peculiar forms 
 existing in far-off starry systems. That is a curious 
 question for speculators. But in case the forms of 
 life in far-off worlds be immensely in excess of what 
 our imagination can enable us to conceive, science 
 makes it abundantly clear that all such forms of life 
 must have been preceded by a long-continued succession 
 
IntrodMction. y 
 
 of changes, in the inorganic substances that constitute 
 the material of organisms, ere the appearance of the 
 simplest organism was possible. The domain of In- 
 organic Evolution is infinite space, and its duration is 
 from the first integration of separate atoms ^ on through 
 all time, till the culmination has been reached, and 
 disintegrating collapse conies to pass. The domain of 
 Organic Evolution is confined to those areas of the 
 consolidated universe where conditions have arisen to 
 render the existence of life a possibility ; and its 
 duration extends from the appearance of the primordial 
 germ in some world far or near, on to the great crisis 
 which, it is supposed, will terminate the present 
 evolutionary process. Such is the relative position of 
 the two branches of Cosmic Evolution from a theoretical 
 point of view ; but, as a matter of fact, modern science 
 is concerned only with oriianisms found existinc^, or to 
 have existed, on our globe. This restriction arises from 
 the necessity of the case. We only know organisms 
 on the globe. Organic Evolution, then, as now studied 
 and expounded, has to do with those forms and 
 arrangements of matter on earth, which, by reason of 
 certain peculiarities, distinguish them from all the other 
 forms and arrangements of matter in the universe ; and 
 
 ^ Or possibly their antecedents, as will be explained in due cour 
 
 se. 
 
8 Pre- Organic Evolution. 
 
 the peculiarities referred to are generalised under the 
 term Life. Thus one great section of matter is 
 distinguished from another and becomes the subject of 
 research, requiring often different methods from those 
 pursued in the study of the facts found in the other 
 larger section — the Inorganic. It will serve to facili- 
 tate our future discussions if the line of demarcation 
 between the two is kept perfectly clear. 
 
 Although, then, popular opinion has associated 
 Evolution, in many instances, exclusively with the 
 researches of Mr. Darwin, let it here be distinctly 
 understood that the Organic Evolution with which 
 his name has been identified is ver}^ restricted in its 
 range. It has nothing whatever to do with the 
 question of ultimate origin, of primordial matter and 
 force, or of the process, be it fast or slow, by which, 
 from a hypothetical elementary condition of tilings, 
 this and other worlds were formed. Nor is it con- 
 cerned immediately with the relation of chemical and 
 molecular changes to the appearance of life in the 
 first instance, or even with the relation of any other 
 cause to the origin of life. Whether matter be eternal 
 or not ; whether there be an Inscrutable Absolute 
 Eeality called God, or it be properly nameless ; whether 
 the earth, the planetary and stellar systems came into 
 
Introduction. 9 
 
 their present magnificent form and order by tlie 
 persistent action of force on the original ultimates of 
 matter and through almost interminable ages, or by 
 any other means, — these are questions with which 
 Orgtniic Evolution has no more to do than it has with 
 the theory of land and rent. Science is too often 
 confounded with philosophy. Science, strictly speaking, 
 has to do only with facts that come under observation, 
 and their proper correlation. As applied to the organic 
 sphere, it simply ascertains the facts of organic life, 
 and so arranges them as to show, if possible, their 
 connection one with another. To attempt to do more 
 is to intrude into the domain of philosophy. Men 
 who may be great authorities in science may, at the 
 same time, be poor authorities in philosophy. It 
 should not be forf^otten that in science, considered as 
 science, there is no room for speculations concerning 
 the ultimate causes and conditions of all things. 
 Any ism that involves transcendental ideas — that 
 makes affirmations or denials of what lies beyond 
 physical facts, — be it Atheism, or Theism, or Agnos- 
 ticism, — lies, for that very reason, outside science. 
 Philosophy alone can create and justify ideas of 
 Being, Cause, and Eelation. Mr. Darwin, when 
 he wrote his Genesis of Species, was wiser than 
 
lo P re-Organic Evolution. 
 
 some of his later followers in this respect ; and 
 any assertions he himself may have made in later 
 years, on such questions, were extra Scientiam. The 
 consistent Orf^anic Evolutionist starts with, as his 
 datum, the existence of a primordial simple form of 
 life, or with few^ such forms, without troubling himself 
 about their origin ; and he seeks to show that observed 
 facts compel the belief, or render it highly probable, 
 that all other forms that have ever existed on the 
 earth came, by a slow natural process of modification, 
 from this first form, or these first few forms, of life. 
 Cutting out, then, from the cosmic whole, this great 
 section of organic facts and existences, it may seem 
 tliat the remainder would embrace the entire known 
 phenomena of the universe, and so be properly de- 
 scribed or classified by the negative term Inorganic. 
 This inference is quite correct, provided attention be 
 strictly confined to material forms and forces ; and 
 thus we may abide by the radical distinction already 
 laid down, namely, that, on its material side, Cosmic 
 Evolution is divisible into the Organic and the In- 
 organic, of which tlie latter is the greater or the earlier 
 part. 
 
 But the qualification just indicated by the phrase, 
 " on its material side," suggests that there is another 
 
Introduction. 1 1 
 
 side, the ?io?i.-material ; and tliat in its widest extent 
 Evolution may be related to it. (3rdinarily, when 
 speaking of the universe, men are thinking only of 
 material things and their relations and changes ; and in 
 modern science this is an admissible conception. But 
 if we use words with any thoughtfulness as to their 
 real significance, we shall see that, by its etymology 
 and also in its truest sense, the term " Universe " 
 embraces all that is ; and in the experience of man- 
 kind, as well as in philosopliy, nothing so surely is as 
 consciousness ; while at the same time nothing is so 
 surely beyond the range of physical characteristics. It 
 is not possible, then, to study the universe wdthout 
 taking note of consciousness in its various forms of 
 manifestation. In fact, with respect to our knowledge 
 of things, it is by far the most conspicuous and im- 
 portant factor. No one can rise to the highest and 
 truest conceptions without a careful study of the facts 
 involved in human consciousness. The innovations of 
 our age have not enabled us to dispense with the 
 radical distinctions made by our ancestors. The dis- 
 tinction between the material and immaterial, the 
 corporeal and spiritual, the physical and metaphysical, 
 still holds good ; and is too deeply laid in the nature 
 of things, and too thoroughly wrought into the texture 
 
12 Pre-Organic Evoliction. 
 
 of all thought, ever to be set aside, or rendered un- 
 suitable, by the superficialities of Positivism. It would 
 appear, therefore, that were we to make a strictly 
 logical division of the whole subject before us, we 
 should regard the universe as consisting of two great 
 sections — tw^o sides — coexisting and in correlation — 
 namely, the Physical and the iVo^i-physical, the Un- 
 conscious and the Conscious. If, as is affirmed, the 
 Physical, under its sub - sections of Organic and 
 Inorganic, is the subject of Evolution, the inquiry 
 would naturally arise whether the i\^(9?^-physical, the 
 Conscious, is also such as that the term Evolution can 
 be applied to it ; and, if so, whether it is capable of a 
 corresponding subdivision into Mental and Moral. 
 
 As a matter of fact, the side of the universe 
 occupied by Consciousness when regarded as a set of 
 phenomena related in a definite order, is said by some 
 to be subject to the law of Evolution, and in a 
 restricted sense, at least, would be so regarded by all 
 who make a study of mental and moral phenomena. 
 Mental and moral phenomena are later, in the order 
 of time, in coming into consideration ; and it is only 
 natural, therefore, that Oriranic and Pre-oruanic Evolu- 
 tion should have hitherto secured most attention. It 
 may also be noted tliat, as mental and moral pheno- 
 
Introductio7i. 1 3 
 
 mena, in their highest development, assume a social 
 form, so Social Evolution is now regarded by Mr. 
 Spencer as the culmination of all Evolutions ; though 
 it is not to be overlooked that the social always includes 
 a large physical as well as 7io?i-physical element. 
 
 It often requires a good deal of reiteration to 
 disabuse the popular mind of ideas that ought never 
 to have been entertained ; and, therefore, leaving, as 
 above explained, the different areas of fact to which, 
 in the present state of science, the term Ev^olution is 
 applied, I may be allowed to emphasise the hope that 
 in perusing the following pages the reader will divest 
 himself, if ever he entertained the notion, of the idea 
 that Evolution and Darwinism are convertible terms. 
 It is a mere superstition to imagine that to constitute 
 a man an evolutionist he must simply be credited 
 with accepting Mr. Darwin's interpretation of the 
 facts of organic life ; and that to reject, or to hesitate 
 to accept, such interpretation is to cut off all claim to 
 be regarded as a believer in Evolution. Doubtless, as 
 I have intimated already, Mr. Darwin was an evolu- 
 tionist of the first rank, and every evolutionist is, with 
 modifications, a Darwinian ; but what I wish to em- 
 phasise is, that Evolution was a principle recognised 
 long before the time of the great naturalist : that 
 
14 Pre-07'ganic Evolution. 
 
 there is an Evolution which is not Darwinian, which 
 Darwin never touched, which neither his mental 
 culture and habits, nor his practical positive nature 
 could face; but which others, differently constituted 
 and equipped, have expounded and advocated, if not 
 with equal success, yet with no little show of learning 
 and skill. This other side of Evolution is that section 
 of the Cosmic referred to above as the Inorganic, which 
 stands first in the order of time ; and it is this and 
 this alone, in so far as it preceded the Organic, that is 
 to be the subject of exposition and discussion in these 
 pages ; and that, too, as bearing on the Biblical 
 representations of God. 
 
 The primary question involved in the consideration 
 of Inorganic Evolution relates to what took place 
 throughout tlie wide universe during the vast ages 
 that antedated the first appearance of life on the 
 earth ; what order was followed, and of w^hat pre- 
 existing conditions was that order the outcome. It 
 would be an error to set the first appearance of life 
 on the earth as the terminal point of Inorganic Evolu- 
 tion, since there are modifications and continued 
 differentiations in the combinations of the inorganic 
 elements going on concurrently with the evolution of 
 organic forms. lUit the great sweep of the evolu- 
 
Introduction. 1 5 
 
 tionary process, as well as its most astounding results, 
 pertain to that portion of the history of the material 
 universe which preceded the dawn of life, and in fact 
 prepared the conditions necessary to its existence. 
 Yet although, for the sake of clearly setting forth the 
 distinction hetween the area of the Organic and the 
 Inorganic, it is necessary to allude to life as we 
 generally understand it in this world, it must he 
 remembered that the reference to antecedent processes 
 of change is not to be understood as applying to this 
 globe alone. The question at issue is not confined to 
 the course of things through all past time on our own 
 planet. Modern inquiry and speculation seem to be 
 restrained by no limit of time or space. The " Syn- 
 thetic Philosophy " seeks the unificatiou of all know- 
 ledge ; and, in pursuit of this, sweeps over all the 
 realms of space, and endeavours to assign the law 
 that governs every change in every point of space. 
 There is a belief, the origin of which in the human 
 mind is an interesting subject of inquiry, that all 
 things visible and invisible are held in a unity in- 
 destructible ; and the search is to find out wherein that 
 unity lies. The disjointed view of the universe, which 
 had largely prevailed up to the time of Newton, began 
 to yield to a very different conception, when it was 
 
1 6 Pre-07^ganic Evohttion. 
 
 shown, by niatheniatical proofs, that the principle of 
 gravitation was operative between all bodies and sub- 
 stances wherever matter was found. And althouoh, as 
 we shall have occasion to notice, it is not possible 
 for the modern philosopher, who builds up his con- 
 clusions on data furnished by science, to pass away 
 into the most distant regions of space and there learn 
 by actual observation what takes place ; yet, holding 
 to the universal prevalence of gravity, he extends the 
 principles of Evolution, verified, as he believes, within 
 the sphere of observation, to the interactions of matter 
 and motion wherever in the wide universe matter and 
 motion exist. 
 
 2. Historical. 
 
 But although the purpose for which the following 
 pages are written is to expound and examine the 
 modern view of Pre-organic Evolution, it will serve to 
 illustrate the main principles in question, as well as 
 indicate the continuity of thought among the diffbring 
 schools, if I first of all refer to some of the cliief 
 thinkers who have laboured in this field. It will 
 suffice if we take typical views, which, though dis- 
 similar in many important particulars, will be found 
 
Introduction. 
 
 17 
 
 to embody the main idea characteristic of our more 
 recent speculations. This course is the more needful, 
 because persons unacquainted with the history of 
 philosophical speculation are prone to ascribe more 
 originality, and consequently, by a queer process of 
 reasoning, more authority, to the author of the dominant 
 theory of Evolution than is fairly due. The lack of 
 historical knowledge on the subject accounts for much 
 of the variety and dogmatism concerning the modern 
 tlieory which unfortunately prevail among those whose 
 acquaintance with it is at second or third hand. 
 
 The first name to which I would direct attention is 
 that of Diogenes of Apollonia, who, though not always 
 included by historians in the Ionic school of philo- 
 sophers, yet, on the whole, seems to me to have as 
 much affinity with that school as any other — an 
 "opinion not the less probable should the date of his 
 appearance be placed after that of Anaxagoras, who 
 was born 600 B.C. Previous to his time, the Ionic 
 thinkers had striven to find one all-pervasive some- 
 thing, a/3%?;, which, though not the cause of changes 
 and combinations, yet was in everything, and in fact 
 was that to which everything could be reduced were 
 a perfect analysis of the world possible. The concep- 
 tion of Thales that " water," by which he undoubtedly 
 
1 8 P re-Organic Evohttion. 
 
 meant the principle of humidity, was the principle of 
 all things, was too crude and ill-founded to do more 
 than stimulate further research. Anaximander took 
 a far more comprehensive view, when he sought to 
 solve the present form of the universe by referring us 
 back to an infinite matter of a most refined and inde- 
 terminate character ; and it was out of this that a 
 separation of parts arose by a process of eternal 
 motion ; and the characteristic of this separation was 
 that it assumed the form of contraries such, for 
 instance, as heat and cold. He is credited with 
 originating what is known as the philosophical 
 doctrine of the Infinite existing fer se and then j?er 
 aliud ; which, in plain speech, means that there was a 
 conceivable time when the Infinite was only as the 
 Infinite, and a time wlien the Infinite manifested itself 
 in the phenomenal finite forms which make up what 
 we see and know. It was this passage of the Infinite 
 principle into the finite forms that really constituted 
 the evolution of the universe. An idea so suggestive 
 was sure to take different shapes in the intellects of 
 men variously endowed ; and it was only natural that 
 his contemporary, Anaximenes, should modify the 
 general conception. He appears to have been a man 
 of more definite, determinate ideas, inasmuch as he 
 
Introduction. 1 9 
 
 regarded the Infinite, which lay far back as the origin 
 of all that is, as a definite form of matter, to which he 
 gave the name of " air ; " and it w^as called Infinite 
 not because of any speculative notion of Being con- 
 sidered apart from concrete matter, but because the 
 so-called " air " was infinite in quantity. But the 
 process by which the originally infinite " air " passed 
 or evolved into this and other worlds was that of rare- 
 faction and condensation — an expanding, a going off 
 and abroad, into space ; and a contracting, in fact, an 
 integration. 
 
 Thus far it was recognised that there was a unity 
 at the origin of things and in things themselves ; that 
 this unity was some etherealised matter, and that the 
 one primitive matter passed by a process of change, 
 somehow brought about, into the various forms of 
 things that make up the universe as we now see it. 
 The universe was a kind of living, moving matter, 
 evolving from the more simple to the more complex. 
 Hence its philosophical description as Hylozoism. 
 Now, Diogenes seized these conceptions and sought to 
 supplement them by another, which others later on in 
 time have not failed to make use of. The preceding 
 thinkers had simply regarded unity in all things, and 
 variety as coming out of the unity by a slow process 
 
20 Pre- Organic Evolution. 
 
 of chancre.^ Diogenes inserted into their views the 
 important idea of First Cause of change. He regarded 
 the complex totality of the universe as being the gradual 
 outcome of a more primitive and simple condition, but 
 this totality was the S6'//-changing mode of the original 
 principle — probably " air." There was in the primordial 
 " air " an active eternal force, by the self-action of 
 which the one original principle of things, in due 
 course, comes out into the varieties which now con- 
 stitute the material universe. There is a modern 
 opinion held by a certain school of speculators that 
 the original form of all things consisted of what is 
 termed Mind-Stoff, i.e. matter impregnated, as it were, 
 with intelligence. This may serve to illustrate the 
 meaning of Diogenes when, referring to the First Cause 
 of the self-evolution of the primordial material, he 
 speaks of the original " air " as an organising intelligence, 
 that is, it is not dead matter or mere blind force. Only 
 thus could he account for the existence of knowledge 
 in men, as one of the effects of the outworking of the 
 original material. The process of change is thus 
 accounted for, as well as the fact of change, on a 
 
 ^ This representation of Diogenes is drawn from Zeller, who (quotes 
 freely from Simplicius in reference to all the main points here 
 noted. He also appeals to the fragments collected by Schleiermacher. 
 
Introduction, 2 i 
 
 rational principle. The rarefaction and condensation 
 — or as we should now put it, the dissipation and 
 integration — are the signs of intelligence, not as a 
 superior principle separate from the stuff of the 
 universe, but as essential to its being. 
 
 Passing on to Anaxagoras, we come to a distinct 
 advance on these views, though it is not certain 
 whether he or Diogenes took precedence in the pro- 
 mulgation of their respective doctrines. As, also, his 
 views are certainly more thoroughly worked out than 
 those of Empedocles, who was born seven years later, it 
 is probable that they were put into form a few years 
 later than were those of his younger contemporary, 
 who held to the eternal coexistence of four co-ordinate 
 elements, fire, air, earth, and water, and the action on 
 these elements, in their chaotic state, of two antagonistic 
 forces, figuratively termed Love and Hate, (f)L\ia kcil 
 v€LKO(i, by which action all things evolved into their 
 present form. Anaxagoras got rid of the one a/3%^ 
 of the Ionics and the four elements of Empedocles 
 by assuming, as the base of his system, the eternal 
 existence of an infinite mass of diffused elementary 
 substances, which, prior to the formation of the world, 
 were commingled and devoid of all order. If we may 
 take the words of Simplicius as authoritative, it would 
 
2 2 P7'e-07'ganic Evohition. 
 
 appear that the mass was not only infinite, but 
 that the elementary substances were infinitely small. 
 Aristotle ^ seems to agree with this later representa- 
 tion. The process by which the present system of 
 things was formed out of these infinitesimal chaotic 
 substances was by the coming together of the sub- 
 stances that were of the same kind ; and the cause 
 which set the process in motion, and effected the end 
 in view, was none other than Mind, vov^. Nor does 
 Anaxagoras rest with this important introduction of 
 an intelligent First Cause, which is not part of the 
 original matter of the universe, as in the case of 
 DioGjenes ; but he states that the first result of the 
 action of Mind on the chaotic infinite mass of 
 infinitesimals was the gathering together of the 
 homogeneous substances which constitute the four 
 contraries, fire, air, water, and earth. The rest of the 
 process of cliange consisted in the action on these four 
 contraries of the same Mind, issuing in the combina- 
 tions which make up the variety we are familiar with. 
 The main idea of this system is, then, that of an 
 intelligent Power bringing order out of confusion, 
 definiteness out of indefiniteness — in short, evolving 
 the cosmos out of chaos. 
 
 ^ Metaiihysics, i. 3. 
 
In troduction. 2 3 
 
 The order of philosophic thought is not always in 
 the ascendiosj line. It is rather often to be indicated 
 by the pendulum. It would be unnecessary for our 
 purpose, therefore, to refer to Heraclitus, were it not 
 that his views are typical of the school that deny all 
 Eeality, and, like Hume, represent all as consisting in 
 a perpetual flux. Eejecting the high transcendental 
 doctrine of Being as taught by the best of the Eleatic 
 school, he conceived the universe as the progressive 
 evolution of a semi-material substance, Fire. The 
 being of things lay in their phenomenal appearance. 
 The history of the universe was simply a successive 
 series of passages from non-h^mg to Being, and vim 
 versa ; which, translated into our modern conceptions, 
 would be, the successive emergence of phenomenal 
 forms from no underlying permanent basis whatever, 
 and the passing away of those forms into nonentity. 
 Evolution without adequate cause, and dissolution 
 without adequate cause, was the law of things, so far 
 as the term law can be used of a system which, like 
 that of Hume, really knows no permanence except 
 the permanence of an incessant flux. 
 
 A very different view of things is presented in the 
 system of Pythagoras. I am aware that but very 
 few fragments of his system of thought are to be 
 
24 Pre- Organic Evolution, 
 
 found in the more reliable Greek authorities, and that 
 much that was taught in his name by his successors 
 was, if not alien to his own views, at least quite 
 supplementary. Also, it may appear, at first sight, 
 that one can scarcely refer to him as the teacher 
 of anything deserving to be classed among ancient 
 theories of Inorganic Evolution ; seeing that his reputa- 
 tion rests, on the one hand, upon the establishment of 
 a semi-religious brotherhood distinguished for temper- 
 ance, love of knowledge and charity, and, on the other 
 hand, a mystical theory of Number as constituting the 
 essence of all things. But I think it will appear, 
 on a closer examination of his doctrine concerning 
 Number, that he did entertain views as to the origin 
 and constitution of the universe that, in some very 
 important particulars, were an anticipation of those 
 propounded by modern Evolutionists. I will not 
 tarry to think out the question of his being a pure 
 Idealist, — for which, no doubt, much might be said, — 
 since any one familiar with the thought and language 
 of Idealism knows that the same forms of speech 
 serve, in the main, for both Idealist and Realist. His 
 opinions, therefore, may be referred to, irrespective of his 
 place in the philosophy of Mind. The real question is. 
 What did he mean by his dictum that Number is the 
 
Introduction. 2 5 
 
 essence, ap'^r], of all things, and what bearing has this 
 on the question of Evolution ? The statement itself 
 to some may seem utterly mystical, and has too often 
 been dismissed with a smile at the dreaminess of its 
 author. Did he mean by it that Number is a q;uasi- 
 substance, a 07ie thing, an ultra intangible substratum, 
 which, by conjunction with its like in various pro- 
 portions, acquires for itself the sensible forms on which 
 we gaze, and that the universe came to its present 
 state by reason of the process of combination ? Had 
 he a vision of the latest conjecture of analytic chemical 
 science, namely, that there is some one ultimate — be 
 it hydrogen or nameless — out of which, by different 
 mathematical arrangements, the entire universe of 
 material forms has been built up, and that, being at 
 a loss for any more suggestive designation, he called 
 it Number ? Or did he mean by it, as Michelet 
 suggests,^ a quasi - spiritual something, — '*' il n'a qu' 
 line materialite abstraite. Avec le nombre com- 
 mence un principe id^al, qui n'a pu encore s'elever a 
 la spiritualite absolue," — a something akin to the 
 " ideas " of Plato, and that, like Plato's archetypes, 
 entered into all that is, and which was, therefore, the 
 
 ^ Examen Critique de L'Ouvrage d'Aristote, intituU Mitajphysie^ 
 p. 124. 
 
26 Pre-Oi^ganic Evolution. 
 
 principle of all things, since witiiout it phenomenal 
 forms could not be ? In this case, Evolution would 
 be the name for the process by which sensible forms 
 gradually come into existence. Or, once more, did 
 he mean that the particular nature of everything 
 depended on a certain proportion between the colloca- 
 tion of the units which are its material substance, and 
 that, as Xumber is the essence of proportion, so 
 Number is the principle of all things ? ^ Much may 
 be said in favour of this view, though the radical 
 tendency of Pythagorean thought seems to me to 
 reach back to the things that are collocated. 
 
 I am disposed to think that the solution is to be 
 found in another direction. It should be considered 
 that Pythagoras was perfectly familiar with the 
 current philosophies of his age, which sought after 
 unity ; and endeavoured to show that things that now 
 appear in definite combination were but the outcome 
 of some one or more primordial eternal substance or 
 principle. They aimed at an analysis of the complex 
 into its original principle or ultimate, whichever term 
 best suits their special theory ; and, by synthesis of 
 the original diffused principle or ultimate, they sought 
 to build up the universe. The idealistic tendencies of 
 
 ^ Tilt Wi>ie Men of Greece, by Professor Blackie. 
 
hitroduction, 2 7 
 
 such a mind as his would naturally cause him to 
 recoil from the crude conceptions of " water," " air," 
 and " fire " as the original ap')(av of all things. It is 
 also well known that he was, for his age, a dis- 
 tinguished mathematician ; for Proclus, the commen- 
 tator on Euclid, says of Pythagoras that he first 
 propounded and solved the theorem that the internal 
 angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, 
 as also the familiar forty-seventh Proposition of the 
 First Book of Euclid. Although all his life he was 
 surrounded by what are called solids, superficies, and 
 lines, he knew, as a mathematician, that among them 
 he could never find the perfect solid, superficies, or 
 line. That may be said of every mathematician. 
 But in his case we have especially to associate with 
 it the fact, that he was a philosopher also; and not 
 only a philosopher in a general way, but one intent on 
 finding out the very essence of all things. Naturally 
 he would look for the essence of things along the lines 
 of his favourite study. He would remember that 
 though the visible superficies and line were not 
 realities but only approximations to reality, he could 
 nevertheless reduce them to points which, though con- 
 crete and theoretically divisible, were the final units into 
 which all solids, superficies, and lines, in fact, the whole 
 
28 Pre- Organic Evolution. 
 
 <b 
 
 material universe, could be resolved. Thus getting at 
 the concrete unit as the base of all concrete things, it 
 would only be a stroke of combined mathematical and 
 metaphysical genius to pass from the concrete point to 
 the invisible mathematical point, as being really the 
 ultimate which lies at the base of concrete points, and, 
 therefore, of all things. He does not appear to have 
 troubled himself with accounting for the passage from 
 the ideal point to the concrete ; and no wonder, since 
 this is virtually the mysterious unsolved problem of 
 all ages — the getting of the visible out of the invisible, 
 the material out of the immaterial, the finite out of 
 the infinite, the relative out of the absolute. 
 
 The invisible metaphysical unit being thus the 
 apXV> the original of all things, there is a singular 
 significance in calling Number the essence of all 
 things ; for Number is the mind's affirmation of indi- 
 viduality, and, strictly speaking, only the unit one is 
 Number — all else is combination of it. But whether 
 we assume this to be the true interpretation of the 
 Pythagorean theory, or whether we take two of the 
 other interpretations just given, we have, in either 
 case, a clue to the view entertained by Pythagoras as 
 to the building up of the cosmos. It is quite true 
 that, as Aristotle objected, among other reasons, to 
 
Introduction, 29 
 
 Plato's doctrine of Ideas, that he did not sufficiently 
 recognise a causal element, so it may be said that 
 Pythagoras deos not throw any light on the cause of 
 the cosmos being built up of Number. Our ignorance 
 is due probably to the circumstance that he did not 
 commit his teaching to writing. He was, however, a 
 devout worshipper of God, and no doubt held God to 
 be the Supreme Power by which the essence Number 
 entered into all things. Supplying thus the causal 
 element from his known belief in a Supreme Being, 
 we see that, expressed in modern phrase, his system 
 really was the evolution of the visible cosmos, by 
 some process not indicated, from an original condition 
 of things in which all that could be said to exist 
 was a universe of ultimate units having no combina- 
 tion one with the other. By some unnamed process 
 Number became numbers, the invisible visible, the 
 simple complex, but all in harmonious proportions. 
 
 Passing on to another typical school of the pre- 
 Socratic Greeks, we may notice the solution given 
 of the origin and course of things by the Atom- 
 ists, as represented by Leucippus and Democritus, 
 elaborated long afterwards in the philosophical poem 
 of Lucretius. We have seen how, following Thales, 
 the Ionics postulated one vup^i], as entering into all 
 
30 Pre- Organic Evolution. 
 
 things, so that the complex world was to be explained 
 by interpenetration everywhere of one definite material 
 principle. Enlarging this conception, Empedocles 
 affirmed the existence of four co-ordinate elements 
 possessed of definite quality, and the present order 
 of things is but the result of the varied interaction 
 and combination of these. Anaxagoras, besides recog- 
 nising an intelligent cause as the source of change and 
 the fashioner of the eternal discrete materials, assumed 
 the existence of an infinite number of substances 
 differing in this essential quality. Thus, in each of 
 these, quality in the ultimate particles out of which 
 the universe, as it now is, was elaborated, was the 
 point held in common. It is just here that Demo- 
 critus makes his first departure from the orthodox 
 doctrine. He refers the beginning of things to the 
 existence of an infinite mass of atoms, indivisible, and, 
 apart from size and weight, which he does not consider 
 to be qualities, possessed of no qualiti/. Moreover, 
 differing from Anaxagoras, he ascribes the motion of 
 the atoms which brings about the interactions and 
 consequent combinations entirely to Necessity, avayKrj, 
 by which he seems to mean an eternal, unaccountable, 
 blind, inevitably acting mechanical force. Motion 
 being thus secured, changes are somehow produced in 
 
Introduction. 
 
 31 
 
 the relation of the primordial atoms so as to issue in 
 the production of what we term qualities of bodies, 
 and of the peculiar co-ordinations and complexities 
 which constitute the cosmos. Of course, such a result 
 could only be attained by assuming also the eternal 
 existence of a vacuum ; for otherwise the movement of 
 atoms would be impossible, — all would be a ple^ucm. 
 It was only natural that inquiry should arise as to 
 how differences in the direction of the movement of 
 the original atoms arose, if the only cause of motion 
 was a blind necessity, and if, by hypothesis, there 
 were no differentiations before the evolving process 
 began. Lucretius seems to have seen the bearing of 
 this. He says : — 
 
 " Whereas mere void on th' other hand has means of hindering 
 No how, in no direction, and at no time, any thing ; 
 Nay, as its very nature prompts, persists in giving way. 
 Wherefore all things in motion set, howe'er in weight they may 
 Differ, at equal speed must through the restful emptiness 
 Be carried, so that heavier things are always powerless 
 On lighter from above to smite, and get by blows alone 
 ]\Iovements of varied kinds through which all Nature's word is 
 done." 
 
 He then goes on to ascribe the origin of the first 
 variation to a " need be " — 
 
 '•' Therefore 'tis need that bodies swerve, 1 say repeatedly, 
 A little, just the least wee bit, lest we should seem to be 
 
32 Pre-Organic Evolution. 
 
 Champions of slanting motion, which reality denies. 
 
 For this in evidence we see set forth before our eyes, 
 
 That of itself no sort of weight can e'er obliquely go, 
 
 When falling headlong from above : this any man might know. 
 
 But who can know that in the whole of Matter's realm so wide, 
 
 From its straight path no thing can swerve a little bit aside ? " ^ 
 
 This Lucretian supplement to the dogmatic positions 
 of the Greek originators of the Atomist, or Alaterial- 
 istic school, completes the conditions supposed to be 
 necessary to an evolution, by a very slow process of 
 change in the mutual relation of primordial atoms, of 
 the beauties and harmonies of the universe. The 
 succession of modifications which arose from this 
 action of Necessity, consequent on the accidental first 
 deviation of the motion of an atom, or a few atoms, 
 from the right line, is elaborately worked out by 
 Lucretius in the poem just quoted. 
 
 It is unnecessary to adduce further instances of 
 Greek speculation on the evolution of the universe 
 from a primordial simple condition of matter. The 
 account given by Plato in the Tima^us is too figura- 
 tive and fanciful to take a place among systems 
 that have exercised a determinate influence on the 
 development of the scientific and philosophical idea 
 
 ^ The Schrnio of Epicurus, a rendering of Lucretius' De Rerum 
 NaturCi, by T. C. Baring, M.A., M.P., j). QQ. 
 
Introduction, 33 
 
 of Evolution. The decadence of the true philo- 
 sophical spirit during the golden age of Latin 
 literature is one of the most noteworthy facts pre- 
 sented to the eye of the historian. Eome produced 
 no man to occupy the place filled by Aristotle and 
 Plato in Greece. The Neo - Platonism of the 
 Alexandrian school contributed no new and im- 
 portant element to the world's thought. Even 
 theologians may do far better by going back to 
 Plato himself than by seeking a Gnosis among 
 fanciful metaphysical quibblers. 
 
 Passing over the Dark Ages and the Eenaissance, 
 neither of which rendered any contribution to the 
 solution of the question that had been so freely 
 discussed in pre-Socratic times, we meet next with 
 Leibnitz (1646-1716) as a labourer in this field. 
 It is true, Leibnitz does not unfold in detail any 
 mechanical or other process by which the inorganic 
 order has arrived at the position in which we find it ; 
 and his two works bearing on the subject, La Monad- 
 ologie and Frincipes de la Nature et de la Grace, 
 have more the character of an exposition of the con- 
 stituents that enter into the nature of things than of 
 any process by which these constituents pass, from a 
 state of separate existence, into definite combinations. 
 
34 Pre- Organic Evolution. 
 
 Nevertheless, it is questionable whether any one has 
 more distinctly laid down the basis and the principles 
 on which Evolution proceeds ; and in reference to 
 organisms, if I may, for a moment, go beyond the 
 inorganic, he has explicitly anticipated the views of 
 Lamarck and Darwin, at least as to the main con- 
 ception of Organic Evolution. In his Monadologic, he 
 teaches that all things are composed of Monads, i.e. 
 imits, the essence of which lies in activity ; that 
 these Monads differ in the degree of their perceptive 
 activity, and that the lowest grade consists of those 
 which are found in combinations which we call 
 inorganic, and in which the perceptive activity is 
 almost at zero ; and that the entire universe is what 
 it now is because the original Monads have become 
 segregated and variously combined. Thus, though 
 he abstains from any detailed account of the process 
 and the stages by which things came to be as we 
 now find them, he distinctly teaches that they have 
 evolved from a primordial set of Monads once dis- 
 crete and uncompounded. No one has ever insisted 
 more clearly than he on the doctrine of Continuity. 
 He maintained that Power can neither be increased 
 nor diminished. There is exactly the same amount 
 of force now as at the beginning. In sections 67-70 
 
Introduction, 3 5 
 
 of the Monadologie he forecasts the theory of systems 
 of cells gradually huilding up the living body ; and 
 he elsewhere says : " And such in my opinion is the 
 force of the law of Continuity that not only should 
 I not be astonished to learn of the discovery of 
 animate beings which, in many of their properties, 
 e.g. those of nutrition and propagation, might pass for 
 vegetables just as well as for animals, but I am even 
 convinced that there must be such, and that natural 
 history will, at some future day, point them out 
 to us." 
 
 The position of Leibnitz, therefore, may be ex- 
 pressed thus : At the origin of things the only forms 
 of existence were units, endowed with activity as 
 their essence ; that activity, though one in kind, was 
 varied in degree, and, in every case, was cliaracterised 
 by perception,^ incipient or more developed. In pro- 
 cess of time, by means not explained, the discrete 
 units formed combinations, the lower kind with the 
 lower and the more animated with the more animated, 
 thus reminding us of the homogeneous segregations 
 of Anaxagoras. Each compound thus formed w^as 
 
 ^Although Leibnitz uses the word " perception," his meaning in 
 the case of the inferior Monads would perhaps be better expressed by 
 " sensibility." 
 
,6 Pre-Oreanic Evolution. 
 
 <b 
 
 dominated by a more active Monad which became the 
 soul or principle of unity in the particular systems so 
 formed.^ And thus by degrees the whole present 
 order was built up. Nature is an intricate compound 
 brought about by the action of ultimates, each of 
 which is a real existence ; and but for the asserted 
 reality and activity might be identified with the 
 Pythagorean unit said by that school to be the essence 
 of all tilings. 
 
 It was, however, reserved to Kant and Laplace to 
 revive ancient speculations in such a form as to bring 
 the exact observations and calculations of modern 
 science to bear on the elaboration of a more coherent 
 view of the evolution of all things from a primordial 
 condition of matter. In his General History of 
 Nature and Theory of the Heavens, Kant sought to 
 show that the planetary system arose from a nebulous 
 condition of matter, by the combined action of gravita- 
 tion and centrifugal motion. And stretching his 
 thoughts beyond the planetary to the sidereal systems, 
 he conjectured, or rather reasoned by analogy, that 
 what was scientifically provable of the one must be 
 true also of the other — thus regarding the entire 
 heavens, with all their splendour and vastness, as the 
 
 ^ La Monadolo(jie, see. 70. Paris edition, 1842. 
 
Introduction. 2)1 
 
 result of the evolution of the original diffused matter 
 according to rigid mechanical laws. In popular 
 literature Laplace is credited with being the author of 
 what is known as the Nebular Hypothesis. It may 
 be true that his opinions became more widely known, 
 by reason of the French language and literature, in 
 days gone by, being more in use among us than the 
 German ; and he certainly gave more mathematical 
 precision to the speculation. But Kant was its real 
 author, and, moreover, Kant took within his survey 
 the entire stellar systems as well as the planetary 
 system, whereas Laplace confined his hypothesis to the 
 latter. The pith of the hypothesis lies in this, that 
 originally the matter now forming the planetary 
 system was uniformly diffused through space. In 
 process of time, by some means, this attenuated mass 
 became separated into large nebulous spheres which 
 began to rotate, possibly because of differences in their 
 densities and irregularities in their forms. By losing 
 their heat, those thus separated bodies began to con- 
 tract, — a change in their condition which accelerated 
 their rotation. The increased velocity of rotation 
 brought about a corresponding increase in the centri- 
 fugal force in the parts nearest to what we now call 
 the equator. Such a tendency to bulge, as it were, at 
 
38 Pre-Organic Evolution. 
 
 the central line, had two effects— it tended to flatten 
 the parts at the poles and also to cast off rings of 
 matter, which either formed permanent rings around 
 the planet, or broke up and formed one or more 
 smaller spheres which continued to revolve round the 
 sun in conjunction with the larger bodies from whence 
 they came. The mass of nebulous matter, which was 
 not so broken up into planets and smaller spheres, 
 became condensed and formed the sun. 
 
 In the light, then, of the history of ancient cosmo- 
 gonies and of the more modern attempts to show the 
 connection of the universe as it now is with a prim- 
 ordial condition of matter, and to indicate the natural 
 process by which the original simplicity gave place to 
 complexity and ordered arrangement of parts, we may 
 now revert to a consideration of Inorganic Evolution 
 as it is expounded by living authorities. 
 
 But in closing this chapter I cannot do better than 
 quote the words of the Astronomer Eoyal of Ireland, 
 Sir E. S. Ball, LL.I)., in illustration of what may be 
 said from an astronomical point of view concerning the 
 !N'ebular Hypothesis, and as thus throwing some light 
 on the problem before us. 
 
 " Such is, in fact, the doctrine of the origin of our 
 system which has been advanced in that celebrated 
 
Introduction. 39 
 
 speculation known as the nebular theory. Nor can 
 it be ever more than a speculation ; it cannot be 
 established by observation, nor can it be proved by 
 calculation. It is merely a conjecture, more or less 
 plausible, but perhaps in some degree necessarily true, 
 if our present laws of heat, as we understand them, 
 admit of the extreme application here required, and 
 if also the present order of things has reigned 
 for sutficient time without the intervention of any 
 influence at present unknown to us. This nebular 
 theory is not confined to the history of our sun. 
 Precisely similar reasoning may be extended to the 
 individual planets ; the further we look back, the 
 hotter and the hotter does the whole system become. 
 It has been thought that if we could look far enough 
 back, we should see tlie earth too hot for life ; back 
 further still, we should find the earth and all the 
 planets red - hot ; and back further still, to an 
 exceedingly remote epoch, when the planets would be 
 heated just as much as our sun is now. In a still 
 earlier stage the whole solar system is thought to have 
 been one vast mass of glowing gas, from which the 
 present forms of the sun, with the planets and their 
 satellites, have been gradually evolved. We cannot 
 be sure that the course of events has been what is 
 
40 Pre- Organic Evolution. 
 
 here indicated, but there are very sufficient grounds 
 for thinking that this doctrine substantially represents 
 what has actually occurred. 
 
 " Many of the features in the solar system harmonise 
 with the supposition that the origin of the system has 
 been that suggested by the nebular theory. We have 
 already had occasion in an earlier chapter to allude to 
 the fact that all the planets perform their revolutions 
 around the sun in the same direction. It is also to 
 be observed that the rotation of the planets on their 
 axes, as well as the movements of the satellites around 
 their primaries, all follow the same law, with one 
 slight exception in the case of the Uranian system. 
 A coincidence so remarkable naturally suggests the 
 necessity of some physical explanation. Such an 
 explanation is offered by the nebular theory. Suppose 
 that countless ages ago a mighty nebula was slowly 
 rotating and slowly contracting. In the process of 
 contraction, portions of the condensed matter of the 
 nebula would be left behind. These portions would 
 still revolve around the central mass, and each portion 
 would rotate on its axis in the same direction. As 
 the process of contraction proceeded, it would follow 
 from dynamical principles that the velocity of rotation 
 would increase ; and thus at length these portions 
 
Introduction. 4 1 
 
 would consolidate into planets, while the central mass 
 would gradually contract to form the sun. By a 
 similar process on a smaller scale the systems of 
 satellites were evolved from the contracting primary. 
 These satellites would also revolve in the same 
 direction, and thus the characteristic features of the 
 solar system could be accounted for. 
 
 " The nebular origin ^ of the solar system receives 
 considerable countenance from tlie study of the sid- 
 ereal heavens." — The Story of the Heavens, pp. 506, 507. 
 
 1 The difficulties of the hypothesis are well discussed in Stallo's 
 Concepts of Modern Phydcs, pp. 280-293. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 EXPOSITIOX. 
 
 A S I have already indicated, Evolution strictly 
 relates to, and is expressive of, a process, and 
 a process alone. As such, it is a brief form for setting 
 forth the result of observation of fact. One condition 
 of things has come out of a prior condition by natural 
 law. This holds good whether w^e speak of Organic or 
 Inorganic Evolution. I have pointed out how Mr. 
 Darwin in his original treatment of Organic Evolution 
 confined himself exclusively to an observation of facts 
 and their co-ordination, and thus was quite wdthin 
 the proper sphere of science, — not committed to any 
 opinion or judgment concerning either metaphysical or 
 theological questions. But in respect to Inorganic 
 Evolution, as it is handled by modern writers, this 
 purely scientific treatment of facts is departed from, 
 and the sense of the term Evolution is practically 
 enlarged to embrace also considerations touching on 
 the most profound subjects in philosophy and theology. 
 It is true, Anaxagoras, in postulating Mind as the oper- 
 
Exposition. 43 
 
 ating Cause in the rear of the changes which built up 
 the universe oat of the infinite cloud of infinitesimal 
 substances, passed, beyond the question of physical fact 
 and process, to the domain of transcendental philosophy; 
 but he did not regard vov^ as being of such a nature 
 as that it must necessarily and eternally express itself 
 in a material series of phenomena, as though it were 
 a mere Force which must so express itself On the 
 other hand, our modern exponents of Inorganic Evolu- 
 tion regard the question of Origin as inseparable, in 
 the sense just indicated, from that of process. The 
 nature of the process is explicable only by constant 
 reference to the peculiarity of the Origin as Inscrutable 
 Power or lieality, often called Force ; and vice versa, the 
 inexplicability of the Origin is sought to be made out 
 by constant reference to its having nothing in common 
 with the phenomenal process, and especially to our- 
 selves its highest product. And this representation of 
 two distinct questions is covered by the one term 
 Evolution,^ which properly applies only to one of 
 them. The reason for this procedure is perhaps to be 
 found in the circumstance that it is not possible, as in 
 the case of Organic Evolution, to obtain by observation 
 all the facts requisite to a judgment ; so that recourse 
 
 ^ I.e. Evolution is here considered philosophically, not scieutilieally. 
 
44 Pre- Organic Evolution. 
 
 must be had to philosophical principles which extend 
 in their range beyond what is positively known, and 
 also involve the question of what that is which is at 
 work in the process, and which lies at the base of it. 
 Be the reason what it may, the fact is clear that, in 
 their treatment of Inorganic Evolution, our modern 
 philosophers do much more than trace a supposed pro- 
 cess ; they discuss elaborately what that is which logi- 
 cally, and, as perhaps some would say, chronologically,^ 
 precedes all Evolution, and, in so doing, raise the most 
 momentous question of all, namely, whether there be 
 anything beyond the phenomena we see ; and, if so, 
 whether that mysterious Something be God or not. 
 
 The questions, then, involved are — first, that of 
 process, and second, that of origin; in other words, 
 hov) came the inorganic universe to be what it is ? and 
 why and whence came it to be what it is ? The first 
 question is one on which differences of judgment may 
 not be very great or of supreme importance ; the 
 answers given to the second question really give us 
 the root distinction between the different schools of 
 Evolutionists. It may seem strange, but I think it 
 will soon appear to be true, that one school, that 
 
 ■ I.e. has an eternal existence, as distingnislieil from the phenomena 
 Avhich are temporal. 
 
Exposition. 45 
 
 represented by such names as Biichner, Hiickel, Vogt, 
 and the advocates of Materialism in general, really, 
 while using language which seems to say otherwise, 
 excludes origin, both as a matter of reality and of 
 logic. Those who assume, as a fundamental position, 
 the existence of an eternal series of phenomena, deny- 
 ing the existence of any noumenal lieality which is not 
 material, and not in an}^ true sense Cause, talk nonsense 
 when they speak of Origin of the evolutionary process. 
 In their case all the changes that have ever occurred in 
 the evolutionary process by which, out of a primordial 
 mass of diffused ultimates, things have become as we 
 know them, are to be ascribed simply to the eternal 
 interaction of bare phenomenal matter under the influ- 
 ence of bare phenomenal force. It were well if such 
 speculators could revise the language employed ; since, 
 from their point of view, the very word phenomena, 
 being strictly correlative to a noumenal lieality which 
 is not material, which is not force in successive action, 
 has no sense in it. It also should be most decidedly 
 settled whether the so-called material phenomenon is 
 only another name for the phenomenal force acting in 
 points, or is a distinct phenomenon. It is usual to 
 refer to the force as being something different ; and 
 although no specific rpiality is affirmed of it, yet its 
 
46 Pre 'Organic Evolution. 
 
 action is so represented that, if it is to be conceived 
 as more than an abstraction, it must be regarded as 
 mechanical — as that which produces primordially the 
 impact of atom on atom in space. Here and there we 
 find the term " mechanical " objected to as inappro- 
 priate ; but Hackel, who figures prominently as a leader 
 in this school, freely so represents it/ and even selects 
 the term and its equivalent " monism " as a protest 
 against what he is pleased to call " dualism." Occa- 
 sionally, and with a view to account for what must 
 always puzzle Materialists, namely, variety in the 
 motion of matter, there is, after the teaching of 
 Lucretius, an implication of a fortuitous element — 
 
 "Just the least wee bit, lest we should seem to be 
 Champions of slanting motion." 
 
 Yet, on the whole, " Necessity " — eternal mechanical 
 Necessity — more nearly indicates the general concep- 
 tion, so far at least as, in such a system, there can be 
 any mental reference to real Cause. 
 
 I am not aware that any of the modern advocates 
 of pure Materialism or Monism ^ have striven to show, 
 
 1 Hifitory of Creation, i. 35, 70, 74 ; ii. 361. 
 
 ^ Haekel's objection to the word Materialism as applied to his 
 view {Hist. Creation, i. 35) is only formal. All that he allows to 
 exist is the "mechanical" action of atoms. This is his "Scientific 
 Materialism" as distinguished from "Moral Materialism," cf. p. 37. 
 
Exposition. 47 
 
 by any elaborate reasoning, the actual or probable 
 process by which the eternal atoms come from the 
 hypothetical state of diffusion into the present ordered 
 arrangements of the inorganic world. As a rule, they 
 avail themselves of the Nebular Hypothesis, and in a 
 rough way sketch the passage from a nebulous condition 
 to the formation of distinct worlds and tlieir contents. 
 Given, then, eternal ultimates of matter and coexisting 
 eternal mechanical force as the primal minimum of 
 existence, — though in what relation eternally existing 
 is not clear, and, somehow, not explained, — there 
 successively arose, in the course of nameless ages, the 
 definite permanent combinations believed to constitute 
 the existing elements known to science, together with 
 all affinities and repulsions, all molecular combinations, 
 all the attractions and condensations of diffuse sub- 
 stances into the stellar and solar systems ; and 
 further, — breaking down all distinction between the 
 inorganic and organic, — all life, all thought, in fact, 
 our very selves — conscience, intellect, moral sym- 
 pathies, and our literary and artistic products. The 
 whole process from first to last is Evolution. 
 
 The other modern school is that which has Mr. 
 Spencer for its chief expounder and advocate. It 
 differs from the school just referred to in reference to 
 
48 P re-Organic Evolution. 
 
 the question of Origin of all phenomena, as also in the 
 view taken of the relation of the phenomena of con- 
 sciousness to the physical order. Moreover, it seeks 
 to work out more in detail, and along lines sup- 
 posed to be indicated by philosophical principles and 
 scientific observations, the actual process by which the 
 primordial diffusion of matter passed into the present 
 form of the universe. It repudiates, with strength of 
 language leaving nothing to be desired, the conception 
 of an eternal series of mere phenomenal changes con- 
 stituting all that is. To it the bare phenomenalism of 
 Positivism is utterly abhorrent. Though it is no part 
 of Mr. Spencer's purpose to enter into a direct contro- 
 versy with philosophical Nihilism, he must be regarded 
 as one of the most formidable opponents of that dreary 
 superficial system. Few men have more persistently 
 afifirmed the existence of the Ileal as well as the 
 apparent, or more cogently set forth the connection 
 between phenomena and something which lies as the 
 base of all. Eeal Cause, not Cause as an abstraction, or 
 as a Kantian " form," or as bare antecedence and con- 
 sequence according to Hume, is, according to Mr. 
 Spencer, a root conception of the human intellect. 
 Hence it is laid down as a primary datum of con- 
 sciousness, as the very foundation of all sound think- 
 
Exposition. 49 
 
 iiig, and consequently as an essential condition to the 
 construction of any enduring system of philosophy, 
 that there exists One Eternal Reality, Cause, or Power, 
 beneath, and beyond, and in, all those phenomenal 
 forms of existence which are the objects of our 
 ordinary knowledge, whether they be mental or 
 material. What we, in ordinary language, call Matter, 
 Motion, and Force in the sensible forms of mechanical 
 pressure or chemical action, are to be interpreted 
 simply and solely as the manifestations — the outward 
 phenomenal expressions — of the One mysterious 
 Reality,^ i.e. Real Cause. To the same source are to be 
 ascribed all the modifications and interactions of 
 matter, motion, and mechanical and chemical force in 
 every place and throughout all time. Nor is this 
 relation between the Eternal Reality and phenomena 
 confined to the material world : the fleeting states 
 composing the human mind, together with the laws 
 which regulate the succession and association of ideas, 
 have, as their noumenal origin, the self-same Reality. 
 All these phenomena, as manifestations constituting 
 the material and mental worlds, are transitory : their 
 original noumenal Cause is permanent : they come into 
 being, It always is : they are in orderly succession, 
 
 ^ Principleis of Biology, i. pp. 490, 491. Cf. First Principles, p. 225. 
 
 D 
 
50 P re-Organic Evolution, 
 
 that ordered succession is the phenomenal outward 
 expression of a deeper order in the One Eeality : they 
 are the proper objects of knowledge — the objects 
 which, when placed in their due relation one to the 
 other, make up the sum of the physical and mental 
 sciences, — It is beyond our knowledge, the Unknowable, 
 except, of course, in the sense of being known to exist 
 and to stand in the relation to all things as Cause 
 to effects. The enormous difference between such a 
 view and that of blauk materialistic phenomenalism is 
 apparent ; and it becomes the more so when we further 
 note its representation of the relation of consciousness 
 to molecular motion, on the one side, and its relation 
 to the One Eeality, on the other. Instead of con- 
 sciousness being the sole direct outcome of the 
 phenomena of force in form of molecular motion in the 
 brain, — a continuation, in fact, without a break or 
 collateral agency, of bare physical phenomena, — it is 
 regarded as a direct manifestation of the One Eeality, 
 radically distinguished as phenomenon from all else in 
 the world, although appearing in such orderly cor- 
 relation with molecular changes in the matter of the 
 brain as to exhibit a stable concomitance. Indeed, the 
 Mental and the Material are but two different aspects 
 or manifestations of the Same Eternal Eeality expressed 
 
Exposition, 5 1 
 
 in Time. Evolution, in its strict sense, is the name for 
 the process by which these manifestations appear ; in 
 other words, the name for the order of the manifestations 
 of tlie One Eternal Eeality which is the truest Being. 
 
 It is very likely that readers for the first time 
 of the chapter (viii.) on the Transformation and 
 Equivalence of Forces in the First Principles, may 
 conclude that the representation there given of the 
 relation between molecular motion and the generation 
 of consciousness more nearly accords with the Materi- 
 alistic view than that I have just set forth. I well 
 remember how I was impressed with that when, many 
 years ago, I first began to study the Spencerian 
 system. But further research into both the First 
 Princip)lcs and the Principles of Psychology will, I 
 believe, lead to the conviction that the chapter 
 referred to does not do justice to Mr, Spencer's real 
 position on the subject. It seems to me that he would 
 be rendering service to philosophy, and doing justice 
 to his own views, were he to recast the First Prin- 
 ciples in the light of more recent research. No one 
 should foi'm a judgment upon his relation to Material- 
 ism without studying the last section of the First Prin- 
 ciples in connection with his Psyclwlogy, and especially 
 those parts in which he deals with the concomitance 
 
52 P re-Organic Evolution. 
 
 of njental and material phenomena, and the rehation 
 of Reality to the two sets of manifestation.^ 
 
 This reference to the place of Mind in the Spencerian 
 system is, of course, beyond the immediate subject we 
 have in hand, but it is made as a matter of necessity 
 in order to make clear that, in Mr. Spencer's view 
 of Evolution, the doctrine jof Origin, Cause, Eeality, 
 therein asserted, justifies his being placed in a class 
 very different from that of the Materialists. With 
 this understanding we can now resume the more im- 
 mediate subject in hand — the Spencerian account of 
 Inorganic Evolution. 
 
 In order, however, tliat the representation may be 
 understood, two statements must be first made — one 
 that the Synthetic Philosophy, of which the theory of 
 Evolution is the principal part, is universal ; it seeks 
 to lay down and substantiate the principles on which 
 the entire material universe, and also the mental, is 
 formed : the other, that with Mr. Spencer Evolution 
 is not only a principle that holds good wherever 
 matter and motion are found, but is essentially the 
 process by which all differentiations in existence come 
 
 ^ Especially in tlie Principles of Biolog)/, i. pp. 490, 491, does he 
 regard the criticism "as most reprehensible " which represents his 
 system of philosophy as " materialistic." 
 
Exposition. 5 3 
 
 from what is undifferentiated — all conceivable com- 
 plexity from that in which there is no complexity. 
 The justification o'f these statements will come in 
 due course when we subject the theory to examina- 
 tion. It suffices here only to say that this view of 
 the miture and range of Evolution runs through all 
 that Mr. Spencer has written. 
 
 One other w^ord is necessary. So far as possible I 
 shall keep clear of the peculiar terminology of the 
 First Principles, and present the case in terms more 
 suited to the general reader. 
 
 In saying this I do not wish it to be construed 
 into any disparagement of the Spencerian mode of 
 presentation. It is possible that to the uninitiated 
 much of the terminology of the First Principles and 
 of the Principles of Psychology may seem mere jargon ; 
 and the fondness therein displayed for generalised 
 forms of expression may be in singular contrast with 
 the more plain, concrete terms found in works that 
 treat of Organic Evolution exclusively. But all this 
 is the natural outcome of Mr. Spencer's mental habit, 
 and of the peculiar method he has adopted for effect- 
 ing his purpose, namely, the deductive application of 
 assumed principles sustained only by a necessarily 
 partial induction of facts. To those who enter into 
 
54 Pre- Organic Evolution. 
 
 liis mode of thought, his language is not only intelli- 
 gible, but very apt for the purpose in view. Let us 
 proceed, then, with a general and, as far as may be, 
 ?io?i- technical exposition of the Spencerian view of 
 Inorganic Evolution. 
 
 To proceed, then : Evolution covers the passage 
 from primordial simplicity to present complexity. At 
 the base of all the reasoning and description, it is 
 assumed that at the commencement of the evolutionary 
 order, in the midst of which we happen to find our- 
 selves, there existed in the entire universe, so far as 
 we know, or can know it, exclusive, of course, of the 
 One Inscrutable Reality in the rear of and entering 
 into everything, and perhaps, also, of the hypothetical 
 ether of science, nothing at all but one diffused mass 
 of ultimate units of matter in motion. Where now 
 there are earth, and planets, and sun, and countless 
 starry systems scattered through space, and moving 
 with ordered silence in their respective orbits, there 
 was originally only an infinite, invisible mist, if that 
 can be called a mist which no eye could possibly see, 
 consisting of ultimate units of matter, — that is, un- 
 compounded, discrete, ever-moving units, more minute 
 and attenuated than the very elements of which it is 
 believed the smallest molecules of science are now com- 
 
Exposition. 5 5 
 
 posed.^ The peculiarity of this vast universe of units 
 was that in it there was no difference at all ; none in 
 size, none in movement, none in relation, none in 
 quality. In fact, the simplicity of each unit was such 
 that there was not, as yet, any quality, as we under- 
 stand the word in these days, in any single unit. 
 Though we may not be able to say what matter is 
 now, and what it, as metaphysicians would say, in its 
 essence was then, this is clear, that prior ^ to Evolu- 
 tion all was in perfectly diffused, infinitesimal parts 
 or ultimates, and that there was the most perfect 
 likeness in all that could be predicated of them, 
 whether of nature, of relation, or of velocity, or direc- 
 tion of motion. Thorough-going Evolution necessitates 
 at first the most perfect simplicity. All integration, 
 all complexity, all differentiation is derived and not 
 primal. To suppose that there were differences in 
 size, in form, in potentiality, in motion, or in relation 
 to the One Reality, or to the possible action of equally 
 situated units, would be to start with the varied and 
 differentiated, and, in that sense, the heterogeneous, 
 which would be a deviation from the main principle 
 of the theory. Once admit combination and positively 
 
 ^ Principles of Psychology, i. p. 155. 
 
 " If " prior" can be used at all, as we shall see further on. 
 
56 Pre-Organic Evolution, 
 
 arranged relations as the direct act or manifestation of 
 the Eternal Eeality, then some of the essential results 
 of Evolution are existing before Evolution begins. 
 The logic of Evolution compels a minimum in which 
 we have bare substance or matter, in slight excess of 
 the mathematical point, free from all cohesions, all 
 differing mternal powers, and all such juxtaposition's 
 and motions as would be inconsistent with the com- 
 pletest uniformity. 
 
 Now, such being the primordial simplicity, the first 
 step in Evolution was, of course, a variation produced 
 in that condition at some point of the whole mass, 
 — which variation took the form of an integration, a 
 coming together, of units that had previously been 
 discrete, separate. The instant that took place perfect 
 simplicity ceased. The uniform condition of matter 
 was broken in upon by a change far-reaching in its 
 effects. All subsequent changes in the history of the 
 universe were there and then initiated, and followed 
 as a natural consequence, as surely as the falling of a 
 stone in the centre of a placid lake is followed by a 
 succession of rings from the centre towards the circum- 
 ference. This is what Mr. Spencer calls " simple " 
 Evolution. It is variation only in the form of integra- 
 tion. There is no involved process in it. Complication 
 
Exposition. 5 7 
 
 of form and motion as yet is impossible. The " in- 
 coherent " only becomes " coherent ; " in plain words, 
 units stich How this change in the first instance is 
 brought about, how this first step in Evolution becomes 
 possible is, as will be seen in due course, a crucial 
 question. The general explanation is that it is by the 
 " persistence of force." 
 
 How long the course of simple integration continued, 
 and how far it affected the whole mass of diffused 
 units before another stage was entered on, is an open 
 question on which no definite information is or can be 
 given. The laws of physics being in the beginning 
 what they are now, warrants the conclusion that once 
 the uniformity was disturbed the integrations would go 
 on till combinations arose which admitted of redistri- 
 butions and differentiations in their parts and relations. 
 But before such a point could have been reached there 
 was a formation, by the cohesion of the units one to 
 the otlier in such strength as to be permanent, of wliat 
 are now known as the elementary substances. " There 
 is reason to suspect that the so-called simple substances 
 are compound, and that there is but one ultimate form 
 of Matter, out of which the successively more complex 
 forms of Matter are built up. By the differing 
 groupings of units, and by the combination of unlike 
 
58 Pre-Organic Evolution. 
 
 groups, each with its own kind and each with other 
 kinds, it is supposed that there have been produced 
 the different kinds of Matter we call elementary ; 
 just as by further compositions similarly carried on 
 these produced further varieties and complexities." ^ 
 We are not explicitly told how it came to pass that 
 when all units were equal in size and motion, and by 
 hypothesis, devoid of definite quality, they, being so 
 inexpressibly simple, should so combine that not even 
 the highest skill of modern science has yet been able 
 to effect a separation. In such integration of what 
 was separate there is evidently more than mere juxta- 
 position and close adhesion. But the position assumed 
 is that, be the permanence of the integration explicable 
 or not, by slow degrees, and through almost intermin- 
 able ages, the breaking up of the original simplicity 
 went on until perhaps the whole mass of primordial 
 ultimates was converted into the enduring, inde- 
 structible, and basal compounds now known as the 
 elements, and till late years supposed to be uncom- 
 pounded. 
 
 But one other statement is necessary to the full 
 representation of this earliest stage of Evolution. The 
 simple integrations thus formed could only occur with 
 
 ^ Principles of Psychology, i. p. 155. 
 
Exposition. 59 
 
 a corresponding loss of motion. All the ultimates in 
 the primordial mass being in motion, it follows that 
 when any two of them came together there was 
 involved in the fact of their integration a loss of some 
 motion. The principle laid down and adhered to in 
 the treatment of the whole theory is, that in proportion 
 to the integration of matter so is the loss or dissipation 
 of motion. The predominance of integration and con- 
 sequent loss of motion is Evolution ; while the pre- 
 dominance of an absorption of motion and disintegration 
 of matter is Dissolution. In 7?,07i-technical language, 
 when the first union took place between two separated 
 units of matter, the original motion that formerly kept 
 them apart, in oscillation or in separate lines, then 
 relatively ceased. This was the initial " integration of 
 matter and concomitant dissipation of motion." Thus 
 it may be said that the first great epoch in the evolu- 
 tionary process was the conversion of units of matter 
 into infinitesimal compounds, and the reduction of the 
 amount of motion — the making of the bricks out of 
 which the great temple of Nature was to be subse- 
 quently and slowly built. Whether in the reduction 
 of the amount of motion, in the production of the 
 elements by integration, there was a corresponding 
 generation of incipient heat, according to the laws 
 
6o Pre-Ors'anic Evolution. 
 
 t> 
 
 applicable to matter and motion in their later stages of 
 development, is not indicated. 
 
 It should be observed that although the first 
 integration took place in the coming together of homo- 
 geneous units to form the elements, integration did not 
 then cease. It is a transformation which is exhibited 
 in the universe as a whole, and in most of its details. 
 The peculiarity of it, as a process, is that it is not 
 complicated by other processes. It is solely the 
 coming together of things that were apart, the forma- 
 tion of aggregates out of scattered fragments. It is 
 the simple cohering of the previously incohering 
 portions of matter. 
 
 After the formation of the elements there began 
 another stage in the process. The elements of which 
 all things are composed being given, a series of 
 changes took place in their relation one to the other, 
 by the persistent action of the force which all along 
 had been expressed in the original matter and motion. 
 It was " by the combination " of the elements " with 
 one another and re-combination of the products " tliat 
 there " were formed systems of systems of molecules, 
 unimaginable in their complexity." ^ The world of 
 the infinitely little probably took as long to frame as 
 
 ^ Principles of Biology, i. p. 486. 
 
Exposition. 6i 
 
 the later worlds of the infinitely great. The passage 
 from the elements to the compound and complex con- 
 dition of matter requisite for the construction of solid 
 bodies, the formation of fluids and finally of starry 
 systems was exceedingly slow, and involved actions and 
 interactions, adjustments and readjustments within the 
 molecular sphere more intricate than the most perfect 
 science can trace out and reduce to intelligible form. 
 Although we have not, and are not likely to have, the 
 appliances for threading the labyrinth of these count- 
 less ages of change and modification, and the formation, 
 thereby, of different molecular compounds, so as to be 
 able to exhibit a scientific outline of the process as we 
 can in the case of the formation of the solid earth with 
 its varied surface of mountain and vale, yet we are 
 justified in thinking that, in and through all, there was 
 an operation, along lines perfectly natural and in a 
 sense mathematically exact, of the one Persistent 
 Force which operated from the very first, and which 
 works still in every change we now see. In this 
 gradual production of the molecular universe, as in 
 that of the elemental, there was with the increased and 
 diversified integration of matter, also, a concomitant 
 loss of motion, with this difference, however, that all 
 the motion of the cohering molecules is not lost. A 
 
62 Pre- Organic Evolittio7i. 
 
 part of the motion involved in the separate existence 
 of the elements of which a less complex molecule is 
 composed, as also of the inferior molecules of which 
 the more, complex are composed, is retained in the 
 interior, as it were, of the molecular constitution ; that 
 is, there exists some internal oscillation of the parts of 
 which the molecule is composed. This retention of 
 some motion after parting with the rest, by the act 
 of combination, is important in the more intricate 
 processes of Evolution which thereby became possible. 
 This accounts for what is known as Compound 
 Evolution. A whole consisting of very minute parts, 
 that is to say, a small integrated portion of matter 
 brought into its state of integration by the coalescing 
 of several previously separate elements into one mole- 
 cule, or of several lower class or earlier molecules 
 into one more elaborately constructed, is caused, by 
 this retained motion of its components, to undergo 
 rearrangements ; in other words, it becomes differenti- 
 ated, it evolves into another condition. It may even 
 break up and enter into new groups with other mole- 
 cules. This is a case of the evolution of homogeneous 
 integrations into heterogeneous integrations. It was 
 such changes as tliese, involving intricacies of re- 
 adjustment which no science can formulate, and 
 
Exposition, 63 
 
 requiring for their full development time whicli no 
 man can describe, and occurring freely throughout all 
 space, that laid the foundation for the countless and 
 intricate combinations which are the study of our 
 modern physical and chemical sciences. It is probable 
 that in reaching this stage we have the close of what 
 I may call the second great epoch of Evolution.^ 
 
 Hitherto the long succession of changes, extend- 
 ing through numberless ages, from the primordial 
 simplicity up to the molecular differentiations just 
 referred to, were only preliminary to a further Evolu- 
 tion from the indefinite and undetermined, to the 
 definite, determined arrangement of matter. For as 
 time passes on there is an ever-increasing distinctness 
 with which parts are marked off from one another. 
 This transformation is " more remarkable than the 
 passage of the whole from an incoherent to a coherent 
 state." - These are the secondary redistributions of 
 matter and motion which yield results of a more perma- 
 nent character — " structural modifications." Hitherto 
 there has been progressive integration — a coming to- 
 gether of different units of matter; henceforth there 
 is to be progressive differentiation in the compounds 
 that have been formed. A series of changes, e.g., bring 
 
 ^ Fir>^t Principles, chap. xiii. - Ibid. \^. 329. 
 
64 Pre- Organic Evohttion. 
 
 about such differences as appear in nebulae that are 
 diffused and irregular as compared with others that are 
 spiral, annular, or spherical/ Thus the indefinite, in- 
 coherent mass of compounds that had been formed by 
 the integration of the ultimate uniformly diffused 
 units became gradually marked off, segregated, until 
 definite portions assumed the varied structure of worlds 
 and satellites. 
 
 It is noteworthy that the evolutionary process, so 
 far as it extends from the original simplicity up to the 
 point just prior to the formation of definite permanent 
 arrangernents of matter, is purely a subject of specula- 
 tion or deduction from the first principles assumed. 
 This recourse to speculation is necessitated by the 
 remoteness in point of time of the changes referred to, 
 by the evident intricacy and subtlety of the first 
 processes of modification of the primordial uniformly 
 diffused ultimates, and, as a consequence, by the 
 absence of any of the data furnished by actual observa- 
 tion, or by a knowledge of strictly analogous changes. 
 But in respect to the changes that have transpired 
 from about the time when the indeterminate mass of 
 elements and inferior molecules began to assume deter- 
 minate definite arrangements, up to the consolidation 
 
 1 Fir&t Princijihs, p. 330. 
 
Exposition, ' 65 
 
 of worlds, there are still within tlie range of scientific 
 observation facts which sufficiently indicate its pro- 
 gressive character. The facts referred to are tliose by 
 which the Xebular Hypotliesis of Kant and Laplace 
 is believed to be warranted. There was a time, then, 
 when the original diffused units which constituted the 
 entire universe had, as we have seen, become a universe 
 of less widely diffused matter, i.e. matter in the state 
 known as elements, and the molecules consequent on 
 primary combinations of elements. The primordial mist 
 had become a mist less attenuated and fit for under- 
 going further modifications in its mass, by which, after 
 a long series of changes, it would be broken up first 
 into circling masses of nebuL^' of various sizes, detached 
 from one another, and then into distinct stars — suns, 
 and planets, and satellites — with the exception of 
 perhaps those nebulous bodies which are still found 
 whirling round in certain distant portions of space, 
 Nor had Evolution merely brouglit these rolling worlds 
 of various degrees of density out of the universal mist, 
 but it had so differentiated and rendered definite the 
 previous incoherent mass of floating molecules as to 
 arrange these millions on millions of worlds into 
 beautifully ordered systems, in which the axial and 
 orbital movements are regulated with a mathematical 
 
66 Pre -Organic Evolution. 
 
 precision and an exquisite balance is maintained be- 
 tween the countless bodies subject to the all-pervasive 
 law of gravity. How this formation of worlds from 
 a highly attenuated mass of molecules was brought 
 about, is shown by the advocates of the Xebular 
 Hypothesis. The laws of matter, in due course, set 
 up in the detached nebulous masses the centripetal 
 and centrifugal forces, which both tended to con- 
 solidate the respective masses into globes of differing 
 density and determine their motions in relation to one 
 another.^ 
 
 To sum up what has been said, we see that in the 
 primordial mass of diffused units of matter there were 
 set up, by the action of Persistent Force, certain primary 
 infinitesimal local modifications in the relation of the 
 units of matter, from which, in accordance with the 
 known action of mechanical force, there issued further 
 modifications in the form of an increase in the infini- 
 tesimal integration of matter and loss of motion ; till, 
 
 ^ A most interesting exposition of the Jitierentiating action of 
 physical laws on a diffused mass, though not in support of Mr. 
 Spencer's particular views, is to be found in Mr. Xornian Lockyer's 
 article in the Nimttenth Century for November 1889. The article 
 itself illustrates what I mean by saying that one can hold to a 
 theory of Pre-organic Evolution stretching far back, without being 
 committed to Mr. Spencer's mode of reasoning, or to his ontological 
 conclusions. 
 
Exposition. 67 
 
 by the continued action of Persistent Force, the huge 
 boundless mass broke up into vast areas of detached 
 nebulosity, which themselves, by the same Force, 
 further broke up into smaller masses, that, by the 
 action of centripetal and centrifugal forces, at length 
 assumed the form of worlds, and settled into those 
 orbital and axial movements which now form the 
 subject of astronomical study, and by their infinite 
 variety, exactitude, and beauty fill the ordinary and 
 extraordinary mind with wonder and awe. How the 
 earth, in particular, as one of these numberless worlds, 
 passed from a condition of rolling heat to a gradual con- 
 densation and cooling, and the formation of a succes- 
 sion of igneous and aqueous deposits, it is the province 
 of physics, supplemented by geology, to describe. 
 
 At the same time, we must not regard this reduction 
 of an indefinite nebulous mass to definite ordered 
 worlds as the whole of Evolution within the sphere of 
 the inorganic. A still higher point has been reached. 
 Consolidation of a crust to a globe is only preparatory 
 to a further stage in the evolutionary process. For 
 subsequently to the early stages in the cooling of the 
 earth, and even to the formation of its primordial crust, 
 there went on an elaborate series of modifications in 
 the molecular world on its surface, wliich very slowly 
 
68 Pre-Orzanic Evolution. 
 
 <b 
 
 prepared the purely inorganic to pass into conditions 
 approaching in instability and subtlety those of the 
 organic, till, at length, the line of Evolution, from the 
 original diffused ultimates of matter into the first 
 germ of life, was, without a single break in the well- 
 nigh infinite course, so far complete.^ 
 
 Or, to put the case in another form : From a 
 minimum simplicity in which differentiation could not 
 find place, there evolved, by very slow interactions of 
 homogeneous units, the permanent elements as the 
 enduring material out of which all things subsequently 
 must be built up ; and next, by most elaborate com- 
 binations arid recombinations of these, there was evolved 
 a slightly more complicated set of atoms, which, in 
 their interactions and apparently chaotic motions, 
 probably constituted the nebulous mass which im- 
 mediately antedates the great differentiating break up 
 of the whole material universe, and which may be 
 supposed to be the condition of matter implied in the 
 Nebular Hypothesis ; and then, further, out of this vast 
 mass there was evolved the definiteness and distinctness 
 of parts and relations seen in the existing solar and 
 stellar systems, as well as the more complete definite- 
 ness and distinctness seen in the inorganic bodies and 
 
 1 Principles of Biology, i. pp. 481-488. 
 
Exposition. 69 
 
 changes on this globe. Thus Matter, Motion, and 
 Force are the only factors entering into the series of 
 changes that have issued in the ordered universe as it 
 now is, and all this interaction, and, consequently, the 
 resulting Cosmos, are to be regarded as the Manifesta- 
 tions of an Eternal Unknowable Power. 
 
 Such being a brief and untechnical outline of the 
 process by which the universe has, so far as relates to 
 the inorganic, reached its present state, it is natural to 
 make some inquiry as to the grounds on which so 
 great a deduction rests. To answer this question fully 
 would require an exposition in detail of the most 
 elaborate works of the British leader of the Evolution 
 Philosophy. It must suffice for our present purpose 
 to indicate only the method adopted. In dealing with 
 this aspect of the subject, it should be remembered 
 that the true inquirer is guided only by what are 
 presumed to be facts and principles that lie open to 
 the student of Nature and of Mind. He asks whether 
 there is anything in the order of events that actually 
 lies within the reach of human research in space and 
 time, which, when considered in connection with the 
 principle of continuity, points to, or throws any light 
 upon, the genesis of things which in themselves lie 
 beyond the sphere of human observation ; and with 
 
yo Pre- Organic Evolution. 
 
 this, also, whether there are discoverable in the human 
 mind any fundamental principles of thought which, by 
 the congruity and coherence they give to knowledge, 
 necessitate, in their application to existing facts, one 
 view of the genesis of all things rather than any other. 
 Can the philosopher utilise the results and methods of 
 established physical science by associating them with 
 universal principles, and so arrive at conclusions con- 
 cerning things unseen and remote, and otherwise 
 unattainable ? 
 
 A very little reflection will show that it is not 
 possible to establish the theory of Pre-organic Evolution 
 simply by the inductive method ; since induction implies 
 a survey and rigid scrutiny of the facts pertaining to 
 the case, and a selection, at all events, out of these, of 
 representative classes of fact that shall do service for 
 others of the same kind outside the limits of actual 
 observation ; whereas in dealing with the genesis of 
 the universe, the vast mass of the actual facts to 
 be considered and compared lie, both as to space 
 and time, utterly beyond all discovery. Our actual 
 observation extends to only the universe as it is in a 
 relatively completed condition, and to only a mere 
 fragment of this. We do not know, in the strict 
 scientific sense of the term, the facts even as far 
 
Exposition, 7 1 
 
 back as the point of time indicated by the Nebular 
 Hypothesis, to say nothing of the immense areas of 
 duration prior to the relatively complex condition of 
 things indicated by that hypothesis. In working out 
 his argument, Mr. Spencer admits that, with the 
 exception of a few nebulose masses supposed to be 
 still rolling round in certain interspaces of the sidereal 
 systems, we cannot get into the rear, as it were, of the 
 perfected stars and planets ; and the logic of his system 
 obliges him to assume that these nebulose masses 
 are the remnants, or else the representatives, of the 
 condition of matter out of which stars and planets 
 immediately arose ; and, further, that this condition 
 arose out of a still prior condition of undifferentiated 
 matter. But although a thorough induction of facts 
 from the first to the last step in the cosmical process 
 is thus impossible, it is nevertheless thought that such 
 an induction of facts at this end of the life of the 
 universe as we are able to make, and from the 
 restricted range of the solar system, taken in combina- 
 tion with a necessary deduction from admitted first 
 principles, is sufficient to render the theory of Evolu- 
 tion, as above explained, the most congruous account 
 of things within reach of the human mind. 
 
 Let us first look at the deductive side of this method. 
 
72 P re-Organic Evolution. 
 
 Of course the main position is that consciousness, which 
 yields us the facts of experience, is veracious. What- 
 ever views may be entertained as to details in psy- 
 chology, we must accept what consciousness yields, 
 as being what it yields, if we are to carry on any 
 congruous thinking ; and its primary deliverance is 
 the distinction between a world of consciousness and 
 a world beyond consciousness. On this basis it is 
 possible to build up conclusions on principles, and note 
 facts illustrating principles. Time and space being 
 the relative realities that condition our thinking, we 
 cannot but think, under the forms of time and space, 
 a few universal principles which, being universal, hold 
 good for all time and space. A belief in the in- 
 destructibility of Matter and Motion and the Persistence 
 of Force is irresistible. We must abolish for ever all 
 our " exact science " unless we admit the indestructi- 
 bility of Matter and Motion. Thought necessitates 
 that they be conceived as incapable of annihilation. 
 It is in the very nature of our consciousness that 
 Matter and Motion, as relative realities, " can never 
 come into existence or cease to exist." ^ So far as 
 experience extends, their continuity is as clearly seen 
 as the absoluteness of their continuance is demanded 
 
 ' Firtit Pr'mci'pleH, p. 182. 
 
Exposition. 73 
 
 by coherent thinking, though the forms they assume 
 to consciousness are endlessly varied. The amount of 
 Matter in the universe is ever the same, though in 
 disintegration and change it passes beyond our ken ; 
 and, however much a motion may be opposed by a 
 resisting body, its motion is continued visibly or 
 invisibly as an element in the resultant. But the 
 indestructibility of Matter and Motion are really 
 derivative principles, or two forms of one universal 
 principle, namely, the Persistence of Force. Force is 
 that which is in all phenomena of Matter and Motion ; 
 we only know them in terms of Force. Their in- 
 destructibility, as modes, is really involved in the 
 constant existence of that of which they are modes. 
 Force is that which is in action in the maintenance of 
 Matter as a phenomenon, and in the production and 
 maintenance of Motion as a phenomenon. It permeates 
 all ; and, in one respect, the unfolding universe is but 
 the continuous presence in varying form of this one 
 Force. It can never be more and never less. Change 
 is but its variegated garb. So pervasive is this great 
 principle, that the Physical Sciences are founded on its 
 truth, and no scientific investigations into the quantities 
 and qualities and relations of things could proceed for 
 a moment apart from its admission. Whatever exists 
 
74 Pre-Organic Evolution. 
 
 at any one moment is a mode in which Force then is ; 
 and its changed mode of existence the next moment is 
 possible only as the force, of which it is the mode, 
 continues to exist. The same truth applies if we try 
 to think the existence of any single thing backwards 
 in some anterior form. Of course, it follows from this 
 all-comprehensive truth, that, when things sustain the 
 relation one to the other of antecedent and consequent, 
 they are always so related in the same way to one 
 another in quantity and in quality. Otherwise, they 
 cannot be antecedent and consequent. Also, the 
 different " forces " known to science, beino- but forms 
 of the One Persistent Force, may undergo transformation 
 into some other equivalent amount of force, but the 
 total amount abides. Again, inasmuch as all forms 
 of force are but varied expressions of the One Per- 
 sistent Force, should there be opposing forces among 
 them, the course of phenomenal development will be 
 determined by the truth, involved in the general 
 principle of the Persistence of Force, that the direction 
 of Motion is always along the line of either greatest 
 traction, least resistance, or their resultant. Forms of 
 Matter will be determined by the line of greatest force, 
 and when once opposing forces are set up — many of 
 them acting in other directions than the same right 
 
Expositiofi. 75 
 
 lines — then a rhythmical motion will result, which will 
 be neither perfectly rectilinear nor perfectly circular.^ 
 
 This somewhat dry and uninteresting statement of 
 principles is as important as it was necessary to the 
 understanding of the theory of Evolution as a reasoned 
 theory. For though they emerge in our consciousness 
 and find constant exemplification in the range of fact 
 that forms our narrow experience at this end of the 
 evolutionary process, yet being inseparable from all 
 conceptions of Matter, Motion, and Force, and, indeed, 
 being such that we must either cease to think of the 
 phenomena of Matter, Motion, and Force, or else think of 
 them in this way, it is right and reasonable to transfer 
 these conceptions, so far as they will apply to such a 
 state of simplicity, to such a primordial condition of 
 Matter as must have existed when the process of 
 Evolution began — if, as we shall see further on, it ever 
 did hcgin ; and it will be found that by their application 
 to the state of things then existing, they will furnish 
 the clue to the changes that then originated, and that 
 ever after went on through the long areas of duration 
 during which the definite and the distinct was being 
 slowly evolved. That is to say, these principles being 
 granted, their application to the diffused mass of 
 
 ^ Fir^i PrindyUs, pp. 226, 227, 248, 249, 254-256. 
 
76 P re-Organic Evolution. 
 
 ultimates that stood at the head of our evolutionary 
 process would cover the scientific laws by which the 
 combinations and changes in the material universe 
 passed from one stage of differentiation to another, till 
 the distinct and definite stellar and planetary worlds 
 and our present inorganic bodies were formed.^ The 
 universe is the embodiment of scientific ideas, and 
 these ideas find their ground in the few philo- 
 sophical principles which are only variations of the 
 one principle — the Persistence of Force. The human 
 intellect works at this end of the vast evolutionary 
 progression, but it supplies us with the principles 
 which were in effective operation at the beginning, 
 and which ramified into intricate lines of action all 
 the way down the numberless ages. To put the case 
 in another way: It is said of Laplace that he expressed 
 his belief that a mind which knew, for a very brief 
 time, the exact position and movement of all the 
 atoms in the universe, would be able to predict, from 
 this knowledge, the whole of the past and future state 
 of the universe — so certain in their operation are the 
 laws of mechanics. In some such way, knowing the 
 truth involved in the expression " the Persistence of 
 Force," with its derivative principles as above indicated, 
 
 ^ First Principles, cliap. x. 
 
Exposition. jj 
 
 a mind well furnished with ideas as to the rigorous 
 exactitude with which the laws of Matter and Motion 
 w^ork, is in a position to indicate, by the application of 
 this knowledge to a primordial state of homogeneous 
 minimum simplicity, the general course of the changes 
 that homogeneous simplicity would undergo, when once 
 the homogeneity has given place, if only in a slight 
 degree, to heterogeneity. The process of Evolution, hy 
 integration and differentiation ever tending towards 
 increased definitencss and distinctness, is that course. 
 
 The inductive evidence in support of Pre-organic 
 Evolution through the long ranges of space and time 
 contemplated in the Spencerian system must neces- 
 sarily be very imperfect, and can only be of force as 
 a supplement to a thoroughly sound deductive argu- 
 ment from assumed first principles. The vast spaces 
 between the stages of change in the condition of 
 matter and motion, first from the primordial, ultimate 
 unity to the elements formed out of them ; next 
 from the elements to the various systems of molecules 
 into which they enter, and that are implied in the 
 state of matter hypothetically present to the view of 
 astronomers in the Nebular Hypothesis ; and, finally, 
 from those systems of molecules down to the solidi- 
 fication of the "lobe and our own time, cannot all be 
 
78 P re-Organic Evolution. 
 
 traversed by our observation. We cannot even trace, 
 by any direct observation, any considerable progression 
 towards increased definiteness and distinctness in the 
 systems of molecules existing around us. We may 
 know of modifications in the temperature of the air, 
 of changes in the constituents of the soil, of the 
 newly - discovered relations of chemical bodies, and 
 liere and there of the formation of solids ; and in 
 these and similar changes we may see illustrations 
 of the interaction of Matter and Motion, and the 
 persistence of relations among forces ; but what we 
 thus learn of the real Evolution of the indefinite 
 into the definite is a mere trifle compared with the 
 enormous items of fact implied in the general Evolu- 
 tion, of all that now is in the inorganic world, from 
 the primordial Matter and Motion. As already 
 stated, Mr. Spencer, of course, does not presume to 
 know, as a matter of observed fact, what lay at the 
 back of the consolidation of the eflobe, much less at 
 the back of the condition of things implied in the 
 first breaking up of the relatively definite mass that 
 existed before system was worked off from system 
 and world from world. Hence the procedure is first 
 to note such facts in the history of the formation of 
 the globe and the solar system as do lie within the 
 
Exposition. 79 
 
 range of science, and to point out how they illustrate 
 the principles already assumed ; and, next, to regard 
 these facts so illustrated as verifications of the 
 principles themselves, and as examples of analogous 
 facts in space and time beyond our reach where the 
 same principles are believed to have been in opera- 
 tion, though under physical conditions somewhat 
 different from those within the range of our research. 
 The argument rests more on an analysis of what now 
 is, or is fairly ascertainable, and seeing in this analysis 
 illustrations of the few first principles assumed, than 
 on the tracking of changes in their actual progress 
 all along the receding line of inorganic history. As 
 by an analysis of a piece of granite a geologist, in 
 possession already of certain general principles, can 
 make some approximate affirmation concerning the 
 process and conditions of its formation, though he 
 never saw a piece of granite actually formed, so the 
 Evolutionist, by an application of his first principles to 
 the few facts that now lie under his eye, makes those 
 observed facts tributary to the building up of his theory 
 which covers processes far beyond all scientific observa- 
 tion. Eesults are dealt with, and processes are got at, 
 by working backwards with the aid of principles in their 
 application to what Matter and Motion are known to be. 
 
8o Pre-Oi'ganic Evolution. 
 
 Such incomplete and general observation of facts 
 as are possible are, then, believed to tally with the 
 presuppositions and outworking of principles on the 
 deductive side. So far as human observation extends, 
 it is seen that on every side there are traces of a 
 progression from small beginnings. In the midst of 
 incessant new appearances nothing is ever known to 
 come into existence ih novo. It is always an old 
 form with a new face. The analysis of compounds 
 reveals a law of combination, and consequently 
 implies a prior separation and relative independence 
 of parts. The present processes of Nature are largely 
 a synthesis of what was discrete. Inorganic matter, 
 in its raw mineral condition, is found to be under- 
 going perpetual modification, till, by a series of 
 synthetic chemical processes it comes, at last, t(j 
 be temporally assimilated into organic vegetable 
 forms ; and although there may follow a dissolution 
 of the elements so combined and brought into 
 definite arrangements, again to be followed, in its 
 turn, by another similar synthetic process, yet even 
 this may be regarded as a miniature illustration of 
 the great law of cycles of Evolution and Dissolution, 
 wdiich is the highest generalisation of the Spencerian 
 philosophy. The seas and mountains, the varied 
 
Exposition. 8 1 
 
 soils of the earth, the series of rock strata, the 
 pebbles on our beaches, the ores fused and refined 
 into bridges and iron roads, are all proved by observa- 
 tion and experiment to be the product of forces 
 working on matter as old as the universe. Com- 
 pounds once thought to be primordial are now made 
 to reveal their formation by being dissolved and 
 re-combined. Even the very elements, so permanent 
 and subtle, and hitherto held to be original, are, it 
 is believed, on the eve of being split up into their 
 constituents ; in other words, there are observed 
 indications that they are products evolved from pre- 
 existing ultimate units. Many of the materials of 
 which the sun and stars are composed are known 
 to be such as enter into the constitution of our 
 mundane bodies. Geologists have pursued a course 
 of observation on the position and structure of the 
 rocks, which proves that the crust of the earth has 
 been the product of forces extending, at least, over 
 hundreds of millions of years. The increased heat 
 as we approach the centre of the earth, and the very 
 slow retardation of the earth's axial rotation, point to 
 a time when wliat is now a solid, was a mass of 
 vapour revolving around its axis, much in the same 
 way as scattered masses of nebulous matter are now 
 
82 Pre-Orga7i2c Evolution. 
 
 observed to revolve in remote portions of infinite 
 space. But granting that our planet, the earth, did 
 pass, by a very slow process, from a rotating nebulous 
 state, to its present condition of definite arrange- 
 ments of parts, it seems to follow, naturally, that 
 other planets of the Solar System would be evolved 
 from a similar mass and by similar methods. There 
 is no conceivable reason, for instance, why Yenus, 
 Jupiter, and the rest should be made by one process 
 and the earth by another. There are, moreover, 
 three well-known facts standing out in great pro- 
 minence, which are believed to point to the con- 
 temporaneous evolution of the entire Solar System 
 from one widely diffused nebulous mass ; these are, 
 the proximate coincidence in direction and plane of 
 the orbital motion of the planets with the axial 
 rotation of the sun ; the general, if not most perfect, 
 coincidence of the orbital motion of the satellites 
 with the axial rotation of the planets to which they 
 belong; and the spheroidal, oblate form of the earth. 
 Eut if facts thus within the range of scientific 
 observation, and doubted by no one who has a right 
 to be heard on the question, lead to the conclusion 
 that the Solar System, with its distinct and orderly 
 worlds, evolved out of a vast nebulous mass by the 
 
Exposition. Z^i 
 
 acLion of rigid meclianical laws, the nature of which 
 is well verified, there seems to be no scientific, and 
 certainly no philosophical, reason for doubting that 
 other outlying, vaster Sidereal Systems were formed 
 in the same way; especially as there are still visible 
 by the telescope, in the interspaces of Sidereal 
 Systems, traces of nebulous masses undergoing a 
 process of cliange by the action of centripetal forces'; 
 and seeing, also, that the composition of Sidereal 
 Systems is shown by the Spectrum Analysis to be 
 substantially, or in many particulars, similar to that 
 of the Solar System. 
 
 It is by some such line of thought that we are, 
 at length, brought face to face with a state of the 
 material universe, in which there was nothing but 
 an infinite diffusion of particles being acted on by 
 such forces as had been generated out of the prim- 
 ordial interaction of the ultimates of matter that 
 were antecedent even to the formation of the elements. 
 It is over this vast unexplorable region of space, and 
 this immeasurable duration that speculation finds 
 scope for the application of assumed first principles 
 to the primordial matter, which, by the very necessity 
 of the case, it is believed must have stood at the 
 head of the evolutionary process. In short, a very 
 
84 Pre-Organic Evolution. 
 
 partial induction of particulars is held to coincide 
 with the issue obtained by an application of first 
 principles, deductively, to a liypothetical primordial 
 condition of matter in which there was perfect homo- 
 geneity. Things, as they are, are a differentiation of 
 what once was perfectly simple ; and the slow and 
 devious process by which the change has been brought 
 about is Evolution.^ 
 
 1 Of course the double method runs throughout, and couki only be 
 here indicated ; but the application and necessity of the double 
 method to the case, as essential to a sound conclusion, can be traced 
 more distinctly, though briefly, in the "Summary and Conclusion" 
 of the Firat Principles, p. 547. 
 
CHAPTEE III. 
 
 CRITICISM. 
 
 1. Scope of the Discussion. 
 
 rpHE principles and course of Pre-organic Evolution 
 being such as has been set forth in the foregoing 
 outline, the inquiry is at once raised, What then ? 
 Are there any issues flowing therefrom which bear 
 adversely on the beliefs and usages of Christian society ? 
 Is the view of the universe therein implied, and 
 regarded as a speculative attempt to set forth the 
 origin and progress of the inorganic order, such as by 
 virtue of its congruity and coherence, commends itself, 
 both in principle and detail, to the impartial judgment 
 of candid men ? Or, on the other hand, must a thorough 
 investigation into its claims lead to its being classed 
 with the many failures of the past to formulate what, 
 from the very nature of the case, passes all understand- 
 ing ? Or, supposing that, in its detailed elaboration, 
 it fails to satisfy our reason, is the main principle of 
 
 85 
 
86 Pre-Organic Evolution. 
 
 an evolution of what now is, from some primordial 
 condition of matter, so far made clear as to render its 
 adoption, as a philosophy, reasonable ? In other words, 
 what is the element of truth in this ambitious system ? 
 and what is that other element, if such there be, which 
 comes into conflict with the assured data of reason ? 
 
 Now, with reference to these inevitable questions, it 
 may be pointed out that the kind and extent of interest 
 taken in them will depend on the speculative or prac- 
 tical bent of the individual before whose attention they 
 are brought. A few of the more keen and restless 
 intellects among us will be fascinated by the system 
 regarded solely as a speculation, and will be glad to 
 know whether, as an elaborate structure of thouirht, it 
 is worthy of a place among those which in past ages 
 have been reared by the constructive intellect. For a 
 certain order of mind the higher reaches of philosophy 
 have a charm, quite irrespective of the bearing of its 
 principles on the conduct of life. It is exhilarating 
 to scale the mountain-peak, and from the summit, far 
 from the petty distractions of the haunts of men, em- 
 brace in the unity of a single glance the multitudinous 
 diversity of the lower regions. Nor is the energy in- 
 volved in the exercise without its satisfactions. Truth 
 is as wide as is Nature and as old as Time, and to the 
 
Criticism. 87 
 
 highest minds is an object of search, and, when found, 
 of pure delight, whether in the detail of a flower or in 
 the unity of a cosmic philosophy. The Platonic soul 
 yearns to see her face anywhere and at any time. The 
 primary question for the healthy intellect is, What 
 
 IS? 
 
 On the other hand, the practical man will be dis- 
 posed to push these inquiries into the congruity of the 
 evolutionary philosophy only in so far as the system 
 is supposed to bear upon the ideas and practices 
 which enter into the staple of Christian life. As a 
 speculative philosophy, it may be left to the criticism 
 of the theorist, and, in due course, find its way to a 
 place among the many relics of the world of thought. 
 But in so far as it embodies principles which are 
 brought down from the high region of speculation to 
 the level of human life, and are there made to under- 
 mine, it is supposed, the very foundations on which 
 Christian society has been established, so far it becomes 
 an object of intense interest, and demands a thorough 
 investigation into its pretensions. Truth is theoreti- 
 cally to be loved and welcomed, but practically it is to 
 be cared for in its incidence on conduct. As a philo- 
 sophy. Evolution is a matter of indifference ; as a 
 factor in the direction and interpretation of life, it is 
 
SS Pre-07'ganic Evohihojt, 
 
 of supreme interest. Possibly, then, the practical man 
 may, for different reasons, take as keen an interest in 
 this philosophy as does the speculative man. 
 
 That the theory of Evolution is of more than 
 academical interest is manifest, when regard is paid 
 to the impression its advocacy has produced on the 
 cultivated and on the popular mind. Some of its 
 most distinguished philosophical supporters have de- 
 viated from the path of pure speculation ; and have 
 taken pains to make out that the acceptance of their 
 views would involve a revolution in the ideas that 
 hitherto have fashioned Christian society. Although 
 others, professing to hold to Evolution as the key to 
 the order of Nature, have asserted that no such radical 
 change in Christian thought need be regarded as a 
 necessary consequence, yet a suspicion of its adverse 
 bearing on religious faith and practice produces feelings 
 of bewilderment and fear in the minds of many, and 
 creates an intense desire to know what are the real 
 facts of the case. Under these circumstances, it is 
 impossible to regard Evolution as an esoteric doctrine. 
 Although in its main features it contains nothing 
 new, but is as old as the age of the Indian sages and 
 the pre-Socratic Greeks, yet, in its modern form and 
 application, it carries with it all the charm of novelty. 
 
Criticism. 89 
 
 and comes into apparent or real conflict with concep- 
 tions which for ages have been dominant in European 
 thought. What it behoves us to find out, if possible, 
 is the truth in this matter. We must squarely face 
 the claim of the evolutionary philosophy upon our 
 rational submission. If it be rigidly and entirely true, 
 then by all means let it be accepted as such, and let it 
 be rigorously applied to the interpretation of life and 
 conduct. If it contain elements of important truth 
 blended with what will not bear the scrutiny of reason, 
 then let us disentangle the true from the false, and not 
 be afraid of lookinof at life in the li^jht of what is 
 philosophically sound, though it be not in accord with 
 our previous conceptions. " Prove all things. Hold 
 fast what is erood." 
 
 o 
 
 It will be remembered that in the exposition given 
 of the theory of Inorganic Evolution, I took occasion 
 to refer to the existence of two distinct schools of 
 thought on this subject, one represented chiefly by Mr. 
 Spencer and the other represented by Buchner, Vogt, 
 and Hackel. Our chief concern is with the former ; 
 because it is more carefully developed and on lines 
 more strictly philosophical, and, moreover, embodies 
 elements which, in the judgment even of those who 
 cannot accept it in its totality, are of great importance 
 
90 Pi^e-Organic Evolution. 
 
 both to philosophy and theology — especially its strong 
 assertion of the existence of an Eternal Eeality. But 
 before proceeding to examine the principles on which 
 it rests, and the manner in which the general argu- 
 ment is developed, it is desirable to say something 
 concerning the other school, usually called the Mechan- 
 ical. Its main point of difference from that repre- 
 sented by Mr. Spencer is, that it does not insist on 
 the essential distinction between an Eternal Eeality 
 and the succession of phenomena owing existence to 
 that Eeality. Practically, it is a modern form of the 
 flux of Heraclitus and the downright materialism of 
 Democritus. " Mechanical " force is the expression 
 preferred by Hiickel for tliat which is the sole ex- 
 planation of changes in the forms of matter ; and 
 whatever is is an outcome alone of the interaction of 
 these. In fact the system, so far as it can be 
 honoured with such a term, is Materialism in its 
 progressive development in the sphere of Nature — 
 meaning by Nature everything. Evolution, according 
 to this school, is the name for the process by which 
 bare matter and mechanical force worked their way 
 on from original simplicity up to the present time. 
 In one respect the question before us is that of 
 Materialism ; and it might, at first sight, seem to be 
 
Criticism. 9 1 
 
 incumbent on us to enter into a thorough exposure of 
 its radical principles. But that is too wide a range, 
 and does not fall within the scope of our present 
 purpose, which is simply to deal with Inorganic 
 Evolution, and not the essential distinction of con- 
 sciousness from every form of matter and motion, or 
 its precise connection with the molecular conditions of 
 the brain, which accompany, and in some w^ay are 
 subservient to, its appearance. The bearing of Materi- 
 alism on the problems of Mind has been fully and 
 often enough dealt with ; and if fair and strong argu- 
 ment, and the common sense of mankind, are of any 
 avail, it ought by this time to be banished from the 
 mind of every reasonable man. It is needless here to 
 spend energy on what is, or ought to be, twice dead. 
 There is a point beyond which argument is of no 
 avail. Nor is it necessary here and now to enter into 
 any detail in dealing with Materialism in so far as it 
 is expressed in the mechanical theory of Evolution ; 
 inasmuch as the principal features of the process of 
 differentiation are one with those of the other school, 
 and the consideration of them may be deferred till 
 we pass on to discuss Mr. Spencer's representations of 
 them. 
 
 The theory of mechanical Evolution admits, then. 
 
92 P7'e-07^ga7zic Evolution. 
 
 for our present purpose, of summary treatment. Re- 
 garding it as deriving all the processes of the inorganic 
 order solely from the phenomenal interaction of me- 
 chanical force and matter, — there being at the back of 
 these nothing whatever, no Eeality, no Origin of either 
 the force and matter, or their continuous interaction, — 
 it is at once seen to violate the most fundamental 
 necessities of human thought. Notwithstanding all 
 that Lange has written in his volumes on the " History 
 of Materialism," it may safely be affirmed, that in view 
 of the historic course of the highest human thought, 
 from Anaxagoras to the present time, this system 
 needs a justification which its advocates have failed to 
 produce. The blank Materialism inseparable from it, 
 and of which it presents a phase, is known to run 
 counter to the deepest, most rational and universal 
 convictions of the human mind. The noisy zeal and 
 bold dogmatism with which this Materialism is advo- 
 cated by such writers as Buchner and Vogt, is in 
 instructive contrast with the calm continuous thought 
 of generations of gifted thinkers who, in the quietude 
 of the study, have given formal, vindicating expression 
 to the common sense of mankind. I know that wide- 
 spread beliefs are not always valid, and popular ideas 
 may be illusory. History tells how, in some notable 
 
Criticism. 93 
 
 instances, illusions have done duty for realities, and how 
 exact thinking has not always coincided with popular 
 opinion. The earth, in days gone by, did revolve 
 round the sun, though common men and uncommon 
 men believed otherwise. The majority of men still 
 hold that the idea of " distance " is acquired directly 
 and immediately from vision, i.e. that men see distance 
 all at once, apart from any process of acquirement ; 
 whereas, if the modern theory of vision be correct, 
 certain philosophers assure us that this is an illusion, 
 and that the idea of distance has its psychological 
 history in the individual mind, as truly as has the 
 formation of the world itself in time and space. But 
 without disputing the truth of this modern version of 
 Berkeley's theory of vision, or denying the power of 
 the association of the contributions of different senses 
 to the formation of what seems to be a simple idea, it 
 is enough to observe, that beliefs and judgmicnts of this 
 class are not for a moment to be compared with those 
 irresolvable convictions which must be abandoned if 
 the assumptions of Materialism be admitted; seeing 
 that the latter do not relate to external appearances, 
 but to the nature of the thinking principle, and 
 are so incorporated with the very constitution of 
 our nature as to be essential to all congruity of 
 
94 Pre-07^ganic Evolution. 
 
 thought, to say nothing of the moral aspects of the 
 question. 
 
 But looking more closely at the mechanical theory 
 of Evolution as a process, and so far independently of 
 the materialistic principle, we cannot but notice the 
 enormous philosophical difficulties it has to encounter. 
 Let it be observed that all is phenoniena — there is 
 nothing else — and all phenomena are in an eternal 
 series. It may seem to the untrained to be a brief 
 and lucky expression when one speaks of an " eternal 
 series of phenomenal changes," but every one well read 
 in the history of philosophy knows that for ages this 
 expression has been held to embody a most crude and, 
 at bottom, baseless conception. It means an exclusion 
 of Origin — a negation, therefore, of the very principle of 
 Causality, which is one of the primary, indestructible 
 forms of thought. This most imperious law of thought 
 is simulated by the hollow phantom called " pheno- 
 menal antecedence " — as though a ghost were as real 
 as a man. Indeed, a little reflection ought to show 
 that, if language has any definite significance, the use 
 of the word " phenomena " in this connection and for 
 the purpose in view, is not only unwarranted but is 
 sheer nonsense. Its essential meaning is " appearance," 
 which, of course, implies something that does appear, 
 
Criticism. 9 5 
 
 something which must be thought as underlying the 
 appearance, that is, a cause, a reality, which accounts 
 for what we see. Phenomenon is plainly correlative 
 to noumenon. In philosophy the only meaning can 
 be the visible appearance or expression of an existence 
 that is invisible. The mind of man cannot, however 
 much phrases may be used which are supposed to 
 teach the opposite, think a fleeting series of appear- 
 ances without also thinking a something underneath 
 which is not fleeting. To say that all that exists is 
 an " eternal series of phenomena," is, 1 say, in the 
 light of the principles that govern human thought, to 
 talk nonsense. By such a perverse use of language 
 no clue is given, or is possible, to the changes which 
 are supposed to constitute the sum of all things. 
 They are causeless. Causality is ignored. Antecedence 
 of a shadow to a shadow neither explains the shadow 
 nor the succession. To say that things and the suc- 
 cession are eternally necessary is, apart from the 
 necessity which springs from a real Cause, not to 
 enunciate any principle recognised by human intelli- 
 gence. If by things being eternally necessary it is 
 simply meant that they eternally arc, we have, in that 
 case, no intelligible principle interpretative of exist- 
 ence, but a mere assertion of existence, which yields 
 
96 Pre- Organic Evolution. 
 
 no information useful to philosophy. Moreover, when 
 we come to deal with the actual process involved in 
 Evolution, we find ourselves in utter helplessness. 
 Of course, if Evolution be the getting of the compound 
 and complicate out of that which was perfectly simple, 
 it is hard to see how there could ever be a jprimordial 
 simplicity in the condition of matter ; for where there 
 is only an eternal series of phenomena destitute of any 
 underlying base or noumenal Cause, there can be no 
 primordial. There is only an endless retrocession. 
 You never reach the point where you can say here all 
 was simple, here differentiation began ; and yet by the 
 explanation of Evolution as the passage from simplicity 
 to complexity, you are bound to find it. Eternity 
 does not hold that you seek. Nor is it possible to 
 leap over this difficulty by assuming that there may 
 have been a series of cycles of Evolutions and Dis- 
 solutions, — in each of which the complicated integra- 
 tions and differentiations of the period are regularly 
 worked back again to a perfect simplicity as a starting- 
 point for a new process of change in the ascending 
 line, — for this would be to claim a regularity of 
 method and a perfection of preparation for which, by 
 admission, no cause exists. 
 
 Dismissing, then, the consideration of the mechanical 
 
Criticism, 97 
 
 theory of Evolution, so far as relates to the inorganic 
 side of the universe, as being utterly unsound in the 
 principles on which it rests, we may now turn our 
 attention to the more elaborate and influential theory, 
 which recognises not only a process of phenomena in 
 orderly and ever -ascending sequence, but, also, an 
 origin of that process in something not phenomenal. 
 It is certainly a pleasure to have to examine a system 
 which, whatever its defects or omissions, does dis- 
 tinctly recognise the objective validity of the principle 
 of Causality, and so seeks to build up an intellectual 
 fabric on solid foundations. How far the ascertainable 
 characteristics of that foundation, and its relation to 
 the superstructure, are truly set forth, are questions on 
 which I may have something to say. 
 
 But the subject before us is very complicated, and 
 can only be intelligently dealt with in so far as we 
 discriminate between the prominent elements entering 
 into it. Although Mr. Spencer does not formally 
 make the distinction, yet, as a matter of fact, and as 
 I have pointed out, there are two sides to the system. 
 The one relates to Eeality, Being, Origin ; the other, 
 to phenomena and the order of their succession. 
 Spencerism is, in the prominence given to the unseen 
 base of things, as far as can be from Positivism. 
 
98 Pre-07'ganic Evolution. 
 
 The transcendental ontology is a perpetual rebuke to 
 the superficial commonplaces of the Positivist school. 
 The assured reality, the transcendence and immanence, 
 of a Primordial Cause, is the basis of the system ; 
 and a philosophy of the sequence and co-ordination of 
 effects is the superstructure. These two conceptions 
 are distinct in their characteristics; they involve for 
 their acquisition a different order of thought, and they 
 each contribute complementary elements towards the 
 framing of a comprehensive Cosmic Philosophy. With- 
 out anticipating in detail future discussion, I may here 
 remark that it will be found in due course, that the 
 Spencerian doctrine of Being bears most directly on the 
 primary question of Theology, the question of Theism ; 
 while the philosophy of the sequence and co-ordination 
 of effects bears more immediately on the secondary 
 question of the relation of God to the ordered universe, 
 and the consequent character of the order itself. 
 
 It may seem to some an unwarrantable thing to 
 thus include a consideration of a transcendental 
 ontology in a discussion of a theory of Pre-organic 
 Evolution. Is not Evolution, it may be asked, con- 
 cerned, by the very meaning of the term, with only the 
 order of phenomena ? Does it not indicate tlie kind 
 of connection there is between the facts of the universe 
 
Criticism. 99 
 
 at any one stage of its existence with other facts at an 
 earher stage ? Such a question seems to be justified 
 by the words of one of the ablest expounders and 
 defenders of Mr. Spencer's system, who says : " The 
 law of Evolution professes to formulate the essential 
 characteristics of a ceaseless redistribution of matter and 
 motion that must go on wherever matter and motion 
 possess the attributes by which we know them." ^ It 
 should, however, as already indicated, be observed, that 
 although the term Evolution is, in Mr. Spencer's 
 works, usually applied to indicate the method by 
 which one phenomenal form passes on into another 
 phenomenal form, and, as such, has nothing whatever 
 to do with primal Origin or Being, yet the presentation 
 of the theory as a whole is made to embrace, also, 
 considerations which apply to that which lies at the 
 back of all phenomena, and without which the passage 
 from the simple to the complicate is unintelligible. 
 Again and again does he seek to show that, inseparably 
 connected with the idea of phenomena in orderly 
 correlation, there is the idea of an Eternal Eeality, 
 without which neither they nor their ordered sequence 
 can be rationally conceived. Evolution, in fact, is the 
 order assumed by the Eternal Eeality in its manifesta- 
 
 ^ Fiske's Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy, i. p. 275. 
 
lOO Pre- Oro; ante Evolution, 
 
 tions; so that we can as little dispense with a con- 
 sideration of the Eternal Eeality in the discussion of 
 the Spencerian theory of Evolution, as we can dispense 
 with a consideration of the root of a tree in expounding 
 what a tree is. If we were disposed to indulge in 
 verbal criticism, there could be found abundant scope 
 for it, inasmuch as, etymologically,the term " Evolution " 
 is inappropriate to indicate the ideas which Mr. 
 Spencer, in treating of the passage from phenomenal 
 simplicity to complexity, seeks to convey. Pie himself 
 admits ^ that however suitable the term may be to 
 indicate the passing out of all forms of organic life 
 from one primordial simple germ, — tlie evolving of 
 many and varied lines out of one, — the term " In- 
 volution " would etymologically be more exact for 
 indicating the getting of all complicate inorganic com- 
 binations by the interaction, in their early stages of 
 change, one with the other of primordial ultimates. If, 
 then, in this discussion I use the term Evolution as 
 embracing more than the bare passage of phenomena 
 from one form to another, I do so because Mr. Spencer 
 disregards the bare etymological connotations of the 
 term, and in this particular instance presses lan- 
 guage illegitimately into the service of philosophy. 
 
 1 First Prhiciples, i>p. 285, 286. 
 
Criticism. loi 
 
 Commonly it relates to process only ; but, as his 
 treatment of it is a philosophy of Evolution, it must 
 be made to embrace an ontological reference. 
 
 There being, then, in the Spencerian system an 
 ontological or noumenal side and a phenomenal side 
 inseparably related, yet demanding a separate con- 
 sideration, it becomes a question of convenience and 
 logical order as to which of them shall be first 
 subjected to criticism. Por reasons that will become 
 apparent as we proceed, we shall take the phenomenal 
 side first. In doing so we shall be following in the 
 wake of Evolutionists, who sometimes give such 
 prominence to the order of phenomena as to convey 
 the impression that it alone was the subject of con- 
 troversy. 
 
 Leaving, then, for the present, the more abstruse 
 and fundamental question of the relation of Evolution 
 to Theism and the idea of Creation, let us now restrict 
 our attention to that aspect of Pre-organic Evolution 
 which has to do with the bare succession and co- 
 ordination of phenomena, in that portion of the history 
 of the universe which either antedates the appearance, 
 or lies outside the region, of organic forms. I say 
 "outside the region of orcjanic forms," because, as 
 previously indicated, while Pre-organic, i.e. Inorganic, 
 
T02 Pre- Organic Evolution, 
 
 Evolution, chronologically antedates the first appear- 
 ance of life on the globe, it also goes on side by side 
 with the Organic up to the present time. It is before, 
 but does not terminate with, the Organic. 
 
 But it is possible that a preliminary objection may 
 be raised to the consideration of the history of 
 the inorganic universe, as set forth in the elaborate 
 reasonings and affirmations of Mr. Spencer. It may 
 be thought to be a weary and, perchance, to many, a 
 fruitless undertaking, if you are about to sift one by 
 one the clever and intricate arguments of so gifted a 
 logician. Moreover, the subject itself is so vast and 
 intricate, so utterly, it may be said, beyond the reach 
 of human understanding, that any conclusion arrived 
 at, one way or the other, is, on that account, of no 
 value. Such a philosophy may afford scope for mental 
 gymnastics, and gratify a morbid curiosity, but can 
 never carry with it the certitude which alone avails 
 with sensible men pressed with many demands on 
 their time and energy. After all, may not the most 
 effective way of dealing with it be the negative one — 
 of leaving it severely alone, regarding its arguments 
 and conclusions as of no serious importance ? Is it 
 not probable that, however carefully the views of the 
 Evolutionist may be examined, and his reasoning met 
 
Criticism. 103 
 
 by counter-reasoning, the main contentions of tlie 
 controversialists may be equally invalid because of the 
 common ignorance of primary data from which they 
 equally proceed. When it is considered that man is 
 but the creature of a few years ; that his range of 
 vision, though aided by scientific appliances, is limited 
 to a mere fragment of the universe both as to space 
 and time ; that the data on which he reasons in this 
 case are not only gathered from the merest fringe of 
 existence, but are, also, coloured by his own personality, 
 and that the conclusions of one age are being con- 
 stantly revised or rejected by another, — it seems to be 
 an almost insane procedure when one attempts to set 
 forth in intelligible order what purports to be the 
 actual process, or, to put it more safely, tlie principles of 
 the actual process, by which, after ages of action which 
 no arithmetic can describe, and through space, stretch- 
 ing beyond the reach of the most powerful telescope, 
 there issued so vast and magnificent a Cosmos as that 
 in the midst of which we now live. Is not the modern 
 intellect becomins^ intoxicated with its recent achieve- 
 ments in natural science ? Is it not the path of 
 wisdom to abstain from formulating conclusions so 
 wide-reaching, and also from allowing any conclusions 
 so formulated to affect for a moment the vital questions 
 
I04 Pre- Organic Evohttion. 
 
 embraced in theological first principles, and the con- 
 duct flowing therefrom ? This probably is the position 
 taken, in the present day, by a large number of earnest 
 Christian people ; and they may regard it as a question- 
 able policy when theologians endeavour, in the interests 
 of religion, to examine the reasonings of the evolutionary 
 philosophy, and to discover what of harmony and what 
 of disagreement there may be between it and those 
 fundamental positions that are implied in the Christian 
 Faith. 
 
 But this preliminary objection to inquiry into 
 the validity of the evolutionary philosophy, though 
 suggestive of the- need of great caution and the 
 avoidance of a dosjmatic tone, is not so stronsj and 
 insuperable as at first sight may appear ; and it may 
 arise more from personal inaptitude for the order of 
 thought required for its prosecution than from any 
 true estimate of what is possible and what is not 
 possible. It is certainly possible to test the strength 
 of Mr. Spencer's main position without entering into a 
 detailed dissection of his elaborate form of reasonin<^ 
 Most philosophies are built up on the assumption of a 
 few principles ; and it is to them, and not to the 
 verbiage arotmd them, that attention should be given 
 if we would know their real worth. Apart from that. 
 
Criticism. 105 
 
 it is not to be overlooked that ideas formulated by 
 leaders of thought, whether in the course of ages they 
 prove to be true or not, do, for the time being, per- 
 colate down into the ordinary channels of human 
 thought and language, and give tone and complexion to 
 the course of life ; and no standing aloof from the 
 intellectual conflict, by those who tliink that they hold 
 truer views, will prevent great mischief being done if 
 the ideas in question are wrong. It is too late in the 
 ages to attempt to check or put down error, if it 
 prevails, by the silence or scorn of assumed superiority. 
 Man must win victories for truth by contending 
 rationally for truth. It involves a contracted view of 
 human capabilities when the intellect is not encouraged 
 to stretch out its powers far beyond any limits hither- 
 to attained. Making due allowances, as is proper in 
 all researches of an intricate character, for the inevit- 
 able incompleteness of details and side intrepretations 
 of phenomena, the attempt to construct, approximately, 
 a universal philosophy of phenomena, and even of 
 Being, is not quite so unreasonable as is imagined. 
 Both science and philosophy have been so far tested 
 through ages of research, as to liave established the 
 truth that principles hold good, irrespective of a 
 knowledge of all the details of fact to which they may 
 
io6 Pre- Organic Evolution, 
 
 apply ; and, indeed, may legitimately be applied be- 
 yond the particulars of which we are cognisant. The 
 human intellect is not an unrelated monstrosity in the 
 universe of things : it is part of an ordered whole — 
 the mental side answering to the material structure. 
 Its constitutive principles and inherent tendencies are 
 in correlation with the material order, and, so far as 
 they are developed, they adumbrate that order. The 
 universe is a Dualism. The order of the material is 
 intelligible, rational, as corresponding to a permanent 
 Eeason. Once and for all, on behalf of mankind, did 
 Socrates win from the individualism and uncertainty 
 of the Sophists a Eeason, no longer to be regarded as 
 exclusive and narrow, but universal. ISTot in Gorgias, 
 or Protagoras, or even in Socrates, but in Mind was 
 the clue to the interpretation of Mature, and the 
 acquisition of eternal truth, to be sought. Unless we 
 are being from age to age utterly deluded by the con- 
 stitution of our nature, the unappeasable craving of 
 cultivated minds for intellectual unity implies its 
 counterpart in the actual structure and processes of the 
 universe. It is not at all necessary that we should swear 
 by the Monadologie of Leibnitz, and adopt his peculiar 
 idealism, to believe that, in a very significant sense, 
 Mind, not m?/ mind merely, is the mirror of all things. 
 
Criticism. 107 
 
 The psychologist of the modern Associationalist 
 school may, it is true, seek to explain away principles, 
 as well as emotions, and so reduce all that has been 
 implied in the term " Mind " to a fleeting series of 
 elemental feelings. Yet a comprehensive and penetrating 
 philosophy will nevertheless maintain, that the mystery 
 of Mind is not to be so easily resolved, by analysis of 
 its states, into a bare succession of unsubstantial 
 elements; and that it is not an accidental association 
 of passing feelings which urges the intellect to pene- 
 trate into the secret of things and to trace out the 
 line of unity which is believed to connect them all 
 from first to last, but is rather a constitutional 
 synthetic bent, associated with a primary, indestructible 
 belief, that all outward nature is interpretable on 
 rational lines, and that some time or other, in this life 
 or the next, the chain of Causation may be found to be 
 traceable, in principle if not in detail, from the latest 
 form of existence up to its Primal Source. 
 
 It is this characteristic of the human mind which 
 urges us to trace up the diverse lines of phenomena 
 to a philosophic unity. It is this which, in the past, 
 has been the spring of all research ; and it is this 
 which, as we gaze upon the uniformities and harmonies 
 of the universe, awakens and nourishes the ambition to 
 
io8 Pre-07'ga7iic Evolution. 
 
 know, if possible, how it came to be what it now is. 
 And, strange as it may sound to those unfamiliar with 
 the history of thought, experience encourages effort to 
 solve the apparently insolvable. Again and again has 
 it been found that phenomena once deemed irregular, 
 or inextricably tangled and beyond the possibility of 
 any reduction to a principle of order and unity, were 
 really so reducible ; ^ and became, under the careful 
 treatment of the intellect, things of beauty, by reason 
 of the intelligible principle which, in spite of appear- 
 ances to the contrary, was, at last, discovered to be 
 the unifying element running through them all. And 
 although, it is true, the area of fact traversed by 
 observation is as yet but a mere speck as compared 
 with the regions that lie beyond and in the past ; and 
 although the triumphs of the intellect over material 
 intricacies are, relatively to the whole, very few and 
 hardly won, yet enough has been achieved to encourage 
 the belief that an intelligible order thus found to 
 prevail, as far as the intellect has penetrated, is a sure 
 indication of a universal continuous order, which, by 
 further exertion, may be traced, if not in all its 
 ramifications, still, in such clear general lines as to 
 point to the path along which truth may be found. 
 
 ^ This was beautifully illustrated in the case of the planet Neptune. 
 
Criticism, 109 
 
 It is obvious that considerations such as these apply 
 to the philosophy of Evolution as a whole, and 
 especially go to justify an attempt to solve the 
 problem of Inorganic Evolution. It is only fair to 
 Mr. Spencer to say that, with respect to some aspects 
 of the problem, he confesses that we know but little, 
 and have not the means of securing the detailed data 
 usually sought in scientific pursuits. But as his 
 method is a combination of the deductive and in- 
 ductive, he is within his philosophical right in, at 
 least, formulating a system which embraces in principle 
 the entire history of the material universe. Whether 
 that system will stand the test of criticism appropriate 
 to the case remains to be seen. At all events, we must 
 not, for reasons above stated, prejudice the case by assert- 
 incj the utter unreasonableness of all effort to construct 
 a philosophy that, in its principle, shall apply to all 
 things in the past and future. In other words, whether 
 the modern theory of Pre-organic Evolution,, considered 
 simply as an ordered succession and co-ordination of 
 phenomena, be true or not, it is not essentially unreason- 
 able to endeavour to ascertain what was the beginning 
 of the succession and what the order of the progression. 
 I may further remark that the discussion on which 
 we are about to enter is restricted in its ranj]fe and 
 
no Pre- Organic Evolution. 
 
 detail, by the circumstance that it is not intended to 
 raise an argument against the fact of an evolution or 
 gradual devolopment in some form, and from some 
 beginnings. Whether the system of thought already 
 described, taken as a whole, be congruous with all we 
 know, and be valid in principle and method, is a 
 matter of opinion, and, so far as we are concerned, will 
 appear by and by ; but that the inorganic universe has 
 come to its present condition by some process of 
 evolution or development, starting from some relatively 
 simple condition of things, can scarcely be doubted by 
 any one who understands the meaning of words, and has 
 given the slightest heed to the processes of Nature that 
 lie within the reach of ordinarily cultivated men. It is 
 certainly possible to believe that the universe has arrived 
 at its present complex condition by a very gradual 
 process of transition from the simple to the compound 
 and intricate, without being committed to the assertion 
 that it was brought about by the particular process, 
 and from the particular form of simplicity, advocated 
 by, say, Democritus, Leibnitz, or Mr. Spencer. 
 
 Still, a cautious man may prefer to say that the 
 whole data for the satisfactory solution of the problem 
 are so manifold, and the greater part of these lie so 
 far back in the abysmal past, that, although the human 
 
Criticism. 1 1 1 
 
 mind may constitutionally yearn after philosophical 
 unity, and may possess principles which shadow forth 
 the actual line of progression, yet during the present 
 life, at least, we are not in a position to construct a 
 philosophy that shall be, in its range, coextensive 
 with all time and all space, and, at the same time, be, 
 in its validity, such as to command the assent of the 
 Eeason. It is possible, perhaps, to construct a system 
 that may hold its own against all rivals with respect 
 to the later portion of the history of the inorganic 
 universe. Hence we may assuredly accept the in- 
 timations afforded by geological study as to the slow 
 condensation of the matter forming the globe ; and, 
 taking into account, also, the present existence of 
 nebulae ^ in various stages of condensation, we may 
 safely infer that the primitive condition of our globe 
 was the outcome of a condensation of nebulous matter 
 under the action of forces generative of heat. Nor 
 need we rest there, for it is certainly most reasonable 
 to suppose that if our globe originated in some such 
 way as this, the other planets in the system, of which 
 it is but a part, originated in the same way. This, of 
 course, would involve the acceptance of the Nebular 
 
 ^ Modern astronomers regard the majority, if not all the nebulae, as 
 clusters of stars. 
 
1 1 2 Pre-Organic Evolution. 
 
 Hypothesis so far, at least, as relates to our Solar 
 System. It is true, as is well known, there are some 
 serious objections of detail to that hypothesis, on 
 which I need not liere dilate; but time, the great 
 frieud and assistant of patient workers, may, as in 
 other similar cases of difficulty, help to remove them. 
 At all events, the rival hypothesis of Meteoric 
 Aeforlomerations is not so free from difficulties as to 
 claim more credence. 
 
 But can the " cautious man " rest there ? Our faith 
 in Evolution, as a fact of the Solar System, from, at least, 
 a nebulous condition, itself highly differentiated, being 
 thus necessitated by a consideration of the known data 
 and their implications, we seem to be led to form a 
 judgment relating to a much wider area. The instinct 
 of philosophical unity, of which every one is more 
 or less conscious, and which we may always follow, 
 though with . caution, together with the analogies 
 which a well-furnished mind cannot but recoraise, 
 naturally lead us on to admit that a process which 
 accounts well for one system of worlds, and which, 
 indeed, in one form or another, we still see at work 
 before our eyes, in the case of some nebuhe in various 
 stages, may reasonably be regarded as a probable 
 solution of the formation of those other more vast 
 
Criticism. 1 1 3 
 
 systems of stars which lie scattered far away through 
 infinite space, and which, in distinction from the 
 Solar, are known to science as the Sidereal Systems. 
 But it should he observed that this only takes us 
 as far hack as the existence of a vast widespread 
 complexity of nebulous centres — embryo worlds — 
 whirling round with inexpressible velocity, and in 
 the initial stage of concentration, each centre-seek- 
 incT mass fiing^inoj off from itself smaller masses that 
 shall, each of them, as time rolls on, condense and 
 fall into their proper orbits around the central point 
 of attraction. 
 
 Thus far, then, it seems possible and reasonable for 
 any one familiar with the facts of geology and astronomy 
 to go back in the great retrocession, without presuming 
 to construct a philosophy of Evolution that shall 
 profess to apply to all time and all space ; and if we 
 would rise out of a dull content with only knowing 
 things as they now appear to us, and would form any 
 idea of the genesis of things, we must, in some such 
 w^ay as this, think out an evolutionary process. I 
 imagine it would be hard to find a man well acquainted 
 with modern geology and astronomy and inorganic 
 chemistry who would for a moment maintain that the 
 globe, the planets, the sun, and the stars were, each 
 
1 1 4 P7'e - Organic Evolit tion . 
 
 and all of them, formed, by one sudden creative act, 
 or even by six sudden acts on six successive literal 
 days, in their present complete condition as composite 
 harmonised worlds. A process of some kind, and in 
 some degree, must be admitted. But once departing 
 from the crude untenable position just indicated, and 
 admitting in principle some process by which a com- 
 plex order arose, we at once seem to place ourselves, 
 for the formation of a judgment on the whole question 
 of both origin and order and range of the process, 
 under the direction of the evidence supplied by a 
 variety of observations on the constitution of these 
 worlds and the changes in their condition they appear 
 to have undergone, assisted by such general principles 
 pertaining to matter and its modificatious as are of 
 universal application. Following that guidance, we 
 seem to be led back and back, throuoh slow change 
 upon change, till we find ourselves face to face with a 
 nebulous universe in a state of diversified motion. In 
 other words, we traverse backwards the history of the 
 inorganic universe along a road which, from our 
 present starting-point to the farthest point touched 
 by modern science, may be described, in more or 
 less approximate language, as that of Evolution. 
 Taking, therefore, this limited view of Evolution, quite 
 
Criticism. 1 1 5 
 
 apart from details as to the exact sequence of the 
 changes implied, there is no need to enter into con- 
 troversy. 
 
 Seeing, then, that we are at one with Mr. Spencer 
 in the assertion of the fact of an evolution, through an 
 enormous length of time, from the universal nebulous 
 condition of matter, as recognised by astronomers, up 
 to the present complex form of the Solar and Sidereal 
 Systems, though by no means pledged to the minutiae 
 of reasoning by which he has sought to trace the 
 process, the question naturally arises. What, then, is 
 the point of contention, if there be one, and where is 
 reason to be found for objecting to his view as a 
 whole ? Having substantially agreed with him, so far 
 as relates to the fact of the derivation of the ordered 
 worlds from a sea of restless nebulae, are you not 
 committed to the principle of Evolution all along the 
 still further receding line ; as, also, to the process 
 implied as having been wrought out along that line, of 
 which the process expounded by him, with respect to 
 the earth's recent passage from nebulosity to solidity, is 
 but a typical fragment ? And further, in that case, 
 can you escape the conception of Evolution which is 
 peculiar to him, namely, a mere dynamic connection 
 of the idea of process with that of origin ? In other 
 
ii6 Pre-Orzanic Evolution. 
 
 words, will you not be led to his ontological con- 
 clusions involviniT the modern Aojnosticism ? 
 
 Now, in reply to these questions I must ask the 
 reader to bear with me if I recall to mind what has 
 been already said, first of all, as to process and origin. 
 Of course, properly speaking, the question of Evolution 
 is one of process, or method, by which, out of the 
 relatively simple, the complex and differentiated has 
 arisen, and no one knows that better than Mr. 
 Spencer. Mr. Darwin, in dealing with the organic 
 side of Evolution, kept rigidly to this view of its 
 nature ; and hence it has become a commonplace 
 with those who write on Organic Evolution to keep its 
 treatment quite apart from that of Origin. But it is 
 not to the purpose to refer to Organic Evolutionists, 
 in their wise separation of things so utterly different, 
 when we are considering the vast theory which pur- 
 ports to set forth the account that philosophy can 
 give of the material universe. This tendency to 
 measure the terms and scope of philosophy by the 
 terms and scope of physical science, in one of its 
 departments, is a weakness into which specialists are 
 liable to fall. The question now before us is, What 
 does Mr. Spencer practically include in his treatment 
 of Evolution, as applied to the material universe, as 
 
Criticis7Ji, 1 1 7 
 
 a whole ? The language of the Fird Princi'ples, the 
 Principles of Psychology, and the Principles of Biology 
 agrees fully with what I have written, pp. 48, 49. 
 Whatever may be the mere etymology and the common 
 use of the term, he, in expounding the nature of 
 Evolution, associates it inseparably with the idea of 
 Origin. His conception of process is understandable, 
 and has sense only as the idea of Origin is kept clearly 
 in view. Thus he says : " And we found that objective 
 science can give no account of the world which we 
 know as external, without regarding its changes of 
 form as manifestations of something that continues 
 constant under all forms. This is also the implication 
 to which we are now led back by our completed 
 synthesis." ^ Again : " Over and over again it has 
 been shown in various ways, that the deepest truths 
 we can reach are simply statements of the widest 
 uniformities in our experience of the relations of 
 Matter, Motion, and Force ; and that Matter, Motion, 
 and Force are but symbols of the Unknown Eeality." "^ 
 In reply to a critic who had represented his idea 
 of Evolution even in the organic sphere as purely a 
 " mechanical " process, he replies with strong emphasis, 
 that he recognises no forces within the organism, or 
 
 1 First Principles, p. 552. ^ Ibid. p. 556. 
 
1 1 8 Pre- Or cyanic Evolution 
 
 s 
 
 without the organism, " but the variously conditioned 
 modes of the universal immanent force ; " and the 
 " whole process " of even Organic Evolution " is every- 
 where attributed by me to the co-operation of the 
 variously conditioned modes " ^ of the said universal 
 immanent force. Likewise in the chapter on Trans- 
 figured Eealism he speaks of being brought round to 
 the conclusion once more that " behind all manifesta- 
 tions there is a Power manifested," which, while it 
 cannot be known, yet is such that " its universal 
 presence is the absolute fact, without which there can 
 be no relative facts ; " and so he concludes " we learn 
 that the one thing permanent is the Unknowable 
 Eeality hidden under all these changing shapes." ^ 
 The question of Evolution in its thoroughness, then, 
 cannot be considered apart from the question of Origin. 
 That is admitted. Evolution is the ordered manifesta- 
 tion, over all time and space, of One Inscrutable Power. 
 Now, such being the conception of Evolution by 
 Mr. Spencer, I say it does not follow that agreement 
 with him as to the fact of there havin<]j been an 
 evolution, from the nebulous condition of matter 
 recognised by astronomers to the present order of 
 
 ' Principles of Biology, i. p, 491. 
 2 Principles of Psychology, ii. p. 503. 
 
Criticism, 1 1 9 
 
 things, necessitates that one should accept his view as 
 to the origin of it, and its precise relation to the Eternal 
 Eeality. That involves a careful consideration of the 
 nature of the Original Cause, and of the possibility or 
 impossibility of a Creative Act. But of this more anon. 
 
 It is only when the theory of Evolution is made to 
 embrace also a process whicli is supposed to have 
 preceded the relatively complex condition of matter 
 implied in the astronomical Nebular Hypothesis, that 
 we are led back and back in thought till we come by 
 logical necessity face to face with the question of 
 Origin. The nature or rather order of this earlier 
 process is certainly more a matter of speculation than 
 is that which runs from the nebulous condition of 
 matter suggested by astonomers to the present. But 
 even were it not so, I trust the sequel will show 
 that the adverse criticism to which the Spencerian 
 theory is exposed chiefly pertains to the question of 
 Origin — i.e. in ivliat the process originated and what 
 the relation of the material universe to its Cause. 
 
 But it may still be urged that an acceptance of an 
 evolution from the nebulous condition recognised in 
 astronomy up to the present, even though it does not 
 commit us to Mr. Spencer's views concerning the 
 Eternal Realitv which stands as Cause of all ; never- 
 
1 2 o Pre- Oi^gan ic Evolution, 
 
 tlieless, as stated in the question on the page just 
 preceding, it seems to commit us to tlie principle of 
 Evolution along the whole line, and to the detail of the 
 process which antedated the nebulous condition. But 
 to answer this question satisfactorily, let me restate 
 what has been already said on the system as a con- 
 tinuous process from first to last. The matter may be 
 put thus : The whole area of time over which the 
 evolutionary process has been at work, ever passing 
 from the more simple to the more complex, is such as 
 no arithmetic can describe. But immense as it may 
 have been, it may, for the purposes of this philosophy, 
 be divided into three stages. Not that there were three 
 or any breaks in the continuity, or that Mr. Spencer 
 makes the distinctions in so many words ; but the 
 whole progression from the initial change up to the 
 present can be marked off, in thought, by three leading 
 characteristics. Looking backwards along the dim 
 vista, these three stages in the evolutionary process 
 may perhaps be conveniently indicated by the terms 
 solid, molecular, elemental ^ — terms, as will be evident 
 to the expert, not free from objection, but sufficiently 
 accurate for the purpose in hand. Each of these stages 
 covered enormous areas of time. Taking our position 
 
 ^ See Appendix, Note A. 
 
Criticism. 121 
 
 in the midst of the present arrangement of bodies, 
 characterised more or less by solidity and tendency to 
 solidity, and casting our vision backwards, the latest 
 stage would extend from the present condition of the 
 various planetary and stellar worlds to the existence 
 of the diffused moving mass of matter which is 
 usually spoken of as the astronomical nebulous con- 
 dition, and which formed the proximate origin of the 
 Solar and Sidereal Systems. This stage would include 
 all the changes involved in the passage from nebulosity 
 to the definitely ordered worlds, and is that which most 
 of the illustrations and arc^uments adduced in the First 
 Principles are intended to expound and establish. 
 Then, taking our position in the midst of the nebulous 
 mass which stood at the beginning of the last stage, 
 and stretching our imagination far back along the 
 line of change, the next stage would extend from the 
 relatively complex nebulous mass to the time when 
 the only condition of matter in existence was that of 
 elements,^ not in combination, but free — separate. This 
 stage would include all the changes involved in the 
 passage from a free, discrete, elemental state to cohesions 
 
 ^ It will be seen that I assume tliat some very simple form of 
 integration of elements and diversified relationship was a character- 
 istic of the nebulous mass. 
 
1 2 2 Pre- Organic Evolution, 
 
 or combinations in those infinitesimal but relatively 
 complex forms which I here assume, in some small 
 degree, existed in the variously moving nebulous mass 
 that antedated the appearance of the Solar and Stellar 
 Systems. Then, further, placing ourselves in imagina- 
 tion among the entirely free, non-cohering elements far 
 back in the past, and stretching thought still further 
 backwards, the next and the earliest stage would extend 
 from the existence of those free, ?zo7i-cohering elements 
 back and back to the time when the only form of 
 matter in existence consisted of those ultimate units 
 out of which, it is believed, tlie elements were formed, 
 and which, in fact, were the original staple out of 
 which, by a ceaseless process of integration and differ- 
 entiation, the entire universe has been evolved.^ 
 
 Now, inasmuch as the whole evolutionary process, as 
 set forth in the Spencerian system, covers all that is 
 implied of change in these three stages — whether the 
 points of division of the stages be correct or not— and 
 sets out with the assumed ultimate units which stand 
 
 ^ I am aware of the existence of a hypothesis of the formation of 
 atomic ultimates out of a prior condition in which the homogeneity was 
 not that of discrete points ; but I am dealing here with what seems to 
 be Mr. Spencer's presuppositions. Sir William Thomson's view will be 
 considered further on in its bearing on our conception of the Eternal 
 Reality which is supposed to stand at the head of all Evolution. 
 
Criticism. 1 2 3 
 
 at the head of the earliest stage, it is manifest that an 
 admission of the fact of Evolution from the nebulous 
 mass to the present, i.e. during the last stage, and a 
 general agreement with Mr. Spencer so far as that is 
 concerned, is quite consistent with scepticism as to his 
 theory in so far as it relates to what is implied in 
 what preceded it. I do not mean to affirm that there 
 was no evolution prior to the nebulous condition ^ with 
 which astronomical science makes us in some degree 
 acquainted, but that the acceptance of Evolution, from 
 the nebulous condition to the present ordered worlds, 
 ought not, and does not commit us to all that is implied 
 in the Spencerian theory of the derivation of all that 
 now is from such a condition of ultimate units as we 
 shall see soon is necessarily implied in his view of 
 things. We are on somewhat safe ground in holding 
 to an evolution of the present order from a nebulous 
 mass ; for there is positive scientific evidence pointing 
 in that direction; and the possibility of a chemical 
 resolution of solids to not only molecular compounds, 
 but even to elements, points to the extreme probability 
 
 ^ That is, I do not mean to deny that the so-called nebulous condi- 
 tion was itself, probably, complex in constitution and in the relation 
 of its items one to the other, as compared with some earlier condition 
 of the ultimate form to which matter is reducible in scientific thought. 
 Kather, I should say it probably was. 
 
1 24 Pre-Organic Evolution. 
 
 of a reverse process having been the order of nature in 
 the formation of those solids, and so far as that goes 
 there may have been a continuous evolution from bare 
 elements. On the other hand, as we shall see in due 
 course, there are assumptions and impossible conditions 
 implied in Mr. Spencer's extreme view, which places 
 it in a category different from that of the more modest 
 view which starts with the Nebular Hypothesis, as 
 ordinarily understood in astronomy. 
 
 I have already pointed out considerations which 
 tend to render reasonable even some attempt to frame 
 a speculative philosophy of the material universe as a 
 whole, though the particular form that philosophy may 
 assume and the conclusions it seems to warrant must of 
 necessity be exceedingly problematical. Under such 
 circumstances, I hold that no a j)vioTi objection can be 
 reasonably urged against our resting in the theory of 
 an Evolution which relates really to the latter part of 
 the history of the inorganic universe, and which finds 
 its initial in an already complicated condition of matter. 
 It assuredly is possible to form some definite judgment 
 on the progress of things in their later stages ; and, 
 though such a modest theory may not satisfy the 
 ambition which seeks to know and understand all 
 things throughout all past time, it has the advantage 
 
Criticism. 125 
 
 of relative solidity so far as it goes. The fact that Mr. 
 Spencer practically recognises the evolution of the 
 present ordered worlds from a state of things implied 
 in the astronomical Nebular Hypothesis as part of his 
 more ambitious theory, is certainly no reason why it 
 should not be held by those who may not follow him 
 in his more extreme flights. Belief in a probable pro- 
 cess over a given period does not involve the same 
 difficulties as an account of the process, through all 
 past time, in relation to the conditions of its commence- 
 meiit. If we are to form any idea at all as to the 
 history of the material universe during the latter part 
 of its progress, for reasons already given, I do not see 
 how any one who has paid attention to the literature 
 of the subject can well avoid accepting the theory of 
 Pre-organic Evolution, from either a prior nebulous 
 condition of matter, or some such condition as that 
 indicated by the Agglomeration Hypothesis. Any out- 
 cry against such a view seems to be the offspring of 
 ignorance of the facts — geological and astronomical — 
 at our command for forming a judgment on tlie ques- 
 tion, or else of an unwillinofness to bow to the teachinoj 
 of Nature, under the apprehension that to do so would 
 necessarily be to set aside the explicit teaching of 
 some higher authority. One can respect the feeling 
 
1 2 6 Pre- Orgafi ic Evolution, 
 
 which prompts Christian men to be jealous of anything 
 that would reflect on the authority of Eevelation. 
 Knowing what inestimable blessings have been made 
 ours through the instrumentality of Scripture, and what 
 good evidence there is that Scripture is the vehicle 
 through which a Divine Voice has reached the heart 
 and conscience of men, we may well be on our guard 
 against whatever would tend to deprive us of our 
 precious heritage. 
 
 At the same time, this profound regard for the 
 Bible, and this desire to keep a tenacious hold on the 
 realities of the Christian Faith, should induce caution 
 lest, in our excessive zeal, by the projection of opinions 
 and theories of our own creation, we put upon the 
 Bible a burden it was never designed to carry. I have 
 often noticed, in studying some of our modern writers 
 on the pre-Socratic philosophies, how prone they are 
 to import their modern conceptions and modern 
 hypotheses into the fragmentary remains of tlie early 
 Greek thinkers, and thus make these old-world men 
 answerable for much that never entered into their 
 minds. Christian men ought to be careful lest they 
 do the same with respect to, especially, the earlier 
 portions of the Book of Genesis. It is not to be for- 
 gotten, in the discussion of such subjects as Evolution, 
 
Criticism. 127 
 
 that those who write upon it are simply following the 
 light which they believe they find in JS^ature, and to 
 them it is simply a question of what are the facts of 
 the case as seen in Nature's records. The man of 
 science cannot but follow his light so far as it leads. 
 He would be an unfaithful man if he did not. If we 
 can show him from Nature — by a more perfect 
 scientific representation of the facts — that what he 
 deems fact is not fact, tliat his supposed light is not 
 light, we render him real service, and improve his 
 scientific position. But we put him in a painful 
 position, and are doing our most sacred interests a 
 wrong, if, instead of bringing a wider and more exact 
 scientific knowledge to bear on him, we, forming, it 
 may be, imperfect theories about Scripture, first impose 
 our ideas on the language of Scripture, and then, and 
 on that account, demand that he shall renounce the 
 light which shines before him — to follow which he, as 
 a man of truth and honesty, is pledged — and submit, 
 not necessarily, be it observed, to tlie real authority 
 claimed by Scripture, which is indubitable, but to that 
 interpretation of its authority and of its words which 
 may be only the transcript of our own minds. 
 
 That the first chapter of Genesis does teach us 
 something concerning the origin of all things, and 
 
128 Pre-Ororanic Evolution. 
 
 dimly concerning an order by which things in the 
 inorganic world became what they are, is plain enough ; 
 but the interpretation we may put on that teaching, 
 with respect to details in their relation to its precise 
 intent, its scope, and its form, may admit of consider- 
 able variety, according as we pay full regard or not to 
 the successive and occasional origin of the books which 
 form the Bible, its general structure, its declared pur- 
 pose, and the analogy between its references to the 
 remote past and its references to the remote future. 
 The utter spirit of levity with which some seem dis- 
 posed to treat the most ancient portion of the sacred 
 records is greatly to be deplored, and reveals how little 
 they are able to appreciate the wondrous spiritual 
 unity which, amidst literary and historical diversities 
 of a most extraordinary character, pervades the entire 
 Jewish and Christian writings, and how inconsistent 
 their temper is with the devout and serious spirit of 
 Him whose name they still wish to bear. At the 
 same time, we have no right, especially in the case of 
 slender references to great transactions in prehistoric 
 times, to claim for our interpretation of Scripture an 
 infallibility which we are indisposed to grant to an 
 interpretation of Xature. The scientific investigator 
 may be able to say, with a justifiable confidence, that 
 
Criticism. 129 
 
 a careful examination of all the facts so far within 
 human reach leads him to the inevitable conclusion 
 that the earth, the Solar and Sidereal Systems came, 
 by a very slow process of change, from a state of 
 molecular diffusion to their present condensed and 
 complex state, i.e. were slowly evolved. And if he 
 knows a little of theological and exegetical literature, 
 he may further add that, among those who admit the 
 authority of Scripture in a very reasonable sense, there 
 is a very considerable diversity of judgment as to the 
 precise interpretation that may, and ought to be put on 
 the language and drift of the first chapter of Genesis, 
 with respect to the order of Nature in the dim past ; 
 and, moreover, he will be able to say tliat there are 
 many devout and well-trained expositors who affirm 
 tliat, taking into account what seems to be the scope 
 of this ancient document — namely, to set forth the 
 Divine Power and Wisdom as running through all 
 things — and tlie principles of interpretation derived 
 from a careful induction of Biblical usage, there is 
 nothing in this portion of Scripture but that is con- 
 sistent with an evolution of the present inorganic 
 system of things from a relatively simple condition of 
 Matter and Motion. As to the origin of Matter and 
 Motion, and their inlierent fitness to evolve so wonder- 
 
130 Pre-Organic Evohttion. 
 
 fully, that is another question, which is presupposed 
 in the passage of Matter from a diffused nebulous 
 condition to its present form. And, also, as concerns 
 the antecedents of the nebulous condition known to 
 science, tliat conies nnder tlie part of the Spencerian 
 system which, as I believe, lies open to adverse 
 criticism. 
 
 But to revert to the main question before us, it will 
 have been noticed, in the exposition I have given of 
 Mr. Spencer's Philosophy, that I have laid considerable 
 stress on its width. It has been represented as apply- 
 ing to all Time and Space, and as furnishing a formula 
 so constructed as to cover all the changes that have 
 ever taken place in the interaction of Matter and 
 Motion. In order to render the sense in which the 
 scope of his philosophy must be understood, I ventured 
 to say that his reference to the evolution of the Solar 
 System, from some nebulous condition of matter, 
 necessarily implied a corresponding evolution of the 
 whole Sidereal System from a similar nebulous con- 
 dition ; and, further, that inasmuch as the nebulous 
 condition known to astronomers is itself, relatively to 
 the ultimate form of Matter, complex, the idea of 
 Evolution carried with it the prior evolution of the 
 Solar and Sidereal nebulous antecedents from some 
 
Criticism. 1 3 t 
 
 perfectly simple form of Matter and Motion. 
 Also, I indicated the line of retrocession from 
 that relatively complex condition back through 
 staixes of molecular and elemental forms, till the 
 minimum, of simplicity was reached from which, in 
 the beginning, logically, all things must have 
 evolved. 
 
 Now, it is probable that the remark may be made 
 that in all this I have misinterpreted Mr. Spencer's 
 system, — that I have assigned to his conception of 
 Evolution a range which he has never claimed for it 
 in any distinct and unambiguous terms; and that 
 especially we may look in vain through his works for 
 any such line of retrocession at the back of the 
 nebulous mass out of which he represents the Solar 
 System to have evolved. It may also be said that 
 he occasionally, in tlie unfolding of his argument, 
 distinctly sets a limit to human knowledge, and allows 
 that there are points beyond which science cannot 
 penetrate. 
 
 So far as mere language goes, I am prepared to 
 admit that there is some force in the objection thus 
 raised to my representation. He docs concentrate his 
 attention almost exclusively on the evolution of the 
 Solar System, and professes to deal with "sensible 
 
132 P7'e- Organ ic Evohttion, 
 
 existences " and the changes they undergo, — under- 
 standing by the expression, " existences " that are 
 ascertainable by the conscious exercise of our powers 
 of observation, either directly or indirectly, i.e. by the 
 senses themselves, or as aided by instruments and 
 scientific reasoning upon the facts given by sense. 
 There is pre-eminently a noticeable absence of any 
 declaration that the molecules of the nebulous mass, 
 immediately antedating the formation of the SoLnr 
 System, are a compound of some more elementary form 
 of matter; and, therefore, much more is there an 
 absence of any systematised deduction of this com- 
 pound from some more discrete and simple form, which 
 itself was also a compound derived by an integration 
 of the ultimate units of which matter in its primordial 
 form consists. There can be no doubt but that as an 
 articulated, minutely reasoned system, his philosophy 
 starts from the condition of matter im. plied in the 
 Nebular Hypothesis. In the interesting chapter (xiv.) 
 on the Law of Evolution he prepares his readers for 
 the passage from tlie deductive side of his argument 
 to the inductive. His object, from the deductive side, 
 is to show, from the nature of the primary principles 
 assumed, that " all sensible existences must, in some 
 way or other, and at some time or other, reach their 
 
C7Hticism. 133 
 
 concrete shapes tliroiigli processes of concentration/' ^ 
 His subsequent introduction of the inductive side of 
 the argument is to illustrate how, as a matter of fact, 
 all sensible existences do thus pass from one state to 
 the other ; and in accomplishing this he confines his 
 attention to the evidence derivable especially from 
 geology, astronomy, and other modern sciences bear- 
 ing on tlie subject. 
 
 But tiie conclusion that might be justly drawn from 
 such language, and such a method of reasoning, would 
 certainly be adverse to the representation I have given 
 of Mr. Spencer's system, if such words and such a 
 method of reasoning stood alone, and constituted all 
 the facts that bear upon the case. It is because I 
 believe that many readers of Mr. Spencer form their 
 judgment upon this partial view of the case that I 
 not only have ventured to give a much wider meaning 
 to his philosophy, but am prepared to submit a few 
 considerations with a view to justify the course I have 
 felt bound to take. 
 
 It may freely be conceded that in the words just 
 quoted from the First Principles the expression " all 
 sensible existences " does refer to such as can come 
 under our senses, and, therefore, such only as are 
 
 ' Firat Priiic'q^les, p. G07. 
 
134 Pre-Organic EvohUion. 
 
 the subjects of scientific observation. It is true of all 
 such that " in some way or other, and at some time 
 or other " they " reach their concrete shapes through 
 processes of concentration." But it does not follow 
 from this fact that " existences " that cannot, by reason 
 of their attenuated nature and infinitesimal size, come 
 under our observation, and so be called " sensible," 
 are, therefore, incapable of concentration, and do not 
 actually pass through changes in their relation one to 
 the other so that they evolve out of a discrete, isolated 
 state into an integrated or compound state. It is 
 possible, certainly, to affirm concentration of forms of 
 matter that lie far beyond the " sensible " sphere. 
 Indeed, our science of physics is constructed on not 
 only the possibility, but the actualit}^ of the concentra- 
 tion, into invisible portions of matter, of ultimate units 
 of matter, which no eye, assisted or unassisted, has 
 seen or can see. The combinations we call " sensible " 
 may be analysed up to a certain point, when no further 
 progress can be made in determining what are the real 
 constituents of the particle under examination, except 
 by assuming the existence of ultimate units of matter 
 which form the basis of the whole combination ; and 
 these units never have been the subjects of actual 
 observation. A particle of dust in the air is a 
 
Criticism, 1 3 5 
 
 "sensible" concentrated portion of matter, and by the 
 application of a drop of water, which is another 
 " sensible " concentrated portion, it becomes more 
 combined with others. But the history of that 
 particle is that, somehow and at some time or other, 
 infinitesimal units, which Mr. Spencer thinks may be 
 more simple than even what we now call elements, 
 came together ; and though their coming together — 
 concentrating-— was a fact lying outside the " sensible " 
 sphere, it is to be regarded as truly an incident in 
 Evolution as when moistened molecules of sand or 
 mud on the beach roll toc'ether and combine in the 
 form of a small stone. 
 
 Moreover, the keynote to Mr. Spencer's Philosophy 
 is iinitij — unity in things and unity in thought. 
 Throughout his works he speaks of the entire mani- 
 festations of the Eternal Eeality, and not of a part. 
 The term Universe is employed to indicate the entire 
 of phenomenal existence ; and this entire phenomenal 
 existence, be it in some portions visible or invisible, 
 constitutes the sole and complete expression of the 
 One Inscrutable Power. Inasmuch as the One In- 
 scrutable Power is One, the totality of the expression, 
 or, as he is pleased to call it, manifestation, is held in 
 a corresponding unity. There are no breaks, no isola- 
 
136 Pre-Organic Evolution. 
 
 tions, no detaclied unrelated parts, no regions in Space 
 or Time, under a supreme law of existence and change 
 peculiar to themselves. The philosophical craving for 
 unification of knowledge is only the human mental 
 counterpart and intelligible sign of an objective unity 
 in the supreme law regnant among things. 
 
 I^ow, to imagine that Mr. Spencer held that the 
 law of Evolution was supreme for " sensible " thing?, 
 and did not apply equally to all things transcending 
 our senses and their appliances, would be to cut the 
 universe into two halves and virtually deny the 
 unity which is the foundation principle of his 
 philosophy. To say that his exposition is confined 
 to the Solar System, and that in its production he 
 has found the supreme law to be that of Evolution, — 
 the integrating of the unintegrated and the rendering 
 definite of the indefinite, — but that we have no right 
 to apply this law so expounded to the vast series of 
 changes which antedated the particular nebulous con- 
 dition with which the evolution of the Solar System 
 started, and also to the vast areas of change lying 
 outside that system, is to destroy the very basis of 
 his structure of philosophic thought. Unity is gone. 
 No one formula is found that will apply to the whole 
 process. This is not a case, then, to which will apply 
 
Criticism. 137 
 
 the significant words : " Only when we can formulate 
 the total process have we gained that knowledge of it 
 which Philosophy aspires to." ^ Should it be said of 
 these words that their context shows that Mr. Spencer 
 is referring only to the total process, as far as relates 
 to " sensible existence," i.c, the process pertaining to 
 tlie Solar System, I reply that, granting that to be so, 
 does he mean us to understand that " the formulation 
 of the total process," so far as it can be traced in the 
 history of the Solar System, has no bearing on the 
 material universe as a whole ? As the formula sought 
 and arrived at is that indicated by the term Evolu- 
 tion, — the passage by slow change from the simple to 
 the complex, the indefinite to the definite, — does he 
 mean to teach, or to wish it to be inferred, that 
 Evolution does not apply to those periods in the 
 history of the universe, and those portions in the 
 universe, which we are not able by direct observation 
 to trace out? Is it that Evolution is the formula 
 for a part of things only, and just that part which we 
 happen to know by its being close at hand ? Again, 
 I say, where is philosophical unity ? Is continuity 
 partial ? Is our unacquaintance with the exact 
 sequence, in detail, of some parts of the history of 
 
 ^ First PrincipUs, p. 274. 
 
1 3 8 P}'e- Oi'ganic Evolution. 
 
 the universe a just reason for saying that that un- 
 trackable liistory was certainly or probably exempt 
 from the law of Evolution ? Has the Eternal Eeality 
 which, though not clothed with many attributes, yet 
 is described as being characteristically " persistent " — 
 has it, in the course of duration, clianged its mode of 
 manifestation, so as to manifest itself here under the 
 law of Evolution, and elsewhere and at another time 
 under some other unknown law ? I for one Q-ive 
 Mr. Spencer credit for more consistency than this. 
 Whether portions of the history of the universe are 
 known to us, as is that of the Solar System with its 
 *' sensible existence," or not ; whether there be depart- 
 meuts of its whole history both in Space and Time 
 utterly beyond our ken ; the logic of ]\Ir. Spencer's 
 exposition of what Philosophy is, and the whole con- 
 ception of the Eternal lieality he has so repeatedly 
 set forth, — both go to show that the words following 
 which he has written, presumably concerning the 
 history of the Solar System, hold true of all systems 
 in all time : " It is obvious that v;e have not acquired 
 all the information within the grasp of our intelligence 
 until we can, in some way or other, express the whole 
 past and whole future history of each object and the 
 aggregate of objects. Usually able, as we are, to say 
 
Criticism. 139 
 
 of any visible tangible thing liow it came to have its 
 present shape and consistence, we are fully possessed 
 with the conviction that, setting out abruptly as we 
 do with some substance which already had a concrete 
 form, our history is incomplete : the thing liad a 
 history preceding the state with which we started. 
 Hence our Theory of Things, considered individually 
 or in their totality, is confessedly imperfect so long as 
 any past or future portions of their sensible existences 
 are unaccounted for. 
 
 "May it not be inferred that Phiiosopliy has to 
 formulate this passage from the imperceptible unto 
 the perceptible ? Is it not clear that this general law 
 of the redistribution of matter and motion, which we 
 lately saw is required to unify the various kinds of 
 changes, must also be one that unifies the successive 
 changes wdiich sensible existences, separately and 
 together, pass through ? Only by some formula com- 
 bining these characters can knowledge be reduced to 
 a coherent whole." ^ That law is Evolution. Change 
 the expression " sensible " into " all " existences, and 
 the unity of the universe, and also of its philosophy, 
 will be retained. 
 
 There are several distinct indications that Mr. 
 
 1 Firs,t Principles, p. 280. 
 
140 Pre- Organic Evolution, 
 
 Spencer does recognise this wide range of the prin- 
 ciple of Evolution. After, for instance, having con- 
 sidered Evolution as it is found at work in the 
 departments covered by astronomy, geology, biology, 
 and other sciences, and affirming its truth of each of 
 these " orders of existences, considered as a separate 
 order," he says, " we recognise these divisions as mere 
 conventional groupings, made to facilitate the arrange- 
 ment and acquisition of knowledge . . . and regard 
 the different existences with which they severally deal 
 as component parts of one Cosmos." ^ He then adds : 
 " We see at once that there are not several kinds of 
 Evolution having certain traits in common, but one 
 Evolution going on everywhere after the same manner." 
 The " divisions " above referred to are within the Solar 
 System ; but he closes tlie paragraph just quoted 
 by saying " that even its transformations are but 
 those of a scarcely appreciable portion of our Sidereal 
 System, which has at the same time been going 
 through parallel changes." ^ But the language is even 
 more distinct than this, for he continues : " In any 
 locality^ great or small, throiiyJwut space, where the 
 occupying matter acquires an appreciable individuality, 
 or distinguishableness from other matter, there Evolu- 
 
 1 First Princ'phs, p. 515. - Ihid. p. 546. 
 
Criticism, 141 
 
 tion goes on ; or rather, the acquirement of this 
 appreciable individuality is the commencement of 
 Evolution." ^ Again, after referring to Dissolutions as 
 the complement of Evolutions, and as embraced in the 
 wider sense of the word, as meaning the law of the 
 interaction or redistribution of Matter and Motion, he 
 speaks of having seen reason to think that there is an 
 alternation of Evolution and Dissolution " in the totality 
 of things," and that " there have been Evolutions that 
 have filled an immeasurable past and that there will 
 be Evolutions that will fill an immeasurable future." 
 So that " we can no longer contemplate the visible 
 creation as having a definite beginning or end, or as 
 being isolated." It becomes " unified with all existence 
 before and after ; and the Force wliicli the universe 
 presents, falls into the same category with its Space 
 and Time, as admitting of no limitation in thought." ^ 
 
 Should it be asked. How comes it to pass, if the 
 actual scope and purpose of the Spencerian philosophy 
 is to set forth the law which governs the passage of 
 the entire material universe from the utmost simplicity 
 to the utmost existing complexity, the argument seems 
 to be derived from a consideration of the changes that 
 have actually occurred in the passage of the Solar 
 
 ^ First Pri7iciples, p. 546. - Ibid. p. 551. 
 
1 4 2 Pre- Organ ic Evolution, 
 
 System from a prior nebulous condition ? — tlie answer 
 is to be found in Mr. Spencer's own language, namely, 
 " Evolution, under its primary aspect, is illustrated 
 most simply and clearly by this passage of the Solar 
 System from a widely diffused incoherent state to a 
 consolidated coherent state." ^ This brings out the 
 method of reasoning adopted. The same is found in 
 the writings of those who treat of Organic Evolution. 
 Tljey expound the law of Natural Selection, and gather 
 their arguments in its support from instances of change 
 within the present reach of the scientific man, intending 
 it to be understood that the law so illustrated, and so 
 far established, shall apply to all the remote foims of 
 life lying now beyond all observation. So Mr. Spencer 
 intends his illustrations and arguments, derived from 
 the formation of the Solar System, to be but typical 
 of the changes which took place outside that System 
 before the nebulous matter assumed the particular 
 form in which it was just before the commencement 
 of the particular condensation, which settled the form 
 and movements of the present earth and planets. Of 
 the " forces displayed " in the progress of the Solar 
 System, he claims to possess some positive knowledge. 
 He admits that there were " antecedents " of these 
 
 ^ Firat Prindpks, p. SOS. 
 
Criticism. 
 
 143 
 
 forces — that is, as I understand it, a prior stage of the 
 one great evolutionary process working towards the 
 production of that separate mass of nebulous matter 
 which constituted the basis of the Solar, as distin- 
 guished from the larger mass which constituted the 
 basis of the more vast Sidereal, System. It is especially 
 noteworthy that he says, also, of these " antecedents " 
 that he can only at any time claim an inferential 
 knowledge, and at present hardly that/ But in saying 
 this, Mr. Spencer assumes a modesty not quite in 
 harmony with the main principle of liis philosophy. 
 Tor in making, as he does, Evolution to be the law of 
 the universe, through all Space and Time, and in 
 explaining it to mean, in its most general form, the 
 passage from the simple to the complex, from the 
 undifferentiated to the differentiated, he virtually as- 
 serts that, at the beginning of all things, if such there 
 was, or, at least, at the beginning of the evolutionary 
 process of the universe, there existed a minimum of 
 phenomenal simplicity — a state of matter in wliich 
 there were not even, probably, the differences we 
 know to exist between the elements ; in which, in 
 fact, there were no such things as differing elements. 
 As to the stages in the retrocession at the back of 
 
 1 Firi^t Principles, p. 203. 
 
144 P re-Organic Evolution, 
 
 the nebulous mass to the primordial condition of 
 matter, i.c, the condition before any integration or 
 modification of the ultimate units took place, I do 
 not enter into that here, as it will come up in the 
 subsequent discussion. But that some such stages are 
 involved in the theory, and must be conceded by Mr. 
 Spencer, will be apparent to any one who grasps the 
 main principle, and especially if he will take the 
 trouble to read what he has written ^ concerning his 
 ignorance of myriads of ages of molecular forma- 
 tion tending towards the organic, and yet expressing 
 his conviction, arising out of the necessity of the case, 
 of the certainty of such gradual formation. 
 
 I say, then, that rigorously worked out, the Spen- 
 cerian system amounts to this, that there is clear 
 evidence, from scientific observation, of the changes 
 now transpiring, and that have transpired, in the history 
 of the globe, together with the implications of the 
 assumed First Principles, that the Solar System has 
 evolved from a condition of matter relatively simple, 
 and known as a diffused nebulous mass; that this 
 proved instance of Evolution from the relatively simple 
 to the complex must be taken as sufficient proof and 
 illustration of a preceding change, differing in detail 
 
 ^ Princ'qdes of Biolo'ji/, i. pp. 4S2-4S7. 
 
Criticism, 145 
 
 but one in principle, and in the forms and conditions of 
 matter ; and that this preceding change, inaccessible to 
 our actual observation and positive knowledge, consisted 
 in a very slow and intricate passage of matter from 
 the primordial minimum, simplicity, in which it must 
 be conceived to have existed, to the particular nebulous 
 condition referred to as standing at the proximate com- 
 mencement of the evolution of the Solar System. 
 This nebulous mass at the head of the Solar System, of 
 course, was only a fragment thrown off from the huge 
 mass that broke up into the various Stellar Systems, 
 and thus was differentiated from it and them. And the 
 whole original mass before breaking up into these Solar 
 and Sidereal Systems was itself, just before it so broke 
 up, in a state differentiated from an earlier condition 
 of its constituents, which was that of discrete elements 
 alone ; and even this very simple condition of purely 
 discrete elements was derived by a process of integra- 
 tion, and in that sense of differentiation, from the earliest 
 condition of matter, namely, that in which the ultimate 
 units were strictly uncompoitnded and Iwmogencous. 
 
 2. The Minimum Simplicity. 
 
 We come, then, to the inquiry, What is there in 
 this Spencerian doctrine of the deduction, by a process 
 
146 Pre- Organic Evohttion. 
 
 of integration and differentiation, of nebulous molecular 
 combinations and movements from a purely elemental 
 form of matter, and of this elemental form from a 
 primordial minimum simplicity, that is open to criti- 
 cism ? A certain reputation has been claimed for 
 Mr. Spencer's speculation, as a whole, on the score 
 that it is concrruous with reason, and, the more so, 
 because no one who seeks to account for the present 
 form and condition of the Solar System can doubt 
 that it is the outcome of an evolution of some kind. 
 The scattered allusions in the First Principles to the 
 "antecedents" of the Solar Evolution, and the admissions 
 here and there of the purely speculative character of 
 any theory concerning those antecedents, must not be 
 allowed to pass as a shield against a critical scrutiny 
 of the Philosophy of Evolution as a whole. Professor 
 Huxley has pointed out, in an excellent address 
 delivered before the Poyal Society, that there is, 
 among a certain class of young scientific men, a super- 
 stitious tendency to convert Darwin's hypothesis of 
 Natural Selection into a creed. In like manner it 
 may be truly said that, among many general readers, 
 whose acquaintance with the ultimate problems of 
 Philosophy is very meagre, there is a disposition to 
 regard the Spencerian speculation concerning the mini- 
 
Criticism. 147 
 
 mum, from which all Evolution must have proceeded, 
 as a new faith, which, unlike all prior faiths, is exclu- 
 sively congruous with reason. The probability of the 
 Evolution of the Solar System, as it is, from a nebulous 
 condition of matter, is taken, by some of those who 
 admit the universal range of his system, as affording a 
 presumption that the implied ideas of the same teacher, 
 concerning what was and what occurred prior to that 
 particular ISTebular stage, are to be accepted as equally 
 satisfactory. Let us see. 
 
 And, first of all, let us notice carefully what is 
 implied in the minimum simplicity with which Uni- 
 versal Evolution must have commenced. I lay great 
 stress on the assertion that Mr. Spencer teaches, some- 
 times explicitly, and always by necessary implication, 
 that so far as concerns Matter, ultimate, eqiial, undiffer- 
 cnticUccl units formed the primordial miimmcm from 
 whence all Evolution proceeded. As I have pointed 
 out in the exposition of Pre-organic Evolution, this is 
 the necessary implication running through his theory 
 from first to last ; and this is the main point to be 
 grasped if we would form an estimate of the congruity 
 of the theory as a whole. The fundamental position 
 is that all differentiation comes out of Evolution. To 
 suppose that differentiation existed prior to Evolution 
 
148 Pre-Organic Evolution, 
 
 would be to sap the foundation of the superstructure. 
 Things are not created differently, or in different com- 
 binations, or endowed with different qualities. They 
 become unlike in relation and movement and com- 
 bination out of the like, by a gradual process, which 
 is the expression of the action of One Persistent 
 Force. Perfectly homogeneous units, equally related 
 to the One Force, is all that exists at the beginning 
 of the evolutionary course. In the light of modern 
 science, the question naturally arises as to the con- 
 nection of these ultimates with the hypothetical ether, 
 but Mr. Spencer does not seem to be turned from his 
 course by such considerations. In one place ^ he just 
 raises the question as to whether the ultimate units 
 can be thoucrht as " molecules of ether," but lie does 
 not insist on it, and is content to start with them as 
 distinguishable, and not as derived from ether. On this 
 subject there is an explicitness which leaves nothing 
 to be desired ; for when working out his theory of tlie 
 " Composition of Mind," or rather his idea of Mental 
 Evolution, as consisting in the elaboration of ultimate 
 units of feeling, " nervous shocks," than which nothing 
 can be conceived as more simple, he has recourse 
 for ilhistration and analogy to what he has already 
 
 ^ rWat rvlnciphf^, p. 224. 
 
Criticism, 1 49 
 
 taught on Material Evolution. I have quoted part of 
 this before, but its importance is such that I must call 
 special attention to it at the outset of my criticism. 
 He says : " The nature of Mind, as thus conceived, will 
 be elucidated by comparing it with the nature of 
 Matter. . . . There is reason to suspect tliat the so- 
 called simple substances (elements) are themselves 
 compound, and that there is but one ultimate form of 
 ]\Iatter, out of which the successively more complex 
 forms of Matter were built up. By the different 
 groupings of units, and by the combination of unlike 
 groups, each with its own kind and each with other 
 kinds, it is supposed that there have been produced 
 the kinds of matter we call elementary; just as by 
 further compositions similarly carried on, these pro- 
 duce furtlier varieties and complexities." ^ Were Mr. 
 Spencer a more historical writer than he is, I should 
 have supposed he was here reproducing the Homa?o- 
 meria of Anaxagoras under a modern guise. Be that 
 as it may, it is clear enough that the ultimate units 
 which lay at the beginning of the evolutionary process 
 were more simple than the elements — the mininutm 
 of existence of a material kind was a multiplicity of 
 diffused units perfectly homogeneous — a uuiverse of 
 
 1 rnnclplcH of rsjjcholofjy, i. pp. 154, 1j5. 
 
150 Pre- Organic Evolutiojt. 
 
 infinitesimal items in which there were none of the 
 qualities which we now consider to be peculiar to the 
 elements — a boundless ocean of specks, the least 
 possible removed in size and concreteness from bare 
 mathematical points. 
 
 But such beino: the minimuni of Matter at the 
 beginning, we have next to notice the postulated 
 minimum of Force, or action in form of a force ; 
 for obviously something else besides Matter is a pre- 
 requisite to an evolutionary process. The question 
 as to the form of the force which was the primordial 
 complement of the original forms of Matter appears 
 to have caused Mr. Spencer some perplexity. It is 
 with reference to this, and not merely to what 
 applied only to the compound nebulous mass with 
 which the Evolution of the Solar System began, that 
 I understand him to ask whether it must be thought 
 as single or double.^ He concludes it to be the 
 more reasonable supposition that the phenomena 
 characteristic of Evolution are due to " the variously 
 conditioned working of a single force," under the 
 form of universal pressure and tension, as these 
 terms are now understood in molecular physics. Of 
 course, it is understood that whatever changes, in 
 
 ^ First Principlc.% pp. 223, 224. 
 
Criticism. 1 5 r 
 
 the roll of the ages, occurred under the action of 
 this form of force, they, as well as the particular 
 force, and the Matter on which it acted, were ultim- 
 ately to be referred in origin to the " One Absolute 
 Cause," — the "Inscrutable Eeality," of which all 
 that is, and has been, and will be, is the manifesta- 
 tion. It comes then to this that, as the starting- 
 point of Evolution, there is to be thought a vast 
 diffusion of ultimate units of Matter, each like the 
 other in every respect, each subject to equal pressure 
 and tension. This perfect equality, this exclusion of 
 all differentiation, is the true homogeneity antedating 
 the evolutionary process of the material universe. 
 All that has followed resulted from the breaking in 
 upon tliis perfect homgeneity. Again, I repeat what 
 is the main position to insist on, namely, that to 
 suppose the ultimate units were in any way dis- 
 similar, or that there were any inequalities or differ- 
 ences in the amount or direction of the force acting 
 on them, or that one part of the diffused mass differed 
 from another in any particular affecting the units, 
 would be to introduce considerable differentiations 
 and adjustments of things before the setting up of 
 the process which, by hypothesis, is supposed to 
 account for all differentiations. 
 
1 5 2 Pre- Orga n ic Evolu Hon , 
 
 Now, it appears to me that there are no known 
 principles by which it is possible to see how an even 
 slightly complicated universe could issue from such 
 a minimum. For in the state of things above 
 described, any change in the relation and motion of 
 any one or more ultimate would be a differentiation, 
 and there would be nothinu; to ori^^nnate this initial 
 change or differentiation essential to the subsequent 
 diversified interaction of Matter and Motion. There 
 could be no new direct action or manifestation of the 
 One InscTutaUc Bcality, since that would imply the 
 Theistic conception of a free Power which strikes in 
 after that the working phenomena of the universe 
 have been established, — tlie very conception, even 
 in its application to Eeligion, which this extreme 
 theory of Evolution was designed to render un- 
 necessary. In the phenomena themselves ^ even when 
 considered as manifestations of an Inscrutable Eeality, 
 there would lie oio cause of variation in the original 
 arrangement of the units of Matter. For suppose 
 we assume that the units, each being under the 
 equal action of one force in form of equal pressure 
 and tension, are at rest, it is obvious that they wouhl 
 remain at rest for ever; and in that case the only 
 existing universe would consist of an eternal mani- 
 
Criticism. 153 
 
 festation of the Inscrutable Eeality, under the 
 phenomenal form of a diffused discrete mass of units 
 of Matter perfectly motionless. There would be an 
 eternal repose of separate specks. But suppose we 
 assume that each of the units, under the action of 
 one force in form of equal pressure and tension, were 
 somehow in motion, either parallel or oscillating, it 
 is clear they could never get out of the mutual 
 relation therein implied. The " Persistence of Force " 
 so acting w^ould be an eternal Persistence in the 
 same form. Mere " persistence " cannot originate a 
 change or modification. In such a case, the only 
 manifestation of the Inscrutable Pteality would be 
 an eternal uniform flight through infinite space of a 
 host of homogeneous units, or else an eternal kicking 
 of units one against the other, with ever-abiding, 
 equal persistency. Our present universe would cer- 
 tainly never have been made. 
 
 It will not do to say that I am here raising only 
 a supposititious case, transcending all human know- 
 ledge of particulars and all conceivability. I do 
 not affirm that Mr. Spencer professes to be acquainted 
 with the particulars in any strictly scientific sense ; 
 but these are the inevitable conditions of the problem 
 as that problem is laid down by himself. These 
 
154 Pre-Organic Evolution, 
 
 ultimate forms of thought are indlssolubly connected 
 with his own conception of Evolution as the law 
 of the universe through all Space and Time. The 
 problem set in the Cosmic Philosophy is to get the 
 present complicated universe, not merely the Solar 
 part of it, from a prior simple undifferentiated con- 
 dition of Matter and Motion. If that be not the 
 problem — if Mr. Spencer is content to say that, 
 whatever Evolution prevails, it took its start from a 
 finely adjusted, mathematically co - ordinated system 
 of molecules, that is, from a differentiated, reasoned 
 primum, then, all essential controversy is at an end. 
 Intelligence is, then, evidently at the Source of all 
 things. Evolution is the outcome and expression of 
 an Infinite Wisdom and Power. The Theist asks 
 for no more, save only the continuous freedom 
 of the First Cause. Persistence of force might work 
 out all after this, producing marvellous differentia- 
 tions. I contend that the only escape from the 
 conclusion just arrived at is to alter the conditions 
 and begin with a modicum of reasoned differentiations. 
 A leak must be opened somewhere if water is to flow ; 
 and so an adjustment of differences and adaptation 
 of items, in view of a definite issue, must pre-exist 
 if an orderly Evolution is to move on through the 
 
CriticisjJi. 155 
 
 acres. This, however, would alter the entire character 
 of the theory of Evolution as expounded in the 
 Spencerian system. It would involve evident pur- 
 pose. The beginnings would he made what they 
 were, with the clear design of issuing in all the 
 beauties and harmonies we now witness. This, the 
 Theistic way of thinking, is abhorrent to the soul of 
 the extreme Evolutionist. With him the ruling idea 
 is that all changes are traceable back and back till 
 you get to the one primordial form of force, simple, 
 undifferentiated. Again and again, with a most weari- 
 some reiteration does Mr. Spencer ascribe all changes, 
 in a receding line ever approaching towards utter 
 simplicity, to the " Persistence of Force." One 
 Matter in units, one Force in one form, are the clue 
 to every event in the inorganic universe. Matter 
 in combination, and Force in dissimilar forms, are 
 the outcome of this one. And so I say the problem 
 is to show how, out of units exactly alike, exactly 
 and 2)ersistently acted upon, exactly related in the 
 same way to the Inscrutable Eeality, there can come 
 such a varied, harmonised, complicated system of 
 things as we now behold. A sole, uniform, dynamic 
 manifestation of the Absolute is somehow to become 
 highly differentiated manifestations of the Absolute. 
 
1 5 6 Pre- Organic Evolution . 
 
 Again, I say, to ascribe discriminating power to the 
 Absolute in its primal sole manifestation, so that it 
 tends to differentiate itself into manifold, diversely 
 adjusted manifestations, is to ascribe to it the very 
 attributes of Intelligence which, as we shall see 
 further on, the whole theory is designed to render 
 unnecessary. 
 
 Let it, then, be duly remembered that in the postu- 
 lated oniniimtm we can find no place, no reason for 
 any single fact of change, for any differentiated law^ or 
 laws, for any dissimilar conditions. It would require 
 a jugglery of words more skilful than that of the Greek 
 Sophists to evolve an ordered universe full of change 
 out of a universe in which all conditions of chanf^e 
 were absent. No laws of mechanics — which are based 
 on the existence of differences in the incidence of force 
 — can apply to a state of things in which all differences 
 are, by hypothesis, excluded. The only mechanical 
 force implied in the condition of things above described 
 is that which either acts so as to keep up an everlast- 
 ing equilibrium of rest, or an everlasting motion 
 without displacement of units. The truth affirmable 
 of any one unit could be affirmed of every other, and 
 that through all time ; and the primary truth would 
 be, that what the unit is now in nature, in relation. 
 
Criticism. 157 
 
 in motion, or in rest, it ever will be. Evolution is 
 impossible out of the very data which Evolution 
 assumes. 
 
 The conclusion thus arrived at is so manifestly 
 obvious, and, at the same time, so absurd, that a 
 suspicion may be awakened that surely there must be 
 some serious error in the statement of the premises 
 from which it is derived, or some illicit process in 
 passing from the premises to the conclusion : it will 
 scarcely be thought by some admirers of Mr. Spencer 
 tliat he would have exposed himself to such a rcdiictio 
 ad ahsurduvi. I confess it does seem strange, and it 
 is hardly what one would look for in a system of 
 philosophy elaborated with such consummate skill, 
 and characterised by unusual severity of reasoning. 
 At the same time, independence of judgment is not to 
 be surrendered even to a great name. Infallibility is 
 a term not recognised within the domain of Philosophy. 
 Aristotle, Leibnitz, and Spinoza occupy places of 
 pre-eminence in the thinking world, and for mental 
 grip and genius and severity of reasoning may dispute 
 with any man of this century the right to stand 
 foremost as correct thinkers. Only a superstitious age 
 could challenge the competency to point out the root 
 error of Mr. Spencer's system, while admitting the 
 
158 Pre-Organic EvohUion. 
 
 possibility and propriety of dissenting from the views 
 of those, probab]}^ his superiors. There are, doubtless, 
 uses in the glamour of a great name, — it entices slow 
 and feeble intellects to activity, and invests Philosophy 
 with an otherwise unattainable charm. But it has its 
 disadvantages, — it may encourage the substitution of 
 personal admiration for the severe quest of truth, and 
 the holding of opinions rather than of reasoned judg- 
 ments. The more intimately acquainted one becomes 
 ^vith the structure and outworking of Mr. Spencer's 
 Synthetic Philosophy the more clearly, I think, will it 
 be seen to be of a nature to lay the author of it open 
 to a fundamental error of the kind now under con- 
 sideration. When a man, be he peasant or philosopher, 
 is intent on proving a point, and proceeds fron.i 
 principles which he thinks cover tlie whole question 
 at issue, he is very apt, in his great eagerness to reacli 
 his goal, to overlook items of fact, wdiich other men 
 who are not intent on establishing a theory, and wdio 
 are regardful only of the particulars embraced in the 
 different propositions, may notice, and may be in a 
 position to see in their bearing upon the course of the 
 argument. Blinkers are useful in securing concentra- 
 tion of sight within a definite area, but for an all-round 
 vision it is better that the eye should be unrestrained. 
 
Criticism. 159 
 
 Spinoza was a more rigorous logician than even Mr. 
 Spencer; yet he did not see what others liave observed, 
 that the conclusion of his most elaborate argument 
 was really assumed in his definition of Substance. 
 The deductive philosopher is of all men in danger of 
 making fatal blunders ; because one fault in the 
 premises from above, sweeps away a host of conclusions. 
 Plato is magnificent, but we are not all Platonists. Of 
 the last century Leibnitz was the prince of deductive 
 thinkers, yet Mr. Lewes and others have ventured to 
 make merry over some of his most ably reasoned 
 doctrines. The sclioolmen of the Middle Ages are the 
 scorn of our Spencerian philosophers ; but had Mr. 
 Spencer been less under the domination of an idea 
 which had to be established somehow as a counter 
 idea to Theism, very much as scholastic theologians of 
 the Middle Ages were dominated in working out de- 
 ductively their favourite systems by some abstract 
 philosophical or theological idea, he would have escaped 
 the great unwisdom of seeking to derive the differenti- 
 ated complex universe as it is from a minimum clearly 
 impossible. 
 
 That in saying this I am not misrepresenting the 
 drift of his argument by drawing upon my own 
 imagination, will be apparent to any one who carefully 
 
i6o Pre- Organic Evolution, 
 
 reads the Fird Principles and notes how in the course 
 of his illustrations of Evolution he now and then seems 
 to get a glimpse of the possibility of such a rcdudio ad 
 dbsurdum ; and how, in order to obviate it, he prolongs 
 his discussion by adducing considerations bearing in 
 that direction. He seems to he conscious that his 
 theory of Evolution is, in principle, the theory of the 
 production of the whole material universe, while his 
 specific illustrations of the theory are drawn from 
 those parts of the universe which lie close at hand. 
 Yet, for some reason or other, he fails to see that the 
 conditions found to exist in one section of the universe, 
 already greatly differentiated, do not apply to the 
 whole universe, before any differentiations are evolved. 
 Perhaps his eagerness to reach the goal of his system 
 perverts his vehement and relentless logic, so that in 
 the excitement of pursuit he does not see the fallacy 
 which is manifest to others who have only to test and 
 not to prove. This assertion is, I know, anticipatory 
 of what is coming, hut I wish to make plain the object 
 of what I am about to adduce, namely, to show that 
 Mr. Spencer's error lies in imagining that, by establish- 
 ing a position which no one who understands the 
 question will dispute, he has made out how possible it 
 is to Gfet an Evolution of all that is from a minimum 
 
Criticism, 1 6 1 
 
 in which there is no differentiation. Should any 
 friend of his on reading this say, in his defence, that 
 he never seeks to get Evolution out of the undifferenti- 
 ated, but always presupposes an initial differentiation 
 not derived by a process, but coming straight and clear 
 from the Eternal Eeality, — then I can only repeat what I 
 have said before, that this is just the position which the 
 Theist assumes — the position which regards Evolution 
 as t]ie outcome of wondrously wise adjustments in the 
 beginning. Bat we know very w^ell, from the polemical 
 character of the early chapters in his work on the 
 subject, that Mr. Spencer wishes to avoid such a con- 
 clusion ; and that his object is, if possible, to find an 
 equilibrium — a balance, a joerfcctly simple condition of 
 matter and motion — that may be regarded, while with- 
 out differentiation, as a point of departure for a ceaseless 
 course of differentiation. In other words, one may say, 
 " Wanted a primordial equilibrium, — an original pheno- 
 menal condition free from the differentiations of quality 
 and size, and direction of motion, — and to find a break 
 up of this equilibrium into a series of changes of an 
 evolutionary character, apart from any Theistic purpose- 
 ful action, or any Intelligence immanent in the units 
 and motions that are equilibrated." 
 
 Xow, in the solution of this problem, in the interests 
 
1 62 Pre-Oroanic Evolution, 
 
 of Universal Evolution, the first step is to give us a 
 liomily on Homogeneity. It is affirmed in the chapter 
 on the "Instability of the Homogeneous/' that the 
 " condition of homogeneity is a condition of mistahle 
 equilibrium," — a statement which must mean, if the 
 word " homogeneity " be taken in its natural sense, 
 that the units, or the molecules, as the case may be, 
 in question, are exactly alike, and are either equally 
 at rest or are moving so as to maintain for the time 
 being their relative position ; only that such a state of 
 things is essentially uncertain in its continuance — it 
 may be disturbed. The explanation of this tendency 
 to change from the equilibrated condition, i.e. the 
 instability of the equilibrium, is then explained by 
 saying that such a condition implies " a balance of 
 forces of such a kind that the interference of any 
 further force, however minute, will destroy the arrange- 
 ment previously subsisting, and bring about a totally 
 different arrangement." ^ 
 
 This, I say, is the first step ; and it should be 
 observed that the condition of equilibrium so described 
 is intended by Mr. Spencer to apply to, and is taken 
 from, local conditions of matter and motion, to be found 
 in parts of the universe as it is while in process of 
 
 1 First Principks, pp. 401, <02. 
 
Criticism. 163 
 
 evolution. The next step in the reasoning is quietly 
 to assume this condition of unstable equilibrium as a 
 type of the equilibrium which, by hypothesis, must be 
 supposed to have antedated Evolution considered as a 
 whole. Of course if this be so it is possible to avoid 
 the conclusion I have hitherto held to be inevitable, 
 namely, that the Spencerian Evolution starts from an 
 impossible minimum.. 
 
 The argument, thus put within a brief compass, is 
 not distinguished for logical force. It is a form of 
 fallacy well known to logicians : it is arguing from 
 what is true of a part to what is true of a whole. 
 There can be no objection to the description above 
 given of " unstable equilibrium " as applied to a finite 
 system of units or molecules which is part of a whole, 
 which has an outside wherein lie forces which some- 
 how and sometime may disturb the existing equili- 
 brium. There are many instances of it amongst us. 
 It is, for example, applicable to the acrobat — a system 
 of molecules in protoplasmic form — as he poses on a 
 tight-rope. There can be no doubt of his being in a 
 condition of " unstctble equilibrium," and the minutest 
 interference by any outside force lying within another 
 system of things would bring about a serious differ- 
 entiation in his position and in the molecules of his 
 
1 64 Pre- Organic Evolution. 
 
 body. Ifc might, also, conceivably, at one time, apply 
 to any vast finite mass of units of matter, such as the 
 total nebulous mass which formed the proximate start- 
 ing condition of the Solar System, as distinguished 
 from the larger outside nebulous mass which was 
 formed to begin the Sidereal Systems. In case such a 
 finite mass ever were in a state of " unstable equili- 
 brium," then, of course, the slightest modification of 
 the relation of any one of the atoms, by the action 
 of any incident force from outside the mass, would 
 affect the whole by bringing about a differentiation, in 
 the form of displacement, throughout the mass, as 
 truly as one drop of water, falling into the system of 
 molecules forming a quiet lake, would disturb its 
 equilibrium, and, according to well-known laws, alter 
 the relations of every atom of the lake. But in all 
 such cases as these, where the action of some force 
 from outside the equilibriated mass is the occasion of 
 producing differentiation, it is obvious that there are 
 already general differentiations existing in the fact that 
 already more than one system exists, and that the action 
 of incident forces from outside is possible. Where, then, 
 is the force of the argument as applied to the whole 
 primordial units of matter, under equal pressure and 
 tension, which, by hypothesis, antedated the entire 
 
Criticism, 165 
 
 evolutionary process of the universe ? The conditions 
 of equilibrium in a single system of things in the 
 great whole are not the conditions of equilibrium in 
 the wliole mass of units before any different systems 
 of things were evolved. It is obvious that the illus- 
 tration, and the argument it subserves, can only arise 
 after the evolution of the universe has become, up to 
 a certain point, an established fact ; and then only as 
 applied to parts of the universe marked off as systems 
 of homogeneity. This Mr. Spencer himself admits in 
 distinct terms, for he says, later on : " For the purpose 
 of the general argument it is needful only to show 
 that any finite mass of diffused matter, even though 
 vast enough to form our whole sidereal system, couhl 
 not be in a state of stahU equilibrium ; that in default 
 of absolute sphericity, absolute uniformity of composi- 
 tion, and absolute symmetry of relation to all forces 
 external to it, its concentration must c^o on with 
 ever-increasing irregularity, and that thus the present 
 aspect of the heavens is not, as far as we can judge, 
 incongruous with the hypothesis of a general evolu- 
 tion consequent on the instability of the homo- 
 geneous." ^ 
 
 If I may put the above sentence into other 
 
 ^ Fir>^t Princiiiles, p. 407. 
 
i66 Pre- Organic Evolution. 
 
 language, it means that, if the great nebulous cloud 
 out of which the entire Sidereal System evolved was 
 characterised, far back in the past, by certain differen- 
 tiations, namely, its imperfect spherical shape, its 
 diverse material elements, the unequal relation of its 
 parts to other forces external to its surface, then it 
 was in just tliat state of uncertain equilibrium as 
 would be sure to break up and issue in the Sidereal 
 System we now see. 
 
 The first comment suggested by such a statement 
 surely is, Certainly it was only natural that such an 
 equilibrium would break up, and the present aspect 
 of the heavens is quite congruous with such a con- 
 ception of the instability of the homogeneous. I do 
 not see how any one familiar with the action of 
 physical laws in masses of matter ?//iuniformly com- 
 posed and related ?r/Lsymmetrically to " forces external 
 to it," could come to any other conclusion. It is 
 merely a case, on a large scale, of the acrobat. It is 
 a huge imperfectly formed ball unequally related, in 
 some of its parts, to a larger world of " forces external 
 to it." No wonder it undergoes changes, and, in 
 in course of time, breaks up its imperfect ball-like 
 shape into different smaller balls called stars. 
 
 But the curious thinu; about this statement is that 
 
Criticism. 167 
 
 Mr. Spencer should use the word homogeneous of 
 what, according to his own account, is destitute of 
 perfect " uniformity of composition," and is unsy in- 
 metrical in its relation to all '' forces external to it." 
 It is certainly a homogeneity in which there is a 
 large element of the heterogeneous. If by homo- 
 geneous he only meant that the ultimate units of 
 matter are alike all through the mass, then that may 
 be said of even every heterogeneous mass in exist- 
 ence, for all things are believed to be made up of 
 the same ultimate atoms of matter only diversely 
 combined. And further, suppose the Sidereal System 
 did evolve from such a huge mass because the equili- 
 brium of its homogeneity was so necessarily un- 
 stable ; what light does that throw upon the question 
 of the primordial condition of things applicable to 
 that greater whole, which must have embraced both 
 this huge nebulous ball from which the Sidereal 
 System sprang, and the " forces external to it " ? 
 How does the passage from this unstable condition 
 of a part of the universe to the present state of 
 the heavens, known as the Sidereal System, already 
 differentiated from the " forces external to it," toucli 
 the question of the minimum simplicity that, accord- 
 ing to the theory of Evolution, must be predicated 
 
1 68 P re-Organic Evolittion. 
 
 of the entire sum of matter and motion ? Are we 
 to take the highly differentiated condition of things 
 implied in the distinction between this unstable ball 
 of nebulous matter and the " forces external to it " 
 as typical of the condition of things that stood at 
 the head of all Evolution ? Are we to assume at 
 the becjinninfT of all Evolution the existence of such 
 actual adjustments and differentiations of relation as 
 are implied to exist in the composition of this 
 nebulous ball and the " forces external to it " ? If 
 the reply be in the affirmative, then I say, once 
 more, we have the Theistic position conceded. Evolu- 
 tion, in that case, began from a primordial rational 
 adjustment that contained within itself a purposeful 
 germ of all subsequent developments. At all events, 
 Mr. Spencer's case of the necessary instability of tlie 
 homogeneous does not serve to get rid of the objec- 
 tion brought against his view of Evolution, that, when 
 carried out to its logical issue, it has to start from 
 an impossible minimum. 
 
 There is, however, one other defence of his position 
 taken by Mr. Spencer which cannot be passed over. 
 That its bearing may be clearly seen, it is necessary 
 to note again the fact that, as I have said, his method, 
 in the latter part of the First Princi^jlcs, is to adduce 
 
Criticism. 169 
 
 instances, witliin the range of our knowledge, of the 
 nature and fact of the evolutionary process, in order, 
 thereby, to prove the nature and fact of Evolution 
 as a process affirmable of the entire universe from 
 first to last. The chapter on the " Instability of the 
 Homogeneous " is in pursuance of the same purpose, 
 only it is directed more specifically to show how 
 Evolution began. Because instances of unstable 
 homogeneity are found from which a series of changes 
 necessarily occur, therefore, the origin of Evolution 
 in the universe began in a similar necessarily un- 
 stable condition of matter. . Such is the account of 
 the " chancres with which Evolution commences^ ^ 
 That, I say, is the argument ; unless, indeed, the 
 theory of Evolution is not affirmed for all that bears 
 " the characteristics of matter and motion in all Space 
 and Time." The reasoning is from the known to 
 the unknown, from the less to the greater. I have 
 pointed out how the cases are not similar ; that the 
 cases chosen are already differentiated, while the case 
 in question, being at the head of all Evolution, is, by 
 hypothesis, undifferentiated. It is, then, a manifest 
 instance of Dictio secundum quid ad dictum sim- 
 2^liciter. The only way of proving the possibility of 
 ^ First Principles, p. 429. The italics are Mr, Spencer's. 
 
170 Pre- Organic Evolution. 
 
 such a theory as Mr. Spencer's name is pledged to, 
 is by the adoption of a logical fallacy. Xow, it is 
 to get rid of this consecpience that he sets up the 
 defence to whicli I have just referred as demanding 
 our attention. 
 
 In reflecting on the position to which his previous 
 reasoning had brought him, Mr. Spencer, probably con- 
 scious of some qualms in his logical conscience, seems 
 to take a survey of what is and what is not possible 
 by way of proof ; and he comes to the conclusion that, 
 in the prosecution of his purpose in the construction 
 of a universal philosophy, the only alternative to 
 his own line of arsjument from instances of sinde 
 systems of things during the evolutionary course, is 
 no argument at all. He squarely faces the question 
 of finding somewhere a homogeneity that is stable as 
 distimruished from the homogeneities that are un- 
 stable, and he gives up the search as hopeless. At 
 no point in the evolutionary course is there to be 
 found one system of things small or great that is 
 perfectly stable — that is free from internal or external 
 conditions tending to change, and, therefore, to further 
 Evolution. He says : " One stable homogeneity only is 
 liypothcticcdly possible. If centres of foree ahsolutely 
 uniform in powers, iccre diffused luith absolute uni- 
 
Criticism, 171 
 
 forniitij ihrowjli itnlimitecl space, they would remain 
 in equilibrium, Tliis, however, though a verbally 
 intelligible supposition, is one which cannot be 
 represented in thought, since unlimited space is 
 inconceivable. But all finite forms of the homo- 
 geneous, all forms of which we can know or conceive, 
 must inevitably lapse into heterogeneity." ^ Let it be 
 observed that this statement, which I have in part 
 italicised, is made in order to justify the argu- 
 ment which I have shown is a manifest fallacy. It 
 is certainly singular that Mr. Spencer should ever 
 imagine that so fallacious an argument could be made 
 valid by this reference to our supposed inability to 
 conceive, i.e. form an image, of an infinite material 
 universe. Surely, apart from any position to be 
 defended, he would never make the fact of the 
 existence of the infinite to depend on our ability to 
 form a mental representation of it. If so, he had 
 better cease to write about the Eternal and Infinite 
 Eeality and its relation to infinite Space and Time. 
 He must know that principles of thought are capable 
 of infinite application, as thought, quite irrespective 
 of an act of imagination to embody the application 
 in imaged concrete form. For aught we know, the 
 
 1 First PrlnciphH, p. 429. 
 
1 7 2 Pre- Orga n ic Evolution . 
 
 universe may be strictly infinite ; in which case his 
 arguing from the changes which must occur in the 
 finite mass, that is necessarily unstable because of 
 being part of a whole and subject to the influence of 
 " forces external to it," to the origin of the first 
 change in an evolutionary course in the infinite whole, 
 is, of course, fallacious. It is not allowable thus to 
 reason from a differentiated part to an undifferentiated 
 whole, even should the whole be hypothetically in- 
 finite. But whatever be the actual extent of the 
 universe, the question raised is not, as Mr. Spencer 
 would seem to suppose, one of conceiving or forming 
 a mental representation of the infinite. It is purely 
 a question of correct tliinking as applied to objective 
 phenomena. Thought, as such, may be infinitely 
 applied, and that too with mathematical exactitude, 
 irrespective of any act of conceiving. 
 
 This tilt against the conception of the universe as 
 infinite is, then, in itself, unavailable for the purpose of 
 showing the inapplicability of what I have said about 
 the absolute uniformity — the indestructible equili- 
 brium implied in the miniimim simplicity with which 
 Evolution, on the Spencerian hypothesis, must start. 
 The impression given, by the way in which Mr. 
 Spencer deals with the difficulty, is, that it is probable 
 
Criticism. 173 
 
 that the universe is not infinite, and that, at all events, 
 lie is quite safe in practically dealing with it for the 
 purposes of his philosophy as finite. " Every finite 
 mass is in unstahle equilibrium." This is the solid 
 rock from which all argument is to proceed. I^ow, I 
 have no objection to conceding this point, if Mr. 
 Spencer desires it. If, however, the mass in question 
 is only part of the whole universe, then I repeat it is 
 not legitimate to reason from what is true of a part — 
 which being a part is greatly differentiated in relations 
 — if not in composition, from the rest, to the whole as 
 it was before the part was differentiated off from it, or 
 before any other differentation had occurred. If, on 
 the other hand, the mass in question is intended to 
 be the entire finite universe before the evolutionary 
 stages began, then I say that the fact that it is so un- 
 stable, so composed of differently combined materials, 
 or so diversely related in its parts as to necessarily 
 issue in a series of changes that are to run on through 
 the course of Evolution, which we know as a fact has 
 been the history of the universe — this fact itself only 
 shows that, before Evolution began, there w^as in the 
 universe a set of differences and adjustments and 
 tendencies which reveal the existence of wonderful 
 differentiations as the condition of the possibility of 
 
174 Pre-Organic Evolution. 
 
 Evolution, which is the very position assumed by the 
 Theist, and implicitly denied by the whole tenor of the 
 Spencerian philosophy. 
 
 But the confusion of the situation does not end 
 here. For the supposition of the finitude of the 
 nniverse not only will not subserve the validity of the 
 arcrument based on the instabilitv of the homoGfeneous, 
 it is, also, inconsistent witli the drift of Mr. Spencer's 
 philosophical system. For when not pressed by the 
 exigencies of the situation, he, as already quoted else- 
 where, represents the scope of his universal philosopliy 
 to be infinite. It is concerned, he tells us, with the 
 " entire manifestations which Force presents ; " and 
 lest we sliould be in doubt as to the range of these 
 manifestations it is added that the " Force whicli 
 the universe presents falls into the same category 
 with Space and Time, admitting of no limitation in 
 tlioncjlitr ^ There can be no doubt but that this 
 language expresses the general scope of the Spencerian 
 system, as will be seen by referring to what I have 
 quoted before (see pp. 131-141). The universe is an 
 infinite manifestation of an infinite Force or Eeality. 
 Again and again are we told, in varying phrase, that 
 the Absolute is expressed in manifestations. Nowhere 
 
 ^ F'lM Principles, p. 551. 
 
Criticism. 175 
 
 in the works of Mr. Spencer have we, apart from this 
 peculiar passage about " finite forms of the homo- 
 geneous/' and the difficulty of conceiving of an infinite 
 mass, any intimation that he is discoursing in his 
 philosophy only about the evolution of tlic universe as 
 a finite form, or that there is a reserved power in the 
 Infinite Eternal Eeality in excess of that which is 
 manifested in the phenomenal forms and changes 
 which constitute the material universe. As Space and 
 Time are infinite, so is " the Force which the universe 
 presents ; " and the presentation of the Force is only 
 another name for the manifestation of Force ; and this 
 manifestation of Force is but the peculiar Spencerian 
 way of indicating what we all mean by the units of 
 Matter and all their relations and changes. 
 
 The result, then, is that the edge of our argument is 
 not to be turned by having recourse to the ambiguous 
 word " inconceivable " as applied to the universe. 
 There seems to me to be only one consistent way of 
 escape, and that is by frankly saying that the doctrine of 
 Evolution intended to be taught is not intended to be 
 applied to the entire universe throughout all past time, 
 but to be confined to those finite systems with which 
 we are now familiar. Or, if it does so apply, yet it 
 does not attempt to account for the changes with 
 
176 Pre-Organic Evolution, 
 
 Avhich it " covnncnces" I can promise this, that should 
 the admirers of the Spencerian system, following their 
 master, elect to thus limit the range of the theory, I 
 for one would not dream of contravening the course of 
 reasoning by which they seek to show what the actual 
 process of Evolution has been. It w^ould be a matter 
 of comparatively small concern as to how a certain 
 large portion of the universe passed from a relatively 
 attenuated and simple condition to the more solid and 
 complex condition in which we now find it. To 
 astronomers and physicists it might afford interest ; but 
 it obviously could not bring into consideration directly 
 the great questions of Origin of all things and of Being, 
 which necessarily rise up when one undertakes to 
 speak of the universe as a whole, and to show its 
 relation primarily, and during its evolutionary course, 
 to an Eternal Eeality. It is quite probable that some 
 may think that it is a waste of energy to enter into 
 the discussions that fill these pages ; and no doubt that 
 judgment would be most just were Mr. Spencer's aim 
 simply to track the process by which a section of the 
 universe came to be what it is. But no one knows 
 better than Mr. Spencer that such a limitation of the 
 scope of his philosophy would rob it of more than 
 lialf its interest to himself. His scope embraces all 
 
Criticism. 177 
 
 phenomena and Eeality. His object is to show that all 
 present phenomena in their manifold order had their 
 origin in a condition of phenomenal simplicity — a con- 
 dition of Matter and Motion in which differentiations 
 had no place ; and that this primordial condition was 
 not the result of previously existing natural law, but 
 was the direct primordial manifestation of the Eternal 
 Reality. Natural law is only an order of fact, and had 
 a beginning. The " changes with which Evolution 
 commences " are ascribed to the Persistence of Force, but 
 not to the Persistence of Force as acting in a series of 
 ordered changes, as is the case now that Evolution is in 
 progress ; for such could not exist before Evolution 
 commenced. The so-called Force being only Persistent 
 Force could not have originated the first change. 
 This philosophy being, then, the philosophy of the 
 universe, and professing to obtain all differentiation 
 from Evolution, necessarily, as I have shown, sets out 
 with an impossible minimum ; and it is compelled to 
 take this singular position, because to admit of adjust- 
 ments, constituted relations, and specific tendencies 
 at the head of Evolution, would, as will become 
 apparent further on, be to convert the Eternal Reality, 
 otherwise called Persistent Force, which stands directly 
 as the Origin of all, into much more than Force 
 
 M 
 
178 Pj'c- Organic Evolution, 
 
 or Power: it would become, in fact, a Purposeful 
 
 Will. 
 
 3. Eternal Cycles. 
 
 It is well known to those familiar with the history 
 of philosophy that there are serious dangers to be 
 encountered in the construction of a congruous system. 
 There are so many elements of thought to be con- 
 sidered, and such a variety of relations to be adjusted. 
 An omission here or a misapplication there may make 
 all the difference between a stable or an unstable fabric. 
 Tliese dangers are especially present in the construction 
 of a system formed by a deduction from what are 
 deemed first principles. It is imperative that the 
 principles, being once adopted, should be carried out 
 with rigid severity. The consciousness of this cannot 
 but awaken a predisposition to see those things which 
 favour the purpose in view, and to overlook those 
 which are not so serviceable. There is also induced a 
 certain narrowness of mental vision ; since the whole 
 energy of attention is concentrated along the line of 
 the chosen principles, and therefore, according to the 
 laws of mental association, those elements of thoudit 
 are likely to be brought into consciousness which are 
 connected with them ; while others, possibly as real 
 and important in the domain of truth, do not come into 
 
Criticism. 1 79 
 
 view. It may hence happen that, in the working out 
 of the system, conclusions seem inevitable which need 
 to be modified by the adoption of some hypothesis 
 supposed to be consistent with the primary data. 
 
 From the time of my first acquaintance with the 
 First Principles, I have had the impression that the 
 rigid application of Mr. Spencer's primary assump- 
 tions was especially fraught with the risks attendant 
 on all deductive systems. We have already seen how 
 the logical issue of his own principles, in their applica- 
 tion to the entire universe and the structure of a 
 thorough-going theory of Evolution, lead to the neces- 
 sity of supposing at the commencement of the evolu- 
 tionary process a minimum which is impossible ; and 
 that when this formidable difficulty came into view an 
 effort was made to obviate it by recourse to a fallacious 
 line of argument and a play on the word " inconceiv- 
 able," as applied to a stable homogeneity of the entire 
 mass of units composing the universe. But recourse 
 is also had to another hypothesis, which is so set forth 
 as to appear to render the impossible minimum not so 
 inevitable a conclusion as I have represented it to be. 
 Cycles of Evolution and Dissolution are made to obviate 
 the necessity of an absolute commencement or Evolu- 
 tion, and to account for the degree of instability requisite 
 
i8o P re-Organic Evohttion. 
 
 for the starting of any fresh process of Evolution. I 
 do not mean to affirm that Mr. Spencer consciously 
 adopts the hypothesis in order to get over the difficulty 
 referred to, but that it is just one of those balancing 
 suppositions which are almost sure to arise in the eager 
 endeavour to render a system deductively framed as 
 congruous as possible. 
 
 The question may arise as to whether, in speaking 
 of cycles of Evolution and Dissolution, there is simply a 
 reference to the evolution of the Solar System from a 
 diffused mass and its future return to a nebulous con- 
 dition, or whether the reference is much wider and 
 embraces the whole of the Stellar Systems — in fact, the 
 entire universe. It must be confessed that the terms 
 used seem at first sight to confine the reference to the 
 Solar System, and there is no doubt but that modern 
 physical science points clearly to the dissolution of the 
 present order ; but the drift of the argument, and con- 
 sistency with the aim and scope of the Universal 
 Philosophy, require that it should be as far-reaching as 
 is the previous reasoning on the nature and law of 
 Evolution, whicli is obviously designed to show that 
 Evolution is a name for the process by which all 
 differentiation is the outcome of utter simplicity, and 
 that it is to be affirmed not of a mere fragment, but of 
 
Criticism. 1 8 1 
 
 the whole universe, i.e. " wherever matter and motion 
 have the characteristics we now know them to have." 
 It is true, the evidences or intimations adduced as 
 pointing to a coming dissolution of the present evolved 
 order are derived, and that necessarily, from only that 
 part of the universe with which science has made us 
 most familiar, namely, tiie Solar System ; yet it must 
 not be forgotten that throughout the First Frinciplcs 
 the method of reasoning is to the effect that a law of 
 change which is found to prevail in that part of the 
 material order with which we are familiar, and to 
 which we can directly apply for deductive purposes 
 the assumed first principles, is to be accepted as pre- 
 valent throughout the whole realms of space — as appli- 
 cable to wdiatever exhibits the characteristics of matter 
 and motion. In the course of the argument on this 
 part of the subject, a plea for modesty in speculation 
 is found in the necessary vastness and mystery of the 
 subject, and there is no committal to any definite order 
 in the process towards Dissolution. For anything said 
 to the contrary one is left in uncertainty as to whether 
 the break up of the Solar System is to be the first step 
 in a slow series of ever- widening dissolution of systems, 
 or almost contemporaneous with the reduction of the 
 entire differentiated worlds and systems of worlds to a 
 
1 82 Pre- Organic Evolution, 
 
 diffused nebulous mass, similar to that which is sup- 
 posed to have been the condition of matter when the 
 present evolutionary process began/ Be that as it 
 may, the teaching is clear that, sooner or later, gradu- 
 ally or by some rapid disintegration, all that has been 
 evolved from a diffused undifferentiated mass of units 
 will be dissolved and reduced again to the primordial 
 condition, and, from that new state of diffusion, enter 
 upon another process of Evolution, which will be one 
 more link in the never-ending cycles. 
 
 A little reflection will show^ that by the adoption of 
 this hypothesis of ever-recurring cycles of Evolution 
 and Dissolution there may be sought some relief from 
 the pressure of the difficulty of what I call an impos- 
 sible miniinu77i which, in the early part of his work, 
 Mr. Spencer implies, and in his Psychology postulates 
 rather positively as the starting-point of Evolution. 
 The hypothesis, of course, has a bearing on the past 
 as well as on the future, and carries with it an implica- 
 tion of the eternal existence of the material phenomena, 
 a question on which I shall have a word to say further 
 on. Our present concern with it is solely in its 
 relation to that minimum simplicity in the condition 
 of matter which, as I have shown, is necessarily 
 
 ^ First Principles, chap, xxiii. 
 
Criticism. 183 
 
 involved in the Spencerian conception of Evolution. 
 It may puzzle a cursory reader of the First Frinci'pUs 
 to comprehend how a hypothesis of an eternal series 
 of Evolutions and Dissolutions can be related at all to 
 a theory which postulates a minimum simplicity, such 
 as we have seen must be involved in Mr. Spencer's 
 conception of Evolution, as the getting of all differ- 
 entiation out of the undifferentiated. A primordial 
 minimum simplicity of matter suggests a commence- 
 ment — a point in time when the differentiations 
 resulting from the barest Evolution have no existence 
 — a first condition of matter. The clue to the puzzle 
 lies in this, that when Mr. Spencer speaks, as he does, 
 so explicitly of " the commencement " of Involution as 
 consisting in certain " necessitated changes " ^ in the 
 original ultimates of matter, he is really referring not 
 to an absolute commencement of all Evolution, for 
 we shall soon see that of that there is none, but to 
 the commencement of that particular process of Evolu- 
 tion in the midst of which we are now living ; and 
 the bearing of his hypothesis of cycles of Evolutions 
 and Dissolutions on the objection I have raised to his 
 view of Evolution, on the ground of its setting out 
 with a minimum simplicity that is impossible, is that, 
 
 ^ First Principles, p. 429. 
 
184 Pre-Organic Evolution. 
 
 inasmucli as the present process of Evolution must 
 liave started with a diffusion of units of matter whicli 
 was the outcome of a prior Dissohition, such an extreme 
 and impossible simplicity as that I contend for need 
 not be looked for. In other words, the condition of 
 matter at the commencement of the present evolu- 
 tionary process was only the (hihris of a prior Dissolu- 
 tion, and hence may have presented the unstable 
 equilibrium which would necessarily issue in a fresh 
 series of differentiations for the building up of our 
 present Solar and Sidereal and other systems. 
 
 Now, on the general question as to the existence of 
 a series of Evolutions and Dissolutions in the history 
 of the material universe, it is not at all necessary to 
 enter into a discussion. We do not possess the 
 information requisite to enable us to make either 
 affirmations or denials. Neither from metapliysical 
 principles nor from Scripture have we any authority 
 for concluding that the present ordered system of 
 things — vast and ancient as it is — is the only one 
 that ever existed in past duration. There is certainly 
 nothing incredible and irrational in holding to the 
 contrary ; nor would any known interests be imperilled 
 thereby. Indeed, on a smaller scale, we are familiar 
 with cycles of change. We see them in rolling 
 
Criticism. 185 
 
 seasons, in atmospheric conditions, in important 
 astronomical recurrences, in the alternations of in- 
 tegration and disintegration which are so well under- 
 stood in chemistry. It behoves us to shun the 
 contracted anthropomorphism which would estimate 
 the stupendous transactions of Eternity by our notions 
 of measured time. Believing, as I do, in the existence 
 of an Infinite Being of boundless resources, I could 
 readily believe in the fact of Eternal Cycles of 
 Evolution and Dissolution during, and by means of, 
 which the Eternal God was manifesting His power 
 and wisdom ; provided the eternity of the series did 
 not involve the absolute, necessary eternity of Matter, 
 as an independent coexistent reality, or did not 
 compel me to regard the relation of the Matter, con- 
 cerned in the series, to God as one of eternal necessity 
 — thus shutting; out the idea of Creation. There is a 
 past compared with which the age of our present 
 ordered universe, though inexpressible in figures, is 
 less than the billioneth part of a moment ; and the 
 resources and purposes of the Eternal God are not 
 surely to be measured or tested by the ideas derived 
 by us from our contemplation even of the vast systems 
 which now engage our thought. Why will men in 
 the nineteenth century persist in practically setting 
 
1 86 Pre-Ororanic EiwliLtion. 
 
 limits to the Eternal Energy and the infinitely wide- 
 reaching purposes of the Unsearchable Wisdom ? 
 
 But while conceding that a hypothesis of eternal 
 cycles of Evolution and Dissolution, in a qualified 
 sense, is not essentially irrational, I am not prepared 
 to admit that that hypothesis, as held by Mr. Spencer, 
 is available for neutralising the objection I have 
 urged against his fundamental conception of Evolution. 
 Eor let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that the 
 condition of matter at the commencement of the 
 evolutionary process in the midst of which we are 
 now living, was simply the d6hris of a prior Dissolu- 
 tion, and, therefore, not quite so utterly simple and 
 undifferentiated as I have insisted that the looic of 
 the Evolution theory, as taught by Mr. Spencer, implies, 
 — that would only push the difficulty further back in 
 the past ; it would by no means solve it. It is true, in 
 such a case, there might be sufficient instability to lead 
 to change in the equilibrium of the diffused units ; 
 or, in other words, the equilibrium would not be real, 
 owing to the presence, here and there in the mass, of 
 a few trifling differences, if not in the nature of the 
 units, yet in their mutual relations. Tiie natural 
 consequence of this would appear in the issue, very 
 gradually, of those manifold differentiations which 
 
Criticism, 1 8 7 
 
 characterise the present Cosmos. But evidently that 
 woukl not be a case of Evolution in the Spencerian 
 sense, which means the getting of all differentiations, 
 in the sense of all differences in the combination 
 and relations of matter and motion, out of a condition 
 in which there was an absence of such differences. I 
 am quite aware that Mr. Spencer generally applies the 
 term " differentiation " to those " secondary changes " 
 which are brought about in Compound Evolution 
 among compounds already in existence. In this 
 sense it implies that " integrations " have been formed 
 by Simple Evolution. But this various use of the 
 term is no reason why it should not be applied also 
 to those other changes, or differences brought about, 
 when the perfectly diffused uniform condition of the 
 primordial units ceases to be, and the units become, in 
 the least degree, integrated one with the other, or 
 come into a relative position one to the other unlike 
 what they once had. The moment the original 
 uniform simplicity is deviated from by the conjunction 
 of only two units, there has arisen a difference, a 
 differentiation, in the mass that constitutes the uni- 
 verse. That is what I affirm, and must affirm, when 
 I say that if the d^hris of a former Dissolution yields 
 differences in the relation of units one to the other. 
 
1 88 Pre-0}'ganic Evolution. 
 
 and that this is the highest and only simplicity ever 
 actually realised in the eternal history of things, then 
 we should not have a case of Evolution in the strict 
 Spencerian sense, namely, the getting of all differenti- 
 ation out of the undifferentiated. In such a case 
 there would he, in principle, exactly what we find to 
 exist around us now, namely, combination, differences, 
 adjustments ; in fact, the essentials of what, accord- 
 ing to Mr. Spencer, constitutes an evolved, and not a 
 primordial, condition. There would he a differentiated 
 universe without Evolution. 
 
 The prior Dissolution, then, not yielding the utterly 
 undifierentiated simplicity demanded, we have to push 
 back in thought to some more remote Dissolution. 
 If, in any one case, a Dissolution did yield the pure 
 simplicity required, then, I say, the objection of an 
 impossible minimum would hold good, and the 
 Spencerian conception of Evolution is reduced to a 
 recluctio ad ahsurdum : — no Evolution ever after could 
 ensue. But if in no case did a Dissolution yield the 
 required simplicity, then it is incorrect to represent 
 Evolution as the process by which all differentiation 
 comes out of the undifferentiated. The alternatives 
 consequent on this conclusion are clear. There must 
 have been, as a condition of the possibility of Evolu- 
 
Criticis7n. 1 89 
 
 tion, the prior existence of differentiations in the 
 constitution of matter and its relations, — in other 
 words, the prior existence of adaptations and adjust- 
 ments of such a nature as would issue in the beautiful 
 order we now witness. The bearing of this conclusion 
 on the interpretation of the Cause which lies at the 
 back of all things, and enters into all changes, will be 
 seen when we come to discuss the Spencerian con- 
 ception of Force or Keality as a substitute for God. 
 The conclusion at present arrived at simply shuts us 
 np to the alternative of a primordial condition of 
 matter from which no Evolution could possibly arise ; 
 or a condition from which, it is true, Evolution could 
 and would arise, but which by that very fact would 
 reveal the existence of adjustments as fine, as exact, 
 as prophetic in their reference, as any now found to 
 exist in the evolved condition of things. There either 
 can be no Evolution at all, or else an Evolution that 
 tells of far-reaching Eeason. 
 
 4. Relation of the Universe to its Eternal Cause. 
 
 To resume the thread of our discussion, the position 
 we have thus far arrived at is this : According to the 
 Spencerian account of Evolution, Evolution is made to 
 proceed from a minimum of simplicity that is impos- 
 
igo Pi'e-Organic Evolution. 
 
 sible: if this conclusion is sought to be evaded by 
 saying that the present evolutionary order proceeded 
 from a mass that was the debris of a prior Dissolution, 
 then that only pushes the difficulty further back, it 
 does not get rid of it : this difficulty must stand, unless 
 recourse be had to the notion of an eternal series of 
 such Evolutions and Dissolutions ; and, even then, it 
 is not actually removed, but is merely kept out of sight 
 by the presentation of another, if possible, greater 
 difficulty, namely, the existence of an eternal series of 
 material changes, in none of which, at any point or 
 stasre, could there be that minimum which must have 
 been if Evolution is the getting of all differentiation 
 from the undifferentiated. 
 
 This question of an Eternal Series of Evolutions 
 and Dissolutions, when stripped of all verbal covering, 
 simply means the eternal existence of Matter and its 
 necessary relation to the coexistent Eternal Eeality. Be 
 it observed, Mr. Spencer nowhere implies tliat Matter 
 eternally exists as an independent Eeality. His view 
 of the universe is not Manichean. Nor is he a mere 
 materialistic phenornenalist who toadies the ancient 
 metaphysical heresy of an eternal series of mere 
 antecedents and consequents without any noumenal 
 base. With him Matter is dependent on the Eternal 
 
Criticism. 191 
 
 Eeality, but it is an eternal dependence. The con- 
 nection between it and the Reality is not that we 
 indicate by the term Oiigination, or Creation : it is that 
 of " Manifestation " qualified by the word " eternal." 
 It is quite true the Eeality referred to is termed 
 " Cause " in the proper philosophical sense of that 
 word, and consequently the Manifestation is " effect ; " 
 but the point to be carefully noted is that the causal 
 connection thus indicated is logical, not chronological. 
 There is no actual antecedence of the one to the other, 
 — it is only a form of thought. It cannot be said of 
 Matter what Arius ventured to say of the Son of God, 
 r)v irore ore ovk tjv. It is true, looking at the succes- 
 sion of phenomena as we do flowing on generation after 
 generation, there is a time element in them : some 
 occur later than others — the destruction of Pompeii 
 was ages after the founding of Eome, and summer 
 follows spring. It might seem, then, as though these 
 phenomena, being new to those who observe them, are 
 newthings; while the Eeality,the Eternal Cause, to which 
 they owe existence, was in existence before them and 
 without them. That, however, is a misconception of the 
 meaning. These phenomena which we, from our point 
 of view, arrange as before and after one another, are 
 only, according to the Spencerian conception, the 
 
J 92 P re-Organic Evolution. 
 
 continuation of one great act, as it were, of the 
 Eternal Eeality, which has been going on ever since, 
 if one may use such an expression, that Eeality has 
 been in existence, that is, from eternity. If we will, 
 to meet our finite way of looking at things, detach 
 events in Nature one from the other, and speak of them 
 as being successive effects of the One great Cause, we 
 then only afhrm succession in time of the effects ; we 
 do not affirm the existence of the One great Cause 
 then, or at any point of duration, without the presence 
 of some effect, any more than we affirm the presence, 
 at any point in duration, of any effect without the 
 coexistence of the Cause. The doctrine of Mr. Spencer 
 is, I say, that we are not to think of the Causal Reality, 
 which underlies all, as ever existing without tlie 
 presence of phenomenal effect in some form.^ As 
 shadow and substance are indestructibly coexistent in 
 the sunshine, and we cannot think of the one being 
 tliere without implying therein the presence of the 
 other, so tliere is an Eternal coexistence of the 
 noumenal Keality, call it what we may, and pheno- 
 menal manifestation of itself. It would not be far 
 from accuracy to speak of the universe, in some form 
 
 1 Matter, as such, is an eternal phenomenon : its changes of form are 
 ever new. 
 
Criticism, 193 
 
 or other, differentiated or undifferentiated, as the 
 eternal shadow of the Eternal Substance. The Time 
 element in their relation is excluded. The Eternal 
 Eeality was never only Eeality ; it was always Eternal 
 Eeality being manifested in Matter and its changes. 
 In some form or other, then, the universe is as ancient 
 as is the Eternal. It is the eternal form of an eternal 
 activity. Phenomena and noumenon for ever and 
 from eternity coexist, but are radically distinguishable 
 in thought one from the other. 
 
 This representation so characteristic of Mr. Spencer's 
 view of the relation of the phenomenal order to the 
 noumenal Cause of all, has a twofold bearing : first, 
 on the question of the minimum simplicity from which 
 Evolution is supposed to proceed ; and second, on the 
 ordinarily received doctrine of Creation. The grounds 
 of its adoption are not explicitly stated ; nor, indeed, 
 is Mr. Spencer explicit in reference to the view itself. 
 The whole question of view of the relation, and ground 
 on which it rests, is resolvable into his conception 
 of what tlie Eternal Eeality is. He cannot think, 
 apparently, of the Eternal Eeality otherwise than as 
 so manifesting itself; much in the same way as Eothe 
 in his Dogmatih, only with true German explicitness 
 of detail, comes to the result, " dcr aholutcn Correlation 
 
194 Pre-0rga7iic Evohition. 
 
 xon Gott unci Welt : Es giht olme Welt Iceinen Gott." ^ 
 Although, then, Mr. Spencer does not in words 
 deliberately adopt this view for the sake of establishing 
 liis position with respect to Evolution, beginning with 
 the minimum simplicity, it nevertheless is held to be 
 presumably congruous with it. 
 
 One of the charms to me of his works is his intense 
 love for, and search after, congruity of thought ; and 
 in this respect the influence of his writings is most 
 wholesome. But so far as I can form a careful judg- 
 ment, the adoption of this view of the eternal relation 
 of phenomena and reality is of no avail for the purpose 
 referred to. For, as previously pointed out, when 
 discussing the question of cycles, if at any point in the 
 eternal series of Evolutions and Dissolutions there 
 existed the mininmtm which I have shown is implied 
 in the Spencerian conception of Evolution, then, no 
 subsequent Evolution could occur — there would be 
 nothing to produce differentiation in the stable 
 equilibrium. If, on the other hand, there did not 
 exist, in any point of the series, the said minimnm, 
 then there must always have existed some considerable 
 differentiation independently of Evolution, that is to 
 
 ^ Of the absolute coirelatioii of Cod ami the world : There is no 
 God without a world. 
 
Criticism. 195 
 
 say, differentiation must have been an eternal antecedent 
 or rather concomitant, and not a temporal product, of 
 Evolution. And thus the doctrine of the eternal 
 coexistence of phenomena and reality brings us to the 
 same conclusion as before, and either renders Evolution 
 impossible, or else implies in the existence of far- 
 reaching adjustments requisite for the possibility of 
 Evolution, characteristics very significant for the Theist 
 and very inconvenient for the Agnostic. 
 
 But the other bearing of the twofold representation 
 — that on the ordinary doctrine of Creation — is very 
 important both as respects the congruity of the 
 Spencerian system and as respects Theology. Mr. 
 Spencer makes no secret of the fact that this concep- 
 tion of an eternal manifestation of an Eternal Eeality 
 in the form of cycles of Evolution and Dissolution, is 
 a philosophical substitute for the theological conception 
 of Creation. Some of the most skilful writimr in the 
 First FrincijyUs is in reference to this subject. The 
 resources of philosophy and logic are laid under con- 
 tribution to show that the concej)tion of Creation, both 
 among the vulgar and the educated, is irrational — 
 that, in fact, it is all a delusion to suppose that we 
 have any conception of it at all. At the same time, 
 his acceptance of the principle of Causality necessitates 
 
196 Prc-Organic Evolution, 
 
 that if that conception be not rational, some other 
 must be forthcoming and be put on a basis of reason. 
 
 Our present business, then, is to estimate the value 
 of this substitute for the idea of Creation. 
 
 The first inquiry is as to the degree of force there 
 is in the argument that the idea of Creation must be 
 set aside because it is inconceivable. It is affirmed 
 that to try to think it is to endeavour to establish a 
 relation in consciousness when one of the terms of the 
 relation is lacking. We cannot conceive of an absolute 
 commencement. Any attempt to set forth the relation 
 of the universe to its Cause, in the above sense, is and 
 must be abortive.^ 
 
 Now, on the question of Cause and the relation of 
 the temporal order to the Eternal Being, it is, no doubt, 
 possible to start grave difficulties, and to make state- 
 ments wdiich to the uninitiated appear unanswerable. 
 Also, it must be conceded that the whole question of 
 Causation, in its bearing on the subject before us, is one 
 that has greatly perplexed metaphysicians. On the 
 other hand, those who start the difficulties and make 
 the statements can be shown to create, thereby, diffi- 
 culties equally serious. Nor ought w^e to conclude 
 that, because wise men have not always seen their w^ay 
 
 ^ Fh-fii Priiidph'H, pp. 35-45. 
 
Criticism. 197 
 
 to the same solution of difficulties, therefore there is 
 no balance of probability in favour of one solution over 
 another. The causal judgment is a radical constituent 
 of the human mind, and is practically recognised as 
 such by Mr. Spencer. Its validity in the structure of 
 human knowledge cannot be set aside by reference to 
 our inability to formulate, or clear of obscurity, all that 
 is implied in it. It most certainly goes straight to its 
 goal — an Eternal Source of all phenomena. By so 
 doing, it does not compel, or even imply, the belief 
 that the phenomena were always existing in some form 
 as phenomena, but only that they potentially existed 
 in their Eternal Cause. It would take us too far 
 astray to traverse this interesting metaphysical field. 
 ]f one wished to make a parade of authorities, here 
 would be a fine opportunity. The question before us, 
 however, as raised by Mr. Spencer, is not so much one 
 of pure metaphysics as of fact, namely, whether the 
 reality of a transcendental act depends for its existence 
 on our ability to conceive it. Let us keep this bare 
 issue before us. 
 
 Be it remembered, then, that the entire argument in 
 reference to the unreasonableness of believing in such 
 a doctrine as Creation proceeds on the assumption 
 that, though we may be in possession of facts and 
 
1 98 Pre- Organic EvoliUion. 
 
 principles — such, for instance, as are implied in the 
 validity of tlie principle of Causality — which, as long 
 as our mental constitution is wliat it is, lead us inevit- 
 ably to certain definite conclusions, yet these must 
 not be recognised as sound philosophical conclusions, 
 if, when stated in terms so far, indeed, ns transcend- 
 ental truth can be adequately expressed in language 
 l)orrowed from phenomenal experience, they are incon- 
 ccivaUc. Truth, reality, must be more than thinJcalh 
 if existent. Distinct human conccivabilltij is the cri- 
 terion of truth. Homo mcnsura rcrum, in its old pre- 
 Socratic sense, as taught by Protagoras, though with 
 modern accretions, is thus the prime axiom ; and its 
 plausibility is for some minds as strong as ever. 
 
 The Cjuestion of conceivability in its relation to 
 knowledge has been often discussed, and Mr. Spencer 
 himself has not been able to see eye to eye on the 
 subject, in some particulars, with Mr. J. S. Mill. For 
 our present purpose it may suffice to notice that there 
 are two senses in which the term may be employed ; 
 and what we have to do is to see whether in either of 
 these the 5io?2.-conceivability of Creation, supposing it to 
 be so, is a valid reason for not believing in its reality. 
 
 In the common acceptation of the term, a thing is 
 said to be inconceivable when we are unable, by the 
 
Cj'iticism, 199 
 
 constructive imac;ination, to frame a mental ima^e — 
 a distinct rc-presentation (Voi'stellung) out of the pre- 
 sentations which, in time past, have been experienced 
 through the senses ; as when, out of remembered 
 materials, we construct an image of a landscape, or of 
 a diagram, or of a scene in history. But ii\ this sense 
 it is clear that there is much truth and reality of which 
 we can never form a conception. I should like to see 
 the man who can conceive, i.e. form a mental image 
 that shall coincide with the reality, of a mathematical 
 line that has length w^ithout breadth, or of an infinite 
 line, or of a curve which, though extended for ever, will 
 never meet, or of a Eeality — a something which is not 
 phenomenon — which has in itself none of the charac- 
 teristics included in our phenomenal knowledge. By 
 no effort, in blending the various elements of sensible 
 experience stored in the memory, can any one form a 
 definite image of either of these. They are perfectly 
 inconceivable. They have never been presentations in 
 sensible experience, and they can never become rc- 
 presentations in the imagination. And yet we all know 
 that there are such things as objective mathematical 
 lines, infinite lines, parabolas, and a Reality which, 
 underlying and accounting for all the phenomena of 
 our sensible experiences, has none of their finite pheno- 
 
200 P re-Organic Evolittio)i. 
 
 menal forms. At the same time, though we cannot 
 " conceive " these as existing, any more than we can 
 Creation, the constitution of our mind is such that, in 
 its operation on and above the facts of sensible experi- 
 ence, we are not only able, but are compelled, to thinh 
 them, and postulate them, as essentials of thought in 
 the fabric of knowledge. In this sense, then, the in- 
 conceivability of Creation is no reason why its reality 
 should not be recognised as a necessity of thought. 
 
 There is, however, another sense in which the term 
 inconceivable may be used, namely, when the assertion 
 of the alleged truth would involve a contradiction. It 
 is not conceivable that a thing should be and not be 
 at the same time. That is unthinkable. Now, I am 
 not aware that there is any contradiction involved in 
 affirming Creation to be a reality. It does not affirm 
 the existence of that which does not exist. It does 
 not deny the existence of that which does exist. It 
 only affirms the origination by the Eternal Will of 
 that which is not self-existent but derived. Mr. 
 Spencer seems to suppose that the idea of Creation 
 carries with it the impossible idea of " absolute com- 
 mencement." But it is well to understand in what 
 sense this expression is used. There are two and, as it 
 seems to me, only two interpretations to be put upon 
 
Criticism. 201 
 
 the expression. It either means that the "commence- 
 ment" of the phenomenal world was without any 
 antecedent, that there was nothing existing before it — 
 in other words, that it was the first thing that ever 
 did exist ; or that there was a point in duration when 
 the phenomenal world that now is emerged into exist- 
 ence out of its antecedently existing noumenal Cause 
 — in other Avords, that the phenomenal had a real 
 beginning, as distinguished from a logical eternal 
 inherence in the noumenal Cause. 
 
 Now, let us take these two interpretations of 
 " absolute commencement " and see how they bear on 
 the point at issue. In so doing, I may safely sny 
 that, in reference to the first intrepretation, it is not 
 true to affirm that the idea of Creation, as understood 
 among philosophical theologians, does imply it. There 
 is no such thing as " absolute commencement," in that 
 sense, intended or implied in saying that things were 
 created. There is no beginning apart from the exist- 
 ence of a prior Power. The principle of Causality 
 implies, in its very nature, that the finite phenomenal 
 world had its becjinnincr in a Cause which is self- 
 existent — uncaused. It had its noumenal antecedent, 
 and its beginning was relative to that antecedent. The 
 world, as an effect, is a new thing in comparison witli 
 
202 Pjx- Organic Evolution, 
 
 the Eternal Cause from whicli it came, but its begin- 
 ning as phenomenal effect does not render nil its 
 prior existence in the Cause. Creation, or origination 
 in this way, then, does not commit us to any such 
 impossibility as " absolute commencement," i.e. begin- 
 ning entirely cut off from a noumenal antecedent 
 base. To say tliat, in this sense, there was no 
 origination, that the finite phenomenal world did not, 
 as such, begin to be, is, as we shall see, to beg the 
 great question of the coeternity of phenomenal Matter 
 and noumenal Eeality, and virtually to set aside the 
 most necessary and fundamental law of the human 
 mind — Causality — or else to empty it of all signifi- 
 cance. The causal judgment is something more 
 positive than a mental impotence to think either of 
 two contradictories, as Hamilton would have us 
 believe; it pushes us irresistibly into the region of 
 noumenal being as the explanation of the existence of 
 what is not noumenal. At the same time, it does not 
 require ns to seek anything beyond the Cause, for to ask 
 the commencement of Iieal Cause is to misunderstand 
 the use of language and the problems of philosophy : 
 it is, in fact, to be thinking of the noumenal Cause 
 as though it were itself but an "effect," which is 
 slieer nonsense. The proper way of speaking of 
 
Criticism. 203 
 
 true Cause not to say "First," but OrIu, Independent 
 Cause. 
 
 If, then, Creation does not imply " absolute coni- 
 mencenrient " in the above sense, let us see whether 
 it does in the other, and whether tliat would prove the 
 idea to be an impossible one. It may be at once 
 admitted that the idea of Creation does imply that 
 there was a point in duration when the phenomenal, 
 that now is, emercjed into existence as a new thincj 
 out of its antecedently existing Eternal Cause ; in 
 other words, that the Eternal Power caused phenomena 
 to be where phenomena had not been. In the 
 lamTuaf:je of the Transcendentalists the Absolute did 
 cictually pass into the Eelative. 
 
 It is admitted by some of the profoundest 
 speculators on these high subjects — such as Hegel, 
 Schelling, and Spinoza — that the passage of the 
 Absolute into the Eelative is as much a fact as the 
 Eeality of the Absolute itself, thougli it would puzzle 
 them to put into words any conception they may have 
 had of it, if they had one at all. It would, also, be 
 difficult for them to show, iu any form of language, 
 that such conception as tliey may profess to have of 
 it differs radically from the conception, so far as they 
 can have one, wdiich philosophical theologians have of 
 
204 Pre- Organic Evolution. 
 
 Creation. It may perhaps be sheer nonsense to talk 
 of mere Power, as Power, existing apart from activity 
 in some form ; but, as there is such a thing as Power 
 acting, as a Spiritual Pteality, within its own nature, 
 e.(j. as the operations of Mind are within the sphere of 
 Mind, so, unless we set a limit to the Absolute and 
 thus destroy it as Absolute, it seems thinkable that 
 Infinite Power should, also, be able to impart both 
 form and reality to what is not itself, that is, give rise 
 to other existence than its own. In Creation the 
 Eternal Cause emerges out of mere existence as 
 Power, active within its own Being, into Power as 
 expressed in other forms of working — in the con- 
 tinuous maintenance of existences which are not 
 itself — and these forms of working are existences 
 which have in themselves no independence, no self- 
 subsistence as has the Eternal from whence they come. 
 In the Eternal they "live and move and have their 
 being." To say that we cannot conceive, of that begin- 
 ning to be, may be quite true if you mean that we, 
 with our phenomenal associations and habits of thought, 
 cannot frame an image of it ; but it is not true if 
 you mean that we cannot tliinh it. For tlie question 
 resolves itself into a constitutive act of the mind. 
 The causal judgment compels us to think a beginning 
 
Criticism. 205 
 
 of phenomena and finite being, as sncli : it does not 
 compel us to tliiiik an eternal coexistence of noumenon 
 and phenomena. 
 
 Should the curious question arise, What was the 
 existence of the Eternal Power before the phenomena 
 came forth, and how can we think of such Power 
 existing without expressing itself in any phenomena ? 
 I would reply, in addition to what has been said, that 
 such questions are more curious than profound. The 
 reality of the pure noumenal existence of the Eternal 
 does not depend on our ability or inabihty to imagine 
 it, for were the iVbsohite comprehensible to us it would 
 not be Absolute. Assuming, as surely I may, the 
 noumenal character of our own Ego which expresses 
 itself in passing forms, is it not within the range of 
 possibility for it to be sometimes below the level of 
 all conscious forms or states, i.e. existing as pure 
 noumenal Power apart from its usual expression ? Is 
 there any principle of philosophy, or any item of 
 knowledge, that necessitates that the present pheno- 
 menal material universe is the only expression of the 
 Eternal Absolute Eeality that ever was or ever can be ? 
 Why will thinking men in one sentence represent the 
 Eternal as Absolute, and then, in another, set a limit 
 to the Being of the Absolute ? I refuse to do any such 
 
2o6 Pix-Oi'ganic EvoliUion. 
 
 thing, and whatever mysteries and potentialities there 
 may be in Absolute Being, I am content to be guided in 
 my judgments by the principle of Causality, which, I 
 affirm, compels the belief that phenomena now existing 
 had an actual beginning, and that too in the EternaL 
 
 Eeverting, then, to the main point that gave rise to 
 this discussion on " absolute commencement," it will 
 be borne in mind that I have represented our belief 
 in the truth of Creation to arise from the fact that the 
 very constitution of our minds necessitates it — we 
 must believe that all things, bein^ij finite, come from 
 the Eternal, and are not, being finite, the Eternal 
 Himself. Of course as I have said, we cannot frame 
 an ima^e of the act of the Eternal in orimnatimT what 
 now is, for that is an act in the depths of the Eternal 
 Being.^ Xor, as we have seen, is there any contradic- 
 tion involved in the belief. The nearest aj^proach we 
 can ever get to a definite idea of what is involved in 
 Creation is, perhaps, by analogy ; as when by the act of 
 our own free personality we originate volitions which, 
 being not identical with the noumenal personality 
 itself, are, in some sense, its creations, and which find 
 
 1 ]\lr. Spencer is confronted with the same difficult}' Avhen he 
 substitutes "Manifestation" for Creation; for tlie Manifestation is 
 not the Beinpf and yet comes from it. 
 
Criticism. 207 
 
 expression out of self. The validity of principles, 
 liowever, does not depend on our ability to comprehend 
 all that is implied in them, but on the laws of thought 
 which compel their acceptance. 
 
 In thus vindicating our belief in Creation as reason- 
 able in spite of Mr. Spencer's objection to it on the 
 score of its being inconceivable, it is some satisfaction 
 to be able to fall back on his own admissions made 
 elsewhere in his works, when unmindful of his tilt 
 against theologians. No man believes more thoroughly 
 in the inconceivable than does Mr. Spencer. In his 
 Psychology he insists, with great emphasis, that all 
 we know is states of consciousness. He teaches that 
 Mind is composed of vivid and faint states,^ and that 
 knowledge lies within the circle of these. The items 
 entering into our knowledge consist of phenomena in 
 consciousness. And yet he teaches most strenuously 
 that there is such a thing as an Eternal Eeality 
 '' outside the rim of consciousness." I do not here 
 stay to discuss the method of balancing these opposite 
 sides of the Spencerian philosophy. Our present point 
 is to ask how is it possible to " conceive " that which 
 is outside the rim of consciousness, seeing that all our 
 knowledge lies in states of consciousness ? According 
 
 ^ " Eelatioiial states " are not made co-ordinate with vivid and faint. 
 
2o8 Pre-Orcranic Evohition, 
 
 to tlie objection raised against Creation, this something 
 outside the rim of consciousness certainly ought not 
 to be affirmed to exist. The matter is not improved 
 by saying that " we have an indefinite consciousness 
 of something beyond tlie rim of consciousness." Of 
 course, Mr. Spencer means that we are compelled by 
 the necessities of our mental constitution — so far as, 
 on his system, we have one — to believe in the existence 
 of an Eternal Eeality, though we cannot conceive it, 
 and for that reason are obliged to term it the 
 " Unknowable." This is practically what I affirm 
 to be true of our belief in the fact of Creation — it is 
 real, though we know only the bare fact. But further, 
 I have said that the principle of Causality, which 
 enters into our mental constitution, compels us, when 
 applied to the interpretation of the phenomenal world, 
 to come to the conclusion, strange and deep in mystery 
 as it may be, that all things originated in the Eternal 
 — were created. Mr. Spencer renders this j^osition 
 most reasonable, inasmuch as, after an elaborate dis- 
 cussion in reference to matter, he feels quite free even 
 to believe and hold to a conclusion which is even 
 more than inconceivable, lie says : " We are obliged 
 to conclude that matter . . . acts upon matter, 
 through absolutely vacant space and yet this conclu- 
 
Criticism. 209 
 
 sion is 'positively itnthinkahle." ^ The italics are mine. 
 If under the necessities of thought the " unthinkable " 
 may be believed when only the relation of material 
 phenomena are concerned, I trust it will not be deemed 
 extravagant when I claim that the " inconceivable " 
 is no bar to belief when the necessities of thought 
 lead us to a conclusion respecting the relation of the 
 Eternal Noumenon to the phenomenal world, that is, 
 the belief tliat God created the universe. 
 
 5. Knoioahility of the Eternal Reality — God, 
 
 As already indicated, Evolution has reference to the 
 process by which the universe is believed to have 
 passed to its present highly differentiated condition 
 from a state of things in which differentiation was at 
 zero. Strictly speaking, then, it relates to the history 
 of phenomenal changes, and any use of the term 
 beyond this is an abuse of language. But we live in 
 an age when exactitude of terms is too often dis- 
 regarded in the eager effort to propound theories ; and 
 so it has come to pass that, just as many extend the 
 use of the term Evolution, beyond the passage of all 
 organic forms from one or a few simple organic forms, 
 
 ^ First Principles, p. 60. Cf. similar concession in reference to Force, 
 pp. 61-67. 
 
 O 
 
2 1 o Pre- Organic Evolution. 
 
 to the interaction or involution of primordial ultimates 
 of matter characteristic of inorganic progress, so others 
 embrace within its scope speculations concerning the 
 Original Cause, to which the units of the universe and 
 the changes they undergo in their relation one to the 
 other are referred. Mr. Spencer, as a matter of theory, 
 distinctly recognises the proper restriction of the term 
 Evolution to the passage of organic forms from a primal 
 organic form, but, as we have seen, he practically 
 extends it over the whole region of inorganic change ; 
 and, I may here again add, he virtually makes his 
 treatment of the subject to include certain representa- 
 tions concerning the Original Cause of all existence 
 and change. It is impossible to sever his treatment 
 of Evolution in the organic and inorganic spheres from 
 the consideration of the nature of the Cause to which 
 all is to be referred, and its relation to the pheno- 
 menal order. This, of course, takes us out of the 
 domain of physical and natural science, and raises 
 questions pertaining to ontology. It is here that we 
 are bound, if we would form an estimate of the whole 
 theory of Evolution, as expounded by Mr. Spencer and 
 the more advanced thinkers, to enter into the more 
 difficult metaphysical questions which lie at the base 
 of all knowledge of the concrete, and note how far the 
 
Criticism. 2 1 1 
 
 conceptions of Mr. Spencer and his school accord with 
 the views of Theists, and how far they are at variance 
 with those views. Doubtless, there are many, nnder 
 the influence of Positivism, who are disposed to care 
 little for either Mr. Spencer's speculations on the 
 Eternal Eeality, or for the Theistic interpretation of 
 things, while quite content to follow him in his ex- 
 position of the evolutionary process considered simply 
 as a process. But as the Spencerian system is a 
 philosophic whole, firmly knit together, and as the 
 congruity of the representation of the portion which 
 relates strictly to Evolution depends on his conception 
 of the Cause of all, it would be unjust to him, not to 
 take into account his explicit teaching concerning the 
 source to which the evolutionary process is to be 
 ascribed ; and, also, it would be unfair to Theism, 
 with its correlated ideas, were it allowed, by our ab- 
 stention from criticism, to be supposed that, on the 
 great question of the Ultimate Cause of all, Mr. Spencer 
 holds an impregnable position. Those familiar with 
 the subject know well that it involves the most difficult 
 of all problems ; and to be discussed thoroughly, with 
 due regard to its abstruse character, would require a 
 separate treatise conceived in the highest vein of 
 speculative philosophy. As, however, I am writing 
 
2 12 Pre-Orp-anic Evohition. 
 
 s 
 
 for some who have not time for a treatise, and, may 
 be, have not full acquaintance with the conceptions 
 and forms of language requisite to a purely meta- 
 physical treatment, I shall strive to put the pith of the 
 controversy in as short a compass as possible, and in 
 terms, as far as can be, free from scholastic technicalities. 
 
 I have previously pointed out the great service Mr. 
 Spencer has rendered to philosophy and to Christian 
 truth in his strong and forcible assertion, on the most in- 
 dubitable of grounds, of the existence at the base and 
 origin of all that is, of One Eternal Reality. For this, 
 Theists of all religions, and Christians also, may most 
 heartily thank him. He has thus set up on a broad 
 foundation, a doctrine most fruitful in its issues. The 
 major part of Theism is manifestly conceded. The ques- 
 tion is whether the position taken does not involve more 
 than, at present, he is prepared to admit ; and whether 
 the negative aspect of the position would not yield to 
 something more decidedly positive, if all the facts avail- 
 able for forming judgment were taken into consideration. 
 
 It may serve to illustrate the nature of the question 
 before us if I refer, on the one side, to Mr. Spencer's 
 idea of the Eternal lieality,^ and, on the other, to 
 
 ' Mr. Spencer has obscured his ideas on the Eternal Reality by 
 sometimes using the ambiguous term "Force" to indicate it. There 
 
Criticism. 2 1 3 
 
 the Biblical conceptions of God, in so far as they 
 agree. Mr. Spencer holds that there exists One 
 Eternal Eeality, distinguishable in thought and fact 
 from all else in existence : the Bible teaches that 
 there is One Eternal Eeality — God — distinguishable 
 in thought and fact from all else in existence. Mr. 
 Spencer holds that the One Eternal Eeality has a 
 nature of its own, is unique, is in no sense to be 
 confounded with phenomena derived from it : the 
 Bible teaches that the One Eternal Eeality — God — 
 is the Living God, and entirely distinguishable in His 
 nature and being from the products of His energy. 
 Mr. Spencer holds that the Eternal Eeality is the 
 Origin, the Cause of all else, that it is the base of all 
 phenomenal being, and, while transcending all things, 
 is, at the same time, immanent in all things as the 
 Power without which they could neither be, nor con- 
 tinue to be, what they are : the Bible teaches that the 
 Eternal Eeality — God — is the Author and Source of 
 all that is — " of Him are all things " — that His Power 
 enters into and keeps in being all that is, while at the 
 same time not identifiable with the things themselves ; 
 
 are in his works two other meanings of the term "Force ;" one the 
 phenomenal expression of the Reality which we know as Mechanical 
 force, the other, the consciousness of power in ourselves which resists 
 a something outside us. Principles of Psychology, ii. pp. 475-478. 
 
2 1 4 Pre- Organic Evolution, 
 
 " in Him we live and move and have our being," by 
 Him " all things consist." Mr. Spencer holds that 
 the One Eternal Reality, in bringing the universe to 
 its present form as the manifestation of its power, has 
 exercised its energy in such a way as to cause the 
 present highly developed forms of its power to proceed, 
 in continuous lines, from the more elementary forms of 
 its power — the Eternal Eeality has graded the outflow 
 of its resources: the Bible teaches that the Eternal 
 Eeality — God — brought about the condition of things 
 in which man finds himself by a series of graduated 
 changes. Whether the account of the progression of 
 things contained in the first chapter of Genesis be 
 interpretable in entire harmony with the unbroken 
 continuity claimed by the advocates of universal 
 Evolution or not, the fact is manifest that God is 
 represented there as working out an orderly advance 
 from an elementary condition of things — chaotic and 
 indeterminate — to the perfected world as it appears 
 with man as the crown and glory of the whole.^ Mr. 
 Spencer holds that, while, as we have seen, the Eternal 
 Eeality has a true being, a nature of its own, far above 
 
 ^ Genesis does not give as much detail in relation to " the heavens " 
 as it does to the earth, for the obvious reason that the narrative more 
 directly concerns man and his dwelling. 
 
Criticism. 2 1 5 
 
 and beyond any being and nature predicable of tlie 
 finite objects that make up the sum of the universe, 
 considered as a product of Eternal Power ; yet that 
 it is " Inscrutable," and, beyond the fact of its exist- 
 ence as Cause of all else, the " Unknowable : " the 
 Bible teaches the same, so far at least as this, that the 
 Eternal Reality — God — is a Being who stands alone 
 and unapproachable in the grandeur and mystery of 
 His nature and the unsearchableness of His ways — 
 we cannot " find Him out to perfection ; " He is One 
 whom " no one hath seen or can see ; " whom " the 
 heaven of heavens cannot contain," and who " covereth 
 Himself with light as with a garment." 
 
 So far, then, there is substantial agreement between 
 this philosophy and Biblical representations of God. 
 In order to see clearly the divergence of the two we 
 must note well the main point of the agreement, 
 which seems to be this : that both the Eternal Eeality 
 of Philosophy and the God of Scripture have a real 
 being, a certain nature of their own, which, so far 
 from being of the same kind as the being and nature 
 of what makes up the phenomenal material universe, 
 are, in fact, the seat, as it were, of the power ex- 
 pressed in the existence of that universe. The points 
 of divergence are two. The first is this, that, accord- 
 
2 1 6 Pre-07'oranic Evolution 
 
 ^> 
 
 ing to the Spencerian philosophy, the relation of the 
 Eternal Eeality possessing such a nature and being, to 
 the phenomenal universe, considered as material, is 
 Eternal, while, according to the Bible, the relation 
 of the Eternal Eeality — God — to that universe - is 
 CONSTITUTED by God. In other words, according to 
 Mr. Spencer, the Eternal Eeality is a Source of power 
 that has been putting forth its energy in one eternal 
 unbroken line of physical changes up to this hour — 
 its relation to the material units and order never had 
 a beginning — the material manifestations in one form 
 or another are as ancient as is the Eternal ; while, 
 according to the Bible, the Eternal Eeality — God — 
 originated the physical units and the order by what 
 is termed Creation, so that He alone is absolutely 
 Eternal. The other point of divergence is this, that, 
 according to ]\Ir. Spencer's philosophy, the nature and 
 being of the Eternal Eeality, beyond the bare fact 
 that it has a nature and being of its own, are 
 absolutely " Unknowable " — it is " Inscrutable ; " 
 whereas the Biblical representation is that we so far 
 at least know the nature and being of the Eternal 
 Eeality — God — as to be able to affirm of Him 
 Eeason, Eighteousness, and Love, i.e. the main charac- 
 teristics of an Intelligent nature. 
 
Criticism. 2 1 7 
 
 Now, with respect to the first point of divergence, I 
 can but refer to what has been said in pp. 195-208 
 on Manifestation versus Creation. It is the second 
 point which here claims our attention. 
 
 It is observable in the study of human systems 
 that no doctrine however erroneous, or statement how- 
 ever far from actual truth, can find a lodgment in 
 a sane mind unless it contains within itself some 
 element of positive truth, or is associated, by an 
 ambiguous use of language, with some approved phase 
 of thought or conduct. 
 
 There are two considerations which, apart from the 
 correctness of the position, may well account for the 
 readiness with which the Agnostic philosophy has been 
 received by many. One is moral. Modesty is always 
 in good repute. The semblance even of the more 
 lowly virtues is sure to give an advantage to any 
 doctrine or belief associated with them. Especially is 
 it good for the philosopher, who is supposed by the 
 populace to know most about the range and the 
 limitations of human faculties, to be able to balance 
 his daring speculations by a confession of infirmity. 
 It sounds well to say, on the one hand, that of the 
 nature of the Primal Cause of all things we know 
 nothing and cannot ever know anything beyond that 
 
2i8 Pre-0rga7iic Evohttion. 
 
 fact that it is ; and, on the other, that for theologians 
 and others to affirm in the interests of religion that 
 they do possess a knowledge of the nature and attributes 
 of the Primal Cause of all things, is to go beyond the 
 bounds which a humble estimate of human faculties 
 would allow. A religion that professes to know so 
 much is, by that fact, self-condemned. A philosophy 
 that confesses its ignorance on matters lying outside 
 the domain of possible knowledge is, by that fact, 
 rendered reasonable. The eye that claims to gaze 
 right into the mystery of Eternal Being is the 
 organ of a boastful, immodest creature. Philosophical 
 Agnosticism is so far religious in its spirit that it 
 abstains from prying into, and makes no pretension 
 to the power to pry into, the Invisible Source of all. 
 It stands afar and wonders ! The new relisrion is to 
 be that of lowly ignorance ! 
 
 The other consideration, pliilosophical, favourable to 
 the Agnostic position, is derived from the general 
 representation of the nature, object, and scope of 
 human knowledge. An appeal is made to the com- 
 mon sense of men as to whether our knowledsje is not 
 confined to that which is purely phenomenal. Do not 
 men know from the mere interrogation of their own 
 consciousness that, beyond the bare fact that there is 
 
Criticism. 219 
 
 something at the back of what they see with their 
 eyes and touch with their hands, they know nothing ? 
 The things we see in the external world are only the 
 outward transitory changes wrought by what is never 
 seen, never known, except as a something to which 
 the changes must be referred. No one can say what 
 it is. And this common judgment is fortified by Mr. 
 Spencer's philosophical account of what knowledge is. 
 Speaking to ordinary men in their ordinary language 
 he would say something of this kind : " The terms in 
 which we state our knowledge are derived primarily 
 from what strikes on the senses, and being used to 
 denote what is phenomenal they are not, and cannot 
 be, expressive or indicative of what is not phenomenal. 
 Oar ideas are built up out of the fleeting impressions 
 we have of external things, and our words are coined 
 to fit these impressions ; so that neither have we ideas 
 or words to conceive or express that which never 
 comes to the senses, never appears in our conscious- 
 ness. To profess to conceive of that which underlies 
 all phenomena is to profess to conceive of that for 
 which we have no faculty, that which if it were pre- 
 sentable in any cognisable form, would, by that very 
 fact, cease to underlie all phenomena, — it would itself 
 be a phenomenon, an appearance, in our consciousness, 
 
2 20 P re-Organic Evolution. 
 
 as truly so as would the image of St. Paul's Cathedral. 
 Thus it is not irreverence, not irreligion, in the true 
 sense of the term, nor is it dogmatism, but the very 
 necessities of thought and the nature of knowledge 
 which compel us to say that we know^ not what the 
 nature of the Eternal Eeality is." Although Kant's 
 system is far removed from that of Mr. Spencer's in 
 most important respects, yet, for purposes of illustra- 
 tion, his doctrine of the unknowability of the finite 
 human mind may be referred to. Kant taught that 
 besides the manifold states which make up our total 
 consciousness, there was lying out of view, deep down 
 and unexplorable, that which was, in fact, the unity of 
 all our states of consciousness, that which accounted 
 noumenally for their presence, that which was the 
 rational key to their existence, but which itself never 
 came into consciousness, and of the nature of which, 
 therefore, we know nothing. In some such way Mr. 
 Spencer teaches with reference to the Eternal Eeality, 
 which is the unity, the base, the source of all the 
 changes and appearances which come into conscious- 
 ness, and which make up what is called the worlds of 
 Matter and of Mind, that we know it not, and have 
 not the faculty to know it. Its manifestations only 
 are known and conceivable. 
 
Criticism. 2 2 1 
 
 Now, there is so much of truth iu the above 
 representation, both moral and philosophical, that the 
 plea for Agnosticism cannot fail to be regarded favour- 
 ably by many. And the general conclusion thus reached 
 is confirmed by the admissions of an influential school 
 of Christian philosophers. No one has insisted more 
 strongly on our inability to know God as He is, i.e. 
 to have any reliable conception of His nature, than 
 Mr. Mansel, the expounder in England of the philo- 
 sophy of the Unconditioned. 
 
 It seems to me that Mr. Spencer's position with 
 respect to the Unknowable is, in one respect, quite 
 impregnable ; but that his error lies in assuming that 
 its truth in that one respect covers the whole ground 
 of the controversy. He confounds an undoubted 
 metaphysical truth with a question of fact for which 
 there is good evidence. The truth of the position 
 may be put thus : There is an unseen unexplorable 
 lieality which is one thing, and there are its pheno- 
 menal manifestations which are another thing. We 
 know them both as existing. But the unseen Eeality 
 has a nature of its own. Following, though not quite 
 true to, Aristotle, the schoolmen called it substance, 
 and affirmed of it an essence, that is, that which con- 
 stituted it what it was. Now this nature, this sub- 
 
2 22 Pre-0ro-a7iic Evolution 
 
 i> 
 
 stance, this essence, this that makes the Eeality the 
 thing that it is, being beneath all phenomena, 
 beyond reach of our faculties, we do not and cannot 
 know. To try to conceive it is to try to frame in 
 thought what never comes into thought. In his 
 Psychology Mr. Spencer has an elaborate chapter to 
 show that even of what is scholastically termed the 
 " substance " of Mind, we have not and cannot have 
 the slightest conception. He might have gone further 
 and said that, taking a single thought, we, while know- 
 ing it to exist as a thought, yet know nothing what- 
 ever of its nature, considered, as the schoolmen would 
 say, in its essence, i.e. in that which constitutes it 
 what it is. All, therefore, who give attention to the 
 subject must agree with Mr. Spencer in his Agnos- 
 ticism, metaphysically considered ; and w^ioever pro- 
 fesses to know the essential nature of God, or to 
 understand what He is in the pure noumenal structure 
 (I use the word as an accommodation only) of His 
 Being, is guilty of the irreverence and audacity which 
 can only spring from ignorance of what is possible to 
 man. It is because the common sense of men responds 
 to this representation that our modern Agnosticism has 
 won its victories. But these victories have been won 
 by the truth thus recognised being made to serve for 
 
Criticis7n. 223 
 
 much that is in excess of itself. One side of a 
 subject has been made to do duty for other sides. 
 The essential inscrutability of a noumenal nature has 
 been mistaken for the impossibility of knowing what 
 are the powers and attributes inherent in that nature. 
 It appears to me that there are two ways of con- 
 sidering a noumenal Eeality — the purely metaphysical 
 and the historical. We may consider the essential 
 nature — the substance — as it is in and for itself, 
 abstracted from all idea of its expression in action ; 
 or we may consider that nature not abstractedly in 
 and for itself, but as revealing itself in action, creating 
 history by the exercise of its being. The two aspects 
 are essential to a comprehensive view of what 
 noumenal Eeality is. On reflection Mr. Spencer will 
 surely not suppose that because the Eternal Eeality 
 has an essential nature, in the scholastic sense, that 
 that exhausts what may be affirmed of it. It is not 
 surely a nature in the sense of being devoid of powers — 
 " pure Being," as the Transcendentalists would say — 
 of which only bare existence can be affirmed. Such a 
 narrow view is precluded by the admitted fact that the 
 universe with all its varieties and adjustments is a 
 manifestation — an expression of tlie Eternal Eeality. 
 The idea of " pure Being," " essential nature," " sub- 
 
22 4 P re-Organic Evolution. 
 
 stance," or whichever term be chosen, must be sup- 
 plemented by the idea of powers, or causal qualities, 
 which are as real in the " Being " as is the nature of 
 the substance of the " Being." Indeed, there are times 
 when even Mr. Spencer, in principle, recognises this, as 
 when he refers to the Eternal Eeality as the " Power " 
 to which all things are to be ascribed. 
 
 But if there be, then, two ways of considering the 
 Eternal Eeality, we have to inquire what light do the 
 manifestations of the Eeality throw upon — not the 
 nature of its Substance, the essence of its Being — but 
 upon what is inherent in that nature. This inquiry 
 really is historical. It means. What does the history 
 of the manifestations of the Eternal, as written out in 
 the vast changes and the stedfast order of the universe, 
 point to as dwelling in and characterising the very 
 being of the Source of all ? It is in pursuance of 
 this line of inquiry that both theologians and most 
 philosophers have come to the conclusion that the 
 Eternal is knowable. The Agnosticism which relates 
 to the nature, the essence, is freely admitted ; but it 
 is claimed that, because in this respect the Eternal is 
 Inscrutable, and we must confess our utter ignorance, 
 it does not follow that the metaphysical impossibility 
 is inconsistent with a satisfactory knowledge of the 
 
Criticism, 225 
 
 characteristics of the Eternal. Ignorance on one point 
 is not ignorance on all. We may agree with Mr. 
 Spencer, and yet decline to extend the Agnosticism 
 to a sphere in which it is no longer a metaphysical 
 question as to the essential nature of a noumenal 
 substance, but solely how has the Eternal Reality 
 revealed itself in the history of the universe. 
 
 This, of course, brings us to that great branch of 
 the Theistic controversy which deals with the evi- 
 dences afforded, in the constitution of things, of the 
 e^stence in the First Cause of all, of Will regulated 
 by Intelligence. It would be beyond my present 
 design to enter fully on so fruitful a theme. But as 
 we are discussimz Evolution in relation to its origin, I 
 may venture to allude to a few points even in Mr. 
 Spencer's representations, or in the implications of his 
 system, which, in my judgment, throw some light 
 on the question before us — the Knowability of God. 
 
 It would, I venture to think, be to the point were 
 
 w^e to direct attention to the remarkable adjustments 
 
 and regular order which are brought into view, when 
 
 following Mr. Spencer in his detailed expositions of the 
 
 principles and the actual process of Evolution ; placing 
 
 these side by side with his often-repeated statement 
 
 that all this is to be regarded as the manifestation of 
 
 p 
 
2 26 Pre-Oroanic Evolution 
 
 ^ 
 
 the Eternal Eeality. This survey of the adjustments 
 and reguhar order of the inorganic universe — ever 
 ^vorlving on and up to a more appreciable completeness 
 and beauty of arrangement — would be more and more 
 suf]fiiestive, were we, also, to take into account the 
 Evolution of Mind with its more subtle adjustments 
 within itself, and in its relation to the external system. 
 All this being, in the Spencerian phrase, a manifesta- 
 tion or series of manifestations of the Eternal, it is 
 certainly most reasonable to conclude that that which 
 is so pre-eminently manifested is Intelligence. Apart 
 from any theoretic views, I suppose a plain man would 
 say that, having such faculties as we have, we cannot 
 reasonably do other than be led by their indications. 
 And when we apply, without prejudice, and free from 
 the thraldom of any theory to be uphekl, these same 
 faculties to the consideration of the nndoubted fact that 
 the external and internal worlds exhibit such a variety 
 and perfectness, and beauty of adjustment and order, 
 surpassing all that our best thought could originate ; 
 and that the finite Mind which recognises and admires 
 this adjustment and order is capable of tracing it out 
 and seeing in it a reflex of its own Pieason, does not 
 the conviction inevitably arise tliat that Great Eeality, 
 of wliich all is but the manifestation, is cliaracterised 
 
Criticism. 227 
 
 by the Intelligence thus revealed ? Is it not a case ot" 
 Intelligence answering to Intelligence ? We do not 
 put our Eeason into Mature. We by our IJeason see 
 lieason there ; and hence think of the Power expressed 
 in l^ature as Eational. 
 
 But the subtleties of thought are manifold ; and it 
 may, therefore, occur to an extreme Evolutionist that 
 all these adjustments, and all tliis exquisite order, are 
 but the outgrowth of Evolution — the necessary un- 
 foldings of a primordial simplicity in which there was 
 no such supposed revelation of Intelligence. In other 
 words, if tlie elaborate arrangements in the present 
 evolved condition of things are the natural development 
 of a prior condition in which such signs of adjustment 
 were not found, there is no necessity to regard them as 
 infallible evidences of the existence of Intelligence in 
 the Cause from whence that prior condition came. It 
 would be possible to meet this view of the case by 
 pointing out the futility of seeking to ascribe the 
 adjustments to the bare process of Evolution, in order 
 to obviate the necessity of seeing in them tlie ex- 
 pression of Intelligence ; seeing that the process of 
 Evolution, though a fact, is not a cause, is not an 
 independent thing, but is itself only the method by 
 which the Eternal Ileality works. Whatever it im- 
 
228 P re-Organic Evolution, 
 
 plies is implied of the Eternal Eeality. Its so-called 
 adjustments, gradually brought about by integration 
 and differentiation, are brought about as successive 
 manifestations of the Cause that lies at the origin, and 
 runs all through the evolutionary process. 
 
 But passing this by, I would direct attention to the 
 minimum simplicity with which, as already expounded, 
 Evolution, according to Mr. Spencer, must be supposed 
 to have begun. There is a common notion abroad that 
 the more severe the original simplicity the less the 
 need of Intelligence. And it is a common mode of 
 thought to imagine that, if all Evolution had as its 
 head the most simple form of matter and motion, then, 
 the only quality or characteristic we need ever to 
 predicate of the Eternal Ileal ity, would be that of 
 Power or Eorce. I need not describe here again the 
 condition of matter and motion wdiich, as implied 
 in Mr. Spencer's system, antedated the first step in 
 the evolutionary process, and which formed the true 
 homogeneity prior to the heterogeneity which results 
 from, and is also, in fact, tlie characteristic of Evolution. 
 Let us analyse tliis primordial condition of simplicity, 
 as previously described, and see what different relations 
 and adjustments are involved even in it. There is, a, 
 the matter which constitutes the ultimates, be it the 
 
Criticism, 229 
 
 hypothetical hydrogen out of which the very elements 
 liave been evolved, or any other substance — it has 
 its own definite nature as matter. There is, l, the 
 diffusion of the matter in form of scattered ultimates, 
 which is a distinct thing, and involves a different act 
 of Power for its production, whether the act be called 
 " manifestation " or by any other term. There is, c, 
 the maintenance of that diffusion at distinct and equal 
 distances, however infinitesimal, between the ultimates, 
 which is a yet more definite, ordered, discriminating act 
 of Power. There is, <:/, the motion in a right line of 
 each ultimate, so as not to come into permanent or 
 even temporary contact ; or else, if the homogeneity 
 both of material and movement be of another kind, an 
 oscillating motion, by which each ultimate approaches 
 and recedes from another at definite distances, so as to 
 keep up the discrete condition of the whole mass ; or, 
 supposing there is not motion at all, there is perfect 
 equilibrium in the sense of each and all being at rest 
 — either which arrangement of ultimates prior to the 
 breaking up of the homogeneity, as the first step in the 
 evolutionary course, implies an adjustment so wide- 
 spread, so minute, so accurate in measurement and 
 order as to secure the primordial homogeneity of each 
 point of the entire mass. There is, r, that peculiarity 
 
230 Pre- Organic Evolution. 
 
 or tendency in each ultimate ^Ylnch, from the first and 
 through all time, secures, when once the primordial 
 homogeneity of relation is broken up, that every 
 ultimate sliall be drawn to every other, rather than 
 repelled only ; and drawn, not in any uncertain or any 
 other fixed mathematical proportion, but in exact pro- 
 portion to the mass of which it becomes a part, and in 
 inverse ratio to the square of the distance. There are, 
 /, as many distinct creations, or, if it be preferred, 
 manifestations, as there are ultimates in the vast mass ; 
 since each one is a separate thing, and has its own 
 separate and definite relation to the originating Power 
 and to each other thing; for each is a separate 
 expression of Cause as truly as though there were 
 only one ultimate in existence. There is, g, the ether 
 which is not atomic, not discrete, but continuous and 
 all-pervasive, and wliich, moreover, is so remarkably 
 constituted as to exist in quantitative and qualitative 
 relation to the moving ultimates — an illustration or 
 expression of power and skill not less than in the case 
 of the items already alluded to. Xow, if we survey 
 tliis list and consider what very different things and 
 relations, what exquisite and widespread adjustments 
 are thus found to be necessary for the very beginning 
 of the evolutionary process, do we not see in them the 
 
Criticism. 2 3 1 
 
 signs not only of separate, even tliougli contemporary, 
 acts of Power — expressions of the Eternal Energy — 
 Ijut of acts of Power directed by Intelligence, before 
 which all our conceptions of human wisdom are as 
 nothing ? Whether we can ever know the precise 
 nature— ix. the actual substance which, speaking 
 metaphysically, is the physical basis of the Eternal — is 
 a small and immaterial question, and w^e may well 
 answer it in the negative ; but that we can see in these 
 works of intelligent arrangement, in the constitution of 
 things prior to any Evolution, the manifest character- 
 istics of that Inscrutable nature, seems to me one of 
 the most patent truths we are capable of acquiring. 
 Eur, be it observed, these wondrous rational adjust- 
 ments are, by hypothesis, not separated from the 
 action of the Eternal by any so-called process, they are 
 not the outcome of a series of antecedent changes, but 
 stand in direct, immediate relation to the Reality. 
 They are the expression, without a medium, of what 
 the Eternal is, as surely as, and more exactly than, the 
 ideas I express by words are the revelation of the 
 intelligent characteristics of that unseen mysterious 
 nature commonly called my Mind. ]\Iaking all allow- 
 ance for the human form of thought, is there not, beyond 
 what, perhaps, the writer saw at the time, a profound 
 
232 Pre-Oi'ganic Evolution. 
 
 philosopliic significance in the words, " He si^ake and it 
 was done " ? 
 
 As I have pointed out before, the minimum simplicity 
 implied in the beginning of Evolution is not affected 
 by any speculation concerning cycles of Evolution and 
 Dissolution ; so in like manner the light thrown upon 
 the characteristics of the Eternal by the adjustments 
 involved in the minimum is not extinguished by such 
 speculation ; for the miiiimitm simplicity must, accord- 
 ing to the theory of Evolution, be that condition of 
 things which is the directest and simplest manifesta- 
 tion of the Eternal Eeality. The actual evolved workl, 
 as we now see it, is, it is true, according to the modern 
 conception, the form in whicli tlie One Eternal Power 
 is at this moment expressing itself. It is the many- 
 voiced harmony of the One all-pervading Eeality. 
 But there is this peculiarity about it, that the varied 
 intricate forms of expression are themselves the result 
 of the w^orking of the One Power, through other pre- 
 viously existing forms — they have antecedents which 
 are phenomenal as well as a One Cause which, running 
 through all antecedents, is not phenomenal — but is 
 primal — noumenal. On the other hand, the peculiarity 
 about the primordial forms of expression, which con- 
 stituted the minimum simplicity with which the onward 
 
Criticism, 233 
 
 process of Evolution began, is, that these had no ante- 
 cedent fhenonienal forms out ofivMch, hy the action of the 
 One Power, they sprany : they, on the contrary, are the 
 first, the immediate expressions of that One Power — in 
 fact, they do not come by natural law ; they are the 
 first steps in the origination of natural law ; tliey are, 
 in the strictest theological sense. Miracles, i.e. the 
 immediate effect of Omnipotence. 
 
 Quite apart from all theories to be established or 
 demolished, it is evident even to a plain practical man 
 that there must have been, as I have already indicated, 
 an extraordinary rational adjustment in the items of 
 fact that formed the very starting-point and material 
 for all subsequent Evolution. Nothing seems to me 
 to be more clearly the dictate of common sense. In 
 fact, the germ of the glorious universe was in the 
 subtle adjustments of that condition of things. Here, 
 to borrow again an expression and idea from Biological 
 Science, was the true Pangenesis. The primal act of 
 Omnipotence was more than an act of Power, it was 
 an act of Pteason as certainly as of Power. The two 
 conceptions must go together. By no logic, no tran- 
 scendental speculation, no reference to physical forces 
 of later differentiation, can the conjunction of the two 
 in the one act of origination be avoided or destroyed. 
 
234 Pre -Organic Evolution, 
 
 The Eternal rieality, to use an expression more suit- 
 able perhaps to Hegelianism, passed out of its absolute- 
 ness — ceased to be das An-sich-Scin — into harmonised 
 phenomenal form at once ; and in that harmony of 
 expression revealed the Intelligence of the Will, 
 which otherwise mifrht have existed, it is true, but 
 would for ever have been a secret within the depths 
 of tlie Eternah 
 
 Xor, keeping still to Spencerian terms and data, do 
 I see how the Intelligence of the Eternal Eeality is to 
 be set aside as unthinkable, or an unnecessary con- 
 clusion from admitted facts, by shifting the position 
 hitherto assumed witli respect to what was the 
 minimum simplicity that lay at the beginning of the 
 evolutionary process. I know it is possible now to 
 renounce the atomic condition of matter, which all 
 through Mr. Spencer seems to assume was the prim- 
 ordial antecedent of the necessary course of material 
 Evolution, and endeavour to find something more 
 simple still, — something of wdiich the atoms of science 
 are as truly the evolved outcome as the present com- 
 bination of the material world are the evolved out- 
 come of the primitive atoms. Sir William Thomson's 
 interesting theory of the evolution of atoms from a 
 previously existing "perfect fluid" by the formation of 
 
Criticism. 235 
 
 " vortex rings " was by no means arrived at or sug- 
 gested with a view to eliminate all ideas of Intelligence 
 from our necessary conception of the Eternal, but 
 purely as a matter of physics. oSTevertheless, such an 
 origin of the atom may seem, at first sight, to serve the 
 purpose of those who appear to be greatly afraid lest 
 we should be led to think of the Eternal Source of all 
 as beinsf soniethincj more than the mere Power which 
 it is tlieir constant habit to declare the Eternal to be. 
 The theory referred to does, indeed, make a completely 
 undifferentiated " perfect fluid " the primordial and 
 directest manifestation of the Eternal ; it is, in fact, 
 the immediate act of Omnipotence in outward form — 
 the Miracle — having no antecedent natural law by 
 which it can be explained. Eegarding this " perfect 
 fluid" as only om thhuj continuous through all space, 
 it would so far appear to be more simple than the 
 coexistence in the same space of the multitudinous 
 atoms, or ultimates adjusted one to the other, implied 
 in the Spencerian beginning of Evolution ; though, 
 when we reflect on it, we shall have to think of the 
 Eternal Power, even in this case, asserting its existence 
 at every distinct point of space, in order to secure 
 unbroken continuity. 
 
 Be that as it may, it is not possible, from such a 
 
2.';6 Pre-Ormnic Evolution. 
 
 J 
 
 view of the beginning of things, to eliminate the ele- 
 ment of Eeason. I say nothing of the adjustment, 
 wondrous and delicate, which is involved in the relation 
 of the " perfect fluid " to the hypothetical ether as the 
 basis of their future modifications through all time. 
 It is enough to observe that the passage of the "per- 
 fect fluid," or any part of it, into the " vortex ring " 
 condition, and the consequent building up of the 
 material order, arose either from a new and direct 
 action of the Eternal Eeality, as such, on the fluid so 
 as to differentiate it into atomic forms ; or else there 
 was involved in the very constitution of the fluid, 
 when it came into phenomenal existence as the mani- 
 festation of the Eternal, all the tendencies and condi- 
 tions which, in the lapse of time, would issue not 
 only in the formation of the " rings," but, through 
 them, of the manifold beauties and harmonies of the 
 universe. Suppose we take the former alternative. 
 It is obvious, in this case, that we ascribe to the 
 Eternal a purposeful, discriminative act — an act, or 
 putting forth of new energy, which is so wondrously 
 adjusted to the existing material as to ensure all 
 the subsequent developments which have made the 
 universe what it now is. Eational Will is thus the 
 characteristic of the Eternal Eeality. Or, suppose we 
 
Criticism, 237 
 
 take the second alternative. In that case we ascribe 
 to the first and sole direct act of the Eternal, in mani- 
 festing itself before natural law was developed as its 
 channel of manifestation, the discriminating, germinal 
 inclusion, in the first expression of itself, of all that has 
 been and ever will be in the ordered universe. The 
 Pangenesis is only pushed further back. The appar- 
 ently simple, plain, undifferentiated " perfect fluid " is 
 anything but simple. It is a profound mystery. It 
 carries within itself the whole of the future. It is the 
 Eeason now seen in the beautiful order of the universe, 
 compressed, latent, yet very actual — in germ. The 
 character of the Eternal Eeality, as Eational Will, 
 thus lies hidden, only to be revealed more in detail as 
 the ages roll on. 
 
 It seems to me that among many there is growing 
 up a crude superstition, to the effect that the further 
 back you can push the beginning of the evolutionary 
 process, and the njore simple you assume the primordial 
 expression of the Eternal Eeality, the more certain are 
 you to find at the origin of all things only a Some- 
 \X\m<j^ of which Intellii^ence cannot be affirmed. I 
 say " superstition," for the idea itself is based on no 
 rational consideration of the data assumed in any 
 thinkable beginning of an evolutionary process — rather 
 
238 Pre- Organic Evohiiion. 
 
 it is connected with an avoidance of such considera- 
 tion. The Theist has nothing to fear, hut everything 
 to hope, from the severest scrutiny of the ultimate 
 data of both science and philosophy. 
 
 From a philosophical point of view the question 
 really comes to this — Are we justified in forming any 
 iud"-ment at all, from the manifestations which the 
 
 JO ' 
 
 Eternal Eeality is admitted to exhibit of itself, as to 
 what the Eeality is ? In other words, can we ascer- 
 tain what are the main characteristics of the Power 
 wdiich is at work in the universe, and to which, in fact, 
 the universe owes its existence ? It may be readily 
 conceded that by bare speculation we can know nothing, 
 and have no right to make any affirmation. I leave 
 out the question of lievelation in the Biblical sense ; 
 as, for the present, that is outside our subject. Of 
 course, mere strictly a fviovi reasoning can never 
 reach the point we are striving after ; since we cannot 
 reason from principles drawn from above to the 
 Eternal, seeing that we have no knowledge, and, there- 
 fore, no principles that can place us, as it were, above 
 and in the rear of the Eternal. So-called «j9nm prin- 
 ciples derived from a study of our own nature partake 
 so far of a iiostcriori element. They move upwards. 
 1 have already pointed out that we do not and cannot 
 
Ci'iticisin. 239 
 
 possibly know the nature of the substance, or whatever 
 else we may please to name that noumenal existence, 
 which lies at the spring of all forms of existence, 
 any more than we can know that of our own Ego ; 
 though for purposes of distinction, to help our ideas by 
 the forms of speech, we may call it spiritual. Eevert- 
 iug to what I have previously said, what I mean is. 
 that — adopting the peculiar phraseology of some 
 theological metaphysicians of the last century, when 
 wishing to discriminate that nature of God which is not 
 His moral nature — we cannot know the Eternal in its 
 jphysical constitution ^t'?^ sc ; in other language, we cannot 
 know the Eternal Eeality as a noumenal thing apart 
 from the manifestations of itself, any more than we can 
 know anything of our own Ego apart from its appro- 
 priate manifestations in form of Thought and Volition. 
 So far there can be no hesitation in falling' in with 
 the dictum that it is not possible for us to know the 
 Eternal. It would be superfluous to contend against 
 a position which has never been seriously maintained 
 in the interests of Religion or Theology. But there is 
 one position that may safely be assumed by all schools 
 of thought, namely, that, in our structure of hioidcdge, 
 the Eternal Eeality can never be separated from the 
 manifestations of itself, wdiich form the immediate 
 
240 Pre- Organic Evolution, 
 
 object of our observation, as little as we can, in any 
 reasoned system of things, separate these manifestations 
 from the Source to which they owe their existence, 
 and of which, in some sense at least, they are revela- 
 tions. It would seem, then, that we can and do know 
 the Eternal Eeality as manifested ; and it is but a step 
 further, and a most rational one, to say that we are 
 warranted to form a judgment of what the Eternal is, 
 from the character of the manifestations which owe 
 their existence to its energy. It does not seem to me 
 to be unphilosophical to recognise some of the attri- 
 butes or characteristics of the Eternal in the marked 
 character of its manifestations. Such a procedure 
 violates no legitimate order of thought ; rather, on the 
 other hand, it is natural to the unsophisticated mind, 
 and would not be called into question by the common 
 sense of mankind. Indeed, men whose whole habit of 
 thought has been formed under the severest philo- 
 sophical training feel as much constrained to such a 
 conclusion, as they are to see the attributes or charac- 
 teristics of the human Ego revealed in the manifesta- 
 tions of its power, and which form our ordinary mental 
 phenomena. In both cases, despite what may be said 
 to the contrary by the school of modern thinkers who 
 follow in the wake of Hume and James Mill, there 
 
Criticism. 241 
 
 exists as constituting ourselves, a seat of power — 
 a spring of activity — and also a set of manifestations 
 owing their existence to the existence of that spring of 
 activity. The Eternal nounienal lieality — be it what 
 it may in the essential nature of its substance, and 
 considered in and by itself, as pure noumenon — is 
 evidently, and by admission, that which is the spring 
 of actions, or, in otlier phrase, of forms of energy which, 
 be it observed, are not characterless, but distinctly 
 bear on themselves, as we have seen, the clear marks 
 of Eeason. 
 
 6. Personcditif. 
 
 I^otwithstanding what has been advanced in the 
 previous section, I am quite aware that an inquiry 
 may arise as to the legitimacy of using the term 
 attributes or characteristics in relation to the Eternal, 
 whatever the suggestive force of the manifestations in 
 respect to the lieality from which they come. But I 
 do not think that any one who distinguishes carefully 
 between the philosophy that deals with fact, and the 
 phase of Transcendentalism which prides itself on 
 soaring above all fact into the region of pure abstrac- 
 tion, need be much troubled on that account. It is 
 higli time that we disabused our minds of the spell 
 
 Q 
 
242 P re-Organic EvohUion. 
 
 supposed to lie in the abstract notion of '' Pure 
 Being" in the sense of the Eleatics and the German 
 Speculative school. No doubt Hegel won many 
 admirers among those who revel in dialectical gym- 
 nastics when, in his endeavour to get as far as possible 
 back and away from the actual world ( Wirklichkeit), 
 he dilated on " Pure Being " {das An-sich-sein) and 
 his other categories ; and thus gave the impression to 
 outsiders who understood not his categories of purely 
 abstract thought, that the Eternal, the Source of all, 
 may have been at one time, if not always, perfectly 
 characterless, possessing no content of nature, in fact, 
 was simply Existence, miriiis all that is ever known 
 to be predicable of Existence. This emptying of the 
 Eternal of all attributes — this reduction, in thought, 
 of the Fount of all energy and variety to a bare 
 abstraction, to which there is not and never was any 
 corresponding Pieality — may be clever, but will never 
 be taken by reasonable men who understand the drift 
 and philosophical basis of the higher Hegelianism, as 
 a reason why we should be prevented from conceiving 
 of the Eternal Eeality assured to us by philosophy as 
 possessed of attributes or characters, answerable to the 
 rational features of the manifestations which meet our 
 observation, even in the primordial adjustments which 
 
Criticism. 243 
 
 lie at the very beginning of the evolutionary process. 
 Even Feuerbach himself, Eadical as he was, and desper- 
 ately antagonistic to Christianity, so felt the inappli- 
 cability of the Hegelian notion of Pure Being to any 
 solution of the actual facts of human existence, that 
 he exclaimed, " Weg mit der Metapliysiky There is no 
 necessity that the conception of attributes or char- 
 acters should imply anything in a spiritual nature 
 answering to distinction of parts in a corporeal nature. 
 Even the attribution of faculties to the human mind 
 is, by modern writers of great authority, represented as 
 rather a statement of the different modes of the exer- 
 cise of one principle of activity than as co-ordinate, 
 coexistent parts of one nature.^ Kant recognises 
 throughout the Kritik der Ecincn Veriiunft, the per- 
 fect unity of consciousness amidst the manifoldness of 
 the sensibility and the forms of the understanding. 
 An active principle of intelligence is perhaps the most 
 concise and, at the same time, approximately the most 
 exact way of stating the conception both of Kant and 
 of Hamilton with respect to that unity which in 
 common speech is called Mind. 
 
 Now, in so far as the Spencerian system runs up all 
 manifestations in the universe at last to One Eternal 
 
 ^ Hamilton's Metaphysics, ii. j)p. 3-5. 
 
244 Pre- Organic Evohition. 
 
 Eeality, it proceeds on lines, with respect to the Source 
 of all things, similar to those followed by Kant and 
 Hamilton with respect to the manifoldness of mental 
 experience and its one noumenal seat. There is, then, no 
 necessarily crude conception of mere physical division 
 or coexistent parts when, paying regard to the rational 
 adjustments which appear in the primordial manifesta- 
 tions of the Eternal Eeality, we think of it somcivlmt 
 after the analogy of our own ]\Iind. The manifold- 
 ness and variety of the manifestations of our Ego reveal 
 a richness of activity in the nature of the Ego, perfectly 
 consistent with its being a unit, a principle of intelli- 
 gence ; and in the same way, only in higher degree, 
 the manifoldness and variety of the rational adjust- 
 ments implied in the very beginning of the evolutionary 
 process reveal a richness of rational resource combined 
 with volitional power in the Eternal. I know that 
 the term Life, as employed nowadays in Biology, carries 
 with it a set of ideas which we must never import 
 into our conception of the Eternal, but natural science 
 must not arrogate to itself an exclusive use of language. 
 There was a use of the term long before Biology came 
 into existence, and which still holds good, and is even 
 essential to the expression of a thought true to tlie 
 nature of things. Apart from all crude materialised 
 
Criticism, 245 
 
 conceptions there may be said to be a Life of the 
 Eternal — an inner self-contained ?a)r;, a fulness of 
 energy involved in unity, an infinitude of resource 
 far in excess of ariything understood by the hard 
 mechanical term " force ; " and it seems to me that 
 if we candidly consider what is revealed — or " mani- 
 fested," as Mr. Spencer would say — to us of the 
 Eternal Eeality by tlie marvellously intelligent, pur- 
 poseful adjustments implied in the very primordial 
 condition of matter which stands at the head of the 
 evolutionary process, we cannot do justice to the facts 
 of the case without calling to our aid the higher sense 
 of the word Life, and so speak of the Eternal as the 
 Living, not merely Reality, but God. 
 
 I am not aware that Mr. Spencer has anywhere 
 denied the general soundness of the principle of 
 forming a judgment of what a reality is, by studying 
 the characteristics of its self-revelation, i.e, its " mani- 
 festations." The students of his works know well 
 enough that there is often an ambiguity in his em- 
 ployment of the term " Ego," and some may doubt 
 whether he can ever consistently mean more than an 
 ideal result of association. But of this more anon, only 
 if he does admit a finite reality answering to the term 
 " Ego," he cannot but regard its " manifestations " or 
 
246 Pre- Organic Evolution. 
 
 self - revelations, in form of ordered thought and 
 reasoned action, as evidence of its being a rational 
 spring of activity. Now a little reflection will show 
 that, in the course of thought I have thus far pursued 
 in reference to the " manifestation " said to be of the 
 One Eternal Eeality, I have simply dealt with a 
 parallel case — parallel, I mean, in the main. It is 
 true, there is this difference, which one would by no 
 means wish to shut out from view, namely, that in 
 the one case, that of our Ego, there is a personal 
 consciousness of the ordered thought and reasoned 
 action, and, by means of that consciousness, an 
 observation of the relation of the thought and action 
 to the Ego which is their spring; while in the 
 other case, that of the Eternal Eeality, the element 
 of our personal consciousness as to the relation of 
 manifestation and its spring is lacking — there is only 
 an observation of what is seen, outside our personal 
 experience, to be reasoned action. But attention to 
 the real point at issue makes clear that this difference 
 does not in the slightest affect the validity of the 
 conclusion arrived at. For, in either case, the con- 
 clusion is based on an observed relation of the 
 phenomena to their admitted cause. The character of 
 our thouEjhts and actions is observed to be rational ; 
 
Criticism. 247 
 
 and we hence regard the " Ego," from wliich it is 
 admitted they spring, as being an abiding principle of 
 intelligence, in other words, a Eational Nature. In 
 like manner, the character of the activities of the 
 Eternal Eeality are observed to be, in the primordial 
 adjustments which lie at the beginning of the 
 evolutionary process, highly rational ; hence we regard 
 the Eeality from which it is admitted they spring and 
 of which it is said distinctly they are " manifesta- 
 tions," as being an abiding principle of intelligence, 
 in other words, a Eational Nature. In both cases we 
 have manifestations or self-revelations of the same 
 generic type — i.e. bearing the stamp of rationality — 
 and consequently we are led up, in both cases, to the 
 existence of a rational spring of activity, in other 
 words, a Eational Cause, a Mind, a Personality. That, 
 in our own case, we are assured of the existence 
 of our own Personality by consciousness, while we 
 are not and cannot be assured, in exactly the same 
 way, by our consciousness of the existence of the 
 Eternal Personality, is only to say that every being 
 is conscious of his own self-existence for himself alone. 
 We do not even know of the existence of our fellow- 
 men, as rational beings, as we do of our own. It is 
 substantially by observation of the rational signs they 
 
248 Pre-Oi'ganic Evolution. 
 
 exhibit that we know them to be personalities ; and 
 it is by observation of the rational signs discoverable 
 in the " manifestations " which Mr. Spencer admits 
 have their origin in the Eternal Eeality, that we know 
 that Eeality to be Mind — Personal. 
 
 There being, then, so far as I can see, no valid 
 objection raised by Mr. Spencer to the principle on 
 which the foregoing argument proceeds, the only 
 reason discoverable for not accepting what appears to 
 be an inevitable conclusion, is purely of a speculative 
 character bordering on mere private opinion. There 
 is one passage in the First Principles which seeks 
 to make out that to think the Eternal as Mind, as 
 Eational Will, or Personality, is to inflict a degradation 
 on the Source and Sustaining Cause of all things. 
 The passage reads thus : — " Is it not just possible 
 that there is a mode of being as much transcending 
 Intelligence and Will as these transcend mechanical 
 motion ? It is true, we are totally unable to conceive 
 any such higher mode of being. But this is no reason 
 for questioning its existence ; it is rather the reverse. 
 Have we not seen how utterly incompetent our minds 
 are to form even an approach to a conception of that 
 which underlies all phenomena ? Is it not proved that 
 this incompetency is the incompetency of the Con- 
 
Criticis7n. 249 
 
 (litioned to grasp the Unconditioned ? Does it not 
 follow that the Ultimate Cause cannot in any respect 
 be conceived by us, because it is in every respect 
 greater than can be conceived ? And may we not, 
 therefore, rightly refrain from assigning to it any 
 attributes whatever, on the ground that such attributes, 
 derived as they must be from our own natures, are 
 not elevations but degradations ? " ^ 
 
 If the reader will take the trouble to refer back 
 to wdiat I have already said on the question of con- 
 ceivability and inconceivability (pp. 204-209), he will 
 see that most of the above paragraph has been suffi- 
 ciently discussed. I am disposed to concede much of 
 what is included within these notes of interrogation. 
 Of course, we cannot conceive, cannot frame into 
 definite thought, the essence, the substance, or what- 
 ever else it may be termed, which constitutes the very 
 being of the Reality "which underlies all phenomena." 
 We cannot even form a definite image or representa- 
 tion of the essence, the substance, or whatever it may 
 be called, of that thinking principle, that personality, 
 which constitutes the actual Mr. Spencer. Let us not 
 quarrel where there is no ground of dispute. But the 
 next interrogation suggesting that, therefore, " in every 
 1 P. 109. 
 
250 P re-Organic Evolution. 
 
 respect" the Ultimate Cause "is greater than can be 
 conceived " is njisleacling. A thing of which we can- 
 not have any knowledge at all is, of course, " greater 
 than can be conceived ; " and so is a thing of which 
 we may have some knowledge but cannot perfect it. 
 The nature of Mr. Spencer, as to its essence or sub- 
 stance, is " in every respect greater than can be 
 conceived," but the nature of Mr. Spencer, as to its 
 chief characteristics, as to its differentia and 'proipria, 
 may be known, though it may not be perfectly known. 
 It is a matter of comparative indifference to me what 
 " in every respect " may be my neighbour's essential 
 being, metaphysically speaking, provided I know that, 
 as a fact, that being is rational. The real question 
 before us, as I have previously indicated, is. Can we and 
 do we know the Eternal Eeality as manifested ? Can we 
 and do we know the characters or attributes of Eeality 
 by observing its self-revelations or manifestations ? 
 If the manifestations are in fact the Eeality as revealed, 
 we are authorised to say that there is in the Eeality 
 that which answers to the speciality of the manifesta- 
 tions — which is, in fact, Cause of them. Intelligence 
 in the manifestations means Intelligence in the Cause, 
 i.e. the Power implied in Cause is a Eational Will. 
 I am rather surprised that Mr. Spencer should 
 
Criticism, 
 
 2^1 
 
 commit himself to such professed utter ignorance of 
 " that which underlies all phenomena " as this para- 
 graph implies. His language here and elsewhere is 
 not consistent. Not only does he know that that 
 which underlies all phenomena actually exists, but he 
 seems to know it to be Cause, even Ultimate Cause. 
 Nay, he knows more than that, for he teaches that it 
 is Eternal, and even goes so far as to speak of it as 
 Power, an expression conveying a conception derived 
 entirely from human experience. How is the Eeality 
 that " underlies all phenomena " thus known to be 
 Cause and Power ? The answer, of course, is from 
 the observed manifestations of that Reality. The 
 Eternal is known as Cause and as Power, because the 
 manifestations are such as compel the conviction that 
 there is that in the Reality which answers to their 
 existence. The Eternal as Cause, as Power, solves 
 the facts. Is it then a departure from a sound 
 philosophy, is it rash and vulgar, to say that the 
 observed signs of Intelligence or Reason in the adjust- 
 ments of primordial matter are there, because the 
 Eternal is not only Cause, Power, but also Rational 
 Cause, Intelligent Power ? The Eternal as Rational 
 Will solves the facts ; and the same mental process 
 by which we are led to say of the Eternal Reality 
 
252 Pre- Organic Evolution. 
 
 that it is Power, leads us on inevitably to say that it 
 is Intelligence. If we are content to accept the one 
 result of the application of our reason to the pheno- 
 mena in their relation to the Eeality, there is no valid 
 ground for refusing to accept the other. To say that 
 we must affirm Power of the Eeality, because that is 
 involved in the very conception of Cause of the pheno- 
 mena is true enough ; but the reason why we are thus 
 compelled to identify Cause and Power is that, in our 
 experience, power is always one with the cause of our 
 own acts, and our primary notion of power not our 
 own is of something in contrast with our own power. 
 In like manner, our knowlediie of intellioence and 
 power combined is referable to our own experience of 
 the two ; and we can both be conscious of power and 
 intelligence in ourselves originating adjustments, and 
 also, after that experience, infer from the presence of 
 adjustments the presence, in the rear, of combined 
 intelligence and power. This being the natural and 
 necessary method of thought, it comes to pass that 
 when we contemplate the Cause of the wonderful 
 adjustments seen in the very conditions and beginnings 
 of an evolutionary process, we find that Intelligence 
 is involved in that very conception as truly as is 
 Power. The attempt to retain the Power without the 
 
Criticism. 253 
 
 Intelligence, i.e. to think of the Eternal Eeality only 
 as bare Power, is clearly the result of disregard of 
 what is implied in our mental processes as applied to 
 the " manifestations." 
 
 Thus far the question is discussed on purely philo- 
 sophical principles. Does it imply that Mr. Spencer 
 is rather doubtful of the philosophical soundness of his 
 position in holding that the Eternal Reality is not 
 Intelligence (or, at least, doubting that it is) but can be 
 said to be only Power ; seeing that he has recourse to 
 mere opinion as a support to his argument ? He does 
 affirm it to be Power, and declines to aftirm it to be also 
 Intelligence, because he is of ojnnion that to do so might 
 he degrading to the Etenud Reality. It is certainly 
 interesting to see one, who is usually so concerned to 
 follow out the logic of facts, turning aside from his 
 habitual course, and manifesting zeal for the rej)utation 
 and honour of the Unknowable. Yet I submit tliat it is 
 not a question of what we may think and feel concern- 
 ing the reputation and dignity of the Eternal Reality — 
 a matter on which we may be misled by conventional 
 notions — but what do the facts point us to. If to be 
 resjarded as Intellic^ent is a degradation to the Eternal, 
 and yet the facts clearly point to its Intelligence, what 
 has that to do with the Universal Synthetic Philosophy ? 
 
254 Pre- Organic Evolittion. 
 
 Philosopliia stet, mat coehcm. Our ideas of dignity 
 and honour depend largely on habits of thought 
 peculiar to early training, or on kind and degree of 
 aesthetic culture — they are variable. The process of 
 thought by which the intellect passes from the 
 adjusted phenomena to the intelligence of the cause 
 is constitutional, imperative. Mr. Spencer suggests 
 that possibly there may be something as far above 
 intelligence as intelligence is above motion, and that 
 as a matter of fact, therefore, this unknown something 
 may be true of the Eternal. But suppose this specula- 
 tion were allowed, would that destroy the fact that 
 the actual adjustments seen in phenomena do imply 
 intelligence, any more than it would destroy the fact 
 that the phenomena \v[\}^\y power ?- If, in the presence 
 of such a guess we must forbear affirming intelligence 
 of the Eternal, for fear of inflicting a degradation, 
 much more ought Mr. Spencer to abstain from affirm- 
 ing power of the Eternal, which, in the rank of attri- 
 butes, is certainly lower than intelligence. The entire 
 argument is a curiosity. It is not only outside the 
 realm of strict philosophy, but is destructive of the 
 very position souglit to be maintained, namely, that the 
 Eternal is Power. 
 
 If Mr. Spencer's intention in this curious piece of 
 
Criticism, 255 
 
 reasoning is to prevent us making the dogmatic 
 
 assertion that the Eternal is Intelligent Will onhj, and 
 
 that there cannot be in the Eternal anything above and 
 
 beyond that, he may be so far at rest. I, for one, 
 
 shall not venture on saying that this may be or may not 
 
 be true of the Unsearchable One. There is no need 
 
 for either affirmation or denial. We have no right to 
 
 attempt to go further than philosophy can legitimately 
 
 carry us. But we are not to be deterred from going 
 
 as far as philosophy does lead us, by the fear of what 
 
 may, after all, have no real existence. It is enough 
 
 for me that I am led up to belief in an Intelligent 
 
 Will as the source and upholder of the order of the 
 
 universe. The assertion of that great truth is not 
 
 invalidated by the possibility of the Eternal being 
 
 or not being something besides ; any more than the 
 
 assertion that I am an intelligent being is invalidated 
 
 by the possibility that, at some far distant time it may 
 
 be discovered that my intelligence is grounded on 
 
 some deeper mode of being. Neither philosophy nor 
 
 Scripture require that in our saying that God is an 
 
 Intelligent Being, we claim thereby to know all that 
 
 may be in the nature of God. 
 
 There is convenience, botli for philosophy and for 
 general purposes, in adopting single terms to represent 
 
256 Pre- Organic EvoliUion. 
 
 what otherwise must always be expressed by a phrase 
 or sentence. It may be well, therefore, to dispense 
 with circumlocution, and now use the term Person- 
 ality to indicate wdiat, hitherto, I have spoken of as 
 Intelligent Will, liational Will, Power and Intelligence, 
 as characteristics of the Eternal Eeality manifested in 
 the phenomena antedating the evolutionary process, 
 and conditioning its existence as a process. The term 
 is useful ; and, although derived from a human source, 
 and primarily denoting a human subject, is fairly 
 correct for the purpose now in hand. It indicates an 
 Infinite Being answering in certain respects to our 
 being. There may be associations with it, in its 
 human application, of which it must be divested when 
 applied to this higher use ; but that is what may be 
 said of other words in constant use in philosophy. 
 There is this distinct advantage in its use, that it 
 connotes just the two attributes or characteristics of the 
 Eternal Eeality which, by a careful philosophical process, 
 we have been compelled to recognise, namely, Power 
 and Intelligence, not isolated, but combined in one 
 continuous act, or, if preferred, expression of energy ; 
 while it saves us from the necessity, otherwise, of 
 employing terms vague in meaning and, to speak more 
 Germcmico, empty of all content. Moreover, it com- 
 
Cj'iticism. 
 
 257 
 
 ports well with the existence of our own Personality, 
 for otherwise it might be supposed to rise higher than 
 its source. We finite personalities are the offspring of 
 the infinite Personality. The law of Life here holds 
 good only in the higher sense of the term employed. 
 In the region of Mind we find tlie truest Biogenesis. 
 The impress of the Supreme Rational Being is on us. 
 I am aware that the Transcendental Philosophy has 
 vexed its soul over the possibility of the Infinite 
 Supreme Cause ever giving rise to beings that are, like 
 itself, true real causes as distinguished from mere 
 phenomena of the One and Only Cause ; but such 
 vexation is inconsistent with its fundamental principle. 
 For it is for the very reason that the Supreme is 
 Infinite that it becomes possible that there should be 
 constituted finite personal causes. To say that sueli 
 a result of the Infinite energy is not possible is clearly 
 to set a limit to that which is affirmed to be un- 
 limited. It is in this human impress of the Divine 
 that we find the dignity and glory of man. Herein 
 lies the possibility of his intellectual and moral 
 communion with his Creator. Here do we see 
 the ground of his responsibility in life, and the 
 secret of his being able to trace the presence 
 of God in the order of Xature. Man himself is 
 
258 Pre-Organic Evoliitioru 
 
 evidence of tlie existence and rational nature of 
 God. 
 
 One is quite disposed to concede to Mr. Spencer no 
 little originality in the general line of argument chosen 
 for establishing his " Synthetic Philosophy," but there 
 is nothing original in his objection to the use of the 
 term Personality to indicate either the Pieality which 
 is assumed to lie at the base of all things, or, in a looser 
 sense, the characteristics of that Eeality as made 
 known to us in its manifestations. This is an old 
 controversy. Spinoza, Hegel, Fichte, Strauss, and 
 others have waxed warm in the endeavour to save the 
 Absolute from any such limitation as is imagined to 
 be involved in the use of the term. Mr. Spencer has 
 familiarised the old objection to a large class of readers 
 whose habits of thought would, otherwise, not have 
 taken them to this border - land of Transcendental 
 Metaphysics. It is well known to the reading public 
 how he regards the term as inadequate and misleading. 
 Its use for the purpose designed is represented as the 
 result of that human tendency to clothe things beyond 
 all conception in a garb purely human — that persistent 
 anthropomorphism wdiich lies in common at the origin 
 of fetichism, polytheism, and theology. It is, in fact, 
 as he thinks, an attempt to restrict the Eternal within 
 
Criticism. 259 
 
 the compass of finite conceptions that have their origin 
 in certain ideas we entertain of ourselves — a procedure 
 very natural for man as he is in process of evolution, 
 but forbidden by the philosophy of the Absolute.^ 
 
 The objection thus raised to the too anthropomorphic 
 character of the term Personality as applied to the 
 Supreme Being, seems to me to be inconsistent with 
 the facts of the case, and also with Mr. Spencer's own 
 practice. In the particular case before us, we ought 
 not to allow any bare speculations of a philosophy, 
 which confessedly does not rest on ascertained truth, 
 but only on guess and surmise and nice distinctions 
 in abstract thought, to override any conclusions to 
 which our ordinary common sense leads us from the 
 calm consideration of manifest facts. I have shown 
 that on any reasonable theory of Evolution we must 
 be brought face to face with a primordial condition of 
 things in which there exist, as the very condition of 
 the possibility of any evolutionary process, differentia- 
 tions in the constitution, or, at least, relations, of matter 
 and motion — nice adjustments, initial tendencies ; that 
 these differentiations, adjustments, and tendencies are 
 themselves the outcome, the direct manifestation, of 
 
 1 First Princiiyles, pp. 108-112. Cf. Stiauss's Glauhenslehre, ii. 
 pp. 50 -524. 
 
26o Pre-Oi'ganic Evolution. 
 
 tlie Eternal Reality, and tliat they cannot be so 
 regarded by our Eeason in relation to their Cause 
 without being conceived as manifestations, not only of 
 Power, but also of Rational Power. The philosophy 
 which regards all phenomena as " manifestations," 
 cannot consistently avoid regarding these particular 
 manifestations as revelations of the purposeful character 
 of the nameless Eternal Reality. "What is possible is, 
 to deny the facts above stated ; onh^, in that case, one 
 would want to see the theory of Evolution with an 
 Eternal Reality at its back and in its course, placed 
 on a basis more congruous with the denial. But once 
 admit the facts — and I maintain the logic of Mr. 
 Spencer's whole system necessitates their admission — 
 and then there is no avoidance of the conclusion that 
 Power and Intelligence are discovered to be charac- 
 teristics of the Eternal. These in some sense are in 
 the Eternal, and not apart from the Eternal. I do 
 not mean to say that the differentiations, adjustments, 
 and tendencies existing before an evolutionary course 
 could arise, manifest all that was in the Eternal ; but 
 I do say that they tell us what the Being of the 
 Eternal is so far as revealed. Both Science and 
 Philosophy avail themselves of the service of language 
 for setting: forth tlie facts ascertained and the con- 
 
Criticism. 2 6 1 
 
 elusions rendered imperative. If Mr. Spencer or any 
 one can find a term other than " Personality " to 
 convey to men the true idea of the Purposeful Power 
 manifested in the phenomena antedating any possible 
 evolutionary process, by all means let it be produced. 
 So far as the common judgment of mankind goes, no 
 other word is more fit to indicate the unity of Power 
 and Intelligence in one nature. It is competent for 
 Mr. Spencer to deny that Power is manifested, and 
 that Intelligence is manifested, and so differ from the 
 judgment of others ; but once admit that this tw^ofold 
 manifestation of the Eternal exists, and we are bound, 
 as it seems to me, to adopt this the best language for 
 expressing the truth. 
 
 Besides, it is not to be overlooked that all language 
 is human in origin, human in its primordial reference, 
 and human in its form. Thought grows out of our 
 experience. Even if we accept the a 'priori theory of 
 Leibnitz and Kant, and say that there are forms of 
 thought inherent in the constitution of the mind, and 
 logically, therefore, prior to experience, we must admit 
 that it is in the human mind that such forms are said 
 to exist, and that they determine the nature of our 
 conceptions. Xo idea arises but that is first of all 
 coloured and stamped by our mental constitution. 
 
262 Pre-Oro^aiiic Evolutio7i 
 
 ^ 
 
 Thought passes through our consciousness, and is first 
 known as conditioned by what we are. Its object 
 may be external, but only external in relation to our- 
 selves. We cannot escape the reference to self. Even 
 on the most transcendental subjects we are under the 
 necessity of thinking and speaking humanly, i.e. in 
 human form. When Hegel discourses grandly on 
 Being, Pure Being, Independent Being, Point of 
 Indifference, and so on, he professes to be speaking of 
 the Absolute and its passage to the Pielative. Yet 
 when w^e look into the matter we see that he can only 
 use the term " Being " by first knowing his own 
 being, and transferring to the Absolute the idea thus 
 derived — purified in thought, as much as may be, 
 from its concrete human origin. Mr. Spencer is in 
 the same position when, speaking of the Eternal, he 
 ventures to describe it as Cause and as Power. Where, 
 I may ask, does he obtain his primary idea of Cause 
 and of Power ? He ought to remember that it is out 
 of his own consciousness of self According to his 
 psychology, we have not a vestige of an idea but that 
 comes to us through and in our own consciousness. 
 The primary conception of Power is that of our power, 
 which is found in the consciousness of resistance ; and 
 it is because we get this conscious idea of our power 
 
Criticism. 263 
 
 that we come in due time to apply the same idea, and 
 same term for the idea, to that something which lies 
 " outside the rim of consciousness." In other words, 
 we anthropomorphise the Power which is not our- 
 selves, and call it the Absolute. This human origin 
 and primary human reference of the very ideas and 
 terms which Mr. Spencer ventures to apply to the 
 Absolute, is only what is done by us when, finding 
 such characteristics as Power and Intelligence united 
 in one nature, in our own case, and constituting a 
 unity known as Personality, we, divesting it of what 
 is purely adventitious, make use of it to indicate that 
 union of Power and Intelligence in the One Eternal, 
 which the study of the " manifestations " of the 
 Eternal has compelled us to recognise. 
 
 The question at issue then comes to this : Is there 
 anything in the term Personality thus human in 
 origin and in primary reference, which renders it more 
 unfit for use in application to the Eternal than other 
 terms as truly human in origin and primary reference ? 
 We have nothing' whatever to do with those crude 
 
 o 
 
 and vulgar uses of language which often shock both 
 theologians and philosopher alike. I have no defence 
 for the free and glib speech with which in certain 
 religious circles the Eternal God is spoken of. It* 
 
264 Pre -Organic Evolution. 
 
 men paid more attention to the reverence and sub- 
 dued tone running through Scripture whenever the 
 Being of God is referred to, they would often stand 
 in awe and be silent, when, as it is, they fling off 
 from their tongues words concerning God as heedlessly 
 and thoughtlessly as a young girl rattles off notes on 
 her piano. We cannot be too profound in our feeling 
 of awe and reverent wonder whenever we attempt to 
 think or speak of the Eternal Power and Godhead, " in 
 whom, by whom, and for whom " all things exist, and 
 whose presence is as real in the remotest point of 
 space as it is by our side and in our very life. Mucli 
 of the scandal created in pliilosophical circles by the 
 easy and flippant way in which the Eternal has been 
 described and discussed, has arisen from this thouoht- 
 less abuse of language on the part of those who have 
 never caught even a glimpse of the profound problems 
 involved in the mystery of existence. Theologians, 
 and philosophers of a school differing from the 
 Spencerian, are not to be lield responsible for tlie 
 crude conceptions and misleading language of popular 
 writers and speakers, to say nothing of the uncultured 
 masses. At the same time, there may be a basis 
 of truth beneath all extravagances. Mr. Spencer has 
 done much to habituate the present generation to 
 
Criliczsm. 265 
 
 speak of the Eternal as " Power." I suppose he will 
 not cease to claim philosophic reason for such a term, 
 even though some men may, thereby, be led to think 
 of the Eternal as a sort of dynamic reservoir of force 
 for propelling the planets along their orbits. The 
 fact is, that the precise language of philosophy and 
 theology is liable to be misconstrued, because men 
 cannot or will not rise to the conceptions attained to 
 by those who originally applied the language to the 
 higher subjects of human thought. Even the most 
 exact thinkers have need to be on their guard lest 
 words in daily use should, in application to abstruse 
 subjects, unconsciously carry with them into the 
 temple of reason accretions unfit for so sacred a 
 place. But the perils to thought, incident to the 
 employment of language for its expression, are not 
 to be a barrier to the adoption of terms which, in 
 themselves, when severed from lower associations, 
 serve better than any other known to us for the 
 specific purpose in hand. 
 
 The true use of the term Personality, as applied to 
 God by theologians, is that of Eational Will — Being 
 conscious of itself as a seat of Piational Energy. That 
 would be the general conception. Pegarded as in 
 definite activity, it is conceived as Power exercised 
 
266 Pre- Organic Evolution, 
 
 with Eeason, or the action of free Power alone 
 ordered lines. The gist of the difficulty in connection 
 with it lies in this, that, with us, Eational Will is 
 associated with successive acts of consciousness, and 
 how are we to conceive successive acts of conscious- 
 ness in the Infinite Eternal One ? But this difficulty, 
 so far as it is a real one, resolves itself into two 
 questions : the one, What do we understand to be 
 covered by the term Mind ? the other. What is the 
 place of Time in our philosophy of things ? 
 
 !N"ow, as to first question, the force of the objection 
 raised to the use of the word Personality will vary as 
 we rest in the conception of Mind entertained by the 
 Associationalist School to which Mr. Spencer belongs ; 
 or take our position among those who hold that Mind 
 implies, in addition to a series of phenomenal changes 
 which associate one with another according to ascer- 
 tained laws, a permanent noumenal reality which is 
 other than the Eternal Eeality, and which, while the 
 seat and spring of these discernible changes known 
 as mental phenomena, is itself consciously distinct in 
 thought and fact from them, and is self-known as 
 the unity of them all. 
 
 I can quite understand how, from one point of 
 view, Mr. Spencer should be unable to apply the 
 
Criticism, 267 
 
 term Personality to the Eternal Eeality which he 
 recognises as being at the base of all things ; because 
 he takes the term " Mind " to be but a name for 
 the sum-total of the ever-flowing series of mental 
 states ; i.e. states regarded solely as a bare series of 
 fleeting experiences, without any distinct spiritual 
 being or entity, which abides unchanged throughout 
 the series, and is the one permanent finite reality 
 whose existence is therein manifested. According to 
 his philosophy, the only reality or permanent source 
 of them is the One Eternal Eeality, which he every- 
 where postulates as the direct and sole source, equally 
 of mental as of material phenomena. There is a 
 two-faced manifestation of the only true permanent 
 Existence — Mind on one side and Matter with its 
 movements on the other. This is the teaching of the 
 principal w^orks from which I usually quote ; but, in 
 this case, it is clear and emphatic, also, in Mr. 
 Spencer's article in the Nineteenth Century, July 
 1884, on " Eetrogressive Eeligion," where he says: 
 "Everywhere I have spoken of the Unknowable as 
 the Ultimate Eeality — the sole existence : all things 
 present to consciousness being but shov:s of it." 
 Students of the Principles of Psychology will remem- 
 ber how, in the course of his exposition, he devotes 
 
68 Pre-Oro-anic Evolutio 
 
 <i> 
 
 n. 
 
 a whole chapter to a consideration of the " Com- 
 position of Mind," or, as he otherwise expresses it, 
 the " Nature of Mind." The essence of the exposition 
 is — that Mind is composed of a series of feelings 
 distinguishable as "faint" and "vivid." The term 
 feelinsj is used in its most generic sense, so as to 
 embrace everything within human consciousness — 
 sensations, ideas, emotions, volitions, and the peculiar 
 class whicli he calls "relational " feelings. Of course, 
 the question is sure to arise. What is the Ego in such 
 a philosophy of Mind ? The answer to this question 
 is to be found in the elaborate and acutely reasoned 
 chapters on the " Partial and the Completed Differen- 
 tiation of Subject and Object." The result of the dis- 
 cussion of the question is that the Ego is the name 
 given to the bond or " nexus " that holds in unity the 
 various states that make up the sum of our subjective 
 experience. This bond or nexus, togetlier with the 
 bond or nexus which holds together the qualities called 
 material, form together the One Permanent Pieality 
 which Philosophy affirms to lie at the base of all 
 manifestations, be they mental or material. The 
 " force " in the " vivid aggregate," i.e. in the objects 
 around us, and of which w^e are conscious, is allied 
 with the " force " in the " faint aggregate," i.e. in the 
 
Criticism. 269 
 
 sum-total of all that enters into our subjective ex- 
 perience. In fact, they together form the One Only 
 Permanent Force (Eeality) of which the mental and 
 moral worlds are but co - ordinate manifestations. 
 They are the two faces of the One Only Existence 
 above referred to. Let it be understood, then, that 
 according to this teaching our so-called Ego is not a 
 distinct spiritual heing, in the proper sense of that 
 term, not a finite centre of power — free power — 
 capable of expressing its hidden life in definite forms 
 of energy : it is " the principle of continuity, forming 
 into a whole the faint states of consciousness, mould- 
 ing and modifying them by some unknown energy." ^ 
 " Every feeling and thought is transitory : the objects 
 amid wdiich life is passed " being " less transitory : 
 the one thing permanent is the Unknowable Eeality 
 hidden under all these changing shapes." ^ 
 
 I think, therefore, I am justified in saying that, 
 according to Mr. Spencer's views of Mind, human 
 Personality, in any real sense of the term, does not 
 exist. There is the series which has no permanence, 
 but varies and vanishes moment by moment : there is 
 the " nexus " or that presence of the One Eternal 
 Reality which is related to, and holds in unity, the 
 
 ^ Principles of PfychoJogy, ii. p. 487. * Ihid, 
 
2 70 Pre ■ Organic Evolution, 
 
 items of the series. In this sense it may be true, as 
 he states, that the Eternal is the Power " which in 
 ourselves wdU it]) under the form of consciousness'' as 
 surely as it manifests itself in the material w^orld. 
 Whatever be the proper designation of such a system, 
 a veiled Hegelianism or Pantheism or anything else, it 
 leaves no place for a finite bond of the states — a real 
 being endowed with the power of being conscious of 
 itself as a thinking free subject, in polar opposition 
 to all else in the universe. Any idea of Personality, 
 under such conditions, must be illusive. 
 
 Whether this development of Mr. Spencer's philo- 
 sophy in its relation to Subject and Object — Ego 
 and ISTon Ego — be quite consistent with some other of 
 his representations, is not for us to discuss. It is 
 enough to observe here that, if his conception of Mind 
 be only that of a series of perishing states, with a 
 permanant bond which is not the Mind but the One 
 Eternal Eeality, in its relation to one of its sets of 
 manifestations, it is easy to see how he should not 
 find in Mind any clue to enable us to affirm Per- 
 sonality of the Eternal Eeality. The two are dis- 
 similar. The one is transitory, the other. Personality, 
 by hypothesis, is permanent. If the permanent 
 element in our series of states is to be called the 
 
Criticism. 271 
 
 'personal element, then, according to Mr. Spencer, 
 there is only one Personality in existence, namely, 
 the One Eternal Power which is the " nexus ' of all 
 so-called human states alike, and which " wells up '' 
 in the consciousness of all. Here again we fall on 
 the track of Hegelianism. 
 
 Let it, however, be considered that, in dealing- with 
 the question of Divine Personality, I am proceeding 
 on the supposition that Mind is much more than Mr. 
 Spencer describes it to be, and that consequently there 
 is more than one Being — more than the " sole existence, " 
 which Mr. Spencer, in his trending towards Pantheism 
 or Hegelianism, seems to recognise. Whatever others 
 may do, I will not undertake to set or imply a limit 
 to the Absolute ; and, by affirming or implying that 
 the Infinite Eternal Eeality cannot constitute or create 
 real, finite, free existences, thus destroy the Absolute- 
 ness claimed. Our own consciousness counts for 
 much on the question as to whether there are such 
 beings — dependent on, and sustained by, the Absolute, 
 and yet separate realities — not mere perishable phe- 
 nomena held in an orderly succession by an Only Being. 
 We men know that we are spiritual entities, real 
 existences, possessed of self-consciousness, and aware 
 of the unity of our self-consciousness. We are per- 
 
Pre-Gi'o-anic Evohition. 
 
 <b 
 
 sonalities. Thought and volition are but forms of 
 energy of the one unity of self-consciousness. They do 
 not constitute Personality, but are the varied expres- 
 sions of it. They reveal in Time what is twielcss — 
 what belongs to seonian life. That there are varieties 
 in mental phenomena which are the forms assumed by 
 our own Personality, is a fact so clear to us that no 
 reasoning will ever avail to make men permanently 
 think otherwise. Truth will assert itself in spite of 
 all fine-spun theories which tend to banish it. We 
 are daily and even momentarily in the habit of 
 recognising in our own life the existence of unity in 
 multiplicity. There is no crudity, no incongruity, in 
 referring all the complicate processes of our thought 
 and purpose to a hidden spring of activity. Personality 
 with us is not a bare abstraction, nor any so-called 
 " 2^ure heing '' destitute of variety of expression, any 
 more than it consists in the successive forms of its 
 energy. It is rather the living unity in the conscious- 
 ness ; that which renders possible the realisation of 
 itself, or as the Germans would say, the Entgegensctzung 
 lies Ich, as distinguished from the forms of its energy 
 in thought and volition. 
 
 The bearing of these observations, on the question 
 before us, is not invalidated by any charge of anthropo- 
 
Criticism. 273 
 
 morphism. For no one, as has been already shown, 
 be he transcendental philosopher or peasant, can think, 
 or know anything apart from his own being; and if 
 we are to be on safe ground at all, in reasoning about 
 the Eternal Eeality, it is obvious that we must start 
 from our well-ascertained conceptions of finite reality, 
 and not from mere " shows." If, as Mr. Spencer says, 
 there be only one real existence and all the rest be 
 "shows," i.e. mere transitory appearances, of course 
 we must rest in the most hopeless Agnosticism ; 
 though I find it hard to see how we can ever be able 
 to know that there is an Infinite Eternal Eeality, if 
 there be no other reality. That, however, is a problem 
 for Mr. Spencer to solve. The fact in our life which 
 justifies an affirmation of Personality of the Divine is 
 this, that, in ourselves, as finite realities, there is a 
 coincidence of unity with variety. Our own heing is 
 the clue to the existence of various states of conscious- 
 ness, as a set of phenomena distinct from itself, as 
 heing. It is aware of itself as other than they, and 
 yet as their source. This, of course, does not prove 
 that there is Personality in the Eternal, but if there 
 be in the manifestations of the Eternal on which we 
 gaze the marks of intelligence — of reason — we are led 
 
 naturally to associate those signs of intelligence with 
 
 s 
 
2 74 Pre- Organic Evohttion, 
 
 a real Personality by seeing how, in ourselves, there 
 is a Personality where there are signs of intelligence. 
 Unity in variety is not impaired by ascribing Per- 
 sonality to the Eternal; while it furnishes the best 
 possible solution of the presence of Eeason which we 
 discern in the constitution of things. 
 
 It has, I know, been said that " the moment we use 
 the words ' intelligence ' and ' volition,' we are using 
 words which have distinct meanings, as descriptive 
 of certain circumscribed modes of psychical activity 
 in man." ^ That may be so ; and so far as it is a 
 charge of anthropomorphism, enough has been said to 
 set it aside. But apart from that, does not Mr. Piske 
 see that a nature, be it finite or infinite, which ex- 
 presses itself in those states or forms is, on that very 
 account, a nature which is capable of keeping its unity 
 in the act of creating forms of its one energy ? It is 
 a case of the coexistence of the one and the many — 
 of unity and manifoldness. Whether the modes be 
 circumscribed or not, is not all the question, or the 
 chief part of it. The principle involved is that of a 
 unity of nature expressed under variety of forms ; and 
 this is a principle much wider than the life of man. 
 It is not asserted that all that is true of man — the 
 1 Fiske's Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy, ii. p, 450. 
 
Criticism, 275 
 
 finite reality — is true of tlie Eternal Infinite Keality. 
 The point insisted on is, that a principle that finds 
 illustration in the case of man — a finite spiritual being 
 — may be strictly true of the Eternal Infinite One. 
 
 Moreover, it is a question for philosophers to 
 answer whether the Infinite is, because infinite, 
 incapable of expressing itself in modes that are " cir- 
 cumscribed." That would certainly seem to be setting 
 a limit to the Infinite One, in short, taking from the 
 Absolute what is essential to Absoluteness. 
 
 But, further, if Mr. Fiske would look at the matter 
 a little more closely, I think he would see that his 
 objection has a much wider bearing than, in this 
 argument, he seems to suppose possible. It raises 
 the question as to whether difference and variety of 
 any kind are possible in the universe consistently 
 with belief in the existence of an Eternal Eeality. 
 The objection cuts deeply into the very base of the 
 " Synthetic Philosophy." For it really means, can the 
 Eternal express itself in difference ? In other words, 
 does not the existence of differences in what Mr. 
 Spencer calls manifestations militate against the unity 
 of the Eeality ? For, be it observed, the point of 
 the argument is this : the " circumscribed modes," the 
 differences in finite expression, imply corresponding 
 
276 Pre- Organic Evobition. 
 
 circumscription in that of which they are the ex- 
 pression ; so that if we think of God as expressing 
 Himself in intelligent forms, or as being conscious of 
 thought and will, we must think of Him as a set of 
 circumscribed modes, or else as circumscribed in that 
 nature which answers to the modes. 
 
 But let us look at this aspect of the question in its 
 bearing on those manifestations of the Eternal which, 
 according to Mr. Spencer and Mr. Fiske, make up the 
 sum of the material universe. We know them as 
 many, as varied, as mutually limiting each other — as, 
 therefore, finite. The very fact of their multiformity 
 and diversity declares them to be circumscribed modes 
 of the energy of the One Eternal Eeality. They, being 
 distinct and differentiated one from the other, are 
 necessarily circumscribed by their mutual coexistence 
 or succession, as the case may be. They are in Time. 
 
 It would seem to follow, then, that even according 
 to Spencerian representations, the Being of the One 
 Eternal Keality is in diverse modes ; and, in the 
 diverse exercise of its energy, is passing through 
 successive points of Time. I know that Mr. Spencer 
 and his disciple would at once repudiate such a con- 
 clusion. The essential oneness, the eternal unity of 
 the Power, is, in their judgment, consistent with this 
 
Criticism. 277 
 
 appearance of phenomenal variety in the succession 
 of Time. The Cause of diversity and circumscribed 
 modes is Om, though with the qualification of possess- 
 ing within its hdmj that sort of variety which is the 
 causal explanation of its manifestation not being one but 
 manifold. But though there is this peculiarity in the 
 heing of the Cause which answers to and accounts for 
 manifoldness in expression, the Cause itself, the Eeality, 
 is not under the conditions of Time. It is Timeless, 
 Ionian, though its manifestations are conditioned — 
 are temporal. Just so ; and that is precisely what is 
 implied in the affirmation of Personality in God. It 
 is the coexistence of variety in expression and unity 
 or essential unchangeableness in principle. It is on 
 an infinite scale what we find in our own being. 
 Eational Will, as Being, is one — it is a nature simple, 
 efficient — a power indissoluble — its manifestations 
 being many, are the forms in which its whole self, for 
 the time being, expresses itself. In ourselves Per- 
 sonality is not a root split up into a number of parts 
 after the manner of a physical division. It is rather 
 the one noumenal nature or being, which is the seat 
 and origin of all those forms of activity which make 
 it known to others, and which, being characterised by 
 its own essential intelligence, are purposeful. What 
 
278 Pre- Orga7L ic Evolution. 
 
 we know as variety in consciousness is but the con- 
 tinued expression of the one Eeal Personality. Apart 
 from expression, it would be alone, unrecognised by 
 other personalities. Being only comes into mutual 
 relation with being, by reciprocal self-revelations. So, 
 likewise, we are violating no law of thought in regard- 
 ing the Personality of the Eternal as one — the one 
 permanent noumenal Being that would be silent, alone, 
 unknown, without a universe in relation to Himself — 
 were there no finite, varied self-revelations. The 
 multiplicity of phenomena through all space and 
 time forms the sum of the expressions of this Being, 
 and so brings the Eternal out of solitariness and self- 
 inclusion. 
 
 The other question raised in this controversy is the 
 place of Time in our philosophy of things. The great 
 difficulty felt with respect to tlie Divine Personality 
 is, that it seems to represent the nature of the Eternal 
 as subject to the conditions of Time. The " circum- 
 scribed modes " are supposed to be temporal, and 
 " succession " is thus predicated of the Eternal. There 
 is no doubt a difficulty in the conception when 
 regarded only on the surface. But let us be thorough 
 if we are to use this as a reason for denying Per- 
 sonality of God. It simply means, when stripped of the 
 
Criticism. 279 
 
 anti-theological covering, that no temporal predication 
 is possible of what pertains to the Eternal Eeality. 
 The logic of the objection goes off into the most 
 pronounced doctrine of the Absolute — the denial of 
 all phenomenal existence — the old Eleatic assertion 
 that the All is Being and Being is All. But as this 
 conclusion is the death-blow both to rational philo- 
 sophy and to common sense, it may at once be set 
 aside and the premiss from which it proceeds may be 
 reconsidered. 
 
 The fact seems to be that, philosophise as we will 
 about Time, it is the human condition under which 
 we know thinsjs, but it does not follow that it is the 
 absolute condition of the Life of the Eternal. This 
 position can be held apart from any theological or 
 anti-theological theory of Being. Even Mr. Spencer 
 recognises and speaks of the manifestations of the 
 Eternal Eeality extending over millions of years ; but 
 because he is obliged, as a finite conditioned human 
 being, so to think of the expression of the Eternal, is he, 
 therefore, obliged to think of the Eternal as being sub- 
 ject to the conditions of Time ? Of course not. The 
 manifestations are successive as we know them. The 
 Eternal is Eeality, Being, above all temporal changes. 
 I want to know, then, why the Eternal per sc should 
 
2 So Pre- Organic Evohttion. 
 
 be necessarily made subject to temporal conditions if I 
 regard the manifestations, which pertain to and reveal 
 the Eternal, as being successive to my view, and, at 
 the same time, as bearing on themselves the signs of 
 intelligence ? Does the stamp of reason on successive 
 phenomena impose on the Eternal a temporal condi- 
 tion which would not be imposed if the succession 
 "were destitute of the rational impress ? As to the 
 impress of intelligence on phenomena implying internal 
 changes in the noumenal Being, which would not be 
 implied if the phenomena were without that impress, 
 that is not the present point — which is solely the 
 question of succession in phenomena. What I say is, 
 the fact of the manifestations of the Eternal assuming 
 to us, under our conditioned modes of thought, the 
 appearance of succession in Time, does not necessitate 
 that the Eternal Being fcr se is subject to that succes- 
 sion. I have already pointed out that intelligence in 
 the manifestations does not necessarily imply in tlie 
 Eternal Being, in the Ileal Personality — the Eational 
 Will per se — either a splitting up of that Being into 
 finite sections, after the manner of physical division, 
 or a series of noumenal alternations. Fichte was about 
 right when he said that God was the Absolute Per- 
 sonality, and that the Time element was only affirm- 
 
Criticism. 281 
 
 able of the succession of ends, Zujeclce, wliicli were the 
 rational forms in which we cognised the existence of 
 that Personality.^ 
 
 I have quoted Mr. Fiske. It is interesting to 
 observe how ably and with what excellent literary 
 form he seeks, in his work entitled The Idea of God, to 
 avoid the conception of the Eternal as mere Force, and 
 to justify the retention of the theological term " God," 
 — thus going far beyond his master in his approach to 
 the Theistic position. He appears to think that by 
 speaking of the Eternal Eeality as " psychic " and 
 as " Power," ^ he escapes the difficulties involved in 
 the terms " intelligence " and " volition." But, while 
 admiring the skill with which the argument is worked 
 out, and appreciating the desire to save the Eternal from 
 the degradation of being regarded as mere " Force," 
 I cannot see that he has done more than virtually 
 assume the ordinary position of Theism. For to say 
 that the manifestations we witness are the manifesta- 
 tions of a psychic Power is to admit the essence of our 
 contention. If by "psychic" it is thought we can 
 better avoid the implication that the Eternal per se is 
 independent of temporal succession and circumscribed 
 modes, by all means let the word be used rather than 
 
 ^ See Appeudix, Note B. - Pp. 151-157. 
 
282 Pre- Organic Evolution. 
 
 " intelligence." The real idea in both cases is that of 
 a noumenal Spiritual Power which, be it observed, is 
 more than bare Power, which, by virtue of being 
 " psychic " or " spiritual," as Mr. Fiske sometimes calls 
 it, is able to produce such wondrous manifestations of 
 itself as we behold, without itself being made subject 
 to the temporal conditions imposed by itself on those 
 manifestations as known to us. It is the psychic or 
 spiritual element, the differentia of the Power, which 
 clearly accounts for the variety, and, as Theists main- 
 tain, the "intelligence," so clearly impressed on the 
 ordered manifestations. This impress is the effect of 
 the psychic characteristic of the Power, i.e. reveUls its 
 nature as psychic. Intelligence or Eeason in the 
 expression is an index to the Eational quality of the 
 psychic Cause. My contention is that, to us who 
 observe them, the manifestations which constitute 
 what is commonly known as phenomena, bear on 
 themselves such clear signs of order and adjustment 
 as to indicate that the Power from which they spring 
 is not only psychic, but that its psychic nature is to 
 be characterised as Eational. It would be a descent 
 into the barren wastes of logomachy to enter into mere 
 verbal disputation over such words as Power, Will or 
 Volition, Intelligence, Eeason, with their possible con- 
 
Criticism, 283 
 
 notations, as applied first to man and then to God. 
 The substantial truth arrived at is that the Eternal 
 Reality, at the base of all things, is found to be a 
 Rational Power. Once concede that, the question of 
 Personality as held by the best philosophical theo- 
 logians is settled, since its use, in such a relation, only 
 implies a Rational Power, an energising Intelligence, 
 independent of all the limitations and conditioned 
 modes of beimr which belono- to finite rational 
 beings. 
 
 It would be irreverent to say that such a conclusion 
 is free from all difficulties. Only vain ignorance could 
 lead us to imagine that the Being of the Eternal stands 
 before our intellect in a clear, perfect light created 
 by our own reason. There is still ample room for 
 questioning and for aw^e. The zealous devotees of 
 Transcendentalism may still speculate concerning the 
 Absolute ; and while some of them may think that the 
 conception of Absolute Beiug excludes of necessity all 
 relations, others may think that, of necessity, it em- 
 braces, or constitutes, all relations ; and hence may 
 even embrace the possibility, of being in distinct and 
 definite self-circumscribed modes. The philosophic 
 Theist may perhaps see in the existence of the Rational 
 Eternal Power a profound mystery, together with a 
 
284 P re-Organic Evolution. 
 
 necessity for some revelation in excess of that which 
 comes through the visible co-ordinations and adjust- 
 ments of Mature ; and he may be encouraged to believe 
 that the very fact that the Eternal is the Absolute, 
 unfettered by db extra imposed conditions, is itself a 
 guarantee as to the possibility of the Eational Power suc- 
 cessively revealing truth to rational beings constituted 
 to recognise and receive it. The man of spiritual vision, 
 who trusts more to spiritual insight than to logical pro- 
 cedure, and who believes that he sees in the depths of 
 his own being some dim reflex of the source of being, 
 may regard the boundless variety and beauty of the 
 phenomenal world, and the unutterableness of his own 
 inner self, as but a sign of the depth and fulness 
 of the Absolute Life of the Eternal. To him the 
 sum of things finite would be as a congeries of 
 ideas which were surface reflections of an inscrutable 
 Eational Nature. Eich and full as they are, they are 
 but, in Platonic lancjuaoe, shiftin«Tj forms. The real 
 abiding truth and beauty — one, indivisible, spiritual, 
 absolute — is in the august Being whose absolute 
 Eternal Life is a necessity of thought, an object of 
 reverent wonder, and known to finite minds only by 
 means of the outgoings of His self-revealing Power. 
 Thus may differing schools of thought speculate and 
 
Criticism. 285 
 
 wonder, and feel oppressed perhaps by the greatness 
 of the mystery of Being. But, notwithstanding that, 
 following such light as we have within us, and the 
 indications given by the manifest order of the universe, 
 we may abide in the one solid conclusion that, whether 
 we can solve all the problems raised or not, whether 
 we are ever to be led into fuller liglit or not, there 
 is enough known, from even the beginnings of the 
 evolutionary process, to assure our intellect of the 
 existence of One who is Spiritual and National, and 
 whose Power is exercised in the production of tlie 
 universe in such a way as to enable us to know Him 
 as the all- Wise God. 
 
 ' Lotze has well said : " Selfhood, the essence of all 
 personality, does not depend on any opposition that has 
 either happened or is happening of the Ego to a non- 
 E<:jo, but it consists in an immediate self-existence, 
 which constitutes the basis of the possibility of that 
 contrast when it appears." ^ Looking at the question, 
 then, from various points of view, it does not appear 
 to be a necessity for us to attempt to construe the 
 Divine Personality as consisting in a succession of 
 fleeting changes, or a limitation of Being, or anything 
 inconsistent with Eternal Existence. The essence of 
 
 ^ Microco^mufi, ii. pp. 686, 687. 
 
286 Pre- Organic Evolution. 
 
 our contention is that, inasmuch as an observation of 
 the actual manifestations of the Eternal Eeality clearly 
 point to the existence in the Eternal Eeality of Power 
 expressed or exercised with Intelligence, that is, 
 rationally, we are justified in following the guidance 
 of facts, and, therefore, in thinking of that Eternal 
 Eeality as being Eational Will ; in other words, as 
 being a Personality. The logic of the premisses 
 assumed by Mr. Spencer with respect to the relation 
 of the phenomena of the initial stage of Evolution to 
 the Eternal Eeality, leads clearly and surely up to God 
 as made known in Scripture. 
 
CHAPTEIl IV. 
 
 SUMMARY OF KESULTS. 
 
 TT will have been observed that, iii the course of the 
 foregoing criticisms and reasonings, I have not 
 attempted to construct a complete Theistic argument, 
 or to meet the various objections commonly raised to 
 the evidence usually adduced for belief in the exist- 
 ence of God. What I have attempted has been to 
 take Mr. Spencer's own representations of Pre-organic 
 Evolution, and to call attention to what primordial 
 condition of matter is logically involved therein ; and 
 then to show that the very state of things which 
 must have existed, as the condition of the onward 
 movement of an evolutionary process, reveals or 
 " manifests " both Power and Intelligence as charac- 
 teristics of the Eternal Eeality which, he says, lies at 
 the basis and as the Cause of all phenomena ; and, 
 further, that though we cannot know what the Eternal 
 Eeality is, in the sense of having any perception or 
 
 287 
 
2 88 Pre- Organic Evolution. 
 
 conception of the essence, or substance, or nature that 
 constitutes the very noumenal being of the Eeality, 
 yet we can, and do, by means of the revealed or 
 manifested characteristics, know the Eeality as re- 
 vealed ; and, lastly, that the knowledge thus acquired 
 is clear, positive, sure, and enables us to think of the 
 Eternal as being Rational Will — Personality. 
 
 Such knowledge, be it observed, does not imply that 
 we know all about God, or that it compels us to 
 think of Him as a mere series of states of conscious- 
 ness either in eternal flux or somehow produced ah 
 extra. It simply means our knowledge of Him only 
 in so far as He is revealed to us in the phenomena of 
 the universe, which are tlie objective forms of His 
 immanent activity or energy. We are compelled by 
 the constitution of our minds to connect those revela- 
 tions of Himself with His real Being — His noumenal 
 nature. So connected, we are obliged to regard His 
 Being, His noumenal nature, as the seat, the spring of 
 that particular characteristic which we recognise as 
 purposeful Power in the phenomena ; and thus we 
 come to think His Being generally as that which, in 
 the normal and constant putting forth of energy, 
 assumes the form of purposeful Power, which, in other 
 words, means Ptational Will. And a Being which 
 
Summary of Results, 289 
 
 thus reveals Himself in form of purposeful Power is, 
 in respect to that mysterious identity whicli so ex- 
 presses itself, most properly designated Personality. 
 The analogy of our own inner nounienal self, and its 
 manifestations in purposeful power, may not be com- 
 plete, because of our finitude and dependence in part 
 on external stimulus ; but in its essential features, 
 namely, in the relation of the inner noumenal self to 
 the forms of consciousness which find their imity 
 therein, it is adequate for the purpose, and justifies 
 the use of the term Personality, as being more nearly 
 adequate than any other known to us ; while not to 
 employ the term, or any other similar term, to indicate 
 what is so far known, would be to be untrue to the 
 leading of the facts implied in the undisputed mani- 
 festations. 
 
 There is a vague notion entertained, I find, by many 
 persons professing to be somewhat cultured, that the 
 ordinary Theistic argument from Order is of no value, 
 because, it is said, the so-called Order is but the 
 outcome of Evolution, and must be credited to an 
 evolutionary process if to anything at all. And thus 
 Evolution, however real it may be as a fact in the 
 history of the universe, becomes more than a continuous 
 fact to be studied, — it becomes a species of Deity to 
 
290 P}^- Organic Evolutio7t, 
 
 which supreme honours are to be paid. Of course, 
 only those who half understand the whole matter can 
 fall under such a delusion, and become the victims of 
 this new superstition. Order in a process is not pro- 
 duced by the process, any more than regularity in the 
 movements of the hands of a watch is produced by the 
 movement. But in the preceding treatment of Pre- 
 oriranic Evolution I have endeavoured to gjo back to 
 the point wlien, so far from Order being p)roduced by 
 Evolution, there was, as yet, no Evolution at all ; and, 
 taking our position at that point, I have, I think, made 
 it plain that before the process of Evolution began, 
 and as the very condition of its possibility, there were 
 existing adjustments, purposeful revelations of Power, 
 which can admit of no reasonable interpretation except 
 that the Eternal Peality which thus and then ex- 
 pressed itself, was a Ileal ity, properly designated 
 Pational Will or Personality. I liave, I think, justi- 
 fied the assertion that such a starting-point of Evolu- 
 tion must be admitted. Eor the hypothesis of an 
 eternal series of cycles of Evolution and Dissolu- 
 tion does not relieve Mr. Spencer of the necessity of 
 assuming at some point a minimum simplicity in 
 which there was no evolved differentiation ; while 
 to assume in the minimum simplicity, which either 
 
Summary of Results. 291 
 
 logically or actually antedated the evolutionary pro- 
 cess, a set of differentiations in the form of adjust- 
 ments, germinal of all that was to follow, would be to 
 ascribe to the Eeality, of which those adjustments were 
 the manifestations, the very purposeful Power which 
 Theists are only too glad to accept, and which, in fact, 
 is a practical concession of their point. 
 
 As I have said already, there can be no valid 
 objection to the theory of Pre-organic Evolution in 
 itself; and I by no means wish it to be understood 
 that I consider it inconsistent with the truest Theism. 
 N'ay, more, I am disposed to think, so far as I have 
 read in detail on the subject, and am able to form a 
 judgment, that the particulars of the process as de- 
 scribed by Mr. Spencer, by which the Planetary 
 System and, by analogy, other systems were formed, 
 are, in the main, most reasonable. It seems to me 
 quite superfluous to enter into minute criticisms of 
 the various terms, definitions, scientific allusions and 
 reasonings employed, as has been too abundantly done 
 by the late Professor Birks in his Modern Physical 
 Fatalism. It is very likely that, in reference to some 
 details of molecular physics and dynamics, Mr. Spencer 
 may stand corrected by a specialist in those depart- 
 ments of research ; and I have already referred to the 
 
292 Pre- Organic Evolution. 
 
 confusion arising from the persistent use of the am- 
 biguous, and, in the light of the most recent science, 
 antiquated word "Force." Notwithstanding all this, and 
 in addition to his excessive fondness for generalisation 
 and logical deduction from assumed data, I am of 
 opinion that Mr. Spencer's system is not to be 
 destroyed by piecemeal criticism and verbal disputa- 
 tions. One could often wish that he had not 
 committed himself to so rigid a logical groove along 
 which all his thoughts must run ; and that he had 
 given more play to the all-round intuitive faculty, 
 and had paid more regard to the significance of man's 
 moral nature. At the same time, the general course 
 of his reasoning carries home the conviction, that in 
 the pre-organic world Evolution has been the law of 
 progress, — that, in fact, the inorganic universe is what 
 it is to-day, in consequence of the presence throughout 
 its whole history, so far as that is traceable, of the 
 principle of Evolution. It is not Evolution as such, 
 nor the value of the general evidence in its favour, 
 that I care to call into question : it is rather the use 
 which has been made of the working out of the theory, 
 in relation to what is affirmable of the Eternal Eeality 
 admitted to stand at the head, as it were, of Evolu- 
 tion, and to manifest itself throughout its entire 
 
Stunmary of Results, 293 
 
 progress. Justice has not been done to the premisses, 
 which even the initial conditions of all Evolutions 
 afford, for forming an estimate of the characteristics of 
 the Original Cause. The question of the history of 
 the universe, or progression from one condition of 
 matter to another, has been deliberately mixed up 
 with the great question of the relation of all things to 
 their noumenal basis, and the nature and possible 
 attributes of that Eeality. It seems to me that, 
 having done that on this latter subject, Mr. Spencer 
 lias erred by defect. He has failed to see what is 
 necessarily involved in the very existence of the 
 initial phenomena that condition the possibility of an 
 evolutionary course ; and by that failure has gone 
 beyond the limits of physical science, and virtually 
 ruled God out of existence. The Reality he has 
 retained is vague, lacking in content, and inadequate 
 to the actual facts of adjustment and variety discover- 
 able in the initial phenomena. The only content he 
 seems to allow is when, borrowing from human ex- 
 perience our idea of Power, he credits the Eeality 
 with being Power, on the ground that the " manifesta- 
 tions" necessarily imply it. But with an unconscious 
 spirit of contradiction, when facing the question of 
 what the Eeality is, as raised by Christians and 
 
294 Pre-0rga7iic Evolution. 
 
 Theists, he denies that we can affirm anything of it 
 except, of course, that it is. On the other hand, 
 keeping strictly to the initial phenomena which are at 
 the head and which condition the evolutionary process, 
 I have endeavoured to be loyal to their teaching; and, 
 quite apart from any moral or theological considera- 
 tions, have been obliged to come to the conclusion 
 that no interpretation is thorough which does not 
 recognise in them the signs of not merely Power, but 
 also that which we commonly understand as Eeason 
 or Intelligence ; and thus, by a natural and necessary 
 mental process, we are led to conclude that in the 
 Eeality there is that which accounts for those com- 
 bined attributes — in other words. Personality. 
 
 A study of what is implied of Eational Power in 
 the " manifestations " or minimum simplicity, which 
 lies at the beginning of the evolutionary process 
 (pp. 228—232), will certainly impress one with the 
 amazing wisdom and power of the Eternal Personality ; 
 and when we also consider that the exquisite adjust- 
 ments and latent tendencies implied in the initial 
 phenomena are subsequently unfolded, by a beautiful 
 course of natural law, into the ever- varying beauties 
 and harmonies of the universe as known by past 
 generations and by ourselves, do we not get an insight 
 
Siimma7y of Results. 295 
 
 into the infinite prescience which, in all candour of 
 judgment, we must predicate of the Eternal Person- 
 ality ? Every fresh study of the Order now prevalent 
 in the universe only deepens this conviction, and in- 
 tensifies the feeling of reverence and awe. If, however, 
 we pass beyond the inorganic, and extend our obser- 
 vation to the facts of the organic world, we cret the 
 feeling that here likewise is the same Power, the same 
 Intelligence, the same Prescience, only working with, 
 if possible, more wondrous skill, and revealing more 
 amply the infinite resources that lie in that unsearch- 
 able well-spring of Power and Eeason which we 
 recognise under tlie name of Personality. But the 
 ranf(e of observation is not restricted even to this ricli 
 domain. The moral constitution of man — the facts 
 of conscience and of obligation — reveal a moral 
 characteristic of the Eternal Personality as surely as 
 the other phenomena reveal the characteristics of 
 Intelligence and Power. That tlie Eternal is the 
 source of Kighteous Law is the meaning of what Kant 
 so aptly termed the " Categorical Imperative." It is 
 no part of my present purpose to work out the whole 
 Theistic argument, or to defend its main propositions ; 
 but I may in passing observe that the attempt to get 
 rid of the implications of conscience and obligation, by 
 
296 Pre-07'ganic Evolution, 
 
 the endeavour to whittle away the real significance of 
 moral obligation, by means of a doctrine of inherited, 
 consolidated experiences of utility, must inevitably fail. 
 I may repeat what I have written elsewhere : " There 
 is nothino- in the ' nervous modifications ' of acjes, which 
 are purely physical changes with corresponding sensi- 
 bilities, that can convert experiences of utility into an 
 eternal, absolute, moral oblicjation ; " ^ — and it is such 
 obligation that is revealed in the moral nature of 
 man. 
 
 This revelation of Righteousness in the moral 
 nature of man, beingj later in time than the revelation of 
 simple Rational Will in the adjustments of the initial 
 phenomena that antedated and conditioned the evolu- 
 tionary process, and complementary to the revelation 
 of the same Will in the Order which runs through 
 that process, we find ourselves, thereby, committed to 
 the conclusion that the revelation of what may be 
 tlie attributes of God is not completed in one stage 
 of the history of the universe. So far as one may 
 venture on an a iiriori supposition in reference to so 
 profound a subject, we may say that in all probability 
 there would be in the depths of the Divine Nature 
 resources and characteristics in excess of what miiiht 
 
 o 
 ^ Evolution and Chfl.sfianifi/, p. 165. 
 
Stunmary of Results. 297 
 
 1)6 " manifested " in the initiation of the evolutionary 
 process of the material side of things. There is 
 certainly not, so far as I can see, any metaphysical 
 ground for supposing that the Eternal exhausted the 
 resources of His Being, in that expression of it which 
 consisted of the material items and adjustments which 
 necessarily antedated the evolutionary process. Nor 
 even are we compelled by any law of thought, or any 
 knowledge of principle or being, to think that this 
 material order which constitutes the visible universe 
 is the only possible mode by which the Eternal can 
 express the fulness of His nature. I would not 
 positively commit myself to the speculation of 
 Professors Stewart and Tait as set forth in their 
 joint work. The Unseen Universe, that prior to the 
 existence of the visible universe there was an in- 
 visible ; yet I may refer to their ingenious specula- 
 tion as indicating the possibility, in the judgment of 
 great authorities, of a progression in the unfolding of 
 the resources that lie in the Being of the Eternal. It 
 may be, in one sense, that looking at the initiation of 
 the evolutionary process far back in the past, we 
 may say that God was all there — the Being of the 
 Eternal was at the base of this manifestation ; but 
 that is not the same thing as saying that all and 
 
2gS Pre-Organic Evolution. 
 
 every attribute of the Eternal Being was then and 
 there, in those physical adjustments, manifested. 
 There is no known necessity for Absolute Being to 
 express itself in all respects at once. To say that, 
 would be, in effect, to condition the Unconditioned, to 
 rob the Absolute of one of the essential predictates of 
 the Absolute, namely, independence or superiority to 
 constraint. Moreover, as a matter of fact, the history 
 of the universe makes clear my contention, that 
 tliere was more in the Eternal than was at first 
 brought out into phenomenal manifestation when the 
 physical order was initiated. Eor it will not, I think, 
 be denied, that consciousness as a fact of the life of 
 the universe appeared late in time — long after the 
 physical order had been in process of Evolution. 
 Man's moral nature, also, is a comparatively recent 
 phenomenon to be accounted for. There was no 
 trace of it in the atoms and tendencies to motion 
 which were primordially adjusted as the starting- 
 point of Evolution. If the adjustment of those 
 atoms and tendencies to motion vrere expressions of 
 Rational Will, they so far revealed certain resources 
 and characteristics of the Divine Being. But they 
 tell nothing of Piighteousness : they give no light as 
 we endeavour to read the full predicates of the 
 
Su7?zma7y of Results. 299 
 
 Eternal. When, however, man appears endowed 
 with a nature which, as I have intimated, cannot be 
 regarded as a part of, or sole product of the pre- 
 existing physical order of things, do we not see in 
 the constitution of that nature — in its regnant law of 
 obligation and its conscious affinity with the Divine, 
 and, also, yearning for fellowship with the very Source 
 of all things — a new revelation, a revelation of 
 Eiditeousness — an attribute not antaGjonistic to the 
 Intelligence and. Will previously manifested but con- 
 gruous with them ; and that required the expression 
 of these in the form of physical adjustments and 
 adaptations, as a condition of its finding, among beings 
 conditioned by materiality, a mode of expression ? 
 There was more in God Himself than at first 
 appeared. He unveiled the glories of His Being 
 gradually, as conditions were created for their setting. 
 So far, then, the principle of successive revelations 
 of the fulness of the Divine nature may be con- 
 sidered as established. But that being the case, we 
 are in a position to appreciate, on most rational 
 grounds, the still further revelation given to us, not 
 in a new physical order, not in the moral constitution 
 of man modified for that purpose, but in the Christ, 
 the express image of His vTToardai^ — in whom dwells 
 
;oo Pi^e-Oro-anic Evolution. 
 
 S' 
 
 " the fulness of the Godhead bodily." It is a fruit- 
 ful theme, but would take me too far away from my 
 purpose, to poiut out how, in the moral deterioration 
 and guilt of man through the exercise of that freedom 
 which cannot be withheld from his nature without 
 destroying it, as a moral nature, there arose, by reason 
 of the action of spiritual law, a condition of the 
 universe wliich gave occasion for, and supplied the 
 natural conditions of, the last and most glorious 
 revelation of the Divine nature as Love : — thus 
 making the historical appearance of Christ, though 
 late in time, not indeed an Evolution, by a slow 
 process of modification, of humanity ; yet an event 
 congruous wdth the progressive unfolding of tlie depths 
 of the riches of the Divine nature. 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 Note A, p. 120. 
 
 I WISH to make a remark or two, by way of explana- 
 tion and qualification, with reference to tlie stages, 
 alluded to in the text, in the course of Evolution from 
 the original ultimates of Matter to the solidified 
 form. I have indicated these stages by the three 
 terms, elemental, molecular, and solid. It will have 
 been observed that I assume the primordial condition 
 of Matter to have been that which Mr. Spencer seems 
 to think highly probable, namely, a condition much 
 more simple than that form known to us when we 
 speak of tlie " elements " of science. His language, 
 especially in the quotation I have given from the 
 Principles of Psychology — a later work than the First 
 Principles — entirely justifies this view. The stages, 
 therefore, would be as follows : The first would cover 
 the period during which the ultimate units, presupposed 
 as the minimum, simplicity, passed, in part if not 
 wholly, into the form now known as the permanent 
 elements ; the second would cover the period during 
 which these elements — i.e. some, if not most — passed 
 into the simplest form of what is known in chemistry 
 as molecules, in contradistinction from the elementary 
 
302 Appendix, 
 
 atoms ; the third stage would cover the period of 
 chariGje amoncj molecules, duriii2j which the various 
 systems of molecules would he formed, and, in due course, 
 assume the form of solids. This triple division is 
 rough, but it is adequate for the purpose I had in 
 view — namely, to point out that, according to Mr. 
 Spencer, Evolution proceeded from the primordial 
 condition of Matter, by definite processes of complexity, 
 till it attained that which, in the inorganic world, 
 ordinarily seems to be the most definite and complex. 
 IMr. Spencer distinctly recognises the ultimate, the 
 elements, the molecule, and the solid as dissimilar in 
 degree of complexity. The solid is composed of many 
 molecules or systems of molecules ; the molecule is 
 composed of at least two, and it may be of many, 
 elements ; and the element is composed of some 
 arrangement of ultimates the precise nature of which 
 science has not yet settled. 
 
 So far, then, as relates to the progression of the 
 ultimate to the solid by stages, i.e. via the elemental 
 and molecular, the representation in the text is, I 
 think, absolutely correct ; and I wish to observe, that 
 that is the only point important to the argument 
 1 have striven to maintain. 
 
 But it is certainly possible to raise a question as to 
 the particular time in the progression ivlicn the molecules 
 evolved from the elements. When alluding to the 
 nebulous mass, especially that from which the Solar 
 System was formed, and of which Mr. Spencer speaks 
 so much, I add the expression " as known to 
 astronomers," intending thereby that condition of 
 things contemplated by Loplace just before the great 
 
Appendix. 303 
 
 break up into the segments wliicli ultimately con- 
 densed into the earth, planets, and sun. In the 
 text I have spoken of that mass as consisting of 
 molecules — not that I intended to imply molecules 
 only. But it is more usual, I believe, to regard the 
 mass as consisting only of elements in a state of 
 separateness. In that case, the molecule would be a 
 later product of Evolution, and should be assigned 
 to the period in the formation of the earth and planets 
 when the condensation, subsequent on the diminution 
 of heat, was considerably advanced. It would have 
 been more exact had I represented this as probably Mr. 
 Spencer's view. I abide by the order, which is indis- 
 putable : the time, or exact points in the history of the 
 transition, is a question on which more light may be 
 thrown in the future. 
 
 It is unfortunate that the use of the term " molecule" 
 is so variable. Thus Clark Maxwell, in his address 
 before the British Association, speaks of the forms of 
 Matter, known to science, as molecules ; and, according 
 to him, the nebulous mass would consist of molecules. 
 He agrees with Herschell that they exliibit such 
 remarkable characteristics that they may be descrihed 
 as " manufactured articles." In this sense the expres- 
 sion in the text would be correct, in so far as it 
 represents the nebulous mass as molecular. But 
 modern physics distinguishes the intcfjrant, from the 
 constituent, molecule ; and the latter really answers 
 to the atom or element of the chemist, while the 
 former w^ould apply to what probably is Mr. Spencer's 
 use of it in the process of Evolution. 
 
 Yet again, it may be remarked that if Mr. Spencer 
 
304 Appendix. 
 
 is right in his supposition that the so-called elements 
 are a compound of ultimate units — an evolution from 
 the more discrete and simple form of Matter — then, 
 virtually the nebulous mass would consist of integrant 
 molecules of a permanent kind. 
 
 Note B, p. 281. 
 
 The following quotation from Karl Schwartz, is in 
 reference to the general teachiug of Fichte's BiKcidativc 
 Theologie, in contrast with that of E. Ph. Fischer's Idee 
 der Gottheit, and is in accord with what is stated 
 in the text. 
 
 " Dies zwecksetzende Schaffen des Absoluten lost 
 den in der Zeit erscheinenden Widerspruch dadurch, 
 dass es die auseinanderfallenden Glieder von Mittel 
 und Zweck in ihrem Zeitunterschiede aufhebt, in 
 Ewi^keit ' einend durchschaut.' Die Weltordnunc; 
 von Zwecken kann ohne Widerspruch nur dadurch 
 gedacht werden, dass ein wissend und wollend sie 
 durchdringendes Absolute in ihnen gegenwartig ist. 
 Nachdem so von dem Weltbegriffe aus die Idee 
 Gottes als des denkenden und w^ollenden Absoluten 
 gewonnen ist, wird im zweiten Theile diese Idee in 
 ihrem innern Pteichthum und als sich zuspitzend zur 
 absoluten Personlichkeit explicirt." — Zur Gcsdiichte der 
 neuesten Theologie, pp. 312, 313. 
 
 MORRISOK AND GIBB, PRINTEnS, EDINBURGH. 
 
T. and T. Clark's PuUications. 
 
 In Two Vols. 8vo, price 21s., 
 
 NATURE AND THE BIBLE: 
 
 LECTURES ON THE MOSAIC HISTORY OF CREATIOxX 
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 EeVISED and COIUIECTEI) BY THE AuTHOK. 
 
 ^ranslatcti from tfjc jFourtlj (!rtiitioa 
 By KATHLEEN LYTTELTON. 
 
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 GRIMM'S LEXICON. 
 
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 Id demy 4to, Third Edition, price 36s., 
 
 A GREEK-ENGLISH LEXICON OF THE 
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 BEING 
 
 GRIMM'S 'WILKE'S CLAVIS NO VI TESTAMENTI.' 
 
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 BY 
 
 JOSEPH HENRY THAYER, D.D., 
 
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 IN THE DIVINITY SCHOOL OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY. 
 
 EXTRACT FROM PREFACE. 
 
 ' nnOWARDS the close of the year 1862, the " Arnoldische Buchhandlun.e:" 
 J_ in Leipzig published the First Part of a Greek-Latin Lexicon of the 
 New Testament, prepared upon the basis of the " Clavis ISTovi Testamenti 
 Philologica" of C. G. Wilke (second edition, 2 vols. 1851), by Professor C, L. 
 WiLiBALD Grimm of Jena. In his Prospectus, Professor Grimm announced 
 it as his purpose not only (in accordance with the improvements in classical 
 lexicography embodied in the Paris edition of Stephen's Thesaurus and in the 
 fifth edition of Passow's Dictionary edited by Post and his coadjutors) to 
 exhibit the historical growth of a word's significations, and accordingly in 
 selecting his vouchers for New Testament usage to show at what time and 
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 the usage of the Septuagint and of the Old Testament Apocrypha, and 
 especially to produce a Lexicon which should correspond to the present con- 
 dition of textual criticism, of exegesis, and of biblical theology. He devoted 
 more than seven years to his task. The successive Parts of his work re- 
 ceived, as they appeared, the outspoken commendation of scholars diverging 
 as widely in their views as Hupfeld and Hengstenberg ; and since its com- 
 pletion in 1868 it has been generally acknowledged to be by far the best 
 Lexicon of the New Testament extant.' 
 
 ' The best New Testament Greek Lexicon. ... It is a treasury of the 
 results of exact scholarship.'— Bishop Westcott. 
 
 ' I regard it as a work of the greatest importance. ... It seems to me a 
 work showing the most patient diligence, and the most carefully arranged 
 collection of useful and helpful references.' — The Bishop of Gloucester 
 AND Bristol. 
 
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 not only unquestionably the best among existing New Testament Lexicons, 
 but that, apart from all comparisons, it is a work of the highest intrinsic 
 merit, and one which is admirably adapted to initiate a learner into an ac- 
 quaintance with the language of the New Testament. It ought to be regarded 
 as one of the first and most necessary requisites for the stud}-- of the New 
 Testament, and consequently for the stud}' of theology in general.' — Professor 
 Emil Schurek.