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EIGHT LETTERS 
 
 CONCERNING 
 
 THE BLESSED TRINITY 
 
 JOHN WALLIS, D.D., 
 
 FORMERLY SAVILIAN PROFESSOR AT THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD. 
 
 a Kcfo lEDition, 
 
 THE AUTHOR'S LAST REVISIONS AND CORRECTIONS: 
 
 TOGETHER WITH 
 
 A PREFACE AND NOTES 
 
 THOMAS FLINTOFF. 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 J. G, & F. UIVINGTON, WATERLOO-PLACE, PALL-MALL; 
 J. H. PARKER, OXFORD; AND T. SOV»'LER, 
 MANCHESTER. * 
 
MAVCUESTKn: 
 VTKI) KV T. SOtVI.EK, SAtN' 
 
PEIITCETOIT 
 .fttC. NOV 1860 
 
 EDITOR'S PREFACE 
 
 The Letters written by Dr. John Wallis, in 
 vindication of the blessed Trinity, which form 
 the subject of the present republication, have 
 received high praise from very different and 
 generally discordant authorities. While they 
 have met with the marked approval of Dr. 
 Waterland, the late excellent Bishop Burgess, 
 and the eminent nonconformist, Mr. John 
 Howe, they have been recommended with 
 equal warmth by Archbishop Whateley and 
 Dr. Parr. Nor has the notice accorded to 
 them been confined to this country. A very 
 learned foreigner, in a most elaborate work 
 on the subject of the Trinity, published abroad 
 some years ago, speaks in the following terms 
 of Wallis, in reviewing the various attempts 
 to illustrate the mysterious union of Three in 
 One. " Quam praeclare AVallisius de logica 
 facultate itemque de mathematica ac physica 
 meritus fuerit ; omnibus opinor notum qui vel 
 
IV EDITORS PREFACE. 
 
 rapida tantiim lectione illius opera percucur- 
 rerint. Is dynamices leges, quibus non parum 
 falsitatis erat admix turn, experiundo patefecit. 
 Is de centro gravitatis omnium primus pro 
 dignitate dispiitarit, specimenque praebuit 
 arithmetical infinitorum, qu^ posset quadan- 
 temis vicem supplere calculi integralis, admi- 
 randa cujus inventio tanto deinceps honore 
 anctorem suum cumulavit. Atque vir iste 
 cujus tarn egregia extabant erga scientias 
 merita, sibi induxit in animum, si forte valu- 
 isset, quiTerere creatis in rebus, exemplum quo 
 Trinitatis fidem rationis usu redderet pmecla- 
 riorem. Quod porro exemplum, ut mathesim 
 quoque accerceret adjutricem fidei, de geo- 
 metricis rebus, hoc est, de trina dimensione 
 corporum excitavit et quantum eniti potuit, 
 confirmavit/'* 
 
 At a period when the Arianism of Milton, 
 at least in his latter days, has been unfortu- 
 tunately placed beyond dispute, and when 
 the orthodoxy of Newton and Locke, on the 
 essential point of the Trinity, has been with 
 some reason doubted, it will not, I trust, be 
 deemed unnecessary or superfluous to bring 
 
 * Mutapliysica siihliiuior dc Doo, Triiiu ot Uiio. Auctore 
 Marcu Maslroliiii. Tom. I. Koni;i>, ISUJ. Fulio. 
 
EDITOR S PREFACE. V 
 
 forward the testimony, contained in the fol- 
 lowing Letters, of the greatest mathematician 
 of his time on that most important subject. 
 
 To whom the first Letter was addressed, 
 does not appear. It was published by Wallis, 
 in 4to, in I69O, when the Trinitarian con- 
 troversy was waxing hot between Sherlock 
 and his various opponents, and contains the 
 famous parallel of the cube, which has always 
 been considered the happiest illustration, bor- 
 rowed from material objects, hitherto made 
 use of to shadow out the mysterious charac- 
 teristics of the Trinity. It appears from a 
 passage at page 111, that the idea of this 
 parallel had occurred to Wallis forty years 
 before, and that he had mentioned it at 
 Oxford about that time to Dr. Seth Ward, 
 then Astronomy-Professor there. 
 
 It has been a matter of doubt with some 
 eminent divines, whether any solid benefit to 
 faith or piety is derivable from attempts to 
 illustrate the credenda of religion by what 
 must necessarily be inadequate and deficient, 
 and fail in some part or other of conveying 
 the desired resemblance. But admitting the 
 utter impossibility of fully expressing any of 
 the higher mysteries of our faith, by analogies 
 
VI EDITOR S IMiEFACE. 
 
 or parallels borrowed from external objects, 
 surely the use of them, when cautiously and 
 modestly propounded, is not merely warrant- 
 able, but even to be commended. Let it be 
 ever recollected that they are not intended to 
 supply the place of argument, but only to be 
 introduced when argument, from the depths of 
 the mystery and the imperfections of human 
 reason, can do little or nothing to elucidate 
 the subject. To confirm the faith of the 
 doubtful, to silence the sceptic, and to give 
 fuller intuition to the devout, we are called 
 upon to make use of any means which Pro- 
 vidence has placed in our power and scripture 
 does not interdict, and infinitely various as 
 are the minds, and tempers, and dispositions 
 of men, it is gratifying to know that there are 
 subsidia, in the armory of faith, fitted and 
 proportioned to every occasion and every 
 capacity. With some a striking parallel will 
 produce more conviction than the slower pro- 
 cess of logical aroumentation. AVe know 
 that it was from the apparent correspondence 
 of mathematical with divine truths that Pascal 
 first became devout, and Barrow turned his 
 attention to theology. 
 
 In the second and subsequent Letters, 
 
EDITOR S PREFACE. Vll 
 
 which were pubhshed by Wallis, in 4to, in 
 169 1-2, he defends his first Letter, and the 
 illustration there contained, from several ani- 
 madversions which had been made upon it by 
 various writers, and explains more fully his 
 parallel of the cube. Perhaps in none of his 
 writings is his acuteness more eminently 
 shewn than in these replies. The observa- 
 tions he makes on the damnatory clauses of 
 the Athanasian Creed and the various texts 
 of scripture which he cites, are exceedingly 
 valuable ; and the perspicuity and logical 
 exactness with which he conducts the defence 
 of his argument through various digressions, 
 and notwithstanding many attempts made by 
 his opponents to change the state of the ques- 
 tion, is truly admirable. Throughout the 
 whole the precision of the veteran geome- 
 trician, trained and practised in ratiocination, 
 is distinctly perceptible. 
 
 Wallis subsequently published Three Ser- 
 mons concerning the sacred Trinity, I69I, 
 4to. These, which it is intended to repub- 
 lish in a separate form, were bound up with 
 the eight Letters, and the following general 
 title prefixed. " Theological Discourses, 
 containing eight Letters and three Sermons 
 
Vlll EDITORS PPvEFACE. 
 
 concerning the Blessed Trinity. B}^ John 
 Wallis, D. D., Professor of Geometry in 
 Oxford. London : printed for Tho. Park- 
 hurst, at the Bible and Three Crowns, at 
 the lower end of Cheapside, near Mercer's 
 Chapel, 1692." 4to. In the Latin edition of 
 Wallis's Collected Works, in three vols., foL, 
 1693-9, a Latin version of the three Sermons 
 was included ; but of the Letters, except the 
 first,* no republication has been made up to 
 the present time, and copies have accordingly 
 become exceedingly scarce. 
 
 Under these circumstances the present re- 
 print was projected, and I was confirmed in 
 my intention of offering a new edition of the 
 Letters to the public by fortunately meeting 
 with Wallis's own copy of them, with con- 
 siderable additions and corrections in his 
 handwriting, evidently inserted by him with a 
 view to a second edition. From this revised 
 copy, which with Wallis's MSS. correspon- 
 dence on the subject of the Letters, was 
 formerly in the possession of Joseph Parkes, 
 Esq., and is now in the collection of my 
 
 * Inserted in Wallis's Life prefixed to his Sermons, 1792, 8vo., 
 and Bishop Burgess's Tracts on the Doctrine of the Holy Trinity. 
 Durham, 1814. Timo. 
 
EDITOR S PREFACE. IX 
 
 friend, James Crossley, Esq., to whose valu- 
 able assistance I am much indebted, the 
 present edition has been printed, and the 
 additional passages have been inserted in 
 their respective places, though it has not been 
 deemed necessary to distinguish them by 
 brackets from the original text. 
 
 It remains only to add, that should any 
 pecuniary profit arise by the present repub- 
 lication, it is intended to be appropriated to 
 the relief of Mr. William Wallis, a lineal 
 descendant of the illustrious author of these 
 Letters, who at a very advanced age, unas- 
 sisted by the liberality of the lovers of those 
 sciences which his ancestor so eminently pro- 
 moted and adorned, is now suffering in the 
 metropolis all the privations of penury and 
 distress. 
 
 T. FLINTOFF. 
 
 Broughton, 21 th July, 1840. 
 
AN EXPLICATION AND VINDICATION 
 
 ATHANASIAN CREED, 
 
 IN A THIRD LETTER, 
 PURSUANT OF TWO FORMER CONCERNING THE SACRED TRINITV 
 
 TOGETHER 
 
 WITH A POSTSCRIPT, IN ANSWER TO ANOTHER LETTER. 
 
 BY JOHN WALLIS, D.D. 
 
 [Pl'BLISHBD IN 1601.] 
 
THE DOCTRINE 
 
 THE BLESSED TRINITY 
 
 BJllEKLY EXPLAINED, 
 
 IN A LETTER TO A FRIEND: 
 
 FORMING THE FIRST OF A SERIES OF LETTERS ON THAT SUBJECT. 
 
 BY JOHN WALLIS, D.D. 
 
 [PriiLISHED IN Kii-'O.] 
 
LElTEll I. 
 
 THE DOCTUINE OF THE BLESSED TRINITY BRIEFLY EXPLAINED, 
 IN A LETTER TO A FRIEND. 
 
 Sir, 
 
 The doctrine of the Arians, Socinians, or Anti- 
 Trinitarians, call them as you please, provided you 
 call them not orthodox Christians, in opposition to 
 those who believe, according to the Word of God, 
 that the sacred Trinity, of Father, Son, and Holy 
 Ghost, are so distinguished each from other, as 
 that the Father is not the Son, or Holy Ghost ; the 
 Son not the Father, or Holy Ghost ; the Holy 
 Ghost not the Father, or Son ; yet so united, or 
 intimately one, as that they are all one God; which, 
 in the Athanasian Creed, is called Trinity in Unity, 
 and Unity in Trinity; or, in common speaking, 
 three persons and one God ; is what you were 
 lately discoursing with me, and of which I shall 
 give you some of my present thoughts. 
 
 The Scripture tells us plainly, " There arc three 
 that bear record in heaven ; the Father, the Word, 
 
and the Holy Ghost : and these three are one, 1 
 John V. 7. And the form of baptism, Matt, xxviii. 
 19j is, " In the name of the Father, and of the Son, 
 and of the Holy Ghost." 
 
 And the Christian church, from the time of 
 Christ and his apostles downwards hitherto, as well 
 before as since the council of Nice, have ever held 
 the divinity of those three persons, as they are 
 commonly called ; and that these three are but one 
 God. And that they have so held, hath been, by 
 divers, sufficiently proved from the most ancient 
 Christian writers which are now extant. Which, 
 therefore, I take for granted as sufficiently proved 
 by others, without spending time, at present, to 
 prove it anew. 
 
 That these are three, distinguished each from 
 other, is manifest: and that this distinction amongst 
 themselves is wont to be called personality. By 
 which word we mean that distinction, whatever it 
 be, whereby they are distinguished each from other, 
 and thence called three persons. 
 
 If the word person do not please, we need not be 
 fond of words, so the thing be agreed : yet is it a 
 good word, and warranted by Scripture, Heb. i. 3, 
 where the Son is called " the express image of his 
 Father's person:" for so we render the word lujpos- 
 tasis, which is there used ; and mean by it, what I 
 think to be there meant. And we have no reason 
 to waive the word, since we know no better to put 
 in the place of it. 
 
If it be asked, what these personahties or charac- 
 teristics are, whereby each person is distinguished 
 from other ; I think we have httle more thereof in 
 Scripture, than that the Father is said to beget ; 
 the Son to be begotten ; and the Holy Ghost to 
 proceed. 
 
 If it be further asked, what is the full import of 
 these words, which are but metaphorical, and what 
 is the adequate meaning of them, I think we need 
 not trouble ourselves about it : for since it is a 
 matter purely of revelation, not of natural know- 
 ledge, and we know no more of it than what is 
 revealed in Scripture, where the Scripture is silent 
 we may be content to be ignorant. And we who 
 know so little of the essence of any thing, especially 
 of spiritual beings, though finite, need not think it 
 strange that we are not able to comprehend all the 
 particularities of what concerns that of God, and 
 the blessed Trinity. 
 
 I know that the fathers, and schoolmen, and 
 some after them, have employed their wits to find 
 out some faint resemblances from natural things, 
 whereby to express their imperfect conceptions of 
 the sacred Trinity : but they do not pretend to give 
 an adequate account of it ; but only some con- 
 jectural hypothesis, rather of what may be than of 
 what certainly is. Nor need we be concerned, to 
 be curiously inquisitive into it, beyond what God 
 hath been pleased to reveal concerning it. 
 
 That the three persons are distinguished, is evi- 
 
dont ; thoiigli wo do not perfectly understand what 
 those distinctions are. That to each of these the 
 Scripture ascribes divinity, is abundantly shewed by 
 those who have written on this subject. That there 
 is but one God, is agreed on all hands. That the 
 Father is said to beget, the Son to be begotten, 
 and the Holy Ghost to proceed, is agreed also ; 
 ihougli we do not perfectly understand the full 
 import of these w^ords. 
 
 And here we might quietly acquiesce, without 
 troubling ourselves further, did not the clamorous 
 Socinians importunely suggest the impossibility and 
 inconsistence of these things, insomuch as to tell us, 
 that how clear soever the expressions of Scripture 
 be, or can be, to this purpose, they will not believe 
 it, as being inconsistent with natural reason. And, 
 therefore, though they do not yet think fit to give 
 us a barefaced rejection of Scripture ; yet they do 
 (and must, they tell us,) put such a forced sense on 
 the words of it, be they never so plain, as to make 
 them signify somewhat else. 
 
 There is, therefore, in this doctrine of the Trinity, 
 as in that of the resurrection from the dead, a dou- 
 ble inquiry : first, wJiether it be possible ; and then, 
 whether it be true. And these to be argued, in 
 both cases, from a very difTerent topic: the one from 
 natural reason ; the other from revelation. Yet so, 
 that this latter doth certainly conclude the former, 
 if rightly understood. And though we should not 
 be able to solve all difficulties ; vet must we believe 
 
the thing, if revealed, unless we will deny the autho- 
 rity of such revelation. 
 
 Thus our Saviour, against the Sadducees, who 
 denied the resurrection. Matt. xxii. 29, " Ye err," 
 saith he, "not knowing the Scriptures, nor the 
 power of God." The power of God, if rightly 
 understood, was enough, from the light of reaso^Ji, to 
 prove it not impossible : but, whether or no it will 
 be so, which natural reason could not determine, 
 was to be argued from Scripture revelation. 
 
 In like manner, St. Paul before Agrippa, Acts 
 xxvi. 8, first argues the possibility of it ; " Why 
 should it be thought a thing incredible with you, 
 that God should raise the dead ?" For if Agrippa 
 did believe the creation of the world, as many even 
 of the heathen did, from the light of nature, he 
 could not think it impossible for that God, who had 
 at first made all things of nothing, to recollect, out 
 of its dust or ashes, a body which once had been. 
 But whether or no he would do so, depended upon 
 another question to be after asked, v. 2/, " Kino- 
 Agrippa, believest thou the prophets?" For this 
 was purely matter of revelation, and could not 
 otherwise be known. For, as to the immortality of 
 the soul, and a future state hereafter, many of the 
 heathens went very far, by the light of nature ; but 
 as to the resurrection of the body, I do not find 
 they had any sentiments about it, or but very faint, 
 if any : and if they had, it may well be supposed 
 to be the remainder of some ancient tradition from 
 
8 
 
 the Jews, or tlieir predecessors. Nor do I see any 
 foundation in nature which should make them think 
 of it, before it was revealed, any more than of the 
 redemption of mankind by Christ, which we should 
 never have thought of, had not God himself con- 
 trived and declared it to us. But, when tliat of 
 the resurrection was once suggested, there was no 
 pretence of reason to think it a thing impossible ; 
 and, therefore, no reason to doubt the truth of it 
 when declared, if we believe the Scriptures, wherein 
 it is revealed, especially those of the New Testa- 
 ment. 
 
 It is much the same as to the doctrine of the 
 Trinity. It is a thing we should not have thought 
 of, if it had not been suggested by divine w riters ; 
 but, when suggested, there is nothing in natural 
 reason that we know of, or can know of, why it 
 should be thought impossible ; but whether or no it 
 be so, depends only upon revelation. 
 
 And in this case the revelation seems so clear to 
 those who believe the Scriptures, that we have no 
 reason to doubt of it, unless the thing be found to 
 be really impossible, and inconsistent with reason. 
 Nor do the Anti-Trinitarians insist on any other 
 ground why they deny it, save only, that it seems 
 to them absolutely impossible; arid, therefore, think 
 themselves bound to put another sense on all places 
 of Scripture, how clear soever they be, or can be, 
 which prove or favour it. 
 
 So that the controversv is now roduce<l to this 
 
single point, whether it be possible or not possible : 
 whether it be consistent or inconsistent with natural 
 light or reason. And to that point, therefore, I shall 
 confine my discourse. For it seems agreed on all 
 hands, as to those who believe the Scriptures, that, 
 if it be not impossible, it is sufficiently revealed. 
 
 Now for us who understand so little of God's 
 infinite essence, and which it is impossible for us 
 fully to comprehend, who are ourselves but finite, 
 and mostly conversant with material objects ; inso- 
 much that we cannot pretend to understand the 
 essence of our own souls ; and when we attempt to 
 explain it, must do it rather by saying what it is 
 not, than what it is; so hard a matter is it for us 
 to fix in our mind or fancy a notion, idea, or con- 
 ception of a spiritual being, which falls not under 
 our senses : it is hard, I say, for us who under- 
 stand so little of a spirit to determine, of what God 
 is pleased to reveal, that it is impossible, or incon- 
 sistent with his essence, which essence we cannot 
 understand. 
 
 But what is it that is thus pretended to be 
 impossible? It is but this, that there be three 
 somewhats, which are but one God ; and these 
 somewhats we commonly call persons. Now what 
 inconsistence is there in all this ? That Father, 
 Son, and Holy Ghost are three, is manifest; and 
 are in Scripture language distinguished. That 
 there is but one God, is manifest also; and all 
 those three are this God. That the name person 
 
10 
 
 is no incongruous word, is evident from Heb. i. 3, 
 where it is used. If it be said, it doth not agree to 
 them exactly in the same sense in which it is com- 
 monly used amongst men; wo say so too, nor doth 
 any word, when applied to God, signify just the 
 same as when applied to men, but only somewhat 
 analogous thereunto. 
 
 What kind or degree of distinction, accordinor 
 to our metaphysics, this is, we need not be very 
 solicitous to inquire ; or, whether, in our metaphy- 
 sics, accommodated to our notions of finite beings, 
 there be any name for it : it is enough for us, if 
 these three may truly be so distinguished, as that 
 one be not the other, and yet all but one God. 
 
 Now, that there is no inconsistence or impos- 
 sibility, that, what in one regard are three, may in 
 another regard be one, is very manifest from many 
 instances that may be given even in finite beings, 
 such as we converse with ; which, though they do 
 not adequately agree with this of the sacred Trinity, 
 nor is it to be expected that they should; finite with 
 what is infinite; yet there is enough in them to shew 
 that there is no such inconsistence as is pretended. 
 
 I shall spare to instance in many resemblances 
 which have been given long since by fathers and 
 schoolmen, or by later writers.* Which, though 
 they are not pretended to be adequately the same 
 with that of the sacred Trinit}', as neither will any 
 
 * NoiK A. 
 
11 
 
 and height, and 
 
 
 F 
 
 / 
 / 
 
 
 
 D 
 
 / 
 
 B 
 
 / 
 
 thino- else be that we can take from finite beings ; 
 yet are they sufficient to shew that there is no 
 inconsistence in it ; which is all that is here incum- 
 bent on us to prove. I shall only name a few. 
 
 I will begin with what concerns the most gross of 
 finite beings, that is, material bodies. 
 
 Suppose we then a cubical body, which what it 
 is, every one knows, that knows a die. In this are 
 three dimensions, length, breadth 
 yet but one cube. Its length, 
 (suppose between east and west) 
 A. B. Its breadth, (suppose 
 between north and south) CD. 
 Its height, (between bottom and 
 top) E. F. Here are three local 
 dimensions, truly distinguished 
 each from other, not only imaginarily. The dis- 
 tance between east and west, whether we think or 
 think not of it, is not that between north and south ; 
 nor be either of these that between top and bottom. 
 The length is not the breadth, or height ; the 
 breadth is not the length, or height; and the height 
 is not the length, or breadth ; but they are three 
 dimensions, truly distinct each from other : yet are 
 all these but one cube ; and if any one of the three 
 were wanting, it were not a cube. There is no 
 inconsistence, therefore, that what in one regard are 
 three, (three dimensions) may in another regard be 
 so united as to be but one, (one cube.) And if it 
 may be so in corporeals, much more in spirituals. 
 
 C B 
 
12 
 
 Suppose we further, each of these dimensions 
 infinitely continued ; the length infinitely eastward 
 and westward, the breadth infinitely northward and 
 southward, the height infinitely upward and down- 
 ward. Here are three infinite dimensions, and but 
 one infinite cube ; there being no limits in nature, 
 greater than which a cube cannot be ; and these 
 three dimensions, though distinct, are equal each to 
 other, else it were not a cube : and though we 
 should allow that a cube cannot be infinite, because 
 a body, and, therefore, a finite creature; yet a spirit 
 may; such as is the infinite God; and, therefore, no 
 inconsistence that there be three personalities, each 
 infinite, and all equal, and yet but one infinite God, 
 essentially the same with those three persons. 
 
 I add further, that such infinite cube can, there- 
 fore, be but one, and those three dimensions can be 
 but three ; not more nor fewer. For, if infinite as 
 to its length, eastward and westward ; and as to its 
 breadth, northward and southward ; and as to its 
 height, upward and downward ; it will take up all 
 imaginary space possible, and leave no room either 
 for more cubes or more dimensions : and if this 
 infinite cube were, and shall be, eternally so, its 
 dimensions also must be infinite and co-eternal. 
 
 I say further, if in this supposed cube, we suppose 
 in order, not in time, its first dimension, that of 
 length, as A. B., and to this length be given an 
 e(|ual breadth, which is the true generation of a 
 s(jiiare, as C. D., which completes the square basis 
 
13 
 
 of this cube ; and to this basis, of length and 
 breadth, be given, as by a further procession from 
 both, an equal height, E. F., which completes the 
 cube ; and all this eternally, for such is the cube 
 supposed to be, here is a fair resemblance, if we 
 may parvis componere magna., of the Father, as 
 the fountain or original ; of the Son, as generated 
 of him from all eternity ; and of the Holy Ghost, 
 as eternally proceeding from both : and all this 
 without any inconsistence. This longum., latum, 
 profundum, (long, broad, and tall) is but one cube, 
 of three dimensions, and yet but one body : and this 
 Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, three persons, and 
 yet but one God. And as there, the dimensions 
 are not, in the abstract, predicated or affirmed each 
 of other, or the cube of either, the length is not the 
 breadth or height, nor either of these a cube ; but, 
 in the concrete, cube is affirmed of all ; this longum, 
 latum, profundum, is a cube, and the same cube. 
 So here, in the abstract, the personality of the 
 Father is not that of the Son, nor either of these 
 that of the Holy Ghost, nor the Deity or Godhead 
 any of these ; but, in the concrete, though the per- 
 sonalities are not, yet the persons are, each of them 
 God, and the same God. 
 
 If it be objected, that those concretes are affirmed 
 or predicated each of other ; that longum is also 
 latum and profundum, this long is broad and tall : 
 but not so here ; the Father is not the Son or Holy 
 Ghost. I answer, that if the words be rightly con- 
 
14 
 
 sidered, tlie analogy liolds here also : lor when we 
 say, this long is broad and tall, where cube or body 
 is understood, the full meaning is plainly thus — this 
 body, which, as to one dimension, that of length, is 
 said to be a long body, is the same body ; which, 
 as to another dimension, that of breadth, is said to 
 be a broad body ; and which, as to a third dimen- 
 sion, that of height, is said to be a tall body. So 
 here, that God, which, as to one personality, is God 
 the Father, is the same God ; which, as to another 
 personality, is God the Son ; and which, as to a 
 third personality, is God the Holy Ghost. So the 
 analogy holds every way, nor is there any incon- 
 sistence in either case. 
 
 I proceed to the consideration of somewhat more 
 spiritual, and less material than that of a body 
 locally extended. 
 
 Suppose we then a created angel, or human soul ; 
 at least if those who deny the blessed Trinity will 
 allow that there are such beings ; but if they be 
 Sadducees, who do not acknowledge either angel 
 or spirit, or that the Holy Scriptures are the Word 
 of God, which testify both, which I doubt is the 
 case of some of them, let them speak out, that so 
 we may know whom we have to deal with ; and not 
 pretend to nibble only at the Athanasian Creed, 
 or some expressions therein, while the quarrel is 
 indeed at somewhat higher, though, ad auioliendaut 
 litridiow^ they think fit fo dissemble it, and that 
 thev do but faintlv believe, if at all, that the Holv 
 
15 
 
 Scriptures are the Word of God, or the doctrmes 
 therein contained to be such. And we have reason 
 to suspect it, when they spare not to let us know, 
 that, were this doctrine of the Trinity therein deh- 
 vered in words as express as could be, they would 
 not believe it. 
 
 But suppose we, what they would seem to grant, 
 and what I am so charitable as to think divers of 
 them do beheve, that there are spiritual beings, 
 such as angels and the souls of men ; and that 
 these spiritual beings are endued with knowledge, 
 or wisdom, and force, or an executive power, to act 
 according to that knowledge. That there is some 
 such thing, at least in man, whether body or soul, 
 they cannot but acknowledge ; for themselves be, 
 and know, and do. And though we cannot fully 
 comprehend, much less express in words, how all 
 this is so ; for we are here at a loss, as well as in 
 higher things ; yet, that it is, they cannot deny, 
 though they do not know how. 
 
 Now, to be, and to know, and to do, are certainly 
 distinct each from other ; though, perhaps, we are 
 not all agreed of what kind, or in what degree this 
 distinction is. To be is not the same as to know, for 
 that may be where this is not; and to do is, for the 
 same reason, somewhat different from both those : 
 for a man may be and may know what he doth not 
 do ; yet it is one and the same soul, at least one 
 and the same man, which is, and knows, and does. 
 There is, therefore, no impossibility or inconsistence 
 
in it, that what in one regard are three, may in 
 another regard be one. Thus in the sacred Trinity, 
 if we conceive of the Father as the original or first 
 person, who begets the Son ; the Son as the wisdom 
 of the Father, begotten of him; and the Holy Ghost 
 as the Spirit of the Father and the Son, as proceed- 
 ing from both, and yet the same God with both ; or 
 what other distinction there may be of these three 
 persons, who are but one God, that we do not 
 know; there is no inconsistence in it, that these 
 three may be one ; three in one regard, and one in 
 another. 
 
 I might shew the same as to the understanding, 
 will, and meaning, which are all the same soul: and 
 the known metaphysical terms of unUm, verwn, 
 honwn, which are all but the same ens. And 
 many other instances of like nature. 
 
 But we hold, it will be said, a greater distinction 
 than that of unwn, verum, bonwn, between the 
 three persons in the sacred Trinity. Be it so. But 
 what that greater distinction is, we do not pretend 
 to comprehend. However, it is from all these 
 instances evident, that there is no impossibilitv or 
 inconsistence with reason, that wliat in one regard 
 are three, may in another regard ho one. Wliicli 
 is what we undertook to show. 
 
 It is true, that not any, nor all of those instances, 
 nor any of those given by other learned men, do 
 adequately express the distinction and unity of tlu* 
 persons in tlio sacrcMl Trinity; i\v noithcM- hath God 
 
17 
 
 distinctly declared it to us, nor are we able fully to 
 comprehend it, nor is it necessary for us to know. 
 But because we do not know " how the bones grow 
 in the womb of her that is with child,"* shall we, 
 therefore, say they do not grow there? Or, 
 because "we cannot by searching find out God, 
 because we cannot find out the Almighty to per- 
 fection," f shall we, therefore, say things cannot be, 
 when God says they are, only because we know not 
 how? If God say, " These three are one,"| shall 
 we say, they are not ? If God say, " The Word 
 was God," and "The Word was made flesh," || 
 shall we say, not so, only because we cannot tell 
 how ? It is safer to say, it is, when God says it 
 is, though we know not, in particular, how it is. 
 Especially when there be so many instances in 
 nature, to shew it not to be impossible or incon- 
 sistent with reason. The thing is sufficiently 
 revealed to those who are willing to be taught, and 
 "receive the truth in the love of it."§ Nor is it 
 denied by those who gainsay it, but that, if the 
 thing be possible, it is sufficiently revealed; there 
 being no other exception made as to the revelation, 
 but the impossibility of the thing. " But if any 
 man list to be contentious,"^ and to "quarrel 
 about words,"** it is no wonder if "hearing, they 
 do hear and not understand ;"ff and that God 
 
 Eccl. xi. 5. t Job xi. 7 J 1 Joliu v. 7. || John i. 1, 14. 
 
 § 2 Thess. ii. 10. t 1 Cor. xi. 1«. Rom. ii. 8. 
 
 2 Tim. vi. 4. Tit. iii. 9, ft Acts xxviii. 28. Matt. xiii. 13. 
 
18 
 
 "give them over to believe a lie," who do not "love 
 the truth."* But "the humble he will teach his 
 way,"f and while we be so we be safe.J 
 
 * 2 Thess. ii. 10, 11. Rom. i. 21, 28. f Psalm xxv. 9. 
 
 X Note B. 
 
 Yours, 
 
 JOHN WALLIS. 
 
 August 11, 1690. 
 
A SECOND LETTER 
 
 CONCERNING 
 
 THE HOLY TRINITY, 
 
 PURSUANT TO THE FORMER FROM THE SAME HAND, 
 OCCASIONED BY A LETTER, THERE INSERTED, FROM ONE UNKNOWN. 
 
 BY JOHN WALLIS, D.D. 
 
 [Published in 1691.] 
 
LETTER 11. 
 
 CONCERNING THE SACRED TRINITY. 
 
 Sir, 
 
 I UNDERSTAND by youF letter, of Sept. 20, that 
 you have printed a letter of mine concerning the 
 Trinity; and have sent me some copies of it to 
 Oxford. But I am not there to receive them ; and 
 so have yet seen none of them : but your letter 
 thither was sent me thence by the post. 
 
 I have, since yours, received, by the same way, 
 a letter directed to me, subscribed W. J. ; but I 
 know not from whom. I suppose it is somebody in 
 London, to whom you have presented a book, for 
 which he returns me thanks. 
 
 That letter to me was thus, (with the post-mark 
 at London, SE. 23. from whence I supply the date, 
 which in the letter was wanting.) 
 
 For the Reverend Dr. Wallis, Professor of Geometry, at Oxford. 
 
 Sir, 
 
 I RECEIVED the honour of your letter, and return you 
 humble and hearty thanks for it. It is writ, in my opinion, 
 
22 
 
 in a modest, peaceable, and Christian style ; and 1 wish it 
 may please others as well as it doth me. I am afraid, 
 however, that it will not give satisfaction to the scholastic 
 Athanasian-Trinitarian. For they are so particular, and 
 withal so positive, in the explication of the greatest of 
 mysteries, as if they understood it as well as any article of 
 their Christian faith. 
 
 Your explication of personality gives no distaste to me, 
 when you say, (page 4) " They are distinguished by per- 
 sonality:" and, "by personality I mean that distinction 
 whereby they are distinguished." Yet I am afraid the 
 high flown School- Trinitarians will say, this is trifling, 
 and idem per idem. Though to me it hath this good 
 sense, that we know there is a distinction betwixt them, 
 which we call personality ; but we can affix no notion to 
 this personality, which is common to it with other per- 
 sonalities, either human or angelical; and, therefore, we 
 can only say, it is that distinction whereby the three 
 hypostases are distinguished. 
 
 But you still use a greater latitude, as to the notion of 
 these persons, or personalities, when you call them " some- 
 whats," (page 9). That, you say, which is pretended to 
 be impossible by the Anti-Trinitarians is only this, " That 
 there be three somewhats, which are but one God ; and 
 these somewhats we commonly call persons." This I take 
 only to signify, that the true notion, and the true name, of 
 that distinction is uidcnown to us, yet the distinction is 
 certain. 
 
 But the deep loanied School-Trinitarians, who decide 
 all things to an liair's breadth, will, I imagine, ridicule 
 this expression. 
 
 A late learned and ingenious author,* you know, hath 
 
 • Dr. Slicil.nk. 
 
23 
 
 gone much further in his determinations about this point. 
 He makes your "three somewhats," not only "three 
 persons," but "three substantial beings," (page 47) and 
 "three infinite minds," (page 66). And the contrary, he 
 says, is both heresy and nonsense. 
 
 Three infinite minds is the same as three infinite spirits. 
 And by infinite, the author understands here, not infinite in 
 extension, but in perfection. So that the three hypostases 
 are three spirits, whereof each is infinite in perfection. 
 
 Then, saith the Anti- Trinitarian, they are three Gods. 
 For what better notion, or what better definition, have we 
 of God, than that he is a Spirit infinitely perfect? And, 
 if there be three such, there are three Gods. In like 
 manner, three substantial beings really distinct, are three 
 substances really distinct. And if each of these substances 
 be endued with infinite perfection, it will be hard to keep 
 them from being three Gods. 
 
 We do not well know what particular explication of the 
 Trinity those persons gave, whom the ancients call Tri- 
 theites. But this we know, that the great offence which is 
 taken at the Christian doctrine of the Trinity by the Jews 
 and Mahometans, is from the appearance of polytheism 
 in that doctrine. Which appearance, methinks, is rather 
 increased than lessened by this exphcation; and, conse- 
 quently, the scandal which, to them, follows upon it. 
 
 But the learned author hath an expedient to prevent 
 polytheism, notwithstanding the real distinction of his three 
 infinite spirits. Which is, by making them mutually con- 
 scious of one another's thoughts and actions : whereby, he 
 says, they would be so united as to make but one God. 
 That, methinks, doth not follow, that upon this mutual 
 consciousness they would be but one God. That which 
 follows is this, that they Avould be three Gods mutually 
 conscious. For there is no reason why this mutual con- 
 
24 
 
 sciousness should make their Godhead cease, if without this 
 they would be three distinct Gods. No union amounts to 
 identity. 
 
 It came in my way to mind you of this more punctual 
 and demonstrative explication of the Trinity, as it is said 
 to be, that you might not expect that every one should be 
 of your mind, nor approve of your modesty as I do. 
 
 Your similitude and comparisons are as just as the nature 
 of the subject will admit. The great defect of the first 
 seems to be this, that it cannot be said of any one dimen- 
 sion that it is a cube, or a body ; whereas it is said of 
 every person, that he is God. 
 
 Your second comparison interferes again Avith the learned 
 author above-mentioned. For he says, (page 72) " It is a 
 mistake to think that knowledge and power, even in men, 
 is not the same thing;" whereas you suppose them distinct, 
 and upon that ground your similitude. 
 
 I cannot but be of your mind in this particular also. 
 For power belongs to the will,* and knowledge to the 
 understanding. And it is plain that we know many things 
 that we cannot do : and, on the contrary, we can do many 
 things and know not how they are done. It may be the 
 ingenious author would be hard put to it to tell us how he 
 ])ronounces his own name ; that is, what organs of speech 
 are moved, and how ; by what muscles and nerves ; and 
 what the whole action is that intervenes betwixt the inward 
 thought and the outward sound ; or betwixt the first cause 
 and the last effect. Or', if he be so good an anatomist and 
 philosopher as to understand all this, at least his little son, 
 or little daughter, who can pronounce the same as well as 
 himself, know not in what manner, or by what meaiis, they 
 do it. So fools and children can move their hands, fingers, 
 
 * I sliouM latlipr sny. tf) tlip oxorutivo faculty; or, powpv of doing. 
 
 OValliVs Note.) 
 
25 
 
 and all the members of the body, as well as philosophers ; 
 though they do not know in what method, or by what 
 mechanism, they are moved. These things are the effects 
 of will, independently on knowledge. And it is as plain, 
 on the other hand, that we know how many things are to 
 be done, which yet we cannot do for want of strength or 
 force. I can lift a weight of two or three hundred pounds, 
 but I cannot hft one of five or six hundred; though I 
 understand as w^ell how the one is moved as the other. 
 And a brawny porter shall raise that of five or six hundred, 
 though he understand staticks less than I do. I can bend 
 a stick, but cannot bend a bar of iron ; though I use just 
 the same method, and understand as much how the one is 
 done as the other. And innumerable instances of like 
 nature shew knowledge and force to be different things. 
 But this, sir, I say only in your defence. 
 
 Your conclusion also agrees very well to my sense. 
 And I think them exceedingly to blame that presume to 
 measure these infinite natures, and all their properties, by 
 our narrow understandings. The Anti- Trinitarians gene- 
 rally are no great philosophers ; yet they take upon them 
 as if they were the only masters of reason ; and in the most 
 sublime and mysterious points will scarce allow revelation 
 to be of greater authority than their judgment. 
 
 But, however, on the other hand, though I never felt 
 any inclination or temptation to Socinian doctrines, yet, I 
 cannot heartily join Mith you in the damnatory sentences; 
 neither would I have us spin creeds, like cobw^ebs, out of 
 our own bowels. In the name of God, let us be content 
 with what is revealed to us in Scripture concerning these 
 mysteries ; and leave the rest to make part of our heaven 
 and future happiness. To strain things to these heights 
 makes still more divisions in the church. We that now 
 have School-Trinitarians, and Scripture- Trinitarians ; and 
 
26 
 
 either of them will have their plea, and pursue their 
 interest; till, by zeal for opinions which are disputable, 
 we have destroyed Christian charity and unity, which are 
 indispensable virtues and duties. 
 
 I am, Sir, 
 
 With sincerity and respect. 
 Your obliged humble servant, 
 
 W. J.* 
 
 London, Sept. 23, 1690. 
 
 If you know from whom it is, pray thank him 
 from me for his civilities therein. And you may 
 please to tell him, that he doth understand me 
 aright, and puts a true sense upon my words. By 
 personality, I mean that distinction, whatever it be, 
 whereby the three are distinguished ; but what that 
 is, I do not pretend to determine. And if I should 
 guess (for it will be but guessing) how it may be, I 
 should not be positive that just so it is. Upon the 
 same account that it is not thought prudent in a 
 siege, to enlarge the line of defence too far. There 
 is a distinction, this we are sure of, between the 
 three : this distinction I call personality ; and by 
 this word I mean that distinction, whatever it be. 
 But what this distinction is, or what degree of dis- 
 tinction, I cannot well tell. If this be trifling, I 
 cannot help it, nor if they please to ridicule it ; but, 
 to me, it seems to be good sense. 
 
 * NOTK C. 
 
27 
 
 If others will venture to determine it more nicely 
 than I have done, they, perhaps, may understand it 
 more distinctly than I pretend to do ; but will give 
 me leave to be ignorant therein of what the Scrip- 
 ture doth not tell me. 
 
 Of the damnatory sentences, as he calls them, I 
 had said nothing; nor do I think that the author 
 of the Athanasian Creed did intend them in that 
 rigour that some would put upon them. And, if it 
 be well considered how there they stand, he will 
 find them annexed, at least so they seem to me, 
 only to some generals which he thought necessary ; 
 as that we ought to hold the Catholic faith ; that 
 the Trinity in Unity is to be worshipped ; that the 
 Son of God was incarnate ; not to every punctilio 
 in his explications, which are but as a comment on 
 these generals, how he thought they were to be 
 understood, or might be explained ; which expli- 
 cations I take to be true and good ; but not within 
 the purview of those clauses, and that a man may 
 be saved, even in the judgment of that author, 
 who doth not know, or doth not fully understand, 
 some of them. His true meaning therein seems 
 to me to be but this, that the doctrine therein 
 delivered, concerning the Trinity and the incar- 
 nation of Christ, is the sound orthodox doctrine ; 
 and such as, for the substance of it, ought to be 
 believed by those who expect salvation by Christ. 
 Certainly his meaning never was, that children, and 
 idiots, and all who do not understand the school 
 
28 
 
 terms, or, perhaps, have never heard tliem, should 
 be, therefore, denied salvation. 
 
 As to what he objects to me, " That it cannot be 
 said of any one dimension that it is a cube, or a 
 body ; whereas it is said of every person, that he 
 is God," he might observe that I had already 
 obviated this objection. For though we cannot 
 say, in the abstract, that length is a cube, and so 
 of the rest ; yet, in the concrete, this long thing (or 
 this which is long) is a cube ; and so this which is 
 broad, or this which is high, is a cube : just so, we 
 do not say, in the abstract, that paternity is God ; 
 but, in the concrete, the Father is God ; and so of 
 the other persons. The personality is not said to 
 be God, but the person is. Which fully answers 
 that exception. 
 
 What he cites of a learned author falls not within 
 the compass of what I undertook to defend ; and 
 that learned person will excuse me, if I do not 
 pretend to understand all his notions, and leave it 
 to him to explain himself.* But what I have 
 endeavoured to defend is as much, I think, as we 
 need to maintain in this point. 
 
 WHiere that author calls it a mistake to think 
 that knowledge and. })ower, in the same man, are 
 not the same thing, I suppose, not having the book 
 at hand, he means no more but this, that though 
 they differ, indeed, (to use the school language) e.v 
 
 Note D. 
 
29 
 
 jjarte rei, yet not ut res et res, but rather ut modus 
 et modus; that is, not as two things, but as two 
 modes of the same thing. And if he should say 
 the hke of length, breadth, and thickness, I would 
 not contend about it; for, even so, it will serve 
 my similitude well enough. If that of the three 
 persons be more than so, it is then, I think, such a 
 distinction as to which, in our metaphysics, we have 
 not yet given a name. But of this I determine 
 nothing, because I would not spin the thread too 
 tine ; and content myself to say, it is that of the 
 three personalities in one Deity, without deter- 
 mining how great that is. And I may the rather 
 be allowed thus to forbear, because I find, even in 
 matters of ordinary conversation, such as those but 
 now mentioned, the schoolmen are not well agreed 
 what things shall be said to differ ut res et res, and 
 \vhat only ex parte rei. Much more, therefore, 
 may I be allowed a like latitude of thought in the 
 present case. 
 
 I add no more but that 
 
 I am, 
 Yours, 
 JOHN WALLIS. 
 
 Soundobs, Sopt. 27, l^JiO. 
 
LETTER III. 
 
 AN EXPLICATION AND VINDICATION OF THE ATHANASIAN CREED. 
 
 Sir, 
 
 In pursuance of what I have said in a former 
 letter, concerning what we commonly call the Atha- 
 nasian Creed, it may not be amiss to express it a 
 little more distinctly. 
 
 We call it commonly the Athanasian Creed ; not 
 that we are certain it was penned, just in this form, 
 by- Athanasius himself; for, of this, I find that 
 learned men are doubtful ; but it was penned either 
 by himself, or by some other about that time, 
 according to the mind and doctrine of Athanasius.* 
 In like manner as what we call the Apostles' Creed, 
 we take to be penned, very anciently, according to 
 what doctrine the apostles had taught them, though 
 not perhaps in those very words. 
 
 But whoever was the compiler, whether Atha- 
 nasius himself, or some other, of the Athanasian 
 
34 
 
 Creed, I suppose, the damnatory sentences, as they 
 are called, therein were not by him intended to be 
 understood with that rigour that some would now 
 insinuate ; who, because perhaps they do not like 
 the main doctrines of that creed, are willing to 
 disparage it, by representing it to the greatest dis- 
 advantage they can ; as if it were intended, that 
 whoever doth not explicitly and distinctly know, 
 and understand, and assent to, all and every clause 
 and syllable therein, could not be saved ; which, I 
 suppose, neither the author did intend, nor any 
 other sober person would affirm : but that the doc- 
 trine therein delivered, concernhig God and Christ, 
 is sound and true doctrine in itself, and ought, as 
 to the substance of it, to be believed as such by all 
 persons of age and capacity, and who have oppor- 
 tunity of being well informed in it, who do expect 
 salvation by Christ ; at least so far as not to dis- 
 believe the substance of it, when understood ; there 
 being no other ordinary way to be saved, that we 
 know of, than that by the knowledge and faith of 
 God in Christ. 
 
 But what measures God will take in cases extra- 
 ordinary, as of infancy, incapacity, invincible igno- 
 rance, or the like, is not the thing there intended to 
 be declared, nor is it necessary for us to know ; 
 but to leave it rather to the wisdom and counsel of 
 God, " whose judgments are unsearchable, and his 
 ways past finding out," Rom. xi. 33. 
 
 Much less do T sujjposc that ho infeudcMl (o 
 
35 
 
 extend the necessity of such explicit knowledge to 
 the ages before Christ. For many things may be 
 requisite to be explicitly known and believed by us, 
 to whom the gospel is revealed, which were not so 
 to them, before "the veil was taken away from 
 Moses' face," and " immortality brought to light 
 through the gospel," 2 Cor. iii. 13, 14. 2 Tim. 
 i. 10. 
 
 Nor are we always to press words according to 
 the utmost rigour that they are possibly capable of; 
 but according to such equitable sense as we use to 
 allow to other homiletical discourses, and which we 
 have reason to believe to have been the true mean- 
 ing of him whose words they are. 
 
 And 1 have the more reason to press for such 
 equitable construction, because I observe those hard 
 clauses, as they are thought to be, annexed only to 
 some generals ; and not to be extended, as I con- 
 ceive, to every particular in the explication of those 
 generals. 
 
 It begins thus, " Whosoever will be saved, before 
 all things, it is necessary that he hold the Catholic 
 faith." Where, before all things, is as much as 
 imprimis ; importing that it is mainly necessary, or 
 a principal requisite, to believe aright, especially 
 concerning God and Christ. 
 
 Which, as to persons of years and discretion, and 
 who have the opportunity of being duly instructed, 
 I think is generally allowed by all of us to be 
 necessary, as to the substantials of religion, in the 
 
36 
 
 ordinary way of salvation, without disputing what 
 God may do in extraordinary cases, or how far 
 God may be pleased, upon a general repentance, 
 as of sins unknown, to pardon some culpable mis- 
 belief. 
 
 It follows, " Which faith, except every one do 
 keep whole and undefiled, (ffwav Kal a^w^ipov) without 
 doubt he shall perish everlastingly." That is, as I 
 conceive, unless a person, so qualified and so capa- 
 citated, as I before expressed, do keep it whole or 
 sound, as to the substantials of it, though possibly 
 he may be ignorant of some particulars of the true 
 faith, and undefiled, or intemerate, without adding 
 thereunto, or putting such a sense upon such sub- 
 stantials as shall be destructive thereof, shall, 
 except he repent, perish everlastingly. Which, I 
 think, is no more than that of Mark xvi. 16, "He 
 that believeth not shall be damned." And what 
 limitations or mitigations are there to be allowed, 
 are, by the same equity, to be allowed in the 
 present clause before us; which, therefore, may, 
 in this true sense, be safely admitted. 
 
 And here I think fit to observe, that whereas 
 there may be an ambiguity in the English word 
 whole, which sometimes signifies totus, and some- 
 times sanus or salvus, it is here certainly to be 
 understood in the latter sense, as answering to the 
 Greek ados. It is not dXi^u totum, but atiav sanmn 
 or salvam. And t,ii,Ziv awav Kal u^ucfupov, to keep the 
 faith salvam et intemcrafd})), whicli is translated 
 
37 
 
 whole and undefiled, might, to the same sense, be 
 rendered safe and sound. Now a man may well be 
 said to be safe and sound, notwithstanding a wart 
 or a wen, or even a small hurt or maim, (at least 
 when healed,) so long as the substantials and vitals 
 be not endangered. And so of the Catholic faith, 
 or Christian doctrine, so long as there is nothing 
 destructive of the main substantials or fundamentals 
 of it ; though, possibly, there may be an ignorance 
 or mistake as to some particulars of lesser moment. 
 
 After this preface (between it and the conclusion, 
 or epilogue) there follows indeed a large exposition 
 of what he declares to be the Catholic faith : that 
 is, to be some part of it; for I take the whole 
 Scripture to be the Catholic faith, whereof this col- 
 lection is but a part, beginning with, " The Catholic 
 faith is this ;" and ending with, " This is the 
 Catholic faith." 
 
 But it is not said that except a man know and 
 believe every particular of that explication, he shall 
 perish eternally ; but only, " Except he keep the 
 Catholic faith," as to the substantials of it, safe 
 and sound. 
 
 For, doubtless, there may be many particulars of 
 CathoUc faith contained in the Word of God, which 
 a man may be ignorant of, and yet be saved. It is 
 true, that the name of our Saviour's mother was 
 Mary ; and the name of the judge who condemned 
 him was Pontius Pilate ; and both these are put 
 into what we call the Apostles' Creed, and are 
 
38 
 
 part of the Catholic faith, and whicii, supposing 
 that we know them to be declared in Scripture, we 
 ought to beheve. But I see not why it should be 
 thought, of itself, more necessary to salvation, if 
 he do not know it to be declared in Scripture, for a 
 man to know that her name was Mary, than that 
 the name of Adam's wife was Eve, or Abraham's 
 wife Sarah, or that one of Job's daughters was 
 called Jemima ; for all these are declared in Scrip- 
 ture ; and, supposing that we know them so to be, 
 ought to be believed as part of the Catholic faith. 
 Nor do I know that it is, of itself, more necessary to 
 know that the name of the judge who condemned 
 our Saviovn- was Pontius Pilate, than that the name 
 of the high-priest was Caiaphas. And though one 
 of these, and not the other, be put into the Apostles' 
 Creed, whereby we are more likely to know that 
 than the other ; yet both of them being true, and 
 declared in Scripture, they are, both of them, parts 
 of the Catholic faith, and to be believed ; but 
 neither of them, I think, with such necessity, as 
 that he who knows them not cannot be saved. 
 
 And what I say of this general preface in the 
 becfinninjT, is in like manner to be understood of 
 the general conclusion in the end ; " which" Catho- 
 lic faith " except a man believe faithfully, he cannot 
 be saved." Of which I shall say more anon. 
 
 After the general preface, concerning the neces- 
 sity of holding the Catholic faith, he proceeds to 
 two main branches of it, tliat of the Trinitv, and 
 
39 
 
 that of the Incarnation, with the consequents there- 
 of, which he declares hkewise as what " ought to 
 be beheved." 
 
 That of the Trinity he declares thus in general ; 
 " And the Catholic faith is this," that is, this is one 
 main part of the Catholic faith, namely, " That we 
 worship one God in Trinity, and Trinity in Unity : 
 neither confounding the persons, nor dividing the 
 substance ;" which is what we commonly say, 
 " There be three persons, yet but one God." And 
 this general, which, after some particular explica- 
 tions, he doth resume, is what he declares, " ought 
 to be believed;" but he doth not lay such stress upon 
 each particular of that explication, though true. 
 
 He thus explains himself; "For there is one 
 person of the Father, another of the Son, and 
 another of the Holy Ghost :" which persons, there- 
 fore, are not to be confounded : " but the Godhead 
 of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy 
 Ghost, is all one." That is, one substance, one 
 God ; which is what he said of not dividing the sub- 
 stance, as if the three persons should be three 
 substances, or three Gods. According as Christ 
 says of himself and the Father, John x. 30, " I and 
 the Father are one :" ev ia/nev (not er^,) that is, one 
 thing, one substance, one God, not one person. 
 And 1 John v. 7j " These three are one," (Jtoi 6t 
 
 Tpei9, 61/ elac) III tveS SUllt UTllWl, UOt UflUS. ThcSC 
 
 three who's, are one what. Th( 
 substance, one God, though three persons. 
 
40 
 
 And as their Godhead, or substance undivided, 
 is all one, so it follows, " the glory equal, the 
 majesty co-eternal." Such as the " Father is," as 
 to the common Godhead, " such is the Son, and 
 such is the Holy Ghost. The Father uncreate, the 
 Son uncreate, and the Holy Ghost uncreate. The 
 Father incomprehensible, the Son incomprehensible, 
 and the Holy Ghost incomprehensible. The Father 
 eternal, the Son eternal, and the Holy Ghost eter- 
 nal." For all these are attributes of the common 
 Deity, which is the same of all. " And yet they 
 are not three Eternals, but one Eternal." Not 
 three eternal Gods, though three persons, but one 
 eternal God. " As also there are not three Incom- 
 prehensibles, nor three Uncreated ; but one Uncre- 
 ated, and one Incomprehensible." One and the 
 sanie substance or Deity, uncreated and incompre- 
 hensible. " So likewise the Father is almighty, the 
 Son almighty, and the Holy Ghost almighty ; 
 and yet there are not three Almighties, but one 
 Almighty. So the Father is God, the Son is God, 
 and the Holy Ghost is God; and yet there are not 
 three Gods, but one God. So likewise the Father 
 is Lord," (kvpio^ the word by which the Greeks do 
 express the Hebrew name Jehovah, the proper 
 incommunicable name of God,) " the Son Lord, 
 and the Holy Ghost Lord ; and yet not three Lords, 
 but one Lord." (Not three Jehovahs, but one 
 Jehovah.) "For like as we are compelled by the 
 Christian \on\y to acknowledge every person by 
 
41 
 
 himself to be God and Lord, so are we forbidden, 
 by the Catholic religion, to say, there be three 
 Gods, or three Lords :" which are so many particu- 
 lar explications, or illustrations, of what was before 
 said in general of "not confounding the persons, 
 nor dividing the substance." Which explications, 
 though they be all true, and necessary consequents 
 of what was before said in general ; yet to none of 
 them is annexed such sanction, as that whosoever 
 doth not believe, or not understand, these illustra- 
 tions, cannot be saved. It is enough to salvation, if 
 they hold the true faith, as to the substance of it, 
 though in some other form of words, or though they 
 had never heard the Athanasian Creed. 
 
 Nor is any such sanction annexed to the personal 
 properties which next follow : " The Father is made 
 of none ; neither created, nor begotten. The Son 
 is of the Father alone ; not made, nor created, but 
 begotten. The Holy Ghost is of the Father, and 
 of the Son ; neither made nor begotten, but pro- 
 ceeding." 
 
 Where, by the way, here is no anathematization 
 of the Greek church,* of which those who would, 
 for other reasons, disparage this creed, make so 
 loud an outcry. It is said indeed, " He doth pro- 
 ceed," and so say they ; but not that he doth "pro- 
 ceed from the Father and the Son." And it is 
 said, he is "Of the Father and Of the Son," 
 
 * Note F. 
 
42 
 
 («7ro T«* TTUTpb^ Kul airo ra' vlot}) SOlTie Way 01" OthcT ; aiicl 
 
 even this, I suppose, they would not deny ; but 
 whether by procession from both, or, if so, whether 
 in the same manner, it is not said, but warily 
 avoided. Though, indeed, it seems to favour what 
 I think to be the truth, and what in the Nicene 
 Creed is said expressly, that he doth " proceed 
 from both;" and, for ought we know, in the same 
 manner, which, yet, we do not determine. Nor do 
 I see any reason why, on this account, we should 
 be said to anathematize the Greek church, or they 
 to anathematize us; even though we should not 
 exactly agree in what sense he may be said to be 
 " Of the Father," and in what " Of the Son." And 
 those who are better acquainted with the doctrine 
 and the languages of the present Greek churches 
 than most of us are, do assure us, that the differ- 
 ences between them and us are rather in some forms 
 of expressions, than in the thing itself. However, 
 those who would make so great a matter of this, 
 should rather quarrel at the Nicene Creed, than 
 the Athanasian, where it is expressly said of the 
 Holy Ghost, that " he proceeded from the Father 
 and from the Son." It is not, therefore, for the 
 phrase filioque that they are so ready to quarrel at 
 this Creed rather than the Nicene ; but from some 
 other reason, and, most likely, because the doctrine 
 of the Trinity is here more fully expressed than in 
 tliat, at which the Socinian is most offended. 
 
 I observe also, that these |)ersonal proj)erties are 
 
43 
 
 expressed just by the Scripture words, beget, be- 
 gotten, proceeding, without affixing any sense of 
 our own upon them ; but leaving them to be under- 
 stood in such sense as in the Scripture they are to 
 be understood — agreeable to that modest caution, 
 which is proper in such mysteries. 
 
 It follows, " So there is one Father, not three 
 Fathers ; one Son, not three Sons ; one Holy 
 Ghost, not three Holy Ghosts. And in this Trinity 
 none is afore or after other :" that is, not in time, 
 though in order. " None is greater or less than 
 another ; but the whole three persons are co-eternal 
 
 together, and co-equal." "Ewai 6i Tpei9 vTroaTaaei^, Kul 
 avva'tciai elaiv eavTa?^, Kal 2aai. " 1 he thrCC yoi rpei^J SiVQ 
 
 (awai v-!r6aTaaei<s) truly persous, or propcrly persons, 
 and co-eternal each with other, and co-equal." 
 
 Having thus finished these particular explications, 
 or illustrations, concerning the Trinity, without any 
 condemning clause of those who think otherwise, 
 other than what is there included, namely, that if 
 this be true, the contrary must be an error ; he then 
 resumes the general, (as after a long parenthesis) 
 " So that in all things, as is aforesaid, the Unity 
 in Trinity, and the Trinity in Unity, is to be 
 worshipped." And to this general annexeth this 
 ratification, " He, therefore, that will be saved, must 
 thus think of the Trinity ;" or, thus ought to think 
 of the Trinity ; or, " let him thus think of the 
 1 rmity, ovtw irepl jpi'ado^ (ppoveiTio. And to this, 1 
 suppose, we do all agree who believe the doctrine 
 
44 
 
 of the Trinity to be true : for, if the thing be (rue, 
 those who would be saved ought to believe it. 
 
 He then proceeds to the doctrine of the Incar- 
 nation, which he declares in general as necessary to 
 salvation. " Furthermore, it is necessary to ever- 
 lasting salvation, that he also believe rightly the 
 Incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ." Which is 
 no more than that of John iii. 36, " He that believ- 
 eth not the Son shall not see life, but the wrath of 
 God abideth on him." And, therefore, we may 
 safely say this also, " There being no other name 
 under heaven whereby we must be saved, neither 
 is there salvation in any other," Acts iv. 12. 
 
 After this, as before he had done of the doctrine 
 of the Trinity, he gives, first, a general assertion of 
 his being God and man ; and then a particular illus- 
 tration of his Incarnation. " For the right faith is, 
 that we believe and confess, that our Lord Jesus 
 Christ, the Son of God, is God and man." 
 
 What follows is a further explication of this 
 general. " God, of the substance of the Father, 
 begotten before the worlds. And man, of the sub- 
 stance of his mother, born in the world. Perfect 
 God, and perfect man ; of a reasonable soul and 
 human flesh subsisting. Equal to the Father, as 
 touching his Godhead; and inferior to the Father, 
 as touching his manhood. Who, although he be 
 God, and man, yet he is not two, but one Christ. 
 One, not bv conversion of the Godliead into flesh, 
 Imt bv taking of tlie mnuliood into God. One 
 
45 
 
 altogether, not by confusion of substance, but by 
 unity of person. For as the reasonable soul and 
 flesh is one man, so God and man is one Christ." 
 
 And thus far, as to the description of Christ's 
 person and natures. The particulars of which I 
 take to be all true ; and, therefore, such as ought 
 to be believed, when understood. But such, many 
 of them, as persons of ordinary capacities, and not 
 acquainted with school terms, may not, perhaps, 
 understand. Nor was it, I presume, the meaning 
 of the penman of this creed, that it should be 
 thought necessary to salvation that everyone should 
 particularly understand all this ; but, at most, that, 
 when understood, it should not be disbelieved. That 
 in the general being most material, that " Jesus 
 Christ, the Son of God, is God and man ;" the rest 
 being but explicatory of this : which explications, 
 though they be all true, are not attended with any 
 such clause ; as if, without the explicit knowledge 
 of all these a man could not be saved. 
 
 He then proceeds to what Christ hath done for 
 our salvation, and what he is to do further at the 
 last judgment, with the consequents thereof: "who 
 suffered for our salvation, descended into hell, rose 
 again the third day from the dead." 
 
 That clause of descending into hell, or hades, 
 (Kuryxeev els: a 68,) which wc meet with here, and in 
 the Apostles' Creed, as it is now read, is not in the 
 Nicene Creed ; nor was it anciently, as learned 
 men seem to be agreed, in what we call the 
 
46 
 
 Apostles' Creed. When, or how, it first came in, 
 I cannot well tell ; nor will I undertake here to 
 determine the sense of it. 
 
 The Hebrew word sheol, and the Greek hades, 
 which here we translate hell, by which word we now- 
 a-days use to denote the place of the damned, was 
 anciently used to signify, sometimes the grave, 
 sometimes the place, state, or condition of the dead, 
 whether good or bad. And when Job prays, Job 
 xiv. 13, " O that thou wouldst hide me msheol,'' (as 
 in the Hebrew,) or in hades, (as in the Greek sep- 
 tuagint,) certainly he did not desire to be in what we 
 now call hell ; but rather, as we there translate it, in 
 the grave, or the condition of those that are dead.* 
 
 But what it should signify here, is not well agreed 
 among learned men. The Papists generally, be- 
 cause that is subservient to some of their beloved 
 tenets, would have it here to signify the place of 
 the damned ; and would have it thought that the 
 soul of Christ, during the time his body lay in the 
 grave, was amongst the devils and damned souls 
 in hell. Others do, with more likelihood, take it 
 for the grave, or condition of the dead ; and take 
 this of Christ's descending into hades, to be the 
 same with his being buried, or lying in the grave. 
 
 * The Saxon word hel or helle, (whence comes the English word hell) 
 dotli luit properly or necessarily import the place of the damned ; hut may 
 be iiuliftereutly taken for hell, hole, or hollow place, which are all words of 
 the same original. Helan (to hide, or cover,) hole (cavitas,) liol (cavus,) 
 hollow. And when it is used in a restrained sense, it is metonymical, or 
 svnecdochical ; as when hole or pit is put for the trrave. and the like. 
 
47 
 
 The rather, because in the Nicene Creed, where is 
 mention of his being buried, there is no mention of 
 his descent into hell, or hades : and here, in the 
 Athanasian Creed, where mention is made of this, 
 there is no mention of his being buried ; as if the 
 same were meant by both phrases, which, therefore, 
 need not be repeated. And though in the Apostles' 
 Creed there be now mention of both, yet anciently 
 it was not so ; that of his descent into hell being 
 not to be found in ancient copies of the Apostles' 
 Creed. If it signify any thing more than his being 
 buried, it seems most likely to import his continu- 
 ance in the grave, or the state and condition of the 
 dead, for some time. And the words which follow, 
 avtcnr) eV veicpwv, Say uothlug of his comiug out of 
 hell, but only of his rising from the dead. 
 
 But the words here stand undetermined to any 
 particular sense ; and so they do in the Apostles' 
 Creed; and are so also in the articles of our church; 
 where it is only said, (because in the creed it stands 
 so) that we are to beheve that he descended into 
 hell, without affixing any particular sense to it. 
 
 The words, doubtless, have respect to that of 
 Acts ii. 27, where, " Thou wilt not leave my soul 
 in hell," or hades, " nor suffer thine Holy One to 
 see corruption," is applied to Christ, cited out of 
 Psalm xvi. 10, where the same had before been 
 spoken of David. And his not being left in hades, 
 seems to suppose his having been, for some time, in 
 hades, whatever by hades is there meant. And 
 
48 
 
 verse 31, "his being not so left," is expressly 
 expounded of liis resurrection. And so again in 
 Acts xiii. 35. Now, as we have no reason to think 
 that David's being in hell, or sheoh though not to 
 be left there, can signify his being in hell among 
 the devils and damned spirits, but rather in the 
 grave, or the condition of the dead ; so neither that 
 Christ's being in hell, or hades, which is the Greek 
 word answering to the Hebrew sheol, should signify 
 any other than his being in the grave, or condition 
 of the dead, from whence, by his resurrection, he 
 was delivered. And to this purpose seems that 
 whole discourse of Peter, Acts ii. 24 — 32, and of 
 Paul, Acts xiii. 30—37. 
 
 But, without determining it to any j)articular 
 sense, the creed leaves the word hell indefinitely 
 here to be understood in the same sense, whatever 
 it be, in which it is to be understood in Acts ii. 
 27, 31, and Psalm xvi. 10. And so far we are 
 safe. So that I take the plain sense of the words 
 to be this — he was for some time in that hell, or 
 hades, whatever by that word be meant ; wherein, 
 it is expressly said, he was not left, but was raised 
 from it. 
 
 It follows, " He ascended into heaven ; he sitteth 
 on the right hand of the Father, God almighty. 
 From whence he shall come to judge the (juick and 
 the dead. At whose coming all men shall rise 
 again with their bodies; and shall give account for 
 their own works. And thev tliat have done ixood, 
 
49 
 
 shall go into life everlasting ; and they that have 
 done evil, into everlasting fire." Of all which, 
 there is no doubt but that it ought to be believed. 
 Ending with, " This is the Catholic faith;" that is, 
 this is true and sound doctrine, and such as every 
 true Christian ought to believe. 
 
 And, as he had begun all with a general preface, 
 so now he closeth all with a general conclusion ; 
 " Which," Catholic faith, " except a man believe 
 faithfully, he cannot be saved:" that is, the doc- 
 trine here delivered is true, and so I think it is in 
 all the parts of it, and is part of the Catholic faith ; 
 the whole of which faith is the whole Word of God : 
 that is, part of that faith which all true Christians 
 do and ought to believe. Which Catholic faitli, 
 the whole of which is the whole Word of God, 
 except a man, so qualified as I before expressed, do 
 believe faithfully, (that is, except he truly believe it) 
 as to the substantial of it, though possibly he may 
 be ignorant of many particulars therein, he cannot, 
 without such repentance as God shall accept of, be 
 saved. Which, so limited, as it ought to be, I 
 take to be sound doctrine, and agreeable to that of 
 John iii. IG, " He that believeth not is condemned 
 already ; because he hath not believed on the name 
 of the only begotten Son of God:" and v. 36, 
 " He that believeth not tha Son shall not see life ; 
 but the wrath of God abideth on him:" that is, 
 according to the words of this creed, he that believ- 
 eth not aright (of God and Christ) cannot be saved. 
 
 D 
 
50 
 
 Which words of Christ we may safely interpret 
 both with an aspect on the doctrine of the Trinity, 
 because of those words, " the only begotten Son of 
 God," and to that of the Incarnation of Christ, and 
 the consequents thereof; because of those words in 
 the beginning of the discourse, v. 16, 17j " God so 
 loved the world, that he gave his only begotten 
 Son," &c., and, " God sent his Son into the world, 
 that the world through him might be saved," which 
 are the two main points insisted on in the Athana- 
 sian Creed. And he who doth not believe on the 
 name of this " only begotten Son of God, and thus 
 sent into the world," the text tells us, " shall not 
 see life ; but the wrath of God abideth on him." 
 Which fully agrees with what is here said, " Except 
 a man believe the Catholic faith," of which the 
 doctrine of the Trinity and of the Incarnation are 
 there intimated, and are here expressed, to be con- 
 siderable branches, "he cannot be saved." And 
 what limitations or mitigations are to be understood 
 in the one place, are reasonably to be allowed as 
 understood in the other : and, consequently, those 
 damnatory clauses, as they are called, in the Atha- 
 nasian Creed, rightly understood, are not so for- 
 midable (as some would pretend) as if, because of 
 them, the whole creed ought to be laid aside. 
 
 For, in brief, it is but thus — the preface and the 
 epilogue tell us, that " whoso would be saved, it is 
 necessary, or (xpv) he ought to hold the Catholic 
 faith. Wliicli faith, (wcept ho keep wliole nnd 
 
51 
 
 undefiled, or (<Twnv K-al afiwf.upov) safe and inviolate, 
 he shall perish everlastingly; or, which except he 
 believe faithfully, he cannot be saved;" which is 
 no more severe than that of our Saviour, Mark xvi. 
 16, " He that believeth not shall be damned." 
 
 He then inserts a large declaration of the Catho- 
 lic faith, especially as to two main points of it; that 
 of the Trinity, and that of the Incarnation. And 
 if all he there declares be true, as I think it is, we 
 have then no reason to quarrel with it upon that 
 account. But he doth not say, that a man cannot 
 be saved who doth not know or understand every 
 particular thereof. 
 
 Of the first, he says but this, " He that would be 
 saved, ought thus to think, or («"tw (ppovehw) let him 
 thus think of the Trinity ; namely, that the Unity 
 in Trinity, and Trinity in Unity, ought to be wor- 
 shipped. 
 
 Of the second, what he says is this, " Further- 
 more it is necessary to eternal salvation, that he 
 believe aright the Incarnation of our Lord Jesus 
 Christ;" which is no more severe than that of our 
 Saviour, " He that believeth not the Son shall not 
 see life ; but the wrath of God abideth on him : 
 because he hath not believed on the name of the 
 only begotten Son of God, whom God hath sent 
 into the world, that the world through him might 
 be saved," John iii. 17, 18, 36. 
 
 Beside these, there are no damnatory clauses in 
 
52 
 
 the whole. All the rest are but declaratory. And, 
 if what he declares be true, we have no reason to 
 find fault with such declaration. 
 
 Now as to those two points, that of the Trinity, 
 and that of the Incarnation, which are the only 
 points in question, there is a double inquiry, as I 
 have elsewhere shewed, whether the things be pos- 
 sible ; and whether they be true. The possibility 
 may be argued from principles of reason : the truth 
 of them from revelation only. And it is not much 
 questioned but that the revelation, in both points, is 
 clear enough, if the things be not impossible. 
 
 As to that of the Trinity, I have already shewed, 
 in a former letter, that there is therein no impossi- 
 bility, but that what in one consideration are three, 
 which we commonly call three persons, may yet, in 
 another consideration, be one God. 
 
 I shall now proceed to shew, that neither is there 
 any impossibility as to the Incarnation of our Lord 
 Jesus Christ. 
 
 Now this consists of two branches — that of his 
 beino" born of a virgin ; and that of the hypostatical 
 union, as it is commonly called, of the human nature 
 with the second person of the sacred Trinity. 
 
 As to the former of the two, there can be no 
 pretence of impossibility. For the same God who 
 did at first make Adam of the dust of the earth, 
 without either father or mother, and who made Eve 
 of Adam's rib, without a mother at least, however 
 
53 
 
 Adam may be fancied as a father, and who shall, 
 at the last day, recall the dead out of the dust, may 
 doubtless, if he so please, cause a woman, without 
 the help of man, to conceive a child. There is 
 certainly no impossibility in nature why it may not, 
 by an omnipotent agent, be brought to pass. And 
 when the Scripture declares it so to be, there is no 
 reason, if we believe the Scripture, to disbelieve 
 the thing. 
 
 It is no more than when Christ cured " the blind 
 man's eyes with clay and spittle;"* or when he 
 said, "Lazarus, come forth," f and he did so; or 
 when " God said, let there be light, and there was 
 light;" J and, of the whole creation, "He spake, 
 and it was done ; he commanded, and it stood 
 fast; "II no more than when he made "Aaron's 
 rod (a dry stick) to bud, and blossom, and yield 
 almonds ;"§ or what is implied in that, "Let not 
 the eunuch say, I am a dry tree;"^ and not much 
 more than when God gave " Abraham a son in his 
 old age,"** and notwithstanding "the deadness of 
 Sarah's womb."ff 
 
 I was about to say, and it is not much amiss if 
 I do, it is not much more than what pretty often 
 happens amongst men, when God gives both sexes 
 to the same person; such there are, and have been; 
 and 1 think there is one yet living JJ who was first 
 
 * John ix. 6. f Jolin xi. 43, 44. { Genesis i. 3. 
 
 II Psalm xxxiii. 9. § Numb. xvii. 8. ^ Isaiah Ivi. 3. 
 
 ** Genesis xviii. 11, 12. ff Rom. iv. 19. 
 
 t$ Note G. 
 
54 
 
 as a woman married to a man, and is since as a 
 man married to a woman ; and what hinders then, 
 but that God, if he please, may mingle the effects 
 of both these sexes in the same body ? A little 
 alteration in the structure of the vessels w^ould do 
 it. For when there is in the same body, and so 
 near, semen virile et muliehre, (that which in both 
 sexes contributes to the being of a child) what 
 hinders but there might be a passage for them to 
 mix ? And plants, we know, do propagate without 
 a fellow, though it be otherwise in animals. And 
 whereas this is said to be by "the Holy Ghost 
 coming upon her, and the power of the Highest 
 overshadowing"* the blessed virgin; it is not much 
 unlike that of the Spirit of God's incubation, or 
 "moving upon the face of the waters." f So that, 
 as to this point, here is nothing impossible, nothing 
 incredible. 
 
 The other particular, as to the hypostatical union, 
 how God and man can be united in one person, may 
 seem more difficult for us to apprehend, because we 
 understand so little of the Divine essence, and, con- 
 sequently, are less able to determine what is, and 
 what is not, consistent with it. And, when all is 
 done, if we be never so certain that there is such an 
 union, yet it will be hard to say how it is. 
 
 But we have no reason from thence to conclude 
 the thing impossible, because we know not how it is 
 
 * l.iikc i. 3o. t (iuiicsis i. 2. 
 
55 
 
 done ; because there be many other things in nature 
 which we are sure to be, of which we are ahnost at 
 as great a loss as to the manner how they be, as in 
 the present case. 
 
 Solomon, as wise as he was, and how well soever 
 skilled in natural philosophy, doth yet acknowledge 
 himself in many things to be at a loss, when he 
 would search out the bottom of natural things, 
 and even when he made it his business so to do. 
 " When," says he, " I applied my heart to know 
 wisdom, and to see the business that is done upon 
 the earth : then I beheld all the work of God, that 
 a man cannot find out the work of God that is done 
 under the sun : because though a man labour to 
 seek it out, yet he shall not find it ; yea, farther, 
 though a wise man seek to know it, yet shall he not 
 be able to find it," Eccl. viii. 16, 17- And shall 
 we then say of "the deep things of God,"* the 
 thing is impossible, because we cannot find it out ? 
 And if we consider how many puzzling questions 
 God puts to Job, in the 37, 38, 39, 40, 41 chapters 
 of Job, even in natural things, we may very well, as 
 Job did, " abhor ourselves in dust and ashes," and 
 be ashamed of our ignorant curiosity ; and confess, 
 as he doth, " I have uttered what I understood not ; 
 things too wonderful for me which I know not;" 
 when he found he had " talked like a fool, while 
 he thought to be wise,"f and would measure the 
 
 * 1 Coi-. ii. 10, 11. t Roin- i- 22. 
 
56 
 
 power and wisdom of God by the narrow limits of 
 our understanding ; and might come to Job's reso- 
 lution, w^hen he had well weighed the matter, " I 
 know that thou canst do every thing, and that no 
 thought can be withholden from thee," Job xlii. 
 2, 3, G. 
 
 " The wind bloweth where it listeth," not where 
 you please to appoint it, " thou hearest the sound 
 thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh, or 
 whither it goeth,"* saith Christ to Nicodemus: but 
 shall we therefore conclude, the wind doth not blow, 
 because we know not how or whence it bloweth ? or, 
 that God cannot command the winds, because we 
 cannot ? We should rather conclude, the wind 
 doth certainly blow, because we hear the sound of 
 it, though we know neither how, nor whence : and, 
 though they do not obey us, yet "the wmd and 
 the seas obey him."f Now, as he there further 
 argues, " If, when he tells us of earthly things, we 
 do not apprehend it, how much more if he tell us of 
 heavenly things?" of "the deep things of God." 
 
 But, to come a little nearer to the business, con- 
 sider we a little the union of our own soul and 
 body. It is hardly accountable, nor, perhaps, con- 
 ceivable by us, who are mostly conversant with 
 material things, how a spiritual immaterial being, 
 such as our souls are, and capable of a separate 
 existence of its own, should inform, actuate, and 
 
 * John iii. 8, 12. f ^'"^t. viii. 26, 27. 
 
57 
 
 manage a material substance, such as is that of our 
 body, and be so firmly united as to be one person 
 with it. By what handle can a spirit intangible 
 take hold of a tangible material body, and give 
 motion to it ? especially if we should admit Lucre- 
 tius's notion, 
 
 Tangere vel tangi, nisi corpus, nulla potest res, 
 
 which he repeats almost as often as Homer doth 
 his Toi/ o' a7ro/j.eii36/iievos, who doth thcuce repute it 
 impossible for an immaterial being to move a body. 
 But we who believe the soul to be a spirit, know it 
 to be possible. Much more is it possible for God, 
 though a being infinitely more pure, who " giveth 
 to all life, and breath, and all things;" and in 
 whom "we live, and move, and have our being;" 
 and who "is not far from every one of us."* It 
 would be hard for us to give an intelligible account, 
 either how God moves all things, or how our soul 
 moves the body ; yet we are sure it is so. That a 
 body may move a body seems not so strange to 
 apprehend, for we see one engine move another ; 
 but by what mechanism shall a spirit give motion 
 to a body when at rest ? or stop it when in motion ? 
 or direct its motions this way or that w^ay ? It 
 would be thought strange that a thought of ours 
 should move a stone : and it is as hard to conceive, 
 did we not see it daily, how a thought should put 
 
 * Acts xvii. 25, 27, 28. 
 
58 
 
 our body in motion, and another thought stop it 
 again. Yet this we see done every day, though we 
 know not how. And it is ahnost the same thing 
 in other animals. And more yet, when an angel 
 assumes a body. There are none of these things 
 we know how ; and yet we know they are done. 
 
 I shall press this a little farther. Our soul, we 
 all believe, doth, after death, continue to exist in a 
 separate condition from the body. And, I think, 
 we have reason to believe also that it will continue 
 to act as an intellectual agent, not to remain in a 
 stupid senseless -fyxoTruvvvxta, (sleep of the soul) 
 else I see not why Paul should " desire to depart, 
 or to be dissolved, and to be with Christ, which is 
 far better, rather than to abide in flesh."* For 
 while he abides in the flesh he hath some enjoyment 
 of Christ, as well as an opportunity of doing some 
 service, which is more desirable, if, when he is 
 departed, he have none at all : and how can he 
 then say, "That to die is gain?" Whether the 
 soul thus separated shall be said to have a subsist- 
 ence as well as a separate existence ; or, whether it 
 may be properly said then to be an entire })erson, 
 (as the soul and body are before death, and after 
 the resurrection) I will not dispute ; because that 
 were to contend about words, and such words so 
 signify as we please to define them, and bear such 
 a sense as we please to put upon them. But it is, 
 
 * Phil. i. 21. 23, 21. 
 
59 
 
 as the angels are, an intellectual, spiritual agent ; 
 and we use to say, actiones sunt suppositorum; and 
 suppositicm rationale, is either a person, or so near 
 a person, that it would be so if men please to call 
 it so. And the spiritual being which doth now 
 separately exist, shall, at the resurrection, resume 
 a body into the same personality with itself, and 
 shall, with it, become one person, as before death 
 it had been. 
 
 Now if a spiritual, immaterial, intellectual being, 
 separately existent by itself, and separately acting 
 as an intellectual agent, may, at the resurrection, 
 assume or reassume a material corporeal being 
 (heterogeneous to itself) into the same personality 
 with itself, or so as to become one person with it, 
 while yet itself remains spiritual as before ; what 
 should hinder, for it is but one step further, but 
 that a divine person may assume humanity into the 
 same personality with itself, without ceasing to be a 
 divine person as before it was ? If it be said, that 
 person and personality in the sacred Trinity are not 
 just the same as what we so call in other cases, it is 
 granted ; and by these words, which are but meta- 
 phorical, we mean no more but somewhat analogous 
 thereunto ; and which, because of such analogy, we 
 so call, as knowing no better words to use instead 
 thereof: according as we use the words. Father, 
 Son, generate, beget, and the like, in a metaphori- 
 cal sense, when applied to God. For no words, 
 borrowed from created beings, can signify just the 
 
GO 
 
 same when applied to God, as when they were 
 apphed to men, but somewhat analogous thereunto. 
 And if the soul, though we know not how, may and 
 do, at the resurrection, assume a body so as to 
 become the same person with itself, though neither 
 the body be thereby made a soul, nor the soul a 
 body, but remain as before, that a body, and this a 
 soul, though now united into one person ; why may 
 not a divine person assume humanity, so to be what 
 is analogous to what w^e call a person; the humanity 
 remaining humanity, and the divinity remaining 
 divinity, though both united in one Christ, though 
 we do not particularly know how ? 
 
 We should be at a great loss, if, to answer an 
 Atheist, or one who doth not believe the Scriptures, 
 we were put to it to tell him how God made the 
 world? of what matter? with what tools or engines? 
 or, how a pure spirit could produce matter where 
 none was ? He would tell us, perhaps, ex nlhilo 
 nihil, in nihilum nil posse reverti ; where nothing 
 is, nothing can be made ; and what once is, though 
 it may be changed, can never become nothing; and 
 will never believe the world was made, but rather 
 was from all eternity, except we can tell him how it 
 was made. Now, if in this case, we may satisfy 
 ourselves, though, perhaps, it will not satisfy him, 
 by saying, God made it, but we know not how, the 
 same must satisfy us here ; that Christ was incar- 
 nate, (God and man) we are certain, for so (he 
 Scripture^ doth assure us, as well as ihat God made 
 
61 
 
 the world ; but how God made the world, or how 
 the Son of God assumed humanity, we cannot tell : 
 nor indeed is it fit for us to inquire farther than 
 God is pleased to make known to us. All farther 
 than this are but the subtile cobwebs of our brain ; 
 fine, but not strong, witty conjectures, how it may 
 be, rather than a clear resolution how it is. 
 
 Another objection I have met with, to which the 
 objectors must be contented with the same answer : 
 we know it is, but we know not how. It would be 
 endless for us, and too great a curiosity, to think 
 ourselves able fully to explicate all the hidden 
 things of God. The objection is this : since the 
 three persons cannot be divided, how is it possible 
 that one of them can assume humanity, and not the 
 other ? And why the second person, and not the 
 first or third ? 
 
 As to the question, why ? I say it is so, because 
 so it pleased God ; and " he giveth not account of 
 his matters;"* he is not accountable to us why he 
 so willeth. 
 
 As to the question, how is it possible ? I see no 
 difficulty in that at all. The persons are distin- 
 guished, though not divided. As in the divine 
 attributes, God's justice and mercy are distinguish- 
 able; though in God they cannot be divided. And, 
 accordingly, some things are said to be effects of 
 his justice, others of his mercy. So the power and 
 
 * Jol) xxxiii. 13. 
 
62 
 
 will of God, both which are individual from himself: 
 but when we say God is omnipotent, we do not say 
 he is omnivolent. He wills, indeed, all things that 
 are, else they could not be, but he doth not will all 
 things possible. And the like of other attributes. 
 
 If, therefore, we do but allow as great a distinc- 
 tion between the persons as between the attributes, 
 (and certainly it is not less, but somewhat more) 
 there is no incongruity in ascribing the Incarnation 
 to one of the persons, and not to the rest. 
 
 It is asked further, how I can accommodate this 
 to my former similitude of a cube and its three 
 dimensions, representing a possibility of three per- 
 sons in one Deity. I say, very easily. For it is 
 very possible for one face of a cube, suppose the 
 base, by which I there represented the second 
 person, as generated of the Father, to admit a foil, 
 or dark colour, while the rest of the cube is trans- 
 parent, without destroying the figure of the cube, 
 or the distinction of its three dimensions, which 
 colour is adventitious to the cube. For the cube 
 was perfect without it, and is not destroyed by it. 
 Which may some way represent Christ's humilia- 
 tion ; who being " equal with God, was made like 
 unto us, and took upon him the form of a servant," 
 Phil. ii. 6, 7. 
 
 So that, upon the whole matter, there is no 
 impossibility in the doctrine of the Incarnation, any 
 more than in that of the Trinity. And, supposing 
 them to be not impossible, it is not denied but tlial 
 
63 
 
 they are, both of them, sufficiently revealed ; and, 
 therefore, to be believed, if we believe the Scrip- 
 .ture. And of the other articles in the Athanasian 
 Creed there is as little reason to doubt. 
 
 There is, therefore, no just exception as to the 
 declarative part of the Athanasian Creed; and, as 
 to the damnatory part, we have before shewed that 
 it is no more severe than other passages in Scrip- 
 ture to the same purpose, and to be understood 
 with the like mitigations as those are. And, conse- 
 quently, that whole creed, as hitherto, may justly be 
 received. 
 
 It is true, there be some expressions in it which, 
 if I were now to pen a creed, I should perhaps 
 choose to leave out ; but, being in, they are to be 
 understood according to such sense as we may rea- 
 sonably suppose to be intended, and according to 
 the language of those times, when they did use to 
 anathematize great errors, which they apprehended 
 to be destructive of the Christian faith, as things of 
 themselves damnable, if not repented of. And, I 
 suppose, no more is here intended ; nor of any 
 other errors than such as are destructive of funda- 
 mentals. 
 
 Yours, 
 
 JOHN WALLTS 
 
 Oxford, Octob. 28, IG9O. 
 
POSTSCRIPT. 
 
 NO\"EMBER 15, 1690. 
 
 When this third letter was printed, and ready to 
 come abroad, I stopped it a little for this postscript, 
 occasioned by a small treatise which came to my 
 hands, with this title, " Dr. Wallis's Letter touching 
 the Doctrine of the Blessed Trinity, answered by 
 his Friend." It seems I have more friends abroad 
 than I am aware of: but who this friend is, or 
 whether he be a friend, I do not know.* It is to 
 let me understand that a neighbour of his, reputed 
 a Socinian, is not convinced by it ; but names some 
 Socinian authors who endeavour to elude Scriptures 
 alleged for the Trinity, by putting some other sense 
 upon them. He might have named as many, if he 
 pleased, who have, to better purpose, written against 
 those authors in vindication of the true sense : and 
 if he should repeat what those have said on the one 
 side, and I say over again what these have said on 
 the other side, we should make a long work of it. 
 
 But he knows very well that was not the business 
 of my letter, to discourse the whole controversy at 
 large, either as to the evidence or as to the anti- 
 quity of the doctrine : for this I had set aside at 
 
 * Note H. 
 
66 
 
 first, as done by others to wliom I did refer, and 
 confined my discourse to this single point, that 
 there is no impossibihty, (which is the Socinians' 
 great objection) but that what in one consideration 
 is three, may in another consideration be one. And 
 if I have sufficiently evinced this, as I think I have, 
 and I do not find that he denies it, I have then done 
 what I there undertook ; and, in so doing, have 
 removed the great objection which the Socinians 
 would cast in our way ; and, because of which, they 
 think themselves obliged to shuffle off" other argu- 
 ments on this pretence. Now, whether he please 
 to call this a metaphysic or mathematic lecture, 
 certain it is that there are three distinct dimensions, 
 length, breadth, and thickness, in one cube. And 
 if it be so in corporeals, there is no pretence of 
 reason why, in spirituals, it should be thought 
 impossible that there be three somewhats which 
 are but one God : and these somewhats, till he can 
 furnish us with a better name, we are content to 
 call persons, which is the Scripture word, Heb. i. 3; 
 which word we own to be but meta})horical, not 
 signifying just the same here as when applied to 
 men, as also are the words. Father, Son, generate, 
 begot, &c., when applied to God. And more than 
 this need not be said to justify what tliere I under- 
 took to defend. 
 
 Now it is easy for him, if he so please, to bur- 
 lesque this, or turn it to ridicule, as it is any the 
 most sacred things of God ; but not so safe, ludere 
 
67 
 
 cmn sacris. The sacred Trinity, be it as it will, 
 should by us be used with more reverence than to 
 make sport of it. 
 
 I might here end, without saying more; but 
 because he is pleased to make some excursions, 
 beside the business which I undertook to- prove, and 
 which he doth not deny, I will follow him in some 
 of them. 
 
 He finds fault with the similitude I brousfht, 
 though very proper to prove what it was brought 
 for, as too high a speculation for the poor labourers 
 in the country, and the tankard bearers in London;* 
 and, therefore, having a mind to be pleasant, he 
 adviseth rather, as a more familiar parallel, to put 
 it thus, " I Mary, take thee Peter, James, and John 
 for my wedded husband," &c., thinking this, I 
 suppose, to be witty. And truly, supposing Peter, 
 James, and John to be the same man, it is not 
 much amiss. But I could tell him, with a little 
 alteration, if their majesties will give me leave to 
 make as bold with their names, as he doth with the 
 names of Christ's mother and of his three disciples 
 which were with him on the mount at his trans- 
 figuration. Matt. xvii. 1, it were not absurd to say, 
 
 * Yet I believe liis tankard bearer is not so dull of apprehension as be 
 would have us think ; for if he have ever seen a die, as most of them have, 
 or shall now be shewed one, he may be able to understand, without a nieta- 
 physic or mathematic lecture, that in a die there is length, breadth, and 
 thickness, and that it is as broad as it is long, and as thick as either, and yet 
 it is not three dies, but one die : and if he have but as often seen a die as he 
 hath been at a wedding, I see not why this of a die may not be thought as 
 familiar as that of a wedding. 
 
68 
 
 I Mary, take thee Henry William Nassau, without 
 making him to be three men, or tliree husbands, 
 and without putting her upon any difficulty, as is 
 suggested, how to dispose of her conjugal affection. 
 And when the lords and commons declared him to 
 be King of England, France, and Ireland, thev did 
 not intend, by alloting him three distinct kingdoms, 
 to make him three men. And when, for our chan- 
 cellor, we made choice of James, Duke, Marquess, 
 and Earl of Ormond, though he had three distinct 
 dignities, he was not, therefore, three men, nor three 
 chancellors. And when Tully says, ^^Sustineo unus 
 tres personas; meam, adversarii, judicisr^ which is 
 in English, (that the tankard bearer may understand 
 it) I being one and the same man, do sustain three 
 persons, that of myself, that of my adversary, and 
 that of the judge ; he did not become three men by 
 sustaining three persons. And, in this answer to 
 my letter, the friend and his neighbour may, for 
 ought I know, be the same man, though he sustain 
 two persons. And, I hope, some of these resem- 
 blances may be so plain, and so familiar, as that he 
 and his tankard bearer may apprehend them, and 
 thence perceive it is not impossible that three may 
 be one. For if, among us, one man may sustain 
 three persons, without being three men, why should 
 it be thought incredible that three Divine persons 
 may be one God, as well as those three other 
 
 * 2 .Ic Orat. 
 
69 
 
 persons be one man ? Nor need he the less beheve 
 it for having, as this answerer suggests, been taught 
 it in his catechism, or, as Timothy did the Scrip- 
 tures, "known them from a child." But I would 
 not have him then to tell me, the Father is a duke, 
 the Son a marquess, the Holy Ghost an earl, accord- 
 ing as he is pleased to prevaricate upon the length, 
 breadth, and thickness of a cube ; but thus rather, 
 that God the Creator, God the Redeemer, and God 
 the Sanctifier are the same God. That God the 
 Creator is omnipotent and all-sufficient ; that God 
 the Redeemer is so too ; and God the Sanctifier 
 likewise. That God the Creator is to be loved 
 with all our heart, and so God the Redeemer, and 
 God the Sanctifier : and then there will be no 
 absurdity in all this. 
 
 As to what he says, that " all people that have 
 reason enough to understand numbers know the 
 difference between one, and more than one," I 
 might reply, that all people who can tell money 
 know that three groats are but one shilling, and 
 three nobles are one pound ; and what in one con- 
 sideration is three, may in another consideration be 
 but one ; which, if it look like a slight answer, is 
 yet sufficient to such an argument. 
 
 He tells me somewhat of Dr. Sherlock, (wherein 
 I am not concerned) and somewhat of the brief his- 
 tory of the Unitarians, of which his neighbour gives 
 the friend a copy ; but he doth not tell me, as he 
 might, and, therefore, I tell him, that Dr. Sherlock 
 
70 
 
 hath confuted that history.* But Dr. Sherlock 
 says nothing contrary to what I defend. For, if 
 there be such distinction between the three persons 
 as he assigns, then, at least, there is a distinction, 
 which is what I affirm, without saying how great 
 it is; nor doth he any where deny them to be 
 one God. 
 
 He tells me a story of somebody, who, in a 
 public disputation at Oxford, maintaining a thesis 
 against the Socinians,f was baffled by his opponent. 
 Whom, or when, he means, I do not know, and 
 so say nothing to it: but that I may not be in 
 his debt for a story, I shall tell him another, which 
 will be, at least, as much to the purpose as his. It 
 is of their great friend Christophorus Christophori 
 Sandius, a diligent promoter of the Socinian cause. 
 He printed a Latin thesis or discourse against the 
 divinity of the Holy Ghost, which he calls " Prob- 
 /eina Paradoxum de Spiritii Sancto,'' (a Paradox 
 Problem concerning the Holy Ghost) with a general 
 challenge to this purpose, " Ut siquis in toto orbe 
 eriiditoriim forte sit, qui doctrind magis polleat, 
 (juam quibusciim hactenus sit collocutus, ea legat 
 quce a se publice sint edita argumenta, seque errare 
 moneat, ac rectiiis sentire doceat.'' (That if in the 
 
 t Perhaps if he rectllect himself he may find that his memory hath failed 
 liim, and the thesis which he means was not against the Socinians, hut the 
 Arminians; for, it is supposed, ho means Dr. Kendal's thesis, against whom 
 Dr. Wallis disputed in tlic Act. at Oxford, 1654. 
 
71 
 
 whole world of learned men there be, perchance, 
 some one of greater learning than those with whom 
 he hath discoursed, he is required to read the argu- 
 ments by him published, to shew him his error and 
 teach him to think better.) Hereupon Wittichius 
 accepts the challenge, and writes against Sandius ; 
 to which Sandius answers, taking in another as a 
 partner with him in the disputation : and Wittichius 
 replies ; and that with so good success, that Sandius 
 and his partner acknowledged themselves to be con- 
 vinced by it, and to change their opinion in that 
 point. This happening but a little before Sandius' 
 death, his partner, surviving, published to the world 
 an account hereof, and of Sandius declaring, before 
 his death, that he was so convinced, in a letter of 
 thanks to Wittichius for it. What Sandius would 
 have done further, if he had lived a little longer, we 
 cannot tell. That of Wittichius bears this title, 
 " Causa Spiritus Sancti, Personce Divines, ejusdem 
 cum Patre et Filio essentice, (contra C. C. S. Prohle- 
 ma Paradoxum,) asserta et defensa, d ChristopJioro 
 WitticMo. Lugduni Batavorum, apud Arnoldum 
 Doude, 1678." The letter of thanks, in 1079, 
 bears this title, '' Epistola ad D. Christophorum 
 Gittichium, Professorem Lugdunensem ; qua gra- 
 ticB ei hahentur pro eruditissimis ipsius in Problema 
 de Spiritu Sancto Animadversionihus : Scripta d 
 Socio Auctoris Prohlematis Paradoxi : Per quas 
 errores suos rejicere coactus est. Colonice, apud 
 Joannem Nicolaiy Beside this letter of thanks 
 
72 
 
 from his partner in the disputation, there was ano- 
 ther from Sandius himself, (not printed, but in 
 manuscript) acknowledging a like conviction ; of 
 which Wittichius recites an extract in his " Causa 
 Spiritus Sancti Victrix demonstrata, a Christo- 
 phoro Wittichio. Lugduni Batavorum, apud Cor- 
 nelium Boiitestein, 1682." 
 
 He takes it unkindly that I charge it upon some 
 of the Socinians, that though they do not think fit 
 directly to reject the Scriptures, yet think them- 
 selves obliged to put such a forced sense upon 
 them, as to make them signify somewhat else ; and 
 tells me of some Socinians who have so great a 
 respect for the Scriptures, as to say that "the Scrip- 
 ture contains nothing that is repugnant to manifest 
 reason ; and that what doth not agree with reason, 
 hath no place in divinity," &c. But this is still in 
 order to this inference ; that, therefore, what they 
 think not agreeable to reason, must not be thought 
 to be the sense of Scripture : and, therefore, that 
 they must put such a force upon the words, how 
 great soever, as to make them comply with their 
 sense. If he except. against the words, how great 
 a force soever, as too hard an expression of mine, 
 they are Socinus's own words, in his epistle to 
 Balcerovius, of January 30, 1581, '■'■Certe contruria 
 sententia adeo mihi et ahsurda et perniciosa (pace 
 Augustine Sfc. dixerim) esse videtur, iit quanta- 
 cunque^ vis potivs Pauli verbis sit adhihenda, quam 
 ea adinitfendd ;" that is, the contrary opinion (with 
 
73 
 
 Augustin's leave, and the rest who are of his mind) 
 seems to me so absurd and pernicious, that we must 
 rather put a force, how great soever, upon Paul's 
 words, that admit it. 
 
 And as to the suspicion I had of some of their 
 sentiments, as to spiritual subsistences, that it may 
 not appear to be groundless, he doth, in his epist. 
 5 ad Volkelium, absolutely deny that the soul, after 
 death, doth subsist ; and adds expressly, " Ostendi 
 me sentire — non ita vivere post hominis ipsius 
 mortem, ut per se prcemiorum posnarumve capax 
 sit:'' that is, that the soul, after death, doth not 
 subsist ; nor doth so live as to be in a capacity of 
 being, by itself, rewarded or punished. And how 
 he can then think it an intelligent being I do not 
 see. St. Paul, it seems, was of another mind, 
 when " he had a desire to be dissolved, (or depart 
 hence) and to be with Christ, as being far better 
 for him, than to abide in the flesh," Phil. i. 23, 24; 
 " and willing rather to be absent from the body, 
 and present with the Lord," 2 Cor. v. 8. Now I 
 do not understand the advantage of his beino^ with 
 Christ, or being present with the Lord, if he were 
 then to be in a senseless condition, not capable of 
 pain or pleasure, punishment or reward. 
 
 In epist. 3 ad Dudithium, we have these words, 
 " Unusquisque sacrce Scripturce ex suo ipsius sensu 
 interpres ; eaque quae sihi sic arrident pro veris 
 admittere debet ac tenere, licet universus terrarum 
 orbis in alia omnia iret :'' that is, every one is to 
 
74 
 
 interpret Scripture according to his own sense ; and 
 what so seems pleasing to him he is to embrace and 
 maintain, though all the world be against it. 
 
 Socinus, in his tract, de Ecclesia^ P^g® ^44, says 
 thus, "JVon attendendum quid homines doceant 
 sentiantve, vel antehac docuerint aut senserint^ 
 quicunque illi tandem, aut quotcunque, sint aut 
 fuerint ;" which is pretty plain ; I am not, says he, 
 to regard what other men do teach or think, or 
 have before now taught or thought, whosoever they 
 be or have been, or how many soever. And if 
 we doubt whether his whosoever are here to be 
 extended to the sacred writers, he tells us of them 
 in particular elsewhere, ''Ego quidem, etiamsi non 
 seniel, sed scepe, id in sacris monwnentis scriptum 
 extareti non idcirco tamen ita rem prorsus se ha- 
 bere crederem,''' Soc. de Jesu Christo servatore, par. 
 3, cap. 6. Operum torn. ii. page 204. As for me, 
 saith he, though it were to be found written in the 
 sacred monuments, not once, but many times, I 
 would not yet for all that believe it so to be. And 
 a little before, in the same chapter, having before 
 told us that he thought the thing impossible, he 
 adds, " Cum ea quce fieri non posse aperfe constat, 
 divinis etiam oracidis ea facta fuisse in speciem 
 diserte attestantibus, nequaquam admittantur ; et 
 idcirco sacra verba, in alium sensum quam ipsa 
 sonant, per inusitatos etiam tropos qiuuidoque e.i- 
 plicantur :"" that is, when it doth plainly appear, or 
 when he thinks so, whatever all the world think 
 
75 
 
 beside, that the thing cannot be ; then, though the 
 divine oracles do seem expressly to attest it, it must 
 not be admitted; and, therefore, the sacred words 
 are, even by unusual tropes, to be interpreted to 
 another sense than what they speak. Which say- 
 ings are, I think, full as much as I had charged 
 him with. 
 
 And if these instances be not enough, I could 
 give him more of like nature ; but I shall conclude 
 this with one of a later date: at a pubhc disputa 
 tion at Franeker, October 8, 1686, where, amongst 
 others, this thesis was maintained ; Scripturce divi- 
 nitatem non aliunde quam ex ratione adstrui posse ; 
 eosque errare, qui asserere sustinent, si ratio aliud 
 quid nobis dictaret quam Scriptural huic potius 
 esse credendum. And when Ulricus Huberus, be- 
 cause it was not publicly censured, as he thought it 
 deserved to be, did oppose it in word and writing, 
 the same was further asserted in public disputations 
 and in print, by two other professors in Franeker, in 
 vindication of that former thesis ; that " the divine 
 authority of Scripture is no otherwise to be proved 
 but by reason ; and if reason do dictate to us ought 
 otherwise than the Scripture doth, it is an error to 
 say that, in such case, we are rather to believe the 
 Scripture." An account of the whole is to be seen 
 at large in a treatise intituled, " Ulrici Huberi, 
 Supremce Frisiorum Curice ex-senatoris, de con- 
 cursu Rafionis et Scripturcp Liber. Franakerce^ 
 
76 
 
 apud Hen. Amama et Zachar. Tcedcuna, l(i87;" 
 and a breviate of it in the Leipsic transactions for 
 the month of August, 1687. And, after this, 1 
 hope this answerer will not think me too severe in 
 charging such notions on some of the Socinians, 
 while yet I said I was so charitable as to think 
 divers of them were better minded. 
 
 But what should make him so angry at what I 
 said of guessino;, I cannot imaojine. That there is 
 a distinction between the three, we are sure ; this I 
 had said before, and the answerer now says it is so : 
 but not such as to make three Gods ; this I had 
 said also, and the answerer says so too. That the 
 Father is said to beget, the Son to be begotten, 
 and the Holy Ghost to proceed, I had said also, 
 and I suppose he will not deny, because thus the 
 Scripture tells us : and whatever else the Scripture 
 tells us concerning it, I readily accept. But if it be 
 further asked, beyond what the Scripture teacheth, 
 as, for instance, what this begetting is, or, how the 
 Father doth be^et his only begotten Son ? this, I 
 say, we do not know, at least I do not, because this, 
 I think, the Scripture doth not tell us ; and of this, 
 therefore, I hope this gentleman, as well as the 
 other, will give me leave to be ignorant. Certainly 
 it is not so as when one man begets another ; but 
 how it is I cannot tell. And if I should set my 
 thoughts awork, as some others have done, and 
 each according to his own imagination, to guess or 
 
77 
 
 conjecture,* how, perhaps, it may be, I would not 
 be positive that just so it is ; because I can but 
 guess or conjecture, I cannot be sure of it. For, I 
 think, it is much the same as if a man born bhnd, 
 and who had never seen, should employ his fancy to 
 think what kind of thing is light or colour; of which 
 it would be hard for him to have a clear and certain 
 idea. And if this gentleman please to look over it 
 again, I suppose he will see that he had no cause 
 to be so angry that I said, we can but guess herein 
 at what the Scripture doth not teach us. 
 
 That the Socinians have set their wits awork to 
 find out other subsidiary arguments and evasions 
 against the Trinity, beside that of its inconsistence 
 with reason, I do not deny ; but that is the founda- 
 tion, and the rest are but props. And if they admit 
 that there is in it no inconsistence with reason, they 
 would easily answer all the other arguments them- 
 selves. 
 
 I thought not to meddle with any of the texts on 
 either side, because it is beside the scope which I 
 proposed when I confined my discourse to that 
 single point of its not being impossible or incon- 
 
 * It is certainly more than (to use the school term) ratione ratiocinantis, 
 and I think more than ratione rationcinatd, as inadequati conceptus ejusdem 
 rei, for thus I think the Divine attributes are distinguished and the three 
 persons somewhat more than so, but not ut res et res ; and though, perhaps, 
 in our metaphysics we have not a term which doth directly answer it, it 
 seems to be somewhat analagoiis to what we call ex parte rei, or ut modus 
 et modus, and the Godhead from each ut res et modus ; but I will not be 
 herein so positive as to require eveiy one else, upon pain of damnation, to 
 think just as I do. 
 
78 
 
 sistent with reason ; and did, therefore, set aside 
 other considerations, as having been sufficiently 
 argued by others for more than an hundred years 
 last past. But having already followed him in 
 some of his excursions, I shall briefly consider the 
 two signal places which he singles out as so mainly 
 clear. 
 
 In the former of them, John xvii. 3, " This is life 
 eternal, that they might know thee the only true 
 God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent," he 
 puts a fallacy upon us, which, perhaps, he did not 
 see himself, or at least hoped we would not see it ; 
 and, therefore, 1 desire him to consider that it is 
 not said, thee only to be the true God ; but thee, 
 the only true God. And so in the Greek, it is not 
 fffc jxovov Tov, but CTc Toi/ fiovov aXf^Oivov Qcov. 1 he res- 
 trictive ix6vov, only, is not annexed to thee, but to 
 God. To know thee, not thee only, to be the only 
 true God; that is, to be that God beside which 
 God there is no other true God. And we say the 
 like also, that the Father is that God beside which 
 there is no other true God ; and say, the Son is 
 also not another God, but the same only true 
 
 God. And if those words, /Va "(ivwoKwal ak -rhv fiovov 
 uXrjOivov Qcov, Kut ov a7re(nct\a<} 'lijaifv "Kpiarov, SuOUld bC 
 
 thus expounded, " to know thee to be the only true 
 God, and whom thou hast sent, Jesus Christ," (to 
 be the same only true God ;) repeating otto Kotvi, 
 
 those words -rhv /novov aXrjOivov Qcov, OY, thuS tO kuOW 
 
 thee and whom thou hast sent, Jesus Christ, to be 
 
79 
 
 the only true God, he would not like that interpre- 
 tation ; but both the words and the sense will very 
 well bear it, without such force as they are fain to 
 put upon many other places. Or if, without such 
 repetition, we take this to be the scope of the place, 
 to set forth the two great points of the Christian 
 religion, or way to eternal life, that there is but one 
 true God, though in that Godhead there be three 
 persons, as elsewhere appears, in opposition to the 
 many gods of the heathen, and the doctrine of 
 redemption by Jesus Christ, whom God hath sent, 
 of which the heathen were not aware, the sense is 
 very plain ; and nothing in it so clear, as he would 
 have us think, against the Trinity, but all very con- 
 sistent with it. 
 
 And the same answer serves to his other place, 1 
 Cor. viii. 6, " But to us there is but one God, the 
 Father, of whom are all things, and we in him ; (or 
 for him,) and one Lord Jesus Christ, by whom are 
 all things, and we by him." For here also one 
 God may be referred airh koivh, both to the Father, 
 if here taken as a distinct person, and to the Lord 
 Jesus Christ ; or, without that, it is manifest that 
 one God is here put in opposition, not to the plu- 
 rality of persons, as we call them, in one Deity, or 
 variety of attributes therein ; but to the many gods 
 amongst the heathen ; and our one Saviour against 
 their many saviours. As is manifest, if we take the 
 whole context together, " We know that an idol is 
 nothing in the world, and that there is no other 
 
80 
 
 God but one. For though there be that are called 
 gods, whether in heaven or in earth, (as there be 
 gods many, and lords many,) but to us there is but 
 one God, the Father, of whom are all things, and 
 we in him ; and one Lord Jesus Christ, by whom 
 are all things, and we by him," v. 4, 5, 6. Where 
 it is evident, that the scope of the place is not to 
 shew either how the persons, as we call them, or 
 how the attributes of that one God are distin- 
 guished amongst themselves ; but to set our one 
 God, who is the Father or Maker of all things, in 
 opposition to the many gods of the idolatrous 
 world ; and our one Saviour or Redeemer against 
 their many saviours. Indeed, if we should set up 
 our Jesus Christ to be another God, the text would 
 be against us ; but not when we own him for the 
 same God. So that here is nothing clear in either 
 place, as he pretends, against Christ's being the 
 same God with the Father. 
 
 But in that other place of John i, which he 
 labours to elude, the evidence for it doth so stare 
 him in the face, that if he were not, as he speaks, 
 "wilfully blind," or did wink very hard, he must 
 needs see it. " In the beginning was the Word, 
 and the Word was with God, and the Word was 
 God. The same was in the beginning with God. 
 All things were made by him; and without him was 
 not any thing made that was made. In him was 
 life; and the life was the light of men," v. 1, 2, 3, 
 4. *' He was in the world, and the world was made 
 
81 
 
 by him, and the world knew him not. He came 
 unto his own, and his own received him not. But 
 as many as received him, to them gave he power 
 (or right, or privilege,) to become the sons of God, 
 even to them that believe on his name," v. 10, 11, 
 12. "And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt 
 among us, (and we beheld his glory, the glory as of 
 the only begotten of the Father,) full of grace and 
 truth," V. 14. Why he should not think this very 
 clear is very strange, if he were not strangely pre- 
 possessed ; unless he think nothing clear but such 
 as no man can cavil against. But there can hardly 
 be any thing said so clearly, but that some or other, 
 if they list to be contentious, may cavil at it, or put 
 a forced sense upon it. For thus the whole doc- 
 trine of Christ, when himself spake it, and he spake 
 as clearly as he thought fit to speak, was cavilled 
 at ; and himself tells us the reason of it. Matt. xiii. 
 14, 15, and John xii. 37, 38, 39, 40, and after him 
 St. Paul, Acts xxviii. 26, and Rom. xi. 8. Not for 
 want of clear light, but because they shut their eyes. 
 In John xii. it is thus, " But though he had done so 
 many miracles before them, yet they believed not on 
 him : that the saying of Esaias the prophet might 
 be fulfilled which he spake, Lord, who hath believed 
 our report ? and to whom hath the arm of the Lord 
 been revealed ? Therefore they could not believe, 
 because that Esaias said again, he hath blinded their 
 eyes and hardened their heart; that they should not 
 see with their eyes, nor understand with their heart, 
 
 F 
 
82 
 
 and be converted, and I should heal them. These 
 things said Esaias when he saw his glory and spake 
 of him." And thus in Matt, xiii, "Hearing ye shall 
 hear, and shall not understand ; and seeing ye shall 
 see, and shall not perceive : for this people's heart 
 is waxed gross, and their ears are dull of hearing, 
 and their eyes they have closed ; lest at any time 
 they should see with their eyes, and hear with their 
 ears, and understand with their heart, and should be 
 converted, and I should heal them." So that it is 
 no argument of a place or doctrine's not being 
 clear, because prejudiced persons are able to pick 
 cavils at it, or put a forced sense upon it. 
 
 But let us see what these cavils are. " This I 
 confess," saith he, " were to the purpose, if by the 
 term Word could be meant (he should rather have 
 said, be meant) nothing else but a pre-existing 
 person ; and by the term God, nothing but God 
 almighty the Creator of heaven and earth ; and if 
 taking those terms in those senses did not make St. 
 John write nonsense." 
 
 Now in reply to this, I first take exception to that 
 phrase, "if it could be meant of nothing else." For 
 if his meaning be this, if no caviller can start up 
 another sense, right or wrong, this is no fair play ; 
 for hardly can any thing be so plain, but that some- 
 body may find a pretence to cavil at it. It is 
 enough for us, therefore, if it be thus meant, with- 
 out saying it is impossible to put a forced sense 
 upon it. But this would have spoiled his design in 
 
83 
 
 mustering up a great many forced senses, (not that 
 he thinks them to be true, for surely they be not all 
 true, and I think none of them are) nor telling us 
 which he will stick to ; but only that he may cast a 
 mist, and then tell us, which is all that he concludes 
 upon it, the place is obscure, he knows not what to 
 make of it ; or rather he knows not how to make it 
 serve his turn. 
 
 But when the mist is blown off, and we look upon 
 the words themselves, they seem plain enough as to 
 all the points he mentions. The Word which was 
 with God, and was God, and by whom the world 
 was made, and which was made flesh and dwelt 
 amongst us, and we saw his glory, and of whom 
 John bare witness, must needs be a person ; and 
 can be no other than our Lord Jesus Christ, who 
 was born of the virgin Mary. And this Word 
 which was in the beginning, and by whom the 
 world was made, must needs have been pre-existent 
 before he was so born. And this Word which was 
 with God, (the true God) and was God, and by 
 whom the world was made, and who is one with 
 the Father, John x. 30, and "who is over all, 
 God blessed for ever,"* Rom. ix. 5, is no other 
 
 * What we render who is, in Rom. ix. 5, is in the Greek, not 09 ea-ri, 
 but o wj/, (he that is) which in Rev. i. 4, {iiiro tiP o wv, &c.) and else- 
 where, is used as a peculiar name or title proper to God almighty, and 
 answers to I AM, Exod. iii. 14. " I AM hath sent me \mto you," of the 
 same import with Jah and Jehovah. And what is said of God indefinitely, 
 without respect to this or that person in the Godhead, at Rev. i. 4, (for 
 Christ in particular is conti-adistinguished, v. .5) a-n-o Ttf 6 wv, Kal 6 ^v. 
 
84 
 
 god than God almighty, Creator of heaven and 
 earth. And this plain sense the words bear, with- 
 out any force put upon them, without any incohe- 
 rence, inconsistence, or contradiction ; save that 
 they do not agree with the Socinian doctrine. And 
 there is no other way to avoid it, but what Socinus 
 adviseth in another case, *'■ Quantacunque vis verbis 
 adhihenda ;''' putting a force upon the words, no 
 matter how^ great, to make them not to signify what 
 they plainly do ; or else to say, which is his last 
 refuge, that St. John writes nonsense. 
 
 But let him then consider whether this do savour 
 of that respect which he would have us think they 
 have for the Holy Scripture ; and whether we have 
 not reason to suspect the contrary of some of them; 
 and whether we have not reason to complain of 
 their putting a forced sense upon plain words, to 
 make them comply with their doctrine ; and lastly, 
 whether it bo not manifest that the true bottom 
 
 Kai o e/j;^o/t6J'09, (from liim that is, and was, and is to come) is at v. 8 
 applied in particular to Christ, "lam Alpha and Omega, the beginning and 
 the end, saith the Lord, which is, and was, and is to come, the Alniiglity," 
 which closeth the description pf Cluist that begins at v. 5. And tliat, by 
 the Lord, is here meant Christ is evident from the whole context, v. 1), 
 13, 17, 18, (he that was dead and is alive) and the whole second and third 
 chapters. And so the description of Christ, Rom. ix. 5, o wv oti iravTUDV 
 Geo? evXo^t/TO^ eh t«\ uiu'va?, 'Afiijv, in its full emphasis is thus, 
 "that BEING overall, (or, the Supreme Being) God blessed for ever, (or, 
 the ever blessed God) Amen," which is used as a character of the Supreme 
 God, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, Mark xiv. 61, when the high- 
 priest asked him, " Art thou the Christ, the Sou of the Blessed?" And 
 there will be need of Socinus's expedient, " quantacnnque vis Pauli verbis 
 adhibenda" to make it signify any other god than God almighty, the 
 Creator of heaven and earth. 
 
85 
 
 of their aversion from the Trinity, whatever other 
 subsidiary reasons they may allege, is, because 
 they think it nonsense, or not agreeable with their 
 reason. For, set this aside, and all the rest is plain 
 enough ; but, because of this, they scruple not to 
 put the greatest force upon Scripture. Nor is 
 there any other pretence of nonsense in the whole 
 discourse, save that he thinks the doctrine of the 
 Trinity to be nonsense : so that the whole contro- 
 versy with him turns upon this single point, whether 
 there be such impossibility or inconsistence as is 
 pretended. 
 
 That of 1 John v. 7, " There be three that bear 
 record in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the 
 Holy Ghost : and these three are one," is wanting, 
 he says, in some copies. And it is so ; and so are 
 some whole epistles wanting in some copies ; a good 
 part of a chapter, as that of the woman taken in 
 adultery, in the Gothic gospels, John viii, and the 
 latter part of St. Mark, last chapter, is wanting 
 in some copies, and the doxology at the end of 
 the Lord's prayer ; but we will not for that quit 
 the place ; for we have great reason to think it 
 genuine.* If this difference of copies happened at 
 first by chance, upon an oversight in the transcriber, 
 in some one copy, and thereupon in all that were 
 transcribed from thence, it is much more likely for 
 
 * Note K. 
 
86 
 
 a transcriber to leave out a line or two which is in 
 his copy, than to put in a line or two which is not. 
 And if it were upon design, it is much more likely 
 that the Arians should purposely leave it out, in 
 some of their copies, than the Orthodox foist it in. 
 Nor was there need of such falsification ; since eV 
 iai.iev concludes as strongly, as to a plurality of 
 persons, and of the Son in particular, which was 
 the chief controversy with the Arians, as cV elai doth 
 as to all the three. And, I think, it is cited by 
 Cyprian, in his book de imitate Ecdesico, before 
 the Arian controversy was on foot. And, therefore, 
 if it were done designedly, and not by chance, it 
 seems rather to be razed out by the Arians, than 
 thrust in by the Orthodox. And the language of 
 this in the epistle suits so well with that of the same 
 author in his gospel, that it is a strong presump- 
 tion that they are both from the same pen. The 
 Word, in 1 John v. 7? agrees so well with the Word 
 in John i, and is peculiar to St. John ; and eV alai, 
 in 1 John v. 7j with ev tVei/ in John x. 30, " These 
 three are one," with " I and the Father are one," 
 that I do not at all doubt its being genuine. And 
 that evasion of his, these three are one, that is, one 
 in testimony, will have no pretence in the other 
 place, where there is no discourse of testimony at 
 all : but " I and the Father are one," unum sumus^ 
 must be one thing, one in being, one in essence ; 
 for so adjectives in the neuter gender, put without 
 
87 
 
 a substantive, do usually signify both in Greek and 
 Latin : and there must be some manifest reason to 
 the contrary that should induce us to put another 
 sense upon them. 
 
 The other place. Matt, xxvhi. 19, " Baptizing 
 them in (or, into) the name of the Father, and of 
 the Son, and of the Holy Ghost," is not so shght 
 an evidence as he would make it. For whether 
 €19 TO ovo/iia (not et9 tu 6u6/:iaTa) be Tendered in the 
 name, and taken to denote the joint authority of 
 Father, Son, and Holy Ghost admitting the person 
 baptized into the Christian church ; or, into the 
 name, which this answerer seems to like better, and 
 taken to denote the dedication of the person bap- 
 tized to the joint service or worship of Father, Son, 
 and Holy Ghost, (baptism itself being also a part 
 of divine worship,) they are all conjoined, either as 
 in joint authority, or as joint objects of the same 
 religious worship, and, for aught that appears, in 
 the same degree. And Socinus himself doth allow 
 the Son to be worshipped with religious worship, 
 as adoration, and invocation, as lawful at least, if 
 not necessary. Now when this answerer tells us 
 of the first commandment, " Thou shalt have no 
 other god but me," (the God of Israel) he might 
 as well have remembered that of Christ, Matt. iv. 
 10, " Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and 
 him only shalt thou serve;" and, therefore, since 
 Socinus, and other of his followers, do allow Christ 
 
88 
 
 to be worshipped, they must allow him to be God, 
 even the God of Israel, and I am mistaken, if he 
 be not expressly called " the Lord God of Israel." 
 Luke i. 16, " Many of the children of Israel shall 
 he (John the Baptist) turn to the Lord their God ; 
 for he shall go before him in the spirit and power 
 of Elias," &c. Now he before whom John the 
 Baptist was to go in the spirit and power of Elias, 
 is agreed to be our Lord Jesus Christ ; it is, there- 
 fore, he that is here called the Lord God of Israel. 
 And we who own him so to be, worship no other 
 God in worshipping him. It is those who do not 
 own him so to be, and do yet worship him, that are 
 to be charged with worshipping another God. Now 
 when here we find Father, Son, and Holy Ghost all 
 joined in the same worship, we have reason to take 
 them all for the same God, and that " these three 
 are one;" and do say, as willingly as he, "Hear, 
 O Israel, the Lord thy God is one God." Father, 
 Son, and Holy Ghost are but one God : as God 
 the Creator, God the Redeemer, and God the Sanc- 
 tifier, are one God ; and what in the Old Testa- 
 ment are said of God, indefinitely, without taking 
 notice of this or that of the three persons, are, in 
 the New Testament, attributed some to one, some 
 to another, of the three persons. 
 
 That which makes these expressions seem harsh 
 to some of those men is, because they have used 
 themselves to fancy that notion only of the word 
 
89 
 
 person, according to which three men are accounted 
 to be three persons, and these three persons to be 
 three men. But he may consider that there is 
 another notion of the word person, and in common 
 use too, wherein the same man may be said to 
 sustain divers persons, and those persons to be the 
 same man ; that is, the same man as sustaining 
 divers capacities, as was said but now of Tully, 
 tres personas unus sustineo.^ And then it will seem 
 no more harsh to say, the three persons. Father, 
 Son, and Holy Ghost are one God, than to say, 
 God the Creator, God the Redeemer, and God the 
 Sanctifier are one God ; which, I suppose, even to 
 this answerer would not seem harsh, or be thought 
 nonsense. It is much the same thing, whether of 
 the two forms we use. And all the cavils he useth 
 may be equally apphed to either. What answer, 
 therefore, he would give to one who should thus 
 object against the latter form, will serve us as well 
 to what he objects against the former. 
 
 If, therefore, the gentleman please to consider it 
 calmly, he will find that, even amongst men, though 
 another person do many times denote another man, 
 and thereupon the words are sometimes used pro- 
 miscuously, yet not always, nor doth the word 
 person necessarily imply it. A king and a husband, 
 though they imply very different notions, different 
 
 * Note L. 
 
90 
 
 capacities, different relations, or different personali- 
 ties, yet may both concur in the same man ; or, 
 in that sense wherein person is put for man, in 
 the same person. So a king and a father, a king 
 and a brother, and the like. And this gentleman, 
 though in the dialogue he sustain two persons, that 
 of an opponent and that of an answerer, or that of 
 a friend and that of an adversary, that so while one 
 gives ill language, the other may give up the cause, 
 and while one reads it with great satisfaction and 
 is convinced by it, the other is not convinced ; yet 
 they do not act each their own part so covertlv, but 
 that sometime the vizard falls off and discovers the 
 man to be the same. For though my letter be 
 answered by a friend; (page 1) yet it is the neigh- 
 bour that is weary of writing, (page 13). 
 
 Now, if person, in a proper sense, when applied 
 to men, do not imply that different persons must 
 needs be so many different men, much less should 
 it be thought nonsense, when, in a metaphorical 
 sense, it is applied to God, that different persons in 
 the Deity should not imply so many Gods ; or, that 
 three somewhats, which we call persons, may be one 
 God ; which is what I undertook to prove. 
 
 And, having made this good, I need not trouble 
 myself to name more texts, though many more 
 there be which give concurrent evidence to this 
 truth, or discourse the whole controversy at large, 
 which was not the design of my letter ; for himself 
 
91 
 
 hath reduced it to this single point — when St. John 
 says, " The Word was with God, and the Word 
 was God ;" if by the W^ord be meant Christ, and 
 by God, the true God, whether, in so saying, St. 
 John do not speak nonsense ? And if I evince this 
 not to be nonsense, as I think I have done, he 
 grants the place is to the purpose, which quite 
 destroys the foundation of the Socinian doctrine, 
 without being obliged to prove that these persons 
 are just such persons, and so distinct, as what we 
 sometimes call persons amongst men, but with such 
 distinction only as is agreeable to the Divine nature, 
 and not such as to make them three Gods. Like 
 as when God the Father is said to beget the Son ; 
 not so as one man begets another, nor is the Son 
 so a son as what we call son amongst men ; but so 
 as suits with the Divine nature, which, how it is, we 
 do not perfectly comprehend. 
 
 I have now done with him. But I have one 
 thing to note upon what I have before said of the 
 Athanasian Creed. I there read it, awai 6i Tpeli 
 
 VTToaraaets, Kal avva'tcial elai, kuI laai, bCCaUSe 1 SO tincl it 
 
 in the copy I used, which is that at the end of the 
 Greek Testament in octavo, printed at London by 
 John Bill, 1622, with Robert Stephan's, Joseph 
 Scaliger's, and Isaac Casaubon's Annotations. But 
 in Whitaker's Greek Testament, reprinted by this 
 copy, 1633, I since find it is ai jpeh, which edition. 
 
92 
 
 I suppose, is followed by some others.* I take the 
 former to be the better readhig, as giving a clearer 
 sense ; and that the corrector of the press had put 
 ai for Of, intending thereby to mend the Greek 
 syntax, because if7r6araaei9 follows; but doth, I think, 
 impair the sense. But as to the doctrine, it is 
 much one whether we read «< or 6i. And what I 
 have said of that w^hole creed is chiefly intended for 
 those who do believe the doctrine of the Trinity, 
 and of Christ's Incarnation, that there is no reason, 
 in my opinion, why they should not allow of that 
 creed. But such as do not believe those points, 
 cannot, I grant, approve the creed ; and it is these, 
 I suppose, who would fain have others to dislike 
 it also. 
 
 * Note M. 
 
A FOURTH LETTER 
 
 CONCERNING 
 
 THE SACRED TRINITY, 
 
 IN REPLY TO WHAT IS INTITULED 
 
 AN ANSWER TO DR. WALLIS'S THREE LETTERS, 
 
 BY JOHN WALLIS, D.D. 
 
 [Published in 1691.] 
 
LETTER IV. 
 
 CONCERNING THE SACRED TRINITY. 
 
 Sir, 
 
 In a former answer, from I know not whom, to 
 my first and second letter, we had two persons (a 
 friend and his neighbour) in one man ; of which I 
 have given account in my third letter. We have 
 now an answer to that also ; but whether from the 
 friend, or the neighbour, or from a third person, he 
 doth not tell me : yet all the three persons may, for 
 aught I know, be the same man. 
 
 However, whether it be or be not the same man, 
 it is not amiss for him to act a third person, as of 
 an adversary, as being thereby not obliged to insist 
 upon and maintain what was before said ; but may 
 fairly decline it, if he please. The one may grant 
 what the other denies, and deny what the other 
 grants; and still, as the scene changes, the man 
 may act another person. And so I find it is. As 
 for instance : 
 
 The former answerer takes it unkindly, and would 
 
96 
 
 have it thought a calumny, that I charged it on 
 some of the Socinians, " That how clear soever the 
 expressions of Scripture be for our purpose, they 
 will not believe it, as being inconsistent with natural 
 reason : and though they do not think fit to give us 
 a barefaced rejection of Scripture, yet they do, and 
 must, they tell us, put such a forced sense on the 
 words, as to make them signify somewhat else," 
 (page 72). Therefore, to shew that this is not a 
 calumny, but a clear truth, I cited their own words, 
 and quoted the places where they are to be found, 
 wherein themselves say the same things in as full 
 expressions as any that I had charged them with : 
 " That every one is to interpret the Scripture ac- 
 cording to his own sense; and what so seems grate- 
 ful to him he is to embrace and maintain, thouofh 
 the whole world be against it ; that he is not to 
 heed what men teach or think, or have at any time 
 taught or thought, whoever they be, or have been, 
 or how many soever : that though, eVen in the 
 sacred monuments, it be found written, not once 
 only, but many times, he should not yet for all that 
 believe it so to be : that what plainly appears 
 cannot be, (or, as was before explained, what he 
 thinks so, though all the world beside think other- 
 wise,) is not to be admitted, even though in the 
 sacred oracles it appear to be expressly atiirmed ; 
 but those sacred words are to be interpreted, though 
 it be by unusual ways or tropes, to some other 
 sense than what they speak : that, because it seems 
 
97 
 
 to him absurd, he must, with Augustin's good leave, 
 and of the rest who think as he doth, put a force, 
 how great soever, upon Paul's words, rather than to 
 admit such sense : that, if our reason dictate to us 
 aught otherwise than the Scripture doth, it is an 
 error to say, that in such case we are rather to 
 believe the Scripture," (pages 73, 74, 75). Now 
 our new answerer, though he would still have it to 
 be a calumny, shuffles it off with this, " He is not 
 concerned that Socinus, or any other author, has 
 dropt imprudent words, and leaves it to the Socinian 
 to answer;" (page 10) for he is now to act the 
 Arian, (pages 11, 12, 14, 16, 17). This point, 
 therefore, 1 look upon as yielded, concerning the 
 slight opinion which some of the Socinians have of 
 Scripture, in competition with human reason. 
 
 Again, when 1 had spoken of our immortal soul, 
 in its separate existence after death, as of an intel- 
 lectual being, (but with an if at least those who 
 deny the blessed Trinity will allow that there are 
 such beings) to shew the suspicion intimated was 
 not groundless, I cited Socinus's own words, (page 
 73) where he expressly tells us " that the soul, after 
 death, doth not subsist, nor doth so live as to be 
 then in a capacity of being rewarded or punished;" 
 that is, in effect, it is no more alive than is the 
 dead body, not sensible of pain or pleasure ; which, 
 I think, is ground enough for such a suspicion, 
 without being uncharitable. Nor doth this new 
 answerer clear Socinus, or himself, from this sus- 
 
98 
 
 picion ; he only tells us, (page 10) it is an insinua- 
 tion, as if they believe not angels, which is nothing 
 to the purpose of the soul's separate existence, 
 which is that I insisted on ; nor doth he so much 
 as tell us that he doth believe angels, much less 
 that he doth believe the soul's separate existence ; 
 so that the ground of suspicion still remains. I 
 had shewed him how different Socinus's opinion is 
 from that of St. Paul, when he " desired to be dis- 
 solved, (or to depart hence) and to be with Christ, 
 as much better for him than to abide in the flesh," 
 Phil. i. 23, 24 ; and " to be absent from the body, 
 (which must be after death, and before the resur- 
 rection) and to be present with the Lord," 2 Cor. 
 V. 8. And this new answerer, though he takes 
 notice of the charge, doth not so much as tell us 
 that he is not of Socinus's opinion herein ; which, 
 if it be so, he might reasonably have told us u})on 
 this occasion. I might have added that of Christ, 
 Matt. X. 28, " Fear not those who kill the body, 
 but are not able to kill the soul:" whereas, if the 
 soul, after death, be as insensible as the body, that 
 is as much killed as this : and that of Christ to the 
 converted thief on the cross, Luke xxiii. 43, " This 
 day shalt thou be with me in paradise:" for, surely, 
 by paradise he did not mean purgatory ; nor yet 
 that he should be witli him in hell amongst the 
 devils and the damned ; nor that his soul should be 
 in a condition as senseless as his body; for j)aradise 
 doth not sound like anv of these. I mio-ht have 
 
99 
 
 added also that of Lazarus and the rich glutton, 
 Luke xvi. 23, 24, 25, 28. For though parables are 
 not strongly argumentative, as to all the punctilios 
 of them ; yet, as to the main scope of them, they 
 are ; else to what purpose are they used ? Now 
 here we have that glutton represented as tormented 
 in hell, and Lazarus at rest in Abraham's bosom, 
 and there comforted, while the other is tormented ; 
 and all this while yet he had brethren upon earth 
 to whom he desires Lazarus might be sent. All 
 which is not agreeable to a condition not capable 
 of reward or punishment. And, upon the whole, 
 we have reason to suspect that Socinians may have 
 some other odd tenets which they think fit rather 
 to conceal than to deny : so that I look upon this 
 point as gained also, that Socinus, uncontrolled 
 by this answerer, doth deny the subsistence of the 
 soul after death, as then capable of reward or 
 punishment.* 
 
 Another point which I look upon as granted, is 
 concerning that place, John i, " In the beginning 
 was the Word, and the Word was with God, and 
 the Word was God, and the Word was made flesh, 
 and dwelt amongst us." Concerning this place we 
 were come to this issue with our former answerer, 
 (at his page 9) if by Word be meant a person, 
 pre-existent to Christ's Incarnation by the virgin 
 Mary; and by God be meant the true God, or 
 
 * Note N. 
 
100 
 
 God almighty, then this place is to our purpose; for 
 else, he tells us, St. John writes nonsense. Now 
 that St. John writes nonsense, I suppose he will 
 not say, whatever he thinks, because he pretends a 
 great reverence for the Scriptures, and doth not 
 take it kindly that I should suspect the contrary. 
 Whether of the other two points he would stick to 
 he did not think fit to tell us; for, indeed, his 
 business was not to tell us what he would have, 
 but what he would not have, and concludes nothing 
 thereupon, but that the place is obscure ; (he knows 
 not how to make it serve his turn) and that it may 
 so seem, he endeavours to cast what dust he can 
 into the spring, and then to say the water is not 
 clear. I have given him my reasons, and I think 
 they be cogent, why I judge the place clear enough, 
 as to both points ; and should I admit, as I think I 
 may, that by Word is meant somewhat else, as he 
 tells us, in forty other places, this is nothing to the 
 purpose. For we are not here inquiring what by 
 the word X070S is meant in Aristotle, or what in 
 Plato, or what in forty other places, but what is 
 meant by the Word in this })lace ; nor what by 
 gods is meant in Psalm Ixxxii. 6, 7» " I have said 
 ye are gods, but ye shall die like men :" but what 
 by God is here meant, where it is said, " the Word 
 was with God, and the Word was God." Nor is 
 here any need of a rhetoric lecture to inquire by 
 what trope or figure, or with what allusion, Christ is 
 here called the Word ; it is (MiouLdi tliat it is Christ 
 
101 
 
 who is here so called. And after all his talk, I do 
 not find that himself hath the confidence to deny, 
 though he doth not think fit to grant it, but that 
 here by the Word is meant Christ, and that God 
 here mentioned is God almighty ; and, consequently, 
 if St. John do not write nonsense, as he is pleased 
 to phrase it, the place is to our purpose. Now our 
 new answerer seems to me to quit the first of these 
 points, and chooseth rather to act the Arian than 
 the Socinian, as taking that to be more defensible ; 
 (pages 11, 14, 17) and doth admit that by the 
 Word here is meant the person of Christ, and pre- 
 existent to his Incarnation, as by whom the world 
 was made, at least as by an instrument ; and doth 
 allow him to be God, though not the same God ; 
 but that the Father and the Word are two Gods ; 
 (page 17) and can allow him the character of being 
 over all, God blessed for ever; and can so be as 
 liberal of the title of God to Christ as any Trinita- 
 rian whatever; (page 16) so that now the dispute 
 is reduced to this — when it is said, "the Word 
 (meaning Christ) was with God, and the Word 
 was God," whether by God be meant the true 
 God, God almighty. Of which we are to say 
 more anon. 
 
 Another grant we have, (page 3) where he doth 
 admit that a thing may be unum and tres^ (one 
 and three) in several respects : and that it is true, 
 indeed, he cannot say, that there is a contradiction 
 in holding that there may be three persons in God. 
 
102 
 
 And, in granting this, he grants what I undertook to 
 prove. For he knows very well, that the business 
 which I undertook was not to discourse the whole 
 controversy at large ; but so stated the question as 
 to confine it to this single point, whether it be an 
 impossibility, or inconsistence with reason, that there 
 may be three somewhats, which we call persons, 
 which are but one God ? And when he grants me 
 that there is in it no contradiction, or inconsistence 
 with reason, all the rest is beside the question. I 
 know very well, that both this and the former 
 answerer have made it their business to change the 
 state of the question ; and if what I bring to prove 
 what I undertake do not prove the task they set 
 me, they glory as if they had the better. But the 
 lawyers tell us, that when issue is once joined, if we 
 prove the thing in issue we carry the cause ; and 
 what is more than so is over and above, or to 
 spare. And a mathematician, if he prove what he 
 proposeth, concludes with quod erat demonstran- 
 dum; (he hath proved what he undertook to prove) 
 if he prove more than so, it is more than he was 
 obliged to do. And if a logician prove (proposi- 
 tionem negatam) the proposition which is incum- 
 bent on him to prove, he hath done his work ; and 
 if he prove more than so, it is more than he need 
 to do. And accordingly, when this answerer doth 
 acknowledge that I have proved what I undertake 
 to prove, that there is no impossibility, there is no 
 contradiction, nor inconsistence with reason, that 
 
103 
 
 three somewhats may be one God, he ought to 
 acquiesce therein, and acknowledge that I have 
 done my work. For when the controversy was 
 divided into two branches, whether the thing be 
 true, and whether it be possible, (and it was the 
 latter of the two that I undertook) if I have shewed 
 it is not impossible, which this answerer doth grant 
 that I have done, I have done the work that I 
 undertook ; and if this be once agreed, it goes a 
 great way as to the other branch, that the thing is 
 true. For I find the last result of our adversaries, 
 when they are close pressed, is commonly this, it is 
 impossible, it is absurd, it is nonsense, it is incon- 
 sistent with reason, and, therefore, it cannot be 
 true ; and that, therefore, a force, no matter how 
 great, must be put upon the words which do, how 
 expressly soever, affirm it, to make them signify 
 somewhat else than what they plainly do signify, 
 than to admit it. And if I have, as is now con- 
 fessed, destroyed this last reserve, let them press 
 this point no more. Or, if they will retract this 
 grant, let the next answerer keep to this point, to 
 prove it impossible, or inconsistent with reason, 
 and not ramble out into other discourses which 
 are nothing to the purpose of what I proposed to 
 prove. 
 
 Amongst his other concessions, I shall reckon 
 that in page 14, where he argues from John xvi. 
 13, that there is between the Father, Son, and 
 Holy Ghost a distinction so great, as that they 
 
104 
 
 may not unfitly be called three persons, where I 
 observe also, that he owns the personality of the 
 Holy Ghost, as well as of the Father, and of the 
 Son. It is true, indeed, he seems to make the 
 distinction between them greater than I do. But 
 I thus far agree with him, that there is, in truth, a 
 distinction, and that more than imaginary, or w'hat 
 depends only upon our imagination, and greater 
 than that of what we call the Divine attributes; 
 and, therefore, we reckon the persons to be but 
 three, but the attributes to be more ; and we do 
 admit, amongst the persons, a certain order or 
 economy, such as in the Scripture we find assigned 
 to them, but do not own the distinction so great as 
 to make them three Gods. 
 
 And that also of pages 13, 14, where he argues, 
 that Christ is indeed God, not only a dignified man : 
 " That God in Christ was tempted, suffered, and 
 died ; not man only. That the merits thereof are 
 founded on the Godhead. In plain terms," saith 
 he, " if Christ were only a man, extraordinarily 
 assisted by God, and thereupon merited by his 
 sufferings and death, it was the man redeemed us 
 by his blood, and not God." And page 16, the 
 like from Rom. ix. 5, "Of whom, as concerning the 
 flesh, Christ came, who is over all, God blessed for 
 ever ;" and asks, " If I ever knew an Unitarian, 
 especially an Arian, deny him that character?" 
 And from Heb. i. 8, " To the Son he saith, thy 
 throne, O God, endureth for ever; a sceptre of 
 
105 
 
 righteousness is the sceptre of thy kingdom," &c. 
 he argues, " That it is not the humanity of Christ 
 that is here spoken of. For what ! Is the humanity 
 of Christ called God ? Is the humanity preferred 
 before angels ? Or, did the humanity frame the 
 world ? Indeed," he says, " they are apt to clog 
 it with a limitation, as not acknowledging him co- 
 equal with the Father; but under that restriction 
 they can be as liberal of the title of God to Christ 
 as any Trinitarian whatever." Where I take what 
 he grants ; and as to the co-equality, shall discourse 
 it afterwards. 
 
 More of this kind I shall have occasion to men- 
 tion afterward ; yet do not blame him for taking 
 this advantage, of shifting the person where he sees 
 cause to grant what was before denied. 
 
 But our new answerer hath yet another art. 
 When he seems to cite what I say, he takes the 
 liberty very often to vary therein, according as he 
 thinks fit, both from my words and from my sense, 
 and, therefore, I desire the reader not to take all as 
 mine which seems to be cited as such; but so much 
 only as he finds to be truly cited. It would be too 
 long to mention all the places where I am so used. 
 I shall only give instance in some of them. 
 
 He tells us, (page 4) that I endeavour to illus- 
 trate the Trinity by an example in a cube, or die ; 
 and so far he says true ; but not so in what follows, 
 where three sides, he says, make one cube ; and 
 which cube, he says, is not to be made without all 
 
106 
 
 the three sides. But certainly he can no where 
 find these to be my words. I confess I am no 
 great gamester at that sport; but I ahvays thought, 
 till now, that a die had six sides, and not only 
 three. I have said, indeed, tliat in a cube, or die, 
 there be three dimensions, length, breadth, and 
 thickness ; but I never called these the three sides 
 of a cube, nor have I any where said that a cube 
 hath but three sides. 
 
 I am represented (pages 5, 6, 7» 8) as maintain- 
 ing three personal Gods : but he knows very well 
 this is not my language, but that the three persons 
 are one God, not three Gods, nor a council of 
 Gods, as he calls it. 
 
 So, where he would ask the doctor, (page 17) 
 whether these two Gods, to wit, the Father and the 
 Word, be one ? he knows my answer must be, that 
 these two, not these two Gods, are one God ; and 
 that I do no where call them two Gods, but one 
 and the same God, according to lliat of Christ 
 himself, " I and the Father are one." 
 
 So, where he talks of adding several persons to 
 our one God ; (pages 3, 8) for he knows that is not 
 my language, but these three are God; not that 
 they are added to God ; much less that Bacchus 
 and Venus, &c. may be thrust into the number; 
 and (page 8) one of your Gods : we have but one 
 God. It is he and his Arian that own two Gods, 
 (page 17) not we. 
 
 Another there is which runs through most part 
 
107 
 
 of his whole discourse, wherein he wilfully mistakes 
 the state of the question : and then, what is brought 
 to prove one thing he misapplies as brought to 
 prove another, and then makes a great outcry that 
 it doth not prove what it was never brought to 
 prove; and this he calls cross purposes. He knows 
 very well that the question w^as by me clearly stated, 
 not as to the whole doctrine of the Trinity at large, 
 but as to the possibility. That, whatever the 
 Socinians pretend, there is no impossibility, non- 
 sense, or inconsistence with reason, that three some- 
 whats, which we call persons, may be one God ; 
 and this he owns to be the state of the question, 
 (page 1) to prove the same agreeable to the com- 
 mon notions of human reason ; and it is done by 
 shewing that, according to the common notions of 
 human reason, nothing is more common than that 
 what in one consideration are three, or many, is yet 
 in another consideration but one. Thus in one 
 cube there be three dimensions, length, breadth, 
 and thickness. So the understanding, will, and 
 memory, in one soul. So the voephv, eTnev/nrjriKhu and 
 KivTjTiKhv a power to know, to will, and to do, in the 
 same intelligent agent, and the like. It is, there- 
 fore, not inconsistent with reason, and this answerer 
 doth allow it, for one to be three ; nor is it non- 
 sense to say, these three are one ; or I and the 
 Father are one; or that three somewhats may be 
 one God. The former answerer complains of these 
 resemblances as impossible to be apprehended by 
 
108 
 
 the common people; and desires some more familiar 
 parallel than that of a cube, or die, that the tankard 
 bearer may apprehend, (in his pages 8, 9). Yet I 
 believe his tankard bearer is not so dull of appre- 
 hension as he would have us think. For if he have 
 ever seen a die, as most of them have, or shall now 
 be shewed one, he may be able to apprehend, with- 
 out a metaphysic or mathematic lecture, that in a 
 die there is length, breadth, and thickness, and that 
 it is as broad as it is long, and as thick as either ; 
 and yet it is not three dies, but one die. However, 
 to gratify his request, I have given him some other; 
 as that the same man may have three dignities, or 
 three kingdoms, and sustain three persons, or three 
 relations, without thereby becoming three men, with 
 other like. With this, our new answerer is not 
 pleased. He is ashamed, he doth blush for me, 
 &c. How much am I obliged for this his great 
 compassion ! But all this is but banter, it is not 
 argument, and no sober man will be more of his 
 opinion for this language ; and much less for that 
 of St. John's writing nonsense, of a lying revelation, 
 of a three-headed monster, (pages 3, 5) and other 
 such indecent language of God and the Scripture. 
 But, why so displeased with these similes ? These 
 are too mean, too familiar ; he expected somewhat 
 higher, somewhat more distinct, (page 5). I see it 
 is as hard a matter to please my two answerers, as 
 to serve two masters : the one complains my similes 
 are not familiar enough ; the other that they are 
 
109 
 
 too familiar ; he expected somewhat more subhme. 
 These do not prove that a Trinity in Unity is 
 necessary to the perfection of the Godhead, (page 
 6). True: these alone do not prove that there is 
 a Trinity in Unity in the Godhead ; much less do 
 they prove that a Trinity in Unity is necessary to 
 the perfection of the Godhead ; nor were they 
 brought to prove it. They were brought to prove 
 there is no inconsistence, but that there may be a 
 Trinity in the Unity of the Godhead ; and if they 
 prove thus much, he, perhaps, may have cause to 
 be ashamed, but I see no reason why I should be 
 ashamed, or any one for me. Now, that they prove 
 thus much, he hath already granted that a thing 
 may be one and three in divers respects ; and that 
 it is no contradiction to hold that there may be 
 three persons in God. They have proved, there- 
 fore, what they were brought to prove. But, says 
 he, (page 5) " Our debate is not whether there may 
 be three persons in God." Yes : our debate is 
 whether there may be; not whether there be. And 
 he knows the question was so stated by me, and so 
 acknowledged by himself, upon this single point, 
 whether there be any impossibility in it ; and so 
 owned by himself, (page 1) not whether it be so, 
 for this I had before said was not to be argued 
 upon the topic of reason alone ; but whether it be 
 agreeable to the common notions of human reason 
 that it may be so : and if this were the question, as 
 he owns, and this be proved, as he owns also, then 
 
110 
 
 I have proved what I undertook to prove, and have 
 no reason to be ashamed, either of the undertaking 
 or of the proof. It is our new answerer who doth 
 wittingly and wilhngly misstate the question, that is 
 at cross purposes, while he applies those arguments 
 to one point which he knows were brought to prove 
 another, which point himself grants to be proved; 
 he cannot say there is a contradiction in it, (page 
 6) and then complains, that they alone do not prove 
 what they were never brought to prove. 
 
 Of like nature is that other point, where he tells 
 us that we do now venture to prove it to be agree- 
 able to the common notions of human reason ; that 
 is, not inconsistent with it. And we do so. But 
 he would have it thought that it is but now of late 
 that any have presumed to this confidence ; (pages 
 1, 2) and would have us content modestly to ac- 
 knowledge it a mere mystery, and to rely upon the 
 authority of the church and tradition, without pre- 
 tending that it is agreeable to reason. Now, that 
 there is in it a mystery we readily grant, and so 
 there is in the whole doctrine of our redemption ; 
 " God manifested in the flesh," &c., 1 Tim. iii. IG, 
 as that which, without revelation, we could not have 
 found out by mere reason ; and that it is above 
 reason, that is, more than what reason alone could 
 have taught us, but not that it is against reason, or 
 inconsistent with it. This is not the doctrine of the 
 Trinitarians, nor ever was, that I know of. Nor is 
 it tradition onlv, or the church's authorilv, but the 
 
Ill 
 
 authority of Scripture that we rely upon, which is a 
 true, not a lying revelation. Nor is it, as he pre- 
 tends, a new doctrine, not raised till several hundred 
 years after Christ, as if the doctrine were to be 
 dated from the time of penning the Athanasian 
 Creed, but as old, at least, as the New Testament, 
 and never contested, that I know of, till several 
 hundred years after Christ, when the Arians arose. 
 But here again my answerers are not agreed, so 
 hard it is to please them both; while one complains, 
 it is but of late, the other tells me, it is old 
 fashioned, (in his page 9) " Thus Dr. Wallis may 
 see that his notions concerning the Trinity are old 
 fashioned, not of a new mode." And truly I take 
 him to be more in the right, that it is not a new 
 quirk, but old fashioned doctrine ; and I like it 
 never the worse for being so. As to what I have 
 said of John xvii. 3, it is more than forty years, and 
 and well towards fifty, since I first preached it in 
 London, on that text, as I have since done there 
 and elsewhere, more than once, and I did not then 
 take it to be new, but what I had been always 
 taught ; and as to that of the three dimensions in a 
 cube, it is forty years or more since I first discoursed 
 it at Oxford with Dr. Ward, then Astronomy-Pro- 
 fessor there, and since Bishop of Salisbury ; and as 
 to the doctrine in general, of three persons in one 
 God, it is no newer than the New Testament. But 
 here again our answerer forsakes the question : for 
 the question is not whether it be a new or old 
 
112 
 
 adventure; but whether it be inconsistent with 
 reason that three may be one ; or, as he words it, 
 (page 3) that a Trinity in Unity is absurd. 
 
 Another piece of the same art it is where my 
 word of personality is by him changed for persona- 
 tion ; (pages 5, 6) for which I would not have 
 quarrelled with him, if by changing the word, he 
 had not meant to change the sense also. For to 
 personate a man, he tells us, (page 6) is but to 
 compose one's actions in likeness of him ; and that 
 one cannot personate three together, but one after 
 another. But my personality, he knows, is more 
 than this personation ; it is not only acting a person, 
 but being a person. A man may successively per- 
 sonate, or act the person of a king and a fatlier, 
 without being cither this or that : but when the same 
 man is both a king and a father, which he may be at 
 the same time, as well as successively, this is more 
 than only to act them. And if by personation he 
 mean no more than acting a person, I wonder how 
 he can tell us, (page 5) that personation is the 
 greatest perfection of being ; and that he never 
 could apprehend any other real unity but persona- 
 tion. What? No real unity but acting a person 
 by imitation ? Sure there is. The bottom, and top, 
 and middle of a mountain are one mountain ; yet 
 I do not take mount Atlas to be a person, or to 
 act a person, much less to become one mountain by 
 personation, or acting a person. 
 
 Of hke nature is it where, to do me a kindness. 
 
113 
 
 he will state my cube more to my purpose ; (page 
 5) meaning the contrary. But how ? In a marble 
 cube may be two accidents, hardness and coldness. 
 There may be so. But what then ? Then, he 
 says, here are three cubes more for me. He would 
 have it thought, I suppose, that I had before dis- 
 coursed of three cubes, whereas I spoke but of one 
 cube, under three dimensions; and he will now help 
 me to another three. But he is out again. For 
 the cold cube, the hard cube, and the marble cube 
 are but one cube, not three cubes. It is the same 
 cube that is cold, and hard, and marble. It would 
 have been much the same, if, instead of a cube, he 
 had taken a marble bowl or ball, and then told me 
 it is cold, and hard, and round. True. And yet it 
 is but one bowl, not three bowls; one ball, not three 
 balls. And what is there in all this of inconsistent 
 absurdity ? It seems to me very consistent, not 
 absurd, and it suits my notion very well. 
 
 But, says he, (page 5) not to suppose the simile 
 tltogether impertinent, (very well ! ) yet it is in our 
 case. Why in our case? For our debate, he says, 
 is not whether there may not be three persons in 
 God. Yes : that is our debate, and the true state 
 of the question. All his other excursions are beside 
 the question. 
 
 But the simile, though not impertinent, is yet, he 
 says, most absurd, because not adequate ; and it is 
 a general rule with him, (page 6) where he brings a 
 simile to have it adequate, that it may really prove 
 
 H 
 
114 
 
 the matter designed. Now that my similes are not 
 adequate, so as to prove all that is to be said of 
 God, or the blessed Trinity, I had told him at 
 first, and more than once, and that they were not 
 intended so to be ; and I tell him now, that I did 
 purposely make choice of such as were a great way 
 off, that it might not seem as if I would have them 
 thought to be adequate as to all that is to be said 
 of the Trinity. And as to the rule he goes by, 
 perhaps it may be his method, where much is to be 
 proved, to prove it all at once, and take all argu- 
 ments to be absurd which do not at once prove all. 
 But we who are conversant in cubes and demon- 
 strations, as he phraseth it, think fit sometimes to 
 use another method ; and, where much is to be 
 proved, to proceed by steps. We first propose one 
 thing, and prove that ; then another, and prove 
 that, and so on : and if what be brought to prove 
 the first step do prove what it is brought to prove, 
 we do not say the argument is absurd, because it 
 doth not prove all at once, but that it is a good 
 argument so far ; and, I think, if he will here give 
 mc leave to use a simile which is not adequate, it 
 is a method used by other men as well as mathema- 
 ticians ; for, if a man be to mount a pair of stairs, 
 we do not say the first step is absurd, because that 
 alone doth not bring him to the top ; or, if to go a 
 journey, that the first step is absurd, because it doth 
 not bring him to his journey's end; but the first step 
 brings him so far, and (he second somewhat Inrther; 
 
115 
 
 and so on, till, step by step, he comes to the top, 
 or to his journey's end. Now, there being divers 
 points concerned in the doctrine of the Trinity, I 
 stated my question not so as to prove all at once, 
 but singled out this one point, that it is not incon- 
 sistent with reason ; or, to use his own words, it is 
 agreeable to the common notions of human reason- 
 ing, that what in one consideration are three, may 
 in another consideration be one ; and that there 
 may be three somewhats which are one God. But, 
 whether indeed there be so, is another step ; and 
 whether these somewhats may fitly be called per- 
 sons, is yet another. Now, if I have made good 
 my first step, my argument or simile is not only 
 not altogether impertinent, but neither is it most 
 absurd, yea not absurd at all, because it proves 
 what it was brought to prove ; and that so it doth 
 himself allows, and tells us plainly, (page 3) he 
 cannot say, there is a contradiction in holding 
 that there may be three persons in God. "Ojrep 
 
 But, I find, he would fain be upon another point, 
 (page 4) and draw me to it. A point not to be 
 argued upon the topic of reason only ; for reason 
 alone can go no further than to prove it possible, or 
 not inconsistent ; but to be argued from Scripture, 
 and divine revelations, whether indeed there are 
 three somewhats, which we call persons, that are 
 but one God. 
 
 But this, I have told him already, is beside the 
 
116 
 
 question which I undertook ; and in this it is he 
 that is the aggressor, not I ; and I only upon the 
 defence. Yet, because he is so desirous of it, I 
 am content to go somewhat out of my way to wait 
 on him, and to hear what he hath to say, why we 
 should think that is not, which he confesseth may 
 be without any contradiction to natural reason. 
 And I shall take notice as I go along, what it is 
 wherein we agree, as well as wherein we differ, 
 that so we may not quarrel about what is agreed 
 between us. 
 
 He begins with the first commandment, (pages 1 
 2, 3, 4) and seems mightily to dread the guilt of 
 idolatry in admitting more Gods than one : our 
 case is, Ave are afraid of idolatry, (page 9) contrary 
 to this commandment, of having no otlier God. 
 And so I would have him be ; but we shall find 
 this fear will be over with him by and by. What, 
 says he, was that commandment made for? What! 
 to prevent polytlieism. Why, how is that to be 
 done ? By denying many gods. If it be not 
 made to deny personal gods, it is made to no 
 purpose. And soon after, with some indignation. 
 What ! is the divinity of Christ implied in the New 
 Testament? It is denied in the first commandment. 
 And (page 9) pray what Scripture shall we regard 
 in competition with this commandment, written by 
 the finger of God, and one of the only precepts he 
 himself immediately delivered ? 
 
 Now I am so far from disliking his zeal for tlie 
 
117 
 
 first commandment, that I do perfectly agree with 
 what I find in that commandment; " I am the Lord 
 thy God, (the Lord God of Israel) thou shalt have 
 no other God but me;" and this I shall desire him 
 to remember by and by. He may add that of 
 Deut. vi. 7? (for in this I agree also) " Hear, O 
 Israel, the Lord our God (the Lord God of Israel) 
 is one Lord;" and that of Matt. iv. 10, "Thou 
 shalt worship the Lord thy God, (the Lord God of 
 Israel) and him only shalt thou serve;" and that of 
 I Cor. viii. 6, " To us there is but one God," and 
 as many more places, as he pleases, to that pur- 
 pose ; and from all these I do agree that we are to 
 have but one God and no more, not two Gods ; no 
 other God than the Lord God of Israel : that we 
 are to worship him alone, and none else; not Satan, 
 not the god of Ekron, not any god, or man, or 
 angel who is not the Lord God of Israel : for all 
 this I grant to be there fully taught ; and I am 
 willing to put as great weight upon this solemn set 
 precept of the first commandment as he doth, and 
 perhaps more. He would have us shew, if we can, 
 (page 9) where this commandment is abrogated. I 
 say, no where. It was never abrogated, never 
 repealed ; it remains, I grant, still in its full force, 
 and, therefore, we own no other God, but the Lord 
 God of Israel; and this Lord God of Israel we 
 say is one Lord, one God, and no more Gods than 
 one. We say indeed, there is a wise God, a power- 
 ful God, an almighty God, an eternal God, a just 
 
118 
 
 God, a merciful God, God the Creator, God the 
 Redeemer, God the Sanctifier; a God who in (lie 
 beginning created the heaven and the earth, a God 
 who in the beginning laid the foundation of the 
 earth, and the heavens are the work of his hands ; 
 a God of Abraham, a God of Isaac, a God of 
 Jacob ; a God who brought the children of Israel 
 out of Egypt, a God who brought them out of the 
 north country; a God who is our mighty Redeemer; 
 a God who is a Saviour of all that trust in him ; a 
 God who doth create in us a clean heart, and doth 
 renew a right spirit within us ; a God who gives us 
 a heart of flesh, a God who gives us a new heart, 
 who putteth his fear in our hearts, who writes his 
 law in our inward parts, a God who searcheth the 
 heart and trieth the reins ; a God who hath visited 
 and redeemed his people, and hath raised up a 
 mighty salvation for us. But we say, the Lord 
 God of Israel is all this ; and, in being all this, he 
 is but one God ; and that there is no other God 
 but one : and we grant, that whoever owns any 
 other God as a true God, or worships a false God, 
 breaks this commandment. I do not know what 
 he would have us grant more upon this command- 
 ment. I wish he do not think we have granted 
 too much. 
 
 He says, (page 3) we vitiate this commandment 
 by bringing in new persons, by adding several 
 persons to our one God. No : we add no persons 
 to our God. We sav that God the Creator, God 
 
119 
 
 the Redeemer, God the Sanctifier, or, in other 
 words, the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are this 
 one God, not added to him : nor are they new 
 persons added to God ; but are God, and ever 
 were so. 
 
 He would have us think, (page 17) that the 
 Father only, and not the Son, or Holy Ghost, is the 
 only true God, because of John xvii. 3 : the words 
 are these, " This is life eternal, to know thee (not 
 only thee) the only true God, (to be that God, 
 beside which there is no other true God) and Jesus 
 Christ whom thou hast sent." And we say the 
 same that is here said. The Father is the only 
 true God, the Lord God of Israel, beside whom 
 there is no other true God ; the Son is also not 
 another God, as the Arians say, and this answerer, 
 (page 17) but the same only true God, the Lord 
 God of Israel, and he is expressly so called, Luke 
 i. 16, 17; and the Holy Ghost likewise, for these 
 three are one, 1 John v. 7 ; and the words, without 
 any force put upon them, may be thus read, to 
 know thee, and whom thou hast sent, Jesus Christ, 
 to be the only true God. For the word only is not 
 a restrictive to thee, but to the true God ; and this 
 is not only a new quirk or criticism, which is the 
 only answer he gives to this defence, but is the 
 true sense of the place. For the same writer doth, 
 in another place, say the very same thing of God 
 the Son, 1 John v. 20, " We are in him that is 
 true, even in his Son Jesus Christ. This is the 
 
120 
 
 true God, and eternal life." Now if Scripture 
 must interpret Scripture, as he tells us, (page 16) 
 certainly St. John in his epistle, 1 John v. 20, 
 understood what himself said in his gospel, John 
 xvii. 3; and that what he said of the Father's 
 being the only true God was not exclusive of the 
 Son, to whom himself gives the same title, " This 
 is the true God, and this is eternal life." And 
 this, I think, is a full answer to what he would 
 urge from this place, or from what he joins with it, 
 I Cor. viii. 4, 5, 6, " To us there is but one God," 
 which is no more express to his purpose than tliis 
 is ; nor doth he pretend that it is, but puts them 
 both together, (page 17). 
 
 There is one place more which comes under con- 
 sideration, w4iich, because he finds it pinch, he 
 would fain shake off, (page 17). It is that of 
 John i. 1, 2, 10, 14, " In the beginning was the 
 Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word 
 was God. The world was made by him; all things 
 were made by him ; and without him was not any 
 thing made which was made ; and the Word was 
 made flesh, and dwelt amongst us." The former 
 answerer would fain shuffle off this place (in his 
 page 9) upon one of these three points, for other- 
 wise he grants it is for our purpose ; either that by 
 the Word is not meant Christ ; or by God not the 
 true God ; or else that St. John wTites nonsense. 
 Now the last of the three, I suppose, our new 
 answerer will not say, because he pretends a great 
 
121 
 
 reverence for Scriptures. The first he quits, and 
 doth admit, according to the Arian sense, which he 
 looks upon as more defensible than that of the 
 Socinians, that by the Word is here meant the 
 person of Christ, who was afterward incarnate of 
 the virgin Mary, and that he was pre-existent to 
 his Incarnation ; as by whom the world was made, 
 at least as by an instrument ; and that he was with 
 God (the true God) at least in the beginning of the 
 world, if not sooner, and that he was God. 
 
 All the doubt is, whether these two Gods, for so 
 he calls them, to wit, the Father and the Word, be 
 one, (page 17). 
 
 Now, if he be God, he must be either a true God 
 or a false God. That he is a false God, methinks, 
 they should not say ; and, if he be a true God, he 
 must be the same God with the Father, who is the 
 only true God, John xvii. 3. 
 
 That he is to be worshipped with religious wor- 
 ship, both the Arians and the Socinians do allow. 
 And if he be God, as the Arians and this answerer 
 do affirm, this worship must be divine worship, and 
 he must be then the Lord God of Israel; or else 
 they break that precept, " Thou shalt worship the 
 Lord thy God, (the Lord God of Israel) and him 
 only shalt thou serve," Matt. iv. 10. 
 
 If he be the Lord God of Israel, but not the 
 same Lord God of Israel, how doth this agree with 
 that, Deut. vi. 4, " Hear, O Israel, the Lord our 
 God is one Lord?" And if he be another God, 
 
122 
 
 whether true or false, then do they break the great 
 and first commandment, " Thou shalt have no other 
 God but me;" no other God, true or false, great 
 or little, equal or unequal, but the Lord God of 
 Israel. On which commandment this answerer 
 doth, deservedly, lay so great a stress, as we heard 
 before. " What was it made for, if not to prevent 
 polytheism? How shall it be done, but by denying 
 many gods ? If not to deny personal gods, it is 
 made to no purpose. How is it consistent with 
 that first commandment, that solemn and set pre- 
 cept of the first commandment, that was delivered 
 by God himself, written by the finger of God, and 
 never abrogated, to bring in new persons, to add 
 persons (one or more) to this only God, though 
 particularly prohibited, and not break it ? What ! 
 is the divinity of Christ implied in the New Testa- 
 ment? It is denied in the first commandment, if 
 he be not the same God who is there meant. And 
 pray what Scripture shall we regard in competition 
 with this commandment?" With more to the 
 same purpose. 
 
 Whether he will make use of the popish distinc- 
 tion of latria and doulia,* for his two Gods, not 
 co-equal, I cannot tell ; but the commandment says 
 expressly, " Thou shalt have no other God but 
 me," equal or unequal. 
 
 Nor doth this error end here, (as he proceeds) 
 
 * Note O. 
 
123 
 
 for our adversaries are not always so lucky as to 
 see consequences. For should some revelation, 
 such as, he says, is not impossible, deify more men 
 than ever the heathen did, here is no fence left ; 
 (here is room enough to thrust in his Jupiter, 
 Bacchus, Venus, &c. of which he tells us, page 8) 
 and it is in vain, he tells us, in such a case, to 
 pretend that the number would be of offence to us : 
 for if we consider aright, there is no more reason 
 for one number than another ; and he thinks that 
 if there be more than one, it is more honourable 
 they should be infinites ; because all between one 
 and infinite is imperfect ; with much more of like 
 nature. Of all which I know not what better to 
 think than that he had forgot all this, when after- 
 wards (at page 17) he will have these two Gods, as 
 he calls them, to wit, the Father and the Word, not 
 to be one, but two and separate. 
 
 Nor will it excuse the matter to say, that this 
 other God is not co-equal with the Father ; for, at 
 this rate, the polytheism, or many gods of the 
 heathen, would be excused, as out of the reach of 
 this commandment ; for they did not make all their 
 gods co-equal to their great Jupiter, nor perhaps 
 any of them equal to our God : but Jupiter was 
 their god paramount, and the rest were either 
 middling gods or lesser gods ; but yet this did not 
 excuse them from polytheism and idolatry within 
 the reach of the first commandment. For that 
 commandment, that unrepealed law, forbids all 
 
124 
 
 other Gods, whether equal or unequal, the leeks 
 and onions in Egypt, which are said to have been 
 there worshipped, as well as the calves at Dan 
 and Bethel. Nor is it less idolatry, nor less within 
 the reach of this commandment, to worship the 
 god of Ekron, because not co-equal to the God 
 of Israel. 
 
 We, therefore, choose to say? that Christ is 
 indeed God, as he is expressly called, John i. 1, 
 " The Word was with God, and the Word was 
 God;" and Heb. i. 8, "Thy throne, O God, 
 endureth for ever;" and in many other places; 
 and not only a man, extraordinarily assisted by 
 God, as this answerer grants also, (at page 14). 
 That " he w as in the beginning, and in the begin- 
 ning was with God," John i. 1, 2, and, therefore, 
 was pre-existent before his Incarnation, and did not 
 then begin to be ; that " he was in the beginning, 
 and all things were made by him, and without him 
 was not any thing made that was made; that the 
 world was made by him," John i. 3, 10, and is, 
 therefore, the same God who " in the beginning 
 created the heaven and the earth," Gen. i. 1 ; that 
 of him it is said, " Thou, Lord, in the beginning 
 hast laid the foundation of the earth : and the 
 heavens are the works of thy hands," Ileb. i. 8, 10, 
 cited out of Psalm cii. 25, and is, therefore, the 
 same God to whom that long prayer, Psalm cii, 
 was made, and of whom so many great things are 
 there said, and which cannot belong to any but the 
 
125 
 
 Supreme God ; and no doubt but, when this was 
 there said by the psahnist, he meant it of that God 
 who " in the beginning created the heaven and the 
 earth," Gen. i. 1. That he is o wv iirl iravTwv, the 
 Being above all things, (or, the Supreme Being) 
 God blessed for ever, (or, the ever blessed God) 
 Rom. ix. 5, which are titles too high for any lower 
 than the Supreme God; that what is said of God 
 indefinitely, as contradistinguished from Christ in 
 
 particular, iteV. l. 4, utto th o wi/, kuI o i]v, kuI 6 ip^o/nevos-, 
 
 " From him which is, and which was, and which 
 is to come, (or, which shall be) and from Jesus 
 Christ," &c., is particularly applied to Jesus Christ 
 as his character, v. 8, " I am Alpha and Omega, 
 the beginning and the ending, saith the Lord, he 
 that liveth, and was dead, and liveth for evermore, 
 v. 16, which is, and was, and is to come, the 
 Almighty." That he is the true God, 1 John v. 
 20, and, therefore, the same God with the Father, 
 who is the only true God, John xvii. 3, and no other 
 true God but what he is. That "he and the 
 Father are one," John x. 30. That " the Father, 
 and the Word, and the Spirit, these three are one," 
 1 John V. 7 ; and Christ, not another God, but the 
 same God, "manifested in the flesh, justified in the 
 spirit, seen of angels, preached unto the Gentiles, 
 believed on in the world, received up into glory," 
 1 Tim. iii. 16. 
 
 Now I know not well what could be said more, 
 
126 
 
 at least, what more need be said, to make the point 
 clear ; or what character he can reasonably desire 
 more by which to describe the almighty Supreme 
 God, and the same God with the Father. He is 
 God, the true God, the only true God ; for there 
 can be but one God that is the only true God ; one 
 with the Father; one with the Father and Holy 
 Ghost ; the eternal God, who is, and was, and shall 
 be, who, when the heavens and the earth shall wax 
 old as a garment, he is the same and his years 
 shall not fail ; the Almighty, tlie mighty God, the 
 eternal Father ; the God who in the beginning 
 made the world, who made all things, and without 
 whom not any thing was made that was made ; who 
 in the beginning laid the foundation of the earth, 
 and the heavens are the works of his hands ; who 
 is the Son of God, the begotten of the Father, the 
 only begotten of the Father, and, therefore, of the 
 same nature with the Father, however not the same 
 person, or not under that consideration. Nor can 
 he say, this is impossible, a contradiction, or incon- 
 sistent with reason, and that, therefore, though the 
 words be clear and . plain, yet we must seek out 
 some other sense to be forced upon them ; for this 
 point is already gained, and he doth confess it, 
 (page 3) that there is no contradiction in holding 
 that there may be three persons in God ; and, if 
 there be no contradiction in it, why should we be 
 afraid to say what in Scripture is said so plainly ? 
 
127 
 
 or, why should we set up two Gods where one 
 will serve, and when the Scripture says there is 
 but one ? 
 
 He will say, perhaps, God made the world by 
 Christ. And we say so too. But not as by a tool 
 or instrument, as he would have it, (page 17) but 
 rather as by his power and wisdom. But the power 
 and wisdom of God are not things diverse from 
 God himself, but are himself; much less are they 
 different gods from God himself. And, even 
 amongst us, the power and wisdom of a man are 
 not things distinct from the man, in that sense 
 wherein the words thing and mode are contradis- 
 tinguished ; much less are they distinct men from 
 the man whose power and wisdom they are. The 
 man and his wisdom, the man and his power, are 
 not distinguished ut res et res^ as the schools speak, 
 but ut res et modus. And power and wisdom, in 
 the same man, ut modus et 7nodus. For though a 
 man may subsist without wisdom, (but God cannot) 
 yet wisdom cannot subsist without somewhat that is 
 wise, nor this man's wisdom without the man ; and, 
 therefore, this wisdom, according to the school dis- 
 tinction, must be modus, and not res. And the 
 like of power. So that if we say, that Christ is 
 the power of God, or the wisdom of God, as he is 
 called, 1 Cor. i. 24, and that God j his power 
 and wisdom, made the world, it doth not follow 
 that this power, or wisdom of God is another god 
 
128 
 
 from God himself; but God and his wisdom, or 
 God and his power, are God himself. Consonant 
 to this it is, where it is said. Col. ii. 3, " In him are 
 hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge." 
 And, perhaps, it is this Divine wisdom who tells us, 
 Prov. viii. 22, 23, 27, " The Lord possessed me in 
 the beginning of his ways : I was from everlasting, 
 from the beginning : when he prepared the heavens 
 I was there;" and much more to the same pur- 
 pose. So the Holy Ghost is called the power of 
 God, Luke i. 35, "The Holy Ghost shall come 
 upon thee, and the power of the Highest shall 
 overshadow thee." Now shall we say, because 
 God is wise in heart, and mighty in strength. Job 
 ix. 4, or because by his wisdom and power he made 
 the world, therefore his wisdom and his power are 
 distinct gods from himself? Or if we should say, 
 that God, as the fountain of being, may be called 
 the Father ; and the same God, as the fountain of 
 wisdom, be called the Son ; and, as the fountain of 
 power, be called the Holy Ghost ; there is nothing 
 of this that is inconsistent with reason, but very 
 agreeable with the common notions of human rea- 
 soning; and yet all these, however under divers 
 considerations, are but one God. But here I must 
 caution again, for I find people are willing to mis- 
 take, or misapply what I say, that I do not set 
 down this as the adequate distinction between the 
 three })ersons, for this I do not pretend thoroughly 
 
129 
 
 to understand;* but only that it is not inconsistent 
 with reason that it may be so, and that there is 
 no necessity, upon this account, to set up another 
 God. 
 
 Or we may say, much to the same purpose, that 
 God, by his Word and Spirit, made the world; and 
 yet that his Word and his Spirit are not, therefore, 
 distinct Gods from himself. And we have them all 
 mentioned in the story of the creation. " God 
 created the heaven and the earth," Gen. i. 1 ; 
 " The spirit of God moved upon the face of the 
 waters," v. 2 ; and " God said, (or spake the word) 
 let there be light," &c., v. 3, 6, 9, H, 14, 20, 24 
 and V. 26, " Let us make man ;" and Psalm xxxiii. 
 6, 9j " By the word of the Lord were the heavens 
 made ; and all the host of them by the spirit, or 
 ^ reath of his mouth : he spake and it was done ; he 
 commanded and it stood fast;" and, to the like 
 purpose. Psalm cxlviii. 5, Job xxvi. 13 : yet are 
 they not three Gods, but rather three somewhats, 
 which are but one God. 
 
 I have insisted the longer on this, because I do 
 not know but that, through the grace of God, such 
 a discourse as this may have a like effect on him, 
 or some of his party, as that of Wittichius had 
 on his friend Sandius. And I have argued it 
 calmly. I have used no scurrilous language, nor 
 given any reproachful terms. I do not oppress 
 
 * Note P. 
 
130 
 
 him with the authority of fathers, or councils, but 
 with Scripture only, and plain reason ; and it 
 seems to me so clear, that if they cannot see it, 
 it is from some other reason than from want of 
 clearness. 
 
 As to what I have said for explication of the 
 Athanasian Creed, though I cannot expect he 
 should approve of that creed while he retains his 
 opinion, I do not find that he takes any great 
 exceptions to what I say of it. 
 
 He doth not lik6 the words Trinity in Unity, as 
 foreign and unscriptural, (page 19). He may, if 
 that will please him better, put it into plainer 
 English, and call it three in one, and then the words 
 are scriptural, " These three are one." 
 
 The possibility of God's being incarnate he doth 
 not deny; only he likes the Arian incarnation better 
 than ours. 
 
 He seems well pleased, (pages 19, 20) that I do 
 not positively affirm this creed to be written by 
 Athanasius ; (it is the same thing to me whether it 
 were written by him or some other, so long as I 
 find it agreeable to Scripture) that I do not anathe- 
 matize the Greek church; (wherein yet I would not 
 be thought to encourage dangerous errors, for the 
 errors are equally dangerous and equally funda- 
 mental, whether I do or do not anathematize them) 
 tliat I do not damn all cliildren, fools, madmen, 
 and all before Christ, as, he tells us, some rigid 
 Trinitarians, 1 know not who, have done too often ; 
 
131 
 
 that I own the word person to be but metaphorical, 
 which (at page 7) he did not like, which I will not 
 disoblige him by unsaying. 
 
 Where it is that I have blamed the fathers I do 
 not remember ; for I think the fathers do concur 
 in this, that there is a distinction between the three 
 which we call persons, greater than that between the 
 Divine attributes ; but not such as to make them 
 three Gods, and that, by calling them persons, they 
 mean no more ; and I say the same. 
 
 I shall conclude with this observation upon the 
 whole. He was at the beginning of his discourse 
 a direct Socinian, dreading the guilt of idolatry in 
 having more Gods than one, as contrary to the first 
 commandment, and therein I agree with him ; but 
 denied the divinity of Christ, as the Socinians do : 
 and thus he continues till toward the end of page 
 10 ; but then begins, silently, to tack about, and 
 after a while, doth with as much earnestness affirm 
 the divinity of Christ, as he had before denied it — 
 that Christ was God from the beginnino;, before the 
 world was ; that he was afterward incarnate and 
 became man ; and, as God and man, redeemed us, 
 &c. And here he is orthodox again, but then 
 tells us that this God is not the same God, or 
 co-equal with the Father, but another God ; and 
 at length tells us plainly that there are, at least, 
 two Gods, to wit, the Father and the Word ; for 
 now the fear of having more Gods than one is 
 over with him, and is by this time a perfect Arian. 
 
132 
 
 And he, who from a Socinian is thus turned Arian, 
 may at the next turn, for aught I know, turn 
 Orthodox. 
 
 In order to which, I would advise him to keep to 
 the sound part of his first opinion while he was a 
 Socinian, namely, that we ought to acknowledge 
 and worship but one God ; and the sound part of 
 his second opinion when he was turned Arian, 
 namely, that Christ (the Word) was God from the 
 beginning, before the world was ; that he was after- 
 ward incarnate, and so became God and man ; that, 
 as such, he suffered, died, and wrought out our 
 redemption ; that the merits of his sufferings are 
 founded on his Godhead, which, otherwise, would 
 not have been meritorious if he were only a man, 
 however extraordinarily assisted by God : and when 
 he hath so joined these two together, as to make 
 them consistent, he will be therein orthodox ; and 
 if to these two he add a third, which he owns also, 
 namely, that there is no contradiction in holding 
 there may be three persons in God, he will then be 
 able to answer all the cavils which either the Arian 
 or the Socinian shall bring against it. 
 
 Yours, 
 
 JOHN WALLIS. 
 
 Jan. 1.3, l69^ 
 
A FIFTH LETTER 
 
 CONCERNING 
 
 THE SACRED TRINITY, 
 
 IN ANSWER TO WHAT IS INTITULED 
 
 THE ARIAN'S VINDICATION OF HIMSELF AGAINST DR. WALLIS'S FOURTH 
 LETTER ON THE TRINITY. 
 
 BY JOHN WALLIS, D.D. 
 
 [Published in 1691.] 
 
LETTER V. 
 
 CONCERNING THE SACRED TRINITY. 
 
 Sir, 
 
 I HAVE met with an answer to my fourth letter. 
 It is not long, and my reply shall be but short. 
 There is very little in it concerning the merits of 
 the cause, save that he resolves to hold the con- 
 clusion; and as to personal reflections, or disdainful 
 expressions, I do not think fit to trouble the reader 
 with a long reply ; for those, I think, do not hurt 
 me so much as him that useth them. 
 
 He is not pleased (page 1) that I said I had 
 argued calmly, without scurrilous language or 
 reproachful terms ; and I appeal to the reader 
 whether it be not so. Nor doth he deny it. And 
 if his language were so too, he needed not to have 
 made the reader an apology to excuse his expres- 
 sions, that he might avoid the character of a 
 common railer, (page 1). 
 
 But, he says, abating the little subtilties and 
 artifices, incomparably witty, there is not the least 
 
136 
 
 grain of weight in my letter. Of this the reader 
 is to be judge, both as to the weight and as to 
 the wit. 
 
 He says, it seems a Socinian wrote against me. 
 True : and it seems he knew it, for he cites him. 
 And tliat himself wrote as an Arian. I think he 
 should rather have said, he wrote first as a Socinian, 
 in his first ten pages, and then as an Arian, in the 
 other ten. For I do not find any thing till toward 
 the end of his tenth page whereby I could judge 
 him other than a direct Socinian ; and I think it 
 will so appear to any other reader. 
 
 He takes to himself the name of Unitarian, by 
 which I do not find the Arians were wont to be 
 called. But it is a new name which the Socinians 
 have taken up to distinguish themselves both from 
 us and from the Arians ; for the Arians are rather 
 Pluritarians, as holding more Gods than one. And 
 the book to which himself refers us, (page 4) is 
 intituled, " The History of the Unitarians, other- 
 wise called Socinians," and (in page 11) where 
 he first mentions the Arians, he doth introduce it 
 with a preface, minding me that I write against 
 Arians as well as Socinians ; as having, till then, 
 spoke for the Socinians only, not for the Arians, 
 and then first beginning to speak for the Arians ; 
 and even in his tenth page, toward the beginning 
 of it, what had been said of the Socinians by name, 
 and of Socinus in particular, he takes to himself as 
 if one of that party. He seems (saith he of me^ to 
 
137 
 
 insinuate an aspersion on us that we believe not 
 angels. 
 
 He tells us now, (page 3) he doth believe them ; 
 and I will suppose also that he doth believe the 
 soul's immortality. But when he there says that I 
 bring a world of arguments to prove the immortality 
 of the soul, he mistakes again ; for those arguments 
 were brought against Socinus, not to prove the 
 soul's immortality, but that the soul, in its separate 
 condition, was capable of pain or pleasure, which 
 Socinus denied. 
 
 For requital to this, he tells me he had a good 
 mind to prove the existence of a Deity, for that he 
 had heard of some men of the profession of the 
 Church of England that have almost been Atheists 
 at the heart. And truly if he should do so, I 
 should not think it much amiss; for I have heard 
 the same suspected of some Socinians. 
 
 He now tells me, (page 2) he never was a 
 Socinian in his life. Of what he had been in the 
 former part of his life I had said nothing, for I 
 knew no more what it was, than who he is, but 
 (page 131) of what he was in the beginning of his 
 discourse, and it is plain he there writes like a 
 direct Socinian, as was shewed but now, though as 
 an Arian some time after. 
 
 He tells me, (page 2) that he is neither the 
 Socinian, nor his friend, who assisted in his first 
 book. Neither did I say that he is; but that he 
 might be for aught I knew. But whether he be or 
 
138 
 
 not, it is the same thing to me ; for I am yet to 
 fight in the dark with I know not whom. 
 
 He says, he is not concerned to defend Socinus, 
 or any man who hath dropt imprudent words. Nor 
 did I require it of him. And whether he were or 
 were not the same man who wrote before ; yet, 
 since here he acts another person, I left it free for 
 him (pages 95, 96) to dechne, if he pleased, what 
 was said before; to grant what was there denied, or 
 deny what was there granted. 
 
 But then, he thinks, (page 1) I should not 
 charge him with writing contradictions, because 
 such things may possibly be found in the other's 
 answer. Nor do I. This is only a piece of his 
 wonted artifice of misreciting me. I tell him, 
 indeed, it is hard to please them both, when they 
 do not agree amongst themselves, and I did ob- 
 serve, and argue from it, what he grants, though 
 the other had denied it. But I never charge him 
 with what the other had said. And, if he look it 
 over again, he will find that I did not confront him, 
 to shew thence a contradiction, with what the other 
 had said ; but did confront what himself had said 
 in his ten first pages with what he says in the other 
 ten ; and it is manifest that, in the first ten, he 
 acts the Socinian, and in tiie latter ten, the Arian ; 
 but in whether of the twain he acts his own part it 
 was not easy to determine, till he now tells us he 
 is an Arian. 
 
 He had argued, (pages H, 14) that the Trinity 
 
139 
 
 are persons, as really, and as properly, and fully 
 personally distinct as three angels, and each person, 
 both Son and Holy Ghost by name, complete and 
 entire in himself, with as complete personal distinc- 
 tion as that in men and angels. From whence, 
 when I inferred his owning the personahty of the 
 Holy Ghost, he fearing, it seems, he had overshot 
 himself, now tells us (page 4) just as much as 
 becomes an Arian. But if he own him to be as 
 much a person as a man, or angel is a person, it is 
 as much, or perhaps more, than we need contend 
 for in this point. 
 
 I had charged him also with misreciting me in 
 many other things : as when I am introduced, very 
 often, as talking of two Gods, three Gods, personal 
 Gods, of adding several persons to our one God, 
 and the like ; according as here also he says (page 
 7) that I say, you yourself own two Gods, and why 
 may not I then three, when he knows very well this 
 is not my language; nor is any thing of all this 
 said by me. To this he now says, (page 5) it is 
 true enough he doth so ; but that he doth it by 
 inference. But he should then speak it as his 
 inference, not cite it as my words. 
 
 I might have taken notice, amongst a great 
 many gross mistakes, that where I had mentioned 
 the lords and commons of England declaring the 
 Prince of Orange to be King of England, France, 
 and Ireland, he misrecites it, (page 6) King of 
 England, Scotland, and France ; as if the parlia- 
 
140 
 
 ment of England had taken upon them to dispose of 
 the kingdom of Scotland, and not that of Ireland. 
 But this, and a many more, I passed over without 
 reflecting on it ; because, in his language, he is so 
 very neghgent and careless, and otherwise obnox- 
 ious, that it were endless to reflect on all. 
 
 But I was obliged to take notice, because it quite 
 perverts my argument, of what he says (page 4) 
 that I say, three sides make one cube, &c., which 
 is neither true, nor are they my words. I argued 
 not from three sides, but from the three dimensions 
 of a cube. This he calls trifling, and would per- 
 suade us that side and dimension diff'er no more 
 
 than muting and his other word, which is 
 
 fitter for his mouth than mine. But though he, 
 perhaps, know no diff'erence between them, yet he 
 should not have cited it as my words, and say that 
 I say so, when I did not : for I ought to know 
 better, and that a cube hath six sides, though but 
 three dimensions. Nor did I argue from the six 
 sides, but from the three dimensions. Yet I can 
 forgive him this, rather than when he doth it wil- 
 fully, though it misrecite my argument; because 
 I believe it to be out of pure ignorance, not of 
 malice. 
 
 He doth not like (page 6) either this or any 
 other similes, and would have me no more to insist 
 upon them; but he must excuse me from taking his 
 advice herein, unless he understood it better than, 
 bv wiiat was now said, ho seems to do; because, if 
 
141 
 
 he be not mistaken, as I think he is, they are very 
 far from my purpose. That is, he thinks they do 
 not prove the Trinity. True : these, alone, do not 
 prove it, nor was it intended they should ; but they 
 prove what they were brought to prove, that it is 
 not a contradiction, or inconsistent with reason, 
 that there may be three somewhats, which we call 
 persons, that are but one God. And thus much he 
 had before granted, and doth now again confirm it, 
 (pages 3, 4). It is true indeed, he says, I cannot 
 say that there is a contradiction in holding that 
 there may be three persons in God ; for, saith he, 
 " there be two sorts of contradictions, the one ex- 
 press, the other imphed. I cannot say there is a 
 contradiction in holding it ; because I have not the 
 definition of the word God so exact as to raise an 
 implied contradiction ; and, for an express contra- 
 diction, I do not pretend to it." If, therefore, there 
 be no contradiction, either express or implied, it is 
 what I was to prove. 
 
 But, saith he, the dispute shall nc^ end here. He 
 will be allowed the privilege (and m body doth deny 
 it him) to fetch in the first commai; Iment to define 
 the word God. With all my heart. I was never 
 against it ; for what he says, more than once, 
 (pages 3, 4) that I meanly cry, he flies to Scripture, 
 is but another piece of his wonted art of misre- 
 citing; there is nothing to that purpose in any 
 thing of mine. I do sometime blame him for 
 changing the state of the question ; as, when he 
 
142 
 
 would have me prove by reason tliat it is so, I tell 
 him that is not the question, nor is that to be 
 proved by reason. The question is, whether there 
 is any thing in reason why it cannot be so. Now, 
 let him keep to the question ; and then, if he think 
 he can prove, from Scripture, that it is inconsistent 
 with reason for three somewhats to be one God ; 
 or that it is a contradiction for God the Creator, 
 and God th§ Redeemer, and God the Sanctifier, 
 to be the same God ; or that it is impossible for 
 the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and 
 the God of Jacob, to be one and the same God, 
 let him try his skill. And let him make what use 
 he can of the first commandment to define the word 
 God, so as to prove this a contradiction. But, 
 when he had claimed this privilege, (and nobody 
 doth deny it) he makes no use of it for any such 
 definition. 
 
 The truth is, I had already granted him, from 
 that commandment, (pages 116, 117, 118, 121, 
 122) more than he was willing I should grant: that 
 we are to have no other God, great or little, equal 
 or unequal, but the Lord God of Israel. 
 
 Yes, says he, there is one Supreme God, another 
 creature God ; but that this is not to have two 
 personal Gods. How so ? If these be two Gods, 
 and each of them a person, complete and entire of 
 himself, as really, and properly, and fully, and per- 
 sonally distinct, as a man or angel, (as he had 
 before told us at pages 8, 14) they must needs be 
 
143 
 
 two personal Gods. But we, according to the first 
 commandment, acknowledge but one God ; and 
 those three somewhats, whom, in a metaphorical 
 sense, we call persons, not so to be distinct as to 
 become three Gods. 
 
 He hopes, however, to avoid the first command- 
 ment by saying that, though they be two Gods, 
 they are not two Gods co-equal, (page 5) and that 
 they worship the Son, not with supreme worship, 
 with mediation, not adoration, (page 6). What he 
 means by liis two worships of mediation and adora- 
 tion, I do not well understand, unless they be new 
 names for doiilia and latria. Nor do I remember 
 that I have before heard of a worship of mediation. 
 That Christ is our mediator I know ; but did not 
 know that he is our worshipper. 
 
 And what doth he think of the Israelites, when 
 they worshipped the golden calf? Surely they did 
 not think this calf to be co-equal with the Supreme 
 God : nor did they think it to be (Deus natus) a 
 god by nature ; but (Deus f actus) a made god, for 
 themselves had made it just before. Yet I never 
 knew that this did excuse them from idolatry. 
 
 He doth not own Christ to be the true God, (for 
 such there is but one, the only true God) nor yet a 
 false God, but a mean between both, (page 6). 
 Now it is true the heathen had (Deos medioxwnos) 
 their middling gods ; but I never knew that we 
 could worship such without idolatry. " Thou shalt 
 worship the Lord thy God, (the Supreme God) 
 
144 
 
 and him only shalt thou serve," was our Saviour's 
 doctrine, Matt. iv. 10 ; and St. John expressly calls 
 him the true God, 1 John viii. 20, (not a middling 
 God, between true and false) and, therefore, the 
 same God with the Father, the only true God. 
 
 To that character of Christ, Rev. i. 8, 11, " I am 
 Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end, the 
 first and the last, saith the Lord, which is, and was, 
 and is to come, the Almighty," he says this style 
 is given him in opposition to God's simpler one, / 
 am. But he should have observed that the same 
 title is, at v. 4, given to God, in contradistinction 
 
 to OhriSt, flTTO tb" o wv, Kai 6 rfv, kui 6 e/i^o/tiej'os-, — Kci} uiro ts" 
 
 'h]<T8~ XfJtffTH, &c. ; and if it were there a character 
 of the Supreme God, it is so here : and if ho think 
 the simpler term 6 wv, I am, to be more expressive 
 of the Supreme God, we have that also empha- 
 tically given to Christ, Rom. ix. 5, o wv CttI -uAvtwv, 
 he which is, or the Being over all, the Supreme 
 Being. 
 
 To what further I had brought (pages 124, 125, 
 126) to prove him to be the Supreme God, the 
 same God with the Father, not a middling or titular 
 God, he makes no reply ; which, therefore, stands 
 as it was, nor need I repeat it, because it may be 
 read there ; and it is so full and clear, that } need 
 add no more to it. 
 
 To what I had said of John xvii. 3, " To know 
 thee (not thee only, or only thee) the only true 
 God," he saith he hath answered already. And I 
 
145 
 
 have already replied, nor need I repeat it. Their 
 argument from thence is just in this form : the God 
 of Abraham is the only true God ; therefore, not 
 the God of Isaac, or the God of Jacob. Yes, say 
 I, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob is the 
 same God, but under another consideration. So 
 here, God the Creator (or God the Father) is the 
 only true God ; therefore, not God the Redeemer, 
 nor God the Sanctifier. Yes ; God the Redeemer, 
 and God the Sanctifier is the same God, the only 
 true God. In like manner, Jer. xvi. 14, 15, and 
 again, Jer. xxiii. 7? 8, " It shall no more be said, 
 the Lord liveth that brought up the children of 
 Israel out of the land of Egypt ; but, the Lord 
 liveth that brought up the children of Israel out of 
 the north country." Now, saith the first command- 
 ment, " I am the Lord thy God which brought 
 thee out of the land of Egypt ; thou shall have no 
 other God but me;" therefore, not the God which 
 brought them out of the north country. Yes, say 
 I, even this God also, which is not another God, 
 but the same God; though considered as the author 
 of another benefit. 
 
 There be many other things, both in his first and 
 second paper, (his Answer and his Vindication) 
 which lie very open to be reflected on, if it were 
 worth the while: but I think I have said enough 
 already ; and he thinks too much, that I have been 
 too stiff, too hard with him, (page 8) which things 
 
14() 
 
 I shall tlierefore omit, to save myself and the reader 
 the labour. 
 
 But three things he calls me to account for 
 omitting — his reproof of my false idea of the per- 
 sonality of God, the impossibility and blasphemy 
 of his Incarnation, and of the death of God, (page 
 8). Now when 1 had proved the things to be 
 true, I thought that had been a sufficient answer 
 to his calling them false, impossible, and blas- 
 phemous : for they are never the more so for his 
 calling them so. And I know not what further 
 answer he should expect, unless he would have me 
 say it is foul-mouthed blasphemy in him to call it 
 blasphemy. But if I should answer him all along 
 at this rate, according as his language deserves, 
 we should, instead of disputing, fall to right down 
 railing, which is the character he was afraid of, 
 (page 1). 
 
 However, to gratify him once more, that by the 
 Word, John i, is meant Christ, himself owns ; and 
 that "this Word was God from the beginning;" 
 that "he made the world, and all things;" and 
 that " without him was not any thing made which 
 was made," and, therefore, say I, himself was not 
 made, unless our Arian would have us think he 
 made himself; that this God is the Supreme God 
 we have proved at large ; (if he deny it to be 
 proved, we must leave it lo the reader to judge of 
 the aroMmionls) and that " tliis Word was made 
 
147 
 
 flesh." I hope I need not tell hhn that to be 
 made flesh, and to be incarnate, is all one, for 
 every one understands this who knows that caro 
 carnis is Latin for flesh : therefore this is no blas- 
 phemy. 
 
 Again, that God in Christ suff'ered and died, and 
 that we are redeemed by the blood of God, he had 
 before told us, (pages 13, 14). That this is the 
 true God we have proved at large, as v/as but 
 now said ; therefore the death of God (that is, 
 of him that was God as well as man) is no blas- 
 phemy. 
 
 Yet again, I do not take his reproof, as he calls 
 it, to be a proof that my idea of personality is 
 false, and, therefore, I did not think it deserved an 
 answer, having proved the thing before. Yet I 
 thought I had answered it, as much as it need to 
 be answered, when (at my page 130) I told him, 
 nor doth he deny it, that he seemed well pleased 
 (at his page 20) that I owned the word person to 
 be but metaphorical, though, (at his page 7) which 
 is the reproof he means, he did not like it : for till 
 after page 7 he acted the Socinian, and did not 
 come to act the Arian till afterward, and then he 
 seemed (at page 20) to like it well enough. 
 
 I shall yet add somewhat more upon that point, 
 which if it may not satisfy him, (who seems to 
 intimate (page 8) that he will not be satisfied) may 
 give some further satisfaction to the reader. 
 
 The word person (jiprsona) is originally a Latiu 
 
Us 
 
 word, and doth not properly signify a man, so as 
 that another person must needs imply another man, 
 for then the word liomo would have served, and 
 they needed not have taken in the word jiersona ; 
 but rather one so circumstantiated. And the same 
 man, if considered in other circumstances, consider- 
 ably different, is reputed another person. And that 
 this is the true notion of the word person appears 
 by those noted phrases, personam induere, per- 
 sonam deponere, personam agere, personam sus- 
 tinere, sustineo unus tres personas, and many the 
 like in approved Latin authors. Thus the same 
 man mav at once sustain the person of a king and 
 of a father, if he be invested both with regal and 
 paternal authority. Now because the king and 
 the father are, for the most part, not only different 
 persons, but different men also, and the like in 
 other cases ; hence it comes to pass that another 
 person is sometimes supposed to imply another 
 man ; but not always, nor is that the proper sense 
 of the word. It is Englished, in our dictionaries, 
 by the state, quality, or condition whereby one man 
 differs from another: and so, as the condition alters, 
 the person alters, though the man be the same. 
 Our schoolmen of later ages do sometimes apply 
 the word persona to angels as well as men ; but 
 even that is but metaphorical ; nor do I find that it 
 ever was so used in approved Latin authors, cither 
 for angels, genii, or their heathen gods, but for the 
 different state or condition of men onlv. 
 
149 
 
 Now when the same man doth thus sustain two 
 persons, as that of a king and that of a father, he 
 may, as to one thing, act as a king, by his regal 
 authority ; as to another thing as a father, by his 
 paternal authority. And these authorities may be 
 in subordination one to the other, though the man 
 be the same ; and what is done in either capacity, 
 may indifferently be said to be done by the man, or 
 by the king ; as that David, or the king, pardoned 
 Absalom, and in like manner by the man, or bv 
 the father. 
 
 This being the true and proper notion of the 
 word person, we are next to consider what it is 
 to signify in the present case. Where we are 
 to consider that the word person is not applied 
 in Scripture to these three so called : it is not 
 there said, these three persons are one, but only 
 these three are one. It is but the church's usaofe 
 
 o 
 
 that gives to these three somewhats the name of 
 persons. 
 
 And, therefore, our Arian was much mistaken 
 when he tells us, (page 20) that the word person is 
 the hinge of the controversy. The hinge of the 
 controversy is that notion concerning these three 
 somewhats, which the fathers, who first used it, did 
 intend to design by the name person : so that we 
 are not from the word person to determine what 
 was that notion, but from that notion which they 
 would express, to determine in what sense the word 
 person is here used. And if the word person do 
 
150 
 
 not well fit that sense, all that can be thence 
 inferred is no more but that they have made use 
 of an unfit name to express their notion. It is no 
 more but as if a cruel pope take the name of 
 Clement, or a wicked one the name of Pius ; or if 
 a man be named Wilson whose father's name was 
 Thomas. And in all such cases, certitudo rei tollit 
 errorem Jiominis. And if we know who is the man 
 designed by such a name, it is a ridiculous excep- 
 tion to say this is not the man, because that name 
 doth not well agree with his nature. It is just as if 
 one should argue there never was such a man as 
 whom they called Pope Pius, because the man 
 whom they so called was not a pious man. 
 
 Now two of these three being represented in 
 Scripture as Father and Son, and this Father said 
 to beget the Son, and all these in a sense meta- 
 phorical, (not in such sense as those words do 
 properly signify amongst men) they thought it not 
 unfit, in continuation of the same metaphor, to call 
 them persons. Because as the word person doth 
 properly agree to the relations of Father and Son 
 in a proper sense, so doth the word person in a 
 metaphorical sense to the Father and Son so taken 
 meta[>horically, and the word beget by a like 
 nu^laphor. 
 
 When, therefore, it is certain that the notion 
 which the ancient fathers had concerning these 
 three, which in a metaphorical sense tiiey called 
 p(M-s()ii, was this, thai \\\c\v is a (Hstinclioii 1)('I\mhmi 
 
151 
 
 ibem, greater than tlial of the Divine attributes, 
 but not so great as to make tbem tbree Gods ; it 
 is manifest tbat they took tbe metaphor, not from 
 that abusive sense of the word person, when, 
 amongst us, it is put for man, but from that proper 
 sense of the word persona, wherein it signifies the 
 state, condition, office, or relation of a man, as 
 variously circumstantiated with reference to others, 
 whereof the same man may sustain more than one. 
 As when David was the son of Jesse, the father of 
 Solomon, and the King of Israel. So if we say of 
 any, that he is a person of honour, a person of 
 worth, and a person of interest, that same man may 
 be all this without becoming three men. 
 
 Now this our Arian may call, if he please, a 
 quirk, a criticism, an undermining the very idea of 
 the word person, (as he did in his pages 7, 15, 17) 
 or may neglect it, if he please ; but the sober 
 reader, who understands it better, will have better 
 thoughts of it. 
 
 And, therefore, I shall not take his advice, 
 (pages 7, 8) to say thai God is the name of an 
 office, that so he might know how to attack me, as 
 he says, which, while I talk so warily, he knows not 
 how to do. I say, God is the name of the nature ; 
 but if he will have Christ to be the name of an 
 office, (the mediatory office) and the Comforter, or 
 even the Creator, the Redeemer, the Sanctifier, to 
 be names of work, function, or office, it vvill not be 
 much amiss. 
 
152 
 
 Now, when I had said this doctrine of ours is as 
 old at least as the New Testament, because I can 
 prove it from thence, he will have it (page 5) no 
 older than the disputes of Alexander and Athana- 
 sius, which the primitive church knew nothing of. 
 But he bars quotations all along : and, therefore, I 
 must not prove it to be known to the church before 
 that time, but leave it to the judgment of readers 
 versed in church history. Whose word must pass, 
 in this case, his or mine ? 
 
 To his question, (page 6) did the Jews ever 
 hear of it before Christianity ? I think they had 
 some intimations of it, as they had of the resur- 
 rection ; but not so clearly (either of them) as to 
 be generally understood of all, nor so fully as in 
 the New Testament : and I think it was from those 
 notices of it amongst the Jews that not only Plato 
 derived much of his philosophy, but other heathens 
 also much of their mythology ; though they did 
 much disguise, and sometimes ridicule the notices 
 they had thence, as our Arian now doth that of 
 the Trinity. But this is not the business now 
 before us. 
 
 Toward the close, he is so kind as not to desire 
 Arianism to be imposed on others, any more than 
 Trinitarianism on him, (page H). But neither is 
 this business before us, who are but disputants, not 
 hiw makers. 
 
 But so constant lie means to be lo his cause, lha( 
 he will hv content to ho pi^rsuaded out of liis uimio 
 
153 
 
 with his opinion. I think tliere is reason why he 
 should change his opinion ; but as to the changing 
 of his name he may use his discretion. But having 
 said much, that he might not be thought to desert 
 it, he thinks it advisable to drop the cause ; which 
 he may, if he please, and leave it to the reader to 
 judge of what is said. 
 
 I conclude as he doth ; " It is impossible but 
 offences will come ; but woe unto him through 
 whom they come. It were better for him that a 
 millstone," &c. 
 
 Yours, &c., 
 
 J. WALLIS. 
 
 Febr. 14, 169^. 
 
A SIXTH LETTER 
 
 rONCERNING 
 
 THE SACRED TRINITY 
 
 ANSWER TO A BOOK INTITLLED 
 
 OBSERVATIONS ON THE FOUR LETTERS, &c. 
 
 BY JOHN WALLIS, D.D. 
 
 PIUIFESSOR OF MATHEMATICS IN OXFORD. 
 
 [Published in 1691.] 
 
LETTER VI. 
 
 CONCERNING THE SACRED TRINITY. 
 
 Sir, 
 
 I FIND from my Socinian adversary, " Observa- 
 tions (as he calls it) on my four Letters," (he 
 might have said five, if he pleased) which I saw not 
 till yesterday, March 13. Nor do I see any great 
 need of publishing a hasty answer, there being so 
 little in it that deserves an answer, which had not 
 been answered before it was written ; and I may, 
 perhaps, ere long, meet with some such like obser- 
 vations upon my fifth, and then I may at once 
 answer both. 
 
 His first head he calls the design of the letters. 
 
 That which I undertook to maintain was clearly 
 stated thus, that it is not inconsistent with natural 
 reason that there may be three somewhats which 
 are but one God ; and that what in one regard are 
 three, may in another regard be one. To prove 
 this, and this only, I brought those arguments or 
 instances at which he cavils. 
 
158 
 
 This he now tells me, (page 4) tlie Socinians 
 will grant me : tliat is, they grant what I under- 
 took to prove, and of which, he says, no man ever 
 was so foolish as to doubt ; and my Arian adver- 
 sary in like manner, (in his Answer, page 3, and 
 his Vindication, pages 3, 5) that none but a mad- 
 man would ever deny it, and that he cannot say 
 there is any contradiction in saying there may be 
 three persons in God. Thus far, therefore, we are 
 agreed on all hands. 
 
 But he now tells me, (page 4) that this is not the 
 question. Yes; this is the question that I under- 
 took. It is true, there be other questions between 
 us and the Socinians ; but the question I undertook 
 was that, and he knows it was so. 
 
 Well but what, says he, is the question ? It is 
 this, he says, (page 4) whether there be three 
 Gods, or but one God. No; this is not the 
 question; for in this we are agreed also. The 
 Socinians, he savs, affirm there is but one God, 
 and so do I. 
 
 The proposition, he says, which, in favour of the 
 Trinity, I should have proved, (that is, the task he 
 sets me, not what I undertook) was this, that what 
 are in one regard three, may in another regard be 
 so one that all of them together are but one, and 
 yet each of them singly, and by itself, is that one. 
 
 Now, I think, I had proved this ; this corjt/fs 
 longum^ corpus latum, and corpus profnnduin, is 
 one cube. The corpus longiini is a cube, the 
 
159 
 
 corpus latum is a cube, and the corpus profundwn 
 is a cube ; and yet this corpus longum, latum, and 
 profundum is altogether but one cube. 
 
 But this is Latin : and his challenge is, (page 5) 
 shew me that Trinitarian that dares dispute the 
 question in plain English. I will endeavour that 
 too. David the son of Jesse was a man, and David 
 King of Israel was a man, and David the father of 
 Solomon was a man ; yet David the son of Jesse, 
 the King of Israel, and father of Solomon was 
 altogether but one man : and this is plain English, 
 without the words of abstract, concrete, paternity, 
 personality, at which he there cavils, or other hard 
 words than what his tankard bearer might under- 
 stand. 
 
 Well but, says he, we may indeed say, this long 
 body is a cube, meaning thereby, this long body, 
 which is also broad and high, is a cube ; and if it 
 were not broad and high it were not a cube; but' 
 we cannot say so here. I will try if I cannot hit 
 this too. The all-wise God, is God all-sufficient ; 
 the almighty God, is God all- sufficip.it ; the ever- 
 lasting God, is God all-sufficient ; meaning by the 
 all-wise God, the God who is also almighty and 
 everlasting; and if he were not also almighty and 
 everlasting, he were not all-sufficient : yet this all- 
 wise, almighty, and everlasting God is altogether 
 but one God all-sufficient. 
 
 But supposing, says he, the doctor's instances do 
 satisfy this difficulty, (as I think thev do) does he 
 
1()0 
 
 not know there are many more (yes, lie dolh know- 
 it) to whicli these instances are not applicable ? 
 Very true : and, therefore, they were not brought 
 to prove all points which concern the Trinity : they 
 w^ere brought to prove this point in particular, that 
 it is not inconsistent with reason that three some- 
 whats may be one God ; and if they prove this, it 
 is what they were brought to prove. When I 
 undertake other points, I may use other arguments. 
 And this hath been said so often, that, if he have 
 any thing else of moment to say, it is strange that 
 repeating the same objection, without any further 
 strength, he should put me so often to give the 
 same answer. 
 
 His next head is of somewhats and persons. 
 
 We are told that Christ and the Father are one, 
 John X. 30, and these three are one, 1 John v. 7? 
 without giving a name to these three : nor what 
 shall we call them ? These three — what ? Not 
 three Gods, for that is false : there is but one 
 God. And three persons he will not allow me to 
 call them, because it is not a scriptural word : 
 person he grants is scriptural, Heb. i. 3, but not 
 persons. I must not call them three nothings ; for 
 certainly it was never meant to be thus understood, 
 these three nothings are one, and when Christ said, 
 " I and the Father are one," he did not mean we 
 two nothings are one. And if they be not nothing, 
 they must be somewhat ; and three such, must be 
 three somewhats; and I could not think of a more 
 
161 
 
 innocent word to design them by ; and, therefore, 
 that we might not quarrel about words, I was 
 content to waive the name of persons, and, without 
 fixing a new name on them, design them by the 
 word somewhat, presuming that those who do not 
 take them to be nothing, would allow them to be 
 somewhat. But neither will this word pass with 
 him. 
 
 Now this is a hard case. The Scripture says 
 these three, without giving them a name. And 
 then, we must not give them a name oecause that 
 name will be unscriptural ; and yet if we do not 
 give them a name, he tells us they be three some- 
 whats, without name or notion ; and that no two 
 can agree what this is, or what is thereby meant ; 
 but as many writers so many explications, (pages 
 8, 16). 
 
 To which I say, as to the notion, I think the 
 Orthodox are all, thus far, agreed, that they are 
 three such somewhats in God, as differ from each 
 other more than what we commonly call the Divine 
 attributes, but not so as to be three Gods. And 
 though, within these limits, divers men may diversly 
 express themselves, yet in this notion the Ortho- 
 dox, I think, do all agree ; and this I had before 
 declared, (Letter iv, page 131) though he please 
 to take no notice of it. So that we are not without 
 a n^'ion of it. And if he will allow us to give 
 a \ame to it, that name, whatever it be, is so to 
 I 3 understood as to denote this notion. And we 
 
 L 
 
16-2 
 
 tliink the word person a fit name to denote this 
 notion hy. But if we may not give it a name, we 
 must then say the notion is such as was but now 
 explained. But they will not allow us to give it a 
 name. And as to our agreement or disagreement, 
 I think the Trinitarians do less disam-ee amonojst 
 themselves than do the Anti-Trinitarians. 
 
 But, he says, (page 9) I own the word persons, 
 when applied to God, to be but metaphorical, and 
 not to signify just the same as when applied to 
 men, but somewhat analogous thereunto. True ; 
 I do so. And I have given my reasons why I do 
 so, more than once ; because two of them being 
 represented to us in Scripture under the names of 
 Father and Son, and this Son said to be begotten 
 of that Father, (which words are therefore not to 
 be quarrelled with, because Scripture language) 
 no man thinks that the one is so a Father, or the 
 other so a Son, or so begotten, as these words 
 signify concerning men, but somewhat analagous 
 thereunto, and in what sense they are Father and 
 Son, they are, in a sense analogous thereunto, two 
 persons, and the Holy Ghost a third. For father 
 and son, in a proper sense amongst men, are such 
 relatives as the Latins did denote by the word per- 
 sona in the first and proper signification of that 
 word ; and, consequently, father and son in this 
 analogical sense are, in a continuation of the same 
 analogv, persons in a like analogical sense. 
 
 But he says further, that in the explication of the 
 
163 
 
 Athanasian Creed, (Letter iii, page 43) I interpret 
 awai v7r6aTa(7ei9, by truly persoiis, or properly persons. 
 I do so : because I suppose it was intended to call 
 them truly or properly such persons as are there 
 meant, (answering to the Greek hypostases) that is, 
 in such a sense as they are there called Father and 
 Son, and that the word person is a true and proper 
 continuation of the same analogy. 
 
 I have before declared, more than once, (in the 
 places by him cited, pages 9, 10) that the true and 
 proper sense of the Latin word persona is not to 
 denote a man simply, for this with them was hoino, 
 not persona, but such quality, state, or condition of 
 a man, whereby he is distinguished from, or stands 
 related to, other men, as a king, a father, a judge, 
 and the like. And accordingly the same man may 
 sustain divers persons ; he may be a king and a 
 father ; and according as such condition varies the 
 person also varies. It is true that in English, for 
 went of a word that answers to homo, we sometimes 
 make use of the word person when we speak indif- 
 ferently of man, woman, or child ; as when a man, 
 or woman, and an infant are spoken of as three per- 
 sons ; but these the Latins would not have called 
 tres personas, but fres homines ; but if considered 
 as father, mother, and child, they may, as thus 
 related, be called tres perse- . And the school- 
 men sometimes, and some others in imitation of 
 them, do in a like sense use the Vvord persona, for 
 want of a Latin word which did indifferently respect 
 
164 
 
 men and angels. But these are new senses of the 
 word persona, quite different from what the word 
 signified in the purity of the Latin tongue, and un- 
 known, I suppose, to the fathers, who first applied 
 the word persona' to those of the sacred Trinity, 
 as I had before shewed at large. (Letter v, page 
 147, &c.) 
 
 But at this rate, he tells us, (page 10) the 
 Socinians will allow God the Creator, God the 
 Redeemer, and God the Sanctifier, or God the 
 Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, to be three persons. 
 And I am not sorry to hear it ; but then I would 
 not have him say, as here, that I make them to 
 be only three names, nor yet (as page 16) three 
 Gods. They are more than three names, but not 
 three Gods. For even amongst men, to be a 
 father is more than a name or title; and, in the 
 Godhead, the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost differ 
 more than so many names. And though I will not 
 take upon me to determine precisely how great the 
 distinction is, (which is what at page 8 he cites out 
 of my Letter ii, page 26) because I would not be 
 positive where the Scripture is silent ; yet certainly 
 it is not so great as to make them three Gods, but 
 greater than merely three names, or even that 
 between what we commonly call the Divine attri- 
 butes. 
 
 His next head is about my explication of tlie 
 Athanasian Creed, which he finds, he says, to be 
 an explication of the damnatory clauses therein. 
 
165 
 
 And he is not much amiss in that observation. He 
 was told so in the first words of that Explication, 
 and in the last words of the Postscript, that it was 
 in pursuance of a clause in a former letter to that 
 purpose ; and that, though other things are ex- 
 plained in it, it was chiefly intended for the satisfac- 
 tion of those who do believe the doctrine of it, but 
 stumbled at those clauses, to shew that they need 
 not, for these clauses, to reject that creed. 
 
 He tells us, (page 11) there is a diff'erence 
 between necessary and requisite. Be it so. But 
 the word there is x/??}, oportet, not uvariKa7ov, which I 
 had rendered (pages 35, 50) by these words, it is 
 necessary, it is mainly necessary, it is a principal 
 requisite, he ought to believe it. And certainly, if 
 he had not a great desire to cavil, he would not 
 have quarrelled at this exposition as not full enough 
 for the word xp>i- 
 
 I had said this creed was part of the Catholic 
 faith, the whole of which I took to be the whole 
 word of God, which a man is obliged to believe as 
 to the substantials of it ; but may be saved, not- 
 withstanding an ignorance or mistake as to some 
 particulars of lesser moment. Now he would have 
 it to be understood that this creed is the whole, not 
 only a part of the Catholic faith ; that nothing must 
 be added to it, nothing taken from it : and that 
 every man and woman shall perish everlastingly 
 who doth not believe and profess this, without 
 taking aught from it, or adding aught to it. Why 
 
166 
 
 I think otherwise, I have shewed before, and need 
 not repeat it, but leave it to the reader to judge 
 whether this or that be Hkelier to be true, and 
 whether he take it to be the meaning of this writer, 
 that all must needs be damned who lived and died 
 before this creed was written; or who possibly never 
 saw it or heard of it, though they should believe all 
 the substantial of the Christian faith, or Word of 
 God, and held nothing destructive of it ; or who do 
 not believe just so much and no more. But if that 
 be his opinion, he doth interpret it more severely 
 against himself than I would have done, or, I think, 
 any man who had not a mind to cavil. 
 
 His next head is about the opinions charged 
 upon Socinus and the Socinians ; concerning which 
 I do not think it needful to trouble the reader with 
 repeating what I had said of those opinions, (Letter 
 iii, page 72, &c., and Letter iv, page 96, &c.) or 
 what he now brings in excuse of it, but shall leave 
 it to the reader to judge, upon what is said on both 
 sides, whether I have not thereby fully proved the 
 charge, of the slight opinion they have of the Scrip- 
 ture, in competition with reason, when it crosses 
 any of their beloved tenets ; and yet, if that be not 
 enough, himself directs (page 16) to Maresius and 
 Lubertus, where, it seems, is more to be found to 
 the same purpose. 
 
 But his plea for himself, (page 16) I do admit, 
 that if Socinus have spoken erroneously, or unad- 
 visedly, or hyporbohcally, he is not ol)ligcd to 
 
167 
 
 defend it ; nor do I know that he is obhged to be 
 a Socinian : he may renounce of Socinus what he 
 pleases. 
 
 Whether he who defended the thesis at Franeker 
 were a professed Socinian, or but covertly so, I 
 cannot tell, because 1 do not know the man. But 
 I do not think it more strange to find a Socinian 
 at Franeker, notwithstanding the synod of Dort, 
 than at London. And sometime (page 16) he 
 will hardly allow himself a Socinian, nor any of 
 his party : but I hope he will not deny Socinus to 
 have been a Socinian. Therefore so far, at least, 
 I was right. 
 
 But he would not have me blacken a man long 
 since dead, who never did me any injury. Very 
 well ; he had before challenged me to maintain my 
 charge against the Socinians, and he now quarrels 
 with me for so doing. He will now hardly allow 
 any to be a Socinian but Socinus himself; and yet 
 I must not blacken Socinus. What am I then to 
 do ? I will even leave it as it is, and let the reader 
 judge : and if he doubt whether I, or my adversary, 
 be more fair in our quotations, let him consult the 
 places, and judge accordingly ; and particularly 
 that of epist. 5 ad VolkeUum. I am at present 
 not at home, nor have books about me ; but sure 
 I am that Socinus doth there, a few lines before 
 what this Observator repeats, directly deny that the 
 soul, after death, doth subsist, according as I had 
 affirmed, though I cannot now recite the whole 
 
168 
 
 sentence, because I have not the book at hand,* 
 but this the repeater, whether by docking or deca- 
 pitation, thinks fit to omit. And then I presume 
 the reader will there find that per se is not meant 
 so by itself, or of his own nature, as not by the 
 gift and grace of God, for so it might as well be 
 said of the soul before death, but so by itself as 
 not in conjunction with the body; and then the 
 sense must be, that though the soul with the body 
 be prcemiorum et pcenarum capax, yet the soul of 
 itself without the body is not so. But I leave this 
 and the rest wholly to the reader's judgment, to 
 judge, upon view, as he shall see cause; adding 
 this also, that he will find it is not only as to this 
 point of the Trinity that Socinus discovers so slight 
 an opinion of the Scriptures, in competition with 
 
 * Socinus's words are these, " Velim autem scias, me duplici de causa, 
 prseter cam quam ipse commemoras, ab ista qua;stione, de animae immor- 
 talitate, abstiniiisse. Nam et milii res erat cum homine qui me calumniandi, 
 inque omnium invidiam vocandi, omnem occasionem quaerebat. Necdimi 
 mihi, quid de qua;stione ista statuendum sit, plane exploratum erat ; quem- 
 admodum nee hodie (juidem est. Tantum id mihi videtur statui posse ; 
 post banc vitam, animam seu animum hominis non ita per sc subsistere ut 
 pricmia ulla potnasvc sentiat, vcl etiam ista sentiendi sit cjipax. Quae mea 
 firma opinio facile potest ex disputatione ista colligi : cum ex multis quae 
 identidem a me ibi dicuntur ; turn ex ea ipsa, de qua praecipue agitur, sen- 
 tentia mea. Nam quamvis, cum ipso Puccio disputans, qui, ut immortali- 
 tatem primi hominis ante peccatum probaret, animi ipsius immortalitatem 
 mihi objiciebat, ostendi, non propterea dici posse homiiicm immortalera 
 (juia anima ipsius non moriatur : tamen satis apparet me sentire, non ita 
 vivere, post hominis ipsius mortem, animam ejus, ut per se pra;mionmi 
 popnariimve capax cxistat : cum in ipso primo homine, totius immortali- 
 tatis rationem uni gi-atiae Divinae tribuo ; ncc in ipsa creationc quidquam 
 immortalis vitse agnosco." Socini Kpist. b ad Volhelium ; die 16 Novem- 
 hris, Anno 1596. 
 
169 
 
 reason ; but in other points also, where they do not 
 favour his opinions. 
 
 He had told us before of somebody at Oxford, 
 who, maintaining a thesis against the Socinians, 
 was baffled by his opponent. Who or when this 
 was he had not told us ; nor what that thesis was. 
 He now tells us, (page 16) it was a thesis against 
 the Socinians, that they preferred reason before 
 Scripture. Perhaps, when he recollects himself, 
 or consults his informer, he may find, if any such 
 thing happened as he suggests, it was on some 
 other thesis, and not against the Socinians, but 
 against the Arminians. But, be it as he says, I 
 know nothing of it, and shall not concern myself 
 about it. 
 
 But in requital of this story I told him another 
 of Sandius, who having proposed a challenge, upon 
 his ProUema Faradoxum^ contrary to the divinity 
 of the Holy Ghost, was so answered by Wittichius, 
 that (as appears by a printed letter published by 
 his friend and partner in that disputation) they 
 were so convinced as to change their opinion. I 
 now add that it so appears, not only by his friend's 
 printed letter, but by another of Sandius' himself 
 to Whtichius, which I have not seen, and I think 
 it was never printed, but the contents of it may be 
 seen in another treatise of Wittichius, with this 
 title, ''Causa Spiritiis Sancti Victriv, printed at 
 Leyden, 1682." 
 
170 
 
 But this matter, he says, is both unskilfully and 
 unfairly related. Why unskilfully ? why unfairly ? 
 He says Sandius was an Arian. Be it so. Not a 
 Socinian. Very well. Nor did I say that he was ; 
 but a friend of the Socinians. He was an Anti- 
 Trinitarian, and did promote, against the Trinita- 
 rians, the common cause of Arians and Socinians, 
 though these, perhaps, might quarrel amongst 
 themselves. But this Observator thought, it seems, 
 because I did not call him an Arian, that I did 
 not know him so to be. And this, I guess, is 
 what he calls unskilful. But I can give him a 
 better reason why I should not call him so. I 
 did not then know I should have an Arian adver- 
 sary to deal with, for my Arian adversary did not 
 yet appear ; but my Socinian adversary was already 
 upon the stage, and with him I was now deal- 
 ing. Yet I could not say that Sandius was a 
 Socinian, but (that the Socinian might be con- 
 cerned in the story) I said, he was a friend of 
 theirs. And what unskilfulness appears in this ? 
 Had I then known, what since I do, that I was to 
 be attacked by an Arian also, I should rather have 
 called him an Anti-Trinitarian, which had been 
 common to both : but, knowing then of none but a 
 Socinian adversary, I chose to call him a friend of 
 theirs, which was neither unfair nor unskilful. 
 
 Perhaps he thinks, if not unskilful, it was at least 
 unfair to say that his partner and he changed their 
 
171 
 
 opinion. But was it not so ? doth not his associate 
 expressly tell us, in the very title page of his letter 
 of thanks for those animadversions, per quas (ani- 
 madversiones) errores suos rejicere coactus est? 
 whereby he was constrained to relinquish his errors ? 
 Well, but did they change all their opinions ? did 
 they relinquish all their errors ? I believe not, but 
 that opinion which was then in dispute ; his Prob- 
 lema Paradoa:um, and the errors therein. And, if he 
 consult the book, he will find it was so; and that this 
 paradox was it which he did relinquish. And what 
 his paradox was he might there see it as well as I. 
 Nor had he told me who, and when, and upon what 
 question, his supposed Anti-Socinian was baffled 
 by his opponent, or how I might come to know it ; 
 and even now, when he pretends to tell me the 
 question, I doubt he is mistaken therein. But what 
 unfairness was there in all this ? when I had told 
 him where he might find as much of it as I could 
 tell him. 
 
 But he tells us now that Sandius was satisfied 
 indeed, as to the point then in question, but not of 
 the divinity of the Holy Spirit. Nor did I say that 
 he was. But I can tell him that he was nearer, 
 even to this, than our Observator was aware, or 
 at least nearer than he thinks fit to own to us. 
 If he consult Wittichius's latter treatise, entituled 
 "Causa Spiritus Sancti Victrix,'' he will there find 
 an extract of a manuscript letter of Sandius to him, 
 in which, to the best of my remembrance, for I 
 
172 
 
 have not here the book at hand,* he tells Witti- 
 chius to this purpose, " That whereas in his Prohlema 
 Paradoxum he had been of opinion that by the 
 Holy Spirit might be meant the whole number of 
 good angels, he did not now think so well of that 
 opinion as before their disputation ; but was con- 
 sidering of two other opinions to be substituted in 
 stead thereof: that by the Holy Ghost might be 
 meant, not the whole number of good angels, as 
 before ; but either some select number of them, as 
 being a superior order, or else some one angel as 
 superior to all the rest, which two he suggests to 
 Wittichius's further consideration. But, if neither 
 
 * Sandius's words are these, (cited by Wittichius in bis Causa Spiritils 
 Sancti Victrix, page 4) "Jam finitis illis quae ad librum tuum regerenda 
 duxi, prseter ea quae satis a socio meo responsum puto, oro te ne graveris 
 ulteriiis boc argumentum prosequi ; quo tandem Veritas, si fieri possit, pate- 
 fiat ; et velut scintilla ex silice ad cbalybem alliso prosiliat. Nam ingenue 
 fateor, mibi conjecturam meam longe verisimiliorem visam, antequam librum 
 tuum, quo me docere aggressus cs, legissem. Non pariim et contulit ad eam 
 debilitandam, consideratio mea, John i. 32, 33, et Matt. iv. 11. Nam post- 
 quam in baptismo Spiritus Sanctus super Christum descendit, et super eum 
 mansit, eumque in desertum duxit, nee ab eo recessit ; cum non verisimile 
 sit Christum tentationem Satane sine Spiritus Sancti auxilio super/isse ; finita 
 demum tentationc dicuntur angeli accessisse et ministrrisse ei. Quod si 
 itaque conjectura mea consistere non possit, ut vix possit, perpendcndum 
 erit, an non Spiritus Sanctus possint esse septem Spiritus principales ; vel, 
 multitudo Spirituum longe subtiliorum cseteris angelonim ordinibus, fijrtean 
 natura ipsa : et an per banc bypothesin salvari possint omnes difficultates 
 contra conjecturem meam bactenus productae. Novi quendam qui sentit, 
 Spiritum Sanctum quidem esse unam personam, eamquc crcatam, sed totum 
 iniiversum essentia sua pervadentem. Valde autem diibito an bxc sententia 
 subsistere queat. Ilia de una persona Spiritus Sancti comprehensis sub eo 
 angelis tanquam ejus ministris et satellitibus milii non admodum amdet. Si 
 autem horum nihil verum comperiatur; timi dcmum mibi vcrisim illinium 
 videbitur, Spiritum Sanctum cum Deo Patre ejusque Vcrbo, unum Doum, 
 nnam substaiitiam, imum individuum esse. 
 
173 
 
 of these should succeed, (as he doubted they would 
 not) he was then inclinable to say, with him, that 
 the Holy Ghost was, indeed, the same eternal God 
 with the Father and the Son." If, in reciting this 
 by memory, I have failed in any considerable cir- 
 cumstance, I submit it to be rectified by the book. 
 But if our Observator have seen that treatise, and 
 knows it thus to be, I think we have more reason 
 to complain of unfairness in his representing it as he 
 doth ; as if he remained fixed in this opinion, that 
 the Holy Ghost was so a person as the Arians 
 always held. 
 
 I am sorry to detain the reader by following our 
 Observator in his so many long excursions which do 
 so little concern the business before us. For wh?it, 
 almost, of what hath been hitherto mentioned of his, 
 doth tend to the confutation of what we affirm, that 
 what we call three persons are more than three 
 names, but not three Gods ? 
 
 In part of his two last leaves he would seem to 
 come somewhat nearer to the business, but not 
 much. He tells us, (page 17) that Luther and 
 Calvin did not like the word Trinity.* It may be 
 so. I will take his word for it without seeking the 
 places, because I do not think it worth while. 
 That they say it is barbarous and sounds oddly — I 
 suppose he knows that by a barbarous word is 
 commonly meant a word not used by classic authors, 
 
 * Note Q. 
 
174 
 
 or not agreeable to the usual forms of speech in 
 Latin and Greek writers. Be it so. And what if 
 I had said so too? Suppose a hunter should say, 
 a trinity of hares sounds oddly, and another say the 
 like of a leash, and choose rather to say, in plain 
 English, three hares, the sense is still the same. 
 And if Calvin, who loved a smooth style and pure 
 Latin words, should say that Trinitas is a barba- 
 rous word, as not extant in classic authors, what 
 great matter is there in all this ? 
 
 I will not trouble myself to inquire whether Tri- 
 nitas be, in that sense, used in Tully ; but sure I 
 am that rpia^ is a good Greek word. And words, 
 though not so well contrived at first, yet when 
 orfce received into common use, and the meaning 
 thereof understood, we choose to retain, rather 
 than to make a needless change. Thus the com- 
 mon phrases of your worship, your honour, your 
 lordship, &c., for one worshipful, honourable, a lord, 
 &c., have been noted long since, by Erasmus in his 
 Colloquies, to be not analogous to the more usual 
 forms of speech in Latin and Greek writers; yet 
 custom hath made them allowable, and, therefore, 
 we do not scruple to use them. So Luther and 
 Calvin, it seems, thought the word Tres to be a 
 better Latin word, in this case, than Trinitas. And 
 I had allowed our adversary, (Letter iv, page 130) 
 instead of Trinity in Unity to say, if that will please 
 him better, three in one. Yet three and trinity, 
 to my apprehension, differ no more than ten and a 
 
175 
 
 decade, or twelve and a dozen. But what is all this 
 to the matter in hand ? Doth Luther or Calvin any 
 where say that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are but 
 three names ? or, that they be three Gods ? If they 
 say neither of these, they do not contradict what we 
 affirm. It is but as if a man should choose to say 
 ten commandments, rather than a decade, or half a 
 score ; or to say there are, in the Apostles' Creed, 
 twelve articles rather than a dozen. And if these 
 be the great disagreements he there complains of, 
 it comes to a very small matter. 
 
 To his argument, that only the Father is God, 
 because of John xvii. 3, " To know thee the only 
 true God," he says, (page 17) I give three answers. 
 I do so. But, he says, the first and third are des- 
 tructive of one another. Not so : they all agree 
 very well, and any of them will destroy his argu- 
 ment. It is not said, " thee only," but " the only 
 true God." He would have us think it all one to 
 say, " thee only, to be the true God," and " thee 
 to be the only true God." I think otherwise. The 
 one gives some seeming colour for his objection ; 
 the other not the least shadow. His argument, the 
 Father is the only true God, therefore not the Son 
 or Holy Ghost, is just in this form — the God of 
 Abraham is the only true God, therefore not the 
 God of Isaac, nor the God of Jacob, which, I pre- 
 sume, he will not allow to be a good consequence. 
 
 He would have it thought I grant, that if it were 
 as thi'" form, " thee onlv, the true God," then the 
 
17(i 
 
 Socinians had undoubtedly gained the point. Not 
 so. He hath not heard me say so yet, nor is he 
 like to do. If I should say, he that brought Israel 
 out of Egypt, and he only, is the true God, my 
 meaning would be but this — that God who brought 
 Israel out of Egypt, and that God only, is the true 
 God ; and this must be understood to be said of 
 him, not as their deliverer out of Egypt, but as 
 God : for he was the true God, and the only true 
 God, long before he brought Israel out of Egypt, 
 and would have been so, though they had never 
 been, or had never been so brought out. There 
 may be vera prcedicatio, which is not Ka06\8 TrpwTou.* 
 And, of all men living, the Socinians are obliged 
 to say that this title, the true God, or only true 
 God, belongs to him, not as Father, but as God : 
 for if, as they would have us think, our Lord Jesus 
 Christ had no being before his being made man of 
 the Virgin Mary, then neither had he a father till 
 that time. But he was the only true God from all 
 eternity; and, therefore, not (with this reduplica- 
 tion) as Father of our Lord Jesus Christ : for he 
 was the only true God, according to their doctrine, 
 long before the man Christ had a father, and would 
 so have been, though this man had never been. 
 And though Christ speak to him as his Father, yet 
 the title of the only true God he ascribes to him as 
 God. If Solomon should have said to David, thou, 
 
 * Note R. 
 
177 
 
 father, art King of Israel ; he was not, therefore, 
 King of Israel as father of Solomon ; for he was so 
 long before he was Solomon's father, which takes 
 away all colour of our Observator's imaginary con- 
 tradiction here pretended, and leaves not the least 
 umbrage for it. 
 
 As little force is there in his other cavil, (page 
 18) if the Father and Son be the only true God, 
 then not the Holy Ghost. Yes ; the Holy Ghost 
 also ; for though it be not here affirmed, yet neither 
 is it here denied. 
 
 But these objections of his have been so often 
 brought, and so often answered, that it is tedious 
 to see the same things brought so often over and 
 over again. 
 
 The like I say of what he repeats from 1 Cor. 
 viii. 6, which is answered sufficiently, (Letter iii, 
 page 79). Nor is it at all strange, or uncommon, 
 that the word father should be sometime spoken 
 of God personally considered, as Father of our 
 Lord Jesus Christ, and sometime of God indefi- 
 nitely, according to his essence, without respect to 
 this or that person. " Father of spirits," Heb. 
 xii. 9. " Doubtless thou art our Father : thou, 
 O Lord, art our Father and our Redeemer," Isaiah 
 Ixiii. 16. " Thou shalt call me My Father," Jer. 
 iii. 4, 19? which the Socinians must not say to 
 be meant as to his personality, as Father of our 
 Lord Jesus Christ, for such, they say, he then 
 
178 
 
 was not, but as to his essence. " The everlasting 
 Father," Isaiah ix. 6, spoken of Christ, not as to 
 his personality, for so he was Son, but as to his 
 essence. 
 
 As to what he objects, (page 19) to that of 
 Rom. ix. 5, " Christ, who is over all, God blessed 
 for ever, Amen," I refer to what is said, (Letter 
 iii, page 83) too large to repeat here. But how 
 Amen, which is a word of asseveration, should 
 make it nonsense, I do not understand. And what 
 was said of God indefinitely. Rev. i. 4, is said 
 particularly of Christ, v. 8, " Who was dead and 
 is alive," v. 17, 18, which description of Christ in 
 particular he had begun at' v. 5, and continues 
 beyond this place. If he deny it, let the reader 
 judge. 
 
 As to that of 1 John v. 7, I refer to what hath 
 been said already. I think there is not much more 
 to be said thereof, on either side, than had been 
 said long before either he or I began to write. 
 And if, after all, he resolve to hold to his opinion, 
 he must give me leave to retain mine ; and let the 
 reader judge as he sees cause. And so for that of 
 Matt, xxviii. 19- 
 
 As to all, in all those letters to which he makes 
 no reply, it stands as it did : and if the reader 
 please to read them over again he will be able to 
 judge, whether it be all so contemptible as to have 
 nothino- of weioht in it. 
 
179 
 
 I have said nothing to his blustering and con- 
 temptuous language, his canting (or rather rant- 
 ing) against Schools, Metaphysics, Mother Church, 
 Alma Mater Academia, School terms, Gothish and 
 Vandelic terms, Abstract, Concrete; as if long and 
 length were all one, and all one to say David was 
 kingdom of Israel, and the kingdom of Israel was 
 father to Solomon, as to say this of the King of 
 Israel, and other the like, to which he is wont to 
 run out when he hath little else to say, but would 
 seem to say somewhat to make a noise ; because 
 the reader would know, without my telling him, 
 that this is raving rather than arguing. And when 
 he tells us, so often, of " The Brief History of the 
 Unitarians," why might not I as well tell him, that 
 Doctor Sherlock had answered it, and means, I 
 suppose, to vindicate that answer, if he think there 
 be need. 
 
 So, when he runs division upon imperial edicts, 
 confiscations, and banishments, seizing and burning 
 of books, capital punishments, fire and faggot, with 
 many other things wherein I am not concerned, 
 what is all this to me ? I do not know that I 
 ever did him any hurt, unless by discovering his 
 errors. I was only arguing as a disputant, not 
 making laws. 
 
 As little need be said of a many little things, as 
 little to the purpose ; as, whether my Third Letter 
 
180 
 
 were not rather a book? Whether the things 
 which God hath prepared for them that love him, 
 are the only deep things of God which we cannot 
 comprehend, or the only secret things which be- 
 long to God, while things revealed belong to us? 
 Whether, what I knew forty years ago, I had been 
 studying and considering forty years, without think- 
 ing of aught else all the while ? Which certainly 
 I could not be, for I was not then forty years old. 
 Whether it be better English to say, God the 
 Creator, God the Redeemer, and God the Sanc- 
 tifier are, or is but one God ? Whether nmnn, in 
 the neuter gender, put absolute without a substan- 
 tive, do not usually signify one thing? Whether 
 the word Trinitas be a pure Latin, or a barbarous 
 word, not to be found in Tully, any more than 
 Unitarian? Whether Tres or Trinitas be the 
 better Latin word? Whether what, in his former 
 letter, (page 9) were but old fashioned notions, be 
 now, in his last, new and cautious? With other 
 the like. 
 
 But, besides that in these and many others, he 
 cavils without a cause, what is all this to the 
 business in hand ? Or how doth it contradict what 
 I affirm ? viz. 
 
 That, what in one consideration are three, may 
 in another consideration be but one. 
 
 That, we may safelv sav, without absurdity, con- 
 
181 
 
 tradiction, or inconsistence with reason, there may 
 be in God three somewhats, which we commonly 
 call persons, that are but one God. 
 
 That, these three are more than three names, 
 but not three Gods. 
 
 That, God the Creator, God the Redeemer, 
 and God the Sanctifier, otherwise called God the 
 Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost, 
 are such three. 
 
 I see nothing of what he hath said which doth 
 overthrow any of these. 
 
 Yours, 
 
 J. WALLIS. 
 
 Febr. 14, l69i. 
 
A SEVENTH LETTER 
 
 THE SACRED TRINITY, 
 
 OCCASIONED BV 
 
 A SECOND LETTER FROM W. J. 
 
 BY JOHN WALL IS, D.D. 
 
 PROFESSOR OF GEOMETRY IN OXFORD. 
 
 [Published in 1«!)1.] 
 
LE'[TRR VII. 
 
 CONCERNING THE SACRED TRINITY. 
 
 In a Postscript to my Sixth Letter, which should 
 have been printed with it, but came, it seems, too 
 late, after all the sheets were printed off, I gave 
 notice that I had received from London, the night 
 before, (March 27) another letter from W. J., of a 
 like import with his former, but somewhat fuller. 
 
 That what in it did directly concern me were but 
 expressions of thanks, respect, and approbation, for 
 which I knew not how otherwise, than by such a 
 way, to return him my acknowledgment ; because 
 he did neither signify who he is that writes, nor do 
 I know any in London to whose name the letters 
 W. J. do belong. 
 
 That there were reflections in it, on some expres- 
 sions of a learned author ; which expressions I do 
 not see that I am at all engaged to defend, and 
 did, therefore, waive them. 
 
 That to say the three Divine persons are three 
 intelligent Beings, three substantial Beings, three 
 
18(j 
 
 Spirits, really distinct, though mutually conscious, 
 is more, he thinks, than that learned author needed 
 to have said, and I think so too ; and that it is 
 more safe to be less positive and particular as to 
 what the Scripture leaves in the dark. And his 
 answer, I think, would not have been less valid 
 against those he undertakes to answer, though such 
 expressions were omitted. 
 
 That I did forbear to publish that letter with- 
 out his order, because I was loth to engage the 
 learned writer thereof in a public dispute against 
 that learned author, unless he please. 
 
 Since which time, considering that the Postscript 
 came too late to be printed with that letter of mine, 
 and that the letter of this reverend divine (for such 
 I take him to be by the contents of it) seems to be 
 penned with that care and caution as if he were 
 willing to have it public ; and without any intima- 
 tion of dislike for my having published his former 
 letter in like circumstances, I have thought it not 
 amiss, nor unagreeable to his mind, to publish this 
 also, which is as followeth (supplying the date from 
 the post-mark at London, denoting what day it was 
 given in to the Post- Office there). 
 
FOR THE REVEREND DR. WALLIS, PROFESSOR OF 
 GEOMETRY, AT OXFORD. 
 
 London, March 24, 169^. 
 
 Sir, 
 
 Your repeated letters give me a just occasion of repeat- 
 ing my hearty thanks to you; and I hope you will give me 
 leave to join both my good wishes and endeavours to pro- 
 mote that moderation which you seem to aim at in stating 
 the mysterious truths concerning the Trinity. Methinks 
 we might be easily persuaded to this, by the difficulties 
 which all men find in conceiving those mysteries; especially 
 the consequences which some make from them, and impose 
 upon us as certain and sacred truths. 
 
 Sir, because I would have you lose as little of your time 
 as may be in reading my letters, I will enter immediately 
 upon the subject proposed, and consider, not some lesser 
 niceties, but the two main points in the doctrine of the 
 Trinity, and the difficulties which our understandings repre- 
 sent to us in the conception of them. 
 
 The two main points are these — the unity of the God- 
 head, notwithstanding the distinction of three persons ; and 
 the equahty of those three persons, notwithstanding their 
 derivation one from another. 
 
 Concerning the Divine persons, the hj^pothesis which we 
 referred to formerly, and shall still follow, (Sherlock's) 
 asserts these three things — first, that they are three Beings, 
 or three intelligent Beings, really distinct — secondly, that 
 they are three substantial Beings, really distinct — thirdly, 
 that they are three infinite Minds, or three holy Spirits, 
 really distinct: and to these, I think, we may of course add 
 
188 
 
 a fourth character, that they are three complete Beings, 
 really distinct. 
 
 They are not inadequate or partial beings. For a spirit 
 infinite in perfection, as each of these is represented, can 
 want nothing to complete its being or perfection. 
 
 Let us now, if you please, run over these characters, and 
 observe the most obvious difficulties that occur to our minds 
 in the conception of them. 
 
 For the first, three Beings really distinct. According to 
 the plain tract of human reason every real being hath its 
 essence, that is, the basis it stands upon, as distinguished 
 from non-entity, or a fictitious being; and every distinct 
 being hath its distinct essence, I mean numerically distinct : 
 and, therefore, according to this principle, there ought to 
 be three distinct essences in the Godhead, seeing there are 
 three beings there really distinct. 
 
 Furthermore, if you give one single essence to three 
 beings really distinct, you must either divide it, or multiply 
 it : either each of these beings must have a piece of this 
 essence, and then you divide it, or each must have the 
 whole; and then, being but one whole, you cannot give it 
 to three without multiplying it. 
 
 Tliis is still made more difficult to conceive, when the 
 author allows these three to be as distinct as Peter, James, 
 and John, for if they be as distinct as Peter, James, and 
 John, they are one but as Peter, James, and John: for 
 every degree of distinction takes away a degree of unity, as 
 every degree of heat takes away a degree of cold. 
 
 We proceed to the second character. The three Divine 
 persons are three substantial Beings, really distinct. That 
 is, in plain English, are three substances really distinct. As 
 a spiritual being is a spirit ; a corporeal being a body ; so 
 a substantial being is a substance ; putting only two words 
 for one. And the autlior must understand it so. l)ecause ho 
 
189 
 
 makes them three spmts afterwards; and, therefore, they 
 must be three substances. 
 
 Besides, what are they, pray, if not substances? they 
 cannot be modes, or bare relations. I know some Platonists 
 call them super-substances ; or, if you will think them 
 lower, and call them semi-substances, as some philosophers 
 do their substantial forms, all this is but playing with 
 words : for there is nothing represented to our faculties but 
 as substances, modes, or relations, excepting what is merely 
 notional. 
 
 And the learned author must not debar us the use of the 
 word substance, under pretence that it sounds corporeally, 
 for two creeds make use of it, and the Scripture itself, upon 
 a fair interpretation, Heb. i. 3. 
 
 To proceed therefore. Here are three substances really 
 distinct, whereof each is a God, (page 47, line 13, page 98, 
 line 23) and yet there is but one God. This is very hard 
 to conceive, as contrary to all our ideas of number and 
 numeration. 
 
 It is true, we may conceive these three substances in 
 strict union one with another, notwithstanding their real 
 distinction. But union is one thing, and unity is another. 
 For unity excludes all plurality and multiplicity, which 
 union doth not, but rather supposes it. Unity also, in 
 simple natures, excludes all compositions, which union, on 
 the contrary, always implies in one kind or other. 
 
 Accordingly, substances, upon union, are not confounded 
 or identified, or brought to unity of substance : but con- 
 tinuing numerically distinct substances, acquire some com- 
 munity or communication of operations ; namely, of such 
 actions and passions as they are respectively capable of. 
 
 Let us consider instances of these things in the chief 
 unions that are known to us. Our soul and body are two 
 substances really distinct, and in close union with one 
 
190 
 
 another ; but, notwithstanding this, they continue distinct 
 substances under that union. In like manner, the human 
 soul of Christ is in union with the \070s, or second person 
 of the Trinity, which we call an hypostatical union ; but 
 neither doth this union make any unity of substance; for 
 the two substances of the Divine and human natures con- 
 tinue distinct under that union, which must not be allowed 
 in the unity of the Godhead, where there can be no plu- 
 rality or multiplicity of substances. 
 
 The learned author does acknowledge (pages 87, 97) 
 that these three substances, if they were separate, would 
 be three Gods; but, being inseparate and inseparable, they 
 make but one. This is again uneasy to conceive, that 
 substances really distinct should not be separable. For 
 the notion of a substance is of that which may subsist 
 by itself; and Avhat mark have we of separability but real 
 distinction? Things that are only modally or notionally 
 distinct we allow cannot subsist separate ; but if they be 
 really distinct, as substances, why may they not be sepa- 
 rated really? When we have proved the real distinction 
 of the soul and the body, as two substances, we think 
 we have sufficient ground to assert the separability of the 
 soul from the body. And, from the same reason, we 
 assert the parts of matter to be separable, as being really 
 distinct substances, let their union be otherwise Avhat it 
 will. For, if our faculties be true, w hat things we clearly 
 conceive really distinct, ut res et res, may, possibly, be 
 separated. Clear and distinct conception being to us the 
 rule of partibility. 
 
 But, however, suppose, if you please, this union indis- 
 soluble ; this does not change it uito unity. If the soul of 
 man[^was made to be in perpetual conjunction with matter, 
 as some Platonists affirm, that doth not make matter and 
 the soul one and the same substance ; nor matter cease to 
 
191 
 
 be matter, or the soul a spirit. So, if you suppose these 
 three Divine substances to be under an indissoluble union, 
 that doth not make them cease to be three substances, but 
 it makes them three substances in an indissoluble union. 
 
 What the learned author says concerning matter and 
 extension, may be returned upon him in reference to the 
 Godhead, (page 80, lines 9, 10). He supposes extension 
 to consist of parts, if they be only assignable parts, whether 
 they can be divided or not. So, say we, according to this 
 opinion, the Godhead may consist of several substances, if 
 they be only assignable substances, whether they can be 
 divided or not : and you may as distinctly assign, by your 
 understanding, three substances in the Godhead, that of 
 the Father, that of the Son, and that of the Holy Ghost, 
 as you may assign three parts in a physical atom, by A, 
 B, C. 
 
 Lastly, there is no substance lost or destroyed in this 
 or any other union, dissoluble, or indissoluble : therefore, 
 as to sul^stances, they are the same, whether in conjunction 
 or separation. 
 
 We come unto the third character, (pages 50, 166, 258, 
 see also page 93). The three Divine persons are three 
 infinite Minds, or three holy Spirits, and yet but one God. 
 This rises still higher than the former as to its unconceiv- 
 ableness. It seems to say and unsay the same thing with 
 the same breath. An infinite spirit is completely a God, 
 as to essence and attributes : therefore three such are three 
 Gods. Omnis mens infinite perfecta est Deus; tres sunt 
 mentes infinite perfects; ergo tres sunt Dii. Where is 
 the fault of this syllogism ? 
 
 This character seems to assert three infinites ; whereas 
 the Athanasian Creed, which stands at the highest pitch of 
 any, is yet very tender and cautious in giving the number 
 three to any thing but the persons. It will not allow three 
 
192 
 
 eternals, nor three incomprehensible^, nor three almighties; 
 but three infinites include all these. 
 
 An infinite spirit, as I said before, is a God, (I mean, 
 infinite in perfection, as our author doth) and three spirits, 
 whereof each is infinite in perfection, are three Gods ; as, 
 three creatures, whereof each is a rational animal, are three 
 men. Both these propositions go upon the same ground, 
 namely, that the definition, and the thing defined, are reci- 
 procal and of the same extent. Now as we have no better 
 definition of a man than that he is a rational animal, so 
 neither have we a better definition of a God than that he is 
 a spirit infinitely perfect. And as so many animals rational, 
 so many men; so likewise, so many spirits infinitely perfect, 
 so many Gods. 
 
 I speak this according to the use of our faculties ; for 
 what the true and precise state of things is, in themselves, 
 when the question is concerning infinite natures, I do not 
 presume to determine. 
 
 But thus much, I think, we may safely determine, that 
 in such cases where our faculties are at a loss, the safest 
 way is to keep close to revelation and the words of Scrip- 
 ture. And that is the conclusion I drive at. 
 
 Lastly, to put a plain question, which will come into 
 every one's mind — here are three spirits infinitely perfect ; 
 either they are Gods, or they are creatures ? They must 
 be one of the two. When we speak of a spirit infinitely 
 perfect, we describe an absolute, complete, entire Being, 
 which must be of some denomination, either a God, or a 
 creature, for we know nothing of a middle nature betwixt 
 these. 
 
 Possibly they will answer this by a distinction ; namely, 
 that they are three Gods, considered separately ; but con- 
 sidered collectively and in union, they are but one God : 
 and seeing they cannot be really sejiarate, it woidd be 
 
193 
 
 improper to call them three Gods. But, pray, why not as 
 properly three Gods as three infinite spirits ? seeing these 
 terms, a spirit infinitely perfect, and a God, are terms 
 equivalent or identical. What partiality is it then to allow 
 the one, and not the other? And if these infinite spirits 
 be inseparable, why do you grant the number three to that 
 name, and not to the name of Gods ? seeing they are both 
 the same thing, and equally inseparable. 
 
 We observed before that this learned author is liberal in 
 his threes; three intelligent Beings, three infinite Minds, 
 three holy Spirits, three divine Glories, three Majesties, 
 but not three Kings. It is the name, it seems, is scrupled 
 rather than the thing. 
 
 Sir, I will add no more upon these heads, but will con- 
 sider now the grand principle which is designed to take 
 off all these difficulties, and that is mutual consciousness ; 
 whereby all these threes are made one, and reduced to a 
 perfect numerical unity. 
 
 I need not spend time in telling you what the author 
 means by mutual consciousness, nor how he applies it to 
 the present case. You know them both suflficiently. But 
 methinks this unitive principle is defectively expressed by 
 the word consciousness. For bare consciousness, without 
 consent, is no more than bare omnisciency. As God is 
 conscious of all our thoughts, good or bad, and of all the 
 Devil's thoughts, without union, as without consent. If a 
 good and bad angel were made mutually conscious of one 
 another's mind, they would not thereupon become one, 
 being still of different wills and inclinations. 
 
 It may be the author will say, consciousness involves 
 consent, as he says, knowledge involves power, or is the 
 same with it. But, besides that I cannot well reconcile 
 the author to himself in this point, (see page 9, lines 3, 4, 
 compared with page 72) I have given you instances, in a 
 N 
 
194 
 
 former letter, to the contrary, to which you may add, if 
 you please, this farther consideration, if knowledge be the 
 same thing with power, then actual conception is the same 
 thing with actual execution : and if so, then you and I 
 may sit quietly in our studies, and, with our thought and 
 pen, build palaces and take towns and cities ; for we know 
 the methods of both, and can distinctly conceive them and 
 delineate them. And as these are not the same thing in 
 us, so neither can we conceive them, in all respects, the 
 same in God : for, from all eternity, God had a clear idea 
 of tlie frame of the world, and of the manner of producing 
 it ; therefore, if God's conception or knowledge had beeji 
 the same with his power, the world had been produced 
 from eternity. 
 
 But to proceed. Let us give this principle its full 
 strength, consciousness, and consent : they would not 
 together make a perfect unity of operations in the Deity, 
 much less of substance. We noted before, that unity and 
 union are different things : and this is more apparent now, 
 when three spirits are to be united into one. For how that 
 can be done, without some sort of composition, is an uncon- 
 ceivable mystery. You may indeed conceive these three 
 spirits, singly and se})arately, as simple beings ; but if you 
 conceive these three simple beings united into one, without 
 annihilation of any one, that one must be a compound 
 being, according to our conceptions. 
 
 Then, as to unity of operations : besides the energies 
 peculiar to the Father and the Son, this author allows 
 (page G7) that every one of these three minds, notwith- 
 standing their union, hath some distinct consciousness, not 
 common to the other two : therefore the Godhead, which 
 consists of these three minds, cannot be one as a single 
 mind is one, where there is an entire community and same- 
 ness of consciousness in all operations. 
 
195 
 
 In my opinion, if this hypothesis were pressed to speak 
 out, the plain language of it would be this — there are 
 three divine substances, three holy Spirits, infinitely per- 
 fect, and, in truth and reality, three Gods ; but, for some 
 reasons, not fit to be called so. These three beings, by 
 similitude of nature, mutual consciousness, consent, co- 
 operation, are under the greatest union possible ; and, in 
 that state of union, do constitute the to Qiiov, the entire 
 all-comprehensive Godhead. This, I confess, looks some- 
 thing like a conceivable thing; but the Christian Trinity 
 does not use to be represented thus : for this amounts to 
 no more than a kind of hypostatical union of three Divine 
 Spirits. j 
 
 Sir, I will trouble you i| > farther upon the first general 
 head, the distinction of the persons. I proceed now to 
 consider the equality of the persons, which I will despatch 
 in a few words. 
 
 The first argument against their equality may be this, 
 (page 99, line 29, &c.) the Father is aj;0v7ro9«TO9, self-exist- 
 ent, self-originated ; whereas the other two are eTepvTrosa-roi, 
 existent and originated from another. T^ow this cannot 
 but make, according to our faculties, not only some dif- 
 ference, but also some inequality : for it is a fundamental 
 perfection to be self-originated, and what is not so is not 
 equal to that which is so. 
 
 You will say possibly, though the Son and Holy Ghost 
 are produced of the Father, yet it is not in such a way as 
 creatures are produced: that is, by a voluntary external act; 
 but this, by an internal, necessary, and emanative act. 
 
 We will allow your distinction ; and admit that the Son 
 and Holy Ghost have a difi^erent origin from that of com- 
 mon creatures. But this does not remove the difficulty. 
 It shews, indeed, a great difference and inequality betwixt 
 any of the Divine persons and bare creatures ; but it does 
 
196 
 
 not shew any equality amongst the Divine persons them- 
 selves. It is true, the dependence which a creature hath 
 upon the Creator for its being is of another kind and degree 
 from that of the Son or Holy Ghost. But, however, they 
 are derivative beings, in some way or other, and dependent 
 upon the Father. And we cannot but conceive some ine- 
 quahty betwixt an original and a derivative, a dependent 
 and independent being. 
 
 Secondly, that act whereby the Son is generated by the 
 Father is some energy and perfection. Nay, it is an 
 energy of the highest perfection, because the result of it is 
 the most perfect being that can any way be produced; or 
 the noblest and greatest product in things. Creation, or 
 that energy that produceth a creature, hath not a term or 
 eifect so noble or so great as that energy whereby the Son 
 is generated: and, consequently, it is not so great a per- 
 fection to create a world, as to generate the Divine X0709. 
 This being so, there is, you see, not only self-origination 
 in the Father, which is not in the Son ; but also an active 
 perfection, of the highest degree possible, in the one, which 
 is not in the other : and, therefore, we cannot in either 
 respect conceive these two Beings equal. 
 
 Besides, if you make them all three equal, and all 
 infinite, they will be co-ordinate, (I mean internally and 
 as to perfection of nature ; for, external subordination, as 
 to economy, signifies nothing in this case) and are no more 
 one than three individuals of the same species are one; that 
 is, than Peter, James, and John are, or may be one. And 
 this, I think, was the doctrine of the Tritheites, or very 
 near it. 
 
 Lastly, you may please to reflect upon the various sen- 
 timents and expressions of the ancients, concerning the 
 dignity and pre-eminence of the Father, (which you know 
 are noted by Petavius, de Trin. lib. 2, c. 2, and line 8, 
 
197 
 
 c. 9, § 15) and consider their consistency or inconsistency 
 with perfect equality. 
 
 Sir, as I do not write this with any disrespect to that 
 treatise, which contains many excellent things, so neither 
 to represent absolute truth or untruth ; but the difficulty of 
 our conceiving things of an infinite nature. From which 
 consideration I would willingly infer two conclusions. 
 
 First, that we ought to keep close to Scripture in these 
 mysterious doctrines. 
 
 Secondly, that we should not impose consequences hu- 
 manly made, with the same rigour as divinely revealed 
 truths. 
 
 The An ti- Trinitarian system is not at all suited to my 
 genius : yet I would not stretch our Trinitarian doctrine so 
 far as to set it at a distance from Scripture as well as from 
 reason. " Secret things belong unto the Lord; but those 
 things that are revealed belong to us and our children," 
 Deut. xxix. 29. And the angels, it may be, think us as 
 foolish and ridiculous for pursuing these notions, farther 
 than as they are revealed, as we think ourselves wise and 
 learned in such pursuits. 
 
 I am, Sir, 
 
 With all sincerity, 
 
 Yovir most humble servant, 
 
 W. J.* 
 
 Note S. 
 
TO THIS LETTER I llEPLY AS FOLLOWETH. 
 
 TO THE REVEREND W. J. 
 
 Sir, 
 
 I AIM obliged to you for the kind and respectful 
 character which you are pleased to afford me in 
 both your letters. I am not at all displeased, but 
 thank you for it, with a like moderation in your's 
 to what you commend in my letters, as to the 
 mysterious truths concerning the sacred Trinity; 
 and do fully close with what you say in the con- 
 clusion, that the angels may think us as foolish and 
 ridiculous for pursuing these notions farther than 
 they are revealed, as we think ourselves wise and 
 learned in such pursuits : like as you or I should 
 laugh at a blind man, who had never seen, that 
 should undertake to conceive in his mind, and 
 express to us in words, a distinct and perfect notion 
 or idea of sight, light, and colours. 
 
 He may hear the noise or sound of those three 
 words, supposing him, though blind, not to be deaf 
 also, and may believe that they signify somewhat ; 
 but what that somewhat is he cannot tell, having 
 never had an idea thereof in his mind, nor a per- 
 ception thereof by his senses. 
 
200 
 
 And if you or I, from that notion which ourselves 
 have of it, would explain it to him, we could do it 
 no otherwise than by the use of such words, in a 
 sense analogical, as do properly belong to somewhat 
 of which he hath, from experience, some idea. 
 
 Sight, we might say, is a certain kind of sense 
 or feeling in our eyes, which we have not in our 
 hands, feet, or other parts of our body, whereby 
 we can, as it were, feel with our eyes the shape, 
 figure, bigness, and proportion of a body at a dis- 
 tance, as we might with our hands, if within our 
 reach. Whereby he might apprehend that there 
 is some kind of resemblance between seeing and 
 feeling; but what indeed it is to see, he cannot 
 comprehend. 
 
 Light, we might tell him, is a necessary requisite 
 to such a feeling with our eyes, as that for want of 
 it, which want we call darkness, we can no more so 
 feel, or discover, by our eyes, such shape, figure, 
 or bigness, than we could with our hands that 
 (suppose) of a piece of money locked up in a box 
 which we could not open ; but, by the admission of 
 such requisite, we are enabled so to feel it with our 
 eyes, as we might with our hands, if the box were 
 opened whereby we might come to handle it. 
 
 Colour, we might tell him, is somewhat of such 
 a nature, as that on a plain board, or the like, on 
 which, by our hand, we can feel nothing but smooth 
 and uniform ; by it may be represented, to be so 
 felt with our eyes, as great variety of shapes and 
 
201 
 
 figures, (suppose of a horse, a bird, a ship, a house, 
 or any shape whatever) as by our hand we might, if 
 we had such shapes formed in wood or stone, and 
 the different motions of such. 
 
 But, after all this, it is not possible for this blind 
 man to have that idea or notion in his fancy of 
 sight, light, and colour which we have who see. 
 
 And it is much more impossible for us, who have 
 no notions in our mind, other than what we derive 
 mediately or immediately from sensible impressions 
 of finite corporeal beings, to have a clear and 
 perfect notion of the nature, unity, distinctions, or 
 attributes of an infinite spiritual being ; or otherwise 
 to express them than by some imperfect analogies 
 or resemblances with things we are conversant with, 
 and by words in a borrowed sense from such. 
 
 I do, therefore, fully agree with you in your two 
 conclusions ; namely, that it is safe and prudent 
 to keep close to Scripture in these mysterious doc- 
 trines, since we know nothing of them otherwise 
 than as there revealed ; and not to impose con- 
 sequences of human deduction with the hke rigour 
 as divinely revealed truths. For, even in common 
 affairs, when things are represented only by the 
 analogy or resemblance which they bear to some 
 other things, it is seldom that the similitude is so 
 absolute between them, but that there is some 
 dissimilitude likewise ; much more when the dis- 
 tance is so great as between finite corporeal beings 
 and what is infinite and incorporeal. So that we 
 
202 
 
 cannot always argue cogently from the one to the 
 other. 
 
 And, therefore, the words nature, essence, unity, 
 distinction, father, son, person, beget, proceed, and 
 the like, when applied to God in a borrowed sense 
 from what they properly signify as applied to crea- 
 tures, must not be supposed to signify just the 
 same, but somewhat analogous to that of their 
 primary signification ; nor consequences thence to 
 be deduced with the same rigour. 
 
 It would be mere cavilling for any to argue, that 
 because knowledge and strength are separable in 
 man, therefore, what in God we call by those names 
 are so in God ; and that, consequently, it may be 
 possible for the all-wise God not to be almighty, or 
 the almighty God not to be all-wise. 
 
 So, if we should argue from the manner of our 
 locahty or duration, to God's ubiquity without 
 extension, and his eternity without succession, the 
 inferences must needs be lame and inconsequent, 
 with other inferences of like nature. 
 
 And, even without proceeding to infinites, if we 
 suppose a spirit, or the soul of man, to be void of 
 parts and local extension, and therefore, as the 
 phrase is, tota in toto et tota in quallbet parte of 
 that space or matter to which it is compresent ; and 
 should yet argue, as you do in a like case, "If one 
 single spirit be compresent w ith three or more really 
 distinct parts of space or matter, we must divide or 
 multiply it : either each of these (extensive parts 
 
203 
 
 must have a piece of that spirit, and then you 
 divide it ; or each must have the whole, and there 
 being but one whole, you cannot give it to each 
 without multiplying it:" such inference, upon such 
 a supposition, which supposition I am loth to think 
 impossible, must needs be lame. 
 
 Yet such are commonly the cavils of those who 
 study to pick quarrels with the doctrine of the 
 Trinity as delivered in Scripture. And, in par- 
 ticular, though, amongst men, three persons are 
 sometimes, not always, so used as to import three 
 men, we may not thence conclude that the three 
 Divine persons must needs imply three Gods : or, 
 if the word persons do not please, though I think 
 it a fit word in the case, we can spare the word 
 without prejudice to the cause, for it is the notion 
 rather than the name that we contend for, and 
 content ourselves to say, they be three somewhats 
 which are but one God : or, we may so explain 
 ourselves, that by three persons we mean three 
 such somewhats as are not inconsistent with being 
 one God. 
 
 And hitherto, I suppose, that you and I do well 
 enough agree. 
 
 Now, as to what you observe concerning the 
 learned author. Dr. Sherlock, I shall begin where 
 you end ; and agree with you, that the treatise, to 
 which you refer, contains many excellent things. 
 The strength and weight of his arguments, as to 
 those to whom he undertakes to answer, doth not 
 
204 
 
 depend upon those expressions against which you 
 object. But his arguments against those are of 
 equal force, though these expressions were spared. 
 
 As to those expressions of his, by you noted, 
 that the three Divine persons are three Beings, 
 three intelhgent Beings, three substantial Beings, 
 three holy Spirits, really distinct, even as distinct 
 as Peter, James, and John ; and one God only, 
 as they are mutually conscious ; I was, I confess, 
 unsatisfied therein, as you are, from the first ; look- 
 ing upon them as expressions too hardy for me to 
 venture upon, and so I find are most others with 
 whom I have discoursed about them, and wish he 
 had declined them. 
 
 Yet I did not think it necessary for me to write 
 against them, though I did not hke them, but 
 chose rather to waive them, and express myself 
 otherwise. For it would be endless, if I should 
 make it my business to write books against every 
 one who hath some expressions which I cannot 
 approve, amongst many others wherein I think he 
 doth well. Nor shall I aggravate the objections 
 which you have urged against them, but leave them 
 as they are. 
 
 I might, perhaps, moJlify some of his expressions, 
 by putting a softer sense upon them than at first 
 view they seem to bear; for I find some men in 
 such matters, do use words at a very diff'erent 
 rate from what others do ; but I have not, whore 
 now I am, the book at hand, and ha\(^ road it ImiI 
 
205 
 
 once, a good while since, when it first came out ; 
 and, therefore, am not walhng to say much without 
 book, lest I should miss his sense, or not perform 
 it to his mind. 
 
 That learned author may, if he think fit, so 
 vindicate or explain those expressions as he shall 
 judge convenient : or he may, which I had rather 
 he should, decline them, without prejudice to his 
 main cause ; which, in my opinion, he may as 
 well defend without them, and thereby less expose 
 himself to the cavils of the Anti- Trinitarians, who 
 are catching at every colourable pretence of object- 
 ing, though not against the main cause concerning 
 the Trinity, if but against some expressions of 
 those who maintain it. 
 
 Thus far, I think, he and both of us do agree ; 
 namely, that there is a distinction between the 
 three more than merely notional, and even more 
 than that between, what we commonly call, the 
 Divine attributes ; yet not so as to be three Gods, 
 or more Gods than one, which is as much as we 
 need maintain against the Anti-Trinitarians ; and 
 that the word person is no unfit name to denote 
 that distinction. And thus far we may close with 
 him, notwithstanding some other inconvenient ex- 
 pressions. 
 
 And if it be agreed that these three, thus dis- 
 tinguished, are but one God, (each communicating 
 in one and the same numerical essence) then they 
 are all equal, as to that common internal essence. 
 
206 
 
 and the common attributes thereof; and then an 
 external subordination, as to economy, you grant, 
 signifies nothing in this case. 
 
 Now, sir, if you look back upon your own dis- 
 course, you will find that the whole edge of your 
 arguments is directed against those expressions, 
 three Beings, three Substances, three Spirits ; and 
 I do acknowledge that, as to these, the arguments 
 seem to me sharp enough, and to do their work. 
 But if, instead of these, he say, as I think he 
 should, that the three persons are one Being, one 
 Substance, one Spirit, like as he says they are one 
 God, that edge will be taken off*.* 
 
 That, I conceive, which did impose upon him 
 in this point, is the forced sense which, in our 
 language, we sometimes put upon the word person, 
 for want of another English word answering to 
 homo, which might indiff"erently respect man, wo- 
 man, and child ; and a like forced sense put by 
 the schoolmen upon the word persona, for want 
 of a Latin word which might equally relate to 
 men and angels, as signifying an intelligent being. 
 Whence he was induced to think, that three 
 persons must needs be three intelligent beings. 
 Whereas jjersona, in its true and ancient sense, 
 before the schoolmen put this forced sense upon 
 it, did not signify a man simply, but one under 
 
 * Aiigustin. Epist. 174. Spiritus est Deus; et Pater Spiritus est, et 
 Filius, ct ipse Spiritus Saiictus; nee tamen tres Spiritus, sed unus Spiritus; 
 sicut lion tres Dii, sed unus Deus. 
 
207 
 
 such, and sucli, and such circumstances, or qua- 
 lifications. So that the same man, if capable of 
 being qualified thus, and thus, and thus, might 
 sustain three persons, and these three persons be 
 the same man. 
 
 Now if, as he says of himself elsewhere in a like 
 case, he have not been taken to be a fool ; yet a 
 wise man may sometimes, upon second thoughts, 
 see reason to change his opinion, as in that case 
 he did, or rectify his expressions. And if then 
 he consider how much easier it will be, and less 
 obnoxious to exceptions, to maintain his hypothesis 
 thus rectified, he may think I have done him no ill 
 office thus to suggest. 
 
 Having thus given you my thoughts of this hypo- 
 thesis, if you press me farther, as between ourselves, 
 to tell you what degree of distinction, as in our 
 metaphysics they are wont 'to be reckoned up, I 
 take this to be between the three Divine persons, I 
 think we need not much trouble ourselves with such 
 niceties. And if I do tell you, it is only ex ahun- 
 danti, as what doth not much concern the main 
 question in hand, which is safe enough without it. 
 Nor that I so prescribe therein, as to require others 
 to express their sentiments just as I do. 
 
 The degrees of distinction commonly mentioned 
 in our metaphysics are such as these — cUstinctio 
 rationis ratiocinantis, which is purely notional, and 
 depends merely on our imagination : distinctio 
 rationis ratiocinates, which is otherwise said to be 
 
208 
 
 secundum inadccqiiatos conceptus ejiisdem rei: dis- 
 tinctio modalis, either ut res et moduSy or ut modus 
 et modus, which is otherwise said to be ex parLe 
 rei sed non ut res et res : and distinctio realis, or 
 lit res et res. Though, in the names of these several 
 degrees, all wi'iters do not always speak alike. 
 One, perhaps, by a distinction ex ])arte rei, may 
 mean the same which another means by distinctio 
 realis ; and so of the rest. And these, thus mar- 
 shalled, are but a contrivance of our own. They 
 might, for aught I know, have been made more or 
 fewer, if the contriver had so thought fit. 
 
 But these degrees of distinction I take to be 
 primarily fitted to our notions of created beings, 
 and are not intended as applicable to God, other- 
 wise than by analogy ; as other words properly fitted 
 to created beings are wont to be so applied : and, 
 therefore, I should choose to say, that, in strictness 
 of speech, our metaphysics have. not yet given a 
 name to these distinctions ; nor do I know any 
 need of it. 
 
 The Divine attributes, we use to say, are dis- 
 tinguished rations ratiocinata, or as inadwquati 
 conceptus ejusdem rei. And it is well enough so 
 to say to those that have not a mind to be captious, 
 but are willing to understand figurative words in a 
 figurative sense. But, to those that have a mind 
 to cavil, I would speak more cautiously, and say, 
 it is, in God, somewhat analogous to what we so 
 call in created beings, and, that of the Divine 
 
209 
 
 persons, somewhat analogous, in the Deity, to what, 
 in created beings is called distinctio modalis, or 
 distinctio d parte rei, sed non ut res et res. 
 
 If it be asked, what that distinction is which is 
 thus analogous, I say, that I cannot tell. You 
 must first tell me, and enable me to comprehend, 
 what is the full and adequate import of the words 
 Father, Son, beget, proceed, &c., when applied 
 to God, in a sense analogous to what they signify 
 as to created beings. If you cannot tell me, pre- 
 cisely, what they are, how should I tell you how 
 they differ ? 
 
 But what need we trouble ourselves with these 
 niceties, or names of these degrees of distinction ? 
 which, when we have all done, will by divers men be 
 diversly expressed. I think it is enough to say, the 
 distinction is greater than that of what we call the 
 divine attributes ; but not so as to make them three 
 Gods ; or, that they be so three as yet to be but one 
 God, and I am content to rest there. 
 
 I am. Sir, 
 
 Yours to serve you, 
 
 J. WALLIS. 
 
 April 11, 1691. 
 
AN EIGHTH LETTER 
 
 CONCERNING 
 
 THE SACRED TRINITY, 
 
 OCCASIONED BY 
 
 lOME LETTERS TO HIM ON THAT SUBJECT. 
 
 BY JOHN WALLIS, D.D. 
 
 PROFESSOR OF GEOMETRY IN OXFORD. 
 
 [Published in 1692.] 
 
LETTER VIII. 
 
 CONCERNING THE SACRED TRINITY, OCCASIONED BY SOME 
 LETTERS TO HIM ON THAT SUBJECT. 
 
 Since my publishing seven Letters, and three 
 Sermons, concerning the sacred Trinity, I have 
 received, on that occasion, several letters from 
 divers persons, some known, some unknown, con- 
 cerning that subject ; mostly by way of gratulation 
 and approbation of what I have done : and where 
 some expressions therein are not just the same with 
 mine, they are much to the same purpose, and not 
 at all contrary to what I undertook to maintain. 
 
 One of them, (from an unknown person) sub- 
 scribed A. B., was written, it seems, by a country 
 gentleman, not a professed divine ; who, though he 
 do not pretend to be much versed in school divinity, 
 yet is, I find, not a stranger to it. It was left for 
 me at my bookseller's, with an intimation that the 
 author was willing to have it printed ; and I left it 
 again with the bookseller for that purpose, though 
 it hath been delayed hitherto, which (because the 
 author did desire it) is as folio weth. 
 
A LETTER TO THE REVEREND DR. WALLIS, OCCASIONED 
 BY HIS SEVERAL LETTERS TOUCHING THE DOCTRINE 
 OF THE TRINITY, &c. 
 
 Reverend Sir, 
 
 It is gratitude and acknowledgment directs these lines 
 to you. I have been so fortunate to meet with your 
 several letters in affirmance of the doctrine of the blessed 
 Trinity, &c., and cannot but confess myself not only 
 confirmed, but much enlarged in my notions about that 
 doctrine by the so plain and pressing reason of your dis- 
 courses. But lest I should seem fond of my own under- 
 standing, and fancy to myself that I do comprehend more 
 touching these matters than I indeed do, I shall humbly 
 offer to you my method of thoughts, and submit the same 
 to your grave judgment and allowance. 
 
 The Metaphysicians, I remember, teach us that one 
 way to know the Deity is by way of eminency. Is there 
 any good or perfection in the creature ? Then, say they, 
 God that is the great author and cause of all things, must 
 be so in a more eminent and high degree. The attributes 
 of God are competent to man, whom he made after his 
 own image, in some measure, but in God they are in the 
 highest and superlative degree. 
 
 Now, besides these eminences and perfections in the 
 Deity, there are three more particular and more trans- 
 cendent eminences, wherein and whereby God hath mani- 
 fested himself to and for the good of mankind. 
 
 God almighty was pleased, in his infinite mercy, to 
 determine that mankind should be rescued from that state 
 of sin which the defection of our first father brought us 
 
21G 
 
 into, and be brouglit back into a state of salvation. But 
 how he should bring about and effect this great work is out 
 of the reach of human contemplation, and can no otherwise 
 be known than as God himself hath been pleased to reveal 
 and discover the same to us in the Scriptures. 
 
 Now the Scriptures intimate to us three several manifes- 
 tations of the Deity in this great work of our salvation. 
 
 The first is that of a Father. That God the Father of 
 heaven and earth, who created the world by his power, and 
 preserveth it by his providence, so loved this world, that he 
 sent his only begotten Son to be our Saviour and mighty 
 Redeemer. 
 
 The second is that of a Son. That Josus Christ, the 
 only begotten Son of God, undertook this great work of 
 man's redemption, and to that purpose came into the 
 world, and became man, a second Adam, who by his 
 holy life, and absolute and perfect obedience to the will of 
 God, did expiate and make atonement for the disobedience 
 of the first. 
 
 The third is that of the Holy Ghost, who, by his inward 
 operations and gracious influences, doth incline and prevail 
 with man to embrace the redemption purchased for him 
 upon the terms of the gospel. 
 
 Now in respect of these three several manifestations of 
 the Deity, there is said to be a Trinity of persons in the 
 Unity of the Godhead, and the same God, in respect of 
 one of these manifestations of himself, is called God the 
 Father ; in respect of another is called God the Son ; and 
 in respect of the third is called God the Holy Ghost. 
 
 That there are these three more eminent manifestations 
 of the Deity, and under these denominations of Father, 
 Son, and Holy Ghost, is most plain in the Scriptures. 
 
 But the great doubt is whether these be three perso- 
 nalities in the Deity. And this doubt, I take it, ariseth 
 
217 
 
 from a misunderstanding and mistaking the true sense of 
 the word persona. 
 
 For this word persona, I think the philosophers are 
 short in their definitions of it. Boethius defines it to be 
 naturae rationalis individua substantia. This other 
 philosophers dislike as too scanty, because it is applicable 
 to man only, and doth not include spiritual beings : and, 
 therefore, they to enlarge it, and make it more compre- 
 hensive, call it substantia particularism intelligens et 
 incommunicabilis, S^c. 
 
 But, for my part, I cannot but like Boethius's definition 
 best, and think him so far in the right, in that he makes 
 the word persona only applicable to man ; for so doubtless 
 it is in its true and proper signification; and it is appli- 
 cable to spirits by a metalepsis only and transumption of 
 the word. 
 
 And herein the philosophers are too short in their defi- 
 nitions of persona, that while they dote so much upon the 
 word substance, they forget that accidents are a more 
 necessary ingredient in its true definition. 
 
 The word persona, in relation to man, doth not only 
 signify individuality, and denote a particular or single 
 man, but it doth imply those qualities also whereby one 
 man differeth from another. By the word quality here I 
 do not mean the single predicament so called, but all the 
 other predicaments, except that of substance, it being 
 those whereby the natures rationalis substantia is indi- 
 viduated. It is quantity that differs the person of taller 
 stature from the lower. It is quality that differs the 
 learned from the unlearned person. It is relation that 
 diff"ers the father from the sou. It is the tibi or locality 
 that differs John of Noke from John at Style. And so of 
 the other predicaments. 
 
 I would, tlierefore, propose the adding a few words to 
 
218 
 
 Boethius's definition, and then, I think, it will be well 
 enough. Let it then be thus, viz., persona est naturce 
 ratlonalis individua substantia taliter qualiter ab aliis 
 diffcrens. Thus defined, it relates to man only, and so 
 to one man as he differeth from another by accidental indi- 
 viduation. For though it be true that every person is a 
 single substance, yet it is as true that they are accidents 
 that do determine the personality. 
 
 And as the specific differences do constitute the species, 
 so predicamental accidents do constitute the individual. 
 Thus rationality doth constitute the species of man, and 
 differs it from that of the brute. And thus wisdom, forti- 
 tude, &c., do differ this particular man from another, and 
 make him to be this person and not another. Nor can we 
 have any certain notion of naked substances, or otherwise 
 conceive of them than as they are clothed with and varie- 
 gated by accidents. 
 
 To this purpose also is the true sense and meaning of 
 the Greek word vn-oaTaai's, which, strictly translated, is in 
 Latin subsistentia. Now subsistentia doth not only im- 
 port the esse of the substance, but the modus essefidi ; 
 and what is that doth modify substance but qualities and 
 accidents. 
 
 The fundamental mistake, therefore, in this great pomt 
 hath been in making the word substance so more than 
 necessary in the definition of persona^ and concluding from 
 thence that there cannot be three persons, but there must 
 be three several substances. Whereas, in truth, there may 
 be in the same one particular man, diversly qualified and 
 circumstantiated, diverse personalities. Thus in the man 
 Melchisedec. Melchisedec, King of Salem, may be said 
 to be one person, and Melchisedec, the priest of the Most 
 High God, another. So in David, in respect of his doul)le 
 ({ualitication of a king and a prophet. 
 
219 
 
 Thus much for what I conceive to be the true notion of 
 persona. 
 
 Now to consider this word persona as it hath been 
 appHed to the Godhead. And here I must say again, 
 as I said before, that this word persoiia is used only in 
 a borrowed sense, and for want of another word that 
 might more appositely and fully signify what is intended 
 by it. 
 
 God cannot properly be said to be a person. There are 
 no accidents in him. All his attributes are essential to 
 him. That wisdom that is finite in man and accidental to 
 him, is infinite in God and essential to him. And so of all 
 the other attributes and perfections of the Deity, that are 
 in an imperfect and low degree competent to man. 
 
 In this borrowed sense, therefore, it is that this word 
 persona is applied to the Deity ; and in respect of those 
 three eminent manifestations of the Deity there are said 
 to be three persons in it. Not that the word person, and 
 distinction of personalities in respect of men, doth bear a 
 full analogy to the diiference of personalities in the Deity; 
 for in this, as in all other contemplations of God, we must 
 expect to fall short and not comprehend. But that the 
 consideration of the different personalities amongst men 
 may help us, in some imperfect measure, to conceive of 
 that Trinity that we adore in the Unity of the Godhead. 
 
 Objection. But here I expect an objection, that if in 
 respect of these three manifestations of the Deity there are 
 said to be three persons, why are there not said to be more 
 persons in the Godhead than three, even as many as there 
 are divine attributes, for so many are the manifestations of 
 the Deity to us ? 
 
 Answer. There is not so much reason to imagine more 
 personalities in the Godhead than these three, as that 
 there are these three and no more. For although it be 
 
220 
 
 true, that every attribute doth import the Deity, and can 
 be predicated of nothing else but the Deity, yet every 
 single attribute doth not, if I may so speak, import the 
 whole Deity. His infinite wisdom doth not necessarily 
 import or administer to us the notion of his infinite power. 
 And so of the other attributes. But these three several 
 manifestations of the Godhead, that are called three per- 
 sons, are such wherein the whole Deity, as I may say, 
 doth exert itself, and appear in all its attributes; and, 
 therefore, I call them three more transcendent eminences 
 or manifestations of the Deity. 
 
 Thus I do conceive this Trinity of persons in the God- 
 head in some sort intelligible, without any necessity of 
 thinking that these three persons must be three several 
 substances, and consequently three Gods. 
 
 And I must confess I cannot but think this great 
 dispute a mere wrangling business, and a contest more 
 about words than things. For at the same time that our 
 adversaries are so fearful of multiplying the Deity by 
 dividing the substance, we tell them that we believe in 
 one God only, and that these three persons in the God- 
 head are but one God. So that all the dispute is, whether 
 to say there are three persons in the Deity doth necessarily 
 imply that there are three substances, which we declare we 
 do not mean nor intend by it. And for my part, if they 
 will as fairly declare that they believe these three several 
 manifestations of the Deity, viz., of God the Father, God 
 the Son, and God the Holy Ghost, as held forth to us in 
 the Scriptures, I would willingly compound with them for 
 the word person, and comply with them in the use of any 
 other word they shall find out that may l)etter, or as well, 
 express what we mean by it. 
 
 I come now to tho other great objection of our adver- 
 saries, touching the hyjiostatical luiion. How the Divine 
 
221 
 
 and human nature could be united in the same person, and 
 this person be at the same time both God and man, and 
 this without multiplying or dividing the Deity, or without 
 confining the Omnipresent to the scanty tenement of a 
 human body; how this God-man should be born of a virgin 
 by the overshadowing of the Holy Ghost, and human 
 nature propagated without the natural help of a man : 
 these things seem so utterly impossible to these men of 
 great reason, that therefore they must not, cannot be ; and 
 the Scriptures themselves must rather be mistaken or false, 
 than that can be true which they think cannot. 
 
 But when they argue thus from impossibility, I wonder 
 their curiosity doth not question the creation itself, how it 
 was possible for God to make all things of nothing. And 
 for the hypostatical union, methinks, before they question 
 that so strictly, they ought to give a better account than 
 yet can be given of the union of the soul of man with his 
 body. And when they question the being born of a virgin, 
 may they not as well question how the first woman was 
 made of the rib of a man : one as well as the other being 
 supposed to come to pass by the divine power. 
 
 But because I am apt, with you, to suspect how far the 
 Scriptures are of authority amongst these reasoning men, 
 I will adventure to propose to them one consideration 
 touching the hypostatical union, to shew that it is not 
 so inconceivable a thing to human reason as they would 
 have it. 
 
 Let them but consider the several degrees of beings that 
 God hath made in the world. The trees and plants to 
 which he hath given vegetation. The brutes to which, 
 besides vegetation, he hath given animal life, senses, and 
 appetites to discern and endeavour after what is necessary 
 to the preservation of their beings. Then to step farther 
 and consider man, to whom, besides all these, God hath 
 
222 
 
 given a rational mind and soul. And to step yet farther, 
 let them consider those higher beings the angels, what 
 pure intellectual beings they are, and what degrees of per- 
 fection God hath given them, beyond what he hath given 
 to man. 
 
 I say when we consider these, what necessity is there of 
 limiting and confining God almighty here? May we not 
 as reasonably think, that if in his infinite wisdom he so 
 thought fit, he might as well make a being yet more 
 perfect? Why is it not as conceivable, that, to bring 
 about his own eternal purposes, he might actuate the 
 human nature by the divine power, and make a man in 
 whom even the perfections of the Deity should reside ? 
 
 Is the principle of essentiality and vitality any whit 
 divided in or from the Deity by giving life and being to 
 those creatures ? 
 
 Is the Eternal Mind any whit multiplied or divided by 
 giving a rational soul or mind to man ? 
 
 Nor is the infinite and eternal Spirit of the world mul- 
 tiplied or divided by creating and giving being to those 
 glorious spirits the angels. 
 
 What necessity then to think that the Godhead must be 
 either multiplied or divided, or in anywise varied by acting 
 the Divinity in the human nature? 
 
 Oh! rebellious mankind, that hast offended thy Creator; 
 but more ungrateful, that wilt not accept his mercy upon 
 his own terms, and believe it exhibited in that manner that 
 he himself has revealed it I 
 
 Is it not that God, whose justice is infinite, that is 
 offended ? Is it not the same God, who is also infinite in 
 goodness and mercy, that is appeased? What room for 
 his mercy, without derogation to his justice, unless there 
 be satisfaction? And what satisfaction can be comj)etonr 
 to the offended Deity? Were men or angels fit to mediate. 
 
223 
 
 or could they make a satisfaction ? Surely not. It is his 
 infinite mercy only that can appease his justice. " There 
 is mercy with him, that he may be feared; yea, mercy 
 rejoicing over judgment." 
 
 Now because it is inconceivable to man how the oiFended 
 Deity should make a satisfaction to itself, God almighty is 
 pleased thus far to condescend to the capacity of human 
 nature, as to tell us in what manner he hath done it, viz., 
 that he hath sent his only begotten Son into the world to 
 be born of a woman, to live a life of righteousness for our 
 instruction and example, and to die the death of sinners to 
 satisfy for our defection. And farther, that our original 
 taint might not prevail over and misguide us into actual 
 transgressions, he hath sent his Holy Spirit amongst us to 
 lead us into the ways of truth and righteousness. This he 
 was pleased to promise after the fall, by his prophets in the 
 times of the Old Testament, and has now performed it to 
 us in the times of the New. 
 
 Now, is it fit for us to object against this manifestation 
 of his mercy to us, and glorious contrivance of our redemp- 
 tion, because we cannot comprehend the mystery of it? 
 That surely was never meant to be within our fathom. 
 
 In the days of the Old Testament, when God was 
 pleased to command the adoration and duty of his people, 
 he manifested himself to them under several appellations, 
 whereby he put them in mind of his mercies to them, and 
 their duty to him. " I am," says he, " the God of 
 Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob." 
 And so in the prologue to the Decalogue — " I am the 
 Lord thy God which brought thee out of the land of 
 Egypt, out of the house of bondage," &c. Intimating 
 thereby to them the great mercies he had shewn in his 
 miraculous preservation of the patriarchs and people of 
 Israel. 
 
224 
 
 So now, in the days of the New Testament, God 
 almighty has been pleased to manifest himself to us under 
 other denominations and appellations, viz., those of God 
 the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost ; 
 intimating thereby to us in what manner he hath made 
 good his promised mercy, and brought about the great 
 work of our redemption ; and that, under those appellations 
 and manifestations of himself, he will now be worshipped in 
 the times of the gospel. 
 
 But for us to understand the great mysteries of our 
 salvation in this manner offered unto us, viz., that of the 
 Trinity in the Unity of the Godhead, and that of the 
 Incarnation of our blessed Saviour, &c., was certainly 
 never intended by God almighty. And shall we doubt 
 what God himself tells us because we cannot compre- 
 hend it? 
 
 When God said to the people of Israel, "I am the 
 Lord thy God which brought thee out of the land of 
 Egypt," &c., had it been fit for them to hav^e inquired 
 how he brought them out of Egypt, and to have ravelled 
 into all the miracles he wrought for that purpose, and 
 to have brought them to the touch of their understand- 
 ings, and to have doubted the truth thereof, or the power 
 of God that did them, because they could not reconcile 
 them to their own reason ? 
 
 Yet thus ill certainly do they use God almighty, who 
 will doubt the manner of our salvation, because they can- 
 not understand the mystery. 
 
 Alas, vain men, that will not believe what God himself 
 has revealed, because it will not bear the test of their weak 
 reason ! Do they thiid^ the wisdom and power of the 
 Almighty are to be bounded by the scanty limits of their 
 understanding? That wore for Mhat is finite to compre- 
 hend infinitv. God wore not God if that wore so. And 
 
•225 
 
 these very men, who value themselves so much upon their 
 reason, that they think they ought to understand the very 
 arcana of heaven, would, 1 doubt not, be ready enough by 
 the same strength of reasoning, to disown that Deity that 
 they could comprehend. 
 
 Thus I have presumed, reverend sir, to trouble you wi*^' 
 this draught of my rude notions about this matter, which I 
 hope you will excuse, they coming from a private country 
 gentleman, unread in polemic divinity, and particularly in 
 this dispute, and in whom these thoughts were occasioned 
 by the perusal of your late papers. 
 
 I am. Sir, 
 
 Yours most humbly, 
 
 A. B. 
 
 May 28th, 1691. 
 
This letter being for substance much to the 
 same purpose with what I had undertaken to main- 
 tain, and the expressions not much different, and in 
 nothing contrary to it, I shall not detain the reader 
 with any long discourse upon it ; because it speaks 
 sufficiently for itself. But I think three manifesta- 
 tions is too faint an expression, and the difference 
 between the three persons is eternal and antecedent 
 to these manifestations. 
 
 It hath been suggested to me by another anony- 
 mous, that we, knowing so little of the infinite 
 divine nature, there may possibly be greater dis- 
 tinction between the three, which we use to call 
 hypostases, or persons, than, what he calls, the civil 
 or relative acceptation of the word person, and we 
 may as well prejudice the truth by affirming too 
 little, as by affirming too much. And it is very 
 true, there may be, for aught we know, (and per- 
 haps there is) more than so, nor have I any where 
 denied it. But how much that more is we cannou 
 tell. Sure we are, not so as to be three Gods, or 
 more Gods than one. And I choose to say, with 
 St. Austin, that these three are one Spirit, (as 
 we say they are one God) not three Spirits. The 
 true ancient import of the word person, when first 
 
228 " 
 
 applied to the Trinity, implies no more than as I 
 explained it ; which was a full answer to the Anti- 
 Trinitarian's popular argument, from the modern 
 gross acceptation of the word person, in English, 
 as if three Divine persons must needs be three 
 Gods, because three persons amongst men doth 
 sometimes, not always, nor did it anciently so, 
 imply three men. And when we say these three 
 persons are but one God, it is manifest that we 
 use this metaphor of persons, when applied to 
 God, as borrowed from that sense of the word 
 person, wherein the same man may sustain divers 
 persons, or divers persons be the same man. I 
 have seen, more than once, an address from Edward 
 Earl of Clarendon, Chancellor of the University of 
 Oxford, to Edward Earl of Clarendon, Lord High 
 Chancellor of England, in a claim of privilege, to 
 remove a cause from the Court of Chancery to 
 that of the University. Yet these two chancellors 
 were not two men, nor two Earls of Clarendon, but 
 one and the same, sustaining two persons, one 
 addressing to the other. And if this do sufficiently 
 answer that popular cavil, it is as much as it was 
 brought for. If it do otherwise appear that the 
 distinction between these three Divine persons be 
 more than so, but yet not more Gods than one, 
 that may well enough be, though this metaphor 
 do not necessarily imply so much. It is certain, 
 that three persons, neither according to the true 
 import of the words, nor according to the intent 
 
229 
 
 of those who so speak, cloth imply three Gods ; but 
 three persons which are one God, or one God in 
 three persons. 
 
 I have also a third letter from W. J., much to 
 the same purpose with what he had written in his 
 two former, and, therefore, I do not think it needful 
 to insert it here; nor do I see that he desires it. It 
 is, he tells me, to take his leave of me, as not 
 meaning to give me any farther trouble in this 
 kind. It is full of divers expressions of respect, 
 thanks, and approbation ; and he doth insist, as in 
 his two former he had done, upon these two things, 
 not to be too positive, in these matters, beyond 
 what the Scripture tells us; and, not to lay the 
 like stress upon our argumentations from thence 
 as on what we find there. In both which, as 
 before I did, I do fully agree with him; because, 
 in matters of pure revelation, we know no more 
 than what is revealed : and, because it is very sure, 
 that even in natural things men do oft mistake in 
 their argumentations from principles which they 
 think to be true and clear; else it could not be 
 that divers men, from the same principles, should 
 infer contrary conclusions ; and because we find it 
 difficult, sometimes, to reconcile some things which 
 yet we cannot well deny to be true. And, if it be 
 so, even in natural things, much more may it be so 
 in things of an infinite nature. So that herein, I 
 think, he and I do not disagree. 
 
230 
 
 Yet would 1 not infer from hence, nor dotli he, 
 that we must therefore be sceptics in all things, 
 because it is possible that in some things we may 
 mistake. For it is one thing to be infallible ; 
 another thing not to err. A man who is not 
 infallible may yet argue truly, and where he doth 
 so his argument is conclusive ; and we may accord- 
 ingly rest in it, and insist upon it, more or less, 
 according to the degree of evidence : for things 
 equally true are not always equally evident, nor 
 equally necessary to be known. Where the evi- 
 dence is not clear, and the matter not needful for 
 us to know, we are not to be too positive in our 
 determinations, but rather be content to be ignorant 
 farther than God is pleased to reveal ; but where 
 it is, and the things be of moment, we must hold 
 fast that which is true, and not suffer ourselves to 
 be easily wheedled out of it. 
 
 Which, I suppose, is his opinion as well as mine : 
 for he seems to interpose this caution, particularly, 
 as to that hypothesis to which, as before he had 
 done, he doth suggest ^ome new difficulties ; but 
 wherein I am not concerned. That God is Trin- 
 iinuSi he doth profess ; and the w^ord person he 
 doth not dislike ; but thinks it safe not to be too 
 positive in determining precisely how great that 
 distinction of persons is. In all which I do concur 
 with him. 
 
 Now as to the word person, though I am not 
 fond of words where the sense is agreed, I am not 
 
231 
 
 willing to quit it, because I do not know a better 
 to put in the room of it : and because, if we 
 quit the word, which the church hath with good 
 reason made use of for so many hundred years, 
 without any just exception made to it, those Anti- 
 Trinitarians who would have us quit the word 
 will pretend that, in so doing, we quit the doc- 
 trine too. 
 
 That we do not by person, when applied to the 
 sacred Trinity, understand such a person as when 
 applied to men ; and that, by three Divine persons, 
 we do not mean three Gods, hath been so often 
 said, and so fully, by those who believe the Trinity, 
 that those who cavil at it, cannot but know it ; 
 but, by person in the Deity, we mean only what 
 bears some analogy with what, amongst men, is 
 said of several persons, (even without being so 
 many several men, which the true sense of the 
 word person doth not import, as hath been often 
 shewed) as do the words beget, begotten, sending, 
 proceeding, or going forth, and many more, which 
 all are metaphorical expressions, taken from what 
 amongst men is wont to be said of persons ; for, 
 of whom but persons are such expressions used ? 
 And they who use to cavil at it may as well do 
 it when we talk of the foot of a stool, the arm of 
 a chair, or the head of a staff, and persuade us, 
 that when we so speak, we do believe a stool, a 
 chair, a staff to have life and sense, because a foot, 
 an arm, a head, properly taken, have so. And 
 
232 
 
 they may as well cavil at the word sacrament, 
 which is a name that we have given to that of 
 baptism and the Lord's supper ; attributes, which 
 is a term we give to some of the divine perfec- 
 tions; creed, by which we mean an abstract of 
 some principal things that we believe, and a great 
 many such other words that we find occasion to 
 make use of; whereof yet there is no danger, 
 when it is defined and determined what by such 
 word, in such discourse, we mean ; even though, 
 in some other discourses, such word may signify 
 otherwise. It is well known that a cone in Euclid 
 doth not signify just the same as in Apollonius ; 
 nor a triangle in Euclid just the same as in 
 Theodosius and others, who write of spherics : 
 but when we meet with these words in Euclid, w^e 
 must there understand them as they are defined 
 by Euclid ; and when in others, so as they are 
 defined by those others. And so when we speak 
 of persons in the Deity, we must be so understood 
 as we there define; that is, for somewhat analogous, 
 but not just the same, with what is meant by it, 
 when applied to men ; and particularly not so dis- 
 tinct as to be three Gods. 
 
 And, for the same reasons, I am not willing to 
 part with the Athanasian Creed, lest those who 
 would have us so do should then say, we have 
 })arted with the doctrine also. They, upon pre- 
 tence that some expressions in it, though true, are 
 not absolutely fundamental, would fain wheedle us 
 
233 
 
 out of all. They might as well say, that because 
 some words might be spared in what we call the 
 Apostolic Creed, or Nicene Creed, or some other 
 words put in, therefore those creeds should be laid 
 aside also. And when they quarrel with the pre- 
 face of it, " Whoever would be saved, ought to 
 hold the Catholic faith ; and the Catholic faith is 
 this," as if it were intended thereby that every 
 syllable in it were so fundamental as, without 
 knowing whereof, a man could not be saved, 
 (which no man can reasonably think to be so 
 meant by the penners of it, L;ince that thousands 
 were saved, even in their opinion, before that was 
 penned, and others since, that never heard of it) 
 is mere cavilling. For no more can reasonably 
 be thought intended by it, but that this is sound 
 doctrine, which, for the substance of it, ought to 
 be believed by those who would be saved : like 
 as if I should say, whoever would be saved, ought 
 to believe the Word of God; and this is the 
 Word of God, pointing to our Bible. No man 
 who is not mad would think my meaning to be, 
 that no man could be saved who did not know 
 that one of Job's daughters was named Jemima ; 
 or that Zeruiah was mother (not father) to those 
 who are called the sons of Zeruiah. 
 
 As to that question, which I meet with in some 
 of the letters, why just three persons, and no 
 more. The answer is short and easy. Because 
 the Scripture tells us of three, but of no more ; 
 
234 
 
 and, had not the Scripture told it us, we had not 
 known of these three. We are baptised into the 
 name of, and therefore into the faith of, the 
 Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, as if this were the 
 first Christian creed. We are told, there are 
 three that bear record in heaven, and, these three 
 are one: not that there are more such than three, 
 and to these three (somewhats) we give the name 
 of persons ; meaning, by the word persons, these 
 three ; and if by persons in the Deity we mean 
 but these three, then there are but three in the 
 Deity whom we call persons, or, whom we mean 
 by that name. 
 
 There is another ingenious person* (a stranger 
 to me) who hath written to me divers letters on 
 this occasion, full of gratulation, approbation, and 
 applause ; but in one of them he moves a question 
 concerning a passage in one of mine, where I say, 
 " We have no notions in our mind other than what 
 we derive, mediately or immediately, from sensible 
 impressions of finite corporeal beings;" and tells 
 me, " That it seems to him that the notion of one 
 INFINITE ESSENCE should be excepted;" and that 
 he hath formerly vindicated Des Cartes against 
 Mr. Hobbes, who had affirmed, " That there is no 
 conception in a man's mind which hath not at 
 first totally, or by parts, been begotten upon the 
 
 • Note T. 
 
235 
 
 organs of sense:" and again, "That a man can 
 have no thought representing any thing not subject 
 to sense." 
 
 But, in a following letter, he declares himself 
 fully satisfied, and that my sentiments do not really 
 differ from his, when I had sent him this answer, 
 viz. 
 
 " As to what you say of my affirming that we 
 have no notions in our mind other than what we 
 derive, mediately or immediately, from sensible 
 impressions of finite corporeal beings, when you 
 consider it again, I believe you will be of my 
 mind. If you can suppose a man in such cir- 
 cumstances as never to have seen, or heard, or 
 felt any thing, I doubt whether he would have 
 any thoughts of God more than an embryo yet 
 unborn, who hath the same soul that he will after 
 have, but hath, I doubt, as yet, no notions of a 
 God. Sure I am that we attain it by other steps. 
 ' The heavens declare the glory of God ; ' but not 
 without being seen, or at least heard of, or some 
 way made known to us by sensible impressions. 
 * The invisible things of him, even his eternal 
 power and Godhead, are clearly seen;' but it is 
 ' by the creation of the world, being understood by 
 the things that are made.' But if we neither see, 
 nor hear of, nor have any notion of the things that 
 are made, how shall we thence derive the notion of 
 a God ? and there must be many notions, ante- 
 cedent to that of one infinite essence, which must 
 
236 
 
 be derived from sensible impressions of corporeal 
 beings. We must have the notion or conception 
 of ens, esse, finis, Jinitum, nonfinitum, unum, non- 
 nullum, non-multa, before we can have the notion 
 of one infinite essence. And those antecedent 
 notions, I think, we do derive, mediately or imme- 
 diately, from what we see, hear, feel, or some way 
 apprehend by the help of our senses. As to Des 
 Cartes, there must be a great many notions, or 
 simple apprehensions, which he must presume, be- 
 fore he can come to the complex notion of Dens 
 est, and a great many illative notions, from natural 
 logic, before he can argue cogito, ergo sum. He 
 must, at least, have a notion, or simple apprehen- 
 sion, of what is meant by cogito, and of what is 
 meant by sum, and of what by ego; and then a 
 complex notion, that what is not cannot think ; and 
 then this illative notion from natural logic, but I 
 think, therefore I am. And, I doubt, he cannot 
 come at all this without some use of his senses. 
 And even after all, it seems to me, that to be is a 
 notion more simple, and therefore antecedent, than 
 to think ; and, therefore, sooner to be apprehended 
 by itself than by consequence from that. But it is 
 not now my business to dispute against Des Cartes ; 
 only to shew that sensitive notions are subservient 
 to our notions of a God ; and, from these our un- 
 derstandings do, by steps, ascend to these." 
 
 Upon this answer, he owns my sentiments to be 
 the same with his, kc; that, in a nalural wav, 
 
237 
 
 the human intellect hath no operation but what 
 is occasioned or suggested by sensible objects. 
 But he thinks, I perceive, and so do I, that from 
 these notions occasioned or suggested by sensible 
 objects, our intellect, or reason improved, may 
 ascend, by steps, to a discovery of something con- 
 cerning God, which in corporeal objects it cannot 
 find. In which we both agree. 
 
 Now the best means we have for the forming of 
 such notions concerning God, is chiefly by one of 
 these two ways ; that of eminency, and that of 
 negation. Whatever of good or excellency we find 
 in the creature, we conclude that in God, who is 
 the fountain of all excellency, there is somewhat 
 analogous thereunto, but much more eminent ; and 
 whatever of imperfection we find in the creature, 
 we conclude that in God, who is infinitely perfect, 
 there is nothing of this imperfection : and from 
 both we conceive a notion of somewhat in God 
 which is more great than is possible for us fully to 
 comprehend ; but what that somewhat is we cannot 
 fully understand. Now these being the steps by 
 which we form these notions, we know no better 
 way to express these conceptions than by metaphors 
 taken from such objects from whence these notions 
 take their rise, or some such figurative expressions, 
 and it was with this prospect that I mentioned that 
 observation ; and in the same way God is pleased, 
 in Scripture, to express himself to us ; by somewhat 
 analogous, not just the same, with what we meet 
 
238 
 
 with in the creature. As when it speaks of God's 
 eyes, ears, hands, feet, &c. ; of his seeing, liearing, 
 striking, going, &c. So when the Father is said 
 to beget, the Son to be begotten, and both these 
 to send out, and the Holy Ghost to proceed or go 
 forth from them. All which expressions are such 
 as we commonly apply to what we call persons. 
 And in what sense those are to be understood con- 
 cerning God, in such sense they are fitly called 
 three persons ; and those who, in such sense, cavil 
 at the word person, would, no doubt, if there were 
 not somewhat else in the wind, as well cavil at 
 those other words. But because so to do were 
 directly to affront the Scripture, whose words they 
 are, they do not think fit so to speak out, whatever 
 they think. When Christ saith, of himself and the 
 Father, John xvi. 28, " I came forth from the 
 Father, and am come into the world ; again, I 
 leave the world, and go to the Father :" of himself 
 and the Holy Ghost, v. 7, 8, " If I go not away, 
 the Comforter will not come unto you ; but if I 
 depart, I will send him unto you ; and when he is 
 come, he will reprove the world," &c. : of himself 
 and the other two, John xiv. 26, and xv. 26, " The 
 Comforter, which is the Holy Ghost, whom the 
 Father will send in my name, he shall teach you all 
 things, and bring all things to your remembrance, 
 whatsoever I have said unto you:" and again, 
 " When the Comforter is come, whom I will send 
 you from the Father, even the Spirit of truth, wliich 
 
239 
 
 proceedeth from the Father, he shall testify of me ;' ' 
 what could be said, as of three persons, more dis- 
 tinctly ? And if the Scripture speak of them as 
 three persons, why should we scruple to call them 
 so? But these three persons are but one God. o* 
 T^e?? ev elai. Thcse three are one ; unum, not unus, 
 one thing, 1 John v. 7j and John x. 30, " I and the 
 Father are one," ev 'eo-yuei/, unum sumus, we are 
 one and the same thing, and therefore one God, 
 and that there is no other God but one, is known to 
 be so often said that I need not repeat it. 
 
 But it is not so much the word person, as the 
 deity of Christ, which these men are offended at; 
 and all their cavils at the word person, and the 
 Athanasian Creed, are but to undermine our Sa- 
 viour's deity. Of this I have said enough else- 
 where, and need not here repeat it. " The Lord 
 our God is one Lord," Deut. vi. 4 : that is, the 
 Lord God of Israel is one Lord ; or, Jehovah the 
 God of Israel is one Jehovah. There are not 
 more Jehovahs than one ; and this one Jehovah is 
 the Lord God of Israel. And Isaiah xlv. 3, 5, " I 
 the Lord (Jehovah) am the God of Israel : I am 
 the Lord, (Jehovah) and there is none else, there 
 is no God beside me." No God beside the Lord 
 God of Israel. So in 2 Kings xix. 15, and many 
 other places to the same purpose. Now our Christ 
 is this Lord God of Israel, Luke i. 16, 17, " Many 
 of the children of Israel shall he (John the Baptist) 
 turn to the Lord their God (to the Lord God of 
 
240 
 
 Israel) and he (John Baptist) shall go before him 
 (this Lord God of Israel) in the spirit and power of 
 Elias." Now no man doubts but that it is our 
 Christ, whose forerunner John Baptist was, and 
 before whom he was to go in the spirit and power 
 of Elias : therefore our Christ is this Lord God of 
 Israel ; this one Jehovah. 
 
 It is true that the Greek Septuagint's translation 
 of the Old Testament doth not retain that word, 
 but doth every where waive the word Jehovah, and 
 puts o Kvpio^ instead of it; and accordingly, the New 
 Testament, which mostly follows the language of 
 that, the only Greek translation then in use, doth 
 so too. But o icv/>io<^, which they substitute for 
 Jehovah, is so oft applied to Christ, even in those 
 places cited out of the Old Testament wherein 
 Jehovah is used, that none can be ignorant of it. 
 
 And though we have not there the word Jehovah, 
 yet we have as full a periphrasis of it as can be 
 desired. It is well known, and owned by all, that 
 the two proper names of God, Jah and Jehovah, 
 are derivatives from the verb hajah or havah, which 
 si^nifieth to be, which, whether we take for one and 
 the same root, or two roots of one and the same 
 signification, is not material, the letters jod and vau 
 in Hebrew being so oft used promiscuously, or one 
 changed for the other; and, therefore, the noun 
 verbal must needs import a being. And it hath 
 been farther observed long since by Hebricians, 
 that the name Jehovah hath moreover tlie jxH-iiliar 
 
241 
 
 characteristics of the three times: (past, present, 
 and future) Je the characteristic of the future 
 tense; J^o of the present tense or participle; and 
 Va of the preter tense, which I did forbear to 
 mention formerly, lest they should throw it off as 
 a criticism, till I had a fresh voucher for it, so 
 good as Dr. Pocock, in his late commentary on 
 Joel i. 19; and we have all this in that character 
 of God, indefinitely. Rev. i. 4, airh tS o wv, kuI 6 rjv, 
 Kttl o epxofievos, from that Being, who is, and hath 
 been, and shall be for the time to come; and it is 
 particularly applied to Christ at v. 8, £7^ iiui to a Kal 
 
 TO Q, Xe'fyei 6 Kvpio? o Geo?, 6 wi/, Kal 6 rjV, Kal 6 ip\6fjbevo<s, 6 
 
 iravTOKpaTivp, " I am Alpha and Omega, saith the 
 Lord God, (Jehovah Elohim) which is, which was, 
 and which is to come, the Almighty;" which is a 
 full account of the name Jehovah, here translated, 
 as elsewhere, by o Kvpw?, with a descant upon it, 
 importing his being, with the three diversities of 
 times, (past, present, and future) and his omnipo- 
 tence superadded. " That Being which now is, 
 which ever was, and which ever shall be, the. Lord 
 God Almighty," so Rev. iv. 8, and Rev. xi. 17; 
 and in Rev. xvi. 5, o wv, Kal 6 ^v, Kal 6 effo/nevo^, so 
 Beza, and so Dr. Pocock reads it, and so ours 
 . translate it; and much to the same purpose is that 
 Rev. i. 11, 17, 18, I^ev. ii. 8, and elsewhere, "I 
 am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end, 
 the first and the last; he that liveth and was dead, 
 and behold I live for evermore;" so Rev. iv. 9, U, 
 Q 
 
242 
 
 Rev. V. 12, 13, 14, "Who liveth for ever and ever." 
 Which fully answers that title, " The living God," 
 whereby the true God doth so oft distinnmish him- 
 self from other gods, as Jer. x. 10, and elsewhere 
 frequently. But I have said so much formerly to 
 this point that I shall now add no more. 
 
 I had almost forgotten one piece, wherein I find 
 myself mentioned, intituled, " A Suit for Forbear- 
 ance," &c.* It aims chiefly at two things. One 
 is ao;ainst " urfrin^ on others too strict an union, 
 wherein Christianity, as delivered by our Lord and 
 his apostles, hath left a latitude and simplicity." 
 But herein, I think, he hath no cause to blame me, 
 nor do I see that he doth. He doth not find me 
 to trouble him with cramping scholastic terms. I 
 know not how I could speak more tenderly than to 
 say these three are three somewhats, not three 
 nothings, and if he please to sport himself with 
 that he may; and that it is convenient, to these 
 somewhats, to give^ name; and that I know no 
 better name than persons; and, therefore, that we 
 may still say, as we were wont to do, three persons 
 and one God; even though by person I do not 
 require men to fancy just such a person as what we 
 so call amongst men; like as by father, son, beget, 
 &c., I do not understand, in God, just such as 
 what these words sitrnify amongst men; and I do 
 
 * NoTi; U. 
 
243 
 
 not know how he could wish me to speak more 
 tenderly, or more agreeing to the Christian sim- 
 plicity, wherein it is delivered by our Lord and his 
 apostles. 
 
 The other is, he thinks it not advisable in things 
 " sufficiently settled by just authority, as is that of 
 the Trinity, to revive a controversy long since 
 determined, and draw the disputatious saw; because 
 to litigate about a fundamental, is to turn it into a 
 controversy." And herein I am so much of his 
 mind, that I would not have advised to start the 
 controversy about what we have been in quiet pos- 
 session of for so long a time; and I am ready to 
 own, that it is an art of our adversaries the Papists 
 to persuade the world that we have no better 
 ground for the doctrine of the Trinity than they 
 have for transubstantiation, for they care not what 
 they overthrow, if thereby they may advance their 
 own ends ; and that atheistical and irreligious 
 men will be glad of any opportunity to ridicule 
 rehgion. 
 
 But if others will make it their business to run 
 down religion, and profess to the world there is 
 nothing but authority to define it, which they de- 
 spise, and no reason or Scripture for it, more than 
 for transubstantiation, I think we are not obliged 
 to stand (all of us) so silent as if we had nothing 
 to say for it, or yielded up the cause. There is 
 a middle way for the promoting what he calls a 
 purer and more scriptural divinity, between a rigor- 
 
244 
 
 ous imposing all the scholastic cramping terms, and 
 a giving up the cause. A modest defence of what 
 the Scripture teacheth us, without excursions into 
 a rigorous pressing of extravagant niceties of our 
 own inventions, may be of good subserviency to 
 shew that the doctrines of our religion are not 
 inconsistent with right reason. 
 
 What he tells us of somebody who had been 
 heretofore Master of the Temple,* that did express 
 himself to this purpose, " The substance of God, 
 with this property, to be of none, doth make the 
 person of the Father; the very selfsame substance 
 in number, with this property, to be of the Father, 
 maketh the person of the Son ; the same substance 
 having added to it the property of proceeding from 
 the other two, maketh the person of the Holy 
 Ghost: so that, in every person, there is implied 
 both the substance of God, which is one, and also 
 that property which causeth the same person really 
 and truly to differ from the other two." This, I 
 say, would pass with me well enough; and if he 
 please so to express himself I should not quarrel 
 with it. 
 
 Again, if I should express it thus, that God, 
 considered as the original or fountain of being, 
 who himself is and gives being to all things else, 
 may be called God the Father, or the God and 
 Father of all; and the same God, as the fountain 
 
 N.)Ti: X. 
 
245 
 
 of wisdom or knowledge, be called God the Son, 
 6 x6o^os, the word, wisdom, or reason, " the true 
 Light, that lighteth every man that cometh into the 
 world," God's wisdom resulting from his essence or 
 being; and the same God as the fountain of power, 
 might, or action, be called God the Holy Ghost, 
 God's power of acting proceding from his essence 
 and wisdom also; and that this eternal, all-wise, 
 and almighty God is one God; perhaps he would 
 not much mislike this: or, if he should, I would 
 not quarrel with him on that account, or be positive 
 that it must just be so. We know that Christ is 
 called the Wisdom of God, the Son of God, the 
 Son of the Highest; and the Holy Ghost is called 
 the Power of the Highest. And we know that, 
 amongst ourselves, knowledge results from the 
 essence of our soul, and action proceeds from 
 both. It is said also, that " in him we live, and 
 move, and have our being;" from God we have 
 our being, our rational life, and our motion, in 
 whose image and likeness we are created. Yet 
 would I not be positive, much less would I require 
 every one to be of that opinion, that the per- 
 sonalities in God must needs be these. I am 
 content to rest here, that these three. Father, Son, 
 and Holy Ghost, whatever name you call them by, 
 differ in somewhat, more than what we commonly 
 call the divine attributes; yet not so as to be three 
 Gods, or more Gods than one, but are one and the 
 same God. And so far we be safe. Nor is there 
 
246 
 
 any danger, that I can see, in giving the name of 
 persons to these three, nor know I a fitter name to 
 give them. 
 
 And this, I think, is as much as need be said as 
 to all those letters which, on this occasion, have 
 come to my hand since the publishing of those 
 already printed; there being nothing in all these 
 which is contrary to what I therein undertook to 
 defend: nor should I have said thus much, if the 
 author of the letter here inserted had not desired 
 to have it published. And now I hope to trouble 
 the press no more upon this occasion. 
 
 Yours, 
 
 JOHN WALLIS. 
 
 November 23, 1691. 
 
NOTES. 
 
 Page 10. Note A. 
 
 The writings of St. Augustine, and in particular his work De Trinitate, 
 furnish many resemblances of this description. It is to be lamented that 
 what this admirable father adduced as affording some illustration of the 
 internal relations of the Trinity, (mind or intellect, self-knowledge and 
 love, or self-complacence,) was afterwards adopted by the indiscreet 
 devotion of his followers, the schoolmen, as an exact and precise expla- 
 nation of the doctrine itself. This has led to a charge against them from 
 many quarters, as if they had held that the personal distinctions in the 
 Trinity were merely modal or nominal. The slightest reference to the 
 works of the great masters, Peter Lombard and Aquinas, or to the con- 
 clusions of Scotus, as explained by his only intelligible interpreter, Rada, 
 is, however, quite sufficient to satisfy any fair or candid inquirer that the 
 distinctions held by them were real and substantial distinctions. Whether 
 some later divines, as for instance. Dr. Arthur Bury, in his Naked Gospel, 
 1690, 4to, and the acute and ingenious Stephen Nye, in his three Tracts 
 on the Trinity, did not adopt the explanation of St. Augustine as a plau- 
 sible cover for Sabellianisra or Uuitarianism, must be left to their readers 
 to judge. 
 
 With every respect to the injunction of the incomparable Donne, " It 
 is a lovely and a religious thing to find out vestigia Trinitatis, impressions 
 of the Trinity, in as many things as we can," (Works, vol. II. p. 216) 
 few can read the following passage from Luther's Collognia Mensalia, 
 (Edit. 1650, fol.) p. 101, without finding it necessary to make a liberal 
 allowance for the allegorical spirit of the age. " Trinitas omnibus 
 creaturis indita. In Sole, substantia, splendor et calor. In Fluminibus, 
 substantia, fluxus et potentia. Sic in Artibus quoque. In Astronomia, 
 motus, lumen, et fluentia. In Musica, tres notfe. Re, mi, fa. In Geo- 
 metria, tres divisiones, linea, superficies, et corpus. In Grammatica, tres 
 partes orationis. In Dictione apud Hebroeos, tres literse substantiales. 
 In Arithmetica, tres numeri. In Rhetorica Dispositio, elocutio et actio 
 sen gestus, nam inventio et memoria non artis sed naturae. In Dialectica, 
 
248 
 
 definitio, divisio et argumentatio. Sic quselibet res habet poudus, luime- 
 rum ct figuram. Sic herbse et flores habeut, 1. Formam, qua, signifi- 
 catur Deiis Pater, ej usque potentia. 2. Odorem seu saporem, quae nota 
 est Filii, ejusque sapientioe, &c. 3. Vim et vires, seu effectus, qui sunt 
 vestigia Spiritus sancti, ejusque bonitatis. Ita licet in omnibus creaturi^ 
 invenire et cernere Trinitatem diviuam im pressam esse." 
 
 The most extensive collectiou I have ever met with of similar parallels 
 or fancied resemblances, is contained in a work written by the celebrated 
 opponent of the Socinian Zwicker, John Amos Comenius, De Christi- 
 anorum Uno Deo Patre, Filio, Spiritu S°- Fides antiqua, Amstelodami, 
 1(559, 12mo. The title of the chapter is " Deum esse Triunum, omnes 
 pariter attestantur Creaturse." (pp. 30 to 41 .) After enumerating a series 
 of parallels in nature and in almost every art and science, he concludes, 
 "Et frustra hoc omnia esse credat aliquis. Profundissima omnium rerum 
 Conditoris sapientia suspicari id non patitur. Si Etenim nos miuuta 
 animalcula, quibus vel mica rationis est, non facile volumus temere aliquid 
 egisse videri, quid ille cui omnis adest Sapientia et cum quo ab Kterno 
 fuit? Qui arenara usque maris et aquarum guttas, dinumerarit? Qui 
 non solum altitudinem Caeli et profunditatera Abyssi, dimensus est, sed 
 et montes pondere libravit, collesque statera? Cui denique omuia opera 
 sua nota sunt ab seterno. Illumne tautam Teniarii mysterii segetem per 
 Universum frustra sparsisse? Credant id, quibus stupere sapere est." 
 Perhaps with a view of checking this prevailing passion of his age, one 
 of the ablest of modern Protestant divines, Moses Amyraldus or Amyraut, 
 in a very solid and judicious Treatise, now little known, published, in 
 Latin, at Saumur, 1661, 8vo., the title of which is De Mysterio Trinitatis 
 deque vocibus ac Phrasibus, quibus tam in Scriptura quam apud Patres 
 explicatur, examines at considerable length, and with great care, the 
 various instances generally adduced as illustrations of the doctrine of the 
 Trinity, and shews how unable most of them are to bear the application 
 of the test of logic or Scripture. With respect to a favourite illustration 
 from the sun, its light and heat, he observes, " Si quis contendat Lumi- 
 nare illud fuisse a Creatore ita comparatum ut dogma de Trinitate, post 
 quam revelatum essct, nobis redderet aliquanto credibilius, non is sum 
 qui repugnarc velim. Verum hoc duo mihi contra concessum iri spero. 
 Unum, ubi doctrina de Trinitate defendenda est non esse talibus rationibus 
 pugnandum ad eum demonstrandam. Nam possunt quideni apud Ortho- 
 doxos aliquid facere ad vcritatis illustrationcm : cum tamen advcrsariis 
 sunt deridiculo et bononim argumcntorum pondus eleveut. Alteniin 
 quod citra opem rcvelationis alicujus extraordiuaria;, istud quidquid est, 
 luillam Trinitatis personarum in Deo cognitionem creare potest." p. 142. 
 
 The parallel of the three dimensions of material bodies to the Trinity, 
 which fdrms the basis of Wallis's following illustration, may be traced in 
 its general idea to more Ihan one of llie Latin fathers, but the first attempt 
 
241 
 
 in print that I am aware of, to make an elaborate comparison between the 
 two subjects, appeared in the Nouvelles de la Republicjue des Lettres for 
 the month of July, 1685, of which periodical work the celebrated Bayle was 
 at that period the editor. The author of the Comparison, whose name is 
 not known, lays down twenty-three theses or propositions applicable to a 
 body and its three dimensions, and by corollaries to each infers resem- 
 blances in the Trinity in all material points. Objections were made to 
 this Comparison by another writer, in the same periodical, the following 
 month, which produced a reply from the author of the parallel in defence 
 of his propositions. Whether Wallis had seen these papers, and was 
 indebted to them for any parts of his illustrations, it is impossible to say. 
 The learned Mastrofini, in his Metaphysica sublimior de Deo, trino et 
 xmo, the first volume of which, and the only one, I believe, printed, was 
 published at Rome, 1816, fol., observes of the Comparison in the Repub- 
 lique des Lettres, which he has translated and introduced into that work, 
 p. 89, "Nihil hactenus legi quod ingeniosius fuerit excogitatum ad 
 Divinam Trinitatem declarandam." He has thought it of sufficient 
 importance to devote to its examination a chapter of considerable length 
 (Lib. 2, c. 9), but not having seen the present Letters, labours under the 
 mistake of considering Wallis as the author of that Comparison, and 
 treats him so throughout, styling it " Wallisiana Comparatio." The 
 terms of his examination would, however, almost equally apply to Wallis's 
 parallel of a cube, and I regret, therefore, that the length to which they 
 extend precludes the possibility of their being inserted in the present note. 
 Their subtlety and acuteness will well repay a perusal, and the reader 
 will have no occasion to regret becoming acquainted with what, though 
 emanating from a Roman Catholic, may, perhaps, be styled the most 
 elaborate and complete defence of the Trinity which the nineteenth cen- 
 tury has yet produced. 
 
 Page 18. Note B. 
 It might justifiably have been expected by the excellent author, that 
 the caution and humility with which he entered upon his designed illus- 
 tration of the main article of the Christian faith, and which pervade the 
 whole of these Letters, would have saved him from the misconstruction 
 and vituperation of contemporary and succeeding writers. But such was 
 not the case. The parallel of the cube was attacked, as if he had pro- 
 pounded it as a perfect illustration of the distinctions of the persons in 
 the Trinity, whereas he repeatedly disclaims its adequately expressing 
 those distinctions, and only oiFers it as shewing that something similar, 
 if between finite and infinite there could be any correspondence, to the 
 mysterious union of Trinity with Unity, was observable in a material 
 cubical body. The other objections made to the Letters are resolvable 
 
•250 
 
 into two: 1st, the use ol the word " somcvvhats," as applied to the three 
 persons of the Trinity ; and 2nd, that the Trinity which Wallis represents 
 is the nominal Trinity of the Sabellians. With respect to the first, when 
 we consider that language has no term which clearly defines these distinc- 
 tions, for language is a mere medium, and what cannot be entirely com- 
 prehended, cannot be adequately expressed ; and further, that most of the 
 words which have been made use of for this purpose, have been found 
 from their inevitable ambiguity to afford ground for constant cavil and 
 controversy, there seemslittle justice in censuring Wallis for what affords 
 only a proof of his judicious modesty and prudence, and his reluctance to 
 adopt any term purporting affirmatively to define what is indefinable. It 
 may further be observed, that more than one of the Latin fathers have 
 applied the words " Tria qusedam" in the same sense in which the expres- 
 sion "three somewhats" is used by Wallis. To the second objection that 
 Wallis's Trinity is the nominal one of the Sabellians, it would scarcely 
 have been necessary to have offered any reply, had not the calumny, 
 for it is no other, been repeated, when the Letters were in few hands, 
 with a pertinacity and confidence which have imposed upon some able 
 and candid writers, amongst whom I may number the learned Mosheim. 
 (Vid. Dissertationes, 2nd vol., p. 527. Edit. 1743, 8vo.) Now Wallis 
 it will be observed, does no where profess strictly to define these dis- 
 tinctions : on the contrary, he observes, (p. 208) " Our metaphysics 
 have not yet given a name to these distinctions," and (p. 128) "I do 
 not pretend to set this down as the adequate distinction, for this I do 
 not pretend thoroughly to understand." Following the mode of treating 
 the subject adopted by the very able Ur. Thomas Pierce (Pacificatorium 
 Orthodoxpc Theologix Corpusculum, 1G83, 12mo., p. 34), who remarks, 
 " Vix melius vix aliter quid sit Tri-unus intelligimus, quam quid non sit, 
 intelligendo," Wallis rather makes his opinion known by negative propo- 
 sitions, than by dogmatical theses. He says, (p. 164) " Though I will 
 not take upon me to detemiine precisely how great the distinction is, 
 because I would not be positive where the Scripture is silent ; yet cer- 
 tainly it is not so great as to make them three Gods, but greater than 
 merely three names, or even that between what we commonly call the 
 Divine attributes:" and further, (pp. 6, 10) "to each of these persons 
 Scripture ascribes divinity," and " that they may truly be so distinguished 
 as that one be not the other, and yet all but one God :" and siibsequently, 
 (p. 227) "I think three manifestations is too faint an expression, and the 
 difference between the three persons is eternal and antecedent to these 
 manitcstations:" histly, (p. 244) he expresses his acquiescence in Hooker's 
 summary of the distinctions, (Eccles. Pol., vol. 2, p. 281, Oxford edit.) 
 which has always, I believe, been considered as a satisfactory exposition 
 of the orthodox scriptural doctrine, and by which the extremes of Sabel- 
 lianism and Trilhcism are alike avoided. But it is unnecessary to accu- 
 
251 
 
 mulate further proofs. No one can read the eight Letters through in the 
 spirit of fairness and candour, without being satisfied that the Trinity 
 held by Wallis was a real and substantial one. Of his contemporaries, 
 perhaps no one was more opposed to the Sabellian or Nominal school than 
 Mr. John Howe. His explanation of the Trinity seems rather liable to 
 the objection, if objectionable at all, of admitting so high a distinction 
 between the persons as to be irreconcilable with the imity of the Deity. 
 Yet he, in a letter to Wallis, (Calm and Sober Enquiry, p. 95,' edit. 1694) 
 speaks of the "respectful thoughts and veneration" he had long had for 
 him, and which were both renewed and heightened greatly by his (Wallis) 
 late clear, prudent, and piovisly modest discourses (both Letters and 
 Sermons) of that "awful mystery, the Trinity in the Godhead." He 
 further observes, "In what you have already said concerning it, you have 
 used that great caution, and so well guarded yourself, as not, so far as I 
 can apprehend, to give an adversary in this single point the least advan- 
 tage." I might adduce Dr. South and Bishop Wetenhall to the same 
 purpose, but it is surely needless. In opposition to such authorities tes- 
 tifying to the orthodoxy of Wallis's explanation of the Trinity, and the 
 irrefragable evidence of the Letters themselves, it is curious and edifying 
 to find Messrs. Lindsay and Belsham claiming Wallis as an Unitarityi, 
 (Apol., p. 228. Calm Inquiry, p. 337.) The reader will ask what are 
 the grounds upon which the claim is made? Is it from an impartial 
 examination of these Letters, and the opinions they express. Not at all. 
 It may be questioned whether either of those two worthies ever saw 
 Wallis's Letters, or his three Sermons on the Trinity. The only tract 
 they seem to be acquainted with, referring to Wallis, is the well known 
 " Considerations on the Explications of the Trinity, 1693, 4to," written 
 by an Unitarian, and which I find attributed in my copy, but I think 
 erroneously, to Stephen Nye, Rector of Honnead. This tract, written 
 against Wallis, Sherlock, and South, and in defence of the Unitarian 
 scheme, they ludicrously enough mistake for Wallis's, and then quote as 
 his own words the designed perversions of liis opponent. Such are the 
 heroes of Unitarianism ! 
 
 Page 26. Note C. 
 From the Biographia Britannica, vol. 6, p. 3683, it appears that the 
 author of this and the two other Letters subsequently addressed to Wallis 
 by the same writer, using the initials W. J., was Mr. William Jane. He 
 must not be mistaken for Dr. William Jane, Dean of Gloucester, and 
 Prolocutor of the Lower House of Convocation in 1689, and by whom 
 the famous Oxford Decree of 1683 against "certain pernicious books and 
 damnable doctrines," and the Decree against Dr. A. Bury's Naked Gospel 
 in 1690, are said to have been drawn up. I have been unable to meet 
 
252 
 
 with any account of Mr. William Jane. The originals of his three letters 
 are in Mr. Crossley's collection, but there is no indorsement or memo- 
 randum by Wallis which can assist the inquiry. 
 
 Page 28. Note D. 
 The notions alluded to are contained in Dr, Sherlock's Vindication of 
 the Doctrine of the Holy and Ever-blessed Trinity, 1690, 4to., in which 
 he propounded a new explication of that doctrine, which occasioned a 
 fierce controversy of some duration. He considered the Trinity in Unity 
 to consist of "three infinite minds mutually conscious," and that this 
 e.\planation solved all the difficulties of that mysterious doctrine. Not 
 content with proposing his own views on the subject, he attacked the 
 generally received exposition with great spirit and vehemence. Of the 
 orthodoxy of his opinions, judging from the whole tenor of his work, and 
 not from a few incautious insulated cx-pressions, there seems no reason to 
 doubt. Though he uses the terms "three distinct infinite minds," a 
 description which taken by itself might seem to import three separate 
 Spirits or Gods, yet it must be observed that he subjoins to it, "which 
 are essentially and inseparably one," so that, in fact, he seems to mean 
 nothing else by those terms but three distinct, intelligent, but not sepa- 
 rate subsistences in the same substance. His later works on the subject 
 of the Trinity; Apology for Writing against Socinians, 1693, 4to. ; Dis- 
 tinction between Real and Nominal Trinitarians, 1696 ; The Present 
 State of the Socinian Controversy, 1698, 4to., in wliich he is more 
 cautious and guarded in his expressions, are all excellent tracts, and are 
 free from the objections which were made to his "Vindication." His 
 most formidable adversary was Dr. South, whose zeal, shai-jjcned as it is 
 said by private and political motives, led to the publication of his Animad- 
 versions on Dr. Sherlock's book, 1693, 4to., and his Tritheisni charged 
 upon Dr. Sherlock's New Notion of the Trinity, 1695, 4to., performances 
 in which all the wit and learning, and it would be difficult to instance any 
 books in which they more abound, cannot atone for the total absence of 
 candour, moderation, and Christian charity. The ablest tract written in 
 defence of Sherlock, was " The Doctrine of the Fathers and Schools 
 considered concerning the Articles of the Trinity of Divine Persons and 
 the Unity of God. By J. B., A.M., Presbyter of the Church of England. 
 1695, 4to." The author's name, I believe, was Braddock. On the pro- 
 mulgation of the Oxford Decree in 1695 against the doctrine asserted in 
 a sermon, preached by a Fellow of University College in the church of 
 St. Peter in the East, in which were the following expressions, " There 
 are three infinite distinct minds and substances in the Trinity, '*and 
 " That the three persons in the Trinity are three distinct infinite minds 
 or spirits, and three individual substances," Sherlock, against whom the 
 
253 
 
 fulminatlon was obviously levelled, published ''A Modest Examination of 
 the Authority and Reasons of the late Decree of the Vice-Chancellor of 
 Oxford, and some Heads of Colleges and Halls, concerning the Heresy of 
 three distinct Infinite Minds in the Holy and Ever-blessed Trinity, 1696, 
 4to." Amongst the answers to this publication, was one entitled "'An 
 Answer to Dr. Sherlock's Examination of the Oxford Decree, in a Letter 
 from a Member of that University to his Friend in London, 1696, 4to., 
 pp. 19," of which a second edition, corrected and enlarged, was published 
 the same year. This tract, though not included in any list of Wallis's 
 works, nor mentioned by any of his biographers, is undoubtedly written 
 by him. It is to be res^etted that its tone is not altogether so mild and 
 temperate as that which characterizes his eight Letters, now republished. 
 But it would, perhaps, be too much to expect that he should have wholly 
 escaped the heats generated by controversy. Wallis observes, "When 
 he (Dr. Sherlock) had let fall some unwary expressions, and not justifia- 
 ble, he might have retracted them with as little discredit as he has done 
 some other ; and it would be the wisest thing he could do. If he will 
 still insist upon it, that if a person be a mind, a spirit, a substance, then 
 three persons must be three distinct minds, spirits, and substances, p. 18, 
 (as distinct as Adam and Abel, though not separate, p. 20) he knows it 
 will not be allowed him : because mind, spirit, substance, are (in their 
 proper signification) absolute ; but person (^in its proper signification) is 
 a relative term. If mind, spirit, person, be equivalent, why cannot he 
 content himself with (what is generally received) three persons, but must 
 impose upon us his new terms of three distinct minds, three distinct spirits, 
 and three distinct substances. The consequence will hold more strongly 
 thus, if an infinite eternal mind or spirit be God, then three distinct 
 infinite eternal minds or spirits are three Gods. (For here the terms are 
 all absolute, not relative.) And if to maintain (obstinately) that there 
 are three Gods (that is, three eternal infinite minds or spirits) be not 
 heresy, what is?" pp. 13, 14, 15. 
 
 Page 33. Note E. 
 Since the publication of Waterland's Critical History of the Athanasiau 
 Creed, which first appeared in 1724, 4to., all that has been added to what 
 his research has there collected, has served to shew the accuracy of his 
 opinions as to the authorship of the creed, and the deductions drawn by 
 him from the external and internal evidence he has examined, seem to 
 have been generally acquiesced in by impartial and capable critics. Ac- 
 cording to his opinion, this creed was not composed by Athanasius, but 
 was originally written in Latin, in France, sometime between the years 
 426 and 430, by Hilary, Bishop of Aries, who is said, by his biographei-, 
 to have composed an admired exposition of the creed, and whose style, so 
 
•254 
 
 far as we are enabled to judge from tlie few fragments of his works that 
 remain, it in some degree resembles. Being a summary of the orthodox 
 and Catholic faith, he thinks it might in process of time acquire the name 
 of the Athanasian Faith, or Fides Athanasii, in opposition to the contrary 
 scheme, which might as justly be called Fides Arii, or the Arian Faith ; and 
 that this equivocal title afterwards occasioned the persuasion that it was 
 a form of faith composed by Athanasius, just as the title of Apostolical, 
 given to the Roman creed, led to the mistake of its being supposed to have 
 proceeded fi'om the Apostles. This, he argues, is very much confirmed 
 by the several tracts wi-itten in the fifth and sixth centuries, dialogue wise, 
 in which the names of Athanasius, Arius, and Photinus are adopted for 
 the speakers, who defend the principles and tenets of those leaders. Such 
 is a short summary of Waterland's opinions on this subject, but it does 
 not fall within the compass of this note to enter fully upon the history of 
 the Athanasian Creed, or the elaborate gi-ounds upon which Watcrland 
 rests his conclusions. I shall merely remark, that there are few greater 
 theological desiderata than a new edition of Waterland's history, which 
 is a model of well applied research and judicious disquisition, witli notes 
 correcting the mistakes he has occasionally fallen into, supplying his omis- 
 sions, and embodying the valuable remarks of the Continental scholars 
 since his period. I trust to see this undertaken by some one whose theo- 
 logical acquirements render him competent to such a work. 
 
 Page 41. Note F. 
 The dispute which long subsisted between the Eastern and Western 
 Churches, as to the procession of the Holy Ghost, seems, on close exami- 
 nation, to have been a dispute merely as to terms, and involving no 
 material difference of belief. The Eastern Churches preferred saying that 
 the Holy Ghost proceeded from the Father by the Son, or when they 
 t^aid. He proceeded from the Father, they also added. He received of the 
 Son. According to either mode of expression, the same thing seems to 
 be substantially meant, as the Western Churches expressed by the terms, 
 " proceeding from the Father and the Son," the Spirit receiving (i. e. his 
 Essence) from the Son Ijcing equivalent to proceeding from Him. See 
 Bishop Pearson on the Creed, p. 324. Ridley's Sermons at Lady 
 Meyer's Lectures, p. 37. Watcrland on the Anathasian Creed, p. 141, 
 edit. 1724. 
 
 Page 53. Note G. 
 In Wallis's own copy of these Letters he has written in the margin 
 Mrs. Hunt, as the person referred to. I am unable to add any further 
 
 jiarlirulars to the niime and notice sujipliod by him. 
 
255 
 
 Page 65. Note H. 
 Who was the author of this tract, which was published without title 
 page in 13 pages, in 1690, 4to., is not known. His reply to the remarks 
 of Wallis was contained in a tract, entitled " Observations on the Four 
 Letters of Dr. John Wallis, concerning the Trinity and the Creed of 
 Athanasius. London, printed 1691, 4to., 20 pages." Both these pieces 
 were afterwards included in the first of the five 4to. volumes of Socinian 
 or Unitarian tracts, which were published at the close of the seventeenth 
 century, and which are understood to have been printed at the expense of 
 the well known John Firmin. It is surprising that so little should be 
 known of the writers of these tracts, who certainly do not yield in con- 
 troversial dexterity, or skill in profiting by the occasional slips of 
 Trinitarians, to any of the advocates of Trinitarianism who have sub- 
 sequently appeared upon the stage. The author of the tract mentioned 
 in the text, appears to have written, besides the "Observations," a small 
 work, first published in 16S9, I2mo., but afterwards inserted in the first 
 volume of the 4to. Socinian tracts, which gave risd*to Dr. Sherlock's 
 vindication, and, indeed, to the whole controversy. It is styled "A 
 Brief History of the Unitarians, called also Socinians, in Four Lettei-s, 
 vvTitten to a Friend." He also wi-ote "An Accurate Examination of the 
 Principal Texts usually alledged for the Divinity of our Saviour, occa- 
 sioned by a Book of M. L. Milbourne, called ' Mysteries in Religion 
 Vindicated,' 1692, 4to.," and "Considerations on the Explications of the 
 Doctrine of the Trinity, by Dr. Wallis, &c., 1693, 4to.," which last tracts 
 were included in the second volume of the 4to. Socinian tracts. On the 
 title page of a copy of the " Considerations on the Explications," now in 
 my possession, some one has written "By Stephen Nye, Rector of Hor- 
 mead, Herts." Besides, however, the disavowal of Nye himself, in his 
 "Doctrine of the Holy Trinity, 1701, 8vo.," which is not certainly as 
 explicit as it might have been, there does not seem to be such a similarity 
 between the style of the tracts in question and Nye's acknowledged pro- 
 ductions, as to lead me to suppose that the former were wi-itten by him. 
 In the piece on which Wallis animadverts in the Postscript to his third 
 Letter, the writer assumes the flimsy disguise of a friend of Wallis's, 
 anxious for his character and reputation, but who, when pressed by a 
 Socinian opponent who is introduced for the purpose, gives up the cause 
 of his supposed friend and the doctrine of the Trinity, without any 
 attempt at a defence. 
 
 Page 70. Note I. 
 Sherlock's confutation of this history is complete and triumphant. 
 Wherever, indeed, he was pitted directly against the open adversaries 
 of the Church, the Roman Catholic, or Socinian, he seldom leaves any- 
 
2o6 
 
 tiling to be wished for, auJ few have been more eminently successful in 
 treatises of a practical kind. His work on Death and Future Judgment, 
 which South made the subject of his bitter and well known sarcasm, is 
 entitled to a high place amongst practical treatises, and is, perhaps, the 
 only one of his writings which is now generally read. His political 
 delinquencies, as his taking the oaths was considered at the time, and the 
 imputation of Tritheism, in which it seems to be now generally admitted 
 he had harsh measure dealt him, have contributed to throw undeserved 
 discredit upon his voluminous writings. There is yet so much that is 
 really sound and excellent in his theological works as, in my opinion, to 
 justify, if not an entire republication, at least a copious selection from 
 them. On the great doctrine of the Incarnation, few divines can, I am 
 convinced, be pointed out who have written more forcibly, clearly, and 
 scripturally than Sherlock. I should be glad to find him not forgotten 
 in the republications, which the improving taste of the present time is 
 originating and encouraging. 
 
 Page 85. Note K. 
 See Wallis's second Sermon on the Trinity (edit. 1691, pp. 42 — 30) 
 for further remarks on this vexata quoestio. The reader who wishes to 
 see an accurate statement of the arguments pro and con, may refer to 
 Home's Introduction, vol. IV., p. 485, edit. 6th; and Orme's "Memoir 
 of the Controversy respecting the Three Heavenly Witnesses, 1 John, v. 
 7, 1830, 12mo.," will furnish him with an historical account of the con- 
 troversy itself. At present, the general tendency of opinion amongst 
 scholars is strongly against the reception of the seventh verse. Since the 
 death of the venerable Bishop Burgess, its strenuous defender, no writer 
 of eminence has, as far as I am aware, undertaken the championship of 
 the text. It would be absurd to deny that the bishop and his predecessor, 
 the archdeacon, were overmatched by their opponents. Travis, though 
 no contemptible writer, and still less deserving of the epithet "wretched," 
 which the rancour of sectarianism has taken at second hand from the 
 (juiver of the infidel, sunk, as who would not, under the joint onslaugh of 
 Porson and Marsh, and Burgess, with infinitely better scholarship, but 
 scarcely fitted by logical, or discriminative, or even, perhaps, critical 
 powers for the task he undertook, waged the war with but indificrent 
 success against the Quarterly reviewer and vindicator of Porson. Still, 
 admitting the failure of particular controversialists, defenders of the text 
 in (juestion, I doubt, if with all humility I may be i)ermitted to do so, 
 whether the battle is yet won, and whether the point can yet be consi- 
 dered as conclusively settled. One argument in favor of the retention of 
 the verse, the testimony of Cyiuian, has never appeared to me to have 
 been suflicientlv answered. I am fullv aware of all that has Iieen uvgi'd 
 
257 
 
 bv Porsou (Letters to Travis, p. 247) iu the Quarterly Review, (No. 65, 
 p. 82) and the Vindication of Person, (p. 381) but the arguments adduced 
 to prove that the passage in Cyprian's treatise de Unitate, which has been 
 so frequently cited, is not in fact a quotation of the disputed text, but a 
 mere allegorical deduction from the eighth verse, or an inference draw m 
 from the words of Tertullian, ingenious and plausible as they nr.iy appeal 
 at first sight, are anything, in my opinion, but solid or convincing. The 
 quotation corresponds so closely with the text, that its force cannot be 
 evaded by any hypothesis, however finely spun, from conjectures and pre- 
 sumptions. Let it be remembered, too, that no doubt exists as to the 
 words of the passage in Cyprian, which has been quoted by Fulgentius 
 and Facundus. Its genuineness, as it now stands, ipsissimis verbis, ib 
 admitted by Porson, (Letters, p. 264) and, indeed, has never been dis- 
 puted. The treatise in which it appears, Cyprian's death taking place 
 A.D. 258, was wi-itten in the earlier part of the tliird century, and is 
 unquestionably the work of that father. So that we have to decide, 
 not between the MSS. of Cyprian and the Greek MSS. of the New 
 Testament, as the point is stated by the Quarterly reviewer, (No. 65, 
 p. 79) but between the evidence of a Latin father, who quotes the 
 verse in the third century, and the evidence of the earliest Greek MSS. 
 of the New Testament, which a century afterwards omit it. In such a 
 question, it is not the multitude of proofs which is so ipaterial. One 
 witness sufTiciently clear and distinct •□ the point in issue, is worth 
 fifty who come after a long lapse of time ; nor can difiiculties derived 
 from the silence of contemporaries, diminish the effect of one positive 
 and irrefragable testimony. To such cases the old law maxim may be 
 applied. Qui prior est tempore potior est jure. In conclusion, I cannot 
 but think that the late Bishop of Salisbury would have been more suc- 
 cessful in this interesting controversy, had he reduced it into narrower 
 limits, and had not his anxiety to accumulate proofs and arguments, with- 
 out regard to their relative value, militated against their individual weight 
 and validity. 
 
 Page 89. Note L. 
 For an excellent, gramnaatical, and philosophical disquisition on the 
 word *' persona," I would refer my readers to Amyraut, de Mysterio 
 Trinitatis, p. 436. He gives the history of its various meanings, and 
 shews indisputably from the passages of Cicero, which he quotes, that the 
 great Roman orator iised it fi-equently iu its ultimate signification of a 
 man, or an intelligent being, as well as in its primary one of a character, 
 capacity, title, or oflice, borne or sustained by an individual. I regret 
 that its length precludes my extracting it here. The latitude of meaning 
 which the word is capable of bearing, without violating the propriety of 
 
 R 
 
258 
 
 the language, miglit, perhaps, have originally rendered it desirable to 
 have selected some other term, more precise and less ambiguous. It is 
 now so far engrafted into our confessions of faith, and its theological 
 meaning is so well ascertained and determined, that no change or substi- 
 tution could conveniently be made. Of the controversies from Boethius 
 downwards, which tliis word has given rise to, a curious history might be 
 written. Valla was the first, I believe, who used the quotation from 
 Cicero in the text, "Tres personas unus sustineo," to settle the meaning 
 of the term as applied, in a theological sense, to the Trinity. Amongst 
 those who so used it before Wallis, it is singular enough to find his anta- 
 gonist Hobbes, (vid. Appendix ad Leviath. p. 342, edit. 1668, 4to.) who 
 makes it the key stone of his explanation of the Trinity. The work of 
 Clendon on the word person, which Dr. Pan- has piaised, and which was 
 published in 1710, 8vo., is a confused, illogical, and rhapsodical produc- 
 tion, the object of which is to prove the Sabellian notion, that the Trinity 
 is nothing more than three outward manifestations of the same Deity. 
 This he preposterously contends is the orthodox explanation of the doc- 
 trine of the Trinity, " as held by the Church of England and established 
 by our law," and particularly by the act of the 9th and 10th of William 
 the 3rd, "for suppressing blasphemy and profaneness." This act, which he 
 so singularly twists to his purpose, merely enacted, " That if any person 
 or persons should deny any one of the persons in the Holy Trinity to be 
 God, or should assert or maintafh that there was more Gods than one, 
 such persons should incur the penalties therein mentioned." Clendon 
 was admirably answered by Leslie, in an Appendix to liis Socinian Con- 
 troversy Discussed. He was of the Inner Temple, but of his life uo 
 further particulars are known. 
 
 Page 92. Note M. 
 As none of the Greek versions of the creed, according to Montfaucon, 
 are ancient, (vid. Diatrib. p. 727) no very great importance need be 
 attached to their various Lections. The Latin original seems the fittest, 
 on all accounts, for the purposes of quotation. The latter of the two 
 reailings mentioned by Wallis appears iu the various Lections collected by 
 Gundling and Montfaucon, but the former seems certainly to agree best 
 with the context. At present, the Greek version in use is that of Dr. 
 Duport. 
 
 PAGt 9<). Note N. 
 See ante, p. 73, and post, p. 168, for Walliss's further remarks on 
 Socinus's opinions as to the sotil. See also Ashwell De Sociuo et Soci- 
 nianismo, p. 187, Oxf. 1680, 12mo.. and Edwards's Socinian Creed, 
 
259 
 
 1697, 8vo., p. 85, for n full examination of the opinions of Socinus and 
 his brethren, Smalcius, Slichtingius, Volkeliiis, and Crellius on that sub- 
 ject. They all seem to have held that the soul of man is not naturally 
 immortal. 
 
 Page 122. Note O. 
 The Roman Catholics range the order of worship into Latria, that is 
 due only to God ; Hyperdulia, that belongs to the Blessed Virgin ; and 
 Dulia, that belongs to the other Saints. 
 
 Page 129. Note P. 
 Notwithstanding this caution, the whole chorus of Unitarian writers, 
 quoting just as much of Wallis as answered their purpose, have repre- 
 sented him as laying down these as the adequate distinctions between the 
 three persons, whereas he consistently and uniformly disclaims doing so. 
 Had he denied the existence of any greater distinction than that expressed 
 in the popular analogies he adduces, his doctrine would unquestionably 
 have been liable to just exception, nor could his opinions on this subject 
 have been considered as orthodox or scriptural. This, however, he has 
 not done ; and nothing can be more unjustifiable than to hold him up as 
 limiting and restraining the characters of distinction, to those of mere 
 outward mauifestation. His description of the distinction between the 
 Divine persons (vid. p. 209) being "somewhat analogous in the Deity to 
 what in created beings is called distinctio modalis, or distiuctio a parte 
 rei sed non ut res et res," may be explained in some measure by the fol- 
 lowing passage in his Logic (edit. 1687, p. 255). " Necessarium est de 
 distinctionibus "in genere aliquid pi-aemittere. Distinctio igitur est vel 
 realis vel rationis vel modalis. Realis quando extrema different ut res et 
 res sine aliqua intrinsica dependentia vinius ad aliud : unde statimntur 
 vulgo, per Divinam saltem potentiam posse mutuo separari et separatim 
 existere. Modalis quando differunt quidem ex parte rei, ita tamen ut 
 alterum includat essentialem respectum seu connexionem ad alterum : 
 unde non possint separatione mutua (hoc est ut utrumque separatim ex- 
 istat) separari : Estque inter rem et modum vel (secundario) inter modos 
 ejusdem rei (modi tamen plerumque separari possunt mutuo, ab inviecm, 
 non a subjecto). Distinctio rationis quando imum aliquod a parte rei 
 coneipitiu- ab iiitellectu ut diversum. Estqxie vel ratiouis ratiocinantis 
 vel ratiocinatae : Hxc fit per inadequatos conccptus ejusdem rei et fuuda- 
 mentum aliquod habet in re : ilia vero, quando quid intelligitur sub diversis 
 conceptibus sine fundamento in re." 
 
260 
 
 Page 173. Note Q. 
 Luther merely says, (Postil. Ecclcsias. Dominica Trinitatis) "Uti nee 
 Latina qiioque dictio Trinitas dulce sonat." The passage in Calvin is in 
 his Admoii. ad Polonos, and is as follows, "Ha;c precatio vulgo recepta, 
 sancta Trinitas, unus Deus, miserere nostri non mihi placet et omnino 
 barbariem sapit." Luther, it will be observed, objects to the word 
 because he considered it sounded harshly. Calvin, because it was not 
 recognized by the classical purity of the language. In the absence of any 
 more valid objection, the uninterrupted use of the term by the Latin 
 church for so many centui-ies, and its fitness to express, not merely the 
 number, but also the equality and consubstantiality of the Divine pei-sons, 
 are quite sufficient to justify its retention in the confessions and services 
 of the church. 
 
 Page 176. Note R. 
 That is, the praedicate may truly apply to the subject, without being 
 of universal application, for "Universalis prajdicatio est quando praedica- 
 tum dicitur kuOoXov de toto subject© (totum intelligo prsedicationis, sive 
 totam ejus latitudinem et ambitum prsedicandi) quando scilicet prsedicatum 
 totaliter attribuitur subjecto non partialiter cum restrictione ad aliquem 
 subjecti partem sen ad peculiare quiddam intra subject! ambitum compre- 
 hensum." Wallis, Logica, p. 220, edit. 1G87. 
 
 Page 197. Note S. 
 The third letter of Jaue, the author of the two letters which Wallis 
 gave to the public, was printed separately, and is entitled, "The Third 
 Letter from W. J, to the Reverend Doctor Wallis, Professor of Geometry 
 in Oxford, upon the Subject of two former Letters to him, concerning 
 the Sacred Trinity. London, 1693, 4to., pp. 19." This letter is subse- 
 quently noticed by Wallis, p. 229. It contains a further exposition of 
 the writer's own views on the subject of the Trinity, but bears no neces- 
 sary relation to Wallis's letters. On that account, it has been deemed 
 ininccessary to reprint it in this volinne. 
 
 P.vr.'E 2.34. Note T. 
 
 This person was the Rev. E. Elys, of whom some account may be found 
 
 in Wood's Athenic, vol. IL, p. 943, edit. 1721. lie succeeded his father 
 
 ill the rectory of East Allington, in Devonshire, in 1639, but o« (te 
 
 accession of William III. was deprived of tliat living in consequence of 
 
261 
 
 his refusal to take the oaths. He subsequently retired to Totness, where 
 he resided till his death. Of the innumerable small tracts and broadsides 
 which he published, no correct list has hitherto been given, that furnished 
 by A. Wood, even with the additions in Bliss's edition, vol. IV., p. 474, 
 being vei-y incomplete. Nearly all his productions are interspersed with 
 poetry, but it cannot be said that his attempts in verse are very success- 
 ful. Of his high prerogative notions, some idea may be formed from his 
 styling Milton, in a Tract published against his Defensio Secunda in 1699, 
 "Monstrum impudentias horrendum, representails Carolum vituperando, 
 Satanse personam, Blasphemias evomentis in Deum." Locke, he cha- 
 racterizes, in a letter to Mr. John Norris, published in 1706, "the great 
 enemy of mankind." Samuel Parker's able Tentamina Physico-Theolo- 
 gica de Deo, he describes as "Tenebraruni Soboles." Yet with all these 
 occasional excesses of language, and the violent prejudices he entertained, 
 he seems to have been a learned, pious, and well-intentioned man. He 
 was a great admirer of Dr. Henry More, whose letters to himself he 
 published in 1694, 8vo. His own letters to Dr. H. More, as well as his 
 correspondence with Wallis on the subject of the Trinity, are in the pos- 
 session of Mr. Crossley. In the latter, he speaks in the highest terms of 
 Wallis's eight letters. 
 
 Page 242. Note U. 
 This piece, the full title of which is " An Earnest and Compassionate 
 Suit for Forbearance, to the Learned Writers of some Controversies at 
 Present, By a Melancholy Stander By. 'Knowing that they do gender 
 strifes.' 2 Tim. ii. 23. Lond. 1691, 4to. pp. 17," was written by Dr. 
 Edward Wetenhall, Bishop of Cork and Ross. Its object, as denoted by 
 the title, is to recommend the discontinuance of the Trinitarian contro- 
 versies, then carried on with so much warmth and vehemence. After 
 stating Sherlock's notion of the Trinity, he proceeds (p. 15) to Wallis, 
 and observes, "Another doctor of our church is pleased more tenderly 
 and safely to explain it thus : The blessed Trinity is three somewhats, 
 and these three somewhats we commonly call persons, but the true notion 
 and true name of that distinction is unknown to us. The word persons 
 (in Divinis) is but metaphorical, not signifying just the same as when 
 applied to men. We mean thereby no more but somewhat analogous to 
 persons. This latter part," Wetenhall observes, " has been ever held to 
 by aU learned Trinitarians : and the doctor speaks like himself. Yet it 
 troubles me what sport some people make even with this explication." 
 Sherlock replied to this tract in his Apology for writing against Socinians, 
 published in 1693, 4to., in which he defends himself with great spirit and 
 ability. This occasioned Wetenhall's Antapology of the Melancholy 
 
262 
 
 Stander By, 1693, 4to., iu answer to which Sherlock puWished a defence 
 of his Apology iu 1694, 4to. A reply was made to this, but evidently 
 not by Wetenhall, in a Vindication of the Antapologist, 1695, 4to., which 
 appears to have closed the controversy. 
 
 Page 244, Note X. 
 This Master of the Temple was the immortal Hooker, nor has the 
 explanation of the Trinity contained in this passage, as I have before 
 observed, ever been objected to by any theologian of eminence, though 
 it is attacked in the Considei'ations on the Explications of the Trinity, 
 and by later Unitarian WTiters. 
 
 T. SOWLER, PnrNTRR, 4, 8T. ANN S-sgUARIt, MANCHESTKIl