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PRESENTED TO THE LIBRARY
PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY
Mrs. Alexander Proudfit.
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|SIMPLICIUS
COMMENT. ||
΄
Made a from the Greek,
τς eS τε D. D.
Dean of Canterbury, and Chaplain} | —
in Ordinary to His Majesty. — [1
The Fourru EDITION Garicceed: :
ἢ
| }With the LIFE of EPICTETUS,
eet From Monfieur BorL4rEAu.
ἯΙ
| |Printed by 7. 8. for Ricuarp SARE, I near | {<3
Gray’ s-Inn-Gate in Holborn. MDCCXxXI.
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Stine ents: 6 Nenana og a.
τὸ ποτ fuse
A τὴ f
ΩΝ
Pe iy
At
on EE BLO eet alt iter Φ--.. Ὁ
To the Worthily Honoured,
WILLIAM GORE
OF
2% Wallan Gs
| County of Hertford, ΕΠ;
SIR,
‘O omit the many trifling Preten-
ces, Commonly made nfe of upon
Nate Bical ions, I fhall think this Dedi-
_ gation Ὁ abundantly juttified , by only al-
ὍΣ ledging
- Epistuiz De
pins One thing in its Excufe ; That
every Man is by no means daly,pr epared
‘to Read, or Relifh, much lefs is every
Man of Quality, a ‘pape: Patron for
pee δ
80. Exquifi ite a Piece of Moraltiyce Te-
quires not only a Good Underftand-
ing, but.a Virtuous and Well-Difpofed
“Mind, a Serious Senfe of the Dignity of
a Reafoning δοῦν. and a due Care to
keep up its Chara@er: Affeétions rai-
fed above the Sordid Enjoyments of the
World, anda fix’d Opinion, that the
Trouble, we @re at about thefe things,
ought not tosbe efteemed the Bulinefs,
but the great Misfortune and πύον
brance of Human Life: A fteddy Go-
vernment of the Paflions, anda Tem-
per Even‘and Eafie, Affable and Oblig-
ing. Without thefe Qualifications, or
fome good Advances towards. them, a
Man’s- Palate can never ftand to the fol-
lowing Reflexions; and the moft excel-
Neitbaieacss ta Ree
ν “ +S elphedigiey ig te
a dae Oe
al! γ
‘
lent Peale:s of Living would be entertain’d
with Coldnefs and Contempt, :
Whether
ἘΣ ἈΤΥΕΕΙ 1} Ἐύλῳ πηαψίψος πε
: Whether I have done this Author
ὙΌΣ in the following Tranflation , 15
neither. poffible nor proper fot Me. to
determine: But, though that. perfor-
mance were alowed to be never [0 per-
- fec&; it is yet a very neceflary Ad-
vantage, and indeed a Right due both
to Him and my Self, to take Sanétu- —
ary in the Goodnefs of a-Perfon, who
knows, the better how to Pardon, be-
Cane he: knows how ts Judge ;~ and
whofe Virtues have already not. only
approved, but tranfcribed, and by the
beft, the Chriftian, Morality , have
even Corrected. and Refined upon all
the moft valuable Parts of this Book.
- How far this is Your cafe, I will
not, I need not take upon me to de-
termine; all, Sir, that have the Hap-
pinefs to know you, will do it for me:
Permit me only to clofe this Addrefs,
with my moft fincere Wifhes, that you
may long continue an Ornament to
Learning, Religion, and your own Fa-
mily; a publick Bleffing to your Coun-
try and yout Friends ; and that I may
A ee have
atte te ate
Ep tsrte Depicarory. ae
have the honour of being ever.ac- ἢ
knowledg’d in thar Number. One Te- _
ftimony whereof, will be the accepting
thefe Profeflions which I am now defi-
rous to make to the World, of my being,
with all poffible Refped, ᾿
a
peers
“iat. Tour mo Obliged,
and moft Humble Servant,
ub GEO, STANHOPE.
’
\
%
Γ Do not give the Reader this Trouble, out of
any Intent to make an Apology for fbew-
wg the following Book in Exglith ; for
- fare the rendring fuch admirable Inftruc-
tious as diffufive as 1: is poffible, cannot need
an Excufe. Nor.dol intend to give him atedt-
ous Account of the Performance itfelf ; but foatl
ouly fay, that tt. hath been my. Endeavour toex-
prefs the Author's. Senfe with all the Eafinefs,
and Freedom I could, fo as to decline both the
Slavery of a Literal, and. the Licentioufue/s of
a Loofe aud Luxuriant Interpretation.
My ‘Defign at prefent, 15 only to make Some ne-
cefary Reflexions upon thofe Parts of the Stoical
Pbilsfophy, which are apt to prejudice Meu a-
gaint it, and tempt fome Per fons, from thefe ex-
travagant Syflems.of Moral Perfettions, to
think. (at leaft.to plead in Vindication of their
oum Exceffes) that the Generality of Rules pre-
fervibed for the. Reforming our Manners, are
Lhings too nicely thought, fublime, airy, and 17)
pratticable Speculations. | |
Tt is not my Purpofe, nor ought it to be any
Man's to vindicate thefe, or any other, Mafiers
of Heathen Morality, in every particular Notion
they advanced. But I mut beg Leave to put my
| - A 4 ᾿ Reader
fe Pe {ΕΠ EB, oe pu
Reader 2” mind, what is the proper Advantage
to be made of thefe Errors ; and that fure is, not
to run downMorality, as anempty Name (to
which the Sioicks muft be allowed, in defpight of
all the Aggravations their Failings are capable
of, to have done excellent Service) but to dif-
cern in this the W2fdom of Almighty God, who,
in the midft of his moft liberal Endowments ,
never fuffered the greateft Heathens to be with-
out fome notable Defect of Fudgment, but ever
debafed their Knowledge with an Alloy of Ig-
novance and Folly; And that, no doubt, ‘to cre- Ὁ
ate inus amore juft Efteem and Veneration for
his own Chriftian Philofoiphy, to which alone
this Perfettion was referved, of Truth with-
out Error, and Light without ‘Darkuefs. ἢ
LT think it therefore my. Duty, (Ὁ far to com-
ply with the Objector in tondemning thefe
Schemes of Ethicks, as to fhew upon this Oc-
cafion, That the Principles of Religion have
exalted our Virtues, and adjufted the meafures
of them, infinitely better, than any Human
Laftitutzons were ever able to do. For, though.
the Stoicks are moft defervedly admired for
their Noble Notions in thefe Matters above any
other Sect, and the brave Attempts they made,
towards the reducing Nature to its Primitive
Purity and Perfection; yet, I think it cannot
- fairly be denied, that, in their Way of Treat- —
ang the Paffions and Powers of the Soul, they
mith over-fbot the Mark, and have quite mif-
taken the Cafe. How far it is poffible to go,
in fibduing the Paffions abfolutely, 1 foall not
| NOW
--
λῈ
Β΄ PRD Bk Aci sE.
now Difpute; I take it for granted, that the.
generality of «People might do agreat deal more
nit, than they either do, or imagene they can
dos And that Sloth, which is the prevailing
Viee,. and the moft fatal Objtruction to a good:
and happy Life, affrights us with many Diffi-
culties and “Difcouragements, by no means. of.
Nature's, but entirely of our own making. Tety
20. deliver ourfelves from thofe inward Commo-
tions, which are vifible Occafions of fo. much
Mifihief, we muft not prefently pafs a rafb
and rigorous Sentence of utter Excifion upon
them, ‘but try fome gentler aud more prudent
Method, becaufe the fame things are equally
\ capable of producing a great deal of good. ..
_ Thefe are indeed the Secret Springs that
_ move and attuate us; and all the Care incum-
bent upon the Governing Part of the Mind, is
to fet them right, and at a true Pitch, that fo
every Motion, which flows from thence, may be
Fuft and Regular... They are like the Acidin
our Stomachs, that conftantly provokes and re-
news our Appetites, and prevents the moft ue-
ceffary Funétious of Life, from becoming fiat
and naufeous tous.. And accordingly, He, who
contrivd, and confequently mufi be beft ac-
guaiuted with our Frame, found them neceffary
to infpire and invigorate this heavy Mafi; He
faw, that thus to eafeus of all our Pains, would
be to rob us, at the fame time, of all our Plea-
fures; and for this Reafon he hath made Pro-
_mifes and Threatnings, Rewards and Punifb-
_ ments, the Gayeties and Anxieties of Heart, f all
te ᾿ which
t
mii ln ible ees nl και Στ
whichare but fo many different ways of working
upon our ‘Paffions, ) the moft proper and powerful
Luducements to the bef? Religion in the World.
So that in truth, the main, I might fay the whole,
of our Duty and Happinefs, confifts, not in flim
fling thefe Affettions, and condemning them to a
State of utter Inactivity, but im moderating and
regulating them: Aud no Degree of Love, or
Hatred; or Defire, or Fear, or Anger, or
Grief, or any other fimple Paffion, can be toa
intenfe, when placed upow worthy Objetis, and
diretted to worthy Ends. :
The fame Difficulty lies againf? Stoicilm, with
regard to Civil Society, and the mutual Concern
we feel for one another. For fome Rules given
here, if literally and firitily followed, may feem
to threaten the Deftrutiion of all Natural Af-
fection and Charity among Men; which there-
fore Chriftianity hath taken ito its peculiar
Care and Protettion. It reprefents Temporal
Affliftions as Chaftifements, and expeits we
foould feel the Smart, in order to be amended by
the Rod. It remits us for Comfort to bigher
and better Confiderations,: atd does not a-
mufe us with vain Notions, that thefe Things
neither touch nor ought. to affect us; but tells
us, That the more féufibly they do fo, the more
glorious the Improvement and the Reward is
capable: of being made. It infpires Campaffion
and good Nature, and the tendereft Refentrents
of other People’s Misfortunes. It commands no
Maz to attend the Funeral Obfegutes of his
friend or Dearett Relation, with a gay or per-
4 fettly
feétly compofed Countenance, as knowing very
well, that this Behaviour is Barbarous and
Brutifo; and that what fome have called Phi-
a
5
Ks
PRB? A OR
f 2 mere σαν
lofophy and Conflancy in fuch Cafes, may feem
rather the Effect of Stupidity, or Sullennefs,
or Pride; that this ws an imaginary Perfection,
which few ever did, and none ought to attain
-- to: And, in-aword, that the Excefs and In-
ordinacy of our Paffions ws the only Thing blame-
able inthem. Againft which therefore it makes
ample Provifion; μιμοῦ as offers no Violence to
_ the Original Softue/s of Human Nature, but
preferves all thofe Refpetts entire, whith we
awe to our felves and to one another; fuch as may
be τ θα with avery good Grace, and fuch as will
be moft effectual, when rightly applied.
This Cenfure tno more, than what appeared
to Me highly feafonable and expedient, to con-
vince the moft partial Admivers of Heathen
Philofophy, that, whereim foever thofe Syftems
of Morality differ from the Chriftian, they are
manifestly iferiour to them. In other Points,
we can fearce give them greater Commendation,
than they rcally.deferve: And among them all,
1 know none, that challenges more Efieem, than
this Book. The Infiru€tious are fo wife, the
Allnfions fo ively, the Exhortations fo moving,
and the Arguments fo firong, that they may well
be allowed, not only to convince cur Reafir,
but toexcite our greateft Admiration. The Ap-
plication is fo eafie, by a litle Change of Phi-
lofophy into Religion, and the Plurality ¢f Di-
vine Beings into the oxe only True Ged, thet
any
i Si } eR
PURE: BA Quake:
any confidering Chriftcan may here find a Scheme
of what Himfelf ought tobe. And, except fome —
particular Subtleties in the Firft, Thirteenth,
Thirty Fourth and Thirty Eighth Chapters,
(which I mention bere particularly, that the
more unlearned Readers may, if they pleafe,
pafs them over, without fiffering themfelves to
be prejudiced againft the reft of the Book) the
Arguments are fo plain and fubjiantial, as to re-
commend themfelves to the Senfe, and to fuit
the Capacity, of every Common Man. But it
muft be remémbred again, what is the proper
Benefit of fach Writings: and That, no doubt,
muft be, to let us fee, what a Reproach the
Perfection of thefe Ancients is to us at this
Day. And I heartily wifh, that the prefent
Treatife may have its due Influence upon every
One who fhall perufe it; by provoking Men to
a Holy Emulation, and a generous ‘Difdam,
that Epictetus bis Proficient fhould out-do any
Profefor of the Gofpel, who walks by a clearer
Light, and excels in every Advantage of Good-
nels, except fuch as he wilfully denies to him-
Self, thofe of Confideration, and Refolution
and an active Zeal. |
CxS)
εδιαδηοῦξ,
EPICTETUS,
French eansaliis of Boileau.
eee
: Fr HILE my Thoughts were employed about
making good the Promifey which my Reader '
will find i in the firft Page of this Edition, it
was my Fortune to light upon the following
Account of EpiGetus in French. Which, by comparing
with the Original Authors, from whom the feveral Paf-
fages ave taken, I obferved to be collefted with fuch Fi-
delity, as might reafonably excufe any farther Pains of
_ Mine, than that of Tranflating it into our own Tongue.
L have therefore ouly added a marginal Note ov two, and
given the Narration as I found it. The greateft part
will approve itfelf Authentick, becaufe gathered from
thofe very Difcourfes of this Philofopher, which Arrian —
bath.preferved fer us; and with regard to them, the
References here are much more exatt, than in Mr. Boi-
leau, or any other Author I have met with upon this
THE
ae
i Tulle foe
HE ‘Time of Epiéetus his Birth feems to have
i been near the End of Nero’s Reign, the Place
ot it Hierapolis, a City in Phrygia. The other Cir-
cumftances relating to it, are uncertain: For we have °
no farther Knowledge of either his Father or Mo-
ther, but that they were both without queftion, of
verymean Condition. *4.Gellius, and Suidas tell us,
that he was Slave to Epaphroditus, a Freeman of Ne-
. ¥o’s, and a Captain of his Guards, and in fhort, a
Man, of whom Story hath delivered down nothing
valuable, or worthy of Remark, but only his being
Matter to fo renowned a Slave. Among fome other
of this Man’s Actions, Arrian hath taken occafion to
mention Two, which, I think, ought not to be o-
mitted here, becaufe they are exactly agreeable to his
Temper, and feem to give usa very expreflive Idea
of the Perfon. | :
This Man had fold one of his Slaves, who was
a Shoemaker, to an Officer of WVero’s, becaufe he
found him a Bunglerat his Trade; But the fame Feli-
szo (for fo the Slave was celled) coming afterwards
to make the Emperor’s Shoes, Epapbroditus upon the
News of this Preferment, was particularly civil, and
moft furprifingly refpectful to him; confulted him
in Bufinefs, applauded his Parts, and made this Good-
for-nothing Fellow his principal Confident, and in-
timate Friend, _
© Another time, there came a Man to him, and
jn great Paflion threw himfelf at his Feet, complain-
ing moft heavily of his hard Fortune, and what Di-
ftrefs he was reduced to; declaring, that now out of
all his Eftate, he had not above a hundred and fifty
* Suid. in Epiger, A, Gell. Lib. τι, Cap. 18,
& Arrian. ‘Lib, J, Cap, 19. ;
¢ Arvian, Lib. I. Cap. 26.
thoufand
ERS oy ET 5. . iil
thoufand Crowns left; to which Epapbroditus re-
plied, not by way of Raillery, as any other Man
would have done upon fo extravagant a Complaint,
but with great ferioufnefs, and an appearance of Con-
cern, that he was really aftonifhed at his Patience,
in forbearing fo long to make his.cafe known.
—4Under the Dominion of this coxcombly Mafter
it was, that Zpiétetus paffed the firft part of his Life.
At what time, or by what means, he obtained his Li-
berty, we have no pofitive Account: Bur thus much
we are aflured of, that upon an Edict of Domitian,
for banifhing all Philofophers from Rome and /taly, he
withdrew to Nicopolis, a City of Epirus, called by
the Moderns Prevefa. And his being included under
that Prohibition, in the Quality of a Philofopher, is
a manifeft Proof that he was a Freeman. For in-
deed, it is not to be imagined, that a Perfon, whofe
Merit had recommended him to the particular Fa-
-vour and Efteem of the Emperours of his time,
fhould be fuffered to continue in Slavery. It hath
been generally thought, that after this Retreat, he
never returned any more to Rome, but paffed the
remainder of his Life at Nicopolis: And this Opi-
nion is grounded upon 4rrian’s taking exprefs no-
tice in feveral parts of his Colleétions, that thofe
“Difcourfes, of which his Book confifts, were made
and. delivered at Nicopolis*. But, not withflanding
this conjecture be fupported by the Authority of
Salmafiusy 1 am apt itil to fulpeét, that it wants
Confirmation. And in this fufpicion Spartian f bears
‘ge out, who, in the Life of Adrian, tells Us, that
_Emperour was very intimate with, and bore a par-
ticular Refpett to Epitierus, Now it will by no
4 A.Gell Lib. XV. Cap.11. Eufeb. Chron,
* Not, ad Epi, & Simpl. p. 4,
¥ Spart. in Adar, Cap. 16.
means
δεν τ» Ns
ΡΤ 9s
ΡΥ τ THe LIF E of
means enter into my Head, how this regard fhould
be fo remarkable, and that familiarity fo ftri&tly kept
up, if Epiétetus his conftant refidence, from the time’
cP Domitian’s Edi&, had been ina place fo stone
as the City of Nicopolis. :
It does not certainly appear, whether he were ever
married; but as I have not Authority” {ufiéieny’ fori.
“affirming, fo neither do T think ‘there is: chough for ἢ,
᾿ denying it. For 4rrian, in feveral Paflages, takes no-
tice of Epiéetus his averfion againit the’ Epicureans,
“pon this Provocation particularly, that they {poke
in, prejudice of Marriage. But whether a married:
ora fingle Man, I take it for highly probable, that
he had no Children. For, befides that no Author
Mefition any fuch, that Repartee of Demonax in Lu-
cian.8, intimates that he had none. Who, when ἘΞ
_picetus advifed him to marry and leave Children, re-
plied pleafantly, With all my heart, a: you give
me one of your own Daughters.
; But how liberal foever Spartian » hath been in the
commendation of drian’s generofity, and high E-
fteem for the Poets, and Orators, and Philofophers,
and Mathematicians, and the Mafters of any fort
of Science (though at the fame time no Man li-
ving took more delight in rallying them than he) yet,
we have no Grounds to believe, that either that Em--
peror or any of his Succeflors, who profeffed fuch
Veneration tor Epiitetus, beftowed upon him fo much,
as might fet him above even extteme Poverty. ‘The rea-
fon of, this probably was his obftinate contempt of
Riches, which would not fuffer any Favours of that
kind to be faften’d upon him. And this appeared by
his manner of HvIng ac Rome, in a little Cottage, ©
without fo much 45. α Door to it, no Attendants but
5. Lucian in Demon.
» Spart. in Adr, ubi fupra. or
one
ἃ τὴ
irl
}
2
4
;
EPICTETUS. Υ͂
PRE ER άέαοτ ποσῶν ὡς ὡὼ0.00.. ὕ0,ἱπαατνυτχασκ ει» να
one old Wrerdan; no Houfhold- Stuff, ible an earthen
Lamp, to the Light of which we owe thofe beauti-
ful, thofe Divine Thoughts, of which Arrian hath
preferved fome noble Remains: And by all thefe Cir-
cumftances, we may makea judgment how poor this
_Philofopher was.
I come now to give an account of his Opinions,
ang his Virtues. Among which his peculiar and dar-
ling one feems to have been Modefty. “This was moft
eminent in his own practice, as well as in his recom-
mendation to others. Hence he ufed to fay, + that
_ there is no need of adorning a man’s Houfe with rich
Hangings or Paintings, * for the moft graceful
Furniture is Temperance and Modefty ; Thefe are
the lafting Ornaments, and will never be the worfe
for wearing. He was fo perfectly mortified toall Am-
bition and Vain-glory, that if any Philofopher ever
made Humility the conftant Principle of all his Adcti-
ons, this was certainly the Man. For, as no Man of
hisage did fo much good, fo nobody fure was fo very
induttrious to conceal the good hedid. ‘This gave oc-
cafion to thofe ion υλὰ which we meet with inthe fol-
lowing Manual, ! “ If you have fo far maftered your
“ὁ Appetite, as to have brought your Body to coarfe
Fare, and to be well contented with mere Necef-
᾿ς faries, do not glory in your ab{temious way of living.
““ And if you drink nothing but Water, proclaim not
““ your own Sobriety uponevery Occafion. Or if you
would inure yourfelf to hardfhip, do. it for your own
© Benefit, not to attract the Admiration of the Peo-
© ple. Let vain-glorious Fools made their Trials as
«ὁ publick as they can; but know, that.all affectati-
*¢ ons of this kind are utterly ani Sines the Character
- © of a Philofopher.
. 5 Stob. Serm. 38.
kK LArrian.. ai LV. Cap. 8.
" wy, Oe LXX
B Ano-
νὴ ἀπ yee
Another inftance how free he was from Vanity,
is this; that, although no Perfon ‘whatfoever of
his time was better. qualified for becoming an Au-
thor; yet he was fo infenfible of any Excellence
that way, fo perfeétly untouched with an inclination
predominant ufually in the moft exalted Minds, as to
leave nothing of his own compofition behind him.
And, had not 4rrian tranf{mitted to Pofterity the Ma-
xims taken from his Mafter’s Mouth, we have fome
reafon to doubt, whether the very Name of Epiétetus
had not been loft to the World.
It was his Judgment, ™that a true Philofepher was
obliged to diftinguifh himfelf, not fo much by what
he {poke, as by what he did: And this gave him
occafion to fay, that the greater part of them, who
made profeflion of this Science, were only Philofo-
phers in Word, but not in Faét. One day,® meeting
with a certain Perfon, who was angry at being pi-
tied, Epictetus reprefented to him, how very unjuft
that Anger was, fince his very being out of humour
upon fuch an occafion was an evident proof, that his
cafe was, fo wretched as to call for Pity. Another
time, ° upon meeting a Man of moft profligate Life,
and infamous Character, who yet had the confidence
to fet up for Learning and Philofophy, he accotted
him thus. “ὁ O fenfelefs Creature, what is it thou
“ wouldeft be at? Haft thou been careful to fee,
“ that thy Veffel be f{weetand clean, before thou put
any Liquor ito it? For if that be not feafoned,
whatever is poured into it, will turn four as Vine-
gar, rank as Urine, or if you can think of any
thing yet more offenfive and corrupt than either.
A. Gellius, who cites the paflage, gives it this Com-
m Arrian, Lid, I. Cap. το. Lib, 11, Cap. 12, & alibi paffim,
A rian. ,Lib. 1V: Cap. 6, 4
¥ 4 Gell, Lib. XYVIL Cap. 19.
mendation
EB, Baie) FGA US. Vil
᾿ς mendation, that nothing could be more weighty, no- ©
thing more true; meaning, that, when moral
Principles, or any fort of ufetul Knowledge, are infu-
~ fed into a Soul depreffed, and polluted with vicious
Habits; this, like a foul Veffel, gives them fuch a
tinéture, that they prefently become good for no-
thing, and turn all to corruption.
ἶ P But there was in Egiéterus one Quality, fo much
the more valuable, becaufe Philofophers are but feldom
famous for it; whichis, that he wasa very great Lo-
ver of Neatnefs; and faid himfelf, upon occafions,
that he had much rather fee one of his Scholars come
to him well drefled and curled, and had more hopes
of fuch a one’s improvement, than of one, whofe
Hair was matted and greafie, and his Habit flovenly.
He did indeed fhare with the moft celebrated Philofo-
phers of old, in that common misfortune of an ill
Perfon. A weaknefs and lamenefs in his Body he fuf-
fered under, by means of a Humour that fell into his
Leg. This he acknowledges very frankly in an Epi-
gram compofed upon himfelf, and quoted by 14. Gel-
lius.
AIAG» Embilyr@ Puoul, % (ὠμαῖι awnedsy
Καὶ weviluleG-y © φίλ᾽ ὠβανόζτοις.
Although by Birth a Slave, in Body lame,
In Fortune poor, yet dear to Heaven I am.
_ .* Planudes in his Anthology mutt needs be miftaken in
attributing this Epigram to Leonidas, becaufe, as Sal-
mafius hath rightly obferved, he was a Poet of note
long before Epiéetus his time. But then Salma/ius
himfelf will not allow this to be compofed by Epi-
P Arrian. Differt. Lib. Cap. 11.
4. A. Gell, Lib. II. Cap. 18.
‘® Salmaf, in Epitt, & Simpl. p. 3- !
B2 fetus
ἀμ Δ.
ὃ ries
-----τττ------.- - »ὀὈὠς-ς-ς-ς-ς-- ἝἷὮἝἷἝἷὮἝἵἝἭἝἃἷἝ“,͵΄΄΄“ὦἝἕἷἝἷ.. .....-...... ᾿
ΓΙ Ἧ
viii OTP ate ia, TR Bhi ee
éetus neither, but thinks that fome half-witted Pe-
dant firft made, and then inferted, ir into the Text
of 4. Gellius. The only Argument alledged for this
Opinion, is, that this Epigram is notto be tound inany ~
antient Manufcript of 4. Gellius. But admitting this
to be fo; if the conjecture be true, we muft fay that
the fame Pedant foifted it into ‘ Macrobius too: For
he alfo quotes it for Epictetus his own, inthe firft Book
of his Saturnalia. 1 own however, there is one rea=
fon which inclines me to fufpeét his being the Author
of it, which is the inconfiftence that appears to me,
fora Man of Epiéfetus his fingular Modefty and Hu-
mility, to {peak fo advantagioufly of himfelf*.
But whatever become of the Compofer, the Mat-
ter of the Diitich is inconteftable. It being certain,
that Epiétetus was very ill ufed by Fortune; but how
niggardly foever She was to him, Providence made
him good amends, by the liberal endowments of ‘his
Mind. And it looks as if Fortune were permitted,
to make War upon him, on purpofe to add to the
Glory of his Triumphs : For I will venture to afirm,
that the Condition and Hardthip of a Slave, as well
as the Infirmities of his Body, were neceffary to re-
commend his Virtue, and fet it off in a brighter luftre ©
to all Pofterity.
The meannefs of bis Fortune had no influence up-
on the greatnefs of his Soul; nor could he ever be
brouglit to a fervile Flattery of Perfons in the moft
exalted Station, but dealt with them very plainly,
when hefaw occafion. Speaking of Princes and Ty-
rants, the Power they boatt of over their Inferiours,
and the Submiffions they expeét upon that account,
5 Macrob, Lib. 1. Cap. 11.
© This Argument Calaudon will by no means admit, but contends for a very
different Senfe of this Duftich, andrbinks tt defigned only to fhewWy that the Pr o/perity or
Adverfity Men mect with in the Affairsof the World, ought not to be efteemed a di-
Stingutfhing Mark of their being more or lefs Favourstes of Heaven.
he
τηνι... σοὃὥὃ»“Ἕ«“« Ἕοὕον. το, γ) ,.-.-....---»»Ῥ ,.-- ᾿ ᾿᾿᾿᾿’
ΝΕ BaP MOU Eek 9, ix
he expreffes himfelf to this purpofe. ᾧ Thefe Great
_ § People are much in the wrong, when they value
ἐς themfelves upon the deference and fervices, paid
᾿ς them by thofe under their Jurifdiétion. Do they
τος think all this Court is made to them for their own
© fakes? Nothing lefs. Each Man that makes it,
“ hath a regard to his particular Intereft ; and, when
&© fuch addrefles ceafe to be for the Intereft of their
“© Subjects, the Prince quickly finds himfelf neglected
“ and defpifed. We take care of fuch, as we do of
6 Beaftsof burden, as we feed and rub downour Hor-
ἐς fes, that they may be capable of doing us better
ςς Service. We adore them, as the Men of Rome
ες facrifice to Difeafes ; if the Fever have Altars, it is
«ς from the fear of being hurt by it. And in another’
«ὁ place ; ¥ Why all thefe Terrours? fays he, What
«ὁ isit that they can do to us, which we fhould be fo
“© much afraid of ? The worft their Malice can inflict
$¢ upon us is Death. And, muft we not of neceflity
6¢ die, fome time, and fome way or other? If we can-
* not avoid going out of the World, what mighty
¢ matter it is how wego?. Nay, is not that the fhor-
&¢ teft and eafieft way, which Violence and Rage fends
* us out by? Was any Tyrant ever fo cruel to his bit-
“Ὁ tereft Enemy, as to be killing him fix Months to-
€¢ gether? And why then is not fuch a Death rather
*¢ to be chofen, than a Heétick Fever, which often-
s* times is whole years before it has difpatched us?
— *Obferve, what freedom he takes with thofe, who
fanfy themfelves free, becaufe they were nobly de-
fcended. § You think, fays he, becanfe you have
“ been twice Conful, your Father was a Senator,
“* and you are the Emperor’s Favourite, that your
* Quality makes You more free, than others of a
» Arrian. Lib. I. Cap. 19.
‘YW Arrian, Lib. UW. Cap. 6.
* Arrian, Lib. IV. Cap. 1.
B 3 i meaney
e
x THe LIF E or
pm el) lec ρϑδοι
*¢ meaner Birth and Fortune. Alas! you are more a
τὰ Slave, than the defpifed Man, who was born fo;
‘* and Fis Condition is more at large than yours. He
< may be fometimes ill ufed by a barbarous Mafter, but
¢ you are perpetually plagued and harrafled, by as
“ many Matters, as you have ungoverned Paffions.
“¢ The difference is, that he is a Slave in Hemp and
“¢ Hair-cloth, and you in Silk and Tiffue. ylf He
“* be wanting in his Duty, he undergoes the lath; but
“¢ if You neglect yours, you are punifht according to
your Quality, and becaufe you are Noble and Cz-
“¢ far’s Favourite, you have the privilege to have
“ your Head taken off. A worthy privilege indeed?
So little Referve did Epiéetus ufe to thofe above ©
him, when it was neceflary to fhew them to them-
felves, and convince them of the vanity of thofe Prero-
gatives they were fo caulefsly proud οἵ; Whereas in
/
truth, they contributed nothing, either to their Vir-—
tue or their Happinefs. Contentednefs gave him true
Liberty under the moft calamitous Circumftances ;
And, without any flourifh upon the-matter, it may be |
truly faid, that no Man ever carried the point of Con-
flancy, to fo high a degree of Perfeétion.
While he was yeta Slave to Epaphroditus, this Brute
of a Mafter one day took a Frolick to wrench his
Leg, Epiftetus obferving him delight with fo barba-
rous a Pleafure, and that he continued it with grea-
ter Violence, faid, with a fmile, and free from any
appearance of Paflion, Jf you go on, you will certainly
break my Leg. In fhort he did fo, and then all the
return he made was this, Did 7 not tell you Sir, that
you would break my Leg? * Celfus tranfported with
¥ Lib. I. Cap. 26.
* See Orig. cont. Celf. Lib. VIL. Pag. 368. Edit. Cantabr. 1658.
where Celfus pretends to prefer the conflancy of Epictetus, above that of Jelus Chrift.
the
VOR rhe
BEPLery ET S: xi
‘
the admiration of Philofophy, extols this Patience fo
far above any other inftance of it ever feen in the
~ World, that he runs his Argument up toa moft ex-
‘travagantand blafphemous Impiety. If, thro’ the In-
juries of time and neglect, we had not loft that Book
which 4rrian compoted of the Life and Death of this
excellent Perfon; I make no doubt, but we fhould
feea great many other like Examples of his Conttancy.
For it cannot reafonably be fuppofed, but he, who
could with fo much calmnefs fupport the breaking of
a Leg, had exercifed his Patience upon feveral other
very trying occafions.
4 Himfelf hath toldus, of whatufeit is to accufflom
one’s {elf to bear the fmalleftaccidents with evennefs of
Temper. If your Oy], fays he, be fpilt, or your
* Wine ftolen, refle& prefently, that by fuch flight
f° Loffes as thefe, the Virtue and Habit of Conftan-
“ cy is purchafed. > Accordingly, having purchafed
an Iron Lamp, which he accounted a very coftly piece
of Furniture, as he fat one day deep in thought, it
was ftolen out of his Hut. When he looked about,
and miffed it, he faid with a fmile, ‘ I fhall cheat
€* this Rogue next time, for when he comes to {teal
© another Lamp he thall find only an earthen one.
This is not indeed an in{tance equal to that of his bro-
ken Leg, but yet it well deferves our mention: Be-
caufe in matters of greater moment, Vain-glory, or
fome other Paffion is apt to ftep in ; but in thofe
which are trivial, a Man is under no temptation to dif-
guife, and therefore mutt be {uppofed to proceed accord-
ing to the true and natural dilpofition of his mind.
[ἡ Him the Habit of Suffering was fo mafterly that
no Man ever had Icarned that Art more perfectly.
He needed no partakers in his Afflictions, to foften
7 Enchirid. Chap.XVII.
b. I, Cap. τ.
B 4 | them ;
Xit THe LIF E or
them ; but had all the Guard within himfelf. Nays
he thought it a fign of a very corrupt Nature, for a
Man to folace himfelf, from others fharing in his Mi-
feries ; as if what any one felt were abated or increa-
fed in proportion as his Neighbours felt more or lefs.
And he would expofe the ridiculous folly of thofe who
aggravated their own Misfortunes, by the confidera-
tion of their being fingular. ‘ What, fays he, in cafe
“you were condemned to be behedded, mutt all
“© mankind be fentenced to the fame Punithment, mere-
“ ly for the fake of giving you that fantaftical Com-
“ fort that other People fuffer as well as You?
And, as Epiffetus his practice advanced him far a-
bove other Philofophers, fo did the correétnefs of his
Notions likewife, concerning this Virtue of Refo-
Jution. For he diftinguifhed very rightly between
Courage, and Foolhardinefs; between enduring and
courting Sufferings and Danger. He advifed no Man
to chufe a rough way, if he had it in his Power to
take a fmooth one; nor to climb Rocks and Pyecipi-
ces, when Providence allowed him to travel this Jour-
ney of Life upon even ground. He was not like that
fturdy Philofopher, who would rather fuffer a Car-
riage to drive over his Body, than turn out of the
way toavoid it. When Epaphroditus broke his Leg,
he bore it patiently, but he could have been very
well fatisfied, to have found him better natured. He
thought it as much a Reproach, to run into Danger,
asto run away from it ; and, though Honour oblige
Men to encounter it when it aflaults them, yet he
acknowledged no fuch high-flown Punétilio, asfhould
render it commendable to prefer it before Safety, and
make it their own Act and Deed. |
When Reafon and Duty lead us on, then he ad-
mits of no changing a right courfe, upon the account
© Arrian. Lib. 1. Cap. 1.
® rar, Lib, 1, Cap. τ,
of
id
i EVs Pbh@ F Biro ws. xiii
of any hazards or inconveniences, which may attend
_ our perfevering init. Tofuch occafions, we muft ap-
_ ply what he fays of the advantage fuch tryals are to
᾿ς good Men. “ © Had Hercules {ate at home by the Fire-
“ fide, and pafled his Life in effeminate eafe and indul-
“ς gence, he had never been Hercules. ὁ They were
« the Lion, the Hydra, the Boar, and all thofe Mon-
“© fters he fo laborioufly defeated, which exercifed his
“ Gallantry. What honour had he acquired, if his
_ © Virtue had not been thus dangeroufly employ’d ? —
“ What benefit had Mankind reap’d from fo great a
“ Soul, if he had declined the occafions of exerting
* it? This plainly fhews, that he did not think thofe
Monfters defirable things, but only maintained the
combating with, and quelling of them, to have been
an occafion for difcovering what kind of Perfon Hercu-
Jes was and for perpetuating his Glory inthe World.
Epiétetus had been very juft to the Reputation. of
Felvidius, for his undaunted fteadinefs in this Virtue.
-*§ This Senator thought it became him to makea
* motion, which the Emperor, Senate, and People,
*¢ all confpired together to obftrucdt; but ftill thar
© univerfal Combination was not able to difcourage
“ him, from profecuting his purpofe, and acting ac-
““ cording to the dictates of his own Reafon and Con-
“ fcience. Ve/pafian was extremely defirous to get
“ fomething paffed in the Houfe, which he forefaw
“ Helvidius would be fure to oppofe. He therefore,
“ knowing his Humour, fent a meflage to defire, he
“ would not come to the Houfe that day. Helvidius his
“* return was, that it was in the Emperour’s Power to
** deprive him of his Senatorfhip, but fo long as he
“ continued a Member of that Body, he could not dif-
© Arrian, Lib. 11. Cap. 16.
‘ula. I. Cap.\6,
8 Arrian, Lib, 1, Cap. 2.
penfe
~
xiv. THEILY F E δε! ae
«εἶ
i
enfe with himfelf trom attending the Bufinefs of
“his Poft. Well, fays Ve/pafian, f am content you
* fhould be there, provided you will be fure not to
“ {peak in the debates that fhall arife to day. I engage
tobe filent, faid he, provided my Voice and Opini-
“on be not asked. Nay, but if you are there, you
“ mutt be advifed with, faid He/pafian; And if 1 be,
reply’d Helvidius, 1 mutt give my Advice freely,
and according to what I conceive moft reafonable
“and juft. But do it at your Peril, faid Ve/pafian,
for be affured, if you are againft what I propofe,
““ your Klead fhall pay for it. Sir, (returned He/vidi-
us) did I ever tell you I was immortal? You will
“ do Your part, and I {hall endeavour to do Mine. It
** may be Your Bufinefs to fentence me to die, and it
“ muit be Mineto die bravely and chearfully. If you
«© will pleafe to order, 1 fhall take care to fubmit. ΄
He had alfo a very particular regard for Agrippinus 5
becaufe one day being told of an Accufation prefer-
ted againft him before the Senate, he only reply’d,
b °Tis very well, but what of the Clock is it?
And when they told him it was about five, “ Well
“Ὁ then faid he, let us go to the Bath, it is time to
“ be moving. ” In his return, he was met by one.
who brought him News, that the Caufe was given
againft him, ‘* Well, faid he, what have they fen-
“ὁ tenc’d me to, to Death? No replied the other, to
« Banifhment only.” Whereupon, 4grippinus aniwer-
ed without any Concern, “ Come then, we will fup
“ to Night at 4ricia },
Epictetus had alfo a particular Refpeét for Pyrrho,
becaufe he looked upon Life and Death as_ things
indifferent. He valued him more efpecially, for
the {martnefs of a Repartee, to one who had a
&
h Stobeus, sArrian. Lid. 1. Cap. τς
8 Alutle Village not far from Rome.
mind
vf t
uy
ἊΝ
͵
EPACGTE TV 5. XV
_ mind to banter him upon this Subje&t. ““ If living and
“ dying be indifferent in your efteem, why then, -
“ὁ fays he, do not you fhew it by dying? For this ve-
© ry reafony replied Pyrrbo, becaufe they are both fo
_ © indifferent, that I know no reafon for preferring
— 66 gs -
; either.
In fhort, Epiétetus made all Philofophy to confift in
Continence and Patience, for which reafon he had al-
_- ways thofe two words in his Mouth, Bear and Forbear :
Words, which in Greek havea pe@uliar Elegance, there
_ being but the difference of a fingle Letter between
them. He frequently exprefled his admiration of Ly-
curgus the Lacedemonian’s Bravery, to a Man who had
pat out one of his Eyes. The People delivered this
_ Offender up to his Mercy, to be punithed as he faw fit.
But Lycurgus, inttead of revenging the Injury, inftruct-
ed him in Virtue, and after he had modelled him into
a good Man, . he brought upon the publick Theatre
the Perfon fuppofed to have long before been put to
death, and to the aftonifhment of all the People, told
them, ““ That the Malefactor, whom they had deli-
“ vered into his hands full of Treachery and Wicked-
** nefs, he now reftored to them, with all the Quali-
* fications of Juftice and true Goodnels.
KE piftetus would frequently extol the Gallantry
and invincible Courage of Lateranus, who, when
condemned by Wevo to be beheaded, ftretched out
his Neck to receive the Blow; and, when the Exe-
_ cutioner gave the ftroke too feeble for the Bufinefs,
difpofed himfelf a fecond time, and laid his Neck
fairer for the fecond ftroke. The fame Perfon,
having been before examined by Epaphroditus, con-
cerning the Confpiracy of which he ftood accufed,
made this refolute Anfwer, “ If I had any thing to
© difcover, I would tell it to thy Mafter, and not
® rian Lib. 1. Cap. 1,
8
‘xvi THe LIF E of he
“to thee.” Thefe Paflages I the rather mention,
becaufe Epiétetus, being a Perfon who made {o nice
and fo juft a Judgment of Men and Aétions, it is much
for the Honour of Their Memory, whofe behaviour
merited his Approbation; and the greateft Men need
no more, for eitablifhing their Reputation with con- —
fidering Perfons among all Pofterity.
He all along profeffed the Stoical Philofophy, which
was of all others, the moft fevere and exalted; and
no Man of all the Afttients, was more expert, at re-
ducing the rigour of their Maxims and Precepts into
Practice. For, though he was one of the lait, who |
formally applied himfelf to the Rules of this Sect, |
yet was he one of the greateft Ornaments of it. He ;
conform’d himfelf, in his Difcourfe and Behaviour, to
the manner of γε ὰν and Zeno, and Diogenes. And
upon undertaking any thing of moment, ufed in the
firft place to confider, what one of thofe Worthies
would have doneupon a like occafion. Whenever he
reproved any Perfon for his Vices, οὐ inftruéted him
in Virtue, 1t was his conftant Cuftom, to quote fome
of thefe Philofophers for Examples. In fhort, he
reverenced them, as Perfons of an extraordinary Cha-
racter, far above the common ftandard ; but above all,
he was an admirer of Socrates, and formed his Style
upon the Model he had fet him. ‘The Comparifons he
made ufe of in all his Difcourfes, were fo familiar, fo
apt, fo jult in every Circumftance, that every Body
was infenfibly won over by them. He did not affect
elegance and politenefs in fpeaking, but was content
with making himfelf intelligible, and delivering found
and good Senfe, in perfpicuous and fignificant ‘Terms.
In this too he copied after Socrates, as indeed he
did throughout, making him his univerfal Pattern,
for all his Actions, and all his Inftructions.
d Arrian,
Though
at PALO iB 1} 5. xVii
ΤῊΝ hough he bore ‘a particular regard to Pyrrho
Pb iniclé » yet was he a moft irreconcileable Enemy to
the ridiculous Scepticifm of the Se& that went under
‘his Name: He asked one of his Followers upon oc-
cafion, who pretended there could be no fuch thing
as Certainty, and, that Men were continually impofed
upon by the Report of their Senfes, ™ Who among
them was ever fo grofly deceived, as to go to the Mill,
when they intended to go tothe Bagnio? And often
he ufed to fay, ‘ That, were he a Servant to one of
ςς thefe Scepticks, he fhould take delight in plaguing
him. πον when fuch a Mafter commanded him to
« pour Oy] into his Bath, he would pour Brine upon
“¢ his Head; when he called for a Julep, he would
“ bring him Vinegar; and if he fhould pretend, fays he,
“ to be angry at this preverfenefs, 1 would either
“ oblige him to acknowledge, that that Vinegar was
“ his Julep, or conf{train him to renounce his own
“ὁ fantattical Principles.”
᾿ Fancy and Fortune, the Two things, by which
‘Mankind are governed, were what he waged War.
againft, all his Life long. For the Former, he ob-
ferved, that all the moft important Events of humane
Life, all the Revolutions that make the greateft
Noife in Story, were at the bottom, norhing but
Fancy and Humour.° ‘ What is the whole Iliad of
“¢ Homer, but a Succeflion of moft unreafonable Hu-
“ mours? Paris took aFancy to carry off Menelaus
“ his Wife, and Helena to go away withhim. Now,
© if her Husband had been {fo prudent, as to account
© the lofs of fuch 4 Wife, rather a Deliverance than
“an Affliction, the whole [εἰ had been fpoiled.
“γε had had neither J/iad nor Odyfes. But upon his
al
Arvian, Lib. I. Cap. 27. -
Arrian, Lib. Ii, Cap. zo.”
Arrian, Lib. 1, Cap. 28.
fe pas
“ being
XViii Tue LIFE or
[iii ster θαι
“¢ being as extravagantly humorfome as the reft, fol-
_ © lowed Wars and Tumults, the Slaughter of infi-
*¢ nite innocent Men, and the utter fubverfion of fe-
** veral antient Cities. And this in good truth, is
“¢ the general way of the World.” The Latter he ufed
to compare to a Woman of Quality, who proftitutes
herfelf to Servants. ‘ The Life, which Men
“ lead in dependence upon Fortune, he would re-
“© femble toa Torrent, foul and rapid, whofe ftream is
“ dangerous to pafs, fierce in itsCourfe, and yet runs
“ quickly off. On the other hand, a Mind devoted
“ to Virtue he compared to a perpetual unexhautted
“ Spring, whofe Waters are clear and Smooth, de-
“ jightful to the Eye and Tafte, fweet and whole-
“ὁ fome, free from all manner of fully or corruption.”
In agreement with thefe Notions, his vigour in the
ftudy of Virtue was fuch, that no Man ever afpired-
more eagerly after perfection. | :
P He had entirely renounced all the Delights
which gratifie the Senfes, to devote himfelf fole-
ly to the nobler Satistactions of the Soul. When
he was. any time at an Entertainment, his Care.
was not fo much to regale his Body, as. his Mind:
as being duly fenfible, that whatever is beftowed
upon the Body, perifhes quickly, and turns to no
account, but whatever is beftowed upon the Mind,
is ἃ lafting Advantage, and can never be loft.
This Confideration moved him to prefer inward
Peace and Tranquillity, before the greateft Advan-
tages in the World; for, as it would be no Com-
fort to a Manto be drowned in a Veflel, though
never fo beautiful, or laden with the richeft Trea-
fures; fo that Man makes a vety ill Choice for
himfelf, who, for the fake of Wealth and Magni-
ficence, is content to be opprefs’d with Cares and
-----
Ρ Stebevs. Serm. I.
Dif-
᾿
!
rr
xt
ὟΝ,
‘,
τος
aA aA n
aoa nA ἐν
φι
΄'
—
PRPOeAe HS. ων
Difquiets, and purchafes any degree of Grandeur,
or what the miftaken World calls Happinefs, at
the expenfe of his own Eafe and Liberty. .To
pais purpofe he would fometimes argue as follows,
A Man born in Perfiaz, would never be uneafie
that he did not dwell in Greece. All that Na-
ture fuggefts upon this occafion, being only a
defire to live happily in one’s own native Coun-
try 3. When a Man therefore is born in mean
and low Circumftances, why fhould he torture
ς himfelf with ambitious Thoughts, and fo eagerly
afpire after Greatnels and Abundance? Why does
he not rather employ his Care, about making
that Condition eafie to him, which Providence
at firft had placed him in? Is it not much more
defirable, to fleep in a hard Bed, fhort and narrow,
with good Heaith; than to be fick in Damask
or Velvet, and tofs about upon Down? And. the
preference is manifeftly due to a Mind perfeétly
compoled, and eafie with a moderate Fortune,
when compared with the higheft Elevation of world-
ly Greatnefles, foured by Vexation and perpetual
Anxiety of Heart. τ We are infinitely. in the
wrong (would he often fay ) to charge our Mifery
upon our Poverty; no, ‘tis our Ambition or our
Difcontent, that makes us truly miferable. And
had we the whole Earth at command, the pofleffion
even of this could not fet us at eafe from our fears
and melancholy. That mutt, and canbe the Work
of Reafononly ; therefore the Man, who cultivates
his Mind well, and provides againit this Evil, by
{tocking it with found Principles, isfatisfied from
himielf, and never complams of Poverty, or For-
tune 8. Thus I have given you a fhort fample of
Epicietus his manner of arguing upon thefe occafions.
4 RT RL EA Re NSN
4 Stobews, Serm. 38.
ΟΣ Arran, Lib, UL, Cap. 16, ~
5 Stobaus,
He
ΧΧ Tue LIFE or
He would by no means bear with thofe, who in-
duftrioufly fought for fome colourable pretence, either.
to cover, or to give countenance to what they did
amifs. “ Such, heufedto fay, were like the wanton
“ Wives of Rome, who, the better to conceal their
“ own Shame, ufed to make Plato’s Books of hisCom-
““ monwealth, the conftant Subject of their Commen-
* dation and Difcourfe, merely, becaufe he there is a-
“ gainft Women being confined to one, as now they
* are. Butin this Point too, they puta very partial
*¢ and malicious Conftruction upen that Philofopher’s
*¢ Words, without attending to his true meaning and
* defign. For it was no part of his Intent, that a
“ Woman fhould firft contract herfelf to one Man,
“ς and then proftitute herfelf to all the Sex; but the
© Marriage now in ufe he thought fit to be abolifhed,
“only, that way might be made for Engagements of
S© another kind. |
This. Principle appeared no lefs in the Praétice, -
than it did in the Doétrine and Difcourfes, of Epiéte-
tus. For, when he was fenfible at any time of having
failed or done amils, his Sincerity never was folicitous
to find out an Excufe for it. Nay, he upon no occa-
fion exprefled greater Satisfaction , than in having his
Faults or Deteéts roundly told him. “ Rufus one
.“ Day happened to reproach him in terms immode-
* rately fevere, for having over-looked a fallacy ina
* Syllogifm, Epifetus to mitigate his Fury, made an-
“νεῖ, Why fo rough and hot, Sir? 1 have not fet
* Fire to the Capitol. Slave, * replied Rufus, dott
* thou think no Fault deferves reproof, but burning
“τῇς Capitol? Thou haft been guilty of the worit
* this Cafe could bear ”. Epiéfetus was {o far from re-
fenting this {martnefs amifs, that he fmiled at the Wit
of it, acknowledged the Jultice of the Argument, and
took delight in telling the Story publickly.
© Arian. Lib. 1, Cap. 7.
Another
E Pao, EES, xxi
_ Another time, one who had formerly lived in great
‘Plenty, ™but was then reduced to extremity of want,
came to him with a Requeft, that he would recom-
“mend him to the People. piétetus, very ready to do
him that piece of Service, endited a Letter in his be-
half, full of kind and tender Expreffions, reprefented
his Misfortune in complaints fo moving, that the
hardeft Hearts muft needs have been foftned by them 5
which when the Party concerned had perufed, he
gave it back again, telling him, ‘ That he made that
“* Addrefs in hopes of receiving fome Relief, and not
with a defign to be taught how to bemoan himfelf,
** for of that he had no need, as not thinking, that his
Sufferings were any real Evil’. This difdainful An-
{wer pleafed Epitterus fo exceedingly, that he never
forgot it afterwards.
But above all, Apiétetus was a Perfon of moft nice
Honour in the matter of Friendfhip. The Reader
need only be put in mind, “ that he was a Stoicks
to convince himfelf, that he did not proceed upon
a Principle of Intereft in this point. *‘ He would
“ not allow Men to confult the Oracle for Advice,
when the Defence of a Friend was under con-
““ fideration: Being fatisfied, that this was a Caufe,
“ἴῃ which they were bound to engage, though
© with the hazard of their very Lives. As he was
once maintaining, Y that the Wife Man only was
““ capable of making a true Friend, and loving fin-
* cerely » a certain Perfon in the Company made
anfwer, that he was none of the Wife, and yet he
* loved his Son with a moft true and tender Aftec-
“tion notwithftanding. You do but imagine to,
““ replied Epiétetus, bur I will convince you of your
“ἐς miftake.. Have you never feen.a couple of Whelps
M. oArvian, Jib..J.Cap..9. ©" ib. 11. 8}. 7-
* Epitter. Enchirid. Cap, 39.
Y Arrian; Lib, I, Gap. 22.
ἐς ΙΒ
( “ἢ playing
xxii Dee! LTE ΡῈ
ςς
ςς
cc
playing together? One would think thefe little
Dogs were infinitely fond of one another; and
yet do but caft a piece of Meat before them, and
this Experiment will foon fhew you, how far they
are from the love you fanly. Juft thus is the Cafe
between you and your Son. Throw ina Bone of
Contention, a bit of Land, or any fuch trifling Ad-
vantage, and fee, whether he will not wifh your
Death in order to get into poffeffion; and, whether
you will not hate him mortally ina very little while
upon this account. Were not Eteocles and Polynices
Children by the fame Father and Mother ? Were
not they brought up all along together? Had not
ten thoufand folemn Proteftations of the moft invio-
lable Friendfhip paffed on both fides? And yet,
when a Kingdom fell to them, which is the Piece
of Meat that makes Dogs worry one another, were ©
not all their former Promifes and Profeflions as ab-
folutely forgotten, as if they had never been? Did
not their brotherly Affection vanifh in a moment?
And did not thefe two Perfons do their utmoft, with
a moft favage Cruelty to deftroy and murder one
another ἢ
z 6 Menelaus entertained Paris with great Hofpita- —
lity, and fo particular a Kindnefs, that any Man,
who had feen how dear thefe two were, while un-
der the fame Roof, would have paffed tor a perfect
Infidel, if he had fo much as feemed to doubt,
whether they were true and eternal Friends, But
here again, another Bone of Contention, a fine
Lady, .was caft between them; and this gave rife —
to one of the longeft and moft Bloody Wars, that ©
hath ever been recorded in Story. So vain a thing —
it is, to conclude Perfons Friends indeed, whofe
Paffions are irregular, whofe Minds are unftable,
% Arrian, Lib, 11) Cap, 22,
ny, “ and —
Be: ΣΡ Gaby Τὴῇῷ 5. ὑχχηΐ
© and who, fo long as they are enamour’d with the
_ © things of this World, cannot poffibly be fixed, and
_ firm to any Profeflions or Principles whatfoever.
_ 2 © A Gentleman, of the firft Quality coming one
᾿ © day to vifit him, after fome Difcourfe about other
Affairs, Epiftetus happened to enquire, whether he
ἐς were married, and how he lik’d that State; the o-
¢ ther anfwered, that he was indeed a married Man,
“ butextremely unhappy in being fo. How fo? fays
| Epistetus, for I prefume all People that marry, doit
with a Profpect of bettering their Condition. True,
* fays thé Noble-man, but it is my misfortune, never
to enjoy one quiet hour, for my extreme fondnefs
and folicitude for my Children. I had a little
Daughter fick lately, and my tendernefs wasfo great,
that 1 was forced to quit the Houfe and run away
from the poor Girl. And do you reckon that an Ar-
gument of Affection? fays Epictetus; methinks one
would be glad to lave their worft Enemies fhew
their Concern, jutt as you do yours for your deareft
Friends. ‘he very truth is, it was not Love, that
drove you from your Child: but fome other difor-
der of mind, like that of a certain Racer at Rome,
who, when his Horfe was upon full {peed wrapped
himfelf up in his Cloak, for eagernefs at the Sports
and, when he had won his‘Prize, without know-
ing his good Fortune, was fain to be difmounted,
and refrefhed with Spirits and Cordials, to recover
him to his Senfes. Confider of this inftance a little,
and then you will come to judge rightly of that,
which you mifcall Excefs of Love for others.
> Some Perfons: had alledged the neceffity of en-
deavouring to be rich; upona pretence, that Po-
_verty incapacitates a Man for being ferviceable to
iy his Friends. “ Alas! faid Epiéterus, how infinitely
* Arvian, Lib. I. Cap. 11.
b Epittet, Enchirid, Cap. 31.
a
2 : ** you
XXiV THe LIFE or
““ you deceive yourfelves! Do you think, that there
“is no way of being ufefulto one’s Friends, but only
* by lending him Money ? No fuch matter. I allow —
** Men to take all lawful and honeft methods of get-
** ting Wealth ; that, when.they have it, they may
“ be in a Condition of Relieving their Friends in
« want. But then take care, that you ufe no me-
« thods, but fuch as are fair and decent. And if, as
“ the World now goes, you can inftruct me in any
« fuch way of growing and being Rich, I engage to
« employ my utmoft endeavoursto be fo my felf. But
“¢ if you expect from me, that I fhould purchafe things
« not really good, at the expence, and with the cer-
« cain Lofs of others, which are really fo ; there I
“τη defire to be excufed. And you are doubtlefs
* unreafonable and unjuft to the laft degree, in re-
«© quiring me to fubmit to fuch hard Conditions ; and
“ much in the wrong, if you do not prefer the good
“ Qualities of the Mind, before the Advantages of
ἐς Fortune; a good Man before a wealthy one; a
«© Man capable of being a faithful Friend, before a
“ rich unfaithful pretender to Friendfhip”. This was —
an Anfwer truly worthy a Philofopher.
But that, which feems tobe the peculiar Glory and
Commendation of Epitfetus, is, that of all the anci-
ent Philofophers, he feems to have made the neareft
approaches tothe true Chriitian Morality, and to have
entertain’d more juft and becoming Notions, concérn-
ing the Nature and Providence of God, than any who
were enlightened by the Gofpel. His Doétrines were 4
in truth, fo very agreeable to ours; ©that St. 44-
guflin, notwithftanding his violent prejudice againft
the generality of the Heathen Sages, thought him-
felf in Juftice bound to make one exception at Jeatt,
and to {peak of this Author with a great deal of Re-
© De Civit, Dei.
feat.
a. EPIETE TU 5. XXV
Spek. Nay, fo far hath he proceeded in this Point,
_ as to make no difficulty of honouring him, with the
~ Character of a very Wife and exceeding good Man.
_ And reafon good there was, ὁ why Epictetus fhould be
_ treated in a manner different from the reft; when we
᾿ς refleét, how clearly he was convinced of, and how |
nobly he argues for, the Immortality of the Soul; the
Unity and Perfeétions of God; the Wifdom and
Goodnefs of Providence; and, which can be faid of
_. none befides, when Humility was fo truely his Cha-
racter, that neither his Morals, nor his Practice, have
the leaft tincture of Vanity in them.
Another Excellence peculiar to himfelf, is, that he
admitted all the Severity of the Stoicks, without tak-
ing in any of their Sournefs. He hath nothing of the
Jnfolence fo ulual with that Sect, of making their Ro-
mantick Wife Men in a manner equal with God. He
_ rejected their Chimerical andimpracticable Perfections ;
and thought a Philofopher never more truly fo, than
when moit modeit. So that he reformed Stcicifm as
well as profefied it, and eiponfed no Principles fo impli-
citely, as not to leave himfelf a Liberty of departing
from them, or altering them for the better, as he faw
occafion.. If then St. Ferome did not grudge a Phi-
lofopher of that Sect, the honour of being numbred
among the Saints, What place fhall we allow Epiéte-
tus? Who, befides that he vindicatesthe Immortality
of the Soul, as ftrenuoufly as Seveca, or ever a Stoick
of them all; hath the advantage over his Brethren,
© in declaring openly againit that moft impious and
Anti-chriftian Maxim, maintained by the reft of this
Profeffion, (viz.) That a Man may lawfully die by bis
own hauds.
f Tam fenfible, /Yolfius thinks him as deep in here
4 Arrian, Lib. 1, Cap. 9. Lib. 11. Cap. 14. & alibi, Ὁ
© Arvian. Lib. I, Cap. 9.
£ Arrian, Lib, 1, Cap. 9. & 24.
3 . as
χχνὶ THe. ΤῈ θὲ
as the reft, but this feems to be only from a wrong
Interpretation of that Paflage, That when a Man is
weary of playing his part, be may be comforted with re- —
membring that the Door is open. But the meaning of
the Door being open, isnot, that we may go out when
we pleafe ; but, that our term of Life is fo fhort,
that it cannot be long before we arecalled out. That.
this was his true Intention is evident from another
Paflage, where he expofes the folly of being full of
Care for to morrow. ὃ Jf you have any Suftenance
(lays he) you will he fupported ; if not, you will make
your exit; the Door ftands always open. The Phrafe
here is the fame, and let Epiéerus be his own Expo-
fitor, who two or three Lines before hath this re-
markable Sentence. Let us wait God’s leifure to de-
liver us from enraged Tyrants: When he gives the
fignal, then march out to him. And again, How ridi-
culous is it to fuppofe, that a Man ought not rather to be
cut in Pieces, than defert the Poft his General hath fixed
him in, and to imagine ourfelves at Liberty to qust the
Poft God hath fet us in, whenever we pleafe ? |
h But to return. The unblemifhed Probity, 10
remarkable throughout his whole Converfation, was
the very thing, which recommended him to the par-
ticular Favour and Efteem of all the greateft Men of
the Age, in which he lived. He contracted a par-
ticular intimacy with Favorinus, and Herod the So-
phift, who are two very eminent Perfons in Anti-
quity ; as we find by Pdilofratus in his Lives. + Spar-
tian, as 1 obferved before, ranks him among the Em-
perour 4drian’s moft confiderable Friends. | * Themi-
fiiusy in his Oration to the Emperour Fovinian, fays,
that he received feveral marks of Honour, and par-
& Arrian, Lib. I. Cap. 9. ih
b 4 Gell, Lib, XVII. Cap. 19. Lib. 1. Cap. 2
Ρ. 2.
δ Spart. in Adr. * Themift, Ovat. 1. ad Fovin, Lib. I. Se&. 7,
Lib. XI. Seé&. 34, 36, &c.
ticular
‘ly a
ΕΝ
fe
\ ΡΠ ΕΟ 5. XXVil
rr Re
ticular Refpeét, from the two Aatonines. And ac-
cordingly Marcus Aurelius, in bis Book of Medita-
tions, εἰς ἑαυτὸν, or Soliloquies, mentions him more
_thanonce, with fo great regard as to fet him upon
δε fame level with the Socrates’s, the Zeno’s, and the
Chryfippus’s. In fhort, his Reputation was fo great
Κ that Lucian, who calls him a wonderful Man, rallies
an ignorant Fellow, for purchafing Epifetus his Ear-
then Lamp at three thoufand Drachms, upon a vain
imagination, that ftudying bythe Light of this Lamp,
would infpire him with the Wifdom of its former
Matter. Whatever he faid carried fuch Force,’ and
met with fo general Acceptance and Refpeét, that no
body could ftand out againft his Arguments. ! * He-
* vod the Sophift, met one day with a pert young
*¢ Blade, who pretended himfelf Profeflorof the Sto-
* ick Philofophy ; andtalked and {waggered at fo in-
“ς folent a rate, asif he thought all the Greeks and La-
“* tins to be mere /gnoramus’s in comparifon of himfelf.
** After having heard patiently all he had to fay, the
way Herod took to reproveand put him out of coun-
** tenance, was to fend for 4rrian’s Collection of Epi-
** Getus his Difcourfes, and turn him to that Chapter
“ς min the Second Book, where he fpeaks of thofe con-
““ ceited People, who talk much, and fanfy themfelves
** Philofophers, becaufe they can do it fluently. This |
““ fo confounded that forward young Gentleman, that
“ he had not one Word to fay for himfelf.”” We may
judge from this inftance, of what Authority £piéetus
and his Doétrines were, at that time in the World.
OF all his Scholars, Arrian is the only one, whofe
Name hath been tranimitted with Reputation to Po-
fterity; and He is fuch ἃ one, as fufficiently demon-
{trates the Excellence of his Mafter, though we fhould
fuppofe, that he alone had been of his forming. For
“Dialogues adver. Τηφοξξ, multes Libros ementem,
ὁ A. Gell Lib. 1. Cap. 2. ™ Cap. 19,
+ this
xxviii THe LIFE of
this is the very Perfon, who was afterwards advan- Ἶ
ced to be the Preceptor of Antonine, "furnamed τῆς
Pious, and dittinguifhed by the Title of Xenophon
the Younger , becaufe, like that Philofopher, hecom-
mitted to writing the Diétates delivered by his Ma-
flex in his Life time: and publifhed them in one Vo
lume, under the Name of Epiéetus his Difcour/es or
Difjertations; which at prefent we have in four Books.
After this he compofed a little Book, called his Ezchz-
ridion, ° which is a fhort Compendium of all Zpiétetus
his Philofophical Principles ; and hath ever been ac-
knowledged, for one of the moft valuable and beauti-
ful Pieces of. ancient Morality. He likewife wrote a-
nother Jarge Book of the Life and Death of Epiétetus,
which is now unfortunately loft. Marcus durelius
mentions a Tra¢t, called the Commentaries of Epi-
étetus, which he had read with great application,
P But thefe probably are the fame with thoie Di/cour-
fes mentioned before. For Arrian in his Pretace to
thofe Books, gives them the Title of τπυμνήμαϊα. Pro-
bably this double Title might proceed trom the dif+
ferent form, under which they were publifhed, in twa
feveral Copies, during 4rrian’s. own Life. 1 am alfo
apt to believe, that thefe Differtations were formerly
larger, than we now enjoy them ; and pollibly, 1 there °
might not be four only, but five or fx Books of them.
Thus much is certain, that 4. Gellius * cites a Paf-
fage out of the fifth, and that Stobcus relates feveral,
|
as of the fame Author, which no where occur in his ©
Writings extant at this day. It is not unlikely, that
Arian, ina fecond Edition, might think fit to leave
out fome things publifhed in a former; and that he
might new caft the Work, by reducing fix Books
” Geneb. in Chron. 4, Gell. Lib. XVII. Cap. τὸ.
% Simpl, in Fovin.
» De feipfo, Saouvnpela. Arrian. Pref. A. Gellius.
TSome fay XML. of thefe called Διαλέξει:γ, and VIII. entituled ArileiCat. See
Holften. de Vit. & Script. Porphyrii, Pag, 2, Edit, Cantabr, 1655.
ΠΣ A, Gell, Lib, XIX, Cap. 1, ὁ hi ἡ
into
BP bes, ΚΤ [5 xxix
‘into four. But however that be, I can by no means
credit Suidas his Account, whemhe tells us, that Epi-
fetus was himfelf a great Writer; forthis is very hard
for any Man to conceive, who hath read drrian at
all, and is acquainted with Epiétetus his Manner, and
Principles.
_ $ There are befides, fome Anfwers pretended to be
made by him to Queftions put by ddriaz the Empe-
rour; but any Man, who gives himfelf the trouble of
reading them, will eafily difcover the Forgery, and
that they cannot belong to this Philofopher. * Wolfias
indeed did once put us in hopes, of feeing fome Let-
ters, written by this Great Man publifhed, which, he
had been informed, were in the Library at Florence.
But in all probability, the Perfon who communicated
this piece of News to him, was not rightly informed
himfelf ; and we are like to wait a great while, before
our Eyes are gratified with the fight of that Curiofity.
ἃ We have no account that can be depended upon,
either of what Diilemper, or about what time, Hpi-
életus dicd. Suidas indeed affirms, that he died when
Marcus Aurelius was Emperor ; but I am very apt
to dufpect the Truth of this Affertion. * Salmafius,
who hath enlarged upon this matter, is of Opinion
that Swidas is miftaken and produces feveral Rea-
fons for thinking fo, which 1 fhall confider in this
lace.
1. Y The Firft is, that the fame Author tells us,
_. Epifictus was Slave to Epaphbroditus, a Captain of
Wero’s Life-Guard. Now from the Death of Nero,
to the beginning of Marcus Aurelius his Reign, there
intervened no lefs than Ninety Four Years. That
SU a Tae a Bh
S Altercat. ad Calcem Exit, Wolf,
© Ia Pref. ad Alvexcat. Adr.
3 Suid, in Epilter,
* Salmaf. in Annot, ad Epider, ὃς Simpl,
7 Pag, 2 i
which
‘ «
*xx The LIFE oF
which adds more to the improbability of this account,
is, that we muft fuppofe Epiffetus fome Years old,
before he was capable either of doing Epapbroditus
any Service, or of removing from Hierapolis to Rome.
So that according to this Computation, Epictetus may
be prefumed to have reached a Hundred and Fifteen
Years, or thereabouts, which 15 not very eafy to be-
lieve. This Conjecture carries fomewhat of Argu-
ment in it, though it be not abfolutely conclufive;
becaufe, as Lipfius * hath obferved judicioufly enough,
’tis pofible he might not be taken into Epaphroditus,
his Family, till after Nero’s Death. But then, in
an{wer to this Solution, it may be replied, that *Epa-
phroditus, being diftinguifhed by that Title of Cap-
tain of Nero’s Guard, it is more credible, that WNe-
yo was living at the time when Epvéferus belonged
to him, and that he ferved him whilft in that Qua-
lity.
A b The fecond Argument is, that Marcus Au-
yvelius does not reckon this Philofopher, among the
Perfons with whom he had any Converfation, but
only fpeaks of reading fome Difcourfes of his, which
Junius Rufticus had communicated to him. This
‘to me feems to carry lefs Strength than the former.
For, befides that Epiéetus had retired to Nicopolis
Tong before that time, we may allow his Death to
2 Lipf. Manudu&. ad Stoic. Philof. Lib. 1.
@ 7 cannot but obferve herea grofs miftake in the Preface to Berkelius’s Edition of
the Enchirid. with Wolfius bis Notes printed at Lugd. and Amft. 1670. where
this Epaphroditus és taken for the Perjon of that Name, Colofi. 4. 18. who
brought that Church’s Charity to St. Paul at Rome. ᾿Τὴρ true, that Chapter men-
tions Saints.of Cafar?s Houfhold, ver. 23. Bat the Charatler given of Epictetus
his Majfter, will not incline us to believe him one of them, And though it be highly
provable, that Epi&etus had fome knowledge of the Chriftian Dotfrine, (as in-
deed the Philofophers, who write after the publication of the Gofpel, do, by their way
af arguing [Ὁ much more refined than their Predeceffors, feem all to have had, ) yet
we have little ground to imagine, that a Perfonof {uch infamous Qualities, fuch info-
lence, and barbarity, and meanne{s of Spirit, as this Epaphroditus, either inftrudted
himin tr, or ever imbibed it heartily himfelf,
b Salmaf. ib, Marc, Antonin, Lib, 1, Cap. 7.
have
ee τ ἐς.
ΣΟΥ ΤΆΤ. ΧΧΧΙ
have happened, much about the beginning of this
‘Emperor's Reign. Swidas affirms no more, than that
the lived till the time of Marcus Zurelius. And he
“might very well be fuppofed to live till the begin-
“ning of his Reign, without implying any neceflity of
this Emperor’s feeing his Difcourfes, till after the Au-
thor was dead. .
3. © The Third Reafon is, in my Judgment, of
‘jittle or no Confideration. Epictetus his Lamp was
fold in Lucian’s time, and from thence it is inferred,
that Epiétetus was dead, before that Sale was made.
But this is no confequence. at all. For we have all
the Reafon in the World to believe, that Lucian out-
lived Marcus Aurelius. And fo this Lamp being fold
while Lucian was yet alive, is no bar to Epictetus his
being alive in 4 Marcus his Reign. Nay, it might
very well happen, that the Lamp might be fold in
_ Epiétetas his own life-time; and, if this be admitted,
that Circumftance will create us no Difiiculty at all.
4. © The Fourth is, that 4. Gellius, who wrote un-
der Antoninus Pius, or at leaft in the very beginning
of Marcus Aurelius, fays of Epiétetus,. that the Memory
οὗ that Philofopher was ftill frefh at Rome. But Sal-
mafius hath not produced that Paflage entire, for 2.
_ Gellius does not {peak there of his Memory in gene-
ral, but of every body’s remembring, that he had been
a Slave; which alters the cafe very much.
sy. The laft Reafon alledged by Saima/ius is taken
from that Expreffion of Gelliws, 2 have heard Favori-
nus fay; And fince Favorizus died under Adrian, Sal-
mafius concludes it impoflible, for Epiéetus not to have
_ died before the Reign of Marcus Aurelius. Now this
Reafon is not convincing; becaufe Favorinus might
very well inform 74. Gellius, what Epiffetus had {aid
_ upon fome certain occafions; though Epiéetus himlelf
στ τ SS
© Dialog, adverf. Indolt. multos Libros ementem,
4 Salmaf. pag. 3
© Salmaf. ibid. p. 2. & p. 3. 4, Gell, Lib, 11. Cap. 18.
F A. Gell, Lib. XVII. Cap. 19.
were
Ἷ POM byl 3,
)
102 47 Corn. Tacitus. |
103 48 | Pliny the Younger.
104 49
ΤΟΥ͂ 7ο
106 ζει:
107 f2
108 53
109 4
IIo ty
III ὴ ζό :
112 bed
112.»,}[,Ὰ χϑ
8 79
riy 60
116 61
117 62
he Σ Adrian. |
6 SF Plutarch. Charon. ¥a-
121 66 mous about this time
Wa " Euphrates’s Death,
I Ἢ 69 Arian,
I2y 70
126 71
138 ha | Favorinns and Polemo.
129 74 ι ;
120 77
121 76
32 | 77 |
133 | 78 | dulus Gellins.
124 79 |
E Years
7 Chrenohgical FABLE
(seen a an a
Years of | Years of hears
Rome. | Chritt. ae
885 135 80
886 136 81
887 137 82
888 138 83
889 I 8.
᾿ 899 ν ge Antoninus Pius,towhom ᾿ς
891 141 86 | Arrianwas Preceptor.
892 142 8
$03 ae ὟΝ Lucian wrote before
894 144, 89 and about this time; died
Sos 147 90 | at the beginning of Com- ᾿
+ 896 146 οἱ | modus’s Reign.
899 149 94
φοο Ifo oF ᾿
ΦΟΙ Ist 96 Epifietus’s Death.
902 12 97
903 173 οὗ
904 | 174 99
910 160 ΤΟΥ͂
gl! 16! 106
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_EPICTETUS
ἃ HIS th
ENCHIRIDION,
"SIMPLICIU δ...
F the Reader be curious to know Epicfetus’s Character,
he may find it at large in an Account of his Life and
Death, written by Arrian, * who alfo compiled
the Difcourfes of Epictetus, and digefted them into
feveral diftin&t Traéts. The fame 4rriaz_compofed
_ this very Book too, which goes by the Nameof Exchiridion,
_ being a Colle&ion out of Ep:dfetus’s Difcourfes, of fuch
Remarks and Rules, as he thought moft feafonable and ne-
_ceffary, arid moft likely to affeét Mens Minds. For thus
much Arriaz himfelf declares; in his Epiftle Dedicatory to
δ Meffalinus ; to. whom he addrefled this Book, as being both
_.aparticular Friend of his; and an exceeding Admirer of
_ Epictetus. (Though the fame Things indeed, and delivered
* The Reader will find all that is material, not only in Arrian, but o-
_therswho have given an account of Epitterus, prefixed to this Edition, fo far
45 occurs at prefentto the Memory and Obfervation of the Tranflator.
|» Meffalinus,] So Salmafiws proves it ought to beread, and nor Mafgalenws.
ὅδε his Note on the Place.
Ei ©
2 Erprctetuss Morals
--...,...».
δε ρααραν κανν ene
inalmoft the fame Expreffions, lie fcattered up and down in
thofe Writings of Arriaz, which are called Epidtetus’s Dif-
courfes.) a Ma 4
The principal Defign of this Book (if Men would but
fuffer themfelves to be wrought upon by it, and would re-
duce what they read into Praétice) is, To fet our Souls as
Free, as when their Great Father and Creator firft gave them
to us ; to difengage them from all thofe flavifh Fears, and
confounding Troubles, and other Corruptions of Human
_Nature, which are wont to fubdue and tyrannize over
them. i, Ἂ,
It is called an Enchiridion, or Manual, becaufe all Perfons,
who are defirous to live as they ought, fhould be perfeé& in
this Book, and have it always ready athand: A Book of as
conftant and neceffary ufe, as the Sword ( which commonly
went by this Name, and from whence the Metaphor feems.
to be taken) is to a Soldier.
The Difcourfes are lively and moving; and All, but the
Stupid and Sottifh muft needs be-affeéted with them: And,
tho’ not at all equally, yet all in fome degree: and it is to
be hoped, they will be fo affef&ted, as to be made fenfible of
their own Failings, and Infirmities ; and awakened into fe-
rious Thoughts and Endeavours of Reformation. -In fhort,
The Man, that can read thefe Reflexions, without any Im- —
preffion or Concern at all, is loft to all the Methods of
Amendment in this World, and can only be made wifer
by the ¢ Fiery Difcipline of the Next. i.
The Inftru€tions he gives, are built upon Human Maree:
and on the Foundation of them all is Man, confidered as a
Rational Soul, making ufe of the Body, as its Inftrument of
Operation. Upon this Account, he allows all thofe inno-
i eT a
cent Pleafures, which Nature requires, and fuch as are ne- —
ceflary to keep up a Succeffion of Mankind in the World;
-- --΄. lod Swe eae
¢ The Fiery Difcipline of the Next.) This Expreffion proceeds upon an Opini-
on of the Pythagoreans and Flatonifts, which fuppoied Men (like Metals) to
be refined from their Drofs and their paft Offences to be punifhed, by feve-
ral forts of Tortures after Death; but thefe to be in the Nature of Cor-
xeGions, as well as Punifhments.. From-them.the Do@&rine of Purgatory —
feems to have been derived; and indeed many other Erroneous Opinions —
among Chriftians, were either the Remains; or the Improvement, of fome
fond Conceits andodd Expreflions among the old Philofopheis, ‘This is
plain in the Gnoftickand Valentinian Hexefigs patticularly, ᾿
and :
wy
Bes
“te
Things, asthe Condition of theprefent Life makes defirable
4
᾿
Ὁ
Ἢ
i
with SimpuLrcius’s Comment. 3
‘and fo he does likewife, the Enjoyment of fuch other
to us: Bur then it is conftantly with this Referve; that the
-Reafoning Faculty preferve its own Liberty, fo as not to be
enflaved to the Body, or any of its fenfwal Inclinations ; but
be conftantly raifing itfelf up above thefe, and afpiring to
the Enjoyment of its own proper Happinefs. So that-we
may take the Advantage of all the Worldcalls good, which
¢an aly way conduce to our TrueHappinefs, provided it be
done with due Temper, and Moderation. But,.as for fuch
as aré wholly inconfiftent withthat True Happinefs, we are
abfolutely forbidden the having any thing at all to do with
them.
One very remarkable Excellency thefe Writings have, is,
That they render all, who govern themfelves by them, truly
happy at prefent; and do notcontent themfelves, with turn-
ing Men over to a long Payment, by diftant Promifes of
their Virtues being rewarded in a future State. Not but
that there moft certainly fhall be fuch a State, and fuch Re-
wards: For it is impoffible, that that Being, which ferves
‘itfelf of the Body, and of its Appetites and AffeGtions, as fo
many Inftruments to act by, fhould not have a diftin@ Na-
ture of itsown; a Nature that continues entire, after thefe
are loftand deftroyed ; andconfequently, it muft needs have
- a Perfe&tion of its own too, peculiar and agreeable to its
Effence and Nature. Now, though we fhould fuppofe the
Soul to be mortal, and that It and the Body perifh both to-
ether; yet he that lives according to thefe DireCtions, will
- be fure to find his Account in them; for he cannot fail of
being atruly happy Maa, becaufe he attains to the Perfection
Of his Nature, and the Enjoyment of that Good, which is
accommodated to a Rational Soul. And thus the Body of
~a Man, which is confeffedly mortal, enjoys its own proper
Happinefs, and can ask nothing farther, when it attains to
all that Vigor and Perfection, of which the Nature of a Bo-
dy is capable.
-. The Difcourfes themfelves are fhort and fententious ; much
after the manner of thofe Precepts, which the Pythagoreans
call their Mezzorandums or Moral Inftitutions : Though among
thefe indeed, there is fome fort of Method and Connexion,
_ and a mutual Relation almoft:all through; as will appear
hereafter, when we come to confider them particularly.
And thefe Obfervations and Maxims, though they be put
E 3 into
ἥ 5 ‘a
= we Ἰὐδνομμάμων sali ; RR ro - = Nh :
4 .. Epeperetus’s Morals τ νων 7
iato diftinét Chapters, are all yet upon one Subjeét, and be-
long to the fame Science ; viz. That of amending the Life of
Man. Theyareall direGted to one and the fame End : which
is, ΤῸ rouze and invigorate the Reafonable Soul, that it
may maintain its own Dignity, and exert all its Powers in
{uch Operations, as are agreeable to uncorrupt Nature.
The Expreffions are perfpicuous and eafy; but yet it may
not be amifs, a little to explain and enlarge upon them: and
that, as well for the Writers own fake, who by this means
will be more fenfibly affected, and carried to a clofer and
deeper Confideration of the Truths contained in them ; as
for rhe Readers Benefit, who, perhaps, not being very con-
verfant in fuch kind of Writings, will be led into a more
perfe& Underftanding of them, by thefe Explanatigns.
Now the Βγ Thing to be cleared upon this Occafion is,
What fort of Perfons thefe Inftruétions were defigned for;
and What Virtues efpecially, they are capable of cultivat-
ing, in the Men that fubmit to be directed by them.
And firft, it is plain, they arenot proper for the Man of
confummate Virtue, who hath abfolutely purged away all
she Dregs of Human Nature: for he (fo far as this mortal
State will admitof fuch Perfeétion) makes it his Bufinefs tq
divett himfelf of Flefh and Senfe, and all the Appetites and
Paffions that attend and fervethe Body ; andis entirely taken
up with the Improvement of his own mind. Much lefs
can they fujt the Circumftances of a fpeculative Virtue ,
which is a Degree ftill higher than the former. For fucha
Perfon is exalted even above the rational Lite, and .attains
to a fort of God like Contemplation. They are adapted
then rmore peculiarly, to an inferiour Rank, who lead their
Lives according to the Diftates of Reafon, and look upon
the Body as an Inftrument of Aétion, contrived for the Ufe
of the Soul: Men, who do not confound thefe two, por
make Either a part of the Other; nor the Body and Soul
both, as equally conftituent parts of Humane Nature. For
he that fuppofes the Man, ftrittly fpeaking, to confilt as
much of Body as Soul, hath a Vulgar Notion of Things;
is depreft and funk down into Matter ; hath no more Pre-
zenfions to Reafon than a Brute; and {fcarce deferves the
Name of Man. He that would anfwer that Charaéter in
good earneft, andaffert the Dignity and Prerogative of a Na-
ture, by which God hath diftinguifhed him from Beafts, mutt
take care to preferve his Soul, as Nature requires it thould
‘be, in a State of Superiority over the Body; fo as to me
6 an
᾿
τς - τορος υὺς
AU a illite
with SrtmpLuicius’s Comment. ἥν
and manage it, not as a part of the fame common Natur¢»
tas an Inftrument, wholly at its Government and Dif-
_ pofal. And fuch a Perfon as this, is the proper Obje& of
_ thofe Moral and Political Virtues, which the following
Difcourfes are intended to excite Men to.. en
That the Real Effence of a Man is his Rational Soul, Jo-
¢rates hath undertaken to demonftrate, in that Dialogue
which Plato gives us, between Him and his beloved Alczbia-.
des. And Epiétetus, proceeding upon this Foundation, :di-.
reéts his Scholars, what fort of Praétices and Converfation’
are proper to make a Man, thus framed by Nature, perfect.
For as the Body gathers Strength by Exercife, andi by fre-
quently repeating fuch Motions as are natural to it 3, fo the
Soul too, by exerting its Powers, and the Praétice of fuch
things as are agreeable to Nature, confirms itfelf in Habits,
and ftrengthens its own natural Confticution. |
] would not have the Reader take it ill; to be detained a
little longer from the following Difcourfes, only whilft I
prefent him with fo neceffary an Introdu@tion to them,:as
the explaining alittle this Notion, which Ep:etus all along
takes for a granted Truth, wz. That the Real Effence of the
Man ishis Rational Soul, which makes ufe of the Body, as its In-
Strument of Action. For Epictetus fets before us the Ope-
rations, peculiar to fuch a Perfon, and becoming his Cha-
racter; and then he makes it his Bufinefs to excite all his
Scholars to get a perfect Knowledge, and to employ them-
felves in the conftant Practice, of them: That by fuch daily
Exercife we may, as I faid, give the finifhing Stroke to Na-
ture, and be as perfect, asour Condition is capable of being.
Thisis the Ground Epicetus goes upon ; which he does not
at all attempt to prove, but takes it, as I faid, fora Fun-
aia Truth, fufficiently plain, and acknowledged be-
ore. .
_ But the Method, in which Socrates proceeds, is this; He
Makes ufe of clear and familiar Examples, and tells us,
That a Man in Cutting (for inftance) utes his Knife, and
heufes his Hand too: Then, inferring from hence, that the
Thing ufed, confidered as an Inftrument, is different from
that which employs it; he concludes, that it is the Man,
which employs the Body as an In{trument. Now in truth it is
the Rationa) Soul, and nothing elfe, that employs this Bo-
dy, in the Exercife of Arts, and Trades, and all manner
of Operations. From hence again he draws this farther In-
ference: viz. That which employs the Body, hath the Go-
ΤΙ vernment
ό τ ΕΡΙΟΈΕτυ 585 Moral
vernment and Difpofal of what it fo employs, Amd then
he forms his Argument into this Disjun@tive Syllogifm, Ei-
ther the Soul alone, or the Body alone, or Both together,
muft needs be the Man. Now if the Man have the com-
mand of the Body, and the Body cannot command nor dif-
pofe of itfelf, thenitis evident, that the Body alone cannot be
the Man. It is evident again, that Body and Soul together
cannot be the Man, for the very fame reafon: For if the
Man have the Government of the Body, and the Body itfelf
have no part of that Government; then it is plain, this pre-
rogative does not extend to Soul and Body both, and there-
fore Both cannot be.the Man. But, in fhort, if the Body
in its own Nature be void of all Life and Motion, and if
at be the Soul, which animates and moves it, (as we fee in
‘Handycraft Trades, the Workman is the Principle of Mo-
tion, and the Tools have none, but what they derive from
him,):then it follows, that the Body is to the Soul, what a
Tool isto the Artificer: And confequently, that the Soul,
being the Original of all Operation, is truly and properly the
Man. ᾿ ἢ
So then, Whoever. would make {πὸ Man his Care, muft.
confult the advantage and improvement ofthe Soul, and pur-.
— =e
LS σον ον
fue the Happinefs peculiar τὸ this: for he that beftows. his ᾿
pains upon the Body, does not (it feems) advance himfelf,
and his own Good, (properly {peaking) but only that of his
Inftrument. Much more extravagant.and abfurd is it then,
to lay himfelf out upon Riches, or any External Advantages
of that kind; becaufe, in fo doing, he purfues avery foreign
Intereft, one much more diftant than the former: Forhe nei~
ther makes the Man, nor the Man’s Inftrumenr, the Objeét.
of his‘Care; but all terminates in thofe things, which» make
for the Convenience of this Infrument only. τ
a. ΟῸΘ ὦ
é
Bpittets
Comment. 7
with SimPLicius’s
igh sown
pon τ Epitteti Enchiridion.
3 CHAP. I.
ΤᾺ LL things whatfoever may be divided into two
ΤᾺ Sorts; thofe that are, and thofe that are not,
within our own Power: Of the Former fort are our
Opiniovs.and Notions of Things; + Our AffeCtions,
our Defires, and our Averfions. And in fhort, all our
AGions of every kind are in our own Power.
a
ΗΝ COMMENT.
¥ WE calls thofe Things 7 our own power, which we out
ΓᾺ feives are Mafters of, and which depend purely upon
our own difpofal and Choice ; as we commonly fay, any
thingis a Man’s own, which he is not’ beholden to any body
elfe for, fo as that it fhould fall within the compafs of a Se-
cond Perfon, to grant or deny it, to permit or debar, or any
‘way hinder him in the Enjoyment of it. Now fucharethe
Motions and Operations of the Soul ; They are born and
bred within us, and owing folely to our own Judgment,
and our own Choice; for indeed, it is not poffible for any
thing without usto determine our Choice. The Odjec? of our
Choice, ’tis confeft, is very often fomething without us 5
but the’ 44 of it, and the Motions toward it, are entirely
our own, and within us. Such, for inftance, are the’ par-
et
» *Affediions] This is the moft convenient Rendring I could think of, for
the Greek ogu2! 3 which though the Latin Zmperus may do right to, yerE
queftion whether any Englifh Word will fully exprefs it: If any, this of
Affettion; which yet 1 donot fo nicely confine my felf to in this Tranflations
as not toxender it by Paraphrafe in fome Places. But I muftown, that in the
midft of my Doubts, what to exprefs it by generally, the Authority of our
Learned Garaker in his Lat, and of Meric Cafaub. inhis Exglifh Tranflation of
Antoninus, very much prevailed with me; who have chofen this Expzeffion
for itin that Paffage which feems very pertinent and directing to this purpofe,
Lib, Wl, Se, XVI. Σῶμα, ψυχὴ, Ns, σώμαϊΘ' αἰϑήσεις, ψυχὴς ὁρμαὶ, yz
Gofudla. Gat. Affelas; Cafanb, Affettions, ἣ
ticular
8 EpircTretus’s Morals
ticular Opinions we entertain, and the Judgments we make
οἱ hings; as that Riches, or Death, or the like, are things
in their own Nature, Good, or Evil, or Indifferent. And,
though we are often induced to take up this or that particular
Opinion upon Truft, and from the Credit we give, to what we
hear other People fay of it; yet is not their Authority, or
their Perfuafion, of fuch abfolute efficacy, as that the Opi-
nion fhould not flillbe our own. For at this rate, we fhould
make our felves as fenflefs Creaturesas Parrots, who when
they call for a Cup of Sack, know not what they fay. If
we be allowed then to think at all, the Opinion muft be our
own A& and Deed; occation’d, ’tis true, fometimes by
things withour us, and recommended and conveyed to us
by the Inftruétions and Arguments of others; but not infu-
fed fo Mechanically, as that we fhould be purely paffive in
the cafe.
Thus again; The Object, which moves our Affection, is
without us, but the Affection itfelf is excited, and arifes,
within us. For there is a great difference obfervable, be-
tween the Internal Motion of the Mind, and the External
Motive or Iuducement to it. This Motion is not like that
of Men thru(t forward by another, forcibly and againtt their
Wills; but fuch a one, as when we move our own Bodies,
by our own Strength, and of our own Accord.
The Cafe is the fame with our Defires; by which the Soul
does (as it werc) put her felf forward, and go in purfuit of
the thing defired ; and fo likewife with our Averfions too,
which are but a kind of turning afide, or running away, to a>
void the Obje& that provokes them.
Now it is fuff ciently manifeft, that of all thefe, the Firft
inorder of Nature mutt be Opinion; by which I underftand
fuch a Knowledge or Judgment of things, as is grounded
upon Reaton, and worthy the Charaéter of a Man. When
this Opinion relates toany real or feeming Good or Evil,
which we apprehend ourfelves to be concern’d in, then it
prefently excites either Defire or Averfion; and, purfuant
to either of thefe, the proper Affections or Motions of the
Soul. For the Good mutt needs be defired, before the Soul
be attected with it, or move towards it; and the Evil mult
be difapproved, before fhe flee from it. Though indeed the
Stoicks have advanced a contrary Method, and reprefented
the AffeGions, by which the Soul is carried to or from its
Objet, as if they were antecedent to Defire and Averfion ;
thus contidering thefe AffeGiions, as the beginnings and im-
mediate
' mediate Caufes of thofe Defires and Averfions in the Soul.
gh
with SiMpLicivus’s Comment. 9
- But after all, the Brutifh Inclinations, fuch particularly as
; _ Anger and Senfual Appetite, are fo much of a piece with
the Body, fo clofely and manifeftly interwoven with the
Blood and Animal Spirits, that they feem to grow from
_ the particular Complexions and Conftitutions of Men. So
that thefe muft of neceffity derive their Motion from an Ex-
ternal Caufe in great meafure, and cannot be pericétly at
their own difpofal, nor under the abfolute maftery of the
Perfons thus defiring, ξ5 2. though They are begun too, and
proceed Originally, from within. Not only fo, but the
Rational Soul itfelf, when fubdued by the Body, and the
brutifhimpulfes of Senfe, does in a great degree degenerate
into Machine, is violently agitated, drawn and managed at
pleafure, and lofes much of its native liberty and power.
But when it aéts in agreement with Nature and Reafon, it
maintains an abfolute freedom, and moves only by an Inter~
nal Principle of itsown. In a Mind thus regularly difpofed,
it is very eafie to difcern, how much we have in our own
power ; tho’ in the former inftance of a diforderly Mind,
the cafe be fomewhat intricate and perplexed. But how-
ever, in order to a more exaét underftanding of the whole
Matter, both what this Liberty and Power is, and what Ob-
jects it extends to; as alfo, to thew, that all the Happinefs
and Mifery of a Man’s Lite depends upon the ufe or thea-
bufe of this Liberty; I will trace the thing up to its firft
Caufe, and examine the whole matter particularly.
. The Source and Original of all things is Good. For in-
deed, that muft needs be both the Caufe, and Beginning,
and the End and Confummate Perfection of all, in which
all Defires centre, and to which all things naturally tend.
Now this Good forms and produces all things out of itsown
fulnefs, both the moft excellent, the middle fort, andthe laft
- and loweft rank of Beings. The Firft and molt excellent,
bear the clofeft affinity to itfelf, areof a piece with it, (as. it
were) and exprefs Images of it. Thus One Good Being
produces many Good Beings ; One fimple and uncompoun-
ded Being, Independent and'Supreme, produces many other
fimple Beings like it felf; One Principle produces many
Principles: And this One, this fimple Being, this Principle,
and this Good, are but fo many feveral Names for God,
who is before all things, and the caufe of all things.
Now whatever is firft, muft of neceffiry be the Pureft and
mott fimple Being. For allcompounded Things and Num-
bers
Το Epireretus’s Morals
a RE ARERR A SR RA A et
bers are after the Simple and Unites, in order of Nature,
and inferior to them in Dignity. And all Compounds, and
Things not Good, do ‘defire the Good, as fomething above,
and better than, themfelves. And whatever is not felf-ex~
iftent , muft have received its Being from fomething elfe.
So that the Firft Principle, and Original Caufe, muft have
all Abfolute and Infinite Power ; the Excellence of which
confifts, and its Exuberance is feen, in the Production of
all things from itfelf, and in giving to thofe that refemble
its own Perfeétions, ‘the | Precedence before others that beat
no fuch Refemblanceto it. And hence it is, that One ¢om-=
mon Principle produces many Principles, many Simple be-
ings, Many Goodneffes, immediately 1 from ifelf, et own
fulnefs.
Thus all Beings, which are diftingwihed from one: ano=
ther, by their own peculiar Differences, and multiplied into
feveral Species, according to the particular Forms and Cir-
cumftances in which they differ, are yet each of them reduci-
ble to One Principle, more properly their own. All things
Beautifuland Lovely (for inftance) of what kind foever that
Lovelinefs and Beauty be, or what Objeé foever itbelong to,
whether Bodies or Souls, are yet derived from one com-
mon Source of Beauty and Gracefulnefs.
The cafe is the fame with all manner of Congruities, dnd
all Truths, and all Principles; for thefe, fo far forth as they
are: Principles and Originals to other things, do exaétly agree,
and are of the fame Nature with that primary Goodnefs,
and original Truth, and ficft principle of all; Allowing on-
ly for fome Abatements, and taking that Agreement in fuck
Proportions, as the capacity of thefe derived and fecondary
Caufes will admit.. For the fame Relation, which that fir
Univerfal Principle bears to all Beings in general, the fam
does each of thefe Subordinate Principles bear to the fivettf
Species, and [ndividuals, contained under it, and partaking
of the Property peculiar to it. For every Species, which is
diftinguifhed from the reft by a peculiar difference of itsown,
mult needs have a tendency to, and terminate in, its proper
Principle ; from whence one and the fame Formis reflected
down, upon all the particular Kinds and Creatures compre-
hended under it.
. Thus an Unite is the Foundation of all Numbers, and a
fingle Caufe is the Original of all Properties, in this γα Va-
riety of Beings. So that all partial and fubordinate Caufes
doreally fubfift, and are contained in the firft and univerfal
one ;
~~ with ϑιμΡίντοτυ 55 Comment. rE
one; and this, not locally or numerically, but effentially
; and virtually ; as the Parts in the Whole, as Generals in a
’ Singular, and as Numbers in an Unite. For this indeed is
itfelf All, above and before All; and out of One Principle
_ many Principles grow, and in One Common Good many
᾿ Goodneffes fubfift and dwell.
Nor is this Principle a limited or particular one (as for
-inftance, a principle of Beauty, or Gracefulnefs, or Good-
πεῖς, or Truth) as each of the reft are ; but fimply and uni-
verfally a Principle or Caufe; a Principle, not only of Spes
cies and Beings, but even of all other Principles too. For
the Property of a Principle cannot take its Rife from Parti-
culars, and from Many, but muft center at laftin an Unite,
and that One isthe great Original of All, the firft Beginning
and Caufe of Caufes.
_ Now the firft and immediate Produ@ions of this firft Ori-
ginal Good, are of the fame Kind and Nature with itfelf.
‘They retain their Native Goodnefs, and, like that from
whence they {pring, are fixed and unchangeable, rooted and
confirmed inthe fame Happinefs ; they ftandin need of no ad-
ditional Good from abroad, but are themfelves naturally and
eflentially Goodand Happy. Now all other Beings, whofe
Defcent from that one original Good is more remote, and
who derive themfelves from that Firft and thefe Secondary
Caufes in Conjunétion, lofe that Perfection of being Effen-
_ tially Good, and enjoy what they have by participation ons
ly. Fixed indeed they arein God’s Effential Goodnefs, and
- therefore he continually communicates it to them. ‘But
the laftand loweft fort; which have no power of a@ing or
moving themfelves, (as Bodies for Example) As their Ex
iftence and Motion, is fomething from without, and what
themfelves are purely paflive in ; fo likewife is all their
Good owing to fomething without them too. And, that
their Motion and Exiflence is from without, is plain, be-
caufe they have no difcerning or governing Faculty;; they
are fubje& to perpetual change and divifion, and confequents
ly cannot be prefent to themfelves in every part, fo as to be
all in all, or produce themfelves entire at once; Nor have
they any power of moving themfelves, as being in theirown
Nature, void of Spirit and Life. Yet ftill, there is a mid-
_ dle ftate between thefe Extremes, a fort of Beings, inferior
to that fixed immutable nature which is always confiftent
with itfelf, and yet fuperior to the Loweft and Mechanical
fort,, And thefe are moved, not inthe fame manner with
at Bodies,
Ἔ
12 Ericretus’s Morals :
a
Bodies, by a Motion impreffed upon them from fomething
elfe; but by one internal and purely theirs. And in this ca-
pacity are Souls, Mafters of their own Motion, and of That
of the Body to which they are united: For which reafon,
we call all Bodies, fet into motion by a Principle from with-
in, Animate; and thofe that have none; but what proceeds
from fomething without, Izanimate Bodies.
᾿ς Sothen the Soul gives motion, both to itfelf, and to the
Body. For if it received its own motion from fomething
without, and afterwards put the Body into motion, this mo-
tiod of the Body could not, with any propriety of Speech,
be imputed tothe Soul, but would be wholly owing to That,
which firft moved the Soul. Now this free Being is beneath
the fix’d and unchangeable Goodnefs; and enjoys its Good
by participation only, and fo is carried towards it; Yetthis is
done by no Fofeign Force, but by its own Spontaneous A&,
its own Inclinations and Defires. For Inclinations, and
Defires, and Atfeétions and Choice, are Motions proper to
Souls, andentirelytheirown.
Now of thefe, the Firft and Beft; being the immediate
produétion ..Ε things Effentially and in their own nature good,
(though with this abatement, that they are not fo themfelves,
but only are defirous of Good) do bear fo near a Relation to
them, that they defire it with a natural and unchangeable Af-
fection ; their Choice is ever uniform dnd confiftent; deter-
mined to the good part, and never perverted to the worfe.
And if by Choice we mean the preferring of one thing before
another; they can fcarce be allowed to have any, unlefs
you will call. it fo, becaufe they ever take the chiefeft and
moft perfeé&t Good. But the Souls of Men are fo contrived,
as to link together, into one Perfon, an Heavenly and an
Earthly Nature; and confequently, muft be capable of in-_
clining to both fides, of foaring upwards; or of finking
downwards. When they make the Former their conftant
Care; their Defires and their Determinations are uniform;
and free, and above Contradiction; but when they lofe this
power, all is inverted and out of courfe, becaufe they em-
ploy themfelves wholly upon purfuing mean ends, and only
affe& low Aétions: Notwithftanding Nature hath quali-
fied them for the animating and moving of Bodies inanimaté
and purely paffive; and for governing thofe things, which
are incapable of procuring or partaking of any Good by
theirown A@; and hath given them a power, not only of
acting as they pleafe themf{elves, but of putting other things
into
\
~ with Simpxiicrus’s Commen:. 13
a eRe ee ea ee toe ee ee
into AGion at pleafure too, which otherwifeare not capable
of any fuch thing. ,
Now when the Soul hath converfed too familiarly. with,
and addiéted herfelf too much to Temporal and Corruptible
things, fuch as have but a perifhing and tranfitory Good in
them; her choice is no longer above Contradi&tion, bur at-
tended with many Struggles and {trong Oppofitions ; ’tis di-
rected ftill indeed to Objeéts eligible and good; bur then
this is fometimes areal Good, and fometimes a treacherous
and deceitful one, which, upon the account of tome Plea-
fure attending it, prevails upon us.. And becaufe this is moft
certain, that true Good is always attended with true Plea-
fure ; hence it is, that, wherever the Soul difcovers the leaft
fhadow of this, fhe catches at it greedily, without ftaying to
confider of what kind the Pleafure is ; whether it be real and
agreeable to that Good which is truly fo; or whcther it be
falfe, and only carries a counterteit face ot Good ; never re-
collecting that itis neceffarily attended with many Troubles
and great Uneafineffes, and would not be Pleature without
thefe to introduce and recommendittous. For hethat takes
pleafure in eating, would have none if he had not firft been
Hungry ; nor would Drinking give a Man any, but for the
Thirlt, that affifted him before. Thus uneafinefs and Pain
are the conftant Attendants of Pleafure, and ever mingled
with it: So that if you fuppofe any Pleafure in Drinking,
you fhall find, that it comes from fome remains of Thirft;
for the Pleafure lafts no longer, than while the Pain continues
with it. So long as we are Hungry, or Dry, or Cold, or
the like, the Meat, and Drink, and Fire, that allay thefe un-
eafinefles, are agreeable to us; but when once the Senfe of
thofe Pains ceafes, we quickly grow weary, and have too
muchof them. And what before gave tatistaGtion and re-
lief, foon becomes our loathing and averfion, and is itfelf a
paintous. Thus alfo the Men, who (uffer themfelves to
be carried away into inordinate and extravagant Enjoyments,
and make Pleafure the only End and Bufinefs of their Lives,
enerally undergo a great deal of trouble and uneafineis a-
ong with it.
Now the choice of this pleafant treacherous Good is the
caufe of all our Faults; as on the contrary, the Choice of
true fubftantial Good is the Foundation of all our Virtue,
‘And indeed all the Good and Evi! of our whol: Lives, the
Happinefs and Mifery of them, depend upon this ireedorn of
Will, and Power of Choice in us. For when the Wi!! is
difins
ΠΡ ΎΨΨ ν ΒΥ ΣΩΣ τον
14 ᾿ς Eprererus’s Morals
adedeeiitigindate ens
difingaged, when it proceeds from a free principle, and its”
determinations are properly the ats of that Rational Soul,
of which our very Effence and Nature confifts; then it is
direéted to Objects truly Eligible and Good, And for this”
reafon, Virtue, which is its proper Happinefs and Perfe-
ction is called in Greek, ’Aee7x, σε. A Name which hath
great affinity toaWord that fignifies * Eligible, not
*‘Aieel. only becaufe Virtue is properly the Object, but
. alfo, becaufe it is the Effe€tof our own Choice:
But when the Will aés in compliance with the brutifh Ap-
petites and Inclinations, and propofes their Enjoyments to
it felf as its own Happinefs; then it makes an ill Choice,
.and fixes upon counterfeit Good inftead of true: So that
all this Freedom and Choice is in our own difpofal. For
the Opinions and Affeétions of the Soul, its Inclinationsand -
Averfions, are but fo many Steps towards Choice; and all
terminate in that at laft: andthefe are properly the motions
of the Mind, arifing from within, and not from any violent
impulfes from without us. So that we our felves are Ma-
fters of all thefe things. : τῇ ἡ
This is the very Reafon, why the Laws of God and Man,
and the Judgment of all Wife Men, make our own Free-
dom and Choice the Standard, to meafure our Aion by.
They\Jook upon the Intention, as a thing abfolutely in our
own power; and they pronounce of our Vices and our Vir-
tues, according to this, and not according to the quality of .
our Actions themfelves. For thefe are not abfolutely ours ;
but are fpecified and diftinguifhed, become forthally dood
or evil, by our own Will, and our own Choice. The
aGion of Killing is always the fame, confidered ftrily in
it felf ; but when this a€tionis involuntary, it is excufed and
pardoned, becaufe in’fuch cafes it is not properly ours, not
in our own power: Nay, when done in a juft Caufe, or in
a legal way, it is not only excufed, but applauded and high-
ly commendable. So that the formal Good, or Evil, of
our Adtions does not depend upon the Adtions themfelves,
but upon the Intention, the Choice, the Freedom and Power
which we have in them, and which give them their moral
Qualities accordingly. ;
By all this it appears, that Epictetus took the tight Me-
thod, when he began his Inftructions with this confideration
of things within our own power ; and advifed us. to make
it the general rule of our Condu@ ; fince all the Excellen+
cy, and all the Dithonefty of our A@tions, all the yes
: nels
σφ" eB Se
with SimpLictus’s Comment. [15
nefs and all the Mifery of our Lives, depends upon it. But,
when he fays in general Terms, Zhaz all things may be diftin-
guifoed into two forts, fome that are, and fome that are uot in
our own power; we mutt not fo underftand him, as if all
things whatfoever were meant by it, but only fuch as are
within us, or any way concern us. For at that rate, there
would be no proportion at all betwixt the Two oppofite
Parts, which ought to be obferved, and is neceffary to make
a juft Divifion. And this Proportion, I fay, would be quite
loft, if all things whatfoever, both thofe that are contained
in the World, and thofe that are above, and out of the
World, were fet in oppofition to the few in comparifon
that are within our own power.
But now, .in regard fome People quarrel with this Diftinc~
tion, even when limited in the moft cautious manner that
can be, and will allow us to have nothing at all in our
power: Andamongthefe, Some affert, that all our AGions,
Appetites, and Paffions, proceed from Neceflity, and not
from Choice ; and Others make us like Stones put into mo-
tion, that a¢t mechanically, by chance, and without any
purpofe or defign at all; tho’ what hath been faid already,
upon our natural Power, andthe Place which our Choice
and Free-Will hath, and the Neceflity that fo it muft be,
might fuffice; yet perhaps it may not be amifs, to confider
the Objeétions of thofe Men, who would rob us of this
Liberty and Power, and to refute them particularly.
Now, if by this mechanical and forced fort of A@ion,
without purpofe, and by pure chance, they intend to fay,
that we propofe to our felves no end at all in what we do,
it is by no means true; or if it would hold in fome cafes,
yet it is evident, there are very many inftances, in which it
will not. For all Arts and Sciences, nay, all Natures and
Beings, have conftantly fome particular aim and end fixed to
them ; to which they direct their Endeavours perpetu-
ally, and make every Action in fome depree fubfervienr.
And it may be faidin general, That there is no one A@,
no one Motion, of any Living Creature in the whole World,
but is performed out of a profpeé of fome real, or at leaft
fome feeming Good: Even wherethe Obje& is Evil, this-
Obfervation holds; fince the avoiding that Evil is for the
attaining fome Good, and for the Advantage we may find
in efcaping from it. ;
But if this acting by Chance, and without any Purpofe, be
fo underitood, that what peg may prove impoflible to
be
36 Eprcretruss, Morals
be compaffed, or incapable of anfwering our end,» or hurt-
ful when we have attained it, (as we fay fometimes, that
a Man took a Medicine without any thought, or to no
purpofe, which didhimno good, orperhaps, did him harm: )
Neither does this Senfe deftroy our Free-Will. For we
maintain, that thofe Defires and Averfions are in our Power,
which concern, not only things that may be attained, and
oe a ὡς σὺν δ i.
turn to our Benefit when they are fo; but thofe too, which —
cannot, and which are prejudicial to us when we have them.
And for this reafon we affirm, that our Errors and our Vi-
ces, are as truly the effects of this Liberty and Choice, as
our greateft Virtues themfelves are.
Thofe who pretend, that our Opinions and Defires, and
generally {peaking, all our Choices and Intentions, are ne-
ceffary, and not at our own Difpofal, as proceeding from
Motives without us, and not beginning of our own accord
within us, argue for their Opinion feveral ways.
Some of them make the Wants of Human Nature the
Ground of this Neceflity. For weall know, that a Man
in extremity of Hunger, or Thirft, or Cold, defires Meat,
and Drink, and Warmth, whether-he will or no; anda
mate upon a Sick Bed, cannot help defiring Health and
afe.
Some lay all upon the Nature of the thing it felf, which
is the Objeét of our Opinion, or Defire, or Averfion; and
contend, that this excites our Paflions, and affe&ts our Minds,
by its own Power and Evidence, whether we are confent-
ing to it, or not. Who is there, for inftance, that hath
attained to the leaft knowledge in Arithmetick, and does
not readily allow, and firmly believe, that twice Two make
Four? And which way fhall we call fuch an Opinion as
this, the effe&t of freedom and Choice, and not rather of
abfolute Con(traint, becaufe arifing from the evidence of the
thing ailented to, and the impoflibility of its being other-
wife? So again, when a Man hath entertain’d a Notion of
any Goodnets or Excellence, when he apprehends a thing to
be Lovely, or Profitable, or the dire& contrary; does he
not forthwith naturally defire the one fort, and decline the
other? For the beft Philofophers are agreed, that the Ob-
jye& of our Defire, and the Final caufe, are the Motives,
which fet all the γε on Work: and if this be true, how
fliall we challenge that as our own A& and Deed, which is
fo abfolutely the effect of Conftraint and Neceffity , impo-
fed by the Nature and Quality of things without us, which ©
flir
with SiMPLicius’s Commenr. 17
EA RRR SRS
it our ions accordingly , without any Difpofal or
— Confent of ὁ
τς Others oe ky that the Difpofition of the Perfon
᾿ defigning i is the caufe of all this Neceffity ; this, fay they,
mutt needs be wrought upon, according as it ftands incli-
ned; Nor is it in ones own Choice, whether he will defire
ὴ thofe things or not, which his own Nature, and Temper,
and Cuftom, ftrongly determine himto. Thus the Tem-
_ perate Perfon finds in himfelf an habitual defire of fuch
_ A@ions, and fuch Converfation, as are agreeable to the Vir-
tue of Temperance; and the lutemperare i is no lefs fond of
all occafions to exercife his Extravagance. Thus the De-
_ figns of them both are fixed, and it is not in their power to
alter them. For fome we fee plainly, who are angry at
themfelves, condemn their own Defires, and wifh with all
their Souls that they could reftrain and fubdue them, yet
_ find their Habits and Cuftoms fo violent and prevailing, that
they are hurried on, and thruft forward, like fo many En-
ΟΠ gines, and feel and lament the force which they cannot re-
fit, when Objects which are agreeable to their Inclinations,
(fuch as by cultom are become familiar and natural to them)
offer themfelves. By the fame reafon, a Skilful and Judi-
cious Man will give a right Judgment of things, and. enter-
tain true Opinions of them ; ; and the Ignorant and Unlearn-
ed, will have falfe and miftaken Notions. For it cannot
agree with the Character of a Wife Man, to take up-with
an Error; nor with that of an Ignorant one, to fiad out
the Truth: But it ftands to great Reafon, that the Igno-
rant one fhould affent to a Falfhood, and ‘the Skilful and
- Learned fhould reje& it. And yet, if thefe things were
entirely at ones own difpofal, this would not be. For
the Ignorant Man would never prefer Falfhood before
‘Truth, if he could. heip it; and the Wife Man, ἢ we
- fhould allow him to affent to Truth, merely by Virtue of
his own ree will, might alfo be allowed to take up falfe
Opinions, if you "do but fuppofe bis Will to incline him
that way too. But this, they tell you, cannot be: . For itis
with the Underftanding, and the Objects about which it is
employed,- as we find it with the Senfes of the Body, and
fenfible Objeéts ; 1 mean, it is impoffible to have things ap-
prehended otherwife than they reprefent theinfelves, unlefs
we fuppofe fome weaknefs or defe@ in the Organs which
fhould apprehend and reprefent them to us.
me
F 2 Thefe
%
χὃ ErrcTretus’s Morals °
Thefe are the Cavils commonly made ufe of againft Free-
Will; though indeed a great many Men infift upon one more;
and fanfy, that there is a Fatality in the Motion and Pofiti-
on of the Heavens, which influencing, not only all other
things, but even our very Deffres and Inclinations too, de-
termines us in the Opinions we fhall efpoufe, and the Choices
we fhall make. And in confirmation of this Argument,
they produce the Prediétions of Aftrologers, who, upon cal-
culating Nativities, and finding what Planet each Perfon is
born under, take upon themto pronounce very peremptorily,
that fucha one {hall be avoluptuous Perfon; a Second, Cove-
tous; a Third, a Lover of Learning and Wifdom; and thus
declare before-hand the Inclinations and Defires, which in
the whole Courfe of their Lives, fha!] afterwards be difcovered
‘by their Behaviour and Converfation. Now thefe Men
could never fay true, nor defcribe fuch Tempers and Prac-
tices fo exactly as they do, if there were not fome Conttel-
Yation, fome fatal over-ruling Influence, which enforces
thefe particular Inclinations and Appetites, and puts it paft
Men’s Power to change or conquer them. And ii any fuch
Fatality there be; how abfurd is it to pretend to a power of
regulating and determining our own Defires, and of fixing
them upon what Objeéts we pleafe, when we are abfolutely
‘and irrevocably ftaked down to this or that particular Obje&
beforehand, and muft defire and purfue it, whether we will
οὐ ποὺ This, I think, is the Sum of all the Obje@ions,
commonly urged againft that Liberty we profefs to affert,
and the power of difpofing our Defires and our Averfions ,
the Refolutions we take, and the A@tions we do, as we fee
fit ourfelves. : i
Now, in Anfwer to the Firft of thefe, which made our
Wants the Foundation of that pretended Neceffity and Con-
ftraint ; we may reply, that, if this were true, then Want
would always create Defire. But this it does not do. For
there are many things, and particularly, inanimate Creatures,
that are oftentimes in great want of fome Quality or other ;
Heat, or Cold, or Drought, or Moifture, and yet they never
defire what they ftand fo much in need of. The Reafon is
plain, becaufe their Nature is not capable of Defire: For,
in order to Defiring, it is neceffary, both to have a Senfe of
the thing defired, and to be moved by that Senfe: from
whence it is plain, that Want does not always infufe, or in-
fer Defire. .
But |
—— ee ee
with SIMPLICIUSS Comment. I9
But the Creatures, which are endued with a Faculty of
ο΄ defiring, when they feel themfelves in want, do then exert
Defire, in order to the Relief of the Wants they feel.
Thus (το illuftrate the Thing by a familiar Inftance) Itch-
ing difpotes us to fcratch; and upon a Senfe of the Uneafi-
πεῖς it gives us, the Hands apply themfelves to the Relief
we want; but yet this Itching does not give us the Hands
we fcratch with: Nor is it tru€, that the Neceffities of Hu-
man Life have invented the Arts and Trades made ufe of for
the Support of it. For itis the Mind of Man, which in-
vented them, faw the Need there was of them, and took
Occafion from thence to feek out this Relief. For all de-
fire is a Motion of the Soul defiring, born and begin with-
in, and exerted by the Soul, when called out by any defira-
ble ObjeG&; burit is by no means infufed into the Soul from
_ without. Now the Irrational Life of Brute Beafts, being
wholly corporeal, and having, in truth, little or nothing,
but what is Matter and Body belonging to it, is troubled
with no difference or diftraétion of Detires, hath no Wants,
except thofe relating to the Body, to fupply; and confe-
quently, but one fort of Defires to exert. And this con-
ftant Uniformity in their cafe, makes us think them the
Effet, not of Liberty, but Neceffity.
Butnow, the rational Soul of Man, being placed, as I faid
' before, in a middle Station, may be confidered in a threefold
Capacity and Difpofition ; One, that inclines it to the worft
part, that is, the Bodily and Brutith ; aSecond, that regards its
_ ownfelf; anda Vhird, that better and more excellent part a-
boveit: fo that here may bea threefold Converfation, a three-
fold Want, anda threefold Defire. When it gives itfelf tame-
ly up to the Body, and confults the Brutifh Appetites and
Wants of that part only; then, of neceffity, it complies and
concurs with all the Bodily defires. And this is that fort of
Defire, which captivates the Will, and hath brought the Free-
dom of itto be a Matter of fo much Controvertie. But when
itpurfues the Inclinations, and lives agreeably to the Nature,
either ofits own felf, or the excellent Beings aboveit; then
‘it exerts its Faculties freely, and defires the Good peculiar
to thefe Conditions, without Difficulty or Oppofition. Now
the Power and Liberty of the Soul confifts in this ; that,
whereas Nature hath made her capable of Defires of feveral
Qualities, fome of a better and more excellent kind, and o-
thers of a worfe and more vile; fhe can fo far difpofe of her
felf, as to fix upon either the one or the other of thefe forts:
3 Which
----εο πο τερΤ΄ΠπΠπςὦἃᾧςὉτττὐὐ--------.--- τσ -----Ὁ.Ψ.Ψ... ~ :
20 | Erprcretrus’s Morals
ἘΣ
Which yet is done with this Difference’, that, by purfuing
_ the worfe her Faculties are enfeebled and debafed, and by
following the better they are exalted and confirmed; forthe Ὁ
Choice of thefe is indeed truly and properly Choice. And —
hence we fee it often happens, that when the Body finds it~.
felf low and empty, and requires Meat, or fome other Sufte-.
nance, the Mind fteps inand countermands this Defire, with
another over-ruling one of Pafting or Abftemioufnefs; and
this too taken up poffibly upon fome Religious Account, or
in Obedience to fome Law, or perhaps, merely in point of’
Prudence, as thinking it better upon its own Account, or
more conducing to the Health of the Body. Now I think
no body can fay, but the Mind, in fuch a Cafe, might, if it
had fo pleafed, have complied with thofe firft Detires, as
indeed we find the Generality of People do upon thefe Oc-
cafions ; but you fee, it exerted another oppofite Defire, and
profecuted that, as the greater Good, and fo more eligible
of the two. So that Epictetus, looking upon the Soul as
endued with Reafon, might upon this Account very juitly
fay, that fhe hadit in her Power to qualifie her Defires, and
to place them upon fuch or fuch Objects, as fhe faw Caufe.. q
The next Objection, which tells us, The Obje&t of De- ©
fire neceffarily excites the Soul to a Defire of it, muft be
acknowledg’d to have a great deal of Truthin it; but yet
not fo. much, asthe Perfons who urge it imagine. For, the
Object does not move the Soul to Defire forcibly and me-
chanically, but by propoting itfelf,, as fomething fit to be
embraced; and thus calling forth thofe Powers of the Soul
into Action, which Nature hath qualified to meet, and to ‘
receive it: Juft as the fenfible Object does not infufe the Fa-
culty of Senfation into the Perfon who receives its Impreffi-
ons, nor draws him by violence to itfelf; but only prefents
itfelf to the Eye, in fuch Proportions as are proper for uniting
with that Organ of Senfe, which was ordained by Nature,
and fitted for that Union. And fo the Object of Defire pre-
fents its Convenience and Fitnefs to the Soul, and this in-
vites fuch Motions, as Nature hath provided proper for this
Purpofe. Thus it mufi needs be; becaufe we fee, that,
when defirable Obje&s offer themfelves, fome People are, Ὁ
and others are not, affected with them; whereas, if the Ob-
ject were endued with fuch Efficacy and Power, as perfectly
to conttrain the Perfon detiring; and if the Motion of the
Mind were neceflarily impreffed by it; it mutt needs follow,
that upon fuch Occations every one miuft be affefed with it,
though
with SimrpLiciuss Comment. 2.1
Ng ugh perhaps not every one in the fame Degree. And, in
truth, fuch an Operation upon the Mind would not be De-
δὴ }
hf ‘e, but aviolent Impulfe, or forcible Attraction; fuch as
_ we fee, when one Body is thruft forward, or dragged along
‘by one another. For Defire is a kind of Expanfion in the
_ Mind, as moving forwards towards the Thing defired, with-
out any local Motion in the Perfon defiring; fuch as we may
refemble to a Man’s ftretching out his Hand to meet or em-
_ brace one, while the reft of his Body is in no Motion. . So
that Defire is a Motion, begun originally, and proceeding
from within; as are alfo our Opinions, and the other Things
mentioned here by Epictetus.
This Motion, indeed, is fometimes what it ought to be,
and is duly proportioned to the Nature of the Thing, which
we defire or conceive of : Aud fometimes it is miftaken and
very different from it, when we are inclined to fomething,
which to Us appears very defirable, but is really. what fhould
rather provoke our Averfion. For it fhews us a gaudy Out-_
fide to invite our Defire, and hath a great deal of hidden
Evil within, which all the while lies concealed, under fome
Advantage, which the Idea of this Obje& flatters us with.
Thus the Thief is carried away with an Idea of Gain and
Riches, as a defirable Thing; and this keeps him from con-
fidering, or having any dread at all of that horrible Evil,
which lies theltered under: this Gain, defiles his Soul, and
taints it with Injuflice. And then, as for any Apprehen-
fions of Difcovery, and Imprifonment, and Punifhmenr,
which are the only Calamities fo wicked a Wretch~feats:;
The exceffive Eagernefs of his Defires utterly overlooks and
flifles all thefe; for he prefently reprefents to himfelf, whata
World of Men do fuch Things, and yet are never found out.
Now, thus much is plainly in our Power, to examine this
Object of our Defire more nicely; and to inform ourfelves.
well, whether it be a real Good and worth our purfuing ; or
_ whether ir only cheats us with a fair Out- fide and counterfeit
Appearance of Good; as, particularly, inthe Inftance of Gain
juftnow mentioned. Nay, we may go fomething farther yet;
for, We may correct and regulate our Defires ; may bring them
to fixupon fuch Objects only, as are truly defirable, and may
teach them not to be impofed upon with falfe Appearances, —
_ Weare told again, That our Defires and our Opinionsare
carried to their proper Obje& with as invinciblea Neceflity,
as aStoneor Clod of Earth is carried downwards; andcon-
fequenily, that Nature hath left us nothing ig our own Power;
I 4 Nor
22 Ericterus’s Morals
‘Nor have we any more reafon to conclude, that we are free |
to think, or to defire, after this or that manner, when we
fee our Affent and Appetite always moved by the Credibility ἰ
‘or the Defireablenefs of their Objeéts, than we have, to fup- —
pofethat a Stone can afcend, when we never fee it dofo. ©
Now to this it may bereplied, that there is atwo-fold Ne-
ceffity, the one abfolutely deftructive of Free-Will, the o-
ther very confiftent with it. That kind of Neceffity, which
proceeds from any Things without us, coes indeed take away
all Liberty and Choice; forno Mancan be faid to aét freely,
when he is compelled by any other external Caule, to doa
Thing, or to leave it undone. But then there is another
fort of Neceflity from within ourfelves, which keeps every
thing within its due Bounds, and obliges each Faculty and
Part to aé& agreeably to its own Nature and original Confti-
tution. And this is fo far from defiroying Free-Will, that
it rather preferves and fupportsit. For by this means it comes
to pafs, that a Free-Agent can be wrought upon by no other
ways, but fuch as are confiftent with the Nature of a Free-
Agent, which is froma Principle of Morion within itfelf.
And this Neceffity is by no means a Mechanical Neceffity,
becaufe it is not impofed by any thing from without us; but
is what the Nature of fuch an Agent admits and requires;
what is neceflary for its Prefervation, and for exerting the
Operations, proper to aCreature endued with fuch a Facul-
ty. as Self-Motion.
Befides, ifthe Soul can bring itfelf to fuch Habits and Dif-
pofitions as are Virtuous or Vicious ; can grow better by
Wifdom and Sobriety, and worfe by Perverfenefs and a Diffo-
lute Behaviour; and can confirmittelf ineach of thefe Cour-
fes, by the frequent Repetition of Acts fuitableto them; then
the Soul is the true Caufe of all this. hough, in truth, it
-muft not be admitted for a general Rule neither, That the
Liberty and Power of the Will is to bejudged of, by Mens
being able to do Things, contrary to one another. For the
Soul§ immediately united to the Original Good, prefer that
conftantly ; and yet the Freedom of their Choice is ftill the
fame ; for that Preference is no more conftrain’d and ne-
ceffary, than if they took Evil inftead of it. But it is their
Excellence and Perfeétion, that they continue ftedfaft in their
own Good, and never fuffer themfelves to be drawn off to,
the Contrary. But as for Our Souls, which are more te-
motely defcended from that great Original, their Defires are
according to their Tempers and Difpofitions : thofeof them
, that
Weel
with StmpLictus’s Comment. 23
that are well difpofed, have good Defires, and thofe that are
ill, have evil ones: But {till thefe Souls of ours are capable
of great Alterations; They frequently recover themfelves
from Viceto Virtue, by Reformation and better Care; They
cline'too, and fink down from Virtue to Vice, by Supine-
nefs and a foolifh Negle&; and both thefe Changes are
wrought in them by their own voluntary Choice, and not by
any Force or Neceffity that compels them to it. So that
there can beno manner of Pretence for charging any part of
our Wickednefs upon God. He created the Sou! after fuch
a manner indeed, as to leave it capable of being corrupted ;
becaufe its Effence is not of the firftand beft fort of Natures,
but hath a Mixture of the middle and the loweft ; and this
Mixture was fit, that fo all might remain in its Perfe&tion;
and the firft and beft continue ftillfuch, without degenerating
into Barrennefs, and Imperfeation, and Matter. God there-
fore, who is infinitely good himfelf, made the Soul in a Ca-
pacity of beingperverted ; and it isan Argument of his Mer-
cy, and the exceeding Riches of his Goodnefs, that he did
fo: Forhe hath fet itabove the reach of all external Violence
and Neceffity, and made it impoffible for it to be corrupted
without its own Confent.
There is one Argument more ftill behind; which pretends,
That a fatal Revolution of the Heavens hath fo ftrong and
abfolute a Power upon us, as not only to influence our
Actions, but even to determine our Choice, and all our In-
- Clinations, and leave us no Liberty at all to difpofe of our-
felves, but onlythe empty Name of fuch a Liberty. Now
Ὁ to thefe we may anfwer, That if the Rational Soul be E-
ternal, and Immortal, (which I hall not go about to prove,
That being foreign to this Subject, but fhall defire at prefent
to take for granted, tho’ it muft be confeft, not in all Points
agseeableto the Dodtrine of the Stoicks in this particular, but)
If the Soul, I fay, be Eternal and Immortal, it cannot be
allowed toreceive its Being from, or to have its Dependence
upon, Matter and Motion. Its Inftrument indeed, that is,
the Animal taken in the grofs, by which I mean, the Body
afimated by the Soul, may owe its Nature and its Changes
to fuch Catfes : For material Caufes produce material Ef-
fees; and thefe may differ, according as thofe Caufes are
differently difpofed; with regard to Things here below.
And the Infirument is formed fo, as to be proper and fer-
viceable tothe Soul, whofe Bufinefs it is to make ufe of it
now ; as the difference of Tools teaches us to diftiguifh the
feveral
ν PN εν, τὰ...
‘
24 Epictretus’s Morals
fevera] Profeflions that ufe them, fo asto fay, Thefe belong
to the Carpenter’s, thofe to the Ma/on’s, and others to the
Smith’s Trade; and not only to diftinguifh the Trades them-
felves, but the Skill and Capacity of the Artificers them-
felves ; to judge of their Defigns and Intentions, and the
PerfeGtion of the Work it felf; for thofe who are Mafters
of their Trade, have better Tools, and ufe them with grea-
ter Dexterity, than others: In like manner, They who have
attained to the Knowledgeof Aftrology, find out the Nature
and Temper of the Inftrument (the Body ) from the differ-
ent Conftitution of Material Caufes, and from hence make
their Conjectures of the Difpofition of the Soul ; and this is
the Reafon, why they often guefs aright. For indeed, the
Generality of Souls, when falling under ill Management,
and the Converfation of naughty Men, (a fort of Degrada-
tion, inflif&ted upon them by way of Punifhment, for the lofs
of theit Primitive Purity) addié themfelves too much to the
Body, and are govern’d and fubdu’d by it ; fo as to ufe it no
longer as their Inftrument of Action, but to look upon it as
a part and piece of their own Effence, and conform their
Defires to its brutifh Appetites and Inclinations. .
Befides, this Pofition, and fatal Revolution of the Hea-
vens, carries fome fort of Argument to the Prodution of
the Souls united to Bodies under it, yet not fo, as to impofe
any abfolute Neceflity upon their Appetites and Inclinations,
but only to infer a Refemblance of their Temper. For, as —
in Cities, there are fome particular folemn Seafons and Pla-
ces, which give us good Grounds to diftinguifh the Perfons —
affembled in them : asthe Days and Places of Publick Wor- ἡ
fhip commonly call thofe that are wife, and religious, and
well-difpofed, together; and thofe that are fet apart for
Pomp and publick Sports, gather the Rabble, and the Idle,
and the Diffolute; fo that the obferving thefe Solemnities
gives us a clear Knowledge of the People that attend upon
them : By the fame Reafon, the particular Seafons and Pla-
ces, (the Houfes and Conjundtions of the Planets) may be
able to give us fome Lizhr, into the Temper of the Souls
united to Bodies under them, as carrying fome Affinity to
the Conjun@iions, under which Menare born. For, when
God πῃ δίς. Juftice hath ordained fuch a particular Pofition,
and all the Fatalities confequwent to it; then thofe Souls,
which have deferved this Vengeance, are brought under that
Pofition. For Likenefs, and Affinity of Tempers, hath | |
a ftrange Power of bringing all that agree in it together.
This
with Simpxicius’s Comment. ᾿ς
This fatal Revolution then, does by no means conftrain of
bind up the Soul, nor take away its native Freedom; but
the Sou! only bears fome Refemblance tothe Temper of this
Revolution; and is framed agreeably to fuch a Body, as it-
felf hath deferved to be given it for its Ufe. And This
gives Men an Opportunity of learning its particular Defires
and Inclinations, by confidering the Conftellations that: Peo-
ple are born under. a
- Again, The Souls chufe their particular Ways of living,
according to their former Dignity and Difpofition; but ftill,
the behaving themfelves well or ill in each of thefe Ways,
is left in their own Power. Upon this Account, we fee
many, who have chofen a Way of Trade, and Bafinefs, and
great Temptation, yet continue very honeft and good Men
in it; and many who profefs Philofophy, and the Improve-
ment of Wifdom and Virtue, are yet of very loofe Con-
verfation, notwithftanding all the Advantages of fuch an
Employment. For the different Methods of Life, as that
of Husbandry, or Merchandife, or Mufick, or the like, are
chofen by theSoul according to her former Difpofition ; and
Mens Station in the World is affignedthem, fuitable to their
Dignity and Deferts: But the Management of themfelves,
in any of thefe Callings, isthe Choice and Work of the Soul
afterwatds; and we do not fo much blame or commend
Men for their Callings themfelves, as for their different Be-
haviour in them.
' Farther yet: This fatal Pofition or Revolution does never
(as fome Men too boldly affirm it does) caufe any thing of
᾿ Wickednefs in us, fo as to make it neceffary, That Men
born under it fhould be Knaves and Cheats, Adulterons, or
addicted to beaftly and unnatural Lufts. For, though the
Cafters of Nativities fometimes fay true, when they foretel
thefe Things; yet this only happens, according as we re-
ceive particular Qualities or Impreffions ; which is done,
-fometimes in a moderate, and fometimes in an immoderate
‘Degree. And it is not the Influence of the Stars, burt the
Corruption of the Mind, that makes Men Knavifh, or Laf-
_ civious, or Unnaturaland Bruirifh. Thofe that receive thele
Influences moderately, and do nor affift them by their own
Depravity, are Cautious and Wary, correct the Heat of
Youth, and ufe ic virtuoufly; but thofe that receive chem im-
moderately, that is, give way to them, and promore them,
debafe and proftitute themfeives to all manner of Wicked-
nefs. And what Reflexion «pon Nature can this be? For,
rm . wines i evel
RCA
26 οι Eptetretus’s Morals
even that, which is moft beneficial to us, may turn to our
Prejudice by aperverfe Ufe of it. The Sungives us Light;
it both makes Things vifible, and enables us to fee them; —
And yet, if aMan will be fo foolith; as to take too much >
of it, to gaze upon his Rays when they fhine in their full
Strength, he may lofe his Eye-fight by his Folly. But
then, that Folly, and not the Brightnefs of the Sun, is to
be blamed ; if that, which is the Author of Light to all the
World, be theOccation of Blindnefs and Darknefs to him.
Now, when the Aftrologers have (as they think) formed to ἢ
themfelves certain Marks and Rules, whereby to know, ©
who will receive thefe Impreffions in a due meafure, and °
who in a vicious excefs;.then they pronounce fome Men
Wife, and others Subtle and Knavifh accordingly. Tho’,
after all, 1 very much doubt; Whether the ereéting of any
Schemes can furnifhthem with fuch Marks of Diftinétion, or
no: Some Things indeed are fo manifeft, that all the World
muft allow them; as, that when the Sun is in Cagzcer, our —
Bodies feel exceffive Heat $ but fome again are exceeding
dark and doubtful, and fuch as none, but thofe who have made
themfelves Matters of Aftrology, can make any thing of. |
Now, thatthofe Things whicha& conftantly according to
the Defign and Directions of Nature, preferve the Original
Conftitution given them at firft by their Great Creator, and
are endued with the greateft Power and Strength, that fuch ©
Things, I fay, always act upon a good Defign, and proper-
ly fpeaking, are never the Caufe of any Evil, feems to me
very plain. For all Evil is occafioned, not by the Excefs,
but by the Want of Power ; and if it were not. fo, Power
ought not to be reckoned among thofe Things that are
Good. And yet it isas plain that even Good Things in Excefs
oftentimes prove hurtful to us; but then, that hurt is not. —
owing to the Things, but to ourfelves. And thus much ©
may fuffice, in Anfwer to them who deny the Freedom of
the Will, upon the Pretence of any Fatality from the Mo-
tion or Pofition of the Heavens >. But
b If this Argument feem obfcure in fome of the Parts of it, that muftbe
imputed to the dark Notions of the Old Philcfo>hers, upon this Matter, and
the Superftitious Regard that they had to Judicial Aftrology ; which Svmplicius
himfelf is content only fofarto comply with, as to allow fomeconfiderable
Influence of the Heavens upon the Bodies and Tempers of Men : and that
Stroke, which the Complexions of People have, in forming the Dilpofitions
of sheir Minds. Some Paflages there are too, which proceed upon the Hy-
pothefés of the Pre-exiftence and Tranf{migration of Souls, and their being
provided with Bodies of Good or Bad Complexions here, accordingto thejr
Meuits or Demeritsin fome formex State, But in truth, this whole ahaa
ο
>
SE
ee νον δ, ἐς νὰ
ἵ
ἡ
Ψ
᾿
Υ
pt DOE te ὧν ᾧ Pe
"
Υ
ἣ
yy
ae : .
with Sime Licitus’s Comment. 17
Βαϊ indeed, to all who deny this Liberty, upon any Ar-
‘gument whatfoever, it may be replied ingeneral, ‘Phat thofe
(gu :
-whogo about to deftroy it, do by no means confider or un-
-deritand the Nature of the Soul, but overthrow its very Ori-
ginal Conftitution, without feeming to be fenfible of it.
For they take away all Principle of Internal and Setf-Mo-
tion, in whichthe Effence of the Soul chiefly confifts. For
it muft be either moved of its own Accord, and then it is
excited by a Caufe within itfelf to its Appetites and A ffe@tions,
and not thruft forward and dragg’d along, as Bodies. are ; or
elfe it is moved by an External Force, and then it is purely
Mechanical.
τ Again, They who will not allow us to have our Actions
at our own difpofal, do not attend to, nor are able to ac-
count for, the Vital Energy of the Soul, and its Affenting
and Diffenting, Accepting or Rejecting Power. Now. this
is what Experience and Common Senfe teaches every Man;
that he hath a Power of Confenting and Refufing, Embrac-
ing and Declining, Agreeing to or Denying; and it is tono
purpofe to argue againft that, which we feel and find every
Moment. But now all thefe are internal Motions, begun
in the Soul itfelf; and not violent Impulfes and Attractions
from Things without us, fuch as Inanimate Creatures mutt
be moved by. For This is the Difference between Animare
and Inanimate Bodies, that the one Sort are moved by an in-
ternal Principle, and the other are not. Now, according
to this Diftin@tion, that which puts the Inanimate into Mo-
tion, muft havea Principleof Motion of its own, and can-
not itfelf be moved Mechanically. For if this alfo derived
_ its Motion from fomething elfe, then, (as was urged before )
the Body is not moved by this, but by that other Caufe, from
whence the Motion is at firft imparted to this; and fo the.
‘Body, being moved no longer from within, but by fome for-
cible Impreffion from without, as all other Inanimate Crea-
tures are, mutt itfelf be concluded Inanimate.
Once more, By denying that we have power over our
A@tions, and a liberty of Willing or not Willing, of Con-
fidering, Comparing, Choofing, Defiring, Declining, and
the like, All Moral Diftinétions are loft and gone, and Vir-
tue and Vice are utterly confounded. There is no longer
σσπς-.---- a
———s
of Judiciary Aftrolozy is now very juftly exploded, as groundlefs and fan-
taflical; and many Modern Philofophers have proved it, by very fudftantial
Arguments, io be no better. See particularly Gafind. in his animadver-
fious onthe Tenth Book of Diogenes Lazrsins,
é any
28 Eprprcretus’s Morals
π΄ »"--- τ----- “ 6 ΠἷΠΠΠΘΠΘθΘΠὃΠὅΠΠΠΘΠᾶᾶὃὁΘὁΘὁ; ο..
any juft Ground left for Praife or Difpraife, Applaufe or
, Reproach, Rewards or Punifhments. The Laws of God
and Man inftituted for thofe Purpofes, and enforced by thefe
Sanétions, are evacuated ; and the very Foundations of them
all torn up, and quite overturn’d. And then, do but con-
fider, how difmal the Confequences muft be. For when
Once we are come to this pafs, all Order and Society mutt
heeds be loft; and nothing left us, but a Life of Rapine and
Violence, of Mifery and Confufion ; a Life, not of Civiliz’d
Men, but of Ravenous and wild Beafts.
But I expe&, that the Adverfaries of this Opinion will
appeal back again to our own Experience, and urge afreth,
What? Do we not often find ourfelves forced by the Ty-
ranny of ΠῚ Men, andthe overbearing Torment of ourown
Paflions, and the ftrong Bent of natural Sympathies and An-
tipathies ? Do not thefe compel us to do and fuffer many
things againft our Wills; and fuch as no Man in his Senfes
would choofe, if it were in his power to avoid? To this
my Anfwer is ΠῚ the fame, Thar notwithftanding all this,
our Liberty is not deftroyed, but the Choice upon thefe Oc-
cafions is ftill free, and ourown. For here are Two things
propofed; and, though the fide we take, be not eligible for
its own fake, and when confidered abfolutely ; yet it is fo,
with regard to the prefent ftreights we are in, and when com-
pared with fomething which we avoid by this means; and
for this Reafon it is, that we make choice of it. And it is
utterly impoffible that a Man fhould be carried to do any
thing without the confent of his own Mind; For he,
that does a thing without his own Choice, is like a Man
thruft downa Precipice by fome ftronger Hand, which he
cannot refift; and this Perfon is at that time under the cir-
cumftance of an Inanimate Creature ; he does not a& at all, —
but is purely paffive in the cafe. Sothat, when wereally do
at, though with never fo great unwillingnefs and relu€tan-
cy, yet {till we choofe to a@, after fuchand fucha manner.
This is further evident from Mens own praétice. For
we find feveral Perfons take feveral ways, when yet the |
neceffity that lies upon them, is the fame. Some choofe to
comply with what is impofed upon them, for fear of endur-
ing fome greater Evil, if they refufe it; Orhers again are pe-
remptory in the refufing it, as looking upon fuch compli-
ance to bea greater Evil, than any Punifhment they cat pof-
fibly undergo, upon'the account of their refufal. So that,
even in thofe Actions that feem moft involuntary, Meh
i
with SiMpLicivus’s Comment. 29
ftillaplace for Liberty and Choice. For we muft.diftinguith
between what is Voluntary, and what isFree. That only is
Voluntary, which would be chofen for its own fake; but
that is Free, which we have power to choofe, not only for its
own fake, but for the fake of avoiding fome greater Mifchief.
And indeed, there are fome cafes, in which we find both
fomething Voluntary, and fomething Involuntary meet. For
which, Reafon thofe are properly call’d Mix’d Actions; that
is, when what is Eligibleupon thefe Occafions, is not fimply
and abfolutely fo, but carries fomething along with it, which
we fhould never choofe, if we could help it. And Homer
very elegantly defcribes the perplexity of Thought, this mix-
ture of Voluntarinefs and Involuntarinefs, inthe Soul, when
he fays to this purpofe,
Great Strife in my divided Breaftl find,
A Will confenting, yet unwilling Mind.
Thefethings I thought fit rather to enlarge upon, becaufe
almoft all the following Book depends upon this diftinétion
of the Thingsiz our own power : For, the Defign of ‘it being
wholly Moral and Inftructive, he lays the true Foundation
here at firft; and fhews us, what we oughtto place all our
Happinefs and all our Unhappinefs in; and that, being at
our own Difpofal, and endued with a principle of Motion
from within, we are to expe@ it all from our own A@ions,
For things that move Mechanically and neceflarily, as they
Ἢ derivetheir Being from, fo they oweall the Good and Evil
they are capable of to, fomething elfe; They depend upon
the [mpreffions made upon them from without, both for.the
thing itfelf, and for the Degree of it.. But thofe Creatures,
_ which δός freely, and are themfelves the caufe’ of. their own
Motions and Operations, receive all their Good and Evil
fromrthefe Operations. Now thefe Operations, properly
_fpeaking, with regard to Knowledge and Speculative Mat-
ters, are their Opinions and Apprehenfions of things; but
with regard to Defirable Objeéis, and Matters of Pra€tice,
they are the Appetites, and Averfions, and the Affe@iions of
_the Soul. When therefore we have juft Ideas, and our No-
- tions agree. with the things themfelves; and when we apply
_ our Detires and our Averfionsto fuch Objects, and in fuch
meafures, as we ought to do; then we are properly bappy,
and attain to that Perfeétian, which Nature hath defigned us
_ for, and. made peculiar to us: But when we fail in thefe
Matters, then we fail of that Happnefs and PerfeQion too.
5 Now
):
On the other hand, if we placeour Affe&tions and Defires
upon things notin our power, and expect to find our Hap-
pinefs in fuch; this double Misfortune muft needs follow
upon it: One way the Difappointment is unavoidable, that,
though we fhould prove fuccefsful, and obtain what we
are fo fond of, yet ftill thefe things are not what we take
them for, nor can we meet with that, which is proper-
ly our Happinefs in them. But befides, it is agreeable to all
the Reafon in the World, to believe, that generally we muft
needs be difappointed of the things themfelves. For how
fhould it be otherwife, when a Man fets his Heart upon that
which is anothers, as if it were his own ; and when he muft
depend upon other Perfons and Accidents, whether he fhall
ever obtain it or no? |
Now the natural Confequences of fuch Difappointments
are, the being interrupted, and haying all our Meafures ar
ὃ ely,
with Simpxicius’s Comment. 35
ken, and a World of Grief and Remorfe, when we find
our Pains have been employed to no purpofe, and that we
are engaged in wrong Courfes. For, as Pleafure and Joy
are the Effeéts of Good Succefs, the accomplifhing what we
with, and being delivered from what wedread; fo, when we
areovertaken by the Mifchiefs we feared, and defeated in our
Endeavours after that wedefired, weprefently fall into Trou-
ble and Difcontent, and complain of every one that wethink
contributed to our Misfortune, and {pare neither Men, nor
fometimes Prévidence, and God himfelf.
Befides, There is another Mifchief comes of this. For
by being fo tenderly affeted for things that are not in our
power, we lofe fometimes thofe that are; and he that de-
prives us of what he could take away, robs us of what he
hath no power to take from us; viz. Regular and Moderate
Defires and Averfions. But if we be difpofed and affected -
as we ought, and make a true DiftinQion between what is
ours, and what is not; if we fettle our Affections, and
beftow our Care, not upon things which belong to another,
but upon our own, our proper Happinefs, and what falls
within the compafs of our own power; that is, opon the
entertaining fuch Defires and Averfions, as are agreeable
to Reafon and Nature ; then we may reft fecure, that we
fhall never be annoyed by any Conftraint or Compulfion, “any
Difappointment or Hindrance; but fhall have the fole Govern-
ment, and entire Difpofal, of fuch Defires and Averfions.
And if fo, then we fhall have no occafion of Grief or Re-
morfe: For that can happen but in Two cafes, either the
mifiing of what we with’d, or the falling into what we
fear’d, and would fain have avoided. Now wecan never
be fruftrated ia our Defires, nor ever be endamaged by any
inconvenience we fear, provided we will but make thofe
things oureare, which areinour own power. Confequently,
we can never live in awe and dread of any Man; for the
reafon, why we fear any Body, is becaufe he may dousfome
prejudice, or fome way obftru@ our Advantage. Burt no
Man alive hath it in his power to offer Violence to our De-
fires and Averfions; and thefe are the things, in which the
Man who lives according to the Dittates of right Reafon,
places his Happinefs. At this rate, we can have wo Exemy
neither, for he is accounted our Enemy, that does us mif-
chief ; but no body can do this to a Man who is out of the
power of all Mankind to hurt him: By the fame Reafon,
fach a Perfon will accufe πο Man, complain of nothing, nor
G3 | ever
36 ΕΡΙ στ τυ 85 Morals
ever do any thing againft ῥὶς Will. So that the {πε of this
Man is untainted with Perturbation and Senfual Pleafure,
muft needs be above all Grief, and all Fear, abfolutely Free,
and exquifitely Happy. *
And here we may obferve farther, how excellently well
he proves the Life of a Wife and Good Man, to be not on-
ly the beft and moft for ones advantage, but the pleafant-
eft and moft for ones fatisfaGtion too. For, as Péato tells
us, Every Creature does, by natural Inftin€@, endeavour af-
ter Pleafure, and run away from Pain. Now fome Pleafures
attend thofe things, that are truly good and advantageous
to us; and Others, thofe that are prejudicial and hurtful.
And this makes it neceflary to take good heed what Choice
we maké, that fo we may embrace and purfue, and accuftom
ourfelves to, the Enjoyment of fuch Pleafures only, as may
be beneficial to us. Temperance, (for Example,) is really
more delightful to a Virtuous Man, than Extravagance and
Licentioufnefs are to the Diffolure. This needs no other
proof than that many Debauchees leave their loofe way of
Living, andturn Sober, when they confider, and come to a
better Senfeof things. But there are no inftances to be pro- ”
duced, of any Temperate Perfons, who proceed upon wife
and reafonable Confiderations, that ever abandoned them-
felves to Debauchery andExcefs. Now if this way of Liv-
ing had not more than ordinary Pleafure in it, Men would
never choofe it with fo much eagernefs and fatisfa€tion,
And, that fuch a Virtuous Life as this, muft needs be more
eafie and pleafant, Epictetus demonftrates, from its being
Free and Uncontrouled, above Checks and Contradidions,
above Hindrances and Difappointments, but depending and
doing all upon the Dictates of one’s own Mind: And thus
thofe happy Men live, who place all their Good and Evil in
their own Adtions, and the ufe of that Liberty and Power,
which Nature hath given them,
Site iah ieinisiiniettotlt lt ttt bine @
CH. A By say,
Ince therefore the Advantages, you propofe to
S your felf, are fo valuable, remember, that you
ought not to content your felf with a cold and mo-
derate purfuit of them; but that fome things a
7 : ς
μδ΄ ......΄΄--ῤ΄πόπΠ΄Π11ἨἨ|ῦὺὖὺὕἰ---'οοι::1::Ὸῦο ς--- Ύ:.Ῥ.ὋῬςῬῥῬὋἥ--ς-ς- -5τηἰἨκ.ἃὝὌἂῷἅἷὨἨτ͵᾿Ὺὲ ω“ς-κς--΄΄----
with Stmpxicius’s Comment. 37
“be wholly laid afide, and others you muft be con-
tent to fufpend for a while. But if you will needs
_ be grafping at both, and expect ro compats thefe,
and at the fame time attain unto Honours and Riches
too ; there will be great hazard of your lofing the
latter, by purfuing the former; Orif mot fo; yet
you will be fure to find your felf fruftrated in all
_ that can make you Free and Happy, while you pur-
due the latter.
COMMENTS
H_WAving direGted us, what it is we are to expe& Happi-
nefs from, and how defirable the Life of fuch Perfons
muf{t needs be, who depend not upon External. Enjoyments,
and things out of their power for it, but placeit in theirown
natural Liberty, and what falls within the compafs of That:
That fucha Lifeis above all Moleftation and Controul, fafe
from the Affaults of any ill Accidents, not only advanta-
geous, but eafie and delightful too, the Good it defires never
deceiving, the Evil it declines never overtaking, but in one
Word, exquifitely Happy, and divinely Bleft ; he now pro-
ceeds to excitein his Reader, a Zeal worthy of fuch mighty
Expectations; and tells him, that he muft not look upon
this as a Bufinefs by the by, while his main Defign and Care
is for fomething elfe; but that his Pains and his Affection
mutt be fo entirely devoted tothis one thing, as not to admit
of any thing befides, into a partnerfhip with it.
The External Enjoyments of the World then muft fit fo
loofe about his Heart, that, as many of them asare incon-
fiftent with a Virtuous Converfation, and the Rules of Right
Reafon, ( fuch as Excefs and Senfual Pleafure, and fordid
Wealth, and Power, and Ambition, ) muft be abfolutely dif-
‘carded. It. beingimpoffible, that any Man, who makes thefe
his Concern, fhould, at the fame time preferve his own Free-
dom, and {nnocence, and Wifdom. But as for fuch others
of them, as may be no ObftruGions to the Sou!’s Good,
provided they be managed with Difcretion ; fuch as a decent
Dwelling, a competent Equipage, the fatisfactions of Mar-
riage, the care of continuing agood Family, the Exercife of
- jut Aathority, and fome degree of Solicitude and Pains for
the providing all neceflary nies : Thefe, and all the ee
3 4 9
¥
30 Epicretus’s Morals
of the like nature, headvifes his Scholars to fuperfede, for
fome convenient time at leaft. And that for very good rea-
fon; it being neceffary, that they who would betruly and
eminently Good, fhould make the Exercife of Virtue their
whole Bufinefs and conftant Study, and fuffer no other thing
whatfoever to divert them from it.
Whoever,propofes to himfelf, not merely to be popular,
and impofe upon the World with a diiiembled Virtue, but
to anfwer the Charaéter of a Sincere and Truly Good Man,
mutt take careof twothings. Firft, He muft attain τὸ fuch
a Degree of Wifdom, as may enable him to diftinguith, be-
tween what will really make for his Advantage, and what
willturn to his Prejudice: and then Secondly, he muft keep
under his brutith Appetites, that they may never revolr, nor
rebel again{ft Reafon ; but may be fo ready and obiervant to
it, asto move, only at fuch Times, andin fuch Proportions,
and toward fuch Objeéts, as the Reafonable Soul fhall limic
and prefcribe tothem. For Menare betrayed into Vice twa
ways. Either for want of the Underftanding being fuffici-
ently enlightened, when wedo not difcern whatis goodand
proper to be done; Or elfe, through the Ungovernablenefs
of the Affe@tions and Senfual Appetites ; when, though the
Mind hath a Notion, though but a weak and imperfeét one,
of what ought to be done, yet the Paflions mutiny and make
head, nfurpa Power that belongs not tothem, and over-rule
the calm Judgment of fober Reafon. Thus the Tragediaz
introduces Medea, complaining of the Impotence of her
‘Mind, when about to murder her Children ;
Remorfe and Senfe of Guilt draw back wey Soxl,
But fironger Paffion does her Pow’ rs coviroul ;
With Rage tran{ported, I pufh boldly oz,
And fee the Precipice I cannot foun.
It is neceffary then, in order to enjoying the World, fa
as tO Maintain ones own Virtue and Innocence, that a Man ἡ
elas himfelf with a competent Degree of Knowledge and
Prudence, and reduce his Appetites to Moderation and Obe-
dience. And when he engages in Bufinefs and Converfation,
that he be fure to do it cautioufly and feafonably, and to put
on this impenetrable Armour. ForthisReafon, Epictetus is
urgent wirh his young Beginners to fufpend even thofe .
things, that areconfiftent with Virtue, for awhile; till Time
and Praéice have confirmed their good Habits, and qualified
Mea ! them.
-:»
ν᾿
with S1mPpLiciuss Comment. 39
“
em to ufe the World with Safety and Difcretion. For, as
Ni: Rafhnefs and Folly to go into the Field unarm’d; fo it
is, to engage with the World, tilla Man hath fortified him-
felf with Temper and Prudence.
But he acquaints us farther ; that, for thofe, who as yet are
but raw and unexperienced in Virtue, to employ themfelves
in Bafinefs and Worldly Care, is not only inconvenient and
hazardous, but ridiculous and vain, and to no manner of
purpofe. They, that place their Defires and their Averfions
upon fuch Things as are out of ἃ Man’s Power, mutt needs
fail of Prudence and Moderation, and cannot have Inclina-
tions and Averfions grounded upon, and govern’d by, right
Reafon, which are the only Things that make Men free, and
eafie, and happy. For they muft of Neceffity live in Sub-
je€tion to their wild and brutifh Paffions, which Lord it over
them, like fomany cruel Mafters, or enraged Tyrants. They
mutt alfo live perpetually in a flavith Fear of ail thofe Men,
in whofe Power it is, either to gratifie their Hopes, or to
Οὔτ αὐ and cefeat them ; who can intercept the Good they
with, or infli@ the Ills they fear; left they fhould exert this
Power totheir Prejudice.
Befides 411 this, When our Care and Conccrn is laid out:
upon the feeming good Things without us, it expofes us to
Difappoinrments in our true Happinefs, by taking off our
Care from thofe Things that are more properly ours. For
they, who divide their Defires and Endeavours between Both,
do neither make a juft Diftin@ion between thofe Things
that are, and thofe that are not, really good ; nor do they
exprefs a becoming Concern, for that which is their own pe-
culiar Happinefs; nor beftow the Pains about ic that it de-
ferves: aud till they co fo, it is impoffible they fhould attain
toit. Forthemott parttherefore, they fall {πότε of thofe ex-
ternal Advantages they propofe to themfelves, becaufe they
do not apply their Minds to thefe entirely, but now and then
are diverted by Defires and Endeavours after their true and
proper Happinefs ; and outof a fecret Shame and Confciouf{-
nefs, that this requires their Care, fall into fuch Perplexities
and Diftraétions, as reftrain and ftop their Career, and will
not fuffer-them to do nor to endure, every Thing that is
neceflary for obtaining the falfe Good they chiefly purfue.
Now, though fuchadivided Life as this, muftbe acknow-
ledg’d to be lefs vicious, than that which addi itfelf whol-
ly to the World, without any Check or Interruption at all;
yet it cannot but be exceeding troublefome and uneafie ;
much
40 Errctetus’s Morals
much more fo indeed, than that of the Worldling. For it
is one continual Labour in vain, ever ftriving to reconcile
Contradiétions, full of perpetual Inconfiftencies and Remor-
fes, Diflikeof ones own AGions, and eternal Self-Condem-
Nation. So that tt muft needs be infinitely painful and de-
teftable. :
But it is worth our taking Notice, that Fprcfetus, upon
thefe Occafions, does frequently in the following Difcour-
fes, admonith and awaken us witha Remember. The Rea-
fon of whichis, that he adrefles himfelf to the Rational Sou! ;
which, though it be naturally and effentially endued with juft
Ideas of Things, and hath an inbred Faculty of difcerning
and adhering to Truth, yet finds but too often, that this Eye
of Reafon is darkened, hath dim and confufed Reprefenta-
tions of Things impofed upon it, by the material Principle,
to which it is united ; and by this means is betrayed into Ig-
norance and Forgetfulnefs, the true Caufe of al! irs Mifear-
riages and all its Miferies. So that, confidered in thefe Cir-
cumftances, it ftands in need of a continual Monitor to
rouze it into Thought and Remembrance.
But when he fays, that 4 Maz who propofes to himfelf Ad-
vantages fo valuable, ought nat to be coutent with a moderate Pro-
fecution of them; This Expreffions is ποῖ τὸ be underftood, as
we take it, when ufed to diftinguifh between Moderation
and Excefs, but is iptended here of the Dete@, and fignifies ’
a fupine Negleét, and cold Indifference. For where our
Happinefs and our All is at ftake, there, as Piwdar expreffes
himielf,
Diftrefs and Danger foould our Courage fire,
Move Gen’rous Thoughis, and brave Kefolves in{pire.
δὐδλκλλαλ λα eda falta ded νὴ fol dol shila
COM Atay
W HEWN therefore any frightful and difcourag-
ing Imagination aflaultsyou, harden yourfelf,
andmeet it boldly, with this Reflexion, That it is
only your Apprehenfion of things, and not the real
Nature of the Things themfelves. Then bring it
to the Teft, and examine it by fuch Rules of Mo-
rality as you are Mafter of ; but efpecially by a
mo!
‘
with SimpLicius’ss Comment. 41
pI A OD,
moit material Diftinction, Of things thar are, or
are not, inour Power. And if, upon Enquiry, it
be found one of the latter fort, remember, that
it is what you are not at all concerned in, and flight
it accordingly.
i ΘΜ BE Nut.
E had told us, That the Man, who propofeth to him-
felf the Attainment of Virtue and Happinefs, mutt be
conftant and indefatigable, and not fuffer the World, or
any of its lemptations, tofeduce ordraw him off from the
purfuit of it: But fince, even they, who do make thefe
Things their Study and Care, are yet fubject to frequent
Fancies and Apprehenfions: Some that put them upon defir-
ing fome of thofe external Advantages, and Others that ter-
rifi2 them with Calamities of that kind; he informs us here,
how to manage fuch Apprehentions, fo as to receive no In-
convenience fromthem. And thefe Apprehenfions he calls
frightful and difcouraging; becaufe they are extravagant and
unreafonable and embitter ones Life with a World of Ter-
rors and Troubles, by the Excefs and Irregularity of their
otions. eM
ey i taliowing Difcourfes, he advifes more at large, not
ῥ e hurried away, and immediately tranfported with any
Magination, whether ittend to Hope or Fear; And here he
fays much the fame Thing in fewer Words ; That a Man
ought to harden and fet himfelf againft it, and difarm
it of all its Force, by this Confideration, That it is but a
Fancy of our own, and no more. Now our Fancies, we
know, do fometimes give us the Reprefentations of Things.
as they really are, as in Things that are indeed Pleafant and
Beneficial ; and fometimes they delude us with wild Incon-
filtencies , gaudy Vanities, and empty Dreams. But the
Strength of thefe Reprefentations depends upon the Im-
prefflions, which they make in our Minds. And this is ex-
ceedingly weakned, by making that {ingle Confideration ha-
_bitual τὸ us. That there is very often a wide Difference, be-
tween the Things themfelves, and the Reprefentations of
themto us: For, when once weare thus fixed, no Violence
they can ufe, will be able to juftle out our Reafon, or per-
vert our Judgment; which he tells us, as foon as we have
-allayed the Heat of the Imagination, and made our Minds
quiet
4» ἘΡΙΟΤΕΤυῦυ 55 Morals
quiet and calm, fhould be prefently employed, in ἃ nice Ex-
amination of the Idea reprefented to us.
Now there are feveral Rules to try it by: Some taken
fromthe Nature of thefe Ideas themfelves, and the Things
they reprefent; as, Whether they be fuch Objeéts as tend
to the good of the Mind, or whether they concern our Bo-
dies, or our Fortunes only: Whether they contribute to any
real Advantage, or whether Pleafure is the only Thing they
can pretend to: Whether what they propofe be feafible, or
not; There is likewife another Method, which proceeds up-
on the Judgment of Wife and Unwife Men, and the Con-
cern They exprefs for them; but efpecially, upomthe Judg-
ment and Determination of Almighty God. For that,
which God himfelf, and Wife and Good Men have approved
of, every one that confults the Safety and Happinefs of his
Soul, muft needs be convinced, will challenge his greatelt
Care and Concern; As on the contrary, whatever They
diflike and condemn, ought by all means to be detefted ἀπά
avoided. And no Man yet ever arrived to that Degree of —
Folly, or was fo far blinded by Paffion and Luft, as to per-
-fuade himfelf, that Injuftice, and Luxury, and Excefs, are
Things well-pleafing to God. ον ἥν
But though there are many Rules which may be fervice-
ableto us, in diftingufhing between the feveral Ideas and ther
Things they reprefent; yetthereis one peculiarto Men, con-.
fidered as Men ; and which is of general ufe upon all Oce
cafions. And this depends upon the Diftin@ion of Things that
Are, and Things that are Not in our own Power. For if the
Obje& that prefents itfelf, as a Thing inviting our Defire,
or provoking our Averfion, be out of our own Difpofal; —
the ready Courfe to be taken, is, to fatisfie ourfelves, and
to difmifs it with this Anfwer, That this is wo part of our Con-
cerm. For it is impoffible for any Thing to be ftriétly Good
or Evil to us, which is not within our own Power; becaufe
the Freedom of the Willis the true fpecifick Difference of
Humane Nature. The very being of a Creature thus quali-
fied, neceflarily infers this Prerogative, That all its Good, |
and all its Evil, fhall depend merely upon its own Choice.
ἔτ UES
CHAP,
with Stmpxiiciuss Comment. 43
CHAP. VI.
Emember, That the Thing, which recommends
| any Defire, is a Promife and Profpect of ob-
taining the Object you are in purfuit of; As on
the contrary, the Thing, which your Averfion
aims at, and propofes to you, is the efcaping the
- Evil you fear. And in thefe Cafes, he, that is
baulked of his Defires, is an unfortunate Man; and
he, that is overtaken by the Mifchief he declines,
is a miferable Man. But now, if you confine
your Averfions to thofe Evils only, which are at
the Difpofal of your own Will; you can be-ne-
ver overtaken by any Calamity you would decline 5.
but if you extend them to fuch Things, as Sick-
nefs, or Poverty, or Death, you will of Neceffity
be miferable.
CHAP. VIL
E.T your Averfions then be taken off from all
Things out of your own Power, and transfer-
red to fuch ‘Things as are contrary to Nature, with-
in your own Power. And as for Detires, lay them
for the prefent, wholly afide : for if you fix them
upon Things out of your Power, you are fure
to be. unfuccefsful ; and if you would reftrain them
to fitand proper Objects, fuch as come within ir,
know this is not come to your turn yet. Let your
Mind therefore go no farther than the mere Ten-
dencies and Propenfions, to moderate and ufe thefe
gently, gradually, and cautioufly.
CO M-
44 ᾿ς ἘΡΙΟΤΕ tTus’s Morals
COMMENT.
HIS now follows in a dire& Method , from what
went before, and is, as it were, a Demonftration of
- the Truth of the laft Chapter: where we were told, that our
Apprenfions and Ideas of Things defirable muft be regulated
by that neceffary Diftin@ion of What is, and what is not with-
22 our own Power. The Obfervation of this Rule would be
fure to make us fuccefsful and happy, and the Negleé& of it
unfortunate and wretched. To this purpofe, his firft bufi-
nefs is, to explain, What fort of Perfons we ufe to efteem
jucky or unlucky; and he tells us, that the End our Aver-
fions propofe to themfelves, is, not to fall into the Mifchief
we endeavour to decline ; fo that in this cafe, the miffing
our Object is fortunate; as on the contrary, it is unfortu-
nate, in cafes of Defire, when we do not get our Object.
And the Misfortune oppofite to good Succefs is, when the
Thing we would avoid does happen to us; for here we get ©
our Objedt indeed, but then this getting is to our Prejudice,
and what we might much better have been without.
When he hath fet thefe Matters in a true Light, then he
proceeds thus. If you take careto make thofe Things only,
the Objects of your Averfions, which are contrary to Na-
ture, and within the compafs of your own choice, as In-
temperance for Example, and Injuftice, and the like; you
can never be overtaken by any Thing you fear, becaufe in
thefe Matters you may be fure to efcape if you pleafe; and ©
confequently, you are fure never tobe unfortunate. But if, |
inftead of thefe youpitch upon Sicknefs, or Poverty, or any
of thofe Things that are out of your own Difpofal; you
muft needs fall into calamitous Circumftances fometimes,
becaufe it cannot depend*upon yourfelf, whether you fhall _
be delivered from thefe or not. So again for Defire, That
Man cannot fecure himfelf againft trequent Difappoint-
‘ments, who fixes upon Obje&ts outothisown Power. But if
our Defires and our Avertfions be confined to Matters with-
in ourown Power and Choice ; then it will not be poffible
for us to be baulked in our Hopes, or overtaken by our
Fears, but Happinefs and Succefs will attend us continually.
The Subttance and Connexion of all which, in fhorr, lies
here. He that extends his Defires and his Averfions, to
Things out of the Difpofal of his own Will, very peas?
millێs-
i
a iaieieaen anne eae
with Simp Licitus’s Comment. 45
a IR A RE RE RS EOE
miffes his Aim, falls fhort inhis Hopes, and is overtaken by
his Fears ; And he muft needs do fo, becaufe thefe Things
depend not onhimfelf, but upon others. Now fuch aone is
confeffed to be an unfuccefsful and unfortunate Perfon, and
_ therefore wretched and miferable.
But it is worth our notice, how Epictetus imitates Socra-
tes’s way of Arguing upon this Occaficn, and accommo-
dates himfelf to his Hearers, fo as, by defcending to Their
Notions, to raife them up higher to fomething better and
more perfect. For, that Happinefs confifts in obtaining Mens
Withes and Defires, and in efcaping the Mifchiefs and Dan-
gers they fear, is the general Notion Men have of it; and
thus far Men of all Perfuafions, and the moft diftant Tem-
pers and Converfations, agree. But then herein they differ,
that they do not employ their Defires and Averfions alike.
For the Wifeand Virtuous purfue fuch Objedts only, as are
really profitable and good, and avoid only the truly mifchie-
vousand fubftantial Evils; andthis they do, by the free Gui-
dance of their Reafon, andthedue Government of their Paf-
fions ; for the brutifh Appetites in Them are fo fubdued, fo
difciplin’d by Ads of Obedience to the Judgment, that they
donot fo much as think any thing pleafant but what Reafon
hath approved, and found to be fo. But the Generality of
Mankind, partly for want of duly improving their Judg-
ments, and pattly from their brutith Affections being kept
in perpetual Commotion and Diforder, diftinguifh the Ob-
jeéts of their Defire, by no other Mark than Pleafure; with-
_ out examining, whether this Pleafure be fuch as makes-for
their true Advantage, or not: And thefe Men often hii up-
on very impure and unfincere Pleafures; fuch ascarry a Mix-
tureand Allay of Painalong withthem. For, in truth, they
are not really and properly Pleafures, but only the empty
Shadows and falfe Refemblances of Pleafure. Yet ftill, as
was faid before, all Mankind are agreed in the general, that
- Profperity and Succefs con{ift in, obtaining the good Things
we with, and keeping off the Evils we fear.. So that even
the Senfual and moft Vicious Men may convince themfelves
from this Difcourfe, that the true way never to be difappoin-
tedintheir Defires, or overtaken by their Fears, is, to agree,
that thofe Things which are within our Power, are the only
good and proper Objeéts of Defire; and that the Evils in our
own Power are the only noxious and deftructive, and pro-
per Objects of Fearand Hatred. Sinceit is plain, that they,
who fix upon Things without their Power, muft needs fall
. fhort
46 Eprererus’s Μ
fhort very frequently oftheir Hopes, and lofe what they defire,
and endure what they fear: And this is what even Vicious —
Perfons acknowledge to be a great Misfortune.
Let then, {ays he, your Averfious be taken off from all Things
out of your own Power, and transferred to fuch Things as are
contrary to Nature, within your Power. For if you place
them upon Sicknefs, or Poverty, or the like, you muft una-
voidably be unfortunate, becaufe thefe are Things notin your
Power to efcape. For, though we can contribute confider-
ably towards the avoiding of them, yet the Thing is not
wholly and abfolutely in ourfelves; but it willdepend upon
fundry other Circumftances and Accidents, whether our En-
deavours fhall fucceed, or not. But, if we would follow
his Advice, take off our Fears from thefe Things, and put
them upon thofe within our own Choice, which are preju-
dicial and againft Nature: If, for Inftance, we would make
it our Gare to avoid Erroneous Opinions, and falfe Appre-
henfions of Things, and whatever elfe can be any Obftruction
to a good Converfation, and fuch a Life, as Reafon and
Nature have made fuizable to our Chara&ter; wefhould ne-
ver beopprefied with any of the Calamities we fear, becaufe
it isin our own Power abfolutely to avoid thefe Things. For
nothing more than our own Averfions and Refolutions is
requifite to the doing this effectually.
All here is fufficiently plain, and needs no Enlargement ;
but that which follows hath fomething of difficulty in it.
For what can be his meaning in that Advice, that All Defre
Jrould for the prefent be wholly laid afide? There is a manifeft
Reafon, why we fhould difcharge all thofe Defires, that
concern Things without our Power; becavfe this evidently
makes forour Advantage, both inregard of the Difappoint-
ments and perpetual Uneafinetfes, which this Courfe delivers
us from; and alfo in Confideration of the Things them-
felves, which, though we fhould fuppofe no fuch Troubles
and Difappointments attending them, are yet not capable of
bringing us any real Advantage, nor that, which is the pro-
per Happinefs of 4 Man.
But what fhall we fay to his forbidding the Defire, even
of thofe good Things, which come within the Difpofal of
our own Wills ὃ The Reafon he gives is this, Becanfe you
are not yet cometothis. But if you were come to it, there
wouldthen be no tarther Occafion for Defire ; tor this is no
other than a Motion of the Mind defiring, by which it reaches
forward to what it is mot yet come to. And this feems wd
eu
LTA Rae Myson σ Ὁ :
ΩΣ νῷ ΝΑ, ͵ ; 3
with StMPLI ctus’s Comment.. 47
cutoff all’ Defire in general : For how is it poffible to obtain
any Good, without firft defiring it? Efpecially, if (as hath
been formerly fhewn) the Good and Happinefs of a Man
confift, not fo much in A@tions, and the effe&ing what he
would, as in the entertaining fuch Defires and Averfions, as
are agreeable to Nature and Reafon ; what Ground can there
be for fufpending all our Detires, and utterly forbidding us
for a while to entertain any at all? Or how can.we imagine
it poffible, for a Man to live void of all Defire? I add, that
this looks like a direét Contradi@ion to what went before,
when in the 4th. Chapter he gavethis Advice, Sizce therefore
the Advantages you propofe to yourfelf are fo exceeding valuable,
Remember, that you ought not to content yourfelf with a cold and
moderate purfuit of them. Yow by that Purfuit he did not un-
derftand any Bodily Motion, but the Eagernefs of the Soul,
by which, in the A& of Defiring, fhe moves towards, and
makes after the Obje@. And again, How can we {fup-
pofe any Affections and Propenfions without Defire? For the
Order of Things infers a Neceffity, before there can be any
fuch Affeétions and Propenfions of the Soul.
In Anfwer to thefe Objections, it may be replied, that E-
pictetus here addreffes himfelf to young Beginners in Philo-
fophy; for whom it cannot be fafe to indulge any Defires at
all, till they be firft competently informed, what are thé
Objeéts which they ought to fix upon. And fo that thefe
Affe&tions and Propenfions of the Soulare to be underftood,
only of thofe firft Motions to or from its Objeéts, which,
the Sozcks contend, are always antecedent to Detire and A-
verfion. Lah i
Or if he dire& his Difcourfe to Men already inflruéted ; *
then we muft not interpret the Words as they feem to found 5
nor may we fuppofe, that he intends to cut off all Defire of
the goodThings inour Power, abfolutely {peaking ; but only
toreftrainthe Vehemence and Eagernefs of that Avertion and
Defire, which in a moderate Degree he is content to allow.
For you fee, that he advifes in the very farhe Place, to make
ufe of our Propexfions and Affections of the Soul gently, coaly,
and cantioufly. For we mutt neceffarily move, towards the
Obje&tof our Defires, and fromthat which is our Averfion;
but four Defires and Averfions are antecedent to fuch Mo-
tions to and from the Object, and do produce them, as Cau-
fes do their proper Effects. ᾿
πον πῶ ον Se eee
Ἰὼ Again
sie
᾿
spe
48 E,prcretuss Morals
gE A A ES
Again, When he advifed before, that Men would not con-
tent themfelves with acold and moderate purfuit of fuch
valuable Advantages, it was no part of his Intention, to re-
commend an eager and violent Detire ; but rather, that we
fhould be fixed and refolved in this profecution, as to fatisfie
ourfelves in doing what he adds himfelf immediately after,
the abandoning forae Enjoyments for all together, and the [ufpend-
ing of others for foime convenient time.
Now a vehement Degree in any of thefe things, either the
Propenfities of the Mind, or the Defires and Averfions of it,
is with great reafon condemned; becaufe of the il] Confe-
quences it is aptto have, when Men fhoot beyond the Mark
thro’ an Excefs of Defire, and attempt things above their
Strength. For this ufually ale to the weakening of the
Soul, as much as overftrainingInjures the Body. And this
is an Inconvenience, which many have found experimentally
from the immoderate Violence and heag of Aétion, which
Men fond of Exercife, and eager in it, are moft unfeafon-
ably guiltyof. Forthere are but very few Perfons of fuch a
Conftitution, either in Body or Mind, as to be able, all on
the fudden, to change from a bad State to a found and good
one. Diogenes indeed, and Crates, and Zezo, and fuch emi-
nent Lights as thefe, might,be fo happy; but for the genera-
lity of People, their Alterations are gradual and flow ; they
fall by little and little, and they recover themfelves fo too ; and
this is {uch a Condition, as Nature hath appointed for us,
with regard to the Soul, as well as the Body. For gentle
Methods are commonly more likely to hold, and a more
fafe way of proceeding. Thefe keep the Soul from {pending —
sits ftrength too faft, and put fome Checks upon its forward-
nefs ; which is the true way, bothof preferving, and by de-
grees, though but flow ones, of confirming and increafing,
the vigour of it. This is the true Reafon, why we are advi-
fed to put a Reftraint upon the Affections of the Soul, to
move /eif#rely and gradually, and with much cooluefs and can-
tion. “Vactis, to flacken the Reins by little and little; and
not to let loofe our Defires and our Averfions, nor give
them their full rangeimmediately. Forthe Man, who froma
diffolute and head-ftrong courfe of Life, would bring him- _
felf to the contrary Habits of Sobriety and ftrié Difcipline,
mutt not prefently leap to the diftant Extreme, from Luxu- |
ry and Excefs, to Abftemioufnefs and Fafting ; but he muft
advance by Steps, and be fatisfied at firft, with abating fome- |
what of his former Extravagance. For what the Author of
the
ei,
,
with Stmpxicius’s Comment. 49
the Golden Verfes hath obferved, is very confiderable upon
thefe Occalions. ἡ
The Και ufe Force, and with foft Pleafures Fight ;
The Wife retreat, and fave themfelves by Fight.
Thus it is in Matters of Learning and Knowledge; Young
Students muft admit the Idea’s of things warily, and
not take every Appearance of Truth for an unconteftable
Axiom; that fo, if upon a Second view, there be occafion
to alter their Judgments, it may be done with greater Readi-
nefs and Eafe, when their Minds are not too ftrongly poffefs’d
with their firft Notions.
Once more, Epictetus advifes his Scholars to move /ezfure-
Wy and gradually to Obje&s of both kinds; but now, if fo
much Caution and Coldnefs be neceflary, why does he allow
our Averfions, any more than our Defires ὃ for he bids us take
off our Averfions from thofe Prejudicial things that are not im our
power, and bend them againft thofe that aré; and yet at the fame
time he prohibits all manner of Defire, and, for fome time,
will not permit us to indulge that at all.
One probable account of this may be taken from the Na-
ture and Condition of Men, who are beginning to reform.
The firft ftep towards a good Life is to throw off all the Ve-
nom and Corruption of a bad one; and till the Breaft have
difcharged itfelf of this, no Nourifhment can be had from
any Principles of Virtue infufed into it. What the great
Hippocrates has moft excellently obferved concerning our Bo- |
dies, is much more truly applicable to our Souls: That fo
long as a Man continues full of grofs and noxious Humours,
the Nourifhment he receives, does not feed Him, fo much as
his Diftempers Forthe Vicious Principles, which had taken
Poffeffion, corrupt all the Good ones that are put to them.
Sometimes they make us difrelifhthem, as unpleafant; fome-
times dread and avoid them, as hurtful and injurious to us ;
fometimes condemn them as Evil, and reject them as im-
poffible to be complied with. And all this while, the Dit
eafe gathers more {trength, and grows upon us, by bringing
us to a Contempt of better Principles, after a pretence of
having tried, and found themdefe@tive. Thus ar Jaft it be-
comes Incurable, and will not fo much as fuffer us to admit
of any Arguments or AGions, that might advance us in Vir+
tue, but produces in us a Loathing of all thofe Remedies,
that contribute to our Recovery. Juft as id the Jaundice,
Β1 whea
ΟΡ Epictetus’s Morals
when the Vitiated Palate thinks Honey bitter, a Man nau-
feates it prefently, and will never endure to tafte Honey af-
ter, in order to the removing that Prejudice. Thus the A-
verfions are allowed in Young. Beginners, becaule the Me-
thod of their Cure requires it; and the firft ftep towards a
Retormation, is, by growing into a Diflike of Vice, to put
themfelves intoaCondition of receiving Virtuous Principles
and Good Inftructions.
This Difcourfe is alfo excellently well fuited to fuch Per-
fons, in regard it fhews them the right way to Liberty, and
Security, and an eafie Mind, that fo their Lives. may be
pleafant and {weet to them, which indeed is the very thing
all Creatures aim at. Now, though an abfolute freedom
from Paffion, and a Converfation in all points agreeable to
the Rules of Decency, and Nature, be the proper Excel-
lency, which we ought to defire and purfue ; yet Beginners
muft fatisfie themfelves with lefs ;.and think they do very
well, when they can abate of their Paflions, and reducethem
within fome reafonable bounds, tho” they cannot gain an ab-
folute Maftery over them. They muft expeé to relapfe
fometimes, and are not fo much to be condemned for fal-
Jing, as encouraged and commended, when they rife again.
Such as thefe therefore are not yet arrived to the perfection
of thofe things which fhould be the Objeé& of their Defires:
And this Irake tobe the meaning of that Expreffion, Tis 1s
not come toyour turm yet ; 1. e. the imperfect State you arein,
hath not qualified youfor fuch Defires: For when we aimat
fomething that exceeds our Capacity, and find we cannot Ὁ
reach it, then Troubles and Difappointments, and a finking
of our Spirits, and fometimes a defponding Mind, follow
upon it. Men violently bent upon things above their
Strength, flight fuch as are proportionable to it, and think
them vile and defpicable ; becaufe they judge of them by way
of comparifon with greater. And yet it is by fimall~begin-
nings only, that we can ever arrive at great Perfe@tions; and
before we can cope with things above us, we mutt practifeup- ὁ
on lefs, and make ourfelves Mafters of fuch as we are a
Match for. ate
CHAP. |
with SimPpLicius’s Comment. 51
CHAP. VII.
Emember upon all Occafions, to reflect with
R yourfelf, of what Nature and Condition thofe
things are which miniiter Delight, or are ufeful and
beneficial to you, or which you have a natural ten-
dernefs for: And that thefe Reflexions may an-
fwer their End, make them familiar, by beginning
at the flighteft and moft inconfiderable things, and
fo rifing to the higher and more valuable. For in-
ftance; it you are fond of an earthen Cup, con-
fider it is but Earthen Ware, and you cannot be
much troubled or furprized, when ever it happens
to be broke. And if you be fond of a Child or a
Wife, confider, that thefe are of Humane, that is of
a Frail and Mortal Nature; and thus your Surprize
and Concern will be the lefs, when Death takes ei-
ther of them away from you.
ΟΕ INST,
Frer the diftinGtion between things within, and things out
of, ofr Own power; and an Advertifement how we
ought to eftcem each of them: That the former fort only
muit belooked upon as our own, the latter as Foreign, and
in the Ditpofal of others; he had told us, how we ought to
be affected with regard to thofe that fall within our power-:
Tomake {uch of them 45 are contrary to reafon and Nature,
the Object of our Averfion, and to fufpend all manner of
Defire, for fome convenient time; (Which Advice, in all
probability, is grounded upon the Arguments already men-
tioned.) But fince it is impoffible to live, without having
fomething of Intereft in, and much Dealing with, thofe
things that’'are not at the Difpofal of ourown Will; henow
informs us how to converfe with them, and tells us, that,
though they be not at our own pleafure, yet they may ‘not
be able to create to us any manner of Difquiet and Contu-
fion,
H 3 And
52 Epicterus’s Morals
And here he takes notice of Three forts of thefe Exter-
nal Things; Firft, Such as can only pretend to pleafe, with-
out profiting us at all; thefe are fuch, as minifter to our En-
tertainment and Delight. TheSecond, fuch as are benefi-
cial and convenient for Ufe. And the Third, fuch as we
have a particular Affection for, by reafon of fome natural
Relation they bear to us, and which we are tender of, with-
out any regard to our own Benefit and Convenience. And
this is a very juft and true Diftindiion. For Pleafure, and
Profit, and Natural Affection, are the Three things that en-
gage our Hearts ; and it is always upon oneor other of thefe
Accounts, that weare fond of this Mortal State, and recon-
ciled to all the Hardthips and Miferies attending ir.
Now the Entertainments and Diverfions that Men are de-
lighted with, differ, according to their feveral Tempers and
Inclinations: Some find their Pleafure in Plays: Others in
Sports and Exercifes, in Races, or Tilting or tne like. Orhers
in Dancings, or Tricks of Legerdemain,in Jugglers, or Za-
ny’s, or Buffoons. Some again in curious Sights; either the
‘Beauties of Nature, as the Colours of Peacocks and other
fine Birds, pleafant Flowers, and Gardens, and Meadows,
and Groves : Or in the perfeétions of Art, as Piétures, and
Statues, and Buildings, or the exquifite Workmanhhip of o-
ther Profeffions. Some value thofe of the Eye lefs, and find
greater fatisfaction in the Entertainment of the Ear, as the
Harmony of Vocal and Inftrumental Mufick ; and, which
isa Pleafure more generous and improving, in Eloquence or
Hiftory, and fometimes in Fables and Romances. For that
thefe contribute much to our Delight, is plain, from that
fondnefs, which all of us naturally have to Stories, from
our very Childhood.
The Second fort, which tend to our Ufe and Benefit, are
likewife various. Some contribute to the improvement of
the Mind, as a Skilful Mafter, Virtuous Converfation, In-
ftru@tive Books, and the like: Some are ferviceable to the
Body, as Meats and Clothes, and Exercife: Some regard
only our Fortune, as Places of Authority, Lands and Te-
nements, Money and Goods, and the like.
But the Third fort we have a Natural Tendernefs for,
without any profpeét of Advantage from them; and thefe
are recommended to our Affection, by fome common tye of
Nature and Affinity between us ; In this Relation ftand our
Wives and Children, our Kindred, our Friends, and our
ΘΗ ΥΠΕΗ. kn his: tr. ene
ὦ Now
τ ρος πο πϑνπὌἔἐἔἐὌἐέοςΗυ το ον
with StmpLiciuss Comment. 53
Now the Advice given, with refpeét to every one of thefe,
is, that we would fit down, and ferioufly confider, what
_ the Nature and Condition of each of themis; what Hazards
and Uncertainties they are liable to; that they are fubje&t to
Corruption and Decay; that the Enjoyment of them is fhore,
and not to be depended upon; and that none of them are
- abfolutely at our own Pleafure and Difpofal. For fuch a
Reflexion as this, which fuggefts to us continually, what
their Nature and Circumftances are, is no other, than a Me-
ditating upon the Lofs of them. And fuch a Meditation
would render the thing eafie and familiar to us; and when
_ any Accident of this kind befalsus, would prevent all that
Surprize and Confufion, and extravagant Concern , which
the Unthinking part of the World are oppreffed with upon
fuch Occafions. And indeed the cate here is the very fame
with fevera] other Inftances, wherein wé find, thatthe. Trou-
blesand Pains of Body and Mind both, though very grievous
at firft and in themfelves, yet grow much more fupportable
by Cuftom and Ufe.
᾿ς Tothis purpofe, the next Words give us very good Coun-
fel ; to begin at firft with little matters; nay, not only with
little, but with the leaft and moft incontiderable; for ac-
cording tothe old Greek Proverb, * 726 Pot- nah iby
ter muft try a Cup, before he can meke a Far. me ater:
He that undertakes the biggeft firft, is pre- *f*R‘*4” Eral.
fently worfted, proves unfuccefsful, {pends a anadtnnkt
his Strength to no purpofe, and gives out in utter Defpair.
But he that fets out leifurely, and begins with {mall and ea-
fie Trials, grows ftronger and bolder with his good Succefs,
and by gaining Ground upon what was a Match for him be-
fore, advances more furely, and conquers {till greater and
greater Difficulties. Thusa Man ufed to Four Meals a Day,
if he attempt all on the fudden to faft a whole Day together,
will find the Change too violent for his Body to bear, and
never get through the trouble and painof it, And this force,
upon Nature is the Reafon, why fuch warm Undertakings
are generally of dangerous confeyuence, only juft for a
fpurt, and away. But if fucha one abate of his former in-
dulgence by degrees; firft take himfelf down to Three Meals,
and, when this Proportion is grown habitual and eafie, then
allow himfelf but Two; Thus it will be very feafible;. and
afterwards he may, without any great trouble, come to con-
tent himfelf with One ; and fuch a Change will be infinite-
ly more fafe, and more likely to continue,
H 4 Apply.
‘34. Epictetus’s Morals
Apply this now to the inftance before us: We fthould
-confider thofe things that are dear to us, upon the account
of their Ufefulnefs and Convenience ; and from fuch among
them as are of Jeaft Confequence and Value, acquaint our-
felves with the Condition of all the reft ; as that their Na-
ture is corruptible, the Enjoyment of them uncertain, and
the Lofs of them what we have reafon to expeét every Mo-
ment. Asin an Earthen Pot, which can have nothing but
its Ufefulnefs, to incline us to value it; we are to remem-
ber, it is of a brittle fubftance, and dafhed to pieces with
the leaft Accident. And what can bea poorer and more
contemptible inftance than this, to begin with? Yet mean
and trifling as it is, a Man that lays a good Foundation here,
and rifes by degrees to.Matters of greater Concern, fhall be
able at laft to encounter his Affection for a Child; and not
only in mere Speculation, and empty formal Words to fay
it, but to make his whole Behaviour fpeak, and all the Dif
pofitions of his Mind to carry the impreffion of this wife
and feafonable Reflexion, That what he thus dotes upon, is
buta Man; if a Man, confequently a brittle and frail Crea-
ture, and fuch as he is in a continual poffibility of lofing.
Andif his Mind be once throughly poflefs’d with this Con-
fideration, and confirmed with an habitual recolleGtion of
it; whenever that Child is fnatch’d away from him, he is
prepared for the Stroke, and cannot be furprized and con-
founded with Paflion, as if fome ftrange or new thing had ~
happened-to him. >
Andhere it is very well worth a Remark, what abundance
of Wifdom and Artifice there is in this Management of
things. For by it we get aMaftery, over those, that are not
by Nature within our Power, and deal with them as though
they were. ~ The faving my Child from Death, is athing not
in my power; but a due Confideration of his being liable
toit, therendring this Confideration familiar and eafie to me,
and living in expeétation of it, asa thing no lefs natural and
likely than his Life, thenot being difturbed if he do Die, and
the behaving my felf with fuch evennefs of Temper, as if
he werenot dead: Thefe are in my power: And which isa
great deal more, they do in effe€t bring the very Accident
of his Death, which is of itfelf not fo, within it too. For
a Man thus compofed, may fay, My Child zs not Dead to me;
or, to {peak more truly and properly, Though be be Dead,
yet l aia fill the fame Maz, as if be were full alive,
Tonly
with SrMmpLic1uss Comment. 55
Ionly obferve farther, That the Inftances produced here
by Epiétetus, are fetch’d fromthe Two latter forts ot Things;
- fuch as are ufeful.and beneficial to us, and fuch as Nature,
and Affinity gives us a more than ordinary tendernefs for :
And thefe were prudently chofen, withanintent, I prefume
to intimate, that thofe things, which are for Entertainment
and Diverfion, and can only pretend to pleafe without pro-
fiting us, are fo very mean and defpicable, as to deferve no
Confideration at all, from Perfons who have made any to-
-lerable advances in the ftudy of Wifdom and Virtue.
| CERES IKE IER Ὁ τὰ ΚΦ
a es CHAP. 1X.
N every Action you undertake, confider firft
if with yourfelf, and weigh well the Nature and
Circumftances of the thing: Nay, thoughit be fo
flight a one, as going to bathe; reprefent to your-
felf before-hand, what Accidents you may proba-
bly meet with. ‘That.in the Bath there is often
Rude Behaviour, Dafhing of Water, Juftling for
Paffage, Scurrilous Language, and Stealing: And
when you have done thus, you may with more Se-
curity go about the thing. To which purpofe you
will do well to fay thus to yourfelf; My Defign
is to bathe, but. fo it 15 too, to preferve my Mind
and Reafon undifturbed, while Ido fo. For after
fuch wife preparation as this, if any thing inter-
vene to ob{truét your Wafhing, this Reflexion will
' prefently rife upon it: Well, but this was not the
only thing I propofed; thatwhich I chiefly inten-
ded, was to keep, my Mind and Reafon undittur-
bed; and this lam fure can never be done, if I fuf-
| fer every Accident to difcompofe me.
COM-
COMMENT.
᾿ς abt giving Inftruétions concerning our Behaviour, with
regard to the things of the World, which ufe to en-
gage our Affections, either upon the account of the Delight
they give us, the Convenience they are of, or the Relation
they bear to us; the next Step in order, is to confider our
A@ions. For thefe too have a great many Circumitances,
out of our Power, and muft therefore be undertaken with
great Prudence, and much Preparation. _The Rule then that
he lays down is this; That you take a juft account of the
nature of each Aétion, and fairly compute the feveral Acci-
dents, which, though they do not neceffarily, yet may pofli-
bly attend it; and to expeét, that thefe are very like to hap-
pen in your own cafe particularly. Now the Fruit of this
will be, either not to be furprized, if fuch Difficulties do
encounter you; or, if the thing be not of abfolute ne-
ceffity, to decline the hazard, by letting it alone. For the
Great Cato reckons this for one of the Errors of his Life,
that he chofe to take a Voyage once by Sea, toaPlace, whi-
ther he might have travell’d by Land. In fuch acafe, though
no misfortune fhould a€tually happen, yet if there be a like-
Yihood of any fuch Accident, and if it do frequently happen
to others, it is an AG of Imprudence, to make choice of
fuch a Courfe, without being driven to it by neceffity: And
this Anfwer, that many People dothe fame, and come off
fafe, will not bear us out, in chufing a more dangerous
_Paffage, when it is left to our own Liberty to take a fafer.
But now, where there is abfolute occafion for our run-
ning fome Rifque; As if we have neceflary Affairs to dif-
patch, which require a Voyage to or from fome Ifland; Or
if we are obliged to ftand by a Father or a Friend, in fome
hazardous or unlucky Bufinefs; Or if we are called upon to
take up Arms in defence of our Country: Then there is no
thought of declining the Matter wholly, and our Method
muft be to undertake it upon due deliberation; and to lay
together the feveral accidental Obftruétions wont to arife in
fuch acafe: That fo by this timely Kkecolle€tion, we may
render them eafie and familiar, and not bedifturbed , when
any of them come upon us. A Man thus prepared, hath -
this double Advantage: If they do not happen, his Joy is the
greater,
>
with SimpLticius’s Comment. 57
rene a Re
greater, becaufe having fo fully poffeft himfelf with an ex-
pectation that they would, this is almolt a Deliverance to
him. And if they do, then he hath the advantage of being
provided againft them, and fo can encounter them, without
much danger or diforder.
Now againft this Counfel I expeét it will be urged, Firft,
That if every one fhou!d take fuch Pains, to reprefent all the
Croffes and Difappointments, which may probably happen
to them in every Undertaking, the Effe@ of this would be
Cowardice and Idlenefs: for Men would find themfelves
utterly difcouraged from attempting any thing all. Befides,
nothing can be more grievous to any Man, than to have the
Image of his. Troubles and Misfortunes conftantly before his
yes; and efpecially, if the Affair he be engaged in continue
anytime, to converfe all that while with this ghaftly Appari-
tion. Therefore, Demofhenes his Advice feems much more
Prudent and Eligible; Yo be fure, that what you attempt,
be Good and Virtuous; then to hope well, and, whatever
the Event be, to bear it generoufly and decently.
But by the Objector’s good leave, if by hoping well, De-
mofthezes mean a good Confidence, grounded upon our un-
dertaking things Virtuous and Commendable, and refting fa-
tisfied in this Confideration, whatever the Event be; he fays
the very fame thing with Ep:ctetus. Only indeed he give us
no Dire&tion, which way we fhall attain to this generous
Temper of Mind, which may enable us to entertain the Dif-
penfations of Providence decently, though they fhould hap-
pen to be harfh and fevere. But Epictetus declares himfelf of
Opinion, that the Method to qualifie ourfelves for fo doing,
is, to take a true Profpeé of the whole Affair, and reprefent
to ourfelyes, that it is fit for us to undertake, and that there
may be feveral Circumftances attending it, which though
they may not be agreeable to us, are yet very tolerable, and
Tach as we may reconcile ourfelves to, upon thefe Two Ac-
counts. ΕἸ, Becaufe the AGtion itfelf, which brings them
upon us, is Virtuous, and Becoming ; and then, becaufe
whenever they happen, they are no more than what were
expected, and provided againft before.
Bur, if by hoping weil, Demo/thenes intend a firm perfua-
fion of Safety and Succefs; then I think it is very difficult ,
nay, | may venture to fay, it is impoffible to conceive, how
a Man thus perfuaded, can ever bear Difappointments and
Croffes with Moderation and Temper. For when a Man
fails from what he wasin imagination, the thock is the fame,
as
458 Erreretus’s Morals
as if he were fo in reality. And neither the Body, nor the
Mind, are of a Conftitution to bear fudden and violent Al-
terations, without great Difturbance. You fee, the very
Weather, and Seafons of the Year, though they change gent-
ly and by degrees, yet put our Humours into a great ferment,
and generally occafion many Diftempers among us; and the
more Violent this Change at any time is, the Greater in Pro-
portion the Diforders that follow uponit, muft needs be.
Nor is it true, that a ju{t Computation of all’ the Diffiicul-
ties and Dangers wont to attend our Actions, muft needs
condemn Men to Slavith Fears, and an Unattive Life. For
if our Reafon convince us, that what we attempt, is good
for the advantage of the Soul, or (which is all one) of the
Man, (for that Soul is the Man, ) the Defire of that Good
mutt needs infpire us with Courage and Vigour, notwith-
ftanding all the difcouraging Dangers that attend ir. And
the confideration of this danger will be very much foften’d,,
by this moft Rational and Virtuous Perfuafion, that we ought
to perfevere in fuch an Undertaking, though at the expence
of fome Hazard and Inconvenience. For all Danger and
Detriment, of either Body or Fortunes, is not properly an E-
vil to us; nor fhall we think it Ours, if we be wife. But
the Benefit of chufing a Virtuous A€tion, and perfifting in
it, in defpight of all Dangers and Difcouragements, is our
own Good; for it is the Good of our Souls, which are
truly and properly ourfelves. And this Advantage is confi-
derable enough to be fet againft many Troubles, and Lofles,
and Banifhments, and Difgraces: Nay, it is fufficient, not
only to be fet againft, but to over-balance them all; becaufe
the Good of this does fo very much exceed the Evil that feems
to be inthem. For if a Man think himfelf obliged to chufe
a Greater Good, when attended only witha Lefs Evil;. how
is it poflible, that he fhould be difcouraged and uneafie, un-
der the expectation of fome crofs Accidents, which fome-
times follow upon Virtuous Actions, when the Good of
thefe AGtions is truly and properly his own, but the Evil of
thofe Accidents, is only fomething remote, and not His?
Efpecially too, when this is by no means a fuperficial and no-
tional Diftinétion, but fuch a real Difference, as his whole
Praétice and Behaviour fhews him fenfible of. This is the
very Reafon, why Men of Virtue and Wifdom have made it
their Glory, to chufe Good with the greateft Dangers ;
why they have done it cheerfully, and facrificed their very
Lives for it; and accounted their Sufferings upon fach an
Account,
>
LL
with SrMPLiciuss Comment. 59
τυ Raa i 5 il AE, 5 I
Account, matter of the greateft Joy tothem. So cic a Me-
moeceus particularly, and all thofe other Heroes , jam’d in
Story, who have votuntarily devoted themfelves, and died
for the Service and Sake of their Country.
Now Epictetus couches his Advice here, under one of the
Meaneft and moft Infignificant Inftances that can be; partly
to illuftrate what he fays, by an Example taken from com-
mon Converfation, and fo to gain the Affent of his Hearers,
to the truth of what he would infer from it; and partly too,
as himfelf had told us before, to put his Scholars. upon exer-
cifing their Virtue in Leffer Trials; that fo from Trivia] Mat-
ters, they may rife by degrees to others of greater Difficulty
and Confequence. And the Succefs of this Method hath
been already’ fhewn to depend upon Reafons, which need
not be repeated. But his Defign is alfo, that we fhould be
careful to apply thefe things to Affairs of Moment, in pro-
‘portion as the Hazards of them are more difcouraging ; ‘and
in thofe Occafions, always to take our Meafures from’ the
Nature of the thing, whether it be agreeable to Decency and
our Duty, and what thofe Hardfhips are that ufually ac-
company it. Then, after fuch Profpe& taken, to fettle our
Minds in this Refolution, that if the worft happen, we will
bear it with Temper and Moderation. For this is the way
to maintain the Character of Virtuous and Rational Men;
this muft let us into all the Advantages of doing well, and
defend us from all that Perplexity into which unexpeéted
Events commonly betray Men. For he that is troubled and
Difcompofed, and fanfies himfelf unhappy in what be-fuffers,
it is plain, either had not fufficiently confidered what he went
about, before he engaged in it; or if he did forefee all this,
then his Diforder is the Effet of Effeminacy and Cowar-
dice, which makes him give out, and repent his Undertak-
ing. But both thefe Failings are highly,Criminal, and con-
trary to the Rules of Nature, and Right Reafon.
* This Perfon was Son to Creon, King of Thebes, and. upon an Anfwer of
the Oracle, that a Plague which then infefted the City, could not be re.
moved, till the Race of Cadmus were all extin&: He, who was the only
remainder of that Family, flew himfelf. Of the fame nature was thar A@
of Certin:, and the Dei, fo much celebrated by the Zeman Pocs and Hifto-
rians, ᾿
hg i τ γῇ
60 Eprreretus’s Morals
‘
CHAP. Xx.
Af Wael which gives Men Difquiet, and makes |
their Lives Miferable, is not the Nature of
Things as they really are, but the Notions and O-
pinions, which they form to themfelves concern-
ingthem. Thus, even Death, which we look up- —
on as the moft perplexing and dreadful, hath in
truth, nothing of Terror init: For if it had, So-
crates muft needs have feared it, as much as we. —
But our Opinion that it is Evil, is the only thing
that makes it fo. Therefore, whenever we meet
with Obftructions and Perplexities, or fall into
Troubles and Diforders, let us be Jaft, and not lay
the blame where it is not due; but impute it allto
our own Selves, and our prejudicate Opinions.
COMMENT.
E were told before, what Means would be proper and
W Effeétual, for preferving an Even and Compofed Tem-
per of Mind, in the midft of all thofe Hardfhips which fre- —
quently attend our beft Actions: That this might be accom- —
plithed by the Power of Premeditation; by reprefenting thefe
inconveniences, are fure to happen; and when we had made ©
the worft of it, convincing ourfelves, that fuch A@tions —
were worth our Undertaking, even with all thofe Incum-
brances. Now that Rule proceeded upon the Work of our
own Minds; but here is another, fetch’d from the Nature
of the Things themfelves, and the Confideration of thofe —
Difficulties and Dangers which ufe to give us Difturbance.
And herehe changes his Method, and confirms what he fays,
not by fome flight and trivial Inftances, as hedidbefore, but —
by Death the greateft and moft confounding one to Human ©
Nature, that can be. For if the Argument hold good in
this cafe, it mutt needs be a great deal ftronger with regard
to all thereft; fince Thofe, by ourown Confeffion, are lefs
difmal and affrighting. .
8 To
=
~ ὡ ‘
with StmPpLicius’s Comment. 67
Good, nor thofe Calamities we call Evil, are what we take
them for; but, as Circumftances are fometimes ordered,
may prove the dire& contrary. For our Folly in this cafeis
jult like that of filly Boys, who cannot endure their Ma-
fters, but think them their worft Enemies, and the Caufe of
a World of Mifery; but value and love thofe as their Friends,
indeed, that invite them to Play and Pleafure.
Thus £p:éecus hath given a fhort but exact Character of
thefe three forts of Perfons. The Perfect Philofophers are
guilty of no Mifcarriages ; for Their Underitanding is fuf-
ficiently accomplifhed to direét them, and the irrational Part
readily tubmits to thofe Direftions. So that here is nothing
but Harmony and Compliance, and confequently, they have
no Body to lay any Mitery to the Charge of; for indeed, they
cannot labour under any Thing that is truly and properly
Mifery. They caufe none to themfelves; for this were a
Contradiétion to the PerfeGtion of their Wifdom and Vir-
tue: And nothing elfe caufes them any, for they do not fup-
pote any External Caufes capable of doing it.
_ The Ignorant and Untaught err in both thefe Refpeas.
Neither théir Reafon, nor their Paffions, are rightly difpofed.
They lay all their Unhappinefs to others, upon an Errone-
ous Imagination, that it proceeds from Things without us.
And indeed, it is eafie and pleafant, and fit for ignorant
.Wretches, to fhuffle off their own Faults from themfelves,
and throw. them upon other People.
The Young Proficient, who hath attained to the firft ©
Principles of Wifdom, though he be guilty of fome Mii-
carriages, and fall now and then into Evil, yet he under-
ftands wherein iti confilts, and from whence it is derived,
and what it was that firft gave Birth to it; and therefore he
lays itat the right Door. -Andthefe Marks are fo diftinguifh-
ing, that no Man, who makesa wile ufe of them, can be
_ in Danger of confounding thefe three Claffes of Men, the
_ Accomplith’d Philofopher, the Rude and Untaught, and the
_ Young Proficient. ,
This Metaphor is fo much the more warrantable and per-
_ tinent, @om the Refemblance, which Education bears to the
_ Management of ourfelves: For this is properly the Train-
tng up of a Child, under the Care and Corre¢:ion of a Ma-
fter. Our Senfual Part is the Child in us; and, like all o-
_ ther Children, doesnot know its own Good, and is violent-
a ly bent upon Pleafure and Paftime. The Mafter that has
_ the Care of it, is Reafon; This fathions our Defires, pre-
ie 19 {cribes
,
63" ‘Epicretus’s Morals
{cribes them their Bounds, reduces and reftrains them, and
dire&ts them to that, which is beit for them. So that the
Ignorant and Untaught live the Life of a Child left to him-
felf, rungiddily on, are perpetually in Fault, as being heady
and heedlefs, and minding nothing, but the gratifying their
own Inclinations; and fo thefe Men never think themfelves
to blame. The Young Proficients have their Mafter at hand,
Correéting and Inftruéting them; and the Child in them is
pretty towardly, and begins to fabmit to Rules. 80 that if
thefe Men are at any time in the wrong, they are prefently
fenfible who hath been too blame, and Vaccufe no Body but
the Offender himfelf, But the Perfe& and Accomplifh’d
Philofophers are fuch, whofe Mafter keeps a conftant Eye
upon them, and hath conquer’d the Child’s ftubborn and per-
verfe Spirit. © So that now he is corrected and improved,
and hath attained to the Perfection he was intended for; that
is, the being obfervant to the Mafter, and abfolutely at his
Direétion. For the proper Virtue of a Child is this Readi-
nefs to receive and to obey Inftructions.
ΓΤ
CHAP. XI.
“gues not yourfelf to be exalted wh any
xcellence not properly your own. If your
Horfe thould be tranfported with his Beauty, and,
boaft of it, this were tolerable in him : But when
you value yourfelf, and brag of his Beauty, confi-
der, That you are not proud of an excellence in
yourfelf, but in your Horfe.. You will fay then,
‘What is a Man’s own? I anfwer, A right Ufle of ©
his Ideas. And when you manage thefe as you
ought, then you may be allowed to pleafe yourfelf.
For this is being exalted with fome Excellere that’
15 properly yours, ὁ | ‘
COM:
‘
τον Ἐπ ο---------.- ar
with Srmpxicius’s Comment, 69
5 AN
COMMENT.
ΗΕ foregoing Chapters acquainted Us, what Method
δι muft be taken to deliver ourfelyes from,Grief,..and
Fear and Confufion, when any calamitous .Circumitances
from without threaten our Peace :. This dire&ts us, how to
referve an Even and Compofed Mind, when any External
dvantages would fhake our Moderation... Now thete Ad-
vantages he calls Noze of Ours, in Agreement with what he
faid at the Beginning of his Book, That the Things out of our
Power are Feeble, and Servile, and lable to Oppofition, and not
Ours, but Another's. And upon the being, contcious. to our-
felves of any fuch feeming Advantages, he forbids us to be
exalted. i Pi is tii i :
By this Exaltation, I underftand here, not any Infolence,
or Hanughtinefs, or Arrogance of Humour, as the Word jis
fometimes ufedin an ill Senfe; (for {tre we arenot allowed
to be exalted in fuch a manner as this, upon the account of
any Advantage whatfoever, though never. fo real a Good,
though never fo truly our own) but, ds I apprehend, this
Exaltation fignifies the being fatisfied with ourfelves; and
imagining, that we are Better or Happier upon the; account
of fome additional Good, which now we have, but had not
formerly. So thathefays, we mutt not think ourfelves ever
the better, for that Good which belongs not to us; nor ima-
gine, that another’s Excellence adds any thing to ours. τ For
. every Good belongs to his own proper Subje@,. in which
it fubfifts, and whofe Quality it is; and no other can pre-
tend to any right in it The Goodnefs, for inftance, ofia
Horfe, belongs to the Horfe himfelf, and not to Us}; For
_-if he be Bold, and Fleet, and Manageable, he hath indeed
the proper Excellencies of a Horfe.; but which way does this
make for our Commendation? How is this the Excellence
of a Man? Or what augmentation can the Virtue or the
Happinefs of his Owner receive from it?
Yes, you’ll fay, the Excellence of any Poffeffions, re-
dounds to the Poffeffor, and the Goodnefs of the Inftru-
ments, to the benefit of the Artificers that ufe them. Ace
cording to the common Opinion of the World, ’tisacknow-
ledged theydo. But pray, is the Excellency of an Ax, fup-
pofe, able to make him a good Carpenter, who was not
one before? In this cafe therefore we would diftinguifb, be-
14 tween
70 Epictetus’s Morals
tween the Excellencies peculiar to the Tool, and thofe ©
peculiar to the Work-man, with relation to the Trade he
profeffes. The proper Excellence of an Ax is to carry a
good Edge, and to be made neat and true; this renders it
fit for Service, and for the Work to be cut out by it: For
every Inftrument is commended by its Work. But this con-
-tributes nothing to the Perfeétion of the Carpenter; for his
Excellence, and proper Commendation, contifts in obferving
»Proportions, and Rules of Art; and he is judged by this,
and not by the Work done by him; becaufe that may hap-
pento fail, from fome Defeé, either in theStuffhe wrought
upon, or the Tools he wrought with, or Twenty other
accidental Obftrudtions.
Well, But what is properly our own Excellence, upon
the account of wh'ch we may be admittedto look upon our-
felves? as better and’happier than we were before? At thebe-
ginning of this Book, the firft thing he mentioned of this
kind, was 4 juft awd true Opinion ; but here he calls it a right
ἔγχε and Management of Ideas; [Ὁ that Opinion in that place,
and Ideas in this, fignifie one and the fame thing. For we
judge of things by the different Reprefentations of them to
our Minds, and thofe Judgments are fometimes true, and
fometimes falfe. Now the right Management of Ideas is
when what appears to Us, agrees exactly with the nature of
things themfelves ; and when we proceed upon thele Ap-
pearances fo, that the Judyments we torm upon them, Carry
nothing in them that is falte and inconfittent; as it would
-be if we fhould affirm, that Intemperance is Good, and
Temperance Evil.
But the mott proper Senfe of this Ufe of Ideas, as Nature
and Reafon dire&t, 1 look upén to be a Defire of thofe
things that are. Good, and an Averfion and Deteftation
of thof2 that are Evil. Woen we have not only a bare {pe-
culative Notion, what is Good and what is Evil ; but de-
fire and purfue that which we think to be Good, and decline
and abhor that which we think to be Evil. And this may
very well be called our own proper Excellence; becaufe the
Regulation of our Defires and Avertions, according to Rea-
-fon and Nature, is always in our own power ; though the
Exerting thefe, and making them effeual by outward Ads,
isnot always fo. i .
Ang yet it is highly probable, that. Ep:detus may intend
fomething farther ftill, by this right ufe of Ideas; which is, —
That our PraGice and Behaviour thould exprefs a ep
OR=
s
EIR
with SimMpLicius’s Comment. 75
Conformity, to thee Ἴ τας Opinions, and Regular Defires =
That we fhould not think it fufficient to deciare it our Senfe,
that Temperance is a Virtue, bur fhould be aétually Tempe-
ate, and make all our A@tions {peak the Conceptions of out
Mind, and the regularity of our Defires upon this occafion:
Nor to fatisfie ourfelves with the empty Commendations of
Juftice, no nor with a few faint and feeble Defires of. this
Virtue; (for this is what follows of courfe, and whatever
we apprehend as Defirable too at the fame time, ) and yet al-
low ourfelves in Aéts of Injuftice. ‘This isthe Cafe of Im-
‘ porent and Incontinent Perfons ; they defire Virtue, but that
’Defire is overborn by a ftronger, which inclines to Pleafure.
- Their Reafon difcerns what fhould be done, though not fo
clearly and powerfully as it might and ought, and fora while
᾿ ftands up in its Vindication; and the Virtuous Defires and
Avertions, which are:rightly difpofed, but weak and confu-
fed, {trike in, and take its part; but prefently the brutifh In-
clinations, like an Impetuous Torrent, bear down all before
them, diftra€tand. divert the Man from his cooler purpofes,
and drive him to what is moft agreeable to his prefent heat.
This is juft the Detcription I gave before of Medea, when
the Trayedian brings her in with thefe Words, which I have
fo oft had occafion to repeat.
_ Remorfe and Senfe of Guilt pull back my Soul,
But ftronger Paffion does ber Pow'rs controul ;\
With'Rage tran{ported, I pujh boldly on,
And fee the Precipice I cannot fhun.
So then, itis by no means fufficient, that a Man’s Judg-
~ ment is rightly informed, and thathis Defires be virtuoufly
inclined in many Inflances, unlefs he be all of a piece; un-.
lefs-he take care, thar the Commendablenefs of his Praétice
_ hold correfpondence with the Truth of his Opinions. “This
is the right and beft ufe of our Ideas, and this we may think
our own peculiar Excellence; but no External Advantage
| can ever be fo. For, asthe particnlar Commendation of a
Carpenter, confidered as a Carpenter, is his working accord-
/ ing to the Rules of Art and Proportion: fo the peculiar Ex-
| cellence of a Philofopher, depends upon the Ideas and Af-
_ feétions of the Mind being Juft and Good; and the exerting
this Excellence is the calling thefe out into A&t, and demon-
‘ftrating them to the World by a Virtuous Converfation.
CHAP.
7: Ἔντοτετυ 85 Morals _
~C HAP. XIL
ΓᾺ S when a Ship lies in Port, and you go out for
ΓᾺ Frefh water, you happen to meet with Shell-_
Fifth, or Sallads upon the Coaft; this is an acciden-
tal Advantage, and befide your main purpofe ; but
ΠῚ your Thoughts muft be fixed upon the Ship,
and it fhould be your great Care to attend the Ma-
fter’s Call; that fo, when he gives you the Signal,
you may quit all readily, andnot be bound, and
carried away by Violence, as Sheep muft be ferved:
So here in the Affairs of the World, if it be your
Fortune, inftead of Fifh or Sallad, to light upon δ΄
Beloved Wife or Child, which give an agrecable
relifh to Life, none of thefe Matters mutt be fuffer-
ed to detain you. But when the Matter gives you
the Signal, all muft-be left, and the beit of your
Way made to the Ship. Burif you are in Years,
be fure you never ftir far from the Ship, for fear you
be out of the way, when the Mafter calls.
COMME NT.
H E hath by a Short but Ingenious Difcourfe, endeayour-
ΠἋ ed to draw us off from the purfuit of thofe External
Advantages, upon which we are ufed to fet fo great a value,
by fhewing us, that all thefe things are neither in our Difpo-
fal, nor any fuch Happinefs as can be properly called Ours.
But now, Icft this Argument of his fhould be fo far miftaken,
or wrelted beyond its true purpofe, as to be thought τὸ debar
us of Marriage, and other innocent Enjoyments and Satis-
faGtions, and abfolutely to forbid us the having any thing at
all to do with the World and its Advantages ; he acquaints
Ὡς in the next place, what things thofe are, which he allows
the Enjoyment of, and with what Limitations we oaght to
enjoy them, wz. That we fhould leave ourfelves and [hem
at the Difpofal of God, and refign all this to his Providence,
without Referve; and then, in fuch an Humble Dependence ΄
: as
} tae
|e CE EE er er RE a NRE TY TET ee
with SimpLicius’s Comment. 43
‘as this is, to ufethem moderately, and to value them as they.
deferve: That our Concern is due in the greateft Meafure,
to the Neceflities of Life, and fuch as Humane Nature can-
. Mot ΡΠ without; which Epidfetzs here hath exprefled, by
a Ship’s Watering: meaning by this, Food, and Raiment,
and Dwelling, and fuch other things, as they, who look no
_ farther than juft needful Supplies, fatisfie themfelves withal.
Thefe things therefore are allowed to be a part of our Care, :
provided it be but in the Second place, and with fubordina-
tion to a Higher Good.
As for fuch things, as arenot abfolutely neceffary, but on-
ly the Conveniencies of Life, asa Wife, Children, Eftate,
and'the like, thefe he calls Accidental Advantages, and befide
our main purpofe ; and therefore they are allowed the Third
Place in our Efteem. When a Bountiful Providence beftows
thefe upon us, we are-to receive and ufe them feafonably;
but be fure to keep our Mind ever fixed upon our Chief and
molt Defirable Good. Batasfor Pleafures, and Riches, and
Honours, and Preferments, and fich other Impertinencies,
he will not fo much as admit thefe into the number of his
Accidental Advantages, but fappofes them Inconfiftent with
a ftriétly Rational and Virtuous Converfation. For thefe
are what, he told us before, mult be wholly laid afide: But
the Enjoyments of Marriage, and fuch other Conveniencies
-of Human Nature, he advifed to have fufpended for a time
only, while Men were Young and Unexperienced in the
Study of Virtue, that fo their firft Beginnings might. meer
_ with no-Interruption, but take good Root, and faften upon
_ the Mind. And for this Reafon, when Men have made
᾿ fome progrefs, and are arrived to fuch a degree of Perfedti.
on, as may qualifie them to ufe thefe with fafety; then he
i
ψ
allows them to enjoy them, provided {till it be in the quality
of an Additional Advantage, and not a Principal Defign..
_ Now the Allufion he hath made ufe of for this purpofe,
_ feems to be exceeding proper and pertinent; for the old Mo-
_ ralifts in their Fables, have commonly chofen the Sea, to
_ reprefent this Mortal State. The Roughnefs of its, Waves,
its frequent Ebbs and Floods, the Tempeltzous Weather to
which it lies expofed, and the fuffocating all that. fink into
_ it, do abundantly juftifie the Metaphor. By the Ship may. be
Meant, that which unites the Soul to the Body, and brings
_ her into this Mortal State, whether it be Fate, or Fortune,
_ or whatever elfe you will pleafe to call it. Ihe Mafter of
: ‘this, Ship is God, who governs pis difpofes all things, and
Ἢ commands
74 Epiererus’s Morals
‘commands the Souls into their refpetive Bodies, according
as his own Infinite Wifdom and tender Care fees fit, and in
‘proportion to their own Deferts. The bringing this Ship in-
to Port is the affigning to thef{e Souls their proper Station,
and Country, and Family; by virtue whereof, fome are
born in one Climate and Nation, and fome in another :
Some are defcended from Great and Noble Families, ‘and
Others meanly born; Some of Virtuous or Healthful Parents,
‘and others of Vicious and Difeafed ones. The going out
‘for {τε Water, is the Care we take for fupplying the Ne-
ceffities of Nature, without which it is impoflible that Life
fhould be fupported: And indeed, what is there in this {tate —
of Mortality of fuch general αἴ δ what that we can fo lit-.
tle want, both for the making of our Meat and Drink, as
‘Water? What is intended by gathering Sallads, or Shell-
Fifh by the by, himfelf hath very elegantly informed us, by
inftancing in a Wife, and an Eftate; and acquainting us
withal, that when Providence is pleafed to beltow them
upon us, we are not to refule them; but foneither are we to
receive Or value them, as either the principal and moft de- ᾿
firable Goods, or indeed fuch as are properly ours. For the
Firft and Chief Good is that Difpofition of Mind, which is
ever obedientto the Matter of the Ship, ever attentive to his
Call. ~ Nor muft we lay ourfelves our upon thefe Matters,
as we were allowed to do upon Water, or neceffary things ;
but look upon them as addititional Comforts only, and
fach as help to make Life eafie and convenient. Now
if’ this Mafter call us to the Ship, and give order for our ©
returning back to Himfelf, and to that which is our true,
our Native Country: Make the beft of your way, (fays
the) to the Ship; leave every thing that relates to this Mor- |
tal Life, be ready to obey his firft Orders, and do not
Joiter, or hanker upon any thing behind, for tear, when Na-
(γε σαῖς the Cable, your Inclinations (till be left on Shore.
Go you muft, that’s moft certain; and therefore it is that he ~
tells you, if you do not follow readily and chearfully, and
quit all of your own accord, you fiall be tied Neck and
Heels, like Sheep, and thrown under the Hatches; that is,
you fhall be forced, and torn away, and thruft out of the
World, like thofe Foolith and Sheepifh Wretches, who dye —
with Cowardice, and Relu&tancy, and Unmanly Lamenta-
tions of themfelves and their Friends.
But there is yet another Caution obfervable here, whichis, —
That the Perfon, to whom the Enjoyment of Marriage, he |
Ὰ uc
with Simpriicius’s Comment. 75 _
a ΄Πὖῦὖ-ς΄΄ἷἴ ..--ς.ς.
fuch others as are the additional Advantages of Life, are al-
lowed, mutt be fure to indulge himfelf in fuch Enjoyment
of them only, as is feafonable; that fo, when he hath taken
as much of thefe as is fit for him, he may remove without
any delay, and readily comply with the Mafter’s Firft Call.
- But if a Man be Old, and draws near his End; he will do
beft to keep himfelf wholly difengaged, and entertain him-
felf with nothing fo much, as the conftant thought and Ex-
pectation of the Ship’s Sailing, and his quitting the Shore;
tor fear, when the time of his Return comes, and the Mafter
calls, he be retarded by his Burden, and faftned down to
Land; and be forced, with a great deal of unbecoming Con-
cern, to leavea Young Wife, and Pretty Children behind.
And furely an Old Man, upon all Accounts, hath much
_ greater reafon to prepare for leaving the World, than to en-
tertain himfelf with vain Projets of fettling in it.
I TI i ob
CPAP yo XAT
Rouble not yourfelf with wifhing, that things
A may be 101} 35. you would have them; but be
well pleafed they fhould be, juft as they are,and the
you will live eatfic.
COMMENT.
HE aft Chapter inftruéted us, what External Advan-
tages thofe are, which we are allowed to partake of,
and how we muit govern ourfelves with regard to them;
that thofe, which are neceflary for the Support of Humane
Nature, muft be ufed and valued accordingly; thofe, which
are convenient as Additional Comforts, and only things by
the bye; but that neither the One, nor the Other, muft be »
᾿ς made our Chief Aim. Now, after the Enjoyment of thefe ,
things allowed under fuch Limitations, he proceecs here to
direct us, by what means we may ufe and enjoy them, with-
out any Prejudice or Paflion, fo asto avoid Difquiet, and live
always free and eafie. The great Obftrudtion to this is a per-
petual Fretfulnefs of Temper, and repining at whatever hap-
pens
76 Epicrerus’s Morals
pens to us. And this can never be cured, but by one of
thefe Two ways: Either, that Providence fhould order all
things agreeable to our Humour; Or that we fhould bring
our own Humour to be fatisfied with whatever Providence
thinks fit to order. The Former of thefe, that Providence
fhould appoint every thing juft as we fhould have it, is nei-
ther poffible for us to bring about, nor would it at all times
be for our Advantage, if we could; for it often happens,
' that we are moft eager and fond of thofe things, which are
prejudicial to us. This comes to pafs, either upon the ac-
count of our Ignorance, becaufe we do not fee the Nature’
and Confequences of them; Or the predominancy of our
Paffions, which puts a Byafs upon the Judgment, and in-
clines Reafon to comply with the Senfual and Brutih part.
So that in effe&t, there is but One way left to be eafie; and
that is, to be of fo equal, fo refigned a Difpofition, as to fit
down well content with whatever Providence fees good to
appoint.
Now this may poffibly be cenfured by Some, as an ex-
ceeding hard, and indeed an Impraéticaple Precept; and that -
no Man can be in good earneit, when he pretends to per-
fuade People, that they ought to be well pleafed, things fhould
be as they are: For what Man of Common Senfe can be fo,
when he obferves the publick and gene?al Calamities of Man-
kind? Is it poflible, that fuch dire effects of Providence, as
Earthquakes, and Inundations, and Fires, and Famines, and
Peftilences, and Murrains of Cattel, and Blattings of Fruit;
or that the Wicked and Barbarous Infolencies Men are guil-
ty of to one another, the Ravaging whole Countries, Burn-
ing and Sacking of Cities, the Imprifonments and Slaveries,
the Murders and Robbéries, the Rapine, and Violence, and °
unbounded Luft, that have driven them paft all Senfe of
God and Religion, and utterly deftroyed Morality, and Vir-
tue, and Friendfhip, and Mutual Faith, and have fo utterly Ὁ
ruined feveral Arts and Sciences, which it hath coft many”
Ages to contrive and bring to maturity, that we have nothing ἢ
left of fome, but the empty Names; and of others, .which '
ought to be look’d upon as the efpecial Gifts, and immediate *
Difcoveries of Heaven, for the benefit and fupport of Man- '
kind, (fuch as Phyfick, and Archite€ture, and the like, ) we»
have no more than fome faint Shadows, and imperfect Ima-»
ges remaining; How, I fay, is it poffible, that thefe, and»
many other Calamities, and monftrous Wickedneifes, which»
the prefent Age is perfectly over-run with, fhould be pe
ο
c/o hl ht i ἫΝ in Oa ;
“ with SIMPLicius’s Comment. 79
Of Pleafure or Contentment-? And who is there, that can
take SatisfaGion, fhall Ifay, in feeing, or bearing a part in.
them? nay, who can fo much as endure the very hearing
them named, except he be firft forfaken of all Humanicy,
and all Goodnefs ὃ
Such. Doubts as thefe, which give fometimes great Per-
plexity, not only to the Weak and Common Man, but to
the Thinking and more Accomplifhed Perfons » Will receive.
fatisfaction; if either Epicterzs be allowed to have any Au-
thority in what he fays, or the great Governor of 41}.
_ things be granted to order the World in Wifdom and Juftice,
For our Piety, and our Advantage, will be fure to termi-
hate in the fame Obje&t; as Epictetus himfelf will affure us
more fully hereafter.
In anfwer therefore to the ObjeGion, I fay, That if all
thefe deplorable Accidents, which the Objeétor hath given
fo Tragical an Account of, be really Evil, and fach as they.
“are generally efteemed to be, itis not poflible, that any Good.
Man thould, without forfeiting that Charaéter, be pleafed to.
have them fo; nor could the Providence of Almighty God
be acquitted from the Imputation of being the caufe of Eyil
tous; nor could Men ever prevail with themfelves, to ho-
nour, or love, or pay Adoration to fuch a Deity. For Jet
Men pretend what they will, no Arguments in the World.
are able to produce thefe Affedtions, for the Author of Mi-
fery and Mifchief. It is a Principle rooted in every Creature,
as Epictetus will thew you, to hate, and decline, and run
_ away from all things that are prejudicial to it themfelves, or.
_the caufe of other things being fo to it. But Whatever is for.
its Benefit, and produ@tive of its Happinefs, thefe things it
Naturally courts and admires. . ὦ
᾿ς Thus much is certain, upon fuppofition that thefe Acci-
dents are really Evil. But how, if, notwithftanding our.
_ dreadful Apprehenfions of them, they be in'truth no fuch:
Matter, but rather Good; as conducing very much to fome:
mighty Benefit, and dire&ted to excellent Purpofes; and that,
if'any Evil do indeed attend thefe Difpetifations, this is what
f the Nature of the things is no way concern’d in, but fuch as
pis wholly owing to the Defires and ftrong Impulfes of our
own Minds: In this cafe, it will by no means follow, that
he, who is well cnough pleafed all things fhould be juft ‘as
they are, is either a Vicious or a Barbarovs Man; nor can
_ We, with any colour, charge the Evil we find in the World
upon ἐμεῖς Occafions, to Almighty God; but mutt acquic
sh LS Ἢ tg his
ei e”|[UT | ee
asc - a Bir : - ῥῬυςβ
78 Epictretus’s Morals |
ΝΣ hl and acknowledge it to be infinitely Wife and
ood. eae .
Now the Things, in which all thefe feeming Evils are,
and from whence they fpring, muft be confidered in this
Condition of Mortality, as undergoing the vicifficudes of Ge-
neration and Corruption, either as Bodies or Souls. And
of thefe Souls again, fome are irrational, of the fame Date
and Daration with the Body; and. having none, or but very
little peculiar Excellence of their own, their Office and Pow-
er extends no farther, than merely the animating thofe Bo-
dies to which they belong; and therefore all their Moti- —
ons depends upon, and proceed in Conjun@ion with, their
refpective Bodies. But other Souls are Rational: Thefe
have. an inward principle of Motion, and an Effence and
Excellence diftiné& from their Bodies; they move by their
own Choice, and are abfolute in the difpofing their own De-
fires and Inclinatigns. Now the Bodies belonging to thefe,
being in their own Nature purely Mechanical, and deriving
their Effence from External Caufes, are Γαδ] εξ to the Mo-
tions of Heavenly Bodies, which influence their Generation
and Corruption, and the various Alterations through: which
they pafs.
But if we come nearer, anddefcend to the immediate and
Material Caufes ; then they are moved and affeéted by a.
mutual Operation upon one another. For this is agreeable
10 all the Reafon in the World, that Temporary and Cor-
ruptible things, fhould depend upon the Eternal for their Sub-
filtence, and be obedient to their Influences: Mechanical Be- Ὁ
ings, upon fuch, as are endued with a Faculty of Self-Mo-
tion; and thofe that are contained within others, upon the
Ambients that contain them. This is the conftant Method
and Rule of Nature, that thefe fhould follow the other Su-
perior to them, as having no Principle of Motion in them-.
felves, no Faculty of Chufing, no Power of Determining
the Defires or A ffections of their Nature ; no Merit or De-
merit from Choice-or Actions, but are only Good or Evil,
in refpect and proportion to their Caufes. Juft as the Sha-
dows of Bodies do not chufe their Sides or Shapes as they
pleafe; but are neceflarily determined by their Caufes and
their Circumftances, and are never the better, or the worfe,
for thofe Determinations. f
Now as to Bodies; Whatever Changes thefe undergo, this.
Variety can be no ΠῚ to them, whether they be Compound |
or Simple Bodies. ΕἸΠῈ of all, becaufe it is what the Condi-
tion |
=
with Simpxicrus’s Comment. 79
tion of their Nature hath made them liable to. | They are
bound in Laws irrevocable, which they may neither con-
troul nor refilt ; and confequently can receive no Harm, by
"whatever they impofe, as having no Power to do otherwife.
For Ignorance would be no Evil, nor the moft brutifh and
extravagant Conver(ation, nor would the Rational Soul be
one whit the worfe for either; had not Nature endued her
with a Faculty of Ditcerning and Underftanding the Truth,
and given her a Power over the brutifh Appetites, by which
fhe is enabled to fubdue and over-rule them. |
_ Secondly, Becaufe the Compound Bodies, which confitt
of fimple Ingredients, of contrary Qualities, fuch as are per-
petually ftruggling with, and ufurping upon one another,
by Difeafes, and Excefs.of Humours, are fometiines ftrength-
ned by throwing off the corrupt Parts; and fomietimes by
Decay and Death, are delivered from all that Trouble and .
Pain, and mutual Strife of contrary Qualities inthem And
in this Cafe, each of the Simples is reftored to its primitive
-Mafs, and recovers itfelf from that Weaknefs; which was
—occafioned by this Oppofition of contrary Humours. ᾿ For,
as each of the Ingredients in.Compofition made fome Im-
: preffion upon its Oppofite, fo it likewife continually. receiv-:
. ed fome from it, and fuffered by it.. But now, when the
| Simples are changed, according to the Changes of the con-
trary Qualities, they return again to their Own primitive’
Being. Thus Water evaporates into the Air from whence it
came, and Air isturned into Fire, from whencevit originally
was. And I cannot fuppofe any Evilin Things of this Kind,
though Inundations, or Fire, of any the moft violent Chan-
ges in Nature, fhould be the Effe& of thefe Inequalities, in
the Elements which compote the Univerfe; or though Pefti-
lences and Earthquakes fhould deftroy and dafh in pieces the -
Bodies compounded of thofe Elements. | Yay
_, But. farther, If thefe Things contribute to fome good Ef=
| fe@ ; if by the infinite Revolutions of Matter and Motion,
the Corruption of one Thing produces the Generation of a-
nother ; how then.can the Corruption of any fingle part be
Be when at the fame time it condices to the Benefit of
+) or
80 Epictretus’s Morals
See EEE Ee
or Lungs, or Brain, and all the parts that are principally —
concern’d in thefunétions of Life, into the Hands, the Feet,
the Skin, or any of the Extreme Parts ; the raifes Blifters,
and caufes Putrefaétions, to remove the Humour, and is
content to corrupt fome parts, for the prefervation of the
whole. This is fometimes, I fay, the work of Nature; and
when it is not fo, we endeavour to fupply it by Art. For
when Phyficians and Chirurgeons draw Sores, and cup, and
{carify, and fear, and cut off Limbs, to fave our Lives ;
they only imitate Nature, and do that by Medicines, which
fhe was not able to do without them. And no Wife Man
blames thefe Methods, nor thinks thofe Pains Evil, which ©
he fuffers upon fuch good Accounts. .
From hence it appears, that if Bodies fubfifted by them- ὁ
felves alone, and whatever they endured had no relation at
all to the Souls of: Men, none of the different Changes they
undergo, would be efteemed Evil: So that, if there be any
real Caufe for this Complaint, it muft be upon the account ~~
of the Souls in thofe Bodies.
Now Some’ of thefe are Irrational, perfe&ily of a piece
with the Bodies, and no more than the animating part of
them. Their Effence , their Power and their Operations fub- —
fiftin, and depend entirely upon, and are in infeparable Con- —
jundtion with, the Body. But Others are Rational, of ἃ
Nature fuperiour to the Body, and diftin& from it, ating
upon a free Principle of Motion and Choice, a Principle of
their own, by which they difpofe their own Inclinations and
Defires , as they fee fit themfelves, (All which hath-been ©
abundantly proved already.) A
Now the Irrational Souls have not the leaft Sign or Foot-
ftep of Free-Agency, no manner of Tendency or Appetite —
from within, but are only the principle of Life and Activi- —
ty tothe Body. Confequently their Being was ordained by ©
the fame Fate, and is fubje@ to the fame Cafualties with the
Body: They have no Dignity, no Merit or Demerit of their
own; but are more or lefs valuable, according to the Dig-
nity of their refpective Bodies; and are as irrefiftibly difpo= —
fed to their Motions, as Shadows are to their Subftances.
It is true indeed, ‘Fhis is more peculiarly the Condition ©
of Plants, which have only a Vegetative Soul, and want |
the Senfitive one, and are not exercifed with thofe Motions, —
which accompany the Defires, and vehement Impulfes of |
the Soul. But Beafts are in a higher Form, and are endued —
with This alfo.. And therefore the Souls of Brutes, being
47
confidered ina middle State, in a Capacity fuperiour to Vege~
tables, —
aaa sah :
- with Stmpxicius’s Comment. δὲ
tables and yet inferiour to fuch as Nature hath made free Agents,
᾿ muft in all Reafon have fomeRefemblance, fome Foot-tteps
at leaft, of Appetites and AffeGtions arifing trom within ;
_and fuch as fhall be moved, fometimes in Agreement to the
Nature of its particular Species, and fometimes contrary to
it. As whena Lion hath that Courage and Fury agreeable
to its kind; and this is fometimes more, and i‘ometimes
lefs, than it oughtto be: And in this refpe&t; the Dignities
and Degrees of fuchSoulsare different; and their Lives are
fo too, according to the Difpofition which Fate and Na-
ture have given them ; whichis fuch, that they are ftill moved
Mechanically, and by external Impreffions. For it is necef-
fary; that whatever is placed between two Extremes, fhould
in fome meafure partake of each of thofe Extremes. __,
Βαϊ now the Rational Soul; which is a Free Agent; and
hath an abfolute Dominion over her own Defires and Pro-
_ penfions, derives its Dignity from Choice ; She ufes the Bo-
dy indeed; but hath all its Appetites and Paffions at her De-
votion. This Soul therefore, when fhe makes ufe of the
Body; only as an Inftrument of Adtion, and maintains her
own Superiority over it, is obftrudted in all thofe Operati-
~ ons, in which the Body bears a part, by the Sutferings and
Difeafes of the Body, but it is not itfelf at all atfeGked with
thofe Pains. From whence it was, that the great Socrates
ufed to fay, the Anguifh was in the Leg, bur not in the
Mind. But if the Soul contraét too intimate a Familiarity
_ with the Body, andgrow fond of it, as if it were no longer
its Inftrument, but a part of itfelf or rather its very felf;
then it communicates in all its Afflictions, degenerates into
Brute, and eftcems all the Extravagancies of Anger and De-
ἥτε its own; is enflaved to them, defcends to little Trick-
ings, and is eternally contriving, how to compa(s external
Objeéts; and, being thus corrupted and difeafed; in tach
manner as a Soul is capable of being difeafed, ic ftands in
need of Phyfick and ftrong Remedies, to cure thefe Diltem-
_ pers. For it is a Rulein Application, that one Contrary is
_ cured by another. Thus, when the Defire is depraved by
pate and Pleafure, and hath conformed it/elf to the
Body too much, by the Love of Senfual Enjoyments ;
and Riches, and Honours, and Preferments, and Pofts of
eri; and the like; there is a neceffity of meeting with
-Croffes and Difappointments, that fo the iubfequent Pain in
the very fame Inftances, may correét and chattite ihe Excefs
Of Pleaftire we formerly took inthem. And this isno where
i K 2 more |
8 ἘἙἘριοστετυϑ,5. Morals
more requifite, than in Pains and Pleafures of the Body. For.
this is neareft to the Soul, and its Torments are received
with a quicker and more tender Senfe than any other. When
therefore the Soul hath revolted from her Supreme Gom-
mander, and forfakes her own Reafon, abandoning herfelf
to the Body and the World, and thinking Their Enjoyments
and Their Happinefs her own, and by this means grows vi-
tiated and diftempered; there feems no other way left, of
putting her out of Conceit with thefe Things, and poifin
the Byafs that carried her to them, (that fo the may defpife ἡ
them, and condemn herfelf, and return to God and right
Reafon, again, and expeét all her Happinefs from an Obe-
dience to thefe) but by making her fenfible, both of the E-
vil of her former Courfes, and of the Smart that follows
them. This only can take off the Propenfity of that Plea-
fure, which fhe hath felt in and by them: For, fo long as
fhe continues to find this, the continues fond of, and faften’d
down to thefe Enjoyments. And no Nail takes fafter hold,
or fixes Things clofer, than Pleafure and the Allurements it
brings, do the Soul, to the Objeéts that occafion it. And
this is the Reafon, why our skilful and tender Phyfician
mingles Bitter with our Sweets, and makes what we are fond-
eft of, to become naufeous and painful to us; he deals with
usas Nurfes do with fucking Children, and puts Wormwood
and Muftard upon the Breaft, to wean our Affetions, and
make us loath Things which are no longer convenient for us.
In fuch Cafes then, the firft Choices of our Minds are de-
termined to the lefs of two Evils; ie ort Death before |
Bodily Pain and AffiiGlions, and had rather be guite out of
the Body, than miferable init ; a With, which no Man would
ever make if he were always eafie and profperous. And —
thus, by Degrees, we are wrought up to an Hatred and A-
verfion of prefent Pleafure, by a Profpe& and Dread of ἃ
much greater, and more complicated Mifery that attends it:
_ As Children are brought off from what is hurtful to them
at firft by a Principle of Fear: Or a Man, who loves any
Meat or Drink prejudicial to his Health, and hath found by
Experience, that it gives him Gripings, or is offenfive to his —
Stomach, is content afterwards to forbear the pratifying his
Palate, provided that Abftinence will but fecure his Eafe, ©
and prevent the much more lafting Pains, which that fhort
Pleafure ufes to bring after it. . This is the Cafe of moft of
us: For alas! How very few are content to forego even
thofe Pleafures, which they are fatisfied owgtit hot to be in-
~ dulged-
᾿ --“.-
__ with ΘΥΜΡΊΙΟΤτυ 55 Comment. 83
from them? ὁ
~ Now the Truth is, This abftaining from Pleafure for fear
of fome greater Pain, is not fo properly the fubduing or de-
ftroying our Paffion, as the exchanging of one Paffion for
dulged, fo long as they find no Trouble or Inconyenience
another. For we are willing to make a faving Bargain, and
barter the Pleafure of Enjoyment away for the Pleafureof
Eafevand Security : And thus one Paffion rifes up in fuccef-
fion to another. But yet thisis a very good Method to begin
with, while we retain our filly Childith Difpofitions; that we
may grow jealous and fearful of thofe Things, to which our
Inclinations lead us moft; and when this Diftafte is once gi-
ven, then, by confidering their Nature, and obferving, that,
befides their being Vicious, the very Uneafinefs and Trou-
bles that attend them, are more exquifite, and more various,
than the Pleafures they afford; and fo returning to Reafon,
and finding, that our Happinefs is really within our own
᾿ς felves, and expected in vain from the Delights of the Body,
Hel
¥
ΕΠ
¢
or the Advantages of the World; and thus, by Degrees
growing confcious of fome Refemblance between Us and
od, and reverencing his Image in our Souls; we chufe a
wife and good Life; now no jonger out of Fear, but from
the more generous Principles of a virtuous and well-inftru&-
ed Mind. Foreven Children, whenthey grow wifer, come
at laft to decline, and to do, thofe Things out of Judgment
_ and Inclination, which at firft nothing but Fear, and the
Rod, could have driven them to.
~ And this is the Defign of our good God, and his tender
Careover us; That the Soul fhould neither cling too faft to
the Body and its Pleafures, and the Enjoyments of the
᾿ World; nor yet abftain from them, when driven only bya
Principle of Fear ; but from its own free generous Choice,
as confidering, that all our Good, and all our Evil, confifts
οἴη our own Choice, and our own Averfions. So that al}
the healing Methods of his Providence are dire&ted to no o-
_ ther purpofe than this; to reftore the Soul to Reafon and
Prudence, and to the Preferring a Virtuous Life. Juft as
the moft eminent Phyficians,. when they proceed to fuch
{marting Severities, as Cutting and Burning, and the like,
do it only with a Defign, to reduce the Body to its natural
- and healthful Temper, and to enable the Parts which were
“before obftructed, to perform their proper Functions again.
~ Now Punithment is the beft Cure fog Wickednefs ; and this
isthe peculiar Ufe and Benefit of thofe Calamities, which
K 3 we
By cena Ε ΤῊΣ τ = ve Morals
ery
we account Evils. And, as we are-commonly very angry —
at our Phy(icians, when they torture and put us to Pain; fo —
do Men likewife generally take it ill, τὸ have thefe fharper —
Remedies of Providence applied tothem. But they are οὔτ
ly the Childith and Etfeminate, the Foolifh and unthinking —
Part of the World, that dofo. For whoever will give him-
felf the Trouble, of making a diligent Obfervation of him-
{elf and others, upon Occafion of the feveral Accidents that
_ befall him; and takes Notice of the Difpofitions of his Soul ;
by what Springs they are moved, and how they are corrected
and changed, he, I make no queftion, will readily acknow-
edge, That Afflidtions are generally the firft Occafion of
Mens conquering their Inclinations, and coming up¢O a due
Contempt of the Body and the World, or (as our great Aur
thor expreffes himfelf) of all thofe things that are out of our
own Power... 65} 6
‘ But, asthe Phyfick applied to our Bodies is of Two forts,
the One Reftorative, the Other Perfervative; The One, to
pare off our Difeafes, and corre@ the Noxious humours
by Drugs of contrary Qualities ; the Other to continue and
confirm Health, by convenient Diet, due Regimen, and mo-
derate Exercife: And as fome Exercifes require great La>
bour and Adtivity, and are fit only for hardy and robult Bo-
dies: So this excellent Phyfician of our Souls does not only
adminifter to the Sick and Difeafed, and recover them’ by
Sufferings and Misfortunes; but he exercifes the Sound and
Healthful, and by fo doing, adds to their Strength.and Vi- —
gour, and renders their Virtue more confpicious ; a Pattern
to others, and a Provocationto be good, And this ig but ne-
ceflary ; for, the Souls of Men, even the Good and Vir-
tuous, ftand in need of Exercife to confirm them, no lefs
than healthful Bodies do. And Aippocrates’s Maxim will hold
good upon this occafion too, That Motion gives Strength,
but Sloth and Inaétivity waftes it. The Reafon is plain; for,
thofe Things which are fo ordered, that they are continually
as perfect as Nature intended them, and are continually em-
ployed in fuch Operations, as Nature appointed for them,
perform thefe Operations with great Readinefs and Dexterity.
But thofe that are not thus continually, muft imitate and —
fupply the Want of that perpetual Motion by their own’
Praétice ; that fo they may not forget by Difufe, and find
themfelves at a Lofs, when any urgent Occafion calls for
the exerting their Powers: For whatever is amelie
/
UN
_with Stmpxiicius’s Comment, 85
το entiation σον»
' Fa ee r Z Ty ΦΕΊ ξ "τὰ TREE
and at other Times our of Motion, coniefles its own Weak-
πεῖς, of which this Vicifficude is the Effeét; and that Weak-
“nefs muft be worn off, and Strength acquired by Action,
Now all Exercife confifts in the fame A@s trequently repeat-
᾿ ed; the very fame, I fay, with that principal Aét, : for the
_ fake of which we ufe this Exercife. Thus in the Olympick
_ Sports, the Exercife ufed τὸ φεγίεξε chemin Wreftling, is
| Wrefiling very often; aod that in order to the Ceftus and
Cuffing, is the inuring them{elves to Blows. Thus Men
learn the Art of War by imitating Aétion, and engaging
one Party with another, when they train together: And the
| more lufty and ftrong the Perfons are, who perform (πεῖς
Exercifes, the more effectually does this practice attain its
end, So that if any Man would get a Maftery over Plea-
_ fare, it is neceffary, whenever any entertaining Objeéts offer
| themfelves, to learn and practife the Contempt of them ;
_ and they that would conquer Pain, muft ufe themfelves to
endure it; and to mafter our Fears, we mult make danger
familiar to us; and to flight Torments, we mutt imitate
_ the Patience of the Noble Lacedemonian Youths, who plaid
_ Prizes of Scourging, and exercifed themfelves in every Thing
that was painful, to qualifie them for it: Ordo, as Sa/af in
our Times did, that laid a red-hot Coal upon his Thigh, and
_ blow’d the Fire, to try how long he was able to undergo
| the Smart.” For thefe. Tryals, and the principal Actions
they are intended to perfeét us in, do not differ in Nature
and Kind, but in Degree and Duration only, as thefe are
€afier and lighter, and may be defifted from at Pleature,
Since therefore Almighty God, when he difpofed of Mens
-Soulsin Mortal Bodies, and affizned them to the Condition in
_ which welive at prefent, endued them with Faculties capable
| of managing every Accident, (fo as to receive no Injury, either.
_ fromthe enticing Pleafures, or fromthe Terrorsand Difafters
of the World) and of fetting the Mind above them all;
the fame infinite Wifdom keeps thofe Faculties in Exercife,
_ that they thould not grow fluggifh, and confequently. feeble,
_ and flack for want of A&ion; and puts the Soul upon many
_ fharp Confli&ts, that, when there is Occafion for exerting her
Powers, fhe may not be found Unexpert and Defeftive. This
__ is it which hath made fo many Illuftrious Heroes; This made
_ Hercules, and Thefeus, and Diogewes, and Socrates, to become
Petfons of fuch eminent Virtue and Renown. Their Cha-
_ raGers would have been little, and their Excellencies loft; nor
would Mankind ever have known, to what wondertul Per-
Py a ἢ 4. fection
\
το νυ τοῦς, λον ἢ
ὃό- -- — Epicterus’s Morals
fection an exalted Virtue can carry them, if there had been ©
no {uch Things as Wild Beafts and Monftets, Tyrants and
wicked Oppreflors, Mortification, and* fevere Abftinence, —
to perpetuate the Memory of thefe Worthies, and eae |
the ‘Proofs of their Courage and Refolution, and recom-
mend their Examples to Pofterity. ἡ
“Now,-l think, no Man that confiders the Matter well, will
doubt! wiierher ‘A fi@ions do’ not better thofe thar’ have fup-
poried’ them as they ought, and add infinitely to their For-
tiiude ‘and Patierice. For fince we fee by the Inftances of
Giadiators and the like, tha: Ufe reconciles Men to the moft
formidable Dangers , ‘and makes them 8 perfe& Sport and
Divertion, infomuch that they enter the Lift cheerfully, and
‘lay their Prizes for a very {mall Confideration ; how can
we imagine, that Exercife fhould fail in Matters of lefs Dif-
ficulty, and enable Men to difdain thofe Calamities, which
none efteem infupportable, but they only, who have not —
hardened themfelves by Praétice? From all which we ma
Conclude, that, when we confider AffiGions, either in the
Quality of Remedies to cure our Diftempers, or as Tryals
and Exercifes to confirm our Health and Strength, they
cannot be Evil with re{pe& to the Soul, which receives
fach mighty Benefit both thefe ways, how harfh and unpa-
latable foever the Application may feem For at this rate,
We muft run into another intolerable Abfurdity, and con-
demn all thofe Medicines and Exercifes as Evil, in refpe —
of the Body; to which, though they be grievous for the —
prefent, all our Recovery and all the Continuance of our,
Health is owing.
Again, whatever is done in fuch Proportion and Manner,
as Nature and Choice both require, cannot be Evil; for a
due regard to this is Juft; and whatever is Jutt, is "Good: ὶ
Nay, even Cutting and Burning are not Evil to our Bodies;
for thefe Bodies, confidered abfolutely and by themfelves,
are infenfible , andthe Refolution of a Compound into its
Simples is not in Nature Evil to that Compound. Since,
then we allow, that Phyfick and Exercife, Burning and Bind-
ing, ‘and Lopping off of Limbs, and allthe'Tortures that Men.
ufe, when they turn their own Executioners, are not Evil,
but Good; Since we'think, the Perfons, who put us to thefe.
Pains for our Advantage, deferve to be thanked and reward-
ed for it, why ‘do we find Fault with Almighty God, when
He proceeds i in the fame Method?’ For:alas, it is not An-.
‘
βά; nor nd ae nor In} juftice, nor Cruelty, hor any sien, .
Ped
vedi
with SimpLicius’s Comment. 87
Ῥω ΣΝ Σ τὰ
_ of Tormenting us, that puts him upon thefe Courfes; but
_ he aéts with all the Skill and prudent Care of a Phyfician,
with the Faithfulnefs and Tendernefs of a Friend, with the
_ Bowels of a Father, with the kindeft Intentions of our greater
᾿ Benefit; and, to fay all in one Word, with all that incom-
prehenfible Love and Goodnefs, which is any way agreeable
to the Nature and Perfeétions of a God.
' Now the Remedies he adminifters upon fuch Occafions;.
are divers. Some he humbles with Difeafes, or Poverty, or
Difgrace; Some with the more publick Calamities of Fa-
mines, or Earthquakes, or Inundations, or Shipwrecks, or
Wars; Some he cures with fuch Medicines, as come im-
mediately from his own Hand, and Others by more remote
and diftant ones , making Men the Minifters of his Juftice,
and Inftruments of punifhing one another. ; But ftill, if Phy-
fick and the Methods of Cure be not Evil, but Good; all
thefe, and all other Remedies muft be allowed to be fo too,
Pea unlanding any Uneafinefs, that we may feel in the
Jperation.,
"If any one fhall fcruple the calling of thefe things Good,
becaufe they are not eligible purely for their own fakes, (asall
things abfolutely, and truly Good muftbe) yet at leaft let him
forbear {tigmatizing them with the Name of Evils, and ra-
ther call them neceffary Expedients, for the attaining what
is truly Good. In Order to which, and for the fake where-
_ of, we chufethefe, becaufe that other is not to be had with-
out them. For there is no Man fo fottith and fenfelefs, as
to chufe Amputations and Searings, or any fuch violent Re-
medies, for their own fakes; . but yet we do it from our De-.
fire of Health, which thefe Means mutt be affifting to us in.
And indeed, the Philofophers have with great Propriety fly-
led all thofe things neceflary Expedients, which are fo or-
dered, as to be preliminary to our Good, and fuch as we
-muft make ufe of for it. Thefe very Things then, fo far as
they conduce to our Good, and in that refpe&, are them-
felyes Good. Some, as they contribute to the Health of the
Body, and Others to that of the Soul, though indeed they be
- fo in a Qualified Senfe only, and much inferiour in Dignity
and Value to thofe Things that are abfolutely Good. And
it is with regard to thefe more excellent Things, that the Ge-
“Nerality of People look upon them, and fo think them com-
_ paratively Evil; Which yet furely is a Cenfure too Severe to
be juttified, if they do not only Contribute, but are Necefla-
“-" "“ῳ ;
τ, to qur Happinefs,
. bits. i
88 Ep ICTET Us’s Morals
Ω
If then the Obje@or’s Arguments are fufficiertly refuted
in that all Things that happen are fo ordained of God, as that
Nature and Choice have both their due, and as is moft bene-
ficial to Mankind; Every Wife Man certainly will think
himfelf obliged, to be well content things fhould be juft as they
are, (unlefs you will fuppofe him to envy the Giving che
Thing its Due, and the Recovering fuch as are Diftempered,
and need fharp Remedies,) he will moft fincerely love, and _
honour, and adore this Excellent Phyfician, and look upon
him, ‘as the World’s great and only Benefaétor.
Now, that Calamitous Circumftances are a fort of Reme-
dies, and that the Adminiftration of proper Phyfick, where
the cafe requires it, is good both to the Body and Soul, na
Body I prefume wil] take upon himto difpure. But what
courfe fhall we take to perfuade Men, that this very Diftem=
per itfelf of Soul or Body, this miferable Condition that ren-
ders fuch painful Applications neceffary, is Good and not
Evil, and that the Author of it is not the Caufe of Evil to us ὃ
To this purpofe, | fhall briefly recolleé&t what was obfer-
ved before, That Difeafes are not Evil to the Body itfelf, as
being by. Nature made fubje& to them, and tending to a diffo-
lution of the Compound, Refolving each of its Parts, and
Reftoring the Simple Elements to their proper Maffes; the
Releafing them from a ftrange place where they were kept in
Bondage, and putting an end to the perpetual Combat of op-
᾿ pofite Qualities among them. Neither can the Difeafe of the’
Body be Evil to the Soul, for it hath been already fhewn to”
be its Phyfick, and its Cure: And thus Experience often
fhews it to be. But granting, that Sicknefs and Corruption’
were injurious to one particular Body,,. yet it {till appears ta’
be for the Advantage of the Soul that owns that Body, and~
to the Conftitution of the Univerfe in general; of the Ele-
ments of which it is formed, and the infinite Revolutions of
Matter and Motion, which are therefore Infinite , becaufe
the Deftroying of one thing becomes the Production of
another. Well therefore may the wife Governour of all
things not value a Creature, which was by Nature corrupti=
ble, and difregard a particular inconfiderable Corruption,
confined to a fingle inftance; when the whole Creation is”
benefitted, and the Better Ends are ferved, and the Eternal
Revolutions of Things are continued and kept up by this
means. - ; .
But perhaps you will fay, though all this fhould be admit- .
ted with regard tothe Body, yet how thall we account 0
the.
—
with SimpLictius’s Comment. 89
“οὐ IR SBIR Se aS = TTT od
_ the Difeafes of the Soul? The frail and diftempered State the
is in, can neither be for the good of her felf that languifhes
_ under it, nor does it contribute any Advantage to the Creation
in common. So that the Author and Ordainer of this ftate
mutt needs be the Caufe of Evil to her; and he that is con-
tent the fhould be thus depraved, and fees and fuffers her
Sickneffes, muft needs be an II] natur’d Being; and therefore,
as to this particular, the Difficulty remains (till the fame.
- Now inanfwer to thisScruple, I beg leave to refreth yourMe-
mory, with what was difcourfed before, concerning the Caufe
of Evil and Vice to the Soul ; while we were explaining Epzcte-
vus’s Diftin@ion between what is, and what 1s not in Out own
power; viz. That the Good and Happinefs of the Soul con-
fifts in Prudent and Regular Defires and Averfions; and that
the Evil and Mifery of it proceeds from {uch as are Vicious
and Exorbitant. Now 1 hope the Defires and Averfions have
been fufficiently proved to bein our own Difpofal; and if
fo, then we ourfelves are the Caufe of our own Vices and
Virtues. This is the true ground of all that Commendation,
which is thought due to Good Men, that their Happinefs and
Excellence is the Effeét of their own free Choice; for which
_ reafon the Greeks call Virtue by a Name, which bears fome
«τ φᾶν,
Affinity to that, which imports Chufing. And for the fame
Reafon, Wicked Men are condemned and reproached, becaufe
they are fuch through their own Sloth and Bafenefs of Soul,
when it is in their own Power to be otherwife. But now,
if thefe Matters proceeded from any External Caufes. this
Virtue or Vice would be no longer Choice, but blind Chance,
or fatal Neceffity. And confequently our Evil and Mifery
can, with no colour of Reafon and Juftice, be charged upon
_ Almighty God.
» (May we not indeed drive this Argument a great deal far-
ther, and urge, that even Vice, which is properly the Difeafe
-of the Soul, is not pofitively and in all refpeéts Evil; but is
itfelf, in fome degree, neceffary to the very Being of Virtue
among Men? For, as our Bodies, if Nature had not made
_ them capable of Sicknefs and Infirmities, could not properly
be faid at any time to enjoy a ftate of Health; becaufe in
truth, this would not be Health, but a fimple and fix’d Dif-
pofition, above the power of Frailties and Difeafes, fuch as
_ the Celeftial Beings enjoy: So the Virtues proper to Hu-
Ἰ tine fuch thing, unlefs the Soul were of fuch a Nature, as
mane Souls, fuch as'Temperance, and Juftice, and Pru-
dence, and all the reft of that Glorious Catalogue, would
15
2
90 Epzrcretus’s Morals
is liable to be depraved. For at this rate fhe would be graced,
not with the Virtues of a Man, but with the Perfections' of
‘an Angel, or a God; whofe peculiar Excellence it is, that
they can never be feduced, or deviate into Vice; bur it isa
Quality rooted in the very Nature of Men, and Humane
Virtues, that they may degenerate, and be corrupted,
_Ifthen Humane Virtues in the Soul, and if the Health o
the Body, though neither of them abfolutely Uniform and
Inflexible, be yet Good; and if the Order of Nature requir-
ed, that, befide the Firft, Simple, and Fix’d Beings, Others
of a Middle and Inferior Nature, thould derivé themtelves
from, the great Original and common Source of all Good;
then there was likewile a necefflity, that there fhould be De-
pravations of fuch good things as are fubject to be deprav-
ed, which have not any pofitive and abiolute Exiftence of
their own, but only a fort of additional one, caft into thofe
that bave. yt ) 9}
And in this, the exceeding Goodnefs of God is very. re-
markable; chat He hath ordained the Diffolution of the Bo-
dy, which asI faid, does as neceffarily follow upon Matter
and Motion, as the Shadow attends upon its Subftance,
This Diffolution he hath made even a good. thing, both with
regard to the Bodies fo Difeafed and Diffolved, (as they are
reftored back again to their Primitive Elements, and fo the
Simples out of which they are compounded, are renewed, )
and with regard to the Souls that own and ufe them, as they
are cured and made better by this Means; and alfo to the —
Univerfe in common, by reafon of that infinite Succeffion —
of Changes and Motions, which thefe Diffolutions, as I |
fhewed before, keep continually on Foot. But as for Vice, |
the Evil of the Soul, and indeed the only thing, which,
when well.confidered, proves to be Evil, of this he utterly
acquits himfelf, and hath no part in it at all. Firft, Becaufe
he only permits to it an Additional and Accidental Being, |
and that-not in the quality of Evil neither, but as being it- —
felf a neceffary Expedient for the promoting of Good. And |
Secondly, Becaufe, even after all thefe Limitations, it de-
pends wholly upon the Choice and Determination of the
Soul, andcan have no Being at all, without our own Con-
fent and aétual Concurrence. For which Reafon it is, that
all the Laws, both of God and Man, fuffer fuch A@ions as
are done involuntarily, to go unpunifhed,
And indeed, all Evil whatfoever, is in fome Senfe an in- |
yoluntary Misfortune to the Sonl.. For the Saul never
2 chufes
*
‘with Srmexziciuss Comment. Ὁ οἱ
chufes Evil, confidered as Evil, but under the Difguife and
-retence of fome Good; as fometimes Riches, fometimes
Senfual Enjovments, or Honours, or Preferments, and
Greatnefs. Now in fuch Cafes, the Mifchiefs attending
thefe, are either wholly overlook’d, or elfe they are leffen’d
and ftifled, by that prevalency of Pafflion which bribes and
{ways the Soul: So that there cannot pofflibly be any fuch
thing in Nature, as an abfolute Evil, when confidered in all
the Circumftances of it. And that, which never had any Be-
ing, may fooner be, than even this Accidental Being in the
Soul, can be entirely Evil, and chofen as fuch. '
~ Some perhaps may imagine, that God is the Caufe of Evil,
as having given the Soul this Freedom to Virtue or Vice, to
the ill Management whereof, that Evil is owing. Now in-
deed, if the Soul’s being indued with a Faculty of adiing free-
Ty and abfolutely be Evil, then he who gave this Faculty,
muft be confeffed the Caufe of Evil: But if fach a Power
be Good, a greater and more valuable Good, than all the
Advantages of the World befides, why then fhould he, who
hath given us the Good, be, for fo doing, charged with the
Evil? Since therefore that which is moft agreeable to our
Nature and Reafon, is aifo moft eligible and defirable, what
account can be given, why any one that is a Man, and un-
derftands at all wherein the peculiar Excellence of a Man
confifts, fhould rather wifh to be a Plant, or any other Ir-
fational Creature, than that which God hath made him?
Though at the fame time we mutt allow, that even Plants,
and other Irrational Beings, are Good in their Kind and Ca-
- pacity; that is, inalower Degree, and a qualified Senfe, and
in proportion to the Ufes they are defigned to ferve.
_ Now, if it bein our own power to be Good and Happy, and
we have the fole Difpofal of this Matter, fo that nothing can
poflibly bring our Defires or our Averfions, under any Com-.
_ pulfion to act as we would not have them, or under any Re-
tive; and the Perfon in whom itis lodged, is t
-ftraint not to aét as we would have them ; fuch a Free Na-
ture, and Abfolute Power as this, is (in my Opinion) a
Glorious Privilege, a moft Magnificent and nee Preroga~
ereby made
aGreat, a Happy, an Arbitrary Prince. But if fuch a Soul
Ἱ
- Contribute to its own Deviations, and can chute whether
it will fo deviate or no; where can any Mifcarriage of that
‘kind be laid, with any tolerable Juftice, but to the charge. of
the Soul itfelf; which isthe true Original and Caufe, both
_ of its own Good, and of all the Deflexions from it, fince
τς τὴ os ΓΝ j 4% 3. aid : τῷ e
data |
in
Epicrerus’s Morals
wre Os
in and by it fuch Deflexions firft began? For the Great Crea-
‘tor, who hath thus made it, fo as to be the Caufe of its own
Ruin, did not abfolutely ruin it, but only made it capable
of being ruined; gnd yet at the fame time too, utterly inca-
pable of it, without its own Confent. If therefore this Vo-
lition, or Confent, be an internal Motion of her own, fhe
is the fole Caufe of her own Sin and Mifery. ~ ;
Behold therefore the Goodnefs and the Wifdom of God!
For, fince the Conftitution of the World; and the Order of
Nature, made a middle fort of Beings neceffary, which
fhould {tand between thofe that are always above, and thofe
that are always below; things that fhould bear a Refemblance,
and be conformed, fometimes to the one and fometimes to
the other of thefe Beings, and thus make the whole perfeé ,
by partaking of, and knitting together, the diftant Extremes :
Since alfo this tendency to things below us is but an acci-
dental and additional thing, and this Tendency isthe very
thing capable of Depravation; he hath endued this middle
fort of Beings with fuch a Tendency; yet fo, as that they may
ftill remain Untainted and Undepraved, if they will do fo;
and that he himfelf might be clear upon all Accounts, and
in no degree the Caufe of any manner of Evil. | gfe
Thefe Arguments I have infifted on the more largely; Not
only, becaufe they ate proper for the explaining what Epicte-
tus hath delivered upon this occafion, but alfo in regard they
give us a great light into what he tells us afterwards, con-
cerning the Nature of Evil. For we might have made very
fhort work of the Cafe now before us, and needed only
have given this Anfwer to all the Objections, that wher
Epidetus advifes Men to be well pleafed, that Things flould be
jujt as they are, he does not intend it of Vice, or that which
is Evil to the Soul; (forhe could never have faid, that Men
who are pleafed with their own, or other People’s Vices ,
are eafie and happy, ) but that we mutt reftrain it to thofe
Accidents, that affeét our Bodies, or our Fortunes. For
thefe are things which a Wife and Good Man will be fure’
to make Advantage of, however they are ordered ; and the
more Crofs and Difficult they are, the more ftill will he pro-=
fit by them. And thefe are the things he means, which’
foolifh and ignorant Men wifh may be conformable to their
own Withes and Defires; and not the Defires and Averfi-
ons themfelves, in which all our Good and Evil confifts.’
For they are in our own power; juft what we pleafe to
make them; Confequently it were moft abfurd and foolith,
to’
ΜΠ ΒΙΜΡΨΙΟΙυ 8.5 Comment. ~ 93
to with they were as we would have them. But he advifes,
that we would forbear wifhing thus of Things out of our
power; becaufe this is what ‘we cannot compafs by any
Strength of our own, nor would it always prove for our
Advantage to do it, if we could: For we often are paffio-
nately defirous of whatis pleafant, though at the fame time it
be prejudicial to us; and we as often decline what is harfh
and unpalatable, tho’ Providence intend it for Phyfick, and
defign our mighty Benefit in the Application.
Icknefs is a Hindrance to the Body, but it does
not enfeeble the Mind, nor can it obitruat
her Freedom, unlefs fhe pleafe herfelf : And Lame
nefs isa Confinement to the Foot, but it can put
no Reftraint upon the Will, nor make that one jot
the lefs AGtive. The fame Confideration is appli-
cable in proportion to every Accident of Human
Life. For you will find, that though thefe may
prove Obftructions to fomething elfe, yet they can-
not or need not, ever be fo to You. :
Hi had told us immediately before, that the Way to live
Eafie and Happy, was for a Man, not to with that
things might be juft as he would have them, but to be well
pleafed, that they fhould be juft as they are: And now he
proves the Argument, intended to be deduced from thence ;
which is, That all outward Misfortunes are to be enter-
tained with Temper and Moderation ; and not only fo,
but he removes (851 conceive ) an Objection, that might be
railed avainft it.
The Argument itfelf feems to me to be thus: Ifthofe Ca-
amities, wiich happen in our Fortunes, or from any Ex-
ternal Caufes, were properly Ours ; yet even upon this Sup-
pofition, we ought to fuffer them with great Patience and
Refignation, though they were much more Difaftrous, than
_ really they are; when it is remembred, that even thefe are
Ο for our Advantage. But if they be not indeed ours, if each
Of themterminates in fomething elfe, and cannot extend to
us; then it would be the laftdegreeof Folly, to be difturbed
atthe Mistortunes, which are none of our own. = Sicknefs,
he fays, is a Hindrance to the Body; and he fays very well,
that it isa Hiudrance only, moc an Evii.. For we have feen
Oyeess alreadyy
δὰ . Eptcrerus’s Morals .
γα Sea STF * eC IPRS th ΡΟ ΜΗΡΩΣΝ. ἐν Ἐν, νη ΡΟΝ ys EE EE
already, that neither the Difeafes nor the Diffolution of the
Body is Evil; but all that it does, is only to put a ftop to its’
Operations, as Lamenefs likewife does, which was Epicte-
tus’s own infirmity; fo that he does not fpeak to us now
in a Formal Speculative way, but from his own Praétice
and Experience. Thus Lamenefs is an Obftruétion to the’
Parts affeCted, as Poverty is to a Man’s Expences and way
of Living; but neither the One, nor the Other is fo to the
Will, and the Mind, unlefs they voluntarily fubmit to be
obftructed by it. I confefs, if the Body, or the Foot, or
our Eftates, were our very Effence and Nature, then thefe
Hindrances would be truly and properly ours; but fince we
fubfift in none of thern, and the Rational Soul otily is otr-
felves ; fince our Bodies are ho more than Inftruments by
which we aét, and our Poffeffions only Conveniences for mi-
niftring to our neceffary Occafions ; and fince all our Good
and Evil depends upon the Choice of our own Mind, and
confequently cannot be reftrained or obftruéted by them, it
is evident, that we ourfelves are not hindred by thefe things
neither: For no outward Accident whatever can put dny
Confinement upon Us, butonly upon fomething elfe, fome-
thing, which We ἀγα ποῖ; And therefore we mutt not faf-
fer ourfelvés to be difordered at thefe Misfortunes, as if they
were our own; becaufe by this means, we (hall fall into an
Evil, that is properly ours, upon the account of fomething
that i$ not fo: For Difcontent, anda Difturbance of the
Mind, aretruly our own Evils. This I take to be the Force.
and Connexion of this Argument. Prey.
But befides this, he removes at the fame time an Obje-
étion, drawn as the Rhetoricians ufe to term it, 44 {με
from the point of Advantage and Convenience. For it may)
be faid upon this occafion, that Sicknefs and Poverty cannot
poffibly be for our Benefit; for how is it poflible, thata
Difeafed Man fhould perform all the Funétions of Nature’
as he ought? or how can we deny, that a Man, when re-,
duced to extreme Poverty, is under an abfolute Conftraint,
to bend all his Care and Pains to the relief of his Wants;
and furnifhing himfelf with neceffary Supports? This Ob-
je@tion now he takes off, by fhewing, that Sicknefs, and Vo-
verty, and all Hardfhips and Inconveniences of that kind;
put the Will under no Confinement at all; and, that in this
free Principle it is, that the very Being of Men confifts, and
all their Good and Evil depends entirely upon it. For how
is the Sick Man tied up from chufing and defiring fuch ©
things,
ξε
_ with Stmpxiierus’sComment: οζ
_ things, as are Virtuous and Reafonable, and hating and de-
clining the contrary? Or what Violence can Extreme Po-
Verty put upon a Man, which fhall be able to compel him
_ to act contrary to the principles of Honefty and Honour ?
Were not Digenes, and Crates, and Zexo in thefe Circum-
ftances? And did They ever thew. themlelves more truly
_Philofophers? Did they ever give more illa(trious Proofé of
Virtue and Greatnefs of Soul, of Contentment aiid Satis-
faction, and even of Abundance in the flendereft Fortthe;
than when they chofe to fore-go. their Plenty, and thought
it Wifdom to exchange that for Want, and to have no Pot-
feffions of their own at all? And indeed, who is there fo
Blind and Brutih, but would be pleafed and proud to fuftain
fuch a Man if fils Neceffities, and think his Liberality a grea-
ee Qbligati and Honour to himfelf, than to the Reéei-
ver: Maa
_ But what need we go fo far for Examples of this kind ;
When even Ep:fezus himfelf, who makes this Declaration,
Was fo eminent an inftance of it? As to his Fortune and
Condition, he was a Slave; Infirm in his Body, Lame from
a Child, and one who was fo much exetcifed with Pover-
ty, and made it fo much his Choice, that his lictle Cots
tage at Kome was not thought worth’a Lock or a Belt;
For alas! there was no. Temptation Within, nothing but a
coarfe Coverlet; and a hard Mattrefs, upon which he lay,
And yet this is the very Man, that tells us, Lamenefs may
obftruét the Feet, but the Mind it cannot, except we pleafe
to lecit. Thus you fee, he did not make it his Bufinefs, as
8 great many do, to fay fine things, and entertain his Rea=
ders with fublime and airy Speculations; but he made:the
Experiment himfelf, and {peaks from his own Knowledge
and Prattice.. And for this Reafon, his Difcouries are the
‘morevaluable. For they manifeft a truly Great Soulin him--
felf, and will make the deeper Impreffion upon all others;
whofe Minds are well difpofed,
: ᾿
᾿ iL | CHAP,
96 Epicretus’s Morals
CAA P.. XIV.
PON every frefh Accident, turn your Eyes,
inward ; and examine how you are quali-
fied to encounter it. If you fee any very Beauti-
ful Perfon, you will find Continence to oppofe a-
gainft the Temptation. If Labour and Difficul-
ty come in your way, you will find a Remedy in
Hardinefs and Refolution. If you lie under the
obloquy of an ΠῚ Tongue, Patienegsand Meek-
nefs are the proper Fences againft it. @nd thus, if
if you do but prepare and ule yourfelf by degrees,
no Accident whatever will be able to furprize or,
fubdue you.
COMMENT.
Fter having advanced fome ftrange fublime Notions,
X and required Men to do that , which the generality of
the World will be fure to think Romantick and Impoffible ;
As for Example, to flight the Difeafes of the Body, as no
Evil of ours; and tobe well pleafed, let our Circumftances
be what they will, that things fhould go juft as they do; ne-
ver to fuffer ones felf either to be caught with the Bait of
Senfual or Worldly Pleafure, or to be dejeéted with any
outward Calamities : It is but reafonable, that he fhould ap-
ply himfelf in the next place, to fhew, that thefe are Per-
fections not above the Powers of Humane Nature, and that
he enjoyns us nothing, but what we are capable of dif- —
charging.
To this purpofe he proves, that the Great Creator to whom
the Soul of Man owes its Being , was pleafed to give it.
fuch a Frame and Temper, that it fhould not be conftantly
determined to Sublime and Heavenly things, nor always —
dwell above, as the Bleffed Spirits, the Angels, and thofe o- —
ther of a Divine and ftill more Excellent Nature do; but —
hath ordered the Matter fo, that this fhould fometimes be —
degraded to a State of Matter, and Motion, and νά τὲ j
Ἷ
with StmexLicius’s Comment. 97
be joyned to the Body, and conyerfe with Frail and Cor-
‘ruptible things. But, though he hath fubjeGted the Soul to
_thefe Hazards and Tryals, yet he hath endued het with par-
ticular Faculties and Powers, fuitable to each occafion; by
‘Means whereof, fhe may engage with all the Accidents, that
-ean-affault her, and come off without Lofs; nay, and van-
quifh, and keep them under too: ci
Againft fuch, as tempt us with an Appearance of. Plea-
fure, he propofes Continence; (and this he rather chofe to
mention, than thofe higher Degrees of abfolute Chaftity and
Temperance; in confideration, that the Perfons now ad-
dreft to, are but Imperfe& and Young Proficients in Virtue.)
Now thefe Objects ftir the Paffions up to Rebellion, and’
, beget a Combat between Reafon and Them. But by Dif-
€ipline, and a ftrié& hand over ones felf, they are fubdued
and reduced to Obedience again: And this is a true De-
fcription of that which we properly call a Continent Life 3
as on the contrary, that Man is properly faid to be Incon-
tinent, whofe Reafon is Impotent; and, though it may ftrug-
gle for a while, yet yields at laft to the ftronger Infults of
Paffion: But now in Perfons, who have attained to the
Perfection of Wifdom and Virtue, the Paffions and Appe-
tites (which as I hinted before, are the-Child to be trained
up in every oneof our Minds) are in abfolute Subjeétion to
Reafon, without any Difpure or Mutiny at all; fo that they
are moved and direéted, entirely towards fuch Objeéts, and
at fuch Times. and in fuch Meafures as this fees fit to pre-
fcribe them. And this is truly Temperance, which. the
Greeks Call Σωφρφούνη ; As being that; which fecures the Rea-
fon, and preferves the Government and Prerogative of the
intelligent Part in us. For when this is brought under, and
diftraéted by Paffion, the Mind is torn in pieces, and de-
‘ftroyed. But while it maintains its own Superiority over
the Affeétions, it continues vigorous and found. ἐς
᾿ δὸ ἀραΐπ, to Perfons that are Mafters in Philofophy, For-
titude is always a prefent Security againft all Difficulty and
Pain: It keeps the very Outguards of the Soul, and fuffers
“nothing of this kind to get the leait Footing there; but per=
feveres without any Perplexity or Difturbance, and looks
“Bpon all the Hardfhips that come in its Way, as fo many
ryals to exercife it.. But the Proficients, who are lefs ex-
pert, muff be content with Hardinefs and Refolution ; Such!
“as may maintain its Poft; and make a gallant Refiftance, and
Lz ’ prevent
‘
98 Epreretus’s Morals
prevent the Sinkings of the Soul, by enabling it to continue
the Fight, and ward againft the Blows, when Trouble and
Pains affault it. |
_ For a conftant and vigorous Oppofition, and hardening
ones felf againft Difficulties, will conquer all our E ffemina-
cy and Paffion, and make Reafon and Virtue triumphant :
and, by fuch Conquefts frequently gained, and prudently
manazed, our Paflions will be ufed to the Yoke, fubmit to
Difcipline, and, obey without Relu@tancy. And, when a
Man hath brought himfelf to this pafs, there will be no far-
ther Trouble to exercife his Patience. He is now above it
all; for he neither defires any Thing, capable of giving him”
Difappointment, nor does he make any [hing his Averfiog,
which can overtake him whether he will or no. And con-
fequently, he can have no Trouble and Pain, which always”
mutt proceed from one of thefe Caufes.
Againft Scandal, and an Ill Tongue, he tells us we fhall
find our beft Defence in Meeknefs... For in truth, Scandal,
in its own Nature, hath nothing that can affi@ us; and-all
that ufes to do fo,. is not what is faid, but the Judgments
and Reflexions we pafs upon it; which we evermore aggra-
vate to ourfelves, according as we are blown up with Vanity, _
ortran{ported with Anger. For all that Scandal can do with-_
out this, is only to make us condemn the Defamer. And
for the proceeding regularly in this Condemnation, without
Heat or Prejudice, we fhall do well to confider, wherein
the Defamer is really to blame; and that it is upon one of —
thefe two Accounts; that he flanders and afperfes us, either
falfly, or out of Malice. Now the Scandal itfelf may very
wellbe born with, . becaufe it is not capable of doing us-any ©
real Injury; and fo, intruth, may the Party, who raifes or
{preads it too, when we confider, that the Injury is done,
notto Us, but to Himfelf; for fo it is, in reality, when his
own Mind is the Sufferer, by doing an ill and a bafe Thing. |
Nay, if this be too little, we may confider farther, that
Scandal is always capable of being madean Advantage to us.
Kt is manifeltly fo; when falfe; And when it is true, we
gain this by it, That it difcovers our own Faults and Fail-
ings ; and either fhews us fomething we did not know be-
fore, or which, though we did know, yet we were apt to
to indulge, upon a Prefumption, that no Body knew it but
ourfelves. And this very Confideration is of great Impor-
tance, to reftrain young Proficients in Virtue. For fuch,
though
with SimpLicrus’s Comment. 99
4 though they arenot come upto that noble Principle of pra@i-
fing Virtue for its own fake, will yet give check to many ex-
_orbitant Paffions, and abftain from grofs Evils, out of Shame,
and Tendernefs to their own Reputation. And indeed, this
_ mutt be faid in behalf of Ambition, and a Defire of Praife ;
*
For ti™pReafon (fays Epictetus) we muft not fuffer our-
felves to be furprifed, or over-born by any Accident, which
would engage our Minds, and draw them off to any Ex-
ternal Advantages or Calamities; fo as that we fhould be
difcompofed with any falfe Ideas of its being Good or Evil.
Nor muft we give too great a Scope to our Defires and our
Averfions, or let them be too hafty in their Motions, but
_ call up the Powers within us to our Affiftance; and, when
_ wehave found, which are the Succours proper for each Cir-
cumftance, then rally them together, and enter the Lifts
_ with Refolution, and ward off every Accident accordingly,
yoo ΕΡιοτετῦ 885 Morals
CHAP. XY.
3 yEver ufe yourfelf to fay upon any Occafion,
N That you have loft any thing, but reftored
it. Tf your Wife or your Child die, you have re-
turned them to the Owner. If your Effate be
taken from you, this too is paid back to the Gi-
yer. But you'll fay, he wasa Knave that defrau-
ded me of it. Alas! What’s that to the Purpofe?
Or how does it concern you, by what ἴσα
what Hand, he that gave it refumes it té
Trouble not yourfelf therefore about thefe Mat-
ters; but while he permits the Enjoyment, ufe it
as a Thing that is not your own, but anothers; and
let your Concern and Affection for it, be juft fuch,
as ‘Travellers have for an Inn upon the Road.
COMMENT.
E had inftruéted us before, in the Nature of External
Accidents and Advantages: Which of them we might
profecute, and how far, and by what Methods weare allow-
edto do it: How we fhould entertain both our profperous
and pleafant, and our adverfe and lefs grateful Fortunes; and
what Improvement is to be made of each of them; and here
he comes to fpeak-of the Lofs of any Advantages we have,
and dire&ts us, not only howto énjoy, but how to part with
them too. Now every Man, who lofes what he efteems his
own, muft needs apprehend himfelf injured, and naturally
flie out, not only into Excefs of Grief for his Lofs, but into
reproachful Language againft thofe that depriv’d him of it.
But he, who reftores upon Demand, what he knew and
confidered was noneof his own, muft be the fenfleffeft Fool
in the World, to be troubled at its being taken away from —
him, orto fall foul upon the Proprietor that requires it. This
then is our Cafedireétly. The World, and its Enjoyments,
are not ours; and for that Reafon, not within the Com-
mand and Difpofal of our own Wills : Nothing indeed is
properly fo, but our Defires and Averfions, and the Incli-
ΕΝ ΣΡ ΣΝ ἃ ἂς ἱὲν PT Re pL ee fads tt. - “Rations
with SrmpLicius’s Comment. τοῦ
LL LLL TE,
nations of our own Minds; and all our Virtue and Vice,
all our happinefs and Mifery, do depend upon thefe. So
that we fhould always keep our Minds ftrongly poffeft with
this Confideration, and be affeéted accordingly to every Thing
without us, as that in which we have no Propriety at all.
And the way to keep our Minds thus poffeft, and thus af-
feted, is, not only to fay fo, and content ourfelves with
Verbal’ Diftin@tions; but to thew it in our PraGtice, and be-
have ourfelves, like Men, who are convinced they have no
Title to them.
Suppofe then, upon the Death of a Child, that a Man
gives himfelf over to Tears and Groans, deplores his Mis-
fortune, and complains of his Lofs; is it not evident, that
this Man while his Son lived, look’d upon him as ftrictly,
and by Right, his own? If it were not fo, with what Pre-
tence does he call this being taken away, a Lofs, or refent
-it fo deeply? The Man that does thus, ’tis plain, would go
farther too, if he could; and revenge the Injury he fanfies
he hath received, upon the Perfon who took him away, if
it were in his Power. But the Man who confiders this
Child, as one in whom he had not any abfolute Propriety,
and that Death hath only paid him back to the Perfon that
lent him, will neither affi@ himfelf upon the Occafion, nor
accufe the Owner that demanded him again.
. And here the Artifice of Epictetus is very obfervable. For
heinftruéts us, not only to adapt our Words to our Thoughts,
-and correé our Expreflions by more juft Apprehenfions of
Things; but contrives, that even our Expreffions may reéti-
fie our Notions. Forto this purpofe, he fays, it is necef-
fary, that we fpeak of the Enjoyments of the World in fuch
Terms, as may not flatter us with any Imaginations of Pro-
-perty in them, but fuch as may wean our Affections, and
make them fit loofe about us; that fo, from calling and
thinking them anothers, and not our own, we may bring
ourfelves to ufe them as fuch.
__ And, fince nothing adds more to our Tendernefs for any
_ thing, than the Care and Concern we are in about it ; he ad-
| vifes us to moderate thefe, and to beftow only fo much up-
on them, as we think worth our while to lay out upon that
which is another Man’s, Some regard indeed muft be had
to them; nor may we fo neglect them, as to give ourfelves
up to Supinenefs and Sloth; but yet we muft not fo fix our
_ Hearts or our Endeavours upon them, as if they were our
_ Own, and that which is never to be taken away from us,
es L4 And
Be
ae in
fou /Erieretus’s Morals
And therefore all the Concern allowed us in this Cafe; is
only that of Travellers in an‘Inn; who confider, that they
are not at home, and that their Stay is like to be very fhort;
and are folicitous for nothing farther, than only to get the
beft Conveniences the Place will afford, and be fatisfied
with what they can get, for the little Time they do ftay.
_ For this Reafon he hath added very conveniently, while
he permits us the Exjoymext, to put us continually in Re-
amembrance, that all our Enjoyments are upon Sufferance,
the Effe& of a permiffive Providence, what we cannot give
ourfelves, but derive fromthe Bounty of another, and that no
other, than the very Perfon who takes them away from us,
Now, becaufe fome People are apt to aggravate their Mif-
fortunes, by tragical Accounts of the Circumftances that at-
tend them, and the Manner of their being deprived of their
Comforts: As, if !mutt lofe my Eftate, yet what need was
there of lofing it by fo much Treachery, or Injuftice, or In-
gratitude? Or if my Child or my Wite had died of a natu-
ral or lingring Death, a Fever, or a Confumption, I could
have fupported it; but to be {natch’d away all on the fud-
den, to die aviolent, an untimely, or a fcandalous Death,
Or toibe sack’d with Tortures and flrong Convulfions ; this
isa difmal and an intolerable AffliGtion. All thefe Complaints
favour of Difcontent, and at the bottom are a finding Fault,
not with the Manner butthe Thing itfelf. For, as we could
not prefcribe to our Great Benefagtor, the Methods, or the
Inftruments, by which he beftowed them upon us; fo nei-
ther muft we find Fault with thofe, by which herecals them; ©
and it is but fit, that -he whogave as he pleafed, fhould take
away as he pleafes too.
We may take Notice farther, that Epsdezus chufes to in- ©
ftance in the tendereft Points, the Death of a Wife or a
Child; becaufe thefe fit clofeft to our Hearts 3 and any other —
Loifes, if compared’ to thefe, are no more than every vul- |
gar Virrue can fuftain and flight. But ftill, ashe told us be-
fore; and wilildo again in the following Difcourfes, we thall
do wellto begin with lefs Tryals, and by rendring thofe fa-
miliar and eafie, to harden ourfelves by Degrees againit thar-
pet'and greater. The fame Rule therefore holds much ftron-
ger, and is more praéticable, when any one hath taken my
Purfe, or {pirited away my Servant, or defrauded me of my
Houfe, or my Eftate; to fay, (and we may fay it with as
hase ba in thefe Cafes too) 1 have not loft thefe Things,
ut reltored them to the Owner, and Lendet of them to me. -—
ea pe bk
΄
with Simpxiciuss Comment. 103
CHAP. XVI,
F you are indeed defirous to improve in Wit-
4 Τ dom and Virtue, you muft never allow your-
ΕἸ in fuch mean Thoughts as thefe; I muft fol-
Jow the Bufinefs of my Calling clofe, or elfe I and
my Family fhall ftarve : I mutt take Pains with this
Boy of mine, and chattife him, or he will be ruined.
Thefe are the Mifgivings of an anxious Mind, and
unworthy a Philofopher, whofe firft Care fhould
/ be the Eafe and Quiet of his own Breaft. For a
Man had better perifh for Hunger, and preferve his
Mind from immoderate Fear and Concern ;- than
live in the greateft Plenty, and continual Perplexi-
ty with it. And it were a Jets Evil for you, that
your Servant or your Child were Vicious, than that
yourfelf fhould be perpetually unhappy with an
anxious Care to prevent it.
FOLOLOT OL COL OLE CLO LOLO SOLO LOLOLO LOLOL O
ἱ CHAP. XVIL
U SE yourfelf therefore to little Tryals firft: Ifa
Cruife of Oil be broken, or a Pint of your
Wine fioln, reflect immediately, that this is the
- Purchafe of Conftancy and acompofed Mind; and
fince nothing can be had Free-coft, he that gets
thefe fo cheap, hath a good Bargain. So again,
When you call your Servant, confider, that it’ 15
poflible he may not attend to you; or if he do, ‘thar
he may not do what you command him. And it
is too great an Advantage, which you give him
over yourfelf, if you put it in his Power, whether
your. Mind fhall be eafie or no.
COM.
104 Epicretus’s Morals
COMMENT.
ἘΣ the Advice laft given, that the Things of this
_ World are what we ought not to think we have any —
Propriety in, or fhould be any farther folicitous about them, —
than Travellers are; to accommodate themfelves in an Inn;
It might very probably be objeéted ; That this Contempt of
the World will expofe us to vaft Inconveniences. For at
this rate, fays one, if I negleét the looking after my Eftate,
I fhall reduce my felf to Want and Beggary ; and if for the
the avoiding this Anxiety, which you fo ftriétly forbid, I
omit the chiding and correéting my Servant, I fhall be acceffo-
ry to his utter Ruin. In Anfwer to both thefe, he infifts up-
on that eminent DiftinGion in the Beginning of his Book,
by which he hath proved, That all our Good and Evil, truly
fo called, depends entirely upon the Ufe of our Natural Li-
berty, and fuch Things as are within the Compafs of our
own Choice; and that no Condition either of our Bodies,
or our Fortunes, can make Men truly Happy or Miferable.
But at prefent he addreffes himfelf principally, to fuch as
are in a State of Proficiency, and have not yet attained to
fuch a Maftery in Wifdom, as fhould qualifie them to attend
to the cultivating their own Minds, and the Management of
their Wordly Concerns both at once, in fo prudent a man-
ner, that thefe Cares fhould not be prejudicial to one another,
or unfafe for the Perfon himfelf. For this is the peculiar
Perfeétion of accomplifh’d Philofophers, that they ride fe-
cure, and fear no Storms from thofe brutifh Appetites, which
they have abfolutely fubdued: Nor is there any Danger, if
They do look abroad into the World fometimes, and give
themfelves alittle loofe, that their Affections fhould be feduced
and perverted by any thing they meet with there, or the
Peace and Tranquillity of their Souls at all difturbed upon
that Account. Thefe Men ftand firm, and collected within
themfelves; and, whatever Confufion they meet in the
World, they manage and compofe it all, by the fixt ftand-
ing Order of their own Minds. But where the Paffions run
high, and are {till upon the Ferment; there. it is dangerous
to. engage a Man’s felf in Bufinefs at all, or to be the leaft
taken off from the beft and fevereft Studies. For there is a
wonderful Affinity between the World and the brutifh Incli-
nations; and thefe, not being yet duly i Ba ἐν '
uce
with SimpLicius’s Comment. 105°
' duced to the Obedience of Reafon, drag down the Mind,
A EE Ma
and utterly immerfe it in Cares and Pleafures; which, like
a Ship without Rudder or Pilot, will drive a wild and fatal
‘Courfe, till at laft the ftrand herfelf, and all be loft.
But in the mean while, what Courfe fhall this Young
Proficient take? For Neceffaries he muft have; and ’tis to
no Purpofe to give him Rules of Living, if you put it out
of his Power to live at all. To this Difficulty Epsttetus ,
if he had pleafed , might have replied, That a great page of
the Prejudice a Man’s Fortunes would receive from ε-
gle&ting and defpifing the World, might be made amends
for, by the ftriét Temperance, and Abftemious Life of atrue
Philofopher; the eafie Contentment and confined Defires,
which are an effential part of his Charatter. But, if this
Remedy be not granted: a fufficient Cure for the Difeafe;
yet at leaft it may fairly be prefumed, that there are People
enough, who would preferve fuch a Man from perifhing.
Such aone, I fay, whofe Wants and Withes will be fo
eafily fupplied, and who muft needs attraét Love and Efteem,
when he negleéts and fcorns the World, for the Exercife of
Virtue, and the Improvement of his own Mind. This Re-
ply, I fay, Epictetus might have made; and the Reafon of
the Thing would have born him out in it. But he paffes
fuch Comforts over, as too effeminate and indulgent; fuch
as were likely to enervate our Virtue, and fully its Bright-
nefs ; and therefore, as if it were a Blemifhand a Ditparage-
ment, for a Wife and Good Man to ftand in any need at all ©
of any thing without, heruns the Comparifon up τὸ the high-
eft and boldeft Extreme; and pronounces peremptorily, That
a Man had better die for Want, and preferve his Mind from
imme ‘erate Fear and Concern, and by that means attain to
the peculiar Perfection of his Nature; than live in continual
Perplexity, though he had the greateft Plenty with it, which
«an never give him that Perfection. For what does all this
World fignifie to a vicious and a difordered Mind, one that
in truth receives more hurt than good, from the Enjoyments
of it? Juft as fumptuous Entertainments, and rich Sauces
gratify a Sick Man, who either cannot relifh, or muft not
tafte them ; or if he do, is fure to nourifh, not himfelf, but
his Difeafe.
So again, It were a lefs Evil, he fays, for you, that your
Servant or your Child were Vicious, than that-you yourfelf
thould be perpetually unhappy, with an Anxious Care to pre-
vent it, If indeed Matters could be fo ordered, as to pre-
“Ne SNORE ΜΝ ferve
106 Epretrerus’s Μοχγαὶς.
ferve him and yourfelf both, and attend to what is neceflary
for each of you, without Diftra&tion, this were much more
eligible. But this can never be, for Two Reafons. Firft,
Becaufe a Man, void of Wifdom and Virtue himfelf, will ©
never be able to make another Virtuous and Wife; And
then, becaufe by this inordinate Concern, you do him no~
manner of Good, but yourfelf in the mean while, an infi- |
nite deal of Hurt. So that in fuch a cafe the beft courfe we
: is to let the Incorrigible Wretch alone in his
_ ae and not difcompofe ourfelves, but take care at
leaft to fave one. ;
But when he had propofed the higheft pitch of Refolution,
and advifed rather to chufe Poverty and Death with Wif-
dom and Virtue, than Plenty and Solicitude without them;
and, if a Man be driven to that hard Neceffity, rather to
over-look the Vice and Ruin of one under his Care, than
to lofe his own Happinefs, and undo himfelf, by trying to
preferve another; to fhew, that Men muft be wound up to
this pitch by degrees, and that he had ajult regard to the A-
bilities of his Scholar, he advifes them here to begin with
Jefs and gentler Tryals, and fuch as the Condition of Young
Beginners are capable of. For Exercife and Praétice, in
Matters of lefs Moment and Difficulty, isa fafe and a fuc-
cefsful Method ; but when fuch things are look’d upon with ~
Difdain, and below one’s Notice, anda Man fcorns the in-
ftances here, of his Oy! being fpilled, or his Wine ftoln,
and will needs fly at all, and attempt great Hardfhips at firft,
he will fall under this double inconvenience; Neither tobea
Match for what he encounters, as having not made his way
up to it gradually; Nor to receive the Benefit and Advan-
tage he might have done, from thofe others; and which,
had he not flighted them, would have qualified him for the
Combat he hath loft, for want of them. For let us ima-
gine, thata Man, without any preparation, or previous
practice in Matters of lefs confequence, would needs, all
upon the fpurt, take upon him to rival Crates, and divett
himfelf of all his Poffeffions at once; how is it poffible, that
this Perfon fhould not immediately repent, and condemn him-
felf, and with Ten Thoufand times, that the thing were un-
done, and he in his former Circumftances again ὃ. For though
Crates himfelf, or Diogezes, or Zeno, or fome other Eminent
Philofopher, may perhaps have made a fudden turn, and
brought themfelves to extreme Stri€tnefs, and Virtue, and
voluntary Poverty, without fuch leifurely advances; ἐδ
i
with SrmpLicius’s Comment 107
-ftill this is a thing that very rarely happens; and that which is
extraordinary, is no Rule for usto follow; efpecially too,
when we confider, that thefe were themfelves very extra-
— ae
ordinary Perfons, and confequently no proper Meafure for
the common rate of Men, to govern themfelves by.
After he had diregted us, how to make great Loffes and
Misfortunes in our Eftates eafie and familiar tous, by Firit
defpifing thofe that are fmall and inconfiderable, for the im-
provement and confirmation of our Virtue; he inftruéts us,
which way to get above all the Difcompofure and Paffion,
that the Negligence, or the Saucinefs of our Setvants, may
be apt to caft us into. For he tells us, we ought before-
hand to reprefent to ourfelves, that it is very poffible your
Servant may not give his Attendance when called upon; or
that if he anfwer to your Call, he may not obferve your
Commands: Andthat we fhould fettle our Minds, not to
give him fo great Advantage over us, as the putting us into
Diforder, would be. And this fettling our Minds is very
-
- confiderable, in that the Inconvenience is in a great meafure
defeated, by being fore-feen. For it is the fuddennefs of an
Accident, that is moft apt to confound young Proficients;
this breaks their Meafures, puts them out of their Biafs, and
beats them from their Pofts. But Premeditation keeps the
Mind firm and cool, it preferves our Thoughts, and gives
us the power and leifure to recolleé&t; and, by Ufe and
Cuftom, prepares and arms the Mind againft all thofe things,
which our Fears and Imaginations reprefent moft difficult
and infupportable. ἡ
Now what a mighty Advantage this Preparation is,. and
how much better we entertain any Accident, when we are
not furprifed, every Man’s own Confideration and Expe-
rience willinform him. Nor is this the cafe of Misfortunes
only, but even of Pleafures and Good Fortune too, when
they come upon us unexpected. AMictions immediately over-
turn our Thoughts, and cramp up the Faculties of Reafon,
_ and put both Body and Soul out of Temper; and Pleafures
and Good Fortune, when fudden and furprizing, fcatter
and diffolve them, and enervate both Body and Mind. From
hence it comes to pafs, that thefe Caufes, tho’ fo very diftant
in themfelves, are yet attended with the fame Effeéts; and
the fame Symptoms plainly prove the Difeafe to be the fame.
For an Excefs, either of Joy or Grief, thocks the Conftitu-
‘tion equally; and throws us into Swoonings, and Sweats,
and the lofs of Senfe, fometimes even to Death itfelf.
But
3
τοῦ ἣ. Eprcrerus’s Morals
But thefe things are fo evident, that they need no enlarge-
ment ; and therefore I rather chufe to obferve the Method Σ-
pietetus hath taken upon this occafion, and the Improvements
we may make of it. When any Lofs or Difappointment in
our Affairs hath happened to us, he advifes; that we would
compofe ourfelves with this Reflexion; That Conftancy and
a Compofed Miud, are Treafures which muft be bought, and this
it feems is the Price we muft pay for them. But when our
Servants provoke us, either by being out of the way, and
not ready to receive our Commands; or by being Infolent,
and not obeying them; the Remedy in this cafe, is to prepare
our Minds, and confider before-hand, that thefe were things
very likely to happen.
This is the Method he prefcribes, but the Improvement
we fhould make of it, is to joyn both thefe Direétions toge-
ther, and apply them to either of the Cafes indifferently. For
indeed, we are no lefs obliged to receive any Lofles what-
foever with all that Premeditation, and fhall find them infi-
nitely leffened to us by Expeétation, and a poffefling our
Minds early with the Thought, that thefe things may very
probably happen to us. And on the other Hand, when we
are incenfed by the Negligence or the Difobedience of Ser-
vants, or any other Provocation of that kind, it will tura
to very good account to recolle&@; That Conftancy, anda
Compofed Mind, are Treafures, which will not come for
nothing; and this is the Price, we are to purchafe them at.
Now the Reafons, why Epictetus himfelf did thus apply
both indifferently, feem to be, That the Inftances produced
by him, of Oyl fpilt, and a little paltry Wine ftoln, are too
mean and trivial, to need the folemnity of any fuch Prepa-
ration; and that in Matters fo fmall, a thort Recolleétion is
fufficient,, after the thing hath happened. And not only f>,
but becaufe in things of lefs Confideration, the profpec& of
the Gain, and comparing the Price with the Purchafe, is
abundantly enough to prevail upon the Soul. For what oc-
cafion can there be of Grudging or Difcontent, when, for
fuch a Trifle as a little Oyl or Wine loft, a Man has it im
his power to receive a thing fo valuable, as Conftancy and
a Compofed Mind, by way of Exchange? Nay, and not only
to procure this for once and no more, but to gain the ftand-
ing Difpofition and Habit of it, which may be ready at hand,
and ferviceable upon every occafion, provided he drive a wife
Bargain, and manage his Market with any Skill and Dexte-
rity. Who would not be proud and pleafed to’ make that
Exchange,
τῇ with ΘΙΜΡΎΙΟΙ 55 Comment. [09
en TT eC OL ei cag cee anit
- Exchange, which Homer tells us Diomede did, when he bar-
tered Brafs for Gold? And who, that hath the Senfe and
_ Reafon of a Man, would not gladly fore-go any advantages
of Fortune, if he can obtain the greateft and moft defirable
_ Advantages of the Mind, in returnfor them? Efpecially too,
when the Matter may very frequently be fo ordered, as not
_ properly to fore-go them neither; but, by a prudent fore-
_ thought and preparation, to think That a thing of no Con-
cern to him, and fo not be fenfible of any Lofs at all.
ἀλη ἠεὴ sete eeepc ae ea tsa δυλοῆν
C HAP... XVUE
F you would indeed improve in Wifdom, you
] muft be content to be thought Foolifh and Stu-
οὐ pid, for neglecting the Things of the World,
COMMENT.
_ *F*HE Reafon, why many of us lay out fo much of our
Thoughts and our Pains upon the World, is not al-
ways ἃ Defire to be fupplied with what is neceflary and con-
- venient for our Circumftances, but to avoid the Cenfure
of being thought Singular, and Infenfible, and Speculative
- Drones. Now in oppofition to this Principle, and all the
_ Difcouragements fuch Apprehenfions give us, he advifes e-
_ very Scholar of his, who would be wife in good earneft,
not to Jet fo poor a Pretence prevail upon him, to abandon
_ himfelf to the Cares of the World, and negleé the true and
_ inward Advantages of his own Mind. For what a Mon-
᾿ς ftrous Abfurdity is it, for a Man to be really Mad, for fear
of being thought fo; and to commit the moft defperate A&
of Folly, left he fhould be called Fool, by thofe who are no
better than Fools themfelves? And in truth, there is nothing
contributes to a Virtuous Life, and fuch a Behaviour as is
‘every way fuitable to the Character of a Man, confidered as
a Rational Creature, more, than to refolve not to be a Slave
_ to the Opinions of the World; not to make what idle and
_ filly People approve, any meafure of our A@ions, or rule
_ to walk by; but to ufe ones felf to defpife both their Com-
mendations and their Cenfures, and to keep our Eyes fteady
upon
3
1 το Errcretus’s Morals
upon the Diétates of right Reafon, and the Judgments of —
thofe few Good and Wife Perfons who live in Conformity
to it; and let thefe guide and govern us in the Management
of all our Affairs. For Reafon is the proper Standard, to
which all our Actions fhould be agreeable, and all the Men, —
whofe Opinions are worth our regarding, will be fure to ‘©
approve whatever is fo.
é : ἊΝ Ψ.
D° not affcét to be thought exceeding Wife 5
and if other People think you fomething more
than ordinary, let this make you fo much the more
Diftruftful and Jealous of yourfelf. For be affured,
it is no eafie matter to profecute your Defigns upon
Virtue, and other external Advantages, at one and
the fame time. But he that fets his Heart upon either -
of thefe, will of courfe find his Concern for the
Other abate and grow cold.
Pidetus hath taken a great deal of Pains, to confine
the Soul of his Young Phiiofopher within 2 narrow —
‘compats, that all his Care may be employed at Home, upon
the Improvement of himfelf; efpecially, when he firft enters
into this reform’d courfe of Life. And fince the Defire of
Riches, and the Cares of the World, are but a part of thofe
Teimptations which engage the AffeGtions, and mifplace them
abroad; fora fuperftitious value for Reputation, and popu-
Jar Applaufe, is every whit as dangerous a Bait; (and fo ἡ
much the more fo indeed, in regard they who are accom-
plifh’'d Perfons, and have fome real Excellencies to recom-
mend them to the World, are the more apt to be infnared
by them,) he advifes to root out this vain-glorious Appe-
tite by all means. Ὁ
Do wot affed to be thought Wife, fays he; not that he con-
demns the moft zealous Defires or Endeavours after Know-
ledge, but only to fupprefs the Vanity of defiring to appear
Knowing. For this fwells the Mind, and puffs it up with
flafhy Imaginations, and inclines itto the World. It reprefents
the Opinion of others, as the Rule of Aéting, rather than
Duty, and the Diéates of a Man’s own Confcience ; and
males him live no longer to himfelf, but to his Mafters,
the People; and, which is worft of all, it makes a Man fa;
tisfied with the empty Shadows, and outward ad Resp
of |
πος
=
Γ
| with ΒΘΈΜΡΓΙΟΙ 8.5 Comment. rrr.
of things, and negligent of the Subftance. For the Vain-
glorious are not half fo much concerned to be really Vir-
den ᾿ :
_tuous or Wife, as they are, to impofe upon themfelves and
“the World, in feeming fo. For this Reafon he exprefles
_himfelf very prudently here, and fays not, Do not be thought
Wife, bat Do ποὲ affed to be thought fo: For in truth, the
Efteem other People have of us, is a thing by no means in
our own Power; nor can we make them think as we would
have them; but the courting that Efteem, and being fond of
. fuch a Character, is entirely our own AG and Deed.
_ Since therefore, fince the World will fometimes have a
_ great Opinion of our Abilities, whether we feek it or no;
in fuch acafe, fays he, let their Commendations make you
but fo much the more diftrufiful and jealous of yourfelf. For
_ this will be a moft excellent Prefervative againft the giving
Lyonrtels up to be governed by other People’s Judgments, and
peaking up with the Fame or Falfe Images of Goodnefs, in-
' flead of the thing irfelf. Befides, that the fufpecting and
_ thinking more meanly of ones felf, when the World extols
_ onemoft, isa Duty particularly feafonable for young Philofo-
phers. For they that are Mafters in it, fit fecure above the
- Breath of Fame, pafs juft and impartial Judgments upo
their own Aétions; and, as they do not think the better,
fo neither need they think at all the worfe, of themfelves,
᾿ for what the World fay of them.
Now Reputation and Applaufe, we know very well, is
not the Attendant of Knowledge only, but of Temperance
and Moderation too, of Juftice and Fortitude, of Prudence;
_and indeed of every Virtue whatfoever. Every Accomplith-
“nent, that qualifies us for Bufinefs, and makes us ufeful to.
our Country and to one another, of every Character, of any
“extraordinary Eminence in the World. All thefe he hath
’ comprehended here in this fhort Expreffion of being thoughe.
| fomething more than ordinary; which extends to every kind of
» Opinion, for our Advantage, let the Ground of it be what
~ it will. ἷ
. At laft, he fhuts up all with a Conclufion, applicable not
‘only tothis Chapter, butto thofethat went before, concerning
the Care that is due to our own Minds, and intimates, that
a Learner in Philofophy will find it no-eali¢ Matter, to pro-
fecute his Defigns upon Wifdom and Virtue with Succefs,
) andar the fame time to grafp at Riches, or I‘ame, 6r any
“other Worldly Advantages. And the Reafon is, becaufe the
᾿ keeping our Minds tight in ve tae of Virtue con-
, fils
.
> en i
Lids sis E.r1tcretus’s Morals
7)
᾿
fits, in an extraordinary Vigilance and Concern for our- —
felves, and the regulating our own Wills; and in making
all without us; all that are called the Goods of Fortune, ©
little or no part of our Concern. But now an eager purfuit
of Fame, or any other external Advantage, utterly Over- —
turns this whole frame of Mind; for it engages our Affecti-
ons upon Foreign and diftant things, and makes us cold and
carelefs for ourfelves. Therefore it can be no eafie matter,
to reconcile thefe wide Extremes, and manage both at once.
But ftill you may obferve, with what Caution the Author
delivers himfelf; he declares it difficult, but he dares not
pronounce it impoffible; becaufe fome exalted Minds exert
themfelves to the Wonder of Mankind, and confequently
mutt be admitted for Exceptions from the general Rules of |
Nature. But as for the reft, who are of the fame Mould
and Tempering with their Neighbours, to Them the Rule
in the Clofe holds good, That he who propofes to follow
One of thefe, in good earneft and to purpofe, muft whol-
ly lay afide all Concern for the Other.
t
SU FRE SSS SSE SE SK SSE SSE SSE δὲς SES BSS δε δε ὅδε Sle Be δ Σ age δδᾷ SSE ARE SE λῆς SS Stes SSE δῆς Se ge δε SE OH OK δῷς
C HAP... XIX.
ΤΊ you defire that your Wife, and Children, and
Friends may never die, this isa Senflefs With;
for you would have what is not your own, to be in
your own power; and would difpofe of that which |
is anothers. So again, if you defire that your Boy
may live without any Faults, this is Foolifh too:
for it is to wifh, that Vice and Corruption may
change their Nature, and be no longer what they
cannot but be. But if you will needs be wifhing,
and would with fo as not to be difappointed, this
may be done; and therefore the beft way is to pra=
ctife upon that, which is in your own power.
CO M.-
PLiciuss Comment. 113
ee COMME N T.
THE firft Care of a Man fhould be, to tonfider what
_ 4 things are worth his Pains; and thofe that deferve to
be thought fo, ’tis plain, muft have the foliowing Qualifi-
cations. They mutt be poffible, for none but Fools lay
_themfelves out upon what can never be compaffed: And
they τη be decent and proper for the Perfon that takes
' pains for them; Something that fuits his Chara€ter and Con-
_Veniences, and Such as he may call his own when he hath
them. For nothing can be more impertinent, than to con-
cern ones felf in other Peoples Matters, and negle& our
Own; or to be extreamly folicitous for obtaining that, which
pencwner will always retain the propriety to. A Third Con-
Jeration fhould be, of what value the Prize we propofe to
ourfelves will be; of what conftancy and continuance; and
whether we can be fecure of keeping it, when we have !got
it. For no prudent Man will give himfelf trouble about
Trifles, and things that will turn to no account; or fuch
_as are likely very foon to decay, or forfake him.
_ And, therefore in purfuance of his Defign, to call off his
young Philofophers Affections from the World, and to
drive on his former Diftinétion of Things that are, and Things
_ that are not in our own power, he proves, that all external Ad-
vantages whatfoever, arereally not Ours, but anothers. And
_he had fhewed at the beginning, that whatever is Anothers,
_ cannot be any of the things in our own power, nor confe-.
quently a proper Object of our Choice.
~ When a Manthen is defirous, that his Wife, and Children,
and Friends, may never be taken away from him, this Man
is folicitous for a thing in which his Choice hath nothing to
Ὗ 0; athing that it is not poffible for him to beftow upon
himfelf; for when things are not entirely at our own Dif-
pofal, nor fubmitted to the Determination of our own Wills,
it is not for Us to make ourfelves Matters of them; but we
muft depend upon the good pleafure of thofe Perfons for
them, in whofe Poffeffion and Difpofal they are.
Befides, there are not any of thofe Advantages we are fo
‘fond of, but they are really mean, and of no value at all,
frail and perifhing, and the Enjoyment of them fhort and un-
certain. Who then would give himfelf trouble, for fo low,
Ἢ poor ἃ Recompence? Or me would engage his Affedti-
4 2 ons
ἱ
¥
TA
iy
Ν
-
1
— ee Thaker ste MT eee
T14 Ericretus’s Morals ©
Ons upon what fo many Cafualties may, and daily do con-
fpire againft, and what they muft at length deftroy, and rob |
him of > So vain is it to fix ones Happinefs, or ones Defires,. —
in the Lives of our tendereft Friends, (for inftance,) or to —
delude ones {elf with vain Hopes, and fond Withes of their —
living always; when at the fame time they are Mortal, and ©
muft fubmit to the fame fatal Neceflity, with every thing |
elfe that is fo; which is, to depart without delay or mercy, —
whenever Death fummons them away. "ἢ
So again, Ifa Man wifh, that his Servant may be Vir-_
tuous, nay, even an Honefter and better Man than himfelf, ἡ
(as many of us are apt to do fometimes, when provoked by —
the Knavery of Servants, ) this Man, (fays Epictetus) isa
ool, and wifhes an idle and impoflible thing. - For fince alk
Knavery proceeds from Vicious Principles, and the Corrup-
tion of the Mind; how can it poffibly be, that a Man, who
takes no care to govern or reform his Brutifh Appetite, but
fubmits and lives according to it, fhould aé any otherwife ©
than Vicioufly? So vain is it for Men to expedt Succefs in
thefe Matters, when they place their Affe@tions and Concern
upon things either impoffible to be had, or at the difpofal of
fome other Perfon, or poor and perifhing, and as hazardous:
and unfure in the Enjoyment, as they were difficult in the
acquifition. Muft not Men needs fail of their hopes, where
fo many Accidents concur to difappoint them? And if they.
Jeada Life of Difappointment, muft they not of neceflity lead ©
a Life of Sorrow and perpetual Torment too? Againft all
thefe Miferies there is but one Remedy, and that isan effectual
‘one indeed: *Tis tomake Ourfeves, and what Nature hath
put within our own power, the fole Object of our Care
and Concern. Now Nature hath given us an abfolute
power, of confining our Defires to fuch things, as fhe hath
made neceffary and expedient for us. And therefore we)
fhall do well, not to be too lavifh, or fquander them away
upon vain and unprofitable Matters, but to lay them out
upon thofe others: For thefe can never fail our Expedta-_
tion, and will*be fure to turn to good account, when we!
have attained them. : " |
δ“ σαν χα
γ᾽
Ἷ
“8 HAT Perfon is properly my Lord and Mafter,
᾿ς Α whohathitin his power to gratifiemy Wifhes,
οὐ to inflid my Fears; to give what I defire to
_ fiave, or to take from me what I am loth to part
“with. The only way then to preferve one’s Liber-
ty, is to reftrain one’s own Paflions, and to have
_ meither Defire nor Averfion for any thing in the
_ power of others: For he that does not fo, 15 fure
to be a Slave as long.as he lives.
COMMENT
UL YFERE again we meet with another fevere Reflexion up-
ὙῈ ΒΓ & on the World, ἀπά ἃ juft Cenfure upon thofe, who
abandon themfelves to the Love and the Cares of it. For
_ by this means we do not only betray our Minds to Mifery
and Trouble, when our Defires are fruftrated, and the Mif-
_ fortunes we fear, overtake us; but, which is more, we fink
_ into a ftate of Slavery, and fubmit, not to one, but'to many
_ Matters, to a thoufand imperious and mercilefs Mafters.
For whoever it be, fays he, that hath it in his owm power,
_ to gratify our Defires, or to bring our Fears upon us, τὸ give
_ what we would fain have, or to take away what weare loth
τὸ part with, that Perfon is moft truly our Lord and Matter.
Sothat, at this rate, every Paflion, and every Accident, ty-
_gamnizes over the worldly Man, without Retiftance/or Con-
troul.
With what humble Submiffion dowe cringe to thofe that
_ have the Riches, or Preferments, or Honours we defire, in
_ their Difpofal! How fervile are allour Applications, and how
: -obfequious all our Behaviour, that we may incline their Fa-
-vour, and prevail for the Advantages we propofe to ourfelves
_ from it? And again, when any of thefe Enjoyments lie at
their Mercy , with what Terrorsand mifgiving Fears do we
_ approach them? What mean Aéts do we make ufe of, to
_ keep their Countenance and Good Graces? and how pitiful-
_ Jy do we-flatter and fawn upon > to fecure the ep erenencs,
d | 3 9
=
Ν᾿
δ
τό | Epicterus’s Morals
‘of that; which they may deprive us of whenever they pleafe?
So poor and precarious are all the Goods of Fortune, fo —
ἴ
i
‘|
x
abfolutely anothers, and fo little ourown. For That, which ~
another can beftow, or call back again, is properly His; and
nothing js really Ours, but what. falls entirely within the —
Compafs of our own Power and Choice.
If then Liberty be, as certainly it is, a moft defirable Thing; —
and if we would affert our own Freedom, and break our
Chains; the Courfe we mutt take, is, to contraét our F ears
and Defires, to contain them within their proper Sphere,
and not fuffer them to rove abroad, or fix them upon any
thing within the Power of any but ourfelves. For if we do-
fo, our Slavery is fure, and the Inftances of it infinite. Our
Defires are our Mafters, when we would obtain them, and
our Poffeffions, when we dread the lofs of them: Our
Averfions are fo, when we fear Dangers, and our Misfor-
tunes, when we fall into them.
To this we may add another Obfervation too; That every
Man in thefe Circumftances is fubjeé&t to two Mafters; one
at home, and another abroad: For the Brutal Appetite with-
in, which moves our Reafon, (that is, ourfelves, whofe
very Effence confilts in this) and carries it away captive,
Submits both Reafon and itfelf to another Mafter, which 15
the outward Obje& of our Paffions: So that we are not on-
ly Slaves, but the meaneft and moft abjeét of them all, even —
the Slaves of Slaves.
Befides, Other Servants have fome Intervals of Freedom
and Leifure at leaft; they are not always confined to their
Matter’s Prefence; they are upon the Level with other Men ©
at fometimes; Night and Sleep fets them free; and they ob-
tain Leave and Eafe now and then, under the hardeft Go-
vernment. But Our Attendance is without any Intermifii-
on; We can neither fly from our Mafters, nor will They
ever remit or difpenfe with our Service; fleeping and waking
we {till drudge on, and are ever labouring to fatisfie the in-
folent, unjuft, and extravagant Commands of our cruel Ty-
rants:: No Moment of Reft is allowed us, after once we
have fubmitted tothem; butthey are perpetuajly teazing, and
harafling us, and employing us either with wicked AGions
or Words; or when there is an Opportunity for neither of
thefe, then diftrating us with idle Thoughts and fantaftick
Imaginations. 7 Ly .
i -
Νὰ;
Bondage to the Neceflity of their Affairs, and the Rigor of
a penurious Fortune: but Ours is not our Fate, but our
_ Choice; We hug and arefond of our Chains, are perpetual-_
_ ly contriving to bind our Slavery fafter upon us, exceeding
—Induftrious to make ourfelves miferable, and ingenious in
- finding out new Methods of ruin; that is, ever feeking out
fome freth Objeé&t of Defire or Fear; and, in order to it,
- complying with fuch Commands, as are never obeyed, but
_ to our infinite Damage, if not our utter Undoing.
_illeieleie eel teieiiis ἠεήοήε ἠεἠεηρ εήεη tli i ire
εἴ
δ
CHAP XI,
y ET itbe your conftant Care, to behave your-
felf in all the Affairs of Human Life, with the
_ fame Decency that you would at a publick Enter-
tainment. If any thing be offered you, receive it
with Modefty; If it pafs by you, and be fent to a-
nother; do not with-hold it from him, or keep
what was not intended you. If the Dith be not
᾿ς yet come down fo low; fhew not yourfelf eager,
_ nor {natch at it greedily, but wait patiently, till it
: comesto yourturn. Manage yourfelf with the fame
ood Manners and Refervednefs, in cafe of a Wife,
or Children, or Honours, or Riches, or Power, or
Preferment. This will render you worthy to be en-.
__tertained by the Gods. But if you can conquer Ap-
| petite fo far, as even to refufe and difdain the deli-
cious Meats that are fet before you: (This will not
only qualifie you to feaft with the Gods, but exalt
you to the fame Dignity and Perfection with them
too. Such were Diogenes, and Heraclitus, andthofe
other renowned Hero’s, who by this generous Scorn
were juftly cfteemed, and in reality were, Divine
᾿ Perfons,
κύτους το a St a Sa
M 4 CO M-
118 Ericretus’s Morals
COMMENT.
yaad fo many Arguments ufed to check the mighty Pro-
penfities of Human Nature, and reftrain bis Scholars
from too eager ἃ Purfuit of the Goods of Fortune; left his Dif-
courfe fhould prove lefs perfuative, for being thought too fe-.
vere; -hetellsus, that it isnot his Intention to debar Men from
all Communication with the World; and therefore he in-
ftruéts us, what Advantages they are allowed to partake of,
and how they ought to demean themfelves with regard to
to them. He had before indulged us the Ufe of not only
the Neceffaries, but the Conveniencies of Human Life; pro-
vided that we accepted of thefe, as additional Enjoyments,
and did not miftake them for our main Concern, but kept
our Minds and Eyes conftantly intent upon the Ship, and
(as he expreft it there) were ready to come on Board, and
Sail at the Mafter’s Call. And now he tells us, that what-
ever of this kind is prefented to us, we may receive it, whe-
ther it be a Wife, or Children, or Riches, or Advancement ;
but then we muft take it modeftly and decently, and not
fuffer our Appetites to grow impatient, and fnatch or reach
at it rudely, before it is offered. So again, if they were
once ours and are taken away (for thus I underftand that
Expreffion of paffing by, and being fent to fome body elfe)
we mult by no means detain them, he fays; that is, we
fhould part with them patiently, neither ftruggling to keep
them, nor repining at the Lofs. If they be not yet come
to us; it will ill become us to defire them before our Turn,
to feed our Withes and Imaginations with them, and be fo
taken up with thefe, as to forget both Virtue and ourfelves,
When they are givento us, we muft not receive them
even then voracioufly, and with too much feeming Tranf-
port; but decently and gently, that fo we may keep our-
{elves above them, and ufe them prudently, without fuffer-
ing our Affeétions to be over-power’d by, and wholly im-
merit in them.
Now the Condition of Men in the World is here repre-
fented, by People met together ata Common Entertain-
ment; where Almighty God makes the Invitation and the
Feaft; and every one of the Guefts partakes of the Provi-
fion, according as his own Appetite ftands affeted. Some —
behave themfelves with a prudent Referve, like well-bred ~
a To) es ae
ἐν
‘4
’ with Simpxiiciuss Comment. 119
Perfons; as the Di@ates of Reafon and Nature direé&t them,
and in a manner acceptable to the the Mafter of the Feaft,
fo as to feem Guefts worthy of the Gods. Others again, are
infolent and unruly, greedy and gluttonous, injure them-
_ felves, and difpleafe the Great Lord that receives them.
But the efpecial Excellency is yet behind. For if you-are
a Perfon of fo exalted a Virtue, as not only to wait with
Patience, and accept with Modefty, but even to decline
and flight thefe worldly Advantages, which the Generality of
Mankiad dote upon fo infinitely, atid can deny yourfelf
what the Mafter of the Feaft offers to you; this is the ut-
-moft Perfe@tion Mortality is capable of : the World is no
longer worthy of fuch a Perfon; he hath tranfcended Hu-
mane Nature itfelf, and is not only fit to be a Gueft of the
Gods, but to be admitted into a fhare of that Dignity, and
thofe Divine Excellencies, which he hath wrought himfelf
up to fo near a Refernblance of.
SS. ee |; ο. δ νου δι,
Ω J
This was the Cafe of Crates and Diogezes, the latter of
which exprett fojufta Contempt of the World, that when
Alexander the Great faw him basking in the warm Sun, and
asked, what he fhould do for him; he defired no more, than
only that he would ftand out of the Sun-fhine. Which An-
_ fwer gave fo true an Idea of the Galiantry of his Soul, that
this mighty Conqueror thought that Philofopher a Braver and
Greater Man, than himfelf in all his Triumphs; arid faid,
that he could with, if that were poffible, tobe Diogenes; but if .
not. then bis fecond With fhould be to continue Alexander.
’ Thus then the Good Providence, which conftitutes this
mortal State, and mingles Mens Circumftances in it, as it
fees moft fuitable and convenient, advances thofe Perfons
to the Table of the Gods, who manage the Incumbrances
of the Body and the World, according to the Direétions gi-
ven us, and temper all their AGions with Prudence and
Moderation. But when Mendonoronly manage, but tran-
{cgnd, the World and its Enjoyments; when they get quite
above thefe Things, and exercife an abfolute Maftery over
» them; then the fame Providence calls up thofeSouls, which
fo well imitate the Divine Excellencies, intoafort of Part-
netfhip and Government; and makes them (as it were) its
Affiftants in the difpofing of Things herebelow. Fot, what
a can we think lefs of them, while they fit enthroned on high, ἡ
and look down, and order all Things, with fuch undiftur-
bed Security, and fo Imperial a Sway, as if themfelves were
no longer a part of this Uniyerfe, but, like thofe Beings a-
. : 5 above,
120 EpictTretus’s Morals
-ππρρΠΤΤὁοπη.τπιτςᾺ.:ῸὋὁἝϑὉ τ -π χΤἸὄτὡΤὌΦ-«΄π΄παΣ.ὔρὄϑϑδτττττττττι,ὕτΧὉΧϑὉ.νϑ.ρϑϑ,᾽..νϑ.0ρϑρϑᾧΤὗἴἔ ἠπ πΤοοορϑρϑρ9ϑρὖϑρὖθρὖϑρῸᾷρῸρ66Π6Π6ὖΠὖ6ὖ6΄ρἷΠἷΠἷΠἷΠἷἧἷἧ!;ἷ.
bove, were diltinct and feparate from it, and governed 'their
own World ὃ
For this Reafon Epictetus fays, Heraclitus and Diogenes,
who had a generous Difdain for thefe Things, were juftly efteem-
ed, and in reality were Divine Perfons. And indeed, they’
are truly fo, who live up to the utmoft Perfe@tion of their
Nature, and diveft themfelves of all Concerns for the Body.
and the World. They are fpiritualized already, and have
no more to do with any Impreffions of Flefh and Senfe,
This is the urmoft Perfection of aHumane Mind ; and what-
ever is abfolutely perfect, is Divine; becaufe it is of God,
who is the Source and Sum of all Perfeétion.
CHAP. XXIL
Woes you fee a Neighbour in Tears, and
hear him lament the Abfence of his Son, the
Hazards of his Voyage into fome remote Part of the
World, or the Lofs of his Eftate ; keep upon your
Guard, for fear fome falfe Ideas rifing upon thefe
Occafions, furprize you intoa Miftake, as if this
Man were really miferable, upon the Account of
thofe outward Accidents. But be fure to diftinguifh
wifely, and tell yourfelf immediately, that the Thing,
which really afflicts this Perfon, is not really the Ac-
cident itfelf, (for other People, under his Circum-
ftances, are not equally afflicted with it) but mere-
ly the Opinion, which he hath formed to himfelf
concerning this Accident. Notwithftanding all
which, you may be allowed, as far as Exprefliohis.
and outward Behaviour go, to comply with him;
and if Occafion require, to bear a part in his Sighs,
and Tears too. But then you mutt be fure to take
Care, that this Compliance do not infeét your Mind,
nor betray you to an inward and real Sorrow, up-.
on any fuch Account.
CO Me
with ϑιμρ Licius’s Comment. 121
COMMENT.
| S this Confideration, that the defirable Things of this
ΓᾺ World are not, cannot be our Happinefs, though
we fhould fuppofe'a Man never fo profperous, fhould re-
ftrain our Eagernefs, and check our too forward Defires af-
ter them; fo that other Reflexion, that no External Mis-
fortune can make us truly miferable, fhould be an Argu-
ment no lefs prevailing, to buoy up our Spirits, and make
us entertain them with Courage and Refolution.
To this purpofe, our Author urges the following Inftance,
of a Man in great Grief and Lamentation for fome Cala-
mity; the Death or the Diftance of a Darling Child, the
Lofs of an Eftate, and being reduced to extreme Poverty,
or the like. And the Caution he gives upon fuch Occali-
ons, is, that the Spectators would not fuffer themfelves to
be born down by the Torrent of this Man’s Tears, and car-
ried into an Erroneous Opinion of his being made miferable
by any of thefe Difafters: For, they are to recolle@ them-
felves, and confider, that no Man’s Happinefs or Unhap-
pinefs does, or ever can, depend upon his Succeffes in the
World, or any of the Good or Bad Events from without.
| But if. this be fo, how comes it then to pafs, that this Per-
fon is fo infinitely affiiéted, as if fome real IJ] had happened
to him? TheAccident, it is plain, cannot be Evil in its own
Nature. Were it fo, all Perfons that lye under the fame
_ Misfortune, would feel the fame Impreffions, and be car-
ried to an equal Excefs of Grief. For thisis a Rule in Na-
_ ture, that Natural Qualities have always the fame Operation ;
and what feels hot to one, will feel fo to every one that
_ touchesit. .Atthis rate then, every one who buries a Son,
muff mourn and lament; and yet Avaxagoras, when News
_ was brought him of the Death of His, made Anfwer, with
all the Bravery and Unconcernednefs in the World, Well,
I knew my Child could be nomore than mortal. But what
then is the true Cauieof all this Melancholy? Nothing elfe,
but the Man’s own Notions of this Accident: This is the
Root of all the Difeafe ; and our Opinions are properly our
_ own. So that we will grant the Ground of this exceffive
| Grief to be not only a feeming, but a real Evil; but then
the Miftake of the Perfon {till remains ; for itis not in any
Accident from without, but rifes entirely from within him-
Ἂν , Ν ό ;
9 felf,
PEE ROE Vi νυ,
g22 Epicretus’s Morals —
felf, and is owing to nothing elfe but his own wrong Ap-
prehenfions. And thisis both areal Evil, and properly ones _
Own too, becaufe Opinions are fome of the Things within
our own Power, and the Truth and Falfhood of thefe de-
pends purely upon the Will, and falls within the Compafs
of our own Choice. ‘i ᾽
~ You will ask perhaps, in the next place, what Behaviour
is proper in fuch a Cafe? Is no Compaflion due to this af-
Aidted miftaken Man? And mutt I only, with a fullen Ma-
gifterial Pride, condemn his Error, and chide or fcorm his
Folly? By no means. This Deportment is unfuitable to
the Chara@er of a Good Man. You are allowed therefore
to pity and comply with him, to condefcend in fome mea-
fure to his Frailties, to fpeak kind and tender Things, and
if youfee Occafion, to drop a few Tears for Company. Nor
is all thisito be put on merely for Oftentation, or to fhew
Good Nature: For Diffimulation and Trick is what no Cir-
cumftance can render excufable to a Good Man. But your
Trouble may be real; and indeed, there is but too juft a
Pretence for it, when you fee fuch an Inftancé of Humane
Infirmity, as a Man who thinks the Misfortunes of the
World worth fo immoderate a Concern.
But ftill you muft fet Bounds to your Pity and Condefcen-
fion, for Grief is catching ; andthereforebe fure to take care,
that it do not faften upon your Mind, and fo you fall into -
the fame Difeafe of a real Concern for the Accident itfelf.
If once you fink fo low, you are for the future incapable of /
doing the Sorrowful any Service. He that would be fet-
viceable to another’s Cure, and quiet the Anguifh of his*
Paffions, muft make fome Advances indeed, and fome Com-
pliances ; but he muft be fure to keep out of the Reach of
infe&tion too. A Man who ftands ftill upon the Bank, and
will not fo much as ftep into the Water, can never draw his
Friend out when he is drowning; and a Man that jumps.
in, and lets the fame Stream carry hima away too, can as lit-
tle doit. He that appears infenfible, and void of all tender
Impreflions, will never be able to compofe another’s Paffi-
on, and bring him to Reafon; but He that fuffers the fame
Paflion to overcome his own Reafon too, will be fo far from
ferving his Friend, that he himfelf muft be beholdem to the
Affiftance of fome third Friend.
C HAP.
ΟΠ with ΘιμΡρι τοι 55 Comment. 123
CHAP. XXII,
Emember, that the World is a Theatre, and
R that your Part in this Play of Life is deter- .
mined by the Poet. Upon him it muft depend,
whether you fhall act along ora fhort one: whe-
ther your Character fhall be high or low: If there~
fore he affign you that of a Beggar, take care to
humour it well ; if a Cripple, or a Prince, or a
private obfcure Man, or whatever it be, make the
beft of it: For confider, that the playing of the
Part afligned you commendably, depends upon
~ yourfelf. This is your Bufinefs; but the giving
out of the Parts, and chufing the Actors, is not
- Yours, but another Perfon’s.
a
COMMENT.
FN one of the Chapters a little before, this prefent Life,
Ἢ and the Diftributionand Enjoyment of the Comforts and
Advantages of it, was compared to a Publick Entertainment,
and the Maker and Mafter of that Entertainment was {aid
to be Almighty God, who left us at Liberty, either to ac-
cept, or to refufe, the Difhes fet before us. For this Rea-
fon it was, that fuch Pains were taken tocorre& and form our
'Appetites aright; andto inftruct us, how we ought to govern
Ourfelves, and our Choice, with regard to all External E-
vents, paft, prefent, and future. For, at Feafts every ει
feeds on what ‘is fet before him, according as his own Palate
ftands, and his own Judgment directs him.
- But here we meet with another kind of Reprefentation ;
Life is refembled to a Play, in which every Man breathing
bearsa part, but the Compofer, and Difpenfer of thefe Parts
is God. For in this refpe&t the prefent Similitude differs
from the former, that in it we are not left to our own Dif-
pofal, whether we will accept-what is affigned us or not.
Providence hath appointed our Character, and we cannot,
change or decline it. here are infinite Inftances of this
i kind ,
ae i ἜΝ Be cdans) 6 ! ;
124 Epictretus’s Morals .
kind, which feem to carry a plain Fatality in them. For
though, when Riches are offered us, it is in our Powerto re-
ject them, and embrace a voluntary Poverty ; yet when Po-
verty or Sicknefsis laid outfor us, itisnot thenin our Pow-
er to decline thefe. So again, we may chufe whether we
will be Mafters and Governowrs, or not; but we cannot
* chufe whether we will be Servants or Subjeéts, or not.
All then that is left to our own Liberty here, is the Ma-
nagement of what falls to our fhare; and the Blame or the
Commendation, the Happinefs or the Mifery, of a Man in
fuch Cafes, does not contift properly, in defiring or not de-
firing, accepting or refufing, (for this laftdoes not fall with-
in our Sphere) but in fuch a Management, as is ftill left at
our own Liberty; thatis, in behaving ourfelves decently
or otherwife, fuitably or unfuitably to our Condition. For,
though we cannot avoid Poverty or Sicknefs when we would,
yet wecan make a Virtue of Neceflity; and, if we pleafe,
can carry ourfelves handfomely under them. And all the
Fate in the World cannot tye us up fo far, but that the hus-
banding and making the beft of thofe things, which we
cannot help, thall be ftill as much in our own Breafts, as of
thofe, which we chute and procure for our own felves,
Thus it is in the practice of the Stage. The Choice of
the Players, is the Poet’s Work; it is Hethat gives out the
Parts, according to the particular Humours of the A@ors ;
He takes notice of their Qualifications and Abilities, and
then fuits the Perfons to the Charaéters they are capable of,
One he appoints to perfonate a Prince, another a Servant,
another a Mad-Man, (for every one is not fit to play Ore/tes.)
Thus far His Care goes, and he is anfwerable no farther:
For the Perfons, to whom thefe Parts are affligned, muft ac-
count for the doing them Juftice in the A@tion.
For this Reafon it is, that Men do not judge of the En-
tertainment of a Play-Houfe, by the Greatnefs or Quality of
the Character, but by the juft Proportion, and the natural
Reprefentation, and the Gracefulnefs of the A@ion irfelf.
How often do we fee a Beggar, or a Servant, or a Mad-
Man, clapped, and at the fame time, a Rich Man, or a Ge-
neral, or a King hiffed? The Reafon of which is, that one
hath hit the Humour of his part, and maintained the Chara-
Ger he was to appear in, and the other did not fo. The
Beggar behaved himfelfas a Beggar fhould do, and the King
“funk beneath the Grandeur of his Poft ; and this Behaviour
was the proper Bulinefs of the ACtors themfelves, though the
chufing,
μὰ a
Af a is 2 δι - “ “ ass -
᾿ with SimpLictius’s Comment. 125
chufing, whether they thould perfonate a King, or a Beggar,
was not.
Juft thus we find in this ναί! Theatre of the World. How
_ many Emperors, and Wealthy, and Strong Lufty Men, have
‘fpoiled their Parts, while the Poor, the Lame, the Slave, the
Defpifed Epictecus, performed His, with the approbation of
his Great Matter, and to the wonder of all the Spe@ators?
For though his Part had lefs of Pomp and Shew than theirs,
yet he ftudied the Charaéter throughly, and kept it up to the
very laft, and anfwered the Defign and Diredtions of the Poet,
who deftin’d him to it. This was his proper Bufinefs, and
therefore this Commendation is due to him for it. For, as -
no Man’s Happinefs or Mifery can confift in any thing, but’
what falls within his own Choice ; fo neither will any Wife
Man allow, that either Praife or Commendation, Honour
or Infamy, belongs properly to any thing elfe. And confe-
guently, it is not the Part, but the Manner of acting it, that
every Man diftinguifhes himfelf by.
CHAP. XXIV.
HEN the Ravens croak or ‘any other Omi-
WV nous thing happens, let not any Supertftiti-
ous Fancies difturb or affright you: But have im-
mediate recourfe to this Diftinétion, for the qui-
eting your Fears, That nothing of this kind can |
Bode Ill to You: To your Body, or your Eftate,
or your Reputation, or your Wife, or your Chil-
dren, “tis poflible it may: but as for yourfelf, ’tis
in your own power to make every thing aufpici-
ous to you; becaule whatever Difatter happens in
any of the fore-mentioned Refpects, you may, if
you pleafe, reap fome very confiderable Advantage
from it. Nie |
CO M-
526 Erprceretus’s Morals
COMMENT.
τὶ i IS Chapter feems to me to be mifplaced, and would
be more Methodical, if fet before the former, and im-
mediately after that which begins with If you fee a Neighbour
ie Tears, &c. For, having told us there, that a Man ought
not to be too fenfibly affe€ted with the exceflive Paffion of
thofe, who think themfelves unhappy, for the lofs of any of
the Comforts of this World; nor fympathize fo far, as to
_imagine, that fuch a one isreally Miferable upon any of thefe
Accounts; (fince a Man’s Happinefs or his Wretchednefs
does not confift in any outward Profperous or Adverfe E-
vents, but purely in the ufe of his own Free-Will, and the
Practice or Negle@ of what God and Nature have made en-
tirely the Objet of his own Choice and Power) herehe adds,
that if any inaufpicious Bird, or other Omen feem to fore-
tel Mifchief and Ill-luck, this ought not to terrify or dif-
compofe us. But, though we fhould fuppofethem to carry
any ill portent to our Bodies or our Fortunes, yet we mutt
diftinguifh between thefe and ourfelves; and fhould confi-
der, that our own Happinefs and Mifery depends upon our
own Difpofal, and can come from nothing but ourfelves.
Do but refolve then not to make yourfelf unhappy, and
all the moft direful Significations of Misfortune, and all the
Misfortunes confequent to thofe Significations, fhall never
Ἢ beable to doit. Your Body, ’tis true may be Sick, or Die;
your Reputation may be Blafted, your Eftate Deltroyed or
Wafted, your Wife or Children takenfrom you; but ftillall
this does not reach yourfelf; that is your Reafoning Mind.
This can never be Miferable, nay, it muft and will be Hap-
py, in defpight of all thefe Ill-bodings, except you confent
to your own Wretchednefs: For all your Good and Evil
depends wholly upon yourfelf. ξ
Nay, which is more, and the greateft Security imaginable, _
thefe very Misfortunes fhall confpire to render you yet more ~
Happy. For out of this Bitter you may gather Sweetnefs,
and convert what is generally miftaken tor Mifery, to your
own mighty Benefit. And the greater thofe Calamities are,
the more confiderable will the Advantage be, provided you
manage them prudently, and behave yourfelf decently under
them. Nowit is plain from hence, that thefe are not Evils,
properly fpeaking, for whatever is fo, muft always do sic
an
Ἵ
with SimpLicius’sComment. 127
and’can never change its Nature fo far, as to contribute to
᾿ anygood Effe&t. Since then:thefe may be fo ordered, as to
become fubfervient to your Good ; and finceno Ill can come
toyou, but what yourfelf muft be inftrumental in, and ac-
céffary to; you mutt of neceffity grant, that all Omens, and
all the Evils threatned by them, are not, cannot be Evils to
you yourfelf, unlefs you pleafe to make them fo 5 and that
all they can pretend to, is to affect fomething that belongs,
or bears fome diftant Relation, to you.
᾿ς κλλλλλλλλλλλλλα oles Gtalk
CPE A EO:
1: is in your power always to come off Conquer-
dL» or, provided you will never engage in any Com-
bats, but fuch, whofe Succeffes will be determined
by your own Choice.
COVA Ae EB NL
E had faid juft before, that no Ominous Predi@ions bo-~
ded any ill to Men, except they brought the Evil upon
themfelves, becaufe it is in the power of every one not to
be Miferable. And this ChapterI take to be a farther Pro-
fecution of that Argument, and added by way of Proof and
_ Confirmation to the former.
For it isin our own power, never to enter the Lifts with
any External Accidents ; that is, we may fo reftrain our De-
fires and Averfions, as not to concern ourfelves with them.
If we ftake our Happinefs upon the Succefs of fuch an En-
ο΄ counter, we mult needs retire with Lofs; becaufe fuch De-
fires will meet with frequent Difappointments, and fuch A-
_ verfions cannot always deliver us from the Dangers we fear.
_ Let all our Combats therefore be confined to ourfelves, and
_ tofuch things, as Nature hath put in the power of our own
| Wills; for’ when you ftrive with your own Defires, and A-
_ vertions, and Opinions, the Prizeis in your own Hands, and
~ you may reft fecure of Danger ‘or Difappointment.. This
he had thewn at large formerly, and this is in effe& the fame
N thing,
/
i ον τι
128 Epictretus’s Morals
ee
thing, as to fay, that a Man fhall never be vanquifhed, but
always come off triumphantly.
And if this be true, then it is no lefs evidently fo, that it
is in a Man’s own Power never to be Miferable : For he.
that is Miferable, isa Subdued Man; and, if it depend upon.
one’s own Choice, whether any Evil fhall happen to him,
then it muft needs be in his own Breaft too, whether any O-
mens or Prediations fhall portend ΠῚ to him. So that Epicte-
tus had reafon, when he pronounced fo peremptorily, that
no inaufpicious Events are fignified to any Man, unle{s him-
felf confpire to make them fo: That is, unlefs he engage in
fuch Difputes, as he is not qualified for, and where the Vi-
tory is doubtful at leaft, if not fure to go againft him. And
this is done by every one, who overlooks his own Mind,
and places his Happinefs and Unhappinefs, in the Events of
Fortune, and the Affairs of the World.
tee ee
CHAP. XXVI.
AK E heed, when you fee any Perfon advan-
ced to an eminent Station of Honour or Pow-
‘ery or any other kind of Profperity, that you be
not prefently furprized witha falfe Idea of his Con-
dition, and rafhly pronounce him Happy. For, if
allthe Happinefs and Tranquillity of our Minds de-
pend upon things within our own power, there
can be no room for Envy or Emulation. And
you yourfelf, when you confider, do not defire to
be a Genera!, or a Senator, or ἃ Conful, but to be
free and eafie. Now the only way to be fo, is to
defpife the World, and every thing that is out of
your own power.
CO M-
ἴ ᾿ 3 . - Ν
‘with διμρεῖσιῦ 85 Comment. 129
COMMENT.
HE only Method of infuring a Conqueft upon all En-
counters, the laft Chapter told us, is never to engage
with what is out of our own power. But becaufe we are
exceeding apt to be drawn into fuch Conflifs ; and by no-
thing more indeed, than by the Examples of other Perfons,
who feem Profperous, and Happy, and by the Envy and E-
mulation that ufually follows upon fuch occafions ; there-
fore he thews us here very briefly, that no body, who makes
the real Happinefs of a Man his ferious Study and fincere
Endeavour, -is capable of Envy or Emulation; and that it
were utterly inconfiftent with his Principles, to be guilty of
either. nih
- For if the proper Happinefs of a Man depend upon the ufe
of his Free-Will, andupon thofe things that are fubjeCtedto
it; and if the Perfons who are promoted to Power and
Honour, and courted with popular Applaufe and Admira-
tion, have not in all this any of thofe Advantages, which
Nature hath putin our own power; it is manifeft, that thefe
_ feemingly Happy Men are not in reality fuch; nor have they,
by this Advancement, attained to any degree of that, which
is the peculiar and true Happinefs of Humane Nature. What
occalion then can all thefe flattering Appearances give for
_ Envy or Emulation? For Envy is properly the repining at
_ another’s Happinefs; and Emulation, is an impatient De-
- fire of raifing ourfelves up to an Equality with others, who
_ exceed us in fomething, which we take for Happinefs.
_ Now the Original Caufe of thefe Paffions is rooted in
- our Nature and Conftitution ; which determines us to thirft
_ after Honour and Efteem, andis uneafie, when we come be--
hind any of our Equals. Hence it is, that Men of mean
_ Souls, and Vulgar Attainments, and fuch as defpair of ad-
_ vancing themfelves by the ftrength of theirown Worth, en-
_ deavour to undermine, and detra& from, others of better De-
fert, that fo they mayrife upon Their Ruins. And to fuch
_ ungenerous Tempers no confideration is fo affiéting, as the
good Succeffes of their Neighbours: And in this- Vile Dif
pofition the very Effence of Envy confifts. For Envy fteals
_ in upon the Profperous, or thofe that are efteemed fo; but
_efpecially, if thofe Perfons are upon the fame level with ours
_ -felves, either in refpeci of their Birth, or Fortune, or P:o-
; 2 feffion
7
]
r
i
Ἢ
130 Erretretus’s Morals
“ele a I ll ΞΕ ΕΣΤ
feffion, or other Accomplifhments. For Perfons either very
much above, or very much below ourfelves, are not the Ob-
εξ of our Envy. Becaufe thefe are not a match for us,
but the one fort excite our Admiration, and the Other pro-
voke our Contempt.
But where Nature hath given a greater ftrength of Parts,
and a more aétive and generous Difpofition, there Menfeel
a gallant warmthof Soul, which exerts itfelf vigoroufly, and
firuggles to come up to the perfection of Others, by virtue - |
of ones Own Merit, without any invidious Arts of leffen-
ing theirs : Nay, not only to comeup with them, but to out~
firip them in the Race, and bear away the Prize. From the
difference then of thefe Two Tempers, and the Practices con-
fequent to them, we may plainly perceive, that Envy is a
Vicious Paffion, and no Qualification can render it other-
wife. But Emulation is fometimes commendable, and near-
ly related to the Love of Goodnefs, when Virtue is the thing
We ftrive to excel in; but it degenerates into Vice, and is
little better than Envy, when the Advantages of Fortune,
and the World, are the Prize we contend for.
Since therefore Good is the proper Object of Envy and
Emulation ; and fince Preference in Honour, or Power, or |
Reputation, is only miftaken for fuch by the Vulgar, but
can really be no fuch thing; becaufe none of thefe fall with-
in our own Choice; it is plain, that in Men, who examine
Matters nicely, there can be no fuch Paffion, as Envy and
Emulation, excited upon-any of thefe Accounts. Confe-
quently, thefe are ‘Refentments, moft unbecoming a Man, ©
who makes Wifdomand Virtue his Study, becaufe they plain- ©
ly argue, that while he accounts fuch Perfons worthy of his
Envy or Emulation, he does likewife expe to find his Hap- |
pinefs, in thofe Advantages which they enjoy. Now this
contradiés the very firft Principles of Philofophy, and is in-
confiftent with the Charaéter he pretends to. For the thing ~
that ought to be firft in his Defires, is Liberty ; the breaking
thofe Chains his Paffions have bound him in, and getting —
joofe from all the Incumbrances of the World. | And: the
only way to deliver himfelf from this Bondage, is τὸ flight —
end dif@ain the World and to affert his Native Freedom, —
from-all thofe external Accidents, thofe Rivals in his A ffe€ti-
ons, which fubdued and enflaved his Mind. For thefe only |
have the power to vanquifh and captivate him, by difappoint-_
ing his Hopes and Expeétations, and oppreffing him with the ©
Calamities he fears. Upon thefe it is, that our Brutifh In~
4 clinations |
“Ἢ
met
Raivdved senees sa -
with SimpLicius’s Comment. 131
clinations let themfelves loofe; and from hence comes all
that remorfelefs Tyranny, which-they ufurp, and fo arbi-
trarily exercife, overus. The Contempt of the World there-
fore is the moft effeGtual Method of reducing all into Order
again, for by a brave and juft {corn of thofe outward Ob-
jects, we weaken the Defires that lead to them ; And when
omce thofe Succours are intercepted and cut off, thefe can-
not ftand alone ; but fallin of courfe, and fubmit themfelves
to Reafon.
CHAP. XXVIL
Emember, when any Man Reviles or Strikes
R you, it isnot the Tongue, that gives you
the Opprobrious Language, or the Hand that: deals
the Blow, that injures or affronts you; bur it is
your own Refentment of it, as’an Injury or Affront,
that makes it fuch to you. When therefore you
are provoked, this is owing entirely to your own
Apprehenfions of the Thing. And efpecially guard
᾿ς yourfelf well againft the firft impreflions; for it-you
can but fo. far fudue your Paffion, as to gain time |
for cooler Thoughts, you will--eafily attain toa ᾿
᾿ good 'Goveérnment of yourfelf afterwards. ‘
“ > 4) ᾿
Se AGB SEE ΝΕ A A BR BS BS AE δε SR χε a δε ate δε age age δῆς ὃς δὲ ae ὅδ ὃς CA A ἐς δε a GR
21. Ott :
CHAP. ΧΧΥΠΙ.
Bus. be {τὸ to keep Death,. Perfecution, and
_ Banifhment, and all thofe Calamities, which
Mankind are moft afraid of, conftantly before your
Eyes, and let them be very familiar to your Mind.
But above all, let’ Death be ever prefent there; For
you will find this a moft excellent Remedy againit
bafe and mean Thoughts, and a powerful Reitrainr
_ to all immoderate Defires.
N 3 | CO Μ:
132 Erpictetus’s Morals
COMMENT,
AS having again expofed the Vanity of all thofe imagi-
nary Happineffes, which Men depend upon the World
for ; and fhewed us, that a Gallant and Generous Difdain of
thefe, is the only poflible Courfe of fetting our Souls at Li-
berty, and living eafie ; he proceeds in the next place, to take
off all thofe formidable Objeétions, which Men are apt, ei-
ther to raife merely for Difcourfe fake, or ufed to feel the
difcouraging effects of in themfelves, while they are yet but.
raw and untrained in the Difcipline of Wifdom and Vir-
tue. And in this he obferves his former Method, of having
recourfe to the firft Principles of Morality.
~The Sum of what the Objetors have to fay, is this: That
fuch a Contempt and Negle& of the World, how Great and
Gay foever they may look at firft, are yet really attended
with many Inconveniences; for they render Men Defpica-
ble and Cheap, keep them Impotent and Low, and:lay them
open to all the Infolences and Injuries imaginable, while they
are neither in a capacity to repel the Wrongs that are done
them by Force nor can defcend fo low, as to prevent them
by Flattery, and Servile Applications. When People fee
this, there is no Indignity, that they have not il! Nature e~
nough to offer; no Liberty, that they will not give them-
felves ; Nor Tongue, nor Hand will know any Reftraint.
And thus we {ee daily, that when Men-have got the Afcen-
dant, there is nothing they ftick at; they. wound fuch uore-
fifting Philofophical Perfons in their Reputation, with Slan-
ders and Reproaches ; offer Violen¢e and Indignities to their
Perfons; treat them with all manner of Contumely and
Scorn; opprefs them in their Eftates; drive them from their
‘Dwellings ; clap them into Prifons; make them fly their
Country; and, as if all this were too little, fometimes take
away their very Lives too. Now, Who would chufe to be
thus trampled upon; and not only chufe, but make a Virtue
of it too? A Virtue, that provokes the moft barbarous {n--
juftice and all manner of Affronts, and leaves a Mat naked
and defencelefs to them all ὃ, ἘΠ at
To all this Epséetus replies in fhort, that there is nothing
Srievous or terrible in all this difmal Reprefentation, For
if there were, all the World would agree in efteeming it fo.
But in truth, the only thing that carries Terror in it, is the
‘Opinion
\ a
with SrmpLicius’s Comment. 133
‘Opinion we entertain of thefe injuries being fuch. So that
the affront is not from the Aétion of the Perfon that offers
but from the Opinion of the Perfon that refents it; And
confequently, we expofe and injure ourfelves; for thefe O-
pinions are our own A& and Deed.
Now, that Reproach and Slanders are no fuch mighty Af-
fiction, nor what ought to move our Indignation, and dif-
quiet our Minds. will very eafily be made appear. or,
they muft be either true or falfe. If the former, why fovery
loth, ἀπά [Ὁ very much ‘difpleafed, to -hear the Truth? Our
Shame in this cafe comes too late ; and we fhould have done
much better, in hating to commit the Faét, than in hating
_ tobe told of itafterwards. But if whatis faid of us be falfe,
it is the Reporter, and not We, that are the worfe for it. τὺ
What Courfe then is to be taken in this cafe ? He tells
you, the Remedy is, Not to let this Affront make too fud+
den and fenfible Impreffions upon you, nor provoke you’ to
- Lamentations and Complaints, as if you thought yourfelf
unhappy upon this Account; but to give yourfelf Leifure to
recollect, and confider the true Nature of the Thing calmly
andcoolly. For ifyouoncecan gaintime, and defend your-
felf again{ft the Surprize of the Thing, you will live eafie
and quiet, and your Mind will be in a Condition to weigh
and apply the Principles of Philofophy, and to diftinguifh,
whether this Accident be any thing within your own Power.
or not. And, when ‘you find it to be fomewhat that your
Will cannot command, the Refult of this will prefently be,
to conclude, that neither your Happinefs or Unhappinefs can
depend upon it; ad that, be it as bad as it is poffible to fup-
pofe, yet youhave itin your Powertoconvert it to an excel-
lent Ufe; and, by atrue Elevation of Soul, which ex-
prefles a decent Contempt of the World, and all its Ma-
lice, to reap. great Advantages from fuch crofs Accidents as
thefe.
Now the beft Expedient for Evennefs of Temper is Cu-
ftom. And therefore, upon any fuch provoking Occafion,
there is no Prefervative againft falfe Notions and immode-
rate Refentments, like Silence, and refufing to give one’s
Paffion vent; and though it may boil and foam within, yet
{till to ftifle the Fire, till we feel its Heat abate ; and not let
loofe the Dog, till he have done fnarling. This Pra@tice is
recommended to us particularly by the Example of Socrates,
who was taken notice of, for never {peaking a Word, when
any thing anger’d him.
" N 4 What
What Ep:deras {ays upon this, Subjeét, .and that-which
follows.in the next Chapter, have, in,my Opinion, fo clofe.
a Coherence, that they ought to be connected by that-Parti-
cle) But, which feems to. me by no Means. redundant, but a
very fignificant Conjunction in this plage. Thus then the
Author carries on-his Argument; Buat.as for Death and Exile,
and all rhofe Calamities which Mankind ane. wfually afrata of, be
fure to keep thefe conftantly before your Eyes; and fo om., 2...
For, having proved, concerning all External Events,-im
general; eventhe difmalleft and dreadfullelt of them all, that
there is not any thing formidable er injurious in the Nature
of the Things themfelves ; but that this is entirely owingto
Mens own Notions and Refentments of them; he prefcribes
Caution, and Leifure, and cooler Confideration, as the bett
Remedy againft fuchmpreflions, and particularly againtt‘our
being enraged at, or dejected under, any Vexation-on crofs
Accidents. But he dire&s to another fort of Application,
againft Death, andExile, and fuch Misfortunes, αὐ are of the
‘firftand moft formidable Kind ; which is, to bear them: con-
tinually in mind, and livein Expectation of them every Mo-
menr, as Things that may comeat any time; and fome of
which mott certainly will come, at,one time or, other.
For when once Reafon hath convinced us, that thefe Things
are not really fuch, as make a Man one whit the better, or
the worfe; and when cuftomary Meditation hath reconciled
us tothem, taken off all their “Perror, and rendred: the
Thoughts of them :eafie and familiar to the Soul, -we pre-
fently Jook upon the-moft dreadful of, them, all, as Things
frequent andcommon; and by this means we feel both our
Spirits fupported δραϊπ the Terrors, and our Affections
much moderated, and. weaned from the Pleafures of the
World.
“-π-ππττο
with SrMPpLiciuss Comment. 135
CHAP. XXIX..
F you refolve to make Wifdom and Virtue the
fl Study and Bufinefs of your Life, you. muft be
fure to arm yourfelf before-hand, againft all the In-
conveniencies and Difcouragements,. that are like to
attend this Refolution. Imagine, that you fhall
meet with many Scoffs, and much Derifion ; and
that People will upbraid you with turning Philo-
fopher. all on the fudden; and ask in Scorn, What
is the meaning’ of all this affected Gravity, yand
‘thefe difdainful Looks? .But be not you affected,
or fapercilious, only flick clofe to whatever you
are in your Judgment convinced is virtuous and be-
coming; and confider this as your proper Station,
afligned you by God, which you muft not quit
upon any Terms. » And remember, ‘That if you:per-
fevere in Goodnefs, thofe very Men, who derided
you αἵ firft, will afterwards turm your Admirers,
But if you give way to their Reproaches, and are
vanquifhed by them, you will then render yourfelf
doubly, and moit defervedly, ridiculous.
sa Fea COMMENT. |
| ὦ ee former Advice extended to all Mankind in general,
“ and concerned them as Men; there he had very largely
diffuaded them from engaging in the Affairs of the World, Ὁ
and all the Difquiets and Superftitious Fears about them; in
_ confideration, that thefe are remote and foreign, out of.our
Reach and Difpofal.;,and, that a Man muft look at home
_ forall thatis properly Good or Evil; This, being the pecu-
liar Prerogative of a»Rational and Free Agent, that all its
_ Happinefs and Mifery depends upon itfelf alone. But now
he takes.another Method, and addrefies himfelf particularly
_ to:fuch, as have made fome Advancesiin Wifdom and Good-
nefs, and are affected with areal Love and Defire of it. And
epost} here
ty
ya
- ,
ee SNe
136 EprcTrerus’s Morals
here his firft Care is, to fecure the Approaches, and firft Ef-
forts of fuch a Defire, by giving timely Warning of the Dif-
ficulties it may probably encounter, left the Surprize of any
fudden and unfore-feen Oppofition fhould difturb the Mind,
and break its Meafures. ν ι
Now nothing is more ufual, than for Men to take it ill,
when any of their Companions leave a way of Living, to
which they have been long accuflomed. And the Method
they take for exprefling fuch Refentments, is, fometimes by
expofing and ridiculing them, that fo the World may think
their own Courfes, at leaft as good, as thofe they ufe with
fuch rude Infolence and Contempt: And this is commonly
the Treatment Men who take better Courfes meet with, from
their old Cronies and intimate Acquaintance. Sometimes
they do it, by reproaching them with Arrogance and’ Pride,
and valuing themfelves upon their Philofophy, more than
they ought to do. .And this proceeds partly from Anger,
and partly from Envy, and a malicious Defire to obftru&
their farther Progrefs. ΝΣ
Andindeed, this fpightfu! Dealing does but too often meet
swith its defired Succefs; for many Perfons are overcome
‘with'thefe Reproaches, and defert their Poft, and relapfe in-
‘to their former Follies, merely to deliver themfelves from
fuch Teazings. .Some of thefe Derifious are exprelt in con-
‘temptuous Looks and Geftures, and they are properly Moc-
-keries. Others do not content themfelves with Apith Fi-
‘gures and ΠῚ Language, but run Men upon Precipices, and
Graw both thofe that would fain be good, and all that take
their part, and affift them in fo neceflary a Reformation, in-
to real Difficulties, and great Dangers. And if this were
done by Strangers only, it were fomething more tolerable ;
but their own Friends and Relations have oftentimes the
greateft Hand in it. Thefe do it upon an idle Pretence, That
a Philofophical Retirement renders Men ufelefs, and loft to
-the World ; and Others do it, partly out of Envy againft a
Life, fo infinitely more happy and commendable tham their
[own ‘and partly out of a Refentment, that this will make
Them; and Their way of Converfation defpifed, by thofe .
that have exchanged it for a better. | A159 |
Nor mutt it bediflembled, that there is fometimes too juft
‘ground for the latter of thefe Reafons; for we very often
fee Men, whofe good Difpofitions and happy Temper in-
cline them to Wifdom and Virtue, ( while they. are not arri-
ved to any Maftery or Perfe@tion in it, but only big jag
Ope a
κ
pty |
| with SimpLicrus’s Comment. 137
Hope of attainingto it in time) exalted with Self-conceit, and
full of Difdain, as if They only had all Perfection, and o-
ther People none at all. When, in truth, this mighty Opi-
nion proceeds only from want of Difcretion and Judgment,
_and is the moft undeniable Evidence again{t fuch Men, that
they really have not that, which they with fo much Confidence
Pretend to. For there is not in the whole World any thing
more incontiftent with Wifdom and Virtue, than an haugh-
ty fupercilious Carriage, and that fwelling Vanity, which
difdains and negleéts that excellent and moft divine Rule of
Knowing one’s Self : A Rule, which is in truth, the Sum and
Subftance of all Philofophy, the firft Principle, and the laft
and higheft Precept in it. )
When Men behave themfelves with fo much, Pride. and
Offentation, the World think the Character of Philofophers
fuits very ill with them. For this Exaltation does not..pro-
ceed from any true Gallantry or Greatnefs of Soul, but it is
a vain Tumour, which draws ill-Humours to it from with-
in, and {wells to an unnatural Bulk ; an Excrefcence, which
caufes Deformity, and proceeds from fome Difeafe. Where-
as true Greatnefs and Strength of Mind, like that of the Bo-
dy, refults from a good Difpofition of the Parts, is diftribu-
ted equally and regularly through the whole Mafs, and pre-
ferves a due Temper, and mutual good Affiftance, between
the Parts within, and thofe without.
Againft this Diflemper he cautions all that make Philofo-
phy their Study, as againft a Thing detefted by all Mankind,
and that which gives a juft Provocation τὸ Malice, ‘and ex-
pofes a Man to all the mifchievous Effeéts of it. But when
all due Care hath been taken to get clear of this Folly ; then
a Man ought to harden himfelf againft all Scofts and Reproa-
ches, with the Confideration of the Dignity of Humane Na-
ture, and what is decent and agreeable to fo excellent a Be-
ing; and then to perfevere in the Choice of Virtue, in. de-
{pight of all Oppofition' to the contrary.; and ina full Per-
fuafion, that thefe good Refolutions and Defires are the Mo-
tions and Impulfes of a Divine Power. For, in truth, *Phi-
lofophy is the nobleft and moft valuable Bleffing, that ever
God beftowed upon Mankind. ae ,
‘The Excellence of the Thing is confeffed by thefe very
Scoffers themfelves ;' who, when they reproach us with pre-
tending to an Accomplithment above us, do at the fame time
exprefs the high Efteem they have for it ; and by not allow-
dwg any Man to profefs himfelf 4 Philofopher on a fadden,
ἀκ: he $ they
a 0.5.5
“- .
138. ἘρΡιοτετυ885 Morals...
i στ πο π-ἀὐὐστ ΘΟ
they expofe indeed the Arrogance and Forwardnefs of the; —
Perfons who prefume to do fo; but then withal they ac-
knowledge’ this to δὲ απ Attainment, which’ requires much,
Time, and great Application. Now thefe very Men,, who.
refent the Vanity of bold Pretenders with fo much Indigna-
tion, and exprefs their Honour of Philofophy that way, will
difcern the Beauty and Majefty of it much better, and ad-
mire it ten thoufand times more, when they behold itseffeéts,
in’ the modeft Converfation of one who conftantly improves,
and perfeveres in being refolutely and obftinately virtnous,
in’ defpight of ‘all the Scoffs and Difcouragements, by which
they attempted, in vain, todrawhimoff, But the Man, that
yields timely to their Reproaches, and upon that Account,
defifts from his good Purpofes, and compounds for his Quiet
by ‘returning to his former Courfes, renders himfelf doub-
ly ridiculous. The Jeftsand Scorn, which paffed upon fuch
a:one at firft, were what he had really no Concern in;, but
the Reproach muft return all upon the Authors themfelves,
and none of their Afperfions would flick, fo long as he pro-
ceeded in a generous Negleét of them, and by degrees was
preparing to change theic Scorn into Admiration and Efteem.
But the fuffering’ ones. felf το. δε vanquithed by their ‘Malice,
does not only juttifie their firft Infolence, by quitting our
fortnet Pretenfions, and falling fo low, after looking fo high ;
{thus vainly attempting to reconcile Philofophy with a mean
and fordid Temper; But it alfo, provokes Contempt upon
another Account; that of being fabdued by fuch bafe and
defpicable Enemies, and letting a fenfélefs Flear, or 8 ma:
ligious Jeft, beat one off from that Poft of Virtue, which God ©
and Wifdom had affigned to him. Moftjuftly therefore, does ᾿
this poor fpirited Wretch deferve a double Portion of Scorn;
the Scorn of wife and good Men, after having fubmitted to
that of Fools and Knaves; Which could have done him no ©
Harm at all, in cafe he had perfifted in his Duty ; but returns ᾿
upon‘him with double Force, and is render’d. moft reafon-
able and due, οἰ δεν own Inconftancy and Defertion.,. 0
Thefe Confidetations dre,abundantly fufficient, to.infpire
any Mind, not: utterly ‘funk into Feeblenefs and Effeminacy,
with generous Refolutiohs to perfevere in Goodnefs ,. and
hold out againft allmanner of Oppofition,. And inthis there —
is one very confiderable Advantage, That. even our Paflions
commeiice good Difpofitions, and the natural Ambition,.e-
very Man hath after Honour and Fame, becomes upon. this.
Occafion an Affiftant to Virtue: It adds Strength and Mi-
ere gour
᾿ς
vith SimPLicivs’s Comment. 139.
...................-ὖῸ-Ὸ’οορὖ τ΄ ΄΄΄΄΄:-:ι:ις.ρ τ ρΡῦ τ’ Ὀτ΄τ’----᾿΄ “΄ ὁ ὁὃὦὁἜὌὁἔΕΠΝ.͵ὁ ]].λΟ Ἑ
gour το. Reafon, and is refined and exalted by it. For thus
we come to a true Notion of Honour; we covet it no lon-
ger for its own fake, nor are proud of it, upon the Account
of the Perfons who pay the Refpe@, and fo place our Hap-
pinefs upon fomething without us: But we value it, as a
Mark and Teftimony of real Virtue and Defert.. And there-
fore the Honour, which, a, Man ought to be fatisfied with, is
by no means that, which comes from the Applaufe of the
Rabble, and unthinking part of the World, who eften mi-
ftake Men and their Characters ; but that which is founded
upon the Commendation of the Wife. and the Good. For
Thefe know how to difcern between Perfons, and their re-
- fpective Merits; And the Teftimony of fuch is what may be
depended upon, without any Danger of being led into falfe
Judgments by it.
COCR LNAR RMR eS wes
ΣΤ BS SAM
F you ever happen to accommodate yourfelf to
Τ᾽ the Humours of the World, for the fakeof Re-.
putation and Applaufe , take notice, that this is be-
low a Philofopher. And therefore content yourfelf
upon all Occafions, with really being what you
would bethought. But if you will needs.be thought
fo too, deferve your own good Opinion, and that
will be fufficient. erat
\
COMMENT
ἵν" were told before, That, when once a Man’s Judg-
ment is convinced of his Duty, he ought conftantly to
perfevere in it; to look uponthis, as the’ particular Poft, and
Charaéter,.which Providence hath appointed him to fill:
That, however Men may ran down Goodnefs for a while,
yet the Refolute and Brave break through all that; and in
time, gain the Admiration of their Enemies and Deriders:
but the Tame and the ‘Fickle, who fink under the Reproa-
ches ofi!! Men, draw downa jult Scorn, andadouble Shame
upon
I __
140 ἘΡΙΟΤΕΤΥυ5᾽5 Morals v
upon themfelves. Now to allthis he adds, That, fora Man —
to forfake his Principles, and confult, not fo much his own
Judgment, as the Humour of the World, thereby to render
himfelf acceptable to others; is a Weaknefs, of which a Phi-
lofopher muft not be guilty: It being'a fix’d Rule to all fuch,
That their only Care ought to be, to recommend themfelves
to their own Confciences, And to Almighty God.
Therefore, {ays he, content yourfelf with being a Philofopher ;
which is but another Name fora Good Man. But if the be-
ing fo alone feem too little; and you defire, that your Light
fhould fhine, and that your Virtue fhould be known and ob-
ferved, (As indeed it is the Nature of Goodnefs, to difcover
its Beauties and thed its Luftre ; and a Man can with better
“Confidence take Satisfaction in his own Virtues, when they
are confpicious and acknowledged; ) then, fays he, do not
fix your Eye upon the World, nor be folicitous to pleafe the
Multitude ; for thefe are but very incompetent Judges of fuch
Matters: But rather (trive to approve yourfelf to your own
Breaft, and let the Senfe and Confcioufnefs of your own Vir-
tue fatisfieyou. ForaMan who hath attained ro fome good
meafure of Philofophy, (and fuch a one, you mutt obferve
Epictetus applies himfelf to at prefent) will be fure, bothto
att confiftently with his Principles, while he’ makes it his
Bufinefs to approve himfelf to his own Confcience; and he
wil! alfo fecure a more difcerning and impartial Judge of his
Actions, when they are to be tried by his own Reafon, than
if he appealed to the Judgment of the World.
And here it may be proper to take notice, how different
this Advice is from fomething which was faid before; all
which, in truth, depends upon the Difference of the Perfons
concerned init. There he addreft his Difcourfe to a Young
Beginner ; One but juft entering upon the Study of Philofo-
phy; andto Him the Counfel thought fit to be given, was
Do not affed to be thought Wife: Becaufe Perfons in his Cir-
cumftances, are ftrangely fond of Fame and Applaufe, tranf-
ported beyond Meafure with Noife and empty Breath, and
not only too creduloufly vain upon the falfe Judgments of
others, but unqualified, as yet, to pafs any true Judgment
upon themfelves. But at prefent he hath a good Proficient
to deal with, one better difpofed to aét upon Principle, and
to follow the Dictates of his own Reafon: And therefore
to fauch a one his Advice is, That he would content himfelf
with being what he fhould be; but if he will needs be thought
fo too, he is now in a Condition to make a juft Eftimate of
himfelf,
\-with ΘΙΜΡΙΙΟΙ 5.5 Comment. 141
aaa)
himfelf, and therefore may be fatisfied with his own Appro-
bation. 3
This feems to be the true Importance of the Chapter:
Though poffibly there may be another very convenient Senfe
of it too. For this Great Man, very probably, defigned it
as a neceéffary Caution alfo. -( As indeed he generally takes
care to prevent any Mifconftructions, to which his Expreffi-
ons may be liable.) Now by faying in the former Chapter,
That thofe who expofe Virtue at firft, will afterwards admire the
Refolute and conftant in it; but the Meu who yielded to thofe
Reproaches deferve to be doubly {corn’d; he might be thought to
to propound the Opinion and Efteem of the World, as the
principal Motive to Goodnefs; And therefore here he re-
tracts that, and takes off all fuch Sufpicions, by calling away
the Soul from the Purfuit of Fame and Reputation abroad,
as that which is apt to corrupt her Principles, and make a
Man more induftrious to pleafe others than himfelf. Andin
Oppofition to this, he would have a Man gain his own Ap-
probation; for the Judgment a wife Man makes of himfelf,
is lefs fubje&t to Partiality, and Prejudice, and Vanity, and
of greater Ufe in the Encouragement it gives to Virtue, than
that of the World can poffibly be. For the being approved
and commended by Wife and Good Judges, is the moft fa-
tisfactory and convincing Evidence, that a Man is truly Vir-
tuous. Now the Perfon, to whom Epictetus {peaks in this
Place, is fuppofed to be fuch a Judge ; and upon this Prefumpti-
onI imagine it is, that he fays in the Clofe of the Chapter,
Dao but deferve your own Good Opinion, and that is enough ἐ all
Confctence.
142 Epreretus’s Morals) ‘~
ΟΗΑΡ. ΧΧΧΙ
| Nic perplex yourfelf with anxious Thoughts’
ὰ like thefe ; 7 fhall lead a wretched obfcure Life,
without any. Name or Notice taken of me, For it
you fuppofe (as this Complaint evidently does.) that
Obfcuricy and Dilrefpe& is an Evil; confider that
it is no more in the power of any but yourfelf to
bring any Evil upon you, than it is to bring any
Bafenefs or Difhonefty upon you. But befides, pray.
confider, Was it any. part of your proper Bufinels,
to be chofen into. a Place of Cammandy, or to be ad-
mitted to, of carefled at, publick Entertainments ?
You muft allow it was not. Where is the Difre-
fpeét then? And what juft Reflexion canat be upon
you, if youare nor? Befides, why fhould you fay,
you fhall be defpifed, and have no Name or Notice
taken of you; when your Bufinefs lies wholly in
‘Matters at the difpofal of your own Will, and for
~ which confequently you have it in your own power,
to make yourfelf as valuable as you pleafe? But your
Friends will be never the better for you. What do
you call being never the better? You will not fur-
nifh them with Money, nor have Intereft enough ~
to give them the Privileges of Citizens of Rome. Ὁ
And why fhould you trouble yourfelf for this? Who
told you, that this was ever incumbent upon you;
er one of thofe Things in your own power, which
you ought to look upon as a Duty? Or how can
ite. expected, you fhould beftow that upon ano-
ther, which you are not pofleft of yourfelf ? Bus
your Friends will anfwer, Pray get it then, that you
may impart tous. Yes, I will, with all my Heart,
provided you can direé&t me, how I may attain thefe
‘Things, and at the fame time preferve my Integri- —
#Y)
XY iM ; 9 ὴ
‘with SrmpxLicius’s Comment. 143
ty, my Modefty, and true Greatnefs of Soul, invio-
late. _But if you defire me to part with my own
real Good, that I may procure you fome imaginary
Good only; this is the greateft Injuftice, and the
greateft Folly imaginable. And which of thefe do
you efteem the more valuable; Money, or a true,
᾿ virtuous, and modeft Friend? Therefore it would
better become You to aflift my Virtue, than to ex-
pect fuch things from Me, as cannot be had, but at
the Expence of that. But it will be objetted again,
That your Country receives no Advantages from you.
What Advantage do you mean? You will not build
publick Porticoes or Bagnioes, nor Exchanges? And
- what if you do not? Does your Country expect to
be furnifhed with Arms from a Shoe-maker, or
Shoes from a Smith? Surely, if every one do it
Service inhisown Way, this 15 all that can in Reafon
be required. And fhall you then be thought to have
done it none, if you make an honeft and good Pa-
triot? No fure. You are very far from, being an
Ufelefs Member of the Commonwealth, when you
do fo. Well, but what Rank then, what Place,
(you'll fay) fhall you but have in the Commonwealth ?
Why truly, even juft fuch a one, as is confiftent
with your Integrity and Modefty. But if once. you
part with thefe, upon a Pretence of promoting the
Publick Good; know, that you are lefs capable of
ferving your Country, when you are grown Kna-
‘vith and Impudent. i
COMMENT.
Wis Men apply themfelves to the Study and Praétice
of Virtue, and are convinced, that nothing fo well
deferves their Care, asthe Improvement of their Minds; ma-
ny Difficulties offer themfelves, to fhake thefe Refolutions.
And, as Men differ intheir Circumftances, fo thefe ObseGi-
_ ons prefent themfelves differently, both to difquiet their own
-* O ; Thoughts,
oe
144 -Epictrerus’s Morals
«--
Thoughts, and to evacuate the Good Advice of Others. ΤῸ
Young Beginners, whofe Minds have not yet purged off the
Drofs of the World, fach mean and fordid Reflexions as
thefe are apt to ftep in; If I veglecdt my Bufinefs and Eftate, I
and ‘vay Family foall fiarve; and except I take the Trouble of
puniflnug my Servant, my Indulgence will be his Ruin. But to
Them, who have made any confiderable Progrefs, thofe Ob-
jections appear Defpicable and Low; they are above fuch tri-
fling Confiderations, and while they are doing their Duty,
€an truft Providence for a Provifion. But then at the fame
time, they are concerned for the difcharge of all thofe good
Offices, which may be expeéted from them; and think, that
both the intrinfick Goodnefs of the thing, and the Honour
attending it, will abundantly jultify fuch a Concern. For
their Defires are Generous and Noble; they aim at nothing
elfe but true Honour; they decline Infamy and Obfcurity,
and propofe to'themfelves the Advantage of their Friends,
and the Service of their Country: And from thefe Topicks,
they flart fome, Objections, which Ep:cfezus here undertakes
to-examine, and to refute particularly.
Firft of all, he applies himfelf to that General one of Ob-
{curity or Difgrace; that if a Man retire from the Gainful Em-
ployments and Bufinefs of the World, or quit his Praétice
atthe Bar,’ >
Where Eloquéuce acquires a juft and lafting Fame,
Cas Homer obferves ;) it muft be his hard fate to be buried —
alive, without any Refped paid, or notice taken of him.
‘Now this Objedtion Ep:cezus takes off moft effectually,
by the followittg Syllogifms: Difgraceis an Evil, and Evilas
well.as Good, is fomething within our own power. But
whatever is fo, no other but ourfelves, can bring upon us.
Therefore when any Man is really in Difgrace ,. this is in,
andby, and from Himfelf, whether Others difrefpe@ him,
or whether they do not. So then the Difgrace from others,
is what we have no juft caufe/to fear, nor indeed ought it
to pafs for Difprace in our Opinion, if Difgrace be allowed
to bevEvil ; for then it muft by confequence be‘our own Act
and Deed... ;
This is the Sum of the Argument... And now if you pleafe,
let us cxamine.the feveral Propofitions whereof it confilts.
Firft of all,, Difgeace or Obfcurity,, (fays be) is an Evil: ©
Wow it,Klononp, be, (as all Men fure. will allow itto be) ἃ.
‘ at Gogd ;
‘with SimpLicius’s Comment. 145°
Good; Difgrace, and any thing that is Difhonourable, mutt
needs be Evil: For if it were Good, it would ceafe to be
Difhonourable, and be valued and efteemed. But, befides the
confent of all Mankind in this notion of Honour; this very
_ thing proves it to be Good, that it is what we account moft
popstly to belong to the beft Perfons and Things. For
onour is attributed to God, to Bletled Spirits, and to the
_ moft excellent of the Sons of Men, as their ftri@ and juft
due, as the δε acknowledgement we can pay, for their
Merit and Goodnefs. So that Difhonour muft needs be an
Evil upon this Account alfo; for, where one Contrary be-
longs to one Extreme, the other Contrary will belong to the
diftant Extreme; and this is the Cafe of Honour and Difho-
hour, with regard to Good and Evil.
The Next thing to be proved would ‘be, that this is a thing
_ wholly in our own ‘power; but this, I prefuime, is done al-
ZL
ready. For there hath been fo much faid in the former part
of this Treatife, to fhew, that all the Good and Evil, pro-
perly fo called, poffible to fall upon Rational and Free A-
gents, mu(ft needs depend upon the Liberty of their own
Choice; and, that nothing which does not fall within a Man’s
own Difpofal, can in true and ftri&t Speaking, be call’d
Good or Evil; that it is to be hoped, there is no need of re-
peating thofe Arguments any more. But now, if Difgrace,
and want of Honour, be our own A&; what depends upon
none, and comes from none but ourfelves, when we lye un-
der it; a Man may abfolutely defpife and negle& the World,
without incurring any real Difhonour upon that accoynt.
You will fay indeed, this excludes him from Places of Dig-
nity and Refpect; that it hinders him from making a Figure
and Interelt in his own Country; that he fits at Home, and
eatsin Private. But then I muft ask you again, whether the
Office ofa Lord Mayor, or a Member of Parliament, whe-
ther the City-Fealts, or the Carefles of the World, are things
din our own Difpofal, and fuch as any Man can give himfelf
when he pleafes: You mult grant me they are not. Now
from thence 1 infer, that no Man is really unhappy for the
want of them; and confequently that Ob{curity, and want
of publick Honour, of which thefe are alledged as the dif-
_couraging Inconveniences, is no Evil or Unhappinets nei-
ther.
Now, astothe Meaning of what follows, there feems to
__be fome difficulty in that fhort Sentence, 42 7s 0 more in the
power of any but yourfelf, to bring any Evil upon you, than it is
ΠΗ ν᾽ ΐ O 2
ta
146. ~~*xEprcetstus’s Morals
to bring Vilene{s or Difbouefty upon you. For this, wot being in
the power of any other Perfon to bring any Evil upow a Man,
feems to be urged from.a proof more evident than itfelf;
and the Infinuation here is, that, as the Decency of an AGi-
on is more eafily difcerned, than the real and intrinfick Good-
nefs ; (for it is by its Comelinefs and Beauty, that Virtue re-
commends itfelf, and invites us to its Embraces, and en-
gages our AffeGtion,) fo alfo the Vilenefs and Difhonefty is
more yilible than the Immorality and Evil. Now Vilenefs
or Turpitude is properly applied to an undue ufe of Pleafures
and Senfual Delights; and this abufe can be the effect of no
other thing but Choice, becaufe the indulging thofe Pleafures
is purely our own AG. . Ic istherefore no more in the power
of any other Perfon, to bring Evil upon a Man, than to
bring Vilenefs or Dithonefty upon him; and Evil it is plain
he cannot; for a Man has no more power to engage us in
Vice, than hehas, to engage us in bafe and unbecoming Pra-
&tices , and Evil, both of Crime and Mifery, is as much in
his own free Difpofal, as Turpitude and Difhonefty: So
that, if a Man cannot be brought into this latter by another,
and if he canno more bebrought into Evil, than into That 5.
it follows, that he cannot be brought into Evil at all by ano-
ther...
- But poffibly the place may be clearer, and a more full and
expedient Senfe found out, if we tranfpofe that Negative
Particle, that fo the Sentence may run thus: It is impoffible
for any Perfontobe made Miferable by any other; may, much
more fo, than to be made Vile and Bafe by him; and thus
the ftrength and ftrefs of the whole Argument, will lie up-
on that note of Comparifon. And this Conjeéture, as well
as the whole Interpretation grounded uponit, feems to carry
a great deal of Truth, if we attend to the Notions, upon
which the Mafters of Reafon and Oratory proceed in thefe
Matters ; for they define Honefty and Turpitude, by that
which is Praife or Blame-worthy, and fo make Decency and
Vilenefs to depend upon the Judgment of the World. But
of things Profitable or Hurtful, and Good and Evil, they give .
us avery different Account; for thefe, they tell us, have a
diftinguithing Charaéter founded in Nature, and are not fo
precarious, as to depend on the Opinions or Determinations
of Men. Now according to this Notion, which allows |
fo much to the Commendations of Men, and makes Ditho-
nefly to confit in the Condemnation and diflike of the
World,
with SimpLicius’s Comment. ~~ ra7
᾿ς World, he fays, a Man muft admit, that it is at leaft as im-
poflible for another to bring evil upon him as it is to bring
’ Dithonefty. And if, (as was proved before, ) This can-
not be done, much lefs can That; and fo the Conclufion
is ftill the fame, vz. that is utterly impoffible to be done at
all.
But then again, What occafion, (fays he) is there for that
Complaint of living without azy Name or Notice taken of you?
Is there no way of becoming Eminent, but by appearing in
fome Office of Authority, and being advanced to the Admi-
niftration of Publick Bufinefs? Alas! poor Man, you have
forgot, it feems, that this is not the Field, where Humane
Good and Evil, the proper and peculiar Happinefs or Mifery
of our Nature, is to be contended for. The Defires and A-
verfions of your Mind, the Actions of your Life, and ina
word, the Management of your Freedom, and what is left
to its Difpofal, thefe are the Lifts which you muft enter, for
that Prize: And this is a Combat, in which if you behave
yourfelf Gallantly, and aét, as uncorrupe Nature and ‘right
Reafon would direét, you may render yourfelf highly valu-
able and confpicuous. Why then do you complain of Ob-
{curity and Contempt, when you have the Poft of Honour
within yourfelf, and may become as Signal and Eminent in
it, as you pleafe ? Why indeed? But, becaufe you have not
yet unlearned the Folly, of placing your Happinefs in Fo-
reign and External Advantages, fuch as it is a neceffary Qua-
lification of everyone, who would be a Philofopher in good
earneft, to neglect and defpife.
~ Well, but allowing, (fays the ObjeGtor) that I may fig-
nalize my felf never fo much ; yet ftill this is but aprivate Sa-
tisfaction ; it gives me no Credit or Influence in the World,
and my Friends are never the better for my Merit. This
now is a Pretence, calculated for one, who hath made fome
-competent Proficiency in Wifdom and Virtue, It argues the
Man-to have got above all fordid feekings of his Own In-
tereft, and tovalue the World and its Advantages no longer
for the fake of himfelf, but in kindnefs to his Friends. The
Affifting of Them he looks upon, as a Good and Gallant
Aétion ; and therefore allows himfelf in the purfuir of Wealth,
and Power, and Intereit, to prevent his being an ufelefs and
‘unprofitable part of the Creation, and to render the Good
he hath, as diffufive as may be. ὁ
This Objection too, Epictetus removes.by Two Argu-
ments: The Fisft proceeds upon the diftin@ion of things
ον : within
--------- τ ἐ ἐἐὁΤΤθθΤΤ“Τ΄΄. ὁ
148 ᾿ Epicretus’s Morals
within our own Power; the Other urges, that a Man who
retains his Virtue and Fidelity, and all the good Qualities, that
create and preferve a true Friendthip, is more ferviceable
and beneficial to his Friends, than if he fhould enrich or pro-
mote them, when the power of doing fo was purchafed, at
the Expence of thofe good Qualities.
From the Diftin@tion of Things in our Power, he argues,
that Riches, and Honours, and Preferments , are none of
thofe, which Nature hath left within the Difpofal of our owa
Wills : If therefore it happen at any time, that a Wife and
Good Man be poffefled of thefe Advantages, let him impart
to others liberally ; Nay, let him efteem the Opportunity of
doing Good, a greater kindnefs to himfelf, than to the Per-
fon who receives it from him. But if it be not his Fortune
to be placed in fuch Circumftances; this is no Reflexion up-
on his Virtue, or any Difparagementto his Kindnefs and good
Intentions. He is not one whit the worfe Man in himfelf
nor the lefsaFriend to others. For (as Epictetus fays,) what
Madnefs is it to expe& that a Man fhould give that to Us, which
be is, not poffelfed of Himfelf? ae
But pray get thefe things, fay your Friends, rhat we may par-
take of them with you. Yes, with all,my Heart, If I can get
Them, and notlofe my Self. Do butorder Matters fo, that
I may {till retain my Fidelity and my Innocence, and not
bring any afperfion upon the Chara@ers I pretend to, v#,
hofe of a Friend and a Philofopher; and when you
have thus fmoothed the way, give your Dire€tions, and
I will not fail to follow them. | Now by this Anfwer our
Author feems plainly to allow a Liberty, both of endeavour-
ing to improve an Eftate, and to embrace publick Offices
and Honours; provided thofe Riches and Honours may be
acquired and enjoyed, without being engaged in any thing in-
confiftent with Virtue, or unbecoming our Character: But
if this be an impoffible Condition, as it too often proves; If |
the Corruption of the World be fuch, thata Man, who makes
it his Bufinefs to acquire thefe Advantages, do at the fame
time bring himfelf under a manifeft hazard, if not a fa-
tal Neceffity, of parting with fomething that is a greater and
more fuhftantial Good ; a Good more properly His, in ex-
change for them: Then, what do thofe Friends who im-
portunea Man to make themdo fotoo; what do they, I fay,
but defire, that he. would part with a Happinefs that is real
and his own: (thatis the Good of his Rational Soul,) τὸ.
procure them a Happinefs which is but imaginary, and can- —
ΓΟΣ,
with Stmpricius’s Comment. 149
not betruly called their own, though they had it? For the
Advantages they are fo eager for, have norelation to the Ra-
tional Mind, in whichthe very Effenceand Nature of a Man
confifts, (and confequently all the Happinefs he is capable
of, confidered as a Man, muft needs depend upon that, ) but
they are the Obje& of meaner Appetites. ey
Lhis therefore is the moft unequal Dealing, and the greateft
Folly imaginable: They deal unequally, becaufe they tran{grefs
the Laws of true Friendfhip: (for the Pythagoreans, ‘you
know, made Friendfhip to confift in Equality:) And No-
thing can be more unfair, than for Me to engage a Friend ©
in fome great hazard, and expofe Him to certain and extreme
-Mifery, and-all this, only to fatisfy fome unreafonable De-
fire of my own. The Folly of it is double; for Who but
Fools, would be fo barbarous, as to impofe fuch an unrea-
fonable Trial of his Kindnefs, upon an Intimate Acquain-
tance, and particular Friend? And Who but fuch, could be
fo blind, as not to difcern the mighty difference, between
the Lofs their Friend would fuftain, by gratifying their Re-
quefts, and the Gain themfelves fhould reap, in cafe he did
fo? He facrifices his All: forfeits his Greateft, his Own pe-
culiar Happinefs, to purchafe that for Them, which is not,
cannot be Their proper Happinefs; and is fo far from being
a Great Good, that it very often proves to be none at all in
the Event, but a great and fore Evil.
But befides all this, there may {till another very good Rea-
fon be given, why he fhould call fuch Men Foolifh and Senfe-
lefs ; and that is, their efteeming Money to be of greater
and more valuable Confideration to them, than the Modefty
and Fidelity of a Friend. And to this purpofe, he proceeds
to thew, that a Perfon thus qualified, is fo far from being
unferviceable to his Friends, that he is really much more
ufeful and beneficial, than even they, who feed them with
the τοῖς they fo much admire. ᾿ ᾿
For if among Servants, thofe who are honeft and refpect-
ful, recommend themfelves nore tothe Efteem of their Ma-
fters, than others who are of quicker Parts, and more dex-
_ terous in the Bufinefs of their Trade; fure the Reafon holds
much ftronger, why a Faithful and Virtuous Friend fhould
have the Preference, infinitely before what the World calls
a gainful one: And that Preference they will have, in.the
Opinion of all wife Men. For we feel the Benefit of thefe
upon every Occafion; they give us the Sweets of good Con-
verfation, and the Affiftance of feafonable Advice ; they are
O4 a per>
150. Erictetus’s Morals
ey '
a perpetual Guard upon whatever we efteem moft dear, anda
fnre Relief in Dangers and Diftreffes ; they are Phyficians
in our Difeafes, and (as if Life were too fhort a Space for
fo much Goodnefs to exercife itfelf in) we find our Ac-
count in fuch Friends, even after Death: And, upon all Oc-
cafions there is a perpetual good Correfpondence, a mutual
Agreement between the Giver and the Receiver of Favours ;
no Difcord in the whole Courfe of their Lives, but conftant
Confent and perfe&t Harmony of Souls. ‘Thofe therefore,
that are Friends indeed, will contribute their utmoft Endea-
vours, towards the preferving the Virtue and Fidelity of their
Friends ; Nay, they will find themfelves obliged to it, in
Tendernefs to their Intereft; and cannot be guilty of fo great
an Abfurdity, as to defire any Thing for their Own Sakes,
which muft turn at laft fo infinitely to their Prejudice, by
robbing their Friend of his Honefty, and rendring him inca-
pable of doing them any farther Service.
Thus alfo that other Argument might be anfwered; and
the obferving what is in a Man’s own Power, and proper-
iy belongs tohim to do, would ferve to refute what follows.
For, Who ever told you, that it was a Dury incumbent up-
on you, or a Thing in your own Power and Choice, to
procure Porticoes and publick Buildings, for the Benefit of
your Country? To this may be replied again, as ic was,in
the Cate of your Friends ; Who can be expected to δείξουν
That upon others, which he never had himfelf ? And if to
this it be rejoyned, Get them yourfelf, that you may have it
in your own Power to give to your Country; what was faid ©
before, will ferve every jot as well, upon this Occafion too.
Bur thete Confiderations he hath left in the general, for Us
to apply, as we fee requifite; and hath fupplied us with ano-
ther clear and full Anfwer, much more pertinent, and par-
ticular to the Matter in hand.
Wiat need this trouble you (fays he)? Is it Your Con-
cern, to provide Cloifters and Exchanges for your Country?
The Sith does not think it his Bufinefs to fupply his Coun-
try with Shoes, but with Arms; and the Shoe-maker does not
think himfelf obliged to furnith out Arms, but Leather and
Shoes. And fure every Commonwealth is ferved in beft
Order, and to moft Advantage, when every one atrends ftri@-
ly to the proper Bufinefs of his Calling, and does not inter-’
meddle with the Concerns of other People ; but takes care ©
to do his own part, and interrupts no Body elfe in the Dif-
charge of His. .
a |
Well,
--ο’Ψτ τ τ ὈΓὈἘῸςΓῸςΥεἨἬεςῬ ᾿πτ“ ρ-ῆ-ῆ-ῇ-Ἑ--ςς.͵.Κ΄Κ)͵͵ΈΚ͵͵ - ῆ ῆ.....------᾿ὕ.......
with StmMpxLiciuss Comment. 15k
Well, but what is my part then, fays the Philofopher ,
and wherein will! it be expected, that I fhould contribute to
the Publick Good? The feeming force of this Queftion he
obviates moft excellently, by appealing to the Man’s own
Judgment in another; What! fays he, if you have been the
Means of making a good Man, have not you been benefi-
cial to your Country? Is not this a pieceof Service, of much
greater Confequence, than the Profits every mean Artificer
bringsto the Publick? This would bethe Advantage, and this
the Thanks and Honour due to you, for making your Self
an honeft. Man and a good Subje&t: But if your Wifdom.
and Virtue have a kindly Influence upon Others too; if your
Inftrutions and your Example from them fato the fame good
Principles, you are then a Publick Bleffing, and more bene-
ficial ftill, in proportion to the Numbers you haye an Influ-
ence upon.
And now you defire to know, what Rank or Office thall
be affigned you, and would fain be, like the General in the
Army, or the Magiftrate of the City, or the Artificer in the
Shop, who know their refpeétive Trufts, and have fome
Station or Bufinefs, Military or Civil, which they can pro-
perly calltheis cwn. ‘To this the Author replies in general
Terms, You may have any that will fall to your fhare, only
with this Provifion, that it be confiftent with Virtue and Ho-
nefty : But if you make Shipwrack of thefe, while you pre-
- tend to venture for Monuments and ftately Buildings ; itis
- great odds, but youlofe your Magnificence, atthe fame time
that your Modefty and Fidelity is caft away. And, I pray,
Whether of the two is the greater Grace to a.Common-
wealth? A City well {tored with true and good Men, or a-
dorned with fumptuous Halls and {plendid Palaces?
But, tocome nearer to the Queftion, What Place or Efteem
is due to a Philofopher, or what Regard fhould the State have
to him? Surely Men thould be efteemed, according to the
Dignity and Value of their Work. And, by this Rule, the
Philofopher may claim Precedence, as a Former and Maker
of Men; One who frames and moulds them into virtuous
Perfons, and ufeful honeft Subjeéts. The Matter he hath to
work upon, is, Himfelf and Others; and the Pains he is ae
about them, is, to refine and purifie their Nature, and exalt
them to a Life of Reafon and Virtue. He is indeed, and
ought to be refpected, as a Common Father and Mafter, a
. Corrector of Errors, anda Counfellor and Affiftantin Good-
nefs; He is liberal of hisCare, makes every other Man’s Be-
7 nefit
152 Errctretus’s Morals.
nefitand Improvement his Endeavour and Concern, and hath
a Hand in all the Good that is done. He adds to the En-
joyments of the Profperous, by congratulating and rejoyc-
ing with them ; and lightens the Burden of the Wretched,
by miniftring feafonable Comforts; and himfelf bearing a
art in their Afflictions. In one word, He will do all thofe
hings, that are poflible, or can be expeéted, to be done, by
one who thinks no part of the World exempt from his Care,
but feels in himfelf a conftant Defire, and kind Intention,
to promote the Good of all Mankind.
Now, if this general Employment do not fatisfie, but you
would needs havethis wondrous Man faftned down to fome
one particular Profeflion ; ina wife and well-conftituted Go-
vernment, this Perfon would be chofen their Head, becaufe
his Eminence and Ufefulnefs muft needs give him the Pre-
ference before others. And indeed, his Qualifications, if
we confiderthem particularly, feemto deferve no lefs. His
Prudence, fo much fuperior to the Common Sheep, capaci-
tates him for a Shepherd to the Flock. His Learning: and
Wifdam entitle him to the Degree of a Senator or Privy-
Councellor. And if he had applied himfelf at all to that
fort of Difcipline, none can be fitter to command an Army,
becaufe he muft needs excel both in true Courage and regu-
lar Condu&t. @ Thus Socrates gain’d immortal Renown, Ὁ
his Bravery at the Battel of Deliwm; and caft, as we are told,
fo univerfal an Awe into his Enemies, that they all ftood
amazed at his Courage; and he made good his Retreat fin-
gle, through a whole Body of them, without their daring
to fall upon him. So likewife ὃ Xezophoz brought off that
great Body of Greeks, and had his Praifes celebrated in the
Olympick Games, for fo noble an Atchievement.
@ ‘This A@ion of Socrares is particularly taken Notice of by Diogenes La-
ertius, The Batrel mentioned here, was fought between the Athenians and
Beotions, in which thelatter won Deliwm, under the Command of Pantaades ;
and the former being put to the Rout, Socrates is faid to have retreated very
Jeifurely.: and feveral Times to have ftood fill, and look’d. back, to fee if
any of his Enemies would dare to purfue and attack him. He is alfo faid, a
little ‘before this Fight to have faved the Life of Xenophon, and to πᾶνε
brought him off, when Unhorfed at the Battel of ~dmphipalts, See Diag. La-
ert, Edit. Meibom. Amf, 1692. Segm. 22, 23.'Pag. 93. See allo Platon, A-
poleg. Scorar, Edit. Marfil, Erin. Lugdun 1590. Pag. 363. ἰ vers
b See Xenophon in Expedit, Cyrs.
This
with ΒΙΜΡΙΙΟΙσ 9᾿5 Comment. 153
This, Ifay, would be the cafe, this the Refpe& paid to a
Philofopher, in a wife and well-conftituted Government.
But we muit take notice, that wicked and ticentious States
do quite contrary: They are moft inaufpicious Places to
dwell in, and have deftru@iive Effets upon the Minds of
Men; they ftifle and quench that Light, which Heaven hath
given us; caft a Blemith upon the beft Employments,, dif-
courage the moft ufeful Sciences, difregard the Perfons,
and obftru& the gcod Influence of themn, who teach us by
their Do@rines, and lead us by their Examples. And, where
fo much wicked Induftry is ufed to damp the Luttre οἵ Vir-
tue, that Place muft be confeft very improper, either for Men
to lay the firft Foundations of Wifdom and a good Life in,
or to improve and confirm themfelves in, after fuch good
Beginnings. But then we muft obferve withal, that, if in
the midft of fuch perverfe Converfation, fome One be found
of a happier Complexion than the reft; One, whofe Soul a
particular good Genius hath made proof againft all Corrup-
tion ; the greater fuch a one’s Difficulties are, and the more
Tryals his Virtue is exercifed with, the more. perfec and il-
luftrious it will appear, and fhed abroad its Rays with grea-
ter Advantage, in the midft of fo much Darknefs. So true
it is, that all the Traverfes of Fortune, and this vaft Variety
of Accidents in Humane Life, contribute exceedingly tothe
Iincreafe of Virtue ; and that both Profperity and Adverfity
work together for the Good of thofe Men, who-have the
Wifdom to chufe Things with Judgment, and to manage
them with Dexterity.
C HAP.
SME eek eT ΦΥΣΜΕΙΒΙΝΣ
B54 Erprcretus’s Morals
CHAP. XXXIL
ἍΤ is poffible, you obferve fome other Perfon more
careffed than yourfelf; invited to Entertain-
ments, when you are left out; faluted before you
are taken any notice of; thought more proper to
advife with, and His Counfel followed rather than
Yours. But are thefe Refpects paid him Good
᾿ ‘Things, or are they Evil ? If they deferve to be e-
fteemed Good, this ought to be matter of Joy to
you, that that Perfon is happy in them: But if they
be Evil, how unreafonable is it to be troubled, that
they have not fallen to your own Share? Befides,
Confider, I pray, that it is not poflible, you fhould
have thofe Civilities paid to you in the fame degree
that others have; becaufe the Profeffion you have
taken upon you, will not {uffer You to do the fame
Things to deferve them that Othersdo. And how
can it be expeéted, that He, who thinks the trou-
ble of waiting at a great Man’s Levee below him,
{hould have the fame Intereft, with one that con-
{tantly pays his Morning Devotions there? Or He,
that only minds his own Bufinefs, with Another
that is eternally cringing, and fawning, and wrig-
ling himfelf into. a Lord’s Train 3 or He, that
will not ftrain a Point to commend him; witha
Parafite, that is ever blowing him up with hisown
Praife, indulging all his Vices, and admiring his
Follies and his Nonfenfe? At this rate, you are
a very unjuft, and a moft unreafonable Man; for
ou expect to receive that gratis, which is really
{et to Sale, and cannot be obtained without paying
the Price. For inftance now, and to ufe a very fa-
miliar one, You enquire in the Market, how Let-
tice go and are told, they are a Half-penny apiece.
Suppofe
{
*
~
with SrmpPLicius’s Comment. 155
Suppofe now, another Perfon bids, and pays, and
takes them; and you will neither bid, nor pay, and
go without them: Is there any Wrong done ? Or
hath the Buyer a better Bargain than You? He
parted with his Money, and hath the Sallad; you
have no Sallad indeed, but you have kept your:
Money. . Juft fo it is in the Cafe before us. You
were not invited toa great Man’s Table; the Rea-
fon is, becaufe you did not buy the Invitation. Pay
the Price, and you may have it; but that Price,
is Commendation and Flattery. If therefore you
think the Thing for your Advantage, it is fet to
Sale, and you know the Market Rates. But if
you expect it fhould come without making Pay-
ments, you are yery unreafonable. And if it be
thought too dear, then fure you have no yeafon to
complain; for, though you have not his Lordfhip’s
Dinner, yet you have fomething as good intheroom
of it; for you have the Satisfaction of keeping the
Price in your own Hand ftill ; that is, of not commend-
ing a Man againft Truth and Confcience; 3 [and
of avoiding his formal haughty Reception of you, which
carries in it a thoufand times more of Infolence, than
Civility.] |
* Thefe Words are not in Simplicius’s Copy ; but bein
generally found j
the xeft, Ihave infested them ina different Character, " Η rT
CO M-
τό, Epzeretus’s Morals
COMMENT.
“THIS Difcourfe feems to be 4-Continuation of the for-
mer; proceeding to obviate fome Objections {till be-
hind, and fuch as feem all to arife from the fame Habit and
Difpofition of Mind. For, when a Man hath turned all
his Thoughts and Care upon his own Improvement, and hath
difengaged himfelf from the World, and its Incumbrances ;
when he hath arrived to that Largenefs and Sufficiency of
Soul, as to defpife Riches, and Honour, and Popularity;
when he thinks it unbecoming his Chara€ter, ro.court the
Countenance of Great Perfons, by all the means Arts and
obfequious Attendance of Slaves and Sycophants ; there will,
in all likelihood, followthis Inconvenjence upon it, that he
fhall be flighted and difregarded himfelf, Many of his E-
qualsand Inferiors fhall be invited home to Entertainments,
fhall be more particularly addreft to in publick Places, and
receive all outward Marks of Refpeét; nay many. lefs ca-
pable of adviling than He, fhall be admitted into the Secrets
of Families, and confulted in all their Affairs of Importance,
while this Perfon, f much their Superior in Worth and
Witdom, is induftrioufly negleéted. |
Now all the feeming Hardfhip, that appears in fuch U-
fage, Epictetus might, if he had thought fit, have taken eff
in.one Word, by remitting us to his ufual Diftin@ion,.of the
Things thatare, and thatarenot, withinthe Compafs of our
own Choice: For, if thofe Things that conduce to our real
Happinefs be at our own Difpofal, andthe Things here men-
tioned are not fo; then ought we not to fuppofe our Hap-
pinefs atall toconfi(t inthem. Butthis Solution of the Dif-
ficulty he takes no notice of here; partly becaufe it is gene-
ral, and applicable to many other Cafes as well as this; and
partly, as prefuming ie abundantly enlarged upon, and that
Ais Reader was (ufficiently perfe@in it before. That there-
fore, which hechules to infill upon, is fomething, that comes
mp clofer to the Matter in-Hand; and proves, that the In-
conveniencies here alledged minifter an Occafion” of much |
greater Advantage, to thofe, who have the Wifdom to make
aright Ute ofthem.
To this Purpofe, he tells.us, that the Inftances in which
Men of inferior Qualifications have,the Preference and Re-
fpect, before thoie, who have made a ftrid yal κα
ife
reer τττς0ὲ........................0.............0..........ὕβ....΄.ὅὁ
with SimPpLicius’s Comment. — 157
Life their Choice, muft be either Good or Evil. If you pleafe,
to make the Divifion perfea, I will take the Confidence to
add, or Indifferent ; for in truth, there area great many Things
of this middle fort. But then it muft be confeft too, that
_ thofe which are indifferent, can neither be called Honour~
able nor Difhonourable. And for that Reafon, the Author
feems not to have thought this Branch worth any. room in
his Divifion. Well, we will fay then, according to Him,
that they are all in one of the Extremes, either Good or Evil:
Now if they be Good, (fays he ) this ought by no means to
be matter of Difcontenttoyou. But quite contrary, it fhould
add to your Joy and Satisfa@ion, that another Perfon is hap-
pyinthem. For this calls for the Exercife of a very Exal-
ted and Philofophical Virtue ; that of wifhing well to all
Mankind, and rejoicing in the Profperity of others.
And here we fhall do well to obferve, what amighty Good
he makes this feeming Evil to contain, and how prodigi-
ous an Honour this Difrefpe& derives upon us. For This
indeed is the very Quality of the Mind, which brings usto the
trueft and neareft refemblance of God, which is the greatett
Happinefs, any of his Creatures can pofiibly attain to. For.
God is himfelf of abfolute and unbounded Power, being in-
deed the only Source of all the limited Powers communica-
tedto any other Beings. Andas his Power isinfinitely Great,
fo his Will is infinitely Good. From hence it comes to
pafs, that he would have all things good, ‘and not any thing
evil, fo far asthat can be. And becaufe his Will can intend
nothing but what his Power is able to accomplifb, therefore
he does really make all things Good; and this K€ does not
niggardly and grudgingly, but communicates to every Crea-
_ ture of his own Goodnefs, in as large Proportions, as the
Condition of each Creature is capable of enjoying ir.
Now the Soul of Man, ’tis true, does not refemble God,
ip infinite and uncontroulable Power, for thisis a Perfe@tion
of the Divine Nature, which our Conttitution cannot re-
ceive; and befides, there are many Degrees of intermediate
Beings, which, tho’ much inferior to God, are yet much fu-
perior to Us in point of Power. But ftill in the other part
of his Excellence, he hath condefcended to make us like him-
felf, and given us the honour of a Will Free and Unbounded,
a Will capable of extending its good Withes, and kind In-
clinations to allthe World, provided we have but the Grace
_to makethis goodufe of it. [tis therefore an inftance of his
» Wonderful Wifdom, and adorable Goodnefs, that he hath
Made
158 . >» Epreretus’s Morals
made This to be his Image and Similitude in our Souls; be-
caufe this is the true and proper principle of all Operation
and A@ion. And though the Soul cannot punctually make
all things Good, as God can, and does; yet it goes as far as
it can in making them fo; and for the reft, it does its part,
by withing that Good, which it cannot givethem. For that
is perfect and true Volition, when the Perfon willing, exerts.
his whole Strength, and all the Faculties affift and concur
withit ; for we havetheabfolute Difpofal of our own Minds,
and fo the withing well to all Mankind, is what any Man
may do, if he pleafe, And indeed a truly Good Man goes
farther than all this; he withes the Profperity of all Men
whatfoever; and he ftops not there, but extends his Kind-
nefs to Creatures of different Species, to Brutes, to Plants,
to even Inaniinate things; ina word, toall that makeup this
great Body of the World, of which himfelf isa part. ’Tis
true, he cannot make thofe Withes effe@tual to all, becaufeas
I faid, the Willing is a Perfe@tion given us by Nature, but
the power of Effeéting is not. For this requires the Co-ope-.
ration of many other Caufes, the Permiflion of the Gods,
and the Concurrence of feveral Agents, which we cannot
command. And hence it is, that all our Virtue confifts in
our Will; the Merit of all our AGtions is meafured by That ;
and that all the Happinefs and Mifery of our Lives is made to
depend upon the Good or Ill ufe of it. And thus you have
the force of this Argument, proceeding upon a Suppofition
that thefe things are Good. :
But if on the other hand, the Refpeéts denied to the Phi- —
lofopher, and paid to others, be Evil ; here can be no ground
of diffatisfa@tion, but a frefh occafion of Joy: Not upon
His account indeed who hath them, ‘but upon your Own,
whohave themnot. Atthis rate, the Good Man can never
be Melancholy at’ the want of thefe things, nor look upon
it as any difparagement to his Perfon, or diminution of his
Happinefs, but is fure to be pleafed, let the Event be what
it will; that is, either for the good Succefs of Others, if it
be Good ; or for his own Efcape, if it be Evil. And thus
all angry Refentments are taken off, in point of Intereft and .
Advantage ; for though we allow thefe things to conduce
to our Habpinefs, yet it is.a much greater Happinefs, to af-
pire after a Refemblance of the Divine Perfeétions, which
the miffing of them gives Men an opportunity to do ; and if
they rather tend to make us Miferable, then the Being with-
out them is not fo properly a Want, as a vsti .
{ce
μος ον Sie ; Ὰ pk es
with SrmpLictius’sComment. τς
After this he proceeds to Two other Topicks, the Poffi-
bility of obtaining them, and the Reafonablenefs of expect-
ing them. From the former of thefe he argues thus. It is
not to be imagined, that one who never makes his Court,
fhould have the fame Privileges, with one who is eternally
labouring to ingratiate himfelf. This Labour muft confift
of all the Ceremonious Fopperies, and Servile Submiffions
imaginable; the waiting at the Great Man’s Rifing, expeét-
ing his coming out, cringing and bowing in the Streets, the
Court, and all Places of publick Concourfe; the Commend-
ing all he does, tho’ never fo bafe, and admiring all he fays
though never fo Senfelefs. And therefore, for a Philofo-
pher, and a Man of Honour and Truth, who cannot fub-
mit to thefe’‘unworthy Methods of infinuating himfelf, to
meet with the fame Countenance, and Marks of Kindnefs,
with thofe who proftitute themfelves at this rate for them ;
is, as the World goes, abfolutely impoffible. ᾿
Nay, it is not only unreafonable upon that account to ex-
pect them, but in pointof Juftice too. It arguesa Mangreedy
and infatiable, when he expects his Meal, and yet will not
confent to pay his Ordinary. It is defiring to invade ano-
thers Right, and ingrofs to yourfelf, what he hath already
bought and paid for: For though he left no Money under his
Plate, yet he gave that purchafe, which you would have
thought much too dear. And confequently (ashe fhews by
that inftance of the Lettice,) you who went withoutthe Din-
her, have as gooda Bargain at leaft, as he that was admitted
to it: He had the Varieties indeed, but then you have your
Liberty; you did notenflave your felf fo far, as to laugh at
his Lordfhip’s dull Jefts, nor to commend what your better
~ Senfe could not like, nor bear the affefted Coldnefs of his
Welcome, nor the tedious Attendancein his Anti-Chamber.
In fhort, you were not the Subje& of his haughty Negli-
gence, and ftiffFormality, northe Jeft of his Sawcy Servants:
_ Now all this you muft have been content with, to have Di-
: ned with his Greatnefs. If youexpeé ir upon eafier Terms,
you are miftaken, for it will come no cheaper;- and if you
expect it, without paying as others do, it argues you greedy,
and an unfair Chapman. And this Character is not confift-
ent with that of aGood Man; fo that you muft change your
By cmPet and be more moderate in-your.Expectances of this
kind.
P C HAP.
160 -Erictetus’s Morals
C'H AP. XXXUE
E cannot be at a lofs, what the Condition of
things is by Nature, what her Laws and
“Methods, nor how Men ought to deport them-
felves, with Regard to them: For thefe are things -
fo plain, that all the World, at one time or other,
are univerfally agreed about them. For Inftance,
‘if a Neighbour’s Child happen to break a Glafs,
we prefently anfwer, that this is a very common
Accident. Now the Application fit to be made
from hence is, that, when one of our own happens
to be broken, we fhould no more think it extraor-
dinary, nor fuffer it to give us any greater Diftur-
bance, than when it was another Man’s Cafe. And
this trivial Example, fhould prepare us for bearing
~Cafualties of greater Confequence, with the like
Temper. When any of our Acquaintants buries a
Child, ot a Wife, every Body is ready to mitigate
the Lofs, with the Reflexion, that all Men are
Mortal, and this is what all Men have therefore Rea-
fon to expeét. But when the Misfortune comes —
home to ourfelves, then we give a loofe to our Paf- -
fions, and indulge our Lamentations and bitter Com-
plaints. Now thefe things ought quite otherwife
-to awaken the fame Confiderations; and it is but
reafonable, that what we thought agood Argument |
to moderate the Refentments ot other People fhould —
be applied with the fame Efficacy, to reftrain the
Exeeties of our Own.
we yy
* The Condition of Nature and our own Duty, is plain to be learn’d from
thofe Accidents, in which our felves have no Iatereft. So Cafaubon, upon
the place, by apeculiar Notion of the Woid διαφίρεῶχ» andin a Senfe highly
agreeable to the reft of the Chapter,
2 CO M-
with StmpxLicius’s Comment. - 164
COMMENT.
* THERE are fome Notions concerning the Nature of
_ SL things, in which all Mankind confent; and not any one
_ confidering Perfon ever pretended to contett or contradiat
them. Such are thefe that follow; That whatever is Good,
_is profitable, and whatever is truly Profitable, is Good: That
all things are carried by a natural Propenfion tothe Defire of
Good: That Equal things are neither lefs nor more than
one another; That Twice Two make Four: And thefe
_ Notions are fuch as right Reafon hath recommended and
_ riveted into our Minds, fuch as long Experience hath con-
firmed, and fuch as carry an exaét Agreement with the
Truth and Nature of things.
But when we defcend from thefe general Truths, tothe par-
ticular Ideas and Do@trines of fingle Perfons, there we very
_ often find ourfelves miftaken. And thefe Erroneous Opini-
ons are of different Sorts. Some of them deceive us, by
two credulous a dependence upon the Report of our Senfes,
_ as when we pronounce the Circumference of the Moon, tobe
as large as that of the Sun, becaufe it appears fo to the naked
Eye. Some weare prepofleffed in favour of, by inclining too
much to our Senfual Inclinations ; as when we fay, that all
_Pleafure is Good. Some are owing tothe Admitting of Ar-
_ guments before they are well weighed; as thofe, which ad-
vance the Belief of the World being made by Two Princi-
ples, and that the Soul is Corporeal. Now thefe are what
Men argue differently upon, and they are fo far from being
_ always true, that many times the Truth lies on the contrary
fide of the Queftion. And it can never be fafe for usto de-_
pend upon fuch particular Affumptions, for the Knowledge
of that true ftate of things, which Ep:cferns means here, by
‘the Condition, the Laws, and the Methods of Nature.
_ But nothing can\be a more pregnant Proof, how exceed-
ing fickle and unfaithful particular Opinions are, and how
firm and unalterable thofe general and acknowledged ones,
than the Variety of Behaviour, in one and the fame Cafe.
For let any Accident happen to a Man’s felf, and he is quite
another Perfon, tranfported with the Vehemence of his Con-
cern, and all his Reafon proves too feeble to fupport it. But
when the very fame Mistortune happens to another, there is
‘none of this Diforder ; he then looks upott it asit really is,
; ar contiders
᾿
4
(
ΤΡ
τόν + ΕΡΙΟΤ τυ 85 Μογαϊθ
confiders it calmly and coolly, without Paffion or Prejudice,
and pailes the fame Judgment upon it with the reft of the
. World who have no partial Affe@tion, or particular Concern
to pervert them; but regard only Truth, and the clear Rea-
fon of the thing.
-Thishe illuftrates by avery trivial Inftance, that of brealt-
ing a Glafs: Which when done by a Neighbour’s Child or
Servant, we are apt prefently to excufe, by putting him in
Mind, how exceeding common this is: that it is what hap-
pens every Day; that, confidering how little a thing throws
a Child down, how often they let things drop out of their —
Hands, and withal, of how exceeding brittle Matter the
Veflél is made, that the leaft Blow in the World dafhes it
to pieces, it is rather to be wonder’d, that fuch things hap+ —
pen no oftner: Thus we fay, when our Difcourfe is Sober
and Difpaffionate. But when one of our own is broken, |
then we rage and ftorm, as if fome new thing had happened
tous. And yetin all Reafon, the fame Confideration of the —
Accident being fo ufual, ought to offer it felf to our Minds,
then too; and with the fame Succefs.
Now this (fays he) you may, if you pleafe apply to Mat-
tersof greater [mportance : When any of our Acquaintants |
buries his Wife or his Child, Whois there, that does not pre-
fently fay, this is every Man’s Cafe? And the Reafon of it
is, becaufethey pafs this Reflexion, from the common Prin-
ciples if their own Minds, and the plain conftant Courfe of
Nature, which they find agreeable to them. For to die, there
is a Neceflity unavoidable; ’tis the very Condition of Hu-
mane Nature ; To be Man, and not fubject to this Fate, would |
imply a Contradiation. And yet for all this, when fuch 2 |
Lofs happens in a Man’s own Family, what Groans, what
Tears, what loud Exclamations, what wild Extravagances
of Paffion do immediately follow? Nay, how hard is it to
perfuade Men that there is nota jultifiable Caufe for all this, or |
that any other Perfon living ever fuffer’d fuch an Affiaion |
before >? Now, why fhould not fuch a one recolle&, how,
he felt himfelf affeded, when he faw his Neighbour in fuch
Exceffes, and how wifely he could tell him then, that he mi-
fiook his own Cafe? That Death was inevitable, and no-
thing more frequent ; and that there was nothing in the Ac~
cident it felf, which could create all this Diforder, but it
was owing entirely to his own miftaken apprehenfions and
the violent paffions of his own Mind, which fhewed him
the thing ina falfe Light? aa
ΤῊΣ Now:
with SimpxLictrus’s Comment. 163
_ Now indeed there are Two Reafons, why we fhould be
thus partial and paflionate in our own Cafe: One is, the
Exceeding Fondnefs, and tender Sympathy, betweenthe Ra-
tional Soul, and the Mortal Body ; which confidering that
this Part muft Die, is much more clofe and moving, than in
Reafonit ought to be, The Other is, that though we know
and are fatisfied, that Die we muft, yet we do not care to
think of it; and fo thefe Two dear Friends live together, as
if they were never to part. Nowthere is nothing that gives
a Man fo much Difturbance and Confufion, as the being fur-
prifed with any Accident ; for, whatever we have forefeen,
and made familiar to our Thoughts by long Expectation, ne-
ver gives us. thofe violent Difturbances.
This I take to be fufficiently plain, from what we fee in
our Behaviour afterwards. For even Thofe that are moft
intemperate in their Griefs, yet within a little while, when
they come to be ufed to the being without what they lament
the Lofs of, return to themfelves and their-Reafon again ,
and all is quiet and eafie, as if no fuch Misfortune had ever
‘happened. Then they can fuggeft to their own compofed
Thoughts, what at firft they could not endure to hear, that
this is mo more than we fee daily come to pafs; That other
People are liable to it, and have born it as well as They;
thatthe Condition of our Nature is Mortal, and moit abfurd
it is to fuppofe any Man‘can be exempt from the common
Fate of his Nature; that our Friends are only gone a little
way before, in the beaten Road, which all our Fore-Fathers
have troden, and in which we ourfelves fhall fhortly follow
them. A
' Now if this Separation, when a little Time and Cuflom
hath rendred it familiar, become fo very fupportable, after
the thing hath happened; I would fain know, what Reafon
can be alledged, why the making fuch a Separation familiar
_ to us beforehand, by frequent Thoughts, and perpetual Ex-
4
᾿
pedations of it, thould not enable us to bear it with great E-
vennefs of Temper, whenever it fhall happen. For furely
the true Caufe of all immoderate Concern upon thefe Oc-
cafions, is that we do not reprefent thefe things to our own
Thoughts, nor accuftom ourfelves to them fo effectually, as
We might'and ought to do, And the Reafon of this again
_ feems to be, that the Generality of People have their Minds
faftened down to their Fortunes; and ali their Imaginations
formed, according to the Model of their prefent Condition.
oe i 3 Pig : Hence
164 Epictetus’s Morals
Hence it is, that the Profperous Man is always Gay and Big,
as depending upon the Continuance of his Happinefs, and
never dreaming of any poffible Change in his Affairs. And
thus People alfo under unhappy Circumftances, are as com-
monly Difpirited and Diffident, and can entertain little
Thought of a Deliverance, and better Days. But another
Caufe,. which contributes to this Fault as much as the for-
mer, is the unreafonable Fondnefs of thefe Things, which
Men lament the Lofs of fo tenderly : They perieétly dote
upon them, while they have them; and cannot therefore ad-
mit any Thought fo uneafie as that of parting withthem; for
no Man alive cares todwell long upon Meditations which are
troublefome and affliiing tohim. This Fonduefs is the
thing we fhould guard our felves againft, at leaft cut off all
the Exceffes of it, by reflecting ferioufly what we are our-
felves, and what that is, which we fo paflionately admire.
We fhould confider, that it is what we cannot call our
own; and that, though we could, yet it is fo imperfect 4.
Blifs, as to cloy and weary us with long Enjoyment. Our
Kindnefs therefore fhould be reduced, and brought within
fuch Proportions as are confiftent with Decency and Mo-
deration: And inall our Converfation, it will be great Pru-
dence to abftain from all Expreffions and Difcourfe, and
efpecially from all fuch A@ions in our Behaviour, as tend —
to endear thefe things the more, and ferve in Truth for no
other End, than to cherifh our own Folly, and make our
Paffions more Exorbitant and Ungovernable.
Bee ee iitaltetei tilt isi iii ἠέ ἥν :
Gi HM) A'P. ΧΧΧΙ͂Ν.
~~, Sno Man fets up a Mark, with a Defign to
. thoot befide it: fo neither haththe Maker of
the World formed in it any fuch real Being, as
Evil. ie Ἢ
COMMENT.
. ee Difputes, which are wont to arife concerning the ᾿
Nature and Original of Evil, have by being unskilfully —
mattaged, proved Occafions of grievous Impiety oe
Q
σι ρου.
with ΘΙΜΡΙΙΟΙῦ 5.5 Comment, τός
God, fubverted the very Foundation of Virtue and good
_ Manners, and perplexed many unwary Perfons, with feveral
_ dangerous Scruples, and inextricable Difficulties.
Firft, As to that Opinion, which makes Evil a firft Prin-
ciple, and will have Two common Principles, a Good and
a Bad one, from whence all things whatfoever derive their
Being, it is attended with a Thoufand prodigious Abfurdi-
ties. For, whence fhould this Power of being a Principle,
which is One, and is imparted to both thefe Contraries in
᾿ common, whence I fay, fhould it come? Or how fhould
one and the fame Caufe give it to them both? And how
is it poffible, that thefe Two fhould be Cowraries unlefs they
be ranked under one common Gezus? For we mutt diftin-
guith between Diverfity and Coxtrariety; that whichis White,
- cannot be termed Contrary to that which is Hot or Cold;
but Contraries are properly thofe things that are moft diftane
_ from one another, yet ftill under the fame common Gewzs,.
White then and Black, are Contraries, becaufe both bear re-
lation to the Gexus of Colour ; for they are both Colours alike.
And Hot and Cold are Contraries, for they likewife meet
under the Genus of Tactile Qualities. And this is Reafon
enough to fhew, that Contraries cannot poffibly be firft Prin-
ciples, becaufe there muft have been fome common Gerus
antecedent to them, or they could not be contraries: And
farther, becaufe One muft needs have a Being, before Many;
for Eachof thofe many Beings mutt fubfift, by virtue of its
Effence, communicated from that firft Being, otherwife no-
thing could ever have been atall,
Again, Some fingle Original Being there muft needs have
been, which muft have been a Foundation for particular Pro-
| perties, and from which thofe Properties muft have been
diftributed among the Many. For, from the Divine Ori-
_ ginal Good, all good things whatfoever proceed; andin like
manner all Truth, from the fame Divine Fountain of Truth.
So that, though there be feveral Principles of feveral Pro-
perties, yet ftill thefe all are comprehended in, and refolved
into, one Principle at laft; and that, not fome fubordinate
and particular one, as thefeare in their own kind only ; but
a Principle from whence all the reft {pring. One that tran-
{cends, conneéts, contains them all, and communicates ta
each of them its Caufal and Productive Power, with fuch
Limitations and Abatements, as their refpe€tive Natures re-
quire. So exceeding irrational and abfurd it is, to think of
P4 adyanr
A
v1
166 Epictetus’s Morals
advancing I wo Principles of all things, or to fuppofe it pof-
fible that there fhould be more than One.
Befides, They that will have this Univerfeto proceed from
Two Principles, are driven by their own Tenets intoa Thou-
fand wild Inconfiftencies. ‘They tell us, one of thefe Prin-
ciples is Good, and the other Evil ; they call the Good one
God, but yet at the fame time, they do not allow him to be
the Univerfal Caufe: They cannot worthip him as Almigh-
ty, for indeed they have clipped the Wings of his Omnipo-
tence, and are fo far from afcribing all Power to him, that
they divide it into halves, or to fpeak more properly they call
him the Source of Goodne{s, and Spring of Light, and yet
deny, that allthings receive Light and Goodnefs from him.
Now what horrid Blafphemies, what opprobrious Reflexi-
ons does this DoGrine caft upon the Majefty of God? They
reprefent him as a Feeble and a Fearful Being, uneafie with
continual Apprehenfions, that Evil will invade his Territo-
ries. And, to eafe himfelf of thefe Fears, and buy off his
Enemy, contrary to all Juftice, and Honour, and Intereft,
cafting fome Souls away, (which are fo many Parts and Par-
cels of himfelf, and never merited by any Offence of theirs
to be thus deliver’d up,) that fo, by parting with thefe, he
may compound for thereft of the Good ones with him. Like
fome General in Diftrefs, who, when the Enemy attacks
him, facrifices One part of his Army, to gain an Opportu-
nity of bringing off the Other. For the Senfe of what they
fay amounts to thus much, though it be not exprefs’d in the ©
very fame Words. Now he that delivered up thefe Souls,
or commanded them to be delivered up in this barbarous man- —
ner, had fure forgot, or at leaft did not duly confider, what
Miferies thofe wretched Spirits muft endure, when in the
Hands of that Evil Principle. For (according tothem) they
are Burnt, and Fryed, and Tormented all manner of ways;
and this too, notwithftanding they were never guilty of any
Fault, but are ftill parts of God himfelf. And at laft they
tell us, that, if any fuch Souls happen to Apoftatize, and
Degenerate into Sin, they never recover themfelves; nor are
from thenceforth in any poflibility of returning to Good, but
continue infeparably united to Evil for ever. (Only here it
is fit we takenetice what Souls thefe are, and how they thus
degenerate; for they do not admit their Crimes to be Adul-
tery or Murder, or any of the groffeft and moft flagitious
Enormities of a diffolute and wicked Converfation, but on- |
ly the denying of Two Principles, an evil anda good “a
n
ΝΥ ΑΥΥΑΎΥ ΣὙΡ
with Simpxuiiciuss Comment. 167
eer
In the mean while, this God, it feems is left maimed and
imperfeét, by the Lofs of fo many of his Parts; he is ftupid
and fenflefs too, (in Their Hypothetis I mean, [0 far be it
from Me to entertaia fo irreverent a Thought) for he under-
ftands nothing at all, either of his own Intereft, or the Na-
tureof Evil: If he did; what Dread could he be under, or
how fhould Evil enter into any part of that Province which
Good poffeffes ; fince their Natures are fo very diftant and ir-
reconcileable, that they cannot run into each other, but their
- Bounds are fix’d, and immovable Barriers fet between them
from all Eternity ?
For this they faytoo. But who, in the Nameof Wonder,
fet thefe Bounds and Barriers? Did Chance? Then it feems
they make Chance a Common Principle too. Did any other
Being which had Authority over both thefe, and prefcribed
tothem as itfelfthought fit? Then it feems That had a Sub-
- fiftence, before They made the World. But how could that
be done before the Creation? For the Divifion they make is
like this upon Earth; they affign the Eaftern, Wettern, and
piste Regions to Good, and referve only the South for
vil.
Afterwards they go on, and fanfy, that Evil hath five A-
partments, like fo many Dens or Caverns ; and here they
tellsus of Woods, and al] manner of Animals, fuch as fre-
quent both Sea and Land; that thefe are at eternal Wars
with one another ; and though they are faid to be immortal,
as being originally Good, yet they pretend at the fame time,
that they are devoured by their Five-formed Montfter.
Now then, fince thefe diftin@ Regions have been fet out,
as you fee, from the Beginning of the World at leaft; and
each affigned and accommodated to its peculiar Inhabitant ;
T would fain be fatisfied, which way Evil fhould make an In-
curfion into the Dominions of Good. Or, if we fhould
- fuppofe this poffible, yet could it be done however, and ΠῚ}
thefe Tworemain contrary to one another? May we not as
wellfay, that White may be Black, and yet retain its White-
nefs ftill ; and that Light can admit Darknefs, and ftill be
Light, as that perfeé&t Evil can make Approaches to perfeét
Good, and ‘ftill continue perfe& Evil? And, if this Impof-
fibiliry be evident and unavoidable, what Occafion is there to
_ defcribe God as they do, committing an A&t of fo much un-
_ neceffary Fear, and Folly, and Injuftice, as is the cafting a-
_ way Souls to Evil for his own Security, and ever fince, la-
_ kouring to no purpofe (for fo they will needs have it 100)
1S
168 ErrcrTretus’s Morals
to redeem thefe Souls from Mifery? A Defign never to be
effected, becaufe, as I obferv’d betore, fome of them have
Japfed, and fo mult abide under the Dominion of Evil to all
Eternity: And all this they will not allow the Good to have
had any Knowledge or Forefight of, though with the fame
Breath they pretend, that the Evil Principle knew perfealy
Well what number of Souls would fall into his Hands, and
laid his Stratagems accordingly.
Their Scheme certainly had been much better contrived, had
they reprefented the Good Principie, as always employed
and taken up with the Contemplation of it felf, and not en-
gaged it in perpetual War, with an Enemy never to be van-
quifhed or deftroyed. For they make Evil to be no lefs E-
ternal and Immortal, than Good. And this indeed is a con-
fiderableObjeGtion, and a [υἱὲ Reproach to their whole Sy-
ftem, that Eternal Exiftence, and Incorruptible Duration, no
Beginning, and no End, are allowed to Evil, as well asto
Good. And when thefe glorious Attributes are given to
that which we cannot but deteft, what Difference is there
left, or what can we fay more in Honour of That, which
we cannot but love and admire ?
Let us now proceed, if you pleafe, to take a fhort View
of the Account they give, concerning the Creation of the
World. Pillars then there are, they tell us, not like thofe
of the Poet,
Which this vaft Globe of Earth and Heav’n fuftain,
{for they fcorn, that any Poetical Fi@ions, or the leaft fabu-
lous Circumftance, fhould be allowed ἃ place in their Philo-
fophy;)} but (as one of their greateft Mafters hath informed
us) of folid unhewn Stone, and twelve Windows, One of
which is conftantly opened every hour.
But their marvellous Wifdom is not more eminently feen
in any one Inftance, than the Account they pretend to give of
Eclipfes. Theytellus, That whenin Framing of the World
the Evils that were in Conjun@ion together gave great Di-
fturbance, by their juftling and diforderly Motions, the Lu- —
minaries drew certain Veils beforethem, to fhelter them from
the ill Influences of that Diforder; and, that Eclipfes are no-
thing elfe, but the Sun and Moon hiding themfelves ftill
behind thofe Veils, upon fome extraordinary and threatning
Emergencies. .
Then
with ΒΙΜΡΙΙΟΙ 8.5 Comment. τόρ
ΤΊ εξ again, How odd and unaccountable is it, that, of
fo many Heavenly Bodies which give light to the World,
they fhould hold only the Two great ones in Veneration ,
and contemn 411 the reft; affigning the Sun and Moon to
the good Principle, but putting all the Stars into the Poffeffi-
on of the Evil, and deriving them from a,bad Caufe?
The Light of the Moon they do not agree to be borrow-
ed from the Sun, but think it a Colle@ion or Conftellation
of Souls, which fhe draws up, like fo many Vapours from
the Earth, between Change and Full; and then tranflates
them by degrees into the Sun, from. the Full to the next
New Moon.
In fhort, they have a world of Extravagant Fancies, which
do not fo much as deferve to be reckoned among Fables.
And yet they are by no means content to have them look’d
upon as fabulous, nor do they ufe them as figures or Hiero- .
glyphicks, foasto fignifie fomething elfe of more fubftantial
Goodnefs, but will needs have them believed to be ftri@ly
and literally true. Thus the Image they give us of Evil, is
a Monfter, compounded of five feveral Creatures ; a Lion,
a Fifh, an Eagle, and fome other two things, I do not well
- remember what; but all thefe, together, are fuppofed to
_ make avery ravenous and formidable Compofition.
Such abominable Impiety againft God are thefe Notions
and Principles chargeable with; and yet ( which is ftill more
amazing ) the Perfons, who advance them, profefs to take
Sanétuary in thefe Opinions, out of a more than common
Refpe&, and a profounder Reverence to the Divine Per-
fections, than the reft of the World (as they think) exprefs.
_ They could not bear the imputing any Evil to God; and, to
ε
ὶ
ἣ
sf
!
avoid this Inconvenience, they have found out a particular
Principle and Caufe of all Evil; a Principle equal in Honor and
Power to the Good, or rather indeed Superior and more Po-
tent than He. For in all the Attempts made hitherto, to cor-
rupt the World, and render it miferable, Evil feems plainly to
have got the better. For they reprefent Evil upon all Occafions
taking Advantage again{t Good, and contriving all manner of
_ Ways not to let it go. This is conftantly the bold and daring
_ Aggreffor ; while Good, in the mean while, gives way to, and
f
ty
mingles it felf with Evil, would fain compound the Matter,
and, for any thing that yet appears, hath difcovered nothing in
its whole Management, but Fear, and Folly, and Injuftice.
Thus, while they abhor to caliGod the Caufe of Evil, they
make him nothing but Evil in the moft exquifite Degree ;
ang
(
170 Eprcrerus’s Morals
and (according to that vulgar Proverb) leap out of the
Frying-Pan into the Fire.
But, befides thefe vile Profanations of the Majefty of God,
this Syftem of Philofophy does, as much as in it lies, tear
up the very Roots of all Virtue and moral Inftru@tion, by
deftroying and utterly taking away all that Liberty of Choice,
which God and Nature hath given us. For, befides thofe
Attributes of Eternity and Immortality, it does alfo afcribe
to this Principle of Evil a compulfive Power over our Wills;
and that, fo very abfolute and ftrong, that it is not only out
of our own Difpofal, whether we will commit Wickednefs
or no, but fuch as even God himfelf is not able to controul
or over-power. In the mean while it muft be confeft, that
thisis avery idle and extravagant Imagination: For, if our
Souls are violently thruft and born down into Murder or
Adultery, or any other that are reputed the moft grievous
Crimes, and commit thefe, merely by the Impulfe of fome
ftronger Power, without any Confent or voluntary Con-
currence of their own, then are they clear of all Guilt. And
this is a Matter fo evident and acknowledged, that all Laws,
both Divine and Humane, acquit Perfons in Cafes of Vio-
lence, and fuch a Force as they could not refift, and where
it is plain they ated againft their Will. And indeed there
is not, nor can be any Sin at all in fuch AGions, where
the Minds of Men are fuppofed to have no Concern, but
to proceed upon Neceflity and Conftraint, and fuch as could
not be refifted by them. .
Now if thefe wife Philofophers, while they were at a lofs,
where to fix the true Caufe of thefe things, confidered as
Evils, bethought themfelves of this Remedy, and fet up fuch
a Principle of Evil, as you have heard, to refolve the Diffi-
culty; they have done their own Bufinefs effe€tually, and,
by a very pleafant Bluader, over-turned their whole Scheme
atonce. For, ifit follows likewife, (upon the Suppofal of
fuch a Conftraint put upon the Wills of Men by that Prin-
ciple ) that nothing they do is any longer Evil, then obferve,
how pleafant a Conclufion they have brought their Matters
to: For the Confequence lies plainly thus. Ifthere be fuch
a Thing as a Principle of Evil, then there is no fuch thing
as Evil in the World; and if there be no fuch Thing as
Evil, then there cannot poffibly beany fuch Thing asa Priny —
ciple of Evil; and fo upon the whole Matter, they have left
themfelves neither a Principle of Evil, nor any Evil ateths
, ised since
with Simpxiticius’s Comment. ΤΣ
PEE SER ENED NRE EIE SCS SAREE TES SS a
_ Since therefore this is difcovered to be but a rotten Fou®-
dation; if any, confcious of its Weaknefs, fhall prefume t0
affirm, that God is the Author of Evil as well as Good,
‘the Falfhood and Impiety of this Affertion will ask but lit-
tle Time and Pains to evince it. For how indeed can we
fuppofe it poffible, that that Opinion fhould be true, which
cafts fuch unworthy Afperfions upon Him, who is the Au-
thor and Giver of all Truth?
And firft, which way can one conceive, that God, whofe
very Effence is perfeét and immutable Goodnefs, fhould
produce Evil out of himfelf? For, fince Evil and Good
are contrary to each other, as our Adverfaries themfelves
grant, How can we imagine one Contrary to be the Pro-
duction of another?
Befides, he that produces any thing out of himfelf, does
it, by being the Caufe of its exifting, by having the Caufe
within himfelf, and by having fome Likenefs to it in his
own Nature; and fo, if you refpect him as the Caufe, the
Producing, and the Produced, are in fome degree the fame.
So that the Promoters of this Opinion feem not to have at-
tended to the manifeft Dithonour they put upon God, by
making him not only the Caufe and Author of Evil, «but
to be the firft and Original Evil in his own Nature.
Since therefore there is no fuch Thing as a common Prin-
ciple of Evil, and fince God is not.the Author and Caufe
of it, what Account fhall we give of its coming into the
World? For it is impoflible any Thing fhould have a Be-
ginning, without a Caufe. And the beft Courfe we can
take for this will be, firft to explain what we mean by
Evil, and then to enquire into its Original; for the Caufes
of Things will very hardly be found, till their Natures are
firft known.
Now as to that Evil, which They fuppofe, who profefs
_to believe a common Principle of Evil, and many of thofe
who difpute this Queftion underftand, we may be bold to
pronounce, that there is no fuch Thing in Nature. For
they pretend, that this Evil hath a pofitive Subfiftence of its
own, as Good hath; that it hath a Power equal to Good,
and contrary to it; that its Etfence is incompatible with that
of Good, and will no more endure any Mixture with it,
than White will with Black, or Hot withCold. Butif there
Were any fuch real and fubftantial Evil, like the Subftance
of a Man, or a Horfe, or any other Species, which really
and actually fubfifis; ic muft needs have fome fort of Per-
feftion
172 _ Epictetus’s Morals
feGtion in proportion to its Nature; and a particular Form,
- which makes it what it is, and diftinguifhes it from all o-
ther Beings. Now every Form, confidered as fuch, is Good
and not Evil, becaufe it is endued with the Perfeétions pe- —
culiar to its Nature. And indeed they are fo fentible of this,
as to make that Evil of theirs defire Good, and embrace
and court it, and receive Advantage by it, and love to par-
take of it, and ufe all poffible Diligence not to part from
it. And how very ridiculous an attempt is it, to impofe
upon us a Thing which do’s all this, for a Being fimply and
abfolutely Evil ?
But then, if we confider in the next place, that Evil, by
the Commiffion whereof Men are denominated wicked, and
are punifhed by God and Man for contraéting the Guilt of
it; this is purely accidental, and hath no real Effence of its
own: For we find that it both is, and ceafes to be, with-
out the Deftruction of the Subje&t, which is the very diftin-
guifhing Charaéter of an Accident; and likewife, it never
fubfifts, but by Inheritence in fome Subjeét: For, what
Evil of this kind was there ever in the Abftraét, without
being the Evil, that is, the Crime, of fome Perfon who
committed it? And fo in like manner, Moral Good, which
is the true Oppofite of Evil, in this Senfe is merely an Acci-
dent too.
Only herein they differ, that Good is that Quality of its
Subjeét, by which it is rendred agreeable to Nature, and at-
tains its proper PerfeStion. But Evil is the Depravation or
Indifpofition of its Subje&t, by which it (werves and departs
from Nature, and lofes or falls fhort of its natural Perfeéti-
on, that is, of Good. For, if Evil were the right Difpofi-
tion, and natural Perfection of the Form to whichit belongs, |
then would it by this Means change its Name and its Na-
ture, and commence Good. So that from hence we may
conclude againit any primary Nature and pofitive Subfiftence’
of Evil; for it is not in Nature as good is, but is only an
additional Thing fuperinduced upon Good, the Privation of,
and Fall from ir.
Juft thus we may conceive Sicknefs, with regard to Health;
and the Vices of the Mind, with refpect to Virtue. And as
the Walking ftrong and upright is the deligned and primary
Action of an Animal, and the end which it propofes to it-
felf when it moves ; but Stumbling or Halting is an Acci-
dent befide the purpofe, and happens through fome Defect,
ba
ον i τῶν
eT στ:
and miffing the intended Aim; being a Motion, not of Νὰ - ~
ture’s.
) with SimpLicius’s Comment. 173
_ ture’s making, nor agreeable to her Operations; direétly fo
- we may affirm of Evil, when compared to its oppofite Good.
| And, though thefe be Contraries , as White and Black are,
yet no Man can maintain, that they do equally fubfit, or
are equipollent to one another, as White and Black are
in a Phyfical Confideration. For thefe do both fubfift alike,
‘and neither of them can pretend to a greater Perfection in
Nature, than the other; and confequently, one is not the
_ mere Privation of the other. For, a Privation is properly
a Defe& or kind of falfe Step in Nature, whereby the ori-
_ ginal Form is not fully come up to, as Limping is in a Man’s
Gate. But now each of thofe Colours hath its Form entire,
_ and as much of what Nature intended fhould belong to it,
| as its Contrary. Whereas, in the Cafe before us, One of
the Extremes is agreeable to Nature, and the Other contra-
ΤΥ to it; and that which is contrary to Nature, isan acciden-
tal Addition to that part which is agreeable to it;. for Good
was firft, and then Evil; not Evil firft, and afterwards
Good. As no Man can fay, that Mifling the Mark was
_ antecedent to the Hitting of it; nor Sicknefs before Health ;
| but quite otherwife. For it was the Archer’s primitive De-
fign to hit the Mark, and he fhot on purpofe that he might
_ do fo. Thus alfo it was the original Intent of Nature, to
| give us found Health, anda good Conftitution; for, the
_ Prefervation and Continuance of the Creature, was the very
_ End the propofed to her felf in forming it. And, in general
| Terms, whatever any Aétion is dire@ted to, that is the pro-
per End of it. But now the mifling the Mark happens af-
| terwards by Accident, when the Operation does not fucceed
as it ought, nor attain the End at firft propofed, but hits up-
- on fomething elfe, fome Difappointment inftead of it. Now
_ then this Difappointment, which comes in afterwards and
_ bythe By, may very truly be faid to be Additional, and-
_ Accidental to the Original Purpofe of Hitting the Mark ;
but that Purpofe can with no good Propriety of Speech be
called fo, with regard to that, which happened afterwards,
_ befides and againft the Man’s Purpofe.
_ If then all Things naturally defire Good, and every Thing
_ of any kind, a&s with a profpeé of, or in order to, fome
_ Real, or fome Seeming Good; itis manifeft, that the ob-
_ taining fome Good is the primary End of all Operations
_whatfoever. Sometimes indeed it happens, that Evil fteps
in between ; when the Defire is fix’d upon fome Obje& not
_ really and truly good, bur fuch in outward Appearance on-
ly
a
194 Epiecretus’s Morals
ly, and which hath an Allay and Mixture of Evil with it.
Thus when a Man in purfuit of Pleafure, or greedy of
Wealth, turnsa Robber, or a Pirate; his Defire, in this Cafe,
is principally fixed upon the feeming Good; and that is the —
Spring, upon which all thefe A&ions move; but, as Mat-
ters ftand, he is forced to take the Good and the Bad together.
For no Man alive was yet fo unnaturally profligate, as to
be guilty of Lewdnefs for Lewdnefs fake; or to Rob any
Man merely for the fake of Stealing; or indeed, difpofed
to any manner of Evil, purely for the Satisfaction of doing
Evil. Becaufe it is paft all doubt, that Evil, confidered and
apprehended as Evil, can never be the Obje& of any Man’s
Defire. For if it were the Principal and original Caufe of
thofe Things which proceed from it, then would it be the
End of all fuch Things: As an End it would be defirable
to them, as Good. For Good and Defirable‘are Terms re-
ciprocal and convertible; and confequently, at this rate, it
would become Good, and ceafe to be Evil.
’Tis moft certainly true then, that all Things whatfoever
do defire and purfue their own Advantage; not all, their
true and real Advantage indeed ; but all their feeming Bene-
fit, and fuch as they at that time take for the true, and δεῖ.
For no Man is willingly deceived; no Man chufes a Fal-
fhood before Truth, nor Shadows before Subftances, who
knows and is fenfible of the Difference between them, when
he does it. But this Misfortune happens generally, from a
blind Admiration of fome apparent Good, which fo dazles
our Eyes, that either we do not at all difcover the Evil it is”
attended with, or if we do difcern that, yet we fee the
Thing through falfe Opticks, fuch as magnifie the Good,
and leffen the Evil to the Eye. Now it is a frequent and a
reafonable Choice, when we are content to take a greater
Good with the Incumbrance of a [εἰς Evil: As for In-
ftance, When we fuffer an Incifion, or a Cupping, and
account the Evil of thefe Pains much too little, to coun-
terbalance the Good there is, in that Health which they re-
ftore to us. ¢
Oace more yet. That all Things defire Good, is farther
plain from hence; That, fuppofing Evil to have areal Be-
ing, and a Power of Acting, whatever itdid, would be for
its own Advantage, that is, in other Words, for itsown
Good. And thus much they who afcribe a Being and Ope-
ration to it confefs; for they pretend,. that it purfues after
Good, would tain detain it, and ufes all poflible Endeavours
, eet
179
GANA EES την SRS πεύυδτες πη δ νανπαιιι οἷ
not to let it go. And if Evil be the Obje& of no Defire,
then is it not any primary and defigned Nature. But, fince
the Condition of it is, in all Particulars, according to the
Defcription here given of it; it is moft truly faid, to bean
Accidental and Additional Thing, fuperinduced to fome-
thing that did fubfift before, but to have no Subfiftence of
its own.
Well (fays the Obje&tor ) Tallow what you fay. We will
fuppofe, that Evil is only an Accident, a Defeét, a Privati-
on of Good, and an Additional Difappointment of the firft
and original Intent of Nature. And what of all this? How
dre we advanced in the Queftion before us? For let this be
what, or after what manner you pleafe, ftill it muft have
fome Caufe:' Otherwife, How, in the Name of Wonder,
did it ever find the way into the World? How then will
you get out of this Maze? You allow God to be the Caufe
of all Things; you muft grant that Evil hath fome Caufe;
and yet you tell me, that God is infinitely Good, and fo
cannot be that Caufe. ὶ
This Objeétion hath been already confidered, and fpoken
to, both at the Beginning of the Book, where we expiained
this Author’s Diftin€tion of the Things in, and not in our
own Power; and alfo in the Comment upon: the XIII.
Chapter, upon Occafion of thofe-words, Trouble not yourfelf
with wifhing , that Things may be juft as you would have them,
&c. But however I will {peak to it once moré here too,
and that briefly , as follows.
God, who is the Source and Original Caufe of all Good-
nefs, did not only produce the higheft and moft Excellent
Things, fuch as are good in themfelves; nor only thofe
that are of a Rank formething inferiour to thefe, and ofa
middle Nature; but the Extremes too, fuch’as are capable
of falling, and apt to be perverted from that which is agree-_
able to Nature, to that which we call Evil. Thus; As,
after thofe incorruptible Bodies, which afe always regular
in their Motions, and immutably good, Others were created
fubjeé to Change and Decay ; fo likewile it was with Souls.
The fame Order was obferved with thefe too; for after
Them which were unalterably fixed in Good, Others were
produced liable to be feduced from it. And this was done,
‘both for the greater illuftration of the Wife and Mighty
Creator’s Glory; that the Riches of his Goodnefs might be
the more clearly feen, in producing good things of all forts,
as many as were capable of fubfifting; and alfo, that the
1 Q Univerfe
4
with SrmpLicitus’s Comment,
176 EpicTetus’s Morals
Univerfe might be full and perfeét, when Beings of all kinds,
and all Proportions, were contained in it. (For Thisisa —
PerfeQion, to want nothing of any kind.) And likewife,
to vindicate the Higheft and the Middle fort, which never |
decline or deviate from their Goodnefs, from that Con- —
tempt, which always falls upon the Loweft of any fort; —
and fuch thefe had been, if the Corruptible and Mortal. ᾿
things had not been Created, and Supported the other’s —
Dignity , ‘by their own want of it. |
And Corruptible they muft be. For it could never be, that
while the Firft, and the Middle fort of Bodies continued as
they are; SomeImmutable, both as to their Nature and their
Operation; Others Immutable indeed, as to their Subftance, ©
but Mutable in their Motion; it could not be, I fay, that —
the Loweit and Sublunary Bodies fhould ever hold out, —
while the violent Revolutions of the Heavenly ones were
perpetually changing their Subftance, and putting them into
unnatural Diforders.
For thefe Reafons certainly, and perhaps for a great
many others more important than thefe, which are Secrets
too dark and deep for us, Thefe Sublunary Bodies were
made, and this Region of Mortality, where the Pervertible
Good hath its Refidence. For there wasa Neceffity, that.
the loweft fort of Good fhould have aBeing too; and fuchis
that, which is liable to Change and Depravation. Hence alfo, ©
there is no fuch thing as Evil inthe Regions above us; for
the nature of Evil, being nothing elfe but a Corruption of ©
the Meaneft and moft Feeble Good, caa only fubfift, where —
that Mean and Mutable Good refides. For this Reafon the —
Soul, which, confidered by herfelf, is a Generous and Im- ©
mutable Being, is tainted with no Evil, while alone in a.
Stare of Separation. But being fo contrived by Nature, as —
to dwell in this lower World, and be intimately united to ©
Mortal Bodies, (for fo the goad Providence of our great
Father and Creator hath ordered it, making thefe Souls 8
Link to tye the Spiritual and Material World together,
joyning the Extremes by the common Bands of Life, ) it”
feems.to bear a part in all thofe Diftempers and Decays ,
which Evil fubjeéts our Bodies to, by difturbing their natu- -
ral Habit and Frame. Though indeed: cannot think this”
tobe Evil, ftriétly fpeaking, but rather Good; fince the”
Efe@ of it is fo: For thus, the fimple Elements, of which ©
thete Bodies are compounded, come to be fet free from a
"great Confinement, and fevered front other parts of Mang
ο
Ψ. 15
΄
with SrmpLiic1us’s Comment. 177
of a different Conttitution, with which they were interwo-
ven and entangled before; and fo, getting loofe from the
_ perpetual Combat between contrary Qualities, are reftored
to their proper Places,,and their Primitive Mafs again, in
order to acquiring new Life and Vigour.
_ And if this Proceeding be the occafion of perpetual Change,
yet neither is that Evil; becaufe every thing is refolved at
laft, into what it was at the beginning. For Water, though
evaporated into Air, yet is by degrees congealed iato Wa-
ter again: and fo, even particular Beings lofe nothing by
thofe Viciflitudes.
_ But that, which ought to be a Confideration of greater
Moment, is, that the Diffolution of Compound Bodies,
and the mutual change of Simple ones into each other, con-
tributes to the Advantage of the Univerfe in general, by
making the Corruption of one thing to become the Rife
and Birth of another. By this perpetual Round it is, that
Matter and Motion have been fuftained all this while. Now
it is obvious to any obfetving Man, that both Nature and
Art, (as was urged heretofore, ) do frequently neglect a
fingle Part, when the detriment of that in particular, may
conduce to the good of the Whole. The former does it, as
often as our Rheums, and Ulcerous Humours, are thrown
off from the Vitals, and turn’dinto Sores or Swellings in any
of the extreme Parts ; and Art imitates this Method of Nature,
as oft as a Limb is feared, or lopped off, for the prefervati-
on of the Body: So that upon the whole Matter, thele
Shocks and Corruptions of Bodies deferve rather to be efteem-
ed Good than Evil; and the Caufe of them, the Caufe of
Good and not Evil Events. For thofe Sublunary Bodies,
which are Simples, fuffer no Injury, becaufe they are fub-
je& to no Decay or Deftru@tion: And for the Evil which
‘the Parts feem to undergo, this hath been fhewp to have
more Good than Evilin it, both in Simples and Compounds,
even when contidered in it felf; but, if taken with refpeét
to the Benefit which other Creatures reap by it; then it is
]
manifeftly Good. So that the Diftempers and Decays of Bo-
dies, take them which way you will, are not Evil, but pro-
duce great Good.
But if any one thall be fcrupulous upon this occafion,
and quarrel with our calling That Good, which is confeiled
to be no better than a perverting of the Courfe of Nature;
let not this Nice Caviller take upon him however to call it
o>)
ba
δ
vil, in the grofs Senfe, and common Acceptation of the
Bit Q2 Word;
‘
re ee
178 - Epictretus’s Morals
sabes eS Bar ae σι ΦΟΟΕΣ
Word; by which we underftand fomething, utterly repug-
nant and irreconcileableto Good. But lethimcall rather it
a Neceffity or Hardfhip; as not defirable for its own fake,
but having fometendency, and contributing , to that which
is fo: For, were it fimply and abfolutely Evil, it could
never be an Inftrument of Good to us. Now that which —
1 mean by Neceffary, though it have not Charms enough
of its own to recommend it, yet does it deferve to be ac-
counted Good, for leading us to that which is Good;
and That which can become a proper Obje& of our Choice,
under any Circumftance, is fo far forth Good. Thus we
chufe Incifions,. and Burnings, and Amputations; nay, we —
are content to pay dear for them, and acknowledge our- |
felves obliged, both by the Prefcription, and the painful O-
peration; All which were moft ridiculous to be done, if
we thought thefe things Evil. And yet lown, this is but
a Qualified and Inferior Good, not ftridlyand properly fo,
but only in a Second and Subordinate Senfe: Yet fo, that
the Creator of thefe things is by no means the Caufe of |
Evil, but a neceffary and meaner Good, though a Good
ftill; for fach we ought to efteem it, fince it is derived from
the fame Univerfal Fountain of Goodnefs, though embafed
with fome Allays and Abatements. And thus much, I
hope, may be thought fufficient, in Vindication of the
Nature and Caufe of that Evil, which Bodies are con-
cerned in.
Nothing indeed can fo truly be called Evil, as the Lapfes
and Vices of the Soul of Man. And of thefe too, much
hath been faid before ; but however we will refume the Dif- |
courfe on this Occafion, and enquire afrefh, both into the
Natureand Caufe of them.
And here we fhall do well to take notice, That the Souls |
of a mope excellent Nature, which dwell in the Regions
above us, are immutably fixed in Goodnefs, and wholly
unacquainted with any Evil. There are alfo the Souls |
of Brutes, of a bafer alloy than ours, and ftanding in the
middle as it were, between the Vegetative Souls of Plants,
and our Rational ones. Thefe,+ fo far forth as they are
Corporeal, are liableto that Evil, to which Bodies are fub-
ject; but fo far as concerns their Appetites and Inclinations,
they bear-fome Refemblance to the Humane. And the Evil,
they are in this Refpeét obnoxious to, is in proportion the |
fame; fo that One of thefe will be fufficiently explained, by
giving an Account of the Other. |
Now
with StmPLicius’s Comment. 179
111 Te
Now the Humane Soul is in a middle Station, between
‘the Souls above, and thofe below. [τ partakes of the Qua-
lities of both; Of thofe more excellent ones, in the Subli-
mity of its Nature, and the Excellence of its Underftand-
ing: Of the Brutal and Inferior ones, by its itrict Affinicy
to the Body and Animal Life. Of Both thefe it is the com- .
mon Band, by its Vital Union with the Body; and by
its Habitual Freedom, it affimilates itfelf fometimes to the
one fort, and fometimes to the other of thefe Natures. So
long as it dwells above, and entertains it felf with No-
bleand Divine Speculations, it preferves its Innocence, and
is fixed in Goodnefs; But when it begins to flag and droop,
when it finks' down from that blifsful Life, and grovels in
the Filth of the World, which by Nature it is equally apt
to do, then it falls into all manner of Evil. So that itsown:
voluntary Depreftion of itfelf into this Region of. Corrupti- .
on and Mortality, is the true Beginning , and proper Caufe,
of all its Mifery and Mifchief. For, though the Soul be of
an Amphibious Difpofition, yet it is not forced either up-
wards or downwards; but aéts purely by an internal Prin-
ciple of its own, and is in perfeét Liberty. Nor ought
this to feem incredible, in an Agent which Nature hath
made Free; fince even thofe Brutes that are Amphibious,
dwell fometimes in the Water and fometimes upon dry
Ground, without being determined to Either, any other-
wife than by their own Inclination.
Now when the Soul debafes herfelf to the World, and
enters iuto 4 near Intimacy with the Corruptible Body, and
e(teems this to be the other Conftituent of the Humane Na- |
ture; then it leads the Life of Brutes, and exerts it felf in
τ fach Operations only, as They are capable of. " 115. Intel-
le€tual Part degenerates into Senfe and Imagination, and.
its Affeétions into Anger and Concupifcence. By thefe the
wretched Mortal attains“to Knowledge, jult of the fame
pitch with that of other Animals; Such as puts him upon
feeking frefh Supplies for a Body continually walling, and
upon continuing the World by Potterity, to fill the Place
of one who.mutt fhortly leave it; and upon making the beft
Provifion he can, for his own Prefervation and Defence in
the mean while. For thefe Cares are what no Mortal would
have, were he not endued with Senfual Faculties and Paflions.
For what Man, who is any thing Nice and Confidering,
would endure to fpend fo many Days and Years upon the
‘ate fupport
180 Eprticretus’s Morals
{upport of this Body, ( when the Burden of the whole Mat-
ter comes to no more, than always filling, and always
emptying ) if Senfual Inclinations did not whet his Appe-
tite? Or who could undergo the tedious Fatigue by which
Succeflion is kept up, if vehement Defires did not perpetu-
aliy kindle new Flames, and the Profpect of Pofterity make
us more eafy to be warmed by them? Thefe Arguments
have been in fome meafure infified on before, and I take
them to be abundantly clear in this Point; that, though our
Paffions and Appetites be the Caufe of-Moral Evil, yet they
are extreamly Beneficial to the Creatures, in which Nature
hath implanted them; as being neceflary to their Conftitu-
tion, and giving a Relifh to fome of the moft indifpenfable
AéGtions of Liie. -Upon all which Accounts, even thefe
cannot with any Juftice be called Evil; nor God who in-
fufed them, the Caufe of Evil, .
But the Truth of the Matter is this: The Soul is by Na-
ture fuperior to this Body, and this Animal Life, and hath
a-commanding power over them put into her Hands. This
Dignity and Power fo long as the preferves, keeping her
Subje&ts under, and at their due Diftance; while the ufes
the Body as her Inftrument, and converts all its Funéions
to her own Ufeand Benefit, fo long all is well, and there
is no danger of Evil. But when once fhe forgets, that the
Divine Image is ftampt upon her; when fhe lays by the En-
fizns of Government, and gives away the Reins out of her
own Hiands; whén fhe finks down into the Dregs of Fleth
ahd Senfe, (by: preferring the Impetuous Temptations of
Pleafure, before the mild and gentle Perfuafions of Reafon,)
and enters into a {trict Union with the Brutith Part; then
Reafon ats againft its own Principles, divefts itfelf of its
Defpotick Power, and bafely fubmits to be governed by its
Slave. And this Confufion in the Soul is the Root of all
Evil; an Evil, not owing to the»more Excellent and Ra-
tional Part, while it maintains its own Station; nor to the
Inferiour and Senfual, while that keeps within its due
Bounds; but to the inverting of thefe, the violent Ufurpa-
tion of the one, and the rame Submiffion of the other; that
is, The Perverfe Choice of Degenerating “into Body and
Matter, rather than forming ones felf after the Similitude
of the Excellent Spirits above us. But ftill all this, as I
faid, is Choice, and not Conftraint;. it is fill Liberty,
though Liberty abufed.
4 And
with SrmMpxiiciuss Comment. 181
Ch LETS REINO i
| And here I would befpeak the Reader’s Attention a little,
τὸ weigh the Reafons I am about to give, why Choice and
Volition muft needs be the Soul’s own Act and Deed, an
Internal Motion of ours, and not the Effect of any Compul-
_ fion from without. I have already urged the Clearneis of
this Truth at large, and that the Soul only is concern’d, and
_ ats purely upon the Principles of her owa Native Freedom,
in the Choice of the Worfe, no lefs than of the Better Part.
Thus much I apprehend to have been plainly proved, from
the Example of Almighty Godhimfelf; the Determinations
of all Wife Laws, and well Conftirured Governments, and
the Judgment of Sober and Knowing Men; Who all agree
in this, That the Merits of Men are to be meafured not by
the Faét itfelf, or the Events of things, but by the Will and
Intention of the Perfon. And accordingly their Rewards
and Punifhments, their Cenfures and their Commendations,
are all proportioned to the Intention ; becaufe this alone is
entirely in a Man’s own Power, and confequently, it is the
only thing he can be accountable for. From hence it comes
to pafs, that whatever is done by Conftraint and Irrefiftible
Force, though the Crime be never fo grievous, is yet par-
doned or acquitted, and the Guilt imputed, not to the Party
that did it, but to the Perfon that forced him to the doing of
it. For he who ufed that Force, did it Voluntarily; but he
who was born down byit, hadno Will of his own concern-
ed in the Fa@, but became the mere Inftrument of Effeting
it, againft the Inclination of bis own Mind.
Since then ourown Choice is the Caufe of Evil; and fince
that Choice is the Soul’s Voluntary AG, owing to no man-
ner of Compulfion, but its own internal meer Motion, what
can we charge Evil upon, fo jultlyas upon the Soul? But.
yet, though the Soul be the Caule of Evil, it is not the
Caufe of it, confidered as Evil; for nothing ever is, Or can
be chofen, under that Notion. But Evil difguifes itfelf, and
deludes us with aa Appearance of Good, and when wechufe
that feeming Good, we take at the fame time the real Evil
concealed underit. And thus muchin Effeet was faid before
too. : ν :
Andnow, having thus difcovered the true Origin of Evil,
- it is fit we proclaim to all the Weld, That God is not charge-
able with any Sin; becaufe it is not He, but the Soul which
produces Evil, and that freely and willingly too: For, were
the Soul under any Conftraint to do amifs, then, I allow,
there would be a colourable Pretence io lay the Blame on
; Q4 God,
γ8: Erpi1ctretus’s Morals
God, who had tuffered her to lie under fo fatal a Neceflity
andhad not left her free to refcue andfave herfelf: (Though,
in truth, upon this Prefumption, nothing that the Soul was
forced to do, could be*ftrittiy Evil.) But now, fince the
Soul is left to her felf, and aéts purely by her ownfree
Choice, fe muft be content to bear all the Blame. ~
If it fhall be farther objeéted, That all this does not yet
acquit Almighty God; for thatitis ftill his Aét, to allow Men
this Liberty, and leave themto themfelues; and that he ought
not to permit them in the Choice of Evil. Then we are to
confider, that one of thefe Two Things muft have been the
Confequence of fuch a Proceeding: Either Firft, That, after
he had given Man a Rational Soul, capable of chufing fome-
times Good, and fometimes Evil, he muft have chain’d up
his Will, aud made it impoffible for him to chufe any thin
but Good; Orelfe, that the Soul ought never to have had
this Indifference at all, but to have been fo framed at firft,
that the Choice of Evil fhould have been naturally impoffible.
One of thefe Two Things the Obje&tor muft fay, or he fays
nothing at all to the Purpofe. (my
Now the Former of thefe is manifeftly abfurd ; for to what
Purpofe was the Will left Free and Undetermined either way,
if the Determining it felf one way, was afterwards to be de-
barred it ? This would have been utterly to take away the Pow-
er of Chufing; for Choice and Neceffity are things Incontift-
ent; and where the Mind is fo tied up, that it can chufe but
one thing, there (properly fpeaking) it can chufe nothing.
As to the Latrer, It muft be remembred in the Firft Place,
that no Evil is ever chofen, when the Mind apprehends it to
be Evil: But the Objetor feems to think, it were very con-
venient to have this Freedom of the Will, whichis fo Ab-
folute in the Determining of itfelf fometimes to real Good,
and fometimes to that which deceives it with a falfe Appear-
ance of being fo, quite taken away: Imagining it to be no
Good, to be fure, and perhaps fome great Evil: But alas!
he does not confider, how many things ‘there are in the
World, accounted exceeding Good, which yet are not real-
ly in any degree comparable to this Freedom of the Will.
For in truth, there is no Thing, no Privilege, in this lower
‘World, fo defirable, And there is no Body fo ftupid and
loft, as to wifh, that he were a Brute, ora Plant, rather than
a Man. And therefore, finceGod difplayed the Abundance
of his Goodnefs and Power, in giving Perfections inferior
to This; how inconfiftent would it have been with that
4 Bounty
with SiMpLiciuss Comment. 183
Bounty of his, not to have beftowed this moft excellent Pri-
viledge upon Mankind?
Befides, (as hath been intimated formerly,) takeaway this
undetermined Propenfion of the Soul, by which it inclines
itfelf to Good or Evil, and you undermine the very Founda-
tions of all Virtue, andin Effect deftroy the Nature of Man.
For if you fuppofe it impoffible to be perverted to Vice, you
have no longer any fuch thing as Juftice, or Temperance, or
any other Virtue, left in the obferving Moral Duties. This
State of Purity may be the Excellence of an Angel, or a
God; but impeccable and indefectible Goodnefs can never
be the Virtue of a Man. From whence itis plain, that there
was a neceffity of leaving the Soul in a capacity, of being
corrupted, and of committing all that Evil confequent to
fuch Depravation, becaufe otherwife a Gap had been left in
εἴπ Creation. There could have been no Medium between
the Bleffed Spirits above, and Brutes below; no fuch thing
as Humane Nature, or Humane Virtue, in the World.
So then we allow, that this Self-determining Power, by
which Men are depraved, is a thing of God’s own Creation
and Appointment; and yet we confider withal, how neceffa-
ry this is to the Order and Beauty of the Univerfe, and how
many good Effeéts it hath. In other Refpeéts, we can by
no means admit, that God fhould be traduced as the Caufe
and Author of Evil upon this Account. When a Surgeon
Jays on a drawing Plaifter to ripen a Swelling, or Cuts or
Sears any Part of our Bodies, or lops off a Limb, no Man
things he takes thefe Methods to make his Patient worfe, but
better; becaufe Reafon tells us, that Men, in fuch Circum-
{tances , are never to be cured by lefs painful Applications.
_ Thus the Divine Juftice, in his deferved Vengence, fuffers
the Paffions of the Soul to rage and fwell fo high, becaufe
he knows thé Condition of our Diftemper ; and that the
{marting fometimes under the wild Suggettions of our own
furious Appetites, is the only, way, to bring us to a ber-
ter Senfe of our Extravagance, and to recover us of our
Frenfie.
Tis thus, we fuffer little Children to burn their Fingers,
_ that we may deter them from playing with Fire. And tor
the fame Reafons, many wife Educators of Youth, do nor
think themfelves oblig’d to be always thwarting the Incliba-
tions of thofe under their Charge; but fometimes connive at
- their Follies, and give them a Loofe: There being no Way
fo effectual for the Purging of thefe Paffions, as to let them
ἫΝ aan fometimes
= ’ , — ---..
134 EpictTretus’s Morals
-
fometimes be indulged, that fo the Perfons may be cloyed,
and naufeate, and grow Sick of them. And in thefe Cafes,
it cannot be faid, that efther thofe Parents and-Governours,
or the Juftice of God, is the Caufe of Evil, but rather of
Good, becaufe all this is done with a Virtuous Intent. For
whatever tends to the Reformation of Manners, or Con-
firming the Habits of Virtue, may be as reafonably called Vir-
tuous, as thofe things that are done, in order to the Reco-
very and Continuance of Health, may be called wholefome.
For Aétions do principally take their Denomination and Qua-
lity, from the End to which they are direéted. So that, al-
though God werein fome meafure the Caufe of this Neceffi-
ty we are in, of deviating from Goodneis ; yet cannot Mo-
ral Evil bejuftly laid at his Door. But how far he is really
- the Canfe of our Reflexion from our Duty, I fhall now think,
it becomes me to enquire. Yo
- God does not by any Power, or immediate AG of his own,
caufethat Averfion from Good, which the Soul is guiity of,
when it Sins; but he only gave her fuch a Power, that fhe
might turn herfelf to Evil; that fo fucha Species of free A-
gents might fill a void Space inthe Univerfe, and many good
effects might follow, which, without fuch an averfion, could
never have been brought about, God indeed is truly and
properly the Caufe of this Liberty of our Wills; but then
this is a Happinefs and a Privilege, infinitely to be preferred
above whatever elfe the World thinks moft valuable; and
the Operation of it confifls in receiving Impreffions, and de-
termining itfelf thereupon, not from any Conitraint, but by
itsown mere Pleafure.
Now, thata Nature thus qualified is Good, [ cannot fup-
pofe there needs any proof; we have the Confeffion of our
Adverfaries themfelves to ftrengthen us in the Belief of ir.
For even they, who fetupa Principleof Evil, declare they do
it, becaufe they cannot think God the Author of Evil, and
thefe very Men do not only acknowledge the Soul to be of
his forming, but theytalk big, and pretend that it is a part of
his very Effence; and yet, notwithftanding all this, they own
it capable of being vitiated, but fo as to be yvitiated by itfelf
only. For this is the manifeft confequence of their other
Tenets ; that is depends upon our own Choice, whether we
will overcome Evil, or be overcomeby it; thatthe vanquith-
ed in this Combat are very juftly punifhed, and the Victors
largely and defervediy rewarded. Now the truth is, when ~
they talk at this rate, they do not well confider, how di-
‘rectly
with ΘΙ ΜΡΙΙΟΙῦ 5.5 Comment. 185
rectly thefe Notions contradi& that irrefiftible neceffity to fin,
which they elfewhere make the Sou! tolie under. But how-
ever, whether the Soul be depraved by its own F oolith Choice,
or whether by fome fatal Violence upon it from without, {till
the being naturally capable of fuch depravation, is agreed on
all Hands; for both fides confefs it to be aétually depraved,
which it could never be, without anatural Capacity of being
fo. Therefore they tellus, the Firft Original Good is ne-
vertainted with Evil, becaufe His Nature is above it, and ins
confiftent withany fuch Defeé; as are alfo the other Good-
neffes, in the next degree of PerfeGtion to him, fuch as in
their Cantare called the Mother of Life, the Creator, and the
fEowes. So then thefe Men acknowledge the depravable
Condition of the Soul; they profefs God to be the Maker of
it, andto have fet it inthis Condition : and yerit is plain they
think the nature of the Soul cepravable, as it is Good, and
not Evil; becaufe atthe fametime that they afcribe this Free-
dom of the Will to God, they are yet fuperfticioufly fearful
of afcribing any Evil to him. And this I think may very
well fuffice, for the Nature and Origin of Evil.
Let us nowapply ourfelves to confider the Paflage before
us, and obferve, how artificially Epictetus hath comprifed ina
yery few Words, the Subftance of thofe Arguments, which
we have here drawn out to fogreat a length. For in regard
the Choice of Good, and the Refufing of Evil, are the Ob-
jeG@ and Ground of all Moral Inftru€tions wharfoever, it
‘was proper for him to fhew, that the Nature of Evil was
fomething very odd, and out of Courfe. In foie Senfe it
hasa Being, and in fome Senfe it is denied to have any; it
hasno Exiftence of its own, and yet it is a fort of fupernu-
merary, and avery untoward addition to Nature. In the
mean while, thisfhews, that We ought not to make it Our
Choice, becaufe Nature never made it Hers; and whenever
it got into the World, it was never brought in by Defign
but came in by Chance. No Man ever propofed it, as the
End of any Action; no Artificer ever drew his Model for it:
The Mafon propofes the Houfe he is Building, and the Car-
penter the Door he is Plaining, for his End; but neither the
One, nor the Other, ever works, only that he may work ill.
Epictetus his Argument then lies in the following Syllogifin’
Evil isthe miffing of the Mark : For wnat Nature hath given .
a real and adefigned Exiftenceto, is the Mark; andthe com-
paffing of that, is the hitting of the Mark. Now, if whee
Nature really made and defigued, be not the mifling of tye
hi atk,
τδό Erictetus’s Morals
Mark , (as it is not, but the hitting it indeed) and if Evil
be the miffing of the Mark, then it ig plain, that Evil can be
none of thofe things, which have a real and a defigned Ex-
iftence,
Now, that Evil is properly the miffing of the Mark, is
plain, from what hath been {poken to this point already. For,
fuppofe a Man makes Pleafure his Mark, he aims at it'as a
Good and Defirable thing; he lets fly accordingly, his Ima-
ginations I mean, which indeed fly {wifter than any Arrow
out of a Bow. But if he donot attain the Good he defires,
but fhoots wide, or fhort of it; ’tis plain this Manis wor-
fted, and hath miffed his Mark. And again, that Some-
thing, to which Nature defigned and gave a Being, is con-
{tantly the Mark every Man aimsat, and the obtaining thofe
things, the hitting of his Mark, is no lefs evident from the
Inftances 1 gave, of the Ma/oz and the Carpexter.
Now, when the Author fays, there is no fuch real Being
as Evil in the World; you areto underftand, that Nature
never formed or defigned any fuch thing: And then, if you
pleafe, you may take his Minor Propofition fingly by irfelf,
which confifts of thofe Words, As ~o Man fers up a Mark
with a Defign to foot befide it. (For this intimates that Evil
is a miffing of one’s Aim,) without mentioning the Major;
which implies, that the principal Defign, and real work of
Nature, is never the miffing, but the hitting of the Mark ;
and fo add the Conclufion, which is this, Therefore Evil is
none of the principal Defigns, or real Works of Nature,
It may likewife be put all together into one fingle Hypo-
thetical Propofition thus: Jf ao Maz (δὲς up a Mark on pur-
292 to foot befide it, then there is no fuch.real Being as Evil iw
the World. For if there were fuch a thing, then it would be
propofed, as the End or Produ& of Aion. But Evil is ne-
ver propofed as a thing to be produced or obtained, but as a
thing to be declined; for Evil is always the Obje& of our
Refufal and Averfion. So that at this rate, it would fol-
low, that there is a Mark fet up, only that it may not be
hit; which is contrary to common Senfe, and the Praétice
of all Mankind. And therefore there can be no fuch thing
in Nature as Evil, becaufe Evil is not capable of being the
End of any Adtion in Nature.
IF
with SimpLicius’s Comment. 187
F any one fhould take upon him to expofe your
I Body to be abufed by every Man you meet, you
would refent it as an infupportable Infolence and
Affront. And ought you not then to be much a-
fhamed of yourfelf, for enflaving and expofing your
Mind to every one who is difpofed to take the Ad-
vantage ? For fo indeed you do, when you put it
in the power of every Malicious Tongue, to di-
fturb the inward peace and order of your Breaft.
For this Reafon, before you attempt any thing,
weigh diligently with yourfelf, the feveral Diff-
culties it is like to be incumbred with, the Cir-
-cumftances preliminary to, and confequent upon it.
For unlefs you come well fettled with this Confi-
deration, you will afterward be difcouraged; and
what you began with Eagernefs and Vigor, you will
defift from with Cowardice and Shame.
ι
CHAP. XXXV.
OU are extremely defirous to win the Olympick
Crown. I wifh thefame for my felf too; and
look upon it as an Immortal Honour. But not fo
faft : Confider the Preparations neceflary to fuch an.
Undertaking, and the Accidents like to follow up-
on it; and then let me hear you fay you’ll attempt
it. You mutt be confined to a ftriét Regimen; mutt
be cramm’d with Meat when you have no Appe-
tite; muft abftain wholly from Boiled Meats; mutt
exercife, whether you be difpofed to it or no, whe-
ther it be hot or cold; muft drink nothing but
what is warm, nor any Winc, but in fuch Pro-
portions as fhall be thought proper for you. In
Ρ nee 4;
τὰ σὴς eee
188 Epictetus’s Morals
Word, you mutt refign yourfelf up to your Gover-
nour, with as abfolute an Obedience, as you would
toa Phyfician. When all this Hardfhip is mafter-
ed, you have all the Chances of Combat to go
* through ftill: And here it is many a Man’s For-
tune to break an Arm, or put out a Leg, to be
thrown by his Adverfary, and get nothing but a
‘mouthful of Duft for his Pains; and, as it may hap-
_ pen, to be lafhed and beaten, and become the Jeft
and Scorn of the Spectators. Lay all thefe Things
᾿ together; and then, perhaps; your Courage may
be cooled. But if upon contidering them well, you
neverthelefs retain your Refolution; then are you
fit to fetabout the Purfuit of what you fo much de-
fire. Otherwife you will come off like Little Chil-
dren, who in their Sports aé& fometimes Wreftlers,
and fometimes Fidlers; now they are Fencets, and
play Prizes; then they turn Trumpeters, and go to
War; and by and by build a Stage and act Plays.
Juft fo we fhall have you, one while an Olympick
* Fighter, and another a Gladiator ; by and by anO-
rator, and after that a Philofopher; but nothing
long, exceptaridiculous Whiffler, a mere Ape, mi-
micking all you fee, and venturing at all Profeflions,
but fticking to none. And all this is occafioned,
by your taking Things upon you Hand over Head,
without being {eafoned and duly prepared for them 5
but either with a rafh Heat, or fickie Inclination.
Thus it is with many People, when they fee an E-
minent Philofopher, or hear him quoted with Ad-
_ miration and Refpect (as, How e&cellently did So-
éraie; write on fuch a SubjeGt ! fure no Man was
ever like him,) nothing will ferve their. Turn, but
thefe Horfpurs mutt needs be Philofophers too, and
each of them does not doubt, but he fhall make a
Socrates in time. Ἢ
any C HAP.
with SIMPLiIc1Us’s Comment. 189
i a re
CHAP. XXXVI.
OW 1 advife thee, Friend, firft of all to con-
fider perfectly the Nature of the Thing thou
would’ft undertake, and then thy own Qualificati-
ons for it, whether this be what thou art cut out
for, or no. Examine thy Limbs, and thy Sinews 5
every Man is not built for the Olympick Exercifes.
Do you imagine, when you apply yourfelf to Phi-
lofophy, that you can be allowed tolive at the fame
rate you do now? To indulge your Appetite, and
be as nice in all you Eat and Drink? Alas! you
muft prepare for want of Sleep, for hard Labour,
for Abfence from your Family and your Friends,
for Contempt and Infolence from your Inferiors,
and to have others, lefs worthy, put over your Head
in Preferments, countenanced more than you in
Courts of Juftice, and refpected more in Conver-
fation. Sit down now, and ask yourfelf, if the
Prize be worth all this Pains. Whether you can be
content, at fo dear a Rate to purchafe an equal Tem-
per, aquiet Mind, perfect Freecom, and unmove-
able Conftancy. If you think the Price fet upon
thefe Things too high, leave them for fome other
Purchafer, and do not expofe yourfelf, like thofe
ridiculous Boys I mention’d’, by being a Philofo-
pher this. Hour, and an Excife-Man the next; a
School-mafter to Day, and a Statefman to Morrow.
Thefe Things are not for your Credit. _ In fhort,
you have but One Man to make and you may make
him either aGood or a Bad one. You mutt cither
make yourfelf, or the World your Care. In a Word,
you muft be either a Fool, or a Philofopher.
‘CO M-
ee ee : πρῶ πῆ: <
1 0.ΌὉΘὃὃ ΕΡΙΟΤΈΤυ 85 Morals
COMMENT.
ait Thing Epictetus drives at, is very much illuftrated
_ by the Comparifons he ufes here, fetting ourfelves in
Oppolition to Others, and the Soul tothe Body. For, to be
injured by ones own felf is much worfe than if it were done
- by another. If we are apt to refent an Unkindnefs, when
coming from a Friend, with much more, Impatience, than
the fame Thing from a Common Man ; becaufe, the Confi-
derations of intimate Acquaintance, and former Obligations
ftep in, and heighren the Provocation, by telling us we had
Reafon to expect better Ufage; how much more is the In-
jeftice aggravated, when a Man does any Thifig to his own
Prejudice? And again, If the Affronts and Injuries done
to the Body, are fo deeply refented ; how much more ten-
der ought we to be, when the Soul is injured and abufed?
Again, If we think it an infupportable Infolence in any
other Perfon, to expofe our Body to Abufes, when yet his
Affronting or not Affronting us after this manner is a Thing
not inour own Power ; and if the expofing our Minds to be
abufed by the next Man we meet, by fuffering ourfelves to
be difordered at the Calumnies of every malicious Railer, be
a Thing which depends purely upon our own Choice, whe-
ther it fhall bedone or not; then we ought to be afhamed up-
on a double Account: Firft, for taking a Thing ill, which
was not in our Power tohelp, and whichtoo, when done, was
not ftriGly Evil tous ; andthen, for expofing our own felves,;
to that which is areal Evil, and that Evil fo much the worfe,
becaufe fuch a one, as it was in our Power to prevent.
Now-upon this Occafion he changes his Expreflion, and
does not call it Indignation, but Shame. For the Injuries
which come upon us from another Hand, we receive with
Refentments of Anger; but thofe that ourfelves are guilty
of, we refle@ upon with Shame and Remorfe. And furely
there is much greater Reafon for doing fo, when we ourfelves
have been guilty of injuring ourfelves; Efpecially, when
thefe Injuries need not have befallen us, indeed could not |
have done fo, but by our own Choice. And this is the pro-
per Notion of Shame: the being out of Countenance at the
Folly and Foulnefs of our own voluntary Mifcarriages..
And what can niore deferve a Bluth, than the not difcern-
ing the mighty Ditference there is, between the feveral ie
“ches
with ΘΙ ΜΡΈΓΙΟΙΟ 55 Comment. rot
ches of fo lively a Comparifon as this? And when one does
-difcern it, what can be more fcandalous, than not to act ac-
cordingly? :
eee efeitos tak eh deed fa
CHAP. XXXVI.
T may be faid, generally fpeaking, That the Qua-
lity of the Perfons we converfe with, and the
mutual Relations they bear, are the true Standard
of a Man’s Duty and Behaviour towardsthem. ‘Thus
my Duty toa Father isto aflift and take care of him;
to fupport his Age and his Infirmitics; to yield to
him, and pay him Service and Refpect upon ail Oc-
cafions , and to receive both his Reproofs and his
Chaftifements, with patience and fubmiffion. But
you'll fay, He is a rigorous and unnatural Father.
Whatis that to the purpofe? Youare to remember,
this Obligation to Duty, does not arife from, the
Confideration of his Goodnefs; but from the Rela-
tion he bears to us: No Failings ‘of his can make
him ceafe to be a Father. And confequently none
can abfolve you from the Obedience of a Son.. Your
Brother hath done you an Injury ; but do not fup-
pofe, that this difpenfes with the Kindnefs you owe
him: You are ftill to obferve what becomes You 5
not toimitate what mif-became Him. Befides, no.
body can do you a real Injury, without your own
Concurrence: You are not one whit the worfe, un-
jefs you think yourfelf fo. After this manner it will
be eafie to difcover, what is fit for you upon alloc-
cafions. For it is but-confidering yourfelf under the
feveral Qualities, of a Neighbour, or a Subject, or
ἃ Civil Magitirate, or a Military Officer, and you
will foon difcern, what Behaviour is proper from,
or to, aPerfon, ineach of thefe Stations relpectively.
Mage ere | CO MM:
192 Eri¢ctTerus’s Morals
COMMENT.
ὌΝ E Duty of aMan is properly that which it becomes
him todo upon every occafion, and the rendring to e-
very one what is fit to be expected from him. This is more
peculiarly'called the Work of Juftice, taken in a fenfe fo
comprehenfive, as to include all manner. of Virtue. For
the Word is fometimes reftrained to one particular Virtue,
diftinguithed from the reft ; and {ometimes enlarged and ex-
tended to them all. Nowit is the bufinefs of Juftice to give
every one hisdue: Upon which accountall Inftitutions, both
Moral and Political, have this for their proper Obje@.
There is private Jufticé, withregard to aMan’s own Mind,
and this affigns to every part of the Soul what belongs to it;
And there is the Publick Juftice of a Country, which diftri-
butes to every, Member of the Commonwealth, according
to his Dignity and Deferts. Having therefore inftru@ed his
young Philofopher, as you fee before (which Precepts have
indeed fome reference to this kind of Duty too) he proceeds
here to direct him, how he may difcover what it is, and dif-
charge it upon all occafions : And what others have been
very prolix and voluminous upon, (as particularly Nicolaus
Damafcenus) he hath here reduc’d into a very narrow com-
pafs, and laid before us with wonderful Energy and Clearnefs.
Now the Duty of a Man, if you will branch it out into its
feveral Heads, concerns his Behaviour, Firlt, towards Men,
and, in general, to all his Equals. Then, to thofe Beings
that are above him. Thirdly, to thofe below him: And,
Laftly, to his own felf. Each of thefe Heads have diftin@
Rules and Meafures ; the Principal whereof Epicfetus treats —
of, beginning in this Chapter with our Duty to one another.
To this purpofe he gives us a convenient Intimation, how _
Wwe may find out what is properly our Duty ; and, that this
differs, according to the feveral Pofts, in which Men ftand
to one another. There is one kind of Deportment due.to a
Father, and another to a Son; one to our own Country-
man, and another to a Stranger; one to a Friend, or a Be-
nhefactor, and another toan Enemy who hath injured us. And
the reafon of this is, Becaufe the Relation I bear to a Father,
as the Perfon to whom, next under God, I owe my Being,
and the Comforts of it, diifers from that which I bear toa
Son, whom! am to contider, not as aCaufe, but as an Ef-
feet, of my felf; and to look upon him, as one tt whom I
have —
ee Se ae -
᾿
with ΘΙΜΡΕΙΟΙ 88 Comment. 103
_ have communicated part of my Own Subftance. So that in
all thefe Cafes, the firft thing we have to do, is, to enquire
into the Quality and Relation of the Perfon, and then to
fait our Demeanour accordingly. __
Now this Relation (generally fpeaking) is the Order of
Things, or the mutual Regard they haveto one another. And
this may be the Effe@ of Neceffity and Naturé, or of Choice ;
it may have refpe@ either to Similitude or Diffimilitude; either
to Proximity, or to Diftance. For this Relation is a fort of
Common Band of the Perfons concerned in it ; which links
them fo together, that, though they be diftiné in other re-
{peéts, yet they cannot be abfolutely disjoined, but mutt con-
tinue to have an Intereft each in other. For which Reafon
it is, that Relatives are faid to belong to one another.
Now the natural Order and Refpeét, which proceeds up-
on Proximity, joins fometimes Equals, as Brothers; and
here both the Denominations and the Durty of each Party is
the fame; for both are Brothers: And fo likewite it is in
other like Cafes. Both are Equals, both are Coufins, both
are Country-men. There is alfo a natural Refpeét, which
implies Diftance; and this regards People of different Birth
and Countries; and likewife proceeds upon the like Names,
and the like Duties, as of one Stranger, or Foreigner, to a-
nother. - And this is a Refpeét inferring Diftance, becaufe,
as that which exprefs’d nearne{s of Blood and Family brought
them clofer together, fo this which denies fuch a nearnefs,
does in that very Jdea fet them farther afunder. This how-
ever isa general Rule, That in all Cafes, where both Par-
ties are upon the Level, and go by the fame Names, there
_ they owe the fame Duties too, and that, whether the Term
by which the Relation is exprefs’d, imply Proximity, or Di-
flance.
Again, there is alfo a mutual Refpe& founded in Nature,
~ where a Difparity is implied ; as, between Father and Son:
For here the Expeétances are not the fame, as between Bro-
thers they were faid to be, nor are the Denominations, as
_ there, the fame. This then is a natural Regard, which joins
- People upon unequal Terms; and this Inequality is the fame
_ in Proportion, as in a Caufe and its Effet. There is ano-
ther Relation too of Difparity between Things which feem
Contraries, as between the Right Side and the Left;. for
thefe have a mutual Refpeét to each other, and yet that depends
upon a kind of local Contrariety. There is likewife a dis-
jun@ive Relation in Natur, ke is between Difparates too,
2 as
194 Ericretus’s Morals |
as Things of laft Year and this Year; for this fhe ws an Ine-
quality in Time.
The Relation upon Choice, which implies Proximity, and
lies between Equals, is that of Friends; and that which im-
plies Diftance, or the Disjunctive, is that of Enemies. ‘For
even Enemies areundera voluntary Relation to one another ;
and thefe Relations lying between Equals, have (as I obfer-
ved before) the fame Names, and are obliged to the fame
Duties. This voluntary Relation lies fometimes in Difparity
too, as between Malter and Scholar, confidered as the Caufe
andthe Effect; between the Buyer.and the Seller, as contradi-
ftinguifhed from each other. The disjunétive Relations of
this kind which carrya Difparity, are the Fleer and the Pur-
fuer; for thefe Men are under a voluntary and an unequal
Relation to one.another, though this be fuch an one, as im-
piies Difiance and Disjun@ion too,
The Relation between Husband and Wife, feems to be
fomething betwixt that by Nature, and that by Choice, for
in Truth it. is partly one, and partly the other, and infers a
Difparity bothof Name and Duty. But that of Neighbours, .
which is a kind of intermediate Relation too, hath an equa-
lityin Duty, and the fame Title. Between the Perfonin Au-
thority, and Him under it,. thereis fome kind of natural Re-
Jation (for Nature intended, in allher Produtions, that the
Better fhould govern the Worfe.) It depends partly upon
Choice too, as when by fume Common Agreement the Weal-
thy bear Rule, and the Meaner People fubmit to it; and it
is.a mixture of both thefe, when inftead of Wealth and Pow- Ὁ
er, the Wifeft are advanced to the Chair by Confent.
And now that this rough imperfe& Draught hath been laid
before us, the feveral Relations Men bear to one another, it
will concern us to confider, in which We, and the Perfons
we.converfe with, ftand, and to take our Meafures from
thence. But with this Caution, That We (till anfwer Our
“Chara@ter, whether They make good Theirs, or no; and ef-
pecially where Nature hath made the Relation, and preferi-
_bedthe Duty. For, whereit is only founded in Choice, there ~
the Good Man who difcharges his own Part, hath it in his
Power to untie the Knot when he will, and let the Relation
fall afunder: Thatis, hecan withdraw his Affection and Ac-
quaintance froman unwortby Friend ; and he canmelt down
a fpightful Man wiih good Offices, and ceafe ro be an Ene- ©
my. For the fame free Choice which contraéted the Rela- —
tion, can as ealily diffolve it too: But the Relations founded ©
in.
ST Ng <
with Simpxicius’s Comment. τος
_ in Nature are Eternal, and no A& of our own Will can ever
make them ceafe.
.
So that if a Friendufe us ill, and become an Enemy ; he
~hathbroke the Bond that linked us together, and releafed us
from all that wasduetohim upon theaccount of Friendfhip,
becaufe he hath ceafed to be our Friend, and chofen to be
our Enemy, But if a Father behave himfelf vicioufly, or
unnaturally, the Cafe is much otherwife: Neither his Ri-
gournor his Vices can make him ceafe to be a Father, be-
caufe thefe are only the Effects of his own Choice ; but the
Relation between us is not founded in Choice, but in Na-
ture ; and the Obligation lies to him as a Father, not as a
good, or a kind Father; fo that though he be not fuch, yet
our Duty continues the fame. Weare bound ftillto pay him
all manner of Duty, awful Obfervance, and tender Concern ;
to confider him, as the Means made ufeof by God, to bring
us into the World; to remember, that his provident Care
and Tendernefs fuftained the Being he gaveus; and that our
Prefervation, as well as our Produétion, is in a great mea-
fure owing to Him. Children fhould always look upon
themfelves as Debtors to their Parents, and pay back all their
Kindnefs, with much Gratirude and large Intereft: They
fhould give moft ready Obedience to all their Commands,
except fuchas tend tothe detriment of the Soul ; andinthefe
cafes their Compliance is difpenfed with, becaufe they are
under a higher Engagement to the Father of Spirits, and
muft not difpleafe Him at any rate.’ And yet upon thefe oc-
cafions too, they fhould endeavour to give as littie Offence
as is poffible; and, though their Refufal may and ought to
be refolute, yet Modefty muft temper their Zeal, and con-
‘trive that it may be refpeGtul too:
In all other Matters, we areto fervethem with our utmott
Power, both in our Bodies and otr Goods: For if the Per-
fons and the Poffeffions of Slaves are at the abfolute difpofal
of thofe, whom Fortune and Purchafe have made their Mia-
{ters ; how much more oughr Ours to be at the Command
of Them, whom Nature made the Caufe of our very Being?
For this reafon, we ought to fubmit to Their Corre@ion,
with much more eafinefs and patience, than Servants do to
their Mafters ; and if to their Bldws, then certainly rather
{ΠῚ ro their Reproaches and hard’ Ufage. The ancient Ro-
mans had a Law, (grounded it feems, upon the Dignity οἵ
this Relation, upon the abfolure’ Right it gave, the indnire
‘Trouble Parents are at for the fake of their Children, the un-
R 3 limited
196 wi Epicrerus’s Morals 7 a
τὸν ase ae I Pa τιν tS ae i he MES
limited Subje€tion due to them, prefuming favourably with-
al of the natural AffeGtion of Parents) which gave the Pa-
rents a Power, if they pleafed, to fell their Children; and
which, if they killed them, call’d themto no account for it.
And the Times of yet greater Antiquity bore fo great a Re-
verence to Parents, as almoft to venture to call them Gods :
But finding fome check from the incommunicable Devotion
due to the Divine Nature, they called their Parents Brothers,
©+#<; hereby intimating, what profound Refpect belonged ta
their Parents themfelves, when even their collateral Relati-
ons were complemented with the Name of fomething Di-
vinein them, —
Now indeed in the Difcharge of our Dutyto Parents, the
firft and principal Motive is the Equity of the thing, and the
acting as becomes Men who make Pretenfions to Wifdom
and Virtue, which this is moft highly agreeable to: And af-
ter this, we fhould reprefent to ourfelves the Divine Juftice
and Vengeance, which is very likely to punifh us in our own
kind. And we have a great deal of reafon to expe&, that
we fhall hereafter findthe fame meafure from Our Children,
which Wegive our Parents now. Bohs, «
So again, if a Brother deal unjuftly by you, let it be your
part co anfwer all the Particulars of the Relation between
you, and to make good that Covenant, which Nature hath
ratified and made unalterable: For though the World be a
wide place, yet youcan have no other Parents, nor Brethren,
nor Kinfmen, but thofeyouhave. And therefore, fince you
mufttake them upon Content, and there is no remedy; be-
have yourfelf, as though you had made them your own Choice.
Confider too, that His Behaviour towards you, is notin your
own Power to determine; but Yours towards himis. You
fhould not therefore fo much regard his Aétions, which you
cannot help, nor are in any degree refponfible for, as what
is agreeable to your own Duty, and fit for You to do; be-
éaufein this confifts all the real Advantage and prejudice that
can happento you. He cando you no harm, let him defign
never fo much; provided you do but depend upon yourown
felf for your Good and Evil : Butif you ramble abroad, and
expect to find it there, you are the worfe then indeed, not by
your Brother’s Malice, but your own Miftakes, and by place-
ing Happinefs and Mifery in things without you. Addtoall —
this, the Advantage of winning him over by good Ufage.
For if your Forbearattce, and Meeknefs, and Affection, can”
render him not only your Brother, but your Friend; thefe
ni ; two
PRs ates
with StmpxLicius’s Comment. 197
‘two Relations meeting in one, and joining Forces, will make
the Union wonderful clofe and ftrong.
Now the Duties we owe to our Mafters, and Teachers,
whofe Bufinefs it is to inftru& usin Wifdom and Virtue, are
much of the fame nature with thofe due to Parents : though
in fome refpeéts, I confefs, the Obligation feems to be grea-
ter in the Cafe before us; For thefe Perfons nourifh and train
up, not our Bodies, but, which is much more. confiderable,
our Souls, that is, our very felves. They do it too upon a
different Principle; not conftrained to it by Nature and Ne-
ceffity, like our Parents ; and by fuch an inftinét, as Brutes
obey no lefs than Men; but they doit out of free Choice, and
a Defire to promote Goodnefs and Virtue. And this makes
anear Approach to, and is a lively Refemblance of, the Di-
vine Bounty ; which takes Compaffion upon funk and lapfed
Souls, is perpetually retrieving them from their Mifery, and
reftoring them to the Blifs they have loft. Mei igen:
Now thefe Obfervances mu(t needs be peculiarly due to
our Inftru@tors, becaufe we ought to look upon their In-
ftrutions, as coming out of the Mouth of God himfelf; and
confequently we fhould fubmit to them, without troubling
ourfelves to find out peevifh Cavils and frivolous Exceptions
againftthem. For certainly, itisnoteafie to conceive, how
He, whofe End and Profeffion it is, to inform us intrue
Wifdom and Goodnefs, fhould impofe any thing upon us,
_ but what tends to the furthering fo excellent a Defign. But
‘now, if our Parents take the pains to teach us, and thus to
the Engagement of being our Parents, that other be added of
being our Teachers too, then we are to pay them all that Ob-
fervance and Refpeét, which can be challenged upon both
thefe accounts. We mutt then look upon them, as the very
Image of God ; reverence them as the Formers of our Souls,
as well as of our Bodies ; and like God, the Caufes, to which
- not ae Being only, but alfo our Well-being ought to be ai-
cribed.
The Next thing that offers itfelf is the Duty of Friends.
And this I fhall treat with all the Clearnefs, yet all the Brevi-
ty, fo weighty and ufeful a Subjeét will bear. The ΕΠ thing
to δὲ regarded here is, The Choice of Friends : The Next,
How to ufe and keep thofe we have chofen: and upon thete
Things all the Benefits of Friendfhip depend.
The Firft thing we fhould look atin our Choice of Friends,
is Likenefs of Temper and Difpofition. For thereare feve-
ral Humours, which though very good when fingle, yet will
5} ἃ R 4 make
τοϑ ΕΡιστετυϑϑ5 Morals |
make but il! Mufick. when brought together. The Sour, and
Phlegmatick, and Cold Temper , will fuit-but ill with the
Brisk and Sanguine ; and yet each of thefe alone, each well
coupled, may be excellent Perfons. The Next ’Contidera-
tion is, How the Perfon whom we make Choice of, hath be-
haved himfelf to his other Friends before. A Third Rule,
which is indeed of fuch moment, that it maybe juftly thought
, toincludeall, is toobferve, Whether he be a Man governed
by his Paflions, or his Reafon. Whenthis is done, we thall
find it very proper to examine into his Inclinations, and fee
which way the Bent and Byafs of his Soul lies ; whetherthey |
draw him to Goodnefs and Virtue, and fuch Aétions and En+
joyments as are commendable, and befitting a Man of Piety
and°’Honour; Or whether to vile and unmanly Pleafures,
and‘fuch as none but fhamelefs Fellows and Scoundrels a-
bandon themfeives to. We fhalldo well to obferve rarther,
whether thefe Detfires and Inclinations be tractable and gentle,
fuch as are fit to be fpoken with, and ready to harken to Rea-
-fon; Or whether they be violent and unperiuadeable, fuch
as mind nothing but their own Gratification, and are deaf
to all Arguments which would draw. them off from it: For
Men of {uch Paffions are always hot and peremptory, and
by no means fit to make Friends of. Thofe allo that are
fond of the World, and expeét their Happinefs any where
but from their own Minds, are very improper to fix upon:
J’or they dote upon Riches, or Miftrefles, or Preferments;
and in all things of a communicable Nature, they carve to”
themfelves too largely, and are defirous to engrofs the Whole; ὦ
fo deltroying that Equality, which Friendthip either fuppo-
fes or introduces. This in Riches, and fuch Inftances, is
plain beyond a doubt ; and the Vain- giorious difcovers it as
evidently in the Defires of Reputation and Applaufe.
Now it is the peculiar Excellence of thofe things which
tend to the Soul’s Good, that the Poffeffor hath them en-
tirely to himfelf, even ‘when he imparts them to others.
They are not diminithed, but augmented, by Communicati-
For they are excited and kindled in the Breafts of the
Perfons on whom we beftow them; and the. farther they
{fpread, the more and larger they grow. So that the Light
of Truth and Virtue takes fire by Converfation, as a Match
does by the mutual: Attrition of Flint and Steel, which
kindles by the Sparks that drop from i uy but lofes none of
the Virtue it’ gives amay Tae
ν FEV ES agp
Again,
with SrtmMpLiciuss Comment. 199
_ Again, When Friends make true Good their End, and
right Reafon their Rule, they are fure never to differ in
- point of Intereft ; for they judge of Advantage by the fame
" common Standard. Now when they are thus agreed in one
Meafure, and judge of Pleafure and Profit, and the Con-
traries to thefe alike; they have fecured themfelves againft
the moft dangerous and ufual Bane of Friendfhip. For with-
out a perfeét Agreement in thefe Matters, Difputes and
Quarrels are always unavoidable. And fo much for the
Choice of our Friends. | f
As for our Behaviour to the Friends thus chofen, That,
in one Word, muft make Reafon and Equity its conftant
Rule. Upon this Account we muft never do any thing to
our Friends, which we would not be perfectly fatisfied
with, when done by Themto Us. Whatever Kindnefles
They receive from Us muft be extenuated, and thought mo-
derately of; but whatever Obligations We receive from
Them muft be very highly efteemed and rated above their
juft Value. The Courfe dire@ly contrary to this mutt be
obferved in Failings and Mifcarriages: Theirs mutt be leffen-
ed and excufed, our Own aggravated and feverely con-
demned. We muft think nothing fo ftri€tly our own, ἃς
that a Friend fhould not have an equal, or rather indeed a
greater, Share and Right init. And upon all Occafions we
fhould give them Precedence and Refpect; and we fhould
do it willingly and chearfully; as confidering, that Their
Honours devolve upgn Us, and that a Friend, according to
the Proverb, is a Man’s fecond Self.
But fince, after all our niceft Circumfpedction and Care,
it is impoflible for us to continue-Men, and not give fome
Occafion of Offence; this Point is to be managed very ten-
derly. A Friend in good earneft, ought efpecially to guard
this Breach ; and to reprove what*is done amils with great
- ‘Yemper.and Softnefs, in Obedience to that old and truly
- Golden Rule, |
Lofe not a Friend on ev'ry flight Pretence;
ει Ready'to pardon, flow to take Offence.
; rs Pythag. Χρυσῶ "Ἐπ,
That, fo you may admit him to 8 Ῥεγίεξε and firm Reconci-
liation 3, and deliver him from the Remorfe of his own Mind,
_ by leaving no ground of Jealoufie, that he hath not {till the
fame Place in your AffeGtion and Effeem. af
RR é t
200 EprctTretus’s Morals
——— ὁ’ --------- --΄΄ἴἷ-΄Ἴ ὁ ...-.- .... ..
Tt is alfo certain, that our Kindnefs and Concern ought
not to be confined to our Friend alone, but extend to his
Relations and Acquaintants, and thofe, whofe A ffairs and
Succeffes he thinks himfelf interefted in. We thould be as
ready to ferve them upon His Account, as He would be to
doit on their own. Our Concern and Affection ought not to
be reftrained to Place neither; but we fhould have the fame,
and upon fome Accounts, a more tender Regard to our
Friend in his Abfence, than we think ourfelves obliged to
exprefs, when he is prefent with us. An eminent Inftance
whereof I could give, from my perfonal Experience in a
Friend of my own. And, toconclude all; when once we
have made a prudent Choice, and laid the Foundations of
Friendfhip in an agreeable Humour, and tried Conftancy ,
and virtuous Difpofitions, the Affections, which naturally
follow upon fuch powerful Attra@ives, will not fail to con-
du us in the right Method of Converfation, and in all the
Duties and good Offices, that can be expeéted, as Tefti-
monies and Endearments of Friendthip, will follow of
Courfe.
Now what a Bleffing Friendthip is, how rich a Treafure,
and how fruitful in the Advantages of Life, is a Subje&
worthy of a long and ftudied Difcourfe; but at prefent I
fhall content my felf with a few Particulars only, and fuch
as occur to my prefent Thoughts.
Firft then; Every Friend hath Two Souls, and Two
Bodies ; and it is as plain from the fore-going Rules, that he
mutt needs have two Eftates: If then a Man have feveral
fuch Friends, his Advantages grow upon him ftill more,
and he is multiplied into more Souls, and Bodies, «and
Eftates, in proportion to the number of his Friends, In
the Study of Wifdom and Nature, Souls thus united have
an infinite Advantage; and the Light of Truth difplays itfelf
much more early and fully to them. Nor have they lefs in
the Exercife of Virtue, by mutual Conferences, and joint
Endeavours: Thefe bring their Improvements into one com-
mon Bank, from whence every Man fupplies his own Oc-
cafions, and eafily grows rich at the publick Stock, Befides,
fuch united PerfeGtion will find a more than ordinary Blef-
fing and Encouragement from Heaven, they are fecure of
prudent and feafonable Advice in all their Difficulties; their
Motions will be regular and well weighed; and their Suc- —
ceffes more probable, as having more Heads to contrive,
and more Hands to act, than thofe can, who ftand τ τὴ ἥ
an
with ΒΙΜΡΨνΙσΙυ 85 Comment. ox
A ANE ht ical SS 2°
and muft encounter Fortune fingly. When fuch a Man is
abroad from his Family and Acquaintants, that Abfence,
and all Want of him is made good to them by his Friend;.
in Him he is prefent while living, and living when dead.
_ _Thefe are fome of the Advantages. And the Pleafures
of Friendthip are not lefs than the Profits of it. For what De-
light can be compared to that fenfible Joy, which runs through
all our Spirits at the fight of a Friend? What Charms do
we find in his Perfon? What Mufick in his Difcourfe?
What an engaging Gracefulnefs in all his AGions? The
Confidence we repofe in him, is above what any Ties of
Blood and Nature can give our neareft Relations a Title
to; And our Minds are more at eafe, and more fecure in
his Fidelity, than any. Degree of Wealth or Power can
make them. Of which Alexander the Great gave a very
pregnant Inftance, who, we are told, when he was asked
where his vaft Treafures lay, pointed to his Friends, - and
faid, Thofe were they. .
A Friend is likewife the beft Inftru&tor, and the δεῖ Cor- _
reCtor that can be. For Reproof is leaft offenfive, when
coming from fuch a Hand; Nor is there any Perfon, whofe
Obfervation keeps us in equal Awe, or whofe Cenfure we
fear fo much, if it hath been our Misfortune to fail in point
of Duty. Our profperous F Ortunes, and all the Gayeties
of Heart we feel upon them, grow double by Communica-
tion, but are flat and infipid without a Friend to partake
of the Pleafure: And all our Affliftions are difarmed, and
their Force broken, when a Friend takes off part of the
a oe by his tender Sympathies, and feafonable Com-
forts.
Friendthip indeed is the beft School for training a Man up
in all manner of Virtue and Prudence, and to learn the
World in. This forms him for Converfation , and fits his
Soul for all poffible Accidents and Encounters: It teaches
him Civility, and Meeknefs, and Truth. For one makes ’
no difficulty of giving Precedence to a Friend; nor takes
Offence at every Slip or Imperfeétion of his; and accuftoms
ones felf to open his Mind freely, and to {peak his Thoughts
‘without any Trick or Referve. Here we find a ftrange Incli-
_fiation to be grateful, and juft, in returning Favours; and
and the pleafure of doing them is upon no occafion fo great,
nor fo generoufly put in Pragtice, as in the Cafe of a Friend.
No Man will run fo many Rifques, nor expofe his Perfon
0 freely to preyent another’s Danger, as He: aes τὴς
ἷ , ΝΆ ren
202 Erictetuss Morals
a ήπΣὠἤΣἼΎΥοοςςςςςςς-- τὐὰὐσοσσσσναν
Friend (corns to decline any Difficulty, and is ready to refcue
his Friend, though at the expence of his own Life. Could
an Army be levied of fuch Men, they would rout double
their Number, by their united Force, and firm Refolutions
not to defert one another. Thefe are the Qualifications,
that ft a Man for the World, and the exercite of them a-
mong Friends is eafie, and pleafant: Whatever feems harfh
at firft, is foftned by Affection, and by degrees a Man will
find himfelf a Matter, capable of acquitting himfelf as he
ought in all Points, as Occafions are offered. ΕΠ to his
Friends; and, when Praétice with Them hath perfected him,
then to all Mankind.
This farther Confideration is likewife worth our Notice,
That Friendihip ties all other Relations clofer, and binds them
fafter upon us. It endears us to thofe whom God and Na-
ture have commanded us to love; it fweetens and recom-
mends their Company, and enclines us to do all that is ex-
pected from us, with chearfulnefs and fatisfa@tion. For un-
lefs Brothers, and Children, and Husbands, and Wives, be
Friends too, and have a particular kindnefs and regard for
one another; though they may, with much ado, follow E-
pidtetus his Dire@tion, and difcharge the feveral Offices be-
longing τὸ their particular Station, yet all their Performan-
ces will come hard and ftrained. There will be nothing of
Pleafure or Alacrity, to whet their Duty, and give itarelifh;
but all is look’d upon asa Burden and a Slavery, the effect of
Neceflity, not Choice; done, not becaufe they would, but
becaufe they muft do it; and not [Ὁ much to oblige the Re-.
ceiver, as to avoid Guilt and Reproach. -
Now the true Reafon, why this Relation of a Friend is
more facred and engaging than any other, feems to be, that it
isnotour Fate, but ourChoice. Our natural Relations we
were born to; But, where ourfelves tye the Knot, itis ge-
nerally Qronger than where Nature does it: Becaufe, of all
the Endowments of the Soul, that-of Reafon and Liberty
feems to be the higheft, and that, by which we make the
neareft approach to the Perfeétions of that Great ONE, in
and by whom all things are united. 2D CIE
Thefe are fome of the Excellent-and Marvellous’ Effects
of Friendfhip, and fach Humane Confiderations as abundant-
Jy recommend it: Bat the moft valuable, and truly: Divine
Recommendation is fill: benind. Is 2. That the Union of
Souls by an Innccent and Sincere Friendthip is the: Nobleft
Contemplation, and the Livelie& Image, of our Union with
God
Ἂ
4 - — Lome ε ἢ » is
with SimpLiicius’s Comment. 203
God himfelf. And indeed we cannot here upon Earth afpire
to any, better and more intimate Conjunction, with Him,
_and thofe Bleffed Spirits , who are ever in perte&t Harmony
-and Concord. It was not therefore without excellent Rea-
fon, that Pyzhagoras and his Followers gave the Preference
to Friendhhip above all other Virtues; and called it, The
very Chain and Complement of them all. For in Truth,
if any One Virtue be wanting, Friendthip will not dwell
there. For how can we fuppofe an Unjuit, or an Intem-
_perate, or Debauch’d Man, or a Coward, capable of Friend-
fhip? And an obftinate perverfe Fool is fo, lefs than any of
them. No, no, this Treafure is too rich, too refined, for
fuch fordid Wretches. A Man therefore that pretends to
Friendfhip, mutt afpire to as high degrees of Perfection, as
the Frailties of Humane Nature will admit; he muft work
off the Drofs of fenfual and brutifh Paffions, purifie and
fublimate his Mind, and then he is qualified to feek a Mate
in Friendthip; and when he hath found {uch another as him-
felf, he mult hold him clofe to his Heart, as his Dearer and
Better Half. 7 iby,
It I have been tedious upon this Subject , the Reader will
be kind, in imputing it to fo good a Caufe, as my Zeal for
Friendfhip; to which it were a moft defirable thing to fee
fome few at leaft pay that Regard, which it deferves. And
indeed a few Inftances would be fome Comfort ia this mi-
ferable Age; when the Vices and Vilenefs of Mankind feern
to have banith’d it almoft quite out of the World. But it is
now high time to come off from this long Digreflion, and
return to that, which this Chapter direéts us to; which is,
to examine fomething more briefly, thofe other Relations,
which Ep:cferus here hath thought fit to male exprefs men-
tion of. )
_ After having told us, that the Confideration of feveral.
Qualities and Relations is the beft Rule of their refpeive -
Duties’, he proceeds to inftance in that of a good Citizen,
or Patriot: For this too gives us ἃ fort of Affinity to all
our Fellow-Citizens, or Subje€ts. The Country reprefents
our Parents; and all who are born in it, who are comprehend-
ed within its. Privileges, and live under its Laws, arein
fome Senfe Brethren; and a manifeft Relation ( though
more dittant, I confefs, than any hitherto infifted upon)
there is between all the Natives of it. The likenefs of Dii-
‘pofitio is thews fuch a Relation to be of Nature’s making;
and this is very often obfervable in People, not only of the
ἀπε = i fame
204 EPICcTETU s’s Morals
fame City or Corporation , but extends itfelf to thofe of the
fame Nation ‘too. Our Behaviour therefore to all fuch —
ought to refemble that to our Kindred; and all imaginable ἡ
_ Care fhould be taken for their Improvement; for in this
we fhall confult our own Benefit alfo, and feel the Advan-
tages, of living among Honeft and Virtuous People; of be-
ing fupplied in all our Neceffities, and affifted in all our
Diftreffes; and of providing Husbands, and Fathers, for 411
our Orphans and Widows: For every Man is capable of
lending a helping Hand, though not every Man in the fame
way: One may be a Friend with his Money; Another by |
his Authority ; a Third by his Intereft and Acquaintance, or
good Advice; a Fourth by his Labour and Pains; and thofe,
who have nothing elfe in their Power, may be ferviceable by
- their Pity and Compaffion.
Now if a Man be both a Fellow-Citizen and a Neighbour,
this renders the Relation fomething nearer ftill. For, as
the State we were born in, and the Family we are defcend-
ed from, are not the Gifts of a blind undiftinguifhing Chance; _
fo are we to look upon that particular Habitation, and pare
of the fame City where we dwell, to be affigned us by a
wife Providence. So that thofe of our Countrymen, who
dwell neareft to us, are upon that account allied more clofe-
ly ftill. And whatever have been fpecified as Duties to the
One, are fo, and indeed more fo, to the Other, as We have >
Opportunities of paying, and They of receiving them.
Therefore we are to rejoice in their Succeffes, and be hearti-
ly concerned for their Misfortunes ; and when any of them
are fick or indifpofed, we mutt endeavour to be ferviceable —
to them, as if they were a part of our own Family. [ἢ all
our Converfation abroad, we fhould make it appear to the —
World, that, while our Neighbour hath no Defigns but —
what are honeft and fair, we will ftand by him to our υἵ-
~moft; and we fhould think it a fhameful Reflexion, that he
fhould upon any occafion ask or receive a kindnefs from
them that dwell at a greater diftance, which it was in the.
power of Us, his next Neighbours, to have done for
him. .
There is alfo a fort of Relation betwixt Us, and Fo-
reigners, who come to {pend fome time in our Country; a
Relation, of which God is the Author, who hath declared,
that he bears a particular regard to Strangers. The good
Offices therefore, due upon this account, ought very puns |
@tually to be difcharged; both in refped& to the Almighty,
I ,
Ι
;
|
who
ne cainniieienensereemestipensamicenmncedisdebenendedenesdhamiaitiiaitichiaiiedtiaieattate temas ieel
το ΜΙ SimpLicius’s Comment. 205
who hath taken fuch Perfons into his peculiar Protection;
and alfo, to exercife and enlarge our good Nature, which
ought not to be confined within the narrow bounds of our
_ own Acquaintance or Country, but muft ftretch its concern
over the whole World, and look upon itfelf, as a Debtor
to all Mankind. There is alfo another very weighty Rea-
fon ftill behind; which is, that this will give us Confi-
_ dence, when we prefent our Addreffes before the God of
- Strangers; and-we may with a better Grace ask and expec
that Affiftance from Him, which we have given to Them
- without grudging. For fuch is his condefcenfion, that he
allows us to look upon all our Endeavours and Aétions
of Kindnefs, as fo many Loans to Himfelf; and he will
_ be fure to repay them with large Ufury, and more. to the
_ Creditor’s Advantage, than any the moft Generous of the
- Sons. of Men.
Above all things, we muft take fpecial care never to in-
_ jure or opprefs a Stranger); -but quite contrary, to give him
- our Countenance, and. Help, and refcue him, if it be poffi+
ble, from the Injuftice of any other’ that fhall attempt it.
Ὁ For God hath. charged! his Providence with a peculiar care
_of Such; becaufe they: are more expofed and deftitute of
_ Humane Helps; and he, who hath promifed to protect them
_ more eminently, will be fure-to revenge their wrongs more
feverely. It is fit too, that thofe who can do it, be aflifts
ing to them in the difpatch, of the Affairs they come about,
_and furnifh them with what convetiences they ftand inneed of ;
_ that they be particularly tender of them in cafes of Sicknefss
and, when, the ends of their Journey are fatisfied, contri-
bute’ all poffible endeavours, towards facilitating their τας
turn home again.
_ Epictetus tells us moreover, That a Private Soldier ought
to confider his.own, and his Commander’s Poft, and from
thence inform himfelf, what is due to his Superior Officers.
Now in fuch a cafe, it is not enough, that their Orders be
obeyed, but it is neceffary, that they fhould be executed
fpeedily; becaufe, in time of A@ion, many favourable
Opportunities prefent themfelves, which) if not prefently
fnatch’d, are loft for ever. And they muft be executed
with Bravery and Refolution too; becaufe the Fortune of
‘the Field may depend upon fuch Obedience. A Private
Soldier is likewife obliged to expofe his own Perfon for
_ the Safety of his Commander, becaufe fuch an ones Life is
_ of Infinite Confequence, Ifa fingle Soldier tall, there isno
: great
206 Erreretus’s Morals.
great Advantage gained, nor does this Lofs change the face of
Affairs; but if a General fall, though the Soldiers under —
him were victorious before, yet their Spirits fink imme-.
diately, their Order is broken, and every one makes the beft
of his way to fave himfelf, as Sheep without a Shepherd run
before Wolves. 80 that indeed, not only the Succefs of the
Day, but the Fate of whole Countries and Kingdoms is of-
ten brought into extreme hazard, by the lofs of one emi-
“nent Commander; of which Xezsphow hath left us an Ἐχ-
ample, in the account he gives of what happened upon the
Death of Cyrus.
It is no lefs evident, That there is alfo a Relation, be-
tween Civil Magiftrates, and the Perfons under their Ju-
rifdi@tion, and feveral Duties which follow from that Re-
lation. And here, if Men do not bear the empty Name of
Governours, but are really what they are called, all ready
Obedience is due to them; all Honour and Refpe&t, as to
Perfons, next under God, the Authors of our Peace and
Happinefs, and greate(t Benefa@tors to the Publick. For
good Governours make this the Study and Bufinefs of their
Lives; they fet about it zealoufly and heartily, and omit no
care, which may any way conduce to the Benefit of the
State. What Hippocrates faid of the Phyficians, is much
more eminently true of Princes; they do not torment them-
felves to no purpofe with the Calamities of other People, —
(and Epiderus advifes they fhould not, ) but they facrifice
themfelves and all their Quiet το ἀγα and Trouble; they
negleét their own private Affairs and Families, and mutt be
content with perpetual Vexations and Interruptions, and —
the lofs of many Opportunities, .which might be improved
to very wife and virtuous Purpofes. ° ‘Syste
Upon all thefe accounts, and to make them fome amends, —
every Man is bound, not only to be obedient, but, fo far as —
in-him lies, to eafe them, and to bear a part of their Bur- |
den; to be a@tiive and vigorous in their Support and 2 ε:
fence, as looking upon Their Dangers to affect the State in
common, and threaten the whole Conttitution. τὸ
And, if thefe Governours be fuch, as do by no means an-
{wer their Charaéter} nor take the Care they ought; | though
"we are not bound to vindicate their Errours, or their Wicked-
nefs, yet, even in fuch cafes, we are obliged to pay them. all
‘that is due tothe Dignity of their Poft; we mutt fhew them
call fit Deference and Refpeat , and comply with their Com- |
mands, as far as witha good Confcience we may. . Ε "
. ~ ut ]
with ΘΙΜΡΎΙΟτυ 8.5 Comment. 207
But it is very fit I thould now apply my felf to the fol-
lowing Chapters , and not quit my firft Defign ; which was
‘to explain Epidfezvs, and ποῖ ἴὸ run out into unnéceflary
Enlargements, upon the feveral Relations Men fiand in to
each other; for otherwife, while I teach my Reader His
‘Duty, he will be apt-to fufpect, that I have forgot my Own. .
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‘
ι
CHAP. ΧΧΧΥΙΙ..
AKE notice, That the principal and moft im-
portant Duty in Religion, is to poffefs your
Mind with juft and becoming Notions of the Gods ;
_ to believe that there are fuch fupreme Beings, and
that they govern and difpofe all the Affairs of the
World, with a juftand good Providence. And,
in agreement to fuch a Perfuafion, to difpofe your-
_ felf for a ready and reverential Obedience, anda
“ΟΝ, ee ee
perfect Acquiefcence in all their Difpenfations: And
this Submflion is to be the Effect of Choice, and
not Conftraint ; as confidering , that all Events are
ordered by a moft Wife and Excellent Mind: For
this is the only Principle, which can fecure you
from a querulous Temper, and prevent all the im-
pious Murmurings of Men, who imagine them-
felves negleGted, and their Merits over-look’d by
a partial Deity. Now for attaining to the good.
Difpofition I have been defcribing, there is but
one poffible Method; viz. Τὸ difregard the Things
of the World, and be fully fatished, that there is
no Happinefs or Mifery in any other thing, but
what Nagure hath put within your own Power and
Choice. For, fo long as you fuppofe any external
τ Enjoyments capable of making you happy, or the
Want of them, miferable, you muft unavoidably
blame the Difpofers of them, as oft as you mect
3 with
αν πὴ τ OTE ΡΟ
208 . EpictTeru s’s Morals.
|
:
with any Difappointment in your Hopes, or, fall
into any Calamity you fear. This is a Principle |
fix’d in all Creatures by Nature, and nothing can
change or remove it, to run away from all that
that feems hurtful and deftruétive, and to have an
averfion for the Caufes of thefe Things to us. So
is it likewife, to purfue and court the contrary, |
and love and admire the Perfons we owe our Good
to: Nor ean a Man take pleafure in the fuppofed
Author of his Mifchief, any more than in the Mif-
chief πίε, Hence it is, that Sons complain of |
their Fathers, and reproach them for not letting them —
into a greater fhare of their Eflates, in which they _
place their Happinefs. Hence Polynices and Eteo- |
cles engaged in that unnatural War, becaufe they
placed their Happinefs in a Crown. Hence the |
Husbandman cries out againft God, when the Sea- _
fon isunkindly ; andthe Merchant repines at Storms, _
and Lofles at Sea; and Mafters. of Families, at the
death of their beloved Wives and Children. Now
no Man can have Religion, without mixing fome |
profpect of Advantage with it; nor can we heartily -
ferve and adore a Being, of whofe Juftice and Kind-—
nefs we have not a good Opinion. So that, by |
making it our Bufineis to regulate our Defires and
our Averfions, and direét them to worthy and proper ©
Objects; wedo at the fame time moit effectually —
fecure our Piety. It is neceffary, alfo, that you |
fhould offer Sacrifices, and conform to the Cuftom
of your Country in the Exercife of Religion; and
that ali things of this kind be performed with Sin-
cerity and Devotion; and not flovenly and care-
lefly, but with a decent Application and Refpect;
and that your Offerings be, according to your Abi-
lity, fo temper’d, as neither to betray an Unwil-
lingnefs or fordid Grudging im One extreme, nor to
run out into the Orher of Profulenefs and Often-
tation. CO M-
oo) hi
"πὸ j - 5 & ‘ on
with StmpLicius’s Comment. 209
͵
ἱ
j
Be
A Fter the Duties expeéted from us to our Equals, that
va’ is, of Men to one another ; he proceeds now to inftruc
‘us, what we owe to our Superious ;, vz. thofe of a Nature
“more excellent than our own. And in all Difquifitions of
this kind, it is a very convenient Method, to begin with
thofe Things that are neareft andymoft familiar to us, and
fo by degrees afcend to thofe above, and at a greater diflance
from us.
~~ Now thefe Duties are likewife difcovered, bytaking ajuft
View of the Relation between the Gods and Us; and that is
fuchan one, as Effeéts bear to their Higheft and Firft Caufes.
_ If then they are to be confidered under this Notion; it is
evident, that they ftand not in any need of our Services, nor
can we add to their Happinefs or Perfection. Our Duties
-confequently, and the Intent of them, are only fuch, as may
_exprefs our Subjection, and procure us a more free accefs
and intercourfe with them: For this is the only Method of
keeping up the Relation to Firft and Higheft Caufes. The
-Inftances of this Subjection due from us, are Honour and
_ Reverence, and Adoration, a voluntary Submiffion to all.
they do, and a perfe& Acquiefcence in all Events order’d by
them; As being fully fatisfied | that they are the Appoint-
ments of Abfolute Wifdom and Infinite Goodnefs.
. Thefe are fuch Qualifications, as we muft attain to,. by
_ redtifying the Ideas of our Minds, and reforming the Errours
_of.our Lives... The Ideas of our Minds mutt be re&tified, by
:
COMME NT.
Te ‘
- entertaining no Thoughts of the Gods, but what are wor-
thy of Them, and becoming Us: ‘as, That they are the Firft
_ Caufe of all Things: That they difpofe of all Events, and
concern themfelves in the Government of the World; And
_ That all their Government, and ali their Difpofals, are wife,
_ and Juft, and Good. For ifa Man be of Opinion, That there
-isno God ; Or if he allow his Exiftence, but deny his Provi-
dence ; Or if he allow both thefe, but think’ that God, and
' that Providence, defe&tive in his Counfels, or unjuft in his
_Diftributions ; fuch an one can never pay him true Honour
and hearty Adoration, or fubmit with a refigned and conten-
' ted Spirit, to the various Accidents of Human Life, as if all
" were ordered for the beft,
ἧς > ‘
* Mana: 2 sae Peat
i :
δ.
210 Erzrcretrus’s Morals
Again ; Itis likewife neceflary, that the Life and Conver- —
{ation of Men be fo difpofed, as to exprefs this Perfuafion
of-a Wife and Good Providence by not flying out into pee- |
_ Vith Murimurings and Complaints, or thinking that Almigh- |
ty God hath done us wrongin any of his Difpenfations. But
this isa Temper we can never attain to, fo long as we expeét
Happinefs, and dread Mifery, from any thing but ourfelves.
The Management of our own Will mutt be our only Care ;
and all our Defires and Averfions reftrained to the Objeéts
of Choice; and then we need never be difappointed in our
Hopes, nor furprized by our Fears. But this muft needs hap-
pen to all who place their Happinefs and Mifery, in the En- |
joyment, or the Want’, of any external Advantages ; and
fuch Difappointments and Surprizes will neceffarily carry
them to a Deteftation of That, which they look upon as the |
Caufe of fuch Misfortunes: And they will very hardly re-
frain from {peaking ill. of that Power, which might have |
prevented their Mifery, buttook nocare todo it. For every
Creature naturally defires Good, and abhors Evil; andthere- |
fore not only the Thingsthemfelves, but the Caufes of them, |
are fhunned and hated, courted and admired, in proportion —
“as they really are, or as we apprehend them to be, Good or
Evil. There is no fuch thing in Nature, nor can there be, |
as that a Man fhould take Delight in, and bear a true Affe- |
ion to, the Perfon, whom he looks upon to have done him |
fome real Injury or Hurt, any more than he can be fond of |
that Hurt or Injury itfelf. And fince all Good naturally at-_
tracis Love and Defire, and all Evil provokes Averfion, we
mutt needs be affeéted alike, both to the Things themfelves, |
and the Caufes of them to us. |
Nay though we be miftaken in our Notions of Good and
Evil, yet that we fhall proceed according to our apprehenfi- _
ons ‘of thefe Things, as if they were really fo, and cannot
reftrain ourfelves from hating and reviling the Authors of our |
Calamity, or the Deceivers of our Hope, he proves from
hence ; That the ftriGteft Ties of Nature, and Duty, and Af-
fection, are generally found too feeble Engagements, tokeep
Men in Temper, or moderate their Refentments. Thus we
fee greedy and impatient Children perpetually railing at their
Fathers, for keeping them out. of their Eftates, which they
account their Good; Or for inflicting fome Severities upon
them which they think Evil ; as when they chaftife their Fol-
lies, or deny them their Liberty. Thus thetwo Sons of Oedipas,
Polynices and Ezcocles, forgetting that they were Brothers,
6 \ ' quarrel’d
.---------.---
i withSimpxLiciuss Comment. 211
“_guarrell’d, and kill’d one another, for the Crown in which
they wereRivals. Thus the Farmer, when his Seed-time or
his Harveft happensill; if it rain too much, or too little, or
if any other crofs accident come to his Crop, prefently rails
and murmurs againft the Gods: Or if he have the modefty
to hold his tongue, yet he is fure to fret and curfe inwardly.
_ Thus Mariners, when they want a fair Wind; even though
_ theyare bound to different Ports, and mutt fail with different
- Winds, one perhaps wifhes for a Northern, another for a
Southerly Gale, and the fame cannot ferve or pleafe them
all; yet they {wear and rant at Providence, as if it were o-
bliged to take care of Them only, and negleét all Thofe,
whofe Bafinefs requires, it fhould blow in the Quarter
_ where it does. So likewife Merchants are never content.
_ When theyareto buy, they would have great Plenty, and a
Jow Market ; but whenit is their turn to fell, then they:wifh
ΟΠ for fearcity, anda rifing Price: And if either of thefe hap-
_ pen otherwife, they grow difcontented, and accufe Provi-
dence. And in general, when Men bury their Wives, or
Children, or have fomething very dear taken from them, or
' fall into fome difafter they feared, they grow angry at the
_ Difpofer of thefe Events. For we are naturally inclined to
_ honour and refpect the Perfons who oblige and gratifie us ;
_ and, as nothing excites thefe Refentments in us fo foon, or
_ fo powerfully, as our own advantage; fo nothing givesfuch
_ an effectual difguft, and fo irreconcilable a difrefpeét, as the
apprehenfion, that any Perfon hath contributed to our lofs
᾿
a
aud difadvantage. ᾿
A Man therefore in taking care to fix his Defires and his
_ Averfions upon the right Objeéts, does at the fame time fe-
_ cure his Piety and Reverence towards God. For this Man’s
_ Hopes are always anfwered, his Fears always vanifhinto no-
| ‘thing ; becaufe he neither hopes nor fears any thing out of
> hisownpower ; He isconfequently always pleafed, and un-
_ der no Temptations to accuieProvidence, for anything that
_ can poffibly happen to him. Butthe Man that gives his De-
' fires a Loofe, and expeéts his Fate from external Acci-
dents, is a Slave to all the World: He lies at the mercy of
» -every Man’s Opinion, of Health and Sicknefs, Poverty and
: Riches, Life and Death, Vidtories and Defeats; nay, even
the Wind and the Rain, the Hail'and the Meteors, and, in
thort, every Caufe and every Effet in Nature, is-his Matter.
For, except every one of thefe fall out juft according ‘to his
mind, his Defires muff be fruftrated, and his Fears accom-
93 plifhed.
¥
SS te
212 . Eprererus’s Morals
plithed. What a Weathercock of a Man is this; How un- |
eafie and unfettled his Life! How tedious and troublefome —
muft he be tohimfelf! How diffatisfied in his Breaft, andhow —
impiousin his Reflexions upon Providence! So that in fhorr,
no one Circumitance iswanting, which can conduce to the
rendring fuch 2 one miferable,
Having thus laid the Foundations of Religion, in true No-
tions of the Divine Nature, in a contented Submiflion to
all Events, and in a firm Perfuafion of a Wife and Good
Providence, difpofing them as we fee; and, having more-
over fhewn the neceffity of defpifing the World, and depend-
ing upon our own Willand the Objeéts of it, for all the Hap-
pinefs and Mifery we are capable of; he proceeds now to
direct us, what methods we fhould take, to exprefs our Reve-
rence and Honour forthe Gods. Someof thofe that are ge-
nerally practifed, and become univerfal, it is highly probable,
that God himfelf inflituted, declaring (as fome Hiftories in-
form us he did) what Services would be moft acceptable to
him; and this, with a gracious Defign of bringing us better:
acquainted with Himfelf, and likewife to fanctifie and en-
Jarge our Enjoyments, that our Offerings might invite his
Bleffings and his Bounty, and, for giving back a little, we
might receive the more.
As therefore we hold ourfelves bound, in the firft place, to
fet apart that Soul which we received from him, to his Ser-
vice; andto confecrate this byrefined and holy Vhoughts, by
worthy and reverent Ideas of his Majefty, and a regular un-
corrupt Life; fo it thouldbe our next care, to purifie and de- ὦ
dicate this Body too, which came to us from the fame Hand;
aud carefully to wath away all the feen or hidden Blemithes
and Pollutions, which it may have contraéted, When the
Soul and its Inflrument are thus clear from all their Stains,
Jet us come decently cloathed into his pretence, and there de-
vote a part of what God in his Bounty hath conferred upon
us, to his Ufe and Service. For it is highly reafonable and
jult, that a Part thould be given back to him, from whom
we receive the Whole: Not that he needs, or is the better
for it: (nor is he fo indeed, either for the Holinefs of. our
Lives, orthe reverent and worthy Jdezs we have of him: ’
And fo this Objection, if it were a good one, would lie e- ὦ
qually againft all Piety in general) butit is for our own Ad- ἡ
vantage ; For, when we have thus qualified ourfelves for his
benign Influences, he communicates himfelf to us, in fach ©
af
‘Ad
ri)
᾿
f !
\
A
ee a
ΠΥ
proportions ἃ5 Ὁ are capable and worthy of, So do the Of
| ferings
‘
with SrmpxLicius’s Comment. 213
ings we devote out of our Fortunes, when recommended
by a pure Confcience andagood Life, derive down the Blef-
ng and Goodnefs of God upon our Eftates, and procure us
ignal Teftimonies of the Power and Efficacy of his Provi-
‘dence. One Man hath found them the Inftruments of a mar-
vellous recovery from fome Epiiepfie, or other incurable
Dittemper; Another of calming boifterous Winds and Seas ;
befides the Divine Favour and Hlumination, which the Vo-
taries often acquire by fuch Religious Services. But if there |
| were none of thefe advantagious Effects to follow, vet it
τη {Ὁ be confefs’d a moft equitable thing, and a decent ex-
_ preffion of Gratitude, to pay back thefe Acknowledgments,
to the Giver of all we enjoy: How much more then, when
the parting with fo {mall a proportion fanctities and confe-
‘crates the Whole, and enfures his Favour and Affiftance in
eur Undertakings ἢ i
Now, as to the Kind and the Manner of thefe Oblations, he
would have us determined by the Cuffom of our Country.
For there is this mighty Difference, among others, between
‘God and Us; He is prefent at all times, and in all places,
' and equally difpofed to exert his Power, and communicate
hisInfluences, the whole Worldover. But We are confined
within a narrew compais. We, as Men, are but one of the
many Species which God hath created, and of the many,
who partake of the fame Nature, have applied ourfelves to
one Profeffion and Way of Life, out of many. Our Εἰποῖ-
‘tations are diftin@ and confined to one little Spot of this
waft Globe; and fo we partake of the Divine Goodnets,
Some in one place and time, and Somein another Thus
there are Countries oppofite to us, whofe Night is our Day,
and Climates fo diftant, that it is Winter in one, and Sum-
mer in another, at the fame time. So likewife Fruits and
Animals are peculiar to fome Countries, and do not grow
or breed in others; the Divine Bounty imparting irfelf to all
the World, and every Creature in ir, though to different
parts of che World, ia different manners. Astherefore the
particuiar manifeftations of God are fuited to feveral Places,
‘and Profeflions, and Seafons, and Modes ; fo in the choice
ef Vidims'and Acknowledgments, each Perfon and Coun-
‘try obferve what is peculiar to Them, and proper for their
Circumftances. And, when by-common Content folemna
| Feftiyals are celebrated as they ought to be, for the Honour
‘ated Worthip of God, a more extraordinary Effe& of the
Wivine Favour and Influence is frequently feen upon thefe
S 4 Occa-
ἶ
‘
=
a -ὦ
"ae
214 ~Erictretus’s Morals
Occafions; as miraculous Cures, {trange and ufeful Predi-
étions, and the like. Such remarkable efficacy do we find,
and fo much more fignal Teftimonies of the Divine Prefence
and Aid may we obferve, at one time above another, And
the fame Succefs is no lefs obfervable, in the proper Choice
and Accommodation of the Piacesin which we worfhip, the
Supplications we ufe, the Ceremonies we conform to, and |
the Oblations we prefent.
Now all the Religious Performances, by which we would
exprefs our Honour for God, ought, he fays, to be atten-
ded with Holinefs and Sincerity, and not done in a flovenly |
andfordid manner. For it is by no means fit, that any im- |
pure thing fhould prefume, or he admitted, to make its ap-
proach to the Pureft and moft Perfe&t Being: And any mix-
ture which adulterates what is pure and fincere, does at the _
fame time pollute and ftain it. Therefore nothing of this .
kind is to be done flovenly and fordidly; for that is Epictetus
his meaning; and the Word he makes ufe of to exprefs it, |
fignifies fuch Duft and Nattinefs, as is contracted from lying
upon a dirty Floor. Nor muft we behave ourfelves loofly
and negligently, fo as, through Idlenefs and Inadvertency,
to leave out, or change, or to confound the Order of any
part of our Worfhip. For, as Words are not the fame, if
you leaveout, or putin, or invertthe courfe of the Letters ;
nor Sentences the fame, if you confound the Words they
confift of, fo the Negleéts and Wandrings of a loofe Wor-
fhip check the Divine Influences, and render all our Devoti- |
ons flat and feeble; as, on the contrary, a wife and fteady —
‘Zeal is the beft Recommendation of our Prayers, and gives ©
them fuch energy and force, as never.returns empty. And
what is there indeed of fo great Confequence, or of fo ftri&
Obligation, as to be able to rouzea Man into Thought, and
difpofe him to Warmth and Attention, if the Prefence of
God, and his folemn Approzches to fo awful a Majefty,
have not the power to do it? Hence it is, that we are advi-
fed to addrefs ourfelves with reverenceand fear ; for nothing
is more offenfive, than a fawcy irreligious Boldnefs. And
the greater Veneration we hold al] things in, which bearany ἡ
relation to God and his Worthip, the more advantage
we fhall receive from them, and, by humbling ourfelves be-
fore the Throne of God, we take the moft effectual method
to betruly exalted. |
But, fearing fome wrong Interpretation upon what he had -
faid; and fuppofing, that, by forbidding Men to be eal and
fordid,
-- το ΓΤ ῦ-ῆ-τΌΓὈΓὈ:ὌἘὌὀἘοἘηὩΟἸΤασα τ -ςΌΈῈ͵Ῥ ἧὅὅ.-ῆἷ }Ύ 85 ὅς... --
with SrmpxLici1uss Comment. 215
Se ὦ ......» --.ς-ς--΄΄-“...- τ Ὃ΄τ’΄’’-“-. ο-ϊὺ᾽»-ῚῚἥΛΛ ΘςσΣ΄.-“ς---ς-ςς--“
Ly
-fordid, he intimates, that they fhould, upon all occafions,
Ν᾿;
Ἷ
come up tothe utmoft, or rather ftrain a point, and go δ6-
_ yond their power, therefore he prevents that Miftake in the
- Clofe of the Chapter. Andindeed, if Moderation bea Vir-
tue, it cannot fhew itfelf any where to more advantage, than
I.
inthe Bufinefs of Religion: The very end whereof is to re-
duce all things to their juft proportions, and keep them with-
in duebounds. Befides, nothing tends more to the preferv-
ing of Religion, and keeping up the conftant Practice of it,
than for Men to proceed in the fame even courfe, with as
_ few Alterations as |the thing is capable of ; for Cuftom and
frequent Repetition make Men perfeét and eafie: But what-
ever is exceffive and upon the {tretch, we can never be re-
conciled to, fo as to make it our daily Bufinefs.
Farther yet, the Men that {train them{felves to be profufe in
their Sacrifices, or anyother way to exceed what others do,
_ and what their own Circumftances will bear, feem to doit
- PF
4
ty
See ee
out of a very mean and miftaken Principle: For this looks,
as if God were to be bribed in their favour, and the value of
the Prefent laid an Obligation upon him: Whereas, alas! all
thefe things are done, not for His fake, but our Own; and
the Firft Fruits, which we confecrate to him, are defigned
for no other than decent Acknowledgments of his Libera-
lity, and a {mall return out of what he hath been pleated to
giveus.
Thus have I trod in the Steps of this excellent Man, and
done him what Right I could, in the Paraphrafe and Expla-
nation of the Chapter now before us. But becaufe in the
beginning he touches upon three Points concerning the di-
vine Nature, and thefe fo. fundamentally neceflary, that all
Pofitive Laws, and all Moral Inftitutions, do prefuppofe the
Belief and Acknowledgment of them; And fince fome per-
verfe and refra€tory Men have. neverthelefs the Confidence
-.t0 oppofe them ; we will fo far comply with their Obftina-
cy, though moft unreafonable, as to prove the Truth of
thefe Three Points, wiz. That there is a divine Nature and
Power; That the World is governed by it; and, That the
Providence by which it is fo governed, is Juft and Good in
all its Difpenfations. The Importunity of thefe Men is fo
much the greater, and our trouble of refuting it will be the
lefs; becaufe, not Mankind only, but Brutes and Plants,
and evety Creature in the World, do according to their Ca-
pacity, 311» declare their Relation to God. Men indeed do
fothe moft of any, becaufe they are carly inflructed by their
Parents.
“τό , Eptctretrus’s Morals
Parents. Religion grows up with them from their Cradle; _
and the Ideas common to their Species take root in, and car-
ty agreat Sway with them. For the Barbarous as well as |
the Civilized Countries, and that in alf'Ages of the World —
too, though they have differ’d exceedingly in other Opinions, ©
yet have ever agreed univerfally in this, That thereisa GOD.
iknow of no Exception to this Rule, except thofe Acrothe- |
ates, of whom Fheophra/tus givesan Account, that they owned
no Deity; but, as a punifhment of their Atheifm, the Earth
opened and fwallowed them up. Befides Them, -we meet
‘with no People, and but very few fingle Perfons, who ever
pretended to difown this; not above Two or Three, from |
the beginning of the World to this Day. yal
But yet fo it is, that agreat many do not duly attend to thefe |
anivertally received Notions; Partly becaufe they take them |
upon Traft, without confidering or underftanding the Argu- —
ments upon which they aregrounded: And partly, fromfeme |
Difficulties in Providence, fuch as the Misfortunes and Af- |
fictions of fome very good, and the Profperity of fome ex+ |
ceedingly wicked Men, which are apt to raife in them the |
fame Scruple, with that in the Tragedian,
Pardon ye Powers , if yet fuch Powers there δός,
For fure that Doubt is modeft, when we fee
Triumphant Vice, and injur'd Piety.
Now fuch Perfons as thefe would foon be convinced, if they —
did but follow Epzczetus his Method, and not imagine, that.
either the Happinefs or Miferyof a Man can depend upon |
external Accidents, or indeed upon any thing elfe, but the
Freedom and Ufe of his own Will. - For at this rate it will
net be poffible for any good Man to be wretched, or any vi-
cious one happy. And now, if you pleafe, we will confi-
der thofe Propofitions, which are barely laid down by Epicte-
ἐπε, and try to prove the [ruth of them, by tuch Arguments.
as are proper, and occur to my prefent Thoughts.
The firtt {tep I fhall make in this Argument, is to confi-
der the Name, by which we call this Being, and what the
Word GOD fignifies. And here we muft obferve, Thar
the Greek Word ©:2..was applied to the Stars, and other Ce-
leftial Bodies; which therefore were fo called from @é-,
which fignifies to Ruz, and had that Appellation given them
for the{wiftnefs of their Motion.» But this Title was after-
ward extended to Incorporeal Caufes, and Inreilectual Beings ;
. and
with Stmpricius’s Comment. 217
‘and more peculiarly to the Firft Caufe and Being of all Things.
Ὁ that by this Name we under(ftand the Original of the Uni-
Verle, the Firft, and Principal, and intellectual Caufe of every
‘Thing. For, ‘whatever hath any exiftence, muft either be
“derived from fome Determinate Caufe, cr it muft fubfift by
“Chance, and Mechanical Neceflity. But whatever fubfifts
after this manner, hath neither any particular efficient Caufe,
‘Nor is itfelf the Final Caufe of its own Produfion; For
“both thefe Qualifications are abfolutely inconfiftent with the
peatate | of Fortuitous Beings, and indeed no Jefs fo, is the
following any conftant Rule and regular Method in the Pro-
_ duétion of them.
_ Now it is obvious to any confidering Perfon, that the
Works of Nature, and of Choice, area fittal Caufe to the
Doer, and the Exiftence of them is propofed, as that which
-anfwers his Defign. Thus the Husbandman plants, and
_fows his Ground, in profpedt of the Corn, and the Trees,
‘that will grow upon it. hus the Coition of all Animals
| propofes to itfelf the continuation of the Species. And in
all the Progrefs of thefe ProduGtions, there is a conftant Or-
) der, and fix’d Courfe obferved ; Some Operations which are
» proper to the Beginning, Others to the Promoting, and o-
) thers to the Perfecting this Work, each perform’d conftant-
ΠΥ in their proper place. The Seeds of Plants are firft caft
» into the Ground, then moiftned and impregnated there, then
) they take root and f{prout, they fhoot up in Straw, or Bran-
| ches, andfo on, till at laft they bloffom, and bud, and bring
)) Fruit to maturity. So likewife that of ‘Animals is cherifhed
) and enlarged, and formed into anEmbryo; which receiving
), vital Nonrifhment, and convenient Growth, is at a ftated
» time brought to a juft Perfection, and then comes to the
) Girth. But ftill in thefe, and in all other Cafes of the like -
) nature, there is the fame Chain of Caufes; and thefe gene-
rally keep their fix’d Times and Meafures.
) Now, if all the Productions of Nature, and all the Effeds of
) Choice, have fome particular Caufeto which they owe their
Beiag; if the Exiftence of thefe thingsbe the final Caufe of
‘their Produdiion; and if the fameOrder and a regular Me-
| thod be conftantly and daly obferved in the producing them
) the natural and necelfary Refult of this Argument is, That
Vall the Wor rks of Nature and of Choice, that is, all Things
' jn this wage World, which have any rea 1Exiften ce, are not
the Eifects of Chance, or Mechanifm, but are owing to fome
i particular pofitive Caufes. And, fince thefe Canfes mutt
i ae
1 needs |
\ J ἐ vii Υ ἡ
a ἐν ae
Bay) wld R SG. uaa
/
218 Ertcetrerus’s Morals
needs be antecedent to their Effe&ts, if They be fuch, as }
had a Beginning themfelves, they muft be owing to fome ἢ
Others who had a Being antecedent to Theirs; and fo we ἢ
may tracethem up, till at laft we cometo Caufes which had ἢ
no Beginning atall. And thefe being eternal, are mofttru- |
ly and properly faid to Exift, as having never not been, not |
owing their Subfiftence to any External Caufe, but folely to |
the Inherent Perfeétions of their own Nature. So that |
the firft and Eternal Caufes of Things muft needs be Self- }
exiftent, or fomething more noble and excellent than felf- |
exiftent, as the following Difcourfe will convinceyou.
The fame Argument holds as ftrong with regard to Mo- |
tiontoo. For if we trace this up to its beginning, we fhall }
find, that thofe Bodies which made the firft Impreflions, ἢ
were either fuch as moved by an Internal Power and Prine |
ciple of theit own; or fuch as were fixed themfelves,
and had no fhare in the Motion they impreffed upon others. —
For whatever is, moved Mechanically, is moved by fome- τ
thing elfe; andj That again by fome other thing; and foon —
for ever: But fuch an account as this of Motion z Iufini-—
zum, is neither poffible to be, nor to be conceived. For at |
this rate, if there were no Beginning of Motion, the only |
Confequence from hence muft needs be, That there would
be no Mover, nor any Moved Bodies at all: And if we
will allow any Beginning, as allow it we mutt, that Firf
Mover muft be either endued with a Principle of Self-
motion, or it muft have no motion at all. But the Latter
of thefe it cannot be neither; For this is evident in all mo-.
tion, that fix’d Bodies are fo far from communicating |
motion to thofe Bodies which have it not, that on the con- |
trary they check and ftop it in thofe that have, and difpofe |
them always to continue in the fame State and Pofture, |
without any manner of alteration. So that Free and Spon- |
taneous motion muff at laft be refolved to be the. firft Caufe. |
of Mechanical. Now the things concern’d in Mechanical
motion, are fuch as are fubje& to Generation and Cor- |
xuption, to Augmentation and Diminution, and to any |
fort of Alteration, whether that refertothe Qualities of the |
Things themfelves, or whether totheir Local Diftances and
Situations. For whatever is produced could never produce
itfelf ; becaufe then it muft have had a Being before it was |
produced, and fo begin to be, both before and after itfelf. |
And whatever receives increafe isnot augmented by itfelf;. |
for Augmentation is nothing elfe, but the addition of fome~
. thing |
es
i = - -
| ὙΠ Simpxicius’s Comment. 219
_ thing which it had not before. So again, whatever is alter-
‘ed, is altered by fome other thing, and not from itfelf ; tor
alteration is properly the introducing of a contrary Quality.
~ So likewife Local Motion cannot be from the Body mov-
ing; for fince all Motions are fubje& to the Rules Ihave here
laid down, and Generation, Corruption, Augmentation,
_ and Alteration, are all but fo many Effeéts of Motion; it is
_ plain this muft be derived from fomething elfe, and could
᾿ς not fet itfelf on going.
_ Thofe ‘things therefore, which in the Courfe of Nature
_ are fuperiour to thefe Produétions, and the Caufes of ne-
_ ceffary Motion, muft needs be capable of moving themfelves.
_ For, if we fhould fuppofe but one Minute’s perfe& Repofe,
_ nothing would ever move again, except fome Free Self-
moving Agent began the Dance. For whatever is once fix’d,
is difpofed to continue fo to all Eternity ; and what ever
_ moves mechanically muft wait the leifure of fome other Bo-
_ dy, and cannot ftir, till it receive the Impreflion, and is put
_ into adtion.
_ Now whatever the firft Principles of Things are, ’tis ne-
| ceffary that they fhould be of a fimple Nature. For all mix’d
| Bodies are compounded of Simples, and confequently the
_ Ingredients muft havea Priority in Nature, before the Com-
_ pofition made of them. Let us then confider fome of the
᾿ς groffeft and moft ovious Bodies; and fo by degrees afcend
_ higher, to try at laft, whether it be poffible for us to. con-
᾿ς ceive Body to be fuch a Principle, as Reafon will tell usthe
firft Principles of all things mult. needs have been ; Or whe-
ther it will not be impoflible to conceive, that thefe Bodies
- which we fee move and fubfift, fhould ever have had that Mo-
- tion and that Exiftence from themfelves.
| Whatever movesitfelf, is called Self-moving; either be-
_ caufe one part of it is ative, and the other paflive in this
' motion; or elfe, becaufe the whole is active, and the whole
' paffive. Now if we imagine One part to communicate,
» and the Other only to receive the Impreflion; {till the fame
» Quettion will return, as to that part ‘vhich begins the moti-
/ on; whether this be done from a Principle of its own, or
from any external Impulfe; and fo up, till at laft you muft
» be torced to ftop at fomething, which muit be acknowledg-
᾿ς ed an entire moving, and entire moved.
οὐ The fame is to be faid of Self-exiftence too. For what-
» ever is Orfinally and properly, muff be an entire Exiftence,
/ and the foe and entire Caufe of its own Exiftence: And
ΟΝ ᾿ whatever
aa a ey ||
220° EprctTetus’s Morals
whatever is fo, muftbe indivilible, and without Parts: For ©
whatever confifts of Parts , and is capable of being divided ,
could never unite its whole felf to its whole felf, fo as to
be entirely moving, and entirely moved; entirely fubfift- |
ing, and yet the entire Caufe of fo fubfifting at the fame
time. |
Again: It is no lefs impoffible, that any Bodies fhould |
be of a fimple Nature; for they muft of neceflity confift of
Matter, and Form, and feveral other Properties, which go
to the compleating of their Nature; fuch as Magnitude, and
Figure, and Colour, and fundry other Qualities, which are
not original and caufal Species themfelves, but only parti-
cipations of thefe, produced in fome Matter without Form, ©
which partakes of them. For, where thefe Original Forms
lie, there every thing is in its true Effence and Perfeétion,
and there is no need of any Matter unform’d to receive
them. But, when thofe Originals are communicated, then
there muft of neceflity be fome Matter to receive them,
which, till ic hath done it, is itfelf void of Form. Since |
then the Firft Principle of things are incorporeal and indi-
vilible; Since their Nature muft be fimple, and that they
are properly Efficient Canufes; Since their Exiftence and their
Motion muft be entirely from themfelves ; and fince it hath
been fhewed, that Bodies are not in any degree capable of
thefe Qualifications; it muft needs, I think be concluded,
that Body could not be the Firft Principle, nor the Univerfe
Owing to any fuch Original. _
Where then fhall we find fuch a felf-moving Agent, as
infufes Motion into the neceffary ones, and may be confi-
dered as a Caufe with refpe@ to them? This fure muft be
fomething which moves from an internal Principle. But
fill, if this Motion from within were derived from fome-
thing elfe, and not from itfelf; we fhould not call this an
Interna! Motion, but an External Impulfe, as we do in Bo-
dies. For if I by a Staff that is in my Hand movea Stone,
though both my Staff and: my Hand contribute to that Mo-
tion more immediately, yet I my felf am the true and pro-
per Caufe of it. What fhall we fay then moves Bodies from
within? What indeed but the Soul? For animated Bodies
are moved from an internal Principle, and all Bodies fo
moved are Animates. If then it be the Soul, which gives ©
an internal Motion to Bodies; and if this internal Mover
be felf moving; it remains, that the Soul is a free and fpon-
taneous Mover, the caufe of Produations and beginning of
: 6 Motions,
a
' with SimpLicius’s Comment. 521
+S ΞΙΞ ΞΞ SS RT Ξ ΞΟ.
Motions, containing in-her felf the feverat Patterns, and
_Meatures, and Forms, according to which thofe Produéti-
ons and Motions are modelled and proportioned. For, if
the conftituent Forms are not in Bodies originally, but de-
rived immediately from fome free Agent; then certainly the
Soul is the efficient Caufe, and affigns to each Body its parti-
cular Form. Now thefe Forms in the Soul, are exceeding:
pure and untainted: As for Example: Beauty in the Body
_of an Animal confilts in the Flefh, and Skin, and Veffels, and
Blood, which make and fill up this Mais. Now it does in-
deed, to the belt of its power, temper and adorn thefe things ;
bur at the fame time it is fullied and changed by them, and
; finks into their Deformity. But Beauty in the Soul i is free
_from_all thefe Allays, and is, not only the Image and Re-
' prefentation of Beauty, but pure, fubftantial , unblemithed,
j original Beauty; not “graceful in one place, and not in ano-
ther, but perfectly andallover fo. From whence it comes to
, pats, that, when the Soul contemplates its own or another
_ Soul’s Beauty, all bodily Graces lofe their Charms, and ap-
pear defpicable and deformed in comparifon. And this in-
fiance hints to us the Purity of all other original Forms, as
: they are in the Soul.
᾿ Now it is very plain, that as there are different Bodies
moved by thefe Souls, fo there are likewife different forts
‘ of Souls which move them; Some of thefe are celeftial,
>and others fublunary: For it were intolerable abfurdity to
| fappofe, that Bodies lefs refined, and inferiour in Dignity
) and Duration, fhould have Life, and Souls, and that thofe
' above fhould want both. It is therefore in this cafe with
» Souls, as with Bodies, the Heavenly ones are the Caufes of
) the fublunary ones. And indeed the Soul is a noble and
᾿ moft excellent Being, efpecially the heavenly one, advanc’d
) by Nature to the firft.Prer ogative of being a Principle, though.
' mot the Firft and Higheft in the Order of Caufes. For,
+ though the felf-moving and felf-exiftent Being, is faperior
) tothofe, whole Motion and Exiftence is derived from fome-
_ thing elfe; yet fill even This is capable of being confidered
‘in a double Capacity, as Active and Paffive, as a Caufe and
δὴ Effet; and ’tis plain, that Simples muft have been before
’ Compounds, and One before Two. Ὁ
© Again: Though this felf-moving Agent depend upon no
"other for its Motion, yet Motion it hath; and Motion in-
ἢ fers Mutation : not an efiential Change indeed, but fuch as
vefpedts its Operations; And neither are thefe Motions Lo-
4 by cal
222 Erreretus’s Morals
cal and Corporeal, (for in that refpe& it is immovable) ὁ
but Spiritual, and peculiar to the Soul; fuch as we call
Confideration, and Debate, and Difcerning, and Opinion ;
and, according as fhe is;moved by thefe motions, fhe im-
preffes corporeal ones upon the Body.
Now whatever this Change be, yet that, which is muta-
ble in any kind or proportion, muft have fomething before
it abfolutely immutab!e, that fo thofe things, which are mu-
table, may ftill be preferved fo. For all Motion and Mu-
tation, both in the higher and our lower Regions, proceeds
from the impreffion made by the Firft Caufe. But fince all
things undergo fuch various Changes, and fince great mo-
tions are violent ; How come the heavenly Bodies to con-
tinue fo much the fame, in their Conftitution, their manner
of moving, the Centre about which they roul, their mutual
Order and Pofition? And whence is it, that, though the
fublunary ones undergo more vifible and frequent Altera-
tions, yet ftill there is a perpetual Reftitution and conftant
Return to their firitt Form? Thus we obferve it plainly,
in Elements, and Seafons, and Plants, and Animals: For,
though thefe do not continue to be numerically the fame,
as Celeflial Bodies do; yet they go round in a Circle, till
at Jaft they return to the point from whence they fet out at
firft. Thus Fire is converted into Air, Air condenfed into
Water, Water into Earth, and then Earth ratified into Fire
again. So the Year brings us, firft into Spring, then to
Summer, after that Autumn, and at laft Wiater thaws into
Spring again. So again, Wheat is turned into the Stem,
then the Blade, after that the Ear, and fo ripe wheat again.
So from Man proceeds firft the Seminal Principle, after that
the Formation, and Vital Nourifiment; and this at laft comes
to be Man again. Now I would ask any one, fince Moti-
on is of itfelf always violent, and always tending to Change,
how it comes to pafs, that the fame Species, and the fame
Courfe and Conftitution of Nature is fo exa@ly preferved.
Certainly this muft needs be the Effet of fome Superior
Caufe, which is itfelf Immoveable, and immutable, and re-
mains for ever in all Points exaétly the fame. Tor even in
mental’ Motions, that Agent which is uncertain in his Mo-
tions, and as fometimes with eafe, and Freedom, and-
{peed ; and fometimes flowly, and with difficulty, muft needs
have {ome other mind Antecedent to it; One, whofe Effence
and Operations are always the’fame, who brisigs all things
to pafs in an inftant, and at pleafure: And no Man τὰ ἃ
e
with StmpLiectus’s Comment, 223
————————
be told, how much fuch a Being as this, which is fix’d and
“unchangeable, not only as to his own Nature and Effence,
but as to his Influence too, is more excellent than that,
which is ftill in motion, and liable to change, though that
Motion be from it felf alone. And Reafon will convince
| us, thatthofe Beings which are moft Noble and Excellent,
/muft needs have had an Exiftence before thofe which are
indigent and depending.
Now we fhall do well, according to this Rule, to afcend
the whole Scale of Caufes in our Thoughts, and try whe-
ther we are able to find any Principle more Excellent, than
_ what is already fix’d upon; and if we can do fo, then to
drive that {till higher, till we come to reft at laft in the
_loftieft and moft majeftick Notions that we are capable of
entertaining. And this is a Courfe we may boldly take:
nor is there any fear of going too far, or overfhooting the
Mark, by conceiving any Ideas too great, and above the
Dignity of this Firft Caufe. For alas! the boldeft Flights
our Minds can afpireto, are too low and feeble; fo far
from furmounting, that they fall infinitely fhort of, his Di-
vine Perfections. This Contemplation upon God, as it is
the moft Excellent, fo itis the only One, in which we are
fure not to be guilty of any Excefs, or over-valuing the
Obje&. And, when we have taken all imaginable pains to
collec all the Ideas that are Great, and Venerable, and Ho-
ly, and Independent, and Produétive of Good; all thefe
Names, aid all thefe Perfe€tions put together, do yet give’
us but a very poor and imperfect Notion of him; Only he
is gracioufly pleafed to pardon and except thefe, becaufe it
is not in the power of humane Nature, to admit any higher
and bétter.
When therefore our Confideration hath carried us from.
Self-moving Beings up to that which is Immovable, and ab-
folutely Immutable, always the fame in its Effence, its Power,
and its Operations; fix’d for ever ina vaft Eternity, out of
which Time, and all the Motions that meafure it, are ta-
ken and derive their Being; there we may contemplate the
Primitive Caufes, of much greater Antiquity than thofe we
obferved in the Self-moving Agent; and there we fhall fee
them lie in all their Perfeétions, Immovable, Eternal, En-
tire, United to each other; fo as that each fhould be all by
Virtue of this intimate Conjunétion, and yet the intellectu-
al Differences between them fhould remain diftin€t and un-
confufed. For what account can be given of fo many dif-
‘ ss joa) ; ferent
uy
Wr
SS |
LL SC,
224, Epicretrus’s Morals .
a ττἙἍἌΨ--ς. ς΄ ΄΄΄΄ὖ΄ῤὖῇῸΠῦ6ΠὋἀρΦἘιὔᾶ-0Φ..
ferent Forms in the World, but only, that the Great God
and Creator of the World produces thefe, as he thinks fit
to feparate and diftinguifh the Caufes of them in his own
Mind? which yet we muft not fuppofe to make fuch a@ual
and incommunicable Differences between the Originals , as
we obferve between the Copies of them here. Nor are the
DiftinGions of the differing forts of Souls the fame with —
thofe of Bodies. Each of the Eight Heavens we fee’, and
the Confiellations peculiar to them, are a part of the whole _
Heaven taken together ; a full and integral Part, and yet
each hath its Effence, and Influences, and Operations, pro- i
per toitfelf. So likewife the Forms of Sublunary, as well
as Celeftial Bodies, which are always the fame, as that of a
Man, a Horfe, a Vine, a Fig-tree; each of thefe are per-
fect and full; though not in Individuals, as the Heayenly
Bodies are; yet according to the Various Species, with
which they fill the World, and by the Effential Differences, ἥ
which diftinguith them from one another. Juft thus it is
with thofe more fimple and Intelle@tual Confiderations, of -
which thefe Farms are compounded, fuch as Effence, Mo-
tion, Repofe, Identity, Beauty, Truth, Proportion, and all
thofe other Metaphyfical Qualities, belonging to the Com=
pofition of Bodies; Each ot which is perfeét in its own kind, _
and hath a diftin& Form of its own, and many Differences _
peculiar toit felfonly. And if this be the Café in fo many |
Inferior Beings, how much more perfe& and entire fhall
every thing fubfift in the great Soul of the World? Thefe are
the {pontaneous Caufes of the Bodies here below, and all.
their differences lie united there. According to this Pat-
tern all thingshereareformed; but that Pattern is abundantly —
more perfe&, and pure, and exa@, than any of its Refem-.
blances. Much more perfc& ftill then are -thefe Divine and
Intelle€tual Forms, than any Corporeal ones, of which
they are the great Originals. For thefe are united, not by
any mutual Contact, or Continuity of Matter, or bodily”
Mixture; but by the. Coalition of indivitible Forms. And
this Union, being fuch as ftill preferves the Diftin@ions δε τὸ
tween them clear and unconfus’d, makes each of them per-_
fe& in itfelf, and qualifies it to be the common Principle’
and Root of all the Forms of its own Likenefs and Kind ,
from the higheft to the loweft.
Now the feveral diltin@ Principles of things derive their
Caufal Power and Dignity, from fome Ove Superiour Prin-
ciples For it is plain, that Maay could not εχ without —
an
¥ ; t
ue
with Simpxiciuss Comment. 225
‘an antecedent Caufe. For which Reafon each of Many is
“One, but not fuch a One, as was before thofe Many. For
the One of Many is a part of that Number, and is diftin-
‘guifhed from the reft by fome particular Qualifications,
‘which give him a Being apart to himfelf: But the One be-
‘fore Many was the Caufe of thofe Many; He comprehend-
ed them all within himfelf, exifted before them, is the Caufe
of Caufes , the firft Principle of all Principles, and the God
of Gods; for thus all the World, by the mere DiGtates of
Nature, have agreed to call and to adore him.
He is likewife the Supreme and Original Goodnefs. For
all Effects have a natural defire and tendency to the re-
{pe€tive Properties of their firft Caufe. Now that, which
all things defire, is Good ; and confequently the firft Caufe
muft be the Original, and the Supreme’Good. So likewife
he muft be the Original and Supreme Power: For every
Caufe hath the higheft Power in its own kind, and confe-
quently the firft Caufe of all muft needs exceed them all in
Power, and have all of every kind. He muft needs be en-
dued with perfe& Knowledge too; for how can we ima-
gine him ignorant of any thing which himfelf hath made?
It is no lefs evident too from hence, that the World, and
all ἐπ Ὁ were produced by him without any difficulty at
all. Thus, by confidering particulars, we are at laft arri-
ved to a general Demontftration;_ and from the Parts have
learnt the Whole, (for indeed we had no other way of
coming to the Knowledge of it, but by its Parts; the Whole
‘it felf is too γα for our Comprehention, and our Under-
ftandings are fo feeble, as often to miftake a very fmall part
for the whole) And the refult of the Argument is this,
That, as all Things and Caufes are derived at laft from
One Caufe; fo they ought to pay all manner of Honour
and Adoration to that Caufe. For this is the Stem and Root
of them all; and therefore it is not an empty Name only,
but there is a Similitude in Nature too, by which every
~Caufe is allied to this Univerfal One. For the very Power
and Privilege of being Caufes, and the Honour that is due
to them, when compared with their Effects, is the free
Gift of this Supreme Caufe, to all the inferiour and par-
‘ticular ones.
Now if any Man think it too great an Honour of thefe
lower and limited ones to be called Caxfes, or Principles, as
well as that Original and General one; It muft be owned
in the firft place, That there is fome Colour for this Scru-
Ta ple,
CE CE So ae eee 5 οι 3 5 νὰ it " 4
226 Eprpi1cretus’s Morals
ple, becaufe this feems to argue an equality of Caufal Power. ©
But then this may eafily be remedied, by calling Thefe bare- ©
ly Caufes, and That the Firft and Univerfal Caufe. And,
though it be true, that each particular Principle is ἃ firft and
general one, with refpeé to others of lefs extent and power
contained under it; (as there is one Principle of Graceful- ὦ
nefs with regard to the Body, another with regard to that
of the Mind, and a third of Gracefulnefs in general, which
comprehends them both;) yet in Truth, and ftri€&t Propriety —
of Speech, none is the Firft Principle, but that which hath ©
no other before or above it; and fo likewife we may, and ~
do, fay by way of Eminence, the Firft and Supreme Cautfe, ©
the Firft and Supreme God, and the Firft and Supreme —
Good.
Moreover we mutt take notice, that this Firft Caufe,
which is above and before all things, cannot poflibly have
any proper Name, and fuch as may give us an adequate Idea
of his Nature. For every Name is given for Diftinétion’s
fake, and to exprefs fomething peculiar; but fince all di-
ftinguifhing Properties whatever flow from, and are in, Him;
All we can do, is to fum up the moft valuable Perfeétions —
of his Creatures, and then afcribe them to Him.. For this ©
Reafon, as I hinted at the beginning of this Difcourfe, the
Greeks made choice of a Name for God, derived from the —
Heavenly Bodies, and the fwiftnefs of their motion. And —
thus we ftyle him Holy, and Juft, and Merciful, and Good,
and Lord, and Omnipotent; and fometimes take the Con- —
fidence to ufe fuch Appellations, as we think applicable τὸ
fome of the Sons of Men.
. Soe |
And thus much fhall fuffice at prefent for the Firft of the —
Three Points before us; which pretends to thew, That there
are Firft Caufes of Things, and that GO D is the truly Pirft
and Original of them all. And, though I have pafs’d over
feveral Steps, which might have been taken in running from
~~ —
Effeets to their Caufes, and would perhaps have made the —
Demonftration more gradual and complete; yet 1 muft be
content to enlarge no farther, as being duly fenfible, that
fome Perfons will think what is already done a great deal
too much; ‘and that thefe Excurfions are by no means a-
greeable to my firft Defign, which was to give as compendi-
ous an Iluftration as I could, to this Manual of Epictetus.
Tne Next Affertion to be proved, is, That this God go-
verns and difpofes all Things by his Providence. Which, ©
though it be, I prefume, largely demonftrated upon feveral
Occa-
fee } , : :
withSimPpLicius’s Comment. (227
- Occafions in the foregoing Chapters, fhall yet be allowed
“a particular Confideration in this place. For fome People
are ready enough to acknowledge the Being, and the Per-
feétions of God; they acquiefce in his Power, and Good-
nefs, and Wifdom; but, as for the Affairs of the World,
thefe they do not fuppofe him to regard at all, nor to be in
the leaft concerned for them; as being too little and low,
and in no degree deferving his Care. And indeed the great-
eft Temptation to this Opinion they frankly own to be mi-
niftred, by the#ery unequal Diftribution of things here be-
low, and the monftrous Irregularities, which the Govern-
‘ment of the World feems chargeable withal. They obferve
‘fome exceedingly wicked Men high in Power and Prefer-
ments, their Eftates plentiful and growing, their Health
found and uninterrupted; and thus they continue a Profpe-
rous and pleafant Life, to extreme old Age, go down to
their Graves gently and peaceably, and frequently leave their
. Pofterity Heirs of their good Fortune, and tranfmit their
ill-gotten Wealth to fucceeding Generations. In the mean
while, many Perfons, as eminently virtuous and good, are
miferably opprefs’d by the Infolence and Barbarity of thofe
wicked Great Ones; and yet for all this lnjuflice, no Ven-
geance, fo far as we can obferve, overtakes the Oppreffor,
nor is there any Comfort or Reward, to fupport the Sufterer.
Thefe, as was hinted before, are the Speculations, which
give Men the Confidence to difpute againtt GO D. _ Some
have been fo far emboldened by them, as to deny his very
Being ; but Others, in compliance with the univerfal Con-
fent of Mankind, and’the natural Intimations we have of
‘Him, are content to allow his Nature and Perfeétions, but
can by no means allow his Providence. Efpecially, when
“it happens to be their own cafe, and their particular Misfor-
_ tunes have given an edge to the Objection, and made it en-
‘ter deeper and more fenfibly. For then they can by no
--means be perfuaded, that fo great an Inequality can be con-
fiftent with Providence; or that GOD can interefh Himfelf
in the Management of the World, and yet do a thing fo
unworthy his Juftice, and fo contrary to his Nature, as to
fuiter infulting Wickednefs to pafs unpunifhed, and injured —
Virtue to perifh unredreffed.
Now the firft Return 1 fhall make to this Obje@ion, fhall
bein more general Terms, by defiring the Perfon who pro-
pofes it, toan{wer meto the feveral Parts of this disjunctive
Argument. .
ie eae ; If
228 Epicterus’s Morals
If there be a God, and nota Providence, then the Reafon
muft be, Either want of Knowledge, and a due Senfe, that
thefe Things ought to be his Care; Or, if he knows that
they ought, and yet does not make them fo; then this muft
proceed, either from want of Power, or want of Will. For
the want of Power there may be two Canfes affigned; Ei-
ther, that the Burden and Difficulty of Governing the World
is fo great, that GOD is not able punétually to difcharge
it; Or elfe, That thefe are Matters fo very mean and in-—
confiderable, that they efcape his Notice, and are not worth
his Care and Obfervation. If the Sufficiency of his Power
be granted, and the Want of Will be infifted upon, this
may likewife be imputed to two Reafons: Either, That he
indulges his own Eafe, and will not take the pains; Or
elfe, as was argued before, That thefe Matters are of fo
mean Confideration, that tho’ he could attend to the moft |
minute Circumftances of them, if he fo pleafed; yet he does
not do it, as thinking it more becoming the Greatnefs of
his Majefty, to flight and overlook them.
This disjunétive Argument being thus propofed in the ge-
neral, the feveral Branches of it may be replied to, as fol-
lows: That, admitting God to be fuch a Being, as hath
been here defcribed, perfect in Wildom and Knowledge,
abfolute and uncontroulable in Power, and of Goodnefs in-
comprehentible; and withal, the Original Caufe and Au-
thor of all Things, produced from and by Himfelf; and fo
thefe fo many parcels (as it were) of his own Divinity; ©
it is not poffibie, Firft, he fhould be ignorant, that the Pro-
duéts of his own Nature, and the Works of his own Hands,
require his Care: For this were to reprefent him more in-
fenfible, than the wildeft and moft ftupid of all Brute Beafts
(fince even thefe exprefs a very tender regard for the Crea-
tures, to whom they give Birth and Being.) It is as abfurd
every whit to fay, in the Next place, Phat this is a Care
too weighty, and above his Power and Comprehenfion:
For how is it poffible to conceive an Effe&t, greater and
ftronger than the Caufe, to which it entirely ows its Pro-
duction? And no lefs fo, Thirdly, to alledge, That thefe
Matters are negleéted, becaufe too little and low to fall
within his Obfervation. For furely, had they been fo de-
{picable, he would never have created them at all. The
want of Will is no more the occafion of fuch a Negle&,
than the want of Power. To fuppofe this Care omitted, on-
ly for the indulging his own Eale, and to avoid the Inter-
; sa ; ᾿ ruption
φασι" enema a rare aaa ad
with SIMPLIC1US'’S Comment. 229
| ruption of his Pleafures, would be to fix upon him the In-
| firmities and Paffions of Men; nay, and fuch as are peculiar
| to the worft and moft profligate of Men too. For not on-
ly humane Reafon,. but natural Inftin@, infufes an anxious
| Tendernefs into Brutes, fuch as fuffers them to decline no
pains, for the Provifion and Support of their Offspring.
_ Nor can we in any reafon imagine fuch want of Will, from
| a Confideration of the Vilenefs of thefe Things; fince no-
thing certainly is contemptible in His Eyes who created it 5
and, whatever he thought worthy the Honour of receiving
its Exiftence from him, he cannot think unworthy of his
Protection and Care. So that, when you have made the
moft of this: Argument that it can poffibly bear, {till every
part meets you with fome intolerable abfurdity; and noone
of thefe Confiderations, nor all them put together, can ever
induce a Man, who believes that God created all thefe
Things, to think, that he does not now infpe& and concern
himfelf for his own Produétions.
But now, after this general Confideration, I fhall apply
my felf more particularly to thofe, who either do really,
or would feem to, entertain a due fenfe of the Divine Ma-
jefty ; and in pretended Honour to that, difparage and lower
the Affairs of humane Life, as Things below his Notice,
and fuch as it would be an unbecoming Condefcenfion, a
debafing of Himfelf, to exprefs any Care or Concern for.
And here I muft take leave to vindicate the Honour of
Human Nature; by telling the ObjeGtors, That Mankind
and their Affairs are no fuch fmall and contemptible mat-
ters, as they have thought fit to reprefent them. For, in
the firft place, Man is not only an Animal, but a Rational
Creature too; his Soul is-of exceeding Dignity and Value,
capable of Wifdom, and, which is more, of Religion; and
_ qualified for advancing the Honour of God, above any other
Creature whatfoever. There is no manner of ground then
for fo wild a Suppofition, as, That God fhould undervalue
and difregard fo very confiderable a part of the Creation;
nor are the Actions and Affairs of Men to be thought de-
~ et neither, fince they are the Refults of a Thinking
ind.
But withal I muft add, That they, who thus leffen Man-
kind, furnifh us with another Argument in behalf of Provi-
dence, and cut themfelves off from taking any advantage of
that part of the Objetion, which would {uppofe thefe things
to exceed the Power of God. For the more you difparaye
124 ‘Mankind,
&
230 EPicrerus’s Morals
Mankind, the more eafie flill you confefs it to take care
of them. The Senfes, "tis true, difcern greater Objeéts
wiih more eafe than fmaller (as we find plain by the Pro-
portion of thofe that affect our Sight, and the Loudnefs
of thofe that ftrike our Ἐπ} but the Faculties of the
Mind and Body, quite contrary, bear fmall Trials, and
matter them much more eafily and fpeedily, than greater.
A Pound weight is carried with lefs pains than a Hund-
red, and a half Acre of Ground ploughed fooner and eafier
than an Acre; ΤῸ that, by Parity of Reafon, the lefs Man-
kind is reprefented, the lefs troublefome you make the Go-
vernment and Care of them to be. Ἶ
Again: They who deny, That Providence defcends to
every little Nicety (as they call it) do yet acknowledge
a Superintendence over the whole World in general. But
what Providence is that, which takes care of the Whole,
and not of its Parts? At this rate, we thall imagine the
Almighty God to come behind what almoft every Art and
Science among Men pretends to. For the Phyfician, whofe
Profeffion obliges him to ftudy the Diftempers and the Cure
of the whole Body, does not think himfelf at liberty to
neglect the feveral Parts; and the fame may be faid of the
Mafter of a Family, the Commander of an Army, and
the Civil Magiftrate in a State. Which way indeed is it
poffible to preferve the Whole from ruine, but by con-
‘fulting the Safety of the Parts, of which it is compound-
ed? Far be it therefore from us to imagine, that Almigh-
ty God fhould betray that want of Skill and Induftry ,
which feeble Men attain to. He takes care of the Whole,
aud the feveral Parts of it, at the fame time, and with the
fame trouble. And this moft wifely, for the fake of the
Parts themfelves., in a great meafure; bur much more,
with a delign to promote the Good of the Whole. Where-
as, We poor unthinking Mortals are often tempted to Im-
patience, by particular and private Misfortunes, not duly
conlidering , how far thefe contribute to the Benefit: of the
Whole.
Now if any Man fhall imagine the Difpofal of humane
Affairs to be a Bulinefs of great Intricacy, and Trouble,
and Confufion; and confequently that it muft needs per-
plex the Almighty, diftra@ bis Mind, and difturb his Hap-
pels: This Perfon maft be taught to make a difference,
between the Frrailties of a Man and thé Perfeétions of a
God. For itis plain, all this Objegtion is built upon κ
Mog
4s j : y
᾿ at .
with SrmMpLiciuss Comment. 231
Imagination, that God is fuch a Supervifor as one of Us;
and that He is under the fame neceflity of attending every
part of his Charge diftin@ly, and proceeding by fingle and
fubfequent Actions; fo that, while he is employed in one
Affair, it is not poflible for him to apply his mind to any
thing elfe. .
Methinks it were eafie for fuch a Perfon to refle@ , how
Lawgivers and Princes manage themfelves upon thefe oc-
cafions. They ordain wife and convenient Laws, and
affign particularly, what Rewards fhall be given to Merit
and Virtue; what Punifhments infli@ed upon Vice and
Difobedience ; what Satisfaction made for Injuries, and
the like. And thefe Laws they contrive fo, as to extend
even to the f{malleft matters, fo far as they can forefee
and provide again{t them. When this is done, they do not
give themfelves the trouble of watching and prying into
every Corner; they live and enjoy their Eafe as they ufed
to do; and the Care they take of the State is not feen in
perpetual Confufion and Difquiet of Heart, but in the Efta-
blifhment and Obfervation of thefe wholefome Contftituti-
ons. Now, if Men can have fo general an Influence, and
fo effeétual too, without perfonal Anxiety; much more
mutt we confefs it poflible for God. He founded the World,
and formed every Creature in it, and fixed wife Laws for
the Government of them all: He confidered, that our
Actions are fuch as are proper. to Souls; that there is a
great mixture of Virtue and Vice in them, and, according
as each Perfon exceeds in the one or the other of thefe, he
allots his Punifhment, aud his Portion. Some he plates
more commodioufly, and others lefs fo; and ranks us ac-
cording to our Deferts; thofe that have done well, with
good, and thofe that have done i!l; with worfe Sous)
and hath determined too, what each of thefe thal) deto
one another, and fuffer from one another. Now hereiz is
the Juftice of God vindicated, that the Fundamental Caife
of all thefe different Fates, is abfolutely left to our ovn
difpofal. For it isin our Power, what fore of Perfonswe
will be; and we may make our felves fuch as we chode,
and refolve to be, by the native Liberty of our Minds, ind
by having Virtue and Vice properly and entirely the Obe&
of our own Choice. And betfides this, God hath. appoiited
-over Men particular Guardian Spirits, which nicely obfrve
the fmalfeft Actions, and are exact in fuch Retributions as
each Man’s Behaviour deferves.
_ tow
ἤν;
Soli}
os
232 | Ertctrerus’s Morals
Now in this, the Care of God differs from that of Men;
That His Providence did not fatisfie itfelf, to conftitute
Things in good Order at the beginning, and afterwards dif-
penfe with any farther Concern about them; nor doth it ceafe
from ating, as the Law-giver in the State was fuppos’d to
do. For indeed, properly fpeaking, the Goodnefs of God
knows no Beginning; nor is there any time when it was
not, and when it did not communicate itfelf, and make all
Things good from its own exuberant Fulnefs. Nor are we
to fuppofe, that this Infpe€tion requires any laborious atten-
dance, as if God were fometimes prefent, and fometimes
abfent ; for thefe are fuch Confinements, as Bodies and Mat-
ter-only are fubje& to; whereas He is prefent at all times,
in all places, with, and above, all Things. And the Pro-
vidence of this mighty Being, thus Eternal and omnipre-
fent, and infinitely Good, finds no difficulty in expanding
itfelf, and imparting its Influences to every Creature, asthe .
Dignity of their Nature, and the Deferts of each Individu-
al, require. And as the Sun fheds his Rays of Light upon
the whole World, and every thing partakes of them with
different EtfeQs: Some things are made capable of feeing,
others of being feen; Some bloffom and bud, others are
impregnated and multiply ; Some thew black tothe Eye, and
others white; Some grow ftiff and hard, others are melted
and foftned; and all this by the fame Light and the fame
Heat, adapting itfelf to the feveral Capacities and Difpofi-
tions of the Things upon which it falls: and that too, with-
‘out any Trouble to the Sun, or the leaft Interruption to
hi} Happinefs: So the Goodnefs of GOD, whofe Gift
and Workmanfhip that very Sunis, doth moft affuredly know
hew to impart itfelf to every Creature, in fuch proportions,
asthe Neceflities of each require, or the Condition of its
Niture will admit, much more eafily, than any Creature of
tht moft general Influence can doit. And that, without
Criating any Perplexity to Almighty G OD, or giving the
lejft difturbance to his Blifs, by foextenfiveaCare. For God
is iot like the Works of Nature, which are aéted upon at
the fame time they a&, and fo fpend themfelves; nor is his
Gceodnefs any acquir’d Perfe@ion, that it fhould tire and
beexhaufted, but it is natural and unbounded. Nor is he
colfin’d to one fingle Action at a time, (as we find our feeble
Mads are) that he fhould not be able to comprehend or ma-
nag fo great a variety of Affairs, and yet enjoy Himfelf in
theContemplation of that Perfe& and Supreme Good, which
6
is
with SimpLicius’s Comment. 233
RSNA SE
is infinitely more excellent, and above the World. For, if
when the Soul of Man aipires to Perfe€tion, and foars up
to God, it be faid to converfe and dwell on high, and to
difpofe and govern the World ; How much more juft and
eafie is it to believe, That the Author and Iniufer of that
Soul muft needs, without any manner of difficulty or di-
ftraction, guide and govern that Univerfe, which himfelf
has form’d.
Now, as to that Obje&tion of the amazing Inequality in
the Diftribution of the Things of this World, I can never
yield, That the Profperity of 111 Men, or the Afidtions of
the Good, are of ftrength fufficient to fhake our Belief of
Providence. For, in the firft place, we wholly miftake the
matter; and it is avery wrong Notion which generally pre-
vails, Of Wicked Men being happy, and Good Men mi-
ferable. If this obtain {till with my Readers, it is to very
little purpofe, that fuch pains have been taken to prove that
Neceffary Truth, That the Good Man is one, who places
all humane Happinefs and Mifery in the Freedom of his
own Mind, and the directing this aright to fuch Obje@s, as
fall within the compafs of his own Power and Choice; and,
That he who does fo, can never be difappointed in his De-
fires, nor opprefs’d by his Fears; and confequently can ne-
ver have any Unhappinefs befal him. For the Objeétors
themfelves agree with us in the Notion of Evil, That it is
the Difappointment of fome Defire, or the Falling into
fomething that we fear. Sothat, even according to their
own Rule, the Good Man can never be wretched, or lie
under any misfortune which can make him unhappy, confi-
der’d as a Man.
Onthe other fide, All men agretin their Notions of Wick-
ed Men, that they pervert the Courfe and Defign of Nature,
and do not live as becomes Men. They forget the Privilege
God hath giventhem, and neglect the Ufe and Improvement
of that Liberty, which is the diftinguifhing Character and Pre-
rogative of Humane Nature; They look for Happinefs from
external Advantages, fuch as Health, and Riches, and Honour,
and Power, and High Birth, and fenfual Enjoyments, andthe
like; and the want of thefe they efteem Mitfery: for which
Reafon, all their defires.are fix’dupon thefe imaginary Good
Things, andall their Fearsand Averfions upon thecontrary
EvilOnes. Nowit is not poffible for thefe outward Things
always to anfwer a man’s Wifhes and Endeavours ; Difap-
pointed Expectations, and furprifing Calamities there ἘΠῚ
4 ΤᾺΝ an
234 ΕΡΙΟΤΈτυ 55. Morals
and will be; and therefore thefe men cannot but be ααμμν δα,
py, by the Confeffion of the Obje&tors themfelves. And /
the very Perfons concern’d, if they would but give them-
felves leave to be ferious, and refle@ cooly and impartially
upon the many Accidents of this kind which difquiet them,
muft needs be driven toa fenfe and acknowledgment of their
own Mifery.
But, if this do not fatisfie, becaufe they are plainly prof!
perous, and fucceed above other men, in the Advantages and’
Interetts of the World ; I fhall make no fcruple to affirm,
That thefe Succeffes do but add to their Unhappinefs. For
they only put them upon greater Extravagancies, and are fo
many frefh Temptations to commit more Violence, and caft
4 greater Blemifh upon Humane Nature. And this, I think,
muft be admitted for an unconteftable Truth, That what-
ever is contrary to Nature and Duty, mutt of ieee be
both a Fault, and a Misfortune.
_ Now becaufe our Auditors are to be dealtwaihy: not only
bydry Demonftrations, but by moving and gentle Perfua-
fions, I fhall endeavour to win them over to this Opinion,
of the oaly feeming Good and Evil ia all external Accidents.
and Advantages, by reminding them of what was faid be-
fore ; that the things we commonly call Evil, are not pro-
perly fo, notwithftanding the Troubles and Uneafineffes.at-
tending them ; and that what paffes for Good in the Opi-
nion of the World, is very far from being fuch, notwith-
ftanding all its outward Gaities and deluding Appearances.
Sometimes what we call Evils, are made ufe of to excel-
Jent purpofes ; they are either fharp Remedies to cure ἃ di-
ftemper’d Mind, or wholefome Trials to exercife a found
Virtue. And what weterm Good Things, are difpofed fo,
as to illuftrate the Juftice of God; and are proportioned to
the prefent Occafions, or to the Deferts, of the Perfons on
whom they are beftowed, and from whom they are taken a-
way. ‘Thus Riches are given to a wife and good man, both
for his own eafe and comfortable Enjoyment, and alfoto fur-
nifh him with larger Abilities of doing good, and Opportuni-
ties to exercife a generous and charitable Difpofition. But the
very fame Things to the vicious man are fent as a.Curfe,
and a Punifhment: For the covetous and worldly man
makes his Life a perpetual Drudgery and Toil ; he enflaves
himfelf to Anxiety, and Anguifh, and continual Fear; and
never enjoys the Plenty he hath taken fuch pains to procure.
And this indeedis a moft juft and a moft ingenious Revenge
upon
-
«ἢ SiMPLictius’s Comment. 235
_ upon them, that they fhould thus prove their own Tormen-
ters.
On the other hand, the Luxurious and Extravagant are
poorer than the very Beggars in the Streets. To many of
thefe their Riches are their Ruin, by tempting them to Ex-
ceffes, and running them upon dangerous and deftructive
enries, So that all the Advantage they make of them, is
to grow the worte, and fet themfelves farther off from
sall duch Improvements, and fuch a Converfation, as befits
the Dignity of Humane Nature, and is agreeable to the Di-
ctates of Reafon. Thus Health and Power, and Prefer-
ments, very often turn to the Prejudice of vicious Men.
And thefe are fent, partly in vengeance to fcourge them for
their paft Follies, and partly as Chaftifements to reduce
them; that when they have given a Swing totheir Appetites,
and gorg’d themfelves with criminal Pleafures, they may ct
lait grow fick of them, throw off their 11 Humours, and be-
come reform’d Men. Forthe Tendernefs of that Good Pro-
vidence, which is fo afliduous in promoting the True Hap-
pinefs of Souls, is not fo much to reftraia us from the grofs
and outward acts of Sin, and from grat’fying our Appetites,
by Fear or any other fach curbing Paffions which ufeto give
check to them; but rather to fubdue the Appetite itfelf, and
utterly waft and deftroy all the evil Habits, that had gain’d up-
onus by the frequent indulging of it before. The Subftance
of what I have hinted here, was difcours’d more largely in
fome foregoing Chapters, (Ch. XIII. and XXXIV.) and
there, if the Reader think fit, he may refrefh his Memory.
And fo much for my Second Argument, in reply to thofe
who deny a Providence, and would make us believe, that
GOD hath no Hand at all in the Government and Difpofal
of things here below.
And now as the old Proverb hath it, Te * Third Cup to
Jove, and then we have done ; for there remains only One Ob-
jection moreto be refuted; which, though it own both God
and his Providence, yet does not profefs itfelf fatisfied with
the Juftice of either, in the Government of the World.
They reprefent Almighty God, as one capable of being
perverted and byafled with Gifts and Oblations. And in-
deed it is a modern, and but too vulgar Imagination, that
the moft greedy Extortioner, amd the mercilefs Oppreffor,
ee,
*Thisis an Expreffion taken from the Cuftom of the Olympick Entertainments, and o-
ther piblick Feafis, See Exafm, Adag, avd Pindar, thm. Hymn, 6.
Ρ ό ἶ Who
τ
236 Epicretus’s Morals
who minds nothing but his own Intereft, and makes, or re- _
gards, no difference between Right and Wrong, if hedo but
expend a very incontiderable part of his ill-gotten Wealth up-
on pious Ufes; and diftribute a piece of money among thofe
who pretend it is their Bufinefs to addrefs to the Gods, and
that they have a fecret Faculty of inclining their Favour;
then all fhall be well; they may perfift in their Wickednefs
fecurely, and fhall never be called to account for it. And
fome indeed there are, who both entertain thefe Opinions”
without any Judgment, and declare without any due Cau-
tion, that they think ic no Reflexion upon the Goodnefs of
God, that he fhould connive at the Wicknefs of Men and
pafs it by patiently.
What Anfwer thal] we find now torefute this Error? The
beft courfe will be to take it in pieces; and, becaufe it refers
both tothe Perfonthat does, and to him that receives the In-
jury, to examine of what Confequence this Remiffion and
Indulgence would beto both, and how each of them are af-
feéted and concerned in it. ;
Now, if it be for the Intereft and real Advantage of the
wicked and unjuft Perfon, to have his vicious Courfés con-
nived at, and that no Punifhment at all thould be infli@ed
for them; then it is poflible God may remit and wink at
them, becaufe it is moft certain, that every good thing, of
what kind foever it be, is derived down from that Original
Source of all Goodnefs, upon his Creatures here below.
But if this would really be the worft and moft deftrudtive of
all Evils, to have their Wickedne({s thus affifted and encou-
raged; if Impunity wou'd only harden them in Vice, and
render them but fo much more bold and unreclaimable ;
then how can we admit fo abfurd athought, asthat God thould
become acceffary to allthis Mifchicf, who hath been fo large
ly and clearly proved, to have no hand at all in bringing
any of our Evils upon us? Sie
Now Injuttice, and Avarice, and Intemperance, and In-
juries, and Extravagancies of al) forts, are but fo many Cor-
ruptions and Indifpofitions of the Mind; they are contrary
to Nature, and no better than the Difeafes and Scandals, as
well as the Vices, of Mankind. If God therefore contri-
bute to the growth of thefe Diftempers, if he add to their
Malignity, and let them go on till they are paft all Cure ;
the Mifery and Corruption will be charged upon him. But
if Prefents and Bribes prevail upon him to do fo; thisis fome-
thing more vile and mercenary , than even the ordinary fo 3
ο
"
with Simpxicius’s Comment. 237
of Men, whocan boaft of no remarkable Virtue, will ftoop
to. For, Who of a moderate Underftanding, and com-
mon Honefty, will fuffer his Charge to perith for Hire? Will
any tolerabie Phyfician, when he finds his Patient furfeited,
for the fake of a good Fee, or the Interceffion either of his
Friends, or himfelf, permit him to eat and drink freely of
thofe very things which brought the Diftemper? nay, which
is more, Will he not only permit, but procure them, and
affift the fick perfon in that which muft prove his certain Ru-
in ? So farfromit, that if he at allanfwer the Charaéter and
Duty of his Profeffion, he will let nothing divert him from
the moft ungrateful Remedies, and painful Applications,
when the State of the Diftemper requires them. Since then
the angry Juftice of God, and the avenging Difpenfations of
Providence, have been fo fully fhewn, to carryin them the
Nature and Defign of Medicines, to diftempered Mankind ;
how can we fuppofethis great Phyficianof Souls, lefscare-~
ful of our Recovery, than we think our felves obliged to be
to one another ?
But the Perfons, who are opprefs’d by Injuftice, are no
lefs the Obje&t of his Providence, than thofe who commie
it; and therefore we fhall do wellto examine a little how
this eafinefs to wicked Men, and this affifting and encourag-
ing their Villanies, for the fake of their Oblations, can be
reconciled with his Tendernefs and Care for the innocent
Sufferers. What Opinion muft we needs have of that Ge-
neral, who would fuffer himfelf to be corrupted by the E-
nemy, and deliver up his Camp and whole Army for Re-
ward? Or what Shepherd would be fo treacherous to his
Flock ὃ Shepherd did I fay? nay, What Shepherd’s Curs,
when they have recovered a part of their Flock from the
Wolves, will fit down contentedly, and fee the reft devour-
ed ὃ And then fure this part of the Argument needs no far-
ther Confutation, than onlyto reflect, what monftrous Im-
piety that Opinion is guilty of, which taxes God with fuch
Infidelity, and Bafenefs to his Charge, as not Men only,
but even brute Beafts, difdain and abhor.
Indeed if we confider the thing only in the general, itis
moft irrational to conceive, that the Offerings of wicked
Men fhould ever prevail upon God, or incline him to be
propitious at all. Tis true, he gracioufly accepts thofe of
the Pious and Upright: Not for any refpeét to the Gifts them-
felves, Gr any occafion he hath for them; but for the fake’
of the Votaries, who, when they thus apply, defire that,
not
ε "ςτὸ a EIEN 8 ey at AE Si A A nn pao ie lad - μυῃ ο΄.
238. Ep1ctretus’s Morals
not only their Minds, but their Eftates, and all they poflefs,
may be confecrated to his Ufe and Service. There is like=:
wife no dgubt to be made, but the matter may be fo order-"
ed, as even to render the Gifts and Prayers of wicked men
acceptable to him; that is, provided they come with a pur-
pofe of growing better, and beg to be reformed by his Ρα-
nifhments, and be ready to fubmit to the Methods of theif
Cure. Butif the fecret and true Intent of their Devotions
be only to avert his Judgments, and to confirm themfelves
in Vice, itis moft abfurd to fuppofe, they can ever be well
received upon thefe Terms. For, though there were no
Guilt to be laid to their Charge, yet this alone were fuffici-
ent to render them abominable in the Sight of God, That
they fuppofe him a Bafe and a Mercenary Being, and hope
by Bribery to foften his provoked Juftice, ἀπά τὸ buy off their
own Punifhment. :
And now lexpeét to have the Queftion put, From whence
this Notion of God, pardoning mens Sins, came to’be fo u-
niverfaily received; and what Foundation there is for fay-
ing, and believing, as almoft every body does, That Prayers,
and Alms, and the like, havea power to make God flexible
and propitious. For fure the World hath not taken all this
upon Truft; and yet they are much to blame, to lay that
ftrefs they do upon it, and to propagate this Opinion with
fo much Confidence, if it be unfate, and impious to be be-
lieved, that God forgives wicked Men, and pafles by their
Offences, without punifhing them, as they have deferved.
In order to fatisty this Doubt, we mutt obferve, That,
where men are duly fenfible of their Faults, and heartily pe-
nitent for them, thefe things contribute very much to their
Converfion, as being decent and proper T’eftimonies of a
fincere Repentance. The Bending of the Knees, and Bo-
dily Proftrations, exprefs the Sorrows and Submiffions of a
dejected Soul ; and the Offering up their Goods, or lay-
ing them out to Pious and Charitable Purpofes, fuch as
God peculiarly regards and delights in, proclaims, how en-
tirely their Minds, and Perfons,-and all they have.are de-
voted to Him. ᾿ peer is
For when weare told, That our Sins turn God’s Face a-
way from us, That he is angry at them, and leaves, or for-
fakes us, upon the Provocation they give him; Thefe Ex-
preflions muft not be takenin a {tri and literal Senfe. They -
{peak the Paflions and Infirmities of Creatures, fuch as-car=
ry no Congruity with the Divine Nature, and its immutable —
Happinels
ἊΣ
with StmpLicius’s Comment. 239
᾿
Happinefs and PerfeGtions. But the Truth is, we deprave
and debafe ourfelves, by forfaking the Diétates of Nature
and Reafon; we deface the Image of the Divinity in out
‘Souls, and by our Wickednefs and Folly, fall off, and with-
draw ourfelves from him. Not that wecan run away from
that watchful Eye to which all things are prefent; but we
change the manner of its Influences upon us, and expofe
ourfelves toadifferent fort of Treatment; for now we have
brought a Difeafe upon our Souls, and made Severity and a
eharhher Providence neceffary for our Cure.
But, when we recover the foundnefs and perfection of
our Nature, and make nearer Approaches to God, by reftor-
ing that Image and Charatter of his Divinity in us, which
-confifts in the imitation of his Juftice, and Holinefs, and
Wifdom; we then return, and are admitted to a more ea-
fieAccefs. We renew our Acquaintance, and contrac a.
fort of frefh Affinity with him. Atid this Return of Ours
to God, we often exprefs in fuch Terms, as if it were His
Returnto us ; Juft as men at Sea, who when their Cable is
faftned to a Rock, while they draw themfelves and their
‘Veffel to the Rock, are fo idle as toimagine, that they draw
the Rockto Them. And thisis ounCafe; Repentance, and
eer orien, and Works of Piety and Charity, anfwer ex-
ΔΕ. to that Cable: For thefe things are the Inftruments of
our Converfion, and the beft Proofs of its being unaffected
and real: When we cherifh and fupport, either the Perfons
_themfelves who have fuffered by our Oppreffion, or our In-.
folence, or our Slanders; Or, if that cannot be, make Sa-
tisfaction to their Families, and relieve thofe that are in ne-
ceffity ; When we hate Injuftice, When we decline the Con-
-verfation of naughty Men, and become the Companions
and Friends of the Wife and Virtuous; and when we are -
Ἷ
full of Indignation againft ourfelves, and content to turn our
a
own Punifhers. And if we would be throughly reformed
indeed, we mutt perfevere in this method, not fuffer our Re-
folutions to be fickle-and uncertain, or any Intermiffions
tocool our zeal; till we have ated a fufficient Reyenge up-
on ourfelves, and perfected the Defign of our Amendment.
And there is not, there cannot be, any other certain Tetfti-
mony of a fincere and perfe& Repentance, but only this One,
That of forfaking our Sins, anddoing fo no more. Nay,-1
-muftadd too, Thenot allowing ourfelvesin any [εἴς or low-
3 er degrees of Guilt, or complying with the Temptations and
_ Tendencies toward them. For inthis Cafe we mult behave
U ourfelves
240. | Epirererus’s Morals —
ourfelves like Sailors, who fteer their Courfe beyond th© —
Point they would make, and bear dpwn towards One fide,
when they would crofs over to the Other. |
Now as to the Efficacy of Repentance, whether it be ir
Meritand Power enough to reftore the Soul to its Primitive
Purity ; this, 1 think, can admit of no Difpute, when it is
confidered, That Almighty God does in all his Difpenfati-
ons propofe it as his End, and al ways cleanfeand reform us
by this Means. For what other account can be given of all
the Punifhments, and thofe dire Effe&s of his Vengeance up-
otrus, bothin this, and the next World, but only, that they
are defigned to change the Soul, by the Suffering and Tor-
tures inflidted upon it; that a Senfe of her own Wretched-
nefs may provoke her to a juft Deteftation of the Vices that —
were the wicked Caufe of it; and may inflame her withamore —
fervent Love, and impatient Defire of Virtue? There is in-
deed fomething very inftructing in Affliction, and a ftrange
Aptnefs in the rational Soul, to harken to it, and be taught —
by it. Bat a Man is never fo well difpofed to learn, nor
makes fuch quick and fure Progrefs, as when he exercifes
this Difcipline upon himfelf. Becaufe then the very Punifh-
ment is voluntary, and the Improvement is much more like-
ly to be fo. Andindeed, confidering that Pleafureand fen-
fua] Profpe&ts tempt Men to offend ; ; the Ruleof curing Di-
feafes by their Contraries, makes Sorrow and Pain abfolutely |
necefiary, to remove this ’Sicknefs of the Mind, and expel the
Humours which brought it upon-us. And Repentance wants
no Qualifications of this kind; for the truly penicent Perfon
chaflifes himfelf with the Scourge of a guilty Confcience; |
and feels fuch bitter Remorfe, and Anguifh of Heart, as are
infinitely fharp and flinging, and more inconfolable, than
any Smart or bodily Pain can poffibly be.
Thus much in oppofition to the Third ObjeGion againft
God and Religion, whichis indeed the worft and moft impi- |
ous of all che Three. For it were a much more excufable |
Error, to denya Gad and a Providence, than to allow both
thefe, and yet advance tuch Incongruous Notions concern-—
ing him. Better it were for Us and Him both, that he had
no Being, and no Concern in governing the World at all,
than that he fhould be guilty of fo much Treachery and Bafe-
nefs, as this Objection lays to his Charge: For this is to be |
Evil, and that is much worfe than nor to be at all. Therea+)
fon is evident, becaufe Goodnefs and Happinefs is Superiours
to Exiftence. It is the Principle of Being, the Cauic trom §
whence®
a
Bi with Stmericriuss Comment. 24%
_-whenceall things derive it, and the very End for which they
have it. For Exiftence itfelf is what no Man would defire,
but merely upon the Apprehenfion of its being Good; ἀπά
therefore, whenever we apprehend ourfelves in Evil Circum-
ftances, we naturally wifh not to beatall. ~ Ὁ
If I have here again enlarg’d beyond the juft Bounds of a
Commentary, the Importance of the Argument will juftifie
meinit. For, in Truth, a regular and well grounded De-
votion towards God, Juft and. Becoming Apprehenfions,
concerning the Perfections of his Nature, the Certainty 0
his Providence, and the Juftice and Goodnefs of all his
Proceedings with Mankind; and, confequent to fuch a Pers
-fuafion, a fubmiffive refigned Temper, and eafie Acquief-
cence under all his Difpenfations, as the Effets of a moft
excellent Wifdom, and fuch as are always beft for us; Thefe
are the Sum of all human Accomplifhments, the Founda-
tion and the Perfection, the Firft and the Laft Step of all
‘Moral, and all Intelle€&tual Virtue.” For, tho’ the Soul of
“Man be (’tis confefs'd) a Free Agent, and proceed upon
Internal Principles of Good and Evil; yet ftill this Liberty
and Power of determining herfelf was the particular Favour
and Gift of God ; and therefore, while fhe holds faft by the
Root, fhe lives and improves, and attains the Perfection
God made her capable of. But when fhe feparates herfelf,
and, as it were, difengages, and tears herfelf off; fhe grows
barren, and withers, and putrifies, till fhe return, and be
united to the Root again, and fo recover her Life and Per-
_fe&tion once more. Now nothing, but a firm and a vigo-~
rous Senfe of thefe Three Points we have been explaining ,
can ever prevail upon the Soul to endeavour fuch a Refto-
ration. For how is it poffible'to apply to God, when we
do not believe that he is? Or what Encouragement is the
belief of his Exiftence, without a Perfuafion, that he is con-
cerned for us, and takes notice of us? Leaft of all fhould
we addrefs to a Being, who does infpeé& and govern our
_ Affairs, if we were poffefs’d with an Opinion, That all
ΟΠ that Care and Infpection were direéted to Evil and Mali-
_ cious Purpofes, and that he waited over us only for Mife~
"ry and Mifchief. ἃ ,
αν
Ἶ
aa
Ura CHAP;
5,42... . Epr1ceretus’s Morals
CURA P... XXODSE:
W HEN you confult the Oracle, remeunioah tis
only the Event that you are ignorant of, and
come to be inftruéted in. But, though you do not
know what that fhall be particularly, yet Philofo-
phy (if you have any) hath already taught you, of
what Quality and Confequence it fhall prove το οι τὺ
For you are fatisfied before-hand, That if it be any _
of the Things out of our own Power, it mutt
needs be indifferent in its own Nature, and neither
good nor bad of itfelf. Therefore, when thefe Oc-
cafions call you abroad, leave all your Hopes and
Fears behind you; and do not approach the Pro-
phet with fuch anxious Concern, as if you were to
hear your Doom from his Mouth; but behave your-
felf as becomes a Man fully perfuaded, That no ex-
ternal Accident is any thing to You; and that no-
thing can poflibly happen, which may not, by
good Management, be converted to your Advan-
tage, though all the World fhould endeavour to
obftruct it. When therefore you addrefs to the
Gods, come boldly, as one who asks their Advice;
and withal, when they have given ir, be all Com-
pliance; for confider, whofe Counfel you have
ask’d, and how impious a Difrefpeét it will be, not
to follow it. When therefore you apply yourfelf.
to the Oracle, obferve Socrates his Rule, To ask
no Queftions, but what the Event is the only mate-
rial Confideration to be cleared in; They fhould be
Matters of great Importance and Difficulty, and
fuch as are not capable of Refolution, by Reafon, or
Art, or any humane Methods. But if you are in
difpute, whether you ought to affift your Friend ,
in diftrefs, and expofe your Perfon for the Detence
of your Country 5 thefe are not Queftions fit to be.
put,
i i ene ne ee a RE ERTS SE OR SERRE EE EE DEERE SS + EE RE ARES
ἡ -withSimpricius’s Comment. 243
ut, becaufe they anfwer themfelves: For, though
the Sacrifice be never fo inaufpicious, though it
ο΄ fhould portend Flight or Banifhment, lofs of Limbs,
or lof of Lifes yet ftill Reafon and Duty will tell
you, That, indefpight of all thefe Hazards, you
muft not defert thofe that have a right to your
Service and Affiftance. In this cafe you need no
other Determination than that memorable one,
which pollo gave fo long fince, when he thruft
that Wretch out of his Temple, who fuffered his
Friend to perifh for want of Help.
COMMENT.
AA Fter having given Direétions for the underftanding and
‘due difcharge ofour Duty to one another, and towards
God; the next thing to be done, was to inform us, What
we owe to our Selves. But, before this could be methodi-
cally undertaken, it was neceflary to take notice of a fort
of mix’d Duty, which refpeéts both God and ourfelves; and
this arifes from Divination, or the confulting of Oracles.
To this purpofe he divides his Difcourfe into Three Parts,
and tells us, upon What Occafions we ought to contult
them, with What Difpofition it fhould be done, and What
ufe is to be made of their Determinations.
He begins with the Second of thefe, thinking it perhaps
the Firft, both in Confequence, and in Order of Nature;
and tells us, That the Mind fhould preferve fuch a firm and
even Temper upon thefe Occafions, as neither to bring any
Defires, nor any Averfions along with it: For at this rate
_ it would be impoffible to;come without great anxiety and
diforder. If our Defires are eager, we fhall be afraid of hear-
ing that what we with will notcometopafs; andif our Aver-
fions are violent, we fhall be in no lefs concern to be told,
That what we fear moft, fhall certainly happen to us. But
the Queftion is, What courfe we fhall take, to throw off
thefe Paflions, and poffefs ourfelves with that Indifference.
To This he replies, That the Confideration of thofe Things
we enquire about, will be able to effeét it: For we need
only reflect, That they are external Accidents, and Things
_putofour Power; for no man is fo fenfelefs, asto-confult an
| U 3 iN Oracle
244 |. Erictetus’s Morals
Oracle upon the Events of thofe, which his own.Cheice —
muft determine. Who ever enquired ata Shrine, Whether —
he ought to regulate his Inclinations and Averfions, to re- —
duce them within juft bounds, or ἴὸ χ them upon fic and
Worthy Objects? The Queries ufually put, are quite of ano-—
ther ftrain; Whether a Voyage thall be profperous? Whe-
ther it be advifable to marry? Whether the purchafing fuch
a parcel of Land would turn to good account? And thefe,
being fuch things, as we ourfelves are not made Mafters of
by Nature, *tis plain our Defires and our Averfions ought |
not to have any concern in the Divination. The only thing |
we want to be fatisfied in, is fome particular Event. This
‘is the Soothfayer’s Work, and. out of the compafs of our
own Knowledge: But the Quality of that Event we know
as well ashe. For Philofophy hath aflured us, That none
of thofe matters, which are out of our own power, can be
in themfelves good or evil; and by confequence none of
them proper Objeéts of our Inclination or Avertion.
Befides, They that are skill’d in thefe Myfteries, have a
Notion, That an extreme Paffion and Concern in the Per-
fon applying to the Oracle, difturbs the whole method’of
Divination, and confounds the Omen. .So that this Calm-
nefs will be of advantage in that refpec&t alfo; And you will
efcape all immoderate {lititude, when you remember, that, be
the Accident whatever it will, you have it ftill in your power
to convert it to your own Benefit; and the more difaftrous,
fo much the more beneficial ftill may a prudent manage- |
ment render it to you: And therefore come boldly (fays he)
and caft afide vain Fears, and unnecefiary Scruples, whez
you profess to ask Counfel of the Gods. . δ ἡ
From that Expreffion, he takes occafion to inform Men,. °
what is their Duty to the Gods in thefe Cafes; namely, That
when we haveasked their Advice, we fhould be fure to take
it: For he that confults God *himfelf, and yet refufes to
follow his Advice; Whom will that Man be direéted by?
And indeed, there is not any more probable or more fre-
quent ground for our Stiffnefs and Ditobedience, than the
Prepoffeffions we lie under, and the ftrong Byafs of our
own Inclinations and Averfions. So that from henee we
have difcovered one advantage more of approaching the Deity
with a difpaffionate and unprejudiced Mind: For this will
not only deliver us from all thofe Anxieties and Fears, fo
jnconvenient and fo hazardous upon fuch occafions; but it
will alfo difpofe us exceedingly to a ready ae
an
with StmpLiciuss Comment. 245
and leave us free to refign ourfelves entirely , to be govern-
ed by the Will and Directions of God. |
_ The Next Enquiry he goes upon, concerns thofe things,
which are the proper Objeéts of Divination ; and thefe he de-
clares to be fuch only, whofe End is perfeétly dark and un-
- known: Where nothing but the Event itfelf can give us any
light; things fo purely accidental, that no humane Prudence,
_ no Rules of any particular Art, no helps of Experience and
long Obfervation, can enable us to pronounce what they
fhall be.» >
___ Thus much is agreeable to Reafon and common Senfe.
_ Forno body confults an Oracle, whether it be fit for a Man
_ to Eat, or Drink, or Sleep, becaufe Nature teaches us the
-neceflity of thefe Refrefhments, and we cannot poflibly fub-
ΠΕ without them. Nor, whether it be advifable for a Man
80 improve in Wifdom, and lead a virtuous Lfe; for every
_ wile and good Man fees and feels the Advantage of doing
fo. Nor does he defire the Prophet to refolve him, what
fort of Houfe he fhall build; becaufe this is the Bufinefs. of
a Surveyor, and his Schemes and Models are drawn by Rule
and Art. Nor does the Farmer defire to be fatisfied, whe-
ther he fhould fow his Corn, or not; for this is a thing ab-
folutely neceffary to be done. But he may perhaps enquire,
what Seafon, or what parcel of Land, or what fort of
Grain, and which Plants will turn to beft account; upona
fuppofal (till, (1 mean) that Experience, or fome other na-
tural Caufes , have not inftruéted him in thefe things before.
Or a Man may reafonably enough ask, if it be proper to
undertake fuch a Voyage, efpecially if the Seafon of the
Year, or any other Circumftances, contribute to the ren-
dring ic hazardous for him.
Nor would it be proper to enquire, whether one fhould
go abroad into'the Market, or to We/tmmfter-Hall, or walk
--aturn into the Fields: For tho’ ic betrue, that even thefe
trivial Undertakings are fometimes attended with very {trange
and very difmal Confequences; yet generally {peaking, they
fall out juft as we intend, and-defire they: fhould. And
swhere there is a very high Probability, and fuch as is moft
‘commonly anfwered by the Event, there all Divination is
needlefs. If it were not{o, nothitig in the World could be ex-
'empt fromit; for the beft concluding Reaton, and the fureft
Rules of Art, do not always fucceed right. Nature fome-
- times works out of her common courfe, and Choice does
frequently miftake, and fall fhort of what is defigned. But
RAs U 4 {till
246 Epicretus’s Morals |
ftill there is no difficulty worthy an Oracle in thefe matters ;
becaufe we reft fatisfied in great Probabilities, and are not be
. difturbed at the few, the very few Exceptions to the contrary.
Otherwife we fhall be over-run with idle Whimfies, and
fuperftitious Fears; fuch as improve every little Accident -
into fomewhat terrible and ominous, and would make us |
utterly unactive, and afraid ever to attempt any thing fo long ©
as we live. ᾿
But here arifes a Query worth a little confideration. It is,
Whether the confulting of Oracles concerning matters with-
in Our own power be wholly difallowed: As for inftance; —
What Opinion we ought to entertain of theSoul: Whether |
it be mortal or immortal; And, Whether we fhould apply
ourfelves to fuch a particular Mafter or not: And the Rea- ©
fon of this doubt is, Becaufe feveral of the Ancients feem —
to have confulted the Gods about fome Difficulties in Na-
ture; and yet themaking fuch or fuch aJudgment of Things
is our own proper AG; and confeffed to be one of thofe
Things which come within the compafs of our Will.
Now I muft needs fay, with Submiffion, That whatever
is attainable by Reafon and Logical Demonftration, ought
to be learn’d that way. For this will give us a clear and
undoubted perception, and the difcoyery of Effeéts from their
Caufes is the true fcientifical Knowledge. It leaves no
Doubt behind, but fatisfies ourfelves, and enables us to in-
ftruét and convince others. An affurance from Divine Te-
ftimony, that the Soul is immortal, may give us a firm be- ©
lief of the thing, and we fhould do ill, and unreafonably, in
refufing Credit to fuch a Teftimony; but ftill this is only
Faith, and differs very much from Science. And if God
vouchfafe to communicate to any Man the Knowledge of
Natural Caufes by immediate Revelation; this is to be look’d
upon. as an extraordinary Favour, a fpecial Cafe, and fuch
as falls not under the common Rules of Divination, nor to
be depended upon from it. For the primary Talent, and
proper Object of this, is only to inftruét Men in fuch un-
certain Events of human Aé@tions, as no Art or Confidera-
tion can bring them to any certain Knowledge of. And, tho’
fome Perfons have addrefs’d to Oracles for Myfteries in Na-
ture; yet they were butfew who did fo ; and thofe, none of
the moft eminent Reputation for Philofophy neither; but
fuch as contented themfelves withcredible Teftimonies, and
chofe rather totake Things upon Truft, than to be at the trou- —
ble of attaining to a demonftrative Evidence, Whereas God
4
with Stmpxiiciuss Comment. 247
es a cer.
+ feems plainly to have defign’d This for the Soul’s own Work;
and by infufing into usa Principle of Liberty and Reafon, to
have left the Contemplation of our own Nature as one of
_ the Subje&s mott proper to employ our own Study and
Pains. And upon that account, both Epictetus, and Socra-
_ tes before him, feem tocondemn and forbid fuch Queftions,
as impertinent and fuperfluous; in regard that the Soul is
_ fufficiently qualified to make thofe Difcoveries by her own
Strength.
For the famereafon, you fee he difapproves of that Query,
_ Whether a Man ought to relieve his Friend in diftrets, or
_ -expofe his Perfonin defence of his Country. Becaufe right
_ Reafon cries out aloud, that thefe things muft bedone ; and
no Hazards can be fo formidable, as that the moft certain
profpeét of them fhould juftifie our neglecting to do fo. To
what purpofe then do we trouble the Gods, for that which
hath no difficulty in it; and where we mutt be loft to all
᾿ς fenfe, if we be not able to fatisfie ourfelves? And befides,
he gives usaninftance, wherein the Prophetick God declared
his Difpleafure, againft One who came to have this Scruple
refolved : For That, which our own Reafon will convince
usis fit and neceflary tobe done, we mutt fet about without
-more ado; and not raife idle Doubts, or frame frivolous
__Excufes, though we are fatisfied, that the performance of
τ would coft us our Fortunes, or our Lives. This may
feem a Hardfhip, but it is back’d with this invincible Argu-
ment, That Virtue is our own proper Good, and ought to
be dearer to us than our Bodies, or our Eftates; which in
comparifon of our Souls, bear buta diftant Relation to us.
_ After this Argument, intimating, That our Duty ought to
be difcharged, even at the expence of the greatelt Sufterings
and Dangers ; he introduces a God confirming this Opinion
by his-own practice, and expelling that Mifcreant out of his
Temple, who did not relieve his Friend, but fuffer’d him
to be murder’d, that he might fave himfelf. The Story in
fhort is thus. T’wo Perfons upon their Journey to Delphos,
were fet upon by Thieves; While One of thefe was no far-
ther folicitous than to make his own efcape, the Other was
killed. The Surviver continued his Travels; and when he
came to the Oracle, the God rejected his Addrefs, expell’d
him the Temple, and reproached his Cowardice and bafe
Defertion of his Friend, in this following manner; if
Do
248 . Epreretus’s Morals
eng
Do not, prefumptuous Wretch, thefe Rites profane,
Nor with polluted Gifts our Altars ftain: Uae
Nor prudent Fears, and threatning Fate pretend ;
Falfe to thy God, thy Howour, and thy Friend. .
Thefe claim thy Blood in any danger near, ἌΡΗ
And muft condemn that bafe and guilty Fear, ii ξ
Which of a Coward made a treach’rous Murderer. >
Henceforth dare to be juft and brave; for know,
He, that decknes to ward it, gives the Blow. |
Now tho’ it is plain, that this Perfon, would he never fo
fain, yet poffibly he might not have been able to fave his Fel-
Yow Traveller’s Life; yet that Uncertainty by no means dif-
penfed with him for not attempting it.. His Inclination and
Endeavour fhould not have been wanting ; tho’ that Relief
he intended had been never fo unfuccefsful; nay, tho’ ic had |
involv’d himfelf in the fame Fate. That then, which rendred
him unworthy to approach the Shrine of Apollo, was the
Difpofition of his Mind; which prevail’d upon himto betray
his Friend, and to facrifice a Life which he ought to have”
defended, in tendernefs'to That which he ought to. have ex-
pofed. ὲ ᾿
ν And that this is the true ftate of the Cafe, is no lefs evi-
dent from another Inftance of two Perfons, who were like-
wife befet with Thieves. Thefe had got one of them at an
Advantage; and whilft the other darts atthe Rogue, he mifs’d |
his Aim, and killed his own Friend. When he came to the
Oracle, he durft not approach, as having Blood upon him ;
but the God juftified his A&tion, cleared him of the Scruple
he'lay under, and gave him this following kind Invitation.
Approach, brave Man, the Gods are Fuft and Kind;
They only hate abafe and murd’rous Mind.
Thy flaughter’d Friend to Us for Fuftice cries,
And his expiring Groans have prerc’d the Skies =
Yet not for Vengeance, but Rewards they fue;
Rewards to Courage, and to Friendfhip due.
That Zeal, which Death and Danger did difdain,
A difobedient Weapon cannot ftain:
Spotle/s thy Hand, and gex’rous thy Defign, Ὁ
Lhe Guilt, mifguiding Fate’s, the Glory’s Thine.
Now,
Pee κέρμα,
(estan a anal Ei nal ἀῦμεις τευ EN REINER ak ERO δ ea
Now, if by the fhedding this Blood, hedid not only contra&
very Tragical, fo exceeding contrary to his Intention ; then
_ itisvery plain, that Virtues and Vices are ποῖ to be meafur-
᾿
better underftanding of our Author. Is, That we are to |
confider, what fort of Perfons thefe things are addreffed to.
Now thofe which I have laft @xplained, and feveral of thofe
which follow afterwards, are adapted particularly to'a‘mid-
dle fort of Men : Such as are neither utterly ignorant of Phi-
lofophy, norabfolutely Matters of it; but have applied them-
- felves to the Study of it for fome time, and made tolerable
advances towards Perfeétion, tho” they have not yet attain-
edtoit. And this is fufficiently intimated to us, by the fre-
quent repetition of thofe Words, (lf you have any Philofo-
phy) upon every occafion.
CURIA
Sage ig Ai) Edy Ack. while.
NOnfider with yourfelf ferionfly, what Figure
is moft fit for you to make in the World; and
then fix upon a Method and Rule in order hereun-
to; which be fure toobferve nicely, both at home
alone, and abroad in Company.
SHE HEE ESR AE Ege a BS SRE TO ASR Me a χε AARC Sane a aa a
; ; C‘H AP, XLI
i ET one of your Principal Rules be Silence ;
Bu and when you difcourfe, confine yourfelf to
fuch Subjects as-are neceffary, ‘and exprefs your fenfe
᾿ ν in
Si AOS MERLE,
250 Epictretus’s Morals
inas few Words as you can. But if an Opportu-"
nity happens, as fometimes perhaps it will, which
makes it feafonable for you to ftart the Difcourfe,
let it not be upon any of the common Topicks of
Talk, fuch as Plays, Horfe-Races, Fencers, Fafhi-
ons, Meats, Wines, or Entertainments; which the |
generality of the World ufe to make the Subject —
of their Converfation. But above all things take
care not to talk of other People ; neither fo as to ©
cenfure their Conduct, nor to δα lavifh in their —
Commendation, nor to make invidious Compari- —
fons between one and another. me
ddd hth ccna ddd daddy
CHAP. XLIL
HEN ever you happen into Company, where
W you have Authority and Influence enough
to do it, try to change the Difcourfe, and bring it
to becoming Subjects. But if you are among Peo-
ple of another Temper, and fuch as will not en-
dure Reftraint or Reproof, then hold your own
Tongue. | |
COMME NT.
HE Duties, owing toa Man’s felf, are the Next thing
to be learn’d; and thofe he begins to treat of here, ad-
vifing his Proficient, (for to fuch a one he writes now) to
make it his firft Care, to determine with himfelf, what Fi-
ure he intends to make, and what Part to play upon this
heatre of the World. And when once that is done, the
Next muft be, fo to model all his AGtions, as that they may
. confpire together fo the maintaining of that Character. This,
he tells him, mutt be kept conftantly in view, that his whole —
Behaviour may be level’d at it, both in publick and in Ἰὰς ἢ
; with SimpLicius’s Comment. 251
. By which I fuppofe he means, that a Man fhould be always
_confiftent with himfelf, and his Life all of a piece; not flu-
Quating and uncertain, like a troubled Sea, which is ever
_ ebbing and flowing, asthe Winds and Tide change. Forthe
Circumftances of Humane Life are no lefs fickle than thefe ;
and therefore we mutt fix ourfelves upon a good Bottom,
_ that we may be able to ftand the Shock and the Variety of
them. Socrates is faid to have attained to fo great ἃ Maftery
in this Point, that the Air of his Face was always the fame;
Neither Pleafure and Profperity could give him a more fe-
rene and gay Countenance ; nor any of thofe which the
~ World call Calamities, force him into a dejeéted and melan-
- choly one. , In fuch perfeé&t Agreement was he conftantly
with himfelf.
Now of all the Expedients proper for this Chara@ter, the
firft and moft confiderable, which he recommends, is a great
degree of Silence. For the defign of al] Moral Inftruétions
is chiefly to confine the Soul within her own proper Sphere,
which is the Improvement and Contemplation of herfelf, and
to draw her Thoughts and Affetions off from the World,
and the fenfual Appetites and Paffions, and an inordinate
Concern for the Body. And no One thing contributes more
tothe effecting of this, than Silence. The Pythagoreaus, you
fee, were fo fenfible of the Benefit, that they impofed a Qusz-
quennial Silence upon all that entred into their Difcipline;
and thought it the moft aufpicious Beginning they could poffi-
bly make. For, as the Senfes, when fix’d upon External Ob-
jects, do carry the Mind abroad with them; (a plain Inti-
mation whereof we have in that common Culftom of Men
fhutting their Eyes, when they would think with greater At-
tention; ) fo Speech of neceffity lets loofe the Mind, and
fets the Thoughts to roving ; and that much more indeed,
_than any outward and fenfible Object. For there the Soul,
- only cooperates withthe Organ, and bears it Company; but
here fhe is the firft and principal Mover, and diétates what
- the Tongueutters. And the only effe€tual cure for this Ram-
bling is to keep it at home, by holding ones Peace, and not
indulging it in all its Effufions.
Not that an Univerfal Silence is expeéted from us. No,
nor fo high a degree of it, as that the Pyzhagoreans required.
- Thefe are too exalted, and, asthe World goes, unattainable
Perfeétions. But he hath fuited himfelf to our Temper,
and Circumftances, and expeéts only fuch, as will confit
with our Andiriaisies, and the Affairs of the World: There-
fore
-΄--ὄἕ ὃ... ,
252 ~Epicretus’s Morals
fore he advifes us either to be filent, or at Jeaft to {peak no
oftner, and no more, than is neceflary ; as the anfwering to
whatis asked us, or thelike. And inmentioning this Word
Necefjary, he hath givenus avery compendious Hint, what
Subjects we ought to converfe upon. Such as {pecially tend
tothe promoting of Wifdom and Virtue, the improvement:
of the Mind, and the neceffities of the Animal Life. For
thefe being but very few, and having fomething of Subftance
and Bufinefs-in them, not loofe, and empty, and imperti-
nent things, do not confound the Mind with Levity, nor fill
it with wild and extravagant Ideas.
He hath alfo ordered us, even upon {πεῖς moft allowable
-Occafions, to be as brief as conveniently we can.. Forit is
very obfervable, That thofe who talk moft, generally under-
ftand leaft. There is nothing difpofes a Man to a multitude
of Words, fo much as flight and fuperficial Notions of the
Things he is talking of. He does not know what he fays,
and that is the Reafon he does*not know when to give over.
But one who goes to the bottom of Things, and hatha clear
and true Apprehenfion, will colle& himfelf into a little
Room, becaufe he will fay nothing but what is material, and
dire&tly to the Point in hand.
But if at any time an Occafion of enlarging offer itfelf,
by which I underftand Speaking, not only when you are pro-
voked to it, but beginning fome Difcourfe of yourown Ac-
~ cord; Tho’ there may be-a neceffity for difpenting with the
Latter of thefe Rules, and indulging yourfelf in a larger
proportion of Talk; yet be fure ftill to obferve the former,
and not go out of the Road 1 have dire@edyou. Let your
Subje&ts be fomething of Neceflity and Ufe; fomething
which may advance the Loveand Pra¢tice of Virtue, reform
the Paffions, or inftruct the Underftanding. Such as may
minifter Advice’ to Men in Difficulties, comfort them un-
der Afflictions, affift them in the fearch of the Truth, give
them a reverent Senfe of God, an awiul Admiration of his
Divine Excellencies, “honourable and becoming Opinions,
of his Providence, and of his readinefs to help and forward
all thofe in the praétice of Virtue, who are careful to ime
plore his Aid by Prayér. But as for the common ridiculous
Themes, fuch as Fencers, Horfe-Races, andthe like, or
Feafts, or Fafhions, Cookery and Wines; Who eats and
drinks, and dretles beft, and fuch Stuff ; fcorn the idle Prat-
tle. For thefe Subjects are apt to make a {trong Impreffion
- upon the Fancy, and fometimes get within a Man’s Affecti-
ons
with Simruicius’s Comment. 253
ons before he isaware; they give a Tin@ure to his Appetites,
and have a very unhappy Influence upon all his Converfa-
tion: And it is really.no unufual thing, for Peoples Man-
ners to be formed. by their Difcourfe.
_ But above all things, he gives us warning not to entertain
ourfelves, and our Company with talking of other People3;
neither fo as to call their Behaviour to Account, nor to be
_ profufe in their Praifes, nor free in making Comparifons be-
tween one Man and another. As, That this Lady is hand-
- fomer than That, or this Man Braver, or Honefter than
_ That, or thelike. ‘There is nothing more evident than that
this Topick- does, in a more than ordinary manner, divert
- the Soul from itfelf, and its own Bufinefs ; for it. makes
Men bufie, and curious, and impertinent, extremely inqui-
fitive, and troublefome, where they have nothing to do.
But why fhould this (you'll fay ) do fo more than any o-
ther? And. what can our talking of other Men have in it,
~ worfe than the Subjeéts mentioned before?
To.this we may reply, That the Perfon to whom the Ad-
vice is here direéted, being one, who hath made fome pro-
grefs in Philofophy, is not fo likely to entertain himfelf with
thofe trivial Matters, as with fomething that relates to Man-
‘kind, and their Affairs and Actions. It was therefore con-
venient to draw him off from thofe.things efpecially, which
his own Inclination would moft difpofe him to ; and hence
he adds that Emphatical Caution, But above all things.
Befides, tho’ it be true, That the fame Affections are ftir-
red in us by both Difcourfes alike, (for we are infentibly
drawn in, to love and hate Things and Men by talking of
them) yet thereis one peculiar Vice in Converfation, when
we pretend to give Characters of other People; which is,
That it ftrangely fwells one with Vanity, and Pride, and
Contempt of others. For whoever pretends to fit in Judg-
᾿ ment upon.the Conduét of Others, he does it it out of fome.
imagined Excellence in Himfelf, which he fanfies gives him
aRight to arraign his Neighbours. And befides, any miftake
in our Judgments of Men is more inexcufable, and of infi-
nitely worfe Confequence, than if we pronounce wrong in
‘thofe other trifling Matters; and therefore we fhould be ve-
ry {paring and tender in this Point.
_To prove the Importance of this Advice yet more; he
proceeds farther, and lays ἃ reftraint upon our Ears, as well
as our Tongue. And indeed, with good Reafon. For our
Imaginations, and inconvenient Defires are cherifhed, by hear-
6 ;
ing
πες i as τεφει εις οςς
ὄν αν τ
254 Epreretus’s Morals
ing the Subjeéts, which minifter fuch Thoughts, fpoken of
by others, as well as by {peaking of them ourfelves. And
befides, They, who give themfelves thefe indecent Liberties;
if fome perfon of Gravity and Authority fit by, and do not
check them, take advantage of his Patience, and grow per- —
fe&ly carelefs; they then think they have a.privilege of fay-
ing what they will, and no Shame, no Senfe of Decency
hath any longer power upon them. Therefore he direéts us,
to take all the prudent Methods we can, of putting a ftop to
fuch Difcourfe, and turning it to fome other more manly
and becoming Topick. But, becaufe this is not to be done
at all times, nor will every Company ‘bear it; therefore
(fays he) if you are fallen in among Men of ill Temper,
no Breeding, or vicious Converfation, (for thefe are the
Perfons he calls People of another Kidney ) yet at leaft dif-
countenance them by your Silence; and preferve yourfelf
from Infe&tion, by withdrawing from their Difcourfe into
your own Breatt.
ΓΤ 0: SS IS US ESS
CHAP. XLII.
1} but upon few Occafions; and when you
do, let it not be much, or loud.
COMME NT.
A the former General Precept of an even Temper,
and Uniform Behaviour; to which, he tells his Profi-
cient in Philofophy, nothing will more effectually conduce,
than a prudent Frugality in Difcourfe; the Next reftraint is
put upon the Exceffes of. Mirth, which are commonly €x-
preffed by Laughter. And perhaps by this of Joy, he might
defign, that we fhould underftand kim to extend his Rules
to the contrary Extreme of Grief too. Now Laughter is a
fort of Evacuation, which the Mind gives itfelf; a kind of
Vent, which it finds for Joy, when it is full and runs over.
The very nature and manner of it feems to {peak thus much,
The {welling of the Lungs, the Interruptions of ἘΠῊΝ the
ever-
with StmpLicius’sComment. 255
Reverberations of the Air, and that cackling noife, which
_refembles the purling of Waters, All thefe betray an extraor-.
‘dinary Vehemence, and Emotion, inthe Soul and Body
both ; All confefs plainly, That neither of them are then in
that fedate and fteady Temper, which Nature and Reafon
find moft agreeable. The fame Inconveniences follow up-
on the other Extreme. For immoderate Sorrow, and in-
_dulged Tears, give as great a fhock to a Man’s Judgment,
and Confiftence with himfelf. Which indeed is never to
_ be preferved, but by juft meafures, and a conftant Modera-
_ tion in every thing. Ἢ
_ For this Reafon it is, that he condemns the laughing upon
_ every occafion, as an Arguinent of infufferable Levity. But
i there happens any thing, which may juftly provoke Laugh-
ter; though we are not abfolutely to decline it, for fear
_ we be fufpeéted to want this property of Human Nature,
and appear unreafonably four and morofe; yet at leaft it
_ muft be allow’d, That there are very few things in Conver-
-fation, which will juftifie much of it. A man that is eter-
nally upon the Giggle, fhews a mighty defect of Judgment,
and that every little occafion of mirth is mafter of his Tem-
_ per, when it thus blows him up into exceflive Joy. For
this reafon it ought not to be frequent, nor to continue
long at atime. For fo I underftand his forbidding it to be
much. Nor fhould it be noify, and violent, and convul-
five; but fhew the Evennefs and Government of the Mind,
by being modeft,;* and fcarce exceeding a Smile, which
_moves the Lips a little, yet fo as to make no great altera-
tion in the Face, -
+ eS
Sei ΘΜ tetef dedefolufeleiededeobaiitat ok tobi
CHAP. XLIV.
2% it be poflible, avoid Swearing altogether; but
«Ὁ if you cannot do that abfolutely, yet be fure to
decline.it as much as you can.
COMMENT.
Ks Ria Firft place in this Catalogue of Duties, which re-
ἱ fpeéts our Selves, was due to the reftraining thofe E-
ruptions and Vehemences τ Paflion, which give ἃ diftur-
bance
256 _ Eptcrertus’s Morals
Ae Ar AL EA προσ, - |
bance to the Quiet of our Minds, and render our Behaviout —
Irregular and Inconfiftent. The Next he affigns to that>
wherein the Honour of God is concerned.
᾿ Forthe very Nature of an Oath confifts in this, That it in-
vokes Almighty God as a Witnefs, and introduces him as
a Mediator, and a Bondfiman, to undertake for our Honefty
aud Truth. Now to make bold with God, upon every
trivial Occafion, (and few of the Affairs of Mankind are
any better) is to take a very unbecoming Freedom, and
fuch as argues great want of Reverence for fo tremendous
a Majefty. Refpe&t and Duty then ought to make us de-
cline an Oath. Even fo, as if we can poffibly help it, ne-
ver to bind our Souls with fo Sacred an Engagement at all.
And a man, that is duly cautious, and tender in thefe mat-
ters, would rather undergo fome Trouble, . or pay fom@
Forfeiture, than allow himfelf the Liberty of Swearing. But
if there be any urgent and unavoidable Neceffity for doing —
it; As, if that Teftimony of my Truth be required to refcue
my Friend, or my Relation, from the Injuries of an Op-
preffor, or a Falfe Accufer; Or if my Country, and the ~
Peace of it command this Affurance of my Fidelity: In
fuch Cafes, and other fuch like, we may take an Oath in-
deed; but then we muft be fure not to proftitute our Con-
{ciences. For, when once we have brought ourfelves un-
der fo folemn an Obligation, and engaged God as a Wit-
nefs and a Party init, no Confideration muft ever prevail
with us, to be unfaithful to our Promife, or untrue in our
Affertions.
C7 H A. P: ΕΝ.
Ecline all Publick Entertainments, and mixed
D Companies; but if any extraordinary occafion
call you to them, keep a {triét Guard upon your-
felf, left you be infe&ted with rude and vulgar Con-
verfation: For know, that though a Man be never
fo clear himfelf, yet, by frequenting Company
that are tainted, he will of neceflity contract fome
Pollution from them. , |
CO M-
:
᾿ ΟΠ ΒΙΜΡΙΙΟτῦ 5.5 Comment. 257
ἡ ᾿ . 7
COMMENT.
i np RE former Chapter was intended to give us a due
_ 4 and awful regard to God, and to check thofe Liber-
ties, which light Thoughts of his Majefty are apt to en-
courage in us. His Next defign is, to chain up that many-
headed Monfter, Defre. And, in order hereunto, he pre-
{cribes Rules, and fets Bounds to feveral inftances of it;
beginning with thofe which are moft neceffary for the fufte-
nance of Life; and fo proceeding to others, which make
_Provifion for the Body; till at laft he defcend to thofe,
which Nature is moft prone'to.
_ And there was good reafon here to give a particular Ad-
vertifement concerning Feafts, and large Companies, in re-
gard of the mighty difference obfervable, between thofe of
Philofophers, and thofe of common Men. The Eating
and Drinking part, and all the Jollity, which is the End
and Bufinefs of moft Invitations, Men of Senfe have always
look’d upon, as the leaft part of a Feaft: And their Meet-
ings have been defigned only for Opportunities to improve
one another, by mutual Conference, wife Difcourfes, affi-
duous Enquiry into the Truth, and a free Communication
of each others Studies and Opinions. This is exceeding
_ plain, to their immortal Honour, from thofe admirable
Pieces of Plato, and Xenophoz, and Plutarch, and Others,
called by the Name of their Sympofia, and are an account of
the Difcourfe which paffed, when Friends met to eat and
_ drink together. But the Entertainments of the greateft part
of the World propofe nothing to themfelves, but Luxury,
and Excefs, gratifying the Palate and fenfual Appetites:
They are not the Entertainment of a Man, but the Cram-
- ming and Gorging of a Brute; and moft juftly fall under
the Reproach of an old Obfervation : The Table which gives us
Meat without Difcourfe, is not fo properly a Table, as a Manger.
A good Man therefore will be careful how he mingles
himfelf in fuch Meetings, and will decline them as much
as is poflibte. But if any extraordinary occafion draw us a=
broad, fuch asa Solemn Feftival, the [nvitation of a Parent,
acommon Meeting of Friends or Relations, or Civility and -
Complaifance, where the thing cannot in good Manners
be refufed; then the Next care is, That we keep a ftri@
guard upon ourfelves; sc we awaken our Reafon, ἐμῶν
ἶ 2 [1
bao
νά, ὦ EPICTETUS’s Morals |
προ: --- 5 |
‘Call up all our Powers, to watch the Motions of the Mind, |
and keep her under a fevere Confinement, for fear the
ramble abroad, indulge herfelf in the Diverfions of the |
Company, and by degrees degenerate into their Follies,
For there is a ftrange Contagion in Vice; and no Dif.
eafe conveys itfelf more infen{ibly, or more fatally, than |
fenfaal and brutith Inclinations do. Whoever therefore al: _
lows himfelf in the Converfation of Perfons addi@ed to
them, and grows accuftomed to their Vices, (for that I take
to be the meaning of frequenting them) will-foon contra
their Pollutions. His own Innocence and Purity will not |
be able ro fecure him: In thefe cafes, the leaft Touch leaves |
a Tinéture behind it. And this indeed is the proper Noti- |
on of Pollution, the foiling of a clean thing with an un-
clean, and thereby cafting a Blemifh and Stain upon it.
GSS SSSR BERS TES SS SB Bo eo
CiHi ALP. XEVE Malia
τ Ufe and Neceffity be the Rule of all the.
Provifions you make for the Body. Choofe
your Meats and’ Drinks, Apparel, Houle, and Re- —
tinue, of fuch Kinds, and {uch Proportions, as will
moft conduce to thefe Purpofes. . But as for all be-
yond this, which minifters to Vanity or Luxury, |
retrench and defpife it.
COMMENT.
See neceflary Supports and Conveniences of the Body
mutt firft be acquired, and then made ufe of. But E-
pictetus hath inverted this Order; for he gives us Dire&tions
for the Ufe of them here, and referves the. Procuring of
them to be treated of hereafter.
It were a thing perhaps muck to be wifhed, and would
make greatly for the Honour of Human Nature, that-fo no- |
ble a Being as the Rational Soul, could be independent,
and not fland in need of thefe outward Conveniences. But _
whatever Glories belong to that Soul » Confidered in itfelf;
yet
‘ with SimpLicius’s Comment. 259
yet its own Immortality will not fuffice, in this indigent and
precarious ftate, where it is joined to a mortal and corrup-
tible Body, and aéts in and by it. Yet ftill, tho’ this Con-
fideration expofes it to fome wants; it fhews us withal,
Ba tree thofe Wants are net Many. For, the Body being the
‘Inftrument of the, Soul, can need no more, than jult fo
“Much as will qualifie it for Service and A@ion. his is
the true meafure of our Expences upon it, and all beyond,
favours of Luxury and Extravagance.. When the Carpen-
ter choofes an Axe, and fees afterwards, that it be kept in
good order, he concerns himfelf no farther, than to confi-
der the Size, and the Shape, and the Sharpnefs of the Edge :
“He is not fo, folicitous to have the Helve gilded, nor the
Handle ftudded with Pearl or Diamonds: The reafon is, be-
caufe fuch coftly Ornaments would be, not only fuperfluous,
but prejudicial; they would be extreamly ridiculous aud fin-
gular too, and they would be a hindrance to his Tools, and
render them lefs fit for the Ufes they were defigned to ferve.
Juft thus ought we to behave ourfelves to this Body of ours,
this Inftruament of our Soul; giving ourfelves Concern for
no Supplies, but fuch as may contribute to the making it of
conftant Ufe to us.
That which fhould determine our Choice in Meats and
Drinks, fhould be the Confideration, which is moft natu-
ral, andthe moft ready at hand; for thofe are generally the
mott fimple, moft eafie of digeftion, and moft wholefome.
We are to remember, that the Animal Life in us mutt be
fupported; but, that Nature hath not made Varieties and
Quelques Choces neceffary to this purpofe. And therefore we
may very well difpenfe with. the Niceties of the Kitchea
and Preferving Room, and all the Arts of ftudied Luxury.
For the only Bufinefs we have to do, is, to repair the De-
cays of a Body which is perpetually wafting. And that this
may be done at a much eafier rate, is very plain, from the
Examples of thofe whom neceffitous Circumftances compel
to a plain and coarfe Diet: who yet generally have more
Strength, and better Health, than thofe that indulge their
Palates, and fare fumptuoufly.. This we fhall foon be con-
vinced of, if we do but compare Country-mea with Cour-
tiers, Servants with their Mafters, and, in general, poor
People with Rich. For Superfluities and dainty Meats do
but opprefs Nature; they are treacherous Delights, and car-
ry a kind of fecret Poifon in them, Hence it is, that we
fee the Conftitutions of Men who live. deliciguily, fo mi-
X 3 {erably
260 EPICTETUS’s Morals
ferably broken; and inftead of good Nourifhment, all their
Food turns into Corruption and ill Humours, Catarrhs and |
Vapours, and all the wretched Confequences of weak Sto- |
machs, and indigefted Fumes. ἡ
The Health therefore of the Body, and the preferving it
in a vigorous and aétive ftate, fhould prefcribe to us, both |
for the Kind, and the Quantity, of our Diet. Otherwife we |
fhall be but the worfe for the Care and Expence we are at
about it; and, bya very impertinent and miftaken Tender~'
nefs, fhall render this Inftrument lefs capable of doing the -
Soul Service, and perhaps too, quite break, or wear it out
the fatter. |
Now it is a very great happinefs, to have been brought —
up f{paringly, and ufed to a plain Diet from one’s Cradle.
For by this means there will be no ftrite between Nature and
Appetite; but that, which is moft for the Benefit of the Bo-
dy, will be likewife moft agreeable to the Palate. Such a
Man lies under no Temptation of deftroying the one, for
the fake of gratifying the other.
The fame Rule Ought to take place in our Apparel too;
in which Socrates gave himlelf fo little trouble, that we are
told, he wore the fame Cloaths, both in Winter and Sum-
mer. Now I can allow a Man to indulge himfelf to de-
grees of Tendernefs, which would make him feem a per-
fect Epicure in comparifon of Socrates; and yet I thould think
he might content himfelf, with Wearing fuch Linen and
Woollen as our own Country affords, and to change thefe |
for warmth or coolnefs, as the Seafons of the Year fhall - :
make it moft eafie and convenient for him. But for foreign
Vanities, and fantaftick Drefles; fuch as put us upon fifhing
all the Eaft and Weftern Rivers for Pearl, and flaying whole
Forefts for Furrs and Ermins, and rifling the India’s for
Silks, and exchanging fubftantial Gold and Silver for the
Cobwebs of Worms; this can be nothing elfe, but Foppe-
ry and Nonfenfe, the mark of a profligate Mind » and the
fcandal of an Age abandoned to Luxury and Madnefs.
So again for our Houtes. Crates is faid to have fatisfied
himfelf with aT ub, tho? at the fame time he had avery fine
Wife, which would have given him a fair pretence for amore
{pacious Dwelling. This is a piece of mortification not re-
quired at our hands: and Epictetus is well contented, we
fhould have a Honfe, and all Conveniences about it; pro-
Vided that both the Proportion and the Finithing be contrived
for Ufe, and nor for Pomp andExcefs, Iris it, there —
e
with StmpLicius’s Comment. 261
Dy pn bry
ti be a decent apartment for the Men, and another for the Fe-
“males, of the Family; tho’ indeed thefe diftinét Apartments
are not abfolutely neceflary neither. But to talk of thirty or
forty Lodging-Rooms, of inlaid Floors, and Marble Hearths,
᾿ of Carvings, and Paintings, and Fret- ‘work, and different
i Apartments, fuited to the feveral Months of the Year ; this
} is not to fupply our Neceflity, but to gratify our Curiofity
-and Pride. And it hath this farther Inconvenience in ir,
Thata Man ufed to fuch Things, is condemned to a perpe-
tual uneafinefs, whenever his own Occafions call him to a
_ Place where he cannot be equally accommodated; or when
_ the change of his Fortunes reduces him to aneceflity of part-
_ ing with thofe Conveniences, which, at the Expence of fo
~ much Labour and Treafure, he hath provided for himfelf. I
might add too, and that very feafonably, Thata Man who hath
ufed himfelf to take delight inthefe things, cannot efcape the
folly and mifery of placing his Happinefs in them; and fo
will utterly neglect the Improvement of his own Mind, and
forget the true Felicity of humane Nature, And, if by any
Misfortune (as indeed there are a great many that may con-
tribute to it) he lofethefe Enjoyments ; he muft confequent-
ly be expofed to all the Excetles of Paffion, and an impotent
Mind, and imagine himfelf wretched to the very laft degree:
And yet, to any who efteems things rightly, it wil! appear,
thathe was much more unhappy, and had more jult occafions
_of lamenting his own Condition, when in the midft of his
fo-much-admired Gaity and Splendour.
The number of our Retinue, and ufe of our Servants, are
fubjcé to the fame Limitations; 7. 6. the Occafion we have for
them, and the proportion of our Eftates. For Servants fhould
be always kept fo, as to have enough of that which is neceffa-
ry and convenient for them; and yet to be always in Employ-
- menttoo: Here we mutt cut the middle way betweenthetwo
Extremes, Idlenefs and Indulgence on the one hand, and Bar-
barity and Slavery on the other. But as for vaft Crowds of Pa-
ges and Footmen, fuch as have nothing to do, but to clear
the way in the Streets, or to make a great appearance, run
before aChair, or hang behind a Coach ; the Matters would
do well toconfider, that fo many Attendants are, in plain
Terms, but fo many Keepers. And fure there cannot be a
greater Slavery, than fo many Eyes continually upon you;
to have every Motion watched, every Difcourfe over-heard,
no Freedom or Privacy left ; no Retirement fafe from Ob-
tabla and, in a word, nothing done or faid, without
X 4 their
262 .ς Eptcretus’s Morals
their Knowledge, and faucy Cenfures upon It and You. But, —
befides the infupportable Inconvenience of them in one’s —
Own Family, they are often very troublefome and injurious. —
“to Others. Knavifh and vexatious to Tradefmen, fhirking
out of Markets and Shops, rude and infolent to their Bet-
ters, guilry of athoufand Violences and Affronts; and all
this, upon a Confidence of their own Strength; that their —
Matter’s Authority will prote& them, or their Fellow-Ser-
vants {tand by them in their Rogueries, and be able to bear
them out againft all oppofition. By thefe wicked Qualities,
and their abominable Idienefs, they grow lewd and debauch-
ed, andarethe worft Enemies commonly, that their Mafters
have. Who all the while, for the State of keeping thefe
Rake-hells about them, are forced to break their own Reft,
and undergo many Hardthips, and fubmit to the mean Arts
of Filattery, and making their Court, and become Slaves their
own felves, and which is worft of all, abandonthe Rules of
Wifdom and Virtue. - But if Men will be fo fond of a pro-
fligate Life, the matter is not great, if they pay dear for their
Vanity, and therefore letthem go on, till Repentance makes
them wifer. .
As for the Philofopher, who conforms himfelf to Epicte-
tus his Rules, a very moderate Attendance will ferve his
Turn. For his Concerns with the World are not like to
be very great; and he will not chink himfelftoo good, to do
all that he can in his own Perfon, without being troublefome
to Others. So that, except in cafes of Sicknefs, or fome
Bufinefs, which healone cannot poffibly difpatch, or Retire-
ment from the Affairs of the World, to gain leifure for at-
tending to fome better Employment, he will have very lit-
tle occafion for a Servant. Thus Epscfetus is faid to have
lived a long time all alcne ; till at laft he was forced to hire
a Nurfe, to bring up apoor Friend’s Child; whofe extreme
Neceffity had made him refolved todropthe poor Infant, if
Epidtetus in Charity had not taken it home, and maintain-
ed it. .
After having made particular mention of the Neceffaries
of Human Life, he exhorts in general to retrench all Super-
fluities; reducing whatever is fuch, to thefe two Heads,
Luxury and Vanity. For indeed, whenever we exceed the
Bounds of Moderation in any of our Expences, One of
thefe two is always the Caufe of it, And we are told
that the Perfons of immortal Renown for their Wifdom
. and Virtue heretofore, were fo extremely nice in this Point,
; iba ah oat ΤΣ ΝΟΥ τὰ
ats | og,
a
with SrmpLticiuss Comment. 263
eS GAIL Gch ree
and fo careful not to indulge themfelves in any thing but
what was abfolurely needful; “That Diogenes, atter having
_ ufed a long time to carry a Wooden-Dith in his Pocket to
drink Water in, paffed by one Day, and faw a poor Fellow
taking up Water in the Palms of his Hands, and fo drink-
_ ing it: Whereupon he flung away his Dith immediately in-
tothe River, and faid, he had now no farther occafion for
‘it, fince it only ferved for a Uie, which his Hands could
as well fupply without it. .
TES CURR ΠΟ BOR A SESS SR SEE ΝΣ
CHAP. XLVII.
Ἢ Bftain from Familiarities with Women before
Ἃ Marriage, as much as poflibly youcan; At
leaft, if you indulge yourfelf in any Liberties of
this kind, be fure to wrong no Man’s Bed, nor
tranfgrefs any Law. But, how perfect foever your
own Chaftity may be, let not the Conceit of this
make you troublefome to others that are more frail;
And be not too lavifh, either in reproving Their
Failings, nor in Commendation of your own Vir-
tue.
COMMENT.
ΑἸ ΝΣ from all kind of Bodily Pleafure hath this pe-
culiar good Effeét, that it confirms and invigorates the
᾿ Rational Soul; and, by the Experience of Conquelts gained
by fingle As, encourages it to exert itfelf in new Attempts
upon a Confidence, that it is able to mafter the Brutifh and
_ Rebellious Appetites. Now the Diforders of thofe Appe- °
tites are to be fubdued Iwo ways; by wafting the Habits
of them, and keeping from frequent Repetitions of their
feveral A&is; and by uling them to fubmit to the Dif-
cipline of Reafon. But the Virtue of Continence in the
Pleafures of the Bed, which is a Species of the Brutal, is of
fo much greater Benefit to the Soul, and deferves to be
more highly efteemed , in proportion as the Temptation is
ip ooh , ᾿ ᾿ itronger,
264 ErictTetus’s Morals
ftronger, and the Conqueft more difficult and noble than
the reft. ᾿ ;
Now, although in this Cafe Reafon be informed and di-
rected by Doétrines of Prudence and Morality, and alfo by
pofitive Laws, excellently fitted for this purpofe; and the
Impetuous Sallies of the brutifh Inclination are check’d, and
held in by this means; yet many Inftances male it plain,
That there is another Method of dealing with them. The
Appetites, which lead to all thofe Enjoyments whereof Senfe
is moft fond, notwithftanding they are natural tous, and
very vehement in their Solicitations, may, by good Ma-
nagement and Cuftom, be reduced; vanquifhed by mild and
gentle ways, and without any great Violence committed
upon Humane Nature. Thus we fee, Perfons, who have
habituated themfelves to Fafting and Abftemioufnefs, find
no difturbance at all from the craving of their Appetites;
but quite contrary feel themfelves opprefs’d and indifpofed, »
if they allow themfelves to eat, either above their ufual
Quantity, or before their ufual Hour. And thus we find
too, that Ambition for the Olympick Crown, reftrains all
Inclinations of another kind, while Men are dieting for
the Exercifes; tho’ Reafon and common Senfe will tell
us, That the unreafonable quantity of Meat, which they
are forced to take, to nourifh and ftrengthen them at fuch
times, muft needs raife thofe Defires, and render the Soli-
citations of them more importunate, than otherwife they
would be. Now we cannot with any good Grace call
that Invincible, which, for the fake of a Sprig of Laurel,
is vanquifh’d every Day. So alfo both Cuftom and Pofitive
Law have utterly forbidden, That very near Relations
fhould come together; and the Inclinations of thefe Per-
fons, tho’ infufed into them by Nature, are yet almoft in-
capable of being moved towards one another, notwith-
ftanding any the molt engaging Charms of either Party; and .
whenever they are fo, we look upon it as an extreme Un-
happinefs, and particular Judgment. The Confequence of
this I take to be, That the Paffion, which can very hardly
be provoked in One cafe, might with good Care be fup-
prefs’d in Another.
Now that ftrict Chaftity, which is here required before
Marriage, is very Reafonable and juft upon Many Ac-
counts; but is particularly fo upon This, That the Man
may be upon equal Terms with his Wife, and give her the
Satisfaction of the fame unblemift’d Virtue in his Own te
! on,
with SimpLicius’s Comment. 265
LY
fon, which he expe&ts to meet with in Hers. But { {ays he)
if fome Liberties mult be taken, yet keep at leaft within
the * Compafs which the Law allows: For all beyond
that, is impious and abominable; or elfe the Law would
not have made a Difference, and fenced it in, Befides, it
argues great Impotence, and an ungovernable mind, to lay
all this in common; and is of ill Example, and peftilene
Confequence ; for it hardens a Man’s felf, and emboldens
Others to flight, not only this, but all Laws whatfoever,
when once the Authority which gave them Sandion, is
violated.
But how perfed foever your own Chaftity may be, let not
(fays he) zhe Cozceit of this make you troublefome to others
who have the Misfortune of being move frail. And be not too
lavifo, either in reproving Their Failings, or 12 commending your
ὁ τὰ Virtue. This is very prudent and feafonable Advice;
for fuch Reproaches cannot but be very harth and grating,
from Perfons with whom we ordinarily converfe; fince we
fee, how tenderly human Nature can bear Reproof, and
how very few can endure to be chidden, even by thofe
who have a Right to do it, by virtue of their Poft and Au-
thority. Now one great Reafon, why even.the fofteft Re-
bukes are generally fo very ill refented, I take to be this ς
That fo long as no Body tells us of our Faults, we pleafe
ourfelves with an Opinion, that they are concealed from
all the World, and by degrees come to think nothing a
Fault, which is not known. And this again proceeds from
a bafe Principle of Hypocrifie and Oftentation: which makes
the Opinion of the World our Rule in Judging ourfelves ;
and if we can but approve ourfelves to Oiher Men, we are
not much concerned, whether we can do dt or no, to, the
Truth; that.is, to God, and to our own Confciences. ἢ
But if the Perfon reproving us, do not only take off the
Veil from Us, but put it upon himfelf; and while he is ex-
poiing our Faults, exalt and proclaim his own Viriues; this
aggravates the provocation yet more. ΕΓ at this rate he in-
fults.over us like a Conquerer, and upbraids our Weak-
neffes , and makes the Comparifon, only that we may look
a great deal lefs, and ferve as Foils for his Merit. And
a
* Thists to be underftood of the Heathen Countries only, where Simple Forttcation
was nar prohibited by any Human Conftitution ; ‘but the Chrifiians have referred that
bite Ree |
what
i
᾿ ;
266 | Epicretus’s Morals
what can be more unequal than this, that our Competitor
fhould be our Judge? |
Befides, fuch haughty Rebukes, and invidious Compari-
fons, are not only injurious to the Perfon defigned to be
leffened by them, but even to the Author himfelf. For
they fwell his: Mind with Pride, and confirm him in his [n-
folence and Vain-glory ; they corrupt all his Reproofs, and
incline him to correét Mifcarriages, not fo much out of any.
defire to reform them, as to raife his Own Reputation by
finking that of Others. And he, who hath once difcovered
fuch bafe indire& Defigns, muft never expeé& to have his
Reproofs heard with any Patience, or to work any Good .
by them. For he gives a Man the faireft Opportunity in the
World to excufe his Folly, by laying hold on the odious
Comparifon. And if he can but return this Anfwer, That
lefs is expected from Him, He for bis part is no Philofopher ;
and therefore bis Fatlings are no great Matters: he thinks his
Reprover effectually filenced, and Himfelf fufficiently vin-
dicated.
SEH SMES MSE EHH OLA +
ΟΡ AP OREV IE.
] F you happen to be told at any time, That ano-
ther Perfon hath fpoken ill of you, never trou.
ble yourfelf to confute the Report, or excufe the
thing; but rather put all up with this Reply;
That you have feveral other Faults befides that,
and if he had known you more intimately he would
have faid worfe of you.
COMMENT.
fF Phat feems dire&ted more particularly againft Anger;
a Paffion which never feels itfelf more eafie to be pro-
voked, than upon the News.of our being flandered and
mifreprefented. But befides, it is likewife a Check to Am-_
bition and Vain-glory, The Two great Fomenters of that
Paffion. « ΐ ᾿
But
! )
a ᾿ ἘΚΑΟΤΝΝ ἊΝ > Ἀ ἜΥΝῚς
with SiMpLicius’s Comment. 267
πο νυ τυ ΑΜ ΡΥ ee TT Tl Teen. SS
_ Bucit may very well feem ftrange, that he fhould advife
us here not to juftifie ourfelves, and make a Man the Pub-
lifher of his own Follies and Misfortunes, by fo frank an
Acknowledgment, That he hath feveral other Faults be-
fides that particular one laid to his Charge.. You may call
this Moderation and Temper, but it feems to bea very great
Extreme, and more Affectation than Evennefs of Spirit.
To this Objeétion we may fay, That the Dire@ion is a-
greeable enough to the main defign of the Author in this
place; which is, ΤῸ wean the Soul from what fhe is moft
fond of, to draw her off from the World, and all that can
engage her Affetions there, and to make the Improvement
of the Mind, and the Teftimony of ones Breaft, the fole
End and Bufinefs of Life. Now when a Man is extremely
folicitous to be cleared, and cannot reft fatisfied in the
Approbation of his.own Confcience, and throw himfelf
upon an Appeal to the Judgment of God, to whom all
hearts are open, and every action known; this Man, Ifa
plainly fhews a ftrong defire to recommend himfelf t ἊΨ
good Opinion of the World. And the Effedt of ἢ a
Defire will be, That if he can impofe upon the Warld
with falfe Pretences, he will be fatisfied with the deceitful
Appearance of Virtue too, and perfuade himfelf of bis In- -
nocence; becaufe thofe Judges, to whofe Sentence he re-
fers his Aétions, think him fo, and are able to urge nothing
to the contrary. But now; when a Man fs got above the
Cenfure of the World, and fcorns to make that a Rule for
his Behaviour ; he is under no Temptation of partiality to
himfelf, but fees his own Faults, and {tands condemned by
the Teftimony of his own Mind againft him.
Now the accufing ones own felf, and owning other
Faults, befides what the World lays to our Charge, ftrikes
at the very Root of Oftentation and Vain-glory. And in-
deed it is neceflary fomething fhould do fo: For TVhis is a
prevailing Paffion, riveted clofe into the Soul, fo intricately
faftned and intangled there, that it fixes itfelf, while we
endeavour to pluck it up; for even thofe Aétions, wherein
we induftrioufly avoid Vain-glory, are often ftrongly tin¢iu-.
red with it; and chiefly owing to it.
It hath alfo one contiderable advantage above other Paffi-
ons; whichis, That its Vicioufnefs and Deformity. lies
‘concealed longer than any elfe, and deceives us with a Co-
lour ot Virtue, becaufe it is by Virtuous A@ions only that
we hope for Reputation. Not confidering in the mean
while,
£
2
268 EprrctTretus’s Morals
while, That this very courting of Applaufe fullies the moft
commendable Actions, and robs them,of all pretenfion to
Virtue, becaufe we do not make That our principal End,
nor choofe the Good for its own fake, but for the Credit
and Honour it, will derive upon us. For it is plain, The
Mark we aim at is Glory and Commendation, and the Good
we apply ourfelves to, is not the Effe@ of Choice but Ne-+
ceffity. Thus many a Man would not be Juft (for inftance )
but only that there is no way to get the good Opinion of the
World without it.
There is this to be faid farther in its excufe, That this
Paffion' feems to be extremely ufeful for the qualifying of
feveral others. For we are content to undergo many tharp
Confli&s with ourfelves, and deny feveral Inclinations and
Enjoyments, upon this account. And, as it is a reftraint
to our Vicest, fo is it likewife a powerful Incentive and
Spur to Virtue; it puts us upon engaging in many difficult
ucounters, reconciles us to Aufterities and Mortifications,
rpofes Tasks, which, though performed with great
Alaerity upon this account’, would otherwife feem fevere
and infupportable Punifhments. . ;
For this Reafon, Ambition and Defire of Applaufe are
very fignificantly termed the inmoft Garment of the Soul,
as {ticking clofeft to it of all Paffions whatfoever; becaufe,
when we have ftript our felves of the reft, yet this is ftill
retained; And in truth the reft, are many times laid afide
for the fake of this. At leaft they appear to be fo; for
to {peak ftritly, this is all but Appearance, and Hypocri-
fie ; nor does this Paffion in reality make the Soul abandon
Vice; It only puts a Reftraint upon the outward A@, with-
out any effectual Reformation of the Mind, or correéing
the inward Motions to Wickednefs. Thus we find, that
thofe very Perfons, who, to preferve their Reputation, ab-
ftain from grofs and fcandalous Lewdnefs, do yet without
any remorfe indulge themfelves in unfeen Liberties, and
loofe Imaginations. So that, upon the whole matter, men
are not one whit the better, but the worfe upon this account.
There are not any vicious Defires reclaimed by it; and the
abftaining from the open Gratification of thofe Defires blows |
men up with a falfe Opinion of Virtue, and adds to their
Vanity ten times more. .
It feems, I confefs, eapable of doing fome Service to
Young men, whofe Paffions ride high; by curbing the Ex- -
erbitancies, which Youth, through the Heat and nae
snag
with ΘΙ ΜΡ σι 85 Comment. 269
that Age, is fo exceeding apt τὸ fly out into. But when
thofe importunate Solicitations wear off, and men grow in-
to cooler Reafon, no Quality of the Mind can be more dan-
gerous and deftructive. For it abfolutely ruins all Virtue,
by feducing the Soul to bafe Principles. It makes the Opi-
nion of the World the chief End of A@ion, and lays more
firefs upon recommending ones felf to Others, than upon
the Satisfaction and Teftimony of ene’s own Confcience.
It propofes Good to us, as eligible, not for any Intrinfick
Excellence of its own, but for the Honour and Fame con-
fequent to the doing of it: So that in fhort we never really
choofe Good; not Good I.mean, confidered as fuch, be-
caufe we do not choofe it for its own fake.
Nor is this only a dangerous Vice, but a moft extrava-
gantly ridiculous one too; and fuch as expofes all who are
tainted with it, to one moft abfurd and inconfiftent Folly.
For Men of this Temper commonly value Themfelves, and
defpife Others extremely ; and yet at the fame time doghey
court, and flatter, and fear Others; and pin all their Happi-
nefs, and all their Expectation, upon thofe very Wretches,
whom they think fo defpicable.
Now nothing can cure this extravagant and flavifh Paffion,
fo effe€tually as Moderation; an evennefs of Mind, anda
frank acknowledgment of our own Faults and Failings.
And yet even This hath fome hazard in it too. For affeét-
ed Humility is the greateft Pride, and, without due Caution
and prudent Care, we fhall fall into the very danger we
would avoid, and become Vain-glorious, even in theAccu-
fations of ourfelves. Many men know, that to leffen them-
felves in their own Expreffions, is to befpeak the Com-
mendation of others by a fly and a furer way. But this
Temper recommended by Epzc#etvs mutt be fincere, free from
underhand Trickings, and indirect Ends. And indeed he
- recommends it upon very good Grounds, For it is eafie to
perceive, That, if Fate fhould fo order the matter, as that
our Virtues and Advantages fhould be known to ourfelves
alone; and our Follies and Defes publifhed to all the
World ; there would prefently be an end of all Vain-glory,
and whatever Good we do, we fhould be invited to it for
its Own fake, when there could be no Profpeét of Applaufe
to tempt us.
CHAP.
270 Erprctretus’s Morals
CHAP. XLIX.
fT is by no means convenient, that you fhould
i frequent the Theatres; but if any occafion hap-
pen to call you thither, difcover no Concern but
for yourfelf alone. That is, do not wifh the Suc-
cefs-any other than it is, or that the Victory fhould
fall on any Perfon, except him that gains it. For
this will keep your Mind free and difengaged. Let
your Behaviour there be eafie and fedate, not be-
traying any Tranfport of the Mind, by Shouting
or loud Laughter, or long and vehement Emotion.
So again, when the Play is over, do not difcourfe
Much of what you faw there, nor enlarge upon
things for which you are never the better: For if
you do, this plainly implies, that the Entertainment
hath gotten within you, and that you admired, and
were highly pleas'd with it.
COMME NT.
τ ἀν fenfual and brutith Appetites are not confined to
fuch Obje&ts only, as our Touch and Tafte are em-’
ployed in, but extend themfelves likewife to thofe which
entertain our Sight and our Hearing. And what fort of
Behaviour and Difpofition will become us with refpe& to
' thefe, he tells us here, by laying down this Rule: That it
1s by no means neceffary or convemient to frequent the Publick
Theatres. We might have faid indeed, That it is abfolutely
neceflary , and highly expedient, not to frequent them: For
in truth fuch Places leave a ftrong Infection, and make the
whole Life of thofe that ufe them, to become Theatrical, |
all Show and formality.
But there may fometimes an occafion fall out, in which
a Man cannot, without Injury to himfelf or his Charaéer,
refufe appearing there; as, either upon fome Publick Fefti-
val, which the Entertainments are defign’d to Honour,
aad make more folemn; or in compliance with ys Cu-
oms
β
ν- πον. Ἐν’, ees dle peer δα δ παν ἀν νδιν,
with SrmpLrcius’s Comment. 27%
_ ftoms of the World; or at the requeft of Friends; (for it
looks four and morofe to be fingular, and decline the re-
_ Geived Practices of Mankind;) οὐ we may be invited thither,
_ only to make an Experiment upon our own Selves, as hav-
ing a mind to be fatisfied, what Improvements we have
_ made, and how differently we are affected with thefe Mat-
ters, at different times. If therefore any of thefé; or any
other reafonable Caufe, bring us to the Theatre, we muft
be fure to call up all our Vigilance; to colleé& ourfelves ,
and not let our Paffions get loofe ; but be folicitous only
for the Peace and Evennefs of our Mind, and perfeétly in-
different where the Succefs of the Combat lights. For wé
are to remember, that all thefe are things foreign, and
without us, and confequently fuch as our Defires and A-
verfions ought by no means to faften upon. .
This inward Tranquillity is what Ep:cfetus expe€ts our
outward Air and Behaviour fhould fhew: That our Mien
and Countenance be fettled and compofed, yet eafie and -
good natured too; fuch as may exprefs Gravity without
Sullennefs, and Mirth without Levity: Not making our-
' felves troublefome and ridiculous, either by loud Acclama-
tions and Applaufes at what is well performed; or by burft-
ing out into loud and exceffive Laughter at any comical
'Paffages that come before us; but commending the one fort
with Judgment and Moderation, and approving the other
with a fitent Smile.
When the Sight is over, there is a farther care to be taken,
Not to difcourfe largely upon any thing we have been entertained
with there; as confidering, that thefe matters contribute
not at all to the making a Man wifer or better. And fince
‘they are in no degree inftru@tive, or reforming; 4 Man
ought not to think them worthy to be the fubye& of his
ifcourfe. Now indeed Epictetus his Caution here, of not
difcourfing much upon Things for which we are never the
better, may bear different Interpretations : For he may either
intend it of all Things relating to thefe Publick Entertain-
ments, the Succeffes of the Gladiators, and every Event
which is there prefented to us; and that a Man cannot poffi- ~
bly be edified, by talking upon fuch Subjeéts as thefe: Or
elfe he may only cut off fome particular parts of our.Dif-
courfe upon thefe Subjects, and advife us, when we do
make them the matter of our Talk, that we fhould fay no
more upon thefe occafions, than what may fome way con-
duce to the correcting of Manners, and making us wifer.
¥ And
VE Epicretus’s Morals —
And fuch Topicks particularly are thofe, which make Ob- ©
fervations upon the Behaviour, and condemn all fuch inde- |
cent and irregular Geftures, as plainly difcover, thatthe |
‘Mind is not in due temper. But to runout, and enlarge
extravagantly, upon what hath paffed, is a manifeft Indica- —
tion, that our Minds were too much affected with it; and
that it appeared to be great and ju(t matter of Admiration
tous. All which is very unworthy a Philofopher, anda
Defe& peculiar to little and vulgar Souls.
acer tease hrtda dade acede det dude Beds odode ae duced dy
CHAP. L.
E not fond of going to every body’s Rehear- i
B fals. But when you do, be fure to preferve |
a grave and fedate Temper; yet do not run into the
other Extreme neither, of rude and unmannerly
Morofenefs. Νὴ
COMME NY.
* HE next thing he gives DireGtion in, is, thofe Publick
Rehearfals, which the Pretenders to Oratory and Poe- —
try ufe to make, merely for Oftentation, and to proclaim —
their own Eloquence. The’ Subje&s of thefe Rehearfals ©
were various. Sometimes a Panegyrick upon fome great
Prince, or General, or Statefman; Sometimes they were —
Politick Harangues; Sometimes a fine Defcription of a Ci-
ty, or Country; fometimes the difcuffing a Point of Law,
or the like. Now fuch as thefe, which propofe nothing
farther to themfelves than Vanity and Oftentation, and have —
no concern with Virtue, or any thing that is properly Ours, —
he advifes us not to be forward in frequenting; nor indeed —
‘ever to attend them at all, without fome good Reafon which —
may juftifie our coming. For it may very often happen, ©
that this will be expeéted from you, either as a Teftimony —
of your Friendfhip to the Compofer , or a Mark of Refpect —
due to the Great Man, who is his Theme; or upon fome —
other account, which Civility and Good-Breeding may | }
necef>_
with SiMexLiciuss Comment. 273
-neceffary.. And thefe Compliances are fometimes of great
Ute, and have good Effect; by taking off the edge of that
Envy and Spight, with which all People are naturally per-
fecuted, who recede from the common way of living, and
do not do as the World does.
Since then you ‘mutt in all likelihood be there fometimes ,
the Next point to be gained is a due and decent manage-
“ment of yourfelf upon thefe occafions. And this will beft
be done, by a grave and compofed Temper; yet not fo fe-
vere, as to be rude and troublefome. Your Gravity mutt
fhew itfelf in commending Things as they deferve; fo as
neither to be unfeafonable, nor immoderate and lavifh in
your Praife. Your compofed Temper will keep you or-
derly and quiet; it will prevent all irregular Motion, and
Joud Applaufe. and impertinent Interruptions. It will con-
tinue the fame modeft, decent Air, without thofe fudden
and vehement alterations, both in Body, and Mind, and
Mien, which are but too frequent in fuch cafes. Your Eafi-
nefs muft be preferved too all this while, that you may a-
void the Indecency of being over-thoughtful, and feeming
not to attend. By this alfo you will be kept from a fullen
and affected Silence; and, when Things are well faid, will
not grudge them their due Commendation. It will prevent
all peevith Cenfures and malicious Criticifms, and that ill-
bred Roughnefs, which calls out to the Poet, and reproaches
‘him with Falfhood and Flattery, or a dull Thought, or flat
and improper Expreffions. In fhort, the Eafinefs and Com-
placency expected from you, will confift in fuch Candour
and Good Nature, as feems pleafed with the Eloquence of
the Rehearfer, and the Merit of the Perfon commended, and
can congratulate Both freely, when they deferve it, with-
out any mixture of Envy or Detraction.
| FRUAMARUGD OBENMBO
CcEL AP. LIT.
HEN you are engaged in Bufinefs with any
Perfon, but efpecially if he be a Man of
Quality and Power, confider with yourfelf, how
Socrates and Zeno would have behaved themfelves
ΠΝ 2 upon
,
274 Eptctsetus’s Morals
upon this occaffon, and then you will never be at
alofs, how to manage your Affair with decency,
and to advantage.
COMMENT.
| ion 2a ce Perfons make their own Improvement the’
main Bufinefs of their Lives, and confequently meddle
not with any but themfelves; fo that they are very feldom
troubled with attendance and application to Great Men. Be-
fore Perfons fo unpraétifed therefore, he fets Socrates and
Zeno for Patterns; that by taking Meafures from their Vir-
tues and Demeanour, they may be able to manage fo nice a ᾽
Point of Converfation; and confider, that thefe excellent
“Perfons, when they addrefs’d to Authority and Greatnefs,
did not put on a ftiff Formality and diffemble Refpect ; but
fhewed a true and genuine Noblenefs of Soul, agreeable to
the Tenour of their whole Lives. And this too fuch, as
was the Refult of Philofophy and Prudence, and not the
Effe&t of Infolence and Vanity: That this kept them ina
due Moderation and Decorum ; between a fubmiffive Cring-
ing, and a fawcy Pertnefs. ;
The fame Temper will prevent any fuch mean and abjeét
Awe for the Eminence of any Man’s Station, as fhould betray
usinto Flattery, and prevail with us to complement their Fail-
ings, and commend their Vices. And yet it will not fuf-
fer us to prefume upon our own Authority and Wifdom
neither; or fo far to forget Decency and Good-Manners,
as to reproach and rip up thofe Vices, in rude and opprobri-
ous Language. It teaches us the foiteft and moft gentle
methods of Reproof; and advifes, firft, to allow what they
have done well, its due Praifes, and fo to make way for
juft and neceflary Rebukes. Thus fweetning the lefs-pala-
table part of our Difcourfe, with what we know hath an a-
greeable Relith, as Phyficians wrap up bitter Pills in Honey,
to make them go down the more glibly. And when we muft
at laft proceed to this moft ungrateful good Office, it will
become us, not to be too rigorous Obfervers, nor too fe-
vere Interpreters of their AGtions; as if their Deformities
were any Diverfion to us, or we took a malicious Joy in
finding fault: But to demonftrate, by all our Carriage,
That Reformation is our only End; and to purfue this
With a moft affeGionate Zeal, exprefling great Tendernefs,
and
9 mie
ENN EE DLE TELLS SL
with Simpiicius’s Comment. 275
and much Trouble and Concern, that the Luftre of their
good A@ions fhould be thus fullied and eclipfed, by thefe
Failings, and Blemifhes, and rebellious Paflions.
There is alfo another Topick applicable to this purpofe,
which I do not doubt but Socrates and Zeno managed with
marvellous dexterity and fuccefs: Which was, To con-
vince People of Condition, what a world of Inconvenien-
ces and Troubles Greatnefs was ever incumbred with; and,
that the only defirable thing in it, is the Power and Oppor-
tunities of doing good, and making that Good diffufive and
effe€tual , above Men of a meaner Capacity. So that thofe,
who in fuch a Poft abandoned themfelves to Vice, and ne-
glect to improve this advantage, retain the bitter part, and
throw away all the fweet; are opprefs’d with the Miferies
and the burdenfome Cares of Riches and Honour, and lofe
al] the Comfort and all the Happinefs of them.
But all this while it muft be remembred, that Socrates and
Zeno are propofed to us as Patterns, becaufe it is conve-
nient, that we fhould fix our Eyes upon the nobleft and
moft perfect Examples, and, fo far as we can, afpire by de-
grees to their PerteGtions. But ftill we muft in matters of
Praétice be content to keep to our own Model, and fhall
acquit ourfelves very well, if our Actions bear proportion
to our Condition and Character. Nor can it be expeéted,
that a young Proficient in Philofophy, and one, whom £-
picterus fuppofes ftill to ftand in need of his Inftruation,
fhould be able, in his Behaviour and Converfation, to pros
ceed jult as Socrates and Zeno did. The pretending to per-
fonate thefe Great Men in all things, would not be Imita-
tion, but Mimicry; and fit fo ill upon fuch a one, as to
make Him and what he did ridiculous. How vain an.at-
tempt this would prove, we need no other Argument, than
that account given of Zeno by Antigonus, the Succeffor of
— Alexander in Syria; who, tho’ he had converfed with feve-
ral Philofophers, yet declared, ‘That he never could fo far
command himfelf in Company with Zev, as to conquer his
Diforder and Confufion; and, That the very Prefence of
that Man did (what no other could do) damp him with an
unfual Awe and Concern. ;
And thus Epiderus takes occafion, from dire&ting us what
Methods are proper to be ufed in addrefs to, and conference
with, Men in eminent Dignity, to defcend to inferiour
Conditions, and give Rules tor Converfation in general.
Υ3 CHAP,
Ff
Ris eh
oa
£
276 -Erteretus’s Morals
CH. A, P... LE.
Ὁ 7 Hen your Occafions make it neceflary to vis
| fit a Man of Quality, refle&t with’ yourfelf
before you go, .what may happen to you. Poffi-
bly he may not be at home; or if he be, that he
will not be fpoken with; that the Porter may
fhut the Door rudely upon you; that you may
wait in the Hall among the Foot-men; that none
of them will carry your Meflage to his Lord; or,
if they do, that you will meet with nothing but
Scorn and Neglect. When you have prepared your-
felf thus, if you think it worth your while to go
upon fuch Terms, do it; and bear whatever hap-
pens, as you ought. But do not repine afterwards,
and fay with yourfelf, ‘That the Bufinefs was not
worth all this Trouble: For that is a Reflexion
unbecoming a Philofopher, and thews a vulgar
Soul, not reconciled fufficiently to the Accidents
_of the World.
COMMENT.
wT HE Advice he gives here, is much of the fame nature
& with what we met with before in the Ninth Chapter}
where he begins thus: fw every Action you uxdertake, confider,
τῆ, with yourfelf, and weigh well the Nature and Circum-
frances of the Thing, “ὅτε. Only there indeed he continues and
illuftrates his Ditcourfe, by a very low and familiar inflance
of Bathing; but here he applies it to that much more im-
portant one, of application to Great Men. There is alfo
this other difference between the two Paflages, That the
Conciufion and Defign of his Advice there, was to per-
_faade Men, not to be too much concerned at things when
they had happened, but to keep their Temper even, and
their Reafon undifturbed; whereas here his Bufinefs ‘is to
bring Men to a prudent Forecaft, that they may not run on
giddily , nor fee Things by halves; but reprefent to oe
i elves
Ὁ ἡ ἀμὸν γρῶδν Στ
with StmpLicius’s Comment. 277
felves before-hand, all the poflible Difficulties and Incon-
_veniences, which can rife upon them; that they may take
as true an Jdea of all the difcouraging Circumftances now ,
as it is poflible for the Event to give them afterwards.
For, after we have taken upon us the flavery of waiting
upon a Great Man, and met with thefe Difappointments
and cold Negleéts; we are apt to fit down difcontented,
and with much remorfe to condemn our own Folly, and
take it exceeding ill to be treated with fo much Infolence
and Scorn, and fo unbecoming our Quality or Defert. Now
all that Diffatisfa@ion is owing to one of thefe two Cau-
fes; Either, That we madea rath and ill Choice at firft ;
Or elfe, That thefe external Accidents make too ftrong
and too tender an Impreffion upon us. And both thefe De-
fects betrays a bafe and anarrow Soul; not {uitable in any
degree to the Dignity of a Philofopher, who fhould know
how to manage, and how to flight, every Accident of this
kind: Not fuffering himfelf to be impofed upon, like the
ignorant Vulgar, with the falfe appearances of Things; nor
miltaking thofe for matters of Confequence, which are,
really and in their own Nature, mere Trifles, and of little
Or no confideration at 41] to him.
So that, having in the former Chapter inftru&ed us, what
‘Decorum is to be obferved towards Perfons of Honotr and
Authority, who are content to admit us to fome|F amiliarity
and free Conferences with them, and propoted the, Pru-
dence of Socrates and Zeno for the Standard of our Behavi-
our; he prefcribes to us here, the Rules proper to be fol-
lowed, where we are received with Coldnefs, and Dif-
dain, and rougher ufage: That, except wheré fome abfo-
lute Neceflity requires, we fhould have nothing at all to
do with fuch Perfons ; and when any urgent occafion com-
pels us to chufe this Attendance, and our Bufinefs muft be
followed, though at the Expence of all rhofe Hardfhips and
Affronts; then we fhouild fettle and compofe our Minds
before, and not expofe ourfelves to the misfortune of a
Surprize, or the weaknefs of a late Repentance, and with
we had never undertaken it, when thefe things are come
“@pomius, 0) το .
εἶ
ἘΝ a ae CHAP.
“78 Epictetus’ Morals ——
CORA PB... Aaa.
&
ἝΝ familiar Converfation with your Friends and
A Acquaintants, do not make it your Bufinefs, to
entertain Company with tedious Narratives of your-
felf, and your own Affairs. Confider, that Their
_Refentments and Yours are very different upon thefe |
occafions. And though the Exploits by which you -
have fignalized yourlelf, the Succefles you have
obtained, the Dangers you have encountred, or the
Afflictions you have undeigone, may be a very a-
greeable Story to yourfelf to tell, yet it will not
be equally fo for others to hear |
BB SSE ae ae ΝΕ SS SRR aS a ae a ee ae eae ΧΕ aaa a ae a ae
CH AP. LIV,
f A S little will it become you to render yourfelf
] the common Buffoon, and be always trying
to make the Company laugh. This is avery nice
and ticklifh thing ; exceeding apt to degenerate in-
to Vice and Folly; and (obferve it when you will)
He that only ftudies Diverfion, -fhall be fure at the
fame time to lofe Refpect.
CHAP. LY.
F all kind of Difcourfe, none is more unfafe,
none more defpicable, than That, which ~
breaks inupon Modefty and Good-Manners. W hen-
ever therefore any Perfon in your prefence flies out
into Obfcenitry, (if fo great a Liberty can δ». Ὁ
3 ς
with SrmMpLiciuss Comment. 279
ae
be taken) reprove him publickly, and puta ftop
to the lewd Talk. Burt if that cannot convenient-
ly be done, yer at leaft do yourfelf the Juftice to
difapprove it; and, by forbearing to join with him,
by bluthing for him, and by chiding Looks, let all
the Company fee plainly, that you deteft his filthy
Ribaldry, )
COMME NT.
ERE he defcends from converfing with Great Perfons,
to prefcribe the Meafures fit to be taken with thofe of
common Quality, fuch as are of aCondition equal, or infe-
sior to our own. The thing we are chiefly concerned to
take care of in this cafe, is the rendring ourfelves eafie and
acceptable to all kind of Company in general; to obferve
fuch a prudent Medium, as may prevent a ftiff and formal
diftance in One extreme, and keep off fuch a fawcy Free-
dom, as may make us cheap and contemptible in the Other.
Nay, which is more, we are not only to fecure a due re-
fpe& and value for ourfelves, but to confult the Intereft of
thofe we converfe with. And a wife Man will not only
endeavour to recommend himfelf, by making his Difcourfe
free, and eafie, and diverting, but:by making it beneficial
and improving too. ἣν
In order to the learning this Art, Epictetus gives us warn-
ing of feveral Indecencies, which are apt to prejudice Peo-
ple againft us. The Firft of thefe is the expatiating upon
ourfelves, choofing out fome of our own Performances,
or our own Hardfhips, for ourconftant Topick ; and running
Divifions perpetually upon our Families, or our Fortunes.
And this in truth is the moft naufeous and tirefome thing in
the World. For there is a Principle of Jealoufie in every Man,
which turns again at all the fulfome Commendations of our-
felves, and the Company prefently grow fick of them in
their own defence. Nothing is more affuming, and confe-
quently nothing can be more provoking: It argues very lit-
tle and low Thoughts of all Mankind befides, when we
can with fuch difdain overlook the reft of the World, and
imagine no Affairs but our own, worthy to furnifh out mat-
ter for Difcourfe. Befides, all thele extravagant Pancgy-
Ticks upon ourfelyes, are no beter than fo many fly in-
yeQives
280 EprceTretus’s Morals
vedtives againft other People; and He, that takes pains to
extol his own Condué&, only makes an invidious Compa-
rifon, and always defires to be fo underftood, as by a Side-
wind to reproach and condemn that of his Neighbour. So
that a Man full of himfelf, is acommon Enemy; No Pa-
tience can brook him; And confequently nothing can more
effectually contribute to render our Converfation agreeable
and entertaining, than declining to trouble the Company
with our own Affairs. Which hath alfo this farther advan-
tage too, that it checks the Vanity of our Temper, abates
our Love of Popular Applaufe, and difcovers a true Bra-
very and noblenefs of Spirit.
His Next piece of Advice concerns the gay and the facetious
Part of Converfation: And here, in purfuance of his fo
mer Dire&ions, not to indulge ourfeives in long and vio-
fent Laughter, nor to burft out upon every trivial’ occafion ;
he forbids his Proficient to be always aéting the Buffoon,
and endeavouring to make the Company laugh. Andthat,
for this very good reafon, becaufe Mirth is a flippery and un-
faithful Ground; and they who refolve never to wanta Jeft,
will eafily degenerate into Impertinence and Folly. For,
when a Man accommodates himfelf fo far to the Humours
of the Vulgar, as to confult their Merriment and Diverfion ;
it fhews' that his Soul is of their Size and Temper, and re-
lifhes the fame mean unworthy Pleafures. Indeed, if there
be any difference between them, he that labours to enter-
tain another with fuch Difcourfe, is the worfe, and the.
greater Fool of the two. So that, whoever makes the
Company. merry after this manner, does it at his own Ex-
pence. For this naturally renders him cheap, and encoura-
- ges the Heaters to be lavifh and fawcy in their turn too.
And there cannot be any more effeGtual courfe to lofe a
Man in the Reputation of the World, and rob him of all
the Refpeé:, otherwife due to his Quality, ‘or his Parts,
τα τὸ be thus profufe of his Wit, and to fet up fora
common Jefter. Med
And yet it muft be owned, that Diverfion is the very Soul
of Converfation; and fome wife’ Men have frequently {tu
died to entertain the Company with pleafant Difcourfe, to
take [off the Imputation of Morofenefs and Ill-humour. |
To thofe therefore, who upon occafions find it convenient
to give a little Loofe to Mirth, he adds this moft neceflary _
Caution, Always to keep within the Bounds of Modefty and De-
cency.. For all obfcene Difcourfe is abfolutely eg
, wit
Ὗ
with SiMPLicius’s Comment. 29%
,εν:::.......:.5:--..... eens ’
with the Chara@ter of a wife and good Man; and he,’ wh
ptetends to any progrefs in Philofophy, will be fo far from
allowing himfelf in it, that he mutt not with patience hear
any fuch thing from another. And therefore Epzétetus com-
mands fuch a one, to reprove thefe uncomely Liberties,
provided it can conveniently and properly be done. As for
inftance; If the Perfon be younger than we, and fo our
Age feem to give us fome Authority over him; If he be
one who hath any remains of Modefty left, and we have
any reafon to hope our Rebukes will! prove fuccefsful ; If
there:be no great diftance between his Quality, or his Eftate,
and ours; fo that he is not too big, or too vain to be re-
proved. For in thefe Circumftances, you may without any
breach of Civility do it; and neither the Offender nor the
Company will take it ill, or think you too bold, if they
under{tand themfelves at all. But it muft be confefs’d, that
this Duty is not always praéticable; for there aré fome Per-
fons, with whom this Liberty cannot be taken. Their
Age, or their Condition, may give what they fay a Privi-
lege of being pafied over. Their Temper may render them
incapable of Animadverfion, or their hardened Wickednefs
may have put them paft all power of its doing good upon
them. And in fuch cafes, the attempt would not only be
ridiculous, but might poffibly be dangerous too. For no
Man is obliged to do what does not become him, becaufe
another hath done fo; nor muft our Zeal be fo warmly
purfued, as to break good Order, or give the Company di-
' fturbance, or create ourfelves Enemies, by fuch indifcreet
and unneceflary CorreGtions. But fiill there is one Remedy
left, which muft be taken in Juftice to ourfelves ; which is,
by our Silence to refufe the becoming a Party ; to demon-
ftrate, that we underftand what Behaviour is fit for us; and
that we do difcreetly difaliow thofe things, which Prudence
or Good-Manners will not fuffer as-openly to rebuke.
- And here I cannot omit obferving, how nice and pun@u-
al Ep:derus is, in fniting the Rules he gives, according to
the different Circumftances of the Cafe in hand. He had
treated before of Difcourfe, concerning the Entertainments
of the Publick Theatre, the Combats of Gladiators, Horfe-
Races, Feafts, Meats, and Wines, and Modes, and giving
Characters of Men to their prejudice, or their advantage ;
and upon all fuch Occafions, he direéts us to turn the Dif-
courfe off to fome other more ufeful Subje&t. But here, it
feems, that is not fufficient ; for we muit not only change,
but
282 Errctretuss Morals
but reprove it too, if that can properly be done. There, if -
we cannot turn the Difcourfe, we may content ourfelves —
with being filent; but here it is not every Silence that will
ferve the turn: It is neceffary, it fhould be a fort of empha-
tical and very fignificant one, fuch as may diftinguith our
Thoughts, and exprefs a Diflike and Deteftation of what
is indecently fpoken. ;
Seis leit iio ἤεήεεηεγεῆεεηήειξοήεῆε
CHAP. LVL
HEN the Idea of any Pleafure ftrikes your
Imagination, as you muft in other Cafes, fo
fhould you in this efpecially, ftand upon your
Guard, and not fuffer yourfelf to be hurried away
with the impetuous Torrent, Run not eagerly up-
on Enjoyment, nor improve the Thought into
Aétion: but take time to confider; and let that
time be employed in making a juft. Computation,
between the duration of the Pleafure, and that of
the Repentance fure to follow it; and then you
will not fail to check your Inclinations, and chide
yourfelf for indulging them in any. Degree at all,
Confider farther too, That the denying thofe In-
clinations will certainly give you an inward [ΟΥ̓ ς΄
and, in{tead of being reproached by your own Con-
fcience, you fhall be comforted and commended
by it. Butif, uponmature Deliberation, the thing
you are moved to, appear no way inconvenient,
you may gratifie your Appetite, but you muft not
Jet it loofe. For even innocent Enjoyments require
a ftrait Rein, anda fteady Hand, for fear the Im-
preffion be too ftrong and powerful, and the Pleas
fures of Senfe charm and captivate your Reafon.
And therefore, even in thefe Cafes too, reprefent
to yourfelf the inward Complacency of having done
well, and wifely; and the Triumphs of a good
Confcience, after fubduing Temptations. BY
with Simpxicius’s Comment. 283
*.
COMMENT
_“T"Here is not in the whole World any thing more per-
nicious to the Soul, than the Pleafures of Flefh and
Senfe. For thefe fetter and faften down the Mind; and
God, who faw thofe deftruiive Confequences of them,
hath therefore in his infinite Wifdom, and marvellous Good-
nefs, made all fuch Pleafures of exceeding fhort Continu-
ance. Thus thofe of the Ep:cwre \aft no longer, than juft
while his Meats and Drinks lie upon the Tongue. When
once they are fwallowed into the Stomach, all the Relith
of them is loft and gone, and the Palate returns to its for-
mer Habit again. So likewife thofe Pleafures, which Senfe
is fondeft of , and the moft exquifitely affe€ted with, con-
tinue no longer, than juft the time of Fruitions When
that fhort moment is once paft, the Man is as if it had
never been at all. It is alfo very plain, that Pleafure is
properly the Objeé& of the Senfitive Faculties, and does not
extend to the Rational Soul; for Creatures void of Senfe,
are not capable of bodily Pleafure.
Nor is this the Condition of bodily Pleafures only, but of
thofe other Satisfa&tions, which we call fo; fuch as Men take
in gay Cloaths, pompous Equipage, rich Jewels and Furni-
ture, large Eftates, and the like; even Thofe are but very
fhort-liv’d. For when once the firft Fluth of Joy is over, they
pall and fink down into nothing; and Time, in proportion as
it makes them familiar tous, makes them flat and infipid too.
But, alas! the Cafe is not the fame in the.contrary Extreme;
nor do our Griefs for the lofs of thefe things wear off fo faft,
as our Satisfactions of acquiring, or poffefiing them: Thefe
are long and lafling, and very often’grow by time. Thus
‘Pleafure it feems, of al! forts, but efpecially fuch as affeéts
our bodily Senfes, vanithes very quickly ; and well it were
for us, if it, and all its ἘΠ ες, went offtogether: But ie
leaves a Sting behind, wounds the.Soul, difarms Reafon ;
and, if it be indulg’d to excels, does not ftop there neither,
but many times proves of terrible Confequence to the Body
too. Whereas Abftinence from Pleafure, and the Conquefts
we gain over it, are of infinite Advantage to the Soul;
they fill it with durable Satisfaétion, and infpire Joys of
quite another kind, Joys agreeable to Reafon and oncore
rupt Nature, fuch as no Guilt pollutes, no mixture or re-
remains of Sorrow taint, no Time wears away.
Thus
284 Erictretrus’s Morals
Thus much I thought neceffary to premife in general, by
Way of Introduction to Epictetus his Advice, which begins
in thefe Terms: ‘‘ When the Jdea of any Pleafure ftrikes
“your Imagination, as you muft in other Cafes, fuch as
“ Power or Riches, or the like; fo fhould you in this of
““ Pleafure more efpecially, ftand upon your Guard, and not
“ fuffer yourfelf to be hurried away, from Thought to A&.
Be not too rafh and hafty, but allow yourfelf leifure for
better Confideration. And, when you have fo far prevail-
ed upon yourfelf, as to gain time, and fufpend the gratify-
ing of your Fancy for a while ; employ this time in making
a juft Computation. Weigh firft the time of Enjoyment
well; and afterwards obferve, how infinitely this is over- —
balanced by that of Repentance. Think how many fad Re-
membrances ,- what bitter Remorfe, what lafting Shame,
what felf-condemning Reflexions, the being vanquithed by
this Temptation will coft you; and then you will be afham- Ὁ
ed to purchafe fo fugitive a Pleafure, with fo permanent a
Mifery.
But, that you may have no pretence, no Colour left for
fo imprudent an Exchange; confider once more the durable
Advantages of Self-denial: the fincere and never-fading
SatisfaGtions which refult from a [ἢ fubdued; the perpe-
tual Applaufes of a good Confcience, and the Happinefs of
being approved by ones own Breaft: Do but caft thefe things
into the Scale, and give them their due weight, and then
the Difparity will be fo manifeft, that Appetite muft yield
to Reafon. And if you repeat this again and again, as
fit Occafions offer themfelves; you will by degrees gain an
habitual and complete Victory, and fo abfolutely reduce the
fenfual Inclinations, that they will not be in a Condition to
rebel, or give you any contiderable difturbance. ;
Since then the Pleafure lafts no longer than the fingle In-
ftant of A€tion; when once that Inftant is over, there is
no difference between one who hath had this Enjoyment,
and one who had itnot. Andhence it is evident, that Plea-
fure can have but.very little to recommend it. You will
fay, perhaps, that the Voluptuous Perfon hath the Satis-
fa&tion of Remembrance, and recollecting the Delights he
enjoyed; which is a kind of bringing them back again, and
an acting them over in Imagination a fecond time. Bur,
alas! this is a very poor and lame Satisfaction; and we
need no other proof of its being fo, than thofe dark and
imperfect Ideas, which the remembrance of a pleafant Dream
gives
ΜΠ Stmpxiictus’s Comment. 285
' gives us; for thofe of ἃ paft Pleafure are exaétly the fame,
every whit as feeble and imaginary.
But in regard there are fome Fleafures no way inconfiftent
' ‘with Duty, and right Reafon; fuch as thofe of the Mar-
*
riage-Bed, or Bathing after a Fever and the like; therefore
he adds one neceffary Caution more; That even thefe Plea-
fares, which may be innocent and convenient in themfelyes,
-fhould yet be fo tempered with a prudent Reftraint, that the
Gratefulnefs of them to Senfe do not overbear our Reafon.
Nor mutt we fo abfolutely give ourfelves up to the En-
joyment, as to be tranfported with Rapture and Joy. But
even then, when we allow ourfelves the Fruition, we
fhould check and correét the Exuberance of our Pleafure,
by a feafonable Reflexion, that Reafon ought always to be
‘uppermoft; and that it is infinitely more becoming and ad-
vantagious, to be above Senfe, than to be a Slave to it.
For indeed, this is as much more eligible, as the due Go-
vernment of our Paflions is better, than the living under
the Tyranny and Ufurpation of them; as much more No-
ble, as Reafon is Superiour to Inftin&, and the Dignity of
the Humane Nature above that of a Brute.
essa ou Cog aseCaeecmou a9 Ge
CTA PS LVI
HEN, upon mature Deliberation, you are
ΝΥ perfuaded a thing is fit to be done, do it
boldly; and do not affect Privacy in it, or concern
yourfelf at all what impertinent Cenfures or Re-
_flexions the World will pafs uponit. For if the
thing be not Juft and Innocent, it ought not to
be attempted at all, tho’ never fo fecretly. And
if it be, you do very foolifhly to ftand in fear of
thofe, who will themfelves do ill, in cenfuring and
condemning what you do well.
COMMENT.
Here is not any thing for which Epictetus feems more
concern’d, than that Virtue fheuld be chofen for Vir-
tue’s fake; that fo the Good we do might be complete
ὃ and
.
286 Eprecretus’s Morals :
and perfect, when done our of a jult fenfe and value of its
own intrinfick Worth, without any fordid Allays, or indi-
net Ends, fuch as the Opinion of the World, and the de-
fire of Applaufe atid Reputation particularly. For whoe-
ver choofes Good upon this account, make this, and not
doing well, his ultimate End, that is, indeed, his Good.
Now if a Man hath confulted his own Reafon, and is
upon good Grounds convinced, That fuch and fuch a thing
ought not to be done; no confidetation whatfoever fhould
prevail upon him to do it, becaufe it ought not to be done.
Again, if upon a grave and wife Debate with himfelf, he
come to a Refolution, That it fhould be done, and do it
in this Perfuafion; it is moft fenfelefs and freaking to en-
deavour the concealing of it, from any apprehenfions of the
Conftrudtions other People will put upon it. For if He be
right in refolving , They cannot be fo, in itterpreting it to
his Difadvantage; and at this rate, a Man betrays lefs Ho-
nour and Regard for a real Good, (for fuch is a wife and
virtuous Action) than he does for a feeming Evil; (for
fuch is a falfe Opinion, and malicious Cenfure.) And in-
deed, generally {peaking , this is the Cafe of the Errors and
Mifapprehenfions of the Vulgar: which Men ftand in fo
much fear of, and are fo apt to forego, or at [εδῇ to difown
the Pra@tice of Virtue, left they fhould fall under them. |
From hence likewife refults another very mifchievous
Effet, which is, That the Conclufions and Di@ates of
right Reafon fhould be look’d upon as Evil. For fo they
plainly are, when Men decline and difavow them, fince
nothing is ever fhunn’d or difclaimed, but under the Notie
on of Evil.
Farther yet, there is a Third great Incotivenience confe-
quent upon taking thefe mean and indireét Methods; which
is, YFhat fuch a Man turns Deferter to Virtue, and runs
away from the true Standard of all his Behaviour, wz.
the Nature of the A@ions themfelves, and the Judgment
and Teftimony of his own Breaft; and gives himlelt up en-
tirely to be governed by common Opinion, expeéts no Hap-
pinefs but what Applaufe can give him, tears no Mifery but
Cenfure and Reproach, and is fo bigotted to the World,
as utterly to renounce his own Reafon, and think nothing
Good or Evil, True or Falfe, but what Common Fame
declares to be fo.
CHAP.
with ΨῚ ΜΡ Liciuss Comment. 287
C HAP. LVIIL.
© S this Sentence, It is Day, and, It is Night,
£X if you take it apart, is moft true; but if
“you join it together, is abfolutely falfe: So for a
Man, at a publick Entertainment, to carve himfelf
the beft and greateft fhare; though if he confider
his own Body fingly, it might be well enough 5 yet
in regard of that Common Right, which this In-
Vitation gives to all that are prefent, it is moft un-
‘becoming and unreafonable. And therefore, when
you eat abroad, remember, you are to look farther
than the bare fatisfying of your own Appetite, and to
obferve all that Decency and Refpeét, which is due,
both to the Company you are joyned with, and to
the Mafter of the Houfe, that invited you.
COMMENT.
ἍΝ Stoicks are particularly nice and fubtle, in illuftra-
Ἢ ting and arguing from Hypothetical Syllogifms: And.
thefe are of two forts, One they call Disjunétive, the Other
Conjunétive or Complex. The Disjundive are fuch as con-
fit of contradi@ory parts, fo that if one be true, the other
muft needs be falfe; and if the one be falfe the other is
certainly true. Asforinftance; when] fay, It is either Day
or Night, but it is Night, therefore st is not Day. Thus by
affirming the one part, “you deny the other; and by deny-
ing the one, you affirm the other: As when 1 make my
Affamption thus; ὁπό it is aot Day, and conclude from
thence, therefore it is Night; or, but i is not Night, therefore
it is Day. And fuch a Disjunétive Propofition as this,
whofe-patts are inconfiftent, (as when we fay, It is either
Day or Night,) is received as an Axiom ; that is, as a Truth
felf-evident, fuch as is plain and agreeable to the Common
Senfe and Notions of all Mankind. For fuch Propotitions
the Srozcks ufed to call Axioms. mE 2 νη:
Now a Complex Propofition confifts of two Parts; but
thefe fuch, as have a neceflary connexion with, and depen-
lea Ν Ζ dence
288 Epicrertus’s Momls
dence upon, one another. So that if one be allowed, the.
other follows in courfe; for which occafion they are very
properly termed, the Antecedent arid the Confequent. And
the Condition of thefe Propofitions is this; That if you af-
:
firm the Antecedent, you eftablifh the Confequent; but if’ |
you deny the Confequent, you overthrow the Antecedent
at the fametime. For inftance, this is a true Conjun@ion,
If it be Day, it is mot Night; becaufe/upon this Antecedent,
It is Day, the Affumption follows, But if it be Day, it is not
Night; fo that putting this into one Complex Propofition,
the Antecedent infers the Confequent ; for thus you proceed,
But it is Day, therefore it ἐς not Night. And fo likewife if
you deny the Confequent, you deny the Antecedent alfo;
as if you fay, But 12 25 zot mot Night ( which is as muchas to
fay that it is, for the two Negatives here make one Affir-
mative) therefore it is wot Day. And this is a Cafe of a
Conjunétive or Complex Propofition, &nd the Rule it pro-
ceeds upon. "
Let us now fee, what ufe Epidetus makes of this, an
how he applies it to his prefent purpofe. This Propofition,
It is either Day, or Night, ina disjun@tive Syllogifm, he tells
us, Carries its own Evidence along with it, and is uncon-
teftably true. But in a Conjun@ive Syllogifm the cafe is
much otherwife. For when thefe two parts are brought in-
to one Complex Propofition, then to affirm the ome, we
muft deny the other; and the Sentence muft of neceflity run
thus, Jf it be Day, it is ot Night. Now then (fays he) as,
this Disjun@tive Propofition, in a Disjun@ive Syllogifm, is
moft true, becaufe the whole Argument depends upon it,
and all the ftrefs lies in the oppofition of the parts thus dis-.
joyned; but in a Complex Propofition it is moft falfe, for,
the Conjun@tion is there torn afunder, by the neceflary in-
fertion of the Negative Particle, If # be Day, it is not Night :.
So likewite at a publick Entertainment, however it may be
for the Advantage of a Man’s own Body to carve the beft
for one’s felf, and to {cramble for the greateft fhare; yet,
this is abfolutely inconfiftent with the Equity and Common
Right of Humane Society at all fuch publick Meetings... For
a Man is not here to !ook upon himfelf, as a Disyundtive,
and to act as if he fteod.fingle;, but to confider himfelf in
conjunétion with the το! of the Company, and to be guilty
of nothing, to break that ConjunGion,, by infringing the Pri-
Vileges which 116 in-common, and engrofling any fuch for
his own. private ntere{t. ry: eee onl "
ὦ
iat ; : | When
«2... σξ
with ΘΙΜΡΙΙΟΙν 5.5 Ὁοπηίποητ, 289
When therefore you dine in Company (fays he) do not
regard the Cravings of your own Appetite, nor pick out the
choiceft part of the Dinner to gratifie your own Palate. But
confider, that there is another Duty, befides what you owe
τὸ your own Body; a Duty of mutual participation, and
affuming no more, than what you are content to allow to
Others, who have indeed equal pretenfions with your Self.
Now nothing can be more manifeft, than that by this in-
ftance of a Feaft, Epicferws meant a great deal more than
he hath expreffed. He intended no doubt, that we fhould
ftretch this Rule to all the affairs of Humane Life, which
concern others as well as ourfelves, and to all our Com-
merce and Dealing with one another. For all greedinefs,
and grafping at more than belongs to us, Ioofens and breaks
the Bonds of Humane Society, which can never be main=,
tain’d otherwife, than by allowing every body the fhare due
to him. Of how great efficacy this is towards uniting Men
together, and making that Union durable and ftrong, be-
fides what common Experience teaches us, we have an in-
fiance, even in the worft and vileft Men. For the very
Combinations of Thieves and publick Robbers, though thefe
Men have caft off all the Ties of Juftice and Common Ho-
nefty, are yet preferved, fo long as they keep to the private
Agreements made among themfelves, and are content, that
the Booty fhotild be divided equally. And fure ftri& Jufticé
inuft needs cemient Men very ftrongly, when even this fee-
ble imitation of it can go fo far, in confirming and main-
taining a Community founded in Injuttice:
_ So then, after the various Dire€tions and Exhortations in
the foregoing parts of this Book, Some of which were de-
figned to excite Men to true Freedom, Some to recommend
Fortitude, Others Generofity, and Greatnefs of Soul, O-
thers Prudence, and Temperance: This Chapter is defigned
to make Men juft; and, in order to the effecting this, to re-
move firft of all that greateft obftruétion to it, whichis A-
varice, and an inordinate Defire of more than in ftriétnefs
belongsto us. ὁ
BE RR
ὧν ae
Za CHAP.
2... Ἐριοτετυβ᾽8 Morals
CUREA'P. ὭΣ,
: F you. take upon you a Character above your ca+
-& pacity, you fall into this two-fold Inconveni-
ence, firft to mifcarry in what you have undertaken,
~and then toslofe the opportunity of undertaking
fomewhat elfe mote proportionable to your ability,
_ in which you. might have come off with Honour,,
COMMENT.
we are not always to aim at that Good, which is moft
/¥ noble and excellent in itfelf, but that for which we
are beft qualified, and which is moft fuitable to our own
Circumftances. For there never comes any good Of extra-
vagant Undertakings. So that we fhall do well to proceed
leifurely , in the choice of the Figure we defire to make in
the World, and not afpire to things above us.. An eminent
Orator, or a Philofopher ina Commonwealth; a Pilot, or
Mafter in.a Ship; a Prince, or publi¢k Magiftrate in a State:
Thefe Chara@ters look great and gay; but every body is not
cut out for them, And it is much more graceful, for a
Man to aét in a lower Station, where he fills his Poft, and
tops his part; than to bein a higher, which he cannot come
upto, nor difcharge the Duties of, with that decency and ap-
plaufe that is expected. Thus a Man had better be a good
Other, and teach the firft grounds of Learning well, than.
an unable Mafter, who cannot finifh what is well begun.
And it is more defirable to be an honeft and prudent Ma-
nager of a private Family, than a bad Governour of a City
or Nation. For, befides the prejudice fich perfons do them-
felves, in not coming up to the Dignity ot a Character too
lofty for them, (which mifcarriage I would have rated, not
by the Approbation of the Cenfure of the World, but aecord-
ing to the real Nature of the Character itfelf) they are unfor-
tunate in another refpe&. For they have not only come off
very {curvily in attempting what they were not fit for; but
they have alfo flipp’d an opportunity of behaving themfelves _
well, and gaining applaute in fomething elfe, which they
were fitfor. For itis in Human Life, as itis in a Play -houfe,
2 eX where
ΩΝ
with 5 ΡΥ ΤΟτῦ 5.5 Comment. 29%
_ ‘where the Praife is due, not to the Part, but to the Perfor-
mance; and he that plays a Servant well, is look’d upon.
with mote approbation, and reputed a better Aftor, than
he that attempts to play a Man of Honour, ora Prince,
and does it ill. sae :
- This Chapter too feems to have a more immediate regard
‘to Equity and Juftice ; for it advifes every body to be con-
tént with that part, which Providence fees fitteft for them
upon this Stage of Life; that they fhould not affect Cha-
' aéters above them, nor be defirous of, or diffatisfied with,
‘thofe that are affigned to other People.
FRORVHHGBGR BS GSMGABOGSOw
CHA P.-LX.
iA in walking it is your great Care, not to run’
your Foot upona Nail, or to tread awry, and
ftrain your Leg; fo let it be in all the Affairs of
Humane Life, not to hurt your Mind, or offend
your Judgment. And this Rule, if obferved care-
fully in all your deportment, will be a mighty fee
curity to you in your Undertakings.
COMMENT.
. i ys Soul of Man is injur’d or wounded two ways:
dg Either, when it is pricked with brutifh Inelinations,
and vehement Paflions, which faften it to the Body: in which
it makes fome refiftence, but yet is overpowered by the pre-
vailing force of Paffion, and yields at laft, though with re-
lu@ancy, Or elfe, when its Judgment is perverted, and the
Byafs of fenfual Objeéts draw itfo ftrongly, that it does not
᾿ make any diftin@tion betwixt its own rational Nature, and
the other inferiour and irrational parts, which are the Seat
τ of the Paffions. é
This excellent Guide therefore warns us to havea care of
both thefe Inconveniences, and to proceed warily in all the
Affairs.of Humané Life, as we do, when we would tread
fure in walking. We mult decline thofe brutifh Appetites ,
which gall ana wound the Soul; and fix wholly upon bo-
. 43 - dily
ἄρν Epicteruss Morals
dily OGje&s, and faften down the Soul to the Body much
ftronger and clofer, than any Nail can poffibly join mate-
rial things; for they make the Mind forget itfelf, and mi-
ftake thefe Affections, and the Body they ferve, for one; and
the fame Subftance.. |
This therefore is analogaus to piercing the Foot with a
Nail. But the Other Misfortune, that of a perverted Judg-
‘ment, he refembles to treading awry, and ftraining, or put-
ting our a Leg; becaufe this Error af the Mind proceens
from the Imagination, that part which is loweft in the Soul,
as the Foot is in the Body; and by which it holds corref-
pondence with the corporeal and animal Life. And the Ad-
vice he gives upon this occafion is, that, as we take care
to keep our Body upright when we walk, fo we fhould be
‘exceeding cautious and tender of the Soul, when it goes 8-
broad, and concerns itfelf in the Affairs of the World;
That the Faculty of Reafon, which is predominant in our
Minds, and the very Character and Prerogative of Humane
Nature, make no falfe fteps; Thatit donot forget itfelf, or
its Authority; That it be neither giddy through eagernefs of
Defire, and heat of Paffion, or grow corrupt, and dull, ‘and
ftupid, through Sloth and Effeminacy. — Le 8
And if we did but manage our felves with the fame wa-
rinefs in our AGions, as we do in our fteps: If we would |
ut look before us conftantly, and be fure to take good
ooting, this he tells us, would be a mighty fecurity to us
in all our Undertakings. For, though Humane Nature will
be the fame ftill, and all our Vigilance cannot fet it abfo-
lutely above Error and Frailty; yet the ill Confequences of
thefe Infirmities would be in a great. meafure preyented.
We might flip, but we fhould not fall; and the flips we did
make, would be but few, and thofe eafily recover’d too.
For thus: we find, that when through fome little incogitan-
cy we happen to touch upon a Nail, or make a falfe ftep;
a {mall recollection will ferve the turn, to difengage our
Foot, before the Nail hath run in too deep; and to correct
that Trip, which was but a flight one, and made before we
y “77 oe as \ : ot ie |
Were aware of it. =
ἐν δὴν get Se £3
CHAP.
Ὁ“
q
with SrmpLiciuss Comment. 293
ἌΝΩ Maks LXE
ΕΣ Neceflities of the Body are the proper
9 meafure of our Care for the things of the
World; and thofe that fupply thefe are enough,
as the Shoe is faid to fit the Man, which anfwers to
the bignefs of the Foot. But if once you leave this
_ Rule, and exceed thofe Neceffities, then you are
* carried into all the Extravagancies in the World.
‘Then you do not value your Shoe for fitting the
Foot, unlefs it be gilded too, and afterwards from
gilding you go to a rich Purple; and: from that a-
_ gain, to having it ftudded, andeet with Jewels.
. For when once a Man hath exceeded the bounds
of Moderation and Convenience, he never knows
where to ftop. ἘΠ
COMMENT.
ΤΣ are two things to be confidered in Clothes, and
= Diet, and Goods, and Eftate, and whatever elfe is requi-
fite for our Bodies, that is, the getting, and the ufing of
them. He hath informed us already, after what manner
they are to be ufed, and direéted to this purpofe. That
thofe wants of the Body, which are neceffary to be fuppli-
ed, fo as to render it ferviceable to the Soul ,. fhould deter-
_ mine this point. By which means all Superfluities are cut
off, and every thing which tends only to-Luxury and vain
Pomp. Now he tells us, what proportion we ought to be
content with, and What fhould be the meafure of our La-
bours and our Defires in the getting an Eftate; and This
he fays is the Body too. For the end of getting thefe things,
is, that we may ufe them ; as far then as they are of ule to
us, fo far, and in fuch proportions may we defire, and en-
deavour after them. . But they are only fo far ufeful, as they
become ferviceable to the Body, and fupply its neceffities.
Confequently , the Body, and its Wants, which determine
how far thefe things are capable of being ufed, do alfo de~
termine, how far they are fit to be defired, - and what
biel . Z4 τος meafure
29 ἘΡΙΟΤΕΤυ 5᾽5 Morals
meafure of them a Man ought in reafon to fit down fa-
tisfied with. . )
Let us look then at the Foot, for inftance, and fee what
wants it labours under, and what fupplies are fufficient for
it; and, when we have done fo, we fhall find, that good
plain Leather is all it needs. A good upper Leather, to
keep the Foot tight and warm; and a ftout Sole, to de-
fend the Ball of the Foot from being hurt by what it treads
upon. But now, if a Man bear regard to Ornament and
Luxury, as well as Ufe and Convenience; then nothing
Jefs than Gold, and Purple, and Jewels, will fervethe turn,
and one of thefe Extravaganciés only ferves to make way
for another. For, it feems, the Rowaxs were grown fo cu-
rious and vain, as to wear rich Purple Shoes, and Shoes fet
with precious Stones, and thefe were more exquilite and
modifh Vanities than gilded ones.
Now juft thus ἴξ is in getting, and fpending an Eftate.
When a Man hath once tranfgreffed thofe bounds, which
Nature and Neceffity have fet him, he wanders no body
knows whither; and is continually adding one foolifh Ex-
pence to another, and one idle Whimfey to another, till at
Jaft he be plunged over Head and Ears in Luxury and Vanity.
For thefe were the only Caufes of feducing him at firft; and,
when once he had broke loofe from his Meafures, a thoufand
imaginary Wants prefented themfelves, and every one of
thefe gave him as great a difturbance, as if they had been real
ones. - At firft he wanted only Ten thoufand Pound, then
Twenty ; and when he was poflefs’d of this, he wanted Forty,
as much as ever he did the firft Ten; fo he would a Hundred,
if he had Forty, and foto all Eternity; for he has now let his
eee loofe, and thefe are a boundlefs Ocean never to be
led.
Now nothing is more evident, than that thofe Defires
which do not keep within the bounds of Ufe and Conve-
nience, do, and muft needs, grow infinite and infatiable.
Not only, becaufe this is the laft Fence, and there is no-
thing left to ftop them afterwards; but becaufe we fee plain-
ly, that, when they exceed thefe things, they quickly ne-
gle& and difregard them too; forget the ends, to which they
are direGted, and inftead of preferving, fometimes deftroy,
the Body. Thus we often ruin our Health, and diftort our
Limbs, only for Ornament and Fafhion; and make thofe
very things our Difeafes, which Nature intended for Reme-
dies againit them. ake
n
with StmrpLiciuss Comment. σοῦ
And poffibly, upon this account more particularly, Epicfe-
tus might make choice of a Shoe to illuftrate his Argument.
For this inftance is the more emphatical and fignificant; be-
caufe, if we do not take care to fit the Foot, but make it
bigger than it ought to be, for Beauty and Ornament; it
hinders our going, inftead of helping us, and oftentimes
makes us ftumble, and fall very dangeroufly. Hence it is
plain, the Confiderations, which relate to our ufing the
things of the World, will give us great light into that part
of our Duty, which relates to the getting of them; and the
Rules, we are to be governed by , are in great meafure the
fame in both Cafes.
Thefe Chapters too, which prefcribe to us the Rules and
the Duty of Moderation, both in ufing and getting an Eftate,
may, in my Opinion, be very properly referred to the fame
common Head of Juftice, with the Former.
| * SURMNNI ee eEeS
CHAP. LXIL
Hen Womenare grown up to Fourteen, they .
δ begin to be courted and careffed; then they
think, that the recommending themfelves to the
A ffe&tions of the Men is the only bufinefs they have
to attend to, and fo prefently fall to tricking, and
drefling, and practifing all the little engaging Arts
peculiar to their Sex: In thefe they place all their
Ae as they do all their happinefs in the fuccefs
ofthem. But it is fit they fhould be given to un-
derftand, that there are other Attractives much more
- powerful than thefe; That the Refpeét we pay
' them, is not due to their Beauty, fo much as to
their Modefty, and Innocence, and unaffcéted Vir-
tue. And that thefe are the true, the irrefiftible
Charms, fuch as will make the fureft and moit latt-
ing Conquetts. |
CQ ἡ:
296 ἘΕΡΙΟΤΕΤῦυ 855 Morals
COMMENT. \
Ince he had in the foregoing Difcourfes allowed his Phi-
lofopher to marry, it was but reafonable, he fhould in-
ftruct him here, what Methods are moft proper to be made
ufe of inthe choice of a Wife, and which are her moft necefla-
ry and defirable Qualifications. ‘This therefore he does, in
fhort, but very fignificant Obfervations; fhewing what a
wife Man fhouldchiefly regard, and expofing at the fame time
the Mifchiefs, which the generality of Men fall into, by
taking wrong meafures. Moft People, fays he, when they
are difpofed to marry, look for a young and a beantiful Mi-
ftrefs; then they cringe, and flatter, and adore her; keepa
mighty diftance, and accoft her in the moft refpectful and
fubmiffive Terms imaginable; and the end of all this is no
other, than the enjoyment of her Perfon. The Women
know the meaning of all this well_enough, and manage
them/felves accordingly ; they drefs, and fet off their Perfons
to the beft advantage, and thefe are the Arts they ftudy to
recommend themfelves by.
Now in truth, though we declaim againft this Vanity and
Folly in that Sex, yet the Men are much more to blame,
than They. For the Original of all this Vanity is from our -
felves: And the Folly is Ours, when we pay fo much re-
ἔρεξε upon accounts that fo little deferve it. It is'in our
power to reform what we condemn, and it is our Duty to
do it. We fhould thew them, that no Beauty hath any
Charms, but the inward one of the Mind; and thata Grace-
fulnefs in their Manners is much more engaging, than that
of their Perfon and Mien. That Meeknefs, and Obedi-
ence, and Modefty, are the true and lafting Ornaments:
For fhe, that has thefe, is qualified as fhe ought to be, for
the management and governing of a Family, for the bear-
ing and educating of Children, for an affectionate and ten-
der Care of her Husband, and for fubmitting to a prudent
and frugal way of living. And when all is done, thefe,.
and thefe only, are the Charms and the Ornaments, which
render Wives amiable, and give them the beft Title to our
Honour and Refpect.
CHAP.
αὐτῆ SimpLicrus’s Comment. 297
ΟΕ AP... XU.
ry Here is no furer fign of Stupidity and want of
- Senfe, than to trifle away a great deal of rime
in things relating to the Body; as to be long at Ex-
ercife, or at Meals, or in Drinking, or in the other
Functions of Nature. For we ought to look upon
all that is done to the Body, as things by the bye;
and upon the Improvement of the Soul, as that
which challenges’ our ‘Time, and is the true and
᾿ main End and Bufinefs of our Lives.
COMMENT.
S Men of excellent Parts and noble Difpofitions, are al-
ways aiming at fomething manly and brave, and afpire
eafter as high degrees of Accuracy and Perfection, as their
Nature can carry them up to: So fluggifh and heavy Souls
are ever employing themfelves, in fomething that is little,
and vulgar, and infignificant, where they hope to meet with
no Difficulty, and from: whence they are fure to reap, no
Honour. So that, when we confider Man, as he is a Crea-
ture, whofe very Effence is a Reafoning Soul, and whofe
Body is:‘only the Inftrument of that Soul, contrived for her
Ufe, and to be employed at her Pleafure; for fuch a one, I
fay, to concern himfelf very little inthe Operations of theSoul,
but to Jet That lie idle and uncultivated, while all his Time
and Pains are beftowed upon the Body; argues a mighty De-
fe&t in Nature, and indeed can fcarce proceed from any other
Caufe, than fuch a Defect. For what Artificer of any Note
or Skill at all would fpend his whole time upon fcouring his
Tools; without putting them to the Ufes they were intended
for, and following his Trade with them? And yet this fenfe-
lefs Wretch is every Man, who. applies all his Care and
Time to the Service of-his Body, and neglects his Mind.
But in Truth, this mighty Affiduity upon the Body,. does
not only betray want of Senfe, but excefs of Paffion too.
For thé time we fpend upon any Object, is ufually propor-
tioned-to the Pleafure we take in it, and the Affe@tion we
have for it. - And for this Reafon, we ought to look npn
Ree ᾿ he Λ εἶ ᾿ . : ͵ " al
298 Erictstvus’s Morals
all the Pains we are at upon the Body, only as a thing by
the bye; to have very little Tendernefs for, and take but
fmall Satisfaction in it; and to transfer all thefe things to
an Objeét more worthy of them, even that Soul, whofe In-
‘ftrument and Servant this Body is; for they are all its due:
and this is the true Meafure and Rule, by which we fhould be
governed, inthe diftribution of our,Services to each of them.
CH AR Iv...
Hen any Man does you an Injury, or reflects
ἣν upon your Good Name, confider with your
felf, that he does this out of a. Perfuafion, that it
is no more than what you deferve, and what be-
comés him to fay or do. And it cannot be expe&-
ed, that Your Opinion of things, but his. own,
fhould give Law to his Behaviour. Now if, that
Opinion of his be Erroneous, the Misfortune is not
Yours, but His, who is thus led into Misftakes
‘ concerning you.. For the Truth of a Propofition
~ is not fhaken one whit, by a Man’s. fuppofing ‘it
to be falfe; the Confequence is not the worfe, but
the Perfon who judges amifs of-it 156. Such Con-
fiderations as thefe may ferve to difpofe you to Pa-
tience and Meeknefs; and by degrees you will be
able to bear the moft fcurrilous Reproaches, and
think the bittereft and moft infolent Traducer worth
no other Return, than this mild Anfwer, That
thefe, it feems, mitre ον of you, and it is
not ftrange, that this Man fhould vent his own
Opinion treely, and a&t according to it, © '
: COMMENT.
ὝΩΙ S Chapter is plainly intended to perfuade us to bear
Injuries with Meeknefs and Moderation; The Argu-
ments made ufe to this purpofe, are Two. Th
Θ
with Simpuicius’s Comment. 299
fo do all the World. So that it would be a moft extrava-
gant and fenfelefs thing, for me to be angry, for his aéting.
according to Nature, and upon a Principle univerfally con-
fented to by- all Mankind.
But you will fay perhaps, That his following his own
Opinion is not the thing you quarrel. with, but the enter-
taining an ill Opinion of you, for which there is no Ground
or Colour of Juftice. Now, upon Examination of this Pre-
tence too, it will be found, that you have not at all mend-
ed the Matter, but that this is as ridiculous and abfurda
Paffion, as the other. For if he have done you no harm,
where is the Provocation? and that it is plain he hath not;
for no Body is the worfe for it, but himfelf. He that thinks
he does well when he really does il], and miftakes Falfhoods
for Truth, is under a dangerous Delufion, and fuffers ex-
treamly by his Error. And therefore the Man who injures
your Perfon or your Reputation, does but wound himfelf
all the while: And this he does more effectually, and to
his own greater Prejudice, than it is poflible for You in the
height of all your defired Revenge, or for the moft Potent
and malicious Enemy in the World, to do. For whatever
the World commonly efteems moft noxious, can reach no
farther than the Body, or the External Enjoyments; and
cconfequently does not, in ftriét fpeaking, hurt the Man him-
felf: But Error is a Blemifh upon the Soul, an Evil which
affeéts his Effence, and taints the very diftinguifhing Cha-
raéter of the Human Nature.
Now, that the Perfon who entertgius this falfe Opinion,
and ποῖ Ἧς concerning whom it is entertained, receives all
the Prejudice by it, he proves beyond all Contradiction, -by
the Inftance of a complex Propofition. For, fuppofe one
fhould fay, Lf it be Day, thew the Sun is above the Horizon,
and another Perfon fhould maintain that this is falfe; his
ftanding out againft it, does not in any degree weaken the
Truth of the Affertion, nor invalidate the neceflary depen-
ἈΝ dence
300 Epictetus’s Morals
dence of the Two Parts of it upon each other: It remains
in the fame Petfection ftill; but the Perfon; who judges
amifs concerning it, does not fo. Thus the Man who af-’
fronts or traduces you, contrary to all the Rules of Jufti¢e,
and Honour, and Duty, injures himfelf, but You continue
untouch’d; and neither the Edge of the Weapon, nor the
Venom of his Tongue can enter you. | Efpecially if you are,
as you ought to be, fully convinced, that there is no fuch ’
thing as Good or Evil to be had from any thing, but what
falls within the Compafs of our own Choice. ᾿
When therefore you have called up your Reafon, and
have reflected, firft, how natural it is for every Man to be
governed by his own Senfe of things; and then, that the
Injury does not really reach you, but falls back upon the
Perfon who vainly intended it for you; this will cool your
Paffion, and fill you with a generous Difdain. You will
think his impotent Malice deferves ro be flighted only, and’
may check both his Folly, and your own Refentment, with
fome fuch fcornful return as this, That be does but what all
the World do; for though all are not of the fame mind, yet.
in that vaft variety of Opinions every Man aéts according »
to his Own.
ΕΥ̓ΤΥΨΥΥΥΥΤΥΥΥΥΥΥΧΥΥΨΥΥΎΥ
CHAP. LXV.
ἘΠῚ thing hath two Handles: the One foft
and manageable, the Other fuch as will not en-
dure to be touched. If thenyour Brother do you an
Injury, do not take it by the hot and hard handle,
_ by reprefenting to your {elf all the aggravating Cir-
cumftances of the Faét; but look rather on the.
foft fide, and exteguate it as much as is potlible, by
confidering the nearnefs of the Relation, and the
long T’riendfhip and Familiarity between you, O-
bligations to Kindnefs, which a fingle Provocation
ought not to diffolve. And thus you will take the .
accident by its manageable handle.
CO Ms
with SimpxLicius’s Comment. 301
went asinignd 9G MAE E Ν᾿ ἢ
LL the parts of this material World are compofed of
A different Principles and contrary Qualities: From
whence it comes to pafs, that in Some refpects they agree,
and can fubfift together, and in Others they are oppofite ,
and incompatible, and deftructive of one another. Thus
the Fire hath two Qualities of hot and dry, moft remarkable
in it. With regard to its Heat, it agrees well with the Air,
and is compatible with it; but its Drought is repugnant to
the moi(fture of the Air, and contends with it, and deftroys
ir. And this Obfervation holds in Moral, as well as Natu-
ral Philofophy. For thus an Injury received from a Brother,
hath two Handles, and is capable of different Conftructions
and different Refentments, according to that Handle we take
it by. Confider the Man, my Brother, my Friend, my old
Play-fellow, and Familiar, and this is the foft and pliable fide,
it difpofes me to Patience and Reconciliation, and Kindnefs.
But if you turn the other fide, and regard only the Wrong,
the Indignity, the unnatural Ufage of fo near a Relation:
this is the untractable part; it will not bear the Touch, and
difpofes to nothing but Rage and Revenge. Now it is plain,
that what we efteem light and very tolerable, is entertained
by us with Eafinefs and Patience, and makes no change in
our Cheerfulnefs and Temper; but what we look upon as
_ grievous and infupportable, leaves very angry Refentments
and melancholy Impreflions, and utterly difcompofes the |
Evennefs and Quiet of our Minds. This is ‘the natural re-
fult of fuch Accidents, and fuch Apprehenfions. But now,
fince it is our Duty always to preferve the Mind fedate
and calm, -not to fuffer it either to be dejeéted with Grief
and Sullennefs, or ruffled with Anger; fince we are obliged
to bear whatever happens to us with Patience and Modera-
tion; and fince all things have two handles, one that will,
and the other that will not, abide the Touch; It is plain
that the way to difcharge this Obligation, is always to lay
hold on the right and the traétable handle. For in Truth,
all. things whatfoever, Riches and Poverty, Health and Sick-
nefs, Marriage and Celibacy, ‘Children and no Childten,
and to be fhort, all the Accidents of human Life, are jult
as you ufe and receive them: They have both their Conve-
wniences to recommend them, and their Inconveniences to
Jefien our elteem of them.
reP ae
Thus
302 Epr1eretus’s Morals
Thus Riches are detirable, it you confider the Advan-
tages of Plenty, and this is their foft Handle; but then they
are attended with infinite Care, acquired with Toil, poflefs’d
with Fear, lo{t with Remorfe and Trouble; and thefe Anxi-
eties are allays and abatements upon them, and their untra-
ctable Handle. Poverty feems very tolerable, when we re-
fiec&t upon the Quiet and the undifturbed Retirements of that’
State ; but if we tura the Tables, and obferve the Indigence
and Dependence of it, the Negle&, and the Scorn that it
expofes one to, thefe make it very dreadful and almoft in-
{upportable. Health is very defirable, upon the account of
that perfe&t Eafe and Freedom we enjoy with it; the Vi-
gour of our Spirits, and the ready and punétual Obedi-
ence of all our Parts, in difcharging their refpe&tive Duties :
But even This hath its Incumbrances too, the Arrogance —
and affuming Pride, and that Confidence in their own
Strength, to which. fulnefs of Blood commonly expofes
Men. Sicknefs appears a very tolerable Evil, when we re-
fle&, that, as the Spirits are low, fo are the Pafflions too,
and the Mind is then more free and undifturbed: But the
Faintings, and Languifhings, and Uneafinefs of a fick Bed,
are the hard and the heavy Handle. Marriage is recommended
to us by the fatisfaGtion of having Iffue of our own ; the en-
der Care and mutual Affe&tion of both Parties; but then it
hath its Bitter, as well as its Sweet, the multiplying of
Cares, and creating new Wants to one’s felf, an inordinate
Fondnefs, and a perpetual Uneafinefs and Fear for thofe —
we love fodearly. And furely the want of Children, which
is commonly efteemed fo mighty an Unhappinefs, hath a
great deal to extenuate it; for this leaves a Man free and eafie,
qualifies him to encounter with any Difficulties, delivers
him from that anxious Concern, which the Care and Des
pendence of a Family muft of neceflity diftra@ him with;
it allows him leifure for attending betrer Studies, and dif-
engages him from that extravagant Folly, of making himfelf
a Slave to the World, and enjoying nothing while he lives,
that he may leave a little more to his !'amily when he dies ;
and, which in my Opinion is the greateft misfortune of all,
it brings him under no Temptation of Indulgence and Fond-
nefs for lewd and ungracious Children. For though their be-
ing fuch isa mighty AffliGion, yet, alas! we too often make
it a greater to our felves; and love their very Vices, becaufe
our own Children are guilty of them. Even Infolencies, —
aud Injuries, and Affronts, have fomething aah
- them;
with StimpLicivus’s Comment. 303
them; for very often, when Men reproach us, they bring us
better acquainted with our own Concerns, and tell us
fomething we did not know before; but, to be fure, they
always minifter occafions of Patience, and exercife our Vir-
tue. Corporal Pains and Punifhments are of all others the
moft formidable to humatie Nature; and yet the Anguith of
thefe would be mitigated, and we fhould in fome degree be
reconciled to them, did we but refleét what good they do
us, did we confider, that they try the Soul, as Fire does
Metals, and purifie it from its Drofs. And if there were
no other Benefit to be had from them, yet the very enduring
them with Courage and Conttancy is itfelf a very great one.
And much more it is for a Man’s real advantage, to fall
into Afflictions and behave himfelf gallantly under them,
than never to be diftreffed or affli€ted at all. For the efcap-
ing AffliGtions is only a piece of good Fortune, which reaches
to the Body, or the Eftate, and no farther; but the bearing
them with Fortitude and Decency is a Happinefs of the Soul,
and what the Man is properly the better for. Nay, latftly,
to fhew that there neither is, nor can be, any thing without
the Two Handles we fpeak of, even our Enemies themfelves
have them ; and it is avery feafible thing to make a Benefit
of Them too; For theit Spight awakens our Care, puts us
upon examining into our own Paffions and Failings more
nicely ; and the knowing, how curious they will be to ob-
᾿ ferve, and how pleafed to find our Faults, renders us moré
circum{peét and wary in all our Behaviour. And thefe are
fuch valuable Confiderations, that P/atarch thought it worth
his while to write a Traét * on purpofe upon this Subjeét,
to fhew, how a Man may manage himfelf fo, as to improve
the Malice of his Enemies, and convert it to his own Ad-
vantage.
G6 SHE ANE Se HE SEE χε BEE HG BSR SS BOE RG SD Se 586 26 ARE ΜῈ ae δε AN a δε ὅδε ME δε δὲ He ΜῈ δὴ aE
CHAP. LXVI.
r Here is no Confequence or neceflary Connexi-
on at all between thefe Affertions: 1 am richer
than you, therefore I am a better Man than you;
. » Plutarch, Moral, Tom, 1. ats ἂν vis var’ ex Degy ὠρελοῖτος
; a Or,
304 Ἐριστῆτυ 595 Morals
or, Tam more learned, or eloquent than you, there-
fore 1 am better than you. But all the Inference
“that can be made from fuch Comparifons, 15 only
_ this: Tamaricher Man than you, therefore my
Eftate is larger than yours; [am more Eloquent than.
you, therefore my Expreflions are more propery and
my Style more delicate than yours. And what is all
this to the purpofe? for neither the Eftate nor the
Style is the Man: and confequently Thefe may be
_ the better, and yet You may not be one whit the
_ better. .
COMME N'T.
EN of Letters commonly thew their Talent in quaint-.
nefs of Expreflion and exaét Compofition: which is
a nicety unbecoming a Philofopher, except this Faculty were
inftilled very early, and grew up with him; fo that Educa-
tion and long Cuftom have made him fo great a Mafter of
Language, that his Rhetorick be not laboured or aftected,
but flow naturally from him. And even the Man who is
thus happy, muft not value himfelf upon it; becaufe this is
not the End a Philofopher ought to aim at, nor the peculiar
Excellence of human Nature. Elegance is properly what
fuch Studies pretend to; and he that fucceeds well! in them,
gains the Reputation of a good Poet, or a good Hiftorian.
But he that aipires to the Character of a Good Man, ‘and
defires to diftinguifh himfelf by a Life conformable to the
beft Reafon, propofes an End agreeable to fuch a Life; and
confequently cannot have any pretence to prefer himfelf be-
fore another, for any advantages of Eloquence which he
may have above him. For there is a wide difference; be-
tween fuch a one’s Eloquence and himfelf: Nor is this the
effential Property and Prerogative of his Nature, that he
fhould receive his Denomination from it, as every Artificer
is diftinguifhed by his Profeffion. All the boaft then, that
can be allowed him in this cafe, comes only. to thus much,
My Language is better than yours. And this Inftance is what
Ε the rather have chofen to infift upon, becaufe I imagine,
Epidtetus bis main intention here, was to give his Philofo-
pher a Check, for-that fuperftitious Nicety very common a-—
mong them, of being over-curious and elaborate in their
Compo-
with StmpLicius’s Comment. 305
Gompofitions, and fpending too much time and pains about
Words. But, becaufe this was a tender point, that other
Inftance of the Richer Man’s exalting himfelf is added, the
better to cover his Defign, and make the Reproof the fofter.
‘
CONTI
CHAP. LXVIL :
[ F any Man bathes too foon, do not you prefent-
ly fay, He hath done ill in it; but only, that
he did it early. If a Man drink a great deal of
Wine, do not cenfure him for having done ill; but
only fay, ‘That he drinks a great deal: For how
is it poflible for You to know whether he did 11
or no, unlefs you were confcious of his Intentions,
and faw the Grounds he went upon? And this Cau-
tion, which | here advife you, isthe only way to,
prevent that common Injury and Inconvenience, of
determining rathly upon outward. appearances, and
denouncing peremptorily concerning things that
you do not know.
COMMENT. ha
He would have us proceed in our Judgment of Menand
i 1 AGions, with great accuracy and. circum{pection:
Not to be too forward in giving our Opinion,of any kind,
either in praife or difpraife, acquitting or condemning. of
them, till we are firft well fatisfied of the. Perfon’s Intenti-
on, what Reafons he proceeded upon, and what End he di-
rected itto. For thefe are the very Confiderations which
make, an A@ion formally good or evil; and according as
thefe vary, they may deferve a very different Interpretation.
Thus a Man may give Blows, and do good in it (if this
be intended to correct a Fault; ) he may give one Subitance
to his prejudice (if.it be defiyned to feed his Difeafe; ) nay,
matters may befo ordered,. that Stealing fhall be an A& of
γὰνΝ Maia Jaftice,
206. .. Erictetus’s Morals
a ae
Juftice, and Reftitution an Inyury, as if the Obje& of Both
be a Mad-man’s Sword.
If then we would deal honeftly and fairly, we muft judge
of Aétions according to the Circumftances that appear to us,
and as they are in themfelves. When we fee a Man bathe
before the ufual Hour, all we fhould fay of it is, That he
hath done it early; without pretending to determine the
Quality of the Fa@, or calling it good or evil, till we
Know what it was that moved him to do fo. Poffibly he
was obliged to fit up all Night, and wanted this Refrefh-
ment to fupply his lofs of Sleep. Now this and the like
are very material Confiderations; for a Man’s motives and
intention quite alter the nature of the thing. You ought
not then to be too hafty in paffing Judgment upon this Bath-
ing out of courfe; for till thefe things are known, the Qua-
lity of the Faé& does not lie before you, nor have you any
Matter to proceed upon. Thus again, a Man may drink a
larger proportion of Wine than otdinary , and there may be
feveral Reafons which will juftifie him in it; the Conftituti-
on of his Body, or the Seafon of the Year, or the Tempe-
rament of the Air, may make it neceffary. And confe-
quently, what rafh and bufie People are apt to condemn,
when well enquired into, proves no more than Duty and
Prudence; done to fatisfie Nature, or to fupport the Spirits
in faint fultry Weather, or to keep out moift Fogs or petti-
Tential Vapours. :
Now if we do thus, as he advifes, and ftop at the A@tions
themfelves, without prefuming to applaud or to condemn
them, till we have throughly examined into the Grounds of
them, and are fatisfied of the Man’s Difpofition and Defign ;
we decline an Injuftice and an Inconvenience, which other-
wife it is impoffible to avoid. And that is, the knowing one
thing, and judging another; the determining more than we
have Evidence for. For in both the Inftances before us,
nothing appears but the outward Aét, and its Circumftances ;
that the Bathing was early, that the Wine was much; but the
Caufes of thefe do not appear, upon which depends the
moral Good or Evil of the thing; and yet the bufie World
are ever giving their definitive Sentence in this point too.
And what can be more rafh, more injurious, more abfurd
than this, from what they do fee, peremptorily to pronounce
of what they do not fee? ;
Now fince the Minds of Men, and the fecret Springs of ©
their Actions, do fo very feldom fall within our ee
ΕΓ .* take
with StmPxLicius’s Comment. 307
take Ep:detus his Defign here to be, the diffuading us in ge-
neral from judging Men at all. And indeed it is but prudent
for our Own fakes, as well as fit for Theirs, to be very
{paring in this particular; that, by fufpending our Judgment,
Wwe may not fal! under the fhame of retracting it afterwards
upon better Information. And therefore he would not have
ms over-forward , either in our Cenfures, or our Commen-
dations; though he levelled this Chapter chiefly , no doubt,
againft the Condemning fide; becaufe the Injury done by
ταί Cenfures, is generally greater; and becaufe the Evil is a
great deal more popular. For the World is not rafh only,
but ill-natur’d too; they are apt and glad to find Faults,
and forward fometimes to make them. This bafe Praétice
therefore lay more direétly to the Author’s purpofe, which
was to inftruct us in another Branch of Juftice, one indeed
no lefs neceffary than any of the reft; viz. That which
concerns our Neighbour’s Reputation. .
ἀλιλοἠλιλολεήνλοηνῆν ἠρλρλοὴελελ ἡ detilok dilei gti total dlatoisiefbatatat
CHAP. -LXVIIL.
N Ever profefs yourfelf a Philofopher, nor talk
: much of Rules and wife Obfervations, among
the Ignorant and Vulgar; but let your Rules be
feen in your Practice. Thus, when your are at a
Publick Entertainment, difcourfe not of Tempe-
rance and Moderation to the Company; but let
your own Example teach it them; and remember
_ that Socrates upon all occafions declined Oftenta-
tion; infomuch, that when fome Perfons in deri-
fion came to him, and defired him to recommend
them to a Philofopher, he carried them to fome
who profefs’d themfelves fuch, without exprefling
the leaft Indignation at the Affront they had put
upon Him, aie ©
Aa3 CHAP.
308 Epictetus’s Morals |
ΓΑ aad Bi i,
AY, if you happen in Converfation with ig-
3 norant and common Men, though they flart
a Difcourfe concerning fome Points of Philofophy,
do your forbear joining with them in it: For when
Men are forward to vent their Notions, it is a
fhrewd fign they are not well digefted. It is pofli-
ble your Silence may be interpreted Ignorance,
and that fome of the Company may be confident,
and rude enough, to tell you fo. But if you hear
this Reproach without being concerned, then be
afflured, your Philofophy begins to have its due ef-
feé&: For, as Sheep do not give up again the Grafs
they have eaten, to fhew how well they are fed;
but prove the Goodnefs of the Pafture and their
own Cafe, by concocting their Meat well, and
bringing a large Fleece, and giving large quantities
of Milk; fo muft You approve the Excellence of
your Doétrines to the World, not by Difputes and
plaufible Harangucs, but by digeiting them into
Practice, and growing ftrong in Virtue. |
COMMENT.
Y this Paffage you may plainly perceive, that the Per-
fon addreft to, is not fuppofed to be a complete Phi-
lofopher; for fuch a one is inno danger of bringing up indi-
gefted Notions; nor can he need the Advice given tothat pur-
pofe, This is applicable only to one ftill in a ftate of Proba-
tion and Proficiency, who hath not yet abfolutely deliver-
ed his Mind from the importunate Paffions of Popularity,
and Self-conceit, and affecting to be thought wife. Vices,
which this Author hath taken great Pains to expofe and re-
form; as by other Arguments, fo particularly by ane, which
πε Method taken in this Chapter plainly infinuates; vz.
That as one cannot with any Truth fay, That the Brafs,
qhile it is melting down, is-a Statue, or thatan Embryo is a
3 Man;
Ν
with StmpxLicius’s Comment. 309
Man; fo neither can we, That a Perfon, who is ftill un-
der Difcipline and Proficiency, is a Philofopher. Thefe
are the rude and imperfe&t Beginnings of what is to come
after ; but they are not the Things themfelves. They are
the Matter under preparation, but they have not the Form,
which muft conftitute their Effence: | And, though they be
in neyer fo fair a Difpofition to receive it, yet till this is
done, they are not the perfect Beings, which they muft and
would be. But, though in Other cafes it be fufficient to
fay, That to call them fo were'a Breach of Truth, yet im
This That feems too gentle an Imputation: For there is,
ina truly Philofophical Life, fomething fo great and vene-
rable, fomething fo much above the common Condition of
Humane Nature, and fo very near approaching to Divine,
that the afcribing fuch exquifite Perfection to Perfons, who
are as yet only climbing up to it, may juftly feem, not
only a bold Falfhood, but an impious and blafphemous
one too.
Shall then that Man, who muft not: prefume to call him-
felf a Philofopher, take upon him the Office of one? Shall
he fet himfelf in the Chair, and think:it becomes Him, who
is but a Learner, to teach, and magifterially di@tate to o-
thers? No, certainly. It is fit he fhould know his diftance,
and keep it, But you'll obje&t, That this will be a mighty
Lindrance to his Profictency, by debarring him that Difcourfe
avith Men of lefs Attainments, which floould exerci[e and im-
prove bis Talent. Lanfwer, The Difcourfe Epictetus difal-
lows, is not fuch, as is intended for a Trial, but the Effect
of Vanity; nor is the Delign of it Advancement in Wif-
dom, bur Oftentation and Appiaufe. Well, but How mat
be behave himfelf in {ποῦ Conspany then? Why, the properett
_ and moft effectual courfe to recommend himfelf, will be,
to forbear the venting his Principles in Words, which is
but an empty and a very {fuperficial way of propagating
them; and to demonttrate the Power and Influence of them
in his AGtions. This is a fubftantial Argument, and an-
fwers the true End of Philofophy, which is not florid Ha-
rangue and nice Difpute, but prudent and unblamable Pra-
tice; for this was never intended to teach us to talk well,
but to live well. If therefore you be at a Publick Dinner, do
wot trouble yourfelf to read grave Lectures to the Company, con-
_ cerning Temperance in Eating, and its juft Bounds and Mea-
fares; but take care to obferve thofe Meafures, and keep within
_ thofe Bounds yourfelf. For by this means you will gain Ay-
4 Aa 4 3 thority
310 Erictetus’s Morals -
thority to you Inftru€tions; and, when it comes to your
turn to prefcribe to others, every Word will make its own
way. For, how ridiculous and abfurd is it, to fer other
Men Rules of Temperance, or Patience, and at the fame
time to be guilty of Gluttony, or fink under the Burden
of Affi&ion ones felf? What force or weight can fuch a
one expeé his πιο ftudied Difcourfes fhould find? And,
How unreafonable and inconfiftent is it, to impofe fuch
Laws upon the Condué& of Others, as we are not content
to fubmit to in our own? :
But this is not all. He requires a higher degree of Self-
denial ftill. He does not only forbid the beginning fuch
kind of Difcourfe ; but if any of the Ignorant and Vulgar en-
gage in it of their own accord, he will not allow us to join
with them, nor fet up for an Oracle, or great Doétor, a-
mong Men of meaner Attainments than ourfelves. For
this (he fays)} is very fufpicious; It looks, as if what is fo
very ready to come up, loaded the Stomach, and was never
well digefted. For'as Meats, when duly concoéed, diftri-
bute themfelves into’ the feveral Parts, and mix with the vi-
tal Juices and Blood to nourifh and ftrengthen the Body; fa
do Maxims and Do@rines, when-well digefted, convert in-
to Novrifhment , and make the Soul healthful and vigorous.
There they lie, like Sap in the Root; which, when occa-
fion ferves, fpreads itfelf, and brings forth the Fruits of vir-
tuous Aétions firft; and when the proper Seafon comes,
and thefe have attained a juft Maturity, then of edifying Dif-
courfes in great abundance. But if any one fhall force this
Fruit of Difcourfe before its time, when it is not yet ripe
and kindly; this in all likelihood will turn to no better ac-
count, than the difcharging ones Stomach of undigefted
Meat. And there cannot be a clearer proof that it wants}
Digeftion, than our not being able to keep it any longer,
For this is dire&ly that Man’s Cafe, who brings up his Pre-
cepts of Philofophy again, While they are raw and whole,
and does not fhew the effect and ftrength of them, in the
improvement of his Mind, and growing in thofe virtuous
Habits, which they were intended to produce and confirm.
Farther; in regard the Soul is naturally given to look a-
broad into the World, and, for that reafon, feels itfelf very
powerfully wrought upon by good Examples, he propofes
Socrates for an eminent pattern of Modefty: who, though a
moft accomplifhed Philofopher, and declared by the Tefti-
mony of Apollo himfelf to be the Wifeft Man in aie
ney
with SimpxLicivuss Comment. 3117
One, who confequently had good warrant to take more
upon him, than any mere Proficient ought to pretend to,
was yet the fartheft that could be from an affuming Tem-
per, and made it the bufinefs of his whole Life, to decline
and difcountenance Pride and Oftentation. One very re-
markable Inftance of this kind was his Behaviour to fome
filly People, who came with a defign to put a Slur upon
him, and defired, that he would recommend them to fome
Philofopher, capable of inftru€ting them. He faw thro’
their pretence well enough; but without taking any notice,
or fhewing the teaft Refentment of the Affront they intend-
ed him, carried them to the Sophifters: Men, who had the
Confidence to call themfelves Mafters and Profeflors, and
madea Trade of Teaching others. Thus when Hippocrates the
Son of Apollodorus, made it his requeft, to be helped toa Ma-
fter, he recommended him to Protagoras. And in that Tra&
of Plato, whichis intitled Teetetus, he fays of himfelf, that he
delivered over feveral to the Tuition of Prodicus, and feveral
to other wife and great Men: So very {paring was this Divine
Perfon in putting himfelf forward, and fo far was he from
thinking it a Diminution or Reflexion upon himfelf, to be fo.
For this, after all, is the mighty Objection, and that a-
gainft which Ep:dtetus fortifies his Scholar. He does not
think it a fufficient renouncing of Vain-glory, not to begin
a Philofophical Difcourfe among Men, who do not make
Philofophy their Bufinefs: No, nor to fit ftill, and not
interpofe when they have begun it: but there is yet a far-
ther difclaiming of this vicious Quality expeGted. It is pro-
bable, this Silence may be thought to betray your Igno-
rance; it is poffible fome of the Company may be fo plain
as to tell you fo; and tho’ no Reproach can be more grat-
ing, than that of a defe& in one’s own Profeffion, yet this
Proficient is to rum the rifque of that, and to hear it with-
out being moved. This if he can do, it is a furer fign that
he hath mortified his Vanity, than his uttering the moft ela-
borate Satyr in the World againftit; for you have an affu-
rance now that other People contemn you. And if you
can fee and hear this without Paffion; if you find, that the
Refentments, which ufed formerly to boil up in your Breaft
upon the like occafions, now he cool and quiet; Take
comfort, and triumph. For the fubduing of your Anger
proves, that the Operation is begun, and that you are now
reaping thofe Fruits, which all the wife Exhortations you
have heard, were intended to cultivate, and all your Sis
ains
/
-
312 Epr1cTretus’s Morals
Pains and Study propofed to produce. I mean, a Life of
Virtue and frit Reafon, and the making you not fo much
a florid and well-fpoken, asa prudent and agood Man. For
‘Moral Precepts are learnt, not to be repeated but prattifed ;
and the Excellency of them muft be proved, not by the Me-
mory, or the Tongue, but by the Conver fation of the Hearer.
‘And the bearing this imputation of Ignorance without any
‘diforder, is itfelf fucha Proof; for it fhews the Mind to be got
above both the Fame and the Cenfures of the World. And
-this is the Improvement every Mafter expeéts to find; for
he, that, inftead of Pradtice, gives him his Leures again,
and thinks himfelf the better for being able to remember and
‘repeat them, is guilty of as great an Abfurdity in Nature,
as it would be for Sheep to throw up the Grafs they had
eat, that fo the Shepherd may be fatisfied of that good Feed-
‘ing, which ought to fhew itfelf in a large Fleece, firmnefs
‘of Flefh, and abundance of Milk.
ETON CRETE
ei ae: Gee Gr Βοος.
ye you have fo far maftered your Appetite, as to
have brought your Body to coarfe Fare, and to
be well contented with mere Neceffaries, do not
glory in your abftemious Diet. And if you drink no-
thing but Water, proclaim not your own Sobriety
upon every occafion: Or if you would inure your-
felf to Hardfhip, do it for your own Benefit, not
not to attract the Admiration of other People. Let
Vain-glorious Fools embrace Statues in the Streets,
to fhew the Crowd, how long they can endure the
Cold; but let Your Trials of yourfelf be private:
And if you would be Hardy in good earneit, when ~
you are almoft quite parched with extreme Thirft,
take cold Water in your Mouth; then deny your-
felf the fatisfaétion of Drinking, and fpit it out a-
gain, and tell no body.
60 Μ-:
with SrtMpLictus’s Comment. 313
COMMENT.
7 Ain-glory hath a thoufand feveral Pretences to ground
ΟὟ ΠΕ] upon; but the moft ufual, and moft plaufible, are
fuch as Epictetus hath touched upon in this Treatife. Some
People court Applaufe, by affuming Narratives of their own
Performances; Others depend upon their Eloquence for it ;
a Third fort expe&t to be admired, by diftating to all the
Companies they come in, and taking upon them to tall
gravely , and teach every one they converfe with his Duty;
and thefe he hath exploded and warned us of already. There
is another fort of Vanity very frequent, which is the valuing
ourfelves upon voluntary Aufterities; a {pare Diet, a frugal
way of Living, abftaining from lawful Pleafures, and ufing
the Body to great Hardfhips; and That makes the Subjeé& of
the Chapter now before us.
The Perfons therefore, who put thefe Severities upon them-
felves, are advifed not to look big upon the Matter ; that is,
not to be too much exalted with an Opinion of their own Me-
rit; Orimagine, that they have attained to fome peculiar Ex-
ceilence, and made fome mighty Conqueft upon Human Na-
ture, which none but They ever made before. For alas! how
extravagant an imagination is this, when we fee ourfelves
out-done every day and many hundreds of indigent Wretches
take up with lefs, and endure more, than the greateft of thefe
Boafters can pretend to? ’Tis true, the One do it out of Ne-
ceffity, the Other out of Choice. But {till Humane Nature
is the fame in Both; and therefore it is plain, thefe Men, after
all their Practice and Pains, have not carried it fo far as it is
capable of going. Belides, there is al way this Confideration rea-
dy at hand to mortifie our Pride and Self-conceit of all kinds :
_thatif we excel in this particular, yet there are feveral others
wherein we are deficient; and for one good Quality, which
We have and Others want, there might many be reckoned,
which Others have and We want. But there is indeed one
peculiar Misfortune, which attends a Man’s thinking highly
of himfelf upon the account of any Excellence whatfoever ;
which is, That it both hinders him from improving and re-
fining that particular Virtue, as otherwife he might do, fup-
pofing that he hath attained to the Perfection of it already ;
and it cheeks and cools his Endeavours after other Virtues, as
over-rating this fingle one, and thinking That alone fufficient.
But
514 Errctetus’s Morals’
But do not (fays he) exercife any of your Virtues for
pomp and fhew; nor, if you drink Water, beat about the
Bufh in all Companies, to wriggle in a Difcourfe of your
own Abftemioufnefs and Sobriety: If you would exercife
any bodily Severity, do it for your Benefit, for a trial of
your own Patience, to harden your Conftitution, and to
qualifie you ftill more and more for Toil, and Trouble,
and Self-denial. And if thefe be, as they fhould be, the true
Ends you propofe from the !Praétice of them, you will be
well fatisfied with repeating them in private, and not covet
the Eyes and Admiration of the Multitude, nor make it your
bufinefs to gather a number of Speétators*; like thofe
Wretches, who when they run away from the violence of
too mighty an Enemy, implore the affiftance of the People,
and get upon the Statues to cry help, that they may be more
feen, and fooner get a Rabble about them: Their bufinefs
being only to draw Company together in their own Defence,
and to make themfelves and their Oppreffion more confpi-
cuous and deplorable. .
But, if you will be mortifying, do it privately and in good
earneft. When you are extreme thirfty, take cold Water
into your Mouth; and though your Entrails are ready to be
burnt up, yet {pit it out again; and when you have thus fub-
dued the importunate Clamours of Nature and Neceffity, teli
no body what you have done. This is Mortification and
Severity indeed. But things of this kind, done to be feen
and commended of Men, fhew plainly that the bent of the
Soul lies outwards; that the Man is more concerned for
the Fame of the World, than the real and intrinfick Good-
mefs of the A@tion; and lays a greater ftrefs upon Their
Praife or Difpraife, than upon the Approbation, or the Re-
proaches, of his own Confcience. Befides, he lofes all the
* The Account given of this Paflage by Cafaubon, in his Notes on this
Chapter, feems much more pertinent and fatisfa@ory, than this given here
by Simplicius. He tells us, that the 4/cericks formerly, amongft other Trials
jn which they exercifed themfelves, ufed to pra&ife the enduring of Cold:
To which purpofe in a Frofty Winter’s Morning, it was very common to
go out into the Streets and Publick Places, and there cling round one of
the Brafs or Marble Statues. And becanfe this was very juftly fufpe&ed to
be done, more to get the Obfervation and Applaufe of a gazing Rabble,
than out of any good defign upon themfelves ; therefore Ep:étervs choofes
that inftance of expofing Vain-glory upon thefe Accounts. This is a very
clear and natural account of the place, and feems grounded upon Authori-
ties fufficient to give it the preference before that of Simplsins, See Cajanb,
in Epittes. Not. 57.
seal
with SrmPLicits’s Comment. 315
fee eR nC SAE Pe OO OE
real Good of his Abftinence and Severity, and profanes 3
virtuous Aétion, by an end fo bafe and indire&, as popular.
Applaufe. 2
Now, that the practifing fuch Aufterities as thefe upon
ones felf, is of excellent ufe, Experience daily demonftrates.
For by this buffetting of the Body, we keep That, and its
fenfual Inclinations under; and reduce them fo low, as not
only to prevent any rebellious InfurreGlions againft Reafon,
but to bring them to a willing and ready compliance, even
with thofe of its Commands, which are of hardeft digeftion
to Flefh and Senfe. There is moreover this mighty Con-
venience in it; that thefe voluntary Hardfhips fit and pre-
pare us for neceflary and unavoidable ones. Every Man’s
Circumftances are fickle and changeable; and fure, when
any Affii&ion, as Want, or the like, happens to us; it is no
{mall advantage for the Body to be fo habituated, as to bear
thofe Evils without any great alteration or reluGtancy, which
it is not poflible to run away from. This gains an abfolute
Maftery over the World, and fets us above all the uncer-
tainties of Humane Affairs, when it is no longer in the
power of the moft fpightful Fortune to hurt us. For what-
ever extremity of Suffering fhe can poffibly drive us to, this
is only what we have by long Cuftom made eafie and tami-
liar to ourfelves before.
goseCaoa ρος ρος ροςϑοος ϑοος ϑοῦς 9
ee — eS ee eee eS ee
CHAP. LXXI.
t be is the peculiar Quality, and a Character of an
undifciplin’'d Man, and a Man of the World,
to expect no advantage, and to apprehend no mif-
chief from himfelf, but all from Objcéts without
him: Whereas the Philofopher, quite contrary,
looks only inward, and apprehends, no Good ox
Evil can happen to him, but from himfelf alone.
GHA ὃ.
3τό . ΞΕ ΡΙΟΤΈΕΤτῦυ 85 Morals
CHAP. LXXIL
‘ T HE marks by which a Proficient in Philofophy
may be known, are fuch asthefe. He is not
inquifitive or bufie in other Men’s Matters, fo as to
_ cenfure, or to commend; to accufe, or to com-
plain of any body. He never talks big of himfelf,,
nor magnifies his own Virtue or Wifdom. When
he falls under any hindrance or difappoinment in
his Defigns, he blames none but himfelf. If any
Perfon commend him, he fmiles within himfelf, and
receives it with a fecret Difdain; and if other Peo-
ple find Fault with him, he is not at all folicitous
in his own Vindication. His whole Behaviour is
Jike that of a fick Man upon recovery, full of cau-
tion and fear left he fhould relapfe again, and injure
his advances towards Health, before it be confirm-
ed and perfectly found. As for Defire, he hath ut-
terly abandoned it, except what depends upon his
own felf; and Averfions he hath none, but to fuch
Objeéts only, as are vicious and repugnant to Na-
ture and Reafon, The Affections and Appetites,
which Nature made ftrong, he hath abated, and
taken off all the edge and eagernefs of them. If
he be difparaged, and pafs for an ignorant or infen-
fible Man, he values it not. And, to fum up all
ina word, he is exceeding jealous of himfelf, and
obferves every Motion of his Mind as rigorouily ,
asa Man would watcha Thief, or an Enemy, who
lies lurking to rob, or to kill him. :
COMME NT.
SE hath now gone through all the inftru@ive part of his
1 Book, and is drawing on towards a Conclution. And
the Subftance of what he choofes to clofe up all with, Ry
this
{ 7
with SimpLicrus’s Comment. 317
this moft neceffary Caution; That we muft not content our-
felves with reading, or underftanding, or remembring Rules
of Morality; but take care, that they influence our Lives’,
and be tranfcribed in all our Actions. That no Man who
addits himfelf to the Study of Philofophy, muft propofe
fo mean an End, as only the informing his Judgment, the
filling his Head with curious Notions, or furnifhing his
Tongue with Matter of learned Difcourfe; but the reform-
ing his Vices, and bettering his Converfation: confidering,
that the Defign of Moral Precepts is never anfwered by
any thing fhort of Praétice. To this purpofe’, he firft de-
{cribes to us Three forts of People, whofe Characters are
fo comprehenfive, that all Mankind come under fome one
or other of them.
For every Perfon whatfoever is, Either a fecular Man,
one that lives at the Common rate, and minds the Affairs
of the World, and This is one extreme: Or elfe he isa
Philofopher, who hath abandoned all other Care and Concern,
but what relates to Virtue, and the Improvement of his own
Mind; and this is the other oppofite Extreme: Or elfe he
muft be one of a rank between both thefe; neither fo un-
taught as the fecular and common Man, nor yet fo accom-
plithed as the Philofopher; but fuch a one as hath rencunced
the World, and is afpiring to a Moral Perfe@ion. Thefe
are called Proficients, and to Them the feveral Exhortations,
which hath lately fallen under our Contideration, are parti+
cularly directed. But of thefe we are to take notice, that
Epictetus makes Two forts; Some that are young Begin-
ners, and lately entred into this Difcipline; and Others, that
have ufed it longer, and made fome competent advances
MD ἱερὴ ss
+. Now here he prefents us with a Defcription of every one
of thefe. He begins with that of the Vulgar and undifci-
plin’d Man, he gives him this diftinguithing Mark; That
he expects no part of his Happinefs or Mifery from himfelf,
but from outward Objeéts: And the Account of this is as
follaws.
Reafon, which is our very Effence and Form, that which
makes and denominates us Men, is placedin our own Power.
And fo likewife are the Senfual Appetites and Paffions ; On-
ly with this difference, That thefe are not peculiar to-Us
alone, but given to us in common with Brutes. So that
Reafon is the incommunicable Privilege, and proper Pre-
rogative of Humane Nature, That which is given τὸ all
4 Mer
A ES ay
318 Epicretus’s Morals
Men in common, and to none but Men. For, though
there be a difference between one Man’s Reafon and ano-
thers , when you come to particular Perfons, and Operati-
tions, and Objects; yet the Faculty in general is the fame;
the Foundation it proceeds upon, the fame; and its Ends
and Motives are the fame. All men are direéted by it to
purfue the fame good Things, to deteft and fhun the fame
Evils, to affent to the fame Truths, and to reje& the fame
Errorsand Untruths. Sothat Reafon is every Man’s Guide;
and from this he takes his Meafures of Good and Evil, of
True and Falfe.
Now the Obje&s, which Reafon infpires us with a Love
and Defire of, are certain incorporeal Excellencies , Indivi-
fible and Immutable; fuch as Juftice, and Moderation, and
Prudence. The advantage of thefe, and the like good Things
is, That each Perfon may enjoy the whole of them, with-
out injuring or depriving his Neighbours. They are of un-
bounded extent; and no one Man hath the lefs, for any
other Man’s having more. From hence it comes to pafs,
that the Determinations of Right Reafon can never be re-
pugnant to one another; and, fo long as we purfue the Ob-
jects it prefents and recommends to our Affection, there fol-
lows no Strife or Contention, but all is Union, and mutual
Confent, fweet Harmony, and perfeét Peace.
_ But now, the Senfual Appetites and Paffions, fuch as An-
ger, and Concupifcence, and the reft which are fubordinate
tothefe Two; tho’ ingeneral, and in their own Nature, they
be the fame in You, and Me, and Every one, yet the Ob-
jets they faften upon are not the fame in each Perfon. But
I fix upon one thing, and you upon another; and fo both
the Defires themfelves, and the ObjeGts of them, and con-
fequently the Averfions, and Their Objects too, are ex-
tremely diftant from one another, and peculiar to each fin-
gle Man. And, tho’ it fhould happen, That all fhould a-
gree in the fame Objeéts, yet would not this put an end to
the Difference neither; becaufe the things themfelves which
engage thefe Affections, are Corporeal, and Singular, and
Divifible, fuch, as that one Man’s Plenty neceffarily infers
another Man’s Want: as Money, for inftance, or Lands,
or Women, or Honour, or Power, or Preferments. No
Man can enjoy the Whole of thefe, nor indeed a Part of
them, without depriving or confining fome body elfe, in.
proportion to the Quantity which himfelf enjoys. Upon
thefe Accounts it is, that in thefe Cafes Men differ vaftly
[ is
7)
1
τ
/
4
y
with StmpLicius’s Comment. 3 19
TIT NTO nor ann nthe
-intheir Judgments; and not only fo, but the Order and good
Government of the World is overturned by them. For
whenever the Peace of Mankind is difturbed, either by pri-
vate Grudges, Family-Quarrels, Civil Infurrections, or Fo-
reign Wars; fome of thefe things are conftantly at the bot-
tom of them. Sothen, the common and untaught Man be-
trays'his Folly, in forfaking the general Rule, and flighting
the Common Good of his Nature, and fetting up a particu-
Jar Standard of his own, One, that mifleads his Judgment,
and, inftead of that Good which is univerfal, cramps up his
Defires, and confines him to onc that is Perfonal, Individu-
al, and Corporeal, fuch as does not approve itfelf to the
concurring Judgment of all Mankind, but only feems foto
his own private Opinion and miftaken Senfe of things. For
this is the true Cafe of External Objeé&ts. And wherefoever
the Defire, or the Averfion fixes; whether it be a Virtuous
and Reafonable, or whether a Vicious and Unnatural one;
That, to be fure, is what we apprehend to be our Good,
and our Evil; and we look for the Happinefs and the Mife-
ry of our Lives from thence. For whatfoever we defire,
excites our Love under the Notion of Good; and whatfow
ever we deteft or avoid, provokes our Averfion under the
Notion of Evil.
Now the Philofopher, on the other hand, hath difcarded
ail Outward things; he will have nothing to do with Matter
and Body, but looks upon them as things that very little con-
cern him, and fuch as he cannot have any ftriét Propriety in.
He hath divefted his Mind of all thofe Prejudices, which
might mifguide it, and refined his Reafon from the Drofs
of Senfe and Paffion; fo that thefe Shadows and gaudy De-
lufions can impofe upon him no longer. Confequently he
3s concerned.for no Good, but what is fubftantial; nor at-
tends to any other Bufinefs, than the Improvement of him-
felf, the Promotion of Wifdom and Goodnefs, and the a-
(piring after thofe Incorporeal Excellencies, which appear.
fo charming and lovely to clear-fighted Reafon. Sucha one
need never go out of himfelf to be happy; Virtue is his
Good, and that is always athome: And as for Evil, it is
utterly banifhed hence, and can never annoy, or get with-
in him.
After this Defcription of the Perfons, who make up the
two diftant Extremes , he proceeds in the next place to give
a Reprefentation of the Middle fort; wz. Thofe whom he
€alls his Proficients, and for whofe Ufe all that went be-
j Be fore
320 ᾿ἘΕΡΙΟΤΈΤυ 55 Morals
fore was principally intended. For the very Nature of the a
Subye&t fhews us plainly, that it could belong to none elfe. ©
The compleat Philofopher needs no Inftruiion or Affiftance, —
but it is properly his Bufinefs to affift and inflru@ others. —
Nor can this be laid down as a neceffary Qualification of a
Philofopher, That he neither confures, nor commends any ~
Body; for he is a Mafter, and a Corre€tor of Manners, ©
and confequently, as his Authority will bear him out in
both, fo his Poft requires he thould do both, as he fees occa-
fion. Nor can thefe Difcourfes belong properly to the
Common and Undifciplin’d Man; for as the Other is above
them, fo This man is not capable of them; they would be
utterly loft upon him, till he change his Courfe of Living ,
and begin to aé&t upon a nobler Principle. This Chapter —
therefore is a very Compendious Recolle@tion of what went |
before at large; It is a kind of Remembrancer to us, and
prefents us with the Subftance of the whole Book in little,
and at one view.
I only add, before I quite fhut up this Chapter, that That
Paflage of watching himfelf, as he would watch an Enemy, is
very pertinent, and elegantly exprefs’c. For, we are to
confider fuch a Man, in the Mid-way as it were, between
that Vice which he hath difclaimed, and is running away
from, and that Virtue which he is moving towards the Per-
fection of. In this State we cannot but fuppofe him fre-
guently to reflect upon his former Mifery; and like a Pa-
‘tient, who is in a way of Recovery, but far from perfect
. Health, to be exceeding jealous and tender, fearful of a Re-
lapfe, and cautious of indulging himfelf in any Liberties,
which may keep him back from a found and confirmed State.
This Jealoufie therefore muft needs make him a curious
Obferver of his own Ations, and as fevere in his Sentences
upon them, as if they were done by an Enemy. And this
Rigour is of excellent Ufe; becaufe it frees the Mind of all
that partial Fondnefs, to which we are too much inclined;
and which oftentimes makes us either wholly over-look our
own and our Friend’s Faults; or at leaft pafs very gentle
and favourable Conftru€tions upon them. And indeed this
is the only way to make us honeft and fincere; fora diffo- |
lute Man hath no Principles to reftrain him; but is * (ac-
cording to the Proverb) 4 Limber Leather, which wil ftretch
and bend to any thing, and you never know where to have him,
-.ὕ..-.--....- -- te σος
* See Exafm, Adag. Μαώῶλὴρ,
CH AP:
ith Stmpxiicius’s Comment. 321
CHAP. LXXIIL.
7: you obferve any Man value himfelf for under-
ftanding Chry/ippus his Book throughly, and giv-
ing a juft Explanation of it; reprefent to yourfelf
the intolerable Abfurdity of {uch a Man’s Pride, by
this fingle Reflexion, that if Chry/ippus his Writ-
ings had not been ob{fcure, this Expounder would
have nothing to brag of. Well, but what is it that
‘I think moft worthy my Study?) Why my Duty,
refulting from the Condition of my Nature. Ide-
fire to know then, who it is that can teach me this
Duty, and I am told Chryfippus can. Upon this
Information Iapply my felf tothe reading his Books
Tread, but I do not underftand him. My next Care
then is to look out a good Expofitor. In all this
I have done no great Matter. For when by the
help of this Expofition I comprehend his Meaning,
yet {1111 want the Practical Part 5 and this in truth 15
the only valuable Progrefs. For, If I reft in the Au-
thor, or in the Commentator, and content my felf
with a bare Underftanding, or apt Explication; I
have forgot the Matter I took in hand, and am no
longer itudying the Perfeétions of a Philofopher,
_ but thofe of a Grammarian. The Difference is on-
ly this, that, whereas I have chofen Chry/ippus to
exercife my Talent upon, He would have pitch’d
_ yather upon Afomer, or fome other Clafick Author.
But this I am fure of, that the more capable J am
thought of explaining Chry/fippus, the more I ought
to be out of Countenance, 1f what I can teach o-
_ thers fo well, I do not take due care to practile as
exactly my {elf, |
Bbz CO M-
322 Erictretus’s Morals
COMMENT.
a having diftinguifhed Mankind into Three Claffes,
and reprefented the Qualities proper to Each of them;
and alfo made a fhort recapitulation of ‘the Directions given
before at large to his Proficient; he now begins to enter
‘upon the concluding Part, inculcating in this and the fol-
lowing Chapters, that Rule, which alone can give Life and
Energy to all the reft; wz. That the reducing thefe Pre-
cepts into Practice, muft be our chief Study and Care; and
that the Good Works, which they are excellently accom-
modated to produce, are the genuine Fruits expected from
them, and the very End for which they were compofed and
communicated, For what an Eminent Orator faid once upon
a like Occafion, is extreamly applicable to the Cafe now in
Hand, Words without Actions are but mere Air, and
empty Sound.
To this purpofe, he fays, a Man fhould refle& ferioufly
with himfelf, what his meaning is, when he reads fuch Mo-
ral Inftru€tions, and puts his Mind upon a fedulous Enqui-
ry after its true and proper Happinefs. “The Anfwer to this
CQueftion will be, That he intends to examine into humane
Nature, and fee what is the Conftitution, and true Condi-
tion of it: And from thence to purfue his Enquiry farther,
and confider what A@tions, and what Sentiments are agree-
able to this Nature; what Impreflions are fit for a Creature
fo framed to admit and indulge; and what are to be ftifled
and reftrained as incongruous and unfeemly. Well, upon
due Reflexion, I find, that | havea Principleof Reafon, anda
Body; But thefe, not equal in Authority or Value. For
my Reafon is the Chara&ter of my Nature, it challenges a
Right over my Body, and commands it as an Inftrument, ΄
fubfervient to it, and over-ruled by it. The Inference then
from hence is plainly this, That God and Nature defigned I
fhould live a Life of Reafon, and not of Senfe; that all my
bodily Paffions fhould conform themfelves to the Com-
mands of their Lawful Superior; that all my Fears, and all
my Defires, fhould be reduced into due Order, and pay
Homage to the raore illuftrious Perfeétions of the Soul.
But ftill Iam at a lofs, how this is to be effected. I am
told, That Chry/ippus hath written an excellent Piece to this
purpofe. I fall immediately to reading his Book, H
n
with StmPLictius’s Comment. 32.3
find itfo abftrufe and dark, that I can make nothing at all
of it. I am direéted to a good Commentary, and by the
help of this I underftand him perfectly. But all this while
here is very little good done, and but fmall praife due, ei-
ther to the intelligent Reader, or the perfpicuous Commen-
tator. For when Chry/ippus wrote this, he did not intend
only to be underftood and expounded, He had a farther and ᾿
much better View; vz. That both bis Reader and his In-
terpreter fhould praGtife what he hath written. If then I do
this, I attain to the Benefit thefe Writings were properly
intended for, and they have had their due and full effect up-
on me. But if I delight in the Author, or applaud the Ex-
pofitor never fo much; if I am skill’d in all his Criticifms,
fee thro’ all his Intricacies, admire the weight of his Sen-
tences, or the turn of his Style; in fhort, if I mafter every
Difficulty, and have every Attainment, but only that of
Pra@ice; I am not one whit improved in my Bufinefs.
The Title of a more nice and exaét Grammarian I may
‘indeed have fome pretenfion to, but can lay no claim at all
to that of a Philofopher. For this Talent of explaining an
Author’s Meaning, is properly the Qualification of a Gram-
marian; The only difference is, That Chry/ippus is an Au-
thor fomething out of his way, and Homer a much more
likely Man to come under his Confideration.
But there is another difference, which is much more to
my Difadvantage. For a Man may read Homer, or ex-
‘plain him, and reft there, and yet not be the worfe, if he
be never the better for it. Whereas with Chryfippus it is
much otherwife; for the unedifying Reader, in this cafe,
cannot be innocent: And thofe, who do not mend by his
Precepts, contract'a deeper guilt, and incur a jufter and
more fevere Condemnation. Woulditnot be an intolerabie
‘reproach to any fick Man, who fhould read Prefcriptions
proper for his own Diftemper, and value himfelf upon pro-
nouncing the Receipts gracefully, and defcanting handfomely
‘upon the Virtues of the feveral Ingredients, and upon be-
ing able to dire& others , how thefe are to be applied , and
yet make ufe of none of them himfelf? Does fuch a Man
deferve Pity? And yet, as extravagant and abfurd a Folly
‘as this is, ours is every whit as bad, or worfe; when we
have the Difeafes of our Souls fet plainly before us, ‘and are
fully inftruéed in the Medicines and Reftoratives proper for
them, and yet are fo carelefs and ftupid, as to do nothing
towards our Recovery.
: b 3 ΘΗ,
324 Epictetus’ Morals
CH AP. LXXIV.
W Hatever Direétions are given you, look upon
them as fo many Laws, which have a bind-
ing Power, and fuch as you cannot without Im-
piety depart from. Perfevere therefore in the Ob-
fervance of them.all; and be not diverted from
your Duty by any idle Reflexions the filly, World
may make upon you; for Their Cenfures are not
_ in your Power, and confequently fhould not be a-
ny part of your Concern. ‘A
CQM ME N-T.
NE Swallow, we commonly fay, makes no Summer;
no more doa few fingle Acts of Virtue make a Habit,
or obferving the Directions of Coryfppus, in one or two In-
ftlances, conftitutesa good Man. But our Obedience mutt
be firm and conftant; we muft confider our Duty, as that
which is our Happinefs and trueft Advantage; and mutt fuf-
fer no Confideration, how tempting foever, to draw us off
from it.. We muft look upon ourfelves as under indifpen-
fable Obligations, fuch as cannot be broke loote from, with-
out the higheft Impiety. And reafon good there is to do fo;
for if we efteem it difhonourable and impious, to fail of our
Promife, or fly off from an Agreement in every trifling
matter, becaufe, though the thing is of no value, yet the
Violation of our Word is of horrible confequence, (as,tend-
ing to take away that mutual Faith and good Affurance, by
which all Society and Commerce is maintained among Men; )
How much more folemn and facred ought thofe Engage-
ments to be efteemed, by which we have tied ourfelves up
to Wifdom, and Virtue, and Innocency of Life? Now
thefe are violated, when a Man affents to the Truth of what
he is taught, and the Reafonablenefs of what he is com-
manded, and exprefles this Affent by living accordingly for
atime, but afterwards relapfes and turns Deferter,
Upon this account, he advifes us by all means to perfe-
vere in Goodnefs, and particularly not to be difcompofed
with any pefiesione the idle World thall caft uponus: For,
ag
with Stmpxricius’ss Comment. 325
wae
s he intimated before (Chap. XXIX. ) it is highly proba-
ble, they will take upon them to cenfure our Condué pret-
ty freely; they will tax us with Singularity and Precifenefs,
_ and call our Change, Pride or Affectation. Now fuch Dit-
couragements as thefe, we mutt be provided againft, and
not let them cool our Zeal, or fhake our Virtue; and
that, becaufe other Men’s Tongues are not at our difpofal,
and therefore what they fay fhould give us no difturbance.
_ This Paflage may probably enough allude to that allego-
rical Saying of Pythagoras and his Followers: Lhat when a
Man comes into the Temple, he foould never look behind him. By
which they defigned to infinuate, That Religious Purpofes
fhould be fixed and fteady; and that, when we come to
God, we fhould come with fettled Refolutions, not with
doubtful and wavering Minds, fuch as would fain divide
themfelves between God and the World. 5; a pate
| CA, Pi) ct eke ba
} δ then, and be doing; How long will you
_) defer ‘your own Happinefs, and neglect the
_ due obfervance of thofe Dire@tions, which fhew
you the way to it, andthe Dictates of Reafon,
which, if duly followed, would always choofe the
beft! You have the Rules and Precepts to this
purpofe laid plainly before your Eyes; you have
perufed and affented to the Truth and Equity of
“them: What Mafter'do you flay for now? Whom
ες gan you with any. colour Jay thefe Delays of Refor-
. Matton upon? You are paft the Giddinefs of Youth,
and have all the Advantages of found Reafon, . and
a ripe Judgment. If you negleé& this Opportunity,
and grow flothful now, and make one Retolutionat-
teranother, and fix firft one Day, and then another,
for the turning over a new Leat with yourfelf, and
{till do nothing; you will cheat yourlelf, and go
backwards, and at laft drop out of the World, not
Bb 4 one
a SATs
326 Erictretus’s Morals
one jot a better Man than you-came into it. Lofe
no time then, but fet about a good Life juft now;
and let the Determinations of Right Reafon be an
inviolable Law to you from this very Moment. If
you meet with a difcouraging Difficulty, or an en-
ticing Pleafure; if you are invited by a profpect of
Honour, or affrighted with the Fear of Difgrace,
encounter the Temptation bravely, whatever it be.
Remember this is the Combat you are called to;
this is the Field, in which you are to fignalize your-
felf, and there is no declining the Trial. All your
Fortunes depend upon one Engagement; and the
Ground you have gotten heretofore, mutt either be
maintained by one gallant Victory, or loft by one
bafe Retreat. It was thus that Socrates grew fo great,
by putting himfelf forward upon all occafions, pufh-
ing every Advantage as far as it would go, and ne-
ver hearkning to any other Perfuafions, but thofe
of his own. Reafon. And if you are not fo great a
Man as Socrates, yet it will become you to live and
act, as if you intended in time to be as greatas he.
COMMENT.
“5 HIS alfo is an Admonition ; no lefs requifite than the
former: and highly neceffary it is, that a Man, who
hath embraced this philofophical Difcipline, and refolved to
fubmit to it, fhould be put in mind how precious Time is,
and awakened into Diligence.
Delays (as we commonly fay of them) are dangerous; and
one certain ill effeé& of them is, that they are but fo many
Pretences for indulging our Sloth. To what Purpofe there-
fore (fays he) do you defer your own Happinefs, and the
practice of thofe Rules you have received? For it is this |
Praétice only, that can render you virtuous and happy, and —
anfwer the Defign both of the compofing and the learning
them. The Operation expected from them, is, To conform
all your Aétions to right Reafon; to fix this as a perpetual
and inviolable Law; to retrench your Defires, allay all you
tara? ae Paffions,
t
with StmMpxLiciuss Comment. 327
Paffions, and bring every Inclination and every Averfion, to
fix upon proper Objects, and confine themfelves within
their juft bounds. | hie!
Another poffibly might alledge want of Inftrudtion in his
own excufe, and declare himfelf moft ready to be good,
were he-but fufticiently taught how to be fo. But this cannot do
You any fervice, who have had all the advantages imagina-
ble of Knowledge and Improvement. You, I fay, who have
not only had the Maxims of Philofophy, and the Meafures
of Virtue fully explained and illuftrated; but have applied
your Mind to the ftudy of thefe things, and made forme con-
fiderable progrefs in them. You efpecially, who have bad
it evidently proved, That you are by no means to content
yourfelf, with having your Underftanding enlightned, and
your Judgment convinced by thefe Rules, unlefs you digeft
and make them of a piece with your Soul, that they may be
likea Principle of new Life within you, exerting itfelf in vir-
tuous Habits, and influencing your whole Converfation.
Since therefore all this, and indeed all that can be neceflary
for your due Information, hath been fo fully opened, and
fo pathetically urged upon you; make not Ignorance and
want of Means a pretence, as if you ftill were to wait for
{ome more powerful Call. ΝΝ
Others may poffibly plead their Age,..and tne Heats and
unthinking Follies of Youth, which.render them incapable
of fober Reflexion and fevere Difcipline. But you are in
the very Seafon of Life, which is moft kindly for Virtue;
the Vehemences of Youth are worn off, and the Weakneffes
of old Age have not yet difabled you. Your Paffions are
fedate, your Judgment folid, and your. Strength in its per-
fection. And if this inviting Opportunity be fuffered to flip
through your hands; if you cannot now find in your heart
to take fome pains to be good, when you are beft qualified
to mafter what you attempt; .if Sloth and Supinenefs get
the power over you, to make Appointments and break them:
to fix upon particular Days for fetting about this Great
Work; and, when they are come, to drive it off to a far-
ther Day again, you do but play booty. with your Conici-
ence, and deal like difhoneft Debtors, who ftop their Cre-
ditor’s mouths with fair Promifes, and fix a diftant time for
thofe Payments, which they never intend tomake. Thus,
while your Soul is deluded with avain Hope and Expectation
of doing fomething, you ftifle the Reproaches from withia,
by frefh Refolves; but ftill thofe New are as infignificant as
the
328 Epretretus’s Morals
the Old, and pitch upon a To-morrow which will never
eome. And it were well indded, if this were the worft of
it; but, alas! in Virtue there can be no fuch thing’ as ftand-’
ing ΠῚ: While you defer growing better, you neceffarily
grow worfe, and by infenfible Decay relapfe into Ignorance
and Vice again. Thus, after a number of Years fpent in.
fruitlefs Intentions, you live and die a Fool, and fo muft
continue forever. For, as our ftate of Separation, be-
fore we came into thefe Bodies, had a great influence upon
what we do here, and the Difpofition of the Souls’we
brought into the World, is a marvellous advantage to our
future Virtue: So our Behaviour here is but the Preface
and Preparation to what we fhall do there again. For the
whole of this taken together, is one entire Life, and the
time we pafs here but one ftage it; Only the * ftate of Pre-
exiftence makes fome alteration in our Life here; and our
Life here makes a confiderable one, and indeed determines
as, as to the ftate of our Separation hereafter. . ee
~ Now therefore, vow afpire (lays he) to perfection’, and live
at owe that does fo. Abfolute Perfection he does not méan }
for then his Exhortatiom would be needlefs:. But the Per-
feGtion of a Proficient, fuch a degree, as a ftate of Difcipline
and Probation is capable of; that is, fo as never’to lofe
ground, but to be continually advancing forwards. ‘And to
this purpofe, whatever, upon mature Confideration, appears
moft reafonable, Jet it have the force of a Law with you;
a Law, I fay, which cannot be fatisfied with being known
and underftood , but requires a pofitive and punctual Obe-
dience. Peas Se
To ftrengthen you in this Refolution, you have one migh-
ty Encouragement ; which is, That all the Accidents of hu-
mane Life are fo far in fubse€tion to you, that you may
with a prudent Care make them all, though never fo diffe-
rent in themfelves, confpiré together to your own advan-
tage. For, whether you meet with any thing fuccefsful or
difaftrous, pleafant or painful; whether it tend to Honour
or Ignominy, All are manageable: Only be fure, ler the
Temptation be never fo {mall, do not flight or negle& it;
and though it be never fo great, do not be difpirited at it.
Security will give a Defeat, where there was no Strength
--...--».,ὕὉὕ--..,.,ῬἙὈΠτ1...,ΤΤΤρΡ-.ττ-|ττ a ὲὲτΤτΎ SS aT f
* This proceeds upon the Plaronick Pythagorean Hypothejis, and agrees te the
Notions more largely take Netice of, Chap. I.
: ὦ
) RT aes
Ὁ»
with Stmpxicius’s Comment. ΄329
to do it; and Defpondency will lofe the Prize, where there
is Force enough to winit. - '
Be fure then, that you let no Accident pafs unimproved ;
But imagine, that every one is an Adverfary challenging you
to the Field, and that Virtue is the Crown you are to con-
tend for. Remember, that there is no middle ftaté, no get-
tilig off without Blows, but Conqueft or Ruine mutt be the
Fate of the Day. Nor are you to flip one Day, or overlook
one fingle Adtion, upon a vain imagination, That fuch lit-
- ‘tle things cannot turn to your prejudice: For that one Day,
that fingle A@tion, determines your whole Fortune; and
your Prefervation, or your Deftruction, depends upon this
nice point. Thus Ep:cetus affures you, and he tells you
very true. And if it feem incredible and furprizing, pray
be pleafed to confider, that every Indulgence of a Vice gives
it new force to affault us, and abates of our power to
refift it. He that is flothful and irrefolute to day, will be a
great deal more fo to morrow; and if there be (as there will
be fure to be) any frefh Objection to palliate his Idlenefs,
he. will have a great deal lefs mind to encounter it the -
Third day, than he had the Second. Thus by degrees the
Difpofition to Goodnefs will walte away. and all the Vi-
gour of his Mind will languifh-and die. It will yield more
and more tamely to every freth atrack, till at laft Reafon be
-quite enfeebled and over-powered, and all the advances the
Man had-formerly made in Goodnefs, be loft to all other
‘Intents and Purpofes, except that only of adding to his Shame
‘and his Guilt. ᾿ ᾿
᾿ Now the very fame fingle Trials, which, when neglect-
‘ed, do thus lofe ground, do, when attended to and impro-
‘ved, get and maintain it. For Virtue increafes'by the fame
rmethods, and much in the fame proportions, that it declines,
“The practice of one Day, and the performance of one AG,
_ Jeavesyan Imprefiion behind: it, and confirms, the Mind.fo,
that the next Attempt proves a great deal more eafie. The
‘Relu@ancies of Senfe wear off, and répeated Acts become
habitual and familiar} and we daily feelour own Advanra-
ges. Frequent ufe gives us a more mafterly hand ; and what
“we can do well, and with eafe, we naturally cometo do
with delight. Thus.Men never continue long the fame;
but ever Hour, every moral Adtion, every fingle Accident
of their Lives, makes fome alteration in them.
᾿ς Socrates hada juft fenfe of this, and exprefs’dit abundantly
jn the circunfpeCion of his Life. Forthe very thing, which
raijed
330 ΕΡΙΟΤΈΕΤῦ 85. Morals
raifed him fo high, and gave him the Chara&er of the Wifeft
of Men, was his conftant Care, never to negle& any ad-
vantage, or delay the doing any good. He made every Ac-
cident of every kind turn to fome good account; and was
deaf to all other Solicitations, though never fo importunate,
except thofe of his own‘Reafon, and the Refults of his moft
careful and compofed Thoughts. You will fay, perhaps,
This fignifies very little to You, who have not the Vanity,
to think yourfelf like Socrates. But give me leave to fay,
Hf you are not like him, you would do well to endeavour
it. And, whatever you want of his Perfections at prefent,
live with that exaétnefs, as if you meant and hoped one day
to equal them. For the profpeé of an eminent Example is
a wonderful advantage; it fires a Man with noble Emula-
tion ; and, whilft he keeps the Pattern in his eye, he is pro-
voked to imitate his Excellencies, and feels himfelf at once
direGted how to copy after them, and afhamed not to do fo.
BELLELELIBRIELERIBIIBES
CHAP. LXXVI.
δ, dpa firft and moft ufeful Topick in Philofo-
ΤῈ phy, isthe Mora] part, which teaches Men
their Duty ; as for inftance, That they fhould not lie:
The fecond is the Demontftrative part, which gives —
us infallible Proofs of it, and fhews us evident ae
fons wherefore we ought not to lie: The Third is
the diftinguifhing and Argumentative part, which
inftrués us, what a Demonftration is, and how
_ this in the cafe before us is one; What is a Confe-
quence; What a Contradiction; What is True,
and what is Falfe. Now from hence it is plain,
that the Latft of thefe is fubfervient to the Second;
that the Second is fubordinate to the Firft, and that
the Firft is the moft important and neceflary point
of all; That which all our Sudies fhould be direét-
ed to, and wherein they fhould all center and reft
at laft. But we quite invert this Order. Bt tas
ir
with SimpLicius’s Comment. 331
Third employs moft of our Time and Pains, and
the Firft is not thought worth either: So that, by
a ftrange Abfurdity, we commit the Crime, and at
the fame time value ourfelves exceedingly, for be-
ing able to demonftrate beyond all contradiction,
that we ought not to commit it.
COMMENT.
-
T is abfolutely neceffary, that ἃ Man, who makes any
pretenfions to Philofophy, and aims at the peculiar per-~
feGtion of his Nature, both as he is an Animal and a Rational
Creature, fhould have a clear and demonftrative knowledge
of the Truth. Otherwife, he may be liable to great Errors,
and run into infinite Inconveniencies, by taking things upon
Truft, and leaning too much, either to the bare Authority,
or the infufficient Proofs, of confident Pretenders. Virtu
is a thing of the higheft Confequence, and it is not fit we
fhouid take up with fo flight and feeble Perfuafions concern-
ing it, as mere Opinion and Probabilities are capable of cre-
ating in us. Now clear and undoubted Evidence is an effe&
owing only to Demonftration. And it is Logick’s peculi-
ar Province, to inform us in the Nature of a Demonftrati-
on: as, That it isa Syllogifm confifting of Propofitions put
together according to Rules 6f Art; and that thofe Propo-
fitions muft be of clear anc loubted Truth: As alfo to ac-
quaint us, what Propofiti re qualified, and what Method
is to be obferved, for the forming them into a true Syllo-
gifm.
, From hence we plainly perceive, that the whole compafs
of Philofophy may be reduced to Three Heads; and that
thefe will comprehend, if not all abfolutely, yet all that
_ 15 material and neceflary in it. ‘The Firft is the Preceprtive
part, that which converts our Speculation into Praétice,
which prefcribes Modefty and Temperance in our Adtions,
and prohibits Lying in all our Difcourfe and Converfation.
The Second is the demonftrative part, which fhews us clear-
ly, not only that we fhould or fhould not, but alfo affigns
convincing Reafons, why we fhould or fhould not, do this
or that. The Third is the Illuftrating and Arguing part,
which fets Rules to our Reafoning, and affifts Nature by
Art.. This prevents our being impofed upon by any falfe
aPPear> ,
332 © Eprererus’s Morals
appearances, by teaching us the Difference, between a real
demonftration, and a pretended one; and fhews the mutual
Coniexions and Confequences of fome Propolitions, and the
irreconcileable Oppofition between others; as, That the
Species neceffarily infers its Gewus , and the Being of a Man
implies that of an Animal: That a particular Affirmative
and an univerfal Negative, and fo likewife a particular Ne-
gative and an univerfal Affirmative, are direét Contradidi-
ons, never to be reconciled, and impoflible to be both true,
or both falfe together. It acquaints us too with the quali-
fications of a Syllogifm: What Propofitions it confilts of ;
How thefe Propofitions mutt be put together; What diffe-
rence there will bein the Conclufion according to the manner
of formingit; and what differences there are between true and
fair Syllogi{ms, and irregular, fophiftical, and enfnaring ones.
Now nothing can be more plain, than that this Third
Topick, which inftru¢ts us in a!l the Subtleties of Reafon-
ing, is intended to ferve the Second; and that This is an
Ingenious and Artificial Expedient, contrived, as we fee, to
remove all the Scruples and Diflatisfa@tion of our Minds,
to direét and fix our Judgments, and give us the moft uncon-
teftable and fatisfa¢tory Affurance, what is our real Happi-
nefs, and what our Duty. This, I fay, is the Bufinefs of
the Second Head, which contifts in Demonftrative Proofs.
But then it is every whit as plain too, that this Second is
fubordinate to fomething beyond it; wz. The Pradtical and
Preceptive Part; and confequently Both the other are re-
folved into the Firft. For ourd{nowledge is intended only
to qualifie us for Action, : us toit; and therefore
the Practice of Virtue“and a Good Life is the ultimate De-
fign of all Study, and all Inftru@ion. Here we mutt fix at.
Jaft ; for every thing elfe confpires to promote this; but be-
yond this there is no End of greater Confequence, or higher
Perfection. Ἶ
And happy were it for us, if we governed ourfelves by
thisRule. But, alas! wetake quite contrary Meafures. The
greatelt part of our Time and Pains is employed upon the
Third Head; in nice Difputes and Controverted Points 5
and we can fpare but very little for the Second, which fhould
convince us of the Excellence, andthe Neceffity of being —
Virtuous, and poffefs our Souls with a lively and vigorous
Senfe of our Duty. But for the Firft of thefe Topicks,
which confifts in reducing our Knowledge into Praétice, we
allow this no Portion of our Care at all. We sok
an
with SimpLicrus’s Comment. 333
and difpute eternally, about curious and unprofitable Quefti-
ons; and overlook that which would conduce to the pro-
moting true Goodnefs. We ftudy this now and then, and
talk fearnedly, and affectionately upon ir; but {till we dono
part of what we fay.. Nay, which is the moft monftrous
inconfiftence that can be, we are guilty of grofs Enormities
in our own Perfons, and‘at the fame time are proud, that
we are able to convince and perfuade Others; That we can
fhew, we ought not to be what we are; And it pleafes us
much to think, that no body can expofe the Deformity of
own Aétions, better than our Selves. :
Now all this is turning things up-fide down, and begin-
ning at the wrong End. The Method in which we onght to
proceed isthis: Tirft, to learn how to argue againft Vice;
Then , to employ our Valentin demonftrating the Bafeneis
and Incongruity of it to ourfelves;. and, when we are ar-
rived to a full and undoubted Conviction, Then a€tually to
decline it, and to perfevere in the PraGice of what we have
learnt. Confidering, that we learnt it for that very pur-
pofe; and that the Preceptive Part, tho’ Superiour to all
the reft, is yet itfelf fubordinate to the Pradlical.
This is the Subftance and Defign of Epicetus in the Chap-
ter now before us; where he does, with great Dexterity,
inforce the Praétice of his Moral Maxims, and expofe the
Vanity of thofe Men, who make Speculation the end of
their Knowledge, with that Indignation, which fo exquifite |
a Folly deferves. ;
φρο συ σα ΣΟ
ΟΠ PR. LXXVIL
; ; every undertaking we fhall do well to refign
A ourfelves to. the Difpofal of Providence, in fome
fuch Ejaculation as this: ,
Ondu& me, Youve, and thou, O powerful Fate, |
In every Enterprife,; in every State,
As You determine: For I muit obey
The wife Injun&tions, which you on me lay. ᾿
Por
aS i ag ll i lll oes ;
334 Eper1ecretus’s Morals ἶ
For fhould I at your dread Decrees repine,
And ftrive your Sacred Order to decline;
I fhould but Jabour wickedly in vain, Ay
And ftruggle with an everlafting Chain,
And after all, be dragg’d along with pain.
E. Walker’s Epidet. Eng, Paraphraf.
' Ese @oscaoe eres es@g2G@a09@ae
CHAP. LXXVIIL
H E that fubmits to Deftiny’s Decrees,
Is juftly counted Wife by Men, and knows
The due Refpeét which to the Gods he ows.
COMMENT.
ΤᾺ regard Some of the Ancients have collected together
thofe Moral Axioms, which were occafionally deliver-
ed, andlie fcattered upanddownin larger Books; he advifes
us to have fome of thefe fignificant Sentences always ready
at hand; as being not only fhort, and fo no Burden to the ~
Memory , but alfo likely to make a deeper and more lafting
Impreffion, both upon the Account of their own Weight ,
and the celebrated Name of their Authors. For this Rea-
fon he fubjoins fome here. The firft was a Meditation of
Cleauthes, Scholar to Zezo, and Matter to Chryfippus. The
Eminence of this Man was fo great, that I my felf have
feen at Affos, (of which place he was a Native) avery no-
ble Statue, worthy his Fame, and the Magnificence of th
Senate of Rome, who fet it up in Honour of him. ᾿
In thefe Verfes he begs the Guidance of God, and that»
Providence and Power, whereof God is the Source, and
which makes and moves all things. This he calls here by
the name of Fare; and promifes for his part, that he will
obey its Motions, and follow it whitherfoever it leads him.
And it is but reafonable, that He, and every Man, fhould
cifpofe his Mind to a willing and ready compliance; be- ᾿
~caufe Oppofition (as he} obferves) will not only be
Wicked but Fruitlefs too,tand follow it we muft, whether
we
΄
eins ε κόμμαν ἐναις τ ποσνσο ος
with ΘΙΜΡΙΙΟΙυ 8.5 Comment. 335.
we will orno. Only it isin our Choice, whether this fhall
be done with Cheerfulnefs and Contentation; or with Re-
lu€tance and Sorrow. Shake our Chain, and gall ourfelves
with it we may, but break it we cannot. For the Caufe
~ will always be ftronger than its Effe&t, and there is no get-
ting loofe from Him, 7 whom we live, and move, and have
x
our Being. . ΝΣ
To this purpofe Epictetus advifed us before ( Chap. XIII.)
Trouble not yourfelf (Lays he) with wifhing , That things may
be juft as you would have them, but be well pleafed they fhould
be juft as they are; and then you will live eafie. And indeed
this of Submiffion is a moft comprehenfive Duty; it takes
in the whole Subftance of Morality and Virtue: And a Man .
may very defervedly be called Good, when he is fatisfied
with his Lot in common’ with the reft of the World, and
can look upon himfelfas a part of this vaft Univerfe, with-
out any fuch greedy and afluming Notions, as would τας
ftrain Providence within a narrow Compafs, and makea .
World of himfelfalone, and oppofe that Harmony of Events,
which confults the Good of the whole. As if the Courfe
of the World were to be changed , and its Order difturbed,
to follow fo inconfiderable a Part; rather than He fhould
move along with this great Engine, and take up with what
falls to his own Share.
‘The Second Sentence is taken out of one of Ezripides his
“Tragedies, and hath a great Affinity to the Former. For
Neceffity fignifies that over-ruling Power, which fubmits
all things to God, and makes all contribute to the Firft .
Caufe, (that is, to obeying the Divine Pleafure, and pro»
moting his Glory) whether they will or no. The Man
therefore who ftrikes in, and aéts in confent with This,
who follows it with Alacrity, and betrays no Lothnefs, or
Regret, gives a good Proof of his Wifdom: His Behaviour
fhews, that he underftands the Nature of the World; and,
that Partiality to a private Intereft, hath not fo far biafled
him, but he can ftill make a jult Diftindion between a
Whole anda Part. And, as This proves his Wifdom, fo
‘does it his Piety too; for nothing better expreffes our
Reverence for God, than fuch a cheerful Refignation of
ourfelves, and receiving contentedly whatever he fends
upon us.
Cec CH AP.
336 ute Erroretus’s Morals...
πα reams
CO FE XIE ne, cae ae
R this other. Ὁ Crito, τε this be God’s Bh
fure concerning me, His Will be done; day- —
ts and Melitus may také away my Life, but it is
“not in their power to do me any Hurt. 6ῸὋ |
EOMMENT.
“THis is quoted out of a Difcourfe of Plato’s, entitled
Crito, and is {poken there in the Perfon of Socrates.:
The Senfe is much the fame with the Former, only wrap-
ped up a little clofer, and delivered in »fewer Words.
And indeed the Man, | who can make this Profeffion,, and.
whofe Life fpeaks it..as well as his Tongue, hath vanquifh+ |
ed all his Pride and Difcontent, and cured the Degeneracy.
of his Nature. He hath abandoned Corruption, given up —
himfelf to God without any referve, and fubmits to. all his
Difpenfations with a ‘perfeé acquiefcence of Mind.. And
to me Epitietus feems to have produced thefe Sayings at
the clofe of ‘his Book ,.that, by the Teftimony and Exam-
ple of fuch eminent Perfons.,. he might confirm us in this.
Belief » that the utmoft Perfeétion attainable by a Humane.
Soul, is a fincere Converfion or turning to God ; and that
a ready compliance with the Divine Will upon all. occafi ions,
is the Crown and Complement of.all Virtues.
That laft Claufe, Anytus avd Melitus may kell mc, but
they cannot burt me, is taken out of Plato’s Defence οὗ So-
crates, and fpoken to his Accufers. And thus our Author
brings both ends together, by refrefhing our Memory here,
with what he infifted upon fo largely at the beginning ; vz.
That the Man, who places his Good and Evil in the ufe of
his Native Liberty only, and in'thofe things which come
within the compafs of his own choice, does not depend
upon external Objeéts for his Happinefs;. This Man, I fay,
is above the World, he cannot be brought under the Do-
minion of any thing, nor is it in the Power of Men, or
Accidents, to do him the leaft Prejudice.
Thus I have finithed thofe Meditations, which occur’d to
me upon this Subject... And. becaufe I thought they gs
i
with SiMPLicus’s Comment. 337
“a of diate Service to as many as fhall ‘tea Fitted Ι was
willing to contribute the little Affiftance I could, tothe tru-
ly underftanding fo excellent .an Author. Nor does my
‘writing this Commentary prove beneficial to Others only,
for I my felf have already found great Advantage from it, by
the agreeable Diverfion it hath given,me, in a Seafon of
Trouble and Publick Calamity. All I have. more to add,
is only a Prayer, proper to this Subject, and wich it I con-
clude.
“ Grant, I befeech thee, O Lord, the Giver and Guide
“of all-Reafon, that we may always be mindful of the
“ Dignity, of the Nature, and of the Privileges, thou haft
- Honoured us withal; that we may aét in all things as be-
"ἐς comes free Agents, to the fubduing and governing our
Paffions, to the refining them from Fleth and Senfe, and
ἀπ “tor, the rendring them fubfervient to excellent Purpofes.
ἐς Grant us alfo thy Favourable Affiftance, in the reform-.
ing and direting our Judgment; and enlighten ας with
“thy Truth, that- we may “difcern thofe things that are
“ἐς really Good; and, having difcovered them, may. love
~ and cleave fedfattly to the fame. And, finally, Difperfe,
“* we pray thee, thofe Mifts, which darken the Eyes of our
ἐς Mind, that fo we may have a perfect Underftanding :
And (as Homer expreiies it) know ( ip Θεὸν, ads τα dee)
4 both God and Mau, and what to each is due. .
piers ies ae Ss
AAR TAT i ITE a TOR IT PF He pp
Gioia bids THE
THE
TABLE
TH E Inirodudion. Page 1.
The Diftin&ion of Things in and out of our Power. Ch.I. 7.
The Nature and Condition of Things. Ch. 1. 2.
The Effects of a true and falfe Fudgment of Things. Ch. Il. ἦν.
The ernde ity of due C onfideration , and Preparation of Mind.
Ch. | 6.
. That Viren and Vanity cannot be Both attended to at once. iy.
‘That we muft Jufpena our Fudgments, till things are duly ex-
amined, Ch. 40."
That our oscil proceed from the fear of Mifery, aud the
Difappointment of our Defires.. Ch. VI. 43.
_ That young Beginners in Virtue foould proceed flowly and sree
dually. Ch. VII.
_ That the Nature of what we love is a very material and sei
_ ry Confideration. Ch. VIL. fi.
The Circumftances and probable Confequences of every Under-
taking , foould be well weighed before we undertake it. Ch.
IX.
SS:
Our Difturbances ave owing, not to the Thiugs themfelves, but
our Ideas of them. Ch. X, 60.
Wife Men make no Complaints. . Ib.
Men ought not to value themfelves upon the Gooods of Fortune,
but thofe of the Mind. Ch. XI. 68.
Lhe Ufe and Improvement of our Notions of things, is our με τυ
Bufinefs and Virtue. 69.
~ Our Minds foould be fixed upow God, and all exterval Advanta-
ges ufed and valued, as things only by the bye. Ch. XII. 72.
cary not trouble ourfelves with wifoing Impoffibilities. Ch.
75:
A well-difciplin’d Mind is fubjeE to πο Obftructions. Ib... Ge
The Pawers of the Mind wanft be fet againft all Accidents κι
vicious Defires, Ch. XIV
What we part with is not loft » but reftared to God the Oster
Ch, XY, roo.
8
Meas Care... Ch. XVI.
τς Improvement of the Mind ought 10 be every Man’s cbief
Page 103.
i | We mujt improve ourfelves by rifing from faeall things to greater.
ion. oY LL. Ib.
’ 2 ἧς not to be expected that every thing fhould be juft aswe would
ὙΨΗΝ have at 103.
Le a ot be difcouraged at other Peoples ill Opinion of ms..
Ch. XVill. 5 ; 109.
_ No Maz is capable of purfuing feveral Ends at once. 1το.
ΠΣ is a vain thing to defire the fecuring to ourfelves, what Na-
ture hath put out of our own Power, Ch. XIX. Ima
Who is properly our Majter. Ch. XX. - 11:
We muji take what God gives us thankfully, and be content to
.* want what he denies us. Ch. XXI. 117.
᾿ Good Nature mujt be fo reftramed as not to difiurb the Peace
of cur owa Mind. Ch. XXII. τ > Dy
Lhe Part we mujft ad ia this Play of Life, depends upou God's
Appointment. Ch. XXIII. ἣ 123.
A wife Man improves every Accident of Human Life. Ch.
XXIV. 125.
| Nothing fhould be attempted that is out of our reach, and above
our, Strength, Ch. XXV 127.
The way to avoid envying ad admiring others. Ch. XXVI.
| 128.
| Liberty is no way to be had, but by defpifing the World. Ib.
ΝΟ Maw ts injured except by himfelf. Ch. XXVIL 131.
The Benefit of Deliberatiun. Ib.
The Advantage of Premed:tation. Ch. XXVIII Ib.
A Philofopher muft be above Derifion and Cenfure. Ch. XXIX,
135.
Perfeverance conquers all Difficulties. ᾿
The Confcioufnels of our own Virtue ought to fupport and fatisfy
us. Ch. XXX. 139.
' A Good Maz needs not the Advantages of Fortune, to render him
ufeful to the Publick... Ch. XXXI. 142, &c.
τ We foould rejoice with all Men, and envy wone. Che XXXII.
: 154, ἄς.
The Courtefies of the Horld never come for nothing. i Ib.
We frould pafs the fame Sudgment upon our own Misfortunes,
that we do upon other Peoples, Ch. XXXUI. 160.
Concerning the Nature of Evil. Ch. XXXIV. he G4.
Early Confideration prevents late Shame and Repentance. 187.
‘Lhe Mifchief and folly of Rafa Attempts, Ch. XXXV, .
KEK VEO ΠΝ Ae | eet
Of
ὰ
A
Vip AB ΜῈ.
“᾿ς τας νοσσία
π-π------ι.-.-«““΄ςο. .ὖᾳὍὉ0ὕὕ “π΄ ΡΟΝ
i be the Duties Men owe one another, and, that we muft do our 4
Parts, though other People do not difcharge Theirs. Ch. —
: ue ee. Page τοι.
A Difcourfe of Friendfhip. τον &c.
‘ “4 Difcourfe concerning God and Providence, and ihe Duties of
«Religion. Ch. XXXVIIL 07, ἄς.
Ὁ No Danger fhould difcourage us in our Duty. 209.
Ht what Cafes, and with what Difpofition’, Oracles foould be
coufulted, Ch. XXXIX.. 2425 &c.
‘Rules for Converfation.
~
. a Man fhould refolve what Character he will maimtain.
a XL.
roy Ὡς Government of the Tongue. Ch. ΧΙ]. ~ “40.
OF Reproof. Ch. XLII. 250.
* OF Laughter. Ch. XLIII. fees
OF Swearing. Ch. XLIV. 255.
“OF our Behaviour at publick Entertainments. Ch. XLV. 256.
Our Poffeffions foould be meafured not by Luxury, but Ufe. Ch.
x
LVI. 258.
‘Men muft be chafte, without Vanity and Cenforioufaefs. Ch.
XLVII. 263.
Calumuies flaould be defpifed. Ch. XLVI. 266.
- Publick Shows Oa ς be een with an even and compofed Mind.
Ch. XLIX 270.
Rehearfals of Poets and Orvators, how to be heard. Ch. L. 272.
Great and Wife Men foould be made our Patterns for Cozver-
fation. Ch. LI. OMe F<
We ae a ourfelves for cold Reception from Great Men.
276.
Talksse cs one’s felf to be avoided. Ch. 1.111. 278.
OF Fefting. Ch. ya Ib.
OF obfcene Difcourfe. t, LV. Ib.
Lhe gh f denying Meads ana oeltaeprg from shi
Ch. LV
- The Senfe if Duty, and ea common Ba. mes be the Rule
of our Actions. Ch. LV 2850
We καρ confalt the Rights " Men in common, and not our pri-
wate Intereft. Ch. LVIII. 287.
Every Man fhould confider his οἴ Abilities, and not aim at .
things above him. Ch. LIX. 90x
Lhe Integrity of the Mind, floould be our great Care. ΟἿ. LX.
291.
Nature
:
|
ΝΑ ΒΒ. Tee
-----------.-.--------- - ---.
Nature : is foon fatisfied, but extravagant Defires never. Ch.
ji XT. Page 293
a ‘Modepiy ia a Wife 2s a more valuable Excellence than ἊΣ
em Cn. LX:
The Body deferves but little of our Time and Pains, but the Mand
1s worthy of them all. Ch. LXIII. 297.
What other People fay or think of us, is not fo much our Con=
cerz as theirs. LXIV 298.
We Should take every thing by its beft handle. Ch. LXV. 300.
— No Man is really the better for any external Advantages. Ch.
LXVI. 303.
Of γα Cenfures. LXVIL. 305-
Virtue is to be fhewn not in wife Harangues, but good Actions.
Ch. LXVIIL. 307.
Of forwardne{s ἐς Inftrudion, and how our Improvement im
Kuowledge fhould be manifefted. Ch. LXIX. 308.
Againft Oftentation, Ch. LXX Ede
Every Man’s Happinefs and Mifery i is from himfelf. Ch. LXXT:
31 fe
The Character of a Proficient in Wifdom and Gooduefs. “Ch.
LXXII τό;
Pradice is ἌΡ Ἐχά of all Moral Kuowledge. Ch. LX ἐπ cs
We muft mind our νι; βειξϊν, and defpife the Cexfures if ἢν"
World. Ch. LXXIV 324-
ainft deferring a good Lift. Ch. LXXV. 32.5.
th Wrifdorn confifts not in learned Difputes about Virtue, but
in the practice of it. Ch. LXXVI. 33m.
The Duty of Self-Refignation and Submiffion to the Divine (ill,
Ch. LXXVII, LXXVIII, LXXIX. 335, Kez
The C oracle ion. 357:
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