^\ic Co-mplc?\m"t oV t\n« 
 
 P 
 
 Rev, T\^ 
 
 ac n-^cxS) 
 
 CXacxvnno 
 
 ^ 
 
 I- t' 
 
 
 \ -yn ->n ^"T* 
 
 ^e aci:\OTi oT 
 
 tWi 
 
 F 
 
 T<^. 
 
 .\3v-\. 
 
 y^s-ry 
 
 >V C 
 
 \r< - 
 
 C\'r^^n c^t,\ 
 
 l\ , \ a"^ 
 
S' s 
 
 :c-!^^* 
 
 
 PRINCETON. N. J. 
 
 \ 
 
 BX 8958 .C53 S5 1876 
 Skinner, Thomas Harvey, 182 
 
 The complaint of 
 
 the Rev. 
 
THE COMPLAINT^<^^,,/----^^,,v 
 
 / 
 
 Rev. Thomas H. Skinner, 
 
 -^©•-^aiiTSx i-^nE 
 
 ^ 
 
 AT ITS FALL MEETING, 1876, 
 
 ARGUMENT. 
 
 CINCINNATI: 
 
 GAZETTE COMPANY PRINT, FOURTH AND VINE STREETS, 
 1876. 
 
¥'NTRO»UCTION 
 
 WITHIN less tlian a year I have been, three several times, deprived 
 of my constitutional rights as a free Presbyter under the very 
 banner of the Constitution itself. I have earnestly sought amid dis- 
 organizing movements to maintain our standards, and the peace, 
 purity, and unity of the Church, in matters of grave moment to 
 every lover of the truth and order of the Presbyterian Church. A 
 just Complaint having been regularly brought by me before the Synod 
 of Cincinnati, and reported as '* in order" by the Judicial Committee, 
 and the Synod having voted to hear the Complaint, it was, without even 
 a reconsideration of the vote, turned out of doors, under the pretense 
 of postponement. I, therefore, present to the attention of my brethren 
 the merits of the specific case upon which I asked the Synod to adjudi- 
 cate. The imputation, gratuitously and injuriously made by the Pre- 
 amble to the Resolution of the Synod, whereby my Complaint was prac- 
 tically ejected from the House, abundantly justifies me in publishing 
 the Complaint itself and the Argument I had prepared in its support. 
 Neither of them would the Synod even hear. Whether it touches the 
 case of Mr. McCune, every reader may judge for himself. My brethren 
 will decide whether I had just cause of complaint against the Presbytery 
 and whether the Synod could honorably, as a Court of Christ, excuse 
 itself for refusing the hearing I demanded as my right, at its last 
 meeting. They will judge upon whom rests the responsibility of the 
 causes of complaint to the General Assembly. 
 
 It has been truly said by one well versed in our ecclesiastical law, 
 " it may be doubted whether a similar arbitrary unconstitutional pro- 
 ceeding c^n be found in all ecclesiastical jurisprudence of the Presby- 
 terian Church." The law of our Church, publicly cited, repeated, and 
 urged in the Synod itself, declares that " where there is a right to 
 appeal and complain, there is positive obligation on the part of the 
 judicatory to receive and issue such appeals and complaints;" aud that 
 " where ecclesiastical rights of individuals or bodies are concerned 
 
there is no discretion ; all such rights are guarded by the constitution 
 by which every church court is bound," bound not only to " receive" 
 and " issue," but to " seasonably issue," during the very same meeting 
 of the judicatory, to which the complaint or appeal has been made, the 
 case having been reported "in order," and the records and parties 
 being present. Nothing but "an act of God," unforeseen, or one or 
 other of the grounds of postponement specified in our Digest, none of 
 which existed in this case, is held to justify any departure from this 
 constitutional law. No man may be robbed of his constitutional 
 rights by arbitrary power. Even on the supposition that the McCune 
 case had been pending before the lower court, yet this gave no right 
 for the Synod to eject my Complaint from the house. The Synod 
 had prior jurisdiction. Our Digest tells us that when the pending 
 of one case is set up to defeat another, " the case must be the same; 
 There must be the same parties, or at least such as represent the same 
 interests, there must be the same rights asserted, and the same relief 
 prayed for. The identity in these particulars should be such that, 
 if the pending case had already been disposed of, it could be pleaded in 
 bar, as a former adjudication of the same matter, between the same 
 parties." And yet, in violation of these clear principles of righteous- 
 ness, the arbiti-ary power of the Synod was used in derogation of 
 my vested ecclesiastical rights, and the Synod ejected my Complaint 
 by an indefinite postponement, upon the excuse of a perhaps, which 
 neither civil nor ecclesiastical law would tolerate for a moment. Was 
 not this a living and practical illustration of the doctrine, officially set 
 in circulation by order of the Synod in 1870, that "organic enactments, 
 denominational laws, are the apples of discord and wedges of division 
 in the Christian Church," and ought not to be " enforced?" The 
 end sought was gained, just as the ends sought had been gained in the 
 Presbytery. Nothing is left but to complain to the Assembly. The 
 conduct of the Presbytery for six months, the twice taking from me 
 my right and compelling a complaint to Synod, then the repetition by 
 the Synod of the very offense it was bound to rebuke, and the com- 
 pulsion again of a Complaint to the Assembly, tells its own story and 
 shows where the responsibility rests. I might plead that the Synod's 
 action was either a prejudice in favor of Mr. McCune, or against my- 
 self, or both. I leave this for others to determine. 
 
 A generation ago, the Presbyterian Church was torn by the very 
 principles and course of action which have agitated our ministry and 
 Churches within the bounds of the Synod of Cincinnati, giving rise to 
 excesses and disorganizing movements for years past, in connection, 
 among other things, with temperance crusades, women's preaching, un- 
 
licensed evangelism, and anti-denominational organic union. These 
 excesses and movements, and the practical destruction of a part of 
 our Presbyterian government, with tendencies antagonistic to the whole 
 of it, I felt myself called upon, with others, in conscience and loyalty 
 to our Church, publicly to oppose. 
 
 Therefore, to relieve myself of what I deem an unjust imputation, 
 implied in the resolution passed by the Synod, and to vindicate my 
 own honor, in the character of my Complaint against the Presbytery, 
 to that body, all the more that the Presbyteiy is now about to enter 
 upon Mr. McCune's case, I publish my own Complaint and Argument 
 for the consideration of all concerned, as also for the information of 
 the Church. I append my protest against the Synod's action, and my 
 Complaint against the Synod to the General Assembly. 
 
 T. H. S. 
 
0OMPLAINT TO THE &YNOD. 
 
 The undersigned respectfully complains to the Synod of Cincinnati 
 against the following action of the Presbytery of Cincinnati, during its 
 sessions at its stated fall meeting, at Mt. Auburn, September 13 to 15, 
 inclusive, and at Cincinnati, October 3 to 5, inclusive, to wit : 
 
 I. Jn sustaining the decision of the Moderator, whereby my Freamble 
 and Resolutions upon the case of Mr. McGune were ruled as out of order, be- 
 cause they were assumed to be unconstitutional. The "point of order" 
 (so called) was raised by Dr. Morris, as follows : " That the Preamble 
 and Resolutions just presented by Dr. Skinner can not be considered 
 by this body, on the ground that such consideration would be in vio- 
 lation of the constitutional rights of the Rev. W. C. McCune, and 
 would be a virtual trial of the said Mr. McCune, without due regard 
 to the forms provided for in our constitution." "The Moderator re- 
 turned to the Chair and announced his decision of the point of order, 
 as follows : ' The point of order is loell taken, and the Preamble and 
 Resolutions are not in order.' The decision was appealed from, and 
 the Moderator sustained." 
 
 My reasons of complaint against this action are : 
 
 1. It was a repudiation by Presbytery of its vested constitutional right 
 (Form of Grovernment, Chapter X, Section 8) " to condemn erroneous 
 opinions which injure the purity or peace of the Church," apart from 
 judicial process against the author. 
 
 2. It was a violation of 'parliamentary rule, in derogation of my con- 
 stitutional right to introduce said Preamble and Resolutions, and to 
 discuss the merits of the same after they were seconded, and I was en- 
 titled to the floor, no matter what their fate might have been on the 
 final vote, after discussion. 
 
 3. Said decision of the Moderator, sanctioned and sustained by 
 Presbytery, was an exercise of the most responsible prerogative re- 
 
served to the General Assembly, viz.: that of deciding upon question?! 
 of constitutional law, and binding its interpretation on the court as a 
 rule of action. 
 
 4. It was turning a constitutional question into a parliamentary rule 
 of order, so inventing a new rule, in derogation of my constitutional 
 and parliamentary rights. 
 
 II. In accepting, and thereby making official documents of, the Special 
 Report and Collaterals of the Committee of Investigation in the case of Mr. 
 McCune, loithout any action whatever to amsnd or to rectify statements, judg- 
 ments, and personalities, therein contained, at variance ivith righteousness and 
 truth. The Report accepted, Record, p. 217. 
 
 My reasons of complaint against this action are : 
 
 1. The Report opens with, and its recommendations rest upon, state- 
 ments contrary to truth. 
 
 2. It steps out of its way to raise a new case, instead of confining 
 itself to the terms of the resolution under which the committee was 
 appointed. 
 
 3. It implies a censure upon the undersigned, and recommends the 
 Presbytery to pass a judgment which also implies a censure. 
 
 4. Part of the Collaterals indulge in gross personalities against the 
 undersigned, which would not be tolerated a moment in debate, and 
 ought not to be tolerated in an official document. 
 
 III. For adopting an answer to tlw protest of the undersigned, September 
 15, 1876, Mt. Auburn, without rectifying its errojieou^i state7neiiis and the 
 false impression it is calculated to make. 
 
 My reasons for complaint against this action are : 
 
 1. Said answer does not accurately represent the facts of the case. 
 
 2. It represents the undersigned as being out of order and furnishing 
 reasonable ground for the annoyances and unlawful interruptions un- 
 der which he was forced to retire from the floor of the Presbytery. 
 
 3. No withdrawal of the protest, for alteration, on account of mis- 
 representations in the answer, could make the protest " more agree- 
 able" to the ** views'' of the undersigned. 
 
 This Complaint is respectfully submitted, with the request that it 
 may be prosecuted immediately, according to the discipline of our 
 Church. 
 
 Thomas H. Skinner. 
 
 Cincinnati, October 14, 1876. 
 

 Mr. Moderator, this Complaint limits itself, specifically, to two 
 things: (1.) To the denial of my constitutional and parliamentary 
 rights as a Presbyter, guaranteed to me by the standards of our 
 Church and our accepted rules of parliamentary order. (2.) To the 
 impeachment of my conduct and character as a man and as a minister 
 while in the public defense of these rights, as al-fo in the public defense 
 of our Presbyterian faith and order. It impinges, in no respect, upon 
 the vierits of the case of the Rev. Mr. McCune, now in judicial pro- 
 cess before the Presbytery of Cincinnati. It relates solely to myself 
 and the Presbytery. This Complaint, Mr. Moderator, needs no apol- 
 ogy. The utmost effort has been made, by various parties, to try and 
 degrade the great cause of Truth and Order, out of which this Com- 
 plaint has sprung, to the aspect of a mere personal quarrel. "The 
 Address to all the Churches of North America," by the advocates of 
 anti-denominational organizations ; the wide-spread advocacy of the 
 principles involved herein by so-called Christian Church Union jour- 
 nals, to which the names and influence of many Presbyterian minis- 
 ters are given ; the existence and character of a new organization of 
 this kind in the very bosom of the Presbytery of Cincinnati, with its 
 published Declaration and Basis ; the multiplied utterances of the 
 press throughout the land, both secular and i-eligious, and the action 
 of the Presbytery itself instituting inquiry into the merits of this 
 movement, are an abundant answer to so gratuitous a conception. I 
 need, therefore, say no more on this point. There are three separate 
 counts in the Complaint I bring before you: (1.) As to my constitu- 
 tional and parliamentary rights. (2.) As to the acceptance of the 
 Committee's Report and its Collaterals. (3.) As to the adoption of 
 the answer to a protest. I complain, first, that my rights have been 
 Avrested from me; second, that my conduct and character are im- 
 peached in accepted and official documents of the Presbytery, contrary 
 to all precedent. Such is my Complaint. 
 
9 
 
 I. The first point of the Complaint is against Presbytery's action 
 " in sustaining the decision of the Moderator, whereby my Preamble 
 and Resolutions upon the case of Mr. McCune were ruled as out of or- 
 der, because they were assumed to be tmconstitiitional." (1.) The first 
 reason in support of this first point is that such action, assuming such 
 unconstitutionality, was "a repudiation" by Presbytery of its vested con- 
 stitutional right (Form of Government, Chapter X, Section 8) "to con- 
 demn erroneous opinions which injure the purity and peace of the 
 Church, apart from judicial process against their author." 
 
 I wish it to be distinctly understood by the Synod, that the ground 
 on which the Presbytery's action rested was not the mere inexpediency 
 of the application of non-forensic or episcopal power to the condemna- 
 tion of Mr. McCune's errors and irregularities, but it was the denial 
 that such episcopal power, so to do, did exist by the constitution. If the 
 constitutional power to condemn widely-spread errors, apart from 
 judicial process, had been recognized, no ground would have existed 
 on which to raise a " point of order," or decide any one " out of order" 
 who sought to persuade Presbytery to exercise that power, and save a 
 tedious, unnecessary and vexatious litigation. The only question that 
 could have arisen, was, is it " wise, equitable, and for the edification 
 of the Church," to exercise this power, and to this point my Preamble, 
 Resolution, and Argument were directed; i. e., to a discussion of the 
 merits of the case, in view of the Committee's official report, furnishing 
 the "facts" iu the case by order of the Presbytery, after five months' 
 investigation. If deemed contrary to the constitution, irregular, unwise, 
 inequitable, and not for edification, after hearing my argument, to 
 exercise this power, it was competent to vote down my motion, or lay it 
 on the table ; but I assert it was an outrage upon all my rights to shut 
 my mouth, a second time, upon a debatable motion, duly seconded and 
 read, absolutely in order, and on which I had already proceeded to 
 speak. At the Glendale Presbytery, April 13, 1875, the plea of 
 official ignorance was made. The information I came forward to oflTer 
 was declined. It was said I could not speak on the merits of my 
 Preamble until the "/acfe" were brought in by a Committee. The 
 Committee of Investigation, consuming the summer, reported the 
 "facts" September 13, 1875, indorsing Mr. McCune's course at 
 Lin wood and Mt. Lookout, and although themselves disapproving some 
 of his views, yet reccomraending no disapproval by the Presbytery, but 
 suggesting process against myself for slander. The report was not 
 adopted, but accepted. It was a discussion of the merits of the case by 
 Mr. McCune and the Committee. I then took the official documents, 
 and sought by a Preamble and Resolution, to have Presbytery disap- 
 
10 
 
 prove both the views and course of Mr. McCune, and forbid their 
 continuance. My mouth was a second time stopped, on the merits of 
 the case, although having the floor, under a debateable motion and per- 
 fectly in order. What was accorded to a Committee and to Mr. McCune 
 apart from judicial process, was denied to me. To support what policy, 
 and in whose interest all this was done, I leave others to judge. The 
 refusal to "consider" ray Preamble and Resolutions was an oppression. 
 To accomplish this, it was necessary to find some ground on which to 
 raise a " point of order." I announce to the Synod that the very con- 
 stitution itself was declared unconstitutional, and on that ground I was 
 pronounced out of order, and my rights to discuss the merits of the 
 case, after Mr. McCune had discussed them several hours before Pres- 
 bytery, and the Committee's report had discussed them, was wrested 
 from me. It is of this injustice I complain, all the more that the Com- 
 mittee itself had intimated to the Presbytery not to have "a judicial 
 trial," and had not even recommended a disapproval of Mr. McCune's 
 "views," and had actually indorsed his "course" at Linwood and Mt. 
 Lookout. It alters not the injustice of the proceeding, that, after 
 much effort to throw this grave matter out of court, and suggest action 
 against myself for the public defense of my rights and the honor of my 
 Church, it was finally considered expedient to institute process against 
 Mr. McCune. The ground on which I was ruled " out of order" was 
 not the inexpediency of exercising the non-judicial power of the Pres- 
 bytery in condemnation of the errors before us, but the denial of that 
 power altogether, and on that ground wresting from me my right of 
 discussion. The reactionary half-recognition of the episcopal power 
 of the Presbytery came later, only in order to furnish a basis for the 
 opinion of its non-applicability to the case in hand, and a justificati(jn 
 of judicial process, but not to allow me any right of discussion on the 
 merits of my Preamble and Resolutions. My Complaint, I think, is un- 
 derstood. I shall show that the Presbytery has the very power it repu- 
 diated, that I was in order, .and that the action of the Presbytery 
 was an oppression, twice repeated. 
 
 Has the Presbytery the constitutional power to condemn erroneous 
 opinions and irregularities of practice, which disturb the tranquility 
 of the Church, apart from tedious and extreme forensic process ? My 
 conviction is clear that it not only has this right, but it is in duty bound 
 to exercise it for the edification of the body of Christ ; and I think I 
 shall be able to justify this conviction, deep-seated and ineradicable as it 
 is, by the best of evidence and sound argument. I shall adduce in 
 support of my first reason the organic law of the Church itself, estab- 
 lished precedents, approved, selected, and recorded since the reunion, 
 
11 
 
 in our Digest, for our guide, and by the recognized practice of all courts 
 in their interpretation of constitutional law. 
 
 The whole power of jurisdiction and order, vested by Christ in the 
 Church of God on earth, and iu every branch and denomination of 
 it wherever found, is of divine right and origin, and is limited alone 
 by the sovereign authority of the Lord Jesus Christ, It is for the 
 edification fif His spiritual body and not for destruction. Supervisory 
 and authoritative, it is broad as the inspection and control of the whole 
 Church and adequate to all her wants and necessities. Its exercise is 
 directed to two things, the preservation of the heavenly doctrine in 
 its purity, and the guardianship of the Christian conduct ; in other 
 words, to faith and morals. Take these two things away, truth and 
 duty, and neither Form of Government nor Code of Discipline has 
 any value. The written Constitution of the Presbyterian Church, with 
 its system of doctrine and polity, we declare to be "agreeable to the 
 Word of God," and vow to maintain and enforce it as the law of the 
 Church, just because we so believe. Ministerial and declarative alone, 
 and unfettered by human commandments, and neither legislating nor 
 binding by virtue of human authority, nor against the revealed will 
 of God, it is the vice-regal function of the Church, derived from the 
 crown of Him on whose shoulders is the government, who holds the 
 key of David, and who has said, "I give to you the keys of the king- 
 dom. Whatsoever ye shall bind on earth shall be bound in heaven, 
 and whatsoever ye shall loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven." It 
 is an awful and solemn trust, and not a "popish usurpation," to be 
 executed in view of our accountability to Christ for the manner in 
 which we defend the heavenly doctrine and the order of the heavenly 
 house. 
 
 The most general, or the generic, name of this power is "Episco- 
 pal." It is the exercise of that ivatch and control which are given to 
 those whom Christ has appointed and the Holy Ghost has chosen to be 
 ordained "overseers" (Episcopoi. Acts xx. 28; 1 Tim. iii. 1, 2) and 
 " shepherds" in the Church. It is sometimes called " Paternal" power, 
 in allusion to 1 Tim. iii. 4, 5. Modified as to the method of its exer- 
 cise, in certain extreme cases, by judicial forms and rules of procedure, 
 it is called " Judicial " or " Forensic." It is the broadest, most compre- 
 hensive, and far-reaching function of government and administration 
 that exists ; the most indispensable to the very existence of the Church 
 itself. It is the character of all her action. Deny to the Church of 
 Christ episcopal power, and she is stripped at once of the very means 
 of her self-preservation ; her oversight and control are alike wrecked, 
 and not even a shadow is left on which to shape her judicial. But this 
 
12 
 
 is so plain I need not argue it. Enough to say that it is by virtue of 
 this episcopal power alone, apart from judicial forms, the power of 
 supervision or inspection, declarative and authoritative, and put by 
 Christ in ordination and the laying on of hands upon the shoulders of 
 every presbyter-bishop, whether teaching or ruling, and vested in every 
 ministerial court, the Church of Christ executes nearly the whole of 
 her divine commission. By this she preaches the gospel, *iministers 
 sacraments, admits members and ministers into the Church and dis- 
 misses them, examines, licenses, puts, or refuses to put, calls into the 
 hands of her ministers, elects, installs, ordains, translates, and removes 
 both ministers, elders, and deacons. By this she forms and dissolves 
 pastoral relations, organizes, visits, unites or divides, and commands 
 Churches, redresses evils, and does whatever pertains to their welfare. 
 By this she requires candidates to pursue certain studies and report 
 their progress to her courts, and calls upon her ministers to give ac- 
 count of their work in the vineyard of the Lord. By this she erects 
 and convenes her courts, frames rules, and subjects to review and con- 
 trol their records and proceedings. She warns against transgression, 
 by this same power, admonishes, reproves, rebukes, exhorts, entreats, 
 enjoins, defends the faith, directs the conduct, decides cases of con- 
 science, suppresses schismatical controversies, arrests lawless practices 
 against her polity, resolves questions of doctrine and discipline reason- 
 ably proposed, condemns erroneous opinions, and bears public testi- 
 mony against whatever she regards as injurious to the faith and order 
 of God's house, and to good manners, charity, truth, and holiness. 
 And all this simply by preamble and resolution, motion and overture, 
 act, testimony, and deliverance, memorial, recommendation, and 
 injunction ; — not by process and verdict. Valid documentary evidence 
 and present undeniable facts, in her own court, have the sanctity and 
 force of a true witness. Moderator, who is it that denies the episcopal 
 power of the Church of Christ ? or the episcopal power of every court 
 in it? As well deny that the sun shines in the heavens! Why sir, 
 what kind of power was it the Committee of the Presbytery exercised, 
 in approving the "course" of Mr. McCune, and disapproving his 
 "views" apart from judicial process, and under a Preamble and 
 Resolution of Investigation? What kind of power is it that the editor 
 of the Herald and Presbyter exercised? And is any one so forgetful of all 
 consistency as to aver that the Presbytery itself has less power than a 
 mere Committee, the creature of its own appointment, or than the indi- 
 vidual editor of a religious newspaper, both using, in full, the name of 
 the author, and affirming a judgment upon the merits of the case? How 
 preposterous to think that in the grave matters that so often engage her 
 
13 
 
 attention in a wicked world, where the adversary ever works to corrupt 
 her faith and destroy her order, the Presbyterian Church is tied, by 
 every considerable transgression, to an extreme forensic process, that 
 may consume a year for its issue, and in the end the remedy prove 
 worse than the disease ! What a harvest of practice for the contentious 
 and obstinate, unwilling to be reclaimed by milder means ! What a 
 premium on discord ! What a plight for the Church of Christ in the 
 hands of him who, abhorring "jiidicial" power and crying for " peace 
 and safety'' in the midst of fast coming calamities, denies the " Episco- 
 pal" power too! Then, what is left but fire and stubble? Moderator, 
 the compass of 1834 will not do for either you or me to steer by in pres- 
 ent or coming storms ! [t is a question if the anchor of Reunion will 
 hold us, for the gale is strong ! 
 
 But the Church is not so bound. The recognition of this episcopal 
 power is inscribed in the constitution, in express terms. "It belong- 
 eth," says our admirable Confession, Chapter XXXI, Section 2, " to 
 Synods and Councils, ministerially to determine controversies of faith 
 and cases of conscience, to set down rules and directions for the wor- 
 ship of Grod, and government of His Church, which decrees and deter- 
 minations, if consistent with the Word of God, are to be received with 
 reverence and submission, not only for the agreement with the Word, 
 but also for the power whereby they are made, as being an ordinance 
 of God, appointed thereunto in his Word." The same episcopal power 
 is expressed again in our Form of Government, Chapter X, Section 8, 
 which recognizes the "power" vested by Christ in the Presbytery, not 
 merely to " issue appeals, from church sessions and references brought 
 before them," nor merely to "judge ministers" by forensic process, but 
 also, and by a discriminating clause, "to resolve questions of doctrine or 
 discipline, seriously and reasonably proposed, to condemn erroneous 
 opinions which injure the purity or peace of the Church, * * and 
 to order whatever pertains to the spiritual welfare of the churches un- 
 der her care.'" Again, with unmistakable emphasis does our Book 
 of Discipline, Chapter I, Section 5, revolt against the idea that the 
 Church is tied to extreme forensic process in the exercise of her power, 
 when it declares that, "the exercise of discipline in such a manner avS 
 to edify the Church, requires not only much of the spirit of piety, but also 
 much prudence and discretion. It becomes the rulers of the Church, 
 therefore, to take into view all the circumstances which may give a 
 different character to conduct, and render it more or less offensive ; 
 and which may, of course, require a very different mode of proceeding in 
 similar cases, at different times, for the attainment of the same end." 
 What could be more explicit ? Again, the same power, apart from 
 
14 
 
 judicial process, is recognized as belonging to our General Assembly. 
 Form of Government, Chapter XII, Section 5: "To the General Assem- 
 bly also belongs the power of deciding in all controversies respecting doc- 
 trine and discipline ; of reproving, warning, or bearing testimony against 
 error in doctrine, or immorality in practice, in any Church, Presbytery 
 or Synod; of suppressing schismatical contientions and disputations," 
 etc'., etc. Thus is this episcopal power common to all our courts, 
 without exception, for the Presbytery is only a larger session, and the 
 Synod a larger Presbytery, while the Assembly is the crown of all. 
 Will any one say that before error in doctrine and practice, in any 
 member of a Presbytery, can be condemned, or the Presbytery arrest 
 lawless movements and condemn erroneous views of its members, or 
 bear testimony against error rife in the Presbyterian Church, forensic 
 process against their author must be commenced and concluded ? It is 
 not the doctrine of the Presbyterian Church. The best interpretation 
 of any organic instrument or statute is the practice of its framers in the 
 generation contemporaneous with and succeeding its adoption, and the 
 best evidence of that practice is the action of the administering courts 
 themselves, and the decrees and determinations of the supreme court 
 of the Church, which have all the force of constitutional law. " Con- 
 temporanea expositio est optima et Jortissima in lege" — contemporaneous 
 exposition is the best and strongest interpretation in law ; this is a 
 maxim of acknowledged validity, universal and conclusive. The con- 
 struction of the constitution by the courts contemporaneous with its 
 enactment is the surest construction, and next to this, the practice of 
 the courts succeeding. Such judicial interpretation obtains the force 
 of constitutional law itself. 
 
 I appeal, therefore, to five celebrated cases in our Digest which 
 testify to the practice of the Church from its very beginning in this 
 land, following the practice of its parent source and which remains 
 alike for all future time, notwithstanding the momentary obscurations 
 of 1822 and 1834, which only prepared the way for an intenser bright- 
 ness. And all the more I do this, again, at this time, inasmuch as it 
 has been wildly asserted in the lower court, that the exceptional 
 decisions of 1822 and 1834 are today accepted law by "ninety-nine 
 hundredths of the Reunited Church.' I need only advert to them 
 briefly; they are the cases of Harker, Davis, Balch, Craighead and 
 Barnes. All these began with the direct exercise of episcopal power, 
 apart from judicial process; some of them began, continued, and were 
 concluded by that power alone; while others, which beginning with that 
 power and failing by this milder means to secure the peace and purity 
 of the Church, were concluded by forensic adjudication. 
 
15 
 
 1. Rarlcer. — Moore's Digest, p. 218; Baird's Digest, p. 604. In 
 conformity with the early practice of the Church, a non-judicial refer- 
 ence was made to the Synod by Presbytery respecting Mr. Harker, 
 who had "imbibed and vented certain erroneous doctrines." "In 1761, 
 Mr. Harker ;^inted and published his views, and Synod appointed a 
 committee to examine tJf.e booh, who reported next year. The Synod 
 proceeded to consider Mr. Barker's principles, collected from his booh by 
 the committee, which are in substance as follows." After examination, 
 the Synod passed the following judgment, without any judicial process 
 whatever. "The Synod judge that these principles are of a hurtful 
 and dangerous tendency, giving a false view of the covenant of grace. 
 etc., etc., and that they are contrary to the Word of God and our 
 approved standards of doctrine." On the further consideration of the 
 case, the Synod made the following judgment, to wit: "That Mr. 
 Harker has for several years past been dealt with in the tenderest 
 manner, etc., etc., but that instead of succeeding in these attempts, 
 he appeared to be rather confirmed and resolute in propagating his 
 opinions among the people, etc., etc. On the whole, though the 
 exclusion of a member be grievous, yet we judge that the said Mr. 
 Samuel H&rker can not be consistently a member of this body, and 
 accordingly declare him disqualified for preaching and exercising his 
 ministry," etc. Such was the case. The fathers of the Church exer- 
 cised their episcopal power in "condemning erroneous opinions," and 
 finally excluded a contumacious member, apart from judicial process. 
 
 2. Balch.— Moore's Digest, p. 220 ; Baird, p. 614. Mr. Balcb, in 
 1797, having imbibed Hopkinsian doctrines, propagated them, caiusing 
 a schism in the Church, and the erection of a new independent organi- 
 Kation. The "creed" of Mr. Balch, gathered by a commission, was 
 referred to the General Assembly, without any judicial process against 
 its author, asking that the author be required to " acknowledge before 
 the Assembly that he was wrong in the publication of his creed, 
 renounce the errors pointed out, engage to teach nothing hereafter of 
 a similiar nature, and that the Moderator admonish him,"' etc. Mr. 
 Balch acknowledged his errors: "I do fully acknowledge," etc., did 
 " cheerfully renounce them," did "solemnly and sincerely engage," etc., 
 did "cheerfully submit himself to admonition," and was declared "in 
 good standing in the Church." It was an exercise of episcopal power 
 by the fathers of the Church, under the organic law of the Church. 
 
 3. Z>ams.— Moore's Digest, p. 222; Baird, p. 634. The Second 
 Presbytery of South Carolina, in the exercise of its episcopal power, 
 "represented" to the Synod that Mr. Davis, belonging to the First 
 Presbytery, was permitted to " pass without censure, though known to 
 
16 
 
 teach erroneous doctrines on some fundamental points." Synod required 
 the Presbytery to "attend to this matter." After various efforts, 
 charges were tabled by the Second Presbytery, and abandoned, Mr. 
 Davis being excused from censure, on the ground of " liberty of opinion." 
 Synod then commenced a "judicial investigation," and, fflially, referred 
 the matter to the Assembly. The Synod's actii)u was declared irregular 
 in proceeding to such judicial investigation, when there was "no refer- 
 ence and no appeal," and the next Assembly refused to "reconsider." 
 This action was just, because the Synod was not a court of original 
 jurisdiction over a minister. It, however, considered an "overture" from 
 the Synod of the Carolinas, "requesting their attention to a late 
 publication of the Rev. W. C. Davis, denominated the Gospel Plan." 
 The finding upon the overture was, that the doctrines of Mr. Davis are 
 " contrary to the Confession of Faith and the Word of Grod," "of very 
 dangerous tendency," and the "Assembly do judge, and do hereby 
 declare, that the preaching or publishing them ought to subject the 
 person or persons so doing, to be dealt with by their respective Presby- 
 teries according to the discipline of the Church relative to the propa- 
 gation of errors." Judicial process was commenced in a new Presbytery, 
 to which Mr. Davis was attached, his former Presbyte'ry having 
 been dissolved. Mr. Davis decliiied jurisdiction and was deposed from 
 the ministry. The fact is patent that by episcopal power the errors and 
 course of Mr. Davis were condemned, upon overture alone, apart from, 
 the conduct of a regular judicial trial. 
 
 4. Craighead.— 'Moore's Digest, p. 223; Baird, p. 638. Mr. Craig- 
 head having preached a Pelagianizing sermon before Synod, in 1806, 
 " the things he uttered before the Synod were immediately submitted 
 to that court by the Committee of Bills and OoeHures." (Princeton 
 Review, October, 1847, p. 196.) He was admonished on the spot, 
 formally by the Synod, in the exercise of its episcopal power, through 
 the Moderator, to abstain from the propagation of his views. He "set 
 at naught the admonition " of the Synod, determined to keep on in his 
 way, and published the sermon. Judicial process was afterward 
 resorted to. In the course of it, the Assembly said, in 1824, " The 
 Synod might have proceeded instantly to condemn the errors of Mr. 
 Craighead's book, as the Assembly did the " Gospel Plan" of W. C. 
 Davis," that is, even without judicial process. (Baird, 642.) It recog- 
 nized the right to exercise episcopal power, not only in the condemna- 
 tion of error, but for a " lofty and independent spirit, that would not be 
 controlled by authority," from " a bold and confident controvertist, 
 who sets his opponents at defiance." 
 
 5. Barnes.— Moore's Digest, p. 226; Baird, p. 650. In 1829, Mr. 
 
17 
 
 Barnes preached the " Way of Salvation," the sermon causing public 
 discussion. Next year the Presbytery of Philadelphia allowed a call 
 from the First Church of Philadelphia to be placed in his hands. A 
 minority protested and complained that the proper consideration 
 of hife views was suppressed, and the right of the Presbytery to 
 pronounce upon those views, apart from judicial process, denied. 
 Synod sustained the complaint of the minority, and enjoined Pres- 
 bytery "to hear and decide on their objections to the orthodoxy of 
 the sermon of Mr. Barnes, and to take such order on the whole sub- 
 ject as is required by a regard to the purity of the Church and its ac- 
 knowledged doctrines and order." Obedient to this injunction, Pres- 
 bytery, apart from judicial process, "entered into an examination of 
 Mr. Barnes' sermon, and decided as follows: Presbytery, etc., "are of 
 the opinion that it contains speculations of dangerous tendency," etc. 
 (reciting the points), and, "on the whole, express their deep regret 
 that Mr. Barnes should have preached and published a discourse so 
 highly objectionable," etc., "and earnestly recommend to Mr. Barnes 
 to reconsider and renounce the erroneous matter," etc., and appointed 
 a committee to wait upon Mr. Barnes, and report the result of their 
 interview at the next meeting. Mr. Barnes refused to hear the com- 
 mittee, resisted the exercise of the episcopal power of the Presbytery, 
 pronouncing " the whole proceeding unconstitutional " This was fall- 
 ing back, not on the early practice of the Church, but upon a new in- 
 terpretation of the constitution given in 1822. The whole matter was now 
 referred directly to the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, 
 with the folloAving question, viz.: " Whether, by the constitution, it is 
 competent to any Presbytery to take up and examine any printed pub- 
 lication, and to pronounce it to be erroneous or dangerous, if they so 
 find it, witlioui in the first i^lace eominencing a formal prosecution of the 
 author, even supposing it to be known and admitted that the author is 
 a member of its own body ; or whether a Presbytery, in every such 
 case, mu&t, when disposed to act on the same, forthwith commence a 
 forensic prosecution of the author of the publication which is believed to 
 contain erroneous and dangerous opinions or doctrines ? " Baird, pp. 
 654, 655. It is the question of episcopal power, as to its extent, raised 
 in 1831, notwithstanding the previous and uniform practice of the 
 Church, save once, in 1822, which was counteracted by the action of 
 1824. 
 
 The following correspondence with one well qualified to judge in the 
 matter presented, I here insert : 
 
18 
 
 Cincinnati, October 15, 1876. 
 
 Bro. Bairij : Will you be so kin4 as to give me your opinion in re- 
 spect to the five cases — Balch, Davis, Harker, Craighead and Barnes — 
 named in the Digest, and state whether they are cases in which the 
 episcopal poiver of the Presbytery, in so far as it may be distinguished 
 from judicial or forensic process, was exercised. 
 
 Yours fraternally, etc. 
 
 Cincinnati, October 16, 1876. 
 
 Dear Brother: By "judicial or forensic process" I understand 
 you to mean, proceedings implying the presence of a prosecutor and 
 defendant and forms, the essential features of which are stated in our 
 book, in the chapter on Actual Process. 
 
 Episcopal jurisdiction, as contrasted with this, must mean that au- 
 thority by which, without an intervening prosecutor, or the forms of 
 actual process. Church courts act immediately and of their own knowl- 
 edge for the correction of disorders, the reclaiming of wanderers, and 
 the protection of the Church and its doctrines. 
 
 Of proceedings of this kind, respecting which you inquire, the rec- 
 wds of the Church exhibit a number of memorable examples. C,on- 
 spicuous among them are the cases of Harker, Balch, Davis, Craighead 
 and Barnes. In each of these cases the episcopal authority was em- 
 ployed in examining and censuring the published opinions of the par- 
 ties. In the Harker case, the Synod, without any of the forms of ac- 
 tual process, having first censured Barker's book, eventually excluded 
 him from the ministry for contumacy and persistency in error. In the 
 other cases, the episcopal function was exercised in censure of the pub- 
 lications, and its action was followed, more or less directly, by meas- 
 ures of forensic or judicial process. 
 
 Two other signal examples of episcopal jurisdiction you will find in 
 the New Light and Cumberland Schisms. In both instances the Sy- 
 nod of Kentucky asserted direct epi.scopal authority over unsound min- 
 isters, citing them to its bar, examining them as to their opinions and 
 conduct, and suspending them from their ministry. And in both cases 
 the General Assembly, after mature inquiry into the whole proceed- 
 ings, fully approved them. 
 
 1 could mention other instances, but these may serve you as exam- 
 ples of the whole. In fact, it is, I think, beyond question that in all 
 periods of the history of our Church, from the beginning until a com- 
 paratively recent date, the episcopal function was in constant exercise, 
 and its righteousness unquestioned by any. 
 
 Yours, very truly, 
 
 Samuel J. Baird. 
 
 The fortunes of this new movement, that sought to confirm a novel 
 and unwarranted interpretation of our organic law, I need not recount. 
 
19 
 
 They are spread at length in Baird's Digest, pp. 650 to 733, to which 
 Moore's Digest, p. 226, refers, traversing a painful conflict of seven 
 years. It was a time of trouble. Must the author of every erroneous 
 and dangerous sentiment be put on trial before the errors of his publi- 
 cations, whether by book, or pamphlet, or newspaper, and his irregu- 
 larities, be condemned ? To what, in troublous times, would the Church 
 be reduced, save a police court or an arena of interminable strife? 
 
 The answer of the Assembly of 1834 to the above question, an an- 
 swer which led directly to the disruption of the Church, because it de- 
 nied to the Church her right to condemn erroneous opinions apart from 
 the arraignment of the author, was in these words : "That in the opin- 
 ion of this Assembly, to take up, and try, and condemn, any 'printed 
 publications as heretical and dangex'ous, is equivalent to condemning the 
 author as heretical ; that to condemn heresy in the abstract can not be 
 understood as the purpose of such trial ; that the results of such trial 
 are to bear upon, and seriously to aSect, the standing of the author ; 
 and the fair and unquestionable mode of procedure is, if the author 
 be alive and known to be of our communion, to institute process against 
 him, and give him a fair and constitutional trial." Baird, p. 669 (8). 
 The peculiar introduction of the word "try" in its technical meaning, 
 and in an illegitimate application to the phrase, "printed publications," 
 as though any court could ever dream of instituting forensic process 
 against a book, an opinion, or a thing, is evidently inappropriate. The 
 protest to this answer was this : " We protest, because in our judgment 
 this decision not only establishes a principle erroneous in itself, but 
 does in fact the very thing which it imputes to the memorialists; it 
 casts censure on a former General Assembly for examining and con- 
 demning a heretical book before the author was tried and condemned 
 by bis Presbytery. We here refer to the case of W. C. Davis." 
 Baird, 671. 
 
 I gladly and thankfully pass over the history. Would there were 
 nothing here to recall the past! In 1834 the exercise of the episco- 
 pal power, in this respect, was denied. In 1835, and in 1837, it was 
 triumphantly reaffirmed by the Presbyteries in General Assembly. I 
 quote the action of the Assembly of 1835: '^Resolved that, in the 
 judgment of this General Assembly, it is the right, and may be the 
 duty, of an?/ judicatory of our Church to take up, and, if it see cause, 
 to bear testimony against any printed publication which may be circu- 
 lating in its bounds, and which in the judgment of that judicatory may 
 be adapted to inculcate injurious opinions, and this whether the author 
 be living or dead, whether he be in the communion of this Church or 
 not, whether he be a member of the judicatory c h-jni ng tlie opinion, or of 
 
20 
 
 some other. * * * To deny to our judicatories, as guardians of the 
 churches, this right, would be to deny to them one of the most precious 
 and poiverfid means of bearing testimony against dangerous sentiments, 
 and guarding the children of the Church against "that instruction 
 which causeth to err." No counter decision to this has ever been 
 made. The action of the Assembly of 1836, of which my own father 
 was the author, and which I well understand, did not antagonize with 
 the definitive action of 1835, which is a pi-ecedent that can not be set 
 aside in the Keunited Church. Just what the Assembly of 1836 did, 
 was simply to maintain that, to episcopally condemn the errors of a 
 publication, which errors the Assembly had already decided not to be 
 errors, after the formal judicial trial of their author for the same, was 
 improper, and in contravention of the rights of the author, as also a 
 reversal of its own decision upon the merits of the errors themselves. 
 Baird's Digest, p. 694 (3, 4, 5). Whatever difference of opinion 
 might have existed as to the errors themselves, there can be no doubt 
 that the position taken was correct, and in this view I have the sanc- 
 tion of my father himself. 
 
 What then. Moderator, is the result we have reached? It is no less 
 than this: (1.) That the express letter of our constitution asserts the 
 right of every oue of our Presbyteries and of other courts to condemn 
 error in doctrine and irregularity in practice arising therefrom, apart 
 from judicial arraignment of the author. (2.) That our earlier and 
 later assemblies and inferior courts have done this very thing, not 
 merely "in the abstract," as in the cases of Universalism and Socinian- 
 ism, etc., but in the concrete, in any publication, whether book, ser- 
 mon, or pamphlet, set on foot by any one, dead or alive, member of a 
 Presbytery or not, and referring to the publication by title and to the 
 author of the publication by name. (3.) That five memorable his- 
 toric precedents or actual cases in court confirm and illustrate this 
 exercise of episcopal power ; and (4.) That judicial process against 
 the author, or, in other words, the judicial arrest of the person, whether 
 by responsible prosecutor or by common fame, instead of the examina- 
 tion and disapproval of the thing, is not the first but always the last 
 resort ; and this I affirm is the genius of our constitution, an instru- 
 ment framed and fraught alike with the spirit of wisdom and charity, 
 conservative alike of its doctrine and order and the standing of our 
 ministry, the best possible means to save both the Church and her 
 public teachers from defection and destruction. 
 
 And now. Moderator, this is the law of our Church, its established 
 law, by the perpetual power of the standards, by memorable exposi- 
 tions and precedents in all our courts, contemporaneous with and sue- 
 
21 
 
 ceediug the enactment of our constitution, and by the latest as well as 
 earliest deliverances of our supreme court. I advance now to say, 
 that it is the law of our Church, established triumphantly also by the 
 maxims of common law and common sense, as well as by the univer- 
 sally recognized rules and decisions of all civil courts, where contradic- 
 tory decisions have existed in the same court upon questions of law 
 over which the court has proper jurisdiction. It has been confidently 
 asserted in the Presbytery that the decision of 1834 is the law of the 
 Presbyterian Church, and so regarded by 'ninety-nine hundredths" of 
 the reunited body — a marvelous assertion, truly ! Certainly the novel 
 interpretation of 1822 was slain by the latter contrary interpretation 
 of 1824. Upon what principle, may I ask, is that of 1834 exalted 
 in force above the still later and contrary interpretation of 1835 in 
 the undivided Church ? Not, certainly, upon any principle of legal 
 interpretation, either literal, rational, historical, or mixed. Not, cer- 
 tainly, upon the ground of the early practice of the Church, uninter- 
 rupted, untd 1822. Such logic is in face of all reason, all law, all 
 sense, and is repugnant to the rule accepted by all judges and enforced 
 in all civil courts. ''Stare decisis et quieta non movere " — to stand by the 
 decisions and not to disturb rights and principles at rest — is an ac- 
 knowledged rule. Judicial interpretations of the constitution, con- 
 temporaneous with its enactment and giving the sense of its framers, 
 will be upheld. The construction of the law by the courts having 
 jurisdiction in the case, at the time and afterward, is the surest and 
 best construction, and no modal limitation is to be inferred which may 
 defeat the plain intent of the law. A principle once established and 
 continued, under the construction of the supreme court which has 
 jurisdiction over questions of constitutional law, is to be maintained 
 as the law of the land. The construction of the court obtains the 
 force and acquires the sanction of constitutional law itself. While the 
 constitution remains unchanged the construction remains unchanged 
 also. ''Stare decisis" — abide by the decisions. Otherwise a change 
 of construction, in the interest of any excitement, strikes at the foun- 
 dation of all principles and all rights confirmed under the previous 
 construction and opens the door to interminable strife. The Assem- 
 blies of 1822 and 1834 violated this wholesome maxim. They did not 
 "abide by the decisions." They did disturb the "principles and 
 rights at rest." They uttered contradictory decisions to the old, and 
 paved the way for what followed. Contemporaneous exposition was 
 against them. An uninterrupted practice until 1822 was against 
 them. It was incumbent on the Assemblies of 1835 and 1837, in the 
 yet undivided Church, to reclaim and reinstate the early and true 
 
22 
 
 construction of the clause in our constitution, which acicnowleclges the 
 vested right of Presbytery " to condemn erroneous opinions which 
 injure the peace and purity of the Church," and set aside the interpre- 
 tation of 1834, or else allow the new construction, antagonistic to the 
 plain intent of the law and the whole spirit of our constitution. For 
 who does not know that, where contradictory decisions exist, the " last 
 decision" is sdways in force until reversed. Again I invoke the ac- 
 knowledged maxims of law by which the courts of law are governed : 
 " Jiidicia poster lor a sunt in lege fortiora" — the later decisions are the 
 stronger in law ; " Judieiis posterioribus fides est adhibenda" — ^fuU faith is 
 to be had in the later decisions; " Judlcia posteriora priora abrogant" — 
 later decisions annul the earlier contrary ones. Nothing is more settled. 
 The last decision of the Supreme Court of the United States on a question 
 of constitutional law will stand and be respected as against any former 
 contradictory one, and the same is true of the last decision of the 
 General Assembly, the supreme court of the Church, in its construc- 
 tion of the clause in question. Just as in legislation a later statute 
 repeals the former contradictory one, so in adjudication the later judg- 
 ment of the court annuls the prior ones in conflict therewith ; and 
 this is true in cases both of original and appellate jurisdiction. The 
 last decision of the Greneral Assembly is final, authoritative, and bind- 
 ing on all inferior courts over which it has jurisdiction, whether Synods, 
 Presbyteries, or Sessions. 
 
 By what right, then, Moderator, in law, in logic, in reason, in sense, 
 or history, can any one assert that the decision of 1834 is of superemi- 
 nent authority and binding force, as against |he later decision of 1835, 
 which occurred in the undivided Church? Does opposition to the 
 decision of 1835 constitute law, especially when no counter subsequent 
 decision of the Assembly is to be found? All the more, again, by what 
 right, when, by the very terms of our Reunion, we accept as law that 
 which was legally established antecedent to the division of 1838, and 
 our "Concurrent Declarations" affirm that the rules and precedents of 
 each branch of the Church, only subsequent to that division, shall not be. 
 regarded as law, unless "approved by both the bodies" and " re-estab- 
 lished in the united body?" 
 
 The use, by Presbytery, of an author's nayne, or of his publication, 
 in condemning erroneous doctrines, publicly propagated by book, 
 pamphlet, newspaper, and circulated over the author's ovvn signature, 
 or preached from the pulpit, advocated in special lectures on the plat- 
 form, and advertised from place to place, can form no valid matter of 
 objection to the exercise of episcopal power. It is only what occurs 
 in every public discussion and literary criticism of the works of 
 
23 
 
 theologians and moralists. The author uses it himself, and is well 
 known. The position that to condemn the erroneous opiniom or doc- 
 Urines of a man is to condemn the man himself as a heretic, is un- 
 charitable, unhistoric, unscriptural and illogical; — uncharitable to ths 
 court, for it subjects the court to the imputation of an attempt t« 
 secure, by indirection, a censure of the author, which it may fail to 
 gain by judicial action, so forcing a construction of the act of the 
 court that can not be justified ; — uncharitable, also, to the author, for it 
 labors to carry over to the author, who is always more and better than 
 his errors, a disapproving judgment that bears against the error* 
 alone. It is unhistoric and unscriptural, for, in all ages of the Church, 
 apostolic and post-apostolic, and under all forms of discipline, only he 
 is called a " heretic " who obstinately and contumaciously declines to 
 hear the admonition of the Church. So Bingham shows, a.s I shall 
 . hereafter quote. So the Apostle instructs us : "A man that is a heretic, 
 after the first and second admonition, reject," It is illogical on many 
 accounts, for it assumes that a judgment against erroneous doctrine 19 
 a judgment against the person, character, and standing, of the author. 
 And yet, in the same breath, severe judicial process is invoked ta 
 secure the very end apparently so much deplored! This is inconsistent, 
 for surely the exercise of authoritative non-judicial power is milder 
 and more tender than the exercise of forensic procedure, — for while a 
 judgment against the author, by judicial process, aims at the person, 
 character, standing and usefulness of the man, a judgment against the 
 thing alone, leaves the person, character, standing, usefulness un- 
 touched. Pride may object, but neither justice nor reason can. 
 Peter's standing was not impaired by Paul's ' reproof at Antioch, 
 neither were the churches of Cilicia and Syria injured by the injune- 
 tion of the Jerusalem Council. 
 
 The objection, moreover, assumes that because the author of error 
 is under the jurisdiction of some Presbytery, therefore no judgment 
 can emerge against his error, except upon judicial process. Formal 
 verdict of "guilty," as in the case of "crime," must be found and 
 formally declared. The whole man and his opinions must be so 
 chained together, under the categories of moral guilt and crime, that 
 no admonition may be allowed, and no injunction be imposed, except 
 upon a personal conviction. That is, the mere fact of jurisdiction, or 
 jurisdiction, ipso facto, compels extreme forensic process. But tjiis 
 is a petitio. Jurisdiction does not, ex necessitate, compel forensic pro- 
 cess against the author. It is simply a dictio juris, or saying of the 
 law, that both the man and his doctrines are amenable to the authority 
 of some particular court, to be dealt with in any one of the different 
 
24 
 
 constitutional modes deemed best for the edification of tiie Church. 
 Jurisdiction imposes no necessity for this, rather than that, procedure. 
 Such necessity rests on otlier grounds. 
 
 The objection still further assumes that the clause, Form of Govern- 
 ment, Chap. X, Sec. 8, means only a condemnation of error in thesi, — in 
 other words, the Presbytery is shut up either to judicial arraignment 
 of the author, or to a deliverance against an abstraction. But what 
 is the character of this abstraction ? Where shall we find it ? Where 
 there is jurisdiction in cases of erroneous doctrine, it binds to judicial 
 process, it is alleged. The logical consequence of this is, there can 
 be no such tiling as a condemnation of error in the abstract hiside of 
 the Presbyterian Church, no matter how wide-spread or rife it may be, 
 for all persons inside the Presbyterian Church are wndeviiii jurisdiction, 
 and where there is jurisdiction over error, judicial process, it is argued, 
 must obtain. Fate is not more inevitable than the logical conclusion 
 from these premises, that " error in ike abstract " means error outside of 
 the Presbyterian Church, that is, outside of its jurisdiction. The 
 Presbyterian Church, therefore, can condemn erroneous opinions, rife in 
 her own bosom, in no other way than by the judicial trial, in detail, of 
 every man who holds them, became every man is under her jurisdic- 
 tion ! Condemnation of error in thesi, therefore, means condemnation 
 of error oxitside of the Presbytervm Church ! And this is what is 
 meant by the clause in Form of Government, Chapter X, Section 8! 
 The whole authoritative character of the Presbyteiy, in relation to 
 error in doctrine, inside of the Church, is reduced to judicial process. 
 To such absurdity are we brought by objecting to the use of a name ! 
 See Baird's Digest, *p. 669 (8); 672, "^120; 730, §168; 731 (4). 
 Against such illogical position the decision of 1835 was directed; a 
 decision still of binding force. It is gratuitous to say that the clause, 
 Form of Government, Chapter X, Section 8, means only condemna- 
 tion in thesi, whether inside or outside our jurisdiction. The book 
 does not say so. The interpretation is a gloss, not an exposition ; a 
 modal limitation upon the law, imported into the text, not drawn 
 from it ; a restriction of its broad intent, which no jurist would decree 
 as just. Action in thesi is included, but the vested power of the 
 Presbytery, under that clause, is not limited thereto. The criticism, 
 that the exercise of episcopal power against error would cast some 
 reflection on the author, is sentimental. It is the duty of Diotrephes, 
 Alexander the coppersmith, Demas, Hymeueus and Philetus, to make 
 such reflection impossible. But what is the reflection in this case com- 
 pared with it in cases judicial? 
 
 The objectien, moreover, is theologically untenable. Nothing is 
 
25 
 
 clearer in the doctrine of Christ, than that the errors and sins of a be- 
 liever are constantly condemned before God and the world, while to 
 the person and standing of the believer there is " no condemnation" 
 whatever. This one fact alone is conclusive proof of the incorrectness 
 of the position that the condemnation of error is equivalent to the 
 condemnation of its author. Were such a position true, in itself, or 
 relatively, it would not be possible for God to condemn sin, in the 
 believer, without condemning the person of the believer at the same 
 time. It is bad theology. It is as bad polity. The spirit of the 
 polity of Christ is in harmony with the spirit of the doctrine of Christ, 
 and not against it. It is the grace of the gospel -doctrine that inter- 
 venes to protect the person of the believer, while it condemns his sins. 
 It is the same grace of gospel-polity that intervenes to protect the 
 not yet contumacious person of the teacher, while yet it condemns 
 his errors. It is lawful, right, wise and expedient, to condemn 
 the error and irregularity of any member of Presbytery, without 
 arraigning his person in formal trial before a judicial bar. 
 
 Thus, the whole objection is uncharitable, unhistorical, unscriptural, 
 and rests upon prejudices, assumptions, sentimentalisms, importations, 
 illogical inferences, and irrelavent conclusions — all confronted by the 
 letter of the constitution, the nature of the power vested in the 
 Church, by apostolic example, by the precedents of our court, and by 
 the doctrine of the Gospel itself. 
 
 The fundamental false postulate upon which the whole objection 
 rests, and to which every argument of the objecter returns, is the 
 denial, outright, of the authoritative character of episcopal or pater- 
 nal power, confining that authority to judicial determinations, a.nd 
 restricting the idea of "discipline" to forensic process. It divests 
 the testifying function of the Church of its whole authoritative value, 
 reducing her witness for the truth of Christ, to mere advice, to be 
 rejected or received, at will. It denies the binding nature of that tes- 
 timony. It makes it simply moral suasion, man's word, not God's 
 demand. In dealing with error everything not judicial is called advi- 
 sory. It is a compromise with Independency — pure Brownism. It 
 denies that the Church is the steward of God invested by Christ, min- 
 isterially, to rule the understanding, conscience, and belief of man, 
 and dictate, according to God's Word, what shall be maintained as 
 truth and what condemned as error, apart from judicial process. It 
 asserts that, save in a case of judicial process, tlie authority of the 
 Church in reference to error amounts to a mere power of advice, in 
 other words, no authority whatever — a power binding none, but a mere 
 opinion, to be entertained or not, at pleasure. It lifts the voice of 
 
26 
 
 remonstrance against the authoritative exercise of the very power 
 Christ has delegated to His Church, as an invasion of the rights of 
 ministers and men, a power so abundantly illustrated by the Church, 
 in all ages. It exclaims against authority where forensic forms are 
 wanting. It relegates public offenses against the truth to the category 
 of private ones, then challenges the right of court, or minister, to 
 prosecute, unless some private injury has been received. It deems a 
 private conference and explanation, with liberty abundant still to 
 teach the error, an ail-sufficient satisfaction to the Church and to the 
 truth. It holds that admonition and injunction can never be employed 
 for the arrest of error, till all judicial forms have been exhausted. Its 
 tendency is evil. It disintegrates, demoralizes. It mars the sense of 
 solemn obligation, create? indifference to vows, hostility to creeds, 
 invites debates on things forever settled; degrades the ministry, 
 destroys its influence, corrupts the Church, depreciates the truth of 
 God, disputes the law of Christ, and grieves the Spirit of all grace. It 
 ends, at last, in open insubordination, and resistance to all authority, 
 judicial and episcopal alike. History repeats itself, and wisdom may 
 t-ake lesson from the past. 
 
 Bat, Moderator, in addition to all I have said, I would emphasize 
 the fact, already alluded to, that the whole episcopal power the Pres- 
 bytery possesses to condemn error in doctrine and practice, apart from 
 forensic forms, so far from being unconstitutional, is grounded in that 
 «olemii evangelical commission which Christ, the Head of the Church, 
 gave to His apostles, and, through them, to the gospel ministry for all 
 time. In four passages of the New Testament (Matthew xvi. 19 ; 
 Matthew xviii. 18; Matthew xsviii. 19, 20; John xx. 21-23), the 
 eharter for the whole disciplinary power of the Church is contained. 
 It relates, not to extraordinary and miraculous endowment, peculiar to 
 apostolic times, but to ordinary and perpetual functions, durable to the 
 world's end. This plenary power, thus delegated by Christ to the 
 apostles, each minister possesses to its whole extent. Will any one be 
 so foolish as to say that, under such a charter, a Presbytery, Synod, or 
 General Assembly possesses less power, less authority, than is given by 
 Christ to each one of the individual members composing it, or that 
 8uch power is only to be exercised under judicial forms, for the pre- 
 servation of truth and the suppression of error ? Was it forensic pro- 
 cess, think you, of which the Saviour spoke when He lifted up His hands 
 on Olivet to bless His chosen, while His feet parted from the mountain 
 and a cloud received Him out of their sight? Sir, it was a gift of 
 episcopal power from the "chief Shepherd and Bishop" of our souls, 
 bequeathed to ordained overseers of the flock, and adequate to all the 
 
27 
 
 necessities of the Church henceforth and for evermore— an authorita- 
 tive power of instruction, inspection, and government, to be executed 
 in His name. And well did the first princes in the Church understand 
 their commission. Were Simon IMagus, or the incestuous Corinthian, 
 served with an ecclesiastical libel, and allowed a year and a half, or 
 two years, of judicial process, through ascending appelate courts, be- 
 fore a conclusive sentence overtook them? Were the erroneous opin- 
 ions of Judaising and Gnosticising teachers, who ventilated their soul- 
 subverting words and walked disorderly, tabulated into formal accusa- 
 tions, witnesses cited, cross-examinations had, wranglings perpetuated, 
 two appeals taken, and bitter parties formed, before the errors them- 
 selves were condemned ? Did Paul sist Peter in a judicial process at 
 Antioch for his half Christian conduct and time-serving dissimulation? 
 Was Titus commanded to institute judicial investigation against publi« 
 offenders before he dared to "admonish" them, or "rebuke them 
 sharply" and "before all," that they might be "sound in the faith?" 
 Think you the apostle reluctated to mention the names of Hymeneus 
 and Philetus, Alexander and Demas, Hermogenes and Phygellus, or 
 note by special designation the "unruly and vain talkers and deceivers 
 of the circumcision, whose mouths must be stopped, who subvert 
 whole houses, teaching things which they ought not, for filthy lucre's 
 sake?" Was there any " reflection" here f Or think you that th« 
 Lord Jesus himself, in glory, deemed it "unconstitutional" and "out 
 af order" to spot " that woman Jezebel" in the church at Thyatria, or 
 name the Balaamites in Pergamos, before a responsible prosecutor had 
 stood up, or formal charges had been preferred ? No, Moderator, it 
 was an exercise of episcopal power, as I have said, by the chief Shep- 
 herd and Bishop of our souls, who walked unseen among the golden 
 candlesticks and said, " I know thy works." 
 
 The Thessalonian Church was enjoined to " warn them that are un- 
 ruly." Must judicial process be commenced by the Presbytery of 
 Thessalonica ? The Corinthian Church is enjoined " not to company 
 with" the gross offenders named by the apostle. Must the offenses be 
 first proved by judicial process against the offenders? The Ephesian 
 Church is enjoined " to have no fellowship with the umfruitful works 
 of darkness, but rather reprove them." Was it that Presbytery must 
 meet and institute a judicial process before admonition or injunction 
 oould go forth? Timothy and Titus are ordered to "rebuke openly, 
 before all, them that sin, that others may fear." Has a Presbytery 
 less power than Timothy or Titus ? "A man that is a heretic, after the 
 first and second admonition, reject." Did the Presbytery refuse to ad- 
 monish or reject until after judicial process ? The Roman Church was 
 
28 
 
 enjoined " to mark them which cause divisions and offenses, contrary 
 to the doctrine" they had learned, and "avoid them." Was it to be 
 done only after j udicial process? John enjoins the whole Church not 
 to " receive into the house," nor salute, a corrupter of the truth. 
 Was it an injunction to institute judicial process? The truth is that 
 the administration of godly discipline for the preservation of the truth 
 and morals of the Chui'ch is by episcopal function, apart from forensic 
 forms, except in the last resort. It is of the same nature as that of a 
 father over his own house, who, having learned to rule well therein, 
 " knows how to take care of the Church of God." 
 
 Who were the "some among you" in the Corinthian Church who 
 denied the resurrection ? Were they not as distinctly marked by these 
 discriminating Avordsas were the Cretan "slow-bellies and liars" them- 
 selves ? What kind of power was it the Jerusalem Council exercised 
 under a non-judicial reference from Antioch, against "certain men" 
 well known, who accounted circumcision more than Christ and His 
 cross, and preached without restraint their soul-subverting doctrine ? 
 Was it error only "in the abstract " that council condemned — error, 
 evasive of all allusion to its propagators, or its reported relation to the 
 particular Church at Antioch ? Was forensic process ordered to be in- 
 stituted against the Judaizers or those who had imbibed their false 
 teaching ? No. Episcopal poAver was invoked, the power of the Je- 
 rusalem Presbytery, as such, and exercised to its oecumenical extent. 
 Error in doctrine and practice was condemned. The emissaries of 
 Judaism, from their headquarters at Jerusalem, "false brethren, un- 
 awares brought in, who came in privily to spy out the liberty" of Gen- 
 tile Christians in " Christ Jesus, that they might bring them into 
 bondage," were put under the ban. The Churches in Antioch, Syria, 
 and Cilicia were all admonished and enjoined, apart from forensic pro- 
 cedure. Verse 24th of the fifteenth of Acts is a simple preamble; 
 verse 29th is simply a resolution of injunction. 
 
 If we do but read the Scriptures carefully, we shall find that the 
 discipline of the Apostolic Church confined itself to admonition first of 
 all, solemnly and twice repeated, before procedure to greater severities. 
 We shall next ^detect the more impressive warning that followed ; then 
 the sharp rebuke and the authoritative injunction against both error in 
 doctrine and practice, by the sole exercise of episcopal power, vested 
 by Christ in His chosen ministry, apart from all judicial process. We 
 shall then learn that it was contumacy against such admonition, warn- 
 ing, rebuke, and injunction, that paved the way for excommunication. 
 If judicial process ever entered it was only after all other means had 
 been exhausted. Surely, if in the case of notorious error, like that of 
 
29 
 
 Simon Magus, or notorious practice, like that of the "incestuous" 
 man of Corinth, the notoriety of the fact, or what was '-commonly 
 reported " and known to all as true, made the offender, i})SO facto, liable 
 to excommunication, what folly it is to deny the Church's right of 
 mere admonition and injunction when common fame and documentary 
 evidence in court, bright as daylight, make the case- beyond dispute! 
 
 The history of the sub-Apostolic Church, long before the existence 
 of Theodosian and Justinian codes with civil penalties for error, only 
 confirms the interpretation I have given of the exercise of episcopal 
 power. Errors in doctrine and practice were condemned, uniformly, 
 before extreme process was instituted against their authors. " The 
 directions," says Bingham (Antiquities, II, p. 891), "were drawn up 
 upon the models of those rules of the Apostles which forbade Christians 
 to give any countenance to notorious offenders." " Errorists are they 
 who, when they are reproved for their unsound opinions, contuma- 
 ciously resist" (II, 981). The offenders were named, their errors con- 
 demned, and the Churches were warned and enjoined as well as the 
 offender himself, who was admonished or rebuked. It is the doctrine 
 of the Presbyterian Church, framed upon the Apostolic model, in all 
 times and countries, and signal examples of which are found in all her 
 history. "It thus appears," says Sir Henry Wellwood Moncrief, con- 
 vener of the General Assembly of the Free Church of Scotland, " that 
 the Free Church, by retaining the old form of process as part of her 
 law, would restrain a Presbytery from instituting or entertaining a regular 
 process against any minister until all means have been exhausted for pre- 
 venting the necessity of such a process being entered on." (Practice of the 
 Free Church, Edinburg, 1871, p. 118.) It is the assertion of episcopal 
 power as lodged in the Presbytery, and precisely to the same end is 
 the comment of Stewart of Pardovan, the Blackstone of the Presby- 
 terian Church, in his " Methodised Observations" upon the clause in 
 our Form of Government, Chapter X, Section 8, giving power to the 
 Presbytery to "condemn erroneous opinions which injure the purity 
 or peace of the Church" — upon which he says that the Presbytery has 
 not only the power of '^ censuring ministers" of "rebuking gross or con- 
 tumacious sinners," but also the power "of answering of questions, cases 
 of conscience, solving of difficulties in doctrine or discipline, with peti- 
 tions from their own or those in other Presbyteries, examining and 
 censuring according to the Word of God any erroneous doctrine which hath 
 been pid)licly or more privately vented within their bounds, and the 
 endeavoring, the reducing, and conversion of any that remain in error 
 and schism." (Obser. Method., Book I, Title XII, Section 4.) 
 
 How different from our practice, that would do nothing except 
 
30 
 
 resort to judicial process in the very start! Deprive the Church 
 of Christ of her right to bear testimony against and condemn error 
 ..in doctrine and practice, vented in her own bosom, apart from judicial 
 process, to admonish, warn, reprove, rebuke, enjoin ; deny to Presby- 
 tery this right, a right accorde I to every pastor and elder by the Word 
 of (rod, and enforced in every Apastolic letter, and the mission of the 
 Church, as a witness for the Truth, its pillar, ground, and guardian, is 
 concluded forever. With this, tlierefore, I close the discussion of the 
 first reason to the first point of my Complaint, by affirming that the 
 action of the Presbytery of Cincinnati was a repudiation of the right 
 vested in it by the Head of the Church, to condemn erroneous opinions 
 which injure its peace and purity, a right guaranteed by the constitu- 
 tion itself and protected by parliamentary rule. 
 
 (2.) The second reason in support of my first point of Complaint is, 
 that the action of Presbytery, sustaining the decision of the Moderator 
 (see first point of Complaint), was "a violation of parliamentary rule, in 
 derogation of my constitutional right to introduce my Preamble and Reso- 
 lutions, and to discuss the merits of the same after they were seconded, 
 and I was entitled to the floor, no matter what the result might have 
 been on the final vote, after discussion." 
 
 I claim. Moderator, that, when I was interrupted on the floor of 
 the Presbytery by Dr. Morris, who rose to a " point of order," assert- 
 ing that my Preamble and Resolutions were unconstitutional, and, 
 therefore, that even the " consideration" of them was not to be enter- 
 tained, and when the Moderator of the Presbytery decided that the 
 point was ^^ well taken," and the Presbytery sustained, on appeal, this 
 decision, I was perfectly " in order." The rules in order in both 
 houses of Congress, in our State Legislatures, and in deliberative 
 bodies in general, are derived from the British Parliament, and modi- 
 fied to suit our various circumstances. The rules of order for our 
 Church judicatories have the same origin. We have thus acquired a 
 system of parliamentary regulations, prescribing and defining a cer- 
 tain fixed mode of procedure in the course of deliberative business. 
 Our general rules of order, which form no part of the Constitution of 
 the Presbyterian Church, as the Constitution of the Presbyterian 
 Church forms no part of them, are inscribed in our Digest, pp. 204 to 
 208, and are forty -three in number. As to the order prescribed in 
 "judicial process," I do not hear speak. It belongs to the pi'ocess 
 itself, Presbytery acting as a court, and not as a deliberative and parlia- 
 mentary body. According to Rule of Order XIV, whenever a motion is 
 made, seconded, written, and read aloud, and the mover addresses the 
 Moderator (Rule XXXI), being entitled to the floor, he conforms to 
 
31 
 
 the rules of order laid down for the guidance of our courts. My Pre- 
 amble and Resolution were in writing; they were duly seconded ; no 
 other business was before tlie house, and I was entitled tor the floor by 
 the Moderator's decision, none disputing it; I addressed the chair; I 
 was respectful to my brethren. The Investigating Committee had re- 
 ported, and the official documents necessary to sustain my Preamble 
 and Resolutions were upon the table, subject to the call of myself or 
 any member of the body. I had not only a constitutional right to 
 introduce a Preamble and Resolutions, the object of which was to 
 disapprove erroneous opinions already disapproved of by the Com- 
 mittee itself, but also a parliamentary right to debate the Preamble 
 and Resolutions themselves upon tfieir merits. There are two classes 
 of motions, both of which are in order, but only one of which is in 
 order to be discussed upon their merits; in other words, there are 
 motions ciebateable and it/idebateable. In conformity with all parlia- 
 mentary manuals, our rules of order specify both. (See Rule XVIII.) 
 The motions w/idebatable on their merits are: " to lay on the table," 
 " to take up business," " to adjourn," and " the call for the previous 
 question." All other motions, without exception, nre debateable on their 
 merits. No power can deprive a man of his right to debate a debate- 
 able motion. My Preamble and Resolutions, therefore, were not only 
 "in order," according to our rules, but debateable on their merits by 
 the same rules ; and this is a universal rule. (See the Manuals of Jef- 
 ferson, Cushing, Roberts, and Warrington, on "Motions.") I was " in 
 order." I had violated no parliamentary rule of procedure in busi- 
 ness. The action of the Presbytery, sustaining the Moderator and 
 declaring me " out of order," was, therefore, itself, a violation of par- 
 liamentary rule in derogation of my constitutional rights of free dis- 
 cussion on the merits of the case before us. It was abundantly com- 
 petent for the Presbytery, after I had been heard, to make their 
 assumed unconstitutionality of my motion their reason, if they saw 
 fit, for voting down my motion, and putting my Preamble and Reso- 
 lutions out of the house. But, 1 submit that such assumed unconsti- 
 tutionality was no reason whatsoever why, when perfectly " in or- 
 der," I should have been pronounced " out of order," as at a previous 
 Presbytery, and thus twice be denied both ray constitutional and par- 
 liamentary rights to debate the merits of my motion. I shall return 
 to this again. 1 was perfectly " in order." 
 
 (3.) The third reason in support of ray first point of Coraplaint (see 
 fii'st point of Complaint) was, that "said decision of the Moderator, 
 .sustained and sanctioned by the Presbytery, was an exercise of the 
 most responsible prerogative reserved to the General Assembly, viz. : 
 
32 
 
 that of deciding questions of constitutional law and binding its interpretation 
 on the court as a rule of action." Individual Presbyteries or Synods 
 have no right to bind their interpretations of constitutional law as a 
 rule of action on the court, much less, where Ihe supreme court itself 
 has, after a sharp contest, announced a definitive decision, and appli- 
 cable precisely to such cases as the one referred to in my Preamble 
 and Resolutions. It matters not, that a person, charged with teaching 
 erroneous opinions, denies the opinions charged, or even his own writ- 
 ten language. This is no bar to deliberation. " Allegans contraria 
 non est audiendus." It rather concludes the case against him. A 
 man may multiply denials and self-contradictions perpetually. This 
 may be a reason why preamble and resolutions should not be 
 adopted, upon a final vote, but it is no reason why they should 
 be declared as " out of order," nor is it any reason in support of 
 the Presbytery's assumption of the Assembly's prerogative to decide 
 constitutional law and bind it as a rule of action on the court. Again, 
 I appeal to the acknowledged maxim of law, " Ejus est interpretari, cujius 
 est condere," — it belongs to that power to interpret the law, whose ofiice 
 it is to settle and establish it. To the General Assembly, therefore, 
 composed of the representatives of Presbyteries, or in other words, to 
 Presbyteries in Assembly by means of their representations, but not 
 to Presbyteries individually, pertains this high prerogative. Other- 
 wise, our Church would become a very Babel of multiplied and con- 
 tradictory decisions upon questions of constitutional law, confusion worse 
 confounded. The interpretation of the Assembly is binding law, and 
 not the interpretation of the individual Presbytery. 
 
 The Presbytery's action assumed to interpret the clause in our Form 
 of Government, Chapter X, Section 8, "to condemn erroneous opin- 
 ions," etc., as meaning, that no court can condemn such opinions 
 except by judicial arraignment of their author. But this exception is 
 an interpolation of the constitution. It is an addition, an unauthor- 
 ized gloss, not only in the face of a previous and discriminating clause 
 as to "judging ministers," a clause involving both the person and the 
 judicial process together, but directly in face of contrary and binding 
 decisions of our supreme court itself. Where does the constitution 
 say. Moderator, that Presbyteries have no power to condemn errone- 
 ous opinions, except by the modal limitation of judicial process ? No- 
 where. That limitation defeats " the plain intent of the law," and is 
 a mere obiter dictum, without the least authority. Not less unauthor- 
 ized is the assertion that " the exercise of episcopal power is a usurpa- 
 tion of the judicial without submitting to its limitations." This is to 
 deny both the letter of the constitution and the decisions of our 
 
33 
 
 supreme court. Judicial process is always the last resort and not the 
 fii'st. The Presbytery had uo right to put its interpretation upon the 
 constitution in face of the Assembly's interpretation of our law, ah-eady 
 given. 
 
 And this was the doctrine of the very Assembly of 1834 itself. In 
 the most express terms that Assembly affirmed, that to the General 
 Assembly alone it belongs to interpret the constitution. It said these 
 words, " the Form of Government vests the right of deciding questions 
 of constitutional law, not in Synods, but in the General Assembly." 
 Moore's Digest, p. 263 (3). According to this announcement, no in- 
 ferior court and no moderator may assume this prerogative and bind a 
 new interpretation on the court as a rule of action. The thing to be 
 specially remarked, just here, is this, that the very Assembly of 1834, 
 which gave a wrong interpretation of the clause, " to condemn errone- 
 ous opinions which injure the peace and purity of the Church," by 
 construing said clause with an unauthorized limitation, was the very 
 Assembly which yet maintained that the Supreme court alone is compe- 
 tent to interpret the constitution and bind that interpretation as a rule 
 of action on all our courts. 
 
 Precisely the same doctrine was reaffirmed by the Old School Gen- 
 eral Assembly of 1844, six years after the division. It said these 
 words: "What interest has the Synod more than other Synods or 
 Presbyteries in giving a wrong exposition of our book. When we in- 
 terpret our constitution, the voice of the whole Church should be heard." 
 (Moore's Digest, p. 598 (3). Thus, both the Old School and the New 
 School brethren agreed in this, that the prerogative of interpreting 
 our constitution and binding the interpretation upon all the courts, as a 
 rule of action, belongs to the General Assembly alone. And all the more 
 is this evident as we learn, from our supreme decisions, that no com- 
 plaint will lie, in any case, against a court for declining to usurp this 
 function of the Assembly (Moore's Digest, p. 598 (4), but that it will 
 lie against the exercise of this function. (Moore's Digest, p. 593 (4). 
 Thus, the general law maxim, " Ejus est interpretari cujus est conderej' 
 the constitution itself, in its literal, rational and historical construction, 
 brethren of both Old and New School alike, with the binding de- 
 cisions of our Digest and its historical precedents, all show that the 
 Cincinnati Presbytery, in the action I complain of, usurped the high 
 prerogative of the General Assembly. 
 
 (4.) The fourth reason in support of my first point of Complaint is 
 (see first point of Complaint), " that the action of Presbytery was tlie 
 turning of a constitutional question into a parliamentary rule of order, so 
 inventing a new rule in derogation of my constitutional and parlia- 
 mentary rights." 
 
34 
 
 Moderator, Avhat do we mean when we use the expressions " law" 
 and "order?" Is each one pleonastic of the other? Or, is there a 
 well-defined and settled distinction between them ? True, in a general 
 and wide sense, law is a rule of action. But when we use it in the 
 expression, " law and order," what is it we mean by law, and what by 
 order, each as distinguished from the other, in deliberative bodies? 
 The conceptions are totall}^ different. By " law" we mean, our consti- 
 tution, an organic statute, or a decision of the supreme court. Our 
 Confession of Faith, Form of Government, Book of Discipline, Cate- 
 chisms, Directory of Worship, and the decisions of the General Assem- 
 bly, are what we call '■'law." By "order" we mean, conformity to a 
 j)rescribed mode of procedure in business in a deliberative body, and 
 nothing more. When we say laiv, the mind goes straight to the con- 
 stitution and its authorized interpretation. When we say order, the 
 mind goes straight to parllamentery rules of procedure in business. 
 The termini of the two conceptions, and the contents of the two, are 
 totally different. The one relates wholly to the constitution and its 
 interpretation, the other relates wholly to the general rules of our judi- 
 catories for procedure in business — it relates to "proceedings" — and 
 such is the definition of lexicographers and parliamentarians. Mr. 
 Webster's definition of "order" is as follows: "Adherence to the 
 point in discussion according to established rules of debate ; as the 
 member is not in order, i. e., he wanders from the question." " Estab- 
 lished mode of proceeding ; — the motion is not in order." " Regular- 
 ity ; settled mode of operation." The definition in Jefferson's Manual 
 is as follows : " Order in conformity with the ndes of order laid down. 
 Departure from the rules, is a breach of oi'der." In that majestic vol- 
 ume of a thousand pages by Mr. Gushing, on the " Law and Practice 
 of Legislative Assemblies," founded on Hatsell's celebrated precedents, 
 we have the following clear and unambiguous words: "All questions 
 of order are determined by reference to the rules of order. Any mem- 
 ber, rightfully in possession of the house, his motion having been sec- 
 onded, is in order." "And it is the right of members to originate 
 propositions, at their pleasure, for the consideration of the house ; and 
 any member, in possession of the house, may make any motion he 
 thinks proper." 
 
 Now, Moderator, where in all our rules of order is the interpretation 
 of the constitution according to the Assembly of 1834 to be found? 
 Where is our constitution found in the rules of order? Where are any 
 of the decisions of any of our General Assemblies found in the rules 
 of order? And by what right did the Presbytery of Cincinnati make 
 its interpretation of the constitution a rule of order, and, upon that 
 
35 
 
 ground, rule my Preamble and Resolutions as "out of order f" The 
 thing is too evident to require discussion. Nothing is a "point of order" 
 hi parliamentary debate which does not relate to accepted rides of order pre- 
 scribed for procedure in business. 1 was perfectly in order, according to 
 the rules of our court, as I have already shown. I violated no parlia- 
 mentary regulation, either at Glendale or at Cincinnati. My paper 
 was before the house, written and seconded, no other business being 
 before the body, and was just as much in order as the papers of Br. 
 Morris or those of Messrs. Ritchie, Hills, and Stauton. A man is in 
 order, if he conforms to the parliamentary rules of procedure in busi- 
 ness. He may be perfectly in order, while his motion may be per- 
 fectly unconstitutional, and his motion may be perfectly constitutional, 
 while he himself is as perfectly "out of order." Therefore it was a 
 usurpation of my rights, when a question of constitutional law was 
 turned into a " point of order," entertained by the Moderator, and 
 sustained by the Presbytery, so taking from me, both ray constitu- 
 tional and parliamentary rights to discuss my Preamble and Resolu- 
 tions on their merits, and to adduce in their support the "facts" 
 which had been introduced into the house by the official report of its 
 own committee. 
 
 But it has been said, there are such things as "constitutional rules," 
 and we have a right, therefore, to turn questions of constitutional law 
 into "rules of order." The logic of this reasoning is as fallacious as 
 the intuition of the fiicts is obscure. No calculus, known to mathe- 
 matics to-day, is able to fix the amount of power necessary to draw 
 such an enormous conclusion, and no logical harness, yet made, is 
 strong enough to endure the strain. For, " constitutional rules " 
 relate to polity, and are parts of the constitution itself. They are 
 actual amendments to, or interpretations of, the Articles of Govern- 
 ment and Discipline, in every case, however, " exckiding alteration 
 of the doctrine and fundamental principles of the Church." (Moore's 
 Digest, p. 328.) Proposed to all the Presbyteries and adopted, upon 
 overture, by two thirds of them, they are then, formally, declared by 
 the Assembly to be laic, and are irrepealable, henceforth, by the As- 
 sembly itself or by any subordinate court. They are legislative acts 
 of the whole Church. Presbytery can not make them, nor unmake 
 them ; neither can Assembly. As part of the constitution, they 
 have the whole force of constitutional law. These rules are of the 
 nature of judicial order of proceeding definitely defined, which, though 
 not parliamentary rules of order, are defined order itself. Clearly, a 
 motion against any of these could not be entertained, for here law and 
 order are made identical. Where the constitution itself, as in judicial 
 
36 
 
 process, assumes the feature of a mandate, an express "shall," it is 
 then settled order itself, and no motion can be entertained against it, 
 making it out of order. The ground of refusal to entertain such mo- 
 tion, is not that the motion is unconstitutional, however true that may 
 be, but that it is against order itself, and no motion is in order that is 
 out of order. 
 
 Nor are our Rules of Order part of our Constitution. In express 
 terms our Digest says: "The following rules, not having been sub- 
 mitted to the Presbyteries, make no part of the Constitution of the Pres- 
 byterian Church." (Moore's Digest, p. 204.) And even if they did, yet, 
 such a rule as the one the Cincinnati Presbytery has legislated into 
 existence, on the basis of 1834, has no place in the catalogue. But 
 now, we have been suddenly presented with a new rule of procedure, 
 we may call it Rule XLIV, added to the list, and it will read this way : 
 "iVb Presbytery shall consider any motion, preamble or resolution, condemnhig 
 erroneous opinions under its jurisdiction which injure the peace and purity of 
 the Church, unless after judicial process of the author of said opiiiionsy The 
 odor of it. Moderator, savors very much of an attack upon the consti- 
 tution indeed, but then, you know, it is only a "rnZe of order V I 
 admit. Moderator, that under such an enactment, my Preamble and 
 Resolutions would have been out of order, but I deny that the Assem- 
 bly has made such an enactment, or bound such a rule upon the court. 
 Where is such a rule to be found, even in our constitutional rules ? 
 Where is the Presbytery's right to turn a question of constitutional 
 law, in face of the binding decision of the Assembly, into a rule of 
 order? It is pure legislation, an assumption, by Presbytery, of the 
 function of the General Assembly ; a violation of the dearest and 
 most sacred rights of motion and discussion, guaranteed to every 
 Presbytery by the constitution of the Presbyterian Church, and by 
 parliamentary rule. How often must it be repeated before we under- 
 stand it, that nothing is a "point of order'' which does not relate to 
 established rules of order prescribed for procedure in business. 
 
 But now. Moderator, granting that all I have said goes for nothing; 
 admit, for the sake of argument, the unconstitutionality of my Pre- 
 amble and Resolutions ; allow that the Presbytery's construction of the 
 constitution was right, as against the binding decisions of the General 
 Assembly ; grant that there is no such thing as non-judicial power to 
 condemn error ; grant everything that the brethren opposed to my motion 
 maintained, or might maintain, I still deny that a man is " out of order" 
 simply because his motion or preamble and resolutions either are, or 
 assumed to be, "unconstitutional.'' You may lay them ou the table, 
 or vote them down, after they have been moved, seconded and dis- 
 
37 
 
 cussed, even though they declare that the constitution itself is uncon- 
 stitutional. But the mover is " in order," and has both a constitutional 
 and a parliamentary right to be heard on their merits. 
 
 In support of this position I adduce the testimony of several gen- 
 tlemen of eminent authority in parliamentary experience. The first 
 I mention is the Hon. J. F. Foliett, late Speaker of the House of 
 Representatives of the State of Ohio. 
 
 Cincinnati, O., October 9, 1876. 
 Hon. J. F. Follett: 
 
 Dear Sir — The constitution of the Presbyterian Church, Form of 
 Government, Chapter X, Section 8, gives a Presbytery the "power to 
 condemn erroneons opinions that injure the peace and purity of the 
 Church. Suppose I offer the following : 
 
 " Whereas, A. B. has taught and teaches so and so, which is 
 "erroneous'' (here I quote the proofs of error in language of the 
 author), therefore, 
 
 " Resolved, i'hat A. B. is in error in said opinions, and is hereby en- 
 joined not to propagate them. 
 
 I. Is this preamble and resolution "out of order" if it is duly 
 moved, seconded, and the mover has the floor, and there is no other 
 business before the house ? 
 
 II. Suppose some one rises to what he chooses to call a "point of order, ^' 
 viz.: That according to his interpretation of the constitution, the above 
 clause excludes the condemnation of error, except in the abstract, and 
 that forty General Assemblies have so decided, and therefore it is 
 "out of order" even to "consider" the preamble and resolution, is the 
 the mover "out of order" on that account? 
 
 Is any interpretation of the constitution, pro or eon, to be made a 
 parliamentary rule for procedure in business? Admit that the Pre- 
 amble and Resolution are against the constitution itself, most clearly, 
 does that make their mover " out of order," and close his mouth on the 
 merits of the case ? 
 
 Suppose a member of the legislature moves to burn up the constitu- 
 tion of the State, or to secede from the Union, and the motion is 
 seconded, and the mover has a riglit to the floor, is he "out of order" 
 because he is unconstitutional? Is he not entitled to speak to the full 
 merits of the case, even though the house will vote down his i-esolutions 
 instantly ? 
 
 I hold that the "constitution " is one thing and "order" is another. 
 Order in a deliberative body, is conformity to a prescribed mode of 
 procedure in business and relates wholly to parliamentary rule, while 
 
38 
 
 constitution or organic law is a wholly different thing, and no inter- 
 pretation of it may ba made a parliamentary rule under which to 
 declare a resolution opposed to that interpretation as " out of order,'' 
 if it is duly seconded and the member has a right to the floor and no 
 other business is before the house? Please inform me, is my view 
 right or wrong ? 
 
 Truly yours, etc., etc., 
 
 ii? ^ :^ * 
 
 " I have iw hesitation in saying your vieio is right, 
 
 John F. Follett." 
 
 1, Does the unconstitutionality of a motion or preamble and resolu- 
 tion make said motion or preamble and resolution, ipso facto, "out 
 of order f" 
 
 " It does not. 
 
 J. F. FOLLEIT." 
 
 2. Is an unconstitutional motion, preamble or resolution, if duly 
 seconded, no other business being before the house, "in order," and 
 debateable on its merits? 
 
 •'' It is. Very truly, / 
 
 J. F. Follett." 
 
 I also add the following answer from my respected friend, Hon. 
 Kufus King, President of the late convention of the State of Ohio, 
 assembled for the revision of its Constitution ; — an answer written to the 
 same communication addressed to the Hon. Mr. Follett : 
 
 " Cincinnati, O., October 8, 1876. 
 
 " My Deak Ser — Unless precluded by some special rule of order, the 
 Presbytery was bound to entertain such a motion as yours. I do not 
 see how it can even be questioned. Nothing which has relation to the 
 laws, powers, or duties of the body, can be out of order, if not expressly 
 forbidden by the rules of order. 
 
 Yours very truly, 
 
 RuFus King." 
 
 I add also the following correspondence had with the Hon. Schuyler 
 Colfax, formerly Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Presi- 
 dent of the Senate, of the United States : 
 
 Cincinnati, O., November 1, 1876. 
 Hon, Schuyler Colfax : 
 
 Dear Sir — Allow me to ask your decision, as a parliamentarian, 
 upon the following questions : 1. Is it the province of a presiding 
 officer, or of any deliberative body, acting under written parliamentary 
 
39 
 
 " Rules of Order," to make this or that assumed or real interpretation 
 of the Constitution a "point of order," or a "rule of order," when 
 said interpretation is no part of tlie " Rules of Order?" 2. Does the 
 unconstitutionality of a proposition make it, ipso facto, "out of order?" 
 3. Is any motion, Preamble, or Resolution, even if unconstitutional, 
 debateable on its merits, if duly offered and seconded, and not excluded 
 by the specified class of " undebateable motions" known as such to 
 parliamentarians? Please be so kind as to give me your opinion. 
 
 Very truly yours, etc., etc., 
 
 >|; j[; ijc >K 
 
 " South Bend, Ind , November 7, 1876. 
 "Dear Sib — Your letter has just reached me. In Congress, the 
 presiding officers do not rule out questions on any grounds of uncon- 
 stitutionality. This practice is supposed to be the true inference from 
 the British rule laid down in Jefferson's Manual, Sec. 35. " If an amend- 
 ment be proposed inconsistent with one already agreed to, it is fit ground 
 for its rejection by tlie House; but it is not within the competence 
 of the speaker to suppress it, as if it were against order ; for were 
 he permitted to draw questions of consistence within the vortex of order, 
 he might usurp a negative on important modifications and suppress 
 instead of subserve the legislative will." 
 
 Respectfully yours, 
 
 Schuyler Colfax."' 
 
 I ako add the following correspondence with the Hon. Edward McPher- 
 son, for many years Clerk of the National House of Representatives 
 and a universal authority on parliamentary law and precedent through- 
 out the country. 
 
 Cincinnati, O., October 9, 1876. 
 Hon. Edward McPherson: 
 
 Dear Sir — Our Form of Government, Chap. X, Sec. 8, with which 
 you are well acquainted, gives Presbytery the "power," among other 
 things, " to condemn erroneous opinions which injure the purity or 
 peace of the Church." This is a function of Episcopal power, as I 
 take it, discriminated from the function of Judicial power, which is 
 involved in the previous clause, viz., of "judging ministers." My 
 question is this, would a Preamble or, in other words, a proposition, 
 introduced into Presbytery, reciting erroneous doctrines or views 
 propagated by any of its ministers, with the necessary proofs therefor, 
 taken from ofiicial documents on the table, or otherwise, and an 
 ajipended Resolution condemning the error and enjoining its new 
 propagation, be "out of order" or "unconstitutional?" And' would 
 an amendment, unconstitutional in itself, be "out of order" on that 
 ground? To what extent does the jurisdiction of a parliamentary 
 officer go ? May any proposition or motion duly made and seconded 
 be debated on its merits, if within the rules as to debateable motions? 
 A brief answer to these interrogations will place me under obligations 
 to your kindness. 
 
 Very sincerely yours, etc., 
 
40 
 
 "Gettysburg, Pa., Nov. 10, 1876. 
 " Dear Sir — I have been from home for several weeks and your 
 letter of the 9th October did not reach me till after the 19th. 
 
 "Please excuse the delay of this reply. I believe I understand 
 yotfr point. 
 
 "As to the amendment. An amendment to a pending proposition, 
 germane to it, is in order, without any regard to the alleged unconsti- 
 tutionality. A presiding officer never undertakes to pass upon the 
 effect of an amendment. His jurisdiction is wholly confined to the par- 
 liamentery questions of germaneness, degree, etc. 
 
 "As to the proposition. Any proposition duly offered and properly 
 pending is subject to debate upon its merits, within the rules, as well 
 if it be clearly unconstitutional, or if only presumably so. To deny 
 this would be seriously to fetter all deliberative proceedings. 
 With great respect, 
 
 Truly yours, 
 
 Edward McPheeson."* 
 
 Fortified by such testimony as the above, I maintain, therefore, (1.) 
 That by "order"' is meant conformity to prescribed "rwfes of order'' 
 for procedure in business ; (2.; That nothing is a ''point of order "' which 
 does not relate to these rules ; (3.) That our parliamentary rules of order 
 are no part of our constitution ; (4.) That constitutional rules are no part 
 of the rules of order ; (5.) That Presbytery had no right to interpret 
 the constitution, bind its interpretation upon the court, and turn it 
 into a rule of order ; (6.) That Presbytery had no right to legislate a 
 new rule into existence conflicting with the binding decision of the 
 Assembly; (7.) That a man is always " in order" when he conforms 
 to the rules of order, and only "out of order" when he departs from 
 the same; (8.) That a man may be perfectly "in order" when his 
 motion is utterly rmconstitutional, and his motion may be perfectly 
 constitutional, when the man himself is utterly " out of order." 
 
 I need say no more on this first point of complaint. I complain that 
 the dearest right of a Presbyterian minister, protected by a true con- 
 struction of the constitution and by parliamentary rules, to both 
 which I conformed, were taken from me, on the floor of the Presby- 
 tery, by an arbitrary decision of that body, and this action I submit 
 to the judgment of the Synod. 
 
 II. The second point of Com|)laint is against the Presbytery's action, 
 in accepting, and thereby making official documents of, the Special 
 Report and collaterals of the Committee of Investigation in the case of 
 
 * The communications from Mr. Colfax and Mr. McPherson I did not receive 
 till after the meeting of Synod. I have talien the liberty to Insert them in the 
 speech. - T. H. S. 
 
41 
 
 Mr, McCune, " idthout any action whatever to amend or to rectify statements, 
 judgments, and personalities therein contained, at variance with Righteous- 
 ness and Truth." This, of course, relates wholly to myself and the Pres- 
 bytery. I complain of no statements, judgments, or personalities, in 
 reference to any one else. 
 
 (1.) The first reason in support of this second point of Complaint is, 
 "That the Report opens with, and its recommendations rest upon, 
 statements contrary to truth.^' 
 
 (a.) It says, my Resolution, offered at Glendale, and printed in my 
 pamphlet, was a "Resolution censuring Mr. McCune." This is not 
 true. The Resolution simply asked Presbytery to "reject the princi- 
 ples" Mr. McCune has advocated, and to say that the '' course pursued'' 
 is in ^'contravention" of our law, and "inconsistent" with membership 
 in our body. It relates wholly to things, proper to be acted upon by 
 the episcopal power of the body. It proposes no " censure " of the 
 person, not even an admonition. It implies no censure whatever. It 
 is just what our Church has done scores of times, without censure, 
 and repeats every time upon "review and control" of Records, and 
 in public deliverances whenever necessary. 
 
 (b.) It says my pamphlet made " light of the Committee and its 
 work," In no paragraph, sentence, or clause of my pamphlet, can a 
 syllable be found authenticating such a charge, or reflecting in the 
 slightest degree upon the " the Committee and its work." The statement 
 is wholly gratuitous. 
 
 (c.) It says, that my pamphlet " contains the staple and authority for 
 the rumors existing against Mr. McCune." This also is untrue. My 
 pamphlet was itself the product of "rumors,'' and of various publica- 
 tions, as also of previous discussions, long before the pamphlet was 
 born ; and this was well known to the Committee. It was neither the 
 staple, nor the authority, ^'■for the rumors existing," at the time of its 
 publication, nor at the time of Presbytery's appointment of its Com- 
 mittee. And none knew this better than the draftsman of the Report, 
 Dr. J. Gr. Montfort. The pamphlet was published about two weeks 
 after the Presbytery arose at Glendale, April 13, 1876. Now then. 
 Moderator, I affirm that Mr. McCune's book on " Organic Uniou " was 
 published in 1866, and has since been fully circulated. The " Chris- 
 tian Unity," edited by Mr. McCune, appeared in November, 1873. 
 Dr. Monfort's adverse criticism upon the principles of that paper ap- 
 peared in the same month, saying: "It will be seen that Bro. 
 McCune aims at a great change in the Churches." In August, 1875, 
 this same widely-circulated paper contained an editorial by the drawer 
 of the report. He says, in that editorial, among other things: " If 
 
42 
 
 these brethren are for orgauization and association, or are already or- 
 ganized and associated, the external bond of union being the conven- 
 tion or association which met in New York in 1873, in Cincinnati in 
 1874, and in Suffolk, Va., in 1875, we are at a hss to understaiid how 
 Mr. McCune or Mr. Mellish can be willing to maintain connection 
 with the Presbyterian or Baptist Church, We should suppose that 
 each would pass at once for an old organization that is unauthorized 
 and extra-scriptural to a new one on a New Testament Basis." 
 "The Address to all Christian Ministers and Chui'ches in North 
 America" was issued in 1874. A long debate between Mr. McCune 
 and the Christian Standard occurred in 1875 and the earlier part of 
 1876. The L. and M. L. "Declaration and Basis," and the Council 
 were in the latter part of 1875; and the Herald and Presbyter 
 published the proceedings, as did other papers. Public discussions by 
 Messrs. McCune, Morris, Skinner, and Layman, besides, occurred in 
 the Cincinnati Gazette, Commercial, and Times, also discussions in the 
 Christian Observer, the United Presbyterian, Interior, the Presbyterian, 
 the Journal and Messenger, the North-western Christian Advocate, 
 and other papers, all which I pi-esent as evidence for the point I make, 
 before ever the Glendale Presbytery met, or my pamphlet saw the 
 light. An interlocutory meeting had even been proposed in reference 
 to this matter. The opening sentences of my pamphlet are themselves 
 a refutation of the Committee's statement. The resolution of the 
 Presbytery under which the Committee was appointed, and beginning 
 thus, " Wheras, for some time past there have been current rumors," etc., 
 — a form of expression penned by the drawer of the report himself, — 
 seals the allegation of the Committee as untrue. With what con- 
 science, then, or with what sense of justice or of truth, could the 
 drawer of the report and the Committee base their report upon the 
 false statement that my pamphlet was the '■'staple and authority for 
 the rumors existing," in " time past," and into which they were appointed 
 to inquire, before the pamphlet was born ? On this I need say no more, 
 except that nothing could be more unjust or untrue than the attempt 
 to make me the author of Common Fame; a device contrived (1), 
 to cut away any Presbyterial action on the ground of Common Fame 
 in the case, and (2) to lay the ground that I be required to become a 
 responsible prosecutor. Thus does the report of the Committee open 
 with, and its recommendations rest upon, three unfounded statements. 
 (2.) The second reason in support of the second point of Complaint 
 is, that this accepted report steps out of its way to raise a new ca»e, 
 instead of confining itself to the terms of the resolution under which 
 the Committee was appointed." This policy, in the light of the pre- 
 
43 
 
 ceding untruthfulness, was evidently to my damage before the public 
 and was beyond the province of the Committee. The terms of that 
 resolution were, to have a ''full conference Avith Mr. McCune, ' 
 and to inquire into all the "facts" bearing on the "case" of Mr. 
 McCune, and report to Presbytery. Under these instructions the 
 Committee assumes to pronounce upon me personally and upon tlie 
 publication of my pamphlets, written in defense of my rights as a 
 Presbyter, and of the faith and order of the Church, a condemnatory 
 judgment. It recommends that I be dealt with for publishing the 
 pamphlet. My mouth having been closed in the G-lendale Presby- 
 tery, I am to be dealt with for opening it outside of the Presbytery, 
 and then have it closed again on the merits of the case when the Pres- 
 bytery met thereafter. It recommends that Presbytery take action 
 to the effect that I either " prove or retract" certain picked state- 
 ments by Mr. McCune, and that I "ought'' so to do, in default of 
 which, it suggests a prosecution for "slander.'" Was this, Moderator, 
 the work the Committee was sent to do under the terms of the reso- 
 lution, recommending no action whatever in the case it was appointed 
 to examine, and the material "facts" of which case it was required to 
 present to the Presbytery. It turned aside to do as I have intimated. 
 I submit that this was an unlawful exercise of the functions of the 
 Committee, in the interest of a personal attack upon myself. And 
 yet Presbytery accepted all this without a word of rebuke or official 
 correction. 
 
 (3.) The third reason in support of the second point of Complaint is, 
 "That it implies a censure on the undersigned and recommends the 
 Presbytery to pass a judgment which also implies a censure." Cen- 
 sure for publication, censure in case I declined to " prove or retract." 
 It says I " ought'' to do one or tho other, that is, I am under moral 
 obligation to do this, and in case I do not, then a prosecution for 
 " slander " may be the next appropriate step ! What is all this, Mode- 
 rator, but an implied "censure" of me personally ? All this, I affirm, 
 was beyond the province of the Committee under the terms of its 
 instructions ; and against this unprecedented liberty I complain, as also 
 against the formal acceptance of such a report, giving it the sanction of 
 an official document, I hold as firmly as any man can, that a public 
 slanderer "ought" to prove or retract, and that no apologies short of 
 this "ought" to be accepted. Ministerial character is too precious to 
 be trifled with. 
 
 (4.) The fourth reason in support of the second point of Complaint 
 is, "That part of the Collaterals of the Report indulge in gross person- 
 alities against the undersigned, which would not be tolerated for one 
 
44 
 
 nioinent in debate, aud ought not to be tolerated in an official docu- 
 ment/' 
 
 The Collaterals are specified by the Committee in their Special Re- 
 port, and are expressly said by them to be a 'part of our report." 
 What they contain was well known to Dr. Monfort, the Chairman of 
 the Committee, and to the Committee itself. I think it will be difficult 
 for any one to sliow wherein I personally have violated the first prin- 
 ciples of Christian courtesy or gentlemanly respect, by the use of 
 opprobious and vituperative epithets against any one. I have sought 
 simply to defend the faith and order of my Church, in a manly and 
 Christian way. But the Report of the Committee has introduced into 
 the Presbytery an array of gross personalities, the parallel to which 
 can not be found in any official document, secular or political, in the 
 country. Collateral No. 1, p. 5, "violent, unlawful and slanderous 
 a.S3ault;" "attacked and villified," p. G ; " unrighteous attempt," p. 6 ; 
 '• proposed to reach this high-handed and tyrannical result," p. 7 ; 
 "assailing me with a great mass of quotations of garbled phrases," 
 p. 7; " shameful unfairness," p 7; " flagrantly unjust," " slanderous," 
 " defiant," "disrespectful to the lawful jurisdiction of the Presbytery," 
 "frantic outcry," p. 8; " slanderous charges," "crying injustice," p. 
 10; "unprecedented in the history of slander," p. 5. Collateral No. 
 4, "violent, unlawful and contumacious assault," p. 1; "recklessly 
 and officiously asserts," p. 5; "defamatory pamphlet," "tyrannical 
 and false assumption," p. 5 Collateral No. 5, "untrue and slander- 
 ous statements," p. 3; "defamer," "shamefully untrue statements," 
 p. 4; "shameful and outrageous wrong," p. 12; "violently contuma- 
 cious and defamatory statements," p. 26. 
 
 Moderator, I blush for my Church. I blush for the degeneracy of 
 manners that prevails in our midst, and for that demoralization of 
 Christian sentiment and propriety which could aliow our ears to be 
 shocked by such things in a court of the Lord Jesus Christ. I hang 
 my head in shame. I complain righteously to this body. Personalities, 
 sir, are the" order of the day, and it is time that the Church of Christ 
 set its face like a flint against the enormity. It pleased my ear, I must 
 say it in justice to some of my brethren, to hear their expressions of 
 indignation at the character of the Report, styling it "outrageous," 
 " horrid," and ■' unparalleled in the history of the Church." But that 
 the Presbytery itself, under the lead of those who controlled it, 
 should tolerate and accept such a Report without rebuke, tells its own 
 story. 
 
 III. The third point o? Complaint is against the action of Presby- 
 tery, in "adopting an answer to the protest of the undersigned, Sep. 
 
45 
 
 teniher 15tli, 1876, Mt. Auburn, without rectifying its errmieous state- 
 ments and tlie false impression it is calculated to make." 
 
 (1.) My first reason in support of this third point of Complaint is, 
 "That said answer does not accurately represent the facts of the case.'" 
 My second reason in support of the third point is, that "it represents 
 the undersigned as being out of order and furnishing reasonable grounds 
 for the annoyances and unlawful interruptions under which he was 
 forced to retire from the floor of the Presbytery." My third reason 
 is, " that no withdraival of the protest for alteration, on account of mis- 
 representation in the answer, could make the protest " more agree- 
 able" to the "views" of the undersigned." I take these three reasons 
 together, and for the first two of them adduce the public reports of 
 the occurrences at Mt. Auburn, certified to, as correct reports, by the 
 gentlemen of the press who made them. I also present my Protest 
 and the Answer of the Presbytery to the same. (Here read the 
 Gazette and Commercial reports.) 
 
 Now, Moderator, I make the following points: (1.) I was ruled as 
 in order, by the Chair, when reading the Special Report of the Inves- 
 tigating Committee. (2.) I never traversed that report with " unlim- 
 ited " range, as the protest insinuates. I confined myself, in the 
 first place, strictly to the Special Report ; and in the second place, 
 closely to one paragraph of that report, printed as No. 2 in the Ga- 
 zette, reading it from the print. I had read precisely one inch and 
 three quarters by actual measurement, during over an hour's patient 
 and protracted effort to go on uijder the ruling of the Moderator. I 
 sought to read nothing else, and I will read now just what I read then. 
 (Here read.) This is all, sir. There is nothing else in that report 
 that touched the question in hand. It is therefore untrue that I was 
 indulging in " unlimited reading,"' or that the Moderator called me 
 to order on that account. (3.) All Mr. McCune's objections and in- 
 terruptions were directly to the point, that I had 7io right to read that 
 part of the report which the Moderator ruled I had a right to read, in 
 order to show that the Committee was as much bound to prosecute 
 Mr. McCune as I was. (4.) I was never called to order once by the 
 Moderator, or as ruled out of order. The Moderator's remarks, that I 
 would confine myself to the question and the paper, were remarks 
 made in the midst of boundless confusion, not as calls of myself to order, 
 but as simple repetitions and assurances to the court that, in what I 
 should say and read, I must confine myself to the paper and to the ques- 
 tion, both which I did, not that I had transgressed in a single instance. 
 (5.) The inch and three quarters that I did read was germane to the 
 matters involved in the motion under discussion, as the whole para- 
 
46 
 
 graph was, and this I was proceeding to show, but was prevented by 
 persistent interruptions, which were not restrained. They coincided with 
 "the particular matters" complained of, but I was not allowed to go on 
 and show this fact. (6."; The drawer of the Keport affirmed to me per- 
 sonally, in my study, after the Presbytery was over, that I had a perfect 
 right to read that whole paragraph, which is six inches long in print, and 
 that I ought to have been allowed a still larger range. It is not true, 
 therefore, as I have shown, that I sought an " unlimited " range, or that 
 I was out of order, or that I wandei'ed from the question, or that I did 
 anything not pertment to the discussion, or that I trespassed the ruling of 
 the Chair, or that my conduct gave any just ground for the unlawful in- 
 terruptions to which I Avas subjected, or that in nearly or quite every 
 instance, the Moderator found it necessary to warn me to keep within 
 his ruling, all which the answer to the protest alleges as true, and the 
 contrary of which I allege. The simple fact is this, the determination 
 on the part of several individuals was, that that part Tof the Commit- 
 tee's report which I was reading should not be read and I was forced 
 to retire, under protest that I was not protected in my rights. And 
 now, in face of such allegations as the above, in the answer to the 
 protest, it must be evident to every one, that no ivithdrawal of my pro- 
 test by myself, could make it "more agreeable' to my " views" or to 
 the facts in the case, or to my vindication against the false impeach- 
 ments of the answer, by any alteration that I might make, and there- 
 fore my only resort is, to complain to this body against the injustice 
 that has been done. 
 
 And thus do I sum up the whole case of which I complain : A case 
 of grievous injustice against a man who has simply sought to draw the 
 notice of his Presbytery, in these days of demoralization in this region, 
 to endangering error and practice, under the disguise of a false 
 unionism and liberalism, which repels the distinctive tenets of our 
 creed, and the enforcement of denominational law. Injustice in vio- 
 lation of my 'Constitutional and parliamentary rights, both which have 
 been twice wrested from me on the floor of the Presbytery, bound to 
 l)rotect me in the same ; injustice in accepting the Committee's Ke- 
 port, which opens with, and rests upon, three separate statements of 
 untruth ; injustice in seeking to make me the author of the " rumors " 
 which, "in time past," had spread over the country, before even my 
 pamphlet was born ; injustice in turning aside to institute a new case, 
 and pronounce on the basis of those untruths a censuring judgment 
 against me personally, as also against the public defense of my rights 
 as a Presbyter, and of the faith and order of the Presbyterian Church ; 
 injustice in asserting that I was under moral obligation either to 
 
47 
 
 •' prove or retract ; " injustice in recommending a judicial investigation 
 of certain selected statements, on Mr. McCune's representation alone, 
 as if my quotations or argument were false on that account; injustice 
 for suggesting a prosecution for " slander" in case I declined to accede 
 to the imputation in the judgment, that I ought to " prove or retract;" 
 injustice in accepting collaterals to the report, and making them offi- 
 cial documents, when they abounded in gross personalities and multi- 
 plied vituperative epithets, not tolerated even in the councils of uncon- 
 verted men; injustice in representing me as a persistent breaker of 
 the order of my Presbytery, a constant trespasser upon the ruling of 
 the Chair, and the author of the very disorder and confusion under 
 which 1 was forced to retire from the floor of the Presbytery; a 
 twelve-fold injustice, repeated, protracted, accumulated, and which I 
 here bring and lay before the bar of this Synod, and upon which I 
 ask the judgment of my brethren, and all this injustice, oppression 
 and wrong, in an effort to avoid and delay the bounden duty of the 
 Presbytery, to attend to the disorders which, by common fame, had 
 been circulated through the country. 
 
 But, Moderator, high over all personal injustice and wrong, looms 
 the great question of the Episcopal or Paternal Power of the Presby- 
 tery to condemn error in doctrine and practice, apart from judicial 
 process, and so conserve the faith and order of the Church. This 
 power, expressly vested in the Presbytery, and in all our courts, by 
 Christ, the Head of the Church, and engraved in the constitution 
 itself, Cincinnati Presbytery has repudiated. It is a dangerous re- 
 lapse. To the Presbyterian Church, to-day, as ever, belongs the 
 whole power of the apostolic Ciiurch, save its miraculous and extra- 
 ordinary to oversee and govern the flock of G-od, a plenary power ad- 
 ministered in fidelity centuries before our forms of " actual process'' 
 were recorded. To each minister of the Presbyterian Church belongs 
 the whole ordinary power of the apostles, to watch, govern and direct, 
 to reprove, rebuke and exhort with all, long suffering and doctrine, 
 apart from judicial forms. Who will say that the Presbytery has not 
 the inherent power which belongs inherently to each minister and 
 elder who composes it ? Sir, it is more than a fallacy to say that the 
 doctrine and order of the house of God can not be protected under 
 our constitution, except by forensic process. The prophets contradict 
 it. The New Testament contradicts it. The apostolic example con- 
 tradicts it. The practice of the Church in every age contradicts it. 
 Every apostolic epistle is a loud protest against it. The history 
 of the Presbyterian, and every other Evangelical Church in Chris- 
 tendom, contradicts it. And woe to the Church of Christ, the 
 
48 
 
 day when she puts herself at the mercy of every tenacious inventor of 
 doctrine, or every reviver of heresies exploded a thousand times, who 
 makes use of her standards to shackle her freedom, and dares her to 
 move one step in vmdication of her creed, unless at the expense of 
 perpetual judicial war. Sir, my heart and my head alike are in this 
 great matter ; I want to save the anchor. I would have my brethren 
 pause, in this our great Church, whose limits extend so wide, and re- 
 member that maxim consecrated by so much illustration : " times of 
 
 UNION ARE TIMES OP PERIL FOR THE TRUTH." And I WOuld have 
 
 them consider, too, the significance of that other maxim, printed so 
 clearly and legibly on the page of church history, viz.: " That every 
 schismatic demands a trial ! " But, Moderator, if the genius of our 
 constitution is eminent in anything, it is in this, that the mission of 
 the Church is to bear testimony to the truth of Christ, and that it is 
 the bounden duty of the Presbytery, apart from forensic forms, to 
 condemn errors in doctrine and practice, under its own jurisdiction, 
 which injure the unity, peace and purity of the Church. The failure 
 to do this was the source of either increasing corruption on the one 
 hand, by i-eason of neglect, or of perpetual war on the other, by rea- 
 son of eifort herein. First and last, it is the " heavenly doctrine" and 
 " heavenly order" we prize above all. Condemn the error in doctrine 
 and the irregularity in practice by the episcopal power vested by 
 Christ in the ministry of His Church. Eebuke and exhort, admonish 
 and warn. Enjoin all not to propagate what is fatal to truth and 
 order. If contumacy follows, the remedy is at hand, without years of 
 contenticm, agony, resistance, and regret. 
 
 Moderator and brethren, I tiiank you; I feel I have discharged a 
 sacred duty to God, to my Church, to Christ, to you, in bringing this 
 matter before you. My conscience is at rest. My heart beats warm 
 in hope that God will bring good out of this contest. Were it in my 
 hand to do it, I would arrest every unnecessary judicial process for 
 false doctrine, everywhere, and I would call upon every court of the 
 Lord Jesus to stand to its responsibility in tlie exercise of legitimate 
 episcopal power, condemning erroneous opinions and practices, so pre- 
 serving to the Church her noble polity and creed, and, at the same 
 time, her unity, purity and peace. 
 
 PROTEST. 
 
 * ' To the Synod of Cincinnati : 
 
 " Dear Brethren — The undersigned hereby protests against the 
 action of the Synod of Cincinnati, taken at its annual session, October 
 23, 1876, in adopting the following preamble and resolutions, to wit : 
 
40 
 
 " Whereas, The issuing of tlie complaint of Dr. Skinner, as reoora- 
 mended by the Judicial Committee, woy prejudice the case now known 
 as the McCune case, at present pending before the Cincinnati Presby- 
 tery; therefore, 
 
 " Resolved, That the coiisiaeration of the report of the Judicial 
 Committee upon the said complaint of Dr. Skinner, be and is hereby 
 postponed until the issue of the case of Mr. McCuue by said Presbytery." 
 
 My reasons for this protest, are : 
 
 "1. Because my rights to a present hearing upon the merits of my 
 particular case, which I have closely and carefully discriminated from 
 any possible relation to the possible case of Mr. McCune, not yet 
 framed, and belonging to another court, is guaranteed to me by the 
 provisions of the constitution, all the conditions necessary as to this 
 having been by me fulfilled. 
 
 "2. Because the argument of the Preamble, that the present hearing of 
 ray complaint in this court, utterly distinct from a case not yet framed, 
 nor presented to another and lower court, would be just as good in the 
 lower court against the hearing of Mr. McCune's case, when it shall 
 be presented, if any such connexion exists between them as the 
 Preamble assumes. Each case must stand upon its own merits, and 
 each court must judge for itself. 
 
 "3. Because the Sjnod had no official knowledge of my complaint, 
 while its character was misrepresented by individuals, the complaint 
 itself never having been so much as read, and equally, has no official 
 knowledge of the case, yet to be, of Mr. McCune. The Judicial 
 Committee, in neither of its reports, either described my complaint, or 
 made a solitary quotation from it. 
 
 "4. Because the Judicial Committee had unanimously reported that 
 my complaint was 'in order,' and had been regularly conducted, and 
 recommended that it be taken up by the Synod, and the Synod voted 
 to take up my complaint. 
 
 "5. Because even a refusal to consider the Judicial Committee's 
 'repo^i,' as the resolution has it, and which declared that my complaint 
 Avas ' in order,' is not only a refusal by the Synod to hear now my 
 complaint, and to which hearing I have a perfect right, but is a refusal 
 to decide, even now, ichether there is any complaint at all by me recjtdarly 
 in order before this body, and entitled note to be heard. It was a practical 
 ejection of my complaint from the Synod. 
 
 " 6. Because it is a repetition, now the third time during six months, 
 of the very thing of which I complain to this body as previously twice 
 practiced upon me in the court below, viz: The setting aside of my 
 present constitutional rights by the exercise of an assumed discretion- 
 ary power, excluded by the provisions of the constitution itself in all 
 cases where such rights are involved. 
 
 "For these reasons I repectfully protest, and give notice of com- 
 plaint to the General Assembly. 
 
 "Yours fraternally, 
 
 " Thomas H. Skinner." 
 " Lebanon, O., Oct. 24, 1876." 
 
50 
 
 NOTICE OF COMPLAINT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. 
 
 " To the Moderator of the Synod of Cincinnati : 
 
 " The undersigned hereby respectfully gives notice of his complaint 
 to the General Assembly, against the following action of the Synod of 
 Cincinnati, October 23, 1876, to wit : 
 
 " ' Whereas, The issuing of the complaint of Dr. Skinner, as recom- 
 mended by the Judicial Committee, may prejudice the case, now known 
 as the McCune case, at present pending before the Cincinnati Pres- 
 bytery; therefore, 
 
 " * Resolved, That the consideration of the report of the Judicial 
 Committee upon the said complaint of Dr. Skinner be, and hereby is, 
 postponed until the issue of the case of Mr. McCune by said Presbytery.' 
 
 " My reasons for this complaint are : 
 
 " First, Because the above action excluded the undersigned from 
 a hearing on his complaint to which he was entitled both by constitu- 
 tional and parliamentary law. 
 
 ** Second, Because the preamble specifying the ground of the Synod's 
 action offered no good and sufficient showing for setting aside the vested 
 ecclesiastical rights of the undersigned. 
 
 "Third, Because such action is an encouragement of insubordination 
 in the lower courts, and is destructive, not only of individual rights, 
 but of the peace, purity, and unity of the Church. 
 
 " OcTonER 27, 1876. " Thomas H. Skinner." 
 
 " The undersigned unite with the Rev. T. H. Skinner, D. D., in the 
 above cojuplaint to the General Assembly. 
 
 " T. Charles Thomas, Nathanial West, 
 
 " W. B. Spence, R. H. Leonard, 
 
 " Henry W. Biggs, Edward H. Camp, 
 
 " J. Gamble, E. I). Ledyard. 
 " L. H. Long, 
 
 ACTION OF the SESSION OF THE SECOND PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH. 
 
 " ' Resolved, that the session of the Second Presbyterian Church of 
 Cincinnati, in full sympathy with our Pastor in his efforts to maintain 
 the faith and order of the Presbyterian standards, and to secure respect 
 by the lower courts for vested ecclesiastical rights, unite with him in 
 his complaint to the General Asembly." 
 
 "October 30, 1876." 
 
 "J. Burnet Jr., Clerk of Session. 
 " James Taylor, Wm. H. Neff, 
 " Wm. H. Allen, S. J. Broadwell, 
 "E. H. Pendleton, Wm. H, Mussey." 
 
51 
 
 ACTION OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES. 
 
 " Resolved, That we, the undersigned, Trustees of the Second 
 Presbyterian Church of Cincinnati, being in full accord and sympathy 
 with our Pastor in his efforts to maintain the faith and order of the 
 Presbyterian standards, and to secure respect by the lower courts for 
 vested ecclesiastial rights, unite with him in his complaint to the 
 Oeneral Assembly. 
 
 "November 6, 1876. 
 
 " Wm. Woods, John Shillito, President. 
 
 "■ Geo. Wilshire, Thornton M. Hinkle, Sec. 
 
 "John A. Murphy, A. S. Winslow." 
 " G. P. Griffith, 
 
 action of the deacons. 
 
 " Resolved, That the Deacons of the Second Presbyterian Church, of 
 Cincinnati, in full sympathy Avith the Session, the Trustees and the 
 Pastor, do cordifilly unite with the Pastor in the above complaint to 
 the General Assembly. 
 
 " D. B. LuPTON, 
 " H. P. Lloyd, 
 " Wm, Hubbell Fisher, 
 "Geo. a. Prichard." 
 November 6, 1876. 
 
 "The undersigned, members and Elders of other Presbyterian 
 
 ■Churches of the city of Cincinnati, also unite in the above complaint. 
 
 " F. T. LocKWOOD, W. W. Scarborough, 
 
 " Francis Ferry, H. Stewart, 
 
 " Alex. M. Johnson, Geo. W. McAlpin, 
 
 " Hugh McBirney, Wm. Clendenin, 
 
 " Richard Smith, M. W. Oliver, 
 
 "Theo. Kempe;r, Ira. Ha\nes, 
 
 "John W. Caldwell, J.C.Bradford. 
 
Princeton Theological Semmary-Speer Library 
 
 1 1012 01041 9168