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 (Princeton C^eofo^tcaf ^etninarj 
 
A N 
 
 i.y^/j 
 
 ESS AY 
 
 C O^N€ E R N I N 
 
 Humane Understanding. 
 
 
 JOHN LOCKE, Gent. 
 
 VOLUME II. 
 
 ^§IJL*&* 
 
 
 LONDON: 
 Printed in the Year M D C C X. 
 
L^^-: •.' 
 
 '••**»Vt»X 
 
 
■i 
 
 THE 
 
 €'ON:TENT S. 
 
 BOOK MI. 
 
 Of w 
 
 O R D S. 
 
 CHAP. 
 I. OfPf^ordt and Lattguage in gc 
 
 neral. 
 1. of the Signification ofiVords. 
 J. of getie^-al Terms, 
 4, Of the Nj??. es of fimple Ideas. 
 f. of the Names of mixed Modei 
 and Relations. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
 6. of the hfames of Suhftancef^ 
 
 7. of ahflrafi and concrete Termu 
 
 8. OfthelmperfeBionofWords. 
 g. Of the Abufe of IVords, 
 
 10. Of the Remedies of the forego^ 
 ing ImperfeSmns arid Abufei». 
 
 B O O K I V. 
 
 Of K N Q w L 4 D G E an4 Op I N I o n. 
 
 CHAP. 
 1 . 0/ Kneraledge in general, 
 i. of the Degrees of our Knowledge. 
 
 3. of i he Extent of Humane Know- 
 ledge, 
 
 4. Of the Reality of our Knowledge, 
 
 5. of Truth in general. 
 
 6. Ofuniverfal Propo/itions, their 
 
 Truth and Certainty. 
 
 7. of Maxims, 
 
 8. of tricing Propofiiions, 
 
 9. 0/ OHr Knowledge ofExiBenee. 
 19, Oftht Exifience of a. GOD. 
 j^l. Of the Knawlsdgt oj the Exi- 
 
 p,encfi ofoihfr Things. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
 I z. of the Improvement of our KnevH" 
 ledge, _ .^ 
 
 I J. Some other Confider at ions' con* 
 cerning our Knowledge, ■ 
 
 14. Of Juagment. 
 
 IS Of Probability. 
 
 16. Of the Degrees of Affent. \ 
 
 \ 7. Of Reafon. 
 
 18. 0/ Faith and Reafin., as con- 
 tra diftingutfhed., 
 
 ip. Of Enthufiafm. 
 
 xo. Of wrong AJfent, or Error. 
 
 21.. The Divifion of tk^Sciencts, 
 
 h 
 
 a a 
 
THE 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 BOOK III. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 '»' Of Words or Language in general, 
 
 SECT. 
 
 1 . Man fitted to form articH- 
 
 Uie Sounds. 
 1. To make them- Sigfit of /- 
 deat, 
 J, 4. To nittke general SfgH!. 
 
 5. Words uiriv^ately derived 
 jrom fuch tu figntjy fen^- 
 
 ble Ideas. 
 
 6. Difirilution. 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 Of the Signification of Words, 
 
 SECT. 
 
 I . Wards arefenfihle Signs ntf- 
 
 ct£'jrj for Communicmtion. 
 
 t, 3. Words are the fenf.ble Stgnt 
 
 of his Ideas V)ho ttjis them, 
 
 4., Words often ftcrttly refer- 
 red. Firfi, to the Idsas in 
 other Mens Minds. 
 
 J. Secondly, To the Reality of 
 Things. 
 
 (. Words hy Vje readily extite 
 Jdeas. 
 
 7, Words often ufed without 
 Signification. 
 
 8. Their Signification per felf' 
 
 iy arbitrary. 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 Of general Termt. 
 
 SECT. 
 
 1. The greateH part of Words 
 general, 
 
 2, For every particular Thing 
 to have a Name, u impoffible. 
 
 },4., And ujelefs. 
 
 y. What Things have proper 
 Names. 
 6-%, Horn general Words sre 
 made. 
 $. General Natures are no- 
 thing but ahpraH Ideas, 
 le. Why rhe Genas is ordinarily , 
 
 made Ufe of in Definitions'^. 
 1 1, General and univerjal are 
 Creatures ej the Under* 
 flandmg. 
 J r. Ahftracf Ideas are the Ef- 
 fences of the Genera and 
 Species, 
 J J. They are the Workman/hip 
 of the Under ft andinf^, but 
 have their Foundation m 
 the Similitude ofThingt. 
 
 14.. 
 
The Contents. 
 
 14.. Eash dtjiinB ahjtraB Idt»,is 
 adifiifiB EJfence, 
 
 15. Rtalani nominal Ejfence, 
 
 16. Ctnflant Connexion between 
 the Name and Nominal Ej- 
 fence. 
 
 1 7 . Suppo/itiont that Species are 
 diflingai/hed by their real 
 Effences, ufelejs. 
 
 \%. Real and nominal Ejfence, 
 the fame in (imple Ideas and 
 Modes , different in Sub- 
 fiances, 
 
 19. Effences ingenerable and in- 
 corruptihle, 
 
 10. Recapitulation. 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 of the Names of (imple Ideas. 
 
 -SECT. 
 
 I, Names of fitnple Ideas, M'des, 
 and Sttbflancest have each 
 fomething peculiar. 
 
 a. Firji, Names of Jlmple Ideas 
 and Subjiances, intimate real 
 Exijlence. 
 
 3. Secondly, Names of Jimplt 
 Ideas and Modes, fgntfy al- 
 ways both real and nominal 
 Effence. 
 4. Thirdly, Names of Jlmple 1- 
 
 deas undeftnable. 
 $, If all V ere definable, ^twould 
 be a Procefs in infinitum. 
 
 6, What a Definition ts. 
 
 7. Simple Ideas, vfhy indefinable. 
 t, j. Infiance Motion, 
 
 10. Light. 
 
 11. Simple Ideas why undefina- 
 
 ble, farther explained. 
 It, 13. The contrary fj^ewed in com- 
 plex Ideas by Inftances of a 
 Statue and Rainbow. 
 ^4. Tht Na;met ofeompUx I^eas, 
 
 when to be made intelligible 
 
 by Words. 
 If, Fourthly y Names offimple /- 
 
 deas leafi doubtful. 
 16, Fifthly, Simple Ideas have 
 
 few yffcents in linea pr«di- 
 
 caniencaii 
 1^, Sixthly, Name: of /imple I- 
 
 deas Jland for Ideas not at 
 
 all arbitrary. 
 
 CHAP V. 
 
 of the Names of mixed Modes and 
 Relations. 
 
 SECT. 
 
 I , They fidnd for abffraB /- 
 deas, as other general Names. 
 
 2. Firjl, The Ideas they /land 
 for, are made by the Under' 
 fianding, 
 
 3 . Secondly, Made arbitrarily , and 
 
 without Patterns. 
 
 4. Uow this is done. 
 
 5. Evidently arbitrary, in thaf 
 
 the Idea is often before the 
 Exijlence. 
 
 6. Injiances Murther , Incefi, 
 
 Stabbing. 
 
 7. But fliUfubfervient to the End 
 
 of Language. 
 
 8. Whereof the intranfiatable 
 Words of divers Language^ 
 are a Proof. 
 
 S. This Jhews species to be made 
 for Communication, 
 10, II. In mixed Modes^ ''tis the 
 Name that tits the Combi- 
 nation together, and makes 
 it a Spicies, 
 12. For the Originals of mixed 
 Modes, we look no fan her 
 than the Mind, wh>ch aljo 
 (hews them to be the Work- 
 manjhip of the Underjland- 
 tf'S' A3 I J, 
 
The Contents. 
 
 1 3. lijeir bein^ made by the Un- 
 derJIaudtHg without Pat- 
 teriii, P:ews the Reafen why 
 they are fo compounded. 
 
 14. N/ttnti of mixed Modes jiavd 
 always far their Real £/- 
 Jemes. 
 
 1 5. Why their KamtS areiifual- 
 ly got before their Ideas, 
 
 16. Re.i\on of my being fo large 
 OH this SubjeEi. 
 
 C H'A P. VI. 
 
 of the Names of Snb Ranees. 
 
 SECT. 
 
 I . The common Names of Sub- 
 fianees pand for forts^ 
 
 i. The Ejfence ofeachjort, is 
 
 the abjfraff Idea. 
 3. The nominal and real Ef 
 fence dijfei'CHt. 
 ^ 6, Nothmg ejfential to Indivi- 
 duals. 
 ■;,Z, The nominal Ejfence bounds 
 the Species. 
 5. Not the real Ejfence which 
 we know not,' 
 10. Not luhjl ant ial Forms which 
 
 we know lefs, 
 
 1 I . Tiiat the n0min.1l Effence it 
 
 that whtreby we dijiingutfh 
 
 Species , farther evident 
 
 from spirits. 
 
 12. IVhii-eof there are probably 
 
 Mumberlefs Species. 
 1 3. T':e no7ninalEjfenct that of 
 the Species , proved from 
 Water and Ice. 
 1 4 -18. Dtjfculties againfl a cer- 
 tain Number of real Ejfc7ices . 
 19. Our nominal Effence s of Sub- 
 fiances, not perfeB Coiltcli- 
 »ns of P>operttes. 
 
 II. But Jiich a CoUeSlionas tur 
 N^?»e jiaudsfor. 
 
 iz, Our abflra^ Idra; are to m 
 the Measures of SpeLia, In- 
 Jlances in th.it of t4an. 
 zj. Specie f not diHinguij/hed by 
 
 Generation. 
 24. Not by fubftantial Forms. 
 2j. The jpecifick Ejftmes art 
 
 made by the Mind, 
 r6. Therefore veyy variota and 
 
 uncertain! 
 27. But not fo arbitrarily as 
 
 iftixed Modes, 
 i8. Though very hn^erfeB, 
 Z5>. Which yet ferves for totn- 
 
 mon Converfe. 
 
 30. But mak^s feveral Effencet 
 
 fignified by the fame Name* 
 
 - 3 t. The 7xore general our Ideas 
 
 'are , the more incofpleat 
 
 and partial they are. 
 
 53, This all accommodated t» 
 
 ■ the End tf Speech. 
 3 3, Inftances in Caffnaries, 
 34. Men make the Species ^ in- 
 
 Jlance Gold. 
 3 S' Though Nature make the Si- 
 militude. 
 16. And continues it in the 
 
 Races of Things. 
 37. Each aljiraB Idea is an Ef- 
 fence. 
 38. Gtntrz and S^ic\c?, in order 
 to naming, injlance Watch, 
 3P, Species of artificial Things, 
 lefs confufedthan natural. 
 . 40. Artificial Things ofdi^mB 
 Species. 
 
 41. Subllances alone have pro- 
 per Names. 
 
 42, Difficulty to treat of Words 
 with Words. 
 
 43,44. Injlance of mixed Modes ijt 
 
 Kincah and Niouph, 
 4 J, 46. Injlance of Subji antes in 
 Zahab. 
 47. Their Ideas perjt^^ and 
 fherejort vanoHf* 
 
 48. 
 
The Contents. 
 
 48. Therefore tof.x their Species, 
 
 a real Ejfence Ufuppofed. 
 
 49. Which Suppopion is of no Ufe, 
 
 50. Condajiort' 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 
 0/ Particlet. 
 
 SECT. 
 
 I. PtirticUi conneB Parts, cr 
 
 whole Sentences together, 
 z. In them conjifls the Art of 
 
 well Speaking. 
 3, 4. They /hew what Relation 
 
 the Mind gives to its own 
 
 Thoughts, 
 5. Inllance in Bur. 
 «J. This Matter but lightly 
 
 touched here. 
 
 CHAP. VIII. 
 
 OfAhJlralf and Concrete Tirniu 
 
 SECT. 
 
 I. ^bllra5l Teytns mtpredica- 
 
 ble one of another, and why, 
 a. They /hew the Difference of 
 our Ideas. 
 
 CHAP. IX. 
 
 of the ImperfeSfion of Words, 
 
 SECT. 
 
 1 . Words are ufed for recor' 
 ding and communicating 
 our Thoughts, 
 
 2. Any Words will ferve for 
 recording. 
 
 3. Communication by Words ^ 
 Civil or Philejophical. S 
 
 4. The ImperfeBien of Words, 
 is the Douhtfulncfs of their 
 iigmfcatitn. 
 
 y, Caufes of thiir Imp'erjeBi-' 
 on. 
 
 tf. The bJames of mixed Modes 
 
 doubtful. Firjiy Becauft the 
 
 Ideas they /land for, are fa 
 
 complex. * 
 
 y. Secondly, Becaufi they have 
 
 no Standards. 
 8. Propriety not a fufficient 
 
 Remedy. 
 y, The way of learning theft 
 
 Names, contributes alfo ttt 
 
 their Doubtfuhiefs. 
 1 o. Hence unavoidable Obfcuri- 
 
 ty in ancient Authors. 
 1 2, Names ofSubflances referrd. 
 
 Firfi, to real Effences that 
 
 cannot be known, 
 ii, 14.. Secondly , To co-ext fling 
 
 Slicalittes, which are hiowit 
 
 but imperfeBly. 
 
 15. With thtf JnjpeifeBton they 
 may ferve far Civil, but not 
 
 well for Philofophical Ufe» 
 
 16. Inflance Liquor of Nerves, 
 
 17. Inflance Gold. 
 
 18. The Names of/impUldeJf^ 
 the leaft doubtful. 
 
 ip. And next to them Jimple 
 Modes. 
 
 ao. The mofl doubtful, are the 
 Names of very compounded 
 Mixed Modes and Subfiances, 
 
 2. 1 , Why this Imperfeciion char- 
 ged upon Words. 
 12, 23. Tha/kould teach us Mode- 
 ration, in impofing our own 
 Senfeofold Authors. 
 
 CHAP. X. 
 
 Of the Abu fe of Words, 
 
 ECT. 
 
 I. Abitfe of Words. 
 i,'5, Firfl, Words without 4ny, or 
 without clear Idiat., 
 
 A * A- 
 
The Contents. 
 
 8. 
 9 
 
 10. 
 
 II. 
 II. 
 
 14. 
 
 1<J. 
 17* 
 
 18. 
 
 ao. 
 
 21. 
 
 Zl. 
 
 13. 
 24. 
 
 Occ/ijioncd hy Itarning 
 iJav.ci before the Ideas thty 
 teltng to, 
 
 Seeondly, Unfltudy j^ppltca- 
 tt$n of them. 
 
 Thirdly, y1 felted Ohfcurity 
 by wroti^ application. 
 Logic k and Dtfpute as much 
 contributed to this. 
 Calling it Subtihty. 
 This Learning very little 
 benefits Society. 
 But defiroys the Inflruments 
 cf Knowledge and Commu- 
 nication. 
 
 As ufeful as to confound the 
 Sound of the Letters. 
 This Art has perplexed Re- 
 ligion and Juhice. 
 And ought not topafs for 
 Learning. 
 
 Fourthly, Taking them jot 
 Things. 
 
 Inftance in Matter, 
 This makes Errors lafling. 
 Fifthly, Setting them for 
 vhat they cannot fignify. 
 y.g. putstng them for the 
 realEjfencet of Sub ft antes. 
 
 Hence we think every 
 Change tf our Idea in Sub- 
 Qances, not to change the 
 Species, 
 
 The Caufe of this Abufe, a 
 Support ion of Nature's vork- 
 ing always regularly. 
 This Abufe contains twt 
 falje Suppofitions. 
 . Sixthly, A SuppoJttton,thaf 
 Hoards have a certain and 
 evident Signification, 
 The Ends of Language. Firft, 
 To convey our Ideas. 
 Secondly , To do it with 
 Sluicknefs. 
 
 Thirdly, Therewith to con- 
 vey the Knowledge #/ 
 Things, 
 
 2^-3 1. Mow Mens Words fail in 
 
 all thefe. 
 
 32. How in Subllancet, 
 
 3 3. How in Modes and Relations, 
 
 34 Seventhly, Figurative Sketch 
 
 alji an Abuje of Language, 
 
 CHAP. XI. 
 
 of the Remedies of the foregoing Im» 
 
 perfeff ions and Abujes, 
 SE GT. 
 
 1. They are worth feeking, 
 
 2. Are not eafie. 
 
 3. But yet nttefary to Philo- 
 fophy. 
 
 4. MtfufetflVordt, the Csufe 
 of great Errors. 
 
 $. Obftinacy. 
 
 6. And Wrangling. 
 
 7. Inftance Bat and Bird. 
 
 8. Firii, Remedy to ufe n9 
 Word without an Idea. 
 
 9. Secondly, To have diftinff I- 
 deas annexed f them itt 
 Medes. 
 
 10. And diftinff and conforma- 
 ble in Subliances. 
 
 1 1 . Thirdly, Propriety. 
 
 iz. Fourthly , T« make known 
 
 their Meaning, 
 1 5. And that three Ways, 
 
 Fir ft, In fimple Ideas by fy- 
 
 nonymous Terms or fhewing. 
 
 Secondly, In mixed Mtdes by 
 
 Definition, 
 
 16, Morality capable of Dt- 
 monHration. 
 
 17, Definitions can make moral 
 Difcourfes clear. 
 
 18, And is the only way. 
 IJ. Thirdly, In Subffancet^ by 
 
 fhewing and defining, 
 20, 21. Ideas of the leading Qua- 
 lities ofSubftancetf are beft 
 g9t bjf Jhtwing^ 
 
 22. 
 
 !+• 
 
 I J. 
 
The Contents. 
 
 11. The Ideas of their Powers aj. Not eaBe to he made fh. 
 
 befi by Definition. 
 
 ij. ARefisSion on the Know- 
 ledge of Spirits. 
 
 24. Jdeas alfo of Sub fiances muji 
 be conformable to Things, 
 
 z6. Fifthly , By Conflancy in 
 their Signification. 
 
 zj. When the f^ariation is to be 
 explam'd. 
 
 BOOK IV. 
 
 CHAP. r. 
 
 of Knowledge in general. 
 
 SECt. 
 
 1. Our Knowledge einverfant 
 about our Ideas. 
 
 2. Knowledge is the Perception 
 of the Agreement or Difa- 
 greement of two Ideas. 
 
 5. This Agreement four fold. 
 4. Fir ft , Of Identity or Di- 
 
 nierfity. 
 $. Secondly y Relateen, 
 
 6. Thirdly, Of Co-exiftence. 
 
 7. Fourthly, Of real Exiftence. 
 %. Knowledge aBual tr habi- 
 tual. 
 
 p. Habitual Knowledge two^ 
 fold, 
 
 C H A P. II. 
 
 Of the Degrees of our Knowledge. 
 
 SECT. 
 
 I, Intuitive. 
 
 1, Demonflrative. 
 
 3. Depends on Proofs. 
 
 4. But not fo eafie, 
 
 5. Not without precedent Doubf, 
 • 6. Not fo clear. 
 
 7, Each Step muft have intui" 
 tive Evidence, 
 
 8, Hence the Miftake ex prs- 
 cegniclSj 6c precooccHie. 
 
 9. Demonflration not limited 
 to §luantity. 
 1 0- 1 J, Why it has been fo thought, 
 14. Senfitive Knowledge of par- 
 ticular Exiftence. 
 1 y . Knowledge noi always clear, 
 . where the Liias are Jo. 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 Of the Extent of Human Knowledge. 
 SECT. 
 
 I. P/r/?, No farther than ws 
 
 have Ideas. 
 X, Secondly, No farther than 
 we can perceive the Agree- 
 ment or Difagreement, 
 
 3. Thirdly , Intuitive KnoW' 
 ledge extends it felf not to 
 all the Relations of all our 
 Ideas, 
 
 4. Fourthly, Nor demonftrative 
 Knowledge. 
 
 5. Fifthly, Senfitive Knowledge 
 narrower than either. 
 
 6. Sixthly, Our Knowledge 
 therefore narrower than our 
 Ideas. 
 
 7. How far our Knowledge 
 reaches. 
 
 %, Firfi, Our Knowledge of /- 
 dentity and Diverfity,as far 
 as our Ideas. 
 
 p. Secondly, Of Co-exiftence » 
 very little Way. 10, 
 
The Contents. 
 
 10. Btcdufe tJje Ctnnexion be- 
 tvetn m»J}Jimplc Ideas it 
 unknowTi. 
 
 1 1 . tffeciallj offecondary Slua- 
 litiet. 
 
 ! 2- - 1 4. j4nd farther, hecauji all 
 Connexion betvetn any Je- 
 condary and primary Qua- 
 lities is undijcovtrable. 
 
 15. Of Repugnancy to co exiS 
 larger, 
 
 16. of the Co exiflence of Pow- 
 ers a very little vay. 
 
 17. Of the Spirits ytt narrover. 
 
 18. thirdly,Of other Relations, 
 tt u not eafe to fay how far. 
 Morality capable of Demon- 
 
 firatton. 
 xp. Two Things ban) e made mo- 
 ral Ideas thought uncapabte 
 of DemonfJration. Their 
 Complexednefs, and want of 
 Jcnjible Reprefentations 
 aa. Remedies of thuje Difficulties, 
 iJ. Fourthly, Of real Exijlence, 
 ve have art intuitive Know- 
 ledge of our own, demonflra- 
 tive ofGodsfenftile oj fame 
 few other Things. 
 2t. O-ir Ignorance great. 
 \l, Firff,Ofie.Caufe of its want 
 ef Ideas, either fuch as we 
 have no Conception of or 
 fuch as particularly we^ 
 have not, 
 1^. Becaufe of their Remote- 
 
 nefs, or, 
 ay. Becauje of their Mtnutenefs, 
 •2.6. Hivce no Science of Bodies* 
 7. 7. Much left of Spirit f. 
 
 18. Secondly, IVant ef a dtfea- 
 virable Connexion between 
 Ideas we have. 
 
 19. Iniiaiices. 
 
 io Thirdly, IVant of tracing 
 
 9ur Ideas. 
 ji. Extent in RffpeS of Uni- 
 
 'Vtrfaliry. 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 Ofjhe Reality of our KwmUdge. 
 SEGT. 
 
 1. Object ton. Knowledge pU» 
 ced in Ideas, taay be all bare 
 ri/ton, 
 2, 3- '^njwer. Not fo, where Ideat 
 ■ agree with Things. 
 . ^. As,Firfl, All fimplt Ideas do, 
 5. Secondly, AU complex Ideas 
 excepted. 
 
 6. Hence the Reality ofmathf 
 mattcal Knowledge. 
 
 7, jind of Moral. 
 
 S. Exiflence not required to 
 
 make tt real. 
 5, Nor will it be lefs true or 
 certain J becaafe moral Ideas 
 are of our own making and 
 naming. 
 
 I o.. Mif- naming diflurbs notice 
 
 .. Certainty of the Knowledge. 
 
 H. Ideas of Subfiances have ■ 
 their Archetypes without us. 
 
 Iz. So far as they agree with 
 thofe, jo far our Knowledge 
 concerning them, ii real. 
 
 I J. In our Enquiries about Sub' 
 fiahces, we mufl con/ider /- 
 deas , and not confine our 
 Thoughts to Names orSpecies 
 fuppofit fet out by Names. 
 14 iJ.ObjeHionagamlf a change-. ' 
 ling being fome thing bet ween' - 
 Man and Beafl, anfwertd, 
 
 18. Recapitulation. 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 Of Truth in general. 
 SECT. . 
 
 I, What Truth is, 
 
 a. An^htjciniieg, »r fe^tror 
 
The Contents. 
 
 ting of Signs i u c. Ideas or 
 
 Words. 
 a. Which make mental or mer^ 
 
 bal Propojitions. 
 4. Mental Propojttions are vt' 
 
 ry hard to be treated of. 
 St Being nothing but the join' 
 
 ing , or Je^arating Ideas 
 
 without W'ords, 
 
 6. When mental Propofitiens 
 contain real Truth , and 
 vhen verbal. 
 
 7. ObjeEfion againfi verbal 
 Truth, that tt may be thm 
 alchimerical. 
 
 8. Anjwered, real Truth is a- 
 bout Ideas agreeing to 
 Things. 
 
 Jf. Faljhtod is the joining of 
 
 Names otherwifs than their 
 
 Ideas agree. 
 JO. General Propo fit ions to be 
 
 treated of more at large. 
 II. Moral and metaphyseal 
 
 Truth, 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 of Xfniwrfal Propopionr, their 
 Truth and Certainty. 
 
 SECT. 
 
 I, Treating of Words ntcejfary 
 
 to Knowledge. 
 a. General Truths hardly to 
 ' be under flood, but in verbal 
 Propofitions. 
 
 3. Certainty twofold , of 
 Truth, and of Knowledge, 
 
 4. No Propofition can be known 
 '' to be true,where the Ejfence 
 
 of each Species men tioned^ is 
 not known. 
 
 5. This more particularly con* 
 ' cerns Subfiances, 
 
 §.. Ths Truth offevt univgrfd 
 
 Proportions concerning SuB^ 
 fiances, is to be known. 
 7, Becaufe CO'Cxiftence of Ideas 
 in few Cafes to be known. 
 
 8, 9. Inftance in Gold. 
 
 10. As far as any fuchCo exi- 
 ftevce can be known, fo far. 
 univerfal Propofitions may 
 be certain. But this will g» 
 hut a little way, becaufe, 
 
 1 1 , 1 z. The §lualities which make. 
 our complex Ideas of Sub* 
 fiances, depend moftly on ex- 
 ternal, remote, and unper* 
 ceived Caufes. 
 
 1 3 , Judgment may reach far" 
 ther, but that is not Know^ 
 ledge. 
 
 14, What is requi/ite for our 
 Knowledge of Subfiances. 
 
 1 s. Whilft our Ideas of Subfiances 
 contain not thiir real Con- 
 fiitutions, we can make but 
 fero general certain Propo- 
 fitions concerning them. 
 
 •16. Wherein lies the general 
 Certainty of Propofitions. 
 
 CHAP. V 11. 
 0/ Maxims. 
 
 They are felf evident. 
 
 Wherein that Self-evidenca 
 
 conftfis. 
 Self -evidence not peculiar t» 
 
 received Axioms. 
 4. Firfi , As to Identity and: 
 
 Diverfity, all Propofitions 
 
 are equally felfevident. 
 $. Secondly, In Co-exiftence we 
 
 have few felf evident Pro- 
 
 pofitions, 
 6, Thirdly^ In other Relations 
 
 we may have^ 
 
 SECT 
 I. 
 
 a. 
 
 3» 
 
The Contents! 
 
 7. Fmrthly, C$netrning resl 
 
 Exiftence, loe h»vt none. 
 t. Ihefi jixiems do not much 
 influenit tur tther Know- 
 ledge. 
 9, 10. Becaufe they are not the 
 Truths rhe/irfi known, 
 11. fVbat Uft tbift general Ma- 
 xims have> 
 \x. Maxims, JfCart he not t»^ 
 km in the life of Words jmay 
 prove ContradtSfions. 
 1^. Infiance in Vacuum. 
 
 1 4. They prove not the Exigence 
 of Things without us. 
 
 1 5. Their Application dangerous 
 about complex Ideas. 
 
 16-18. Infiance m Man. 
 19. Ltttle Ufe ofthefe Maxims 
 in Proofs where we have 
 clear and diJitnS Ideas, 
 xo. Their Ufe dangeroM where 
 9itr Ideas are confufed. 
 
 c H A P. V n r 
 
 Of trifling Prepofltions, 
 
 SECT. 
 
 I. Same Propofitious bring no 
 Increafe to our Knowledge, 
 X, 5. As, Firfl , Identical Propo* 
 fitions. 
 
 4. Secondly, When a part of 
 any complex Idea itpredtca' 
 ted of the whole. 
 
 J. As part of the Definition of 
 the defined. 
 
 €. Infiance Man and Palfry. 
 
 7. For thu teaches but the Sig- 
 nification of Words. 
 
 X. But no real Knowledge. 
 
 9. General PropofitioHS con- 
 concerning Subilances , ar$ 
 often trifling, 
 1 o- And why. 
 ji. Thirdly t UfifgWtrdsVsri* 
 
 oufly, ii trifling with thtm. 
 iz. Marks of Verbal Propopti- 
 
 •ns. Firfl, Predication in 
 
 abftraa. 
 1^. Secondly, Apart of the De- 
 finition predicated of any 
 
 Term, 
 
 CHAP. IX. 
 
 0/ our Knowledge of Exigence. 
 SECT. 
 
 I, General certain Propofiti' 
 
 ons eeneern not Extjience. 
 X. A threefold Knowiidge of 
 
 Exifttnce. 
 J. Our Knowledge of ottr own 
 Exiflence, it intuitive. 
 
 CHAP. X. 
 
 Of the Exiftence of a G O.D. 
 SECT. 
 
 I, We are capable of knowing 
 certainly, that there it Wr- 
 GOD. 
 X. Man kntwt, that he him- 
 filf «. 
 
 3 . He knows alfi, that nothing 
 cannot produce a Being, 
 therefore fomtthmg Eternal. 
 
 4. That eternal Being muft be 
 
 moH powerful, 
 S- And moH knowing. 
 
 6. And therefore G O D, 
 
 7. Oitr Idea of a mofl perfeff*' 
 
 Being, not the fole Proof 
 of a GO Vf. 
 
 8. Something from Eternity, 
 
 9. Two forts oj Beings, Cogita- 
 tive and Incogttattve, 
 
 10. Incogitattve Being, cannot 
 produce a Cogitative. 
 XI, 12. Therefore there has been 
 an eternal Wifdom, 
 
 I J. Whether 
 
The Contents 
 
 8. 
 
 1 }. Whether nutter ial or no. 
 
 l\^. Not material , Firft , Be* 
 caufe every ParticUtf Mat- 
 ter is not cogitative. 
 
 Ij, Secondly, One Particle alone 
 of Matter^ cannot be cogi- 
 tative. 
 
 \6. Thirdly ^ A Syflem ofinco- 
 gitative Matter, cannot be 
 cogitative, 
 
 17. Whether in Motion, or at 
 Reft. 
 1 8 , 1 p Matter not co-eternal with 
 an eternal Mind^ 
 
 CHAP. XI. 
 
 Of the Knowledge of the Exiilenee of 
 other Things. 
 
 SECT. 
 
 I. Js to be had only hy Senpt- 
 
 ® tiOH. 
 
 z» Inpance Whiteneft of tbi* 
 Paper. 
 
 3. This, tho" not fo certain as 
 Demottfiration, yet may be 
 called Knowledge, and proves 
 the Exigence of Things 
 without us. 
 
 4. Firfi , Becaufe we cannot 
 have them but by the Inltt 
 of the Senfes. 
 
 5. Becaufe an Idea from affual 
 Senfation, and another from 
 Memory, are very dijlinl} 
 ferceptiont. ^ 
 
 C. Thirdly^ Pleafure or Pain, 
 which accompanies aBual 
 Senfation, accompanies not 
 the returning of tbofe Ideas 
 without the external Ob- 
 jeifs. 
 
 7. Fourthly, Our Senfes ajftjl 
 one another's Tejiimony of 
 the Exiiience of outward 
 Things. 
 Vol. If. 
 
 5. 
 
 10. 
 
 It. 
 
 IJ- 
 
 I+. 
 
 This Certainty is as great 
 as our Condition needs. 
 But reaches no farther thaii 
 allual Senjation. 
 Folly to expeSi Denionflra' 
 tion in every thing. 
 Pafl Exiftencc it known by 
 Memory, 
 
 The Exigence of Spirits not 
 knowabte. 
 
 Particular Propoftiofh coti' 
 corning Exijlenct, are know- 
 able. 
 
 Jnd general Propojtiiont 
 Mncerning abftraSi Ideas. 
 
 CHAP. X 11. 
 
 Of the improvement of our knowledgi. 
 
 SECT. 
 
 i. Knowledge is not from MaS 
 
 Kims. 
 3* The Oec^ion ofthatOph 
 
 nion. 
 .J. But jrom the Comp&rtUj- 
 dear and diftinB Ideas. 
 
 4. Dangerous to build upoft 
 precarious Principles. 
 
 5. This no certain way >i 
 Truth, 
 
 6. But to compare clear com* 
 pleat Ideas under fieddf 
 Names. 
 
 7. The true Method ofadvan, 
 cing Knowledge, u by confi' 
 dering our abfiraB Ideas. 
 
 8. By which. Morality alfo may 
 be made clearer. 
 
 j>. But Knowledge of Bodies ii 
 to be improved only by Ea- 
 . perience, 
 10. Thii may procure us Conve^ 
 
 nience, not Sctemet 
 It. We are fitted for moral 
 Knowledge i and natural 
 Improvement I * 
 
 B \%. 
 
The Contents. 
 
 11. Buttr.ujl beware of Hypo- 
 
 thefes and wrong Principikt. 
 
 I J. The true Ufe ejHjpothefes. 
 
 1 4. Clear anddtftinEi Jdtas with 
 fe tied Natnes, *nd t be find- 
 ing ofthofe which /hew their 
 Agreement , or Difagree- 
 tncnt, are the ways to en- 
 large our Knowledge. 
 
 I/. Slathematicks an InUa^ici 
 of it. 
 
 CHAP. XIII. 
 
 Some other Confidcrations concerning 
 our Knowledge. 
 
 S.E C T. 
 
 1 . Our Knowledge partly ne- 
 cejffary, partly voluntary. 
 
 2. The Api>licatton 'voluntary ; 
 l>ut we htow as Things art, 
 not as we pleafe. 
 
 3. JnJiancW in Sumber, 
 
 CHAP. XIV. 
 
 0/ Judgment. 
 
 SECT. 
 
 I. Our Knowledge being Jhort , 
 we wmt frmethiftgelje. 
 
 a. M'hat UJe to be madeofthit 
 twilight Estate. 
 
 3 . "judgment fupplitt the want 
 of Knowledge. 
 
 4. Judgment is the prefntning 
 Things to be fo , without 
 perceiving tt. 
 
 CHAP. XV. 
 
 of Probability. 
 
 Pr(ib.ibijify it the App'-tr^ 
 ance of agreement u^ on fal- 
 lible l' roofs. 
 
 SECT. 
 
 z. It is ti fuppty the want oj 
 Knowledge. 
 
 J. Being that which maiei m 
 freUtme Things to be trut.be- 
 fore we know them tt be ft. 
 
 4. The Grounds of Probability 
 are two ; Conformity with 
 our own Experience, or the 
 Teflimony of other Expert' 
 *nce. 
 
 5. In this aS the yfgretmentiy 
 pro and con, ought to be 
 examined^ before we time 
 to a JwigVient, 
 
 6. They being capable of great 
 yartety. 
 
 C H A P. X V I. 
 
 Of the Degrees of /ijfent: 
 
 SECT. 
 
 1. Our Affent ought to bi re- 
 gulated by the Xjrtxnds oj 
 Probability , 
 
 i, Theje caitnot ahdays be aU 
 aihialiy in Vievf, and then 
 we muft content our felves 
 with the Remembrance that 
 we once faw Ground for fuch 
 a Degree of Ajfent, 
 
 5, The tU Conjequence of this, 
 if our former Judgment 
 wereyjot rightly made. 
 
 4, The right Ufe dfit, is mw 
 
 tual Charity and Forbear- 
 
 ^ ance. ' 
 
 J . Probability is either of Ma^ 
 
 terofFaH or Speculation. 
 
 6, The concurrent Experience 
 of all other Men with our s^ 
 produces AJfurance approach' 
 ing to Knowledge. 
 
 7, Unq'jef tenable TeSimony 
 and Experience fbr themoji 
 part produce Confidence. 
 
 %. Fair Tcjlif/itny, arid the Na- 
 ture 
 
10. 
 
 II. 
 
 12. 
 
 n- 
 
 14 
 
 tare of the thing indiffe- 
 rent , produces alfi cojiji- 
 dint Belief. 
 , Experience and Teflimonies 
 clajbing, infinitely vary the 
 Degrees of Probability, 
 Traditional Tipimoniesy the 
 farther removed, th« lefi 
 their Proof. 
 
 Yet Hi/iory is of great Vfe. 
 In things which Senfi can*' 
 not di [cover. Analogy is the 
 great R.ule of Probability. 
 One Cafe where contrary EX' 
 perienne lefftns not the TV- 
 ftimony. 
 
 The bare Tefiimony of Re- 
 velation is the highefi Cer* 
 tdinty. 
 
 The Contents 
 14. 
 
 CHAP. xvn. 
 
 0/ Reafen. 
 
 SEGT. 
 I. 
 
 of 
 
 II 
 
 \x 
 
 n 
 
 Various Significations 
 the Word Reajon. 
 i. Wherein Reafoning confifls. 
 
 3, Its four parts. 
 
 4. SyHogifm not the great In- 
 Jirument of Reajon, 
 
 J. Helps little in Demonftra- 
 tion, lefs in Prebabiltty. 
 
 6. Serves not to encreaf oar 
 Knoivledge,but fence with it, 
 
 7. Other Helps Jkouid be fought, 
 8- We ReafoH about Particulars. 
 9. Firjl, Reafon fails us for 
 
 want ofldeaf, 
 3. Secondly t Becaufe of obfcurt 
 and i7f/perfe£i Ideas. 
 Thirdly, For want of Inter- 
 mediate Ideas, 
 Fourthly, Beeaufe of wrong 
 Principles. 
 
 Fifthly, Bteatife of douhf- , 
 fttl Terms. 
 
 Our highefi Degree of Know- 
 ledge is intaiti'ue without 
 reafunhig. 
 
 IS. The next is Demonfiration 
 by reafoningi 
 
 16'. to fttpply :he hfivrowhefs of 
 this, we have nothiv^ but 
 JudgKiJitupoH probableRea- 
 foning. 
 
 17. Intuition , Demenfiration, 
 Judgment. 
 
 18. Confcque7ices of Words ^ and 
 Confcj'iences of Ideas, 
 
 1$, Four ferts of Arguments t 
 Firfly Ad Verecoudiam. 
 
 20. Secondly, Ad Ignorantiam, 
 
 z I . Thirdly, Ad Haminero. 
 
 2Z. Fourthly, Ad Judicium. 
 
 zj. Above, contrary, and ac* 
 cording to Reafon. 
 
 34. Reafon and Faith not oppt" 
 fits. 
 
 CHAP. XVIIJ. 
 
 Of Faith and Reafon, and fheir di- 
 fiinU Province}* 
 
 SECT. 
 
 I. hecejfary to knoit theif 
 
 Boundaries, 
 z. Faith and Reafon what, as 
 
 contra- diflinguifhed. 
 
 3, No new fimple Idea can bs 
 
 conveyed by traditional 
 Revelation, 
 
 4, Traditional Revelation may 
 
 make hs know Propofitiont 
 knowtble a/Jo by iieafoitt 
 but not with the dme Cer- 
 tai?ity that ReaJ$n doth. 
 
 5, Rivehttion cannot be ad- 
 
 mi tied againjl the deaf 
 Evidence bf Reafon, 
 
 6, Tradttionn! ' Revelation 
 much lefs* 
 
 f. Things above Rtafoft. 
 
 B a «. 
 
The Contents. 
 
 8. Or not etntrary to Rtafon, 
 
 if rtvenUd, are Matter 
 ef Faith. 
 
 9. Revelation , in Matters 
 where Reafon tannot judge^ 
 or hut pr»b ably, ought to be 
 hearknid to. 
 
 10, In Matterrohere Reafon can 
 
 Afford certain Knowledge 
 that i) to be hearkened to. 
 
 11. Iftho Boundaries be not jet 
 
 between Faith and Reafon, 
 no Enthtt[iafT», or Extra, 
 n/agancj/ in Religion can 
 be contradified. 
 
 CHAP. XIX. 
 
 -*• 
 of Enthufiafm. 
 
 SECT. 
 
 1 . L ovi ef Truth neceffarjt 
 
 2. j1 Forvardneft to diffste, 
 whence. 
 
 3. Forte of Enthufiafm, 
 
 4. Reafon and Revelation. 
 
 5. Rife of Enthufiafm, 
 6, 7, Enthufajm, 
 
 8 , <). Enthufiafm miHaktn for fet' 
 ing and feeling. 
 I o. Enthufiafm how to be difco- 
 "jered, 
 
 1 1 . Enthufiafm fails of Evi» 
 
 dence, that the Propofition 
 is from GOD. 
 
 12. Firmnefs of Perfwajion, no 
 
 Proiifthat any Propofition 
 
 is from GOD. 
 1 J. Light in the Mind, what, 
 J 4.. Revelation tnufi be judg'd 
 
 by Re/ffon, 
 I J. Belief no Proof of Revth* 
 
 :ian. 
 
 CHAP. XX. 
 
 Of wrong Affent, or Error. 
 
 SECT. 
 
 I. Caufts of Error. 
 
 X, Firfi, iVant tf Proofs. 
 
 3. Obj IVhat fhall become of 
 thofe who want them^anfwered. 
 
 4. People hindered f rim Enquiry. 
 J. Secondly, Want ofjkiL' to ufe 
 
 them. 
 
 6. Thirdly, Want ofWiU to ufe 
 them. 
 
 7. Fourthly, Wrong Meafures of 
 Probability, whereof 
 
 %, 10. FtrSl, Ondtful Propofttiom 
 taken for Principles. 
 
 1 1 , Secondly, Received Hypethefif. 
 
 12. Thirdly, Predominant Paffions. 
 I J, The Means of evading Probo' 
 
 bilities, ift. Suppofid Fallacy. 
 14. zi\y.Suppofed yirgnvjtntjor 
 the contrary. 
 
 ly. What Probabilities deter- 
 mine the yiffent, 
 
 1 6. Where it is in our Power t» 
 fufpendit. 
 
 17. Fourthly, Authority, 
 
 18. Men not in fo many Errors 
 as is imagined. 
 
 CHAP. XXI. 
 
 Divijion of tie Sciences, , 
 
 SECT. 
 
 I. Three forts. 
 X, Firjl, Phyfica, 
 J. Secondly, Pra6Jica. 
 Thirdly, ^jd^hotim- 
 f. This is the firfl Divifton of 
 the ObjtHs of Knowledge. 
 
 O F 
 
O F 
 
 Humane Underftanding. 
 BOOK III. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 Oj Words or Language tn general. 
 
 G 
 
 §. I. ^""^ O D having defigned Man for a W'» /'''<' '» 
 (bciable Creature, made him not /'^«» anicuM 
 only with an inclination, and un- '*"^ bounds. 
 der a neceflitv to have tellowihip 
 with thofe of his own kind ^ but furnifhed him alfb with Lan- 
 guage, which was to be the great Inftiument, and common 
 Tye cf Society. Man therefore had by Nature his Organs fo 
 faHiioned, as to be ^t to frame articulate Saunds, which we call 
 Words, But this was not enough to produce Language ; tor 
 Parrots, and (everal other Birds, will be taught to make articu- 
 late Sounds diftinft enough, which yet, by no means, are ca- 
 pable of Language. 
 
 §. 2. Befidej articulate Sounds therefore, it was T9 make thevt 
 farther neceffary, that hefliould be abletouje thefe fyvt of Ideii. 
 Sounds, as Signs of internal Conceptions ^ and to make 
 them Itand as marks for the Ideas within his own Mind, where- 
 by they might be made known to others, and the Thoughts o£ 
 Mens Minds be conveyed from one to another. 
 
 §. a. But neither was this fufikient to make To make gs-. 
 Words fo ufeful as they ought to be. It is not e- ««''^' •^'^"'• 
 nough for the perfcftion ot Language, that Sounds 
 can oe made Sgns of ideas^ unlefs thole Signs can be ib made uie 
 ©fj as Je coaafrebendfeveral fAtticular Thingj : For the Multiplica-!' 
 
 B 5 t4oa 
 
% Worfts or Language in General. 
 
 tion of Words would have perplexed their U(c, had every par- 
 riciiiar thing ntcd of a diftinft Name to be fignified by. To re- 
 medy this Inconvenience, Language had yet a farther Improve- 
 ment In the ufe of general Terms, whereby one Word was 
 made to mark a multitude of particular Exiftences : Which ad- 
 vantageous u(c of Sounds was obtain'd only by the Difference 
 of the Idem they were made Signs of Thofe Names becoming 
 general, which^ are made to ftand for general ideat^ and thofe 
 remaining particular, where the ideoi they areufcd tor are par- 
 ticular. 
 
 §j 4. Befides thefe Names which ftand for Ideat^ 
 
 To mahgs- there be other Words which Men make ufe of^ 
 
 ner^l Signs, not to fignify any Idea^ but the want or abfence ot 
 
 fome idcoi fimple or complex^ or all Ideas together ", 
 fuch as are Ntbil in Latin, and in Englilh, Ignorance and Bar- 
 renmfs. All which ntgative or privative Word?, cannot be faid 
 properly ro belong to, or fignify no ideM : for tnen they would 
 be perfe6Vly infignificant Sounds ', but they relate to pofitive 
 Ideaii and iignify their Abferce. 
 
 §. 3. It may a]{(> lead us a little towards the O 
 Words ulti- riginal of all our Notions and Knowledge, if wc 
 wntely dtri- ) emark, how great a Dependance our Wordt have 
 wd from fuch on Common {tni\h\€.ldeai \ and how thofe, which 
 fls (ignifj len- are made ufe of to ftand for A6lions and Notions 
 jibU Idea.-. quite removed from ^zn{'Z^h Ave their rife from thence, 
 
 and from obviom fenfible Ideas are transferred to more 
 iihflrufc Sigriific^rtionsy and made to ftand for ideds that come aot 
 under the - ogniz ince of our Senfes^ v. g. to Imagine^ Apprehend^ 
 Corf:prche»d, Ad'iere , Conceive , Injiill, Difgufl, DifiurbancCy Tran- 
 ^uillin. Sec. art all Words taken from the Operations of (enfi- 
 bie Tl;'Mgs_> and applied to certain Modes of Thinking. Spirit, 
 in irs primary Signification, is Breath ; Angel, a Meflenger : 
 An 1 I cciiht nor, but if we could trace ihcm to their Sources, * 
 wefliould hnd, in all Languages, the Names, which ftand fof - 
 Thi:^gs •It fill not under our Sfnfes, to have had their firft 
 rife from fenfible Idea;. By which we may give fome kind o£ 
 guef<:, \~ hat kind of Notions they were, and whence derived, 
 whicl' Hllcd theii Minds, who were the Bril Beginners of Lan^ 
 guag;.. j and how Nature, even in the naming of Things, un- 
 aware- r ggefled to Men the Originals and Principles of all theit 
 Knowledge ; Wliilff, to giveN.imes, that might make known 
 to others anv Operations they felt in themfclves, or any other 
 Ideasy that came uat under thcip Senfes^ tbey were lain to. borrow 
 
 W'ords. 
 
Words or Language in General, 1 
 
 Words from ordinary known lde(i4 of Senfation, by that means 
 to make others the more eafily to conceive thofe Operations they^ 
 experimented in themlelves, which made no outward (enfible 
 Appearances j and then when they had got known and agreed 
 Ndmes, to fignify thofc internal Operations of their own Minds, 
 they were fufficiently furniflied to make known by Word, all 
 their other Ideas ; hnce they could confift of nothing, but ei- 
 ther of outward lenfible Perceptions, or of the inward Opera- 
 tions of their Minds about them; we having, as has been pro- 
 ved, no ideas at all, but what originally come either from ^C:V)r 
 lible Objc6ls without , or what we feel within our felves, 
 from the in vard Workings of our own Spirits, which we are 
 confcious to our felves of within. 
 
 §. 6. But to underftand better the ufe and Diflrihutioit^ 
 force of Language, as fublervient to Inllru6lion 
 and Kaovvledgej it will be convenient to conftder, 
 
 Firjiy To what it » that Nainesy in the uje of Language^ are imr 
 mediately applied. 
 
 Secondly y Since all ('ejfccpt proper ) Names are general, and 
 fo ftand not particularly for this or that fingle Thing; but for 
 (brts and ranks of Things, it will be neceifary to confider, in 
 the next place, what the Sorts and Kinds, or, if you rather like 
 the Latin Names , what the Species and Genera cf Things are j 
 wherein they confift ; and how they come to be made. Thefe 
 being ( as they ought ) well looked into, we (hall the better 
 come to find the right ufe of Words ; the natural Advantages 
 and Defe6h of Language ; and the Remedies that ought to be 
 ufed, to avoid the inconveniencies of obicurity^ or uncertainty 
 in the fignification of Words, without which, it is irapcfiSble 
 to difeourfe with any elearnefs, or order, concerning. Know- 
 ledge : Which being converfant about Propoiitians, and thofe 
 moft commonly univerQ ones, has greater connexion wkb 
 Words, than perhaps is fufpedted. 
 
 Thcfe Conhderations therefore, Ihall be the matter of tba 
 Following Chapters.. 
 
 B 4 € M A E 
 
The Signification of Wor^s. 
 
 CHAR If. 
 
 Of the S'tgntficAtion of Words, 
 
 Words art §• I. X yC A N, though he have great variety 
 ftnfihU sigm IVl of Thoughts, and fuch, from which 
 
 Kicepry for -*- X others, as well as himfelf, might re- 
 
 Conmumca- ceivre Profit and Delight \ yet they are all with- 
 "^' in his own Breaft, invlfible, and hidden from o« 
 
 thers, nor can of themfelves be made appear. The 
 Comfort, and Advantage of Society, not being to bchad with- 
 out Cominunicaiion of Thoughts, it was neceifary, that Man 
 Ihoi'ld find our fome external lenfible Signs, whereby thofein- 
 vifiblc Jc/fu/, whtLh his Thoughts are made up of, might be made 
 xnr.wn CO orhcr?^ For this purpole, nothing was lo fit, either 
 for Plenty ov Qujcknefs, as thofe articulate Sounds, which with 
 fo much Eafe and Variety, he found himfelf able to make. 
 .Thus we may conceive how PVords, which were by Nature fo 
 "Well adapted to that purpofe, come to be made ule of by Men, 
 as tU^ Sifns of their ideoi ; not by any natural connexion, that 
 there is between particular articulate Sounds and certain Ideas, 
 for then there would be b-Jt one Language amongft all Men ; 
 but by a voluntary Impofition, whereby fiich a Word is made 
 arbitrarily the Mark of luch an Idea, The ufe then oi Words, 
 is to be ienfible Marks of Ideas; and the Ideas they ftand for, 
 ^re :heir projper and immediate Signification. 
 
 §. 2. The ufe Men have of thefc Marks, being 
 Words are the eirher to record their own Thoughts for ihcAffi- 
 fenfihk Signs ftance of their own Memory; or, as it were, to 
 •^^'* ''^^' bring out their ideasy and lay them before the view 
 vhoujesthew. ^j^ others : J^orJs m their frim*ry or immediate Sig' 
 iiijicatson^ ftand far nothings Ifut the Ideas in the Mind 
 '^f him thatufes them, how imv'»erfc<5lly loever, or careltfly thofe 
 l^deas are cojleftcd from the Things, which they are fuppofed to 
 reprefcnr. V^'hen s Man fpeaks to another, it is, that he may 
 be underlloud :, and the end of Speech i?, that thofe Sounds, 
 as Marks, may make known his ideas to the Hearer. That 
 ![hen which VVoi-ds a,rc the Marks of, are the Ideas of the 
 Speaker: I^or ^an any one apply them, es Marks^ Imniediately 
 
The Signifcation of WorJs, ' 5* 
 
 to any thing elfe, but the Ideasy that he himfelf hath. For this 
 would be to make them Signs of his own Conceptions, and yet 
 apply them to other Ideas ; which would be to make rheni 
 Signs, and not Signs of his ideas at the fame time •, and fb in 
 cffe^, CO have no Signification at all. Words being voluntary 
 Signs, they cannot be voluntary Signs impofed by him on Things 
 he knows not. That would be to make them Signs of nothing, 
 Sounds without Signification. A Man connor make his Words 
 the Signs either of Qnalitles in Things, or of Conceptions in the 
 JMind of another, whereof he has none in his own. *TiIl he 
 has fome Ideas of his own, he cannot fuppofe them to corre- 
 spond with the Conceptions of another Man ', nqr can ufe any 
 Signs for them : For thus they would be the Signs of he knows 
 not what, which is in Truth to be the Signs of nothing. But 
 when he reprefents to htmfHf ^Dther Mens ideas^ by fome of his 
 own, if he confent to give them the fame Name?, that other 
 Men do, 'tis ftill to his own ideas \ to Ideas that he has, and 
 not to Ideas that he has not. 
 
 §. J. This is fo ncceflary in the ufe of Lan- Words are the 
 guage, that in this refpc6f, the Knowing, and the finjible Signs 
 jfgnorant *, the Learned, and Unlearned, ufc the «/ ^» If^cas 
 Vl^ords they fpeak ( with any meaning ) all alike. "^^ «/« '^«». 
 They, in every Mat^s Mouthy fiand for the Ideas he 
 has, and which he would exprefs by them. A Child having 
 taken notice of nothing in the Metal he hears called Gold, but 
 the bright fhining yellow Colour, he applies the Word Gold 
 only to his own Idea of that Colour, and nothing elfe *, and 
 therefore calls the firae Colour In a Peacock's Tail, Gold. A- 
 iiother that hath better obferved, adds to fhining yellow, great 
 Weight : And then the Sound Gold, when he u(es it, ftands 
 for a complex Idea oi a fhining Yellow and very weighty Sub- 
 fiance. Another adds to thofe Qualities, Fufibility : and then 
 the Word Gold to him fignifies a Body, bright, yellow, fufi- 
 ble, and very heavy. Another adds Malleability. Each of 
 thefe ufes equally the Word Gold, when they have Occafion to 
 exprefs the Idea^ which they have apply'd it to : But it is evi- 
 . dent, that each can apply it only to his own Idea ^ nor can he 
 make it ftand, as a Sign of fuch a complex Idea, as he has not. 
 §.4. But though Words, as^ they are ufed by pfr^yj^ ,r,^„ n 
 Men,can properly and immediately fignify no- cretly rejerred] 
 thing but the IdeaSythaX are in the Mind of the Firft, to the Ideas 
 Speaker i yet they in their Thoughts give them i« other Mens 
 5i^cr^tr^fe?encet©,two peher thip|s,. Mmdif^ 
 
6 The S'tgmfication of Words, 
 
 Firjlf theyfufpofe their Words to be Mnrkj of the Ideas in the 
 "Minds alfo of other Men^ tpith rvbom they commitnicate : For clfc 
 they fhouldralk in vain, and could nor be undciftood, if the 
 Sounds they applied to one Idea, were fuch, as by the Hearer, 
 were applied to another , which is to fptak two Languages. 
 But in this Men ftand not ufualljr to examine, whether the Idea 
 thiy, and thofe rhcy difcourfe with have in their Minds, be the 
 faoie : But think it enough, that they uft the Word, as they 
 image, in the common Acceptation ot that Language •, in which 
 they (uppofe, that thei^^j, they make it a Sign ot, is precifely 
 the fame, to which the Underftanding Men of that Country 
 apply that Name. 
 
 §. 5. 5'ecW/)',Becau^Mr«vvould not be thought 
 Stctndly, T» to tail* barely of their own Imaginations, but of 
 the rcMlnj af Things as really they are ^ therefore they often 
 Xhi ngs. fuppofe their Words to Jlatid alfo for the reality ofTlmgs, 
 
 But Ais relating more particularly to Subftances, 
 and their Nanie?, as perhaps the former does to fimple Ideoi an4 
 Modes, we fhall fpeak of thefe two different ways applying 
 Words more at large, when we come to treat of the Names of 
 mixed Modes, and Subftances, in particular : Though give me 
 leave here to lay, that it is a perverting theule of Words, aii<i 
 brings univoidable Obfcurity and Confulion into their Signifi- 
 cation, whenever we make them ftand for any thing, but thofe 
 Jdtai we have in our own Minds. 
 
 §. 6. Concerning Words alfo it is farther to be 
 Words by ufe confidercd : Firft, That thcv being immediately 
 readtly excite the Signs of Mens Ideas j and, by that means, the 
 Ideas. Inftrumcnts whereby Men communicate their Con- 
 
 ception?, and exprefs to one another thofe Thougbta 
 and Imaginations, they have within their own Breads, there 
 Qomes by conjiant ufe^ to be fuch a Connexion betrveen certain Soiindsy 
 snd the Ideas they fiand for^ that the Names heard, almoft as rea- 
 'dily excite certain l^^^j, .as if the Obj;.6ls themlelvcs, which 
 arc apt to produce them, did actually atteft the Senles. Which 
 is manlfcftly <b in all obvious fenfiblc Qualities j and in all Sub- 
 Itances, that frequently^ and familiarly occur to us. 
 
 §. 7- Secondly, That though the proper and im- 
 Wurdspften mediate Signification of Words, arc ldea% in the 
 itftd without Mind of the Speaker 'y yet becaufc by familiar ufe 
 fignification. from our Cradles, we come to learn certain articu- 
 late Sounds very perfe6lly» and have them readily 
 on ourTonguts, and c^ways a,c hand in qui Memories ^ buty^t^ 
 
The Signification ef iVords. j 
 
 are not always careful to examine, or (tattle their Significations 
 perfe<flly, it often haprens that Men^ even when they would ap- 
 ply themfelves to an attentive Conftderatian, do /ef their Thoughts 
 more on Pf^ords than Things. Nay, becaule Words are many of 
 them learn'd, before the Ideas are known for which they Hand : 
 Therefore (bme, not only Children, but Men, fpeajc (evcyal 
 Words^ no otherwife than Parrots do, only becaufe they have 
 learn'd them, and have been accuftomed to thofe Sounds. But 
 fb hr as Words are of U(e and Signification, fb far is there a 
 conftant connexion between the Sound a^d the idea ; and a Dc- 
 lignation, that the one ftand for the other : without which Ap- 
 plication of them, they are nothing but io much infignificant 
 Noiie. 
 
 §. 8. Jj^<// by long and fa nillar ufe, asl-iasbeen Th^ir Signifi. 
 fdXdy come to excite in Men certain Ideas., io con- cattan ptr- 
 ftantly and readily, that they are apt tofuppoft a ff^h«rbitra^ 
 natural connexion between them. But that they U- 
 fignify only Mens peculiar Ideas^ and that hy a per-, 
 feBly arhttrary Jmpofition., is evident, in that they often fail to 
 excite in others (evtn that vff. the lame Language) the (ame 
 Ideatf we take them to be the Signs of : And every Man has fa 
 inviolable a Liberty, to make Words ftand for what Ideas he 
 pleafes, that no one hath the Power to make others have the 
 fitnt Ideas in their Minds, that he has, when they u(e thelamc 
 Words, that he does. And therefore the great Angujlui himfelfi, 
 In the Pofleifion of that Power which ruled the World, acknow- 
 ledged, he could not make a new Latin Word : which was as 
 much as to fay, that he could not arbitrarily appoint, what Idea 
 any Sound (nould be a S.ign of, in the Mouths and common 
 Language of his Subjects. 'Tis true, common u(e, by a tacit 
 Confent, appropriates certain Sounds to certain Ideas in all Lan- 
 guages, which (b far limits the Signification of that Sound, 
 that unlefs a Man applies it to the (ame Idca^ he does not fpeak 
 properly : And let me add, that unlefi a Man's Words excite 
 theft.me Ideas in the Hearer, which he maizes them ftand for m 
 fpeaking, he does not fpeak intelligibly. But whatever be the 
 confequence of any Man's ufing ot Words diffcrewly, either 
 from their general Meaning, or the particular Senfe of the Pex- 
 lon to whom he addrt&s them, this is certain, l\\nv Signifira^*. 
 rioil, in his ufe of them, is lirai.ted to his Ideas^ and they caa be 
 Aligns o( nothing ciE 
 
 CHAP. 
 
S General Terms. 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 Of General Terms. 
 
 Thegrtatefi §. j. A LL Things, thatexift, being VzxUr 
 f»rtofmrds /A culars, it may perhaps be thought 
 
 ^tner^l. J- ^ reafonable that Words, which ought 
 
 to be conformed to Things, (hould be fo too, I 
 mean in their Signification; but ytt wehnd the quite contrary. 
 The far greateft part of PPords, that make all Languages, are ge- 
 neral Terms : which has not been the EBcSt of Negle6l, or 
 Chance, but of Reafon, and Neceflity. 
 
 §. X. Firft, It K impajjlhlcf that every particular 
 For every par- thin^Jhould have a dtfiintl peculiar Name. For the 
 ticular tking fignification and ufe of Words, depending on that' 
 so bavt a connexion, which the Mind makes between its 
 •*"?' " ""' Ideas, and the Sounds it ufes as Signs of them, it 
 foj/ibie. jg neceffary, in the Application of Names to Things, 
 
 that the Mind (hould have diftia6l Idtas of the 
 Things, and retain alfb the particular Name that belongs to e- 
 very one, with its peculiar appropiation to that Idea. But it is 
 beyond the Power oi Humane Capacity to frame and retain di« 
 ftin6l Ideas of all the particular Things we meet with : every 
 Bird, and Bead Men faw •, every Tree, and Plant, that affe<^- 
 ed the Senfes, could not find a Place in the moft capacious Un- 
 derftanding. If it be looked on, as an Inftanceof a prodigious 
 Memory, That fome Generals have been able to call every Sol- 
 dier in their Army, by his proper Name : We may eafiiy find a 
 Reafon, why Men have never attempted to give Nanies^to each 
 Sheep in their Flock, or Crow that flies over their Heads ^ 
 much Icfs to call every Leaf of Plants, or Grain of Sand that 
 came in their way, by a peculiar Name. 
 
 §. ;. Secofidly, If it were poflible, it would yet 
 Andufeltfs. he ufelefj ; becaufe it would not (erve to the chief 
 
 end of Language. Men would in vain heap up 
 Names of particular Things , that would not ferve them to 
 communicate their Thoughts. Men learn Names, and u(e them 
 in Talk with others, only that they may be underflood : which 
 5s then only done, when by Ufe or Confent, the Sound I make 
 
 by 
 
General Terms, 6 
 
 by the Organs of Speech, excites in another Man's Mind, who 
 hears Ir, the Idea I apply ic to in mine, when I fpeak it. This 
 cannot be done by Names, applied to particular Things, where- 
 of I alone having the Ideas in my Mind, the Names of them 
 could not be (ignificant, or intelligible to another, who was noc 
 acquainted with all thofe very particular Things, which had 
 fallen under my Notice. 
 
 §. 4. Thirdly, Bat yet granting this alfo feafible ^ ( which I 
 think is not,) yet a difttnSi Name for every particular Thing, ipould 
 not be of any great ufe for the improvement of J^novpledge ; which 
 though founded in particular Thing?, enlarges it lelf by ge- 
 neral Views J to which, Things reduced Into Sorts under ge- 
 neral Names, are properly fiibfervient. Thefe, with the Names 
 belonging to them, come within (ome compafs, and do not mul- 
 tiply every Moment, beyond what, either the Mind can con- 
 tain, or life requires. And therefore in thefe Men, have for 
 the moft part ftopp*d : but yet not fb, as to hinder rhemfelves 
 from diftinguifhing particular Things, by appropriated Names, 
 where Convenience demands ir. And therefore in their own 
 Species, which they have mcft to do with, and wherein ihey 
 have often occafion to mention particular Perfons ^ they make 
 ule of proper Names, and their difiindt Individuals have dl- 
 ftinft Denominations. 
 
 §. 5 . Befides Perlbns » Countries alfo , Cities, What things 
 Rivers, Mountains, and other the like DIftinfti- ^^'^' proper 
 ons of Place, have ufually found peculiar Names, ^""'f^' 
 and that for the fame Reafon ^ they being fuch as 
 Men have often an Occafion to mark particularly , and, as ft 
 Vftte, (et before others in their Difcourfes with them. And I 
 doubt not, but if we had reafon to mention particular Horfts, 
 as often as we have to mention particular Men, we fliould have 
 proper Names for the one, as familiar as for the other ^ and Buct- 
 phalus would be a Word as much in Ufe, as Alexander, And 
 therefore we fee that amongft Jockeys, Horfes have their proper 
 Names to be known and diftinguifhed by, as commonly as their 
 Servants : Becaufe amongft them, there is often occafion to men* 
 lion this or that particular Horfe, when he is out of Sight. 
 
 §. 6. The next thing to be confidered is, hojv 
 general Words come to be made. For fince all things How general 
 that exift are only particulars, how come we by Words are 
 general Terms, or where find we thofe general Na- ^'^de, 
 tures they are ^ppofed to ftand for ? Words be- 
 come general, by being made the figns of general idias : a^d 
 
 ideai 
 
lb General Terms. 
 
 Ideas bccorrte general, by feparating from rhem the circumftartccs 
 ot rime, uiiJ Place^ and any other Ideas^ that may dercrminc 
 them to this or that particular Exlltence. By this way of ab- 
 ftra6tionthcy arc niide capable ot repreleiiting more Individuals 
 th.tn one •, each of which, having in it a conformity to iham 
 abllradl Uea^ is (as well call it ) oi that Sort. 
 
 §. 7. Bit to deduce this a little more diftirxSliy, it will not 
 perhaps be amifs, to trace our Notions, and Names, from their 
 beginning, and obferve by what degrees we i roceed, and by 
 what ftops we enlarge our ideas from our firit Infancy. There 
 is nothing more evident, than that the hieas of the Perfons Chil- 
 dren couverfe with, ( to inllance in them alone) are like the 
 Pcrfons themfolvc?, on^y particular. The ideas of the Nurfe, 
 an! the Mother, arc well framed in their Minds j and, like 
 PIdlures of them there, reprclent only thofe Individuals. The 
 Names they firllgave to them, are confined to thefe Individuals j 
 and the Names of Nurfe and Mammae the Child ufes, determine 
 themfclvcs to thofe Perfoli?. Afterwards, when Time and a large 
 A( quainrance has made them ob(erve,that there are a great many 
 other Things in the World, that in fome common agreements of 
 Shape, and feveral other Q^jalities, referable their Father and 
 Morher, and thofe Perfons they have been ufed to, they frame 
 an Ide.tj which they find thofe many Particulars do partake in j 
 and to that they give, with others^ the name Man for Example, 
 And tim they come to have a general Name,, and a general idea. 
 Wherein they make nothing new, but only leave out of the 
 complex idea they had of Peter and James, Mary and Jane^ that 
 which is peculiar to each, and retain only what is common to - 
 them all. 
 
 §. 8. By the fame way, that they come by the general Name 
 and Idea of Man, they eafily advance to more general Names and 
 Notions. For obferving, that leveral Things that differ from 
 their Idea of Man, and cannot therefore be comprehencicd un* 
 der that Name, have yet certain Qiialltie?, wherein they:agree* 
 with Man, by retaining only thofe Qualities, and uniting thein 
 into one idea., they have again another and a more general Idea'j 
 to which having given a Name, they make a term of a more 
 comprchenfiveexteniion : Which new Ideaia made, not by any, 
 new addition, but only, as before, by leaving out the Ihape^ 
 and fome other Properties fignified by the name Many and re- 
 taining only a Body, with Life, Senfe, and Spontaneous Moti- 
 on, comprehended under the Name AnimaU 
 
General Terms, ii 
 
 §. 9. That this is the vpay^ vpherehy Men firji 
 formed general Ideaf, and general Names to them, I General Na- 
 think, is Co evident, that there needs no other '«'-f^ <"•« wo- 
 proof of it, but the confidering of a Man's felf, ^^"^ff^' 
 or others, and the ordinary proceedings of their /'""^^ ^°^'^^' 
 Minds in Knowledge : And he that thinks ge- 
 neral Natures or Notions, are any thing elle but fiich abflrait 
 and partial ideas of more complex ones, taken at firlt from par- 
 ticular Exiftences, will, I fear, be at a lofs where to find them. 
 For let any one refledl, and then tell me, wherein does his Idea 
 of Man differ from that of Peter and Paul j or his Idea^ of Horje 
 horn that of Bucephalm, but in the leaving out fomething, that 
 fe peculiar to each Individual j and retaining fo much of thofe 
 particular complex Ideas, of feveral particular Exiflences, as they 
 are found to agree in ? Of the complex ideas, hgniiicd by tlie 
 names Man^ and Horfe, leaving out but thofe particulars where- 
 in they differ, and retaining only thofe wherein they agree, and 
 of thofe, making a new diitinft complex idea, and giving the 
 name Animal to it, one harh a more general term, that compre- 
 hends, with Man, feveral other Creatures. Leave out of the 
 Idea of Animal, Seiife and fpontaneous Motion, and the remain- 
 ing complex Idea, made up of the remaining fimple ones of Body, 
 Life, and Nourifhmenr, becomes a more general one, under 
 the more comprehenfive term, Vivens, And not to dwell lon- 
 ger upon this particular, fo evident in it felf, by the lame way 
 the Mind proceeds to Body, Suhjiance, and at laft to Being, Thing, 
 and fiich univerfal terms, which fland for any of our Ideas what- 
 Ibever. To conclude, this whole myilery of Genera and Species, 
 which make (iich a noife in the Schools, and are, with Juftice, 
 fo little regarded out of them, is nothing elfe but abftradt Ideas^ 
 more or le(s comprehenfive, with names annexed to them. In 
 all which , this is conftant and unvariable, That every one 
 general term. Hands for fuch an idea, as is but a part of any of 
 thole contained under it. 
 
 §. 10. This may (hew us the reafbn, vphytinthe why the 
 defining of fVords, Which is nothing but declaring Genus is ordi- 
 their fignificarion, we mal^ufeof theGenus^ or next narily made 
 general Word that comprehends ir. Which is not «/« o/'" 0^>- 
 out of neceflity, but only to lave the labour of e- "'"^s;. 
 numerating the feveral fimple Ideas , which the 
 next general Word or Genw-, flands for ^ or, perhaps, fome- 
 rimes the fhame of not being able to do ir. But though defining 
 by Gf»wand Differentia, ( 1 crave leave to ufe thefe terms of Arr, 
 
 ihough 
 
1 2 General Terms. 
 
 though originally liatln, fince they mofl: properly fuit thofe No*' 
 tions they are applied to ; ) I fay, though defining by the Genug 
 be the Ihortcft way ; yet, I think, it may be doubted, whether 
 it be the beft. This I am fure, it is not the only, and Co not 
 abfolutcly neccflary. For Definition being nothing but making 
 another underftand by Words, what Idea, the term defined 
 ftands for, a definition is bed made by enumerating thofe fim- 
 ple Ideas that are combined in the fignification of the term de- 
 fined : and if inftead of fuch an enumeration, Men have accu- 
 ftomtd themfflvesto ufethe next general term, it has not been 
 out of neceffiry, or for greater clearncfs j but for quicknefs and 
 difparch fake. For, I think, that to one who dehred to know 
 whai Idea the word Man ftood for j if it (hould be faid, that 
 Man was a fblid extended Subftance, having Life, Senfe, fpon-, 
 tancous Morion, and the Faculty of Reafbning, I doubt not but 
 the meaning of the term Man, would be as well underftood, 
 and the Idea it ftands for, be ar leaft as clearly made known, as 
 when it is defined to be a rational Animal *, which by the feveral 
 definitions oC Animal, Vivens, and Cor/>w, refblvcs it lelf into thofe 
 enumerated Idtas. I have in explaining the term Man, followed 
 here the ordinary Definition ot the bchools : which tho', per- 
 haps, not the moft ?xa6l, yet ferves well enough to my prefenc 
 purpofe. And one may, in this inftance, fee what gave occa- 
 fion to the Rule, that a Definition mull confift oi Genus and 
 Differentia : and it fufiiccs to (hew us the little ncceflity there Is 
 of fuch a Rule, or advantage in the ftri6b obferving of it. For 
 Definitions, as has been faia, being only the explaming of one 
 Word, by feveral others, io that the meaning, or idea it ftands 
 for, maybe certainly known, Languages are not always fo made, 
 according to the Rules of Logick, that every term can have its 
 fignification, exactly and clearly expreflcd by two others. Ex- 
 perience fufficiently fatisfics us to the contrary ; or clfe thole 
 who have made this Rule, have done ill, that they have given 
 us fb few Definitions conformable to it. But or Definitions, 
 more in the next Chapter. 
 
 §. 1 1. To return to general Words, it is plain, 
 Central and by what has been faid, That General and Vniverfai, 
 Vhiverfal are belong not to the real exiftence of Things j but 
 CreatHrti of are the Inventions ^an^ Creatures of the Vnderflanding^ 
 the Utidtr- made by it for its own ufe, and concern only Signs^ 
 jiandivg, whether Words, or Ideas. Words are general, as 
 
 has been ^id, when ufed, for Signs of general 
 Ideas j and fo an: applicable indifferently to many particular 
 
 Things i 
 
General Terms. ij 
 
 Things J And Tdeast are general, when they are fet up as tlie 
 Reprdentatives of many particular Things -• but Univcrfality 
 belongs not to things ihemfelves, which are all of them parti- 
 cular in their Exiftence, even ihofe Words, and Ideate which ia 
 their fignificacion, are general. When therefore we quit Par- 
 ticulars, the Generals that reft, are only Creatures of our own 
 making, their general Nature being nothing but the Capacity 
 they are put into by the Underftandlng, uf fignifying or repre- 
 (cnting many particulars. For the fignification they have, Is 
 nothing but a relation, that by the Mind of Man is added to 
 them. (^) 
 
 §. iz. 
 
 (») Againft this the Bifliop oiWorceSler obje£ls, and our 
 Author * anfwers as followeth ; However, faith the Bifhop, * In hit firU 
 the abHraBed Ideas are the Work of the Mind, as- appears Letter, p» I 8^, 
 by an Infiarice produced ej the Rflence of the Sun being in &c. 
 one fingle IndiviHual : In which Caje it is granted. That 
 the Idea may be fo abftiadied, that more Suns might agree in it, and it is 
 as much a Sort, as if there were -as many Suns as tTier:- are Stars, So that 
 here we bays a real Eflfence fubfifting in one Individuai, bin capable of being 
 mul.iplied mro more, and ihe fame Effcnce remaining But in this one Sun 
 there is a rtal Effence, and not a meer nominal or abftrafled E/Tcnce : Bun , 
 fuppofc there were more Suns j wou'd not each of them have the real Efllicc 
 of the Sun ? For whar is it makes the Second Sun, bur having the fame real 
 Effence with the Firft ? If it were but a Nominal Eflcnce, then the Second 
 would have nothing but the Name. 
 
 This, as I underliand ir, repWes ^r. Locke, is to prove, that the ahflrail 
 generaj Effence of any Sort of Things, or things of the fame Dcnommari- 
 on, v.. g. of Man or Marigoles, hath a real Being out of the Underftanding ; 
 which, I coofeft, I am not able to conceive. Your Lordlhip's Proof here 
 brought out of my Effay, coacerning the Sun, I humbly conceive will noc 
 reach it ; becaufe what i& faid- there.does not at all concern the real but «o- 
 tninal Effence, a« is evident from hence, that the Idea I fpsak of there, is 
 a complex Idea ; but we have no complex Idea of the internal Conftitution 
 or real Effence of the Sun. Bcfides, I fay exprefly, Thar our diftinguiffi- 
 ing Subftances into Species, by Names, is not at all founded on their nal 
 Eflences. So that the Sun being one of thefe Subftances, I cannot, in the 
 Place quoted by your Lordlhip, be fuppofed to mean by E fence cf the Stin^ 
 the real Effence of the Sun, unlefs I had fo expreffed. But all this Argu- 
 ment will be at an end, when your Lordfhip fhali have explained what 
 you mean by thefe Words, true Svn* In my Senfe of them, any thing will 
 be a true Sun to which the name Sun may be traly and properly apply'd-, 
 and to tkat Subftance or Thing, the name.5aw may be truly and- properly 
 apply'd, which has united- in it that Gon-»bi nation of feniible Quahties, by. 
 which any tliiog^ qlfe tlja: i? called Snx a diiiiogu^.Qjgd ij oas othe? Sab? 
 YqJ. II, ■ G &MS^, 
 
14 General Terms. 
 
 §. iz. The nexc fhir * ihcrcfore to beconfide- 
 Ajii-tiEi Ideas i*cd, is, Vf^hat kjnd of Jl^nification it «r, that General 
 art the £(■ li'ords have. For as ic is evident, that they do not 
 ftncis if tht fignlty barely one particular thing •, for then 
 Cncra aniT thcy would not be general Terms, but proper 
 Species. Names ; fo on the other lidc, 'tis as evident, they 
 
 do not fignity a plurality ^ for M^n and Men 
 would then fignify the fame •, and the diftindlion ol numbers 
 (as Grammarians call them) would be fupcrtluous and ufelefs. 
 That then which general Words fignify, is a fort of Things ; 
 and each of them does that, by being a fign of aii abftiadt 
 
 Idea 
 
 ftanccs, J. c. by rhc Nominal EJfence : And thus our S«w is denominated and 
 diftingiiini^H from a fixed Scar, not by a real Elfence 'hat we do not kno\»r 
 ( for if wc did, 'ris pofiVnle we fhould find the real Ejfevct or Conilituttcn 
 of one of the hxcd Stars to be the fame with ihat of our 2un ) but by a com- 
 plex Idta of rciilil)k Quilities co-cxifting, whici), wherever they arc found, 
 ifiake a True Srin. And thus I crave leave to anfwer y> ur Loid(hips Que- 
 ftion : ro' rebat is it makes the Second S«m to be a true 6uh, but hnving the 
 fame real Hffencc trith the Firfi ? if It were but a Nimmal Effince, then the 
 Second voould have iiathing but the Name. 
 
 I humbly conceive, if it had the nominal Effence, it would have fome- 
 ihing bcfidcs the Name, via. That nominal Effcnce which is fufficient to dc-" 
 nominate it truly a i«», or to make it be a true Suu, though we know no- 
 thing of that real Effcnce whereon that nominal one depends j your Lord- 
 /hip will then argue, That that real E/Jh:ce is in the Second Sua, and maker 
 the Second Sun. I grant ir, when thtSecond Sun comes to exill, fo as to be 
 perceived by us to have all the Ideas contained in our complex Idea, i, e. in 
 our Nominal Ejjence of a Sun. For fhould it be true ( as is now believed by 
 Aftronomers ) that the real Effcnce of the Sun were in any of the fixed Star?, 
 yet fiich a Star could not for that, be by us called a Sun, whilli it anfwers 
 not our complex Idea, or nominal Effcnce of a Sun. But how far that wi!l 
 prove. That the Ejfcncn oflhingf, as they are know able by us, hai'e a 
 reality in thetn Aiih^dir^>mxhzi oi abHrnB Ideas \n thclA\i\d, which are 
 mterly Creatures of the Mmd, I do not fee 4 and we fhall farther enquire, \A 
 conficiering y> mv Lorddiip's following Words. Therefore, fay:you, tiiezt 
 fnvfi be a real Efence in every Individual of the fame Kind, Yes, and I beg 
 leave of ycur Lordfhip to fay, of a different Kind too. for that alone u it 
 TPhich makes it to be whac it is. 
 
 That every Individual Subftancc has a real, internal, individual Confti- 
 tution, I. e. a real Effcnce, that makes it to be what it is, I grant. Vfoo 
 this your Lordlhip fays, Peter, fames and John are all true and real Men. 
 Anfw. Without doubt, fuppoling them to be Men, thcy are true and real 
 Men, J. e, fuppofing the Names of that Species belongs to them. And la 
 Three Bob/fj'ief ^vc all trae and real Bai/^tques^ fuppodng tUc Nu,u\(; of thai 
 ^pecicsofAaiRuls belongs to tbcau ' ^- fox 
 
General Terms, ij 
 
 Idea in the mind, to which idea^ as Things exiding are found to 
 agree, fo they come to be ranked under that narne •, or, which 
 IS all one, be of that fort. Whereby it is evident, that the 
 Ejfences of the fortSf or ( if the Latin Word pleafes better ) Species 
 of Things, are nothing elfe but thefe abftraii Ideas. For the 
 having the Eilence of any Species, being that which makes any- 
 thing to be of that Species, and the conformity to the Idea, to 
 which the name is annexed, being that which gives a right to 
 that name, the having the Effence, and the having that Con- 
 formity, muft needs be the fame thing : Since to be of any 
 Species, and to have a right to the name of that Species, is all 
 
 one. 
 
 For I befeech your Lordfhip to confidcr,Whether in your way of arguing, 
 by naming them Pettr,J*mes and Jthn, Names familiar to us, as appropria- 
 ted to Individuals of the Species Man, your Lordfhip dees qot firft fuppole 
 them Men, and then very fafely ask, Whether they be not all true and real 
 Men ? But if I (hould ask your Lordfliip, Whether IVewcena, Cuckery and 
 Conpeda were true and real Men or no ? Your Lordfhip would not be able 
 to tell me, till I have pointed out to your Lordfhip the Individuals called by 
 thofc Names, your Lordfhip by examining whether they had in them thofe 
 fenfible Qualities, which your Lordfhip has combined into that complex 
 Idea, to which you give the Spccifick Name Man, determin'd them all, or 
 fome of them to be of the Species which you call Man, and fo to be true nnd 
 real Man j which when your Lordfhip has determin'd, 'tis plain you did ic 
 by that which is only the nominal Eifince, as not knowing the real one. 
 But your Lordfhip farther asks, What it it makes Peter, James and ]ohn 
 real Men ? Is'it the attributing the general Name to them ? No certainly ^ 
 tut that the true and real Effence of Man is in every e«| of them. 
 
 If when your Lcrdfihip asks, IVhat makes them Men ? Your Lordfhip 
 ufed the Word making in the proper Senfe for the ciEcienf Caiii'e, and in thac 
 Senfe it were true, that the EfTcnce of a Man, i. e. the Specifick ElTence 
 of thac Species mada a Man ; it would undoubtedly follow, rhat this Spe- 
 ciftck EfTence had a reality beyond that of being only a general, abftra£i 
 Idea in the Mind. But when it is (aid, Thar it is the true a?id real E fence 
 of a Maft in enjery one of them that makes Peter, James and John true and 
 real Men, the true and real meaning of thofe Words is no more but that the 
 Effence of that Spcc'cs, /. e. The Properties anfwering the complex, abflrail 
 Idea, to which the Specifick Name is given, being found in them that makes, 
 them be properly and truly called Men, or is the fcaf^jn why they are called 
 Men, Your Lordfliip adds, ^nd we muji be at certain of this, A wc are 
 that we are Men. 
 
 How, I bcfcech your Lordfhip, are we certain, titat they are Men, hue 
 only by our Senfes, finding thok; Properties in them which anf-^ter the ab- 
 ilraft, complex Idea, which is in our Minds of the Spccifick Idea, to wbJclai 
 (fc havs annexed ths Specifick Name M^n ? This I talie to be the true mean.- 
 
 C 2,. JOg, 
 
1 6 General Terms. 
 
 one. As for Example, to be a fAanj or of the Species Mj»,and 
 to have right ro ihe nameAi<««, is the fame thing. Again, to be 
 a Matty or of the fame Species Ai4w, and have the Efl_nce of a 
 Ai4/2, i^ the (ame thing. Now fince nothing can be a Mm^ or 
 have a right to the name Man, bur what has a conformity to 
 the abftrat^l idea the name Man ftands for ; nor any thing be a 
 Man, or have a right to the Species Man, but what has the 
 Effence ofthat Species •, it follows,that theabftra<^ Idea for which 
 the name Itancjs, and the Efllnce of the Species, is one and the 
 fame. From whence it is ealy to obferve, that the Eflences of 
 the forts of things, and conlequently the forting of This, is the 
 
 Wor ic- 
 ing ut vshat your Lordfliip fays in the next Words, viz. Thty take their 
 Penomin^tion of being Men, from that common Nature or Effence ■which is 
 in them ; and 1 am apt to think, thefe Words will not hold true in tny oihtr 
 Sen ft.-. 
 
 Your Lordfhip's fourth Inference begins thus : That the general Idea it 
 not 7niide f om the Jtmple Ideas, by the meet AU of the H'^ind abfiraBing 
 from Cncumjlanfes, hut from Reajon and Confderarion of the Nature tf 
 Things, 
 
 I rhought, my Lord, That Reafon and Conftderation had been A5s of the 
 Mind,.meer ABs of the Mind, when any thing was done by them. Your 
 Lcrd{hip civcs a Rcafon for it, viz.. For when we Jee feveral Individuals 
 that haiie the jame Powers and Properties, we thence infer. That there mufi 
 i?e fometb'vg common to all, which makes than of one Kind, 
 
 I grant the Inference to be true ; but muft btg leave to deny that this 
 
 proves, That the general Idea the Name is annexed to, is hot made by the 
 
 Mv.jd. I have faid, and ir agrees with what your Lordfliip. 
 
 * B. ?.C. 6. here fays, * That ' the Mind in making it complex Ideas 
 
 §. 28, Ap. * of Subllanccs, only follows Nature, and purs no Ideas ro- 
 
 ' gcther, which are not ftippoled to have an Ui^ion in Na» 
 
 ■ ture J no body joins the Voice of a Shetp, with the Shape of an Horfc ; 
 
 • nor the Colour of Lead, with the Weight and Fixedncfs of Gold, ro bt 
 
 • the compkx Ideas of any real Subflances ; unlcfs he has a Mind to fill hit 
 
 • Head with Chimera's, and his D;fcourfe9 with unintelligible Words. Men 
 
 • obfervitig certam Qualities always joined and exifting together, -thercia 
 
 • copied Nature, and of Ideas fo united, made their complex ones of Sub- 
 
 • ftanccs, Cfc. Which 1$ very little different from what your Lordfhip here 
 Uys, T/iac 'tis from our Obfcrvarion of Individuals, that wc come to infer, 
 TJf.it tmre is famethingcommoH t» them aH. But I do not lee how it will 
 thcnct follow,'' tbat th^ general or fpecifick Idea is not made by the mecr Adl 
 of the Mind. No, fays your Lordfhip, There is fomethtvg common to ihent 
 41U, which makes them oj one Kind ; and if the dijfe-cxce cf Kinds be real, 
 sh/it which makes them all of o?ie Kind muft not ei a nominal, but real 
 ESlnce. 
 
 Til'* 
 
General Terms] 'ij 
 
 Worktnanfhip of the Underftanding.that abftra£ts and makes 
 ichofe general ideas. 
 
 §. 1 5 . I would not here be thought to Forget, jijgy are the 
 much lels lo deny, that Nature in theProdudion mrkmmjhi^ 
 of Things, makes feveral ot them alike : there is of the Under- 
 nothing more obviou?, efpccJally in the Races of flanding, bus 
 Animal?j and all things propagated by Seed. B it have their 
 yet, I think, we may fay, the /3mw^ of them un* foundation in 
 der Names, » the iVorkmanjhif of thi; Vnderfiandin^, ^^' Itmilitude 
 ukjng occajim from the jimilitude it obftrves amongil "^ ' '"'^^' 
 them, to make abfl:ra<^ general Ii^e^jj and (et them 
 up in the mind, with Names annexed to them, as Patterns or 
 Fbrms, ( for in that fence the word Form has a very proper fig^ 
 nificationj ; to which, as particular Things exifting are found 
 
 to 
 
 This may be fome Obje£lion to the Name o^fitminal Eff^ice ; bur is, as 
 I humbly conceive, none to the Thing deHgned by ir. There is an internal 
 Confticution of Things, on Which their Properrits depend. This your Lord- 
 ihip and I are agreed of, and this wecall the resl . Efersce. There are aifd 
 certain complex ideas, or Combinations of theft Properties i^ Mens Minds, 
 to wliich they commonly annex Specifick Names, or Names of Sorts or 
 iiT/nif of Things. This, I beheve, your Lordfliip does not deny. Thefs 
 complex Ideas, for want of a better Name, I have called nominal Ejfence ^ 
 how properly, I will not difpute. Bat if any one will help me to a bttrer 
 Name for them, I am ready to receive it : till then,! muft.to exprefs my felfj 
 ufe this. Now, my Lord, Body, Life, and the Power of Rf^^w/»^, being 
 not the real Eflenceof a Man, as I believe your Lordfliip will agree, will 
 your Lordfliip fay, that they are not enough to make the thing wherein 
 they are found, of the Kind called Man, and not of the Kind called Baboon, 
 b'etitufe the difference oft'fefe Kinds it real ? If this be not real enough to 
 make the Thing of one Kind, and not dfahother, I do Rot fee how Ani'mat 
 f-ationale can be enough really to diftinguifti a Man from an Hirfe ; for thac 
 is but the nominal, hot real Effence of that Kind, defigned by the HzmtMan. 
 And yet, I fuppoft, every one thing is real enough, to make a real diffe-^ 
 tence between that and other Kinds. And if nothing^Will ferve the turn, 
 to MAKE things of one Kind., and not of another ( which ^s I have fliew'd, 
 fignifies no more but ranking of them under different Specifick Names ) feut 
 their real, unknown Confiitutions, which are the real EffeKCes we are fpeak- 
 ing of, 1 fear it would be a long while before we fhonld have really differenc 
 Kinds c5f Silbftances, or diflindt Names for them, unkfs we could diftinguirti 
 them by thefe Differences, of which we have no diftindt Conceptions, for 
 I think it would not be readily anfWer'd me, it I Oioiild demand, wherein 
 lies the real difference in the internal Conftiturion of a Stag from that of a 
 Biteki whieh arc ^aclj df th?m v?i-y well known to be oj 9ne Kind, and not 
 
1 8 General Terms, 
 
 to ng'ce, (b they come to be of that Species, have that Denorm- 
 nation, or are puc into that Clajfu, For when we fay, this is a 
 Af j«, that a Horfe j this Juftice^ that Cruelty ., this a fVatch, that 
 a 7dc;^ i what do we el(e but rank Things under different ^. 
 cifick Names, as agreeing to thofe abllra6l Lieaff ot which we 
 have made thofe Names the figns ? And what are the EfTencca 
 of thofe Species, fet out and marked by Names, but thofe ab- 
 ftradl Ideas in the mind j which are, as it were, the bonds be- 
 tween particular Things that exill,and the Names they arc to be 
 ranked under ? And when general Names have any cojinexion 
 with particular Beings, thefe ab(tm(St/^e« arc the Medium that 
 unites them : Co that the EiTcnces of Species, as dillingullhed 
 and denominated by u?, neither arc, nor can be any thing but 
 thofe prccife abilra6i: Ideas we have in our mind?. And there- 
 fore 
 
 cf the other ; and no body queftions but chat the Kind whereof each of 
 them IS, are reaf/y different. 
 
 YourLordQiip farther fays, y^nd tim difference doth mt depend upon tbt 
 €9tnplex Idt»s of Subftantts, wherebj Men arbitrarily join Modes together, in 
 their Minds. I confefs, my Lord, I hnow not what to fay to this, becaufc 
 I do not know what thefe complex Ideas of Subftanccs are, whereby Men ar- 
 bitrarily join Modes together in their Minds. But I am ap: to think there 
 is a Millakc In the matter, by the Words that follow, which are thefe : For 
 let them miftake in their Cunplicatitn of IdeM, either in leaving out or 
 •putting in what doth not belong to them j and let their Ideat be what they 
 Toiil, the real Effence of a Man, and an Horfe, and a Tree, are jufi what 
 they were . 
 
 The Mi (lake I fpokc of, I humbly fuppofc is this, That Things are here 
 taken to be dlilingui fixed by their real ECTencc ; when by the very way of 
 fpeaking of ihcm, it is clear. That they are already diftingui£hcd by their 
 nominal EfTcnces, and are fo taken to be. For what I bcftech your Lord- 
 Ihip, docs your Lordfhip mean, when you fay, The real Effcnte ef a Man^ 
 and an Horfe, and a Tree, but that there are fuch kinds already let out by 
 the Signification of thefe Names, Man, Horfe, Tree ? And what, I bcfcech 
 your Lordftiip, is the Signification ofeachof the Specifick Nanaes, but the 
 complex Idea it ftands for ? And that complex Idea is the nommal Elfence, 
 •nd nothing cli'e. So that, taking Man, as your Lordfhip does here, to 
 ftand for a kind or fort of Individuals, all which agree in that common, com- 
 plex Idea, which that Specifick Name Hands for, it is certain rhat the real 
 Ed'cnce of /all the Individuals , comprehended under the Specifick Name 
 Man, in your life of it, would be jull the fame ; let others leave out or put 
 into their complex Idea of A/.«Mwhat they plcafe ; bccau(e the real Eflcnce 
 on wh ch that unaltcr'd complex idea, ;. e. thofe IVopcrtic* depend, raul\ 
 acceflurily be coticludc4 to be the fame. 
 
 '^^ 
 
General Terwsl 19 
 
 fore the fuppofed real JEfTenccs of Subftancc?, if diflFerent from 
 our abft rail I^ff 4/5 cannot be the EfTences cf the Sptcies we rank 
 Things into. For two Species may be one, as rationally, as 
 two different ElTences be the EfTciices of one Species : And 1 de- 
 mand, what are the alterations may, or may not be in a Horje 
 or Lead^ without making eirher of them to be of another Spe- 
 cies? In determining the Species of Things by oar abftradl Ideas, 
 this is eafy to refblve : but if any one will regulare himfelt here- 
 in, by fuppofcd real Eflcncei?, he will, I fuppofc, be ar a loft: 
 and he will never be able to know when any thing preciiely ceafes 
 to be of the Species of a Horjct or Lead. 
 
 §. 14. Nor will any one wonder, that I nach di^hiB ab- 
 fey thefe EJJences, or abftracSl: ideas, (which P^^^^ ISca w adt- 
 are the meafures of Name, and the boundaries J^^"^ Ejjaice. 
 
 of 
 
 For I raJie it for granted, That in ufing the Name Man, in this place, 
 your Lordfliip ufcsit for that complex Idea which is in your Lordiliip's Mind 
 of that Species. So that your Lordfhip by putting it for or rubliicuting ic 
 in the place of that complex Idea where you fay the real EfTenceof it is juji 
 as it was, or the very fame it was, does fuppofe the Idea it ftaids tor, to 
 be Ideally the fame. For if I change the Signification of the Word Man, 
 whereby it may not comprehend jii/t the fame Individuals which in youi* 
 Lordfhip's Senfe it does, but fhut out fomc of thofc that to your Lordfliip 
 are Men in your Signification of the Word A/<r;;, or rake in others to which 
 your LordQiip does not allow the Name Man. I do nor think you will fay, 
 that the real EflTencc o£ Man, in both thefe Senfes, is rhe fame ; and yec 
 your Lordfliip fcems to fay fo, when you fay, Let Me?i tntjlake /« the Co}»^ 
 plication of their Ideas, either in leaving out or prtttnig in what doth JioP 
 belong to thetn -, and let their Ideas be itthat they plcafe, the re>ilEJJence of 
 the Individuals comprehended under rhe Names annexed to thefe Ideas, will 
 be the fame : For l"o, I humbly conceive, it muft be put, to make our whac 
 your Lordfhip aims at. For as your Lordfhip puts it by the N.mc of Ma7i^ 
 or any other Spccifick Name, your Lordfhip items to me to fuppofe, that 
 that Name flands for, and n^t for the fame Idea, at the lame rime. 
 
 For Example, my Lord, let your Lordftiip's Idea, ro which you annex 
 the Sign Man, be a rational Animal : Let another Man's Idea be a rational 
 Animal of fuch a Shape; let a third Man's Idea be of an Animal offuch a 
 Size a id Shape, leaving out Rationality ) let a fourth be an Animal with a 
 Body of fuch a Shape, and an immitcrial Subftance, with a lower of Rca- 
 foning ; let a fifh leave out of his Idea, and immitciial Subllance. 'Tis 
 plain every one of thefe will call his a Man. as well as jrour Loidfliip, and 
 yet 'tis as plain that Man as Handing for all thefe dirtind, complex Ideas 
 cannot be fuppofed to have the fame internal Conrtirurion, i' e* the fame 
 nalK^eriCi^ The Truth is, every diaintf, abltraft Idea, with a Name t.? 
 
 C ^ It, 
 
 I 
 
ao General Terms. 
 
 of vSpccics } are the Work>nan/hip of the Vnds^ (landings Who confi* 
 dcrs, that at icaft the complex ones are often, in feveral Men, 
 different Collections of limple Ideas : and therefore thatisCot;*- 
 tonfnefs to one Man, which is not fb to another. Nay, even 
 in Subllances, where their abftra6t Ideus (eem to be taken from 
 the Things thcmfelves, they are not conllantly the fame ; no 
 not in thiit Species , which is mod familiar to us, and with 
 which we have the moll intimate acquaintance : It having been 
 more than once doubted, whether the Farwbarn of a Woman 
 were a Man^ even ib far, as that it hath been debated, whether 
 it were, or were not co be nouriihed and baptized : wnich could 
 
 it, makes a real, diftin£l kind, whatever the real Eflcnce ( which wc knojr 
 not of any of them ) be. 
 
 And therefore I grant it true what your Lorddiip fays in the next Words, 
 And let the noniin.il Effence differ nsverfo much, the re^l, common Efjence 
 or Naiiire of the feveral Kinds, are not at all alter d by them, i. e. That our 
 Thoughts or Ideas cannot alter the real Conftitutions tHit arc in Things 
 that cxifl, there is nothing more certain. But yet 'tis true, that the Changes 
 of Ideas to which we annex them, can and does alter the Signification of 
 their Names, and thereby alter the Kinds, which by thcle Names wc'rank 
 and fort them into. Your Lordfhip farther adds, yind thefe real EJfencet 
 are ur.changeable, i. c, the internal Conllirutions are unchangeable. Of 
 vhar, I befecch your Lordfhip, are the interyial CcnJUtufionf unchangeable ? 
 Not of any Thing that exifts, but of God alone j for they may be changed 
 all as cafily by that Hand that made them.asthe inttrnal Frame of a Watch. 
 What then is it that is unchangeable ? The internal Conftitution or real Ef- 
 fence of a Species : which, in plain Englifh, is no more but this, whilftthe 
 fame Cpecihck Name, <v. g. oi Man, Horfe, or Tree, is annexed to or made 
 the Sign of the fame abfirad^, complex Idea, under which I rank feveral 
 Individuals ; it is impofl'ible but the real Conftitution on which that unal- 
 tcr'd, complex Idea or nominal Eflcnce depends, muft be the fame, i. e. in 
 other Words, where wc find all the fame Properties, we have Reafon to con- 
 clude there is theMame real, internal Conftitution, from which thofe Pro- 
 pcfties flow. 
 
 But your Lordlhip proves the rcil EflTences to be unchangeable, 'bccaufc 
 God makes them, in thofe following Words; For hovtei/er there may hap- 
 fcn fame njariety in Individuals by particular Accidents, yet the Effhices tf 
 Men, and Horfes, andTrees retnatn always thejay/ie ; becauje they do not dt- 
 •petid on the Ideas of Men, but on the IVill of the Creator, who hath made 
 feveral Sorts of Beings. 
 
 'Tis true,thc real ConftitutionB or Eflcnccs of particular Things cxifling, 
 do nor depend on the Ideas of Men, but on the Will of the Creator ; but 
 their being ranked into Sorts, under fuch and fuch Namc^, doc» depend and 
 vhiliy depend on tlic Ideas of Mco. 
 
 not 
 
General Terms, 21 
 
 not be, if the abflracSt Idea or EffencC) to which the Name Man 
 belonged, were of Nature's making ", and were not the uncer- 
 tain and various Collection of fimple Ideas, which the Under- 
 (landing puts together, and then abftradling It, 'affixed a name 
 to it. So that in truth every dijiinH abfiracl. Idea, » a dtiHnB 
 EJJence : and the names that Itand for fuch diltincft Ideas, are the 
 names of Things effentially different. Thus a Circle is as cfTcii- 
 tlally different from an Oval, as a Sheep from a Goat.- and Rain 
 is as effentially different from Snow, as Water from Earth, that 
 abftra<3; Idea whkh Is the Effence of one, being Impoflible to be 
 communicated to the other. And thus any two abftradi; Ideas, 
 that in any part vary one from another, with two diftlndi names 
 annexed to them, conftitute two diffinc^ forts, cJr If you pleafe. 
 Species, as effentially different, as any two the mofl: remote, or 
 oppofite in the World. 
 
 §.15. But fince the EJfences of Things are r.^i ^„j „„, 
 thout^^hr, by fame, ( and not without rfaion, ) to „^^„^l £^»fr 
 be wholly unknown ; It may not be amifi tocon- 
 lider the jeveral Jignificat.'ons of the Word Effence. 
 
 firfi, Effence may be taken for the beinc of any thing, where- 
 by it Is, what It is. And thus the real internal, but generally 
 in Subftances, unknown Conftitutlon of Things, whereon their 
 difcoverable Qualities depend, may be called their EJfence, This 
 is the proper original fignltication of the Word, as is evident 
 from the formation of it j Effentia, in its primary notation ^g- 
 nlfying properly Being, And in this fenie it Is Itlll ufed, when 
 Wc fpeak of the Effence of particular things, without giving them 
 any Name, 
 
 Secondly^ The Learning and DIfputes of the Schools, having 
 been much bulled about Genus and Species, the Word EJfence 
 has almoft loft its primary Signification •, and Inftead of the real 
 Conftitution of things, has been almoft wholly applied to the 
 artificial Conftitution of Genus and Species. 'Tis true, there is 
 ordinarily fuppofed a real Conftlturlon of the forts of Things ^ 
 and 'tis psft doubt, there muft be fome real Conftitution, on 
 which any Collection of fimple Ideas co exifting, muft depend. 
 But It being evident, that Things are ranked under Names in- 
 to Sorts or Species, only as they agree to certain abftradl Ideas, 
 to which we have annexed thofe Names , the EJfence of each 
 GeniHy or Sort, comes to be nothing but that abftraft Idea, 
 which the General, or Sortal ( if I may have leave fo to call it 
 from Sort, as I do General from. Gems, ) Name ftands for. And 
 this we fhall find to be that, which the Word EJfence imports, 
 
 in 
 
-2 General Terms. 
 
 in ic?5 mofi: familliir ufe. Thefe two forts of BJfeiices^ I fuppofcj 
 may not unfitly be termed, ihc one the /^m/, the other the No- 
 77ixfial Effence. 
 
 % 16. Between the Nominal EJfence, a7id the Name, 
 < onff.tntQon- jj^^j.^ j^ p^ ^^^^ ^ Connexion, that the Name of any 
 
 t-Kten the °^ 1 hings cannot be attributed to any parti- 
 
 hiamtandNo- P''"'^'* R^'ngi but what has this EJfence^ whereby 
 !»;«<»'/ £/;f7it<r. \^ anfwers that abftradl /^e4, whereof tiiat Name 
 is the Sign. 
 
 §.17. Concerning the real Eflences of corpo- 
 hstsml ^^^^ ."lubftances, (10 mention thofe only,) there 
 *ay^ diihH- ^^^'> '^ '^ rniftuke not, two Opinions. The one is 
 trtiift:eii hy' °^ thofe, who ufing the Word EJJenccy for they 
 their real know not what, (uppofe a certain number cf thoie 
 E fences , ufe- EfTcnces, according to which, all natural thing* 
 Itjr, are made, and wherein they do exadfly every one 
 
 of them partake, and fb become of this or that 
 Species, The other, and more rational Opinion, is ot thofe, who 
 look on all natural Things to have a real, but unknown Con- 
 ftitution of their infenfible Part?, from which flow thofe fenfible 
 Qualities, which ferve us to dlftinguilh them one from another, 
 according as we have Occafion to rank them into fcrts, under 
 commcn Denominations. The former of thefe Opinions, which 
 fuppofes thc(e EJJences, as a certain number of Forms or Molds, 
 wherein all natural Things, thatexift, aie calf, and do equally 
 partake, ha-^, I imagine, very much perplexed the Knowledge 
 of natural Things. The frequent Productions ofMonfters, lit 
 all the Species of Animals, and of Changeling?, and other ftrangc 
 JfiTues of humane Birth, carry with them difficulties, not poffi- 
 ble to ronfift with this Hypothefis : Since it is as impolHbie, that • 
 two Things, partaking cxa<5f ly of the (ame real Ejfencey fhould 
 have different Properties, as that two Figures partaking in the 
 ftme real Ejjeuce of a Circle, fhould have different Proprrties. ' 
 But were there no other reafbn againft if, yet the fuppofitjon df - 
 EJfencesy that cannot be kiiown ; and the making them neverthe- 
 lefs to be that, which dillinguilhes the Species of Things, k i'o 
 jrhol/y vfelejs^ and unserviceable to any part of our Knowledge, 
 that that alone were fufficient, to make us lay it by ; and con- 
 tent our ftlvcs with fuch F,JJhices of the Sorts or Species of 
 Things, as come within the reach of our Knowledge : which, 
 when lirioufly confidcrcd, will be found, as I have fiid, to be 
 n Jthing elfe, but thofe ablba£f complex Ueoi^ to which we have 
 annexed dillinil general Numcs. 
 
 §. 18. 
 
General Terms. ij 
 
 §. 18. Ej(/e«c« being thus diftinguUhed lnto^V 
 mind and Hfial, we may farther obferve, that In Rtalavdnc- 
 the Species ofjlm-ple Ideas atid Modes they [are ahi;ays „iinal EJfenct 
 the fame'. But tn Sttbjlances, always quite different, the fame ix 
 Thus a Figure including a Space between three Jitnple Ideas 
 Lines, is the real, as well as nomlital Effcnce of a ""^ Moiies, 
 Triangle ; it being not . only the abftra^t idea to d'fenMt tn 
 which the general Name is annexed, but the very Suhjianses. 
 Ejfentia^ or Being, of the thing it felf, that Foun- 
 dation from which all its Properties flow, and to which they arc 
 all infeparably annexed. But ic isfarotherwile concerning that 
 parcel of Matter, which makes the Ring on my Finger, where- 
 in thefe two Effences are apparently different. For it is the real 
 Conftltution of icsinlenfible Pares, on which depend all thole 
 Properties of Colour, Weight, Fufibllity, Fixednefs, C?c. which 
 makes it to be Gold^ or gives ic a right to that Name, which is 
 therefore its nominal EJJence. Since nothing can be call'd Gold^ 
 but what has a Conformity of Qiialities to that abftra<5l com- 
 plex Ideaj to which that Name is annexed. But this DilliniSH- 
 on of EJfences, belonging particularly to Subftances, wc (hall, 
 when we come to confider their Names, have an occafion to 
 treat of more fully. 
 
 §. 19. That fuch 4t/?r4S Ideas, with "Names to Efences ingS' 
 them, as we have been fpeaking of, are Effences, nerabU and 
 may farther appear by what we are told concern- ^^<''>yrupi^le* 
 ing Effencesy vi^. that they are all ingenerable, and 
 incorruptible. Which cannot be true of the real Conftltutions 
 of Things, which beein and pt rifh with them. All things, that 
 exift, beUdes their Autnor, are all liable to Change •, efpecially 
 thofe Things we are acquainted with, and have ranked into 
 Bands, under diilin<Sl Names or Enfigns. Thus that, which 
 was Grafs to Day, is to Morrow the Fklhof aSheepj and with- 
 in few days after, becomes part of a Man ; In all which, and 
 the like Changes, 'tis evident, thijr real Effence, i. e. that Con- 
 ftltution, whereon the Propcrtief^f thefe teveral things depend- 
 ed. Is deftroy'd, and perifhes with them. But Ejfences being taken 
 for l5^f(f;, eftablifhed In the MinJ, with Names annexed to them, 
 they are fuppo(ed to remain fteadily the lame, whatever muta- 
 tions the particular Subftances are liable to. For whatever be- 
 comes of Alexander and Bucephalus, the ideas to which Man and 
 Horfe are annexed, are fuppofcd ncverthclcfs to remain In the 
 lame ; and Co the Effences of thofe Species are preferved whole 
 and undeftroy'd, whatever Changes happen to any , or all of 
 
 th« 
 
24 Names of fimple Ideas. 
 
 the Individuals of thofe Specks, By this means the Effence of a 
 Species rtftsfafeandeiuiit;, without the cxiltence of (o much as 
 one Individual ot that kind. For were there now no Circle 
 exllting any where in the World, fas, perhaps, that Figure ex- 
 ilts not any where exadlly marked out, ) yet the Idea, annexed to 
 that Name would not ceafe to be what it is \ nor ceafc to be as 
 a pattern, to determine which of the particular Figures wc meet 
 with have, or have not a Right to the Name Circle^ and to ro 
 (hew, which of them, by having that Eflence, Was of that S^t- 
 cics. And though there neither were, nor had been in Nature 
 fuch a Beaft as an Vnicorn^ nor fuch a Fiflh as a Mermaid •, yet 
 fuppofmg thofe Names to ftand for complex ajb.^raft Ideas^ that 
 contained no inconfiftency in them j the EJfence of a Mermaid is 
 as intelligible, as that of a Man ", and the idea of an Vnicom^ as 
 certain, ftcady, and permanent, as that of a Horle. From what 
 has been faid, it is evident, that the Dodlrine of the Immutabi- 
 lity of EJfences, proves them to be only abftra6l Ideas ; and is' 
 founded on the Relation, ellablifhrd between them, and certairt 
 Sounds as Signs of them *, and will always be true, as long as 
 the (ame Name can have the fame (ignification. 
 
 §. zo. To conclude, this is that, which in fliort 
 Recapitu- I would (ay, ( vi:{. ) that all the great Bufinefs of 
 iation. Genera and Species, and their EJfenceSf amounts to 
 
 no more but this. That Men making abftra<5l Ideas, 
 and fettling them in their Minds, with Names annexed to them, 
 do thereby enable themfclves toconfider Things, and difcourfe 
 of them, as it were in bundles, for the eafier and readier im- 
 provement, and communication of their Knowledge, which 
 would advance but flowly, were their Words and Thoughts 
 confined only to Particulars. 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 Of the Names of fmple Ideas. 
 
 Names of Ji7n- §, i, 'T^^Hough all Word?, as T have fhewn^ 
 
 p^e Ideas, I fjgnify nothing immediately, but the 
 
 AloJa, and X. jj^^^ jj^ jj^g ^\^^ of the Speaker , 
 
 Suiflancet, ^^^ ^^^^^^ ^ ^^^^^^ furvey, we (hall find that the 
 
 tm!th7m pt- ^'^"*" ^ffifnple Ideas, mixed Modes, ( under which 
 
 ^uliar 1 comprifc Relations too,) and natural Suhjiaucesi 
 
Names of fimple Ideas. 25" 
 
 hivt each of them fomething peculiar^ and different from the other. 
 For Example : 
 
 §. z. Fir ft. The Name J of fimple Ideas and Sub' Firfl^-nametof 
 fiances^ with the abftra6t I^^iW in the Mind, which f'*»pi' Ideas 
 they immediately lignify, intimate alfb fome real '^"^ •^«^- 
 Exiftence, from which was derived their original fi^"*^^^ ' "'^^' 
 pattern. But the Names of mixed Modes, terminate ^"'^ ^*' 
 in the Idea that Is in the Mind, and lead not the '/ *"^^- 
 Thoughts any farther, as we fhall fee more at large in the fol- 
 lowing Chapter. 
 
 §. 5. Secondly^ The Names of fimple l^e^L^ and .7 .t r 
 
 Modes, fignify always the real, a well as nominal r'^li^^ltTani 
 Bffence of their Species. But the Names of natu- ^^J^' f^Tfy^al- 
 fal Subftances, fignify ratdy , if ever, any thing ^^^^ ^;,j^ r/aUnd 
 but barely the nominal Ejfences of thofe Species, riominal Ejfence. 
 as we Qiall fliew in the Chapter, that treats of 
 the Names of Subftances in particular. 
 
 §. 4. Thirdly, The Names of fimple Ideas are not Thirdly, 
 capable of any definitions; the Names of all compk-x N^^mes offmn 
 Ideas are. It has not, that 1 know^ hitherto been pie If^e^s «»- 
 taken notice of by any B^dy, what Words are, and definable. 
 what are not capable of being defined ; the want 
 whereof is C as I am apt to, think ) not feldom the occafion of 
 great wrangling, and obfeurity in Mens Difcourfes, whiift fome 
 demand definitions of Terms, that cannot be defined j and othet'i 
 think, they ought to reft fatisfied, in an Explicarion made by a 
 more general Word, and its Reftri<5lion, ( ortolpeak in Terms 
 of Art by a Genus and Difference, ) when even after fuch De- 
 finition made, according to rule thole who hear ft, have often 
 no more a clear Conception of the meaning of the Word, than 
 they had before. This at lealf, I think, that the (hewing what 
 Words are, and what are not cipable of Definitions, and where- 
 in confifts a good Definition, is not wholly belides our prelcnt 
 purpofej and perhaps, will afford (b much Light to the Natuvc 
 of thefe Signs, and our ideai, as to deferve a more particular 
 Confideration. 
 
 §. 5. I will not here trouble my felf, to prove }f all were de^ 
 that all Terms are not definable from that Pro- finable, 
 grefs, in infinitum, which it will vifibly lead us in- ^twould be a 
 to, if W€ (hoi^ld allow, that all Names could be ffff^A in iji- 
 ■ defined. For if the Termsof cneDe&aition,were ^-'"^y"; 
 iUll Cobe defined by another, Whereat laf^ffiould 
 "^z flop, ? But I IhaU from tlie Nature of our ideas^ and iha 
 
»6 Names of fimple Ideas. 
 
 Signification of our Words (h- w, why fame Names can, and otheri 
 cvinot be defined, ii\\~\ vvhicli i hey arc. 
 
 §. 6. I think, it is agreed, that a Definition is jio-' 
 What » Dtfi- thing elft-, but the (ioewingthe meaning of one iVord 
 jti:ion it. by fever al othernot fynonymousTerjns. The meaning 
 
 ot Words being only the Ideas they are made to 
 ftand for by him that uks them ^ the meaning of any Term is 
 then (hewed, or the Word is defined whin by other Word.*, the 
 Idea'xt is m;*de the Sign of, and annexed to in the Mind of the 
 Speaker, is as it were reprefented, or fer before the view of ano- 
 ther ^ and thus Irs Signification afcer'aincd ; Thij is the only 
 life ai.d end of Dcfiniiiuns ^ and therefore the only meafure of 
 what 15, or is not a good Definition. 
 
 §. 7. This being premlfed, I fay, that the Names 
 
 Simple Ideas of Simp.'e Ideas, and thofe only, are incapable of be* 
 
 vhy undefiua- ,„^ defined. The reafon whereof is this, That the 
 
 ^^'- Several Terms of a Definition, fignifying feveral 
 
 Ideas, they cm altogether by no means reprefent 
 an Idea, which has no Compofition at all : And therefore a De- 
 hnition which is properly nothing but the fhcwingthe meaning 
 of one Word by (evcral others not fignifyipg each the fame 
 thing, can in the Names of fimple ideas have no Place. 
 
 §. 8. The not obferving this difference in our 
 Inftances Mo- idt.tSj and their Names, has produced that eminent 
 fion. trifling in the Schools, which is To eafy to be ob^ 
 
 (erved, in the definitions they give us of fomc few 
 of thefe fimple Ideas. For as to the greatcft part of them, even 
 thofe Maimers of Definitions, were fain to leave them untouch*d, 
 meerly by fhe impoflibility they found in it. What more ex- 
 quifite Jargon cculd the Wit of Man invent, than this Defini- 
 tion, The AFi of a beiyig in Pon-cr, di far forth <« in Porver, which 
 would puzzle any rational Man, to whom it was not already 
 known by its famous abfurdity, to gucfs what Word it could 
 ever be fiippofed to be the Explication of. If TuHy asking a 
 Dutchman what Berveeginge was, fhould have received this Expli- 
 cation in his own Ivan.uage, that it was Adtn emit in poreniia 
 ij'.tatenm in potentia ", I ask whether any one can imagine he could 
 thereby have undcrftood what the Word Bctveeghige fignified, 
 or have gut {To J what Idea a Dutchman ordinarily had in his Mind, 
 and would fignify to another when he u(ed that found. 
 
 §. 9. Nor have the Modern PhUofbpher.', who have endea- 
 voured to throw cfF the Jargon ofthe School^-, and (peak intel- 
 hgibly, much better fucccedcd in defining limple L/c^, whether 
 
Names of Jimple Ideas. %j 
 
 by explaining their Caiifes, or any otherwifc. The AiomUlf., 
 who define Morion to he 2. pajfage from one f lace to another^ What 
 do they more than put one fynonimoU3 Word for another ? For 
 what is Pdjfage other than Motion ? And if they were asked 
 what Paflage was, How would they better define it thaiibyMo-r 
 tiov ? For is iDnot at lead as proper and figniiicanf, to (ay, 
 Pafja^e K a Motion from one place to another^ as to iay, Motion u a 
 PaJfagCf &c. This is to tranflate, and not to define, when we 
 change two Words of the i^me Signification one for another j 
 which when one is better underftood than the other, may fervc 
 to difcover what Idea tlie unknown Hands for :, but is very far 
 from a Definition, unlefs we will fay, every Englifh Word in 
 the Didionaray, is the definition of the Latin Word it an- 
 fwers, and that Motion is a definition of Motus. Nor tviU the 
 JncceJJive Application of the parts of the Superficies of one Borly, ta 
 thofe of another, which the Cartejians give us, prove a much bet- 
 ter definition of Motion, when welfcxamined. 
 
 §. 10. The A^ of Perfpicttom, ai far firth as j^erfpi- Light. 
 cuottSy h another Peripathetick definition of a hmi le 
 Idea^ which though not moreablurd than the iormer of Motion^ 
 yet betrays its Ulelefsneli and Inlignificancy more plainly, bc- 
 caufe Experience will eafily convince any one, that it cannot 
 make the meaning of the Word Light ( which it pretends to de- 
 fine } at all underftood by a blind Man : but the definition of 
 Motion appears not at firll fight Co ufelel?, bccaufe it (capes this 
 way of Trial. For this fimple idea, entring by the Touch as 
 well as Sight '^ 'tis impoffible to (hew an Example of any one, 
 who has no other way to get the Idea of Motion, but barely by 
 the definition of that Name. Tho(e who tell us, that Light is 
 a great number of little Globule?, ftriking briskly on the bottom 
 of the Eye, fpeak more intelligibly than the Schools : but yet 
 the(e Words never (b well underftood, would make the Idea^ 
 the Word L/^/jf ftands for, no more known to a Man that un- 
 derftands it not before, than if one ITiould tell him, that Li^ht. 
 was nothing but a Company of little Tennis-balls, which Fairies 
 all day long ftruck with Rackets againft fomc Mens Fore-heads, 
 whilll they paffed by others. For granting this explication of 
 \^ the thing to be true ; yet the Idea of the caufe of Light, if we 
 • had it never (b exadt, would no more give us the Idea of Lights 
 'k.felU as It is fuch a particular perception in us, than the Idea of 
 the Figure and Motion of a (harp piece of Sceel, w juld give us 
 the li/e.? of that Piin, which it is able to caufe in us. Fjr the 
 ^aufe of any Senfationj and the Seiifation it feifj in all B^e fim- 
 
 t 
 
aS Names of Jimp le Ideasi 
 
 pig Ideas of oneSenfe, are two Ideas ; tind two Ideas Co differenf]| 
 and diftant one from another, that no two can be more io. 
 And therefore fhould Des Cartes s Globules ftrike never fo long 
 on the retina of a Man, who was blind by a Gutta Serena^ he 
 would thereby never have any idea of Light, or any thing ap- 
 proaching to it, though he underflood what little Globules were. 
 and what llriking on another Body was, never (b well. And 
 the it fore the Cartefians very well diftinguilh between that Light 
 which is the Caufe of that Senlation in us, and the Idctx which 
 is produced in us by n, and is that which is propcily Light. 
 
 §. 1 1. Simple Ideas, as has been (hewn, are only 
 Simple Ideas to be got by thofe impreffions , Objects thcmlelves 
 why U7tdefi' . make OH our Mind', by the.proper Inlets appoint- 
 uab't, farther ed to each fort. If they are not received this way, 
 explained. all the Words m the World, made ufe of to explain^ 
 
 or dsfi/ie any of their Names, tviH never be able to fro- 
 duce in us f^e Idea it Jiands for. For Words being Sounds, caa 
 produce in us no other limple Ideas, than of thole very Soundsj 
 nor excite any in us, but by that voluntary connexion, which 
 is kr.own to be between them, and thofe limple Ideas, which 
 common Ule has made them Signs of.- He that thinks other- 
 wife, let him try if any Words can give him the tafteof a Pine- 
 Apple, and make him have the true idea of the Relifli of that 
 celebrated delicious Fruit, So far as he is told it has a refcm- 
 blance with any Taftes, whereof he has the Ideas alieady in his 
 Memory, imprinted there by lenfible Objeds not Strangers to 
 his Palate, lofar may he approach that refemblancc in hi* Mind. 
 But this is not giving us that Iden by a Definition, but exciting 
 ill us other fimple Ideas, by their known Names •, which will be 
 flill very different from the true tafte of that Fruit it felf. In 
 Light and Colours, and all. other fimple Ideas, it is the fime 
 thing : for the lignification of Sounds, is not natural, but only 
 fmpolcd and arbitrary. And no definition of Light, or B^dnefs^ , 
 h more fitted, or able to produce either of thofe Ideas in'us, than 
 the found Light, or I\ad, by it fclf. For to hope to produce an 
 Idea of Light, or Colour, by a Sound, however formed, is to 
 expeft that Sounds Ihould be vifible, or Colours audible *, and 
 romake the Ears do ihe Office of all the other Senfes. Which 
 js all one as to lay, that we might Talfc, Smell, and See by the 
 JSars : a fort of Phllofb,^hy worthy only oi Sanco Panca, who had 
 the Faculty to fee Dulcinea by Hearlay. And therefore he tha: 
 has n9t before received in'o his Mind, by the proper Inlet, th« 
 firr.ple Lies, which any Word flaudsfor^can uever fom^ to know 
 
Names of Jimp le Ideasi 29 
 
 the fignification of that Word, by any other Words, or Sounds, 
 whatfoever put together, according 10 any Rules of Definition. 
 The only way is, by applying to his Senfes the proper Object ; 
 and fo producing that Idea in him, for which hehas learn'd the 
 name already. A ftudious blind Man, who had mightily beat 
 his Head about vifible Objects, and made ufe of theexp'icaxion 
 of his Books and Friends, to underftand thofc names of Light, 
 and Colours, which often came in his way ; bragu'd one day. 
 That he now underftood what Scarlet fignified. Upon which 
 his Fiiend demanding, what Scarlet, v/as ? the blind Man an- 
 fwered, It was like the Sound of a Trumpet. Juft fuch an Un- 
 derrtauding of the Name of any other fimple Idea will he have, 
 who hopes to get ic only from a Definition, or Other Words 
 made ufe of to cxpl-.^n It. 
 
 §. I 2.. The cafe is quite otherwile in complex Th contrary 
 Ideoi^ which conlifUng of feveral fimple ones, it is /licwedhicotK, 
 in the power of Words, ftanding for the feveral plex Ideas l>y 
 IdeaSf that make that Compofition, to imprint com- inftunces ef <» 
 plex Ideai in the Mind, which were never there be- •S^-^^«f c»d 
 fore, and To ipake their Names be underftood. In ^^'"^'^w- 
 fuch Collections of I<^e</^, palling undc^r one name, 
 Definition^ or the teaching the fignlhcatloii oi one word, by Se- 
 veral others, has place, and may make us tinderjiand the Names of 
 Things, which never came within the reach of our Senfes j ao)^ 
 frame Ideas fuitabh to thofe in other Mens Minds, when thejj* 
 ufe thofe Names ; provided that none of the terms of the Defi- 
 nition ftand for any fuch fimple Ideas^ which he to whom the Ex- 
 plication is made, has ricveryethadin his Thought. Thus the 
 word Statue may be .explained to a blind Man by other word?, 
 when Figure cannot, his Senfes having given him the Idea of 
 Figure, but not of Colours, which therefore Words cannot ex- 
 cite in him. This frain'd the Prize to the Painter, againil the 
 Statuary j each of which contending for the Excellency of hi:; 
 Art, and the Statuary bragging, that his was to be preferred, 
 becaufe it reached farther, and even thofe who hud loft their 
 Eyes, could yet perceive the excellency of it. The Painter a- 
 greed to refer hlmfelf to the Judgment of a blind Man v who 
 being brought where there was a Statue made by the one, and 
 a Picture drawn by the other •, he vvas firll led to the Statue, m 
 which he traced with bis Hands, all the Lineamenes of the Face 
 and Body^ and with great admiration, applauded the Skill of 
 the Work-man. But being led to the PitSlure, and having his. 
 Hands laid upon it. was. told, That now he fuuched the Head, 
 VohU. D and 
 
^o Names of fimple Ideas. 
 
 and then the Forehead, Eye<?, Nofc, (3c. as his Hand moved 
 over the Parts of the Picture on the Cloth, without finding any 
 the kuft dlllji.ction : \A' hereupon, he cried out, that certainly 
 that mull needs be a very adnnirable and divine piece of Work" 
 raatifbip, v\hich touid rcprefent to them all thofe Parts, where 
 he could neither feci nor pe'ceivear\y thing, 
 
 § i-^. He that Ihould ufe the word [{ainhotp^ to one who 
 knew all thofe Colours, but yet had never feen that Phcenomemn^ 
 would, by enumerating the Figure, Largenefs, Pofitior, and 
 Order of the; Colours, To well define that word, that it might 
 be pcrf.£tly undcrftood. But yet that Definition^hov, exa6t and 
 perft£l loevcr, would never make a blind Man underltand it^ 
 btcault- fcveral of the fimple Jdeanhsu make that compkx onc^* 
 being fuch as he never received by Sen^tion and Experience, 
 no words are able to excite them in his Mind. 
 
 §. 14 Simple ideasy as has been (hewed, can 
 Tht Names of only be got by Experience, from thofe Objedls, 
 complex ideis which are proper to produce in us thole Percepti- 
 iphen to be ons. iVhen by this means we haveour Minds ftored 
 9nade inteh- y^\(\^ them, and know the Names for them, then 
 ^ V ipe are in a condition to define, and by Definition to 
 
 ^' underftand the Names of complex Ideatf that are 
 
 ^ made up of them. But when any terra ftands for 
 
 ^Hnple Jdea, that a Man has never yet had in his Mind, it isim- 
 ^Hiible, by any Words, to make known its meaning to him. 
 iHien any term ftands for an Idea a Man is acquainted with, 
 but is ignorant, that that term is the Cgn of ir, there another 
 name, of the fame Idea which he has been accuflomed to, may 
 make bim underftaiid i:s meaning. But in no cafe whatfbever, 
 is any natne, of any fimple Idea, capable of a Definition. 
 
 §.15. Fourthly^ But though the Names offim- 
 
 Four:'- 1/, pie Ideoi, have not the help of Definition to dcrer- 
 l^jimes iffttj:- mine their fignification ; yet that hinders not but 
 fit Idejs Icajl that they are generally lefs doubtful and uncertain^ than 
 doibiful. thofe ofmixid Modes and Siibftances. Bccalife tlie/ 
 
 Handing only for one fimple Perception, Men, for 
 the moft parr^^ e.iGly and perfe£lly agree in their fignification : 
 And there is little room for miffake and wrangling about thelir 
 meaning^ He that knows once, that Whitcnefi is the Name 
 of that Colour he has obfervcd in Snow, or Milk, will not be 
 apt to mifapply that Word, as long as he retains that idea ^ 
 wh'ch when he iiislqaite loft, he is not apt to miftake the mcatk. 
 ing of 'it, but perceives he undcrftands it not. There is neiihcj 
 
Names ef fimple Ideas. ji 
 
 a multiplicii7 of fimple Uem to be put together, which makes 
 the doubtfuhiefi in the Names of mix^d Modes: nor a luppofedj ^ 
 but an unknown real Eflence, with properties depending there-C^^ 
 * on , the precife number whereof are alio unknown , which 
 makes the •difficulty in the Names of Subftances. But on the 
 contrary, in fnnple ideat the whole fignificiiion of rhe Name 
 is known at once, and confiftsnot of parts, whereof more or 
 le/s being put in, the Idea may be varied, and fb the fignifica- 
 tion of its Name, be obfcure, or uncertain. 
 
 §. 1 6. Fifthly^ This farther may be obferved. Fifthly, Sim- 
 concerning fimple Ideas, and their Names, that they flc icleas have 
 have but fetv Ajcents inlinea fradicamcntaliy ( as they few Afce-ntt 
 call it,) /row thelowefl Species, to the fummim Genus. '» J'nta p.«- 
 The realbn whereof is, that the loweft Species be- dicamcntali. 
 jng buc one fimple Idea, nothing can be left out of 
 it, that (b the difference being taken away, it may agree with 
 Ibme other thing in one Idea common to them both j which ha- 
 ving one Name, is the Gemis of the other two ; v. g. There ia 
 nothing can be left out of the J(^e4 of White and Red, to make 
 them agree in one common appearance, and fb have onegenaral 
 name J as i^4^;ow^/z>y being left out of the complex Idea ot Man, 
 ■ makes it agree with Brute, m the more general Idea and name 
 ^f Animal. And therefore when to avoid unpleafint enumera- 
 tions, Men would comprehend both Wlnte and I{ed^ and feveral 
 other fuch fimple J<V(?^, under one general name ", they have been 
 fain to do it by a Word, which denotes only the way they gee 
 into the Mind. For when iVnite, I{edy and Tellowy are all com- 
 prehended under the Genm or lume Colour, it fignihcs no more, 
 but fuch Ideas, as are produced in the Mind only by the Sight, - 
 and have entrance only through the Eyes. And when they 
 Would frame yet a more general term, to comprehend both Co- 
 lours and Sounds, and the like fimple Ideasjiheydo it by a Word, 
 that lignifies all fuch as come into the Mind only by ©ne Senfe : 
 And fb the general term Quality, in its ordinary acceprion, comr 
 prehends Colours,- Sounds, Talies, Smells, and tangible Qiiali- 
 ties, with diftindlion from Extenfion, Number, Motion, Hea* 
 f&re, and Pain, which make Impreflions on the Mind, and in- 
 troduce their Ideas by more Sen'^es than one. 
 
 §. 17. SzWj/j/, The Names of limple I^e^/, sixthly^ Names of 
 Subftances, and mixed Mode?, have al(b this /wp/? ideas Jiaruk' 
 difference ', That thofe of mixed Modes {land jor Ideas 7.'o; at. 
 for Ideas per fe6lly arbitrary: Thole of Sub- all arbitrary, 
 fiantes^ are not perfedlly fo ^ but refer to a fat^ 
 
 Pa, #er% 
 
'■^z Names of mixed Modes. 
 
 ternt tl »ftgh tvith Come latittuk : and thofe of fimfle Ideas are perfe6liy 
 taken from the Exiftence ot" Things, and are not arbitrary at aS. 
 ^WhicU what difierence it niakcs in the Signitications of their 
 Names, vve (hall fee in the followrna Chapters. 
 
 The Names of fimple Modes, diner little from thole of fim- 
 pie Ideas. 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 0} the Names of mixed Modes and Relations. 
 
 ihcy pnd §. I . ^ | '^ H E Names of mixed Modes being 
 for abftraEt I general , they ftand , as has been 
 
 l'ic3s,as other -■- lhewii,br Sorts or Species of Things, 
 
 gcy.erfll each of which has its peculiar Eflence. The & 
 
 J^a/aes, ftjnces of thele Species alfo, as has been Ihewed, 
 
 are nothing but the abftradt I^e4j in the Mind, to 
 which the N.unes U annexed.^ Thus far the Names and Eflences 
 of mixed Modes, have nothin.T," but what is common to them, 
 with oihcr Ideas : But if we take a little nearer fiirvey of them, 
 we (hall find, that they have (omething peculiar, which, per^ 
 h*ps, may delerve our attention. 
 
 §- z. The firft Particularity I fhall obferve tii 
 Fi'rfi The ^^^^m »s, that the abllratl Ideasy or, if you pleafe, 
 ideas they ti'^ EfTcnces of the feveral Species qf mixed Modes 
 -Ijndfor, are are made by the ViuUrfianding^ wherein they differ 
 \nadt hy the from chofe of fimple Ideas : in which fbrr, the Mind 
 l/ndcrjland- has no Powcr to make any one, but only receives 
 i«g: (uch as are prefenred to it, by the real Exiflence of 
 
 Things operating upon it. 
 §. ;. In the next place, theie Effences of the Species of mixnd 
 Modesy a-e not only made by the Mind, but mz<^& very arbitrarily, 
 Miade vvithout Pufcrns, or reference to any real Exiftence. 
 Wherein they diif^r from thofe of Subftances, \vhich carry with 
 them the Suppofition of Tome real B.sing, from which they are 
 
 taken^ and. ro which they are conformable. But 
 Sse3ndly,insde in its complex Ideas ot mixed Modes, the Mind 
 jtrhitrarily, t:ikes a liberty not to follow the Exiftence of 
 Mndwitbiut Things cxu(ftly. It unites and retains certain Col- 
 T,att(rnso . kiSions, as fo many difl:in£i fpecifick /fi^<?4j, whilll 
 
 ether:, tha? as oft';n ccciir in Nature, and arc as 
 
 plainl.( 
 
Mames of mixed Modes. ^ J 
 
 [Plainly fuggefted by outward Things, pafi negle6led without 
 particular Names or Specifications. Nor does the Mind, in thele 
 of mixed Modesj as in the complex Ideas of Subftances, examine 
 them by the real Exiftence of Things ; oir verify them by Pat- 
 terns, containing fiich peculiar Compofitions in Nature. Td 
 know whether his idea of Adultery^ or Jnceftj be rlghtj will a 
 Man feek it any where amongft Things exiiling ? Or is it true, 
 becaufe any one has been W itnefs to fiich an Adlion ? Ko : buc 
 it fuffices here, that Men have put together fuch a Colle(^ion 
 into one complex Idea, that makes the Archetype^ and fpecifick 
 Idea, whether ever any (iich Action were committed in reruni 
 naturat or no. 
 
 §. 4. To underftand this aright, we mufl: con- ^ovf thU a 
 fider wherein this making of thefe complex Ideas cori' '*''*^* 
 Jifts: and that is not in the making any new IdiA^ 
 by putting together thbfe which the Mind had before. Where^ 
 in the Mind does thefe three things: Firft, It chufe a certairi 
 Number. Secondly, It gives them connexion, and makes tberri 
 into one Idea. Thirdly, It ties them together by a Name. IFj 
 Weekamine how the Mind proceeds in thele, and what Liber- 
 ty it takes in them, we (hall eafily obferve, how thiefe Eflences 
 of the Species of mixed Modes, are the Woirkmanlhip of the 
 -. Mind ; and con(equentIy , that the Species themfelves are^of 
 Mens making. 
 
 §. 5. No body can doiibr, but that thefe Werfj of E<vidently ar- 
 mixed Modies, are made by a voluntary Colle6ti jh bitrary,' that 
 of Ideai pUt together in the Mind, independent the Idea is of- 
 from any original Patterns in Nature, who will ten before the 
 but refle£V, that this fort of complex Ideas may be ^^'fie^^^' 
 made, abftrafted, and ha^enarties given them, arid 
 fo a Species beconftiruted, before any one individual of that Spe- 
 cies ever exilled. Who can doubt, but the Ideas cf SacrtlegCy ot 
 Adultery, might be framed in the Mind of Men, and have names 
 given them ', and fo.thefe Species of mixed Modes beconflirutev'^ 
 before (either of them was ever committed ; and might be as well 
 difcourfed of, and reafoned about, and as certain Truths difco- 
 vered of them, whilft yet they had no being but in the llndcr- 
 ftanding, as well as now, that they have but too frequently 
 a real Exiftence ? Whereby it is plain, how much the font of 77iixed 
 Modes are the Creatures of the Vnderjlandin^, where they have a 
 being as fubfervient to all the end? of real Truth and Knowledge^ 
 as \yhen they really exill : "^nd we cannot doubt, but Law- 
 makers have often made Laws about Species of A(ftions^ which 
 
^4 Names of mixed MoJes» 
 
 were only the Creatures of their own Underftandings ; Beings 
 that had no other cxiftence, but in tlieir own Minds. And, I 
 think, no body can deny, but that the B^furre'clion was a Spe- 
 cies of mixed Modes in the Mind, before it really txifted. 
 
 §. 6. To (ce how arbitrarily thefe Ejjences of 
 IftjI^Mces, mixed Modes are made by the iVlind, we need but 
 HH'iier,!nce/I, take a vicw of almolt any of them. A little look- 
 utalhnig. ' ing into them, will fati^fie us, that 'tis the Mind, 
 that combines (everal fcatrered independent Ideas, 
 mto one complex one \ and by the common name it gives them, 
 makes tiiem the Eikncc of a certain Species, without regulating 
 it felt by any connexion they have in Nature. For what great- 
 er conntxion in Nature, lus the Idea of a Man, than the Idea of 
 a Sheep, with Killing, that this is made a particular Species of 
 Action, lignified by the Word Murder •, and the other not ? Or 
 what union there is in Nature, between the idea of the Relation 
 of a Father, with Killing, than that of a Son, or Neighbour j 
 that thofe are combined into one complex Idea, and thereby 
 made the Effence of the diiUn<51: Species Parricide, vvhiift the o- 
 tiler make no dilHndi: Species at all ? But though they have 
 made killing a Man's Father, or Mother, a dilfinit Species 
 from killing his Son, or Daughter j yet in fomc other cafes. Son 
 and Daughter are taken in too, as well as Father and Mother j 
 and they arc all equally comprchmded in the fame Species, as in 
 that oi hiccjl. I'hus the Mind in mixed Modes arbitrarily u- 
 nites into complex J^erff, fuch as it finds convenient j whilft o- 
 thers that have altogether as much union in Nature, are left loofe, 
 and never combined into one idea, becaufe they have no need 
 of one name. 'Tis evident then, that the Mind, by its free 
 choice, gives a connexion to a certain number ot ideas; which 
 in Nature have no more union with one another, than others 
 that it leaves out : Why elfe is the part of the Weapon, the be- 
 ginning ot the Wound is made with, taken notice of^ to makc^ 
 the dilTin£l Species called Stabbing, and the Figure and Matter 
 of the Weapon It ft out ? 1 do not fay, this is done without 
 Rcafon, as wc fhall fee more by and by :, but this I fay, that ic 
 is done, by the free choice of the Mind, purfuing its own ends ^ 
 and that therefore thefe Species of mixed Modes, arctheWork- 
 manfhip of the Underilanding : And there is nothing more evi- 
 dent, than that for the molt j^arr, in the framing thefe ideas, 
 the Mind fearches not its Patterns in Nature, nor refers the 
 ideas it makes to the real Exilknc^f Things ; but puts fuch 
 tog. ther, as may bcft fervc its own Purpoles, without tying 
 
 ic 
 
tfames of ifnixtd Modei. jj 
 
 it (elf to a preclfe imitation of any thing that really ex fts. 
 
 §. 7. But though the(e complex Ideas^ or Ejfences 
 of mixed Modes, depend on the Mind, and are made But Jim fuh- 
 by it with great liberty j yet they are not made at jcrvicnt to 
 random, and jumbled together without any reafon '^^ '"^^Z 
 at all. Though thefe complex Ideas be not always ^^^^g<^^g«- 
 copied from Nature, yet they are always fuiced to 
 the end for which abftradt Ideas are made : And though they 
 be Combinations made of ideoi, that are locfe enough, and have 
 as little union in themfelves, as feveial other, to which the 
 Mind never gives a connexion that combines them into one Idea ^ 
 yet they are always made for the convenience ot Communica- 
 tion, which is the chief end of Language. The u(e of Latiguage 
 isj by fliort Sounds to fignify with eateand dUparch general 
 Conceptions \ wherein not only abundance of panicukis may 
 be contained, but alfo a great variety of independa.it Idtdi col- 
 lected into one complex one. In the making thtreljre of the 
 Species of mixed Modes, Men have had regard only to (iich 
 Combinations, as they had occafion to mention one to another. 
 Thofe they have combined into diftindl complex ideas^ and gi- 
 ven Names to •, whilft others that in Nature have as near a unions 
 are left loofc and unregarded. For to go no farther than hu- 
 mane Aftions themfelves, if they would make diftin6l abftrait 
 ideaii^ of all the Varieties might be obferved in thctn, the Num- 
 ber muft be infinite, and the Mem.ory confounded with thu 
 Plenty, as well as overcharged to little Purpofe. It faffices, 
 that Men make and name lb many complex Ideas of thefe mixtd 
 Modes, as they find they have occalion to have names lor, in 
 the ordinary occurrence of their Affairs If they join to the idcA 
 of Killing, the idea of Father, or Mother^ and to make a di- 
 ftin6k Species from killing a Man's Son, or Neighbour, ir is bfc- 
 caule of the different Heinoufnels of the Crime, and the dittindt 
 Punifllment is due to the murdering a Man's Father and Mother, 
 different fi-om what ought to be infliited on the Murder of a 
 Son or Neighbour •, and therefore they find it neceffary to men- 
 tion it bv a diflinft Name, which is the end of making that ci» 
 ftinil Combination. But tho' the Ideas of Mother and Daugh- 
 ter, are (b differently treated, in reference to the ides, ot Killings 
 that the one is joined with it to make a dillinit abftra6l idea. 
 with a narne, and fo adiftindV Specie?, and the other not •, y^iL 
 in refj)e<3; of carnal Knowledge, they are both taken in under 
 Xnciiji ^ and that ftill for the fame convenience of' expreiling mi- 
 iier on§ Natrje^ and reckoning of one Species, fuch unclean Mix- 
 
^6 l^anies of mixer/ Modes. 
 
 tarcs^ as have a peculiar turpitude beyond others', and this t6 a* 
 void Circumlocutions, and tedious Deicriptiona. 
 
 ^. 8. A moderate Sl^ill ;/; different Languages^ 
 Whereof the will cafily (acisfy one ot the truth of this, it being 
 imranfl.ita- (o obvious to obfervc great ftore of fVords in me 
 hie Words of Language, which have not any that anfwer them in 
 divo-s Lan. another. Which plainly fliews, thatthofe of one 
 guares are a Country, by their cufiioms and manner of Life, 
 proof. . j^ ^^^ found occafien to make fcveral complex Ideatf 
 
 and give Names to them, which others never col- 
 Ic<55:cd into fpecifick Ideas. This could not have happened, if 
 thcfc Species were the Ilcady VVorkmanfhip of Nature •, and 
 nut ColIe6lions made and abil:ra6led by the Mind, in order to 
 riiiming, and for the convenience of Communication. The 
 Terms of our Law, which arc not empty Sounds, will hardly 
 Hiid VVcrds that anlvvcr them in the Spanifh or Italian, no Icanty 
 Languages ; much le(?, I think, could any one rranflate them 
 into [he Carihce, or l^ejloe Tongues ; And the Verfura of the lip- 
 mans, or Corban of the Jews, have no Words in other Lan- 
 guages to anfwer them: The reafon whereof is plain, from 
 what has been faid. Nay, if we will look a little more nearly 
 into this matter, and exa6lly compare dilFerent Languages, wc 
 iihallfind, that though they have Words, which in Tranllitions 
 and Diclionarics, are fuppofed to anfwer one another ^ yet there 
 i.^^ fcarce one of ten, amongft the Names of complex Ideas, cfpe- 
 cially of mixed Modes, that ftands for the fame precife Idea, 
 which the Word does that in Di6lionaries it is rend red by. 
 There are no Ideas moie common, and lefs compounded, than 
 the Meafures of Time, Extenfion, and Weight, and the Latin 
 Names Hora^ Pes, Libra are, without difficulty, rendred by the 
 Engi'iJI: Names, Hour, Foot,and toimd : But yet there is nothing 
 more evident, than that the Ideas a I{oman annexed to thefe La- 
 tin Nameb, were very far different from thofe which znEngUJh-* 
 jnan exprcflcs by thofe Eng'ifli ones. And \i either of th'tfe 
 fhould make oft- of the mcafurei that thofe of the other Lan- 
 guage defjgn'd by their Names, he would be quite out in his ac- 
 count. Thefe are too fenfible proofs to be doubted *, and we 
 fhall find this much morefb, in the Names of moreabftra^land 
 compounded Ideas ; fiich as are the greateft part of thofe which 
 make up Moral Difcourfes: Whofe Namc», when Men come 
 curioi fly to compare, with thofe they are tranflated into, in o- 
 tlur Languag^.-s, thty will find very tew of them exactly toccr- 
 rcf[XMid in i^ whole extent of their Significations. 
 
 §. 9. 
 
Names of mixed Modes. 57 
 
 §. 9. The reafon why I take To particular No- . 
 ticeot this, is, that we may not be miftaken about ThU Jhewt 
 Genera^ and Species^ and their EJJences^ as if they Species to bt 
 were Things regularly and conltantly made by »"»«'<^ /*'* 
 Nature, and had a real Exiftence in things; when C'>«;»««;f;i- 
 they appear, upon a more wary (iirvey, to be no- ''""* 
 thing elfe but an Artifice of the Underftanding, for 
 the eafier fignifyingfiichcoUedlionsof Jfj^e^j, as it Oiould oftefi 
 have occafion to communicate by one general term j under 
 which divers particulars, as far forth as they agreed to that ab* 
 ftra^ Idea, might be comprehended. And if the doubtful iig- 
 nlfication of the word Speciesy may make it found harfh tofome, 
 that I fty, that the Species of mixed Modes are made by the 
 Underftanding ; yet, I think, it can by no body be denied, that 
 'tis the Mind makes thole abftra6l complex Ideasy ro wliicn (pe- 
 cifick Names are given. And if it be true, as it i^, rhat the 
 Mind makes the Patferns, forlbrting and naming ot Tnings, I 
 leave it to be confidered, who makes the Boundaries of the Sort, 
 or Species •, (ince with me, Species and Sort have no other difte- 
 rence, than that of a Latin and ErgliQi Idiom. 
 
 §. I O. The near station that there is between in mixed 
 Species^ Effences^ and their general Name, at leaft In Modes 'tii the 
 mixed Modes, will farther appear, when we con- Name that 
 fider, that it is the Name that feems to prefcrve f'^i '^^ Cow- 
 thofe EJJencesy and give them their lafting duration, ^i"^'"" '"- 
 For the connexion between the loofe parts of thole i^^Y'"', ^"^ 
 complex Ideas, being made by the Mind, this union, ^" ^" ''* * 
 which has no particular foundation in Nature, ^^ "^* 
 woud ceafe again, were there not (bmething that 
 did, as It were, hold It together, and keep the parts from fcat- 
 tering. Though therefore it be the Mind that makes the Colle- 
 ction, 'tis the Name which Is, as it were, the Knot, that ties 
 them faft together. What a vaft variety of different ideas, does 
 the Word Triumphus hold together, and deliver to us as one Spe- 
 cies I Had this Name been never made, or quite loff, we mighr, 
 no doubt, have had defcriptions ot what paifed in that Solem- 
 nity : But yet, I think, that which holds thofe different parrs 
 together, in the unity of one complex Idea, is that very Word 
 annexed to It : without which, the feveral parts of that, would 
 no more be thought to make one thing, than any other fhew, 
 which having never been made but once, bad never been united 
 into one complex Idea, under one denomination. How much 
 therefore, in mixed Modes, the unity necefllary to any Eflence, 
 
 depends 
 
^8 Names of mixed Modes, 
 
 depends oh the Mind •, and how much the continuation and 
 fixing of that Unity, depends on the Name in common ufe an- 
 nexed to ir, I leave to be confidered by thofe, who look upon 
 £^encti and Sfecies^ as real eftablithed 'l^hings in Nature. 
 
 §. 1 1. Suitable to this, we find, that Men fpeakjng of mixed 
 JAodes^ feldotn im^gii^Q or tal^e any other for Species of t htm, butfuch 
 as arejst out by name : Becaulethey being ot Man's making only, 
 in order to naming, no fuch Species are taken notice of, or fup- 
 pofed to be, unlefs a Natne be joined to it, as the Sign of Man's 
 having combined into one Idea (everal loofe ones •, ai.d b/ that 
 liarMj giving a lading Union to the Parts, which would oiher- 
 wi(e ceafe to have any, as foon as the Mind laid by that abilra<St 
 Idea^ and ceaftd adlually to think on it* But when a Name is 
 once annexed to it, wherein the parrs of that complex Idea have 
 a ferried and permanent Union \ then is the Effenccy as it were 
 cftablilhed, and the Species look'don ascompleat. For to what 
 purpofe (hould the Memory charge it (elf with fuch Compoliti- 
 ons, unlefs it were by Abftra6lion to mike them general ? And 
 to what purpofe make them general, unlefs it were, that they 
 miiZ,ht have general NameSf tor the convenience of Difcourfe^ 
 and Communication ? Thus we fee, that killing a Man with a 
 Sword, or a Hatcher, are looked on as no diliin<£l Sj eciea of 
 Aftion : But if the Point of the Sword firft enter the Body, it 
 paffcs for a diftin6l Species^ where it has a diftindl Name, as in 
 England, in whofe Language it is call'd Stabbing : But in another 
 Country, where it has not happened to be fpecihed under a pe- 
 culiar Name, it pafles not for a diftin6fc Species. But in the Spe- 
 cies of corporeal Subftances, though it be the Mind that makes 
 the nominal EfTence : yet fince chofe Ideas, which are combined 
 in it, are fiippofed to have an Union in Nature, whether the 
 Mind joins them or no, therefore thofe are looked on as dillin<5l 
 Species, without any of)eration of the Mind, either abltra6lmg, 
 or giving a Name to that complex Idea, -, 
 
 % 11, Conformable alfb to what has been faid, 
 ^"V r^*^'' concerning the EJfences of the Species oi mtxed 
 ^fs/I'"*' ^''^"t f^^- '^cy are the Creatures of the Under- 
 'iook " Ki' Ur. ^''incling, rather than the Works of Nature : Con- 
 thtr than^l'e f^rmable, 1 fay, to this, we find, that their Names 
 Mind , vhiih ^^^d, our Thoughts to the Mind, and no farther. When 
 mlfofhewi them We fpeak of Juftice, or Gratitude, we frame to our 
 to hi the M^ork- felves no Imagination of any thing exiiling, which 
 manfpipofUH- We would conceivc ; but our Thoughts terminate 
 dtrjlandpig. in the abflra«5V Ideas of thofe Vcrtues , and look 
 
 not 
 
Names of mixed Modes, ^ g 
 
 not farther *, as they do, when we fpeak of a Horje, or Iron^ whofe 
 fiiecifick We4J we confidernot, as barely in the Mind, but as in 
 ^ Things themfelves, which aftord the orginal Patterns of thofe 
 'ideas. But in mixed Modes, at lead the moft confiderabie parts 
 of them, which are moral Beings, we conGder the original Pat- 
 terns, as being in the Mind ^ and to thofc we refer for the di- 
 ftinguifhing of particular Beings under Names. And hence I 
 think it is. That thefe EJfences of the Species of mixed Modes, 
 are by a more particular Name called Notions j as by a peculiar 
 Right, appertaining to the Underftanding. 
 
 §.19. Hence likewife we may learn, H^hy the Their being 
 complex Ideas of mixed Modes , are commonly more w^f ^7 the . 
 compounded and decompounded^ than thoje of natural Unc{er[it:nd- 
 Subjlances. Beciufe they being the Workmanfhip "'-? ^'thout 
 of the Underftanding, purluing only its own ends, ^'^^*''"> ^ 
 and the conveaiency of exprefling in (hort thofe J-^^^y^y^ 
 Ideas it would make known to another, does with 1"^ ^ ^'lom-^ 
 great liberty unite often into one abftradl Idea toujided. 
 Ti ings that in their Nature have no coherence ; 
 and io under one Term, bundle Together a great variety of 
 compounded, and decompounded Ideas. Thus the Name oi" 
 Procejfion^ what a great mixture of independent Ideas of Perfbns, 
 Habits, Tapers, Orders, Motions, Sounds, does it contain in 
 that complex one, which the Mind of Man has arbitrarily put 
 together, to exprefsby that one Name? Whereas the complex 
 Ideas of the forts of Subftances, are ufually made up of only a 
 fmall number of fimple ones *, and in the Species of Animals, 
 thefe two, vi:{. Shape and Voice, commonly make the whole 
 nominal Effence. 
 
 §. 14. Another thing we may obferve from ' Names of 
 what has been faid, is, That the Names of mixed nnxed Modes ^ 
 Modes always fignify fwhen they have any deter- f^^'^^ always 
 mined Signification ) the real Effences of their Sfecies. f"^ '^"^ ''^'*' 
 For thefe abftracSt Ideas, being the Workmanfhip ^f^"^^^- 
 of the Mind, and not referred to the real Exiflyice 
 of Things, there is no fuppofition of any thing more fignilied 
 by that Name, but barely that complex Idea, the Mind it lelf 
 has formed, which is all it would have exprefs'd by it -^ and is 
 that, on which all the properties of the Species depend and from 
 which alone they all flaw : and fo in thefe the real and nominal 
 Effence is the fame 5 which of what Concernment it is co the 
 certain Knowledge of general Truth, we fhall fee hereafter. 
 
 §, 13. 
 
40 Names of mixed Modes. 
 
 §.15. This alfo may fhew us the Reafon, U'h^ 
 ^'hy their for the mofl part the Names of mixed Modes are got, 
 names are u- before the Ideus they Jl and for are perfe^ly knoivn. ^ 
 juaUy got Li- BccauC' there being no Species, of thefe ordinarily ' 
 Jtre thetrlAcii. taken notice of, but what have Names •, and'thofc 
 Species J or^ rather their Eflenccs, being abftraft 
 complex Tdesamade arbirrarily by the Mind, it is convenient, if 
 iioc ncceflary, to know the Names, before one endeavour to 
 fiame thcfe complex I^f^j : unlefs a Man vvill fill his Head with 
 a Company of abftiad complex Ideas, which others having no 
 Names for, he has nothing to do with, but to lay by, and forget 
 again. I confcfs, that in the beginning of Languages, it was 
 ncctffary to have the Idea, before one gave it the Name : And 
 io ir is Hill, where making a new complex idea, one alfb, by 
 giving ic a new Name, makes anew Word. But this concerns 
 ret Languages made, which have generally pretty well provided 
 for ideofy which Men have frequent Occafion to havcj and com- 
 municate : And in fuch, I ask, whether it be not the ordinary 
 Method, that Children learn the Names of mixed Modes, before 
 they have their ideas ? Whatonii of a thoufand ever frames the 
 abltradl Idea of Glory and Ambition before he has heard the 
 Names of them. In (imple Ideas and Subftances, I grant it ii 
 otherwlfe ; which being fiich ideas, as have a real Exiftence 
 and Union in Nature, the Ideas, or Names, are got one before 
 ihe other, as it happens. 
 
 §. 1 6. What has been ftid here of mixed Mode»^ 
 Reafon of my is wjth very little diflference applicable alfb to Re- 
 Leingjt largt lations^'. which fince every Man himfelf may ob- 
 cji thii Sub' ferve, I may fparc my felf the Pains to enlarge on : 
 j'^' Efpecially, fince what I have here faid concerning 
 
 Words in this Third Book, will poflibly be thought 
 by (bme to be much more than what fo flight a SubjecSl required. 
 I allow, ic might be brought into a narrower Compafs : But I; 
 was willing to ftay my Reader on an Argument, that ^ppearS>tQ 
 me new, and a little out of the way, ( I am fure 'tis one, I 
 thought not of, when I began to write, ) That by fcarching ic 
 to the bottom, and turning it on every fide, fbme part or other 
 might meet with every one's Thoughts,and give occafion to the 
 ni( It averfc, or negligent, to reficiSt on a general Mifcarriage ; 
 which, though of great confcquence, is little taken notice oh 
 When it is confidered, what a pudder is made about Ejfencesf and 
 how much all f(jrts of Knowledge, Difcourfe, and Converfa- 
 lion, arc pellcr'd and dif^rdci'd by the carclefs, and confufed 
 
 U(e 
 Ufe 
 
Names of Suhjlances* j^0 
 
 life and Application of Words, it wil], perhaps, be thowght 
 worth while throughly to lay ic open. And I (hall be pardon'd, 
 if I have dwelt long on an Argument, which I think .therefore 
 needs to be inculcated ; becaule the Faults, Men are ufuaily 
 gailty of in this kind, are not only the greateft hinderances of 
 true Knowledge •, but are fb well thought of, as to paft for ir. 
 Men would often (ee what a fmall) pittance of Reafbn and Truth, 
 or pofiibly none at all, is mixed with thofe huffing Opinions they 
 are fwell'd with •, if they would but look beyond fafhionable 
 Sounds, and obferve what Ideas are, or are not comprehended 
 under thofe Words, with which they are fb armed at all points, 
 and with which they lb confidently lay about them. I fihaU 
 imagine I have done Tome Service to Truth, Peace, ajiid Learn- 
 ing, if, by any enlargement on this SubjecSl, I can make JVIen 
 refledl on their own life of Language , and give them Reafon 
 to (ufpe6t, that fince it is frequent for other?, it may alio be pot 
 fible for them, to have ibmetim€5 very good and approved 
 Words in their Mouths, and Writings, with very uncertain, 
 little, or no fignification. _ And therefore ic is not unreafonable 
 for them to be wary herein themfelves, and not to be unwilling 
 to have them examined by others. With this defign therefore, 
 I fhall go on with what 1 have farther to fay, concerning this 
 matter. 
 
 g H A P. V L 
 
 ^a^ r -tr ^ i[r ^^^^^^ 
 
 Of the Names of Suhjlances, 
 
 §. I. •'"nr^HE common Names of Snbjlances,9.s well The common 
 I as other general Terms , fland for Names of 
 -^ Sons : which Is nothing elfe but the Subjiances 
 being made figns of fuch complex Ideas, wherein fe- Z-*"^ Z**" 
 Veral particular Subftances do, or might agree, by "^'"■^^' 
 virtue of which, they are capable or being com- 
 prehended in one common Conception, and be fignified by one 
 Name. ^ I fay, do or might agree : for though there be but one 
 Sun exiflingin the World, yet the Idea of it being 'abil:ra6fed,, 
 & that more Subftances ( if there were feveral ) might each a- 
 gree in it ; it is as much a Sort, as if there were as many Suna 
 siith^re i^re Stars, Theywm'C ypt i;heijc Reafons, who think. 
 
 ihere 
 
4''^. ly antes of Suhjlances. 
 
 there are, and that each fixed Star, wculd anfwer the Idea the 
 Name Sun Hands fi)r, to one who were placed in a due diftdnce ; 
 which, by the way, may (hew us how much the Sorts, or, it 
 you picalc, Genera and Species of Things ( for chofe Latin Terms 
 fignify to mc, nonioiethan theEnglilh word Sort) depend on 
 luch Colledtious of IdtaSy as Men have madej and not on the 
 real Nature ot Things : fmcc 'tis not impoffible, but that in 
 propriety of Speech, that might be a Sun to one, which is a 
 otar to another. 
 
 §. 1. The meafure and boundary of each Sort, 
 The Eifence of or Speciesy whereby it is conltituted that particular 
 T^f^'" Sort, and diftinguilhed from others, is that we call 
 Uci "^ its Ejfefice, which » nothii:>g but that d/iraci Idea 
 to which the Name k annexed : So that every thing 
 , contained in that Idea, is cfTential to that Sort. 
 
 Thij;, though it be all the E//f«ce of natural Subftance?, that we 
 know, or by which we diftinguifh them into Sorts ;, yet I call 
 it by a peculiar Name, the nominal Effence, to diftin^uilhitfrom 
 that real ConlHtution of Si;bftances, upon which aei ends this 
 Komival Ejjetice, and all the Properties of that Sort ; which there- 
 fore, as lias been f<ud, may be called the real EJJence: r. g. the 
 nominal Ejfence of Gold^ is that complex idea the word Gold Itands 
 for, let it be, forinflance, a Body yellow, of a certain weight, 
 malleab'e, fufiblc, and fixed. But the realEffence is the ConlH- 
 tution of the infenfible parts of that Body, on which thofe Qua- 
 lities, and all the other Properties of Gold depend. How far 
 thefe two are different, though they are both<;allcd Ejfence^ ]s 
 obvious, at firft fighr^ todifcover. 
 
 §. 3. For though, perhaps, voluntary Motion, 
 The Tionin^l with Senfe and Reafon, join'd to a Body of a cer- 
 ajid renl EJ- tain Shape, be the complex Idea, to which I, and 
 fi»ce dife- others, annex the Name Man ; and fb be the no- 
 ^"^^' mtnal Effence oE the Species ib called : yet no body , 
 
 will fi\, that that complex idea is the real EJJe7ke __ 
 and Source of ail thofc Operations, which are to befcimd in any 
 individual of that Sort. The foundation of all thofe Qualities, 
 which are the Ingredients of our complex I'/e^jis fomething quite 
 different ; And had we fuch a Knowledge ol that Conftitution 
 of Maw, from which hisFact)ltitsof iVlov)ng,Scnf^ttion,and Rca- 
 (<>ning, and other Powers flow •, and on which his ^) regular 
 f^iape depends, as *fis po0ible Angels have, and 'tis certain his 
 Maicf r has, wc Ihould have a quite other Idea of his 'EJJence^ 
 than, what now is c jntaincd in our Definition of tiaat Species^ 
 
Names ef Suhjiances, ^^ 
 
 be it what It will : And our lie* of any individual Man would 
 be as far different from what it now is, as is his, who knows 
 all the Springs and Wheels, and other contrivances wirhin, of 
 the famous Clock at Stratburg^ from that which a gazing Coun- 
 try-man has of it, who barely lees the motion of the Hand, and 
 hears the Clock ftrike, and obferves only (bme of the outward 
 appearances. 
 
 §. 4. That EJfencffy in the ordinary ufe of th^ Nothing ef- 
 word, relates to Sorts, and that it is confidered in f"if"il to in- 
 partlcular Beings, no farther than as they are rank- ^'''^i^u^lf. 
 ed' intoSortSt appears from hence: 1 hat take but 
 away the abllradt Ideas, by which we fort Individual?, and rank 
 them under common Names, and then the thought of any thing 
 ejjential to any of them, inflantly vanilhes: we have no notion 
 of the one, without the other : which plainly fhews their rela- 
 tion. 'Tis neceffary for me to be as I am •, GOD and Nature 
 has made me fo : But there is nothing I have, is eflential to mc. 
 An Accident, or Difeafe, may very much alter my Colour, oc 
 Shape i a Fever, or Fall, may take away my Reafon or Me- 
 mory, or both J and an Apoplexy leave neither Senfe, nor Un- 
 derftanding, no, nor Life. Other Creatures of my fhape, may 
 . be made with more, and better, or fewer, and worfe Faculties 
 than I have : and others may have Reafon and Senfe in a fhape 
 and body very different from mine. None of thefe are tflential 
 to the one, or the other, or to any Individual whatfoever, til! 
 the Mind refers it to fbme Sort or Spcies of things j and theu 
 prefently, according to the abftradl Idea of that fort, fbmething 
 IS found ejjential. Let any one examine his own Thoughts, and 
 he will find, that as foon as he fiippofes or fpeaks ol Ejjentia!, 
 the confideration of fome Species, or the complex Idea, fignihed 
 by fbme general Name, comes into his Mind : And 'tis in refe- 
 rence to that, that this or that Quality is faid to be ejjential. Sp 
 that if ic be asked, whether it be effential to me, or any other 
 particular corporeal Being to have Reafon ? I fay no • no more 
 than It is ejjential to this white thing I wrice on, to haVe Words 
 in it. But i^ that particular Being be to be counted of the Sotc 
 Man, and to have the Name Man given it, then R(6afbn he£er,^ 
 tial to it, fuppofing Reafon to be ^ part of the complejj Uea the 
 Name M4« ftands tor : as it is ejjential to this thing I write on 
 to contain Words, if I will give it the Name Jreaifije, and rank 
 It under th3.t Species, So that ejfential, avdnot ejfefit^ial, relate on'^ 
 t9 our ahjiraci ideas, and the Names, annexed t^. thern'-) which a- 
 ^.gunts to m more but this. That what ever particular Thing, 
 
^^ Names of SuhftaHces. 
 
 has not in it thofe Qualirle?, which are contained in the abftraci 
 ideAy which any general Term Hands for, cannot be ranked un- 
 der that Spectesf nor be called by that Name, iiiice that abftradl 
 Idea is the very Ejjence of that Species. 
 
 §. 5. Thus if the ideao^Bodyj with fome People, be bare Ex- 
 tcnlion or Space, then Solidity is not ejjential to Body: If others 
 make the Idea^ to which they give the Name Body, to be Solidity 
 andExrenfion, then Solidity is effential to Body. That there- 
 fore, and that alone is confidered as ejjential, which maizes a part of 
 the cympkx Id .a. the Name of a Sort fiands for, without which, iio 
 particular Thing can be reckoned of that Sort, nor be intituled 
 to that Name. Should there be found a parcel of Matter, that 
 had all the other Qiialities that arc in Iron, but wanted Obedi- 
 ence CO theLoad-ftouc:, and would neither be drawn by it, ikm: 
 veceive Dire£lion from it, Would any one queftion, whether it 
 wanted any th'mge£entia!? It would be ab^rd to ask, Whether 
 a thing really cxilHng, wanted any thing effential to it. Or could 
 it be demanded, Whether this made an effential or y^ec/^c/j. diffe- 
 rence, or no-, fincewe have no other meafure o{ effential 01 fpe- 
 cifickjy butour abftrad/ie^i? And to talk of fpecifick Differences 
 in Nature, without reference to general ideas and Names, is to 
 talk unintelligibly. For I would ask any one. What is fufficient 
 to ma Ice an effential difference in Nature, between any two par- 
 ticular Beings, without any regard had to fbme abflraiS; Idea, 
 which is looked upon as the Eflence and Standard oizSpecits ? 
 All fuch Patterns ^nd Standards, being quite laid alide, particular 
 Beings, confidered barely in themfelves, will be found to have 
 all their Qualities equally effential •, and every thing, in each Indi- 
 vidual, will be effs7itial to it, or, which is more, nothing at all. 
 For though it may bereafonable to. ask, Whether obeying the 
 Migner, be effential to Iron ? yet, I think, it is very improper 
 and infignilicanc to ask, Whether it be effential to the particular 
 parcel of Matter, I cut my Pen with, without conlidering It urv 
 der the Name Iron, or as being of a certain Species ? And it, as 
 has been faid, our ab^n^ Ideat, which have Names annexed to 
 them, are the Boundaries of S/'uc/fj, nothing can he effential biit 
 .what is contained in thofe Ideas. 
 
 §. ^. 'Tis trucjl have often mentioned a real Effencefdifi'm^ m 
 !?ublhnce?, from thofe abftra<5l Ideas o( them, which I call their 
 nominal Elfenc-'. By this real F^ffence, 1 mean, that real confticu- 
 tion of any Thing, which is the foundation of all thole Proper* 
 l^ies, that are combined in, and are conllanhy found to caexift 
 W![h the nominal Kl]gn:e \ thgt oardcular conilirutioii^which every 
 
l^ames of Suhftances, 4^ 
 
 Thing has within it felf, without any relation to any thing 
 without it. But Ejfence, even in this fenfe , relates to a Sortj and 
 fuppofes a Species : For being that real Conilitution, on which 
 the Properties depend, it neceflarily fuppofes a fort of Thing?, 
 Properties belonging only to Species^^nd not to Individuals j v.g, 
 Suppofing the nominal Eflence of Gold^ to be Body of luch a 
 peculiar Colour and Weight, with Malleability and Fufibility, 
 the real Eflence is that Conftitution of the parts of Matter, on 
 which thefe Qaalitie?, and their Union, depend ; and is alfo the 
 foundation of its Solubility mAq.F^^giaj and other Properties ac- 
 companying that complex Idea. Here are EJfences and Proper- 
 ties, but all upon liippoGtion of a Sort, or general abftrav^ idea^ 
 which is confiidered as imtnutable : but there is no individual par- 
 cel of Matter, to whichany of thefe Qualities are fo annexed, as 
 to be ejjential to it, or infcparable from it. That which is ef- 
 fential, belongs to it as a Condition, whereby it is of this or that 
 Sort : But takeaway theconfiderationofits being ranked under 
 the Name of fbmeabftrad; idea^ and then there is nothing necef- 
 fary to it, nothing infeparable from it. Indeed, as to the red Ef- 
 fences of Subffances, we only fuppofe their Being, without pre- 
 cilely knowing what they are : But that which annexes them ftill 
 .to the Species., is the nominal Effence, of which they are thefiip- 
 
 pofed foundation and caufe. 
 
 §. 7. The next thing to be confidered is,by which j-^g „omin/iI 
 of thofe EfTences it is, that Subflances are determined e fence bounds 
 intoSon%, or Species-^ and that'tisevident, is hy the the Species. 
 nominal Ejfence. For 'tis that alone, that the Name, 
 which is the mark of the Sort, fignifies. 'Tis impofliblc there- 
 fore, that any thing fbould determine the Sorts of Things, which 
 we rank under general Names, but that Idea, which that Namu 
 is defign'd as a mark for; wh'ch is that, as has been fiiewn, 
 which we call the Nominal Ejfence. Why do we lay. This is a 
 Uorfe, and that a Mule\ this is an Animal^ that an Herb? How 
 comes any particuliar Thing to be of this or that Sorty but becaufs 
 it has that nominal Effence, or, which is all one, agrees to that 
 abftradt Idea^ that Name is annexed to ? And 1 defire any one 
 but to reiledt on his own Thought?, when he hears or (peaks any 
 of thofe, or other Names oi Subftanccs, to know what fore of 
 EJfences they ftand for. 
 
 §. 8. And that the Species of Things to usy are nothing hut the 
 
 y linking them under dijiintl Name s^accor ding to the complex Ideas /« us ; 
 
 and not according to precifc, diftin'H-, real EJfemes in them, is 
 
 Voll. II. 1£ p'a;a 
 
46 Names of Sulfl^nces. 
 
 plain from hence, Thatwefindmany of the Individuals that are 
 rank'd into one Sort,caird by one common Name,and (b receiv*d 
 as being ot one Species, have yet Qualities depending on their real 
 Conftitucioni?, as tar different one from another, as from others, 
 from which they are accounted to differ y/'fc;^c<i//)'. This, as icis 
 cafy to be obfcrved by all,who have to do with natural Bodies ; fo 
 Chymifts efiiccially are often, by fad Experience, convinced ot'it, 
 when they, fometimcs in vain, feck for the fame Qualities in one 
 parcel of Sulphur, Antimony, or Vitriol, which they have found 
 in others. For though they are Bodies of the fame Species^ having 
 the fame nominal EJfoice, under the lame Name ; yet do they of- 
 ten, upon fevcre ways of Examination, betray Qualities fbdiffe- 
 -rent one from another, as to fruftrato the Expe6tation and La- 
 bour of very wary Chymifls. But if Things were didinguifhed 
 into Species , according to their real Effence", it would beasim- 
 po/fible to find different Properties in any two individual Sub- 
 ilanccsof the f^mtSpecies^ as it is to find different Properties in 
 two Circles, or two equilateral Triangles. That is properly the 
 Effence to us, which determines every particular to this or that 
 ClaJJls j or, which is the fame Thing, to this or that general 
 Nane: And what can that be el(e, but that abftra<5l IdeAy to 
 which that Name is annexed ? and fo has, in truth , a reference, 
 not ^o much to the Being of particular Things, as to their general 
 Denominations. 
 
 §. 9. Nor indeed can we rank, and f&rt Things^ 
 Not the real and confequcntly ( which is the end of Sorting ) ue- 
 Efi'ence which nominate them by their real EJfencesy becaufe we 
 »f kmr» net, knovv them not. Our Faculties carry us no far- 
 ther towards the knowledge and dift indtion ofSub- 
 flanccs, than a Colleclion of thole fenfible J</e^/,which we obferve 
 in them •, which how ever made with the greatcll diligence and 
 < xacStnefs, w e arif capable of, yet is more remote from the true 
 internal Conffitutbn, from which thofe Qualities flow, than, 
 as Ifaid, u Countryman's J^e/t is from the inward contrivance ot 
 that famous Clock at Strasburv^ whereof he only fees the outward 
 Figure and Motion. There is not fo contemptible a Planter A- 
 nimil, that does not confound the moll inlarged Underlfanding^ 
 I'hough the familiar ufe of Things about us, take olf our Won- 
 der ^ yet it cures nor our Ignorance. When we come to examine 
 the Stones, we tread on j or the Iron, we daily handle, weprc- 
 Icntly fiudjWr know not their Make ', and ran give no kearon,of • 
 t he different Qi^iilities we HnJ in them. ' Pis evident the internal 
 Conltitution, whereon their Properties depend, b ynknown to 
 
 us. 
 
i^ames of Suhflantts. 47 
 
 us. For to go no farther than the grofleft and rrioft obvious wc 
 can imagine amongllthem. What is that Texture of Parrs, that 
 real hffence^ that makes Lead and Antimony fufible •, Wood and 
 Stones not? What makes Lead, and Iron malleable ; Antimony 
 and Stones not ? And yet how infinitely thefe come ihorr, ot the 
 fine Contrivances, and unconceivable renl EJJences of Plants or 
 Animals, every one knows. The Workmanfliip of the All-wife, 
 and Powerful God, in the great Fabrick of the Univerfe, and 
 every part thereof, farther exceeds the Capacity and Compre- 
 hertuon of the moil inquifitive and intelligent Man, than the 
 beft contrivance of the moll ingenious Man, doth the Concepti* 
 bns of the moft ignorant of rational Creatures. Therefore we in 
 vain pretend to range Things into Sorts, and difpofe them into 
 certain Clafles, under Names, by their real Ejfevces^ that are (o 
 far from our difcovery or comprehenfion. A blind Man may as 
 foon fort Things by their Colours, and he that has loft his Smell, 
 as well diftinguifli a Lily and a Rofe by their Odors, as by thofe 
 internal Con llitutions which he knows not. He rfcar thinks he 
 can diftinguifli Sheep and Goats by their real Eflcnces, thit are. 
 Unknown to him, may be pleafed to try his Skill in thole Species, 
 called Cajfiowary, and Querechincbio ^ and by their internal real 
 . Efl'ences, determine the Boundaries of thole Species^ without 
 knowing the complex Idea of lenfible Qualities, that each of 
 thofe Names ftand for, in the Countries where thole Ariimals 
 are to be found. 
 
 - §. lo. Thole therefore who have been taught, Not fuhpan'" 
 that the leveral Sfeties of Subftances had tbefr di- tial forms 
 ftin<Sl internal Jubftamial Forms'^ and that it was ^^"^^^^^ 
 thofe Forms, which made the diftinaion of Sub- ^"'^l^J'- 
 ftauces into their true Species and Genera, were led^ 
 yet farther out of the way, by having their Minds let^ upon 
 fruitlels Enquiries after fubftantial Forms, wholly unintelligible, 
 and whereof we have Icarcelb much as any obfcure, or coil- 
 fuled Conception in general. 
 
 §. 1 1. That Q\iTrankivg^2X\^ dillinguifhing natu- ff^^^t the ro- 
 iral Subftances into Specie s,confifts in the Nominal EJJences ninal Ejfenfe 
 the Mind make?, and not in the real EHences to be i, that where- 
 found in the Things themfelves, is farther evident bpvedififi- 
 from our Ideas oi Spirits. For the Mind getting, s'^'P^ Species 
 only by reflecting on its own Operations, thofe fiin- ftrther e- 
 pie Ideas which it attributes to Spirits^ it hath, or 'i>'den^ fnvi 
 can have no other Notion of Spirit, but hj attribu- -^f "•'^^• 
 4ing all thofe Operations^ it finds in it fsif, to a fort , 
 .; • ■ £ i ■ ■ ^i 
 
'48 Names of Suh(lances\ 
 
 of Beings, without confideration of Matter. And even thi 
 moll advanced Notion we have of God, is but attributing the 
 fame dm pie Ideas which we have got from Refledtion on what 
 We find in our felvtp, and which we conceive to have more 
 Perftftion in them, than would be in their abfencc, attributing, 
 I fay, fhofe fimple Ideas to him in an unlimited degree. Thus 
 having get from refleding on our ftlvesi the Uea ot Exiftcnce, 
 Knowledge, Power, and Pleafure, each of which we find it bet- 
 ter to have than to want:;, and the more we have of each, the 
 better •, joyning all thefe together, with infinity to each of 
 them, we have the complex Idea of an eternal, omnifcient, 
 omnipotent, infinitely wife , and happy Being. And though 
 we are told , that there are different Sfecies of Angels •, yet 
 we know not how to frame diftinft fpecifick Ideas of rhtm ', not 
 out of any Conceit, that the Exiftence of more Sfecies than one 
 of SpirttSi is impoflible; But becaufe having no more fimple 
 Ideas ( nor being able to frame more ) applicable to fuch Beings, 
 but only thofe few, taken from our felvcs, and from the A- 
 6fions of our own Minds in thinking, and being delighted, 
 and moving feveral parts of our Bodies •, we can no otherwife 
 diftinguifh in our Conceptions the feveral 'Species of Spirits . one 
 from another, bur by attributing thofe Operations and Powers, 
 we find in our felvcs, to them in a higher or lower degree; and 
 fo have no very dliVind: fpecifick Ideas of Spirits, except only of 
 GOD, to whom we attribute both Duration, and all thofe other 
 Ideas with Infinity •, to the other Spirits^ with limitation : Nor 
 as I humbly conceive do we, between GOD and them in our 
 ideasy put any difference by any number of fimple Ideas^ which 
 we have of one, and not of the other, but only that of Infinity. 
 All the particular J^f.« of Exiftence, Knowledge, Will, Power, 
 and Motion, ^c. being J<^e<:j derived from the Operations of our 
 Minds, we attribute all of them to all forts o{ Spirits^ vixih the 
 difference only of degrees, to the utmoft we can imagine, e^en 
 Iiifini'y, vvhen we would frame, as well as we can, an Uea of 
 the firll Being-, who yet, 'til certain, is infinitely more remote 
 yi the real Excellency of his Nature, from the highelt and perfeft- 
 trt of all created Being?, than the greatell Man, nay, pureft 
 J-eraphim, is from the molt contemptible part of Matter; and 
 confequcntly mult infinitely exceed what our narrow Under- 
 Ihndings can conceive of him.^ 
 
 §. 1 2. It is not impoffible to conceive, nor 
 Whercej there are repugnant to rcafon, that there may be many 
 p>obMy»u7^,b:,Ujs Species of Spirits, as much feparated and di- 
 ^^^••^•'. "^ vcrfifie4 
 
Nantes of Sulflances. 49 
 
 'Perfificd one from another, by difti'nft Properties, whereof we 
 have no Ideasj as the Species of fenfible Things are diftingullh- 
 ed one from another, by Qualities, which we know, and ob- 
 ferve in them. That there fhould be more Species of intelli- 
 gent Creatures above us, than there are of fcnfible and mate- 
 rial below us, is probable to me from hence j That in all the 
 vifible cof-pcreal World, we fee no Chafms, or no Gaps. AH 
 quire down from us, the defcent is by eafy fteps, and a conti- 
 nued feries of Things, that in each remove, differ very little 
 one from the other. There are Fifhes that have Wings, and 
 are not Strangers to the airy Region : and there are fbme Birds, 
 that are Inhabitants of the Water '-, whofe Blood is cold as Fifhes, 
 and their Flefh fb like in tafle, that the fcrupulous are allowed 
 them on Fi lb- days. There are Animals fo near of kin both to 
 Birds and Beaffs, that they are in the middle between both ; Am- 
 phibious Animals link the Terreftrial and Aquatique together j 
 Seals live at Land and at Sea, and Porpoifeshave the warm Blood 
 and Entrails of a Hog, not to mention what is confidently repor- 
 ted of Mermaids, or Sea-men. There are fome Brurcs, that 
 feem to have as much Knowledge and Reafbn, as fome that are 
 called Men 1 and the Animal and Vegetable Kingdoms are fb 
 nearly join'd, that if you will take the loweft of one, and the 
 highell of the other/ there will fcarce be perceived any great 
 difference between them j and fo on till we come ro the loweft 
 and the mofl inorganical parts of Matter, we fhall find every- 
 where, that the ^veral Species are linked together, and differ 
 but in almofl infenlible degrees. And when we confider the in- 
 finite Power and Wifdom of the Maker, we have reafbn to 
 think, that it is fiii^able to the magnificent Harmony of rhe 
 Univerfe, and the great Defign and infinite Goodnefs of the 
 Architeft, that the Species of Creatures fhould alfb, by gentle 
 degrees, afcend upward from us toward his infinite Pcrfe6f Ion, 
 as we fee they gradually dcfcend from us downwards : Which if 
 it be probable, we have reafon then to be perfwaded, that there 
 are far more Species of Creatures above us, than there are beneath j 
 We being in degrees ofperfe<Stion, much more remote from the 
 infinite Being of GOD, than we are from the loweft ffate of 
 Being, and that which approachesnearelt to nothing. And >et- 
 ofallthofe d\^'mGt Speciesy for the reafbns above- laid, we have 
 no clear diffindi Ideat. 
 
 §.13. But to return to the Species of The mmnal Efe„ce, 
 corporeal Subflances. If I fhould ask any that of the siccus, 
 one whether Ice and Wmt were two diflina? i'^],/''"^ ^^"'''' 
 
 fc ) Specie^ 
 
5'o Names af Suhjlances* 
 
 Species of Things, I doubt not but I (hould beanlwered in the 
 a^rmative : And it cannot be denied, but he that (ays they are 
 two diftin6i: Species^ is in the right. But if an Englijh-riun, bred 
 ill Jamaica, who, perhaps, had never fetn nor heard ot Ice, 
 coming into England in the Winter, find, the Water he put in 
 his Bafonat nighr, in a great part frozen in the Morning ^ and 
 not knowing any peculiar Name it had, Ihould call it harden'd 
 Water ; I ask. Whether this would be a new Species to him, 
 different from Water ? And, I think, it would be anfwered 
 here. It would not be to him a new Species^ no more than con- 
 gealed Gclly, when it is cold, is a diflm^t Species^ from the fame 
 Gelly fluid and warm', or that liquid Gold, in the Furnace, 
 is adillin«9: Species from hard Gold in the Hands of a Workman. 
 And if this be fb, 'tis plain, that our diftin^ Specie s^ are nothing 
 but dijlincl cowplex Ideas, with dtjlintt Names annexed to them. 
 ^TIs true, every Subllance that exiib, has its peculiar Con It i- 
 tion, whereon depend thofe fenfible Qualities, and Powers, we 
 obfcrvc in ir : But the ranking of Things into $/>^c«e/, which is 
 nothing but forcing tbejn under feveral Tlrle", is done by t.s, 
 according to the ideas that we have of them : VVhich tho luffi- 
 cienc roulliinguilh them by Names; Co that we may be able 
 to difcourfe of them, when we have them not prefcnt before us : 
 yet if we fuppoft it to be done by their real internal Conftirutions, 
 and thatThinRsexilling are diftinguiftied by Nature into Specie':, 
 by real Eflences, according as we diftinguifti them into Species by 
 Name?, we fliall be liable to great Miftakes. 
 
 §. 14. To diftinguilh fubftanrial Beings into 
 Diff.:ul:ies Species, according to the ufual fuppoliiion, that 
 again/} a ecr- there are certain precife Effences or F<yrms of Things, 
 tain nurnifer of whereby all the Individuals exiftinp, arc^ by Na- 
 rtalEfcnces tuie dillinguifhed into Speciesyihiie Things are ne- 
 ceflary : 
 
 %. 1%. Firjl^ To be afllixed, that Nature, In the produftion 
 ot Thin^c, always dtfigns them to partake of cerrajii regulated 
 clUblifheU EJjences^ which are to be the Models of all Things to 
 be productd. This, in that crude Senlf, it Is^ ufuilly propofed, 
 would nee4 fome betcer Explication, before it can be afltntci 
 to. 
 
 ^. \6. Secondly^ It would benecelTary to know, whether Na- 
 ture always attains that Effence^ it defigns in the produ<5lion of 
 Things. The irregular and monllrous Eirrhs,thac in divers forts 
 of Animals have been observed, willaj\yays give us rea^n to doubt 
 of ont, ox both of theft. 
 
Names of Sulflances, jl 
 
 §. 17. Thirdly, It ought to be determined, whether thofe 
 we call Monflers, be really a difl:in6t Species, according to the 
 fcholaltick notioa of the word Species •, lince it is certaii), that 
 every thing that exiib, basics particular Conftitutioni And yec 
 we find, thatfbaieof thefe monftrous ProduiSlions, have few or 
 none of thofe Qyalities, which are fuppoled to refult from, and 
 accompany ih&EjJ'ence of thsii Species y from whence they ieeni 
 to belong. 
 
 §. 18. Fourthly, The re^/ £j(7e«cej of thofe Things, 0«'' nominal 
 which we diftinguifli into Species, and as fo dilliii- ^^pr.ces of 
 guiihed we name, ought to be known ", i. e. we ■^«^7?''«f«^ 
 ought to have Ideas ofrhem. But fince we are ig- "^^ p^^'fecf 
 norant in thefe four points, the fuppofed red Ejfences ''"*'^"'»^ "f 
 0/ Things^ ft and us not infteadfor the diftinguijhing ^"p^^'^ie-'* 
 Suhftances into Species. 
 
 §. 19. Fifthly^ The only Imaginable help in this cafe would 
 be, that having framed perfect complex Ideas of the Properties 
 of things, flowing from their different real Eifences, we thould 
 thereby diftlnguiln them into Species. But neither can this be 
 done : for being ignorant ot the real Eflence it fclf, it h impoifi- 
 ble to know all thofe Properties that flow from it, and arc fo 
 annexed to it, that any one of them being away, we may cer- 
 ta,inly conclude, that that Effence Is not there, and !«> the Thing 
 is not of thzz Species. We can never know what are the pre- 
 cife number of Properties depending on the real Eijence of Goldy 
 any one of which failing, the real EfTence of Gold, and con- 
 fequently Gold, would not be there, unlefs we knew th.e real 
 EfTence of Gold it felf, and by that determined that Species. 
 By the Word Gold here, I muft be undf ritood to defign a parti- 
 cular^ piece of Matter', v. g. the laft Guinea that was coin'd. 
 For if it (hould ffand herein its ordinary Signification for that 
 complex Idea whiefi I or any one elfe calls Gold ; /. e. for the 
 nominal EfTence of Gold, it would be Jargon: fb hard is it, to 
 fliew- the various meaning and imperfection of Words, when we 
 have nothing elfe but Words to do it by. 
 
 §. 10. By all which it is clear , That our di[lingmjlnng Sub^ 
 fiances into Species by Names, is not at oW foimded o?i their real 
 EJfences\ nor can "we pretend to range, and dctevmirtc them 
 exactly into Species, according to internal tll'cntial differences. 
 
 §.2,1. But (ince, as has been remarked, we 
 have need of general Words, tho' we know not But jHch a ColU- 
 the real EiTences of Things ; all vve can do, is to ^•''« ''-' ou:-Na?As.s 
 coUeil. fuch a number of fimple Ideas, as by fi''""^^ /"''• 
 
 E 4 Exami"- 
 
S'i- Names of Sulflances, 
 
 £\Mmination, we find to be united together in Things exifting, 
 and thereof to make on*.' complex Idea. Which though it be 
 not the rial Fflciiccof any Subftance that exills,is yetthefpecificli 
 EJ]i)tce,to which Gur Name bclongs,and is convertible with if, by 
 which we may at lealttry the Truth ofthefe nominal Effences. 
 For Exaniple,thcre be that (ay, that the Efll nee o^Body is Exten- 
 fion: If it be fb, we can never miftakein putting the Eflcnceof 
 any thing for the Thing it ftlf. Let us then in Difcourle, put 
 Extenfion for Body^ and when we would fay, that Extenfion 
 moves, and (ee how it will look. He that fliould fay, that one 
 Exrcnfion, by impuKemov-es another extenlion, would, by the 
 bare Expreflion, fufhciently (htw theabfurdity offuch a Notion. 
 The £//^/;ce of any thing, in refpeflof us, is the whole complex 
 Jdeaj comprehended and marked by that Name ; and in Sub- 
 llances, bcfides the feveraldiftin(!i (\m^\Q ideas that make them 
 up, theconfufed one of Subftance, or of an unknown Support 
 and Caufe of their Union, is always a part : And therefore the 
 Eflcnce of Body is not bare Extenfion, but an extended fblid 
 thing:, andfotoHiy, an extended folid thing moves, or impels 
 another, is all one, and as intelligible, as to fay, Bcdj moves, 
 or impel?. Likewise, to fay, that a rational Animal is capable of 
 Coni'trfation, is all one , as to fay, a Man. But no one will fay. 
 That Rationality is capable of Converfation, becaufe it makes 
 not the v/hole Effence, to which we give the Name Man. 
 
 §. ix. There are Creatures in the World, that 
 Our abflraB have fhapcs like ours, but hairy, and want Lan- 
 Idcas are to us guagc, and Reafon, There are Naturals amonglt 
 the mcafitres uj,' hat have pcrft6tly our fhape, but want Reafon, 
 «fspec;es, iv and fomc of them Language too. There are Crca- 
 ftance in that tures,as 'tis faid, ( fn fides penes Authorem, but there 
 cfM-*n. appear? no contradiftion, that there fhould be 
 
 futh) that with Language, and Rearon,and a fhape 
 in other Things agreeing with ours, have hairy Tails :, others / 
 where the Males have no Beards, and otlers where the Females_ 
 h.we. Ific he asked, whether thefe be all "Men^ or no, all of 
 humnne5/'<?no; '(is phin, the Qiieflion. refers only to the nomi- 
 nal Effence: For thofe of rhcm to xVhom the definition of the 
 Word M.in^ or the complex Idea fignifiedbyNarne, agrees, arc 
 Mfw, and the other not. But if the Enquiry be made concerning 
 the fuppofc'd real Ef^i nee ; and whether the internal Conftiti.tioa 
 and Frame of thrfe fevcral Creatures be fpccifically different, ic 
 is wholly imp' ffiblc for usroanf\vcr, no part of that going into 
 our f^eciiick Idea: only we have Reafon to think, that where the 
 
 Faculties, 
 
Names of Suhfiances, 5"^ 
 
 Faculties, or outward Frame fo much differs, the Internal Con- 
 ftitutioa is not exafliy the fame : But, what difference in the 
 internal real Conftitution makes a fpecifick difference, it is ia 
 vain to enquire ^ whilft our meafures of Species be, as they arcy only, 
 our abjiraii Ideofi which we know ', andnot that internal Conlti- 
 tution, which makes no part of them. Shall the difierence of 
 Hair only on the Skin, be a mark of a different internal (j^eciHcl? 
 Conftiturion between a Changeling and a Drill, when they a- 
 gree in Shape, and want of Reafein and Speech ? And ftiall not 
 tha want of Reafbn and Speech, be a fign to us of different real 
 Conftitutions and Species bet^veen a Changeling, and a reafon- 
 able Man ? And fo of the reft, if we pretend, that the diftin- 
 <Sfcion of Species or Sorts is fixedly eftablifhed by the real Frame, 
 and fecret Conftitutions of things. 
 
 §. xj. Nor let any one %, that the power of spec/es net 
 propagation in Animals by the mixture of Male (jift'^g^'fied 
 and Female, and in Plants by Seeds, keeps the v Gengr». 
 fuppofed real ^/'mw diftinft and entire. For grant- ^'"■' 
 ing this to be true, it would help us in the diftin- 
 6lion of the Species of things no farther than the Tribes of A- 
 nimals and Vegetables. Whatmuft we do for the reft? Bur in 
 thofe too it is not fufficient : for if Hilf ory lie not, Women 
 have conceived by Drills; and what real Species^h^j th^t meafure^ 
 fuch a Production will be in Nature, will be a new Queflion;^ 
 and We have Reafbn to think this not impoflible, fince Mules 
 and Jumarts, the one from the mixture of an Afs and a Mare^ 
 the other from the mixture of a Bull and a Mare, are fb fre- 
 quent in the World. I once faw a Creature that was the IfTue 
 of a Cat and a Rat, and had the plain Marks of both about it j 
 wherein Nature appear'd to have followed the Pattern of nei- 
 ther fort alone, but to have jumbled them both together. To. 
 which, he that (hall add the raonftrous Produdlions, that are (b 
 frequently to be met with inNature,will find it hard, even in the 
 race of Animals, to determine by the Pedigree of what Speciey 
 every Animal's IfTue is", and beat alofs about the real Efience, 
 which he thinks certainly conveyed by Generation,and has alone 
 a right to the fpecifick Name. But farther, if the Species of Ani- 
 mals and Plants are to be diifinguifhedonly by.Propagation,muU: 
 I go to the Indies to fee the Sire and Dam of the one, and the 
 PJant from which the Seed was gather'd,that produced ihe other, 
 CO know whether this be a Tyger or that Tea ? 
 
 §. X4. Upon the whole mattes 'tis evident, ^^a/ hy fubfiaiir 
 that 'tis their own Colleciioiis of fenlibk Qija: tial forms. 
 
 litiesa 
 
'^4 Names of Suhflances. 
 
 lities, that Men make the Eflencc3 of their feveral [yrfs of 
 Subftances *, and that their real internal Strudturcs , arc not 
 conlidercd by the greateft part of Men, in the forting them. 
 iMuch lefs were zny fubfi.mtntl Forms ever thought on by any, 
 but thole who have in this one part of the World, learned 
 the Langua;;e of the Schools : and yet thofe ignorant Men, 
 who pretend not any infight into the real Eflences, nor trouble 
 themfclves about (ubftantial Forms, but are content with know- 
 ing Things one from another^ by their fcnlible Qualities, are 
 often better acquainted with their Differences; can more nicely 
 diftinguifh them from their ufes ', and better know what the/ 
 may expedl from each, than thofe learned qaick-fighted Men, 
 who look fb deep into them, and talk (b confidently of fome- 
 thlng more hidden and tffential. 
 
 §. X5. But fuppofing that the real EJfenees of 
 The fpecifck Subftances were discoverable, by thofe, that would 
 Efences are fevcrely apply themfclves to that Enquiry ^ yet we 
 made by the could not reafonably think, that the ranking ^ 
 M-^^d- things under general Namesy zvai regulated by thole in- 
 
 ternal real Conftitutions, or any thing eUe but their 
 ohviom appearances. Since Languages, in all Countries, have been 
 eftablilhed long before Sciences. So that they have not been 
 Philofbphers, or Logicians, or fuch who have troubled them- 
 (elves about Forms and Ejjencesy that have made the general, 
 Name?, that are in ufe amongft the feveral Nations of Men ; But 
 thoft', more or lefs comprehenfive terms, have for the moft part^ 
 in all Languages, received their Birth and Signification, from 
 innorant and illiterate People, who forted and denominated 
 'I'nings by thofe fen fible Qualities they found in them, thereby 
 ro fignify them, when abfenr, to other?, whether they had an 
 Occafion to mention a Sort, or a particular Thing. 
 
 §. ^6. Since then it is evident, that we fort and 
 Therefore name Subftances by their nominal^ and not by their 
 -very vitrteu* real EJfenees ; the next thing to be coiifidercd-.is,' 
 W uHcer- how, and by whom thefe Effences come to be raade.^ 
 '*'"• As to the latter, 'ris evident they are made by the 
 
 Mindf and not by Na'ure : For were they Nature's 
 Workmanfhip, they could not be fo various and different in fe- 
 veral Men, as experience fells us, they are. For if we will ex- 
 amine ir, wc (hall not find the nominal Elfence of any one SfC' 
 cies of Subflances, in all Men the fame ; no not of that, which 
 of all others we are the moft intimately acquainted with. It 
 coulu no: pofTibly be^ that the abfliad I^erf, to which the Name 
 
blames of Sulftancgs. ^^ 
 
 Man 13 gl^en, fiiould be different in feveral Men, if it were of 
 Natuie'a making", and that to one it fhould be Animal rationaky 
 and to another, /inimalimplume hipes latjs unguibui. He that an- 
 nexes the Name Man^ to a complex idea^ made up of Senfe and 
 fpontaneous Motion, join'd to a Body oi fich a Shape, has there- 
 by one Effence of the Species Man : And he that, upon farther 
 examination, adds Rationality, as another EiTence of the S.peci»f 
 he calls Man : By which means, the fame individual will be a 
 true Man to the one, which is not fb to the other. I thijik, 
 there is fcarce any one will allow this upright Figure, fo well 
 known, to be the effential difference of the Spectcs. Man; and 
 yet how far Men determine of the (orrs of Animals, rather by 
 their Shape, than Defcenr, is very vifible^ fince it has been more 
 than once debated, whe:her feveral humane Fatui fhould be 
 preferved, or received to Baptifin, or no, only becaufe ci the 
 difference of their outward Configuration, from the ordinary- 
 Make of Children, without knov^^ing whether they were not 
 as capable of Reafon, as Infants cail: in another Mould : Some 
 whereof, though of an approved (haf e, are never capable of as 
 much appearance of R.eafon, all their Lives, as is to be found 
 in an Ape, or an Elephant ; and never give any fjgns of being 
 ad:ed by a rational Soyl. Whereby it is evident, that the out- 
 ward Figure, which only was found wanting, and not the Fa- 
 culty of Reafon, which nobody could know would be wanting 
 in its dueSea(bn,was made effential to the humane Species. The 
 learn';d Divine and Lawyer, muff, on fiich occafions, renounce 
 his facred Definition of Animal [{ationakf and fubffitute fome o- 
 ther Effence of the humane J/'fciVj. Monfieur Menage furnifhc^ 
 us with an Example worth the raking notice of on this occafion. 
 When the Abbot of St. Martin, fays he, was bom, he had fo little of 
 the Figure of a Man-, that it befpake him rather a Monjler. 'Twos for 
 fome time under Deliberation^ whether he Jhould he bapti:^ed or no^ 
 IloWever , he ivai bapti:(e4 and declared a Man provifionaUy [ till 
 time fhould fhew what he would prove. ] Nature had moulded 
 him fo untCTvardly^ that be tfai called all his Life the Abbot Malotruy 
 i. e. Ill fhaped. He n^ai o/Caen. Mena^iana l-^l. This Child, 
 we fee was very near being excluded out of the Species of Man^ 
 barely bv his Shape. He efcaped very narrowly as he was, and' 
 'tis certain a Figure a litdemore odly turn'd had caft him, and 
 he had been executed as a thing not to be allowed to pafs for a 
 Man. And yet there can be no Reafon given, why if the Li- 
 neaments of his Face had been a little aket'd, a rational Soul 
 ^Quld not have been lodg'd in hira a why a Viftge fomewhat 
 
 * longer 
 
5 5 Name 5^ of Sul flames. 
 
 longer, or a Nofe flaBijf, or a wider Mouth could not have con- 
 fined, as well as the 'fed: ot his ill Figure, with fuch a Soul, 
 fiich Parts, as madt,hiAi, disfigurtd as he was, capable to be a 
 Dignicaiy in the Church. 
 ' §. x/. Wherein then, would I gladly know, confifls the pre- 
 cife and unmoveaUe Boundaries of that Speciei ? ' Tis plain, it We 
 examine, there is no fuch thing made by Nature^ and cftabliQied 
 by Her iimongft Men. The real Effence of that, or any other 
 Ibrt of Subftances, 'cis evident we know not ", and therefore are 
 {o undetermined in our nominal Eflcrnces, which we make our 
 lelve'-, that if (everal Men were to be asked, concerning forae 
 odlyihiped Fcetui, as foon as born, whether it wereaM^w, or 
 no, 'tis paft dojbt, one fliould meet with difFereni Anfwers. 
 Which could not happen, if the nominal Eflences, whereby we 
 limit and diltinguifli the Species of Subftanccs, were not made 
 by Man, with fome liberty ; but were exactly copied froai pre- 
 cipe Boundaries ftt by Nature, whereby it diftinguifh'd all Sub-, 
 ftances into certain Species. Who would undertake to refolve, 
 what Spicies that Monfter was of, which is mentioned by Licetus^ 
 lib. I.e.;. with a Man's Head and Hog's Body ? Or thole other, 
 which to the Bodies of Men, had the Heads of Beafts, as Dogs, 
 Horfes, i3c. If any of thele Creatures had lived, and could 
 have fpoke, it would have increaftd the difficulty. Had the up- 
 per parr, to the middle, been of humane Shape, and all below 
 Swine; Had it been Murder to deftroyit? Or muft theBiOiop 
 have been confulted, whether it were-JVlan enough to be ad- 
 mitted to the Font, or no ? As I have been told, it happen'd in 
 France fbme Years (ince, in fome what a like cafe. So uncertain 
 are the Boundaries of Species of Animals to us, who have no o- 
 ther Mcafurcs, than the complex Ideat of our own colleiling : 
 And fo far are we from certainly knowing what a Aitf/i isj 
 though, perhap?, it will be judged great Ignorance to make any 
 doubt about it. And yet, I think, I may fty, that thq^ certain ' 
 Boundaries of that Species^ are fo far from being Iftteirmincd. _ 
 and the precipe number oi [\mp\e Ideoit which make the nominal 
 Eflence, fo far from being fetled, and perfe<£Hy known, that 
 very material Doubts may ftill arife about it ; And I imagine, 
 none of the Dcfinirions of the word Man-, which wc yet have, 
 nor Defcrlptions of that (ort of Animal, are fo perfc6i and exa6l, 
 as to fatiffie a confiderate inqullitive Perf^n ; much kfs to ob- 
 tain a general Confent, and to be that which Men would every-^ 
 where flick by, in the Decifion of Cafes, and determining of 
 Life and Death, E.-iptIGn or no Baptifm, in Prodti^ions tha5 
 mi^ht happen. §. iS- 
 
 A 
 
Names of Sulflances. ^f 
 
 $. i8. But though thefe nominal EJJences of Suh- 
 y?a/7cwaremadeby theMInd, they are «of yet made pf*f»tj9ar' 
 fi arbitrarily, as thofe of mixed Mode:. To the ma- ^[xJ^IiAA 
 king of any nominal Effence, it is neceflary, F/>/?» ' ° ''* 
 That the Ideas whereof it confifts, have fuch an Union as to 
 make bat one Idea, how compounded foever. Secondly, That 
 the particular Ideas fo united, be exa6tly the fame, neither more 
 nor left. For if two abftrad complex Ideas, differ either in 
 Number or Sorts, of their component parts, they make two 
 different, and not one and the lame Effence. In the firff of 
 thefe, the Mind, in making its complex Ideas of Subftances, 
 only follows Nature j and puts none together, which are not 
 fuppoled to have an union in Nature. No body joins the Voice 
 of a Sheep* with the Shape of a Horfe ; nor the Colour of Lead, 
 with the Weight and Fixednefi of*Gold, to be the complex 
 Ideas oizny real Subftances; unlefs he has a mind to fill hia 
 Head with Chimara's, and his Difcourfe with unintelHgible 
 Words. Men, obferving certain Qualities always join'd and 
 exifting together, therein copied Nature , and of Ideas fo united, 
 made their complex ones of Subftances. For tho' Men may 
 make what complex Ideas they pleafe, and give what Names to 
 them they will ; yet if they will be underftood, wjien they.. 
 Ipeak of Things really exifting, they unuft, in fbme degree,- 
 conform their Ideas to the Things they would fpeakof : Or ejfe 
 Mens Language will be like that of Bahl ', and every Man's 
 Words,being intelligible only to himfelf, would no longer /erve 
 to Gbnverfation, and the ordinary Affairs of Life, if the ideas 
 they ftand for, be not fbme way anfwering the common ap- 
 pearances and agreement of Subfta,nces, as they really exift. 
 
 §. 29. Secondly, Though the Mind of Men, in 
 making its complex Ideas of Subfiances, never put any Tho' very im- 
 together that do not really, or are not fuppofcd to ferfeS. 
 co-exift '-) and fo it truly borrows that Union from 
 Nature •• Yet the number it combines, depends upon the various Care, 
 Indiiftry^ or Fancy of him that makes if- Men generally content 
 themlelves with Ibme few fcnfible obvious Qualities; and often, 
 if not always, leave out others as material, and as firmly uni- 
 ted, as ihofc that they take. Of fenfible Subftances there are 
 two forts •, one of organiz'd Bodies, which are propagated by 
 Seed ; and in thefe, the Shape is that, which to us is the lead- 
 ing Quality, and moft charac^eriftical Part, that determines the 
 Species : And therefore in Vegetables and Animals, an extended 
 lulid Subftance of fuch a certain Figure ufually fcrvts the turn. 
 
 For 
 
58 Names oj Suhjlanus, 
 
 For however fomc Men fecm to juIie their Dcfiiutkm of /Ini' 
 mat [Rationale, yet (houU there a Creature be found, that iiad 
 LanguapjC and Reafun, but partakcd not ot the ufual Ihapeofa 
 Man, I believe it would hardly pafs for a Man, how much Ibc- 
 Ver it were Animal Rationale. A>id if Balaam-^ hk had, ail his 
 Ufe, dilcourfed as rationally as he did once with hi.^ Mafter. I 
 doubt yet, wlicther any one would have thought him worthy 
 the Name Man^ or allowed him to be of the lame Sj>ecies with 
 himfelf. As in Vegetables and Animals *tis the Shapt,fo in raoft 
 other Bodies, not propagated by Seed, 'tis the Colour we moft 
 fix on, and are molt led by. Thus where we find the Colour 
 of Gold, wc are apt to imagine all the other Qualities, com- 
 prehended in our complex I^ea, to be there alfo; and we com- 
 monly take thcfe two obvious Qijalities, -y*:^. Shape jJhd Colour, 
 for fo pre(umptivc Idedi 6f feveral Species , that in a good Pi- 
 6tuic, vvc readily fay, ihis is a Lion, and that a Role; this is 
 a Gold, and that a Silver Gohlet, only by the different figures 
 and Colours, reprelentcd to the Kye by the I-*cncil. 
 
 §. ao. liut though this ferves well enough for 
 Which yet grofs and confu/ed Conceptions, and unaccurate 
 ferveforcom ways of Talking and Thinking ^ yet Men are far 
 f/itn Converfe. enough from having agreed on thefrecijfe number offim' 
 fie Ideas, or Qualities, belonging to any fert of Things^ 
 Ji^nified by its name. Nor is it a wonder, fince it requires much 
 rime, pains, and skill, ft ridt enquiry, and long examination, to 
 find out what, and how many thofe limple IdeM are, which are 
 conftantly and infeparably united in Nature, and areal\9ays to 
 be found together in the fame Subjedi. Moft Men, wanting 
 either Time, Inclination, or Induftry enough for this, even to 
 Ibme tolerable degree, content themlelves with fome few obvi- 
 ous, and outward appearances of Things, thereby readily todi- 
 fflnguilh and fort them for the common Affairs of L'ie •• And 
 fo, without farther examination, gi^e them Names, or take up 
 the Names already in ulc. Which, though in common Conver- 
 fation they pafs well enough for the figns of fbme few obvious " 
 Qualities co-exifting, are yet far enough ffom comprehending, 
 an a fetled fignificarion, a precife number of fimple ideM •, much 
 left all thofe, which are united in Nature. He that (hall con- 
 fider, after fo much ftir, about Genus and Species j and fuch a 
 deal of Talk of fpecifick Differences, how few X^'ords we have 
 yet fetled Definitions of, may, withReafbn, imagine, that i^ofcf 
 FormSf which there hath been fb much noife nude about, are 
 only Chmaras •, which give us no light into the fpc^ificjc Na- 
 tures 
 
t^ames of Sul fiances. 5' 9 
 
 tures o^ Things. And he that fhall confider, hov^ far the 
 Names of Subftances are from having Significations, wherein ail 
 who ufe them do agree, will have reafon to conclude, that 
 though tlie nominal EfleiKes of Subftances, are all luppoied to 
 be copied from Nature \ yet they are all, or moft of them, very 
 imperfe^. Since the Compofition of thofe complex Jdeas^ are, 
 in feverdl Men, very different : and therefore, that thefe Boun- 
 daries of Species^ are as Men, and not as Nature makes them, 
 if at leaft there are in Nature any fuch prefixed Bounds. *ris 
 true, that many particular Subftances arefo made by Nature, 
 that they have agreement and likenefi one Vf^ith another, and fo 
 afford a Foundation of being ranked into forts. But the forting 
 of Things by us, or the making of determinate Species^ being in 
 order to naming and comprehending them under general terms, 
 I cannot lee how it can be properly (aid, that Nature fets the 
 Boundaries of the Species of Things: Or if ic be fo, our Boun- 
 daries of Species^ are not exaftly conformable to thofe in Na- 
 ture. For w^e, having need of general l^ames for prcfent ufe, 
 flay not for a perfe6t difcovery of all thofe Qualities, which 
 would beft fliew us their moft material differences and agree- 
 ments ^ but we our felves divide them, by certain obvious ap^ 
 pearances, into Species^ that we may the eafior, under general 
 Names, communicate our Thoughts about them. For having no 
 other Knowledge of any Subftance, but of the fimple J^e4Sf, that 
 are united in it ; and obferving feveral particular Things to a- 
 gree with others, in feveral of thofe fimplc lied*, we make that 
 coUeiftion our fpeclfick Idea^ and give ic a general Name; that 
 in recording our own Thoughts, and in our Difcourfe with o- 
 thers, we may in one fhort word, defign all the Individuals that 
 agree in that complex Idea^ without enumerating the fimple 
 tdeas^ tbat make it up •-, and fo not wafte our Time and Breath 
 in tedious Defcriptions : which we fee they arc fain to do, who 
 would difcourfe of any new fort of Things, they have not yet 
 a Name for. 
 
 §.51. But however, thefe %c/>j of Subftances Efivces of 
 pafs well enough in ordinary Converfation, it is species mder 
 plain , that this complex Idea, wherein they ob- '^^ f*^^^ 
 lerve feveral Individuals to agree, i?, by different "^^^ '"^'7 
 Men, made very differently •, by fbme more, and 'P*'^^^' 
 others lefs accurately. In fome, this complex idea 
 contains a greater, and in others a fmaller number of Qijalities, 
 and io is apparently fuch as the Mind makes it. The yellow 
 ftiining Colour, makes Gold to Children ^ others add Weight, 
 
 Mrakable- 
 
6o Names of Suljlances. 
 
 Malleablcnefs, and Fufibility ; and others yet other Qyalltlcs, 
 which rhey Hud joined with that yellow Culour, as conftintly 
 as its Weight and Fufibility i For iiiallthcfc, and the like Qua- 
 lities, one has as good a right to be put into the complex Idea 
 of that S'jbltance, wherein they arc all join'd, as another. And 
 therefore different Men leaving our, or putting in (everal finiple 
 IdeM^ which others do not, according to their various Examina- 
 tion, Skill, or obfervation of that fubjefl, have different Effences 
 of Gold ; which muft therefore be of their own, and not of Na- 
 ture's making. 
 
 §. ;x. If the number of fimple Ideas, that makf 
 The more ge- the nominal EJfence of the lowelt Species, or Hrlt 
 itei-al our I- (brtingof Individuals, defends on the Mind o^ Wim^ 
 dcas arc, the variously colle6ling them, it is much more evident, 
 TTJore ivcom- that they do fb, in the more comprehenlive Clajfis, 
 fkte andpar- which, by the Mafters of Logick are called Genera, 
 t ml they are. 'Yhde are complex ideai defignedly imperfe<^ : 
 And 'tis vlfible at firft fight, that feveral of thofe 
 Qjalitlcs, that are to be found in the Things themlelves, are 
 purpofciy left out of generical Ideas. For as to the Mind, to 
 make general Ideas, comprehending (everal particulars, leaves 
 out thofe of Time, and Place, and fuch other, that make them 
 incommunicable to more than one Individual \ (b to make other 
 yet more general Ideas, that may comprehend different forts, ic 
 leaves out thofe Qiialities that diftingulth them, and puts into 
 its new Collection, only fuch ideas, as are common to feveral 
 Ibrtjf. The fame Convenience that made Men exprefs feveral 
 parcels of yellow Matter coming from Guiny and ?eru, under 
 one Name, fetsthemalfb upon making of one Name> that may 
 comprehend both Gold, and Silver, and fbme other Bodies of dif- 
 ferent Jbrts. This is done by leaving out thofe Qualities, which 
 are peculiar to each fort ^ and retaininga complex Idea made up 
 of thofe, that are common to them all. To which the Name Metal 
 being annexed, thereisaGf«w conftituted ^ the EflTenoe whcreoF 
 being that abftrad I:/ff4, containing only Malleablencfs and Fufi- 
 bility, with certain degrees of Weight and Fixednef?, wherein 
 fbme Bodies of feveral Kinds agree, leaves out the Colour, and o- 
 ther Qiialities peculiar to Gold,and Silver, and the other forts com- 
 prehended under the Name Metal. Whereby it is plain, that Men 
 follow not cxa£lly the Patterns fee them by Nature, when they 
 make their general r^e<« of Subllances ', fmce there is no Body to 
 be found, which has barely Malleablencfs and Fufibility in it, 
 without other Qjalitics as infeparable as thofe. But Men, in 
 
 niaking 
 
Names of Sulflantes» 6 1 
 
 taakhig their general Idtas^ feeking more the convenience df 
 Language and quick difpatch, by fhort and comprehenfive fign?, 
 than the true and precife Nature of Things, asthey ejiift, haVe, 
 in the framing their abftra6l;^ Ideeii^ chiefly purfued that end, 
 which was, to be furnilhed with ftore of general, andvarioufly 
 comprehenfive Names. So that in this wholebufinefs o£ Genejra 
 and Species , the GenuSf or more comprehenfive, is but a partial 
 oConcepiion of what is in the Species^ and the Species, but a par- 
 tial Idea of what is to be found in each individual. If therefore 
 anyone will think, that aA</^»,and a HorCey andan Animal, and 
 a Plant, C^c. are diftinguifhed by real EfTences made by Nature, 
 he mull Nature to be very liberal of thefe real Effenccs, making 
 one for Body,another for an Animal,and another for a Horfcjand 
 all thefe Effences liberally bellowed upon Bucephalus. But if we 
 would rightly confider what is done, in all thefe Generadindi Spe- 
 cies, or Sorts, we fhould find, that there is no new Thing made, 
 but only more or left comprehenfive figns whereby we may be 
 enabled to exprefs, in a few fyllables, great numbers of parri- 
 icular Thing?, as they agree in more or lefs general Conceptions, 
 which we havp framed to thatpurpofe. In all which, We rtiay 
 obferve, that the rhore general term, is always the Name of a lefs 
 complex Idea ^ and that each Genus is but a partial Conception cf 
 the Species comprehended under it. So that if thefe abftraiSl ge-- 
 neral ideas be thought to be complete , it can only be in refpt6t 
 of a certain eftabllfhed relation, between them and cerrair* 
 Kamesjwhich are tnade ule of to fignifie them ; and not in refptdt 
 of any thing exlfting, as made by Nature. 
 
 §. 33. rhis is adjujied to the true end of Speech, rhi, all ac^ 
 which IS to be the ealieit and fhorrelt way ot com- cnmr.odated 
 raunicating our N otions. For thus he, that would to the end cj 
 make and difcourfe of Things, as they agreed in speak. 
 the complex Idea of Extenfion and Solidity, needed 
 but ufe the Word Bod^, to denote all fuch. He 
 that, to thefe, would join others, fignified by the Words Life, 
 Senfe, arid fpontaneous Motion, needed but ufe the Word ^«/wd/i 
 to fignify all which partaked of thole Ideas : and he that had 
 made a complex /dfe4 of a Body, with Life, Senfe, and Motion, 
 with the Faculty of Reafoning, and a certain Shape joined to Ir, 
 needed but ufe the fhorc monofyllable Mm, to exprefs all parti- 
 culars that correfj:)ond to that complex li/e^. This is the proper 
 bufinefs of Genus and Species : and this Men do , without any 
 conUdcrauon 0^ real EJJefices or fiih/lantial Forms, whiclironne not 
 Within the reach of our Knowledge, v/hen vve think of thols 
 Voll 11, F thing? J 
 
6z Names of Suhjiances. 
 
 things', nor within the fignification of our Word^j when W6 
 difcourfe with others. 
 
 §. 54. Were T to talk with any one, of a Sort 
 htfianeein of Birds, I lately faw in St. Jamci's Park, about 
 Contraries. three or four Foot high , with a Covering of 
 fomething between Feathers and Hair, of a dark 
 brown Colour, without Wings, but in the Place thereof, two 
 or three little Branches, coming down like fj^rigs of Spanifh 
 Broom •, long great Legs, with Feet only of three Claws, and 
 without a Tail :, I mult make this Dclcription of ir, and ib may 
 make others underftand me •• But when I am told, that the Name 
 of it is CaJfuartSy I may then ufe that Word to ftand in difcourfe 
 for all my complex lilea mentioned in that defcripiion :, though 
 by that word, which is now become a fpeclfick Name, I know 
 no more of the real Eflencc, orConftitutionofthatfort of Ani- 
 mals, than I did before •, and knew probably as much of the Na- 
 ture of that 5/ec;>j of Birds, before I leam'd the Name, as many 
 £«^/;y^'mendoofSwans, or Herons, which are fpecifick Names, 
 very well known of Ibrts of Birds common in England. 
 
 §. ;5. From what has been ^S, 'tis evident^ 
 Men deter- that Men make forts of Things. For it being dif- 
 mtne the forts, ferent Eflences alone, that make different Species^ 
 'tis jilain, that they who make thofe abftrac^ Ideas^ 
 which are the nominal Eflences, do thereby make the Stecies^ or 
 Sort. Should there be a Body found, having all the other Qua- 
 lities of Gold, except Malleablencfs, 'cwoulqf no doubt, be made 
 a qucltion whether it were Gold or noj ;. e. whether it were 
 of that Species. This could be determined only by that abllradt 
 Jdea^ ^o which every one annexed the Name Cold : fb that it 
 wculdbe true Gold to him, and belong to that Sfecits who in- 
 cluded not Malleablencfs in his nominal Eflcnce, fignified by the 
 Sound Gold •, and on the other fide, it would not be irue Gold, 
 or of that S"/ec:<Vj to him, who included Malleablencfs in his fpe- 
 citickJ^ff4 And who, I pray, isir, that makes thcfe divetsS/^e- 
 ciesy even under on*^ and the fame name, but Men that make 
 tw'o different abftia^l ideafy confifling not exa6lly of the fame 
 colle6lionof Qiialitics? Nor isit amcre Suppofition to imagine, 
 that a Body may exill, wherein the other obvious Qualities of 
 Gold may be without Malleablenefs ; fince it is certain, that 
 Gold it felfwillbcibmctimes fo eager, (as Artiftscall it ) that it 
 willas little endure the Hammer, asGlafj.itfc]f What we have 
 (aid, of the putting in, or leaving out of Malleablencfs out of the 
 complex Idea^ the Name Gold is, by any one, annexed to, may 
 
Names of Stihjiances\ 65 
 
 be (aid of its peculiar Weight, Flkednefs, and feveral other the 
 like Oyaiicies: For whatfoevei Is left out, or put in, 'tis Hill the 
 complex Ueuy to which that Name Is annexed, that makes the 
 Sfecies : and as any particular parcel of Matter anAyers that Idea^ 
 16 the Name of the fort belongs truly to it ; and it is of that Sfe^ 
 cies. And thus aliy thing is true Gold^ perfeft Metal. All which 
 determination of the Speciesy 'tis plain, depends on the Undcr-^ 
 {landing of Man, making this or that complex Idea. 
 
 §. 56. This then, InQiort, is the Cafe : Nature 
 makes many particular Things ^ which do agree one Nature mahe^ 
 with another, in many fenuble Qualities, and pro- theStmiUtude, 
 bably too, in their internal Frame and Conftitution; 
 but 'tis not this real Eflettce that diftlnguiflies them Into Impedes % 
 'tis Meriy who, taking occafion from the Qualities they find uni- 
 ted in them, and wherein, they obferve often leveral individuals 
 to agref, range them into SartSf in order to their naming^ fot the 
 ■convenience of comprehenfive figns; under which individuals, 
 according to their conformity to this or that abftraft Idea^ come 
 to be ranked as under Enfigns^ Co that this Is of the Blue, thac 
 the Red Regijnent ; this is a Man, that a Drill : And in this* 
 I think, con/ifts the whole bufinels of Genus and Species. 
 
 §. 3 7. 1 do not deny, but Nature* in the conftant produ£liort 
 of particular Beings, makes them not always new and various^ 
 but very much alike and of kin one to another : But I think ic 
 ilevertheleis true, that the boundaries of the Species^ whereby Men 
 Jort them, are made by Men\ (inCe theEflences of the Species^ dl- 
 ftinguifhed by different Names, are , as has been prcsved, of 
 Man's making, and feldom adequate to the internal Nature of 
 the Things they are taken from. So that we may truly fay^ 
 fuch a manner of (bning of Things , is the Workmanfhip of 
 Men. 
 
 §. ; %. One thing, 1 doubt not, but Will feem Each ahjira^ 
 Very ftrange in this Doctrine ', which is, that from Idea it an 
 what has been (aid, it will follow, that each ah- Efeme. 
 fira^ Idea, with a name to it^ makes a diJiifiEi Species, 
 But who can help it, if Truth will have it fo ? For fo it muft 
 remain, till fome body can fhew us the S/'ecw of Things, limited 
 and difllngulftied by (bmething elfe j and let us fee, that general 
 terms fignify not our abflraft /^e^/, butfomething different ironrx 
 them. I would fain know, why a Shock and a Hounds arc 
 not as difthicft Species^ as a Spaniel and an Elephant. We have 
 no other Uea of the different Effence of an Elephant and a 
 Spaniel, thanwc have of the different Eflenceof aShockand a 
 
 F 9., Houitd 5 
 
64 Names of SuhJlAncds 
 
 Hound ^ all the eflential difference, whereby we know and di- 
 flinguifh them one from another, confiftingonlyin thedifferent 
 CoJiedion of Gmple J^tf^/, to which we have given thofe diffe- 
 rent Names. 
 
 §.59. How much the makjng of Species and Ge- 
 Genera and "^''^ ^ '" '"'^''' ^^ g^^^^^^ Names, and how much ge- 
 Sfccksareiu neral Names are ncctflary, ifnotto the B-ing, yet 
 order tona- at Icaft to the completing of a Spectes, and making 
 nAng. it pafs for (uch, will appear, befides what has been 
 
 faid above concerning Ice and Water, in a very fa- 
 miliar Example. A filent and a Itriking Watch, are but one Spe- 
 cies, to thofe who have but one Name for them : but he that nas 
 the Name TVatch for one, and Clocks for the other, and dillinft 
 complex Ideas y to which thofe Names belong, to him they are 
 different Species, It will be faid, perhaps, that the inward con- 
 trivance and conftitution is different between thefe two, which 
 the Watch maker has a clear Idea of And yet, 'tis plain, rhey 
 are but one Species to him, when he has but one Name for them. 
 For what is fufficient in the inward Contrivance, to make a iiew 
 Species ? There are (bme iVatches^ that are made with four 
 Wheels, others with five: Is this a fpecifick difference to the 
 Workman ? Some have Strings and Phyfies, and others none \ 
 Ibme have the Balance loofe, and others regulated by a fpiral 
 Spring, and others by Hogs Bridles : Are any, or all of thefe 
 cnouiih to make a fpecifick difference to the Workman, that 
 knows each of rhefc, and feveral other different contrivances, in 
 the internal Conftitutions of ?^4fc/;« ? 'Tis certain, cachofthcfe 
 hath a real difference from the reft : But whether it be an 
 effcntial, a fpecifick difference or no, relates only to the complex 
 Idi'o, to which the Name iVatch is given : as long as they all a- 
 grce in the Idea which that Name ftands for, and that Name 
 docs not as a gcnerical Name comprehend different Species under 
 icjthey are not effcntially nor f^ccifically different. But if any on^ 
 will make minuter Divifions from Differences, that h^ kno\»s ia 
 the internal frame of Watches j and to fuch prccifc complex 
 idcai, give Names that fhali prevail, they will then be new Species 
 to them, who have thofe Ideas with Names to them ; and tan, 
 by thofe difference?, diftinguifh Watches into thefe fevcral forts, 
 ani then IPatch will be a generical Name. But yet they would 
 be nodillin6t; Species to Men, ignorant of Clock-work, and the 
 inward Contrivances ofWatchc?, who had no other Idea, but 
 the outward Shape and Bulk, v^ith the marking of the Hours 
 by the Hand. For to them, all thole other Names would be 
 
 but 
 
Names of Suhfiances. 6 7 
 
 but fynonymolis Terms for the fame Idea^ and fignifie no more, 
 nor no other thing but a PVatch. Juft thus, I think, it is in na- 
 tural Things. No body will doubt, that the Wheels, or Springs 
 ( iflmayfolay) within, are different indi rational Man, and a 
 Changeling-, no more than that there is a Difference in the Frame 
 between a Drill and a Changeling. But whether one, or both 
 thefe Differences be effential, or (pecifical, is only to be known 
 to u?, by their agreement, or difagrcement with the complex 
 Idea that the Name Man (lands for: For by that alone can it be 
 determined, whether one, or both, orneither of thoftbea Man, 
 or no. 
 
 §. 40. From what has been before ftid, we speci'es of ar^ 
 may fee the reafbn, why, in the Species of artificial t i fid al things 
 Things., there is generally lefs confujion and unceftainty., lefi cofifu/ed 
 than in natural. Becaufe an artificial Thing being than natural, 
 a produdlion of Man, which the Artificer defign'd, 
 and therefore well knows the Ideaof, the Name of it is fuppo^d 
 to ftand for no other Idea, nor to import any other Eflence, 
 than what is certainly to be known, and eafy enough to be ap- 
 prehended. For the Idea, or Eflence, of the feveral forts of^r- 
 tificial Things, confiding, for the moft part, in nothing but 
 the determinate Figure of fcnfible Parrs *, and fometimes Mo- 
 tion depending thereon, which the Artificer fafliions in Matter, 
 fuchas he finds for his Turn, it is not beyond the reach of our 
 Faculties to attain a certain idea thereof^ and fo fettle the fignifi- 
 cation of the Names whereby the Species of artificial Things are 
 diftinguifhedjwith lefs Doubt, Obfcurity, and Equivocation,than 
 we can in Things natural, whofe Differences and Operations 
 depend upon Contrivances,beyond the reach of our Diicoveries. 
 
 §. 41. Imuftbeexcufedhere, iflthink, rfm^c/W 
 Things are of diftinH Species, as well as natural : , ^^^^fi"^J- 
 Since I find they are as plainly and orderly ranked a'"£'c 
 into forts, by different abffradl Ideas, with gene ^ "* Z'^^^^* 
 ral Names annexed to them, as diftincSt one from another as rhofe 
 of natural Subftances. For why fhould wenot think a Watch,, 
 and Piftol, as diftin6t Species one from another, asaHorfe, and 
 a Dog, they being expreffed in our Minds by diftinil Ideas,, and 
 to others, by dill:in6t Appellations ? 
 
 §. 4.1. This is farther to be oblerv'd concerning Subflancesa- 
 Suhftances, that they /?/o«(? of all our feveral forts of lane have pre-- 
 Ideas, have particular, or proper Names, whereby P^'' ^^w«- 
 one only particular Thing is fignified. Becaufe in 
 femple J^frfj, Modes,^'and Relations, It feldom happens, that 
 
66 Karnes of Stiljlances, 
 
 Men h^ve occafion to mention often this, or that particular^ 
 when it is abfent. Befides, the greatefl: part of mixed Modes, 
 being Actions, which iperifli in their Birth, are not capable of a 
 lalling Duration, as Subftances, which are the A6lorsj and 
 wheitin thefimple idea that make up the complex Ififrfi deCgned 
 by the Name, have a lafting Union. 
 
 §. 45. Imuft beg pardon of my Reader, forha- 
 ' Difficulty to ving dwelt fo lon^ upon this Subjeft, and perhaps, 
 treat of iVords. with fome Obfcurity . But I dcfire, it may be con- 
 fidered, how difficult it is, to lead another by iVords 
 into the Thoughts of Things ^ ftriffd ofthofeffecificxl differences we give 
 then^: Which Things, if I name not, I (ay nothing-, and if I 
 do name rhcm, I thereby rank them into fome (brt, or other, 
 and fuggeft to the Mind the uliial abftra£i: idea of that Species j and 
 fo croft my purpose. For to talk of a Man, and to lay by, at 
 the fime time, the ordinary fignification of the Name hdan, 
 which is our complex Idea, qfually annexed to it ', and bid the 
 Reader conGder M.w, as he is inhimfclf, and as he is realiy di- 
 itinguifhed from others, in his internal Conftitution, or real 
 Eflence, that is, by fbmeihing, he knows not what, looks like 
 tritiing : and yet thus one mult do , who would fpeak of the lijp- 
 poled real Eflences and Species of Things, as thought to be 
 ma«le by Nature, if it be but only to make it underftood, that 
 there is no flich thing fignified by the general Namcs,which Sub- 
 llances are called by. But becaufeit is difficult by known familiar 
 Names to dothis,give me leave to endeavour by an Example, to 
 make the different Confiderationjthe Mind has of fpecifick Names 
 and Ideas, a little more clear; and to fhcw how the complex Ideat 
 of Modtsare referred fbmetimesto Archetypes in the Minds of 
 other Intelligent Beings ; or which is the fame, to the fignifica- 
 tion annexed by others to their received Names ; and fbmetimes 
 to no Archetypes at all. Give me leave alfo to fhew how the 
 Mind always refers its Ideai of Subftances, either to the Subftan- 
 ces themfelves, or to the fignification of their Namcfi, as to'the 
 Archetypes; and alfo to make plain the Nature o[ Species, or fbrt- 
 ing of Things, as apprehended, and made ufe of by us ", and of 
 the EfTences belonging to thofc Species, which is, perhaps of 
 more Moment, to difcover the Extent and Certainty of our 
 Knowledge, than we at firft imagine. 
 
 §. 44. Lctusfuppofe j^ln?! In the State of 
 Tnflanct tf mixed a grown Man, with a good Underftanding, 
 Modes in Kinncah but in a flrange Country, with all Things 
 ««iNiouph. j,g^^ ^j^j unknown about him ; and no 
 
 Qthci 
 
NatKes of Suhflances* 67 
 
 other FacuUIes^ to attain the Knowledge of them, but what 
 one of this Age has now. ^ He obferves Lamech more melancholy 
 than ufual, and imagines it to be from a fufi:)icion he has of his 
 Wife Adah ( whom he moft ardently loved ) that (he had too 
 much kindnefs for another Man. Jdam dilcourfes thefe his 
 Thoughts to Eve^ and defirea her to take care that Adah commit 
 not folly : And in thefe Difcourfcs with £w, he makes ufe of 
 the/e two new Words, KJnneah and Niouph. In time, Adam's 
 Miftake appears, for he finds Lamech's Trouble proceeded fi'om 
 having kill'd a Man : Buc yet the two Names, Kjnneah znd 
 Nioufh; the one ftandiug for Sulpicion, in a Husband, of his 
 
 mi 
 mixed 
 
 ,,., — ..,„ .^ ..,.w., . ^v wt^^ww^ -. A(Slions 
 
 effentially different-, I ask wherein confifted the Effences of 
 thefc two diftindl Species of Adlions ? And 'tis platn^ it confift- 
 ed in a preclfe combination of fimple Ideasy^Ser^nt in one 
 from the other. I ask, whether the complex Idea in Adam's Mind, 
 which he call'd Kjnneahy were adequate, or no ? And it is plain 
 it was ; for it being a Combination of fimple Idecu^ which he 
 without any regard to any Archetype, without refpe6l to any 
 thing as a Pattern, voluntarily put together, ablirafted and gave 
 the Kame KJnneab to, to exprefi in (hort to others, by that 
 one found, all the fimple iJc^i contained and united in that com- 
 plex one, it muft neccflarily follow, that it was an adequate /</f^. 
 His^ own Choice having made that Combination, it had all in ic 
 he intended It Ihould, and fo could not but be perfedl', could 
 not but be adequate, it being referr'd to no other Archetype, 
 which it was fuppoftd to reprefent. 
 
 §.45. Thefe Words, Kjnneah and Niouph, by degrees grew 
 into comaion ufe ; and then the cafe was foraewhat alter'd. A' 
 dam's Children had the fame Faculties, and thereby the fame 
 Power that he had, to .make what complex ideas of mixed 
 Modes they pleafed in their own Minds*, to abftra6l them, and 
 make what Sounds, they pleafed, the figns of them : But the 
 ufe of Names being to make our Ideas within us known to others, 
 that cannot be done, but when the fame Sign Hands for the fame 
 Idea in two, who would communicate their Thoughts, and 
 Difcourfe together. Thofe therefore of Adam's Children, that 
 found thefe two Words, K.inneah and Kiauph, in familiar uCc^ 
 could not take them for infignificant Sounds, but muft needs con- 
 clude, they ftood for fbmething, for certain Ideasy abft rad ideaiy 
 
 F 4 they 
 
^^ Names of Suh fiances. 
 
 they being general Name?, which abftraft ideas were the Eflen- 
 ces ot the Species dlftinguiflied by thofe Names, If therefore 
 lmT°" I'^t-- rhefe Words, as Names of Species already efta- 
 blilh d and agreed on. they were obliged to conform the Ideas, 
 m their Minds, fignified by theft Names, to the J^mj, that they 
 itood for in other Mens Minds, as to their Patterns and Ar- 
 chetypes \ and then indeed their Ideas of thefe complex Modes 
 xvcre liable to be inadequate, as being very apt ( efpecially thofe 
 thatconfifted ot Combinations of many [\m'^\t Ideas ) not to be 
 exactly conformable tothei^c^j in other Mens Minds, ufmg 
 the fame Names •, though for this, there be ufually a Remedy 
 at Hand, which is, to ask the meaning of any Word, weunder- 
 ftand nor, of him thatufes it: it being as impoflible, to know 
 certainly, what the Words Jealoufy and Adultery ( which I think 
 anfwer .-I^<.lp and :|1NJ ; ftand for in another Man's Mind, 
 With whom I would dilcourft about them ^ as it was impoffible, 
 jn the beginning of Language, to know what Kj^neahsLndNtouph 
 ftoqd for in another Man's Mind, without Explication, they 
 -being voluntary Signs in every one. 
 
 §. d.6. Let us now alfb confi-'er after the fame 
 inHanee ff manner, the Names of Subftances, in their firfi: Ap- 
 ^bftr.nces m plication. One of Adam\ Children, roving in the 
 Zjhab. Mountain?, lights on a glittering Subftance, which 
 
 pleafes his Eye, Home he carries it to Adam, who, 
 upon confideration of it, finds it to be hard, to have a bright 
 yellow Colour, and an exceeding great Weight. Thefe, per- 
 haps at firff, are all the Qualities, he takes notice of in it, and ab- 
 fira6i:Ing this complex Idea^ coufiftingof a Subftance having that 
 pecuh'ar bright Yellownefs, and a Weight very great in propor- 
 tion to its Bulk, he gives it the Name T^ahab, to dominate and 
 tnark all Subftances, that have thefe fenlible Q;ialitics In them. 
 ris evident now that, in this Cafe, AdamaSis quite differently, 
 from what he did before in forming thofe Ideas of mixed Mode?,- 
 to which he gave the Name KJnneah and Niotipk For. therchc 
 put liieas together, only by his own Imagination, not taken from 
 the Exillence of any thing- and to them he gave i\'amcs to de- 
 nominate all Things, that fhould happen to agree to thofe his ab- 
 ftra6l Ideas, without confidering whether any fu'h thing did 
 exijl, or no :, the Standard there was of his own n-. iking. But 
 in the forming his J^e/iof thii new Subftance he takes the quire 
 contrary Courfe i here he has Standard made by Nature .• and 
 th-rcfore being to reprefcnt that to hImfelF, by the Ide^lr^e ha^ 
 Q(it, even when it is abf^nt, he puts in ao ^mp\c Idea Into his 
 
 con'pkx' 
 
Names of Sulftances. 69 
 
 complex one, but what he has the Perception of from the thing 
 it felf. He takes Care that his Idea be conformable to his Ar- 
 chetype, and intends she Name (hould ftand for an Idea fo, 
 conformable. 
 
 §. 47. This piece of Matter, thus denominated :!^ahalf by 
 jidam, being quite different from any he had feen before, no Bo- 
 dy, I think, will deny to be a diftinft Species, and to have Its 
 peculiar Effence ; and that the Name :^ihab is the mark of the 
 Species, and a Name belonging to all Things partaking in that 
 Eflence. But here it is plain, the Effence , Adam made the 
 Name ::^ahab ftand for, was nothing but a Body hard, (hlnlng, 
 yellow, and very heavy. But the inqulhtive Mind of Man, 
 not content with the Knowledge of thefc, as I may Iny, fuper- 
 ficial Qjalirle?, purs Adam upon farther Examination of this 
 Matte)-. He therefore knocks, and beats it with Flints, to fee 
 what was difcoverable in the Infide: He finds it yield to Blows, 
 but not eafily icparate into pieces : he finds it will bend without 
 breaking. Is not now DudlHity to be added to his former Idea, 
 and made part of the Eflence of the Species, that Name :^ahah 
 ftands for ? Farther TriaJs difcover Fufiblity, and Fixednefs 
 Are not they al(b, by the ftme Reafbn, that any of the others 
 were, to be put into the complex Idea , fignlfied by the Name 
 Z^hab} It not. What Reafbn will there be fhewn more for the 
 one than the other ? If thcfe muft, then all the other Propertie?, 
 which any farther Trials fhall difcover in this Matter, ought by 
 the fame Reafbn to make a part of the Ingredients of the com- 
 plex Idea, which the Natoe X^hab ftands for, and Co be the 
 EfTencs of the Species, marked by that Name. Which Proper- 
 ties, becauff they are endlef^, it is plain, that the idea made 
 after this falhion by this Archetype, will be always Inadequate. 
 
 §. 48. But this is not all, it would alfb follow, 
 that the Names of Subftances would not only have, jj^^ir ideas 
 C as In truth they have ) but would alfb be fuppo- imptrfeB, 
 /ed to have different Jignifications, as ufed by different and there- 
 Men, which would very much cumber the ufe of jore larioutl 
 Language. For if every diftin6l Quality, that 
 were difcov^red in any Matter by any one, were fupi)ofed to 
 make a neceffary part of the complex Idea, fignlfied by the 
 common. Name given it, it muft follow, that Men mufl fup- 
 pofe the ^me Word to fignify different Things in different 
 Men; fince they cannot doubt, but different Men may have 
 difcovered feveral Qualities in Subltances of the iame Deno- 
 mination, which others know nothing o£ 
 «. To 
 
JO Names of Suhfiances, 
 
 , §. 49. To avoid thii therefore, they have fkf- 
 
 T v ejore ^^^ ^ j,g^i EjTfence belonging to every Specie Sj from 
 ^sSts^'a^ which thcfe Properties' all flow, afid would have 
 re»l'^.fferict ^^^^ Name of the Species ftand for that. But they 
 if fH^pojeci. "o*: having any Idea of that real Eflence in Subftanccs , 
 and their Words Hgnifying nochiflg but the ideas they 
 have, that which is done by this Attempt, is only to put the 
 Name or Sound, in the place and flead of the thing having that 
 real Eflence, without knowing what the real Eflence is; and this 
 is that which Men do, when they fpeak of Species of Thing?, as 
 fuppofing them made by Nature , and diftinguiflied by real 
 Eflenccs. 
 
 §. 50, For let us confider, when we affirm, 
 which s«p- that all Gold is fixed, either it means that Fixed- 
 pfitiort ii of nefs is a part of the Definition, part of the nominal 
 no tifi. ElTence the Word Go/</ (lands for li and fo this 
 
 Affirmation, all Gold ii fixed., contains nothing but 
 the fignlfication of the Term Gold. Or elfe it means, that Fix- 
 ednels not being a part of the Definition of the Word Go/^, is a 
 Property of that Subftance it (elf: in which cale, it is plain, 
 that the Word Gold ftands in the place of a Subftance, having 
 the real Eflence of a Species of Things, made by Nature. In 
 which way of Subfticution, it has fo confuted and uncertain a 
 ^gnification, that though this Propofition, Gold ts fixed, be in 
 that fenfc an Affirmation of (bmething real ; yet *tis a Truth 
 will always fail us in Its particular Application, and Co is of no 
 real Ufe nor Certainty. For let it be never fo true, that all 
 G*/^, i. e. all that has the real Eflence of Gold, is fixed, What 
 ferves this for, whilft we know not in this fenft-, what is or is not 
 Qald ? For if we know not the real Eflence, of Gold, 'tb impol^ 
 fible we fhould know what parcel of Matter has that Eflence, 
 ^nd fo whether it be true Gold or no. 
 
 §. 5 1. To conclude •, What liberty Adam had 
 ConcJufon. at fir ft: to raake.any complex Ideas of miked Mddes, 
 by no other Pat(,rn, but by his own Thoughts, 
 the fime have all Men ever fince had. And tht farne neceility 
 of conforming his Ideas of Subftanccs to Things without him, 
 as to Archetypes made by Nature, that Adam was under, if he 
 Would not wilfully inii">o(e upon himfclf, the lame are all Men 
 ever fincc under too. The (ame E.ibci ty alfo, that Adam had of 
 affixing any new Name to any Liea\ the fame has any one ftill, 
 ( efpecially the beginners of Languages, if wc can imagine any 
 fuch,) but only with this difference, that in Places , whew 
 
P ankles. J I 
 
 Men in Society liave already eftabllflied a Language amongft 
 them, the (ignification of Words are very warily and fparingiy 
 to be alter'd. Becaule Men being furnifhed already with Names 
 for their Ideas, and common Ufe having appropriated knowa 
 Names to certain idcasy and affefted Miiapplicarion of them 
 cannot but be very ridiculous. He that hath new Notion?, 
 will, perhaps, venture fom.etiraes^ on the coining new Terms 
 to exprefs them ; But Men think it a Boldnefi, and 'tis uncer- 
 tain, whether common Ufe will ever mate them pafs for currant. 
 But in Communication with others, it is neceflary, that we 
 conform the ideas we make the Vulgar Words of any Lan- 
 guage fland for, to their known proper Significations, ( which I 
 have explain'd at large already, ) or elle to make known that 
 new Signification, we apply them to. 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 
 Of Particles, ^ 
 
 §, I . TP\ Efides Words, which are Names o{lie.ii Particles eon- 
 r^ in the Mind, there are agrpat many n^^ Parts, or 
 ■*-' others that are made ufe of, to fignify ^^'^^ ^«»'«»' 
 the connexion that the Mind gives to Ideas, or Pro- "" ^o^^^^^*"- 
 fofitionsj one with another. I^he Mind, in commu- 
 nicating its thought to others, docs not only need figns of the 
 Ideas it has then before it, but others al(b, to (hew or intimate 
 fome particular action of its own, at that time, relating to thofe 
 Ideas. This it does (everal ways; as. Is, and Is not are theg^r 
 neral marks of the Mind affirming or denying. But befides 
 affirmation, or negation, without which, there is in Words na 
 Truth or Falfhood, the Mind does, in declaring its Sentiments; 
 to others, conne61:, not only the parts of Propofitions, but 
 whole Sentences one to another, with their (everal Relations 
 and Dependencies, to make a coherent Difcourlc. 
 
 §. 1. The Words, whereby it fignifies what In them con- 
 connexion it gives to the (everal Affirmatioiis and fftstheArtof 
 Negations, that it unites in one continued Rea(bn- vf^ll fieaking. 
 ing or Narration, are gnerally call'd P^jmWe/ : and 
 Vis in the right ufe of the(e, that more particularly confifts the 
 cleart^eis and beauty of a good Stile, To think well, it is not 
 
 SPPUgh, 
 
7^ Particles. 
 
 enough, that a Man has Jiw^ clear and dlHirKa in his Thoughts, 
 mr that he obfcrves rhc agreemcnr, or difagreemenr, of ibme oF 
 them; b'Jt he mufl think in train, and obfervethe dependence of 
 hisl^houghcsandRcafunings,one uponanother; And toexprcfs 
 well fuch methodical ard rational Thoughts, he mull have Words 
 tofoiTV A/hat Connexion, I{e/}rtafonj DiJltnaion,Oppofitton,EmphaJ}s, 
 &c. lit- gives to each refpedive part of his dtfcourfi. To mi- 
 ihke in any of thefe, is to puzzle, inflead of informing, his 
 Hearer : and therefore k is, that thofe Words, which are not 
 truly, by themfelve?, the names of any Ideas, are of fuch con- 
 ftantand indipenfible ufe in Language, and do much contri- 
 bute to Mens well exprcfling themfelves. 
 
 §. ;. This part of Grammar has been, per* 
 Thiy fhtto haps, as much ncglc6led, as fbme others over-di- 
 rphat Relation Hgently cultivated. 'Tis eafy for Men to write, 
 the M.nd gives one after another, o£ Cafes Viud Genders, Moods zni 
 13 its own jenfes , Gerunds and Supines : In thefe and the like. 
 Thoughts. [i^gre has been great diligence ufed •, and Parti- 
 cles themfelves, in^ fome Languages, have been, 
 ^Ithgrca' (hew of exatlnefs, ranked into their feveral Orders. 
 DUt tnough Prepofitions and ConjimBions, &c. arc Names well 
 known in Grammar, and the Particles contained under them 
 carefully ranked into their diftin6l; fiibdivifiorsi yet he who 
 would (hew the right ufe of Particles, and what fignihcancy and 
 force they have, muft take a little more pains, enter into his own 
 Thoughts, and obferve nicely the feveral Poftures of his Mind 
 in difcourfing. 
 
 §. 4. Neither is it enough, for the explaining of 
 They/kiva thefe Words, to render them, as is ufiially in D\' 
 vhat Rflation (Stioraries, by Words of another Tongue which 
 the Mfttd gives came ncarcfl to their fignification : For what is 
 Th'^T" ^eant by them, is commonly as hard to be under- 
 , oughts. flood in one, as another Language. Tiieyareair 
 Marias of fome yfH ion, or Intimation of the Mind .y and 
 therefore to undcriiand ihem rightly, the feveral views, po- 
 ftures, ftands, turns, limitations, and exceptions, and feveral other 
 Thoughts of the Mind, for which we have either none, or very 
 deficient Names, are diligently to be (fudied. Of thefe, there 
 are a great variety, much exceeding the number of Particles, 
 that raofl Languages have, tocxprefs them by i and therefore it 
 is not to be vvonarcd, that tnolt of thefe Particles have divers, 
 and fbmetimcs almoft oppolitc fignifKrations. In the Hebrew 
 Tongue, there is a particle confilf ing but of one fingle E^rter. 
 
Particles, y^ 
 
 of which there are reckoned up, as I remember, feventy, I am 
 lure above fifty ^veral fignlfications. 
 
 §. 5. BVT is a Particle, none more famlJiarin infiance in 
 our Language » and he that fays it is a di/creclve Bur, 
 Conjun<3;i<Dn, and that It anfwers Sed in Latin, or 
 Mais m French, thinks he has fiifficiently explained it. Bur it 
 (eems to me to intimate feveral relations, the Mind gives to the 
 feveral Propofitions or Parts of them, which it joins by this mo- 
 nofy liable. 
 
 Firft, BVT to fay no more: Here it intimates a flop of the 
 Mind, in the courfe it was going, before it came to the end 
 of \t. 
 
 Secondly, 1 faw BVT trvo Plants: Here it fhews, that the 
 Mind limits the (enfetowhat is exprcffed, with a Negation of 
 all other. 
 
 Thirdly, Teu Pray \ BVT it is not that GOD wouU hringyou 
 to the true Religion, 
 
 Fourthly, BVT that he would cofifirm you in pur own: The 
 firft of thefe BVTS intimates a fuppofition in the Mind, of 
 Ibmething otherwife than it fhould be ^ the latter fhews, that 
 the Mind makes a direct oppofition between that, and what 
 goes before it. 
 
 Fifthly, All Animals have Senfe ', BVT a Dog is an Animal: 
 Here it fignifies little more, but that the latter Propofition is 
 joined to the former, as the Minor of a Syllcgifm. 
 
 §. 6. To thefe, I doubt not, might be added a great many 
 othpr fignifications of this Particle, if it were my bufinefs to 
 examine it in its full latitude, and confider ic in all the places it 
 is to be found : which if one fhould do, I doubt, whetiier in all 
 thofe manners it is made ufe of, it would deferve the Title of 
 Di/cretive, which Grammarians give ro ft. But I intend not 
 here a full explication of this fore of Signs. The inftances I 
 have given in this one, may give occafion to reflect upon their 
 ufe and force in Language, and lead us into the contemplation 
 of feveral Adlions of our Minds in difcourfing, which it has 
 found a way to intimate to others by thefe Particles, fbme where- 
 of conftantly, and others in certain conftrudions, have the fenfe 
 of a whole Sentence contained in them. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
^4 Ahllracl and Concrete Termsi 
 
 C H A t». VIII. 
 
 Of Ahftra^ and Concrete Terms. 
 
 §. I. ' I '^HE ordinary Words of Language^ 
 Ahflrafi I and ouf common ufe of them, Would 
 
 Terms not pre- have glvcn us light into the Nature 
 
 dical>le one of of Our ideas^ if they had been but conlidered 
 amthir, and with Attention. The Mind, as has been Ihewn j 
 »^7' has a Power to abftradt its Ideai, and (b they be- 
 
 come EfTenccs, general Effencci, whereby the 
 forts of Things are dilHnguifhed. Now each abftradl J^m being 
 dirt in6l, (b that of any two the one can never be the other, the 
 Mind will, by its intuitive Knowledge, perceive their ditference ; 
 and therefore in Propofitions, no two whole JdcM can ever 
 be affirmed one of another. This we fee in the common ufe of 
 Language, which permits not any trva AbjiraH iVordSf or Natnes 
 cf abftract ideas, to be affirmed one of another. For how near 
 of kin fbever they may feem to be, and how certain (bevcr ic 
 is, that Man is an Animal, or Rational, or White, yet every 
 one, at firlf hearing, perceives the Falfhood of rhefe Prop:)fi- 
 tions •, Humanity is fdnimality^ or B^ionality^ or Whitenefs : And 
 this is as evident, as any of the moil allow'd Maxims. All 
 our Affirmations then are only inconcrete, which is the affirm- 
 ing, not one abftract Idea to be join'd to another \ which 
 abil:ra6t Ideasy in Subftances, may be of any fort ', in all the reff, 
 are little elfe but of Relations j and in Sublfances, the moft 
 frequent are of Powers; v. g. a Man is TVhitej fignifles, that the 
 thing that has the Effence of a Man, has alfo in it the_ 
 EfTence of Whitenefs, which is nothing but a power to pro-* 
 duce the Idea of Whitenefs in one, whofe Eyes can dlfcover 
 ordinary Ohjecls *, or a Man n rational^ fignific?, that the fame 
 thing, that hath the EfTence of a Man, hath aifo in ic the 
 EfTence of rationality, i. e. a power of Reafoning. 
 
 §. z. This diib'ndtion of Names, fhews us al- 
 Theyjhe-atht fo the dIfTcTciice of our ideas'. For If we obferve 
 diferenc, of them, We fhall find, that our fimpk Ideas have all 
 tur Idea, abflraEl , as tvell as concrete Names : The one 
 whereof is ( to (peak the Language of Gram- 
 marians ) 
 
AljiraB and Concrete Terms] ^ j 
 
 manan3)a Subftantive, the otheran Adje6livej asWhitcnefs, 
 White, Sweetneff, Sweet. The like alfb holds in our Ideas of 
 Modes and Relations j as Juftice, Juft v Equality, Equal-, only 
 with this difference, That fome of the concrete Names of 
 Relations, amongft Men chiefly, are Subftantlves ; as Paterni' 
 tas, Pater; whereof it were eafy to render a Reafon. But as 
 to our ideas of Suhfiances^ we have very few or no abJlraEl 
 Names at all. For though the Schools have introduced Animali- 
 fas J Humanitas, Corporetasj and fome others ', yet they hold no 
 proportion with that infinite number of Names of Subftances, 
 to which they never were ridiculous enough to artempt the 
 coining of abftradl ones : and thofe few that the Schools for- 
 ged, and put into the mouths of their Scholars, could never 
 yet get admittance into common ule, or obtain the licenfe of 
 publick approbation. Which ftems to me at leaft to intimate 
 the confefllon of all Mankind, that they have no Ideas of the 
 real Eflences of Subftances, fmce they have not Names for 
 foch Ideas ; which no doubt they would have had, had not 
 their confcioufnefs w ihemfelves of their ignorance of them, 
 kept them from fo idle an attempt. And therefore though 
 they had Ideas enough to diftinguifli Gold from a Stone, and 
 Metal from Wood ; yet they but timoroufly ventured on lUch 
 terms, as Aurietas and Saxietas, MetalUetas and Ligm'etas, or the 
 like Names, which (hould pretend to fignify the real Eflences 
 of thofe Subftances, whereof they knew they had no Ideas. And 
 indeed, it was only the Doftrine oi Juhflamial Forms, and the 
 confidence of miftaking Pretenders to a Knowledge that they 
 had not, which firft coined, and then introduced AnimalitaSf 
 and Humanitas^ and the like*, which yet went very little far- 
 ther than their own Schools, and could never get to be current 
 amongll underftanding Men. Indeed, Humanitas was a Word 
 familiar amongft the P^mans; but in a far different Sence, and 
 flood not for the abftraft Eflence of any Subftance ;, but was 
 the abftradt Name of a Mode, and its concrete Humanus, not 
 Homo, 
 
 CHAR 
 
7 6 Imperfe[lio)t oj Wor^s. 
 
 CHAP. IX. 
 
 Oj the ImperfeHion of Words. 
 
 §• I. I ^RQM what has been (aid In the forei- 
 mrds art afed W^ going Chapters, it is eafy to perceive, 
 
 for recording what imperfeftioii there is in Lan- 
 
 and communi- guage, and how the very Nature of Words, makes 
 cattng etir \i almoft Unavoidable, for many of them to be 
 Thoughts. doubtful and uncertain in their fignifications. To. 
 
 examine the perfeolion, or imperfc6lion of Words, 
 it is neceflary firft to confider their ufeand end : For as they are 
 more or lefs fitted to attain that, lo are they more or left ptr- 
 ie<Sl. We have, in the former part of this Difcourfe, often, 
 upon occafion, mentioned a double ufe of Words. 
 
 Firft^y One for the recording of our o%n Thoughts. 
 Secondly f The other for the communicating of our Thoughts 
 to others. 
 
 §.• X. As to the firft of thefe, for the recording our 
 Any Words ottn Thoughts for the help of our own Memories, 
 will ferve for whereby, as it were, wc talk to our felve?, -any 
 recording. Words will ferve the turn. For fince Sounds are 
 voluntary and indifferent fignsofany Idtas, a Man 
 may u(e what Words he pleafes, to fignify his own ideas to 
 himftlf; and there will be no imperfedlion in them, if hecon- 
 ftantly ufe the fame fign for the fime idea , for then he cannot 
 fail of having bis meaning underftood, wherein confifts the 
 right u{e and perfedtion of Language. 
 
 §. ; . Secondly, As to communication of Words, that 
 Comwamca^ tOO has a double ufe. \ -. ' 
 
 tion by Words I- Civil. 
 
 Civil or Phi- II. Philofophic.il. 
 
 hfophical. F/V/?, By their cxW'L^'e, I mean fuch a commu- 
 
 nication of Thoughts and Ideai by Word?, as may 
 ferve for the upholding common Converfation and Commerce, 
 about the ordinary Affairs and Conveniencies of civil Life, in 
 the Societies of Men one amongft another. 
 
 Secondly, By the Philofophic.il Vfe of Word?, I mean fuch an 
 ufe of them, as may ferve to convey the prcciie Notic ns of 
 
 Things, 
 
Imperfe^ion of Wor^s* 77 
 
 Things^ arid to exprefs, in general Propofitionp, iQertam and 
 undoubted Truths, which the Mind may reft upon, and be ifa- 
 tisfied with, in its fearch after true Knowledge. Thcfe t\^6 
 Ufes are very diftindt ; and a great deal kls cxa6lhcls will 
 ittve in the one, than in the other, as we . (hall fee in what 
 follows. . ^ • , ;-T .,,-)• ^ .-'i" .(> 
 
 §. 4. The chief End of Language In Commu- The impty- 
 nication being to be underftood, Words (crve not fe^ions of 
 well for that ei'id, neither in Civil, nor Philofb- Words is the 
 phical Difcourle,.when any Word does not excii'e doubt fulmfs of 
 in the Hearer, the ftme idea which it Hands foF ^^-^'^ Sigmfi- 
 in the Mind of the Speaker. Now fince Sounds ^*''''"- 
 have no natural connexion with our Ideas^ but 
 have all their fignlfication from the arbitrary impoficionof Men^ 
 the doiihtfulnefs and uncertainty of their Jigmfication, which li 
 the tmperfefiitin We here are fpeaking of, haapits caufe niore In 
 ihe Ideas they rtand for, than in any incapacity, there is in ona 
 Sound, more than in another, to fignify any JJca : For in th4t 
 regard, they are all equally f erft<5i. 
 
 ! That then which makes doubtfulnefs and uncertainty in thd 
 fignification of fome more than other Words, is the dinerence 
 of Jc/mj they ftand for. ", 
 
 §.5. Words having naturally no fignification, 'daafeseft^eir 
 the Idea which each 11 ands for, muft be learned If'per/ecrien. 
 and retained by thole who would exchange 
 Thoughts, and hold intelligible Difcourfe with others, in lay 
 Language. But this is hardeft to be done, where, 
 - Firft, t\\Q Ideas they ftand for, are very complex, and tnidi 
 up of a great Number Ideas put together. 
 
 Secondly, Where the Ideas they ftand for, have no certalri , 
 connexion in Nature^ and fb no (ettled Standard, any- where 
 in Nature exlfting, to re£iify and adj'jft them by. 
 
 Thirdly, Where the fignification 6t the Word is referred to 
 a Standard, which Standard is not ea(y to be Icbow)!. 
 
 Fourthly, Where the fignification of the Word^ and the tfi^l*', 
 EfTence of the Thing, are not exaftly the fame. 
 
 Theie are difficulties that artend the fignification of fcvehl 
 Words that are intelligible. Thofe which are noc iiifelligible 
 at all, fuch as Nam.-s ftanding for any fimple 7^f4^, which a- 
 notherhas not Organs or Faculties to attain; as the Names oF 
 Colours to a blind Man, or Sounds to a deaf M^n, need nop" 
 here be mentioned. . •,,, v 
 
 In all thele cafes, vre fhili find an imperfection in Wdfdih 
 Vol!. If. Q • ^hkW 
 
^S IinperfeBioyt cf Pfor^s. 
 
 whjch Ifhall moreat large exjikln, in rhcir paftlculaf applica- 
 tion to our feveral forts of Ideas : For if wc examine them, we 
 (hill find, that the Names of mixe^ Modes are mofl liable to doubc- 
 fitlnefs atid imperfetlion^ for tht two fhfl of thefe R^afons j and tlje 
 Ndtnej of Subjlances chiefly for the tiro • latter. 
 
 §. 6. Firfi^ Tlie Names of mixed Modes^ are 
 
 The Names 0/ many of them h'able to great uncertainty and ob- 
 71fTp% ^Uf'tyin their fignlficacion. 
 tlclit'the ^' Bccaufe of that^re^r Cnmpofition^ thefe complex 
 
 Ideas rl'v* ^^^'" ^^^ often made ui> of. To make Words 
 Jhndfol are ^'"V'iceable to the end of Comnriunicatton, it is 
 fo complex. neccflary, ( as has been fiid ) that they excite, in 
 the Hearer, exactly the fame Idea they lland for m 
 the Mind of the Speaker. Without this. Men fill one another's 
 Heads with noife and founds , but convey not thereby their 
 Thoughts, and Ify not before one another their Itteof^ which is 
 the tiiJ of Difcoiirfe and Language. B'lt when a Word flands 
 for a very complex fc/^jthat is compounded and dccompounde^j 
 it is not eafy for Men to form and retain that Idea f6exa6lly, 
 as to make the Name in common ufe, ftand for the ftme pre* 
 cife Ideay without any the leaft variarion. Hence it comes to 
 paft, that Mens Names, of very compound Ideasy fuch as for 
 the raoft part are moral Words, have feldom, in two difFcrenc 
 Men, the fame precife fignification, fince one Man's complex 
 Idea feldom agrees wich another?, and often differs from his 
 owTr,'froni that w^hichhe had yellerday, or will have to mor- 
 row. • ■ 
 
 §, 7. n. Becaufe the names of mixed Modes, for 
 
 Secondly, Be- the moft part, rvam Standards in Nature, whereby 
 caufe they Men may reftify and adjufl their fignifications -, 
 have no Stan- therefore they are very various and doubtful. They 
 dards. ^^^ aflcmblages of Ideas put together at the pleafurc 
 
 of the Mind, purfuing its own ends of Difcourfe, ^ 
 and fiiired to its own Notions, whereby it dgfigns not to copy 
 any thing really exifting, but to denominate and rank Things, 
 as they come to agree, with thofe Archetypes or Forms it has 
 made. He that iirft brought the word Shamj J^'heedle^ or Ban- 
 ter in ufe, put together, as he thojghc fit , thofe Idcai he made 
 it (land for: And as it is with any new Names of Modes, that 
 are novv b!OU£!,ht into any Language •, fb was it with the old 
 ones, whtn they were firft made ufe of. Names therefore, that 
 ftiind for ColkiVions of J</iT.rj, which the Mind makes at plea- 
 furc, mull needs be of doubLfulfignification, when fuch Colle6H- 
 
 ons 
 
tmperfe^ioH of Words, ^9 
 
 t)ns ate no where to be found conftantly united in J^ature, noi* 
 any Patrerns to be fliewn whereby Men may adjufl them. 
 What the word Murther^ or Sacriledge^ (3c. fignifies, can never 
 J>e known from Thin^ themfelves : There be many of the 
 parts of thofe complex ldca$y which are not vifible in the A6i;i- 
 pn it felf, the intention of the Mind, or the Relation of holy 
 Things, ; which make a part of Murder^ or Sacr Hedge j have no 
 neccriary connexion with the outward and vifible Adiion of 
 him that commits either: and the pulling the Trigger of the 
 Gun, with which the Murther is committed, and is all the A^i- 
 on, that, perhaps, is vilible, has no natural connexion with 
 thofe other ideas, that make up the copipltx one, named JViwr- 
 der. They have their union and combinatipn only from the 
 Uiiderftanding which unites them under one Name: bye uni- 
 ting them without any Rule, or Pattern, it cannot be bi|C that 
 the figaiiication of -the Name, that ftands for fuch voluntary 
 Colledlions, (hould be often various 'id t\).G Minds of differenjc 
 Men, who have fcarceany ftanding Rule to regulate themfclviS?, 
 3nd jcheir Notions by, in fuch arbitrary Ideoi. 
 
 S- 8.. 'Tis true, common Vfe^ that is the Rule of Propriety nat 
 PfQpriety, may be fuppofed here to afford (owe afiiffident 
 ftid, to fettle the fignification of Language ^ and it ^emedy^, 
 cannot be denied, but that in (bmengafi ire itdoes. 
 Q'0ViX3XQ\\.\& reguUtti the meming efJ4^ords pretty well for corn* 
 pion Conyerfation j but no body having an Authority to efta* 
 blifli the precifefignitication of Words, nor determine to what 
 Ideas any one fliall annex them, common life is not fufficienc 
 to adjuft them to Philolbpjpical Difcour(es •, there being fcarce 
 any Name, of aiiy very complex idea, ( to fay nothing of others, J 
 which, in common life, has noc a great latitude,and which kee- 
 ping within the Bounds of Propriety, rnay not be made the 
 iign of far different Ideas. Befides, the rule and meafure of I^ro- 
 priety it felf being no where ^ftablifhed, it is often matter of 
 Pifpute, whether this or that way of ufing a Word, be pro- 
 priety of Speech, or no. From all which, it is evident; that 
 the Names of fuch kind. of very complex ^4?'^ j ^te naturalij;. 
 liable to this imperfc<Stion, to be of doubtfol and uncertain Sig- 
 nification •, and even in Men, that have, a Mif^d to underRand 
 one another, do not always ftand for the (am^ Id^a ia Speaker 
 and Hearer* Though the Names G/orj- and {>/?4r»/z^i<? be the fa^/e 
 collective Idea^ which every one thinks on» or intends by i4a3;t 
 Name, is apparently very different in Men ufing the fame in e- 
 Very Man 3 mouth, Through a whole Countryiyet jhe complex 
 Language, G % Thi 
 
8o ImperfecliOH of Words*' 
 
 "•^i / -' . ?. 9. The w.iji a1fo vpherein the "Natnts of mixed 
 J .w.^/p/ Modes are ordinarily learned ^ <!/ofX not a little cuntri' 
 ther"'^imcs ^"^' '"/'"^ liouhtfitlnejs of their JlgtuficAtion. For if 
 toiHributes ^^ ^''^ obferve how Chiicirfn learn Languages, 
 atfa :a thur wcfhallfind, that to make them underlland what 
 Daabtfulnefs. ^^^ Names of fimple Ucm^ or Subftanccs, ftand 
 for, People ordinarily Ihew them the thing, Whert!- 
 ofthev would have them have the idea'y and then repeat to 
 thtm the Name that ftands for ir, as JJ'hite^ Sn^eet^ Milk, Sugar^ 
 Cat, Do(r. But as for mixed Modes efpccially the moil niatc- 
 •xial of ihem, moral Words, the Sounds areufually learn'd Hrll, 
 •and then to know what complex Ide^s they itand for, they 
 are cither beholden to the explication of others, or ( which 
 happens for the moil part ) are left to their own Oblcrvation 
 and Induftry •, which being little laid out in the fearch of the 
 true and precifc meaning of Names, thefe moral Words are, 
 in mod Mens Mouths, little more than bare Soujids ; or when 
 they have any, 'ris for the moft part but a very loofe and un* 
 determined, and eonfequently obfcure and confufcd fignification. 
 And even thofe themfelves, who have with more attention fet- 
 led their Notions, do yet hardly avoid the inconvenience , to 
 have them fland for complex Ideas, different from thole which 
 other, even intelligent and ffudious Men, make them the figns 
 of. Where fhall one find any , either comroverful Debate^ or 
 familar Dijcourfe^ concerning Honour^ Faithy Grace, l{eligicn^ 
 Chirrch, 5cc. wherein it is not eafy to obferve the different No- 
 ■fiuns Men have ot them^ which is nothing but this, that they 
 are not agreed in the fignification |of thofc Words ;, nor have 
 m their Minds the fame coTiplex ideai which they make them 
 lland for : and fo all the conteits that follow thereupon, are 
 only about the meaning of a Sound. And hence we fee, that 
 interpretation of Laws, whether Divine, or Humane, there is 
 no end ; Comments beget Comments, and Explications make 
 new Matter for Explication*; .• And of limiting, diftinguifhing, 
 varying the fignification of thefe moral XA'^ords, there is no end. 
 7'hcfc Tdcii of Mens making, are, by Men ftill having the 
 jume Power, multiplied in inflttitimi. Many a Man, who was 
 \Tctty well ftttsficd of the meaning of a Text of Scripture, or 
 Claufe in the Code, at firil reading, has by confjlting, Coni- 
 inenrators, q liteloft the fcnfe of ir, and by thofe Elucidation??, 
 given rife or increafe to his Doubts, and drawn obfcurity upon 
 rhe place. I i'j.y not this ^hat I think Commentaries nccdlc/s; 
 "but to thew how uncertain the Nauict; of njixed Modes natu. 
 
 rally 
 
Imperfeciion of Wordi. Sc 
 
 rally dre, even in the Mouths of thofe, who had both the In- 
 tcnlion and the Faculty of Speaking as clearly, as Language . 
 was • capable td exprefsi their Thoughts. ' 
 
 §. lo. What obfcurhy this lias unavoidably Henc? un- 
 brought upon the Writings of Men, who have aijoidabisob- ^ 
 live'd iii remOte Ag(s, and dFffercnt Counfrievit .A«'V^/ "' ^"' • 
 will be rteedlefs' to take notice. Smce the numerous '^""^ 4tiih<^%x 
 Voluthes of learned Men , employing their 
 Thoughts that way, are Pr6ofs more than enough, to (hew 
 what A'ttentrori, Study, >» Sigdcity, and Reafbning is required, 
 to find out the xrw<: mQknm^ cf antient Authors. But there being ; 
 no Writings we have any great concernment to be vrty follici- . 
 tous about the meaning of, but thofe that contain either Truths 
 we are required to believe, or Laws we are to obey, and draw 
 inconveniences on us. when we miftake or tranfgrefs, we may 
 be lefs anxious about the $en(e of other Authors , who Writing . 
 but their iF>wn Opinion'^, we are under no greater ncccfllcy to; 
 know rhem, than they to know ours. Our gocd or evil depend"- ' 
 ing not on their Decrees, vve may fafely be ignorant of thcii' 
 Notions ; And therefore in the reading of them, if they do not 
 ufe their Words with a due clearnefs and perfpicuiry, we may 
 lay themafide, and without any injury ilone tiiem, rcfolve thus, 
 with our (elves. 
 
 Si non vis intelligi^ dehes negtigi. 
 
 % ii.Tf the fignificati:>il|bf the Names of mixed Modes are 
 uncertain, becaule there be no real Standards exilling in Na- 
 ture, to which thofe Ideas are referred, and by which they mav 
 be adjufted, the Names of Suhjlances are of a dmtbtful figmficati- 
 orif for a contrary reafon, vi:(. becaufe the idea^y they Itand for, 
 are fuppofed conformable to the reality of Things, and are re- 
 ferred to Standards made by Nature. In our ideas of Subllancea 
 we have not the liberty as in mixed Modes, to frame what 
 Combinations we think fir, to be the chara6teriftical Notes, to 
 rank and denominate Things by. In thefe we muft follow Na-" 
 ture, fuit our complex Ueas to real Exiilences, and regurate the 
 fignificarion ot their Names by the Things themfeives, if we 
 will have our Names to be the figns of them, and- Hand f^r 
 them. Here, ^tis true, we have Patterns to follow j but Pat- 
 teifns, that will make the fignification of their Names very un- 
 certain : For Names muft be of a very unfteady and various 
 menning, if the Ideas they ftand for-, be referred to Standards 
 
 G ^ without 
 
Sz Imperfifiion of WorJs, 
 
 without; U5, that either canntt he known at alt^ or can he kpopf^hut 
 tmperffiWy and uncertainly. . , , ^^ , , 
 
 ^. I a. The frames of Subjiances have^ as has 
 W»wj#; efs h ^'^" ftievved, a double reference in their ordi- 
 
 Ftrfl, Tore/tl ^^^fii oometimcs they are made to ftand for, 
 Effemtf that ^'^^ ^^ '^^clr (jgnification is fuppofed to agree to, 
 cannot be The real.Confiitution ofThings^ from which all their 
 
 i»w»,j , Properties flow, and in which they all centre. But 
 
 ,,. , this realConftitution, or ( asitisapttobecalled ) 
 
 EiGfenicc,. being utterly unknown to us, any Sound that is put 
 to ftand for ir, muft be very uncertain in its application •, and 
 It will be impo{]Sble to know, what Things are, or ought to 
 bp called an Horfe, or Antimony, when thofe Words afc putfor 
 real EiTences, that we have no Ideas of at all. And therefore 
 in this Suppofition, the Names of Subftances being referred to 
 Standards that cannot be known, their fignifications can never 
 be aojufted and eftablifhed by thofe Standards. 
 
 _^ §. 1 ; . Secondly, The Jimfle ideas that are found 
 
 Seteitdiy, To j^ co-exiji tn SuhfianceSy being that which their 
 *<9'*^vT Names immediately fignify, thefe, as united in the 
 wku'h'are ^v^ral Soft? of Things, are the proper Standards 
 knc-xn hut ixa- ^'^ which their Names are referred, and by which 
 •terfeFiiy. thcir fignijBcarions may beft be re6lificd. But nei- 
 
 ther will thefe Archetyfes (o well lerve to this 
 purpofe, as to leave theifc Names, without very various and 
 i:ncertain fignifications. ,Eccaiife th(A fimple Ideas that co-exilf, 
 an^ areunittd in the fame Subje6l^, oeing very numerous, and 
 having all an ecpai right to go into the compLx fp ccifick J^f^, 
 which the fpccinck Name is to ftand for, iVJen, though they 
 propofe to thtmfelves the vtry fame Subje£V to confider, yet 
 fiame very d 'fife rent ideas about it; and fo the Name they ufe 
 for if, unavoidably con^s to have, in feyeral Men, very diffe- 
 rent fignifications. The fimple Qualities which make up the" 
 complex Xi/^.ij, being mof], of them flowers, in relation to Chan- 
 ges, which ihcyareaptto make in^ or receive from other Bo- 
 dies, are almoft infinicc. He that fhall but obferve, what a 
 great variety of alterations any one of the bafer Metals is apt 
 ro receive, from the different application only of Fire ; and 
 how much a t^reater numlx;r of Changes any ol them will re- 
 ceive in the T^ands of Chymifts, by the application of other 
 Bodic?, will not think it f^r^ngc, that i count the Propcrtie* 
 of Bodies noi eafy :g bt Collc&ed, and completely known b^ 
 
 tlje 
 
Imperfe^JOH of Words. 8 j 
 
 the way I of enquiry, whichour Faculties are capable of. They 
 being therefore at leaft fo many, that no Min^can know the pre- 
 cife and definite number, they are differently difcovered by diffe- 
 rent Men, according to their various skill, atrention, and ways 
 of handling; who therefore cannot chufe but have different /^("ds 
 of the fame Subftance, ancj llierefore make ttc ftgnlfication of ics 
 common Name very various and uncertain. For fhe complex I- 
 deat of Subftanccs, being made upof fuch fim pie ones as arefup- 
 poftd to cocxift in Nature, every one has a right to put into his 
 complex ldea^i\\Q{Q Qualities he has found to be united together, 
 JFor though in the Subftance Gold^ one faiisfics himfelf with Co- 
 lour and Weight, yet another thinks Solubility in Aq. Hegia^ as 
 neceffar^ to be joined with that Colour in hhldea of Gold, as 
 any one does irs Fufibility j Solubility in Wf ^g^^^ being a Qua- 
 lity as conftantly joln'd with its Colour and Weight,as Fufibili- 
 ty, or any others others put in irs Ductility or Fixednefi>(^c. as 
 they have been taught by Tradition,- or Experience. Who of 
 all thefc, has eilablilh'd the right fignification of the Word 
 Gold? Or who fhallbe the Judge to determine ? Each has hi& 
 Standard in Nature, which he appeals to, and w ith Reafon thinks 
 he has the (arae right to put into his com\i\QX idea, fignified by 
 the Word Gold^ thofe Qua^tics, which ujion Trial he has found 
 united •, as another, who, has not ft> well examined, has to leave 
 them out; or a third, who has made other Trials, has to put in 
 others. For the Union in Nature of theft Qualities, being the 
 true Ground of chtir Union in one complex Idea^ Who can (ay, 
 one of them has more reafon to be put in, or left out, than ano- 
 ther ? From whence it wWalways unavoidably follow, that the 
 com^Xtyildeai of Subftances, in Men ufing the fame Name for 
 them, will be very various > and fo the fignifications ot thofe 
 Names, very uncertain. 
 
 §. 14. Belides, there is fcarce any particular Secondly jocor' 
 thing exifting, which, in fbme of its fimplelJ^^j, extftnig&ua-^ 
 does not communicate with a greater, and ino- ^'^'^[ w^/f/:' 
 thers with a lefs Number of particular Beings ; '"•^ ^";»"/''* 
 Who fhall determine in this Cafe, which are thofe ""'P'^f'^^y- 
 that are to make upthe precifeColledtion, that is to be fignifed 
 by the fpecifick Name ■, or can with any juil Authority prefcribe,^ 
 which obvious or common Qualities are to be left out •, or which 
 more feeret, or more particular, are to be put into the fignification 
 of the Ntime of any Subftance i All r^hich together, feldom or 
 never fall icy f reduce that various and doubtful Signification in the- 
 Names^ 0^ Snb0ances-yWh\ch. caufes fuch UiKertaintyj^Difputcs^or Mi- 
 i^akes;^, when we con-^e to 3 Philofophical Ufc of them. % 1 5, 
 
^4 Imperfect OH of Wonis. 
 
 4.' i*!. Tis true, as t» civil ■ and commcn Cout>tr- 
 Withthiiim fiiioti^ the general names 6f Subjiancesy regulated iti 
 fer^feRion, their Qfdinar/ Sigiiificarion by Ibme obvious Q^ia- 
 1/^7 r>,ay ]jf;^.,-^ ^3, ^y j^e Shape and Figure in Things of 
 
 clw h' ^<nowa ftminal Propagation, and in other Sttb- 
 p,li)irP;"jZ rtances, for the moft part by Colour, join'd with 
 C^phUml Uic. -^^ other IcniibJc Qualities, ) do well enough, to de^ 
 ■' ' \ lign the Things Men would be uuderitood to f[:eak 
 ot ; Andfo they ufualiy conceive well enough the 
 Subflances meaht by the Word Gold, or ^pple, tadiftingujlh the 
 one from the other. But in Plnbfophical Enquiries and Debates^ 
 wi)ere general Truths are to be eftabliih'd, and Con({qucnce8 
 rirawn from Pofitions laid down, there the precife ligniricatioii 
 of the Names of Subftances will be found, not only not to be 
 rveH ejlabtiftosdy but alfo very hard to be fo. For Example, he 
 that (hall make Maileablenefs, or a certain degree of FixedneG, 
 a pare of his complex Idea of Gold, may make Propofitions con» 
 cerning Gold, and draw Confequenccs from them, that will 
 truly and clearly follow from Gold, taken in fuch a lignificarion : 
 But yer fuch as another Man can never be forctd to admit, 
 nor be convinced of their Truth, who makes not Maileable- 
 nefs, or the fame degree of Fixedriefi, part of that complex 
 Idea, that the Name Gfdd, in his ufeof it, (lands for. 
 
 §. 1 6. This is a natural, and almoft unavoid- 
 Infiamc, Li- able Iinperf 6lion in alniofl all the Names of Sub- 
 ?*or. fiances, in all Languages whatfbever, which Men 
 
 ^ will eafily find, when^ce paffing from confufed 
 or loofe Notions, they come to morftlrid and dole Enquitier. 
 For then they will be convinced, how doubtful and obfcure 
 thofe Words are in their Significatioii, which inordinary ufc ap- 
 pea,red very clear and determined. I was once in a Meeting of 
 very learned and ingenious Phyficians, where by chance there 
 aroreaQiieflion, whether any Liquor paCfed through the Fila* 
 jnents of the Ntrvcs. The Debate having been nvnnag'd a good, 
 while, by variety of Arguments on, both (ides, I ( who had been 
 ufcd to fufpetfl^-, that the greaceft part of Difputes were more a- 
 baut the (ignification of Words, than a real difference in the 
 Conception of Things ) A^fired, That before they vveut any 
 farther on in this Difpute, they would Hrll examine, and tfta- 
 blifh aniongft them, what the Word Liquor (jgnihcd. They 
 at (irft were a little forprizkd at the Propofal i and had ihty 
 Ken Ptrfons Icfs ingenious, they might perhaps have taken it 
 foi a very frivolous or extravagant oae -• Singe there v/as no ooe 
 ■ • ' ^^»crc. 
 
Imperfe^toH of tVerds. 8^ 
 
 there, that thought not hlmltlf to underftand very perfe^ily, 
 what, the Word Liquor ftood for-, which, I think too, none of 
 the molt perplexed Names of Subllances. However, they were 
 pleaiedto comply with my Motion, and upon Examinatioa 
 found, that the fignification of that Word, was not io fettled 
 and certain, as they had all imagined j but that each of thenj 
 made it a fign of a different complex idea. This made them 
 perceive, that the Main pf their Dispute was about the^ fignifi- 
 cation of that Term v and that they, differed very little in their 
 Opinions, concerning (brae fluid and fubale Matter, pailiiig 
 through the Conduits of the Nerves^ tho^it was not fo eal/ tt> 
 agree whether it was to be called Xif^wo'', or no, a thing which 
 when each confidered, he thought it not worth the contending 
 aboyr. := . -;ij!;/! - ..:; ; , f,:r ' 
 
 §,! 17. How much this.is the Cafe in the great- Injf.ivce 
 eft part of Di(]:)utes, that Men are engaged fo hotly ^^Z'^- 
 in, I fhall, perhaps, have an Occafion in another 
 place to take notice. Let us only here confider a little more 
 exactly the fore-mentioned inftaucc of the Word GoUy and we 
 fliill lee how hard it ispreti'ely to determine its Signihcatidn. I 
 think all agree, to make it ftand for a Body of a certain yellow 
 (hining Colour ; which being the idea to which Children have 
 annexed that Name, the fhining. , yellow part ot a Peacock's 
 Tail, is properly to them Gold. Others finding Fufibility join di 
 withthat yellow Colour in certain parcels of Matter, make of 
 that Combination a complex I^ea to which they give the Name 
 GoJd CO denote a fort ot Subftances j And (b exclude from being 
 Gold all ^fiich yellow Ihining Bodies, as by Fire will be reduc'd 
 to Alhe5,and adrnit to be vi that Species, or to be comprehended 
 under that Name Go/^ only fuch Subffances as having that ihi- 
 ning yellow Cobur will by Fire be reduced to Fufion, and not 
 to A(hes. Another by the fame Reafon adds the Weight, which 
 being a Q.iality, as ftraitly join'd withthat Colour,as its Fufibi- 
 lity, he thinks has. the fame Rea(bn to be j un'd in its Idea^and 
 to be fignified by its Name : And therefore the other made up 
 of Body, of fuch a Colour and Fufibility, to be impeffe<5 j 
 and (q on of all the reft ; Wherein no one can fbew a Keaf6% 
 why fbme of the inftfparable Qualities, that are always united ia 
 Nature, fhoiJd be put into the nominal Eflence, and others left 
 out! Or why the Word Goldj figuifying that fort ot Body the 
 Ring on his Finger is made of, (hould determine that fort, rather 
 bv us, Colour, Weight, ^nd Fufibility i thai by its Colour, 
 W^ i&ht* and Solubiljry in A^. I^gia : Since the .diijColving it by 
 "' " t;hat 
 
8(^ Iwpfrftnhn of Words, 
 
 that Liquor, is as infeparaWe from it, as the FuGon by Fire;- 
 and they arc both of tliem nothing, but the relation which that 
 Subilancc lias ro two other Bodies, which have a Powtr to ope- 
 rare differently upon jt. Fot by what right is it, that Fufibiiity 
 comes robe a part of the Effertce, fignihcd by the Worxi Qoli^ 
 and Salubility but a property of it ? Or why is its Colour part 
 of the Effcnce, and its Malleablcnefi but a property I* I'hat 
 which I mean, is this. That fhefe being ail but Properties, de- 
 pending on its real Conftitution ; and nothing but Powers, ei- 
 ther acllve or paflive, in reference to otherBodics, no one has 
 Authority to determine the fignification of the Word Gold^ ( as 
 refcn'd to fuch a Body cxifting in Nature) more to one Col- 
 lection of Ideas to be found in that Body, than to another; 
 Whereby the fignification of that Name muft unavoidably be 
 Very uncertain.^ Since, as has been (aid, feveral People obferve 
 fevcral Properties in the (ame Subftance j and, I think, I may 
 lay no body at all. And therefore we hivc but very iraperfedi 
 dcfcriptions of Things, and Words have very • uncertain Sigmli* 
 cacio^s. ."-''"'.'•/" A 
 
 §. 1 8. From what hajS Tbi^eti (aid, it \% eafy ro 
 The frames ef obfcTve, what has been before remarked, w:^. 
 Jimplt Ideas That rhe Names of fimple Ideas are^ of all others, 
 the lean x\\c leafi liable to Miftakes, and that for thefe Rea- 
 dcuhtful, i^ojjg^ p^^j}^ Becaule the Ideas they Itand for, be- 
 
 ing each but one fingle perception, are much eafier 
 got, and more clearly retained, than the more complex oneFj 
 and therefore are not liable to the uncertainty, which ufually at- 
 tends thole compounded ones of Subflances and mixed Modes, in 
 w^hich the precife number of fimple Ideas j that make them up, 
 are not cafily agreed, and fo readily kept in the Mind. And 
 Sccendly , becaufe they are never referred to any other Ef- 
 (ence , but barely that Perception they imtriediately fignify : 
 Which reference is that, which renders the fignilkation of the- 
 Names ol Subllanccs naturally Co perplexed, «nd gives octafion 
 fo (o many Difputes. Men that do not perveffly ufe their 
 Word?, or on purj-)o(e fet themfclvcs to cavil, feldom mittake 
 in any Language, which they arc acquainted with, the Ufcand 
 Signification of tlie Names of fimple Ideas ; PFhite^ and Sttfeet, 
 Tellorv and Bitter, carry a very obvious meaning with them, 
 which cvtry one precifcly comprehends, or eafily perceives he is 
 iv'noran: of, and fecks to be informed. B.Jt what preciic Col- 
 Je<5fion of fimple Ideas, Mcdejly, or Frugality itand for in ano- 
 ih^.'i'sufe, 13 not fo certainly known. And however wearc apt 
 
 CO. 
 
 ii 
 
ImperfeTlion vf Words, %y 
 
 to think, we well enough know, what is meant by Gold or Iron ^ 
 yet the precife complex tdea^ others make them the figns of, is 
 not lo cerrain : And 1 believe it is very feldom thac in Speaker 
 and Hearer, they Hand for exactly the lame Colle61:ion. Which 
 muft needs produce Miftakesand Difpures, when they are made 
 ufe of in Dilcourfes, wherein Men have to do with univerfal 
 Propofitions, and would fettle in their Minds univerlal Truths, 
 and confider the Confequences, that follow from them, 
 - §. 19. By the lame Rule, the Names of fimple 
 Modes are next to thofi of fiwple Ideas, leafi liable to And next to, 
 Doubt and Vncertainty^ efpecially thoie of Figur« them fvoU 
 and Number, of which Men have fo clear and di- Modes. 
 ftindl Ideas. Whoever, that had a Mind to un- 
 derrtand them, mlllook the ordinary meaning of Sw«», or 4 
 Triangle ? And in general the leaft compounded Ideas in every 
 kind nave the leail dubious Names. 
 
 §. zo. Mixed Modes therefore, that are made j.^^ ^^^ 
 up but of a few and obvious fimple Ideas y have deuhtful are . 
 ufiaiiy Names of no very uncertain Signihcation. the Names of 
 But ciie Names oi mixed Modes^ which comprehend 'uery com- 
 a great Number of fimple Ideas, are commonly of pounded mix- 
 a very doubtful, and undetermined meaning, as ^d Modes and 
 has been fhewn. 'The Names of Subftances, be- Subnances. t 
 ing annexed to Ideas, that are neither the real Ef- ' ■ ■ 
 
 lences, nor exa6l Reprtlentations of the Patterns they are re-! 
 ferred to, are liable yet to greater Imperfe6tion and Uncertain- 
 ty, efpecially when we come to a philofbphical ufe of them. 
 
 ^. XI. The great diforder that happens in our 
 Names of Subftances, proceeding for the moft part J'f^y thU m- 
 from our want of Knowledge, and Inability to ferfeBioft'^^'^ 
 penetrate into their real Conftituticns, it may pro- charged upon- 
 bably be wondered, fVhy I charge thts ai an Imper* ^ords, 
 feBion, rather upon our Pf^ords than Underli-anding'. 
 This Exception has fb much appearance of Juftice, that I think 
 my felf obliged to give a Reafon, why I have followed this Me- 
 thod. I muft confcfs then, that when I firll began this Difcourfe 
 of the Underftanding, and a good while after, I had not the \eaik 
 Thought, that any Coniideration of Words was at all neceflary 
 to it. But when having paffed over the Original and Compofi- 
 tion of our Ideas^ I began to examine the Extent and Certainty 
 of our Knowledge, 1 found it had Co near a Connexion with 
 Words, that unlefs their force and manner of Signification were 
 firft well oblervedj there could be very little feid clearly and 
 
 peril' 
 
SS ImperfeB'tott of Wor^fs, 
 
 pertinently concerning Knowledge: which being converfant a- 
 bout Truth, had conlbntly to do with PropoGtiocs. And 
 ihough it terminated in Things, yet it was for the moil part 
 fo much by the intervention of VVords, that they ftem'd tarce 
 feparable horn our general Knowledge. At kaft they interpofc 
 themselves fo ranch between our Underftandings, and the Truth, 
 which it would contemplate and apprehend, that like the Me- 
 dtum through which vifible Obje(5ls pafs, their Obfcurity and 
 Dibrder does riot (eldom caft a mill before our Eyes, and im- 
 p(?(e ui-onourUnderftandings. If we confider, in the Fallacies, 
 Akn put upon ihemfelvcs, as well as others, and the Millakes 
 in Miis Difputcs and Notion*, how great a part h owing to 
 Wore!?, and their uncertain or millaken Signihcations, welhall 
 have rtaf()n to think this no finall obftacle in the way to Know- 
 ledge, which, I conclude we are the more carefully to be warned 
 cf, bccaufc it has been fo far from being taken notice of as an 
 inconvenience, that the Arts of improving it have been made 
 the bufineis of Mms ftudy, and obtained the Reputation ot 
 Learning and Subiiliry, aswelhall lee in the following Chapter. 
 But I am apt to imagine, that were the Imperfe6lions of Lan- 
 guige, as the Inftrunient ot Knowledge, more throughly weigh- 
 ftd> a great many of the Controverfies that make liich a Noife 
 in the World, would of themfcives ceafe V and the way to 
 Knowledge, and, perhaps. Peace too, lie a great deal opener 
 lhi|n^jt;do.s. .. 
 
 -:;fjnvj'). §• 2.1. Sure I am , that the fignihcation of 
 
 Thkfinvld Words, In all Languages, depending vtry much 
 itath tis Ma- on thp Thoughts, Notions, and UfM of hira that 
 dtratioyt , tn ufes them i muft unavoidably be of great uncer- 
 tmpofuigcur tainty, to Men of the fime Language and Coun- 
 p^« Saijeof try. Xhls is lo evident in the Greek Authors, that 
 «IJ Author}. Y^^^ ^j^j^j Qjj^jl peru(^ ti-^eir Writings, will find, in 
 
 alnioft every one of them, a diltin(5l JLanguage, ' 
 ihough the fame Words. But when to this natural difficulty in 
 dvcry Country, there (hall be added different Countries, and re- 
 mote Ages, wherein the Speakers and Writers had very diffe- 
 rent Notions, Tempers, Culfonis, Ornaments, and Figures of 
 Speech, ^c, eveiy one of which, influenced the fignihcation of 
 their Words then, though to us now they are loll and t-nknown, 
 it xcQuld become m to be charitable one to another in oiir Interpretations 
 or Mtfunderfiandni'j^ of thofe ancient H'^iitin^s, which though ot 
 great concernment to be undcrttood, arc liable to the unavoid« 
 ablQ (jiSiculties of Speech, whjcbj ( if we except the Narpes oF 
 
 iimjilQ 
 
Alufi of IVorJs. ^9 
 
 firtiple ideSy and (bme very obvious Things ) is not capable, 
 without a conllant defining the terms of conveying the (en(e?.nd 
 intention of the Speakerj without any manner of doubt and ua- 
 cerrainty, to the Hearer. And in Dileourfes of Religion, Law', 
 and Morality, as they are Matters of the higheft concernmcnr, 
 (b there will be the greateft difficulty. 
 
 §. X}. The Volumes of Interpreters, and Commentators on 
 the Old and New Teftamenr, are but too manifeft proofs of 
 this. Tho' every thing (ard in the Text be infallibly rrup, yec 
 the Reader may be, nay cannot chufe but be very fallible in the 
 underftanding of it. Nor is it to bewondred, that the Will of 
 GOD, whencloathed in Words, fhould be liable to that doubt 
 and uncertainty, which unavoidably attends that fort of Con- 
 veyance, when even his Son, whilft cloathed in Flefli, was fub- 
 je6l to all the Frailties and Inconveniences of humane Nature, 
 Sin excepted. And we ought to magnify his Goodnefs, that 
 he hath fprcad before all the World, fuch legible Chara6fers of 
 his Works and Providence, and given all Mankind ib fuffici- 
 ent a light of Realbn, that they, to whom this written Word 
 never came, could not ( whenever they fet themfelves to forch ) 
 cither doubt of the Being of GOD, or of the Obedience due 
 to Him. Since then the Precepts of natural Religion are plain, 
 and very intelligible to all Mankind, and feldom come to be 
 controverted ; and other revealed Truths, which are conveyed 
 to us by Books and Languages, are liable to the common and na- 
 tural obfcurities and difficulties incident to Words, metWnks ic 
 would become us to be more careful and diligent in obferving 
 the former, and lefs magiilerial, pofitive, and imperious, inim- 
 pofing our own fcnfe and interpretations of the latter. 
 
 C HAP. X. 
 
 Of the 4httfe of tVar^s^ 
 
 §. I . T) EGdes the IrapqrfeiStion that 13 natural- ^^nj'e »f 
 Wj ly in Language, and the obfcurity and ^^^frds, 
 ^-"^ con ufion that is fo hard to be avoided 
 in the life of Words, there are feveral wilful Faults and Nsghcl.s^ 
 which Men are guilty of, in this way ofCommunicarion,wherer 
 by they render thefe ngnslefs clear and diiiin^l in their fjgnilica- 
 tion, than naturally they n(iQ<^ to be, 
 
 i. 1- 
 
9« Ahnfe t>f irorjs. 
 
 §. 1. Firji, In this kind, the firft and raoft pal« 
 Fn^ft.a'vrds pablcabule is, the uiing ot Words, without clear 
 wifhaut any, and dlltind^ ideai \ or, which Is W'Jr^t, Ti^s with- 
 er vKihout out any thijig fignjfie^. Of thefc there ar^ two 
 
 </««r Ideas. fores ; 
 
 1. One may obferve, in all Languages, certain 
 Words, that if they be, examined, will be found, in thqr firfl 
 Original, and their appropriated life, not to Hand for any clear 
 and Uiltinit ideuf, Thefe, f jr the moft part, the (cveral SeB^ 
 of Philofophy and Religion liave introduced. For rheir Au- 
 thors, or Promoters, cither affecting Something fingular, and 
 out of the way of common Apprehenftons, or to (upport /ome 
 ftrange Opinions, or cover fome Weaknefs of their Hypothe(i$, 
 feldom fail to com new Words, and (uch as, when they come to 
 be examined, may juftly be zaMcfi infixnificant Terms. For ha- 
 ving either had no determinate Colle6lion of Ideas annexed to 
 them, when they were firft invented :, or at leaft liich as, if well 
 examined, will be found inconGltenr, 'tis no wo.ider if after- 
 wards, in the vulgar ufe of the fame party, they remain empty 
 Sounds, with little or no fignification, am :)ngft thofc who think 
 it enough to have them often in theli Mouths, as the diillnguifh- 
 ing Chara6ters of their Church, or School, without much trou- 
 bling their Heads to examine, what are the precife //s/c/m they 
 ftand for. I (hall not need here to heap up Inlfance.^ every 
 one's Reading and Converfation will fufficiently furnifh him; 
 Or if he wants to be better ftored, the great Mint-Maiters of 
 ihefe kind of Terms, I mean the School- men and Metaphyfici- 
 ans, ( under which, I think, the difputing Natural and Moral 
 Philofophers of thefe latter Age?, may be comprehended, } have 
 where-withal abundantly to content him. 
 
 §. ;. II. Others there be, who extend this abufe • yet farther^ 
 who take fo little care to layby Word', which in their primary 
 Notation have fcarce any clear and diftinft Ideas which they are 
 annexed to, that by an unpardonable Negligence, tlTey familiar- " 
 ly ufe PPordsy which the Propriety of Language h.is affixed "to 
 very important Ideas^ rvithout any difttnil meaning at all. IVtfdom^ 
 Glory^ Grace, &c. are Words frequent enough in every Man*s 
 Mouth ; but if a great many of thofe who ufe them, fhould be 
 asked, what they mean by them ? rhcy would beat a (land, and 
 not know what to anfwer : A plain proof, that though they 
 haVe learned tho(e Sound?, and have them ready at their Tongues 
 end, yet there are no determined Ideas laid up in their Minds, 
 which arc to be expreifed to ©thers by thttn. 
 
 §. 4' 
 
Ahufe of Wor^s. 91 
 
 §. 4. Men having been accitjiomed l}om their 
 Cradles to learn fVordSf rvfhkh are eafily got and re- Occaponed h 
 rained, before they knetiTy or had framed the complex learning 
 tdeaty ro which they were annexed, or which were ^^" ''^fo^e 
 to be found in the things t\3ey were thought to ^^^^ ''^^^« '^^'r 
 fland for, they nfually tontiniie to dofotW their Lives, ''^''^"S '"• 
 and without taking the pains neceffary to lettle in 
 their Minds determined ideas^ they ufe their Words for fuch un^ 
 fteady and confiifed Notions as they have, contenting them- 
 selves with the (ame Words other People ufe ^ as if their very- 
 found neceflarily carried with it conftantly the fame meaning. 
 This, though Men rhake a (hift with in the ordinary Occur- 
 rences of Life, where they find it neceflary to be underftood, 
 and therefore they make figns till they are fb ; Yet this infigni- 
 ficancy in their Words, when they come to reafbn concerning 
 either their Tcnents or Intereft, manlfeftly fills their Difcourfe 
 with abundance of empty unintelligible Noife and Jargon, efpe- 
 cially in Moral Matters, where the Words, for the moft part, 
 ftanding for arbtrary and numerous CoUedtions of Ideas^ not 
 regularly and permanently united in Nature, their bare Sounds 
 are often only thought on, or at leaft very obfcure and uncertain 
 - Notions annexed to them. Men rake the Words they find ia 
 ufe araongft their Neighbours j and that they may notfeem igno- 
 rant what they ftand for, ufe them confidently, without much 
 troubling their heads about a certain fixed meaning ; whereby, 
 befides the eafe of it, they obtain this advantage, That as in 
 foch DIfcourfes they feldom are in the rightjfo they arc as feldom 
 to be convinced, that they are in the wrong", itbeing all one to 
 go about to draw thofe Men out of their Miftakes, who have no 
 fettled Notions, astodifpoffefi a Vagrantof his Habitation, who 
 has no fettled abode. This I guefi tobe fo ;, and every one may 
 obferve in himfelf and others, whether it be, or no. 
 ^ §» 5. Secondly^ Another great abufe of Words Secondly, Un- 
 19^ Inconflamy in the ufe of them. It is hard to fieadyApph- 
 find a Difcourfe written of any Subject, efpe- catisjt of 
 cially of Controverfie , whereon one (hall not them. 
 obferve, if he read wirh attention, the f^me Words 
 ( and thofe commonly the moft material in the Difcourfe, and 
 upon which the Argument turns ) ufed fometimcs for one CoUe- 
 £lion of fimple Ideaiy and fometimes for another, which is a per- 
 fe6t Abufe of Language. Words being intended for figns of my 
 Ideoi^ to make them'known toothers, not by any narural figni- 
 jiication, but by a voluntary inipofttion, 'tis plain cheat and 
 
 abufe. 
 
gz Alufc \>f Words, 
 
 abufe, when I make ihcm lUnd fbmetimes for one rhfng, and 
 lometiraes tor anoih-.r , the wilful doing whereof, can be im- 
 puted to nothing but great Folly, or greater Oifhonelty. And 
 a Man, in his Acconipts with another, may, with as muchtair- 
 n^fs, make the Chara£lers of Numbers iland fbmvtimes for one, 
 and fomctimcs for another CoIlc6lion of Unites: v.^. this Cha- 
 radcr 3 ILxndsfomciimes for three, fometimes for four, and (omc- 
 times tor ci^^ht j as in hid Difcourfc, or Rea(bning,mai<c the fame 
 Wo db ftand tor different Collections of (imple/^M*. JfAlui 
 Ihould do (bin rheir Reckonings, 1 wonder who would liave to 
 do with them ? One who wogld fpeak thus in the Affairs and Bu- 
 finefb of the Worldjand call 8 fometimes 7, and (bmetimes nine, 
 as bed ferved his Advantage, would prefemly haveclapp'd upon 
 him one of the two Na nes Men conlfantly are difguAed with it. 
 And yet in Arguins, and learned Contclb, the fame fort of pro- 
 ceeding paffes commonly for Wit and Learning: but to me it 
 appears a greater difhonefty, than the mifplacing of Counters, \n 
 the cafling up a Debt \ and the cheat the greater, by how much 
 Truth. is of greater concernment and value, than Money. 
 
 §. 6w Thirdly^ Another abufe of Language is, an 
 Thirdly, A[- offered Obfcurtty^ by cither applying old Words, 
 fcHedohfcH' to new and unufual Significations^ or introdu- 
 rtty-by vrorg d^g newand ambiguous Tcrm?,without dehning- 
 Apflicatton. either, or elfe putting them fb together, as may 
 confound their ordinary meaninii. Ttiough the 
 Pcripatetick Philofbphy has been, moll: eminent in this way, 
 yet other Sc6ls have not bicn wholly clear of it. There 
 IS fcarce any of them that are not cumbred with fome Diffi- 
 culties, (fuch is the hnpcrft^fion of Humane Knowledge,) 
 which they have been fain to cover with Obfcurity of Terms, 
 and to contound the fignihcationof Word-:, which, like a Milt 
 before Peoples Eyes, might hinder their weak parts from being 
 difcovered. That Bo^y and £;tre/i/ioB, in common ufe, fland for 
 two diftin«5l Ideas, is plain to any one that will but rciiec^ a little. 
 For were their Signification preciftly the fame, it would be pro- 
 per, and as intelligible to fay, the Body of an ExtenfioHy as th* 
 Extenfion of a Body ', and ytt there are thofewho find ic ntceflary 
 to confound their Signification. To this Abufe, and the Mif- 
 chiefs of confounding the SigniHcation of Words, Logick, and 
 the liberal Sciences, as they have been handled in the School?, 
 have given Reputation i und the admired Art of Difputing, 
 hath added much to the natural Imperfe6lion of LangHagt?,whil(t 
 ic has been made ufe oif and litted, to perplex the Signification 
 
Ahiife of Words » 95 
 
 of Word?, more than to difcover the Knowledge and Truth of 
 Things : And he that will look into that fort of learned \Vritings, 
 will find the Words there much more obfcurt, uncertain, and 
 undetermined in their Meaning, than they are in ordinary Con- 
 verlation. 
 
 §. 7. This is unavoidably to be fo, where Mens Logtck and 
 Parts and Learning, are ellimartd by their Skill in MP»^^ ^^'. 
 Diluting. And if Reputation and Reward {hall f «^^ ^*»f.^' 
 attend thcfe Conqueits, which depend moftiy on ''"'''^ '' '^"' 
 the Finenefi and Niceties of Words, 'tis no Won- • 
 dcr if the Wic of Man fo employ M, fhould perplex, involre^ 
 and fubrilize the Signification of Sounds, fo as never to wane 
 fomething to lay, in oppofing or defending any^ Qi^ieftlon *, the 
 Vi(Slory b.^ing adjudged not to him who had Truth on his fide, 
 but the laft Word in the Difpute. 
 
 §. 8. This, though a very ufelefi skill, and that CaHing it 
 which I think the diredi: oppofite to the ways oi Subtlety. 
 Knowledge, hath yet pafled hitherto under the 
 laudable and efteemed Names of Subtlety and Jcutenefs •, and has 
 had theapplaufeof theSchoofs, and Encouragema t of one part 
 of the learned Men of the World. And no wonder, finre the 
 Philofbphers of old, (" the difputing and wrangling Philolopher's 
 I mean, fuch as Lucian wittily, and with reafbn raxes, ) and 
 the Schoolmen fince, aiming at Glory and Efteem, tor their great 
 and univerfal Knowledge, eafier a grtar deal to be pretended to, 
 than really acquired, found this a good Expedient to cover their 
 Ignorance, with a curious and unexplicable Web of perplexed 
 Words, and procure to thcmfelves the admiration of others, by 
 unintelligible Terms, the aprer to produce Wonder, becaufe 
 they could not be underftood ; whillt it appears in all Hiftoryj 
 that thele profound V>oOi rs were no wiler, nor more ufeful 
 than their Neighbours*, and brought but fmall Advantage to 
 humifne Life, or the Societies, wherein they lived \ Unids the 
 coining of new Words, where they produced no new Things 
 to apc?ly them to, or the perplexing or obfcuring the fignifi- 
 cation of old ones, and fo bringing all things into qjtftion and 
 difpute, were a thing profitable to the Life of Man, or worthy 
 Commendation and Reward. 
 
 §. 9. For, notwithftanding the(e Icarn'^d Dif- J^^^ Learn- 
 putants, the^ allk-nowing Doftors, it was to the '■"g'^i^y ^'f- 
 unfcholatlick Statefman, that the Governments ^''^ ^^«9^f* 
 of the World owed their Peace, Defence, and Li- ^"^'^'J' 
 berties; and from the illiterate and contemned 
 
 Vol], II. H Ale- 
 
94 . Ahufc ef Words. 
 
 Mechanick, (a Name of DIfgrace ) that they received the Im- 
 provemenrs otufeful Arts. Nevci-thelcfs,this artificial Ignorance, 
 and teamed Gibberi/h, prevailed mighrily in thefe lart Ages, by 
 tne Intcreft and Artifice of thofe, who found noeafier way to 
 that pitch of Authority and Dominion they have attained, than 
 by amuling the Men of Bufincfi, and Ignorant, with hard 
 VVords, or imploying the Ingenious and Idle in intricate Di- 
 fputes, about untelligible Terms, and holding them perpetually 
 enta igled in that cndlefa Labyrinth. Befidesjthere is no fuch way 
 to gain admittance, or give Defence to Itrange and abfurd Do- 
 6lrines, as to guard them round about with Legions of oblcure, 
 doubtful, and undefined Words. Which yet make thefe Re- 
 treats, more like the Dens of Robbers, or Holes of Foxes, than 
 the Fortrefles of fair Warriours : which if it be hard to get them 
 out of, it is not tor the flrength that is in them, but the Briars 
 and Thorns, and the Obfcunty of the Thickets they are belet 
 with. For Untruth being unacceptable to the Mind of Man, 
 there is no orher defence left for Abfurdity, but Obfcurity. 
 
 §. I o. Thus learned Ignorance, and this Art of 
 But deHreys keeping, even inquifitive Men, from true Know- 
 thtinftr« ledge, hath been propagated in the World, and 
 tnentsof ^^j^ much perplexed whilft it pretended to inform 
 
 Knowledge the Underftanding. For we fee, that other well- 
 tin om7n*- jj^^^^^j^g ^^jd wife Men, whofe Education and Parts 
 had not acquired that AcutevefsyCQ\M intelligibly ex- 
 prefs themfelves to one another ; and in its plain 
 tile, make a benefit of Language. B'Jt though unlearned Men 
 well enough undcrflood the Words White znd Blacl(j,(^c. and had 
 conftant Notions oHhe Ideas fignified by thole Words •, yet there 
 U'ere Philof)phers fouhd, who had learning and /«^^/^^y enough 
 to prove, that Snon^ was hlack^; i. e. to prove, that White was 
 Blacl^, Whereby they had the Advantage to deftroy the Inftru- 
 ments and Means of Difcourfe, Converlation, Inftru<^ion, and 
 Society; w^hiift with great Art and Subtlety they did no mcrrefjut 
 perplex and confound the fignification oiPWordf, and thereby 
 render Language lefs ufetul, than the real Dcfe£lsofit hadmade 
 it, a Gift, which the illiterate had nor attained to. 
 
 §. J I. Thefe learned Men did equally in{lru6l 
 As iifeful as to Mens Underftanding?, and profit their lives, as he 
 covfoundths whofhould alter the fignification of known Cha- 
 joHjid of the rafters, and, by a fubtlc Device of Learning, far 
 Letters. ftirpaffing the Capacity of the Illiterate, Dull, and 
 
 Vulgar, ihould, in his Writing, fhew, that he 
 ^ could 
 
Ahufe of Words. 9j 
 
 could put A for B, and D for E, (3c. to the no fmall Admirarioa 
 and Benefit of his Reader, It being as fcjiflefs ro put,BA?4, 
 which is a Word agreed on to ftand for one fenlible Idea, to puc 
 it, I (ay, for another, or the contrary Jdea^ i. e. to call Snot» 
 Blacli,^ as to put this mark A, which is a Character agreed on to 
 Hand for one Modification of Sound, made by a certain Moti- 
 on of the Organs of Speech, for B which is agreed on to flan dl 
 for another Modification of Sound, made by another certain Mo- 
 tion of the Organs of Speech. 
 
 §. II. Nor hath this Milchief Hopped in logical Thwy^rthas 
 Niceties, or curious empty Speculations j it hath in- pe'pUxed 
 vaded the great Concernments of Humane Life and ^'^•^"'" ""^ 
 Society ; obfcured and perplexed the material /*'-''"• 
 Truths of Law and Divinity ^ brought ConfufKn, ^ 
 Diforder and Uncertainty into the Affairs of Mankind ^ and if 
 not deftroyed, yet in great meafure rendred uftlefs, thofe two 
 great Rules, Religion and Juflice. What have thegreatcftparc 
 of the Comments and Difputes, upon the Laws of GOD and 
 Man (erved for, but to make the meaning more doubtful, aiid 
 perplex the fenfe ? What have been the tffe£i of thofe multi- 
 
 £ lied curious DiflincSlions, aiad acute Niceties, butObfcuriry and 
 [ncertainry,leaving the Words more uninteliigible,and the Rea- 
 der more at a lofs ? How elfe comes it to pafs, that Princes, f^.eak- 
 ing or writing ro their Servants,in their ordinary Commands, are 
 eafily underflood ; (peaking to their People, in their Laws, are 
 notfo? And, as I remarked before, doth it not often happen,thac 
 a man of an ordinary Capacity, very well underftands a Text, 
 or a Law, that he reads, till he confiilts an Expofitor, or goes to 
 Council J who by that time he hath done explaining thcm,makes 
 the Words fignifie either nothing at all, or what he plcafes. 
 
 §. I}. Whether any by Inter effs of thefe Pro- . , , 
 feffions have occafioned this, I will not here exa- ^^ " /■ "r^f 
 mine ^ but I leave it to be confidered, whether it iJ^rniZ. 
 would not be well for Mankind, whofe concern- 
 ment it is to know Things as they are, and to do what they ought; 
 and not to (pend their Lives in talking about them, or toffing 
 Words to and fro j Whether it would not be well, I fay, that 
 the life of Words were made plain and dire6l *, and that Lan- 
 guage, which was given us for the improvement of Know leilge, 
 and bond of Society, fliould not be employed to darken Truth, 
 and unfetcle Peoples Rights ; to raife Mifipj and render unnrel- 
 ligible both Morality and Religion ? Or that at leaft, it this vJll 
 happen, it fliould not bethought Learning or Knowledge to 
 dofo? Hi §, 14- 
 
/ 
 
 9 6 Alufe of iVorJs. 
 
 % I4> Fourthly, AiV)thcr great ahufeof Words isy 
 Feur^Iy, ^/^ takjng tUm for Things. This, though it, in 
 i»h.ing them fome degree, concerns ail Names in general", yet 
 /•r thinp. j^^Qj.g particularly aftcdts ihofc of Subftances. To 
 this Abufe, thofe Men are moll fubjc6^, who con- 
 fine their Thoughti to any one Syftein, and give thcmfelves up 
 into a firm belief of the perfc6tion of any received Hypothefis: 
 wiiereby they come to be perfuadcd , that the Terms of that 
 Se6t, arc io fuited to the Nature ot Thijigs, that they perfeftly 
 correfpond with their real Exiftejice. Who is there, that has 
 been bred up in the Peripatetick Philofophy, who dees not think 
 the Ten Names, under which are ranked the Ten Predicaments, 
 to be exa<5lly conformable to the Nature of Things ? Who is 
 there of that School, that is not perfuaded, that fubftmtiat Forms, 
 vegetative Souls, abhorrence of a Vacuum^ intentional Species., &C. are 
 fomething real ? Thefe Words Mtn have learned from their 
 very entrance upon Knowledge, and have found their Mafters 
 and Syftems lay great Strefs upon thtm : and thdcfore they 
 cannot quit the Opinion, that tht7 are conformable to Nature, 
 nnd are the Reprefcntations of fomething that really exiftf. 
 The Flatonifls have their Soul of the World., and the Epicureans 
 their endeavour tottfards Motion in their Atoms,when at reli. There 
 is fcarceany Se£l in Philofophy has not a dirtir6t let of Ttrms, 
 that others underfland not. But yet this Gibberifh, which in 
 the Weaknefs of Humane Underftanding,fcrves fo well to palli- 
 ate Mens Ignorance, and cover their Error', comes by familiar 
 ule amonglt thofe of the fame Tribe, to feera the moft impor- 
 tant part of Languag*?, and of all other the Term/; the moft figni- 
 ficant : And (hould y^frxa/and /Ether ial Vehicles come onte,by the 
 prevalency of that Doctrine, to be generally received any where, 
 no doubt thofe Terms v/ould make impreflions on Mens Minds^ 
 jb as to eftablifh them in the perfuafion of the reality of. tiich 
 Things, as much ^speripatetick^Forn>s iind intentional Species have 
 herttofore done. 
 
 §.15. How much names tal^en for Things, are 
 iMflance in apt to mijlead the Vnderfiandsn^, the attentive 
 hUitrtr. reading of phiiofophic li Writers would abundantly 
 
 difrover; and that, perhaps, in Words little fufpciSl- 
 cdof any fuch Mifufc. I (ball inliance in one only, and that a 
 very familiar one. How many intricate Dlfputes have there been 
 about Matter, asif there were* (brae fuch thing really in Nature, 
 diilin£l from Bcdy; as 'tis evident, the \\'ord Matter (hmdsfor 
 an Idea diftind from the Idea of Body ? For if the idcM thefetwo 
 
 Terms 
 
Alafe of Words, gj 
 
 Terms flood for, were precisely the feme, they might indif- 
 fereixd^f^rt all places be put one for another. But We (ee, that 
 though it be proper to (ay, There hone Matter of all Bodies^ one 
 cannot fay, There is one Body of ail Matters : We familiarly (ay, 
 one Body is bigger than another*, but it founds harfli (and I think 
 is never ufed ) to fay, one Matter is bigger than another. Whence 
 comes this then t' Vt:{. from hence, that tho' Matter and Body^ 
 be not really diftinil, but where-cver there is the one, there is 
 the other J Yet Matter and Body, (land for two different Con- 
 ceptions, whereof the one is incomplete, and but a part of the 
 other. For Body flands forafolid extended figured Subflance, 
 whereof Matter is but a partial and more confufed Conception, it 
 feeming to me to be ufed for the Subftance and Solidity of Body, 
 without taking in itsExtenfion and Figure: And therefore it is 
 that fpeaking of Mdwer, we fpeafc of it always as one, becaujfe 
 in truth, it exprefly contains nothing but the Idea of a fblid Sub- 
 ftance, which is every- where the fame, every- where uniform. 
 This being our Idea of Matter, we no more conceive, or ^ealc of 
 different Matters in the World, than we do of different Solidi- 
 ties j though we both conceive, and fpeak of different Bodies, 
 becaufc Extenfion and Figure are capable of variation. But fince 
 Solidity cannot exift without Extenfion, and Figure, the taking 
 Matter to be the Name of fomething really exiiting under that 
 Precifion, has no doubt produced thofe obfcure and unintelligi- 
 ble difcourfes and D fj;utcs, which have filled the Heads and 
 Books of Philofophers concerning Materia prima-, which Imper- 
 feftion or Abufe, how far it may concern a great many other 
 general Terms, Heave tobeconfidered. This, I chink, I may 
 at leafl fay, that we fhould have a great many fewer Difputes 
 in the World, if Words were taken for what they are, the Signs 
 oF our Ideaf only, and not for Things themfclves. For when 
 we argue about Matter, or any the like Term, we truly argue 
 only about the Idea weexprefsby that Sound, whether that pre- 
 cife Idea agree to any thing really exifting in Nature, or no. And 
 if Men would tell , what Ideoi they make their Words if and for, 
 there could not be half that Obfcurity or Wrangling, in the 
 fearchor fupport of Truth, that there is. 
 
 §. 16 But whatever inconvenience follows from T&is makes 
 this miflake of Words, this I am fure , that by Erron lajling. 
 conftant and familiar ufe, they charm Men into 
 Notions far remote from the Truth of Things. 'T would be 
 a hard Matter, to perfuade any one, that the Words which his 
 Father or Schoolmafler, the Parlbn of the Parifh, or fuch a Re- 
 
 H 3 verend 
 
98 Ahufe of Words. 
 
 vei end Do<5lor ufed,fignlfied nothing ihat really exifted in Nature : 
 Which, perhaps, is none of the leajl CaufeSj that Men are fo hardly 
 drawn to quit their Miftakesy even in Opinions purely Philofbphi- 
 cal, and where they have no other Interell but Truth. For 
 the Word?, they have a long Mme been ufed to, remaining firm 
 in thi ir Minds, 'tis no wonder, that the wrong Notions annex- 
 ed to them, ftiould not be removed. 
 
 §. 17. Fifthly^ Another Abufe of ff'ordjf xthefei^ 
 Fifthly, fet ting them in the place of Things, which they do or can 
 tivgf kirn for by no means fignify. We may obferve, that in the 
 »/j-r ih^y gentral Names of i>ubftances, whereof the nomi- 
 canyiitt jgnify ^.j^\ £{fence9 arc only known to us, when we put 
 them into Propofitions, and affirm or deny any 
 thing about them, we do mod commonly tacitly fuppoft, or in- 
 tend they fhouid lland for the real Efllnce of a certain fort of 
 Subftanc(s. For when a Man fays Gold ii Malleable^ he means 
 and would infinuate fomething more than this, that tt^hat I call 
 Cold is malleabley ( though truly it amounts to no more ) but 
 would have this underftood, vi:{. thatGo/^s^j i. e. what has thereat 
 £Jfence of Gold is malleable, which amounts to thus much, that 
 2i4aBeablenefs depends on., and is infef arable from the real Effence of 
 Cold. But a Man, not knowing wherein that real Elflence con- 
 fills, the connexion in his Mind of Mallcablenefs, is not truly 
 "with an Eflence he knows not, but only with the Sound Gold 
 lie puts for it. Thus when we fay, that Animal rationale is, and 
 'Animal implume bipes latis ungmbus, is not a good definition of a 
 Man ; 'tis plain, we fuppofe the Name Man in this cafe to (land 
 for the real Eflence of a Species, and would fignify, that a ra- 
 i tonal Animal better defcribed that real Eflence, than a t»o-legd 
 uinimal with broad Nails, and rvtthout Feathers. For elfe, why 
 might not Plato as properly make the Word ai3p6)7r(J^or Matt 
 ftand for his complex Idea, made up of the Idea of a Body, 9i-- 
 ftinguilhed from others by a certain fhape and other outward 
 appearance?, as Anjiotlcy make the complex idea, to which he 
 gav^c the Name a.3poc7r^ or Man, of Body, and the Faculty 
 of Reafoning join'd together ; unlefi the Name av^pCL-Tr©-- or 
 Man., "wttG fuppored to ftand for fomething elfe, than what it 
 fignihe^ •, and to be put in the place of fbme other thing, than 
 the Idea a Man profelTcs he would exprefs by it ? 
 
 r. z Pu.'tiKr §■ 18. Tis true, the Names ^of Subflances 
 
 thtmfor tke retl would be much more ufeful, and Propofitions 
 
 Effects efSfd" nnde in them much more certain, were the real 
 
 fiances, EfTcnccs of Subftanccs the Ideas in cur Minds, 
 
 which 
 
Ahufe of Words. ^g 
 
 which thofe words fignified. And 'tis for want of thole real 
 Eflences, that our Words convey fo little Knowledge or Cer- 
 tainty in our difcoiirfes about thtm; And therefore the Mind,. 
 to remove that Imperfection as much as it can, makes them, by 
 a fecret Suppofition,^ to ftand for a Thing, having that real Ei" 
 fence, as if thereby it made fbme nearer approaches to it. For 
 though the Word lAan or Goldy fignify nothing truly but a 
 complex Idea of Properties^' united together In one fort ofSub- 
 ftances : Yet there is fcarce any Body in the ufe of thefe Words, 
 but often fiippofes each of thofe Names to ftand for a thing 
 having the real Effence, on which thofe Properties depend. 
 Which is(b far fromdiminifhing the Imperfection of our Words, 
 that by a plain Abufe, it adds to ir, when we would make them 
 ftand for fbmethrng, which not being in our complex Idea^ the 
 name we ufe, can no ways be the fign of. 
 
 §. 19. This fliews us the Reafbn, Why in Hence we think- 
 mixed Modes any of the Idem that make the Com- '"very chtinge »f 
 pofition of the complex one, being left out, or "«'" Idea in Sub- 
 changed, it is allowed to be another thing, i. e. fif":^^, not ro 
 to be of another Species, as is plain \tk Chance- '"/"'St t^e S^e- 
 medly , Man-Jlaughter, Murther , Parricide, 3fc. "^^' 
 The Reafbn whereof is, becaufe the complex 
 Idea fignified by that Name, is the real, as well as nominal Ef^ 
 fence-, and there is nofecret of that Name to any other Effence^ 
 but that. But in Subfiancei it is not fb. For though in that called 
 Go//s/ one puts into his complex idea^ what another leaves out; 
 and Vice Verfa : yet Men do not ufuaily think, that therefore tht 
 Species is changed : Becaufe they fecretly in their Minds refer that 
 Name, and fuppofe it annexed to a real Immutable Effence of a' 
 thing exifting, on which thofe Properties depend. He that adds 
 to his complex Idea of Gold, that of Fixednefs or Solubility in 
 aq. Hegiaf which he put not in it before, is not thought to have 
 changed the Species ; but only to have a more perfe<9b idea, by 
 adding another fimple J^w, which is always infa<St, joined with 
 thofe other, of which his former complex idea, confifted. But 
 this reference of the Name to a thing, whereof we have not the 
 Idea, is fb far from helping at all, that it only ferves the more to 
 involve us in Difficulties. For by this tacit reference to the real 
 Effence of that Species of Bodies, the Word Gold ( which by 
 ftand ing for a more or lefs perfej^ CoUeftion of limple Ideas, 
 ferves to defign that fort of Body- well enough in civil DKcourfe ) 
 comes to have no fignlfication at all, being put for fomewhat, 
 whereof we haveao idea at all, and fo can fignify nothing at 
 
 H 4 all. 
 
loo ^lufe of Words, 
 
 all, when the Body ft fclf is away. For however it may he 
 thoughr all one ; yer, if well confidered, it will be found a 
 quire different thing, to argue about Gold in Name, and about 
 o parcel of the Body ir fclf, v.g. a piece of Leaf-Goldhxd before 
 us J though in Difcourfe weare fain to fubftitute the Name for 
 the thing. •' > ' 
 
 §. lb. That which, I think, very much difpofts 
 The Caufe »f -Mm to fiibltitute fheir Names for rhe real Effences 
 the j^bufe, of Species, is the fuppolition before mentioned, 
 Suf>*>o/ition tf that Nature works regularly in the Produdion of 
 Nature's Things, and fets the Boundaries to each of thofe 
 
 working al. Species^ by giving exA^lv the fame real internal 
 »«y: reguUr- Conllitution to each individual, which we rank 
 ^' under one general Name- Whereas any ore who 
 
 obferves their different Qualities can hardly doubt, 
 ithatmany of the Individuals, called by the fame Name, are, in 
 iheir internal Conflitution, as different one from another, as k- 
 veral of thofe which are ranked under different fpecifick Names. 
 3:his fiippojltiofif however that the fame frecife internal Confittution 
 ■goes always tvith the fame fpecifick.name^ makes Men foru^ard to take 
 ihofe vathes for the [{eprefentatives of thole real Effences^ though 
 Indeed they lignify nothing but the complex ideat they have in 
 their Minds, whtn they ufe them. So that, if I may (b fay, 
 i5gnif>ing one thing, and being fuppofed for, or pur in the place 
 of another, they cannot but, in fuch a kindofufe, caufe a great 
 deal of Uncertainty in Mens Difcourfes *, efpecially in thofe, who 
 have throughly imbibed the Doftrine o^ fubfiantial Forms, where- 
 by they firmly imagine the feveral Species of Things to be de- 
 termined and diffinguifbed. 
 
 §. XI. But however prppofterous and abfurd it 
 •ThU Mufe be, to make our Names ftand for Ideas we hive 
 ttntairtt two not, or ( whlch is all one) Effences that \Ve knaw 
 falfe fuppofi- not, it being in efTeft to make our Words the figns 
 tiotn. of nothing ; yet 'tis evident to any one, whoever 
 
 fo little reflects on the ufe Men make of their 
 Words, that there is nothing more familiar. When a Man 
 asks, whether this or that thing he fees, let it be a Drill, or a 
 monflrous Fcetns^ be a Man, or no ; 'tis evident, the Qtieltion is 
 not, Whether that particular thing agree to his complex idea. 
 cxpreffcd by the Name Man : But whether it has in it the real 
 EfTence of a Species of Thing;?; which he fuppofcs his Name 
 Man to flaiid for. In which way of ufing the Names of Sub- 
 ftanccs, there arc rhcfc falfe fuppofitions contained. 
 
Alufe- ef Werds, i o i 
 
 Virji, That there are certain preclfe Eff^nc^s, according to 
 which Nature makes all particular Thiogs, and by which they 
 are diftinguiftied into Species. That every Thing has a real Con- 
 ftitution, whereby it, is what it is, and on which its fcnfible 
 Qualities depend, is paft Doubt : But I think it has;been Proved, 
 that this makes not the di^ln^hn o^ Species, as werankthemi 
 nor the boundaries of their Names. . 
 
 Secondly, This tacitly alfo Infmuates, as if we had ideoi of 
 thcfepropofed Effences. For to what purpofe elfe is it, to en- 
 quire whether this or that thing have .the real Eflence of the 
 Species Man, if we did not fuppofe that there were fuch a fpe- 
 cifick Effence Iftiown ? Which yet is utterly falfe : And there- 
 fore fuch Application of Names, as would make them ftand for 
 ldea$ which we have not, muft needs caufe great Diibrder in Dip 
 courles and Realbnin^s about them, and be a great Inconveni- 
 ence in our Communication by Words. 
 _§. xz. S/at^/j/)/, There remains yet another more ^- t-t ..* 
 general, though, perhaps, lefs obferA'ed Ahufe of ^ IT/It^' 
 iVords ; and that is, that Men having by a long and thitm'rds 
 familiar ufe annexed to them certain Ideai, they are ^^^g ^ ^g^, 
 apt to imagine fo near and necejfary a connexion bettteen f^j^ a„^ ^^,-, 
 the Names and the Signification they ufe them in, that dtntfignifica' 
 they forwardly (uppole one cannot but underftand tiin, 
 what their meaning is ^ and therefore one ought 
 to acqulefcc in the Words delivered, as if it were paft doubt^ 
 that in the ufe of thofe common received Sounds, the Speaker 
 and Hearer had necefliirlly the fame precife Ideas. Whence 
 presuming, that when they have in DifCourfe ufcd any Term, 
 they have thereby, as it u ere, fet before others the very thing 
 they talk of. And fb likewife taking the Words of others, a$ 
 naturally {landing forjuft what they themfelves have been ac- 
 cuftomed to apply them to, they never trouble ihemfclves to 
 explain their own, or underftand clearly others meaning. From 
 whence commonly proceeds Noife , and Wrangling, without 
 Improvement or Liformation ; whilft Men take Words to be 
 the conftant regular marks of agreed Notions, which in truth 
 are no more but the voluntary and unfteady (igns of their own 
 Ideas. And yet Men think it ftrange, if in Dilcourfe, or (where 
 it is ofren abfolutely neccflary ) in Difpute, one fomelimes asks 
 the meaning of their Terms : Though the Arguings one may 
 every day obftrve in Converfation, make it evident, that there 
 are few Names of complex ideat, which any two Men ufe for 
 the fame juft precife Colledior. 'Tis hard lo name a Word, 
 
 which 
 
loi Alufe bf Wards. 
 
 which will not be a dear Inftance of this Ir/<r is a Term, none 
 more familiar. Any one almoft would rake it for an Affront, 
 to be asked what he meant by it. And yet if it comes in Qiic- 
 ftion, whether a Plant, that lies ready formed in the Seed, have 
 Life ■-, ^i^Hether the Embrio in an Egg before Incubation, or a 
 Man in a Swound without Senfe or M )fion, be alive, or no ? It 
 is ealy to perceive, that a clear diftinft fettled idea does not al- 
 ways accompany the life of fo known a Word, as that of Lift 
 is. Some grofs and confuted Conceptions Men indeed ordinarily 
 have, lo which they apply the common Words of their Lan- 
 guage, and fuch a loofe u(e of their Words fervrs them well e- 
 noii^h in their ordinary Dllcourfesor Affairs, cut this is not 
 (afficicnt for Philofophlcal Enquiries. Knowledge and Reafon- 
 ing require precife determinate Ueoi. And though Men will not 
 be fj imporrunately dull, as not to underltand what others fay, 
 without demanding an Explication of their Terms ; rvbt fo 
 troublelbmely critical, as to correA others in the ufe of the 
 Words they receive from them : yet where Truth and Know- 
 ledge are concerned in the Cafe, I know not what Fault it can 
 be to defire the Explication of Words, whofe Senfe feems du- 
 bious •, or why a Man fhould beafharaed to own his Ignorance, 
 in what Senfe another Man ufes his Words, fince he has no o- 
 ther way of certainly knowing it, but by being informed. This 
 Abufe of taking Words upon Truft, has no where fpread fb 
 far, nor with fo ill Effefts, as amongft Men of Letters. The 
 mulriplication and obftinacy ofDIfputes, which has fb laid wafbe 
 the intellcdVual World, is owing to nothing more, than to this 
 111 ufe of Words. For though it be generally believed, that 
 there is great diverfity of Opinions in the Volumes and Variety 
 of Con trover (ies, the World is diftrafted with •, yet the mofl I 
 ^an find, that the contending learned Men of different Parties ^ 
 do, in their Arguingsone with another, is, that they/peak'-dif- 
 ferent Languages. For I am apt to imigine, that when any of 
 them quitting Terms, think upon Things, and know what 
 they think, they think all the fame : Though perhaps, what 
 the|^ would have, be different. 
 
 §. i;. To conclude this Confideration of the 
 Tht Ends of Imperfej^ion, and Abufe of Langiiage ^ the ends 
 Language, e/L/tnguage in our Difcourfe with orhersy being chiefly 
 FirJI, To con- thcfe three : Firfl , To make k/iorvn one Mans 
 vey »ur]dtis. Thoughts or ideas to another. Secortdlyy To do 
 fr with as rnuch eafe and ^uid^nejsy as is poffible ; 
 ^w^thirdly. Thereby r* convey the K/iorpledge of Things. Lan- 
 guage 
 
Alufe of Wor^s, io> 
 
 guage IS either abufed, or defident, when it fails of any ofthefe 
 Three. 
 
 firfi. Words fail in the firft of thefe Ends, and lay not open 
 one Man's Ideas to another's view. Fir/?, When Men have 
 Names in their Mouths without any determined Ideas in their 
 Minds, whereof they are the figns : or Secondly^ When they 
 apply the common received Names of any Language to Ideas, to 
 which the common u(e of that Language does not apply them : 
 or Thirdly^ When they apply them very unfteadily, making them 
 ftand now for one, and by and by for another Idea, 
 
 %. X4, Secondly^ Men fail of conveying their Secondly, T9 
 Thoughts, with all the quicknefi and eafe that may da it with 
 be, when they have complex Ideas, without ha- qt^ickntfs: ' 
 ving diftinft Names for them. This is fbmetimes 
 the Fault of the Language it felf, which has not in it a Sound 
 yet apply'd to fuch a Signification : and fbmetimes the Fault of 
 the Man, who has not yet learn'd the Name for that Idea he 
 would fhew another. 
 
 \:r',§. 25. Thirdly J There is no Knowledge of Thirdly, 
 Things, conveyed by Mens Words, when their Thgrewith t» 
 Ideas agree not to the Reality of Things. Tho' ic convey the 
 be a Defe£l, that has its Original in our Ideas, Knowledge «f 
 which are not fo conformable to the Nature of Things. 
 Things, as Attention,^ Study, and Application 
 might make them : Yet it fails not to extend it felf to our Words 
 too, when we ufe them as Signs of real Beings, which yet ne- 
 ver had any Reality orExiflence. 
 
 §. 26. Firft ^ He that hath Words of any Lan- fJov Mens 
 guage, without diftindt ideas in his Mind, to which ^ords fait 
 he applies them, does, fb far as he ufes them in *^ alithefe. 
 Difcourfe, only make a Noife without any Senfe 
 or Signtficaiion ^ and how learned fbever he may feem by th© 
 u(e of hard Words, or learned Terms, is not much more ad- 
 vanced thereby in Knowledge, than he would be in Learning,, 
 who had iwthing in his Study but the bare Titles of Books, 
 without pofTefling the Contents of them. For all fuch Words, 
 however put into D.fcourfe , according to the right Conflru- 
 6lion of Grammatical Rules, or the Harmony ot well turned 
 Periods, do yet amount to nothing but bare Sounds, and no-. 
 thing elfe, 
 
 §. 27. Secondly, He that has complex Ideas, without parricular 
 Names for them, would be in no better a Gafe than a Book- 
 feller, who had in his Ware-houfc Volumes, th^c lay there un- 
 bound. 
 
104 Ahufe of VV^rJs. 
 
 bound, and without Titles j which he could therefore make 
 known to others, only by fhewing the loole SheeTF, rnd com- 
 municaie them only by l^ale. This Man is hindred in his Dif 
 course, for want of Words to communicate his complex Ideas, 
 whicii he is therefore forced to make known by an enumeration 
 of the fimple ones that compofe them f, and fo is fain often to 
 ufe twenty Words, to expiefs what another Man fignifies in 
 one. 
 
 §. a8. Jhirdly, He that puts not conftantly the (ame Sign for 
 the (.irae Idea^ but ules the fame Words fometimes in one, and 
 (ometimes in another Signification, ought to pafs in the Schools 
 and Converfation for as fair a Man, aa he docs in the Market 
 and Exchange, who fells feveral things under the fame Name. 
 §. 19. Fourthly, He that applies the Words of any Language 
 to JdeaSi different from thofe, to which the common ufe of that 
 Country applies them, however his own Underftanding may be 
 fill'd with Truth and Light, will not bv fuch Words be able to 
 convey much of it to others, without defining his Terms. For 
 however, the Sounds are fuch as are familiarly known, and eafily 
 enter the Ears of thofe who are accuftom.ed to them ; yet fland- 
 ing for other Ideas than thofe they ufually are annexed to, and 
 arc wont to excite in the Mind of the Hearer?, they cannot 
 make known the Thoughts of him who thus ufes rhem. 
 
 §. 30. Fifthly, He that hath imagined to himfelf Subftances 
 fuch as never have been, and fill'd his Head with Ideas which 
 "have not any coirtfpondei.ee with the real Nature of Things, 
 to which yet he gives fettled and d( fined Names, may fill his 
 DifcQurfe, and peihaps, another Man's Head, with the fanta- 
 ftical Imaginations of^his own Brain, but will be very far from 
 advancing thereby one lot in real and true Knowleegc. 
 
 §. ;i. He that hath Names without ideasy wants meaning in 
 his Word?, and fpeaks only empty Sounds. He that hath com- 
 plex Ueas without Names for tbem, wants Liberty and Difpatch 
 in his Expreflions, and is ncct flitated toufe Periphrafes. He that 
 ufes his Words loofly and unfteadily, will either be rot minded, 
 or not underflood. He that applies hi? Names to Ideas, different 
 from their common ufe, wants Propriety in his Language, and 
 fpeaks Gibberifh. And he that hath Ideas of Sublknces, difa- 
 greeing with the real lixiftcncc of Things, (o far wants the 
 Material* of true Knowledge in his Underftanding, and hath, 
 inflcad thereof. Chimeras, 
 Urn m Sub ^- 5"^' ^^ ^"'' Notions concerning Subftances 
 if^rttci ^^'t ^re \iz!o\c to all the former Inconveniences: 
 
Alufe of Words. lOJ 
 
 u^. He that ufes the word larantula, without having any Ima- 
 gination or Idea of what it ftands for, pronounces a good Word ^ 
 but fo long means nothing at all by it. x. He that, in a new- 
 dilcover'd Country, fhall fee feveral forts of Animals and Ve- 
 getables, unknown to him before, may have as true Ideas o£ 
 them, as of a Horfe, or a Stag ; but can fpcak of them only b/ 
 a defcription, till he ihall either take the Names the Natives 
 call them by, or give them Names him(elf. ;. He that ufes the 
 Word Body fometimes for pure Extenfion, and fometimes for 
 Extenfion and Solidity together, will talk very fallacioufly. 
 
 4. He that gives the Name Horfe, to that idea which common 
 Ufage call Male, talks improperly, and will not beunderftood. 
 
 5. He that thinks the Name CwMwr ftands for feme real Being, 
 impoftson himfelf, and miflakes Words for Things. 
 
 §. 53. In Modes and Relations generally, we w</w in 
 are liable only to the four firft of thefe Inconve- Modes and 
 niences, (vi^^-) i. I may have in my Memory the ^^''''"'«'« 
 Names of Modes, as Gratitude, or Charity, and yet 
 not have any precife Ideas annexed in my Thoughts to thofe 
 Names, a. I may have Ideas^ and not know the Names ihac 
 belong to them ', v. g. 1 may have the Idea of a Man's drinking, 
 till his Colour and Humour be altered, till his Tongue trips, and 
 his Eyes look red, and his Feet fail him , and yet not know, 
 that it is to be called Drunkennefs. 5. I may have ihe Ideas of 
 Vertues or Vices, and Names alfb, but apply them amifs : v. g. 
 When I apply the Name Frugality to that Idea which others call 
 and fignify by this (bund, Covetoufnefs. 4. I may ufeany of thofe 
 Names with irconftancy. 5. But in Modes and Relations, I 
 cannot have Ideas difagreeing to the Exiftence of Things : tor 
 Modes being complex Ideas, made by the Mind at pleafure^ 
 and Relation being but my way of conlidering, or comparing 
 two Things together, and ib alfo an Idea of my own rnaking, 
 thefe ideas can fcarce be found to difagree with any Thing exi- 
 fting ; fince they are not in the Mind, as the Copies of Things 
 regularly made by Nature, mr as Properties infeparably tiowing 
 from the internal Conftitution or Eflence of any Stibflance ; 
 but, as it were. Patterns lodg'd in my Memory, with Names 
 annexed to them, to denominate AcSfions and Relations by, as 
 they come to exiit. But the miftake is commonly in my giving 
 a wrong Name to my Conceptions •, and fo ufing Words in a 
 different fenfefrom other People,! am not underftood, but am 
 thought to have -wrong Ideas of then, when I give wrong 
 Names to them. Only if I put in my Ideas of mixed Modes 
 
 Or 
 
io6 Ahfe of Words. 
 
 or Relation?, any inconfiftent Ideas together, 1 fill my Head 
 alfo with Chimaras \ fince fiich Ideas^ it" well examined, cannot 
 fo much as exift in the Mind, much Ic^ any real Being, be ever 
 denominated trom them. 
 
 §. 54. Since Wit tfrd Fancy finds eafier enter- 
 Sevtnthly, tainment in the World, than dry Truth and real 
 Figurative Knowledge, figurative Speecbejf and ailufion in Lan- 
 Speech alf» an guage, will hardly be admitted, zsan iraperfe(fti-. 
 ^hufitfLan- on or ahufeoixt. I confefl in Difcourfo, where 
 luxge. yyg (^g|j rather Pleafux^ and Delight, than Infor* 
 
 mation and Improvement, fiich Ornaments as are 
 borrovv'd from them, can fcarce pafs for Faults. But yet, if 
 we would fpeak of Tbings as they are, wemuft allow, that all 
 the Art of Rhetorick, befides Order and Clearnefs, all the arti- 
 ficial and figurative application of Words Eloquence hath in- 
 vented, are for nothing elfe but to infinuate wrong ideasy move 
 the Paflions, and thereby miflead the Judgment : and fb indeed 
 are perfc6t cheit : And therefore however laudable or allow- 
 able Oratory may render them in Harangues and popular Ad* 
 drefles, they are certainly, in all Difcourfes that pretend to in- 
 form or inftrudV, wholly to be avoided ^ and where Truch and 
 Knowledge are concerned, cannot but be thought a great fault, 
 cither ofthe Language or Perfbu that makes uie of them. 
 What, and how various they are, will be lupcrfluous here to 
 take notice i the Books of Rhetorick which abound iu the World, 
 will inftru(^ thofe, who want to be informed . Only I cannot 
 but obferve, how little the prefervation and improvement of 
 Truth and Knowledge, is the Care and Concern ot Mankind^ 
 fince the Arts of Fallacy are endow'd and preferred, 'Tis evi- 
 dent how much Men love to deceive, and be deceived, fince 
 Rhetorick, that powerful Inftrument of Error and Deceit, has 
 Its eflabliflied Profeflbrs, is publickly taught, and has alwa-ys 
 been had in great Reputation : And, I doubt not, but it will 
 be thought great boldnefi, if not brutality in me to have faid 
 thus much againft it. Eloquence, like the fair Sex, has too pre* 
 vailing Beauties in it, to (uffer it (elf ever to be fpoken againli 
 And 'tis in vain to find fault with thofe Arts of Dcceiviiig, 
 wherein Men find pleafure to be Deceived. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
Remedies »f the ImperfeSliott^ Sec. loy 
 
 c H A p; 
 
 Of the Remedies of the foregoing ImperfeHions 
 and AhuJiS, 
 
 %. I. ^ j "^ H E natural and improved Imper- They an 
 
 I feilions of Languages, we have feen ^^rthjeeking, 
 -*- above ac large: and Speech being 
 the great Bond that holds Society together, and the common 
 Conduit, whereby the Improvements of Knowledge are con- 
 veyed from one Man, and one Generation to another, it would 
 Well deferve our moft ferious Thoughts, to confider what lUmt' 
 dies are to be found for thefe Inconveniences above-mentioned. 
 
 §. z. I am not (b vain to think, that any one 
 can pretend to attempt the perfect ^forming the Are not 
 Languages of the World, no not fb much as of his i(*fy. 
 own Country, without rendring himfelf ridiculous. 
 To require that Men fliould u(e their Words conftantly in the 
 fame fenfe, and for none but determined and uniform IdeM^ 
 would be to think, that all Men ftiould have the fame Notions, 
 and fhould talk of nothing but what they have clear and di- 
 ftinft ideas of. Which is not to be expected by any one, who 
 hath not vanity enough to imagine he can prevail with Men to 
 be very knowing or very filcnr. And he muft be very little 
 skill'd in the World, who thinks that a voluble Tongue, ftail 
 accompany only a good Underftanding ^ or that Mens talking 
 much or little, (hall hold proportion only to their Know- 
 ledge. 
 
 §. 3. But though the Market and Exchange Bat yet «*. 
 muft be left to their own ways of Talking, and ceffarytoPki- 
 Goffippings not be robb'd of their ancient Privi- i^Jo^h' 
 lege : though the Schools, and Men of Argument 
 would perhaps take it amifs co have any thing offered, to abate 
 the length, or leflen the number of their Difputes", yet, methinks 
 thofe, who pretend ferioujly to fearch after, or maintain Truth,(biOu\d 
 think themfelves obliged to ftudy, how they might deliver 
 themselves without Obfcurity, Doubtfulnefs, or Equivocation, 
 to which Mens Words are naturally liable, if care be not 
 taken, 
 
 §. 4. 
 
io8 Remedies of the Imperfeil'ion. 
 
 §. 4. For he that fhuU well confider the JErrwi 
 Mifufe of and Oblcuriry, the Miftakes and Confufion, that 
 mrdsthe Isfpread in the TVorld by an ill ufe of T^ords, will find 
 
 taufe of great ^^^^ rta.ion to doybt, whether Language, as it 
 Errort. ^^^ j^^i^ employ 'd, has contributed more to the 
 
 improvement or hhidrance of Knowledge amongfl Mankind. 
 How many are there, that when they would think on things, 
 fix their Thoughts only on Words, eft)ccially when they would 
 apply their Minds to Moral Matters ? And who then can won- 
 der, if the refiilt of fiich Contemplations and Reafbnings, about 
 little more than Sounds, whilft the Ideas rhey annexed to them, 
 are very confufed, or very unlleady, or perhaps none at all j 
 who can wonder, I fay, that fiich Thoughts and Reafbnings, 
 end in nothing but Obfcurity and Miflake, without any clear 
 Judgment or Knowledge ? 
 
 §. 5 . This Inconvenience, in an ill ufe of Wbrds, 
 Obflinacy Men fuffer in their own private Meditations; but 
 
 much more manifeft are the Difordtrs which fol- 
 low from ir, in Conver^rion, Difcourfe, and Arguiugs with 
 others. For Language being the great Conduit, whereby Men 
 convey their Difcoveries, Reafbnings, and Knowledge, from 
 one to another, he that makes an ill ufe of it, though he does 
 not corrupt the Fountains of Knowledge, which are in Things 
 rhemfelves; yet he does, as much as in him lies, break or Hop 
 the Pipes, whereby itisdiftributed to the puhlick ufe and ad- 
 vantage of Mankind. He that ufes 'Words without any clear 
 and ftcady meaning. What does he but lead himfelf and others 
 into Errors } And he that defignedly does it, ought to be looked 
 on as an Enemy to Truth and Knowledge. And yet who can 
 wonder, that all the Sciences and Parts of Knowledge, have 
 been (o over-charged with obfcure and equivocal Terms, and 
 mfignificant and doubtful Expreflions, capible to make then\pft 
 attentive or quick- fighted, very little, or not at all the more 
 Knowing or Orthodox, fince Subtil ty, inthofe whomakcPro- 
 feflion to teach or defend Truih, hathpafTcdfb much for a Ver- 
 tuer A Vertue, indeed, which confifting, for the moff part, in 
 nothing but the fallacious and illufbry ufe oi obfcure ot deceitful 
 Termsy is only fit to make Men more conceited in their Ignorance, 
 and obfttnate in their Errors. 
 
 §. 6. Let us look into the Books of Controverfy 
 AndlVrang- of any kind, there we (hall fee, that the tScQt of 
 iifg- obfcure, uniteady or equivocal Terms, is nothing 
 
 but noifc and wrangling about Sounds, without 
 
 convincing 
 
And Ahufe of U^ords. 1 09 
 
 conviiiclng or bettering a Man's UnderftandingI Vot if thfc 
 idea be not agreed on, betwixt the Speaker and Hearer, for 
 which the Words ftand, the Argument is not about Things, but 
 
 •Names. As often as fuch a Word, whofe Signification is not 
 afcertained betwixt them, comes in ufe, their Underflandings 
 have no other Object; wherein they agree, but barely rhe 
 Sound, the Things that they think on at that time as exprefled 
 by that Word, beirg quite different. 
 
 §. 7. Whether a Bat be a Birdy orno, is not a In/iaiice Bat 
 queftion, whether a liat be another Thing than «»^ ^'^^- 
 iadeed it is, or have other Qiialiries than indeed it 
 has, for that would be extremely abfurd to doubt of: But the 
 queftion is, i . Either between thofe that acknowledged them- 
 felves to have but imperfefl idtai of one or both of thofe forts 
 of Things, for which thefe Names arefuppofed ro ftnnd ; and 
 then it is a real Enquiry, concerning the Nature of a Birdy or a 
 Bdf, to make their yet imperfed: Ideas of it more complete, by 
 examining, whether all the fimplelc/e<ij, to which combined to- 
 gether, they both give rhe Name Bird^ be all to be found in x 
 
 ■ Bae : But this is a queftion only of Enquirers, ( not Difputers ) 
 who neither affirm, nor deny, but examine: Or, a. It is a 
 queftion between Difputants ; whereof the one aflBrms, and the 
 other denies, that a Bat is a Bird. And then the queffion is 
 barely about the fignification of one, or both thefe Words •, irt 
 that they not having both the fame complex Ideasy to which 
 they give thefe two Names ^ one holds, and t'other denies, that 
 thefe two Names may be affirmed one of another. Were they 
 agreed in rhe Signification of thefe two Niime?, it were impof* 
 fible they (houlddifpute about them. For they would prefendy 
 and clearly fee, (were that adjufted between them, ) whether 
 all the fimple ideofy of the more general N^nie Birdy were 
 
 "found in the complex Ideaoi a Bat^ or no j and lo there could 
 be no doubt, whether a Bat were a Bird or nT?. And here t 
 defire it may be confidered, and carefully examined, whether 
 the greateft part of the Difputes in the World, are not meerly 
 Verbal, and about the Signification of Words; and whether if 
 the^ Terms they are made in, were defined, and reduced in 
 their Signification ( as they muft be where they fignify any 
 thing ^ to determined Colle6lion3 of the fimple Tdeoi they do 
 or fhould ftand for, thofe Difputes would not end of themfelves^ 
 and immediately vaniih. I leave it then to be confidered, what 
 the learning of Difputation is, and how well they areemploy'd for 
 the Advantage of themfelves, or others, whofe Bufiaefs h only 
 Voll» II. I m 
 
no Remedies cf the Iwperfefiion^ 
 
 rhc vain Oftcntiuon of Sounds-, i. e, thole fwhp fJDcnd their 
 Liv(j3 in DIfpurcs and Controvirfiq^. When I fliii.ll fee any of 
 thofe Combataiito, ftrip all his Terms oi Ambiguity and Obfcu- 
 tity, ( which cvcr^ one may do in die Words he u(e himlelf ) i 
 (hull think him a Champion for Rpowledgc, Truth, and Peace, 
 and not the Slave of Vain-Glory, Ambition, or a Party. 
 
 §. 8. To remedy the Dcfetis of Speech before-mcn- 
 Firff, Remedy tioned, to fome degree, and toprevtnt thelncon- 
 joufe neiVard venicnces that foUuw from them, I imagine, the 
 without an obfervation of thefe following Rules may be of 
 ^^^*' a(c, till fomc body better able fhall judge it worth 
 
 his while, to think more maturely oa this Matter, 
 and oblige the World with his Thoughts on ic» ^ 
 
 Ftrft, A Man (hould take care to ufeno^ word without a figni' 
 fication^ no Name without an Liea for which he makes it If anc^. 
 7'his Rule will not feem altogether netdleii, lo any one who 
 (hall take the pains torccollecl; how often he has met with (uch 
 Words •, as Injlm^y Sympathy, and Atitipathy^ &c. in the Dif- 
 courfe of others, fo made u(e of, as he might eafily conclude, 
 that thofe that ufed them, had no ideas in their Minds to which 
 they applied them •, but (poke them onljr as Sounds, which 
 u(ij;dly ferved inifcad of Reafbns, on the like Occafions. Noc 
 but that thefe Words, and the like, have very proper Signifi- 
 cations in which rhcy may be ufed ^ but there being no natural 
 connexion between any Words, and any ideaSf thtfe, and any 
 other, maybe learn'dby rote, and pronounced or writ by Men, 
 who have no 7</<!<iJ in their Minds, to which they have annexed 
 them, and for which they make themftand:, which is necel* 
 fary they fhould, if Men would (peak intelligibly even to them^ 
 (elves alone. ^ _, , ^ 
 
 §. 9. Secondly^ 'Tis not enough a Man ufes his 
 Secondly, to jVords as fi^ns of iomt ideas^ thofe ideai^ he ai\Pt.xe3 
 k»ve dijiiu:! [h^m to, it they befimpUi muft be clear ahd dilf in~^ i 
 U<.isatinexcd j£ complex, muft be determinate, i. e. the precife 
 tot kern in Colledllon of funple Idtas fettled in the Mind, 
 M^des, ^.j^j^ j.j^^j S®urd annexed to it, asthefign ofihac 
 
 precile determined ColltiSion, and no ether. This 
 is very ncceflfary in Names of Modes, and efpecially moral 
 Words ; which havingino fettled Objects in Nature, from whence 
 their ideas are taken, as from thtii Original, are apt to be very 
 confufcd. Jtiflicc is a Word in every Man's Mourh, but moll 
 commonly with a very undetermined loofe lignification : Which 
 will always be fo, unkfsa Man has in his Mind dillin^ compre- 
 
 henfien 
 
anil Ahufe of Words. i 1 1 
 
 lieilfiori'of the component parts, that complex idea confifts of; 
 and if it be deconripounded, mult be able to refolve it ftill on, 
 till he at Jaft conies to the fimple ideas^ that make it up; And 
 Unlefs this Be done, a Mail makes an ill ufe of the Word, let ic 
 hQjttjiicieyhv example, or any other. I do not fay, a iVhrl 
 needs ftand to recolleft, and make this Analyfis at large every 
 time the word Juftice comes in his way : But this, at leall:, \i 
 necefliiry, that he have io examiilcd the lignification of thac 
 Name, and fettled the Idea of all its Parts in his Mjid, that he 
 can do ic when he pleafts. If one, who makes his complex Idea of 
 Jujlioe^toheiucho. treatment of the Perfbn or Goods of another* 
 as is according to Law, hach not a clear and diUin-ft Idea what 
 LaTv is, which makes a part of his complex Ideaoi Jultice, 'cis 
 plainj [vh idea of Juftice it ftlf, will be confufed and impcrfcbl. 
 This exa£tnefs will, pefhaps, be judged very troubiefome: and 
 therefore moft Men will think, they may be excufed Irom fee- 
 ling the complex Ideas of mixed Modes fo precifely in their 
 Minds. But yet I muft fay, rill this be done, it mull not be 
 V/ondred, that rhey have a great dealof Obfcurity and Contufiori 
 In their oWn Minds, and a great deaf of wrangling in theit 
 Difcourfe wich others. 
 
 "* §. io. irr the Names of Stt^^iwejp, for aright And cofifhr^ 
 ttfe of theni , fbmething more is required than ti>«hle in Sut>- 
 h2iTt\y determined Ideas: In tYitftthe Names tnuft alfi J^^-'^"' 
 he conforfHable to Things^ as they exift ; But of this, 
 I (hall have occafion to fpeak more at large by and by. This 
 Exa<9:iicl5% abfbhitely neceffary in Enquiries alter philofophical 
 Knowled^, and in Cbntroverfies about Truth. And though 
 it would bi. well tod, if it extended it fclf to common Convtrfa- 
 lion," and theordinary AiS\i!rs of Ltfej yet I think that islcarce 
 to be_^^pc6ted, Vulgar Notions fuit Vulgar Dlfcourfts: and 
 both, though Confufed enough, yet ferve pretty well the Market, 
 andtheW^ke. Mcrchahts and Lovers, Cooks and Taylors^' 
 h^ve Wofds'wherewithal to difpatch their ordinary Affairs-, and 
 fb, I think, jnight Philofophers and Difputants too, if they* 
 had a Mind to underftand, and to be clearly underilood. 
 
 §. I i. thirdly t 'Tis not enough that Men have 
 Ideas-, determined Ii:/e<«j for which they make thefs Thirdtj^ ' ' 
 figns Hand-, but they mu§l alfo cake care to apply Propriety 
 their Words., as rear as may be, to fuch idcii as^ 
 common ufe has annexed them to. For Words, efpecially df Lan- 
 guages already framed, being ho Man's privat:e pofftlTion, [fUZ 
 she common meafuts of Commerce and Ccramuilicitioni; 'tis 
 
 It hst 
 
iiz Heme files cff the Irtiperfe^ioff, 
 
 not for any one, at pleafure, ro change the Stafnp they arc 
 current In; nor alter the idcji they arc affixed ro; or at leaft 
 when there is a ntccificy to do (o, he is bound to give notice 
 of it. M-n's Iii'^entions infpeaking are, or at Icaft (hould be, 
 to be underllood; which cannot be without frequent Explana- 
 tions, Demmds, and other the like incommodious Interruptions, 
 where Men Jo not follow common U(e. Propriety of Speech, 
 U that which gives our Thoughts entrance into other Men's 
 Alinds with the greareft eafe and advantage •• and therefore 
 defcrves fbme part of our Care and Study, efpccially in the 
 Karnes of moral Words. The proper fieniHcation and ufe of 
 Terms is hell to be learned from thofc, who in their Writings 
 and Di'courfcs, appear to have had the cleareft Notions, and 
 ?iD,'l)'d ro them their Terms with the exa<fieft choice and fitnefs. 
 Tnia wayofufmg a Man's Word?, according to the Propriety 
 of the Language, tho it have not always the goodCortune to be 
 underllood: Yet moll commonly leaves the blame of it on him, 
 who U fb unskilful in the Languige he fpeaks, as nottoundcr- 
 Itand it, when made ufe of, as it ought to be. 
 
 §. II. Fourthly^ But bccaufc common ule has 
 Fourthly, to not fo vifibly annexed any fignification to Words, 
 viake known ^^ ^q make Men know always certainly what they 
 thetrmta?:ing, prccifely (land for : And becaufe Men in the Im- 
 provement of their Knowledge, come to have 7- 
 de,ti different from the vulgar and ordinary received ones, for 
 which r hey mull either make new Words, (which Menfeldom 
 vcncure to do, for fear of being thought guilty of Affe<^ation 
 or Novelty, )orelfe mull ufe old ones, in a new Signification. 
 I'hcrtfore after the Obfervation of the foregoing Rules, it is 
 lometimcs nectflary for the afcertainin^ the fignihcation of 
 Words, lo declare their Meaning'-, where 'either common Ufe has 
 left it uncertain and Ioofci(as it has in moll Names of very 
 complex ideas ) ox where the Term, being very material in* the 
 Difcourk, and that upon which it chiefly turns, is liable to any 
 Doubtfulnefs oi Miliake. 
 
 ^. i;. A^ the ideoit Mens Words ftand for, are 
 And that of different fbrrs: fo the way of making known 
 three ways. tj^e ideoi, they ftand for, when there is Occafion, 
 is alfo different. For though defining be thought 
 the proper nv)', to mak^ knowrt the proper Jjgnffication of PfWdt j 
 yet there be fbme Words, that will not be dttiiied, as there be 
 other?, whole prtcife Meaning cannot be made known, but by 
 Ociluition : and, jxrhaps, a third, which partake fomewhat of 
 
 both 
 
and Ahafe of Words. 1 1 j* 
 
 both the other, as we fhall (ee in the Names of fimple Ideas 
 Modes, and Subftances. 
 
 §. 14. Firft, When a Man makes u(e of the /""•/, in Jim- 
 Name oi any fimple Idea, which he perceives is not P^' '''"-"s by 
 underftood, or is in danger to be miftaken, he is fy^omwous 
 obliged by the Laws^ of Ingenuity, and the end of J^^'"'*^ '"■^^"'• 
 Speech, to declare his meaning., and make known "'^' 
 whsLtldea he makes it ftand for. This, as has been 
 fliewn, cannot be done by Definition : and therefore, when a fv'- 
 nonymous Word fails to do ir,there is but one of thefe ways le^r. 
 Firfti Sometimes the naming the SuhjeSl, vpherein that fimple Idea is 
 to be found,will make its Name be underitood by thofe, who are 
 acquainted with that SubjecSV, and knov it by that Name. S) 
 to make a Couiirrv-man underftand what Fueillemortc Colour 
 fignifies, it may (uffice to tell him, 'ris rhe Colour of wither'd 
 Leaves falling in Autumn. Secondly^ Bat the only fure way of 
 making known the fignification of the Name of any fimple 7<3^(?^ 
 is by prefenting to his Senfes that SubjeB^ which may produce it in 
 fH Mind, and make hin actually have the Idsa, that Wore', 
 (lands for. 
 
 §.15. Secondly, Mixed Modes, efpecially thofe Secondly, in 
 belonging to Morality, being moft of them fuch "''^^^ ^^""^^^ 
 Combinations of Ideas, as the Mind puts together h defimtton. 
 of its own choice *, and whereof there are not al 
 ways ftanding Paterns to be found exifl^ing- the fignification of 
 their Names cannot be made known, as thofe of fimple Ideas, 
 by any {hewing : but in recompence thereof, may be pcrfe6l]y 
 defined. For they being Combinations offcveral ldetii,*t\i7iX the 
 Mind of Man has arbitrarily put together, without reference to 
 any Archetypes, Men may, if they pleafe, exadtly kn-jw the JF- 
 deat, thit go to each Compofition% and fo borhufe thefe Words 
 in a certain and undoubted Signification, and ptrfe6t!y declare, 
 when there is Occafion, what they iland for. This, if well 
 confidered, would lay great blame on rhofe, who make not 
 their Difcourfes about moral things very clear and ciiffindl:. 
 For fince the precife fignification of the Names of mixed ModcF, 
 or which Is all one, the real Eff nee of each Species, is to be 
 known, they being not of Nature's^ but Man's making* it is a 
 great Kegllgence and Pcrverfenefs, to difcourfe of moral Things 
 with Uncertainty and Obfcurity, which is more pardonable in 
 treating of natural Subftances, where doubtful Terms are hard- 
 ly to be avoided, for a quire contrary Rea(bn, as we fhall fee 
 by and by. 
 
 1 5 §. id 
 
1 1 4 Retyiedies of the ImperfeWton. 
 
 , ,. §. 16. Upm tills groand it ir, that I am bold 
 
 MtraUty CI- to think, that Morality ^ capable of Demonjlratioa, 
 fjihlf of De- a-: Well as Mathcmaticlcs : Since the predfe rtal 
 sfionjiirittcn. ElTeiKe of the Things motal Words (land for, may 
 be ()er('c611y. known •, and fo the Congruiry, or In- 
 congruity of tlie Things themftlveSj be certainly di(covered, in 
 which confifts perft6l Knowledge. Nor let any one objcf!-, 
 that the Names of Subftances are often to be made ufe of in 
 Morality, as vvell as thofe of Mode?, from which vvill arlfe 
 Oblcurity. ^ For as to Subllanccs, when concerned In moral D'lC- 
 tourfc?, their divers Natures are not (b much enquir'd Into, as 
 iuppcfcd 1^ y. g. whtn we fay that Man k fulje^ to Larv •■ We 
 mean norhing by Man^ but corporeal rauoual Creature: What 
 'the real Efhncc or oihcr Qiialltics.bf that Creature are in this 
 Cafe, is no way couGdered. And therefore, whether a Child 
 or Charigtiing be a Man in a phyfical Senie, may amongfl the 
 Naturalills be as difputable as it will, It concerns not. at alj, 
 the i7ior.il Man, a3 I may call him, which is this irarooY* ^blC; 
 unchangeable Jdea^ a corporeal rational "Being. For were th.ero, 
 a Mon),cy, or any other Creature to be tound, that hati the 
 life ot Ucafon, to fuch a degree, as to be able to underfland 
 gercal Sign?, and to deduce Confequerces about general ideas^ 
 he would no doubt be fubje^l to Law, aiic^, in that fenft', be a 
 Mauy how much (bever he differ'd in Shape from others of that 
 Name. The Names of Subftancesy if they be ufed in lhtm» 
 as theyfhould, cm nomoredifturb Moral, than the) do'Mathe- 
 jnatlcal Difcourfcs; Where, if the Mathematicians fpeak 9f a 
 Cube or C^lohe of Gold^ cr any other ^ody^ he has his clear let- 
 led Idea, which varies not, though ii^ niay, by mi^latc, be 
 applied to a particular Body, to which it belongs not. 
 
 §. 17. This I have'here mentioned bj'|-lheb)ie,to. 
 
 DefnitioKs fhew ot what Con(equence it Is for Men, in their 
 
 can make Names of mixed Modcii, and confequently, in ail 
 
 mural Dif- their moral Difcourfc?, to define their vVard:* when 
 
 C9urj%s I tar. there IS Occafion ; Since thertby morallCnowledge 
 
 may be brought to fo great Ckarncfs and Certain- 
 
 fy. And it muft be great, wan^o{ Ingenuity, ( to ^y rK;,wor(e of 
 
 it) tonfule to do k: Since a Defimtionis the only trajf, whereby 
 
 thefrecife Meaning of moral Words can be l^otrn-f and. yet a way,^ 
 
 whcriby their Mcai^ii)g may be known cfr/ijzn/)/, arid wiihour 
 
 leaving any r(x>n) for any conn fl about it. And therefore the 
 
 Nv^llgtnce or r^jverftiiefs of Mankind, i^annor be txciifcd, ij^ 
 
 their DIfcourfesin Moialhy be hot much morp clear, ikaij.iHolq 
 
and Alufe of Words, 115' 
 
 in Natural Philofbphy: fince they are abouc'J^e^ in the Mind> 
 which are none of them fal(e or difproportionate \ they having 
 no external Beings for Archetyps'^\\\&i they are referred to, and 
 muft correfpond with. It is far cafier for Men to frame in 
 their Minds an Uea^ which (hall be the Standard to which they 
 will give the Name Juftke, with which Pattern fb made, all 
 A6lions that agree fhall pals under that denomination , than,, 
 having feen Artfltdes^ loivzmeznldea^ that fliall, in allThing?^ 
 be exaclly like him, who is as he is, let Men make what Idex 
 they pleafe of him. For the one, they need but know the Com- 
 bination of Ideai^ that are put together^ within in their own 
 Minds •, for the other, they mufl enquire into the whole Nature, 
 and abftrufe hidden Conftitution, various Qualities of a thing 
 exifling without them. , / . 
 
 §. 18. Another Reafon that makes the defining Andk the 
 of mixed Modesto iiecefTary, efpecially of moral Words^ o»h """"J- 
 h what I mentioned a little before, ■»/:{. That it 
 is the only rpay jvhereby the fignification of the moft of them Can he 
 known with Certainty. For the ideas i\\cy ftand for, being for 
 the moft part fuch, w hofe component Parts no where exift to- 
 gether, but fcattered and mingled with others, it is the Mind 
 ^lone that colie6l:s them, and gives them the Union of one ideai 
 and it is only by Words, enumerating the fevcral fimpie Jdeoi. 
 which the Mind has united, that we can make known to others, 
 what their Names ftand for; the Aflillance of the Senfes in this 
 Cafe not helping us, by the propofal of fenhblc Objedts, to 
 {hew the Jdeas^ which our Names of this kind ftand tor, as it 
 does often in the Names of fenfible fimpie Ideas^ and alfb to, 
 fome degree in thofe of Subftances. 
 
 §. 19, Thirdly, For the explaining the f^nifica- 7h>rdly, H 
 tion of the Names of Subjtances as they ftand for the Si,biU7ues, 
 Ideas we have of their dilHn(3: Species, both rhe h'f^-^'^'^S, 
 fore- mentioned ways, vi^. oi Jhen^ing and defining^ and dcjlmng,. 
 arjerequffitCj in many Cafes, to be made ufe of. For 
 there being ordinarily in each Sort fome leading Qualities, to 
 which we fuppofethe other Ideas, which make up our complex 
 Idea of that Species, anriexed, we forwardly give the fpccifick 
 Name to that thing, wherein that characElcriftical Mark is 
 found, which we take to be the moft diftinguifliing Idea of 
 that Species. Thefe leading or charaffcriftfoil ( as I may fd 
 call them j ideas^ in the forts of Animals and Vegetables, is (ag 
 has been before remarked, C)f». V I. §. 29. C/7.IX. §., i5.)moft- 
 ly Figure, andin inanimate Bodies Colour, and in fome both to- 
 gether. Now,, I 4 §. 10. 
 
.] 
 
 1 1 6 . Remedies of the Jmperfe^ion^ 
 
 §. xa Tiled" IcaJtnz fenfible Qualities arc thofc, 
 Irleas of rhi wkich mike the chief Ingredients of our fpecifick^ JdcAS^ 
 JttJing^ta and conlcquciitly the moft obfervable and unvaria- 
 Jtdei of Sub- ]q\q p.^rt in the Definitions of our fpecifick Names, 
 J^'**'*"; *'"' as attributed to Sorts of Subfiances coraing under 
 ^Z'^*' 7 our Knowledge. For though the Sound Man^ in 
 / twtng. j^^ ^^^ Nature, be as apt to fignify a complex idea 
 
 made up of Animality and Rationality, united in the fame Sub- 
 ject, as to fi^nify any other Combination; yet ufed as a Mark- 
 ro Hand for a fort of Creatures we count of our own kind, 
 perhaps the outward fhapeis as neceffary to be taken into our 
 complex Jdeif lignlfied by the Word Man^ as any other we find 
 in if, and therefore why Plate''s Animal imflume Eipes latis un- 
 onibt's, (hould nor be as good a Dehnition of the Name Man^ 
 tUnding for that (brt of Creatures, will not be eafy to (hew > 
 for 'ti.-i the Shape, as the leading Q^tality, that feems more to 
 determine that Species, than a Faculty of Reafbnin^ , which 
 appears not at firft, and in (bme never. And if this be not 
 allow'd to be fo, I do not know how they can be excufed from 
 JMurther, who kill monftrous Births, (as we call them, j be- 
 Caule of an unordinary Shape, without knowing whether they 
 liave a Rational Soul, or no-, which can be no more difcerned 
 in a weli-tormtd, than ill-{haped Infant, as foon as born, An4 
 who is it has informed us, that a Rational Soul can inhabit no 
 Tenement, unleft it has jurt: fucha (brt of Frontifi^iece, or can 
 join it felf to, and inform no (brt of Body, but one that Is juft 
 of fuch an outward Strufture ? 
 
 §. ^ I . Now tbefe lading Qualities, are hefl made 
 W.:i$of the kptren by Jherping^ Q.nd c^nhzr6\^ ht m^dc known 
 htdivgfi^ia otherwife. For the fliape of an Horfe^ or Cajfaary, 
 litiet of Sub' yj]]\ tjg }^^^ rudely and imp'jrfedly imprinted on 
 h-nir ^^^ ^^'""^ ^y Words, the fight of the'- Animals_ 
 fh^tn^ ^ ^^^^. '^ ^ f houfand times better : And the idea of the 
 '^* particular Colour Goldy isnotro be got by any de- 
 
 ^ription of it, but only by the frequent Exerciic of the Eyes 
 about ic, as is evident, tn thofe who are uled to this iMctal, who 
 will frequently dlftlnguifh true fron counterfeit, pure from 
 ^lujccrarc, by the Sighr, where others ( who have as good Eyes, 
 bur ycr, by ufe, have not got the prccife nice idea ot that pe- 
 culiar Yiliow ) fhaU not perceive any difference. The like 
 may be 'aid of thofe other fimplc ideasj peculiar in their kind to 
 any Subftancc j for which precifc Ideasj there arc no peculiai: 
 Names. The particular Ringing v^ound there ig in G<?/^» dlftindl; 
 
 froJW 
 
and Ahtife (yf Words, 117 
 
 from the Sound of other Bodies,has no particular Name atwej^ed to 
 it, no more than the particular Yellow,that belongs to that MetaL 
 
 S, xi. But becaule many of the fimple ideai 
 that make up our fpecifick Ucdi of Subftances, are The ideas of 
 Powers, which lie not obvious to our Senles in the their Pomrr 
 Things as they ordinarily appear •, therefore, in ^ffi h Defi- 
 the fignification of our Numes of Subjlances^ fome »''*•"• 
 fare of the fignification trill he betttr made knotvn, by 
 enumerating thofefmfle Ideas, than in (hetving the Suhjlance it Jelf, 
 For he that, to the yellow (hining Colour of Gold got by fight, 
 fliall, from my enumerating them, have the Ideas of great Du- 
 <aility, Fufibility, Fixednels, and Solubility in Aq. Hegia, will 
 have a perfefter Idea of Gold, than he can have by feeing a piece 
 of GoUf and thereby imprinting in his Mind only its obvious 
 Qjalities. But if the formal Conftitution of this (hining, heavy, 
 du6m Thing ( from whence all thefe its Properties flow ; lay 
 open to our Senles, as the formal Conftitution, orElTence of a 
 Triangle does, the fignification of the Word Gold, might as eafil/ 
 J?e acertaincd, as that of Triangle. 
 
 §. xj. Hence we may take notice, how much a RefieEtion 
 the Foundation of all eur Kjiowledge or corporeal on the KmV' 
 ThingSy lietin our Senfis. For how Spirits, feparate /ed^e of Spi" 
 from Bodies, ( whole Knowledge and iJeaf of thefe ritt. 
 Thing?, is certainly much mca-e perfe£l: than ours) 
 know them, we have no Notion, no Id^a at all. The whole 
 cxrent of our Knowledge, or Imagination, reaches not beyond 
 Qur own idea, limited to our ways of Perception. Though yet 
 Ik be not to be doubted, that Spirits of a higher rank than thofe 
 fmmerfed in Flefh, may have as clear Ideof of the radical Con- 
 ttltution of Subftances, as we have of a Triangkj and fb per- 
 ceive how all their Properties and Operations flow from thence ; 
 but the manner how they come by that Knowledge, exceeds our 
 Conception?. 
 
 §. 14. But though Definitions will ferve to ex- ideas alfo of 
 plain the Names of Subftances, as they Hand for Subflances 
 our Ideas ^ yet they leave them not without great mujl be con- 
 Imperfeftion, as they ftand for Things. For our formable t» 
 Names of Subilances being not put barely for our Thingi, 
 Ideas, but being mad^ ufc of ultimately to repre- 
 lent Things^ and fb are put in rheir place, their fignification 
 muft agree with the Truth of Things, as well as with Mem 
 Heau Arid therefore la Subftances, we are not always to relt 
 ia the ordinary Qompkj^ Id^a^, commonly received as the fignifi- 
 
 cation 
 
1 1*3* Remedies of the IwperfeflioMy 
 
 cation, of tnat Word, b'lt mufl: go a li^fic farther, and enquire 
 into the Nature and IVopcrtics of the Things thcmfclvcs, and 
 thereby pcrit 61, as much as we can, our idcaj of their diftin6t 
 Species •, or eUe learn them from fiich as are u(cd to that fort of 
 Things, and are experienced in them. For fmce 'tis intended 
 their N acnes fhould Hand forfuch QoW.SixoWioi ^\m^\c Ideas ^ as 
 do redly cxift in Things themielvefj as wdll as for thecomplex 
 Idcx m other Mens iMinds, vjh'iih ia their ordinaiy acceptation 
 they lland for j therefore to define their Names righty natural HtV, 
 Jtory is to be enquired into i and their Properties are, with Care 
 and Jixamination, to be found out. For it is not enough, tor 
 the a'c^olding Inconveniences in Dlfcourfes and ArguingS about 
 natiiral Bodies and fublkntial Things, to hare learned, from the 
 Propriety of the Language, the common but confufed, or very 
 irapcrfcir Idea, to which each Word is applied, and to keep 
 them to ihat idea in our uic of them : but we muft, by acquaint- 
 ing our felves with the Hiflory of that fort of things rcftify afld 
 fe-t'.e our complex idea^ belonging to each fpccifick Nan^c ^ and 
 in difcouife wiih others, ( if we hnd them miftake us ) we ought 
 ID tell, what the ccmplcx Idea If, that we make fuch a Name 
 Hand for. This is the more nectfTary to be done by all thofe» 
 who (carch after Knowledj^e, and Philofophiral Venly, in that 
 Children being taught Wcrdswhilft they have butimperft^ 
 Notions of Things, apply them at random, and without much 
 thinking, and feidom frame determined Ideas to be fignified by 
 them. Wliich Cuflom, ( It being eafy,and ferving wtU enough 
 for the ordinary Affairs of Life and Converlition ) they arc apt 
 toconiinue, wh.n they arc Men : And lb bcg,in at the wrong 
 end , l<;4rning Words hrlf, and perfe<9:ly, bur make the No- 
 tions ro which they Jii^j^ly tholo Words afterwards, very overt- 
 ly. By this means it come: to pa(5, tharjVlenrpcaking the pro- 
 per Language of their 'Country, i. e: accoiding to Gramriiar- 
 Rules of that Language, do yet fjjcak. very improperly of 
 Tfi'in^s thcmfelves •, and by their arguing one uitH another, 
 make but fmall Progrefs in the difcovcries ofufcful Truths, and 
 th-, Knowledge of Things, as they are to be found in them- 
 klvcs, and not in oi;r Imaginations ; and it matters nor much^ 
 ior the improvement oP our Knowledge, how they are'call'd. 
 ., , , , : ^. i s. It wiTc therefore to be wI[h'd,That Men. 
 
 .Vr»^ t*jy to oe > , * 11-11- • • 1 • J • ■• L 
 
 visdef$. vcrlcd m phylical Enquirit-s^ and acquainted with 
 
 the fevcral forrs of natural Bodies, would fct down 
 
 ♦hofc fimple /^f4/, wherein ihey obferve the Individuals of each. 
 
 ! r: ronftantly to agree. This would remedy a great deal of that 
 
 con- 
 
and Ahufe of Words^ 119 
 
 Confufion, which coniei froip (everal Perfonsj applying the fame 
 Name to a Collection of a imaller, or greater number of fcn- 
 fible Qaalities, proportionably a,s they have been more or lefs 
 acquamted with, or accurate in examining ij^ie Qualities of any 
 fort of Things, which come un<^er one denomination. But a 
 Di^ionary of this fort, containing, as it were, a Natural Hi- 
 ftory, requires too many HaDd3,tis wtll as too much Time,Coft, 
 Pains, and Sagacity, tyer CP be hoped for *, and till tharbedone, 
 we muft content our (elves, ^'ith (uch Dtfinitions of the Names 
 of Subflances, a? explain the^ fenle Men ufe them in. And 
 'twould be well, where there is Occafion, if they would afford 
 us fo much. This yet is nat ufually done ; but Men talk to one 
 another, and di(j-)ute in Words, wbofe meaning is not agreed 
 between them, out ofamlflake, that the fignifiiation ol com- 
 mon Words, arc ccrrainiyeftabiiflied, and the i^rccife Ideas^ they 
 Pand for, perfedlly ki)own i and that it is a ftiame to be igno- 
 rant of them. Both which Suppofitions are fal/e : no Names 
 of complex Ideas having fo (etc led detcrniined Signihcations, that 
 they are conftantly ufed for the fame prccife Ideas. N^or is it a 
 (haniefor a Man not (ohave a certain Knowledge of any thing, 
 but by the nectflary ways of attaining ic j and (0 it is nodifcre* 
 dit not to know, what preclfe j£leasLr)y Sound ftands for {n ano-. 
 iher Man's Mind, without he declare it tp me, by fbme other 
 way t1ian barely ufmg that Sound, there being no other way, 
 without fuch a Dcclaraiion, certainly 10 know ir. Indeed, the 
 neceflity of Communication by Language, brings Men to an 
 Agreement in the fignification of common Words, within fbme 
 tolerable latitude, that may ferve for ordinary CoriVttfation ; 
 and ft) a Man cannot be fuppofcd wholly ignorant of the Ideasy 
 which are annexed to Words by common Ufe, in a Language 
 Bimiiiar to him. But common Ufe being, but a very uncertain 
 Rule, which reduces it /elf at laft to the i^e^j of particular Men, 
 proves often but a very variable Standard. But though fuch.a 
 Pidiionaryf j^ I have above-mentioned, will require too much 
 Time, Co/l and Paiiiv, to be hoped for in this Age; yet, roe- 
 thinks, it is not unrealbnable to propofe, that Words ftanding 
 for Things, which are known and diftiqguiflitd by their out- 
 ward (hapes, (houid be cxpreffed by little Draughts and Piintf 
 made of them. A Vocabulary made aft^r this faftiion, would/ 
 perhaps with more eafty and In lefg time, teach the true (tgnifi.^ 
 cation of many Terms, especially in Languages of remote Coun- 
 tries or Ages, and fettle truer ideas in Mens Minds of feveral 
 Things, whereof we read the Names in ancient Authors, than 
 aUthe large and laboriou.- Comments of karufi^ Criticks. Natura- 
 
 '-■'■ ^ ■■■• ^■•^v; ■ m^, 
 
1 10 Remedies of the Imperfeflion^ &c. 
 
 lifts, that treat of Plants and Animals, have found the Benefit of 
 I his way : And he that has had occafion to confult them,wJll have 
 rcafbn to confef?, that he hasaclear/ip<*ofy^p/tt>w, oxlbexitom^. 
 little Print of that Herb, or Bcaft, than he could have from a long 
 Definition of the Names of either of them. And Qi no doubt, he 
 would have of 5fri>i/ and Siflrum^ if inftcad of a Curry-comb znd 
 Cymbal, which are the Engliflj Names Dictionaries render them 
 by, he could fee ftamp'd iu the Margin, fmall Piftures of thefe 
 Inltrumcnts, as they were in ufeamongft the Ancients. Toga^ Tu- 
 nica^ PdiUum, are Words eafily tranfliated by Gorpn, Coat, and 
 Cloaks : but we have thereby no more true Ideas of the Fafhion of 
 thofe Habits amongft the i^owtfM/, than we have of the Faces of 
 the Taylors who made them. Such things as thefe, which the 
 Eye diftinguifhes by their Qiapes, would be beft^ let into the 
 Mind by Draughts made of them, and more determine the figni- 
 ticarion of (uch Words, than any other Words fet for them, or 
 made ulc of to define them. But this only by the bye. 
 
 §. 2,6. ¥ifthlyy IfMen will not be at the pains to 
 Fifthly, tj declare the meaning of their Word?, and Definitt- 
 Confiancjin onsof thcir Terms are not to be had:, yet this is 
 their figm. (he Icaft Can be ^expefted, that in all Dilcourfes, 
 featien. wherein one Man pretends to inft:ru6t or convince 
 
 another, he (boula ufe the fameJVord confiamlyintht 
 fame fenfe i If this were done, ( which no body can refufc, with- 
 out gfeat dilin^cnuity ) many of the Books exrant might be (pa- 
 red •, many of^the Controverfies in Difpute would be at an end j 
 (everal of thofe great Volumes, fwollen with ambiguous Words, 
 now ufed in one fenfe, and by and by in another, would (brink 
 into a very narrow compaf* j and many of the Philofbphers ( to 
 mention no other, ) as well as Poets Works, might be contained 
 in a Nut-lhell. ■ '.. . 
 
 §. 17. But after all, the provifion of Words is' fb 
 when the v»- fcanty in refpc6l of that infinite variety of Thoughts, 
 riattenit$9ie that Men, Wanting Terms to fuit theil frccife No- 
 txfUind. tion, will, notwithftanding their utmofl caution, be 
 forced often to ufe the fame Word, in fbmewhat 
 different Senfes. And though in the continuation of a Dlfcourfe, 
 or the purfutt of an Argument, there be hardly room to digrefs 
 into a particular Definition, as often as a Man varies the fignifica- 
 tion of any Term ', yet the «mpx)rt of the Difcourfe will, for the 
 moftparr, if there be no dcfigned fallacy, fufficiently lead candid 
 and inrclligent Reader?, into the true meaning of it: but where 
 rhariMiotlutficiditfo guide the Reader, there it concerns the 
 Wrircr to explain his meaning, and (hew in what fenfe he there 
 "cjthatTewn. BOOK 
 
BOOK IV. 
 
 Ill 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 Of Kn9wledge in GeneraL 
 
 S. I. 
 
 S 
 
 Our Kmw- 
 
 hdgi cfinver' 
 fant about 
 our ideas. 
 
 Kmvleiige 
 tithe Percep'' 
 ti«n of the 
 Agreemint or 
 Difagreement 
 oftwoldcM. 
 
 I N C E the Mind, in all its Thoughts 
 and Reafbnings, hath no other imme- 
 diate Object but its own IdeaSf which 
 it alone does or can contemplate, ic is 
 evident, that our Knowledge is only converfent 
 about them. 
 
 §, X. Knowledge then (eems to me to be nothing 
 but the perception of the connexion and agreementy or 
 difagreement And repugnancy of any of our ideat. In 
 this alone it confifts. Where this Perception is, 
 there is Knowledge, and where it is not, there, 
 though we may fancy, guefs, or believe, yet we 
 always come (hort of Knowledge. For when we 
 know that J4^ite is not Blacky what do we elfe but perceive, that 
 thefe two Ideas do not agree ? When we poflefi our (elves with 
 the utmoft fccuriiy of the Demonftration, that the three Angles of 
 4 Triangle are equal to two right ones, What do we more but per- 
 ceive, that Equajity to two right ones, does neceffary agree to, 
 and is infeparable from the three Angles of a Triangle ? * 
 
 §J_. 
 
 * The placing of Certainty, as Mr. Loske does \a the Perception of the 
 AgreemcQC or Difagreemenc of our Ideas, the BiQiop of IVorcefier fufpeds 
 may be of dangerous Con(equence to that Article of Faith, which he bai 
 endeavoured to defend ; to which Mr. L$cke anfwers, f 
 Since your Lordfhip hath nor, as I remember, ftiewn, or f ^n hit id 
 gone about to (hew, how this Propofition, <viz, that Cer- Letter to the 
 tainty confifts ill the Perception of the Agreement or Difa- Btjhop of 
 greement of two Ideas, is oppofitc or ioconfiftent withrA*if Worcefter, ^a 
 Article of Faith, which your LorJ/hip has tndiavoured to 8}, ^c, 
 defend: 'tis plain^ 'tis bur your Lotdihip's Fsar, chat ic 
 
 may 
 
Ill Knowledge. 
 
 §. 5. B'Jt^ to underftand a llctle more dlfllm'lly. 
 This ^gree- whcrciii this Agreement or Difagrccment confifts, 
 m^Ht Jourj»ld. I thinic we may reduce it all to thefe tour Sorts: 
 
 \tT identity^ or Dherfuy, 
 
 i. Filiation. 
 
 :i...Qi)-exifience, or neceffary Conntxioa, — 
 
 4- ^al Exijience. 
 
 Tirji, Of I- §. 4. Firji, As to the firft fort of Agreement or 
 dentity,orDi- Difagreement, vi:^. Identity ^ or Diverfity. Tis the 
 'vrjicjf. £^(^ fi^^ Qf the Mind, when it has any Sentiments 
 
 or Ideas at all, to perceive its Idcas^ and (o far as 
 it perceives ihem^to know each what it is, and tl^crefc)' alfa 
 to perceive their difference, and that one is not anotlt^fljpjr This 
 is (oablolutely^neccilary^thac without it there could beso l^novv« 
 '*"■ >i /> ,.:i!qj.: "'"ledge, 
 
 may he ef dangerout Confequcnce to ir, w'liich, as I humbly conceive, is no 
 proof rhac ic is any vi»ay 109 >nhitenc with that Article, 
 
 Nj P-Jtly) ithiok, can blame your Lordfhip, or any one" elHr, for. being 
 concerned tor any ^^rricle" "pf rlic Chiifti4il Fiilli : but if thJat Concern ( a$ 
 it may, and as vi'C'knoW: it'' has dotie) make any one apprthetid Danger, 
 where no Danger is ; tre wi;- therefore, to give up and condnnn. any Pro- 
 pofitioo. becaufc any 6ne» though of tfte firft Rank and Magntrode^ fears 
 it may be of dangeransCsnfftfuence to any Truth of lleligiQn, Without (hew* 
 ing thit it IS To ? Iffuch Fears be the Mfiafures wlicrehy to judge of Troth 
 and Falftiood, the afSj-mmg tbac there are Antipodes would be JliU a Wcrefic j- 
 aod. the Doftrine of <ht Motion of the Earth, mull be rei&8tf^, aa oVcr^ 
 throwipg the Truth oX the Scripture, {otof.thtit dangcroM Ccmfequtnce it 
 has been apprehended to be, by many Icajned and pious Divines, out of 
 their great Conc^rh'fcr Religion. And yet, noiwjtiilhndipg .thofc great 
 Apprchcnfions of ifihM datfgerotts Cotife^uetice it might i^,,iti5.now univcr- 
 fally received by Learned Men. a» an und6ub'ted Truth-, and Writ for Jjy 
 fume, whofe Belief of the Scriptures is not at all queftioned ; andparcicu-~ 
 larly, very lately, by a Divine of the Church of England, *irh great 
 Strength of Rcalbn, In His wonderfully ingenious New Theory ef tJ:e Enrth. 
 
 The Reafon your Lordfhip gives of ycmr Pears, th^t it vi ay U of fitch 
 dangerout Ctnfequenee to that Article of Faith, vhich your Lor dfhif eri' 
 deavourj to defend, though it occur in more Places than one, is only this; 
 'viz. That it is made uf: of h tU Men to do Mtfchief i. e. to oppofe that 
 Article of Faith, which your LordQiip has endeavoured to defend. But, ray 
 Lord, if it be a Reafon to lay by any Thing, as bad, becaufc it is, or may 
 be ufed to an ill Purpofe, I know not what will be innocent enough to be 
 kept. Arm', which were made lor our Defence, are fometimes made ufeof 
 to do Mifihiefi and ye; they are not thonjht of davgervHf Confejkence for 
 
Knowleage, 12? 
 
 ledge, no Reafbning, no Imagination, no diftlnc^: Thoughts at 
 all. By this the Mind clearly and infallibly perceives tach Idea 
 to agree with it k\U and to be what itis ; and all diftinft ideas 
 to disagree, /. e. the one not to be the other : And this it does with- 
 out ^ains. Labour, or Dedu(Slion, but at Hrft View, by ksi natural 
 Power of Perception and Diitin«5tion. And thoiigh; M^n of 
 Art have reduced this into thofe general Rules, iVuat p;^ ?i^ and 
 It is impojfible for th fame thing to be^ and not to be, tor ready Ap- 
 pjifiationin all Cafes, wherein there may, be occafion to- reflect 
 on It J yet it is certain, that the firft Exercife of this F.itulry, 
 is about particular Jif/wj. A Man infallibly knows, as fc)on as 
 ever he has them In his Mind that ih^lde^s he c%\\%,Whtte. and 
 /{^oW, are the very Ideaj they are, and that they aire nat oeher 
 We<w which he calls i^«^ or Square. .Nor, can anyMa'xifn or 
 ^ropofition in the_^World^ make hira kv'ow it clearer or (iirer 
 than he did beforcv and without any,j(uqh general i^ulei. Jfkik 
 
 then 
 
 all that. No Body ^ lays ly his Sword and; P-iJIqIs^ or thinks chcm of fucli 
 dangerous Confequence as to be negleSed, or thrown away, bdcaBfe Robbers, 
 aud the worll of Men, fometimes make ufe ofthena, to take aR'ay honcft 
 Mens Lives or Xjoods. And the rcafon is» beC|auie they were defii^'ccd, und 
 will ferve. to prefervt them. And who.kijpw* but, this may. be the pi-sfenc 
 Cafe ? If your Lordftiip thiniis, that placing of Certainty mtJFie Perception 
 of the Agreement or Difi^greeroeQC of Ideas, be to be rejected aj.iaHe, be- 
 caufcyou. apprehend ;V Wjfry^tf of dangerous, Confe^aence to that .Article ef 
 Faith„i^ on the other fide, perhaps others, with mc, nsay thialiica D.fciscti 
 againft Error, and fu'(as being of good ufe^ to ba received aod adhered to. 
 
 I wnjuld not, my Lord, be hereby thpughrtp fet, up ray .©iwn; or any one* 
 Judgment againft your Lord(hip's. But. I have/aid this only to: Qacw^ while 
 the Argument lies for or againft the Truth of. any Propoficion,- barc^ in aa 
 Imagination, that it may he of ConfequcBce to rhc fupportirtgor.QVgVchrcw- 
 ing pf any remote Truth j it will be iropoHibie, that way, to determine of 
 the Truth or Falfhood of that Propofition. F«r Imagination will be itt up 
 agaioft Imaginacion, arid the ftronger probably will be againU >our Lord- 
 (liip ; the ftrongeft Imaginations being ufiiaJly in the veakeil Hcacs, The 
 only way, in this cafe, to put it paft doubt:, lis t9;(hcw the InconfUkncycf 
 the two Propofitipns ; i^nd then ic wijl be fe^n,. -that one overthrows tiite 
 other; th^truc the falfe one. .,, ,. ,.>,,. 
 
 Your Lordlhip fays indeed. This \i]ti^ne.Vvi^th9d of Certainty. : J viiW 
 not fay fo my feif, for Fear of defervipg a fccond Reproof from your 
 LordCbip, for being too.forward toaliunje to my felf the HonaUr of hemg 
 an Original. But this, I thmk, gives me occafion, and wilJ cxcufcnie t^om 
 being thought impertinent,, if 1 ask your LordfbJp, whether ihere be any 
 other, or older Method oj Certainty? And what it is ? For if there be no 
 ©tber, nor older than ihij, cither ihiB was- always i\v: NUthod 9f CtTt.ntity, 
 
 fcfld 
 
1 ^4 Knowledge. 
 
 then is the firft Agreement or Difagrcemer.r, which the Mind 
 perceives in its Ideas ; which it always perceives at firft fight : 
 And if there ever happen any doubt about ir, 'twill always be 
 found to be about the Names, and not the Ideas themfelve?, 
 whofe Identy and Diverty will always be perceived, as fbon and 
 as clearly as the Ideas themfelves are, nor can it poffibly be other- 
 wife. 
 
 §. 5. Secondly^ The next fort of Agrcemenr, or 
 Secondly, Re- Difagreetnent, the Mind perceives in any of its 
 iative, IdeaSf may, I think, be called I{elat$ve, and is no- 
 
 thing but che Perception of the I{ilation between any 
 tW9 Ideas, of what kind fbever, whether Subftanccs, Modes, or 
 any other. For finccall diftinfl ideas muft eternally be known 
 not to be the fame, andfbbc univerfally and conftantly denied 
 one of another, there could be no room for any ix)fitive Know" 
 kdge at al', if we could not perceive any Relation between our 
 
 IdeaSf 
 
 and fo mine is no »e»one ; or clfe the World is ogligcd to me for this nev 
 one, after having been fo long in the Want of fo ncccflary a Thing, as a 
 Method a Cirtaivty. If there be an older, I am furc your Lordfhip cannot 
 but know it ; your condemning mine as niv, as well as your through Infighc 
 into Antiquity, cannot but fatisfy every Body that yoa do. And therefore 
 CO fee the World right, in a thing of that great Concernment, and to over* 
 throw mine, and thereby prevent the dangerous Confejuefice there Is in my 
 having unfeafonably fiarud it, will nor, I humbly conceive, misbecome 
 your LordQiip's Care of that Article you have endeavoured to defend, not 
 the good Will you bear to Truth in general. For I will be anfwerable fof 
 my felf, that I (hall : And I think I may be for all others, that they all 
 •rill give off the placing of Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or 
 Difagreement of Ideas, if your LordQtip will be pleafcd to (hew, that it lies 
 in any Thing elle. 
 
 But truly, not to afcribe to my fel fan Invention of what has been as old 
 ft; Knowledge is in the World, I muft own, I am not guilty of what your _ 
 Lordlhip is pleafcd to call J?<ir/i»g «j» Methods of Certainty. Knowletlge 
 ever (ince there has been any in the World has confided in one particular 
 Adion of the Mind ; and fo, I conceive, will continue to do to the end of 
 it : And to/tart new Methods of Knowledge, or Certainty, ( for they are tO 
 me the fame thing ) i, *. to hndout and propofe new Methods of attaining 
 new Knowledge, either with more Eafc and Quickncfs, or in things yet un- 
 known, IS what I think no Body could blam; : But this is not that which your 
 Lord(hip here means, by nev Methods of Ctrtainry. Your Lordfhip, I 
 think, means by it, the placing of Crrf/i/wfy in fomcching, wherein either 
 it docs aot confift, or elfe wherein it was not placed before now ; if this 
 were to be called a nev Method of Certainty. As to the larrer of tbcfe, I 
 rhail know whether I am guilty or no, wbeo your Lordfhip will do me the 
 
 Favojr 
 
Knowledge^ 1 2 ^ 
 
 Ii/M/,ancl find out the Agreement or Difagreement,they have one 
 with another, in (everal ways the Mind takes of comparing ihem. 
 
 §. 6. Thitdly^ The third fort of Agreement, or Thirdly, of 
 Dilagreement to be found in our Ueas^ which the Co-exipnce, 
 Perception of the. Mind is employ'd about, is Co- 
 exiftence^ or Non-co-exijience in the fame Subject*, and this be- 
 longs particularly to Subftances. Thus when we pronounce 
 concerning Goldf that it is fixed, our Knowledge of this Truth 
 amounts to no more but this, that fixednefs, or a Power to re- 
 main in the Fire unconfumed, is an Idea, that always accompa- 
 nies^and is joined with that particular fort of Yellownefi, Weight, 
 Fufibility, Malleablenefs, and Solubility in w^. B^egia, which 
 make our complex Idea, fignified by the Word Gold. _ 
 
 §.7. Fonrthl/, The fourth and laft fort is, that of ^^^^^S^ 
 aSiual real Exiftence agreeing to any idea. Within ^*^ *'-' ^" *' 
 ihefe four forts of Agreement or Difagreemenr, is, Ifuppofe con- 
 tained 
 
 Favour to tell me, wherein it was placed before : which your Lord(hip 
 knows I profefled my felf ignorant of, when I writ my Book, and fo I am 
 ' Aill. But \£ parting of new Methods of Certainty, he the placing of Ccrtalncy 
 in fomething wherein it does not conlift ; whether I have done that or no, I 
 inuft appeal to the Experience of Mankind. 
 
 There are feveral Anions of Mens Minds, that they are confcious to them- 
 felves of performing, as willing^ belie'ving, knowing, &c which they have 
 fo particular fenfe of, that they can diftinguifh them one from another ; or 
 elfe they could not fay, when they willed, when they believed^ and when they 
 knew any thing. But though thefe Adions were different enough from one 
 another, not to be confounded by thofe who fpoke of them, yet no Body, 
 that I had met wirh, had, in their Writings, particularly fet down wherein 
 the Ad oi Knowing precifcly conGftcd. 
 
 To this Refleftion, upon the A£tions of my own Mind, the Subjed of my 
 ^{f<*y concerning Humane Utiderfl anding naturally led me ; wherein, if t 
 have done any thing new, it has been to defcribe to others, more panicu-i 
 larly than had been done bcfore,what it is their Minds do, when they perform 
 that Afifion which they call Knowing; and if.upon Examination, they obferve, 
 t have given a true Account of that ASion of their Minds in all the parts of 
 it ; I fuppofe it will be in vain to difpute against what they find and feci in 
 themfelves. And if I have not told them right, and exadly what they 
 find and feel in themfelves, when their Minds perform rhe Ait of knowing, 
 what I havefaid will be ail in vain ; Men will not be perfuaded againft their 
 Senfes. Knowledge is an internal Perception of their Minds ; and if, when 
 they refle£i on ir, they find it'is not what I have faid it is, my grounditft 
 Conceit Will not be hearken'd to, but be exploded by every Body, and die 
 of It felf: And no body need to be at any Pains to drive it out of the V/oild. 
 So impoffible ig ic to find our, or Ihr: new Methods of Certainty, cr to 
 Voll. ^I. K. have 
 
126 Knowledge, 
 
 tiiiied all the Knowledge we have, or are capable of : For all th« 
 Enquiries that we cin make, concerning any oi cur Ideas^zW that 
 we know or can affirm concerning any of ihem, is. That it i?, 
 or is not tht fime with ibme other ; that it does, or docs not al- 
 ways, co-cxi(t with Tome other Idea in the fame Subj 61 j that it 
 has this or that Rdation to lome other ldea\ or that it has a real 
 Exifttnce without the Mind. Thus Blue h mtJeUow, is of 
 Identity. Trvo Triangles uf on equal Bafts, kenvcen two ParaQeU are 
 equaly is of Relation. Iron is fufceptib/e of magnettcai ImpreJfio/iSy 
 is of Co-txiftencc, GOD », is of real Exiftcnce. Though identity 
 and Co-exiftence are truly nothing but Relations, yet they are 
 fo peculiar ways of Agreement, or Difagrceraent of our ideas^ 
 that they defcrve well to bcconfider'd as diftindt Head;, and not 
 under Relation in general*, fince they are (6 different Grounds 
 of Affirmation and Negation,^ as will eafily appear to anyone, 
 w ho will but re He cb on what is (aid in feveral places of this Efliay. 
 
 I 
 
 have them received, iFaoy ane places it in any thirg, but in that wherein 
 it really confifls : muchlefs can any one be in danger to be mifled into Er- 
 ror, by any fuch »/ir, and to every one vifibly fcnfelcfs Projcdh Can it 
 be fuppofed, That any oi.e coMJiart a mv Alet bod of Seeing, and per- 
 fuade Men thereby, that they do not fee what they do fee ? Is it to be 
 fear'd, That any one can call fuch a Mift over their Eyes, that they ihould 
 rot know when they lie, and fo be led out of their way by it ? 
 
 Knowledge, I iind m my fcli^ and I conceive in others, confifts in the 
 Perception of ihe Agreement or Difagrcement of the immediate ObjeQs of 
 the Mind in Thinking, which I call Ideaa ; But whether it docs (o in others 
 or no, mult be dctcimin'd by their own Experience, rcfltdmg upon the 
 Action of their Mind in knowing j fur that I cannot alter, nor I think they 
 tliemfL-Jvcs. But whether they will call thofc immediate Obje<3s of their 
 Mmds, in thinking ideas or na, is perfcftly in their own Choice, If they 
 diflike that Name, they may call them Notions or CtneeptroTis, or. how 
 they plcilc } ir matters not, if they ufc tbern (o aS to avoid Obicnrity and 
 Confiifion. li chey arc conllantly okd in the lame and a known ftnfe, every 
 one has the Liberty to pleafc himl'clf in iiis Terms, there lies neither Truth, 
 hor Error, nur Science, in that ; though thofc that take them i .t Thing?, 
 and DC t f 't what they arc, bare arbitrary Signs of our Ideas, mike a great 
 deal ot Do often about them ; as ii fomc great Matter lay in (he ufeofthis 
 or »!.ar oou-id. All that 1 know, or can imagine of Ditfeience, about them, 
 18, thar thofc Words are always bciV, whofc bignifications are bcit known in 
 ih; S«.c.le ihty are ulld ; and (o are leall apt to breed Confulion. 
 
 My Lord, your Lurdiliip has been pleafcd ro findfjult with my ufe of ihe 
 new Term Itie.rs, without telling me a better hJame for the immediate Ob- 
 jtds* k tlic M;r>cl in thinking. Your Lcrdfliip alfo has been pleafcd to find 
 fiuii. with my Dirinition of Knowledge, without doing roe ibe Favour to 
 
 jjivc 
 
Knomledyt. 127 
 
 ] {hould now proceed^ to examine the (everal degrees of our 
 Knowledge, but that it is neceflary firftto coiifidcr the difftrcnc 
 Acceptations of the Word Kjioxvkdge. 
 
 §. 8. There are feveral ways wherein the Mind JCnowU^ge 
 ispofleffed of Truth', each of which is called aau:tl or 
 Knowledge. ^ ^ ^ habUu^l. 
 
 I . There is aSual KjiowledgCj which is the pre- 
 lent View the Mind has of the Agreement, or Difagrecmcnt of 
 aiiy of its Ideoi^ or of the Relation they have one to another. 
 
 %. A Man is iaid to know any Proportion, which having been 
 once laid before his Thoughts, he evidently perceived the Agree- 
 ment, or Difagreement of the Ideas whereof ic confifts ^ and fo 
 lodg'd it in his Memory, that whenever that Propofitioii comes 
 again to be reflected on, he, without doubt or hefitation, era- 
 traces the right iide, aflents to, and is certain of the Truth of 
 it. This, I think, one may c^W habitual JQiow ledge : And thus a 
 
 Man 
 
 give me a better. For \t is only about my Definition of" Knowledge, that 
 all this ftiri concerning Certainty, is made. For with me, to kno* and be 
 certain, is the fame thing ; what I know, that I am certain ofj and what 
 t am certain of, tha£ I know. What reaches to Knowledge, I think may be 
 called Certainty ; and what comes ihorc of Certainty, I thmk cannot be 
 called Knowledge ; as your Lordfhip could not but obferve in the j8tb 
 Seftion of C&, 4. of ray 4th Bank, which you have quoted. 
 
 My Definition of Knowledge ftands thus: Knotoledge feems , to we, to 
 he nothing bnt the Perception of the Connexion, and Agreevient^ or Difa- 
 greement , and Repugnajjcy of any of our Ideas. This Definition your 
 Lordihip diflikes, and apprehends it may be of dangerous CojifequeKce as to 
 that Arviclt of ChriHian Faiths which your Lordfhip has endeavoured to di' 
 fend. For this there is a very eafy Remedy : It is but for your Lordfliip 
 to fet afiie this Definition of Knowledge, by giving us a btttcr, and this 
 Danger is over. But your Lordiliip fccme rather to have a Controverfy 
 with my Book, f>r having ic in it, and ro put me upon the Defence of it j 
 for which I muft acknowledge my felt" obliged to your Lordfhip for affording 
 me fo much of your Time, and for allowing me the Honour tf couvcifing 
 fo much, with one fo far above mc in all Refpe£ts. 
 
 Your Lordfhip fayS) It may be of dangerous Covfcquence to that Article 
 cfChrifiian Faith, -which you have endeavoured to defend. Though the 
 Laws of difputing allow bare denial as a fufficient Anfwer to Sayir-gs, with- 
 out any Offt of a Proof; yet, my Lord, to fhew how willing I am to g've 
 your Lordlhipali Satisfadlion, in what you apprehend may be of dangerous^ 
 Confequence in rr.y Book, as to tliat Arcicle, I ihall nut lland ftrll fullcnly, 
 and put your Lordfiiip upon the Difficulry of fhevving wherein that Danger 
 iiesi but ilull, on rhe other fide, endeavour to ihew your Lordiliip that 
 that Definition of mine, whether true or filfc, right or wrong, can be of 
 
 ' ' ¥, z no 
 
ii8 Knovokdge. 
 
 Man may be faid to know all thofc Truths, which are lodg*d 
 in his Memory, by a foagoing clear and full Perception, where- 
 of the Mind is allured palt doubt, as ofren as it has OccaGon to 
 rcfletft on ihem. For our finite Underflandings being able to 
 think, clearly and diftin(£lly, but on one thing at once, if Men 
 had no Knowledge of any more than what thi^y aftually thought 
 on, rhcy would all be very ignorant : And he that knew moft-, 
 Would know but one Truth, that being all he was able to think 
 on at one time. 
 
 §. 9. Of habitual Knowledge,thcrc are alfb, vul- 
 
 Habitual garly I'peaking, two degrees : 
 Knowledge pirfl. The one is of fuch Truths laid up in the Me- 
 
 two-juld. tnory, as whenever they occur to the Mind, it a^ualfy 
 
 perceives the Halation is between thofc Ideas. And this 
 is in all thofe Truths, whereof we have an uitmtive Kjiotoledge^ 
 where the ideas themlclveJ, by an immediate View, difcover 
 their Agreement or Difa^reement one with another. 
 
 Secondly J The other i^oi fuch Truths, whereof the Mind having 
 been convinced, it retains the Memory of the Convi^ion, tvithout the 
 Proofs. Thus a Man that remembers certainly, that he once per- 
 ceived 
 
 7t9 d^ngerou! Conftqutnce tt that Article of Faith. The Rcafon which I 
 fhall ciTcr for it, is this ; Bccaufc it can be of no Confequencc to it at all. 
 
 Thar which your Lordllup is afraid it may be dangerous to, is m ylrticlt 
 of Faith: Tliac which your Lordiliip labours and is concerned f^r, is the 
 Certainty of Faith. Now, My Lord, I humbly conceive the Certainty of 
 Faith, if your Lordfliip thinhs ht to call it fo, has nothing to do with the 
 Certainty of Knowledge, And to talk of the Certainty of Fattht lecms all 
 one ro m:', as to talk oFtlie Knowledge of Believing, a way of fpeakmg not 
 cafy to mc to undtriland. 
 
 Place Knowledge in what you will, flart what ?;<?» Me! hodt.of Certainty 
 you pleafc, that are apt to le>tvt Mens J^hndi more douhtful than htfbre-^ 
 place Certainty on fuch Groand;;, as will leave little or no Knowledge in 
 the World. Por theft are the Arguments your Lordiliip ufes againit my 
 Definition of Knowledge; this fliakcs not at all, nor in the lcal^ concerni 
 the AfTurarvce of Faith ; this is quite diftind from it, neither llands nor 
 tails with Knowledge. 
 
 Faith ftands by it ftif, and upon Grounds of its own ; nor can be rc- 
 mnvcd from them, and placed on thofc of Knowledge. Their Grounds arc 
 fo far from being the fame, or having any common, that when it is brought 
 to Certainty, Faith is deftroy'd ; 'ris Knowledge then, and Faith no longer. 
 
 With wlia: Alfifrancc focvcr of Believing, I afTent ro any j^rticle of 
 F.tith, fo that T ftdfaftly venture my All upon it, it is ftill but Belteying. 
 Biing it to Cer:ai»ty, and it ctafts to bti F.mb, I believe that Jtfus 
 
 ChriJl 
 
Knowledge. iig 
 
 ceived the Demonftralion, that the three Angles of a Triangle 
 are equal to two right ones, is certain that he knows it, becaufe he 
 cannot doubt of the Truth of it. In his adherence to a Truth, 
 where the Demonftration, by which it was at firil known, is 
 forgot, though a Man may be thought rather to believe his Me- 
 mory, than really to know, and this way of entertaining a Trurh 
 feem'd formerly to me like fomething between Opinion and 
 Knowledge, a fort of Affurance which exceeds bare Belief, for 
 that relies on the Teftimony of another-, Yet upon a due exa- 
 mination! find it comes not fhort of perfect Certainty, and Is in 
 cfFe6t true Knowledge. That which is apt to miflead our firft 
 Thoughts intoamiftake in this Matter is, that the Agreement 
 or Difagreement of the ideas in this Cafe is not perceived, as ic 
 was at firft, by an a6tual View of all the Intermediate ideas^ where- 
 by the Agreement or Difagreement of thofe in the Propofitlon 
 was at firft perceived ; but by other intermediate Ideaj, that fhew 
 the Agreement or Dilagrcement of the ideas contained in the Pro» 
 pofitlon whofe Certainty we remember. For Example, in this 
 Propofition, that the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two 
 right ones, one, who has feen and clearly perceived the Demon- 
 Itration of this Truth, knows it to be true, when that Demon- 
 
 Chi ift was crucified, dead, and buried, rofe again rhe third Day from the 
 Dead, and afcendedinto Heaven : Lee now /mc/) Methods of Knowledge or 
 Certainty^ be flarted, as leave Mens Minds more doubtful than before : 
 Let the Grounds of Knowledge be refolved into what, any one pUafes, ic 
 touches not my Faith ; the Foundation of that ftands as fure as before, 
 and cannot be at all fliaken by it ; and one may as well fay, That any 
 Thing that weakens the Sight, or c^fts a mi ft before the Eyes, endangers 
 the Hearing ; as that any thing which alters the Nature of Knowledge 
 (if that could be done) (hould be oi dangerous Confeqnence to an Article 
 o/" Faith. 
 
 Whether then I am or I am not miftaken, in the placing Certainty in 
 the Perception of the Agreement or Difagreement cf Ideca • whether this 
 Account of Knowledge be true or falfe, enlarges or (traitens the Bounds of 
 it more than it fliould ; Faith ftill ftands upon its o*n Bifis, winch is not 
 at all altcr'd by it ; and every Article of that has juft the fame unmoved 
 Foundation, and the very fame credibility, that it had before. So that, my 
 Lord, whatever I have laid about Certainty, and how much foever I may 
 be oat in ir, if I am miftaken, your L.ordfhip has no Re^fon to apprehend 
 any Ditnger to any yirticle of Faith, from thence ; everyone of them 
 ftands upon the fame Bottom it did before, out of the Reach of what be- 
 longs to Knowledge and Certainty. And thus much of my way of Certain' 
 ty by Ideas '^ which, I hope, will fatisfie your Lordfliip, how far it is from 
 being dangerous t9 any Article of the Chriftian Faith whatfoever. 
 
 K 5 ftratiou 
 
J 10 Knowledge. 
 
 ftratlon i? gone cut of his Mind ; fo that at prcfent \t is rot 
 aiSually In View, and pofiibly cannot be recolle<aed: Bur he 
 knov/s it in a different way, from what he did before. The 
 Agreement of the two Ideai join'd in that FropoGtion is perceived, 
 but it is by the intervention of other ideai than thole which at 
 nrlt produced that Perception. He remember?, i. e. he knows 
 ( for Remembrance is but the reviving of fome paft Knowledge ) 
 that he was once certain of the Truth of this Propofition, that 
 the three Angle? of a Triangle are equal to two right ones. The 
 Immutabiliry of the fame Relations between the iame Immutable 
 Things, is now the Idea that (hews him, that if the three Angles 
 of a Triangle were once equal to two right ones,thcy will always 
 be equal CO two right ones. And herce he comes to be certain, 
 that what was once true in the cafe U always true; what Idedf once 
 agreed will a! ways agree; and confequcntly what he once knew to 
 be true he will alwaysknowto be true,as long as he can remem- 
 ber that he once knew it. Upon this ground it is, that particu* 
 Jar Demonilrations in Marhematicks afford general Knowledge. 
 If then the Perceptions that the fame Ideas w ill eternally have the 
 fame Habitudes and Relations be not a fufficient ground of 
 Knowledge, there could be no knowledge of general Propofiti- 
 ons in Mathematicks, for no Mathematical Demonff ration would 
 be any other than particular: And when a Man had demon- 
 ftratcd any Propofiticn concerning one Triangle or Circle, his 
 Knowledge would not reach beyond that particular Diagram. 
 If he would extend it farther, he mull renew his Demonftration 
 in another inltancc, br fore he could know it to be true in ano- 
 ther like Trinngle, and fo on: by which means one could never 
 come ro the Knowledge of any general Propofition?. No Body, 
 
 1 think, can deny that Mr. Newtcn certainly knows any Propo- 
 ijtlon, that he now at any time reads in his Book, td be true^^ 
 though he has not in a6lual View that admirable Chain of in- 
 rermcdiite Ideas, whereby he at firfl difcovered it to be true. 
 Such a Memory as that, able to certain fuch a Train of Parti- 
 cular?, may be well thou^iht beyond the Reach of Humane Fa- 
 culties. When the very Difcovcry, Perception, and laying to- 
 gether that wonderful Connexion of Ideas U found to furpafs 
 mofl Readers Comprehtnfion. But yet 'tis evident, the Author 
 himfelf knows the Propofition to be tYue, rtmcmbring he once 
 faw the Connxion of ihof*.' Ideas as certainly as he knows fuch 
 
 2 Man wounded snoihcr, remembring that he faw him run 
 him th'^^iUgh. But btcanfc the Memory is not always fo clear as 
 adlual Pciccptionj and docs in all Men more or Icfs decay in 
 
 knoth 
 
Degrees of Knowlerfge. i ^ r 
 
 length of lime, this amongft other Differences is one, which 
 (hews, that demon/} rat ive JQiowledge^ Is much more imperfect 
 than intmtivcf as we fhall fee in the following Chapter. 
 
 c H A p. ir. 
 
 Of the Degrees of our Knovoledge, 
 
 §. I. A LL our Knowledge confifthig, as I intuitive, 
 /^ liave faid, in the View the Mind has ot 
 **■ its own IdeaSf which is the utmoft Light and 
 greateft Certainty, we with our Faculties, and in our way of 
 Knowledge arc capable of, it may not beamifsjtoconfider a little 
 the degrees of jts Evidence. The different cltarnels of our 
 Knowledge Teems to me to lie in the different way of Perception, 
 the Mind has of the Agreement, or Difagreement of any of its 
 Ideas, For if we will refle5t on our own ways of Thinking, we 
 (hall find, that (bmetimes the Mind perceives the Agreement or 
 Difagreement of two Ideas immediately by thcmfelves, without 
 the Intervention of any other ; And thi?, I think, we may call 
 intuitive Kjiowledge. For in this, the Mind is at no Pains of pro- 
 ving or examining, but perceives tlie Truth, as the Eye doth 
 Light, only by being dire61:ed toward it. Thus the Mind per- 
 ceives, that ff'h'te is not Black,, That a Circle is not a Triangle, Tliac 
 Three are more than Two, and equal to One and Trvo, Such kind 
 of Truths, the Mind perceives at the firft fight of the Ideas to- 
 gether, by bare Intuition, withoac the Intervention of any other 
 ideas and this kind of Knowledge is the cleared, aixJ moft cer- 
 tain, that humane Frailty is capable of. This part of Know- 
 ledge is irrefiftible, and like bright Sunfhine, forces it fclF imme- 
 diately to be perceived, as foon as ever the Mind turns its View 
 that way; and leaves no Room for Hefitation, Doubt, or Ex- 
 amination, but the Mind is presently fill'd with the clear Light 
 of it. Tis on this Intuition, that depends all^ the Certainty and 
 Evidence of ^11 our Knowledge, which Certainty every one finds. 
 tobefo great, that he cannot imagine, and therefore not require 
 a greater : For a Man cannot conceive himfelf capab'e of a grea- 
 ter Certainty, than to know that any Is^m in his Mind Is fuclj 
 as he perceives it to be; and that two ideas, wherein he per- 
 C^wes a di€erenc?>, aie different, and not precKely the fame. He 
 
 it 4 . ikic 
 
I ] 2 Decrees of KnovuleSge, 
 
 that demands a greater Certainty than this, demands he knowt 
 no-- wliar, and (hews only that he has a Mind to be a Sceptick, 
 without being able to be lo. Certainty depends fo wholly on 
 this Intuition, tha: In the next degree of KjiowUdge^ which I call 
 Demonjitative, this Intuition is neceffary in all the Connexions 
 ot the intermediate Ideas y without which we cannot attain 
 Knowledge and Certainty. 
 
 §. X. The next degree of Knowledge is, where 
 Dtmtnjlra- the Mind perceives the Agreement or Difagree- 
 tive. ment of any ideai^ but not immediately. Tliough 
 
 wherever the Mind perceives the Agreement or 
 Difagrcement of any of its Ideas, there be certain knowledge ; 
 Yet it does not always happen, that the Mind fees that Agree- 
 nent or Dilagreemcnt, which there is between them, even where 
 it is difcoverable ', and in that cafe, remains in Ignorance, and 
 at mofl, gets no farther than a probable Conje6lu re. The Rea- 
 fon why the Mind cannot always perceive prefently the Agree- 
 ment or Difagrcement of two Idaat i<, becaufe thole Ideas con- 
 cerning whofe Agreement or Difagrecment the Enquiry is made, 
 cannot by the Mind be fo put together, as to fhew it. In this 
 Cafe tlirn, when the Mind cannot lo bring its Ideat together, as 
 by thtir immediate Comparifon, and as it werejuxta-pofition, 
 or Application one to another, to peiceive their Agreement or 
 Difagreeraent, it is fain, by the intervention of other Id eai ( one 
 or more, as it happens) to difcover the Agreement or Difagree- 
 mcnt, which it fearches^ and this is that which wec^WRea/on- 
 mj^. Thus the Mind being willing to know the Agreement or 
 Difagrcement in bignef?, between the three Angles of a Trian- 
 gle, and two right one?, cannot by an immediate View and com- 
 faing the.n, doit: Becaufe the three Angles of a Triangle can- 
 not be brought at once, and be compared with any one, or two 
 Angles', andfbof this the Mind has no immediate, no intuitive 
 Knowledge. In this Cafe the Mind is fain to find out fbme other 
 Anglti;, to wh'ch the three Angles of a Triangle have an 
 Equality i and finding thofc equal to two right ones, comes to 
 know their Equality to two right ones. 
 
 §. ;. Thofe intervening Ideas j which ferve to 
 De^tnJ.' ojt (hew the Agreement of any two others, are called 
 Tr9op. Proofs) and where the Agretnr.tnt or Difagree- 
 
 mcn: is by this means plainly and clearly perceived, 
 ?t is called Detnor.jlrationy n being p:en>n to the Uiiderllanding, 
 and the Mind made Ice that ir i-. fo. A quickncfs in the Mind 
 10 find out thcfc intermediate I^mj, ("that (hall difcover the A- 
 
 grcement 
 
Degrees of Knowleelge, i j j 
 
 greement or Difagreement of any other, ) and to apply them 
 right, is, I fuppole, that which is called Sagacity. 
 
 §. 4. This IQiavfiledge by intervening' Proofs^ ^«* not fo 
 though it be certain, yet the evidence ot it is not "fy- 
 altogether fo clear and bright, nor the affent fb 
 ready, as in intuitive Knowledge. For though in Demonflrationy 
 the Mind does at laft perceive the Agreement or Difagreement 
 of the Ideas it confiders^ yet 'tis not without Pains and Atten- 
 tion : There maft be more than one tranfient Vkw to find ir. 
 A fteddy Application and Purfuit is required to this Difcovery : 
 And there muft be a Progreffioii by fleps and degrees, before 
 the Mind can in this way arrive at Certainty, and come to per- 
 ceive the Agreement or Repugnancy between two Ideas that 
 need Proofs, and the u(e of Reafou to (haw ic 
 
 §. 5. Another difference betrveen intuitive and de- Not without 
 monjirative KJiowledge^ is, that though in the latter precedent 
 all doubt be removed, when by the Intervention doubt. 
 of the intermediate Ideas ^ the Agreement or Disa- 
 greement is perceived •, yet before the Demonftration there was 
 a doubt, whicii in intuitive Knowledge cannot happen to the 
 Mind that has its Faculty of Perception kit to a degree capable 
 of diftinfl ideas, no more than it can be a doubt to the Eye, 
 (that can diftinftly fee White and Black,) Whether this Ink, 
 and this Paper be all of a Colour. If there be Sight in the 
 Eyes, it will at firft gUmpfe, wi'hout Hefi^ation, perceive the 
 Words printed on this Paper, different from the Colour of the 
 Paper : And fo if the Mind have the Faculty of dillin6fc Per- 
 ception, it will perceive the Agreement or Difagreement of 
 thofe I^ftf J that produce intuitive Knowledge. If the Eyes have 
 loft the Faculty of feeing, or the Mind of perceiving, we in 
 vain enquire after the quickneft of Sight in one, or clearnefs of 
 Perception in the other. 
 
 §. 6. 'Tis true, the Perception, produced by t7»tfo clear. 
 Demonflration^ is alfb very clear ", yet it is often with 
 a great Abatement of that evident Luflre and full AfTurance, 
 that always accompany that which I call intuitive ; like a Face 
 reflecSted by feveral Mii rors one to another, where as long as 
 it retains the fimilitude and agreement with the Objedt, it pro- 
 duces a Knowledge *, but 'tis ftili in every fucceffive Refl;6tion 
 with aleffening of that perfe£i Clearnefiand DifHn6lnefs, whicli 
 is in thefirfl:, rill at laft, after many removes, it has a great mix- 
 ture of Dimnefs, and is not at firft Sight fo knowable, elfi-)ecially 
 to weak Eyes. Thus it is with Knowledge, made out by a 
 long Train of Proofs. §, 7. 
 
1^4 Decrees of Knowlecfge. 
 
 §. 7. Now, in every Jlep R^itfon makfi in detTion* 
 E.*:hftpniufi firattve i^otv ledge ^ there is an intuitive Knowledge 
 have intui- of that Agreement or Difagreement, it feeks with 
 ttve Evf the nrxt iiicerracdiate /^/tftf, which it ufes ds a 
 denct. Proof; For if it were not fo, that yet would need 
 
 a F^roof. Since without the Perception of fuch 
 Agreement or Difagreement, there ii no Knowledge produced : 
 It ic be perceived by it felf, it is intuitive Knowledge ; If it 
 can 'lot be perceived by it felf, there ts need of fbme inter- 
 vening UeXf as a common meafiire to (hew their Agreement or 
 Diftgreemenr. By whicii it is plain, that evecy ftcp in Rcafbn- 
 ing, that produces Knowledge, has intuitive Certainty ; which 
 when the Mind perceives, there is no more required, but tore- 
 member it to make the^Agreement or Diftgreement of the Ideas, 
 concerning which we enquire, vifiblc and certain. So that to 
 make any thing a Demonfiration, it is neceffary to perceive the 
 immediate xAgreemcnt of the intervening iHeasy whereby the A- 
 prccment or Difagrremcnt of the two Ideas under Examination 
 ( whereof the one is always the firft, and the other the laft in 
 the Account ) is found. This intuitive Perception of the Agree- 
 ment or Difagreemcnt of the intermediate Ideas, in each Step 
 and Progreffion of the Demonftration^ muft alfb be carried cxa£lly 
 in the Mind, and a Man muft be fure that no part is left out \ 
 which becaufe In long Dcdu6lion!»,and the ufe of many Proofs,the 
 Memory docs not always fb readily and exactly retain : therefore 
 it comes to pafi, that this is more imperfect than intuitive Know- 
 ledge^ and Men. embrace often Fallhood for Demonftracions. 
 
 §. 8. The neceffity of this intuitive Knowledge, 
 
 Utnce the mi- in each ftcp ol fcicntihcal or demonftrative Rea- 
 
 fi*ke,e^ prx- fbning, gave occafion, I imagine, to thzlmijiaken 
 
 cognins & Axiom^ that aB I{eafoning trai ex prxcojniHs S prtS' 
 
 pracconcelTis. conceffis ', wh'ch how far it is miftaken, I fhall have 
 
 occafion to fhew more at large, where! come to 
 
 confider Propofitions, and particularly thofc Propofitions, which 
 
 arc called Maxims •, and to (hew that 'tis by a miftake, that 
 
 they are (uppoled to be the foundations of all our Knowledge 
 
 and Rcafonings. 
 
 Demennratitn ^- '>■ ^^ ^^^ been generally taken for granted^ 
 
 -„, i.r^ifs^ r« that Mithematicks alone are capable of demon- 
 not tmtfta to n • a- • r» i /- 1 a 
 
 quantity. Itrative Certamry r 13ut to have fuch an Agrcc- 
 
 • ment or Difagreemcnt, as may intuitively be 
 
 perceived, being, as I imagine, not rhe IVivilcge of the Idea^ of 
 NtmBevj Extenfio>7,v^<3i Ftgitre zionc, it may polHbiy be the want 
 
 of 
 
Degrees of Knowledge. igj 
 
 of due Method and Application in us ; and not of fufficient evi- 
 dence in things, that Demonftration has been thought to have fo 
 little to do in other parts of Knowledge, and been Icarce fo much 
 as aim'd at by any but Mathematicians. For whatever Ideas-wc 
 have, wherein the Mind can perceive the immediate Agreement 
 or Difagreemenr. that is between them, there the Mind is capable 
 of intuitive Knowledge ; and where it can perceive the Agree- 
 ment or Disagree ment of any fwo ideas., by ai intuitive Percep-? 
 tionof the Agreement or Pi^greement they have with any in* 
 termediate Ideas, there the Mind is capable of Demonftration, 
 wfeidi is not limited to Ideas of Extenfion, Figure, bjumber, 
 and their Modes. (2?wt^ t* - — -i — --^——-—z- — - — j»-*- 
 
 §. lo. The Rcafbn why it has been generally ^hyithns 
 Ibught for, and ruppofed to be only in thole, I ^J^" /« 
 imagine, has been, not only the general ulefulnefs ^^^'^g^^t' 
 of thole Sciences; But becaule, in comparing their 
 Equality or ExceCs the Modes of Numbers have every the Jeaft 
 difference very clear and perceivable : and though in Extenfion, 
 every the leaft Excels is not fo perceptible :, yet the Mind has 
 found out ways, to examine and dilcover demonftratively the 
 juft Equality of two Angle?, or Extenfion?, or Figures, and both 
 thefe, i. e. Numbers and Figures, can be let down, by vifible 
 atd lafting marks, wherein the Ideas under confideration are per- 
 £.6Hy determined, which for the moft part they are not, wherp 
 they are marked only by Names and Words. 
 
 §. II. But in other fimple litftf^, whole Modes and Differences. 
 arc made, and counted by degrees, and not quantity, we have 
 not 16 nice and accurate a diftin6iion of their differences, as to 
 perceive, or find ways to meafuretheir juR Equality of the leaft. 
 Differences. For thole other fimple Ideasj being appearances or 
 lenlations, produced in us, by the Size, Figure, Number, and 
 Motion of minute Corpulcles fingly inlenfible, their difterent 
 degrees alio depend upon the variation of ibme, or all of thole 
 Caules; which finceic can.not be oblervcd by us in Particles of 
 Matter, whereof each is roolubtile to be perceived, it is impoC 
 fible for us to have any cxa6l Meafures of the different degrees, 
 of thele fimple Ideas. For luppofing the Senlation or idea we 
 name Ti'hitenefsj be produced in us by a certain number of Glo- 
 bules, which having a verticity about their own Cenrcrs, ftrike 
 upon thei^^^;«4 of the Eye, with a certain degree of Rotation, 
 as well asprogreffive Swiftnels^ it will hence eafily follow, that 
 the more the fuperficial parts of any B )dy are fo ordered, as to 
 rtfl^dl the greater number of Globules of Light, and to give 
 
 - them 
 
1 1 6 Degress of Knowledge. 
 
 tl)tm that proper Rotation, which is fit to produce this Senfa- 
 tioii of White in us, the more White will that Body app^ear, 
 that, from an equal (pace fends to the f{etina the greater number 
 of fuch Corpufcles, with that peculiar fort of Motion. I do 
 not fay, that the Nature of Light confilts in very fniaU round 
 Globules, nor of Whirenels, in fuch a texture of Parts as gives 
 a certain Rotation to thofe Globules, when it refle£ls them j for 
 I am not now treating phyfically of Light or Colours ; But this^ 
 I think, I may fay, thit I cannot (and I would be glad any one 
 would make intelligible that he did ) conceive how Bodies with- 
 out u?, can any ways affefl our SenfeSj but by the immediate 
 contact of the fenfible Bodies themfelves, as^ in Tailing and 
 Feeling, or the impuKeof fbme infenfible Particles coming from 
 them, as in Seeing, Hearing, and Smelling; by the different 
 impulfeof which Parts, caufed by their different Size, Figure, 
 and Motion, the variety of Senfations is produced in us. 
 
 §. II. Whether then they be Globules or no-, or whether 
 they have a Verticity about their own Centers, that produce 
 the Idti o{ I'Voitenefs in us, this is certain, that the more Parti- 
 cles of Light are refle£led from a Body, fitted to give them that 
 pecaliar Motion, which produces the Senfation of Whitenefs 
 in us:, and poffibly too, thequicker that peculiar Motion is, the 
 whiter docs the Body appear, from which the greater number 
 are rf fleiled, as is evident in the fame piece of Paper put in 
 the Sun-beams, in the Shade, and in a dark Hole ; in each of 
 which, it will produce in us the I^r<< of Whitenefs in far diffe- 
 rent degrees. 
 
 §. i;. Not knowing therefore what number 
 
 Whj it has of Particles, nor what Motion of them is fit to 
 henjo thought, produce any prccife degree of iVbitenefiy we can- 
 not demon lirate the certain Equality of any two 
 degrees of iVbitenefs, bjcaufe we have no certain Standard to 
 meafure them by, nor Means to diftinguifh every the leallreal 
 difference, the only Help vve have being from our Senles, 
 which in this point fail us. But where the difference is fo great, 
 as to produce in the Mind clearly diftinit Ideatf uhofe difFeren' 
 ces can be perfe(5liy retained, there thefe Ideas of Colours, as we 
 fee in different kind?, has Blue and Red, arc as capable of 
 Dt^rnonffrarion, as Ideas of Number and Extenfion. What I 
 have here faid of H^citenefs and Colours, I think, holds true in 
 all fecondary Qnialitics, and their Modes. 
 
 §. 14. 
 
Degree i of Knevoledge. 1^7 
 
 %. 14. Thefe two, ( vi:{. ) Intuition and Demou- 
 ftration,. are the degrees of our Knowledge; what- Senfitive 
 ever comes (hort of one of thefe, with what aflli- Knowledge of 
 ranee foe ver embraced, is but Faith, or Opinion, particHiar Ex' 
 but not Knowledge, at leaft in all general Truths. <7^«»". 
 There is, indeed, another Perception of the Mind, 
 employ 'd about the particular Exiftence of finite Beings without 
 us; which going beyond bare probability, and yet not reach- 
 ing perfe(Sly to either of the foregoing degrees of certainty, 
 paffes under the name of Knowledge. There can be nothing 
 more certain, than that the idea we receive from an external 
 Objeft is in our Minds ^ this is intuitive Knowledge.^ But 
 whether there be any thing more than barely that Idea m our 
 Minds, whether we can thence certainly infer the Exiftence 
 of any thing without us, which correfponds to that Idea^ is 
 that, whereof fome Men think there may be a Queftion made, 
 becaule Men may have fuch Ideoi in their Minds, when no 
 fiich Thing exifts, no fuch Obje(3: affe<Els their Senfes. But 
 yet here, I think, we are provided with an Evidence, that 
 puts us paft doubting : For I ask any one, Whether he be not 
 invincibly confcious to himfclf of a different Perception, w^hen 
 he looks on the Sun by Day , and thinks on it by Night ^ 
 when he aftually taftes Wormwood, or frtiells a Role, or only 
 thinks on that Savour, or Odour ? We as plainly find the. 
 difference there is between any idea revived in our Minds by 
 our own Memory, and actually coming into our Minds by 
 our Senfes, as we do between any two diftin6t ideas. If any 
 one fay, a Dream may do the feme thing, and all thefe ideas^ 
 may be produced in us without any external Obje»fVs, he may 
 .pleafe to dream that I make him this Anfwer, 1 . That 'tis no 
 great matter, whether I remove his Scruple, or no : Where all 
 this but Dream, Reafoning and Arguments are of no ufe, Truth 
 and Knowledge nothing, i. That I believe he will allow a 
 very manifeft difference between dreaming of being in the 
 Fire, and being aitually in it. But yet if he be refolved to ap-^ 
 
 fiear fo fceptical, as to maintain, that what I call being ailual- 
 y in the Fire is nothing but a Dream ; and that we cannot 
 thereby certainly know, that any fuch thing as Fire actually 
 exifts without us : I anfwer. That we certainly finding, that 
 Pleafure or Pain follows upon the application of certain Obje(5t3 
 to us, whofe Exiftence we perceive, or dream that we perceive, 
 by our Senfts : This Certainty is as great as our Happinefs, or 
 Mifery, beyond which,we have no concernment to know,or to be. 
 
 So 
 
I jS Extent of Humane Knowledge. 
 
 So that, I think, we may add to the two former forts of ^Cww/eajgfi 
 ihis aUo, of the Exigence of particular external Objedb, by that 
 Perception and Confcioufncfs wc have of the aiflual entrance of 
 lieM from them , and allow thele three degrees of K^notpledge.^ 
 viz. Intuitive^ Demonjlrative^ and Scnfujve ; in each of which, 
 there are different degrees and ways ot E/idcnccand Certainty. 
 §.15. Bjt fince our Knowledge is founded on, 
 KnoisUdge andemployM about our Ji^.;* only, will ic not fol- 
 »of alvnys low from thence, that it is conformable to our 
 ^Usr , vhtrt ideas; and that where our Idea are clear and di- 
 fffe Ideis are (lln6l, or obfcure and confufed, our Knowledge 
 i*- will be Co too ? To which I anfwer, No : For 
 
 our Knowledge confiding in the Perception of the 
 Agreetnent or DiCigreement of any two Ideai^ its cleanun or 
 oblcurity, confiftsin the clearness or obfcurity of that Percepti- 
 on, and not in the clearnefs or oblcuriry of the/if^tf themfelves; 
 ■a. ^. a Man that has as clear Ideas of the Angles of a Triangle* 
 and of Equality to two right ones, as any Mathematician in 
 the World, may yet have but a very obfcure Perception of their 
 Agreement, and fo have but a very obfcure Knowledge of ic. 
 But Ue.is, which by reafbn of their ObCcuricy or otherwiie, ar« 
 confuted, cannot produce any clearer diftin<5t Knowledge^ bc- 
 caufe as far as any Ideas are confufed, fo far the Mind cannot 
 perceive clearly, whether they agree or dilagree. Or to exprefi 
 the fame thing in a way Icfs apt to be mif-underllood. He that 
 hath not determined the Ideas to the Words he ufes, cannot 
 nuke Proportions of them, of whofe Truth he can be certain* 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 /, 
 
 : Of the Ext^k^nMc t£^|i-,,,. ;^ 
 
 i§. 1. T 7" Nowltdge, as has been faid, laying in the Percep- 
 Iv^ tlon of the Agreement, or Difagreement, of any 
 ■^ ^ of our Ideas^ it follows from hence. That, 
 ^ „ ^, r , F»>/?i We can have I^mrpled^e no farther 
 
 F.rfl, So farther ^^an we have 7^.... 
 t fjau we havt' Idas. , t> n t*! .. u ^ 
 
 c, J/ \.»r ,/ §• 1- Secowrf/y, That we can nave no Knon^- 
 
 th.iH we cm per- '^«J?* farther than we can have Perception ot 
 
 ce;ve their /i,irtt- that Agrecnicnt, or Difagreement : Which 
 
 Tntnt or Difagrsc- Perception being, i. Eitixcr, by intuitw]^ or 
 mnt, the 
 
Extent of Humane kno]!oledge, ijp 
 
 the immediate comparing any two ideas ^ or, 2. By ^eafon^ ex- 
 amining the Agreement, or Difagreemenc of two Ideas^ by the 
 Intervention of fbme others : Or, 3. By Senfation^ perceiving 
 the Exiftence of particular Things. Hence it alfo follows, 
 
 §. 5. Thirdly, That we cannot have an intui- 
 tive knowledge, that (hall extend it felf to all our Thirdly, In- 
 Ideas , and all that we would know about them j tuittve Kmw 
 becaufe we cannot examine and perceive all the ledge extends 
 Relations they have one to another by Juxta-pofi- ^^ /# »«' '» 
 tion, or an immediate comparifon one with ano- "^ the ReU* 
 ther. Thus having the Ideas of an obtufe, and an """'"•/ '*^ 
 acute angled Triangle, both drawn from ecjual *""" ^*^* 
 Bafes, and between Parallels, I can by intuitive 
 Knowledge, perceive the one not to be the other ^ but cannot 
 that way know, whether they be equal, or no ', becaufe their 
 Agreement or Difagreement in equality, can never be perceived 
 by an immediate comparing them : The difference of Figure 
 makes their parts uncapable of an exa6t immediate application •, 
 and therefore there is need of fome intervening Quantities to 
 meafiire them by, which is Demonftration, or rational Know- 
 ledge. 
 
 §. 4. 'Fourthly^ It follows alfb, from what is a- Fourthly, Nor 
 bovc obferved, that our rational Kjiowledge, can- deymnjiratinje 
 not reach to the whole extent of our Ideas. Be- KnowUdgt, 
 caufe between two different I^/m/ we would exa- • 
 
 mine, we cannot always iind fuch Mediums, as we can conne<5l 
 one to another with an intuitive Knowledge, in all the parts 
 of the Deduction j and wherever that fails, we come (hort of 
 Knowledge and Demonftration. 
 
 §. s. Fifthly, Senfative }^mtoledge reaching Fifthly , Senfitirue 
 no farther than the Exiftence of Things a- Knowledge n»r- 
 dually prefent to our Senfes, is yet much nar- ^"""^^ '^'"» "^her, 
 rower than either of the former. 
 
 §. 6. From all which it is evident, that the sixthly, Our ^know- 
 Extent of our Knoipledge' comes not only Abort ledge therefore nar- 
 of the Reality of Things, but even of rhe Ex- '"''«'*** '^-"» ««^ 
 tent of our own Ideas. Though our Know- ^^f^^' 
 ledge be limited to our Ideas, and cannot ex- 
 ceed them either in Extent or Perfedlion ; and though thefe be 
 very narrow bound?, in refpe^l; of the extent of All-being, and 
 far (hort of what we may juftly imagine to be in (omeevcn cre- 
 ated Underftanding?, not tied down to the dull and narrow In- 
 formation , is received from fome [qw , and not very acute 
 
 ways 
 
140 Extent of Humane Knowledge, 
 
 ways of Perception, fuch as arc our Senfes j yet it would be 
 well with u?, it our Knowledge were but as large as our Ideaty 
 and there were not many Doubts and Enquiries concerning the 
 lAcAi we have, whereof we are not, nor I believe ever ftiall be 
 in this World, rcfolved. Neverthelefs, I do not queftion, but 
 that Humane Knowledge, under the prefent Circumftances of 
 our Beings and Conftitutions may be carried much farther, than 
 it hirhcrco has been, if Men would fincercly, and with freedom 
 of Mind, employ all that Induftryand Labour of Thought, in 
 improving the means of difcovering Truth, which they do for 
 the Colouring or Support of Falftiood, to raainrain a Syftem, 
 Interefl: or Party, they are once engaged In. But yet after all, 
 1 think 1 may, without Injury to humane Perfe6lion, be confi- 
 dent, that our Knowledge would never reach to all we might 
 defire to know concerning thofe ideat we have ; nor be able to 
 formount all the Difficulties, and relolve all the Qjeflions might 
 arife concerning any of them. We have the Ideas of a Square, 
 zCircle^ and EquAlity: and yet, perhaps, fhall never be able to 
 find a Circle equal to a Square, and certainly know that it is fo. 
 We have the Ideas of Matter and Thinkjng^ * but poflibly fluU 
 never be able to know, whether any mere material Being thinks, 
 
 or 
 
 * Againil that AlTcrtion of Mr. Locke, That pojfiblj vfe fhall neiier it 
 ahU to know whether any material Beings thinks or not, &c. The BiHiop 
 ct ^oreejftr argues thus : If this be true, then for all that we can know hy 
 tur Ideof o/Martcr ;i»«/ Thinking, Matter may ha-je a Power ofThinkwg : 
 yiniifthii hold, then it ii impojfible to frove a JpintualSubftance in «/, 
 from the Idcz e/^ Thinking : For bow can we he ajftired by our Ideas, that 
 
 God hath not given fuch a power of Thinking, to Matter 
 
 t Eflay of fo dijpofed as our Bodies are? Ejpecially fince itis f faid. 
 
 Humane Un- " That in refpcdi of our Notions, it is not n)uc(i more rc- 
 
 derft. B. 4. C. " mote from our Comprehcnfion to conceive thitGod cjn,_ 
 
 3. §, 6* " if he pleafcs, fuper-add to our Idea of Matter a Faculty 
 
 " ofThinking, than that he Hiould fuper-add to it another 
 •' Subftance, with a Faculty of Thinking. Whoever afferts this, cm never 
 prove a jhiritual Subjiance in us from a Facul:y of Thinking; hecaufe he 
 tannot know from the Idea of Matter and Thinking, that Matter fo dijpofed 
 cannot think. And he cannot be certain, that God hath not framed the 
 Matter of our Bodies fo as to he capable of it. 
 
 To which Mr. Locke * anf^crJ thus : Here yoor Lord- 
 
 * In hi<ijirf} fhip argues, that upon my Principles it cannot ht proved 
 Letter to tht Bi- that there m a f^n itual Subfiance in us. Ti> which give 
 
 /hop ofH^orceJier, me leave, with iubmilfion, to fjy. That 1 think it may 
 p. 6^, 6i, ixc, be proved froni my Principles, and I think I have done 
 
 iti 
 
Extent of Humane Knowledge i"- " • I4i''' 
 
 it ; and the Proof ia my Book ftands thus. Firft, We experiment in our 
 fclves Thinking. The Idea of this A^ion or Mode of 27?/«/6;wg, is inconfi- 
 flenc with the Idea of Self-fubfifteoce, and therefore has a nectflary Conns- 
 Qion, with a Support" or Subjeft of Inhefion ; The Idea of that Support.is 
 what we call S«^/«»« ; and fo from r/j/w^/wgexperimenred in us, we have 
 a Proof of a thinking Suhjhnce in u«, which in my Senfc is a Spirif. Againft 
 this your Lordfhip will argue, That by what I have fiiid of the PolTibiiity 
 that God may, if he pkafcd, fuper-add to Matter a Faculty of Thinking, ic 
 can never.be proved that there is a Spiritual Subftance in us, becaufe upon 
 that Suppofition it ispolfible it may be a material Subflance that thinks in us. 
 I grant it j but add, that the general Idea of Subftance being the fame e- 
 very'-where, the Modification of Thinking, or the Power of Thinking joined 
 to it, makes it a Spirit, without confidcring what other Modifications it 
 has, as, whether it has the Modification o£ Solidity, or no. Asontheo- 
 ther fi^c ^ubfiance, that has the Modification of So/;<^;r/ is Matter, whether it 
 has.thp, Modification of Thinking or no. And therefore^ if your Lordlhip 
 me^ViS hy ij^iritual, and immaterial Subftance, I grant I have not proved, 
 nor upon my Principles can it be proved, your Lordlhip meaning ( as I think 
 you doj demonOratively proved, That there is an immaterial Subftance ia 
 us that thinks. Though I prefume, from what I have faid 
 about the Suppofition of a Syftem of Matter, Thinking B. 4. C. 10. 
 "(which there demonftrate that God is immaterial) will §. 16. 
 frove it in the highcll degree probable, that the thinking 
 fubftiBcc in us is immaterial. But your Lord/hip thinks not Probability e^ 
 nough, and by charging the want of Deenon^ation upon my Principles, 
 that the thinking thing in us is immaterial, your Lordfiiip feems to conclude 
 it demonftrable from Principles of Philofophy. That Deraonllration I (hould 
 with Joy receive from your Lordlhip, or any one. For 
 though all the great Ends of Morality aod Religion are well B. 4. C. j, 
 enough fecured without it,as I have fhewn, yet it would be a §, 6. 
 great advaoce of our Knowledge in Nature and Philolophy. 
 
 To what I have faid in my Book, to ftiew that all the great Ends of Re- 
 ligion and Morality are iecurcd barely by the Imraottality of the Soul, with- 
 out a neccHary Suppofition that the Soul is immaterial, I crave leave to add* 
 That Immortality may and iTiall be annexed to that, which in its own Na- 
 ture is neither immaterial nor immortal , as the Apoftle 
 exprcfly declares in thcfc words, * For this Corruptible * i Cor, ly. 
 muJI put on Interruption, and thii Mortal muff put on Ira- s ?• 
 mortality. 
 
 Perhaps my ufing the word Spirit for a thinking Subflance, without ex- 
 cluding Materiality out of it, will be thought too great a Liberty, and fuch 
 as deferves a Cenfurc, becaufe 1 leave Immateriality out of the Idea I make 
 it a fign of. I readily own, That words fhould be fparingly ventured on in 
 a Seofe wholly new j and nothing but abfolure NecelTity can excufe the bold' 
 nefs of ufing any Term, in a Seofe whereof we can produce no Exaniple. Buc 
 in the prefenr cafe, I think I have great Authorities to juflifie me. The 
 3 ul is agreed, on all hands, to be that in us which tbiuks. And he that 
 Voll. II. L wiU 
 
14^ EsTent ^Humans /V/j(?h57?^^qT^/ V 
 
 will look into the iirft Book of Cicoo's Tttfculan Qncflion?, and into the 
 6:h Book o\yirgirs .£>;?«//, will find rliat rhLfc rwo great Men.whoofall the 
 Romanshcfi anrfctftoftd Fhilofophy, thooghf, or ar kaft did not deny the 
 Soul ro be a fubtil Mitrcr, which rrighLcomc ur.dtr the Name. of Aura, of 
 Ignis, or i'Erhcr, and this Soul they borh of them called Spiritus ; in the No- 
 tion of which, 'tis plain they included only Thought and aftivc Motion, with- 
 out the total exciufion of Matter. Whether they thoughc right in this I do 
 not fay. that is not the Quellion ; but whether they fpoke properly, when 
 they called an active, thinking, fubtl Subllance, out of which they excluded 
 enly grofs and palpable Matter, Spiritus, Spirit. I think that no body will 
 deny, That if any amung the Romans can be allowed to fpeak properly, 
 T'lHy and .Fn-gtl are the two who may moft fccurcly by dependeH on fjr it : 
 And one of them fpcalung cf che Soul, fays, Dum JpiritHS hot regit artus; 
 and the other, f^ita continttur corpore (fy'Jpiritu, Where 'tis plain by Cir' 
 p'ts, he means ( as generally every -where) only grofs Matter that 'may be 
 flit and hand feci, as appears by thefe words. Si cifr ant fangutt^'' aut cere- 
 I'ium efl anitHH!, certe, qnoniam eji Corpus, ijitenht cum relitfui ^oriire,fi 
 avima cfl, forte dilJip<tlntur, f ignis extinguetur,ToCc. Qucft. I. i c. i I . Here 
 Cu'ert oppo(es Corpus to Ignis and minima, i. e. Aura or Breath. And the 
 iour.dation of that his DiftinQion of the Soul, from that whxh he calls Cor^ 
 pus or Body, he gives a little lower in thefe words, Tanta ejus tenattas ut 
 fugiat aciew,lb. c. 12, Nor was it the Heathen World alone that had this No- 
 tion o( Spirit ; themoftenlightncd ofall the Ancient People 
 Eccl.-i. jp. of God, So/(jwo«himfcj|f,fpeaks after the fame manner.TAjf 
 vhich hefaUmh the Sons of Men, bifalleth theBeafiSy even one 
 thing befalleth them ; as the nu dieth fo dieth the other, yta^ they have aH 
 •ne Spirit. So I tranflate the Hebrew word nn here, for fo I find it tran- 
 flited the very next Vcrfe but one j IVho knovtth the Spirit 
 f^tr, 2 r. of a Man that gtnth uprward, and Spit-it of a Beafi that gotth 
 
 down totheEarth.ln which places it is plain that Solomon :if'- 
 plies the Word nn a"d ourTraoflatorsof him the word Spirit toaSubrtance, 
 out of which Immateriality was not wholly excluded, unlejs the Spirit of a 
 Bcafi that gotth downwards to the Earth be immaterial. Nor did the way of 
 Speaking in onr Saviour's time vary from this..; St Luke tells 
 Ch,jL\- 37. us.That when our Savicar.afrer his Refurreflior.ftood'in^hc 
 midft of them, thty were affrighted, andfupptftdthxt they 
 had feen irViViXCC ^the Greek word which always anfwers Spirit in Englifh; 
 and fo the Tranllators of the Bible render it here, They fuppoftd that they 
 hadfm a Spirit. But cUr Saviour fays to them, Behold my Hands andtt-y 
 Fctt, that it is I my ftlf, handle me and fee ; for a Spirit hath no Flefh ahd 
 Boues, at you fee me have. Which wprds of our Saviour put the fame di- 
 ftinci'on between Bo^ and S^'>;r, that Cicero did in the place above-cited, 
 viz. That the one was a grofs Compagcs that could be felt and handled ^ 
 atid the o»lrcr fuch as Virgd ficfcribes ihc Ghoft or Soul of Anchtfes, 
 Ttr coTiatus ibi collo dare brachia circum 
 Lib. V /, Tcr frujff-a coviprtnja m.^nus effugit imago. 
 
 Par levibHf vtniU ^otUtricji-^ fimillimajomn9, 
 
Extent of Humane Knowledge, ^ <*^-^^|^^ 
 
 I would not be thought hereby to fay, Thar Sfirit never does fignifie a 
 purely immaterial Subftance. In that Senfe the Scripture, I take it, fpeak?, 
 when it fays. God is a Spirit ; and in that fenfe I have i^s'd it ; and in thac 
 fcofe I have proved from my Frinciples, that there is a J^irittial S.ubfiance ; 
 and am certain that there is ajpiriiual immaterial Subflance: which is, I 
 humbly conceive, a dire£l Anfwer to your Lordfliip's Queftion in the Begin- 
 ning of this Argument, viz. Hevf we come to he certain that there is a jpi- 
 ritual Sukjlance ; fuppojitig this Principle to he true, that thsfimplc Ideas by 
 Senfation and RefleQion,are the fole Matter and Foundation of all Rcafcning ? 
 But this hinders not but that if God, that infinite, omnipotent, and perfect- 
 ly immaterial Spirit, fhonid pleafe to give to a'Syftem of very fubcil Matrer, . 
 Senfe and Motian, it might, with propriety of Speech, be called Spirit i 
 though Materiality were not excluded out of its complex Idea. Your Lord- 
 fhip proceeds, It it faiiii7ideed sljemhere, " That it is re- 
 pugnant to the Idea of fenflefs Matrer, that it Ihould put B. 4. C. i }. 
 into it fclf- Senfe, Perception, and Knowledge. But this § y. 
 doth 7!0t reach the preferst cafe ; which is not what Matter 
 c-Tw do of it felf, but what Matter prepared by an omnipatent hand can do. 
 ^nd what certainty can we have that he hath not done it ? We Cttn have 
 none from the Idcifs, for thofe are given up in this cafe, and confequently, 
 we can have no certainty upon thefe Principles, whether we have any Jpi' 
 ritual SubJIance within tu or not. 
 
 Your Lordlhip in this Paragraph proves, that from what I fay, Wf can 
 have no certainty whether we have any fpiritual Subftancc in «* or not. If 
 by fpiritual Subftancc your Lordfliip means an immaterial Subftance. in us, 
 as.you fpeak p. 246. I grant what your Lordfhip fajs is true, That it can- 
 not, upon thefe Principles, be demonflrarcd. But I muft crave lc*vc to lay 
 at the lame time. That upon theft' Principles, it can be prov'd, to the highcll 
 degree ef Probability. If by ^iritual Sub^ance your Lordftip means a 
 thinking Subftancc. I muft diflent from your Lordlhip, and fay, That we 
 can have a Certainty, upon my Principles, that there is a jpiritual Subjfarue 
 in M. In fhort, my Lord, upon, my Principles, i. e. trom the Idea of 
 Thinking, wt can have a Certainiy that there is a thinking Sublhnce in us ; 
 from hence wc have a Certainty thit there is an eternal fAmji'w? Subfance. 
 This thinking Subftanpe, which has been from Eternity. I have proved to 
 be immaterial. This eternal, immaterial, thinking Subftancc, has pur iuco 
 us a thinking Subftancc, which whether it be a msterial or immaterial .Suo- 
 ftjnce, cannot be infallibly dcmonftrated from our Ideas^ though trom thccn 
 ic may be proved, that it is to the higheft degree probable that it is imma- 
 terial. 
 
 Again, the Bi/liop of Worcefter undertakes to prove from Mr. Locked Prin- 
 ciples, that we may be certain, " .That the firft eternal Thinking Being or 
 " omnipotent Spirit cannot, if he would, give to certain Syftems of created 
 " fenfible Matter, put togecher as he fees fie, fbme degrees of Senfe, Pcr- 
 " ception and Thoug^ht. 
 
 To which Mr. Locke has njade the following Aofwer in his Thud Letter, 
 p. ^9^,^97 >fyc, 
 
 L 1 , Your 
 
144 Extent of Humane KmwUAge. 
 
 Your firft Argument I rake to be this. That according to mc, the Kno»r- 
 ledge wc have being by oMr Ideas, and our Idea ot" Matter in geneial being a 
 foli.d Sai)ftancc,and our Idea of Cody a fold cxttndcdfigured Subllancc j if i 
 admit Matter to be capable of Thinking, 1 confound the Idea of Matter with 
 the Idea of a 'Spirit ; To which I anfwcr, No, no more than I confound the 
 Idea of Matter with the Idea of an Horfc, when 1 fay that Matter in general 
 is a foliii extended Suljiance •■, and that an Horfc is a material Animal, or 
 an extended foi;d Subllance with Scule and fpontaneous Motion. 
 
 The Idea of Matter is an extended fjid Subflince j where ever there is 
 fuch a Subllance there is Matter } and the Eflence of Matter, whatever other 
 Qililiries, not conraiacd in that Eflence, it Hull plcafe Gud to fuppiradd to 
 if. For'Example, God creates an extended folid Subftanee, without the fu- 
 pcradding any thing clfe to it, and fo we may confidcr it at reft : To fome 
 parts of It he fupcradds Motion, but it has fliU the Effencc of Matter : O- 
 ther parts of it he frames into Plants, with all the Excellencies of Vegetation, 
 Life and Beauty, which is to be found in a Rofcbr a Peach-tree, ^c. above 
 the ElVcnce of Matter in general, but it is ftill but Matter : To other parrs 
 he adds Sen fe and fpontaneous Motion, and thofc other Properties that are 
 to be fuund in an Elephant. Hitherto 'tis not doubted but the Power of God 
 may go, and that the Properties ofaRofe, a Peach, or an Elephant, fupcr» 
 added to Matter, change not the Properties of Matfer j but Matter is io 
 thefe things Matter ftill. But if one venture to go one ftep farther and fay, 
 God may giTc to Matter, Thought, Reafon, and Volition, as well as Senfe 
 and fpontaneous Motion, there arc Men ready prcftntly to limit the Poi^'er 
 of the Omnipotent Creator, and tell us, he cannot do it ; bccaufe it dcftroys 
 the ElTence, or changes the ejfcntial Propertief of Matter. To mal.e gciod 
 which Aflertion they have no more to fay, but that Thought and Reafon. 
 are no: included in the Efler.ce of Matter, I grant it j but whatever Excel- 
 lency, not con-ained in its Eflence, be fupcraddcd to Matter, it docs not 
 deftroy the Eflence of Matter, if it leaves it an extended folid Stibftance ; 
 where -ever that is, there is the Eflence of Matter j and it every thing of 
 greater Pcrfediion, fuperadded to fuch a Subllance, dellroys the Eflence ot" 
 Matter, whit will become of the Eflence of Matter ia a Plant, or an Animal, 
 whofc Properties far exceed rhofe of a mecr extended folid Sub/lance ? 
 
 But 'tis farther urged. That wc cannot conceive how Matter, can Think. 
 I grant it : but to argue from thence, that God therefore cannot give to 
 fatter a Faculty of Thinking, is to fay God's Ommpotcncy is limited to a 
 narrow compafs, bccaufe Man's Underftanding is foj and bring down God's 
 infinite I'owtr to the file of our Capacities. If God can give no Power to 
 »ny parts of Matter, but what Men can account for iVonj the ElTcncc of 
 Matter in general : If all fuch Qualities and Properties mull deftroy 
 the ElTence, or change the Efjential Properties of Matter, which are to our 
 Conceptions above it, and wt cannot conceive to be the natural Confecjuencc 
 of that Efltpcc ; it is plain, tliat the Eflence of Matter is dfflroycd, and its 
 ejjsntial Propci tits changed in moil of the fenfiblc parts of this our Syftcm ; 
 For 'ris vifibic. thit all the Pla.ic: shave Revolutions about certain remote 
 Gcnrtrr, which 1 wou.d have any one explain, or mak? cor.c;.i?iblt by tlic 
 
 bare 
 
Extent of Humane Knowledge. i^^ 
 
 fcare Effence or nataral Powers depending on the Eflcnce of Matter in gene- 
 ral, whithout fomething added to that Effence, which we cannor conceive ; 
 for the moving of Matter in a crooked Line, or the attradion of Matter by 
 Matter, is all that can be faid in the Cafe j either of which, it is above our 
 Reach to derive from the EflTence of Matter or Body in general j though one 
 of rhefe two mull unavoidably be allowed to be faperadded in this inftance 
 to the Eflcnce of Matter in general. The Omnipotent Creator advifed noc 
 with us in the making of the World, and his ways are not the lefs Excellent, 
 becaufe they are pall our finding our; 
 
 In the next place, the vegetable part of the Creation is not doubted, to be 
 wholly Material ; and yet he that will look into it, will obferve Excellencies 
 and Operations in this prt of Matter, which h* will not find contained in the 
 Efleace of Matter in general, nor be able to conceive how they can be pro- ' 
 daced by if. And will he therefore fay. That the Eflence of Matter is de- 
 ftfoyed in them, becaufe they have Properties and Operations not contained 
 in the EfTential Properties of Matter as Matter, nor explicable by the Effence 
 of Matter in general ? 
 
 Let us advance one ftep farther, and we fliall in the Animal World meet 
 with yet greater Perfeftions and Properties no ways explicable by the Effence 
 •f Matter in general. If the Omnipotent Creator had not fuperadded to the 
 Earth, which produced the irrational Animals, Qualities far furpaffingthofe ■ 
 of the dull dead Earth, out of which they were made Life, SenCcy and fpon- 
 tancous Motion, nobler Qualitiee than were before in it, ic had ftill remained 
 rude fenfelefs Matter j and if to the Individuals of each Species, he bed not 
 fuperadded a power of Propagation, the Species had periflied v/nh thofe In- 
 dividuals : But by thefe Effences or Properties of each Species, fuperadded 
 te the Matter which they were made of, 'the Effences of Properties of Mat- 
 ter in general were not deftroyed or changed, any more than any thing that 
 was in the Individuals before, was deftroyed or changed by the Power of 
 Generation, fuperadded to them by the firft Benediction of the Almighty, 
 In all fuch Cafes, the fuperinducement of greater Perfeiftions and nobler 
 Qualities, deftroys nothing of the Effence or Perfedions that were there 
 before; unlcfs there can be flicwed a manifeft RepugnaiTcy between them ; 
 bat all the Proof offered for that, is only. That we cannot conceive ho\v 
 Matter, without fuch fuperadded Pcrfedtions, can produce fuch Effeds ; 
 which is, in truth, no more than to fay. Matter in general, or every part 
 of Matter, as Matter has. them not ; but is no Reafon to prove, that God, 
 if be pleafes, cannot fuperadd them to fome parts of Matter, unlefs it can 
 be proved to be a Contradidion, that God ihould give to fomc parts of Mat- 
 ter, Qualities and PerfeSioBS, which Matter in general has not j though 
 we cannot conceive how Matter is invefted with them, or how it operates 
 by vertue of thofe new Endowments. Nor is it to be wondcr'd that we 
 cannot, whilft we limit all its Operations to thofe Qualities it had before, 
 and would explain them, by the known Properties of Matter in genera!, 
 without any fuch fuperinduccd Perfedions. For if this be a right Rule of 
 Reafoning, to deny a thing to be, becaufe we cannor conceive the manner 
 how ic comes to be : I Ihail dcfirc them who ule it^ to Hick to this Rule, 
 
 i- 3 - and ' 
 
14'^ Exte)9t of Humane Knowledge, 
 
 and fi-e what Work it will make both in Divinity, as well as Philofophy ; 
 and wlicrhtr they can advance any thing more in (i\QMr o( See ft icifm ? 
 
 l'i)r to keep within the prtfenr Subjeft of the Power of Thinking and 
 Self-morion, bcllow'd by Omnipotent Power on fome Farts of Matter: 
 The Obj.ction to this is, I cannot conceive how Matter fhould Think : 
 Whar \s the- Conllquence ? E.rgo, God cannot give it a Power to Think. 
 Let this ftand for a good Rcafon, and then proceed in other Cifes by the 
 fame You cannot coHceivc how Matter can attrafl Matter at any. di- 
 flincc, much Icfs at the diftancc of loooooo Mile» ; Ergo, God cannot 
 give it fuch a Power ; you canilot conceivt how Matter fhould feel, or 
 move it felf, or affcft an I m material Being, or be moved by it : Erge, 
 God cannot give it fuch Power?, whirh i» in effcft to deny Gravity and the 
 Rcviilurions of the Planets about the Sun ; to make BrotcJ mter Michitics 
 Without Scnfe or fpontaneous Motion, and to allow Man neither Scnfe nor 
 voluntary Motion. 
 
 Le- us apply this Rule one degree farther. You cannot conceive how an 
 extended folid Subrtance fhould think, therefore G-id cannot make it thirik ; 
 Can you conceive how your own Soul, or any Subfianec, thinks ? You And 
 indeed that you do think, and (b do I ; but I want to be told how the A- 
 flion of Thinking is pcrfornscd : This, I confefs, is beyond my Conceptiort; 
 arid I would be g'ad any one, who conceives it, would cxpla n it to me, 
 G^d, I find, has given me this Faculty j and fincc I cannot but be convinced 
 of hi': Power in this [nflaice, which though I every moment experiment in 
 my (elf, ycr cannot conceive the manner cf ; what would it be icfs thati an 
 infolent Abfurdity, to deny his Power in other like Caf<s, ortly for this Rca- 
 fon, becaufo 1 cannot conceive the manner bow ? 
 
 To expla n this Matter a little faVtlicr. God ha5 created' a Subftance ; let 
 it bf, for (.xample, a fohd extended Subftance, Is God bound to give ic 
 belides Being, a Power of Adioo ? Thar, I think, no Body will fay : He 
 tlnciefore msy leave it in a fta;e ot Tna^iviry, and it will be neverthelefs a 
 Subftancc j for Adiion is not neceffjfy to the Being of any Subftancc that 
 God does create : God has likewise created and made to cK\l\^de novc,an inl- 
 materi-al Sobftance, which will not lofc its Being of a Subftance,. though God 
 lliould bcftow on it nothing more but this bare Being, without givii^g-ic 
 a'ny Aflivity ar glj. Here are now two diftmfl Subftance?-, the one Marefial; 
 the other Immaterial, both in a jlare of perfcd Inaiflivity. Now f Ssfc', 
 What Power God can give to oneofthcfe Subl?anccs( r.?ppnfing them t6 
 retain the fame diftinft Natures, that they had as Subflances in their ftattedf 
 Inaftivity ) which he cannot give to the other? In that ftate, 'tis plain, 
 neither nf them thinks-; for Thinking biing an AiSion, it cannot be denied, 
 that God can put an end to any Aftmn of any created Snbftance, withoo? 
 annihilating of the Subftancc whcilof ir is an A<5lion ^ and if it be fl>, h<? 
 can ttlfij create or give Exiflence to fuch a Siibftanco, wirhcar giving that* 
 Subftancc any AiHion at all. By t7-,c fame Reafon it i^ phh, that neither 
 of them can move it felf: Now, I w'ouid a^k, why Orfinipo'cncy cannct 
 give to cither of thcfe SubiTanccs, which arc equally in a ftate of pwFcfl' 
 (nictivity, the fame Pcm'cr, rliat it'bsrti'give to the other ? Let it bt for 
 * ■ Exjmple, 
 
Extent of Humane Knowledge, 147 
 
 Example, that of fpotitancous or Sdf-motioo, which is a Power that 'tis 
 foppos'd God can giv* to an unfolld Subftatice, but denied that he can give 
 to a folld Subftance. 
 
 If it be asked, Why they limit the Ommpotency of God, jo reference to 
 the one rather than the other of ohc Subftances ? All that can be faid to 
 it is, That they cannot conceive, how the folid Subftance fliould ever ba 
 able to move it felf. And as little, fay I, are they able to conceive how a 
 created unfolid Subftance (honld move it felf: But there may be fomething 
 in an immaterial Sobfliance, that yoa do not Itnow. I grant it j and m a 
 material one too: For EKample, Gravitation o£ Matter towards Matter, and 
 in the feveral Proportions obf«rvable, me\'itably (hews, that there is fome- 
 thing in Matter that w^ do not underftand, unlefs we can conceive Self- 
 motion in Matter ; or an incKplicable and inconceivable AttraiSion in Matter, 
 at Jmmenfe and almoil incomprehcnfible Diflances ; It muli therefore be * 
 confcflcd, that there is fomething in folid, as well as unfolid Subftances, 
 that we do not underftand. But this we know, that they may each of them 
 have their diftin£l BeingSi without any Aj^iVity fuperadded to them, unlefs 
 yotj will deny, That God* can take from any Being its Powtr of A^Sting, 
 which 'tis probable will be thought too prefumptuous for any one to do j 
 and I fay, it is as hard to conceive Sdf-motion in a created immaterial as in a 
 jffiaterial Being, confider it hovr you will : And therefore this is no Reafon 
 to deny Omnipotency to be able to give a Power of Self motion to a ma- 
 terial Subftance, if he plcafes, as well as toan immaterial ; fioce neither of 
 them can have it jfrom themfelves, nor can we conceive how it can be in ei- 
 ther of them. 
 
 The fame is vifible in the other Operation of Thinking ; both thefe Sub- 
 ftances may be made, and exift without Thought ; neither of i hem I aa, 
 or can have the Power of Thinking from it fcif : God may give it to ei- 
 ther of them, according to the good Pleafui-e of lus Omnipotency ; and 
 in which ever of theni it j», it is equally beyond our Capacity co coiKtive, 
 how either of thofe Subftances thinks. But for that Reafon, to deny that 
 Gad, who had Power enough to give them both a Being out of nothing, 
 can by the fame Omnipotency give them what other Powers a.nd Ferfeitu 
 ons he pleifes, has no better a Foundation than to deny his Power of Cre- 
 ation, becaufe we cannot conceive how it i? performed j and there at laft 
 this way of Reafoning muft terminate. 
 
 That Omnipotency cannot make a Subftance to be folid and not folid at 
 . ithe fame time, I think, with due Reverence, we may fay j but that a folid 
 Subftance may not have Qualities, Pcrfeftions and Powers, which have no 
 natural- or viliblyrteccflary Connexion with Solidity and Extenfion, is too 
 much for us ( who are but of Yefterday and luiow nothing ) to be pofirive 
 in. It God cannot join things together by Connexions inconceivable to us, 
 we muft deny even the Confiftency, and Being of Matter it fdf; fince e- 
 very Particle of it having feme Bulk, has its Parts conneSed by ways in- 
 conceivable to uf. So that all the Difficulties, that are raifed againft the 
 Thinking of Matter from our Ignorance or narrow Conceptions, ftand not 
 at all in the way of the Power of God, if he pleafes to erdain it fu j nor 
 
 L 4 proves' 
 
148 Extent of Humane Knowledge. 
 
 proves any thing againrt his having afluallf endued fome parcels of Marten 
 fo difpoffd as he thinks fir, a Faculty of Thinking, till it can be flicwni 
 that it contains a ContraHiftion to fuppofe it. 
 
 Though ro me Senfation be comprehended under Thinkijig Jn general, yet 
 in the tbregoing Difcourfc, I have fpolwr of Senfc in Brutes, as diftjndi 
 from Thinking. Bccaufc your Lordfhip.as I rtmember, fpeaks of Senfe in 
 Brutes. But htre I take liberty to obfcrve.That your Lordfhip allows Brutes 
 to have Senfation, it will follow, either that Cod can and dorh give to fome 
 • parcels of Matter a Power of Perception and Thinking ; or that all Animals 
 nave immiterial, and cenfequently, according to your LordHiip, immortal 
 Souls, as well as Men; and to fay that Fleas and Mites, ^^ have immor- 
 tal Souls as well as Men, will pofljbly be looked on, as going a great way 
 to ferve an Hypothcfis. 
 
 I have been pretty large in making this Matter plain, that they who are 
 fo forward to beftuw hard Cenfures or Names on the Opinions of chofe 
 whofe differ from them, may confidcr whether fometimes they are not more 
 due to rhcir own : And that they may be perfuaded a little to temper that 
 Heat, which fuppofing the Truth in their current Opinion, gives them ( as 
 they think ) a Right to lay what Imputations they pleafc on tbofe who 
 would fairly examine the Grounds they ftand upon. For talking with a Sup- 
 pofition and Infinuations, that Truth and Knowledge, nay and Religion too, 
 flands and falls with their Syftems ; is at bcft bnt an imperious way of beg- 
 ging the QueftioD, and alTuming to thcmfelves, under the pretence of Zeal 
 for the Caufe of God, a Title to Infallibility. It is v?ry becoming that 
 Men's Zeal for Truth fliould go as far as their Proofs, but not go for Proofs 
 themfclve5. He that attacks received Opinions with any thing Uit fair Ar- 
 gamenis, may, I own, be juflly fufpe^ted not to mean well, nor to be led 
 by the Love of Truth ; but the fame may be faid cf him too, who fo de- 
 fends them. An Error is not the better for being common, nor Truth ths 
 vorfc for havirg lain neglefied : At^ if it were put to the Vote any-wher? 
 in the World, 1 doubt, as things are managed, whether Truth would have 
 the Majority, at leaf}, wbilft the Authority of Men, and not the examina* 
 tion of Things muft be its Meafure. The imputation oi Sctptidfm and thofc 
 broad Infinuations, to render what I have writ fufpe£i«d, ib fre<}uent as^if 
 thar were the great Bufinefs of all this Pa ns you have been at about me, ~ 
 has made mc fay thus much my Lord, rather as my Senfe of the way tp 
 eftabiifh Truth in its full Force and Beauty, than that I think the Wprld 
 will need to have any thing faid to it, to make it dittinguifh between your 
 Lordlliip's and my Dcfign 10 Writing, which therefore I fccurely leave to 
 the Judgment of the Reader, and return to the Argiimcnr in Hand. 
 
 What I have above faid, I take to be a full Anf^er to all that your 
 
 LoidlTiip would infer from my Idea of Matter, of Liberty, 
 
 * I Anf and from the ro\w«er of Abilra^ing. You ask, * How can 
 
 p. 7 J. T/iy Idea of Libt^ty agrte vi(b tbf Ide* that Btdtes can 
 
 operatt only by Aiotian aad Impulfi ? Av[-». By the Omoi- 
 
 t F.tTay B. 1. potency of God , who can make all rhiogs agree , that 
 
 Ch. 8. §. II. involve not a Contradidion. 'Tis true, I fay, t That 
 
 Scdio 
 
Extent of' Humane Knowledge, 149 
 
 «' Bodies operate by impulfe, and notking clfe. And fo I thougfit when I 
 writ it, and yet can conceive no other way of their Operation. But 
 I am fince convinced by the Judicious Mr. Newton's incomparable Book, 
 that 'lis too bold a Prefumption to limit God's Power in this Point, by 
 my-flarrow Conceptions, The Gravitation of Matter, towards Matter, 
 byways unconceivable tome, is not only a Demon flratlon that God can, 
 if he plea(e8, pat into Bodies, Powers, and ways of Operation, above 
 what can be derived from our Idea of Body, or can be explained by what 
 we know of Matter, but alfo an unqueftionable and every-where vifible 
 Inftance, that he has done Co. And therefore in the next Edition of my 
 Book, I fhall take care to have that Paffage re£lified. 
 
 As to Se Iff cenfcioujnefs, your Lordftiip ask, ■\ What is \ i. AnC 
 there like Self-Con jcmufnefs in Matter! Nothing at all in P. 74. 
 Matter as Matter. But that God cannot beftow on forae 
 parcels of Matter a Power of Thinking, and with it Self-confcicufnefi 
 will never be proved by asking, * How it is p-jfble to 
 apprehend that meer Body fhould perceive that it doth *• ibid, 
 perceive ? The Weaknefs of our Apprehenfion I grant in 
 the Cafe: I confefs as much as yoa pleafe , that we cannot conceive 
 how a folid, no, nor how an unfolid created Subftance thinks ; but this 
 Weaknefs of our Apprehenfions, reaches not the Power of God, whofe 
 Weaknefs is flrongerthan any thing in Men. 
 
 Your Argument from Abflradion, wc have in this Quefti- * i- Anfur. 
 on, * If it may be in the Tower of Matter to think, how p. 7^, 
 (omes it to be jo impejfihle for fu$h organized Bodies as the 
 Brutes have, tq enlarge their Ideas by j^bftraElion'i j^nfw. This feems 
 to fflppofe, that I place Thinking within the natural Power of Matter. 
 Jf that be your Meaning, my Lord, I neither fay, nor fuppofe, that all 
 Matter has naturally in it a Faculty of Thinking, but the diredi contrary. 
 Bat if you mean that certain parcels of Matter, ordered by the Divine 
 Power, as fcems fit to him, may be made capable of receiving from his 
 Omnipotency the Faculty of Thinking; that indeed I fay, and that being 
 granted, the Anfwer to your Queftion is eafy, fince if Omnipotency can 
 give Thought to any folid Subftance, it is not hard to conceive, thac 
 God may give that Faculty in an higher or lower Degree, as it pl^afts 
 him, who knows what Pifpofition of the Subjeft is fuited to fuch a parti- 
 cular way or degree of Thinking. 
 
 Another Argument to prove. That God cannot endure any parcel qf 
 Matter with the Faculty of Thinking, is taken from thofe 
 Wo^ds of mine, * where I fbew, by what Connexion of * i. Let. 
 Ideas we may come to know. That God is an Immaterial p. 1 35, 
 Subftance. They are thefe, ' ' The Idea of an eternal adual, 
 *' knowing Being, with the Idea of Immateriality, by the intervcation of 
 ' ^ the Idea of Matter, and of its aSual DiviQon, Divifibiliry SHd want of 
 • ' Perception, &e. From whence your LordQiip thus argues, 
 t Here the want of Perception is owned to be fo sjfentiat f z. Anfir. ' 
 i9 Ai^ttir, (hat Qod is therefore (QWludeti tn be Jmmatit'^^ j>, 77. 
 
 ri*l' 
 
I JO ExteMt of Humane K}wwle^^€. 
 
 rial, jfiifa.' Perception and Knowledge In that one Etcrni? Being, 
 wlierc it has its SoDrcc, 'tis vifible mult be cfTcntially infeparable , 15 
 net Matter ; How fir this nukes the want of Peraptim an ejfenttal Pri' 
 ferty of AUttcr, I will not difputc; it fufficcs that it flicws, That Pcr- 
 ctption is nor an cfTeiitial Property of Martcr ; and therefore Matter ear- 
 not be that eternal original Being, to which Perception and Knowledge is 
 eflcntial. Mut'cr, 1 fay, naturally is withoat Perception : Ergo, fays your 
 Lordfliip, w»nt of Perception U an ejfenttal Property of Matter, and'God 
 docs no! change the epHtial Properties of things^ their bTatH>e remaining. 
 From whence you infer. That God cannot beftow on any parcel of Matter 
 (the Nature of Matter I emaining )a Faculty of Thinking Ifthc Rulesof 
 Logick fince my days be not changed, I may fafcly deny this Confcquence. 
 For an Argument that runs thus, Go^ does not-, Ergo, he cannot, I was 
 taught when I came firft to the Univcrfity, wnold not hold. For I never 
 fttid God did. But * " That I fee no Contradiflioo in if, 
 
 * B. 4. C. " that he rtiould, if he plcaftd, to give fome Syftcms of 
 5. § 6. *' fenfleis Matrcr.a Faculty of Thinkingjand I know no Body, 
 
 before Des Canes, that ever pretended to fhew that there 
 was any ContradiQionin i^. So that at worft, my not being able to fee in 
 Matter any Hich Ircapacity, as makes it impoffible for Omnipotency to 
 bcilowonit a Fjculry tf Thinking, makes me oppofiteonly to the Carte- 
 Cun?, For as far as I have fcen or heard, the Fathers of the Chriftian Church 
 never pretended to dcmonftrate that Matter, was incapable to receive a 
 Power of Senfation, Perception and Thinking, from the Hand of the omni- 
 potent Creator. Let Us therefore, ifyoupleafc, fuppofe the Form of yotn* 
 Argumentation right, and that your Lordfhip mean?, God cannot : And 
 th:n if your Argument be good, it proves. That God conld not give to 
 Bitahm', Afsa l^ower to fpeak to his Mafter as he did, for the want of ra- 
 tional Difcourftf, being natural to that Species, 'risbnt for your Lorddiip to 
 call ic an E[fentiat Property, anH then God cannot change the Effenti at Pro- 
 perties of things, their Nature remaining'. Whereby it is provetf, That God 
 cannot with all his Omnipotency, give to an Afs a Power to fpeak as 
 -Balaam's did. 
 
 You fay, f my Lord, you da not fet Bounds f» God's Qm* 
 
 + I. Anf. nhotency. For he may if he pleaje change a Body tnto an 
 p. 78, himaterial Siil>f}ance, i. e. take away from a Subftance the 
 
 S-^lidity which it had before, and which made it Matter, and 
 then give it a Faculty of thinking which it had not before, and which makes 
 it a Spirit.^the fame Subftaoc'e remaining. For if the fame Subftance re- 
 mjins not, Body, is not changed into av immaterial Subjfance, But the 
 folid Subflarrcc and all belonging to it is Annihilated, and an Immaterial 
 tiubflance Created, w>hich is not change df one thing into another, but the 
 <ic(lroymg of one, and making ano'her de novo. In this change therefore 
 ofaBodyor Material Subllancc into an Immaterial, let us obfervc rhofe 
 dilljnvit Confidcrarions. 
 
 Firft, yon, fay, God may if Pe pleafcs take awiy from a folid Subftance 
 Schdity, whichisthat which raa'kts iti Mafcrial SubJtancc or JSfl.Vy ; and 
 
 may 
 
Extent of Humane Knowledge, i^i 
 
 -may make it an Immaterial Subftance, i.»e. a Subftance without Solidity. 
 Bat this Privation of one Quality gives it not aoother ; the bare taking 
 away a lower or icfs- Noble Quality does not give it an Higher or Nobler; 
 that muftbcthc Gift of God. For the bare Privation of one, and a meaner 
 Qaality cannot be the Pofition of an Higher and better : unlefs any one 
 will fay, that Cogitation, or the Power of thinking, refirlts from the Na- 
 xnre of Subftance it felf ; which if it do, then wherever there is Subilance, 
 there muft be Cogitation, or a Power of thinking. Here then, upon your 
 Lordftiip's own Principks is zn Immateriat Subflance withoot the Faculty 
 of thinking. 
 
 In the next place, yduwill nor deny, but God may give to this Subftance, 
 thus deprived of Solidity, a Faculty of thinking ; for you fuppafe it made 
 capable of that by being made Immaterial, whereby • you allow, that the 
 feme numerical Subftance may be fometimes: wholly Incogitarive^ or without 
 a power of thinking, and at other jimcs perledtly Cogitative, or indued 
 «rith a Power of thinking. 
 
 Further, you will not deny, bur Gt)d can give it Solidity and make it 
 Material again. For I conclude it will not be denied, that God can make 
 it again, what it was before. Now I crave leave to ask your Lordfhip, why 
 God having given to this Subftance the Faculty of thinking after Solidity 
 was taken from it, cannot reftorc to it Solidity again, without taking away 
 the Faculty of thinking. When you have rcfolved this my Lord, yon will 
 have proved it impoffibie for God's Omnipotence to give to a Sohd Subftance 
 a;FacuIty of thinkings but till then, not having proved ic impoillble, and yet 
 dertying that God can db it, is to deny that he can do, whaiiisin it felf poffi- 
 bJs; which' as I hwmbiy conceive is vifibly to fe( Boundf t^'A '-•;. •.. 
 God'sOmniptt7iey,. tlixoxx'gh yon (z^ here, -^ you do wfff /e^ "t^" AnCp. 78. 
 Bound's to God's Omnipotency, ,•/-',,;,,- 
 
 Iflfhouid imitate your Lordfliip'tf way of Writinj^,- I fljoirW not omic 
 t6 bring in Epicurus here, and take notice that this was his Way, Deum 
 vsrhir fonert, rettllere. And then add, that / am certain you do not thiitk 
 he f>y emoted the great ends of Religion and Morality, For 'tis with fuch 
 Candid and Kind InfinuafionE, as theft, that you bring in 
 hofti tloHeSt t and 5]5;K£r/» * Into your Difcourlis hereabout f i. AoC 
 God's being able, ifhe pleafe, to give to fome parcels of p. j-f. 
 Matter ordered as he thinks fit, a Faculty of thinking, Nei- *Ib. p. 79, 
 Cher of thofe Authors having, as appears by anyPaflages' 
 yoa bring ourof them,'faid any th:ng to this QJieftion, nor having, ssik. 
 fiefflia, any other bufinefs here, but by their Names skilfolly to give that 
 Character to my Book, with which you would recommend it to the 
 World. ■ ■: . . , . ■ ... 
 
 1 pretend nor to enqairff what meafure df Zeal, nor for what, guides your 
 Lordlliip's Pen in fuch^ a way of Writing, as yours has all along been with 
 rrte : Only I caniioc but -confider, what Reputation it would give to the 
 Wt'ieings of the Fathers of the Church, if they Ihould think Truth required, 
 oflVeligion allowed them ro imitate fach Patterns. But. God be thanked 
 A*fe"be tbofe araongft them who do not admire fuch ways «f nanaging the 
 
 Caufe 
 
I J z Extent ef Humane Knowledge. 
 
 Caafc ofTrurh or Religion. Thty being fcnfibJc, that if ewery one, who 
 believes or can prerendhe hai Trurh on his fide, is thereby Authorized witli- 
 out proof, to inlinuate, what ever may fcrve to prejudice Mens Minds agait^ft 
 the other fide, there will be great ravage made on Charity and PradJice, 
 withfHJt any gain to Truth or Knowledge. And that the Lit'crtics frequently 
 taken by Oifputantsto do fo, may have been the caufe that the NVorld In 
 all Ages has rcccired fo much harm, and fo little Advantage from CoDtro- 
 verfies in Religion. 
 
 Thcfe arc the Arguments which your Lord/liip has brought to confute 
 one faying in my Book, by other Piflages in it, which therefore being all 
 but Argumtntm ad Hominem, if they did prove what they do nor. arc of 
 no other ufc, than to gain a Vi(aory over me, a thing methinks fo much 
 heneath yvinr Lordfhip, tliat it docs not ddbrve one of your Pages. The 
 Qncftion ii, whether God can, if he pleafes, bcftow on any pacel of Matter 
 ordered as he thinks tit, a Faculty of Perception and Think- 
 
 * I. Anf. ing. You Uy, * Ttu look upon a Miftake herein i$ be of 
 p, 79. dangerotts Conftt^ueuce^ at to the great ends tf Religion 0nd 
 
 Aloraltty. If this be fo, my Lord, I think one may well 
 wonder, why your Lordllup has brought no Arguments to EftabliQi the 
 Truth itfelf, which Teu look on to be ef fuch dangerous Confequence to be 
 mtflaien in ; but have fpent fo many Pages only in a Perfonal Matter in 
 endeavouring ro (hew. That I had Inconfillences in my Book, which if 
 any fucb thing had been (hewcd.the Quellion would be Hill as far from being 
 decided, and the danger of mifhking about it as little prevented) as if 
 nothing of all this had been faid. If therefore your Lordrfiip's Care of the 
 great ends of Religion and Morality have made Tbu think it necefjary to 
 d«ar this Qucftion, the World has rcafon to conclude there is little to be 
 faid againd that Propofition, which is to be found in my Book ctjncerning 
 the PolVibility, that fome parcels of Matter might be fo ordered by Omni- 
 potence, as to be endued with a faculty of Thinking, if God fo plealed, 
 llr.cc your Lordfhip's Concern for the promoting the great ends of Religion 
 and Morality, has not enabled you to produce one Argument againft a Pro- 
 polition, that yon think of fo dangerous Confequence to them. 
 
 And here I crave leave to oblcrve, That though in your Title' Page yisu _ 
 promifc to prove; that my Notion of Ideas is tnconfifient with it felf, (which 
 jf it were, it could hardly be proved to be inconfiftcnt with any thing elfe, ) 
 and with the Articles of the Chrijfian Faith ; Yet yonr Attempts all along 
 have been to prove me in fome Paflages of my Book inconfiftcnt with my 
 fcif, without having Qicwn any Fropofition in my Book inconfiftent with 
 any Article of the Chn^ian Faith. 
 
 I think, your LordQiip has indeed made ufe of one Argument of yoar 
 
 own : But it is fuch an one, that I confcfs I do not fee how it is apt much to 
 
 promote Religion, cfpecially the Chriftian Religion founded on Revelation. 
 
 I (hall fctdown your Lordfhip's Words, that thoy may be- 
 
 * I. Anf. confidcred, you fay: * That yott are of Opinion, that tht 
 f. S^t 5S' ^^f*^ F-nds of Religion and Morality are Itcji fccared by tht 
 
 M Prcifj ofthcJmnjartality of the ^ohI frtm tti i^^ture and. 
 
 I'ro^ertiHi 
 
Extent of Humane Knowledge. i^j 
 
 Properties ; and which you think prtrues it itmnaten'nl^ TouriLorci/kip does n«f 
 q'tefiion whether God can givt Jtnmortality, to a Material Sut fiance ^ but 
 you fay , it takes oivery muchj'rom the E'videtice of Immortality, if it depend 
 wholly upon God^s giving that, lohich of its own Nature it ss 
 not capable of &c. So Irkewifc you fay, t if ** A/tf» cannot he f z. Anf. 
 certainjbut thai Matter may thtnkQa^ 1 affirm) then -mha: be" p. j?. 
 comet of the Soul's Immateriality {and confequently Immorta' 
 lity ^from its Operation ? But for all this, fay /, his afTurance of Faith rc- 
 mainson its own Bafis. Now you appeal to any Man of Sence^whether the find- 
 ing the uncertainty of his own Principles which he went upon in pint 'of 
 Rsafon, doth not weaken the Credibility of thefe fundamental Articles, when 
 they are confidered purely as Matters of Faith ? For before ^there was a natu- 
 ral Credibility in them on the account of Reafon ; but by going on wrong 
 grounds of Certainty^ all that is loft ^ and' infiead of being Certain, he a 
 more doubtful than ever. And if the Evidence of Faith falis fo much Jhort 
 of that of Reafon, it mufl needs have lefs effeEl upon Mens Minds, when the 
 jSubferviency of Reafon is taken away ; as it mitfi be when the grounds of 
 Certainty by Reafon are vanifhed. Is it at all probable. That he whof.nds 
 his Re'tfon deceive him infuch Fundamental Points, fhould have hit Faith 
 fland firm and unmoveable on the account of Revelation ? For in Matters ef 
 • Revelation, there mufl be fome Antecedent Principles fuppofed before we can 
 believe any thing on the Account of it. 
 
 More to the fame purpofc we have fome Paffages farther, 
 where from fome of ray Words, your Lordfhip fays, * 2o« * lb. p. jy. 
 cannot but obferveXhat we have no Certainty upon mj grounds, 
 that Self'confcioufnefs depends upon an individual Immaterial Subfance, 
 and confequently that a Material Subflance may, according to my Principle:, 
 have Self-confcioufnefs in it j at leafl that I am not certain of the contrary. 
 Whereupon your Lordfhip bids me confider^ whether thisdoth not a little aff'eit 
 the whole Article of the Refurreliion ? What does ail this tend to? But to 
 make the World believe, that I have lefftned the Credibility of the Immorta- 
 lity of the Soul and the Rcfurr€£lion,by faying.That though it bemofthigWy 
 probable,that the Soul is Immaterial.yec upon my Principles it cannot be de- 
 monftrated ; becaufe it is not impolTible to God's Omnipotency,if hepleafes to 
 beftow upon Come parcels of Matter difpofed as he fees fit, a Faculty of thinking. 
 
 This your Accufatlonof my leffening the Credibility of thefe Articles of 
 Faith is founded on this.That the Article of the Immortality of the Soul abates 
 of its Credibility, if it be allowed. That its Immateriality (which itshcfup- 
 pofed Proof from Reafon and Philofophy of its Immortality ) cannot be dc- 
 monftrated from natural Reafon; Which Argument of your Lordfhip*s bot- 
 toms, as I humbly conceive, on this, That Divine Revelation abates of its 
 Credibility in all thofe Articles it propofcs proportionably, as Humane Rea- 
 fon fails to fupport the Teftimony of God, And all that your Lordfhip in 
 ihofo PafTages has faid, when Examined, will I fuppofe be found to import 
 thus much, viz. Does God promife any thing to Mankind to be believed ? 
 It is very fit and credible to be believed, if Reafon can demonftrare it to be 
 iriie. bat if Humane Reafon comes Ihort in the Cafe, and cannot make 
 
15:4 Extent of Ilumine Knowledge. 
 
 Jr our, iu Credibility is thereby lejfencd j which is in effect to fay, That the 
 Veracity otGod is not a firm and furc Foundation of Faith to rely upon, 
 without the cancurrcnt Tcllimony of Rcafon, ;. e. with Reverence be it fpo- 
 kcn, God ig not to be believed on his own VVbrd, unlefs what he reveaJs be 
 in it felf credible, and might be bchvcd without him. 
 
 If this be a way to promote Religion, the Chrillian Religion in all its 
 Articles, 1 am not forry, that it is no: a way to be fouad in any of my 
 Writings, fjr I imagine any thing like this would, (^and I Qiould think 
 dcfi.'rv'd ) to have other Titles than bare Scepticifm bellowed upon ir, and 
 w^uld havcraifcd no i'lnall Out-cry againft any one; who i:> not to be fup- 
 polld to be in the right in all that fays, and fo may fecurtly iliy what he 
 plcafcs. Such as I, the Prophanum f^u/g/u, who take too much upon us, 
 if we would examine, have nothing to do but to hearken and believe, tho* 
 what he faid fliould fubvert th« very Foundations of the Chriftian Faith. 
 
 What 1 have above obferved.is fo vilibly contained in your Lordihip's Ar- 
 gument, That when I met with it in your Anfwcr to my firft Letter.it fetiti'd 
 fb Itrangs from a Man of your Lordiliip's Charadcr, and in a Difpute in 
 defence of the DoQrine of the Trinity, that I could hardly perfwade rny 
 felf, but it was a flip of your Pen : But when I found it in 
 * lAnf. p. your fccond Letter * made ufe of again, and fenouHy en- 
 a8,&zp. larged as an Argument of Weight to be inli(icd upon, I 
 
 was convinced, that it was a Principle, that you heartily 
 embraced, how little favourable foevcr it was to the Artii;I;;s of the Cbri-« 
 ilian Religion, and particularly tho(c which you undertook to defend. 
 
 I defirc ray Reader to perufe the Paffagcs as they /land in your Let- 
 ters themfclves, and fee whether what you fay in them doe* not amount 
 to this. That a Revelation from God is more or lefs credible according as it; 
 has a iironger or weaker Confirmation from Humane Reafon. For, 
 
 I. Your Lordfhip fays, f ^ou do not qttsflion rohttber 
 
 t I Anf. God cangiiJt Im7>iortality to a msterial Subjia}ice ; but you 
 
 p- yy. I fay it takes off very much from the evidence of 1mm or t a- 
 
 lity, if it depends wholly upon Ged's giving that which of 
 
 Its owo Nattire it U not capable of. 
 
 To which I reply, any ones not being able to deraonftratc the Soul to be 
 Imipateri^, takes off not njery much, nor at all from the evidence of its 
 Immortality, if God has revealed, that it (hall be Immortal, becaafc the Ve- 
 racity of God is a Dcmonftration of the Truth of what he has rcv.aled, and 
 the want of another DemonHration of a Propofition, that is demonllrati- 
 vely true, takes not off from the Evidence of it. For where there is a 
 clear Dcmonllratian, there is as much Evidence as any Truth can iiavc, that 
 is not Self-evident. God has revealed that the Souls of Men (hall live for 
 ever. But.fays your LordOiip.fiora thisEvidence it takes oSvcry much if it 
 depends wholly upon Qid's giving tkat^ of its own I7atttre it is not capable 
 of. I. c. The Revelation and Tcllimony of God lofes much of its Evidence, if 
 this depends wholly upon the good Plcafuve of God, and cannot not be de- 
 injaftiat vcly midc out by natoal Reafon, that the Soul is immaterial, and 
 confiqucntly in ics ojrn Niturc immorcal. For ^hit is all that heic jsor can 
 
 be 
 
Epctent of Humane Knoxoleclge. 15^ 
 
 be meant by thefe Words,»J&/f^ tf itt D-mn Naturt it unst capable «/,to make 
 thera to rhe purpofe. For the whole of )o.ir Lordftiip's Difcoiirfe here, is 
 to prove, That the Soul cannot be material, becaufe then the Evidence of 
 its being immortal would be very much lejfenedi Whicli is to fay, That 'tis 
 not as credible upon divine Revelation, that a material Sul^f^ance (hould be 
 hnqjortal, as an immaterial j or which is all one, That God is not equally 
 to be believed, when he. declares, that a material Subftance fhali be immor- 
 tal, as when he declares, that an immaterial fliall be fo, becaufe the Immor- 
 tality of a material Subftance, cannot be demonltrareci from natural Reafon. 
 
 Let HS try this Rule of your Lordfhip's a little farther. God had re- 
 vealed, that the Bodies Men {hall have after the Refnrre<aion, as wcii ajs 
 their Souls, {hail live to Eternity. Docs your Lordflvp believe the eter- 
 nal Life of the one of thefe, more thin of the other, becapfe you think. 
 you can prove it of one of them by natural Reafon, and of the other not ? 
 Or can any one who admits of divide Revelation in the Cafe, doubt ot one of 
 them more than the other ? Or think this Propofuion lefs credibile, the Bo- 
 dies of M^n, afrer the Refurredtion, fhall live for ever ; than this. That the 
 Souls of Men fhall, after the Refurreftion, live for ever ? For that he mtiit 
 do, if he thinks either of them is Icfs credible than the other. If this bs 
 fo, Reafon is to be confulted, how far God is to be believed, and the credit 
 of divine Tcftimony, muft receive its force from the Evidence of lieafon ; 
 which has evidently taken away the credibility ofdivine Revtlatior,in all fu- 
 pcrnatural Truths, wherein the Evidence of Reafon fails. And how much fucli 
 a Principle as this tends to the fupport of theDoSrine of the Trinity, or the 
 promoting theChriftian Religion, I fhall leaveit to your Lordfhip toconfider. 
 
 I am not fo well read in Hobbss or Spinoza, as to be able to fay, what 
 were their Opinions in this Matter. But pofTibly there be thofe, who will 
 think your Lord{hip's Authority of more ufe to them in the Cafe, than thofe 
 juftly decried Names : And be glad to find your Lordfliip a Patron of the 
 Oracles of Reafon, fo little to the Advantage of the Oracles of Divine Reve- 
 lation. This at leaft,I think, may be fubjoined to the Words . ^ ^^ 
 at the bottom of the next Page, f That thofe who have ^ 
 
 gone about to leflen the Credibility of Articles of Faith, 
 which evidently they do, who fay they are lefs credible, becaufe they cannor 
 be made out demonftratively by Natural Reafon, have not been thought to 
 fccure fevcral of the Articles of the Chriftian Faith, cfpccially thofe of tlw 
 Trinity, IncMrnation, and RtfurreBton of the Body, which are rhofc upon 
 the account of which I am brought by your Lordfhip into this Difpute. 
 
 I fhall not trouble the Reader with* your Lordftup's Endeavours in ths 
 following Words, to prove, That if the Soul be not an immaterial Sub» 
 fiance, it can be nothing but Life ; your very firft Words vilibly confuting 
 all that you alledge to that purpofe. They are, * // 
 the Soul he a material Subjlance, it is really nothijsg but ^ '! Anf. 
 Life^ which is to fay, That if the Soul be really- a Srtb- p.j;. 
 fiance, it is not really a Subjiajtce, but rea!i^' nothing elfe 
 but an afftft.on of a Subflance ; for the Life, wht-ther ofa mirerial cr -Iw- 
 maceriil Subllancc, is not the Subdance it frlf^ but an afftClion of--T. 
 
1^6 Extent dJ Humane Knowledge. 
 
 2. You Uy, * AlthtHgh we think the feparat! Staff «f 
 * I Anf, the Soul after Death, is fufficiently revealed in the Scrip- 
 p. 57. tnre ; yet it creates a great difficulty m undcrftandmg it, if 
 
 the Soul be nothing but Life, or a material Snbftance, which 
 muji be diffolved when Life ii indid. For if the Soul be a material Sub- 
 fianC€, it musl be made up, as ethers are, of the Cohe/ion ef folid and feparate 
 Parts, how minute and tnvifible foever they be. And what ii it which 
 Jbould keep them together, when Life it gone ? So that it it no eajji matter 
 JO give an Account, how the Soul fJtould be capable of Immortality, unlefs 
 tt be an immaterial Subflance ; and then we know the Solution and Ttx- 
 turt ef Bodies cannot reach the Soul, being of a different Nature. 
 
 Ler ir be as hard a matter, as it will, togive an /Account what it it, 
 , that fhould keep the Parts »f a material Soul together, after it is fep:rjted 
 from the Body j yet it will be always as eafy to give an Account of" ir, as to 
 jiuoutit what it u which fl:all hep together a material and imicaterial 
 Subftancc. And yet the Difficulty that there is to givean Account of that, 
 1 hope docs nor, with yoUr Lordfliip, weaken the Credibility of the inftpa- 
 lable Union of Soul and Body to Eternity : And 1 pcrfwade my felf, that the 
 Men of Senfe, lo whom your Lordiliip appeals in the Cafe, do nor, fiud their 
 btiicf of this Fundamtntal Point, much weakened by that difnculty. I 
 thought heretofore ( and by your Lordfhip's l^crmiflion, would think fo 
 flill ) that the Union of Parts of Matter, one with another, is as much in 
 the Hands of Cod, as the Union of a material and immaterial SubAance ^ 
 and that is docs not take off'vtry much, or at all, from the Evidenft of 
 Jmmortaltiy, which depends on that Union, that it is no eafy matter t» 
 give an jitconnt what tt is that (hould keep them together : Though its dt- 
 f ending whoUy upon the Gift- and fjod Pleajure of God, white the manner 
 creates great difficulty in the Under ^anding, and our Reafon cannot discover 
 in the Nature of things, how it is, be that which your Lcrdfhip fb pofitiirc- 
 ly fays leffens the Credibility ef the Fundamental Articles of the Refurre- 
 if ion and Immortality. 
 
 But, my Lord, to remove this Objeflion a little, and to fhew of howr 
 fmall Force jc is even with your fclf ; give rac leave to prcfurac, That your 
 Lordfliip as firmly believes the Immortality of the Body after the Refur- 
 iwStion, as any other Article of Faith : Iffu, then it being no eajy Matier 
 to give an yiccount, what ^it ii that fh all keep together the Parrs cif a mate-" 
 rial Soul, to one that believes it is material, can no more weaken the Cre- 
 dibility o( ns Immoruhty, than the like, difficulty wtakcns the Credibili- 
 ty of the Immortality of the Body. For when your Lordfhip dull rind jt an 
 t/*fe Matter to give an Mcount, what it is befidts the good Pleafure of 
 God, which fl}aU keep together the Farts of our muerial Bodies to Eter- 
 nity, or even Soul and Body ; I doubt not but any one, who ihall think the 
 Soul material, will alfo find it as e^Jie to give an Account, what it is that 
 ilull keep thofe Parts of Matter alio together to Eternity. 
 
 Were it not that the Warmth of Controverfy is apt to make Men fo ftr 
 forger, as to take up thofe Principles thcmfclvts ( when they will fcrve their 
 \u>i) ) which (biy have h'ghly cundwinucd ia ucbcii 5, I fliould wcndcr 10 find 
 
 your 
 
Extent 6f Humane Knowle^Igs. -. '5^/ 
 
 four Lord/hip to argue, that becanfe it is a ^iflScultv to un^erjiand vhstt 
 /hould keep together the minute Parts of a material t<tul, •mhev LiU if go^^ ♦ 
 and becaulc it ts not an tape matter t-i give an A:coitnt how the Soiu /hould 
 be eapabk of Immortality, unltfs it be an unmaterial ^hfiana ; Tlurcfore 
 it is HOC fo credible as lixt were eafy to give an Account by Natural Realon, 
 ho^n it could be, ■ For to this ic is, rhac allth.siyour Difcourfe tends as is 
 evi<icnt by whac is already fee down outof Page ss 4 'tnd will be more mUy 
 made ouc by what your Lordfhip iiys in other place?, though there needs 
 no.fuch Proofs, fin ce it would all be nothing againlt me in auy other SeniCo 
 
 I thought your Lordflaip had in other pbces aflerted, and infUkd on thii 
 Truth, That no part ot Divine Revelation, was the 'tis to be believed, be- 
 caufctbe thing it k\i created great difficulty in the Undsrflandtrg, and the 
 manner of it was hard to beexplained y and it was no eafie matter to gfje 
 an Account how it was. This, as I take it, your Lordfliip condemned la 
 others, as a very unlrearpnable Principle, and fuch as would fubvert all the 
 Articles of the Chriftian Religion, that w?re mere matters of Faith, as I 
 think it will : And is icpofljble, that you (hould make ufe of it here youff 
 felf, againft the Article of Lije and Immortality ^ that Chrift hath brought 
 to light ihrough the Gofpel i and neither was, not could be made ouc by 
 Natural Reafon without Revelation ? But you will fay, you fpeak only of 
 the Soul J and your Words are. That it ii no *afy matter to gi've an Ac- 
 count how the Souljhould he capable of Jmtnortaltty, unlefs it be an imma- 
 terial Subjlance, I grant it; but crave leave to fay. That there is not 
 anyone of thofe Difficulties, that are, or c»n be raifed about the manner 
 hov a material Soul can be iinmortal, which do not as well reach the Im- 
 mortality of the Body. , . . . 
 
 But if it were not fo, I am fure this Principle of your Lordfiiip*s would 
 reach other Articles of Faith, iii|erein our natural Reafon finds it not to 
 ealie to give an Account how tnofe Myfteries are: And which therefore, 
 according to your Principles, mnft be lefs credible, than other Articles; 
 Xh^t create lefs difficulty to the UnderHandiyig, For you c 
 Lordfhip fays, * That you appeal to any Man of Senfe, * a And 
 whether to a Man who thought by his Principles, he could p. 2.8. 
 from naiural Grounds demonftrate the Imtiiortality ofiba 
 §oul, the finding the uncertainty ef thofe Principles hewetit upon in point of 
 Reafon, i.e. the finding he could not certainly provu it by natural Reafoh, 
 doth not weaken the credibility of that fundamental Article, when it it 
 confidered purely as a Matter of Faith ?, Which in effect, I humbly con-^ 
 ceive, amounts to this, That a Propofitlon divinely revealed, that cannot, 
 be proved by natural Reafon, is lefs credible than oue that can ; Which 
 feems to me to come very little Inort of chis, with due reverence be ic 
 fpo'ktn, That God is lefs to be belitvcd when he affirms a Propolition, 
 that cannot be provert by natural Reafoo, than when he propofes wliat caii 
 be proved by it. The dire£t contrary to which is my Ofi- 
 nioiv, though you endeavour to make good, by tfufe f 1- f z Anf. 
 lowing Words, f Ifthi evidence of Faith falls f much p, i5>. 
 fkort of that of Reafon, it mufiiteedi havt left effeHupan 
 
 Vol!. II, M */f^f 
 
1^8 Extent of Hnmane Knowledge, 
 
 Mens Minds, when the Huhferviency of Reafon it tsken svMy • as it niuft 
 tf wktn tht Ground} of Certainty by Reafon are vantfhed. Is it at af/ prO'* 
 bable, that he who finds his Reafon deceive him m fueh fundamental 
 Points, fliotild have hi* Faith {land firm and unmoveable on the Account of 
 RtveLttion ? Than which I rhink there arc hardly pliiner Wordi to be 
 found out to declare, that the Credibility of God's Ttflimony depends on 
 the natural Evidence or Probability of the things we receive from Revela- 
 tion ; and cifcs and falls with it : A/id that the Truths of God, or the Ar- 
 ticles of mccr Faith, lofe fo much of their Credibility, as they want Proof 
 from Reafon : Which if tru«,' Revelation may come to have no Credibility 
 at all. For if in this prcfcnt Cafe, the Credibility of this PropofitJon, 
 The Souls of Mcnfhall live forever, revealed in Scripture, be leflcned by 
 conf iTing it cannot be dcmonftratively proved from Reafon ; though it be 
 alTcrted to be m oft highly probable: Muft not by the fame Role its Credi- 
 bility dwindle away to nothing, if natural Reafon (Could not be able to 
 make it out to be fo much as probable ; or fliould place the probability 
 from natural Principles on the other fide ? For if mecr want of Demonftra^ 
 tion lejfcns the Credibility of any Piopofition divinely revealed, muft not 
 want of Probability, or contrary Probability from natural Reafon, quite 
 take away its Credibility? Here at laft it muft end, if in any one Cafe 
 the Veracity of God, and the Credibility of the Truths we receive from 
 him by Revelation, be fubjeftcd to the VerdiSi of Humane Reafon, and 
 be allowed to receive any Acceflion or Diminution from other Proofs, or 
 want of other Proofs of its Certainty or Probability. 
 
 If this be your Lordfliip's way to promote Religion or defend its Arti* 
 cles, I know not what Argument the greateft Encmici of it could u(e more 
 effedual for the Subvcrfion of thofe you ^ve undertaken to defend, this 
 being to refolve all Revelation perfectly aiH|iurely into Natural Reafon, to 
 bound its Credibility by that, and leave no Room for Faith in other things, 
 than what can be accounted far by Natural Reafon without Revelation, 
 
 Your Lordfliip f infifts much upon it, as if I had con- 
 t I Anf. tradiQed what I had faid in my EJfay, * by faying, That 
 p. +8. ' — !4. «pon my Principles it cannot be dcmonftratively proved, 
 * B. 2.C. that it is an immaterial Subftance in us that ThinJis, how- 
 aj. ever probable it be. He that will be at the J^aius td.rcad 
 
 that Chapter of mine, and confider it, will find, that my 
 Bufinefs there was to ftiew, that it was no harder to conceive an immate- 
 rial than a material Subftance ; and that from the Ideas of Thought, and 
 and a Power of moving of Matter, which \vc experienced in our fclvcf^ 
 ( Ideas originally not belonging to Matter as Matter ) there was no more 
 difficulty to conclude there was an immaterial Subftance in us, than that 
 wc had material Parts. Thcfe Ideas of Thinking, and Power of moving 
 of Matter, I in another place ftiew'd did dcmonftratively lead us to the 
 certain knowledge of the exiftcncc of an immaterial Thinking Being, in 
 whom wc have the Idea of Spirit in the ftridleft Scnfe ; in which Scnfc I 
 alia applied it to the Soul, in that ijd Ch. of my Effay, thccafily con- 
 ceivable Poflibility, nay great Probability that the thmJiing Subftance in 
 
 ui 
 
Extent of Humane Knowledge, i^^ 
 
 Qj 13 irtimaterial, giving me fufiicient ground for it : In which Senfe I 
 /hall think I may fafely attribute it to the thinking Subftance in us, till 
 your Lordfhip (hall have better proved from my Words, That it is impof- 
 fibJe ic fliould be immaterial. For I only fay, That it is impofTible, r. e, 
 involves no Gontradidion, that God the omnipotent immaterial ^pi^!c 
 fliould, if he pleafes, give to ferae parcels of Matter , difpofed as he 
 thinks fit, a Power of Thinking and Moving ; Which parcels of Mat- 
 ter fo endued with a Power of Thinking and Motion, might properly be 
 Called Spirits, in contradiftinftion to dnthinking Matter. In all which, I 
 prefume, there is no manner of Conrradiflion. 
 
 I juftified my ufe of the Word Spirit in that Senfe from the Authorities 
 of Cicero and Virgil, applying the Latin Word Spirittn, fom whence 
 Spirit is derived, to the Soul as a thinking Thing, without excluding Ma- 
 teriality out of it. To which your Lordfhip replies, "* 
 T^^t Cicero in his Tufculan Queftions, fuppofes the Soul not * i Anf, 
 to ie a finer fort of Body , but of a different Nature from p. j8.— *5o, 
 the Body.-'—^That ht caSs the Body the PriJoH of the Soul, 
 -^— And fays, That a xoife Man's Bufinefs is to dram off" his Sottl from hii 
 Body. And then your Lordfhip concludes, as is ufual, with a Queftioii, Zr 
 it pojfible no-0 to think fo great a Man look'd on the Soul but at a modifi' 
 cation of the Body, which muft bo at an end vfith Life ? Anfw, No ; it i^ 
 impofTible that a Man of fo good Senfe is TuBy^ when he ufes the Word 
 Corpus ot Body for the grofs and vifible parts of a Man, which he acknow- 
 ledges to bemortaljfhould look on the Soul to be a Modification of that Body^ 
 in a Difcoarfe wherein he was endeavouring to perfuade another, that ic 
 was immortal. Jc is to be acknowledg'd that tt\x\y great Men, fuch as bd 
 was, are not wont fo manifeftly to contradiS themfelvts. He had there- 
 fore no Thought concerning the Modification of the Body of Man in the 
 Cafe: He was not fuch a Trifler as to examine, whether the Modificatioft 
 of the Body of a Man was immortal, when that Body it felf was rnortal : 
 And therefore that which he reports as Diaearchui's Opinion, he difmiffcs' 
 in the beginning without any more adoj c. 1 1» But Cicero's was a dire©, 
 plain and fcnfible Enquiry, viz. What the Soul was, to fee whether from 
 thence he could difcover its Immortality ? But in all that Difcourfe in hi» 
 firfl Book ofTufeulan §luefii»ns, where he lays out fo much of his Reading 
 and Reafon, there is not one Syllable fhewing the leal^ Thought, that the Soul 
 was an immaterial Subflaoce j but many Things direftly te) the contrary* 
 
 Indeed ( i.^ he fhursout the Body taken, in the Senfe ^ , 
 tie ufes * Corp;^ all-a-long, for the fenfible organical parts '^' **' 
 
 of a Man ; and is pofitive that is not the Soul : And Body '^' '^' ' 
 in this Senfe, taken for the Humane Body, he calls the Prifon of the Soul j 
 and fays a wife Man, inflancing in Socrates and Cato, 'n glad of a fair op- 
 portunity to get out of if. But he no where fays any fuch thing of Matter ; 
 He calis not Matter in general the Prifon of theSoul^nar talks a Word of be>* 
 ing fcparate from it. 
 
 2.- He concludes, that the Soul is not like other Things here below, made 
 tip of a Compofition of the Elements", chap. 27. 
 
 Mi 3, H« 
 
 .iii. 
 
i6o Extent of HumMie Knowledge. 
 
 J. He excludes the two grofs Elements, Earth and' Water, from beings 
 the Soul, chap, 26. 
 
 So Ur he is clear and pofitive : But beyond this he is uncertain ; beyond 
 this he coii!d not get. t\»r in fome Places he fpcaks doubituUy, whether the 
 Soul be not Air, or Fire. Anim* fit itHtmui i^nilve nefiio, c. 2/. And 
 thertfirc he agrees with Pai:cetiu4, that, it" it be at ail Elementary, it is, as 
 he calls it, Jiiflammtna Anima, inflatued Atr ; and fur thiS he gives fevcral 
 Rcalons, c. 18, i j). And though he thinks it to be of a ptculmr Nature »f 
 Its own, yet he is fo far from thinking it immaterial, that he fay*, c. \^.. 
 That the admitting it to be of an nerial or ignetM Nature, would not be 
 inconfillcnt wi h any thing he had laid. 
 
 That which ht fc^ms nnuft to en<;lincto is, That the Soul was not at alt 
 Elementary, but was of the Hinie Subftince wi;h the Hcavens» which Art' 
 ftotle, to dirtingnifli from the four Elements ard the changeable Bodies 
 here below, which he fuppoi'ed made up of them, called ^uinta Ejfentia, 
 That this was Tu///s Opinion is iii plain from thefe Words, E-rgo, An'mus^wi 
 ut ego aico, Mvinm ejf, ut Euripides audct due^e Den4 j i^ qttidem fi Det*/, 
 aut anirna aut tgiiU cji, idem' efl anithw hotninis. N^m ut ills uatura 
 cttleftu fy terra niacat ((y humort ; [\c utrtufque harum rerutn humoHus 
 animui ejl t.rptri. Sin autem efl tjumta (jumdam natura ab Ari^otele in-^ 
 duBa v primum lottc ^ deorum ejl ffy' animorum. Hauc ms fentetitiam ftr 
 cuti, bii ipfit verbit in Confolatlone htec exprejjimtit, ch. i6. And then he 
 goes on, c. zj. to repeat thofe his own Words, which your Lordlliip has 
 cjuoted out of him, wherein he had affirmed, in his Treatife de Conjalatiout, 
 the Soul not to have its Original from the Earth, or mixed or made of 
 iny Thing earthly j but had faid, Stngularis eft tgitur efuadam natura (^^ 
 'vn ammi fi\un^n ab hu ufnatii notifque naturii: Whereby, he tells us, 
 he meant nothing but ArifiotWi §ijtinta EJfentia-, which being aoraixed, 
 being that of which the Gods and Souls cohlilled, he calls it divtnum cm' 
 Itfte-, and concludes it eternal, it being as he fpeaks, StjunBa ab omni mor- 
 tati cottcretiont. From which it is clear. That in all his Enquiry about the 
 Subltance ot the Soul, his Thoughts went not beyond the four Elements, or 
 yfnftotles Quinta Ejjcntia to look for it. In all which there is nothmg of 
 Immatcruliry, but qui' e the contrary. 
 
 He was willing to believe (as good and wife Men have alwa/s been ) that 
 the SkuI was immortal ; but for that 'tis plain he never thought of iTs lai- 
 nliteriahy, but as the Eaftern People do who believe the Soul to be immor- 
 tal, but have Deverthckfs no Thought, no Conceptior>of its Immatcnaliry. 
 It IS remarkable what a very confidcrable and judicious Au-/ 
 
 • Loubere thor * lays in the Cafe. No Opinion, (ays he, hat tten. 
 du Rfyjutue fo uni'virfally received m that of the Immortality of th0 . 
 dt jj4»«,T. I. i Soul . but Its ImntJtcriality u a Truth the knowledge vherc 
 c. 19. §. 4. of h u not (pread fo far. jind indeed it ii extrejnely dijficult 
 
 to let into ibe Mtud of a S\^mnc, the Ideaof a pure Spirii. 
 Tfjis the M:Jionari:s, who have been longefi among them, are pofttive in. All. 
 the F-igant offheEaft do truly believe. That there remains fomething of a 
 Mdu ajt^rhii Death, which Jubfifis inde^endsntly andje^aratelyfrew his Body.. 
 
 Hut 
 
Extent of Huvnane Knowledge, * 1 6 1 
 
 B«/ they give Extension and. Figure to that which remains^ an^ attribute t0 
 it all the jttme Members, allthe fame Subftances, both felid and liquid, whifh 
 y»ur Bodies are eot/ip^fed oj. They onlyfuppofe that the Souls are of a Matter 
 
 fubtil enough to efcapc being feen or handled. Such were the Shadts and 
 
 the Manes of the Greeks and the Romans. And 'tis by thefe Figures of the 
 Souls, anfwerable to tJpofe of the Bodies, that Virg\{ fitp^ofed Maea^s knew 
 Palinurus, D'lio and Anch\Ces in the other World. 
 
 This Gentleman was not a Man that travelled into tliofe Parts.for hisPiea- 
 fure, and to have the Opportunity to tell ftrange Stories, coHeded bjr 
 Chance, *hen he rerorned :But one chofen forthepurpofe fandhe feems well 
 chofen for the puipofe ) to inquire into the Singularities of i/^w). And he has 
 fo well acquitted himfelf of the Commiflion, which his Epiille Dedicatory tells 
 us he had, toinform himil-lf exaftty of what was moft remarkable there, that 
 had we but an Account of other Countries of the Eaft.as he has given us of thi j 
 Kingdcm,which he was an Envoy to, we fliould be much better acquainted than 
 we are, with the Manners, Notions and Religions of that part of the World, 
 inhabited by civiliz.'d Nations, who want neither good Senfe nor Acutenefs 
 of Reafon, though not caft into the Mould of theLogick and Philofophy of 
 our Schools. 
 
 But, to return to C/«ra. 'Tis plain, That in his Enquiries about the Soul 
 his Thoughts went not at all btyond Matter. Thus the Exprtflaons that 
 drop from him infeveral places of this Book, evidently flicw. For Exam- 
 ple, That the Souls of excellent Men and Women afcendcd into Heaven ,• of 
 others that they remained here on Earth, c. 12. That the Soul is hot and 
 <irarms the Body : That at its leaving the Body it penetrates and divides, and 
 breaks through our thick, cloudy, moift Air: That it (tops in the Region 
 of Fire, andafcends no farther, the equality of Warmth and Vv^cig,ht making 
 that its proper place, where it is nouriflied and fuftaincd with the fame 
 Thing?, wherewith the Stars are nouridied and fuftained, and that by the 
 Convenience of its Neigbourhood itlhall there have a clearer View and ful-. 
 ler Knowledge of the Heavenly Bodies, c. i p. That the Soul aifo from rhi«. 
 height fliall haveapleafancand fairer Profpeft of the Globe of the Earth, 
 the difpofition of whofe Parts will then lie before it in one View, c. 20. Thic. 
 it is hard to determine what Conformation, Size and [-"lace, theSooi has in 
 the Body : That it is to fubtil to be feen : That it is in the Humane Body as^ 
 in a Houfe or a VcfTel, or a Receptacle, c. zi. All which, are Exprcdioni- 
 that fufficiently evidence, that he who ufed them had not. in hjs Mind fepa-. 
 fited Materiality from the Idea of the Soul, 
 
 It may perhaps be repIicd,Thatagreat part of tbiiwh cb Vie find in chap^^ 
 ip. is faidupon the Principles ofthoie who would have the Soul to be Anima 
 inflammata^ infltmed Air. I granr it. But it is- alio to be cbllrved, Thjtin 
 this 19th, and the two following Chapters, he does not only not deny, but 
 even admits, That fo material a thing as inflimcd Air raay think.- 
 
 The Truth of the Cafe in (hcrt is this ; Cicero v.is willing to bi'-eve the- 
 Soul immortal, but when he fought in the Natureof the Suul ic (cii^iutRcrbing' 
 to eftablifh this bis Bel.cf into. a. Certainty of it, he found hjfofelf at a Lois. 
 Ikconfcfled he knew aot what tbc.Soul was ; but the notj|io*ing whai it waf> 
 
1 6z ^ Extent of Humane Knowledge, 
 
 he argues, Cs z. was no Rcafon to conclude it was not. And thereupon hp 
 procecdi to the repetition oF what he had faid in his 6:h Book de Rtpub, con- 
 cerning the Soul. The Argunitnr, which borrowed from Piatt, he there 
 makes ufc of, if it have any force in it, not only proves the Soul to be im- 
 roorta], but more than, I think, your Lord/hip will allow to be true: For 
 n proves it to be cternal,and without beginning as wiibout end, Ktque nata 
 ferta eft, & ttttrna eft, fays he. 
 
 Indc'ed from the Faculties of the Soul he concludes right, That it is of 
 divine Original : But »s to the Subftaace of the Soul, heat the end of this 
 Dilcourfe concerning its Faculties, f.2 j. as well as at the beginning of it f.ii. 
 is not aOiamcd to own his Ignorance, what it is ; Animafit animuSy ignifve^ 
 Mifdo; nec me pudet ut iftot, fateri ntftive auodnefciam. lllud, finlla ali» 
 dc re ebfcnra affirmare ptjfum, five anima, five ignis fit animus, eum jura- 
 Ttm ejfe divtnum, c. is. So that all the Certainty he could to attain to about 
 the Saul, was. That he was confident there was fomethibg divine in it, i yt, 
 there were Faculties in the Soul that could not rcfult from the Nature of 
 Matter, but muft have their Original from a Divine Power ; but yet thofe 
 Qualities, as Divine as they were, be acknowledged might be placed io 
 Breath or Fire, which your Lord/hip will not deny to be material Subftances, 
 So that all thofe divine Qualities, which he fo much andjuftly extols in the 
 Sou', led hira not, as appears, fo much as to any the leaf! Thought of Im- 
 materiality. This isDemonf?ration, That he built them not upon an exclafi- 
 on of Materiality out of the Soul ; for he avowedly proftllcj be does not 
 know, bur Breath or F"irc might be this Thinking Thing in us : And in all his 
 Confiderations about the Subftanceof theSoul itfelf, he fluck in y^ircrFire, 
 or y^rtftotle's §luinta Ejfentia ; for beyond thofe *'.i8 evident he went not. 
 
 But with all his Proofs out ofPlatOy towhofc Authority he defers fo much, 
 with all the Arguments his vaft Reading and great Parts could furnifh hinj 
 with for the Immortality of the Soul, hs was fo little farisfied, fo far from 
 being certain, fo far from any Thought that he had,or could Prove ir.that he 
 over and over again profefles his Ignorance and Doubt of it. In the beginning 
 he enumerates the fcveral Opinions of the Philofophers, which he bad well 
 fludied, about it : And then full of Uncertainty fay«, Harum Sent enti arum 
 qu.t njira fit, Dchs alitjuis videret, tjuttveri fintiUima magna c^eeftto, c.ii. 
 And towards th; latter end hiving gone them all over agatn, an<f ooip 
 afctr another exjmin'd the ■, he profefTcs himfclf fliU at a lofs, not know- 
 ing on which to pitch, nor what to determine. Mentis acies, fays he, ftip' 
 fam intuens ngnnuntjuam hebefcic, ob eamque caufam contemplandi dili- 
 ^entiam ornistiwus. Jtaque dubitans, circnmjpeffans, htfitans multa ad- 
 verfa revtrttns ta7,qusm in rate tn nan immenfe, ntftra iehitnr gratis, 
 c. 30. And fo conclude this Argument, when the Peifon he intro<!uccs as 
 «lifcourfing with him. tells him he is refolved to keep firm to the Belief of 
 the Immortality : TttiS)' anfwcrs, c. 8l.- Laudo id c^utdew, itfi nik:l avimti 
 •portet confidert-^ n.aijewur enim fitpi aliquo acute conjuji, labanus, 
 n^utgn.ui^te feutentiam clanonbus ctiam in rebus ; tn his tft entsa alt qua 
 obfcurtfas. . " 
 
 So unmoveable is that Truth dtllvtrca by the Spirit of Trath, That 
 
 ihovgK 
 
Extent of Humane Knowledge. 165 
 
 though the Light of Nature gave fome obfcure glimmering, fome uD' 
 certain hopes of a future State ; yet Humane Reafon could attain to Clcar- 
 nefs, no Certainty about it, but that it was JESUS CHRIST alona 
 who had hrtught Life and Immortality t» light, through 
 the Go/pel *. Tho' we are now told. That toovrn the ina- * z Tim.i.io. 
 biliry of natural Reafon to bring Immortality to Light, 
 or which paffes for the fame, to own Principles upon which the Immate- 
 riality of the Soul ( and as 'tis urged confequently its Immortality ) can- 
 not be demonftratiTely proved, does lejfen the Belief of this Article of 
 Revelation, which JESUS CHRIST alone h»s brought to Light, and 
 which confequently the Scripture afiures us is efiablirhed and made certain 
 only by Revelation. This would not perhaps have feemed ftrange from thofe 
 who are juftly complained of, for flighting the Revelation of the Gofpel, 
 and therefore would not be much regarded, if they (hould contradiiSl fo 
 plain a Text of Scripture, in favour of their all-fufficienr Reafon ; Buc 
 what ofe the Promoters of Stepticifm and Infidelity, in an jige fo much 
 fufpefled by your Lord(hip, may make of what comes from one of your greac 
 Authority and Learning, may deferve your Confideration- 
 
 And thus my Lord, 1 hope I have fatis£ed you concerning Cicero's OpI-» 
 nion about the Soul in his firft Book of Tufculan Queftions ; which, tho' 
 I cafily believe, as your Lord/Iiip f^ys you are no ftr anger to^ yet I humbly 
 conceive you have not /hewn ( and upon a careful perufal of that Treatile 
 again I think I may boldly fay you cannot lhew)onc Word in it, that ex- 
 prefTesany thing like a Notion in Tully of the Soul's Immateriality, or its 
 $eing an immaterial Subfiance. 
 
 From what you bring out of Virgil your Lordftiip • con^ * i. Anf. p« 
 eludes. Thai he no more than Cicero does me any kindnefs 6z, 6 1, 
 in this Matter, being both Afertors of the Soul's Immorta- 
 lity. My Lord, were not the Queftion of the Soul's Immaterirality, ac» 
 cording to Cuftom, changed here into that of its Immortality, which I 
 am no Icfsan Aflertor of than either of them, Cicero and Virgil, do me all 
 the kindnefs I defired of them in this Matter ; and that was to fhew, thac 
 they attributed the Word Spiritut to the Soul of Man, without any thought 
 of Its Immateriality; and this the Vcrfes you your felf 
 bring out of fz>^»7,t + ^ncid. 4,. 
 
 38;. 
 Et eumfrigida mors animx deduxerit artus. 
 iOmnibtu, umbra locis adero, dabis impxobe ftenas* 
 
 confirm, as well as thofe I quoted out of his fith Book; and for this Monfi'^u^ 
 dt la.Ltttbere (hail be my Witnefs in the Words ibovc fet down out of him}; 
 where he (hews, that there be thofe amongft the Heathens of our days, as 
 well as PVrgj/and others amongft the ancient Greeks and Romans, who 
 thoght the Souls, or Ghofts of Mem departed, did not die with the Body^ 
 without thinking them to be perfeftly immaterial j thp latttct being much, 
 moce iQcoinprehenllble to chem than the fortner, 
 
 ^ 
 
 ^xim 
 
164 Extent of Humane Knowledge. 
 
 Your Lordfhip's f Anfvrcr concerning what is {aid, 
 •\ I. Anf. Fccltf, 13. turns wholly upon Sj/owjox's raking the Soul to 
 ». 64 .6j. bt immortal, which was not what I qaeftioncd: All that I 
 
 quoted that place for, was to flicw, that ^irit in Englifli 
 might properly be applied to the Soul, without any Notion of its Imma- 
 teriality , as n^T was by Soltmoriy which whether he thought the Souls 
 of Men to be immaterial, docs little appear in that PafTage, where he 
 fpeaks of the Souls of Men and Beafh together, as he does. But farther, 
 what I contended for, is evident from that place in that the JVord Spirit. 
 is there applyed, by our Tranflators, to the Souls of Beafts, which your 
 Lordfhip I think does not rank amongft the immaterial, and confequent- 
 ly immmortal Sfiritt, though thcjr hare Scofc and Spontaneous Moti- 
 
 OD. 
 
 Put yoo fsy , f If the Soul be not of it [elf a fret thinking 
 + 1 . Anfw. Subflsnce,yoti do not fee what Foundation there u in Nuure 
 j). 6s, for a day ej Judgment. Anfwer. Though the Heathen 
 
 World did not of old, nor do to this day, fee a Foundaticn 
 in Nature for a day of Judgment; Yet in Revelition, if that will fatisfy 
 your Lordfnip, every one may/« a Foundation for a day of Judgment, be- 
 caufe God has pofitively declared it • though God has not by that Revelatioa 
 taught us, what the Subftancc ofthcSoul is; nor has any where faid. That 
 tiie Soul of it felf /; a free Agent. Whatfoever a;.y created Subftance is, it 
 is not of it ;,lf, bur is by the good Plcafure of its Creator : Whatever de-^ 
 grces of Perfedion.it has it has from the bountiful Hand of its Maker. For 
 it is true in a natural, as well as a fpiritual Senfc, what Sf^. 
 *2.Corj.5« PauKiys, * Not that we are fufficient oiour (elves to think 
 anythingzi of our ftlves, butour jujfciency is of God, 
 But your LordOiip, aS I guefs, by your following Words, would argue, 
 That a material Subltancc cannot be a free Agent ; whereby I fuppofe you 
 only rrrean, that you cannot /t* or conceive how a folid- Subftanct; fliould 
 begin, flop, or change its own Motion. To which give me leave to anfwer, 
 Thi: when you can make it conceivable, how any created, finire,''dependenc 
 SubiUnce can move it fclf, or alter or flop its own Motion, which it muft to 
 be a free Agent; I fuppofe you will find if no harder for God ro beftow this 
 Power on afohd, than ah unfolid created Subftance. 7«//>:, 
 t Tofculan in the place above quoted, f could not conceive this Power 
 Quxftian, L. ro be in any thing, but what was from Eternity ; Cum pa^ 
 •i . C. 1 3. "•^eat tgitur ttenium id iffe qttodjcpfum moveat quis ejl qui 
 
 hanc naturafn animis cjji tnbutam iteget ^ But though you 
 cannot y/tf how any created Subftance, folid, or not folid, can be a frei 
 Agent, ( pardon me, my Lord, if I put in both, tiil your Lordlhip pUafe 
 'to explain it ot eirhcr, and flicw the manner how either of them can, of it 
 f/lf, move it ftlf or any tiling cllc ) yet I do not think, you will fofar deny 
 Men to be free Agents, irom the ditSculty there is to jet how they are free 
 Agent?, as ro doubt, whether thert be FoHud^'isn enough ftra.daj 0/ 
 Judgment. 
 
Extent of Humane Knowledge. 165^ 
 
 or no ', it being impoffible for us, by the contemplation of que; 
 o^nldcasy wirhout Revelation, to difcover, whether Omnipo-. 
 rency has not given to fome Syftems of Matter fitly dlfpoftd, a 
 Power to perceive and think, or elfe joined and fixed to Matter 
 fo difpoled, a thinking immaterial Subftance : It being, in re- 
 fpe6l of our Notions, not much more remote from our Cora- 
 prehenfion to conceive, that GOD can, if he pleales, Superadd 
 to Matter a Facu|ry of Thinking, than that he fhould fuper-„ 
 
 • It is not for me to judge how far yo'ir Loidiliip's Specularions reach : 
 But finding in my felf nothing to be truer than what the 
 wife 5«/owc» tells me, * -^s thott knows ft not what is the • * Eccl. il. 
 way of the Spirit^ nor how the Bonis do grow in the Womb 5;, 
 of her that ts with Child ^ even fo thott knttfift not the 
 iVorksofGedwhomaketh all things. I gratefully receive and rejoice in 
 the Light of Rtvelation, which fets me at reft in many things ; ths manner 
 whereof my poor Reafancanby no means make out to me: Omnipotency, 
 I Itnow, can do any thing that contains in it no Contradidton ; fothati 
 readily believe whatevcc God has declared, though my Rcafon find Difficul- 
 ties in ir, which it cannot maftei'. As in the prcfent Cafe, God having re- 
 vealed that there fhall be a day of Judgment, I think that Fou7idatton e- 
 iiougb, ro conclude Men zre free enough to be made aofwerable for their A- 
 ftions, and to receive according to what they have done, though how Mara 
 is a free Agent, furpafs my Explication or Comprehenfion. 
 
 In anfwcr to the place I brought our of St. Luke, * your * C. 14, W 
 Lordfliip asks, t Whether, from thefe Words of our Sa- ^ jp, 
 'viom, it follows^ that a Spirit ii only an y4ppearance. I -f i AnC 
 anfwer. Ho, nor do I know who drew fuch an Inference p, 65. 
 from them : But it follows, that in Apparitions there is 
 fomething that appears, and that which appears is not wholly immaterial ; 
 and yet this was properly called TlViV^X^ and was often looked upop by 
 thofe, who called it TrVtU/XO. in Greek, and now call it Spirit in Engliflj, 
 to be the Gho.l or Soulof one departed, which I humbly conceive juftiiies 
 my ufe of the Word Spirit, for a thinl^ing Voluntary Agent, whether ma- 
 terial or immaterial. 
 
 Your LordHiip fays, :{: That I grant, that it cannot :}: i Anf, 
 Vpon thefe Principles, be demonftrated, that the fpiritual p. 6:^. 
 Subftance in us is immaterial : From whence y&u conclude. 
 That then my Grounds of Cert ai?Uy from Ideas, are plainly given up. ThiS 
 teing a way of arguing, that you often make ufe o£ I have often had Oc- 
 cafion to confider it, and cannot after aH fee the force of this Argument. 
 I acknowledge that this or that Pi opofition cannot upon my Principles be 
 demonftrated ; Ergs, \ grant this Propofition to be talfe, That Certainty 
 confilis in the Perception of the Agreement or Difagrcement of Ideas, 
 For that is my ground of CertainfjJ, and till that be given i|p, my grounds. 
 cfCertaijity-^uswtgivcitup, ' ' . ^ . . • 
 
 add 
 
1 66 Extent of llnmaHe KKOvoled^e. 
 
 a^dd to it another Subftance, with a Faculty of Thinking j fince 
 wc know not wherein Thinking confifts, nor to what (ore of 
 Subftances the Almighty has been pleafed to give that Power, 
 which cannot be in any crented B?ing, but merely by the good 
 Pleafure and Bounty of the Creator. For I fee no Contradi. 
 ftion in it, that the firft eternal thinking Being, fliould, if he 
 pleafed, give to certain Syltems of created fenflefs Matter, put 
 together as he thinks fit, Tome degrees of Senfe, Perception, 
 and X^ought : Though, as I think, I have proved, Lih. 4. 
 Ch. io. it is no lefs than a contradi«ftion to fuppofe Matter 
 (\vhich is evidently in its own ^Jature void of Senfe and 
 Thought ) fhould be that Eternal firft thinking Being. What 
 Certainty of KT\ovv|edge can any one have that fome Percepti- 
 ons, fuch as, v.g. Pleafure and Pain, (hould not be in fome Bo- 
 <3ies themftlvcs, after a certain manner modified and moved, as 
 well as that they fhould be In an immaterial Subftance, upon 
 the Motion of the parts of Body ; as far as we can conceive 
 being able only to ftrike arj affed^ Body ^ and Motion, accor* 
 <iing to the utmoft reach of our lAeiu^ being able to produce no- 
 thing but Motion *, fo that when we allow it to^produce Plea- 
 sure or Pain, or the Ucaoi a Colour, or Sound, we are fain to 
 quit our Reafbn, ^o beyond our idem^ and attribute it wholly 
 to the good Pleafure of^our Maker. For fjnce we muft allovsr 
 he has annexed EfFe(5ls to Motion, which we can no way con- 
 ceive Motion able to produce, what reafbn hav€ we to con- 
 clude, that he could not order them as well to be produced in ^ 
 Subjt(5l we cannot conceive capable of them, as well as in a Sub- 
 jeft we cannot corKeive the Motion of Matter can any way o- 
 fKTare upon ? 1 fay not this, that I would any way lefTen the 
 telief of the Soul** Immateriality : I am not here faking of 
 Probability, but Knowledge ; and I think not only, .that it be- 
 comes the Modefty of Philofbphy, not to pronounce Magifterfal- 
 ly, where we want that Evidence that can produce Knowledge j 
 but alfo, that it is of ufe to us, to difcern now far our Know- 
 ledge does reach \ for the flate we are at prcfcnt in, not being 
 that of Vifion, we muft, in many Things, content our felves 
 with Faith and Probability : and in the prcfent Qucflion about 
 the In:\materiality of the Soul, if our Faculties canjiot arrive at 
 demofiftrative Certainty, we need not think it ftrange. All the 
 great Ends of Morality and Religion, are well enough {kosxtdi^ 
 without Philofbphical Proofs of tnc Soul's Immateriality ; fince 
 it is f vidcnt, that he who made us at firft begin tofiibfift here, 
 J^nfiblc intelligent Beings^ and for feveral yejirg continued us in 
 
 fuch 
 
Extent of Hufi/iane Knowleelgt, 167 
 
 fuch t ftate, can and will rcftore us to the like ftate of Senfi- 
 bility in another World, and make us capable there to receive 
 the Retribution he has defigned to Men, according to their Do- 
 ings in this Life. And therefore 'tis not of fuch mighty neceflity 
 to determine one way or t'other, as fome over zealous for, or 
 agalnft the Immateriality of the Soul, have been forward to make 
 the World believe. Who, either on the one fide, indulging too 
 much their Thoughts immerled altogether in Matter, can allow 
 no Exiftence to what is not material : Or, who on the other fidc» 
 finding not Cogitation within the natural Powers of Matter, ex- 
 .amiaedover and over again, by the utmoft Intention of Mind, 
 have the confidence to conclude, that Omnipotency it felf, can- 
 not give Perception and Thought to a Subttance which has the 
 Modification of Solidity. ' He that confiders how hardly Sen(a« 
 tion is, in our Thoughts, reconcilable to extended Matter *, or 
 Exiftence to any thing that hath no Extenfion at all, will confeft, 
 that he is very far from certainly knowing what his Soul is* 
 'Tis a Point, which (eems to mr, to be put out of the reach of 
 our Knowledge : And he who will give himfelf leave to confider 
 freely, and look into the dark and intricate part of each Hypo- 
 thefis, will fcarce find his Reafon able to determine him fixedly 
 for, or agalnft the Soul's Materiality. Since on which fide fo-J 
 ever he views it, either as an unextended Subftance, or as a 
 thinking extended Matter ; the DifiBculty to conceive either, 
 will, vyhilft either alone is in his Thoughts, ftill drive bim to 
 the contrary fide. An unfair way which fome Men take wich 
 themleives ; who becaufe of the unconceivablenefs of fomething 
 they find in one, throw themfelves violently into the contrary 
 Hypothefis, though altogether as unintelligle to an unbiafTed 
 Underftanding. This (erves, not only to mew the Weaknefs 
 and the Scanrijiefs of our Knowledge , but the infignificant 
 Triumph of fuch fort of Arguments, which, drawn from our 
 own View, may fatisfy us that we can find no certainty on one 
 fide of the Queftion j but do not at all thereby help us to Truth, 
 by running into the oppofite Opinion, which, on examination, 
 will be found clogg'd with equal difficulties. For what Safety,' 
 what Advantage to any one is it, for the avoiding the feeming 
 Abfurdities, and, to him, unformbuntable Rubs he meets with 
 in one Opinion, to take refuge in the contrary, which is built 
 on fomething altogether as irexplicable, and as far remote from 
 his Comprehenfion ? 'Tis paft controverfy, that we have in us 
 fomething that thinks, our, ver^ Doubts about what it is, con- 
 firm ths certainty of its being, though we mufl content our 
 ■ • ■ ^- felyes 
 
J 68 Extent of Humane Knowledge, 
 
 (elves in the Ignorance of what klftd o'i Being \x. is: And Ms \n 
 vain to go about to be fceprical in this, as it is unreafonable in 
 moit other cafes to be pofitive agaiiilt the being of any thing, 
 bccaulc wc cannot comprehend its Nature. For I would fain 
 » know what Sublhnce exilh that has not lomething in it, which 
 maniLftly b.fflcs our Underftandings. Other Spirits, who fee 
 and know the Nature and inward Conrtitutionof things, how 
 much muft they exceed us in Knowledge ? To which ifwe add 
 larger Comprehenfion, which enables them at one Glance to fee 
 the Connexion and Agreement of very many IdtM^ and readily 
 Supplies to them the intermediate Proofs, which we by fingle and 
 fljw Step?, and long poring in the dark, hardly at laft find out, 
 and are often ready to forget one before we have hunted out a- 
 rother, vvemayguels at (brae part of the Happinels of fupcrior 
 lanks of Spirits, who have a quicker and more penetrating Sight, 
 '^as well 35 a larger Field of Knowledge. But to return to the Ar- 
 J2U nent in hand, our KjfiowlcdgCy I fay, is not only limited to the 
 Piuc'ty and Imperfeftions of the Usm we have, and which we 
 employ it about, but even comes (hort of that too : But how 
 far it reaches let us now enquire. 
 
 §. 7. The Affirmations or Negations we raak? 
 How far O'ir concerning the ^deM we have, may, as I have be- 
 Krovfhdge fore intimated in general, be reduced to thefe four 
 reaches. forts, vi:(. Identity, Co-exiftence , Relation, and 
 
 real Exiltence. I (hall examine how far our Know- 
 ledge extends in each of thefe : 
 
 §. 8. Firjiy As to Identity and Diverfityy in this 
 ^""A ^'"' way of the Agreement or Difagreenrcnt of ideas, 
 Knavudge •/ ^^ intuitive Kjiowledge u as far extended as our Ideaf 
 i nr/f;- an thcmfelves : and there can be no idea in the Mind, 
 Ur at cur I., whjch It docs not prelcntly, by an iiiiuJtive Knorw-!. 
 ^j^3s^ ledge, perceive to be wliat it is,, and to be different 
 
 from any other. 
 
 ,. , §. 9. Secondly^ As to the fecotld fort, which is 
 econ y, J ^^^ Azreement. or Dtfazreement of our Ideas in Co' 
 n/en Utile 'xijience , m thi5 our iinowledgc is very inort, 
 ^j^^ though in this confilh the grcatell and moft ma- 
 
 teriil part of our Knowledge concerning Sub- 
 ftance-. For our Id^as of the Species ot Subllances, being, as I 
 have Ihcwcd, nothing but certain Collc6tions of fimple Ideas uni- 
 ted in one Subjcdf, and 16 co-e::ifting together : v.g. Our ideas 
 of Flame iai Bady hot, luminous, and moving upward ^ o£ Qpld, 
 
Extent tf Hamant. Knowkelge, \6g 
 
 i Body heavy to a certain degree, yellow, malleable,and fufi- 
 ble. Thefe, or (brpe fuch complex Ideas as thefe in Mens, 
 Minds, do thefe two Names of the different Subflances, Flame 
 and Gold, ftand for. When we would know any thing farther 
 concerning thefe, or any other fort of -Subftances, what do we 
 enquire buc what other Qualities, or Powers, thefe Subllances, 
 have, or have not ? which is nothing elfe but to know,. what 
 other fimpk Ideas do, or do not coexill: with thofe that make 
 up that complex i^e<< i' 
 
 S. lo. This how weighty and confiderable a Becaufe the 
 part foever of Humane Science, is yet very narrow, cmmxion be- 
 and fcarce any at ail. The Reafojr whereof is, ^*^^" ^f 
 that the fimple: Ideas whereof our complex Ideas {^'7»l«ow«!^ > 
 Qf Subftances, are made up, are, for the molt * * -, 
 
 part, fuch as earry with them, in their own Na- 
 ture, no vifible neceffary Connexion, or inconfiftehcy with any 
 other fimple ideas^ y/\\o^t co-efcifience with them we would in-^ 
 form our felves about. - . . 
 
 , §. II. The Ideas, rhat our complex ones of '" ^/^'*(^Z/ 
 Sttbftances are made up of, and about which our Seiind^ryi' 
 Knowledge, concerning Subftances, is moll em- '^^^"' 
 ploy'd, arethofeof their /^co«(5/47<2m<x/jV/«; which ,j 
 depending all (as has been fhewn ) upon the primary' Qualities \ 
 of their minute and uifenfible parts j or if not upon them, upon 
 fbmething yet more remote from our Comprehenfioo, 'tis im- 
 poffible we fliould know, which, have a neccjGTary union or in- 
 confiftency pne with another: For not knowing the Root they 
 Ipring from not knowing what fize, figure, Jind texture of Parts . 
 they are, on which depend and from which refulc tliofe Qualities 
 whfchmakeour.complex I^cdof Gold, 'tis impoifible we fhould 
 know what other Qualities reifiilt from, or are incompatible 
 with the fame Conftitution of the infenfibJe parts oiGold-, and 
 lb confequently muft always co-fAr;y? with that complex /^/^^ we,. 
 hAVe of it, or elfe are ;>2c<)w/if?e«f wirh it. :: 
 
 §. iz. Befides this Ignorance of the primary Becaufe all ^ 
 Qualities of the infenfible Parts of Bodies, on which connexion be- ,, 
 depend all their fecondary Qualities, there is yet ?i^^^»«»7i>- ; 
 another and more" 'incurable part of Ignorance, ^^"^^7 @rf :> 
 which fets us more.remote froai -a certain Know- /Jf,>/^^,^*"7 
 ledge of the Co-jcijience, or Incoexiji^nce ( if I may dfffoverable. ■ 
 fo fay ) of different lie^rj in the fame Subje6t ^ and , ■. : ' . 
 tijat is, thatther,e is no discoverable Connexion between any fs- . 
 eondary ^dity^ and thofe primary ^ahties that it depends on. 
 
tyo Extent oj Humane Knowledge, 
 
 §. i;. That the Size, Figure ind Motion of one Body fliould 
 icaufe a Change in the Size, Figure and Motion of another Body, 
 is not beyond our Concej^tion •, the reparation of the Parts of 
 one Body, upon the intrufion of another ^ and the Change from 
 Rclt to Motion, upon impulfe ; thefe, and the like, (ecm to us 
 to have fome Conntxion one with another. And if we knew 
 thefe Qiialiiies of Bodies, we might have reafon to hope, we 
 might be able to know a great deal more of thefe Operations of 
 them one upon another : But our Minds not being able to dif* 
 cover any Connexion betwixt thefe primary Qualities of Bodies, 
 and the Senfations that are produced in us by them, we can never 
 be able to eftabllfli certain and undoubted Rules, of the Confe- 
 quence or Co-exipence of any ficondary Qi»alities, though we 
 could difcover the Size, Figure, or Motion of thofe invifible 
 Parts, which immediately produce them. We arc fo far from 
 knowing what Figure, Size, or Motion of Parts produce a yel- 
 low Colour, a (weet Tafte, or a (harp Sound, that we can by 
 iio means conceive how any S»;^e, Figure^ or Motion of any Par- 
 ticle?, can poflibly produce in us the Idta of any Colour y Tafte^ 
 or Soirnd wnatfoever ', there is no conceivable Cannexiow betwixt^ 
 the one and the other, ' 
 
 §. 14. In vain therefore (hail we endeavour to difcover by, 
 our IdeaSf ( the only true way of certain and univerfal Know- 
 ledge, ) what other ideas are to be found conftantly joined with 
 that of our complex Idea of any Subftance : finct we neither 
 know the real Confticution of the minute Parra, on which their 
 Qijalities do depend ; nor, did we know thcm,could we difcover 
 any necefiary Cormexitn betAeen them, and any of the fecondary 
 Qualities j which is neceffary to be done, before we can certain* 
 ly know their necejfary Coexiftence. So that let our complex Idea 
 of any Species of Subftances, be what it will, we can hardly, 
 from the fimple Ideas contained in it, certainly determine the 
 necejftry Co-exigence of any other Qyality wnatfoever. Oar 
 Knowledge in all thefe Enquiries, reaches very little farther than 
 our Experience. Indeed, fome few of the primary Qualities have 
 a neceflary Dependence, and vifible Connexion one with another, 
 as Figure neceffarily fuppofes Extenflon, receiving or communi- 
 cating Motion by impulfe, fuppofes Solidity. But though thefe, 
 and perhaps fome others of our fi^/ have : yet there are fofev^ 
 of ihem, that have a vijjble Connexion one with another, that we 
 can by Intuition or Demonftration, difcover the Co-exifVence 
 of very few of the Q;jalities are to be found united in Sub- 
 flanccs : and wc are lett only to the affiftancc of our Senfes, to' 
 
 make 
 
Extent of flttwiane Kmwletige, 17 1 
 
 make known to us, what Qiialiries thty contain. For of all the 
 Qualities that are co-exifient in any Subject, without this Depcn« 
 dence and evident Connexion of their ideat one with another. 
 We cannot know certainly any two to co-exift any farther, than 
 Experience, by our Senfes, informs us. Thus though we fee the 
 yellow Colour, andupon Try al find the Weight, Malleablenefs, 
 Fufibility, and Fixednefs, that are united in a piece of Gold j 
 yet becaufe no one of ihefe Idetu has arty evident Defehdence^ or 
 necefiary Connexion with the other, we canhor certainly knowj 
 that where any four of thefe are, the fifth will be there aWb, 
 how highly probable fbever it may be ; Becaufe the highert Pro- 
 bability, amounts not to Certainty ', without wVich, there can 
 be no true Knowledge. Foi this Ccexijience can be no^ farthet 
 known, than it is perceived > and it cannot be perceived but 
 cither in particular Subje6f$, by the Obfervaiion of our Senfes, or 
 in general, by the neceffary Connexion of the ideas themfelves. 
 
 §. 1^. As to tffcompatihtlity or repugnancy to Co- eX' rp . 
 ifience, we may know, that any Subjcft can have ^ f^'fl^l",T. 
 of each fort of primary Qualities, but one particular ;^ " " ^'^'^ 
 at once, v. g. each particular Extenfion, Figure, 
 Number of Parts, Motion, excludes all other of each kind. The 
 like alfb is certain of all feiifible Idea peculiar to each Senfc ; for 
 whatever of each kind is piefent in any Subje ft, excludes all o- 
 ther of that fort ; v. jf. no one Subjeft can have two Smells, or 
 two Colours, at the fame time. To this, perhaps, will be ft id, 
 has not an O/^^i?, or the infufion of Lign«?w 'Nephriticuniy two Co- 
 lours at the feme time? To which 1 anfwer, that thefe Bodies, 
 to Eyes differently placed, may at the fame time afford different 
 Colours ; But I take Liberty alfb to fay, that to Eyes differently 
 placed, 'tis different parts of the Objeft, that refltft the Panl. 
 cles of Light : And therefore 'tis not the fame part of the Ob^ 
 jedt, and io not the very fame Subjcft, which at the fame time 
 appears both yellow and azur^. For 'tis as impoflible that the 
 very ftme Particle of any Body, fhould at the fame time diffe- 
 rently modify, or nfleft the Rays of Light, as that it (hould 
 have two different Figures and Textures at the fame time. 
 
 §. 16. But as to the PoTptr of Stuftances to chznge i , r- 
 the fenfible Qualities of other Bodies, which make f/J*'fp't 
 a great part of our Enquiries about them, and is J^^'^^l^ /**' 
 no confiaerablc branch of our Knowledge 5 I doubt, i^^^i^ ^^^f 
 as to thefe, whether our Kjiotpledge reaches much 
 farther than our Experience ; or whether we can come to the 
 difcovery of moft of thefe Powers, and be certain that they are 
 
 in 
 
lyi Extent of HuntAtn Kttowledge. 
 
 in any Subjc<5t hy the Connexion with any of thofe Ideas, which 
 to us make its Eflcnce. Bccaufe the Adbve and Paifivc Powers 
 of Bodies, and their ways of operating, confifting in a Texture 
 and Motion of Parts, which wc cannot by any means come to 
 difcover : 'Tii but in very few Cafes, we can be able to perceive 
 their Dependence on, or Repugnance to any of thofe J^e^f, which 
 make our complex one of that fort of Things. I have here in- 
 ftanccd in the corpufcularian Hypoihefis,asthat which is thought 
 to go fartheil in an intelligible Explication of the Qualities of 
 B jdies •, and I fear the Weakncfb of Humane Undtrflanding is 
 Icarce able to fubltltute another, which will afford us a fuller and 
 clearer Dilcovcry of the necefl'ary Connexion, and Co exijicnce, 
 of the Powtr?, which are to be obferved united in ftveral forts 
 of them. This at leaft k certain, that which ever Hypothcfis 
 be clearcft and trueft, ( for of that it is not my bufmelsto deter- 
 mine, ) our Knowledge concerning corporeal vSubilaiices, will 
 be very little advanced by any of thtm, till we are made fee, 
 whatQiialities and Powers of Bodies have anecejfary Connexion or 
 Repugnancy one with another j which in the prefent State of Phiio- 
 fophy , I think, we know but to a very fmall degree ; And,I doubt, 
 whether with thofe Faculties we have, we (hall ever be able to 
 carry our general Knowledge (I (ky ncrt particular Ex^xricnce) In 
 this part much farther. Experience is that, which in this part 
 wemufl depend oil And it were to be wifh*d, that it were 
 more improved. We find the Advantages fbme Mens generous 
 Pains have this way brought to the flock of natural Knowledge. 
 And if others, efpcclally the Phllofbphers by Fire, who pretend 
 to it, had been fo wary in their Obfervations, and lincere in their 
 Reports, as thofe who call themfelvcs Philofophers ought to have 
 been,our Acquaintance with the Bodies here about us,andourIn- 
 fight into their Powers and Operations had been yet much greater. 
 ^ . . §.17. If we are atalofs in rerpe6toCthe Ppw-, 
 
 / pints yet ^^^ and Operattonsof Bodies, I think it is eafy" toi" 
 
 narrower. 1 j r 1 j 1 ■ r 
 
 conclude, tpe are much more tn the dark^ tn reference to 
 
 Spirits-, whereof we naturally have no Ideaij but what vvc draw 
 
 from that of our own, by refledling on the Operations of our 
 
 own Souls within us, as far as whey can come within our Obfer- 
 
 vation. But how inconfiderable a rank the Spirits that inhabit 
 
 our Bodies hold amonpfl thole variou5, and poffibly inqumcra- 
 
 bJc, kinds of nobler Beings; and how far fhort they come of the 
 
 Endowments and Perfeftions of Cherubims and Scraphims, and. 
 
 ii hnirc forts i.i Spirits above u.^, is what by a tranfient hint, in_ 
 
 another place, I have offered to my Reader's Confidcration. 
 
 §. 18, 
 
Ektent ef Humane Knowledge, lyj 
 
 §, 1 8. As to the third fort of our Knowledge, . - 
 
 vh. the Azr cement or Difagreement of any 0/ oar Ideas . "^ J) * 
 T- , ^ , . -ni- •> • J.U 1 ii !->• IJ Other Rdati" 
 
 tn any other {{elatton : This, as it is the largelt Field ^^^ .^ ^ ^^^ 
 of our Knowledge, (b it is hard to determine how ^^jy ^g j^y 
 ifar it may extend ; Becaufe the Advances that are ^j^* far. 
 made in this part of Knowledge, depending on our 
 Sagacity^ in finding intermediate Idea, that may fhew the B^U- 
 iions and Habitudes of ideas, whofe Co-exiftence is not conGder- 
 ed, *tis a hard Matter to tell, when we aie at an end of fuch Dif^ 
 coveries ;, and when Reafbn has all the helps it is capable of, for 
 the finding of Proofs, or examining the Agreement orDifagree- 
 meni: of remote Ideas. They that are ignorant of Algebra, can- 
 not imagine the Wonders in this kind are to be done by it: and 
 what farther Improvements and Helps, advantageous to other 
 parts of Knowledge, the fagacious Mind of Man may yet find 
 out, 'tis noc eafy to determine. This at leaft I believe, that the 
 Ideas of Quantity are not thofe alone that are capable of Demon- 
 ftration and Knowledge ^ and that other, and perhaps moreuie- 
 iful parts of Contemplation, would afford us Ccrtaintyi if ViceSj 
 Paffions, and domineering Intereft: did not oppofe, or menace 
 fuch Endeavours. 
 
 The Idea of a (upreme Being, infinite in Power, Morality U- 
 Goodnefi and Wifuom, whofe Workmanfhip we ^abU of dc- 
 are, and on whoni we depend ^ and the idea of monflration. 
 pur ifelvesjasunderftanding, rational Beings, being 
 fuch as are clear in us, would, I fuppofe, if duly confidered, and 
 purfued, afliord fiich Foundations of our Duty and Rulesof Acti- 
 on, as might place Morality amongH the Sciences capable of Demon- 
 Jtration : wherein 1 doubt not, but from feif-evident Propofiti- 
 bns, by neceflary Confequences, as incon tellable as thofcinM^- 
 themarick?j the Meafures of right and wrong might be made out, 
 to any one that will apply himielf with the fame IndilFcrency 
 and Atrention to the one, as he does to the other of thefe Sci- 
 ences. The Relation, o£ other Modes may certainly be perceived; 
 as well as thofe of Number and Extenfion : and t cannot feej 
 why rhey (hould not alio be capable of Demonftration, if due 
 Methods were thought on ro examine, or purfue their Agi*ec- 
 ment or Difagreement. PPhere there is no Property^ there is no In* 
 jufiicej is a Propofitibn as certain as any Demonftration in £«t 
 did: For the Idea of Progeny, being a right to any ihirg ; and 
 (he Idea to which the name Injufiice is given, being the Inva- 
 fion or Violation of that right •, it is evident, that thefe I^e^j be- 
 ing thus eflablifhed, and thefe Names annexed to them, J can as 
 tettainly kjiov? this Prc^ponddli to Be true, as that a TiianGle 
 * folhir; f^ has 
 
1^4 Extent of Humane Knowle^lge, 
 
 has three Angles equal to two right one?. Again, No Government 
 allows abfohite Liberty : The idea of Government being the tfta- 
 blilhment ot Society upon certain Rules or Laws, which require 
 Conformity to them ; and the Idea of abfblute Liberty being for 
 any one to do whatever he pleafes ^ 1 am as capable of being cer- 
 luinof the Truth of this Propofition, as of any in Matheraaticks. 
 §. 19. That which in this refpeft has given the 
 Tr»o Things advantage to the Ideas of Qiiantity, and made them 
 have madt thought more capable ot Certainty and Demon- 
 
 wor<»/ Ideas a .• 
 
 pab/T oToe- ^*^fl^ Th.1t they can be fet down and reprcfented 
 men fir at ion. ^Y ^"fiblc Marlcs, which have a greater and nearer 
 Their Cornp'le- Corrcfpondence with them than any Words or 
 Kednsfs, and Sounds whatfoever. Diagrams drawn on Paper 
 vavt of fenji- are Copies of the ideas in the Mind, and not liable 
 ble Reprefen- to the Uncertainty that Words carry in their Signi- 
 tation. ' fication. An Angle, Circle, or Square, drawn in 
 Lines, lies open to the view, and cannot be mi- 
 ftakcn ; It remains unchangeable, and may at leifure beconfi- 
 dercd, and cxamintd, and the Demonftration be revifed, and all 
 the parts of it may be gone over more than once, without any 
 danger of the leaft change in the Ideas. This cannot be thus 
 done in moral Ideas ^ we have no fenlible marks that rclembic 
 them, whereby we can fct them down j we have nothing but 
 Words CO exprefs them by: which though, when written, they 
 remain the lame, yet the Ideas they ftand for, may change in 
 the fame Man ; and 'tis very feldom, that they are not different 
 in different Perfbns. 
 
 Secondly^ Another thing that makes the greater difficulty m 
 EthJcl{Sfbj That moral ideas are commonly more complex than 
 thofe ot the Figures ordinarily confidered in Mathematicks. 
 From whence thefe two Inconveniences follow. F/>-/?,*T4iac 
 their Names are of more uncertain Signification, the precife Col- 
 Je6lion of (imple Ideas they ftand for not being fb cafily agreed 
 on, and fo the Sign, that is ufed for them in Communication al- 
 ways, and in Thinking often, does not ftcadily carry with it the 
 i^meldea. Upon which the fame Diforder, Confufion, and Er- 
 ror follows, as would if a Man, going to demonftrate fbmething 
 of an Heptagon, (hojld in the Diagram he took to do it, leave 
 out one of the Angles, or by over-fight make the Figure with 
 one Angle more than the Name ordinarily imported, or he in- 
 trnded it fhould, when at firft bethought of his Dcmonflration. 
 'J^his ofren happens, and is hardly avoidable in very complex 
 moral Ideas, where the fiime Name being retained, one Angle, 
 
 i. e. 
 
Extent of Humane Knowledge, iJS 
 
 i. e. one firaple idea, is lefc out or put Jn, in the cobiplex one* 
 ( i\i\[ called by the fame Name ) more ut one time than another. 
 Secondly^ From the Coraplexednefs of thefe moral ideas there 
 follows another Inconvenience, [vi:{.) that the Mind cannot ea- 
 fiJy retain thofe preci(e Combinations, fo exatft and perfedly, as 
 is neceflary in the Examination of the Habitudes and Correfi^on- 
 dencicsj Agreements or Diftgreements, of (eVeral of them one with 
 another > efpecially where it is to be judg'd of by long Dedu6lions, 
 and the Intervention of leveral other complex Ideas^ to fhew the 
 Agreement or Difagreement of two remote ones. 
 
 The great help againft this, which Mathematicians find in Dia- 
 grams and Figures, which remain unalterable in their Draughtbj 
 is very apparent, and the Memory would often have great dim- 
 culty otherwise to retain them fo exactly, whiift the Mind went 
 over the parts of them, ftep by ftep, to examine their (eyeral 
 Coriefpondencies : And though in calling up a long Sum, either 
 in y^ddition, Multiflication^ or Divifion^ every part be only aPro- 
 grc flion of the Mind, taking a view of its own li^f^?/, andconfi- 
 dering their Agreement or Difagreement :, and the Kefblution of 
 the C^eftion be nothing but the Rcftjlt of the whole, made up 
 of fuch particulars, whereof the Mind has a clear Perception i 
 yet without fetting down the (everal Parts by Marks, whole pre- 
 cile Signihcations are known, and by Marks, that laft and re- 
 main in view, when the Memory had let them go, it would be 
 almoft impoflible to carry (b many ^MextnUdeai in Mind, withr 
 out confounding, or letting flip Ibmc parts of the Reckoning, 
 and thereby making ail our Realbnings about it ulelefi. In which 
 Cafe, the Cyphers or Marks help not the Mind at all to perceive 
 the Agreement of any two, or more Numbers, their Equalities 
 or Proportions : That the Mind has only by Intuition of its own 
 Ideai of the Numbers themlelves. But the numerical Characters 
 are helps to the Memory, to record and retain ihe feveral idea 
 about which the Demonftration is made, whereby a Man may 
 know how far his intuitive KnoNV ledge, in furveying feveral of the 
 particulars, has proceeded :, that lo he may without Confuliort 
 goon to what is yet unknown', and, at laft, have in one view 
 before him the Refult of all his Perceptions and Realbnings. 
 
 §.10. One part of thefe Difadvatages in moral r m di s of 
 ideas^ which has made them be tliought not capable ^yr^ Qifficli^ ' 
 of demonftration, may in a good mealure be reme' ^y^^ 
 died by Definitions, letting down that ColletSiion 
 of fimple ldect6y which every Term ftiall ftand for ^ and then ufing 
 the Terms ftedily and coiiftantly for that prccii'e Colle6tion. And 
 #haE Methods ^/|f/*ri;^3 or fameching of that kiiidi may hereafter 
 
 B z Iwggcfti 
 
i^6 Extent of Humane Knowledge. 
 
 fuggcft, to remove the other difficulties, is not eafy to fore-tell. 
 Confident I am, that it iMen would in the fame Method,and with 
 the fjlmc IndifFcrcncy.fearch after moral,as they do mathematical 
 Truths, they would find them to have a ftronger Connexion one 
 ^ith another, and a more neceffary Conftqucnce from our clear 
 and didinil Ideasyind to come nearer perfedt Demon ft ration,rhan 
 is commonly imagined. But much of this is not to be expe6led, 
 whilll thedefireof Efteem, Riches, or Power, makes Men efpoufe 
 the well endowed Opinions in Fa{hion,and then (eek Arguments, 
 either to make good their Beauty, or varnilh over, and cover 
 their Deformity. Nothing being fo beautiful to the Eye, as Truth 
 is to the Mind j nothing fo deformed and irreconcilable to the Un- 
 derltanding, as a Lye. For though many a Man can with fatis- 
 faftion enough own a no very handfbme Wife in his Bofom •, yet 
 who is bold enough openly to avow, that he his efpouled a Falf- 
 hood, and received into his Brcall fo ugly a thing as a Lye? 
 Whilft the Parties of Men, cram their Tenents down all Mens 
 I'hroats, whom they can get into their Power, without permit- 
 ting them to examine their Truth or FalQiood •-, and will not let 
 Truth have fair play in the World, nor Men the Liberty tolearch 
 after it ; What Improvements can be expc6led of this kind ? 
 W hat greater Light can be hoped for in the moral Sciences ? The 
 Si.ibjc6t part of Mankind, in moft Places, might, inftead thereof, 
 with .Egyptian Bondage, txpt6^ Egyptian Darknefs, were not the 
 Candle of the Lord fet up by himleif in Mens Minds, which it is 
 impoflible for the Breath or Power of Man wholly to txtinguiflj. 
 ,. r. ir §. 21. As to the fourth fort of our Know- 
 
 tuitixeKm-wledge of Things, We have an intuitive Knowledge 
 cur twn demonflrattve ^^ ^"'^ O^" Exiftence •, a dmonftrati ve Kno W- 
 tfGed's fenfibleof/tme ledge of the Exiftence ofaGod;, oflhe£A:»- 
 f(w other Things. Our (lence of any thing el(e, we have no other but 
 Ignorance gr tat. a fenfitive Knowledge, which extends not 
 
 beyond the Obje£ls prefent to our Stnfes. 
 §. 11. Out Knowledge being fb narrow, as I have fliew'd, it 
 will, perhaps, give us fome Light into the prelcnt State of our 
 Minds, If we look a little into the dark fide, and take a view of 
 our Ignorance : which being infinitely larger than our Knowledge, 
 "may fervemuch to the quieting of Difputt^, and Improvement: 
 of ufcful Knowledge ; ifdllcovering how far we have clear and 
 difliii/> Ideas, we confine our Thoughts within the Contempla- 
 tion of thofe Things, that are within the reach of our Undcr- 
 ItaiiJingi, and lanch not out into that Abyf^ of Darknef^ ( where 
 we have not Eyes to fee, nor Faculties to i-crcqive any thing,) out 
 
 o/" 
 
Extent of Humane Knowledge. 177 
 
 of a Prefiimption, that nothing Is beyond our Comprehenfion. 
 But to be fatisfied of the Folly of fuch a Conceit, we need not 
 go far. He that knows any thing, knows this in the firfl: place, 
 that he need not feek long for Inftances of his Ignorance. The 
 meaneft, and moft obvious Things that come in our way, have 
 dark fides, that the qulckeft Sight cannot penetrate into. The 
 cleareft, and moft enlarged Underftandings of thinking Men 
 find themlelves puzzled, and at a lofs, in every particle of Mat- 
 ter. We fhall the left wonder to find it fo, when we^ corfidcr 
 the Caufes of our Ignorance^ which, from what has been faid, I lup^ 
 pofe, will be found to be-chiefly thefe three : 
 
 F»V/?, Want of ideai. 
 
 Secondly^ Want of a difcoverable Connexion between the Idedi 
 we have. 
 
 Thirdly^ Want of tracing, and examining our Ideas, 
 
 §. a^. Firflt There are fome Things, and thofe 
 not a few, that we arc ignorant of for want of ^yfl* ont 
 Ideas. '''"^'"^,1'; 
 
 Firfl, All the fimple Ideas we are cofined (as I have "^J^ertfll 
 fhewn) to thofe we receive from corporeal Obie<!^ts !I/r ,,f j/*^ 
 by Setjfation, and rrom the Operations or our own Concept ton of. 
 Minds as the ObjeiSs of l^efle^ion. But how much or fuch .is pa/- 
 thefe few and narrow Inlets are difproportionatc to ticuUrly we 
 the vaft whole Extent of all Beings, will nor be have not. 
 hard to perfuade thofe, who are not (b foolfli, as to 
 think their Span the meafure of all Things. What other fimple 
 Ideas 'tis poffible the Creatures in other parts of the Univ',i fe may- 
 have, by the Afliftance of Senfes and Faculties more or perft6ler, 
 than we have, or different from ours, 'tis not for us to determine : 
 But to fay, or think there are no fuch, becaufe we conceive no- 
 thing of them, is no better an Argument, than if a blind Man 
 fliouldisc politive in it, that there was no fuch thing as Sight and 
 Colours, becau(e-be had no manner of Idea, of any fuch thingj^ 
 nor could by any means frame to himfelf any Notions about 
 Seeing. The Ignorance, and Darknefs that is in u?, no more 
 hinders, nor confines the Knowledge, that is in others, than the 
 blindnefs of a Mole is an Argument againft the quick- fii^lifedrjefs. 
 of an Eagle. He that will confidcr the infinite Power, W iJdor?),and 
 Goodnefs of the Creator of ail Things, will find Reafbn to thin.k 
 it was not all laid out upon fb inconfiderable, mean, and impo^ 
 tent a Creature, as he will find Man to be; who in probability^, 
 is. one of the loweft of all intelle£liJai Brings. VVh»r Faculties rher^'>. 
 fore other Species, o£ Creatures have to penetr-ate in'tothe Nature 
 ^jj4.W^9ftQ>»iUfWo§^ Ifhii^^si, wh^t ldepi}:i\iQy. ma]^ rcoeiKfi 
 
178 Extent cf Humane Knowledge. 
 
 of them, far dlflfcrcnt of ours, we know nor. This wc know, 
 and certainly find, that wc want feveraiorht^r views of them,be- 
 lides thofe we have, to make Difcoverics of them more perftdV. 
 And we may Lx; convinced that the ideas, we can attain to by 
 our I'aculties, arc V€ry dil'proportionate to Things themfelves, 
 when a politive clear diftinft one of Subllance it ftlf, which is the 
 Foundation of all the reft, concealed trom us. But want of 
 Ideas of this kind being a Part, as well as Caulc of our Ignorance, 
 cannot be defcribed. Only this, I think, I may confidently. fty 
 of it, tliat the intellectual and fenfible World, are in this perftdily 
 alike; That that part, which we (ecot either of them, holds n9 
 proportion with what we fee not ; And whatfoever we can 
 reach with our Eyes, or our Thoughts of either of ihem, 15 but 
 a point, almoft nothing, in comparifbn of the reft. 
 
 §. 14. Secondly, Another great Caufe'of Igno- 
 Bccaufe of ranee, is the want of Ideas tee are capable of. As 
 thttr Remote- the want ot idein, which our Faculties are not ab'e 
 ^fjf* or, to give us, fhuts us wholly from thofe views of 
 
 Things, which 'tis reafbnable to think other Beings, 
 perfc£ler than we, have, of which we know nothing, fo the 
 want of Ideas^ 1 now fpeak of, keeps us in Ignorance of Things, 
 Wc conceive capable of being known to us. Bulk^f Figure, and 
 Taction, w&h^vQldeasoL But though we are not without ideas 
 of thefe primary Qualities of Bodies in general, j^et not knowing 
 what is the particular B«//(., Figure, and Motion, oi thegrea- 
 tclt part of the B lies ot the Univerfe, we are ignorant of the 
 Several Powers, Efficacies, and Ways of Operation, whf reby the 
 Effc6ls, which we daily foe, are produced. Tbcfc are hid from 
 us in fome Things, by being tooremote •, and in others, by being 
 to mimite. When we confider the vaft diftance of the knoWn 
 and vifible parts of the World, and the Reafons we have to tfiink, 
 that what lies within our Ktn, is buta fmallpart of theimmenTc 
 Univerfe, we (hall then difcover an huge Abyfs of Ignorance. 
 What arc the particular Fabriclcs of the great MaflfLSolJVlatter, 
 which makeup the whole ftupendious frame of Corporeal Beings ; 
 how far they are extended , what is their Motion, and how con- 
 tinued, or communicated •, and what Influence they have one 
 upon another, are Contemplation', that at firft glimpfe our 
 Thoughts lofe themfelves in. If we narrow our Contemplation, 
 and confine our Thoughts to this little Canton, I mean thisSy- 
 il^cm of our Sun, and the groflfer Muffcs of Matter, that vilibly 
 move about it, what fevcral forts of Vegetable?, Animals, and in- 
 tellc6hial corporeal Beings, infinitely different from thofe of our 
 little rpoc of Earth, may there probably be in the other Planets, 
 
 to 
 
Extent of Humane Kftowkd^el 179 
 
 to the Knowledge of which, even of their outxvard Figures and 
 Parts we can no wayatrain, whilft we are confined to rhisEanh, 
 there being no natural Mean?, either by Senfation or Refl:6iion, 
 to conceive their certain Ideas into our Minds ? They are out o£ 
 the reach of thofe Inlets of all our Knowledge; and vvhat forts 
 of Furniture and Inhabitants thole Manfions contain in them, we 
 cannot (o much as guefs, much left have clear, and diftin^t Ideas 
 of them. 
 
 §. 25. If a great, nay far the greateft part of _g^.,,^^^ ^r 
 the feveral ranks of Bodies in the Univerfe, (cape their Mtnute- 
 our Notice by their Remote nels, there are others nefs. 
 that are no lefs concealed from us by their JW;- 
 mitenefs, Thele infenlible Corpufcles, being the a£live parts 
 of Matter, and the great Inltruments of Nature, 0!i which 
 depend not only all their fecondary Ql^alities, but alfo moll of 
 their natural Operations, our want of preclfe diftin6l Ideas of 
 their primary Qualities, keeps us in an uncurable Ignorance of 
 what we defir^. to know about them. I doubt not but if we could 
 difcover the Figure, Size, Texture, and Motion of the minute 
 Conftituent p^rts of any two Bodies, we {hould know withouc 
 Trial feveral of their Operations one upon another, as we do now 
 the Properties of a Square, or a Triangle. Did we knovv^he 
 Mechanical Affe6lions of the Particles of i^/j«^^r^. Hemlock, Opiiim^ 
 and a Mm, as a Watch-maker does cholc of a Warch, whereby 
 it performs its Operations,and of a File which by rubbing on them 
 will alter the Figure of any of the Wheels, we fhould be able 
 to tell beforehand, that i^j«W^ will purge, Hemlock kill, and 
 Opium make a. Man deep, as well as a Warch-maker can, that 
 a little piece of Paper laid on the Balance, will keep the Watch 
 from goingvtill it be removed :, or that fbme fmall parr of ic, 
 being rubo d by a File, the Machin would quite lofe its Motion,, 
 and the Watch go no more. The diffolving of Silver in aq^uafor' 
 t», and Gold in <?<////« R^giay and not viceverfa^ would be then, 
 perhaps, namore difficult to know, than it istoaSmiih touii- 
 derfla,nH, why the turning of one Key will opni a Lock, aiid 
 not the turning of another. But whi'ft we are deltitute of Senfes 
 acute enough, todilcover themmute Particles of Bodies,, and to 
 give us Ideas of their mechanical Affeilions, we muit be content to, 
 be ignorant of their properties and ways ot Operation v nor cart 
 we bcalEiredaboutthemany farther, than foms few Triatswe' 
 make, are able to reach, But whether they will fucceed again an-- 
 other time, we cannot be certain. This hinders our certain Kiiow- 
 ledgQ of uniyerlal Truths concerning natural Bodies :and our Rea-* 
 feat^aSJjies ush^r.^ii)tvei!y little bt;y on d par ticqlas n^nsr, of Fa6K 
 ~ "■ ' ' ^ 4 §> ^6v 
 
i8o Extent of fJumane Knowledge. I 
 
 §. 16. And therefore 1 aii apt to doubt that, 1 
 ijtnce no ^ow far (oever humame Indullry may advance ufc- ll 
 ScttHfeofBo- f^,l and expertmental Philofophy in fhyftcd things ^ 
 *'"• fcienttfical will Hill be out of our re^ich : becaufe we 
 
 wantptrfcdl and adequate Ideas of thofc very Bo- 
 dies, which are nearcft to us, and moft under our Command. 
 Thofe which we have ranked into Clafles under Name?, and we 
 think our felvcs befl acquainted with, we have but very imper- 
 fc£i, and incompleat Ideas of, Diftinft Ideas of the feveral Ibrts 
 cf Bodies, that fall under the Examination of our Scnfts, perhap?, 
 we may have: but adequate fJe^j, Ifufpefl, we have not of any 
 one amongll them. And tho' the former of thefe will ferve Ui for 
 corhmon life and Difcourfe : yet whilft we want the latter, we 
 are not capable of fcienttfical Knowledge •, nor (hall ever be able to 
 difcovcr general, inftru6liyc, unqutltionable Truths concerning 
 them. Certainty and Demonfirationy arc Things we muft not, in 
 thefe Matters, pretend to. By the Colour, Figure, Tafte, and 
 Smell, and other fenfible Qiialities, we have as clear anddiflindt 
 ideas of Sage and Hemlock, as we have of a Circle and a Triangle : 
 But having no Ideas of the particular primary Qiialities of the mi- 
 nure parts of either of thefe Plants, nor of other Bodies which we 
 ■would apply them to, wc cannot rell what efft£t:s they will pro- 
 duce-, Nor when we fee thole tffe6ls,can we fo much as guers,much 
 lefi know,their manner of produdtion. Thus having no Ideas of the 
 particular mechanical Aftt^iions of the minute parts of 3odies, 
 that are within our view and reach;We are ignorant of their Con- 
 ftitutionsPowers,and Operations : and of Bodies more remote,we 
 are yet more ignorant,not knowing fb much as their very outward 
 Shape?, or tlic fenfible an 1 groff.'r parts of their Conflitutions. 
 
 §. Z7. This, at firft fight, will Ihew us how dlf^ 
 Muihleft of proportionate our Knowledge is to the whole cx- 
 Spirits. rent even of material Beings ; to which, if we add 
 
 the Confidenition of ihat infinite number of 5/'xn>f 
 that may be, and probably arc, which are yet more rcmqtc trom 
 ourKnowltdgc, whereof we have no cognizance, nor can frame 
 roour ftlvcs any dillindl: ideas oiihax feveral ranks and forts, we 
 (hall find this caufc of Ignorance conceal from us in an impene- 
 trable obfcurity, almolt the whole Inrelkftual World j a greater; 
 certainly, and more beau;iful World than tie material. For 
 bating fame very few, and thoie, if 1 may focal! them, fuferfi- 
 cial Ideas of Spirit, v/hich by rtrie6lion we goc of our own, and 
 from thence, I he btfl wecan coUcdl, of the i'arhero^all Spirit?, 
 rhe eternal independent Author of them and us and allThings, 
 we have no ccrrain infornjauon^ fb mudi as of the Extf^enee 6f 
 
Extent of Humane KHowkdge. i %i 
 
 other Spirits, but by revelation. Angels of all forts are naturals 
 ly beyond our Mcovtry : And all thofe intelligences, whereof 
 'tis likely there are more Orders than of corporeal Subftances, are 
 Thing?, whereof our natural Faculties give us no certain account 
 at all. That there are Minds, and thinking Beings in other Men 
 as well as himfelf, every Man has a reafbn, from their Words 
 and Anions, to be fatlsfied : And the Knowledge of his own 
 Mind cannot fuffer a Man, that con fiders, to be ignorant, that 
 there is a G O D. But that there are degrees of Spiritual Beings 
 between us and the great GOD, who is there, that by his own 
 (earch and ability can come to know ? Much lefs have we di- 
 ftin6l Ideas oi their different Natures, Conditions, Stiites, Pow-t 
 ers, andfeveral Conftitutions, wherein they agree or differ from 
 one another, and from us. And therefore in what concerns their 
 different Species and Properties, we are under an abfblute igno- 
 rance. 
 
 §. ^8. Secondly, What a finall part of the Tub- Secondly, 
 ftantial Being?, that are in the Univcrfc, the want "'*»' "/« <iif 
 o[ Ideof leave o^ en to our Knowledge, we have ^<f'^e>'^^le C4)n^. 
 fetn. In the next place, another caufe ot Ignorance, "^*"" /^" 
 of no lefs moment, is a want of a difcoverable Con- J^'^" ^" 
 nexion between thofe Ideas which we have. For 
 wherever we want that, we are utterly uncapable of unlver(al and 
 certain Knowledge*, and are, as in the former cafe, left only to 
 Obfervation and Experiment : which how narrow and confined 
 it is, how far from general Knowledge, we need not be told. 
 I fhali give fome few Inftances of this caule or our Ignorance, and 
 ft) leave it. 'Tis evident that the Bulk, Figure, and Morion of 
 ftveral Bodies about us, produce in us (everal Sen^tion?, as of Co- 
 lours, Sounds, Taftes, Smells, Pleafure and Pain, i3c. Thefe me- 
 chanical Affe6lions of Bodies, having no affinity at all with thole 
 Ideoi, they produce in us, ( there being no conceivable Conne- 
 xion between any impullecf any fort of Body, and any Percep- 
 tion of a Colour, or Smell, which we find in our Minds) we can 
 have no diftincf Knowledge of fuch Operations beyoiid our Ex-; 
 perJence; and can reafon no oiherwife about them, than as ef- 
 feits produced by the Appointment of an infinitely Wi'e Agent, 
 which perfe61:ly furpafs our Comprehenfions. As the ideai of fen- 
 iible fecondary Qjalitie?, yvhich we have in our Minds, can, by 
 us, be no ^yay deduced from bodily Caufes, nor any Correfpon- 
 dtnce or Conhcxion be ifound between them ai>d thole primary 
 Qualities whicK ( Experience iSievvs us), produce tl^em, in us ; fd 
 on the other fide; the Operatbh oFoia- Miiids upon our Bodies 
 h. as u!ux>nc€iyabb.. How a^^y Tkoyght foouLd-produgs a Mo=r' 
 
i8i Extent ef Humane Knowledge, 
 
 tion in Body is as remote from the Nature of our Ideau^ as how 
 any B-^Ki^ fhould produce any Thought in the Mind. That it is 
 fb, it Experience did not convince uj, the ConHderation of the 
 Things rhemiclvcs would never be able, in the Icail:, to difcover 
 to us. Thefe, and the like, though they hive a conftant and 
 regular Connexion, in the ordinary courfe of Tilings : yet that 
 connexion b ing not dilcoverable in the ide^s themfclves, which 
 appearing to have no neceffiry dependance one on another, we 
 can attribute their connexion to nothing el(e, but the arbitrary 
 Determination of that All-wife Agent, who has made them to 
 b •, and to operate as they do, in a way wholly above our weak 
 Underftanding? to conceive. 
 
 §. 19. Infome of our Jiieas there are certain Rc- 
 Inflnnccs. latioTi?, Habitudes, and Connexions, fo vifibly in- 
 cluded in the Nature of the Ideai themfelves^ that 
 we cannot concei\^e them feparabic fron them, by any Power 
 whatfoever. And in the(c only, we are capable of certain and 
 univerfal Knowledge. Thus the Idea of a right-lined Triangle 
 necoflarily carries with it an equality of its Angles to two right 
 ones. Nor cm we conceive this Relation, this connexion of 
 thefe two ideMj to be poflibly mutable, or to depend on any ar- 
 bitrary Power, which of choice made it thu«, or could make it 
 otherwife. But the coherence and continuity of the Parts of 
 Matter ; the produftlon of Senfation in us of Colours and 
 Sounds, (3c. by Impulfe and Motion j nay, the original Rules 
 and Communication of Motion being fuch, wherein we can dis- 
 cover no natural Connexion wirh any Ideas we have, we cannot 
 but alcribc them to the arbitrary Will and good Pleafure of the 
 Wifj Architect. 1 need nor, 1 think, here mention the Rcfur- 
 rcAlon of the dead, the future ftate of his Globe of Earth, and 
 fuch other Things, which are by every one acknowledged to de- 
 pend wholly on the Determination of a free Agent. TheThing? 
 that, as far as our Oblcrvation reache?, vve conftantly find to 
 proceed regularly, we may conclude, doaclby a Law fetthemj 
 but yet by a Law, that we know not : whereby, tho' Caufes 
 v/okftcadily, and Effo6l,> conftantly flow from them, yet their 
 Connexions and Dependencies being not difcovcrablc in our Ideai^ 
 wccan hive but an experimental Knowledge of them. From 
 all which 'tis eafy to perceive, what a darknefi we are involved 
 m, hov/ little 'tis of Being, and the things that are, that we are 
 capable to know. And therefore vve fhall do no Injury to our 
 Knowl( dge when we modcflly think with our ftlvcs, that we are 
 fo far from being able to comprehend t hj whole Nature of the 
 Univcrfe, and all the ihing5Comai!)ci initi that wq aie notca- 
 
 pa.bis: 
 
Extent of Humane Knowledge, i8j 
 
 pable of a philofophjcal ^^on^ledge oi t]\Q Bodies that are abou^ 
 us, and make a pare of us ; Concerning their (econdary Quali- 
 ties, Powers, and Operations, we can have no univerfal Cer- 
 tainty. Several effects come every day within ihe notice of our 
 Senfes, of which we have fo far fenfitive Kjiowledge : but the caufes, 
 manner, and certainty of their produ6tion, fo» the two forego- 
 ing Reafbns, wemuft be content to be ignorant oE In thefe we 
 can go no farther than particular Experience informs us of matter 
 of fail, and by Analogy to guefs what £ffc6ts the like Bodies 
 are, upon other trials, like to produce. But as to a perfeft Sci- 
 ence of natural Bodie<», (not to mention fpiritual Beings,} we 
 are, I think, fo far from being capable of any fuch thing, that 
 I conclude it loft labour to (eek after it. 
 
 §. 50. Thirdly, Where we have adequate J^f4f, Thirdly, want 
 and where there is a certain and difcoverable Con- 4 tf^^i^ig our 
 nexion between them, yet we are ofren ignorant, ^''^^s- 
 for want of tracing thole Ideai which we have, or 
 may have ^ and for want of finding out thofe intermediate 7^^^, 
 which may ihew us, what Habitude of Agreement or Dilagree- 
 ment they liave one with another. And thus many are ignorant 
 of mathematical Truths, not out of any imperfc<51ion of their 
 Faculties, or uncertainty in the Things themielves •, but for want 
 of application in acquiring, examining, and by due ways com- 
 paring thole Ideas. That which has moft contributed to hinder 
 the due tracing of our Ideas, and finding out their Relations, and 
 Agreements or Difagreements one with another, has been, 1 fup- 
 pole, the ill. ule of Words. It is impoflfible that Men Ihould ever 
 truly leek, or certainly dilcover the Agreement or Difagreemcnt 
 of ideas rheralelves, whilft their Thoughts flatter about, or ftick 
 only in Sounds of doubtful and uncertain Significations. Ma- 
 thematicians abftra<5ling their Thoughts from Names, and ac- 
 cuftoming themfeives to let before their Minds, the Ideas them- 
 ielves, that they would con(ider,and not Sounds initeadofthenf, 
 have avoided thereby a great part of that Perplexity, Puddcring, 
 and Confufion, which has lb much hindred Mens Progrefsin o- 
 ther parts of Knowledge. For whilft they ftick in "Words of un- 
 determined and uncertain Signification, they are unable to diftin- 
 guiih True from Falle, Certain from Probable, Connftent from 
 Inconfiftent, in their own Opinions. This having been the Fate 
 or Misfortune of a great pare of the Men of Letters, thif Increali 
 brought into the Stock of real Knowledge, has been very little, 
 in proportion to the Schools, Difputes, and Writings, the World 
 has been fiU'd with •, whilft Students, being loft in the great 
 Wood of Words, knew not whereabout they werej how far 
 
 their 
 
184 Reality of Knowledge. 
 
 their D\^covtn^^ were advanced, or what was wanting in their 
 own, or the general Stock of Knowledge. Had Men, in the 
 PlfcDvcries of the material, done, as rhcy iiave in thofc of the 
 inrelkiiual World, involved all in the obfcurity of uncertain 
 and doubtful ways of talking, Volumes writ of Navigation and 
 Voyages, Theories and Stories of Zones and Tydes, multiplied 
 and difputed j nay, Ships built, and Fleets fet out, would never 
 have taught us the way beyond the Line j and the Antipodes 
 would be flill as much unknown, as when it was declared \i& 
 Ttiy to hold there were any. But having (poken futficiently of 
 Words, and the ill or carelefs ufe, that is commonly made of 
 ihem, 1 fhall not fay any thing more of it here. 
 
 §. ; I . Hitherto we have examined the extent of 
 Extent in re- our Knowledge, in refpeft of the (everal forts of 
 fiecl of Urn- geJ,-ig5 that are. There is another extent of it^ in 
 v:rfality. reffcH ofVniverfality^ which will alfo dclerve to be 
 
 Confideredr and in this regard, our Knowledge follows the Na- 
 ture of our Ideas. If the Ideas are abftra6t, whole Agreement or 
 Difagreement we perceive, our Knowledge is univerfal. For 
 what is known of fuch general Ideas^ will be true of every par- 
 ticular thing, in whom that Eflence, i. e. that abftra6b ideas is 
 to be found : and what is once known of fuch Ideas, will be per- 
 petuallv, and for ever true. So that as to all general Knowledge, 
 we muft fearch and find it only in our own Minds, and *tis only 
 the examining of our own ideas, that furnifheth us with that. 
 Truths belonging to Eflences of Things, ( that is, to abftra6t 
 Ideas) are eternal, and are to befound^jpt by the Contemplation 
 only of thofe Effences : as the Exjftence of^hings is to be known 
 only from Experience. But haviiig more to faj •f this in the 
 Chapter?, where I (hall fpeak of general and rssA'Knowledge, 
 this may here fuffice as to the Univerfality of t^f Knowledge 
 jn general. 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 0(the A/rMs^g/^*'*'^ 
 
 ohy.^ion, §. I. T" Doubt not but my Reader, by this time, 
 
 KntvJcdge I may b? apt to think, that I have been all 
 
 placedin Ideai -•- this while only building a Caftle in the 
 
 may be alL ^{^ . and be ready to (ay to me. To what 
 
 baye Vif.tn, purpofc aH this llir ? Knowledge, fey you^ 
 
 ^ ^ " . h: 
 
. Reality of Knowledge, iS^ 
 
 is.bnly the Pcrteption of the Agreement or Difagreemeni: of ouf 
 own Ideas : but who knows what thoie Ideas may be ? Is there 
 any thing fo extravagant, as the Imaginations of Mens Brains t 
 Where is the Head that has no Chimeras in it ? Or if there be 
 a fjber and a wife Man, what difference will there be, by your 
 Rules, between his Knowledge, and that of the moll extrava- 
 gant Fancy in the World ? They both have their Ideas, and per- 
 ceive their Agreement and Dilagreement one with another. If 
 there be any difference between them, the advanftge will be on 
 the warm-headed Man's fide, as having the more Ideas, and the 
 more lively. And fb, by your Rules, he will be the more know- 
 ing. If ic be true* that all Knowledge lies only in the Percepti- 
 on of the Agreement or Di^greement of our o^n Ideas, theVi- 
 fionsof anEnthufiaft, and the Reafbniogs of a fober Man, will 
 be equally certain. 'Tis no matter how Things are; fo a Man 
 obferve but the Agreement of his own Imaginations, and talk con- 
 formably, it is all Truth, all Certainty. Such Caftlesin the A'r, 
 will be as ftrong Holds of Truth, as the Demonftrations of Euclid^ 
 That an Harpy is not a Centaur, is by this way as certain Know- 
 ledge, and as much a Truth, as that a Square is not a Circle* 
 
 But of what life » all this fine Kjloxvledge of Mens own Imaginati- 
 ons, to a Man that enquires after the reality of Things ? It mat- 
 ters not what Mens Fancies are, 'tis the Knowledge of things 
 that is only to be prized : 'tis this alone gives a value to our Rea- 
 fbnings, and preference to one Man's Kaowledge over another's. 
 That it is of Things as they really are, and not of Dreams arid 
 Fancies. 
 
 §. 2.. To which I anfwer^ That if our Know- jinfatr. Not 
 ledge of our ideas terminate in them, and reach no fo,vhere Ideas 
 farther, where there is fbmething farther intended, "g^ee with 
 our mofl ferious Thoughts will be of little more ^'^'»^^- 
 ule, than the Reveries of a crazy Brain j and the 
 Truths built thereon of no more weight, than the DIfcourfes of 
 a Man, who lees Things clearly in a Dream, and with great 
 Aflurance utters them. But, I hope, before I have done, to 
 make it evident, that this way of Certainty, by the Knowledge 
 of our own Ideas^ goes a litrle farther than bare Imaginition: 
 and, I btlievc it will appear, that all the certainty of general 
 Truths a Man has, lies in nothing clle. 
 
 §. 5. 'Tis evidenr, the Mind knows not Things ^nfmsr,Not 
 immediately, but only by the Interventinn of the fo,v)here\6Q^% 
 Ideas It has of them. Our Knowledge therefore is "^^'^ *'^'^ 
 real^ only fo far as there is a Conformity berweni '^^'^5''- 
 our hleas and the reality of Things. But what Ihal' be here the 
 
 Crireri^ ni^ 
 
i86 Reality tf Knowledge. 
 
 Criterion? How (hall the Mind, when ir perceiv^es nothing but 
 its own ideas^ know that they agree with Things ihcmftlves ? 
 This, tho' it items not to want ditficuhy, yet, 1 think there be 
 two forts of /^tw, that, we may be allured, agree vvhh Things. 
 
 §. 4. Fi>/?, The firft are hmple ideas^ which lince 
 ^/, //r/? [}^g Mind, as has been fhewaJ, can by no means 
 \L 7o ^^^^ '^ '^^ ^''l^' raullncc^farily be tht produa of 
 as 0.^ Things operating on ilic Mind in a i auira! way, and 
 producing therein thofe Perceptions which by the Wildom and 
 Will ot our Maker they are ordained and adapted to. From 
 whence it follows, that fimple Ideas itre not fiilions of cur Fancies^ 
 but the natural and regular prouu6lions of Things without u?, 
 leally operating upon us •, and fb carry with them all the con- 
 formity which is intended •, or which our Stare requires: For 
 they reprefent to usThingsuncIer thofe Aj^pearances which they 
 are fitted to produce in us : whereby we are enabled to diftin- 
 guifti the (brts of particular Subftances, to difcern the Stares they 
 are in, and Co to take thtm forourNeceflTities, and apply them 
 to our Ufes. Thus the Idea of Whitenefs, or Bitrerncfs, as it is 
 in the Mind, exadly anfwering that Power which is in any 
 Body to produce it there, has all the real conformity it can, or 
 ought to have, with Things without usj And this conformity 
 between our fimple Ideasy and the ExifteiKe of Things, is fuf5- 
 cient fof real Knowledge. 
 
 §. 5. Secondly, All our complex Ideas^exccptthofi of 
 Stcondlj/ Ail SuMawes, bein^ Archetypes of the Mind's own raa- 
 except of ^ub' '^'"?> "°^ intended to be the Copies or any thing, 
 Ranees. ^^ ^^ ^^^'"^ Originals, cannot want any conformity ne- 
 
 ceffary to real Kjiorvledge. For that which is not 
 defigncd to reprefent any thing but it felf, can never be capable 
 of a wrong reprcfenration,nor miflcad us from the true apprehen- 
 fion of any thing, by its Diflikenefs to it : and luch, excepting 
 ihofe of Subftances, are all our complex Ideas. Which, as I have 
 Jhewed in another place, are Combinations oi deas^ which the 
 Mmd, by its free choice, puts together, without confidering any 
 connexion they have in Nature. And hence it is, that in all 
 ihefc forts the Ideas themfelvc^ are confidered as the Arcljetypes, 
 and Things no otherwile regarded, but as they are conformable 
 ro them. So that wecannot but be infallibly certain, that all 
 the Knowledge we attain concerning thefe Ideas U real , and 
 reaches Things themfelves. Bccaufe in all our Thoughts, Rea- 
 fonings, and Difcourfes of this kind, we intend Things no far- 
 ther, than aD they are conformable to our Ideas. So that in thelt', 
 we cannot mils oi a certain undoubted reality, 
 
 §. 6, 
 
Reality of knowledge, iS^ 
 
 §. i^. I doubt not but it will be eafily granted, 
 that the Kjiotvledge we have of Mathematical Iriithsf Hence the 
 is not only certain, but real Kjiorpledge ^ and not the Reality »f tn». 
 bare empty Vifion of vain inlignificant Chimeras of thsnatjcal 
 the Brain : And yet, it we will confider, we (hall Kf>»-«le%e. 
 find that ic is only of our own Ideat. The Mathe- 
 matician confiders the Truth and Properties belonging to a Rect- 
 angle, or Circle, only as they are in I<if4 in his own Mind. For 
 'tis poffible he never found either of them exifting mathematically, 
 i. e. precifely true, in his Life. But yet the Knowledge he has 
 of any Truths or Properties belonging to a Circle, or any other 
 mathematical Figure, are neverthelefs true and certain, even of 
 real Things exifting : becaufe real Things are no farther concer- 
 ned, nor intended to be meant by any fiich Proportions, than as 
 Things really agree to thofe Archetypes in his Mind. Is it true of 
 theldeaofzTrjanglet that its three Angles are equal ro two right 
 ones ? It is true alfo of a Triangle, where-ever it rcalJy exifts. What- 
 ever other Figure exifts, that is not exactly anfwerable to that I- 
 dea of a Triangle in his Mind, is not at all concerned in that Propo- 
 (ition. And thefore he is certain all his Knowledge concerning 
 filch Jdetay is real Knowledge : becaufe intending Things no far- 
 ther than they agree with thefehis Ideas, he is lure what he knows 
 concerning thofe Figures, when they have barely an Ideal Exifiena 
 in his Mind, will hold true of them alfb, when they have a real 
 Exiftence in Matter •, hisconfideration being barely of thofe Fi-, 
 gures, which are the fame, whcre-ever, or however they exift. 
 ^nd of moral. . ^' 7 ^^^ hence it follows, ihit moral Knowledge 
 hus capable of real Certainty, Q,sMathemat\cks. For 
 Certainty being but the Perception of the Agreement, or Difir 
 greement of our Ideas -, and Demonftrjtion nothing but the Percep- 
 tion of fuch Agreement, by the Intervention of other Ideas, or Me- 
 diums, our moral Ideas, ^s v/ell as mathematical, hting Archetypes 
 themlelves, and Co adequate, and complete J^/mj, all the Agree- 
 ment, or Difagreement,which we fhall find in them, will produce 
 real Knowledge, as well as in mathematical Figures. 
 
 §• 8. For the attaining of Kjiotpkdge and Cer- ^^^n 
 tainty it is requifite, that we have determined Ideas : remtindto "' 
 and to make our Knowledge real, it is requifite, make it veal, 
 that the Ideas anfwer their /Archetypes. Nor let it be 
 wondred, that I place the Certainty of our Knowledge in the Con-^ 
 fideration of our Ideas, with (o little Care and Regard ( as ic may 
 feem) to the real Exiftence of Things j Since molt of thofe DiP 
 courles, which rake up the Thoughts and engage Difpures of 
 thofe who pretend to make it tiidr B'jfiiiQQ to enquire afcer Truth 
 
 and 
 
i38 Reality of Knowtedge. 
 
 and C-jftainty^ will, I prefiimc, upon Examination be found to 
 he general Propofittons J and Notions in which Exillencc is not it 
 all concerned. All the Difcoutfes ot the Mathematicians about 
 the (rjaaring of a Circle, conick SedlioiiSi or any other part of 
 Mathematicks, concern not the Exiflence of any of thofe Figures, 
 but their Demollrations, which depend ou chcir iJeaSf are the 
 (aniCjWhether there be any Square or Circle exilling in the World, 
 or no. In the fame manner, the Truth and Certainty of moral 
 Difcourfes abftra6ls from the Lives of Men, and the Exiftenee of 
 thole Vertues in the World, whereof they treat : Nor are Tull/s 
 Offices left true, becaule there is no Body in the World that exact- 
 ly pra6liles his Rules, and lives up to that Pattern of a vertuous 
 Man, which he has given us, and which exilled no where, vvheri 
 he writ, but in idea. If it be true in Speculation j i. e. in idea, that 
 Murther deferves Deathy it will alfo be true in Reality of ar^ A6lion 
 thlt exifts conformable to that Idea of Murther. As for other 
 A(5lion5, the Truth of that Propofition concerns them not. And 
 thus it is of all other Species of Things, which have no other EC' 
 fences, but thoCe ideasf which are in the MinJs of Men. 
 
 §. 9. Bjt it will here be faid, that W moral Kjiow- 
 Nor will it bt ledge be placed in the Contemplation of our own 
 lefs true or ^gj.^i ijgasy and thofe, as other Modes, be of our 
 certain, he- q^,^ making, What ftrange Notions will there be 
 caufi moral \- ^f y„yj -^^ 3,^^ remverance ? What confufion of Ver- 
 amare of our wt- -r 1 1 ,f 
 
 twn making: ^"^^ and Vices, it every one may make \\h^tldeas 
 mnd naming, of them hepleafes? No confufion nordifbrder iii 
 the Things themfelves, nor the Reafonings about 
 them *, no more than ( in Mathematicks ) there would be a Diftur- 
 bance in the Demonftration, or a change in the Properties of Fi- 
 gures, and their Relations one to another, if a Man fh 5uld make 
 a Triangle with four Corners, or a Trape:(ium with four right 
 i^ni^ies : that is, in plain E;jg/i/?j,change the Names of the Figures, 
 and call that by ens Name, which Mathematician; call'd ordina- 
 rily by another. For let a Man make to himfelf the Idea of a Fi- 
 gure with three Angles, whereof one is a right one, and call it, 
 if he plealc, EquiUtenim or Trape:{ium^ or any thing elfe, the Pro- 
 perties of, and Dcmonftrations about that JJf^, will be the lame, 
 as if he caird it a HeBangular Trian;jje. I confefs, the change of 
 the Name, by the inpropricty ol Speech, will at hrftdliturb him, 
 who knows not what Idea it ftands lor : buc as foon as the Figure 
 is drawn,the Confcquences andDemonftration are plain and clear. 
 Jull the fimc is it in moral Knowledge, let a M::n have x.\\tIdeA 
 of taking from others, without their Cor. ft nt", v.'bat their honeft 
 Induftry has pofi( (led ihcm of, and cull this ^ujliccy if he pleafe. 
 
 He 
 
Reality of Knowledge. J 89 
 
 He that tllces the Name here without the I^e^ put to it, will 
 be miftaken, by joining another Idea of his own to that Name: 
 But rtrip the Idea of that Name, or take it fuch as ic is in the 
 Speaker's Mind, and the fame Things will.agree to It, asif yoa 
 call'd it Injuftice. Indeed, wrong Names ill moral Difcourfe?, 
 breed ufualiy more diforder, becaufe they are not fo eafily re- 
 <aiiied^ as in Mathematicks, where the Figure once cfrawn and 
 feen, makes the Name ufelefi and of no force. For what need ot 
 a Sign, when the Thing fignificd is prefent and in view ? But: 
 in moral Names, that cannot be To ealily and fhortly ^dohe, be« 
 caule of the many decomtaofitions that go to the making up the 
 complex Ideas of thole Modes. But yet for all the mijcalUn^ of 
 any of thofe ideai^ contrary to the u(ual fignification of the 
 Words of that Language, hinders nor, but that we may have 
 certain and demonftrative Knowledge of their feveral Agree- 
 ments and Difagreements, if we will carefully, as in Mathema- 
 ticks, keep to the fame precife Ideas^ and trace them in their fe- 
 veral Relationsone to another, without being led away by their 
 Names. If we but feparate the Idea under confidcration fronji 
 the Sign that Itands for ir, our Knowledge goes equally oil m 
 the Discovery of real Truth and Certainty, whatever Sounds 
 we make ufe of, 
 
 §. I o. One thing more ive ire to take notice of, MifnMming 
 That where GOD, or any other Law-maker,hatn diflurh not, 
 defined aily Moral Narrtes, there they have made t^e Certainty 
 the Effence of that Species to which that Name "f /^^ Know- 
 belongs •, and there it is not fafe to apply or ufe ^**^^' 
 them otherwife ; feut in other cafes 'tis bare imprO" •, ,. 
 
 priety of Speech to apply them contrary to the cotnmon u^ge 
 of the Country. But yet everi this too difturbs not the Cer- 
 tainty of that Knowledge, which is ftiU to be had by a due 
 Contemplation and comparing of thofe even nick-nam'd ideas^ 
 
 §. I i. 7/&»W/)/, There is another lore of cow/»/i?A' 
 Ideas^ whfch being referred to Archetypes without IJeas 0/ S«^' 
 UJ^ may differ from them, and fo our Knowledge Jl'tnces ha^jg 
 about them, may come fhort of being real. Such ^^^"' Arche-^ 
 areour /flfff^jofSubflahce?, which confifting qf a ^^?^' vifhtat 
 Colle<3:ion of fimple Ideas, fujDpofed taken from *^° 
 the Works of Nature, may j/et vary from them, . 
 by having more or different Ideas united in them, thail are to 
 be found united in the things themlelves : From whence it comes 
 to pais, thit they tnay, and often dd fail of being QY.^^\y con- 
 formable to Things ihemfelves, 
 
 VoiK ir, ^; li 
 
igo Reality of Knoivledge. 
 
 §. II. I fay ihtn, that to have Ideas of Suh- 
 So far as thy fiances, which,' by being conformable to Thinf!,s, 
 ^Z'ee With . muy afford us real Knovvledgf, it is not enough, 
 thije, fo far as in Modcs, to put together (uch Ideas as have no 
 our Know- inconfiftence, though thcv did never before fo 
 Icdgt concern- gxilt. V. g. xk^^Adeas <^{ Ucrikqe OX Ferjury, (3c. 
 ing t,:.em u ^^^^ ,^^ ^^j and true ld£as before, as after rheExi- 
 ftence of any fuch Fa6l. But our Idea: ofSubJlances 
 being fuppofed Copies, and referred to Archetypes 
 without us, mufl: llill be talcen from fomcthing that does or has 
 exilkd j they muft not confill of J^e<w put together at the plea- 
 sure of our Thoughts, without any real Pattern they were taken 
 irom, though we can perceive no inconliftence in lucha Com- 
 bination; The reafbn whereof is, becaufe wc knowing not what 
 real Conlb'tution it is of Subftance?, whereon our fimple Ideas 
 depend, and which really isthecaufe of the itridl union of fome 
 of them one with another, and the exclufion of others j there 
 are very few of them, that we can be fure are, or are not in- 
 confiftent in Nature, any farther than Kxpericnce andfcnfible 
 Oblcrvation reaches. Herein therefore is founded the realiiy of 
 our Knowledge concerning SubjJances, thiit all our complex /dw* 
 of them muft be fuch, and fiich only, as are made up of fuch 
 fimple ones,^ as have been difcovered to co-cxift in Narure. And 
 our Ideas being thus true, though not, perhaps, very exa(5t Co- 
 pies, are yet the Subjects of real (as far a^s we have any ) IQuw- 
 ledge of them. Which fas has been alrca ly fLewed ) will not 
 be found to reach very far ; But fo far as it does, it will ftill be 
 real K^nott' ledge. Whatever Ideas we have, the Agreement we 
 find they have with others, will flill be Knowledge. If thofe 
 J leas be abftratS, it will be general Knowledge. But to make 
 ir real concerning Subftanccs, the Ideas mull: be taken from the 
 real Exiftence of things. Whatever fimple ideas have been 
 f jund toco exift In any Subftance, thele we may with Confi- 
 dence join together again, and (6 make abftradt Ideas of Sub- 
 fiances. For whatever have once had an union in Nature, may 
 be united again. 
 
 . §.13. This, if we rightly cmfider, and 
 
 l' t"*!- '"^''"'"^ "' cotifiiie not our Thoughts and abft"ra6l Ideas to 
 njufi coni'der Ideas ^ames, as if there were, or could be no other 
 and ntt' confine our .^"''^^ ^t Things, than what known Names 
 Thought f to hi. imes or ^^^^ already determined, and as it were fet 
 ^pectfs fuppofed fa out, We Ihould thinkof Things with greater 
 »«; l>j Nakhs, Freedom and lefb Cunfufion, than perhaps we 
 
 - do. 
 
Reality of Knowledge. 191 
 
 do. 'T would poflibly be thought a bold Paradox, if not a very 
 dangerous Falfhood, if I fliould fay, that fome Changelings^^ who 
 have lived forty Yearg together, without any appearance of Rea* 
 foil/ are fbniething between a Man and a Beaft : Which Preju- 
 dice \i founded upon nothing el(e but a fah'e Suppofulorij that 
 thefe two Names, Man and Beaft^ {land for diftin£t Species fb 
 /er out by real Effences, that there can come no other Species 
 between them : Whereas if we will abftra6l from thofe Names* 
 and the Suppofition of fuch fpecifick Effences made by Nature^ 
 wherein all Things of the fame Denominations did exajflly and 
 equally partake :, if we would not fancy, that there were a cer- 
 tain number of thefj Effences, wherein all Things, as in Molds, 
 were call and formed, we fhould find that the Uea ol: the Shape, 
 Motion, and Life of a Man without Reafbn, is as much a di- 
 ltin6l Ideay and makes as much a diftindt fort of Things from 
 Man and Beaft, as the Idea of the Shape of an Afs with Reafon, 
 would becificrent from either that of Man or Beafl, and be a 
 Species of an Animal between, or diftln6V from bothv 
 
 ' §. 14. Here every body will be ready to ask, 
 \i Changelings mv^ be fuppofed fbmething between OhjeFliona^ 
 Man and Beafl, 'Pray what are they ? I anfwer, g"'^ " 
 Changelinpt which is as good a Word to fignify , ^"^^^ ^"^* 
 (bmething different from the (ignificatlon of Ai ^ N SjlZweeH 
 or BEAST, as the Names Man and Beafl are to ^ J^„ ^„^ 
 have fignifications different one from the other, ^gaj}^ an- 
 This, well confidered, would refolve this matter, Jmred. 
 and (hew my meaning without any more ado. But 
 J. am not (b unacquainted v/ith the Zeal of fome Men, which 
 enables them to fpin Confequences, and to fee Religion threatned, 
 whenever any one ventures to quit their Forms of Speaking j 
 as not to forefee, what Names foch a Propofition as this is like 
 to be charged with : And without doubt it will be asked, If 
 Changelings are fbmething between Man and Beaft, what vvill 
 become of them in the other World ? To which I anfwer, 
 1. It concerns me not to know or enquire. To their own Ma- 
 iler they Hand or fall. It will m^e their flate neither better 
 nor worfe, whether we determine any thing of ir, or no. They 
 are in the Hands of a faithful Creator and a bountiful t'atherj 
 who difpofis not of his Creatures according to our narrow 
 Thoughts or Opinions, nor dillinguilhes them according to 
 Names and Species of our Contrivance. And v/ethat know fo 
 little of this preftnt World we are in, may, I think^ conten-c 
 Qur feives without being peremptory in defining the different 
 
 O * jftates* 
 
i'gi Reality of Knowledge] 
 
 Itates, wlilch Creatures (hall come into, when they go oIT ihU 
 vScagc. It may fijffi c i>s, that he hath made known to all 
 thofe, who arc capable of Inftrudion, Difcourfc, and Reafon- 
 ing, that they (hall come to an account, and receive according 
 to what they have done in this Body. 
 
 §.15. But, Secondly^ I anfwer, The force of thefe Mens 
 Ol'cftion, ( vi:{. will you deprive Changelings oi a future ftate ? ) 
 i* founded on one of two Suppofitions, which are both falfc. 
 The Hrfl is, that all Things that have the outward Shape and 
 Appearance of a Man, mull neceflarlly be defigned to an im- 
 mortal future Being, after this Life. Or, Tcondly, that what- 
 ever is of humane Birth, muft be fb. Take away thefe Ima- 
 gination?, and fuch Qiieltions will be groundlefi and ridiculous. 
 1 defire then thofe, who think there is no more but an accidcn* 
 tal difference between themfclves and Changelings, the Effence 
 in b'jth being cxaflly the ftme, to confider, whether they can 
 imagine Immortality annexed to any outward (hape of the Bo- 
 dy ^ the very propofingit, is, I fuppofe, enough to make them 
 dilbwn it. No one yet, that ever I heard of, how much foc- 
 vcr immcrfcd in Matter, allow'd that Excellency to any Figure 
 of the grofs fcnfible outward pari?, as to affirm eternal Life 
 due to it, or neceffary confequence of it ; or that any Mafs of 
 Matter fhould, after its difTolution here, be again feilored here- 
 after to an everlafting flate of Senfe, Perception, and Know- 
 ledge, only becaufe it was molded into this or that Figure, and 
 had fuch a particular frame of its vifible parts. Such an Opi- 
 ij<on as thi,--, placing Immortality in a certain fuperficial Figure, 
 turns out of doors all confideration of Soul or Spirit, upon 
 whofe Account alone fomc corporeal Beings have hitherto been 
 CDncIuded immortal, and others nor. This is to attribute more 
 to the outfide, than infide of Things*, to place the Excellency 
 of a Man, more in the external Shape of his Body, than inter- 
 nal Pcrfc<5lions of his Soul : which is bi't little better than to 
 annex the great and ineflimable Advantage of Immorta'ity 
 and Life evcrlalling, which he has above other material Be- 
 ings, to annex it, I lay, to the Cut of his Beard, or the Fa- 
 fhion of his Coat. For this or that outward Make of our 
 B )aie.s, no more carries with it the Hopes of an eternal Dura- 
 tion, than the Fafhioii of a Man's Suit gives him rcafonable 
 grounds to imagine it will never wear our, or that it will make 
 him immirtal. Twill perhaps be laid, that no Body thinks 
 that the S'lapc makes any thing immortal, hut 'tis the Shape 
 is the Sign of a rational Soul within , which is immortal, i 
 
 wondtt 
 
Reality of Knowledge. 19-5 
 
 wonder who made it the Sign of any fuch Thing : for bare- 
 ly faying it, will not make it (^o. It would require fome 
 Proofs to perfuade one of if. No Figure that I know fpeaks 
 any fiich Language. For it may as rationally be concluded, 
 that the head Body of a Man, wherein there is to be found 
 no more Appearance or A6lion of Life, than there is in a 
 Statue, has yet neverthelefs a Hying Soul in it, becaufe of 
 its Shape:, as that there is a rational Soul in a Cbangelin^^^' 
 becaufe he has the Outfide of a rational Creature, when his 
 Anions carry flir Jcfs Marks of Reafbn with them, in the 
 whole courft of his Life, than what are to be found in 
 many a Beaft. 
 
 §. 1 6. But 'tis the iiTue of rational Parents, Movprs. 
 and muft therefore be concluded to have a ra- 
 tional Soul I know not by what Logick you muft Co con- 
 clude. I am fure this is a Conclufion, that Men no where 
 allow of. For if they did, they would not make bold, as 
 every- where they do, to deftroy ill-iormed and mif fhapcd 
 Produdlion?. Ay, but thefe are Mqvfiers. Let them be (o; 
 What will your driveling, unintelligent, intradtable Chavge-\ 
 ling be ? Shall a Defeil in, the Body make a Movfter-^ a De- 
 hSt in the Mind, ( the far more Noble, and, in the common 
 Phrafe, the fat more Eflential Part ) not ? Shall the want of 
 a Nofc, or a Neck, make a Monjler^ and put fuch IiTue ouc 
 of the rank of Men \ cbe want of Reafon and llnderftanding, 
 not ? This is to bring all back again, to what was exploded 
 juft now; This is to place all in the Shape, and to rake 
 the Mcafure of a Man only by his Out-fidc. To (hew tiiar, 
 according to the ordinary way of Rea(bning in this Matter, 
 People do lay the whole ftrefs on the Figure, and refblve 
 the whole Effence of the Species of- Man (as they make ir); 
 inco the outward Shape, how unreafonable foever they difown 
 it, we need but trace their Thoughts and Pra«5lice a Ikrle far- 
 ther, and then it will plainly appear. The well-fhaped Chavge- 
 ling is a Man, has a rational Soul, tho' it appear not j this is, 
 part doubt, fay you. Make the Ears a Uttle.longcr, and more 
 pointed, and the Nofe a little flatter than ordinary, and ihcn 
 you begin to boggle : Make the Face yet narrower, flatter, 
 and longer, and then- you are at a.ftaiid: Add ftill more 
 and more of the Likenefs of a Brute to ir, and let the, Head 
 be perfedly, that of (bme other Animal^ then- prefenily 'tis 
 a M(jw/?er :. an4 'd? Dfppnftration with, you that it h^th. np 
 rational Soul, and muft be,>d(^ilr'^}^.'d. Wii^re i^w ( 1 i\?k )^= 
 
 ~^" ' ' ' " " "" ■" o ^, ^ ■ '^ ' "%ii; 
 
194 Reality of Knowledge. 
 
 fhall be the jufl mcafure •, which the utmoft Bounds of that 
 Shape, that carrie? with it a rational Soul ? For fince there 
 has been Humane Fatuss produced, half Beali, and half 
 Man-, and others three pArtsone, and one part t'other, and 
 1ii it is poifible they may be in all the variety of Approaches 
 to the one or the other Shape, and may have (everal degrees 
 of Mixture of the Likencfs of a Man, or a Brute, I would 
 gladJ^ know what are ihofe precipe Lineament?, which ac- 
 cording to this Hj^pothefis, are, or are not capable of a ra- 
 tional Soul to be joined to them. What fort of OutfiJe is 
 the certain Sign that there is, or is not (ii'-h an Inhabitant 
 within? For till that be done, we talk at random ol hUn: 
 and (hall always, I fear, do fb, as Ion? as we give our (elves 
 up to certain Sounds, and the Imaginations of fettled and 
 fixed Species in Nature, we know not what. But after all, 1 
 defire it may be confidered, that thofe who think they have 
 anfwered the Difficulty, by telling us, that a mif-lhaped 
 Tarn h a Motifier, run into the fame Fault they are arguing 
 again!!, by conllitutfng a Species between Man and Beaft. 
 For what elfe, I pray, is their Monfter in the caf^, ( if the 
 Word Monjler fignifies any thing at all ) bur fomething nei- 
 ther Man nor Beaft, but partaking fomewhat of cither; 
 And iuil fo is the ChangsUn? before mentioned. So ncctfTiry 
 is if ro quit the common Notion of Species and Lflence?, if 
 we will truly look »nto rhe Natuire ^t Things, and examine 
 them, by what our Faculties can difcover in them as theyexilf, 
 and nor by groundkfs Fancies, that have been taken up 
 about them. 
 
 §. 17. I have mentioned this here, beraufe 
 Words and \ think we Cannot be too cautious that Wmdi 
 Specter. ^nd Species, in the ordinny Notions which we 
 
 have been uftd xo ot them, impofe not on u^. 
 For I am apt to rh'nk, therein lies one great obftaclc to our 
 dear anddiftindl Knowledge, efpecially in reference to Sub. 
 ft ajices •, and from thence has role a great part of rhe Difficul- 
 ties about Truth and Certainty. Would we accuftom our 
 lelves to leparate Contemplations and Reafoninps from Word?, 
 We might, in a great mcafme, remedy this Inconvenience 
 within our own Thoughts; But yet it would (liil difturbus 
 in our Difcourfe withoihers, a^ long as we retained the Opi- 
 rlon, that Species and their Effenccs were any thing el^but 
 our abftracfi ideas^ ( fuch as they are ) with Names annexed 
 to them, to be the figns of them. 
 
 5. 18^ 
 
Truth in General, 19^ 
 
 §. 18. Wherever we perceive the Agreement 
 or Difagreement of any of our Ueas there is cer- Recapitula- 
 rain Knowledge; nnd wherever we are fure ^ion. 
 thofe Ideas agree with the reality of Things, 
 there is certain real Knowledge. OF which Agreement of our 
 Ideas wi[h the reality of Things, haying here given the 
 marks, I think I have (hewn wherein It is, that Certainty, real 
 Certainty, confifts. Which whatever it was to others, was, 
 I confeS, to me heretofore, one of thofe Defiderata which I 
 found great waijt of. , 
 
 C H A P. V. 
 
 Of Truth in General, 
 
 §. I. T ^ T Hat is Truth, was an Enquiry Wh.n Truth 
 V/V/ many Ag^s fince ; and it being «• 
 that which all Mankind either 
 do, or pretend to learch after, it cannot but be worth our 
 while carefully to examine wherein it confifts:, and fo acquaint 
 our felves with the Nature of it, as to cbferve how the 
 Mind diftinguifhes it from Fallhood. 
 
 §. z. Truth then (eems to me, in the proper -^ ^'S^^ pin- 
 import of the Word, to fignify nothing but the ^^g, or fe^a- 
 joining or feparativg of Signs-) as the Things Jignified ''^^'^S "J 
 by them, do agree or difagree one with another. The -^'^"^i^*^' 
 joining ot feparating ojfSigns here meant is whaf rJ^y 
 by another Name, we call Propofition. So that 
 Truth properly belongs only to Propofitions ; 
 whereof there are two Sorts , vi:{. Mental and Verbal ; as 
 there are two (brts of Signs commonly made ufe of,~^. ideas 
 and Words. 
 
 §. ?. To form a clear Notion of Truth, it is Whuhmake 
 very neceffary toconfider Truth of Thought, and mental or 
 Truth of Words, diftinaiy one from another: '^^rhal Prjtpo- 
 but yet it is very difficult to treat of them afun- Z^""^- 
 der. Becaufe it is unavoidable, in treating of 
 Alental Propofitions, to make ufe of Words : and then tie Ij> 
 ftances given of Mental Propojitions, ceafe immediately to be 
 barely Mental> aud become Verba/. For a m(nta[ Fropnjltion 
 
 O 4 bang 
 
\Q^ Truth in Geusral. 
 
 being nothing but a bare Coiifideration of the Ideas, as iV^y 
 arc iji our Minds ftripp'J of Names, tticy lofe the Nature of 
 pureJy mental Propofittonsy as foon as rhcy are put into Words." 
 Mental Pro- '^"'^ ^^'''^ which makes it yet harder to treat of 
 fofitiovs are 'n^«^'«/ and verbal Propofuiens feparately^ is, That 
 •very hard to ^^^ McH, if not all, in their Thinking and Rea- 
 h treated of, (onings within themfelvcs, make ufl- of Words 
 inftead of J^f^j 3 at lealt when the Subj(.£l of their 
 Meditation contains in it complex ideas. Which is a great Evi- 
 dence of the Imperfcftion and Uncertainty of our Uedi of that 
 kind, and may, if attentively made ule of, ferve for a mark to 
 Ojew us, what are thofe Thing?, we have clear and ijcrfc(^ 
 eflablifhed ideas of, and what rot. For if we will curioufly 
 obferve the way oar Mind takes in Thinking arid Reaioning, 
 we (hall find, I fuppofe, that when we'make any Propofitions 
 within our own Thoughts, about IJ^hue or Blacks Street or 
 Bitter, aTriangle or a. Circle^ we can and often do frame in our 
 Minds the /^e<<* themfdves, without rtfic^ling on the Name?. 
 But wh(?n we would collider, or make Propoiitions about th? 
 more complex J(ie<if, as of a Md», Vitriol, fortitude^ Gloiy^ we 
 ufually put the Name for the idea : Becaufe rhe ideas theft Names 
 Hand for, being for the moft part impcrfe6t, confufed, and unr 
 determined, we refleit on the Names ihemfelves, becaufe they 
 are more clear, certain, and dillindf, and readier occur to our 
 Thoughts than the pure Ideas: and fb we makeufe of thefe 
 Words inllead of the Ideas themfrlve?, even when we would 
 meditate and reafbn within our felve?, and mal^e tacit inenraL 
 Pfopoiitions. In Stihjlances, as has been already noted, this is 
 occafioned by the Imperfection of our Ideasx \vc making the 
 Name Hand for the real Efltnce, of which we have no Idea at all. 
 In Modes-, it is occafioned by the great Number of fimpie ideas^ 
 that go to the making them up. For many of them being com- 
 pounded, thcN^rwe occurs much eaficr»han the complex 7i^t'4 ic 
 Iclf, which requires Time and Attention to be recolle6^ed, and 
 e'xadlly rcprefcnted totheMind, evenin thofe Men, who have 
 formerly been at the Pains to do it ^ and is utterly impoflible to' 
 be done by thofe, '.vho though they have ready in their Me- 
 n^ory, the greatell: part of the common Words of their Lan- 
 guage, yet perhaps, never troubled tliemfclrcs in all their Livcs^ 
 to conrider what precife Ideas the molt of them iHod for. Some 
 cqafufed or obfcure Notions have /crved their turns , and marry 
 w'ho talk very much of l^elhion and Qonf^ienr^ey of Church and 
 ?<«/', of Porver and ^f,ht^ of OWru^ions aod Hupjottrsjf M^fan^^ 
 
Truth in General. i(^j 
 
 choly, and Choler^ would, perhaps, have little lefc in their 
 Thoughts and Mediiadons, ifonefhould df fire them ro think 
 only of the Things themfelves, and lay by thofe Words, with, 
 which they fo often confound others, and not feldom them- 
 felves alfo/ 
 
 §. 5. But to return to the Confideration of Being no- 
 Truth: We muft, I fay, obferve two Torts of Pro- t^i«g bat tht 
 pbfitions, that we are capable of making. joining, trfi^ 
 
 Firft, Mental^ rvherein i\\tldeas, m our Under- Pf''''t'»g y 
 ftandings are without the ufe^ of Words p«f to- ^"'/'"^""^ 
 nether, or feparated by the- Mind, perceiving or 
 judging of their Agreement, or Difagreement. 
 
 Secondly^ Verbal Profofitionsy vj\{\<:\\ are Words the Signs of ouy. 
 ideas put together or feparated in ^ffirrnative or Negative Sentemeu 
 By which way of aiBrming or denying, thefe Signs, made by 
 Sound?, are as it were put together or feparated one from an- 
 other. So that Propofition confifts in- joining, or feparating 
 Signs, and Truth confifts in the putting together, or fepara- 
 ting thcfe SignF, according as the Tnings, which they ftand 
 tor, agree or difigrec. 
 
 §. 6. Every one's Experience will fatisfy him, Pf^henmentat 
 that the Mind, eicher by perceiving or fiippofing PropoJItions 
 the Agreement or Difigreemenr of any of its J^e</;, ""^'*'» real 
 does tacitly within it lelf put them into a kind of %''^^» ^"'^ 
 rropohtion arhrmative or negative, or negative, , . 
 which 1 have endeavoured to exprefs by the Terms 
 Putting together and Sepiratin^. But this A6lion of the Mind, 
 v^hich isfb familiar to every Thinking andReafoning Man, is 
 eafier to be conceived by rcflc^in^ on what paffcs in us, when 
 we affirm ordeiiy, than to be txplainedby Words. When a 
 Man has in his Mind the Idea of two Linesj^ vi:{, the Side and 
 Diagonal of a Square, whereof the Diagonal is an Inch long, he 
 may have the J^''^ alfo of the Divifion of that Line, into a certain 
 Number of equal Parts j 1;. ?. into Five, Ten, an Hundred, a 
 Thou^nd, oraiiy other Number, and may have the Idea o^ 
 that Inch Line, being divifibleor not divifible, into ibch equal 
 parts, as a certainNumber of them vv^ill be equal to the Side-line. 
 Now whenever he perceives, believes, or fuppofes fuch a kind 
 of Divifibilit^ to agree or di^gre to his idea of that Line, he, as 
 h were, joins' or feparates thpfe two ideas^ vi:(. the ld^0 of that 
 Linfj/and the JJe.j of that I^Ind o^ Divifibility, and fb makes a 
 mental Propofition, which is true or falfe, according asfucha 
 kind of DiviribrHrVj a Dlviribllity into fuch alirust Parts, doe& 
 
 really 
 
19S Truth in General. 
 
 really agree to that Line or no. When Ucts are fo put together, 
 or leparatedin the Mind, as they, or the Things they ftand 
 fordo agree, or not, that is, as I may callir, mental Truth. But 
 Truth of tVordsh fomcthing more, and that is the affirming or 
 denying of Words one ot another, as the ideas they Hand for 
 agrt«ordiT»gree : And this again is two fold. Either purely Ver- 
 bal^^ndi trifling, which I (hall fpcakof, Chap. 10. crt{eald.nd in- 
 itruitive •, which is theObjed of that real Knowledge, which 
 we have fpokcn of already. 
 
 ol'\tnion ^' 7' ^'^^ ^^""s ^S^'" W'l^ be apt to occur the 
 
 again fl ver- fame D jubc about Truth, that did about Know- 
 i>.tl Yrttth, ledge : And it will be objrdcd, That if Truch be 
 tifki this it nothing bjt the joining or (eparating of Words in 
 »At/ all he PropofuionvJS the Ue:is thcv Ifand for agree or dif- 
 (bunsrical, agree in Mens Minds, the Knowledge of Truth « 
 
 not fo valuable a Things it is taken to be •, nor worth 
 the Pains and Time Men imploy to the fearch of it: fmce by 
 tins accoujit^ it amounts, to no more than the Conformity of 
 Words, to the Chimeras of Mens Brain?. Who knows not what 
 odd Notions many Mens Heads are hll'd wich,and what ftrange 
 Ideas -iiW Mens Brains are capable of ? Butif werefthcre, we 
 know the Truth of nothing by this Rule, but of the vifionary 
 World in our ownlmiginations j nor have other Truth, but 
 what as much concerns Harpies and Centaurs^ as Men and Horfcs. 
 For thofe, and the like, may be Ideat in our Heads, and have 
 their Agreement and Difagreement there, as well as the Ideat 
 of real Beings, and io have as true Propofitions made about 
 them. And 'twil b? altogether as true a Propofition, fo fay all 
 Centaurs at: Animals^ as that all Men are Annhals'^ and the Cer- 
 tainty of one, as great as the other. For in both the Propofi- 
 tion?, the Words arc put together according to the Agreement 
 of the Jdeasm our iMinds: And the Agreement of the Idea of 
 Animdly with that oiCentaur^ is as clear and vifible to the Mind, 
 as the Agrecm:nr of the r^Mof -.'/;7;>«.j/, with that of Aidw; and 
 fothe'e two Propofirions arc equally true, equally certain. But 
 of what u(e is ailiLrh Truth to us ? 
 
 Avftpcrcd ^•^' Though whu has been fiid in the fore- 
 rtal Truth /s R''^'"S Chapter, to diftinguiOi ical from imaginarjr 
 alfOMt l^oas Knowledge, might fufficc here, in anfwer to this 
 agreeing :o Doubt, to dlllinguifh real Truth from chimeric^/^ of 
 Things. (if you pleafe, ) barely nominal^ they depending 
 
 both on the fame foundation •, yet it may not be 
 amifs here agiin to confider, that though our Words fjgnify 
 
 nothing 
 
Truth in General. igg 
 
 nothing but our iJeas, yet being defigned by tViem ro iignify 
 Things, tlie Truth they conrain, when put into Propofition?, 
 will be only Verbal^ when they ftand for ideas m the Mind, 
 that have not an Agreement with the Reality of Things. 
 And therefore Truth, as well as Knowledge, may well come 
 finder the diftin6tion of Verbal an'd i^e^/^ that being only iier' 
 hal Truths wherein Terms are joined according to the Agree- 
 ment or Disagreement of the Ideas they Itand for, without re- 
 garding whether our Ideas are fuch, as really have, or are ca- 
 pable of having an exiftence in Nature. But then it is they 
 contain real Truths when thele Signs are joined, as our lde/!s 
 agree ", and when our ideas are fuch as we know are capable 
 of having an Exiftence in Nature : which in Subllances fhe 
 cannot know, but by knowing that fuch have exilfed. 
 
 §. 9. Truth is the marking down in Words, 
 the Agreement or Dlfagreemtnt of Ideas as it is. j^'^^/^'ood U 
 Falfhood is the Marking down in Words, the A- '^ll"^"l"f "I" 
 greement or Difagreement of Jdeas otherwife than ^p/r'^/"' ^'' 
 it is. And fb far as thefe ideas thus marked by jj^^j^ jj^ 
 Sounds, agree to their Archetypes, fo far only is apee. 
 the Truth real. The Knowledge of this Truth, 
 confifts in knowing what Ideas the Words Ifand for, and the 
 Perception of the Agreement or Difagreement of thole Ideas 
 according as it is marked by thofe Words. 
 
 §. 10. But becaufc Words are looked on asihe General pn' 
 great C -nduits of Truth and Knowledge, and pojlsionsto be 
 that in conveying and receiving of Truth, and treated of 
 commonly in reafoning about it, we makeufe of »'OreatUrge. 
 Words and Propofitions, I (hall more at large en- 
 quire, wherein the certainty of real Truths, contained m 
 Propofition-, confifts, and where it is to be had •, and endea- 
 vour to fhew in what fort of univerfal Propofitions we arc 
 capable of being certain of their real Truth, or Falfhood. 
 
 I (hall begin with general Propofitions, as thole which mof| 
 employ, our Thoughts, and exercife our Contemplation. Ge- 
 neral Truths are moll looked after by the Mind, as thofe th it 
 moft enlarge our Knowledge •, and by their Comprehenfive- 
 ntfs^ fatisfying us at once of many Particulars, enlarge our 
 y'xew^ and Tnorren our way to Knowledge. 
 
 §. II. Bsfides, Truth taken in the ftri6t Moral mti 
 Senfe bcfore-m.entloned, there ar^ other forts of n^^taphjfuni 
 Truths •, as, i. Moral Truths which is fpeaking Tru.^h. . 
 Things according to the Perfuaf^on of o-^r Qwn 
 
 Minds, 
 
200 Vniverfal Tro^ofit'ions^ 
 
 Minds, though the Propofirlon wc Pi^ak agree not to the Rea- 
 lity of Things, a. Metaphyfical Truth, which Is nothing but 
 the real Exiltence of Things, conformable to the I^eas to 
 which we have annexed their Names. This though it fcerns 
 to confill ill the very Beings of Things, yet when confidcred 
 a little nearly, will appear to include a tacit Propoiition, where- 
 by the Mind joins that particular Thine, to the Idea it had 
 before fettled with a Name to it. But thcfe Confiderations, 
 of Truth , cither having been before taken Notice of, or 
 not being much ro our prefcnt purpofe, it may futBce here only 
 to have mentioned them. 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 Of Vniverfal Propofitioas, their Truth and 
 Certainty. 
 
 Treating of §. i. f | '■NHough thc examining and judging of 
 Words neceffary I i^g^i by thcmfclves, their Nam?s 
 
 '» K"oy»lidgc, -1- being quite laid aGde, be the be(t 
 
 and fiirefl: way to clear and diftin6l Knowledge: 
 yet through the prevailing Cuftom of ufmg Sounds for ideas, 
 I think it is very feldom pradlifed. Every one may obferve 
 how common it is for Names to be made u(e of, inftead of the 
 Ideas themfelves, even when Men think and reafbn within 
 their own Brcalls j efpccially if the Ideas be very complex, and 
 made up of a great Colle6lion of fimple on2S, This makes 
 the CO nji deration of iVordsy and Propofitions, Co neceffary a part of 
 theTreatife of K^nowledgey that 'tis very hard to (peak intelligibly 
 of the one, without explaining the other. 
 
 §. X. AH the Knowledge we have, being only 
 
 ^r^/^'v' °^ particular or general Truths, 'cIs evident, that 
 f "« .' Iv '^ whatever may be done In the former of thefe, the 
 ft9o<i'7ut7n latter, which is that, which with Reafon is moft 
 ifrbalPrtpol- ^ught after, Can never be well made known, 
 sitns. ^ and io very feldom apprehzjided, but as conceived 
 " and exprtffed in iVurds. It is not therefore out of 
 ©ur way, tn the Examination, of our Kiiowlcdge, to enquire 
 into the Truth, ar4 Ce;taiiity. oi univerfal Proportion?. ^• 
 ' ■ ■■ " • ' ^^ '^." 
 
thttr Truth and CertaiKty. 20 1 
 
 ^. 2. But that we may not be mifled in this /, ^ . , , , 
 •cafe, by that which is the Danger every -where, I Sr^rrlT 
 mean by the Doubtfuhiefs of Terms, 'tis fit to ob- ^ridiiL^led.c 
 ferve, that Certainty is two-told ; Certainty ofTrutht 
 and Certainty of Knowledge. Certainty of Truth is, when Words are 
 io put together in Propofitions, as exadly to exprels the Agree- 
 ment or Dilagreement of the Ideas they iftand for, as really Ic 
 is. Certainty of Kjiorv ledge is, to perceive the Agreement or Dif^ 
 agreement of Ideas, as cxprtffed in any Propofition. This we 
 ufuaiiy call knowing, or being certain of the Truth of any Pro- 
 pofition. 
 
 §. 4. Now becaufe rve cannot he certain of the ^^ propori" 
 Truth of any general Propofition, unlefs rve hflow the fig„ ^^„ ^^ 
 frecife Bounds and Extent of the Species its Terms ft and known to ie 
 foTy it isneccffcry we (hould know the Effenceof /r»p, vhere 
 each SpecieSf which is that which conftitures and the Efejice of 
 bounds it. This, in all fimple Ideas and Modes, ^^'h Species 
 is not hard to do. For in thefe, the ren land nomi- mentioned is 
 nal EfTence being the fame j or which is all one, ""' known, 
 the abftraft Idea, which the general Term Hands 
 for, being the (ble Effence and Boundary that is or can be fup- 
 pofed, ot the Species, there can be no doubt, how far the Spe-> 
 cies extends, or what Things are comprehended under each 
 Term : which, 'tis evident, are all, that have an exaft Confor- 
 mity with the Idea it {lands for, and no other. But in Subftan- 
 ces, wherein a real Effence diftindl from the nominal, is fuppo- 
 fedto conftitute, determine, and bound the Species, the Extent 
 qf the general Word is very uncertain: becaufe not knowing 
 this real Effence, we cannot know what is, or is not of that 
 Speciesy and confequently what may,- or may not with Certainty 
 be affirmed of it. And thus fpeaking of a Man, or Gold, or 
 .any other Species of natural Sublfances, a^ fuppoled conftituted 
 by a precife real Effence, which Nature regularly imparts to 
 every individual of that Kind, whereby it is made to be of that 
 Species, we cannot be certain of the Truth of any Affirmation 
 or Negation. made of it. For Man, or Gold, taken in this Senie, 
 and ufed for Species of Things , conftituted by real Effence?, 
 different from the complex Idea in the Mind of the Speaker, 
 ftand for we know not what, and the Extent of thefe Species, 
 withfuch Boundaries, are ib unknown and undetermined, that 
 itisimpoffible with any certainty, to affirm, that all Men are 
 rational^ or that all Gold is yellow. But where the nominal 
 Effence is kept to, as the Boundary of each Species, and Men 
 
 extend 
 
201 Vntverfal Tropofitioni^ 
 
 extend the Applicr^iion of any general Term no farther than 
 to the particular Things, in which ihc complex IcUa it ftands 
 for is to be found, there they arc in no Danger to miftakc the 
 Bounds ot each Spezics, nor can be in doubr, on this Account, 
 whether any Propofitions be true, or no. I have chofe to 
 explain this Uncertainty of Fropohtions in this fcholaftick way, 
 and liave made life of the Terms of EJJences and Species, on 
 purpofc to fhew the' Abfurdtty and Inconvcnieicc there is to 
 think of them, as of any other fort of Realities, than barely 
 abilraft Ucas with Names to them. To fuppofe, that the Spe^ 
 cies of Things are any thing, but the fort'ng of tht m under ge- 
 neral Names, according as they agree to feveral abltra6l I4eas, 
 of which we make ihofc Names the Signs, is to confound 
 Truth, and introduce Uncertainty into all gencralPropofuions, 
 that can be m.ade about rhem. Though therefore the Things 
 might, to People not pofTefled with Ichokftick Learning, be 
 perhaps treated of, in a better and clearer way : yet thofe wrong 
 Notions of Ejfencss or Species^ having got root in mull Peoples 
 Minds, who have received any Tin6ture from the Learning, 
 ■which has prevailed in this part of the World, arc to bedifco- 
 vcred and removed, to make way for that ufe of Words, which 
 fliould convey certainty with it. 
 
 • §. 5. T/jff Names of SuhJ}ances then, whenever 
 This n/ore niade to ftand for Species^ rvhich are fnppofed to he 
 fitrticaUrJy conftituted by reilEjfence^ which we kiiow not, are 
 concerns Sub- ^^^ capable to convey Certainty to the Vnderjiandtng : 
 panctf. Q^ j.j^^ Truth of general Propofitions made up of 
 
 fuch Terms we cannot be fure. The Reafbn 
 whereof is plain. For how can we befure that this or that Qua* 
 lity is in Gold, when we kn(t\r not what is or is not Gold. Since 
 an this way of (peaking nothing is GoW, but what partakes 
 of an Eflence, which we not knowing, cannot know where ic 
 is, or is not, and fo cannot befure, that any parcel of Matter \n ' . 
 the World is or is not in thisSenfe Gold), being incurably igno- 
 rant, whether ic has or has not that which makes any thing to 
 be called Go/i, i. c that real EflTence of Gold whereof we have 
 no Idea at all. This being as irapoflible for us to know, as it 
 is for a blind Man to tell in what Flower the Colour of a ?anfie 
 1^ or is not to be found, whilfl he has no idea ot the Colour of 
 a ?anfie at all. Orif we could ( which is impolfible )^ certainly i 
 know where a rctl Edbnce, which wc know nor, is, tf. 'j^. in I 
 what parcels of Maf^tcr rhe real Eff.ncc o^Gold i-, yet could we • 
 ivn be (urc, that thb or that Qijalicy could with Truth be af- 
 
 bim'd . 
 
their Truth and Certainty, . to^ 
 
 firm'd o^ Gold J fince it is impoflible for us to know, that this 
 or chat Quality or Idea has a nectilary Connexion with a real 
 Eflence, of which we have no Idea at all, whatever Species 
 that fuppofed real Effence may be imagined to conftitute, 
 
 §. 6. On the other (ide, the Names of Subfiances, 
 when made u(e of as they (hould be, for the ideas The Truth 
 Men have in their Minds, tho' they carry a clear offe-m um- 
 and determinate Signification with them, tpHI not n/erfal Pro- 
 yet ferve us to make tnmy univerfal Propojuions^ of pofitims cojf 
 whofe Truth we can be certain. Not becaufe in cernmgSu^- 
 this ufe of them we are uncertain what Thing*? f^^/"^' ^^ '* 
 are fignilied by them, but becaufe the complex ^^^«''*»' 
 Ideof they (land for, are fuch Combinations of 
 iimple ones, as carry not with them any difcoverable Conftc- 
 xion or Repugnancy, but with a very few other ideas. 
 
 §. 7. The commplex Ideas, that our Names of 
 the Species of Subftances properly ftand for, are Becaufn Co- 
 Colle(5tions of fuch Qntalitles, as have been obfer- exiftenceofi* 
 ved to co-exift in an unknown Siibfiratutn which deas infiw 
 we call Subjiance-y but what other Q^ialities necef- Cafes to he 
 farily co-exilt with fuch Combinations, we can- kmwn. 
 not certainly know, unlefi we can difcover their 
 natural Dependence j which in their primary Qualities, we can 
 go but a very little way in; 'and in all their ftcondary Qijali- 
 ties, we can difcover no Connexion at all, for the Realons 
 mentioned, Chap. ;;. vi^^. i. Becaufe we know not the real 
 Conftitutions of Subftances, on which each fecondary Quality 
 particularly depends, a. Did we know that, it would lerve 
 us only for experimental (not univerialj Knowledge ; and reach 
 with Certainty no farther, thati|)that bare Inltance. Becaufe 
 our Underftandings can difcover no conceivable Connexion 
 - between any fecondary Quality, and any Modification whatlo- 
 cver of any of the fnmary ones. And therefore there are 
 very fe^v general Propofitions to be made concerning Subftan- 
 ces, which can carry with them undoubted Certainty. 
 
 §. 8. AH Gold is fixtdj is a Propofition \vho<e 
 Truth _we cannot be certain of, how univerfally injlanci'fn 
 {bever it be believed. For if, according to the GoU. 
 ufelefefs Imagination of the Schools, any one fu|i- 
 pofes the Term Geld to ftand for a Species of Things fet qut 
 hy Nature, by a real Efierice belonging to ir, 'tis evident he 
 knows not what particular Subftances are of that Species V 
 and fo cinintj with certainty, affirm any thing univeriiiliy of 
 
 GoU. 
 
?-04 VHiveffal fropofiuonr^ 
 
 Gold. Bur if he makes Gold (land for a Species, determined ty it'i 
 nominal- Eliencc, Ice the nominal Eflftncc, for example, be the 
 complex Idea of a Bodyj of a certain j'^Z^ow (,'olour, malleable -^fufibley 
 ikn\ heavier than any orher known ; in thia proper ufe of the 
 Word Gold^ there is no Difficulty to know what is, or is not Gold. 
 But yet no other (^ality can with Certainty be univerfally af- 
 firmed or denied o[Goldj but what hath a difcoverable Connexi- 
 on, or Incon(illency with that nominal Efl'c;nce. Fixcdnefs^ for 
 example , having no neccflary Connexion, that we can dif- 
 cover, with the Colour, Weight, or any other fimpie Idea of 
 <wr complex one, or with the whole Combination together; 
 it i;i impoffible that we fhould certainly know the Truth of 
 this Propolition, That all Gold is fixed. 
 
 §. 9. As there is no diicoverable Connexion between Fixed- 
 nefsy and the Colour, Weight, and other fimple Ideas of that 
 nominal Effcnce of Gold^, (6 if we make our complex Idea of 
 ColJy a Body ytllorvj fufible^, duFUlCy weighty^ and fixed^ we (hall 
 be at the fame Uncertainty concerning Solubility m Aq. I{egia '^ 
 and for the fame Reafbn. Since we caw never, from Confi- 
 derationof ihcldeas themfclvc?, with Certainty affirm or deny, 
 of a Body, whole complex Idea is made up of yellow, very 
 weighty, ductile, fufibte, and fixed, that it is foluble in A^, 
 ^gta: And fo on of the reft of its Qualities. I would gladly 
 meet with one general Affi -marion, concerning any Quality of 
 Gold, that any one can certainly know is true. It will, no 
 doubt, be prefently obje(5led. Is not . this an univerfal certain 
 Propofition, AH Gold is malleable ? To which I anfwer. It is 
 t^ very certain Propofition, if Malleablenefs be a part of the 
 complex Idea the word Gold llands for. But then here is nothing 
 affirmed of Goldj but that thft Sound ftands for an idea in 
 which Malleablenefs is contained : And fuch a fort of Truth 
 and Certainty as this, it is to fay a Centauris four-footed. But 
 if Malleablenefs makes not a part of the fpecifick Efleiice the 
 Name Gold ttands for, 'tis plain. All Gold is malleable^ is not a 
 ctrtalii Proportion. Beraufe let the compKx Idea of Gold^ 
 be made up of which foever of its other Qualities you pleafe, 
 Malleablenefs will not appear to depend on that complex Idea^ 
 nor follow from anyfimpFe one contained in it. The Con- 
 nexion that Malleablenefs has ( If ic ha*^ any } with thofe other 
 Qualities, being only by the Intervention of the real Conftl- 
 cution of its infenfible part?, which, fiiice we know nor, 'tis 
 impoffible wc fhowld perceive thai Connexion, unlefs wc could 
 di (cover that which tics them together, 
 
 §. 10: 
 
their Truth and Certainty, 205 
 
 §. 10. The more, indeed, of thefe co-exifting 
 Qualities we unite into one complex Idea^ under -^sfctr as 
 one Name, the more precife and determinate we ^nyfuchCo- 
 make the Signification of that Word ; but yet ''^JP^^c^ 
 never make it thereby more capable of univerfd /„"^/r ^ 
 Certainty, in refpea of other Qiialities, not con- ,^„;j,^/r/' 
 tain'd in our complex Idea ; fince we perceive pyopjitjons 
 not their Connexion, or Dependance one on ano- ,„^^ ^^ ^^^^ 
 ther ; being ignorant both of that real Conftitu- tain. But 
 tion in which they are all founded ; and alfo tins will go 
 how they flow from it. For the chief part of our hut a little 
 Knowledge coiicerning Subftances, is not, as in vxiylecaufe. 
 other Things, barely of the Relation oftwo/^^^x, 
 that may exirt feparately ; but is of the neceffary Connexion 
 and Co-exiftence of feveral diftin6l Uea4 in'the fame Subje^, 
 or of their Repugnances fo to co-exift. Could we begin an 
 the other end, and difcover what it was, wherein that Colour 
 confifted, what made a Body lighter or heavier, what Tex- 
 ture of Parts made it malleable, fufible, and fix'd, and fit 
 to be diflolv'd in this fort of Liquor, and not in another j if 
 (I fay) we had fuch an Idea as this of Bodies, and could per- 
 ceive wherein all fenfible Qualities originally confift, and 
 how they are produc'd ; we might frame fuch abftraft Ueas 
 of them, as would furnilli us with Matter of more general 
 Knowledge, and enable us to make univerfal Proportions, 
 that fhould carry general Truth and Certainty with them. But 
 whilfl: our complex Uea4 of the forts of Subftances, are fo re- 
 mote from that internal real Conftitution, on which their 
 fenfible Qualities depend, and are made up of nothing but 
 an imperfed Colledion of thofe apparent Qiialities our Senfcs 
 can difcover, there can be very few general Propofitions con- 
 cerning Subtiances, of whofe real Truth we can be certainly 
 aiTur'dj fince there are but few fimple Ideas .^ of whofe Con- 
 nexion and necelTary Co-exiftence, we can have certain and 
 undoubted Knowledge. I imagine, amongft all thcfecondary 
 Qualities of Subftances, and the Powers relating to them, there 
 cannot any two be nam'd, whofe neceffary Co-exiftence, or 
 Repugnance to co-exift, can certainly be known, unkfs. in 
 thofe of the fame Senfe, which neceffarily exclude one ano-t 
 ther, as I haye_ elfcwhere fliew'd. N9 one, I think, by the 
 Colour that is in any Body, can certainly know what Smell, 
 Tafte, Sound, or tangible Qualities it has, nor what Altera- 
 tions it is capable to make, or receive, on, or from other Bo- 
 
 P dies. 
 
2C<$ Univerfal Propojltions^ 
 
 (lies. The fame may be faid of the Sound or Tafte, &c. Our 
 Ipccifick Names of Subltanccs ftandinp; for any CoUedlions of 
 luch liieAf^ tis not to be wonder'd, that we can, with them, 
 make very few general Propofitions of undwhted real Certainty.. 
 But yet fo far as any complex /f/c^, of any foit of Subftances, 
 contains in it any iimplc Idea^ whofc ncccfiary Co-cxiftence 
 with any other may hz difcover'd, fo far univerfal Propofitions 
 may yvith Certainty be made concerning it : v. g. Could any 
 one dilcover a neccflary Connexion between Mallc.iblenefs^ dutd. 
 the Colofir or Weight o^ Gold^ or any other part of tiic complex 
 Idea ficnify'd by that Name, lie might make a certain uni- 
 vcrlal Propohtion concerning Gold in this refpeit ; and the 
 real Truth of this Propofition. Jhat all Gold u rxall able , W014I4 
 be as certain as of this, The three Angles »f all rigkt-lind Tri- 
 4tngleSf Are equal t» two right ones. 
 
 §. II. Had we fuch Ideas of Subftances, as to 
 The^ia- know what real ConlHtutions produce thofe fen- 
 litics which fible Qiialities we find in them, and how thofe 
 7n.ike our Qualities flowd from thence, we could, by the 
 complex fpecifick Ideas of their real Efiencesin our Minds, 
 Ideas of more certainly find out their Properties, and dif- 
 iiuhJLiiices^ cover what Qualities they had, or had not, than 
 mini on ''^^ ^^" "°^ '^'y ^."'' Senfes: And to know the 
 extelnil Properties of Gold^ it would be no more neceflary 
 remote and ^'"'^'^ ^^^'^ fliould exift, and that we fliould make 
 unfercVw'd Experiments upon it, than it is ncctfliry for the 
 Caxifis. knowing the Properties of a Triangle, that a 
 
 Triangle ftiould exift in any Matter; the Idea in 
 our Minds would fcrve for the oqe, as well as the other. 
 P>ut we are fo far from being admitted into the Secrets of 
 Nature, th t wc fcarce lo much as ever approach the firtt 
 Entrance towards their. For we are wont to confidcr the 
 Subftances wc meet wiih, each of them as an entire Thing by - 
 it itlf, hiving all its Qiialities in it lelf, and independent of 
 other Things; over-looking, for the moft part, the Operati- 
 ons of thofe invit'ible Fluids they are cncompafs'd with ; and 
 upon whofe Motions and Operations depend the gieateft pare 
 of tj)ole Qualities which, are taken Notice of in them, and 
 arc made by us the inl.eient Marks of Difiin6ion, whereby 
 wc know and denominate them. 4 ut a Piece of Gold any 
 where by it ftlf, fepuatc trom the Reach and Innuence of 
 all otlicr Bodies, it will immediately loie all its Colour and 
 Weight, a4id, perhaps, Malleablenefs too: Which^ for ought 
 
their Truth and Certainty, 207 
 
 i know, would be changed into a perfect Friabilityi Water^ 
 in which to us Flmdhy is an eflential Qiiality, left to it felf, 
 would ceafe to be fluid. But if inanimate Bodies owe fo 
 much of their prefent State to other Bodies without them, 
 that they would not be what they appear to u?, were thofe 
 Bodies that inviron them removed, it is yet more fo in P^egc- 
 tables, which are iiourilli'd, grow, and produce Leaves, 
 Flowers, and Seeds, in a conlbnt SuccefTion. And if we 
 look a little nearer into tlie State of -^iWj-, we fhall find, 
 that their Dependence, as to Life, Motion, and the moll con- 
 fideirable Qualities to beobferv'd in them, is fo wholly on, 
 extrinfical Cauies aud Qualities of other Bodies, that make 
 no part of thein, i,hat they cannot fubfift a Moment without 
 them : Thoup,li yet thofe Bodies on which they depend, are 
 little taken Notice of, and make no part of the complex Idea^' 
 we frame of thoic Ani^nals. Take the Air but a Minute from 
 the greateft part of living Creatures, and they prelently loie 
 Senfe, Life, and Motion.' This the NecelTity of Breathing has 
 forc'd into our Knowledge. But bow many other extrinfi- 
 cal, and poffibly very remote Bodies, do the Springs of .thofe 
 admirable Machines depend on, which are not vulgarly ob*- 
 ferv'd, or fo much as thought on ; and how many are there, 
 which the leveielt Enquiry can never difcover ? The Inhabi- 
 tants of this Spot of the Univerfe, though remov'd fo many 
 Millions of Miles from tl-e Sun, yet depend fo much on the 
 duly temper'd Motion of Particles coming from, or agitated 
 by it, that were this Earth remov'd, but a fmail pnt of that 
 Diftance out of its prefent Situation, and plac'd a little far- 
 ther or nearer that Source of Heat, 'tis more than probable^ 
 that the greateit part of the Animals in it, would immedi- 
 ately periiii : Since we find them fo often deftroy'd by an 
 Exc&fs or Defeat of the Sun's Warmth, which an accidental 
 Polition, in fome parts of this our little Globe, expofes them 
 to. The Qui lilies obferv'd in a Load-fione, mutt needs have 
 their Source far beyond the Confines of that Body ; ?.nd the 
 Ravage made often on feveral lorts of Animals, by invifible 
 Caufes, the certain Death (as we are told) of fome of them, 
 by barely paifrng the Line, or, as 'tis certain of others, by 
 being remov'd into a neighbouring Country, evidently fhew, 
 that the Concurrence and Operation of feveral Bodies, with 
 which they are feldom thought to have any thing to do, is 
 abfolutely neceflary to make them be what they appear to 
 us^ and to preferve thofc Qualities, by which we know aid 
 
 P 2 . dik\ii^iib 
 
2c8 Univerfal Vropofitwns^ 
 
 iliftinguifli tlicm. We are then quite out of the Way, when 
 we tliipk that Things contain within thcmfelves the Qua- 
 lities that appear to us in them : And we in vain fearch fot 
 that Conl'titution within the Body of a Fly, or an Elephant, 
 upon which depend thofe Qiialities and Powers we obferve 
 in them. For which, perhaps, to undcrftand them aright, 
 we ought to look, not only beyond this our Earth and At- 
 mofphcre, but even beyond the Sun, or remotelt Star our Eyes 
 liave yet difcover'd. For how much the Being and Opera- 
 tion of particular Subftanccs in this our Globe, depend on 
 Caufcs utterly beyond our view, is impofPiblc for us to deter- 
 mine. Wc fee and perceive fomc of the Motions, and grofler 
 Operations of Things here about us; but whence the Streams 
 come that keep all tliefe curious Machines in Motion and 
 Repair, how convcy'd and modify 'd, is beyond our Notice 
 and Apprchenfion ; and the great Parts and Wheels, as I may 
 ' fo fay, of this ftupendious Strudlure of the Univerfe, may, 
 for ought we know, have fuch a Connexion and Dependance 
 in their Influences and Operations one upon another, that, 
 perhaps. Things in this our Manfion, would put on quite 
 another Face, and ceafe to be what they are, if ibme one of 
 the Stars, or gr^-at Bodies incomprehenlibly remote from us, 
 iliould ceafe to be, or move as it does. This is certain, Things, 
 hov>'ever abfolute and entire they feem in themfelves, are but 
 Retainers to other pans of Nature, for that which they are 
 moft taken Notice of by us. Their obfervable Qiialities, 
 A6tions, and Powers,- are owing to lometing witliout them ; 
 and there is not fo complcat and perfcdl a part, that we 
 know, of Nature, ■\vhiclj docs not owe the Being it has, and 
 the Excellencies of it, to its Neighbours ; and wc mult not 
 confine our Thoughts within tlie Surface of any Body, but 
 look a great deal futl.er, to comprehend perfectly thole Qiia- 
 lities that are in it. 
 
 §. 12. If this be fo, it's not to be wonder'd, that rre have 
 very impeyfcB Ideas a' Subh'ances ;_ and that the real Eilcnces, 
 on which depend thcr Properties and Operations, areunknown 
 to us. VVe car. not difcover lb much as that Sit^i', Figure, 
 and Texture of their minute and active Parts, which is really 
 in them; much Ids the diHcrcnt Motions and ImpuHcs made 
 in, and upon them by Bodies froip without, upon which de- 
 rends, and by which is form'd tiic greatelt and moft remar- 
 kable Part of tliolc Qiialities wc obicrve in them, and of 
 which our coaip'cx ld(^s of them are made up. This Confi- 
 
 deration 
 
their Truth and Certainty. 209 
 
 deration alone is enough to put an end to all our Hopes of 
 ever having the Ideoi of their real Eflences; which, whiltt wq 
 want, the nominal ElTences, we make ule of inlteadof them, 
 will be able to furnilli us but very iparingly with any gene- 
 ral Knowledge^ or univerfal Fropolitions capable of real Cer- 
 tainty. 
 
 §. 13. We are not therefore to wonder, if Cer- j^i^rment 
 tdnty be to be found in very few general Propo- ^^^^j^ 
 
 fitions made concerning Subftances : Our Know- farther, but 
 ledge of their Qualities and Pioperties go very that is not 
 feldom farther than our Senfes reach and inform Knowledge. 
 us. Poflibly inquifjtive and obferving Men may, 
 by Strength o( Judgment, penetrate farther, and on Probabilities 
 taken from wary Obfervation, and Hints well laid together, 
 often guefs right at what Experience has not yet difcover'd 
 to them. But this is but guefling ftill j* it amounts only to 
 Opinion, and has not that Certainty which is requifite to 
 Knowledge! For all general Knmkdge lies only in our own 
 Thoughts, and confilts barely in the Contemplation of our 
 own abftradt Idea^, Where-ever we perceive any Agreement 
 or Difagreement amongft them, there we have general Knon- 
 ledge ; and by putting the Names of thofe Ideas together ac- 
 cordingly in Propofitions, can with Certainty pronounce gene- 
 ral Truths. But becaufe the abftrad Ideas of Subftances, for 
 which their fpecihck Names, Itand, whenever they have any 
 diftinit and determinate Signification,, have a dilcoverable 
 Connexion or Inconfiftency with but a very few other Ideas, 
 the Certai^ity of univerfal Propofnions concerning Sahfrances, is ve- 
 ry narrow and fcanty in that part, which is our principal 
 Enquiry concerning them ; and there is Icarce any of the 
 Names of Subftances, let the Idea it is apply 'd to, be what it 
 will, of which we can generally, and with Ce/tainty pro^ 
 nounce, that it has or has not this or that other Qiiaiity be- 
 longing to it, and conltantly co-exifting or inconfiltent with 
 that Idea, where-ever it is to be found. 
 
 §. 14. Before we can have any tolerable Know- iTy^^. 
 ledge of this kind, we mult firit know what rsnJ({ie7o 
 Changes the primary Qualities of one Body, do ^^fy j{now~ 
 regularly produce in the primary QHalities ot ano- iedg;e of 
 ther, and how. Secondly, we mult know what Siihftances. 
 primary jQy.aliti''S of any Body, produce certain 
 Senfations, or Ide^ts in us. This is in Truth, no lefs than to 
 know all the ]£tfe6^s of Matter, under it divers Modifications 
 
 P 3 of 
 
 ws 
 
-210 Univerfal Tropofttions^ 
 
 o^ Bulk, Figure, Colicrion of Part?, Motion, and Reft. 
 Which, I think, every Body will allow, is utterly inipofTible 
 to be known by us, without Revcl.nion. Nor it it were re- 
 veal'd to us, what Ibrt of Figure, Bulk, ani viotion of Cor- 
 pufcles, would produce in us the Senlaiion ol i yelhrv Co- 
 lour, av^l what fort of Figure, Bulk, and Texture of Parts 
 in the Supcrfices of any Body, were fit to give luch Corpuf- 
 clcs their due Motion to proJuce thu Coloin-. Would that 
 be enough to inake Hnivcrfal Propofilions with Certaintj, con- 
 cerning the fevcral forts of them, unkis \vc had Faculties 
 acute enough to perceive the prccife Bulk, Figure, Texture, 
 and Motion of Bodies in thoi'e minute Part?, by which they 
 operate on our Senfes, that fo w^ might by thofe frame our 
 abftrad Ideas of them. I have mention'd here only corporeal 
 Subftances, whofe Operations Icem to lie more level to our 
 Undcrrtandings : F»r as to the Opermom of Spirits, both their 
 thinking and moving of Bodies, we at ftrft Sight find our 
 fclvcs at a lofs ; though perhaps, when we have apply'd our 
 Thoughts a little nearer to the Confideiation of Bodies, and 
 their Oper tions, and examined how fr our Notions, even 
 in thcfe, reach, with any Clearnefs, beyond fcnfible Matter 
 of Fa6^, we fhall be found to ccfnfefs, that even in thefe too, 
 our Difccurfcs amount to ver)' little beyond perfect Igno- 
 jwncc and Incr'.pacity. 
 '• _ §• r"). This is eviJent, tl:e ab/IraH cor^ip'ex Ideas 
 
 7^/^///? our qC Suh^ames, for which their general Names ftand, 
 ^Tl) "^^ comprehending their real Confiitutions, carf- 
 
 buhjtaiues afford us htit very little uniz'crfal Certainty. Becaufe 
 contain not ■'^ ,, r ^/ ^ , "r ^l ^ 
 
 il^eir real *^"'- '^^^'^ ^' them are not made up or that, on 
 C'ovjlituti- ^h'^h t^o^^ Qiialitics we obfcrve in them, and 
 ons, wc rnn ^'^^uld inform our Iclves about, do depend^ or " 
 vtijkc hi: with which they have any certain Connexion. - 
 fcTv s;rmral V, g. Let the Idea to w^hich we give the Name 
 £eri,'f/iPro- Man, be, as it commonly is, a Body of the or- 
 pr.fufons^ dinary Shape, with Scnfe, voluntary Motion, and 
 conceinln;^ Reaion joiu'd to it. This being the abliradt Ide^^ 
 
 ^"'- and confcquLUtly the ElTence of our Species Aian^ 
 
 wc can make but very few general certain Pro- 
 poHuoiis conccrnuig Alan^ (ianding for luch an Idea, Be- 
 cauic not kiiowuig the real Conftitution on which Senfation, 
 Power of Motion, and Kcalbning, with that peculiar Shape, 
 depend, and whereby they arc united togethi.r in tlio fame • 
 Subject, there arc vtry few other Qualities, with which wc 
 
 caj^ 
 
their Truth and Certahity, 211 
 
 can perceive them to havea neceflary Connexion ; and there- 
 fore we cannot with Certainty affirm, That all Men jlcep by 
 Intervals • that no Alan can be nourifh'd by Wood or Stcaes ; 
 that all Men mil be poyfond by H.mloci : BecauCe thefe Ideas 
 have no Connexion nor Repugnancy with this our nominal 
 Eflence of Man, with this aWirad^ Idea that Name ftands for. 
 We muft in thefe and "the like appeal to Tryal in particular 
 Subjeds, which can reach but a little way. We murt con- 
 tent our felves'with Probability in the reft; but can have no 
 general Certainty, whilft our Ipecifick /</f<^ of y^/<^;2 contains 
 not that real Conftitution, which is the Ro:t wherein all his 
 infeparable Qualities are united, and from whence they flow. 
 WhilR our Idea the Word Man ftands for, is only an im- 
 perf^6t Colledion of fome ienfible Qualities and Powers in 
 him, there is no difcernible Connexion or Repugnance be- 
 tween our fpecifick Idea, and the Operation of either the 
 Parts of Hemlock or Stones, upon his Conftituticn. There 
 are Animals that I'afely eat Hemlock, and others that are 
 nouiilli'd by Wood and Srones : But as long as we want 
 lleof of thofe real Conftitutions of different forts of Animals, 
 whereon thefe, and the like Qiialities and Powers depend, 
 we muft not hope to reach Certainty in univerfal Piopofitions 
 concerning tiiem, Thofe few Ideas only, wlMch have a dif- 
 cernible Connexion with our nominal Eflence, or any part 
 of it, can afford us much fuch Propofition?. But thefe are 
 fo few, and of fo little Moment, that we may juftly look 
 on our certain general Kmrvledge of Stibfiances, as almoft none 
 at all. 
 
 §. 16. To conclude, general Propo/tiions, of WI.>erei)i 
 what kind foever, are then only capable of Cer- lies the ve~ 
 tainty, when the Terms ufed in them ftand for neral Cer- 
 fuch Ideas, whofe Agreement or Difagreement, tainty of 
 as there exprefs'd, is capable to be dilcover'd by Fropfitiojis. 
 us. And we are then certain of their Truth or '•>• 
 
 Falfhood, when we perceive the Ideas the Terms ftarhi fbf, 
 to agree, or not agree, according as they are affirm'd or-dc- 
 ny'd one of another. Whence we may take Notice, ^at 
 general Certainty is never to be found but in our Id:as. When-^ 
 ever we go to feek it elfewhere in Experiment, or Obfervati-, 
 ons without us, our Knowledge goes not beyond Particulars, 
 'Tis the Contemplation of our own abliracl: Ideas^, that alone 
 is able to afford us gemrd Knowledge, 
 
 P 4 C H A P, 
 
212 Maxims. 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 
 Of Maxims. 
 
 They _ are §. i, ' I ^ Here are a fort of Propofitions, which 
 Self-evi- J^ under the Name of Aiaxitrs and 
 
 dent. AxiorKs^ Iiave pafs'd for Principles of Science: 
 
 And becaufe they sutjelf-evulent, have been fup- 
 pos'd innate, without that any Body (that I know) ever 
 went about to (liew the Reafon and Foundation of their 
 Clearnels or Cogency. It may however be worth while to 
 enquire into the Reafon of their Evidence, and fee whether 
 it be peculiar to them alone, and alfo examine how far they 
 influence and govern our other Knowledge. 
 
 §, 2. Knorvledge, as has been fliewn, confiRs 
 
 Wherein in the Perception of the Agreement or Difagree- 
 that Self- mcnt of Ideai : Now, where that Agreement or 
 ev'hk7ice Difagreement is perceiv'd immediately by it felf, 
 confifts. without the Intervention or Help of any other, 
 
 there our Knorpledgc isjelf-evident. This will appear 
 to be fo to any one, who will but confider any of thofe 
 Propofitions, which, without any Proof, he afTents to at firft 
 Sight ; for in all of them he will find, that the Realbn of 
 his AfTenl, is from that Agreement or Difagreement, which 
 the Mind, by an immediate compaiing them, finds in thole 
 Ideas anfwering the Affirmation or Negation in the Propoli- 
 tion. ■ . ^ 
 
 §. ^. This being fo, in the next Place let us 
 
 Self-cvl- confider, whether this Self-evidence be peculiar 
 deuce not only to thofc I'ropofitions which commonly pals 
 feculUr to under the Name of Maxims, and have the Dig- 
 yccch*d iiity of Axioms allow'd them. And here 'tis 
 Axioms. plain, that fevcral < iher Truths, not allow'd to 
 be Axioms, partake equally with them in this 
 Sif-cvidencc. This we lliall fee, if we go over ihcie fevcral 
 forts of Agreement or Difagreement of Idcu, which 1 have 
 abovc-mcntion'd, viz,. Indeniity, Relation, Co-cxilki\ce, 
 and real Exificnce ; which will diicovcr to us, that not only 
 thofe t'cw Propofitions, which have had the Credit cfMaxims^ 
 
 arc 
 
Maxims, 115 
 
 iire feff- evident, but a great many, even almoft an infinite 
 Number of other Tropofitions are fiich. 
 
 §.4. For, Hr/?, the immediate Preception r. « . 
 of the Agreement or Difagreemcnt of Identity, ij^^^f^y ^„^ 
 being founded in the Mind's having diftin6l Biva-fity, all 
 Ideas, this affords us as many felf-evident Pro- Propofitiom 
 portions, as we have diliind Ideoi. Every are equally 
 one that has any Knowledge at all, has, as the felf-evident. 
 Foundation of it, various and di(tin6t Ideoi : 
 And it is the firrt Ad't of the Mind, (without which, it can 
 never be capable of any Knowledge) to know every one of 
 its Ideas by its felf, and diliinguifli it from others. Every 
 one finds in himlelf, that he knovv^s the Ideas he has : 
 That he knows alfo, when any one is in his Underftandiiig, 
 and what it is : And that when more than one are there, he 
 knows them diffindly and confufedly one from another. 
 Which always being fo, (it being impoifible but that he 
 fhould perceive what he perceives) he can never be in doubt 
 when any Idea is in his Mind, that it is there, and is that 
 Idea it is ; and that two diliino: Ideas, when they are in his 
 Mind, are there, and are not one and the fame Idea. So that 
 all fuch Affirmations, and Negations, are made without any 
 Poflibility of Doubt, Uncertainty, cr Hefitation, and mult 
 neceffarily be affented to, as loon as underftood ; that is, as 
 foon as we have, in our Minds, determined Ideas, which the 
 Terms in the Propofition ftand for. And therefore whcre- 
 ever the Mind with Attention confidcrs any Propolition, lo 
 as to perceive the two Ideas, fignify'd by the Terms, and af- 
 firmed or deny'd one of the other, to be the fame or ditk- 
 rent, it is prefently and infallibly certain of the Truth of 
 fuch a Propofition, and this equally whether thefe Propofiti- 
 ons be in Terms ftanding for more general Ideas, or fuch ns 
 are lefs fo, v. g. whether the general' /</f^ o^ Being be affirm 'd 
 of it felf, as in this Propofition, Tvkatfoevcr is, u ; or a more 
 particular Idea be affirm'd of it felf, as a Man is a. Man, or 
 Tvhatfoever is White, is White. Or whether the Idea of Being in 
 general be deny'd of not Being, which is the only (if 1 may 
 lb call it) Idea di&excnt from it, as in this other Propofition, 
 It is impoffiUe for the pme to he, and not to he ; or any Idea of 
 any particular Being be deny'd of another di'fferent from it, 
 as a Man is not a Horfe -, Red is not Blue, Ti.e Difference of 
 the Ideas, as foon as the Terms are underftood, makes the 
 Tfuth of the Propofition prefently vifibJe, and that with an 
 
 equal 
 
ii4 Max'wis. 
 
 «qual Certainty and Eafinefsin the Icfs, as well ss the more 
 general Probo''tions, and all for the lame Reifon, i>\z,. be- 
 caufc the Mind perceives in any Ideas, that it has the fame 
 Idea to the lame wi h ii; felf • and two different Ideas to be 
 different, and not the lame. And this it is equally certain of, 
 ivhether theie Ideas be more or lels general, abl^ra(ft, and 
 comprehcnfivc. It is not therefore alone to thcfe two gene- 
 ral Propositions, Wh.nfoever is, is- and, // is m^ojft^Ae for the 
 fime Thi/ig to he, and not to he • that this Self-evidence belongs 
 by any peculiar Right, The Perception of being, or not be- 
 ing, belongs no more to thefe va-^ue Ideas, fignify'd by the 
 Terms Wkatjocver and Things than it does to any other Ideas. 
 Thefe two general Maxims amounting to no more, in Oiort, 
 but this, that the fame is the fan:e, and Janie is not different, 
 are Truths known in more particular Inftances, as well as 
 in thefe getieral Maxim?, and known alfo in particu'ar In- 
 (bnccs, before thele general Maxims are ever thought on, and 
 draw all their Force from the Difcernment of the Mind em- 
 ploy 'd about particular Ideas. There is nothing more vifible, 
 than that the Mind, without the help of any Proof or Re- 
 fle6\ion on either of thele general Propofition?, perceives fo 
 clearly, and knows fo certainly, that the Idea of White, is 
 the Idea of White, and not the Idea of Blue ; and that the 
 Idea of White, when it is in the Mind, ir. there, and is not 
 abfcnt, that the Confidcration of ihele Axioms can add no- 
 t'liing to the Evidence or Ccrt^ijuy of its Knowledge. ]uft 
 1*0 it is (as every one may exptriincit in himfelf) in all the 
 Ideas a Man has in his Mind : He knows each to be it lelf, 
 and not to be another ; and to he in his Mind, and not a- 
 nay, when it is there, with a Certdiiny that cannot be great- 
 er; and tiicrcfore the Truth rf no general Propofition can be 
 known with a greater Certainty, nor add any thing to this. - 
 So that in refpet5l o'i Identity, our intuitive Knowledge rea- 
 ches as far as our Ideas. A nd we are capable of making as 
 many felf-cvident Fropofitions, as we have Names for dilfinft 
 Ideas. And 1 appeal to cvi.ry one one's owr. Mind, whether 
 this Propofition, A Circle rs a Circle, be not as felf-tvident a 
 Prcpontion, tis that con filling of mere general Terms, W'hat- 
 fcezrr is, is: «And again, whether this Propofition, Bbe is 
 not Kcil, be not a Piopo'.";tion that the Mind can no more doubt 
 of, as loon as it undedlands the Word?, than it does of that 
 Axiom, It is inprffihle fcr il.e jan:e thing to he^ and not to be f 
 And io of all the like. 
 
Maxims, 115 
 
 §. «;. Secondly, As to Co-exijlence, or fucli ne- 
 ceffary Connexioe between two Ideas, tliat ui Secojidly, In 
 the Subje6l where one of them is fuppos'd, Co-exiftence 
 there the other muli neceflarily be alio ; of we have few 
 fuch Agreement or Difagreement as this, the felf-evUent 
 Mind has an immediate Perception but in ve- Vropfitiom. 
 ry few oF them ; and therefore in this Sort we 
 have but very little intuitive Knowledge. Nor are there to 
 be found very many Propofitions that are felf-evident, t'io* 
 ibme there are ; v. g. the Idu of filling a Place equal to the 
 Contents of its Superficies, being annexed to our Ided of Bo- 
 dy, I think it is a felf-evident Propofition, That tm Bodies 
 cannot be in the J.ime Place. 
 
 §. 6. Thirdly, As to the Relatims of Modes, 
 Mathematicians have fram'd many Axioms con- Thirdly, In 0- 
 cerning that one Relation of Equality. As ther Relatiom 
 Equals tahn from Equals, the Remainder mil he we may have. 
 Equals] which, with the reft of that Kind, how- 
 ever they are received for Maxims by the Mathematicians, and 
 are unquelHonable Truths ; yet, I think, that any one who 
 confiders them, will not find that they have a clearer Self-e- 
 vidence than thele, that one and one are equal to two ; that if 
 you take from the five Fingers of one Hand tivo, and from the five 
 Fingers of the ether Hand tm, the remaining Numbers will he e~ 
 qual. Thefe, and a thoufand other fuch Propofitions, may be 
 found in Numbers, which, at very firft Hearing, force the Af- 
 fent, and carry with them an equal, if not greater Clearncl?, 
 than thofe mathematical Axioms. 
 
 §, 7. Fourthly, As to real Exiftence,- fince" 
 that as no Connexion with any other of our Fourthly, Con- 
 Ideits, but that of our felves, and of a firft B^- ceming real 
 ing, we have in that, concerning the real Ex- Exiftance, wc 
 iftence of all other Beings, not fo much as de- ^^-^^e none. 
 monftrative, much lefs a felf-evident Know- 
 ledge ; and therefore concerning thofe, there are no Maxim?. 
 
 §.8. In the next Place let usconfider, what 
 Influence thefe receiv'd Maxims have upon the Thefe jixioms 
 other Parts of our Knowledge. The Rules e- do not much 
 flablifh'd in the Schools, that all Reafonipgs influence our 
 are ex pracognitis, & prceconceffjs, feem to lay °^^'^^ Know- 
 the Foundation of ail other Knowledge in theie ^^'^S^' 
 Maxims, and to fuppofe tl:iem to be pracognita ; 
 vvhereby, I think, is meant thefe two Things : Firft, Tint 
 
 thef- 
 
Ii6 Maxims, 
 
 thefe Axioms are thofe Truths that arc firft known to the 
 Mind ; and fccondly, that upon them the other Parts of our 
 
 Knowledge depend. 
 
 §, cf. Fir ft J That they are not the Truths frjl 
 Secmfe they Inoren to the Mind, is evident to Experience, 
 are not the ' as wc have (hevvn in another Place, B. I. Ch.W. 
 Truths we firft Who perceives not, that a Child certainly 
 knew. knows that a Stranger is not its Mother ; that 
 
 its Sucking-Bottle is not the Rod, long before 
 he knows that 'tis impoffiblc for the fame Thing to be, and not 
 to he ^ And how many Tiiilhs are there about Numbers, 
 which it is obvious to obfervc, that the Mind is perfectly ac- 
 quainted with, and fully convinc'd of, before it ever thought 
 on thefe general Maxims, to which Matiiematicians, in their 
 Arguings, do lometimes refer them ? Whereof the Reafon is 
 very plain : For that which makes the Mind aflent to fuch 
 Propofitions, being nothing elfe but the Perception it has of 
 the Agreement or Difagreement of its Ideas^ accordiiig as it 
 finds I hem affirmed or deny'd one of another, in Words it 
 underflands, and every Idea being known to be what it is, 
 and every two diftin(5l Ideals being known not to be the lame, 
 it mull: ncceffarily follow, that fuch felf-evident Truths mult 
 be firfi known, which confift of Ideas that are fiyfi in the 
 Mind ; and the IdeM Brft in the Mind, 'tis evident, are thofe 
 of particular Things, from whence, by flow Degrees, theUn- 
 derrtanding proceeds to fome few general ones j which being 
 taken from the ordinary and familiar Objects of Senfe, are 
 general Names to them. Thus particular Ideas are firfi re- 
 ceived and dilHnguifti'd, and fo Knowledge got about them ; 
 and next to them, the lefs general, or fpccifick, which are 
 !iext to particular : For abltravil Ideas arc not lo obvious or 
 eafy to Children, or the yet unexercised Mind, as particular 
 ones. If they ieem to grow Men, 'tis only becaulc by con- 
 ftant and familiar Ufe they arc made fo : For when we nice- 
 ly reflcil upon them, we lliall find, that general Ideas are 
 Fidlions and Contrivances of the Mind, that carry DirHcul- 
 ty with them, and do not eafily otlec themfelves, as we are 
 apt to imagine. For Example, Docs it not require fome 
 Pains and Skill to form the general Idea of a 7>-u«^/.',(which 
 is yet none of the molt abltra:i, comprehenfive, and dilii- 
 cult) for it mull be neither Oblique, nor Redanglc, neither 
 Equilaurial, Equicrural, norScalcnon; but all and none of 
 Uiclc .It once. In Effcd"i it is lomething impcrfe>il:3 that cauT 
 
 not 
 
Maxims. Ii7 
 
 not exift } an Idea wherein fome Parts of feveral different and 
 inconiiftent Ideas are put together. 'Tis true, the Mind in 
 this iiTiperfed State has need of fuch IdeaSj and makes all the 
 Hafte to them it can, for the Conveniency of Communica- 
 on and Enlargement of Knowledge ; to both which it is na- 
 turally very much enclin'd. But yet one has Realon to fuf- 
 pecl fuch Ideas are Marks of our Traperfedion ; at Icaft, 
 this is enough to fliew, that the moil abftra6l and general /- 
 deas, are not thofe that the Mind is fir/I- and moft_ eafily ac- 
 quainted with, nor fuch as its earlierf Knowledge is conver- 
 fant about. 
 
 §. to; Secondly, From what hasb?en faid, it 
 plainly follows, that thefe magnify 'd Maxims, Secatife on 
 are not the Principles and Foundations of all our t/jem the other 
 other KnoTxledge. For if there be a great many Parts of our 
 other Truths, which have as much Self-evi- K7iowhdge do 
 dence as they, and a great many that we know ''^^ defend. 
 before them, it is impofiible they fhould be the 
 Principles from which we deduce all other Truths. Is it im* 
 poflTible to know that one and ttvo are equal to three, but by 
 Virtue of this, or fome fuch Axiom, viz.. The Whole is equal 
 to all its Parts talen together f Many a one knows that one and. 
 tm are equal to three, without having heard, or thought on 
 that, or any other Axiom by which it might be prov'd ; 
 and knows it as certainly as any other Man Knows, that the 
 Whole ii equal to all its Parts, or any other Maxim ; and all 
 from the fame Rcafon of Self-evidence ; theEquality of thofe 
 Ideas being a? vifible and certain to him without that, or a- 
 ny other Axiom, as with it, it needing no Proof to make it 
 perceiv'd. Nor after the Knowledge, That the Whole w equal 
 to all its Parts, does he know that one and tno are equal to three y 
 better, or more certainly than he did before. For if there 
 be any odds in thofe Ideas, the Whole and Parts are more ob- 
 fcure, or at leaft: more difficult to be fettl'd in the Mind, 
 than thofe of one, tm, and three. And indeed I think I 
 may ask thefe Men, who will needs have all Knowledge be- 
 fidcs thofe general Principles themfelve?, to depend on gene- 
 ral, innate, and felf evident Principles? What Piinciple is 
 rcquifjte to prove, that one and one are tm, that tm and tvpo 
 are four, that three times tm are jix f Which being known 
 without any Proof, do evince, that either all Knowledge does 
 -not depend on certain pracognit^, or general Maxims, calKd 
 Principles, or e!fe that thefe are Piincipks ; and if thefe 
 
 are 
 
1 1 8 Maxims. 
 
 nrc to be countcJ Principles, a G;rcat Part of Numeration 
 will be fo. To wiiich, if n'c add all the felfniviJent Pro- 
 pofitions ■which inay be made fibout all our dilHnd Ide^s, 
 Princepleswill be ahnolt infinite, at Icaftiinmraerablcj which 
 Men arrive to the Knowledge of at different Ages ; and a 
 great many of thelc innate Principle?, they never come to 
 know all their Lives. But whether they come in View of 
 the Mind earlier or lat.r, this is true of them, that they arc 
 all known by their native Evidence, arc whol.y independent, 
 receive no Light, nor any cap.ible of any Proof one from a- 
 nother, much Icfs the more particular from the general ; or 
 the more fimpie from thp more compounded ; the more fimr 
 plc, and lefs abftradV, being the moft familiar, and the eafi- 
 er and earlier apprehended. But which ever be the cleared 
 Ideas^ the Evidence and Certainty of all liich Propofitions is 
 in this. That a Man fees the fame Idea to be the fame Idea, 
 and infallibly perceives two difterent Heai to be different /- 
 dcas. For wMien a Man has in his Undfferftanding the Ide- 
 c.s of one and of trro^ the Idea of Tellorv and the Idea of Bltie, 
 he cannot but certainly know, that the Idea of one is the /- 
 dea of one, and not tl.c Idea of two ; and that the Idea of 
 Yellow is the Idea of Yellow, and not the Idea of Blue. For 
 a Man cannot cont'ound the Iddis in his Mind, which ^e 
 has diliindt : That would be to have them confus'd and di- 
 rtinit at the lame Time, which is a Contradidion ; and to 
 have none diilincl, is to have no Ufe of our Faculties, to 
 have no Knowledge at all. And therefore what Idea Ibever 
 is affirm'd of it kit, or whatlbevcr two entire diftind Ideas 
 arc (leny'd one of another, the Mind cannot but aiTcnt to 
 inch a Propofition, as infallibly true, as foon as it undcr- 
 rtands the Terms, without Hefitation or need of Proof, or 
 regarding thofe made in more general Terms, and cal I'd 
 Maxim?. 
 
 §. II. What lliall we then fay ? Arc thefc 
 Whatjiftthife general Maxims of no Ule ? l>y no Means; 
 X^neral Mix- though perhaps their Ule is not that which it 
 iwshrce. is commonly taken to be. But li nee doubt- 
 
 ing in the Icall of wliat haih been by fomc 
 Ktcn afcrib'd to thelc .Maxinss, may be ape to be cry'd out a*- 
 gaiiili, as overturning the Foundations of all the Sciences, 
 it may be worth while to ccntiJcr them, with Rcfpcbt to o- 
 iher Parts of our Knowledge, and examine more particular" 
 ly to >vhAt Purposes they lerre, and to what not. 
 
 i# It 
 
Maxims. 119 
 
 1. It is evident from what has been already faid, that they 
 are of no Ufe to prove or confirm lefs general felf-evident 
 Propofitions. 
 
 2. 'Ti3 as plain that they are not, nor have been the Foun- 
 dations whereon any Science hath been built. There is, I 
 know, a great deal of Talk, propagated from Scholafticfc 
 Men, of Sciences and the Aiaxims on which they are built: 
 But it has been my ill Luck, never no meet with any fuch 
 Sciences j much lefs any one built upon thefe two Aiaxims^ 
 What is, ii ; and h is impojfihle for the fame to he, and not to he. 
 And I would be glad to be fhewn where any luch Science 
 fretted upon thelb, or any other general Axioms is to be 
 found ; and fhould be obliged to any one who would lay 
 before me the Frame and Syftem of any Science fo built on 
 thefe, or any fuch like Maxims, that could not be fhewn to 
 ftand as firm without any Conhderation of them. I ask. 
 Whether thefe general Maxims have not the fame Ufe in the 
 Study of Divinity, and in Theological Quef^ions, that they 
 have in the other Sciences ? They ferve here too, to filencc 
 Wranglers, and put an end to Difputc. But I think that 
 no Body"^ will therefore lay, that the Cfirifrian Religion is 
 built on thcit Maxims, or that the Knowledge we have of 
 itj is deriv'd from thefe Principles. 'Tis from Revelation we 
 have receiv'd it, and without Revelation, thefe Maxims had 
 never been able to help us to it. When we find cut an Idea^ 
 by whofe Intervention we difcover the Connexion of 'two 
 others, this is a Reveiation from God to us, by the Voice of 
 Reaion. For we then come to know a Truth that we did- 
 not know before. When God declares any Truth to us, this 
 is a Revelation to us by the Voice of his Spirit, and we are: 
 advanc'd vin our Knowledge. But in neither of thefe do we 
 receive our Light or Knowledge from Maxims, But in the 
 one the Things themfelves afl^ord it, and we fee rhe Truth 
 in them by perceiving their Agreement or Difagreement. Jn 
 the other, God himfelf affords it immediately to us, and we 
 iee the Truth of what he fays in his unerring Veracity. 
 
 3. They are not of ufe to help Men forwards in the .Ad-» 
 vancement of Sciences, or new Difcoveries of yet unknown 
 Truths* Mr. JSltmon, in his never enough to be admir'd 
 Book, has demonftrated feveral Piopofitic^ns, which are fa 
 many new Truths, before unknown to the World, and are 
 farther Advances in Mathematical Knowledge : But for the 
 Difcovery of thefej it was not the general Maxims, What i^; 
 
2 20 Maxims. 
 
 is • or, tl:e Whole it higgcr than a Part, or tlie like, that liclp'd 
 him. Thefe were not the Clues that lead him into the Dif- 
 covery of the Tiiitli and Certainty of thole Propofitions. 
 Nor was it by thcin th.it he p,ot the Knowledge of thofe De- 
 jnonllratioii! J but by findin.^ out intermediate Ideas, th^t 
 fhcw'd the Agreement or Difagrecment of the Ideas, as ex- 
 prcfsd in the Propofitions he demonllrateJ. This is the great 
 Exercile and Improvement of Iniman Underfbnding in the 
 enlarging of Knowledge, and advancing the Sciences; where- 
 in they are far enough from receiving any Help from the 
 Contemplation of thclc, or the like magnify 'd Adaxims. 
 Would I hole who have this traditional Admiration of thefe 
 Propofition?, that they think no Step can be made in Know- 
 ledge without the Support of an Axiow^ no Stone laid in the 
 building of the Sciences without a gejicral Aiaxiw, but di- 
 Itinguilli between the Method of acquiring Knowledge, and 
 of communicating between the Method of raifing any Sci- 
 ence, and that of teaching it to others as far as it is advan- 
 ced, they would lee that tliofe general A'laxims were not the 
 Foundations on which the hrft Difcoveries raifcd their ad- 
 mirable Stnitftures, nor the Keys that unlock'd and open'd 
 thofe Secrets of Knowledge. Though afterwards, when 
 Schools were erected, and Sciences had their Profefibrs to 
 teach what others had found out, they often made ufe of 
 Maxims^ i. c. laid down certain Proportions which wxre 
 iclf-cvidcnt, or to be received for true, wlifch being fettl'd in 
 the Minds of their Scholars, as unquelHonable Verities, they 
 en ocralion made ufe of, to convince them of Truths in par- 
 ticular Inltances, that'wcre not fo familiar to their Minds as 
 tlioic general y^xio^.s which liad btii^re been inculcated to 
 them, and c^ircfully fcttl'd in their Mind?. Though the(e 
 particular Inliances, when well reHe^lcd on, are no iefs felf- 
 evident to the Undciftanding, than the general Adaxinis 
 brought to conHrm tlicm: And it was in thole particular In- 
 ttanccs, that the rirli" Difcovcrer found the Truth, without 
 ilie help of the geiicral Alaxims : And io may any one elfe 
 do, who with Attention confiders tlicm. 
 
 To come therefore to tlie Vk that is made o^ Af^nxirKs. 
 
 1. They arc of Ufe, as has been obfav'd, in the ordinary 
 Method? of teaching Sciences as far as they are advanced : But 
 of little i.r none in advancing them father. 
 
 2. 1 licy are of Uiz in Difputcs, for the filcncing of obfti- 
 iiaic Wranglers, and bringing tliofe Contefts to iome Con- 
 
 cluficn. 
 
Maxims. 221 
 
 elufion. Whetlier a need of them to tliat End, came not in, 
 in the Manner following, I crave LeaVe to enquire. The 
 Schools having made Difputation theTouch-ftone of Mens A-- 
 bilities, and the Criterion, of Knowledge, ad judg'd Victory to 
 him that kept the Field ; and he that had the laft Word, was 
 concluded to have tbe better of the Argument, if not of the 
 Caufe. But becaufe by this Means there was like to be no 
 Decifion between skilful Combatants, whilfl: one never fail'd 
 of a medius terminm to prove any Propofition, and the other 
 could as conftantly, without, or with a Diftindion, deny 
 the Major or Adinor. To prevent, as much as could be, the 
 running out of Difputes into an eudlefs Train of Syllogifms, 
 certain general Propofitions, moft of them indeed felf-evi- 
 dent, were introduced into the Schools, which being fuch as 
 all Men allow 'd and agreed in, were look'd on as general 
 Meafures of Truth, and ferv'd inftead of Principles, (where 
 the Difputants had not laid down any other between them) 
 beyond which there was no going, and which muft not be 
 receded from by either Side. And thus thefe Maxims getting 
 the Name of Principles^ beyond which Men in Difpute could 
 not retreat, were by MiftaKe taken to be the Originals and 
 Sources from whence all Knowledge began, and the Foun- 
 dations whereon the Sciences were built ; becaufe when in 
 their Difputes they came to any of thefe, they fbpp'd there, 
 and went no farther, the Matter was determined. But how" 
 much this is a Miftaite, hath been already lliewn. 
 
 This Method of the Schools, which have been thought 
 the Fountains of Knowledge, introduc'd, as I fuppofe, the 
 like Ufe of thefe Maxims, into a great Part of Converfation 
 out of the Schools, to ftc^ the Mouth of Civillers, whom a- 
 ^ny one is excus'd from arguing any longer with, when they 
 deny thefe general felf-evident Principles receiv'd by all rea- 
 fonable Men, who have once thought of them ; but yet 
 their Ufe herein, is but to put an End to Wrangling. They 
 in Truth, when urg'd in luch Cafes, teach nothing ; that 
 is already done by the intermediate Ideas made ufe of in the 
 Debate, whofe Connexion may be feen without the Help of 
 tniofe Maxims, and fo the Truth known before the Maxim 
 is produc'd, and the Argument brought to a firfl Principle. 
 Men would give oft a wrong Argument before it came to 
 that, if in their Difputes they proposed to themfclves the find- 
 ing and embracing of Truth, and not a Conteft for Vi6io- 
 jy. And thus Maximi have their. Ufe to put a Stop to theit 
 
212 Maxims. \ 
 
 Ververfcnefs, whole Ingenuity fliould have yielded fbonef. 
 But the Method of the Schools having allow'd and encou- 
 rag'd Men to oppofe and rcfi/t evident Truths, 'till they arc '■ 
 baffl'd, /. e. 'till they are rcduc'd to contradi6i themfclves» 
 or fome elhblifli'd Principle, 'tis no Wonder that thcyfliould 
 not, in civil Converiiition, be alliam'd of that which in 
 the Schools is counted a Vertue and a Glory, viz,, obftinate- 
 ly to maintain that Side o{ the QUcftio'n they have chofcn, 
 whether true or falfe, to the laft Extremity, even after Con- 
 vi\5\i6n : A ftrancc Way to attain Truth and Knowledge ; 
 and that which I think the rational Part of Mankind, not 
 corrupted by Education, could Icaree believe (hould ever be 
 admitted amongft the Lovers of Truth, and Students of Re- 
 ligion or Nature; or iiitroduc'd into the Seminaries of thofc 
 who arc to propagate the Truths of Religion or Philofophy 
 ^mongft the Ignorant and Unconvinc'd. How much fuch a 
 Way of Learning is likely to turn young Mens Minds from 
 the finccre Search and Love of Truth ; nay^ and to make 
 them doubt whether there is any fuch Thing, or at leaft 
 worth adliering to, I fhall not now enquire. This, I think, 
 that bating thofe Places which brought the Perimenck Philo- 
 lopliy into their Sclx)ols, Ivhcre it continu'd many Ages, 
 without teaching the World any Thing but the Art of Wrang- 
 ling ; thcfe Maxims Were no where thought the Foundations 
 on which the Sciences were built, iicr the great Helps to the 
 Advancement of Knowledge. 
 
 As to thele general Maxims therefore, they 
 JVbai Ufe are, as I have faid, of great \JJe in Dilputes, 
 tlefe general to ^i.pihe Adonths of Wrangkrs ; but not of much 
 Jtlaxims Ija-jc. Jjje to the DiIcov£ry of unknpwn Truths, or 
 to help the Mind forwards in its Search after 
 Knowledge ; For whoever began to build his Knowledge on 
 this general Propolition, What is, ii j or, it is impojjihle fcr the - 
 fame Jhin^ to he, and not to he ; and from either of thefe, as 
 from a Principle of Science, deduc'd a 5)/f«; of ufeful Know- 
 ledge ; wrong Opinions often involving Contradictions, one 
 of thefe M.ixims, as :i Touch-lione, may jerve well to (hew 
 whether they lead. But yet, however fit to lay open the Ab- 
 furdity or Miliake of a Man's Reafouing or Opinion, they 
 are of very little Vfe for enlightning the UndcrftanJing ; and 
 h will not be foinid, that the Mind receives much Help 
 from them in its Progreis in Knowledge ; which would be 
 neither lels, nor Icis certain, were thtfe two gmeral J^ropo/i- 
 
 lion 
 
Maxims. 223 
 
 tions never thought on. Tis true, as I have laid, they fome- 
 times Jerve in Argumentation to ftop a Wrangler's Mouth, 
 by (hewing the Abfurdity of what he faith, and by expollng 
 him to the Shame of contradidtingwhatall the World knows, 
 and he himlelf cannot but own to be true. Eut it is one 
 Thing to fihew a Man that he is in an Error, and another to 
 put him in PolTeflTjon of Truth ; and I would fain know 
 what Truths thefe two Propofitions are able to teach, and by 
 their Influence make us know, which we did not know be- 
 fore, or could not know without them. Let us reafon from 
 them, as well as we can, they are only about Identical Pre- 
 dications, and Influence^ if any at all, none but fuch. Each 
 particular Proportion concerning Idenity or Diverfity, is as 
 clearly and certainly known in it felf, if attended to, as ei- 
 ther of thefe general ones ; only thefe general ones, as fer- 
 ring in all Cafes, are therefore more inculcated and infjfted 
 on. As to other lefs general Maxims, many of them are 
 no more than bare verbal Propofitions, and teach us nothing 
 but the Refpeft and Import of Names one to another. The 
 Whole is equal to all its Parts : What real Truth, I befeech 
 you, does it teach us ? What more is contain'd in that Max- 
 im, than what the Signification of the Word Totum, or the 
 Whole, docs of it felf import? And he that knows that the 
 Word Totum ftands for what is made up of all its Parts, 
 knows very little lefs, than that the Whole is equal to all its 
 Pans, And i^pon the fame Ground, I think that this Pro- 
 pofition, A Hill is higher tkaa a Falley, and feveral the like, 
 may alfo pafs for Maxims. But yet Matters of Adathematlds, 
 when they would, as Teachers of what they know, initiate 
 others in that Science, do not without Reafon place this, 
 and fome other fuch Maxims, at the Entrance of their Sy- 
 jictMS. that their Scholars, having in the Beginriing perfedlly 
 acquainted their Thouglits with thefe Propofitions made in 
 fuch general Terms, may be ws'd to make fuch Reflexions, 
 and have thefe more general Propofitions, as form'd Rules and 
 Sayings, ready to apply to all particular Cafes. Not that if 
 they be equally weigh'd, they are more clear and evident, 
 than the particular Inftances they are brought to confirm; 
 but that being more familiar to the Mind, the very naming 
 them, is enough to fatisfy the Underftanding. But this, I 
 fay, is more from our Cufi:om pf ufingthem, and the Efla" 
 blimment they have got in our Minds, by our often think- 
 jng of'thejp, than from the different Evidence of Things* 
 
 0.2 . But 
 
2 34 Max WIS. 
 
 But before Cuftora has fcttVd Methods of Thinking and 
 Reafoning ip our Minis, I am apt to iinagine it is quite o- 
 therwile ; and that the ^liild, wticn a Part of his Apple is 
 taken away, kr.ows it better in that particular Inftance, than 
 by this general Proi^ofition, The Whole is equal to all its Parts • 
 and that if one of tlic(c hive need to be confirm'd to him 
 by the other, the general has more need to be let into his 
 Mind by the particular, than the particular by the general. 
 For in I'articulars, our Knowledge begins, and fo fpreads it 
 fclf, by Decrees, to Generals \ though afterwards the Mind 
 takes the quite contrary Courfc, and having drawn its Know- 
 ledge into as general Propofitions as it can, makes thofe fa- 
 miliar to its Thoughts, and accuftoms it felf to have Re- 
 courfc to them, as to the Standards of Truth and Falfhood. 
 By which familiar Vfe of tkcw, as Rules to meafure theTnith 
 of other Propofitions, it comes in Time to be thought, that 
 more particular Propofitioiis have their Tmth and Evidence 
 from tlicir Conformity to thefe more general ones, which, 
 in Dil'courfe and Argumentation, arc io frequently urg'd, 
 and conftantly admitted. And this I think to be the Rea- 
 lon why amongft lb many fclf-evi dent Propofitions, themoft 
 general only have had the Title of Maxim?. 
 
 §. 12. One Thing farther, I think, it may 
 Maxims tf "^^ ^ amifs to obferve concerning thcl'e genc- 
 Tarehenottl- ^ Maxims, that they are fo far from im- 
 ken in the Ufe proving or eftabli(hing our Minds in true 
 of Words, m.iy Knowledge, that if our Notions be wrong, 
 pove Contra- loofe, or unfleady, and we rcfign up our 
 Jiff ions. Thoughts to the Sound of Words, rather than 
 
 fix tiian on fettl'd dctermin'd ///(vw of Things ; 
 I fay, thck general MAxir>:s will^rz/r to confirm us in Mi- 
 Ibkes; and m fucha Way of Ufe of Words which is mod 
 common, will jervt to prove Contradictions : v. ^, He that , 
 with Des Cartes (Vail frame in his Mind an Idea of what he 
 calls Body^ to be nothing but Extenfion, may eafily demon- 
 flrate, that there is no VAcuttm^ i, e. no Space void of Body 
 by this Maxim, What is, is : For the lAeA to which he an- 
 nexes the Name Body^ being hare Extenfion, his Knowledge 
 that Space cannot be without Body, is certain : For he 
 knows his own Idea of Extenfion clearly and dirtin(^ly, and 
 kiiow? that it is rvkfU it ij, and not another Idea, tho* it be 
 call'd by ihefe three Names, Extenfian, Body^ Space. Which 
 ihice Words landing for one and the fame /^m, may, no 
 
 doubt, 
 
Maxims, 7 2$ 
 
 4oubt, with the fame Evidence and Certainty, be affirmed 
 one of another, as each of it fcif: And it is as certain, that 
 whilft I uk them all to ftand for one and the fame Idea^ this 
 Predication is as tmeand identical in its Signification, That 
 SpAce is Body, as this Predication is true and identical, thfi.t 
 Body is Body, both in Signification and Sound. 
 
 §. I J. But if another fiiall come, and make 
 to himfclf another Idea, different from Des Car- Injlance in 
 tes% of the Thing, which yet, with Des Cartes, Vacuum. 
 he calls by the fame Name Body, and make his 
 Idea, which he expreffes by the Word Body, to be of a Thing 
 that hath both Extenpm and Solidity toE^etlier, he will as ea- 
 llly demonftrate, that there may be a V^cmm, or Space with- 
 out a Body, as Des Cartes demonftrated the contrary. Be- 
 caufe the Idea to which he gives the Name Space, being bare- 
 ly the fimple one of £Ar?f;^/;5« j and xhz Idea, to which he 
 gives the Name Body, being the complex Id a oC Extenfion and 
 Re/ifiibility, or Solidity together in the fame Subjedt, thefe two 
 Ideas are not exactly one and the fame, but in the Under- 
 ftanding as diftind as the Ideas of One and Two, White and 
 Black, or as of Corporeity and Hnmanity, if I may ufe thofe 
 barbarous Terms : And therefore the Predication of theni in 
 our Minds, or in Words (landing for them, is not identical, 
 but the Negation of them one of another ; viz:, this Propor- 
 tion, Extenfion, or Space is not Body, is as true and evidently 
 certain, as this Maxim, It is impoffible for the fame Tking to he, 
 and not to he, can make any Propofition. 
 
 §.14. But yet, tho' both thele Propofitions j. ^^^^^ 
 (as you fee) may be equally demonltrated, viz.. ^^^ ^/^ EKift- 
 that there may be a Vacuum, and that there ence of Things 
 cannot be a Vacmm, by thefe two certain Prin- without vs. 
 ciples, Cviti.) What is, is, and the fame Thing 
 tannot be, and he ; yet neither of ihefe Principles will fcrve 
 to prove to us, that any, or what Bodies do exift ; For that 
 we are left to our Senfes, to difcover to us as far as they can. 
 Thofe univerfal and felf-evident Principles, being only our 
 conftant, clear, and diftind^ Knowledge of our own Ideas, 
 more general ©r comprehenfive, can affuie us of nothing that 
 paffes without the Mind, their Certainty is founded only 
 upon the Knowledge we have of each Idea by it felf, and of 
 its Diftindion from others ; about which, we cannot be 
 miftaken whiUt they are in our Minds, tho' we may, and 
 often are miftaken, when we retain ^e Names without the 
 
 Q.3 Ideas, 
 
226 Maxims, 
 
 Ideas, or life them confufedly fometimcs for one, and feme- 
 times for afiotber IJea, In which Caies, the Force of thefe 
 Ax'nTMs. reaching; ^nly to the Sound, and not j^e Significa- 
 tion of the Wofj. , jerves only to lead us into ConfuTion, 
 Miflake, and Erro • Tis to Ilicw Men, that thefe Maxims, 
 however cry'd up for the great Guards to Truth, will not 
 lecure them from Error in a carclcfs loofc Ufc of their Words, 
 that I have made this Remark. In all that is here fuggeftcd 
 concerning their little Ufe for the Improvement of Know- 
 ledge, or dangerous Ufe in Undermin'd Ideas, 1 have been far 
 enough from faying or intending tl^cy fl»ould be Uid afide, 
 as fume have been too forward to charge m* I affirm them 
 to be Truths, fclf-evidcnt Truths; and fo cannot be .aid a- 
 fide. As far as their Influence will reach, 'tis in vain to 
 endeavour, nor would I attempt to abridge it. But yet, 
 without any Injury to Truth or Knowledge, I may have 
 Reafon to think their Ufe is not anfwerable to the great 
 Strefs which feems to be laid on them, and I may warn Men 
 not toniake an ill Ufc of them, for the confirming thcm- 
 felvcs in Errors. 
 
 §. i«>. But let them be of what VJe they will 
 Their Jp- in verbal Tiopofitions, they cannot difcover or 
 flicathn Ivi- prove to us the Icaft Knowledge of the Nature 
 ge^ovs ahout of Subltances, as they are found and exiftwith- 
 roOT//e« Ideas. p^,t ^j,^ ^^^y farther tlian grounded on Experi- 
 ence. And tho' the Confcquence of thefe two 
 PropoHtions, call'd Principles, be very clear, and their Vjc 
 not dangerous or hurtful, in the Probation of fuch Things, 
 wherein there is no need at all of them for Proof, but fuch 
 a? are clear by themfelvcs without them, viz.. where our 
 Ideas arc; determined, and known by the Names that ftand 
 for them : Yet when thefe Principles, viz..* What i^, w; and, 
 h is imfclfibU for the fnie Thing to if, and not to if, arc made 
 ufe of in the Probation of Propofitions, wlierein are Words 
 ftanding for complex Ideas, v. g. Aian, Horfc, Gold., V<rtue ; 
 there they arc of infinite Danger, and moft commonly make 
 Men receive and retain Fallhood for manifefl Truth, and 
 Uncertainty for Dcmoniiration : Upon which follows Error, 
 Obfiinacy, and all the Mifchiefs that can happen for wrong 
 Reafoiiing. The Rcalon whereof is not, that thefe Principles 
 are Icfs trtie, or of lef? Force in proving Propofitions made 
 f)f Terms Handing for complex Ideas, than where the Propo- 
 rtions arc ahout fimpk Uus. But bccaufc Men jniftake ge- 
 nerally, 
 
Maxims, 227 
 
 ncrally, thinking that where the fame Terms are preferv'd,' 
 the PropoHtions are about the fame Things, tho' the Ideas they 
 ftand for, arc in Truth different. Therefore thefe Maxims are 
 Jriade ufe of to fupport thofe, which in Sound and Appear- 
 ance are coxitradiilory Propofitions ; as is clear in the De- 
 monftrationsabove-raention'd about a Vacmm. So thatwiiilft 
 Men take Words for Things, as ufually they do, thefe Max- 
 ims may and do commonly ferve to prove contradidlory 
 Propofitions. As fhall yet be farther made manifel-l-. 
 
 §. 16. For Inftance: Let AUn be that, con- 
 cerning wliich you would by thcle firft Principles Inflance in 
 dcmonftrate any Thing, and we iLall fee, that ^I^n. 
 fo far as Demonftration is by thefe Principles, 
 it is only verbal, and gives us no certain unirerfal true Pro- 
 pofition, or Knowledge of any Being exifting without us. 
 Fir/?,, a Child hayiog' framed the Idea o( 3. Man, it is pro- 
 bable, that hi? Uct is juft like that Pidure which the 
 Painter makes of the vifible Appearances join'd together ; 
 and fuch a Complication of Ideas together in his Under- 
 ftanding, makes up the fingle complex Idea which he calls 
 Man, whereof White or Flelli-colour in England being one, 
 the Child can d.empnftrate to you, that a Negro is not a 
 Man, becaufe White-colour was one of the conftant fiin-« 
 pie Ideas of the complex Idea he calls Man : And therefore 
 he can demonftrate by the Principle , It is impcffible for 
 the fame T^ing to he, and not to he, that A Negro is not a Man ; 
 the Foundation of his Certainty being not that univerfal Pro- 
 pofition, which, perhaps, he never heard nor thought of, but 
 the dear diftin6l Perception he hath of his own fimple Ideas 
 of Black and Wbite^ which he canr\ot be perfwaded to take, 
 nor can ever miftake one for another, whether he knows that 
 Maxim or no : And to this Child, or any one who hath 
 fuch an Idea, which he calls Man, can you never demon- 
 ftrate that a Man hath a Soul, becaufe his Idea of Man in- 
 cludes no fuch Notion or Idea in it. And therefore to him, 
 the Principle of What is, is, proves not this Matter ; but it 
 depends upon Golle<ftion and Obfervatipn, by which he is to 
 liiake his complex Jdea calf d Man. 
 
 §. 17. Secondly, Another that hath^one farther in framing 
 and colleding the Jde^ he calls Man, and to the outward 
 Shape adds Laughter, 3,nd rational Dijcoarfe, may demonftrate, 
 that Infants and Changelings are no Men, by this Maxim^ 
 Jt is mpojjihk for the fame Tloing to be, and not t9 be : And I 
 
 Q.4 ^P 
 
2 28 M/?xiffts. 
 
 hare difcours'd with very rational Men, who have aflually 
 dcny'd that they arc Men, 
 
 §, iS. Thirdly, Perhaps another makes up the complex 
 Idea which he calls /!//?«, only out of tlie Jdeas of Body in 
 general, and the Powers of Language and Rcafon, and leaves 
 cur the Shape wholly: This Man is able to demonflrate, that 
 a Man may have no Hands, but be _Quadrnpes^ neither of 
 thofc being included in his Idea of Man ; and in whatever 
 Body or Shape he found Speech and Reafon join'd, that was 
 a A/an: Becaule having a clear Knowledge of fuch a com- 
 plex Idea, it is certain that What is, is. 
 
 §. ip. So that, if rightly confider'd, I think 
 LlttkUfeof we may fay, that where our Ideas are dctcr- 
 thefe Maxivis min'd in our Minds, and have-annex'd to 
 J7i Proofs them by us known and fteady Names under 
 
 where wehnve thofe fettl'd Determinations, there is little Need, 
 char mid di- ^r no Ufe at all of thefe Maxims, to prove the 
 jlmil Ideas^ Agreement or Difagreement of any of them. 
 He that cannot difcern the Tiuih or Falfhood 
 of fuch Piopdfitions, without the Help of thefe, and the like 
 Maxims, will not be kelp'd by thtfe Maxims to do it : Since 
 be cannot be fuppo?'d to know the Truth of thefe Maxims 
 themfelvcs without Proof, if he cannot know the Truth of 
 others without Pi oof, which arc as fclf-evident as thefe. 
 Upon this Ground it \% that intuitive Knowledge neither 
 requires nor admits any Proof, one part of it more than a- 
 noihcr. He that will fuppofe it docs, takes away the Foun- 
 dation of all Knowledge, and Certainty: And he that needs 
 any Proof to make him certain, and give his Aflent to this 
 Piopofttion, that Tvfo are equal to Two, will alfo have need of 
 a Picof to make him admit, that What is, is. He that peeds 
 a Probation to convince him, that Two are not Three, that 
 White is )iot Black, tlat a Triangle is not a Circle, &c. or any 
 other two determin'd dU\\n6\Jdeas Art not one and'the fame, 
 will need alfo a Demonftration to convince him, that it is 
 impofhble for the fame Thing to be, and not to he, 
 
 §. 20. And as thefe Maxims arc of little Ufe 
 Tleir Ufe^ whcre we have determin'd Ideas, io they arc, 
 dnn^erous ' as I have fliewd, of dangerous Ufe where our 
 vhete our I- Jdeas are not determined, but fuch as are of a 
 Heas are cori' ^oofe and wandering Signification, fometimes 
 '^'''''' (landing for one, and lomctimcs for another 
 
 Idea ; from which follows Miftake and Error, 
 
 which 
 
Trifling Propojitions. 229 
 
 which thcfe. Maxims (brought as Proofs to eftablifli Propor- 
 tions, wherein the Terms ftand for undermined Ideas} do by 
 their Authority confirm and rivet. 
 
 CHAP. VIII. 
 
 Of Trifling Fropcjitions. 
 
 §.i.TTTHethet the Maxims treated of in someVropofiti 
 VVtheTore-soing Chapter be of that om hrinsm' 
 Ufe to real Knowledge, as is gerTerally luppos d, jnaenfe to 
 1 Jeave to be confider'd. This, I think, may our know- 
 confidently be affirm'd, that there are univer- hdge. 
 fal Propofitioiis ; that tho' they be certainly 
 tvue, yet they add no Light to our Underttandings, bring no 
 Increale to our Knowledge. Such are, 
 
 §. 2. Fi^flj -^11 purely identical Prope/itiof/s. Jsfirjf^ Iden- 
 Thefe obvioully, and at nrft Elufh, appear to tkal Pro^o- 
 continue no Inftru6tion in them : For when fitions, 
 we affirm the faid Term of it felf, whether it be 
 barely verbal, or whether it contains any dear and real Jdea^ 
 it (hews us nothing but what we mu(t certainly know be- 
 fore, whether fuch a Pi opofition be either made by, or proposed 
 to us. Indeed, that moft general one, Wh^t is, is, may ferve 
 fometimes to Ihew a Man the Abfurdity he is guilty of, when 
 by Circumlocution, or equivocal Terms, he would, in particu- 
 lar Inftanccs, deny the fame Thing of it felf j becaufe no Bo- 
 dy will fo openly bid Defiance to common Senfe, as to affirm 
 vifible and dire6t Contradidions in plain Words: Or if he 
 does, a Man is excus'd if he breaks on any farther Difcourfc 
 with him. But yet, I think, I may fay, that neither that re- 
 ceived Maxim, nor any other identical Piopofition teaches us 
 any thing : And tho'infuch kind of Propofitions, this great 
 and magnify *d Maxim, boarted to be the Foundation of De- 
 monftration, may be, and often is made ufe of to confirm 
 them, yet all it proves, amounts to no more than this. That 
 the fame Word may with great Certainty be affirm'd of it fclf> 
 without any doubt of the Truth of any fuch Propofition ; 
 and let m^dd alfo, without any real Knowledge. 
 
 §. 3. For at this Rate, any very ignorant Perfon , who can 
 but make a Propofition, and knows what he means when he 
 
 fays. 
 
2^0 Trifling Vropojitions. 
 
 bySy y^ye or A\ may make a MilH^vi of Propofitionj, of 
 whole Trutlislic imy be infallibly cci tain, and yet not know 
 one Thing in the World thereby j v. ^. what is a Soul, is a 
 Soul ; or A Soul U 4 Sou' ; a Spirit « << 5/'<V« ; «t Fetiche is 4 Ft- 
 tiche, &c. Tliefe all being equivalent to this Propofition, fie. 
 Iti-rft w, «; i. c. w/i^ff k/tth Exijhnce, hath Exiiicnce; or, who hath 
 m Soul, hath 4 Soul. What is this more than trifling with 
 Words? It is but like a Monkey (Hfting liis Oyftcr from one 
 Hand to the other ; and had he had but Words, might, no 
 doubt, have faid, Oyfterin right Hand h Sdjecl, and Oyfter 
 in left Hand is Prcdieate ; and fo might have made a tclf-evi- 
 dent Propofition of Oyfter, /. p. Oyjler is Oyfi-er ; and yet, with all 
 tFus,not have been one Whit tliewifer,or more knowing; And 
 that way of handling the Matter, would much at one have fatif- 
 iy'd the Monkey's Hunger, or a Man's Underftanding; and 
 they two would have improved in Knowledgeand Bulktogcthcr. 
 I know there are fome, who bccaule identical Propojitiom 
 are felf-cvidcnt, fhew a great Concern for them, and think 
 ihey do great Service to Philofophy, by crying them up, as if 
 iu them was contained all Knowledge, and tlie Underftanding 
 were led into ail Truth by em only. I grant, as forwardly as a- 
 nyone, that tbcyarcall true, and felf-evident. I grant farther, 
 tliat tlie Foundation of all our Knowledge liesin the Faculty wc 
 bave of perceiving the fame Idea to be the fame, and of difcer- 
 lilng it from thofe that are different, as 1 have ("hewn in the 
 fore-going Ciiapter, But how that vindicates the making 
 ofe of identical Propofitions, for the Improvement of Know- 
 ledge , from the Imputation of Trifling, I do not fee. Let 
 tfny one repeit, as often as he pleafcs, that the Will is theWill, 
 £ff lay what Strefs on it he thinKs fit ; of what Ufe is this, and 
 an infinite tJie like Propofitions, for the enlarging our Know- 
 ledge ? Let a Man abound as much as the Plenty of Words 
 srhich he has, will permit him in fuch Propofitions as thefc ; 
 ^ Lavt is a taw, and Obligation is Ohlif;ation : Right is Right, 
 and Wron^ is Wrong ; will thcfc and the like ever help him to 
 an Acquaintance with Ethich i or inftrud him or others, iu 
 the Knowledge of Morality i Thofe who know not, nor per- 
 haps ever will know, what is Right, and what is Wrong, nor 
 ihe Mcaliiie* of them, can with as much Affurance make, 
 and infallibly know the Truth of thclc and all fu|h Propofi- 
 lions, as he that is bcft inftruiied in Moralky, can do. But 
 what Advance do fuch Propofitions give in the Knowledge 
 of any Thing ncccfiary, or ufeful for thcii Conduct. 
 
 He 
 
Trifling Vropofitions, 2 5 1 
 
 He would be tliought to do little lefs than trifle, who for thfc 
 cnlightning the Underftanding in any part of Knowledge, 
 (hould be bufy with identical Propofitions, and infift on fuch 
 Maxims as thcfe ; Suhjiance is Suh[iance, and Bedy is Body ; a, 
 Vacuum is aVacuttm^ and a Forte x is a Vertex : A Centatire is a Cen- 
 taure^ and a Chinntra is a Chimara, &c. For thefe, and all fucl\ 
 are equally true, equally certain, and equally felf-evident. 
 But yet they cannot but be counted trifling, when made ufe 
 of as Principles of Jiiftru6lion, and Strefs laid on them, as 
 Helps to Knowledge ; fmce they teach nothing but what 
 every one, who is capable of Difcourfe, knows without be- 
 ing told, viz,. That the fame Term is the fame Tenn, and the 
 feme Idea the fame Idea. And upon this Account it was that I 
 formerly did,and do ftill think, the offering and inculcating fuch 
 Propofitions, in order to give the Underftandingany new Light 
 or Inlet into theKnowledge of Things, no better than trifling. 
 Inftrudion lies in fomething very different, and he that 
 would enlarge his own, or aficdwr's Mind, to Truths he 
 does not yet know, mui\ find out intermediate Ideas, and then 
 lay them in fuch Order one by another, that the Underftand- 
 ing may (ee the Agreement, or Difagreement of thofein Que- 
 ftion. Propofitions that do this, are inrtru61:ive : But they are 
 far from fuch as affirm the fame Term of it felf ; which as no 
 way to advance ones fclf or others in any fort of Knowledge. 
 It no more helps to that, than it would help any one in his 
 learnii^ to read, to have fuch Propofitions as thefe incul- 
 cated to him, <e» A is an A, and 4 B is a B ; which a Man 
 may know as well as any School-Mafter, and yet never be a- 
 ]ble to read a Word as long as he lives. Nor do thefe, or any 
 fiich identical Propofitions help him one Jot forwards in the 
 Skill of Reading, let him make what Ufe of them he can. 
 
 If thofe who bbme my calling them trifling Propofitions^ 
 had but read, and been at the Pains to underftand what I 
 had above writ in very Tphin Englijh^ they could not but have 
 ieen that by identical fropofitionsy I mean only fiich wherein 
 the fame Term importing the fame Ufa, is affjrm'd of it felf : 
 Which I take to be the proper Signification (^ identical Propofi- 
 tions', and concgLning all fuch, I thing I may continue fafely 
 \o fay. That to propofe them as inftru£Hve, is no better than 
 Uiiiing, For no one who has the Ufcof Reafon, can mifs them, 
 whea:e it is iicceilary they fhould be taken Notice of; nor 
 doubt of their Truth, -wfecn he does take Notice of them. 
 put i| Men will califtcopofjtiomf%;ip6'/!/,'Wfetrein the fame 
 
 JeriK 
 
2 5- Trifing Propofitions. 
 
 Term is affirm 'd of it iclf, whether they fpeak more properly 
 than I, others muft jiiJ^e : This is certain, all that they fay m 
 Propofitions tliat aic not identical, m my Senfe, concerns not 
 mc, nor what I have faid ; all that I have faid relating to 
 thofe Propofitions, wherein the fame Term is affirm'd of it 
 felf. And I would fain fceanlnftancc, wherein any (iichcan 
 be made ufeof, to the Advantage and Improvement of any one's 
 Knowledge. Inftances of other kinds,n'liatever Ufe may be made 
 of them, concern not me, as not being fuch as I call identical. 
 §.4. Secondly, Another fort of trifiing Pro- 
 Seconiily, petitions is, Jfhen a part of the complex Ida is 
 , '" J . " • predicated of the ISlame of the whole ; a part of 
 fr^xcated of ^^^ Definition of the Word defin'd. Such are 
 tha whole. *" Proportions wherein the Gentu is predi- 
 cated of the Species, or more comprchenfive oflefs 
 comprehenrive Terms : For what Information, what Knowledge 
 carries thisPropofition in it, viz. Lead is a Metal, to a Man who 
 jkuows the complex Idea the Name Lead (iandS for. All the 
 iimplc Ideas that go to the complex one fignify'd by the Term 
 Metal, being notmng but what he bctbre comprehended, and 
 jQgnify'd by the Name Lead, Indeed, to a Man that knows 
 the Signification of the Word Metal, and not of the Word 
 l£ad, it is a fhorter Way to explain the Signification of the 
 Word Lead, by faying it is a Metal, which at once exprefles 
 fcreral of its fimple Ideas, than to enumerate them one by 
 one, telling him it is a Body very heavy, fufihie, and malleahle. 
 §. «J, A hke trifling it is, to predicate any 0- 
 Ai fart of thtr part of the Definition of the Term defnd, or 
 *h Dtfinition to affirm any one of the fimple Ideas of a com- 
 afthe defin'd. plex one, Of the Name of the whole complex 
 Uea-y as Al Gold is fnftble. For Fufibilitj being 
 One of the fimple Ideas that goes to the making up the com- 
 |>Iejf one the Sound Gold ftands for, what can it be but play- 
 ing with Sounds, to affirm that of the Name Cold, which is 
 comprehended in its receiv'd Signification ? Twould be 
 thought little better than ridiculous, to affirm gravely, as a 
 Truth of Moment, That Gold is yellow ; and I fee not how it 
 is any )ot more material to fay, It is fufible, unlefs that Qua- 
 lity be left cut of the complex Idea, of which the Sound 
 Gold is the Maik in ordinary Speech. What Inftru6lion can 
 il carry with it, to tell one that which he bath been told al- 
 fcady, or he is fuppos'd to know before? For I am fuppos'd 
 to knew the Signihcation of ;he Word another ufcs to me, 
 
 or 
 
Trifling V r op o fit tons, 235 
 
 or elfe he is to tell me. And if I know that the Name GoU 
 ftaflds for this complex Idea of Body, yellm>^^ heavj^ MMe^ 
 malkahle, 'twill not much inftrutt me to put it folemnly af- 
 terwards in a Propofition, and gravely fay, All Gold is fuf- 
 hie. Such Propofjtions can only fcrve to (hew the Dinng^- 
 nuity of one, who will go from the Definition of his own 
 Terms, by reminding him lonietimes of it ; but carry no 
 Knowledge with them, but of the Signification of Word's, 
 however certain they be. 
 
 §, 6. Every Man is m Animal, or living Be- Injlame M^n 
 dy, is as certain a Propofition as can be ; but and Palfry. 
 no more conducing to the Knowledge of 
 Things, than to fay, A Palfry is an ambling Horjc, or a neigh- 
 ing ambling Animal, both being only about the Significati- 
 on of Words, and make me know but this; That Body^ 
 Senfe, and Motion, or Power of Senfation and Moving, are 
 three of thofe Ideas that I always comprehend and fjgnify 
 by the Word Man ; and where they are not to be found to- 
 gether, the Name Man belongs not to that Thing : And fo 
 of the other, that Eody, Senfe, and a certain Way of Goings 
 with a certain Kind of Foice, are Ibmt of thofe Ideas y(hk.h 
 I always comprehend, and fignify by the Word Palfry ; and 
 when they arc not to be found together, the Name Palfry 
 belongs not to that Thing. Tis juft the fame, and to tte 
 fame Purpofe, when any Term (fanding for any one c^ 
 more of the fimple Ideas, that altogether make up that com- 
 plex Idea which is call'd a Man, is affirmed of the Term 
 Man: v. g. fiippofe a Roman, fignify 'd by the Word Homo:: 
 All thefe diftin<ft Ideas united in one fubjeift, Corporeitas, Sen- 
 fibilitas, Potentia fe movendi, Riitionalitas, RifthiUtas, he might, 
 no doubt, with great Certainty, univerfally affirm one,n)ore, 
 or all of thefe together of the VV'ord Hon 0, but did no more 
 than fay, that the Word Horn, in his Country, comprehend- 
 ed in its Signification, all thefe Ideas. Much like a RomMice 
 Knight, who by the Word Palfry, fignify 'd thefe Ideas ; Bedy 
 of a certain Figure, fear-legg'd, nith Serije, Amotion, Amblings 
 jNeigking, White, ufed to have aWcman on his Back, might with 
 the lame Certainty, univerfally affirm alfo any, or all of thefe 
 of the Word Palfry : But did thertby teach no more, but 
 that the "Word Palfry, in his, or Romance Language, (food 
 for ail thefe, and was not to be apply'd to any Things where 
 any of thefe were wanting. But that fhall teil me, that in 
 whatever Thing Senfr, Motion, Reajon, and Lmghttr were 
 
 united. 
 
234 ^''(/^'""^ Vropofit'wns, 
 
 united, that Thinphad atf^ually a Notion of God, or would 
 be caft into a Sleep by Opim;, made indeed an inftru6live 
 Propofition ; becaul'e neither having the A'otion of Cod, nor 
 hfing ca/i- into Sleep by Opium, being contain'd in the Idta fig- 
 nify'd by the Word Man, we arc by Juch Propofitions taught 
 (bmetl ling more than barely what the Word Aian rtandsfor: 
 • And therefore tlie Knowledge contain'd in it, is more than 
 urbdl. 
 
 §. 7. Before a Man mates any Propofi- 
 
 PoT this ^'on, he is fuppos'd to undcrfhnd the Terms 
 teaches hilt the he ufes in it, or elfe he talks like a Parrot, on- 
 Sixnification ly making a Noife by Imitation, and framing 
 of Words. certain Sounds wiiich he has learn'd of others ; 
 
 but not as a rational Creature, ufmg them for 
 Signs of Ideas which he has in his Mind. The Hearer isalfo 
 fuppos'd to underfland the Terms as the Speaker ufes them, 
 or elfe he talks Jargon, and makes an unintelligible Noife. 
 And therefore he trifles with Words, who makes fuch aPro- 
 pofitionjWhich when it is made, contains no more than one of 
 the Terms doe?, and which a Man wasliippos'd to know be- 
 fore : v.g.a Triangle hath three Sides, or Saffron is yelloiv. And, 
 this is no farther tolerable than where a Man goes to explain 
 his Terms, to one who is fufjpos'd, or declares himfelf not to 
 undcrlhnd him : And then it teackes only the Signification of 
 that Word, and the Ufe of that Sign. 
 
 §. 8. We can know then the Truth oftw» 
 
 But m re- Scirts of PropofitioiiS, with pcrfc6l Grtainty ; 
 al Knowledge, tlie one is, of thofe trifling Proportions which 
 have a Certainty in them, but 'tis but a ver- 
 bal Certainty, but not inltruCtivc. And, fccondly, we can 
 know the Truth, and fo nny he certain in Propofitions, which 
 affirm fometliing of another, wiiich is a ncceflary Conlequencc 
 of its prccife complex Mv, but not contain'd m it. As^that 
 the external Angle of all Tria>t"les. is bigger than either of the op* 
 foftte internal Angles ; which Relation ofthe outward Angle,to 
 cither of the oppoilte internal Angles, making no Part of the 
 complex Idea fignify'd by the Name Tiiangic ; thisis a real 
 Truth, and conveys with it inftru^tivc, real Knowledge, 
 
 S! p. Wc having littlcor no Knowledge of 
 
 General Pro- w'liat Combinations there be of fimplc Idea* 
 
 fofithiis cnn^ exifting together m Sublbnccs, but by our 
 
 ievnm^ Suh- Scnfes,' WC 'cam.ot make .loy umvcrial certain 
 
Trifling Proportions, 2 5 5 
 
 Piopofmons concerning them, any farther than ^^^^ trjflm 
 our nominal Effences lead us ; which bei»ne ^ ^' 
 
 to a very few and inconfiderable Truths, in Rc;fpe(ft of thofe 
 which depend on their real Conftitutions, the general Prcpo^ 
 jitions that are made<?^o«; Sdfances^ if they are certain^ are, ftr 
 the mo^ part, but trifling ; and if they are inftrudive,arc uncer- 
 tain, and fuch as we can have no Knowledge of their real 
 Truth, how much foever conftant Obfervation and Anal<:^ 
 may aflift our Judgments in guefTuig. Hence it comes to paSfe^ 
 that one may often meet with very ckar and coherent Dif- 
 courfes, that amount yet to nothing. For 'tis plain, tlut 
 Namesof fubftantial Beings, as well as others, as far as thcf 
 have relative Significations affix'd to them, iiiay. With great 
 Truth, be ;oin'd negatively and affirmatively in- Propofitions, 
 as their relative Definitions make them fit to be fo join'd ; 
 and Propofitions confifting of fuch Terms, may, with the 
 fame Clearnefs, be deduc'd one from another, as thofe that 
 convey the moli real Truths ; and all this, w^ithout any 
 Knowledge of the Nature and Reality of Things exiting 
 without us. By this Method, one may make Demonftra- 
 tions and undoubted Propofitions in Words, and yet thereby 
 advance not one Jot in the Knowledge of the Truth of Things; 
 v,g. he that having learn'd thefe following- Words with thek 
 ordinary, mutually, relative Acceptations annex 'd to them, 
 V, g, Smfiance, Ad an. Animal, Form, Soul, Vegative, Sen/at ive. 
 Rational, may make feveral undouted Propofitions about the 
 Soul, without knowing at all what the Soul really is ; andof 
 thisSort,a Man may find an infinite Number of Propofitions, 
 Reafonings, and Ccmclufions, in Books of Metaphyficfcs, 
 School-Divinity, and fome Sort of natural Philolbphy ; and 
 after all, know as little of God, Spirits, or Bodies, as he did 
 before he fee out. 
 
 §. 10. He that hath Liberty to define, /. e, 
 determine the Signification of his Names of -^nd why, 
 Subfl^ances, (as certainly every one does in Ef- 
 it&i, who makes them fl:and for his own Ideas) and makes 
 their Significations at a Venture, taking them from his own 
 or other Mens Fancies, and not from an Examination or En^ 
 quiry into the Nature of Things themfdves, may, with little 
 Trouble, demrnlTiate them one of another, according to thofe 
 feveral Refpeds, and mutual Relations he has given them one^ 
 to another ; wherein, however Things agree, or difagree, ia 
 th«i; own Nature, he needs mind nothing but his. own No?i 
 
 tions. 
 
25^ Trifling Vropofitions. 
 
 tions, with tli?" Name; he hath beRow'd upon them : But 
 thereby no more incrcalbs his own Knowledge, than he does 
 his Riches, who taking a Bag of Comiicrs, calls one in a 
 ccrrain Place, a Pound ^ another in another Place, a Shilling ; 
 and a third in a third Place, a Penny ; and fo proceeding, 
 may undoubtedly reckon right, and cx[\ up a great Sum, ac- 
 cording to his Counters fo plac'd, and (landing for more or 
 lefs, as he pleafes, without being one joe the richer, or with- 
 out even knowing how much a Pound, Shilling, or Penny 
 is, but only that one is contained in the other twenty Times, 
 and contains.thc other twelve ; which a Man may alfo do in 
 the Signification of Words, by making them in Relpedl of 
 one another more or lefs, or equally comprehenfive. 
 
 §. II. Tliough yet concerning moft Words . 
 f ti^'v" ^ '" Difcourfes, efpecially argumentative 
 fing Words jjj^^ controverfial, there isthis more tobecom- 
 
 VrWn n>U P''"^''^ °^' ^'^^^^' ^^ ^^^ ^°^^ ^°" °^ trifling, 
 tbm^ ^' ' *"'^ which (ets us yet farther from the Certain- 
 ty of Knowledge we hope to attain by them, 
 or find in tliem, viz., tliat mo(f Writers arc fo far from in- 
 truding us in the Nature and Knowledge of Things, that 
 they uje their Words loojly and uncertainly, and do not, by 
 ufing them conHantly and flcadily, in the fame Significati- 
 ons, make plain and clear Dcdudliions of Words one from 
 another, and make their Dilcourfes coherent and clear, (how 
 little Ibever it were inflru^livc) which were not difficult to 
 do, did they not find it convenient to fhelttr their Igno- 
 rance or Obftinacy, under the Oblcurity and Perplcxednefs 
 of their Terms : To which, perhaps, Inadvertency and ill 
 Cuftom does in many Men much contiibute. 
 J^f i r §• 12. To conclude, barely verbal Propofuiont 
 
 lal ProtohJ- ^"^y be known by thele following Marks: 
 ons *^ Fir//, AH Propofitions, wherein two abftracft - 
 
 Firft, Predict- Terms are affirmed one of another, are barely 
 t'loninahjlraH. about the Signification of Sounds. For fincc 
 no abftrad Idea can be the fame with any o- 
 thcr but it felf, when its abftra«5l Name is affirrn'd of any 
 other Term, it can fignify no more but this, that it may, or 
 ought to be call'd by that Name ; or that thefc two Names 
 fignify th.e fame IdvA. Thus l>.ould any one fay, that Parfi- 
 mony is Frngality^ that Craiitude is Ju,:icc -. ihat this, or that 
 Action is, or is not Tttripermce : However ipecious thefc and 
 the like Propofilions may at ft? 11 fight icCiii, yet when wc 
 
 come 
 
Knowledge ofExifience, ^237 
 
 come to prefs them, and examine nicely what they contain, 
 we lliall find, that it all amounts to nothing, but the Signi- 
 fication of thok Terms. 
 
 §. 13. Secondly, Ail Propcifyions, vhmin a Secondly, J 
 pan of the. complex ]dea, which any Tenu p^^^ ^f the 
 Iknds for, is predicated of tlm Term, arc only Definitiovpre- 
 verbal, v. g. to lay, tl:at Cold is a Aietal, or (fk.ited of aity 
 heavy. And thus all Propofitions, wherein Tavi. 
 more comprclienrive Word?, calTd Genera, are 
 affirm'd of fubordinate, or Jei? comprehenfive, call'd Species^ 
 or Individuals, are barely verbal. 
 
 When by thefe two Rules, w^e have examined the Propo- 
 fitions that make up the Dilcourfes weordinv^ly meet wich, 
 both in and out of Books, we (l-iall, perhaps, find that a 
 greater part of them than is ufually liilpcded, are purely a- 
 bout the SignificatioM of Words, and contain nothing in 
 them, but the U{e and Application of thefe Signs. 
 
 This, 1 think, I may lay down for an infallible Rule, 
 that were-ever the diftinil Idea any Word Ihnds for, is not 
 known and confiderd, and fomething not contain'd in the 
 Idea, is not atf.rm'd, or deny'd of it, there our Thoughts flick 
 wholly in Sounds, and are able to attain no real Truth or 
 Falfliood. This, perhaps, if well heeded, might fave us a 
 great deal of ufelels Amulement and Diipute ; and very 
 much fhorten our Trouble and Wandering in the Search of 
 real and true Knowledge. 
 
 CHAP. IX. 
 
 Of our Knowledge of Exijle7ice. 
 
 §. I. TJ Itherto we have only confider'd the ^^„^^^^ ^^,. 
 1 1 EiTences of Thmgs, which being ^^;„ rropofiti- 
 only abiiract Idea^^ and thereby removed in o?zj conccmnot 
 our Thoughts from particular Exiftence, (that Exiflence. 
 being the proper Operation of the Mind, in 
 Abftra^ioiJ, to confider an Indea under no other Exiftence, 
 but what it has in the Underftandiiig) gives us no Know- 
 ledge of real Exiftence at all. Where, by' the Way, we may 
 take Notice, that mivtrfal Propo/itio^s, of whofe Truth or 
 
 R Fallliood 
 
2^8 Knowledge cf Uxijlence, 
 
 Falfhood we Can have certain Knowledge, concern not Ex' 
 ijicncc ; and firtlicr, that all particular Affirmations or Klegati- 
 ons^ that would iiot be certain, if ihcy were made general, 
 arc only conci-rning Exiftence ; they declaring only the acci- 
 dental Un'on or Separation of ld<:af in Tilings cxifting, which 
 in their ablha^t N£iture>, hive no known necelTary Union 
 or Repugnancy. 
 
 §. 2* But leaving the Nature of Propofitions, 
 
 A thvcC'feJd and different Ways of I-'redication , to be con- 
 X-'iotvlctii^c of fider'd more at large in another Place, let us 
 Exijlcncc. proceed now to enquire concerning our Know- 
 
 ledge of the Exifhticc of Things, and how we 
 tv'^nic by it. l.fay ll.en, that \vc have the Knowledge of our 
 fwi Exifrcnce by Intuition; of the Exigence of GOD by 
 Demontlration ; and of other Things by Senfalion. 
 
 §. ;. As for o'lr mn Exiftence, we perceive 
 
 Our Knoxv' it io plainly, and io certainly, that it neither 
 hi^frc of our nceds, nor is capable of any Proof. For no- 
 ov>n Exijicnce thing can be more evident to u?, than our own 
 is intuitive. Exiitence. / thin}:, I reajon^ I fed Pleajare and 
 Pain : Can any of theie be more evident to 
 me, than my own Exiftence? If I doubt of all other Things, 
 that very Doubt mak.s mc perceive my own Exilience^ and 
 -will not fuffcr me to doubt of that. For if I know / fed 
 Tuin, it is evident 1 have as certain Perception of my own 
 Exifteixc, a? of the Exiftence of the Pain I feel : Or if I knov7 
 / doHL't^ 1 i:avc as certain Perception of the Exiftence of the 
 Thing doubting, as of that THbught which I call doubt. 
 Experience then convinces us, that ne have m intuitive Know- 
 ledge of our or\:n Exijfencc, and an internal infallible Percep- 
 t on that we are. In every Ail of Senfation, Realbning, or 
 Thinking, we are coufcious to our felvcs of our own Being ; 
 and, in this Matter, come not iTiort of the higheft Degree of" 
 Certdinty, 
 
 C H A P. 
 
Knowledge of the Exiftence of a GOD. 23 9 
 
 C H A P. X. ^ 
 
 Of our Knowledge of the Exifience of a GOD, 
 
 §. I. nr^ Hough GOD has given us no in- 
 
 I mtc Ide^s of hhvidf ; though he ^!,fLT 
 has ftampd no oiigmal Characters on our -y, certainly 
 Minds, wherein we may read his Being ; yet ^/^^^ fj^^ye u a 
 having furnilli'd us with thofc Faculties our GOB. 
 Minds are endowed with, he hath not left 
 himfelf without Witnefs ;. fmce we have' Sen fe, Perception, 
 and Realon , and cannot want a clear Proof of him , 
 as long" as we carry our felves about us. Nor can we 
 juftly complain of our Ignorance in this great Point, fince he 
 has fo plentifully provided us with the Means to difcover, 
 and know him, fo far as is necefiary, to the End of our Being, 
 and the great Concernment of our Happinefs. But tho' tljis 
 be the moft obvious Truth that Reafon difcovers, and the* 
 its Evidence be (if I miftake not) equal to mathematical 
 Certainty ; yet it requires Thought and Attention, and the 
 Mind mui-l: apply it lelf to a regular Deduc:Hon of it from 
 fome part of our intuitive Knowledge, or clfe we fhall be as 
 uncertain and ignorant of this, as of oii;er Propofitions, 
 which are in themfelves capable of clear Demoiiftration. Tq 
 fliew therefore, that we are capable of hncmng^ i. e. hing 
 certain that there is a GOD^ and how we may come by this 
 Certainty, I think we need go no farther tha« our felves, 
 and that undoubted Knowledge we have of our own Ex- 
 iftence. 
 
 §. 2. I think it is beyond Qiieftion, that . ;y-„j ^^^^^ 
 Man has a clear Perception of his own Being- lie flat he hjm- 
 knows certainly, that he exifts, and that he is r^if /j. 
 fomething. He that can doubt, whether he be 
 any thing or no, I fpeak not to, no more than I would 
 argue with pure Nothing, or endeavour to convince Non- 
 enity^ that it were Something. If any one pretends to be fo 
 fceptical, as to deny his own Exiftence, (for really to d[oubt 
 of it, is manifeftly impoffible) let him for me enjoy his be-" 
 ^ov'd Happinefs of being NotfTing, until Hanger, or fome 
 
 Pv 2 other 
 
240 Knowledge of the Ex'ifience of a GOD. 
 
 other Pain convince him of the contrary. This then, I think, 
 I may take for a Truth, which every one's certain KnowkJge 
 nitures him of beyond th.e Liberty of dcuttidp, viz.. that he 
 is fomething that actually cxKK 
 
 §. ^. In the next Place, Man knows by an 
 He kjnrvs d- intuitive Certainty, that bare Nothing can no TKore 
 fo, that No- produce any real Bein^^ than ir can be cqw^d to tvco 
 /Zi/wf cMinot right Angles. If a Man knows that Non-en- 
 frodiicea Be- tity, or the Abfcnce of all Being, cannot be e- 
 in<i[, therefore qujl to two right Angles, it is impoflible he 
 Somcthng e- (j^^^jij j^^^^ any Dcmonftration in EucHd. 
 ^"^" ' If ihereff re wc know there is fome real Being, 
 
 and that Non-entity cann. t produce nny real 
 Being, it is an evident DemonHration, that from Eternity 
 there has been Something ; fiiice what was not from Eternity, 
 had a Bcginr.ii\g ; and what had a Beginning, muft be pro- 
 duc'd by lomething tile. 
 
 ^. 4. Next, it is evident, that what had its 
 
 TbMeten1.1l Being and Beginning from another, muft alfo 
 
 Beinf^ vmjl l^e have all thatuhiciiis in, and belongs to its 
 
 mojl fowerfut. Being from another too. All the Power it has, 
 
 mud be owing to, and rcceiv'd from the fame 
 Source. This eternal Source then of all Being, muft alfo be 
 the Source and Original of all Powers and fo this eternal Be- 
 ing nmji be aljo the mcfi ponerfHi 
 
 §. «^. Again, a Man finds in himfelf Per- 
 
 A-nd nnjl cepticn and Knmvkdgc. We have then got one 
 
 knowing. ^ Step fajt|,cr ; and we arc certain now, that 
 
 there is not only I'bme Being, but fome know- 
 ing intelligent Being in the World. 
 
 There was a Time then, when there was no knowing Be- 
 ing, and when Knowledge began to be ; or elfc, there has 
 been alfo a knoaing Bciig from Eternity. If it be laid, there 
 wapa Time when no Being had any knowledge, when that 
 eternal Beuig wis void of all Underftanding, 1 reply, that 
 then it was impoflTible there fhiould ever have been any Know- 
 ledge. It being as impoflTible that Things wholly void of 
 Knowledge, and operatmg blindly, and without any Per- 
 ception, (liould produce a knowing Being, as it is impodi- 
 ble, that a Triangle fhicu'd make it felf three Angles bigger 
 than two right ones. For it is ai^ repugnant to the /<^f4 of 
 fenlclefs Matter, that it (hould put into itlelf Senfe, Per- 
 ception, and Knowledge, as it is repugnant to the Idea of a 
 
 Tii- 
 
KncwleJge of the Exijiencs of a GOD, 241 
 
 Triangle, that it (hould put into it felt greater Angles than 
 two right ones. 
 
 §, 6. Thus from the Confideration of our 
 felvcs, and what we infallibly find in bur own ^nti then- 
 Conltitutions , our Reafon leads us to the fo^^ ^°^' 
 Knowledge of this certain and evident Truth, 
 That there is an eternal j rKO^t powerful , and mojl knowing Being 5 
 which whether any one will pleafe to call God^ it mauejs not.* 
 The Thing is evident, and from this A/<?4 duly confider'd, wiJI 
 eafilybe deduc'd all thofe other Attributes which we ought 
 to alcribe to this eternal Being, If neverthelefs any one 
 lliould be found lo fenfelefsly arrogant, as to fuppofe Man a- 
 lone, knowing and wife, but yet the Produdl of mere Igno- 
 rance and Chance ; and that all the reft of the Univei fe a6led 
 only by that blind Hap-hazard ; I fhall leave with him that 
 very rational and emphatical Rebuke of Tully^ L. 2. de Leg, 
 to be confider'd at his Leifure, ' What can be more fillily ar- 
 *■ rogant and misbecoming, than for a Man to think that he 
 ' has a Mind and Undcrftanding in him, but ye^in all the 
 ' Uiiiverfe befjde, there is no fueh Thing ? Or that thole 
 * Things, \vhich with the utmoftSrtetch of his Reafon he can 
 ' fcarce comprehend,lliould be mov'd and manag'd without a- 
 ' ny Reafon at all ? Qnidefi cnint vcrias^quam neminem ejfe 0- 
 porteretam finite arrogant em^ at in fe mentem 0" rationem putet 
 inejfe, in cxlo mundoi]; non putet i Ant ea qug, vix jttmma ingenii 
 rationc cowprehendat^ nulla ratione movcri putet i 
 
 From what has been faid, it is plain to me we have a more 
 certain Knowledge of the Exiftence of a God, than of any 
 Thing our Senfes have not immediitely difcover'd to us. Nay, 
 I preiume I may fay, that we more certainly know that 
 there is a God, than there is any Thing elfe without us. 
 When I fay we knoiv^ I mean there is fuch a Knowledge with- 
 in our Reach, which we cannot mifs, if we will but apply 
 our Minds to that, as we do to feveral other Enquiries. 
 
 §. 7, How far the Idea of a nioft perfeti Being, 
 which a Man may frame in his Mind,. does, or o^^ jdea of 
 docs not prove the Exiffence of a God, I will not a mojl perfect 
 here examine. For in the different Make of 'Be'mg^-not the 
 Mens Tempers, and Applicuion of their fole Proof of' 
 Thoughts, fome Arguments prevail more on ^ God. 
 one, and fome on another, for the Confirma- 
 tion of th^ fame Truth. But yet, I think, this I may fay, 
 xhdX it is an ill Way of elbblirhing this Truth, and filencing 
 
 K 3 Athe- 
 
242 Knotvled^e of the Exigence of a GOD. 
 
 Atlidfls, to lay tl.c whole Strcls of fo important a Point a« 
 this, upon that iolc Fcaindation : And take lomc Mens ha- 
 ving, that Idea oiGoA in their MniJs, (for 'tis evident, fome 
 Men have none, andlbnie worie than none, and the moft ve- 
 ry ditiercnt) for t! e oiJy Proof of a Deity; and out of an 
 c5ver-fondneis of that dailins; Invention, caliper, cr a( lealt 
 endeavour to invalidate all other Aremncnls, and forbid, us 
 ' to hearken to thoii: Proof:-, as bcinR weak or fallacious, 
 ■which our own Exilkncc, and the luifible Pails f'f the Uni- 
 vcrfe, oftcr io clcuiy and cogently to our Thoughts, that I 
 deem it iinpofTibie U)r a cojifideringMan to withRand thc'ni. 
 For I judge it as ceitain and clear a Truth^ Thdt tie invifible 
 7 hi»gs of God are clearly jcen irmi the Geatim of the World^ he- 
 ingtindi-rjlocd hy tkc Things that arc made, even Lis eterndl Power 
 ami God-head. Iho' cur own Being Rnnilhes us, as I have 
 ilicwn, with ^\\ evident, and inconttlbble Proof of a Dei- 
 ty ; and I believcno Body can avoid tiie Cogency of it, who 
 ^vill but as carefully attend to it, as to any other DcmonfUa- 
 tion of fc many Parts ; yet this being lb fundamental a 
 Truth, and of that Confequcnce, that all Religion and genu- 
 ine Morality depend thereon, 1 doubt not but I iiiall be tor- 
 given by my Reader, if I go over lomc Parts of this Argu- 
 ment again, and enlarge a little more upon them. 
 
 §. S. There is no Truth more evident, than 
 
 Soniethm^ that Smu thing muft htfrom Eternity. I never 
 from Eteniity. yet heard of any one lo unreafonable, or that 
 could fuppofe ib manifeii a Contradidtion, as 
 a Time wherein there was perfectly Nothing. 1 hi? being of 
 all Abiurditics the greatcf-t, to imagine tliat pure Nothing, 
 the perfed Negation and Abicnce ot" all Beings, lliould ever 
 produce any real Exilleixe. 
 
 It being then unavoidab'e for all rational Creatures to 
 conclule tlwt fomcth.ing has exi{ied from Eternity, let us 
 lee what Kind of Thing that mult be. 
 
 §. Q. There arc but two Sorts of Beings in 
 
 Ttoo Soits ^^^^ World, thit Man knows or conceives : 
 vf Bchi^Sy Co- Fj rjl ^ ^i\ch as are purely material, without 
 f ii.it h-e iVid Senle,' Kerception, or 1 hi'Ught, as the Oip- 
 JiicQ^itM'yce. pings of our Beaids, and Paring of our Nails. 
 
 Stcoiuiiyy Senlible, thiiikijig, perctiving Be- 
 inrs, iii.h as w? find our iclves to be ; which, if you pleale, 
 wc will In.!C.!ft$;r call •"•••■•.''>'•'•?' '• .''/."••.■:.: Eciiie^ ; which, 
 
 10 
 
Knowledge of the Exijlenee of a GOD, 245 
 
 te our prefent Purpole, if for nothing elle, are, perhaps, bet- 
 jer Terms, than material and immaterial. 
 
 §. 10. If then there muft be fomethins; eler- 
 Incogjtative nal, let us lee what Sort of Being it muft be^ 
 Being cannot And to that, it is very obvious to Reafon, 
 produce a ca- t|,at it murt neceflarily be a cogitative Being, 
 gitative. Pqj it ig 33 impoflTible to .conceive that ever 
 
 bare incogitative Matter Oiould produce a 
 thinking intelligent Being, as that nothing fhould of it felf 
 produce Matter. Let us luppofe any Parcel of Matter eternal, 
 great or 'fma 11, we ftiall find it, in it lelf, able to produce 
 Nothing. For Example, Let us fuppofe the Matter of thg 
 next Pebble we meet with, eternal, clofely united, and 
 the Parts firmly at Reft together, it there were no other 
 Being in the World, muft it not eteranlly remain fo, a deadj 
 inactive Lump ? Is it poflible to conceive it can add Moti- 
 on to it IHf, being purely Matter, or produce any Thing ? 
 Matter then, by its own Strength, cannot produce in it ielf 
 fo much as Motion : The Motion it has, muft alfo be frojo 
 Eternity, or elf'e be produc'd, and added to Matter by fom? 
 other Being xnore powerful than Matter ; Matter, as js evii* 
 dent, having no l^ower to produce Motion in it felf. But 
 let us fuppofe Motion eternal too ; yet Matter, incogitative 
 Milter and Motion, whatever Changes it might produce of 
 Figure and Bulk, could never prodnce TI:ougl:t. Knowledge 
 will ftill be as far beyond the Power of Motion and Matter 
 to produce, as Matter is beyond the Power of JSJotking^ or 
 JS/on-emity to produce. And I appeal to every one's owi^ 
 Thoughts, whether he cannot as ealily conceive Matter pro- 
 duc'd by Nothing, as Thought to be produc'd by pure Matter^ 
 when before there was no fuch Thing as Thought, or an in- 
 telligent Being exifting. Divide Matter into as minute Parts 
 as you will, which we are apt to imagine a Sort offpirituali- 
 >Eing, or making a thinking Thing of it, vary the Figure and 
 Motion of it, as much as you pleale, a Globe, Ci^ibe, CpiKj 
 P}:ifm,Cylinder,C7'/:.whofe Di- 
 ameters are but 1 000000th Part (a) JGry 'srl of a %%ne, 
 of a Cry (a) will operate no a Line -i- of an Inch, an Inch ~ 
 £)ther wife upon othenBodies of of a philcf0phic.1l Foot, a philo- 
 psoportioaableBuik, thanthoie fophical Foot {- of a PenMum, 
 of an liich or Foot Diameter j y^hofe D adrom:, in the Uti^ 
 and yoi may as rationally ef- ^""^'^ °/45. l>^&^^eh ^^ ^^'i^'- 
 
244 Knowledge of the Exigence of a GOD. 
 
 anl Knowledge, by putting 
 ^nl to ove Second of Time, or together, in a certain Figure 
 ^y-of a Minute. J Ihvce afte^ed- and Motion, grofs Particles of 
 • ty m.-idc uf, of this Mefurc here. Matter, as by thofe that arc the 
 andthePArtsof,t,ynderad4:a- minutcft. tl at do any 
 
 m.il Dvuioii. with li.vnes to ,' •,, t-, • i, ■ 
 1; L , r 1 fh-^i •/«„„•/ wherecxilt. They knock, un- 
 thcmi beCiVtlc l think it fvoiud . , ,-n ^ # • a 
 he of \cvcy.il Convenience, that ' V^\ ^"^ r^lift one another, ;uft 
 this ff}ju!d he the common Met- as the greater do, and that is 
 fure^ in the Common^Wf;M of all they can do. So that ',if we 
 Letters. wiU luppole nothing firit, or e- 
 
 ternal; A/<?rrercan never begin 
 to be : If wc will fuppofe lure Matter,\vithout Motion eternalj 
 Aiotinncin never begin to be : If we luppofe only Matter and 
 Motion hnf, or eternal ; 7 bought can never begin to be. For 
 it is iinpodibic to conceivethat Matter cither with or without 
 Motion, could have originally in and from it fclf, Senfe, Per- 
 ception, and Knowledge, as is evident from hence, that 
 then Scnfc, Perception, and Knowledge, mu(t be a Property 
 eternally inlcparablc from Matter and every Particle of it. 
 Not to add, that though our general or Ipccifick Concep- 
 tion of Matter makes us fpeakof it as one Thing, yet really 
 all Matter is not one individual Thing, neither is there any 
 luch 1 hingc>ii(ting as oncmaterial Being, or one fmgie Body, 
 that w^know or can conceive. And therefore, if Matter were 
 the eternal firft cogitative Being, there would not be one e- 
 tcrnal inrinitc cogitative Being.bnt an infinite Number of eter- 
 nal hnitc ccgiiative Beings, independent one of ar.o.her,of li- 
 mited Force, and diltinvit Thoughts, which could never pro- 
 duce that Order, Humony, and Beauty, which is to be 
 found in Nature. Since therefore whatfoevcr is the firrt e- 
 tcrnal Bci/i^, niult necclTarily be cogitatavc ; and whatfoever 
 is flrft of all Things, mu(l ncccHi^rily contain in it, andadihi- 
 ally have, at Icail, aJl the Pe-fcctions that can ever after cx- 
 ilf i liorcan it ever give to another any Perfection that it hath 
 not,^iither aiUially in it leif, or at Icalt in a liigher Dcg;ce : 
 It nectflaiily follows, that the firil eternal Being cannot be 
 Matter. 
 
 §. II. /'' therefor*, i.lxvvident, that Sorrc- 
 
 Therefore tl:inj neccra ily inuli exij} fro^j Eternity/vsiKo 
 
 t jcre Lu hen as evident, \.h\z that Sor/if thing mttj} neceflarily 
 
 Tl' Jj" I c .1 cnntativi- He'ui^ ; For it is as iinpofrible,that 
 
 It ija:)m. .-"" - v* -^ n • i i • 
 
 '' UK^.)3ttdllVc M.uier Inouid produce a co^i- 
 
 gitativc 
 
Knowledge of the Exiftence of a GOD. 245 
 
 tatire Being, as that nothing, or the Negation of all Being* 
 fhould produce a pofitive Being or Matter. 
 
 §. 12. Though this Difccvery of the necef- 
 fary Exiflence of an eternal Adind^ docs lliffici- TherefoT'S 
 ently lead us into the Knowledge of GOD, theit has hem 
 fince it will hence follow,that all other knowing <"« ettm.rl 
 Beings that have a Beginning, muft depend on Wifdom, 
 him, and have no other Ways of Knowledge, 
 or Extent^ of Power, than what he gives them ; and therefore 
 if he raadt thofe, he made alfo the lefs excellent Pieces of 
 this Univerfe, all inanimate Beings, whereby his Omnifchnce^ 
 Fomr^ and Providence will be cftablifh'd, and all his other 
 Attributes necefTarily follow: Yet to clear up this a littk 
 farther, we will fee what Doubts can be rais'd againfi it. 
 
 §.13. Firfi^ Perhaps it will befaid, thattho' 
 it be as clear as Demonftration can make it. Whether ntn- 
 that there muft be an eternal Being, and that terialorw. 
 Being muft alfo be knowing ; yet it does not 
 follow, but that thinking Being may alfo be matevial. Let it 
 be foj it equally ftill follows, that there is a GOD: For if 
 there be an eternal, omnifcient, omnipotent Being, it is cer- 
 tain that there is a GO D, whether you imagine that Being to 
 be material, or no. But herein, I fuppofe, lies the Danger 
 and Deceit of that Suppofition : There being no Way to 'a- 
 void the Demonftration, that there is an eternal knowing 
 Being, Men, devoted to Matter, would willingly have it 
 granted, that this knowing Being is material ; and then let- 
 ting Gide out of their Minds, or tlie Difcourfe, the Demon- 
 ftration whereby an eternal knowing Beirig was prov'd necei- 
 farily to exift, would argue all to be Matter, and fo deny a 
 GOD, that is, an eternal cogitative Being ; whereby they 
 are fo far from eftablifhing, that they deftroy their own Hy- 
 pothefis. For if there can be, in their Opinion, eternd M:it- 
 ter, without any eternal cogitative Being, they manife'^ly fe- 
 parate Matter and Thinking, and luppofe no nece^lary Con- 
 nexion of the one with the other, and fo elkblilli the Ne- 
 cefTity of an eternal Spirit, but not of Matter, fnce it has 
 been prov'd already, that an eternal cogitative Being is una- 
 voidably to be granted. Now, if thinking Matier may be 
 feparatcd, the eternal Exijlence of Matter mil net folkto from 
 the eternal Exigence «f a cogitative Beings and they fuppofe it 
 10 no Purpofe. 
 
 ^. 14^ But 
 
2J^6 Knowledge of the Ex'ijlcnce of a GOD* 
 
 ^. 14. But now let us Ice how they can ft" 
 Not vi.itcrhl, titfy thcmklvc?, or others, that this cterndthink^ 
 fiijl t bcCiUifc tug ^t-'f'g, ^ n:atcriah 
 
 fiery PattiJe [pirjl^ I would ask tlicm, whether they ima- 
 iff Matter is gjnc that all Matter, every Particle of Matter ^ 
 not cogit.uh'e. thinks i This, I luppole, they will Icarce lay. 
 lince then there wruld be as many eternal 
 tiiinklng Beings, as there are Particles of Matter, and lo an 
 Infinity of Gods. And yet, if they will i)ot allow Matter as 
 Matter, that is, every Particle of Matter to be as well cogi' 
 tative as extaided, they will have as hard a Task to make out 
 10 their own Realbns, a cogitative Being out of incogitativc 
 Pai tides, as an extended Being out of uncxtended Parts, if I 
 may lo Ipeak. 
 
 §. 15. Secondly, If all Matter does not think, 
 Secondly y I J-ext ask, whether it be only one Atom that 
 One P.I) tide a- dccsfo f This has as many Abfurdities as the 
 tone of Mat- other ; for then this Atom of Matter mull be 
 ta-f cannot be alone eternal, or not. If this alone be eternal, 
 co^itat-.ve. i|,e,-, this alone, by its powerful Thought or 
 Will, made a^i the rclt of Matter. And fo 
 we have the Creation of Matter by a powerful Thought, 
 which is that the Materialifts ftick at : For if they fuppofe 
 vnc fingle tiiinking Atom to have produc'd all the relt of 
 Matter, ihcy c.nnot afcribe that Pre-eminency to it upon 
 any other Account, than that of its Thinking, the only lup- 
 pos]d DiHcicnce. But allow it to be by feme other Way, 
 which is above our Conception, it mu(f be (iill Creation, 
 and thclc Men muli give up their great Maxim, £.v nihilo nil 
 fit. If it be laid, that all the relt of Matter is equally e- 
 lernal, as that thinking Atom, it will be to fay any Thing 
 Jt PIcalure, though never lo abiurd : For to fuppofe all Mat- 
 ter eternal, and ytt one linall Particle in Knowledge and 
 Tower inhnitely above ail the reir, is without any the Icait 
 Appearance of Rcafon to t'raine any Hypothelis. Every Par- 
 tide of Matt'.r, as Matter, is capable ot all the fame Figures 
 and Motions of any e)th.er ; and I challenge any one in hi* 
 Ihoughts, to add any Thing clic to one above another. 
 
 §. 16. Thirdly^ If then neither one peculiar 
 Atom alone can be thia eternal thinking Be- 
 inp;, nor all Matter, as Matter, i,e, every Par^ 
 tide of Mittcr cxxx be it, it only remains, tliat 
 ir \^ j'cm- •I'rtAin S);kf» 0^ M.ntiT liuiy put to.- 
 
 gefhcr, 
 
 Thivny,, 
 
 A 
 
 S^jUn of 
 
 in- 
 
 rof tit'it 
 
 
 Mjttir^ t 
 
 j;(- 
 
Knowledge of the Exiftence of a GOD. 247 
 
 cether, that is this thinking eternal Being. Tliis , , 
 is that , which I imagine is that Notion ^.^.^ ^ 
 which Men are apteft to have of GOD, who ' ' - 
 
 would have him a material Being, as moft readily fuggcfted 
 to them, by the ordinary Conceit they have of thcmfelves, 
 and otfier Men, which they take to be matevial thinking Be- 
 ings. But this Imagination, howcr moie natural, is no lefs 
 abfurd than the other : For to fuppofe the eternal thinking 
 Being to be nothing elfe but a Compofiiion of Particles of 
 Matter, each whereof is irxogitative, is to afcribe all the 
 Wifdom and Knowledge of that eternal Being only to the 
 JaxM-Pofition of Parts ; than which, nothing can be 
 more abfurd. For unthinking Particles of Matter, however 
 put together, can have nothing thereby added to them, but a 
 new Relation of Pofition, w^hich 'tis impoflible (Lould give 
 Thought and Knowledge to them. 
 
 §. 17. But farther, this corporeal Sy (fern either 
 has all its Parts at Reft, or it is a certain Mo- Whether, in 
 tion of the Parts wherein its Thinking con- -^^"^'ow, ot at 
 fifts. If it be perfectly at Re(i, it is but one ^''fi- 
 Lump, and fo can have no Priviledges above 
 one Atom. 
 
 If it be the Motion of its Parts on which its Thinking de- 
 pends, all_ the Thoughts there muft be unavoidably acciden- 
 tal, and limited, fince all the Particles that by Motion caule 
 Thought, being each of them in it lelf without any Thought, 
 cannot regulate its own Motions, much lefs be regulated by 
 the Thought of the whole, fmce that Thought is not theCaufe 
 of Motion, (for then it mult be anieced,ent to it^ and fo 
 without it) but the Confequence of it, wheieby Freedom, 
 Power, Choice, and all rational and wife Thinking or A6t- 
 ing, will be quite taken away : So that fuch a thinking Be- 
 ing will be no better nor wifer, than pure blind JVfetter, fince 
 to refolve all into the accidental unguided Motions of blind 
 Matter, or into Thought depending on unguided Motions of 
 blind Matter, is the fame Tiling ; ^lot to mention the Nar- 
 rownefs of fuch Thoughts and Knowledge that^ mu(i depend 
 -on the Motion of fuch Parts. But there needs no Enumera- 
 tion of any more Abfurdities and Impolfibihties in this- Hy- 
 pothecs, (however full of them it be) than that befoie-men- 
 tion'd, fmce let this thinking Syftem be all, or a Part of the 
 Matter of the Univerle, it is impoiTible that any one Paiti- 
 dc fliould either know its own, or the Motion or- any other 
 
 Pra- 
 
C48 Knozvlcfdge oj luc' r.xijtcncc of a GOD. 
 
 Particle, 01 ihc Wliolc know tl;e Motion of every, Particular j 
 andlo rct;ulatc its own Tlioujilitsor Motions, or indeed have 
 any Tliou;-lit rdulting from iLich Motion. 
 
 §. I a. Others would have A^attcr to be eter- 
 MMter not «..'/, notwithlian^ing that they allow an etcr- 
 €o-iterii.it n;r1, cocitativc, iniinaterial.Bcin:". This, the' 
 
 with an ctcr- \( take not away the Being of a GOD, yet 
 n*l Mind. j-,,-,^-^ j[ denies one and the firfl great Piece of 
 
 his WorkinaiiO^ip, the Creation, let us confi- 
 der it a little. A'fatter mult be ;;l!owM eternal ; why ? Be- 
 caule you cannot conceive how it can be mide out of No- 
 thing ; why do you not all ^ tiiin: your Iclf eternal? You 
 will anfwer perhaps, btc.ufe about twenty or forty Years 
 fjncc, you began to be. But if I ask you what that Ton is, 
 which began then to be, you can fcarce tell me. The Mat- 
 ter whereof you are made, began not then to be ; for if it 
 did, then it is not eternal j but it began to be put together 
 in fuch a Falliion and Frame as makes up your Body j but 
 yet that Frame of Particles is not You, it niakes not that 
 thinking Thing You are ; (for I have now to do with one, 
 who allows an eternal, immattria), thinking Being, but 
 would have unthinking Matter eternal too ;) therefore when 
 did that thinking Thing begin to be ? If it did never begin 
 to be, then have you always been a thinking Thing from E- 
 ternity ; the Ablurdity whereof I need not confute, ull I 
 juect with one who is lo void of Underfbnding, as to own 
 it. If therefore you can allow a thinking Thing to be jnadc 
 out of nothing, (as all Things that are not eternal mult be) 
 why alfo can you. not allow it polTible, for a material Being 
 to be made out of nothing, by an equal Power, but that 
 you have the Experience of the one in View, and not of the 
 other ? Thouih, when well confider'd, Creation of a Spirit 
 will he fc wnd to require 110 lels Po^ver, than the Creation of 
 Matter. N^y, pclilbly, if we would emaiicipatc i ur felvcs 
 fiom vulgar Nouoni-, and railc oui Thoughts as far ..s they 
 would reach, toaclokr Contemplation of Things, we might 
 be able to aim at lomc dim and Iccming Conception how 
 Matter might at iirit be made, and begin to c\iti by thel^ow- 
 cr of that eternal hilt Bein:; ; but to give Beginning and Be- 
 ing to a Spirit, wou'd be tound a more in.vincelveable EfteA 
 of omnipotent Power. But this beinj; m hat would perhaps 
 lead us tot) far from the Notions on which il,c Philoibphy 
 now in the World is bulitj it would not be pardonable to de- 
 viate 
 
KncvAe/igp of the Exijlence of a GOD. 249 
 
 viate fo far from them, or to enquire fo far as Grammar it 
 felf would an horize, if the common icttl'd Opinion oppo- 
 fcs it; efpeciaiiy in this Place, where the receiv'd Do»5trinc 
 ferves well enough to our prcient Purpcfe, and leaves this 
 X).\{\ Doubt, that the Creation or Teginning of any one 
 SUBSTANCE cut of Nothing, being once admitted, the 
 Creation of all other, but the CREATOR himfelt, may, 
 with the fame Eafe, beliipposd. 
 
 §. 19. But you will lay, is it not impoffi- 
 bleto admit 0^ \ht making cny Thing cm 0^ Nc- ■ Mnter tiot 
 thing, fince we cannot pofTibly conceive it ? I co-cterml 
 anlwer, No ; i. Becaule it is not rcafonable to ^^i'^^ ^« f^^er- 
 deny the Power of an infinite Being, bccaufe '^'^^ JiLnd, 
 we cannot comprehend its Operations. We do 
 not deny other Et-r"e6ls upon this Ground, becaufe we cannot 
 pcflibly conceive the Manner of their Produd.ion. We can- 
 not conceive how any Thing but Impulfe of Body can move 
 Body ,• and yet that is not a Reaion fufiicient to make us 
 deny it pofTible, againft the conftant Experience we have of 
 it in our felve?, in all our voluntary Motions, which are 
 produc'd in us only by the free A6^ion or Thought of our 
 own Minds ; and are not. nor can be the Effe^ls rf the Iinpuire 
 or Determination of the Motion of bl ind Matter, in or upon cue 
 Bodies ; for then it could not be in our Power or Choice to 
 alter it. For Example: My right Hand writes, whilft my left 
 Hand is ftill ; what Caules reft in one, and Motion in the 
 other ? Nothing but my Will, a Thought of my Mind ; 
 my Thought only changing, the right Hand relis, and the 
 left Hand moves. This is Matter of Fa6i-, which cannot be 
 deny'd : Explain this, and make it intelligible, and th»n the 
 next Step w'ill be to underftand Creation : For the giving a 
 new Determination to the Motion of the animal Spirits, 
 (which lome make Ui'e of to explain voluntary Motion) clears 
 not the Difficulty one ]ot, to .alter the Determination of Mo- 
 tion being in this Cafe no eafier nor lefs, than to give Mo- 
 tion it felf; fince the new Determination given to the ani- 
 mal Spirits, muft be either immediately by Thought, or to 
 fome other Body put in their way by Thought, which was 
 not in their_ way before, and fo mtift owe its Motion by 
 Thought ; either of which leaves voluntary Motion as unin- 
 telligible as it was before. In the mean Time, 'tis an over- 
 valuing our fe Ives, to rpdiice all to the narrow Meafure of 
 our Capacities j and tQ conclude a}l Things impoffible to be 
 
 done, 
 
cjo Knovcledge of ths 
 
 done, wlioCc Manner of doinc; exceeds our Comprchcnnon. 
 This is to make our Compreliciifion inHnite, or GOD fi- 
 nite, Avhcn ^^'h^x. lie can do, is limited to what we can con- 
 ceive of it. If ynu do not undcrlbiid the OpcrAtions of 
 your own finite Mind, that tliinkinj; Thing within you, do 
 tiot dcetn it (hangethat you cannot comprehend the Opera- 
 tions of that eternal infinite Mind-, vv^ho made and governs 
 all Things, and whom the Heaven of Heavens cannot con- 
 tain. 
 
 CHAP. XL 
 
 Of mtr Knowledge of the Exifien'ce of other Things, 
 
 It is to he §• I- ' I ^ H E Knowledge of our own Be- 
 
 hnJ only iy X i"?^ ^^'^ '""^^^ t)y Intuition. The 
 
 Stnfuion, Exiftence of a GOD, Reaibn dearly makes 
 
 known to us, as has been fhewn. 
 
 The Knmhdge of the Exijtence of any other Thing we cart 
 have only by Senfmcn : For there being no neceflary Con- 
 nexion of real ExIfiencCy with any Idea a Man hatli in his 
 Memory, nor of any other Exigence, but that of GOD,with 
 the Exeftciicc of .my particular Man ; no particular Man can 
 know tiic Exiicnce of any other Being, but only when by 
 achial operating upon him, it makes it fcif pcrceiv'd by him. 
 For the having the Idea of any Thing in our Mind, no more 
 proves the Exilicnce of thatThing, than the Picture of a Man 
 evidences his being in the World, or the Vifions of a Dream 
 make thereby a true HiH-ory. " ' ~ 
 
 $.2. 'Tis therefore tfie actual* receiving of 
 
 Ikp'irc Iddi from witliout, that gives us Notice of the 
 Ifhrtevcfs r>f Ex'iiencc of other Things, and make us know, 
 t?}iiP%^o. thai fomcthing doth exiii: at that Time with- 
 out us, which catifcs t'.iat Idea in u«, tho' per- 
 haps Ve neither know nor confidcr how it doc? it : For it 
 takes' not from the Certainty of cur Senfc?, and the Ideas we 
 receive by them, that we know not the Manner wherein thty 
 arc proluc'd ; v, g. whilfi: T write this, I have, by the Pfi- 
 yzx aftefting my EycSjthat //f.t product in my Mind, which, 
 whatever Objccl caulcs, l call \'^hite j by which 1 know that 
 
 that 
 
Exijlence of ether Things. 151 
 
 that Quality or Accident (/. e. whofe Appearance before my 
 Eyes, always cauies that Idea) doth really cxiR, and bath a 
 Being without me. And of this, the greateft AfTurance I 
 can pofTibly have, and to which my Faculties can attain, is 
 the TelUmony of my Eyes, which are the proper and fbl.c 
 judges ofthisThinc;, whofe Teftimony I have realon to rely 
 on, fsfo certain, that I can no more doubt, whiKl I Vvrite 
 this, that I fee White and Black, and that fomething really 
 cxifts, that caufes that Senfation in me, than that I ivrite 
 or move my Hand ; whicli is a Certainty as great as humari 
 Nature is capable of, concerning the Exigence of any Thing, 
 but a Man's felf alone, and of GOD. 
 
 §. 3. Tkc -Notice Tve have by our Scr/feSy of the 
 exijling of Things vtiikoat us^ tli(5' it be not al- Thistho^ ^wt 
 together fo certain as our intuitive Know- -^ certain as 
 ledge, or the Dcdudlions ofonrReafon, em- ^^'«<"i^''.7/7or, 
 ploy'd about the clear abflraa Ideas of our ^'^'"^yy^ll'd 
 own Minds; yet it is an AfTurance that de- J,'Jp^ov'/ 
 ferves the JSIanje of Knordcd^e. Ifweperfwade fv;^«-,'^^'^ ^■'z- 
 our ielvcp, that our haculties act and inform Thhigs rpu/J. 
 us right concerning the Exilkrce of thcfe out m. 
 Objedls that aftedt them, it cannot pafs for an 
 ill-grounded Confidence : For I think no Body can, in ear- 
 neft, be fo fceptical, as to be uncertain of the Exigence of 
 thofe Things which he fees and feels. At leaft, he that can 
 doubt fo far, (whatever he may have with his own Thoughts) 
 will never have any Controverfy with me j fi nee he can 
 never be fure I fay any thing contrary to his Opinion. As 
 to my felf, I think GOD has given me Afiurance enoueh 
 of the Exiftence of Things without me ; fince by their dif- 
 ferent Application, I can produce in my felf both Plcafure 
 and Pain, vvhich is one great Concernment of my prefent 
 State. This is certain, the Confidence that our Faculties do 
 not herein deceive us, is the greateft AfTurance we are capa- 
 ble of, concerning the Exiftence of material Being?. For we 
 cannot a6t any thing, but by our Faculties ; nor" talk of 
 Knowledge it felf, but by the Help of thofe Faculties, which 
 are fitted to apprehend even what Knowledge i". But befides 
 the AfTurance we have from our Senles the'mfelvcs, that they 
 do not err in the Information they give us of the Exifiencc 
 of Things without us, when they are aftei^ed by them, we 
 are farther confirmed in this AfTurance, by other concurrent 
 Rcafons. 
 
2 $2 KnoiuIeJgeoftbff 
 
 5. 4. Fjr/?, '1 is plain thofe Perceptions are 
 f //?, le-. produc'd in us by exterior Ciufas aftcding our 
 eiufe we can- Sen Its j bcciufc thnfe that rvant the Organs of any 
 mot Lave them Senje^ never can have the Ideas belonging to that 
 hut h the In- Senfe produc'd in ihcir Minds. This is too 
 let of the evident to be doubteJ ; and therefore we can- 
 &nfes. jj^,. jjm^ y, aflur'd, that they come in by the 
 
 Organs of that Scnfc, and no other Way. The 
 Orj^ns t' em (elves, 'tis plain, do not produce them ; for 
 then the Eyes of a Man in the Daik, would produce Colour?, 
 and his Nofc fmell Rofcjs in the Winter: But we fee no 
 Body gets the Relil"h of a Pinc-Applc, 'till he goes to the 
 Indies where it i.% and taHes it. 
 
 ^. %. Secondly^ B^OluCq fometimcs I find that 
 
 iccvtfc nn J cannot ax'oid tide having thofe Ideas produc'd in 
 
 Lies from ae- ^^ ^-^^ . p^j, ^j^^. ^^j^^^ j^y ^^^^ ^^^ ^-j^^^.^ 
 
 Tnd i^othsl or Windows fall, lean at Pleafure re-call to 
 from Melmr, 1-"^ ^"^^ Xh^Ueoi oi' Light, 01 the Snn which 
 cie very di- tormcr benlations had lodg d in my Memory ; 
 jiinl} Ptrcep- ^^ 1 c^n at PIcafure lay by that Idea, and 
 thvs, take into my View that of the Smell of a Rofe, 
 
 or 7>/?e of ^ugar. But if I turn my Eyes at 
 Noon towards the Sun, I cannot avoid the Ideas which the 
 Light or Sun then produces in me. So that there is a ma- 
 nifeft Difference between the Ideas laid up in my Memory, 
 (over which, if they were there only, I fhould have con^ 
 Ibntly the fame Power to difpofe of them, and lay them 
 by at Pleafure) and thofe which force themleh^es upon me, 
 and I cannot avoid having. And therefore it muft needs be 
 ibme exterior Caufe, and the brisk adling of fome Objects 
 witliout me, whole Efficacy I connot refift, that produces 
 thofe Ideas in r\y Mind, whether I will or no. Eelides, 
 there is no Body wlio doth not perceive the Difference in 
 bimfclf, between contemplating the Sun, as he hath the Idid 
 of it in liis Memory, and actually looking upon it : Of 
 which two, his Perception is fo diftind, that few of his Ideas 
 arc more diftinguilViable one from another: And therefore he 
 hath certain Knowledge, that they are not both Memory, or 
 the Actions of his Mind, and Fancies only within him; but 
 lliit a^hial Seeing hath a Caufc without. 
 
 S.e.jiwdiy; 
 
253 
 
 Thirdly^ 
 VUafure or 
 Pain which 
 accompajiies 
 aBiual SmfatU 
 otty accompa- 
 nies not the 
 returning of 
 thofe Ideas 
 without the 
 external Ob» 
 jeBs. 
 
 Exijlence of other Things, 
 
 §.6. Thirdly, Add to this, that nmy of thofe 
 Ideas are prodncd in m voith Vain, which after- 
 wards we remember without the leafi Offence. Thus 
 the Pain of Heat or Cold, when the Idea of it 
 is reviv'd in our Minds, gives us no Diftur- 
 bance ; which, when felt, was very trouble- 
 fome, and is again, when a6^ually repeated^ 
 which is occafion d by the Diforder the exter- 
 nal Objed caufes in our Bodies, w^hen apply *d 
 to it : And we remember the Pain of Hunger, 
 ThirJl, or the Head-ach, without any Pain at 
 all ; which would either never difturb us, or 
 elfe conftantly do it, as often as we thought 
 of it, were there nothing more but Idea^ floating in our 
 Minds, and Appearances entertaining our Fancies,without the 
 real Exiftence of Things affe6lingus from abroad. The fame 
 may be faid of Pleafure, accompanying feveral a6tual Senfi- 
 tions : And iho' m.athematical Demonftration depends not 
 upon Senfe, yet the examining them by Diagrams, gives 
 great Credit to the Evidence of our Sight, and feems to give 
 it a Certainty approaching to that of the Demonftration it 
 felf For it would be very ftrange, that a Man ftiould allow 
 it for an undeniable Truth, that two Angles of a Figure, 
 which he meafuresby Lines and Angles of a Diagram, fhould 
 be bigger one than the other j and yet doubt of the Exiftence 
 of thofe Lines and Angles, which by looking on, he makes 
 ufe of to meafure that by. 
 
 §. 7. Fourthly, Our Senfes, in many Cafes, 
 bear witnefs to the Truth of each other's Re- 
 port, concerning the Exiftence of fenfible 
 Things without us. He that fees a Fire, may, 
 if he doubt whether it be any thing more than 
 a bare Fancy, feel it too ; and be convinc'd, 
 by putting his Hand in it. Which certainly 
 could never be put into fuch exquifite Pain_ 
 by a bare Idea or Phantom, unlefs that the Pain be a Fancy 
 too : Which yet he cannot, when the Burn is well, by rai- 
 fmg the Idea of it, bring upon himfelf again. 
 
 Thus I fee, whilft I write this, I can change the Appear- 
 ance of the Paper ; and by defigning the Letters, tell before- 
 hand what new Idea it fhall exhibit the very next Moment, 
 barely by drawing my Pen over it j which will neither ap- 
 pear (let me fancy as much as I will) if my Hand ftands ftill j 
 
 S or 
 
 Fourthly, 
 Our Senfe: af- 
 fifi one ano- 
 thersTeftimony 
 of the Exi- 
 jlence of out- 
 ward Things. 
 
2 54 Knowledge of the 
 
 or tlio' I move my Pen, ifmy tycs le fl^ut : Nor when thofe 
 Chai"a6lcrs arc once made on ilic Paper, can I cluifc after- 
 wards but fee them a^ they are ; that is, luye the ldea4 of 
 inch Letters as 1 have made. Whence it is manifeii, that 
 they arc not barely tl;c Spoit and Play ot my cwn lmagii;a- 
 tion, when I find that the Ciiara^lcrs, that were made at the 
 Pleafure o^ my o\vn Thoughts, do not obey them ; nor yet 
 ccdlc to be, whenever I ilia 11 fancy it, but continue to af- 
 fcd my Scnics conllanlly and regularly, according to the 
 'Figures I made them. To which, if wc- will add, that the 
 Si^ht of thole ihall, from anotlier Man, draw llich Sounds 
 as' 1 before-hand dcfign they l>.all iknd for, there w^iTl be 
 little Reafon left to doubt that thole Words I write do 
 really cxift without me, when they caule a long Scries of re- 
 gular Sounds to atiedf my Ears, which could not be the 
 Eriect of )ny Imaguiation, nor could my Memory retain them 
 m that Order. 
 
 §. 8. But yetj if after all this, any one will 
 This Cer- . be io Icepiical, as .to diHruit his Senlcs, and 
 tainty is at to affirm^ that all we fee and hear, feel and 
 irrc.ii oi our tatte^ think and do, durir.g our whole Be- 
 CoiuVu'ion jiig^ is but the Scries and deluding Appear- 
 
 "^^tds. ances o^l a long Dream, whereof there is no 
 
 Reality, and therefore ^viH queftion tlie Exi- 
 gence of all Things, or our Knowledge of any Thing; T muft 
 dehre him to confider, that if all be a Dream, then he doth 
 but dream fhat he makes the Qiieltion ; and fo it is not 
 much matter, th.it a waking Man lliould anfwer him. But 
 yet, if he plcafcs, he may dream that 1 irake hnn this An- 
 ihvtr. That tic Certainty of Ihings txilhng i^i nruw AVjur^t, 
 when ^ve have the Tcjjmony of our M-ujcs for it, is not only 
 oi great as our Frame can attaui to, but .?.< our Cohdition m^di^ 
 For our Faculties being luited not to the full Extent of Be- 
 ing, nor to a perfect, clear, comprehenfivc Knowledge of, 
 Things free from all Doubt and Scruple, but to the Prefer- 
 vation of Us, in whom they arc, and accommodated t6 tlic 
 Ule of Life ; they icrre to i ur Purpoie well emngh, if they 
 will but give us certain Notice of thoic Things, wliich aie 
 convenient or incoiivcfiient to uj. For he that lees a Can- 
 dlt burning, nnd hath experimented the Frrce of its Flame, 
 by putting his Finger in it, w^ill little doubt that this is 
 Something cxilfir.g without him, which docs him Harm, 
 and puu hnn lo great Pain ; Which is Ailuraiicc enough, 
 
 >Yheu 
 
Exifteiice of other Tbhigs. 255 
 
 when no Man requires greater Certainty,, to govern his A- 
 <il:ious by, than what is as certain as his Actions themiUves* 
 And if our Dreamer plcales to .try whether the glowing 
 Heat of a Glafs Furnace, be barely a wandering Imagination 
 in a drowfy Man's Fancy, by putting his Hand into it, 1 e 
 may, perhaps, be waken'd into a Certainty greater than he 
 could wi<}i, that it is fomething more than bare Imaginati- 
 on. So that this Evidence is as great as we can defire,^ be- 
 ing as certain to us as our Plcafure or Pain, i, e. Happinefs 
 or Mifery ; beyond which we have no Concernment, either 
 of Knowing or Being. Such an AfTurance of the Exigence 
 of Things without us, is lufficient to dired: us in the attain- 
 ing the Good, and avoiding the Evil, which is caufed by 
 them, which is the important Concerment we have of bein§ 
 made acquainted with them. ■ 
 
 §. 9. In fine then, when our Senfes do a- 
 ^Uilly convey into our UnderRandings any ^ut reaches 
 Idca^ we cannot but be fatisfy'd that there wo farther 
 doth fomething at that Time really exift with- ^^■'^^» ^j?"*^' 
 out us, wiiich doth^ afie6l our Senfes, and by Seyifation. 
 them give Notice of it lelf to our apprehenfive 
 Faculties, and a<Siually produce that Idea which we then 
 perceive : And we cannot fo far diftruft their Teftimony, as 
 to doubt that fuch Colledions of fimple Idau^ as we have 
 obferv'd by our Senfes to be united together, do really exill 
 together. But this Knowlcd^^e extends- as far as the prcjcnt Te- 
 [iimony of our Senfes^ employ 'd about particular Objects, that 
 do then afieft them, and no farther* For if I law Inch a 
 CoUiition of fimple Ideas ^ as is wont to be calfd Man^ ex- 
 iting together one Minute lince, and am now alone, I can- 
 not be certain that the lame Man exift? now, fi nee there is 
 no neceflary Connexion of his Exiftence a Minute fince, with 
 his Exiftencc now : By a thouiand Ways he may ceafe to be, 
 fmce I had the Teliimoy of my Senfes for his Exif-lence. And 
 if I cannot be certain that the Man I faw lalt to Day, is 
 now in Being, 1 can lels be certain that he is lo, who hath 
 been longer remov'd from my Senfes, and I have not leen 
 fmce Yelkrday, or fince the laft Year ; and much lels can I 
 be certain of the Exigence of Men that I never law. And 
 therefore, tho' it be highly probable that Millions of Men 
 do now cxiil-, yet whiifl: I am alone writir.g this, 1 have 
 not that Certainty of it, which we ftri6lly call Knowledge ; 
 the' the great Likelihood of it, puts me paft Doubt, and it 
 
 S 2 bf 
 
256 Knowledge of thi 
 
 be reafonablc for me to do fcvcralTliinpisupon tlic Confidence 
 that there arc Men (and Men alio of my Acquaintance, with 
 whom I have to do) now in the World : Eut this is but 
 Piobability, not Knowledge. 
 
 §. 10. Whereby yet we may obferve how 
 
 Folly to ex- foolifli and vain a Thing it is for a Man of 
 pel: Denmi- a narrow Knowledge , who having Reafon 
 Jlrat'ion in e- given him to judge of the different Evidence 
 very Ibin^ and Probability of Things, and to be fway'd. 
 accordingly j how vain^ 1 fay, it is to expeU 
 Demon/Oration and Certainty in Things not capable of ic, and 
 refufe Aflent to very rational Propofitions, and a6l contrary 
 to very plain and clear Truths, bccaufe they cannot be made 
 out fo evident, as to furmount every the leaft ( I will not 
 fay Reafon, but) Pretence of* Doubting, He that in the 
 ordinary Affairs of Life, would admit of nothing but dire6t 
 plain Demonftration, would be fure of nothing in this 
 World, but of peridiing quickly. The Wholefomenefs of 
 liis Meat or Drink, would not give him Reafon to venture 
 on it : And I would fain know what 'tis he could do upon 
 iiich Grounds as were capable of no Doubt, no Objedion. 
 
 §. II. As when our Senfes are adually em- 
 
 r.ijl Ex I- ploy'd about any Obje*il-, we do know that it 
 Jlenceie known does exift ; fo by our Aiemory^ we maybe af- 
 by Memory. fur'd, that heretofore Things that atfev!iled our 
 Senfes, have exiffed. And thus ire have Knovf- 
 ledge of the pa[i Exij^ence of feveral Things, whereof our Sen- 
 fes having inform'd US, our Memories ttil I retain the Ideas; 
 and of this we are pafl: all Doubt, fo long as we remember 
 well. But this Knowledge alfo reaches no farther than our 
 Senfes have, formerly afTur'd us. Thus feeing Water at this 
 inftant, 'tis an unqueflionable Truth to me, that Water 
 doth exif} : And remembering tliat I faw it Yefterday, it 
 will alfo be always true ; and as long as my Memory re- 
 tains it, always an undoubted Propofition to me, th.at Wa- 
 ter did exilt loth ?«/;, 1688, as it will alfo be equally true, 
 that a certain Number of very fine Colours did cxili, which, 
 at the fame Time, I faw upon a Bubble of that Water : But 
 being now quite out of the Sigiit both of the Water and 
 Bubbles too, it is no more certainly known to mc, that the 
 Water doth now exili, than that tlie Bubbles or Colours 
 therein do fo ; it being no more necclTary that Water fliould 
 ciift to Day, bccaufe it exilled Yclferday, than that the Co- 
 lours 
 
Exjftence of other Things. '257 
 
 lours or Bubbles exift to Day, becaufe they exifted Yefterday, 
 tho' it be exceedingly inuch more probable, becaufe Water 
 hath been obferv'd to continue long in Exigence, but Bub- 
 bles, and the Colours on them, quickly ceafe to be. 
 
 §. 12. What Ideas we have of Spirits, and 
 how we come by them, I have already fhewn. ^ The Exijlence 
 But tho' wc have thofe Ideas in our Minds, of Spirits 7iot 
 and know we have them there, the having the kyiswaMe. 
 Ideas of Spirits, does not make us Inm that 
 any fuch Things do exift without us, or that there are any finite 
 Spirits, or any other fpiritual Beings, but the eternal GOD. 
 We have Ground from Revelation, and feveral other Reafon?, 
 to believe with Afiurance, that there are fuch Creatures ; 
 but our Senfes not being able to difcover them, we want the 
 Means of knowing their particular Exillences. For we can 
 no more know, that there are finite Spirits really exifting 
 by the Idea we have of fuch Beings in our Minds, than by 
 the Ideas any one has of Fairies, or Centaurs, he can corae 
 to know, that Things anfwering thofe Ideas, do really exi(i 
 
 And therefore concerning the Exiftence of finite Spirits, 
 as well as feveral other Things, we- muft content our felves 
 with the Evidence of Faith ; but univerfal certain Propofi- 
 tions concerning this Matter, are beyond our Reach. For 
 however tvue it may be, v. g. that all the intelligent Spirits 
 that GOD ever created, do fti 11 exift ; yet it can never 
 make a part of our certain Knowledge. Thefe, and the like 
 Propofitions, we may aflcnt to, as highly probable, but aire 
 not, I fear, in this State, capable of knowing. We are not 
 then to put others upon Demonftrating, nor our felves upon 
 Search of univerfal Certainty in all thofe Matters wherein 
 we are not capable of any other Knowledge, but what our 
 Senfes give us in this or that Particular. 
 
 §. 13. By which it appears, that there are p • ; 
 two Sorts of Propo/Tm/?;. i. There is. one Sort jy,\Zjiiions 
 of Propofitions concerning the Exiflence of any concey-nim 
 Thing anfwerable to fuch an /^f^ ; as having Exiftence arc 
 the Idea^ of an Elephant, Phoenix, Motion, or an knowalle: 
 An^el, in my Mind, the firft and natural En- 
 quiry is , Whether fuch a Thing does any where exifl ? 
 And this Knowledge is only of Particulars, No Exiftence of 
 any Thing without us, but only of GOD, can certainly 
 be known farther than our Senfes inform us. 2. There is 
 another Sort of Propofmnt^ wherein is cjtprelTed the Agree- 
 
 S 3 jneaf 
 
2 5 8 Knowledge of the 
 
 mcnt or Dilagrccincnt of our abRtacft Ideas, and tbcir Depen- 
 daiicc one on another. Snch Propofitions may be uniVi-rfd 
 and ceitiin. So having the Ilea of GOD, and my Iclf, 
 of Fear and Obedience, I cannot but be furc tiiat GOD is 
 to be fcai'd and obcy'd by mc : And this Propofition will 
 be certain, conccrninp; Alan in general, if 1 lave made an 
 -abftrawt /:^frf of Ibch a Spqcics, whereof I am one Particular, 
 i^ut yet' this Piopofition, how certain focver. That Men 
 on.c;ht to fear and obey QQD, proves not to me the Exi- 
 ftcnce of Men in the World, but will be true of all fuch 
 Creatures, whenever they do cxilt : Which Certainty of inch 
 general Propofition?, depends on the Agreement or Dilagree- 
 mcnt is to be difcovcr'd in thofe ab'iracl Ideas, 
 
 §. 14. In the former Cafe, our Knowledge 
 Jiid ^oiey.:! is the Conkquencc of the Exigence of Things 
 Piafo/itions producing Ideas in our Minds by our Senles: 
 concenun^% ah- In the litter. Knowledge is the Confequcnce 
 7?/\7r7 Ideas. c£ xhz Ide^^s (be they what they will) that are 
 in our Minds producing there general certain 
 Propofjtion?. Many of thefe arc call'd atern£ TcritateSy and 
 all of than indeed arc io •„ not from being written all or ary 
 of them in the Minds of all Men, cr that they were any 
 of them PropoGtions in any one's Mind, 'till he, h.aving got 
 ihc abilrai't Ideas, join'd or feparated them by Affirmation 
 or Negation. But wherefoever wc can fuppole fuch a Crea- 
 ture as Alan is, cndow'd with fuch Faculties, and thereby 
 furnidi'd with inch Ideas as we have, we muft conclude he 
 mull needs, when he applies his Thoughts to the Confidcra- 
 tion of his Idea^, know the Truth of certain, Propofition 
 that will arilc from the Agreement or Dilagreement which 
 be will perceive in liis own Ideas. Sucli Propofitions are 
 therefore call'd eternal 7'rntl:s, not becaufe they are eternal 
 Propofitions adually form'd, and. antecedent to the Under- 
 ftanding, that at any lime makes them ; nor bccaule tbcy 
 are imprinted on the Mind frojn any Patterns that arc any 
 where of them out of the Mind, and exiHed before: But bc- 
 caule being once made alout ablira6l LLas, fo as to be true, 
 they will, wdicncvcr they can be liippos'd to be made again 
 at any Time paft or to come, by a Mind having thofc Id.^s 
 always actually be true. For Names being liippos'd to ftand 
 perpetually for the lime Ideas ; and the .'amc Ideas having 
 ^mmijtably the fame Habitudes one to anotlier, Propofitions^ 
 
 con- 
 
- Improvement of cur Knowledge, 25 9 
 
 concernLiig any abftract IAcm^ that arc oixe tiwe, mufl: need^ 
 be cterml Vermes, 
 
 / 
 
 %^ 
 
 » , , CHAP. Alf. ^ , t%^M^ 
 Of the hnprovemeht of our Knoxpledge. ' ^^^hf 
 
 §. r, IT having been the Goramon receiv'dO- Knoivhdg^ 
 
 X pinion amondl Men of Letters, that ^ not from 
 Maxims were the Foundation of all Know- ■^^^'■xnhs. 
 ledge ; and that the ^ciences were each of 
 them built upon certain Praco^nita, from whence the Un- 
 derltanding was to take its Rile, and by which it was to 
 condiidl it felf, in its Enquiries, into the Matters belonging 
 to th^t Science; the beaten Road of the, Schools has Dcen 
 to lay down in the Beginning, one or more general Propofi- 
 ticns, as Foundations whereon to buiJd the Knowledge that 
 was to be had ofthat Subject. ThefeDo^.Srines thus laid down 
 for Foundations of any Science, were call'd Principles, as 
 the Beginnings from which we muft fet out, and look no 
 fartlicr backwards in our Enquiries, as we have already ob- 
 ierv'd. 
 
 §. 2. One Thing,which might probably give (The Occa- 
 an Occafion to this Way of Proceeding jn 0- [ion f that 0- 
 ther Sciences, was (as I liippoi'e) the good Sue- p^^^^n.) 
 ceis it feem'ei to have in Mathemmch, where- 
 in Men being obferv'd to attain a great Certainty of Know- 
 ledge, thefe Sciences came by Pre-eminence to be call'd 
 Ma.Bi^iy.:iCI,ci ^ and Ma^Hcr/f ^ Learning, or Things learn'd, 
 throughly, learn d, as having, of all other?, the greateft Cer- 
 tainty, Clearnefs, and Evidence in them. 
 
 §. 3. But if any one will con fid er he will (I -^"^ /'ow 
 guefs ) find that the great Advmcement and ^^-"^ comparing 
 Certamty of real Knowledge^ which Men ar- ^J-^t^"^ ^'^' 
 rivd to in thefe Science?" was not owing to /' "^"-^ ^^^as. 
 the Influence of thefe Principles, nor deriv'd 
 from any peculiar Advantage they receiv'd from two or three 
 general Maxims laid down in the Beginning ; but from the 
 clear, dijHoB, ccmplea£ Ideas their Thoughts were employ 'd 
 sbout, and the Relation of Equality an? Excels fo clear be.- 
 
 S 4 twec« 
 
26o Improvement of our Knowledge. 
 
 tween fome of them, th.it they had an intuitive Knowledge, 
 and by that, a Way to dilcover it in others,and this without 
 the Help of thofc Afaxinjs. For I ask, Is it not polTible for a 
 young Lid to know that his whole Body is bigger than 
 his little Finger, but by Virtue of this Axiom, that the whole 
 is bigger than a Part; nor be afTar'd of it, till hehaslearn'd 
 that Maxim i Or cannot a Countr/ Wench know, that ha- 
 ving rcceiv'd a Shilling from one that owes her three, and a 
 Shilling a'fo from another that owes her three, that the re- 
 inaining Debts in each of their Hands are equal ? Cannot 
 rhe,i I lay, know this withow (lie fetch the Certainty of it 
 from this Maxim, That // yon take Equals from Equals, the 
 Remainder mil be Equals, a Maxim which pofTibly fhc never 
 heard or thousjhtof ? I defire any one to confidcr, from 
 "what has beencllftwhere faid, which is known firft and clear- 
 ed by moft People, the particular Initance, or the general 
 Rule 5 and which it is that gives Life and Birth to the 
 other. Thefe general Rules are but the comparing our more 
 general and abfirad Ideas, which are the VVorkmanl"hip of 
 the Mind, made, and Names given to them, for the ea- 
 fier Difpatch in its Reafonings, and drawing into compre- 
 hcnfive Terms, and fliort Rules, its various and multiply 'd 
 Obfervations. But Knowledge began in the Mind, and was 
 founded on Particulars, though afterwards, pcrhips, no 
 Notice be taken thereof ; it being natural for the 
 Mind (forward ftill to enlarge its Knowledge) moft atten- 
 tively to lay up thofe general Notions, and make the proper 
 Ulc of them, which istodisburthen the Memory ofthecum- 
 bcrlbme Load of Particulars. For I defire it may be confider'd 
 wh.it more Certainty there is to a Child, or any one, that 
 his Body, little Finger and all, is bigger than his little Fin- 
 ger alone, after you have given to his Body the Name jrhole, 
 and to his little Finger the Name Part, than he could have 
 had before ; or what new Knowledge concerning his Body, 
 can thefe two relative Terms givchim,which he could nothave 
 without them ? Could he not know that his Body was big- 
 ger than his little Finger, if his Language were yet lo imper- 
 fect, that he had no fuch relative Terms as Whole and Part f 
 I ask farther, When he has got thefe Names, how is he more 
 certain tliat his Body is a Whole^ and his little Finger a PatCj 
 than he was, or might be certain before he leain'd thole 
 Terms,that his Body was bigger than his little Finger? Any 
 one may as rcafonably doubt, or deny, that his little Finger 
 
 is 
 
hnprovement of our Knowledge. 16 1 
 
 is a Part of his Body, as that it is lefs than his Body. And 
 he that can doubt whether it be lefs, wiJl as certainly doubt 
 whether it be a Part. So that the Maxinfif 7l)<? whole is linger 
 than a Part, can never be made ufe of to prove the little 
 Finger iels than the Body, but when it is ulekfs, by being 
 brought to convince one of a Truth which he knows already. 
 For he that does not certainly know that any Parcel of Mat- 
 ter, with another Parcel of Matter ;oin'd to it, is bigger 
 than either of them alone, will never be able to know it by 
 the Help of thele two relative Terms, Whole and P/frf, make 
 of them what Maxims you pleaie. 
 
 §.4, Butbeitin the Mathematicksas it will, Bam;erom 
 whether it be clearer, thit taking an Inch from ^^ ^"'('^ "/o* 
 a black Line of two Inches, and an Inch from -P^ecarmn ^ 
 a red Line of two Inches, the remaining Parts ^I'^^'^'pl^^' 
 of the two Lines will be equal ; or that if yof4 
 tale Eqnab from Equals, the Remainder will be Equals : Which, 
 I fay, ofthefe two is the clearer and firft known, I leave 
 to any one to determine, it not being material to my prefent 
 Occation. Th^t wliich I have here to do, is to enquire, 
 whether if it be the readieft Way to knowledge, to \)tg\\\ 
 with general Maxims, and build upon them, it be yet a fafc 
 Way to take the Principles, which are laid down in any other 
 Science, as imqueftionable Truths ; and fo receive them 
 without Eximinatfon, and adhere to them without fufFering 
 to be doubted of, becaiife Mathematicians have been fo hap- 
 py, or fo fair, to ufe none but feif-evident and updeniable. 
 If this be fo, I know not what may not pais for Truth in 
 Morality, what may not be introduc'd and prov'd in natu- 
 ral Pliilofophy. 
 
 Let that Principle of fome of the Philofophers, that all is 
 Matter, and that there is nothing elfe, be receiv'd for certain 
 and indubitable, and it will be cafy to be feen by the Wri- 
 tings of fome that have reviv'd it again in our Days, what 
 Confequences it will lead us into. Let any one, with Po- 
 lemo, take the World ; or with the Stoich, the ty£ther, or the 
 Sun : or with Anaximenes^ the Air to be God, and what a 
 Divinity, Religion, and Worfhip, mufl we needs have ! iVo- 
 thing can he fo dangerous as Principles thus taken ftp mtkout Qne- 
 fiioning or Examination ; efpecially if they be fuch as con- 
 cern Morality, Vvhich influences Mens Lives, and gives a 
 Biafs to all their A6tions. Who might not juftly expert a- 
 M other Kind of Life in JriflippMSy vvho plac'd Happinefs in 
 • bodily 
 
262 Improvement of our Knon-ULlge, 
 
 bodily Pfeafuie ; and in Amifihcnes, uiio made Vertue fiiffi- 
 cicnt to Felicity ? j^.nd he, who with Plato^ fhall place Ika- 
 titudc in the Kn6\iTlr«dgs af God, will have his Thoughts 
 rais'd to othtr Conicmplations than thofc who look not be- 
 yond this Spot of Earth, and tliofe pcTiOiing Things which 
 arc to be had in it. He thr.t, w\\\\ AnlelaHs^ llull lay iit 
 down 33 a Prif,cip'e, That Right and'Wrong, Honeft and 
 Dtl}.ojic(i, are dcHn'd only by Liws, and not by Nature, 
 y,\\\ hivc other Meafures of. moral Rectitude and Pravity, 
 than thoi'e who take it for granted, that we are under Obli- 
 gations antecedent to ail human ConHitutions. 
 
 §. 5. If therefore thole that pafs for Princi" 
 This iV *w? p/f-f, arc not cenain, (which we mutt have fomc 
 eett.tinWpyto' Way lo know, thit w^e may be able to dilHn- 
 Tiiith. guiili them from thoic that arc doubtful) but 
 
 are only made fo tons by cur blind AfTent, 
 \\K are liable to be mifled by them 5 and inlkad of being 
 giiidcd into Truth, wclliall, by Principle?, be only confirmed 
 in Mittakc and Error. 
 
 §. 6. But fmce the Knowledge of the Cer- 
 Itt: to com- tainty of Principles, as well as of all other 
 f.ire dc.ir ' TiTJth?, depends only uron the Perception 
 r»wrr/f.7/-I(!ens we have of the Agreement or Difacrecment 
 Ttn-ter fie.Teiy of our Idcas^ tl:c Way to imprwe our Knovledge^ 
 Kimts. js liot, 1 am liire, blindly, and with an im- 
 
 plicit Faith, to receive and Iwallow Princi- 
 ples ; but i?, I think, to get and ^.v in our Alwds clear, di- 
 tiin[}, rtid co7?,plem Ideas, as far as they arc to be had, and 
 ^ine.r to them proper ^nd conjlant IsJanifs. And thus, perhaps, 
 jviihout any other Principles, but barely confideiing thote 
 (dc£i^ and by comparing thzn cne ixith another, findir."g their 
 Agreement nnd Diiagrccmcnt, and their fevcral Relations 
 and Habitudes, we fhall get more true and clear Knowledge 
 byiheCondud ofthisoncRuIc, than by taking up Piinciptes, 
 and thereby putting our Minds into the Dilpolal of others. 
 . §. 7. \Vc »)ni therefore, if we Avill proceed as 
 
 Tie true Me- Rf^f^n advilcs, trdapt otfr MetkUf of Enquiry 
 
 'X 'Know' ^' '^■' ^''^'■"' "' '^-^ ^^"-'^^ "^ e.vamnc, and tli 
 Iclle-sh^on- ^''"^'^ ^^'^ fcarch after. General and certain 
 fferw-- ('nr r.!'- Truths arc only founded in the Habitudes and 
 fltaS Idcns. Relations of aWlrad Ideas. A lagacious and 
 methodical Application of our Thoughts, for 
 the finding out thcte Relations, is the only Way to dilcover 
 
 * sll 
 
Improvement of our Knoivledge. 365 
 
 all tbatcan be put, with Truth and Certainty concerning 'cm, 
 into 2;eneral Propofitions. By w liat Steps wc are to pvoceed in 
 thei'e,istobe learn'd in the Schools of the Mat!:ematicians,uho, 
 from very plain and eafy Beginnings, by gentle Degrees, and a 
 continu'd Chain'of Reafonings, proceed to the Dilcovcryand 
 Dcmonrtration of Truths that appear at firfl Sight beyond hu- 
 man Capacity. The Art of finding Proofs, and the admirable 
 Mctiiods they have invented for the fingling out, and lay- 
 ing in order thoie intermediate /AW,thatdemonftratively iTevv 
 tlic Equality or Inequality of unapplicable Qiiantities, is that 
 which has cariy'd them lo far, and produc'd luch wonderful 
 and unexpected Difcoveries: Rut whether fomething like this, 
 in refpedt of otlicr Idcivs^ as wellasthofc of Magnitude, may 
 not in Time be found out, I will not determine. This, I 
 think, I may lay, that if other Ideas, that are the real as 
 well as nominal tilences of their Specie?, were purfu'd in the 
 way familiar to Mathematicians, they would carry our 
 Thoughts farther^and with greater Evidence and Clearnefs than 
 pofhbly we are apt to imagine. 
 
 §.8. This gave me the Confidence to advance j^y which Mo- 
 that Con jedmre w hich 1 luggeli,0r.7p 3. viz. That )v:/;Vy alfo may 
 Morality -is capable of Demvnftration^ as well as /'£-• made ckai- 
 Mathematick?. For the Ideas that Ethicks are e>: 
 con verfant about-, hei ng all real Effences, and 
 fuch, as 1 imagine, have a diicoverable Connexion and Agree- 
 ment one with another ; • fo far as we c^in find their Habi- 
 .tudes and Relations, fo far we fhall be pofids'd of certain, 
 real, and general Tnaths ; and I doubt not, but if a right 
 Method were taken, a great part of Morality might be made 
 out with that Clearnefs, that could leave, to a conilderin^ 
 Man, no more Reafon to doubt, than he could have to doubt of 
 the Truth of Fcopofitions in Mathcmaticks, which have beeii 
 demonli-rated to him. 
 
 §. 9. In our Search after the Knowledge o^Snl- 
 ihnces, om W3i\t oHdeas, that are luitable to ^„, Amw- 
 iiich away of proceeding, obliges us to a quite ledge of Bodies 
 different Method. We advance not here, as istoheimp-o^ 
 in the other, (where pur abftradt Ideas are real, as ved avly hj 
 well as nominal EiOfcnccs) by contemplating Experience, 
 cm Ideas, and copfidering their Relations and 
 Correfpondencies ; that helps us very litt c, for the Reafons 
 that in another place we have at large fct down. By which, 
 J think, it is evident that Subftanccs aftcrd Matter of very 
 
 little 
 
2^4 Improvement of unr Knowledge. 
 
 little general Knowledge; and the barcContemphtion of their 
 abRrad /r/f<rj-, will carry us but a very little way in the Search 
 of Truth and CcrtaiiUy. Whattlitn arc we to do for the Im- 
 provement of our Knonledge in fubiiantial Beings f Here we are 
 to take a quite contrary Courfe, the want oi Ideas of their real 
 Effences, lend us from our own Thoughts, to the Things ihem- 
 felvcs, as they exilh Experience- here mu(l- teaeh me what 
 Rcalbn cannot: And 'tis by trying alone, that I can certain- 
 ly know what other Qualities co-exift with thofe of my com- 
 plex Idea^ V. g. whether that yetlorv, heavy, fuftble Body I call 
 Cold, be malleable or no ; which Experience (which way e- 
 ver it prove in that particular Body I examine) makes me 
 not ceitain that it is fo in all or any other yellow, heavy, 
 fHJihle Bodies,but that which I have try 'd. Becaufe it isnoCon- 
 fequence one way or t'other from my complex Idea, theNe- 
 cefTity or Inconfiliencc of Malleability hath no vifible Con- 
 nexion with the Combination of that Colour, Weight, and F«- 
 filility in any Body. What I have faid here of the nominal 
 Hflcnce of CoWJuppofs'd to confiRof a Body of fuch a determi- 
 nate G/o^/-, Weijiht , and Ffi/tbility, will hold true, \f Mallea- 
 hleriejs, Fixedncfs, and Sohdility in A.pi.x Regine be added to it. 
 Our Reafonings from thtfc Ideas, will carry us but a little 
 way in the certain Difcovcry of the otlier Properties in thofe 
 MafTes of Matter wherein all thefe are to be found. Becaufe 
 the other Properties of fuch Bodies depending not on thefe, but 
 oti that unknown rxalE(Tcnce,ojnvliich thefe alfo depend, we 
 cannot by them difcover the reft; we can go no farther than the 
 fnnplc Ideas of our nominal ElTence will carry us, which is very 
 little beyond themlclves ; and fo afford us but veiy fparingly 
 any certain, univerfal, and uieful Truth?. For upon Tryal, 
 having found that particular Piece (and all others of that 
 Colour, Weight, and Fufibility, that I ever try'd) malleable, 
 that alfo makes now perhaps a part of my complex /<^e/r, part 
 of my nominal EfTcncc o^ Gold : Whereby, though I make my 
 complex Idea, to which I affix the Name Gold, to confift of 
 more fimplc Ideas than before ; yet ftill, it not containing 
 the real ElTcncc of any Species of Bodies, it helps me not cer- 
 tainly to know ( I lay to know, perhaps, it may to conje- 
 6ture) the other remaining Properties of that Body, farther 
 than they have a vifiblc Connexion with fome or all of the 
 fimple Ideas that make up my nominal EiTcncc. For Exam- 
 ple, I cannot be certain, from this complex /r/c^, whether G"o/^ 
 be fix'd or no ; becaufe, as before, there is no nccciTary Con- 
 nexion 
 
V 
 
 Improve tnent of our Knowledge, 265 
 
 nexion or Inconfiftence to be difcover'd betwixt a complex /- 
 Au of aBodyj^yf/Zczy, heavy, f^ifibk, n allcahle ; betwixt tliefe,! fay, 
 and FixedneJSjio that I may certainly know^,that in whatfoever 
 Body thefe are found, there Fixednefs is fuve to be. Here agjin, 
 for AfTurance, I inuft apply iny (elf to Experience ; as far as 
 that reaches, I may have certain Knowledge, but no farther. 
 
 §. 10. I deny not, but a Man accuftom'd to 
 rational and regular Experimentst("hall be able to TJjm may pro- 
 fee farther into the Nature of Bodies, and guefs cure m Conve- 
 righter at their yet unknown Properties, than nience, not Sci- 
 ons that is a Stranger to them : But yet, as I ^"'^^^ 
 have faid, this is but Judgment and Opini- 
 on, not Knowledge and Certainty. This vpay of getting and 
 improving our Knowledge in Stihftances only by Experience and 
 Hiftory, which is all that the Weaknefs or our Faculties in 
 this State oi Mediocrity, which w^c are in in this World, can 
 attain to, makes me fufpe6l that natural Philofophy is not 
 capable or being madea Science. We are able, I imagine, to 
 reach very little general Knowledge concerning the Species 
 of Bodies, and their feveral Properties. Experiments and Hi- 
 ftorical Obfervations we may have, from which we may draw 
 Advantages of Eafe and Health, and thereby increafe our Stock 
 of Conveniences for this Life ; but beyond this, I fear our Ta- 
 lents reach not, nor are cm Faculties,as I guefs, able to advance. 
 
 §.ii. From whence it is obvious to conclude, 
 that fmce our Faculties are not fitted to pene- Jf^e m-e fitted 
 trate into the internal Fabrick and realElTences for moral 
 of Bodies, but yet plainly difcover to us the Knowledge 
 Being of a GOD, and the Knowledge of our ^'^^ natural 
 felves, enough to lead us into a full and clear ^^'^^ovments, 
 Difcovery of our Duty, and great Concerxi- 
 ment, it will become us, as rational Creatures, to employ 
 thofe Faculties we have about what they aremoft adapted to,and 
 follow the Direction of Nature, where it feems to point us 
 out the w?iy. For 'tis rational to conclude, that our proper 
 Employment lies in thofe Enquiries,and in that fort of Know- 
 ledge^ which ismoftfuited to our natural Capacities, and car- 
 ries in it ourgreateft Intereft, i. c. the Condition of our e- 
 ternal Eftate'. Hence I think I may conclude, that Morality 
 is the proper Science and Ba/tnefs of Mankind in general, (who 
 are both concern'd atid fitted to fearch out their Summtim 
 Bontini) as feveral A: t?, converfant about ieveral parts of 
 Nature, are the Lot and private Talent of particular Men^ 
 
 for 
 
266 Improvement oj our Knowledge. 
 
 for the common Ulc of human Life, and their own particu- 
 lar Subfilkncc ill this Woild. Of ^\■hat Confcquence the Dil- 
 covcry of one ivmiral BoJy and iis Proptnics may be to hu- 
 man Life, ihc whole great CoiuiucnL of yimraca is a con- 
 vmciuc; Iniiancc ; whole Ic;norance in ulcful Ars, and 
 n'.'.nt of lhcc,ieatc(^ pait of theConvemcnccs of Life; in a 
 Country that abou idcd witli all iorts of natural Plenty, I 
 think may be aitributcd to their Ignorance, of what was to 
 be tbund in a very ordinary delpicablc Stone, 1 mean tlie 
 Mineral of Irm. And Avhatcver wc think of our Parts or 
 Improvements in this part of the World, wh.ere Knowledge 
 and Plenty kern to vie each with other; yet to any one that 
 willfcrioully reHcif onit, I fuppofc it will appear p.ili doubt, 
 that were the Ulc oi Iron lolt among us, avc I'Jiould in a few 
 Ages be.unavoid.ibly reduc'd to the Wants and Ignorance of 
 the ancient lavage Americans, whofc natural Endowmens 
 and I'rovifions come no way lliort of thofe of the moll Hou- 
 lilliing and polite Nations ; lo th.it he who Hrl^ made known 
 Lhs Ulb of that one contempliblcr Miperal, may be truly lUl'd 
 the Father of Arts, and Author of i^lcnty. 
 
 §. I 2. 1 would, not therefore be thought to 
 HiitmuJIic- dil-dkem, or (iifjwade the Study of A'atkre. I 
 voitofHypj- readily agree the Contemplation of his Works 
 thcfu, and gives us Occafion to admire, revere, and 
 wrovs hbici- .i^,i-,fy yj^ii- Author : And if rightly dirci'ted, 
 ^■'•^ may be of greater Beneht to Mankind, than 
 
 the Monuments of exemplary Charity, that 
 have, at lb great Charge, beln raifcd by the Founders of 
 liolpitals and Alms-houles. He that H'rit invented Printing, 
 difcover'd the Ulc of the Compals ; or made publick the 
 X'iitue and right LTc of Kin Kina^ did more Icu' the Pro- 
 pagati(M) 'of Knowledge, for the Supplying and Increafe of 
 iiiefiil Commodities, and Liv'd inoie from the Giave, than 
 thole who built Colleges, VVork-liruies,and Hofpitals. -AH 
 that 1 woulJ lay, is, that we liiould not Ix; too forwardly 
 poPcfs'd with the Opinion, or Expejiaiion of Knowledge, 
 where it is not to be liad, or by VVays that will not attain 
 It : That we liiould not take doubtful Syllcrs, for compleat 
 Sciences; uor unintelligible Notii^ns, for Icientilical Dcmon- 
 iiraiions. In the Knowledge of Bodies, wc mult be content 
 lo glean, what we en, from paniail r Exrennuuis; fmcc 
 wecanneit, from a Dilcovcry of their real Lflcnces, criip at 
 a iiinc whole Sheaves ; aud in Buii.ilts coinprchend the N;.- 
 
 ture 
 
Improvement of our Knowledge^ 26 J 
 
 ture and Properties of whole Species together. Where our 
 Enquiry is concerning Co-exiftcnce, or Repugnaq' to co-ex- 
 ift, which by Contemplation ot our Idcas^ we cannot dilco- 
 ver J there Experience, Oblervation, and natural Hil^ory, 
 inu(t give us, by our Senies, and by Retail, an Infight in- 
 to corporeal Subrtances. The Knowledge of Bodies we muft 
 get by our Senfes, warily employ 'd in taking Notice of 
 their Qiialities and Operations on one another : And what 
 w^e hope to know of ieparnte Spirits in this World, we 
 muft, I think, expect only fi-jai Revelation. He that iliail 
 confjder, /;o» little general Maxims, frccarims Principles^ Ani 
 Hypothefts Uid down at Pleajure^ have pron.oted true Knavledgty 
 or help'd to fatisfy the Enquiries of rational Men after real 
 Improvements: How little, I Iky, the letting out at that 
 End, has for many Ages together adv^jfnc'd Mens Progrels 
 towards the KnowledTe of r.atural Philolbphy, will think, 
 we have Reafon'to thank thole, who, in this latter Age, 
 have taken another Coiirie, and liave trod out to u?, tlio' not 
 an eafjer Way to learn d Ignorance, yet a furer Way to pro- 
 fitable Knowledge, 
 
 §.13. Not that we may not, to explain a- 
 ny Pl.cenomeaAQ^ Nature, make Ule of any pro- The true Ufe 
 bable //ypoz-re/fj vvhatfoever. Hypotkefcs, if they of Hypothefts, 
 are well made, are at leaft great Helps to the 
 Memory, and often direct us to new Difcoverie?. Eut my. 
 Meaning is, thit we lliould not take m any one tco hailiiy, 
 (which the Mind, that would always penetrate into theCai^i- 
 ies of Tilings, and have Principles to reft on, is very apt to 
 do) 'till we have very well examin'd Particulars, and made 
 feveral Experiments m that Thing which we would explain 
 by our Hypothefis, and lee wliether it will agree to them all ; 
 whether our Principles will carry us quite through, and not 
 be as inconfiftent with our Phencwenm of Natur-e, as they 
 leem to accommodate, and explain another. And at Icaft 
 that we take Care that the N.;mc of Principles deceive us 
 nor, nor impofe on us, by making us receive that for an uu- 
 queftiop.able Truth, wliich is really, at heft, but a very doubt- 
 ful Conjefture, Inch as are moft (I had almoft laid all) of 
 tlie Hypotl:efa in natural Philolophy. 
 
 §.14. Bu; whether natural Philofophy beca- Clenr n-)id dJ- 
 pable of Certainty or no, ti.e Ways to enlarge /-'"'^ I^^'^;^ , 
 wr Knowledge^ as far as we arc capable, lecm.To ^^'-'^^^ /<""''';' 
 me, in Oio.t, to be thefe two : Kmcs.and tht 
 
268 Improvement cfour Knowledge. 
 
 Fir [I, The firj} is to get and fettle in our Minds 
 j[nd:n7ofthofc cletcrmin'd Idcxf of thnie Thing?, whereof we 
 vhich Jbex9 \^^y,^ general or IpeciHck Names ; at leaft of 
 their -^P^^' fb m.my of ihcm as we would confider and 
 ment or D:j.i- \^x\^^q\c our Knowledge in, or Realon about. 
 ^l7iV.nsto'^ "^"^ ^^ ^'^^y be7/;fd/?ci: Ideas of Subfiances, we 
 incre.ifc onr fHould ende.ivour alfo to make them as com- 
 Knowled/e. P'^^^ ^s wc can, whereby I mean that we* 
 llicuIJ put togctlur as many fnnple Ideas, as 
 being conflantly obfciv'd to cb-cxift, may perfectly deter- 
 mine the Species; and each of tiiofe fimple Ide^, which are 
 the Ingredients of our complex, one lliould be clear and di- 
 ftind in our Minds : For it being evident that our Know- 
 ledge cannot exceed our Idcaf, as far as they are either iiiiper- 
 feit, confused, or oblcure, we cannot expeil to have certain^ 
 pcrfcil, or clear Knowledge. 
 
 Secondly^ The other is the Art of finding out thofe interme- 
 diate Ideas, which may ("hew us the Agreement or Repugnan- 
 cy of other Ideas, which cannot be immediately compar'd. 
 
 §. i"^. That thefe two (m\1 net the relying 
 Mathemvlcks On Maxims, and drawing Confequenccs from 
 im Injl.mceof Tome gener.il Propofitions) arc the right Me- 
 '■f* thod of improving our KiiowleJge in the Id^as 
 
 of other Modes, bcfides thofe of Qiiantity, the 
 Conflderation of Mathematical Knowledge will eafily in- 
 form us. Where firft we ("hall find, that he that has not a . 
 pcrfeftand clear Idea of thofe Angles or Figures of which he 
 defircsto know any Thing, is utterly tlicreby inicapable of a- 
 ny Knowledge about them. Suppole but a Man not to have 
 a pcrfe(fl:cxail;l:/</<'.t of a right ^ngUy a Scalcmw, or Trapeum;, 
 and there is nothing more certam, than that he will in vain 
 fcek any Dcmonlbation about them. Farther it is evident, 
 that it was not the Influence of thole Maxims which are ta- 
 ken for Principles in Maihcmaticks, that hath led the Mali^ers 
 of that Science into thofe wonderful Difcovcrics they have 
 maJc. Let a Man of good Parts kno\v all the Maxims ge- 
 nerally made Vie of in Mathcmaticks never fo perfe^i^ly, and 
 contemplate thiir Extent and Confcquences as much as he 
 plealcp, he will, by their Affiftance, I fuppole, fcarcc ever 
 come to know, that the Square of the Hypotenuje in .; right an- 
 rld Tri.tngle, is equal to the Siju^res of th: frro other Sides, The 
 Knowledge thatr/v IVhcle is equal to a I it! P^rts, and if you 
 tah' Eqtulsfrm EoudUy the Hcwnindcrnill be cquM, &c. liclp'd 
 
 him 
 
Confiderations concerning our Knowledge. 269 
 
 him not, I prefume, to this Demondration : And a Man 
 may, I think, pore long enough on thofe Axioms, without 
 ever feeing one Jot the more of Mathematical Truth?. They 
 have been difcover'd by the Thoughts otherwife apply'd ; the 
 Mind had other Objeds, other Views before it, far different 
 from thofe Maxims, when it firft got the Knowledge of fuch 
 Kind of Truths in Mathematicks, which Men well enough 
 acquainted with thofe receiv'd Axioms, but ignorant of their 
 Method who firrt made thefe Demonftrations, can never fuf- 
 ficicntly admire. And who knows what Methods, to en- 
 large our Knowledge in other Parts of Science, may hereaf- 
 ter be invented, anfwering that of Algtlra, in Mathematicks, 
 which fo readily finds out /rfe-rfj of Quantities to meafure o- 
 thers by, whofe Equality or Proportion we could otherwife 
 very hardly, or perhaps never come to know ? 
 
 CHAP. XIII. 
 
 ^ome farther Confiderations concerning our Know- 
 ledge. 
 
 §»i. /^l^^ ifwo^W^f, as in other Things, K - 
 Vy. fo in thig, has a great Conformity j^^'" partlT 
 with our Sight, that it is neither viholly neccffa- ^jgcejfary part^ 
 ry, nor wholly volmtwy. If, our Knowledge a, voluntary. 
 were altogether neaeflary, all Mens Knowledge 
 would not only be alike, but every Man would know all 
 that is knowable ; and if it were wholly voluntary, fome 
 Men fo little regard or value it, that they would have ex- 
 tream little, or none at all. Men that have Senfcs, cannot 
 chufe but receive fome Ueas by them i and if they have Me- 
 mory, they cannot but retain fome of them ; and if they have 
 any diftinguiiliing Faculty, cannot but perceive the Agree- 
 ment or Difagreement of fome of them one with another ; as 
 he that has Eyes, if he will open them by Day, cannot but 
 fee fome Objeds, and perceive a Difieicnce in them. But 
 tho' a Man with his pyes open in the Light, cannot but fee ; 
 yet there be certain Objeils, which he may chule whether he 
 will turn his Eyes to ; there may be in his Reach a Book con- 
 taining Pidures and Pifcouriea, capable to delight or inlirud^ 
 
 T him 
 
2 70 Confider at'ions concerning our Knowledge. 
 
 him, which yet he may never liave the Will to open, nevet 
 Like the Pains to look into. 
 
 §. 2. There is alfo another Thing in a Mans 
 TfjeJppIic.i- Power, and that is, tlioiic,h he turns his Eyes 
 lion volnnt.i- ibmctimes towards an Objc6t, yet he may 
 ry ; hut wc chufe whether he will ciirionily furvey it, and 
 hnwMThinj^s with an intent Application endeavour to ob- 
 arcnotaswe (erve accurately all that is viliblc in it. But 
 peaje. y^^^ what lie docs (tc, he cannot fee otherwile 
 
 than he doe?. It depends not on his VVill to 
 fee that Black which appears I'dloiv ; nor to per'.wasle himfelf, 
 thai what acKirJIy /r<«/</j liim. Feels co'd : The Earth will not 
 appear painted with Flowers, nor the Fields covcr'd with 
 Verdure, whenes^er he has a Mind to it : In the cold Win- 
 ter, he cannot help f^.'ein!2;it white and hoary, if he will look 
 Abroid. jufl thus is it with our Underftanding ; all that is 
 vjlumary in our Knowledge, is the employing, or with-hold- . 
 ing any of our Faculties from this or that Sort of Objeds, and 
 a more or lefs accurate Survey of them ; but they being em- 
 ploy 'd, our Will hath no Poiver to determine the Knowledge of the 
 Mind one way or other ; that is done only by the'Objedls 
 ihcmfelves, as far as they are clearly difcover'd. And there- 
 fore, as far as Mens Senfes arc donverfant about external Ob- . 
 ^eits, the Mind cannot but receive thole Ideas which are pre- 
 fentcd by them, and be inform'd of the Exigence of Things 
 without ; and lb far as Mens Thoughts coiiverfe with their 
 own determined Ideas, tiiey cannot but in feme Meafure ob- 
 feive the Agreement andDilagKcnKntthat is to be found a- 
 mongd fome of them, which ly^fo far Knowledge ; and if 
 they have Names for thole Ideas which they liavc thu? confi- 
 der'd, they muft needs be aflur'd of the Truth of thole Propo- 
 litions, which exprels that Agreement or Difagrtcment they _ 
 perceive in them, and be undoubtedly convinc'd of tholi? 
 Truths :^ For wh.it a Man fees, he canr.ot but fee , and what 
 he p<rceives, he cannot but know that he perceives. 
 
 §. 3. Thus hetliat has got the Ideas of Nutn- 
 hiflance in bcrs, and hath taken the Pains to compare one, 
 Niml'os. two, and three, to fix, cannot chufe but know 
 
 that tiny are equal. He that hath got the Idea 
 of a Triangle, and found the Ways to mcallire its Angles, 
 and their Magnitudes, is certain that its three Angles are 
 equal to two right ones : And can as little doubt of that, as. 
 
 of 
 
Judgment, 271 
 
 of this Truth, that it is impoffible for the fame to he, and not to 
 he. 
 
 He alfo that hath the Idea of an intelligent, 
 but frail and weak Being, made by and de- -J^ natural Re- 
 pending oft another, who is eternal, omnipo- %'0"- 
 tent, p^rfedly wife and good, will as certain- 
 ly kno>v that Man is to honour, fear, and obey GOD, as 
 tj^at the Sun ihines when he fees it. For if he hath but the 
 Ideas of two fuch Beings in his Mind, and will turn his 
 Thoughts that Way, and confider them, he will as certainly 
 find, that the inferior, finite, and dependent, is under an 
 Obligation to obey the fupream and infinite, as he is certain 
 to find, that f/^ree, jonr^ a.ndfeveny are le(s than fifteen, if he 
 will confider and compute thofe Numbers; nor can he be 
 furer in a clear Morning, that the Sun is rifen, if he will 
 but open His Eyes, and turn them that Way- But yet thefe 
 Truths being never fo certain, never fo clear, he may be ig- 
 norant of either, or all of them, who will never take the 
 Pains to employ his Faculties as he (hould, to inform himfelf 
 about them. 
 
 CHAP. XIV. 
 
 Of Jiidgmejit, 
 
 §. I. 'Tp HE iinderftan^g Faculties being 
 
 X given to Man, not barely for Spe- Our Know - 
 culation, but alfo for the Conduit of his Life, ledge hemg 
 Man would be at a great Lofs, if he had no- /^^'>*'^i f^ ^-''f 
 thing to direa him, but what has the Cer- pmetLhgelJe^ 
 tainty of true Knowledge, For that being very 
 fhort and fcanty, as we have feen, he would be often utterly 
 in the Dark, and in mott of the Adions of his Life, per- 
 fedlly at a Stand, had he nothing to guide him in the Ab- 
 ience of clear and certain Knowledge. He that will not eat, 
 'till he has Demonftration that it will nourifh him ; he that 
 will not ftir, 'till he infallibly knows the Bufinefs he- goes 
 about w'ill lucceed, will have little elfe to do, but fit ftiU 
 ■ind periOi. 
 
 T 2 §.2. There* 
 
2 72 Judgment. 
 
 ^. 2. Therefore, as God has fet fomc Things 
 WkuUfeto in broad Day light, a? he iias given us fomc 
 hem.ukofthis certain Knowledge, though limited to a few 
 twilight StMc. Things in Comp.irifbii, probably, as a Tafte 
 of what intcllc^ual Creature? arc capable of, 
 to excite in us a Defirc and Endeavour a'lcr a better State ; 
 fo, in the greatcft Part of cur Concernment, he has afforded 
 us only the Twilight, as 1 m.iy fo fay, of Probability^ fuita- 
 bL% I prcfumc, to that State of jMcdiocrity and Probitioucr- 
 fhip he has been pleas'd to place us in here : wherein, to 
 check our Over-confidence and Prefumption, we might, by 
 every Day's Experience, be made fcnftble of our Short-fighted- 
 iiels, and Liablencfs to Error ; the Senfe whereof might be a 
 condant Admonition to us, to fpcnd the Days of this our 
 Pilgrimage widi Induftry and Care, in the Search, and fol- 
 lowing of that Way, which might lead us to* a State of 
 greater Pcrfcition. It being highly rational to think, even 
 were Revelation filcnt in tiie Cafe, that as Men employ 
 thofe Talents God has given them here, they dial! nccorJing- 
 1/ leceive their Rewards at the Clofc of the Day, when 
 their Suu iTiall fct, and Night lliall put an End to their 
 Labours. 
 
 ^. 3. The Faculty which God lias given Man 
 Judgment to iupply the Want of clear and certain Know- 1 
 fupplies the ledge, in Cafes where tliat cannot be had, is j 
 jraiit of Judgment : Whereby the Mind takes its Ideas 
 
 Knowledge, to agree or difagrec ; or which is the fame, a- 
 ny Propofitiori to be true or falfe, without 
 perceiving a demonlkativc Evidence in the Proofs. The 
 Mind fonutimes excrciles this Jud^ff^ent out of Ncccflfity, 
 where demonftrativc Proofs and certain Knowledge are not 
 to be l»ad ; and fometimcs cut of Lazinefs, Unskilfulnefs, or. 
 Hafte, even where dcmonflrative and certain Proofs are to be 
 !iad. Men often Ihy not warily to examine the Agreement 
 cr Difagrccment of two /dc<ts, which they are dclirous or 
 concern'd to know ; but either incapaWe of fuch Attention 
 as is rcquifite in a long Train of Gradations, or impatient ^ 
 of Delay, lightly caft their Eyes on, or wholly pafs by the 
 Proofs ; and fo, without making out the Demonftration, 
 determine of the Agreement or Difagrccment of two Idf^rSy 
 as it were ; by a \'^iew of them as they are at a Diftance, and 
 t.tke it to be the one or the other, as fcems mo(t likcl/ to j 
 them upon fuch a loofc Survey, Tins Faculty of the Mind, 
 
 when 
 
Probability. 273 
 
 when it k exercis'd immediately about Things, is call'd Jttdg- 
 mtnt ; when about Truths delivered in Words, is moft com- 
 monly call'd A^ent or Ut\]m : Which being the moft uliial 
 Way wherein the Mind has occafion to employ this Faculty, 
 I (hall, under thefe Terms, treat of it as leaft liable in out 
 Language to Equivocation. 
 
 §. 4. Thus the Mind has two Faculties, ^^ ^^ ^ 
 convcrfant about Truth and Falfliood. /£"*f!r?,?,",-,,* 
 
 FirJ}, KntMge, whereby it certainly per- Things to h 
 ceives, and is undoubtedly fat'tffy'd of the A- fo without fer~ 
 greemcnt or Dilagreement of any Ideas. ceiving it. 
 
 Secondly,- Judgment, which is the pultwgldeas 
 together, or leparating them from one another in the Mind, 
 when their cert, in Agreement or Difagreement is not perceiv'd 
 but prejam'd to be fo, which is, as the Word imports, taken 
 to be lo, before it certainly appears. Aiid if it lb unites, or 
 feparates them, as in Reality Things are, it is right Judgment. 
 
 Troh.d'iliry 
 
 CHAP. XV. 
 
 Of Probability, 
 
 §. I. AS Demonftration is the (hewing the 
 
 jCX Agreement or Difagreement of two ^ theApvcar- 
 Jdeas^ by the Intervention of one or more nnce of A-ree- 
 Proofs, which have a conftant, immutable, „,^jj( ^p.^^ 
 and vifible Connexion one with another j fo f,^U]hle Proofs, 
 Probability is nothing but the Appearanjue of 
 fuch an Agreement or Difagreement, by the Intervention of 
 Proofs, whofe Connexion is not conftant and immutable, 01 
 at leaft is not perceiv'd to be lb, but is, or appears, for the 
 moft part, to be fo, and is enough to induce tiie Mind to 
 jftdge the Fropofition to be true or falfe, rather than the 
 contrary. For Example : In the Demonftration of it, a Man 
 perceives the certain immutable Connexion there is of Equa- 
 lity between the three Angles of a Triangle and thole in- 
 termediate ones, which are made ufe of, to (hew their Equa- 
 lity to two right ones ; and fo, by an intuitive Knowledge 
 of the Agreement or Difagreement of the intermediate /f/f^i- 
 in each Step of the Progrefs, the whole Series is continu'd 
 with an Evidence/which clearly Ihews the Agreement oi 
 
274 Trobability, 
 
 Diragrccmcnt of thofc three Angles, in Equality to two 
 right ones ; And thus he has certain Kiiowlcdge that it is lb. 
 But another Man, who never t ok the Pains to obfervc the 
 Demonftration, hearing a Matheimtician, a Man of Credit, 
 affirm the three Angles of a Triangle, to be equal to two 
 ri.ht ones, ^ffems to it, /. e. receives it for true. In which 
 Cafe, the Foundation of his AfTent is the Probability of the 
 Thing, the Proof being luch as for the molt part carries. 
 Truth with it : The Man, on whofc Tcftimony he receives 
 it, not being wont to aftirm any thing contrary to, or belides 
 his Knowledge, efpccially in Matters of this kmd. So that 
 that which caufcs his Aficnt to this Propofition, that the 
 three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones, that 
 which makes him take thcfe Ideas to agree, without know- 
 ing them to do fo, is the wonted Veracity of the Speaker in 
 other Cafes, or his fuppos'd Veracity in this. 
 
 §. 2> Our Knowledge, as has been Oiewn, 
 hiitofup^ being very narrow, and we not happy enough 
 fly the Want to find certain Truth in every Thing which we 
 of Knowledge. • have occalion to confuler, moft of the Propofi- 
 tions we think, reafon, dilcourfc, my, adt upon, 
 are fuch as we cannot have undoubted Knowledge of their 
 Truth ; yet fome of them border fo near upon Certainty, 
 that we make to doubt at all about them, but ajftnt to them 
 as firmly, and a6l, according to that AfTent, as refolutely as 
 if they were infallibly dcmonflrated, and that our Know- 
 ledge of them was perfect and certain. But there being De- 
 grees- herein, from the very Neighbourhood of Certainty and 
 Demonftration, quite down to Improbability and Unlikeli- 
 ncfs, even to the Confines of Impofllbility ; and alfo Degrees 
 of Ajjent from full ^[furancc and Confidence, quite doWn to 
 Conjeitfire, Douht^ and Dijlnd -, I fliall come now, (havii^, 
 as I think, found out the Bounds of human Knowledge, and 
 Certainty) in the next Place, to confider the fevo-^l Degrees 
 i*n'd Grounds of Probability^ and AJfcnt or Faith. 
 
 §. r^. Probability is Likelinefs to be true, the 
 
 ]^e:ng that y^ry Notation of the Word fignifying fuch a 
 
 ivAu-/' mnkcs piopnfition, for which there be Arguments or 
 
 T/.;««.r ,n A- Proofs, to make it pals, or be rcceiv d for true. 
 
 JtlllVf! to te -T-i T- • 1 •» #• 1 • . • r r 
 
 true, h fore roe "^ tntertauiment the Mmd gives this Sort or 
 
 know than to Propofitions, is call'd Belief, -^ff^^^t or Opini- 
 
 irc J'g. on, which is the admitting or receiving any 
 
 Proportion for true, upon Arguments or 
 
 jfropfs 
 
Proofs that are found to p^rfvvadc dve it as Xxxpiy 
 
 without certain KnowlejJaetbat it h .> , ...ud herein lies thp 
 
 Difference between Prohahility -irA Cr-tc.ir.ty, FiiitL\ ^ri A KfioK-- 
 
 ledge, that in all the Pans, of K ' there is Intuition ^ 
 
 each immediate Idea^ each Step vifible aj;id. certain 
 
 Connexion -, in Belief not lb. 1 \m \v i)ich inak-es me, believe.-, 
 
 is fomething extraneous to the Thing 1 believe ; Ibmetbing 
 
 not evidently Join'd on both fides to, and fo not manifeitly 
 
 fhewing the Agreement or Difagreement of thof^ Ideas that 
 
 are under Confideration. 
 
 §.4. Probdility then being to fupply the TheGrojmds 
 
 Defe(it of our Knowledge, and to guide us of VyohnhHity 
 
 where that fails, is always converfant about aretwo-^Con- 
 
 Propofitions whereof we have no Certainty, f^^'^f'^y with 
 
 but only feme Inducements to receive them ^"^ ""'" ^''V' 
 
 for true. The Grounds of it are, in fliort, thefe /f^e"^^'^'y^^ 
 
 c u • icjtvnony of 
 
 rw^o following : _ ^ _ othenExpiri- 
 
 Firfl, The Conformity of any Tiling with ^,^^.^,^ ^ 
 our own Knowledge, Obfervalion, and Expe- 
 rience. 
 
 Secondly, The Teftimony of other?, vouching their Obfer- 
 vation and Experience. In the Teliimony of others, is to 
 be confider'd, i. The Number. 2. The Integrity. 3. The 
 Smil of tl.e VVitnefles. 4. The Defign of the Author, where 
 it is a Ttftimony out of a Book cited. «;. The ConfiRency 
 of the Parts, and Circumdances of the Relation. 6. Con- 
 trary Teftimonies. 
 
 §. %. Probability wanting that intuitive E- ^^ ^j^;^ ^^ 
 vidence which infallibly determines the Un- theJ^reements 
 de.r(ianding, and produces certain Knowledge, p^^ ^„^ con, 
 the Mind, if it mil proceed rationally, ought to ought to be 
 examine all the Grounds (f Probability, and fee examhi'd, he- 
 how they make more or iefs, for or ^igainfi any fors we come 
 probable Propofjtion, before it aflents to, or to a Judg- 
 difients from it, and upon a due ballancing wewz'. 
 the Whole, rejed or receive it, with a more 
 or Iefs firm AiTent, proportionably to the Preponderancy of 
 the greater Grounds of Probability ou one fide or the other. 
 For Example : 
 
 If I my felf fee a Man walk on the Ice, it is paft Probabi- 
 lity, 'tis Knowledge : But if another tells me he faw a Man 
 in England, in the midft of a fharp Winter, walk upon 
 Water hardened with Cold ; this has lb great Conformity 
 
 T 4. with 
 
2fS Frohah'ility, 
 
 witli what isiifually obfcrv'd to happen, that I am difpos'd, 
 by ihc Nature of the Thing it fclf, to alTent to it,unlefs fome 
 inanifdt Sulpicion attend tlie Relation of that Fa6^. But if 
 the lame Thing be told to one born between the Tropicks, 
 who never law nor heard of any fuch Thing before, there 
 the whole Probability relies on Teftimony : And as the Re- 
 lators arc more in Number, and of more Credit, and have 
 no Intercl^ to fpeak contrary to the Truth ; fo that Matter of 
 Fad is like to, find more or Icls Belief Though to a Man, 
 whofe Experience h.sbeen always quite contrary, and has 
 never heard of any Thing lik» it, the moft untainted Credit 
 rf a Witnefs will fcarcc be able to find Belief. And as it 
 happcn'd lo a. Dtiuh AmbaiTador, who entertaining the King 
 of^Mw \\ith the Particularities o( Holland, whichhc wasin- 
 quifitive after, amonglt other Thing?, told him, That the 
 Water in his Country would fometimes, in cold Weather, 
 be fo hard, that Men walk'duponir, and that it would bear 
 an Elephant, if he were there. To which the Kingrcply'd, 
 Hitkerto Jhavehelicvd the fir Mge Things you have told me, be- 
 caufe Hook upon yon m afob.r, jair Aian j hnt new I unj Jure yon 
 lie. • ' - ' 
 
 §. 6. Upon thefe Grounds depends the ?ro- 
 T/jey being lability of any Propof.tion : And as theCon- 
 '^'7-u'y t f^'^iTiify ^^ our Knowledge, as the Certainty of 
 gru nrie y. Qblcrvations, as the Frequency and Conflancy 
 of Experience,and the Number and Credibility of Teftimonies, 
 do more or lefs agree or difagree with it, fo is any Propofition 
 in it ftlf, moieor lefs probable. There is another, I confcls, 
 which, tliough by it felt it be no true Ground of Probability, 
 yet is C'ftcn made ule of for one, by which Men moft com- 
 moiily regulate their Afient, and upon which they pin their 
 Faith more than any Thing elfe, and that is the Opinion of 
 otkrs ; though there cannot be a more dangerous Thing to 
 re!ie on, nor more likely to millead one, fmce there is much 
 more FalfhcoJ and Error among Men, than Truth and Know- 
 ledge. And if the Opinions and Pcrfwafions of other?,whom 
 wc knon' and think well of, be a Ground of Aflent, Men 
 iuvc Rcafon to be Heathens in Japan, Mahometans in Tw- 
 kiy, P.ipifis in Spain, Protcftanis in England, and Lutherans 
 in Snede).. But of this wrong Ground of Aflent, I (hall 
 have Occafion to fpcak moic at large in anothei: Place. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
Degrees of Jffent. 277 
 
 CHAP. XVI. 
 
 Of the Degrees of Ajfent. 
 
 §. I. r-r\ H E Grounds of Probibility we Ohy Ajfent 
 X liave laid do^vn in the foregoing ouj^ht toh n- 
 Chapter, as they are the Foundations on which pointed by the 
 cur Anient is built, fo are they allb theMea- 2'T/J.J; 
 fure whereby its fevaral Degrees arc, or ought "^ '^ ' '/• 
 to be regaUted: Only we are to take Notice, 
 that whatever Grounds of Probability there may be, they yet 
 operate no farther on the Mind, which fearchts after Truth, 
 and endeavours' to judge right, than they appear, at Icaft 
 in the firft Judgment or Search that the Mind makes. I con- 
 fefs, in the Opinions Men have, and firmly ftick to, in the 
 World, their -4(/c'«Ms not always' from an aclual View of 
 the Reafons that at firit prevaildwith them ; it being in ma- 
 many Cafes almoft impofTible,^ and in mcft very hard, even 
 for thofe who have very admirable Memories, to retain all 
 the Proofs, which upon a due Examination, made them em- 
 brace that Side of the Qucftion. It fuffices th^-t they have 
 once, with Care and Fairneis, fifted the Matter as far as they 
 could ; and that they have fearch'd into all the Particulars 
 that they could imagine, to give any Light to ti:e Qiieftior^ 
 and with the beft of their Skill, call up the Account upon 
 the whole Evidence : And thus having once found on which 
 Side the Probability appear d to them, after as full and ex- 
 ail an Enquiry as they can make, they lay up the Conclufion 
 in theiu Memories, as a Truth they have dilcover'd ; and for 
 the future they remain fatisfy'd with the Teftimony of their 
 Memories, that this is the Opinion, that, by the Proofs tliey 
 have once feen of it, delerv^es fuch a Degree of their Ajjmt 
 as they afford it. 
 
 §, 2. This is all that the greateft Part of T/jefe can- 
 Men ate capable of doing, in regulating their ^^°^ always he 
 Opinions and Judgments, unlcfs a Man will ^^«^^(y '» 
 exaa of them, either to retain diftiriftly in Vxsw , and then 
 their Memories all the Proofs 'concerning any ^« J"W «°n' 
 probable Truth, and fhat too in the fame Oi- ''"' '"' ^'^'"'^ 
 ' ' der, 
 
2/8 Degrees of JJjent, 
 
 ith -he Re ^''» *"'"' regular Dcdu6lion of Confcqiience?," 
 Z^,braL. ' »" which they have formerly plac'd or fccn 
 th.n we once t''^'^^ ' >vhicn lometunes is enough to hll a 
 /iw Ground ^'^'P'^ Veluine upon one Hngle Qiiclliun : Or 
 for fuch a clfc they muR require a Man, for every Opini- 
 De7;rec of Ap on that he embraces, every Day to examine ^he 
 fait. Proofs ; boili which are iiiipoli'iblc. It is una- 
 
 voidable tlicreforc, that tlie Memory be rely'd on in the Cafe, 
 and that Men Ic pcrjixadcd of Jcveral Opinion), -ivhcreof tie 
 Vroofs *re nut atlu.-lly in their Thoughts ; nay, which perhaps 
 tliey arc not able actually to recal. Without this, the great- 
 eft Part of Men muft be either very Sccptick?, or change eve- 
 ry Moment, and yield thcmlelves up to whoever, having 
 lately ftudy d the Qiiertion, offers them Arguments ; which, 
 for want of Mcmoryj they arc not able prefently to an- 
 swer. 
 
 §. 3. I cannot but own, that Mens fiici- 
 
 The ill Con- ^'''S ^^ ^^''^"' /'''/ Jf^dgr^ent, and adhering firm- 
 feqitenceof ly ^o Conclu^ioi.s formerly made, is often the 
 tbisy if our Caufe of great Obftinacy in Error and Mi- 
 form:r fudg- liakc. But the Fault is not that they relie 
 ment were vot on their Memories for what they have before 
 7i^/jtly viade. well-judg'd, but bccaufe they judg'd before 
 they had well examin'd. May we not find a 
 great Number (not to fay the gieateft Part) of Men, that 
 think they have form'd right ]u Jcments of feveral Matters, 
 and that for Jio other Re.iibn, but bccaufe they never thought 
 otheruife ? That imagine thcmfelvcs to have judg'd right, 
 Wily bccaufe they never qucRion'J, 1 cvr o .min'd their own 
 Opuiions ? Which is indeed 10 iliink ti.ty ;udg'd right, 
 bccaufe they never judg'd at all : And yet thefe, ofall Men, 
 Lold their Opinions with the grt,:ieit Stiftncis j thofe bcuig 
 generally the moft fierce and firm in their Tenet^ who 
 l)avt leaft cx.imin'd them. V\'hat we once know, we 
 arc certain is fo j and wc may be iccure that ilierc are 
 iio latent Proofs undil'cover'd , which may overturn our 
 Kn<nvledge, or bring it in Doubt. Rut in Matters of Pro- 
 bability, 'tis not in cvtiy Cafe wc can be fure that we have 
 all the Paiticulars before us, that any way concern the 
 Qiicdion ; and that thc'c is no Evidence behind, and yet 
 unicen, wiiich may eaif the Probability on the other fide, 
 and out- weigh all that at prefcnt f:cins to preponderate 
 With U5. Wiio alniolt is there that hv^ih the Lcifiire, Pa- 
 tience, 
 
'Degrees of AJfent, 279 
 
 tience, and Means to colle6l together all the Proofs concern- 
 ing moft of the Opinions he has, fo as fafely to conclude, 
 that he hath a clear and full View, and that there is no more 
 to he alledg'd for hi? better Information ? And. yet we are 
 forc'd to determine our ielves on the or.e Side or other. The 
 Condud of cur Lives, and the Manajienient of our great 
 Concern?, will not bear Delay ; for thofe depend, for the 
 mod part, on the Determination of our Judgment in Points 
 wherein we are not capable of certain and demonftrative 
 Knowledge, and wherein it is neceflary for us to embrace the 
 one Side, or the other. 
 
 §. 4. Since therefore it is unavoidable to the 
 greateli part of Men, if not all, to have leve- The right Ufe 
 ral Opinions, without certain and induhitab'e of it, 7?muMl 
 Proofs of their Truths ; and it carries too great Charity mid 
 an Imputation of Ignorance, Lightnefs, or Porhearance,^ 
 Folly, for Men to quit and renounce their for- 
 mer Tenets prelently upon the Ofter of an Argu.nent which 
 they cginnot immediately anfwer, and Hu'w the InluTiciency 
 of ; it would methinks become all Men to maintain Peaccy 
 and the common Offices of Humanity itnd Friend/hip^ in the 
 Biverfuy of Opinions. ^mcQ we cannot reaibnably expe6l, that 
 any one fhould readily and obfequiouily quit his own Opini- 
 on, and embrace ours with a blind Rv;fignation to an Au- 
 thority which the Undcrrtandiur; of Man acknowledges not. 
 For however it may often miftake, it can own no other 
 Guide but Reafon, nor blindly fubmit to the Will and Di- 
 ctates of another. If he you would bring over to your Sen^- 
 timents, be one that examines before he ailents, you mult 
 give him Leave at his Leifure to go over the Account again, 
 and recalling what is out of his Mind, examine all the Par- 
 ticulars, to fee on which fide the Advantage lies ; and if he 
 will not think our Arguments of Weight enough to f ngage 
 him anew in io much Pains, 'tis but what we do often 
 our felves in the like Cafe ; and we fhould take it amifs, if 
 others Ihou'd prefcribe to us what Points we fhould fludy r 
 And if he be one who takes his Opinions upon Trull-, how 
 can we imagine that he fhould renounce thole Tenets which 
 Time and Cuftora have fo fettl'd in his Mind, that hejhinks 
 them felf-evident, and of an unqueftionable Certainty; or 
 which he takes to be Impredlons he li^s receiv'd from GOD 
 himfelfjOr from Men fent by him ? How can we expec^,l fay, 
 that Opinions thus jfetirdj lliould be given up to the Argu- 
 
 4iicnts 
 
2 go Degrees of Ajfent. 
 
 incnts of Autliority of a Stranger or Adverfary, efpecially if 
 there be any Sufpicion of Intercft or Defign, as there never 
 fails to be where Men find theinfclvcs ill treated ? Wefhould 
 do well to coinmifcratc our mutual I,c,ncrancc, and endea- 
 vour to remove it in all the gentle and fair Ways of Infor- 
 mation, and not inftantly treat others ill, as oblHnate and 
 pcivcric, becaufc they will not renounce their own, and re- 
 ceive our Opinion?, or at leall ihofc we would force upon 
 tliem, when 'tis more than probable th.t we are no lefs ob- 
 ftinatc in not embracing fome of theirs. For where is the 
 Man that has uncontelhble Evidence of the Truth of all that 
 he hold?, or of the Fallhood of r.U he condems ; or can lay, 
 that he has examined, to the Bottom, all his own, or other 
 Mens Opinions ? The NccelHty of believing without Know- 
 ledge, nay,ofttn upon very flight Grounds,in this fleeting State 
 of Adion and Blindnefs we are in, lliould make us more bufy 
 and careful to inform our felve?, than conil^rain others ; at 
 lead thole who have not throughly exanin'd to the;; Bottom 
 all their own Tenets, mull confcis they are unfit to prelcribe 
 to others, and nre umcafouable in impofrngthat as Truth on 
 other Mens Belief, which they themfehes have not Icarch'd 
 into, nor weighcL the Arguments of Probability on which 
 tiicy lliould receive or rejeit it. Thofe who liave fairly and 
 truly exaiuin d, and are thereby got part Doubt, in all the 
 Doilrincs ihey profels, and govern themfclves by, would have 
 a Julter Pretence to require others to follow them : But thefe 
 ai"e lo few in Number, and find fo litttle Reafon to be ma- 
 girterial in ihcir Opinions, that nothing infolcnt and impe- 
 rious is 10 be expected from them ; and there is Reafon to 
 tliink, that if Men were better inftruc^cd themfclres, they 
 would be lefs impolingon others. 
 
 §. <^. But to return to tl c Grounds of Af- 
 Pvok-ihility is fent, and the feveral Degrees of it, we are to 
 fUherofM.it- ^^l^^ Notice, that the Propofitions we receive 
 ar of F^Ui , or ^^^qy\ Inducements of Probability^ are of two 
 sj'ecuhti'ii. ^oris^ either concerning fome particular Exi- 
 rtence, or, as it is iifually tcrm'd, Matter of 
 PaiV, which falling under Obllrvaiion, is capable of human 
 TefHuimn-^ or cHe concerning Things, which being beyond 
 the DiFo\ cry ot oiir Sculcs, arc not capable of any fuch Tc- 
 
 Jh^iiony. 
 
 S.6. Con- 
 
Degrees of ^Jfent. 28 1 
 
 §. 6. Concerning the ^r/ of" thefe, viz.. par- 
 timlar Mmer of F^a, The comvr- 
 
 Firfi, Where any particular Thing, confo- ''^"^ ^^'^5?*" 
 nant to the conftant Obfervation oF our (elves ''j'^'. ],l„l.% 
 and others, in the like Cafe, comes altered by p^',,.^^ trodvcn 
 the concurrent Reports of all that mention it, jfumnce ap- 
 we receive it as ealily, and build as firmly up- pro.uhhix (» 
 on it, as if it were certain Knowledge; and Knowledge. 
 we reafon and a6l thereupon with as little 
 Doubt, as if it were perfeCl: Demonllrtion. Tl.u?, if all 
 Englijh-Mtn, who have occafion to mention it, fjiould af- 
 firm, that it froze in England ti.e laft Winter, or that there 
 were Swallows feen there in the Summer, I think a Man 
 could almoft as little doubt of ir, ?s that ieven and four are 
 eleven. The firft therefore, and lighfl- Decree of Probdilitj^ 
 is, when the general Conlent of all Men, in all Ages, as far 
 as it can be known, concurs with a Man's conftant and ne- 
 ver-failing Experience in like Cafes, to confinn the Truth of 
 any particular Matter of Fa6t attefted by fair Witneffes ; 
 fuch are all the liaied Conftitutions ?nd Properties of Bo- 
 dies, and the regular Proceedings of Ciufes and Effefls in 
 the ordinary Courfe of Nature. This we call an Argument 
 from the Nature of Things themfelves : For what our own 
 and other Mens conftant Obfervation has found always to 
 be after the fame Manner, that we with Reafon conclude to 
 1:e the Effe6ls of fteady and regular Caufcs, though they come 
 not within the Reach of our Knowledge. Th.us that Fire 
 warm'd a Man, made Lead fluid, and changed the Colour 
 or Confifl^ency in Wood or Charcoal; that Iron funk in Wa- 
 ter, and fwam in Qiiickfilver. Thefe, and the like Propo- 
 fitions about paiticular Fa(5ls, being agreeable to ourconftant 
 Experience, as often as we have to do with thefe Matters, 
 and being generally fpoke of, (when mention'd by others) as 
 Things found conftantly to be fo, and therefore not fomuch 
 as controverted by any Body, we are put paft Doubt, that a 
 Relation affirming any fuch Thing to have been, or any Pre- 
 dication that it will happen egainin the fame Manner, is ve- 
 ry true. Thefe Trohahilities rife fo near to Ctrtaintj, that they 
 govern our Thoughts as abfolutcly,and iufluence ail our Ani- 
 ons ?s fully, as the nioft evident Demonfl-ration ; and in 
 what concerns U!=, \ve make little or no Diflereiice between 
 them and certain Knowledge. Our Belief thu? ^rounded^ ri- 
 fes to ^jjiirancw 
 
?82 Degrees of Affent, 
 
 VuquejllonMe • ^' T Scconjlh p^ next Degree o^ Prchalilhy 
 T.fthnony ani ^^ ^v''^'' ' ""^* PY '"V ^^^'^ Experience, and 
 Experiencefor the Aprccmcnt of all ot'crs that mention it, 
 the moft P.-rt ^ ThJno; to be for the moll part To j and that 
 produce Covfi- the p.irticul .r Inlbncc of it is aitcrttJ by ma- 
 ^ence. ny and undoul ted Witncflcs, v. g, Hirtory 
 
 giving us liich an Account or M^n in all A- 
 ges, and my own Experience, as far as I had an Opportuni- 
 ty to obfervc, confirming it r!,:it mo(l: Men prefer their pri- 
 vate Advantage, to the publi*. >.. If all Hiliorians that write 
 cfTiberin-s^ fay that Tiberius <\.\ fo, it is cxtreamly piobable. 
 And in this Cafe, our Allent has a luffici.nt Foundation to 
 raife it lelf to a Degree which we may call Confidence^ 
 
 §. 8. Thirdly^ In Tltingf^ that happen iiidif- 
 F.vr Teflhno- ^cf^ritlv, as that a Bird fnould fly this or that 
 ny, md the Way, that it (hould thunder on a Man s right 
 h'.ntuile of the or left Hand, CS'c. when any particular Mat- 
 Thhj'j hidiffc- terof Fdctis vouched by the concurrent Te- 
 rent, frodu- flimony of unfufpcried Witncfles, there our 
 *cs alfo covfi- AITent is alio unavridable. Thus, that 
 (tent Belief. tj^^rc is fuch a City in It.'.Iy as Ron:e ; that a- 
 
 bout 1700 Years ago, there liv'd in it a Man 
 call'd Juliiu C^Jar • that he w^asa General, and that he won 
 a Battel againii another call'd Pompcy : This, though in the 
 Nature of the Thing there be nothing for nor againft it, yet 
 being related by Hiftorians o[' Credit, and contradicted by 
 no one Writer, a Man cannot avoid believing it, andean as 
 little doubt of it, as he does of the Being anlAdions of his 
 own Acquaintance, whereof he himtelf is a Witnefs. 
 
 §. p. Thus far the Matter goes tafy enough. 
 Eotferier.ce Piobability upon (uch Ground-^ carries lo much 
 find Tejliim- Evidence with it, that it nainrally determines 
 ■nh's clrijhing, the judgment, and leaves us as htile Liberty 
 infinitely vary to believe or disbelieve, as a Deir,on(tration 
 ihe Decrees of does, whether we will know or be ignoiant. 
 Prohahility. Tj,e Diihculty is, when Teftimonics^ contra- 
 
 diil common Experience, and the Reports of 
 Hiftory and Witnefi"cs,clani with tlic ordinary Courlc of Na- 
 ture, or with one another; there it is, where Diligence, At- 
 tention, and ExaCtnels is rcquir'd to form a right ]uigmenr, 
 and to proportion the ^'ijjcrn to the dirterent Evidence and 
 Probability of the Thing, which rifcs and falls according as 
 thofc two Foundations of Credibility, viz. Common Obfcr- 
 
 vaiiosji 
 
Degrees of Ajfent. '35.5 
 
 vation in like Cafes, and particu'ar Teftimonies in that par- 
 ticular Inftancc, favour oi: conliMdidl: it. Thefe are liable tt) 
 fo great Variety of contra'ry Oblevvations, Circum(tances, 
 Reports, different Qiialifications, TeiiiperF, Defigns, Ov€p- 
 fights, &c. of the Reporter?, thnt 'tis impofllble to reduce to 
 precile Rules, the various Decrees wherein Men give their 
 Affent. This only maybe fail in general, tl:at astheArgu- 
 'ihients and Proofs, pro and co», upon due Examination, nice- 
 ly weighing every particular Circumftance, fhall to any one 
 appear, upon the whole Matter, in a greiter or lefs Degree, 
 to preponderate on either Side, fo they are fitted to produce 
 in the Mind fuch different Entertainment, as we call Belicfy 
 Conje^ptre, Guefs, Douht, Wavering, Dijlrujl^ Disbelief , &c. 
 
 §. 10. This is what concerns ^Iffera in Mat- 
 ters where Teftimony is made Ufe of; con- Tyadiihnal 
 ccrning which, I think it may not be amifs TeJl%iomei, 
 to take Notice of a Rule obferv'd in the Law the farther rt- 
 of England, which is, that though the attefled ^>ov\i, the lefs 
 Copy of a Record be good Proof, yet the ^^'^^>- P'M- 
 Copy of a Copy never fo well attefied, and by 
 never fo credible Witnefies, w^ill not be admitted as a Proof ^ 
 in Judicature. This is fo generally approved as reafonable, 
 and fuited to the VVifiom and Caution to be us'd in our En- 
 quiry after material Truths, that I never yet heard of any one 
 that blam'd it. This Pradice, if it be allowable in the De- 
 cifions of Right and Wrong, carries this Obfervation along 
 with it, viz. That any Teftimony, the farther oft it is from 
 the original Truth, the lefs Force and Proof it has. The Be- 
 ing and Exiftence of the Thing it felf, is what I call the ori- 
 ginal Truth. A credible Man vouching his Knowledge of 
 it, is a good Proof : But if another equally credible do wit- 
 nefs it from his Report, the TeHimony is weaker ; and a 
 third that atteflsthe Hear-lay of an Hear-fay, is yet lefs con- 
 fiderable. So that in traditional Trmhs, each Removt weakens the 
 Force of the Proof ; and the more Hands the Tradition has fuc- 
 ceflfively pafs'd through, the lefs Strength and Evidence does 
 it receive from them. This I thought neceffary to be taken 
 Notice of, becaufe I find amongft fome Men the quite con- 
 trary commonly pra61is'd, w^ho look on Opinions to gain 
 Force by growing older ; and wliat a thouland Years iincc 
 would not, to a rational Man, contemporary with the firft 
 Voucher, haveapnear'd at all probable, is now urg'd as cer- 
 tain beyond all Quertion. only bgcaufe fevaal have fincc, 
 
 from 
 
284 Degrees of Affent, 
 
 from l)im, faid it one after another. Upon this ground Pro- 
 pofitions, evidently falle or doulnful enough in their Hift 
 beginning, come by an inverted Rule or Probability, to paft 
 for authentick Truths ; and thofe which fntnd or deferv'd 
 little Credit from the Mouths of their fir(^ Authors, are 
 thought to grow venerable by Age, and are urg'd as unde- 
 niable. 
 
 §. II. I would not be thought liCre to leflen 
 let Hiflory thc Credit and Ule of Hijiory : 'Tis all the 
 ii of great Ufe. Light we have in many Caies; and we receive 
 from it a great part of the ufcful Truths w'e 
 bavc, with a convincing Evidence. I think nothing more 
 valuable than the Records of Antiquity : I wifli wc had 
 more of them, and more uncorrupted. But this Truth it 
 felf forces me to fay, That no Prol ability can arifc higher than 
 its firll Original. What has no other Evider.ce than the fin- 
 gle Tefiimoiiy of one only Witncfs, muft (tand or fall by 
 Iiis only Teftunony, whether good, bad, or inditlerent j and 
 tho' cited afterwards by Hundreds of others, one after ano- 
 ther, is fo far from receiving any Strength thereby, that it is 
 only the weaker. Pafhon, Intcrel^, Inadvertency, MiRakc 
 of his Meaning, and a thoufand odd Reafons or Capricio's, 
 Mens Minds are adted by, (impoflTible to be dilcover'd) may 
 make one Man quote another Man's Words or Meaning 
 wrong. He that has but ever io little examined thc Citations 
 of Writers, cannot doubt how little Credit thc Quotations 
 dcferve, where the Originals are wanting ; and conl'equent- 
 ly how much lefs Quotations of Quotations can be rely'd on. 
 Ihis is certain, that what in one Age wasafHrm'd upon (light 
 Grounds, can never after come to be more valid in future 
 Ages, by being often repeated. But the farther (till it is from 
 thc Original, the lefs valid it is, and has always Ids Force in 
 rtie Mouth or Writing of him that hi\ made ule of it, tiian 
 in his from whom he recciv'd it. 
 
 §. 12. The Probabilities wc have hitherto 
 t'^'S^o"'^' mention'd, are only fuch as concern Matter of 
 ca d-r ^^^^' ^"'^ ^"'^^^ 1\^\n^^ as are capable of Ob- 
 '^ver*'^^ Anilo' ^•^'■^'^^•^'^ '^"'^ Tcftimony. There remains that 
 71 \hc \re^t f^t'^^r fort concerning vvh:ch Men entertain 
 Rxileofrioha- Opinions with Variety of Afltnt, though the 
 tility. Tki)igs be fucii, that jailing nut under tl:e Reach 
 
 of our Scups, ti:ey ere no: capable of Teftitr.ony. 
 Such arc, i. The EsilUi.cc, Nature, and Operations of finite 
 
 jmmiterial 
 
T>e£^ rees of Jffait. 285 
 
 immaterial Beings without us ; as Spirit?, Angels, Devils, 
 &c^ or the Exiftence of material Beings j which either 
 for their Smallnefs in themfelve?, or Remotenefs from us, 
 our Senfes cannot take Notice of, as whether there be any 
 Plants, Animals, and intelligent Inhabitants in the Planets, 
 and other Manfions of the vaft Univerfe. 2. Concerning 
 the manner of Operation in moft parts of the Works of Na- 
 ture J wherein, tho' we fee the fenfible Eftedls, yet their Cau- 
 fes are unknown, and we perceive not the Ways and Man- 
 ner how they are produced. We fee Animals are generated, 
 nourifli'd, and move ; the Load-done draws Iron ; and ihe 
 parts of a Candle luccelTively melting, turn into Flame, and 
 give us both Light and Heat. Thele and the like Eftcd-s we 
 ifee and know; but the Caufes that operate, and the Man- 
 ner they are produc'd in, we can only guefs, and pro- 
 bably conjecture. For thcfe, and the like, coming net 
 within the Scrutiny of human Senfes, cannot be examin'd by 
 them, or be attefted by any Body, and therefore can appear 
 more or lefs probable, only as they" more or lefs agree to 
 Truths that are eftablilli'd in our Minds, and as they hold 
 Proportion to other parts of our Knowledge and Ohlervati- 
 on. Aialogy in thefe Matters, is the only Help we have, and 
 'tis from that alone we draw all our GrounJs of Frot)alility. 
 Thus obferving that the bare Rubbing of two Bodies vio- 
 lently one upon another, produces Heat, and very often 
 Fire it felf, we haveReafbn to think, that whar we call Heat 
 and Fire, confilts in a violent Agitation of the imperceptible 
 minute Parts of the burning Matter : Obferving likewile 
 that the different Refra6tions of pellucid Bodies produce in 
 our Eyes the different Appearances of Itveral Colours j and 
 alfo that the different ranging and laying the fuperficial 
 Parts of feveral Bodies, as of Velvet, watered Silk, &c, 
 does the like, we think it probable that the Colour and Shi- 
 ning of Bodies, is in them nothing but the different Arange- 
 ment and Refraction of their minute and infenfible Parts. 
 Thus finding in all parts of the Creation, that fall under 
 human Obfervation, that there is a gradual Connexion of one 
 with another, without any great or difcernable Gaps between, 
 in all tliat great Variety of Things we fee in the W^orld, 
 which are lo clofely link'd together, that, in the feveral Ranks 
 ot Beings, it is not eafy to dilcover the Bounds betwixt them, 
 we have Reafon to be perfwaded, that by fuch gentle Step?, 
 Things albend upwards in Degrees of Perfection. Tis an 
 
 U hard 
 
286 ' Degrees of Affait. 
 
 liar J Matter to fay where Scnfible and Rational begin, and 
 where Inlenliblc and Irrational end : Aiid wlio is there 
 quick- figlitcd enough to determine precirdy, which is the 
 lowed Species of living Things, and which the firft of thofc 
 which have no Life r Things, as far as we c.ui ol lerve, Icfleii 
 and augment as the Qinntity does in a regular Cone, 
 where, tho' there be a manifel-l: Odds betwixt the Bignefs of 
 the Diameter at remote Diliance, yet the Diticrcnce between 
 the upper and under, where they tciich one anotl er, is hard- 
 ly difccinable. The Difference is exceeding great between 
 Ibmc Men, and lome Animals ; but if we will compare the 
 Underllanding and Abilities of fome Men, and feme Brutef, 
 we l>iall find lo little Difference, that 'twill be hard to fay, 
 that th.it of the Man is either clearer or larger. Obferving, 
 1 fay, inch gradual and gentle Deicents downwards in thofe 
 Parts of the Cre.'tion that are beneath Man, the Rule of A- 
 i.alogy may make it probable, that it is lb alfo in Things 
 above us, and our Oblcivatiouj and that there are feveral 
 Ranks of intelligent Beings, excelling us in feveral Degrees 
 of Peifedlion, afcending upwards towards the infinite Per- 
 fei^ion of the Creator, by gentle Steps and Difterences, that 
 are every one at no great DiRance from the next to it. This 
 iort of Probability, which is the belt Conduct of rational 
 Experiments, and the Rife of Hypothefis, has alio its Ufc 
 and Influence; and a wary Reafoning from Analogy, leads 
 us often into the Difcovery of Truths, and ufeful Produdi- 
 ons, which would otherwiie lie conceal'd. 
 
 §. 12;. Tl,o' the common Experience, and 
 One Cafe the ordinary Courfe of Things, have juflly a 
 mtheve contra- mighty Influence on the Minds of Men, to 
 iy Expo knee make ihcm give or refufe Credit to any Thiijg 
 lejfcvs not the propos'd to their Belief; y^et there is one Cale 
 Tejlmony. wherein the xStnngenels of the Fact leffcns not 
 
 the Aflent to a fair TelHmony given of it. For 
 where fuch fupernatural Events are fuitable to Ends aim'd at 
 by him, who has ihc Power to change the Courfe of Nature, 
 thrre, under fuch Circumftanccs, they may be the filter to 
 procure Belief, by how much the more they are beyond, or 
 contrary to ordinary 0.-i(:ivatio!.. This is the proper Cak of 
 Miracles, which, well attcftcd, do not only find Credit 
 th(mklves, hut give it alio to ot[:er Truthi^, wliich need 
 luch Contirmaiion. 
 
 §. 1^ Re- 
 
Degrees of Ajfent, 287 
 
 §. 14. Bcfides thofe we have hitherto meh- 
 tion'd, there is one fort of Propofitions that The lave 
 challenge the highelt Degree of our Affent, Tejlhnony of 
 upon bare TelHinony, whether the Thing pro- -^evelnthji, is 
 pos'd, agree or dilagree with common Experi- ^J^'^ Jj\9:hijl 
 ence, and the ordinary Courfe of Things, or ^'^''^'^"'O'- 
 no. The Reafon whereof is, becaufe the Tefti- 
 mony is of fuch an one as cannot deceive, nor be deceiv'd, 
 and that is of God himfelf* This carries with it Afiuiance 
 beyond Doubt, Evidence beyond Exception. This is call'd 
 by a peculiar Name, Revelation^ and our Aflcnt to it, Faith: 
 Which as abfolutely determines ouv Minds, and as perfe<ftly 
 excludes all wavering, as our Knowldlge it felf ; and we 
 may as well doubt of our own Being, as we can, whether a- 
 ny Revelation from God be true. So that Faith is a fettl'd 
 and fure Principle of Affent and Aflurance, and leaves no 
 maimer of room for Doubt or Hefifation. Only we mult 
 be fure, that it be a dix-ine Revelation, and that we under- 
 ftand it right; elfe we lliall expofe our felvcsto all the Extra- 
 vagancy of Enthufiafm, and all the Error of wrong Princi- 
 ples, if we have Faith and Aflurance in what is not divine 
 Revelation. And therefore, in thofe Cafes, our Affent can 
 be rationally no higher than the Evidence of its being a 
 Revelation, and that this is the Meaning of the ExprefTions 
 it is deliver'd in. If the Evidence of its being a Revelation, 
 or that this its true Senfe, be only on probable Proofs, our 
 Affent can reach no higher than an Affurance or Diffidence^ 
 arifing from the more or leis apparent Probability of the 
 Proofs. But of Faith, and the Precedency it ought to have 
 before other Arguments of Perfvvafion, I iViall fpeak more 
 hereafter, where I treat of it as it is ordinarily plac'd, in 
 Contradiftin(ftion to Reafon • tho', in Truth, it be nothing 
 elle but an Affent founded on the higheft Reafon. 
 
 U 2 CHAP 
 
288 Reajon. 
 
 C H A P. XVII. 
 
 Of Reafm. 
 
 7^,n'ious Si^- §. I. ' I ^ HE IVcrd Reafon in the Englijl? 
 vific.itiovs of j|^ Laiipuaec, his different SignificMi- 
 
 *a^ r^'^'^ or/j ; Soiiuiimcs it is taken for true and clear 
 Kcafun. Principles; lomttinies for clear and fair Dc- 
 
 diid^ious from thole Principles \ and fometimes 
 for the Caufe, and particularly the fin.il Caule. But the 
 Confideration I ihall have of it here, is in a Signification 
 different from all thefc ; and that is, as it (lands for a Fa- 
 culty in Man. That Faculty, whereby Man is fuppos'd to 
 bedirtingiulli'd from Bcalis, and wherein it is evident he 
 much furpafles thein. 
 
 '§. 2. If general Knc\\ ledge, as Ii-sbeen 
 V'herehi fhewn, coiihlis in a Perception of the Agree- 
 Rcifonirt^ ment or Difagrecment of our owu Ideoi. and 
 
 covjijii. the Knowledge of the Exillence of all Things 
 
 without us, (except only of aGod, whole Exi- 
 gence every Maninaycrtauily knovvaiiddcmonllratetohimfelf 
 from his own Exi(icncc) be had only by our Senfes. What 
 Room then is there for the Excrciic of any other Faculty, but 
 outward Senfc, and inward Perception ? W hat Need is 
 there of Realon ? Very much ; both for the Enlargement 
 of our Knowledge, and regulating our Aflent : For it hath 
 te do both in Knou ledge and Opin'on, and i^ necclTary and 
 afliliing t ^ all our other intellectual Facu'ties, and indeed, 
 contains two of them, viz,. Sagacity and Illation. By the one, 
 it finds out, and by tlie other, it fo orders the intcrniediate 
 Jdeat., as to difcover what Connexion there is in each Link of 
 the Chain, whereby the Extrcams are held together ; and 
 thereby, as it were, to draw into Vic^v the Truth foucht 
 for, which is that we call li'iMi'.n or Inference^ and confifts in 
 nothing but the Perception of the Connexion there is between 
 \\\c Idc.ti in each Step of the Dcdudion, whereby the Mind 
 comes to lee cither the certain Agreement or Difagrcement 
 of any two Liafj as in Dcmonrtraiion, in which it airives at 
 
 Know- 
 
Reafon, 289 
 
 Knowledge j or their probable Connexion, on wUich it gives 
 or with-holds its Aflent, as in Opinion. Senfe and Intui- 
 tion reach but a v^ery little nay. The greatert Part of out 
 "Knowledge, depends upon Deductions and intermediate Ide- 
 04 : And in thofe Cales, whaewe are fain to fubftitute Af- 
 fent inftead of Knowledge, and take Propofitions for true, 
 without being certain tliey are 'io^ wchave Need to find out, 
 examine, and compare the Grounds of tiieir Probability. la 
 both thefe Cafes, the Faculty, which finds out the Means, 
 and rightly applies them to dilcover Certainty in the one, 
 and Probability in the other, is that which we call Rcalon- 
 For as Reafon perceives the neceflary and indubitable Con- 
 nexion of all the UeAs or Proofs one to anotiier, in each Siep 
 of any Demonflration tliat produces Knowledge; foit like- 
 wife perceives the probable Connexion of all the Uea^ or 
 Proofs one to aioothcr, in every Step of a Difcomfe to which 
 it will think Aflent due. This is the lowelt Degree of that 
 which can be truly calfd llealon. For where the Mind 4oes 
 not perceive this probable Connexion ; where it Joes not 
 difcern wliether there be any fuch Connexion or no, there 
 Mens Opinions are not the Produit of judgment, or the 
 Conlequence of Reafon, but the Effedts of Chance and Ha- 
 zard of a Mind floating at all Adventures, without Choice, 
 and without DiredHon, 
 
 §. 3. Scthatwemay in Reajon confider thefe 
 jmr Degrees ; the fir(l: and highefi, is the dif- Its four 
 covering and finding out of Proofs ; the fe- Parts. 
 cond, the regular and methodical Difpofition 
 of them, and laying them in a clear and fit Order, to make 
 their Connexion and Force be plainly and eafily perceiv'd ; 
 the third is the perceiving their Connexion ; and the fourth, 
 as making a right ConcIuGon. Thefe levera I Degrees may 
 be oblerv'd in any mathematical Demoniirition : It being 
 one Thing 10 perceive the Connexion o^ each Part, as the 
 pemonftration is made by another j another to perceive the 
 Dependence of the Conclufion on all the Parts 5 a third to 
 make out a Demonflration clearly and neatly one's felf ; and 
 fomething different from all thefe, to have firrt found out 
 thofe intermediate Idem or Proofs by which it is made. 
 
 U 3 §. 4, Tiicrc 
 
3 ^o Reafon. 
 
 ^. 4. There is one Thing more, which I 
 S-.'Hoi-ifm '^^'^ (Jcfirc to be confidcr'd concerning Rca- 
 v^uhe ^re.if l*"^'! ' ^"^ that is. Whether Syllocifw^ as is ge- 
 fnflium'iint of ncrally thought, be the proper liillrument of 
 Reafon. it, and theiircfullcd Way of cxercifing this Fa- 
 
 culty. T! c Caufts 1 have to cfoubt, are ihefe; 
 
 F;V;?, Bt-caule Syllngihn Icrvcs cur Realbn but in one on- 
 ly ofthe forc-intntion'd Parts of it ; and that is, to iliew 
 the CoiincNion of ilie Prrof? in any one Inftance, and no 
 :norc ; but in this it is of no great Ulc, fince the Mind can 
 perceive liich Conntxi'on wlicre it really is, aseafily, nay, 
 jcrhaps, better without it. 
 
 If we will oblerve tlie Actings of cur own Minds, we 
 il'all find that we renfon Vt[\ ard clearcl^, when we only 
 oblerve the Connexion of the Proof, witl cut reducing 
 our Thoughts to any Rule of Syllogifm. And therefore we 
 may take Notice, that there are many Men that reafon ex- 
 ccc iing clear and rightly, who know not how to make a 
 Syllogifm. He that will look into many Parts of y^fia and 
 .^yinjiri'ii, will find Men rcalon there, perhaps, as acutely as 
 himielf.who yet nevcryet heard of a Syllogifm,ror can reduce 
 any one Argument to tl ofe Forms : And 1 believe Icarce any 
 one ever makes Syliogifms in reafnning within himfclf Indeed 
 Syllogifm is made iiie of on Occafjon to difcover a Fallacy 
 hid in a r! ctorical Flourifh, or cunningly wrapp'd up in a 
 imooth Period ; and Gripping an Abfurdityof the Cover of 
 Wit and good Language, fhew it in its naked Deformity. 
 But the VVcaknefs or Fallacy of fuch a loofe Difcourfc, it 
 iliews, by the artificial Form it is put into, only to thofe 
 wl-,o have throughly (Hidy'd Aicde md Fi(r»re, and have fo 
 examin'd the many Ways that tlirec Propohtions may be put 
 together, as to know which of them does certainly conclude 
 right, and which not, and upon what Grounds it is that 
 they do fo. All who have {0 far confider'd Syllogifm, 
 «stofee the Reafon why, in three Propofitions laid together 
 jn one Form, the Conclufion will be certainly right ; but in 
 anothw not ctriainly lb, I grant are certain of the Conclu- 
 fion they draw from tiic Premiiles in the allow 'd Abodes a.nd 
 Ftguns. But ihcy who have not lb far look 'd intothofe Forms, 
 are not lure,by Virtue of Syllogifm, that the Conclufion cer- 
 tainly follows from the PremilTcs : They only take it to be 
 lo by an implicit Faith in their Teachers, and a Confidence 
 ^n thole Forms cf Argumentation • but this is fiill butbe- 
 '" ' ' ' Jieving; 
 
Reafon. 291 
 
 lieving, not beins; certain. Now, if of all Mankyid, thofe 
 whocanmake Syllogifms, are extreamly tew in Compirifon 
 of thofe who cannot, and if of thole kw who have been taught 
 Logick, there, is but a very fmall Number wlio do any more 
 than behevethat Syllogifms in the allow 'd Moda and Figures 
 do conclude right, without knowing certainly that they do 
 lb. If Syliogiliiis mu(f be taken for the only proper Inliru- 
 ment of Reafon and Means of Knowledge, it will follow, 
 that before Arijiotk there was not one Man that did, or could 
 know any Thing by Reafon ; and that fince the Invention 
 of Syllogifms, there is not one of ten thoufand that doth. 
 
 But God has not been ^o Ip uing to Men, to make them 
 barely two-legg'd Creature?, and left it to Arilhtlc to make 
 them rational, /. e. tliole few of them that he could get fo to 
 examine the Grounds of SyHogilln?, as to fee, that in above 
 threefcore Ways, that three Propofitions may be laid together, 
 there are but about fourteen wherein one may be fure that 
 the Conclufion fs right, ?nd upon what Ground it is, that 
 inthefefew the Conclufion is certain, and in the other not. 
 God has been more bountiful to Mankind than fb : He has 
 given them a Mind that can reafon without being inftru6led 
 in Methods of Syllogizing: The Undcrlianding is not taught 
 to reafon by thefe Rules ; it has a native Faculty to perceive 
 the Coherence or Incoherence of its lleas^^ and can range 
 them right,without any liich perplexing Repetitions. I fay not 
 this any way to leffen Arijiotk^ whom 1 look on asone of the 
 gre.itcft Menamongftthe Ancients; whole large Views, Acute- 
 nefs, and Penetration of Thought and Strenght of judgment, 
 few haveequall'd : And who in this ver/ Invention of Forms 
 of Argumentation, wherein the Conclullon may belliewnto 
 be rightly inferred, did great Service agai nit thofe who were 
 not alliauVd to deny any Thins. And I readily own, that 
 all right Realbning may be reduc'd tc his Forms of Syllo- 
 gifra. But yet T think, without any Diminution to him, I 
 may truly lay, that they are not the only, nor the bert Way 
 ofReafoning, for the leading of thofe into Truth who are 
 willing to find it, and defire to make the beR Ufe they may 
 of their Reafon, for the Attaintment of their Knowledge. 
 And he himfelf, it is plain, found out lome Forms to be 
 conclufive, and others not, not by the Forms themfelves, 
 but by the original Way of Knowledge, /. e. by the vifible 
 Agreement of Idetu, Tell a Country Gentlewoman, that 
 the Wind is South-Weft, and the Weather lourine, and like 
 
 U 4 ''to 
 
^92 lienfon, 
 
 to Raiiv, and llie will cafily undcrRand, lis not fafe for lier 
 to f,o Abtoad liiln OkI, in fuch a Day, after a Fever : 
 She clearly Ices the probable Connexion of all thcfe, viz., 
 South-We!^ Wind, and Cloud?, Rain, Wetting, taking 
 Cold, Rclapfc, and Danger of Death, without tying them 
 together in thofc artificial and cumbcrfome Fetters of feveral 
 Syllo^ijr^js, that clog and hinder the Mind, which proceeds 
 frcm one part to nnoihcr quicker and clearer without them: 
 And the Probability which ("he eafily perceive? in Things 
 thus in their native State, would be quite loft, if this Argu- 
 ment were managed learnedly, and propos'd in Mode and 
 Figure. For it very often confounds the Connexion : And, 
 1 think, every one will perceive in Mathematical Demon- 
 fhations, that the Knowlelgc gain'd thereby, comes lliorteft 
 and cleareft without SyH^rJfm. 
 
 InRrence is look'd on as the great AS: of tlx rational Fa- 
 culty, and fo it is, wiien it is rightly made; but the Mind, 
 either very defirous to enlarge its Knowledge, or very apt to 
 favour the Sentiments it has once imbib'd, is very forward 
 to make Inferences, and theicfore often makes too much 
 bafte, before it perceive? the Connexion of the Ideas thatmuft 
 h( U the Extrcams together. 
 
 To infer, is nothing but by Virtue of one Fropofition laid 
 dow'n as true, to draw in another as true, /. e. to fee or 
 fuppofe iiich a Connexion of the two Ideas of the inferr'd 
 l-'ropolition. V. g. Let this be the Fropofition laid down, 
 Men pjall he j)mi[Hd in another Worlds and from thence be 
 inferr'd this other, Then Men c^m determine thernfelves. The 
 Qiiefifon now is to kncw^ whetlier the Mind has made this 
 Inference right, or no ; if it has made ir, by finding out the 
 intermediate LicM^ and taking a View of the Connexion of 
 them, plac'd in a due Order, it has proceeded rationally, 
 an 1 made a right Inference. If it has done it without luch 
 a View, it has not io much made an Inference that will 
 hold, or an Inference of right Reafon, asfhewn a Willingnefs 
 to have it be, or be taken for luch. But in neither Cafe is it 
 Sy'logifm, that dilcover'd th.ole Ueof, or fliew.'d the Connexion 
 ot tt;em, for they muli be both found out, and the Con- 
 nexion every where perceiv'd, before they can rationally be 
 in:ide Ulc of in Syllo^ifm ; unlefs it can be faid, that any 
 lUaj witliout confidering what Connexion it hath with the 
 two other, wliole Agreement Oiould be fhewn by it, will da 
 well enough in a Syfhgifm^ and may be taken at a venture for 
 
 the 
 
Reiffon. 29g 
 
 the Medius Terminus, to prove any Conclu~on. But this no 
 Body will fay, becaufe it is by Virtue of the perceiv'd A- 
 greement of the intermediate Idea, with ihe Extreams, that 
 Vhe Extreams are concluded to agree, and therefore ench in- 
 termediate Idea muft be fuch, as in the whole Chain hath a 
 vifible Connexion with thofe two it is plac'd between, ot 
 elfe thereby the Conclufion cannot be infcrr'd or drawn 
 in ; for where-ever any Link of the Chain is loofe, and 
 without Connexion, there the wliole Strength of it is loft, 
 and it hath no Force to infer or draw in any Thing, In the 
 Inftance abovc-mention'd, what is it Oiews the Force of the 
 Inference, and confcquently the Realbnablenefs of it, but a 
 View of the Connexion of all the intermediate Ideas that 
 draw in the Conclufion, or Propofition infcrr'd ; v. g. Men. 
 
 Jhall he pH^iflod,- God the Pmi/her, /;//? Punifprnenty 
 
 the Pttnijh'd gHilty^ co'Md kave done otl.cnvtje, Freedom, 
 
 Sdf-deterTrAnmon ; by which Chain o[ Ideas thus vifjbly link'd 
 together in Train, i. e. each intermediate Idea agreeing on 
 each fide with thofe two, it is immediately plac'd between, 
 the Ideas of Men and Sclf-determtnation appear to be con- 
 i"ie6led, i. e. this Propofition, Men can determine tf.erf;Jdves, is 
 drawn in, or inferr'd fiom this, that theyjlndl he pur-ipy'd m 
 the other World, For here the Mind feeing the Connexion 
 there is between the Idea of Mens Puni/lpKent in the other World^ 
 and the Idea of God punifhing : between God ptini(hing, and 
 the Jytfiice of the Ptinijlm^ent ; between Juflice of Pwiifhment and 
 Guilt ; between Gnilt and a Porter to do otherwije ; between a 
 Power to do othcrmfe and Free don?, and between Freedom and 
 Self-determnation, fees the Connexion between Men and Self- 
 determination, 
 
 Now, I ask, whctlier the Connexion of the Extreams be 
 not more clearly feen in this fimple and natural Dilpofition, 
 than in the perplex'd Repetitions, and Jumble of five or fix 
 Syllogijms f I muft beg Pardon for calling it Jumble, 'till 
 lome Body (liall put thefe Idcoi into fo many Sydogifms, and 
 then fay, that they are lefs ^umbl'd, and their Connexion 
 more vifible, when they are tranfpos'd and repeated, and 
 fpun out to a greater Length in artificial Forms, than in 
 that fhiort natural plain Order they are laid down in 
 here, wlierein every one may fee it ; and wherein they 
 muft be feen, before they can be put into a Train of Syllv 
 gijms. For the natural Order of the conneding Ideas, 
 muft dire6t the Order of the Sjthgifws, and a Man muft 
 ' . - ^^^ 
 
7 94 Reafoii. 
 
 fee ll)C Connexion cf cacli intcrmeJiLitc Idea with thofc that 
 it conncdls, before he can with Reafon make ule of it in a 
 Syllogijn;. And when all thofc Sylhgijn.s are made, neither 
 thole that arc, nor thole that are not Logician-, will fee the 
 Force of the Argumentation, ;. e. the Connexion of the Ex- 
 ITcnms one jot the better. [For thole that are not Men of 
 /rt, not knowing tlie true Forms of Syllogijn:, nor the Re:- 
 fons of them, cannot know whether they arc m:^dc in right 
 and conclufive Aiodes and Figures, or no, and lo arc not zx. 
 all help'd by the Forms they arc put into, though by tb.cm 
 the natural Order, wherein the Mind could judge of their 
 leipcctivc Connexion, being diflurb'd, renders the Illation 
 much more inccrtain than witi out them.] And as for Lo- 
 gicians thcmfclvts, they fee the C'nnexion of each intermedi- 
 ate ld:a with thofc it fhnus between, (on which the Force 
 ef the Inference depends) as we'l before as after the SjVo- 
 gifm is made, or cllc they do not fee it all. For a Sylkgijm 
 neither l>.eu^ nor ^lengthens the Connexion of any two /- 
 dtas immediately put together, but only by the Connexion 
 fecn in them, lliews what Connexion the Extreams have one 
 with anotb.ev. Put what Connexion the Intermediate has 
 f\'ith cither of the Extreams in \h^\. SyU<.giJn)^ that no Syllo- 
 gifm docs or can flxw. That the Mind only doth, or can 
 perceive as ihcy (land there in xhzt j'^.xta Poftion, only by its 
 own View, to which the Syllocinical Form it happens to be 
 in, gKcs no Help or Light at all ; it only fhcws, that if the 
 intermediate Idea agrees with thofc it is on both fides imme- 
 diately apply'd to, then thofe two remote ones, or as they 
 are call'd Extnan.s, do certainly agree, and therefore the in - 
 mediate Connexion of each Jdea to that which it is apply'd 
 to on e.ich fide, on which the Force of the Reafoning de- 
 pends, is ?s well leen before as after the SyllogifM is made, 
 or elfe he that makes the bylUgijm, could never fee it at al). 
 "Hiis, as ha? been already oblerv'd, is fcen only by the Eye, 
 or the perceptive Faculty of the Mind, takmg a View of 
 them laid together, in a juxta Pi/uion, which View of any 
 two it has equally, whenever thev are laid together in any 
 Fropofiiion, whether tlut Propofitiou be plac'd as a Major, 
 or a Alinor^ in a Syllogijm, or iio. 
 
 Of what Ule then are Syllogijnisf I anfwer, Their chief 
 and main Ule is in the Scliools where Men are allow'd, 
 without Shame, to deny the Agreement of Ideas, that do ma- 
 nili:(tly a^ree n or out of the Schools, to thofc who from 
 
 thcpce 
 
Reafon. 295 
 
 thence have leariVd, without Shame, todeny the Connexion- 
 of Ideas, which even to themfelvcs is vifible. But to an in- 
 genuous Searcher after Truth, who has no other Aim, but to 
 find it, there is no need of any fuch Form, to force the al- 
 lowing of the Inference ; the Truth and Reafonablenefs of 
 it is bt-tter feen in rarging of the Irleoi in a fimple and plain 
 Order. And hence it is, that Men in their own Enquiries 
 after Truth, rever ufe SyUcgifms to convince thcmlclves, [or in 
 teaching otheis to infiiudt willing Learners] becaufe before 
 they can put them into a Syllcgifm^ they muft fee the Connex- 
 ion that is between the intermediate Idea, and the two o- 
 ther Ideas it is fet between, and apply'dto, to l"hew their A- 
 greement ; and when they fee that, they Ice whether the In- 
 ference be good or no, and fo Syllogijm crmes too bte to 
 fettle it. For to make \Jk. again of the former Inftance, I 
 ask whether the Mind, confidering the /^e4 of Juftice, plac'd. 
 as an intermediate A/c^ between the Pmijlment of Men, and 
 the Guilt of the PunillVd, (and 'till it does fo confider it, 
 the Mind cannot make Ute of it as a mcdius tcm.inm) does 
 not as plainly lee the Force and Strength of the Inference, 
 as when it is form'd into Syllogifm ? To lliew it in a very 
 plain and eafy Exajnnple, let Aniwal be the intermediate /- 
 dea, or medtm terniinm, that the Mind makes Ule of to lliew 
 the Connexion of //o»o and vivcns ; I ask whether the Mind 
 does not more readily and plainly fee that Connexion, in the 
 fimple and proper Polition of the connecting Idea in the 
 Middle ? Thus, 
 
 Homo Animal vivcns ^ 
 
 Than in this perplex'd one, 
 
 Anin:d vivens Homo Animal. 
 
 Which is the Pofition thefe Ideas'havc in a Syllogifm, to 
 fhew the Connexion between Homo and vivens by the Inter- 
 vention of Animal. 
 
 Indeed Syllogifm is thought to be of neceflary Ufe, even 
 to the Lovers of Truth, to lliew them the Fallacies that are 
 often conceal'd in florid, witty, or involv'd Difcourfcs. Butthat 
 this is a Miftake, will appear, if weconfidcrthat the Reafon 
 why fometimes Men, who finceiely aim at Truth, are im- 
 pos'd upon by luch loofe, and as they are calfd, rhetorical 
 ' Dif- 
 
7^6 Reafon. 
 
 Difcourfcs, is, lliat their Fancies being llruck with fome 
 lively metaphoiicul Rcprdlntations, they iiegleiSl to oblerve, 
 cr do not ealily perceive what are the true Ucas upon whicli 
 the Inference dcpenJ?. Now, to fiiew Inch Men ihe Weak- 
 nefs of inch an Arc;tjmentation, there needs no more but to 
 ftrip it of the llipcrfluous Licas^ which bleridcd and confoun- 
 ded will) thofe on ninth the Inference depends, feem to lliew 
 a Connexion where there is none, or at lead do hinder the 
 Dilcovery of the want of itj and then to lay the naked l- 
 icM on which the Force of :hc Arj^umentation depends, in 
 their due OrJci \ in which Pofition the Mind taking a Vie\r 
 of Lhcm, fees what Connexion they have, and fo' is able to 
 jiidTC of the Infcicncc, without any need of a Syllogilm at 
 all." 
 
 I grant tliat MoiU and Figure is commonly made Ufe of 
 inliich Cafes, as if tic Detection of the Incolierence of fuch 
 loviieDifcourlc?, were wholly owing tothe Syllogillical Form ; 
 and fo I my fclf formerly thought, 'till upon a ftriclcr Exa- 
 mination, I now find th'.t laying the intermediate Ideai na- 
 ked in ihcir due O.der, fhcws the Incoherence of the Argu- 
 jnciitation Letter than Syllogifm ; not only as fubjcdlingeach 
 Link of the Chain to the immediate View of the Mind in 
 its pro; cr Place, whereby its Connexion is belt oblerv'd ; 
 but alio becauie Syllogifm llievys the Incoherence only to 
 thofe (who are not one of ten thoufand) who perfectly ub- 
 derltand Aktlc and Figure^ and the Reafon upon which thofe 
 Forms are eltablillfd ; whereas a due and orderly placing of 
 the hlcns upon which the Inference is made, makes every one, 
 both Logician or not Logician, who underliands the Terms, 
 and hath the Faculty to perceive the A gi cement or Dila- 
 greemcnt of fuch Ide^u, (without which, in or outofSylio- 
 giiin, he cannot perceive the Strength or We.'kneis, Cohe- 
 rence or Incoherence of the Dilcourle) fee the Want of Con- 
 nexion in the Argumentation, and the Abfurdiiy of the 
 Inference. 
 
 And thus I have known a Man unskilful in Syllogifm, 
 »vho at Hrit hearing could perceive the Weakncfs and In- 
 rlufivcnefs of a longaitilicial and plaufible Dili:ourfe, where- 
 with others better skill d in Syllogifm have been milled ; and 
 1 believe there are few oi my Readers who do not know 
 luch. And indeed, if it were not fo, the Debates of molt 
 Fiinces C uncils, and the Bufinefs of Aflemblics, would be 
 m Danger to be inifmanag'd, lince thole who arc rcly'd up- 
 on. 
 
Re a fan, 297 
 
 on, and have ufually a great Stroke in them, are not always 
 Inch, who have the good Luck to be perfectly knowing in 
 the^Forms of Syhgijw^ or expert in A'hde and Figure, And 
 if Syllogilm were the only, or f^) much as the lurtrt Way 
 to de|e6tthe Fallacies of artificial Dilcourfcs, I do not think 
 that all Mankind, even Princes in Matters that concern their 
 Cro^^'i^s and Dignities, arc fo much in Love with Falfliood 
 and Mirtake, that they would eveiy wliere have negleiied to 
 bring Syllogiim into the Debates of Moment, or thought it 
 ridiculous fo much as to offer them m Affairs of Confe- 
 quence ; a plain Evidence to me, that Men of Parts and Pe- 
 netration, who were not idly to difpute at their Eafe, but 
 were to acl according to thcRefult of their Debates, and of- 
 ten pay for their Miftakes with their Heads or Fortunes, 
 found thofe Scholaftick Forms were of little Ufe to dilcover 
 Truth or Fallacy, whilft both the one and the other might 
 be fliewn, and better (hewn without them to thofe who would 
 not refufe to fee what was vifibly lliewn them. 
 
 Secondly, Another Reafon that makes me doubt wh.ether 
 Syllogifm be the only proper Infirumcnt of Realon in the 
 Difcovery of Truth, is, that oF_ whatever \Jk Mode and H- 
 ^«rf is pretended to be in the laying open of Fallacy, (which 
 has been above confider'd) thofe Scholaftick Forms of Dif- 
 courfe arc not lefs liable to Fallacies, than the plainer Ways 
 of Argumentation ; and for this I appeal to commoji Obfcr- 
 vation, which has always found thele artificial Methods of 
 Reafoning more adapted to catch and intangle the Mind, 
 than to inftru6l and inform the Undcrfianding. And hence 
 it is, that Men even when they are baffi'd and filcnc'd in 
 this Scholaftick Way, are feldom or never convin'd, and lo 
 brought over to the conquering Side ; they perhaps acknow- 
 ledge their Adverfary to be the more skilful Difputant, but 
 reft neverthelefs pcrfwaded of the Truth on their Side 5 and 
 go away, worfted as they are, with the fame Opinion they^ 
 brought with them, which they could not do, if this Way of 
 Argumentation carry 'd Light and Convidion with it, and 
 made Men fee where the Tiiith lay ; and therefore Syllogilni 
 has been thought more proper for the attaining Viiiory in 
 Difpute, than for the Difcovery or Confirmation of Truth, 
 in fair Enquiries: And if it be certain, that Fallacy can be 
 couch'd in Syllogifms, as it cannot be deny'd, it muft be 
 fomething elie, and not Syllogifmj that muft difcover them. 
 
298 Reafou, 
 
 I have had Experience how ready foine Men arc, when all 
 the Ufc whidi they have been wont to afcrilvr to any Thing, 
 is not allow'd to cry out, that I am for layinc; it wholly a- 
 Tide. But to prcvcjit luch unjult and groundlcis Iinpuiati- 
 ons, I ttll them, that I am not for taking away any Hetps to 
 thcUndcrlhnding, in the Attainment of Knowledge j and 
 if Men skilTd in, and us*d to Syllogifms, find them' aflifting 
 to their Reafon in the Difcovciy of Truth, I think they 
 ought to make Ufe of them. All that 1 aim at, is, that 
 they ("hould not afcribe more to thefc Forms, than belongs to 
 them; and think, that Men have no Ufc, or not ib full a 
 Ule of their reaioning Faculty, without them. Some Eyes 
 want Spe6lacles to lee Things clcaily and di(fin<f)ly ; but let 
 not thofc that ufc them therefore fay no Body can fee clearly 
 without them : Tln^e who do lb, will be thought in Favour 
 with Art (which pcihaps they are beholding to) a Httle too 
 much to deprels au/l dilcieJit Nature. Reafon, by its 
 own Penetration, where it is ftrong and exercis'd, ufually fees 
 quicker and clearer without Syllogifm. Tf Ufc of thofe Spe- 
 dtacles has fo dimn'd its Sight, that it cannot without them 
 fee Conf.quences or Inconfequcnces in Argumentation, I am 
 not ib unreafonable as to be againft the uhng them. Every 
 one knows what bcft fits his own Sight ; but let him not 
 thence conclude all in the Dark, who ule not ;urt the fame 
 Helps that he finds a need of 
 
 §. «). But however it be in Knowledge, I 
 
 Helps littU think I may truly fay it is of f^ir lefs, or no 
 In Bemonjlia- Ufe at all in Probabilttiis. For the AHcnt there 
 tion, lefs hi being to be determin'd by the Freponderancy, 
 PxohahUif). after a due weighing of all the Proofs, with 
 all Circumflances on both Sides, nothing is 
 fo unfit to adill: tl,e Mind in that, as Syllogifm ; which 
 running away with one allum'd Probability, or one topical 
 Argument, purfues that 'till it has led the Mind quite out 
 of Sight of tlic Thing under Confideration ; and forcing it 
 upon fome remote Difficulty, holds it faft there intangl'd 
 perhaps, and as it were manacl'd in the Chain of Syllogilins, 
 without allowing it the Libcity, much kfs affording it the 
 Helps rcquifite to llitw on which Side, rll Things confidcr'd, 
 is the greater Probability. 
 
\ Reafon, 299 
 
 §. 6. But let it help us (as perhaps may be 
 faid) 111 convincing Men of th.eir triors aud Serves not to 
 Miliakeg ; (and yet I would fain fee the Man j}!creafe our 
 that was forced out of his Opinion by Dint Knowled^e^ 
 ofSyHogifmJ yet (iill it fails our Reafon m that hit fence with 
 Part which, if not its higheft Ferfedtion, is if- 
 yet certainly its bardeft Task, and that which 
 we nioli need its Help in ; and that is, the finding out of 
 Pniiifs, and wahng new Difcoveries. The Rules of Sylhgifm 
 ierve not to furnilh the Mind with thofe intermediate /^f^y, 
 that may lliew the Connexion of remote ones. This Way of 
 Re.ifoning difcovers no new Proofs, but is the Art of mar- 
 Hialling and ranging the old ones we have already. The 
 47tli Propofition of the firft Book of Euclid, is very true ; 
 but the Difcovery of it, I think, not owing to any Rules 
 of common Logick. A Man knows firrt, and then he is a- 
 blc to prove lylogiftically : So that Syllogifm comes after 
 Knowledge, and then a Man has little or no need of it. But 
 'tis chiefly by the finding out fhofc Ideas that fluw the Con- 
 nexion of diftant ones, that our Stock of Know^ledge is in- 
 creas'd, and that ufeful Arts and Sciences areadvanc'd. Syl- 
 logifm, at i)eft, is but the Art of fencing with the little 
 Knowledge we have, without making any Addition to it ; 
 and if a Man fhould employ his Reafon all this Way, he 
 will not do much otherwife than he who having got lome 
 Iron out of the Bowels of the Earth, Oiould have it beaten 
 up all into Swords, and put it into his Servants Hands to 
 fence with, and bang one another. Had the King of Spain. 
 employed the Hands of his People, and his Spani/Jy Iron fo, 
 he had brought to Light but little of that Treafure that lay 
 fo long hid in the dark Entrails of -^wer/V.'\ And I am apt 
 to'think, that he who fhall employ all the Force of his Rea- 
 fon only in brandilljing of Syllogijws, will difcover very lit- 
 tle of that Mafs of Knowledge which liesyeLconceal'd in the 
 fecret Rccefles of Nature ; and which, I am apt to think, 
 native rulfick Reafon (as it formerly has done) is likelier to 
 open a Way to, and add to the coinmon Stock of Mankind, 
 rather than any Scholaliick Proceeding by the ihiS: Rules of 
 Mode and Figure. 
 
 §. 7. 1 doubt not, neverthclefs, but there are Other Help 
 Way? to be found to aflift our Reafon in this JIjouU he 
 molt ufeful Part; and this the judicious fought. 
 Hooker encourages me to fay, who in his Ecd. 
 
5 CO Retifon. 
 
 Pel. /.I. §. 6. fpcaks tlms : If there wight he added the ri^ht 
 Helps cf true Art and Learning^ (nhich Helfs^ / tkh/I- plainly con- 
 fefs, this Age of tf:e World tarrying the Name of a learn d A^e, 
 doth neither nmch krtow^ ncr generally regard J there veculd m- 
 douhtedly be almo^ as mPich Difference in A'Ut:irity of Judgment 
 hetneen Men therewith inurdj and that nhich now Alen are^ as 
 bctnccn Men that are ncrr, and Jnnecents. I do not preicnd to 
 Iiave found or diicover'd here any of thofe right Helps 0/ Art 
 this greas Man of deep Thoiicht inciitions : But tliis is plain, 
 that Sy logijw, and the Logick now in Ufe, whicli were as 
 well known in his Days, can be none of thofe he means. It 
 is fufficient for me, if by a Difcourle perhaps fomcthing out 
 of the Way, I am fure as to mc wholly new and unborrow'd, 
 I (liall have given Occafion to others to ca(t about for new 
 Dilcov^ries, and to feck in their own 'Jhoughts for thofe 
 right Helps of Art which will fcaice be found, I fear, by 
 thofe ■who lervilely confine themitlves to the Rules and Di- 
 dtates of others : For beaten Tradts lead thefe fort of Cat- 
 tel, (as an obferving Roman calls them) whofc Thoughts reach 
 only to Imitation, non (juo eundem efl^ fed quo itur. But I can 
 be bold to iay, that this Age is adorn'd with fome Men of 
 that Strength of Judgment, and Largencls of Comprchenfion, 
 that if they would employ their Thoughts on this Subjeft. 
 could open new and undifcover'd Ways to the Advancement 
 of Knowledge, 
 
 §. 8. Having here had an Occafibn to fpeak 
 We reafon oC Sy II ogifw in general, and the Ufe of it, in 
 iihout Particn- Rcalbning , and the Improvement of our 
 /'"J. Knowledge, 'tis fit, before 1 leave this Subjedi, 
 
 to take Notice of one manifcrt MiHake in the 
 Rules of Sy'logifrfi; viz.. That no SyllogiHical Rcaloning can 
 be right and conclulive, but what has, at leaft, one general 
 Propofiiion in it. As it we could not reajon, and have 
 Knowledge alon: Particulars, Whereas, in Truth, the Mat- 
 ter rightly confidtr'd, the immediate Objed of all our Rea- 
 ioning and Knowledge, is nothing but Paitinih.r?. Every 
 Man's Rtafoiiing and Kr.ow ledge, is only about the Ideas 
 csilling in his own Mind, which are truly, every one of 
 ihem, particular Hxilknccsj and cur Knowledge and Rcafon- 
 ing about other lliings, is only as they correlpond with 
 thofe our particular I.ieas. So that the Perception of the A- 
 grcement or DilagrQcment of our pariicular Idea^^ is the 
 >Yholc and utmoil cf all our KiiowlcJce. Univcrlalily ii» 
 
 tut 
 
Reafon. go I 
 
 but accidental to it, and confifts only in this, That tliC par- 
 ticular Ideas about which it is, are inch, as more than one 
 particular Thing can correfpond with, and be reprefented by. 
 But the Perception of the Agreement or Difaereement of a- 
 ny two Ideas, and coniequently, our Knowledge is equally 
 clear and certain, whether either, or both, or neither of thole 
 Ideas be capable of reprefencing more real Beings than one, 
 or no. One Thing moie I crave leave to offer about Syllo- 
 gifm, before I leave it, viz.. May one not upon ;uft Ground 
 enquire whether the Form Syllogifm now has, is that which 
 in Reaibn it ought to have ? For the Mtdlm Tern 'mm being 
 to join the Extreams, ,/'. e. the intermediate Ideoi by its In- 
 tervention, to (hew the Agreement or Dilagreement of the 
 two in Quertion, would not the Pofition of the Med'ms Ter- 
 mnm be more natural, and fhew the Agreement or Difa- 
 greement of the Extreams clearer and better, if it were plac'd. 
 in the Middle between them ? Which might be eafily done 
 by tranfpofing the Propofitions, and making the AieA'itu 
 Terminus the Predicate of the firrt, and the Subjed of the 
 lecond. As thus, 
 
 Omnis Homo efi Animal , 
 Omne Aniwal ejl vivens. 
 Ergo omnis Homo efi vivens, 
 
 Omne Corpus e/} extenfum & folidum, 
 JSIullum extenfum & jolidftm ed pura exten/tOj 
 Ergo corpus non efi pnra exten/io. 
 
 I need not trouble my Reader with Inftances in Syllogifirs, 
 whofe Conclufions are particular. The fame Reafon holds 
 for the fame Form in them, as well as in the general. 
 
 §. p. Reajon, tho' it penetrates into the 
 Depths of the Sea and Earth, elevates our Firfi, Re.u 
 Thoughts as high as the Stars, and leads us fon fails w for 
 thro' the valt Spaces, and large Rooms of this wanf of ldea.s. 
 mighty Fabrick, yet it comes far f^.ort of the 
 real Extent of even corporeal Being j and there are many 
 Inftances wherein it fails m ; As, 
 
 Eirfr^ It perfectly fails us, »^frf oar Ideas /.n7. It neither 
 does, nor Can extend it felf farther than they do. And there- 
 fore where-ever we have no Ideas^ our Realoning flops, and 
 ^ve are at zn End of our Reckoning: And 'i -^i any Time 
 
 X vvg 
 
502 Reafon, 
 
 we reafon about Words, which do not ftand for any Ideasy 
 'tis only about tliofe Sounds, and notliing elfe. 
 
 §. 10. Secondly^ Our Rcalbn is often puzil'd, 
 Secondly, and at a Lofs, hccattfe of the OhfcHrity, Confu- 
 Becnu/e ofoh- fion, or ImpcrfeBion of the Ideas it is employ d a- 
 faire and im- Ifout ; and there we are involv'd in Difliculties 
 ferfe^ Ideas, and Contradi:;tion5. Tlius, not liaving any 
 perfed Idea of the leaft Extenfion of Matter, 
 nor of Infinity, we arc at a Lois about the Divifibility of 
 Matter ; but having perfcdl, clear, and dilHnd Ideas of Num- 
 ber, our Reafon meets with none of thofc inextricable Dif- 
 ficulties in Numbers, nor finds it felf involv'd in any Con- 
 tradidions about them. Thus we having but impcrfed: /- 
 dcas of the Operations of our Minds, and of the Beginning 
 of Motion or Thought how the Mind produces either of them 
 in us, Lindmuch imperfe6ler ytt, of the Operation of GOD, 
 run into great Difficulties about free created Agents, which 
 Reafon cannot well extricate it felf out of 
 
 §. II. Thirdly^ Our Realbn is often at a 
 Thirdly, Stand, hecanje it perceizes not thofe Ideas, vpkich 
 
 For want of could Jerve to jhav the certain or prohabk Agreeit 
 intermediate went, or Dijagreement of any tno other Ideas: 
 Ideas. And in this fome Mens Faculties far out-go 
 
 others. 'Till Algebra^ that great Inftrument 
 and Inftance of human Sagacity, was difcover'd. Men, with 
 Ama7emenr, look'd on levcral of the Demonftrations of an- 
 cient Mathematicians, and could fcarce forbear to think the 
 finding feveral of thofc Proofs to be fcmcthing more than 
 human. 
 
 §. 1 2. Fourthly^ The Mind by proceeding upon 
 Fourthly^ f^lfe Principles^ is often eneag'd in Abfuvdities 
 Secaii/e of and Difficulties, brought into Straits and Con- 
 vronjf^ Vrhxc'i. traditions, without knowing how to free it 
 /^^'' felf: And in that Cafe it is in vain to im- 
 
 plore the HJp of Reafon, unlcf? it be to dif- 
 cnver the Falfhood, and rejed the Influence of thofe wrong 
 PrincipIeF, Reafon is fo far from clearing the Difficulties 
 which the Building upon falfe Foundations brings a Man 
 into, that if he will purfuc it, it entangles him the more, 
 and engages him deeper in Perplexities, 
 
Redfori. 503^ 
 
 §.13. Fifthly^ As obfcurc and irriperfedl A 
 deas often involve our Reafon, fo, upon the Fifthly, Be- 
 fame Ground, do duhiota Words, and uncertain caufs of 
 Signs , often, in Difcourfes and Arguings, doubtful 
 when not warily attended to, puz^z^le Mens Terms, 
 Reafons and bring them to a Nonplus : But 
 thefe two latter are our Fault, and not the Fault of Reafon. 
 But yet the Confequences of theni are neverthelefs obvious ; 
 and the Perplexities or Errors they fill Mens Minds with, are 
 everywhere obfervable. 
 
 §. 14 Someofthe Jdeoi that dre in the Mind, 
 are fo thefe, that they can be by themfelves, Our h^^heft 
 immediately compar'd one with another : Degree of 
 And in thele, the Mind is able to perceive, that Knowledge, U 
 they agree, or difagree, as clearly as that it has ^'ntii:t:ve, 
 them. Thus the Mind perceives, that an Arch ^'^'■'°"H ^^^' 
 of a Circle, is lefs than the whole Circle, as J°'"'"S' 
 clearly as it does the Ideaoi a Circle : And this 
 therefore, as has been faid, I call intuitive Knowledge , which 
 is certain, beyond all Doubt, and needs no Probation, nor 
 can have any ; this being the highelt of all human Certain- 
 ty. In this confifts the Evidence of all thofe Maxims which 
 ho Body has any Doubt about,but every Man (does not, as is 
 laid, only to affent to, but) knows to be true, as foon as e- 
 ver they are proposed to his Underftanding* In the Difcove- 
 ry of, and Aflent to thefe Truths, there is no Uie of the di(^ 
 curfive Faculty, no need of Reafoning, but they are known by 
 afuperior, and higher Degree of Evidence. And fuch, iff 
 may guefsac Things unknown, I am apt to think, that An- 
 gels have nowj and the Spirits of juftMen made perfe6lj fhall 
 have, in a future State, of thoufands of ThingSj which now, 
 either wholly efcape otir Apprehenfions, or which our fhort- 
 fighted Reafon having got fome faint Glimpfe of, We, in the 
 dark, grope after. 
 
 §* 1^5. But though we have here and thetea 
 little of this clear Light, fome Sparks of bright 7/;^ next ie 
 Knowledge; yet the greateft Part of our IdsM Demonftrathn 
 are fuch, that vVe cannot difcern their Agree- ^7 Reafoning.. 
 ment, or Difagreement, by an immediate 
 comparing them. And in all thele we have JSlecd of Rea- 
 Joning, and mult, by Difcourfe and Inference, make our 
 Dilcoveries. Now^ of thefe there are two Sorts, which i 
 ftail take the Liberty to mention herefagain. 
 
 X i Fiif, 
 
304 Reafon, 
 
 Fi-fi^ Thofe wbofe Agreement or Di {agreement, tlioiigh 
 it cann^t be ("ceu 1 y an miinediatc putting tlicm together, 
 yet may be examin'd by the Intervention of other /</c<t<,vvhich 
 can be crmp.irM with them. In thisCak, when the Agree- 
 ment or DiOgrccment of ihe intermediate Idea, on both bdes 
 with thofe which we would compare, is plainly difcern'd, 
 there it amoinits to DeinonHration, "whereby Knowledge is 
 produc'd, which, though it be certain, yet it is not lo eafy, 
 i.or altogctlier lo clear, as intuitive Knoveledge -^ bccaufein 
 that there is barely one iimplc Intuition, wiicrein there is no 
 Room for any the lealt Millakc or Doubt ; the Truth is fccn all 
 perfectly at once. In Demonflration, 'tis tiue, there is Intu- 
 ition too, but not altogether at once, for there mufl be a 
 Remembrance of the Intuition of the Agreement of the 
 Aiedium, or intermediate Idea^ with that we compar'd it 
 with before, when we compare it with the other ; and 
 where th.erc be many A-Jcdiums^ there the Danger of tl,e 
 Miltake is th.c greater. For each Agreement or Difagree- 
 mentof the Ideas mult be obferv'd and leen in each Step of 
 the whole Train, and rctain'd in the Memory, juft as it is, 
 and the Mindmuft be fure that no Part of what is neccflary 
 tomake up the Dcmonftration, is omittedor over-look'd. This 
 makes iome Demonllration long and peiplex'd, and too hard 
 for thole who have notStreneth of Parts diftinclly to perceive, 
 and exaitly carry lii many Particulars orderly in their Heads. 
 And even thofe, who arc able to ma(kr luch intricate Specu- 
 lations, are fain lometimcsto go over them again, and there 
 is need of more than one Review before they can arrive at 
 Certainty. Cut yet where the Mind clearly retains the In- 
 tuition it had of the AgrccineiiL of any //r^ with another, 
 and that with a third, and that with a fourth, &c.- there 
 the Agreement of the firit and the fourth is a DcmonMration, 
 and produces certain Knowledge, which may be call'd Raii- 
 onal Knoivlcdgc^ as the other h Intuitive. 
 
 §. 16. Secondly, There are other Ideas, whofe 
 
 Tj fupply Agreement, or Dilagrecment, can no other- 
 
 thc Kmoiv- ^^'''"^ ^'^ judg'd of, but by the Intervention of 
 
 ntfsofthis^wc Others, which have not a certain Agrement 
 
 k-ne »,;:h))i;^ wiih the Extreams, but an ufual or likely one: 
 
 int Jnti;,i!c}it And in thelciti?, xhiMXh^ Judgment is propeily 
 
 tipou pto'rihu exercis'd, v.hich is the acquicfcing of the 
 
 Re.ifoubt^. Mind, tint any Ideas do agree, l>y compning 
 
 them with fuch probable Mcdinms. This, 
 
 t!iou"3h it never amounb to Knovkdse, no, not to that which 
 
"Re a fun. ♦ ^05 
 
 is the loweft Degree of it; yet fomctimc? the intermeJiate' 
 Ueas tie the Extreams fo firmly together, and the Probability 
 isfo clear and ftrong, that Afient as neceffarily follows it, 
 as Knowledge does Demonfhation. The great Excellency 
 and Ufe of the Judgment, is to obferve right, and take a 
 trueEftimate of the Force and Weight of each Probability ; 
 and then caftingthem up all right together, chufe that fide 
 which has the Over-b;il lance. 
 
 §. 17. Intumve Kmvoledge is the Perception , 
 of the certain Agreement, or Difa<^reement y. !f'°f.» 
 cf two Idea4, nnmediately compard toge- onjudment. 
 thcr. \ 
 
 Rational Knowledge is the Perception of the certain Agree- 
 ment or Dif'.greeiTient of any iwo Ideas j \y the Interven- 
 tion of one or more other Ideof. 
 
 Judgment is the thinking" or taking two Ideas to agree or 
 dilagreS;,by the Intervention of one or more Ideas, whofe 
 certain Agreement or Difagieement with them it does not 
 peceive, but hath obferv'd to be frequent and ufual. 
 
 §. iS. Though the deducing one Propofi- 
 tion from another, or making Inferences in Confequen-^ 
 Words ^ be a great Part of Reafon, and that ces of Worh, 
 which it is ufually emjploy'd about •, yet the ^i^d Confe- 
 principal A6t of Ratiocination is the finding ^nenccs of I- 
 the Agreement or Difagreement of two Ideas ^^'^^' 
 one with another, by tlie Intervention of a 
 third. Asa Man, by a Yard, finds two Houfes to be of the 
 fame Length, which could not be brought together to mea- 
 fure their Equality by juxta-pofition ; Words have their 
 Confequences, as the Signs of fuch Ideas : And Things 
 agree, ordifagree, as really they are j but we obferve it on- 
 ly by our Idea£. 
 
 §. I p. Before we quit this Subject, it maybe 
 worth our while a little to refietft on fo-dr Sorts Four Sorts 
 
 of Arguments, that Men in their Reafonings ofjtgnmnts. 
 with others do ordinarily make Ufe of, to pre- ^'''^' ^^ ^^" 
 vail on their Aflent ; or at leaft fo to awe recundiam. 
 them, as to filence their Oppofition. 
 
 F/>/, The firft is, to alledge the Opinions of Men, whofe 
 Parts, Learning, Effeminacy, Power, or fome other Caufe, has 
 gain'd a Name, and fettl'd their Reputation in the common 
 Efteem with fome Kind of Authority. When Men are erta- 
 blifh'd m any Kind of Dignity, 'tis thought a Breach of 
 
 ^ 3 Mo. 
 
5o6 Reafon, 
 
 Modefly for others to derogate any Way from it, arid que- 
 (Hon tlie Autlioriy of Men,n'hoarein Pofleffion of it. Thisis 
 apt to be cenfur'd, a? carrying with it too much of Pride, when 
 a Man does not readily yield to the Determination of ap- 
 prov'd Authors, which is wont to be receiv'd with Refpeft 
 and Submidion by others ; and 'tis look'd upon as Infolence 
 for a Man to fet up, and adhere to his own Opinion, a- 
 gainft the current Stream of Antiquity, or to put in the Bal- 
 laiice agriinft that of forae learned Dodor, or otherwife ap- 
 piov'd Writer. Whoever backs his Tenets with fuch Au- 
 thorities, thinks he ought thereby to carry the Caufe, and is 
 ready to ftile it Impudence in any one who fliall ttand out 
 -igaiiirt them. This I think may be caird ArgnmentHm ad 
 Virecfrndianj. 
 
 §. 20. Secondly^ Another Way thtt Men or- 
 y^econdly^ Ad dinarily ufc to drive othejrs, and force them to 
 Igiiorantiam. fubmit th^ir Judgments, ajrd receive the O- ^ 
 
 pinion in Debate, is to require the Adverliry 
 ;;o admit what they allcdge as a Proof, or to aflTign a better. 
 And this I call ArgnmentHm ad Igntramiam. 
 
 §, 21. Thirdlyy A third Way is to prefs a Man 
 
 T7;hdly^ 4d With Confcquerices draWn from his own Prin- 
 
 Huminem. ciples or Conceflions. This is already known 
 
 under the Name of ArgumentHm ad Homnem, 
 §. 22. Fourthly^ The fourth is the ufing of 
 Fourthly, Ad Proofs drawn from any of the Foundations of 
 Judicium. Knowledge or Probability." This I call Arjgw 
 
 Tuenmrn ad Judicium, This alone of all the four 
 brings true Inrtruclion with it, and advances us in our 
 Way to Knowledge. For i. It argues not another Man's O- 
 pinion to be right, becaufe I ought of Rcfpe6l, or any other 
 Confideration, but that of Conviction, will riot contradict 
 him. 2. It proves not another Man to be in the right Way, 
 nor that I ought to take the lame with him, becaufe I knoW 
 not a better. ' 3. Nor does it follow, that another Man is in 
 the right Way, becaufe he has fhewn me that I am in the 
 wrong. I may be modeli, and therefore not oppofe anothet 
 Mill's Perfwafjon J I may be ignorant, and not be able to pro- 
 duce a better ; I may be in an Error, and another may mew 
 ire that' I am fo. Tnis may difpofe me perhaps' for the Re- 
 ception of Truth, but helps me not to it ; that tnuft come 
 from Proofs and Arguments, and Light arifing from the Na- 
 ture of Things themfclves, and not from my Sliamefacedncfs, 
 i^i^nor.inccj or Error, §. 23. By 
 
t 
 
 Reafon, 30^ 
 
 §. 23. By what has been before faid of ReA- 
 
 ottj we may be able to make fome Guefs at Move, contra- 
 
 the Diftindion of Things, into thofe that are yy, and accord 
 
 according to, above, and contrary to Reafon. (^^^S '^ ■^^*- 
 
 1. According to Reafon are fuch Propofitions, /''"• 
 whofc Truth we can difcover, by examining 
 
 and tracing thofe Ideas we have from Scnfation zrxdi .Reflexi- 
 on, and by natural Deduction find to be true or probable, 
 
 2. Abwve Reajon are fuch Propofitions, wliofe Truth or Proba- 
 bility we cannot by Reafon derive from thofe Principles. 3. 
 Onti-ary to Reafon are fuch Propofitions, as are inconfiftent 
 with, or irreconcileable to our cleir and diftinift Ideas. Thus 
 the Exiftence of one GOD, is according to Reafon -, the Ex- 
 igence of more than one GOD, contrary to Reafon j the? 
 Refurreilion of the Dead, above Reafon. Farther, as above 
 Reafon maybe taken in a double SerTe, vIk,. either as fignify- 
 ing above Probability, or above Certainty, fo in that large 
 Senfe alfo contrary to Reafon is, I fuppoie, fometimes taken. 
 
 §. 24. There is another Ufe of the Word 
 Reafon, wherein it is oppos'd to Fatth j which,^ Reafon avd 
 though it be in it felf a very improper Way of F.ii/^} mtop^ 
 fpeaking, yet common Ule has fo authorized fofue, 
 it, that it would be Folly either to oppole or 
 hope to remedy it ; only I think it may not be amifs to take. 
 Notice, that however Faith be oppos'd to Reafon, Faith is 
 nothing but a firm AlTent of the Mind ; which if it be regu- 
 lated, as is our Duty, cannot be afforded to any Thing, but 
 upon good Reafon, andfo cannot be oppofite to it. Hethac 
 believes, without having any Reafon for believing, may be 
 in Love with his own Fancies ; but neither feeks Truth as he. 
 ought, nor pays the Obedience due to his Maker, vvho w ould 
 have him ule thofe difcernmg Faculties he has given him, 
 to keep him out of Miltake and Error. He that does not this 
 to the be(f of his Power, however he fometimes lights on 
 Truth, is in the right but by Chance; and I know not whe- 
 ther the Luckinefs of the Accident will excufe the Irregula- 
 rity of his Proceeding, This at leaft is certain, that he muft 
 be accountable for whatever Mirtakes he runs into ; where- 
 as he that makes Ufe of the Light and Faculties GOD has 
 given him, and feeks fmcerely to difcover Truth, by thofe 
 Helps and Abilities he has, may have this Satisfaitiou in do- 
 ipg his Duty as a rational Creature, that though he oultl 
 mifs Truthj he will not mifs ^he Reward of it : For he go- 
 
 X 4. verns 
 
3o8 Faith and Reafon. 
 
 verns his A^ent nc;Iir, nnd places itas heOiould, who in any 
 Cafe or Matter whatioevcr, believe? or disbelieves according as 
 Feafon dirciV him. He th.it does oihcrwifc, tranfgrefles againft 
 his own Lipht, and mifufis thofe Faculties which were gi- 
 ven him to no other End, but tofcarch and follow the clear- 
 er Evidence, an J greater Probability. But fince Reafon and 
 Faith are by fo:ne Men opp^s'd, we will fo confider them in 
 the followir.g Chapter. 
 
 CHAP. XVIII. 
 
 Of Faith and Reafon, and their dtflinci Provinces, 
 
 §. I. |T has been above llievvn, i. That we 
 Necejf.iry to Jt arc of NecelTity ignor.int, and want 
 
 hiow their Knowledge of all Sorts, where we want Ideas. 
 Boundaries. 2. That we are ignorant, and wnt ntional 
 Knowledge, where we want Proofs. 3. That 
 wc want general Knowledge and Certainty, as far as we want 
 clear and determined fpecirtck Ida!s. 4. Th it we want Proba- 
 bility to dirtCl our AlTcnt in Matters where we have neither 
 Knowledge of our own, nor Tcftimony of other Men to bot- 
 tom our Rcalbii upon. 
 
 From thcfe Things thus premised, I think we miy come 
 to lay down the Meafures and Boundaries letrvcen Faith and 
 Keajon ; t!ie Want whereof may poffibly have been the Ciufe, 
 if not of great Diforders. yet at IcaH of great Difputes, and 
 perhaps Milhkts in the Wokld: For 'till it be refolv'd how 
 far we arc to be guided by Reafon, and how far by Faith, 
 we fliill in v.iin difpute, and endeavour to convince one, a- 
 nothcr in Milters of Religion. 
 
 Fvth m i §• 2. I find every Seit, as far as Reafon will 
 v.n^rJ Jhif Iiclp them, make Ufc of it eladly; and where 
 
 Ki.yon what • r -i i t ^ >rr- iJ r -n ■ t 
 
 at contr.iHi- *^ ^'^''^ them, they crj' out, Jt^ Matter of Faith, 
 ftivmijh'd. ^'^^ ^^^"''^ Reafon. And I do not fee how they 
 can argue with any one, or ever convince a 
 Gain-fayer, who makes Ufc of the fame Pica, without fct- 
 t ns: down flrid B undaries between F.tith and Reajon, which 
 ought to I e tlic fivft Point eftabliih'd in all Qjicftions, where 
 Faith has any Thing to do. 
 
 Rcajon 
 
Fahh and Reafon. 509 
 
 Reajon tlicrefors here, as con trad idinguifh'd to Faith, I take 
 to be the Difcovery of the Certainty or Probability of liich 
 Propofjtions or Truths, which the Mind arrives at by Dedu- 
 6lio!i made from fuch Ideas which it has got by the Ufe o£ 
 its natural Faculties, viz.. by Senfation or Reflexion. 
 
 Faith, on the other Side, is the Afient to any Fropofition, 
 not thus made our by the Dedu^S^ions of Reafon, but upon 
 the Credit of the Propofer, as coming froin GOD in fomc 
 extraordinary Way of Communication. This Way of dif- 
 covering Truths to Men, we call Revelatien, * 
 
 §. :5. TzVy?, Then I fay, th^it no A-fan infpir'd 
 ly G O D, can by any Revelation commnmcate to c- No 7iew five 
 thers i^ny nerv firfiple Ideas which they had r;Ot ?^e Idea ctifi 
 before from Senfation or Reflexion : ,For what- ^'^ canvey^dhy 
 foever Impreffions he himfcif may have from tf'^dithnal 
 the immediate Hand of GO D, this Revtlati- ^'^'e^^^'o-n. 
 on, if it be of new fimple Ideas, cannot be 
 convey 'd to another, cither by Words, or any other Signs ; 
 becaufe Words, by tiieir immediate Operation on us, caufe 
 no other Ideas but of their natural Sounds ; and 'tis by the 
 Cuflom of uGng them for Signs, that they excite and revive 
 in our Minds latent Ideas ; but yet only fuch Ideas as were 
 there before. For WorJs feen or heard rccal to our Thoughts 
 thofe Ideas only, which to us they have been wont to be 
 Signs of ; but cannot introduce any perfe6lly new, and for- 
 merly unknown Hmple I leas. The fame holds in all other 
 Signs, which cannot fignify to us Things of which we have 
 before never had any Idea at all. 
 
 Thus whatever Things were dlfcover'd to St. Paul when 
 he was rapp'd up into the third Heaven, whatever new Ideas 
 his Mind there received, all the Defcription he can make to 
 others of that Place, is only this, that there are fuch Things 
 as Eye hath mc feen, nor Ear heard, ncr hath it enter d into the 
 Heart of Alan to conceive. And liippofing GOD fliould dis- 
 cover to any one, fupernatural'y, a Species of Creatures in- 
 habitingj for Example, Jupiter or Saturn, (for that it is im- 
 pofTible there may be fuch, no Body can detw) which had 
 fix Senfes, and imprint on his Mind the Ideas convey 'd to 
 theirs by thit fixth Senfe, he could no more, by Words, pro- 
 duce in the Minds of other Men thofe Ide^is, imprinted by 
 that fixth Senfe, than one of us could convey the Idea of any 
 Colour by the Sounds of Words into a Man, who having the 
 otiicr four Senfes pcrfeil, had always totally wanted the fifth 
 
 of 
 
gio Faith ami Re afon, 
 
 of Seeing. For our fimple Ideas then, M'hich are the Foun- 
 dation, and folc Matter of all our Notions and Knowledge, 
 we mud depend wholly on our Reafon, I mean, ournatural 
 Faculties, and can by no Means receive them, or any of 
 them, from traditional Revelation ; I fay, traditional Revelati' 
 Wy in Diltindion to original Revelation. By the one I mean 
 that firlt Impreflion which is made immediately by GOD, 
 on the Mind of any Man, to which we cannot fet any Bounds ; 
 and by the other, thofe ImprefTions deliver'd over to others 
 in Words, and the ordinary Ways of conveying our Concep- 
 tions one to another. 
 
 §. 4. Secondly y I fay, xhdX the fame Truths may 
 Tradiliond ^^ difcoverd^ and convey'd dojvn from Revelation, 
 Rc-jsluion which are difcoverahlc to ni by Reafon, and by 
 
 m,'iy m.ike lis thofe Mvr; we naturally may have. So GOD 
 knov Propofi- might, by Revelation, difcover the Truth of a- 
 tiortiknova- ny Propofition in Euclid', as well as Men, by 
 hledfohyRcfi- t^^ natural Ufe of their Faculties, come to 
 Jon, but not make the Difcovery themfelvcs. In all Things 
 
 Cert in* that ^^ ^''"'^ ^"^^' ^''"^ '^ ^'"'^ ^.^'^ °' ^^^ °^ ^^' 
 Xeafondotb^ velation, GOD having furnifh'd us with na- 
 tural, and furcr Means to arrive at the Know- 
 ledge of them. For whatfoever Truth we come 
 to the clear Difcoixry of, from the Knowledge and Contem- 
 plation of out own Ideas, will always be ccrtainer to us, than 
 tliolc v;hich are convey'd to us by traditional Revelation: For 
 the Knowledge wc have that this Revelation came at firft 
 from GOD, can never be fo fure as the Knowledge we have 
 from the clear and diftin6l Perception of the Agreement or 
 Difagreement of our own Ideas, v, g, if it were reveal'd 
 iome Ages lince, that the three AncLs of a Triangle were e- 
 qual to two right ones, I might ailent to the Truth of that 
 jpropohtion, upon the Credit of the 1 radition, that it was 
 rcvtal'd : But that would never amount to fo great a Cer- 
 tanuy as the KnowlcJgeof it, upon the comparing and mea- 
 iiiring my own Ideas of two right Angle?, and the three An- 
 gles of a Triangle. The like holds in Matter of Fad, know- 
 ably by our Senfcs, v.g. tlie Hirtory of the Deluge is con- 
 vey'd to us by Writings, which had their Oiiginal from Re- 
 velation ; and yet no Boely, I think, will lay he has as cer- 
 tain and clear a Knowledge of the Flood, as A^oah that law 
 )t ; or that he himlelf would have had, had he then becna- 
 )ivc, and fccn it. For he has no greater an Alluraiice, than 
 
 that 
 
Faith and Reafon, 5 1 1 
 
 that of his Senfes, that it is writ in the Book fuppos*d writ 
 by Mojes infpir'd ; but he has not fo great an Afturance that 
 Mofes writ that Book, as if he had feen Mofes write it. So 
 that theAfTurance of its being a Revelation, is lefs ftill than 
 the Aflurance of his Senfes. 
 
 §. I?. In Propofjtions then, whofe Certain- Revelntion 
 ty is built upon the clear Perception of the A- afnnot he ad- 
 greemcni or Difagreemcnt of our Ideas attain'd viUted ngainjl 
 cither by immediate Intuition, ai in felf-evi- the clear Evi^ 
 dent Propofitions, or by evident Dedu6lionsof ''^"'^<? of Rea- 
 Reafon in Demonftrations, we need not the f°^' 
 Afliftance of Revelation, as necelTary to gain 
 our Aflent, and introduce them into our Minds ; becaule 
 ^he natural Ways of Knowledge could fettle them there, or 
 had done it already, which is the greateft AfTurance we can 
 poflibly have of any Thing, unlefs where GOD immedi- 
 ately reveals it to us ; and there too our AfTurance can 1)e 
 po greater than our Knowledge is, that it is a Revelation from 
 GOD. But yet nothing I think can, under that Title, (hake 
 or over-rule plain Knowledge, or rationally prevail with a- 
 ny Ma« to admit it for true, in a direil Contradidlion to 
 the clear Evidence of his own Underrtanding : For fince no 
 Evidence of our Facuhics by which we receive fuch Revelati" 
 cnsy can exceed, if equal the Certainty of our intuitive Know- 
 ledge, we can never receive for a Truth any Thing, that is di- 
 jfe6tiy contrary to our clear and diftin6t Knowledge, v, gj 
 the Ideas of one Body and one Place do fo clearly agree, and 
 the Mind has fo evident a Perception of their Agreement, 
 that we can never^ afTent to a Propofition that affirms the 
 fame Body to be in two diftant Places at once, however it 
 flioutd pretend to tke Authority of a divine Revelation, fmcc 
 theEyidence,Firy?,That we deceive notour felves in afcribing 
 it to GOD. Secondly, That w^e underRand it right, canne-f 
 ver be fo great, as the Evidence of our own intuitive Know- 
 ledge, whereby \ye difcern it impolTible for the fame Body to 
 be in two Places at once. And therefore no Propofition can ht 
 feceivdfor divine Revelation, or obtain the Aflent due to all 
 fuch, if it he contraditlory to our clear and intuitive Knovfledge^* 
 caufe this would be to fubvert the Principles and Founda- 
 tions of all Knowledge, Evidence, and AfTent whatfoevers 
 apd there would be left no Difference between Truth ana 
 I'alfliood, no Meafures of credible and incredible in the 
 World, if dpubtful Propofitions fliall take Place before felf- 
 
 eTi- 
 
5 1 2 Fititb ami Reafon. 
 
 evident ; and ^vhat wc certainly knovi% give Way to what 
 we may poHib'y be miftakcn in. In Propofitions therefore 
 central^ to the clear Perception of the Agreement or Difa- 
 grcenient of any of our l.Uas, 'twin be in vain to urc;e them 
 as Matters ( f Faith. They cannot move our Afl'ent un- 
 der that, or any other Title whatfocvcr : For Fmh can 
 never convince us of any Thing, that contraJidh our Know- 
 ledge, bccaufe, tho' F4th be founded on the Tcftimony of 
 GOD, (who cannot lye) revealing any Propofiiion to us ; 
 yet we cannot have an Aflurance of the Truth of its being a 
 divine Revelation, greater than our own Knowledge ; fmce 
 the whole Strength of the Certainty depends upon our 
 Knowledge, that GOD revcal'd it, nliich, in this Cafe, 
 where the Propofition fupposareveal'd c(;;;rradi6ts our Know- 
 ledge or Reafon, will always hive this Objection hanging to 
 it, (vu.) that we cannot tjll how to conceive that to come 
 from GOD, the bountifiil Author of our Being, which, if 
 received for true, mu't overturn all the Principles and Foun- 
 dations of Knowledge he has given us ; renJer all our Fa- ^ 
 culties ufclefsj wholly deftroy t'le moll excellent Part of his 
 Woiknunlliip, our Underftandings; and put a Man in a 
 Condition, wherein he will have lefs Light, lefs Conduit, 
 than the Bcaft tliat perill.cth. For if the Mind of Man can 
 never have a clearer (and perhaps not fo clear) Evidence of 
 any Tiling to be a divine Revelation, as it has of the Princi- 
 ples of it? own Reafon, it can never have a Ground to quit 
 tlie clear Evidence of its Reafon, to give Place to a Propofi- 
 tion, whole Revelation has not a greater Evidence than thofe 
 Principles have. 
 
 §. 6. Thus far a Man has Ufe of Reafon, 
 TraJithn.il and ought to hearken to it, even in iiyimedi- 
 Jlevel.uhn ^te and original ReveUiion, where it is fup- 
 
 jmtch lefs. pQj,'j j^ ]^^ j^^ jjg ^^ himfelf : But to all thofe 
 
 who pretend not to immediate ReveUicn, but arc 
 rcquir'd to piy Obedience, and to receive the Truths reveal'd 
 to others, wiach, by the Tradition of Writings, or Word of 
 Mouth, are convey 'd down to them, Reafon has a great deal 
 more to do, and is that only which can induce us to receive 
 them. For Matter of I\dih being only divine Revelation, 
 and nothing cllc, Fai:'} (as weufc the Word c.iU'd com- 
 morly tlivmc Faith') has to do with no Propofitions, but 
 thofe which arc fuppos'd to be divinely reveal'd. So that I 
 do not f'wC how thofe, who make Revelation alone the fole 
 
 Objea 
 
Faith and Reafon, 2 1 2 
 
 Ob;e6l of Vrnth, can fay, that it is a Matter of Faitk^ and 
 not o[ Reaf[n, to believe, that fuch or Inch a Propofitlon to 
 be found in fuch or luch a Pook, is of divine Infpiration ; 
 unlefs it be reveard, that that Propolltion, or all in that 
 Book, was communicated by divine Infpiration. Without 
 fuch a Revelation^ the believing or not believing that Propo- 
 fition, or Book, to be of divine Authority, can never be 
 Matter of Faith, but Matter of Reafon; and fuch, as I mu(t 
 come to an AlTent to, only by the Ufe of my Reafon, which 
 can never require or enable me to believe that, winch .is 
 contrary to it felf: It being impoflibe for Realon ever to 
 procure any AlTent to that, which to it felf appears unrea- 
 fonable. 
 
 * In all Things therefore, where we have clear Evidence from 
 our laeas, and thofe Principles of Knowledge I have abcve- 
 mention'd, Reafon is the proper Judge ; and ReveUticn, tho* 
 it may, in confenting with it, confirm its Didates, yet Ccin- 
 jiot in fuch Cafes invalidate its Decrees : Aor can rve h: ob~ 
 ligd, where vpe have the clear and evident Sentence of Reafon, to 
 qpiit it, for the contrary Opinion, under a Pretence that it is Mat- 
 ter of Faith ; which can have no Authority againft the plalp 
 andclear Di(ftates of Reafon, 
 
 §. 7. But Thirdly, There being mpny 
 Things, wherein we have very imperfec^l; No- Things ahovt 
 tions, or none at all ; and other Things, of Reafon. 
 whofe paft, prelent, or future Exigence, by 
 the natural Ule of our Faculties, we can have no Know- 
 ledge at all ; thefe, as being b-yond the Difcovcry of our 
 natural Faculties, and above Reafon, are, when reveal'd, the 
 ■proper Matter of Faith.. Thus that Part of tl:e Angels re~ 
 bell'd againft GOD, and thereby loft their firft happy State; 
 and that the Dead fhall rile, and live again : Thefe, and 
 the like, being beyond the Difcovery of Reafon. are purely 
 Matters of Faith • with which Reafon has, dire«5tly, nothing 
 to do. 
 
 §. 8. But fince GOD in giving us the ^ ' 
 Light of Realon ha? not thereby ty^d up his , ^'^f^ con- 
 u J r a J- II 1-1 ^^aty to Kea~ 
 
 own Hands from atlording us, v/hen he thmlis A„-^r..^„^,/v 
 
 ht, the Light of R:Velation in any of thole are Matter of 
 Matters, wherein our natural Faculties are able Fah/j. 
 t6 give a probable Determination, Revelanon, 
 where God has been pleas'd to give it, f^nj} carry it, againfi 
 the prdable GnjeUwi'S of Reajinj became the Mind not be- 
 
 irig 
 
514 Faith and Reafon, 
 
 ing certain of the Truth of that it docs not cvidcntljr know, 
 biit only yielding to the Probability that appears in it, is 
 bound to g,ivc up its Adent to fuch a Teftiniony, which, it 
 is fatisfy'J, come froni one who cannot err, and will not 
 decdvc. But yet it ftills belongs to Reafortj to judge of the 
 Truth of its being a Revelation, and of the Signification of 
 the Words wherein it is delivered. Indeed, if any Thing 
 fhall be thought Revelation^ which is contrary to the plain 
 Principles of Reafon, and the evident Knowledge the Mind 
 lias of its own clear lind diltinil Ide^s^ there Reajon muft be 
 hcarken'd to, as to a Matter within its Province. Since a 
 Man can never have fo certain a Knowledge, that a Propofi- 
 tion, which contradicts the dear Principles and Evidence 
 of his own Knowledge, was divinely reveal'd, or that he 
 underrtands the Words rightly, wherein it is deliver 'd, as he 
 has, that the contrary is true, and fo is bound to confidet 
 and judge of it, as a Matter of Reafon, and not fwallow if, 
 without Examination, as a Mitter of FrftV/'. 
 
 §. 9. f/V/?, Whatever Propofition is reveal'di 
 Rnehtion.in ©f whofe Truth our Mind, by its natural Fa- 
 Matten where culties and Notions, cannot judge, that is 
 ^enfon cannot , ^^^^^^^ ^^ ^^.^^^ ^^^j ^^^^ Reafon. 
 
 p%My Secondly, All Propofitions, whereof the 
 
 ou?ht to he Mind, by the Ufe of its natural Faculties, can 
 le.irken''dto. come to determine and judge, from naturally 
 acquir d Ideas, are Matter of Reafon j with this 
 Difference ftill, that in tliofe, concerning which it has but 
 an uncertain Evidence, and lb is perfwadcd of their Truth, 
 only upon probable Grounds, which (till admit a PoflTibility 
 of the contrary to be true, without doing Violence to the 
 certain Evidence of its own Knowledge, and overturning the 
 Principles of all Reafon, in llich probable Propofitions, I 
 fay, an evident Rcz'eUtion. ought to determine our AfTcnt e- 
 vcn againft Probability. For where the Principles of Reafon 
 have not cvidenc'd a Propofition to be certainly true or 
 falfe, there clear Revelation, as another Principle of Truth, 
 and Ground of Aflent, may determine ; and lb it may be 
 Matter of Faith, and be alfo above Reafon, bccaufe Reafon^ 
 in that particular Matter, being able to reach no higher 
 than Probability, Faith c^ave the Determination where Rtajoit 
 came fhcrt ; and Rvelation difcover'd on which fide the 
 Truth Idy 
 
 $. 10. TbUf 
 
Faith and Reafon. 
 §. 10. Thus far the Dominion o^ Faith rea- 
 
 315 
 
 In Miitters 
 TV here Ren f on 
 cajt afford cer- 
 tain Knovg- 
 led^e that t 
 to be hearkened 
 
 to. 
 
 ches, and that without any Violence, or Hin- 
 drance to Reajm ; which is not injured, or 
 difturb'd, but affifted and improv'd, by new 
 Difcoveries of Truth, coming from the eternal 
 Fountain of all Knowledge. Whatever God 
 hath reveal'd, is certainly true ; no Doubt can 
 be made of it. This is the proper Object of 
 Faith : But whether it be a divine Revelation, or no, Reafon 
 muft jud^e; which can neier permit the Mind to rejedt a 
 greattr Evidence to embrace what is kfs evident, nor allow 
 it to entertain Probability in Oppofition to Knowledge and 
 Certainty. There can be no Evidence, that any traditional 
 Revelation is of divine Original, in the Words we receive it, 
 and in the Senfe we underftand it, fo ckar, and fo certain, 
 as that of the Principles of Reafon : And therefore, nothing 
 that ts contrary to, and incon0ent with the clear and jvlf -evident 
 DiElates of Reafon, has a Right to he urgd, or ajfented to, as a 
 Matter of Faith, wherein Reafon hath nothing to do. Whatfocver 
 is divine Revelation, ought to over-rule all our Opinions, 
 Prejudices, and Intererts, and hath a Right to be receiv'd 
 with full AlTent : Such a Submiflion as this of cur Reafon to 
 Faith, takes not away the Land-marlis of Knowledge: This 
 fl-iakes not the Foundations of Reafon, but leaves us that Ufe 
 of our FacuUieF, for which they were given us. 
 §. II. If the Provinces of Faith and Reafon are 
 not kept difim^ by thefe Boundaries, there will, 
 in Matter of Religion, be no Room for Reafon 
 at all ; and thofe extravagant Opinions and 
 Ceremonies, that are to be found in the fcve- 
 ral Religions of the World, will not delerve 
 to be blam'd. For to this crying up of Faith, 
 in Oppofjtion to Reafon, we may, I think, in 
 good Meafure, afcribe thofe Abfurdities that 
 fill almoft all the Religions which poffefs and 
 divide Mankind. For Men having been prin- 
 cipl'd with an Opinion, that they muft not confult Reafon 
 in the Things of Religion, however apparently contradi(fto- 
 ry to common Senfe, and the very Principles of all their 
 Knowledge, have let loofe their Fancies, and natural Super- 
 iHtion ; and have been, by them, led into fo ftrange Opi- 
 nions, and extiavagant Practices in Religion, that a confide- 
 fatG Man eannot but ftandamaz'dat their Follies, and judge 
 
 them 
 
 If the Boun- 
 daries he not 
 fet between 
 Faith and Rea- 
 fon, no En- 
 thnfiafm, or 
 Extravagancy 
 in Religion, 
 can he contr.t- 
 diBed. 
 
^i6 Enthiijiiifm. 
 
 tlicm fo far from being accepta!-»lc to the g:Jit and wife 
 GOD, that lie cannot avoid tliirikinc; them ridiculous, and 
 offcnTiVc to a lobcr good Man. So that, in Ette«;t, Religion, 
 which llK.uId molt diftin^uillj us from Bcalls, and ought 
 xnort ptculi.irly to elevate us, as rati^^nal Creatures, above 
 Brutes, is th.\' wherein Men ofren appear molt irrational, 
 and more linkhls than Bcalts ihcmielvcs, Crcdo^ quia im- 
 fojjlbile eft: 1 believe^ hee^uje it is irf.poffiUe, might, in a good 
 Man, pais for a Sally of Zeal ; but would prove a very ill 
 Rule for Men to chule their Opinions, or Religion by. 
 
 CHAP. IXX. 
 
 Of EiithiifiafTfi, 
 
 Lrve of §• ^' TT E that wculd rerioudy fet upon 
 Ttuth neceff.i- \7jL ^^'^ Search of Truth, ought in the 
 
 ry. firft Place to prepare his Mind with a Love of 
 
 it : For he that loves it nor, will not take 
 much Pains to get it, nor be much concern'd when he 
 inifTes it. Theie is no Body in the Common-wealth of 
 Learning, who docs not profefs himfclf a Lover of Truth : 
 And there is not a rftional Creature that would rot take it 
 amifs to be thought otherwiic of. And yet for all this one 
 may truly lay, there are very few Lovers of Truth for Truth's 
 Sake, even amongll tr.ofe who i)crfvvadc ti.emlelves that they 
 are io. Mow a Man may know whether he be lo in earneft, 
 is worth Enquiry: And 1 think there isthis one unerring 
 Mark of it, viz.. The not entertaining any Piopofition with 
 greater Af^urance than ilie Proofs it is built upon will war- 
 rant. Whoever goes beyond this Mealiiie of Affent,' 'tis 
 plain, receives not 1 ruth in the Love of it; loves not Truth 
 for-Tiuth's Sake, but for lomc other By-LnJ. For the k'- 
 vidcnceihat ; iiy Propoliiion is true, (except Inch as are felf- 
 cviJcnt) lying only in the Proofs a Man h;^s of it, whatlo- 
 cvcr Degrees of Allan he aliords it beyond the Degrees of 
 that Evidenc-?, 'tis plain all thvit Surplufage of Af^.ur.ince is 
 owing to iomc otlicr Aftc^;ion, and not to the Love of 
 Truth: It bcii g as impollible, that the Love of Truth fiiould 
 carry my AiTenr above the Evidence, that thc.c is to me, 
 
 that 
 
Enthufiafm, 317 
 
 that it is true, as that the Love of Truth fhoul J make me 
 aflent to any Propofition, for the Sake of that Evidence, 
 which it has not, that it is true ; which is, in Efted,' to love 
 it as a Truth, bccaufe it is pofllble or probable that it may 
 not be true. In any Truth that gets not PofTefllon of our 
 Minds by the irrefifiible Light of SeU-evidence, or by the 
 Force of Demonftration, the Arguments that gain it Afl'eht, 
 arc the Vouches and Gage of its Probability to us ; an(J We 
 can receive it for no other than fuch as they deliver it to 
 our Underftandings. Whatfoever Credit or Authority we 
 give to any Pn polition more than it receives from the Prin- 
 ciples and Proofs it lupports it felf upon, is owing to our 
 Inclinaiions that Way, and is fo far a Derogation from the 
 Love of Truth,as fuch : Which, as it can receive no Evidence 
 from our PaflTions or Interefts, fo it (hould receive no Tin-^ 
 <5ture from them. 
 
 §. 2. The afluming an Authority of diiflta- 
 ting toothers, and a Forwardnefs to prefcribe JForte.vd- 
 to their Opinions, is a conRant Concomitant ^efs to dilute 
 of this Byals and Corruption of our Jud^- frovi whuice. 
 ments : For how almoft can it be otheruile, 
 but that he lliould be ready to impofe on others Belief, who 
 has already impos'd on his own ? Who can reafon.ibly ex- 
 pe(fi Arguments and Convi(Slion from him, in deahhg with 
 others, whofe Underftanding is not accuHom'd to them irt 
 his dealing with himfelf ? Who does Violence to his own 
 Faculties, tyrannizes over his own Mind, and ufurps the 
 Prerogative that belongs to Truth alone, which is to command 
 Aflent by onljr its own Authority, i. e. by and in Propor- 
 tion to that Evidence which it carries with it. 
 
 §. 3. Upon this Occafion, I Oiall take the 
 Liberty to confider a third Ground of Aflent, Forte of 
 which, with fome Men, has the fame Autho- ^^tlmfiafni. 
 rity, and is as confidently rely'd on as either 
 Faiih or Reafon ; I mean Enthufiafm. Which, laying by Rea- 
 fon, vvouldlet up Revelation without it: Whereby in Ef- 
 fe6l it takes away both Realbn and Revelation, and fubftl- 
 tutes, in the Room of it, the ungrounded Fancies of a Man's 
 own Brain, and aflumes them for a Foundation, both of O- 
 pinion and Conduit. 
 
 §. 4» Rcafon is natural Revelation, whereby 
 the eternal Father of Light, and Fountain of Reafon and 
 ail Knowledge, communicates to Mankind that Revelation. 
 Votmn of Truth which he has laid within the 
 
 YT* iiir iiir' 
 
5 1 8 .^ Enthiifuifin, 
 
 Re.ich of their natural Faculties. Revelation is natural /?<?4- 
 jon cnlarg'd by a new S.t of Diicoverics communicated by 
 GOD immediately, which Reafon vouches the Truth of, by 
 the Teftimoiiy and I'roofs it gives, that they come from 
 GOD. So that 1^ that takes away Reajon^ to make Way 
 for Rivclation, puts out the Light of both : And does much 
 ^vhat the fame, as if he would pcrlwad a Man to put out 
 his Eyes, the better to n.ceivc tiictemotc Light of an iiivifible 
 Star, by a Telelcope. 
 
 5. <f. Immediate RiVelaiion being a much 
 Rife of En- eaficr Way {ov Men to eftablifli their Opini- 
 thnjiafm, on?, and regulate their Conduct, than the tedi- 
 
 ous, and not always Uiccelbful Labour of [hict 
 Reafoning, it is no Wonder that iome have been very apt 
 to'pretend to Revelation, and to periwade thcmfelves, that 
 they arc under the peculiar Guidance of Heaven in their A- 
 (f^ions and Opinions, efpecially inthofeof tiiem .which they 
 cannot account for by the ordinary Methods of Know- 
 ledge and Principles of Rca(bn, Hence we fee, that in all 
 Ages, Men in whom MelanchoUy has mix'd with Devotion, 
 or whofc Conceit of thcmfelves has raisd them into an Opi- 
 nion of a greater Familiarity with G O D, and a nearer Ad- 
 mittanceto his Favour,than is atforded toothcrsjhave often flat- 
 tered themlelves WMth a Pcrfwafion of an imnrcdiate Inter- 
 courfc with the Deity, and frequent Communications from 
 the divine Spirit. GOD, I own, cannot be deny 'd to be 
 able to enlighten the Undcrftanding by a Ray darted into 
 the Mind immediately trom the Fountain of Liglit. This 
 they underrtand he has promisd to do, and who then hasfo 
 good a Title to expeil it, as thole who arc his pecu'liar Peo- 
 ple, chofen by him, and depending on him? 
 
 §.6. Their Minds being thus prepar'd,w^hat- _ 
 
 Ehthufufm. ever groundlcls Opinion comes to lettle it lelf 
 
 ftrongly upon their Fancies, is an Illumination 
 
 from the Spirit of GOD, and prcfentiy of divnie Authority : 
 
 And whatfoever odd Action tlicyfind in thcnilelves a ftrong 
 
 Inclination to do, that Impulle is concluded 10 be a Call 
 
 or Diredion frrm Heaven, and muft be obey'd ; 'tis a 
 
 CommilTlon from above, and they canurt err in executing it, 
 
 ^. 7. This I take to be properly Enthutiafm, which tho* 
 
 r undcd neither on Kealon, nor divii c Revelation, but li- 
 
 Hng from the Conceits of a warm'd 01 over-weening Brain, , 
 
 works yet, where it once gets fooling; more powerfully on 
 
 th« 
 
Enthuftafm. 3 1 p 
 
 the Peifwafions and A.6tions of Men, than cither ofthofe 
 two, or both together : Men being moft forwardly obedient 
 to the Impulfes they receive from themfelves ; and the whole 
 Man is fure to a6t more vigoroufly, where the whole Man is 
 carry 'd by a natural Motion. For ftrong Conceit, like a 
 new Principle, carries all eafily with it; when got above 
 common Senfe, and freed froin all Rcrtraint of Reafon, and 
 Check of Reflexion, it is heightened into a divine Autho- 
 rity, in Concurrence with our own Temper and Inclination. 
 
 §. 8. Though the odd Opinions and extra- ^ ^ r. ^ .. 
 vagant hS(\on% Enthpifiajm ha^ run Men into, ni}(iakaifor^ 
 were erough to warn them againft this wrong scehi? mid 
 Principle fo apt to mifguide them both in their Fedmr. 
 Belief and Conduct ; yet the Love of fome- 
 thing extraordinay,the Eafe and Glory it is to be infpir'd and 
 be above the common and natural Ways of Knowledge, lo 
 flatters many Mens Lazinefe, Ignorance, and Vanity, that 
 when once they are got into this Way of immediate Revc- 
 latiop, of Illumination without Search, and of Certainty 
 without Proof, and without Examination, 'tis a hard Mat- 
 ter to get them out of it. Reafon is lo(-|; upon themj they are 
 above it : They fee the Light infus'd into their L^nderfland- 
 ings, and cannot be liiiftaken ; 'tis clear and vitible there ; 
 like the Light of bright Sun-fhine, rtiews it feif, and needs 
 no other Proof, but its own Evidence j they feci the Hand 
 of GOD moving them within, and the Impulfes of the Spi- 
 rit, and cannot be miftaken in what they feel. Thus they 
 fupport themfelves, and are fine Reafon hath nothing to do 
 with what they fee and feel in themfelves -, what they have 
 a fenfible Experience of, admits no Doubt, needs nc? Proba- 
 tion. Would he not be ridiculous, who Ihculd require to' 
 have it prov'd to him, that the Light (liine?, and that he fees" 
 it ? It is its own Proof, and can have no other. WI>eu 
 the Spirit brings Light into our Minds, it difpels Darkneff. 
 We lee it, as we do that of the Sun at Noon, and need not 
 the Twilight of Reafon to fhewit us. This Light from Hea- 
 ven is ftfong, dear, and pure ; carries its own Demonftra- 
 tion with it ; and we may as rationally take a Glow-worm 
 to aflTift us to difcover the Sun, as to examine the celelHal 
 Ray by our dim Candle, Reafon. 
 
 §. 9. This is the way of talking of thefc Men ; they are fine, 
 becaufe they are fure; and their Perfwafions are right, on'y 
 betai^fe they are fttong in them. For, when what they fay is 
 
 Y .^ Hripp'd 
 
520 Enthtifi/if?n. 
 
 ftripp'i ofilic Metaphor of feeing anl feeling, this is all it 
 amounts to; and yet thclc Similes lo impofe on them, that 
 they fcrve them, for Certainty in themlelves, and Demon- 
 Itration to oti.er?. 
 
 But to examine a little lobcrly this internal 
 Enthupfvi, Light, aiid this Feeling on which they build 
 how to l>c d'lf- fo much. Thclc Men have, they fay, clear 
 covered. Light, and they fee : They have an awaken d 
 
 Scrde, and ihey feel : This cannot, they are 
 fare, be difputeJ them. For when a Man fays he fees or 
 he feel?, no Body can deny it him, t':at he does fc. But 
 here let mc ask : This Seeing, is it the Pcrcepiion of the 
 Truth of the Fropofition, or of this, that it is a Revelation 
 from God ? This Feeling, is it a Perception of an Inclinati- 
 on or Fancy to do Something, or of the Sptrit of God mo- 
 ving that Inclination ? Thefe are two very different Percep- 
 tions, and mult be carefully diftinguilli'd, if we would not 
 impofe upon our fclves. I may perceive the Truth of a Pro- 
 pofiticn, and yet not perceive that is an immediate Revela- 
 tion from God. I may perceive the Truth of a Propolltion 
 in Euc'ul, without its being, or my perceiving it to be a Re- 
 velation : Nay, I nKiy perceive I came not by this Know- 
 ledge in a natural Way, and fo may conclude it rcveal'd, 
 wittiout perceiving that it is a Rcv^elation from God ; becaule 
 there be Spirits wliich, without being divinely commilfion'd, 
 may excite thofe /^ci/in me, and lay them in fucli Order 
 before my Mind, th.it I may perceive their Connexion. So 
 that the Knowledge of ar.y Propolltion coming into my 
 Mind, I know not how, is not a Perception that it is from 
 God. Much lefs is a (bong Perfwafion, that it is true, a 
 Perception that it is from God, or fo much as true. . But 
 however it becall'J Liaht and Seeing, I iuppofe, it is at molt 
 but Belief and Aflurance ; and the Propolltion taken for a 
 Revelation, i? not fuch as they know to be true, but take 
 to be true. For where a Proposition is known to be true, 
 Revelation is needlels : And it is hard to conceive how 
 there can be a Rcvel.Jtion to any one of what he knows al- 
 ready. If therefore it be a Propolltion which they are per- 
 iwaded, but do not know, to be true, whatever they may 
 c:.\\ it, it is not Seang, but Believing. For thefe are two 
 V/ays, wheicby Truth comes into the MinJ, wholly diltind", 
 la that o'.ic is not the ( tlur. What 1 lee 1 ki.ow to be 16 
 yj the Evidciicc of the Thing it fclf j what I believe, I take 
 
 10 
 
Enthufiapn* 021 
 
 to l^e fo upon the Teftimony of another : But this Tcftitnony 
 I inuft know to be given, or elle what Ground have I . of 
 of Betfeving? I muft lee that it is God that reveals this to 
 me, or elfe I lee nothing. The Que/Hon then here is, How- 
 do I know that God is the Revealer of this to me ; that this 
 ImpretTion is mgde upon my Mind by his holy Spirit, and 
 that therefore I ought to obey it? If 1 know not this, how 
 great Ibever the AiTurance is, that I am poilefs'd U'ith, it is- 
 groundlels \ whatever Light I pretend to, it il but an En- 
 thufiafnt* For whether^ the Propofilion fupposd to be re- 
 vcal'd, be in it felf evidently true, or villbly probable, or 
 by the natural Ways of Knowledge uncertain, the Propofi- 
 tion that muft be well grounded, and manifefted to be true, 
 is this, that God is the Kevealer of it, and that what I take 
 to be a Revelation, is certainly put into my Mind by him 
 and is not an lllufion, drop'd in by Ibnie other Spirit, or 
 rais'd by my own Fancy. For if I imliake not, thele Men 
 receive it for true, becanfe they preiiime God rcveai'd it. 
 Does it not then (land them upon, to examine upon what 
 Grounds they prefume it to be a Revelation from God ? Or 
 elfe all their Confidence is rneer Freliunption ; and this 
 Light they are fo dazl'd with, is nothing but an ignis fatuw, 
 that leads them continually round in this Circle. It is a 
 Revelation, hecaufe they firmly believe it ; and they believe it, bc" 
 CHHJc it is a Revelation, 
 
 §. II. In all that is of divine Revelation, p ^j r r 
 there is need of no other Proof, but that it is r^jfsofE-^ 
 an Infpiration from God : For he can neither j^ncethattl" 
 deceive, nor be deceiv'd. But how fhall it be Pioporttion is 
 known, that any Prcpofition in our Minds, is from God. 
 a Truth infus'd by God ; a Truth that is re- 
 veafd to us by him, which he declares to us, and therefore 
 we ought to believe ? Here it is that Emhufiajm fails of the 
 Evidence it pretends to. For Men thus pofiels'd, boaft of a 
 Light whereby, they lay, they are enlighten'd, and brought 
 into the Knowledge of tliis or that Truth. But if they know 
 it to be a Truth, they niuit know it to be fo either by its 
 oWn Self-evidence to natural Rcalon, or by the rational 
 Pi;oofs that make it ought to be fo. \£ they lee and know 
 ij to be a Triith either of thefe two Ways, they in vain 
 iuppofe it to be a I^velation. For they ki.ovv it to be true 
 by the lame Way that any other Man naturally may know 
 that it is iOj without the Help of Revelation. For thus all 
 
 V 3 the 
 
52 2 Enthnfiafm. 
 
 the Tiutli?, of what kind Ibcver, that Men uninfpir J are 
 cnlighrcn'd with, came into their Minds, and arc eftabliihd 
 there, Jf they lay they know it to be true, bccaufe it is a 
 Repclaticn from GoJ, the Reafon is^good : But then it will 
 bpcleinandcJ, how they know it to be a ReztUtion from God ? 
 if they lay by the Light it brinc,s with it, which lliines 
 brigl^t in tl-.eir Minds, and they cannot refift ; I befeech 
 them to confiJer, whether this be any more than what we 
 haye t.iken Notice of already, viz.. that it is a Revelation, be- 
 caufe thev ftrongly believe it to be true. For all the Light 
 'thty Ipcak of, is but a ftronc, tho' ungrounded Perfwalion 
 of their own Minis, that it is a Truth. For rational Grounds 
 'from Proofs that it is a Truth they muft acknowledge to 
 have none, for then it is not receiv'd as a Revelation, but 
 upon the ordinary Grounds, that other Truths are receiv'd : 
 And if they belief it to be true, becaufe it is a Rivelmon, 
 and have no other Reafon for its being a Revelation, but be- 
 caufe they are fully ptrfwaded, without any other Reafon, that 
 It is true, they believe it to be a Rtveinion only becaufe they 
 ilrongly believe it to be a Revelation, wliich is a very uniafe 
 Ground to proceed on, either in our Tenets, or A(f^ions: 
 And what readier V/ay can there be to run cur felvcs into 
 the ninft extravagant Eriors and Mifcarriages, than thus to 
 let up Fancy for our ilipream and lole Guide, and to believe 
 any Propofition to be true, any Aclioii to be right, only 
 becaufe we believe it to be lb ? The Strength of our Pcrfwa- 
 fions arc no Evidence at all of their own Revftitude : Crooked 
 Things may be as IHff anJ unflexible as ftreight j and Men 
 may be as pofjtive and peremptory in Error as in Truth. 
 How come eile the untradable Zealots in dirttrcnt and, op- 
 pofite parties ? For if the Light, which every one thinks he 
 has in his Mind, which in this Calc is nothing but the 
 Strength of his own Ptrfwafion, be an Evidence that it is 
 from God, contrary Opinions may have the fame Title to be 
 Inipiraiions; and Ciod will be not only the Father of Lights, 
 bur of oppofitc and contradictory Lights, leading Men con- 
 trnyWaysj and contradidtoi-y Propofitions will be divine 
 Tiuihs, if an ungrounded Strength of Aflurance be anEvi- 
 dcn' e that any Propofition is a divine Revelation. " 
 
 §. 12. This cannot be other\vifc, yvhilfl 
 
 Firmu,-/: of Firmnefs of Perfwhfion is made the Caufe of 
 
 C-rfv^ifioJi, no Believing, and ContiJtnce of being in the 
 
 Proof thci: n- Right, is made an Arguinent of Truth. St. 
 
Enthujiafin. 523 
 
 Takl himfelf believed lie did well, and that lie ny Propofuioft 
 had a Call to it, when he perfecutcd ihe Chii- ^f>om God. 
 ftians, whom he confidently thought in th.e 
 Wrong : But yet it was lie, and not they, who were mifta- 
 ken. Good Men are Men ftill liable to Millakes, and are 
 fometimes warmly cngag'd in Errors, which they take for 
 divine Truths^ ("hining in their Minds with the cleareft Light. 
 §. 15. Light, true Light in the Mind, is, or ^. ,^ .^ 
 can be nothing elfe but the Evidence of the ji^ Mind 
 Truth of any I-\oporition ; and if it be not a what. * 
 felf-evidei'it Proportion, all the Light it has, 
 or can have, is from the Clcarnefs and Validity of thofc 
 Proofs upon whicli it is receivd. To talk of any other 
 Light in the UnderRanding, is to put our fclves in the Dark, 
 or in the Power of the Prince or Daiknefs, and, by our own 
 Confent, to give our lizlves up to DeluHon, to believe a 
 Lie : For if Strength of Perfvvaficn be the Light which muft 
 guide u?, 1 ask how Hiall any one diitinguidi between the 
 Delufions of Satan, and the Infpivations of the Holy Ghoft ? 
 He can transform himfelf into an Angel of Light. And 
 they who are led by this Son of the Morning, are as fully 
 fatisfy'd of the Illumination, /. e. are as ftrongly perfwaded 
 that they are cnlightenM by the Spirit of God, as any one 
 who is fo : They acquieice and rejoyce in it, are a6led by it; 
 and no Body can be more fure, nor more in the Right, (if 
 their own ftrong Belief may be ]udge) than they. 
 
 §. 14. He therefore that will not give him- 
 felf up to all the Extravagancies of Delufion Revelation 
 and Error, murt bring this Guide of his Li2,ht ^-^fi hjudfd 
 wuhin to the Tryal. God, when he makes the ''/^ Reafvn, 
 Prophet, does not unmake the Man : He leaves 
 all his Faculties in their natural State, to enable him to 
 )udge of his Infpirations, whether they be of divine Original 
 or no. When he illuminates the Mind with fupernatural 
 Light, he does not exftinguilli that which is waturaU If he 
 would have us affent to the Truth of any Propofition, he 
 either evidences that Truth by the ufual Methods of natural 
 Reafon, or elfe makes it known to be a Truth, which he 
 would have us ailent to, by his Authority, and convinces us 
 that' it is from him, by ibme Marks which Reafon cannot 
 be miftaken in. Reafon mull be our iaft judge and Guide 
 in every Thing. I do not mean, that we muft confult Rea- 
 foUj and examine whether a Propoiition reveafd from God, 
 
 Y J. can 
 
5 24 E.nthiffkifm. 
 
 c\\\ be made out by natural Principles; and if it cannot, that 
 then n'C may rc;c:t it : Rut confult it we muft, and by it 
 examine whctlicr it be a Revelation from God or no : And 
 if Rcafon finds it to be reveal'd from God, Reafon tlien de- 
 clares for it, as much as for any other Trutli, and makes it 
 one of Iki Dii^atc?. Every Conceit that throughly warms 
 rur Fancies, muft pafs for an Infpiratien, if there be no- 
 thing but the Strength of our Perfwafions, whaeby to judge 
 of our Perfwafions. U Reafon muft not examine their Truth 
 hy fomcthing cxtrinfical to the Perfwafions themfelves; In- 
 ipirations and Dchifions, Truth and Fallhood, will have the 
 y mc Meafure, and will not be poilible to be diftinguifti'd. 
 §. i<). If this internal Light, or any Propo- 
 Btlief no fition, which under that Title we take for in- 
 Proof of Re- ipir'd, be conformable to the Principles of Rea- 
 velaiion. fon, or to the Word of God, which is attefted 
 
 Revelation, Reafon warrants it, and we may 
 fafely receive it for true, and be guided by it in our Belief 
 and Actions : If it receive no Teftimony nor Evidence from 
 cither of thefe Rules, we cannot take it for a Rcvelariofiy or 
 lo much as for true, till we have fome other Mark that it is 
 a RcveUtion, befides our believing that it is fo. Thus we fee 
 the holy Men of Old, who had Revelaiions from God, had 
 fomething eUe befjdes that internal Light of Affurance in 
 their own Minds, to teftify to them that it was from God, 
 They were not left to their own Perfwafions alone, that thofe 
 Perlwafions were from God, but had outward Signs to con- 
 vince them of the Author of thofe Revelations. And when 
 ilicy were to convince others, they had a Power given them 
 io jufiify the Truth of their Commiffion from Heaven ; and 
 by vifible Signs to afTert the divine Authority of a Meflage 
 they were fent with. A'fofes faw the Bufti burn without be- 
 ing confum'd, and heard a Voice out of it. This was fome- 
 thing bcfidcs finding an Impulfe upon his Mind to go to 
 Pharaoh, that he might bring his Brethren out of Egypt ; and 
 yet he thought not this enough to authorize him to go with 
 that Mefliige, 'till God, by another Miracle of his Rod turn'd 
 into a Serpent, had alTur'd him of a Power to teftify his Mif- 
 f.on by the fame Miracle repeated before them whom he was 
 ic'nt to. Gideon wasient by an Angel to deliver Ifrad from 
 the' Aiide.vnteSy and yet he de'T'd a Sign to convince him, 
 that this Comminion was fiom God. Thefe, and feveral the 
 )}k:' Inftanccs to be found among the Prophets of Old, are e- 
 
 ncugh 
 
Wrong AJJent, or Error. . 325 
 
 nough to lliew, that they thought not an inward Seeing orPer- 
 fwafion of theirown Minds,withoiitany other ProoF, a lufficient 
 Evidence that it was from God^ tho' the Scripture does not eve- 
 ry where mention their demanding or having liich Proofs. 
 
 §. 16. In what I have laid, I am far from denying that 
 God can, or doth fometimcs enlighten Mens Minds in the 
 apprehending of certain Truths, or excite them to good A<5li- 
 ons, by the immediate Influence and AlTilhnce of the hoi/ 
 Spirit, without any extraordinary Signs accompanying it. 
 But in fuch Cafes too we have Reafon and tlie Scripture, uner- 
 ring Rules to know whether it be from God or no. Where 
 the Truth embrac'd is conicmant to the Revelation in the writ- 
 ten Word of God, or the Adion conformable the Dictates of 
 right Reafon^ or holy Writ, we may be aflur'd that we run 
 no Risk in entertaining it as fuch, becaufe though perhaps it 
 be not an immediate Revelation from God, extraordinarily 
 operating on our Minds, yet we are fure it is warrc^nted by 
 that Revelation which he has given us of Truth. But it is 
 not the Strength of our private Peifwafion within our felves, 
 that .can warrant it to be a Light or Motion from Heaven; 
 nothing can do that, but the written Word of God without 
 us, or that Standard of Reafon which is common to us with 
 all Men. Where Reafon or Scripture is exprets for any Opi- 
 nion or Adion, we may receive it as of divine Authority ; 
 but 'tis not the Strength of our own Perfwafions which can 
 by felf give it that Stamp. The Bent of our Minds may fa- 
 vour it as much as we pleafe j that may Qievv it to be a Fond- 
 ling of our own, but will by no Means prove it to be an 
 Ofispring of Heaven, and of divine Original. 
 
 CHAP. XX. 
 
 Of wrong Ajpnty or Error. 
 
 §• !• T7' Knowledge being to be had only of 
 
 JX. vifible certain Truth, Error is not a Cnufes of Er- 
 Faultpf our Knowledge, but a Miftake of our ror. 
 Judgment giving Affent to that which is not true. 
 
 Butif Affent be grounded on Likelihood, if the proper Qb- 
 jedand Motive of our AfTent, he Probability, ani that Pro- 
 bability confiHs in what is laid down in the foregoing 
 Chapters, it will be demanded how Men come to give their 
 
326 JFrong JJpffit, or Error. 
 
 AfTtnts contrary to Probability ? For there is nothing more 
 common, than Contrariety of Opinions j nothing moire ob- 
 vious, than that one Man wholly disbelieves what another on- 
 ly doubts of, and a third fltdfartly believes, and firmly adheres 
 to. The Rcalons whereof, thoue,h they may be very various, 
 yet, I fuppofe, may be all rcduc'd to theie four. 
 
 1. Want of Proofs. 
 
 2. 1 1 ^nt of Ability to fife them, 
 
 3. Want of II ill to ttje thcvt. 
 
 4. Wrong AlcaJHres of Prohahilitj. 
 
 §. 2. Firfl, By Want of Proofs. I do not 
 Firjl, Want mean only the V\ ant of thofc Proofs which arc 
 of P> oofs. no where extant, and fo are no wiicre to be 
 
 had ; but the Want even of thole Proofs which 
 arc in Being, or might be procured. And tlius Men want 
 Proofs, who have not the Convenience or Opportunity to 
 make Experiments and Oblervations themlclves, tending to 
 the Proof of any Propofition ; nor likewife the Convenience 
 to enquire into, and colieit the Te(-liinonics of others : And 
 in tiiis State arc the grcatcft Part of Mankind, wJ!0 are given 
 up to Labour, and cnflav'd to the Necellity of their mean 
 Condition, whole Lives are worn out only in the Provifioni 
 for Living. Thcfe Mens Opportunity of Knowledge and En- 
 t]uiry, arc commonly as narrow as their Fortunes, and their 
 Underftandmgs are but little inftruded,^ whenall their whole 
 Time and Pains is laid out 10 IHU the Croaking of their own 
 Bellies, or the Cries of their Children. 'Tis not to be expect- 
 ed, that a Man who drudges on, all his Life, in a laborious 
 Trade, fliould be more kno\\ing in the Variety of Things 
 done in tlie World, than a Pack-horfe, who is driven con- 
 f-lantly forwards and backwards in a narrow Lane, and dirty 
 Road, only to Market, fhould be skill'd in the Geography of 
 the Country. Nor is it at all more polTible, that he who 
 wants Ltiliire, Books, and Languages, and the Opportunity 
 of converfmg with Variety of Men, iViOuld be in a Conditi- 
 on to collect thofeTetHmonies andObfervations Avhich ate in 
 Being, and are nccelTary to make out many, nay, moft of the 
 Propolitions, that, in the Societies of Men, are jndg'd of the 
 grcatcd Mouitnt ; or to find out Grounds of AlTurance I'o 
 great, as the Belief of the Points he would build on them, is 
 thcuchi ncccfiary. To that a great Part of Mankind are,by the 
 natural and unalterable State of Things in this WorlJ, and 
 the Ccnftiuuion of human Atfairs, unavoidably given ever 
 
 TO 
 
Wrojig AJJejit^ or Error, 527 
 
 to invincible Ignorance of thofe Proofs on which others build, 
 and which are ncceflary to eftablilli thofe Opinions; the great- 
 er Part of Men having much to do to get the Means of Li- 
 ving, are not in a Condition to look after thofe of learned 
 and laborious Enquiries. 
 
 §. 3. What fhall we fiy then ? Are the ^x, • ^. 
 greateft Part. of Mankmd by the Nccemty of p^itZctf 
 their Condition, iub;ected to unavoidable Ig- ^/,^y-^, ^^j^^ ■' 
 norance in thofe Things which are of gieat- ^vmit them^ 
 tft Importance to them ? (for of thofe 'tis obvi- anfwer'd, 
 ous to enquire.) Have the Bulk of Mankind 
 no other Guide, but Accident and blind Chance, to conduct 
 them to their Happinefs or Mifery ? Are the current Opinions, 
 and licensed Guides of every Country, fufficient Evidence and 
 Security to every Man, to venture his greatert Concernments 
 on, nay, his everlafting Happinefs or Mifery ? Or can thofe 
 be the certain and infallible Oracles and Standards of Truth, 
 which teach one Thing in Chriftendomj and another in Tur- 
 key f Or (hall a poor Country-man be eternally happy, for 
 having the Chance to be born in /r<«/> ; or a Day-Labourer 
 be unavoidably lolt, becaufe he had the ill Luck to be born 
 in England i How ready fome Men may be to fay fome of 
 thcfe Things, I will not here examine ; but this I am lure, 
 that Men muft allow one or other of thefe to be true, (let 
 them chule wliich they pleafe) or elfe grant, that God has 
 furnilL'd Men with Faculties fufficient to direct them in the 
 Way they fhould take, if they will but lerioully employ 'em 
 that Way, when their ordinary Vocations allow them the 
 Leifure. No Man is fo wholly taken up with the Atten- 
 dence on the Means of Living, as to have no fpare Time at 
 all to think of his Soul, and inform himfelf in Matters of 
 Religion. Were Men as intent upon this, as they are on 
 Things of lower Concernment, there are none fo enflav'd to 
 the Neceflities of Life, who might not find many Vacancies 
 that might be husbanded to this Advantage of their Knowledge. 
 
 §. 4. Befides thofe whofe Improvements and 
 Informations are rtraiten'd by the Narrownefs People hin- 
 of their Fortunes, there are others, whofe Large- der'dfromEu" 
 nefs of Fortune would plentifully enough fup- J«'7' 
 ply Books, and other Requilltesfor clearing of 
 Poubts, and difcovering of Truth ; bjit they arc cooped in clofe 
 ly the Lam of their Countries, and the ftridl: Guards of thofe 
 whole lateiel-l it is to keep them ignorant, left,kno>ving more, 
 
 tliey 
 
f 
 
 ^28 Wrong Jjpnt, or Error, 
 
 they n-iouU bclicrc t!ie Icfs in thein. Thefe are as far, nay, far- 
 llier from the Lilcrty and OpportHnities of a fair Entjuiry, than thole 
 poor and wretched labourers we before Ipoke of; and, howe- 
 ver ihcy may Icem liigli and great, areconh'n'd to Narrownels 
 of Thought, and ctillav'd in that which lliould be the frccft 
 Part cf Man, their Iilnderlhndings. This is generally 
 the Cale of all ihofc who live in Places where Care is taken 
 to propagate Truth without Knowledge, where Men are 
 Ibrc'd, at a Venture, to be of the Religion of the Country, 
 and nuirt therefore fwallow down Opinions, as fjlly People 
 do Empiricks Pill?, without knowing %vhat they arc made 
 cf, or how they will work, and have nothing to do, tut be- 
 lieve that they will do the Curej btit in this, are much more 
 miferablc than they, in that they arc not at Liberty to rcfufe 
 iwallowing what rcrhapsthey had rather let alone, ortochul'e 
 the Phyhcian to whoii: Conduit they w6uld trurt themfelves. 
 §. <^, Secondly, Thofe who rvant Skill to ufe 
 Feco-ndly^rant thfe Evidences they leave cf Probabilities, who 
 of Skill to life cannot carry a Train of Confequences in their 
 tbem. Heads, nor weigh exadtly the Prcponderancy 
 
 of contrary Proofs and TeHimOni.p, miking 
 every Circiimftance its due Allowance, may be eafily mifled 
 to aiTcnt to Pol'itions that are not probable. There are fome 
 Men of one, fome but of to Syllocifms, and no more; and 
 others that can butcidvance one Step farther. Thefe cannot 
 always difccrn that Side on which the ftrongeft Proofs lie, 
 cannot conllantly follow that which in it felf is the more pro- 
 bable Opinion. Now, that there is fuch a Difierence be- 
 tween Men, in Rcfpccl of their Underrtandings, I think no 
 Cody, who has had any Converlation with his Neighbours, 
 will queHion; though h.e never was at Weflminder-kaU, or the 
 Exchange on the one Hand, nor at Alms-kotifes^ or Bed\im on 
 the other : Wh'ch great Diftcrcnce in Mens Intellectuals, 
 wl.cther it riles from any Defect in the Organs of the B'^dy, 
 particularly adapted to Thinking; or in the Dulncls or Un- 
 rractablcnelsoftliclc Faculties, for wantof Ufe ; or, as fome 
 think, in the natural DiHcrcnccs of Mens Souls themlelves; or 
 fome, or all of thclc together, it matters not here to examine : 
 Only this is evident, that there is a Diftcvcncc of Degrees in 
 Mensl^nderftandinr.s, Apprehcnlions, and Realonings, to fo 
 meat a Latitude, that one may, without doing In;ury to Man- 
 kind, afhrin, that there is a greater Diliance between lome 
 Men and others^ in this Refpcc^, than between lomc Men 
 
 and 
 
Wrong AJfent, or Error, 529 
 
 and fome Bcafls. But how this comes about, is a vSpeciiIiti- 
 on, though of great Coniequence, yet not neceflary to our 
 prefcnt Purpofe. 
 
 §. 6. Thirdly, There are another Sort of Peo- 
 ple that TfAnt Proofs^ not becaufe they are out Thirdly, Want 
 of their Reach, but hecauje they mil not ujc them 5 of Will to tcfe 
 \vho, though they have Riches and Leiliire e- ^"^"'' 
 nough, and want neither Parts nor other Helps, 
 are yet never the better for them. Their hot Puifuit of Plea- 
 fure, or conftant Drudgery in Bufinefs, engages feme Mens 
 Thoughts elfewherej Lazinefs and Ofcitancy in general, or a 
 particular Averfion for Books, Study, and Meditation, keep 
 others from any ferious Thoughts at all; and fome out of 
 Fear, that an impartial Enquiry would not favour thofe O- 
 pinions which beft fuit their Prejudices, Lives, and Defigns, 
 content themfelves without Examination, to take upon Tmlf 
 what they find convenient, and in Farhion. Thus moft Men, 
 even of thole that might do otherwile, pafs their Lives with- 
 out an Acquaintance with, much lefs a rational Affent to 
 Probabilities they are conccrn'd to know, tho' they lie fb 
 inuch within their View, that to be convinc'd of them, they 
 need but turn their Eyes that Way. But we know fome Men 
 will not read a Letter, which is luppos'd to bring ill News ; 
 and many Men forbear to cafl up their Accompts, or fo much 
 as think upon their Eftates, who have Reafon to fear their 
 Affairs are in no very good Pofture. How Men,whofe plenti- 
 ful Fortunes allow them Leifure to improve their Underfiand- 
 ings, can falisfy^ themfelves with a lazy Ignorance, I cannot 
 tell ; but methinks they have a low Opinion of their Soul?, 
 who lay out all iheir Incomes in Provifions for the Body, 
 and employ none of it to procure the Means and Helps of 
 Knowledge, who take great Care to appear always in a neat 
 and fplendid Outfide, and would think themfelves miferabie 
 in coarfe Cloth?, or a patch'd Coat, and yet contentedly fuf- 
 fer their Minds to appear Abroad in a pic-bald Livery of 
 coarfe Patches,^ and borrowed Shreds, fuch as it has pleas'd 
 Chance, or their Country-Taylor, (I mean the common O- 
 pinion ot thofe they have convers'd with) to cloath them in, 
 I will not here mention how unreafonable this is for Men 
 that ever think of a future State, and their Concernment in 
 it, which no rational Man can avoid to do fometiir.es; nor 
 fliall 1 take Notice what a Shame and Confuilon it is, to the 
 greateft Contemners of Knowledge, to be found ignorant 
 
 m 
 
q^o . Wrong Ajjent^ or Error. 
 
 in Things iliey are concern d to know. But this, at Icaft, 
 is worth the Con lid oration of thofe wl,o call themlclves 
 Gentlemen, That however they may tliink Credit, Rdpcvft, 
 Power, and Authority the Concomitants of their Birth and 
 Fortune, yet they will find all theCe ftill carry 'd away from 
 them by Men of lower Condition, who furpafs them in 
 Knowledge. They who arc blind, will always be led by 
 thole that lee, or elfe fall into the Ditch': And he is certain- 
 ly the moft iiibjeited, the mod: enflav'd, who is fo in his 
 Undcrftanding. In the foie-going Inltances, iome of the 
 Caufes have been Hiewn of wrong Ailcnt, and how it comes 
 to pals, that probable Doctrines are not always receiv'd with 
 an Aflcnt proportionable to the Re;ifons which are to be had 
 for their I^robability : But hitherto we have confider'd only 
 liich Probabilities, whofe Proofs do exiR, but do not appear 
 to him that embraces the Error. 
 
 §. 7. Fcunhly, There remains yet the laft 
 Fourthly^ Soxt^ who, cvcn whcre the real Probabilities 
 Jf'rovg Mea- appear, and are plainly bid before them, do 
 l"i"vl- "' not admit of the Convi6lion, nor yield unto 
 xphereof manifeft Reafons, but do either ?:Ti/«'j fuf- 
 
 ^' pend their Af[ent,or give it to the lefs probable 
 
 Opioion. And to this Danger are thofe ex- 
 pos d, who have taken up wong Meafnrcs of Probabilky, which 
 arc, 
 
 1. Propofuions that are not in themfelves certain and evident, 
 Ifit dotiltful and falje, taken Hp for Principles. 
 
 2. Received Hypothejes. 
 
 3. Predomnant Pajjlons, or Inclinations. 
 
 4. Authority. 
 
 Fiyfl Dou^'i ^' ^' ^^^^'> ^'^^ ^'^ ^"'^ firmeft Ground of 
 fnlAoZil- Pi-^^l5ability, is the Conformity any Thing _ 
 »vs tnken fjy "'^^ to our own Konwledge ; elpecially that 
 Piincipus. P-i^"^ ^f our Knowledge which we hav^ en> 
 brac'd, and continue to look on as Princi- 
 I'lc?. Thefe have fo great an InHucncc upon our Opinions, 
 that lis uiiialiy by them we judge of Truth, ai;d mealiirc 
 Probability to that Degree, that what is inconfilknt with 
 !^ our Principles, is fo fir from palTiiig for probable with us, 
 that it will not be allow'd polfible. The Reverence born 
 to thcfe Principles^ is lo great, and iheir Authority fo para- 
 mount to all other, that the Teftimony not only of other 
 MeUj but the Evidence of our ownScuksare often rcjeGlcd. 
 
 V\'h«!i 
 
Wrong AJfent^ or Error. 5 :^ I 
 
 when they offer to vouch any Thing contrary to thefe efta- 
 bliili'd Rules. How much the Dodtrine of innate Principles, 
 and that Principles nrc not to be prov'd or qucRion'd, has, 
 contributed to this, I will nor here examine. This 1 readi- 
 ly grant, that one Truth cannot contradid another ; but 
 withal, I take Leave alio to iaj^, that every one ought very 
 carefully to beware what he admits [ova. Principle^ to'examine 
 it ftriitly, and fee whether he certainly knows it to be true - 
 of it felfby its own Evidence, or whether he does only with 
 Aflurance believe it to be fo upon the Authority of others : 
 For he hath a ftrong Byafs put into his Underftanding, which 
 will unavoidably milguide his Afient, who hatii imbib'd 
 wrong Principles, and has blindly given himfelf up to the Au- 
 thority of any Opinion in it felfnot evidently true. 
 
 §. 9. There is nothing more ordinary, than that Children 
 (liould receive into their Minds Propofitions (elpecially a- 
 bout Matters of Religion) from their Parents, Nurfes, or 
 thofe about them ; which being infiniiated into their unwa- 
 ry, as well as unbyafs'd UnderitanJings, and faften'dby D&^ 
 grees, are at hi\ (equally, whether true or falfe) riveted 
 there, by long Cuftom and Education, beyond all Poffibility 
 of being pull'd out again. For Men, when they are grown 
 up, refleding upon their Opinions, and finding thofe o£ 
 this Sort to be as ancient in their Minds as their very Mcr 
 mories, not having oblerv'd their early Infinuation, ncr by 
 what Means they got them, they aje apt to reverence them as 
 lacred Things, and not toluffer them tobeprophan'd,touch'd, 
 or queftion'd : They look on them as the Urim and Tkummm 
 fet up in their Minds immediately by G O D himfelf, to be 
 the great ?.nd unerring Decider? of Truth and FaOiood, and 
 the judges to which they are to appeal in all manner of 
 Controverfics, 
 
 §. 10. This Opinion of his Principles (let them be what 
 they will) being cncc e[iahli(l}d in any one's Adind, it is ealy 
 to be imagii/d, what Reception any Proportion lliall find, 
 how clearly loever prov'd, that fiiall invalidate their Autho- 
 rity, or at all thwart with thefe internal Oracles : Whereas, 
 the groilell Ablurdities and Improbabilities, being but agree-,, 
 able to li-ich Principles, go down glibly, and are eafjl}^ di*^ 
 ■ geftcd. The great Obftinacy that is to be found in Men firm-'"' 
 ly believing quite [contrary Opinions, though many times 
 equally abfum in the various Religions of Mankind, are as 
 evident a Proof, as they are an unavoidable Gonfequence of 
 
 this 
 
^ 5 ? Wrong Jfpfity or Error. 
 
 this Way of Re.ifoning from receiv'd traditional Piinciples. 
 So that Men will dibL.eIieve their own Eyes, renounce the 
 Evidence of their "^cnfcs, and give their own Experince the 
 Lie, r.it'erth.n aLiniit • f any Thing dilagrceing with thefe 
 i'.cred Tenets. Take an intclli»;cnt RuM^wil, that from the ve- 
 ry Hrli Dawning of any Notions iw his Underftanding, hath 
 had this Principle conlrantly inculcated, z/is:. That he muli 
 believe as the Church ft. e, thole of his Communion) be- 
 lieves, or tlK't the Pope is inhdlibk ; and this he never fo 
 much as heard quelhon'd, 'till at forty or fifty Years old he 
 met witli one of other Principles : How is he prcpar'd eafily 
 to fwaliow", not only again! t all Probability, but even the 
 clear Evidenc ot his Scnlcs, ti c Do6trine ot Tranjubjiamia- 
 tkn i This Principle has luch an Iniltience pn his Mind, 
 that he will believe that to be Flelli, which he fees to be 
 Bread. And what Way will you take to convince a Man 
 of any improbableOpinion he holds,who,with fome Philofo- 
 phcip, hath laid down this as Foundation of a Reafoning, 
 That hemuftbcheve his Reafon (for fo Men improperly call 
 Arguments drawn from their Prniciples) againft their Scnfes ? 
 Let an Enthnfiaj} be principl'd that he or his Teacher isin- 
 fpir'd, and aded by an immediate Communication of the 
 divine Spirit, and you in vain bring the Evidence of cleat 
 Rcafons againft his Dodrine. Whoever therefore have im- 
 bib'd wrong Principles, are not, in Things inconfiftent with 
 thefe Principles, to be movd by the moft apparent and 
 convincing Probabilities, 'till they are fo candid and ingenu- 
 ous to themlelves, as to be pcrfvvaded to examine even thofe 
 very Principles ^ which many never fuBer themfelves to do. 
 
 §. II. Secondly, Next to thele, areMen whofe 
 Secondly^ Underlhndings are cart into a Mold, and fa- 
 Rcceh^d Hy i>,ion'd jult to the Size of a ncciv'd Hypothecs, 
 fothefis. -j-j-jg Diftereixre between thefe and the former,!?, 
 
 that they will admit of Matter c^ Pad, and 
 agree witli Diflenters in that ; but diticr only in afTigning of 
 Rcalons, and cxplaininc, the Manner of Operation. Thefe 
 are not at that open Defiance with their Senles, as the for- 
 mer ; tlicy can endure to hearken to their Information a lit- 
 tle more patiently ; but v\ill by no Means admit of tlnir Re- 
 ports, ill the Explanation of Things ; m^r be pvevail'd on by 
 Probabilities, which wculd convince then;, that Things are 
 not brought about juft after the fame Manner that they have 
 decreed within themfclves that they arc. Would it not ba 
 
 an 
 
Wrong Jfint^ or Error. 333 
 
 an infuffcrableThir.g, for a learn'd ProFelTpr, a.nd that which 
 l)is Scarlet would blufli at, to have his Authority of forty 
 Years llandine, wrought out of hard Rock Greek and Latin, 
 with no fmall Expence of Time and Candle, and confirm'd 
 by geweral Tradition, and a rcrcrend Beard, in an Inftant 
 over-turned by an upftart Novelift ? Can any one expe6^ that 
 he fliould be made to confefs, That what he taught his Scho- 
 lars thirty Years ago, was all Error and Miftake ; and that 
 he fold them hard Words and Ignorance at a very dear Rate? 
 What Probabilities, I fay, are fufficient to prevail in fuch a 
 Cafe? And whoever, by the moft cogent Arguments, will 
 be prcvaii'd with to dilrobe himfelf at once of all his old 
 Opinions, and Pretences to Knowledge and Learning, which, 
 with hard Study, he hath all his Time been lab uring for ; 
 and turn himfelf out (lark naked in Queft a-frelli of riew No- 
 tions ? All the Arguments can be us'd, will be as little able 
 to prevail, as the Wind did with the Traveller, to part with 
 his Cloak, which he held only the fafter. To this of wrong 
 HypothefiSj may be reduc'd the Errors that may be occafion'd 
 by a true Hypothefis, or right Principles, but not rightly un- 
 derftood. There is nothing more familiar than this. The 
 Inftances of Men contending for different Opinions, which 
 they all derive from the infallible Truth of the Sciipture, are 
 an undeniable Proof of it. All that call themfelves ChriMi- 
 ans, allow the Text that fay?, y.nctvo^.Tc,^ to carry in it the 
 Obligation to a very weighty Duty. But yet however erro- 
 neous will one of their Pradices be, who, uiidcrrtandiijg 
 nothing but the French, take this Rule with one Tranflaiion 
 to be repcntes vous, repent j or with the other fatei^ Penitence, 
 do Penance. 
 
 §. 12. Thirdly, Probabilities, which crofs 
 Mens Appetites, and prevailing Pajpons, run the Thirdly, 
 fame Fate. Let never (o much Probability hang P'^^omlmyit 
 on one fide of a covetous Man's Reafoning, ^^P^''^^- 
 and Money on the other, and it is eafy to fore- 
 fee which will outweigh. Earthly Mmds, like Mud-Wal!s, 
 refift the ftrongeft Batteries J and tho', perhaps, fometimes the ^^ 
 Force o^ a clear Argument m.iy make foine Imprefllon, yet r?\ 
 they neverthelefs ftand firm, keep out the Enemy Truth, that *^^ 
 would captivate or difturb them. Tell a Man, paffionateiy 
 in Love, that he is Jilted ; bring a fcore of Witnefles of the 
 Falfliood of his Miftrefs, 'tis ten to one but three kind Words 
 ef hers fbaM invalidate all their Tcftimonies. ^oi volm.ui. 
 
 If fmk 
 
::»54 Wrong AJfent^ or Error, 
 
 fad'e (tel'mM', wl.At J-'.its our Wijhes, is fcrixardly bJ'evd^ is, I 
 lufP'.^k, what every one hath juoic tlian once experimented ; 
 and tho' Men cannot always openly pain-fay, or refift the 
 Force of manifcft Probab" lilies, that make againli tiiem, yet 
 yield they not to the Argumcit ; not but that it is the Na- 
 ture of the Undcrliandirg conHanily to clcfe with the more 
 ] lo'^-.blc lidc. but yet ?. Mm hnth a Power lo lufpend and 
 • iis Enquiries, and r.ot permit a full and i^uisfadtory 
 
 , i:i;iatior-, as far ns the Matter in Qiicrtion is capable, 
 nnd w'.il bcTvr it to b. made. Until that be Otne, theje will 
 be always theie liio U^ys left tf cf^^dtng the M.-ojl afparcm Pro- 
 labih:i:s. 
 
 , §. 1 5. Fir/?, That the Arcumcn'.s beins; (as fof 
 
 The Means ({,g ,,.^{. J , h 3^) broucilu in Words, thre 
 
 1) j.i-iil; , ^^y be a tAMcy latait m thein ; and the Lonle- 
 A/?, SjiTps\{ qucnccs being, perhaps, many m IrMJi, they 
 pAiiicy, iii'-y be Ibme'of them incoherent. There be 
 
 very few Dilcourfes are lb ll-.ort, clear, and 
 donfiftcnt, to winch mofi Men may nor, with Satisfadion c- 
 iiouch to tliemlclves, raiie this Doubt ; and from whole 
 Uminion they may not, without Reproach of Di'incer.uity 
 or Unre.tlonablenels, fct ihemfclves free with the old Reply, 
 I\h/i pcrftjitdelisj ctiatv ft perfn^'jcris ) tho I cannot finjwer^ I mil 
 not )i:ld. 
 
 ^. 14. Secondly, Manife^ Probabilities may 
 
 Secondly, be evaded, and the AfTent with-held upon this 
 Supposed Jr- SiiggcHion, That I burp not yvt all that may le 
 pnncvts for (aid on the contrary fd:. And therefore, tho' I 
 :/js CO. tn/y. ^^ beaten, 'tis not necefTary I fliould yield, 
 not kriovving what Forces there arc i.n Referve 
 beliind. This is a Refuge againll CcuviBion^ fo open and lo_- 
 wi ie, t' at it is hard to determine, when a Man is quite out 
 of t'iC' Verge of it, 
 
 ^. i"^. But yet there is fomf End of it, and 
 
 ^f^{^-'' ^^^~ a Man having car.^fully cnquir d into all the 
 hihlnies de- Grounds of Probability and Unlikclinefs ; done 
 
 'i'v/r ^^^ "^'^•'^^^ ^^ "^^°''^ himlclf in all Particulars 
 
 ^ " ' f.iirly, and caft u\> tl:e Sum total on both fides, 
 
 may in moft Giles come to acknowledge, upon the whole 
 Mitier, en which f;de the Probability rclis ; wherein feime 
 Proc^lsMi Matter of Reafon, being Suppofitioiis upon univerlal 
 txptrieiice, are fo cogent and clear, and (ome Teftimonie? in 
 Matter of Fadl io univerfal, that he cannot rcfufe his Af]ent. 
 
Wrong JJJenty cr Error, 555 
 
 So that, I think, we m^y conclude, that in PropoHtion?, 
 where tho' the Proofs in view are of mort Moment, yet there 
 are fufficient Grounds to fufpeit that there is either Fallacy 
 in Words, or certain Proofs, as conh'dcrable, to be produc'd 
 pn the contrary fide, their AiTent, Sufpenfe, or Dificnr, are 
 often voluntary Adlions : But where the Proofs are fuch as 
 nnake it highly prob-ible, and there is nor luSxie^u Ground 
 to liifpedt, that there is either Fallacy of Words, (wl.ich 
 fober and ferious Confideration may difcovev) nor equally 
 valid Proofs yet undifcover'd latent on the other fide, (which 
 alfo the Nature of the Thing, may, in fome Cafe?, make 
 plain to a confiderate Man) there, I think, a Man^ who has 
 weigh 'd them, canjc^rce refafe his Affsnt to the fide on which 
 the greater Probability appears. ^ Whether it be probab'e, that 
 a promilcuous Juinble of printing Letters fliould often fall 
 into a Method and Order, which (liould ftamp on Paper a 
 coherent Diicourfe 5 or that a blind fortuitous Concourfe of 
 Atoms, not guided by an underftanding Agent, fhould fre- 
 quently conflitute the Bodies of any Species of Animals: 
 In thefe and the like Cafes, I think no Body that confiders 
 them, can be one jot at a liand, which fide to take, nor at 
 all waver in his AfTent. L^ftly, when there can be no Sup- 
 pofition, (the Thing in its own Nature indifferent, and 
 wholly depending upon the Teftimony of Witnefies) that 
 there is as fair Teftiuio'ny againft, as for the Matter of Fact 
 attefted 5 which by Enquiry is to be learn'd, v, g. whether 
 there was 1700 Years agone fuch a Man at Rome as Julim 
 Gtfar : In all fuch Cafes, I fay, I think it is rot in any ra- 
 tional Man's Power to refufe his Aflent ; but that it neccfTa-r 
 rily follows, and doles with fuch Probabilities. In other lefs 
 clear Cafes, 1 think it is in a Man s Power to fufpend his 
 Afent; and, perhap?, content himfelf with the Proofs he has, 
 if they fivour the Opinion tl.at fuits with his Inclination or 
 Intereft, and {0 (tep from farther Search. But tliat a Man 
 fliould afford his AfTent to that fide, on which the lels Pro- 
 bability appears to him, feems to me utterly imprailicable, 
 and as impoflTible, as it is to believe the fame Thing probable 
 and improbable at the fame Time. 
 
 §. f 6, As Knowledge is no more arbitrary jrJjet-e it -k 
 thaa Perccpriou; fo, I think, AiTent is no in our Por.'tr 
 more in our Power than Knowledge. Wlien ta fufpeid it. 
 the Agreement of any two Ideoi appears to our 
 Mindfj wh:th?r imiiiediateiy, or by the AfTift^nC'e cf Rea- 
 
 Z 2 if-'H^ 
 
^^Mf 
 
 5^6 Wrong Affent^ or Error, 
 
 foil, lean no more refiife to perceive, no more avoid know- 
 ing it, tlian I cm avoid feeing; tlioic Objeils which I turn 
 my Eyes to, anJ look on in Day-light : And what, upon 
 full Ex.imination, I find the molt probable, I cannot deny 
 my AHciit to. But tliough we cannot hinder our Know- 
 ledge, where the Agreement is once pcrcciv'd j nor our Af- 
 fent, where the Probability fnanifeftly appeals upon due 
 Confidcration of all the Mcafiircs of it ^ yet vce can kinder 
 hcth Knowledge and Affent^ ly Jtoppin^ onr Enijuiry^ and not 
 employing our Faculties in the Search of any Truth. If it 
 were not io, Ignorance, Error, or Infidelity, could not in a- 
 ny Cifc be a Fault. Thus in feme Cales wc can prevent 
 or fulptnd our Allcnt : But can a Man, vers'd in modern or 
 ancient Hiliory, doubt whether there belijch a Mace as A'rwf, 
 or ^^'hethcr there was fuch a Man as Jnlim C<tfar f Indeed 
 there are Millions of Truths, that a Man is not, or may not 
 tliink himielf conccrnd to know , as wliether our King 
 Rkbtrrd the Third was Crook-back d, or no ; or whether 
 Riger Bacon was a Mathematician, or a Magician. In thefe 
 ana fuch like Giles, where the AlTent, one way or other, is 
 of no Importance to the Intered of any one, no Action, no 
 Concernment of his following or depending thereon, there 
 'tis not (hange that the Mind fhould cive it iclf up to the 
 common Opinion, or render it Itlf to the firit Comer, Thefc 
 and the like Opinions, are of fo little Weight and Moment, 
 that, like Motes in the Sun, their Tendencies are very rare- 
 ly taken No, ice of They are there as it were by Chance, 
 and the Mind lets them float at Liberty. But where the 
 Mind judges that the Prcpofition has Concernment in it j 
 where the AiTcnt, or not Afienting is thought to draw Con- 
 qucnces of Moment after it, and Good or Evil to depend on 
 chufing or rcfufmg the right fide, and the Mini fets it lelf 
 lerioully to enquire, and examine the Probability ; there, I 
 think. It is not in our Choice to take which fide we plcafe, 
 if manilclt odds appear on either. The greater Piobability, 
 1 think, in that Cafe, will determine the Afcnt j and a Man 
 can no mere avoid affenting, or taking it to be true, where 
 he perceive? the greater Probability, than he can avoid know- 
 ing it to be true, where he perceives the Agreement or Dif- 
 grecment of ai.y two Jdatf, 
 
 If this be {'(>, the Foundation of Error will lie in wrong 
 Mcafurc? of Trobibi I ity ; as the Foundation cf Vice in wrong 
 Mealurcs of Good. 
 
 5. 17. Fom/ljfy 
 
Wrong Jjjent^ or Error, 337 
 
 5. 17. Fourthly^ The fourth and laft vorong 
 Mcajure of Prohahilhy I fiiall take Notice of, Fourthly^ An- 
 and which keeps in Ignorance or Error more thonty. 
 People than all the other together, is that 
 which I have mentioned in the foregoing Chapter, I inean, 
 ik\t giving up oar Affent to the common nceivd Opinions^ either 
 of our Friends or Party, Neighbourhood or Country, Hoxv 
 many Men have no other Ground for their Tenets,' than the 
 fuppos'd Honelty, or Learning, or Number of thofe of the 
 fame ProfeHion ? As if honeft or bookilli Men could not err; 
 or Truth were to be eftabliflfd by the Vote of the Multitude ; 
 yet this, with moft Men, ferves the Turn. The Tenet has had 
 the Attcftationof reverend Antiquity ; it comes to me with 
 the Pafl'port of former Ages, and therefore 1 am fecure in 
 the Reception I give it ; other Men have been, and are of the 
 lame Opinion, (for that is all is (aid) and therefore it is rea- 
 Ibnable for me to embrace it. _ A Man may more juRifiably 
 throw^ up Crofs and Pile for his Opinions, than take them up 
 by fuch Meafures. All Men are liable to Error, and moll: 
 Men are, in many Points, by Padlon or Intercft, under Temp- 
 tation to it. If we could but fee the fecret Motives that 
 influenc'd the Men of Nameand Learning in the World, and 
 the Leaders of Parties, we lliould not ahva s find, that it 
 Vv^as the embracing of Truth for its own Sake, that made 
 them efpoufe the Dodrines they own'dand maintained. This 
 at lealtis certain, there is not an Opinion lb abliir'd, which 
 a Man may not receive upon this Ground. There is no Et- 
 ror to be nam'd, which has not had its Profefiors : and a 
 Man iliall never want crooked Paths to walk in, if he thinks 
 that he is in the right Way, wiiere-ever he has the Footftcps 
 of others to follow. 
 
 §. 18. But notwithflanding the great Noife 
 is made in the World about Errors and Opini- M^yi n:t in 
 ons, I muft do Mankind that Right, as to fay, fo>"f-^'y Errors 
 There are not jo many Aden in Errors^ <ind vnrcng ^ ^ nMgm a. 
 Optnims, m is commonly fuppos'd. Not that I 
 think thty embrace the Truth ; but indeed bccaufe concerning 
 t'iiofe Do6trines they keep Inch a Stir about, they have no ^^-' 
 Thought, no Opinion at all. For if any one lliould a litile ' 
 catechize the greateft Part oF the Partiz.ii;s of molt of the 
 Seits in theVVorld, heNVoulJ not find, concerning thofe Mat* 
 ters they are fo zeal, us for, that they have any Opinions of 
 
 their 
 
5 3 3 Div'ffwn of the Sciences. 
 
 tliC'r own, imicli lefs would he have Re.ifon to tliink, that 
 they t( ok them upon the Examination of Arguments, and 
 Appearance of Prc^b.ibiHty. Tliey are rclolv'd to ftick to a 
 Parry that Education or Interell has ciig./^i'J them in; and 
 there, Hkc the common Soldiers of an Army, fhew their 
 Courage and Warauh as their Leaders direct, without ever 
 examining, or fo much as knowii^g the (Jaule tliey contend 
 for. If a Man's Life ("hews that he has no ieious Regard 
 for Religion ; for what Realon fhould we think, tkat he 
 beats his Head about the Opinions of his Church, and trou- 
 bles himfelf to examine the Grounds of this or th:t Do- 
 drine ? 'Tis enough for him to obey his Leaders, to have his 
 Hand and his Tongue ready for the Support of the common 
 Caufe, and thereby approve himfelf to thofc who can give 
 Iiim Credit, Pjcfernier.t, or Protedion in that Society, Thus 
 Men become ProftiTors cf, and Combatants for tliok Opini- 
 ons .thL7 were never coiiviii:'d of, nor Prolelytes to ; no, 
 nor ever had fo n'fuchas floating in their Heads ; and though 
 one cannot lay there arc fewer improbable or erroneous O- 
 pinions in the World than there are, yet this is certain, there 
 are fewer that ailualiy af'ent to them, and mirtake them for 
 •^ Truths, than is imagin'd. 
 
 b 
 
 CHAP. XXL 
 
 Of the D/rifon of the Sciences. 
 
 §. T. A LL that can Fall within the Compafs 
 Three Sorts. /^ of human Undedtandir.g, being ci- 
 
 ther, Fir/f^ The Nature of Thmgs ^? ^''<^y a^^ 
 in themfclvcs, tlieir Relations, and their Manner of Operati- 
 on : Or, Secondly, Thai winch Man himfelf ought to do, as a 
 ration and volnn ary Agent, for the Attainment of any End, 
 cfpecially Happinefs : Or, Tiir.dly^ The Ways and Means 
 whtrcby- the Knowlcilgeof both the one an.l theothcr of ihefe 
 areattain'd and commuuicated : I think Sdcna may Ic di- 
 vided properly into thclii thrge Sorts. 
 
 . 2. Firjfj 
 
Bivifion of the Sciences, ij39 
 
 §, 2. f/r/?, The Knowledge of Things, as 
 they are in their own proper Bejngs, their Con- Fhft, Phy- 
 rtitiuions, Properties, and Operations, where- fi'^a* 
 by 1 mean not only Matter and Body, but 
 Spirits alio, which have their proper Nature?, ConHitutions, 
 and Operations, as well as Bodies. Thi?, in a little more 
 enlarg'd Senfe of the Wf5rd, I call ip'jcnxitj or naturd Philofc- 
 phy. The End of this is ba'C fpeculative Truth, and wliai« 
 foever can afford the Mind of Man any fuch, falls under this 
 Branch, %vhether it be God himfelf, Angels. Spirits, Bodie^ 
 or any of their Affcdions, as Number, and Figure, &c» 
 
 §. :}. Secondly^ Y^f-r/jtyJ, The Skill of right 
 applying our own Powers and A6lions, for Secondly, 
 t! e Attainment of Things good and ufeful Pradica. , 
 The moft confiderable under this Head, is E- 
 thids, which is the leeking out thol'e Rules and Meafurcs of 
 human A6tion?, which lead to Happincl?, and the Means to 
 praftice them. The End of this is not bare Speculation, 
 and the Knowledge of Truth j but Right, and a Condud 
 iuitabie to it. 
 
 §. 4. Thirdly^ht third Branch maybe call'd 
 ffAij.ico\iKr,oi the DcHrine i'f Signs ^ lie moft ulli- Thhly 2h» 
 al whereof being Words, it is aptly enough /^'*'7mj. 
 term'd alio ?.o-'!kv.^ Logick ; the Bufinefs where- 
 of is to confider the Nature of Signs the Mind makes Ufe 
 of for the underrtanding of Things, or conveying its Know-<- 
 ledge to others. For fince the Things the Mind contem- 
 plates are none of them/" befi ies it felf, prefent to the Under-? 
 f-landing, 'tis neceffary that fomething elle, as a Sign crRe- 
 prelentalion of the Thing it confider?, ("h.ould be prefent t© 
 it : And thei'e are Ideoi. And bccaufe the Scene of Ideas that 
 jnakes one Man's Thoughts,cannot be laid open to the imme- 
 diate View of another, nor laid up any where but in the 
 Memory, a no very fure Repofitory ; therefore, to commu- 
 nicate our Thoughts to one another, as well as record them for 
 our own Ufe, Signs of our Ideoi are alfo necefTary. Thcfc 
 which Men have found mort convenient, and therefore gene- 
 rally make Ufe of, are articulate Sounds. The ConOdera- 
 tion then of Ideas and Words, as the great Inftrumentsof 
 Knowledge, makes no deipicable Part ci their Contempla- 
 tion, who would take a View of human Knowledge in the 
 whole Extent of it. And perhaps if they were difiinctly 
 >^'eigh'd, and diily confider'd, they would afford us another 
 
 Sort 
 
^i^o Dwijton of the Sciences. 
 
 Sort of Lop;ick andCiitick, than what \vc have been hitherto 
 
 acquainted witf). 
 
 §. i^. llfs fcems to inc the frjl and rKOJi gene- 
 This is tie ral, ^.s ircH cii natural Divifion of the Objects of 
 f.rP Dh'jfir>n_ oiir Uiidcrfhiiding. For a Man can employ 
 'of the Ohjcffs Ilis Thoughts about nothing, but either the 
 ef Knowledge. Contemplation of Things themfclvc?, for the 
 Difcovery of Truth ; or about tlie Things in 
 fcis own Power, whicli are his, own Aclions^ for the Attain- 
 ment of his own Ends ; or the Signs the Mini makes Ufc of, 
 both in the one and theother, and the right ordering of them 
 for its clearer Information. All which three, viz,. Things zs 
 they arc in themfclves knowable ; Aclions as they depend on 
 u?, in order to Happinefs ; and the right Ufe o^ Signs in or- 
 der to Knowledge, being toto Cff/o difterent, theylcem'dto 
 me to be the three great Provinces of the intellectual Worldj 
 wholly fep.irate anddiftin»5l one from another. 
 
 ■ 
 
THE 
 
 INDE 
 
 The frfl Number is the ^age^ the feconi the SeBion -, Vol 
 is to dijiinguijl} the fecond Volume from the firjt. 
 
 ABbot of St. Mmin, Vol. z. 
 p. 55. §.i6. 
 Abftra<Sion, p. 119. §.9. 
 Puts perfect Di fiance betwixt 
 Men and Beafts, p. iio.§. 
 10. 
 What, Vol. z. p. 4. §. I. 
 Abftradion how, p. 113. §. r, 
 Abftraft Ideas, why made, p. 
 348. §.6, 7,8. 
 Terms cannot be affirm'd one 
 of another, Vol. z. p. 74. 
 §. r. 
 Accidentj p. 243. §. z. 
 A dlionsthe beft Evidence of Mens 
 Principles, p. 33. §.7. 
 But two Sorts of A. p. 191. §. 
 
 4- 
 
 Unpleafaiit may be made plea- 
 fant, and how, p. 2z8. §. 
 69. 
 
 Gannot be the fame in different 
 Places, p. 241. §. II. 
 
 Confider'd as Modes, or as mo- 
 ral, p. 330. §. 15. 
 Adequate Ideas, p. 345. §, i.- 
 and p. 346. §. z. 
 
 Ideas we have not of any Spe~ 
 
 cies of Subftances, Vol. z. 
 p. iSo. §. z6. 
 
 Affirmations are only in Con- 
 crete, Vol. 2, p. 74. §. I. 
 
 Agreement and Difagreement of 
 our Ideas four fold. Vol. 2. 
 p. 122. §. 3. and p. 1 86. 
 
 §• 4i 5» ^1 7- 
 Algebra, Vol. 2. p. 268. §. 15. 
 Alteration, p. 277. §. z. 
 Analogy ufefui in natural Philo- 
 
 fophy, Vol. 2. p. 286. §. 13, 
 Anger, p. i88. §. 12. and 14. 
 AntipathyandSympathy,whence, 
 
 p. 3<56. §.7. 
 A rguments o f four Sorts, i . Jd 
 
 verecurJimi^ p. 271. §. 3. 
 24 Jd ignorantianiy Vol^ t. p. 
 
 306- §. 20. ^ , 
 
 3. M homhiem^ Vol. %. ik §.■ 
 
 21. 
 
 4. Jd jtcdichm, ih. §.22. 
 Arithmetick, theUfe of Cyphers 
 
 in A. Vol. 2, p. 174. §^ 
 19. 
 Artificial Things are moft of 
 'em coUedive Ideas, p. 271- 
 
 §•3- 
 Why we are lefs in Confufioii 
 
 about A. Things, than a- 
 
 9 bout 
 
1 N D E A\ 
 
 K^tit natural, Vol. z. p- <55. 
 
 Have diltinfl Species, ih.^i. 
 AlTentto Maxims, p. i('>. ^. lo. 
 Upon hearing ;ini! unJerl tank- 
 ing tiie Terms, p. zi. §. 17, 
 
 ih. 
 A Mark of Self-eviJence, p. 
 
 zi. §. 18. 
 Not of Innate, p. ^r. §. 18. 
 
 p. iz. §. 19. p. 17, §. i6, 
 
 17. 
 Is tc Proptfitions, Vol. z. p. 
 
 171. §. 3. 
 Ought to be proportion'J to 
 
 the Proofs, Vol. z. p. 316. 
 
 AfT'Ciati)!! of Lleas, p. 3(54. 
 This Affci-.ticn how made, p. 
 
 3^.5. ^. 6. 
 Ill EfFeds of it as to Antipa- 
 thies, p. 366. §. 7. p. 367. 
 §. 8. p. 369. §. 15- 
 
 And this in Seds of Philofc^hy 
 
 and Religion, p. 370. §. 18. 
 
 Its ill InflixMices as lointelle- 
 
 <fhial Habits, p. 369. §. 17. 
 
 Afliiran-e, Vol. z. p. 381. § 6. 
 
 Atheifm in the World, p. 50. §. 
 8. 
 
 Atom, what, p. i8t. §. 3. 
 
 Aiithonty relying on others O- 
 pinions, one great Caufe of 
 Error, Vol. z. P- 337. §• 
 
 B 
 
 BEings, but rwo Sorts, Vol. 
 z. p. 241. §. c 
 The eternal Being nuift be co- 
 gitative, Vol. z. p. 143. §. 
 lo. 
 Belief, what, Vol. z. p. Z74. §. 
 
 To be without Reafon, is a- 
 gahift our I)ut.v, Vol. z. p. 
 3^7 §. z^. 
 
 Beft in r>Mr Opinion, not a Rnfe 
 of God's Adions, p. 55. §. 
 iz. 
 
 Elintl Man, if made to fee, would 
 not know which a Globe, 
 which a Cube by his Sight, 
 tiio' he knew them by his 
 Touch, p. 107. §.8. 
 
 Blood, how it appears in a Mi- 
 crofcope, p. Z5 5. §. ir. 
 
 Biutes have no univerfal Ideas^ 
 p. izo. §. ro, II. 
 Abftracl not, p. izo. §. 10. 
 
 BoJy, we ha/e more primary I- 
 deas of Body, than of Spirit, 
 p. Z59. §. 16. 
 The primary Ideas of Bofly, p. 
 
 100. §. 17. 
 The Extenlion or Cohefion of 
 Body as hard to be imder- 
 ftood, as the thinking of 
 Spirit, p.z6i,z6z, z6^. §. 
 Z3,Z4, Z5,z6, Z7. 
 Moving of the B. by B. as 
 hard to be underftood as by 
 Spirit, p. z6.}. §. z8. 
 What, p. 131. §. II. 
 
 Butjitsfeveral Significations, Vol. 
 2. p. 73. §. 5. 
 
 CApacity, p. 117. §.3. ^ 
 Capacities, to k^now their 
 Extent ufeful, p. Z. §. 4. 
 To cure Scepticifm and Idle- 
 . nefs, p. 4. §. 6. ■ 
 Are fuitcd 10 our preient State, 
 
 p. 5. §-5- 
 Caufe, p. Z76. §. r. 
 
 And Eftlit, rh. 
 Certainty depends on Intuition, 
 Vol. z. p. 131 §. r. 
 Wherein it conJifts, Vol. z. p. 
 
 195- §• 18. 
 Of Tiuih, Vel. z. p. 195- 
 T.J U had in very f.w Propo- 
 
11^ D E X, 
 
 iitions concerning Subftan- 
 ces, VoL z.p. 239. S- 13- 
 "Where to be had, Vol. z. p. 
 
 XII. §. 16. 
 Verbal, Vol. 2. p. 103. § 8. 
 Real, ih. 
 
 Senfible Knowledge, the utmoft 
 Certainty we have of Exi- 
 gence, Vol. z. p. 250. §.2. 
 Changelings, whethet M.^n or 
 no. Vol. 2. p. rpo. §.13, 
 14. 
 Cleamefs alone hinders Confufi- 
 
 on of Ideas, p. 118. §. 3. 
 Clear and obfcure Ideas, p. y-^. 
 
 §.2. 
 ColourSjModes of C. p. i8r. §.4. 
 Comments upon Law, why in- 
 finite, Vol. 2. p. 80. §. 9. 
 Complex Ideas, how made, p. 
 118. §. 6. and p. 124. §. I. 
 In ihefetheMindis more than 
 
 parti ve, p. 124. §.2. 
 Ideas reducible to Modes, Siib- 
 ftances, and Relations, p. 
 124. §. 3. 
 Comparing Ideas, p. 1 1 8. §. 4. 
 Herein Men excel firutes, ib. 
 
 5- 
 Coirpounding Ideas, p. 125. §. 
 
 6. 
 In this is a great Difference 
 
 bftiween Men and Erutes, p. 
 
 126.^.7. 
 Corepulfion, p. 195. §. 13. 
 Confidence, Vol, 2. p. 282. §. 
 
 •7- 
 Confufion of Ideas, wherein it 
 
 confifts, p. 335, 336. §.5, 
 6, 7. 
 Caufes of C. in Ideas, p. 3315, 
 
 ^337' 338. §.7. ^> 9» ^2,. 
 Of Ideas grounded on a Refe- 
 rence to Names, p. 338. §. 
 10, II, 12. 
 Its Remedy, ih. §. 12. 
 C^nfus'd Id-^a^, p'. 335. §.4. 
 
 Confcience is our own Opiiijon 
 of our own Adions, p. ^-i. 
 §.8. 
 
 Confcioufnefs the f.ime, 
 
 C. probably annex'd to the fame 
 individual, immaterial Sub- 
 ftance, p. 296. §. 25. 
 Neceffary to thinking, p.. 71, 
 72. §. 10, II. and p. 77. §. 
 19. 
 What, p. 77. §. in. 
 
 Contemplation, p. in. §. i. 
 
 Creation, p. 277. §. 2. 
 
 Not to be deny'd, becaufe we 
 cannot conceive the Man- 
 ner how, Vol. 2. p. 2-|9. 
 §.19. 
 
 D 
 
 DEfiniiion, why the Genus 
 is usM in Ds, Vol. 2. p. 
 II. §. ro. 
 Defining of Terms would cut ff 
 a gieat Part of Difputes, 
 Vol. 2. p. ()6. §.15. 
 Demonftration, Vol. 2. p. 132. 
 
 §• 3- 
 Not fo clear as intuitive Know- 
 ledge, Vol. 2. p. 133. §. 
 
 4i 6» 7- 
 Intuitive Knowledge neceffary 
 
 in each Step of a D. Vol. 
 
 %. p. 134. §.7. 
 Not limited to Quantity, Vol. 
 
 2. p. 134. §. 9. 
 Why that has been fuppos'J, 
 
 ;-^. p. I -,5. §. 10. 
 Not to be expedled in all Cafes, 
 
 Vol. 2. p. 256. §. 10. 
 What, Vol. 2. p. 273, §. I. 
 Defire, p. 187. §. 6. 
 Is a State of Uneafinefs, p. 
 
 204, 205. §.31, 32. 
 Is mov'J only by Happinv^fs, 
 
 p. 210. §. 41. 
 How fLir^ p. an. §. 43. 
 
 a 2, " HOMT 
 
I N D E J. 
 
 How to be raisM, F'-i3- §• 
 
 Milled by wrong JuJgment, p. 
 zza. §.58. 
 
 DifSionaries how to be made, 
 \'uJ. z. p. 118. §. Z5. 
 
 Difcerning, p. ii(5. §. r. 
 The Foundation of forae gene- 
 ral Maxims, ih. 
 
 X)ifcourfe cannot be between two 
 Men, who have different 
 Names for the fame Idea or 
 different Ideas for the fame 
 Name, p. Sc). §. 5. 
 
 Defpair, p. z8'7. §. 11. 
 
 •Difpofition, p. Z40. §. 10. 
 
 Difputing, The Art of D. pre- 
 judicial to Knowledge, p. 
 
 355, 35^5 357- §• ^> 7' S, 
 
 ^ 9- 
 
 Deftroys the Ufe of Language, 
 Vol. z. p. 94. §. 10. 
 
 Difputes, whence, p. 139. §. z8. 
 
 ' Multiplicity of D. owing tc 
 the Abufe of Words, V^ol. 
 2,. p. lOI. §. 22. 
 Are moft about the Significa- 
 tion of Words, Vol. 2. p. 
 109. §.7. 
 The Way to leiTen Ds, Vol, z. 
 
 ^,., ^2-37- §• ^3- 
 Diltance, p. iz"]. §. 3. 
 
 Difiinft Ideas, p. 335. §. 4. 
 Divifibility of Matter incompre- 
 
 henfible, p. z66. §.31. 
 Dreaming, p. 183, §. r. 
 Seldom in fouie Men, p. 74, 
 §. i^. 
 Dreams for the moft Part irra- 
 tional, p. 75. §. 16. 
 In D. no Ideas but of Senfa- 
 tion and Reflexion, p. '■jC. 
 
 Duration, p. 140. §. I, z. 
 Whence we got the Idea of 
 Duration, p. 141, 142. §. 
 3> 4» 5. 
 
 Not from Motion, p. 145. §. 
 
 16. 
 Its Meafure, p. r46. §.1-7, 18. 
 Any regular Periodical Ap- 
 pearance, p. 146, 147. §. 
 
 ip, 20. 
 None of its Meafures known 
 
 to be exaft, p. 148. §. zr. 
 We only guefs them equal by 
 
 the Train of our Ideas, p, 
 
 148. §. zi. 
 Minutes, Days, Years, &c. 
 
 not neceffary to D. p. ^ ^^. 
 
 5- ^3- 
 Change of the Meafures of D. 
 
 change not the Notion of ir, 
 
 p. 149. §• 13- 
 
 The Meafures of D. as the 
 Revolutions of the Sun,may 
 be apply 'd to D. before the 
 Sunexifled, p. 150, 1 51. §. 
 25, z6, Z7. 
 
 D. without Beginning, p. 1 5 1. 
 §. 27. 
 
 How we may meafure D. p. 
 151, 15Z. §. z8, Z9, 30. 
 
 Recapitulaiion concerning our 
 Ideas of D. Time, and Eter- 
 nity, p. 153. §. 32. 
 
 And Expannon compared, p. 
 154. 
 
 They mutually embrace each 
 other, p, i6z. §. iz. 
 
 Conflder'd as a Line, p. 161, 
 
 §. II. 
 
 Duration not conceiveable by 
 us without Succeflloii, p. 
 163. §. II. 
 
 EDucation partly Caufe of 
 Unreafonablenefs, p. 364- 
 
 E&a, p. Z55. §. ir. 
 £nthufufm, Vol. 2. p. 316. 
 
 De- 
 
INDEX. 
 
 Defcrib'd, Vol. z. p. 318. §. 
 
 6, 7. 
 Its Rife, ih. §.5. 
 Ground of perfwaCon muft 
 
 be examin'd, and hov/, VoJ. 
 
 i. p. 3Z0. §. 10. 
 Firmnefs of it no fufficient 
 
 Proof, Vol. 2. p. }%z, 3x3. 
 
 §• 12-, 13- 
 Enth. fails of the Evidence it 
 pretends to, Vol. 2. p. 321. 
 §.ii. 
 Envy, p. 288. §. 13, 14. 
 Error, what, Vol. 2. p. 325. §. 
 I. 
 -Caiifes of Error, ih. 
 
 1. Want of Proof s, Vol. 2. p. 
 326. §.2. 
 
 2. Want of Skill to life them, 
 ik p. 328.. §. 5- 
 
 3. Want of Will to life them, 
 7'^. p. 329. §. 6. 
 
 4. Wrong Meafures of Proba- 
 bility, ib. p. 330. §. 7. 
 
 Fewer Men affent to Errors, 
 than is fuppos'd, ib. p, 337. 
 §. i8. 
 Effence, real and nominal, \o]. 
 2. p. 21. §. 15. 
 
 Siippofition of unintelligible 
 real EfTences of Species of no 
 Ufe, ih. p. 22. §. 17. 
 
 Real and nominal E. in limple 
 Ideas and Modes, always tlie 
 fame, in Subllances always 
 different, ih. p. 23. §. i8. 
 Eflences, how ingenerable and 
 incorruptible. Vol. 2. p. 23. 
 
 §• 19. 
 
 Specifick Es of mix'd Modes, 
 are ef Mens making, and 
 how, ih. p. 32, 33. 
 
 Tho' arbitrary, yet not at ran- 
 dom, ih. p. 35. §. 7. 
 
 Of mix'd Modes, why call'd 
 Notions, ih. p. 38. §. ri. 
 
 What, Vol, 2. p. 42, §i 2. 
 
 Relate only to Species, ik p. 
 
 ^ 43- §• 4. 
 
 Real Elfences, what, ih. 44J. 
 
 §. 6. 
 We know them not, ih. ^6.' 
 
 ^§•9- 
 
 Our fpecifick Eflences of Sub- 
 ilances, are nothing but 
 Colleftions of fenfible Ideas, 
 
 Vol. Z. p. 51. §. 21. 
 
 Nominal are made by the Mind, 
 
 2^. p. 54. §.26. 
 But not altogether arbitrarily, 
 
 ih. p. 57. ^. 28. 
 Different in feveral Men, ih. 
 Nominal Es of Subftances,how 
 
 made, ik p. 57. §. 28, 29. 
 Are very various, ih. p. 58, 
 
 59* §• 3O' 3r- 
 Of Stjtecies is the abftradt Idea 
 
 the Name ftands for. Vol. 
 
 2. p. 14. §.12. 
 Is of Man's making, Vol. 2.- 
 
 p. 19. §. 14. 
 Eur founded in the Agreement 
 
 of Things, Vol. 2. p. 17. §. 
 
 13- 
 Real Es determine not our 
 
 Species, ih. 
 Every diftind abftrad: Idea 
 
 with a Name, is a diftinft 
 
 E. of a diftind Species, Vol. 
 
 2. p. 19. §. 14. 
 Real Es of Subftances not to 
 
 be known, Vol. 2. p. io8. 
 
 Effential, what, Vol. 2. p. 42. 
 
 §. 2. and p. 44. §. 5. 
 Nothing E. to Individuals,VoI. 
 
 2. p. 43. §. 4. 
 But to Species, Vol. 2. p. 44. 
 
 Eflential Difference, what,VoI. 
 2. p. 44. §. 5. 
 Eternal Verities, Vol. 2. p. 258. 
 
 §.14. 
 Eternity in our Difputes, and 
 Rca- 
 
INDEX. 
 
 RMfonings abont it, why 
 ■«i-e ar« Aj^t to Blunder, p. 
 340. §.15. 
 
 "VHience we get its Idea, p. 
 I5r. §. 28. 
 Evil, vvhar, p. 210. §. 42. 
 Exigence, an Idea of iJenfaticn 
 and Rtfledjon, p. 94. §. 7. 
 
 Our own E. we know intui- 
 tively, Vol. z. p. 238. §. 2. 
 
 And cannot d ubt of, ilt. 
 
 Of created Tilings, knowable 
 only by our Senfes, Vol. 2. 
 p. 250. §. I. 
 
 Fall E. known only by Memo- 
 ry, Vol. 2. p. 256. §. ir. 
 
 Expanfion boundlufs, p. 154. §. 
 
 2, 
 
 Sho\il(l be apply'd to Space in 
 general, p. 138. §. 27. 
 Experience often helps us where 
 we think not it does, p. 
 107. §.8. 
 Extafy, p. 183. §. r. 
 Extenfion, we have no dinincl 
 Ideas of very great or very 
 little E. p. 34r. §. r-^. 
 Of Body incomprehenfibk?, p. 
 
 zCn. $. 2-;. 
 Denominations from Plac- 
 aml E. are many of them 
 Relatives, p. 279. §. 5. 
 and p. i2-». §, 2. 
 And Body not the fame Thing, 
 
 p. 131. §. ir. 
 Its Definition infignificant, p. 
 
 Of P.oJy, and of Space, how 
 difiinguirti'd, p. 89. §. 5. 
 and p. 138. §. 21. 
 
 ^^Aoulties of rfie Mind firft 
 
 cxercisM, p 122. ^. 14. 
 Are but Powers, p. 192. §. 6 
 Operate not, p. 197, \r,b. §. 
 i^, 20. 
 
 Faith atid Opilnion as 'Ufiin- 
 guifli'd from Know'lciige, 
 what, Vol. 2. p. 274. §. z. 
 
 And Knowledge their Diffe- 
 rence, /^. §.3. 
 
 What, Vol. 2. p. 287. §. 14. 
 
 Not oppofite to Realbn, Vol. 
 
 2. p. ^07. §. 24. 
 
 And Reafon, Vci. 2, p. 308. 
 
 As contra diftinguifh'd to 
 Reafon, what, Vol. t. p. 
 308. §. 2. 
 
 Cannot convince us of any 
 thing contrary to our Rea- 
 fon,Vol.2. p. 311. §. 5,<^,8. 
 Matter of F. is only Divine Re- 
 velation, Vol. 2, p. '?r2. 
 §.6. 
 
 Things above Reafon are only 
 proper Matters of F. Vol. 
 
 ^' V- 3^3) 'bH- §. 7- 9' 
 Faifhood, Vol. 2. p. if^9. ^?q. 
 
 Fear, p. 187. §. 10. 
 
 Figure, p. 128. §. 5, 7. 
 
 Figurative Speech and Abufe of 
 
 Language, Vol. 2. p. 106. 
 
 ^. . §• 34- 
 
 Finite and Infinite made of Quan- 
 tity, p. 167. §. I. 
 All pohtive Ideas, of Quan- 
 tity F. p. 17 r. §. 8. 
 
 Forms fubnantial F. diflin- 
 guifh not Species, Vol. 2. 
 p. rr. §. 10. - 
 
 Free, hew far a Man is F. p. 
 
 I09. §. 21. 
 
 A Man not free to will, or 
 not to will, p. 200. § . 22, 
 23, 24. 
 Freedom belongs only to A- 
 g-nts, p. 198. §. ip. 
 Wherein it conhlls, p. 202. §. 
 27. 
 Free-will Liberty belongs not 
 to the Will, p. 195. §. 14. 
 Wherein confiHs that whicli 
 is call'd F. p. 2rd. §. 47. 
 C. 
 
I ND E J. 
 
 GEneral Ideas how made, p. 
 IIP- §-9. , ^, , 
 Knowledge what, Vol. z. p. 
 
 184. §. 31. 
 Proportions cannot be known 
 to be true, without knowing 
 the EfTence of the Species, 
 
 Vol. 2. p. 2^01. €. 4. 
 
 2. p. 
 
 Words how made. 
 
 d, 7. §. 6, 7, '8. 
 Belong only to Signs, ik p. 
 
 iz. §. II. 
 Gentleman fhould b e ignorant. 
 
 Vol. z. p. 329. §. 6. 
 Genus and Species what, Vol. 2. 
 
 p. II. §. 10. 
 Are but Latin Names for Sorts, 
 
 Vol. 2. p. 36. §. S. 
 Is but a partial Conception of 
 
 what is in the Species, Vol. 
 
 2. p. 60. §.32. 
 And Species adjufled to the 
 
 End of Speech, Voh 2. p. 
 
 61. §. 33. 
 And Species are made in order 
 
 to general Names, Vol. 2. 
 
 p. 64. §. 39. 
 Generation, p. 277. §. 2 
 God immoveable,becauIe infinite, 
 
 p. 260. §. 21. 
 Fills Immenfity, as well as E- 
 
 terniiy, p. 155. §.3. 
 His Duration not like that of 
 
 the Creatures, p. 162. §. 
 
 12. 
 An Idea of G. not injiate, p. 
 
 50. §.8. 
 The Exillen<:e of G. evident 
 
 and obvious to Nature, p. 
 
 52. §. p. 
 The Notion of a G. once got, 
 
 is the likelieft to fpread,ahd 
 
 be continu'd, p. 52, 54. §. 
 
 9, ro. 
 Idea of G. late and imperfea, 
 
 Contrary, p. 57. §. 15. 
 Inconfillent, p. 57. §.15. 
 The bed Notions ofG. got by 
 Thought and Application, p. 
 
 5^. §-15. 
 Notions of G. frequently not 
 
 worthy of him, p. 58. §. 16. 
 The being of a G. certain, /^. 
 As evident as that the three 
 
 Angles of a Triangle are e- 
 
 qual to two right ones,g. 65. 
 
 §.22. 
 The Being of a G. demoa- 
 
 ilrable. Vol. 2. p. 239, 
 
 241. §. r, <5. 
 More certain than any other 
 
 Exiftence without us^ Vol. 
 
 2. p. 241. §. 6. 
 The Idea of G. not the only 
 
 Proof of his Exillence, ik 
 
 §• 7- 
 The Being of a G. the Foun- 
 dation of Morality and Di- 
 vinity, ib. 
 • Not material. Vol. 2. p. 243. 
 
 How we make our Idea of God, 
 p. 267. §. 33, 34. 
 Gold is fix'd i the various Sig- 
 nification of this Propofition, 
 Vol. 2. p. 70. §. .50. 
 Water flrain'd through it, p. 
 88. §. 4. 
 Good and Evil, what, p. 185. 
 
 The greater G. determines 
 
 not the Will, \\ X05, &c. 
 
 ^' 35, 3^, 44- 
 Why, p. ai2 §. 44, 4(5. p. 
 
 22z.§. 59, <5o, 64, <55,<-8. 
 Twofold, p. 223. §. 6r. 
 Works on the Will only by 
 
 Defire, p. 213. ^. 4<5. 
 Defirs of G. ho%v to be rais'd, 
 
 p, 213. §. 4<i, 47- 
 
 H 
 
INDEX. 
 
 H 
 
 HAbit, p. 240. §. 10. 
 Habitual Adliuns pafs ofcen 
 without our Notice, p. ic8. 
 §. 10. 
 Hair, how it appears in a Mi- 
 
 crofcope, p. 2,55. §. 11. 
 Happinefs, what, i\ zio. §. 4s- 
 ■WhatH. Menpurlue, p. 211. 
 
 §• 43- 
 How we come to reft in nar- 
 row Happinefs, p. zii.§. 59. 
 
 Hardnefs, what, p. 88. 5' 4- 
 
 Hatred, p. 186. §. 5. aud p. i88 
 §.14. 
 
 Heat and Cold, how the Senfati- 
 on of them both is produc'd 
 by the fame Water, at the 
 fame Time, p. 10 1. §. zi. 
 
 Hifiory, what H. of molt Au- 
 thority, Vol. 2. p. 284 §. 
 II. 
 
 Hope, p. 1 87. §. 9. 
 
 Hypothefis their Ufe, Vol. a. p. 
 267. §. 13. 
 Are to be built on Matter of 
 Fact, p. 71. §. 10. 
 
 ICE and Water, whether diftincl 
 Spscies, Vol. 2. p. 49. §. 13. 
 Liea, what, p. 97. §. 8. 
 
 Is their Oiiginal in Children, 
 p.48. §. 2. 
 
 None innate, p. 59. §. 17. 
 
 Becaufe not remember 'J, p. 61. 
 §. 20. 
 
 Aie what the MinJ is em- 
 ploy 'd about in thinking, 
 p. 6r. §. J. 
 
 All from Senfation or Reflexi- 
 on, p. 67. §. 2. 
 
 Their way of getting, obferva- 
 bie in Children, p. 69 §. 6. 
 
 Why feme have more, l'om;> 
 fcw«r, p. 70. §. 7. 
 
 Of Reflexion got late, and ii: 
 
 fomc very negligently, p. 
 
 70. §. 8. 
 Their beginning and Increafe 
 
 in Cliildren, p. 78. §. 21, 
 
 22, 23, 24. 
 Their Original in Senfation 
 
 and Reflexion, p. 79. §. 24. 
 Of one Senfe, p. 85. §. i. 
 Want Names, p. 85. §. 2. 
 Of more than one Senfe, p. 
 
 90. §.i. 
 Of Reflexion, p. pr. §. r. 
 Of Senfation and Reflexion, 
 
 p. pr. 
 As in the MinJ, anJinThings 
 
 muft be diftinguilh'd, p. 97. 
 
 §• 7. 
 Which firft accidental, not 
 material to know, p. lod. 
 
 Of Senfation alter'd by the 
 
 Judgment, p. 107. §. 8. 
 Principally thofe of Sight, p. 
 
 108. §. 9. 
 Of Reflexion, p, 122. §. 14. 
 Simple I. Men agree in, p. 
 
 139. §. 28. 
 Move in a regular Train of our 
 
 Minds, p. 144. §. Ii. 
 That have Degrees, want 
 
 Names, p. 181. §■ 6. 
 Why fome have Names, and 
 
 others not, p. 182.- §-7. 
 Original, p. 234. §• 73« 
 All csmplex Is refilvable into 
 
 hmple, p. 254. §. 9. 
 What funple Is have been moft 
 
 m.:>dify'd, p. 254. §• 10. 
 Our complex I. of God, and 
 
 other Spirits, coaunon in e- 
 
 very Thing but Infinity, p. 
 
 268. §. 30. 
 Clear and oUcure, p. 334. §. 
 
 •> 
 
 Diftin*.^ and confus'J, p. 335^ 
 
INDEX, 
 
 May be clear in one Part^ and" 
 obfcure in another, p. 339. 
 
 §• 13- 
 Real and fantaftical, p. 343. 
 
 §.i. 
 Simple are all real, p. 343. §• 
 
 i. 
 And adequate, ih. 
 What I. of mixt Modes are 
 
 fantaftical, p. 344. §. 4. 
 What 1. of Subflances are fap- 
 
 taflical, p. 345. §. 5. 
 Adequate and inadequate, p. 
 
 345. §. r. 
 
 How faid to be in Things, p. 
 
 346. §. X. 
 
 Modes are all adequae I. p. 
 
 347' §• 3- 
 Unleis as referr'd to Names, p. 
 
 ^^|§.4.5. 
 
 Of Subllances inadequate, p. 
 
 353. §. ri. 
 I. As referr'd to real EfTences, 
 
 p. 344. §, d, 7. 
 z. As referr'd to a Colledion 
 
 of fimple Ideas, p. 351. §. 
 
 o. 
 Simple Ideas are perfeft ckti- 
 
 ^tf, p- 353- §• I*- 
 Or Subflances are perfeft «k- 
 
 rvTA ih. §• 1 3 • 
 Of Modes are perfeft Arche- 
 
 types, p. 354. §. 14. 
 True or falfe, w, . 
 When falfe, p. 3<5r, &c. §. 
 
 XI, XX, 23, X4, X5. 
 As bare Appearances in the 
 
 Mind, neither true i!br falfe, 
 
 ^ P- 345. §. 3- 
 
 As referr'd 10 other Mens I- 
 deas, or to real Exiflence, 
 or to real Effences, may be 
 true or falfe, p. 355. §.4, 
 
 5- 
 The Reafon of fu:h Reference, 
 
 p. 356. §. 6, 7, 8. 
 Simple 1. referi'd to other 
 
 Mens I. leaft apt to be falfe, 
 
 ^P-357- §-9- 
 
 Complex ones in this Refpeft, 
 mere apt to be falfe, efpeci- 
 ally thofe of mix'd Modes, 
 
 ^.P- 357- S' ". ' 
 
 Simple I. referr'd to^xiflence, 
 
 are all true, p. 358. §. 14, 
 
 16. 
 Tho' not Refemblances, p. 
 
 359. §. 15- 
 
 Tho' they Ihould be diff.rent 
 in different Men, p. 359. §» 
 15. 
 
 Complex Ideas of Modes are 
 all true, p. 360. §. 17. 
 
 Of Subflances when falfe, p. 
 363. §.z6. 
 
 When right or wrong, ih. 
 
 That we are uncapable of. 
 Vol. X. p. 177. §. X3. 
 
 That we cannot attain, be- 
 caufe of their Remotenefs, 
 Vol. X. p. 178. §. X4. 
 
 Becaufe of their Minutenefs, 
 Vol. X. p. 179. § X5. 
 Simple have a real Confor- 
 mity to Things, Vol. x. p. 
 186. §. 4. 
 
 And all others but of Subflan- 
 ces, ik §. 5. 
 
 Simple cannot be got by Words 
 of Definitions, Vol. x. p. 
 x8. §. 1 1. 
 
 But only by Experience, Vol. 
 X. p. 30. §. 14. 
 
 Of mixt Modes, why moft 
 compounded, Vol. x. p. 39 
 
 §• 13- 
 Specifick of mix'd Modes, how 
 
 at firft made, Initance of 
 
 Kinneah and Nioufh, VoLXc 
 
 p. 66. §.43. 
 Of Subflances, Inflance in Za- 
 
 hab^ Vol. X. p. dp. §, 47. 
 Simple I. and Modes have all 
 
 abflra^, as well as^ con' 
 
I N D E X. 
 
 Crete Names, Vol. z. p. 74. 3 
 
 CH Subflances have fcarce an.v 
 
 concrete Names, Vol. z. \>. 
 
 7f §.:^. 
 Diftl*rent in different Men,Vo]. 
 
 z p. 82. §.13. 
 Our Is almoll all relative, p. 
 
 1 00. §. 3. 
 Particulararefirfl in the Mind, 
 
 Vol.r. p. 116. §. 9. 
 General are imperfeft, ih. 
 How pofitive Ideas may be 
 
 from private Caufes, p. <)6. 
 
 $• 4- 
 
 Idenycal Propofitions teach nc- 
 
 tiiing. Vol. i. p. lip. §. 2. 
 Identity not an innate Idea, p. 
 
 4^- §■ 3' 4' 5- 
 And Diverfjty, p. a8o. 
 Of a Plant wherein it confifls, 
 
 p. i8r. §. 4. 
 Of Animals, p. 283. §.5* 
 Of a Man, p. 283. §. 6, 8. 
 Vnity of SubftaJice does not 
 
 always make the fame Idea, 
 
 p. 284. §. 7. 
 Perfonal I. p. 28(5. §. p. 
 Depends on the f.iine Confci- 
 
 oufnefs, p. 287. §. ro. 
 , Continu'd Exillence makes I- 
 
 dentity, p. 299. §. 29. 
 And Diverfity in Ideas the 
 
 firll Perception of the Mind, 
 
 Vol. 2. p. I2i. §. 4. 
 JJeols and Madmen, p. 121. §. 
 
 IX. 
 
 Ignorance, our I. infinitely ex- 
 ceeds our Knowledge, Vol. 
 i. p. 176. §. 22. 
 Catilfs of I. Vol.2, p. 177. §, 
 '> -♦ 
 
 I. \ox want of Ideas, ;/'. 
 
 X Fut want of d!lcoverr»bic 
 Connexion beiween the I- 
 rieas w: havCjVo!. i.p i8i- 
 
 For want of tracing tl)e I- 
 
 deas we have, V^ol. 2. p. 
 
 183. §.30. 
 illation, what, Vol. 2. p. 288. 
 
 § 2. 
 Immenliiy, p. 127. §. 4, 
 How this Idea is got, p. 168. 
 
 §• 3- 
 Immoralities of whole Nations, 
 
 p. 34. %, 9. and p. 35. §. 
 
 lo. 
 Immorality not anncx'd to any 
 
 Stiape, Vol. 2. p. 191, §. 
 
 15- 
 
 Impenetrability, p. 86. §. f . 
 Lnpofition of Opinions unreafo- 
 nible, Vol. 2. p. 279. §. 
 
 4. 
 Impogihile eji idem ejfe^ &* non 
 
 ejfcy not the firft Thing 
 
 known, p. z6, §. 25. 
 Impoflibility not an innate Idea, 
 
 p. 48. §.3. 
 Impreffion on the Mind, what 
 
 p. 14- §• 5. 
 
 Inadequate Ideas, p. 345. §. t. 
 
 Incompatibility how far knowa- 
 ble, Vol. 2. p. 171. §. 15. 
 
 IndlvUnatknh Principium, is Ex- 
 iftence, p. 281. §. 3. 
 
 Infallible Judge of Controverfies, 
 p. 41. §. 12. 
 
 Inference, what, Vol.2, p. 288. 
 §. 2, 3, 4. 
 
 Infinite, why the Idea of I. not ' 
 applicable to otiier Ideas, as 
 well as thofe of Quantity, 
 Iii#e they can bi as often 
 repeated, p. 170. §.6. 
 The Idea of Infinity of Space 
 or Number, and the Space 
 or Number I. mud be dillin- 
 guifliV, p. 171. §. 7. 
 Our Idea of infinite veiy ob- 
 
 Lure, p. 17 r. §.8. 
 Number fi.irHilhes us with the 
 clear- 
 
1 N D E I-, 
 
 cleareftl.oflnfinire, p. 175. 
 
 S' 15. 
 
 The Idea of L a growing I- 
 dea, p. 173. §. 12. 
 
 Our Idea ©f I. partly pofitive, 
 partly comparative, partly 
 negative,, p. 175. §.15. 
 
 "Why fome Men think they 
 have an Idea of infinite Du- 
 ration, but not of infinite 
 Space, p. 178. §. 20. 
 
 Why Dif^utes about I. are u- 
 fually perplex'd, p- 179. §. 
 ii. 
 
 Our Idea of Infinity has its 
 Original in Senfation and 
 Reflexion, p. 179. §. zz. 
 
 We have no pofitive Idea of I. 
 p. 134, &c. and p. 3.J1. §. 
 16. 
 Infinity, why more comnwnly al- 
 iow'd to Duration, than to 
 £xpaniion, p. 155. §. /j. 
 
 How applyM to God by us, p. 
 1(57. §. I. 
 
 How we get this Idea, ih. 
 
 The I. of Number, Duration, 
 
 afld Space, different Ways 
 
 cqnfider'd, p. 161. §. 10,11. 
 
 Innate Truths muft be the firfl 
 
 known, p. 27. §, z6. 
 
 Principles to no Purpofe, if 
 Men can be ignorant or 
 doubtful of them, p. 3-7. §. 
 
 Principles of my L. Herlert 
 
 examin'd, p. 40. §. 15. 
 Moral Rules to no Purpofe, if 
 
 effauable or alterable, p. ^^ . 
 
 §- 20. 
 Propofuions muft be diftiii- 
 
 guifh'd from others by their 
 
 Clearnefs and Ufefulnefs, p. 
 
 6z. §.zi. 
 The poSrine of I. Principles 
 
 of ill Confequence, p. (55. §. 
 
 Inftant, what, p. 143. §. rp. 
 And continual Change, p. 144. 
 §.13, 14, 15. 
 Intuitive Knowledge, Vol. 2. p. 
 131. §. r. 
 Our iiigheH Certainty, Vol. 2. 
 p. 287. §. 14. 
 invention, wherein it conliits, p. 
 
 9. 
 Joy, p. 187. §. 7. 
 Iron of what Advantage to Man- 
 kind, Vol. 2. p. 2(55. §• "• 
 Judgment, wrong Judgments in 
 Reference to Good and £vil, 
 p. 222. §. 5. 
 Right I. it. §, 58. 
 One Caufe of wrong J. Vol. ^ 
 
 p. 278. §. 3. 
 Wherein it conlilU, Vol. z. p. 
 
 K 
 
 KNowIedge has.a great Con- 
 nexion with Words, Vol. 
 
 2. p. roo. §. zi. 
 What, Vol. z. p. 121. §.^. 
 How much our K, depends an 
 
 our Senfes, Vol. 2. p. 1 17. 
 
 ^.23. 
 AAual, VcJ.2. p. 127. 5.8. 
 Habitual, ih. 
 Habitual twofold, Vol s. p. 
 
 128. §. p. 
 Intuitive, Vol. 2. p. 131. §. 
 
 r. 
 Intuitive the cleareft, ih. 
 Intuitive irrefiftible, ib. 
 Demonilrative, Vol. 2. p. 132.. 
 
 §•2-, 
 Of general Truths h all other 
 
 intuitive or demonftrative, 
 
 Vol. 2. p. 137. §. '4- 
 Of particular Exiftences is fen" 
 
 fitive, ih. 
 Clear Id«as Jo not always pro- 
 b 7^ 'ilif 
 
INDEX. 
 
 dnce clear Knowledge, VoL 
 
 z. p. 138. 5. 15. 
 What kind of K. we have of 
 
 Nature, p. zs'j. §. iz. 
 Its Beginning and Progrefs, p. 
 
 IZ2. §. 15, 16, 17. and p. 
 
 19. §. 15, 16. 
 Given us in the Faculties to 
 
 obtain it, p. 55. §. 12. 
 Mens K. according to the Em- 
 ployment of their Faculties, 
 
 p. 65. §. 22. 
 
 To be got only by the Applica- 
 tion of our own Thought 
 to the Contemplation of 
 Things, p. 64. §. 23. 
 
 Extent of human K. Vol. z. 
 p. 138. 
 
 Our K. goes not beyond our 
 Ideas, Vo!. 1. p. 13S. §. i. 
 
 Nor beyond the Perception of 
 their Agreement or Difa- 
 greement, Hid. §. 2. 
 
 Readies not to all our Ideas, 
 Vol. 2. p. 139. §. 3. 
 
 Much lefs to the Reality of 
 Things, ihiit. §. 6. 
 
 Yet very improveable, if right 
 Ways were taken, ihid. 
 
 Of Co-exiftence, very narrow, 
 Vol. 2. p. i6S. §. 9, ro, n. 
 
 And tlierefore Subltances very 
 narrow, Vol. 2. p. 170. 
 
 §• 14, ^5, i^- 
 Oi other Relations undermina- 
 
 b!e, Vol. 2. p. 173. §. 18. 
 Of Exiflence, Vol. 2. p. I'jS. 
 
 §.21. 
 Certain and univerfal, where 
 
 to be had. Vol, 2. p. 182. 
 
 §.29. 
 ill Ufe of Words a great hin- 
 
 deranceofK. Vol.2, p. 183, 
 
 General, where to be got, Vol. 
 
 z. p. 184. §. 31. 
 Lies only in our Thoughts, 
 
 Vol. 2. p. 209. §. 13. 
 
 Reality of our K. Vol. 2. p. 
 
 184. 
 Of Mathematical Truths, how 
 
 real, Vol. 2. p. 187. §. 6. 
 Of Morahty real, il>iJ. §. 7. 
 Of Subflances, how far real, 
 
 Vol. 2. p. 190. 5. 12. 
 What maVes our K- real, Vol. 
 
 2. p. 185. §. 3. and p. 187. 
 
 §. 8. 
 Confidering Things, and not 
 
 Names, the Way toK. Vol. 
 
 2. p. 190. §. 13. 
 Of Subftances, wherein it con- 
 
 fifts. Vol. 2. p. 199. §. 10. 
 What requir'd to any tolerable 
 
 K. of Subflances, VqI. 2. p. 
 
 209. §. 14. 
 Self-evident, Vol. 2. p. 212. 
 
 §.2. 
 Of Identity and Diverfiry, as 
 
 large as our Ideas, Vol. 2. 
 
 p. 168. § 8. and p. 213. 
 
 §• 4- 
 
 Wherein it confifls, ihU. 
 Of Co-exiflence, v ry fcanty, 
 
 Vol. 2. p. 115. §. 5. 
 Of Relations of Modes not fo 
 
 fcanty, ik §. 6. 
 Of real Exiftence, none, ihiti. 
 
 §•7- 
 Begin$ in Particulars, Vol. 2. 
 
 p. n8. §. II. 
 Intuitive of our ox*n Exi- 
 
 ilencc. Vol. 2. p. 238. §. 2. 
 Demonftrative of a God, Vol. 
 
 Z. p. 239. §. I. 
 Improvement of K. Vol. 2. p. 
 
 259. 
 Not improv'd by Maxims, it. 
 
 $• ^ 
 
 Why fo thought, ih. §. 2. 
 K. only improv'd by perfefting 
 
 and comparing Ideas, Vol. 
 
 ^. p. 262. §. (5. and p. 267, 
 
 ^ ^ Ana 
 
INDEX 
 
 And finding their Relations, 
 Vol. 2. p. z6z. §. -7. 
 
 By intermediate Ideas, Vol. z. 
 p. 267. §. 14. _ 
 
 In Subfbinces how t© be ini- 
 prov'd, Vol. a. p. z6z. §. 
 
 7- 
 
 Partly neceffary, partly volun- 
 tary. Vol. z. p. 269. §. I, 
 z. 
 
 Why fome, and fo little, Vol. 
 z. p. 270. §. 3. 
 
 How encreas'd. Vol. i, p. 
 z8i. §. d. 
 
 LAnguages, why they Change, 
 / p. 238. §. 7. 
 Wherein it confifts, Vol. 2. 
 
 p. I. §. 1,2,3. 
 Its Ufe, Vol. 2. p. 35. §.7. 
 Its ImperfeftioMS, Vol. 2. p. 
 
 8p. §. r. 
 Double Ufe, ik 
 The Ufe of L. deflroy'd by the 
 
 Subtilty of Difputing, Vol, 
 
 2. p. 94. §. 10, II. 
 Ends of L. Vol. 2. p. 102. §. 
 
 23. 
 Its Imperfeft ions not eafy to be 
 
 ciif'd, Vol. 2. p. 107. §. 2, 
 
 NeceiTary to Philofophy they 
 fhould be, Vol. 2. p. 107. 
 
 §• 3- 
 To ufe no Word without a 
 
 diftind and clear Idea an- 
 
 nex'd to it, is one Remedy 
 
 of the Imperfedions of L. 
 
 Vol.2, p. no. §. 8, 9. 
 Propriety in the Ufe of Words, 
 
 another Remedy, Vol. 2. 
 
 p. HI. §. II. 
 Law of Nature generally allow'J, 
 
 p. 32. §. 6. 
 There is, tho' not innate, p. 
 
 Its Inforcenvsnt, p. 326. §. 6, 
 Learning, the ifl State of L. in 
 
 thefe latter Ages, Vol. 2, 
 
 p. 89, ^c. 
 Of the Schools, lies chiefly ia 
 
 the Abufe of Words, ik 
 Such Learning of ill Confe- 
 
 quence, Vol. 2. p. 95. §. 
 
 12. 
 Liberty, what, p. 193. §. g^ p^ 
 
 10, II, 12. and p. 196. §. 
 
 15. 
 Belongs not to the Will, p. 
 
 195. §. 14. 
 To be determin'd by theRefuIt 
 
 of our own Deliberation, is 
 
 no Reftraint of L. p. 214. 
 
 §• 47'4^'49» 50. 
 Founded in a Power of fuf- 
 pending our particular De- 
 fires, p. 214. §. 47,51,52. 
 Light, its abfurd Definitions, 
 Vol. 2. p. 27. §. 10, 
 Light in the Mind, what. Vol. 
 2. p. 323. §. 13. 
 Logick has introduc'd Obfcurity 
 in Languages, Vol. 2. p, 
 92. §.(?. 
 And hinder'd Knowledge, Vol. 
 2. p. 93. §.7. 
 Love, p. 186. §. 4. 
 
 M 
 
 MAdnefs, p. 121. §.13. 
 Oppefition to Reafon de- 
 ferves that Name, p. 365. 
 
 §- 4- 
 Magilkrial, the molt Icnowing 
 
 are moft M. Vol. 2. p. 279. 
 
 §.4. 
 Making, p. 277. §. 2. 
 Ma,n not the Produft of kind 
 
 Chance, Vol. 2. p. 241, §^ 
 
 6. 
 The Eflence of M. is plac'd in 
 
 his Shape, Vcd, %. p. 193. 4- 
 
 16, We 
 
I N D E J. 
 
 We kiKHV not his real Eflence, 
 VoL z. p. 43, §. 3. anJ p. 
 5 J. §. zx. 
 
 The Boundaries of the human 
 Species not determin'd, Vol. 
 1. p. 5(5. §. Z7. 
 
 What makes the fame indivi- 
 dual M. p. 294. §. XI. and 
 p. 299. §. 19. 
 
 The fame M. may be different 
 Perfons, ik 
 Mathematicks, their Methods, 
 Vol. z. p. z6z. §. 7. 
 
 Improvement, Vol. z. p, zd8. 
 
 §.15. 
 Matters incomprehenfiblt*both in 
 ^s Cohefion and Divifibili- 
 ty, p. t6o. §. 20, ^c. and 
 p. z63. 5. 27. 
 What, Vol. X. p. g6. §. 15. 
 Whether in us it thipks, is not 
 to be known, Vol. x. p. r 39. 
 
 Cannot produce Motion, or 
 
 any Thing elfe, Vol. x. p. 
 
 243. §. 10. 
 And Motion cannot produce 
 
 Thought, ih. 
 Kot eternal. Vol. 2. p. X48. 
 
 §. 18. 
 Maxims, Vol, x. p. xix. and 
 
 p. 2x4. §. IX, 13,14,15. 
 Not alone Self-evident, Vol. 
 
 ^. p. XIX. §. 3s 
 Are not the Truths firft known, 
 
 Vol. X. p. 116. §. 9. 
 Not the Foundation of our 
 
 Knowledge, Vol. x. p. 117. 
 
 §. 10. 
 Wherein their Evidence con- 
 fills. Vol. X. \\ 1x7. §. 10. 
 
 and p. X67. §. 16. 
 Their Ufe, Vol. x. p. n8. §. 
 
 II, 12. 
 Wily tlic moil general fclf-e- 
 
 videi.t Proportions alone 
 
 pafs for M. ik. 
 
 Are commonly Proofi only 
 where there is no need of 
 Proofs, Vol. X. p. X26. §. 
 
 Of iittleUfe with clear Terms, 
 Vol. X. p. 227. §. i<5. and 
 p. xx8. §. 19. 
 
 Of dang«ro(is Ufe with doubt- 
 ful Terms, Vol. x. p. 29. 
 
 §. IX. 
 
 When fir/l known, p. 16. §. 
 
 9, IX, 13. p. i8. §. i^. 
 
 and p. 20. §. 16, 
 How they gain Affent, p. 23. 
 
 §. 21, XX. 
 Made from particular Obfen©- 
 
 tions, il'. 
 Not in the Underftanding be- 
 fore they are aftually, p. 
 
 24. §. 22. 
 Neither their Terms nor Ideas 
 
 innate, p. 24. §. 23. 
 Leaft known to Children, and 
 
 illiterate People, p. 27. §. 
 
 Memory, p. iir. §. 2. 
 Attention and Pleafure fettle 
 Ideas in the Memory, p. iii. 
 
 And Repetition, p. 112. §.4. 
 
 and p. 113. §. 6. 
 Difference of M. p. 112. §.4, 
 
 In Remembrance the Mind 
 fometimes aiftive, fometimes 
 palllve, p. 113. §. 7. 
 
 Its Neceflity, p. 114. §. 8.' 
 
 D;.'ff(Ss, p. 1 14. §. 8, 9. 
 
 In Brutes, p. 115. §. 10. 
 Metaph) fick and Schcol-Divini- 
 ty fill'd with uninflrudiive 
 Propofitions, Vol. r. p. 234, 
 
 S'9' 
 Method us'd in Mathematicks, 
 
 Vol. 2. p. 261. §.7. 
 Mind, the Quicknefs of its Ani- 
 ons, p. 108, 5* 10* 
 
 •Miqutes^ 
 
I N D EX, 
 
 Minutes, Hours, Days, not ne- 
 ceffary to Duration, p. 149. 
 §. 23. 
 
 Miracles, the Ground of AlTent 
 to M. Vol. 2. p. x86. §. 
 
 Mifery, what, p. zio. §. 4^. 
 Modes, mix'd Modes, p. 23)5. 
 §. I. 
 
 Made by the Mind, p. 236. 
 %.z. 
 
 Sometimes got by the Expli- 
 cation of their Names, p. 
 2'3«J. §. 3. 
 
 "Whence a mix'd Mode has its 
 Unity, \\ 237. §. 4. 
 
 Occafion of mix'd Ms, p. 237. 
 
 §• 5- 
 
 Mix'd Modes, their Ideas how 
 
 Mi fimple and complex, p. 
 
 125. §.4. 
 Simple M. p. 117. §. I. 
 Of Motion, p. liio. §. 2. 
 Moral good and evil, what, p. 
 
 322. §. 5. 
 Three Rules whereby Men 
 
 judge of M. Reftitude, p. 
 
 32'3- §• 7- 
 Beings, how founded on fim- 
 ple Ideas of Senfation and 
 Reflexion, p. 329. §. 14, 
 
 15- 
 
 Rules not felf-eviJent, p. 31. 
 
 §•4- 
 
 Variety of Opinions concern- 
 ing M. Rules, whence^, p. 
 32. §. 5, 6. 
 
 Rules of innate cannot, with 
 publick Allowance, be tranf- 
 grefs'd, p. 36. §. II, 12, 
 
 13- 
 
 Morality capable of Demonflra- 
 tion, Vol. 2. p. 114. §. Id. 
 and p. 173. §. 18. and p. 
 263. %.t. 
 The proper Study of Mankind, 
 VoL 2. p. 265. §. II. 
 
 Of Aftions in their Conform* 
 ty to a Rule, p. 330. §.15. 
 
 Miftakes in Moral Adians 
 owing to Names, il. §. i(j. 
 
 Dilcourfes in M. if not clear, 
 'tis the fault of the Speaker, 
 Vol. 2. p. 114. §.17, 
 
 Hinderances of demonftrative 
 treating of M. i. Want of 
 Marks. 2. ComplexedneCs, 
 Vol. 2. p. 174. §. ip. 
 
 3. Intereft, Vol. 2. p. 175. §. 
 20. 
 
 Change of Names in M, chan- 
 
 fes not the Nature of 
 hings, Vol. 2. p. 1 88. §, 
 9, ir. 
 And Mechanifm hard to be 
 
 reconcil'd, p. 39. §. i^ 
 Secur'd amidft Mens wrong 
 JuJgments, p. 229. §. 70. 
 Motion, flow or very fwift, 
 why not perceiv'd, p. 143. 
 §. 7, 8, 9, 10, II. 
 Voluntary inexplicable, VoL 
 
 2. p. 249. §. 19. 
 Its ablurd Definitions, VoL x, 
 p. 26. §.8,9. 
 
 N 
 
 "X/yAfl^iing of Ideas, p. 119. §, 
 
 Names Moral eftablifli'd by Law, 
 are not to be vary'd from. 
 Vol. 2. p. 189. §. ro- 
 
 Of Subftances (landing for real 
 Effences, are not capable to 
 convey Certainty to the 
 Underftanding, Vol 2. p. 
 202. §.5. 
 
 Standing for nominal Effences 
 wiJJ make fome, tho' not 
 many, certain Propofitions, 
 ih. p. 203. §. (5, 
 
 Why Men fubftiiute Ns for 
 
 real Effences, which they 
 
 know 
 
INDEX 
 
 know not, Vol. a. p- pp. 
 
 §• 19- 
 Two falfe Suppofitions in fuch 
 
 an Ufe of Names, Vol. z. 
 
 p. too. §. II. 
 A particular Name to every 
 
 partiailar Tiling impoflibl-, 
 
 Vol. z, p. 8. §. I. 
 And ufelefs, if>. §. 2. 
 Proper Ns, where us'd, ik p. 
 
 9- "§• 4. 5. 
 Specihck Ns are afhx'd to the 
 
 nominal Effence, Vol. z, p. 
 
 xz. §. i6. 
 Of fimple Ideas, and Subflan- 
 
 ces refer to Things, Vol. z, 
 
 p. 25. §. 2. 
 And Iland for both real and 
 
 nominal EfTence, ih, §. 3. 
 Of fimple Ideas, not capable 
 
 of Definitions, ih. §. 4. 
 "Why, Vol. 2. p. z6. §. 7. 
 Of Isaft doubtful Signification, 
 
 Vol.2, p. 30. §-15. 
 Have few Afcents in Vmrn 
 
 predict mentally Vol. 2. p. 
 
 31. §. r6. 
 Of complex Ideas may be de- 
 
 fin'd, Vol, 2. p. 29. §.12. 
 Of mix'd Modes llaud for ar- 
 bitrary Ideas, Vol.2, p. 32. 
 
 §. 2. and p. 66. §. 44. 
 Tie together the Parts of their 
 
 complex Iileas, Vol. 2. p. 
 
 37. §. 10. 
 Stand always for the real Ef- 
 fence, Vol. 2. p. 39. §. 14. 
 "Why got iifnally bvifore tlie I- 
 
 deas are known, Vol. 2. p. 
 
 40. §. 15. 
 Of Relations comprehended 
 
 imJer thofe uf mixM iModf5, 
 
 ih. 5. irt. 
 Cenerrl of SiibAancesNs ftand 
 
 forSoitSjVol. 2. p. 41. ^. r. 
 Necellary to Species, ' Vol 2. 
 
 p. 64. §. 39. 
 
 Proper Names belong only to 
 Subftan:es, Vol. 2. p. 65. 
 §.41. 
 
 Names of Modes in their nrft 
 Application, Vol. 2. p. 66, 
 
 §• 44- 
 Of Subllanc^s in their firfl 
 
 Application, Vol. 2. p. (58, 
 69. §. 46, 47. 
 
 Specini:k Names lland for dif- 
 ferent Things in different - 
 Men, Vol. 2. p. 69. §.48. 
 
 Are pat in the place of the 
 Tiling fupposM to luve the 
 real Effence of the Species, 
 ^'ol. 2. p. 70. §. 49. 
 
 Of mix'd McKles doubtful of- 
 ten, becaufe of the great 
 Compofition of the Ideas 
 they fland for, Vol. 2. p. 
 78. §. 6. 
 
 Becaufe they want Standards 
 in Nature, ii. §. 7. 
 
 Of Siibriances doubtful , be- 
 caufe referred to Patterns 
 that cannot be known, or 
 known but imperfectly, Vol. 
 X. p. 81, &c. §. II, 12, 
 13, 14. 
 
 In their Philofophical Ufe 
 hard to have fettl'd Signifi- 
 cations, Vol. 2. p. 84. §. 
 
 15- 
 Inflance Lr;uor, ih. §. 16. 
 Gold, Vol. 2. p. 82, §. 13. 
 Of fimple Ideas, why leafl 
 
 doubtful, Vol. a. p. 8(^. §. 
 
 i8. 
 Leaft compounded Ideas have 
 
 the leaft dubious Names, 
 
 Vol. 2. p. 87. §. 19. 
 Natural Philofophy not capable 
 
 of Science, Vol. 2. p. i8o- 
 
 §. z6. and p. 265. §. 10. 
 Yet very ufcful, Vol. 2. p. 
 
 z66. §. 12. 
 Hvju' to be iaiprov'J, iK 
 
 What 
 
I N D E jr. 
 
 What has hindei'J its Im- 
 provement, i^. 
 Neceflity, p. 195, 
 Negative Terms, Vol. 2. p. z. 
 
 Names fignjfy the Abfence of 
 
 pofliiive Ideas, p. 96. §. 5. 
 
 Mr. Newton, Vol. 2,. p. nb. §. 
 
 II, 
 'Nothi;ig, that N. cannot pro- 
 duce any Thing, is Demon- 
 Uration, Vol, z. p. z^z, §. 
 
 .3- 
 Notions, p. 236. §. z. 
 Number, p. 163. 
 Modes of N. themofl diftinft 
 
 Ideas, ih. §. 3. 
 Demonftration in Ns the moft 
 
 determinate, ih. §. 4. 
 The general Meafure, p. 166. 
 
 §.8. 
 Affords the cleareft Idea of In- 
 finity, p. 171. §. 5?. 
 Numeration, what, p. i6/^ §. 
 
 5. 
 Names neceffary to it, ib. 
 And Order, p. 166. §. 7. 
 Why not early in Children, 
 
 and in fome never, ih. 
 
 Organs, our Organs fuiteJ to 
 our State, p. 155. §. iz, 
 
 13- 
 
 O 
 
 OBfcurity unavoidable in an- 
 cient Authors, Vol. z. p. 
 81. §. 10. 
 The Caiife of it in our Ideas, 
 
 P-335- §• 3- 
 Obftinate they are mod, who 
 have lealt examin'd. Vol. z. 
 
 . p. i78.§. 3- 
 Opinion, what, Vol. z. p. 274. 
 
 §• B° 
 
 How Os grow up to Princi- 
 ples, p. 44. §. 21, zz, 23, 
 Z4, Z5, 2-6. 
 
 Of orhers a wrong GroMnd of 
 ^ITenr, VoL, 2. p.- 276. §.<5, 
 
 PAin prefent, works prefcnily, 
 p. 225. §. 64. 
 Its Ufe, p. 92. §. 4. 
 Parrot mention'd by S. W. T. 
 p. 284. §. 8. 
 Holds a rational Difcourfe, ih. 
 Panicles join Parts, or whole 
 Sentences together, Vol, z. 
 p. 71. §. I. 
 In them lies the Beauty of 
 
 well Speaking, ih. §. 2. 
 How their Ufe is to be known, 
 
 Vol. 2. p. 72. §. 3. 
 They exprefs fome Adion, or 
 Paflion of the Mind, ih. §. 4. 
 Pafcal, great Memory, p. 1x5. 
 
 S'9' 
 Paflion, p. 241. §. n. 
 
 Paflions, how they lead us into 
 
 Error, Vol. z. p. 284. §. 
 
 12. 
 
 Turn on Pleafure and Pain, p. 
 l86. §. 3. 
 
 Ps are leldom fingle, p. zoj). 
 
 §•39- 
 Perception threefold, p. 192. §« 
 
 In P. the Mind for the moft 
 part pafljiye, p. ii6. §. i. 
 
 Is an Imprefllon made on the 
 Mind, p. 118. §. 3, 4. 
 
 In the Womb, ih. §. 5. 
 
 Difterence between it and in- 
 nate Ideas, ih. §. 6. 
 
 Puts the Difterence between the 
 AniiTial and vegetable King- 
 dom^ p. 120. §. II. 
 
 The feveral Degrees of it Ihew 
 the Wifdoai and Goodf.efs 
 of the IVIaker, p, izu f. 
 
1 N D E J, 
 
 Belongs tc all Animals, p. izi. 
 
 §. IX, 13, r^. 
 I'he firft Inlet of Knowledge, 
 
 p. 121. §. 15. 
 Pcrfon, w'l-i.ir, p. zH6. §. 9. 
 A Forcnfick Term, p. 297. 
 
 §. 2<5. 
 
 The fame Confcioufnefs alone 
 makes the fame, p. 289. 
 §. 13. and p. 295. §. 23. 
 
 The fame Soul, without the 
 fame Confcioufnefs, makes 
 not the fame P. p. 196. 
 
 §. 15. 
 
 Reward and Punifhment fel- 
 low perfonal Identity, p. 
 293. §. 18. 
 Phancy, p. 114. §.8. 
 Ph:intallical Ider.s, ih. 
 Place, p. 129. §. 7, 8. 
 
 life of P. p. 130. §. 9. 
 
 Nothing but a relative Pofiti- 
 on, p. 130. §. lo. 
 
 Sometimes taken for the Space 
 a Body fills, p. 130. §. 10. 
 
 Twofold, p. 157. §. 6, 7, 
 Pleafure and Pain, p. 185. §. r. 
 and p. 188. §. 15, 16. 
 
 Join themfelves to moft of our 
 Ideas, p. 92. §. 2. 
 
 Why join'd to feveral Ani- 
 ons, p. 92. §. 3. 
 Power, how we come by its I- 
 deas, p. 189. §. r. 
 
 Adive and Paiijve, p. 190. 
 §.2. 
 
 No paflive Power in God, no 
 adtive Power in Matter j 
 both adive and paflive in 
 Spirits, ih. 
 
 Our Idea of adive P. clearefl 
 from Refledion, p. ijd. §. 
 
 Fs operate not en Ps, p. 197. 
 
 §• iH 
 Make a great part of the I- 
 
 deas of Subftances, p, 2514 
 
 §•7- 
 
 Why, p. 253. 5.8. 
 
 An Idea of S^iifation and 
 
 Refledtion, p. 94. §. 8. 
 Pradlical Principles not innate, 
 
 p. 29. §. I. 
 Not univvrfally aflentcd to, 
 
 p. 30. §. 2. 
 Are for Operation, p. 30. §. 
 
 Not agreed, p. 39. §. 14. 
 Different, p, 44. §. 21. 
 principles not to be receiv'd 
 
 without ftridt Examination, 
 I Vol. 2. p. 2'1i. §.4. and p. 
 
 330. §. 8. 
 The ill Confequences of 
 
 wrong P. Vol. 2. p. 331. 
 
 §. 9, 10. 
 None innate, p. 9. §. r. 
 None univerfally alfentcd to. 
 
 How ordinarily got, p. 44. 
 
 §. 22. 
 
 Are to be examin'd, p. 4^. 
 §. 26, 27. 
 
 Not innate, if the Ideas they 
 are made up of, are not in- 
 nate, p. 47. §. I. 
 private Terms, Vol, 2. p. 2. 
 
 §•4- 
 Probability, what, Vol. 2. p. 
 273. §. 1. and p. 274. §. 
 
 The Grounds of P. Vol; 2. p. 
 
 275. §.4. 
 
 , In Matter of Fadt, Vol. s. p. 
 
 276. §. 6. 
 
 How we are tu ju.lge in Ps, 
 Vol. 2. p. 1-75 • §• 5- 
 
 Difficulties in Ps, Vol, z. p. 
 282. §. 9. 
 
 Grounds of P. in Speculation, 
 Vol. 2. p. 284. §.12. 
 
 Wrong Meafurcs in P. V^ol. 2. 
 
 P- 330- §• 7- 
 How evaded by prejuiic'd 
 
 Minds, Vol. 2. p. 3 34. §.13. 
 
 Proofs, 
 
I-^ D E X, 
 
 Proofs, Vol. 2. p. 131. §. 3- 
 Properties of fpecifick Effences 
 
 not known. Vol. 2-. p. 51. 
 
 §. 19. 
 Of Things very numerous, p. 
 
 35i §.. xo. and 362,. §. 
 
 2,4. 
 Proportions Identical, teach no- 
 thing, Vol. z. p. 2?.9. §. 2. 
 Generical teach nothing, Vol, 
 
 z. p. 232. §. 4. 
 Wherein a Part of theDifiniti- 
 
 on is predicated of the Sub- 
 
 jeft, teach nothing, ib. §. 
 
 5, d. 
 But the Signification of that 
 
 Word, Vol. z. p. 234. §. 
 
 7- 
 
 Concerning Subflances general- 
 ly either trifling, or uncer- 
 tain, ih. §. rj. 
 
 Merely verual, how to be 
 
 known, Vol. 2. p. 236. §. 12. 
 
 Abftra<n: Terms predicated one 
 of another, produce merely 
 verbal Ps. ib. 
 
 Or a part of complex Idea pre- 
 dicated of the whole, Vol. 
 2. p. 237. §. 13, 
 
 More Ps. merely verbal than 
 is fufpe(fled, ib. 
 
 Univerfal Ps. concern not Ex- 
 igence, Vol. 2. p. 237. §. 
 r. 
 
 What Ps. concern Exiftence, 
 ib. 
 
 Certain Ps. concerning Exi- 
 ftence, are particular concer- 
 ning abftrad Ideas, may be 
 general. Vol. 2. p. 257. §. 
 
 • ^^' 
 
 Mental, Vol. 2, p. 195. §. 3. 
 
 and p. 197. §. 5. 
 Verbal, ib. 
 
 Mental hard to be treatetl. 
 Vol. 2. p. r9<;. §. 3, and p. 
 
 196. §. ^, 
 
 e * 
 
 Punilhment, what, p. 32*. 
 
 §. 5- 
 And Reward follow Confci- 
 oufiiefs, p. 293. §. i8. andp. 
 
 207. §. 26. 
 An unconfcious Drunkard why 
 
 punilh'd, p. 295. 5. 22. 
 
 Quality, fecundary Qiialities, 
 their Con necflion, or Incon- 
 fiflence unknown, Vol.x. p. 
 
 169. §. ir. 
 
 Of Subftances fcarce knowable, 
 
 but by Experience, Vol. 2. 
 
 p. 170 and p. 171. §. 14, \6. 
 
 Of Spiritual Subllances, lefs 
 than of Corporal, Vol. 2. p. 
 172. §. 17. 
 
 Secundary have no Connedlion 
 with the primary that pro- 
 duce them. Vol. 2. p. i6r)^ 
 
 170. §. 12, 13. and p. i8r. 
 §. 28. 
 
 Of Subftances depend on re- 
 mote Caufes.Vol. 2. p. zo6. 
 §. ir. 
 
 Not to be known by Defcrip- 
 tions. Vol. 2. p. n6. §. 2r. 
 
 Secundary, how far capable 
 of U^monlcration^ Vol. 2. 
 p. 155, 136. §. ir, IS, 
 
 What, p. 74. §. 8. and p. 
 
 How faid to be in Things, p. 
 346. §.2. 
 
 Secundary would be other, if 
 we would difcover the Mi- 
 nute Parts of Bodies, p. 315, 
 
 Primary Qs, p. 97. §. 9. 
 
 ow theyproduce Ideas in us, 
 
 p. ^^. §. 12, 
 Secundary Q^;. p. 98. §..13, 
 
 Primary Q_s refeipble our Ide- 
 as-, 
 
I N D E A\ 
 
 as, fecTinJaiynot, p. pp. §. 
 15, 16. 
 
 Three Softs of Qs in Bodies, 
 p. lOi. §. 13. 
 
 i. ft Primary, fecunJary im- 
 mediately perceivable, and 
 fecundary mediately percei- 
 vable, p. 104. §. 25. 
 
 Secundary Qs are bare Powers, 
 p. loz. §. 23, 14, 25. 
 
 Seciindary Qs have no difer- 
 nable Conne-fiion with the 
 firll, p. 104. §• 25. 
 Qiotations, how little to be 
 relyM on, Vol. 2. p. 248. 
 §. 12. 
 
 K 
 
 R 
 
 E.U Ideas, p. 3.13. §. r. 
 
 Rcafon, its various Signi- 
 fication'', Vol. 2. p, 288. 
 
 , §• '• 
 
 What, ih. §. z. 
 
 Reafoii is natural Revelation, 
 
 Vol. 2. p. 318. §. 4. 
 It miift judge of Revelation, 
 
 Vol. 2. p. 323. ^. 14, 
 It muft be our lait Guide in e- 
 
 very thing, ih. 
 Four parts of R. VoJ. 2. p. 
 
 301. §. 302, 
 Where ll. fails us. Vol.. 2. p. 
 
 314. §. 9. 
 Njcelfary in all but Intuition, 
 
 Vol. 2. p. 303. §. 15. 
 As conrradifli'nguiih'd to 
 
 Faith, what. Vol. 2. p. 
 
 5e8. §. 2. 
 Helps Us not to the Knowledj^e 
 
 of innate Truths, p. 16. §. 
 
 8. 
 General Ideas, general Terms, 
 
 and Reafon, ufually grow to 
 
 gother, p. 19. §. 15. 
 Re:oU*dioi), p. 1^3. §. 1. 
 R:flcxion, p. 68. §'. 4. 
 
 Related, p. 271. §; r.' 
 Relation, p. iz6. §. 7. and p. 
 27 r. §. I, ^c. 
 
 R. proiX)rtional, p. 320. §.I. 
 
 Natural, p. 320. §. 2, 
 
 Inffituted, p. 321. §. 3. 
 
 Moral, p. 322, §. 4. 
 
 Numerous, p. 331. §. 17. 
 
 Terminate in fiiigle Ideas, ih. 
 
 Our clear Idea of Relation, 
 p. 331. f 18. 
 
 Names of Rs. doubtful, p. 
 
 , 33^. §. 19- 
 
 \V ithout correlative Terms, 
 not fo commonly obferv'd, 
 p. 272. §. 2. 
 
 Different from the Things rela- 
 ted, p. 273. §. 4. 
 
 Changes without any Change 
 in the Subjecl:, ih. §. 5. 
 
 Always between two, p. 273, 
 §. 6. 
 
 All things capable of R. ik 
 
 The Idea of R. often clearer 
 than of the things related, p. 
 274. §. 8. 
 
 All terminate in funple Ideas 
 of Senfation and Reflexion, 
 p. 175. §. 9. 
 Ivelatives, p. 271. §. i. 
 
 Some R. Terms taken for ex- 
 ternal Denominations, ih. 
 
 Some for abfolute, p. 272. 
 §.3. 
 
 How to be known, p.^ 275. §. 
 10. 
 
 Many Words tho' abfolute, 
 are Rs, p. 273. §. 6. 
 Religion, all Men have Time to 
 
 enouire int«, Vol. 2. p. 327. 
 
 §• 3- 
 But in many Pfaces are hm- 
 
 dred from enquiring, ih. §. 
 
 Remembrance of great Force in 
 
 common Life, p. 328. §.^2. 
 
 "What, 
 
INDEX. 
 
 'What, p. 6r. §. zo. and p. 
 
 '13- § 7' . 
 
 Reputation of great Force in 
 
 common Life, p. 32.8. §-i2,. 
 Reflraint, p. 195. § ^3\ 
 Revelation an unouijlHonable 
 Ground of A (Tent, Vol. z. p. 
 
 Belief no Proof of it, Vol. z. 
 
 p. 3-4. § 15- 
 Traditional R. cannot convey 
 
 any new limple Idea, Vol, 
 
 z. p. 309. §. 3. 
 Not fo fure as our Reafon or 
 
 Senfes, Vol. z. p. 310. 
 
 In Things of Reafon, no need 
 
 of R. Vol. 2. p. 311, §. 5. 
 Cannot over-rule our clear 
 
 Knowledge, ih. and ]^^ 315. 
 
 §. 10. p. 3T6. §. 9. 
 Mull over-rule Probabilities of 
 
 Reafon, Vol. 2. p. 313. 
 
 §.8. 
 
 Reward, what, p 322. §. 5. 
 Rhetorick, an Art of deceivinp, 
 Vol. 2. p. 106. §. 34. 
 
 SAgacity, Vol. a. p. 132. 
 ^ §. 3- 
 
 Same, whether Subftance, Mode, 
 
 or Concrete, p. 299, ^. 29. 
 
 Sand, white to the Eye, pellucid 
 
 in a Microfcope, p. 255. 
 
 S. II. 
 
 Sceptical, no Body fo S. as to 
 doubt his own Exiflence, 
 Vol. 2. p. 239. §. 2. 
 
 Schools, wherein 'faulty. Vol. 2. 
 p. 92. §. 6. 
 
 Science divided into a Coqfide- 
 ration of Nature, of Opera- 
 tion, and of Signs, il>. 
 Ko S. of natural Bodies, Vol, 
 J' P' 33S' ^^' 
 
 Scripture Interpretations of 
 
 S. not to be impos'd. Vol* 
 
 z. p. 89. §. 23. 
 Self, what makes it, p. 292. §. 
 
 17. p. 293. 5. 20. and p. 
 
 295. §.23,24,25. 
 Self-Love, p. 364. C 2. 
 Partly caufe of XJ nreafonable- 
 
 nefs in m^ji. 
 S.lf- Evident Propofitions, where 
 
 to be had, Vol. 2. p. 113, 
 
 Neither needed nor admitted 
 Proof, Vol. 2. p. 228. §. 
 
 Senfation, p. 37. 5. 3. 
 
 Diflinguifhable from other 
 Perceptions, Vol. 2. p. i^-j. 
 
 ^ §• 14- 
 
 Explain'd, p. roi. §. zi. 
 What, p. 183. §. I. 
 Senfes, why we cannot conceive 
 
 other Qualities than the OI>- 
 
 jedis of our S. p. 83. §. 3. 
 Learn to difcern by Exercife, 
 
 Vol. 2. p. 116. $.21. 
 Much (juicker, would not te 
 
 ufeful to us, p. 255. §. ir. 
 Our Organs of S. fuited to our 
 
 State, p. 255. §. 12, 13. 
 Si-nlible Knowledge is as certain 
 
 as we need, Vol. 2. p. 254. 
 
 §.8. 
 Goes not beyond tlie prefent 
 
 Ad, Vol. 2. p. 255. §. 9. 
 Shame, p. 188. 5. 17. 
 Simple Ideas, p. 80. §. r. 
 Not made by the Mind, p. 81. 
 
 §.2. 
 Power of the Mind over them, 
 
 p. 123. §. I. 
 The Materials of all our Know- 
 ledge, p. 94. §. 10. , 
 All pofitive, p. 95. §. r. 
 Very different from their Caii- 
 
 Us, p. 95. §.2, 3. 
 
 Sin 
 
INDEX, 
 
 Sill with difFerent Men, flands Species, why changing one fim^ 
 
 for different A(flions, p. 41. 
 
 §. ip. 
 Solidity, p. 8<5. §• r. 
 lufeparable from Body, p. 86. 
 
 §. I. 
 By it Body fills Space, p. 87. 
 
 This Idea got by Touch, ;/'. 
 How diftinguifh'J from Space, 
 
 p. 87. §. 3. 
 From Hardnefs, p. 88. §. 4. 
 Something from Eternity demon- 
 flrated, Vol. z. p. 241. §. 
 8. 
 Sorrow, p. 187. §. 8. 
 Soul thinks not always, p. 71. 
 §. o. 
 Not in found Sleep, p. 71. §. 
 
 II. 
 Its Immateriality we know 
 
 not, Vol. z. p r39. §. 6. 
 Religion not concernM in the 
 
 Ss Immateriality, i!'. 
 Our Ignorance about it, p. 
 298. ^. 27. 
 Sound, its Modes, p. 181. §. 3. 
 Space, its Idea got by Sight and 
 Touch, p. 127. §. z. 
 Its Modifications, p. 127. §. 
 
 Not Body, p. 132, §. 12. 
 Its Parts infeparable, p. 132. 
 
 §. 15. 
 Immovable, p. T32. §. 14.' 
 Whether Body or Spirit, p. 
 
 99- §• i^'. 
 
 whether Subfian.'e or Acci- 
 dent, p. 133. §. 17. 
 
 Infinite, p. 134. §.20. and 
 p. i«^j8. §. 4. 
 
 Ideas of Scul and Body diflindl-, 
 p. r36. ^. 23. 
 
 Coiifider'd as a Solid, p. 161. 
 
 §. TI. 
 
 H-ird r vTonceive any real Be- 
 ing void cf Soul, il'. 
 
 pie Idea of the complex 
 one, is thought to change 
 the S. in Modes, but not in 
 SuUilances, Vol. 2. p. pp. 
 
 Of Animals and Vegetables, 
 moilly diflinguifh'd by Fi- 
 gure, ih. ^. 19, -o. 
 
 Of other Things by Colour, ik 
 
 Made, by the UnJerftanding, 
 for Communication, Vol. 2. 
 p. 37. §.9. 
 
 No Species of mix'd Modes 
 without a Name, Vol. 2. 
 r.38. §. II. 
 
 Of SubAances are determinM 
 by the nominal Efience, Vol. 
 I' P- 45. §. 7> 8, p. 47. 
 §. ir. p. 49. §. 13. and p. 
 
 39- §.13- 
 
 Not by fubflantial Forms, Vol. 
 2. p. 47. §. 10. 
 
 Nor by the real ElTence, Vol. 2. 
 p. 5 r. §.i8. and p. 54. §. 25. 
 Of Spirits, how diHinguilh'd, 
 Vol. 2. p. 47. §. ir. 
 
 More S. of Creatures above 
 than below us, Vol. 2. p. 
 48. §. 12. 
 
 Of Creatures very gradual, il'. 
 
 What is neccflary to the ma- 
 king of S. by real EfTences, 
 Vol. 2. p. 50. 3. 14. 
 
 Of Animals and Plants cannot ' 
 be diflini^uilh'd by Propaga- 
 tion, Vol. 2. p. 5V §. 23. 
 
 Of Animals and \'egetables 
 dirtinguilh'd principally by 
 the Shape and Figure, of o- 
 ther Things by the Colour, 
 Vol. 2. p. 57. §. 29. 
 
 Of Man iikewife'in Parr, Vol. 
 2. p. 54. §. z6. 
 
 Inftance Abbot of St. M.ntiny 
 ih. 
 
 Is but a partial Conception 
 of 
 
 i 
 
I N D E a: 
 
 of what is in the Individu- 
 als, Vol. z. p. 60. §. 3^. 
 Tis the complex Idea which 
 the Name ftands for, that 
 makes the S. Vol. z. p. 6z. 
 
 §•35. 
 Man makes the S. or Sorts, 
 
 Vol. z. p. 63. §. 36, 37. Stupidity, p. 114. §. 8 
 But the Foundation of it is Subliance, p. 2,35. §. j. 
 
 in the Similitude found in S. no Idea of it, p. 59. §. jg - 
 
 We have no Idea how Spirits 
 communicate their Thought, 
 p. z6S. §. 36. 
 
 How far we are ignorant of 
 the Being, Species, and Pro- 
 perties of S. Vol. z. p. 180. 
 
 Things, il'. 
 "Evety diftiniH: abflraft Idea 
 makes a different S. Vol. z. 
 p. 63. §. 38. 
 Speech, its End, Vol. a. p. 4. 
 
 §. ^' 
 Propers. Vol. 2. p. 7. §.8. 
 Intelligible, ih 
 Spirits, the Exiftence of S. not 
 
 knowable. Vol. z. p. 257. 
 
 §• 12,. 
 Operation of S. on Bodies not 
 
 conceivable, Vol. 2. p. i8r. 
 
 §.z8. 
 "What Knowledge they have 
 
 of Bodies, Vol. 2. p. 117. 
 
 §• 2-3- 
 
 Separate, how their Know- 
 ledge may exceed ours, p. 
 115. §. 9. 
 
 We have as clear a Notion of 
 the Subliance of S. as of 
 Body, p. 248. §.5. 
 
 A Conjedure concerning one 
 Way of Knowledge, where- 
 in Ss excel us, p. 257. 
 
 %. 13. 
 
 Our Ideas of S. p. 258. §. 15. 
 As clear as that of Body, p. 
 
 260. §.22. 
 Primary Ideas belonging to S. 
 
 p. 259. §. 18. 
 Move, p. 259. §. 19. 
 Ideas of S. and Body compar'd, 
 
 p. 2^5. §. 30. 
 The Exigence of S. as eafy 
 
 to be admitted as that of 
 
 FodieSj p. z6^. §. 28. 
 
 Not very knowable, ik 
 
 Our Certainty concerning 
 them reaches but a little 
 Way, Vol. 2. p. 203, §. 7. 
 p. 205. §. 10. and p. 210.- 
 ,§• 15. 
 
 The confus'd Idea of S. in ge- 
 neral, makes always a Part 
 of the Effence of the Spe- 
 cies of Ss, Vol. 2. p. 51. 
 §• *!• 
 
 In Ss we muft redify the Sig- 
 nification of their Names by 
 the Things, more than by 
 Definitions, Vol. 2. p. 117, 
 
 Their Ideas,ringle or colledive, 
 
 p. 125. §. 6. 
 We have no diftinfl Idea of 
 
 S. p. 133. §.18,19. 
 We have no Idea of pure S. 
 
 p. 243. §. 2. 
 Our Ideas of the Sorts of Ss, 
 
 p. 245. §. 3,4,6. 
 Obfervables in our Idea of Ss, 
 
 p. 269. §. 37. 
 Collective Ideas of Ss, p. 270. 
 They are fingle Ideas, ih. §. 2. 
 Three Sorts, p. 280. §. 2, 
 The Ideas of Ss have in the 
 
 Mind a double Reference, 
 
 p. 348. §.6, 
 The Properties of Ss numerous, 
 
 and not at all to be known, 
 
 p. 352. §. 9, 10. 
 Theperfed Ideas of Ss, p. 25 r. 
 
 Three 
 
1 N D E I. 
 
 Three Sorts of Iileas, make 
 our complex one of S?» 
 p. 254. §. 9. 
 Subtilty, what, Vol. z. p. 93. 
 
 §.8. 
 Succedioii, an Idea get chiefly 
 from the Train of our I- 
 deas, p. 94. §. 9. and p. 
 142-. §. 6. 
 Which Train is the Meafure 
 of it, p. 144. §. rz. 
 Sumnmvi Bomm^ wherein it con- 
 
 fiHs, p. 210. €. 5^. 
 Syllogifm, n.> Help to Reafon- 
 ing, VuJ. 2. p. 290 §. 4. 
 TheUfeofS. ib. 
 laconveiiiencies of S. ib. 
 Of no Ufe in Probabilities, 
 
 Vol.2, p. 298. §.5. 
 
 Helps not to new Difcoveries, 
 Vol. 2. p. 299. §. 6. 
 
 Or the Improvement of our 
 Knowledj^e, ib. §. q. 
 
 Whether in Syllogilm the Med. 
 Ttr. may not be better 
 plac'd. Vol. z. p. 300. 
 §.8. • 
 
 Way be about Particulars, ib. 
 
 TAfle and Smt;lls, their Mode?, 
 p. i{^r. §. 5. 
 Teilimony, how it leflens its 
 Force, Vol. 2. p. 283. §.. 
 10. 
 Thinking, p. 183. §. r. 
 
 Modes of T. p. 183. §. r, 2. 
 Mens enlinary Way of T. p. 
 
 184. §.4. 
 An Operation of the Soul, p. 
 
 71. §. 10. 
 Witiioiit Memory, ufelofs, p. 
 74. §. 15. 
 Time, wlLir, p. 14(5. §. 17, 18. 
 Noc tb.e Meafure of ^l.>iion, 
 p. i4i/. §.22. 
 
 And place diflinguifliable Por- 
 tions of infinite Duration 
 and Expanfion, p. 156. §. 
 5,6. 
 
 Twufol 1, p. 157. §. 6^ 7. 
 
 Denominations from Time are 
 Relatives, p. 277. §. 3. 
 Toleration neceflary in our State 
 of Knowledge, Vol. 2. p. 
 279. §. 4. 
 Tradition, the older, the lefs cre- 
 dible, Vol. 2. p. 312. §.6. 
 Trifling Propofitions, Vol. 2. p. 
 229. 
 
 Difcourfe?, Vol. 2. p. 234, 
 ^35. and p. 236. §. 9, lo, 
 ir. 
 Truth, what. Vol. 2. p- 195. 
 §• 2" P- 197- §• 3- and p. 
 199. §. 9- 
 
 Of Thought, Vol. 2. p. 195; 
 §. 3. and p. 199. §. 9. 
 
 Of Word5, Vol. 2. p. 195, 
 
 §• 3- 
 "Verbal and real, Vol. 2. p. 
 
 198.^.8,9. 
 Moral, Vol. 2. p. 199. §. 11. 
 Metnphyfical, p. 355, §. 2. 
 General, f-ddom apprehended 
 
 but in Words, Vol. 2. p. 
 
 199. §. 10. 
 In what it confifls, p. 361, 
 
 §• 19- 
 Love of it ncweflary,- Vol. 2, 
 
 p. 316. §. r. 
 Plow we may know we love 
 it, ib. 
 
 U 
 
 VAcuum poflible, p. 135, 
 
 Motion proves a V. p. i3<5. 
 
 We have an Idea of it, p. 87. 
 
 Varkty 
 
I N D E Z 
 
 Variety of Mens Purfuits ac- 
 counted for, p. 2,18. §. 54, 
 
 Tertue, what in Reality, p. 41. 
 ^.18. 
 What, in fts common Appli- 
 cation, p. 34. §. 9, 10, ir. 
 Is preferable under a bare Pof- 
 filiility of a future State, p. 
 zzp. §. 70. 
 How taken, p. 41. §. 17. 
 Wholly paffitive in the Re- 
 ception of finjple Ideas, p. 
 80. §. z$.- 
 Vice hes in wrong Meafures of 
 Good, Vol. z. p. 335. §. 
 16. 
 Underftanding, what, p. if>z. §. 
 . S, <5. 
 Like a dark Room, p. 1x3. 
 
 §• 17- 
 
 "When rightly us'd, p. 4. §.7. 
 
 Three forts of Perception m 
 
 the U. p. ipz. §. 5, 
 Wholly pafTive in the Recep- 
 tion of' iimple Ideas, p. 80. 
 §. 25. 
 Uneaiiuefs alone determines the 
 Will to a new Action, p. 
 
 202. §. 29, 31,32, ^f. 
 
 Why it determines the Will, 
 
 p. 207. §.36. 
 Caufes of it, p. 221. §. 57. 
 Ujiity, an Idea both of .Senlati- 
 
 on and Reflt?£lion, p. 94. 
 
 . S. 7- 
 
 Suggejied by every Thing, p. 
 163. §. I. 
 IJniverlality is only in Signr, 
 
 VoL 2. p. 12. §. II. 
 IJniverfals, how made, n. 119. 
 
 ^ ,§. 9. 
 
 Volition, what, p. 192. §. 5. 
 &nd p. 196. §.15. 
 ^ctrer known by Rtflvidli ^9 
 
 rhau 'Word>', p. 203. §, 
 
 Vohmtary, what, p. 192. §. 5. 
 p. 194. §. ir. and p. 202. 
 §. 2b. 
 
 W 
 
 WHat is, is, is not univer- 
 fally alTented to, p. 14. 
 
 §• 4- 
 Where, and when, p. 255. §. 8. 
 Whole and Part not innate Ide- 
 as, p. 49. §. (5. 
 Will, what, p. 192. §. 5, 6. p. 
 196. §.15. and p. 232. §. 
 29. 
 
 What determines the W. p. 
 202. §. 29. 
 
 Often confounded with De- 
 fire, p. 203. §. 30. 
 
 Is converfaiit only about our 
 own Adions, ihJd. 
 
 Terminates in them, p. 209. 
 §.40. 
 
 Is deter min'd by thg greaieft 
 prefent removeabid Unea- 
 finefs, il'id. 
 Wit and Judgment, wherein 
 
 different, p. 117. §. 2. 
 Words, an ill Ufe of Words, une 
 great Hinderance of Kno'>v>- 
 Jiedge, Vol. 2. p. 183. 
 
 Abufe of Ws. Vol. 2. p. 89. 
 
 Sects introduce Ws; witaoiit 
 Signification, Vol. 2, p. 90. 
 §.2. 
 
 Th':; Schools have coui'd !MuI- 
 titudesof infignificant Ws, 
 ■ rl'U. 
 
 And render'd others obfcure. 
 Vol. 2. p. 92. §. 6. 
 
 Ofceu us'd without Significa- 
 tion, Vol. 2 p. 9. §• 3. 
 
 And why, Vol. 2. p. 91. §. 5. 
 
 Inconfiancv in their Ufe, an4 
 A blue of Ws. 7/'. 
 
 Obfcuriry and Abufe of Ws, 
 VoL 2. p. 92. 5- <5, • 
 d T;i- 
 
lU B E I. 
 
 Taking them for Things, an 
 AbuleofWs, Vol z. p. 96. 
 
 W ho moA liable to this A- 
 
 bufeofWs. ih. 
 This Abufe of Ws. is a Caufe 
 
 cf Obllinacy in Error, Vol. 
 
 a. p. 97. §. 16. 
 Making them fland for realEf- 
 
 fences which we know not, 
 
 js an Abiifeof Ws, Vol. a. 
 
 1 he Suppofition of their cer- 
 tain evident Signification, 
 an Al'ufe of Ws. VoL z* p. 
 lOi. §. zz. 
 
 Ufe of Words is, 1. To com- 
 municate Ideas. X. With 
 Quickn.'fs. 3. To convey 
 Knowledge, Vol. z. p. lox. 
 §. 23, 
 
 How they fail in all thefe, ih: 
 
 Hov in Subflances, Vol. 2. 
 
 p. 104. §. 3Z. 
 H jw in Modes and Relations, 
 
 Vol. z. §. p. 105, 33. 
 "Mifufe of Ws, a great Caufe 
 
 of Error, Vol 2. p. iu8. §. 
 
 4- 
 OfObflinacy, ih. §. 5. 
 
 And of Wrangling, ih. §. 6. 
 
 Signify one Thing in Enqui- 
 ries, and another in Dif- 
 putes, Vol z. p. lop. §. 7. 
 
 The Meaning of Ws is made 
 known in fimple Ideas by 
 
 , Ihewing, Vol. 2. p. ilz. 
 
 §• n. 
 
 In mix'd Modes by defining. 
 Vol. 2. p. 113. §. I5» 
 
 In Subflances by fhewing and 
 
 defining too, Vol. 2. p. 115. 
 §. 19, "and p. 116. §. 2 J, 
 22. 
 
 The ill Confequencc of learn- 
 ing Words firft, and their 
 
 Meaning afterwards, Vol,- - 
 2. p. 117. §. z^. 
 No Shame to afk Men the 
 Meaning of their Words, 
 where they are doubtful ^ 
 Vol. 2. p. 118. §.25. 
 Are to be us'd conftantly in 
 the fame Senfe, Vol. 2. p. 
 1 20. §. z6. 
 Or elfe to be explain'd where 
 the Conteft determines it 
 not, ih. p. 27. 
 How made general, VoL 2. p. 
 
 Signifying infenfible Things 
 deriv'd from Names of fen- 
 ble IdeaSjVol. 2. p. 2. §. 5. 
 
 Have no natural Signification, 
 Vol. 2. p. 4. §. I. 
 
 But by Impolition, Vol. 2. p. 
 7. §.8. 
 
 Stand immediately for the I- 
 deas of the Speaker, Vol. 2. 
 p. 4. §. I, 2, 3. 
 
 Yet with a double Reference, 
 
 1. To the Ideas in the 
 Hearers Mind, Vol. 2. p, 
 
 5. §.4. 
 
 2. To Reality of Things, p. 
 
 6. §. 5 . 
 
 Apt byCuftom, to excite Ide- 
 as, Vol. 2. p. 6. §. 6. 
 
 Often us'd without Significa-^ 
 tion, ih. p. 7. 
 
 Moft general, yol, 2. p. 8.' 
 §. I. 
 
 Why fome Ws. of one Lan- 
 guage cannot be tranflated 
 into thofe of another, Vol. 
 
 2. p. 36. §. 8. 
 
 Why I have been fo large on 
 
 Ws, Vol. 2., p. 40. 5« i^- 
 
 New Ws, or in new Signifi- 
 
 • cations, are cautioufly to 
 
 be us'd,Vol. 2. p. 70. §. 51. 
 
 Civil Ufe of Ws, Vol. 2. p. 
 
 ''■ «• '■ Phi- 
 
PhilofoJhicalUfeoFWs, ih. Not Tranflatable, p. 138. §. 
 
 Are very different. Vol, Z. p. 6. 
 
 84. §, 1$. The Suppofition of their cer- 
 
 ^^lifs their End when thejr tain, evident Signification, 
 
 ' excite not in the Hearer, an Abufe of Ws, Vol, ^, 
 
 the fame Idea is jn the p. lor. §. z%. 
 
 Mind of the Speaker, Vol. Worfhip, not an innate Idea, p. 
 
 a. p. -77. §. 4, 50- §• 7- 
 
 What Ws are moil doubtful, Wrangle, when we wrangle a^ 
 
 and why, ih. §. 5, ^c. t^iut "Words, Vol. z. p. 237, 
 
 What unint;elligible, ih. §. 13. 
 
 Are fitted to the Ufe of com- Writings ancient, why hardly 
 
 . (Tnon J.jfe, p, 3x0. §, :%. to be precifely underftood^ 
 
 Vol. %. p. 89, §. Z3, 
 
 i .t , i w II > i . . m ' 
 
 FINIS. 
 
v^'«<),t 
 
 
 \ 
 
^1 '/'{''"x^