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THE 
 
 ANALOGY 
 
 OF 
 
 RELIGION, 
 
 NATURAL AND REVEALED, 
 
 TO THE 
 
 CONSTITUTION AND COURSE OF NATURE. 
 
 TO WHICH ARE ADDED, 
 
 TWO BRIEF DISSERTATIONS : 
 
 I. ON PERSONAL IDENTITY. I!. ON THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 
 TOGETHER WITH 
 
 A CHARGE, 
 
 DELIVERED TO THE CLERGY OF THE DIOCESE OF DURHAM, AT THE PRIMARY 
 VISITATION, IN THE YEAR 1751. 
 
 -V 1 — 
 
 BY JOSEPH BUTLER, LL. D, 
 
 LATE LORD BISHOP OF DURHAM. 
 
 EJUS (ANALOGUE) HJEC VIS EST, UT ID QUOD DUBIUM EST, AD AIASUID SIMILE DE 
 QUO NON QU/ERITUR, REFERAT ; UT INCERTA CERTIS PROBET. 
 
 QUINT. INST. ORAT. J.. I. C. 6. 
 
 SECOND AMERICAN EDITION. 
 
 TO WHICH IS PREFIXED 
 
 A LIFE OF THE AUTHOR, 
 
 BY DR. KIPPIS ; 
 
 WITH A PREFACE, GIVING SOME ACCOUNT OF HIS CHARACTER, 
 AND WRITINGS, 
 
 BY SAMUEL HALIFAX, D. D. 
 
 LATE LORD BISHOP OF GLOUCESTER. 
 
 BOSTON: 
 
 PUBLISHED BY DAVID WEST, NO. 56, CORNHIIT 
 
 ^. G. house; PRINTTR. 
 
 1 809, 
 
N 
 
ADVERTISEMENT 
 
 «■© THE FIRST AMERICAN EDITION QF DR. BUTLER'S ANALOGY. 
 
 The Editor has so far presumed on the taste of 
 persons attache to .science, and reyjkaled reli- 
 gion, in the United States of America, as to publish 
 the following Work, without soliciting the previ- 
 ous encouragement of subscription. The very hon- 
 ourable testimonials which it has received from those 
 the most distinguished for piety and learning in Eu- 
 rope, and in our own country, have prompted him to 
 the attempt. The several editions through which it 
 has passed beyond the Atlantic, are a proof of the 
 publick sentiment in its favour. 
 
 At a period in which infidelity is attempting to 
 propagate its principles in this western world, this ela- 
 borate defence of our koly religion has a claim to 
 the patronage of its sincere friends, especially of our 
 venerable Clergy, and of young Students in Divinity. 
 The very respectable characters which preside over 
 our different Universities, and the other gentlemen of 
 virtue and science, to whom the academical education 
 of our youth is committed, will cheerfully embrace an 
 
is ADVERTISEMENT. 
 
 opportunity of recommending to their pupils this inval- 
 uable antidote against Deism. The dying testimony 
 of a BOWDOIN, the learned and the good, who, as 
 a Magistrate, a Philosopher, a Christian, lately shone 
 as a star of the first magnitude in the American hem- 
 isphere, cannot fail to operate as an extensive recom- 
 mendation of the work.* 
 
 A handsome edition of the Analogy, with two brief 
 Dissertations by the same excellent Prelate, at two 
 thirds of the price of the English edition, now offers 
 itself to the publick. The celebrity of the Author, 
 the novelty and uncommon force of his arguments, 
 and the importance of the cause which he advocates, 
 will not solicit its patronage in vain. 
 
 * " He mentioned, during his last sickness, that the perusal of Bishop 
 
 * BUTLER's ANALOGY had been of great use to him in satisfying his 
 " doubts, and confirming his mind on the subject of Christianity. "From the 
 " time of my reading that book," said he, " I have been an humble follower 
 
 • of the blessed JESUS." See Dr. Thacher'* Sermm on the death of the Hon. 
 
 JaMSC B0WD0IN,£/f. 
 
tTHfi LlFfe 
 
 UF 
 
 Dr. BUTLER 
 
THE LIFE 
 
 Dr. BUTLER. 
 
 Dr. Joseph Butler, a prelate of the most dis- 
 tinguished character and abilities, was born at Wan- 
 tage, in Berkshire, in the year 1692. His father, 
 Mr. Thomas Butler, who was a substantial and repu- 
 table shopkeeper in that town, observing in his son 
 Joseph* an excellent genius and inclination for learn- 
 ing, determined to educate him for the ministry, a- 
 mong the Protestant dissenters of the presbyterian 
 denomination. For this purpose, after he had gone 
 through a proper course of grammatical literature, at 
 the free-grammar school of his native place, under the 
 care of the Rev. Mr. Philip Barton, a clergyman of 
 the church of England, he was sent to a dissenting 
 academy, then kept at Gloucester, but which was 
 soon afterwards removed to Tewkesbury. The prin- 
 cipal tutor of this academy was Mr. Jones, a man of 
 uncommon abilities and knowledge, who had the hon- 
 
 * He was the youngest of eight children, 
 
THE LIFE OF 
 
 our of training up several scholars, who became of 
 great eminence, both in the established church and 
 among the dissenters. At Tewkesbury, Mr. Butler 
 made an extraordinary progress in the study of tiivin- 
 ity ; of which he gave a remarkable proof, in the let- 
 ters addressed by him, while he resided at Tewkesbury, 
 to Dr. Samuel Clarke, laying before him the doubts, 
 that had arisen in his mind, concerning the conclusive- 
 ness of some arguments in the Doctor's demonstration 
 of the being and attributes of God. The first of these 
 letters was dated the 4th November 1713; and the 
 sagacity and depth of thought displayed in it, immedi- 
 ately excited Dr. Clarke's particular notice. This 
 condescension encouraged Mr. Butler to address the 
 Doctor again upon the same subject, which likewise 
 was answered by him ; and the correspondence being 
 carried on in three other letters, the whole was an- 
 nexed to the celebrated treatise before mentioned, 
 and the collection has been retained in all the subse- 
 quent editions of that work. The management of this 
 correspondence was intrusted by Mr. Butler, to his 
 friend and fellow-pupil, Mr. Seeker, who, in order to 
 conceal the affair, undertook to convey the letters to 
 the post-office at Gloucester, and to bring back Dr. 
 / Clarke's answers. When Mr. Butler's name was dis- 
 covered to the Doctor, the candour, modesty, and 
 good sense with which he had written, immediately 
 procured him the friendship of that eminent and ex- 
 cellent man. Our young student was not, however, 
 during his continuance at Tewkesbury, solely employ- 
 ed in metaphysical speculations and inquiries. An- 
 
DR. BUTLER. £ 
 
 other subject of his serious consideration was, the pro- 
 priety of his becoming a dissenting minister. Accord- 
 ingly, he entered into an examination of the princi* 
 pies of non-conformity ; the result of which was, 
 such a dissatisfaction with them, as determined him to 
 conform to the established church. This intention 
 was, at first, disagreeable to his father, who endeav- 
 oured to divert him from his purpose ; and, with that 
 view, called in the assistance of some eminent presby- 
 terian divines ; but finding his son's resolution to be 
 fixed, he at length suffered him to be removed to Ox- 
 ford, where he was admitted a commoner of Oriel 
 college on the 17th March 1714. At what time he 
 took orders doth not appear, nor who the bishop was 
 by whom he was ordained ; but it is certain that he 
 entered into the church soon after his admission at Ox- 
 ford, if it be true, as is asserted, that he sometimes 
 assisted Mr. Edward Talbot in the divine service, at 
 his living of Hendred, near Wantage. With this gen- 
 tleman, who was the second son of Dr. William Tal- 
 bot, successively bishop of Oxford, Salisbury, and. 
 Durham, Mr. Butler formed an intimate friendship at 
 Oriel college ; which friendship laid the foundation 
 of all his subsequent preferments, and procured for him 
 a very honourable situation when he was only twen- 
 ty-six years of age. For it was in 1718 that, at the 
 recommendation of Mr. Talbot, in conjunction with 
 that of Dr. Clarke, he was appointed by Sir Joseph \ 
 Jekyll to be preacher at the Rolls. This was three 
 years before he had taken any degree at the universi- 
 ty, where he did not go out bachelor-of-law till the 
 
6 
 
 THE LIFE OF 
 
 10th June 1721, which, however, was as soon as that 
 degree could suitably be conferred upon him. Mi% 
 Butler continued at the Rolls till 1726 ; in the begin- 
 ning of which year he published, in one volume octa- 
 vo, " Fifteen Sermons preached at that Chapel." In 
 the meanwhile, by the patronage of Dr. Talbot, bishop 
 of Durham, to whose notice he had been recommend- 
 ed (together with Mr. Benson and Mr. Seeker) by- 
 Mr. Edward Talbot, on his death-bed, our author had 
 been presented first to the rectory of Haughton, near 
 Darlington, and afterwards to that of Stanhope, in the 
 same diocese. The benefice of Haughton was given 
 to him in 1722, and that of Stanhope in 1725. At 
 Haughton, there was a necessity for rebuilding a great 
 part of the parsonage-house, and Mr. Butler had nei- 
 ther money nor talents for that work. Mr. Seeker 5 
 therefore, who had always the interest of his friends at 
 heart, and acquired a very considerable influence with 
 Bishop Talbot, persuaded that prelate to give Mr. But- 
 ler, in exchange for Haughton, the rectory of Stan- 
 hope, which was not only free from any such incum- 
 brance, but was likewise of much superior value, be- 
 ing indeed one of the richest parsonages in England. 
 Whilst our author continued preacher at the Rolls- 
 chapel, he divided his time between his duty in town 
 and country ; but when he quitted the Rolls, he re- 
 sided, during seven years, wholly at Stanhope, in the 
 conscientious discharge of every obligation appertain- 
 ing to a good parish priest. This retirement, howev- 
 er, was too solitary for his disposition, which had in it 
 
DR. BUTJLEK, y. 
 
 a natural cast of gloominess. And though his recluse 
 hours were by no means lost, either to private im- 
 provement or public utility, yet he felt at times, very 
 painfully, the want of that select society of friends to 
 which he had been accustomed, and which could in- 
 spire him with the greatest chearfulness. Mr. Seeker, 
 therefore, who knew this, was extremely anxious to 
 draw him out into a more active and conspicuous 
 scene, and omitted no opportunity of expressing this 
 desire to such as he thought capable of promoting it. 
 Having himself been appointed king's chaplain in 
 1732, he took occasion, in a conversation which he ' 
 had the honour of holding with Queen Caroline, to 
 mention to her his friend Mr. Butler. The queen 
 said she thought he had been dead. Mr. Seeker as- 
 sured her he was not. Yet, her majesty afterwards 
 asked Archbishop Blackburn if he was not dead ; hi& 
 answer was, " No, madam ; but he is buried." Mr* 
 Seeker continuing his purpose of endeavouring to 
 bring his friend out of his retirement, found means ? 
 upon Mr. Charles Talbot's being made lord-chancel- 
 lor, to have Mr. Butler recommended to him for his 
 chaplain. His lordship accepted, and sent for him j 
 and this promotion calling him to town, he took Ox- 
 ford in his way, and was admitted there to the degree 
 of doctor-of-law, on the 8th December 1733. The 
 lord-chancellor, who gave him also a prebend in the 
 church of Rochester, had consented that lie should 
 reside at his parish of Stanhope one half of the year. 
 Dr. Butler being thus brought back into the world. 
 
g THE LIFE OF* 
 
 his merit and his talents soon introduced him to par* 
 ticular notice, and paved the way for his rising to those 
 high dignities which he afterwards enjoyed. In 1736, 
 he was appointed clerk-of-the-closet to queen Caro- 
 line ; and, in the same year, he presented to her ma- 
 jesty a copy of his excellent treatise, entitled, " The 
 Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the 
 Constitution and Course of Nature." His attendance 
 upon his royal mistress, by her especial command, 
 was from seven to nine in the evening every day : and 
 though this particular relation to that excellent and 
 learned queen was soon determined by her death in 
 1737, yet he had been so effectually recommended by 
 her, as well as by the late lord-chancellor Talbot, to 
 his majesty's favour, that, in the next year, he was 
 raised to the highest order of the church, by a nomi- 
 nation to the bishopric of Bristol ; to which see he 
 was consecrated on the third of December 1738. 
 King George II. not being satisfied with this proof of 
 his regard to Dr. Butler, promoted him, in 1740, to 
 / the deanry of St. Paul's, London; into which he 
 was installed on the 24th of May in that year. Find- 
 ing the demands of this dignity to be incompatible with 
 his parish-duty at Stanhope, he immediately resigned 
 that rich benefice. Besides our prelate's unremitted 
 attention to his peculiar obligations, he was called up- 
 on to preach several discourses on public occasions, 
 which were afterwards separately printed, and have 
 since been annexed to the latter editions of the Ser* 
 mons at the Rolls-chapeL 
 
DR, BUTLER, g 
 
 In 1746, upon the death of Dr. Egerton, bishop of • 
 Hereford, Dr. Butler was made clerk-of-the-closet to 
 the king ; and on the 16th October 1750, he received 
 another distinguished mark of his majesty's favour, 
 by being translated to the see of Durham* This was 
 on the 16th of October ; in that year, upon the de- 
 cease of Dr. Edward Chandler, our prelate, being 
 thus appointed to preside over a diocese with which 
 he had long been connected, delivered his first, and 
 indeed his last charge to his clergy, at his primary 
 visitation in 1751. The principal object of it was, 
 u External Religion.'' The bishop having observed, K ' 
 with deep concern, the great and growing neglect of 
 serious piety in the kingdom, insisted strongly on the 
 usefulness of outward forms and institutions, in fixing 
 and preserving a sense of devotion and duty in the 
 minds of men. In doing this, he was thought by sev- 
 eral persons to speak too favourably of Pagan and 
 Popish ceremonies, and to countenance, in a certain 
 degree, the cause of superstition. Under that appre- 
 hension, an able and spirited writer, who was under- 
 stood to be a clergyman of the church of England, 
 published in 1 752, a pamphlet, entitled, " A serious 
 Enquiry into the Use and Importance of External 
 Religion : occasioned by some passages in the Right 
 Rev. the Lord Bishop of Durham's Charge to the 
 Clergy of that Diocese ; — Humbly addressed to his 
 Lordship." Many persons, however, and we believe 
 the greater part of the clergy of the diocese, did not 
 think our prelate's charge so exceptionable as it ap- 
 
 b -. 
 
10 THE LIFE OF 
 
 peared to this author. The Charge, being printed at 
 Durham, and having never been annexed to any of 
 Dr. Butler's other works, is now become extremely 
 scarce ; and it is observable, that it is the only one of 
 his publications which ever produced him a direct 
 literary antagonist. 
 
 By this promotion, our worthy bishop was furnish- 
 ed with ample means of exerting the virtue of charity ; 
 a virtue which eminently abounded in him, and the 
 exercise of which was his highest delight. But this 
 gratification he did not long enjoy. He had been but 
 a short time seated in his new bishopric, when his 
 health began visibly to decline ; and having been 
 complimented, during his indisposition, upon account 
 of his great resignation to the Divine will, he is said to 
 have expressed some regret, that he should be taken 
 from the present world so soon after he had been ren- 
 dered capable of becoming much more useful in it. 
 In his last illness, he was carried to Bristol, to try the 
 waters of that place , but these proving ineffectual, he 
 removed to Bath, where, being past recovery, he died 
 on the 16th of June, 1752. His corpse was conveyed 
 to Bristol, and interred in the cathedral there, where 
 a monument, with an inscription, is erected to his 
 memory. 
 
 On the greatness of Bishop Butler's character we 
 need not enlarge ; for, his profound knowledge, and 
 the prodigious strength of his mind, are amply dis- 
 played in his incomparable writings. His piety was 
 of the most serious and fervent, and, perhaps, some- 
 
DR. BUTLER. , , 
 
 what of the ascetic kind. His benevolence was warm, 
 generous, and diffusive. Whilst he was bishop of 
 Bristol, he expended, in repairing and improving the 
 episcopal palace, four thousand pounds, which is said 
 to have been more than the whole revenues of the 
 bishopric amounted to, during his continuance in that 
 see. Besides his private benefactions, he was a con- 
 tributor to the infirmary at Bristol, and a subscriber 
 to three of the hospitals at London. He was likewise 
 a principal promoter, though not the first founder, of 
 the infirmary at Newcastle, in Northumberland. In 
 supporting the hospitality and dignity of the rich and 
 powerful diocese of Durham, he was desirous of imi- 
 tating the spirit of his patron, Bishop Talbot. In this 
 spirit, he set apart three days every week for the re- 
 ception and entertainment of the principal gentry of 
 the country. Nor were even the clergy who had the 
 poorest benefices, neglected by him. He not only oc- 
 casionally invited them to dine with him, but conde- 
 scended to visit them at their respective parishes. By 
 his will he left five hundred pounds to the society for 
 propagating the gospel in foreign parts, and some lega- 
 cies to his friends and domestics. His executor and 
 residuary legatee was his chaplain, the Rev. Dr. Na- 
 thaniel Forster, a divine of distinguished literature, 
 Bishop Butler was never married. Soon after his de- 
 cease, the following lines, by way of epitaph, were 
 written concerning him ; and were printed first, if we 
 recollect aright, in the London Magazine. 
 
THE LIFE OF DR. BUTLER, 
 
 Beneath this marble Butler lies entombed, 
 Who, with a soul inflamed by love divine, 
 
 His life in presence of his God consumed, 
 Like the bright lamps before the holy shrine. 
 
 His aspect pleasing, mind with learning fraught, 
 His eloquence was like a chain of gold, 
 That the wild passions of mankind controlled ; 
 
 Merit, wherever to be found, he sought. 
 
 Desire of transient riches he had none ; 
 
 These he, with bounteous hand, did well dispense ; 
 Bent to fulfil the ends of Providence ; 
 
 His heart still fixed on an immortal crown. 
 His heart a mirror was, of purest kind, 
 Where the bright image of his Maker shined ; 
 
 Reflecting faithful to the throne above, 
 
 The irradiant glories of the Mystic Dove. 
 
TO THE REVEREND 
 
 DR. THOMAS BALGUY, 
 
 archdeacon and prebendary of winchester, &c. 
 
 Dear Sir, 
 
 I trust you will excuse the liberty I have taken of 
 prefixing your name to the following sheets ; the lat- 
 ter part of which, I am confident, will not be thought 
 undeserving of your approbation ; and of the former 
 part you will commend the intention at least, if not 
 the execution. In vindicating the character of Bishop 
 Butler from the aspersions thrown upon it since his 
 death, I have but discharged a common duly of hu- 
 manity, which survivors owe to those who have de- 
 served well of mankind by their lives or writings, 
 when they are past the power of appearing in their 
 own defence. And if what I have added, by way of 
 opening the general design of the works of this great 
 Prelate, be of use in exciting the younger class of stu- 
 dents in our universities to read, and so to read as to 
 understand, the two volumes prepared and publish- 
 ed by the Author himself ; I flatter myself I shall 
 have done no inconsiderable service to morality and 
 religion. Your time and studies have been long suc- 
 cessfully devoted to the support of the same great 
 
14 
 
 cause ; and in what you have lately given to the 
 world, both as an author and an editor, you have 
 largely contributed to the defence of our common 
 Christianity, and of what was esteemed by one, who 
 was perfectly competent to judge, its best establish- 
 ment, the Church of England. In the present 
 publication I consider myself as a fellow-labourer with 
 you in the same design, and tracing the path you have 
 trod before, but at great distance, and with unequal 
 paces. When, by his Majesty's goodness, I was 
 raised to that station of eminence in the church, to 
 which you had been first named, and which, on ac- 
 count of the infirmity of your health, you had desired 
 to decline ; it was honour enough for me on such an 
 occasion to have been thought of next to you : And I 
 know of no better rule by which to govern my con- 
 duct, so as not to discredit the royal hand which con- 
 ferred on me so signal and unmerited a favour, than 
 in cases of difficulty to put the question to myself, 
 how you would probably have acted in the same situa- 
 tion * You see, Sir, I still look up to you, as I have 
 been wont, both as my superior and my example. 
 That I may long reap the benefit of your advice and 
 friendship ; and that such a measure of health and 
 strength may be continued to you, as may enable you 
 to pass the evening of your days with comfort, and 
 enjoy the blessings of the life you love, is the cordial 
 wish of, 
 
 Dear Sir, 
 
 Your very affectionate 
 
 and faithful Servant, 
 
 S. GLOUCESTER 
 
 nouth-Straet, Westminster, 
 lfthMay, 1786. 
 
 £ 
 
PREFACE 
 
 EDITOR. 
 
 * When I consider how light a matter very often subjects the best 
 " established characters to the suspicions of posterity, posterity 
 " often as malignant to virtue as the age that saw it was envious of 
 "its glory ; and how ready a remote age is to catch at a low revi- 
 " ved slander, which the times that brought it forth saw despised 
 " and forgotten almost in its birth ; I cannot but think it a matter 
 "that deserves attention." — Letter to the Editor of the Letters on 
 the Spirit of Patriotism, &c. by Bishop War burton. See his 
 Works, Vol. VII. p. 547. 
 
 Ihe Charge to the Clergy of the Diocese of Bur- 
 ham, which is subjoined to the present volume, was 
 printed and published in the year 1751, by the learn- 
 ed Prelate, whose name it bears ; and, together with 
 the Sermons and Analogy of the same writer, both 
 too well known to need a more particular description, 
 completes the collection of his works. It has long 
 been considered as a matter of curiosity, on account 
 of its scarceness ; and it is equally curious on other 
 accounts, its subject, and the calumny to which it gave 
 occasion, of representing the Author as addicted to 
 superstition, as inclined to popery, and as dying in the 
 communion of the church of Rome. The improved edi- 
 tion of the Biographia Britannica, now publishing* un- 
 der the care of Dr. Kippis, having unavoidably brought 
 this calumny again into notice ; it may not be unsea- 
 sonable to offer a few reflections in this place, by way 
 
j q PREFACE 
 
 of obviating any impressions that may hence arise, to 
 the disadvantage of so great a character as that of the 
 late Bishop Butler ; referring those who desire a 
 more particular account of his life, to the third volume 
 of the same entertaining work, printed in 1784. Art*.. 
 Butler (Joseph. J 
 
 I. The principal design of the Bishop, in his Charge, 
 is to exhort his Clergy to " do their part towards re- 
 viving a practical sense of religion amongst the people 
 committed to their care ;" and, as one way of effect- 
 ing this, to " instruct them in the importance of exter- 
 nal religion" or the usefulness of outward observances 
 in promoting inward piety. Now, from the com- 
 pound nature of man, consisting of two parts, the 
 body and the mind, together with the influence which 
 these are found to have on one another, it follows, 
 that the religious regards of such a creature ought to 
 be so framed, as to be in some way properly accom- 
 modated to both. A religion which is purely spirit- 
 ual, stripped of every thing that may affect the senses, 
 and considered only as a divine philosophy of the 
 mind, if it do not mount up into enthusiasm, as has 
 frequently been the case, often sinks, after a few short 
 fervours, into indifference : an abstracted invissible 
 object, like that which natural religion offers, ceases 
 to move or interest the heart ; and something further 
 is wanting to bring it nearer, and render it more pres- 
 ent to our view, than merely an intellectual contempla- 
 tion. On the other hand, when, in order to remedy 
 this inconvenience, recourse is had to instituted forms 
 and ritual injunctions ; there is always danger lest men 
 be tempted to rest entirely on these, and persuade 
 themselves that a painful attention to such observances 
 will atone for the want of genuine piety and virtue. 
 Yet surely there is a way of steering safely between 
 
BY THE EDITOR. 
 
 17 
 
 these two extremes ; of so consulting both the parts 
 of our constitution, that the body and the mind may- 
 concur in rendering our religious services acceptable 
 to God, and at the same time useful to ourselves. 
 And what way can this be, but precisely that which 
 is recommended in the charge ; such a cultivation of 
 outward as well as inward religion, that from both 
 may result, what is the point chiefly to be laboured 
 after, and at all events to be secured, a correspondent 
 temper and behaviour ; or, in other words, such an 
 application of the forms of godliness as may be sub- 
 servient in promoting the power and spirit of it ? No 
 man who believes the Scriptures of the Old and New 
 Testament, and understands what he believes, but 
 must know, that external religion is as much enjoin- 
 ed, and constitutes as real a part of revelation, as that 
 which is internal. The many ceremonies in use 
 among the Jews, in consequence of a divine com- 
 mand ; the baptism of water, as an emblem of moral 
 purity ; the eating and drinking of bread and wine, 
 as symbols and representations of the body and blood 
 of Christ, required of Christians, are proofs of this. 
 On comparing these two parts of religion together, 
 one, it is immediately seen, is of much greater impor- 
 tance than the ottnr ; and, whenever they happen to 
 interfere, is always to be preferred : but does it follow 
 from hence, that therefore that other is of little or no 
 importance, and, in cases where there is no compe- 
 tition, may entirely be neglected ? Or rather is not 
 the legitimate conclusion d rectly the reverse, that 
 nothing is to be looked upon as of little importance, 
 which is of any use at all in preserving upon our minds 
 a sense of the Divine Authority which recals to our 
 remembrance the obligations we are under, and helps 
 to keep us, as the scripture expresses it, in the fear of 
 
 c 
 
2 g PREFACE 
 
 the Lord all the day long ?* If, to adopt the instance 
 mentioned in the charge, the sight of a Church 
 should remind a man of some sentiment of piety ; if, 
 from the view of a material building dedicated to the 
 service of God, he should be led to regard himself, his 
 own body, as a living temple of the Holy Ghost ,t and 
 therefore no more than the other to be profaned or 
 desecrated by any thing that defileth or is impure ; 
 could it be truly said of such a one that he was super- 
 stitious, or mistook the means of religion for the end ? 
 If, to use another, and what has been thought a more 
 obnoxious instance, taken from the bishop's prac- 
 tice, a Cross, erected in a place of public worship,]; 
 should cause us to reflect on him who died on a cross 
 for our salvation, and on the necessity of our own dy- 
 ing to sin..§ and of crucifying the flesh with its affections 
 and lusts ;|| would any worse consequences follow from 
 such sentiments so excited, than if the same sentiments 
 had been excited by the view of a picture, of the cru- 
 cifixion suppose, such as is commonly placed, and 
 with this very design, in foreign churches, and indeed 
 in many of our own ? Both the in tances here ad- 
 duced, it is very possible, may be far from being ap- 
 proved, even by those who are under the most sincere 
 convictions of the importance of true religion ; and it 
 is easy to conceive how open to scorn and censure they 
 must be from others, who think they have a talent for 
 ridicule, and have accustomed themselves to regard all 
 pretensions to piety as hypocritical or superstitious. 
 But wisdom is justified of her children.^ Religion is 
 what it is, whether men will hear, or whether they will 
 forbear ;** and whatever in the smallest degree pro- 
 
 • Prov. xxiii. 17. f 1 Cor. vi. 19. 
 
 \ See note [A], at the end of this Preface. 
 § Rom. vi. 11. || Gal. v. 24. 
 
 \ Matth. xi. 1& ** Ezek, U. 5. 
 
BY THE EDITOR. j^ 
 
 motes its interests, and assists us in performing its 
 commands, whether that assistance be derived from 
 the medium of the body or the mind, ought to be 
 esteemed of great weight, and deserving of our most 
 serious attention. 
 
 However, be the danger of superstition what it may, 
 no one was more sensible of that danger, or more ear- 
 nest in maintaining that external acts of themselves 
 are nothing, and that moral holiness, as distinguished 
 from bodily observances of every kind, is that which 
 constitutes the essence of religion, than Bishop But- 
 ler. Not only the charge itself, the whole inten- 
 tion of which is plainly nothing more than to enforce 
 the necessity of practical religion, the reality as well as 
 form, is a demonstration of this ; but many passages 
 besides, to the same purpose, selected from his other 
 writings. Take the two following as specimens. In 
 his Analogy he observes thus : " Though mankind 
 have, in all ages, been greatly prone to place their re- 
 ligion in peculiar positive rites, by way of equivalent 
 for obedience to moral precepts ; yet, without mak- 
 ing any comparison at all between them, the nature 
 of the thing abundantly shews all notions of that kind 
 to be utterly subversive of true religion : as they are, 
 moreover, contrary to the whole general tenor of scrip- 
 ture ; and likewise to the most express particular dec- 
 larations of it, that nothing can render us accepted of 
 God, without moral virtue."* And to the same pur- 
 pose in his Sermon, preached before the Society for the 
 Propagation of the Gospel, in February, 1738-9. 
 " Indeed amongst creatures naturally formed for re- 
 ligion, yet so much under the power of imagination as 
 men are, superstition is an evil, which can never be out 
 
 * Analogy, Part II. Chap, h 
 
2q PREFACE 
 
 of sight. But even against this, true religion is a great 
 security, and the only one. True religion takes up 
 that place in the mind, which superstition would usurp, 
 and so leaves little room for it ; and likewise lays us 
 under the strongest obligations to oppose it. On the 
 contrary, the danger of superstition cannot but be in- 
 creased by the prevalence of irreligion ; and by its 
 general prevalence, the evil will be unavoidable. For 
 the common people, wanting a religion, will of course 
 take up with almost any superstition which is thrown 
 in their way ; and, in process of time, amidst the in- 
 finite vicis itucies of the political world, the leaders of 
 parties will certainly be able to serve themselves of that 
 superstition, whatever it be, which is getting ground ; 
 and will not fail to carry it to the utmost length their 
 occasions require. The general nature of the thing 
 shews this ; and history and fact confirm it. It is 
 therefore wonderful, those people who seem to think 
 there is but one evil in life, that of superstition, should 
 not see that atheism and profaneness must be the in- 
 troduction of it."* 
 
 He who can think and write in such a manner, can 
 never be said to mistake the nature of real religion : 
 and he, who, after such proofs to the contrary, can 
 persist in asserting of so discreet and learned a person, 
 that he was addicted to superstition, must himself be 
 much a stranger both to truth and charity. 
 
 And here it may be worth our while to observe, 
 that the same excellent prelate, who by one set of men 
 was suspected of superstition, on account of his charge, 
 has by another been represented as leaning to the op- 
 posite extreme of enthusiasm^ on account of his tw r o dis- 
 courses On the Love of God. But both opinions are 
 
 ' Serm. XVI. p. 33'J, 840. Ed. -lth, 17495. 
 
BY THE EDITOR. 21 
 
 equally without foundation. He was neither super- 
 stitious nor an enthusiast. His mind was much too 
 strong, and his habits of thinking and reasoning much 
 too strict and severe, to suffer him to descend to the 
 weaknesses of either character. His piety was at once 
 fervent and rational. When, impressed with a gener- 
 ous concern for the declining cause of religion, he la- 
 boured to revive its dying interests, nothing he judged 
 would be more effectual to that end, among creatures 
 so much engaged with bodily things, and so apt to be 
 affected with whatever strongly solicits the senses as 
 men are, than a religion of such a frame as should in 
 its exercise require the joint exertions of the body and 
 the mind. On the other hand, when penetrated with 
 the dignity and importance of the first and great com- 
 mandment,* Love to God, he set himself to inquire, 
 what those movements of the heart are, which are due 
 to him, the Author and Cause of all things ; he found, 
 in the coolest way of consideration, that God is the 
 natural object of the same affections of gratitude, rev- 
 erence, fear, de^re of approbation, trust, and depend- 
 ence ; the same affections in kind, though doubtless 
 in a very disproportionate degree, which any one would 
 feel from contemplating a perfect character in a crea- 
 ture, in which goodness with wisdom and power are 
 supposed to be the predominant qualities, with the 
 further circumstance that this creature was also his 
 governor and friend. This subject is manifestly a 
 real one ; there is nothing in it fanciful or unreason- 
 able. This way of being affected towards God is piety, 
 in the strictest sense : this is religion, considered as a 
 habit of mind ; a religion, suited to the nature and 
 condition of mamf 
 
 * Matth xxli. 38. 
 
 t See note [B], at the the end of this Preface. 
 
22 PREFACE 
 
 II. From superstition to popery the transition is 
 easy. No wonder then, that, in the progress of de- 
 traction, the simple imputation of the former of these, 
 with which the attack on the character of our author 
 was opened, should be followed by the more aggra- 
 vated imputation of the latter. Nothing, I think, 
 can fairly be gathered in support of such a suggestion 
 from the charge , in which popery is barely mentioned, 
 and occasionally only, and in a sentence or two ; yet 
 even there, it should be remarked, the bishop takes 
 care to describe the peculiar observances required by 
 it, " some as in themselves wrong and superstitious, 
 and others of them as being made subservient to the 
 purposes of superstition." With respect to his other 
 writings, any one at all conversant with them .needs 
 not to be told, that the matters treated of both in 
 his Sermons and his Analogy did, none of them, direct- 
 ly lead him to consider, and much less to combat, the 
 opinions, whether relating to faith or worship, which 
 are peculiar to the church of Rome : it might there- 
 fore have happened, yet without any just conclusion 
 arising from thence, of being himself inclined to favour 
 those opinions, that he had never mentioned, so much 
 as incidentally, the subject of popery at all. But for- 
 tunately for the reputation of the bishop, and to the 
 eternal disgrace of his calumniators, even this poor 
 resource is wanting to support their malevolence. In 
 his >ermon at St. Brides, before the Lord Mayor, in 
 1740, after having said that " our laws and whole 
 constitution go more upon supposition of an equality 
 amongst mankind, than the constitution and laws of 
 other countries *," he goes on to observe, that " this 
 plainly requires, that more particular regard should be 
 had to the education of the lower people here, than in 
 places where they are born slaves of power, and to be 
 
BY THE EDITOR. 23 
 
 made slaves of superstition :"* meaning evidently in 
 this place by the general term superstition, the partic- 
 ular errors of the Romanists. This is something ; but 
 we have a still plainer indication what his sentiments 
 concerning popery really were, from another of his 
 Additional Sermons, I mean that before the House of 
 Lords, on June the 11th, 1747, the anniversary of his 
 late Majesty's accession. The passage alluded to is as 
 follows, and my readers will not be displeased that I 
 give it them at length. " The value of our religious 
 establishment ought to be very much heightened in 
 our esteem, by considering what it is a security from ; 
 I mean that great corruption of Christianity, popery, 
 which is ever hard at work to bring us again under 
 its yoke. Whoever will consider the popish claims 
 to the disposal of the whole earth, as of divine right, 
 to dispense with the most sacred engagements, the 
 claims to supreme absolute authority in religion ; in 
 short, the general claims which the Canonists express 
 by the words, plenitude of power — whoever, I say, will 
 consider popery as it is professed at Rome^ may see, 
 that it is manifest, open usurpation of all human and 
 divine authority. But even in those Roman-catholic 
 Countries where these monstrous claims are not ad- 
 mitted, and the civil power does, in many respects, 
 restrain the papal ; yet persecution is professed, as it 
 is absolutely enjoined by what is acknowledged to be- 
 their highest authority, a general council, so called, 
 with the pope at the head of it ; and is practised in 
 all of them, I think, without exception, where it can 
 be done safely. Thus they go on to substitute force 
 instead of argument, and external profession made by 
 force instead of reasonable conviction. And thus 
 
 * Sena. XVII. p. 3€7. 
 
 V 
 
24, PREFACE 
 
 corruptions of the grossest sort have been in vogue;, 
 for many generations, in many parts of Christendom ; 
 and are so still, even where popery obtains in its least 
 absurd form : and their antiquity and wide extent 
 are insisted upon as proofs of their truth ; a kind of 
 proof which at bsst can only be presumptive, but 
 which loses all its little weight, in proportion as the 
 long and large prevalence of such corruptions have 
 been obtained by force."* In another part of the 
 same sermon, where he is again speaking of our ec- 
 clesiastical constitution, he reminds his audience that 
 it is to be valued, " not because it leaves us at liberty 
 to have as little religion as we please, without being 
 accountable to human judicatories ; but because it 
 exhibits to our view, and enforces upon our con- 
 sciences, genuine Christianity, free from the supersti- 
 tions with which it is defiled in other countries ;" 
 which superstitions, he observes, " naturally tend to 
 abate its force."f The date of this sermon should 
 here be attended to. It was preached in June, 1747 ; 
 that is, four years before the delivery and publication 
 of the charge, which was in the year 1751 ; and ex- 
 actly five years before the author died, which was in 
 June, 1752. We have then, in the passages now 
 laid before the reader, a clear and unequivocal proof., 
 brought down to within a few years of Bishop But- 
 ler's death, that popery was held by him in the ut- 
 most abhorrence, and that he regarded it in no other 
 light than as the great corruption of Christianity, and a 
 manifest, open usurpation of all human and divine author- 
 ity. The argument is decisive ; nor will any thing be 
 of force to invalidate it, unless from some after-act 
 during the short remainder of the bishop's life, besides 
 
 * Term. XX. p. 410—442. j P. 449. 
 
BY THE EDITOR. j 
 
 that of delivering and printing his Charge, "(which, 
 after what I have said here, and in the Notes added 
 to this Preface and to the Charge, I must have leave 
 to consider as affording no evidence at all of his in- 
 clination to papistical doctrines or ceremonies) the 
 contrary shall incontrovertibly appear. 
 
 III. One such after- act, however, has been alleged, 
 which would effectually demolish all that we have 
 urged in behalf of our Prelate, were it true, as is pre- 
 tended, that he died in the communion of the church vf 
 Rome, Had a story of this sort been invented and 
 propagated by Papists, the wonder might have been 
 less : 
 
 Hoc Ithacus velit, & magno mereentur Atridaj. 
 
 But to the reproach of protestantism, the fabrication 
 of this calumny, for such we shall find it, originated 
 from among ourselves. It is pretty remarkable, that 
 a circumstance so extraordinary should never have 
 been divulged till the year 1767, fifteen years after the 
 Bishop's decease. At that time Dr. Thomas Secker 
 was Archbishop of Canterbury ; who of all others 
 was the most likely to know the truth or falsehood of 
 the fact asserted, having been educated with our author 
 in his early youth, and having lived in a constant hab- 
 it of intimacy with him to the very time of his death. 
 The good Archbishop was not silent on this occasion : 
 with a virtuous indignation he stood forth to protect 
 the posthumous character of his friend ; and in a pub- 
 lic newspaper, under the signature of Misopssudes^ cal- 
 led upon his accuser to support what he had advanced, 
 by whatever proofs he could. No proof, however, nor 
 any thing like a proof, appeared in reply ; and every 
 man of sense and candour at that time was perfectly 
 convinced the assertion was entirely groundless.* As 
 
 * See note [C],at the end of this Preface. 
 D 
 
2(5 PREFACE 
 
 a further confirmation of the rectitude of this judg- 
 ment, it may not be amiss to mention, there is yet in 
 existence a strong presumptive argument at least in its 
 favour, drawn from the testimony of those who attend- 
 ed our author in the sickness of which he died. The 
 last days of this excellent Prelate were passed at Bath ; 
 Dr. Nathanael Forster, his chaplain, being con- 
 tinually with him ; and for one day, and at the very 
 end of his illness, Dr. Martin Benson also, the then 
 Bishop of Gloucester, who shortened his own life 
 in his pious haste to visit his dying friend. Both these 
 persons constantly wrote letters to Dr. Secker, then 
 Bishop of Oxford, containing accounts of Bishop 
 Butler's declining health, and of the symptoms and 
 progress of his disorder, which, as was conjectured, 
 soon terminated in his death. These letters, which 
 are still preserved in the Lambeth library,* I have read ; 
 and not the slenderest argument can be collected from 
 them, in justification of the ridiculous slander we are 
 here considering. If at that awful season the Bishop 
 was not known to have expressed any opinion, tending 
 to shew his dislike to popery ; neither was he known 
 to have said any thing, that could at alt be construed 
 in approbation of it : and the natural presumption is, 
 that whatever sentiments he had formerly entertained 
 concerning that corrupt system of religion, he contin- 
 ued to entertain them to the last. The truth is, nei- 
 ther the word nor the idea of popery seems once to 
 have occurred either to the Bishop himself, or to those 
 who watched his parting moments : their thoughts 
 were otherwise engaged. His disorder had reduced 
 him to such debility, as to render him incapable of 
 speaking much or long on any subject ; the few bright 
 
 * See note [D], at the end of this Preface, 
 
BY THE EDITOR. 27 
 
 intervals that occurred were passed in a state of the ut~ 
 most tranquillity and composure ; and in that compo- 
 sure he expired. Mark the perfect man> and behold the 
 upright ; for the end of that man is peace.* — Let me die 
 ihe death of the righteous, and let my last end be like 
 his!\ 
 
 Out of pure respect for the virtues of a man, 
 whom I had never the happiness of knowing, or even 
 of seeing, but from whose writings I have received the 
 greatest benefit and illumination, and which I have rea- 
 son to be thankful to Providence for having early 
 thrown in my way ; I have adventured, in what I have 
 now offered to the public, to step forth in his defence, 
 and to vindicate his honest fame from the attacks of 
 those, who, with the vain hope of bringing down su- 
 perior characters to their own level, are for ever at work 
 in detracting from their just praise. For the literary- 
 reputation of Bishop Butler, it stands too high in the 
 opinion of the world, to incur the danger of any dimi- 
 nution ; but this in truth is the least of his excellen- 
 cies. He was more than a good writer, he, was a good 
 man ; and, what is an addition even to this eulogy,, he 
 was a sincere Christian. His whole study was directed 
 to the knowlege and practice of sound morality and 
 true religion : these he adorned by his life, and has 
 recommended to future ages in his writings ; in which, 
 if my judgment be of any avail, he has done essential 
 service to both ; as much, perhaps, as any single per- 
 son, since the extraordinary gifts of the word of wis- 
 dom and the word of knowledge \ have been with- 
 drawn. 
 
 * Ps. xxxvii. 37. f Numb, xxiii. 10. { 1 Cor. xii. 8. 
 
ng PREFACE 
 
 IN what follows, I propose to give a short account 
 of the Bishop's Moral and Religious Systems, 
 as these are collected from his works. 
 
 I. His way of treating the subject of morals is to be 
 gathered from the volume of his Sermons, and par- 
 ticularly from the three first, and from the preface to 
 that volume. 
 
 " There is," as our Author with singular sagacity 
 has observed, " a much more exact correspondence be- 
 tween the natural and moral world, than we are apt to 
 take notice of."* The inward frame of man answers 
 to his outward condition. The several propensities, 
 passions, and affections, implanted in our hearts by the 
 Author of nature, are in a peculiar manner adapted to 
 the circumstances of life in which he hath placed us. 
 This general observation, properly pursued, leads to 
 several important conclusions. The original internal 
 constitution of man, compared with his external con- 
 dition, enables us to discern what course of action and 
 behaviour that constitution leads to, what is our duty 
 respecting that condition, and furnishes us besides with 
 the most powerful arguments to the practice of it. 
 
 What the inward frame and constitution of man is, 
 is a question of fact, to be determined, as other facts 
 are, from experience, from our internal feelings and 
 external senses, and from the testimony of others. 
 Whether human "nature, and the circumstances in 
 which it is placed, might not have been ordered other- 
 wise, is foreign to our inquiry, and none of our con- 
 cern : our province is, taking both of these as they 
 are, and viewing the connexion between them, from 
 that connexion to discover, if we can, what course of 
 action is fitted to that nature and those circumstances. 
 From contemplating the bodily senses, and the organs 
 
 • Serm. VI. 
 
BY THE EDITOR. q 
 
 or instruments adapted to them, we learn that the eye 
 was given to see with, the ear to hear with. In like 
 manner, from considering our inward perceptions and 
 the final causes of them, we collect that the feeling of 
 shame, for instance, was given to prevent the doing of 
 things shameful ; compassion, to carry us to relieve 
 others in distress ; anger, to resist sudden violence of- 
 fered to ourselves. If, continuing our inquiries in this 
 way, it should at length appear, that the nature, the 
 whole nature of man, leads him to and is fitted for that 
 particular course of behaviour, which we usually dis- 
 tinguish by the name of virtue ; we are authorized to 
 conclude, that virtue is the law we are born under, that 
 it was so intended by the Author of our being ; and 
 we are bound by the most intimate of all obligations, a 
 regard to our own highest interest and happiness, to 
 conform to it in all situations and events. 
 
 Human nature is not simple and uniform, but made 
 up of several parts ; and we can have no just idea of it 
 as a system or constitution, unless we take into our view 
 the respects and relations which these parts have to each 
 other. As the body is not one member, but many, 
 so our inward structure consists of various instincts, 
 appetites, and propensions. Thus far there is no dif- 
 ference between human creatures and brutes. But 
 besides these common passions and affections, there is 
 another principle, peculiar to mankind, that of con- 
 science, moral sense, reflection, call it what you please. 
 by which they are enabled to review their whole con- 
 duct, to approve of some actions in themselves, and to 
 disapprove of others. That this principle will of course 
 have some influence on our behaviour, at least at times, 
 will hardly be disputed : but the particular influence 
 which it ought to have, the precise degree of power in 
 the regulating of our internal frame that is assigned it 
 
JO 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 by him who placed it there, is a point of the utmost 
 consequence in itself, and on the determination of 
 which the very hinge of our Author's moral system 
 turns. If the faculty here spoken of be indeed, what 
 it is asserted to be, in nature and kind superior to every 
 other passion and affection ; if it be given, not merely 
 that it may exert its force occasionally, or as our pres- 
 ent humour or fancy may dispose us, but that it may 
 at all times exercise an uncontrollable authority and 
 government over all the rest ; it will then follow, that 
 in order to complete the idea of human nature, as a 
 system, we must not only take in each particular bias, 
 propension, instinct, which are seen to belong to it, but 
 we must add, besides the principle of conscience, to- 
 gether with the subjection that is due to it from all the 
 other appetites and passions ; just as the idea of a civil 
 constitution is formed, not barely from enumerating 
 the several members and ranks of which it is composed, 
 but from these considered as acting in various degrees 
 of subordination to each other, and all under the di- 
 rection of the same supreme authority, whether that 
 authority be vested in one person or more. 
 
 The view here given of the internal constitution of 
 man, and of the supremacy of conscience, agreeably 
 to the conceptions of Bishop Butler, enables us to 
 comprehend the force of that expression, common to 
 him and the ancient moralists, that virtue consists in 
 following nature. The meaning cannot be, that it 
 consists in acting agreeably to that propensity of our 
 nature which happens to be the strongest ; or which 
 propels us towards certain objects, without any regard 
 to the methods by which they are to be obtained ; but 
 the meaning must be, that virtue consists in the due 
 regulation and subjection of all the other appetites and 
 affections to the superior faculty of conscience ; from 
 
BY THE EDITOR. 
 
 31 
 
 a conformity to which alone our actions are properly 
 natural, or correspondent to the nature, to the whole 
 nature of such an agent as man. From hence too it 
 appears, that the Author of our frame is by no means 
 indifferent to virtue and vice, or has left us at liberty 
 to act at random, as humour or appetite may prompt 
 us ; but that every man has the rule of right within 
 him ; a rule attended in the very notion of it with au- 
 thority, and such as has the force of a direction and a 
 command from him, who made us what we are, what 
 course of behaviour is suited to our nature, and which 
 he expects that we should follow. This moral faculty 
 implies also a pre-sentiment and apprehension, that the 
 judgment which it passes on our actions, considered as 
 of good or ill desert, will hereafter be confirmed by the 
 unerring judgment of God ; when virtue and happi- 
 ness, vice and misery, whose ideas are now so closely 
 connected, shall be indissolubly united, and the divine 
 government be found to correspond in the most exact 
 proportion to the nature he has given us. Lastly, this 
 just prerogative or supremacy of conscience it is, which 
 Mr. Pope has described in his Universal Prayer, though 
 perhaps he may have expressed it rather too strongly, 
 where he says, 
 
 n What conscience dictates to be done, 
 
 " Or warns me not to do, 
 <r This teach me more than Hell to shun, 
 
 " That more than Heaven pursue."- 
 
 The reader will observe, that this way of treating 
 the subject of morals by an appeal to facts does not at 
 all interfere with that other way, adopted by Dr. 
 Samuel Clarke, and others, which begins with inquir- 
 ing into the relations and fitnesses of things, but rather 
 illustrates and confirms it. That there are essential 
 differences in the qualities of human actions, establish- 
 ed by nature, and that this natural difference of things. 
 
32 PREFACE 
 
 prior to and independent of all will, creates a natural 
 fitness in the agent to act agreeably to it, seems as little 
 to be denied, as that there is the moral difference before 
 explained, from which we approve and feel a pleasure in 
 what is right, and conceive a distaste to what is wrong. 
 Still, however, when we are endeavouring to establish 
 either this moral or that natural difference, it ought 
 never to be forgotten, or rather it will require to be 
 distinctly shewn, that both of these, when traced up to 
 their source, suppose an intelligent Author of nature 
 and moral Ruler of the world ; who originally ap- 
 pointed these differences, and by such an appoint- 
 ment has signified his will that we should conform 
 to them, as the only effectual method of securing our 
 happiness on the whole under his government.* 
 And of this consideration our Prelate himself was not 
 unmindful ; as may be collected from many expres- 
 sions in different parts of his writings, and particularly 
 from the following passages in his Xlth Sermon. " It 
 may be allowed, without any prejudice to the cause of 
 virtue and religion, that our ideas of happiness and mis- 
 ery are, of all our ideas, the nearest and most important 
 to us; that they will, nay, if ycu please, that they ought 
 to prevail over those of order, and beauty, and harmo- 
 ny, and proportion, if there should ever be, as it is im- 
 possible there ever should be, any inconsistencebetween 
 them." And again, " Though virtue or moral recti- 
 tude does indeed consist in affection to and pursuit of 
 what is right and good, as such ; yet, when we sit down 
 in a cool hour, we can neither justify to ourselves this 
 or any other pursuit, till we are convinced that it will 
 be for our happiness, or at least not contrary to it."t 
 Besides the general system of morality opened above, 
 our Author in his Volume of Sermons has stated with 
 
 * Sec note [I 7 ], at the end of this Preface. f Serm. XI. p. 229. 
 
BY THE EDITOR. gg 
 
 accuracy the difference between self-love and benevo* 
 lence ; in opposition to those, who on the one hand 
 make the whole of virtue to consist in benevolence,* 
 and to those, who on the other assert that every par- 
 ticular affection and action is resolvable into self-love. 
 In combating these opinions, he has shewn, I think un- 
 answerably, that there are the same kind of indications 
 in human nature that we were made to promote the 
 happiness of others, as that we were made to promote 
 our own : that it is no just objection to this, that we 
 have dispositions to do evil to others as well as good | 
 for we have also dispositions to do evil as well as good 
 to ourselves, to our own most important interests eVen 
 in this life, for the sake of gratifying a present passion : 
 that the thing to be lamented is, not that men have 
 too great a regard to their own real good, but that 
 they have not enough : that benevolence is not more 
 at variance with or unfriendly to self-love, than any 
 other particular affection is ; and that, by consulting 
 the happiness of others, a man is so far from lessening 
 his own, that the very endeavour to do so, though he 
 should fail in the accomplishment, is a source of the 
 highest satisfaction and peace ofmind.f He has also, 
 in passing, animadverted on the philosopher of Malms- 
 bury, who in his book Of Human Nature has advanced, 
 as discoveries in moral science, that benevolence is on- 
 ly the love of power, and compassion the fear of future 
 calamity to ourselves. And this our Author has done, 
 not so much with the design of exposing the false rea- 
 soning of Mr. Hobbes, but because on so perverse an 
 account of human nature he has raised a system, sub- 
 versive of all justice and honesty. { 
 
 * See the 2d Dissertation On the Nature of Virtue, at the end of the Analogy 
 f See Sermons I. and XI. and the Preface to the Volume of Sermons. 
 $ See the Notes to Sermon I. and V. 
 
 E 
 
34 PREFACE 
 
 II. The Religious System of Bishop Butler is 
 chiefly to be collected from the treatise, entitled The 
 Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Con- 
 stitution and Course of Nature, 
 
 All things are double one against another, and God hath 
 made nothing imperfecta On this single observation of 
 the Son of Sirach, the whole fabric of our Prelate's 
 defence of religion, in his Analogy, is raised. Instead 
 of indulging to idle speculations, how the world might 
 possibly have been better than it is ; or, forgetful of 
 the difference between hypothesis and fact, attempting 
 to explain the divine economy with respect to intelli- 
 gent creatures from pre-conceived notions of his own ; 
 he first inquires what the constitution of nature, as 
 made known to us in the way of experiment, actually 
 is ; and from this, now seen and acknowledged, he en- 
 deavours to form a judgment of that larger constitu- 
 tion, which religion discovers to us. If the dispensa- 
 tion of Providence we are now under, considered as 
 inhabitants of this world, and having a temporal in- 
 terest to secure in it, be found, on examination, to be 
 analogous to, and of a piece with that further dispen- 
 sation, which relates to us as designed for another 
 world, in which we have an eternal interest, depend- 
 ing on our behaviour here ; if both may be traced 
 up to the same general laws, and appear to be carried 
 on according to the same plan of administration ; the 
 fair presumption is, that both proceed from one and 
 the same Author. And if the principal parts objected 
 to in this latter dispensation be similar to, and of the 
 same kind with what we certainly experience under 
 the former, the objections, being clearly inconclusive 
 in one case, because contradicted by plain fact, must, 
 
 * Ecclus. xlii. 24. 
 
BY THE EDITOR. o r 
 
 in all reason, be allowed to be inconclusive also in 
 the other. 
 
 This way of arguing from what is acknowledged to 
 what is disputed, from things known to other things 
 that resemble them, from that part of the divine estab- 
 lishment which is exposed to our view, to that more 
 important one which lies beyond it, is on all hands 
 confessed to be just. By this method Sir Isaac New- 
 ton has unfolded the System of Nature ; by the same 
 method Bishop Butler has explained the System of 
 Grace, and thus, to use the words of a writer, whom I 
 quote with pleasure, " has formed and concluded a 
 happy alliance between faith and philosophy."* 
 
 And although the argument from analogy be al- 
 lowed to be imperfect, and by no means sufficient to 
 solve all difficulties respecting the government of God, 
 and the designs of his Providence with regard to man- 
 kind, (a degree of knowledge, which we are not fur- 
 nished with. faculties for attaining, at least in the pres- 
 ent state) yet surely it is of importance to learn from 
 it, that the natural and moral world are intimately 
 connected, and parts of one stupendous whole or sys- 
 tem ; and that the chief objections, which are brought 
 against religion, may be urged with equal force against 
 the constitution and course of nature, where they are 
 certainly false in fact. And this information we may 
 derive from the work before us ; the proper design of 
 which, it may be of use to observe, is not to prove the 
 truth of religion either natural or revealed, but to con- 
 firm that proof, already known, by considerations from 
 analogy. 
 
 After this account of the method of reasoning em- 
 ployed by our Author, let us now advert to his man- 
 
 * Mr. Mainivqfings Dissertation, prefixed to his Volume of Sermons. 
 
aft PREFACE 
 
 ner of applying it, first to the subject of Natural Re- 
 ligion, and secondly to that of Revealed. 
 
 1. The foundation of all our hopes and fears is a 
 future life ; and with this the treatise begins. Nei- 
 ther the reason of the thing, nor the analogy of nature, 
 according to Bishop Butler, give ground for imagin- 
 ing, that the unknown event, death, will be our de- 
 struction. The states in which we have formerly ex- 
 isted, in the womb and in infancy, are not more differ- 
 ent from each other than from that of mature age in 
 which we now exist : therefore that we shall continue 
 to exist hereafter, in a state as different from the present 
 as the present is from those through which we have 
 passed already, is a presumption favoured by the anal- 
 ogy of nature. All that we know from reason con- 
 cerning death, is the effects it has upon animal bodies : 
 and the frequent instances among men of the intel- 
 lectual powers continuing in high health and vigour, 
 at the very time when a mortal disease is on the point 
 of putting an end to all the powers of sensation, in- 
 duce us to hope that it may have no effect at all on 
 the human soul, not even so much as to suspend the 
 exercise of its faculties ; though if it have, the sus- 
 pension of a power by no means implies its extinction, 
 as sleep or a swoon may convince us.* 
 
 The probability of a future state once granted, an 
 important question arises, how best to secure our in- 
 terest in that state. We find from what passes daily 
 before us, that the constitution of nature admits of 
 misery as well as happiness ; that both of these are 
 the consequences of our own actions ; and these con- 
 sequences we are enabled to foresee. Therefore, that 
 our happiness or misery in a future world may depend 
 on our own actions also, and that rewards or punish* 
 
 * Part I. Chap. 1. 
 
BY THfi EDITOR. g* 
 
 ments hereafter may follow our good or ill behaviour 
 here, is but an appointment of the same sort with 
 what we experience under the divine government, ac- 
 cording to the regular course of nature.* 
 
 This supposition is confirmed from another circum- 
 stance, that the natural government of God, under 
 which we now live, is also moral ; in which rewards 
 and punishments are the consequences of actions, 
 considered as virtuous and vicious. Not that every 
 man is rewarded or punished here in exact proportion 
 to his desert ; for the essential tendencies of virtue 
 and vice to produce happiness and the contrary are 
 often hindered from taking effect from accidental 
 causes. However, there are plainly the rudiments and 
 beginnings of a righteous administration to be dis- 
 cerned in the constitution of nature ; from whence 
 we are led to expect, that these accidental hindrances 
 will one day be removed, and the rule of distributive 
 justice obtain completely in a more perfect state.f 
 
 The moral government of God, thus established, 
 implies in the notion of it some sort of trial, or a 
 moral possibility of acting wrong as well as right, in 
 those who are the subjects of it. And the doctrine 
 of religion, that the present life is in fact a state of 
 probation for a future one, is rendered credible, from 
 its being analogous throughout to the general con- 
 duct of Providence towards us with respect to this 
 world ; in which prudence is necessary to secure our 
 temporal interest, just as we are taught that virtue is 
 necessary to secure our eternal interest ; and both are 
 trusted to ourselves.J 
 
 But the present life is not merely a stateof probation, 
 implying in it difficulties and danger ; it is also a state 
 of discipline and improvement ; and that both in our 
 
 * Part I. Chap. f>, f Ch. 3. J Ch. 4. 
 
gg PREFACE 
 
 temporal and religious capacity. Thus childhood is 
 a state of discipline for youth; youth for manhood, 
 and that for old age. Strength of body, and matu- 
 rity of understanding, are acquired by degrees ; and 
 neither of them without continual exercise and atten- 
 tion on our part, not only in the beginning of life, 
 but through the whole course of it. So again with 
 respect to our religious concerns, the present world is 
 fitted to be, and to good men is in event, a state of 
 discipline and improvement for a future one. The 
 several passions and propensions, implanted in our 
 hearts, incline us, in a multitude of instances, to for- 
 bidden pleasures : this inward infirmity is increased 
 by various snares and temptations, perpetually occur- 
 ring from without. Hence arises the necessity of re- 
 collection and self-government, of withstanding the 
 calls of appetite, and forming our minds to habits of 
 piety and virtue ; habits, of which we are capable, 
 and which to creatures in a state of moral inperfec- 
 tion, and fallen from their original integrity, must be 
 of the greatest use, as an additional security, over and 
 above the principle of conscience, from the dangers 
 to which we are exposed.* 
 
 Nor is the credibility here given, by the analogy of 
 nature, to the general doctrine of religion, destroyed 
 or weakened by any notions concerning necessity. 
 Of itself it is a mere word, the sign of an abstract 
 idea ; and as much requires an agent, that is, a neces- 
 sary agent, in order to effect any thing, as freedom re- 
 quires a free agent. Admitting it to be speculatively 
 true, if considered as influencing practice, it is the same 
 as false ; for it is matter of experience, that, with re- 
 gard to our present interest, and as inhabitants of this 
 world, we are treated as if we were free ; and there- 
 
 * Ch. 5. 
 
BY THE EDITOR. 39 
 
 fore the analogy of nature leads us to conclude, that, 
 with regard to our future interest, and as designed for 
 another world, we shall be treated as free also. Nor 
 does the opinion of necessity, supposing it possible, at 
 all affect either the general proof of religion, or its 
 external evidence. * 
 
 Still objections may be made against the wisdom 
 and goodness of the divine government, to which 
 analogy, which can only shew the truth or credibility 
 of facts, affords no answer. Yet even here analogy is 
 of use, if it suggest that the divine government is a 
 scheme or system, and not a number of unconnected 
 acts, and that this system is also above our compre- 
 hension. Now the government of the natural world 
 appears to be a system of this kind ; with parts, re- 
 lated to each other, and together composing a whole ; 
 in which system ends are brought about by the use 
 of means, many of which means, before experience, 
 would have been suspected to have had a quite con- 
 trary tendency ; which is carried on by general laws, 
 similar causes uniformly producing similar effects ; the 
 utility of which general laws, and the inconveniences 
 which would probably arise from the occasional or 
 even secret suspension of them, we are in some sort 
 enabled to discern ;t but of the whole we are incom- 
 petent judges, because of the small part which comes 
 within our view. Reasoning then from what we 
 know, it is highly credible, that the government of 
 the moral world is a system also, carried on by general 
 laws, and in which ends are accomplished by the in- 
 tervention of means ; and that both constitutions, the 
 natural and the moral, are so connected, as to form to- 
 gether but one scheme. But of this scheme, as of 
 
 * Ch. 6. 
 
 f See a Treatise on Divine Benevolence, by Dr. Thomas Balguy, Part II. 
 
.q PREFACE 
 
 that of the natural world taken alone, we are not 
 qualified to judge, on account of the mutual respect 
 of the several parts, to each other and to the whole, 
 and our own incapacity to survey the whole, or, with 
 accuracy, any single part. All objections therefore 
 to the wisdom and goodness of the divine government 
 may be founded merely on our ignorance ;* and to 
 such objections our ignorance is the proper and a sat- 
 isfactory answer.! 
 
 2. The chief difficulties concerning Natural Re- 
 ligion being now removed, our Author proceeds, in 
 the next place, to that which is Revealed ; and as 
 an introduction to an inquiry into the credibility of 
 Christianity, begins with the consideration of its im- 
 portance. 
 
 The importance of Christianity appears in two 
 respects. First, in its being a republication of Nat- 
 ural Religion, in its native simplicity, with authority, 
 and with circumstances of advantage ; ascertaining, 
 in many instances of moment, what before was only 
 probable, and particularly confirming the doctrine of 
 a future state of rewards and punishments. J Second- 
 ly, as revealing a new dispensation of Providence, 
 originating from the pure love and mercy of God, and 
 conducted by the mediation of his Son, and the guid- 
 ance of his Spirit, for the recovery and salvation of 
 mankind, represented in a state of apostacy and ruin. 
 This account of Christianity being admitted to be 
 just, and the distinct offices of these three Divine Per- 
 sons being once discovered to us, we are as much 
 obliged in point of duty to acknowledge the relations 
 
 • See note |F], at the end of this Preface] 
 
 f Ch. 7. 
 
 J. See note [G], at the end of this Preface. 
 
£Y THE EDIT0&. 
 
 41 
 
 we stand in to the Son and Holy Ghost, as our Me- 
 diator and Sanctifier, as we are obliged in point of du- 
 ty to acknowledge the relation we stand in to God the 
 Father ; although the two former of these relations 
 be learnt from revelation only, and in the last we are 
 instructed by the light of nature ; the obligation in 
 either case arising from the offices themselves, and not 
 at all depending on the manner in which they are 
 made known to us.* 
 
 The presumptions against revelation in general are, 
 that it is not discoverable by reason, that it is unlike 
 to what is so discovered, and that it was introduced 
 and supported by miracles. But in a scheme so large 
 as that of the universe, unbounded in extent, and ev- 
 erlasting in duration, there must of necessity be num* 
 berless circumstances which are beyond the reach of 
 our faculties to discern, and which can only be known 
 by divine illumination. And both in the natural and 
 moral government of the world, under which we live, 
 we find many things unlike one to another, and there- 
 fore ought not to wonder if the same unlikeness ob- 
 tain between things visible and invisible ; although it 
 be far from true, that revealed religion is entirely 
 unlike the constitution of nature, as analogy may 
 teach us. Nor is there any thing incredible in reve- 
 lation, considered as miraculous ; whether miracles be 
 supposed to have been performed at the beginning of 
 the world, or after a course of nature has been estab- 
 lished. Not at the beginning of the world ; for then 
 there was either no course of nature at all, or a power 
 must have been exerted totally different from what 
 that course is at present. All men and animals cannot 
 have been born, as they are now ; but a pair of each 
 sort must have been produced at first, in a way alto- 
 
 * Part II. Ch. 1. 
 
42 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 getfier unlike to that in which they have been since pro- 
 duced ; unless we affirm, that, men and animals have 
 existed from eternity in an endless succession : one 
 miracle therefore at least there must have been, at the 
 beginning of the world, or at the time of man's crea- 
 tion. Not after the settlement of a course of nature^ on 
 account of miracles being contrary to that course, or, 
 in other words, contrary to experience : for in or- 
 der to know whether miracles, worked in attestation 
 of a divine religion, be contrary to experience or 
 not, we ought to be acquainted with other cases, sim- 
 ilar or parallel to those, in which miracles are alleged 
 to have been wrought. But where shall we find such 
 similar or parallel cases ? The world which we inhabit 
 affords none. We know of no extraordinary revela- 
 tions from God to man, but those recorded in the Old 
 and New Testament ; all of which were established by 
 miracles. It cannot therefore be said that miracles are 
 incredible, because contrary to experience, when all 
 the experience we have is in favour of miracles, and on 
 the side of religion. * Besides, in reasoning concerning 
 miracles, they ought not to be compared with com- 
 mon natural events, but with uncommon appearances, 
 such as comets, magnetism, electricity ; which to one 
 acquainted only with the usual phenomena of nature, 
 and the common powers of matter, must, before proof 
 of their actual existence, be thought incredible.! 
 
 The presumptions against revelation in general be- 
 ing dispatched, objections against the Christian reve- 
 lation in particular, against the scheme of it, as distin- 
 guished from objections against its evidence, are con- 
 sidered next. Now, supposing a revelation to be re- 
 ally given, it is highly probable beforehand, that it 
 
 * See note [H], at the end of this Preface, 
 f Ch. 2, 
 
BY THE EDITOR. 4 g 
 
 must contain many things, appearing to us liable to 
 objections. The acknowledged dispensation of nature 
 is very different from what we should have expected ; 
 reasoning then from analogy, the revealed dispensation, 
 it is credible, would be also different. Nor are we in 
 any sort judges at what time, or in what degree, or 
 manner, it is fit or expedient for God to instruct us, in 
 things confessedly of the greatest use, either by natural 
 reason, or by supernatural information. Thus, argu- 
 ing on speculation only, and without experience, it 
 would seem very unlikely that so important a remedy 
 as that provided by Christianity for the recovery of 
 mankind from a state of ruin, should have been for 
 so many ages withheld ; and, when at last vouchsafed, 
 should be imparted to so few ; and, after it has been 
 imparted, should be attended with obscurity and 
 doubt. And just so we might have argued, before 
 experience, concerning the remedies provided in na- 
 ture for bodily diseases, to which by nature we are ex- 
 posed : for many of these were unknown to man- 
 kind for a number of ages ; are known but to few 
 now; some important ones probably not discovered 
 yet ; and those which are, neither certain in their ap- 
 plication, nor universal in their use. And the same 
 mode of reasoning that would lead us to expect they 
 should have been so, would lead us to expect that the 
 necessity of them should have been superseded, by 
 there being no diseases ; as the necessity of the Chris- 
 tian scheme, it may be thought, might also have been 
 superseded, by preventing the fall of man, so that he 
 should not have stood in need of a redeemer at all.-* 
 
 As to objections against the wisdom and goodness 
 of Christianity, the same answer may be applied to 
 them as was to the like objections against the consti- 
 
 * Ch. 3. 
 
A* PREFACE 
 
 tution of nature. For here also, Christianity is a 
 scheme or economy, composed of various parts, form- 
 ing a whole ; in which scheme means are used for the 
 accomplishing of ends ; and which is conducted by 
 general laws ; of all of which we know as little as we 
 do of the constitution of nature. And the seeming 
 want of wisdom or goodness in this system is to be 
 ascribed to the same cause, as the like appearances of 
 defects in the natural system ; our inability to discern 
 the whole scheme, and our ignorance of the relation 
 of those parts which are discernible to others beyond 
 our view. 
 
 The objections against Christianity as a matter of 
 fact, and against the wisdom and goodness of it, hav- 
 ing been obviated together, the chief of them are now 
 to be considered distinctly. One of these, which is 
 levelled against the entire system itself, is of this sort : 
 the restoration of mankind, represented in Scripture 
 as the great design of the Gospel, is described as re- 
 quiring a long series of means, anpl persons, and dis- 
 pensations, before it can be brought to its completion ; 
 whereas the whole ought to have been effected at 
 once. Now every thing we see in the course of na- 
 ture shews the folly of this objection. For in the nat- 
 ural course of Providence, ends are brought about by 
 means, not operating immediately and at once, but 
 deliberately and in a way of progression ; one thing 
 being subservient to another, this to somewhat further. 
 The change of seasons, the ripening of fruits, the 
 growth of vegetable and animal bodies, are instances 
 of this. And therefore that the same progressive 
 method should be followed in the dispensation of 
 Christianity, as is observed in the common dispensa- 
 tion of Providence, is a reasonable expectation, justi- 
 fied by the analogy of nature.* 
 
 * Ch. 4. 
 
BY THE EDITOR. ^ 
 
 Another circumstance objected to in the Christian 
 scheme is, the appointment of a Mediator, and the 
 saving of the world through him. But the visible gov- 
 ernment of God being actually administered in this way, 
 or by the mediation and instrumentality of others, there 
 can be no general presumption against an appoint- 
 ment of this kind, against his invisible government 
 being exercised in the same manner. We have seen 
 already that, with regard to ourselves, this visible gov- 
 ernment is carried on by rewards and punishments ; 
 for happiness and misery are the consequences of our 
 own actions, considered as virtuous and vicious, and 
 these consequences we are enabled to foresee. It might 
 have been imagined, before consulting experience, that 
 after we had rendered ourselves liable to misery by our 
 own ill conduct, sorrow for what was past, and behav- 
 ing well for the future, would, alone and of themselves, 
 have exempted us from deserved punishment, and re- 
 stored us to the divine favour. But the fact is other- 
 wise ; and real reformation is often found to be of no 
 avail, so as to secure the criminal from poverty, sick- 
 ness, infamy, and death, the never-failing attendants 
 on vice and extravagance, exceeding a certain degree. 
 By the course of nature then it appears, God does not 
 always pardon a sinner on his repentance. Yet there 
 is provision made, even in nature, that the miseries, 
 which men bring on themselves by unlawful indulgen- 
 ces, may in many cases be mitigated, and in some re- 
 moved ; partly by extraordinary exertions of the of- 
 fender himself, but more especially and frequently by 
 the intervention of others, who voluntarily, and from 
 motives of compassion, submit to labour and sorrow, 
 such as produce long and lasting inconveniences to 
 themselves, as the means of rescuing another from the 
 wretched effects of former imprudences. Vicarious 
 
4 g PREFACE 
 
 punishment, therefore, or one person's sufferings con- 
 tributing to the relief of another, is a providential dis- 
 position, in the economy of nature :* and it ought 
 not to be matter of surprise, if by a method analogous 
 to this we be redeemed from sin and misery, in the 
 economy of grace. That mankind at present are in a 
 state of degradation, different from that in which they 
 were originally created, is the very ground of the 
 Christian Revelation, as contained in the Scriptures. 
 Whether we acquiesce in the account, that our being 
 placed in such a state is owing to the crime of our first 
 parents, or choose to ascribe it to any other cause, it 
 makes no difference as to our condition ; the vice and 
 unhappiness of the world are still there, notwithstand- 
 ing all our suppositions ; nor is it Christianity that 
 hath put us into this state. We learn also from the 
 §ame Scriptures, what experience and the use of ex- 
 piatory sacrifices from the most early times might 
 have taught us, that repentance alone is not sufficient 
 to prevent the fatal consequences of past transgres- 
 sions ; but that still there is room for mercy, and 
 that repentance shall be available, though not of it- 
 self, yet through the mediation of a Divine Person, 
 the Messiah ; who, from the sublimest principles of 
 compassion, when we were dead in trespasses and sins,\ 
 suffered and died, the innocent for the guilty, the just 
 for the unjust ,J that we might have redemption through 
 his blood, even the forgiveness of sins.§ In what way 
 the death of Christ was of that efficacy it is said 
 to be, in procuring the reconciliation of sinners, the 
 Scriptures have not explained : it is enough that the 
 doctrine is revealed ; that it is not contrary to any 
 
 * See note [I], at the end of this Preface. 
 
 f Ephes. ii. 1. \ Pet. iii. 18. 
 
 § Coloss. i.14. 
 
BY THE EDITOR. 
 
 47 
 
 truths which reason and experience teach us ; and 
 that it accords in perfect harmony with the usual 
 method of the divine conduct in the government of the 
 world.* 
 
 Again it hath been said, that if the Christian reve- 
 lation were true, it must have been universal, and 
 could not have been left upon doubtful evidence. 
 But God, in his natural Providence, dispenses his gifts 
 in great variety, not only among creatures of the same 
 species, but to the same individuals also at different 
 times. Had the Christian revelation been universal 
 at first, yet from the diversity of men's abilities, both 
 of mind and body, their various means of improve- 
 ment, and other external advantages, some persons 
 must soon have been in a situation, with respect to 
 religious knowledge, much superior to that of others, 
 as much perhaps as they are at present : and all men 
 will be equitably dealt with at last ; and to whom 
 little is given, of him little will be required. Then 
 as to the evidence for religion being left doubtful, 
 difficulties of this sort, like difficulties in practice, af- 
 ford scope and opportunity for a virtuous exercise of 
 the understanding, and dispose the mind to acquiesce 
 and rest satisfied with any evidence that is real. In 
 the daily commerce of life, men are obliged to act 
 upon great uncertainties, with regard to success in 
 their temporal pursuits ; and the case with regard to 
 religion is parallel. However, though religion be not 
 intuitively true, the proofs of it which we have are 
 amply sufficient in reason to induce us to embrace it ; 
 and dissatisfaction with those proofs may possibly be 
 men's own fault.f 
 
 Nothing remains but to attend to the positive evi- 
 dence there is for the truth of Christianity. Now, 
 
 * Ch. 5. f Ch. 6. 
 
48 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 besides its direct and fundamental proofs, which are 
 miracles and prophecies, there are many collateral cir- 
 cumstances, which may be united into one view, and 
 all together may be considered as making up one ar- 
 gument. In this way of treating the subject, the 
 revelation, whether real or otherwise, may be supposed 
 to be wholly historical : the general design of which 
 appears to be, to give an account of the condition of 
 religion, and its professors, with a concise narration of 
 the political state of things, as far as religion is affect- 
 ed by it, during a great length of time, near six thou- 
 sand years of which are already past. More particu- 
 larly it comprehends an account of God's entering 
 into covenant with one nation, the Jews, that he 
 would be their God, and that they should be his 
 people ; of his often interposing in their affairs ; giv- 
 ing them the promise, and afterwards the possession, 
 of a flourishing country ; assuring them of the greatest 
 national prosperity, in case of their obedience, and 
 threatening the severest national punishment, in case 
 they forsook him and joined in the idolatry of their 
 pagan neighbours. It contains also a prediction of a 
 particular person, to appear in the fulness of time, in 
 whom all the promises of God to the Jews were to be 
 fulfilled : and it relates that, at the time expected, a 
 person did actually appear, assuming to be the Saviour 
 foretold ; that he worked various miracles among 
 them, in confirmation of his divine authority ; and, 
 as was foretold also, was rejected and put to death by 
 the very people who had long desired and waited for 
 his coming ; but that his religion, in spite of all op- 
 position, was established in the world by his disciples, 
 invested with supernatural powers for that purpose ; 
 of the fate and fortunes of which religion there is a 
 prophetical description, carried down to the end of 
 
BY THE EDITOR. ^ 
 
 time. Let any one now, after reading the above his- 
 tory, and not knowing whether the whole were not a 
 fiction, be supposed to ask, whether all that is here 
 related be true ? And instead of a direct answer, let 
 him be informed of the several acknowledged facts, 
 which are found to correspond to it in real life ; and 
 then let him compare the history and facts together, 
 and observe the astonishing coincidence of both i 
 such a joint review must appear to him of very great 
 weight, and to amount to evidence somewhat more 
 than human. And unless the whole series, and 
 every particular circumstance contained in it, can 
 be thought to have arisen from accident, the truth 
 of Christianity is proved.* 
 
 The view here given of the moral and religious 
 systems of Bishop Butler, it will immediately be 
 perceived, is chiefly intended for younger students, 
 especially for students in divinity ; to whom it is ho- 
 ped it may be of use, so as to encourage them to pe- 
 ruse, with proper diligence, the original works of the 
 author himself. For it may be necessary to observe, 
 that neither of the volumes of this excellent Prelate 
 
 * Ch. 7. To the Analogy are subjoined Two Dissertations, both original- 
 ly inserted in the body of the work. One on Personal Identity, in which are 
 contained some strictures on Mr. Lode, who asserts that consciousness makes 
 or constitutes personal identity ; whereas, as our Author observes, conscious- 
 ness makes only personality, or is necessary to the idea of a person, i. e. a 
 thinking intelligent being,' but presupposes, and therefore cannot constitute 
 personal identity ; just as knowledge presupposes truth, but does not consti- 
 tute it. Consciousness of past actions does indeed shew us the identity of 
 ourselves, or gfves us a certain assurance that we are the same persons or 
 living agents now, which we were at the time to which our remembrance 
 can look back ; but still we should be the same persons as we were, though 
 this consciousness of what is past were wanting, though all that had been 
 done by us formerly were forgotten ; unless it be true, that no person has 
 existed a single moment beyond what he can remember. The other Disser- 
 tation is On the Nature of Virtue, ;vhich properlv belongs to the moral system 
 of our Author, already explained. 
 
£Q PREFACE BY THE EDITOR. 
 
 are addressed to those, who read for amusement, of 
 curiosity, or to get red of time. All subjects are not 
 to be comprehended with the same ease ; and moral- 
 ity and religion, when treated as sciences, each ac- 
 companied with difficulties of its own, can neither of 
 them be understood as they ought, without a very pe- 
 culiar attention. But morality and religion are not 
 merely to be studied as sciences, or as being specula- 
 tively true ; they are to be regarded in another and 
 higher light, as the rule of life and manners, as con- 
 taining authoritative directions by which to regulate 
 our faith and practice. And in this view, the infinite 
 importance of them considered, it can never be an 
 indifferent matter whether they be received or reject- 
 ed. For both claim to be the voice of God ; and 
 whether they be so or not, cannot be known, till their 
 claims be impartially examined. If they indeed come 
 from him, we are bound to conform to them at our 
 peril ; nor is it left to our choice,, whether we will 
 submit to the obligations they impose upon us or 
 not ; for submit to them we must in such a sense, as 
 to incur the punishments denounced by both against 
 wilful disobedience to their injunctions. 
 
*The following Epitaph, said to be written by Dr. Nathanael Forster, is 
 inscribed on a flat marble stone, in the cathedral church of Bristol, 
 placed over the spot where the remains of Bishop Butler are de- 
 posited ; and which, as it is now almost obliterated, it may be worth 
 .while here to preserve. 
 
 H. S. 
 
 Jleverendus admodum in Christo Pater 
 JOSEPHUS BUTLER, LL.D. 
 
 Hujusce primo Diceceseos 
 Deinde Dunelmensis Episcopus. 
 
 Qualis quantusq ;> Vir erat 
 
 Sua libentissime agnovit astas : 
 
 ! £t si.quid Praesuliaut Scriptori ad famam valent 
 
 Mens altissima, 
 
 Ingenii perspicacis et subacti Vis, 
 
 Animusq ; pius, simplex, candidus, liberalis, 
 
 Mortui hand facile evanescet memoria. 
 
 Obiit Bathonias 1 6 Kalend. Julii, 
 
 A.D, 1752. 
 
 Annos natus 60. 
 
NOTES TO THE PREFACE, 
 
 THE EDITOR, 
 
 Page 18. [A]. 
 
 Dr. Butler, when Bishop of Bristol, put up a cross, a plain piece 
 of marble inlaid, in the chapel of his episcopal house. This, which 
 was intended by the blameless Prelate merely as a sign or memorial, 
 that true Christians are to bear their cross, and not to be ashamed of 
 following a crucified Master, was considered as affording a presump- 
 tion that he was secretly inclined to popish forms and ceremonies, and 
 had no great dislike to popery itself. And, on account of the offence 
 it occasioned, both at the time and since, it were to be wished, in pru- 
 dence, it had not been done. 
 
 Page 21. [B]. 
 
 Many of the sentiments, in these two discourses of Bishop Butler, 
 concerning the sovereign good of man ; the impossibility of procuring 
 it in the present life ; the unsatisfactoriness of earthly enjoyments ; to- 
 gether with the somewhat beyond and above them all, which once at- 
 tained, there will rest nothing further to be wished or hoped ; and 
 which is then only to be expected, when we shall have put off this mor- 
 tal body, and our union with God shall be complete ; occur in Hook' 
 er^s Ecclesiastical Polity, Book I. § xi. 
 
 Page 25. [C]. 
 
 When the first edition of this Preface was published, I had in vain 
 endeavoured to procure a sight of the papers, in which Bishop But* 
 ler was accused of having died a papist, and Archbishop Secker's 
 replies to them ; though 1 well remembered to have read both, when 
 they first appeared in the public prints. But a learned professor in 
 the university of Oxford has furnished me with the whole controversy 
 in its original form ; a brief history of which it may not.be unaccept- 
 able to offer here to the curious reader. 
 
54? NOTES TO THE PREFACE, 
 
 The attack was opened in the year 1767, in an anonymous pam- 
 phlet, entitled The Root of Protestant Errors examined ,* in which the 
 author asserted, that " by an anecdote lately given him, that * some 
 Prelate,' (who at the bottom of the page is called B — p of D — m) is 
 said to have died in the communion of a church, that makes use of 
 saints, saint days, and all the trumpery of saint worship/' When this 
 remarkable fact, now first divulged, came to be generally known, it 
 occasioned, as might be expected, no little alarm ; and intelligence of 
 it was no sooner conveyed to Archbishop Secker, than in a short let- 
 ter, signed Misopseudes, and printed in the St. James's Chronicle of May 
 5), he called upon the writer to produce his authority for publish- 
 ing " so gross and scandalous a falsehood." To this challenge an im- 
 mediate answer was returned by the author of the pamphlet, who, 
 mow assuming the name of Phileleutheros, informed Misopseudesy 
 through the channel of the same paper, that " such anecdote had been 
 given him ; and that he was yet of opinion there is not anything im«- 
 probable in it, when it is considered that the same Prelate put up the 
 popish insignia of the cross in his chapel, when at Bristol ; and in his 
 last episcopal Charge has squinted very much towards that supersti- 
 tion." Here we find the accusation not only repeated, but supported 
 by reasons, such as they are ; of which it seemed necessary that some 
 notice should be taken : nor did the Archbishop conceive it unbecom- 
 ing his own dignity to stand up, on this occasion, as the vindicator of 
 innocence against the calumniator of the helpless dead. Accordingly, 
 in a second letter in the same newspaper of May 23, and subscribed 
 Misopseudes, as before, after reciting from BishopBuTLER's Sermon be- 
 fore the Lords the very passage here printed in the Preface, and obser- 
 ving that "there are, in the same Sermon, declarations, as strong as 
 can be made, against temporal punishments for heresy, schism, or even 
 for idolatry," his Grace expresses himself thus : " now he (Bishop 
 Butler) was universally esteemed, throughout his life, a man of 
 strict piety and honesty, as well as uncommon abilities. He gave all 
 the proofs, public and paivate, which his station led him to give, and 
 they were decisive and daily, .of his continuing to the last a sincere 
 member of the church of England. Nor had ever any of his acquaint- 
 ance, or most intimate friends, nor have they to this day, the least 
 doubt of it." As to putting up a cross in his chapel, the archbishop 
 frankly owns, that for himself he wishes he had not ; and thinks that 
 in so doing the Bishop did amiss. But then he asks, " can that be 
 opposed, as any proof of popery, to all the evidence on the other 
 side ; or even to the single evidence of the above-mentioned Sermon ? 
 Most of our churches have crosses upon them : are they therefore 
 popish churches ? The Lutherans have more than crosses in theirs : 
 are the Lutherans therefore papists ? # " And as to the Charge^ no 
 papist, his Grace remarks, would have spoken as Bishop Butler 
 there docs, of the observances peculiar to Roman catholics, some of 
 
BY THE EDITOR. £ 5 
 
 which he expressly censures as wrong and superstitious, and others 
 as made subservient to the purposes of superstition, and, on these ac- 
 counts, abolished at the reformation. After the publication of this 
 letter, Phileleuiheros replied in a short defence of his own conduct, but 
 without producing any thing new in confirmation of what he had ad- 
 vanced. And here the controversy, so far as the two principals were 
 concerned, seems to have ended. 
 
 But the dispute was not suffered to die away quite so soon. For 
 in the same year, and in the same newspaper of July 2 1 , another letter 
 appeared ; in which the author not only contended that the cross in 
 the episcopal chapel at Bristol, and the charge to the clergy of Durham 
 in 1751, amount to full proof of a strong attachment to the idolatrous 
 communion of the church of Rome, but, with the reader's leave, he 
 would fain account for the bishop's " tendency this way." And this 
 he attempted to do, " from the natural melancholy and gloominess 
 of Dr. Butler's disposition ; from his great fondness for the lives 
 of Romish saints, and their books of mystic piety ; from his drawing 
 his notions of teaching men religion, not from the New Testament, 
 but from philosophical and political opinions of his own ; and above 
 all, from his transition from a strict dissenter amongst the presbyteri- 
 ans to a rigid churchman, and his sudden and unexpected elevation 
 to great wealth and dignity in the church." The attack thus renew- 
 ed excited the archbishop's attention a second time, and drew from 
 him a fresh answer, subscribed also Misopseudes, in the St. James's 
 Chronicle of August 4. In this letter our excellent Metropolitan, first 
 of all obliquely hinting at the unfairness of sitting in judgment on the 
 character of a man who had been dead fifteen years, and then remind- 
 ing his correspondent, that "full proof had been already published, 
 that bishop Butler abhorred popery as a vile corruption of Chris- 
 tianity, and that it might be proved, if needful, that he held the Pope 
 to be Antichrist," (to which decisive testimonies of undoubted aver- 
 sion from the Romish church another is also added in the postscript, 
 his taking, when promoted to the see of Durham, for his domestic 
 chaplain, Dr. Nath. Forster, who had published, not four years be- 
 fore, a sermon, entitled, Popery destructive of the evidence of Christian- 
 ity) proceeds to observe, " That the natural melancholy of the bish- 
 op's temper would rather have fixed him amongst his first friends, than 
 prompted him to the change he made : that he read books of all sorts, 
 as well as books of mystic piety, and knew how to pick the good that 
 was in them out of the bad : that his opinions were exposed without re- 
 serve in his Analogy and his Sermons, and if the doctrine of either be 
 popish or unscriptural, the learned world hath mistaken strangely in 
 admiring both : that instead of being a strict dissenter, he never was 
 a communicant in any dissenting assembly ; on the contrary, that he 
 went occasionally, from his early years, to the established worship, 
 and became a constant conformist to it, when he was barely of age, 
 and entered himseff, in 1714, of Oriel College : that his elevation to 
 
56 NOTES TO THE PREFACE, 
 
 great dignity in the church, far from being sudden and unexpected, 
 was a gradual and natural rise, through a variety of preferments, and 
 a period of thirty two years : that as bishop of Durham he had very 
 little authority beyond his brethren, and in ecclesiastical matters had 
 none beyond them ; a larger income than most of them he had ; but 
 this he employed, not, as was insinuated, in augmenting the pomp of 
 worship in his cathedral, where indeed it is no greater than in others, 
 but for the purposes of charity, and in the repairing of his houses." 
 After these remarks, the letter closes with the following words : " Up- 
 on the whole, few accusations, so entirely groundless, have been so 
 pertinaciously, I am unwilling to say maliciously, carried on, as the 
 present ; and surely it is high time for the authors and abettors of it, 
 in mere common prudence, to shew some regard, if not to truth, at 
 least to shame. " 
 
 It only remains to be mentioned, that the above letters of archbishop 
 Seeker had such an effect on a writer, who signed himself in the St. 
 James's Chronicle, of August 25, A Dissenting Minister, that he declared 
 it as his opinion, that " the author of the pamphlet, called The Root of 
 Protestant Errors examined, and his friends, were obliged in candour, in 
 justice, and in honour, to retract their charge, unless they could estab- 
 lish it on much better grounds than had hitherto appeared :" and he ex- 
 pressed his " hopes that it would be understood that the dissenters in 
 general had no hand in the accusation, and that it had only been the 
 act of two or three mistaken men." Another person also, " a for- 
 eigner by birth," as he says of himself, who had been long an admirer 
 of bishop Butler, and had perused with great attention all that had 
 been written on both sides in the present controversy, confesses he 
 had been " wonderfully pleased with observing, with what candour 
 and temper, as well as clearness and solidity, he was vindicated from 
 the aspersions laid against him. ,, All the adversaries of our prelate, 
 however, had not the virtue or sense to be thus convinced ; some of 
 whom still continued, under the signatures of Old Martin, Latimer, 
 An Impartial Protestant, Paulinus, Misonothos, to repeat their confuted 
 falsehoods in the public prints ; as if the curse of calumniators had 
 fallen upon them, and their memory, by being long a traitor to truth, 
 had taken at last a severe revenge, and compelled them to credit their 
 own lie. The first of these gentlemen, Old Martin, who dates from 
 N-c-st-e, May 29, from the rancour and malignity with which his let- 
 ter abounds, and from the particular virulence he discovers towards the 
 characters of bishop Butler and his defender, I conjecture to be no 
 other than the very person who had already figured in this dispute, so ear- 
 ly as the year 1752 ; of whose work entitled, A serious inquiry into the 
 use and importance of external Religion, the reader will find some ac- 
 count in the notes subjoined to the bishop's charge, at the end of this 
 volume. 
 
BY THE EDITOR, 
 
 57 
 
 Page 26. [D]. 
 
 The letters, with a sight of which I was indulged by the favour of? 
 our present most worthy Metropolitan, are all, as I remember, wrap- 
 ped together under one cover ; on the back of which is written, in 
 Archbishop Secker's own hand, the following words, or words to 
 this effect, Presumptive arguments that Bishop Butler did not die a pa- 
 pist. 
 
 Page 32. [E]. 
 
 " Far be it from me," says the excellent Dr. T. Balguy,* " to dis- 
 pute the reality of a moral principle in the human heart. I feel 
 its existence : I clearly discern its use and importance. But in no 
 respect is it more important, than as it suggests the idea of a moral 
 Governor, Let this idea be once effaced, and the principle of con-< 
 science will soon be found weak and ineffectual. Its influence on 
 men's conduct has, indeed, been too much undervalued by some philo- 
 sophical inquirers. But be that influence, while it lasts, more or less, 
 it is not a steady and permanent principle of action. Unhappily we 
 always have it in our power to lay it asleep. — Neglect alone will sup- 
 press and stifle it, and bring it almost into a state of stupefaction : 
 nor can any thing less than the terrors of religion awaken our minds 
 from this dangerous and deadly sleep. It can never be matter of in- 
 difference to a thinking man, whether he is to be happy or miserable 
 beyond the grave.'' 
 
 Page 40. [F]. 
 
 The ignorance of man is a favourite doctrine with bishop Butler. IC 
 occurs in the second part of the Analogy ; it makes the subject of hi* 
 fifteenth Sermon ; and we meet with it again in his charge. Whethei 
 sometimes it be not carried to a length which is excessive, may admit 
 of doubt. 
 
 Page 40. [G.] 
 
 Admirable to this purpose are the words of Dr. T. Balguy> in the 
 iXth of his Discourses, already referred to. « The doctrine of a life 
 to come, some persons will say, is a doctrine of natural religion ; and 
 can never therefore be properly alleged to shew the importance of 
 revelation. They judge perhaps from the frame of the world, that 
 the present system is imperfect : they see designs in it not yet complet- 
 ed ; and they think they have grounds for expecting another state, in 
 which these designs shall be farther earned on, and brought to a con- 
 clusion, worthy of Infinite Wisdom. I am not concerned to dispute 
 the justness of this reasoning ; nor do I wish to dispute it. But how 
 far will it reach i Will it lead us to the Christian doctrine of a judg- 
 
 * Discourse IX. 
 
 H 
 
33 NOTES TO THE PREFACE. 
 
 ment to come ? Will it give us the prospect of an eternity of happi- 
 ness ? Nothing of all this. It shews us only, that death is not the end 
 of our beings ; that we are likely to pais hereafter into other systems, 
 more favourable than the present to the great ends of God's Providence, 
 the virtue and the happiness of his intelligent creatures. But into what 
 systems we are to be removed ; what new scenes are to be presented 
 to us, either of pleasure or pain ; what new parts we shall have to act, 
 and to what trials and temptations we may yet be exposed ; on all 
 these subjects we know just nothing. That our happiness for ever 
 depends on our conduct here, is a most important proposition, which 
 we learn only from revelation." 
 
 Page 42. [H]. 
 " In the common affairs of life, common experience is sufficient to 
 direct us. But will common experience serve to guide our judgment 
 concerning the fall and redemption of mankind ? From what we see 
 every day, can we explain the commencement, or foretel the dissolution 
 of the world ? To judge of events like these, we should be conversant 
 in the history of other planets ; should be distinctly informed of 
 God's various dispensations to all the different oraers of rational be- 
 ings. Instead then of grounding our religious opinions on what ive 
 call experience, let us apply to a more certain guide, let us hearken to 
 the testimony of God himself. The credibility of human testimony, and 
 the conduct of human agents, are subjects perfectly within the reach of 
 our natural faculties ; and we ought to desire no firmer foundation for 
 our belief of religion, than for the judgments we form in the common 
 affairs of life ; where we see a little plain testimony easily outweighs 
 the most specious conjectures, and not seldom even strong probabili- 
 ties." Dr. Balgirfs 4th Charge. See also an excellent pamphlet, en- 
 titled, Remarks on Mr. Hume's Essay on the Natural History of Reli- 
 gion, § v. And the 6th of Dr. Powell's Discourses. 
 
 Page 46. [I]. 
 Dr. Arthur Ashley Sykes, from whose writings some good 
 may be collected out of a multitude of things of a contrary tendency, 
 in what he is pleased to call The Scripture Doctrine of Redemption,* op- 
 poses what is here advanced by Bishop Butler ; quoting his words, 
 but without mentioning his name. If what is said above be not 
 thought a sufficient answer to the objections of this author, the reader 
 may do well to consult a charge On the use and abuse of Philosophy in 
 the study of Religion, by the late Dr. Powell, who seems to me to have 
 had the observations of Dr. Sykes in his view, where he is confuting 
 the reasonings of certain philosophizing divines against the doctrine 
 of the atonement. Powell's Discourses, Charge III. p. 342 — 348. 
 
 * See the Observations on the texts cited in his first chapter, and also in 
 chapter, the fifth and sixth. 
 
THE 
 
 ANALOGY OF RELIGION, 
 
 NATURAL AND REVEALED, 
 
 TO THJB 
 
 CONSTITUTION AND COURSE OF NATURE. 
 
RIGHT HONOURABLE 
 
 CHARLES, LORD TALBOT, 
 
 BARON OF HENSOL, 
 
 LORD HIGH CHANCELLOR OF GREAT BRITAIN, 
 
 THE FOLLOWING 
 
 TREATISE 
 
 IS, WITH ALL RESPECT, INSCRIBED, 
 
 IN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE HIGHEST OBLIGA- 
 TIONS TO THE LATE 
 
 LORD BISHOP OF DURHAM AND TO 
 HIMSELF, 
 
 BY HIS LORDSHIP'S MOST DUTIFUL, 
 
 MOST DEVOTED, 
 
 AND MOST HUMBLE SERVANT, 
 
 JOSEPH BUTLER. 
 
ADVERTISEMENT. 
 
 If the reader should meet here with any thing which 
 he had not before attended to, it will not be in the 
 observations upon the constitution and course of na- 
 ture, these being all obvious, but in the application 
 of them ; in which, though there is nothing but what 
 appears to me of some real weight, and therefore of 
 great importance, yet he will observe several things 
 which will appear to him of very little, if he can think 
 things to be of little importance, which are of any real 
 weight at all upon such a subject as religion. How* 
 ever, the proper force of the following treatise lies 
 in the whole general analogy considered together. 
 
 It is come, I know not how, to be taken for grant- 
 ed by many persons, that Christianity is not so much 
 as a subject of inquiry, but that it is now at length 
 discovered to be fictitious. And accordingly they 
 treat it as if, in the present age, this were an agreed 
 point among all people of discernment, and nothing 
 remained but to set it up as a principal subject of 
 
64 
 
 ADVERTISEMENT. 
 
 mirth and ridicule, as it were by way of reprisals 
 for its having so long interrupted the pleasures of 
 the world. On the contrary, thus much, at least, 
 will be here found, not taken for granted, but prov- 
 ed, that any reasonable man, who will thoroughly 
 consider the matter, may be as much assured as he 
 is of his own being, that it is not, however, so clear 
 a case that there is nothing in it. There is, I think, 
 strong evidence of its truth ; but it is certain no one 
 can, upon principles of reason, be satisfied of the 
 contrary. And the practical consequence to be 
 drawn from this is not attended to by every one who 
 is concerned in it. 
 
 May, 1736. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 Page 
 INTRODUCTION | 7 
 
 PART I. 
 
 OF NATURAL RELIGION. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 Of a Future Life • 79 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 Of the Government of God by Rewards and Punishments ; 
 and particularly of the latter - -. - 100 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 Of the Moral Government of God - » 113 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 Of a State of Probation, as implying Trial, Difficulties and 
 Danger - - - » . 14& 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 ®f a State of Probation, as intended for Moral Discipline and 
 Improvement - - . . 149 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 Of the Opinion of Necessity, considered as influencing Prac- 
 tice - - - „ m 176 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 
 Of the Government of God, considered as a Scheme or Consti- 
 tution, imperfectly comprehended . . 193 
 
 CONCLUSION - o 05 
 
 PART II. 
 
 OF REPEALED RELIGION. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 Of the importance of Christianity - ' . ojg 
 
 t 
 
66 CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 Of the supposed Presumption against a Revelation, considered 
 as miraculous - 23S 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 Of our Incapacity of judging, what were to be expected in a 
 Revelation ; and the Credibility, from Analogy, that it must 
 contain Things appearing liable to Objections - 241 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 Of Christianity, considered as a Scheme or Constitution, imper- 
 fectly comprehended - 258 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 Of the particular System of Christianity j the Appointment of 
 a Mediator, and the Redemption of the World by him *67 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 Of the want of Universality in Revelation j and of the suppos- 
 ed Deficiency in the Proof of it - - 288 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 
 Of the particular Evidence for Christianity » - 310 
 
 CHAP. VIII. 
 
 Of the Objections which may be made against arguing from 
 the Analogy of Nature to Religion - - 851 
 
 CONCLUSION 364 
 
 DISSERTATION I. 
 
 Of Personal Identity - - ■ - 377' 
 
 DISSERTATION II. 
 Of the Nature of Virtue - - • 385 
 
 A Charge to the Clergy of the Dioeese of Durham, 1751 397 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Jl rob able evidence is essentially distinguished 
 from demonstrative by this, that it admits of degrees ; 
 and of all variety of them, from the highest moral 
 certainty, to the very lowest presumption. We can- 
 not indeed say a thing is probably true upon one 
 very slight presumption for it, because, as there may 
 be probabilities on both sides of a question, there 
 may be some against it ; and though there be not, 
 yet a slight presumption does not beget that degree of 
 conviction which is implied in saying a thing is prob- 
 ably true. But that the slightest possible presump- 
 tion is of the nature of a probability, appears from 
 hence, that such low presumption, often repeated, 
 will amount even to moral certainty. Thus a man's 
 having observed the ebb and flow of the tide today, 
 affords some sort of presumption, though the lowest 
 imaginable, that it may happen again tomorrow ; but 
 the observation of this event for so many days, and 
 months, and ages together, as it has been observed by 
 mankind, gives us a full assurance that it will. 
 
 That which chiefly constitutes probability is ex- 
 pressed in the word likely, i. e. like some truth,* or 
 true event $ like it, in itself, in its evidence, in some 
 
 * Verisimile. 
 
£g INTRODUCTION. 
 
 more or fewer of its circumstances. For when we de- 
 termine a thing to be probably true, suppose that an 
 event has or will come to pass, it is from the mind's 
 remarking in it a likeness to some other event, which 
 we have observed has come to pass. And this obser- 
 vation forms, in numberless daily instances, a presump- 
 tion, opinion, or full conviction, that such event has 
 or will come to pass, according as the observation is, 
 that the like event has sometimes, most commonly, or 
 always so far as our observation reaches, come to pass 
 at like distances of time, or place, or upon like occa- 
 sions. Hence arises the belief that a child, if it lives 
 twenty years, will grow up to the stature and strength 
 of a man ; that food will contribute to the preserva- 
 tion of its life, and the want of it for such a number 
 of days, be its certain destruction. So likewise the 
 rule and measure of our hopes and fears concerning 
 the success of our pursuits ; our expectations that 
 others will act so and so in such circumstances ; and 
 our judgment that such actions proceed from such 
 principles ; all these rely upon our having observed 
 the like to what we hope, fear, expect, judge ; I say 
 upon our having observed the like, either with re- 
 spect to others or ourselves. And thus, whereas the 
 prince* who had always lived in a warm climate, nat- 
 urally concluded in the way of analogy, that there was 
 no such thing as water's becoming hard, because he 
 had always observed it to be fluid and yielding, — we 
 on the contrary, from analogy conclude, that there is 
 no presumption at all against this ; that it is supposa- 
 ble there may be frost in England any given day in 
 January next ; probable that there will on some other 
 day of the month ; and that there is a moral certain- 
 
 t The story is told by Mr. Locke in the Chapter of Probability. 
 
INTRODUCTION. g9 
 
 ty, i. e. ground for an expectation without any doubt 
 of it, in some part or other of the winter. 
 
 Probable evidence, in its very nature, affords but 
 an imperfect kind of information, and is to be consid- 
 ered as relative only to beings of limited capacities. 
 For nothing which is the possible object of knowledge, 
 whether past, present, or future, can be probable to an 
 infinite Intelligence, since it cannot but be discerned 
 absolutely as it is in itself, certainly true, or certainly 
 false. But to us, probability is the very guide of life. 
 
 From these things it follows, that in questions of 
 difficulty, or such as are thought so, where more satis- 
 factory evidence cannot be had, or is not seen ; if 
 the result of examination be, that there appears upon 
 the whole, any the lowest presumption on one side, 
 and none on the other, or a greater presumption on 
 one side, though in the lowest degree greater ; this de- 
 termines the question, even in matters of speculation ; 
 and in matters of practice, will lay us uncjer an abso- 
 lute and formal obligation, in point of prudence and 
 of interest, to act upon that presumption or low prob- 
 ability, though it be so low as to leave the mind in 
 very great doubt which is the truth. For surely a 
 man is as really bound in prudence to do what upon 
 the whole appears, according to the best of his judg- 
 ment, to be for his happiness, as what he certainly 
 knows to be so. Nay, further, in questions of great 
 consequence, a reasonable man will think it concerns 
 him to remark lower probabilities and presumptions 
 than these ; such as amount to no more than showing 
 one side of a question to be as supposable and cred- 
 ible as the other ; nay, such as but amount to much 
 less even than this. For numberless instances might 
 be mentioned respecting the common pursuits of life, 
 where a man would be thought, in a literal sense, dis- 
 
>j INTRODUCTION. 
 
 tracted, who would not act, and with great applica- 
 tion too, not only upon an even chance, but upon 
 much less, and where the probability or chance was 
 greatly against his succeeding.* 
 
 It is not my design to inquire further into the nature, 
 the foundation, and measure of probability ; or whence 
 it proceeds that likeness should beget that presump- 
 tion, opinion, and full conviction, which the human 
 mind is formed to receive from it, and which it does 
 necessarily produce in every one ; or to guard against 
 the errors, to which reasoning from analogy is> liable. 
 This belongs to the subject of logic ; and is a part of 
 that subject which has not yet been thoroughly consid- 
 ered. Indeed I shall not take upon me to say, how 
 far the extent, compass, and force of analogical rea- 
 soning can be reduced to general heads and rules, 
 and the whole be formed into a system : but though 
 so little in this way has been attempted by those who 
 have treated of our intellectual powers, and the exer- 
 cise of them, this does not hinder but that we may 
 be, as we unquestionably are assured, that analogy is 
 of weight, in various degrees, towards determining 
 our judgment and our practice. Nor does it in any 
 wise cease to be of weight in those cases, because per- 
 sons, either given to dispute, or who require things 
 to be stated with greater exactness than our facul- 
 ties appear to admit of in practical matters, may 
 find other cases in which it is not easy to say, whether 
 it be or be not of any weight ; or instances of seem- 
 ing analogies, which are really of none. It is enough 
 to the present purpose to observe, that this general 
 way of arguing is evidently natural, just, and conclu- 
 sive. For there is no man can make a question but 
 that the sun will rise tomorrow ; and be seen, where 
 
 * See Ch. vi. Part II. 
 
INTRODUCTION. ^ 
 
 it is seen at all, in the figure of a circle, and not in 
 that of a square. 
 
 Hence, namely from analogical reasoning, Origen* 
 has with singular sagacity ob erved, that he who be- 
 lieves the Scripture to have proceeded from him who is 
 the Author of nature ', may well expect to find the same 
 sort of difficulties in it, as are found in the constitution of 
 nature. And in a like way of reflection it may be 
 added, that he who denies the Scripture to have been 
 from God upon account of these difficulties, may, for 
 the very same reason, deny the world to have been 
 formed by him. On the other hand, if there be an 
 analogy or likeness between that system of things and 
 dispensation of Providence, which revelation informs 
 us of, and that system of things and dispensation of 
 Providence, which experience, together with reason, 
 informs us of, i. e. the known course of nature ; this is 
 a presumption, that they have both the same author 
 and cause; at least so far as to answer objections against 
 the former's being from God, drawn from any thing 
 which is analogical or similar to what is in the latter s 
 which is acknowledged to be from him ; for an Au- 
 thor of nature is here supposed. 
 
 Forming our notions of the constitution and gov- 
 ernment of the world upon reasoning, without foun- 
 dation for the principles which we assume, whether 
 from the attributes of God or any thing else, is build- 
 ing a world upon hypothesis, like Des Cartes. Form- 
 ing our notions upon reasoning from principles which 
 are certain, but applied to cases to which we have no 
 ground to apply th?m, (like those who explain the 
 structure of the human body, and the nature of dis- 
 
 *' Xpn /uiv roi yz rov a.Tct£ TretpstSi^ciiuivcv fu crTjWvrof tgv Kitr/mov livau taCtu 
 tolc yzfLtyoLS 7ri7ritT^aii, on ota 7rtpt th'c jcrjVe&Jc ivrwroi rots ftrxcrt ?cv t?o; atorr 
 x6yov,,ToLura, k*\ Trsfi t«v ypzth. Philocal. p, 23. Ed. Cant-. 
 
72 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 eases and medicines, from mere mathematics, without' 
 sufficient data) is an error much a-kin to the former \ 
 since what is assumed in order to make the reasoning 
 applicable, is hypothesis. But it must be allowed just, 
 to join abstract reasonings with the observation of facts, 
 and argue from such facts as are known, to others that 
 are like them ; from that part of the divine government 
 over intelligent creatures which comes under our view, 
 to that larger and more general government over them, 
 which is beyond it ; and from what is present, to collect 
 what is likely, credible* or not incredible, will be here- 
 after. 
 
 This method then of concluding and determining 
 being practical, and what, if we will act at all, we can- 
 not but act upon in the common pursuits of life ; be- 
 ing evidently conclusive, in various degrees, propor- 
 tionable to the degree and exactness of the whole anal- 
 ogy or likeness \ and having so great authority for its 
 introduction into the subject of religion, even reveal- 
 ed religion ; my design is to apply it to that subject in 
 general, both natural and revealed ; taking for proved, 
 that there is an intelligent Author of nature, and nat- 
 ural Governor of the world. For as there is no pre- 
 sumption against this prior to the proof of it, so it has 
 been often proved with accumulated evidence ; from 
 this argument of analogy and final causes ; from ab- 
 stract reasonings ; from the most ancient tradition 
 and testimony, and from the general consent of man- 
 kind. Nor does it appear, so far as I can find, to be 
 denied, by the generality of those who profess them* 
 selves dissatisfied with the evidence of religion. 
 
 As there are some, who, instead of thus attending to 
 what is in fact the constitution of nature, form their 
 notions of God's government upon hypothesis ; so 
 there are others, who indulge themselves in vain and 
 idle speculations, how the world might possibly have 
 
INTRODUCTION. 73 
 
 been framed otherwise than it is ; and upon supposi- 
 tion that things might, in imagining that they should, 
 have been disposed and carried on after a better mod- 
 el than what appears in the present disposition and 
 conduct of them. Suppose now a person of such a 
 turn of mind, to go on with his reveries, till he had at 
 length fixed upon some particular plan of nature, as ap- 
 pearing to him the best ; one shall scarce be thought 
 guilty of detraction against human understanding, if 
 one should say, even beforehand, that the plan which 
 this speculative person would fix upon, though he were 
 the wisest of the sons of men, probably would not be 
 the very best, even according to his own notions of 
 best ; whether he thought that to be so, which afford- 
 ed occasions and motives for the exercise of the great- 
 est virtue, or which was productive of the greatest hap- 
 piness, or that these two were necessarily connected, 
 and run up into one and the same plan. However, it 
 may not be amiss once for all to see, what would be 
 the amount of these emendations and imaginary im- 
 provements upon the system of nature, or how far they 
 would mislead us. And it seems there could be no 
 stopping, till we came to some such conclusions as 
 these : that all creatures should at first be made as 
 perfect and as happy as they were capable of ever be- 
 ing : that nothing, to be sure, of hazard or danger 
 should be put upon them to do ; some indolent persons 
 would perhaps think nothing at all ; or certainly, that 
 effectual care should be taken, that they should, wheth- 
 er necessarily or not, yet eventually and in fact, always 
 do what was right and most conducive to happiness, 
 which would be thought easy for infinite power to ef- 
 fect ; either by not giving them any principles which 
 would endanger their going wrong, or by laying the 
 right motive of action in every instance before their 
 
 K 
 
74 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 minds continually in so strong a manner, as would 
 never fail of inducing them to act conformably to 
 it ; and that the whole method of government by 
 punishments should be rejected as absurd, as an- 
 awkward round-about method of carrying things 
 on ; nay, as contrary to a principal purpose, for 
 which it would be supposed creatures were made, 
 namely happiness. 
 
 Now, without considering what is to be said in par- 
 ticular to the several parts of this train of folly and ex- 
 travagance, what has been above intimated, is a full, 
 direct, general answer to it, namely, that we may see 
 beforehand that we have not faculties for this kind of 
 speculation. For though it be admitted, that from 
 the first principles of our nature, we unavoidably judge 
 or determine some ends to be absolutely in themselves 
 preferable to others, and that the ends now mentioned, 
 or if they run up into one, that this one is absolutely 
 the best ; and consequently that we must conclude 
 the ultimate end designed, in the constitution of na- 
 ture and conduct of Providence, is the most virtue and 
 happiness possible : yet we are far from being able to 
 judge, what particular disposition of things would be 
 most friendly and assistant to virtue ; or what means 
 might be absolutely necessary to produce the most 
 happiness in a system of such extent as our own world 
 may be, taking in all that is past and to come, though 
 we should suppose it detached from the whole of 
 things. Indeed we are so far from being able to judge 
 of this, that we are not judges what may be the neces- 
 sary means of raising and conducting one person to the 
 highest perfection and happiness of his nature. Nay, 
 even in the little affairs of the present life, we find men 
 of different educations and ranks are not competent 
 judges of the conduct of each other. Our whole na- 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 75 
 
 ture leads us to ascribe all moral perfection to God, 
 and to deny all imperfection of him- And this will 
 for ever be a practical proof of his moral character, to 
 such as will consider what a practical proof is ; because 
 it is the voice of God speaking in us. And from hence 
 we conclude, that virtue must be the happiness, and 
 vice the misery of every creature ; and that regularity 
 and order and right cannot but prevail finally in a uni- 
 verse under his government. But we are in no sort 
 judges, what are the necessary means of accomplishing 
 this end. 
 
 Let us then, instead of that idle and not very inno- 
 cent employment of forming imaginary models of a 
 world, and schemes of governing it, turn our thoughts 
 to what we experience to be the conduct of nature 
 with respect to intelligent creatures ; which may be 
 resolved into general laws or rules of administration, 
 in the same way as many of the laws of nature respect- 
 ing inanimate matter may be collected from experi- 
 ments. And let us compare the known constitution 
 and course of things, with what is said to be the moral 
 system of nature ; the acknowledged dispensations of 
 Providence, or that government which we find our- 
 selves under, with what religion teaches us to be- 
 lieve and expect ; and see whether they are not 
 analogous and of a piece. And upon such a com- 
 parison, it will I think be found, that they are very 
 much so ; that both may be traced up to the same 
 general laws, and resolved into the same principles of 
 divine conduct. 
 
 The analogy here proposed to be considered is of 
 pretty large extent, and consists of several parts ; in 
 some more, in others less exact. In some few in- 
 stances, perhaps, it may amount to a real practical 
 proof ; in others not so. Yet in these it is a con- 
 
JQ INTRODUCTION. 
 
 firmation of what is proved other ways. It will un- 
 deniably show, what too many want to have shown 
 them, that the system of religion, both natural and 
 revealed, considered only as a system, and prior to the 
 proof of it, is not a subject of ridicule, unless that of 
 nature be so too. And it will afford an answer to al- 
 most all objections against the system both of natural 
 and revealed religion ; though not perhaps an answer 
 in so great a degree, yet in a very considerable degree 
 an answer, to the objections against the evidence of it : 
 for objections against a proof, and objections against 
 what is said to be proved, the reader will observe are 
 different things. 
 
 Now the divine government of the world, implied 
 in the notion of religion in general and of Christianity, 
 contains in it, — That mankind is appointed to live in a 
 future state ;* that there, every one shall be rewarded 
 or punished ;t rewarded or punished respectively for 
 all that behaviour here, which we comprehend under 
 the words, virtuous or vicious, morally good or evil :| 
 that our present life is a probation, a state of trial, § 
 and of discipline,]] for that future one; notwithstand- 
 ing the objections, which men may fancy they have, 
 from notions of necessity, against there being any such 
 moral plan as this at all ;** and whatever objections 
 may appear to lie against the wisdom and goodness of 
 it, as it stands so imperfectly made known to us at 
 present :ft that this world being in a state of apos- 
 tacy and wickedness, and consequently of ruin, and the 
 sense both of their condition and duty being greatly 
 corrupted amongst men ; this gave occasion for an ad- 
 ditional dispensation of Providence ; of the utmost im- 
 portance jJJ proved by miracles ;§§ but containing in 
 
 * Ch. i. f Ch. ii. } Ch. Hi. § Ch. iv. || Ch. v. 
 
 •• Ch. vi. -If Ch. vii. || Part IL Ch. i. $§ Ch. ii. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 77 
 
 it many things appearing to us strange and not to 
 have been expected ;* a dispensation of Providence, 
 which is a scheme or system of things ;f carried on 
 by the mediation of a divine person, the Messiah, in 
 order to the recovery of the world ; J yet not revealed 
 to all men, nor proved with the strongest possible evi- 
 dence to all those to whom it is revealed ; but only to 
 such a part of mankind, and with such particular evi- 
 dence as the wisdom of God thought fit.§ The de- 
 sign then of the following Treatise will be to shew, 
 that the several parts principally objected against in 
 this moral and Christian dispensation, including its 
 scheme, its publication, and the proof which God has 
 afforded us of its truth ; that the particular parts prin- 
 cipally objected against in this whole dispensation, are 
 analogous to what is experienced in the constitution 
 and course of nature, or providence ; that the chief 
 objections themselves which are alleged against the 
 former, are no other than what may be alleged with 
 like justness against the latter, where they are found in 
 fact to be inconclusive ; and that this argument from 
 analogy is in general unanswerable, and undoubtedly 
 of weight on the side of religion, || notwithstanding the 
 objections which may seem to lie against it, and the 
 real ground which there may be for difference of opin- 
 ion, as to the particular degree of weight which is to 
 be laid upon it. This is a general account of what 
 may be looked for in the following Treatise ; and I 
 shall begin it with that which is the foundation of 
 all our hopes and of all our fears, all our hopes and 
 fears which are of any consideration i I mean a fu- 
 
 ture, life. 
 
 f Ch. iv. f Ch. v. § Ch. vl. vii. 
 

 
 ANALOGY 
 
 RELIGION 
 
 CONSTITUTION AND COURSE OF NATURE, 
 
 PART I. 
 
 OF NATURAL RELIGION. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 Of a Future Life. 
 
 qtrange difficulties have been raised by some con- 
 cerning personal identity, or the sameness of living 
 agents, implied in the notion of our existing now and 
 hereafter, or in any two successive moments ; which, 
 whoever thinks it worth while, may see considered in 
 the first Dissertation at the end of this Treatise. But 
 without regard to any of them here, let us consider 
 what the analogy of nature, and the several changes 
 which we have undergone, and those which we know 
 we may undergo without being destroyed, suggest, as 
 to the effect which death may or may not have upon 
 us ; and whether it be not from thence probable, that 
 we may survive this change, and exist in a future state 
 of life and perception. 
 
80 Of a Future Life. Part L 
 
 I. From our being born into the present world in 
 the helpless imperfect state of infancy, and having ar- 
 rived from thence to mature age, we find it to be a 
 general law of nature in our own spedtte, that the same 
 creatures, the same individuals, should exist in de- 
 grees of life and perception, with capacities of action, 
 of enjoyment and suffering, in one period of their be- 
 ing, greatly different from those appointed them in 
 another period of it. And in other creatures the 
 same law holds. For the difference of their capaci- 
 ties and states of life at their birth (to go no higher) 
 and in maturity ; the change of worms into flies, and 
 the vast enlargement of their locomotive powers by 
 such change ; and birds and insects bursting the shell, 
 their habitation, and by this means entering into a 
 new world, furnished with new accommodations for 
 them, and finding a new sphere of action assigned 
 them ; these are instances of this general law of nature. 
 Thus all the various and wonderful transformations of 
 animals are to be taken into consideration here. But 
 the states of life in which we ourselves existed formerly 
 in the womb and in our infancy, are almost as different 
 from our present in mature age, as it is possible to 
 conceive any two states or degrees of life can be. 
 Therefore, that we are to exist hereafter in a state as 
 different (suppose) from our present, as this is from 
 our former, is but according to the analogy of na- 
 ture ; according to a natural order or appointment 
 of the very same kind with what we have already ex- 
 perienced. 
 
 II. We know we are endued with capacities of ac- 
 tion, of happiness and misery ; for we are conscious 
 of acting, of enjoying pleasure, and suffering pain. 
 Now that we have these powers and capacities before 
 death, is a presumption that we shall retain them 
 
Chap. I. Of a Future Life. 81 
 
 through and after death ; indeed a probability of it 
 abundantly .sufficient to act upon, unless there be some 
 positive reason to think that death is the destruction 
 of those living powers; because there i in every case 
 a probability, that all things will continue as we ex- 
 perience they are, in all respects, except those in 
 which we have some reason to think they will be al- 
 tered. This is that kind* of presumption or proba- 
 bility from analogy, expressed in the very word contin* 
 uance^ which seems our only natural reason for believ- 
 ing the course of the world will continue tomorrow, 
 as it has done so far as our experience or knowledge 
 of history can carry us back Nay, it seems our only 
 reason for believing that any one substance now ex- 
 isting will continue to exist a moment longer, the 
 self-existent substance only excepted. Thus if men 
 were assured that the unknown event, death, was not 
 the destruction of our faculties of perception and of 
 action, there would be no apprehension that any other 
 power or event unconnected with this of death, would 
 destroy these faculties just at the instant of each crea- 
 ture's death, and therefore no doubt but that they 
 would remain after it ; which shows the high proba- 
 bility that our living powers will continue after death, 
 unless there be some ground to think that death is 
 their destruction.! For, if it would be in a manner 
 certain that we should survive death, provided it were 
 
 * I say kind of presumption or probability ; for T do not mean to affirm 
 that there is the same degree of conviction, that our living powers will con- 
 tinue after death, as there is, that our suhstances will. 
 
 f Detraction of living powers, is a manner of expression unavoidably am- 
 biguous ; and may signify either the destruction of a living bting, so as that the 
 same living being shall be uncapable of ever perceiving or acting again at all ; or, the 
 destruction of those means and instruments by which it is capable of its present life, of 
 its present state af perception and of action. It is here used in the former sense. 
 When it is used in the latter, the epithet present is added. The loss of a 
 
 L 
 
32 Of a Future Life. Part I. 
 
 certain that death would not be our destruction, it 
 must be highly probable we shall survive it, if there 
 be no ground to think death will be our destruction. 
 
 Now, though I think it must be acknowledged, 
 that prior to the natural and moral proofs of a future 
 life commonly insisted upon, there would arise a gen- 
 eral confused suspicion, that in the great shock and 
 alteration which we shall undergo by death, we, i. e. 
 our living powers, might be wholly destroyed ; yet, 
 even prior to those proofs, there is really no particu- 
 lar distinct ground or reason for this apprehension at 
 all, so far as I can find. If there be, it must arise 
 either from the reason of the thing, or from the analogy 
 of nature. 
 
 But we cannot argue from the reason of the thing, that 
 death is the destruction of living agents, because we 
 know not at all what death is in itself ; but only 
 some of its effects, such as the dissolution of flesh, 
 skin, and bones. And these effects do in no wise ap- 
 pear to imply the destruction of a living agent. And 
 besides, as we are greatly in the dark, upon what the 
 exercise of our living powers depends, so we are whol- 
 ly ignorant what the powers themselves depend up- 
 on ; the powers themselves as distinguished, not only 
 from their actual exercise, but also from the present 
 capacity of exercising them ; and as opposed to their 
 destruction : for sleep, or however a swoon, shews us, 
 not only that these powers exist when they are not ex- 
 ercised, as the passive power of motion does in inani- 
 mate matter ; but shews also that they exist, when 
 
 man's eye, is a destruction of living powers in the latter sense. But we have 
 no reason to think the destruction of living powers in the former sense. t» 
 be possible. We have no more reason to think a being endued with living 
 powers ever loses them during its whole existence, than to believe that a 
 stone ever acquires them. 
 
Chap. I. Of a Future Life. S3 
 
 there is no present capacity of exercising them ; or 
 that the capacities of exercising them for the present, 
 as well as the actual exercise of them, may be sus- 
 pended, and yet the powers themselves remain unde- 
 stroyed. Since then we know not at all upon what 
 the existence of our living powers depends, this shews 
 further, there can no probability be collected from 
 the reason of the thing, that death will be their de- 
 struction ; because their existence may depend upon 
 somewhat in no degree affected by death, upon some- 
 what quite out of the reach of this king of terrors. 
 So that there is nothing more certain, than that the 
 reason ef the thing shews us no connexion between 
 death, and the destruction of living agents. Nor can 
 we find any thing throughout the whole analogy of 
 nature, to afford us even the slightest presumption, 
 that animals ever lose their living power ; much less, 
 if it were possible, that they lose them by death ; for 
 we have no faculties wherewith to trace any beyond or 
 through it, so as to see what becomes of them. This 
 event removes them from our view. It destroys the 
 sensible proof, which we had before their death, of 
 their being possessed of living powers, but does not 
 appear to afford the least reason to believe that they 
 are, then, or by that event, deprived of them. 
 
 And our knowing that they were possessed of these 
 powers, up to the very period to which we have facul- 
 ties capable of tracing them, is itself a probability of 
 their retaining them beyond it. And this is confirm- 
 ed, and a sensible credibility is given to it, by observing 
 the very great and astonishing changes which we have 
 experienced ; so great, that our existence in another 
 state of life, of perception and of action, will be but 
 according to a method of providential conduct, the 
 like to which has been already exercised even with re- 
 
34 Of a Future Life. Part L 
 
 gard to ourselve ; according to a course of nature, 
 the like to which we have already gone through. 
 
 However, as one cannot but be greatly sensible 
 how difficult it is to silence imagination enough to 
 make the voice of reason even distinctly heard in this 
 Case ; as we are accustomed, from our youth up, to in- 
 dulge rhat forward delusive faculty, ever obtruding 
 beyond its sphere ; of some assistance indeed to appre- 
 hension, but the author of all error ; as we plainly lose 
 ourselves in gross and crude conceptions of things, 
 taking for granted that we are acquainted with what 
 indeed we are wholly ignorant of ; it may be proper to 
 consider the imaginary presumptions, that death will 
 be our destruction, arising from these kinds of early 
 and lasting prejudices ; and to shew how little they 
 can really amount to, even though we cannot wholly 
 divest ourselves of them. And, 
 
 I All presumption of death's being the destruc- 
 tion of living beings, must go upon supposition that 
 they are compounded, and so discerptible. But since 
 consciousness is a single and indivisible power, it should 
 seem that the subject in which it resides must be so 
 too. For were the motion of any particle of matter 
 absolutely one and indivisible, so as that it should im- 
 ply a contradiction to suppose part of this motion to 
 exist, and part not to exist, i. e part of this matter to 
 move, and part to be at rest, then it* power of motion 
 would be indivisible ; and so also would the subject in 
 which rhe power inheres, namely, the particle of mat- 
 ter : for if this could be divided into two, one part 
 might be moved and the other at rest, which is con- 
 trary to the supposition. In like manner it has been 
 argued,* and, for any thing appearing to the contrary, 
 justly, that since the perception or consciousness, which 
 
 * See Dr. Clarke's Letter to Mr. DoJivelL and the defences of it. 
 
v Chap. I. Of a Future Life. 85 
 
 we have of our own existence, is indivisible, so as that 
 it i a contradiction to suppose one part of it should be 
 here and the other there, the perceptive power, or the 
 power of consciousness, is indivisible too ; and conse- 
 que tly the subject in which it resides, i. e. the con- 
 scious being. Now upon supposition that living agent 
 each man calls himself, is thus a single being, which 
 there is at least no more difficulty in conceiving than in 
 conceiving it to be a compound, and of which there is 
 the proof now mentioned, it follows, that our organ- 
 ized bodies are no more ourselves or part of ourselves, 
 than any other matter around us. And it is as easy 
 to conceive how matter, which is no part of ourselves, 
 may be appropriated to us in the manner which our 
 present bodies are, as how we can receive impressions 
 from, and have power over any matter. It is as easy 
 to conceive that we may exist out of bodies, as in 
 them ; that we might have animated bodies of any 
 other organs and senses wholly different from these 
 now given us, and that we may hereafter animate these 
 same or new bodies variously modified and organized, 
 as to conceive how we can animate such bodies as our 
 present. And lastly, the dissolution of all these several 
 organized bodies, supposing ourselves to have succes- 
 sively animated them, would have no more conceiva- 
 ble tendency to destroy the living beings ourselves, or 
 deprive us of living faculties, the faculties of percep- 
 tion and of action, than the dissolution of any foreign 
 matter, which we are capable of receiving impressions 
 from, and making use of for the common occasions oi' 
 life. 
 
 II. The simplicity and absolute oneness of a living ' 
 agent cannot, indeed, from the nature of the thing, be 
 properly proved by experimental observations. But 
 as these fall in with the supposition of its unity, sq 
 
S& Of a Future Life. Part L 
 
 they plainly lead us to conclude certainly, that our 
 grobs organized bodies, with which we perceive the 
 objects of sense, and with which we act, are no part of 
 ourselves ; and therefore show us, that we have no 
 reason to believe their destruction to be ours, even 
 without determining whether our living substances be 
 material or immaterial. For we see by experience, 
 that men may lose their limbs, their organs of sense, 
 and even the greatest part of these bodies, and yet re- 
 main the same living agents. And persons can trace 
 up the existence of themselves to a time, when the 
 bulk of their bodies was extremely small, in compari- 
 son of what it is in mature age ; and we cannot but 
 think that they might then have lost a considerable 
 part of that small body, and yet have remained the 
 same living agents ; as they may now lose great part 
 of their present body, and remain so. And it is cer- 
 tain that the bodies of all animals are in a constant 
 flux, from that never ceasing attrition which there is 
 in. every part of them. Now things of this kind un- 
 avoidably teach us to distinguish between these living 
 agents ourselves, and large quantities of matter, in 
 which we are very nearly interested ; since these may 
 be alienated, and actually are in a daily course of suc- 
 cession, and changing their owners ; whilst we ?re as- 
 sured, that each living agent remains one and the same 
 permanent bt- ing * And this general observation, leads 
 us on to the following ones. 
 
 First, That we have no way of determining by ex- 
 perience, what is the certain bulk of the living/being 
 each man calls himself ; and yet, till it be determined 
 that it is larger in bulk than the solid elementary par- 
 ticles of matter, which there is no ground to think any 
 
 * See Biticrtation 1 . 
 
Chap. I. Of a Future Life. 87 
 
 natural power can dissolve, there is no sort of reason 
 to think death to be the dissolution of it, of the living 
 being, even though it should not be absolutely indis- 
 cerptible. 
 
 Secondly \ From our being so nearly related to and 
 interested in certain systems of matter, suppose our 
 flesh and bones, and afterwards ceasing to be at all re- 
 lated to them, the living agents ourselves remaining 
 all this while undestroyed, notwithstanding such alie- 
 nation ; and consequently these systems of matter not 
 being ourselves, it follows further, that we have no 
 ground to conclude any other, suppose internal systems 
 of matter, to be the living agents ourselves ; because 
 we can have no ground to conclude this, but from 
 our relation to and interest in such other systems df 
 matter ; and therefore we can have no reason to con- 
 clude, what befalls thot>e systems of matter at death, to 
 be the destruction of the living agents. We have al- 
 ready several times over lost a great part or perhaps 
 the whole of our body, according to certain common 
 established laws of nature, yet we remain the same 
 living agents ; when we shall lose as great a part, or 
 the whole, by another common established law of na- 
 ture, death, why may we not also remain the same :? 
 That the alienation has been gradual in one case, and 
 in the other will be more at once, does not prove any- 
 thing to the contrary. We have passed undestroyed 
 through those many and great revolutions of matter, 
 so peculiarly appropriated to us ourselves ; why should 
 we imagine death will be so fatal to us ? Nor can it 
 be objected, that what is thus alienated or lost, is no 
 part of our original solid body, but only adventitious 
 matter ; because we may lose entire limbs, which 
 must have-contained many solid parts and vessels of the 
 originafbody ; or if this be not admitted, we have no 
 
88 Of a Future Life. Part L 
 
 proof, that any of these solid parts are dissolved or al- 
 ienated by death. Though, by the way, we are very 
 nearly related to that extraneous or adventitious mat- 
 ter, whilst it continues united to and distending the seve- 
 ral parts of our solid body. But after all, the relation a 
 person bears to those parts of his body to which he is 
 the most nearly related, what does it appear to amount 
 to but this, that the living agent and those parts of the 
 body mutually affect each other ? And the same thing, 
 the same thing in kind, though not in degree, may be 
 said of all foreign matter, which gives us ideas, and 
 which we have any power over. From these obser- 
 vations, the whole ground of the imagination is re- 
 moved, that the dissolution of any matter is the destruc- 
 tion of a living agent from the interest he once had in 
 such mattery 
 
 Thirdly , If we consider our body somewhat more 
 distinctly, as made up of organs and instruments of 
 perception and of motion, it will bring us to the same 
 conclusion. Thus the common optical experiments 
 show, and even the observation how sight is assisted by 
 glasses shows, that we see with our eyes in the same 
 sense as we see with glasses. Nor is there any reason 
 to believe, that we see with them in any other sense ; 
 any other, I mean, which would lead us to think the 
 eye itself a percipient. The like is to be said of hear- 
 ing ; and our feeling distant solid matter by means of 
 somewhat in our hand, seems an instance of the like 
 kind as to the subject we are considering. All these 
 are instances of foreign matter, or such as is no part of 
 our body, being instrumental in preparing objects for, 
 and conveying them to the perceiving power, in a 
 manner similar or like to the manner in which our 
 organs of sense prepare and convey them. Both are 
 in a like way instruments of our receiving such ideas 
 
Chap. I. Of a Future Life. 89 
 
 * 
 from external objects, as the Author of nature ap- 
 pointed those external objects to be the occasions of* 
 exciting in us. However* glasses are evidently in* 
 stances of this ; namely of matter which i no part of 
 our body, preparing objects for and conveying them 
 towards the perceiving power, in like manner as our 
 bodily organs do. And if we see with our eyes only 
 in the same manner as we do with glasses, the like 
 may justly be concluded, from analogy, of all our oth- 
 er senses. It is not intended, by any thing here said, 
 to affirm, that the whole apparatus of vision, or of 
 perception by any other of our senses, can be traced* 
 through all its steps, quite up to the living power of 
 seeing, or perceiving ; but that so far as it can be tra- 
 ced by experimental observations, so far it appears, that 
 our organs of sense prepare and convey on objects, in 
 order to their being perceived, in like manner as for- 
 eign matter does, without affording any shadow of ap- 
 pearance that they themselves perceive. And that we 
 have, no reason to think our organs of sense percipi- 
 ents, is confirmed by instances of persons losing some 
 of them, the living beings themselves, their former 
 occupiers, remaining unimpaired. It is confirmed 
 also by the experience of dreams ; by which we find 
 we are at present possessed of a latent, and, what would 
 other wie be, an unimagined, unknown power of per- 
 ceiving sensible objects, in as strong and lively a man- 
 ner without our external organs of sense as with them* 
 So also with regard to our power of moving, or di- 
 recting motion by will and choice : upon the destruc- 
 tion of a limb, this active power remains, as it evi- 
 dently seems, unlessened ; so as that the living beings 
 who has suffered this loss, would be capable of mov- 
 ing as before, if it had another limb to move with* 
 It can walk by the help of an artificial leg j just as it 
 
 M 
 
90 Of a Future Life. Part I. 
 
 can make use of a pole or a leaver, to reach towards 
 itself, and to move things, beyond the length and the. 
 power of its natural arm ; and this last it does in the 
 same manner as it reaches and moves, with its natural 
 arm, things nearer and of less weight. Nor is there 
 so much as any appearance of our limbs being endu- 
 ed with a power of moving or directing themselves, 
 though they are adapted, like the several parts of a 
 machine, to be the instruments of motion to each 
 other, and some parts of the ^ame limb, to be instru- 
 ments of motion to other parts of it. 
 
 Thus a man determines, that he will look at such 
 an object through a microscope ; or being lame sup- 
 pose, that he will walk to such a place with a staff a 
 week hence. His eyes and his feet no more deter- 
 mine in these cases, than the microscope and the 
 staff. Nor is there any ground to think they any 
 more put the determination in practice ; or that his 
 eyes are the seers or his feet the movers, in any other 
 sense than as the microscope and the staff are. Upon 
 the whole then, our organs of sense and our limbs are 
 certainly instruments, which the living persons our- 
 selves make use of to perceive and move with ; there 
 is not ary probability that they are any more, nor con- 
 sequently, that we have any other kind of relation to 
 them than what we may have to any other foreign 
 matter formed into instruments of perception and 
 motion, suppose into a microscope or a staff ; (I say 
 any other kind of relation, for I am not speaking of 
 the degree of it) nor consequently is there any proba- 
 bility, that the alienation or dissolution of these in- 
 struments is the destruction of the perceiving and 
 moving agent. 
 
 And thus our finding, that the dissolution of mat- 
 ter, in which living beings were most nearly interested, 
 
Chap. I. Of a Future Life. 91 
 
 is not their dissolution, and that the destruction of 
 several of the organs and instruments of perception and 
 of motion belonging to them, is not their destruction, 
 shows demonstratively, that there js no ground to 
 think that the dissolution of any other matter, or de- 
 struction of any other organs and instruments, will be 
 the dissolution or destruction of living agents, from 
 the like kind of relation. And we have no reason to 
 think we stand in any other kind of relation to any 
 thing which we find dissolved by death. 
 
 But it is said these observations are equally applicable 
 to brutes ; and it is thought an insuperable difficulty, 
 that they should be immortal, and by consequence ca- 
 pable of everlasting happiness. Now this manner of 
 expression is both invidious and weak ; but the thing 
 intended by it, is really no difficulty at all, either in the 
 way of natural or moral consideration. For first, sup- 
 pose the invidious thing, designed in such a manner of 
 expression, were really implied, as it is not in the lea>t 
 in the natural immortality of brutes ; namely, that 
 they must arrive at great attainments, and become ra- 
 tional and moral agents ; even this would be no diffi- 
 culty, since we know not what latent powers and ca- 
 pacities they may be endued with. There was once, 
 prior to experience, as great presumption against hu- 
 man creatures, as there is against the brute creatures, 
 arriving at that degree of understanding, which we have 
 in mature age. For we can trace up our own exist- 
 ence to the same original with theirs. And we find it 
 to be a general law of nature, that creatures endued 
 with capacities of virtue and religion, should be placed 
 in a condition of being, in which they are altogether 
 without the use of them, for a considerable length of 
 their duration ; as in infancy and childhood. And 
 great part of the human species go out of the present 
 
92 Of a Future Life. Part I, 
 
 world, before they come to the exercise of these ca- 
 pacities in any degree at all. But then, secondly, the 
 n tural immortality of brutes does not in the least im» 
 ply, that they are endu-d with any latent capacities of 
 a rational or moral nature. And the economy of the 
 universv might require, that there should be living crea- 
 tures without any capacities of this kind. And all dif- 
 ficulties as to the manner how they are to be disposed 
 of, are so apparently and wholly founded in our igno- 
 rance, that it is wonderful they should be in isted upon 
 by any, but such as are weak, enough to think they are 
 acquainted with the whole system of things. There is 
 th n absolutely nothing at all in this objection which is 
 so rhetorically urged against the greatest part of the 
 na'ural proofs or presumptions of the immortality of 
 human minds : I say the greatest part ; fork is less 
 applicable to the following observation, which is more 
 p culiar to mankind : 
 
 //flT. That as it is evident our present powers 3nd ca- 
 paciti.s of reason, memory and affection, do not de- 
 pend upon our gross body in the manner in which per- 
 ception by our organs of sense does ; so they do not 
 appear to depend upon it at all in any such manner, 
 as to give ground to think, that the dissolution of this 
 t>-">dy, w r ill be the destruction of these our present pow- 
 ers of reflection, as it will of our powers of sensation ; 
 or to g've ground to conclude even that it will be so 
 much as a suspension of the former. 
 
 Human creatures exist at present in two states of 
 life and perception, greatly different from each other ; 
 each of which has its own peculiar laws, and its own 
 peculiar enjoyments and sufferings. When any of our 
 senses are affected or appetites gratified with the ob- 
 j cts of them, we may be said to exist or live in a state 
 gf ben.ation. When none of our senses are affected or 
 
Chap. I. Of a Future Life. 93 
 
 appetites gratified, and yet we perceive and reason and 
 act, we may be said to exist or live in a state of reflec- 
 tion. Now it is by no means certain, that any thing 
 which is dissolved by death, is any way necessary to the 
 living being in this its state of reflection, alter ideas are 
 gained. For, though from our present constitution 
 and condition of being, our external organs of sense 
 are necessary for conveying in ideas to our reflecting 
 powers as carriages and leavers and scaffolds are in 
 architecture ; yet when these ideas are brought in, we 
 are capable of reflecting in the most intense degree, and 
 of enjoying the greatest pleasure, and feeling the great- 
 est pain by means of that reflection, without any as- 
 sistance from our senses ; and without any at all, which 
 we know of, from that body which will be dissolved by 
 death* It does not appear then, that the relation of 
 this gross body to the reflecting being, is, in any de- 
 gree, necessary to thinking 1 ; to our intellectual enjoy- 
 ments or sufferings : nor, consequently, that the dis- 
 solution or alienation of the former by death, will be 
 the destruction of those present powers, which render 
 us capable of this state of reflection. Further, there 
 are instances of mortal diseases, which do not at all af- 
 fect our present intellectual powers ; and this affords 
 a presumption, that those diseases will not destroy these 
 present powers. Indeed, from the observations made 
 above,* it appears, that there is no presumption, from 
 their mutually affecting each other, that the dissolu- 
 tion of the Body is the destruction of the living agent. 
 And by the same reasoning, it must appear too, that 
 there is no presumption, from their mutually affecting 
 each other, that the dissolution of the body is the de- 
 struction of our present reflecting powers ; but instan- 
 
 * P. 86, 87, 88. 
 
94 Of a Future Life. Part L 
 
 ces of their not affecting each other, afford a presump- 
 tion of the contrary. Instances of mortal diseases not 
 impairing our present reflecting powers, evidently turn 
 our thoughts even from imagining such diseases to be 
 the destruction of them. Several things indeed great- 
 ly affect all our living powers, and at length suspend 
 the exercise of them ; as for instance drowsiness, in- 
 creasing till it ends in sound sleep ; and from hence 
 we might have imagined it would destroy them, till 
 we found by experience the weakness of this way of 
 judging. But in the diseases now mentioned, there is 
 not so much as this shadow of probability, to lead us 
 to any such conclusion, as to the reflecting powers 
 which we have at present ; for in tho; e diseases, per- 
 sons the moment before death appear to be in the 
 highest vigour of life ; they discover apprehension, 
 memory, reason, all entire ; with the utmost force of 
 affection ; sen re of a character, of >hame and honour ; 
 and the highest mental enjoyments and sufferings, 
 even to the last gasp : and these surely prove even 
 greater vigor of life than bodily strength does. Now 
 what pretence is there for thinking, that a progressive 
 disease when arrived to such a degree, I mean that de- 
 gree which is mortal, will destroy those powers which 
 were not impaired, which were not affected by it, dur- 
 ing its whole progress quite up to that degree ? And 
 if death, by diseases of this kind, is not the destruc- 
 tion of our present reflecting powers, it will scarce be 
 thought that death by any other means is. 
 
 It is obvious that thi* general observation may be 
 ■carried on further ; and there appears so little con- 
 nexion between our bodily powers of sensation, and 
 our present powers of reflection, that there is no reason 
 to conclude, that death, which destroys the former, 
 does *o much as suspend the exercise of the latter, or 
 
Chap. I. Of a Future Life. 9S 
 
 interrupt our continuing to exist in the like state of re- 
 flection which we do now. For suspension of reason, 
 memory, and the affections which they excite, is no 
 part of the idea of death, nor U implied in our notion 
 of it. And our daily experiencing these powers to be 
 exercised, without any assistance, that we know of, 
 from those bodies, which will be dissolved by death ; 
 and our rinding often that the exercise of them is so 
 lively to the last ; these things afford a sensible appre- 
 hension, that death may not perhaps be so much as a 
 discontinuance of the exercise of these powers, nor of 
 the enjoyments and sufferings which it implies.* So 
 that our posthumous life, whatever there may be in it 
 additional to our present, yet may not be entirely be- 
 ginning anew, but going on. Death may, in some 
 sort, and in some respects, answer to our birth ; which 
 is not a suspension of the faculties which we had be- 
 fore it, or a total change of the state of life in which 
 we existed when in the womb ; but a continuation of 
 both, with such ar\d uch great alterations. 
 
 Nay, for what we know of ourselves, of our present 
 life and of death, death may immediately, in the nat- 
 ural course of things, put us into a higher and more 
 enlarged state of life, as our birth does ;f a state in 
 
 * There are three distinct questions, relating to a future life, here consid- 
 ered : whether death be the destruction of living agents ; if not, whether 
 it be the destruction of their present powers of reflection, as it certainly is- 
 the destruction of their present powers of sensation; and if not, -u/hether it 
 be the suspension, or discontinuance of the exercise, of these present reflect" 
 ing powers. Now, if there be no reason to believe the last, there will be, if 
 that were possible, less for the next, and less still for the first. 
 
 f This, according to Strabo, was the opinion of the Brackmans, 
 
 VOf&ifyiv piv y<*£ tiq tov fu.lv ivQetdl fitov, ug xv autQUp K^otc'ivuv uvxi' tov & 
 Sxvxtov, yivariv tig tov ovToog /3/W, Koti tov iv^ot(uo»x Toig QiXoo-o$4ca.<rf 
 Lib XV. p. 1039. Ed. Amst. 1707- To which opinion per- 
 haps Antoninus may allude in these words, ug vvv ■zui^uivuc* T«m 
 
 ep&gvov ik tjjj yugT^bg rv\v yvvcttKog e-« s^sA^"/?, VTag ix.$i%-aS jk* tkv upnv 
 h q to 4 , * / #*g' dV *^ T * ^A'JTgy t*t» sK7ri<ruTxt. Lib. IX. C^. 3. 
 
96 Of a Future Life. Part f. 
 
 which our capacities and sphere of perception and 
 of action may be much greater than at present. For* 
 as our relation to our external organs of sense ren- 
 ders us capable of existing in our present state of 
 sensation, so it may be the only natural hindrance 
 to our existing, immediately and of course, in a 
 higher state of reflection. The truth is, reason does 
 not at all shew us in what state death naturally leaves 
 u>. But were we sure that it would suspend all our 
 perceptive and active powers, yet the suspension of 
 a power and the destruction of it are effects so to- 
 tally different in kind, as we experience from sleep 
 and a swoon, that we cannot in any wise argue from 
 one to the other, or conclude, even to the lowest 
 degree of probability, that the same kind of force 
 which is sufficient to suspend our faculties, though 
 it be increased ever so much, will be sufficient to 
 destroy them. 
 
 These observations together may be sufficient to 
 shew, how little presumption there is, that death is 
 the destruction of human creatures. However, there 
 is the shadow of an analogy which may lead us to 
 imagine it is ; the supposed likeness which is obst rv- 
 ed between the decay of vegetables, and of living 
 creatures. And this likeness is indeed sufficient to 
 afford the poets very apt allusions to the flowers of 
 the field, in their pictures of the frailty of our present 
 life. But in reason, the analogy is so far from hold- 
 ing, that there appears no ground even for the com- 
 parison, as to the present question ; because one of the 
 two subjects compared is wholly void of that, which is 
 the principal and chief thing in the other, the power 
 of perception and of action, and which is the only 
 thing we are inquiring about the continuance of ; so 
 that the destruction of a vegetable is an event not 
 
Chap. I. Of a Future Life. 9? 
 
 similar or analogous to the destruction of a living 
 agent* 
 
 But if, as was above intimated, leaving off the de- 
 lusive custom of substituting imagination in the room 
 of experience, we would confine ourselves to what we 
 do know and understand, if we would argue only from 
 that^ and from that form our expectations, it w ould 
 appear at first sight, that as no probability of living 
 beings ever ceasing to be so, can be concluded from 
 the reason of the thing, so none can be collected from 
 the analogy of nature, because we cannot trace any 
 living beings beyond death. But as we are conscious 
 that we are endued with capacities of perception and 
 of action, and are living persons, what we are to go 
 upon is, that we shall continue so, until we foresee 
 some accident or event which will endanger those ca- 
 pacities, or be likely to destroy us ; which death does 
 in no wise appear to be. 
 
 And thus, when we go out of this world, we may 
 pass into new scenes, and a new state of life and ac- 
 tion, just as naturally as we came into the present* 
 And this new state may naturally be a social one. 
 And the advantages of it, advantages of every kind* 
 may naturally be bestowed, according to some fixed 
 general laws of wisdom, upon every one in proportion 
 to the degrees of his virtue. And though the ad- 
 vantages of that future natural state, should not be 
 bestowed, as these of the present in some measure are, 
 by the will of the society, but entirely by his more 
 immediate action, upon whom the whole frame of na- 
 ture depends ; yet this distribution may be just as 
 natural as there being distributed here by the instru- 
 mentality of men. And indeed, though one were to 
 allow any confused undetermined sense, which people 
 please to put upon the word natural^ it would be a 
 
 N 
 
93 Of a Future Life. Part L 
 
 shortness of thought scarce credible, to imagine that 
 no system or course of things can be so, but only what 
 we see at present ; especially whilst the probability of 
 a future life, or the natural immortality of the soul, is 
 admitted upon the evidence of reason ; because this is 
 really both admitting and denying at once, a state of 
 being different from the present to be natural. But 
 the only distinct meaning of that word is stated^ fixed, 
 or settled ; since what is natural, as much requires and 
 presupposes an intelligent agent to render it so, i. e. to 
 effect it continually or at stated times, as what is su- 
 pernatural or miraculous does to effect it for once. 
 And from hence it must follow, that persons' notion of 
 what is natural, will be enlarged in proportion to their 
 greater knowledge of the works of God, and the dis- 
 pensations of his providence. Nor is there any ab- 
 surdity in supposing, that there may be beings in the 
 universe, whose capacities, and knowledge, and views, 
 may be so extensive, as that the whole christian dis- 
 pensation may to them appear natural, i. e. analogous 
 or conformable to God's dealings with other parts of 
 his creation ; as natural as the visible known course 
 of things appears to us. For there seems scarce any 
 other possible sense to be put upon the word, but that 
 only in which it is here used j similar, stated, or 
 uniform. 
 
 This credibility of a future life, which has been 
 here insisted upon, how little soever it may satisfy our 
 curiosity, seems to answer all the purposes of religion, 
 in like manner as a demonstrative proof would. In- 
 deed a proof, even a demonstrative one, of a future 
 life, would not be a proof of religion. For that we 
 are to live hereafter, is just as reconcilcable with the 
 scheme of atheism, and as well to be accounted for by 
 it, as that we are now alive, is ; and therefore nothing 
 
Chap. I. Of a Future Life. 99 
 
 can be more absurd than to argue from that scheme, 
 that there can be no future state. But as religion im- 
 plies a future state, any presumption against such a 
 state is a presumption against religion. And the fore- 
 going observations remove all presumptions of that 
 sort, and prove, to a very considerable degree of prob- 
 ability, one fundamental doctrine of religion ; which, 
 if believed, would greatly open and dispose the mind 
 seriously to attend to the general evidence of the 
 whole. 
 
100 Of the Government of God Part I. 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 Of the Government ef God by Rewards and Punish- 
 ments ; and particularly of the latter. 
 
 That which makes the question concerning a 
 future life to be of so great importance to us, is 
 our capacity of happiness and misery. And that 
 which makes the consideration of it to be of so great 
 importance to us, is the supposition of our happiness 
 and misery hereafter depending upon our actions here. 
 Without this, indeed, curiosity could not but some- 
 times bring a subject, in which we may be so highly 
 in-erested, to our thoughts ; especially upon the mor- 
 tality of others, or the near prospect of our own. But 
 reasonable men would not take any farther thought 
 about hereafter, than what should happen thus occa- 
 sionally to rise in their minds, if it were certain that our 
 future interest no way depended upon our present be- 
 haviour ; whereas, on the contrary, if there be ground, 
 either from analogy or any thing else, to think it does, 
 then there is reason also for the most active thought 
 and solicitude to secure that interest, to behave so as 
 that we may escape that misery and obtain that hap- 
 piness in another life, which we not only suppose our- 
 selves capable of, but which we apprehend also is put 
 in our own power. And whether there be ground for 
 this last apprehension, certainly would deserve to be 
 most seriously considered, were there no other proof 
 of a future life and interest than that presumptive one 
 which the foregoing observations amount to. 
 
Chap. II. by Rewards and Punishments. 101 
 
 Now in the present state, all which we enjoy, and a 
 g**eat part of what we suffer, is put in our own power. 
 For pleasure and pain are the consequence* of our ac- 
 tions ; and we are endued by the author of our na- 
 ture with capacities of foreseeing these consequences. 
 We find by experience he does not so much as pre- 
 serve our lives, exclusively of our own care and ?tten- 
 tion to provide ourselves with, and to make use of, 
 that sustenance, by which he has appointed our lives 
 shall be preserved, and without which, he has appoint- 
 ed they shall not be preserved at all. And in general 
 we foresee that the external things, which are the ob- 
 jects of our various passions, can neither be obtained 
 nor enjoyed without exerting ourselves in such and 
 such manners ; but by thus exerting ourselves, we 
 obtain and enjoy these objects in which our natural 
 good consists ; or, by this means G^d gives us the 
 posses ion and enjoyment of them. I know not that 
 we have any one kind or degree of enjoyment, but by 
 the means of our own actions. And by prudence and 
 care we may, for the most part, pass our days in tol- 
 erable ease and quiet ; or, on the contrary, we may by 
 rashness, ungoverned passion, wilfulness, or even by 
 negligence, make ourselves as miserable as ever we 
 please. And many do please to make themselves ex- 
 tremely miserable, i. e. to do what they know before- 
 hand will render them so. They follow those ways, 
 the fruit of which they know by instruction, example, • 
 experience, will be disgrace, and poverty, and sickness, 
 and untimely death. This every one observes to be 
 the general course of things ; though it is to be al- 
 lowed, we cannot find by experience, that ail our suf- 
 ferings are owing to our own follies. 
 
 Why the author of nature does not give his crea- 
 tures promiscuously such and such perceptions, with- 
 
102 Of the Government of God Part I. 
 
 out regard to their behaviour ; why he does not make 
 them happy without the instrumentality of their own 
 actions, and prevent their bringing any sufferings up- 
 on themselves, is another matter. Perhaps there may 
 be some impossibilities in the nature of things, which 
 we are unacquainted with. Or less happiness, it may 
 be, would upon the whole be produced by such a 
 method of conduct, than is by the present. Or per- 
 haps divine goodness, with which, if I mistake not, 
 we make very free in our speculations, may not be a 
 bare single disposition to produce happiness, but a dis- 
 position to make the good, the faithful, the honest 
 man happy. Perhaps an infinitely perfect mind may 
 be pleased with seeing his creatures behave suitably 
 to the nature which he has given them, to the rela- 
 tions which he has placed them in to each other, and 
 to that which they stand into himself ; that relation 
 to himself, which, during their existence, is even 
 necessary, and which is the most important one of all. 
 Perhaps, I say, an infinitely perfect mind may be 
 pleased with this moral piety of moral agents, in and 
 for itself; as well as upon account of its being essen- 
 tially conducive to the happiness of his creation. Or 
 the whole end, for which God made, and thus governs 
 the world, may be utterly beyond the reach of our 
 faculties ; there may be somewhat in it as impossible 
 for us to have any conception of, as for a blind man 
 t< > have a conception of colours. But however this be, 
 it is certain matter of universal experience, that the 
 general method of divine administration is forewarn- 
 ing us, or giving us capacities to foresee, with more or 
 less clearness, that if we act so and so, we shall have 
 such enjoyments, if so and so, such sufferings ; and 
 giving us those enjoyments, and making us feel those 
 sufferings, in consequence of our actions. 
 
Chap. II. by Rewards and Punis /merits. 103 
 
 " But ail this is to be ascribed to the general course 
 of nature." True. This is the very thing which I 
 am observing. It is to be ascribed to the general course 
 of nature ; i. e. not surely to the words or ideas, course 
 ef nature, but to him who appointed it, and put 
 things into it y or to a course of operation, from its 
 uniformity or constancy, called natural ; # and which 
 necessarily implies an operating agent. For when 
 men iind themselves necessitated to confess an Author 
 of nature, or that God is the natural Governor of the 
 world, they must not deny this again, because his 
 government is uniform ; they must not deny that he 
 does things at all, because he does them constantly ; 
 because the effects of his acting are permanent, wheth- 
 er his acting r?e so or not, though there is no reason to 
 think it is not. In short, every man, in every thing 
 he does, naturally acts upon the forethought and ap- 
 prehension of avoiding evil or obtaining good \ and if 
 the natural course of things be the appointment of 
 God, and our natural faculties of knowledge and ex- 
 perience are given us by him, then the good and bad 
 consequences which follow our actions are his appoint- 
 ment, and our foresight of those consequences is a 
 warning given us by him, how we are to act. 
 
 " Is the pleasure then naturally accompanying every 
 particular gratification of passion intended to put us 
 upon gratifying ourselves in every such particular in- 
 stance, and as a reward to us for so doing ?" No cer- 
 tainly. Nor is it to be said, that our eyes were natu- 
 rally intended to give us the sight of each particular 
 object, to which they do or can extend ; objects which 
 are destructive of them, or which, for any other rea- 
 son, it may become us to turn our eyes from. Yet 
 there is no doubt but that our eyes were intended for 
 
 * P. 97, 98. 
 
104 Of the Government of God Part I. 
 
 us to see with. So neither is there any doubt but 
 that the fore een plea ures and pains belonging to the 
 passions were intended, in general, to induce mankind 
 to act in such and such manners. 
 
 Now from this general observation, obvious to eve- 
 ry one, that God ha^ given us to understand he has ap* 
 pointed satisfaction and delight to be the consequence 
 of our acting in one manner, and pain and uneasiness 
 of our acting in another, and of our not acting at- all ; 
 and that we find the consequences which we were be- 
 forehand informed of uniformly to follow — we may 
 learn, that we are at present actually under his govern- 
 ment in the strictest and most proper sense ; in such a 
 sense, as that he rewards and punishes y*s for our ac- 
 tions. An Author of nature being supposed, it is not 
 so much a deduction of reason as a matter of expe- 
 rience, that we are thus under his government ; under 
 his government, in the same sense as we are under the 
 government of civil magistrates. Because the annex- 
 ing pleasure to some actions and pain to others, in our 
 power to do or forbear, and giving notice of this ap- 
 pointment beforehand to those whom it concerns, is 
 the proper formal notion of government. Whether 
 the pleasure or pain which thus follows upon our be- 
 haviour be owing to the Author of nature's acting up- 
 on us every moment which we feel it, or to his having 
 at once contrived and executed his own part in the 
 plan of the world, makes no alteration a> to the mat- 
 ter before us. For if civil magistrates could make 
 the sanctions of their laws take place, without inter- 
 posing at all after they had passed them, without a tri- 
 al and the formalities of an execution ; if they were 
 able to make their laws execute themselves, or evjry 
 offender to execute them upon himself; we should be 
 just in the same sense under their government then, as 
 
Chap. IL by Rewards and Punishments* 105 
 
 we are now, but in a much higher degree, and more 
 perfect manner. Vain is the ridicule, with which one 
 foresees some persons will divert themselves, upon 
 finding lesser pains considered as instances of divine 
 punishment. There is no possibility of answering or 
 evading the general thing here intended, without de- 
 nying all final causes. For final causes being admit- 
 ted, the pleasures and pains now mentioned must be 
 admitted too as instances of them. And if they are, 
 if God annexes delight to some actions and uneasiness 
 to others, with an apparent design to induce us to act 
 so and so, then he not only dispenses happiness and 
 misery, but also rewards and punishes actions. I£> 
 for example, the pain which we feel, upon doing what 
 tends to the destruction of our bodies, suppose upon 
 too near approaches to fire, or upon wounding our- 
 selves, be appointed by the Author of nature to pre- 
 vent our doing what thus tends to our destruction, this 
 is altogether as much an instance of his punishing 
 our actions, and consequently of our being under 
 his government, as declaring by a voice from heaven 
 that if we acted so, he would inflict such pain up- 
 on us, and inflicting it, whether it be greater or 
 less. 
 
 Thus we find, that the true notion or conception of 
 the Author of nature is that of a master or governor, 
 prior to the consideration of his moral attributes. The 
 fact of our case, which we find by experience, is, that 
 he actually exercises dominion or government over us 
 at present, by rewarding and punishing us for our ac- 
 tions, in as strict and proper a sense of these words, 
 and even in the same sense, as children, servants, sub- 
 jects, are rewarded and punished by those who govern 
 them. 
 
106 Of the Government of God Part L 
 
 And thus the whole analogy of nature, the whole 
 present course of things, most fully shows, that there 
 is nothing incredible in the general doctrine of religion, 
 that God will reward and punish men for their actions 
 hereafter ; nothing incredible, I mean, arising out of 
 the notion of rewarding and punishing. For the whole 
 course of nature is a present instance of his exercising 
 that government over us, which implies in it rewarding 
 and punishing. 
 
 But as divine punishment is what men chiefly 
 object against, and are most unwilling to allow, it may 
 be proper to mention some circumstances in the nat- 
 ural course of punishments at present, which are an- 
 alogous to what rtligion teaches us concerning a fu- 
 ture state of punishments ; indeed so analogous, that 
 as they add a farther credibility to it, so they cannot 
 but raise a most serious apprehension of it in those 
 who will attend to them. 
 
 It has been now observed, that such and such mis- 
 eries naturally follow such and such actions of impru- 
 dence and wilfulness, as well as actions more commonly 
 and more distinctly considered as vicious; and that 
 these consequences, when they may be foreseen, are 
 properly natural punishments annexed to such actions. 
 For the general thing here insisted upon is, not that we 
 see a great deal of misery in the world, but a great 
 deal which men bring upon themselves by their own 
 behaviour, which they might have foreseen and avoided. 
 Now the circumstances of these natural punishments 
 particularly deserving our attention, are such as these : 
 that oftentimes they follow or are inflicted in conse- 
 quence of actions, which procure many present ad- 
 

 Chap. II, by Punishments. 107 
 
 vantages, and are accompanied with much present 
 pleasure; for instance, sickness and untimely death is 
 the consequence of intemperance, though accompa- 
 nied with the highest mirth and jollity : that these \ 
 punishments are often much greater than the advan- ) 
 tages or pleasures obtained by the actions of which they 
 are the punishments or consequences : *mat though 
 we may imagine a constitution of nature, in which 
 these natural punishments which are in fact to follow 
 would follow, immediately upon such actions being 
 done, or very soon after ; we find on the contrary in 
 our world, that they are often delayed a great while, 
 sometimes even until long after the actions occasioning 
 them are forgot ; so that the constitution of nature is 
 such, that delay of punishment is no sort nor degree 
 of presumption of final impunity : that after such 
 deUy, these natural punishments or miseries often 
 come, not by degrees, but suddenly, with violence, 
 and at once ; however, the chief misery often does : 
 that as certainty of such distant misery following such 
 actions is never afforded persons, so perhaps during 
 the actions they have seldom a distinct full expecta- 
 tion of its following ;* and many times the case is 
 only thus, that they see in general, or may see, the 
 credibility that intemperance, suppose, will bring after 
 it di ease-, civil crimes civil punishments, when yet 
 the real probability often is that they shall escape ; 
 but things notwithstanding take their destined course, 
 and the misery inevitably follows at its appointed 
 time, in very many of these cases. Thus also, though 
 youth may be alleged a> an excuse for rashness and 
 folly, as being naturally thoughtless, and not clearly 
 foreseeing all the consequences of being untractable 
 
 * See Part II. Chap. vi. 
 
108 Of the Government of God Part I. 
 
 and profligate, this does not hinder, but that these 
 consequences follow, and are grievously felt throughout 
 the whole course of mature life. Habits contracted 
 even in that age are often utter ruin ; and men's uc- 
 cess in the world, not only in the common jense of 
 worldly success, but their real happiness and misery 
 depends, in a great degree, and in various ways, upon 
 the manner in which they pass their youth ; which 
 consequences they for the most part neglect to con. 
 sider, and perhaps seldom can properly be said to be- 
 lieve, beforehand. It requires also to be mentioned, 
 that in numberless cases the natural course of things 
 affords us opportunities for procuring advantages to 
 ourselves at certain times, which we cannot procure 
 when we will, nor ever recal the opportunities, if we 
 have neglected them. Indeed the general course of 
 nature is an example of this. If, during the oppor- 
 tunity of youth, persons are indocile and self willed, 
 they inevitably suffer in their future life for want of 
 those acquirements which they neglected the natural 
 season of attaining. If the husbandman lets his seed 
 time pass without sowing, the whole year is lo^t to him 
 beyond recovery. In like manner, though after men 
 have been guilty of folly and extravagance up to a cer- 
 tain degree ', it is often in their power, for instance, to 
 retrieve their affairs, to recover their health and char- 
 acter, at least in good measure ; yet real reformation 
 is, in many cases, of no avail at all towards preventing 
 the miseries, poverty, sickness, infamy, naturally an- 
 nexed to folly and extravagance exceeding that degree. 
 There is a certain bound to imprudence and misbe- 
 haviour, which being transgressed, there remains no 
 place for repentance in the natural course of things. 
 It is further very much to be remarked, that neglects 
 
Chap. II. by Punishments. 109 
 
 from inconsiderateness, want of attention,* not look- 
 ing about us to see what we have to do, are often at- 
 tended with consequences altogether as dreadful as 
 any active misbehaviour, from the most extravagant 
 passion. And lastly, civil government being natural, 
 the punishments of it are so too ; and some of these 
 punishments are capital, as the effects of a dissolute 
 course of pleasure are often mortal. So that many 
 natural punishments are finalf to him who incurs 
 them, if considered only in his temporal capacity ; and 
 seem inflicted by natural appointment, either to re- 
 move the offender out of the way of being further mis- 
 chievous ; or as an example, though frequently a dis- 
 regarded one, to those who are left behind. 
 
 These things are not what we call accidental, or to 
 be met with only now and then ; but they are things 
 of every day's experience : they proceed from gene- 
 ral laws, very general ones, by which God governs the 
 world, in the natural course of his providence. And 
 
 * Part II Chap. vi. 
 
 f Thegeneral consideration of a future state of punishment, most evident- 
 ly belongs to the subject of natural religion. But if any of these reflections 
 should be thought to relate more particularly to this doctrine, as taugh: in 
 scripture, the reader is desired to observe that gentile writers, both moralists 
 and poets, speak of the future punishment of the wicked, both as to the du- 
 ration and degree of it, in a like manner of expression and of description as 
 the scripture does So that all which can positively be asserted to be matter 
 of mere revelation, with regard to this doctrine, seems to be, that the great 
 distinction between the righteous and the wicked shall be made at the end 
 of this world; that each shall then receive according to his deserts. Reason 
 did, as it well might, conclude that it should, finally and upon the whole, be 
 well with the righteous and ill with the wicked ; but it could not be deter- 
 mined upon any principles of reason, Arhether human creatures might not 
 have been appointed to pass through other states of life and being, before 
 that distributive justice should finally and effectually take place. Revelation 
 teaches us, that the next state of things after the present is appointed for the 
 execution of this justice, that it shall be no longer delayed ; but the mystery of 
 God, the great mystery of his suffering vice and confusion to prevail, shall then 
 be finished ; and he will take to him his great poivcr and -Kill reign, by rendering 
 to every one according to his works. 
 
110 Of the Government of God Part L 
 
 they are so analogous to what religion teaches us con- 
 cerning the future punishment of the wicked, o much 
 of a piece with it, that both would naturally be ex- 
 pressed in the very same words and manner of descrip- 
 tion. In the book of Proverbs * for instance, wis- 
 dom is introduced as frequenting the mot public 
 places of resort, anda> rejected when she offers herself 
 a the natural appointed guide of human life. How 
 long, speaking to those who are passing through it, 
 how long, ye simple ones, will ye love folly, and the s corn- 
 ers delight in their scorning, and fools hate kn wledge f 
 Turn ye at my reproof Behold, I will pour out my Spirit 
 upon you, I will make known my words unto you. But 
 upon being neglected, Bicause I have called, and ye 
 refused, I have stretched out my hand, and no man re- 
 garded ; but ye have set at nought all my counsel, and 
 would none of my reproof: I alfo will laugh at your ca- 
 lamity, I will mock when your fear cometh ; when your 
 fear cometh as desolation, and your destruction cometh as a 
 whirlwind ; when distress and anguish cometh upon you. 
 Then shall they call upon me, but I will not answer ; they 
 shall seek me early, but they shall not find me. This pas- 
 sage every one sees is poetical, and some parts of it are 
 highly figurative ; but their meaning is obvious. And 
 the thing intended is expressed more literally in the 
 following words : For that they hated knowledge, and 
 did not choose the fear of the Lord — therefore shall they 
 eat of the fruit of their own way, and be filled with 
 their own devices. For the security of the simple shall 
 slay them, and the prosperity of fools shall destroy them. 
 And the whole passage is so equally applicable to 
 what we experience in the present world concerning 
 the consequences of men's actions, ami to what re- 
 
 * Chap. I. 
 
Chap. II. by Punishments. Ill 
 
 ligion teaches us is to be expected in another, that it 
 may be questioned which of the two was principally 
 intended. 
 
 Indeed when one has been recollecting the proper 
 proofs of a future state of rewards and punishments, 
 nothing methinks can give one so sensible an appre- 
 hension of the latter, or representation of it to the 
 mind, a» observing, that after the many disregarded 
 checks, admonitions and warnings, which people meet 
 with in the ways of vice and folly and extravagance ; 
 warnings from their very nature ; from the examples 
 of others ; from the lesser inconveniences which they 
 bring upon themselves ; from the instructions of wise 
 and virtuous men — after these have been long despi- 
 sed, scorned, ridiculed ; after the chief bad conse- 
 quences, temporal consequences, of their follies have 
 been delayed for a great while ; at length they break 
 in irresistibly, like an armed force ; repentance is too 
 late to relieve, and can >erve only to aggravate their 
 distress ; the case is become desperate, and poverty and 
 sickness, remorse and anguish, infamy and death, the 
 effects of their own doings, overwhelm them, beyond 
 possibility of remedy or escape. This is an account of 
 what is in fact the general constitution of nature. 
 
 It is not in any : ort meant, that according to what 
 appears at present of the natural course of things, men 
 are always uniformly punished in proportion to their 
 misbehaviour ; but that there are very many instances 
 of misbehaviour punished in the several ways now 
 mentioned, and very dreadful instances too ; sufficient 
 to show what the laws of the universe may admit, and, 
 if thoroughly considered, sufficient fully to answer all 
 objections against the credibility of a future state of 
 punishments, from any imaginations that the frailty 
 of our nature and external temptations almost annihi- 
 
112 Of the Government of God. Part 1. 
 
 late the guilt of human vices, as well as objections of 
 another sort, from necessity, from suppositions that 
 the will of an infinite being cannot be contradict- 
 ed, or that he must be incapable of offence and 
 provocation.* 
 
 Reflections of this kind are not without their ter- 
 rors to serious persons, the most free from enthusiasm, 
 and of the greatest strength of mind ; but it is fit 
 things be stated and considered as they really are. 
 And there is, in the present age, a certain fearlessness, 
 with regard to what may be hereafter under the gov- 
 ernment of God, which nothing but an universally 
 acknowledged demonstration on the side of atheism 
 can justify ; and which makes it quite necessary, that 
 men be reminded, and if possible made to feel, that 
 there is no sort of ground for being thu* presumptu- 
 ous, even upon the most sceptical principles. For, 
 may it not be said of any person upon his being born 
 into the world, he may behave so as to be of no service 
 to it, but by being made an example of the woful ef- 
 fects of vice and folly ? That he may, as any one may, 
 if he will, incur an infamous execution from the hands 
 of civil justice; or in some other course of extrava- 
 gance shorten his days ; or bring upon himself infamy 
 and diseases worse than death ? So that it had been 
 better for him, even with regard to the present world, 
 that he had never been born. And is there any pre- 
 tence of reason, for people to think themselves secure, 
 and talk as if they had certain proof, that let them act 
 as licentiously as they will, there can be nothing anal- 
 ogous to this, with regard to a future and more gene- 
 ral interest, under the providence and government of 
 the same God ? 
 
 * See Chap. iv. and vi. 
 
Chap. III. Of Moral Government. lia 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 Of the Moral Government of God. 
 
 J\s the manifold appearances of design and of final 
 causes, in the constitution of the world, prove it 
 to be the work of an intelligent mind, so the par- 
 ticular final cau e.s of plea ure and pain distributed 
 amongst his creatures, prove that they are under his 
 government ; what may be called his natural govern- 
 ment of creatures endued with sense and reason. This, 
 however, implies somewhat more than seems usually 
 attended to, when we >peak of God's natural govern- 
 ment of the world. It implies government of the 
 very same kind with that, which a master exercises 
 over his servants, or a civil magistrate over his sub- 
 jects. These larter instances of final causes as really 
 prove an intelligent Governor of the world, in the sense 
 now mentioned, and before* distinctly treated of, as 
 any other instances of final causes prove an intelligent 
 Maker of it. 
 
 But this alone does not appear at first sight to de- 
 termine any thing certainly, concerning the moral 
 character of the author of nature, considered in this 
 relation of governor ; does not ascertain his govern- 
 ment to be moral, or prove that he is the righteous 
 Judge of the world. Moral government consists, not 
 barely in rewarding and punishing men for their ac- 
 tions, which the most tyrannical person may do ; but 
 in rewarding the righteous and punishing the wicked, 
 
 * Ch.ii. 
 
114 Of the Moral Part I. 
 
 in rendering to men according to their actions con- 
 sidered as good or evil. And the perfection of moral 
 government consists in doing this, with regard to all 
 intelligent creatures, in an exact proportion to their 
 personal merits or dements. 
 
 Some men seem to think the only character of the 
 author of nature to be that of simple absolute benev- 
 olence. This, considered as a principle of action and 
 infinite in degree, is a disposition to produce the great- 
 est possible happiness, without regard to persons' be- 
 haviour, otherwise than as such regard would produce 
 higher degrees of it. And supposing this to be the 
 only character of God, veracity and justice in him 
 would be nothing but benevolence conducted by wis- 
 dom. Now surely this ought not to be asserted, unless 
 it can be proved ; for we should speak with cautious 
 reverence upon such a subject. And whether it can 
 be proved or not, is not the thing here to be inquired 
 into ; but whether in the constitution and conduct of 
 the world a righteous government be not discernibly 
 planned out ; which necessarily implies a righteous 
 Governor. There may possibly be in the creation be- 
 ings, to whom the author of nature manifests himself 
 under this most amiable of all characters, this of infi- 
 nite absolute benevolence ; for it is the most amiable, 
 supposing it not, as perhaps it is not, incompatible 
 with justice ; but he manifests himself to us under 
 the character of a righteous Governor. He may, con- 
 sistently with this, be simply and absolutely benevo- 
 lent, in the sense now explained ; but he is, for he has 
 given us a proof in the constitution and conduct of 
 the world that he is, a governor over servants, as he 
 rewards and punishes us for our actions. And in the 
 constitution and conduct of it, he may also have giv- 
 en, besides the reason of the thing, and the natural 
 
Chap. III. Government of God* 115 
 
 presages of conscience, clear and distinct intimations 
 that his government is righteous or moral ; clear to 
 such as think the nature of it deserving their atten- 
 tion ; and yet not to every careless person, who casts 
 a transient reflection upon the subject.* 
 
 But it is particularly to be observed, that the divine 
 government, which we experience ourselves under in 
 the pre ent state, taken alone, is allowed not to be the 
 perfection of moral government. And yet this by no 
 means hinders biJt that there may be somewhat, be it 
 more or less, truly moral in it. A righteous govern- 
 ment may plainly appear to be carried on to some de- 
 gree ; enough' to give us the apprehension that it shall 
 be completed, or carried on to that degree of perfec- 
 tion which religion teaches us it shall ; but which can- 
 not appear, till much more of the divine administra- 
 tion be seen, than can in the present life. And the 
 design of this chapter is to inquire, how far this is the 
 case ; how far, over and above the moral naturef 
 which God has given us, and our natural notion- of 
 him as righteous Governor of those his creatures, to 
 whom he has given this nature ; I say how far besides 
 this, the principles and beginnings of a moral govern- 
 ment over the world may be discerned, notwithstand- 
 ing and amidst all the confusion and disorder of it. 
 
 Now one might mention here, what has been often 
 urged with great force, that in general less uneasiness 
 
 * The objections against religion, from the evidence of it not being uni- 
 versal, nor so strong as might possibly have been, may be urged against 
 natural religion, as well as against revealed ; and therefore the considera- 
 tion of them belongs to the first part of this treatise, as well as the second. 
 But as these objections are chiefly urged against revealed religion, I chose to 
 consider them in the second part. And the answer to them there, Ch. vi. as 
 urged against Christianity, being almost equally «pplicable to them as urged 
 against the religion of nature ; jo avoid repetition, the reader is referred to 
 that chapter. 
 
 | Dissertation II. 
 
116 Of the Moral Part I. 
 
 and more satisfacti6n are the natural consequences* of 
 a virtuous than of a vicious course of life, in the pres- 
 e: t state, as an instance of a moral government estab- 
 lished in nature ; an instance of it, collected from ex- 
 perience and present matter of fact. But it must be 
 owned a thing of difficulty to weigh and balance pleas- 
 ures and uneasinesses, each amongst themselves, and 
 also against each other, so as to make an estimate, with 
 any exactness, of the overplus of happiness on the side 
 of virtue. And it is not impossible, that, amidst the 
 infinite disorders of the world, there may be excep- 
 tions to the happiness of virtue, even with regard to 
 those persons whose course of life, from their youth up, 
 has been blameless ; and more with regard to those 
 who have gone on for some time in the ways of vice, 
 and have afterwards reformed. For suppose an in- 
 stance of the latter case ; a person with his passions in- 
 flamed, his natural faculty of self-government impair- 
 ed by habits of indulgence, and with all his vices about 
 him, like so many harpies, craving for their accustomed 
 gratifications, who can say how long it might be, be- 
 fore such a person would find more satisfaction in the 
 reasonableness and present good consequences of vir- 
 tue, than difficulties and self denial in the restraints of 
 it ? Experience also shows, that men can, to a great 
 degree, get over their sense of shame, so as that by 
 professing themselves to be without principle, and 
 avowing even direct villany, they can support them- 
 selves against the infamy of it. But as the ill actions 
 of any one will probably be more talked of, and oftener 
 thrown in his way, upon his reformation, so the infamy 
 of them will be much more felt, after the natural sense 
 of virtue and honour is recovered. Uneasinesses of 
 
 * See Lord Sbafuburys Inquiry concerning Virtue, Part II. 
 
Chap. III. Government of God. 117 
 
 this kind ought, indeed, to be put to the account of 
 former vices -, yet it will be said, they are in part the 
 consequences of reformation. Still 1 am far from al- 
 lowing it doubtful, whether virtue, upon the whole, be 
 happier than vice in the prebent world. But if it were, 
 yet the beginnings ot a righteous administration may, 
 beyond all question, be found in nature, if we will at- 
 tentively inquire after them. And, 
 
 I. In whatever manner the notion of God's rrfbral 
 government over the world might be treated, if it did 
 not appear whether he were in a proper sense our gov- 
 ernor at all, yet when it is certain matter of experience, 
 that he does manifest himself to us under the charac- 
 ter of a governor, in the sense explained,* it must de- 
 serve to be considered, whether there be not reason to 
 apprehend, that he may be a righteous or moral Gov- 
 ernor. Since it appears to be fact, that God does gov- 
 ern mankind by the method of rewards and punish- 
 ments, according to some settled rules of distribution, 
 it is surely a questioa to be asked, what presumption 
 is there against his finally rewarding and punishing 
 them, according to this particular rule, namely, as they 
 act reasonably or unreasonably, virtuously or vicious- 
 ly ? since rendering men happy or miserable by this 
 rule, certainly falls in, much more falls in, with our 
 natural apprehensions and sense of things, than doing so 
 by any other rule whatever ; since rewarding and pun- 
 ishing actions by any other rule, would appear much 
 harder to be accounted for by minds formed as he has 
 formed ours, Be the evidence of religion then more 
 or less clear, the expectation which it raises in us, that 
 the righteous shall, upon the whole, be happy, and the 
 wicked miserable, canjaot however possibly be consid- 
 ered as absurd or chimerical ; because it is no more 
 
 * Chap. II. 
 
IIS Of the Moral Part I. 
 
 than an expectation, that a method of government 
 already begun, shall be carried on, the method of re- 
 warding and punishing actions ; and shall be carried 
 on by a particular rule, which unavoidably appears to 
 us at first sight more natural than any other, the rule 
 which we call distributive justice. Nor, 
 
 II. Ought it to be entirely passed over, that tran- 
 quillity, satisfaction, and external advantages, being 
 the Hatural consequences of prudent management of 
 ourselves, and our affairs ; and rashness, profligate neg- 
 ligence, and wilful folly, bringing after them many in- 
 conveniences and sufferings ; these afford instances of 
 a right constitution of nature ; as the correction of 
 children, for their own sakes, and by way of example, 
 when they run into danger or hurt themselves, is a 
 part of right education. And thus, that God governs 
 the world by general fixed laws, that he has endued 
 us with capacities of reflecting upon this constitution 
 of things, and foreseeing the good and bad conse- 
 quences of our behaviour, planely implies some sort of 
 moral gevernment ; since from such a constitution of 
 things it cannot but.follow, that prudence and impru- 
 dence, which are of the nature of virtue and vice,* 
 must be, as they are, respectively rewarded and pun- 
 ished. 
 
 III. From the natural course of things, vicious ac- 
 tions are, to a great degree, actually punished as mis- 
 chievous to society ; and .besides punishment actually 
 inflicted upon this account, there is also the fear and 
 apprehension of it in those persons, whose crimes have 
 rendered them obnoxious to it, in case of a discovery ; 
 this state of fear being itself often a very considerable 
 punishment. The natural fcar^nd apprehension of it 
 rno, which restrains from such crimes, is a declaration 
 
 See Dissertation II. 
 
Chap. III. Government of God. 119 
 
 of nature against them. It is necessary to the very 
 being of society, that vices destructive of it should be 
 punished as being so ; the vices of falsehood, injustice, 
 cruelty ; which punishment therefore is as natural as 
 society, and so is an instance of a kind of moral gov- 
 ernment, naturally established and actually taking 
 place. And, since the certain natural course of things 
 is the conduct of Providence or the government of 
 God, though carried on by the instrumentality of 
 men, the observation here made amounts to this, that 
 mankind find themselves placed by him in such cir- 
 cumstances, as that they are unavoidably accountable 
 for their behaviour, and are often punished, and some- 
 times rewarded unde^his government, in the view of 
 their being mischievous, or eminently beneficial to 
 society. I 
 
 If it be objected that good actions, and such as 
 are beneficial to society, are often punished, as in the 
 case of persecution and in other cases, and that ill and 
 mischievous actions are often rewarded, it may be an- 
 swered distinctly, first, that this is in no sort necessary, 
 and consequently not natural, in the sense in which it 
 is necessary, and therefore natural, that ill or mis- 
 chievous actions should be punched ; and in the next 
 place, that good actions are never punished, consider- 
 ed as beneficial to society, nor ill actions rewarded, un- 
 der the view of their -being hurtful to it. So that k 
 stands good, without any thing on the side of vice to 
 be set over against it, that the Author of nature has 
 as truly directed, that vicious actions, considered as 
 mischievous to society, should be punished, and put 
 mankind under a necessity of thus punishing them, as 
 he has directed and necessitated us to preserve our 
 lives by food. 
 
120 Of the Moral Part I. 
 
 IV. In the natural course of things, virtue as such 
 is actually rewarded, and vice as such punished ; which 
 seems to afford an instance or example, not only of 
 government, but of moral government, begun and 
 established ; moral in the strictest sense, though not in 
 that perfection of degree, which religion teaches us to 
 expect. In order to see this more clearly, we must 
 distinguish between actions themselves, and that qual- 
 ity ascribed to them, which we call virtuous or vi- 
 cious. The gratification itself of every natural passion, 
 must be attended with delight ; and acquisitions of 
 fortune, however made, are acquisitions of the means 
 or materials of enjoyment. An action then, by 
 which any natural passion is gratified or fortune ac- 
 quired, procures delight or advantage, abstracted from 
 all consideration of the morality|of such action. Con- 
 sequently, the pleasure or advantage in this case is 
 gained by the action itself, not by the morality, the 
 virtuousness or viciousness of it ; though it be, per- 
 haps, virtuous or vicious. Thus to say such an ac- 
 tion or course of behaviour procured such pleasure or 
 advantage, or brought on such inconvenience and pain, 
 is quite a different thing from saying, that such good or 
 bad effect was owing to the virtue or vice of <uch ac- 
 tion or behaviour. In one case, an action, abstracted 
 from all moral consideration, produced its effect ; in 
 the other case, for it will appear that there are such 
 cases, the morality of the action, the action under a 
 moral consideration, i. e. the virtuousness or vicious- 
 ness of it, produced the effect. Now I say, virtue, as 
 such, naturally procures considerable advantages to the 
 virtuous, and vice, as such, naturally occasions great in- 
 convenience and even misery to the vicious, in very 
 many instances. The immediate effects of virtue and 
 vice upon the mind and temper are to be mentioned 
 
Chap. III. Government of God, 121 
 
 as instances of it. Vice, as such, is naturally attended 
 with some sort of uneasiness, and, not uncommonly^ 
 with great disturbance and apprehension. That in- 
 ward feeling, which respecting lesser matters, and in 
 familiar speech, we call being vexed with oneself, and 
 in matters of importance and in more serious language, 
 remorse, is an uneasiness naturally arising from an ac- 
 tion of a man's own, reflected upon by himself as 
 wrong, unreasonable, faulty, i. e. vicious in greater or 
 less degrees ; and this manifestly is a different feeling 
 from that uneasiness which arises from a sense of mere 
 loss or harm. What is more common, than to hear 
 a man lamenting an accident or ev nt and adding,—-* 
 but however he has the satisfaction that he cannot 
 blame himself for it ;*or on the contrary, that he has 
 the uneasiness of being^ensible it was his own doing ? 
 Thus also the disturbance and fear, which often follow 
 upon a man's having done an injury, arise from a sense 
 of his being blameworthy ; otherwise there would, in 
 many cases, be no ground of disturbance, nor any rea-> 
 son to fear resentment or shame. On the other hand, 
 inward security and peace, and a mind open to the 
 several gratifications of life, are the natural attendants 
 of innocence and virtue. To which must be added 
 the complacency, satisfaction, and even joy of heart, 
 which accompany the exercise, the real exercise, of 
 gratitude, friendship, benevolence. 
 
 And here, I think, ought to be mentioned, the 
 fears of future punishment, and peaceful hopes of a 
 better life, in those who fully believe, or have any se- 
 rious apprehension of religion, because these hopes and 
 fears are present uneasiness and satisfaction to the 
 mind ; and cannot be got rid of by great part of the 
 world, even by men who have thought most thor- 
 oughly upon the subject of religion. And no one can 
 
 Q 
 
122 Of the Moral Part i. 
 
 say, how considerable this uneasiness and satisfaction 
 may be, or what upon the whole it may amount to. 
 
 In the next ^place comes in the consideration, that 
 all honest and good men are disposed to befriend hon- 
 est good men, as such, and to discountenance the vi- 
 cious, as such, and do so in some degree, indeed in a 
 considerable degree ; from which favour and discour- 
 agement cannot but arise considerable advantage and 
 inconvenience. And though the generality of the 
 world have little regard to the morality of their own 
 actions, and may be supposed to have less to that of 
 others, when they themselves are not concerned, yet 
 let any one be known to be a man of virtue, some 
 how or other he will be favoured, and good offices 
 will be done him, from regard to his character with- 
 out remote views, occasionally^ and in some low de- 
 gree,! think, by the generality of the world, as it hap- 
 pens to come in their way. Public honours too and 
 advantages are the natural consequences, are some- 
 times at least the consequences in fact, of virtuous ac- 
 tions ; of eminent justice, fidelity, charity, love to our 
 country, considered in the view of being virtuous. 
 And sometimes even death itself, often infamy and 
 external inconveniences, are the public consequences 
 of vice, a vice. For instance, the sense which man- 
 kind have of tyranny, injustice, oppression, additional 
 to the mere feeling or fear of misery, has doubtless 
 been instrumental in bringing about revolutions, 
 which make a figure even in the history of the world. 
 For it is plain, men resent injuries as implying faulti- 
 ness, and retaliate, not merely under the notion of 
 having received harm, but of having received wrong ; 
 and they have this resentment in behalf of others, as 
 well as of themselves. So likewise even the generality 
 are, in some degree, grateful, and disposed to return 
 
Chap. III. Government of God. 123 
 
 good offices , not merely because such an one has been 
 the occasion of good to them, but under the view, 
 that such good offices implied kind attention and 
 good desert in the doer. To all this may be added 
 two or three particular things, which many persons 
 will think frivolous ; but to me nothing appears so, 
 which at all comes in ti wards determining a question 
 of such importance, a*, whether there be or be not a 
 moral institution of government, in the strictest sense 
 moral, visibly established and begun in nature. The 
 particular things are these : that in domestic govern- 
 ment, which is doubtless natural, children and others 
 al' o are very generally punished for falsehood and in- 
 justice and ill behaviour, as such, and rewarded for the 
 contrary ; which are instances where veracity and jus- 
 tice, and right behaviour, as such, are naturally en- 
 forced by rewards and punishments, whether more or- 
 less considerable m degree : that, though civil gov- 
 ernment be suppo.ed to take cognizance of actions in 
 no other view than as prejudicial to society, without 
 respect to the immorality of them ; yet as such actions 
 are immoral, so the sense which men have of the im- 
 morality of them very greatly contributes, in different 
 ways, to bring offenders to justice ; and, that entire ab- 
 sence of all crime and guilt in the moral sense, when 
 plainly appearing, will almost of course procure, and 
 circumstances of aggravated guilt prevent, a remission 
 of the penalties annexed to civil crimes, in many cases, 
 though by no means in all. 
 
 Upon the whole then, besides the good and bad ef- 
 fects of virtue and vice upon men's own minds, the 
 course of the world does, in some measure, turn upon 
 the approbation and disapprobation of them, as such, 
 in others. The sense of well and ill doing, the pre- 
 sages of conscience, the love of good characters and 
 
124 Of the Moral Part I, 
 
 dislike of bad ones, honour, shame, resentment, grati- 
 tude ; all these, considered in themselves, and in their 
 effects, do afford manifest real instances of virtue, as 
 such, naturally favoured, and of vice, as such, discoun- 
 tenanced, more or less, in the daily course of human 
 life ; in every age, in every relation, in every general 
 circumstance of it. That God has given us a moral 
 nature,* may most justly be urged as a proof of our 
 being under his moral government ; but that he has 
 placed us in a condition, which gives this nature, as 
 one may speak, scope to operate, and in which it does 
 unavoidably operate, i. e. influence mankind to act, 
 so as thus to favour and reward virtue, and discoun- 
 tenance and punish vice — this is not the same, but a 
 further additional proof of his moral government, for 
 it is an instance of it. The first is a proof that he 
 will finally favour and support virtue effectually; the 
 second is an example of his favouring and supporting 
 it at present, in some degree. 
 
 If a more distinct inquiry be made, whence it arises 
 that virtue, as such, is often rewarded, and vice, as 
 such, is punished, and this rule never inverted — it 
 will be found to proceed, in part, immediately from 
 the moral nature itself, which God has given us ; and 
 also, in part, from his having given us, together with 
 this nature, so great a power over each other's happiness 
 and misery. For first, it is certain that peace and de- 
 light, in some degree and upon some occasions, is the 
 necessary and present effect of virtuous practice ; an 
 effect arising immediately from that constitution of 
 our nature. We are so made, that well doing, as 
 such, give* us satisfaction at lea.->t in some instances ; 
 ill doing, as such, in none. And secondly, from our 
 
 * Sec Dissertation II. 
 
Chap. III. Government of God. \ 25 
 
 moral nature, joined with God's having put our hap- 
 piness and misery in many respects in each other's 
 power, it cannot but be that vice, as such, some 
 kinds and instances of. it at least, will be infamous, 
 and men will be disposed to punish it, as in itself de- 
 testable ; and the villain will by no means be able al- 
 ways to avoid feeling that infamy, any more than he 
 will be able to escape this further punishment, which 
 mankind will be disposed to inflict upon him, under 
 the notion of his deserving it. But there can be noth- 
 ing on the side of vice to answer this, because there is 
 nothing in the human mind contradictory, as the lo- 
 gicians speak, to virtue. For virtue consists in a re- 
 gard to what is right and reasonable, as being so ; in 
 a regard to veracity, justice, charity, in themselves ; 
 and there is surely no such thing as a like natural re- 
 gard to falsehood, injustice, cruelty. If it be thought 
 that there are instances of an approbation of vice, as 
 such, in itself, and for its own sake, (though it does 
 not appear to me that there is any such thing at all ; 
 but supposing there be,) it is evidently monstrous ; as 
 much so as the most acknowledged perversion of any 
 passion whatever. Such instances of perversion then 
 being left out, as merely imaginary, or, however, un- 
 natural, it must follow from the frame of our nature, 
 and from our condition, in the respects now described, 
 that vice cannot at all be, and virtue connot but be 
 favoured, as such, by others, upon some occasions, and 
 happy in itself in some degree. For what is here in- 
 sisted upon, is not the degree in which virtue and vice 
 are thus distinguished, but only the thing itself, that 
 they are so in some degree, though the whole good 
 and bad effect of virtue and vice, as such, is not in- 
 considerable in degree. But that they must be thus 
 distinguished in some degree, is in a manner necessary ; 
 
126 Of the Moral Part I. 
 
 it is matter of fact of daily experience, even in the 
 greatest confusion of human affairs. 
 
 It is not pretended but that in the natural course of 
 things, happiness and misery appear to be distributed 
 by other rules than only the personal merit and de- 
 merit of characters. They may sometimes be distri- 
 buted by way of mere discipline. There may be 
 the wisest and best reasons, why the world should be 
 governed by general laws, from whence >uch promis- 
 cuous distribution perhaps must follow, and also why 
 our happiness and misery should be put in each other's 
 power in the degree which they are. And these 
 things, as in general they contribute to the rewarding 
 virtue and punishing vice, as such, so they often con- 
 tribute also, not to the inversion of this, w hich is im- 
 possible, but to the rendering persons prosperous, 
 though wicked ; afflicted, though righteous ; and, 
 which is worse, to the rewarding some act 'ions , though 
 vicious, and punishing other actions, though virtuous. 
 But all this cannot drown the voice of nature in the 
 conduct of Providence, plainly declaring itself for vir- 
 tue, by way of distinction from vice, and preference to 
 it. For, our being so constituted, as that virtue and 
 vice are thus naturally favoured and discountenanced, 
 rewarded and punished respectively, as such, is an in- 
 tuitive proof of the intent of nature that it should be 
 so ; otherwise the constitution of our mind, from 
 which it thus immediately and directly proceeds, would 
 be absurd. But it cannot be said, because virtuous 
 actions are sometimes punished, and vicious actions 
 rewarded, that nature intended it. For, though this, 
 great disorder is brought about, as all actions are 
 done, by means of some natural passion, yet this may 
 be, as it undoubtedly is, brought about by the perver- 
 sion of such passion, implanted in us for other and 
 
Chap. III. Government of God. 127 
 
 those very good purposes. And indeed these other 
 and good purposes, even of every passion, may be 
 clearly seen. 
 
 We have then a declaration in some degree of pres- 
 ent effect, from him who is supreme in nature, which 
 side he is of, or what part he takes ; a declaration for 
 virtue, and against vice. So far therefore as a man is 
 true to virtue, to veracity and justice, to equity and 
 charity, and the right of the case, in whatever he is 
 concerned, so far he is on the side of the divine ad- 
 ministration, and cooperates with it ; and from hence, 
 to such a man arises naturally a secret satisfaction and 
 sense of security, and implicit hope of somewhat fur- 
 ther. And, 
 
 V. This hope is confirmed by the necessary tenden- 
 cies of virtue, which, though not of present effect, yet 
 are at present discernible in nature, and so afford an 
 instance of somewhat moral in the essential constitu- 
 tion of it. There is, in the nature of things, a ten- 
 dency in virtue and vice to produce the good and bad 
 effects now mentioned in a greater degree than they do 
 in fact produce them. For instance ; good and bad 
 men would be much more rewarded and punished, as 
 such, were it not that justice is often artifically eluded, 
 that characters are not known, and many, who would 
 thus favour virtue and discourage vice, are hindered 
 from doing so by accidental causes. These tendencies 
 of virtue and vice are obvious with regard to individ- 
 uals. But it may require more particularly to be 
 considered, that power is a society, by being under the 
 direction of virtue, naturally increases, and has a nec- 
 essary tendency to prevail over opposite power, not un- 
 der the direction of it ; in like manner as power* by 
 being under the direction of reason, increases, and hzR 
 a tendency to prevail over brute force. There are 
 
128 Of the Moral Part I, 
 
 several brute creatures of equal, and several of superior 
 strength, to that of men, and possibly the sum of the 
 whole strength of brutes may be greater than that of 
 mankind ; but rer.son gives us the advantage and su- 
 periority over them, and thus man is the acknowledg- 
 ed governing animal upon the earth. Nor is this su- 
 periority considered by any as accidental, but as what 
 reason has a tendency, in the nature of the thing, to 
 obtain. And yet perhaps difficulties may be raised 
 about the meaning as well as the truth of the assertion, 
 that virtue has the like tendency. 
 
 To obviate these difficulties, let us see more distinct- 
 ly how the case stands with regard to reason, which 
 is so readily acknowledged to have this advantageous 
 tendency. Suppose then two or three men, of the 
 best and most improved understanding, in a desolate 
 open plain, attacked by ten times the number of beasts 
 of prey — would their reason secure them the victory 
 in this unequal combat ? Power then, though joined 
 with reason, and under its direction, cannot be ex- 
 pected to prevail over opposite power, though merely 
 brutal, unless the one bears some proportion to the 
 other. Again — put the imaginary case, that rational 
 and irrational creatures were of like external shape and 
 manner ; it is certain, before there were opportunities 
 for the first to distinguish each other, to separate from 
 their adversaries, and to form an union among them- 
 selves, they might be upon a level, or in several re- 
 spects upon great disadvantage, though united they 
 might be vastly superior ; since union is of such effi- 
 cacy, that ten men, united, might be able to accom- 
 plish what ten thousand of the same natural strength 
 and understanding, wholly ununited, could net. In 
 this case then, brute force might more than maintain 
 its ground against reason, for want of union among 
 
Chat. III. Government of God. 129 
 
 the rational creatures. Or suppose a number of men 
 to land upon an island inhabited only by wild beasts, 
 a number of men, who, by the regulations of civil 
 government, the inventions of art, and the experience 
 of some years, could they be preserved so long, would 
 be really sufficient to subdue the wild beasts, and to 
 preserve themselves in security from them ; yet a con- 
 juncture of accidents might give such advantage to 
 the irrational animals, as that they might at once 
 overpower, and even extirpate* the vvhole species of 
 rational ones. Length of time then, proper scope and 
 opportunities for reason to exert itself, may be abso- 
 lutely necessary to its prevailing over brute force. 
 Further still— there are many instances of brutes sue* 
 ceeding in attempts which they could not have un- 
 dertaken had not their irrational nature rendered them 
 incapable of foreseeing the danger of such attempts^ 
 or the fury of passion hindered their attending to it ; 
 arid there are instances of reason and real prudence 
 preventing men's undertaking what, it hath appeared 
 afterwards, they might have succeeded in by a lucky 
 rashness. And in certain conjunctures, ignorance 
 and folly, weakness and discord, may have their ad* 
 vantages. So that rational animals have not neces- 
 sarily the superiority over irrational ones ; but, how 
 improbable soever it may be, it is evidently possible, 
 that, in some globes, the latter may be superior* 
 And were the former wholly at variance and disunit- 
 ed, by false self interest and envy, by treachery and in- 
 justice, and consequent rage and malice against each 
 other, whilst the latter were firmly united among 
 themselves by instinct, this might greatly contribute 
 to the introducing such an inverted order of things. 
 For every one would consider it as inverted, since rea- 
 son has, in the nature of it, a tendency to prevail over 
 
 R 
 
130 Of the Moral Part L 
 
 brute force ; notwithstanding the possibility it may 
 not prevail, and the necessity which there is of many 
 concurring circumstances to render it prevalent. 
 
 Now I say, virtue in a society has a like tendency 
 to procure superiority and additional power, whether 
 this power be considered as the means of security front 
 opposite power, or of obtaining other advantages. 
 And it has this tendency, by rendering public good 
 an object and end to every member of the society ; 
 by putting every one upon consideration and diligence, 
 recollection and self government, both in order to see 
 what is the most effectual method, and also in order 
 to perform their proper part for obtaining and pre- 
 serving it ; by uniting a society within itself, and so 
 increasing its strength ; and, which is particularly to 
 be mentioned, uniting it by means of veracity and jus- 
 tice. For as these last are principal bonds of union, 
 so benevolence or public spirit, undirected, unrestrain- 
 ed by them, is, nobody knows what. 
 
 And suppose the invisible world, and the invisible 
 dispensations of Providence, to be in any sort analo- 
 gous to what appears, or that both together make up 
 one uniform scheme, the two parts of which, the part 
 which we see, and that which is beyond our observa- 
 tion, are analogous to each other, then there must be 
 a like natural tendency in the derived power, through- 
 out the universe, under the direction of virtue, to pre- 
 vail in general over that which is not under its protec- 
 tion, as there is in reason, derived reason in the uni- 
 verse, to prevail over brute force. But then, in order 
 to the prevalence of virtue, or that it may actually pro- 
 duce what it has a tendency to produce, the like con- 
 currences are necessary as are to the prevalence of rea- 
 son. There must be some proportion between the nat- 
 ural power or force which is, and that which is not, un- 
 
Chap. III. Government of God. 131 
 
 der the direction of virtue ; there must be sufficient 
 length of time ; for the complete success of virtue, as of 
 reason, cannot, from the nature of the thing, be other- 
 wise than gradual ; there must be, as one may speak, 
 a fair field of trial, a stage large and extensive enough, 
 proper occasions and opportunities, for the virtuous to 
 join together to exert themselves against lawless force, 
 and to reap the fruit of their united labours. Now 
 indeed it is to be hoped, that the disproportion be- 
 tween the good and bad, even here on earth, is not so 
 great but that the former have natural power sufficient 
 to their prevailing to a considerable degree, if circum- 
 stances would permit this power to be united. For 
 much less, very much less power under the direction of 
 virtue, would prevail over much greater not under the 
 direction of it. However, good men over the face of 
 the earth cannot -unite, as for other reasons, so because 
 they cannot be sufficiently ascertained of each other's 
 characters. And the known course of human things, I 
 the scene we are now passing through, particularly the 
 shortness of life, denies to virtue ils full scope in seve- 
 ral other respects. The natural tendency, which we 
 have been considering, though real, is hindered from 
 being carried into effect in the present state ; but these 
 hindrances may be removed in a future one. Virtue, 
 to borrow the Christian allusion, is militant here, and 
 various untoward accidents contribute to its being oft- 
 en overborne ; but it may combat with greater ad- 
 vantage hereafter, and prevail completely, and enjoy 
 its consequent rewards in some future states. Neg- 
 lected as it is, perhaps unknown, perhaps despised and 
 oppressed here, there may be scenes in eternity lasting 
 enough, and in every other way adapted, to afford it a 
 sufficient sphere of action, and a sufficient sphere for 
 the natural consequences of it to follow in fact. If the 
 
133 Of the Moral Part I. 
 
 soul be naturally immortal, and this state be a progress 
 towards a future one, as ciiildnood is towards mature 
 age, good men may naturally unite, not only amongst 
 themselves, but aio with other orders or virtuous crea- 
 tures, in that future state. For virtue, from the very 
 nature of it, is a principle and bond of union, in some 
 degree, amongst all who are endued with it, and 
 known to each other ; so as that by it a good man 
 cannot but recommend frimself to the favour and pro- 
 tection of all virtuous beings, throughout the whole 
 poiverse, who can be acquainted with his character, 
 and can any way interpose in his behalf in any part of 
 his duration. And one might add, that suppose all 
 this advantageous tendency of virtue to become effect, 
 amongst one or more orders of creatures, in any dis- 
 tant scenes and periods, and to be seen by any orders 
 of vicious creatures throughout the universal kingdom 
 of God, this happy effect of virtue would have a ten- 
 dency, by way of example, and possibly in other ways, 
 to amend those of them who are capable of amend- 
 ment, and being recovered to a just sense of virtue. 
 Jf our notions of the plan of Providence were enlarged, 
 in any sort proportionably to what late discoveries have 
 enlarged our views with respect to the material world, 
 representations of this kind would not appear absurd or 
 extravagant. However, they are not to be taken as 
 intended for a literal delineation of what is in fact the 
 particular scheme of the universe, which cannot be 
 known without revelation ; for suppositions are not to 
 be looked on as true, because not incredible, but they 
 are mentioned to shew, that our finding virtue to be 
 hindered from procuring to itself such superiority and 
 advantages is no objection against its having, in the 
 essential nature of the thing, a tendency to procure 
 them. And the suppositions now mentioned do plain- 
 
Chap. III. Government of God, 133 
 
 ly shew this ; for they shew that these hindrances are 
 so far from being necessary, that we ourselves can easi- 
 ly conceive how they may De removed in future states, 
 and full scope be granted to virtue. And all these ad- 
 vantageous tendencies of it are to be considered as dec- 
 larations of God in its favour. This, however, is tak^ 
 ing a pretty large compass ; though it is certain that, 
 a. the material world appears to be, in a manner, 
 boundless and immense, there must be some scheme of 
 Proviuence vast in proportion to it. 
 
 But let Ui return to the earth our habitation, and 
 we shall see this happy tendency of virtue, by imagin- 
 ing an instance pot so vast andieinote ; by ^uppo^ing 
 a kingdom or society of men upon it, perfectly virtu- 
 ous, tor a succession of many ages, to whieh, if you 
 please, may be given a situation advantageous for uni- 
 vt al monarchy. In such a btcte there would be no 
 suet; thing as faction ; but men of the greatest capa- 
 city would of course, all along, have the chief direction 
 of affairs willingly yielded to them ; and they would 
 share it among themselves without envy. Each of 
 these would have the part assigned him to which his 
 genius was peculiarly adapted ; and others, who had 
 not any distinguished genius, would be safe, and think 
 themselves very happy, by being under the protection 
 and guidance of tho>e who had. Public determina- 
 tions would really be the result of the united wisdom 
 of the community j and they would faithfully \>e exe- 
 cuted, by the united strength of it. Some would in 
 a higher way contribute, but all would in some way 
 contribute, to the public prosperity ; and in it, each 
 would enjoy the fruits of his own virtue. And as ia 
 justice, whether by fraud or force, would be unknown 
 among themselves, so they would be sufficiently se- 
 cured from it in their neighbours j for cunning ?jid 
 
134 Of the Moral Part L 
 
 false self interest, confederacies in injustice, ever slight, 
 and accompained with faction and intestine treachery ; 
 these on one hand would be found mere childish folly 
 and weakness, when set in opposition against wisdom, 
 public spirit, union inviolable, and fidelity on the 
 other ; allowing both a sufficient length of years to 
 try their force. Add the general influence which such 
 a kingdom would have over the face of the earth, by 
 way of example particularly, and the reverence which 
 would be paid it. It would planely be superior to all 
 others, and the world must gradually come under its 
 jempire ; not by means of lawless violence, but partly 
 by what must be allowed to be just conquest, and part- 
 ly by other kingdoms submitting themselves volun- 
 tarily to it, throughout a course of ages, and claiming 
 its protection, one after another, in successive exi- 
 gencies. The head of it would be an universal mon- 
 arch, in another sense than any mortal has yet been ; 
 and the eastern style would be literally applicable to 
 him, that all people^ nations and languages should serve 
 him. And though indeed our knowledge of human 
 nature, and the whole history of mankind, shew the 
 impossibility, without some miraculous interposition, 
 that a number of men, here on earth, should unite in 
 one society or government, in the fear of God and uni- 
 versal practice of virtue ; and that such a government 
 should continue so united for a succession of ages ; yet 
 admitting or supposing this, the effect would be as 
 now drawn out. And thus, for instance, the wonder- 
 ful power and prosperity promised to the Jewish na* 
 tion in the scripture, would be, in a great measure, the 
 consequence of what is predicted of them, — that the 
 people should be all righteous and inherit the land for 
 ever* were we to understand the latter phrase of a 
 
 » Isai. U.21. 
 
Chap. III. Government of God. 135 
 
 long continuance only, sufficient to give things tim6 
 to work. The predictions of this kind, for there are 
 many of them, cannot come to pass in the present 
 known course of nature ; but suppose them come to 
 pass, and then the dominion and preeminence promis- 
 ed must naturally follow, to a very considerable degree. 
 
 Consider now the general system of religion ; that 
 the government of the world is uniform, and one, and 
 moral ; that virtue and right shall finally have the ad- 
 vantage and prevail over fraud and lawless force, over 
 the deceits as well as the violence of wickedness, un- 
 der the conduct of one supreme Governor ; and from 
 the observations above made, it will appear, that God 
 has, by our reason, given us to see a peculiar connex- 
 ion in the several parts of this scheme, and a tendency 
 towards the completion of it, arising out of the very 
 nature of virtue ; which tendency is to be considered 
 as somewhat moral in the essential constitution of 
 things. If any one should think all this to be of lit- 
 tle importance, I desire him to consider what he would 
 think if vice had, essentially and in its nature, these 
 advantageous tendencies ; or if virtue had essentially 
 the direct contrary ones. 
 
 But it may be objected, that, notwithstanding all 
 these natural effects and these natural tendencies of 
 virtue, yet things may be now going on throughout 
 the universe, and may go on hereafter, in the same 
 mixed way as here at present upon earth ; virtue some- 
 times prosperous, sometimes depressed ; vice some- 
 times punished, sometimes successful. The answer to 
 which is, that it is not the purpose of this chapter, nor 
 of this treatise, properly to prove God's perfect moral 
 government over the world, or the truth of religion, 
 but to observe what there is in the constitution and 
 course of nature to confirm the proper proof of it, 
 
136 Of the Moral Part 1. 
 
 supposed to be known ; and that the weight of the 
 foregoing observations to this purpose may be thus? 
 distinctly proved. Pleasure and pain are, indeed, to a 
 certain degree, say to a very high degree, distributed 
 amongst us without any apparent regard to the merit 
 or demerit of characters. And were there nothing 
 else, concerning this matter, discernible in the con ti- 
 tution and course of nature, there would be no ground 
 from the constitution and course of nature, to hope or 
 to fear that men would be rewarded or punished here- 
 after according to their deserts ; which, however, it is 
 to be remarked, implies that even then there would be 
 no ground from appearances to think, that vice upon 
 the whole would have the advantage, rather than that 
 virtue would. And thus the proof of a future state of 
 retribution would rest upon the usual known argu- 
 ments for it ; which are, I think, plainly unanswera- 
 ble, and would be so, though there were no additional 
 confirmation of them from the things above insisted! 
 on : but these things are a very strong confirmation 
 of them. For, 
 
 First, they shew that the author of nature is not 
 indifferent to virtue and vice. They amount to a 
 declaration from him, determinate and not to be evad- 
 ed, in favour of one, and against the other ; such a 
 declaration, as there is nothing to be set over against 
 or answer, on the part of vice* So that were a man, 
 laying aside the proper proof of religion, to determine 
 from the course of nature only, v* hether it were most 
 probable that the righteous or the wicked would have 
 the advantage in a future life, there can b° no doubt 
 but that he would determine the probability to b?, 
 that the former would. The course of nature then, 
 in the view of it now given, furnishes us with a real 
 practical proof of the obligations of religion. 
 
Chap. III. Government of God. 137 
 
 Secondly, when, conformably to what religion 
 teaches us, God shall reward and punish virtue and 
 vice, as such, so as that every one shall, upon the whole, 
 have his deserts, this distributive justice will not be a 
 thing different in kind, but only in degree, from what 
 we experience in his present government. It will be 
 that in effect, towards which we now see a tendency. 
 It will be no more than the completion of that moral 
 government, the principles and beginning of which have 
 been shewn, beyond all dispute, discernible in the 
 present constitution and course of nature. And from 
 hence it follows, 
 
 Thirdly, that as under the natural government of 
 God, our experience of those kinds and degrees of 
 happiness and misery which we do experience at pres- 
 ent, gives just ground to hope for and to fear higher 
 degrees and other kinds of both in a future state, sup- 
 posing a future state admitted, so under his moral 
 government, our experience, that virtue and vice are, 
 in the manners above mentioned, actually rewarded 
 and punished at present, in a certain degree, gives just 
 ground to hope and to fear that they may be rewarded 
 and punished in an higher degree hereafter. It is ac- 
 knowledged indeed that this alone is not sufficient 
 ground to think that they actually will be rewarded 
 and punished in a higher degree, rather than in a low- 
 er ; but then, 
 
 Lastly, there is sufficient ground to think so, from 
 the good and bad tendencies of virtue and vice. For 
 these tendencies are essential, and founded in the na- 
 ture of things, whereas the hindrances to their becom- 
 ing effect, are, in numberless cases, not necessary, but 
 artificial only. Now it may be much more strongly 
 argued, that these tendencies, as well as the actual re- 
 wards and punishments of virtue and vice, which arise 
 
 s 
 
13& Of the Moral Part L 
 
 directly out of the nature of things, will remain here- 
 after, than that the accidental hindrances of them 
 will. And if these hindrances do not remain, those 
 rewards an punishments cannot but be carried on 
 much further towards the perfection of moral govern- 
 ment, i. e. the tendencies of virtue and vice will be- 
 come effect ; but when, or where, or in what particu- 
 lar way, cannot be known at all, but by revelation. 
 
 Upon the whole, there is a kind of moral govern- 
 ment implied in God's natural government ; # virtue 
 and vice are naturally rewarded and punished as ben- 
 eficial and mischievous to society,! and rewarded and 
 punished directly as virtue and vice,} The notion 
 then of a moral scheme of government is not fictitious 
 but natural, for it is suggested to our thoughts by the 
 constitution and course of nature ; and the execution 
 of this scheme is actually begun, in the instances here 
 mentioned. And these things are to be considered as 
 a declaration of the author of nature for virtue and 
 against vice ; they give a credibility to the supposition 
 of their being rewarded and punished hereafter, and 
 also ground to hope and to fear that they may be re- 
 warded and punished in higher degrees than they are 
 here. And as all this is confirmed, so the argument 
 for religion from the constitution and course of nature 
 is carried on farther, by observing, that there are nat- 
 ural tendencies, and, in innumerable cases, only artifi- 
 cial hindrances, to this moral scheme's being carried 
 on much farther towards perfection than it is at pres- 
 ent. § The notion then of a moral scheme of govern- 
 ment much more perfect than what is seen, is not a 
 fictitious but a natural notion, for it is suggested to 
 our thoughts by the essential tendencies of virtue and 
 vice. And these tendencies are to be considered as in- 
 
 * P. 117. f P. IIP. \ P. 120, &c. § P. 127, &c. 
 
Chap. III. Government of God. 139 
 
 timations, as implicit promises and threatnings from 
 the author of nature, of much greater rewards and 
 punishments to follow virtue and vice than do at pres- 
 ent. And indeed, every natural tendency which is to 
 continue, but which is hindered from becoming effect 
 by only accidental causes, affords a presumption that 
 such tendency will, some time or other, become effect ; 
 a presumption in degree proportionable to the length 
 of the duration through which such tendency will con- 
 tinue. And from these things together arises a real 
 presumption, that the moral scheme of government 
 established in nature shall be carried on much farther 
 towards perfection hereafter, and, I think, a presump- 
 tion that it will be absolutely completed. But from 
 these things, joined with the moral nature which God 
 has given us, considered as given us by him, arises a 
 practical proof* that it will be completed ; a proof 
 from fact, and therefore a distinct one from that which 
 is deduced from the eternal and unalterable relations, 
 the fitness and unfitness of actions. 
 
 * See this proof drawn out briefly, Ch. vi. 
 
140 Of a State of Trial. Part I. 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 Of a State of Probation, as implying Trial, Difficulties, 
 and Danger. 
 
 I he general doctrine of religion, that our pres- 
 ent life is a state of probation for a future one, com- 
 prehends under it several particular things distinct 
 from each other. But the first and most common 
 meaning of it seems to be, that our future interest is 
 now depending, and depending upon ourselves ; that 
 we have scope and opportunities here for that good 
 and bad behaviour, which God will reward and punish 
 hereafter ; together with temptations to one, as well 
 as inducements of reason to the other. And this is, 
 in great measure, the same with saying, that we are 
 under the moral government of God, and to give an 
 account of our actions to him. For the notion of a 
 future account and general righteous judgment im- 
 plies some sort of temptations to what is wrong, oth- 
 erwise there would be no moral possibility of doing 
 wrong, nor ground for judgment or discrimination. 
 But there is this difference, that the word probation is 
 more distinctly and particularly expressive of allure- 
 ments to wrong, or difficulties in adhering uniformly 
 to what is right, and of the danger of miscarrying by 
 6uch temptations, than the words moral government. 
 A state of probation then, as thus particularly imply- 
 ing in it trial, difficulties and danger, may require to 
 be considered distinctly by itself. 
 
 And as the moral government of God, which re- 
 ligion teaches us, implies that we are in a state of tri- 
 al with regard to a future world, so also his natural 
 
Chap. IV. Of a State of Trial. 141 
 
 government over us implies that we are in a state of 
 trial in the like sense with regard to the present world. 
 Natural government by rewards and punishments as 
 much implies natural trial as moral government does 
 moral trial. The natural government of God here 
 meant,* consists in his annexing pleasure to some ac- 
 tions and pain to others, which are in our power to 
 do or forbear, and in giving us notice of such appoint- 
 ment beforehand. This necessarily implies, that he 
 has made our happiness and misery, or our interest, to 
 depend in part upon ourselves. And so far as men 
 have temptations to any course of action which will 
 probably occasion them greater temporal inconven- 
 ience and uneasiness than satisfaction, so far their tem- 
 poral interest is in danger from themselves, or they are 
 in a state of trial with respect to it. Now people 
 often blame others, and even themselves, for their 
 misconduct in their temporal concerns. And we find 
 many are greatly wanting to themselves, and miss of 
 that natural happiness which they might have obtain- 
 ed in the present life ; perhaps every one does in some 
 degree. But many run themselves into great incon- 
 venience, and into extreme distress and misery ; not 
 through incapacity of knowing better, and doing bet- 
 ter for themselves, which would be nothing to the 
 present purpose, but through their own fault. And 
 these things necessarily imply temptation, and danger 
 of miscarrying, in a greater or less degree, with respect 
 to our worldly interest or happiness. Every one too, 
 without having religion in his thoughts, speaks of the 
 hazards which young people run, upon their setting 
 out in the world ; hazards from other causes than 
 merely their ignorance and unavoidable accidents. 
 And some courses of vice, at least, being contrary t© 
 
 * Ch. it 
 
142 Of a State of Trial. Part I, " 
 
 men's worldly interest or good, temptations to these 
 must at the same time be temptations to forego our 
 present and our future interest. Thus in our natural 
 or temporal capacity we are in a state of trial, i. e. of 
 difficulty and danger analogous or like to our moral 
 and religious trial. 
 
 This will more distinctly appear to any one who 
 thinks it worth while more distinctly to consider 
 what it is which constitutes our trial in both capaci- 
 ties, and to observe how mankind behave under it. 
 
 And that which constitutes this our trial, in both 
 these capacities, must be somewhat either in our ex- 
 ternal circumstances, or in our nature. For, on the 
 one hand, persons may be betrayed into wrong be- 
 haviour upon surprise, or overcome upon any other 
 very singular and extraordinary external occasions, 
 who would otherwise have preserved their character of 
 prudence and of virtue ; in which cases, every one, in 
 speaking of the wrong behaviour of these persons, 
 would impute it to such particular external circum- 
 stances : and on the other hand, men who have con- 
 tracted habits of vice and folly of any kind, or have 
 some particular passions in excess, will seek opportu- 
 nities, and, as it were, go out of their way to gratify 
 themselves in these respects, at the expence of their 
 wisdom and their virtue ; led to it, as every one would 
 say, not by external temptations, but by such habits 
 and passions. And the account of this last case is, 
 that particular passions are no more coincident with 
 prudence, or that reasonable self love, the end of which 
 is our worldly interest, than they are with the princi- 
 ple of virtue and religion, but often draw contrary 
 ways to one as well as to the other ; and so such par- 
 ticular passions are as much temptations to act im- 
 prudently with regard to our worldly interest, as to act 
 
Chap. IV. Of a 'State of Trial. 143 
 
 viciously.* However, as when we say, men are mis- 
 led by external circumstances of temptation, it cannot 
 but be understood that there is somewhat within 
 themselves to render those circumstances temptations 
 or to render them susceptible of impressions from 
 them ; so when we say, they are misled by passions, 
 it is always supposed that there are occasions, circum- 
 stances and objects, exciting these passions, and afford- 
 ing means for gratifying them. And therefore, 
 temptations from within and from without coincide 
 and mutually imply each other. Now the several 
 external objects of the appetites, passions and affec- 
 tions being present to the senses, or offering themselves 
 to the mind, and so exciting emotions suitable to 
 their nature, not only in cases where they can be grat- 
 ified consistently with innocence and prudence, but 
 also in cases where they cannot, and yet can be grati- 
 fied imprudently and viciously ; this as really puts 
 them in danger of voluntarily foregoing their present 
 interest or good as their future, and as really renders 
 self denial as necessary to secure one as the other ; i. e. 
 we are in a like state of trial with respect to both, by 
 the very same passions, excited by the very same 
 means. Thus mankind having a temporal interest 
 depending upon themselves, and a. prudent course of 
 behaviour being necessary to secure it, passions inor- 
 dinately excited, whether by means of example, or by 
 any other external circumstance, towards such objects, 
 at such times, or in such degrees, as that they cannot 
 be gratified consistently with worldly prudence, are 
 temptations, dangerous and too often successful temp- 
 tations, to forego a greater temporal good for a less ; 
 i. e. to forego what is, upon the whole, our temporal 
 
 * See Sermons preached at the Rolls, 1726, 2d Ed. p. 205, life. Pref. p 
 35,-t& Serm.p. 21, &V. 
 
144 Of a State of Trial. Part L 
 
 interest, for the sake of a present gratification. This 
 is a description of our state of trial in our temporal ca- 
 pacity. Substitute now the word future for temporal. 
 and virtue for prudence, and it will be just as proper a 
 description of our state of trial in our religious capa- 
 city ; so analogous are they to each other. 
 
 If, from consideration of this our like state of trial 
 in both capacities, we go on to observe farther how 
 mankind behave under it, we shall find there are some 
 who have so little sense of it that they scarce look be- 
 yond the passing day ; they are so taken up with pres- 
 ent gratifications as to have, in a manner, no feeling 
 of consequences, no regard to their future ease or for- 
 tune in this life, any more than to their happiness in 
 another. Some appear to be blinded and deceived by 
 inordinate passion in their worldly concerns as much 
 as in religion. Others are not deceived, but as it were 
 forcibly carried away by the like passions, against their 
 better judgment and feeble resolutions too of acting 
 better. And there are men, and truly they are not a 
 few, who shamelessly avow, not their interest, but their 
 mere will and pleasure, to be their law of life, and who, 
 in open defiance of every thing that is reasonable, will 
 go on in a course of vicious extravagance, foreseeing, 
 with no remorse and little fear, that it will be their 
 temporal ruin, and some of them under the apprehen- 
 sion of the consequences of wickedness in another 
 state. And to speak in the most moderate way, hu- 
 man creatures are not only continually liable to go 
 wrong voluntarily, but we see likewise that they often 
 actually do so, with respect to their temporal interests 
 as well as with respect to religion. 
 
 Thus our difficulties and dangers, or ©ur trials, in 
 ©ur temporal and our religious capacity, as they pro- 
 reed from the same causes, and have the same effect 
 
Chap. IV. Of a State of Trial. 145 
 
 upon men's behaviour, are evidently analogous and 
 of the same kind. 
 
 It may be added, that as the difficulties and dangers 
 of miscarrying in our religious state of trial are greatly 
 increased, and one is ready to think in a manner wholly 
 made, by the ill behaviour of others ; by a wrong edu- 
 cation, wrong in a moral sense, sometimes positively 
 vicious 5 by general bad example ; by the dishonest 
 artifices which are got into business of all kinds ; and* 
 in very many parts of the world, by religion's being 
 corrupted into superstitions, which indulge men in 
 their vices ; so in like manner, the difficulties of con- 
 ducting ourselves prudently in respect to our present 
 interest, and our danger of being led aside from pursu- 
 ing it, are greatly increased by a foolish education ; 
 and, after we come to mature age, by the extravagance 
 and carelessness of others whom we have intercourse 
 with, and by mistaken notions, very generally preva- 
 lent, and taken up from common opinion, concerning 
 temporal happiness, and wherein it consists And per- 
 sons, by their own negligence and folly in their tem- 
 poral affairs, no less than by a course of vice, bring 
 themselves into new difficulties, and, by habits of in- 
 dulgence, become less qualified to go through them ; 
 and one irregularity after another embarrasses things 
 to such a degree, that they know not whereabout 
 they are, and often makes the path of conduct so in- 
 tricate and perplexed, that it is difficult to trace it 
 out, difficult even to determine what is the prudent 
 or the moral part. Thus, for instance, wrong behav- 
 iour in one stage of life, youth ; wrong, I mean, con- 
 sidering ourselves only in our temporal capacity, with- 
 out taking in religion ; this, in several ways, increases 
 the difficulties of right behaviour in mature age ; i. e* 
 
 T 
 
146 Of a State of Trial. Part L 
 
 puts us into a more disadvantageous state of trial in our 
 temporal capacity. 
 
 We are an inferior part of the creation of God. 
 There are natural appearances of our being in a state 
 of degradation. x\nd we certainly are in a condition, 
 which docs not seem, by any means, the most advanta- 
 geous we could imagine or desire, either in our natu- 
 ral or moral capacity, for securing either our present or 
 future interest. However, this condition, low and 
 careful and uncertain as it is, does not afford any just 
 ground of complaint* For, as men may manage their 
 temporal affairs with prudence, and so pass their days 
 here on earth in tolerable ease and satisfaction, by a 
 moderate degree of care, so likewise with regard to re- 
 ligi m, there is no more required than what they are 
 well able to do, and what they must be greatly want- 
 ing to themselves if they neglect. And for persons 
 to have that put upon them which they are well able 
 to go through, and no more, we naturally consider as 
 ;aitable thing, supposing it done by proper au- 
 thority. Nor have we any more reason to complain 
 of it, with regard to the Author of nature, than of 
 his not having given us other advantages, belonging to 
 other orders of creatures. 
 
 But the thing here insisted upon is, that the state of 
 trial, which religion teaches us we are in, i> rendered 
 credible by its being throughout uniform and of a 
 pi with the general conduct of Providence towards 
 us m all other respects within the compass of our 
 knowledge. Indeed if mankind, considered in their 
 natural capacity, as inhabitants of this world only, 
 found themselves, from their birth to their death, in a 
 settled state of security and happiness, without any so- 
 licitude or thought of their own ; or if they were in 
 no danger of being brought into inconveniences anrf 
 
Chap. IV. Of a State of Trial. 147 
 
 distress, by carelessness, or the ? folly of passion, through 
 bad example, the treachery of others, or the deceitful 
 appearances of things ; were this cur natural condi- 
 tion, then it might seem strange, and be some pre- 
 sumption agdnst the truth of religion, that it repre- 
 sents our future and more general interest, as not se- 
 cure of course, but as depending upon our behaviour, 
 and requiring recollection and self government to ob- 
 tain it. For it might be alleged, " what you say is 
 our condition in one respect is not in any wise of a sort 
 with what we find, by experience, our condition is in 
 another. Our whole present interest is secured to our 
 hands, without any solicitude of ours ; and why should 
 not our future interest, if we have any such, be so 
 too ?" But since, on the contrary, thought and con- 
 sideration, the voluntary denying ourselves many 
 things which we desire, and a course of behaviour far 
 from being always agreeable to us, are absolutely ne- 
 cessary to our acting even a common decent and com- 
 mon prudent part, so as to pass with any satisfaction 
 through the present world, and be received upon any 
 tolerable good terms in it ; since this is the case, all 
 presumption against self denial and attention being 
 necessary to secure our higher interest, is removed. 
 Had we not experience, it might, perhaps speciously, 
 be urged, that it is improbable any kind of hazard 
 and danger should be put upon U* by an infinite Be- 
 ing, when every thing which is hazard and danger in 
 our manner of conception, and will end in error, con- 
 fusion and misery, is now already certain in his fore- 
 knowledge. And indeed, why any thing of hazard 
 and danger should be put upon such frail creatures as 
 we are, may well be thought a difficulty in specula- 
 tion, and cannot but be so till we know the whole, or, 
 however, much more of the case. But still the con- 
 
148 Of a State of Trial. Part I. 
 
 stitution of nature is as it is, Our happiness and mis- 
 ery are trusted to our conduct, and made to depend 
 upon it. Somewhat, and in many circumstances a 
 great deal too, is put upon us, either to do or to suf- 
 fer, as we choose. And all the various miseries of life 
 which people bring upon themselves by negligence 
 and folly, and might have avoided by proper care, are 
 instance- of this ; which miseries are beforehand just 
 as conti gent and undetermined as their conduct, and 
 left to be determined by it. 
 
 These observations are an answer to the objections 
 against the credibility of a state of trial, as implying 
 temptation >, and real danger of miscarrying with re- 
 gard to our general interest, under the moral govern- 
 ment of God ; and they shew that, if we are at all to 
 be considered in such a capacity, and as having such 
 an interest, the general analogy of Providence must 
 lead us to apprehend ourselves in danger of miscarry- 
 ing, in different degrees, as to this interest, by our 
 neglecting to act the proper part belonging to us in 
 that capacity. For we have a present interest, under 
 the government of God which we experience here upon 
 earth. And this interest, as it is not forced upon us, 
 so neither is it offered to our acceptance, but to our 
 acquisition, in such sort as that we are in danger of 
 missing it, by means of temptations to neglect, or 
 act contrary to it ; and without attention and self 
 denial mu^t and do miss of it. It is then perfectly 
 credible that this may be our case, with respect to that 
 chief and final gaod which religion proposes to us. 
 
Chap. V. Of Moral Discipline. 149 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 Of a State of Probation, as intended for Moral Dis- 
 cipline and Improvement, 
 
 £ rom the consideration of our being in a probation 
 state, of so much difficulty and hazard, naturally arises 
 the question, how we came to be placed in it. But 
 such a general inquiry as this would be found involved 
 in insuperable difficulties. For though iome of these 
 difficulties would be lessened, by observing that all 
 wickedness is voluntary, as is implied in its very notion, 
 and that many of the miseries of life have apparent 
 good effects, yet when we consider other circumstan- 
 ces belonging to both, and what must be the conse- 
 quence of the former in a life to come, it cannot but be 
 acknowledged plain folly and presumption to pretend 
 to give an account of the whole reasons of this matter ; 
 the whole reasons of our being allotted a condition, out 
 of which so much wickedness and misery, so circum- 
 stanced, would in fact arise. Whether it be not be- 
 yond our faculties, not only to find out, but even to un- 
 derstand, the whole account of this \ or, though we 
 should be supposed capable of understanding ir, yet, 
 whetherit would be of service or prejudice to us to bein- 
 formed of it, is impossible to say. But as our present 
 condition can in no wise be shewn inconsistent with the 
 perfect moral government of God, so religion teaches 
 us we were placed in it that we might qualify ourselves, 
 by thepractice of virtue, for another state whichi-* to fol- 
 low it. And this, though but a partial answer, a very 
 partial one indeed, to the inquiry now mentioned, yet- 
 
150 Of a State of Part L 
 
 is a more satisfactory answer to another, which is of 
 real, and of the utmost importance to us to have an- 
 swered, — the inquiry, what is our busii ;ess here ? The 
 known end, then, why we are placed in a state of so 
 much affliction, hazard and difficulty, is, our improve- 
 ment in virtue and piety, as the requisite qualification 
 for a future state of security and happiness. 
 
 Now the beginning of life, considered as an educa- 
 tion for mature age in the present world, appears plain- 
 ly, at first sight, analogous to this our trial for a future 
 one ; the former being in our temporal capacity, what 
 the latter is in our religious capacity. But some ob- 
 servations common to both of them, and a more dis- 
 tinct consideration of each, will more distinctly shew 
 the extent and force of the analogy between them, and 
 the credibility which arises from hence, as well as from 
 the nature of the thing, that the present life was in- 
 tended to be a state of discipline for a future one. 
 
 I. Every species of creatures is, we see, designed for 
 a particular way of life ; to which the nature, the ca- 
 pacities, temper, and qualifications of each species, are 
 as necessary as their external circumstances. Both 
 come into the notion of such state, or particular way 
 of life, and are constituent parts of it. Change a 
 man's capacities or character, to the degree in which 
 it is conceivable they may be changed, and he would 
 be altogether incapable of a human course of life, and 
 human happiness ; as incapable as if, his nature con- 
 tinuing unchanged, he were placed in a world where 
 he had no sphere of action, nor any objects to answer 
 his appetites, passions, and affections of any sort. One 
 thing is set over against another, as an ancient writer 
 expresses it. Our nature corresponds to our external 
 condition : without this correspondence, there would 
 be no possibility of any such thing as human life and 
 
Gha*. V. Moral Discipline. 151 
 
 human happiness ; which life and happiness are, there- 
 fore, a result from our nature and condition jointly ; 
 meaning by human life, not living in the literal sense, 
 but the whole complex notion commonly understood 
 by those words. So that without determining what 
 will be the employment and happiness, the particular 
 life of good men hereafter, there must be some deter- 
 minate capacities, some necessary character and qual- 
 ifications, without which persons cannot but be utterly 
 incapable of it ; in like manner as there must be some, 
 without which men would be incapable of their pres- 
 ent state of life. Now, 
 
 II. The constitution of human creatures, and in- 
 deed of all creatures which come under our notice, is 
 isuch, as that they are capable of naturally becoming 
 qualified for states of life, for which they were once 
 wholly unqualified. In imagination we may indeed 
 conceive of creatures as incapable of having any of 
 their faculties naturally enlarged, or as being unable 
 naturally to acquire any new qualifications ; but the 
 faculties of every species known to us are made for 
 enlargement, for acquirements of experience and hab- 
 its. We find ourselves in particular endued with ca- 
 pacities, not only of perceiving ideas, and of knowl- 
 edge or perceiving truth, but also of storing up our 
 ideas and knowledge by memory. We are capable, 
 not only of acting, and of having different momentary 
 impressions made upon us, but of getting a new fa- 
 cility in any kind of action, and of settled alterations 
 in our temper or character. The power of the two 
 last is the power of habits ; but neither the percep- 
 tion of ideas, nor knowledge of any sort, are habits, 
 though absolutely necessary to the forming of them. 
 However, apprehension, reason, memory, which are 
 the capacities of acquiring knowledge, are greatly im- 
 
152 Of a Stale of Part I. 
 
 proved by exercise. Whether the word habit is ap- 
 plicable to all these improvements, and in particular 
 how far the powers of memory and of habits may be 
 powers of the same nature, I shall not inquire. But 
 that perceptions come into our minds readily and of 
 course, by means of their having been there before, 
 seems a thing of the same sort as readiness in any par- 
 ticular kind of action, proceeding from being accus- 
 tomed to it. And aptness to recollect practical ob- 
 servations of service in our conduct, is plainly habit in 
 many cases. There are habits of perception, and hab- 
 its of action. An instance of the former is our con- 
 stant and even involuntarily readiness, in correcting 
 the impressions of our sight concerning magnitudes 
 and di>tances, so as to substitute judgment in the room 
 of sensation imperceptibly to ourselves. And it seems 
 as if all other associations of ideas not naturally con- 
 nected, might be called passive habits, as properly as 
 our readiness in understanding languages upon sight, 
 or hearing of words. And our readiness in speaking 
 and writing them is an instance of the latter, of active 
 habits. For distinctness, we may consider habits as 
 belonging to the body or the mind ; and the latter 
 will be explained by the former. Under the former 
 are comprehended all bodily activities or motions, 
 whether graceful or unbecoming, which are owing to 
 use; under the latter, general habits of life and con- 
 duct, such as those of obedience and submission to au- 
 thority, or to any particular person ; those of veracity, 
 justice and charity ; those of attention, industry, self 
 government, envy, revenge. And habits of this latter 
 kind seem produced by repeated acts, as well as the 
 former. And in like manner as habits belonging to 
 the body are produced by external acts, so habits of 
 the mind are produced by the exertion of inward 
 
CtfAP, V. Moral Discipline. 138 
 
 practical principles, i. e. by carrying them into act, or 
 acting upon them ; the principles of obedience, of ve- 
 racity, justice and charity. Nor can those habits be 
 formed by any external course of action, otherwise 
 than as it proceeds from these principles ; because it is 
 only these inward principles exerted, which are strictly 
 act«? of obedience, of veracity, of justice, and of charity. 
 So likewise habits of attention, industry, self govern- 
 ment, are in the same manner acquired by exercise f 
 and habits of envy and revenge by indulgence, whether 
 in outward act, or in thought and intention, i. e. in-* 
 ward act ; for such intention is an act. Resolutions 
 also to do well, are properly acts. And endeavouring 
 to enforce upon our own minds a practical sense of 
 virtue, or to beget in others that practical sense of it 
 which a man really has himself, is a virtuous act. All 
 these, therefore, may and will contribute towards 
 forming good habits. But going over the theory of 
 virtue in one's thoughts, talking well, and drawing fine 
 pictures of it, — this is so far from necessarily or cer- 
 tainly conducing to form an habit of it, in him who 
 thus employs himself, that it may harden the mind in 
 a contrary course, and render it gradually more insen- 
 sible, i. e. form an habit of insensibility to all moral 
 considerations. For, from our very faculty of habits, 
 passive impressions, by being repeated, grow weaker. 
 Thoughts, by often passing through the mind, are felt 
 less sensibly ; being accustomed to danger begets in- 
 trepidity, i. e. lessens fear ; to distress, lessens the pas- 
 sion of pity ; to instances of others' mortality, lessens 
 the sensible apprehension of our own. And from 
 these two observations together, — that practical habits 
 are formed and strengthened by repeated acts, and that 
 passive impressions grow weaker by being repeated up- 
 en us, — it must follow, that active habits may be 
 
 v 
 
1J4 Of a State of Part L 
 
 gradually forming and strengthening, by a course of 
 acting upon such and such motives and excitements, 
 whilst these motives and excitements themselves are, 
 by proportionable degrees, growing less sensible, i. e. 
 are continually le*s and les3 sensibly felt, even as the 
 active habits strengthen. And experience confirms 
 this ; for active principles, at the very time that they 
 are less lively in perception than they were, are found 
 to be, some how, wrought more thoroughly into the 
 temper and character, and become more effectual in 
 influencing our practice. The three things just men- 
 tioned, may afford instances of it. Perception of dan- 
 ger is a natural excitement of passive fear, and active 
 caution ; and by being inured to danger, habits of the 
 latter are gradually wrought, at the same time that 
 the former gradually lessens. Perception of distress in 
 others is a natural excitement, pasriveiy to pity, and 
 actively to relieve it ; but let a man set himself to at- 
 tend to, inquire out, and relieve distressed persons, and 
 he cannot but grow less and less sensibly affected with 
 the various miseries of life with which he must become 
 acquainted, when yet at the same time benevolence, 
 considered not as a passion, but as a practical principle 
 of action, will strengthen ; and whilst he passively com- 
 passionates the distressed less he will acquire a greater 
 aptitude actively to assist and befriend them. So also 
 at the same time that the daily insta/ices of men's dy- 
 ing around us give us daily a less sensible passive feel- 
 ing or apprehension of our own mortality, such in- 
 stances greatly contribute to the strengthening a prac- 
 tical regard to it in serious men, i. e. to forming an 
 habit of acting with a constant view to it. And this 
 seems again further to shew, that passive impressions 
 made upon our minds by admonition, experience, ex- 
 ample, though they may have a remote efficacy, and 
 
Chap. V. Moral Discipline. 155 
 
 a very great one, towards forming active habits, yet 
 can have this efficacy no otherwise than by inducing 
 us to such a course of action ; and that it is, not be- 
 ing affected so and so, but acting, which forms those 
 habits ; only it must be always remembered, that real 
 endeavours to enforce good impressions upon ourselves, 
 are a species of virtuous action. Nor do we know 
 how far it is possible, in the nature of things, that ef- 
 fects should- be wrought in us at once, equivalent to 
 habits, i. e. what is wrought by use and exercise. 
 However, the thing insisted upon is, not what may be 
 possible, but what is in fact the appointment of nature; 
 which is, that active habits are to be formed by exer- 
 cise. Their progress may be so gradual as to be im- 
 perceptible in its steps ; it may be hard to explain the 
 faculty by which we are capable of habits throughout 
 its several parts, and to trace it up to its original, so 
 as to distinguish it from all others in our mind ; and 
 it >eems as if contrary effects were to be ascribed to it. 
 Bu^he^tlu^^hi g eneral, that our nature is formed to 
 ■■^ief«3itii^onl'e"sn5rtn^ner as this, to use and exercise, 
 is matter of certain experience. 
 
 Thus, by accustoming ourselves to any course of 
 action, we get an aptness to go on, a facility, readiness, 
 and often pleasure in it. The inclinations which ren- 
 dered us averse to it grow weaker ; the difficulties in 
 it, not only the imaginary but the real ones, lessen ; 
 the reasons for it offer themselves of course to our 
 thoughts upon all oecasioa%~ and the least glimpse of 
 them is sufficient to make us go on in a course of ac- 
 tion to which we have been accustomed. And prac- 
 tical principles appear to grow stronger absolutely in 
 themselves by exersise, as well as relatively with re- 
 gard to contrary principles, which, by being accus- 
 tomed to submit, do so habitually and of course. And 
 
156 Of a State of Part h 
 
 thus a new character in several respects may be form- 
 ed, and many habitudes of life not given by nature, 
 but which nature directs us to acquire. 
 
 III. Indeed we may be assured, that we should 
 never have had these capacities of improving by expe* 
 rience, acquired knowledge and habits, had they not; 
 been necessary, and intended to be made use of. And 
 accordingly we find them so necessary, and so much 
 intended, that without them we should be utterly in- 
 capable of that which was the end for which we were 
 made, considered in our temporal capacity only, the 
 employments and satisfactions of our mature state of 
 
 life. 
 
 Nature does in no wise qualify us wholly, much less 
 at once, for this mature state of life. Even maturity 
 of understanding and bodily strength are not only ar- 
 rived to gradually, but are also very much owing to the 
 countinued exercise of our powers of body and mind, 
 from infancy. But if we suppose a person brought into 
 the world with both these in maturity, as far as this is 
 conceivable, he would plainly at first be as unqualified 
 for the human life of mature age as an idiot. He 
 would be in a manner distracted with astonishment, 
 and apprehension, and curiosity, and suspense ; nor can 
 one guess how long it would be before he would be 
 familiarized to himself, and the objects about him, 
 enough even to set himself to any thing. It may be 
 questioned too, whether the natural information of his 
 sight and hearing would be of any manner of use at all 
 to him in acting, before experience. And it seems, 
 that men would be strangely headstrong and self will- 
 ed, and disposed to exert themselves with an impetuosi- 
 ty which would render society insupportable, and the 
 living in it impracticable, were it not for some acquir- 
 rd moderation and self government, some aptitude 
 
Chap. V. Moral Discipline. 157 
 
 and readiness in restraining themselves, and conceal- 
 ing their sense of things. Want of every thing of 
 this kind which is learnt, would render a man as un- 
 capable of society as want of language would, or as 
 his natural ignorance of any of the particular employ- 
 ments of life would render him uncapable of provid- 
 ing himself with the common conveniences, or sup- 
 plying the nece sary wants of it. In these respects, 
 and probably in many more, of which we have no par- 
 ticular notion, mankind is left by nature an unform- 
 ed, unfinished creature, utterly deficient and unquali- 
 fied, before the acquirement of knowledge, experience 
 and habits, for that mature state of life which was the 
 end of his creation, considering him as related only to 
 this world. 
 
 But then, as nature has endued us with a power of 
 supplying those deficiencies by acquired knowledge, 
 experience and habits, so likewise we are placed in a 
 condition, in infancy, childhood and youth, fitted for 
 it ; fitted for our acquiring those qualifications of all 
 sorts, which we stand in need of in mature age. 
 Hence children, from their very birth, are daily grow- 
 ing acquainted with the objects about them, with the 
 scene in which they are placed and to have a future 
 part, and learning somewhat or other necessary to the 
 performance of it. The subordinations to which they 
 are accustomed in domestic life, teach them self gov- 
 ernment in common behaviour abroad, and prepare 
 them for subjection and obedience to civil authority. 
 What passes before their eyes, and daily happens to 
 them, gives them experience, caution against treache- 
 ry and deceit, together with numberless little rules of 
 action and conduct, which we could not live without, 
 and which are learnt so insensibly and so perfectly as to 
 be mistaken perhaps for instinct, though they are the 
 
158 Of a State of Part I. 
 
 effect of long experience and exercise, as much so as 
 language, or knowledge in particular bu iness, or the 
 qualifications and behaviour belonging to the several 
 ranks and professions. Thus the beginning of our 
 days is adapted to be, and is, a state of education in 
 the theory and practice of mature life. We are much 
 assisted in it by example, instruction, and the care of 
 others ; but a great deal is left to ourselves to do. 
 And of this, as part is done easily and of course, so 
 part require^ diligence and care, the voluntary forego- 
 ing many things which we desire, and setting ourselves 
 to what we should have no inclination ro, but for the 
 necessity or expedience of it. For^ that labour and 
 industry which the station of so m^ny absolutely re- 
 quires, they would be greatly unqualified for in ma- 
 turity, as those in other stations would be for any oth- 
 er sorts of application, if both were not accustomed to 
 them in their youth. And according as persons be- 
 have themselves, in the general education which all 
 go through, and in the particular ones adapted to par- 
 ticular employments, their character is formed and 
 made appear ; they recommend themselves more or 
 less, and are capable of and placed in different stations 
 in the society of mankind. 
 
 The for mer part of life then is to be considered as 
 an important opportunity which nature puts into our 
 hands, and which, when lost, is not to be recovered. 
 And our being placed in a state of discipline through- 
 out this lite for another world, is a providential dispo- 
 sition of things, exactly of the same kind as our being 
 placed in a state of discipline during childhood, for 
 mature age. Our condition in both respects is uni- 
 form and of a piece, and comprehended under one and 
 the same general law of nature. 
 
Chap. V. Moral Discipline. 159 
 
 And if we were not able at all to discern how or in 
 what way the present life could be our preparation for 
 another, this would be no objection against the credi- 
 bility of its being so. For we do not discern how 
 food and sleep contribute to the growth of the body, 
 nor could have any thought that they would before we 
 had experience. Nor do children at all think, on the 
 one hand, tl at the sports and exercises to which they 
 . are so much addicted contribute to their health and 
 gr >wth ; nor on the other, of the necessity which there 
 is for their being restrained in them ; nor are they 
 capable of understanding the use of many parts of dis- 
 cipline, which nevertheless they must be made to go 
 through, in order to qualify them for the business of 
 mature age. Were we not able then to discover, in 
 what respects the present life could form us for a fu- 
 ture one, yet nothing would be more supposeable 
 than that it might, in some respects or other, from 
 the general analogy of Providence. And this, for 
 ought I see, might reasonably be said, even though 
 we should not take in the consideration of God's mor- 
 al government" over the world. But, 
 
 IV. Take in this consideration, and consequently 
 that the character of virtue and piety is a necessary 
 qualification for the future state, and then we may 
 distinctly see how, and in what respects, the present 
 life may be a preparation for it ; since we want, and 
 are capable of, improvement in that character, by moral 
 and religious habits, and the present life is jit to be a state 
 of discipline for such improvement ; in like manner as 
 we have already observed how, and in what respects, 
 infancy, childhood and youth are a necessary prepara- 
 tion, and a natural state of discipline, for mature age. 
 
 Nothing which we at present see would lead us to 
 the thought of a solitary unactive state hereafter \ but, 
 
j 60 Of a State of Part L 
 
 if we judge at all from the analogy of nature, we must 
 .suppose, according to the Scripture account of it, that 
 it will be a community. And there is no shadow of 
 any thing unreasonable in conceiving, though there 
 be no analogy for it, that this community will be, as 
 the Scripture represents it, under the more immediate, 
 or, if such an expression may be used, the more sensi- 
 ble government of God. Nor is our ignorance what 
 will be the employments of this happy community, nor 
 our consequent ignorance what particular scope or oc- 
 casion there will be for the exercise of veracity, justice 
 and charity amongst the members of it with regard to 
 each other, any proof that there will be no sphere of 
 exercise for those virtues ; much less, if that were pos- 
 sible, is our ignorance any proof, that there will be no 
 occasion for that frame of mind, or character, which is 
 formed by the daily practice of those particular virtues 
 here, and which is a result from it. This at least 
 must be owned in general, that, as the government 
 established in the universe is moral, the character of 
 virtue and piety must, in some way or other, be the 
 condition of our happiness, or the qualification for it. 
 Now from what is above observed, concerning our 
 natural power of habits, it is easy to see that we are 
 capable of moral improvement by discipline. And 
 how greatly we want it, need not be proved to any one 
 who is acquainted with the great wickedness of man- 
 kind, or even with those imperfections which the best 
 are conscious of. But it is not perhaps distinctly at- 
 tended to by every one, that the occasion which hu- 
 man creatures have for discipline, to improve in them 
 this character of virtue and piety, is to be traced up 
 higher than to excess in the passions, by indulgence 
 and habits of vice. Mankind, and perhaps all finite 
 creatures, from the very constitution of their nature, 
 
Chap. V. Moral Discipline. l(jl 
 
 before habits of virtue, are deficient, and in danger of 
 deviating from what is right ; and therefore stand in 
 need of virtuous habits, for a security against this dan- 
 ger. For, together with the general principle of moral 
 understanding, we have in our inward frame various 
 affections towards particular external objects. These 
 affections are naturally and of right subject to the 
 government of the moral principle, as to the occasions 
 upon which they may be gratified, as to the times, de- 
 grees and manner in which the objects of them may be 
 pursued ; but then the principle of virtue can neither 
 excite them, nof prevent their being excited. On 
 the contrary, they are naturally felt, when the objects 
 of them are present to the mind, not only before all 
 consideration whether they can be obtained by lawful 
 means, but after it is found they cannot. For the 
 natural objects of affection continue so ; the necessa- 
 ries, conveniences and pleasures of life remain naturally 
 desirable, though they cannot be obtained innocently ; 
 nay, though they cannot possibly be obtained at all. 
 And when the objects of any affection whatever can- 
 not be obtained without unlawful means, but may be 
 obtained by them, such affection, though its being ex- 
 cited, and its continuing some time in the mind, be it 
 as innocent as it is natural and necessary, yet cannot 
 but be conceived to have a tendency to incline persons 
 to venture upon such unlawful means, and therefore 
 must be conceived as putting them in some danger of 
 it. Now what is the general security against this dan- 
 ger, against their actually deviating from right ? As 
 the danger is, so also must the security be from with- 
 in ; from the practical principle of virtue.* And the 
 
 * It may be thought, that a sense of interest would as effectually restraia 
 creatures from doing wrong. But if by a sense of Interest is meant a specu- 
 lative conviction or belief, that puch and such indulgence would occasion 
 
 X 
 
162 Of a State of Part I. 
 
 strengthening or improving this principle, considered 
 as practical, or as a principle of action, will le^en the 
 danger, or increase the security against it. And this 
 moral principle is capable of improvement by proper 
 discipline and exercise, by recollecting the practical 
 impressions which example and experience have made 
 upon us, and, instead of following humour and mere 
 inclination, by continually attending to the equity and 
 right of the case in whatever we are engaged, be it in 
 greater or less matters, and accustoming ourbelves al- 
 ways to act upon it, as being itself the just and natural 
 motive of action ; and as this moral course of behav- 
 iour must necessarily, under divine government, be 
 our final intere t. Thus the principle rf virtue, im- 
 proved into an habit, of which improvement we are thus 
 capable, will plainly be, in proportion to the strength of it, 
 a security gainst the danger which finite creatures are in, 
 from the very nature of propension, or particular affections. 
 This way of putting the matter supposes particular af- 
 fections to remain in a future state, which it is scarce 
 possible to avoid supposing. And if they do, we clear- 
 ly see that acquired habits of virtue and self govern- 
 ment may be necessary for the regulation of them. 
 However, though we were not distinctly to take in 
 this supposition, but to *>peak only in general, the 
 
 them greater uneasiness, upon the whole, than satisfaction, it is contrary to 
 present experience to say, that this sense of interest is sufficient to restrain 
 them from thus indulging themselves. And if by a setue of interest is meant 
 a practical regard to what is, upon the whole, our happiness, this is not only 
 coincident with the principle of virtue or moral rectitude, but is a part of 
 the idea itself. And it is evident this reasonable self love wants to be im- 
 proved, as really as any principle in our nature. For we daily see it over- 
 matched, not only by the more boisterous passions, but by curiosity, shame, 
 love of imitation, by any thing, even indolence; especially if the interest, the 
 temporal interest, suppose, which is the end of such self love, be at a dis- 
 tance. So greatly are profligate men mistaken, when they affirm they 
 are wholly governed by interestedness and self love. And so little cause i 
 there for moralists to disclaim this principle. See p. Hi', 1 1\ 
 
Chap, V. Moral Discipline. 163 
 
 thing really comes to the same. For habits of virtue, 
 thu> acquired by discipline, are improvement in vir- 
 tu? ; and improvement in virtue must be advance- 
 ment in happiness, if the government of the universe 
 be moral. 
 
 From these things we may observe, and it will far- 
 ther shew this our natural and original need of being 
 improved by discipline, how it comes to pass, that 
 creatures made upright fall ; and that those who pre- 
 serve their uprightness, by so doing raise themselves to 
 a more secure state of virtue. To say that the former 
 is accounted for by the nature of liberty, is to say no 
 more than that an event's actually happening is ac- 
 counted for by a mere possibility of its happening. 
 But it seems distinctly conceivable from the very na- 
 ture of particular affections or propensions. For, 
 suppose creatures intended for such a particular state 
 of life for which such propensions were necessary ; 
 suppose them endued with such propensions, together 
 with moral understanding, as well including a practi- 
 cal sense of virtue as a speculative perception of it, 
 and that all these several principles, both natural and 
 moral, forming an inward constitution of min , were 
 in the most exact proportion possible, i; e. in a pro- 
 portion the most exactly adapted to their intended 
 state of life; such creatures would be made upright, 
 or finitely perfect. Now particular propensions, from 
 their very nature, must be felt, the objects of them 
 being present, though they cannot be gratified at all, 
 or not with the allowance of the moral principle. But 
 if they can be gratified without its allowance, or by 
 contradicting it, then they must be conceived to have 
 some tendency, in how low a degree soever, yet some 
 tendency, to induce persons to such forbidden gratifi- 
 cation. This tendency, in some one particular pro- 
 
164 Of a State of Part 1. 
 
 pension, may be increased by the greater frequency of 
 occasions naturally exciting it, than of occasions ex- 
 citing others. The least voluntary indulgence in for- 
 bidden circumstances, though but in thought, will 
 increase this wrong tendency, and may increase it fur- 
 ther, until, peculiar conjunctures perhaps conspiring, 
 it becomes effect ; and danger of deviating from right, 
 ends in actual deviation from it ; a danger necessarily 
 arising from the very nature of propension, and which 
 therefore could not have been prevented, though it 
 might have been escaped, or got innocently through. 
 The case would be as if we were to suppose a strait 
 path marked out for a person, in which such a degree 
 of attention would keep him steady ; but if he would 
 not attend in this degree, any one of a thousand ob- 
 jects catching his eye might lead him out of it. Now 
 it is impossible to say how much, even the first full 
 overt act of irregularity, might disorder the inward 
 constitution, unsettle the adjustments, and alter the 
 proportions which formed it, and in which the up- 
 rightness of its make consisted ; but repetition of ir- 
 regularities would produce habits : and thus the con- 
 stitution would be spoiled, and creatures made upright 
 become corrupt and depraved in their settled char- 
 acter, proportionably to their repeated irregularities in 
 occasional acts. But on the contrary, these creatures 
 might have improved, and raised themselves to an 
 higher and more secure state of virtue, by the con- 
 tra* y behaviour ; by steadily following the moral prin- 
 ciple, supposed to be one part of their nature, and 
 thus withstanding that unavoidable danger of defec- 
 tion, which necessarily arose from propension, the other 
 part of it. For, by thus preserving their integrity for 
 some time, their danger would lessen, since propen- 
 cions by being inured to submit, would do it more ea-, 
 
Chap. V. Moral Discipline. 16£ 
 
 sily and of course ; and their security against this les- 
 seni g danger would increase, since the moral princi- 
 ple would gain additional strength by exercise ; both 
 which things are implied in the notion of virtuous 
 habits. Thus then, vicious indulgence is not only 
 criminal in itself, but also depraves the inward con ti- 
 tution and character. And virtuous self government 
 is not only right in itself, but also improves the inward 
 constitution or character ; and may improve it to such 
 a degree, that though we should suppose it impossible 
 for particular affections to be absolutely coincident 
 with the moral principle, and consequently should al- 
 low, that such creatures as have been above supposed 
 would for ever remain defectible, yet their danger of 
 actually deviating from right may be almost infinitely 
 lessened, and they fully fortified against what remains 
 of it, if that may be called danger against which there 
 is an adequate effectual security. But still this their 
 higher perfection may continue to consist in habits of 
 virtue, formed in a state of discipline, and this their 
 more complete security remain to proceed from them. 
 And thus it is plainly conceivable, that creatures 
 without blemish, as they came out of the hands of God, 
 may be in danger of going wrong, and so may stand in 
 need of the security of virtuous habits, additional to 
 the moral principle wrought into their natures by him. 
 That which is the ground of their danger, or their 
 want of security, may be considered as a deficiency in 
 them, to which virtuous habits are the natural supply. 
 And as they are naturally capable of being raised and 
 improved by discipline, it may be a thing fit and 
 requisite that they should be placed in circumstances 
 with an eye to it ; in circumstances peculiarly fitted 
 to be to them a state of discipline for their improve- 
 ment in virtue. 
 
166 Of a State of Part I. 
 
 But how much more strongly mu<t this hold with 
 respect to those who have corrupted their natures, are 
 fallen from their original rectitude, and whose passions 
 are become excessive by repeated violation i of their 
 inward con titution ? Upright creatures may want to 
 be improved ; depraved creatures want to be renew- 
 ed. Education and discipline, which may be in all 
 degrees and sorts of gentleness and of severity, is ex- 
 pedient for those, but mu t be absolutely necessary for 
 these. For the^e, discipline of the severer sort too, 
 and in the higher aegrees of it, must be necessary, in 
 order to wear out vicious habits ; to recover their 
 primitive strength of self government, which indul- 
 gence must have weakened ; to repair, as well as raise 
 into an habit, the moral principle, in order to their 
 arriving at a secure state of virtuou> happiness. 
 
 Now whoever will consider the thing, may clearly 
 see, that the present world is peculiarly Jit to be a state 
 of discipline for this purpose, to such as will set them- 
 selves to mend and improve. For, the various temp- 
 tations with which we are urrounded ; our experience 
 of the deceits of wickedness ; having been in many 
 instance^ led wrong ourselves ; the great viciousness of 
 the world ; the infinite disorders consequent upon it ; 
 our being made acquainted with pain and sorrow, ei- 
 ther from our own feeling of it, or from the sight of 
 it in others ; these thir.gs. though some of them may 
 indeed produce wrong effects upon our minds, yet 
 when duly reflected upon, have, all of them, a direct 
 tendency to bring us to a settled moderation and rea- 
 sonableness of temp; r, the contnry both to thought- 
 less levity, and also to that unrestrained self will, and 
 violent bent to follow present inclination, which may 
 be observed in undisciplined minds. Such experience 
 as the present state affords, of the fraility of our nature j 
 
Chap. V. Moral Discipline. ]67 
 
 of the boundless extravagance of ungoverned passion* 
 of the power which an infinite Being has over us, by 
 the variou capacities of misery which he has given us ; 
 in short, that kind and degree of experience which the 
 present state affords us, that the constitution of nature 
 is ^uch as to admit the possibility, the danger, and the 
 actual event of creatures losing their innocence and 
 happiness, and becoming vicious and wretched, hath 
 a tendency to give us a practical sense of things very 
 different from a mere speculative knowledge, that we 
 are liable to vice, and capable of misery. And who 
 knows, whether the security of creatures in the high- 
 est and most settled state of perfection may not in part 
 arise from their having had such a sense of things as 
 this, formed and habitually fixed within them, in some 
 state of probation. And passing through the present 
 world with that moral attention which is necessary to 
 the acting a right part in it, may leave everlasting im- 
 pressions of this sort upon our minds. But to be a 
 little more distinct — allurements to what is wrong ; 
 difficulties in the discharge of our duty ; our not be- 
 ing able to act an uniform right part without some 
 thought and care ; and the opportunities which we 
 have, or imagine we have, of avoiding what we dislike, 
 or obtaining what we desire, by unlawful means, when 
 we either cannot do it at all, or at least not so easily, 
 by lawful ones ; these things, i. e. the snares and 
 temptations of vice, are what render the present world 
 peculiarly fit to be a state of discipline to those who 
 will preserve their integrity, because they render being 
 upon our guard, resolution, and the denial of our 
 passions necessary in order to that end. And the 
 exercise of such particular recollection, intention of 
 mind, and self government in the practice of virtue 
 has, from the make of our nature, a peculiar tendency 
 
j 68 Of a State of Part 1. 
 
 to form habits of virtue, as implying not only a real 
 but also a more continued and a more intense exercise 
 of the virtuous principle, or a more constant and a 
 stronger effort of virtue exerted into act. Thus sup- 
 pose a person to know himself to be in particular dan- 
 ger for some time of doing any thing wrong, which 
 yet he fully resolves not to do ; continued recollection, 
 and keeping upon his guard, in order to mak? good 
 his resolution, is a continued exerting of that act of vir- 
 tue in a high degree, which need have been, and per- 
 haps would have been, only instantaneous and weak, 
 had the temptation been so. It is indeed ridiculous 
 to assert, that self denial is essential to virtue and piety ; 
 but it would have been nearer the truth, though not 
 strictly the truth itself, to have said, that it is essential 
 to discipline and improvement. For though actions 
 materially virtuous, which have no sort of difficulty, 
 but are perfectly agreeable to our particular inclina- 
 tions, may possibly be done only from these particu- 
 lar inclinations, and so may not be any exercise of the 
 principle of virtue, i. e. not be virtuous actions at all ; 
 yet on the contrary, they may be an exercise of that 
 principle ; and when they are, they have a tendency 
 to form and fix the habit of virtue. But when the 
 exercise of the virtuous principle is more continued, 
 oftener repeated, and more intense, as it must be in 
 circumstances of danger, temptation, and difficulty 
 of any kind and in any degree, this tendency is in- 
 creased proportionably, and a more confirmed habit is 
 the consequence. 
 
 This undoubtedly holds to a certain length ; but 
 how far it may hold I know not. Neither our intel- 
 lectual powers, nor our bodily strength, can be impro- 
 ved beyond such a degree ; and both may be over- 
 wrought. Possibly there may be somewhat analogous 
 
Chap. V. Moral Discipline. 169 
 
 to this, with respect to the moral character, which is 
 scarce worth considering. And I mention it only, lest 
 it should come into some persons' thoughts, not as an 
 exception to the foregoing observations, which perhaps 
 it i , but as a confutation of them, which it is not. 
 And there mav be several other exceptions. Obser- 
 vations of this kind cannot be supposed to hold minute- 
 ly and in every case. It is enough that they hold in 
 general. And these plainly hold so far, as that from 
 them may be seen distinctly, which is all that is intend- 
 ed by them, that the present world is peculiarly Jit to be a 
 state of discipline, for our improvement in virtue and piety, 
 in the same sense as some sciences, by requiring and 
 engaging the attention, not to be sure of such per- 
 sons as will not, but of such as will, set them- 
 selves to them, are fit to form the mind to habits of 
 attention. 
 
 Indeed the present state is so far from proving, in 
 event, a discipline of virtue to the generality of men, 
 that, on the contrary, they seem to make it a disci- 
 pline of vice. And the viciousness of the world is, in 
 different ways, the great temptation which renders it 
 a state of virtuous discipline, in the degree it is, to 
 good men. The whole end and the whole occasion 
 of mankind's being placed in such a state as the pres- 
 ent, is not pretended to be accounted for. That 
 which appears amidst the general corruption, is, that 
 there are some persons, who, having within them the 
 principle of amendment and recovery, attend to and 
 follow the notices of virtue and religion, be they more 
 clear or more obscure, which are afforded them ; and 
 that the present world is, not only an exercise of vir- 
 tue in these persons, but an exercise of it in ways and 
 degrees peculiarly apt to improve it ; apt to improve 
 it, in some respects, even beyond what would be by 
 
170 Of a Suite of Part I. 
 
 the exercise of it required in a perfectly virtuous soci- 
 ety, or in a society of equally imperfect virtue with 
 themselves. But that the present world does not ac- 
 tually become a state of moral discipline to many, 
 even to the generality, i. e. that they do not improve 
 or grow better in it, cannot be urged as a proof that 
 it was not intended for moral discipline, by any who 
 at all observe the analogy of nature. For, of the nu- 
 merous seeds of vegetables and bodies of animals, 
 which are adapted and put in the way to improve to 
 such a point or state of natural maturity and perfec- 
 tion, we do not see perhaps that one in a million ac- 
 tually does. Far the greatest part of them decay be- 
 fore they are improved to it, and appear to be abso- 
 lutely destroyed. Yet no one, who does not deny all 
 final causes, will deny that those seeds and bodies 
 which do attain to that point of maturity and perfec- 
 tion, answer the end for which they were really design- 
 ed by nature, and therefore that nature designed them 
 for such perfection. And I cannot forbear adding, 
 though it is not to the present purpose, that the ap-> 
 pcarance of such an amazing waste in nature, with re- 
 spect to these seeds and bodies, by foreign causes, is to 
 us as unaccountable, as, what is much more terrible, 
 the present and future ruin of so many moral agents 
 by themselves, i. e. by vice. 
 
 Against this whole notion of mora! discipline it may 
 be objected in another way, that so far as a course ot 
 b ■haviour, materially virtuous, proceeds from hope 
 and fear, so far it is only a discipline and strengthen- 
 ing of self love. But doing what God commands, 
 because he commands it, is obedience, though it pro- 
 ceeds from hope or fear. And a course of such obe- 
 di nco will form habits of it. And a constant regard 
 to veracity, justice and charity may form distinct hab- 
 
Chap. V. Moral Discipline. 171 
 
 its of these particular virtues, and will certainly form 
 habits of self government, and of denying our inclina- 
 tions, whenever veracity, ju tice or charity requires 
 it. Nor is there any foundation for this great nicety, 
 with which some affect to distinguish in this case, in 
 order to depreciate all religion proceeding from hope 
 or fear. For, veracity, justice and charity, regard to 
 God's authority, and to our own chief interest, are not 
 only all three coincident, but each of them is, in it- 
 self, a ju.t and natural motive or principle of action. 
 And he who begins a good life from any one of them, 
 and perseveres in it, as he is already in some degree, 
 so he cannot fail of becoming more and more of that 
 character, which is correspondent to the constitution 
 of nature as moral, and to the relation which God 
 stands in to us as moral governor of it ; nor conse- 
 quently can he fail of obtaining that happiness which 
 this constitution and relation necessarily suppose con- 
 nected with that character. 
 
 These several observations concerning the active 
 principle of virtue and obedience to God's cojnmands 
 are applicable to passive submission or resignation to 
 his will, which is another essential part of a right char- 
 acter, connected with the former, and very much in 
 our power to form ourselves to. It may be imagined, 
 that nothing but afflictions can give occasion for or 
 require this virtue ; that it can have no respect to, nor 
 be any way necessary to qualify for, a state of perfect 
 happiness ; but it is not experience which can make 
 us think thus. Prosperity itself, whilst any thing sup- 
 posed desirable is not ours, begets extravagant and un- 
 bounded thoughts. Imagination is altogether as 
 much a source of discontent as any thing in our exter- 
 nal condition. It is indeed true, that there can be no 
 scope for patience, when sorrow shall be no more; but 
 there may be need of a temper of mind which shal* 
 
172 Of a State of Part I. 
 
 have been formed by patience. For though self love, 
 considered merely a> an active principle leading us to 
 pursue our chief interest, cannot but be Uniformly co- 
 incident with the principle of obedience to God's 
 commands, our interest being rightly understood ; be- 
 cause this obedience, and the pursuit of our own chi f 
 interest, must be in every ca e one and the same thing ; 
 yet it may be questioned, whether self love, considered 
 merely as the desire of our own interest or happiness, 
 can, from its nature, be thus absolutely and uniformly 
 coincident with the will of God, any more than par. 
 ticular affections cad ; coincident in such sort, as not 
 to be liable to be excited upon occasions and in de- 
 grees, impossible to be gratified consistently with the 
 constitution of things, or the divine appointments. 
 So that habits of resignation may, upon this account, 
 be requisite for all creature^ ; habits, I say, which ig- 
 nify what is formed by use. However, in general it 
 is obvious, that both self love and particular affections 
 in human creatures, considered only as pas^ve feelings, 
 distort and rend the mind, and therefore stand in need 
 of discipline. Now denial of those particular affec- 
 tions, in a course of active virtue and obedience to 
 God's will, has a tendency to moderate them, and 
 seems also to have a tendency to habituate the mind 
 to be easy and satisfied with that degree of happiness 
 which is allotted us, i. e. to moderate self love. But 
 the proper discipline for resignation is affliction. For 
 a right behaviour under that tiial ; recollecting our- 
 selves so as to consider it in the view in which religion 
 teaches us to consider it, as from the hand of God ; 
 receiving it as what he appoints, or thinks proper to 
 permit, in his world and under his government ; this 
 will habituate the mind to a dutiful submission. And 
 such submission, together. with the active principle of 
 obedience, make up the temper and character in us 
 
Chap. V. Moral Discipline. 173 
 
 which answers to his sovereignty, and which absolute- 
 ly belongs to the condition of our being, as depend- 
 ent creatures. Nor can it be said that this is only 
 breaking the mind to a submission to mere power, for 
 mere power may be accidental, and precarious, and 
 u urped ; but it is forming within ourselves the tem- 
 per of resignation to his rightful authority, who is, bv 
 nature, supreme over all. 
 
 Upon the whole, such a character, and such qual- 
 ifications, are necessary for a mature state of life in the 
 present world, as nature alone does in no wise bestow, 
 but has put it upon us in great part to acquire, in our 
 progress from one stage of life to another, from child- 
 hood to mature age ; put it upon us to acquire them, 
 by giving us capacities of doing it, and by placing us, 
 in the beginning of life, in a condition fit for it. And 
 this is a general analogy to our condition in the pres- 
 ent world, as in a state of moral discipline for another. 
 It is in vain then to object against the cerdibility of 
 the present life's being intended for this purpose, that 
 all the trouble and the danger unavoidably accompa- 
 nying such discipline might have been saved us, by our 
 being made at once the creatures and the characters 
 whkh we were to be. For we experience, that what 
 we were to be was to be the effect of what we would 
 do ; and that the general conduct of nature is, net to 
 save us trouble or danger, but to make us capable of 
 going through them, and to put it upon us to do so. 
 Acquirements of our own, experience and habits, are 
 the natural supply to our deficiencies, and security 
 against our dangers, ince it is as plainly natural to set 
 ourselves to acquire the qualifications, as the externa! 
 things, which we stand in need of. In particular, it 
 is as plainly a general law of nature that we should, 
 with regard to our temporal interest, form and culti- 
 vate practical principles within us, by attention, u>e 
 
174 Of Moral Discipline. Part I. 
 
 and discipline, as any thing whatever is a natural law ; 
 chiefly in the beginning of life, but also throughout 
 the whole course of it. And the alternative is left to 
 our choice, either to improve ourselves, and better 
 our condition, or, in default of such improvement, to 
 remain deficient and wretched. It is therefore perfect- 
 ly credible, from the analogy of nature, that the same 
 may be our case, with respect to the happiness of a fu- 
 ture state, and the qualifications necessary for it. 
 
 There is a third thing, which may seem implied in 
 the present world's being a state of probation ; that it 
 is a theatre of action for the manifestation of persons' 
 character , with respect to a future one; not to be 
 sure to an all knowing Being, but to his creation or 
 part of it. This may, perhaps, be only a consequence 
 of our being in a state of probation in the other senses. 
 However, it is not impossible that men's shewing and 
 making manifest what is in their heart, what their re- 
 al character is, may have respect to a future life, in 
 ways and manners which we are not acquainted with - 7 
 particularly it may be a means, for the Author of na- 
 ture does not appear to do any thing without means, 
 of their being disposed of suitably to their characters ; 
 and of its being known to the creation, by way of ex- 
 ample, that they are thus disposed of. But not to 
 enter upon any conjectural account of this, one may 
 just mention, that the manifestation of persons' char- 
 acters contributes very much, in various ways, to the 
 carrying on a great part of that general course of na- 
 ture, respecting mankind, which comes under our ob- 
 servation at present. I shall only add, that probation, 
 in both these senses, as well as in that treated of in the 
 foregoing chapter, is implied in moral government, 
 since by persons' behaviour under it their characters 
 cannot but be manifested, and, if they behave well, 
 improved. 
 
Chap. VI. Of the Opinion of Necessity. 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 Of the Opinion of Necessity, considered as influencing 
 Practice, 
 
 J hroughout the foregoing treatise it appears,, 
 that the condition of mankind, considered as in- 
 habitants of this world only, and under the govern- 
 ment of God which we experience, is greatly anal- 
 ogous to our condition as designed for another 
 world, or under that farther government which reli- 
 gion teaches us. If therefore any assert, as a fatalist 
 must, that the opinion of universal necessity is recon- 
 cileable with the former, there immediately arises a 
 question in the way of analogy, whether he must not 
 also own it to be reconcileable with the latter, i. e. 
 with the system of religion itself, and the proof of it. 
 The reader then will observe, that the question now 
 before us is not absolute, whether the opinion of fate 
 be reconcileable with religion ; but hypothetical, 
 whether, upon supposition of its being reconcileable 
 with the constitution of nature, it be not reconcileable 
 with religion slso ; or, what pretence a fatalist, not 
 other persons, but a fatalist, has to conclude from his 
 opinion that there can be no such thing as religion. 
 And as the puzzle and obscurity which must unavoid- 
 ably arise from arguing upon so absurd a supposition 
 as that of universal necessity will, I fear, easily be seen, 
 it will, I hope, as easily be excused. 
 
 But since it has been all along taken for granted, as 
 a thing proved, that there is an intelligent author of 
 nature, or natural governor of the world ; and since 
 
.176 Of the Opinion of Necessity, Part L 
 
 an objection may be made against the proof of this, 
 from the opinion of universal necessity, as it may be 
 supposed that such necessity will itself account for the 
 origin and preservation of all things, it is requisite that 
 this objection be distinctly answered, or that it be 
 shewn that a fatality, supposed consistent with what 
 we certainly experience, does not destroy the proof of 
 an intelligent author and governor of nature, before 
 we proceed to consider whether it destroys the proof 
 of a moral governor of it, or of our being in a state of 
 religion. 
 
 Now, when it is said by a fatalist, that the whole 
 constitution of nature, and the actions of men, that 
 every thing, and every mode and circumstance of ev- 
 ery thing, is necessary, and could not possibly have 
 been otherwise, it is to be observed, that this neces- 
 sity does not exclude deliberation, choice, preference, 
 and acting from certain principles, and to certain 
 end< ; because all this is matter of undoubted expe- 
 rience, acknowledged by all, and what every man 
 may, every moment, be conscious of. And from 
 hence it follows, that necessity, alone and of itself, is 
 in no sort an account of the constitution of nature, 
 and how things came to be and to continue as they are ; 
 but only an account of this circumstance relating to 
 their origin and continuance, that they could not have 
 been otherwise than they are and have been. The 
 assertion that every thing is by necessity of nature, is 
 not an answer to the question, whether the world 
 came into being as it is, by an intelligent agent form- 
 ing it thus, or not ; but to quite another question, 
 whether it came into being as it is, in that way and 
 manner which we call necessarily, or in that way and 
 manner which we call freely. For suppose farther, 
 ♦hat one who was a fatalist, and one who kept to his 
 
Chap. VT. as influencing Practice. 177 
 
 natural sense of things, and believed himself a free 
 agent, were disputing together, and vindicating their 
 respective opinions, and they should happen to instance 
 in a house, — they would agree that it was built by an, 
 architect. Their difference concerning necessity and 
 freedom would occasion no difference of judgment 
 concerning this, but only concerning another matter, 
 whether the architect built it necessarily or freely. 
 Suppose then they should proceed to inquire concern- 
 ing the constitution of nature ; in a lax way of speak- 
 ing, one of them might say it was by necessity, and 
 the other by freedom ; but if they had any meaning 
 to their words, as the latter must mean a free agent, 
 so the former must at length be reduced to mean an 
 agent, whether he would say one or more, acting by 
 necessity ; for abstract notions can do nothing. In- 
 deed we ascribe to God a necessary existence, uncaused 
 by any agent. For we find within ourselves the idea 
 of infinity, i. e. immensity and eternity, impossible, 
 even in imagination, to be removed out of being. 
 We seem to discern intuitively that there must and 
 cannot but be somewhat, external to ourselves, answer- 
 ing this idea, or the archetype of it. And from 
 hence (for this abstract, as much as any other, implies 
 a concrete) we conclude that there is, and cannot but 
 be, an infinite and immense eternal Being, existing 
 prior to all design contributing to his existence and 
 exclusive of it. And from the scantiness of language, 
 a manner of speaking has been introduced, that neces- 
 sity is the foundation, the reason, the account of the 
 existence of God. But it is not alleged, nor can it be 
 at ail intended, that every thing exists as it does, by 
 this kind of necessity, a necessity antecedent in nature 
 to design : it cannot, I say, be meant that every thing 
 exists as it does, by this kind of necessity, upon several 
 
 z 
 
178 Of the Opinion of Necessity, Part I. 
 
 accounts ; and particularly becau-e it is admitted, 
 that design, in the actions of men, contributes to ma- 
 ny alterations in nature. For if any deny this, I shall 
 not pretend to reason with them. 
 
 From these things it follows, first, that when a 
 fatalist asserts that every thing is by necessity, he must 
 mean by an agent acting necessarily ; he must, 1 ay, 
 mean thb, for 1 am very sensible he would not choose 
 to mean it: and, secondly, that the riecessitj/ by 
 which such an agent is supposed to act does not ex- 
 clude intelligence and design. So that * ere the sys- , 
 tern of fatality admitted, it would just as much ac- 
 count for the formation of the world as for the struc- 
 ture oi an house, and no more. Necessity as mu.h 
 requires and supposes a necessary agent, as freed' m 
 requires and supposes a free agent, to be the former of 
 the world. And the appearances of design and of final 
 causes in the constitution of nature as really prove this 
 acting agent to be an intelligent designer, or to act From 
 choice, upon the scheme of necessity, supposed pos- 
 sible, as upon that of freedom. 
 
 It appearing thus, that the notion of necessity does 
 not destroy the proof that there is an intelligent au- 
 thor of nature and natural governor of the wurld, the 
 present question, which the analogy before mention- 
 ed* suggests, and which, I think, it will answer, is 
 this,— -whether the opinion of necessity, supposed 
 consistent with possibility, with the constitution of the 
 world, and the natural government which we expe- 
 rience exercised over it, destroys all reasonable ground 
 of belief that we are in a state of religion ; or whether 
 that opinion be reconcileable with religion, with the 
 system and the proof of it. 
 
 • P. 175. 
 
Chap. VI. as influencing Practice* 179 
 
 Suppose then a fatalist to educate any one, from his 
 youth up, in his own principles ; that the child 
 should reason upon them, and conclude that since he 
 cannot possibly behave otherwise than he does, he is 
 not a subject of blame or commendation, nor can de- 
 serve to be rewarded or punished : imagine him to 
 eradicate the very perceptions of blame and commen- 
 dation out of his mind, by means of this system ; to 
 form his temper, and character, and behaviour to ir, 
 and from it to judge of the treatment he was to ex* 
 pectj say from reasonable men, upon his coming abroad 
 into the world ; as the fatalist judges from this system 
 what he is to expect from the author of nature and 
 with regard to a future state. I cannot forbear stop- 
 ping here to ask, whether any one of common sense 
 would think fit that a child should be put upon these 
 speculations, and be left to apply them to practice. 
 And a man has little pretence to reason, who is not 
 sensible that we are all children in speculations of this 
 kind. However, the child would doubtless be highly 
 delighted to find himself freed from the restraints of 
 fear and shame, with which his playfellows were fet- 
 tered and embarrassed, and highly conceited in his su- 
 perior knowledge so far beyond his years. But con- 
 ceit and vanity would be the least bad part of the in- 
 fluence which these principles must have, when thus 
 reasoned and acted upon, during the course of his ed- 
 ucation. He must either be allowed to go on and be 
 the plague of all about him, and himself too, even to 
 his own destruction, or else correction must be con- 
 tinually made use of, to supply the want of those nat- 
 ural perceptions of blame and commendation which 
 we have supposed to be removed, and to give him a 
 practical impression of what he had reasoned himself 
 out of the belief of, that he was in fact an accountable 
 
180 Of the Opinion of Necessity, Part I, 
 
 child, and to be puni heel for doing what he was for- 
 bid. It is therefore in reality impo sible, but that the 
 correction which he mu^t meet with, in the course of 
 his education, must convince him that if the scheme 
 he was instructed in were not false, yet that he reason- 
 ed inconclusively upon it, and some how or other mis- 
 applied it to practice and common life ; as what the 
 fatalist experiences of the conduct of Providence at 
 present, ought in all reason to convince him that this 
 scheme is misapplied when applied to the subject of 
 religion. But supposing the child's temper could re- 
 main still formed to the system, and his expectation 
 of the treatment he was to have in the world be regu- 
 lated by it, so as to expect that no reasonable man 
 would blame or punish him f r any thing which he 
 should do, because he could not help doing it — upon 
 this supposition it is manifest he would, upon his com- 
 ing abroad into the world, be insupportable to socie- 
 ty, and the treatment which he would receive from it 
 would render it so to him, and he could not fail of do- 
 ing somewhat very soon for which he would be deliv- 
 ered over into the hand of civil justice. And thus, 
 in the end, he would be convinced of the obligations 
 he was under to his wise instructor. Or suppose this 
 scheme of fatality in any other way applied to practice, 
 such practical application of it will be found equally 
 absurd, equally falacious in a practical sense. For 
 instance, that if a man be destined to live such a time, 
 he shall live to it, though he take no care of hi. own 
 preservation ; or if he be destined to die before that 
 time, no care can prevent it ; therefore all care about 
 preserving one's life is to be neglected, which is the 
 fallacy instanced in by the ancients. But now on the 
 contrary, none of these practical absurdities can be 
 drawn from reasoning upon the supposition that we are 
 
Chap. VI. as influencing Practice. 181 
 
 free ; but all such reasoning with regard to the com- 
 mon affairs of life is justified by experience. And 
 therefore, though it were admitted that this opinion 
 of necessity were speculatively true, yet with regard to 
 practice it is as if it were false, so far as our experience 
 reaches ; that is, to the whole of our present life. 
 For, the constitution of the present world, and the 
 condition in which we are actually placed, is as if we 
 were free. And it may perhaps ju tly be concluded, 
 t 1 since the whole proce s of action, through every 
 st p of it, suspense, deliberation, inclining one way, 
 det rmining, and at last doing as we determine, is as 
 if we were free, therefore we are so But the thing 
 here insi ted upon is, that under the present natural 
 government of the world, we find we are treated and 
 dealt with as if we were free, prior to all consideration 
 whether we are or not. Were thi> opinion therefore 
 of necessity admitted to be ever so true, yet such is in 
 fact our condition and the natural course of things, 
 that whenever we apply it to life and practice, thi> ap- 
 plication of it always misleads u*, and cannot but mis- 
 lead us, in a most dreadful manner, with regard to 
 our present interest. And how can people think 
 themselves so very secure then, that the same applica- 
 tion of the same opinion may not mislead them also, 
 in some analogous manner, with respect to a future 
 or more general and more important interest ? For, 
 religion being a practical subject, and the analogy of 
 nature shewing us that we have not faculties to apply 
 this opinion, were it a true one, to practical subjects* 
 whenever we do apply it to the subject of religion, and 
 thence conclude that we are free from its obligations, 
 it is plain this conclusion cannot be depended upon. 
 There will still remain just reason to think, whatever 
 appearances are, that we deceive ourselves ; in some- 
 
182 Of the Opinion of Necessity, Part L 
 
 what of a like manner, as when people fancy they can 
 draw contradictory conclusions from the idea of infinity. 
 
 From these things together, the attentive reader 
 will see it follow: , that if upon supposition of freedom 
 the evidence of religion be conclusive, it remains so 
 upon suppo>ition of necessity, because the notion of 
 necessity is not applicable to pracriol subjects, i. e. 
 with respect to them, is as if it were not true. Nor 
 does this contain any reflection upon reason, but only 
 upon what is unreasonable. For to pretend to act 
 upon reason, in opposition to practical* principles, 
 which the author of our nature gave u> to act upon, 
 and to pretend to apply our reason to -ubjtcts, with 
 regard to which our own short views, and even our 
 experience, wili shew us it cannot be depended upon, 
 and such at best the subject of necessity must be, this 
 is vanity, conceit and unreasonableness. 
 
 But this is not all ; for we find within ourselves a 
 will, and are conscious of a character. Now if this in 
 us be reconcileable with fate, it is reconcileable with it 
 in the author of nature. And besides, natural gov- 
 ernment and final causes imply a character and a will 
 in the governor and designer j* a will concerning the 
 creatures whom he governs. The author of nature 
 then being certainly of some character or other, not- 
 withstanding necessity, it is evident this necessity is as 
 reconcileable with the particular character of benevo- 
 lence, veracity and justice in him, which attributes are 
 the foundation of religion, as with any other charac- 
 ter ; since we find this necessity no more hinders men 
 from being benevolent than cruel, true than faithless, 
 
 * By ivill and character is meant that, which, in speaking of men, we 
 •hould express, not on'y by these words, but also by the words temper, taste, 
 dispositions, practical principles ; that txbole frame of mind, from ivhcnct ive act 'it. 
 an; ma nncr rather' than another. 
 
Chap. VI. as influencing Practice. 183 
 
 just than unjust, or if the fatalist pleases, what we call 
 unjust. ! 1 <>r it is said indeed, that what, upon suppo- 
 sition of freedom, would be just punishment, upon sup- 
 portion of necessity becomes manifestly unjust, because 
 it is punishment inflicted for doing that which persons 
 could not avoid doing ; as if the necessity which is 
 supposed to destroy the injustice of murder, for in- 
 stance, would not also destroy the injustice of punish- 
 ing it. Hu wever, a little to the purpose as this ob- 
 jection is in itself, it is very much to the purpose to 
 observe from it how the notions of justice and injustice 
 remain, even whilst we endeavour to suppose them re- 
 moved ; how they force themselves upon the mind, 
 even whilst we are making suppositions destructive of 
 them ; for there is not, perhaps, a man in the world, 
 but would be ready to make this objection at first 
 thought. 
 
 But though it is most evident, that universal neces- 
 sity, if it be reconcileable with any thing, is reconcile- 
 able with that character in the Author of nature which 
 is the foundation of religion, " yet, does it not plain- 
 ly destroy the proof that he is of that character, and 
 consequently the proof of religion ?'" By no means. 
 For we find, that happiness and misery are not our fate, 
 in any such sense as not to be the consequences of our 
 behaviour ; but that they are the consequences of it.* 
 We find God exercises the same kind of government 
 over us with that which a farther exercises over his 
 children, and a civil magistrate over his subjects. 
 Now, whatever becomes of abstract questions con- 
 cerning liberty and necessity, it evidently appears to 
 us, that veracity and justice must be the natural rule 
 and measure of exercising this authority or govern- 
 ment, to a Being who can have no competitions, or 
 
 * Chap. ii. 
 
184 Of the Opinion of Necessity, Part I. 
 
 interfering of interests, with his creatures and his 
 subjects. 
 
 But as the doctrine of liberty, though we experience 
 its truth, may be perplexed with difficultie which run 
 up into the most abstruse of all speculations, and as 
 the opinion of necessity seems to be the very basis up- 
 on which infidelity grounds itself, it maybe of some 
 use to offer a more particular proof of the obligations 
 of religion, which may distinctly be shewn not to be 
 destroyed by this opinion. 
 
 The proof from final causes of an intelligent Author 
 of nature is not affected by the opinion of necessity, 
 supposing necessity a thing possible in itself, and recon- 
 cilable with the constitution of things.* And it is a 
 matter of f ct, independent on this or any other spec- 
 ulation, thar he governs the world by the method of 
 reward^ and punishments;! and also that he hath 
 given us a moral faculty* by which we distinguish be- 
 tween actions, a; :<i approve some as virtuou and of 
 good desert, and disapprove others as vicious and of 
 ill desert. | Now rhis moral discernment implies in 
 the notion of it a rule of action, and a rule of a very 
 peculiar kind ; for it carries in it authority and a right 
 of direction ; authoritv in such a sense, as that we can- 
 not depart from it without being self condemned. § 
 And that the dictates of this moral faculty, which are 
 by nature a rule to us, are moreover the laws of God, 
 laws in a sense including sanctions, may be thus proved. 
 Consciousness of a rule or guide of action, in creatures 
 who are capable of considering it as given them by 
 their Maker, not only raises immediately a sense of 
 duty, but also a sense of security in following it, and 
 of danger in deviating from it. A direction of the 
 
 * P. 176, &c. f Ch. ii. | Dissertation U 
 
 S Sermon 2. at the RoiU. 
 
Chap. VI. as influencing Practice. 185 
 
 Author of nature, given to creatures capable of look- 
 ing upon it ab such, is plainly a command from him ; 
 and a command from him necessarily includes in it, 
 at least, an implicit promise in case of obedience, or 
 threatening in case of disobedience. But then the 
 sense or perception of good and ill desert,* which is 
 contained in the moral discernment, renders the sanc- 
 tion explicit, and makes it appear, as one may say, ex^ 
 pressed. For since his method of government is to re- 
 ward and punish actions, his having annexed to some 
 actions an inseparable sense of good desert, and to 
 others of ill, this surely amounts to declaring upon 
 whom his punishments shall be inflicted, and his re- 
 wards be bestowed. For he must have given us this 
 discernment and sense of things, as a presentiment of 
 what is to be hereafter ; that is, by way of informa- 
 tion beforehand what we are finally to expect in his 
 world. There is then most evident ground to think, 
 that the government of God, upon the whole, will be 
 found to correspond to the nature which he has given 
 us ; and that in the upshot and issue of things, happi- 
 ness and misery shall, in fact and event, be made to 
 follow virtue and vice respectively, as he has already, 
 in so peculiar a manner, associated the ideas of them 
 in our minds. And from hence might easily be de- 
 duced the obligations of religious worship, were it on- 
 ly to be considered as a means of preserving upon our 
 minds a sense of this moral government of God, and 
 securing our obedience to it ; which yet is an ex- 
 tremely imperfect view of that most important duty. 
 Now I say, no objection from necessity can lie 
 against this general proof of religion. None against 
 the proposition reasoned upon, that we have such a 
 
 * Dissertation IT- 
 
 A A 
 
186 Of the Opinion of Necessity, Part I. 
 
 moral faculty and discernment, because this is a mere 
 matter of fact, a thing of experience, that human kind 
 is thus constituted ; none against the conclusion, be- 
 cause it is immediate and wholly from this fact. For 
 the conclusion, that God will finally reward the righ- 
 teous and punish the wicked, is not here drawn from 
 its appearing to us fit* that he should, but from its ap- 
 pearing that he has told us he iviil. And this he hath 
 certainly told us, in the promise and threatening which 
 it hath been observed the notion of a command im- 
 plies, and the sense of good and ill desert which he has 
 criven us, more distinctly expresses. And this reason- 
 ing from fact is confirmed, and in some degree even 
 verified, by other facts ; by the natural tendencies of 
 virtue and of vice ;t and by this, that God, in the 
 natural course of his providence, punishes vicious ac- 
 tions as mischievous to society, and also vicious ac- 
 tions, as such in the strictest sense.} So that the gen- 
 eral proof of religion is unanswerably real, even upon 
 the wild supposition which we are arguing upon. 
 
 It must likewise be observed farther, that natural 
 religion hath, besides this, an external evidence, which 
 the doctrine of necessity, if it could be true, would 
 
 * However, T am far from intending to deny that the will of God is deter- 
 mine!, bv what is fit, by the right and reason of the case ; though one choose^ 
 to decline matters of such abstract speculation, and to speak with caution 
 when one does speak of them. But if it be intelligible to say, that it is ft and 
 reasonable for every one to consult hit oivn happinss % then ft ness iff action, or th'- 
 ,iyht and reason of the ea>e, is an intelligible manner of speaking. And it seems 
 as inconceivable to suppose God to approve one course of action, or one end, 
 preferably to another, which yet his acting at all from design implies that he 
 dc-.e^, without supposing somewhat prior in that end to be the ground of the 
 preference, a« to suppose him to discern an abstract proposition to be true, 
 without supposing somewhat prior in it to be the ground of the discernment. 
 It doth not therefore appear, that moral right is any more relative to per- 
 ception than abstract truth is ; or that it is any more improper to speak of 
 the fitness and Tightness of actions and ends, as founded in the nature ot 
 things, than to speak of abstract truth, as thus founded, 
 f p. 127 J P. 118,&c. 
 
Chap. VI. as influenc'mg Practice. x 87 
 
 not affect. For suppose a person, by the observations 
 and reasoning above, or by any other, convinced of the 
 truth of religion ; that there is a God, who made the 
 world, who is the moral Governor and Judge of man- 
 kind, and will upon the whole deal with every one ac- 
 cording to his works ; I say, suppose a person con- 
 vinced of this by reason, but to know nothing at all 
 of antiquity, or the present state of mankind ; it would 
 be natural for bueh an one to be inquisitive what was 
 the history of this system of doctrine ; at what time, 
 and in what manner, it came first into the world, and 
 whether it were believed by any considerable part of it. 
 And were he upon inquiry to find, that a particular 
 person in a late age first of all proposed it, as a deduc- 
 tion of reason, and that mankind were before wholly 
 ignorant of it ; then, though its evidence from reason 
 would remain, there would be no additional proba- 
 bility of its truth, from the account of its discovery. 
 But instead of this being the fact of the case, on the 
 contrary he would find, what could not but afford 
 him a very strong confirmation of its truth, first, 
 that somewhat of this system, with more or fewer ad- 
 ditions and alterations, hath been professed in all ages 
 and countries, of which we have any certain informa- 
 tion relating to this matter. Secondly, that it is cer- 
 tain historical fact, so far as we can trace things up, 
 that this whole system of belief, that there is one God, 
 the Creator and moral Governor of the world, and that 
 mankind is in a state of religion, was received in the 
 first ages. And, thirdly, that as there is no hint or 
 intimation in history, that this system was fir>t reason- 
 ed out, so there is express historical or traditional evi- 
 dence, as ancient as history, that it was taught first by 
 revelation. Now these things must be allowed to be 
 of great weight. The first of them, general consent, 
 
188 Of the Opinion of Necessity, Part I. 
 
 shews this system to be conformable to the common 
 sense of mankind. The second, namely, that religion 
 was believed in the first ages of the world, especially 
 as it does not appear that there were then a ly super- 
 stitious or false additions to it, cannot but be a farther 
 confirmation of its truth. For it is a proof of this 
 alternative, either that it came into the world by reve- 
 lation, or that it is natural, obvious, and forces itself 
 upon the mind. The former of these is the conclu- 
 sion of learned men. And whoever will consider how 
 unapt for speculation rude and uncultivated minds 
 are, will, perhaps from hence alone, be strongly in- 
 clined to believe it the truth. And as it is shewn in 
 the second part* of this treatise, that there is noth- 
 ing of such peculiar presumption against a revelation 
 in the beginning of the world, as there is supposed to 
 be against subsequent ones, a sceptic could not, I 
 think, give any account, which would appear more 
 probable even to himself, of the early pretences to rev- 
 elation, than by supposing some real original one, 
 from whence they were copied. And the third thing 
 abovementioned, that there is express historical or 
 traditional evidence as ancient as history, of the sys- 
 tem of religion being taught mankind by revelation ; 
 this must be admitted as some degree of real proof 
 that it was so taught. For why should not the most 
 ancient tradition be admitted, as some additional 
 proof of a fact, against which there is no presumption ? 
 And this proof is mentioned here, because it has its 
 weight to shew, that religion came into the world by 
 revelation, prior to all consideration of the proper au- 
 thority of any book supposed to contain it, and even 
 prior to all consideration whether the revelation itself 
 be uncorruptly handed down and related, or mixed 
 
 * Chap, ii 
 
Chap. VI. as influencing Practice. 189 
 
 and darkened with fables. Thus the historical ac- 
 count which we have of the origin of religion, taking 
 in all circumstances, is a real confirmation of its truth 
 no way affected by the opinion of necessity. And the 
 external evidence, even of natural religion, is by no 
 mean inconsiderable. 
 
 But it is carefully to be observed, and ought to be 
 recollected after all proofs of virtue and religion, which 
 are only general, that as speculative reason may be 
 .neglected.* prejudiced and deceived, — so also may our 
 moral understanding be impaired and perverted, and 
 the dictates of it not impartially attended to. This 
 indeed proves nothing against the reality of our spec- 
 ulative or practical faculties of perception ; against 
 their being intended by nature to inform us in the 
 theory of things, and instruct us how we are to be- 
 have, and what we are to expect in consequence of 
 our behaviour. Yet our liableness, in the degree we 
 are liable, to prejudice and perversion, is a most serious 
 admonition to us to be upon our guard with respect 
 to what is of such consequence as our determinations 
 concerning virtue and religion, and particularly not to 
 take custom, and fashion, and slight notions of hon- 
 our, or imaginations of present ease, use and conve- 
 nience to mankind, for the only moral rule.* 
 
 The foregoing observations, drawn from the nature 
 of the thing, and the history of religion, amount, 
 when taken together, to a real practical proof of it, 
 not to be confuted ; such a proof as, considering the 
 infinite importance of the thing, 1 apprehend would 
 be admitted fully sufficient, in reason, to influence the 
 actions of men who act upon thought and reflection, 
 if it were admitted that there is no proof of the con- 
 trary. But it may be said, " there are many proba- 
 
 * Dissertation II. 
 
190 Of the Opinion of Necessity , Part I. 
 
 bilities, which cannot indeed be confuted, i. e. shewn 
 to be no probabilities, and yet may be overbalanced 
 by greater probabilities on the other side ; much more 
 by demonstration. And there is no occasion to bject 
 against particular arguments alleged for an opinion, 
 when the opinion itself may be clearly shewn to be 
 false, without meddling with such arguments at all, 
 but leaving them just as they are. Now the method 
 of government by rewards and punishments, and es- 
 pecially rewarding and punishing good and ill desert, 
 as such, respectively, must go upon supposition that 
 we are free, and not necessary agents. And it is in- 
 credible that the Author of nature should govern us 
 upon a supposition as true, which he knows to be false ; 
 and therefore absurd to think he will reward or punish 
 us for our actions hereafter, especially that he will do 
 it under the notion that they are of good or ill desert." 
 Here then the matter is brought to a point. And the 
 answer to ?11 this is full, and not to be evadtd, that 
 the whole constitution and course of things, the whole 
 analogy of Providence, shews beyond possibility of 
 doubt, that the conclusion from this reasoning is false, 
 wherever the fallacy lies. The doctrine of freedom 
 indeed clearly shows where ; in supposing ourselves 
 neressary, when in truth we are free agents. But up- 
 on the supposition of necessity, the fallacy lies in ta- 
 king for granted, that it is incredible necessary agents 
 should be rewarded and punished. But that, some 
 how or other, the conclusion now mentioned is false, 
 is most certain. For it is fact, that God does govern 
 even brute creatures by the method of rewards and 
 punishments, in the natural course of things. And 
 men are rewarded and punished for their actions, pun- 
 ished for actions mischievous to society as being so, 
 punished for vicious actions, as such, by the natural 
 
Chap. VI. as influencing Practice. 191 
 
 instrumentality of each other, under the present con- 
 duct of Providence. Nay even the affection of grati- 
 tude, and the passion of resentment, and the rewards 
 and punishments following from them, which in gen- 
 eral are to be considered as natural, i. e. from the Au- 
 thor of nature, — these rewards and punishments, be- 
 ing naturally* annexed to actions considered as imply- 
 ing good intention and good desert, ill intention and 
 ill desert, -these natural rewards and punishments, I 
 say, are as much a contradiction to the conclusion 
 above, and shew its falsehood, as a more exact and 
 complete rewarding and punishing of good and ill de- 
 sert, as such. So that if it be incredible that necessary 
 agents should be thus rewarded and punished, then 
 men are not necessary, but free ; since it is matter of 
 fact that they are thus rewarded and punished. But 
 if, on the contrary, which is the supposition we have 
 been arguing upon, it be insisted that men are neces- 
 sary agents, then there is nothing incredible in the far- 
 ther supposition of necessary agents being thus reward- 
 ed and punished, since we ourselves are thus dealt with. 
 From the whole, therefore, it must follow, that a 
 necessity supposed possible, and reconcileable with the 
 constitution of things, does in no sort prove that the 
 Author of nature will not, nor destroy the proof that 
 he will, finally and upon the whole, in his eternal gov- 
 ernment, render his creatures happy or miserable, by 
 some means or other, as they behave well or ill. Or, 
 to express this conclusion in words conformable to the 
 title of the chapter, the analogy of nature shews us, 
 that the opinion of necessity, considered as practical, 
 is false. And if necessity, upon the supposition above 
 mentioned, doth not destroy the proof of natural re- 
 
 * Sermon 8th, at the Roll?. 
 
192 Of the Opinion of Necessity. Part L 
 
 ligion, it evidently makes no alteration in the proof of 
 revealed. 
 
 From these things likewise we may learn, in what 
 sense to understand that general assertion, that the 
 opinion of necessity is essentially destructive of all re- 
 ligion. First in a practical sense ; that by this notion, 
 atheistical men pretend to satisfy and encourage them- 
 selves in vice, and justify to others their disregard to 
 all religion. And secondly, in the strictest sense, that 
 it is a contradiction to the whole constitution of na- 
 ture, and to what we may every moment experience 
 in ourselves, and so overturns every thing. But by 
 no means is this assertion to be understood, as if ne- 
 cessity, supposing it could possibly be reconciled with 
 the constitution of things and with what we experience, 
 were not also reconcileable with religion ; for upon 
 this supposition it demonstrably is so. 
 
X2hap. VII. Of the Government of God. %m 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 
 ^Of the Government of God, considered as a Scheme cr 
 Constitution, imperfectly comprehended, 
 
 1 hough it be, as it cannot but be, acknowledg- 
 ed, that the analogy of nature gives a strong credi- 
 bility to the general doctrine of religion, and to the 
 several particular things contained in it, considered as 
 so many matters of fact, and likewise that it shews 
 this credibility not to be destroyed by any notions 
 of necessity, — yet still objections may be insisted 
 Upon against the wibdom, equity and goodness of 
 the divine government implied in the notion of re- 
 ligion, and against the method by which this govern- 
 ment is conducted 5 to which objections analogy can 
 be no direct answer. For the credibility or the cer- 
 tain truth of a matter of fact does not immediatelv 
 prove any thing concerning the wisdom or goodness 
 of it; and analogy can do no more, imme iately or 
 directly, than shew such and such things to be true or 
 credible, considered only as matters of fact. But still, 
 if, upon supposition of a moral constitution of nature 
 and a moral government over it, analogy suggests and 
 makes it credible that this government must be a 
 scheme, system, or constitution of government, as dis- 
 tinguished from a number of single unconnected acts 
 of distributive justice and goodness, and likewise that 
 it must be a scheme so imperfectly comprehended, and 
 of such a sort in other respects, as to afford a direct 
 general answer to all objections against the justice and 
 goodness of it,— -then analogy is, remotely, of great 
 
 B B 
 
194 The Government of God> Part I. 
 
 service in answering those objections, both by suggest* 
 ing the answer, and shewing it to be a credible one. 
 
 Now this, upon inquiry, will be found to be the 
 case. For, fir>t, upon .supposition that God exer- 
 cises a moral government over the world, the analogy 
 of his natural government suggests and makes it cred- 
 ible that his moral government must be a scheme quite 
 beyond our comprehension ; and this affords a general 
 answer to all objections against the justice and good- 
 ness of it. And, secondly, a more distinct observation 
 of some particular things contained in God's scheme ; 
 of natural government, the like things being supposed 
 by analogy to be contained in his moral government, 
 will farther shew how little weight is to be laid upon 
 these objections. 
 
 I. Upon supposition that God exercises a moral 
 government over the world, the analogy of his natural 
 government suggests and makes it credible that his 
 moral government must be a scheme quite beyond our 
 comprehension ; and this affords a general answer to 
 all objections against the justice and goodness of it. 
 It is most obvious, analogy renders it highly credible, 
 that upon supposition of a moral government, it must 
 be a scheme ; for the world, and the whole natural 
 government of it, appears to be so, to be a scheme, sys- 
 te n, or constitution, whose parts correspond to each 
 other and to a whole, as really as any work of art, or 
 as any particular model of a civil constitution and 
 government. In this great scheme of the natural 
 world, individuals have various peculiar relations to 
 ( Wet individuals of their own species. And whole 
 species are, we find, variously related to other species 
 upon this earth. Nor do we know how much farther 
 thvj-e kinds of relations may extend. And, as there is 
 not any action or natural event, which we are ac- 
 
Chap. VII. a Scheme incomprehenhble. 195 
 
 quainted with, so single and unconnected as not to 
 have a respect to some other actions and events, — so 
 pos ibly each of them, when it has not an immediate, 
 may yet have a remote natural relation to other actions 
 and events, much beyond the compass of this present 
 world. There seems indeed nothing from whence we 
 can so much as make a conjecture, whether all crea- 
 tures, actions and events, throughout the whole of 
 nature, have relations to each other. But, as it is ob- 
 vious that all events have future unknown conse- 
 quences, so if we trace any as far as we can go into 
 what is connected with it, we shall find, that if such 
 event were not connected with somewhat farther in na- 
 ture unknown to us, somewhat both past and present, 
 such event could not possibly have been at all. Nor 
 can we give the whole account of any one thing what- 
 ever ; of all its causes, ends and necessary adjuncts ; 
 those adjuncts, I mean, without which it could not 
 have been. By this most astonishing connexion, 
 these reciprocal correspondencies and mutual relations, 
 every thing which we see in the course of nature is ac- 
 tually brought about. And things seemingly the 
 most insignificant imaginable, are perpetually observ- 
 ed to be necessary conditions to other things of the 
 greatest importance ; so that any one thing whatever 
 may, for ought we know to the contrary, be a necessa- 
 ry condition to any other. The natural world then, 
 and natural government of it, being such an incom* 
 prehensible scheme, so incomprehensible that a man 
 must really in the literal sense know nothing at all, 
 who is not sensible of his ignorance in it, this imme- 
 diately suggests, and strongly shews the credibility, that 
 the moral world and government of it may be so too. 
 Indeed the natural and moral constitution and govern- 
 ment of the world are so connected, as to make up to- 
 
J 96 The Government of God, Part X t , 
 
 gether but one scheme ; and it is highly probable, 
 that the first is formed and carried on merely in sub- 
 serviency to the latter, as the vegetable world is for 
 the animal, and organized bodies for minds. But 
 the thing intended here is, without inquiring how far 
 the administration of the natural world is subordinate 
 to that of the moral, only to observe the credibility 
 that one should be analogous or similar to the other ; 
 that therefore every act of divine justice and goodness 
 may be supposed to look much beyond itself, and its im- 
 mediate object ; may have some reference to other 
 parts of God's moral administration, and to a general 
 moral plan ; and that every circumstance of this his 
 moral government may be adjusted beforehand with a 
 view to the whole of it. Thus for example ; — the de- 
 termined length of time, and the degrees and way in 
 which virtue is to remain in a state of warfare and dis- 
 cipline, and in which wickedness is permitted to have 
 its progress ; the times appointed for the execution of 
 justice ; the appointed instruments of it ; the kinds of 
 rewards and punishments, and the manners of their 
 distribution ; all particular instances of divine justice 
 and goodness, and every circumstance of them, may 
 have such respects to each other as to make up all to- 
 gether a whole, connected and related in all its parts ; 
 a scheme or sy>tem which is as properly one as the 
 natural world is, and of the like kind. And suppos- 
 ing this to be the case, it is most evident that we are 
 not competent judges of this scheme, from the small 
 parts of it which come within our view in the present 
 life ; and therefore no objections against any of these 
 parts can be insisted upon by reasonable men. 
 
 This our ignorance, and the consequence here 
 drawn from it, are universally acknowledged upon 
 pther occasions ; and, though scarce denied, yet are 
 
Chap. VII. a Scheme incomprehensible* 197 
 
 universally forgot, when persons come to argue against 
 religion. And it is not perhaps easy, even for the 
 mo t reasonable men, always to bear in mind the de- 
 gree or our ignorance, and make due allowances for it. 
 Upon these accounts, it may not be useless to go on a 
 little farther, in order to shew more distinctly how just 
 an answer our ignorance is, to objections against the 
 scheme of Providence. Suppose then a person boldly 
 to assert that the things complained of, the origin and 
 continuance of evil, might easily have been prevent- 
 ed by repeated interpositions ;* interpositions so 
 guarded and circumstanced, as would preclude all mis- 
 chief arising from them ; or, if this were impractica- 
 ble, that a scheme of government is itself an imperfec- 
 tion, since more gooa might have been produced with- 
 out any scheme, system, or constitution at all, by con- 
 tinued single unrelated acts of distributive justice and 
 goodness \ because these would have occasioned no ir- 
 regularities. And farther than this, it is presumed, 
 the objections will not be carried. Yet the answer is 
 obvious, that were these assertions true, still theob er- 
 vations above, concerning our ignorance in the scheme 
 of divine government, and the consequence drawn 
 from it, would hold in ^reat measure, enough to vin- 
 dicate religion against all objections from the disorders 
 of the present state* Were these assertions true, yet 
 the government of the world might be just and good 
 notwithstanding ; for, at the most, they would infer 
 nothing more than that it might have been better. 
 But indeed they are mere arbitrary assertions, no man 
 being sufficiently acquainted with the possibilities of 
 things to bring any proof of them to the lowest de- 
 gree of probability. For however possible what is as- 
 serted may seem, yet many instances may be alleged, 
 
 • P, 200. 201. 
 
198 The Government of God 9 Part L 
 
 in things much less out of our reach, of suppositions 
 absolutely impossible, and reducible to the most pal- 
 pable self contradictions, which not every one by any 
 means would perceive to be such, nor perhaps any one 
 at first sight suspect. From these things it is easy to 
 see distinctly how our ignorance, as it is the common, 
 is really a satisfactory answer to ail objections against 
 the justice and goodness of Providence. If a man, 
 contemplating any one providential di pensation, which 
 had no relation to any others, should object, that he 
 discerned in it a disregard to justice, or a deficiency of 
 goodness, nothing would be less an answer to such ob- 
 jection than our ignorance in other parts of Providence, 
 or in the possibilities of things no way related to what 
 he was contemplating. But when we know not but 
 the parts objected against may be relative to other 
 parts unknown to us, and when we are unacquainted 
 with what is in the nature of the thing practicable in 
 the case before us, then our ignorance is a satisfac- 
 tory answer ; because, some unknown relation, or 
 some unknown impossibility may render what is ob- 
 jected against just and good ; nay, good in the highest 
 practicable degree. 
 
 II. And how little weight is to be laid upon such 
 objections will farther appear, by a more distinct ob- 
 servation of some particular things contained in the 
 natural government of God, the like to which may be 
 supposed, from analogy, to be contained in his moral 
 government. 
 
 First, as in the scheme of the natural world no 
 ends appear to be accomplished without means, so we 
 find that means very undesirable often conduce to 
 bring about ends, in such a measure desirable as great- 
 ly to overbalance the disagreeableness of the means. 
 And in cases where such means are conducive to such 
 
Chap. VII. * Scheme incomprehensible. 199 
 
 ends, it is not reason, but experience, which shews us 
 that they are thus conducive. Experience also shews, 
 many means to be conducive and necessary to accom- 
 plish ends, which means, before experience, we should 
 have thought would have had even a contrary tenden- 
 cy. Now from these observations relating to the nat- 
 ural scheme of the world, the moral being supposed 
 analogous to it, arises a great credibility, that the put- 
 ting our misery in each other's power to the degree it 
 is, and making men liable to vice to the degree we 
 are,— and in general, that those things which are ob- 
 jected against the moral scheme of Providence, may 
 be, upon the whole, friendly and assistant to virtue, 
 and productive of an overbalance of happiness, i. e. 
 the things objected against may be means, by which 
 an overbalance of good will, in the end, be found pro- 
 duced. And from the same observations, it appears 
 to be no presumption against this, that we do not, 
 if indeed we do not, see those means to have any such 
 tendency, or that they seem to us to have a contrary 
 one. Thus those things which we call irregularities, 
 may not be so at all ; because they may be means of 
 accomplishing wise and good ends more considerable. 
 And it may be added, as above, that they may also 
 be the only means by which these wise and good ends 
 are capable of being accomplished. 
 
 After these observations it may be proper to add, in 
 order to obviate an absurd and wicked conclusion from 
 any of them, that though the constitution of our na- 
 ture from whence we are capable of vice and misery, 
 may, as it undoubtedly does, contribute to the per- 
 fection and happiness of the world : and though the 
 actual permission of evil may be beneficial to it, (i. e. it 
 would have been more mischievous, not that a wicked 
 person had himself abstained from his own wickedness 
 
200 The Government of God, Part I.' 
 
 but that any one had forcibly prevented it, than that 
 it was permitted) yet notwithstanding, it might have 
 been much better for the world if this very evil had 
 never been done. Nay, it is most clearly conceivable, 
 that the very commission of wickedness may be bene- 
 ficial to the world, and yet that it would be infinitely 
 more beneficial for men to refrain from it. For thus, 
 in the wise and good constitution of the natural world, 
 there are disorders which bring their own cures, dis- 
 eases which are themselves remedies. Many a man 
 would have died, had it not been for the gout or a 
 fever ; yet it would be thought madness to assert, that 
 sickness is a better or more perfect state than health, 
 though the like with regard to the moral world has 
 been asserted. But, 
 
 Secondly, the natural government of the world is 
 carried on by general laws. For this there may be 
 wise and good reasons ; the wisest and best, for ought 
 we know to the contrary. And that there are such 
 reasons, is suggested to our thoughts by the analogy of 
 nature ; by our being made to experience good ends 
 to be accomplished, as indeed all the good which we 
 enjoy is accomplished, by this means, that the laws by 
 which the world is governed are general. For we have 
 scarce any kind of enjoyments but what we are, in 
 some way or other, instrumental in procuring our- 
 selves, by acting in a manner which we foresee likely to 
 procure them ; now this foresight could not be at all, 
 were not the government of the world carried on by 
 general laws. And though, for ought we know to the 
 contrary, every single case may be at length found to 
 have been provided for even by these, yet to prevent 
 all irregularities, or remedy them as they arise, by 
 the wisest and best general laws, may be impossible in 
 the nature of things, as we see it is absolutely impossi- 
 
Chap. VII. a Scheme incomprehensible. SOI 
 
 ble in civil government. But then we are ready to 
 think, that, the constitution of nature remaining as it 
 is, anc^ the course of things being permitted to go on 
 in other respect as it does, there might be interpo- 
 sitions to prevent irregularities, though they could not 
 have been prevented or remedied by any general laws. 
 And there would indeed be reason to wish, which, by 
 the way, is very different from a right to claim, that all 
 irregularities were prevented or remedied by present 
 interpositions, if these interpositions would have no 
 other effect than this. But it is plain they would have 
 some visible and immediate bad effects ; for instance, 
 they would encourage idleness and negligence, and 
 they would render doubtful the natural rule of life, 
 which is ascertained by this very thing, that the course 
 of the world is carried on by general laws. And far- 
 ther, it is certain they would have distant effects, and 
 very great ones too, by means of the wonderful con- 
 nexions before mentioned.* So that we cannot so 
 much as guess what would be the whole result of the 
 interpositions desired. It may be said, any bad result 
 might be prevented by farther interpositions, whenever 
 there was occasion for them ; but this again is talking 
 quite at random, and in the dark.f Upon the whole 
 then, we see wise reasons, why the course of the world 
 should be carried on by general laws, and good ends 
 accomplished by this means ; and, for ought we know, 
 there may be the wisest reasons for it, and the best ends 
 accomplished by it. We have no ground to believe, 
 that all irregularities could be remedied as they arise, or 
 could have been precluded, by general laws. We find 
 that interpositions would produce evil, and prevent 
 good ; and, for ought we know, they would produce 
 greater evil than they would prevent ; and prevent 
 
 * P. 194, &c, f 196, 197. 
 
 c c 
 
202 The Government of God, Part !♦ 
 
 greater good than they would produce. And if this 
 be the case, then the not interposing is so far from be- 
 ing a ground of complaint, that it is an instance of 
 goodness. This is intelligible and sufficient, and go- 
 ing farther seems beyond the utmost reach of our fac- 
 ulties. 
 
 But it may be said, that " after all, these supposed 
 impossibilities and relations are what we are unac- 
 quainted with, and we must judge of religion, as of 
 other things, by what we do know, and look upon 
 the re^t as nothing ; or however, that the answers here 
 given to what is objected against religion, may equally 
 be made use of to invalidate the proof of it, since their 
 stress lies so very much upon our ignorance." But, 
 
 First, though total ignorance in any matter does 
 indeed equally destroy, or rather preclude all proof 
 concerning it, and objections against it, yet partial ig- 
 norance does not. For we may in any degree be con- 
 vinced, that a person is of such a character, and con- 
 sequently will pursue such ends, though we are greatly 
 ignorant what is the proper way of acting, in order the 
 most effectually to obtain those ends ; and in this case, 
 objections against his manner of acting, as seemingly 
 not conducive to obtain them, might be answered by 
 our ignorance, though the proof that such ends were 
 intended might not at all be invalidated by it. Thus 
 the proof of religion is a proof of the moral character 
 of God, and consequently that his government is mor- 
 al and that every one upon the whole shall receive ac- 
 cording to his deserts -, a proof that this is the designed 
 end of his government. But we are not competent 
 judges what is the proper way of acting, in order the 
 most effectually to accomplish this end.* Therefore 
 our ignorance is an answer to objections against the 
 
 * P. 74, 75. 
 
Chap. VII. a Scheme incomprehensible, 203 
 
 conduct of Providence in permitting irregularities, as 
 seeming contradictory to this end. Now, since it is 
 so obvious that our ignorance may be a .satisfactory 
 answer to objections against a thing, and yet not affect 
 the proof of it, till it can be shewn, it is frivolous to 
 assert that our ignorance invalidates the proof of reli- 
 gion, as it does the objections against it. 
 
 Secondly, suppose unknown impossibilities and un- 
 known relations might ju>tly be urged to invalidate 
 tht- proof of religion, as well as to answer objections 
 against it, and that in consequence of this the proof 
 of it were doubtful, — yet still, let the assertion be de- 
 spised, or let it be ridiculed, it is undeniably true that 
 moral obligations would remain certain, though it 
 were not certain what would, upon the whole, be the 
 consequences of observing or violating them. For, 
 these obligations arise immediately and necessarily from 
 the judgment of our ownmind, unless perverted, which 
 we cannot violate without being self condemned. And 
 they would be certain too, from considerations of in- 
 terest. For though it were doubtful what will be the 
 future consequences of virtue and vice, yet it is, how- 
 ever, credible, that they may have those consequences 
 which religion teaches us they will ; and this credibil- 
 ity is a certain* obligation in point of prudence, to 
 abstain from all wickedness, and to live in the consci- 
 entious practice of all that is good. But, 
 
 Thirdly, the answers above given to the objections 
 against religion, cannot equally be made use of to in- 
 validate the proof of it. For, upon supposition that 
 God exercises a moral government over the world, 
 analogy does most strongly lead us to conclude, that 
 this moral government must be a scheme or constitu- 
 tion beyond our comprehension. And a thousand 
 
 * Part. II. Ch. vi. 
 
^04* The Government of God. Part I. 
 
 particular analogies shew us, that parts of such a 
 scheme, from their relation to other parts, may con- 
 duce to accomplish ends, which we should have thought 
 they had no tendency at all to accomplish ; nay ends, 
 which before experience we should have thought such 
 parts were contradictory to, and had a tendency to 
 prevent. And therefore all these analogies shew, that 
 the way of arguing made use of in objecting against 
 religion, is delusive ; because they shew it is not at all 
 incredible, that, could we comprehend the whole, we 
 should find the permission of the disorders objected 
 against to be consistent with justice and goodness, and 
 even to be instances of them. Now this is not appli- 
 cable to the proof of religion, as it is to the objections 
 against it ;* and therefore cannot invalidate that proof, 
 as it does these objections. 
 
 Lastly, from the observation now made, it is easy 
 to see, that the answers above given to the objections 
 against Providence, though in a general way of speak- 
 ing, they may be said to be taken from our ignorance, 
 yet are by no means taken merely from that, but from 
 somewhat which analogy shews us concerning it. v For 
 analogy shews us positively, that our ignorance in the 
 possibilities of things, and the various relations in na- 
 ture, renders us incompetent judges, and leads us to 
 false conclusions, in cases similar to this, in which we 
 pretend to judge and to object. So that the things 
 above insisted upon, are not mere suppositions of un- 
 known impossibilities and relations, but they are sug- 
 gested to our thoughts and even forced upon the ob- 
 servation of serious men, and rendered credible too, by 
 the analogy of nature. And therefore, to take these 
 things into the account, is to judge by experience and 
 what we do know ; and it is not judging so, to take 
 no notice of them. 
 
 • Sermon at the Rolls, p. 312. 2d Ed. 
 
conclusion; 
 
 The observations of the last chapter lead us to 
 consider this little scene of human life, in which we 
 are so busily engaged, as having a reference of some 
 sort or other, to a much larger plan of things. 
 Whether we are any way related to the more distant 
 parts of the boundless universe, into which we are 
 brought, is altogether uncertain. But it is evident 
 that the course of things which comes within our view 
 is connected with somewhat past, present, and future, 
 beyond it.* So that we are placed, as one may speak, 
 in the middle of a scheme, not as a fixed but a pro- 
 gressive one, every way incomprehensible ; incompre- 
 hensible in a manner equally with respect to what has 
 been, what now is, and what shall be hereafter. And 
 this scheme cannot but contain in it somewhat as won- 
 derful and as much beyond our thought and concep- 
 tion! as any thing in that of religion, For, will any 
 man in his senses say, that it is less difficult to conceive 
 how the world came to be and to continue as it is, 
 without, than with, an intelligent author and governor 
 of it ? or, admitting an intelligent governor of it* 
 that there is some other rule of government more nat- 
 ural and of easier conception than that which we call 
 moral ? Indeed, without an intelligent author and 
 governor of nature, no account at all can be given 
 how this universe, or the part of it particularly in 
 
 * P. 194, &c. f See Part II. Ch. ii. 
 
20(5 Conclusion. Part L 
 
 which we are concerned, came to be, and the course 
 of it to be carried on, as it is ; nor any of its general 
 end and design, without a moral governor of it. 
 That there is an intelligent author of nature and 
 natural governor of the world, is a principle gone up- 
 on in the foregoing treatise, as proved, and generally- 
 known and confessed to be proved. And the very 
 notion of an intelligent Author of nature, proved by 
 particular final causes, implies a will and a character.* 
 Now as our whole nature, the nature which he has 
 given us, leads us to conclude his will and character to 
 be moral, just and good, — so we can scarce in imagi- 
 nation conceive what it can be otherwise. However,, 
 in consequence of this his will and character, whatever 
 it be, he formed the universe as it is, and carries on 
 the course of it as he does, rather than in any other 
 manner ; and has assigned to us, and to all living 
 creatures, a part and a lot in it. Irrational creatures 
 act this their part, and enjoy and undergo the pleas- 
 ures and the pains allotted them, without any reflec- 
 tion. But one would think it impossible, that crea- 
 tures endued with reason could avoid reflecting some- 
 times upon all this ; reflecting, if not from whence we 
 came, yet, at lea*t, whither we are going ; and what 
 the mysterious scheme, in the minst of which we find 
 ourselves, will, at length, come but and produce; a 
 scheme in which it is certain we are highly interested, 
 and in which we may be interested even beyond con- 
 ception. For many things prove it palpably absurd to 
 conclude, that we shall cease to be at death. Partic- 
 ular analogies do most sensibly shew us, that there is 
 nothing to be thought strange, in our being to exist 
 in another state of life. And that we are not living 
 beings affords a strong probability that we shall eon* 
 
 * P. 182. 
 
Part I. Conclusion. 207 
 
 tinue so, unless there be some positive ground, and 
 there is none from reason or analogy, to think death 
 will destroy us. Were a persuasion of this kind ever 
 so well grounded, there would surely be little reason to 
 take pleasure in it. But indeed it can have no other 
 ground, than some such imagination as that of our 
 gross bodies being ourselves ; which is contrary to ex- 
 perience. Experience too most clearly shews us the 
 folly of concluding, from the body and the living 
 agent affecting each other mutually, that the dissolu- 
 tion of the former is the destruction of the latter* 
 And there are remarkable instances of their not affect- 
 ing each other, which lead us to a contrary conclusion. 
 The supposition then, t which in all reason we are to 
 go upon, is, that our living nature will continue after 
 death. And it is infinitely unreasonable to form an 
 institution of life, or to act, upon any other supposition. 
 Now all expectation of immortality, whether more 01 
 less certain, opens an unbounded prospect to our hopes 
 and our fears ; since we see the constitution of nature 
 is such as to admit of misery, as well as to be produc- 
 tive of happiness, and experience ourselves to partake 
 of both in some degree ; and since we cannot but know 
 what higher degrees of both we are capable of. And 
 there is no presumption against believing farther, that 
 out future interest depends upon our present behav- 
 iour ; for we see our present interest, doth, and that 
 the happiness and misery which are naturally annexed 
 to our actions, very frequently do not follow till long 
 after the actions are done to which they are respective- 
 ly annexed. So that were speculation to leave us un- 
 certain whether it were likely that the author of na- 
 ture, in giving happiness and misery to his creatures, 
 hath regard to their actions or not, yet since we find 
 by experience that he hath such regard, the who!- 
 
208 Conclusion* Part L- 
 
 sense of things which he has given us plainly leads us, 
 at once and without any elaborate inquiries, to think 
 that it may, indeed must, be to good actions chiefly 
 that he hath annexed happiness, and to bad actions 
 misery ; or that he will, upon the whole, reward those 
 who do well, and punish those who do evil. To con- 
 firm this from the constitution of the world, it has 
 been observed, that some sort of moral government 
 is necessarily implied in that natural government of 
 God, which we experience ourselves under ; that good 
 and bad actions at present are naturally rewarded and 
 punished, not only as beneficial and mischievous to 
 society, but also as virtuous and vicious ; and that 
 there is, in the very nature of fche thing, a tendency to 
 their being rewarded and punished in a much higher 
 degree than they are at present. And though this 
 higher degree of distributive justice, which nature thus 
 points out and leads towards, is prevented for a time 
 from taking place, it is by obstacles which the state of 
 this world unhappily throws in its way, and which 
 therefore are in their nature temporary. Now as these 
 things, in the natural conduct of Providence, are ob- 
 servable on the side of virtue, so there is nothing to be 
 set against them on the side of vice. A moral scheme 
 of government then is visibly established, and in some 
 degree carried into execution ; and this, together with 
 the essential tendencies of virtue and vice duly consid- 
 ered, naturally raise in us an apprehension, that it will 
 be carried on farther towards perfection in a future 
 state, and that every one shall there receive according 
 to his deserts. And if this be so, then our future and 
 general interest, under the moral government of God, 
 is appointed to depend upon our behaviour, notwith- 
 standing the difficulty which this may occasion of se- 
 curing it, and the danger of losing it, just in the same 
 
Part I. Conclusion. 209 
 
 manner as our temporal interest* under his natural gov- 
 ernment, is appointed to depend upon our behaviour, 
 notwithstanding the like difficulty and danger. For, 
 from our original constitution, and that of the world 
 which we inhabit, we are naturally trusted with our- 
 selves, with our own conduct and our own interest. 
 And from the same constitution of nature, especially 
 joined with that course of things which is owing to 
 men, we have temptations to be unfaithful in this 
 trust, to forfeit this interest, to neglect it, and run 
 ourselves into misery and ruin. From these tempta- 
 tions arise the difficulties of behaving so as to secure 
 our temporal interest, and the hazard of behaving so 
 as to miscarry in it. There is therefore nothing in- 
 credible in supposing, there may be the like difficulty 
 and hazard with regard to that chief and final good 
 which religion lays before us. Indeed the whole ac- 
 count, how it came to pass that we were placed in 
 such a condition as this, must be beyond our compre- 
 hension ; but it is in part accounted for by what re- 
 ligion teaches us, that the character of virtue and piety 
 must be a necessary qualification for a future state of 
 security and happiness under the moral government of 
 God* in like manner as some certain qualifications or 
 other are necessary for every particular condition of life 
 under his natural government ; and that the present 
 state was intended to be a school of discipline for im- 
 proving in ourselves that character. Now this intention 
 of nature is rendered highly credible by observing, that 
 we are plainly made for improvement of all kinds ; 
 that it is a general appointment of Providence that we 
 cultivate practical principles, and form within ourselves 
 habits of action, in order to become fit for what we 
 were wholly unfit for before ; that in particular, child* 
 hood and youth is naturally appointed to be a state of 
 
 D D 
 
210 Conclusion. Part I. 
 
 discipline for mature age ; and that the present world 
 is peculiarly fitted for a state of moral discipline. And 
 whereas objections are urged against the whole notion 
 of moral government and a probation state, from the 
 opinion of necessity, it has been shewn, that God has 
 given us the evidence, as it were, of experience, that 
 all objections against religion on this head are vain and 
 delusive. He has also, in hi- natural government, sug- 
 gested an answer to all our short sighted objections 
 against the equity and goodness, of his moral govern- 
 ment ; and in general he has exemplified to us the lat- 
 ter by the former. 
 
 These things, which, it is to be remembered, are 
 matters of fact, ought, in all common sense, to awaken 
 mankind \ to induce them to consider in earnest their 
 condition, and what they have to do. It is absurd, 
 absurd to the degree of being ridiculous, if the subject 
 were not of so serious a kind, for men to think them- 
 selves secure in a vicious life, or even in that immoral 
 thoughtlessness which far the greatest part of them are 
 fallen into. And the credibility of religion, arising from 
 experience and facts here considered, is fully sufficient, 
 in reason, to engage them to live m the general prac- 
 tice of all virtue and piety ; under the serious appre- 
 hension, though it should be mixed with some doubt,* 
 of a righteous administration established in nature, 
 and a future judgment in consequence of it ; espe- 
 cially when we consider how very questionable it is, 
 whether any thing at all can be gained by vice ;f how 
 unquestionably little, as well as precarious, the pleas- 
 ures and profits or it are at the best ; and how soon 
 they must be parted with at the longest. For, in the 
 deliberations of reason, concerning what we are to pur» 
 sue and what to avoid, as temptations to any thing 
 
 • Part II. Ch. vi. f P. 1 1 5, I If. 
 
Part I. Conclusion. 211 , 
 
 from mere passion, are supposed out of the case,— so in- 
 ducements to vice, from cool expectations of pleasure 
 and interest so small and uncertain and short, are re- 
 ally so insignificant, as, in the view of reason, to be al- 
 most nothing in themselves ; and in comparison with 
 the importance of religion, they quite disappear and 
 are lost. Mere passion indeed may be alleged, though 
 not as a reason, yet as an excuse, for a vicious course of 
 life. And how sorry an excuse it is will be manifest 
 by observing, that we are placed in a condition, in 
 which we are unavoidably inured to govern our pas- 
 sions, by being necessitated to govern them ; and to 
 lay ourselves under the same kind of restraints, and as 
 great ones too, from temporal regards, as virtue and 
 piety in the ordinary course of things require. The 
 plea of ungovernable passion then, on the side of vice, 
 is the poorest of all things ; for it is no reason, and 
 but a poor excuse. But the proper motives to relig- 
 ion are the proper proofs of it, from our moral nature, 
 from the presages of conscience, and our natural ap- 
 prehension of God under the character of a righteous 
 governor and judge ; a nature and conscience and ap- 
 prehension given us by him ; and from the confirma- 
 tion of the dictates of reason, by life and immortality 
 brought to light by the Gospel ; and the wrath of God re- 
 sealed from heaven^ against all ungodliness, and unrigh- 
 teousness of men. 
 
ANALOGY 
 
 OF 
 
 RELIGION 
 
 TO THE 
 
 CONSTITUTION AND COURSE OF NATURE. 
 
 PART II. 
 
 OF REVEALED RELIGION. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 Of the Importance of Christianity. 
 
 Some persons, upon pretence of the sufficiency 
 of the light of nature, avowedly reject all revelation, 
 as in its very notion incredible, and what must be 
 fictitious. And indeed it is certain no revelation 
 would have been given, had the light of nature been 
 sufficient in such a sense as to render one not wanting 
 and useless. But no man, in seriousness and simplicity 
 of mind, can possibly think it so, who considers the 
 state of religion in the heathen world, before revela- 
 tion, and its present state in those places which have 
 borrowed no light from it ; particularly the doubt- 
 fulness of some of the greatest men concerning things 
 of the utmost importance, as well as the natural inat- 
 
214 Of the Importance Part II. 
 
 tention and ignorance of mankind in general. It is 
 impossible to say who would have been able to have 
 reasoned out that whole system, which we call natural 
 religion, in its genuine simplicity, clear of superstition ; 
 but there is certainly no ground to affirm that the 
 generality could. If they could, there is no sort of 
 probability that they would. Admitting there were, 
 they would highly want a standing admonition, to re- 
 mind them of it, and inculcate it upon them. And 
 farther still, were they as much disposed to attend to 
 religion as the better sort of men are, yet even upon 
 this supposition there would be various occasions for 
 supernatural instruction and assistance, and the greatest 
 advantages might be afforded by them. So that to 
 say, revelation is a thing superfluous, what there was 
 no need of, and what can be of no service, is, I think, 
 to talk quite wildly and at random. Nor would it 
 be more extravagant to affirm, that mankind is so en- 
 tirely at ease in the present state, and life so complete- 
 ly happy, that it is a contradiction to suppose our con- 
 dition capable of being in any respect better. 
 
 There are other person -, not to be ranked with 
 these, who seem to be getting into a way of neglect- 
 ing, and, as it were, overlooking revelation as of small 
 importance, provided natural religion be kept to. 
 With little regard either to the evidence of the former, 
 or to the objections against it, and even upon suppo- 
 sition of its truth, " the only design of it," say they, 
 " must be to establish a belief of the moral system of 
 nature, and to enforce the practice of natural piety 
 and virtue. The belief and practice of these things 
 were, perhaps, much promoted by the first publication 
 of Christianity ; but whether they are believed and 
 practised, upon the evidence and motives of nature or 
 
Chap. I. of Christianity. 21S 
 
 of revelation, is no great matter."* This way of con- 
 sidering revelation, though it is not the same with the 
 former, yet borders nearly upon it, and very much, at 
 length, runs up into it, and requires to be particularly 
 considered, with regard to the persons who seem to be 
 getting into this way. The consideration of it will 
 likewise farther shew the extravagance of the former 
 opinion, and the truth of the observations in answer to 
 it, just mentioned. And an inquiry into the import- 
 ance of Christianity, cannot be an improper introduc- 
 tion to a treatise concerning the credibility of it. 
 
 Now if God has given a revelation to mankind, and 
 commanded those things which are commanded in 
 Christianity, it is evident, at first sight, that it cannot 
 in any wise be an indifferent matter, whether we obey 
 or disobey those commands, unless we are certainly as- 
 sured that we know all the reasons for them, and that 
 all those reasons are now ceased, with regard to man- 
 kind in general, or to ourselves in particular. And it 
 is absolutely impossible we can be assured of this. For 
 our ignorance of these reasons proves nothing in the 
 case, since the whole analogy of nature shews, what is 
 indeed in itself evident, that there may be infinite rea- 
 sons for things, with which we are not acquainted. 
 
 But the importance of Christianity will more dis- 
 tinctly appear, by considering it more distinctly. — 
 First, as a republication and external institution of nat- 
 ural or essential religion, adapted to the present cir- 
 cumstances of mankind, and intended to promote nat- 
 
 * Invenis multos propterea nolle fieri Christianos, quia quasi suffid- 
 
 unt sibi debona vita sua. Bene vivere opus est, ait. Quid mini prxceptu- 
 rus est Christus ? Ut bene vivam ? Jam bene vivo. Quid mini necessarius 
 est Christus ? Nullum homicidium, nullum furtum, nullam rapinam facio, 
 res alienas non concupisco, nullo aduiterio contaminor. Nam inveniatur 
 in vita mea aliquid quod reprehendatwr, et qui reprehenderit faciat Christi- 
 *»***»• Atg, in Psal xrri. 
 
216 Of the Importance Part If. 
 
 ural piety and virtue : and, secondly, as containing an 
 account of a dispensation of things, not discoverable 
 by reason, in consequence of which several distinct pre- 
 cepts are enjoined us. For though natural religion is 
 the foundation and principal part of Christianity, it is 
 not in any sense the whole of it. 
 
 I. Christianity is a republication of natural religion. 
 It instructs mankind in the moral system of the world ; 
 that it is the work of an infinitely perfect Being, and 
 under his government ; that virtue is his law ; and 
 that he will finally judge mankind in righteousness, 
 and render to all according to their works, in a future 
 state. And, which is very material, it teaches natural 
 religion in its genuine simplicity, free from those super- 
 stitions with which it was totally corrupted, and un- 
 der which it was in a manner lost. 
 
 Revelation is farther an authoritative publication 
 of natural religion, and so affords the evidence of testi- 
 mony for the trurh of it. Indeed the miracles and 
 prophecies recorded in Scripture were intended to 
 prove a particular dispensation of Providence, the re- 
 demption of the world by the Messiah ; but this does 
 not hinder but that they may also prove God's general 
 providence over the world, as our moral governor and 
 judge. And they evidently do prove it, because this 
 character of the author of nature is necessarily con- 
 nected with and implied in that particular revealed 
 dispensation of things ; it is likewise continually taught 
 expressly, and insisted upon, by those persons who 
 wrought the miracles and delivered the prophecies. 
 So that indeed natural religion seems as much proved 
 by the Scripture revelation, as it would have been had 
 the design of revelation been nothing else than to 
 prove it. 
 
 But it may possibly be disputed, how far miracles 
 
Chap. I. of Christianity. 217 
 
 can prove natural religion, and notable Objections may 
 be urged against this proof of it, considered as a mat- 
 ter of speculation ; but considered as a practical thing, 
 there can be none. For suppose a person to teach 
 natural religion to a nation, who had lived in total ig- 
 norance or forgetfulness of it, and to declare he was 
 commissioned by God so to do, — -suppose him, in proof 
 of his commission, to foretel things future which no 
 human foresight could have guessed at, to divide the 
 sea with a word, feed great multitudes with bread from 
 heaven, cure all manner of diseases, and raise the dead, 
 even himself, to life,— -would not this give additional 
 credibility to his teaching, a credibility beyond what 
 that of a common man would have, and be an authori- 
 tative publication of the law of nature, i. e. a new proof 
 of it ? It would be a practical one, of the strongest 
 kind, perhaps, which human creatures are capable of 
 having given them. The Law of Moses then, and the 
 Gospel of Christ, are authoritative publications of the 
 religion of nature ; they afford a proof of God's gen- 
 eral providence, as moral governor of the world, as 
 well as of his particular dispensations of providence to- 
 wards sinful creatures, revealed in the Law and the 
 Gospel. As they are the only evidence of the latter, 
 so they are an additional evidence of the former. 
 
 To shew this further, let us suppose a man of the 
 greatest and most improved capacity, who had never 
 heard of revelation* convinced upon the whole, not- 
 withstanding the disorders of the world, that it was un- 
 der the direction and moral government of an infinitely 
 perfect Being, but ready to question whether he were 
 not got beyond the reach of his faculties, — suppose 
 him brought, by this suspicion, into great danger of 
 being carried away by the universal bad example of al- 
 most every one around him, who appeared to have no 
 
 K R 
 
218 The Importance Fart II. 
 
 sense, no practical sense at least, of these things,-^-and 
 this, perhaps, would be as advantageous a situation 
 with regard to religion, as nature alone ever placed 
 any man in. What a confirmation now must it be to 
 such a person, all at once to find that this moral sys^ 
 tern of things was revealed to mankind, in the name 
 of that infinite Being, whom he had from principles of 
 reason believed in ; and that the publishers of the rev- 
 elation proved their commission from him, by making 
 it appear, that he had entrusted them with a power of 
 suspending and changing the general laws of nature. 
 
 Nor must it by any means be omitted, for it is a 
 thing of the utmost importance, that life and immor- 
 tality are eminently brought to light by the Gospel. 
 The great doctrines of a future state, the danger of a 
 course of wickedness, and the efficacy of repentance, 
 are not only confirmed in the Gospel, but are taught, 
 especially the last is, with a degree of light to which 
 that of nature is but darkness. 
 
 Farther : as Christianity served these ends and pur- 
 poses when it was first published, by the miraculous 
 publication itself, so it was intended to serve the same 
 purposes in future ages, by means of the settlement of 
 a visible church; of a society distinguished from com- 
 mon ones, and from the rest of the world, by peculiar 
 religious institutions, by an instituted method of in- 
 struction, and an instituted form of external religion. 
 Miraculous powers were given to the first preachers of 
 Christianity, in order to their introducing it into the 
 world ; a visible church was established in order to 
 continue it, and carry it on successively throughout all 
 ages. Had Moses and the prophets, Christ and his 
 apostles, only taught, and by miracles proved, religion 
 to their cotemporaries, the benefits of their instructions 
 would have reached but to a small part of mankind, 
 
Chap. I. of Christianity. 219 
 
 Christianity must have been, in a great degree, sunk 
 and forgot in a very few ages. To prevent this, ap- 
 pears to have been one reason why a visible church was 
 instituted; to be like a city upon a hill, a standing 
 memorial to the world of the duty which we owe our 
 Maker; to call men continually, both by example and 
 instruction, to attend to it, and by the form of religion 
 ever before tjieir eyes, remind them of the reality; to 
 be the repository of the oracles of God; to hold up 
 the light of revelation in aid to that of nature, and 
 propagate it throughout all generations to the end of 
 the worlds— the light of revelation considered here in 
 no other view than as designed to enforce natural re- 
 ligion. And in proportion as Christianity is professed 
 and taught in the world, religion, natural or essential 
 religion, is thus distinctly and advantageously laid be- 
 fore mankind, and brought again and again to their 
 thoughts, as a matter of infinite importance. A visible 
 church has also a farther tendency to promote natural 
 religion, as being an instituted methodof education, ori- 
 ginally intended to be of more peculiar advantage to 
 those who would conform to it. For one end of the insti- 
 tution was, that by admonition and reproof, as well as 
 instruction, by a general regular discipline, and public 
 exercises of religion, the body of Christ, as the Scripture 
 speaks, should be edified, i. e. trained up in piety and 
 virtue, for a higher and better state. This settlement 
 then appearing thus beneficial, tending in the nature of 
 the thing to answer, and in some degree actually an- 
 swering, those ends, it is to be remembered that the 
 very notion of it implies positive institutions ; for the 
 visibility of the church consists in them. Take away 
 every thing of this kind, and you lose the very no- 
 tion itself. So that if the things now mentioned arc- 
 advantages, the reason and importance of positive in- 
 
220 The Importance Part II, 
 
 stitutions in general is most obvious, since without them 
 these advantages could not be secured to the world. 
 And it is mere idle wantonness, to insist upon knowing 
 the reasons why such particular ones were fixed upon, 
 rather than others. 
 
 The benefit arising from this supernatural assistance 
 which Christianity affords to natural religion, is what 
 some persons are very slow in apprehending. And yet 
 it is a thing distinct in itself, and a very plain obvious 
 one. For will any in good earnest really say, that the 
 bulk of mankind in the heathen world were in as ad- 
 vantageous a situation with regard to natural religion 
 as they are now amongst us ; that it was laid before 
 them, and enforced upon them, in a manner as dis- 
 tinct, and as much tending to influence their practice ? 
 The objections against all this, from the perversion 
 of Christianity, and from the supposition of its having 
 had but little good influence, however innocently they 
 may be proposed, yet cannot be insisted upon as con- 
 clusive upon any principles but such as lead to down- 
 right atheism ; because the manifestation of the law 
 of nature by reason, which upon all principles of theism 
 must have been from God, has been perverted and renr 
 dered ineffectual in the same manner. It may indeed, 
 I think, truly be said, that the good effects of Christi- 
 anity have not been small ; nor its supposed ill effects 
 any effects at all of improperly speaking. Perhaps too 
 the things themselves done have been aggravated ; and 
 if not, Christianity hath been often only a pretence ; 
 and the same evils in the main would have been done 
 upon some other pretence. However, great and 
 shocking as the corruptions and abuses of it have re- 
 ally been, they cannot be insisted upon as arguments 
 against it upon principles of theism. For one cannot 
 proceed one step in reasoning upon natural religion, 
 
Chap. I. of Christianity, 221 
 
 any more than upon Christianity, without laying it 
 down as a first principle, that the dispensations of Prov- 
 idence are not to be judged of by their perversions, but 
 by their genuine tendencies ; not by what fhey do ac- 
 tually seem to effect, but by what they would effect if 
 mankind did their part, that part which is justly put 
 and left upon them. It is altogether as much the 
 language of one as of the other, he that is unjust let 
 him be unjust still ; and he that is holy let him be holy still.* 
 The light of reason does not, any more than that of 
 revelation, force men to submit to its authority ; both 
 admonish them of what they ought to do and avoid, 
 together with the consequences of each, and after this 
 leave them at full liberty to act just as they please, till 
 the appointed time of judgment* Every moment's 
 experience shews, that this is God's general rule of 
 government. 
 
 To return then : Christianity being a promulgation 
 of the law of nature, being moreover an authoritative 
 promulgation of it, with new light, and other circum- 
 stances of peculiar advantage adapted to the wants of 
 mankind, — these things fully shew its importance. 
 And it is to be observed farther, that as the nature of 
 the case requires, so all Christians are commanded to 
 contribute, by their profession of Christianity, to pre- 
 serve it in the world, and render it such a promulga- 
 tion and enforcement of religion. For it is the very 
 scheme of the gospel that each Christian should, in 
 his degree, contribute towards continuing and carry- 
 ing it on ; all by uniting in the public profession and 
 external practice of Christianity ; some by instructing, 
 by having the oversight, and taking care of this reli- 
 gious community, the church of God. Now this far- 
 ther shews the importance of Christianity, and, which 
 
 * Rev. xxii. 11. 
 
-222 The Importance Part II, 
 
 is what I chiefly intend, its importance in a practical 
 sense \ or the high obligations we are under to take it 
 into our most serious consideration, and the danger 
 there must necessarily be, not only in treating it de- 
 spitefully, which I am not now speaking of, but in 
 disregarding and neglecting it. For this is neglecting 
 to do what is expressly enjoined us, for continuing 
 those benefits to the world, and transmitting them 
 down to future times ; and all this holds, even though 
 the only thing to be considered in Christianity were 
 its subserviency to natural religion. But, 
 
 II. Christianity is to be considered in a further view, 
 as containing an account of a dispensation of things 
 not at all discoverable by reason, in consequence of 
 which several distinct precepts are enjoined us. Chrisr 
 tianity is not only an external institution of natural 
 religion, and a new promulgation of God's general 
 providence, as righteous governor and judge of the 
 world, but it contains also a revelation of a particular 
 dispensation of providence, carrying on by his Son 
 and Spirit, for the recovery and salvation of mankind, 
 who are represented in Scripture to be in a state of ruin c 
 And in consequence of this revelation being made, we 
 are commanded to be baptized, not only in the name of 
 the Father, but also of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost ; 
 and other obligations of duty, unknown before, to 
 the Son and the Holy Ghost, are revealed. Now the 
 importance of these duties may be judged of, by ob- 
 serving that they arise, not from positive command 
 merely, but also from the offices which appear from 
 Scripture, to belong to those divine persons in the 
 Gospel dispensation ; or from the relations which we 
 are there informed they stand in to us. By reason is 
 revealed the relation which God the Father stands in 
 to us. Hence arises the obligation of duty which we 
 
Chap. I. of Christianity. 223 
 
 are under to him. In Scripture are revealed the rela- 
 tions which the Son and Holy Spirit stand in to us. 
 Hence arise the obligations of duty which we are un- 
 der to them. The truth of the case, as one may speak, 
 in each of these three respects being admitted ; that 
 God is the governor of the world; upon the evidence 
 of reason — that Christ is the mediator between God 
 and man, and the Holy Ghost our guide and sanctifier, 
 upon the evidence of revelation ; the truth of the case, 
 I say, in each of these respects being admitted, it is no 
 more a question, why it should be commanded that 
 we be baptized in the name of the Son and of the Holy 
 Ghost, than that we be baptized in the name of the 
 father. This matter seems to require to be more 
 fully stated.* 
 
 Let it be remembered then that religion comes un- 
 der the twofold consideration of internal and external ; 
 for the latter is as real a part of religion, of true reli- 
 gion, as the former. Now when religion is considered 
 under the first notion, as an inward principle, to be 
 exerted in such and such inward acts of the mind and 
 heart, the essence of natural religion may be said to 
 consist in religious regards to God the Father Almighty ;' 
 and the essence of revealed religion, as distinguished 
 from natural, to consist in religious regards to the So?: 
 and to the Holy Ghost. And the obligation we are 
 under, of paying these religious regards to each of 
 these divine persons respectively, arises from the respec- 
 tive relations which they each stand in to us. How 
 these relations are made known, whether by reason or 
 revelation, makes no alteration in the case ; because 
 the duties arise out of the relations themselves, not 
 out of the manner in which we are informed of them. 
 
 * See, The Nature, Obligation, and Efficacy, of the Christian Sacrament:. 
 &c. and Colliber of revealed Religion, as there quoted. 
 
224 The Importance Part II, 
 
 The Son and Spirit have each his proper office, in that 
 great dispensation of Providence, the redemption of 
 the world ; the one our mediator, the other our sanc- 
 tifier. Does not then the duty of religious regards 
 to both these divine persons as immediately arise, to 
 the view of reason, out of the very nature of these of- 
 fices and relations, as the inward good will and kind 
 intention, which we owe to our fellow creatures, arises 
 out of the common relations between us and them ? 
 But it will be asked, " what are the inward religious 
 regards, appearing thus obviously due to the Son and 
 Holy Spirit, as arising, not merely from eommand in 
 Scripture, but from the very nature of the revealed 
 relations which they stand in to us ?" I answer — the 
 religious regards of reverence, honour, love, trust, grat- 
 itude, fear, hope. In what external manner this in- 
 ward worship is to be expressed, is a matter of pure 
 revealed command, as perhaps the external manner iit 
 which God the Father is to be worshipped may be 
 more -so than we are ready to think ; but the wor- 
 ship, the internal worship itself, to the Son and Holy 
 Ghost, is no farther matter of pure revealed command, 
 than as the relations they stand in to us are matter of 
 pure revelation ; for the relations being known, the 
 obligations to such internal worship are obligations of 
 reason, arising out of those relations themselves. In 
 ^hort, the history of the Gospel as immediately shews 
 us the reason of these obligations, as it shews us the 
 meaning of the words, Son and Holy Ghost. 
 
 If this account of the Christian religion be just, 
 those persons who can speak lightly of it, as of little 
 consequence, provided natural religion be kept to, 
 plainly forget that Christianity, even what is peculiarly 
 ^o called, as distinguished from natural religion, has 
 yet somewhat very important, even of a moral nature* 
 
Chap. I, ef Christianity g25 
 
 For the office of our Lord being made known * and the 
 relation he stands in to us, the obligation of religious 
 regards to him, is plainly moral, as much as charity to 
 mankind is 5 since this obligation arises^ before ex- 
 ternal command, immediately out of that his office 
 and relation itself. Those persons appear to forget, 
 that revelation is to be considered as informing us of 
 somewhat new in the state of mankind, and in the 
 government of the world ; as acquainting us with 
 some relations we stand in, which could not otherwise 
 have been known. And these relations being real, 
 (though before revelation we could be under no obli- 
 gations from them, yet upon their being revealed) 
 there is no reason to think, but that neglect of behav- 
 ing suitably to them will be attended with the same 
 kind of consequences under God's government, as 
 neglecting to behave suitably to any other relations 
 made known to us by reason. And ignorance, wheth- 
 er unavoidable or voluntary, so far as we can possibly 
 see* will, just as much, and just as little, excuse in one 
 case as in the other ; the ignorance being supposed 
 equally unavoidable, or equally voluntary, in both 
 cases. 
 
 If therefore Christ be indeed the mediator between 
 God and man, i. e. if Christianity be true, if he be in- 
 deed our Lord, our Saviour, and our God,— no one 
 can say what may follow, not only the obstinate but 
 the careless disregard to him in those high relations. 
 Nay, no one can say what may follow such disregard, 
 even in the way of natural consequence. For, as 
 the natural consequences of vice in this life are doubt- 
 less to be considered as judicial punishments inflicted 
 by God, so likewise, for ought we know, the judicial 
 punishments of the future life may be, in a like way or 
 
 F F 
 
226 The Importance Part II. 
 
 a like sense, the natural consequenceof vice j* of men's 
 violating or disregarding the relations, which God 
 has placed them in here, and made known to them. 
 
 Again : if mankind *ire corrupted and depraved in 
 their moral character, and so are unfit for that state 
 which Christ is gone to prepare for his disciples ; and 
 if the assistance of God's Spirit be necessary to renew 
 their nature, in the degree requisite to their being 
 qualiiied for that state ; all which is implied in the 
 express though figurative declaration, Except a man 
 be born of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdo7ii of 
 God ;t supposing this, is it possible any serious person 
 can think it a slight matter, whether or no he makes 
 use of the means expressly commanded by God for 
 obtaining this divine assistance ? Especially since the 
 whole analogy of nature shews, that we are not to 
 expect any benefits without making use of the appoint- 
 ed means for obtaining or enjoying them. Now rea- 
 son shews us nothing of the particular immediate 
 means of obtaining either temporal or spiritual bene- 
 fits. This therefore we must learn, either from expe- 
 rience or revelation. And experience the present case 
 does not admit of. 
 
 The conclusion from all this evidently is, that Chris- 
 tianity being supposed either true or credible, it is un- 
 speakable irreverence, and really the most presump- 
 tuous rashness, to treat it as a light matter. It can 
 never justly be esteemed of little consequence, till it 
 be positively supposed false. Nor do I know a higher 
 and more important obligation which we are under, 
 Than that of examining most seriously into the evi- 
 dence of it, supposing its credibility, and of embracing 
 it, upon supposition of its truth. 
 
 * Q\. x. t Jo!m "i* 5 ' 
 
Chap. I. of Christianity. 227 
 
 The two following deductions may be proper to be 
 added, in order to illustrate the foregoing observations, 
 and to prevent their being mistaken. 
 
 First, hence we may clearly see, where lies the dis- 
 tinction between what is positive and what is moral in 
 religion. Moral -precepts are precepts the reason of 
 which we see ; positive precepts are precepts the rea- 
 sons of which we do not see.* Moral duties arise out 
 of the nature of the case itself, prior to external com- 
 mand. Positive duties do not arise out of the nature 
 of the case, but from external command ; nor would 
 they be duties at all, were it not for such command, 
 received from him whose creatures and subjects we 
 are. But the manner in which the nature of the case 
 or the fact of the relation is made known, this doth 
 not denominate any duty either positive or moral. 
 That we be baptized in the name of the Father, is as 
 much a positive duty, as that we be baptized in the 
 name of the Son, because both arise equally from re- 
 vealed command ; though the relation which we 
 stand in to God the Father is made known to us by 
 reason, the relation we stand in to Christ by revelation 
 only. On the other hand, the dispensation of the 
 Gospel admitted, gratitude as immediately becomes 
 due to Christ, from his being the voluntary minister 
 of this dispensation, as it is due to God the Father, 
 from his being the fountain of ail good ; though the 
 first is made known to. us by revelation only, the sec* 
 ond by reason. Hence also we may see, and, for dis- 
 tinctness sake, it may be worth mentioning, thatposi- 
 
 * This is the distinction between moral and positive precepts, considered 
 .respectively as such. But yet, since the latter have somewhat of a moral na- 
 ture, we may see the reason of them, considered in tin's view. Moral and 
 positive precepts are in some respects alike, in other respects different. So 
 far as they are alike, we discern the reasons of both ; so tar as they are dif- 
 ferent, we discern the reasons of the former, but not of the latter. 
 
228 The Importance Part II, 
 
 tive institutions come under a twofold consideration. 
 They are either institutions founded on natural relig- 
 ion, as baptism in the name of the Father, though this 
 has also a particular reference to the Gospel dispensa- 
 tion, for it is in the name of God, as the Father of 
 our Lord Jesus Christ ; or they are external institu- 
 tions founded on revealed religion, as baptism in the 
 name of the Son and of the Holy Ghost. 
 
 Secondly, from the distinction between what is 
 moral and what is positive in religion, appears the 
 ground of that peculiar preference which the Scripture 
 teaches us to be due to the former. 
 
 The reason of positive institutions in general is very 
 obvious, though we should not see the reason why such 
 particular ones are pitched upon rather than others. 
 Whoever therefore, instead of cavilling at words, will 
 attend to the thing itself, may clearly see that positive 
 institutions in general, as distinguished from this or 
 that particular one, have the nature of riioral com- 
 mands, since the reasons of them appear. Thus, for 
 instance, the external worship of God is a moral duty, 
 though no particular mode of it be so. Care then is 
 to be taken, when a comparison is made between posi- 
 tive and moral duties, that they be compared no far- 
 ther than as they are different ; no farther than as the 
 former are positive, or arise out of mere external com- 
 mand, the reasons of which we are not acquainted 
 with ; and as the latter are moral, or arise out of the 
 apparent reason of the case, without such external 
 command. Unless this caution be observed, we shall 
 run into endless confusion,. 
 
 Now, this being premised, suppose two standing 
 precepts enjoined by the same authority ; that, in cer- 
 tain conjunctures, it is impossible to obey both ; that 
 the former is moral, i. e. a precept of which we see 
 
Chap, ft of Christianity. 229 
 
 the reasons, and that they hold in the particular case 
 before us ; but that the latter is positive, i. e. a pre- 
 cept of which we do not see the reasons ; — it is indis- 
 putable that our obligations are to obey the former ; 
 because there is an apparent reason for this preference, 
 and none against it. Farther, positive institutions, I 
 suppose all those which Christianity enjoins, are means 
 to a moral end ; and the end must be acknowledged 
 more excellent than the means. Nor is observance of 
 these institutions any religious obedience at all, or of 
 any value, otherwise than as it proceeds from a nioral 
 principle. This seems to be the strict logical way of 
 stating and determining this matter ; but will, per- 
 haps, be found less applicable to practice than may be 
 thought at first sight. 
 
 And therefore, in a more practical though more lax 
 way of consideration, and taking the words, moral law 
 and positive institutions, in the popular sense, — I add, 
 that the whole moral law is as much matter of reveal- 
 ed command, as positive institutions are ; for the 
 Scripture enjoins every moral virtue. In this repect 
 then they are both upon a level. But the moral law 
 is, moreover, written upon our hearts — interwoven in- 
 to our very nature. And this is a plain intimation of 
 the Author of it, which is to be preferred, when they 
 interfere. 
 
 But there is not altogether so much necessity for the 
 determination of this question as some persons seem to 
 think. Nor are we left to reason alone to determine 
 it. For, first, though mankind have, in all ages, 
 been greatly prone to place their religion in peculiar 
 positive rites, by way of equivalent for obedience to 
 moral precepts, — yet, without making any compari- 
 son at all between them, and consequently without de- 
 termining which is to have the preference, the nature 
 
'230 Of the Importance Part II. 
 
 of the thing abundantly shews all notions of that kind 
 to be utterly subversive of true religion ; as they are, 
 moreover, contrary to the whole general tenor of Scrip- 
 ture, and likewise to the most express particular decla- 
 rations of it, that nothing can render us accepted of 
 God without moral virtue. Secondly, upon the oc- 
 casion of mentioning together positive and moral du- 
 ties, the Scripture always puts the stress of religion 
 upon the latter, and never upon the former ; which, 
 though no sort of allowance to neglect the former, 
 when they do not interfere with the latter, yet is a 
 plain intimation that when they do, the latter are to 
 be preferred. And farther, as mankind are for pla- 
 cing the stress of their religion any where rather than 
 upon virtue — lest both the reason of the thing, and 
 the general spirit of Christianity, appearing in the inti- 
 mation now mentioned, should be ineffectual against 
 this prevalent folly, — our Lord himself, from whose 
 command alone the obligation of positive institutions 
 arises, has taken occasion to make the comparison be- 
 tween them and mor?.l precepts, when the Pharisees 
 censured him, for eating with publicans and sinners ; 
 and also when they censured his disciples for plucking 
 the ears of corn on the Sabbath day. Upon this com- 
 parison, he has determined expressly, and in form, 
 which shall have the preference when they interfere. 
 And by delivering his authoritative determination in 
 a proverbial manner of expression, he has made it gen- 
 eral : I will have mercy , and not sacrifice* The pro- 
 priety of the word proverbial is not the thing insisted 
 upon, though I think the manner of speaking is to be 
 called so. But that the manner of speaking very re- 
 markably renders the determination general, is surely 
 indisputable. For, had it, in the latter case, been said 
 
 v Matth. ix. 13, and xii. 7. 
 
Chap. t. of Christianity. 231 
 
 only, that God preferred mercy to the rigid observance 
 of the Sabbath, — even then, by parity of reason, most 
 justly might we have argued, that he preferred mercy 
 likewise to the observance of other ritual institutions, 
 and in general, moral duties to positive ones. And 
 thus the determination would have been general, 
 though its being so were inferred and not expressed. 
 But as the passage really stands in the Gospel, it is 
 much stronger. For the sense, and the very literal 
 words of our Lord's answer, are as applicable to any 
 other instance of a comparison, between positive and 
 moral duties, as to this upon which they were spoken. 
 
 And if, in case of competition, mercy is to be pre- 
 ferred to positive institutions, it will scarce be thought 
 that justice is to give place to them. It is remarkable 
 too, that, as the words are a quotation from the Ok! 
 Testament, they are introduced, on both the foremen- 
 tioned occasions, with a declaration that the Pharisees 
 did not understand the meaning of them. This, I 
 say, is very remarkable. For, since it is scarce possi- 
 ble for the most ignorant person not to understand the 
 literal sense of the passage in the prophet,* and since 
 understanding the literal sense would not have pre 
 vented their condemning the guiltless^ it can hardly be 
 doubted that the thing which our Lord really intend- 
 ed in that declaration was, that the Pharisees had not 
 learnt from it, as they might, wherein the general spiri? 
 of religion consists ; that it consists in moral piety and 
 virtue, as distinguished from forms and ritual observ- 
 ances. However, it is certain we may learn this from 
 his divine application of the passage in the Gospel. 
 
 But, as it is one of the peculiar weaknesses of human 
 nature, when, upon a comparison of two things, one is 
 
 * Hm, vi. f Ser Matth. xfr. 7. 
 
232 Of the Importance of Christianity. Part IL 
 
 found to be of greater importance than the other, to 
 consider this other as of scarce any importance at all,— 
 it is highly necessary that we remind ourselves how 
 great presumption it is, to make light of any institu- 
 tions of divine appointment ; that our obligations to 
 obey all God's commands whatever are absolute and 
 indispensable ; and that commands merely positive, 
 admitted to be from him, lay us under a moral obli- 
 gation to obey them --an obligation moral in the 
 strictest and most proper sense* 
 
 To these things I cannot forbear adding, that the 
 account now given of Christianity most strongly shews 
 and enforces upon us the obligation of searching the 
 Scriptures, in order to see what the scheme of revela- 
 tion really is, instead of determining beforehand from 
 reason what the scheme of it must be.* Indeed if in 
 revelation there be found any passages, the seeming 
 meaning of which is contrary to natural religion, we 
 may most certainly conclude such seeming meaning 
 not to be the real one. But it is not any degree of a 
 presumption against an interpretation of Scripture, that 
 such interpretation contains a doctrine which the light 
 of nature cannot discover,! or a precept which the law 
 of nature does not oblige to. 
 
 * See Ch. iii. t P. 233, 234. 
 
Chap. II. Of the supposed Presumption, &c. 233 
 
 CHAR II. 
 
 Of the supposed Presumption aga'mst a Revelation, con- 
 sidered as Miraculous, 
 
 Having shewn the importance of the Christian reve- 
 lation, and the obligations which we are under seri- 
 ously to attend to it, upon supposition of its truth, or 
 its credibility, — the next thing in order is, to consider 
 the supposed presumptions against revelation in gene- 
 ral, which shall be the subject of this chapter ; and 
 the objections against the Christian in particular, which 
 shall be the subject of some following ones.* For it 
 seems the most natural method to remove the preju- 
 dices against Christianity, before we proceed to the 
 consideration of the positive evidence for it, and the 
 objections against that evidence.! 
 
 It is, I think, commonly supposed, that there is some 
 peculiar presumption, from the analogy of nature, 
 against the Christian scheme of things, at least against 
 miracles ; so as that stronger evidence is necessary to 
 prove the truth and reality of them than would be suf- 
 ficient to convince us of other events, or matters of 
 fact. Indeed the consideration of this supposed pre- 
 sumption cannot but be thought very insignificant, by 
 many persons ; yet, as it belongs to the subject of this 
 treatise, so it may tend to open the mind, and remove 
 some prejudices, however needless the consideration of 
 it be upon its own account. 
 
 I. I find no appearance of a presumption, from the 
 analogy of nature, against the general scheme of Chris* 
 
 * Ch. iii. iv. v. vi. \ Ch. vii. 
 
 G G 
 
234 Of the supposed Presumption Part II. 
 
 t'anity, that God created and invisibly governs the 
 world by Jesus Christ, and by him also will hereafter 
 judge it in righteousness, i. e. render to every one ac- 
 cording to his works ; and that good men are under 
 the secret influence of his Spirit. Whether these 
 things are or are not to be called miraculous, is per- 
 haps only a question about words, or however, is of 
 no moment in the case. If the analogy of nature raises 
 any presumption against this general scheme of Chris- 
 tianity, it must be either because it is not discoverable 
 by reason or experience, or else because it is unlike that 
 course of nature which is. But analogy raises no pre- 
 sumption against the truth of this scheme, upon either 
 of these accounts. 
 
 First, there is no presumption, from analogy, against 
 the truth of it upon account of its not being discover- 
 able by reason or experience. For suppose one who 
 never heard of revelation, of the most improved un- 
 derstanding, and acquainted with our whole system of 
 natural philosophy and natural religion, — such an one 
 could not but be sensible that it was but a very small 
 part of the natural and moral system of the universe, 
 which he was acquainted with. He could not but be 
 sensible that there must be innumerable things, in the 
 dispensations of Providence past, in the invisible gov- 
 ernment over the world at present carrying on, and in 
 what is to come, of which he was wholly ignorant,* 
 and which could not be discovered without revelation. 
 Whether the scheme of nature be, in the strictest sense, 
 infinite or not, it is evidently vast, even beyond all pos- 
 sible imagination ; and doubtless that part of it which 
 is opened to our view is but as a point, in comparison 
 of the whole plan of Providence, reaching throughout 
 eternity past and future ; in comparison of what is even 
 
 P. 194, 195. 
 
Chap. II. against Miracles. 235 
 
 now going on in the remote parts of the boundless uni- 
 verse ; nay, in comparison ot the whole scheme of this 
 world. And therefore, that things lie beyond the nat- 
 ural reach of our faculties, is no sort of presumption 
 against the truth and reality of them ; because it is 
 certain there are innumerable things, in the constitu- 
 tion and government of the universe, which are thus 
 beyond the natural reach of our faculties. Secondly, 
 analogy raises no presumption against any of the 
 things contained in this general doctrine of Scripture 
 now mentioned, upon account of their being unlike 
 the known course of nature. For there is no pre- 
 sumption at all from analogy, that the whole course of 
 things, or divine government, naturally unknown to 
 us, and every thing in it, is like to any thing in that 
 which is known, and therefore no peculiar presump- 
 tion against any thing in the former, upon account of 
 its being unlike to any thing in the latter. And in 
 the constitution and natural government of the world, 
 as well as in the moral government of it, we see things 
 in a great degree unlike one another, and thereJ ore 
 ought not to wonder at such unlikeness between things 
 visible and invisible. However, the scheme of Chris- 
 tianity is by no means entirely unlike the scheme of na- 
 ture, as will appear in the following part of this treatise. 
 The notion of a miracle, considered as a proof of a 
 divine mission, has been stated with great exactness by 
 divines, and is, I think, sufficiently understood by 
 every one. There are also invisible miracles, the in- 
 carnation of Christ, for instance, which being secret 
 cannot be alleged as a proof of such a mission, but re- 
 quire themselves to be proved by visible miracles. 
 Revelation itself too is miraculous, and miracles are 
 the proof of it ; and the supposed presumption against 
 these, shall presently be considered. All which I hate 
 
230 Of the supposed Presumption Part II. 
 
 been observing here is, that, whether we choose to call 
 every thing in the dispensations of Providence, not 
 discoverable without revelation, nor like the known 
 course of things, miraculous, and whether the general 
 Christian dispensation now mentioned, is to be called 
 so or not, the foregoing observations seem certainly to 
 shew, that there is no presumption against it, from 
 the analogy of nature. 
 
 II. There is no presumption from analogy against 
 some operations, which we should now call miracu- 
 lous, particularly none against a revelation at the be- 
 ginning of the world ; nothing of such presumption 
 against it, as is supposed to be implied or expressed in 
 the word miraculous. For a miracle, in its very no- 
 tion, is relative to a course of nature, and implies 
 somewhat different from it, considered as being so. 
 Now, either there was no course of nature at the time 
 which we are speaking of, or if there were, we are not 
 acquainted what the course of nature is, upon the 
 first peopling of worlds. And therefore the question, 
 whether mankind had a revelation made to them at 
 that time, is to be considered, not as a question con- 
 cerning a miracle, but as a common question of fact. 
 And we have the like reason, be it more or less, to 
 admit the report of tradition concerning this question, 
 and concerning common matters of fact of the same 
 antiquity ; for instance, what part of the earth was 
 first peopled. 
 
 Or thus : when mankind was first placed in this 
 state, there was a power exerted totally different from 
 the present course of nature. Now, whether this pow- 
 er, thus wholly different from the present course of na- 
 ture, for we cannot properly apply to it the word mU 
 racuious, — whether this power stopped immediately 
 after it had made man, or went on, and exerted itself 
 
Chap. II. against Miracles, 237 
 
 farther in giving him a revelation, is a question of the 
 same kind, as whether an ordinary power exerted it- 
 self in such a particular degree and manner or not. 
 
 Or suppose the power exerted in the formation of 
 the world be considered as miraculous, or rather be 
 called by that name, the case will not be different ; 
 since it must be acknowledged, that such a power was 
 exerted. For supposing it acknowledged, that our 
 Saviour spent some years in a course of working mira- 
 cles, there is no more presumption, worth mentioning, 
 against his having exerted this miraculous power in a 
 certain degree greater % than in a certain degree less ; 
 in one or two more instances, than in one or two few- 
 er ; in this, than in another manner. 
 
 It is evident then, that there can be no peculiar 
 presumption, from the analogy of nature, against sup- 
 posing a revelation when man was first placed upon 
 the earth. 
 
 Add, that there does not appear the least intima- 
 tion in history or tradition, that religion was first rea- 
 soned out ; but the whole of history and tradition 
 makes for the other side, that it came into the world 
 by revelation. Indeed the state of religion in the first 
 ages, of which we have any account, seems to suppose 
 and imply that this was the original of it amongst 
 mankind. And these reflections together, without 
 taking in the peculiar authority of Scripture, amount 
 to real and a very material degree of evidence, that 
 there was a revelation at the beginning of the world. 
 Now this, as it is a confirmation of natural religion, 
 and therefore mentioned in the former part of this 
 treatise,* so likewise it has a tendency to remove any 
 prejudices against a subsequent revelation. 
 
 * P. 1ST, &r. 
 
2l>8 Of the supposed Presumption Part II. 
 
 III. But still it may be objected, that there is some 
 peculiar presumption, from analogy, against miracles, 
 particularly against revelation, after the settlement and 
 during the continuance of a course of nature. 
 
 Now with regard to this supposed presumption it is 
 to be observed in general, that before we can have 
 ground for raising what can, with any propriety, be 
 called an argument from analogy, for or against revela- 
 tion, considered as somewhat miraculous, we must be 
 acquainted with a similar or parallel case. But the 
 history of some other world, seemingly in like cir- 
 cumstances with our own, is no more than a parallel 
 case, and therefore nothing short of this can be so. Yet, 
 could we come at a presumptive proof for or against a 
 revelation, from being informed whether such world 
 had one or not, such a proof, being drawn from one 
 single instance only, must be infinitely precarious. 
 More particularly : first of all, there is a very strong 
 presumption against common speculative truths, and 
 against the most ordinary facts, before the proof of 
 them, which yet is overcome by almost any proof. 
 There is a presumption of millions to one against the 
 story of Casar, or of any other man. For suppose a 
 number of common facts so and so circumstanced, of 
 which one had no kind of proof, should happen to 
 come into one's thoughts, every one would, without 
 any possible doubt, conclude them to be false ; and 
 the like may be said of a single common fact. And 
 from hence it appears, that the question of importance 
 as to the matter before us, is, concerning the degree of 
 the peculiar presumption supposed against miracles ; 
 not whether there be any peculiar presumption at all 
 against them. For, if there be the presumption of 
 millions to one against the most common facts, what 
 can a small pres umption additional to this amount to, 
 
Chap. II. against Miracles. 239 
 
 though it be peculiar ? It cannot be estimated, and is as 
 nothing. The only material question is, whether there 
 be any such presumption against miracles, as to render 
 them n\any sort incredible. Secondly, if we leave out 
 the consideration of religion, we are in such total dark- 
 ness upon what causes, occasions, reasons, or circum- 
 stances, the present course of nature depends, that there 
 does not appear any improbability for or against suppos- 
 ing, that five or six thousand years may have given 
 scope for causes, occasions, reasons, or circumstances, 
 from whence miraculous interpositions may have arisen. 
 And from this, joined with the foregoing observation, 
 it will follow, that there must be a presumption be- 
 yond all comparison greater, against the particular 
 common facts just now instanced in, than against mir- 
 acles in general, before any evidence of either. But,, 
 thirdly, take in the consideration of religion, or the 
 moral system of the world, and then we see distinct 
 particular reasons for miracles — to afford mankind in- 
 struction additional to that of nature, and to attest 
 the truth of it. And this gives a real credibility to 
 the supposition, that it might be part of the original 
 plan of things, that there should be miraculous inter- 
 positions. Then, lastly, miracles must not be com- 
 pared to common natural events, or to events which, 
 though uncommon, are similar to what we daily expe- 
 rience ; but to the extraordinary phenomena of na- 
 ture. And then the comparison will be between the 
 presumption against miracles, and the presumption 
 against such uncommon appearances, suppose, as com- 
 ets, and against their being any such powers in nature 
 as magnetism and electricity, so contrary to the prop- 
 erties of other bodies not endued with these power?. 
 And before any one can determine whether there be 
 any peculiar presumption against miracle?, more than 
 
240 Of the supposed Presumption, &c. Part II. 
 
 against other extraordinary things, he must consider 
 what, upon first hearing, would be the presumption 
 against the last mentioned appearances and powers, to 
 a person acquainted only with the daily, monthly, and 
 annual course of nature respecting this earth, and with 
 those common powers of matter which we every day 
 see. 
 
 Upon all this I conclude, that there certainly is no 
 such presumption against miracles as to render them in 
 any wise incredible ; that on the contrary, our being 
 able to discern reasons for them gives a positive credi- 
 bility to the history of them, in cases where those rea- 
 sons hold ; and that it is by no means certain, that 
 there is any particular presumption at all, from analo- 
 gy, even in the lowest degree, against miracles, as dis- 
 tinguished from other extraordinary phenomena — 
 though it is not worth while to perplex the reader 
 with inquiries into the abstract nature of evidence, in 
 order to determine a question, which without such in- 
 quiries we see* is of no importance. 
 
 * P. £39. 
 
Chap. III. The Credibility of Revelation, tsfc. 2*1 
 
 CHA£. III. 
 
 Of our Incapacity of judging what were to be expected in 
 a Revelation ; and the Credibility, from Analogy, that 
 it mint contain Things appearing liable to Object ionic 
 
 J3esides the objections against the evidence for 
 Christianity, many are alleged against the scheme 
 of it, against the whole manner in which it is put 
 and left with the world, as well as against several par- 
 ticular relations in Scripture ; objections drawn from 
 the deficiencies of revelation ; from things in it 
 appearing to men foolishness ;* from its containing 
 matters of offence, which have led, and it must have 
 been foreseen would lead, into strange enthusiasm and 
 superstition, and be made to serve the purposes of ty- 
 ranny and wickedness ; from its not being universal y 
 and, which is a thing of the same kind, from its evi- 
 dence not being so convincing and satisfactory as it 
 might have been ; for this last is sometimes turned 
 into a positive argument against its truth. f It would 
 be tedious, indeed impossible, to enumerate the several 
 particulars comprehended urfder the objections here 
 referred to ; they being so various, according to the 
 different fancies of men. There are persons who think 
 it a strong objection against the authority of Scripture, 
 that it is not composed by rules of art, agreed upon 
 by criticks, for polite and correct writings. And the 
 scorn is inexpressible, with which some of the prophet- 
 ic parts of Scripture are treated ; partly through the 
 
 * l COr.i. 28. f S.eeCh.ti. 
 
 H H 
 
242 The Credibility of Revelation Part IL 
 
 rashness of interpreters, but very much also on account 
 of the hieroglyphical and figurative language in which 
 they are left us. Some of the principal things of this 
 sort shall be particularly considered in the following 
 chapters. But my design at present is to observe in 
 general, with respect to this whole way of arguing, 
 that, upon supposition of a revelation, it is highly cred- 
 ible beforehand, we should be incompetent judges of 
 it, to a great degree ; and that it would contain ma- 
 ny things appearing to us liable to great objections, 
 in case we judge of it otherwise than by the analogy 
 of nature. And therefore though objections against 
 the evidence of Christianity are most seriously to be 
 considered, yet objections against Christianity itself are, 
 in a great measure, frivolous ; almost all objections 
 against it, excepting those which are alleged against 
 the particular proofs of its coming from God. I ex- 
 press myself with caution, lest I should be mistaken to 
 vilify reason, which is indeed the only faculty we have 
 wherewith to judge concerning any thing, even reve- 
 lation itself ; or be misunderstood to assert, that a sup- 
 posed revelation cannot be proved false from internal 
 characters. For, it may contain clear immoralities or 
 contradictions, and either of these would prove it false. 
 Nor will I take upon me to affirm, that nothing else 
 can possibly render any supposed revelation incredible. 
 Yet still the observation above is, I think, true beyond 
 doubt, that objections against Christianity, as distin- 
 guished from objections against its evidence, are friv- 
 olous. To make out this, is the general design of the 
 present chapter. And with regard to the whole of 
 it, I cannot but particularly wish that the proofs 
 might be attended to, rather than the assertions cavil- 
 led at, upon account of any unacceptable consequen- 
 ces, whether real or supposed, which may be drawn 
 
Chap. III. liable to Objections. 243 
 
 from them. For, after all, that which is true must 
 be admitted, though it should shew us the shortness 
 of our faculties, and that we are in no wise judges of 
 many things, of which we are apt to think ourselves 
 very competent ones. Nor will this be any objection 
 with reasonable men, at least upon second thought it 
 will not be any objection with such, against the just- 
 ness of the following observations. 
 
 As God governs the world, and instructs his crea- 
 tures, according to certain laws or rules, in the known 
 course of nature, known by reason together with ex- 
 perience, — so the Scripture informs us of a scheme of 
 divine Providence additional to this. It relates, that 
 God has, by revelation, instructed men in things con- 
 cerning his government which they could not oth- 
 erwise have known, and reminded them of things 
 which they might otherwise know, and attested the 
 truth of the whole by miracles. Now if the natural 
 and the revealed dispensation of things are both from 
 God, if they coincide with each other, and together 
 make up one scheme of Providence, — our being in- 
 competent judges of one, must render it credible that 
 we may be incompetent judges also of the other. 
 Since, upon experience, the acknowledged constitution 
 and course of nature is found to be greatly different 
 from what, before experience, would have been ex- 
 pected, and such as men fancy there lie great objections 
 against, — this renders it beforehand highly credible, 
 that they may find the revealed dispensation likewise, 
 if they judge of it as they do of the constitution of na- 
 ture, very different from expectations formed before- 
 hand, and liable, in appearance, to great objections ; 
 objections against the scheme itself, and against the de- 
 grees and manners of the miraculous interpositions by 
 which it was attested and carried on. Thus, suppose 
 
£44 The Credibility of Revelation Part II. 
 
 a prince to govern his dominions in the wisest manner 
 possible, by common known laws, and that upon some 
 exigencies he should suspend these laws, and govern, 
 in several instance , in a different manner ; if one of 
 his subjects were not a competent judge beforehand, 
 by what common rules the government should or 
 would be carried on, it could not be expected that 
 the same person would be a competent judge, in what 
 exigencies, or in what manner, or to what degree, those 
 laws commonly observed would be suspended or devi- 
 ated from. If he were not a judge of the wisdom of 
 the ordinary administration, there is no reason to think 
 he would be a judge of the wisdom of the extraordina- 
 nary. If he thought he had objections against the 
 former, doubtless it is highly supposable he might 
 think also that he had objections against the latter. 
 
 And thus as we fall into infinite follies and mistakes, 
 whenever we pretend, otherwise than from experience 
 and analogy, to judge of the constitution and course 
 of nature, — it u evidently supposable beforehand that 
 we should fall into as great in pretending to judge, in 
 the like manner, concerning revelation. Nor is there 
 any more ground to expect that this latter should ap- 
 pear to us clear of objections, than that the former 
 should. 
 
 These observations, relating to the whole of Chris- 
 tianity, are applicable to inspiration in particular. As 
 we are in no sort judges beforehand, by what laws or 
 rules, in what degree, or by what means, it were to 
 have been expected, that God would naturally instruct 
 u S? — -so upon supposition of his affording us light and 
 instruction by revelation, additional to what he has af- 
 forded us by reason and experience, we are in no sort 
 judges by what methods, and in what proportion, it 
 were to be expected that this supernatural light and 
 
Chap. III. liable to Objections. 245 
 
 instruction would be afforded us. We know not be- 
 forehand, what degree or kind of natural information 
 it were to be expected God would afford men, each by 
 his own reason and experience ; nor how far he would 
 enable and effectually dispose them to communicate 
 it, whatever it should be, to each other ; nor whether 
 the evidence of it would be certain, highly probable, 
 or doubtful ; nor whether it would be given with equal 
 clearness and conviction to all. Nor could we guess, 
 upon any good ground I mean, whether natural knowl- 
 edge, or even the faculty itself by which we are capa- 
 ble of attaining it, reason, would be given us at once, 
 or gradually. In like manner we are wholly ignorant, 
 what degree of new knowledge it were to be expected 
 God would give mankind by revelation, upon suppo- 
 sition of his affording one ; or how far, or in what way, 
 he would interpose miraculously to qualify them, to 
 whom he should originally make the revelation, for 
 communicating the knowledge given by it, and to se- 
 cure their doing it to the age in which they should 
 live, and to secure its being transmitted to posterity. 
 We are equally ignorant whether the evidence of it 
 would be certain, or highly probable, or doubtful ;•* 
 or whether all who should have any degree of instruc- 
 tion from it, and any degree of evidence of its truth, 
 would have the same ; or whether the scheme would 
 be revealed at once, or unfolded gradually. Nay, we 
 are not in any sort able to judge, whether it were to 
 have been expected that the revelation should have 
 been committed to writing, or left to be handed down, 
 and consequently corrupted by verbal tradition, and at 
 length sunk under it, if mankind so pleased, and dur- 
 ing such time as they are permitted, in the degree they 
 evidently are, to act as they will. 
 
 * See Ch. vi. 
 
24*6 The Credibility of Revelation Part II. 
 
 But it may be said, " that a revelation in some of 
 the above mentioned circumstances, one, for instance, 
 which was not committed to writing, and thus secured 
 against danger of corruption, would not have answered 
 its purpose." I ask, what purpose ? It would not have 
 answered all the purposes which it has now answered, 
 and in the same degree ; but it would have answered 
 others, or the same in different degrees. And which 
 of these were the purposes of God, and best fell in with 
 his general government, we could not at all have de- 
 termined beforehand. 
 
 Now since it has been shewn, that we have no prin- 
 ciples of reason, upon which to judge beforehand how 
 it were to be expected revelation should have been left, 
 or what was most suitable to the divine plan of gov- 
 eminent in any of the forementioned respects, — k 
 must be quite frivolous to object afterwards as to any 
 of them, against its being left in one way rather than 
 another ; for this would be to object against things, 
 upon account of their being different from expecta- 
 tions, which have been shewn to be without reason. 
 And thus we see that the only question concerning the 
 truth of Christianity is, whether it be a real revelation ; 
 not whether it be attended with every circumstance 
 which we should have looked for — and concerning the 
 authority of Scripture, whether it be what it claims to 
 be ; not whether it be a book of such sort, and so pro- 
 mulged, as weak men are apt to fancy a book con- 
 taining a divine revelation should. And therefore nei- 
 ther obscurity, nor seeming inaccuracy of style, nor 
 various readings, nor early disputes about the authors 
 of particular parts, nor any other things of the like 
 kind, though they had been much more considerable 
 in degree than they are, could overthrow the authority 
 of the Scripture ; unless the prophets, apostles, or our 
 
Chap. III. liable to Objections. 247 
 
 Lord, had promised that the book containing the di- 
 vine revelation should be secure from those things. 
 Nor indeed can any objections overthrow such a kind 
 ©f revelation as the Christian claims to be, since there 
 are no objections against the morality of it,* but such 
 as can shew that there is no proof of miracles wrought 
 originally in attestation of it, no appearance of any 
 thing miraculous in its obtaining in the world, nor any 
 ef prophecy, that is, of events foretold which hu- 
 man sagacity could not foresee. If it can be shewn, 
 that the proof alleged for all these is absolutely none 
 at all, then is revelation overturned. But were it al- 
 lowed that the proof of any one or all of them is lower 
 than is allowed, yet, whilst any proof of them remains, 
 revelation will stand upon much the same foot it does 
 at present, as to all the purposes of life and practice, 
 and ought to have the like influence upon our behav- 
 iour. 
 
 From the foregoing observations too it will follow, 
 and those who will thoroughly examine into revelation 
 will find it worth remarking, that there are several 
 ways of arguing, which, though just with regard to 
 other writings, are not applicable to Scripture ; at least 
 Hot to the prophetic parts of it. We cannot argue, 
 for instance, that this cannot be the sense or intent of 
 such a passage of Scripture, for if it had it would have 
 been expressed more plainly, or have been represented 
 under a more apt figure or hieroglyphick ; yet we may 
 justly argue thus with respect to common books* And 
 the reason of this difference is very evident, that in 
 Scripture we are not competent judges, as we are in- 
 common books, how plainly it were to have been ex- 
 pected, what is the true sense should have been ex- 
 pressed, or under how apt an image figured. The 
 
 ' P 25* 
 
248 The Credibility of Revelation Part II. 
 
 only question is, what appearance there is that this is 
 the sense, and scarce at all how much more determi- 
 nately or accurately it might have been expressed of 
 figured. 
 
 " But is it not selfevident, that internal improba- 
 bilities of all kinds weaken external probable proof V* 
 Doubtless. But to what practical purpose can thi> be 
 alleged here, when it has been proved before,* that 
 real internal improbabilities, which rise even to moral 
 certainty, are overcome by the most ordinary testimo- 
 ny, and when it now has been made appear, that we 
 scarce know what are improbabilities as to the matter 
 we are here considering — as it will farther appear from 
 what follows. 
 
 For though from the observations above made, it is 
 manifest that we are not in any sort competent judges 
 what supernatural instruction were to have been expect- 
 ed, and though it is selfevident that the objections of an 
 incompetent judgment must be frivolous, — yet it may 
 be proper to go one step farther, and observe, that if 
 men will be regardless of these things, and pretend to 
 judge of the Scripture by preconceived expectations, 
 the analogy of nature shews beforehand, not only that 
 it is highly credible they may, but also probable that 
 they will, imagine they have strong objections against 
 it, however really unexceptionable ; for so, prior to ex- 
 perience, they would think they had, against the cir- 
 cumstances and degrees, and the whole manner of that 
 instruction which is afforded by the ordinary course of 
 nature. Were the instruction which God affords to 
 brute creatures by instincts and mere propensions, and 
 to mankind by these together with reason, matter of 
 probable proof, and not of certain observation, — & 
 
 * P. 2M. 
 
Chap. Ill, liable to Objections. .249 
 
 would be rejected as incredible in many instances of it, 
 only upon account of the means by which thi^ instruc- 
 tion is given, the seeming disproportions, the limita- 
 tions, necessary conditions and circumstances of it. 
 For in tance — would it not have been thought highly 
 improbable, that men should have been so much more 
 capable of discovering, even to certainty, the general 
 laws of matter, and the magnitudes, paths and revo- 
 lutions of the heavenly bodies, than the occasions and 
 cures of distempers, and many other things in which 
 human life seems so much more nearly concerned than 
 in astronomy ? How capricious and irregular a way 
 of information, would it be said, is that of invention, 
 by means of which nature instructs us in matters of 
 science, and in many things upon which the affairs of 
 the world greatly depend ; that a man should by this 
 faculty be made acquainted with a thing in an instant, 
 when perhaps he is thinking of somewhat else which he 
 has in vain been searching after, it may be, for years* 
 So likewise the imperfections attending the only meth- 
 od by which nature enables and directs us to communi- 
 cate our thoughts to each other, are innumerable. Lan- 
 guage is in its very nature inadequate, ambiguous, lia- 
 ble to infinite abuse even from negligence, and so liable 
 to it from design, that every man can deceive and betray 
 by it. And to mention but one instance more, that 
 brutes without reason should act, in many respects, 
 with a sagacity and foresight vastly greater than what 
 men have in those respects, would be thought impos- 
 sible ; yet it is certain they do act with such superior 
 foresight — whether it be their own indeed is another 
 question. From these things it is highly credible be- 
 forehand, that upon supposition God should afford men 
 some additional instruction by revelation, it would be 
 with circumstances, in manners, degrees and respects* 
 
 i i 
 
250 The Credibility of Revelation Part II. 
 
 which we should be apt to fancy we had great objec- 
 tions against the credibility of. Nor are the objections 
 against the Scripture, nor against Christianity in gene- 
 ral, at all more or greater than the analogy of nature 
 would beforehand — not perhaps give ground to ex- 
 pect, for this analogy may not be sufficient in some case 
 to ground an expectation upon, but no more nor 
 greater than analogy would shew it, beforehand, to be 
 supposable and credible that there might seem to lie 
 against revelation. 
 
 By applying these general observations to a particu- 
 lar objection, it will be more distinctly seen how they 
 are applicable to others of the like kind, and indeed 
 to almost all objections against Christianity, as distin- 
 guished from objections against its evidence. It ap- 
 pears from Scripture, that as it was not unusual in the 
 apostolick age for persons, upon their conversion to 
 -Christianity, to be endued with miraculous gifts, so 
 some of those persons exercised these gifts in a strange- 
 ly irregular and disorderly manner ; and this is made 
 an objection against their being really miraculous. 
 Now the foregoing observations quite remove this ob- 
 jection, how considerable soever it may appear at first 
 sight. For consider a person endued with any of 
 these gifts, for instance, that of tongues, it is to be sup- 
 posed that he had the same power over this miracu- 
 lous gift, as he would have had over it had it been 
 the effect of habit, of study and use, as it ordinarily is, 
 or the same power over it as he had over any other 
 natural endowment. Consequently he would use it 
 in the same manner he did any other, either regularly 
 an 1 upon proper occasions only, or irregularly and up- 
 on improper ones, according to his sense of decency,; 
 and his character of prudence. Where then is the 
 objection ? Why, if this miraculous power was indeed 
 
Chap. III. liable to Objections. 251 
 
 given to the world to propagate Christianity and attest 
 the truth of it, we might, it seems, have expected 
 that other sort of persons should have been chosen to 
 be invested with it ; or that these should, at the same 
 time, have been endued with prudence ; or that they 
 should have been continually restrained and directed 
 in the exercise of it ; i. e. that God .should have mi- 
 raculously interposed, if at all, in a different manner or 
 higher degree. But from the observations made 
 above, it is undeniably evident that we are not judges 
 in what degrees and manners it were to have been ex- 
 pected he should miraculously interpose, upon suppo- 
 sition of his doing it in some degree and manner. 
 Nor, in the natural course of Providence, are superior 
 gifts of memory, eloquence, knowledge, and other tal- 
 ents of great influence, conferred only on person of 
 prudence and decency, or such as are disposed to make 
 the properest use of them. Nor is the instruction and 
 admonition naturally afforded u> for the conduct of 
 life, particularly in our education, commonly given in 
 a manner the most suited to recommend it, but often 
 with circumstances apt to prejudice us against such 
 instruction. 
 
 One might go on to add, that there is a great re- 
 semblance between the light of nature and of revela- 
 tion in several other respects. Practical Christianity, 
 or that faith and behaviour which renders a man a 
 Christian, is a plain and obvious thing, like the com- 
 mon rules of conduct with respect to our ordinary 
 temporal affairs. The more distinct and particular 
 knowledge of those things, the study of which the 
 Apostle calls going on unto perfection,* and of the pro- 
 phetick parts of revelation, like many parts of natural 
 and even civil knowledge, may require very exact 
 
 • Heb. vi. 1. 
 
252 The Credibility of Revelation Part II. 
 
 thought, and careful consideration. The hindrances 
 too, of natural and of supernatural light and know- 
 ledge, have been of the same kind. And as, it is own- 
 ed, the whole scheme of Scripture is not yet under- 
 stood, so, if it ever comes to be understood, before the 
 restitution of all things,* and without miraculous inter- 
 positions, it must be in the same way as natural know- 
 ledge is come at, by the continuance and progress of 
 learning and of liberty, and by particular persons attend- 
 ing to, comparing and pursuing intimations scattered 
 up and down it, which are overlooked and disregarded 
 by the generality of the world. For this is the way in 
 which all improvements are made, by thoughtful men's 
 tracing on obscure hints, as it were, dropped us by 
 nature accidentally, or which seem to come into our 
 minds by chance. Nor is it at all incredible, that a 
 book which has been so long in the possession of man- 
 kind should contain many truths as yet undiscovered. 
 For, all the same phenomena and the same faculties 
 of investigation, from which such great discoveries in 
 natural knowledge have been made in the present and 
 last age, were equally in the possession of mankind sev- 
 eral thousand years before. And possibly it might be 
 intended, that events, as they come to pass, should open 
 and ascertain the meaning of several parts of Scripture. 
 It may be objected, that this analogy fails in a mate- 
 rial respect ; for that natural knowledge is of little or 
 no consequence. But 1 have been speaking of the gen- 
 eral instruction which nature does or does not afford us. 
 And besides, some parts of natural knowledge, in the 
 more common restrained sense of the words, are of the 
 greatest consequence to the ease and convenience of 
 life* But suppose the analogy did, as it does not, fail 
 in this respect, yet it might be abundantly supplied 
 
 * Acts iii. 21. 
 
Chap. III. liable to Objections. 253 
 
 from the whole constitution and course of nature, 
 which shews that God does not dispense his gifts ac^ 
 cording to our notions of the advantage and conse- 
 qu nee they would be of to us. And thLs in general, 
 with his method of dispensing knowledge in particu- 
 lar, would together make out an analogy full to the 
 point before us. 
 
 But it may be objected still farther and more gen- 
 erally, " The Scripture represents the world as in a 
 state of ruin, and Christianity as an expedient to re- 
 cover it, to help m these respects where nature fails ; 
 in particular, to supply the deficiencies of natural hghu 
 Is it credible then, that so many ages should have 
 been let pa^s, before a matter of such a sort, of so great 
 and so general importance, was made known to man- 
 kind ; and then that it .should be made known to so 
 small a part of them ? Is it conceivable, that this sup- 
 ply should be so very deficient, should have the like 
 ob curity and doubtfulness, be liable to the like per* 
 versions, in short, lie open to all the like objections, 
 as the light of nature itself ?"* Without determine 
 ing how far this in fact is so, I answer, — it is by no 
 means incredible that it might be so, if the light of na- 
 ture and of revelation be from the same hand. Men 
 are naturally liable to diseases, for which God, in his 
 good providence, has provided natural remedies.! 
 But remedies existing in nature have been unknown 
 to mankind for many ages, are known but to few now, 
 probably many valuable ones are not known yet. 
 Great has been and is the obscurity and difficulty in 
 the nature and application of them. Circumstances 
 seem often to make them very improper, where they 
 are absolutely necessary. It is after long labour and 
 study, and many unsuccessful endeavours, that they are 
 
 * Ch.vi. f See Ch. v. 
 
254 The Credibility of Revelation Part II. 
 
 brought to be as useful as they are ; after high con- 
 tempt and absolute rejection of the most useful we 
 have ; and after disputes and doubts which have seem- 
 ed to be endless. The best remedies too, when un- 
 skilfully, much more if dishonestly applied, may pro- 
 duce new diseases ; and with the rightest application, 
 the success of them is often doubtful. In many ca&es 
 they are not at all effectual ; where they are, it is oft- 
 en very slowly ; and the application of them, and the 
 necessary regimen accompanying it, is, not uncom- 
 monly, so disagreeable, that some will not submit to 
 them, and satisfy themselves with the excuse, that if 
 they would, it is not certain whether it would be suc- 
 cessful. And many persons who labour under diseases 
 for which there are known natural remedies, are not 
 so happy as to be always, if ever, in the way of them. 
 In a word, the remedies which nature has provided for 
 diseases are neither certain, perfect, nor universal. 
 And indeed the same principles of arguing which 
 would lead us to conclude that they must be so, would 
 lead us likewise to conclude that there could be no 
 occasion for them, i. e. that there could be no diseases 
 at all. And therefore, our experience that there are 
 diseases, shews that it is credible beforehand, upon 
 supposition nature has provided remedies for them, 
 that these remedies may be, as by experience we find 
 they are, not certain, nor perfect, nor universal ; be- 
 cause it shews, that the principles upon which we 
 should expect the contrary are fallacious. 
 
 And now, what is the just consequence from all 
 these things ? Not that reason is no judge of what is 
 offered to us as being of divine revelation. For this 
 would be to infer that we are unable to judge of any 
 thing, because we are unable to judge of all things. 
 Reason can and it ought to judge, not only of the 
 
Chap. III. liable to Objections. 255 
 
 meaning, but also of the morality and the evidence 
 of revelation. First, it is the province of reason to 
 judge of the morality of the Scripture; i. e. not 
 whether it contains things different from what we 
 should have expected from a wise, just, and good Be- 
 ing, for objections from hence have been now obvia- 
 ted ; but whether it contains things plainly contradic- 
 tory to wisdom, justice or goodness ; to what the light 
 of nature teaches us of God. And I know nothing or 
 this sort objected against Scripture, excepting such ob- 
 jections as are formed upon suppositions, which would 
 equally conclude that the constitution of nature is con- 
 tradictory to wisdom, justice, or goodness, which most 
 certainly it is not. Indeed there are some particular 
 precepts in Scripture, given to particular persons, re- 
 quiring actions which would be immoral and vicious 
 were it not for such precepts. But it is easy to see 
 that all these are of such a kind, as that the precept 
 changes the whole nature of the case and of the ac- 
 tion, and both constitutes and shews that not to be 
 unjust or immoral, which, prior to the precept, must 
 have appeared and really have been so ; which may 
 well be, since none of these precepts are contrary to 
 immutable morality. If it were commanded to culti- 
 vate the principles, and act from the spirit of treach- 
 ery, ingratitude, cruelty, the command would not al- 
 ter the nature of the case or of the action in any of 
 these instances. But it is quite otherwise in precepts, 
 which require only the doing an external action; for 
 instance, taking away the property or life of any. Fcr 
 men have no right to either life or property, but what 
 arises solely from the grant of God ; when this grant 
 is revoked, they cease to have any right at all in ei- 
 ther ; and when this revocation is made known, a§ 
 surely it is possible it may be, it must cease to be un- 
 
256 The Credibility of Revelation Part IL 
 
 just to deprive them of either. And though a course 
 of external acts, which without command would be 
 immoral, must make an immoral habit, yet a few de- 
 tached commands have no such natural tendency. I 
 thought proper to say thus much of the few Scripture 
 precepts, which require, not vicious actions, but ac- 
 tions which would have been vicious had it not been 
 for such precepts ; because they are sometimes weakly 
 urged as immoral, and great weight is laid upon ob- 
 jections drawn from them. But to me there seems no 
 difficulty at all in these precepts, but what arises from 
 their being offences, i. e. from their being liable to 
 be perverted, as indeed they are, by wicked designing 
 men, to serve the most horrid purposes ; and, perhaps, 
 to mislead the weak and enthusiastick. And objec- 
 tions from this head are not objections against revela- 
 tion, but against the whole notion of religion as atrial, 
 and against the general constitution of nature. Second- 
 ly, reason is able to judge, and must, of the evidence 
 of revelation, and of the objections urged against that 
 evidence ; which shall be the subject of a following 
 chapter.* 
 
 But the consequence of the foregoing observation is, 
 that the question upon which the truth of Christiani- 
 ty depends is scarce at all what objections there are 
 against its scheme, since there are none against the 
 morality of it ; but what objections there are against its 
 ■\ndcncc, or what proof there remains of it, after due aU 
 lowanccs made for the objections against that proof ; be- 
 cau.se it has been shewn, that the objections against 
 Christianity, as distinguished from objections against its 
 evidence* are frivolous. For surely very little weight, 
 if any at all, is to be laid upon a way of arguing and 
 objecting, which, when applied to the general consti- 
 
 " Ch. vii. 
 
Chap. IIL liable to Objections. 257- 
 
 tution of nature, experience shews not to be conclu- 
 sive ; and such, I think, is the whole way of objecting 
 treated of throughout this chapter. It is resolvable 
 into principles, and goes upon suppositions which 
 mislead us to think that the Author of nature would 
 not act as we experience he does, or would act, in such 
 and such cases, as we experience he does not, in like 
 cases. But the unreasonableness of this way of ob- 
 jecting will appear yet more evidently from hence, 
 that the chief things thus objected against are justifi- 
 ed, as shall be farther shown,* by distinct, particular 
 and full analogies, in the constitution and course of 
 nature. 
 
 But it is to be remembered, that, as frivolous as 
 objections of the foregoing sort against revelation are, 
 yet, when a supposed revelation is more consistent with 
 itself, and has a more general and uniform tendency 
 to promote virtue, than, all circumstances considered, 
 could have been expected from enthusiasm and polit- 
 ical views, — this is a presumptive proof of its not pro- 
 ceeding from them, and so of its truth ; because we 
 are competent judges what might have been expected 
 from enthusiasm and political views. 
 
 * Ch. W. latter ptrt. And v. vi. 
 
 & JC 
 
258 Christianity a Scheme, Part II. 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 Of Christianity, considered as a Scheme or Constitution^ 
 imperfectly comprehended* 
 
 It hath been now shewn* that the analogy of 
 nature renders it highly credible beforehand, that 
 supposing a revelation to be made, it must contain 
 many things very different from what we should 
 have expected, and such as appear open to great ob- 
 jections, and that this observation, in good measure, 
 takes off the force of those objections, or rather pre- 
 cludes them. But it may be alleged, that this is a 
 very partial answer to such objections, or a very un- 
 satisfactory way of obviating them, because it doth 
 not shew at all that the things objected against can be 
 wise, just and good, much less that it is credible they 
 are so. It will therefore be proper to shew this dis- 
 tinctly, by applying to these objections against the 
 wisdom, justice and goodness of Christianity, the an- 
 swer abovef given to the like objections against the 
 constitution of nature, before we consider the particu- 
 lar analogies in the latter to the particular things ob- 
 jected against in the former. Now that which affords 
 a sufficient answer to objections against the wisdom, 
 justice and goodness of the constitution of nature, is 
 its being a constitution, a system or scheme imperfect- 
 ly comprehended ; a scheme in which means are 
 made use of to accomplish ends, and which is carried 
 on by general laws. For from these things it has been 
 proved, not only to be possible, but also to be credi- 
 
 • In the foregoing chapter. 
 
 f Part I. Ch. vii. to which this all along refers. 
 
Chap. IV. imperfectly comprehended. 259 
 
 ble, that those things which are objected against may 
 be consistent with wisdom, justice and goodness, nay 
 may be instances of them ; and even that the consti- 
 tution and government of nature may be perfect in 
 the highest possible degree. If Christianity then be a 
 scheme, and of the like kind, it is evident the like ob- 
 jections against it must admit of the like answer. 
 And, 
 
 I. Christianity is a scheme, quite beyond our com- 
 prehension. The moral government of God is exer- 
 cised, by gradually conducting things so in the course 
 of his providence, that every one, at length and upon the 
 whole, shall receive according to his deserts ; and nei- 
 ther fraud nor violence, but truth and right, shall finally 
 prevail. Christianity is a particular scheme under this 
 general plan of Providence, and a part of it, conducive 
 to its completion, with regard to mankind ; consist- 
 ing itself also of various parts, and a mysterious econ- 
 omy, which has been carrying on from the time the 
 world came into its present wretched state, and is still 
 carrying on for its recovery, by a divine person, the 
 Messiah, who is to gather together in one, the children 
 of God that are scattered abroad* and establish an ever- 
 lasting kingdom, wherein dwelleth righteousness.^ And 
 in order to it, after various manifestations of things, 
 relating to this great and general scheme of Providence, 
 through a succession of many ages : (For the Spirit of 
 Christ which was in the prophets, testified beforehand his 
 sufferings, and the glory that should follow ; unto whom it 
 was revealed, that not unto themselves, but unto us they 
 did minister the things which are now reported unto us by 
 them that have preached the Gospel ; which things the an- 
 gels desire to look into\) — after various dispensations^ 
 
 * Joh. xi. 52. f 2 Pet. iii. 13. 
 
 t 1 Pet. i. 12, 12. 
 
260 Christianity a Scheme, Part II. 
 
 looking forward and preparatory to this final salvation, 
 in the fullness of time, when infinite wisdom thought fit, 
 He, being in the form of God, — made himself of no repu- 
 tation, and took upon him the form of a servant, and was 
 made in the likeness of men ; and being found in fashion as 
 a man, he hwnbled himself, and became obedient to death, 
 even the death of the cross ; wherefore God also hath high* 
 ly exalted him, and given him a name which is above every 
 name ; that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of 
 ih'mgs in heaven, and things in the earth, and things un- 
 der the earth ; and that every tongue should confess, that 
 Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father.* 
 Parts likewise of this economy, are the miraculous mis- 
 sion of the Holy Ghost, and his ordinary assistance giv- 
 en to good men ; the invisible government which Christ 
 at present exercises over his church ; that which he him- 
 self refers to in these words, %In my father's house are 
 many mansions — I go to prepare a place for you ; and his 
 future return to judge the world in righteousness, and 
 completely reestablish the kingdom of God. For the 
 Father judgeth no man ; but hath committed all judgment 
 unto the Son, that all men should honour the Son, even as 
 they honour the Fat her. \ All power is given unto him in 
 heaven and in earth. % And he must reign till he hath put 
 all enemies under his feet* Then comet h the end, when he 
 shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Fa- 
 ther ; when he shall have put down all rule, and all au- 
 thority and power. And when all things shall be subdued 
 unto him, then shall the Son also himself be subject unto him 
 that put all things under him, that God may be all in all.\ 
 Now little, surely, need be said to shew that this system 
 or scheme of things is but imperfectly comprehended 
 by us. The Scripture expre^ly asserts it to be so. 
 
 • Phil. ii. | Joli. xiv. 2. \ Joh. v. 88, %T- 
 
 § Matth. xxvili. 18. || ] Cor. xv. 
 
Chap. IV. imperfectly comprehended. 261 
 
 And indeed one cannot read a passage relating t(Hbis 
 great mystery of Godliness? but what immediately runs 
 up into something which shews us our ignorance in it • 
 as every thing in nature shews us our ignorance in 
 the constitution of nature. And whoever will seri- 
 ously consider that part of the Christian scheme which 
 is revealed in Scripture, will find so much more unre- 
 vealed, as will convince him, that, to all the purposes of 
 judging and objecting, we know as little of it as of the 
 constitution of nature. Our ignorance, therefore, is 
 as much an answer to our objections against the per- 
 fection of one as against the perfection of the other* f 
 
 II. It is obvious too, that in the Christian dispen- 
 sation, as much as in the natural scheme of things 
 means are made use of to accomplish ends. And the 
 observation of this furnishes us with the same answer 
 to objections against the perfection of Christianity, as 
 to objections of the like kind against the constitution 
 of nature. It shews the credibility, that the things 
 objected against, how foolish\ soever they appear to 
 men, may be the very best means of accomplishing 
 the very best ends ; and their appearing foolishness is no 
 presumption against this, in a scheme so greatly beyond 
 our comprehension § 
 
 III. The credibility that the Christian dispensation 
 may have been, all along, carried on by general laws,|J 
 no less than the course of nature, may require to be 
 more distinctly made out. Consider then upon what 
 ground it is we say, that the whole common course of 
 nature is carried on according to general foreordained 
 laws. We know indeed several of the general laws of 
 
 ^matter, and a great part of the natural behaviour of 
 living agents is reducible to general laws. But we 
 
 * 1 Tim. iii. 16. f. P. 194, &c. J 1 Cor. i. 
 
 § P. 19§> 19?: J] P. 200, 201. 
 
262 Christianity a Scheme, Part II. 
 
 kngjJf ina manner nothing by what laws, storms and 
 tempests, earthquakes, famine, pestilence, become the 
 instruments of destruction to mankind. And the 
 laws by which persons born into the world at ; uch a 
 time and place are of such capacities, geniuses, Km. 
 pers ; the laws by which thoughts come into our 
 mind in a multitude of cases, and by which innume- 
 rable things happen, of the greatest influence upon the 
 affairs and state of the world ; these laws are so wholly 
 unknown to us, that we call the events which come to 
 pass by them accidental, though all reasonable men 
 know certainly that there cannot, in reality, be any 
 such thing as chance, and conclude that the things 
 which have this appearance are the result of general 
 laws, and may be reduced into them. It is then but 
 an exceeding little way, and in but a very few respects, 
 that we can trace up the natural course of things be- 
 fore us to general laws. And it is only from analogy 
 that we conclude the whole of it to be capable of be- 
 ing reduced into them — only from our seeing that 
 part is so. It is from our finding that the course of 
 nature, in some respects and so far, goes on by general 
 laws, that we conclude this of the rest. And if that 
 be a just ground for such a conclusion, it is a just 
 ground also, if not to conclude, yet to apprehend, to 
 render it supposable and credible, which is sufficient 
 for answering objections, that God's miraculous inter- 
 portions may have been, all along in like manner, by 
 general laws of wisdom. Thus, that miraculous pow- 
 ers should be exerted at such times, upon such occa- 
 sions, in such degrees and manners, and with regard to 
 such persons, rather than others — that the affairs of 
 the world, being permitted to go on in their natural 
 course so far, should, just at such a point, have a new 
 direction given them by miraculous interpositions — 
 
Chap. IV. imperfectly comprehended. 263 
 
 that these interpositions should be exactly in such de- 
 grees and respects only, — all this may have been by 
 general laws. These laws are unknown indeed to us, 
 but no more unknown than the laws from whence it 
 is, that some die as soon as they are born, and others 
 live to extreme old age— that one man is so superior 
 to another in understanding — with innumerable more 
 things, which, as was before observed, we cannot re- 
 duce to any laws or rules at all, though k is taken for 
 granted they are as much reducible to general ones as 
 gravitation. Now, if the revealed dispensations of 
 providence, and miraculous interpositions, be by gen- 
 eral laws, as well as God's ordinary government in the 
 course of nature, made known by reason and expe- 
 rience,— *-there is no more reason to expect that every 
 exigence, as it arises, should be provided for by these 
 general laws or miraculous interpositions, than that 
 every exigence in nature should by the general laws of 
 nature ; yet there might be wise and good reasons that 
 miraculous interpositions should be by general laws, 
 and that these laws should not be broken in upon, or 
 deviated from, by other miracles. 
 
 Upon the whole then, the appearance of deficiencies 
 and irregularities in nature is owing to its being a 
 scheme but in part made known, and of such a cer- 
 tain particular kind in other respects. Now we see no 
 more reason why the frame and course of nature should 
 be such a scheme, than why Christianity should. And 
 that the former is such a scheme, renders it credible 
 that the latter, upon supposition of its truth, may be 
 so too. And as it is manifest that Christianity is a 
 scheme revealed but in part, and a scheme in which 
 means are made use of to accomplish ends, like to 
 that of nature, — so the credibility that it may have 
 been all along carried on by general laws, no less than 
 
2£4 Christianity a Scheme ', Part H. 
 
 the course of nature, has been distinctly proved. And 
 from all this it is beforehand credible that there might, 
 I think probable that there would, be the like appear- 
 ance of deficiencies and irregularities in Christianity as 
 in nature ; i. e. that Christianity would be liable to 
 the like objections as the frame of nature. And these 
 objections are answered by these observations concern- 
 ing Christianity, as the like objections against the 
 frame of nature are answered by the like observations 
 concerning the frame of nature. 
 
 The objections against Christianity, considered as 
 a matter of fact,* having in general been obviated in 
 the preceding chapter, and the same, considered as 
 made against the wisdom and goodness of it, having 
 been obviated in this, the next thing, according to the 
 method proposed, is to shew that the principal objec- 
 tions, in particular, against Christianity may be an- 
 swered by particular and full analogies in nature. 
 And as one of them is made against the whole scheme 
 of it together, as just now described, I choose to con- 
 sider it here, rather than in a distinct chapter by itself. 
 The thing objected against this scheme of the Gospel 
 is, " that it seems to suppose God was reduced to the 
 necessity of a long series of intricate means, in order to 
 accomplish his ends, the recovery and salvation of the 
 world ; in like sort as men, for want of understanding 
 or power, not being able to come at their ends direct- 
 ly, are forced to go roundabout ways, and make use 
 of many perplexed contrivances to arrive at them." 
 Now every thing which we see shews the folly of this, 
 
 * P. 19:5. 
 
Chap. IV. Imperfectly comprehended, 263 
 
 considered as an objection against the truth of Chris- 
 tianity. For, according to our manner of conception, 
 God makes use of variety of means, what we often 
 think tedious ones, in the natural course of providence, 
 for the accompli hment of all his ends. Indeed it is 
 certain there is somewhat in this matter quite beyond 
 our comprehension ; but the mystery is as great in na- 
 ture as in Christianity. We know what we ourselves 
 aim at, as final ends, and what courses we take, mere- 
 ly as mean> conducing to those ends. But we are 
 greatly ignorant how far things are considered by the 
 Author of nature, under the single notion of means 
 and ends ; so as that it may be said, this is merely an 
 end, and that merely means, in his regard. And 
 whether there be not some peculiar absurdity in our 
 very manner of conception, concerning this matter, 
 somewhat contradictory arising from our extremely 
 imperfect views of things, it is impossible to say. 
 However, thus much is manifest, that the whole nat- 
 ural world and government of it is a scheme or sys- 
 tem ; not a fixed, but a progressive one ; a scheme, 
 in which the operation of various means takes up a 
 great length of time, before the ends they tend to can 
 be attained. The change of seasons, the ripening of 
 the fruits of the earth, the very history of a flower, is 
 an instance of this, and so is human life. Thus vege- 
 table bodies, and those of animals, though possibly 
 formed at once, yet grow up by degrees to a mature 
 state. And thus rational agents, who animate these 
 latter bodies, are naturally directed to form each his 
 own manners and character, by the gradual gaining of 
 knowledge and experience, and by a long course of 
 action. Our existence is not only successive, as it 
 must be of necessity, but one state of our life and be- 
 ing is appointed by God to be a preparation for an- 
 
266 Christianity * Scheme, 6fr. Part II. 
 
 other, and that to be the means of attaining to anoth- 
 er succeeding one ; infancy to childhood, childhood 
 to youth, youth to mature age. Men are impatient, 
 and for precipitating things ; but the Author of na- 
 ture appears de liberate throughout his operations, ac- 
 complishing his natural ends by slow .successive steps. 
 And there is a plan of things beforehand laid out, 
 which, from the nature of it, requires various systems 
 of means, as well as length of time, in order to the 
 carrying on its several parts into execution. Thus, in 
 the daily course of natural providence, God operates 
 in the very same manner as in the dispensation of 
 Christianity, making one thing subservient to another, 
 this to somewhat farther, and so on, through a pro- 
 gressive series of means, which extend, both backward 
 and forward, beyond our utmost view. Of this man- 
 ner of operation, every thing we see in the course of 
 nature is as much an instance, as any part of the 
 Christian dispensation. 
 
0hap. V. Appointment of a Mediator, &V. 267 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 Of the particular System of Christianity ; the Appoint- 
 ment of a Mediator, and the Redemption of the World 
 by him. 
 
 1 here is not, I think, any thing relating to 
 Christianity which has been more objected against 
 than the mediation of Christ, in some or other of its 
 parts. Yet, upon thorough consideration, there 
 seems nothing less justly liable to it. For, 
 
 I. The whole analogy of nature removes all ima- 
 gined presumption against the general notion of a Me- 
 diator between God and man.* For we find all living 
 creatures are brought into the world, and their life in 
 infancy is preserved, by the instrumentality of others j 
 and every satisfaction of it, some way or other, is be- 
 stowed by the like means. So that the visible govern- 
 ment which God exercises over the world is by the in- 
 strumentality and mediation of others.. And how far 
 his invisible government be or be not so, it is impossi- 
 ble to determine at all by reason. And the supposition 
 that part of it is so, appears, to say the least, altogeth- 
 er as credible as the contrary. There is then no sort 
 of objection, from the light of nature, against the gen- 
 eral notion of a mediator between God and man, con- 
 sidered as a doctrine of Christianity, or as an appoint- 
 ment in this dispensation ; since we find by experience 
 that God does appoint mediators to be the instru- 
 ments of good and evil to us, the instruments of his 
 
 * 1 Tim. ii. 5. 
 
268 The Appointment of Part II. 
 
 justice and his mercy. And the objection here re- 
 ferred to is urged, not against mediation in that high, 
 eminent and peculiar sense in which Christ is our me- 
 diator, but absolutely against the whole notion itself 
 of a mediator at all. 
 
 II. As we must suppose that the world i- under the 
 proper moral government of God, or in a state of re- 
 ligion, before we can enter into consideration of the 
 revealed doctrine concerning the redemption of it by 
 Christ, so that supposition is here to be distinctly tak- 
 en notice of. Now the divine moral government 
 which religion teaches us, implies that the consequence 
 of vice shall be misery, in some future state, by the 
 righteous judgment of God. That such consequent 
 punishment shall take eifect by his appointment, is 
 necessarily implied. But, as it is not in any sort to be 
 supposed, that we are made acquainted with all the 
 ends or reasons for which it is fit future punishments 
 should be inflicted, or why God has appointed such 
 and such consequent misery should follow vice, and as 
 we are altogether in the dark how or in what manner 
 it should follow, by what immediate occasions, or by 
 the instrumentality of what means, there is no absurd- 
 ity in supposing it may follow in a way analogous to 
 that, in which many miseries follow such and such 
 courses of action at present; poverty, sickness, infamy, 
 untimely death by diseases, death from the hands of 
 civil justice. There is no absurdity in supposing fu- 
 ture punishment may follow wickedness of course, as 
 we speak, or in the way of natural consequence from 
 God's original constitution of the world, from the na- 
 ture he has given us, and from the condition in which 
 he places us ; or in a like manner, as a person rashly tri- 
 fling upon a precipice, in the way of natural conse- 
 quence, falls down j in the way of natural consequence, 
 
Chap. V. a Mediator and Redeemer. 269 
 
 breaks his limbs, suppose ; in the way of natural con- 
 sequence of this, without help, perishes, 
 
 Some good men may perhaps be offended, with 
 hearing it spoken of as a supposable thing, that the 
 future punishments of wickedness may be in the way 
 of natural consequence ; as if this were taking the ex- 
 ecution of justice out of the hands of God, and giv- 
 ing it to nature. But they should remember, that 
 when things come to pass according to the course of 
 nature, this does not hinder them from being his do- 
 ing, who is the God of nature ; and that the Scrip- 
 ture ascribes tho.se punishments to divine justice which 
 are known to be natural and which must be called so, 
 when distinguished from such as are miraculous. But 
 after all, this supposition, or rather this way of speak- 
 ing, is here made use of only by way of illustration of 
 the subject before us. For since it must be admitted, 
 that the future punishment of wickedness is not a mat- 
 ter of arbitrary appointment, but of reason, equity 
 and justice, it comes, for aught I see, to the same thing, 
 whether it is supposed to be inflicted in a way analo- 
 gous to that in which the temporal punishments of 
 vice and folly are inflicted, or in any other way. And 
 though there were a difference, it is allowable, in the 
 present case, to make this supposition, plainly not an 
 incredible one, that future punishment may follow 
 wickedness in the way of natural consequence, or ac- 
 cording to some general laws of government already 
 established in the universe. 
 
 nl. Upon this supposition, or even without it, we 
 may observe somewhat much to the present purpose 
 in the constitution of nature or appointments of Prov- 
 idence ; the provision which is made that all the bad 
 natural consequences of men's actions should not al- 
 ways actually follow ; or that such bad consequences 
 
270 The Appointment of Part IL 
 
 as, according to the settled course of things, would in- 
 evitably have followed if not prevented, should in 
 certain degrees be prevented. We are apt presump- 
 tuously to imagine, that the world might have been so 
 constituted, as that there would not have been any such 
 thing as misery or evil. On the contrary we find the 
 Author of nature permits it ; but then he has provid- 
 ed reliefs, and, in many cases, perfect remedies for it, 
 after some pains and difficulties ; reliefs and remedies 
 even for that evil, which is the fruit of our own mis- 
 conduct ; and which, in the course of nature, would 
 have continued and ended in our destruction, but for 
 such remedies. And this is an instance both of sever- 
 ity and indulgence, in the constitution of nature. 
 Thus all the bad consequences now mentioned, of a 
 man's trifling upon a precipice, might be prevented. 
 And though all were not, yet some of them might, by 
 proper interposition, if not rejected ; by another's 
 coming to the rash man's relief, with his own laying 
 hold on that relief, in such sort as the case required. 
 Persons may do a great deal themselves towards pre- 
 venting the bad consequences of their follies ; and 
 more may be done by themselves, together with the 
 assistance of others their fellow creatures ; which as- 
 sistance nature requires and prompts us to. This is 
 the general constitution of the world. Now suppose 
 k had been so constituted, that after such actions were 
 done as were foreseen naturally to draw after them 
 misery to the doer, it should have been no more in 
 human power to have prevented that naturally conse- 
 quent misery, in any instance, than it is in all, — no 
 one can say whether such a more severe constitution 
 of things might not yet have been really good. But 
 that, on the contrary, provision is made by nature, that 
 we may and do to so great degree prevent the bad 
 
Chap. V. a Mediator and Redeemer. 271 
 
 natural effects of our follies, — this may be called 
 mercy or compassion in the original constitution of the 
 world; compassion as distinguished from goodness in 
 general. And, the whole known constitution and 
 course of things affording us instances of such com- 
 passion, it would be according to the analogy of na- 
 ture to hope, that, however ruinous the natural con- 
 sequences of vice might be, from the general laws of 
 God's government over the universe, — yet provision 
 might be made, possibly might have been originally 
 made, for preventing those ruinous consequences from 
 inevitably following ; at least from following univer- 
 sally, and in all cases. 
 
 Many, I am sensible, will wonder at finding thi3 
 made a question, or spoken of as in any degree doubt- 
 ful. The generality of mankind are so far from hav- 
 ing that awful sense of things, which the present state 
 of vice and misery and darkness seems to make but 
 reasonable, that they have scarce any apprehension or 
 thought at all about this matter any way ; and some 
 serious persons may have spoken unadvisedly concern- 
 ing it. But let us observe what w T e experience to be, 
 and what from the very constitution of nature cannot 
 but be, the consequences of irregular and disorderly 
 behaviour ; even of such rashness, wilfulness, neglects, 
 as we scarce call vicious. Now it is natural to appre- 
 hend, that the bad consequences of irregularity will be 
 greater in proportion as the irregularity is so. And 
 there is no comparison between these irregularities, and 
 the greater instances of vice, or a dissolute profligate 
 disregard to all religion, if there be any thing at all in 
 religion. For consider what it is for creatures, moral 
 agents, presumptuously to introduce that confusion and 
 misery into the kingdom of God, which mankind have 
 in fact introduced — to blaspheme the sovereign Lord 
 
272 The Appoint rrunt of Part II. 
 
 of all — to contemn his authority — to be injurious to 
 the degree they are, to their fellow creatures, the crea- 
 tures of God. Add that the effects of vice in the 
 present world are often extreme misery, irretrievable 
 ruin, and even death ; and upon putting all this to- 
 gether iu will appear, that as no one can say in what 
 degree fatal the unprevented consequences of vice may 
 be, according to the general rule of divine govern- 
 ment, so it is by no means intuitively certain how far 
 these consequences could possibly, in the nature of the 
 thing, be prevented, consistently with the eternal rule 
 of right, or with what is in fact the moral constitution 
 of nature. However, there would be large ground to 
 hope that the universal government was not so severely 
 strict but that there was room for pardon, or for hav- 
 ing those penal consequences prevented. Yet, 
 
 IV. There seems no probability that any thing we 
 could do would alone and of itself prevent them ; pre- 
 vent their following or being inflicted. But one would 
 think, at least, it were impossible that the contrary 
 should be thought certain. For we are not acquaint- 
 ed with the whole of the case. We are not informed 
 of all the reasons which render it fit that future pun- 
 ishments should be inflicted, and therefore cannot 
 know whether any thing we could do would make 
 such an alteration as to render it fit that they should 
 be remitted. We do not know what the whole nat- 
 ural or appointed consequences of vice are, nor in what 
 way they would follow, if not prevented; and there- 
 fore can in no sort say, whether we could do anything 
 which would be sufficient to prevent them. Our ig- 
 norance being thus manifest, let us recollect the analo- 
 gy of nature or Providence. For, though this may be 
 but a slight ground to raise a positive opinion upon in 
 this matter, yet it is sufficient to answer a mere arbi- 
 
Chap. V. a Mediator and Redeemer. 273 
 
 trary assertion, without any kind of evidence, urge'd by 
 way of objection against a doctrine, the proof of which 
 is not reason but revelation. Consider then — people 
 ruin their fortunes by extravagance ; they bring dis- 
 eases upon themselves by excess ; they incur the pen- 
 alties of civil laws, and surely civil government is nat- 
 ural ; will sorrow for these follies past, and behaving 
 well for the future, alone and of itself prevent the nat- 
 ural consequences of them ? On the contrary, men's 
 natural abilities of helping themselves are often im- 
 paired .; or if not, yet they are forced to be beholden 
 to the assistance of others, upon several accounts and 
 in different ways ; assistance which they would have 
 had no occasion for had it not been for their miscon- 
 duct, but which, in the disadvantageous condition 
 they have reduced themselves to, is absolutely neces- 
 sary to their recovery, and retrieving their affairs. 
 Now since this is our case, considering ourselves mere- 
 ly as inhabitants of this world, and as having a tem* 
 poral interest here, under the natural government of 
 God, which however has a great deal moral in it,— 
 why is it not supposable that this may be our case also 
 in our more important capacity, as under his perfect' 
 moral government, and having a more general and fu- 
 ture interest depending ? If we have misbehaved in 
 this higher capacity, and rendered ourselves obnoxious 
 to the future punishment which God has annexed to 
 vice, it is plainly credible, that behaving well for the 
 time to come, may be — not useless, God forbid- 
 but wholly insufficient, alone and of itself, to prevent 
 that punishment, or to put us in the condition which 
 we should have been in had we preserved our inno- 
 cence. 
 
 And though we ought to reason with all reverence, 
 whenever we reason concerning the divine conduct, yet 
 
 M M 
 
274 The Appointment of Part II. 
 
 it may be added, that it is clearly contrary to all our 
 notions of government, as well as to what is in fact the 
 general constitution of nature, to suppose that doing 
 well for the future should, in all cases, prevent all the 
 judicial bad consequences of having done evil, or all 
 the punishment annexed to disobedience. And we 
 have manifestly nothing from whence to determine, in 
 what degree and in what cases reformation would pre- 
 vent this punishment^ even supposing that it would in 
 some. And though the efficacy of repentance itself 
 alone, to prevent what mankind had rendered them- 
 selves obnoxious to, and recover what they had for- 
 feited, is now insisted upon in opposition to Christian- 
 ity, — yet, by the general prevalence of propitiatory 
 sacrifices over the heathen world, this notion of re- 
 pentance alone being sufficient to expiate guilt, ap- 
 pears to be contrary to the general sense of mankind. 
 Upon the whole then, had the laws, the general 
 laws of God's government been permitted to operate, 
 without any interposition in our behalf, the future 
 punishment, for aught we know to the contrary, or 
 have any reason to think, must inevitably have follow- 
 ed, notwithstanding any thing we could have done to 
 prevent it. Now, 
 
 V. In this darkness, or this light of nature, call it 
 which you please, revelation comes in — confirms every 
 doubting fear, which could enter into the heart of 
 man, concerning the future unprevented consequence 
 of wickedness — supposes the world to be in a state of 
 ruin — (a supposition which seems the very ground of 
 the Christian dispensation, and which, if not proveable 
 by reason, yet it is in no wise contrary to it) teaches 
 us too, that the rules of divine government are such as 
 not to admit of pardon immediately and directly upon 
 repentance, or by the sole efficacy of it ; but then 
 
Chap. V. a Mediator and Redeemer. 275' 
 
 teaches at the same time what nature might justly have 
 hoped, that the moral government of the universe was 
 not so rigid, but that there was room for an interpo- 
 sition to avert the fatal consequences of vice, which 
 therefore by this means does admit of pardon. Rev- 
 elation teaches us, that the unknown law< of God's 
 more general government, no less than the particular 
 laws by which we experience he governs us at present, 
 are compassionate,* as well as good in the more Gene- 
 ral notion of goodness ; and that he hath mercifully 
 provided that there should be an interposition to pre- 
 vent the destruction of human kind, whatever that 
 destruction unprevented would have been. God so 
 loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that 
 whosoever believeth, not to be sure in a speculative, 
 but in a practical sense, that whosoever believeth in him 
 should not perish ;f gave his Son in the same way of 
 goodness to the world as he affords particular persons 
 the friendly assistance of their fellow creatures, when 
 without it their temporal ruin would be the certain 
 consequence of their follies ; in the same way of good- 
 ness, I say, though in a transcendent and infinitely 
 higher degree. And the Son of God loved us and gave 
 himself for us, with a love which he himself compares 
 to that of human friendship, though in this case all 
 comparisons must fall infinitely short of the thing in- 
 tended to be illustrated by them. He interposed in 
 such a manner, as was necessary and effectual to pre- 
 vent that execution of justice upon sinners, which 
 God had appointed should otherwise have been exe- 
 cuted upon them ; or in such a manner as to pre- 
 vent that punishment from actually following, which, 
 according to the general laws of divine government, 
 
 * P. 269, &c. f Joh. iii. 16/ 
 
276 The Appointment of Part II, 
 
 must have followed the sins of the world, had it not 
 been for such interposition.* 
 
 If any thing here said should appear, upon first 
 thought, inconsistent with divine goodness, a second, 
 I am persuaded, will entirely remove that appearance. 
 For were we to suppose the constitution of things to 
 be such as that the whole creation must have perished, 
 had it not been for somewhat, which God had ap- 
 pointed should be, in order to prevent that ruin, — ■ 
 even this supposition would not be inconsistent in any 
 degree with the most absolutely perfect goodness. But 
 still it may be thought, that this whole manner of 
 treating the subject before us supposes mankind to be 
 naturally in a very strange state. And truly so it does. 
 But it is not Christianity which has put us into this 
 state. Whoever will consider the manifold miseries, 
 and the extreme wickedness of the world, that the best 
 have great wrongnesses within themselves, which they 
 complain of and endeavour to amend, but that the 
 generality grow more profligate and corrupt with age ; 
 that heathen moralists thought the present state to be 
 
 * It cannot, I suppose, be imagined, even by the most cursory reader, 
 that it is in any sort affirmed or implied in any tiling said in this chapter, 
 that none can have the benefit of the general Redemption but such as have 
 the advantage of being made acquainted with it in the present life. But it 
 maybe needful to mention, that several questions which have been brought 
 into the subject before us, and determined, are not in the least entered into 
 here ; questions which have been, I fear, rashly determined, and perhaps 
 frith equal rashness contrary ways. For instance, whether God could have 
 saved the world by other means than the deitth of Christ, consistently with 
 (he general laws of his government. And had not Chrir.t come into the 
 world, what would have been the future condition of the better sort of men, 
 those just persons over the face of the earth, for whom Manasset in his pray- 
 er asserts, repentance was nor appointed. The meaning of the first of these 
 questions is greatly ambiguous; and neither of them can properly be answer- 
 ed, without going upon that infinitely absurd supposition, that we know the 
 whole of the case. And perhaps the very inquiry, what would have followed 
 ,f God bad not d.nr as h* far, may have in it some very great impropriety, and 
 ought not to be carried on any farther than is necessary to hejp our partial 
 and inadequate conceptions of ihu 
 
Chap. V. a Mediator and Redeemer. Tl*l 
 
 a state of punishment ; and what might be added, that 
 the earth our habitation has the appearances of being 
 a ruin ; — whoever, T say, will consider all these, and 
 some other obvious things, will think he has little rea- 
 son to object against the scripture account, that man- 
 kind is in a state of degradation ; against this being the 
 fact, how difficult soever he may think it to account 
 for, or even to form a distinct conception of the occa- 
 sions -and circumstances of it. But that the crime of 
 our first parents was the occasion of our being placed 
 in a more disadvantageous condition, is a thing 
 throughout and particularly analogous to what we see 
 in the daily course of natural providence ; as the re- 
 covery of the world by the interposition of Christ has 
 been shewn to be so in general. 
 
 VI. The particular manner in which Christ inter- 
 posed in the redemption of the world, or his office as 
 mediator ', in the largest sense, between God and man, is 
 thus represented to us in the Scripture. He is the 
 light of the world ;* the revealer of the will of God in 
 the most eminent sense. He is a propitiatory sacri- 
 fice ;t The Lamb of God ;\ and, as he voluntarily of- 
 fered himself up, he is stiled our high priest. § And, 
 which seems of peculiar weight, he is described be- 
 forehand in the Old Testament, under the same char- 
 acters of a priest, and an expiatory victim. || And 
 whereas it is objected, that all this is merely by way of 
 allusion to the sacrifices of the Mosaick law, the apos- 
 tle on the contrary affirms, that the law was a shad- 
 ow of good things to come, and not the very image of the 
 things ;** and that the priests that offer gifts according to 
 
 * Joh. i. and viii. 12. f Rom. iii. 25, and v. 11. 1 Cor. v. 7. Eph. 
 
 v. 2. 1 Joh. ii. 2. Matth. xxvi. 28. \ Joh. i. 29, 36, and through- 
 
 out the book of Revelation. § Throughout the Epistle to the He- 
 
 brews. H Isai. liii. Dan. ix. 24. Ps, ex. 4. ** Heb. x. 1. 
 
278 The Appointment of Part II. 
 
 the law — serve unto the example and shadow of heaven- 
 ly things , as Moses was admonished of God when he was 
 about to make the tabernacle. For see, saith he, that tbou 
 make all things according to the pattern shewed to thee in 
 the mount ;* i. e. the Leviticai priesthood was a shad- 
 ow of the priesthood of Christ, in like manner as the 
 tabernacle made by Moses, was according to that shew- 
 ed him in the mount. The priesthood of Christ, and 
 the tabernacle in the mount, were the originals ; of 
 the former of which the Leviticai priesthood was a 
 type, and of the latter the tabernacle made by Moses 
 was a copy. The doctrine of this epistle then plainly 
 is, that the legal sacrifices were allusions to the great 
 and final atonement, to be made by the blood of 
 Christ ; and not that this was an allusion to those. 
 Nor can any thing be more express or determinate, 
 than the following passage. // is not possible that the 
 blood of bulls and of goats should take away sin. Where- 
 fore when he comet h into the world, he saith, sacrifice and 
 offering, i. e. of bulls and of goats, thou wouldest not, but 
 a body hast thou prepared me — Lo I come to do thy will 
 God — By which will we are sanctified, through the 
 offering of the body of Jesus Christ once for alL\ And to 
 add one passage more of the like kind — Christ was once 
 offered to bear the sins of many, and unto them that look 
 for him shall he appear the second time, without sin, i. e. 
 without bearing sin as he did at his first coming, by 
 being an offering for it, without having our iniquities 
 again laid upon him, without being any more a sin of- 
 fering ; — unto them that look for him shall he appear the 
 second time, without sin, unto salvation.\ Nor do the 
 inspired writers at all confine themselves to this man- 
 ner of speaking concerning the satisfaction of Christ, 
 but declare an efficacy in what he did and suffered for 
 
 * Heb viiL 4, 5. f Heb. x. 4, 5, 7, 9, 10. J Heb. ix 28. 
 
Chap. V. a Mediate and Redeemer. 27# 
 
 us, additional to and beyond mere instruction, exam- 
 ple and government, in great variety of expression ; 
 That Jesus should die for that nation the Jews ; and not 
 for that nation only, but that also, plainly by the efficacy 
 of his death, he should gather together in one, the children 
 of God that were scattered abroad ;* that he suffered for 
 sins, the just for the unjust ;f that he gave his life, himself, 
 a ransom ;\ that we are bought, bought with a -price ;§ 
 that he redeemed us with his blood ; redeemed us from the 
 curse of the law, being made a curse for us ;|| that he is 
 our advocate, intercessor and propitiation ;** that he 
 was made perfect, or consummate, through sufferings ; 
 and being thus made perfect, he became the author of sal- 
 vat ion ;ft that God was in Christ reconciling the world 
 to himself by the death of his son, by the cross, not imputing 
 their trespasses unto them ;\\ and lastly, that through 
 derth he destroyed him that had the power of death. %% 
 Christ then having thus humbled himself , and become obe» 
 dient to death, even the death of the cross, God also hath 
 highly exalted him, and given him a name which is above 
 every name ; hath given all things into his hands ; hath 
 committed all judgment unto him ; that all men should hon- 
 our the Son even as they honour the Father, \\\\ For, wor- 
 thy is the lamb that was slain, to receive power, and rich* 
 es, and wisdom, and strength, and honour, and glory, and 
 blessing. And every creature which is in heaven, and on 
 the earth, heard I, saying, Blessing, and honour, and glo- 
 ry, and power, be unto him that sitteth upon the throne, 
 and unto the Lamb for ever and eve tM 
 
 * Joh. xi. 51, 52. f 1 Pet. iii. 18. \ Matth. xx. 28. Mark x, 
 
 45. 1 Tim. ii. 6. § 2 Pet. ii. 1. Rev. xiv. 4. 1 Cor. vi. 20. 
 
 |f 1 Pet. i. 19. Rev.v. 9. Gal. iii. 13. * ** Heb. vii. 25. 1 Joh. ii, 
 1, 2. ff Heb. ii. 10, and v. 9. # 2 Cor. v. 19. Rom. v. 10. Eph. 
 n. 16. §§ Heb. 5. 1 4, See also a remarkable passage in the Book of 
 
 Job, xxxiii. 24, flg Phil. ii. §, 9. Joh, iij. 85, and v. 25* £§, 
 
 j Rev. v. 12, m: 
 
2S0 The Appointment of Part II. 
 
 These passages of Scripture seem to comprehend 
 and express the chief parts of Christ's office, as media- 
 tor between God and man, so far, I mean, as the na- 
 ture of this his office is revealed ; and it is usually 
 treated of by divines under three heads. 
 
 First, he was, by way of eminence, the prophet ; 
 that prophet that should come into the world* to declare 
 the divine will. He published anew the law of nature 
 which men had corrupted, and the very knowledge of 
 which, to some degree, was lost among them. He 
 taught mankind, taught us authoritatively, to live so- 
 berly, righteously and godly in this present world, in ex- 
 pectation of the future judgment of God. He con- 
 firmed the truth of this moral system of nature, and 
 gave us additional evidence of it, the evidence of tes- 
 timony.! He distinctly revealed the manner in which 
 God would be worshipped, the efficacy of repentance, 
 and the rewards and punishments of a future life. 
 Thus he was a prophet in a sense in which no other 
 ever was. To which is to be added, that he set us a 
 perfect example, that we should follow his steps. 
 
 Secondly, he has a kingdom, which is not of this world. 
 He founded a church, to be to mankind a standing 
 memorial of religion, and invitation to it, which he 
 promised to be with always even to the end. He ex- 
 ercises an invisible government over it himself, and by 
 his Spirit ; over that part of it which is militant here 
 on earth, a government of discipline,/^ the perfecting 
 of the saints, for the edifying his body, till we all come, 
 in the unity of the faith, and of the knowledge of the Son 
 of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature 
 jf the fulness of Chrht.\ Of this church, all persons 
 scattered over the world, who live in obedience to his 
 laws, are members. For these he is gone to prepare a 
 
 - Joh. v\ 14. f P. L'lC, &c. \ £ph. iv. 12, IS. 
 
Chap. V. a Mediator and Redeemer. 281 
 
 place, and will come again to receive them unto himself \ 
 that where he h there they may be also — and reign with 
 him for ever and ever ;* and likewise to take vengeance 
 on them that know not God, and obey not his Gospel ,f 
 
 Against these parts of Christ's office, I find no ob- 
 jections but what are fully obviated in the beginning 
 of this chapter. 
 
 Lastly, Christ offered himself a propitiatory sacrifice, 
 and made atonement for the sins of the world ; which 
 is mentioned last in regard to what is objected against 
 it. Sacrifices of expiation were commanded the Jews, 
 and obtained amongst most other nations from tradi- 
 tion, whose original probably was revelation. And 
 they were continually repeated, both occasionally, and 
 at the returns of stated times, and made up great part 
 of the external religion of mankind. But now once in 
 the end of the world Christ appeared to put away sin by 
 the sacrifice of himself \ And this sacrifice was, in the 
 highest degree and with the most extensive influence* 
 of that efficacy for obtaining pardon of sin, which the 
 heathens may be supposed to have thought their sac- 
 rifices to have been, and which the Jewish sacrifices 
 really were in some degree, and with regard to some 
 persons. 
 
 How and in what particular way it had this efficacy, 
 there are not wanting persons who have endeavoured 
 to explain ; but I do not find that the Scripture has 
 explained it. We seem to be very much in the dark 
 concerning the manner in which the ancients under- 
 stood atonement to be made, i. e. pardon to be ob- 
 tained by sacrifices. And if the Scripture has, as 
 surely it has, left this matter of the satisfaction of 
 Christ mysterious, left somewhat in it unrevealed, all 
 
 * Joh. xiv. 2, 3. Rev. mil . 21. and xi. 15. 
 
 f 2 Thess. i. 8. f Heb. ir. 26. 
 
 N N 
 
282 The Appointment of Part II. 
 
 conjectures about it must be, if not evidently absurd, 
 yet at least uncertain. Nor has any one reason to 
 complain for want of farther information, unless he 
 can shew his claim to it. 
 
 Some having endeavoured to explain the efficacy of 
 what Christ has done and suffered for us, beyond what 
 the Scripture has authorized, others, probably because 
 they could not explain it, have been for taking it away, 
 and confining his office as redeemer of the world to his 
 instruction, example and government of the church. 
 Whereas the doctrine of the gospel appears to be, not 
 only that he taught the efficacy of repentance, but 
 rendered it of the efficacy which it is by what he did 
 and suffered for us ; that he obtained for us the ben- 
 efit of having our repentance accepted unto eternal 
 life ; not only that he revealed to sinners that they 
 were in a capacity of salvation, and how they might 
 obtain it, but moreover that he put them into this 
 capacity of salvation by what he did and suffered for 
 them ; put us into a capacity of escaping future pun- 
 ishment, and obtaining future happiness. And it is 
 our wisdom thankfully to accept the benefit, by per- 
 forming the conditions upon which it is offered on our 
 part, without disputing how it was procured on his, 
 For, 
 
 VII. Since we neither know by what means punish- 
 ment in a future state would have followed wickedness 
 in this ; nor in what manner it would have been in- 
 flicted had it not been prevented ; nor all the reasons 
 why its infliction would have been needful ; nor the 
 particular nature of that state of happiness which 
 Christ is gone to prepare for his disciples ; and since 
 we are ignorant how far any thing which we could do 
 would, alone and of itself, have been effectual to pre- 
 vent that punishment to which we were obnoxious, 
 
Chap. V. a Mediator and Redeemer. 283 
 
 and recover that happiness which we had forfeited, — 
 it is most evident we are not judges antecedently to 
 revelation, whether a mediator was or was not neces- 
 sary to obtain those ends, to prevent that future pun- 
 ishment, and bring mankind to the final happiness of 
 their nature. And for the very same reasons, upon 
 supposition of the necessity of a mediator, we are no 
 more judges antecedently to revelation, of the whole 
 nature of his office, or the several parts of which it con- 
 sists, of what was fit and requisite to be assigned him, 
 in order to accomplish the ends of divine Providence 
 in the appointment. And from hence it follows, that 
 to object against the expediency or usefulness of par- 
 ticular things, revealed to have been done or suffered 
 by him, because we do not see how they were condu- 
 cive to those ends, is highly absurd. Yet nothing is 
 more common to be met with than this absurdity. 
 But if it be acknowledged beforehand that we are not 
 judges in the case, it is evident that no objection can, 
 with any shadow of reason, be urged against any par- 
 ticular part of Christ's mediatorial office revealed in 
 Scripture, till it can be shewn positively not to be re- 
 quisite or conducive to the ends proposed to be accom- 
 plished, or that it is in itself unreasonable. 
 
 And there is one objection made against the satis- 
 faction of Christ, which looks to be of this positive 
 kind, that the doctrine of his being appointed to suf- 
 fer for the sins of the world, represents God as being 
 indifferent whether he punished the innocent or the 
 guilty. Now from the foregoing observations we may 
 see the extreme slightness of all such objections ; and 
 (though it is most certain all who make them do not 
 see the consequence) that they conclude altogether as 
 much against God's whole original constitution of na- 
 ture, and the whole dailv course of divine Providence 
 
284 The Appointment of Part II. 
 
 in the government of the world, i. e. against the whole 
 scheme of theism, and the whole notion of religion, as 
 against Christianity. For the world is a constitution 
 or system, whose parts have a mutual reference to each 
 other ; and there is a scheme of things gradually car- 
 rying on, called the course of nature, to the carrying 
 on of which God has appointed us, in various ways, 
 to contribute. And when, in the daily course of nat- 
 ural providence, it is appointed that innocent people 
 should suffer for the faults of the guilty, this is liable 
 to the very same objection as the instance we are now 
 considering. The infinitely greater importance of that 
 appointment of Christianity which is objected against, 
 does not hinder but it may be, as it plainly is, an ap- 
 pointment of the very same kind with what the world 
 affords us daily examples of. Nay, if there were any 
 force at all in the objection, it would be stijpnger in 
 one respect against natural providence than against 
 Christianity ; because under the former we are in 
 many cases commanded, and even necessitated wheth- 
 er we will or not, to suffer for the faults of others — 
 whereas the sufferings of Christ were voluntary. The 
 world's being under the righteous government of God 
 does indeed imply that, finally and upon the whole, 
 every one shall receive according to his personal de- 
 serts ; and the general doctrine of the whole Scripture 
 is, that this shall be the completion of the divine gov- 
 ernment. But during the progress, and for aught we 
 know even in order to the completion of this moral 
 scheme, vicarious punishments may be fit, and abso- 
 lutely necessary. Men by their follies run themselves 
 into extreme distress, into difficulties which would be 
 absolutely fatal to them, were it not for the interposi- 
 tion and assistance of others. God commands by 
 the law of nature, that we afford them this assistance* 
 
Chap. V. a Mediator and Redeemer. 285 
 
 in many cases where we cannot do it without very- 
 great pains, and labour, and sufferings to ourselves. 
 And we see in what variety of ways one person's suf- 
 ferings contribute to the relief of another ; and how, 
 or by what particular means, this comes to pass or fol- 
 lows, from the con titution and laws of nature which 
 come under our notice ; and being familiarized to it 
 men are not shocked with it. So that the reason of 
 their insisting upon objections of the foregoing kind 
 against the satisfaction of Christ, is, either that they 
 do not. consider God's settled and uniform appoint- 
 ments as his appointments at all, or else they forget 
 that vicarious punishment is a providential appoint- 
 ment of every day's experience ; and then, from their 
 being unacquainted with the more general laws of na- 
 ture Gr divine government over the world, and not see- 
 ing how the sufferings of Christ could contribute to 
 the redemption of it, unless by arbitrary and tyranni- 
 cal will. — they conclude his sufferings could not con- 
 tribute to it any other way. And yet, what has been 
 often alleged in justification of this doctrine, even from 
 the apparent natural tendency of this method of our 
 redemption ; its tendency to vindicate the authority 
 of God's law.;, and deter his creatures from sin, — this 
 has never yet been answered, and is I think plainly un- 
 answerable, though I am far from thinking it an ac- 
 count of the whole of the case. But without taking 
 this into consideration, it abundantly appears from the 
 observations above made, that this objection is not an 
 objection against Christianity, but against the whole 
 general constitution of nature. And if it were to be 
 considered as an objection against Christianity, or con- 
 sidering it as it is, an objection against the constitu- 
 tion of nature, — it amounts to no more in conclusion 
 than this, that a divine appointment cannot be neces- 
 
286 The Appointment of Part Ii. 
 
 sary or expedient, because the objector does not dis- 
 cern it tc be so, though he must own that the nature 
 of the case is such, as renders him uncapable of judging 
 whether it be so or not, or of seeing it to be necessary, 
 though it were so. 
 
 It is indeed a matter of great patience to reasonable 
 men, to find people arguing in this manner, objecting 
 against the credibility of such particular things revealed 
 in Scripture, that they do not see the necessity or expe- 
 diency of them. For though it is highly right, and 
 the most pious exercise of our understanding, to in- 
 quire with due reverence into the ends and reasons of 
 God's dispensations, — yet when those reasons are con- 
 cealed, to argue from our ignorance that such dispen- 
 sations cannot be from God, is infinitely absurd. The 
 presumption of this kind of objections seems almost 
 lost in the folly of them. And the folly of them is 
 yet greater, when they are urged, as usually they are, 
 against things in Christianity analogous or like to those 
 natural dispensations of Providence which are matter 
 of experience. Let reason be kept to ; and if any 
 part of the scripture account of the redemption of the 
 world by Christ can be shewn to be really contrary to 
 it, let the Scripture, in the name of God, be given up ; 
 but let not such poor creatures as we, go on objecting 
 against an infinite scheme, that we do not see the ne- 
 cessity or usefulness of all its parts, and call this rea- 
 soning ; and, which still farther heightens the absurd- 
 ity in the present case, parts which we are not actively 
 concerned in. For it may be worth mentioning, 
 
 Lastly, that not only the reason of the thing, but 
 the whole analogy of nature, should teach us not to 
 expect to have the like information concerning the 
 divine conduct as concerning our own duty. God 
 instructs us by experience, (for it is not reason, but 
 
Chap. V. a Mediator and Redeemer, 287 
 
 experience which instructs us) what good or bad con* 
 sequences will follow from our acting in such and such 
 manners ; and by this he directs us how we are to be- 
 have ourselves. But, though we are sufficiently in- 
 structed for the common purposes of life, yet it is but 
 an almost infinitely small part of natural providence 
 which we are at all let into. The case is the same 
 with regard to revelation. The doctrine of a mediator 
 between God and man, against which it is objected 
 that the expediency of some things in it is not under- 
 stood, relates only to what was done on God's part in 
 the appointment, and on the Mediator's in the exe- 
 cution of it. For what is required of us, in conse- 
 quence of this gracious dispensation, is another sub- 
 ject in which none can complain for want of informa- 
 tion. The constitution of the world, and God's nat- 
 ural government over it, is all mystery, as much as the 
 Christian dispensation. Yet under the first he has 
 given men all things pertaining to life, and under the 
 other all things pertaining unto godliness. And it 
 may be added, that there is nothing hard to be ac- 
 counted for in any of the common precepts of Chris- 
 tianity; though if there were, surely a divine command 
 is abundantly sufficient to lay us under the strongest 
 obligations to obedience. But the fact is, that the 
 reasons of all the Christian precepts are evident. Posi- 
 tive institutions are manifestly necessary to keep up 
 and propagate religion amongst mankind. And our 
 duty to Christ, the internal and external worship of 
 him ; this part of the religion of the Gospel manifest- 
 ly arises out of what he has done and suffered, his au- 
 thority and dominion, and the relation which he is 
 revealed to stand in to us.* 
 
 * P. 223, &c. 
 
28 S Revelation not universal: Part II. 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 Of the want of Universality in Revelation ; and of the 
 supposed Deficiency in the Proof of it. 
 
 It has been thought by some persons, that if the ev- 
 idence of revelation appears doubtful, this itself turns 
 into a positive argument against it, because it cannot 
 be supposed that if it were true it would be left to sub- 
 sist upon doubtful evidence. And the objection against 
 revelation from its not being universal is often insisted 
 upon as of great weight. 
 
 Now the weakness of these opinions may be shewn, 
 by observing the suppositions on which they are foun- 
 ded, which are really such as these, — that it cannot be 
 thought God would have bestowed any favour at all 
 upon us, unless in the degree which we think he might, 
 and which we imagine would be most to our particu- 
 lar advantage ; and also that it cannot be thought he 
 would bestow a favour upon any unless he bestowed 
 the same upon all ; suppositions which we find contra- 
 dicted not by a few instances in God's natural govern- 
 ment of the world, but by the general analogy of na- 
 ture together. 
 
 Persons who speak of the evidence of religion as 
 doubtful, and of this supposed doubtfulness as a posi- 
 tive argument against it, should be put upon consid- 
 ering what that evidence indeed is, which they act up- 
 on with regard to their temporal interests. For, it is 
 not only extremely difficult, but, in many cases, abso- 
 lutely impossible, to balance pleasure and pain, satis- 
 
Chap. VI. Supposed Deficiency in its Proof. 289 
 
 faction and uneasiness, so as to be able to say on which 
 side the overplus is. There are the like difficulties and 
 im possibilities in making the due allowances for a 
 change of temper and taste, for satiety, disgusts, ill 
 health ; any of which render men incapable of enjoy, 
 ing, after they have obtained, what they most eagerly 
 desired. Numberless too are the accidents, besides 
 that one of untimely death, which may even probably 
 disappoint the best concerted schemes ; and strong ob- 
 jections are often seen to lie against them, not to be re- 
 moved or answered, but which seem overbalanced by 
 reasons on the other side ; so as that the certain dif- 
 ficulties and dangers of the pursuit are, by every one, 
 thought justly disregarded, upon account of the ap- 
 pearing greater advantages in case of success, though 
 there be but little probability of it. Lastly, every one 
 observes our liableness, if we be not upon our guard, 
 to be deceived by the falsehood of men, and the false 
 appearances of things ; and this danger must be greatly 
 increased, if there be a strong bias within, suppose 
 from indulged passion, to favour the deceit. Hence 
 arises that great uncertainty and doubtfulness of proof, 
 wherein our temporal interest really consists, what are 
 the most probable means of attaining it, and whether 
 those means will eventually be successful. And num- 
 berless instances there are, in the daily course of life, 
 in which all men think it reasonable to engage in pur* 
 suits, though the probability is greatly against suc- 
 ceeding, and to make such provision for themselves, 
 as it is supposable they may have occasion for, though 
 the plain acknowledged probability is that they never 
 shall. Then those who think the objection against 
 revelation, from its light not being universal, to be of 
 weight, should observe, that the Author of nature, in 
 numberless instances, bestows that upon some which 
 
 o o 
 
290 Revelation not universal : Part II, 
 
 he does not upon others who seem equally to stand in 
 need of it. Indeed he appears to bestow all his gifts 
 with the most promiscuous variety among creatures 
 of the same species ; health and strength, capacities 
 of prudence and of knowledge, means of improvement, 
 riches, and all external advantages. And as there are 
 not any two men found of exactly like shape and fea- 
 tures, so it is probable there are not any two of an ex- 
 actly like constitution, temper and situation, with re- 
 gard to the goods and evils of life. Yet, notwithstand- 
 ing these uncertainties and varieties., God does exercise 
 a natural government over the world, and there is such 
 a thing as a prudent and imprudent institution of life,, 
 with regard to our health and our affairs, under that 
 his natural government. 
 
 As neither the Jewish nor Christian^revelation have 
 been universal, and as they have been afforded to a 
 greater or less part of the world, at different times, 
 so likewise at different times both revelations have had 
 different degrees of evidence. The Jews who lived 
 during the succession of prophets, that is, from Moses 
 till after the captivity, had higher evidence of the 
 truth of their religion, than those had, who lived in 
 the interval between the last mentioned period and 
 the coming of Christ. And the first Christians had 
 higher evidence of the miracles wrought in attestation 
 of Christianity than what we have now. They had 
 also a strong presumptive proof of the truth of it, per- 
 haps of much greater force, in way of argument, than 
 many think, of which we have very little remaining ; 
 I mean the presumptive proof of its truth, from the 
 influence which it had upon the lives of the generality 
 of its professors. And we, or future ages, may possi- 
 bly have a proof oh it, which they could not have, 
 from the conformity between the prophetick history 
 
Chap. VI. Supposed Deficiency in its Proof. 291 
 
 and the state of the world and of Christianity. And 
 farther, if we were to suppose the evidence which some 
 have of religion to amount to little more than seeing 
 that it may be true, but that they remain in great 
 doubts and uncertainties about both its evidence and 
 its nature, and great perplexities concerning the rule 
 of life ; others to have a full conviction of the truth 
 of religion, with a distinct knowledge of their duty ; 
 and others severally to have all the intermediate de- 
 grees of religious light and evidence, which lie be- 
 tween these two, — if we put the case, that for the pres- 
 ent it was intended revelation should be no more than 
 a small light, in the midst of a world greatly over- 
 spread, notwithstanding it, with ignorance and dark- 
 ness ; that certain glimmerings of this light should ex- 
 tend and be directed to remote distances, in such a 
 manner as that those who really partook of it should 
 not discern from whence it originally came ; that some 
 in a nearer situation to it should haye its light obscur- 
 ed, and in different ways and degrees intercepted ; 
 and that others should be placed within its clearer in- 
 fluence, and be much more enlivened, cheered and di- 
 rected by it ; but yet that even to these it should be 
 no more than a light shining in a dark place ; — all this 
 would be perfectly uniform and of a piece with the 
 conduct of Providence in the distribution of its other 
 blessings. If the fact of the case really were, that some 
 have received no light at all from the Scripture, as 
 many ages and countries in the heathen world ; that 
 others, though they have by means of it had essential 
 or natural religion enforced upon their consciences, 
 yet have never had the genuine scripture revelation 
 with its real evidence proposed to their consideration, 
 and the ancient Persians and modern Mahometans may 
 possibly be instances of people in a situation somewhat 
 
292 Revelation not universal : Part II, 
 
 like to this ; that others, though they have had the 
 Scripture laid before them as of divine revelation, yet 
 have had it with the system and evidence of Christianity 
 so interpolated, the system so corrupted, the evidence 
 so blended with false miracles, as to leave the mind in 
 the utmost doubtfulness and uncertainty about the 
 whole ; which may be the state of some thoughtful 
 men, in most of those nations who call themselves 
 Christian. And lastly, that others have had Chris- 
 tianity offered to them in its genuine simplicity, and 
 with its proper evidence, as persons in countries and 
 churches of civil and of Christian liberty ; but how- 
 ever that even these persons are left in great ignorance 
 in many respects, and have by no means light afforded 
 them enough to satisfy their curiosity, but only to 
 regulate their life, to teach them their duty, and en- 
 courage them in the careful discharge of it : I say, if 
 we were to suppose this somewhat of a general true 
 account of the degrees of moral and religious light 
 £nd evidence, which were intended to be afforded 
 mankind, and of what has actually been and is their 
 situation, in their moral and religious capacity, there 
 would be nothing in all this ignorance, doubtfulness 
 and uncertainty, in all these varieties, and supposed 
 disadvantages of some in comparison of others, respect- 
 ing religion, but may be paralleled by manifest anal- 
 ogies in the natural dispensations of Providence at 
 present, and considering ourselves merely in our tem- 
 poral capacity. 
 
 Nor is there any thing shocking in all this, or which 
 would seem to bear hard upon the moral administra- 
 tion in nature, if we would really keep in mind that 
 every one shall be dealt equitably with, instead of for- 
 getting this, or explaining it away, after it is acknowl- 
 edged in words. All shadow of injustice, and indee4 
 
Chap. VI. Supposed Deficiency in its Proof, 293 
 
 all harsh appearances, in this various economy of 
 Providence, would be lost, if we would keep in mind 
 that every merciful allowance shall be made, and no 
 more be required of any one than what might have been 
 equitably expected of him, from the circumstances in 
 which he was placed, and not what might have been 
 expected had he been placed in other circumstances ; 
 i. e. in Scripture language, that every man shall be 
 accepted according to what he had, not according to what 
 he had not* This however doth not by any means 
 imply that all persons' condition here is equally ad- 
 vantageous with respect, to futurity. And Provi- 
 dence's designing to place some in greater darkness 
 with respect to religious knowledge, is no more a rea« 
 son why they should not endeavour to get out of that 
 darkness, and others to bring them out of it, than 
 why ignorant and slow people in matters of other 
 knowledge should not endeavour to learn, or should 
 not be instructed. 
 
 It is not unreasonable to suppose that the same wise 
 and good principle, whatever it was, which disposed 
 the Author of nature to make different kinds and or- 
 ders of creatures, disposed him also to place creatures 
 of like kinds in different situations ; and that the same 
 principle which disposed him to make creatures of dif- 
 ferent moral capacities, disposed him also to place 
 creatures of like moral capacities in different religious 
 situations, and even the same creatures in different pe- 
 riods of their being. And the account or rea on of 
 this is also most probably the account, why the con- 
 stitution of things is such, as that creatures of moral 
 natures or capacities, for a considerable part of that du- 
 ration in which they are living agents, are not at all 
 subjects of morality and religion, but grow up to be 
 
 * 2 Cor. viii. 12. 
 
294 Revelation not universal : Part IL 
 
 so, and grow up to be so more and more, gradually 
 from childhood to mature age. 
 
 What, in particular, is the account or reason of 
 these things, we must be greatly in the dark, were it 
 only that we know so very little even of our own case. 
 Our present state may possibly be the consequence of 
 somewhat past which we are wholly ignorant of, as it 
 has a reference to somewhat to come, of which we 
 know scarce any more than is necessary for practice. 
 A system or constitution, in its notion, implies varie- 
 ty ; and so complicated an one as this world, very 
 great variety. So that were revelation universal, yet 
 from men's different capacities of understanding, from 
 the different lengths ot their lives, their different edu- 
 cations and other external circumstances, and from 
 their difference of temper and bodily constitution, — 
 their religious situations would be widely different, 
 and the disadvantage of some in comparison of others, 
 perhaps, altogether as much as at present. And the 
 true account, whatever it be, why mankind, or such a 
 part of mankind, are placed in this condition of igno- 
 rance, must be supposed also the true account of our 
 farther ignorance, in not knowing the reasons why or 
 whence it is that they are placed in this condition. 
 But the following practical reflections may deserve the 
 serious consideration of those persons who think the 
 circumstances of mankind or their own, in the fore- 
 mentioned respects, aground of complaint. 
 
 First, the evidence of religion not appearing ob- 
 vious, may constitute one particular part of some men's 
 trial in the religious sense, as it gives scope for a virtu- 
 ous exercise or vicious neglect of their understanding, 
 m examining or not examining into that evidence. 
 There seems no possible reason to be given, why we 
 may not be in a state of moral probation, with regard 
 
Chap. VL Supposed Deficiency in its Proof. 295 
 
 to the exercise of our understanding upon the subject 
 of religion, as we are with regard to our behaviour in 
 common affairs. The former is as much a thing 
 within our power and choice as the latter. And I 
 suppose it is to be laid down for certain, that the same 
 character, the same inward principle, which, after a 
 man i convinced of the truth of religion, renders him 
 obedient to the precepts of it, would, were he not thus 
 convinced, set him about an examination of it, upon 
 its system and evidence being offered to his thoughts j 
 and that in the latter state his examination would be 
 with an impartiality, seriousness and solicitude pro- 
 portionable to what his obedience is in the former. 
 And as inattention, negligence, want of all serious 
 concern about a matter of such a nature and such im- 
 portance, when offered to men's consideration, is, be- 
 fore a distinct conviction of its truth, as real immoral 
 depravity and dissoluteness, as neglect of religious prac- 
 tice after such conviction, — so active solicitude about 
 it, and fair impartial consideration of its evidence be- 
 fore such conviction, is as really an exercise of a morally 
 right temper as is religious practice after. Thus, that 
 religion is not intuitively true, but a matter of deduc- 
 tion and inference ; that a conviction of its truth is 
 not forced upon every one, but left to be, by some, 
 collected with heedful attention to premises ; this as 
 much constitutes religious probation, as much affords 
 sphere, scope, opportunity, for right and wrong behav- 
 iour, as any thing whatever does. And their man 
 ner of treating this subject when laid before them, 
 shews what is in their heart, and is an exertion of it. 
 
 Secondly, it appears to be a thing as evident, though 
 it is not so much attended to, that if upon considera- 
 tion of religion the evidence of it should seem to any 
 persons doubtful, in the highest supposable degree. 
 
296 Revelation not universal : Part 11. 
 
 even this doubtful evidence will, however, put them 
 into a general state of probation in the moral and relig- 
 ious sense. For, suppose a man to be really in doubt 
 whether such a person had not done him the greatest 
 favour, or whether his whole temporal interest did not 
 depend upon that person, — no one, who had any sense 
 of gratitude and of prudence, could possibly consider 
 himself in the same situation with regard to such per- 
 son, as if he had no such doubt. In truth, it is as just 
 to say that certainty and doubt are the same, as to say, 
 the situations now mentioned would leave a man as en- 
 tirely at liberty in point of gratitude or prudence, as 
 he would be were he certain he had received no favour 
 from such person, or that he no way depended upon 
 him. And thus, though the evidence of religion 
 which is afforded to some men should be little more 
 than that they are given to see the system of Christian- 
 ity, or religion in general, to be supposable and credi- 
 ble, — this ought in all reason to beget a serious prac- 
 tical apprehension that it may be true. And even this 
 will afford matter of exercise for religious suspense and 
 deliberation, for moral resolution and self government, 
 because the apprehension that religion may be true, 
 does as really lay men under obligations as a full con- 
 viction that it is true. It gives occasion and motives 
 to consider farther the important subject, to preserve 
 attentively upon their minds a general implicit sense 
 that they may be under divine moral government, an 
 awful solicitude about religion, whether natural or re- 
 vealed. Such apprehension ought to turn men's eyes 
 to every degree of nuw light which may be had, from 
 whatever side it comes, and induce them to refrain in 
 the mean time from all immoralities, and live in the 
 conscientious practice of every common virtue. Es- 
 pecially are they bound to keep at the greatest distance 
 
Chap. VI. Supposed Deficiency in its Proof. 29? 
 
 from all dissolute profaneness j for this the very nature 
 of the case forbids ; and to treat with highest rever- 
 ence a matter, upon which their own whole interest 
 and being, and the fate of nature depends. This be- 
 haviour, and an active endeavour to maintain within 
 themselves this temper, is the business, the duty, and 
 the wisdom of those persons, who complain of the 
 doubtfulness of religion ; is what they are under* the 
 most proper obligations to. And such behaviour is 
 an exertion of, and has- a tendency to improve in 
 them that character, which the practice of all the sev- 
 eral duties of religion, from a full conviction of its' 
 truth, is an exertion of, and has a tendency to improve 
 in others ; others, I say, to whom God has afforded 
 such conviction. Nay, considering the infinite im- 
 portance of religion, revealed as well as natural, I think 
 it may be said in general, that whoever will weigh the 
 matter thoroughly may see there is not near so much 
 difference as is commonly imagined, between what 
 ought in reason to be the rule of life, to those persons 
 who are fully convinced of its truth, and to those 
 who have only a serious doubting apprehension that 
 it may be true. Their hopes, and fears, and oh liga- 
 tions will be in various degrees; but, as the subject 
 matter of their hopes and fears is the same, so the 
 subject matter of their obligations, what they are 
 bound to do and to refrain from, is not so very unlike. 
 It is to be observed farther, thit from a character 
 of understanding, or a situation of influence in the 
 world, some persons have it in their power to do infi- 
 nitely more harm or good, by setting an example of 
 profaneness and avowed disregard to all religion, or, 
 on the contrary, of a serious, though perhaps doubt- 
 ing apprehension of its truth, and of a reverend re- 
 gard to it under this doubtfulness, than they can dp, 
 p p 
 
•298 Revelation not universal : Part II. 
 
 by acting well or III in all the common intercourses 
 amongst mankind. And consequently they are most 
 highly accountable for a behaviour, which they may 
 easily foresee is of such importance, and in which 
 there is most plainly a right and a wrong, even ad- 
 mitting the evidence of religion to be as doubtful as 
 is pretended. 
 
 Tn? ground of these observations, and that which 
 renders them just and true, is, that doubting necessa- 
 rily implies some degree of evidence for that of which 
 we doubt. For no person would be in doubt con- 
 cerning the truth of a number of facts so and so cir- 
 cumstanced, which should accidentally come into his 
 thoughts, and of which he had no evidence at all. 
 And though in the case of an even chance, and where 
 consequently we were in doubt, we should in common 
 language say that we had no evidence at all for either 
 side, — yet that situation of things, which renders it 
 an even chance and no more, that such an event will 
 happen, renders this case equivalent to all others, 
 whore there is such evidence on both sides of a ques- 
 tion,* as leave> the mind in doubt concerning the 
 truth. Indeed in all these cases, there is no more ev- 
 idence on one side than on the other ; but there is 
 (what is equivalent to) much more for either than 
 for the truth of a number of facts which come into 
 one's thoughts at random. And thus in all these 
 cases doubt as much presupposes evidence, lower de- 
 grees of evidence, as belief presupposes higher, and 
 certainty higher still. Any one who will a little attend 
 to the nature of evidence, will easily carry this ob- 
 servation on, and see that between no evidence at all, 
 and that degree of it which affords ground of 
 doubt, there are as many intermediate degrees, as there 
 
 * Introduction, 
 
Chap. VI. Supposed Deficiency in its Pro r f. 299 
 
 are between that degree which is the ground of doubt, 
 and demonstration. And though we have not facul- 
 ties to distinguish the^e degrees of evidence with any 
 sort of exactness, yet in proportion as they are discern- 
 ed they ought to influence our practice. * For it is as 
 real an imperfection in the moral character, not to be 
 influenced in practice by a lower degree of evidence 
 whrn discerned, as it is in the understanding not to 
 discern it. And as in all subjects which men consider, 
 they discern the lower as well as higher degrees of evi- 
 dence,, proportionably to their capacity of understand- 
 ing, — so in practical subjects they are influenced in 
 practice, by the lower as well as higher degree> of it, 
 proportionably to their fairness and honesty. And as, 
 in proportion to defects in the understanding, men 
 are unapt to see lower degrees of evidence, are in dan- 
 ger of overlooking evidence when it is not glaring, 
 and are easily imposed upon in such cases, — so in pro- 
 portion to the corruption of the heart, they seem ca- 
 pable of satisfying themselves with having no regard 
 in practice to evidence acknowledged real, if it be not 
 overbearing. From these things it must follow, that 
 doubting concerning religion implies such a degree of 
 evidence for it as, joined with the consideration of its 
 importance, unquestionably lays men under the obli- 
 gations before mentioned to have a dutiful regard to 
 it in all their behaviour. n 
 
 Thirdly, the difficulties in which the evidence of 
 religion is involved, which some complain of, is no 
 more a just ground of complaint, than the external 
 circumstances of temptation which others are placed 
 in, or than difficulties in the practice of it after a 
 full conviction of its truth. Temptations render our 
 state a more improving state of discipline* than it 
 
 * Part I. Chap. v. 
 
300 Revelation not universal* Part II, 
 
 would be otherwise, as they give occasion for a more 
 attentive exercise of the virtuous principle, which 
 confirms and strengthens it more than an easier or less 
 attentive exercise of it could. Now speculative diffi- 
 culties are, in this respect, of the very same nature with 
 these external temptations. For the evidence of reli- 
 gion not appearing obvious, is to some persons a temp- 
 tation to reject it, without any consideration at all ; and 
 therefore requires such an attentive exercise of the vir- 
 tuous principle, seriously to consider that evidence, as 
 there would be no occasion for but for such temptation. 
 And the supposed doubtfulness of its evidence, after 
 it has been in some sort considered, affords opportu- 
 nity to an unfair minctof explaining away, and deceit- 
 fully hiding from itself, that evidence which it might 
 see, and also for men's encouraging themselves in vice 
 from hopes of impunity, though they do clearly see 
 thus much at least that these hopes are uncertain ; in 
 like manner as the common temptation to many in- 
 stances of folly, which end in temporal infamy and 
 ruin, is the ground for hope of not being detected, 
 and of escaping with impunity ; i. e. the doubtful- 
 ness of the proof beforehand, that such foolish behav- 
 iour will thus end in infamy and ruin. On the con- 
 trary, supposed doubtfulness in the evidence of re- 
 ligion calls for a more careful and attentive exercise of 
 the virtuous principle, in fairly yielding themselves up 
 to the proper influence of any real evidence, though 
 doubtful, and in practising conscientiously all virtue, 
 though under some uncertainty whether the govern- 
 ment in the universe may not possibly be such, as 
 that vice may escape with impunity. And in general, 
 temptation, meaning by this word the lesser allure- 
 ments to wrong and difficulties in the discharge of 
 our duly, as well as the greater ones— temptation, I 
 
Chap, VI. Supposed Deficiency in its Proof. 301 
 
 say, as such, and of every kind and degree, as it calls 
 forth some virtuous efforts, additional to what would 
 otherwise have been wanting, cannot but be an ad- 
 ditional discipline and improvement of virtue, as well 
 as probation of it in the other senses of that word.* 
 So that the very same account is to be given why the 
 evidence of religion should be left in such a manner, 
 as to require in some an attentive, solicitous perhaps 
 painful exercise of their understanding about it, as why 
 others should be placed in such circumstances as that 
 the practice of its common duties, after a full convic- 
 tion of the truth of it, should require attention, solici- 
 tude and pains ; or, why appearing doubtfulness 
 should be permitted to afford matter of temptation to 
 some, as why external difficulties and allurements 
 should be permitted to afford matter of temptation to 
 others. The same account also is to be given why 
 some should be exercised with temptations of both 
 these kinds, as why others should be exercised with 
 the latter in such very high degrees as some have been, 
 particularly as the primitive Christians were. 
 
 Nor does there appear any absurdity in supposing, 
 that the speculative difficulties in which the evidence 
 of religion is involved, may make even the principal 
 part of some persons' trial. For, as the chief tempta- 
 tions of the generality of the world are, the ordinary 
 motives to injustice or unrestrained pleasure, or to live 
 in the neglect of religion, from that frame of mind 
 which renders many persons almost without feeling as 
 to any thing distant, or which is not the object of their 
 senses, — so there are other persons without this shal- 
 lowness of temper, persons of a deeper sense as to what 
 is invisible and future ; who not only see, but have a 
 general practical feeling, that what is to come will be 
 
 * Part I. Chap. v. and p. 174. 
 
302 Revelation not universal : Part IL 
 
 present, and that things are not less real for their not 
 being the objects of sense ; and who, from their nat- 
 ural constitution of body and of temper, and from 
 their external condition, may have small temptations 
 to behave ill, small difficulty in behaving well in the 
 common course of life. Now when these latter per- 
 sons have a distinct full conviction of the truth of re- 
 ligion, without any possible doubts or difficulties, the 
 practice of it is to them unavoidable, unless they will 
 do a constant violence to their own minds ; and re- 
 ligion is scarce any more a discipline to them than it 
 rs to creatures in a state of perfection. Yet these per- 
 sons may possibly stand in need of moral discipline and 
 exercise in a higher degree, than they would have by 
 such an easy practice of religion. Or it may be requi- 
 site for reasons unknown to us, that they should give 
 some firther manifestation* what is their moral char- 
 acter, to the creation of God, than such a practice of 
 it would be. Thus in the great variety of religious 
 situations in which men are placed, what constitutes, 
 what chiefly and peculiarly constitutes the probation, 
 in all senses, of some persons, may be the difficulties in 
 which the evidence of religion is involved -, and their 
 prL cipal and distinguished trial may be, how they will 
 behave under and with respect to these difficulties. 
 Circumstances in men's situation in their temporal ca- 
 pacity, analogous in good measure to this respecting 
 religion, are to be observed. We find some persons are 
 placed in such a situation in the world, as that their 
 chief difficulty with regard to conduct, is not the do- 
 ing what is prudent when it is known, for this in num- 
 berless cases is as easy as the contrary, but to some the 
 principal exercise is, recollection and being upon their 
 guard against deceits, the deceits suppose of those about 
 
 • P. 174. 
 
Chap. VI. Supposed Deficiency in its Proof. 303 
 
 them, against false appearances of reason and prudence. 
 To persons in some situations the principal exercise 
 with respect to conduct is, attention in order to inform 
 themselves what is proper, what is really the reasona- 
 ble and prudent part to act. 
 
 But as I have hitherto gone upon supposition, that 
 men's dissatisfaction with the evidence of religion is not 
 owing to their neglects or prejudices, it must be added 
 on the other hand, in all common reason, and as what 
 the truth of the case plainly requires should be added, 
 that such dissatisfaction possibly may be owing to those, 
 possibly may be men's own fault. For, 
 
 If there are any persons who never set themselves 
 heartily and in earnest to be informed in religion ; if 
 there are any who secretly wish it may not prove true, 
 and are less attentive to evidence than to difficulties, 
 and more to objections than to what is said in answer 
 to them, — these persons will scarce be thought in a 
 likely way of seeing the evidence of religion, though it 
 were most certainly true, and capable of being ever so 
 fully proved. If any accustom themselves to consider 
 this subject usually in the way of mirth and sport ; if 
 they attend to forms and representations, and inade- 
 quate manners of expression, instead of the real things 
 intended by them ; (for signs often can be no more 
 than inadequately expressive of the things signified) or 
 if they substitute human errors in the room of divine 
 truth, — why may not all, or any of these things, hin- 
 der some men from seeing that evidence which really 
 is seen by others, as a like turn of mind with respect 
 to matters of common speculation and practice, does, 
 we find by experience, hinder them from attaining that 
 knowledge and right understanding, in matters of com- 
 mon speculation and practice, which more fair and at- 
 tentive minds attain to ? And the effect will be the 
 
304 Revelation not universal: Part II. 
 
 same, whether their neglect of seriously considering the 
 evidence of religion, and their indirect behaviour with 
 regard to it, proceed from mere carelessness, or from 
 the grosser vices ; or whether it be owing to this, 
 that forms and figurative manners of expression, as 
 well as errors, administer occasions of ridicule, when 
 the things intended and the truth itself would not. 
 Men may indulge a ludicrous turn so far as to lose all 
 sense of conduct and prudence in worldly affairs, and 
 even as it seems to impair their faculty of reason. 
 And in general, levity, carelessness, passion and preju- 
 dice do hinder us from being rightly informed with 
 respect to common things ; and they may in like man- 
 ner, and perhaps in some farther providential manner, 
 with respect to moral and religious subjects ; may hin- 
 der evidence from being laid before us, and from be- 
 ing seen when it is. The Scripture* does declare that 
 every one shall not understand. And it makes no dif- 
 ference by what prov dential conduct this comes to 
 pass ; whether the evidence of Christianity was, ori- 
 ginally and with design, put and left so as that those 
 who are desirous of evading moral obligations should 
 not see it, and that honest minded persons should ; or 
 whether it comes to pass by any other means. 
 
 Farther, the general proof of natural religion and 
 of Christianity, does, I think, lie level to common 
 men ; even those, the greatest part of whose time, 
 from childhood to old age, is taken up with providing 
 
 • Dan. xii. 10. See also Isai. xxix. 13,14. Matth. vi. 23, and xi. 25, 
 and xiii II, 12. Joh. iii. 19. Joh. v 44. 1 Cor. ii. 14, and 2 Cor. i v. 4. 
 S Tim. iii. IS, and that affectionate, as well as authoritative admonition, so 
 very many times inculcated, He that bath ears to bear, let bim bear. Croiius 
 saw so strongly the thing intended in these and other passages of Scripture 
 of the like sense, as to say that the proof given us of Christianity was less 
 than it might have l>een, for this very purpose : Ut Ha scrmo Evaiigetti tan- 
 quj'u lapis esst-t LyJius ad quern ingenia sanabilia exflorarentur. De Ver. R. C 
 L. 2, towards the end. 
 
Chap. VI. Supposed Deficiency in its Proof. S03 
 
 for themselves and their families the common conven- 
 iences, perhapN necessaries of life ; those I mean of 
 this rank, who ever think at all of asking after proof or 
 attending to it. Common men, were they as much 
 in earnest about religion as about their temporal af- 
 fairs, are capable of being convinced upon real evi- 
 dence, that there is a God who governs the world ; 
 and they feel themselves to be of a moral nature, and 
 accountable creatures. And as Christianity entirely 
 falls in with this their natural sense of things, so they 
 are capable, not only of being persuaded, but of being 
 made to see, that there is evidence of miracles wrought 
 in attestation of it, and many appearing completions 
 of prophecy* But though this proof is real and con- 
 clusive, yet it is liable to objections, and may be run 
 up into difficulties ; which, however, persons who are 
 capable not only of talking of, but of really seeing, are 
 capable also of seeing through ; i. e. not of clearing up 
 and answering them so as to satisfy their curiosity, for 
 of such knowledge we are not capable with respect to 
 any one thing in nature, but capable of seeing that the 
 proof is not lost in these difficulties, or destroyed by 
 these objections. But then a thorough examination 
 into religion with regard to these objections, which 
 cannot be the business of every man, is a matter of 
 pretty large compass, and from the nature of it requires 
 some knowledge, as well as time and attention, to see 
 how the evidence comes out upon balancing one thing 
 with another, and what upon the whole is the amount 
 of it. Now if persons who have picked up these ob- 
 jections from others, and take for granted they are 
 of weight, upon the word of those from whom they 
 received them, or by often retailing of them come to 
 see or fancy they see them to be of weight, will not 
 prepare themselves for such an examination with a 
 
 QQ 
 
306 Revelation not universal : Part II. 
 
 competent degree of knowledge, or will not give that 
 time and attention to the subject, which from the na- 
 ture of it is necessary for attaining such information, — 
 in this case they must remain in doubtfulness, igno- 
 rance or error, in the same way as they must with re- 
 gard to common sciences, and matters of common life, 
 if they neglect the necessary means of being informed 
 in them. 
 
 But stiil perhaps it will be objected, that if a prince 
 or common master were to send directions to a ser> 
 vant, he would take care that they should always bear 
 the certain marks who they came from, and that their 
 sense should be always plain, so as that there should be 
 no possible doubt, if he could help it, concerning the 
 authority or meaning of them. Now the proper an- 
 swer to all this kind of objections is, that, wherever 
 the fallacy lies, it is even certain we cannot argue thus 
 with respect to him who is the governor of the world ; 
 and particularly that he does not afford us such in- 
 formation with respect to our temporal affairs and in- 
 terests, as experience abundantly shews. However, 
 there is a full answer to this objection from the very 
 nature of religion. For, the reason why a prince 
 would give his directions in this plain manner, is, 
 that he absolutely desires such an external action 
 should be done, without concerning himself with the 
 motive or principle upon which it is done ; i. e. he 
 regards only the external event, or the thing's being 
 done, and not at all, properly speaking, the doing of 
 it, or the action. Whereas the whole of morality and 
 religion consisting merely in action itself, there is no 
 sort of parallel between the cases. But if the prince 
 be supposed to regard only the action, i. e. only to de- 
 sire to exercise or in any sense prove the understanding 
 or loyalty of a servant, he would not always give his 
 
Chap. VI. Supposed Deficiency in its Proof. 307 
 
 orders in such a plain manner. It may be proper to 
 add, that the will of God respecting morality and re- 
 ligion may be considered either as absolute or as only 
 conditional. If it be absolute, it can only be thus, 
 that we should act virtuously in such given circum- 
 stances ; not that we should be brought to act so by 
 his changing of our circumstances. And. if God's 
 will be thus absolute, then it is in our power, in the 
 highest and strictest sense, to do or to contradict his 
 will, which is a most weighty consideration. Or his 
 will may be considered only as conditional, that if we 
 act so and so we shall be rewarded ; if otherwise, pun- 
 ished ; of which conditional will of the Author of na- 
 ture the whole constitution of it affords most certain 
 instances. 
 
 Upon the whole — that we are in a state of religion 
 necessarily implies that we are in a state of probation ; 
 and the credibility of our being at all in such a state 
 being admitted, there seems no peculiar difficulty in 
 supposing our probation to be just as it is in those re- 
 spects which are above objected against. There seems 
 no pretence, from the reason of the thing, to say, that the 
 trial cannot equitably be any thing, but whether per- 
 sons will act suitably to certain information, or such as 
 admits no room for doubt ; so as that there can be no 
 danger of miscarriage, but either from their not at- 
 tending to what they certainly know, or from over- 
 bearing passion hurrying them on to act contrary to 
 it. For, since ignorance and doubt afford scope for 
 probation in all senses, as really as intuitive conviction 
 or certainty, and since the two former are to be put 
 to the same account as difficulties in practice, — men's 
 moral probation may also be, whether they will take 
 due care to inform themselves by impartial considera- 
 tion, and afterwards whether they will act as the case 
 
308 Revelation not universal : Part II. 
 
 requires, upon the evidence which they have, however 
 doubtful. And this, we find by experience, is fre- 
 quently our probation,* in our temporal capacity* 
 For, the information which we want with regard to 
 our worldly interests is by no means always given us 
 of course, without any care of our own. And we are 
 greatly liable to self deceit from inward secret preju- 
 dices, and also to the deceits of others. So that to be 
 able to judge what is the prudent part, often requires 
 much and difficult consideration. Then after we 
 have judged the very best we can, the evidence upon 
 which we must act, if we will live and act at all, is per- 
 petually doubtful to a very high degree. And the 
 constitution and course of the world in fact is such, as 
 that want of impartial consideration what we have to 
 do, and venturing upon extravagant courses because 
 it is doubtful what will be the consequence, are often 
 naturally, i. e. providentially, altogether as fatal as 
 misconduct occasioned by heedless inattention to 
 what we certainly know, or disregarding it from over- 
 bearing passion. 
 
 Several of the observations here made may well 
 seem strange, perhaps unintelligible, to many good 
 men. But if the persons for whose sake they are made 
 think so — persons who object as above, and throw off 
 all regard to religion under pretence of want of evi- 
 dence, — I desire them to consider again whether their 
 thinking so be owing to any thing unintelligible in 
 these observations, or to their own not having such a 
 sense of religion and serious solicitude about it as even 
 their state of scepticism does in all reason require. It 
 ought to be forced upon the reflection of these per- 
 sons, that our nature and condition necessarily require 
 
 * P. 107, 299, 302, 303. 
 
Chap. VI. Supposed Deficiency in its Proof. 309 
 
 us, in the daily course of life, to act upon evidence 
 much lower than what is commonly called probable ; 
 to guard not only against what we fully believe will, 
 but also against what we think it supposable may, 
 happen ; and to engage in pursuits when the proba- 
 bility is greatly against success, if it be credible that 
 possibly we may succeed in them. 
 
310 Of the particular Evidence Part II. 
 
 CHAP. VIT. 
 
 Of the particular Evidence for Christianity, 
 
 The presumptions against revelation, and objections 
 against the general scheme of Christianity and partic- 
 ular things relating to it, being removed, there remains 
 to be considered what positive evidence we have for 
 the truth of it, chiefly in order to see what the analogy 
 of nature suggests with regard to that evidence and the 
 objections against it, or to see what is, and is allowed 
 to be, the plain natural rule of judgment and of action* 
 in our temporal concerns, in cases where we have the 
 same kind of evidence and the same kind of objections 
 against it that we have in the case before us. 
 
 Now in the evidence of Christianity there seem to 
 be several things of great weight, not reducible to the 
 head either of miracles or the completion of prophecy, 
 in the common acceptation of the words. But these 
 two are its direct and fundamental proofs, and those 
 other things, however considerable they are, yet ought 
 never to be urged apart from its direct proofs, but al- 
 ways to be joined with them. Thus the evidence of 
 Christianity will be a long series of things, reaching, 
 as it seems, from the beginning of the world to the 
 present time, of great variety and compass, taking in 
 both the direct and also the collateral proofs, and 
 making up, all of them together, one argument ; the 
 conviction arising from which kind of proof may be 
 compared to what we call the effect in architecture or 
 other works of art, a result from a great number of 
 
Chap. VII. for Christianity. 311 
 
 things so and so disposed, and taken into one view. 
 I shall therefore, first, make some observations re- 
 lating to miracles and the appearing completions of 
 prophecy, and consider what analogy suggests in an- 
 swer to the objections brought against this evidence. 
 And, secondly, I shall endeavour to give some ac- 
 count of the general argument now mentioned, con- 
 sisting both of the direct and collateral evidence, con- 
 sidered as making up one argument ; this being the 
 kind of proof upon which we determine most questions 
 of difficulty, concerning common facts, alleged to have 
 happened or seeming likely to happen, especially ques- 
 tions relating to conduct. 
 
 First, I shall make some observations upon the di- 
 rect proof of Christianity from miracles and prophecy, 
 and upon the objections alleged against it. 
 
 I. Now the following observations relating to the 
 historical evidence of miracles wrought in attestation 
 of Christianity appear to be of great weight. 
 
 1 . The Old Testament affords us the same historic- 
 al evidence of the miracles of Moses and of the proph- 
 ets, as of the common civil history of Moses and the 
 kings of Israel, or as of the affairs of the Jewish nation. 
 And the Gospels and the Acts afford us the same his- 
 torical evidence of the miracles of Christ and the apos- 
 tles, as of the common matters related in them. This 
 indeed could not have been affirmed by any reasonable 
 man, if the authors of these books, like many other 
 historians, had appeared to make an entertaining man- 
 ner of writing their aim, though they had interspersed 
 miracles in their works, at proper distances and upon 
 proper occasions. These might have animated a dull 
 relation, amused the reader, and engaged his atten- 
 tion. And the same account would naturally have 
 been given of them as of the speeches and description- 
 
3l2 Of the particular Evidence Part 1L 
 
 of such authors ; the same account, in a manner, as is 
 to be given why the poets make use of wonders and 
 prodigies. But the facts, both miraculous and natu- 
 ral, in Scripture, are related in plain unadorned narra- 
 tives, and both of them appear, in all respects, to stand 
 upon the same foot of historical evidence. Farther — 
 some parts of Scripture, containing an account of mir- 
 acles fully sufficient to prove the truth of Christianity, 
 are quoted as genuine, from the age in which they 
 are said to be written, down to the present ; and no 
 other parts of them, material in the present question, 
 are omitted to be quoted in such manner as to afford 
 any sort of proof of their not being genuine. And as 
 common history, when called in question in any in- 
 stance, may often be greatly confirmed by cotempo- 
 rary or subsequent events more known and acknowl- 
 edged, and as the common scripture history, like many 
 others, is thus confirmed, — so likewise is the miracu- 
 lous history of it, not only in particular instances, but 
 in general. For the establishment of the Jewish and 
 Christian religions, which were events cotemporary 
 with the miracles related to be wrought in attesta- 
 tion of both, or subsequent to them, these events 
 are just what we should have expected, upon supposi- 
 tion such miracles were really wrought to attest the 
 truth of those religions. These miracles are a satis- 
 factory account of those events ; of which no other 
 satisfactory account can be given, nor any account at 
 all but what is imaginary merely and invented. It 
 is to be added, that the most obvious, the most easy 
 and direct account of this history, how it came to be 
 written and to be received in the world, as a true his- 
 tory, is, that it really is so ; nor can any other account 
 of it be easy and direct. Now, though an account 
 not at all obvious, but very far fetched and indirect, 
 
Chap. VIL for Christianity. 313 
 
 may indeed be, and often is, the true account of a mat- 
 ter, — >yet it cannot be admitted on the authority of its 
 being asserted. Mere guess, supposition, and possibil* 
 ity, when opposed to historical evidence, prove nothing 
 but that historical evidence is not demonstrative. 
 
 Now the just consequence from all this, I tjiink, is, 
 that the scripture history in general is to be admitted 
 as an authentick genuine history, till somewhat posi* 
 tive be alleged sufficient to invalidate it. But no man 
 will deny the consequence to be, that it cannot be 
 rejected, or thrown by as of no authority, till it can 
 be proved to be of none ; even though the evidence 
 now mentioned for its authority were doubtful. This 
 evidence may be confronted by historical evidence on 
 the other side, if there be any ; or general incredibility 
 in the things related, or inconsistence in the general 
 turn of the history, would prove it to be of no author- 
 ity. But since, upon the face of the matter, upon a 
 first and general view, the appearance is that it is an 
 authentick history, it cannot be determined to be fic- 
 titious without some proof that it is so. And the fol- 
 lowing observations, in support of these and coincident 
 with them, will greatly confirm the historical evidence 
 for the truth of Christianity. 
 
 2. The epistles of St. Paul, from the nature of 
 epistolary writing, and moreover from several of them 
 being written, not to particular persons, but to church- 
 es, carry in them evidences of their being genuine, 
 beyond what can be in a mere histbrical narrative, left 
 to the world at large. This evidence, joined with that 
 which they have in common with the rest of the New 
 Testament, seems not to leave so much as any particu- 
 lar pretence for denying their genuineness, considered 
 as an ordinary matter of fact, or of criticism ; I say 
 particular pretence for denying it, because any single 
 
 R R 
 
314 Of the particular Evidence Part IL 
 
 fact, of such a kind and such antiquity, may have gen* 
 eral doubts raised concerning it, fr^m the very nature 
 of human affairs and human testimony. There u also 
 to be mentioned, a distinct and particular evidence of 
 the genuineness of the epistle chiefly referred to here, 
 the firsLto the Corinthians, from the manner in which 
 it is quoted by Clemens Romanus, in an epistle of his 
 own to that church.* Now these epistles afford a 
 proof of Christianity,, detached from all others, which 
 is, I think, a thing of weight, and also a proof of a na- 
 ture and kind peculiar to itself. For, 
 
 In them the author declares, that he received the 
 Gospel in general, and the institution of the Commu- 
 nion in particular, not from the rest of the apostles, or 
 jointly together with them, but alone, from Christ 
 himself, whom he declares likewise, conformably to 
 the h^tory in the Jets, that he saw after his ascen- 
 sion t So that the testimony of St. Paul is to be 
 considered as detached from that of the rest of the 
 apostles. 
 
 And he declares farther, that he was endued with a 
 power of working miracles, as what was publickly 
 known to those very people — speaks of frequent and 
 great variety of miraculous gifts, as then subsisting in 
 those very churches to which he was writing, which he 
 was reproving for several irregularities, and where he 
 had personal oppo ers ; he mentions these gifts inci- 
 dentally, in the most easy manner and without effort, 
 by way of reproof to those who had them, for their 
 indecent u-e of them, and by way of depreciating 
 them, in comparison of moral virtues ; in short, he 
 speaks to these churches, of these miraculous powers, 
 in the manner any one would speak to another of a 
 thing, which was as familiar and as much known in 
 
 * Clem. Rom. Ep. J. c. 47. f Gal. i. 1 Cor. xi. 23, &c. 1 Cor. xv.8. 
 
Chap. VII. for Cbrisfjamty. 315 
 
 common to them both, as any thing in the world.* 
 And this, as hath been observed by several persons, is 
 surely a very considerable thing. 
 
 3. It is an acknowledged historical fact, that 
 Christianity offered itself to the world, and demanded 
 to be received, upon the allegation, i. e. as unbeliev- 
 ers would speak, upon the pretence of miracles, pub- 
 lickly wrought to attest the truth of it in such an age, 
 and that it was actually received by great numbers in 
 that very age, and upon the professed belief of the re- 
 ality of these miracles. And Christianity, including 
 the dispensation of the Old Testament, seems distin- 
 guished by this from all other religions. 1 mean, that 
 this does not appear to be the case with regard to any 
 other ; for surely it will not be supposed to lie upon 
 any person, to prove by positive historical evidence that 
 it was not. It does in no sort appear that Mahomet- 
 anism was first received in the world upon the foot of 
 supposed miracles,! i. e. publick ones ; for, as revela- 
 tion is itself miraculous, all pretence to it must neces- 
 sarily imply some pretence of miracles. And it is a 
 known fact that it was immediately, at the very first, 
 propagated by other means. And as particular insti- 
 tutions, whether in paganism or popery, said to be 
 confirmed by miracles after those institutions had ob- 
 tained, are not to the purpose, — so were there what 
 might be called historical proof, that any cf them were 
 introduced by a supposed divine command, believed 
 to be atte ted by miracles, — these would not be in any 
 wise parallel. For single things of this sort are easy to 
 be accounted for, after parties are formed and have 
 power in their hands, and the leaders of them are in 
 
 * Rom. xv. 19. 1 Cor. xii. 8, 9, 10—28, &c. and ch. xiii, 1, 2, 8, and 
 the whole xivth ch. 2 Cor. xii. 12, 13. Gal. iii. 2, 5. 
 f See the Koran, c. xiii. and c. xvii. 
 
316 Of the particular Evidence Part II. 
 
 veneration with the multitude, and political interests 
 are blended with religious claims and religious distinc- 
 tions. But before any thing of this kind, for a few 
 persons, and those of the lowest rank, all at once to 
 bring over such great numbers to a new religion, and 
 get it to be received upon the particular evidence of 
 miracles, — this is quite another thing. And I think 
 it will be allowed by any fair adversary, that the fact 
 now mentioned, taking in all the circumstances of it, 
 is peculiar to the Christian religion. However, the 
 fact itself is allowed that Christianity obtained, i. e. 
 was professed to be received in the world, upon the be- 
 lief of miracles, immediately in the age in which it is 
 said those miracles were wrought ; or that this is what 
 its first converts would have alleged, as the reason for 
 their embracing it. Now certainly it is not to be sup- 
 posed, that such numbers of men, in the most distant 
 parts of the world, should forsake the religion of their 
 country in which they had been educated, separate 
 themselves from their friends, particularly in their fes- 
 tival shows and solemnities, to which the common 
 people are so greatly addicted, and which were of a na- 
 ture to engage them much more than any thing of 
 that sort amongst us, and embrace a religion which 
 could not but expose them to many inconveniences, 
 and indeed must have been a giving up the world in a 
 great degree, even from the very first, and before the 
 empire engaged in form against them, — it cannot be 
 supposed that such numbers should make so great, 
 and, to say the least, so inconvenient a change in their 
 whole institution of life, unless they were really con- 
 vinced of the truth of those miracles, upon the knowl- 
 edge or belief of which they professed to make it. 
 And it will, I suppose, readily be acknowledged, that 
 the generality of the first converts to Christianity must 
 
Chap. VII. for Christianity. 317 
 
 have believed them ; that as by becoming Christians 
 th.7 declared to the world they were satisfied of the 
 truth of those miracles, — so this declaration was to be 
 credited. And this their testimony is the same kind 
 of evidence for those miracles as if they had put it in 
 writing, and these writings had come down to u?. 
 And it is real evidence, because it is of facts which 
 they had capacity and full opportunity to inform 
 themselves of. It is also distinct from the direct or 
 express historical evidence, though it is of the same 
 kind ; and it would be allowed to be distinct in all 
 cases. For were a fact expres ly related by one or 
 more ancient historians, ?nd disputed in after ages; 
 that this fact is acknowledged to have been believed 
 by great numbers of the age in which the historian 
 says it was done, would be allowed an additional proof 
 of >uch fact, quite distinct from the express testimony 
 of the historian. The credulity of mankind is ac- 
 knowledged, and the suspicions of mankind ought to 
 be acknowledged too, and their backwardness even to 
 believe, and greater still to practise, what makes against 
 their interest. And it must particularly be remember- 
 ed, that education, and prejudice, and authority, were 
 against Christianity, in the age I am speaking of. So 
 that the immediate conversion of such numbers, is a 
 real presumption of somewhat more than human in 
 this matter ; I say presumption, for it is not alleged as 
 a proof alone and by itself. Nor need any one of the 
 things mentioned in this chapter be considered as a 
 proof by itself ; and yet all of them together may be 
 one of the strongest. 
 
 Upon the whole — as there is large historical evi- 
 dence, both direct and circumstantial, of miracles 
 wrought in attestation of Christianity, collected by 
 those who have writ upon the subject, — it lies upon 
 
318 Of the particular Evidence Part II. 
 
 unbelievers to shew, why this evidence is not to be 
 credited. This way of speaking is, 1 think, just, and 
 what persons who write in defence of religion naturally 
 fall into. Yet, in a matter of such unspeakable im- 
 portance, the proper question is, not whom it lies up- 
 on, according to the rules of argument, to maintain 
 or confute objections, but whether there really are any 
 against this evidence, sufficient in reason to destroy the 
 credit of it. However, unbelievers seem to take upon 
 them the part of shewing that there are. 
 
 They allege, that numberless enthusiastick people, 
 in different ages and countries, expose themselves to 
 the same difficulties which the primitive Christians 
 did, and are ready to give up their lives for the most 
 idle follies imaginable. But it is not very clear to what 
 purpose this objection is brought. For every one 
 surely, in every case, must distinguish between opinions 
 and facts. And though testimony is no proof of en- 
 thusiastick opinions, or of any opinions at all, yet it is 
 allowed in all other cases to be a proof of facts. And 
 a person's laying down his life in attestation of facts or 
 of opinions, is the strongest proof of his believing them. 
 And if the apostles and their cotemporaries did believe 
 the facts, in attestation of which they exposed them- 
 selves to sufferings and death, this their belief or rather 
 knowledge, must be a proof of those facts ; for they 
 were such as came under the observation of their sen- 
 ses. And though it is not of equal weight, yet it is of 
 weight that the martyrs of the next age, notwithstand- 
 ing they were not eye witnesses of those facts, as were 
 the apostles and their cotemporaries, had, however, 
 full opportunity to inform themselves whether they were 
 true or not, and gave equal proof of their believing 
 them to be true. 
 
 But enthusiasm, it is said, greatly weakens the evj- 
 
Chap. VII. for Christianity. 319 
 
 dence of testimony even for facts, in matters relating 
 to religion ; some seem to think it totally and abso- 
 lutely destroys the evidence of testimony upon this 
 subject. And indeed the poweft of enthusiasm, and 
 of diseases too which operate in a like manner, are very 
 wonderful in particular instances. But if great num- 
 bers of men, not appearing in any peculiar degree weak, 
 nor under any peculiar suspicion of negligence, affirm 
 that they saw and heard such things plainly with their 
 eyes and their ears, and are admitted to be in earnest, — 
 such testimony is evidence of the strongest kind we can 
 have for any matter of fact. Yet possibly it may be 
 overcome, strong as it is, by incredibility in the things 
 thus attested, or by contrary testimony. And in an 
 instance where one thought it was so overcome, it 
 might be just to consider, how far such evidence could 
 be accounted for by enthusiasm ; for it seems as if 
 no other imaginable account were to be given of it. 
 But until such incredibility be shewn, or contrary testi- 
 mony produced, it cannot surely be expected, that so 
 far fetched, so indirect and wonderful an account of 
 such testimony as that of enthusiasm must be ; an ac- 
 count so strange, that the generality of mankind can 
 scarce be made to understand what is meant by it ; it 
 cannot, I say, be expected that such account will be 
 admitted of such evidence, when there is this direct, 
 easy and obvious account of it, that people really saw 
 and heard a thing not incredible, which they affirm 
 sincerely and with full assurance they did see and hear. 
 Granting then that enthusiasm is not (strictly speak- 
 ing) an absurd but a possible account of such testi- 
 mony, it is manifest that the very mention of it goes 
 upon the previous supposition that the things so at- 
 tested are incredible, and therefore need not be consid- 
 ered until they are shewn to be so. Much less need it 
 
320 Of the particular Evidence Part II. 
 
 be considered after the contrary has been proved* 
 And I think it has been proved to full satisfaction, 
 that there is no incredibility in a revelation in general, 
 or in such an one*as the Christian in particular. 
 However, as religion is supposed peculiarly liable to 
 enthusiasm, it may just be observed, that prejudices 
 almost without number and without name, romance, 
 affectation, humour, a desire to engage attention or 
 to surprize, the party spirit, custom, little competi- 
 tions, unaccountable likings and dislikings,— these in- 
 fluence men strongly in common matters. And as 
 these prejudices are often scarce known or reflected 
 upon by the persons themselves who are influenced by 
 them, they are to be considered as influences of a like 
 kind to enthusiasm. Yet human testimony in com- 
 mon matters is naturally and justly believed notwith- 
 standing. 
 
 It is intimated farther, in a more refined way of ob- 
 servation, that though it should be proved that the 
 apostles and first Christians could not, in some re- 
 spects, be deceived themselves, and in other respects 
 cannot be thought to have intended to impose upon 
 the world, — yet it will not follow that their general 
 testimony is to be believed, though truly handed down 
 to us ; because they might still in part, i. e. in other re- 
 spects, be deceived themselves, and in part also design- 
 edly impose upon others ; which, it is added, is a thing 
 very credible, from that mixture of real enthusiasm 
 and real knavery to be met with in the same characters. 
 And I must confess I think the matter of fact, con- 
 tained in this observation upon mankind, is not to be 
 denied ; and that somewhat very much a-kin to it, is 
 often supposed in Scripture as a very common case, 
 and most severely reproved. But it were to have been 
 expected, that persons capable of applying this obser- 
 
GttAP. VII. for Christianity. 321 
 
 vation as applied in the objection, might also fre- 
 quently have met with the like mixed character, in in- 
 stances where religion was quit s out oft! ease. The 
 thing plainly is, that mankind are naturally endued 
 with reason, or a capacity of distinguishing between 
 truth and falsehood ; and as naturally they ar- endued 
 with veracity, or a regard to truth in what they say; 
 but from many occasions, they are liable to be preju- 
 diced and biassed and deceived themselves* and capa- 
 ble of intending to deceive others, in every different 
 degree— insomuch that as we are all liable to be de- 
 ceived by prejudice, so likewise it seems to be ad! an 
 uncommon thing for persons, who from their regard 
 to truth would not invent a lie entirely without anv 
 foundation at all, to propagate it with heightening 
 circumstances, after it is once invented and set agoing. 
 And others, though they would not propagate a lie 
 yet, which is a lower degree of falsehood, will let it pass 
 without contradiction. But notwithstanding all this, 
 human testimony remains still a natural ground of as- 
 sent, and this assent a natural principle of action. 
 
 It is objected farther, that however it has happened 
 the fact is, that mankind have, in different ages', been 
 strangely deluded with pretences to miracles ancl won- 
 ders. But it is by no means to be admitted that they 
 have been oftener, or are at all more liable to be de- 
 ceived by these pretences than by others. 
 
 It is added, that there is a very considerable degree 
 of historical evidence for miracles, which are on all 
 hands acknowledged to be fabulous. But suppose 
 there were even the like historical evidence for these, 
 to what there is for those alleged in proof of Chris- 
 tianity, which vet is in no wise allowed, but suppose 
 this, — the consequence would not be, that the evi- 
 dence of the latter is not to be admitted. Nor is 
 
322 Of the particular Evidence Part II. ■ 
 
 there a man in the world who, in common cases, would 
 conclude thus. For what wou'«d such a conclusion 
 really amount to but this, that evidence confuted by 
 contrary evidence, or any way overbalanced, destroys 
 the credibility of other evidence, neither confuted nor 
 overbalanced ? To argue that because there is, if there 
 were, like evidence from testimony for miracles ac- 
 knowledged false, as for those in attestation of Chris- 
 tianity, therefore the evidence in the latter case is not 
 to be credited, — this is the same as to argue, that if 
 two men of equally good reputation had given evi- 
 dence in different cases no way connected, and one of 
 them had been convicted of perjury, this confuted the 
 testimony of the other. 
 
 Upon the whole then, the general observation that 
 human creatures are so liable to be deceived, from en- 
 thusiasm in religion, and principles equivalent to en- 
 thusiasm in common matters, and in both from neg- 
 ligence ; and that they are so capable of dishonestly 
 endeavouring to deceive others, — this does indeed 
 weaken the evidence of testimony in all cases, but does 
 not destroy it in any. And these things will appear, 
 to different men, to weaken the evidence of testimony 
 in different degrees ; in degrees proportionable to the 
 observations they have made, or the notions they have 
 any way taken up, concerning the weakness and neg- 
 ligence and dishonesty of mankind, or concerning the 
 powers of enthusiasm, and prejudices equivalent to it. 
 But it seems to me that people do not know what they 
 say, who affirm these things to destroy the evidence 
 from testimony, which we have of the truth of Chris- 
 tianity. Nothing can destroy the evidence of testimony 
 in any case, but a proof or probability that persons 
 are not competent judges of the facts to which they 
 give testimony, or that they are actually under some 
 
Chap. VII. for Christianity. S£3 
 
 indirect influence in giving* in such particular case. 
 Until this be made out, the natural laws of human 
 actions require that testimony be admitted. It can 
 never be sufficient to overthrow direct historical evi- 
 dence, indolently to say, that there are so many princi- 
 ples from whence men are liable to be deceived them- 
 selves, and disposed to deceive others, especially in 
 matters of religion, that one know* not what to believe. 
 And it is surprizing persons can help reflecting, that 
 this very manner of speaking supposes they are not 
 satisfied that there is nothing in the evidence of which 
 they speak thus ; or that they can avoid observing, if 
 they do make this reflection, that it is on such a sub- 
 ject a very material one.* 
 
 And over against all these objections is to be set the 
 importance of Christianity, as what must have engaged 
 the attention of its first converts, so as to have render- 
 ed them less liable to be deceived from carelessness than 
 they would in common matters ; and likewise the 
 strong obligations to veracity which their religion laid 
 them under ; so that the first and most obvious pre- 
 sumption is, that they could not be deceived them- 
 selves, nor would deceive others. And this presump- 
 tion in this degree is peculiar to the testimony we have 
 been considering. 
 
 In argument, assertions are nothing in" themselves, 
 and have an air of positiveness which sometimes is 
 not very easy ; yet they are necessary, and necessary 
 to be repeated, in order to connect a discourse, and 
 distinctly to lay before the view of the reader what is 
 proposed to be proved, and what is left as proved. 
 Now the conclusion from the foregoing observations 
 is, I think, beyond all doubt, this — that unbelievers 
 must be forced to admit the external evidence for 
 
 * See the foregoing chapter. 
 
324 Of the particular Evidence Part fl, 
 
 Christianity, i. e. the pr#of of miracles wrought to at- 
 tes :t r to be of real weight and very considerable, 
 though they cannot allow it to be sufficient to con- 
 vince them of the reality of those miracles. And as 
 they must in all reason admit this, so it seems to me, 
 thai upon consideration they would in fact admit it ; 
 those of them, I mean, who know aay thing at all of 
 the matter ; in like manner as persons, in. many cases, 
 own they see strong evidence from testimony for the 
 truth of things, which yet they cannot be convinced 
 are true— cases, suppose, where there is contrary testi- 
 mony, or things which they think, whether with or 
 without reason, to be incredible. But there is no tes- 
 timony contrary to that which we have been consider- 
 ing ; and it has been fully proved that there is no in- 
 credibility in Christianity in general, or in any part 
 of it. 
 
 II. As to the evidence for Christianity from proph- 
 ecy, I shall only make some few general observations 
 which are suggested by the analogy of nature, i. e, by 
 the acknowledged natural rules of judging in com* 
 mon matters, concerning evidence of a like kind to 
 this from prophecy. 
 
 1 . The obscurity or unintelligibleness of one part 
 of a prophecy does not, in any degree, invalidate the 
 proof for fof esight, arising from the appearing comple- 
 tion of those other parts which are understood. For 
 the case is evidently the same as if those parts, which 
 are not understood, were lost or not written at all, or 
 written in an unknown tongue. Whether this observa- 
 tion be commonly attended to or not, it is so evident, 
 that one can scarce bring one's self to set down an in- 
 stance in common matters to exemplify it. How- 
 ever, suppose a writing, partly in cypher, and partly in 
 plain words at length, and that in the part one un- 
 
Chap. VII for Christianity. SQ5 
 
 derstood there appeared mention of several known 
 facts, it would never come into any man's thoughts to 
 imagine, that if he understood the whole, perhaps he 
 might find that those facts were not in reality ki own 
 by the writer. Indeed, both in :h> < example and 
 the thing intended to be exemplified by it, ou: iot 
 understanding the whole (the whole suppose of a 
 sentence or a paragraph) might sometimes occasion 
 a doubt, whether one understood the litera! meaning 
 of such a part ; but this comes under another con- 
 sideration. 
 
 For the same reason, though a man should be in- 
 capable, for want of learning or opportunities of in- 
 quiry, or from not having turned his studies this way, 
 even so much as to judge, whether particular prophe- 
 cies have been throughout completely fulfilled, — yet 
 he may see in general, that they have been fulfilled to 
 such a degree as, upon very good ground, to be con- 
 vinced of foresight more than human in such prophe- 
 cies, and of such events being intended by them. For 
 the same reason also, though by means of the deficien- 
 cies in civil history, and^the different accounts of his- 
 torians, the most learned should not be able to^make 
 out to satisfaction, that such parts of the prophetick 
 history have been minutely and throughout fulfilled, — 
 yet a very strong proof of foresight may arise from that 
 general completion of them which is made out ; as 
 much proof of foresight, perhaps, as the Giver of 
 prophecy intended should ever be afforded by such 
 parts of prophecy. 
 
 2. A long series of prophecy being applicable to 
 «uch and such events, is itself a proof that it was in- 
 tended of them ; as the rules by which we naturally 
 judge and determine in common cases parallel to this 
 will shew. This observation I make in answer to the 
 
526 Of the particular Evidence Part 11= 
 
 common objection against the application of the 
 prophecies, that considering each of them distinctly by 
 itself, it does not at all appear, that they were intend- 
 ed of those particular events to which they are appli- 
 ed by Christians ; and therefore it is to be supposed 
 that, if they meant any thing, they were intended of 
 other events unknown to us, and not of these at all. 
 
 Now there are two kinds of writing which bear a 
 great resemblance to prophecy, with respect to the 
 matter before us ; the mythological, and the satirical, 
 where the satire is to a certain degree concealed. And 
 a man might be assured, that he understood what an 
 author intended by a fable or parable, related without 
 any application or moral, merely from seeing it to be 
 easily capable of such application, and that such a 
 moral might naturally be deduced from it. And he 
 might be fully assured, that such person* and events 
 were intended in a satirical writing, merely from its be- 
 ing applicable to them. And, agreeably to the last 
 observation, he might be in a good measure satisfied 
 of it, though he were not enough informed in affairs, 
 or in the story of such persons, to understand half the 
 satire. For, his satisfaction that he understood the 
 meaning, the intended meaning of these writings, 
 would be greater or less, in proportion as he saw the 
 general turn of them to be capable of such application, 
 and in proportion to the number of particular things 
 capable of it. And thus, if a long series of prophecy 
 is applicable to the present state of the church, and to 
 the political situations of the kingdoms of the world, 
 ^ome thousand years after these prophecies were deliv- 
 ered, and a long series of prophecy delivered before 
 the coming of Christ is applicable to him, — these 
 things are in themselves a proof, that the prophetick 
 history was intended of him, and of those events ; in 
 
Chap. VII. for Christianity. S27 
 
 proportion as the general turn of it is capable of such 
 application, and to the number and variety of partic- 
 ular prophecies capable of it. And, though in all just 
 way of consideration, the appearing completion of 
 prophecies is to be allowed to be thus explanatory of, 
 and to determine their meaning, — yet it is to be re- 
 membered farther, that the ancient Jews applied the 
 prophecies to a Messiah before his coming, in much 
 the same manner as Christians do now ; and that the 
 primitive Christians interpreted the prophecies respect- 
 ing the state of the church and of the world in the last 
 ages, in the sense which the event seems to confirm 
 and verify. And from these things it may be made 
 appear, 
 
 3. That the shewing even to a high probability, if 
 that could be, that the prophets thought of some 
 other events in such and such predictions, and not 
 those at all which Christians allege to be completions 
 of those predictions ; or that such and such prophecies 
 are capable of being applied to other events, than those 
 to which Christians apply them, — that this would not 
 confute or destroy the force of the argument from 
 prophecy, even with regard to those very instances. 
 For, observe how this matter really is. If one knew 
 such a person to be the sole author of such a book, 
 and was certainly assured, or satisfied to any degree 2 
 that one knew the whole of what he intended in it, — 
 one should be assured or satisfied to such a degree, that 
 one knew the whole meaning of that book ; for the 
 meaning of a book is nothing but the meaning of the 
 author. But if one knew a person to have compiled 
 a book out of memoirs, which he received from anoth- 
 er of vastly superior knowledge in the subject of it, 
 especially if it were a book full of great intricacies and 
 difficulties, — it would in no wise follow that one knew 
 
528 Of the particular Evidence Part IL 
 
 the whole meaning of the book, from knowing the 
 w :ole meaning of the compiler ; for the original mem- 
 oi s, i. e. the author of them, might have, and there 
 would be no degree of presumption in many cases 
 against supposing him to have, some farther meaning 
 than the compiler saw. To say then that the Scrip- 
 tures, and the things contained in them, can have no 
 otner or farther meaning than those persons thought 
 or had, who first recited or wrote them, is evidently 
 saying that those persons were the original, proper, and 
 sole authors of those books, i. e. that they are not in- 
 spired ; which is absurd, whilst the authority of these 
 books is under examination, i.e. until you have de- 
 termined they are of no divine authority at all. Un- 
 til this be determined, it must in all reason be suppo- 
 sed, not indeed that they have, for this is taking for 
 granted that they are inspired, but that they may 
 have some farther meaning than what the compilers 
 savv or understood. And upon this supposition it is 
 supposable also, that this farther meaning may be ful- 
 filled. Now event- corresponding to prophecies, in- 
 terpreted in a different meaning from that in which 
 the prophets are supposed to have understood them, 
 this affords ir a manner the same proof, that this dif- 
 ferent sense was originally intended, as it would have 
 afforded if the prophets had not understood their pre- 
 dictions in the sense it is supposed they did ; because 
 there is no presumption of their sense of them being 
 the whole sense of them. And it has been already 
 shewn, that the apparent completions of prophecy 
 must be allowed to be explanatory of its meaning. 
 So that the question is, whether a series of prophecy 
 has been fulfilled, in a natural or proper, i. e. in any 
 real sense of the words of it. For such completion is 
 equally a proof of foresight more than human, wheth- 
 
fclHAfr. VII. for Christianity. $2$ 
 
 er the prophets are or are not supposed to have under- 
 stood it in a different sense. I say, supposed ; for, 
 though I think it clear that the prophets did not un- 
 der tand the full meaning of their predictions, it is 
 another question how far they thought they did, and 
 in what sense they understood them. 
 
 Hence may be seen to how little purpose those per- 
 sons busy them -elves, who endeavour to prove that the 
 prophetick history is applicable to events of the age 
 in which it was written, or of ages before it. Indeed 
 to have proved this before there was any appearance 
 of a farther completion of it, might have answered 
 some purpose ; for it might have prevented the ex- 
 pectation of any such farther completion. Thus, could 
 Porphyry have shewn that some principal parts of the 
 book of Daniel, for instance, the seventh verse of the 
 seventh chapter, which the Christians interpreted of 
 the latter ages, was applicable to events which hap- 
 pened before or about the age of Antiochus Epiphanes,— 
 this might have prevented them from expecting any 
 farther completion of it. And, unless there was then* 
 as I think there must have been, external evidence con- 
 cerning that book more than is come down to us, 
 such a discovery might have been a stumbling block 
 in the way of Christianity itself ; considering the au- 
 thority which our Saviour has given to the book of 
 Daniel, and how much the general scheme of Christ- 
 ianity presupposes the truth of it, But even this 
 discovery, had there been any such,* would be of ve* 
 
 * It appears that Porphyry did nothing worth mentioning in this way. 
 For Jerom on the place says Duas posteriores bestias—in uno Macedonum regno 
 fitnit. And as to the ten kings, Decern reges enumerat, qui fuerunt stvissimi .« 
 ipsosque reges non uniusponit regni, verbi gratia, Macedonia, Syria, Asia et 
 JEgyptia ; sed de dhersis regnis unum efficit regnum ordinem. And in this way Of 
 interpretation any thing may be made of any thing. 
 
 T T 
 
330 Of the particular Evidence Part II. 
 
 ry little weight with reasonable men. Now, this pas- 
 sage, thus applicable to events before the age of Por- 
 phyry^ appears to be applicable also to events which 
 succeeded the dissolution of the Roman empire. I 
 mention this, not at all as intending to insinuate, that 
 the division of this empire into ten parts, for it plainly 
 was divided into about that number, were, alone and 
 by itself, of any moment in verifying the prophetick 
 history ; but only as an example of the thing I am 
 speaking of. And thus upon the whole, the matter 
 of inquiry evidently must be, as above put, whether 
 the prophecies are applicable to Christ, and to the 
 present state of the world and of the church, appli- 
 cable in such a degree as to imply foresight ; not 
 whether they are capable of any other application, 
 though I know no pretence for saying the general turn 
 of them is capable of any other. 
 
 These observations are, I think, just, and the evi- 
 dence referred to in them real, though there may be 
 people who will not accept of such imperfect informa- 
 tion from scripture. Some too have not integrity and 
 regard enough to truth, to attend to evidence which 
 ke p^ the mind in doubt, perhaps perplexity, and 
 which is much of a different sort from what they ex- 
 pected. And it plainly requires a degree of modesty 
 and fairness, beyond what every one has, for a man to 
 say, not to the world, but to himself, that there is a 
 real appearance of somewhat of great weight in this 
 matter, though he is not able thoroughly to satisfy 
 himself about it ; but it shall have its influence upon 
 him, in proportion to its appearing reality and weight. 
 It is much more easy, and more falls in with the neg- 
 li *ence, presumption and wilfulness of the generality, 
 to determine at once, with a decissive air, there is 
 nothing in it. The prejudices arising from that abso* 
 
Chap. VII. for Christianity. 331 
 
 lute contempt and scorn with which this evidence is 
 treated in the world, I do not mention. For what 
 indeed can be said to persons, who are weak enough 
 in their understanding to think this any presumption 
 against it, or if they do not, are yet weak enough in 
 their temper to be influenced by such prejudices, up- 
 on such a subject ? 
 
 I shall now, secondly, endeavour to give some 
 account of the general argument for the truth of 
 Christianity, consisting both of the direct and circum- 
 stantial evidence, considered as making up one argu- 
 ment. Indeed to state and examine this argument 
 fully, would be a work much beyond the compass of 
 this whole treatise ; nor is so much as a proper abridg- 
 ment of it to be expected here. Yet the present sub- 
 ject requires to have some brief account of it given. 
 For it is the kind of evidence, upon which most ques- 
 tions of difficulty in common practice are determined ; 
 evidence arisi: g from various coincidences which sup- 
 port and confirm each other, and in this manner prove, 
 with more or less certainty, the point under consider- 
 ation. And I choose to do it also : First, because it 
 seems to be of the greatest importance, and not duly 
 attended to by every one, that the proof of revelation 
 is, not some direct and express things only, but a great 
 variety of circumstantial things also ; and that though 
 each of these direct and circumstantial things is in- 
 deed to be considered separately, yet they are after- 
 wards to be joined together ; for that the proper force 
 of the evidence consists in the result of those several 
 things, considered in their respects to each other, and 
 united into one view. And in the next place, because 
 it seems to me, that the matters of fact here set down, 
 which are acknowledged by unbelievers, must be ac- 
 knowledged by them sjso to contain together a de- 
 
332 Of the particular Evidence Part II. 
 
 gree of evidence of great weight, if they could he 
 brought to lay these several things before themselves 
 distinctly, and then with attention consider them to-, 
 gether, instead of that cursory thought of them to 
 which we are familiarized. For being familiarized 
 to the cursory thought of things, as really hinders 
 the weight of them from being seen, as from having 
 its due influence upon practice. 
 
 The thing asserted, and the truth of which is to be 
 inquired into, is this, that over and above our reason 
 and affections, which God has given us for the infor- 
 mation of our judgment and the conduct of our lives, 
 he has also, by external revelation, given us an ac- 
 count of himself and his moral government over the 
 world, implying a future state of rewards and punish- 
 ments ; i. e. hath revealed the system of natural reli- 
 gion ; for natural religion may be externally* revealed 
 by God, as the ignorant may be taught it by mankind 
 their fellow creatures — that God, I say, has given 
 us the evidence of revelation, as well as the evidence 
 of reason, to ascertain this moral system ; together 
 with an account of a particular dispensation of Provi- 
 dence, which reason could noway have discovered, and 
 a particular institution of religion founded on it, for 
 the recovery of mankind out of their present wretch- 
 ed condition, and raising them to the perfection and 
 final happiness of their nature. 
 
 This revelation, whether real or supposed, may be 
 considered as wholly historical. For prophecy is noth- 
 ing but the history of events before they come to pass ; 
 doctrines also are matters of fact ; and precepts come 
 under the same notion. And the general design of 
 Scripture, which contains in it this revelation, thus 
 considered as historical, may be said to be to give us 
 
 * P. 216, &c, * 
 
Chap. VII. for Christianity. 333 
 
 an account of the world, in this one single view, as 
 God's world ; by which it appears essentially distin- 
 guished from all other books, so far as I have found, 
 except such as are copied from it. It begins with an 
 account of God's creation of the world, in order to as- 
 certain and distinguish from all others who is the ob- 
 ject of our worship, by what he has done ; in order to 
 ascertain who he is, concerning whose providence, 
 commands, promises and threatenings, this sacred book 
 all along treats , the Maker and Proprietor of the 
 world, he whose creatures we are, the God of nature ; 
 in order likewise to distinguish him from the idols of 
 the nations, which are either imaginary beings, i. e. no 
 beings at all, or else part of that creation, the histor- 
 ical relation of which is here given. And St. John, 
 not improbably with an eye to this Mosaick account 
 of the creation, begins his gospel with an account 
 of our Saviour's preexistence, and that all things were 
 made by him, and without him was not any thing made 
 that was made ;* agreeably to the doctrine of St. Paul, 
 that God created all things by Jesus Christ.f This be- 
 ing premised, the Scripture, taken together, seems to 
 profess to contain a kind of an abridgment of the his- 
 tory of the world, in the view just now mentioned ; 
 that is, a general account of the condition of religion 
 and its professors, during the continuance of that apos- 
 tacy from God, and state of wickedness, which it every 
 where supposes the world to lie in. And this account 
 of the state of religion carries with it some brief ac- 
 count of the political state of things, as religion is af- 
 fected by it. Revelation indeed considers the com- 
 mon affairs of this world, and what is going on in it, 
 as a mere scene of distraction, and cannot be supposed 
 £o concern itself with foretelling at what time Ro?ne 
 
 * Joh. i. 3. f Eph. iii. 9. 
 
334? Of the particular Evidence Part II. 
 
 or Babylon or Greece, or any particular place, should 
 be the most conspicuous seat of that tyranny and dis- 
 soluteness, which all places equally aspire to be ; can- 
 not, I -ay, be supposed to give any account of this wild 
 scene for its own sake. But it seems to contain some 
 very general account of the chief governments of the 
 world, as the general state of religion has been, is, or 
 shall be, affected by them, from the first transgression, 
 and during the whole interval of the world's continu- 
 ing in its present state, to a certain future period, spok- 
 en of both in the Old and New Testament, very dis- 
 tinctly and in great variety of expression : The times of 
 the restitution of all things :* when the mystery of God 
 shall be finished, as he hath declared to his servants the 
 prophets :t when the God of heaven shall set up a king- 
 do?)!, which shall never be destroyed : and the kingdom 
 shall not be left to other people, \ as it is represented to be 
 during this apostacy, but judgment shall be given to the 
 saints ,§ and they shall reign :\\ and the kingdom and do- 
 minion, and the greatness of the kingdom under the whole 
 heaven, shall be given to the people of the saints of the 
 Most High % 
 
 Upon this general view of the Scripture, I would re- 
 mark how great a length of time the whole relation 
 takes up, near ^ix thousand years of which are past - 9 
 and how great a variety of things it treats of ; the nat- 
 ural and moral system or history of the world, in- 
 cluding the time when it was formed, all contained 
 in the very first book, and evidently written in a rude 
 and unlearned age ; and in subsequent books, the va- 
 rious common and prophetick history, and the partic- 
 ular dispensation of Christianity. Now all this to- 
 gether gives the largest scope for criticism ; and for 
 
 • Acts iii 21. f Rev. x. 7. \ Dan. ii. 
 
 § Dan. vii. 22. |) Rev. 1 Dan. x\i 
 
Chap. VII. for Christianity. 335 
 
 confutation of what is capable of being confuted, ei- 
 ther from reason, or from common history, or from 
 any inconsistence in its several parts. And it is a thing 
 which deserves, I think, to be mentioned, that where- 
 as some imagine the supposed doubtfulness of the evi- 
 dence for revelation implies a positive argument that 
 it is not true, it appears, on the contrary, to imply a 
 positive argument that it is true. For, could any 
 common relation, of such antiquity, extent and variety 
 (for in these things the stress of what I am now observ- 
 ing lies) be proposed to the examination of the world ; 
 that it could not, in an age of knowledge and liberty, 
 be confuted, or shewn to have nothing in it, to the sat- 
 isfaction of reasonable men, this would be thought a 
 strong presumptive proof of its truth. And indeed it 
 must be a proof of it, just in proportion to the proba- 
 bility, that if it were false, it might be shewn to be so ; 
 and this, I think, is scarce pretended to be shewn but 
 upon principles and in ways of arguing, which have 
 been clearly obviated.* Nor does it at all appear, that 
 any set of men who believe natural religion, are of the 
 opinion that Christianity has been thus confuted. Bur 
 to proceed : 
 
 Together with the moral system of the world, the 
 Old Testament contains a chronological account of 
 the beginning of it, and from thence an unbroken 
 genealogy of mankind for many ages before common 
 history begins ; and carried on as much farther, as to 
 make up a continued thread of history of the length 
 of between three and four thousand years. It con- 
 tains an account of God's making a covenant with a 
 particular nation, that they should be his people, and 
 he would be their God, in a peculiar sense ; of his of- 
 ten interposing miraculously in their affairs ; giving 
 
 * Ch. ii. iii. Sea 
 
336 Of the particular Evidence Part IL 
 
 them the promise, and long after the possession, of a 
 particular country ; assuring them of the greatest na- 
 tional prosperity in it, if they would worship him, in op- 
 position to the idols which the rest of the world wor- 
 shipped, and obey his commands* and threatening them 
 with unexampled punishments, if they disobeyed him, 
 and fell into the general idolatry ; insomuch that this 
 one nation should continue to be the observation and 
 the wonder of all the world. It declares particularly, 
 that God would scatter them among all people, from one end 
 of the earth unto the other ; but that when they should 
 return unto the Lord their God, he would have compas- 
 sion upon them, and gather them from all the nations 
 whither he had scattered them ; that Israel should be sav- 
 ed in the Lord with an everlasting salvation, and not be 
 ashamed or confounded world without end. And as some 
 of these promises are conditional, others are as abso- 
 lute as any thing can be expressed ; that the time 
 should come, when the people should be all righteous, 
 and inherit the land for ever ; that though God would 
 make a full end of all nations whither he had scattered 
 them, yet would he not make a full end of them ; that he 
 would bring again the captivity of his people Israel, and 
 plant them upon their land, and they should be no more 
 pulled up out of their land ; that the seed of Israel should 
 not cease from being a nation for ever.* It foretells, 
 that God would raise them up a particular person, in 
 whom all his promises should finally be fulfilled ; tire 
 Messiah, who should be in an high and eminent sense, 
 their anointed Prince and Saviour. This was fore- 
 told in such a manner, as raised a general expectation 
 of such a person in the nation, as appears from the 
 New Testament, and is an acknowledged fact ; an ex- 
 
 ' Deut. xxviii. 64. Ch. xxx. 2, ?,. Isai. xlv. 17. Cli. !x. 21, Jer.xxx. 
 \\. Ch. x!vi. 28. Amosix. 15. Jer. xxxi, 'M>. 
 
Chap. VIL for Christianity. £37 
 
 pectation of his coming at such a particular time* be- 
 fore any one appeared claiming to be that person, and 
 when there was no ground for such an expectation, 
 but from the prophecies ; which expectation therefore 
 must in all reason be presumed to be explanatory of 
 those prophecies, if there were any doubt about their 
 meaning. It seems moreover to foretell, that this 
 person should be rejected by that nation, to whom 
 he had been so long promised, and though he was so 
 much desired by them.* And it expressly foretells, 
 that he should be the Saviour of the Gentiles ; and 
 even that the completion of the scheme, contained 
 in this book, and then begun, and in its progress, 
 should be somewhat so great, that, in comparison 
 with it, the restoration of the Jews alone would be but 
 of small account. // is a light thing that thou shouldest 
 be my servant to raise up the tribes of Jacob, and to re- 
 store the preserved of Israel : I will also give thee for a 
 light to the Gentiles, that thou mayest be for salvation unto 
 the end of the earth. And, In the last days, the moun- 
 tain of the Lord's house shall be established in the top of 
 the mountains, and shall be exalted above the hills ; and 
 
 all nations shall flow into it for out of Z ion shall go 
 
 forth the law, and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem. 
 
 And he shall judge among the nations and the Lord 
 
 alone shall be exalted in that day, and the idols he shall ut- 
 terly abolish. \ The Scripture farther contains an ac- 
 count, that at the time the Messiah was expected, a 
 person rose up, in this nation, claiming to be that Mes- 
 siah, to be the person whom all the prophecies refer- 
 
 * Isai. viii. 14, 15. Ch. xlix. 5 Ch. liii. Mai. i. 10, 11, and Ch. iir. 
 
 } Isai. xlix. 6. Ch. ii. Ch.xi. Ch. lvi. 7. Mai. i. 11. To which must 
 be added the other prophecies of the like kind,- several in the New Testa- 
 ment, and very many in the Old ; which describe what shall be the co rs 
 nl^lon of the revealed phn of Providence. 
 
 U U 
 
338 Of the particular Evidence Part IL 
 
 red to, and in whom they should center ; that he spent 
 some years in a continued course of miraculous works, 
 and endued his immediate disciples and followers 
 with a power of doing the same, as a proof of the 
 truth of that religion which he commissioned them to 
 publish ; that, invested with this authority and power, 
 they made numerous converts in the remotest coun- 
 tries, and settled and established his religion in the 
 world, to the end of which the Scripture professes to 
 give a prophetick account of the state of this religion 
 amongst mankind. 
 
 Let us now suppose a person utterly ignorant of his- 
 tory, to have all this related to him out of the Scrip- 
 ture. Or suppose such an one, having the Scripture 
 put into his hands, to remark these things in it, not 
 knowing but that the whole, even its civil history, as 
 well as the other parts of it might be from beginning 
 to end an entire invention, and to ask, what truth 
 was in it, and whether the revelation here related was 
 real or a fiction ? And instead of a direct answer, sup» 
 pose him, all at once, to be told the following confest 
 facts, and then to unite them into one view. 
 
 Let him first be told in how great a degree the pro- 
 fession and establishment of natural religion, the be- 
 fief that there is one God to be worshipped, that virtue 
 is his law, and that mankind shall be rewarded and pun- 
 ished hereafter, as they obey and disobey it here ; in 
 how very great a degree, I say, the profession and estab- 
 lishment of this moral system in the world is owing to 
 the revelation, whether real or supposed, contained in 
 this book ; the establishment of this moral system, even 
 in those countries which do not acknowledge the prop- 
 er authority of the Scripture.* Let him be told also 
 what number of nations do acknowledge its proper 
 
 • P. 291. 
 
Chap. VII. for Christianity. 339 
 
 authority. Let him then take in the consideration of 
 what importance religion is to mankind. And upon 
 these things he might, I think, truly observe, that this 
 supposed revelation's obtaining and being received in 
 the world, with all the circumstances and effects of it, 
 considered together as one event, is the most conspicu- 
 ous and important event in the story of mankind ; 
 that a fcook of this nature, and thus promulged and 
 recommended to our consideration, demands, as if by 
 a voice from heaven, to have its claims most seriously 
 examined into ; and that, before such examination, to 
 treat it with any kind of scoffing and ridicule, is an of- 
 fence against natural piety. But it is to be remember- 
 ed, that how much soever the establishment of natural 
 religion in the world is owing to the scripture revela- 
 tion, this does not destroy the proof of religion from 
 reason, any more than the proof of Euclid's Elements 
 is destroyed by a man's knowing or thinking that he 
 should never have seen the truth of the several propo- 
 sitions contained in it, nor had those propositions come 
 into his thoughts, but for that mathematician. 
 
 Let such a person as we are peaking of be, in the 
 next place, informed of the acknowledged antiquity 
 of the first parts of this book, and that its chronology, 
 its account of the time when the earth and the several 
 parts of it were first peopled with human creatures is 
 no way contradicted, but is really confirmed, by the 
 natural and civil history of the world, collected from 
 common historians, from the state of the earth, and 
 from the late invention of arts and sciences. And as 
 the Scripture contains an unbroken thread of common 
 and civil history, from the creation to the captivity, for 
 between three and four thousand years, let the person 
 we are speaking of be told in'the next place that this 
 general history, as it is not contradicted but is confirmed 
 
340 Of the particular Evidence Part II. 
 
 by profane history as much as there would be reason to 
 expect, upon supposition of its truth, — so there is noth- 
 ing in the whole history itself \ to give any reasonable 
 ground of suspicion of its not being, in the general, a 
 faithful and literally true genealogy of men, and se- 
 ries of things. I speak here only of the common 
 scripture history, or of the course of ordinary events 
 related in it, a* distinguished from miracles and from 
 the prophetick history. In all the scripture narrations 
 of this kind, following events arise out of foregoing 
 ones, as in all other histories. There appears nothing 
 related as done in any age, not conformable to the 
 manners of that age j nothing in the account of a suc- 
 ceeding age which, one would say, could not be true, 
 or was improbable, from the account of things in the 
 preceding one. There is nothing in the characters 
 which would raise a thought of their being feigned ; 
 but all the internal marks imaginable of their being 
 real. It is to be added also, that mere genealogies, 
 bare narratives of the number of years which persons 
 called by such and such names lived, do not carry the 
 face of fiction, perhaps do carry some presumption of 
 veracity ; and all unadorned narratives, which have 
 nothing to surprize, may be thought to carry some- 
 what of the like presumption too. And the domes- 
 tick and the political history is plainly credible. 
 There may be incidents in Scripture, which taken 
 alone in the naked way they are told, may appear 
 strange, especially to persons of other manners, tem* 
 per, education ; but there are also incidents of un- 
 doubted truth, in many or most persons' lives, which, 
 in the same circumstances, would appear to the full 
 as strange. There may be mistakes of transcribers, 
 there may be other real or seeming mistakes not easy 
 to be particularly accounted for ; but there are cer- 
 
Chap. VII. for Christianity. 341 
 
 tainly no more things of this kind in the Scripture, than 
 what were to have been expected in books of such an- 
 tiquity, and nothing in any wise sufficient to discredit 
 the general narrative. Now, that a history claiming 
 to commence from the creation, and extending in one 
 continued series through so great a length of time and 
 variety of events; should have such appearances of re- 
 ality and truth in its whole contexture, is surely a ve- 
 ry remarkable circumstance in its favour. And as all 
 this is applicable to the common history of the New 
 Testament, so there is a farther credibility, and a very 
 high one, given to it by profane authors ; many of 
 these writing of the same times, and confirming the 
 truth of customs and events which are incidentally as 
 well as more purposely mentioned in it. And this 
 credibility of the common Scripture history, gives some 
 credibility to its miraculou* history ; especially as this is 
 interwoven with the common, so as that they imply 
 each other, and both together make up one relation. 
 Let it then be more particularly observed to this 
 person, that it is an acknowledged matter of fact, which 
 is indeed implied in the foregoing observation, that 
 there was such a nation as the Jews, of the greatest 
 antiquity, whose government and general polity was 
 founded on the law here related to be given them by 
 Moses as from heaven ; that natural religion, though 
 with rites additional, yet no way contrary to it, was 
 their established religion, which cannot be said of the 
 Gentile world ; and that their very being as a nation 
 depended upon their acknowledgment of one God, 
 the God of the universe. For, suppose in their cap 
 tivity in Babylon, they had gone over to the religion 
 of their conquerors, there would have remained no 
 bond of union to keep them a distinct people. And 
 whilst, they were under their own kings, in their own 
 
342 Of the particular Evidence Part II. 
 
 country, a total apostacy from God would have been 
 the dissolution of their whole government. They, in 
 such a sense, nationally acknowledged and worshipped 
 the Maker of heaven and earth, when the re-t of the 
 world were sunk in idolatry, as rendered them, in fact, 
 the peculiar people of God. And this so remarkable 
 an establishment and preservation of natural religion 
 amongst them, seems to add some peculiar credibility 
 to the historical evidence for the miracles of Moses and 
 the prophets ; because these miracles are a full satisfac- 
 tory account of this event, which plainly wants to be 
 accounted for, and cannot otherwise. 
 
 Let this person, supposed wholly ignorant of history, 
 be acquainted farther, that one claiming to be the 
 Messiah, of Jewish extraction, rose up at the time 
 when this nation, from the prophecies above mention- 
 ed, expected the Messiah ; that he was rejected, a* it 
 seemed to have been foretold he should, by the body 
 of the people, under the direction of their rulers ; 
 that in the course of a very few years he was believed 
 on and acknowledged as the promised Messiah, by 
 great numbers among the Gentiles, agreeably to the 
 prophecies of Scripture, yet not upon the evidence of 
 prophecy, but of miracles,* of which miracles we have 
 also strong historical evidence ; (by which I mean here 
 no more than must be acknowleged by unbelievers, 
 for let pious frauds and follies be admitted to weaken, 
 it is ab-urd to say they destroy, our evidence of mira- 
 cles wrought in proof of Christianity!) that this reli- 
 gion, approving itself to the reason of mankind, and 
 carrying its own evidence with it, so far as reason is a 
 judge of its system, and being no way contrary to rea- 
 son in those parts of it which require to be believed 
 upon the mere authority of its Author, — that this re- 
 
 • P. 314, &c. f P. 321, &c. 
 
Chap. VII. for Christianity. 34S 
 
 Jigion, I say, gradually spread and supported itself, for 
 some hundred years, not only without any assistance 
 from temporal power, but under constant discourage- 
 ments, and often the bitterest persecutions from it, and 
 then became the religion of the world y that in the 
 mean time the Jewish nation and government were 
 destroyed, in a very remarkable manner, and the peo- 
 ple carried away captive and dispersed through the 
 most distant countries, in which state of dispersion 
 they have remained fifteen hundred years ; and that 
 they remain a numerous people, united amongst them- 
 selves, and distinguished from the rest of the world, as 
 they were in the days of Moses, by the profession of 
 his law, and every where looked upon in a manner 
 which one scarce knows how distinctly to express, but 
 in the words of the prophetick account of it, given so 
 many ages before it came to pass — Thou shalt become an 
 astonishment, a proverb, and a byword, among all nations 
 whither the Lord shall lead thee* 
 
 The appearance of a standing miracle, in the Jews 
 remaining a distinct people in their dispersion, and the 
 confirmation which this event appears to give to the 
 truth of revelation, may be thought to be answered by 
 their religion's forbidding them intermarriages with 
 those of any other, and prescribing them a great many 
 peculiarities in their food, by which they are debarred 
 from the means of incorporating with the people in 
 whose countries they live. This is not, I think, a sat- 
 isfactory account of that which it pretends to account 
 for. But what does it pretend to account for ? The 
 correspondence between this event and the prophecies ; 
 or the coincidence of both, with a long dispensation 
 of Providence of a peculiar nature, towards that peo- 
 ple formerly ? No. It is only the event itself which is 
 
 * Deut. xxviii. 37. 
 
344 Of the particular Evidence Part II. 
 
 offered to be thus accounted for, which single event 
 taken alone, abstracted from all such correspondence 
 and coincidence, perhaps would not have appeared 
 miraculous ; but that correspondence and coincidence 
 may be so, though the event itself be supposed not. 
 Thus the concurrence of our Saviour's being born at 
 Bethlehem, with a long foregoing series of prophecy 
 and other coincidences, is doubtless miraculous, the 
 series of prophecy, and other coincidences, and the 
 event, being admitted j though the event itself, his 
 birth at that place, appears to have been brought 
 about in a natural way j of which, however, no one 
 can be certain. 
 
 And as several f these events seem in some degree 
 expressly to have verified the prophetick history alrea- 
 dy, so likewise they may be considered farther as 
 having a peculiar aspect towards the full completion 
 of it, as affording some presumption that the whole of 
 it shall, one time or other, be fulfilled. Thus, that 
 the Jews have been so wonderfully preserved in their 
 long and wide dispersion, which is indeed the direct 
 fulfilling of some prophecies, but is now mentioned 
 only as looking forward to somewhat yet to come ; 
 that natural religion came forth from Judea, and 
 spread in the degree it has done over the world, before 
 lost in idolatry, which together with some other things 
 have distinguished that very place, in like manner as 
 the people of it are distinguished ; that this great 
 change of religion over the earth, was brought about 
 under the profession and acknowledgment that Jesus 
 was the promised Messiah ; things of thi> kind natu- 
 rally turn the thoughts of serious men towards the full 
 completion of the prophetick history, concerning the 
 final restoration of that people, concerning the estab- 
 lishment of the everlasting kingdom among them, the 
 
Chap. VII. for Christianity. 345 
 
 kingdom of the Messiah, and the future state of the 
 world under this sacred government. Such circum* 
 stances and events compared with these prophecies, 
 though no completions of them, yet would not, I think* 
 be spoken of as nothing in the argument, by a person 
 upon his first being informed of them. They fall in 
 with the prophetick history of things still further give 
 it some additional credibility, have the appearance of 
 being somewhat in order to the full completion of it. 
 
 Indeed it requires a good degree of knowledge, and 
 great calmness and consideration, to be able to judge 
 thoroughly of the evidence for the truth of Christ- 
 ianity, from that part of the prophetick history which 
 relates to the situation of the kingdoms of the world, 
 and to the state of the church, from the establish- 
 ment of Christianity to the present time. But it ap- 
 pears, from a general view of it, to be very material. 
 And those persons who have thoroughly examined it* 
 and some of them were men of the coolest tempers, 
 greatest capaciries, and least liable to imputations of 
 prejudice, insist upon it as determinately conclusive. 
 
 Suppose now a person quite ignorant of history, first 
 to recollect the passages abovementioned out of Scrip- 
 ture, without knowing but that the whole was a late 
 fiction, then to be informed of the correspondent facts 
 now mentioned, and to unite them all into one view ; 
 that the profession and establishment of natural reli- 
 gion in the world is greatly owing, in different ways, to 
 this book, and the supposed revelation which it con- 
 tains ; that it is acknowledged to be of the earliest an- 
 tiquity ; that its chronology and common history are 
 entirely credible ; that this ancient nation, the Jews, of 
 whom it chiefly treats, appear to have been in fact the 
 people of God in a distinguished sense ; that, as there 
 was a national expectation amongst them, raised from 
 
 x x 
 
346 Of the particular Evidence Part II. 
 
 the prophecies, of a Messiah to appear at such a time, so 
 one at this time appeared claiming to be that Messiah ; 
 that he was rejected by this nation, but received by the. 
 Gentiles, not upon the evidence of prophecy, but of 
 miracles ; that the religion he taught supported itself 
 un!er the greatest difficulties, gained gound, and at 
 length became the religion of the world ; that in the 
 mean time the Jewish polity was utterly destroyed, and 
 the nation dispersed over the face of the earth ; that 
 notwithstanding this, they have remained a distinct nu- 
 merous people for so many centuries, even to this day, 
 which not only appears to be the express completion of 
 several prophecies concerning them, but also renders 
 it, as one may speak, a visible and ea^y possibility that 
 the promises made to them as a nation may yet be ful- 
 filled ; and to these acknowledged truths, let the per- 
 son we have been supposing add, as I thii k he ought, 
 whether every one will allow it or not, the obvious ap- 
 pearances which there are, of the state of the world, in 
 other respects besides what relates to the Jews, and of 
 the Christian Church, having so long answered and 
 still answering to the prophetick history ; — suppose, 
 I say, these facts set over against the things before men- 
 tioned out of the Scripture, and seriously compared 
 with them, — the joint view of both together must, 
 I think, appear of very great weight to a considerate 
 reasonable person ; of much greater indeed, upon hav- 
 ing them first laid before him, than is easy for us who 
 are so familiarized to them to conceive, without some 
 particular attention for that purpose. 
 
 All these things, and the several particulars contain- 
 ed under them, require to be distinctly and most thor- 
 oughly examined into, that the weight of each may be 
 judged of upon such examination, and such conclusion 
 drawn as results from their united force. But this has 
 
Chap. VII. for Christianity. 347 
 
 not been attempted here. I have gone no farther than 
 to show, that the general imperfect view of them now 
 given, tru- confest historical evidence for miracles, and 
 the many obvious appearing completions of prophecy, 
 tog-: ther with the collateral things* here mentioned, 
 and there are several others of the like sort ; that all 
 this together, which being fact must be acknowledged 
 by unbelievers, amounts to real evidence of somewhat 
 more than human in this matter ; evidence much 
 more important than careless men, who have been ac- 
 customed only to transient and partial views of it, can 
 imagine, and indeed abundantly sufficient to act upon. 
 And these things, I apprehend, must be acknowledged 
 by unbelievers. For though they may say, that the 
 historical evidence of miracles, wrought in attestation 
 of Christianity, is not sufficient to convince them that 
 such miracles were really wrought, they cannot deny 
 that there is such historical evidence, it being a known 
 matter of fact that there is. They may say, the con- 
 formity between the prophecies and events is by acci- 
 dent ; but there are many instances in which such con- 
 formity itself cannot be denied. They may say, with 
 regard to such kind of collateral things as those above- 
 mentioned, that any odd accidental events, without 
 meaning, will have a meaning found in them by fanciful 
 people ; and that such as are fanciful in any one cer- 
 tain way, will make out a thousand coincidences which 
 seem to favour their peculiar follies. Men, I say, may 
 talk thus j but no one who is serious can possibly 
 think these things to be nothing, if he considers the 
 importance of collateral things, and even of lesser cir- 
 cumstances, in the evidence of probability, as distin- 
 
 * All the particular things mentioned in this chapter, not reducible to 
 the head of certain miracles, or determinate completions of pr ophtcy. 
 See p. 310, 311. 
 
348 Of the particular Evidence Part II. 
 
 guished in nature from the evidence of demonstration. 
 In many cases indeed it seems to require the truest 
 judgment, to determine with exactness the weight of 
 circumstantial evidence ; but it is very often altogeth- 
 er as convincing, as that which is the most express and 
 direct. 
 
 This general view of the evidence for Christianity, 
 considered as making one argument, may also serve to 
 recommend to serious persons, to set down every thi g 
 which they think may be of any real weight at all in 
 proof of it, and particularly the many seeming com- 
 pletions of prophecy ; and they will find that, judging 
 by the natural rules by which we judge of probable 
 evidence in common matters, they amount to a much 
 higher degree of proof, upon such a joint review, than 
 could be supposed upon considering them separately 
 at different times, how strong soever the proof might 
 before appear to them upon such separate views of it. 
 For probable proofs, by being added, not only in- 
 crease the evidence, but multiply it. Nor should I 
 dissuade any one from setting down what he thought 
 made for the contrary side. But th^n it is to be re- 
 membered, not in order to influence his judgment, 
 but his practice, that a mistake on one side may be, 
 in its consequences, much more dangerous than a mis- 
 take on the other. And what course is most safe, and 
 what most dangerous, is a consideration thought very 
 material, when we deliberate, not concerning events, 
 but concerning conduct in our temporal affairs. To 
 be influenced by this consideration in our judgment, 
 to believe or disbelieve upon it, is indeed as much prej- 
 udice as any thing whatever. And, like other prej- 
 udices, it operates contrary ways, in different men. 
 For some are inclined to believe what they hope, an4 
 others what they fear. And it is manifest unreason^ 
 
Chap. VII. for Christianity. 349 
 
 bleness, to apply to men's passions in order to gain 
 their assent. But in deliberations concerning conduct, 
 there is nothing which reason more requires to be tak- 
 en into the account, than the importance of it. For, 
 suppose it doubtful what would be the consequence of 
 acting in this, or in a contrary manner, still that tak- 
 ing one side could be attended with little or no bad 
 consequence, and taking the other might be attended 
 with tne greatest, must appear to unprejudiced reason 
 of the highest moment towards determining how r we 
 are to act. But the truth of our religion, like the 
 truth of common matters, is to be judged of by all 
 the evidence taken together. And unless the whole 
 series of things which may be alleged in this argu- 
 ment, and every particular thing in it, can reasonably 
 be supposed to have been by accident, (for here the 
 stress of the argument for Christianity lies) then is the 
 truth of it proved ; in like manner as if in any common 
 case, numerous events acknowledged, were to be al- 
 leged in proof of any other event disputed, the truth of 
 the disputed event would be proved, not only if any 
 one of the acknon ledged ones did of itself clearly im- 
 ply it, but, though no one of them singly did so, if the 
 whole of the acknowledged events, taken together, 
 could not in reason be supposed to have happened, un- 
 less the disputed one were true. 
 
 It is obvious how much advantage the nature of 
 this evidence gives to those persons who attack Chris- 
 tianity, especially in conversation. For it is easy to 
 shew, in a short and lively manner, that such and such 
 things are liable to objection, that this and another 
 thing is of little weight in itself ; but impossible to 
 shew, in like manner, the united force of the whole 
 argument in one view. 
 
350 Evidence for Christianity* Part II. 
 
 However, lastly, as it has been made appear that 
 there is no presumption against a revelation as mirac- 
 ulous ; that the general scheme of Christianity, and 
 the principal parts of it, are conformable to the expe* 
 rienced constitution of things, and the whole perfectly 
 credible, — so the account now given of the positive ev- 
 idence for it, shews that this evidence is such, as from 
 the nature of it cannot be destroyed, though it should 
 be lessened. 
 
Chap, VIII. Objections against the Analogy, &V. 351 
 
 CHAP. VIII. 
 
 Of the Objections which may be made against arguing 
 from the Analogy of Nature to Religion. 
 
 If every one would consider, with such attention as 
 they are bound even in point of morality to consider, 
 what they judge and give characters of, the occasion of 
 this chapter would be, in some good measure at least* 
 superseded. But since this is not to be expected, for 
 some we find do not concern themselves to understand 
 even what they write against ; since this treatise, in 
 common with most others, lies open to objections 
 which may appear very material to thoughtful men at 
 first sight ; and, besides that, seems peculiarly liable to 
 the objections of such as can judge without thinking, 
 and of such as can censure without judging, — it may 
 not be amiss to set down the chief of these objections 
 which occur to me, and consider them to their hands. 
 And they are such as these ; 
 
 " That it is a poor thing to solve difficulties in rev- 
 elation, by saying that there are the same in natural 
 religion, when what is wanting is to clear both of them 
 of the?e their common, as well as other their respec- 
 tive, difficulties ; but that it is a strange way indeed 
 of convincing men of the obligations of religion, to 
 shew them that they have as little reason for their 
 worldly pursuits ; and a strange way of vindicating 
 the justice and goodness of the Author of nature, and 
 of removing the objections against both, to which the 
 system of religion lies open, to shew that the like ob- 
 jections lie against natural providence j a way of an- 
 
352 Objections against the Analogy Part IL 
 
 swering objections against religion, without so much, 
 as pretending to make out that the system of it, or the 
 particular things in it objected against, are reasonable ; 
 especially, perhaps some may be inattentive enough to 
 add, must this be thought strange, when it is confes- 
 sed that analogy is no answer to such objections ; that 
 when this sort of reasoning is carried to the utmost 
 length it can be imagined capable of, it will yet leave 
 the mind in a very unsatisfied state ; and that it must 
 be unaccountable ignorance of mankind, to imagine 
 they will be prevailed with to forego their present in- 
 terests and pleasures, from regard to religion, upon 
 doubtful evidence." 
 
 Now, as plausible as this way of talking may ap- 
 pear, that appearance will be found in a great measure 
 owing to half views, which shew but part of an object, 
 yet shew that indistinctly, and to undeterminate Ian- 
 guage. By these means weak men are often deceived 
 by others, and ludicrous men by themselves. And 
 even those who are serious and considerate, cannot al- 
 ways readily disentangle, and at once clearly see 
 through the perplexities in which subjects themselves 
 are involved, and which are heightened by the defi- 
 ciencies and the abuse of words. To this latter sort of 
 persons, the following reply to each part of this objec- 
 tion severally may be of some assistance, as it may also 
 tend a little to stop and silence others. 
 
 First, the thing wanted, i. e. what men require, is 
 to have all difficulties cleared. And this is, or at least 
 for any thing we know to the contrary it may be, the 
 same as requiring to comprehend the Divine Nature, 
 and the whole plan of Providence, from everlasting to 
 everlasting. But it hath always been allowed to argue 
 from what is acknowledged to what is disputed ; and 
 it is in no other sense a poor thing to argue from natu- 
 
CftAP. VIII. of Nature to Religion. 233 
 
 ral religion to revealed, in the manner found fault with, 
 than it is to argue in numberless other ways of proba- 
 ble deduction and inference, in matters of conduct, 
 which we ar-j continually reduced to the necessity of 
 doing Indeed the epithet poor, may be applied, I fear 
 as properly, to great part, or the whole, of human 
 life, as it is to the things mentioned in the objection. Is 
 it not a poor thing, for a physician to have so little 
 knowledge in the cure of diseases as even the most 
 eminent have ? To act upon conjecture and guess, 
 where the life of man is concerned ? Undoubtedly it 
 is ; but not in comparison of having no skill at all in 
 that useful art, and being obliged to act wholly in the 
 dark. 
 
 Further — since it is as unreasonable as it is common, 
 to urge objections against revelation which are of equal 
 weight against natural religion ; and those who do 
 this, if they are not confused themselves, deal unfairly 
 with others, in making it seem that they are arguing 
 only against revelation, or particular doctrines of it, 
 when in reality they are arguing against moral provi- 
 dence,—^ is a thing of consequence to show that such 
 objections are as much levelled against natural religion, 
 as against revealed. And objections, which are equal- 
 ly applicable to both, are properly speaking answered, 
 by its being shown that they are so, provided the form- 
 er be admitted to be true. And without taking in 
 the consideration how distinctly this is admitted, it is 
 plainly very material to observe, that as the things ob- 
 jected against in natural religion, are of the same kind 
 with what is certain matter of experience in the course 
 of Providence, and in the information which God af- 
 fords us concerning our temporal interest under his 
 government, — so the objections against the system of 
 Christianity and the evidence of it, are of the very same 
 y v 
 
354 Objections against the Analogy Part II. 
 
 kind with those which are made against the system and 
 evidence of natural religion. However, the reader 
 upon review may see, that most of the analogies insist- 
 ed upon, even in the latter part of this treatise, do not 
 necessarily require to have more taken for granted than 
 i in the former ; that there is an Author of nature, or 
 natural Governor of the world ; and Christianity is 
 vindicated, not from its analogy to natural religion, 
 but chiefly from its analogy to the experienced con- 
 stitution of nature. 
 
 Secondly, religion is a practical thing, and consists 
 in such a determinate course of life, as bejng what 
 there is reason to think i- commanded by the Author 
 of nature, and will upon the whole be our happiness 
 under hi* government. Now if men can be convinced 
 that rhey have the like reason to believe this, as to 
 believe that taking care of their temporal affairs will 
 be to their advantage,— such conviction cannot but 
 be an argument to them for the practice of religion. 
 And if th^re be really any reason for believing one of 
 the^e, and endeavouring to preserve life, and secure 
 ourselves the necessaries and conveniences of it, — then 
 there is reason also for believing the other, and endeav- 
 ouring to secure the interest it proposes to us. And 
 if the interest which religion proposes to us be infinite- 
 ly greater than our whole temporal interest, then there 
 must be proportionably greater reason for endeavour- 
 ing to secure one than the other ; since by the suppo- 
 sition, the probability of our securing one, is equal to 
 the probability of our securing the other. This seems 
 plainly unanswerable, and has a tendency to influence 
 fair minds, who consider what our condition really is, 
 or upon what evidence we are naturally appointed to 
 act ; and who are disposed to acquiesce in the terms 
 upon which we live, and attend to and follow that 
 
Chap. VIII. of Nature to Religion. 35 5 
 
 practical instruction, whatever it be, which is afford- 
 ed us. 
 
 But the chief and proper force of the argument re- 
 ferred to in the objection lies in another place. For, 
 it is said that the proof of religion Ls involved in such 
 inextricable difficulties as to render it doubtful, and 
 that it cannot be supposed that if it were true it would 
 be left upon doubtful evidence. Here then, over and 
 above the force of each particular difficulty or objec- 
 tion, these difficulties and objections, taken together, 
 are turned into a positive argument against the truth 
 of religion ; which argument would stand thus. If 
 religion were true it would not be left doubtful, and 
 open to objections to the degree in which it is ; there- 
 fore that it is thus left, not only renders the evidence 
 of it weak, and lessens its force in proportion to the 
 weight of such objections, but also shews it to be false, 
 or is a general presumption of its being so. Now the 
 observation, that from the natural constitution and 
 course of things, we must in our temporal concerns, 
 almost continually, and in matters of great conse- 
 quence, act upon evidence of a like kind and degree 
 to the evidence of religion, is an answer to this argu- 
 ment ; because it shews that it is according to the con- 
 duct and character of the Author of nature to appoint 
 we should act upon evidence like to that which this ar- 
 gument presumes he cannot be supposed to appoint we 
 should act upon ; it is an instance, a general one made 
 up of numerous particular ones, of somewhat in his 
 dealing with us similar to what is said to be incredible. 
 And as the force of this answer lies merely in the par- 
 allel which there is between the evidence for religion 
 and for our temporal conduct, the answer is equally 
 just and conclusive, whether the parallel be made out 
 
356 Objections against the Analogy Part IL 
 
 by shewing the evidence of the former to be higher, or 
 the evidence of the latter to be lower. 
 
 Thirdly, the design of this treatise is not to vindi- 
 cate the character of God, but to shew the obligations 
 of men ; it is not to justify his providence, but to shv^w 
 what belongs to us to do. These are two subjects, 
 and ought not to be confounded. And though they 
 may at length run up into each other, yet observations 
 may immediately tend to make out the latter, which 
 do not appear by any immediate connexion to the 
 purpose of the former ; which is less our concern than 
 many seem to think. For, 1st, it is not necessary we 
 should justify the dispensations of Providence against 
 objections, any farther than to shew that the things ob- 
 jected against may, for aught we know, be consistent 
 with justice and goodness. Suppose then, that there 
 are things in the system of this world, and plan of Prov- 
 idence relating to it, which taken alone would be un- 
 just, — yet it has been shewn unanswerably, that if we 
 could take in the reference which these things may 
 have to other things present, past and to come, to the 
 whole scheme which the things objected against are 
 parts of, — these very things might, for aught we know, 
 be found to be not only consistent with justice, but in- 
 stances of it. Indeed it has been shewn, by the anal- 
 ogy of what we see, not only possible that this maybe 
 the case, but credible that it is. And thus objec- 
 tions drawn from such things are answered, and Prov- 
 idence is vindicated, as far as religion makes its vindi- 
 cation necessary. Hence it appears, 2dly, that objec- 
 tions against the divine justice and goodness are not 
 endeavoured to be removed, by shewing that the like 
 objections, allowed to be really conclusive, lie against 
 natural providence ; but those objections being sup» 
 posed and shewn not to be conclusive, the things ob* 
 
Chap. VIII. of Nature to Religion. 357 
 
 jected against, considered as matters of fact, are farther 
 shewn to be credible from their conformity to the con- 
 stitution of nature ; for instance, that God will reward 
 and punish men for their actions hereafter, from the 
 observation that he does reward and punish them for 
 their actions here. And this I apprehend is of weight. 
 And I add, 3dly, it would be of weight, even though 
 those objections were not answered. For, there being 
 the proof of religion above set down, and religion im- 
 plying several facts, for instance again, the fact last 
 mentioned, that God will reward and punish men for 
 their actions hereafter, — the observation that his pres- 
 ent method of government is by rewards and punish- 
 ments, shews that future fact not to be incredible ; 
 whatever objections men may think they have against 
 it, as unjust or unmerciful, according to their notions 
 of ju tice and mercy, or as improbable from their be- 
 lier of necessity. 1 say, as improbable ; for it is evident 
 no objection against it, as unjust, can be urged from 
 necessity, since this notion as much destroys injustice 
 as it does justice. Then 4thly, though objections 
 against the reasonableness of the system of religion, 
 cannot indeed be answered without entering into con- 
 sideration of its reasonableness, yet objections against 
 the credibility or truth of it may. Because the system 
 of it is reducible into what is properly matter of fact ; 
 and the truth the probable truth of facts, may be shewn 
 without consideration of their reasonableness. Nor is 
 it necessary, though in some cases and respects it is 
 highly useful and proper, yet it is not necessary, to give 
 a proof of the reasonableness of every precept enjoined 
 us, and of every particular dispensation of Providence 
 which comes into the system of religion. Indeed the 
 more thoroughly a person of a right disposition is con- 
 vinced of the perfection of the divine nature and con- 
 
258 Objections against the Analogy Part II. 
 
 duct, the farther he will advance towards that perfec- 
 tion of religion which St. John* speaks of. But the 
 general obligations of religion are fully made out, by 
 proving the reasonableness of the practice of it. And 
 that the practice of religion is reasonable may be shewn, 
 though no more could be proved than that the system, 
 of it may be so, for aught we know to the contrary ; and 
 even without entering into the distinct consideration 
 of this. And from hence, 5thly, it is easy to see, that 
 though the analogy of nature is not an immediate an- 
 swer to objections against the wisdom the Justice or 
 goodness of any doctrine or precept of religion. — yet 
 it may be, as it is, an immediate and direct answer to 
 what is really intended by such objections, which is to 
 shew that the things objected against ate incredible. 
 
 Fourthly, it is most readily acknowledged that the 
 foregoing treatise is by no means satisfactory, very far 
 indeed from it ; but so would any natural institution 
 of life appear, if reduced into a system, together with 
 its evidence. Leaving religion out of the case, men 
 are divided in their opinions whether our pleasures 
 overbalance our pains ; and whether it be, or be not, 
 eligible to live in this world. And were all ^uch con- 
 troversies settled, which perhaps in speculation would 
 be found involved in great difficulties, and were it de- 
 termined uoon the evidence of reason, as nature has 
 determined it to our hands, that life is to be preserv- 
 ed,— yet still the rules which God has been pleased to 
 afford us, for escaping the miseries of it and obtaining 
 its satisfactions, the rules, for instance, of preserving 
 health, and recovering it when lost, are not only falli- 
 ble and precarious, but very far from being exact. 
 Nor are we informed by nature in future contingencies 
 and accidents, so as to render it at all certain what is 
 
 * 1 Joh. iv. 18. 
 
Chap. VIII. cf Nature to Religion. 359 
 
 the be>t method of managing our affairs. What 
 will be the success of our temporal pursuits in the 
 common sense of the word success, is highly doubtful. 
 And what will be the success of them in the proper 
 sense of the word, i. e. what happiness or enjoyment 
 w shall obtain by them, is doubtful in a much higher 
 degree. Indeed the un; satisfactory nature of the evi- 
 dence with which we are obliged to take up, in the 
 daily course of life, is scarce to be expressed. Yet 
 men do not throw away life, or disregard the interests 
 of it, upon account of this doubtfulness. The evidence 
 of religion then being admitted real, those who object 
 against it as not satisfactory, i. e. as not being what 
 they wish it, plainly forget the very condition of our 
 being ; for satisfaction in this sense does not belong to 
 such a creature as man. And, which is more mate- 
 rial, they forget also the very nature of religion. For 
 religion presupposes, in all those who will embrace it, 
 a certain degree of integrity and honesty, which it was 
 intended to try whether men have or not, and to ex- 
 ercise in such as have it, in order to its improvement. 
 Religion presupposes this as much, and in the same 
 sense, as speaking to a man presupposes he understands 
 the language in which you speak, or as warning a man 
 of any danger presupposes that he hath such a regard 
 to himself as that he will endeavour to avoid it. And 
 therefore the question is not at all, whether the evi- 
 dence of religion be satisfactory, but, whether it be 
 in reason sufficient to prove and discipline that virtue, 
 which it presupposes. Now the evidence of it is fully 
 sufficient for all those purposes of probation, how far 
 soever it is from being satisfactory as to the purposes 
 of curiosity, or any other ; and indeed it answers the 
 purposes of the former in several respects, which h 
 would not do if it were as overbearing as is required. 
 
360 Objections against the Analogy Part IL 
 
 One might add farther, that whether the motives or 
 the evidence for any coarse of action be satisfactory, 
 meaning here by that word, what satisfies a man, that 
 such a course of action will in event be for his good, — 
 this need never be, and I think strictly speaking never 
 is, the practical question in common matters. But 
 the practical question in all cases is, whether the evi- 
 dence for a course of action be such as, taking in all 
 circumstances, makes the faculty within us which is 
 the guide and judge of conduct,* determine that 
 course of action to be prudent. Indeed satisfaction 
 that it will be for our interest or happiness, abundant- 
 ly determines an action to be prudent ; but evidence 
 almost infinitely lower than this determines actions to 
 be so too, even in the conduct of every day. 
 
 Fifthly, as to the objection concerning the influ- 
 ence which this argument, or any part of it, may or 
 may not be expected to have upon men, — I observe as 
 above, that religion being intended for a trial and ex- 
 ercise of the morality of every person's character who 
 is a subject of it, and there being, as I have shewn, 
 such evidence for it as is sufficient in reason to influ- 
 ence men to embrace it, — to object that it is not to 
 be imagined mankind will be influenced by such evi- 
 dence, is nothing to the purpose of the foregoing trea- 
 tise. For the purpose of it is not to inquire what sort 
 of creatures mankind are, but what the light and 
 knowledge which is afforded them requires they should 
 be ; to shew how in reason they ought to behave, not 
 how in fact they will behave. This depends upon 
 rhemselves, and is their own concern, the personal 
 concern of each man in particular. And how little 
 regard the generality have to it, experience indeed does 
 too fully shew. But religion, considered as a proba 
 
 * Sep Dissertation H. 
 
Chap. VIII. of Nature to Religion. 361 
 
 tion, has had its end upon all persons, to whom it has 
 been proposed with evidence sufficient in reason to in- 
 fluence their practice ; for by this means they have 
 been put into a state of probation, let them behave as 
 they will in it. And thus, not only revelation, but 
 reason also, teaches us that by the evidence of religion 
 being laid before men, the designs of Providence are 
 carrying on, not only with regard to those who will, 
 but likewise with regard to those who will not, be in- 
 fluenced by it. However, lastly, the objection here 
 referred to allows the things insisted upon in this trea- 
 tise to be of some w r eight ; and if so, it may be hoped 
 it will have some influence. And if there be a proba- 
 bility that it will have any at all, there is the same rea- 
 son in kind, though not in degree, to lay it before men, 
 as there would be if it were likely to have a greater in- 
 fluence. 
 
 And farther, I desire it may be considered, with re« 
 spect to the whole of the foregoing objections, that in 
 this treatise I have argued upon the principles of others,* 
 not my own j and have omitted what I think true* 
 and of the utmost importance, because by others 
 thought unintelligible, or not true. Thus I have ar- 
 gued upon the principles of the fatalists, which I do 
 not believe ; and have omitted a thing of the utmost 
 importance which I do believe, the moral fitness and 
 unfitness of actions, prior to all will whatever ; which 
 I apprehend as certainly to determine the divine con- 
 duct, as speculative truth and falsehood necessarily de- 
 termine the divine judgment. Indeed the principle 
 of liberty and that of moral fitness so force themselves 
 
 * By arguing upon the principles of others, the reader will observe is meant 5 
 not proving any thing from those principles, but notwithstanding them. Thus 
 religion is proved, not from the opinion of necessity, which is absurd, but 
 notwithstanding or even though that opinion were admitted to be true, 
 
 Z Z 
 
1S62 Objections against the Analogy Part IL 
 
 upon the mind, that moralists, the ancients as well as 
 moderns, have formed their language upon it. And 
 probably it may appear in mine, though I have endeav- 
 oured to avoid it, and in order to avoid it, have some- 
 time- been obliged to express myself in a manner which 
 will appear strange to such as do not observe the reason 
 for it ; but the general argument here pursued does 
 not at all suppose or proceed upon these principles. 
 Now, these two abstract principles of liberty and mor- 
 al fitness being omitted, religion can be considered in 
 no other view than merely as a question of fact ; and 
 in this view it is here considered. It is obvious that 
 Christianity, and the proof of it, are both historical. 
 And even natural religion is, properly, a matter of fact ; 
 for, that there is a righteous Governor of the world, 
 is so ; and this proposition contains the general system 
 of natural religion. But then, several abstract truths, 
 and in particular those two principles, are usually taken 
 into consideration in the proof of it, whereas it is here 
 treated of only a< a matter of fact. To explain this ; 
 that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right 
 ones, is an abstract truth ; but that they appear so to 
 our mind, is only a matter of fact. And this last must 
 have been admitted, if any thing was, by those ancient 
 scepticks who would not have admitted the former ; 
 but pretended to doubt, whether there were any such 
 thing as truth, or, whether we could certainly depend 
 upon our faculties of understanding for the knowledge 
 of it in any case. So likewise that there is, in the nature 
 of things, an original standard of right and wrong in 
 actions, independent upon all will, but which unalter- 
 ably determines the will of God to exercise that moral 
 government over the world which religion teaches, 
 i. e. finally and upon the whole to reward and punish 
 men respectively as they act right or wrong, — this as- 
 
Chap, VIII. of Nature to Religion. 363 
 
 sertion contains an abstract truth, as well as matter of 
 fact. But suppose in the present state every man, with- 
 out exception, was rewarded and punished inexact pro- 
 portion as he followed or transgressed thatsense of right 
 and wrong, which God has implanted in the nature of 
 every man, — this would not be at all an abstract truth, 
 but only a matter of fact. And though this fact were 
 aknowledged by every one, yet the very same difficul- 
 ties might be raised as are now, concerning the abstract 
 questions of liberty and moral fitness ; and we should 
 have a proof, even the certain one of experience, that 
 the government of the world was perfectly moral, 
 without taking in the consideration of those questions ; 
 and this proof would remain, in what way soever they 
 were determined. And thus, God having given man- 
 kind a moral faculty, the object of which is actions, 
 and which naturally approves some actions as right and 
 of good desert, and condemns others as wrong and of 
 ill desert ; that he will, finally and upon the whole, 
 reward the former and punish the latter, is not an as- 
 sertion of an abstract truth, but of what is as mere a 
 fact as his doing so at present would be. This future 
 fact I have, not indeed proved with the force with 
 which it might be proved, from the principles of lib- 
 erty and moral fitness, but without them have given 
 a really conclusive practical proof of it, which is greatly 
 strengthened by the general analogy of nature ; a proof 
 easily cavilled at, easily shewn not to be demonstrative, 
 for it is not offered as such ; but impossible, I think, 
 to be evaded or answered. And thus the obligations 
 of religion are made out, exclusively of the questions 
 concerning liberty and moral fitness, which have been 
 perplexed with difficulties and abstruse reasonings, as 
 every thing may. 
 
 Hence therefore may be observed distinctly what is 
 
364 Objections against the Analogy, &V. Part II* 
 
 the force of this treatise. It will be, to such as are con- 
 vinced of religion upon the proof arising out of the two 
 last mentioned principles, an additional proof and a 
 confirmation of it ; to such as do not admit those 
 principles, an original proof of it,* and a confirmation 
 of that proof. Those who believe, will here find the 
 scheme of Christianity cleared of objections, and the 
 evidence of it in a peculiar manner strengthened; those 
 who do not believe, will at least be shewn the absurd- 
 ity of all attempts to prove Christianity false, the plain 
 undoubted credibility of it ; and, I hope, a good deal 
 more. 
 
 And thus, though some perhaps may seriously think 
 that analogy, as here urged, has too great stress laid 
 upon it ; and ridicule, unanswerable ridicule, may be 
 applied, to shew the argument from it in a disadvanta- 
 geous light,— yet there can be no question but that it is 
 a real one. For religion, both natural and revealed, 
 implying in it numerous facts, analogy being a con- 
 firmation of all facts to which it can be applied, as it is 
 the only proof of most, cannot but be admitted by every 
 one to be a material thing, and truly of weight on the 
 side of religion, both natural and revealed ; and it 
 ought to be particularly regarded by such as profess to 
 follow nature, and to be less satisfied with abstract 
 reasonings. 
 
 * P. 184. &c, 
 
CONCLUSION. 
 
 XX hatever account may be given of the strange 
 inattention and disregard, in some ages and coun- 
 tries, to a matter of such importance as religion, it 
 would, before experience, be incredible that there 
 should be the like disregard in those who have had the 
 moral system of the world laid before them, as it is by 
 Christianity, and often inculcated upon them ; because 
 this moral system carries in it a good degree of evidence 
 for its truth, upon its being barely proposed to our 
 thoughts. There is no need of abstruse reasonings and 
 distinctions, to convince an unprejudiced understanding 
 that there is a God who made and governs the world, 
 and will judge it in righteousness, though they may be 
 necessary to answer abstruse difficulties, when once 
 such are raised ; when the very meaning of those 
 words which express most intelligibly the general doc- 
 trine of religion, is pretended to be uncertain, and the 
 clear truth of the thing itself is obscured by the intri- 
 cacies of speculation. But to an unprejudiced mind, 
 ten thousand thousand instances of design cannot but 
 prove a designer. And it is intuitively manifest, that 
 creatures ought to live under a dutiful sense of their 
 Maker, and that justice and charity must be his laws, 
 to creatures whom he has made social and placed in 
 society. Indeed the truth of revealed religion, pecu- 
 liarly so called, is not selfevident, but requires external 
 proof in order to its being received. Yet inattention 
 among us to revealed religion, will be found to imply 
 ihe^ same dissolute immoral temper of mind as inatten- 
 
$66 Conclusion. Part IL 
 
 tion to natural religion ; because, when both are laid 
 before us in the manner they are in Christian countries 
 of liberty, our obligations to inquire into both, and to 
 embrace both upon suppoition of their truth, are 
 obligations of the same nature. For, revelation claims 
 to be the voice of God ; and our obligation to attend 
 to hi> voice is surely moral in all cases. And as it is 
 insisted that it* evidence is conclusive, upon thorough 
 consideration of it, so it offers h>elf to us with manifest 
 obvious appearances of having something more than 
 human in it, and therefore in all reason requires to have 
 its claims most seriously examined into. It is to be 
 added, that though light and knowledge, in what man- 
 ner soever afforded us, is equally from God, yet a mi- 
 raculous revelation has a peculiar tendency, from the 
 first principles of our nature, to awaken mankind, and 
 inspire them with reverence and awe ; and this is a pe- 
 culiar obligation to attend to what claims to be so with 
 such appearances of truth. It is therefore most cer- 
 tain that our obligations to inquire seriously into the 
 evidence of Christianity, and upon supposition of its 
 truth to embrace it, are of the utmost importance, and 
 moral in the highest and most proper sense. Let us 
 then suppose that the evidence of religion in general, 
 and of Christianity, has been seriously inquired into by 
 all reasonable men among us. Yet we find many 
 professedly to reject both, upon speculative princi- 
 ples of infidelity And all of them do not content 
 themselves with a bare neglect of religion, and en* 
 joying their imaginary freedom from its restraints. 
 Some go much beyond this. They deride God's moral 
 government over the world. They renounce his 
 protection, and defy his justice. They ridicule and 
 vilify Christianity, and blaspheme the Author of it; 
 and take all occasions to manifest a scorn and con- 
 
Pa&t II. Conclusion. 367 
 
 tempt of revelation. This amounts to an active set- 
 ting themselves against religion, to what may be 
 considered as a positive principle of irreligion ; which 
 they cultivate within themselves, and, whether 
 they intend this effect or not, render habitual, as a 
 good man does the contrary principle. And others, 
 who are not chargeable with all this profligateness, yet 
 are in avowed opposition to religion, as if discovered 
 to be groundless. Now admitting, which is the sup- 
 position we go upon, that these persons act upon what 
 they think principles of reason, and otherwise they are 
 not to be argued with, it is really inconceivable that 
 they should imagine they clearly see the whole evidence 
 of it, considered in itself, to be nothing at all ; nor do 
 they pretend this. They are far indeed from having 
 a just notion of its evidence ; but they would not say 
 its evidence was nothing, if they thought the system 
 of it, with all its circumstances, were credible, like oth- 
 er matters of science or history. So that their manner 
 of treating it must proceed, either from such kind of 
 objections against all religion as have been answered 
 or obviated in the former part of this treatise, or else 
 from objections and difficulties supposed more peculiar 
 to Christianity. Thus, they entertain prejudices against 
 the whole notion of a revelation and miraculous in- 
 terpositions. They find things in Scripture, whether 
 in incidental passages or in the general scheme of it, 
 which appear to them unreasonable. They take for 
 granted that if Christianity were true, the light of it 
 must have been more general, and the evidence of i\ 
 more satisfactory, or rather overbearing ; that it must 
 and would have been, in some way, otherwise put and 
 left than it is. Now this is not imagining they see th? 
 evidence itself to be nothing or inconsiderable, but 
 quite another thing. It is being fortified against the 
 
368 Conclusion, Part If, 
 
 evidence in some degree acknowledged, by thinking 
 they see the system of Christianity, or somewhat which 
 appears to them necessarily connected with it, to be in- 
 credible or false ; fortified against that evidence which 
 might otherwise make great impression upon them. 
 Or, lastly, if any of these persons are, upon the whole, 
 in doubt concerning the truth of Christianity, their 
 behaviour seems owing to their taking for granted, 
 through strange inattention, that such doubting is, 
 in a manner, the same thing as being certain against it. 
 To these persons, and to this state of opinion con- 
 cerning religion, the foregoing treatise is adapted. 
 For, all the general objections against the moral system 
 of nature having been obviated, it is shewn that there 
 is not any peculiar presumption at all against Christ- 
 ianity, either considered as not discoverable by reason, 
 or as unlike to what is so discovered ; nor any worth 
 mentioning against it as miraculous, if any at all ; 
 none certainly which can render it in the least incred- 
 ible. It is shewn that upon supposition of a divine 
 revelation, the analogy of nature renders it beforehand 
 highly credible, I think probable, that many things 
 in it must appear liable to great objections ; and that 
 we must be incompetent judges of it to a great de- 
 gree. This observation is, I think, unquestionably 
 true, and of the very utmost importance ; but it is 
 urged, as I hope it will be understood, with great cau- 
 tion of not vilifying the faculty of reason, which is 
 the candle of the Lord within us ;* though it can af- 
 ford no light where it does not shine, nor judge where 
 it has no principles to judge upon. The objections 
 here spoken of, being first answered in the view of ob- 
 jections against Chi istianity as a matter of fact, are in 
 the next place considered as urged more immediately 
 
 * Prov, xx, 27, 
 
Part II. Conclusion. 369 
 
 against the wisdom, justice and goodness of the Christ- 
 ian dispensation. And it is fully made out that they 
 admit of exactly the like answer, in every respect, to 
 what the like objections against the constitution of na- 
 ture admit of; that, as partial views give the appear- 
 ance of wrong to things, which upon farther considera- 
 tion and knowledge of their relations to other things are 
 found just and good, so it is perfectly credible that the 
 things objected, against the wisdom and goodness of the 
 Christian dispensation, may be rendered instances of 
 wisdom and goodness by their reference to other things, 
 beyond our view ; because Christianity is a scheme as 
 much above our comprehension, as that of nature, and 
 like that, a scheme in which means are made use of to 
 accomplish ends, and which, as is most credible, may- 
 be carried on by general laws. And it ought to be 
 attended to, that this is not an answer taken merely 
 or chiefly from our ignorance, but from somewhat 
 positive which our observation shews us. For, to like 
 objections the like answer is experienced to be just, 
 in numberless parallel cases. The objections against 
 the Christian dispensation, and the method by which 
 it is carried on, having been thus obviated in general 
 and together, the chief of them are considered distinct- 
 ly, and the particular things objected to are shewn 
 credible, by their perfect analogy, each apart, to the 
 constitution of nature. Thus, if man be fallen from 
 his primitive state, and to be restored, and infinite 
 wisdom and power engages in accomplishing our re- 
 covery, it were to have been expected, it is said, that 
 this should have been effected at once, and not by- 
 such a long series of means, and such a various econ- 
 omy of persons and things ; one dispensation prepar- 
 atory to another, this to a farther one, and so on 
 through an indefinite number of ages, before the emU- 
 
 A A A 
 
370 Conclusion. Part II. 
 
 of the scheme proposed can be completely accom- 
 plished ; a scheme conducted by infinite wisdom, and 
 executed by almighty power. But now on the con- 
 trary, our finding that every thing in the constitution 
 and course of nature is thus carried on> shews such ex- 
 pectations concerning revelation to be highly unrea- 
 sonable, and is a satisfactory answer to them, when 
 urged as objections against the credibility that the 
 great scheme of Providence in the redemption of the 
 world may be of this kind, and to be accomplished in 
 this manner. As to the particular method of our re- 
 demption, the appuintment of a Mediator between 
 God and man, this has been shewn to be most obvi- 
 ously analogous to the general conduct of nature, i. e. 
 the God of nature in appointing others to be the in- 
 struments of his mercy, as we experience in the daily 
 course of Providence. The condition of this world, 
 which the doctrine of our redemption by Christ pre- 
 supposes, so much falls in with natural appearances, 
 that heathen moralists inferred it rom those appear- 
 ances ; inferred that human nature was fallen from 
 its original rectitude, and in consequence of this de- 
 graded from its primitive happiness. Or, however 
 this opinion came into the world, these appearances 
 must have kept up the tradition and confirmed the 
 belief of it. And as it was the general opinion un- 
 der the light of nature that repentance and reforma- 
 tion, alone and by itself, was not sufficient to do away 
 sin, and procure a full remission of the penalties an- 
 nexed to it, and as the reason of the thing does not 
 ut all lead to any such conclusion. — so every day's ex- 
 perience shews us that reformation is not, in any sort, 
 sufficient to prevent the present disadvantages and 
 miseries which, in the natural course of things, God 
 has annexed to folly and extravagance. Yet there 
 
Part II. Conclusion. 371 
 
 may be ground to think that the punishments, which 
 by the general laws of divine government are annexed 
 to vice, may be prevented ; that provision may have 
 been even originally made, that they should be pre- 
 vented by some means or other, though they could 
 not by reformation alone. For we have daily instances 
 of such mercy i in the general conduct of nature ; com- 
 passion provided for misery,* medicine > for diseases, 
 friends against enemies. There is provision made, in 
 the original constitution of the world, that much of 
 the natural bad consequences of our follies, which 
 persons themselves alone cannot prevent, may be pre- 
 vented by the a distance of others ; assistance which 
 nature enables, and disposes, and appoints them to af- 
 ford. By a method of goodness analogous to this, 
 when the world lay in wickedness and consequently in 
 ruin, God so loved the worlds that he gave his only begot- 
 ten Son to -ave it ; and he being made perfect by suffer- 
 ings became the author of eternal salvation to all them that 
 obey him.* Indeed neither reason nor analogy would 
 lead us to think, in particular, that the interposition 
 of Christ, in the maimer in which he did interpose, 
 would be of that efficacy for recovery of the world 
 which the Scripture teaches us it was ; but neither 
 would reason nor analogy lead us to think, that other 
 particular means would be of the efficacy which expe- 
 rience shews they are, in numberless instances. And 
 ther fore, as the case before us does not admit of ex- 
 perience, so that neither reason nor analogy can shew 
 how, or in what particular way, the interposition of 
 Christ, as revealed in Scripture, is of that efficacy which 
 it is there represented to be, — this is no kind nor de- 
 gree of presumption against its being really of that 
 
 * Serm. at the Rolls, p. 106. 
 
 * Joh. iii. 16. Heb. v. 9. 
 
372 Conclusion. Part II, 
 
 efficacy. Farther^-the objections against Christianity, 
 from the light of it not being universal, nor its evi- 
 dence so strong as might possibly be given us, have 
 been answered by the general analogy of nature. 
 That God has made such variety of creatures, is in- 
 deed an answer to the former ; but that he dispenses 
 his gifts in such variety, both of degrees and kinds, 
 amongst creatures of the same species, and even to the 
 same individuals at different times, is a more obvious 
 and full answer to it. And it is so far from being the 
 method of Providence in other cases, to afford us such 
 overbearing evidence as some require in proof of Chris- 
 tianity, that on the contrary, the evidence upon which 
 we are naturally appointed to act in common mat- 
 ters, throughout a very great part of life, is doubtful 
 in a high degree. And admitting the fact, that God 
 has afforded to some no more than doubtful evidence 
 of religion, the same account may be given of it as of 
 difficulties and temptations with regard to practice. 
 But as it is not impossible,* surely, that this alleged 
 doubtfulness may be men's own fault, it deserves their 
 most serious consideration whether it be not so. How- 
 ever, it is certain that doubting implies a degree of 
 evidence for that of which we doubt ; and that this 
 degree of evidence as really lays us under obligations, 
 as demonstrative evidence. 
 
 The whole then of religion is throughout credible j 
 nor is there, I think, any thing relating to the revealed 
 dispensation of things, more different from the expe- 
 rienced constitution and course of nature, than some 
 parts of the comtitutiori of nature are from other parts 
 of it. And if so, the only question which remains is, 
 what po:itive evidence can be alleged for the truth of 
 Christianity. This too in general has been considered, 
 
 * P. 303, &C. 
 
Part II. Conclusion. 37$ 
 
 and the objections against it estimated. Deduct there- 
 fore what is to be deducted from that evidence, upon 
 account of any weight which may be thought to re- 
 main in these objections, after what the analogy of 
 nature has suggested in answer to them, and then con- 
 sider what are the practical consequences from all this, 
 upon the most sceptical principles one can argue upon, 
 (for I am writing to persons who entertain these prin- 
 ciple) and upon such consideration it will be obvious 
 that immorality, as little excuse as it admits of in it- 
 self, is greatly aggravated in persons who have been 
 made acquainted with Christianity, whether they be- 
 lieve it or not ; because the moral system of nature, or 
 natural religion, which Christianity lays before us, ap- 
 proves itself, almost intuitively, to a reasonable mind 
 upon seeing it proposed. In the next place, with re* 
 gard to Christianity it will be observed, that there is a 
 middle between a full satisfaction of the truth of it, 
 and a satisfaction of the contrary. The middle state 
 of mind between these two, consists in a serious appre- 
 hension that it may be true, joined with doubt whether 
 it be so. And this, upon the best judgment I am able 
 to make, is as far towards speculative infidelity as any 
 sceptick can at all be supposed to go, who has had 
 true Christianity, with the proper evidence of it, laid 
 before him, and has in any tolerable measure consid- 
 ered them. For I would not be mistaken to compre- 
 hend all who have ever heard of it ; because it seems 
 evident that in many countries, called Christian, nei- 
 ther Christianity nor its evidence are fairly laid before 
 men. And in places where both are, there appear to 
 be some who have very little attended to either, and 
 who reject Christianity with a scorn proportionate to 
 their inattention, and yet are by no means without 
 understanding in other matters. Now it has been 
 
374 Conclusion. Part IL 
 
 shewn that a serious apprehension that Christianity 
 may be true, lays persons under the strictest obliga- 
 tions of a serious regard to it throughout the whole of 
 their life ; a regard not the same exactly, but in many 
 respects nearly the same, with what a full conviction of 
 its truth would lay them under. Lastly, it will ap- 
 pear that blasphemy and profaneness, I mean with re- 
 gard to Christianity, are absolutely without excuse. 
 For there is no temptation to it but from the wan- 
 tonness of vanity or mirth ; and these, considering the 
 infinite importance of the subject, are no such tempta- 
 tions as to afford any excuse for it. if this be a just 
 account of things, and yet men can go on to vilify or 
 disregard Christianity, which is to talk and act as if 
 they had a demonstration of its falsehood, there is no 
 reason to think they would alter their behaviour to 
 any purpose, though there were a demonstration of 
 its truth. 
 
TWO BRIEF 
 
 DISSERTATIONS. 
 
 I. Of Personal Identity. 
 II. Of the Nature of Virtue. 
 
ADVERTISEMENT. 
 
 In the first copy of these papers, I had inserted the 
 two following Dissertations into the chapters, Of a 
 future Life, and, Of the Moral Government of God> 
 with which they are closely connected. But as they 
 do not directly fall under the title of the foregoing 
 Treatise, and would have kept the subject of it too 
 long out of sight, it seemed more proper to place 
 fhem bv themselves. 
 
DISSERTATION I, 
 
 Of Personal Identity. 
 
 Whether we are to live in a future state, as it is 
 the most important question which can possibly be ask- 
 ed, so it is the most intelligible one which can be ex- 
 pressed in language. Yet strange perplexities have 
 been raised about the meaning of that identity or same- 
 ness of person, which is implied in the notion of our 
 living now and hereafter, or in any two successive mo- 
 ments. And the solution of these difficulties hath been 
 stronger than the difficulties themselves. For, person- 
 al identity has been explained so by some, as to render 
 the inquiry concerning a future life of no consequence 
 at all to us, the persons who are making it. And 
 though few men can be misled by such subtleties, yet 
 it may be proper a little to consider them. 
 
 Now, when it is asked wherein personal identity 
 consists, the answer should be the same as if it were 
 asked wherein consists similitude or equality ; that all 
 attempts to define would but perplex it. Yet there 
 is no difficulty at all in ascertaining the idea. For as, 
 upon two triangles being compared or viewed togeth- 
 er, there arises to the mind the idea of similitude, or 
 upon twice two and four, tli ^ M %i of equality, — so 
 likewise, upon comparing the consciousnesses of one's 
 self or one's own existence in any two moments, there 
 as immediately arises to the, mind the idea of personal 
 
 BBfi 
 
378 Personal Identity. Diss, I. 
 
 identity. And as the two former comparisons not 
 only give us the ideas of simlitude and equality, but 
 also shew us that two triangles are alike, and twice 
 two and four are equal, — so the latter comparison not 
 only gives us the idea of personal identity, but also 
 shews us the identity of ourselves in those two mo- 
 ments ; the present, suppose, and that immediately 
 past ; or the present, and that, a month, a year, or 
 twenty years past. Or in other words, by reflecting 
 upon that which is my self now, and that which was 
 my self twenty years ago, I discern they are not two, 
 but one and the same self. 
 
 But though consciousness of what is past does thus 
 ascertain our personal identity to ourselves, yet to say 
 that it makes personal identity, or is necessary to our 
 being the same persons, is to say that a person has not 
 existed a single moment, nor done one action, but 
 what he can remember ; indeed none but what he re- 
 flects upon. And one should really think it selfevi- 
 dent, that consciousness of personal identity presup- 
 poses, and therefore cannot constitute, personal iden- 
 tity, any more than knowledge in any other case can 
 constitute truth, which it presupposes. 
 
 This wonderful mistake may possibly have arisen 
 from hence, that to be endued with consciousness is 
 inseparable from the idea of a person or intelligent be- 
 ing. ! For, this might be expressed inaccurately thus, 
 that consciousness makes personality, and from hence 
 -it might be concluded to make personal indentity. But 
 though present consciousness of what we at present do 
 and feel is necessary to our being the persons we now 
 are, yet present consciousness of past actions or feelings 
 is not necessary to our being the same persons, who 
 performed those actions or had those feelings. 
 
 The inquiry, what makes vegetables the same in the 
 
Diss. I. Personal Identity. 379 
 
 common acceptation of the word, does not appear to 
 have any relation to this of personal identity, because 
 the word same, when applied to them and to person, is 
 not only applied to different subjects, but it is also 
 used in different senses. For when a man swears to' 
 the same tree as having stood fifty years in the same 
 place, he means only the same as to all the purposes of 
 property and uses of common life, and not that the 
 tree has been all that time the same in the strict phi- 
 losophical sense of the word. For he does not know, 
 whether any one particle of the present tree be the 
 same with any one particle of the tree which stood 11* 
 the same place fifty years ago. And if they have not 
 one common particle of matter, they cannot be the 
 same tree in the proper philosophick sense of the word 
 same ; it being evidently a contradiction in terms to 
 say they are, when no part of their substance and no 
 one of their properties is the same ; no part of their 
 substance, by the supposition ; no one of their prbp. 
 erties, because it is allowed that the same property canV 
 not be transferred from one substance to another. And 
 therefore when we say the identity or sameness of a 
 plant consists in a continuation, of the same life, com- 
 municated under the same organization to a number 
 of particles oj* matter, whether the same or not,— the 
 word same, when applied to life and to organization, 
 cannot possibly be understood to signify what it signi- 
 fies in this very sentence when applied to matter. In 
 a loose and popular sense then, the life and the organ- 
 ization and the plant are justly said to be the same, 
 notwithstanding the perpetual change of the parts. 
 But in a strict and philosophical manner of speech, no 
 man, no being, no mode of being, no any thing, can 
 be the same with that with which it hath indeed noth- 
 ing the same. Now sameness is used in this latter 
 
ago Personal Identity. Diss. I, 
 
 sense when applied to persons. The identity of these, 
 therefore, cannot subsist with diversity of substance. 
 The thing here considered, and demonstratively, as 
 I think, determined, is proposed by Mr. Locke in these 
 words, whether it, i. e. the same self or person, be the 
 same identical substance ? And he has suggested what is 
 a much better answer to the question than that which 
 he gives it in form. For he defines person, a thinking 
 intelligent being, &c. and personal identity, the sameness 
 of a rational being.* The question then is, whether 
 the same rational being is the same substance ; which 
 needs no answer, because being and sub stance in this 
 place stand for the same idea. The ground of the 
 doubt, whether the same person be the same substance, 
 is said to be this, that the consciousness of our own 
 existence in youth and in old age, or in any two joint 
 successive moments, is not the same individual action^ 
 i. e. not the same consciousness, but different suc- 
 cessive consciousnesses. Now it is strange that this 
 should have occasioned such perplexities. For it is 
 surely conceivable that a person may have a capacity 
 of knowing some object or other to be the same now, 
 which it was when he contemplated it formerly ; yet 
 in this case, where by the supposition the object is per- 
 ceived to be the same, the perception of it in any two 
 moments cannot be one and the same perception. And 
 thus, though the successive consciousnesses which we 
 have of our own existence are not the same, yet are they 
 consciousnesses of one and the same thing or object ; 
 of the same person, self, or living agent. The person 
 of whose existence the consciousness is felt now, and 
 was felt an hour or a year ago, is discerned to be, not 
 two persons, but one and the same person ; and there- 
 fore is one and the same. 
 
 * Locke's Works, vol. I. p. 146. f Locke, p. 146, 147. 
 
Diss. I. Pereonal Identity. 381 
 
 Mr. Locke's observations upon this subject appear 
 hasty ; and he seems to profess himself dissatisfied 
 with suppositions which he has made relating to it.* 
 But some of those hasty observations have been carried 
 to a strange length by others, whose notion, when tra- 
 ced and examined to the bottom, amounts, I think, 
 to this :f " That personality is not a permanent, but 
 a transient thing ; that it lives and dies, begins and 
 ends continually ; that no one can any more remain 
 one and the same person two moments together, than 
 two successive moments can be one and the same mo- 
 ment ; that our substance is indeed continually chang- 
 ing ; but whether this be so or not, is, it seems, noth- 
 ing to the purpose, since it is not substance, but con- 
 sciousness alone, which constitutes personality, which 
 consciousness being successive cannot be the same in 
 any two moments, nor consequently the personality 
 constituted by it." And from hence it must follow, 
 that it is a fallacy upon ourselves to charge our present 
 selves with any thing we did, or to imagine our present 
 selves interested in any thing which befel us yesterday, 
 or that our present self will be interested in what will 
 befal us tomorrow; since our present self is not, in real- 
 ity, the same with the self of yesterday, but another 
 like self or person coming in its room, and mistaken 
 for it ; to which another self will succeed tomorrow* 
 This, I say, must follow ; for if the self or person of to- 
 day, and that of tomorrow, are not the same, ' but on- 
 ly like persons, the person of today is really no more 
 interested in what will befal the person of tomorrow, 
 than in what will befal any other person. It may 
 be thought perhaps, that this is not a just representa- 
 tion of the opinion we are speaking of ; because those 
 
 * Locke, p. 152. 
 
 f See an answer to Dr. Clarke's third defence of his letter to M* Dod- 
 •rtr//, 2d edit. p. 44, 56, &c. 
 
$&2 Personal Identity. Diss. L 
 
 who maintain it allow, that a person is the same as far 
 back as his remembrance reaches. And indeed they 
 do use the words identity and same person. Nor will 
 language permit these words to be laid aside ; since if 
 they were, there must be, I know not what ridiculous 
 periphrasis substituted in the room of them. But 
 they cannot, consistently with themselves, mean that 
 the person is really the same. For,it is selfevident that 
 the personality cannot be really the same, if, as they 
 expressly assert, that in which it consists is not the 
 same. And as, consistently with themselves, they can- 
 not, so I think it appears they do not, mean that the 
 person is really the same, but only that he is so in a 
 fictitious sense ; in such a sense only as they assert, for 
 this they do assert, that any number of persons what- 
 ever may be the same person. The bare unfolding 
 this notion, and laying it thus naked and open, seems 
 the best confutation of it. However, since great stress 
 is said to be put upon it, I add the following things. 
 
 First, this notion is absolutely contradictory to 
 th?.t certain conviction which necessarily and every 
 moment rises within us, when we turn our thoughts 
 upon ourselves, when we reflect upon what is past, and 
 look forward upon what is to come. All imagination 
 of a daily change of that living agent which each man 
 calls himself, for another, or of any such change 
 throughout our whole present life, is entirely borne 
 down by our natural sense of things. Nor is it possible 
 for a person in his wits to alter his cQnduct, with re- 
 gard to his health or affairs, from a suspicion that 
 though he should live tomorrow, he should not, how- 
 ever, be the same person he is today. And yet, if it 
 be reasonable to act, with respect to a future life, up- 
 on this notion that personality is transient, it is reason- 
 able to act upon it with respect to the present. Here 
 
Diss. I. Personal Identity. $$$ 
 
 then is a notion equally applicable to religion and to 
 our temporal concerns, and every one sees and feels the 
 inexpressible absurdity of it in the latter case ; if there- 
 fore any can take up with it in the former, this cannot 
 proceed from the reason of the thing, but must be 
 owing to an inward unfairness and secret corruption of 
 heart. 
 
 Secondly, it is not an idea, or abstract notion, or 
 quality, but a being only, which is capable of life and 
 action, of happiness and misery. Now all beings con- 
 fessedly continue the same, during the whole time of 
 their existence. Consider then a living being now 
 existing, and which has existed for any time alive ; 
 this living being must have done and suffered and 
 enjoyed, what it has done and suffered and enjoyed 
 formerly, (this living being, I say, and not another) as 
 really as it does and suffers and enjoys, what it does 
 and suffers and enjoys this instant. All these succes- 
 sive actions, enjoyments and sufferings, are actions, en- 
 joyments and sufferings of the same living being. And 
 they are so, prior to all consideration of its remember- 
 ing or forgetting ; since remembering or forgetting 
 can make no alteration in the truth of past matter of 
 fact. And suppose this being endued with limited 
 powers of knowledge and memory, there is no more 
 difficulty in conceiving it to have a power of knowing 
 itself to be the same living being which it was some 
 time ago, of remembering some of its actions, suffer- 
 ings and enjoyments, and forgetting others, than in con- 
 ceiving it to know or remember or forget any thing else. 
 
 Thirdly, every person is conscious that he is now 
 the same person or self he was as far back as his re- 
 membrance reaches ; since when any one reflects upon 
 a past action of his own, he is just as certain of the per- 
 son who did that action, namelv, himself, the person 
 
384? Personal Identity, Diss, h 
 
 who now reflects upon it, as he is certain that the ac- 
 tion was at all done. Nay, very often a person's assur- 
 ance of an action having been done, of which he is ab- 
 solutely assured, arises wholly from the consciousness 
 that he himself did it. And this he, person, or self, 
 must either be a substance, or the property of some 
 substance. If he, if person, be a substance, then con- 
 sciousness that he is the same person, is consciousness 
 that he is the same substance. If the person, or he, 
 be the property of a substance, still consciousness that 
 he is thesame property is as certain aproof that his sub- 
 stance remains the same, as consciousness that he re- 
 mains the same substance would be ; since the same 
 property cannot be transferred from one substance to 
 another. 
 
 But though we are thus certain that we are the 
 same agents, living beings, or substances now, which 
 we were as far back as our remembrance reaches, yet 
 it is asked whether we may not possibly be deceived 
 in it ? And this question may be asked at the end of. 
 any demonstration whatever ; because it is a question 
 concerning the truth of perception by memory. And 
 he who can doubt whether perception by memory can 
 in this case be depended upon, may doubt also whether 
 perception by deduction and reasoning, which also in- 
 clude memory, or indeed whether intuitive perception 
 can. Here then we can go no farther, for it is ri- 
 diculous to attempt to prove the truth of those per- 
 ceptions, whose truth we can no otherwise prove than 
 by other perceptions of exactly the same kind with 
 them, and which there is just the same ground to sus- 
 pect ; or to attempt to prove the truth of our facul- 
 ties, which can no otherwise be proved than by the 
 use or means of those very suspected faculties them- 
 selves. 
 
DISSERTATION II. 
 
 Of the Nature of Virtue. 
 
 1 hat which renders beings capable of moral 
 government, is their having a moral nature and mor- 
 al faculties of perception and of action. Brute 
 creatures are impressed and actuated by various in- 
 stincts and propensions ; so also are we. But addi- 
 tional to this, we have a capacity of reflecting upon 
 actions and characters, and making them an object to 
 our thought ; and on doing this, we naturally and 
 unavoidably approve some actions, under the peculiar 
 view of their being virtuous and of good desert, and 
 disapprove others, as vicious and of ill desert. That 
 we have this moral approving and disapproving* fac- 
 ulty, is certain from our experiencing it in ourselves, 
 and recognizing it in each other. It appears from 
 our exercising it unavoidably, in the approbation and 
 disapprobation even of feigned characters ; from the 
 
 * This way of Speaking is taken from Epictetm, [a] and is made use of as 
 seeming the most full,and least liable to cavil. And the moral faculty may be 
 understood to have these two epithets, JW/mjutt/jo* and aLTroJoKi/uzntw, 
 upon a double account ; because, upon a survey of actions, whether before 
 or after they are done, it determines them to be good or evil ; and also be- 
 cause it determines itself to be the guide of action and of life, in contradis- 
 tinction from all other faculties, or natural principles of action ; in the very 
 same manner as speculative reason directly and naturally judges of speculative 
 truth and falsehood, and at the same time is attended with a consciousness 
 upon refection, that the natural right to judge of them belongs to it. 
 
 [a] Art. Epkt. I. 1. c 1. 
 
 c c c 
 
386 Of the Nature of Virtue. Diss. II. 
 
 words, right and wrong, odious and amiable, base 
 and worthy, with many others of like signification in 
 all languages, applied to actions and characters ; from 
 the many written systems of morals which suppose it, 
 since it cannot be imagined that all these authors, 
 throughout all these treatises, had absolutely no mean- 
 ing at all to their word^, or a meaning merely chimer- 
 ical ; from our natural sense of gratitude, which im- 
 plies a distinction between merely being the instrument 
 of good and intending it ; from the like distinction 
 every one makes between injury and mere harm, which, 
 Hobbs says, is peculiar to mankind ; and between in- 
 jury and just punishment, a distinction plainly natural, 
 prior to the consideration of human laws. It is man- 
 ifest great part of common language, and of common 
 behaviour over the world, is formed upon supposition 
 of such a moral faculty, whether called conscience, 
 moral reason, moral sense, or divine reason ; whether 
 considered as a sentiment of the understanding, or as 
 a perception of the heart, or, which seems the truth, 
 as including both. Nor is it at all doubtful in the 
 general what course of action this faculty or practical 
 discerning power within us approves, and what it dis- 
 approves. For, as much as it has been disputed 
 wherein virtue consists, or whatever ground for doubt 
 there may be about particulars, — yet, in general, there 
 is in reality an universally acknowledged standard of 
 it. It is that which all ages and all countries have 
 made profession of in publick ; it is that which every 
 man you meet puts on the show of ; it is that which 
 the primary and fundamental laws of all civil consti* 
 tutions, over the face of the earth, make it their busi- 
 ness and endeavour to enforce the practice of upon 
 mankind ; namely, justice, veracity, and regard to 
 common good. It being manifest then, in general. 
 
Diss, IL Of the Nature tf Virtue. 387 
 
 that we have such a faculty or discernment as this, it 
 may be of use to remark some things more distinctly 
 concerning it. 
 
 First, it ought to be observed that the object of 
 this faculty is actions,* comprehending under that 
 name active or practical principles ; those principles 
 from which men would act if occasions and circum- 
 stances gave them power, and which, when fixed and 
 habitual in any person, we call his character. It does 
 not appear that brutes have the least reflex sense of 
 actions as distinguished from events, or that will and 
 de*ign, which constitute the very nature of actions, as 
 such, are at all an object of their perception. But to 
 ours they are ; and they are the object, and the only 
 one, of the approving and disapproving faculty. Act- 
 ing, conduct, behaviour, abstracted from all regard to 
 what is, in fact and event, the consequence of it, is it- 
 self the natural object of the moral discernment, as 
 speculative truth and falsehood is of speculative reason. 
 Intention of such and such consequences, indeed, is al- 
 ways included, for it is part of the action itself ; but 
 though the intended good or bad consequences do not 
 follow, we have exactly the same sense of the action as 
 if they did. In like manner we think well or ill of 
 characters, abstracted from all consideration of the 
 good or the evil which persons of such characters have 
 it actually in their power to do. We never, in the 
 moral way, applaud or blame either ourselves or others 
 for what we enjoy or what we suffer, or for having im- 
 pressions made upon us which we consider as altogether 
 out of our power ; but only for what we do, or would 
 have done, had it been in our power, or for what we 
 
 * ov$e *) oipcTq xoi) xxKia — Iv 5re<W< «A>,« evcpyetx. M. Anton. 1. 
 IV 16. Virtutii laus omnis in actione consistit. Cic. Off. I. 1. c, 6. 
 
388 Of the Nature of Virtue. Diss. II. 
 
 leave undone which we might have done, or would 
 have left undone though we could have done it. 
 
 Secondly, our sense or discernment of actions as 
 morally good or evil, implies in it a sense or discern- 
 ment of them as of good or ill desert. It may be dif- 
 ficult to explain this perception, so as to answer all the 
 questions which may be asked concerning it ; but ev- 
 ery one peaks of such and such actions as deserving 
 punishment, and it is not, I suppose, pretended that 
 they have absolutely no meaning at all to the expres- 
 sion* Now the meaning plainly is not, that we con- 
 ceive it for the good of society that the doer of such 
 actions should be made to suffer. For if unhappily it 
 were resolved that a man, who by some innocent ac- 
 tion was infected with the plague, should be left to 
 perish, lest by other people's coming near him the in- 
 fection should spread, — no one would say he deserved 
 this treatment. Innocence and ill desert are inconsist- 
 ent ideas. Ill desert always supposes guilt ; and if one 
 be not part of the other, yet they are evidently and 
 naturally connected in our mind. The sight of a man 
 in misery raises our compassion towards him ; and if 
 this misery be inflicted on him by another, our indig- 
 nation against the author of it. But when we are in- 
 formed that the sufferer is a villain, and is punished 
 only for his treachery or cruelty, our compassion ex- 
 ceedingly lessens, and in many instances our indigna- 
 tion wholly subsides. Now what produces this effect, 
 is the conception of that in the sufferer which we call 
 ill desert. Upon considering then, or viewing togeth- 
 er, our notion of vice and that of misery, there results 
 a third, that of ill desert. And thus there is in hu- 
 man creatures an association of the two ideas, natural 
 and moral evil, wickedness and punishment. If this 
 association were merely artificial or accidental, it were 
 nothing \ but being most unquestionably natural, it 
 
D„iss. II. Of the Nature of Virtue. 389 
 
 greatly concerns us to attend to it, instead of endeav- 
 ouring to explain it away. 
 
 It may be observed farther, concerning our percep- 
 tion of good and of ill desert, that the former is very 
 weak with respect to common instances of virtue ; 
 one reason of which may be, that it does not appear 
 to a spectator how far such instances of virtue proceed 
 from a virtuous principle, or in what degree this prin- 
 ciple is prevalent, since a very weak regard to virtue 
 may be sufficient to make men act well in many com- 
 mon instances. And on the other hand, our perception 
 of ill desert in vicious actions lessens, in proportion to 
 the temptations men are thought to have had to such 
 vices. For, vice in human creatures consisting chiefly 
 in the absence or want of the virtuous principle, though 
 a man be overcome, suppose, by tortures, it does not 
 from thence appear to what degree the virtuous prin- 
 ciple was wanting. All that appears is, that he had it 
 not in such a degree as to prevail over the temptation ; 
 but possibly he had it in a degree which would have 
 rendered him proof against common temptations. 
 
 Thirdly, our perception of vice and ill desert arises 
 from, and is the result of, a comparison of actions with 
 the nature and capacities of the agent. For, the mere 
 neglect of doing what we ought to do, would in many 
 cases be determined by all men to be in the highest 
 degree vicious. And this determination must arise 
 from such comparison, and be the result of it, be- 
 cause such neglect would not be vicious in creatures 
 of other natures and capacities, as brutes. And it 
 is the same also with respect' to positive vices, or 
 such as consist in doing what we ought not. For, 
 every one has a different sense of harm done by an 
 idiot, madman, or child, and by one of mature and 
 common understanding, though the action of both. 
 
390 Of the Nature of Virtue. Diss. il. 
 
 including the intention which is part of the action, be 
 the same ; as it may be, since idiots and madmen, as 
 well as children, are capable not only of doing mis- 
 chief, but also of intending it. Now this difference 
 must arise from somewhat discerned in the nature or 
 capacities of one, which renders the action vicious, 
 and the want of which in the other, renders the same 
 action innocent or les? vicious ; and this plainly sup- 
 poses a comparison, whether reflected upon or not, 
 between the action and capacities of the agent, previ- 
 ous to our determining an action to be vicious. And 
 hence arises a proper application of the epithets, 
 incongruous, unsuitable, disproportionate, unfit, to 
 actions which our moral faculty determines to be 
 vicious. 
 
 Fourthly, it deserves to be considered whether men 
 are more at liberty, in point of morals, to make them- 
 selves miserable without reason, than to make other 
 people so ; or dissolutely to neglect their own greater 
 good, for the sake of a present lesser gratification, than 
 they are to neglect the good of others, whom nature 
 has committed to their care. It should seem, that a 
 due concern about our own interest or happiness, and 
 a reasonable endeavour to secure and promote it, 
 which is, 1 think, very much the meaning of the 
 word prudence, in our language, — it should seem, 
 that this is virtue, and the contrary behaviour faulty 
 and blameable ; since, in the calmest way of re- 
 flection, we approve of the first, and condemn the 
 other conduct, both in ourselves and others. This 
 approbation and disapprobation are altogether differ- 
 ent from mere desire of our own, or of their happiness, 
 and from sorrow upon missing it. For the object or 
 occasion of this last kind of perception is satisfaction 
 or uneasiness ; whereas the object of the first is active 
 
Diss. II. Of the Nature of Virtue. 391 
 
 behaviour. In one case, what our thoughts fix upon 
 is our condition ; in the other our conduct. It is 
 true indeed, that nature has not given u ; so sensible 
 a disapprobation of imprudence and folly, either in 
 ourselves or others, as of falsehood, injustice and cruel- 
 ty ; I suppose, because that constant habitual sence of 
 private interest and good, which we always carry about 
 with us, renders such sensible disapprobation less 
 necessary, less wanting, to keep us from imprudently 
 neglecting our own happiness, and foolishly injuring 
 ourselves, than it is necessary and wanting to keep us 
 from injuring others, to whose good we cannot have so 
 strong and constant a regard ; and also because im- 
 prudence and folly, appearing to bring its own punish- 
 ment more immediately and constantly than injurious 
 behaviour, it less needs the additional punishment 
 which would be inflicted upon it by others, had they 
 the same sensible indignation against it as against in- 
 justice and fraud and cruelty. Besides, unhappiness 
 being in itself the natural object of compassion, the 
 unhappiness which people bring upon themselves, 
 though it be wilfully, excites in us some pity for them • 
 and this of course lessens our displeasure against them. 
 But still it is matter of experience, that we are form- 
 ed so as to reflect very severely upon the greater in- 
 stances of imprudent neglects and foolish rashness 
 both in ourselves and others. In instances of this 
 kind, men often say of themselves with remorse, and 
 of others with some indignation, that they deserved 
 to suffer such calamities, because they brought them 
 upon themselves, and would not take warning. Par- 
 ticularly when persons come to poverty and distress by 
 a long course of extravagance, and after frequent ad- 
 monitions, though without falsehood or injustice ; we 
 plainly do not regard such people, as alike objects of 
 
392 Of the Nature of Virtue. Diss. IL 
 
 compassion with those who are brought into the same 
 condition by unavoidable accidents. From these 
 things it appears, that prudence is a species of virtue,, 
 and folly of vice ; meaning by folly somewhat quite 
 different from mere incapacity ; a thoughtless want 
 of that regard and attention to our own happiness 
 which we hnd capacity for. And this the word prop- 
 erly includes, and, as it seems, in its usual accep- 
 tation ; for we scarce apply it to brute creatures. 
 
 However, if any person be disposed to dispute the 
 matter, I shall very willingly give him up the words 
 virtue and vice, as not applicable to prudence and 
 folly ; but must beg leave to insist, that the faculty 
 within us, which is the judge of actions, approves of 
 prudent actions, and disapproves imprudent ones ; I 
 say prudent and imprudent actions, as such, and con- 
 sidered distinctly from the happiness or misery which 
 they occasion. And by the way, this observation 
 may help to determine what justness there is in that 
 objection against religion, that it teaches us to be in- 
 terested and selfish. 
 
 Fifthly, without inquiring how far and in what 
 sense virtue is resolvable into benevolence, and vice 
 into the want of it, it may be proper to observe, that 
 benevolence and the want of it, singly considered, are 
 in no sort the whole of virtue and vice. For if this 
 were the case, in the review of one's own character or 
 that of others, our moral understanding and moral 
 sense would be indifferent to every thing but the de- 
 grees in which benevolence prevailed, and the degrees 
 in which it was wanting. That is, we should neither 
 approve of benevolence to some persons rather than to 
 others, nor disapprove injustice and falsehood upon 
 any other account than merely as an overbalance of 
 happiness was foreseen likely to be produced by the 
 
Diss. II. Of the Nature of Virtue. S93 
 
 first, and of misery by the second. But now on the 
 contrary, suppose two men competitors for any thing 
 whatever which would be of equal advantage to each 
 of them, though nothing indeed would be more im- 
 pertinent than for a stranger to busy himself to get one 
 of them preferred to the other, yet such endeavour 
 would be virtue in behalf of a friend or benefactor, 
 abstracted from all consideration of distant conse- 
 quences ; as that examples of gratitude and the cul- 
 tivation of friendship would be of general good to the 
 world. Again, suppose one man should, by fraud or 
 violence, take from another the fruit of his labour, 
 with intent to give it to a third, who, he thought, 
 would have as much pleasure from it as would bal- 
 ance the pleasure which the first possessor would have 
 had in the enjoyment and his vexation in the loss of 
 it ; suppose also that no bad consequences would fol- 
 low ; yet such an action would surely be vicious. 
 Nay farther, were treachery, violence and injustice no 
 otherwise vicious than as foreseen likely to produce an 
 overbalance of misery to society, then, if in any case 
 a man could procure to himself as great advantage by 
 an act of injustice as the whole foreseen inconvenience 
 likely to be brought upon others by it would amount 
 tOj such a piece of injustice would not be faulty or 
 vicious at all, because it would be no more than, in 
 any other case, for a man to prefer his own satisfac- 
 tion to another's in equal degrees. The fact then ap- 
 pears to be, that we are constituted so as to condemn 
 falsehood, unprovoked violence, injustice, and to ap- 
 prove of benevolence to some preferably to others, ab- 
 stracted from all consideration which conduct is like- 
 liest to produce an overbalance of happiness or misery. 
 And therefore, were the Author of nature to propose 
 nothing to himself as an end but the production of 
 
 D D D 
 
394 Of the Nature of Virtue. Diss. II. 
 
 happiness, were his moral character merely that of be- 
 nevolence, yet ours is not so. Upon that supposition 
 indeed, the only reason of his giving us the above- 
 mentioned approbation of benevolence to some per- 
 sons rather than others, and disapprobation of false- 
 hood, unprovoked violence, and injustice, must be, 
 that he foresaw this constitution of our nature would 
 produce more happiness than forming us with a tem- 
 per of more general benevolence. But still, since this 
 is our constitution, falsehood, violence, injustice, must 
 be vice in us, and benevolence to some preferably to 
 others, virtue, abstracted from all consideration of the 
 overbalance of evil or good which they may appear 
 likely to produce. 
 
 Now if human creatures are endued with such a 
 moral nature as we have been explaining, or with a 
 moral faculty the natural object of which is actions,— 
 moral government must consist in rendering them hap- 
 py and unhappy, in rewarding and punishing them, 
 as they follow, neglect, or depart from, the moral rule 
 of action interwoven in their nature, or suggested and 
 enforced by this moral faculty ; # in rewarding and 
 punishing them upon account of their so doing. 
 
 I am not sensible that I have, in this fifth observa- 
 tion, contradicted what any author designed to assert. 
 But some of great and distinguished merit have, I 
 think, expressed themselves in a manner which may 
 occasion some danger to careless readers, of imagin- 
 ing the whole of virtue to consist in singly aiming, ac- 
 cording to the best of their judgment, at promoting 
 the happiness of mankind in the present state j and 
 the whole of vice, in doing what they foresee, or 
 might foresee, is likely to produce an overbalance of 
 unhappiness in it •, than which mistakes, none can be 
 
 • P. 189. 
 
Diss. II. Of the Nature of Virtue. 395 
 
 conceived more terrible. For it is certain that some 
 of the most shocking instances of injustice, adultery, 
 murder, perjury, and even of persecution, may, in 
 many supposable cases, not have the appearance of be- 
 ing likely to produce an overbalance of misery in the 
 present state ; perhaps sometimes may have the con- 
 trary appearance. For this reflection might easily be 
 
 carried on, but I forbear The happiness of the 
 
 world is the concern of him, who is the lord and the 
 proprietor of it ; nor do we know what we are about, 
 when we endeavour to promote the good of man- 
 kind in any ways but those which he has directed, 
 that is indeed in all ways not contrary to veracity and 
 justice. I speak thus upon supposition of persons re- 
 ally endeavouring, in some sort, to do good without 
 regard to these. But the truth seems to be, that such 
 supposed endeavours proceed, almost always, from am- 
 bition, the spirit of party, or some indirect principle, 
 concealed perhaps in great measure from persons 
 themselves. And though it is our business and our 
 duty to endeavour, within the bounds of veracity and 
 justice, to contribute to the ease, convenience, and 
 even cheerfulness and diversion of our fellow crea- 
 tures, — yet from our short views, it is greatly uncertain 
 when this endeavour will, in particular instances, 
 produce an overbalance of happiness upon the whole, 
 since so many and distant things must come into the 
 account. And that which makes it our duty, is, that 
 there is some appearance that it will, and no posi- 
 tive appearance sufficient to balance this on the con- 
 trary side ; and also that such benevolent endeavour 
 is a cultivation of that most excellent of all virtuous 
 principles, the active principle of benevolence. 
 
 However, though veracity as well as justice is to be 
 our rule of life, it must be added, otherwise a snare 
 
396 Of the Nature of Virtue. Diss. II, 
 
 will be laid in the way of some plain men, that the 
 use of common forms of speech generally understood, 
 cannot be falsehood, and, in general, that there can be 
 no designed falsehood without designing to deceive. 
 It must likewise be observed, that in numberless cases 
 a man may be under the strictest obligations to what 
 he foresees will deceive, without his intending it. 
 For it is impossible not to foresee that the words and 
 actions of men in different ranks and employments, 
 and of different educations, will perpetually be mis- 
 taken by each other ; and it cannot but be so whilst 
 they will judge with the utmost carelessness, as they 
 daily do, of what they are not, perhaps, enough in- 
 formed to be competent judges of, even though they 
 considered it with great attention. 
 
CHARGE 
 
 DELIVERED TO 
 
 THE CLERGY 
 
 AT TH$ 
 
 PRIMARY VISITATION OF THE DIOCESE OF DURHAM, IN THE 
 YEAR 1751 J 
 
 BY THE RIGHT REVEREND FATHER IN GOD 
 
 JOSEPH BUTLER, LL. D. 
 
 THEN LORD BISHOP OF THAT PIOCESE. 
 
 WITH NOTES, 
 
 CONTAINING A DEFENCE OF THE CHARGE AGAINST THE OBJEC- 
 TIONS OF AN ANONYMOUS WRITER. 
 
 BY THE EDITOR 
 
CHARGE 
 
 DELIVERED TO 
 
 THE CLERGY, &c* 
 
 It is impossible for me, my brethren, upon our 
 first meeting of this kind, to forbear lamenting with 
 you the general decay of religion in this nation ; 
 which is now observed by every one, and has been 
 for some time the complaint of all serious persons. 
 The influence of it is more and more wearing out of 
 the minds of men, even of those who do not pretend to 
 enter into speculations upon the subject ; but the num- 
 ber of those who do, and who profess themselves unbe- 
 lievers, increases, and with their numbers their zeal. 
 Zeal, it is natural to ask — for what ? Why truly for 
 nothing, but against every thing that is good and sa- 
 cred amongst us. 
 
 Indeed, whatever efforts are made against our reli- 
 
 * The publication of Bishop Butler's Charge, in the year 1751, was 
 followed by a pamphlet, printed in 1752, entitled, A Serious Inquiry/ into the 
 Use and Importance of External Religion, occasioned by some Passages in the Right 
 Reverend the Lord Bishop tf Durham s Charge to the Clergy of thai Diocett, &c, 
 humbly addressed to his Lordship. This pamphlet has been reprinted in a mis- 
 cellaneous work ; such parts of it as seemed most worthy of observation, the 
 reader will fiud in the Notes subjoined to those passages of the Charge, to 
 which the pamphlet refers. 
 
400 Charge to the 
 
 gion, no Christian can possibly despair of it. For He, 
 who has all power in heaven and earth, has promised 
 that he will be with us to the end of the world. Nor 
 can the present decline of it be any stumbling block 
 to such as are considerate ; since he himself has so 
 strongly expressed what is so remarkably predicted in 
 other passages of Scripture, the great defection from 
 his religion which should be in the latter days, by that 
 prophetick question, when the Son of Man cometh, shall 
 he find faith upon the earth ? How near this time is, 
 God only knows ; but this kind of scripture signs of 
 it is too apparent. For as different ages have been 
 distinguished by different sorts of particular errors 
 and vices, the deplorable distinction of ours is an avow- 
 ed scorn of religion in some, and a growing disregard 
 to it in the generality. 
 
 As to the professed enemies of religion, I know 
 not how often they may come in your way ; but often 
 enough, I fear, in the way of some at least amongst 
 you, to require consideration what is the proper behav- 
 iour towards them. One would, to be sure, avoid 
 great familiarities with these persons ; especially if they 
 affect to be licentious and profane in their common- 
 talk. Yet if you fall into their company, treat them 
 with the regards which belong to their rank ; for so 
 we must people who are vicious in any other respect. 
 We should study what St. James, with wonderful ele- 
 gance and expressiveness, calls meekness of wisdom, in 
 our behaviour towards all men, but more especially 
 towards these men ; not so much as being what we 
 «we to them, but to ourselves and our religion, that 
 we may adorn the doctrine of God our Saviour, in our 
 carriage towards those who labour to vilify it. 
 
 For discourse with them, the caution commonly 
 given, not to attempt answering objections which we 
 
Clergy of Durham, 1751. 401 
 
 have not considered, is certainly just. Nor need any 
 one in a particular case be ashamed frankly to ac- 
 knowledge his ignorance, provided it be not general. 
 And though it were, to talk of what he is not ac- 
 quainted with, is a dangerous method of endeavour- 
 ing to conceal it. But a considerate person, however 
 qualified he be to defend his religion, and answer the 
 objections he hears made against it, may sometimes 
 see cause to decline that office. Sceptical and profane 
 men are extremely apt to bring up this subject at 
 meetings of entertainment, and such as are of the freer 
 sort ; innocent ones, I mean, otherwise I should not 
 suppose you would be present at them. Now religion 
 is by far too serious a matter to be the hackney sub- 
 ject upon these occasions. And by preventing its being 
 made so, you will better >ecure the reverence which is 
 due to it, than by entering into its defence. Every one 
 observes, that men's having examples of vice often be- 
 fore their eyes, familiarizes it to the mind, and has 
 a tendency to take off that just abhorrence of it which 
 the innocent at first felt, even though it should not 
 alter their judgment of vice, or make them really be- 
 lieve it to be less evil or dangerous. In like manner, 
 the hearing religion often disputed about in light fa- 
 miliar conversation, has a tendency to lessen that sa- 
 cred regard to it, which a good man would endeavour 
 always to keep up, both in himself and others. But 
 this is not all ; people are too apt inconsiderately to 
 take for granted that things are really questionable, be- 
 cause they hear them often disputed. This indeed 
 is so far from being a consequence, that we know de- 
 monstrated truths have been disputed, and even mat- 
 ters of fact, the objects of our senses. But were it a 
 consequence, were the evidence of religion no more 
 than doubtful, then it ought not to be concluded false 
 
 EEE 
 
402 Charge to the 
 
 any more than true, nor denied any more than affirm* 
 ed ; for suspense would be the reasonable state of mind 
 with regard to it. And then it ought in all reason, 
 considering its infinite importance, to have nearly the 
 same influence upon practice, as if it were thoroughly 
 believed. For would it not be madness for a man to 
 forsake a safe road, and prefer to it one in which he 
 acknowledges there is an even chance he should lose 
 his life, though there were an even chance likewise of 
 his getting safe through it ? Yet there are people ab- 
 surd enough to take the supposed doubtfulness of re- 
 ligion for the same thing as a proof of its falsehood, 
 after they have concluded it doubtful from hearing 
 it often called in question. This shews how infinitely 
 unreasonable sceptical men are, with regard to religion, 
 and that they really lay aside their reason upon this 
 subject as much as the most extravagant enthusiasts* 
 But further, cavilling and objecting upon any subject 
 is much easier than clearing up difficulties ; and this 
 last part will always be put upon the defenders of re- 
 ligion. Now a man may be fully convinced of the- 
 truth of a matter, and upon the strongest reasons, and 
 yet not be able to answer all the difficulties which may 
 be raised upon it. 
 
 Then again, the general evidence of religion is 
 complex and various. It consists of a long series of 
 things, one preparatory to and confirming another, 
 from the veiy beginning of the world to the present 
 time. And it is easy to see how impossible it must 
 be, in a cursory conversation, to unite all this into 
 one argument, and represent it as it ought ; and could 
 it be done, how utterly indisposed people would be to 
 attend to it — 1 say in a cursory conversation ; where- 
 as unconnected objections are thown out in a few 
 words, and are easily apprehended, without more ati 
 
Clergy -of Durham, 1751. 403 
 
 Mention than is usual in common talk. So that, not- 
 withstanding we have the best cause in the world, and 
 though a man were very capable of defending it, yet 
 I know not why he should be forward to undertake it 
 upon so great a disadvantage, and to so little good ef- 
 fect, as it must be done amidst the gaiety and careless- 
 ness of common conversation. 
 
 But then it will be necessary to be very particularly 
 upon your guard, that you may not seem, by way of 
 compliance, to join in with any levity of discourse 
 respecting religion. Nor would one let any pretend- 
 ed argument against it pass entirely without notice ; 
 nor any gross ribalaVy upon it, without expressing our 
 thorough disapprobation. This last may sometimes 
 be done by silence ; for silence sometimes is very ex- 
 pressive ; as was that of our blessed Saviour before 
 the Sanhedrim, and before Pilate, Or it may be done 
 by observing mildly, that religion deserves another sort 
 of treatment, or a more thorough consideration than 
 such a time, or such circumstances admit. However, 
 as it is absolutely necessary that we take care, by dil- 
 igent reading and study, to be always prepared, to be 
 ready always to give an answer to every man that asketh 
 a reason of the hope that is in us, — so there may be oc- 
 casions when it will highly become us to do it. And 
 then we must take care to do it in the spirit which the 
 apostle requires, with meekness and fear :* meekness to- 
 wards those who give occasions for entering into the 
 defence of our religion ; and "with fear, not of them, 
 but of God ; with that reverential fear which the na- 
 ture of religion requires, and which is so far from be- 
 ing inconsistent with, that it will inspire proper cour- 
 age towards men. Now this reverent^ fear will 
 lead us to insist strongly upon the infinite greatness of 
 God's scheme of government, both in extent anddu- 
 
 * 1 Pet. iii. 15. 
 
404 Charge to the 
 
 ration, together with the wise connexion of its parts, 
 and the impossibility of accounting fully for the seve- 
 ral parts, without seeing the whole plan of Providence 
 to which they relate ; which is beyond the utmost 
 stretch of our understanding. And to all this must be 
 added the necessary deficiency of human language, 
 when things divine are the subject of it. These ob- 
 servations are a proper full answer to many objections, 
 and very material with regard to all. 
 
 But your standing business, and which requires con- 
 stant attention, is with the body of the people ; to re- 
 vive in them the spirit of religion which is so much - 
 declining. And it may seem, that whatever reason 
 there be for caution as to entering into any argu- 
 mentative defence of religion in common conversation^ 
 yet that it is necessary to do this/n?/;* the pulpit ^ in or- 
 der to guard the people against being corrupted, how- 
 ever in some places. But then surely it should be 
 done in a manner as little controversial as possible. 
 For though such as are capable of seeing the force of 
 objections are capable also of seeing the force of the 
 answers which are given to them, yet the truth is, the 
 people will not competently attend to either. But 
 it is easy to see which they will attend to most. And 
 to hear religion treated of, as what many deny, and 
 which has much said against it as well as for it, this 
 cannot but have a tendency to give them ill impres- 
 sions at any time ; and seems particularly improper 
 for all persons at a time of devotion, even for such as 
 are arrived at the most settled state of piety ; — I say 
 at a time of devotion, when we are assembled to yield 
 ourselves up to the full influence of the Divine Pres- 
 ence, and to call forth into actual exercise every pi- 
 ous affection of heart. For it is to be repeated, that 
 the heart and course of affections may be disturbed 
 
Clergy of Durham, 1751. 405 
 
 when there is no alteration of judgment. Now the 
 evidence of religion may be laid before men without 
 any air of controversy. The proof of the being of 
 God, from final causes, or the design and wisdom which 
 appears in every part of nature, together with the law 
 of virtue written upon our hearts ;* the proof of 
 
 * The law of virtue written upon our heart?.] The author of the 
 Inquiry, mentioned above,informs OS in his Postscript, that " the certain 
 consequence of referring mankind to a law of nature or 'virtue written 
 upont heir hearts is their having recourse to their own sense of things 
 on all occasions ; which being, in a great majority, no better than 
 family uperstition, party prejudice, or self interested artifice, (perhaps 
 a compound of ail) will be too apt to overrule the plain precepts of 
 the Gospel." And he declares., he has « no better opinion of the 
 clearness^, certainty, uniformity, universality , &c. of this law, than" he 
 has " of the importance of external religion" What then must we say 
 to St. Paul, who not only asserts, in the strongest terms, the reality of 
 such a law, but speaks of its obligation as extending to all mankind ; 
 blaming some among the Gentiles as without excuse, for not adverting 
 to and obeying it ; and commending others for doing by nature (in con- 
 tradiction to revelation) the things contained in the law, thus shewing 
 the work of the law written in their hearts. If, because " natural re- 
 ligion is liable to be mistaken, it is high time to have done with it in 
 the pulpit," how comes it that the same apostle refers the Philippians 
 to the study of this religion, to whatsoever things are true, honest, just, 
 lovely and of good report ? And yet without such a study or knowl- 
 edge of the moral law must always remain imperfect ; for a complete 
 system of morality is certainly no where to be found either in the Old 
 or New Testa merit. [a] When a Christian minister is enforcing the 
 duties or doctrines of revealed religion, he may perhaps do well to 
 " tell his people he has no other proof of the original, truth, obliga- 
 tions, present benefits and future rewards of religion to lay before 
 them, than what is contained in the Scriptures." But what if his pur- 
 pose be to inculcate some moral virtue ? Will it not be useful here, be- 
 sides observing that the practice of that virtue is enjoined by a divine 
 command, to recommend it still further to his hearers, by shewing that 
 it approves itself to our inward sense and perception, and accord, with 
 the native sentiments and suggestions of our minds? Metaphysicians 
 may say what they will of our feelings of this sort being all illusive, 
 liable to be perverted by education and habit, and judged of by men's 
 own sense of things ; they whose understandings are yet unspoiled by 
 philosophy and vain deceit will be little disposed to listen to such as- 
 sertions. Nor are there wanting arguments which prove, and, as 
 fa] Seethe second of Dr. Balguy s Charges. 
 
406 Charge to the 
 
 Christianity from miracles, and the accomplishment 
 of prophecies ; and the confirmation which the nat- 
 ural and civil history of the world give to the scripture 
 account of things ; — these evidences of religion might 
 properly be insisted on in a way to affect and influence 
 the heart, though there were no profes>ed unbelievers 
 in the world ; and therefore may be masted on with- 
 out taking much notice that there are such. And 
 even their particular objections may be obviated with- 
 out a formal mention of them. Be. ides, as to religion 
 in general, it is a practical thing, and no otherwise 
 a matter of speculation, than common prudence in 
 the management of our worldly affairs is so. And 
 if one were endeavouring to bring a plain man to be 
 more careful with regard to this last, it would be 
 thought a strange method of doing it, to perplex him 
 with stating formally the several objections which men 
 of gaiety or speculation have made against prudence, 
 and the advantages which they pleasantly tell us folly 
 has over it, though one could answer those objections 
 ever so fully. 
 
 should seem, to the sati faction of every reasonable inquirer, that the 
 great and leading principles of moral duties have in all age- been the 
 same ; that such virtue- as benevolence, justice, compassion, gratitude, 
 accidental obstacles removed, and when the precise meaning of the 
 words ha been once explained, are instinctively known and approved 
 by all men; and that our approbation of these is as much a part 
 of our nature implanted ii. us by God, and as little liable to caprice 
 and fashion, as the sense of seeing, given us also by Him, by which all 
 bodie appear to us in an erect, and not an inverted position. [b] Mr. 
 Locke's authority ha- been generally looked up to as decisive on such 
 quetion->, and his sentiments have been embraced implicitly and with- 
 out examination. That great and good man, however, is not to be 
 charged with the pernicious consequences which other-; have drawn 
 from his opinion ; con equences which have been carried to such a 
 length, as to destroy all moral difference of human actions : making 
 virtue and vice altogether arbitrary ; calling evil good, and good evil ; 
 putting darknesi for light, and light for darkness j putting bitter fat 
 sweet, and sweet for bitter. 
 
 [b] Set the ttird of Bishop Hurfs Sermons, Vol. /, 
 
Clergy of Durham, 1751. 407 
 
 Nor ^oes the want of religion in the generality of 
 the common people, appear owing to a speculative 
 disbelief or denial of it, but chiefly to thoughtlessness 
 and the common temptations of life. Your chief 
 business, therefore, is to endeavour to beget a practical 
 sense of it upon their hearts, as what they acknowl- 
 edge their belief of, and profess they ought to con- 
 form themselves to. And this is to be done by keep- 
 ing up, as well as we are able, the form and face of re- 
 ligion with decency and reverence, and in such a de- 
 gree as to bring the thoughts of religion often to their 
 minds ;* and then endeavouring to make this form 
 more and more subservient to promote the reality and 
 power of it. The form of religion may indeed be 
 where there is little of the thing itself ; but the thing 
 itself cannot be preserved amongst mankind without 
 
 * By keeping up the form and face of religion in such a degree as to 
 bring the thoughts of religion often to their minds.] To this it is said 
 by our Inquirer, that " the Clergy of the Church of England have no 
 way of keeping up the form and face of religion any oftener, or in any 
 ether degree, than is directed by the prescribed order of the Church." 
 As if the whole duty of a parish priest consisted in reading prayers 
 and a sermon on Sundays, and performing the occasional offices ap- 
 pointed in the liturgy ! One would think the writer who madethisobjec- 
 tion had never read more of the Charge than the four pages he has par- 
 ticularly selected for the subject of his animadversions. Had he look- 
 ed farther, he would have found other methods recommended to the 
 Clergy of introducing a sen c e of religion into the minds of their par- 
 ishioners, which occur much oftener than the times allotted for the 
 publick services of the Church ; such as family prayers ; acknowl- 
 edging the divine bounty at our meals ; pergonal applications from 
 ministers of parishes to individual under their care, on particular oc* 
 casions and circumstances, as at the time of confirmation, at fir.-t re- 
 ceiving the holy communion, on recovery from sickness, and the like; 
 none of which are prescribed in our established ritual, any more than 
 those others so ludicrously mentioned by this writer, " bowing to the 
 east, turning the face to that quarter in repeating the creeds, dipping 
 the finger in water, and therewith crossing the child's forehead in bap. 
 tka." 
 
408 Charge to the 
 
 the form.* And this form frequently occuring in 
 some instance or other of it, will be a frequent admo- 
 nition! to bad men to repent, and to good men to 
 grow better ; and also be the means of their doing so. 
 That which men have accounted religion in the 
 several countries of the world, generally speaking, has 
 
 * The thing itself cannot be preserved amongst mankind without 
 the form.] The Quaker reject all forms, even the two of Christ's 
 own institution ; will it be *aid that " these men have no religion pre- 
 served among them r" It will neither be said nor insinuated. The 
 Quakers, though they have not the form, are careful to keep up the 
 face of religion ; as appears not only from the custom of assembling 
 themselves for the purposes of publick worship on the Lord's day, 
 but from their silent meetings on other days of the week. And that 
 they are equally sensible of the importance of maintaining the influ- 
 ence of religion on their mind-.-, is manifest from the practice of what 
 they call inward prayer, in conformity to the direction of Scripture to 
 pray continually : " Which," saith Robert Barclay, " cannot be under- 
 stood of outward prayer, because it were impossible that men should 
 be always upon their knees,expressing the words of prayer, which would 
 hinder them from the exercise of those duties no less positively com. 
 manded." Apology for the Quakers. Prop. xi. Of Worship. 
 
 \ This form frequently occurring in some instance or other of it, 
 will be a frequent admonition, &c] Here it has been objected, that 
 ■ :i the number, variety, and frequent occurrence of forms in religion are 
 too apt to be considered by the generality a-; commutations for their 
 vices, as something substituted in lieu of repentance, and a i loads and 
 incumbrances upon true Christian edification." This way of arguing 
 against the use of a thing from the abuse of it, instead of arguing from 
 the nature of the thing itself, is the master sophism that pervades the 
 whole performance we are here examining. What reasonable man ev- 
 er denied that the pomp of outward worship has been sometimes mis- 
 taken for inward piety I That positive institutions when rested in as 
 ends instead of being applied as means are hurtful to the interests of 
 true religion ? Not Bishop Butler certainly, who blames the obser- 
 vances of the papists on this account; some of them as being "in 
 themselves wrong and superstitious ;" and others, as being "made 
 sub ervient to the purposes of uper tition," and for this reason " abol- 
 ; hed by our reformers." In the meanwhile it will still be true, that 
 bodily worship is by no means to be discarded, as unuseful in exciting 
 spiritual devotion; on the contrary, that they mutually a^i t and 
 strengthen eacn other ; and that a incremental intercourse with God, 
 and a religious service purely intellectual, is altogether unsuitable to 
 such a creature a.; man, during his present state on earth. 
 
Clergy of Durham, 1751. 409 
 
 had a great and conspicuous part in all publick appear- 
 ances, and the face of it been kept up with great rev- 
 erence throughout all ranks from the highest to the 
 lowest ; not only upon occasional solemnities, but al- 
 so in the daily course of behaviour. In the heathen 
 world, their superstition was the chief subject of statu- 
 ary, sculpture, parting and poetry. It mixed itself 
 with business, civil forms, diversions, domestick enter- 
 tainments, and every part of common life. The Ma- 
 hometans are obliged to short devotions five times be- 
 tween morning and evening. In Roman Catholick 
 countries, people cannot pass a day without having 
 religion recalled to their thoughts, by some or other 
 memorial of it, by some ceremony or publick relig- 
 ious form occurring in ther way ;* besides their fre- 
 
 * In Roman Catholick countries, people cannot pass a day without 
 having religion recalled to their thoughts, by some ceremony or publick 
 religious form occurring in their way.] " What in the former period" 
 /when speaking of the heathen world) wa> " called superstition, be- 
 comes in this" (when speaking of Roman Catholicks) " religion and reli- 
 gious forms; which the papists pretending to connect with Christianity, 
 and the Charge giving no hint that this is no more than a pretence, a plain 
 reader must needs take this as spoken of the means and memorials of 
 true religion, and will accordingly consider these as recommended 
 to his practice and imitation." If a plain reader, at first view of the 
 passage alluded to, should inadvertently fall into such a mistake, he 
 would find that mistake immediately corrected by the very next sen- 
 tence that follows, where the religion of the Roman Catholicks and 
 their superstition are distinguished from each other in express words. 
 But the terms in question are used with the strictest propriety. The 
 design of the Bishop, in this part of his Charge, is to consider religion, 
 not under the notion of its being true, but as it affects the senses and 
 imaginations ©f the multitude. For so the paragraph begins. « That 
 which men have accounted religion in the several countries of the., 
 world," (whether the religion be true or false is beside his present ar- 
 gument) "generally speaking, has a great and conspicuous part in all 
 publick appearances.' ■ This portion he illustrate* by three example?, 
 the Heathen, the Mahometan, and the Roman Catholick religions. 
 The two first of these, having little or nothing of true religion belong. 
 ing to them, may well enough be characterized under the common name 
 of superstition ; the last contains a mixture of both, which thereforethe 
 
 F F F 
 
410 Charge to the 
 
 quent holidays, the short prayers they are daily call- 
 ed to, and the occasional devotions enjoined by con- 
 fessors. By these means their superstition sinks deep 
 into the minds of the people, and their religion 
 also into the minds of such among them as are serious 
 and well disposed. Our reformers, considering that 
 some of these observances were in themselves wrong 
 and superstitious, and others of them made subservi- 
 ent to the purposes of superstition, abolished them, 
 reduced the form of religion to great simplicity, and en- 
 joined no more particular rules, nor left any thing more 
 of what was external in religion than was, in a man- 
 ner, necessary to preserve a sense of religion itself up- 
 on the minds of the people. But a great part of this 
 is neglected by the generality amongst us -, for instance, 
 the service of the Church, not only upon common 
 days, but also upon saints' days ; and several other 
 things might be mentioned. Thus they have no cus- 
 tomary admonition, no publick call to recollect the 
 thoughts of God and Religion from one Sunday to 
 another. 
 
 It was far otherwise under the Law. These words, 
 says Moses to the children of Israel, which I com- 
 mand thee, shall be in thine heart ; and thou shah teach 
 them diligently unto thy children, and shah talk of them 
 
 Buhop, like a good write* as well as a just reasoner, is careful to dis- 
 tinguish. In Roman Catholick countries a man can hardly travel a 
 mile without passing a crucifix erected on the road side ; he may ei- 
 ther stop to worship the image represented on the cross, or he may sim- 
 ply be reminded by it of his own relation to Christ crucified ; thus by 
 one and the same outward sign "religion may be recalled to. his 
 thoughts," or superstition may take possession of his mind. In the 
 celebration of the eucharist, the elements of bread and wine aie regard- 
 ed by a papi.-t as the very body and blood of Christ — to a protestant 
 they appear only as symbols and memorials of that body and blood ; 
 what in one is an act of rational devotion, becomes in the other an in - 
 stance of the grossest superstition, if not idolatry. 
 
Clergy of Durham, 1751. 411 
 
 whan thou sittest in thine house, and when thou walk- 
 est by the way, and when thou liest down, and when thou 
 rise st up* And as they were commanded this, so it 
 
 * And when thou rhest up.] Allowing that " what Moses in this 
 passage wanted to have effected was obedience to the moral law," 
 nothing sure could be of greater use in securing that obedience than 
 the practice here enjoined. Our Inquirer however is of a different o- 
 pinion ; and " very much questions whether his Lordship could have 
 fallen upon any passage in the Old Testament, which relates at all to 
 his subject, that would have been less favourable to his argument.'' 
 
 Who shall decide ? &c. The Bishop goes on, " As they (the Jews) 
 
 were commanded this, so it is obvious how much the constitution of 
 their law was adapted to effect it, and keep religion ever in view." 
 Upon which the Inquirer remarks, *' It was then very ill, or at least 
 very unwisely done, to abrogate that law, whose constitution was a- 
 dapted to so excellent a purpose." Let us first see what may be of- 
 fered in defence of the Bishop, and then consider what is to be said in 
 answertohis opponent. The purposefor which the Mosaick constitution 
 was established was this,to preserve, amidst a world universally addicted 
 to polytheism and idolatry, the great doctrine of the Unity of the Divine 
 Nature, till the seed should come to whom the promise was made. As a 
 means to this end, the Israelites were not only to be kept separate from 
 every other nation, but, the better to ensure such separation, they were 
 to be constantly employed in a multifarious ritual, which left them 
 neither time nor opportunity for deviating into the superstitious ob- 
 servances of their pagan neighbours. And this, I suppose, may suffice 
 for vindicating the Bishop's assertion, that "the constitution of the 
 Jewish law was adapted to keep religion ever in view." But the Jew- 
 ish law was not only adapted t o this end ; we are next to observe that 
 the end itself was actually gained. For though it be too notorious to 
 be denied, that the Jews did not always confine their religious homage 
 to the God of Israel, but polluted the service, due to Him alone, with 
 foreign worship, — yet, even in their worst defections, it should be re- 
 membered, they never totally rejected the true Jehovah ; and after 
 their return from captivity, they were so thoroughly cured of all re- 
 maining propensity to the idolatrous rites of heathenism, as never a- 
 gain to violate their allegiance to the God of their fathers. It appears* 
 then that, in consequence of the Jewish separation, the principle of 
 the Unity was in fact preserved inviolate among that people till the 
 coming of Christ. When the Mosaick constitution had thus attained 
 its end, and mankind were now prepared for the reception of a better 
 covenant^ the law expired of course ; the partition wall that had divided 
 the Jew from the Gentile was taken down, and all distinction between 
 them lost under the common name of Christians, And this may suf- 
 
412 Charge to the 
 
 is obvious how much the constitution of that law was 
 adapted to effect it, and keep religion ever in view. 
 And without somewhat of this nature, piety will grow 
 languid even among the better sort of men ; and the 
 worst will go on quietly in an abandoned course, with 
 fewer interruptions from within than they would have, 
 were religious reflections forced oftener upon their 
 minds,* and consequently with less probability of their 
 amendment. Indeed in most ages of the church, the 
 care of reasonable men has been, as there has been for 
 the most part occasion, to draw the people off from 
 laying too great weight upon external things ; upon 
 formal acts of piety. But the state of matters is quite 
 changed now with us. These things are neglected to 
 a degree which is, and cannot but be, attended with a 
 decay of all that is good. It is highly seasonable now 
 to instruct the people in the importance of external 
 religion.! 
 
 fice to shew, in opposition to our Inquirer, that it was both very well 
 and very wisely done to abrogate a law, when the purpose for which 
 the law had been enacted was accomplished. 
 
 * Were religious reflections forced oftener upon their minds.] " Ac- 
 cording to the Bishop's doctrine, then," says the Inquirer, " it should 
 be not only good policy, but wholesome discipline to force men in 
 England to come to church, and in France to go to mass." And again, 
 " If externals have this virtue to enforce religious reflections, it must be 
 right to compel those who are indisposed to such reflections to attend 
 these memorials." Yes ; granting that the sense of the passage in the 
 Charge is not shamefully perverted, and that we are to understand the 
 Bishop here to speak of external force and compulsion. Whereas by 
 " religious reflections forced" is plainly meant no more than religious 
 reflections oftener thrown in men's way, brought more frequently into 
 their thoughts, so as to produce an habitual recollection that they are al- 
 ways in the divine presence. 
 
 ■\ To instruct the people in the importance of external religion] 
 4< The importance of external religion," the Inquirer remark , " is the 
 grand engine of the papists, which they play with the greatest effect 
 upon our common people, who are always soonest taken and ensnared 
 
Clergy of Durham, 1751. 415 
 
 And doubtless under this head must come into 
 consideration a proper regard to the structures which 
 are consecrated to the service of God. In the present 
 turn of the age, one may observe a wonderful frugali- 
 ty in every thing which has respect to religion, and ex- 
 travagance in every thing else. But amidst the ap- 
 pearances of opulence and improvement in all common 
 things, which are now seen in most places, it would 
 be hard to find a reason why these monuments of an- 
 cient piety should not be preserved in their original 
 beauty and magnificence. But in the least opulent 
 places they must be preserved in becoming repair ; 
 and every thing relating to the divine service be, how- 
 ever, decent and clean ; otherwise we shall vilify the 
 face of religion whilst we keep it up. All this is in- 
 deed principally the duty of others. Yours is to press 
 strongly upon them what is their duty in this respect* 
 and admonish them of it often, if they are negligent 
 
 But then you must be sure to take care and not 
 neglect that part of the sacred fabrick which belongs 
 to you to maintain in repair and decency. Such neg- 
 lect would be great impiety in you, and of most per- 
 nicious example to others. Nor could you, with any 
 
 by form and jhew ; and, so far as we concur with them in the princi- 
 ple, we are doing their work ; since if externals, as such, are important, 
 the plain natural consequence is, the more of them the better." He 
 had the same reflection once before — " If true religion cannot be pre- 
 served among men without formj, the consequence must be that the 
 Romish religion, having— -more frequent occurrences of forms, is better 
 than other religions which have fewer of these—- occurrences" To 
 this argument I reply, Nego conseqttentiam. There may be too much 
 of form in religion, as well as too litUe j the one leads to enthusiasm, 
 the other degenerates into superstition ; one is puritanism, the other 
 popery— whereas the rational worship of God is equally removed 
 from either extreme- Did the Inquirer never hear of the possibility of 
 having too much of a good thing ? Or does he suppose, with the late 
 historian of Great Britain, that all religion is divided into two species, 
 the superstitious and the fanatical ; and that whatever is not one of 
 these must of necessity be the other ? 
 
414 Charge to the 
 
 success, or any propriety, urge upon them their duty 
 in a regard in which you yourselves should be openly 
 neglectful of it. 
 
 Bishop Fleetwood has observed,* that unless the 
 good pub lick spirit of building, repairing, and adorning 
 churches prevails a great deal more among us, and be 
 more encouraged, an hundred years will bring to the 
 ground an huge number of our churches. This excellent 
 prelate made this observation forty year.* ago ; and no 
 one, I believe, will imagine that the good >pirit he has 
 recommended prevails more at present than it did 
 then. 
 
 * But if these appendages of the divine service are to 
 be regarded, doubtless the divine service itself is more 
 to be regarded ; and the conscientious attendance up- 
 on it ought often to be inculcated upon the people, 
 as a plain precept of the Gospel, as the means of grace, 
 and what has peculiar promises annexed to it. But 
 external acts of piety and devotion, and the frequent 
 returns of them are, moreover, necessary to keep up a 
 sense of religion, which the affairs of the world will 
 otherwise wear out of men's hearts. And the fre- 
 quent returns, whether of publick devotions, or of 
 any thing else, to introduce religion into men's seri- 
 ous thoughts, will have an influence upon them in 
 proportion as they are susceptible of religion, and not 
 given over to a reprobate mind. For this reason, be- 
 sides others, the service of the church ought to be 
 celebrated as often as you can have a congregation to 
 attend it. 
 
 But since the body of the people, especially in 
 country places, cannot be brought to attend it often- 
 er than one day in a week, and since this is in no sort 
 enough to keep up in them a due sense of religion, it 
 
 * Charge to the Clergy of St. Asaph, 1710 
 
Clergy of Durham, 1751. 415 
 
 were greatly to be wished they could be persuaded to 
 any thing which might, in some measure, supply the 
 want of more frequent publick devotions, or serve the 
 like purposes. Family prayers, regularly kept up in 
 every house, would have a great good effect. 
 
 Secret prayer, as expressly as it is commanded by 
 our Saviour, and as evidently as it is implied in the 
 notion of piety, will yet, I fear, be grievously forgot- 
 ten by the generality, until they can be brought to fix 
 for themsel ves certain times of the day for it ; since 
 this is not done to their hands, as it was in the Jew- 
 ish Church by custom or authority. Indeed, custom, 
 as well as the manifest propriety of the thing, and ex- 
 amples of good men in Scripture, justify us in insisting, 
 that none omit their prayers morning or evening, who 
 have not thrown off all regards to piety. But secret 
 prayer comprehends not only devotions before men 
 begin and after they have ended the business of the 
 day, but such also as may be performed while they are 
 employed in it, or even in company. 4nd truly, if 
 besides our more set devotions, morning and evening, 
 all of us would fix upon certain times of the day, so 
 that the return of the hour should remind us to say 
 short prayers, or exercise our thoughts in a way equiv- 
 alent to this, perhaps there are few persons in so high 
 and habitual a state of piety, as not to find the benefit 
 of it. If it took up no more than a minute or two, 
 or even less time than that, it would serve the end I 
 am proposing ; it would be a recollection that we are 
 in the Divine Presence, and contribute to our being in 
 the fear of the Lord all the day long, 
 
 A duty of the like kind, and serving to the same 
 purpose, is the particular acknowledgement of God 
 when we are partaking of his bounty at our meals. 
 The neglect of this is said to have been scandalous tQ a 
 
416 Charge to the 
 
 proverb in the heathen world;* but it is without 
 ;;hame laid aside at the tables of the highest and the 
 lowest rank among us. 
 
 And as parents should be admonished, and it should 
 be pressed upon their consciences, to teach their chil- 
 dren their prayers and chatechism, it being what they 
 are obliged to upon all accounts, so it is proper to be 
 mentioned here, as a means by which they will bring 
 the principles of Christianity often to their own minds, 
 instead of laying aside all thoughts of it from week's 
 end to week's end. 
 
 General exhortations to piety, abstracted from the 
 particular circumstances of it, are of great use to such 
 as are already got into a religious course of life ; but 
 such as are not, though they be touched with them, 
 yet when they go away from church they scarce know 
 where to begin, or how to set about what they are 
 exhorted to. And it is with respect to religion as 
 in the common affairs of life, in which many things of 
 preat consequence intended are yet never done at all, 
 because they may be done at any time, and in any 
 manner ; which would not be, were some determin- 
 ate time and manner voluntarily fixed upon for the 
 doing of them. Particular rules and directions, then, 
 concerning the times and circumstances of perform- 
 ing acknowledged duties, bring religion nearer to prac- 
 tice ; and such as are really proper, and cannot well 
 be mistaken, and are easily observed. Such particu- 
 lar rules in religion, prudently recommended, would 
 have an influence upon the people. 
 
 All this indeed may be called form, as every thing 
 external in religion may be merely so. And there- 
 fore whilst we endeavour in these, and other like in- 
 
 * Cudworth on the Lord's Supper, p. 8. Casaub. in Athenaeum, L. i. c. 
 zi. p. 22. Duport. Prael. in Theophrastum Ed. Ncedham. C ix. p. 335, &c. 
 
Clergy of Durham, 1751. 4 1 ? ■ 
 
 stances, to keep up the form of godliness* amongst 
 those who are our care, and over whom we have any 
 influence, we must endeavour also that this form be 
 made more and more subservient to promote ihe power 
 of it.* Admonish them to take heed that they mean 
 what they say in their prayers, that their thoughts and 
 intentions go along with their words, that they really 
 in their hearts exert and exercise before God the af- 
 fections they express with their mouth. Teach them, 
 not that external religion is nothing, for this is not 
 true in any sense ; it being scarce possible but that 
 it will lay some sort of restraint upon a man's morals ; 
 and it is moreover of good effect with respect to the 
 world about him. But teach them that regard to 
 one duty will in no sort atone for the neglect of any 
 other. Endeavour to raise in their hearts such a sense 
 of God as shall be an habitual, ready principle of 
 reverence, love, gratitude, hope, trust, resignation and 
 obedience. Exhort them to make use of every cir- 
 cumstance which brings the subject of religion at all 
 before them ; to turn their hearts habitually to him ; 
 to recollect seriously the thoughts of his presence in 
 whom they live and move and have their being, and by 
 a short act of their mind devote themselves to his ser- 
 vice. If, for instance, persons would accustom them- 
 selves to be thus admonished by the very sight of a 
 church, could it be called superstition ? Enforce up- 
 on them the necessity of making religion their principal 
 concern, as what is the express condition of the gospel 
 covenant, and what the very nature of the thing re- 
 quires. Explain to them the terms of that covenant 
 of mercy, founded in the incarnation, sacrifice and in- 
 tercession of Christ, together with the promised as- 
 sistance of the Holy Ghost, not to supersede our own 
 
 <* * 2 Tim. ill. 5. 
 
 G G O 
 
418 Charge to the % 
 
 endeavours, but to render them effectual. The great- 
 er festivals of the church being instituted for com- 
 memorating the several parts of the gospel history, of 
 course lead you to explain these its several doctrines, 
 and shew the Christian practice which arises out of 
 them. And the more occasional solemnities of relig- 
 ion, as well as these festivals, will often afford you the 
 fairest opportunities of enforcing all these things in 
 familiar conversation. Indeed all affectation of talk- 
 ing piously is quite nauseous ; and though there be 
 nothing of this, yet men will easily be disgusted at 
 the too great frequency or length of these occasional 
 admonitions. But a word of God and Religion 
 dropped sometimes in conversation gently, and with- 
 out any thing severe or forbidding in the manner of it, 
 this is not unacceptable. It leaves an impression, is 
 repeated again by the hearers, and often remembered 
 by plain well disposed persons longer than one would 
 think. Particular circumstances too which render 
 men more apt to receive instruction, should be laid 
 hold of to talk seriously to their consciences. For in- 
 stance, after a man's recovery from a dangerous sick- 
 ness, how proper is it to advise him to recollect and 
 ever bear in mind, what were his hopes or fears, his 
 wishes and resolutions when under the apprehension of 
 death, in order to bring him to repentance, or confirm 
 him in a course of piety, according as his life and char- 
 acter has been. So likewise the terrible accidents which 
 often happen from riot and debauchery, and indeed 
 almost every vice, are occasions providentially thrown 
 in your way to discourse against these vices in common 
 conversation, as well as from the pulpit, upon any such 
 accidents happening in your parish, or in a neighbour- 
 ing one. Occasions and circumstances of a like kind 
 to some or other of these occur often, and ought, if 1 
 
Clergy of Durham, 1751. 419 
 
 may so speak, to be catched at, as opportunities of con- 
 veying instruction, both publick and private, with 
 great force and advantage. 
 
 Publick instruction is also absolutely necessary, and 
 can in no sort be dispensed with. But as it is com- 
 mon to all who are present, many persons strangely 
 neglect to appropriate what they hear to themselves, 
 to their own heart and life. Now the only remedy 
 for this in our power is a particular personal applica- 
 tion. And a personal application makes a very dif- 
 ferent impression from a common, general one. It 
 were therefore greatly to be wished, that every man 
 should have the principles of Christianity, and his own 
 particular duty enforced upon his conscience, in a 
 manner suited to his capacity, in private. And be- 
 sides the occasional opportunities of doing this, some 
 of which have been intimated, there are stated oppor- 
 tunities of doing it. Such, for instance, is confirma- 
 tion ; and the usual age for confirmation is that time 
 of life, from which youth must become more and 
 more their own masters, when they are often leaving 
 their father's house, going out into the wide world and 
 all its numerous temptations ; against which they par- 
 ticularly want to be fortified, by having strong and 
 lively impressions of religion made upon their minds. 
 Now the sixty -first canon expressly requires, that every 
 minister that hath care of souls shall use his best en- 
 deavour to prepare and make able — as many as he can 
 to be confirmed ; which cannot be done as it ought 
 without such personal application to each candidate in 
 particular as I am recommending. Another opportu- 
 nity for doing this is, when any one of your parishioners 
 signifies his name, as intending for the* first time to be 
 partaker of the communion. The rubrick requires 
 that all persons, whenever they intend to receive, shall 
 
420 Charge to the 
 
 signify their names beforehand to the minister ; which, 
 if it be not insisted upon in all cases, ought absolutely 
 to be insisted upon for the first time. Now this even 
 lays it in your way to discourse with them in private 
 upon the nature and benefits of this sacrament, and en- 
 force upon them the importance and necessity of re- 
 ligion. However, I do not mean to put this upon 
 the same foot with catechising youth and preparing 
 them for confirmation ; these being indispensable ob- 
 ligations, and expressly commanded by our canons. 
 This private intercourse with your parishoners prepar- 
 atory to their first communion, let it, if you please, be 
 considered as a voluntary service to religion on your 
 part, and a voluntary instance of docility on theirs. 
 I will only add as to this practice, that it is regularly 
 kept up by some persons, and particularly by one, 
 whose exemplary behaviour in every part of the pasto- 
 ral office is enforced upon you by his station of author- 
 ity and influence in (this part* especially of) the dio- 
 cese. 
 
 I am very sensible, my brethren, that some of these 
 things^ in places where they are greatly wanted, are im* 
 practicable from the largeness of parishes, suppose. 
 And where there is no impediment of this sort, yet the 
 performance of them will depend upon others, as well 
 as upon you. People cannot be admonished or in- 
 structed in private, unless they will permit it. And 
 little will you be able to do in forming the minds of 
 children to a sense of religion, if their parents will not 
 assist you in it ; and yet much less, if they will frustrate 
 your endeavours, by their bad example, and giving 
 encouragement to their children to be dissolute. The 
 like is to be sakl also of your influence in reforming 
 
 * The Archdeaconry of Northumberland. 
 
Clergy of Durba?n, 1751. 421 
 
 the common people in general, in proportion as their 
 superiors act in like manner to such parents ; and 
 whilst they, the lower people I mean, must have such 
 numerous temptations to drunkenness and riot every- 
 where placed in their way. And it is cruel usage we 
 often meet with, in being censured for not doing what 
 we cannot do, without, what we cannot have, the con- 
 currence of our censurers. Doubtless very much re- 
 proach which now lights upon the clergy would be 
 found to fall elsewhere, if due allowances were made 
 for things of this kind. But then we, my brethren, 
 must take care and not make more than due allow- 
 ances for them. If others deal uncharitably with us, 
 we must deal impartially with ourselves, as in a matter 
 of conscience, in determining what good is in our 
 power to do; and not let indolence keep us from set- 
 ting about what really is in our power, nor any heat 
 of temper create obstacles in the prosecution of it, or 
 render insuperable such as we find, when perhaps gen- 
 tleness and patience would prevent or overcome 
 them. 
 
 Indeed all this diligence to which I have been ex- 
 horting you and myself, for God forbid I should not 
 consider myself as included in all the general admoni- 
 tions you receive from me ; all this diligence in these 
 things does indeed suppose that we give ourselves whol- 
 ly to them. It supposes, not only that we have a real 
 sense of religion upon our own minds, but also, that 
 to promote the practice of it in others is habitually up- 
 permost in our thought and intention, as the business 
 of our lives. And this, my brethren, is the business 
 of our lives, in every sense, and upon every account. 
 It is the general business of all Christians as they have 
 opportunity ; it is our particular business. It is so, as 
 we have devoted ourselves to it by the most solemn 
 
422 Charge to the Clergy of Durham. 
 
 engagements ; as according to our Lord's appointment 
 we live of the Gospel ;* and as the preservation and ad- 
 vancement of religion, in such and such districts, are, 
 in some respects, our appropriated trust. 
 
 By being faithful in the discharge of this our trust, 
 by thus taking heed to the ministry we have received in 
 the Lord that we fulfil *7,t we shall do our part to- 
 wards reviving a practical sense of religion amongst the 
 people committed to our care. And this will be the 
 securest barrier against the efforts of infidelity ; a great 
 source of which plainly is, the endeavour to get rid of 
 religious restraints. But whatever be our success with 
 regard to others, we shall have the approbation of our 
 consciences, and may rest assured that, as to ourselves 
 at least, our labour is not in vain in the Lorb.J 
 
 * I Cor. ix. 14. 
 
 f Col. ir. 17. | 1 Cor. xv. 58. 
 
 FINIS. 
 

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