BT 21 . S42 1905 v.2 Seeberq, Reinhold, 1859- 1935 . Text-book of the history of r} n r* tri neg _ ,, V \ Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2019 with funding from Princeton Theological Seminary Library https://archive.org/details/textbookofhistor02seeb 0 TEXT-BOOK OF THE HISTORY OF DOCTRINES BY v Dr. reinhold seeberg, Professor of Theology in Ordinary in Berlin. REVISED, 1904, BY THE AUTHOR. TRANSLATED BY CHARLES E. HAY, D. D. COMPLETE IN TWO VOLUMES. VOL. II. HISTORY OF DOCTRINES IN THE MIDDLE AND MODERN AGES. PHILADELPHIA, PA.: LUTHERAN PUBLICATION SOCIETY. Copyright 1905, BY THE LUTHERAN PUBLICATION SOCIETY. CONTENTS. BOOK II. THE PRESERVATION, TRANSFORMATION, AND FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE IN THE MIDDLE AGES. PART I. HISTORY OF DOCTRINES FROM THE SEVENTH TO THE TENTH CENTURY. CHAPTER I. Introduction. Theology of Gregory the Great. PAGE £ 35. Characteristics of this Period . 15 $ 36. Theology of Gregory the Great . 17 1. Theology, Christology, Councils, Scripture . 17 2. Work of Christ . 19 3. Doctrine of Sin and Grace . 21 a . Original Sin . 21 b. Grace . 22 c. Predestination . 23 d. Repentance . 24 e. Mass, Purgatory . 24 4. The Church . 25 5. Relation to Augustine . 26 CHAPTER II. Doctrinal Conflicts of the Earlier Middle Ages. $ 37. Adoptionist Controversy . 27 1. Migetius, Elipandus, Felix . 27 2. Alcuin, Decision of the Controversy . 28 £ 38. Eastern Church and Worship of Images. Filioque Controversy . . 29 | 39. Controversy Upon Augustiniaii Doctrine of Predestination . 30 1. Gottschalk . 31 2. Opponents of Gottschalk . 31 3. Leaders of Both Parties . •. . 32 4. Councils at Chiersy, Valence, Toucy . 33; £ 40. Divergent Views Upon Parturition of the Virgin . 33 sJ 41. Controversies Upon the Lord' s Supper . 34 I. Popular Views . 34 11 CONTENTS. PAGE 2. Paschasius Radbertus . 35 3. Critical Estimate . 37 4. Rabanus . 37 5. Ratramnus . 38 6. Result . 39 CHAPTER III. Hierarchical Principle. History of Ordinance of Repentance. $ 42. Papacy and Hierarchy. . . . . 40 1 . Situation . 40 2. Problems . 40 3. Donation of Constantine . 40 4. Pseudo-Isidore . 41 § 43. Repentance in Earlier Middle Ages . 41 1. Limitation of Public Repentance . 42 2. Private Repentance . 42 3. Penitential Praxis and Theory . 43 4. Historical Situation . 46 PART II. HISTORY OF DOCTRINES IN SCHOLASTIC AGE. CHAPTER I. Foundations of Hierarchical and Religious Ideals and of Scholastic Theology. $ 44. The Church and the World. . ! . 1. Cluny . 2. Humbert, Gregory VII . . 3. Canon Law and the Church . £ 45. Christianity of Si. Bernard . $ 46. Histo?y of Theology from Anselm to Peter the Lombard . 1. Methods of Treatment . 2. Beginnings, Lanfranc, Anselm, Abelard, Roscellin . 3. Abelard’s Theological and Philosophical Position, His Followers. 4. Opposition to Abelard, Honorius Augustodunensis, Hugo of St. Victor, Robert Pullus . 5. Peter the Lombard, Heads of Doctrine . \ 47. Christology of Abelard and the Lombard. Opposition of Gerhoh . 1. Christology of Abelard . 2. The Lombard, Nihilianism . 3. Christology of Gerhoh . $ 48. Doctrine of Atonement. Anselm and Abelard. . \ ji. Anselm’s Theory of Satisfaction, Critical Estimate . 49 49 50 51 5* 5® 54 55 57 60 62 64 64 65 66 66 66 CONTENTS. Ill PAGB 2. Abelard’s Criticism, His Theory of Atonement . 70 3. Bernard vs. Abelard . 72 4. Atonement in the School of Abelard, in Honorius, Hugo, Robert. 73 5. Atonement in the Lombard . . 73 $ 49. Berenger of Tours and Doctrine of Lord' s Slipper . 74 1. Berenger . 74 2. Opposition to Berenger . 76 3. Development of the Doctrine, Transubstantiation . 77 4. Honorius, Hugo, Robert, the Lombard . 77 5. Dogmatic Establishment of Transubstantiation . 78 | 50. Definition of Sacraments. Seven Sacraments . . 79 1. Origin of the Number Seven . 79 2. Definition . 80 3. Baptism . 80 4. Confirmation . 8 1 5. Lord’s Supper . 81 6. Repentance . 81 a. Abelard . 81 b. Hugo . 82 c. Robert Pullus . • . 83 d. The Lombard . 83 7. Extreme Unction . 84 8. Ordination . 84 9. Marriage . 85 | 51. Conception of the Church . 85 • 1. Hugo, Robert, John of Salisbury . 85 2. Church, Hierarchy, Relation to State . 85 CHAPTER II. Development of Christian Doctrine During Second Period of Scholasticism. $ 52. Aims of the Church. Religious Life. Efforts at Reform . 87 1. Innocent III., Boniface VIII . 87 2. Francis of Assisi and His Influence . 88 3. Popular Practical Christianity . 90 4. Preaching, Penitential Praxis . 91 5. Heretical Movements, Cathari, Waldenses, Begards . 94 | 53. History and Characteristics of Theology in the Thirteenth Century. 96 1. Scholasticism and the Secularization of the Church . 96 2. Development of Scholasticism in Thirteenth Century . 97 Alexander of Hales . 98 Albert the Great . 99 Thomas of Aquino, Divisions of the “ Summa ” . 99 Bonaventura . 100 IV CONTENTS. PAGH 3. Leading Scholastic Ideas . . . 100 a. Revelation, Scriptures, Symbols, Pope . 100 b. Faith . 103 c. Reason Faith . 104 d. Universals . 104 4. Two Aspects of Scholasticism, Roger Bacon, Lullus, Henry of Ghent, Richard of Middleton . 105 § 54- Doctrine of God and Christology . 1 06 1. Advance of Thomas in the Doctrine of God . 106 2. The Trinity, Richard of St. Victor, The Lombard, Joachim of Floris, Fourth Lateran Council . . . 108 3. Christology . 109 $ 55. The Work of Christ . 1 10 1. Alexander, Bonaventura . no 2. Thomas . 113 | 56. Doctrines of Original State and Sin . 114 1. Original Righteousness, Synteresis , Donum super ad ditum . 114 2. Original Sin . 116 $ 57. Doctrine of Grace and Human Freedom . 118 1. Man Cannot Deliver Himself . 118 2. Gratia , creata and increata . f . 118 3. Grace and Free-will . 119 4. Justification, Infusion, Forgiveness of Sins, Assurance . 120 5. Faith and Works, Meritum de condigno and de congruo . 121 6. Evangelical Councils and Christian Perfection . 124 \ 58. Sacraments and the Church. Dogma of Seven Sacraments . 124 1. Dogmatization by Eugene IV . 124 a. Nature and Number of Sacraments . 125 b. Definition of Sacraments . 125 c. Relation of Sign and Grace . 126* d. Effect, “ Character” . 127 e. Ex opere operato . 128 2. Baptism . 1 29 3. Confirmation . 1 30 4. Lord’s Supper, Transubstantiation, Concomitance, Accidents, Bodily Presence and Local Limitation, Effect, Sacrifice of the Mass, Definition of Eugene IV . 13 1 5. Repentance . 135 a. Contrition and Attrition, Confession and Absolution, Thomas and Duns, Biel . 135 m b. Satisfaction . 138 c. Indulgences . 139 6. Extreme Unction . 140 7. Ordination . 141 8. Marriage . 142 CONTENTS. V PAGE 9. The Church, In Thomas, Current Definition, Communio sancto¬ rum , The Pope . . 144 10. The Kingdom of God on Earth . 146 CHAPTER III. Gradual Dissolution of Scholastic Theology. Religious and Ecclesiastical Crisis at Close of Middle Ages. § 59. Theology of Duns Scotus and its Significance for the History of Doctrines . 147 1. Philosophical Position of Duns . 147 2. Revelation, Symbols, Romish Church, Faith . 149 3. Conception of God, Predestination . 150 4. Sin, Original Sin . 153 5. Christology . 154 6. Mariology . 155 7. Redemption, Criticism of Anselm’s View . 156 8. Definition of Grace, Habitus, Merit, Justification . 158 9. Sacraments . 161 10. Significance of Duns in History of Doctrines . 162 § 60. Criticism of Hierarchical Conception of the Church . 165 1. Situation of the Curia, Reform Councils, Leo X . 165 2. Marsilius and Occam, Separation of Church and State, Tasks of Pope and Clergy, Fallibility of Pope and Infallibility of Scrip¬ tures, Rights of the Laity . . 167 3. Theory of Natural Right . 170 g 61. Church Life and Religious Agitations at the Close of the Middle Ages . 172 1. Crisis, Superstition, Expectations . 173 2. Influence of the Church Upon the Masses, Penitential Praxis, Attrition, Indulgences, Jubilee Indulgences . 174 3. German Mysticism . 178 4. Christian Socialism, Wickliffe . 181 $ 62. Review of History of Theology in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries. Nominalism and Augustinianism . 185 1. Duns and the Nominalists . 185 a. Nominalists . 185 b. Thomists . 186 c. Paduan School . 187 d. Augustinian Eremites . 187 e. Return to Augustine, Gerson, Forerunners of the Reformation 188 2. Nominalist Theory of Knowledge . 190 3. a. Criticism and Skepticism . ; . 191 b. Submission to Doctrine of Scriptures and Church, Theory of Inspiration . 192 VI CONTENTS. PAGE 4. Faith, Fides implicita . 195 5. Collapse of the Scholastic System . 196 $ 63. Labors of Later Middle Ages Upon Separate Dogmas and Doctrines 197 1. Sin, Human Freedom . 197 2. Atonement, Redemption . 198 a. Aureolus, Baconthorp, Durand, Capreolus . 198 b. Biel . 198 c. Practical View of Atonement . 200 3. Sacrament of Repentance, Attrition, Justification, Meritum de congruo and de condigno , Assurance . 201 4. Lord’s Supper. . . . 203 a. Occam, Durand, D’Ailli, Substance of the Bread . 203 b. Bodily Presence, Ubiquity in Occam, Faber Stapulensis .... 204 c. Wickliffe’ s Criticism of Transubstantiation . 206 5. Augustinian Tendency . 207 a. Bradwardina . 207 b. Wickliffe’ s Doctrine of Predestination . 208 c. Goch, Wesel and Wessel upon Grace . 208 6. Criticism of Sacrament of Repentance and Indulgences by Wick¬ liffe, Wesel and Wessel . 209 7. Conception of the Church in Wickliffe, Wesel and Wessel . 21 1 •*- § 64. The Renaissance and Humanism in their Significance for the History of Doctrines . 212 1. Literary Agitation . 213 2. Lorenzo Valla, Religious Attitude of Erasmus . 213 3. Lack of Reformatory Elements in Erasmus, Colet, Review and Prospect . 215 BOOK III. FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE THROUGH THE REFORMATION AND FIXATION OF THE DOCTRINES OF CATHOLICISM. PART I. GENESIS OF PROTESTANT DOCTRINE. CHAPTER I. The Views of Luther. $ 65. Luther1 s Place in the History of Doctrines . 221 1. Luther’s Personality . 221 2. Influence of Sacramental Repentance and of Augustine Upon Luther . 222 CONTENTS. Vll PAGE L 3. Early and Later Views of Luther Compared . 223 4. Luther and Scholasticism . 223 5. Evangelical Repentance as Central Point in Luther’s Reformatory Views . 224 6. Reformatory Work of Luther . 225 $ 66. Luther3 s Views Before the Reformation Period . 227 1. External and Internal Word, Law and Gospel . 228 2. Original Sin . 229 I /'3. Christology and Redemption . 229 4. Grace, Faith . 231 5. Sacrament of Repentance . 234 6. The Church . . 234 7. Old Forms with New Content . 235 l 67. Criticism of Sacrament of Repentance. Evangelical Repentance. Faith , Sin, Grace, Justification, Atonement. . 235 1. Theology of the Ninety-five Theses . 235 2. a. Contrition a Fruit of Faith and Love, The Law . 237 b. Confession and Absolution . 240 c. Satisfaction, Advance Upon Previous Theories . 241 3. a. Sin and Original Sin . 242 b. Enslaved Will and Predestination . 243 c. Wrath of God, The Devil . 245 4. a. The Law as Natural Right, The Sabbath . 246 b. The Gospel . 248 c. The Law . 249 d. The Law and Penitence, Agricola . 249 e. Law and Gospel . 251 5. Faith . 252 a. Its Origin, God Revealed in Christ as Loving-Will . 252 b. Its Nature — Acceptance, Trust, Faith and Redemptive Realities . 254 c. Faith and Regeneration . 256 d. Feeling, Experience, Assurance . 256 6. Good Works. From Faith, through Christ, in Liberty . 258 7. Justification Secured by Faith, Actual and Imputed Righteous¬ ness, Harmony of Luther’s Earlier and Later Teachings . 260 8. Grace and Gifts . 263 9. Work of Christ . 265 a. Satisfaction, Payment, Kingdom of God . 265 b. Sacrifice, Satisfaction Rendered to the Wrath of God and the Law, Release from Dominion of Devil . 266 c. Intercession . 269 d. Christ the Second Adam, Example, Following of Christ. . . . 269 Content and Critical Estimate of Luther’s Doctrine of the Atonement, Relation to Duns . 271 Vlll CONTENTS. PAGE io. General Summary . 272 $ 68. Evangelical Ideal of Life . 273 1. Significance of Luther’ s Ideal of the Christian Life . 273 2. Christian Perfection . 273 3. Secular Callings . 274 4. Content of the Christian Life, The Kingdom of God . 275 5. Luther and Social Problems . 278 l % Word and Sacrament . 279 1. The Spirit and the Means of Grace . 279 2. The Word and the Spirit vs. the Inner Word of the Fanatics.. . . 279 3. Conception of the Sacraments . 282 4. Baptism, Infant Baptism . 283 5. Luther’s Earliest View of the Lord’s Supper, Honius and Carlstadt . 285 6. Luther vs. Sacrifice of the Mass . 289 „ $ 70. Reformatory Conception of the Church . 289 1. Significance of the Leipzig Disputation . 289 2. New Conception of the Church . 291^, 3. Fundamental Features of the New Conception . 292 a . The Communion of Saints, Invisibility of the Church . 292 b. The Church and the Means of Grace . 293 c. The Church as Seen . 293 d. The Ecclesiastical Office . 293 e. Nature of the Church . 294 f. Marks of the True Church . . . 294 Jfc 71. Luther' s Attitude Toward the Traditional Standards of Doctrine , i. e.y the Scriptures and the Dogmas of the Church . 296 1. Attitude of Luther Toward the Traditional Standards . 296 2. a. Sole Authority of the Scriptures . 298 b. Difference as Compared with View of the Later Middle Ages, Christ the Content of Scripture, Biblical Criticism . 299 c. Luther’s Treatment of the Scriptures . 301 3. Attitude of Luther Toward the Dogma of the Ancient Church. . 302 4. Attitude of Luther Toward the Trinitarian Dogma . 304 CHAPTER II. Doctrine of Zwingli. Opposition of Luther and Zwingli Upon the Doctrine of the Lord’s Supper. § 72. Reformatory Principles of Zwingli . 306 1. Zwingli’ s Dependence Upon Luther . 307 2. Authority of the Scriptures . 308 3. Doctrine of Sin . 309 4. Work of Christ, Its Objective and Subjective Aspects . 309 5- Faith . 310 CONTENTS. IX PAGE 6. The Law of Christ . 31 1 7. The Ideal of Life . 312 8. Predestination, Conception of God . 312 ^ 9. The Church . 315 10. The Sacraments, Baptism, Infant Baptism . 316 n. Medieval Limitations of Zwingli . 317 £ 73. Controversy Upon the Lord' s Supper . 318 1. Origin of Zwingli’ s Doctrine, Tactics of the Conflict . 318 2. Doctrine of Zwingli . 320 3. Luther and the Words of Institution . 322 4. Christology of Luther as Related to His Doctrine of the Lord’s Supper . 323 5. The Right Hand of God, Mode of Bodily Presence, Relation to Occam . 325 6. Reception and Blessing of the Sacrament . 327 7. Marburg Colloquy, Schwabach Articles . 330 8. Wittenberg Concord, Bucer, Schwabian Compromise . 331 CHAPTER III. The New Dogma. £ 74. The Augsburg Confession . 332 1. Relations Between the Civil Authorities and Theologians in the Establishment of Protestant Doctrine . 332 2. Aim of the Augsburg Confession . . . 334 3. The Trinity, Sin, The Confutators . 335 4. Faith, Justification, Doctrine of Justification in the Apology . 336 5. Good Works, Ideal of Life . 339 > 6. The Church, Ministerial Office . 340 — 7. The Sacraments, Baptism, The Lord’s Supper, Repentance .... 341 8. Practical Demands . 343 *§ 75- The Earlier Reformed Confessions . 344 Justification, Faith, The Church, The Sacraments . 344 PART II. THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT AND (PROVISIONAL) COMPLETION OF PROTESTANT DOCTRINE. CHAPTER I. Lutheran Doctrine to the Adoption of the Formula of Concord. £ 76. Theology of Melanchthon. Its Significance for the History of Doctrines . 347 X CONTENTS. PAGE 1. Melanchthon and Calvin . 347 2. First Edition of the Loci . 348 3. Deviation from Luther in the Theory of Conversion . 349 4. Deviation from Luther Upon the Lord’s Supper, Article X. in the Yariata . 350 5. Later Revisions of the Loci , Attitude Toward the Scriptures, the Ecclesiastical Dogmas, and the Authority of Luther . 351 6. Theology and Philosophy . 353 7. The Church, Visible and as Object of Faith, “ Pure Doctrine”.. 354 — 8. Justification, The Law and Contrition, The Gospel and the Atone¬ ment, Forensic Theory, Faith and Regeneration, Self-con¬ sistency of Melanchthon’ s Theology . 358 77. Theological Controversies in the Lutheran Church from the Death of Ltither to the Adoption of the Formula of Concord. . 362 1. Significance of Melanchthon for the History of Doctrines . 363 2. The Interim, Adiaphoristic Controversy . 364 3. Majoristic Controversy, Menius, Amsdorf, Flacius . 364 4. The Antinomistic Controversy, Amsdorf, Poach, Otto . 365 5. Controversy Upon the Lord’s Supper, Brenz, Crypto-Calvinists, Consecration of Elements . .... 366 6. Synergistic Controversy, Pfeffinger, Strigel, Flacius . 367 ff.\ The Osianarian Controversy . 36Q KJ a. Osiander’s System . 369 b. His Opponents . 373 c. Stancar . 374 8. Christological Conflicts . 374 a. Brenz . 374 b. Chemnitz . 374 9. Predestinarian Controversy, Aepin Upon Descent into Hell . 378 78. The Formula of Concord . . ... 378 1. Political Reasons for Harmony, Frankfort Recess, Weimar Con¬ futation, Naumburg Diet, Corpora Doctrinae . 378 2. Genesis of the Formula of Concord . 380 3. Original Sin and Free Will . 383 4. Doctrine of Justification . 384 a. Obedience of Christ . 384 b. Imputed Righteousness . -. 384 c. Faith and Justification . . . . 384 5. Good Works . 385 6. Law and Gospel . 385 7. The Lord’s Supper . 386 8. Christology . 387 9. Descent into Hell . f . 388 10. Adiaphora . 388 ir. Predestination . 388 CONTENTS. XI PAGE 12. Factions and Sects . 389 13. Critical Estimate of the Formula. . . 389 CHAPTER II. Completion of Doctrinal Construction in the Reformed Church. $ 79* Theology of Calvin. Its Influence Upon the History of Doctrines. 390 1. Theological Type of Bucer, Theology of Bucer, Luther, Bucer, * and Melanchthon, Bucer and Calvin . 390 2. Calvin as Theologian and Churchman . 394 3. Calvin’s Doctrine of the Scriptures and Inspiration . 395 4. Conception of God . - . 396 5- Sin . 398 6. Atonement and Redemption . 399 7. a. Faith . 40 1 b. Repentance . 402 c. Justification . 403 d. Human Freedom . 405 e. Election . 405 8. The Church and its Organization . 408 a. The Totality of the Predestinated . 408 b. The Visible Church . 408 c. Outward Organization . 409 d. Relation to the State . 410/ 9. The Sacraments . 41 1 a. Definition of a Sacrament . 41 1 b. Baptism . 412 c. The Lord’s Supper . 412 10. The Significance of Calvin for the History of Doctrines, Medie¬ val Element in His View . 414 | 80. Triumph of Calvin’ s Doctrine of the Lord’ s Supper . 417 1. Bullinger’s Revival of Zwingli’s Theory . 417 2. The Consensus Tigurinus . 417 3. Reformed Confessions . 417 \ 81. Fundamental Evangelical Principles in Later Reformed Con¬ fessions . 418 1. Reformed Confessions in FI armony with Calvin . 418 2. Atonement, Faith, Repentance . 418 3. The Church, The Glory of God . 4J9i \ 82. Triumph of the Doctrine of Predestination . 420 1. Pighius, Consensus Genevensis . 420 2. The Symbols . 421 3. Remonstrants and Contra-remonstrants, Decrees of Dort . 421 4. Place of Predestination in Doctrinal System . 423 5. Amyraldus, The Formula Consensus Helvetica . 424 CONTENTS. XI 1 PART III. COMPLETION OF DOCTRINAL CONSTRUCTION IN THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH. P AGE $ 83. Establishment of Medieval Theology by the Council of Trent . 427 1. Reformation and Counter-reformation . 427 2. Jesuitism . 429 3. The Council of Trent . 431 4. The Scriptures and Tradition . 431 5. Original Sin, Sin of Adam, Propagation, Relation to Baptism, Concupiscence, Exemption of the Virgin Mary . 432 6. Justification, How Attained, Preserved, Lost, Synergism, Impu¬ tation or Infusion, Inherent Righteousness, Prevenient Grace, Disposition Good Works, Repentance . 433 7. The Sacraments . 438 8. Baptism . 439 9. Confirmation . 439 10. The Lord’s Supper . 439 a. The Dogma . 439 b. Withholding of the Cup . 440 c. Sacrifice of the Mass . 441 11. Sacrament of Repentance, Indulgences, Purgatory . 442 12. Extreme Unction . 445 13. Ordination . 445 14. Marriage . 446 15. Curialism vs. Episcopalism, Conception of the Church in the Cat- echismus Romanus . 446 1 6. Significance of theTridentine Confession for the History of Doctrines 448 I 84. Revival of the Augustinian Doctrine of Grace and its Eccle¬ siastical Rejection . 449 1. Decadence of the Augustinian Doctrine of Grace . 449 2. Bajus, The Bull, Ex omnibus afflictionibus . 450 3. Molina . 451 4. Jansen, The Bull, Cu?n occasione . 452 5. Quesnel, The Constitution, Unigenitus . 454 6. Immaculate Conception . 456 § 85. Completion of the Romish Dogma of the Church. The Vatican Council 456 1. Episcopalistic Movements, Declaration du clerge de France . 457 2. Febronius, The Punctation of Ems . 457 3. Synod of Pistoja . 458 4. Increased Respect for the Papacy in the Age of the Restoration.. 459 5. The Vatican Council, Schema defide , Inspiration . 460 6. Infallibility of the Pope . 460 7. Present Significance of Dogma in the Roman Catholic Church. . . 462 Conclusion. Significance of Dogma in Protestantism . 464 BOOK II. THE PRESERVATION, TRANSFORMATION, AND FUR¬ THER DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE IN THE MIDDLE AGES. PART I. HISTORY OF DOCTRINES FROM THE SEVENTH TO THE TENTH CENTURY. CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION. THEOLOGY OF GREGORY THE GREAT. § 35. Characteristics of this Period. 1. Viewed historically, this period is characterized chiefly by the disintegration of the ancient world. New nations and new governments appear upon the scene. Yet the life of antiquity is perpetuated among the barbarians by the church. Theology becomes the bearer, not of doctrine alone, but of philosophy and culture as well. For this task it was well fitted by the inti¬ mate connection of the fixed doctrines of the church with the ancient modes of thought, and by the universal spirit of Augus¬ tine. Wisdom belonged to the past. “ The first precept of safety is to guard the rule of right faith and to deviate in nowise from the ordinances of the fathers” (Vol. I., p. 387) — such is the motto of the doctrinal history of the period. The only man who indulged in independent speculations, the philosopher Scotus Erigena, was misunderstood by his age. With Augustine, he recognized two sources of knowledge, sound reason ( recta ratio ) and proper authority ( vera auctoritas') . He endeavored from a combination of the two to construct a speculative system. But the speculative-pantheistic tendency prevailed, and the Scriptures were subordinated by means of allegorical exegesis. His specu¬ lations had no influence worthy of mention upon the History of Doctrines (cf. Christlieb, Leben und Lehre des Joh. Scotus Erigena, i860). 2. The German nations received Christianity from the church in fixed forms and as a fixed formula. For them Christianity became simply dogma, and faith the acceptance of tradition.1 1 The only “dogmas,” in the full sense of the term, in the Middle Ages as for the preceding period, were those of the Trinity and the two natures of Christ. Cf. stib. under Gregory the Great and also, e. g., Agobard, de fid. verit. 3 (Mi. 104, 269), and the Poenitentiale of Theodore of Canterbury (i. v. 6, p. 189, in Wasserschleben, Penances): “ from a heretic who should not O5) 1 6 « HISTORY OF DOCTRINES. This, no less than the course of political events, served to con¬ firm the hierarchical idea and the papal power. Rome planted herself firmly in the new provinces of the Western church (cf. the Christianizing of the Anglo-Saxons, her relations with the Franks, Boniface), and, despite many rebuffs, secured power and maintained it. 3. Upon German territory Christianity was, it is true, con¬ ceived and publicly presented in a popular form (vid. the poetry of Cynewolf, Caedmon, the Heliand, the Crist of Otfrid. Cf. Seeberg, Die German. Auffassung d. Christentums in d. frueh- eren Mittelalter, Ztschr. f. k. Wiss., 1888, p. 91 ff. , 148 ff. Hauck, KG. Deutschlands, ii. 706 ff. ). The spirit of the theo¬ logians of the period was influenced by this (vid., e. g., Hauck ii. 268, 589 ff.); but theology not so much as one should sup¬ pose. The development of the practical life of the church pro¬ duced, indeed, new forms which became influential in shaping doctrinal conceptions (the church, repentance, the Lord’s Sup¬ per) and which the church could not ignore in her teaching ; but even here the old formulas were still the sacred material which lay at the basis of all theological labors. 4. The Greek church knew no Middle Age, for it never got beyond the range of the ancient problems of Origen, i. e., the Greek church had no Augustine. The dominant theological au¬ thority in the Middle Ages is Augustine. The entire doctrinal history of the period may be treated as the history of Augustin- ianism. His ideas controlled the leaders of the church and the unfolding of all ecclesiastical conceptions and institutions. The worst features in this development may be traced back to him, as well as the best. The piety of the age found in his teachings an unfailing source of inspiration. They were not the Light, but they testified of the Light. But while Augustine’s formulas thus control the theology of the period, the theologians do not master the formulas. They accomplished nothing more than the collection and arrangement of the Sentences of Augustine (Isidore of Seville, f 636 : Sententiarum sive desummo bono, 11. 3. Alcuin, f 804 : De fide sanctae trinitatis, 11. 3. Rabanus Maurus, f 856 : De clericorum institutione, 11. 3. Paschasius Radbertus, f 865 : De fide, spe et caritate, 11. 3. Cf. Thomasius-Seeberg, DG. II. 13 f. ) . But even this presentation did not faithfully reproduce true Augustinianism. It was an Augustinianism misinterpreted in a Semipelagian spirit and degraded to a popular level. Next to Augustine, the determining authority is Gregory the Great. rightly believe the Trinity.” To these dogmas the later Middle Ages added only obedience to the church, the doctrine of the sacraments, and, particularly, repentance and the doctrine of the Lord’s Supper. THEOLOGY OF GREGORY THE GREAT. 17 The former was understood as interpreted by the latter. The History of Doctrines in the Middle Ages must, therefore, begin with an outline of the theology of Gregory. 5. It follows from the above that we cannot expect to find any real development of dogma in this period. The question in the disputes of the age concerns always the proper understanding or misunderstanding of the traditional formulas, not an actual de¬ velopment of them Significant as is the period for the History of the Church, it furnishes very little material for the History of Doctrines. As in treating of the history of doctrines throughout the entire Middle Ages, so especially during this period the his¬ torian must constantly bear in mind the task immediately before him. He is not to embrace the whole field of theology, but only to portray the movements which prepare the way for and make possible the true doctrinal development of the Reformation period (Council of Trent and Protestant Confessions).1 The great awakening of piety at the close of this period is to be studied in other connections. § 36. Theology of Gregory the Great. The writings of Gregory (f A. D. 604) which particularly concern us are the following : Expositio in 1. lob sive Moralium, 11. 35 ; Homiliae in Ezech., 11. 2 ; Hom- iliae in evangelia, 11. 2 ; Dialogi, 11. 4 ; Regula pastoralis, 11. 3 ; Collection of letters in 14 volumes. Of the latter, the Liber sacramentorum and the Expositio in 1. I regum are critically open to suspicion. Editions : The Mau- rine (Sainthe Marthe), Paris, 1705, in Migne Lat. 75-79. Die Briefe s. Greg, registr. epp. edd. Ewald et Hartmann (Mon. Germ. hist, epist. t. 1, 2). Cf. Lau, Greg. I. d. Gr., 1845. Wolfsgruber, Greg. d. Gr., 1890. Clau- sier, St. Gregoire, Paris, 1886-91. Upon the doctrine of grace, vid. also- Wiggers, Schicksale d. aug. Anthropol., etc., in Ztschr. f. hist. Theol., 1854, p. 7 ff. i. In theology Gregory is an Augustinian in his formulas, and something of the spirit of the great African is also traceable in his writings. But the ruder elements of the popular theology, which in Augustine are kept in the background, here come again into marked prominence. To this is added a crude supersti¬ tion and mythological speculations touching angels, demons, etc., as found especially in the ‘ ‘ Dialogues. ’ ’ Gregory is consciously orthodox. The Christian faith is for him fides trinitatis (mor. xxxiii., c. 10. n. 20 ; in Ezech. 1. ii. hom. 4. 11), but includes also the incarnation (ep. 1. vii. 15 ; ev. ii. h. 33. 6). The term¬ inology, “ trinity of persons” and “ one substance” ( substan - 1 The History of Doctrines in the Middle Ages bears the same relation to that of the Reformation period as does the Ante-nicene to the Post-nicene. Cf. Vol. I., p. 23. 2 HISTORY OF DOCTRINES. 18 tia ), occurs very frequently in his writings (Ez. ii. 4. 7 ; ev. i. 18. 3 ; 19. 7 fin.; mor. xxx. 4. 17). 1 His Christology is just as or¬ thodox : Christ, the deus homo (Ez. ii. 1. 4), or the homo deus (mor. xxii. 17. 42), is true God and man : “ of one (Zinins') with the Father and of the same nature ’ ' (mor. iii. 14.26). But the divine and the human nature, united inconfuse ac inseparabiliter , constitute one person, unus in utraque natura (Ez. i. 8. 24 f. ). “ For we say that he exists, of (ex) two natures and in (in) two natures, but we avoid as impious the statement tnat he is to be considered as composed (compositum) of two persons” (ev. ii. 38. 3; mor. xviii. 52. 85 ; vid. also mor. i. 18, 26 ; xxiii. 19. 35 ; xxiv. 2. 2 ; xxix. 1. if.; xxxiii. 16. 32 ; ev. ii. 22. 8, etc.).2 The Holy Ghost is said to be : “ of one substance (substantia) , with the Father and the Son ” (ev. ii. 30. 3). 3 Gregory knows himself to be upon these points in harmony with the doctrine of the church councils. He is orthodox, he holds, who accepts what sanctae quatuor uzziversales synodi accepted, and rejects what they rejected (ep. vi. 66; opp. ii., p. 843). “ I confess that I receive and venerate four councils, just as I receive and venerate four books of the holy gospel” (ep. i. 25, p. 515; also iii. 10; v. 51, 54; iv. 38)/ Thus the authority of the church is recognized as on a par with that of the Holy Scriptures. Gregory, indeed, sustained by the strictest theory of inspiration,5 sees in the Holy Scriptures the i ‘ foundation of divine authority ’ ’ (divinae auctoritatis fundamentum , mor. xviii. 26. 39). God through them answers the 1 ‘ open or secret questionings of all men” (mor. xxiii. 19. 34). They must lie at the foundation of 1 The divine activity is described, e . g. , in Dial. iv. 6 : creantem et regen- tem, implentem et circumplectentem, transcendentem et sustinentem. Mor. xvi. 37. 45 ; vid. Ez. ii. 5. 10; mor. x. 6. 6. 2 The birth from a virgin was necessary in order to avoid original sin. Vid. mor. xi. 52. 70 ; xviii. 52. 84; xxiv. I. 3. 3 Upon the procession of the Spirit, vid. mor. xxx. 4. 17 : “how the spirit of both proceeds co-eternal from both ; ” mor. xxix. 31. 74 : “ whose (i. e., the Son’s) spirit is the same spirit who proceeds from the Father.” The symbol attributed to Gregory (opp. ii. 1283): “proceeding from the Father and the Son.” Vid. further in Lau, p. 459 f. 4 Gregory recognizes also the fifth council, e.g., ep. i. 25, p. 515 ; *x- 52> P- 966. Cf. Vol. I., p. 276. The authority of the four councils was legally es¬ tablished by Justinian. See Novella 131 : “ Therefore we decree that the holy ecclesiastical rules which have been announced or confirmed by the four holy councils shall prevail instead of laws. For we accept the doctrines of the aforesaid councils just as the Holy Scriptures, and the rules just as laws.” 5 Mor. praef. 1. I, 2: “ Let it be faithfully believed that the Holy Spirit is the author of the book. He, therefore, wrote these things who dictated the things to be written.” “ The writers of sacred eloquence, because, filled with the Holy Spirit, they are drawn above themselves, become as it were (something) beyond themselves.” The Scriptures are “words of the Holy Spirit” (Ez. ii. 10. 3). THEOLOGY OF GREGORY THE GREAT. 19 all preaching ; by their study priests are to be prepared for their vocation ; the reading of them is most urgently commended to all.1 But the force of all this was broken by the introduction of allegorical exegesis as of fundamental authority (mor. i. 24, 33 ; xvi. 19. 24). Thenceforth it became customary to laud the Holy Scriptures, but also to present as scriptural teaching the ‘ ‘ ecclesiastical ” doctrines. 2. In treating of the Work of Christ, Gregory employs the traditional mode of thought and expression (cf. Vol. I., p. 361 n. ). Christ is the Redeemer and Mediator of fallen human¬ ity. “ The Lord appeared in the flesh in order that he might arouse human life by admonishing, stimulate it by furnishing models {exe?7ipla j , redeem it by dying, and restore it ( repararet ) iby arising from the dead ” (mor. xxi. 6. 11). ( a ) This involves the general conception that Christ sur¬ rendered Himself to sufferings and death for us and thereby deliv¬ ered us from them (Ez. ii. 4. 20 ; i. 9; mor. xiii. 43. 48). To speak more precisely, this occurs in the following way : God is angry with the sinner. Hence there is need of a Mediator, who as a “ mediator of God and man” must be God and man — ‘ ‘ through flesh become redemptor , . . . mediator dei et hominis. 2 Because he appeared as the only righteous person among men, and, nevertheless, though without sin ( culpa ), faced the pun¬ ishment of sin, both persuading man no more to sin and hinder¬ ing God from smiting, he furnished an example of innocence and received the punishment of evil-doing. By suffering, there¬ fore, he who took away the sin of man by inspiring righteous¬ ness and tempered the wrath of the judge by dying, persuaded both and gave a hand to each, because he afforded man an example which might be followed and displayed to God deeds wrought upon himself by which he might be reconciled toward men ” (mor. ix. 38. 61). The appearing of Christ in our be¬ half thus appeases the divine wrath. Upon this conception of the intercession of Christ Gregory laid great emphasis. Christ, 1 Gregory often and energetically advised the reading of the Scriptures, e. g., mor. vi. 10. 12 ; xvi. 19, 24. Ez. i. IO. I ff.; ii. 3. 20 ; ep. ii. 52 ; iv. 31, p. 712 : “The Lord of heaven has for (the good of) thy life transmitted to thee his epistles.” Cf. Vol. I., p. 2980. Ep. viii. 17: “But I have inquired who of you belong to the collegium of sacred reading,’ * points to conventicles for the reading of the Scriptures. The Old and New Testaments differ essen¬ tially as presenting the lower ( minora ) and higher ( altiora ) precepts, inasmuch as the New Testament law addresses itself to the inner disposition. Ez. ii. 4, 5, 9; 1. 10 ; mor. xviii. 4. 7. 2 Instead of this exposition of the incarnation we find another : “ Because there was no one among men who could appear before God as a righteous intercessor, I have made myself a man in order to make propitiation for men.” Mor. xxiv. 3. 6. 20 HISTORY OF DOCTRINES. as the Righteous One, makes his merit1 available before the Father. “ For to the Only-begotten Son, to plead for man is to demonstrate before the eternal Father that he is himself a man ; and to him, to have asked in behalf of human nature is to have taken upon himself that same nature in the altitude of his divinity ” (mor. xxii. 17. 42). The effect of the merit of Christ is, there¬ fore, that God abandons his wrath against sinners.2 (<£) Another result of Christ’s sufferings and death is our de¬ liverance from the power of the devil. Man was in a state of guilt. The devil had a certain claim upon him (“ held man, as, it were, lawfully ”). “ This guilt must, therefore, be canceled ; but this cannot be done except through a sacrifice ’ ’ (^sacrificiuni) . But beasts were not sufficient for such a sacrifice ; a man was re¬ quired, and that a sinless man. Since there was none such, the- Son of God became man in order to offer the sacrifice. Since the devil made a mistake in seizing the Innocent One, 1 1 he law¬ fully lost him whom he had, as it were, lawfully held ” (mor. xvii. 30. 46b). The divinity veiled in humanity was thus the bait which God held out to the devil (mor. xxxiii. 7. 1 4 ff. ) . (c) Of the Mediator it is said: “Who, although he could have striven in our behalf even without dying, nevertheless wished, to aid men by dying, since he would certainly have loved us less, if he had not taken upon himself our wounds, nor could he have shown us the power of his love if he had not himself borne for a time that which he took from us ” (mor. xx. 36. 69). This shows plainly where the emphasis falls in Gregory’s theory of the atonement. That Christ was a teacher and an example appears to him the principal feature of his work. He reveals to us the invisible God, instructs us in regard to our sinful state, and teaches us the will of God and his commandments (Ez. ii. 1. 15 f. ; ev. ii. 32. 1 ; mor. vii. 2. 2 ; x. 6. 7 ; xvi. 30. 37 ; xxi. 6. 11 ; xxii. 17. 42 ; xxix. 1. 1). To the instruction thus given is 1 Although the expression, “merit of Christ” (meritum], is not found, the conception appears very plainly : “ For, interceding for sinners, he shows himself the just man who merited indulgence ( indulgentiam mereretur') for others.” Mor. xxiv. 2. 4, and ib. 3. 5* “ But, because there was no one by whose merits ( meritis ) the Lord would have been bound to be reconciled with us, the Only-begotten . . . appeared as the only righteous (One), in order that he might intercede for sinners.” Cf. ib. xvii. 30. 46. The term, “merit,” thereby receives a new application. From ancient times the merita of men had been spoken of, but the term is now transferred to the work of Christ. The Reformation shattered the whole conception as applied to man, but allowed it to stand with reference to the work of Christ. 2 It may be well here to note that Gregory speaks of the intercession of the saints and martyrs, as well as that of the church with its sacrifices (ep. ix. 52, p. 971 ; mor. xvi. 51. 64; xxxv. 8. 13); and also of an intervention ( intervenire ) of the Holy Ghost (ev. ii. 30. 3). THEOLOGY OF GREGORY THE GREAT. 21 added the incitement by example. “ For the incarnate Lord has displayed in himself everything which he has inspired in us, in order that he might commend by example what he had uttered in precept (mor. i. 13. 17). The life and active work of Christ, as well as his death, are regarded from this point of view (/. g., dial. i. 9 ; ev. i. 18. 4 ; 16. 3 ; ii. 22. 7 f. ; 32.3; 21.7; mor. xxi. 6. 11 ; xxviii. 18. 42). The purpose is : 4 * That by present¬ ing a form for imitation, he might change the life of previous •evil-doing” (mor. xxiv. 2. 2).1 Gregory’s theory of redemp¬ tion follows thus the Western type (Vol. I., pp. 193, 260, 361), since it understands Christ as essentially the historical power of goodness in the world, the teacher and exemplar. The idea of outwitting the devil also appears, it is true, in a terribly realistic form (cf. Vol. I., pp. 295, 361 n.). But it is a fateful phenom¬ enon that Gregory seeks to combine the objective and subjective aspects of redemption: “ Inasmuch as Christ dwelt among us, he both presented before the Father the new humanity and actually renewed humanity by his stimulating influence ” (p. 5). All the Middle Age theories of the atonement find their proto¬ type in Gregory — that of Anselm as well as Abelard’s.2 3. In his doctrine of Sin and Grace, Gregory reveals himself as an Augustinian, or, at least, a Semi-Augustinian. (#) The entrance of sin into the world is explained by the weakness of man (mor. iv. 3. 8). 3 The first sin was a free act •of the first man (mor. iii. 14. 26). He surrendered his love to God, and hence was compelled to depend upon himself and his own flesh (mor. viii. 10. 19 ; 6. 8); he became afflicted with spiritual blindness (mor. viii. 30. 49 ; xi. 43. 59 ; ix. 33. 50) and spiritual death. “ Man the sinner dies in sin, is deprived of righteousness, consumed in punishment ” (mor. xii. 6. 9). 4 Through Adam all have become sinners (mor. iv. 27. 53 ; ep. vii. 14 : “We come to this life with merit ( cum merito ) of our death ’ ’ (mor. iv. 24. 45). This is effected through the medium of conception. “ For conception itself is impurity on account of its 1 Gregory often emphasizes the ideas of example and imitation in treating of the mutual relations among men, e. g., Ez. ii. 3. 20 ; 10. 18 ; ev. ii. 31. 4 ; 38. 15 ; mor. x. 6. 9. Vid. especially xv. 51. 57, where the sin of children is explained as an imitation of the sin of the parents. 2 Even the mystic view of Bernard is not foreign to him, e. g ., Ez. ii. 1. 16 : Meditating upon his passion with anxious reflection ; ” mor. xxxi. 52. 104 : “ Because the hearers are by no means able to understand the secrets of his divinity, they are content to recognize the blood of the crucified Lord.” 3 Lau, p. 376, has sought to find in mor. xii. 15. 19 and ix. 49. 73 the be¬ ginnings of the donum superadditum ; but in this he is in error. Vid. mor. xxiv. 7. 13 ; viii. 6. 8. 4 Vid. in mor. xxxi. 45. 87 ff. the seven principal vices : inanis gloria, invidia, ira, tristitia, ventris ingluvies, avaritia, luxuria. Cf. Vol. I., p. 313 n. 22 HISTORY OF DOCTRINES. carnal delight ” (mor. xi. 52. 70; xviii. 52. 84). And: “Because* the human race became corrupt ( putruit ) in its first parent as in its root, it has carried out its barrenness ( ariditatem ) into its branches” (ep. ix. 52, p. 970; cf. mor. xvii. 15. 21). Asbe- tween Creationism and Traducianism, Gregory, like Augustine (Vol. I., pp. 344, 377), declines to decide (ep. ix. 52, p. 970). The consequence of Adam’s sin as thus inherited is the damna¬ tion of unbaptized children dying in infancy (mor. ix. 21. 324 xv. 51. 57). This has an Augustinian sound,1 but Gregory can¬ not make serious practical application of such ideas. For him. sin is still always only weakness and disease. “ We are born with implanted defect of infirmity” (mor. viii. 6. 8). Accordingly, he describes the human race in its natural state as : “this one- great and sick of very great infirmity — this is the human race lying languid throughout the whole world ” (mor. xviii. 45. 73 ; cf. xxi. 7. 12). Yet, with all this, freedom (but not goodness)' of the will seems to remain for the natural man (Ez. i. 9. 2): “ prevenient grace had transformed the free will in him to a good¬ will.” Cf. mor. xxxiii. 21. 39; xvi. 25. 30. ( b ) In the doctrine of grace also we find a similar emaciated' Augustinianism. Gregory emphasizes the fact that without grace there can be no salvation, no human merits (mor. xxxiii. 21. 38 ; xviii. 40. 62 ; Ez. i. 10. 45). Only grace as preveniens and subsequens makes us capable of goodness. Grace, therefore, begins the work : “ Celestial piety in advance ( prizes ) effects, something in us without our agency (sine nobis'), so that subse¬ quently it may also effect with us by our free will the good which, we now seek” (mor. xvi. 25. 30). Prevenient grace works in us the willing of the good ; subsequent grace, that we are able tO' do the good (mor. xxii. 9. 20). In the latter, the will now be¬ comes a good will, co-operates. “ For the good which we do is- both of God and of ourselves, of God through prevenient grace,, of ourselves through obedient freewill ” ( mor. xxxiii. 31. 40; xxiv. 10. 24; xviii. 40. 63). The first thing effected in man by grace- is faith (mor. ii. 46. 71), as an acceptance of the doctrinal teaching of the church (dial. iv. 1 : “that we should believe the things which we cannot yet know by experience”). This, beginning is effected through baptism, which works faith and for¬ gives the guilt of antecedent sins, particularly of original sin (Ez. 11. 10. 7; ev. i. 10. 7; mor. ix. 34. 54; xvi. 51. 57; xviii. 53. 87). The next step in the process is the imparting of the good will, or love (gratia spiritus infusi , mor. xxx. 6. 22; munus infusum , ib. 1 Augustinian, too, is the idea : “Evil is without substance ” (Mai. xxvi„. 37. 68; iii. 9. 15). THEOLOGY OF GREGORY THE GREAT. 23 i. 5). This is accomplished by the preaching of the woid. A sharp discrimination is here observed between the outward, aud¬ ible, and the inward, divine word (mor. xxix. 24. 49). Through this inward speaking of the word occurs the inspiratio or aspiratia gratiae (mor. xxx. 1.4. 5; xi. 9. 12 ; xviii. 40. 63) and through it the good will ( ' bonurn vel/e), or love, is wrought (mor. xxii. 9. 20 ; Ez. i. 9. 2 ; 7. 16). “ For to hear the voice of the Spirit is to mount up by the power of deep inward compunction to love of the invisible Creator” (mor. xxvii. 21. 41). Thus, after faith comes love (Ez. ii. 4. 13). This is thoroughly Augustinian (Vol. I., p. 347 ff.); but how wavering Gregory is upon this point is manifest from such assertions as the following : “ For the commandments of the Lord are called justifications (Ps. 19. 92), in which he by correcting justifies us ” (Ez. i. 7. 16 ; also ii. 10. 5).1 According to this, grace would consist in the giving of the commandments ; and such is accordingly the view of Faustus. And it is to be observed that Gregory, in keeping with this, lays great stress upon man’s co-operation. Thus place is found for the merit ( meritum ) of man in connection with the idea of reward. If we ourselves co-operate in striving after the good, then : “That which is a gift of the omniponent God becomes our merit ” (Ez. i. 9. 2; ii. 4. 6; mor. xvi. 25. 30; xviii. 40. 63; xxxiii. 21. 40). In the same line is Gregory’s assertion that man can do more than is commanded (mor. xv. 18. 20; xxvi. 27- so- (c) The doctrine of Predestination is retained only in form. The irresistibility of grace appears to be taught (mor. xi. 9. 13 ; cf. Ez. ii. 1. 13), but it is denied in mor. xxx. 1. 5. So, likewise, predestination is taught as a “ secret counsel ” (mor. xviii. 26. 43) in connection with the “ certain and definite number of the elect” (mor. xxv. 8. 20; Ez. ii. 1. 11); but it is, after all, only a result of omniscience : “ Whom he calls also elect (Matt. 24. 24), because he perceives that they will persist in faith and good works” (Ez. i. 9. 8; mor. xxv. 8. 19; xviii. 29. 46). The idea is, therefore, that there is a definite number of men whom God appoints to salvation, because he knows in advance that they will accept it. But no one is able to pronounce a certain judgment as to his own election or that of any other person (ev. ii. 38. 14; mor. xxv. 8. 19 ff.; xxiv. 11. 3 2). 2 Here, too, Gregory wavers, and it is evident that predestination has no important place in his religious convictions. 1 I know of no other reference to justification in Gregory’s writings. 2 But vid . Ez. ii. 5. 22 : “ but one sign of election is the firmness ( soliditas ) of love.” 24 HISTORY OF DOCTRINES. (cl) Following the course of the Christian life,1 as depicted by Gregory, we find it interrupted by many sins. God is thereby offended, but man must “abstain even from some things lawful, until by this he may make satisfaction to his Creator ’ ’ in order that his sin may be forgiven him (ev. ii. 34. 15 ff. ). This is repentance. It embraces first of all compunctio , or contritio , i. e., contrition, mourning, penitence (mor. xxiii. 21. 40; xvi. 29, 36). This is effected either through fear of the merited punishment, or through the flame of love and longing for the heavenly fatherland (Ez. ii. 10. 20 f.; dial. iii. 34 ; mor. xxiv. 6. 10). Secret sins in the thoughts are washed away by the sin¬ ner’s tears of penitence and his good works (mor. ix. 55. 83 f. ). But in the case of public repentance, there follows a confession of sins (mor. viii. 21. 37 ; xxii. 15. 31 ; xxxi. 46. 93). When grace has accomplished this, absolution is granted : “ Whom the omnipotent God visits through the grace of compunctio , them the declaration of the pastor absolves ’ ’ (ev. ii. 26. 6). But the “pas¬ tors of the church ’’ also lay a penalty ( toena ) upon those who thus publicly confess their guilt.2 3 This is the satisfaction which the sinner renders to God by abstaining from that which is other¬ wise allowable (vid. supra and reg. past. iii. 30; opp. ii. 87). Thus the sinner secures forgiveness from God, who takes the offering or gift ( munus ) for the offense (culpa) (dial. iv. 60). We have here essentially the fundamental elements of the Romish sacrament of repentance (cf. Yol. I., pp. 177 f. , 195 f., 363 f. ). “ For there are three things to be considered in every one truly penitent, i. e., the change of the mind, the confession of the mouth, and the punishments of the sin ” ( conversio mentis , con- fessio oris , et vindicta peccati (in 1 reg. vi. 2. 33). 4 ( e ) In closest connection with the above stand Gregory’s views upon the Sacrifice of the Mass and Purgatory. The whole significance of the Lord’s Supper is found in the sacrifice of the mass. He maintains the real presence of the body of Christ (ev. i. 14. 1 ; 22. 7 ; also Libr. sacr. post. Theoph. dom. v. praef. opp. iii. 27). But the principal thing is that the appeas- 1 Upon the division of Christian life into active and conteviplative , vid., e.g.y mor. vi. 37. 57-61 ; xxxi. 25. 49; Ez. ii. 2. 2ff. (=Martha and Mary); reg. past. i. 7. For a portrayal of the ideal of the Christian life, e. g ., Ez. i. 10. 9. 2 The injunction is given : “ But let those who preside show themselves to be such that those subject to them may not blush to make known to them even their secret ” (sins) (reg. past. ii. 5. opp. ii. 19). 3 The execution of the punishments ( vindicta ) constitutes the satisfaction as is evident from ep. ix. 52, p. 968 f. 4 Vid. also the compulsory penitence ( Zwangsbusse ) of clericals, monks, and nuns, e. g., ep. i. 44, p. 537 f. ; iv. 9. THEOLOGY OF GREGORY THE GREAT. 25 in g wafer ( hostia placationis') be so presented1 that the sacrifice of Christ for us be repeated : “ For as often as we offer to him the hostia of the passion, so often do we renew ( reparamus ) his passion to ourselves for our absolution,” and that the church may have in it a means of influencing God in addition to prayer and alms (ev. ii. 27. 7-9; dial. iv. 58). There has thereby been given to the church a means of enchantment, which may be of great service, e. g., breaking chains and extending help to the shipwrecked (dial. iv. 57). But it is, above all, an effectual means of bringing help to the souls of the departed. “ That for certain light offenses there is to be a purgatorial fire before the judgment,” is to be believed, according to Matt. 12.31; 1 Cor. 3. 12 ff. (cf. Vol. I., pp. 159, 197 n., 363). Some sins can, accordingly, be forgiven in that world (dial. iv. 39). The sac¬ rifice of the mass is particularly efficacious for this purpose, free¬ ing souls from purgatory (ib. iv. 5 5). 2 4. We must yet glance at Gregory’s conception of the Church. “ The present church is called the kingdom of heaven — for the congregation of the saints is said to be the kingdom of heaven ” (ev. ii. 38. 2 ; 32. 6 ; mor. xxxiii. 18. 34). The church is the kingdom, but primarily limited to the ecclesia justorum , i. e., the elect (vid. mor. xxv. 8. 21). The “one, holy universal church ’ ’ embraces angels and men — men from the time of Abel onward, all believers of the old covenant belonging to it (Ez. i. 8. 28; ii. 3. 17; ev. i. 19. i).3 In its concrete form, like its pro¬ totype, the ark, it embraces clean and unclean. “ In this church, therefore, there can be neither the evil without the good, nor the good without the evil ” (ev. ii. 38 . 7 f. ; Ez. ii. 4. 16 f. ). But only in the church are truth and love to be found, only in it salvation 1 Dial. iv. 58 : “ Living in himself immortally and incorruptibly, he is for us again immolated in this mystery of sacred oblation. For there his body is taken, his flesh is broken for the salvation of the people, his blood is poured out, not now into the hands of unbelievers, but into the mouths of believers. Hence we consider what is the nature ( qualitas ) of this sacrifice for us, which always repeats ( imitatur ) for our absolution the passion of the Only-begotten. For who of the believing can have a doubt that in the very hour of the immo¬ lation the heavens are opened at the voice of the priest, that the choirs of angels are present in that mystery of Jesus Christ, that the lowest things are associated with the highest ? ” . . . Also ev. ii. 37. 7. “ The host offered with the tears and benignity of the sacred altar pleads in a peculiar way for our ab¬ solution, because he who, arising by his own power, now dies no more, through it in his mystery suffers again for us.” Then follows the sentence above quoted. 2 The fourth book of the Dialogue treats exhaustively of conditions in the other world. Vid. especially its conception of the bridge (iv. 36). 3 Membership in the church is conditioned upon faith in the Trinity, and this the Old Testament believers possessed. Ez. ii. 4. 4, 7, 10 ; 3. 16; mor. xxix. 31. 70. 26 HISTORY OF DOCTRINES. (mor. xxxv. 8. 13). The holy universal church proclaims that God cannot, except within it, be truly worshiped, asserting that all who are without its bounds will by no means be saved (mor. xiv. v. 5; ep. xi. 46). Only the church’s sacrifice avails; only its members are in the valid bond ( compages ) of love ; only is its martyrdom meritorious (mor. xxxv. 8. 12; xviii. 26. 40). Sep¬ aration from the church proves lack of love (mor. xviii. 26. 41 f. ). But everything upon which the necessity of the church to salva¬ tion depends lies in the hands of the “ officers ’ ’ (rulers, regentes , and subjects, subditi , mor. xxx. 6. 23; iv. 31. 61; reg. past. ii. 6; in reg. vi. 2. 21). Binding and loosing are prerogatives of the clericals. And “ whether the pastor binds justly or unjustly, nevertheless the pastor’s declaration ( ' sententia ) must be revered by the multitude ” (ev. ii. 26. 5 f. ). They watch over the lives of those under them ( subditi ), lead them to repentance, dis¬ pense absolution (mor. xi. 14. 22 ; xiii. 18. 21 ; dial. ii. 23), present the sacrifice, etc. For the accomplishment of her work, the church lays claim to the aid of the unchristianized state. “ The holy church, because she is not sufficient in her own strength, seeks the assistance of that rhinoceros” (Job 39. 9), i. e., the prince of this world (mor. xxxi. 5. 7). 5. If we compare the Christianity of Gregory with that of Augustine, we reach a remarkable result. Almost everything in Gregory has its roots in the teaching of Augustine, and yet scarcely anything is really Augustinian. That which was un -Augustinian in Augustine becomes the vital element of this Semi-augustinian. The fundamental spirit of Augustine has vanished, and superstition gained supremacy. Everything is coarser, more fixed, and ordinary.1 The controlling motive is not the peace of the heart which finds rest in God ; but the fear of uncertainty, which seeks to attain security through the institu¬ tions of the church. “ For thus the holy church, in the course of her preaching to the faithful concerning the piety and right¬ eousness of the Redeemer, nvingles hope and fear , in order that they may neither incautiously trust in his mercy nor in despair fear his righteousness ” (mor. xx. 5. 13). There are some rays of light in this dark picture (e.g., the initiative of grace, the emphasis laid upon preaching, incidental remarks touching the nature of the church); but the crude Christianity, which is its characteristic, overshadows them with its sacramental magic, its ghostly miracles, its priestcraft, its superficial conception of sin, and its intoning of merit and reward. And even where Gre- 1 Cf. the opinion of Melanchthon : “Gregory, whom they call the Great, I call the dancer and torch-bearer of the theology now passing away n (Corp. Ref. xi. 16). ADOPTIONIST CONTROVERSY. 27 gory’s teaching was, in itself considered, more correct than that of Augustine, as upon predestination, the better was, as matters then stood, arrayed against the good. Such is the form in which the legacy of Augustine was preserved to the church — even thus a rich inheritance. CHAPTER II. DOCTRINAL CONFLICTS OF THE EARLIER MIDDLE AGES. § 37. Adoptionist Controversy . Sources. The letters of Elipandus, Espana sagrada v. 524 ff. Migne Lat. 96. Etherii et Bead adv. Elipandum, 11. 2. Alcuinus adv. Elipandum ; adv. Felicem (Opp. ed. Frobenius, 1777, and Migne 100, 101). Paulinus, 11. 3, c. Felicem, Migne 99. Benedict of Aniane, Testimoniorum nubecula, Migne 103. Agobard, Liber adv. dogma Felicis, Migne 104. Cf. Mansi xii., xiii. Gams, KG. Spaniens, ii. 2, p. 261 ff. Hefele, CG. iii., ed. 2, 642 ff. Werner, Alkuin, 1881, p. 54 ff. Moller, PRE. i., ed. 3, 180 ff. Grossler, Ueber die Ausrottg. des Adopt, im Reich Karls des Gr., 1879 (Jahresbericht d. Gymn. zuEisleben). Hauck, KG. Deutschlands ii., 251 ff. Bach, DG. des MA. i., p. 103 ff. Thomasius-Seeberg, DG. ii., 15 ff. Harnack, DG. iii. 248 ff. The great Renaissance of the Carlovingian age was of the profoundest significance for Church History. Its results for the History of Doctrines were comparatively small. So great de¬ pendence was placed upon antiquity that no advance was made in dogmatics beyond the interpretation of the Fathers. This is attested by all the controversies of the age, which were essen¬ tially disputes about misunderstandings of the accepted teachers of the church. 1. In Spain, a crude attempt was made by a certain Migetius to solve the problem of the Trinity. God, he affirmed, has re¬ vealed himself in a three-fold form : as the Father in David, as the Son in Christ, as the Holy Ghost in Paul (Elip. ad Miget. 3. Esp. sagr. v. 526). He was opposed by the aged bishop, Eli¬ pandus of Toledo. His Christological theory was championed especially by Bishop Felix of Urgellis. The watchwords, adoptio , filius adoptivus , are taken from the Spanish so-called Mozarabic liturgy ( per adoptivi ho minis passionem ; adoptivi hom- inis vestimentum carnis , etc. Vid. Hefele, iii. 651, and also Hauck ii. 257 n.). The theory was that Christ, as the second person of the Trinity, was the “ only-begotten of the Father without adoption ; ’ ’ but that the Son of God assumed, or 28 HISTORY OF DOCTRINES. adopted, the Son of man, who is thus adoptivus and called God (Alcuini opp. ii. 568. Esp. sagr. v. 536. Gallandi xiii. 407. Ale. adv. Fel. i. 1). The unity of person is thought to be pre¬ served in this process, inasmuch as, from the time of his concep¬ tion, the Son of man was taken up into the unity of the person of the Son of God (Ale. 1. c. v. 1). He suffered, indeed, only as the adopted ( adoptivus ) man and was buried in his “ adopted flesh” only (Elip. iv. 16; Mi. xevi. 879). The doctrinal type of the Adoptionists is in the line of the Western Chris- tology, which aimed to secure fuller recognition of the humanity of Jesus.1 They proved the necessity of this upon religious grounds, adducing the resemblance of believers to Christ, their relations to him as members of his body, and his human charac¬ ter (Ale. c. Fel. ii. 4. 14; v. 9; Paulin, iii. 3, 4). Only if an actual man should, with his untainted blood, blot out the deadly handwriting, could we become free from bondage (Elip. ep. 4. 14; Mi. 96. 878. As every man is according to the flesh born from Adam, so everyone obtains the “ grace of adoption,” who receives it in Christ, the second Adam, born of the virgin ( Ale. adv. Fel. ii. 16, also Agob. adv. dogm. Fel. 37). This theory was not really Nestorian, but it was possible to deduce from it consequences which led in that direction. It is scarcely justifiable, therefore, to attribute it to the influence of oriental Nestorians (e. g. , Gams, ii. 2, p. 264 b). “ Adoptionism is to be accounted for by the continued influence of old religious theories, the dependence upon ecclesiastical formulas, and the defective theological culture ” (Hauck, ii., p. 258 n.). 2. This doctrine was vigorously assailed by the Asturians, Beatus and Etherius • then particularly by the Frankish church. Among its literary opponents the most prominent was Alcuin. The first charge against the Spaniards was that they are led to teach a double person ( alter et alter')'. “ Just as the Nestorian impiety divided Christ into two Persons on account of the two natures, ... so also your untaught temerity divides him into two Sons, one a true and the other an adopted Son ” (Ale. adv. Fel. i. 11). Attention was then called to the inconsistency of Adoptionism with the teaching of the Fathers and the church.2 These attempted refutations display a remarkably defective con- 1 Assumtio illim ho minis ; verbum habens hominem , says Augustine (Vol. I., pp. 260 n., 360. Cf. Hilar, upon Ps. 138. 2. To assume man ( hominem suscipere ) is the standing formula in the Spanish Confession (vid. Hahn, Bibl. d. Symbole, ed. 3, pp. 21 1, 236, 237, 245 f. ). The Synod of Toledo, A. D. 675, says in regard to the Logos — not the Son of man — “ He is a son by na¬ ture, not by adoption” (vid. Hahn, p. 243, also Hefele, iii. 1 1 5 ) . 2 For special instances, vid. Bach, i. u6ff. EASTERN CHURCH AND THE WORSHIP OF IMAGES. 29 ception of the real problem at issue. Their authors were con¬ tent to rest in the simple thought : Christ was God, and as God he has delivered us.1 Yet they understood that: “In the as¬ sumption of the flesh by God, the person, not the nature, of the man perishes ’ ’ (Ale. adv. Fel. ii. 12). Adoptionism was con¬ demned at Regensburg, A. D. 794 ; at Frankfurt, A. D. 794 ; at Aachen, A. D. 799. Pope Hadrian I. had already rejected it as Nestorianism and blasphemy (Cod. Carol. 99, p. 294. Mansi, xiii. 865 ff.). Under Leo III. it was again condemned by a Roman Council (Mansi, xiii. 1031, probably in A. D. 799). Nothing was gained as a result of the controversy. The oppo¬ nents of the Adoptionists could not refute them because they were themselves too orthodox to understand them. § 38. Eastern Church and the Worship of Images. Filioque Controversy. Libri Carolini, ed. Heumann, 1731 ; in Migne, 98. 999 ff. Alcuin, de processione spiritus sancti, Migne, 101, 63 ff. Hefele, CG. iii. , ed. 2, 694 ff., 749 ff. Hauck, KG., Deutschl. ii. 276 ft'., 299 ff. i. During the controversies concerning images, the popes arrayed themselves on the side of the image-worshipers (Vol. I., p. 304). The Frankish church had assumed the same position. Delegates of Pope Hadrian had taken part in the Council at Nice, A. D. 787, and it had not been thought necessary to take special measures to protect the Frankish church. But Charlemagne took hand in the controversy. The Libri Carolini contain a keen criticism of the worship of images. God alone, they de¬ clare, is to be adored and worshiped {adorandus et colendus); the saints are only to be venerated (yenerandi) . Images, on the other hand, are only ornamental objects and reminders. It is, therefore, folly to render them worship. The Council of A. D. 754, which was hostile to image-worship, and the Council of Nice were both pronounced infamous and most incompetent (fnep - tissimae). No attention whatever was given, it is true, to the dis¬ tinction between veneration (tt p 0 a xo vagus') and worship (karpeia), the former word having been represented by the term adoratio in the Latin translation of the acts of the Council which was for¬ warded to Charlemagne. Accordingly, the second canon of the Council of Frankfurt, A. D. 794, decided that all adoratio and servitus are to be withheld from images, and that the Nicene Council is to be condemned (Mansi, xiii. 909). 1 It is possible that, as Hauck maintains (ii.,pp. 268, 271, 275), the Ger¬ manic conception of Christ as the rich God, our God, had something to do with this. 3° HISTORY OF DOCTRINES. 2. The Augustinian theology, as is well known, teaches the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son ( Vol. I. , p. 239 f. ). The formula, a patre filioque procedens , first meets us, excepting in the Athanasian Creed (Vol. I., p. 241), in Leo I. (ep. 15. 1 : de utroque processit , in opposition to Priscillian’s Sabellianism, e. g., tract 1); then in the confession of faith of a Council at Toledo (in Hahn, ed. 3, p. 210, probably about A. D. 444); also in the confession of Reccared and the Gothic bishops (A. D. 589, Hahn, p. 232 f.); in Gregory the Great (p. 4); and in A. D. 633, 638, and 675, in confessions of Toledo (Hahn, p. 236, 237, 243). From Spain the term reached the Franks. A council at Gentilly, so early as A. D. 767, appears to have pronounced in its favor (Hefele, iii. 432). In the Confession of Reccared it already appears inserted in the Constantinopolitan Creed (Hefele, iii. 48). In this enlarged form, the confession was used under Charlemagne in the Frankish church. Certain Frankish monks were called to account for this at Jerusalem. As Charlemagne had, at an earlier day, instructed his theologians to advocate the filioque (Alcuin, de processione spiritu sancto; Mi. 101. Libri Carol, iii. 3., p. 269 ff. ), soTheo- dulf of Orleans now wrote a defense of it (de spiritu sancto ; Mi. 105, 239 ff. ), and the Council at Aachen, A. D. 809, adopted the doctrine and, most probably, also the term itself. But Pope Leo III. opposed, not indeed the doctrinal position, but the unauthorized enlargement of the symbol (Mansi, xiv. 19 ff. ). The latter, however, despite the opposition, main¬ tained its place even at Rome. §39. Controversy Upon Augustinian Doctrine of Predestination. Sources. Gottschalk’s (f A. D. 868) utterances upon the subject are collected in Migne, 121, 345 ff. Vid. further especially Rabanus, the let¬ ters to Noting, Eberard, and Hincmar in Migne, 112. Hincmar, de praedest. dei et lib. arb., Migne, 125. Joh. Scotus Erigena, de div. praedest. , Migne, 122. Florus, sermo de praed., Migne, 119. Amolo in the Bibl. max. patr. xiv. For Gottsclialk, Remigius, de tribus epistolis and Libell. de tenenda immobiliter scripturae veritate, Migne, 121. Pruden- Tius, ep. ad. Hincm. , Migne, 1 1 5. Servatus Lupus, libell. de tribus quaestionibus, Migne, 1 19. Ratramnus de praedest., Migne, 121. Mau- guin published a collection : Vet. auctor. qui sec. ix. de praed. scrips, opera 1650; cf. Hefele, CG., iv., ed. 2, 130 ff. Borrasch, der Monch Gottsch., 1868. Schrors, Hincmar, 1884. J. Weiszacker in Jahrbb. f. deutsche Theol., 1859, p. 527 ff. Bach, DG. des MA. i. 220 ff. Reuter, Gesch. d. rel. Aufklarung im MA., 1875, i. 43 ff- Thomasius-Seeberg, DG., ii. 24 ff. Harnack, DG., iii. 261 ff. 1. Augustine had incidentally spoken of a double predestina¬ tion (Vol. I., p. 352 n.). Isidore of Seville yet wrote : “ Pre- CONTROVERSY UPON PREDESTINATION. 3 1 destination is two-fold, either of the elect to (heavenly) rest, or of the wicked to death ” (Sentent. ii. 6). But in this also the Augustinians of the Carlovingian age understood their master in the same sense as had Gregory the Great (cf. p. 22). Then arose a man who, in a checkered career, had found peace for his soul in the Augustinian doctrine of election (Mi. 121, 362 and 363). The monk, Gottscha.lk of Orbais, had met with the writings of Augustine, although he did not have the whole Au¬ gustine. His- thought and emotions centered in the unchange¬ able God, who, of his own good will, elects men or rejects them. This “ most salutary truth ’’was his strength and stay. He paid no attention to the ecclesiastical machinery, the system of good works ( “ not by merits, indeed, but by the gift of the Father,” Mi. 121, 372). “ Just as the immutable God before the foundation of the world through his gratuitous grace immutably predestinated all his elect to eternal life ; so in like manner all the reprobate who will in the day of judgment be condemned on account of their evil deserts has this same immutable God through his righteous judgment immutably predestinated to death justly everlasting” (in Hincm. de praed. 5). God has not foreordained the evil, but the immutable God has ordained salvation for the one class and them for salvation — a gift of grace {beneficium gratiae ) — and for others through a decision of justice ( judicium justitiae ), the merited punishment, and them for it (Mi. 121, 350). Each of these is a good act ( bonum , ib. 358). Hence it is said that God “has predes¬ tinated only good things ( bona , ib. 349). This cannot be based upon the divine prescience, since God would then be mutable and dependent upon the temporal (Mi. 121, 353). Presci¬ ence merely accompanies praedestination ; by it the justice of the latter is attested. With Augustine, Gottschalk regarded the redemptive work of Christ as having reference only to the pre¬ destinated (Hincm., de praed. 27, 29, 34, 35, and Mi. 121. 367, 372). That this is genuine Augustinian doctrine cannot be questioned. It became the criterion for the “ Augustinianism ” of the period.1 2. Gottschalk’s opponents did not understand him. They pressed home upon him, as the “destroyer of the faith,” the familiar brutal consequence : “ God makes man sin against his will,” and is the author of evil, as, e. g., Rabanus, to whose attention the matter was first brought by Noting of Verona. At Mayence, A. D. 848, Gottschalk’s doctrine was condemned and he 1 Even the expression, trina unitas (Mi. 121, 364) employed by Gotts¬ chalk, which harmonizes with the Augustinian conception, was assailed by Hincmar : de una et non trina deitate ; cf. Hefele, iv. 220 f. 32 HISTORY OF DOCTRINES. himself delivered for punishment to Hincmar, in whose district his cloister lay. At Chiersy, A. D. 849, he was terribly scourged and condemned to life-long imprisonment. 3. But the matter now only assumed wider dimensions. In¬ fluential theologians, such as Prudentius of Troyes, Remigius of Lyons, Ratramnus in Corbie, Servatus Lupus in Ferrieres, defended the theory of a two-fold ( gemina ) predestination as the Augustinian doctrine, while, on the other hand, Rabanus and Hincmar further assailed it.1 Amolo and Florus M agister pointed to its disastrous consequences. There was a possibility of reconciliation between these opponents, for they were con¬ tending more or less about words ; but the controversy between Gottschalk and his adversaries could not be compromised, for he was an Augustinian and they were Semi-augustinians. Such, indeed, were also Gottschalk’ s defenders at heart. Between them and his opponents the final contention was only in regard to formulas. The latter would apply the concept of predestina¬ tion only to the election to life, and base reprobation upon pre¬ science (Hincm., de praed. 16; Mi. 125. 424; Raban., Mi. 112, 155); the former spoke, with Augustine, of a double predestina¬ tion, but likewise based reprobation upon prescience. But both agreed that the baptized and believers are predestinated, which Gottschalk denied. _ The controlling consideration for the former — but no less for the latter — was that of the dangerous consequences for the church involved in the strict theory of pre¬ destination. The sacraments would thus be robbed of their value, becoming a mere form and trifling ; the motive to good works, i. e., the thought of rewards and punishment, would be removed, and thus the moral life, as they understood it, would be destroyed. The terrible bugbear of the predestination sect is exposed for the execration of the age (Amolo bibl. max. xiv. 333 f. Raban., Mi. 112. 1554, 1562. Hincm., de praed. 2. 15, 18 ff. , 24 ff. The 5th Canon of Valence in Hefele iv. 195 ; cf. Bach i., 235 ff.). Kurz says : “ The spirit of Gregory for the first time joined issue with the spirit of Augustine, and it carried the day.” The will of man has been wounded by sin. When grace heals it, it is free to perform good works. Hincmar asserts, with Gregory, that the good (which we do) is ours and God’s : “ God’s, through prevenient grace ; ours, through obedi¬ ent free will ” (de praed. 37. 21). * 1 Scotus Erigena also, though in his own way, opposed Gottschalk : Sin and punishment are nonentities, and as such cannot be objects of the divine will, and hence there is only one predestination, i. e., to life. His contem¬ poraries do not seem to have fully understood him, but they suspected his criticism as an “ invention of the devil” (Flor. Mag., Mi. 119, 101). PARTURITION OF THE VIRGIN MARY. 33 4. The decisions rendered at the two Councils of Chiersy and Valence, A. D. 853, were in harmony with these views. The four chapters of Chiersy accurately reproduce Hincmar’s position. (1) The race became through the fall a massa perditionis. “ But a good and just God elected from this same mass of perdi¬ tion according to his prescience those whom he through grace predestinated to life, and predestinated eternal life to them. He foreknew that the others, whom by the judgment of righteous¬ ness he left in the mass of perdition, would perish ; but he did not predestinate that they should perish, but because he is just he predestinated to them eternal punishment. Hence, they ac¬ knowledge but one predestination. (2) Grace has made our will ( arbitrium ) free, “ by grace set free and by grace healed from the corrupt state.” (3) God wishes all men to be saved : “ that some perish is the desert ( meritum ) of those who perish.” (4) Christ died for all. That his death does not set all free “ is the fault of those who are unbelieving, or who do not believe with the faith that works by love. ’ ’ The Augustinian party at Valence, on the other hand, adopted the following statement : “ We confess a predestination of the elect to life, and a predes¬ tination of the wicked to death ; but that, in the election of those who are to be saved, the mercy of God precedes good merit ( meritum bonum ), and in the condemnation of those who will perish, evil merit ( meritum malum ) precedes the righteous judgment of God. But that in predestination God has deter¬ mined only those things which he himself would do, either from gratuitous mercy or in righteous judgment . . . But that in the wicked he foreknew the wickedness because it comes from them ; and did not predestinate it, because it does not come from him.” Those are condemned who think that “ some are predestinated to evil by divine power, i. e. , so that, as it were, they cannot be anything else.” The work of Christ is held to apply to all who believe on him.1 At Toucy, A. D. 860, the controversy was abandoned without any decision having been reached (Hefele, iv. 217 f. ). No decision was needed after Gottschalk was re¬ moved from the field. § 40. Divergent Views Upon Parturition of the Virgin Mary. Sources. Ratramnus, de eoquodChr. ex virg. natus est, Migne, 121. Radbertus Paschasius, de partu virginis, Migne, 120. Cf. Bach, DG. i., 152 ff. Steitz, PRE. xii. 482 f. Various views were expressed during this period in regard to the 1 These declarations were repeated at Langres, A. D. 859, when they seem to have been confirmed by Nicholas I. Vid. Moller, PRE. v. 327. 3 34 HISTORY OF DOCTRINES. partus virginis , which attest the growing disposition toward the worship of Mary. Ratramnus taught that the corporeal virginity was, indeed, preserved before, in, and after the birth of Christ ; but that he nevertheless entered the world by way of birth, through a being born ( nasci ), but not through a being brought forth ( erumpi ). Radbert explained, in reply to the question of certain nuns, that it would be presumptuous to say that Christ was born according to the common law of nature. Such partu¬ rition rests under the curse of sin, and the “ authority of the church,” upon the contrary, teaches through the universal ( ubique ab omnibus') worship of Mary that she remained free from sin in the womb, and, therefore, entered the world without sin (Mi. 120, p. 1371 f.).1 Yet this was by no means a universally accepted doctrine. Anselm still spoke of the original sin of the Virgin (cur deus homo? ii. 16). § 41. Controversies Upon the Lor o' s Supper. Sources. Of the writings of Radbertus Paschasius, vid. Liber de corpore et sanguine domini (A. D. 831) and his commentary on Matt. xxvi. Mi. 120. Ratramnus, de corpore et sanguine domini, Mi. 121. Cf. Steitz, PRE. xii. 474 ff., 535 ff. Ruckert, der abendmalsstreit des MA. in Ztschr. f. wiss. Theol. 1858, p. 22 ff. Dieckhoff, Ev. Abendmalsl. im Ref. Ztalter, 1851, p. 13 ff. Bach, DG. i., 159 ff. Thomasius-Seeberg, DG. ii., 33 ff. Harnack, DG. iii. , 275 ff. Ernst, d. Lehre d. h. Pasch. R. v. d. Eucha- ristie, 1896. 1. The Ancient Church produced no dogma of the Lord’s Supper. Two methods of presenting the subject are found side by side without any attempt at discrimination. They are com¬ monly spoken of as the metabolic and the symbolic views (Vol. I., pp. 196, 301, 323). Pope Gelasius I. taught that “the substance or nature of the bread and wine does not cease to exist, although the elements, the Holy Spirit perfecting them, pass over ( transeant ) into a divine substance, as was the case with Christ himself. And certainly the image and likeness ( imago et similitudo) are honored ( celebrantur ) in the observance ( actione ) of the mysteries” (de duabus naturis in Christo, Thiel. Ep. pontif., p. 541 f. ). The theologians of the Carlovingian period, as Augustinians, were fond of emphasizing the symbolic charac¬ ter of the ordinance, presenting it as a memorial and a symbol (vid. Ruckert, 1. c., pp. 25, 53). On the other hand, as a result of the growing religious materialism, which . found in visi¬ ble miracles the characteristic trait of religion, and of the widen¬ ing influence of the sacrificial idea, the conception of a transfor- 1 Cf. already Augustine, de nat. et. grat. 36. 42. CONTROVERSIES UPON THE LORD’S SUPPER. 35 mation of the elements became more and more clearly defined. All manner of miraculous occurrences in connection with the celebration were related, as that the Christ-child had been seen at the consecration of the elements in the form of a lamb, and his appearance had led many a doubting Thomas to faith (Ger- manus in Martene Thes. anecdot. v. 96, 95. Radbert, c. 14. Cf. Bach, p. 1 66 If.). And even the theologians in their tech¬ nical discussions spoke of a “ consecrating into ( consecrare in) the substance of the body and blood of Christ ” (Alcuin, ep. 41, 163, 90, in Mi. 100, 203, 423, 289). 2. A decisive step was taken in the first monograph upon the subject which we possess. It was written by a monk of Corbie, Paschasius Radbertus. In his book, De corpore et sanguine domini , the attempt is made to combine the religious concep¬ tions of the church at large with the theory of Augustine, as fol¬ lows : ( a ) The omnipotent God does whatever he wishes to do. A miracle of divine omnipotence occurs in the Lord’s Supper ; there is a creative act, a creari (4. 1 ; 15. 1, upon Matt. 26, Mi. 895). The God who created Jesus in the womb of the Virgin without seminal infusion, 4 ‘to-day, through the consecration of his sacrament by his invisible power, effects ( operatur ) in the substance of the bread and wine the flesh and blood of Christ ’ ’ (3. 4). Through this miracle the daily sacrifice for the benefit of the world is made possible (4. 1). The inference is: 4 ‘so that, immediately after the consecration of Christ, the true body and blood are truly believed (8. 2). The body of Christ is, therefore, really present, and this body is in substance the same body in which Christ was born, suffered, rose from the dead, and which he still possesses in heaven (1. 2; 4. 3; 21. 9). The question as to the relation existing between the body now really and locally present in heaven (in this following Augustine)1 and the body present at all places in the Lord’s Supper, is not dis¬ cussed by Radbertus. He speaks of the fruits of the flesh of Christ, and cites in illustration the multiplying of the loaves and increase of the meal, oil, etc., in scriptural miracles (7. 2). “ From which wholesome field (/. e., the body of Christ) the living bread of flesh and the drink of blood daily grow abun¬ dantly for believers, and are reaped by the faithful ” (Ez. 21.3. 2). According to this, the body is present, and yet there is present only a something effected by the body. To the objec¬ tion, that as a fact that the bread and wine can be recognized as such by the senses (taste, color, form), Radbertus replies, that 1 Vid. Vol. I., p. 323; also civ. dei xxii. 29. 4; in Joh. tr. 50. 4; de agone chr. 20. 28; serm. ad catech. 4. 11. 3^ HISTORY OF DOCTRINES. the actual eating of body and drinking of blood would be contrary to human custom, and that, just because of the difficulty in ques¬ tion, belief is meritorious (io. i ; 13. 1, 2 ; 1. 5 ; 8. 1, 2). The effect of participation consists in a deliverance “ from daily faults and slight sins ” (19. 3), in the testing and confirming of faith in the presence of the “ visible sacrament” (4. 2 ; 1. 5), and in a bodily unification with Christ: “but even our flesh also is through it restored to immortality and incorruption ” (19. 1; 21. 2). (b) Realistic as this sounds, Radbertus yet moves in Augustine’s sphere of thought when treating of the reception of the sacrament. He pronounces it a “ spiritual thing, ” which must be understood in spirit u (5. 1). Only those who have spiritually apprehended Christ receive the body and blood (8. 3 ; 6. 2). To the unbelieving they are only apparently offered. “ Unless through faith and knowledge ( intelligentia ) , of what does it taste but of bread and wine to those who eat? ” (8. 2). (V) This line of thought seems quite out of harmony with the views noted under (a) above. Upon the one hand, we receive actually “nothing else” than the body and blood of Christ (20. 3 ; 1.6; 4. 3); on the other hand, it is a spiritual partici¬ pation of faith. But we have here to do with a “mystery.” Hence figura and veritas must be side by side: “because the sacrament is mysterious (mysticum) , we cannot deny that it is a figure ; but if it is a figure, we must inquire how it can be verity. For every figure is a figure of another thing and is always referred to that other thing as being the real thing of which it is a figure.” In this case there is a figure , in so far as we have to do with the sacraments as evident to the senses ; and there is verity in so far as through the word of Christ “the body and blood of Christ are made ( efficitur ) from the substance of the bread and wine.” This verity, however, only faith appre¬ hends ( inter ius recte intelligitur aut creditur) . The relationship is like that between the outward appearance of Christ and his divine nature — or like that between the letter and the word. The visible is present in order that we may through faith attain to the invisible (4. 1, 2). The idea of Radbertus is : In the Lord’s Supper there is both a symbol and a reality. The outward visible and sensible forms, which remain despite the transforma¬ tion, make it a symbol ; the body of Christ, which is present, is the verity. But only he receives the body who believes that it is offered in these symbolic forms. It is, therefore, through (meritorious) faith, or the right understanding of this symbol, that the body is received. Subjectively considered, everything depends upon the merit of faith and the spiritual understanding of the ordinance. The latter may thus be considered the prin- CONTROVERSIES UPON THE LORD’S SUPPER. 37 cipal thing. We must not overlook, however, the re-enforcement of the idea of faith with that of merit, and the thoroughly un¬ evangelical conception of faith. 3. This book of Radbertus might have been written, in its principal parts at least, several centuries earlier ; for its leading ideas are those of the ancient church. It does not lead us be¬ yond the obscurity which marked the teaching of the earlier age. And yet it is of the greatest importance. It is the merit of Radbertus, that he preserved the eucharist from being entirely lost in the sacrifice of the mass, that he attached to its reception some sort of personal moral effect.1 It is true, upon the other hand, that his statement of the problem proved portentous for the development of dogma. Without concerning himself about the historical circumstances connected with the institu¬ tion of the ordinance or about its religious effects, he understands the words of institution as a legal charter2 (cf. in Matt., in Mi. 120, 890 f. ). But the questions which he raised have never since ceased to agitate the church. We may find much in the doctrine to criticize, but we should not forget that the first at¬ tempt to formulate these problems might have proved different, and might easily have been worse. 4. The views of Radbertus met with opposition. Some thought, he reports (in Matt., p. 8 90 f. ), that only the efficacy ( virtus ) of the flesh, and not the flesh — only the figura, and not the veritas — is present in the sacrament. Against these he maintains his position, appealing to the words of institution and the fact that the forgiveness of sins is (to be found) only in the very blood of Christ. A new turn of thought was given by Rabanus (vid. ep. ad Egilonem, Mi. 112, 1510 ff. ). He too maintains that the true body of Christ is daily created by divine power ( potentialiter creatur , p. 1512) out of the 1 Apart from all other considerations, this is attested by his assigning to the eucharist a place by the side of baptism and the word : “ For Christ has left to his church nothing greater in mystery than this and the sacrament of bap¬ tism, and also the sacred Scriptures, in all of which the Holy Spirit ... in¬ wardly works the mysteries of our salvation unto immortality ” ( 1. 4 ; cf. Vol. I., pp. 196 n., 189, 320 f. ). Upon the number of the sacraments, vid. 3. 2 : “ But the sacraments of Christ in the church are baptism and unction, and also the body and blood of the Lord.” Cf. Agobard, De privil. et jur. sacerdotii, *5‘ 2 The external conception of the miraculous element in the sacrament should not be overlooked. It is in keeping with the general conception of God, which was, no doubt, largely due to Germanic influences. The doing of wonders is the chief prerogative of God. Creation is, properly speaking, the only form of activity that is worthy of him. Everything connected with re¬ ligion is miraculous because brought about, or created, by God. God is power. 3» HISTORY OF DOCTRINES. bread ; but he denies the absolute identity of the sacramental and the historical Christ. They differ not in nature, but in the form of their appearance: “ Not indeed in nature ( naturaliter ) but in form fpecialiter) , that body of the Lord which is daily . . . consecrated from the substance of the bread and wine for the life of the world, and which is . . . offered by the priest, is one thing, and the body of Christ which was born of the Virgin Mary and into which the former is changed, is in form ( specialiter ) another thing” (p. 1514). Thus an idea of great importance for the future was injected into the new dogma. 5. Against the view of Radbertus appeared Ratramnus of Corbie in a publication addressed to Charles the Bold. He un¬ dertakes to answer two questions : Whether the Lord’s Supper contains a mystery which only faith can recognize, and whether it is the historical body of Christ (5). ( a ) The bread, he maintains, remains externally what it is, but, inwardly consid¬ ered, it is for faith something higher, heavenly and divine, which is seen, received, eaten, only by the believing soul (9). There occurs, indeed, a change into something better (ycom?nutatio in melius ), but this is to be understood spiritually and figuratively. “ Under the veil of the corporeal bread and the corporeal wine, the spiritual body and the spiritual blood of Christ exist. ’ ’ Out¬ wardly considered, it is bread and wine ; for the eye of the spirit, it is body and blood (16. 21). “ They are figures according to the visible form ; but according to the invisible substance, i. e., the power of the divine word [the Logos] , the true body and blood of Christ truly exist” (49). The Lord is spiritually present through the symbol. “ The Lord is known to be present in some manner, and that manner is in figure and in image, in order that the verity may be felt to be the real thing ” (84). This is evidently the view entertained, despite the occasional use of such terms as converti, commutari , confici (13, 15, 28, 30, 42, 43). (V) The second question Ratramnus answers in the nega- ative. “In appearance ( specie ) it is bread, but in the sacrament the true body of Christ” (57). “ What appears outwardly is therefore not the thing itself \ipsa res), but an image of the thing ( imago rei); but what is felt and known by the mind is the reality of the thing ” (gveritas rei) (77. 88). Therefore bread and cup are memorial signs, likenesses of that which we spiritually receive (73 ff., 96, 98 ff. , 86/88). (V) What then does the sacrament be¬ stow ? The answer can only be : The invisible bread, the spirit of Christ, the power of the Logos (22, 26, 44, 64, 83 f. ). Christ, the Word, is therefore spiritually imparted to us through the mystic form of the sacrament. This is the Augustinian view, adapted to CONTROVERSIES UPON THE LORD'S SUPPER. 39 meet the statement of the problem by Radbertus. The religious element which it contains, the spiritual fellowship of Christ, can¬ not be overlooked. Perhaps Ratramnus would have been able to furnish a more profound and lucid exposition if the problem had not been forced upon him from without and the direction of his thought thus determined for him. The question which he sought to answer was not, how we apprehend Christ in the Lord’s Supper, but whether the historical body of Christ constitutes the Lord’s Supper. 6. The future belonged to Radbertus, for he had the praxis of the church upon his side. His theory did not, indeed, as a theory secure general adoption ; but the Lord’s Supper had be¬ come a subject of theological discussion, and the theologians of the age did not get beyond the obscure position of Radbertus. Some already distinctly taught the theory of transubstantiation, as Haimo of Halberstadt (f A. D. 853): “ That the substance, i. e., of bread and wine — that is, the nature of the bread and wine — is substantially changed into another substance ( substan - tialiter convertatur in alicun substantiam ), viz., into flesh and blood ” (Bach, i. 2 13 n. ). Others clung to the symbolic view of Ratramnus, e. g., the author of an anonymous tract (Bach, i.. 203 ff. ): “Thou receivest the sacrament indeed in a similitude, but thou obtainest the grace and efficacy of the real nature ” (ib. 205 n. Cf. the “some ” who are said to deny the identity of the sacramental and the historical body, in a tract1 attributed to Gerbert, De corpore et sanguine domini,Wli. 139, p. 179). Still others, as the author of the last named tract, called in question the distinction between veritas and jigura (c. 4). Essentially ( naturaliter ) it is the one body of Christ; in appearance (sfie- cialiter ) we must discriminate it from the latter (5). It is a figura , in so far as we see the external bread and wine, but a verity when in truth the body and blood are inwardly believed (4). The effect of participation is a quickening of our flesh through the spiritual and bodily substance of Christ for the pur¬ pose of its resurrection (9 and 8). It is the position of Raba- nus (supra, p. 38) which is here maintained, and it could be easily combined with that of Ratramnus. The discussion did not lead to the final adoption of any form of dogmatic statement. 1 Upon the question of its authorship, vid. Hauck, KG. Deutschlands, iii. 302 f 40 HISTORY OF DOCTRINES. CHAPTER III. THE HIERARCHICAL PRINCIPLE. HISTORY OF THE ORDINANCE OF REPENTANCE. § 42. Papacy and Hierarchy . Sources. Decretales pseudoisidorianae ed. Hinschius, 1863 : cf. Wasserschleben, PRE. xii. 367 ff. Donatio Constantini, especially edited by Zeumer in d. Festschrift fiir Gneist. , 1888. Cf. Friedrich, die const. Schenkung, 1889, also Krueger in Theol. Litztg., 1889, nn. 17, 18. Seeberg in Theol. Littbl., 1890, n. 3-5. 1. To complete our review of the dogmatic history of the period, we must (1) observe in what particular the hierarchical conception of the Western church was extended and modified, and (2) note the influence exerted upon the Christianity of the world by the church through the ordinance of repentance, whose history we must trace in outline, leaving details to the province of Church History. 2. Charlemagne wielded supreme authority over the Western church, and he recognized the primacy of the pope. These two facts are the roots from which sprung the great conflict between pope and emperor. This relation was not changed essentially in principle, but it was changed in fact, under the immediate fol¬ lowers of Charlemagne. Especially did Pope Nicholas I. (A. D. 858-67) assert in unheard-of fashion the claim of papal power, of dominion over bishops and metropolitans, of authority over princes and the imperial crown. Although his successors did not always maintain his position ; although weak and un¬ worthy popes, devoid of all political influence, sat after him in the chair of Peter ; although powerful emperors enforced their edicts upon the church and made popes prisoners — yet something remained as a permanent gain to the church. The church in general believed in the papal idea, and the popes themselves be¬ lieved in it. The pope stood, in his sphere as sovereign, on an equality with the emperor. The kingdom of God stands alongside of and above the kingdom of the world. This was not changed when, in A. D. 982, Otto the Great secured the rank of Roman Emperor. Cf. Hauck, KG. Deutschl. iii. 206 ff., 239 ff. 3. How high-strung were the papal claims is attested by the Donatio Constantini , which appeared about A. D. 754. The spiritual emperor is here presented in contrast with the secular emperor, sharing the latter’s glory and dominion, and even de¬ manding and receiving service at his hands. To him, as the sue- PAPACY AND HIERARCHY. 41 cessor of the prince of the apostles, belongs the primacy over the church of the whole world — and secular power as well (c. 1 1 ff. ). 4. But the hierarchial ideals were carried out to their most extreme details in the Pseudo-Isidorian decretals. It will be necessary for us to note scattered utterances occurring in the doc¬ ument and gather a general impression from them taken as a whole. The priestly estate, particularly the bishops, is exalted in unmeasured terms above the laity. No one should venture to prosecute them before the law, for it is the prerogative of Christ alone to pass judgment upon them (Clem. ep. 1. 32b, p. 40. Anaclet. ep. i. 3, p. 62 f. et pas.). Christ is the head of the church, “but the priests act by legation instead of Christ in the church.” And, just as his church is joined to him, so are the churches joined to the bishops, to everyone according to his portion (Evarist. ep. 2. 4, p. 90). The bishops open and close the gates of heaven, and their decision is, therefore, to be accepted even if they be in error (Clem. ep. 1. 39, p. 43). This applies with especial force to the pope, for it is the Lord’s will that the church at large shall be governed in doctrine and life by the Romish church (Anacl. ep. 3. 34, p. 84; ep. 2. 24, p. 79. Zephyrin. c. 10, p. 133, etc.). Accordingly, no one but God or the bishop of Rome can sit in judgment upon a bishop (Melchiad. ep. 1. 2 f. , p. 243 et pas.).1 For a fuller discussion see Thomas. -Seeberg, DG. ii. , ed. 2., p. 187 ff. It was thus definitely settled that the popular catholic conception of the church should prevail, and not the higher ideal of Augustine, although the latter was still, as a definition, employed until even a later period. The church is the hierarchy, or the subjects (sulditi), who obey the prelates (praelati') . It is the province of the hierarchical state to direct the secular, since its rulers have the truth and the keys of the kingdom of heaven. There remained some elements of truth in these theories also, but the falsehood in them was more potent than the truth. § 43. Repentance in Earlier Middle Ages. Literature. Wasserschleben, Die Bussordnungen der abendl. Kirche, 1851. Regino, De synodalibus causis et disciplinis ecclesiasticis, 11. 2. ed. Wasserschleben, 1840. Ps. -Augustin, de vera et falsa poenitentia, Aug. opp. xvii. i849ff.2 Schmitz, Die Bussbuecheru. die Bussdisciplin d. K. 1883. Hil- 1 The fraudulent tendency, afterward so prominent, is manifest in these claims (cf. the removal of the episcopacy from the jurisdiction of civil and metropolitan courts). But the chief gain was to the papacy. Nicholas I. accepted the new theory : “The decretal letters of the Roman pontiff are to be accepted, although they are not joined to ( compaginatae ) the codex of the canons.” Mansi Coll. cone. xv. 695. 2 As to the date of this document, which Gratian and the Lombard 42 HISTORY OF DOCTRINES. DEFRAND, Unters. iiber d. germ. Poenitenzbb. , 1851. Morinus, Comment, hist, de disci plina in administr. sacr. poenit. Paris, 1651, and Venet. 1702. Steitz, Das rom, Bussakr. 1854. V. Zezschwitz, System d. kirchl. christl. Katechetik i. 485 ff. K. Muller, Der Umschwung in d. Lehre v. d. Busse, warend d. 12 Jahrh., in den Abhandl. f. Weizsacker, 1892, p. 289 ff. Hauck, KG. Deutschlands, i. 212 ff., 252b, ii. 223 ff., 664 ff. Funk, in Kirchenlexikon ii. 1561 ff. Loofs, DG. , ed. 3, p. 258 ff. Moeller, KG. ii. 105 ff. , 206 ff. 1 . The praxis connected with public repentance in the ancient church had already in the days of Augustine been to some extent abridged. 1 Upon Germanic territory it had been introduced, both in the episcopal courts established by Charlemagne and in a strict {e. g., Regino ii. 1. ff. ) ecclesiastical form (Morinus, 1. vii. c. 2 ff. ) . But this public process was distasteful to the Germans. In England it could not be introduced at all (Theodor, Poeni- tentiale i. 13. 4, p. 197, Wassersch.), and even in the Frankish empire, despite various admonitions, it constantly lost ground (Hauck, ii. 224 f. ). It became practically limited by the general adoption of the principle that ‘ ‘ the repentance of those whose sins are in public {in publico') should be in public (Hraban. de clericor. instit. ii. 30 ; cf. decrees of the Councils of Rheims, Mainz, Chalons, A. D. 813. Hefele, iii. 758, 759, 765 ; De vera et fals. poen. 11. 26). It was accordingly only gross actual sins which were regarded as demanding public repentance. 2. The custom of Private Repentance now arose and soon largely usurped the place of the public ordinance. It was a form of cloister discipline originating in Ireland and England, and introduced into the Frankish empire chiefly through Columba (about A. D. 700), whence it spread to other countries. It was at first not required, but only urgently recommended (Counc. of Chalons, 813, c. 33. Hefele, iii. 765); but as it grew customary, it became also a positive requirement of the church. The penitential books gave directions to the clergy for interro¬ gating the wrongdoer concerning his sins, and determining the appropriate works of satisfaction to be performed by him. The system was certainly not without beneficial results in that age. The sinner was compelled to scrutinize his whole life in search of his sins ; he was induced to look for and to recognize and already cite as Augustinian, vid. Muller, p. 292 ff. 10. 25 seems to prove that the author was acquainted with the 33d canon of Chalons (A. D. 813). From various indications I would assign it to the end of the ninth or begin¬ ning of the tenth century. Its spuriousness was detected already by the criti¬ cal eye of Busch (Erl. ed., 27. 344. Letters i. 34). 1 Vid. Vol. I., p. 364 n. Cf. Aug. serm. 82, 7, 10 f . : “Those sins are to be reproved before all which have been committed before all ; those are to be reproved more secretly which have been more secretly committed.” For fur¬ ther details, vid. Morin, v. 9. REPENTANCE IN EARLIER MIDDLE AGES. 43 mourn as sins, not only gross outward offenses, but also the in¬ ward evil desire itself (Vinniaus, poen. 2 ff. , 17. Columba, poen. 23, 35- Theod. poen. i. 2. 21 f. Halitgar, poen., in Morin, append., p. 8a. Reg. i. 304, p. 147), not only mortal sins, but their ramifications (Poen. Merseb. Wasserschl., p. 387 ff. Regino i. 292, 304, p. 146 f. Corrector Burchardi, c. 181, p. 665 ).* And the advice was given, that not only mortal sins, but every sin by which God is offended, be confessed to the priest (Reg. i. 292). If this involves a deepening of the religious life, it is, on the other hand, closely allied to a lamentable superficial¬ ity, as will appear if we examine in detail the practical application of the system. 3. The following outline of the theory, while keeping private repentance primarily in view, is applicable also, with such modi¬ fications as are involved in the nature of the case, to the public administration of the ordinance (vid. Morin, vii. 1. 21). (<2) The benignant God is offended by sin (de ver. et fals. poen. 8. 20 ; 14. 29). Venial sins are absolved (gelost) by the use of the Lord’s Prayer (Vol. I., p. 364 n.); mortal sins, through the fruits of repentance {fructus poenitentiae , de ver. et fals. poen., v. 10). It is necessary now to make satisfaction ( satisfacere ) through suitable repentance ( condignam poententiatn , Reg. ii. 429; i. 303 : condigna satisfaction . The satisfaction consists in bearing the penalty : “ whatever of punishment I may be able to devise, that may suffice for thee” (de ver. et fals. poen. 2. 4). Hence, to do penance is to bear penalty (poenitere est poenatti tenere , ib. xix. 3 5).1 2 This penalty consists in sorrow ( dolor ) of heart on account of sin, which should continue throughout life (dolorem cum vita finiat, ib. 13. 28); then in the confessio before the priest (or even before a layman), which in itself brings a large measure of satisfaction (jnultum satisfactionis, ib. 10. 25); and, finally, in the performance of the appointed works of penance. He who has done, or endured, this is worthy of divine mercy, since he has rendered satisfaction to the divine righteousness (it is necessary ( oportet ) in order that the righteous One may right¬ eously show mercy, ib. 10. 25). Reconciliation, therefore, can¬ not really occur until after the performance of the works of penance (vid. Vinn. poen. 1. 35. Benedikt Lev. c. i. 116. Hraban. de cler. inst. ii. 30 ; cf. de fals. et ver. poen. 15. 31). 1 Vid., e. g., the confessional formula in Reg. i. 304, p. 147 ; cf. Alcuin, de psalm, usu, pp. 2, 9 ; Mi. 101, p. 498 ff. 2 In addition to this vindicative character, the works of penance have also a niedicinalv alue. Vid., e. g ., Vinn. 28 : “So that it cures and corrects con¬ traries by contraries.” Reg. i. 292, 304, p. 148: retnedia peccatorum ; cf. Alcuin, de confess, peccator. 3. 44 HISTORY OF DOCTRINES. But this rule was not observed. On the contrary, it became cus¬ tomary to admit penitents before the expiration of the peniten¬ tial period to the “ fellowship of prayer” ( communio orationis ), and also to full fellowship plena communio') (Theod. poen. i. 12. 4, and many citations in Morin, ix. 16). It might even be granted immediately after the confessio and the assignment of the works of penance to be performed (Morin, ix. 1 7. 7 f. ). In such cases, however, the subsequent performance of the required pen¬ ances was taken for granted, for the sinner was not pardoned through his confession alone (dever. et fals. poen. 18. 34). The motives for this hastening of the process were of a practical nature, i, e ., that the penitent might not be driven to despair or alienated from the church, etc. They are, of course, evident enough in the case of those who secured immediate release from the penalties imposed by the payment of money. He who thus experiences sorrow for sin and confesses the same to the priest has changed his ?nortal into a venial sin (de ver. et fals. poen. 10. 25), and is in consequence no longer subject to the punish¬ ments of hell. But if he do not now bring forth the “ fruits of repentance ’ ’ in works of penance, he will have to endure the fires of purgatory ( ignis purgatorius) (ib. 18, 34). f) The sinner applies to the priest ; the latter examines him strictly in regard to his sins, assigns the atoning works to be performed, and wishes him forgiveness. The sinner confesses his sin and begs for the intercessio of the priest, as well as of Mary and the saints (Alcuin, de psalm, usu, p. 2. 9. Reg. i. 304, p. 147. Halitgar in Morin, app., p. 6b. Corrector Burchardi, 182, p. 666. Beichtanweisg. Othmars, Wasserschl., p. 43 7 ).1 The priest prays to God ( ‘ 4 Mayest thou deign to be appeased, ’ ’ placatus esse digneris) and pronounces the absolution : “ God Omnipo¬ tent be thy helper and protector and grant indulgence for thy sins, past, present, and future’ ’ (Reg. i. 304, p. 148. Corr. Burch., 182, p. 667. Further particulars in Morin, viii. 8. 1 f. , c. 10 f. ). The absolution always bears this deprecatory character, partly in recognition of the traditional idea that God alone can forgive sin (August, serm. 99. 9), partly in view of the immediate situation, inasmuch as the pardon ( purgatio ) of sins could not really be secured until the works of penance should be actually performed (e. g., Reg. i. 304 fin.). ( c ) An important feature of the system is seen in the rede?nption of penances . The works 1 The way was prepared for later theories in the thesis: “It is to be believed . . . that all the alms and prayers and works of righteousness and mercy of the whole church combine ( succurrant ) ... to effect conversion. Therefore, no one can worthily repent ( poenitere ) whom the unity of the church does not sustain” (de ver. et fals. poen. 12. 27 ; 11. 26). REPENTANCE IN EARLIER MIDDLE AGES. 45 of penance are chiefly : Fasting (bread and water on Monday, Wednesday, and Friday), discarding of linen clothing, going barefoot, pilgrimages {peregrinatio) , entering a cloister, scourg- ings (introduced by Dominicus Loricatus, Petrus Damiani, vid. Morin, vii. 13b). It became customary at a very early period to substitute other good works for the required penances. These consisted commonly in prayers and alms, as also scourg¬ ing, pilgrimages, striking the hands upon a pavement, etc. The German system of legal composition for crime opened the way for the adoption of a definite system for such “redemptions.” There were tariffs fixing the character and amount of the works of substitution. It was considered a special advantage of the system that the penitential period could be thus shortened. For example, instead of one day’s fasting, fifty psalms might be sung, or three denarii, or perhaps one, be given to a poor person ; for one year’s fasting there must be twenty- two solidi given in alms, etc. (Corr. Burch., 187 ff. , p. 671 ff.; poen. Merseburg, 41. Canones Hibern., p. 139 f. Beda, poen. 10. 229 b Egbert poen. 15 f., p. 246). Worst of all, it was considered allowable to hire some righteous person to perform these works (Beda, 8, p. 230. Cummean. poen., p. 463; cf. especially Morin, x. 1 6 ff . ). But the most convenient form of “redemp¬ tion ” was by the payment of money, which had a precedent in Germanic law (“ Wergeld, ” vid. Schroeder, Lehrb. d. deutsch. Rechtsgesch., 1889, pp. 75 f., 330 ff., 707). 1 Fixed taxes were imposed, the payment of which exonerated from liability to pen¬ ance, 'e.g.: “ If anyone is not able to fast and does not know the psalms, let him give one denarius per day ; and if he has not the money, let him give as much food as he eats. For one year upon bread and water let him give twenty-six solidi ’ ’ ( Poen. Merseberg. 42 ; cf. 148. Columba, 25. Vinn. 35. Poen. Vindob. 43. Correct. Burch., 2 ff., 50, 190, 195, 198). The Council of Tribur, A. D. 895, first recognized redemption by money also for public penances (vid. Hefele, iv. 558). This praxis was extended through the Crusade movement. The journey to the holy sepulchre was regarded as the required work of pen¬ ance {iter illud pro omni poenitentia reputetur , Council of Cler¬ mont, A. D. 1095, vid. Hefele, v. 222). But not only such as actually took the journey were credited with the performance of this penance, but also any person who furnished the necessary equipment for a crusader.2 Since great multitudes now received 1 On the other hand, it was, in any case, but a step from penance by alms¬ giving to redemption of penance by money. 2 The comments of a contemporary, Leo Cassinensis in his chronicle (iv. 1 1 ), are worthy of note. He attributes the First Crusade directly to the “ pen- 46 HISTORY OF DOCTRINES. absolution immediately after confession, this became everywhere the usual praxis (Morin, io. 20, 22). But inasmuch as, by the fixed rule of the church, the forgiveness of sins depended upon penitence and confession,1 new problems arose leading to further doctrinal definitions. It was necessary particularly to clearly prove the legality of the works of penance as required after the forgiveness of sins had been already granted, as also the right of the church to substitute money for such works of penance and to insist upon confession to the priest as well as to God. To these problems Scholasticism turned its attention (vid. sub.). 4. Both the best and the worst elements in the Christianity of the Earlier Middle Ages come to view in the history of the ordi¬ nance of repentance : on the one hand, the vivid sense of sinful¬ ness (cf. Hauck, ii. 700 f. ; iii. 289), which made the whole life of the believer a perpetual penitence (de ver. et fals. poen. 12. 28) / and the confidence reposed in the living God as the only One who is able to help ;3 on the other, the complete external¬ izing of religion by the theory of the opus operatum. Com¬ pared with the ancient penitential praxis, there are here new fea¬ tures of great importance : (a) The substitution of private for public penance. (^) The extension of the sphere of peniten¬ tial discipline to a wider range of outward conduct and into the realm of inner experience. () Redemption is based in a very one-sided way upon the death 1 Cf. Cremer, Die Wurzeln d. anselm. Satisfactionsbegr., Stud. u. Krit., 1880, 7 ff., and ib. 1893, 316 if. The attempt is here made to trace the depend¬ ence of Anselm’s theory upon the fundamental principle of the Germanic legal system, poena aut satisfactio , showing that the principle of a substitution for penitential penalties was transferred from the penitential discipline (supra, p.45 ) to the doctrine of the atonement. Cf. Brunner, Deutsche Rechtsgesch. i. 163: “The right of challenge belonged only to the offended party or his blood relative. It depended upon the choice of the relative, whether the offender with his relatives should respond to the challenge ( die Feindschaft tragen ), or render the compositio fixed by law.” The validity of this associa¬ tion of ideas has indeed been recently called in question from the juristic point of view (vid. Von Moller, Stud. u. Krit., 1899, p. 627 ff. ). Moller shows that the Germanic penance through money has itself a primitive char¬ acter, and that the idea of substitution is not embodied in German jurispru¬ dence. According to this, the parallelism, “ aut poena aut satisfaction is not specifically German. Nevertheless, the general conception of the subject may be characterized as Germanic. It is only in the light of this system of procedure that we can understand the inner harmony of the transaction as viewed by Anselm, the emphasis laid upon the divine honor, the princely mildness in the conception of God (ii. 16), the substantial character of the service rendered by Christ (cf. Wergeld), the importance attached to the racial-relationship of Christ to mankind, since only a relative could perform specific works of satisfaction. The introduction of the idea of meritum is beset with difficulties (cf. Gregory, p. 20). In other connections also Anselm attributes to the sinner the obligation of rendering satisfaction ( deb - Hum satis faciendi)\ vid. De conceptu virginal. 2. 70 HISTORY. OF DOCTRINES. of Christ, the latter being, under the influence of the juristic con¬ ception of the satisfaction regarded as a material contribution. ( c ) The connection between the active life and the sufferings of Christ is not made clear. (V) The transfer of the benefits of the work of Christ to the church is not intelligibly stated. ( since through it love is excited in our hearts. ’ ’ But this occurs also, according to Paul, through faith in the Crucified. When we are thus freed from sin, we become free also from the devil. But this thought is defaced by the reminiscence from an earlier age, that the cross became a mousetrap and the blood a bait for the devil ( 1 9 A) . The fundamentally Abelardian tendency of the author is revealed also in the remark ( 1 9 F) , that we are reconciled to God, who has always loved us, by the removal of our sins and hostility toward God. Prominence is also given to the objective aspects of redemption. God became man in order to overcome the devil, because a man or an angel might easily have himself fallen into sin (B). It is further held that Christ delivers us from everlasting punishment by remitting our debt ( relaxando de- bituni ) (C), and also from temporal punishment, which is re¬ mitted in baptism and ameliorated in repentance : “ For that penalty could not suffice by which the church binds penitents, unless the penalty of Christ, who absolves for us, co-operates ’ ’ (D). Thus, according to the Lombard : ( a ) Christ has merited deliverance for us through the meritum of his death, since the suffering endured by him works for our deliverance, (b) He has overcome, i. e., captured the devil. (V) His death has awakened us to love and thereby made us righteous and delivered us. Of especial interest for us is the prominent introduction of the conception of the merit of Christ and of his endurance of punishment, and we are particularly impressed by the lack of clearness in the adjustment of the ideas presented in their mutual relations. Thus the idea of redemption did not attain a fixed or complete form in the present period, but the component ele¬ ments were distinctly wrought out. § 49. Berenger of Tours and Doctrine of Lord1 s Supper. Sources. Berenger (f 1088) wrote : Epistola ad Adelmannum'and Liber de sacra coena adv. Lanfrancum (ed. A. and F. Vischer, 1834). Lanfranc DOCTRINE OF LORD’S SUPPER. 75 (f 1089): De corp. et sang, domini adv. Ber. Tur., in Migne 150. 407 ff. Cf. Sudendorf, Berangarius Tur., 1850. Schnitzer, Ber. v. Tours, 1890. Diecichoff, Abendmalslehre im Ref.-zeitalter, i. 44 ff. Reuter, Gesch. der rel. Aufklarung im MA. i. 91 ff. Schwabe, Studien zur Gesch. des. 2. Abendmalsstreites, 1886. Bach, DG. i. 364 ff. Thomas. -Seeberg, DG. ii. 43 * 1. The doctrine of the Lord’s Supper received its scholastic form as a result of the assaults which a forerunner of Scholasti¬ cism directed against the (Radbertian) theory which was at the time gaining general acceptance in the church. Berenger taught as follows : Bread and wine become through consecra¬ tion the body and blood of Christ, i. e ., they become a “sacra¬ ment of the body and blood of Christ. ” Bread and wine signify (. significant ) the body and blood of Christ ; they are a similitude {similitudo') , sign ( signum ), figure ( figura ), pledge (pignus) . The reality involved comes not into the hand nor into the mouth, but into the thought {in cognitionem , de s. coena, pp. 431, 223, ep. ad Adelm. ) . The elements therefore remain what they were; but something new is added to them through the consecration, i. e ., the spiritual significance, which is apprehended by the spirit of the communicant ( Durand, Mi. 149. 1418). After the transformation, the properties of the elements (color, odor, taste) remain, in order that participants may not be horrified, and in order that believers may receive the fuller rewards of faith (Lanfr. 18). In every wafer the entire body of Christ — yea, more, the entire Christ — - is, by virtue of his omnipotence, present (Guitm. 1434, 1480. Alger, i. 15). Anselm of Canterbury, ep. iv. 107, Mi. 159, 255. Believers and unbelievers alike receive him, the latter not with saving efficacy {non salubri efficientia ) (Lanfr. 20. Alger i. 20). With reference to the question concerning the relation of the sacramental to the historical body, Lanfranc declares : 4 ‘ Both the same body which was received from the Virgin . . . and yet not the same — the former, so far as relates to essence ; the latter, if thou regardest the appearance {specieni) of bread and wine ” (Lanfr. 18). Alger endeavored to meet the difficulty thus arising by maintaining that Christ can, by virtue of his omnip¬ otence, be even bodily omnipresent : “In heaven and on earth he can be corporeally present everywhere, in whatsoever way it may please him — contrary to the nature of flesh — always the same and entire” (i. 15, Mi. 785). The term transubstantio is first found in Petrus Comester (f 1 1 79) , in the sermons of Hilde- bert of Lavardin (f 1134), sermo 93, Mi. 171. 776 p cf. PRE. viii., ed. 3, 69. 4. Even in the early days of Scholasticism the theory of tran- substantiation was everywhere advocated. Thus in the school of Abelard,1 2 we note especially Roland’s Sentences, p. 223 ff.,3 as also passages from the Florian Sentences and Omnebene, as pre¬ sented by Gietl (in his edition of Roland, pp. 223, 227, 233, 234), and the Epitome, 29. Also in Honorius Augustod. (elucid. i. 28, 30). Hugo is particularly clear: “Through the words of consecration the true substance of the bread and the wine is changed {conv ertitur) into the true body and blood of Christ, the appearance only of bread and wine remaining, substance passing over into substance {substantia in substantiam transeunte') , (de sacr. ii. 8, 9). Since the body of Christ isnot 1 But we find already in Germanus Paris, in Martene Thes. v. 95 : u transformatur." Haimo of Halberstadt, supra, p. 39. HONORIUS Au¬ gustod. Eucharistion, c. 3: “in substantiam translation''' (5,9, Mi. 172. 1252, 1255). Stephan Augustodunens. (ca. A. D. 1120), De sacr. altaris c. 16: “ in corpus meum transsubstantiari (Mi. 172. 1293). Wilhelm of St. TJflerry, De corp. et sang. dom. c. 3. 2 We have no discussion of the Lord’s Supper by Abelard himself, but the harmonious utterances of his followers reproduce his view. 3 Roland here proceeds already in true scholastic fashion. He, like the other followers of Abelard, discusses the question whether a wafer eaten by a mouse is the body of the Lord (ed. Gietl, p. 234). 7« HISTORY OF DOCTRINES. omnipresent (cf. ii. 2, 13), he is, therefore, only for the time ad tempus ), so long as he will, now present in the Supper as once on earth (ii. 8, 13 ; cf. summ. 6. 2).1 As Robert Pul- lus (sent. viii. 5), so, too, Peter Lombard advocated the trans¬ formation theory : ‘ ‘ It is certain that the true body and blood of Christ are upon the altar ; rather that the whole Christ is there under both the forms, and that the substance of the bread is converted into (his) body, and the substance of the wine into (his) blood’ ’ (sent. iv. dist. 10 D). The accidents of the earthly substance remain for the familiar reasons (dist. 11 A E). But as to the manner of the conversion he declines to attempt any further explanation (11 C). He regarded the effect of the sac¬ rament as consisting in the forgiveness of venial sins and in the perfection of virtue {perfectio virtutis, dist. 12 G; infusion of grace, Hugo, sacr. ii. 8. 7). Finally, he considers the Lord’s Supper under the aspect of a sacrifice. It is a daily sacrifice : “ But he is daily immolated in the sacrament, because in the sac¬ rament there is a commemoration of that which was once done. ’ ’ The sacrifice is repeated on account of our daily sins. “ Christ was both once offered and is daily offered ; but then in one way, now in another” (dist. 12 G). This sacrifice represents that upon the cross only as a picture of the latter (Petr. Pictav. sent, v. 13). Here, as often, theory tardily followed praxis.2 5. The doctrine thus elaborated by the theologians was exalted to the position of a fixed dogma by Pope Innocent III. at the Fourth Lateran council (A. D. 1 2 1 5 ) : 4 4 The body and blood are truly contained in the sacrament of the altar under the forms (. speciebus ) of bread and wine, the bread transubstantiated into the bodyand the wine into the blood by divine power. . . . And this sacrament no one can in any case administer except a priest who has been properly ordained” (Mansi, xxii. 982. Vid. already Can. 6 of the Council of Piacenza, A. D. 1095, Hefele, v. 216). 1 But side by side with these fruitful ideas stands the barren suggestion that, at the first celebration of the Supper, Christ for a time laid aside his mor¬ tal nature, and as mortal bore his immortal self in his hands : “In that which gave he was mortal, and in that which was given he was immortal ; and, nevertheless, he who as mortal gave, and he who as immortal was given, were not two but one self” (de sacr. ii. 8, 3). 2 Other theologians of the twelfth century also treated exhaustively of the Lord’s Supper. Vid. Bach, i. 392 ff. Special mention may be made of the theory of Rupert of Deutz. If Radbert understood the transformation of the elements as a creative act, Rupert conceived it as analogous to the incar¬ nation. As the divine nature assumed the human without destroying it, “ so it does not change nor destroy the substance of the bread and wine according to outward appearance subject to the five senses, when by the same Word he unites the latter in the unity {in unitatem ) of the same body which hung upon the cross” (in Exod. ii. c. 10, Mi. 167, 617 f. ). DEFINITION OF SACRAMENTS. 79 The 11 multitude of incompetents,” the logic of the theologians, and the hierarchy combined in the production of this dogma. It was a corruption of the church’s best possession ( corruptio optimi~) ; yet it served at least to preserve one article of religion to the Christian world. § 50. Definition of Sacraments . The Seven Sacraments. 1. The significance of Scholasticism for the History of Doc¬ trines consists chiefly in the establishment of the Catholic doc¬ trine of the sacraments. The decisive steps in this direction also were taken during the present period. The divine efficiency is located in the sacraments, not in the word. Augustine, as we have seen, had a much more profound conception of the signifi¬ cance of the word. The definition of a sacrament was, to begin with, by no means clear, largely because of uncertainty as to the number to be recognized. Bernard still speaks of many, and enumerates ten (Mi. 183, 271 f.). Hugo of St. Victor recog¬ nizes among the sacraments the sign of the cross, the invocation of the Trinity (de sacr. i. 9. 6), and all manner of ecclesiasti¬ cal symbols and formulas (ib. ii. 9). Roland thus designates the incarnation (p. 157). But in the twelfth century the con¬ stant tendency was to give prominence to certain definite sacra¬ ments. Robert (sent. v. 24) contrasts the unrepeatable (bap¬ tism, confirmation) and the repeatable (repentance, the Lord’s Supper).1 Hugo treats in his Summa of : baptism, confirma¬ tion, the eucharist, extreme unction, marriage, but also repent¬ ance (6. 10 ff. ; cf. de sacr. ii. 14), and the power of the keys, which is conferred through ordination (6. 14). This is practi¬ cally a recognition of the number seven. Here, too, the influ¬ ence of the school of Abelard was felt. The Epitome has : bap¬ tism, confirmation, the Lord’s Supper, extreme unction, mar¬ riage (similarly the sentences of St. Florian, Denifle, archiv. i. 432); repentance is treated of in the third section of the system under the heading of “ love ” (c. 35 ff. ).2 Roland and Om- nebene, on the other hand (vid. Denifle, 1. c., p. 467), have : baptism, confirmation, Lord’s Supper, repentance, extreme unc¬ tion, in connection with which the power of the keys and ordi¬ nation (Rol., p. 267 f. ) are spoken of, and marriage. Since Omnebene appears to have made use of Roland (vid. Gietl, Sent. Rol., p. 54), Hugo and Roland must be regarded as the 1 It is not correct in view simply of the incidental utterance at vii. 14 to re¬ gard him as including ordination as a fifth sacrament. 2 Abelard himself appears to have divided in the same way. Vid. Ethica, c. 23. 8o HISTORY OF DOCTRINES. first to have placed the number of sacraments at seven. But not until we reach Peter Lombard do we find this number clearly and definitely fixed (sent. iv. 2 A).1 It was even then still cus¬ tomary to speak of baptism and the Lord’s Supper as the chief sacraments, which were said to have flowed from the side of Christ (Lomb. sent. iv. 8 A; Hugo, de sacr. i. 9. 7 ; ii. 2. 1). 2. The old (Angustinian) definition of a sacrament, as the “ sign of a sacred reality” ( sacrae rei signum') or a “visible sign of invisible grace,” was still in vogue (Roland, p. 155; epit. i. ). But the conception was gradually becoming more precise : “ God instituted the remedies of the sacraments against the wounds of original and actual sin ’ ’ (Lomb. iv. 1 A; Hugo, de sacr. i. 8. 12). They are not merely signs, and were instituted not only for the sake of signifying {signiftcandi gratia) , but for the sake of sanctifying ( sanctificandi gratia ) (ib. B). Faith and repentance are mentioned as the subjective condition required for a profitable reception (ib. iv. 4 B). But no one so clearly expressed the controlling thought as Hugo : “A sacrament is a corporeal or material element, openly (and) sensibly presented, representing by similitude and signifyingby institution, and con¬ taining by consecration, some invisible and spiritual grace (de sacr. i. 9. 2). Thus, e. g., it may be said of the water of bap¬ tism : “ By consecration ( sanctificatione ) it contains spiritual grace” (ib. ii. 6. 2). This fully expresses the sacramental con¬ ception which dominates the Middle Ages. The sensuous ele¬ ments somehow contain grace ; with them grace is infused into the recipients. There are, indeed, differences between the vari¬ ous sacraments : “ Some, as baptism, offer a remedy for sjn and confer assisting grace ; others, as marriage, are for remedy only ; others, as the eucharist and ordination, strengthen us with grace and virtue ” (Lomb. iv. 2 A). As we shall have occasion here¬ after to discuss each sacrament separately, we here offer but a few brief comments. 3. Baptism accomplishes man’s renewal by a putting off of vices ( depositio vitium ), and a contribution of virtues ( collatio virtutum ) (Lombard iv. 3 L). Original sin is remitted, because (1) through the grace of baptism the vice of concupiscence is 1 According to the above, my statement in Thomas. DG. ii., ed. 2, 216, must be modified. It is inaccurate to say that the Lombard was led to enume¬ rate seven sacraments by combining those acknowledged by Hugo and Robert (see note 1, p. 79). It seems chronologically impossible that the Lombard should have been influenced by Roland (vid. Gietl, 1. c., p. l6f.). The Lombard started out with the enumeration customary in the school of Abe¬ lard (vid. the Epitome), and, following Hugo, added to these repentance and ordination. But this was a natural result of the theological tendencies of the age. DEFINITION OF SACRAMENTS. 81 weakened (debilitatur') , and (2) guilt ( reatus ) is abolished (( aboletur ) in baptism (ib. ii. 32 B). 4. Confirmation works the bestowal of the Holy Spirit for strengthening (ib. iv. 7 A.; infusion of grace, Hugo, de sacr. ii. 7. 1). “ Confirmation is as much worthier than baptism, as it is worthier to be made an athlete than to be cured of disease. . . . Wherefore confirmation is now granted only by a bishop ’ ’ (Robert, sent. v. 23 ; Hugo, 1. c., ii. 7. 4). Roland, on the other hand, declares that baptism is the worthier in its effect, and that confirmation can be called worthier only because it ought to be administered by a worthier person (p. 213). 1 5. As to the Lord’s Supper, see Section 49, 3, 4. 6. We must examine the discussions of repentance somewhat more fully, since the theologians of the period attempted to justify upon theoretic grounds the advances made in the statement of this doctrine. Here, too, Abelard and his school exerted a great influence. He taught that ( 1 ) True repentance consists in contri¬ tion of the heart ( co7itritio cordis') . 2 Where this exists, God grants the forgiveness of sins (ethica 19). Also the Epitome (35) and Roland (sent., pp. 243, 245). Usually confessio will immediately follow contrition (eth. 24; epit. 36; cf. praxis, serm. 8 fin.); it is not, however, a condition required for the forgiveness of sins, but “ a large part of satisfaction ” (eth. 24). (2) But this forgiveness has reference only to the eternal punishments of sin : “ For God, when he pardons sin to the penitent, does not remit all penalty to them, but only the eternal” (eth. 19 ; epit. 35). The “penalty of satisfaction,” on the other hand, was held to release from all temporal punishment of sin, either in this life or in purgatory. If these works of repentance are not sufficient,3 God will complete the punishment “by afflicting with purga¬ torial punishments either in this or in a future life” (expos, in Rom. 2. 4, p. 840 ; eth. 25 ; cf. epit. 37 ; Roland, p. 248). (3) Roland established the necessity of confession and works of satisfaction as follows : “We offend God by thinking wickedly, and we scandalize the church by acting perversely : and just as we offend both, we owe it to both to render satisfac¬ tion — to God through contrition of heart, to the church through confession of the mouth ahd satisfaction by works, if the nature 1 Vid. also Petr. Piet. sent. v. 9 : “ Baptism ... is more useful . . . confirmation better and worthier and more precious, just as water is more use¬ ful than wine, but wine more worthy and excellent.” 2 According to the Epitome, 5, it arises “ not from fear of punishment, but from love of righteousness.” 3 Observe the keen remarks of Abelard concerning “ some of the priests . . . entrapping those under their care in order that for the oblation of coins they may condone or relax the penalties of the enjoined satisfaction ” (eth. 35). 6 8 2 HISTORY OF DOCTRINES. of the time demands” (p. 249). Abelard thus deduced the pro¬ priety of works of satisfaction from the necessity of expiating the temporal penalties of sin, and by this means solved a prob¬ lem raised by the new penitential praxis. But, as he made the remission of the eternal penalty dependent solely upon contri¬ tion, he increased the difficulty attaching to another problem of the same praxis, i. e., that absolution seems to be robbed of its chief significance and the office of priest becomes merely to give advice in reference to works of satisfaction for temporal penalties. (£) Hugo of St. Victor, controverting the views of Abelard, becomes, upon the doctrine of repentance as elsewhere, the rep¬ resentative of the hierarchical orthodoxy. For him the confes¬ sion is the chief thing in repentance, as was doubtless the case in the prevalent praxis (cf. supra, p. 46). It presupposes contri¬ tion and the willingness to render satisfaction (de sacr. ii. 14. 1 ; summa 6. 10). He who will not make confession is a de- spiser of God (sacr. ii. 14. 8). But repentance is actually secured only through confession and satisfaction : “ He confesses his sin to the priest, who imposes upon him a just satisfaction, for he is bound to make satisfaction, not according to his judg¬ ment, but according to the judgment of the priest, and the?i the priest releases him from the debt of future damnation ” (summ. 6. n).1 Absolution accordingly follows confession, but it is granted in view of the satisfaction imposed in connection with the former (see foot-note). Hugo thus theoretically comes to the support of the theory of the older penitential praxis (p. 43 f. ). Finally, he vigorously assails the opinion that priestly absolution has only an ecclesiastical and declaratory signification. Against this he argues : The sinner is bound in a two-fold way : “by ob- duration of the mind and by the debt of future damnation. ” The former, God removes through the grace which works penitence in us, “so that . . . penitent we merit to be absolved from the debt of damnation” (sacr. ii. 4. 8, p. 565). As the resusci¬ tated Lazarus was by the apostles “loosed” from his grave- clothes, so the priests, by means of a power divinely conferred, release the penitent sinner from eternal perdition (ib. p. 565 f. , 1 It is necessary to observe that Hugo is aware that forgiveness depends upon contritio and confessio : “ But there is this remedy, that he repent of his fault in his heart and confess it with his mouth ; which, when he has done, he will then no longer be a debtor of damnation” (sacr. ii. 14. 8, p. 567). The passage above cited does not exclude this view, as the “then” refers only to the imposing of the satisfaction. Cf. somewhat later (p. 1 49). “ The priest releases . . . from the debt of future punishment by absolving through the satisfaction which he imposes.” DEFINITION OF SACRAMENTS. 83 568, and summ. 6. ii).1 In this idea lies the dogmatic signifi¬ cance of Hugo’s teaching. (V) Robert Pullus, on the other hand, locates the essence of the sacrament in absolution and confession. “Absolution, which is, in confession, pronounced above the penitent by the priest, is a sacrament, since it is the sign of a sacred reality ’ ’ (sent. vi. 61). But the priestly absolution is only the announce¬ ment of the forgiveness which God, upon the ground of peni¬ tence, imparts to the sinner (ib.; likewise Petr. Piet. sent. iii. 1 6). But after absolution it remains necessary to perform the penitential works (vi. 52). If the latter be not rendered, they will be completed by the penalties endured in purgatory (ib. and vii. 1 ; vi. 59). (#) The Lombard betrays also here the influence of Abelard. Repentance embraces the usual three parts (sent. iv. 16 A). It is a punishment, and, as such, of a satisfactory nature ( poena satisfacit , iv. 14 A, B, 15 C). The admission (iv. 17 C), that forgiveness presupposes only contrition and confession be¬ fore God, is supplemented by the declaration : “ Confession ought to be offered first to God and then to the priest, nor if there be opportunity for this can entrance to paradise be other¬ wise attained (ib. D), since the latter is a kind of punishment of sin” (ib. F). This does not involve any divergence from Abelard. Confession is then followed by absolution (dist. 18). The question, whether God or the priest forgives, is thus decided : “ That God only remits and retains sins, and nevertheless he has conferred upon the church the power of binding and loosing ; but he absolves in one way and the church in another ” (18 E). 2 The priests decide whether the sinner ‘ ‘ is regarded as released in the view of the church ” (F). But the priests further bind and loose by imposing and mitigating the satisfaction , and by the admission to participation in the sacrament of those who have been purified by rendering the required satisfaction. But since this was, in fact, dependent upon absolution, the Lombard further interprets his language : It is to be observed that, be¬ cause they bind some with the satisfaction of repentance, by 1 The practical frame of mind which harmonizes with this theory cannot be better expressed than by Hugo : “ How can I know when my repentance is sufficient ( amdigna )? Because thou canst not know this, therefore thou hast need always to repent. Thou canst make satisfaction ; thou canst not do too much. It is better to do more than less . . . Nevertheless, in order that the conscience of the sinner may sometimes find comfort, the mode and measure of external repent¬ ance has been appointed, so that when the latter has been completed and perfected, thou mayest begin to have confidence” (de sacr. ii. 14. 2 fin.). 2 Here, as often in the Lombard, we have the theology of “Yes and No.” In iv. 18 D the views of Hugo and Abelard are cited. 84 HISTORY OF DOCTRINES. that very act they show such to be released from their sins, since- penitential satisfaction is not imposed upon anyone except such as the priest judges to be truly penitent. But upon any other they do not impose it, and by that very act they adjudge that his sin is retained by God (G). A defective exercise of re¬ pentance results in the tortures of purgatory : “ And they are more severely punished than if they had fully completed their repentance here ’ ’ ( 2 o B ) . 1 The Lombard advanced the doctrine of repentance by assuring to absolution, by virtue of its close con¬ nection with confession, a secure place in the sacrament, follow¬ ing in this in the footsteps of Hugo. The dogmatic contribu¬ tion of the present period lay in the fact that it began to estab¬ lish a connection between confession and priestly absolution, and to argue the necessity of satisfaction in view of the tem¬ poral, i. e., purgatorial, punishment of sin. 7. The custom of Extreme Unction, based on Jas. 5. 15, was in the present period included among the sacraments. It serves a double purpose : “ for the remission of sins and for the alleviation of bodily infirmity ’ ’ (Lomb. iv. 23 B ; Hugo, de sacr. ii- x5- 3> 8. The origin of the sacrament of Ordination has been traced in Vol. I., p. 319 f. A new motive was furnished for the careful statement of the doctrine by the enlargement of the penitential system and the sacramental conception of grace. The priest receives through ordination the two keys, discretio and potestas. “ In consecration these two are given to all, i. e., the office of exercising discretion and the office of exercising power. ’ *' Binding and loosing are thereby committed to them (Hugo,, summ. 6. 14; cf. Roland, p. 264 ff.; Lomb. sent. iv. 19 A-C). Yet this is only one aspect of the matter. Through ordination, is imparted a more abundant grace ( amplior gratia , Lomb. iv. 24 AjJ as well as a spiritual power {spirituals potestas') and spiritual character {character spiritualist (ib. K). To it those are to be admitted “who may be able worthily to administer the Lord’s sac¬ raments ” (ib. B). If this applies to all the seven orders (ostiarii, lectores, exorcistae, acolythi, subdiaconi, diaconi, presbyteri), it has yet special reference to the priesthood. “The word priest ( 'sacerdos ) is derived from the Greek and Latin, i. e. , sacrum dans , or sacer dux. For just as a king {rex) receives his title because he reigns ( a regendo ), so a priest ( sacerdos ) receives his because he consecrates {sacrando) , for he consecrates and sanctifies” (ib. J). In the conception of this sacrament, as elsewhere, no full and 1 The Council at Aachen, A. D. 836, mentions it among the duties of the spiritual adviser (Mansi, xiv. 681). Item, at Pavia, A. D. 850 (Hefele, iii. 177). The custom is first met with among the Gnostics (vid.Vol. I., p. 99).- CONCEPTION OF THE CHURCH. 85 -clear conclusion was attained in the present period, but the con¬ trolling thought is clear enough. Ordination imparts the spiritual authority to administer the sacraments, and through them to sanc¬ tify the laity (cf. Greg, vii., supra, p. 51). 9. The sacrament of Marriage betrays the juristic origin by the form of statement. It is clear from the evidence above adduced that the theolo¬ gians of the twelfth century had already clearly wrought out the materializing of grace through the sacraments. The theologians of the thirteenth century inherited, indeed, a number of un¬ solved — and insoluble — problems, but also the firmly established fundamental conception which proved the regulating force of medieval Christianity, i. e., Grace is the power efficaciously manifested in the sacraments, whose administration belongs by ■ divine right to the priesthood. §51. Conception of the Church. 1. The task of the present chapter would be imperfectly per¬ formed if we should fail to note the acceptance by the theolo¬ gians of the day of the conception of the church which Gregory VII. introduced (supra, p. 50 ff. ). The utterances of the Scholastics upon the subject are confessedly meagre. Neither the system of Abelard nor that of the Damascenes gave occasion for its discussion. The conception was a self-evident premise, whose application must be made practically by the canonical laws and theologically in the doctrine of the sacraments. It is, therefore, all the more significant that Hugo of St. Victor and Robert Pullus should have expressed themselves plainly upon the subject. We have also discussions of the relation of church and state in the Polycraticus of John of Salisbury (f 1180, opp. ed. Giles, 5 vols. , 1848. Cf. Gennrich, Die Staats- u. Kirchenlehre d. Joh. v. Sal., 1894).1 2 . Augustine indicates the starting point in his query : ‘ ‘ What is the church except the multitude of the believing, the whole number of Christians?” (ynultitudo fide lium, universitas chris - Manor urn) . (Hugo, de sacr. ii. 2. 2). But inasmuch as, ac¬ cording to this, believers are simply Christians, this definition by no means brings us “to the true Christian idea of the church ” (Liebner, Hugo v. St. Victor, p. 446);"' it only declares that the Christian world constitutes the church.2 The correct 1 Vid. also Honorius Augustod.: “The highest glory composed of the apostolic and the imperial.” Mi. 172. 2 Interesting is the definition of Alanus ab Insul.: “ the church is the con¬ gregation of believers confessing Christ and the guardian (. subsidium ) of the -sacraments” (de articul. cath. fid. iv. in., Mi. 210. 613). 86 HISTORY OF DOCTRINES. conception is gained by the division of Christians into rulers and subjects (t praelati et subjecti') (Hugo, ib. ii. 2. 5 ; cf. Robert, sent. vii. 19: “prelates governing the church”). This for¬ mula, frequently occurring already in the writings of Cyprian (Vol. I., p. 180 ff. ), signifies that the right side of the church con¬ sists of the clergy and the left side of the laity (Hugo, ii. 2.3). There are, therefore, two lives or two nationalities, of which one ministers to temporal necessities, and the other administers what pertains to the spiritual life (ib. 3). Each of these nationalities is subject to a ruler, i. e., the king and the pope (ib. 4). The nature of the church is in harmony with this idea, and there are discussions of its orders , sacra?nents, and precepts. The grada¬ tion of the orders is then treated of. The special privileges of bishops, as compared with priests, are placed upon the ground that otherwise the subjects might take advantage of their superi¬ ors and forget the obedience due the latter (ib. ii. 3. 12). The archbishops and the four patriarchs stand above the bishops, and over all is the pope (papa), i. e., father of fathers, whom, pre¬ siding in place of Peter, the chief of the apostles, every ecclesi¬ astical order is bound to obey, who alone has as prerogatives of his high rank the keys of binding and loosing all things upon earth (ii. 3. 5). No one but God may pass judgment upon him (Johann. Polycr. viii. 23; opp. iv. 363). According to the in¬ terpretation of the Augustinian conception of the two states which dominates Hugo, it is but a self-evident conclusion that the spiritual power stands far above the secular ; it is the older and has authority to institute the latter and sit in judgment upon it (ii. 2. 4; cf. Robert, vii. 7): “This sword, therefore, the prince receives from the hand of the church. . . . The prince is, therefore, a minister of the priesthood, and one who exercises that part of the duties of the priests which seems unworthy of the hands of the priesthood ” (Polycr. iv. 3 in.).1 Yet the state is also to be regarded as a divine institution (Polycr., 1. c., iv. 1), but must be subject to spiritual (clerical) direction. Robert 'Expresses the opinion that, according to Matt. 22. 21 : “The priesthood is superior to the kingdom in those things which it administers for God, and the kingdom to the priesthood in those things which pertain to the world ” (vii. 7, p. 920 f. Cf. Hugo, ii. 2. 6, 7 ; Gregory VII., supra, p. 50Y These utterances furnish a precise outline of the Gregorian conception of the 1 John, says: “Therefore the prince is a minister of the public utility and a servant of equity” (Polycr. iii. 2). The gravest crime is tyranny, which is directed “against the very body of justice.” From this is deducted the right of slaying tyrants: “ To kill a tyrant is not only allowable, but right and just ” (ib. iii. 15 ; viii. 17 in., 18 fin.). AIMS OF THE CHURCH. 87 church : ( 1 ) The clergy are related to the laity as a government to its subjects. (2) This exalted position of the clergy is ex¬ plained by their authority to dispense the sacraments. (3) The clergy is a graded organism, whose summit is the pope. (4) The secular power is by divine right subject to the spiritual. CHAPTER II. DEVELOPMENT OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE DURING THE SECOND PERIOD OF SCHOLASTICISM. §52. Aims of the Church. Religious Life. Efforts at Reform. 1. We are now standing upon the summit of the Middle Ages. The cornerstone and foundation of their theological structure were laid in the former period, its scope and tendency deter¬ mined. The decisive work was not done by the leaders of the thirteenth century, but by their forerunners in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. This is true of the theologians no less than of the ecclesiastics and the reformers of the church’s devotional life. We must first of all trace the development of the hierarchical ideas and the religious ideals, whose introduction was noted in Sections 44 and 45. We recall the firm adherence of the later popes to the principles of Gregory VII. Innocent III. claims special attention. He held that 11 The pope is the vicar ( vicaiius ) of Christ, placed midway between God and man, be¬ neath God and beyond man, less than God and greater than man, who judges concerning all and is judged by none (Mi. 217. 658). Thus Aristotle once spoke of the genie as “ O, thou to men divine! ” (Pol. iii. 13. 8). Not only the whole church, but the whole world, is subject to the sway of the pope : “ James, the brother of the Lord . . . left to Peter not only the whole church, but the whole world, to be governed ” (registr. ii. 209). Inno¬ cent accordingly sought to adminster the affairs of the church as its sole ruler (cf. the confirmation of bishops, their oath of obe¬ dience, their being called to the duty of solicitudo , appellation to Rome, the Roman land titles, etc. Vid. the bull of Eger., A. D. 1213, in MG. leg. ii. 224 b; reg. i. 495, 496), and claimed also supremacy over states. As the moon receives its light from the sun, “ so the royal power receives the splendor of its dignity 88 HISTORY OF DOCTRINES. from the pontifical authority” (reg. i. 401, Mi. 217. 1180. Cf. Dollinger, Papsttum, p. 401 f. ).1 These ideas were most abruptly expressed in the bull ‘ ‘ Unam Sanctam, ’ ’ issued by Boniface VIII. , A. D. 1302, whose leading declarations are as follows: “We are compelled by the faith to believe . . . one holy catholic church . . . outside of which there is neither salvation nor the remission of sins. ... In which there is one Lord, one faith, one baptism. . . . Therefore of this one and only church there is one body and one head, not two bodies, as though it were a monster, viz. : Christ and the vicar of Christ, Peter and the successor of Peter. . . . That in this and in its power are two swords, viz., the spiritual and the temporal. . . . There¬ fore both are in the power of the church, viz., the spiritual and the material sword ; but the latter to be exercised for the church, the former by the church. The one is in the hand of the priest ; the other in the hands of kings and soldiers, but at the command and permission (ad nutuni et patientia?ii) of the priest. But it is fitting that sword be under sword, and that the temporal author¬ ity be subject to the spiritual. . . . But that the spiritual power excels both in dignity and nobility any earthly power whatsoever. . . . For, truth being the witness, the spiritual power has (the right) to establish the earthly, and, if it have not been good, to judge it. . . . Whosoever, therefore, resists this power thus or¬ dained of God resists the ordinance of God, unless, like Mani- chaeus, thou dreamest that there are two principles. . . . More¬ over, to every human creature we declare, say, define and pro¬ nounce, that to be subject to the Roman pontiff is absolutely necessary to salvation ” (de necessitate salutis'). 2. The writings of St. Bernard exerted a profound influ¬ ence upon the devout speculation of the following period, but it does not lie within the province of the History of Doctrines to follow them in detail.2 We must not, however, overlook the protest against the secularization of the church which, at the time when the hierarchy was at the summit of its power, and when even ideas of reform had become merely a means for further secularization, was raised by the Brethren of the Poor Life of Christ. The power' of love was revealed in Christ to 1 Innocent maintained that the popes had in the time of Charlemagne transplanted the Greek Empire to Germany, and that in consequence the “ right and authority of examining the person elected to be king” belonged to them (de elect. 34, in Mirbt, Urkunden, p. 78). 2 Vid. the mystical writings of Hugo (f 1141) and Richard (f 1173) of St. Victor; also Bonaventura, Itenerarium mentis, as presented in detail in Thomasius, DG. ii., ed. 2, 272 ff. Religious mysticism is here systematized and developed into a philosophy. These writings may be described as the beginnings of theological ethics. AIMS OF THE CHURCH. 89 Francis of Assisi. The poor life of Christ overwhelmed his soul ; the imitation of Christ became his ideal. He became the knight of 4 11 holy poverty.” Poverty set him free from the world. As he, surfeited with the old life, shook off his relations with the world, he soon found something else and more than his ideal had promised — he found himself and individuality. He did not clothe his thoughts in doctrinal statements. The gospel frame of mind was everything to him. The love of Christ kept his tears of joy ever flowing and taught him to perform miracles of love. The whole creation testified to him of the love of God, and all living things demanded of him love. “Everything temporal ’ ’ was to him ‘ ‘ only an image, ’ ’ the image of the soul, which belongs to its God. Thus his life, and with it the whole crea¬ tion, became a hymn of praise to God, for the service of free love. “ Praise and bless the Lord, and render thanks, and serve him with grand humility ” (Song of the Sun). “ My God and all, who art thou, sweetest Lord, my God ; and who am I, an insignificant worm, thy servant? Most Holy Lord, that I might love thee ! ” (opp. Franc, ed. v. d. Burg, 1849, P* 44)- “ May the glow¬ ing and mellifluous power of thy love absorb, I pray, O Lord, my mind from all things w'hich are under heaven, that I may die from love of thy love, who hast deigned to die from love of my love” (ib. p. 43). Or, as Jacopone sings: “Make me truly to rejoice with — cling to Jesuline ; then at length shall I have lived.” Francis was made the founder of an order by the church of his age. But he sought and attained more than this. He discovered human individuality and opened to it an immediate intercourse with God. It may, perhaps, be correct to say that he wished to make all men monks ; but he did cer¬ tainly also teach the children of men to become Christians and men. As he found God and love in the Jesus of the gospels, and attained liberation from the world in the following of Jesus, he exerted a powerful stimulus upon his contemporaries. He taught the world the directly individual character and the present blessedness of the religious life, and he led men to look upon the world and mankind simply and without dogmatic spectacles. He glorified poverty and love, and taught men to realize in them the sense of personal perfection. His influence can be easily traced in the religious life, as well as in the art and literature, of the following period. This is especially true with reference to the direct and loving appreciation of the human life of Jesus which was manifested in the ensuing age. The one precious pearl of the church’s tradition was thus found anew. How exhaustively and how lovingly have not Bonaven- tura (Meditationes vitae Chr. opp. vi.) and Ludolf of Saxony 9° HISTORY OF DOCTRINES. (Vita Christi ; vid. also De vita et beneficiis salvatoris Jesu Chr. devotissimae meditationes) portrayed the human life of Jesus : ‘ 1 in order that in all places and deeds thou mayest be in mind, as though thou wast present in body ” (Bonav. c. 88 fin.). Into the heart of him who thus regards the life of Jesus there comes a certain “ familiarity, confidence and love ” for the Lord (ib. proem.). He is, as is constantly emphasized, for us the good example : “ Who to this end was sent from heaven to us in order that he might go before us in the path of virtues, and might give to us in his example a law of life and discipline ” (Ludolf, pro- log.). This is the way “ to behold him inspirit ” fib. ii. c. 89). Upon this point cf. Seeberg, in Ztschr. f. K. Wiss. , 1888, p. 163 If. The lessons taught by St. Francis were, thanks to his monastic order and despite it, not lost upon the Christian world. He was a “ pioneer of the reformers.” Cf. Hase, Fr. v. Ass. 1856. Sabatier, Leben d. h. Fr., German trans¬ lation, 1895. Hegler, Ztschr. f. Theol. u. K. 1896. K. Muller, Die Anfange des Minoritenordens, etc., 1885. Thode, Fr. v. Ass. u. die Anfange der Kunst d. Renaissance in Ital., 1885. Ehrle, in Archiv. f. Litt. u. Kirchengesch. d. MA. iii. 554 ff. 3. The reformatory agitations very naturally exerted a marked influence upon the piety of the laity. This was especially true in regard to the penitential brotherhoods attaching themselves to the third order of St. Francis. But it must be acknowledged, further, that among the great masses of the population an external eccle¬ siastical religious life was perpetuated. The people believed in God, Christ, the Virgin Mary, and the saints. They believed just “ what the church believes.”1 “ There is a certain body of the faith to which everyone is bound, and which is sufficient for the simple and, perhaps, for all laymen, i. e., that every adult be¬ lieve that God is, and that he is a rewarder of all the good. Likewise must all believe the other articles implicitly , that everything which the universal church believes is true. ’ ’ These words of Innocent IV.2 justly represent the actual state of things.3 Faith in God consists in the conviction that he guides the for- 1 The “faith” is the Apostles’ Creed, e. g., Schonbach, Altdeutsche Pre- digten i. 41, 46. Its essential content is the Trinity, ib. i. 4; ii. 1 1 5 ; iii. 1 14. It includes also the divinity of Christ and the seven sacraments (vid. Altdeutsch. Pred. ed. Wackernagel, p. 77 fif. ). Vid. also i. 42 : “I believe all that which I as a Christian man ought to believe.” Compare Tertullian’s “credidi quod credere debui.” 2 Apparatus quinque libror. decretalium i. 1. Vid. Ritschl, Fides impli- cita, 1890, p. 10. 3 It was the law for inquisitors : They have power to excommunicate laymen disputing publicly or privately concerning the Catholic faith (Bernard. Guid. practica inquisit. iv. , p. 207). AIMS OF THE CHURCH. 91 tunes of men, rewarding the good and punishing the wicked. Christ by his death overcame the devil ( this is the simple foundation thought. The work is confessedly unfinished, closing abruptly at the doctrine of repentance ; but it was completed by the disciples of Thomas from his other writings. The scheme of the work is as follows : A question ( ' quaestio ) is stated, and then divided into a series of articles, each of which is presented in an interrogative form. Then, with the introductory formula, videtur quod non , a number of ar¬ guments, perhaps from the Bible, the Fathers, or Aristotle, are presented against the question. Then are given, introduced by a sed contra est, a number of other arguments on the affirmative 1 They were yoften edited. Before me lies the Antwerp edition of 1612. I cite the Summa from the edition of Frette and Mare (Paris, 1882 ff. ), and the Compendium according to the edition of Albert, 1896. The literature connected with his name is also almost limitless. Vid. Werner, d. h, Thom., 3 vols. Wagenmann, PRE. xvi. 570 ff. Portmann, Das Syst. d. Summa d. h. Thom., 1894. IOO HISTORY OF DOCTRINES. side. Upon this follows the decision, beginning with Responded dicendum , and usually answering the question in the affirmative. The supposed counter-arguments are then answered under the captions: Ad primutn , Ad secundum , etc., dicendum d We cite an illustration. In the First Part of the Summa the fourth article under the eighth question reads : “ Whether to be every - ' where is an attribute of God ? (i) It appears that to be every¬ where is not an attribute of God.” Four philosophical argu¬ ments are adduced for this position, partly from Aristotle, and then are added two arguments from Augustine. (2) “But upon the opposite side is what Ambrose says.” (3) Here fol¬ lows the answer : “I reply : It is to be said, that to be every- . where is, from the beginning and essentially, an attribute oF God.” Then we have the establishment of this proposition, and afterward a refutation of the six arguments for the negative : “ To the first, second, etc., it is to be said.” With Thomas, the Aristotelian, we here mention his friend, the Franciscan, Bonaventura ( doctor seraphicus , f 1274), who, however, in theology maintained the old Augustinian -Platonic theories. Bonaventura attached a greater importance to the mystic element in his theology than his predecessors. It is not to be inferred, however, that he pursued with any the less energy the dogmatic and philosophical problems of his age. He de¬ clared himself, in comparison with Alexander, a “ poor and lean compiler” (in sent. ii. declaratio). Of his writings, we mention his Commentary upon the Sentences, his dogmatic Compendium breviloquium , and also his Compendium theol. veritatis , the Declaratio terminorum theologiae , and the mystical Compendium itinerarium mentis in deumd 3. Before scrutinizing the teachings of the age upon separate doctrines, it will be well for us to observe, in the case of Thomas, ' who was so influential in determining them, the method and aim of scholastic labors. (a) The Object of faith, and there¬ fore also of theology, is supernaturally revealed by God. The necessity of revelation grows out of the fact that human reason, x cannot by the power of nature recognize the nature of God, e. g., the Trinity. But revelation extends also to such matters 1 This is the treatment of material introduced by Abelard. The conclusio printed in most editions at the end of the separate articles is not the work of Thomas himself. 2 His works were often edited : At Rome, 1588 ff.; Lyons, 1 668 ; Mayence, 160'); Venice, 1751 ; Paris, 1863 f. The best edition is that of Quaracchi, 1882 ff. Hefele edited the Breviloquium in 1861 and Vicetia in 1881. It is not to be imagined that Thomas held a monopoly of the theological ideas in the thirteenth century. Bonaventura both as a Mystic and as a Scholastic- followed to a large extent an independent course. THEOLOGY OF THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY. IOI as reason might perhaps by itself discover, but only slowly and at a late period (c. gentil. i. 3 ff. ; summ. i. qu. 1, art. 1). In this way man becomes absolutely certain in regard to his religious knowledge, since it comes “ immediately from God through rev¬ elation” (summ. i. q. 1, art. 5). But revelation is contained in the Holy Scriptures. Their real author is God : auctor sacrae sci'ipturae est deus (ib. i. q. 1, a. 10). By inspiration God im¬ parted to the prophets definite items of knowledge by the way of transient impression ( i?npressionis transeuntis). “Prophecy is a certain knowledge ( quaedam cognitio') impressed upon the mind of a prophet by divine revelation through some manner of in¬ struction (per modum cujusda?n doctrinae ) (cf. ii. ii. q. 171, a. 2, 6; q. 172, a. 3).1 God has immediately confirmed this by the history of the diffusion of faith, as well as by miracles and ;signs. And thus he shows the teacher of the truth [to be] in¬ visibly inspired (c. gent. i. 6). It must therefore be said: “ The authority of those should be believed to whom revelation has been made ” (summ. i. q. 1, a. 8). As the Scriptures must, •on the one hand, be believed because of their origin, they are, on the other hand, the only sure and binding authority. “ But one uses the authorities of the canonical scripture properly and in ..arguing from necessity ; the authorities of other teachers of the church in arguing, as it were, from one’s own resources, but with probability. For our faith rests upon the revelation given to the apostles and prophets who wrote the canonical books, but not upon revelation, if such there were, given to other teachers” (ib.).2 Thus did Thomas distinctly proclaim the Holy Scriptures as the revelation of God — as the source and absolute authority of Christian doctrine. Precisely so did Bonaventura also teach : “ Authority resides primarily in the Holy Scriptures, which have been wholly established ( condita tot a) through the Holy Spirit for the directing of the catholic faith” (brevil. 5. 7). But reve¬ lation is a doctrine.3 Its necessity is deduced, not from the ex- * 1 Vid. Bonaventura in hexaem serm. 9 (opp. i. 35 f. ), e. g., it is proper that faith be confirmed, through the inspired word. Albert, summ. i, tract. 1, qu. 4 ; qu. 5, membr. 2. It will be observed how moderate is the view here taken of inspiration. In the earlier Middle Ages Agobard had rejected the view which so represented the matter as though ‘ ‘ the Holy Spirit had not only breathed into them ( inspiraverit ) the sense of the preaching and the modes or arguments of their speeches, but had also himself from without formed in the mouths the corporeal words.” Speech is not produced in the prophets as in Balaam’s ass (vid. adv. Fredegis. 11, Mi. 104. 166). 2 Cf. Quodlibeta xii. a. 26 : “ The sayings of expositors do not carry with them necessity, that it should be necessary to believe them, but alone the ca¬ nonical scripture which is in the Old and New Testaments.” 3 The proper object of revelation, i. e., of faith, is the “ first truth,” or God. Everything else (as the divinity of Christ, the sacraments) is entitled to con- 102 HISTORY OF DOCTRINES. istence of sin, but from the debilitas of the human intellect (summ. i q. i, a. 5). The lines of thought presented in the Scriptures must, it was further held, be supplemented. It had been felt necessary in the church from the beginning, that what was contained in the Scriptures “ diffusedly and in various forms and in some cases obscurely ' ’ should be plainly and briefly stated in a connected way, i. e., “ what should be proposed to all to be believed. ’ ’ This is furnished in the symbolum apostolomm , which contains the essence of the Christian faith (cf. also Bonav. breviloq. 5. 7). But since the heretics introduced false doc¬ trines, it became necessary to enlarge and explain this symbol, which was done by the Nicene Creed, the deliverances of other councils, and the Fathers.1 The confession is handed down, “ as it were, by the personality of the entire church which is united through the faith.” A “new edition of the symbol . . . for the shunning of rising errors ’ ’ may yet be a necessity. Its preparation, in such case, is within the province of the pope. The counsel given in 1 Cor. i. 10 cannot be followed “unless a question of faith arising concerning the faith should be deter¬ mined by him who presides over the whole church, so that thus his opinion may be firmly held by the whole church. And there¬ fore a new edition of the symbol pertains to the sole authority of the supreme pontiff, just as do all other things which pertain to the whole church, as the assembling of a general council.” Hence : “by whose authority a council is assembled and his opinion confirmed” (summ. ii. ii. q. 1, a. 9 and 10; cf. q. 11, a. 2). Accordingly, revelation is handed down to the Christian world in the symbols and the decrees of councils, and by means of the papal definitions of the faith. It is of course presumed that these are in harmony with the authority of Scripture ; but in reality, side by side with the anctoritas scriptu?'aey and above it, stands the sola auctoritas summi pontificis. sideration “in so far as through these things we are directed toward God, and we assent to them also on account of the divine truth ” (summaii. ii. q. 1, a. i). 1 In the twelve, or as the Scholastics commonly enumerate, the fourteen arti¬ cles, “ are contained those things which are chiefly to be believed (Bonav. in sent, iii., d. 25, a. 1, q. 1 ). Three symbols are uniformly acknowledged : the first is for the teaching of the faith ; the second, for the explanation of the faith ; the third, for the defense of the faith” (Bonav. compend. theol. verit. v. 21 ; Centiloq., p. 3, sect. 38. Anselm, ep. ii. 41. Alex. Hales, summ. iv. q. 37, sect. 9, names four, but enumerates only three : Apostolic, Athana- sian, Constantinopolitan, for which Bonaventura names the Nicene. So also Richard, sent. ii. d. 25, principale 2, q. 1 and 2. Duns, sent. i. d. 26, q. I, 25. Durand, sent. iii. d. 36, q. 2. Biel, iii. 25, qu. un. Duns, sent. iv. d. 43, q. 1. 11). To the Scripture and the symbols are added the works of the teachers ( documenta doctorum ), of these, Bonaventura enumerates Dionysius, Gregory of Nazianzen, Gregory of Nyssa, John of Damascus, Basil, Athan- THEOLOGY OF THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY. 103 (h) Since revelation cannot be comprehended by the reason, it follows that it must be acccepted in faith. This is necessary, if for no other reason, because otherwise the “merit of faith would be made void” (summ. ii. ii. q. 2, a. 9, 10). Thomas was the first to make a careful analysis of the conception of faith , (vid. quaestio disputata de fide, opp. viii. 804 ff. , and summ. ii. ii. qu. 1 ff. ). He starts with the Augustinian formula: “To believe is to think with assent.” The intellectus possi-, hills, or thinking faculty, reaches a conclusion in one of two ways, either that the object impresses itself upon this faculty in an intellectual way as true, or that the faculty is, by thev will, inclined to assent.1 “And thus also are we moved to believe things said, in so far as the reward of eternal life is promised to us if we shall believe, and the will is moved by this reward to assent to those things which are said, although the intel¬ lect be not moved by anything intellectual (defide, art. 1, p. 805 b). That the intellect in this way responds to the impulse of the will is explained by the disposition ( habitus ) of faith ’ divinely infused,” i. e., infused into the intellect (a. 4, p. 812 ; cf. Heinrich, quodlib. v. q. 21). Faith is thus incited by the will, but it has its seat in the intellect : “ The act of faith consists essentially in cognition, and there is its perfection ” (a. 2, p. 809). Faith is therefore an incipient knowledge of divine things, “which are above reason,” dependent upon practical . motives. It is because of the infirmity of human reason that faith alone is possible in this life. But the goal consists “ in perfect knowledge ( cognitione ) of God ” (a. 10, p. 820 ; c. gent. iii. 25, 8 ; 26 ; 50, 6 ; iv. 42, 1), and “eternal life will afford perfect knowledge of God” (a. 2, p. 807b).2 Upon these principles it can be understood, on the one hand, that faith should be regarded as reaching its consummation in knowledge, - and, on the other hand, that faith, since it proceeds from the will, should be held to be meritorious (a. 3), and also that it should receive its moral character ( formatio ) from the will or from love: “faith is formed {informatur ) by love” (a. 5, p. 813 a; cf. summ. ii. ii. q. 4, a. 5 and 3 ; q. 2, a. 9). The ordinary layman, indeed, never attains an explicit faith ( fides explicita') embracing all the articles of faith. Of him, it is ever to be said : “ He believes implicitly the separate articles which asius, Chrysostom, Hilary, Gregory, Augustine, Ambrose, Jerome (in Hexaem. vid. 9, p. 36 a). 1 Faith has to do not with the determination of the “simple natures’' ( simplex quidditates ) of things, but with the decision. For we believe the true, and we disbelieve the false (de fide, art. i). 2 According to Thomas, the will is subordinate to the intellect, and is spiritual only in so far as it is dependent upon the latter (c. gent. iii. 26. 1). 104 HISTORY OF DOCTRINES. are contained in the faith of the church. ’ ’ 1 But Thomas not only expects of all teachers and spiritual advisers an explicit faith , but he requires the same from the laity also in regard to the Trinity, the incarnation, death, and resurrection of Christ, and 4 ‘ other (articles) of this kind, concerning which the church appoints festivals” (a. ii, p. 822). This demand is in harmony with the fundamentally intellectualistic tendency of Thomas. If final salvation consists in perfect knowledge, then a certain measure of knowledge must be attained on earth as a preparation (p. 822 a). Faith is, therefore, an incipient knowledge of divine revelation begotten of practical motives of the will. But the first subjection of man to God is through faith (summ. ii. ii. q. 16, a. 1). (c) This knowledge is just as little as revelation itself contrary to reason ; it is above reason (de fid. art. 10 ad 7). It cannot, therefore, be the province of theology to prove revelation by human reason ( ratione humana). This would be impossible, since theology deals with super-reasonable articles of faith, receiving its principles from God (summ. i. q. 1, a. 5 and 8; cf. q. 32, a. 1). It can only elucidate somewhat by adducing those things which the philosophers can also recognize. The reasons {rati ones') of theology are not really “ demonstrative , but a kind of persuasions, showing that the things which presented in the faith are not impossible ” (ii. ii. q. 1, a. 5). They are useful also in refuting opponents (c. gent. i. 9). But inasmuch as theology operates with the principles of revel¬ ation, its knowledge is more certain and more important than that of all other sciences (i. q. 1, a. 2, 5). This is essentially the position of Abelard. The great scholastics did not possess the naive confidence of Anselm.2 * {d) This was involved in their relation to the question of Universals. Thomas here, in almost the same degree as Albert before him, follows Aristotle or his Arabian interpreters. Man by means of the senses perceives external things separately. 4 ‘Nothing is in the intellect which was not in the sense” (summ. i. q. 85, a. 3 and 7). There thus arises from the object a particular form {forma particulars). The active 1 Vid. also Bonav. sent, iii., d. 25, a. 1, q. 3. Upon implicit faith, vid. G. Hoffman, Die Lehre von der fides implicita, 1903. 2 In the question, whether theology is a scientia speculativa vel pradica , Albert adopted the latter view (summ. i. tr. 1, q. 3, memb. 3), Thomas rather the former (summ. i. q. 1, a. 4). Thomas argues that theology has to do not so much with human actions as with the “divine affairs.” There is here no real contradiction, since this theology, which is no more than advanced knowledge of the faith, is after all in the conception of Thomas eminently practical. THEOLOGY OF THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY. I05 intellect ( intellectus agens') then transforms this in the intellectual faculty ( intellectus possibilis) into an intelligible species ( species intelligibilis') (ib. i. q. 79, a. 3 ; q. 85, a. 2). The intellect accordingly has knowledge of the Universal, but by this it is by no means to be understood that it thereby directly cognizes ideas actually existent. The general conception, which we form for ourselves, is always merely derivative, a universale post rent. The universal does not exist as a general idea, but it is in the objects of sense under certain criteria ( universale in re). Its original type is seen in the ideas of God ( universalia ante rein ), which eternally preexist in him, as the artist’s ideas exist in him before he executes his work. Thus Albert held, and before him Avicenna. Accordingly, the essential nature of things is dependent upon the divine idea, and in so far Plato was right (c. gent. iii. 24). Theoretically, this Aristotelian fully accepted the maxim : ‘ { For the present we cannot know ( cognoscere ) God except through material effects” (summ. i. q. 86, a. 2, ad. 1). But as revelation now supplies this defect, the knowledge of this world in its connection of causes and effects becomes a knowledge of God (c. gent. iii. 50). The ideas of God are made manifest in the order of the world. 4. Finally, it may be said that Scholasticism has two aspects. It is orthodoxy, maintaining that the teachings of the church, the declarations of the ecclesiastical canon, the customs and practices of the church, are absolutely and unassailably true. That which actually exists is true, if it be ecclesiastically sanc¬ tioned. On the other hand, Scholasticism has a rationalizing tendency. That which is unchurchly is condemned as being unreasonable, and that which is churchly proved to be reason¬ able, by the intricate methods of dialectics. Here may be mentioned two great philosophic minds. Roger Bacon (j~ 1294) emphasized the importance of experience and the knowledge derived from it.1 Raymundus Lullus (f 1315) demanded, in opposition to the Averroistic illumination,2 that the positions of the Christian faith be strictly proved : “We propose to prove the articles of faith by necessary reasons.” The understanding must follow the faith, and thus they must mount together to the knowledge of the truth, even to the mysteries of revelation.3 The joyous confidence in the omnip¬ otence of logical demonstration, which marked the early days of Scholasticism, is here revived. But from the theological point of 1 Vid. St5ckl. ii. 916 ff. 2 Vid. Reuter, Gesch. d. Aufklarung, ii. 148 ff. 3 Vid. his Ars magna and cf. Neander, Denkwiirdigkeiten ii. (1846). Stockl. ii. 924 ff. io6 HISTORY OF DOCTRINES. view, Henry of Ghent (f 1293) is above ail worthy of men¬ tion as a sturdy representative of the older theology (he wrote Quodlibeta , a Commentary upon the Sentences, and a Sunwia theologiae')} In his conception of universals, he varies from Thomas. He held that the patterns ( exemplaria ) of things, exist as independent entities in God (quodl. vii. q. 1,2). Only grace can secure for us a view of these (summ. i. q. 2). He also maintained an actual existence of matter, which Thomas, following Aristotle, regarded as a mere potency (quodl. i. q. 10). Body and soul have not one, but two forms (quodl. iii. q. 15). Everywhere we find the emphasis laid upon perception and the em¬ pirical, as well as upon the religiously-colored Realism of ideas. In this, as his exaltation of the will above the intellect, Henry be¬ trays his Augustinian character, since the activity of the will is the dominating and controlling factor in life : “ The will out¬ ranks the intellect M (quodl. i. q. 14 and 16). As Duns Scotus establishes the transition to the last phase of the scholastic theology, we reserve notice of his position for our next chapter. We can here but refer also to his contemporary, Richard of Middletc , who likewise strongly emphasized the significance of the will in God and in man. (His commentary on the Sen¬ tences was printed, Brixen, 1591.) For the doctrine of Richard, vid. Seeberg, Theologie des Duns Scotus, p. 16 ff. § 54. Doctrine of God and Christo logy. Baur, Die Lehre v. d. Dreieinigket u. Menschwerdung, ii. 1842. J. De- LITZSCH, Die Gotteslehre d. Thom. v. Aq., 1870. Ritschl, Geschichtl. Stud. z. chr. Lehre v. Gott, in Jarbb. f. deutsche Theol., 1865, 279 ff. Wer¬ ner, Thomas, ii. 619 ff. Dorner, Lehre v. d. Person Christi, ii. 399 ff. H. Schultz, Lehre v. d. Gottheit Christi, 1881, p. 153 ff. i. The doctrine of the Nature of God was not wrought out by the ancient church, as the entire interest of that age was absorbed by the Trinitarian problem. The term “ person” 2 was restricted to the Trinitarian formulae, the divine nature being described as 1 ‘ substance ’ ’ or “essense” ( substantia , essentiaf And even when this was embellished by the predi¬ cates of eternity or of superessentiality, it led no further than to 1 Ed. Venet. 1613. Cf. Stockl. ii. 739 ff. Werner, Heinr. v. Ghent in Denkschr. d. Wiener Akad. Phil. -hist, cl., vol. 28, p. 9 7 ff. Siebeck, Ztschr. f. Philos, u. phil. Krit., vol. 93, p. 200 ff. For his biography, see Ehrle in Arch. f. Litt. u. KG. d. MA. i. 366 ff. For his theology, See¬ berg, Theol. des Duns Scotus, p. 605-625. 2 How persistent are such traditional usages is illustrated in the fact that Jacobi is the first who speaks of the “personal” God. Vid. Eucken, Grundbegriffe d. Gegenw, ed. 2, p. 269. DOCTRINE OF GOD AND CHRISTO LOGY. I07 the unfruitful abstractions of the conception of God in Greek philosophy. Even Augustine defined God as Essence ( essentia ), and the conception of the Areopagite appeared to be in harmony with this (Vol. I., p. 290 f. ). This theoretical deficiency was balanced practically by the doctrine of the divine attributes, and theoretically by the wealth of personal analogies, in the Augustinian doctrine of the Trinity, and, still more, by the rec¬ ognition of God as energetic Will in the Augustinian doctrine of predestination. But it was a decided step in advance when Anselm expressly maintained that God is a thinking Spirit (monolog. 27. 7 ff).1 Here, too, the teaching of Thomas is very significant. He also spoke of God in the Grecian way, as the supremely Existent ( maxime ens ), the prime Mover mum mo yens'), and gave the maxim: “We cannot consider concerning God how he is, but rather how he is not ’ ’ (summa i. q. 2, a. 3 ; q. 2 init.; compend. 3 ff. ). But in such connec¬ tions he yet always made it clear that the being of God is think¬ ing and willing (summ. i. q. 19, a. 1). Since now God is the prime Mover, it follows that he is “pure Action ( actus purus) and without any admixture of potentiality” (cq ip. 4, 11 ; summ. q. 3, a. 1, u. 7 ; 9, a. 1 ; q. 25, a. 1). Since this absolute Activity is thinking and willing, it realizes a goal ; and since God is goodness, His will is moved only by goodness or — it is love (ib. i. q. 19, a. 2; q. 20, a. 1). The final goal commensurate with God is He himself. Everything occurring in the world must therefore be referred to this goal, since God is the originator of the world. From this it is inferred that the fundamental relation¬ ship of God to the world is that of love for it. “ When anyone loves another, he wishes good for him, and so treats him as he would treat himself, doing good to him as to himself” (ib. q. 20, a. 1, ad 3). The thought is clear: God always desires himself as the final goal. When he establishes the world, he desires it from eternity as a means to this end ; in other words, he is related to it as to himself, i. e., he loves it. This relation of God to the world is manifested in that he gives to the world all things needful and preserves it in its course (this constituting his justitia and veritas ; q. 21, a. 1 and 2), and, further, in that he banishes misery. This is done when deficiencies are over¬ come “through the perfection of some good.” This is the mercy of God (ib. a. 3). God therefore loves the world, since, in every action of his bearing upon it, righteousness and mercy are joined together. This classical argumentation leads to a religious conception of God which necessarily includes the idea 1 Cf. the Germanic conception of God in Cur deus homo ? Esp. ii. 16. 108 HISTORY OF DOCTRINES. of a personal loving will. But instead of resting content in this positive conception, Thomas displays the influence of the Greek apprehension of God, e. g., regarding redemption as merely the best adapted means ‘ ‘ through which he better and more appro¬ priately attains his end” (ib. iii. q. i, a. 2). Yet we cannot fail to note in Thomas a positive advance in the doctrine con¬ cerning God. 2. This cannot be said in regard to the doctrine of the Trinity. When the Lombard, Alexander, and Thomas cite the spiritual functions of man as furnishing analogies, or when Richard of St. Victor (11. 6 de trin.) endeavors to find the solution of the problem in love, which requires a “mutual love ” and a separateness ( alietas ) of the three persons,1 they do not overstep the suggestions of Augustine. Only one point calls for our attention here. The Lombard (i. Gist. 5) dis¬ cusses the questions, whether the Father begat the divine essentia , or whether the latter begat the Son or himself. He answers them all in the negative. Since the divine essence, or nature, “is common to the three persons and entire in each,” the Father would otherwise have begotten himself, /. e., the essence by virtue of which he exists, which is impossible. Further¬ more, the divine essence would thus seem to be degraded to a mere relationship of the Godhead. The Lombard decides that the divine essence, which is identical in the hypostases, neither begets nor is begotten ; accordingly, the intertrinitarian life is a relation subsisting between the hypostases. These ideas, which were based upon the Augustinian premise of the strict unity of God, were assailed by Joachim of Floris (f 1202), who main¬ tained that the discrimination of the divine substance from the persons leads to Sabellianism or Arianism. He himself, like the Cappadocians, proceeds upon the supposition of the three persons, who together constitute one entity ( unum ), one substance (una substantia') , or one God ( unus deus), but not simply one individual (unus). Collective terms, such as “one herd, one populace,” are cited in illustration.2 The Fourth Lateran Council (A. D. 1215) made the following deliverance: “We believe and confess with Peter Lombard, that there is one certain supreme Entity ( una quaedam summa res), incompre¬ hensible indeed and ineffable, which truly is the Father, the 1 Cf. Meier, DieLehre v. d. Trinit. i. 292 ff. Rich, exclaims : “ Behold, how easily reason demonstrates that there must be a plurality of persons in the Godhead ! ” 2 Vid. excerpts from Joachim in the Protocol of Anagni (A. D. 1255), Denifle, Archiv. i. 136 ff.; cf. also the citation in Duns Scotus, sent. i. d. 5> T 3- DOCTRINE OF GOD AND CHRISTOLOGY. I09 Son, and the Holy Spirit, three persons at once, and separately either one of them. And therefore in God there is a trinity alone, not a quaternity ; because anyone of the three persons is that Entity ( res ), viz., substance, essence, or divine nature, which alone is the source of all things, outside of which nothing can be found. And that Entity is not begetting nor begotten, nor proceeding; but is the Father who begets, the Son who is begotten, and the Holy Spirit who proceeds, that there may be distinctions in persons and unity in nature (Hefele, v. 880 f. ). The church of the Middle Ages thus explicitly adopted the Augustinian doctrine concerning God.1 3. The Christological discussions of the twelfth century were not renewed in the thirteenth. The great Scholastics present in their Christology merely a reproduction of the traditional dogma, in which we note however the failure to emphasize that contemplation of the Man Jesus which inspired the devotional ardor of the Imitatio Christi. The fundamental ideas are as follows : The Logos-person, or the divine nature, takes the impersonal human nature into unity with itself. There is not ' thus originated one nature , but the union is consummated in the person. “ The divine nature . . . united to itself human nature, although not to its very self, but in one person ” (Bonav. iii. d. 5, a. i, q. i). “ The union was made in the person, not , in the nature” (Thom. summ. iii. q. 2, a. 2). 2 It is the entire human nature which is here involved. But the result is, after all, not a real combination of the two natures. The union con¬ sists in their common relation to the Logos-person. The union ... is a certain relation which may be considered between the divine nature and the human, according to which they meet in the one person of the Son of God. The unio is real, not in the divine, but only in the human nature (ib. q. 2, a. 7). Accordingly, the incarnation is to be understood only relatively : “ But God became man in this, that human nature began to be in the suppositum (unoo-raocs) of the divine nature, which pre¬ existed from eternity” (ib. q. 16, a. 6, ad 1). It is the inherited 1 The Lombard introduces into theology the Cappadocian terminology of the Damascene, and argues in its support (i. d. 19 NO). But it is important to observe that, even in the sermons of the period, the Augustinian type of the doctrine is preserved. E . g., Schonbach, Altd. Pred. ii. 115, no; iii. 1 1 5 f . (ein warer got in der heiligen driniisse. Der vaterund sein wistumund sein minne ist neur ein got). 2 Thomas accurately defined both terms. “A Tatura signifies essence ( essentia ), or that which anything is, or the quiddity of a species (ib. q. 2, a. 1); persona , the rational, individual substance of a nature ( rationalis naturae individua substantial) (a. 2, after Boethius); hypostasis is the same, with the omission of the term rationalist iio HISTORY OF DOCTRINES. defect of this Christology, that while divinity and humanity are placed in opposition abstractly, as infinite and finite, the Christ of the Gospels is only depicted in empty words.1 This drift is clearly seen in the discussion by Thomas of the question, whether there is only one being ( esse ) in Christ. He concludes that, as there is no hypostatic being ( Sein ) in the human nature of Christ, the question is to be answered in the affirmative (ib. q. 17, a. 2). Finally, the communicatio idiomatum is taught, as existing between the concretes, God and man : “ They are able to impart to one another the attributes ( idiomata co7?imu?iicare ) of that nature according to which they are spoken of in con¬ crete,” as though it should be said: God is man and man is God (Bonav. iii. d. 6, a. 1, q. 1 ; Thom. iii. q. 16, a. 5). Upon the two wills and two “operations,” see Thom. iii. q. 18 and 19. The present period displayed no independent interest in questions of Christology.2 Theologians were content to demon¬ strate the logical consistency of the traditional teaching of the church. They learned nothing — nor did they forget anything.3 § 55. The Work of Christ. 1 . The present period produced nothing new touching the work of Christ. The attempt was made, as had been done by the Lombard, to combine the objective view, in which the ideas of Anselm were accepted, with Abelard’s subjective interpretations. Thus Alexander of Hales, following Anselm, teaches the necessity of the satisfaction which Christ effects through his “merit” (summ. iii. q. 1, memb. 4 ff. ; q. 16, memb. 3 and 4). Bonaventura states the doctrine with more precision. The work of reparatio includes (1) That men through Christ, especially through his innocent sufferings, learn to know, love, and imitate God, and (2) that their sins be forgiven them through a worthy ( condign am ) satisfaction. This makes the in¬ carnation a necessity (breviloq. 4. 1. 9). “Since a simple creature could not make satisfaction for the whole human race, nor would it be proper that a creature of another race be taken for the purpose, it was necessary that the person of the one 1 How little the problem was understood may be gathered from the fact that Thomas declared that it would have been possible for the Logos to assume two human natures at the same time (ib. q. 3, a. 7). 2 But note the attempt of Bonaventura in the Breviloq. to find for every Christological proposition a ground in the theory of redemption. 3 Luther charged upon the Scholastics, that they “make a wall between the Son of God and the Son born of the Virgin Mary” (Erl. ed. 47. 362). This charge cannot be brought against Bernard, but it is true as applied to the scholastic method. — THE WORK OF CHRIST. Ill rendering satisfaction be God and man ” (sent. iii. d. 20, a. 1, q. 3). The satisfaction is effected through the merit of Christ ( pro nobis mereri et satisfacere , iii. d. 18, a. 2, q. 2) which he won “not only in action but also in suffering ” ( 'passione ) (ib. a. 1, q. 3. ; cf. brevil. 4. 7). Since in the acting and suffering of Christ there was a “ concursus of both natures ” (brevil. 4. 2), there belongs to the “ merit of the God-man — the perfection and plenitude of merit ” (ib. 4. 7). “ But to make satisfaction is to repay the honor due to God ” (4. 9). This was done by the sufferings of Christ as the most appropriate means ‘ ‘ for placating God” (iii. d. 20, a. 1, q. 5). Herein is displayed the mercy as well as the righteousness of God (ib. a. 1, q. 2). But with this Anselmian view is combined also the Abelardian idea, that the passion commended itself also as the most appropriate means, because suited to arouse men to a responsive love toward God (ib. a. 1, q. 5). It is to be noted, finally, that Bonaventura, by developing the thought of Christ’s relation to the church as the Head to the members, brought into view the connection between the work of redemption and the redeemed, as Anselm was never able to do.1 Reparation is accomplished, accordingly, by remedying, satisfying, and reconciling ( remedia?ido , satis- faciendo , et reconciliando, Brevil. 4. 2). 2. The noteworthy discussion of the subject by Thomas fol¬ lows the same line. In Christ as the Redeemer, the human nature comes into prominence ; but to it belongs, in consequence of its union with God, a certain divine efficacy ( virtus ) (summ. iii. q. 48, a. 5, ad 1 ; q. 49, a. 1, ad 1 and 2). This is not in¬ comprehensible, when we remember that the human nature exists only in the divine hypostasis (vid. supra). The work of redemption is thus presented : “ Inasmuch as he is also man, it is competent for him to unite men to God by exhibiting the pre¬ cepts and gifts (of God) to men and by making satisfaction and intercession for men to God ” (q. 26, a. 2). In this summary the leading ideas of the discussion are clearly expressed. (<2) In the human nature of Christ dwells the fullness of all grace (ib. q. 7, a. 1). He is now the Head of the human race, or of the church. From the Head, rank ( or do ), perfection and virtue overflow upon the members (q. 8, a. 1, 3, 4). 2 On the other hand, the merit of the Head inures to the good of the members (q. 48, a. 1 ; q. 49, a. 1) in so far as the latter are willing to belong to the Head. “ But the members ought to be con- 1 But see Bernard, De erroribus Abael., 6, 15: “Therefore the Head made satisfaction for the members.” 2 Thus even the sacraments, “which have their virtue from the passic^ Qf of Christ” (q. 49, a. I ad 4). 1 1 2 HISTORY OF DOCTRINES. formed to the Head ” (q. 49, a. 3, ad 3). This great concep¬ tion establishes the proposition, that Christ is the new man, who is the leaven and principle of the new humanity. (<£) The work of redemption is accordingly to be considered primarily *■ from the point of view, that Christ by his teaching, his acts, and his sufferings became the teacher and pattern of our race. This applies to his circumcision (q. 37, a. 1), baptism (q. 39, a. 1), temptation (q. 4, a. 1, 3), teaching : “ By associating with men ... he manifested to all his divinity by preaching and per¬ forming miracles and by dealing innocently and justly among men” (q. 40, a. 1, ad i),1 and miracles (q. 44, a. 3). It can neither surprise nor give offense to observe that Thomas applies this thought even to the passion of Christ : ‘ ‘ Through this, man recognizes how much God loves man, and through this he is provoked to the loving of God, in which the perfection of human salvation consists, ’ ’ and ‘ ‘ through this he has given to us an example of obedience, humility, constancy, righteousness, and other virtues” (q. 46, a. 3 ; q. 47, a. 4, ad 2). The love ( caritas ) to which we thus attain serves also (according to Lk. 7. 47) to secure the forgiveness of sins (q. 49, a. 1). Even the resurrection, the ascension, and the session at the right hand of God serve this end of instruction and suggestion, the last- named particularly because the exalted Saviour 4 ‘sends forth thence divine gifts to men” (q. 53, a. 1 ; q. 55, a. 3 ; q. 57, a. 6). This is the first train of thought : The Head of the church reveals God to his followers, teaches them, incites them to good, and bestows his gifts upon them, (c) Then comes the ' question of satisfaction. The absolute necessity of this Thomas denies. Since there is no one above God, and he is himself the ‘ “supreme and common Good of the whole universe,” he could even without satisfaction forgive sin (q. 46, a. 2, ad 3). But the method of satisfaction would most clearly give expression to his ' righteousness and mercy, and he therefore chose it (ib. a. 1, ad 3). At this point Thomas parts company with the juristic conception of Anselm, a departure which is further emphasized 9 by his view that, on account of the greatness of Christ’s love and the value of his life, “ the passion of Christ was not only a suffi¬ cient, but also a superabundant satisfaction ” (q. 48, a. 2 and 4). Thus both the necessity and the equivalence of the satisfaction are surrendered. The satisfaction consists in the passion of Christ. He bore all sufferings “ according to genus” (q. 46, a. 5), anq the greatest possible grief (dolor maximus, ib. a. 6). . 01 , i r C q. 42, a. 2, an intelligent response to the inquiry why Christ did not become? a writer. THE WORK OF CHRIST. IT3 But the passion of Christ is now to be regarded, not from a material, but from a personal and ethical point of view. It was an act of obedience and love : “ He suffered out of love and obedience ” (q. 47, a. 2), since God “ inspired in him the will to suffer for us by infusing love into him” (ib. a. 3). His death was also a sacrifice only in so far as it was an act of free will (q. 47, a. 2,ad 2 ; a. 4, ad 2 ; q. 48, a. 3). If the concep¬ tion of “ merit” forms the basis of man’s ethical conduct, according to the theory of the Middle Ages, it is but consistent that Thomas should regard the passion also from this point of view : “Through his passion he merited salvation, not only w . for himself but also for his members” (q. 48, a. 1); for suffer¬ ing is meritorious “only in proportion as anyone voluntarily endures it” (ib. ad. 1). The expiatory sufferings of Christ are the fundamental basis of our salvation. But that the aim of these is for our justification and the imparting of grace, is not . clearly set forth by Thomas. As the stimulating influence of Christ continues in his state of exaltation, “his representation from human nature,” in heaven is “a kind of intercession ( interpellatio ) for us ” (q. 57, a. 6). (^/) The Result of the work of redemption, according to Thomas, embraces the following : ( 1 ) The forgiveness of sins, and this through the love begotten in us (vid. under ( $ 1 : “ Power ( virtus ) wonderfully asso¬ ciated with (, collata ) the corporal agent itself.” $ 5 : “Consecration ( sane - tifeatio) is something coming to the water or oil, and it does not give sub¬ stantial existence ( esse substantiate') to the oil or water, but it gives accidental existence” ( esse accidentale). SACRAMENTS AND CHURCH. I27 a directly creative act of God in the soul, i. e. : “By such covenant the Lord has obligated himself to, in some way, give grace to him who receives the sacrament ” (Bon. sent. iv. d. 1, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2, 3, 4 ; brev. 6. 1). This view, through its advocacy by Duns Scotus, became the dominant one in the later Middle Ages. Since God alone has power to create, grace can have only ah act of God as its direct cause. The sacra¬ ments are “sure signs,” since the divine covenant with the church makes a concomitance of the divine working certain. “The divine will alone is the invisible cause of the effect which the sacrament seals and accompanies. God therefore is the immediate cause of such effect of the sacrament through his assistance to the sacrament, upon which he has arranged always to bestow assistance and confer grace . . . and thus his will alone is the prime and principal invisible cause of this effect ” (report, iv. d. 2, q. 1, § 2). We cannot say “that he binds his power to the sacraments” (sent. iv. d. 14, q. 4, 6). Ac¬ cordingly, the external sign “ signifies” that which the accom¬ panying grace inwardly effects in the recipient, as, e. g. , in the case of baptism, purification : “ But the cleansing of the soul from sin which it certainly signifies, it represents by divine appointment ; from which (it follows that) God, who instituted baptism, assists his sign to the producing of the represented effect ” (Biel, iv. d. 1, q. 1, a. 1 ; cf. Durand, iv. d. 1, q. 4, a. 1). This view reminds us distinctly of the Augustinian origin of the defini¬ tion of a sacrament, being in reality a remnant of Augustinianism in the Franciscan dogmatics : the external sacrament is in and of itself only an image of that which God works in the soul.1 It was certainly only by artifice that transubstantiation could be maintained under such a definition. Of the two views noted, the church naturally chose the coarser. Eugene IV. writes : “ They (the ancient sacraments) did not cause grace . . . but these of ours both contain grace and confer it upon those worthily receiving them. ’ ’ (d) The sacraments bring to man justifying grace (gratia justificans , Thom. q. 62, a. 6). “By sacramental effect I understand the grace making acceptable, which he secures who receives the sacrament not unworthily ” (Biel, iv. d. 1, q. 1, a. 2). Thomas here discriminated between the “ grace of powers and gifts” and “sacramental grace,” inasmuch as the former 1 Thomas had already pointed out the possible consequence of this view : “ According to this, the sacraments of the New Testament would be nothing more than signs of grace, although it is held by many authorities of the saints that the sacraments of the New Testament not only signify but cause fausanf) grace” (iii. q. 62, a. i). 128 HISTORY OF DOCTRINES. complete in a general way the nature and powers of the sou’ ; while the separate sacraments produce special effects (q. 62, a. 2 ; q. 89, a. 1 ; vid. also Bonav. iv. d. 1, p. 1, a. 1, q. 6). Later theologians acknowledged the essential identity of all gratia gratum fciciens : “ That there is one and the same grace in kind in all who have grace, whether this be infused through partici¬ pation in the sacraments, or through merits acquired, or, even without either, gratuitously infused. ’ ’ The difference existing is “ only in the mind {rati one') and not in reality nor in essence ” (Biel, iv. d. 2, q. 1, a. 3, dub. 2 ; vid. already Alex. iv. q. 8,m. 4, a. 2, § 1). But the sacraments impart not only justifying grace. To those which are administered but once is attributed as a “sec¬ ondary effect” the impartation of spiritual character {character spiritualis) which makes man continuously capable of honoring God according to the manner of the Christian religion (Thom, q. 63, a. 1, 2). And, inasmuch as this involves a certain participation in the priesthood of Christ, which is eternal, this “character” attaches to the soul “indelibly” (ib. a. 5). The “character” is therefore the indestructible habitual dis¬ position of the Christian soul — and that “according to the in¬ tellectual part — toward those things which are for the promotion of divine worship ” (a. 4, 5. Alex. iv. q. 8, m. 3, 4. Bonav. iv. d. 6, p. 1, a. 1, q. 3, 5). Duns located the character in the will (iv. d. 6, q. n, § 4). But the conception is so lacking in clearness that we are led to infer that Duns (iv. d. 6, q. 9, § 13), as well as Biel, still entertains serious doubts upon the point. Neither reason nor the authorities demand it, and only one passage of Innocent III.1 can be cited in its favor, and even this Biel thinks can be differently interpreted (Duns, iv. d. 6, q. 9, § 13 f. Biel, iv. d. 6, q. 2, a. 1, concl. 2). But Eugene IV. elevated this point also to the dignity of a dogma of the church : “Among these sacraments there are three which imprint a character , i. e., a certain spiritual mark {signum) distinctive from others, indelibly upon the soul. Whence, they are not repeated in the same person.” {e) Only one further question concerning the sacraments in general remains to be considered — touching the worthy or unworthy reception of them. It is involved in the conception of the New Testament sacraments, that they are effectual exopere operato , i. e., through their objective administration. Thus teaches Alexander (iv. q. 8, m. 4, a. 1) and especially Albert (sent. iv. d. 1, a. 1) and all the later writers, e. g., Bonaven- 1 Vid. the passage in Denzinger, Enchiridion symbolor. et definit. n. 341, 342; cf. Duns, 1. c. : “Therefore solely upon the authority of the church, running up to the present time, it is to be held that character is imprinted.” SACRAMENTS AND CHURCH. I29 tura : “The sacraments of the New Testament justify and con¬ fer grace of themselves ex opere operato ” (iv. d. 1, p. 1, a. 1, q. 5). A certain disposition is indeed desired in the recipient, perhaps faith (Lombard, iv. d. 4, B. Bonav. iv. d. 1, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2); but the later writers especially confined themselves to the requirement, that there be no obstacle ( obex ) nor mortal sin. As an opus operatum , the sacrament did not presuppose a good inner motive ( bonus motus interior ) as necessary to a profitable reception. Precisely this was one mark of distinction from the Old Testament sacraments (Duns, iv. d. 1, q. 6, § 10). With this efficacy ex opere operato is contrasted that based upon the personality or action of the participant (ex opere operante'). That is to say, if the recipient prepares himself for the reception of the sacrament, he receives also as a reward, upon the ground of this merit, a further gracious influence. “ Any sign may be understood to confer grace in a two-fold way. This occurs in one way by the sign itself or the sacrament, or, as some say, by the deed performed, ex opere operato . Thus by the very fact that the work (opus'), i. e., sign or sacrament, is celebrated (exhibetu?') , grace is conferred unless an obstacle of mortal sin hinder ; because, besides the celebration (exhibitio) of the sign externally celebrated, a good inner motive is not required in the recipient by which he may merit grace by worthiness or fitness, but it suffices that the recipient interpose no obstacle. . . . In another way, signs or sacraments are understood to confer grace by the one performing the work (ex opere operante) and by the way of merit, i. e., that the sacrament externally celebrated does not suffice for the conferring of grace, but beyond this is required a good motive, or inner devotion, of the one receiving the sacrament, according to whose intention grace is conferred corresponding to the merit of worthiness or fitness, precisely, and not more, according to the celebration of the sacrament ” (Biel, iv. d. 1, q. 3, a. 1, n. 2). 2. Turning to the separate sacraments, we begin with Bap¬ tism. The material (materia) of this sacrament is water, or, more precisely speaking, washing with water.1 The form (forma) consists in the words : “I baptize thee in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. ’ ’ From the time of Alexan¬ der the effects of baptism were more precisely stated than had been done by the Lombard. It is said to impart the grace making acceptable (gratia gratum faciens), and this impartation effects both a capacitating of the soul for the doing of good and the 1 Duns, iv. d. 3, q. 3, $ 2 : “ The first thing is the visible washing itself, for this, together with the words as a sign, signifies the first effect of baptism.” 9 130 HISTORY OF DOCTRINES. forgiveness of guilt and penalty.1 “ He who is baptized is freed from the guilt (liability, reatus') of the entire penalty owed by him for his sins ” (Thom. summ. iii. q. 69, a. 2), and “ through baptism one secures grace and powers” ( virtutes , ib. a. 4). “ From all eternal (penalty) baptism absolves by destroying all sin ( culpa)' ' and ‘ ‘ grace has a two-fold action, viz. , to destroy sin ( peccatum ) and to make apt for good ” (Bonav. sent. iv. d. 4, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2 and 3). By it there is effected at the same time a restraint of concupiscence (Lomb. iv. d. 4 F ; ii. d. 32 A. Duns, iv. d. 4, q. 7, § 1). Finally, baptism imparts the spiritual li character,” which is to be thought of as an infused disposition {habitus inf usus) . According to this theory, in baptism grace is infused into the sinner, and this grace blots out the sins of the past and weakens the sinful impulses of the recipient. But as these impulses still remain active, there remain also for the bap¬ tized the punishments ( poenalitates ) of the present life (Thom, q. 69, a. 3). Both serve for testing and attesting. Precisely the same gifts are granted in infant baptism, any difficulties sug¬ gesting themselves in this case being met by the consideration, that baptism confers not separate virtues, but the habitus virtu- tum (Thom. q. 69, a. 6). To secure the benefits of baptism, faith is required in the recipient. In the case of unbelievers ( Jictio ), the benefit is secured when they have done penance for their unbelief (Thom. q. 69, a. 10. Bonav. iv. d. 4, p. 1, a. 2, q. 2 f . ) . In the case of children, an obligation imposed upon the sponsors to see to their instruction in the Christian faith takes the place of the yet lacking confession of faith (Lomb. iv. d. 6 G. Bonav. iv. d. 6, p. 2, a. 3, q. i).2 Eugene IV. defines as the effect of the sacrament : “ the remis¬ sion of all original and actual sin, also of every penalty which is due for that sin.” 3. There is no advance in the doctrine of later Scholastics upon the sacrament of Confirmation ; for the assertion that it was instituted by Christ ( 3 f-)> wh° presents this explanation as a possible one, and merely says in comment: “Therefore the other way is more suitable than this.” But to this theory belongs the future, as we shall see. Duns continued to maintain transubstantiation only because it was a dogma of the church. See- BERG, Duns Scotus, p. 382 ff. 1 Although it is said that the substance of the bread and wine do not re¬ main ( non jnanere),\.Y\t term anmhilatio was avoided, inasmuch as the resultant is the body of Christ. Vid. Thom. q. 75, a. 2, 3. Duns, iv. d. 11, q. 4, 14. Biel, iv. d. 11, q. 1, a. 2, dub. 6. Occam, iv. q. 6, ad dub. 7. 2 Biel says that Christ gave to his disciples a “ body such as he had, i. e.y mortal and passible,” without feeling the “ teeth of those eating it ” (iv. d. 9, q. I, a. 3, dub. 3). From the other view it would follow, that if the hostia r. of the first celebration had been preserved, Christ would have been, during the.. SACRAMENTS AND CHURCH. I33 (/) But at this point a difficulty emerges whose solution exer¬ cised the Scholastics beyond all others : If the body of Christ is, as is confessed, present in heaven at a particular place, how can it be received at the same time in the sacrament at various places? Alex¬ ander’s opinion was that “ Christ is circumscriptively, or locally, contained in heaven, but not contained circumscriptively, or locally, under the sacrament ” (iv. q. 40, m. 3, a. 7). Thomas similarly taught “ that the body of Christ is in this sacrament in the manner of substance {per modum substantia ), and not in the manner of quantity {per modum quantitatis') ” (q. 76, a. 1, ad 3). The Christ who is locally present in heaven is, therefore, not present in a local manner in the sacrament, but only substantially (q. 75, a. 1, ad 3 ; q. 76, a. 4, 5; cf. Richard, iv. d. 10, princ. 2, q. 1. Durand, iv. d. 10, q. 10 fin.; vid. also Carthu¬ sian. iv. d. 10, q. iff.). Duns rightly rejected this, since a thing without its properties is not conceivable (iv. d. 10, q. 1. 12). Duns himself thinks that God, by virtue of his omnipo¬ tence, which is limited only by the logically impossible, can very well cause a body to exist at different places at the same time. We cannot see, he argues, why the relations of a thing to space may not be multiplied (ib. q. 2. 11 ; q. 3. 5). Accordingly, Christ can be at the same time in heaven and at any number of places. The later writers disputed this, for its (realistic) pre¬ mise is the independent existence of space, while to the Nomi¬ nalists space is only the object presented as occupying space, upon which theory a spacial existence of Christ in the Lord’s Supper is inconceivable. It is rather to be said, that quantity and the property of occupying space are accidental properties of a thing. If the thing be reduced to a point, it yet remains what it was, and, therefore, still possesses the property of occupying space, although it no longer exists in space. It is, therefore, to be said that the body of Christ is present in the Lord’s Supper with the property of quantity, but without existing therein as a quantity (vid. especially Occam, tract, de sacr. altar, c. 16 ff. Biel, iv. d. 10, q. 1, a 1 and 2. Cf. fuller discussion at a later point). But these empty speculations, all combined, do not prove the impossible. The body of Christ is local in heaven, and it is in its entirety present in its substance at every celebra¬ tion of the Lord’s Supper. Dogma stands over against dogma, and all the efforts of logic cannot bridge the gulf. {g) Finally, the effect of this sacrament claims attention. In general, it is to be said : “ The effect which the passion of Christ three days after his crucifixion, both dead and alive at once ! (Biel, exposit. canonis miss. lect. 46 L). I34 HISTORY OF DOCTRINES. has produced in the world, this sacrament produces in man (Thom. q. 79, a. 1). Regarding it more closely, we may say “ that the eucharist was instituted to be a sacrifice and to be a sacrament , or food” (Biel, exposit. can. miss. lect. 85 D). As the latter, it signifies a strengthening of the spiritual life, the im¬ parting of grace, and the forgiveness of venial sins (Thom., 1. c. ). The later writers are but logically consistent when, in accordance with their interpretation of the work of Christ, they make this impartation of grace to consist in a reminding of the love of Christ and his pious example, and in the awakening of a respon¬ sive affection and inciting to good works. The Supper is a memoriale divinae passionis. This view is instructively presented in Biel, exposit. can. miss. lect. 85 B, O, V, X, Y.1 But, side by side with this effect of the sacrament, stands its sacrificial character. The body of Christ is really offered up : “ There is not only a representative (repraesentativa) , but a real immola¬ tion ( immolatio verafi (Albert, sent. iv. d. 13, a. 23). Thesac- rifice benefits first of all the participants in the sacrament, but then also others “ in so far as it is offered for their salvation,” and in so far as they have faith in the sacrament (Thom. q. 79, a. 7, q. 83, a. 1). The sacrifice is also effectual for souls in purgatory.2 The reality of the sacrifice does not interfere with its being at the same time a representation and reminder of the passion (Biel, 1. c., lect. 85 F). But the principal thing is still : “ And this sacrifice is of operative effects similar to those which the sacrifice upon the cross itself produced ” (Biel, ib. K). This formed the basis of the worst perversions of the practical life of the church (meritoriousness of the mass; private masses ; after A. D. 1264, the festival of Corpus Christi). Here also, theology made no advance. We cite from the definitions of Eugene IV. the following : “ For the priest, speaking in the person of Christ, makes ( conficit ) 1 Biel enumerates the following effects: “ vivificare, relaxare, inflammare, patientiam dare, nutrire, restaurare, unire, copulare, sanare, conservare, robor- are, perducere.” Vid. also sermo46 of Biel’s Festival Sermons. 2 Vid. Biel, sermo 46 R : “ It is granted that the fruit of the eucharist is more efficacious as a sacrament, but it is more general as a sacrifice, . . . because as a sacrament it operates only in those who take it, but as a sacrifice it has effect in all those for whom it is offered. But it is offered, not only for those who participate by taking it, but also for all who are standing by, yea, even for the absent, the living and the dead. . . . Although it is granted that sinners are inflamed by partaking ( perceptione ) of the eucharist, but not by the hearing of the mass. ... Yet even to sinners not contrite nor . . . re¬ garding with displeasure their continuing sins, it is useful to frequently give help ( assistere ) by the office of the mass, and to procure that it be offered for them in order that they may thus merit to be regarded by the Lord with pity,, and may be inspired to displeasure in their sins which they yet have.” SACRAMENTS AND CHURCH. *35 this sacrament ; for, by virtue of the very words, the substance of the bread is converted into the body of Christ, and the sub¬ stance of the wine into his blood, yet in such a way that Christ is contained entire under the form of the bread, and entire under the form of the wine, and under any part whatever of the con¬ secrated wafer and consecrated wine, when separated, is the en¬ tire Christ. ’ ’ 5. As the Lord’s Supper blots out venial sins, and baptism orig¬ inal sin, so Repentance has been instituted to dispel mortal sins. It is with mortal sins alone that confession and absolution have to do, not with so-called venial sins. A certain displeasure in view of the failing, the repetition of the Lord’s Prayer, sprink¬ ling with consecrated water, the blessing of a bishop, are suffi¬ cient for the latter, which are not regarded as requiring an in¬ fusion of grace (Alex. iv. q. 77, m. 2, a. 5. Bonav. iv. d. 17, p. 3, a. 2. Thom. summ. iii. q. 87, a. 1.; a. 2, ad 2 ; a. 3).1 Thus the disastrous discrimination between greater and smaller sins,2 the latter of which were scarcely regarded any longer as actual sins, was justified. This discrimination was necessary, as only by this means could the petition for the forgiveness of sin have any meaning after the sacrament of repentance had been ob¬ served. Turning now to the sacrament of Repentance, we recall the problem which the school of Abelard had left unsolved, i. e., If divine forgiveness follows contrition , what need is there of confession and absolution ? This question was answered, as we shall see, by the Scholastics. In this sacrament also materia and forma are discriminated. The former consists in acts of the penitent ( actus poenitentis ); the latter, in the words of the priest : I absolve thee (Thom. q. 84, a. 2, 3. Bonav. iv. d. 22, a. 2, q. 2. Biel, iv. d. 14, q. 2, a. 1). The remark, “that in anything whatsoever perfection is attributed to the form ’ ’ (Thom. ib. a. 3), fixes at once in advance the position of Ab¬ solution, as constituting the essential element of the sacrament. (<2) According to traditional teaching, the first element of the sacrament is contritio. To understand the course of develop¬ ment here we must constantly bear in mind that repentance, and particularly its first part, contrition, is already, as an act 1 According to Duns not even attritio is here necessary (iv. d. 17, q. 1, 25). 2 Thomas (q. 86, a. 4 ; q. 87, a. 2) thus discriminates: “In mortal sin there are two things, i. e., a turning away ( aversio ) from immutable good, and a turning [conversion toward mutable good in venial sins, on the con¬ trary, there is present only “ an inordinate turning to mutable good without turningr away from God. Eternal punishment, therefore, befits the former, and only temporal punishment the latter.” Upon this question, see also Biel* iv. d. 17, q. 1, a. 2, concl. 3. Cf. Melanchthon apol., p. 168, 6. !36 HISTORY OF DOCTRINES. “ formed ” by love or as a Christian virtue, a product of grace. From this it follows, that contrition in itself merits and effects the full annihilation of guilt and punishment (Thom, suppl. q. 5, a. 2. Cf. Wilhelm v. Paris, de sacr. opp. Niirnberg, 1496, ii. fol. 41 v, 44 V, 46 r). On the other hand, in the sacrament of repentance, contritio is represented as an “inclination ( disposi - tio") toward the receiving of grace ” (Thom. ib. q. 5, a. 1, and iii. q. 89, a. 1, ad 2). But there is no need of any such dis- positio ; in fact, it makes the sacrament entirely unnecessary. Quite forced appears, therefore, the argument of Thomas, that, since no one can know whether he has a degree of sorrow sufficient to secure forgiveness, it is necessary for us to continually avail ourselves of the opportunity of confession and absolution (suppl. q. 5, a. 2, ad 1). And it is no more than an opinion, that the resolution to confess is always combined with contrition (ib.). When we consider, further, that the individual concerned is always one who has fallen into a mortal sin, it is evident that he cannot, without the influence of the sacrament of repentance, even produce contrition in himself. To meet this difficulty a new idea, that of an attritio , or purely human inclination toward the re¬ ception of grace, is introduced as being sufficient. This furnishes a key for the solution of the above problem, for this half-penitence does not fully merit the forgiveness of sins, and hence room is left for confession and absolution. The word, attritio , occurs first in Alarms of Insulis,1 2 then in Alexander of Hales (iv. q. 74) and William of Paris (opp. 1 1. 45 v), but it is used by them in such a way as to indicate that it was already an accepted term in the language of the schoolmen. Thomas defines it: “Attritio signifies a certain, but not perfect, displeasure concerning sins committed ” (suppl. q. 1, a. 2). 2 Its motive is commonly fear : “ Servile fear is the source ( principium ) of attrition ’ ’ (Alex. iv. q. 74, m. 1. Durand, iv. d. 17, q. 1, a. 3). 3 If now anyone has a certain displeasure toward his sin, he is in suitable condi- 1 Vid. Regul. theol. 85 (Migne, 210. 665 C): “is either remitted by attri¬ tion . . . although he have not perfectly repented, or dismissed by contrition when he is fully converted from sin.” 2 Upon the two terms, vid. Biel, iv. d. 16, q. I, a. I, n. 3. 3 Cf. Thomas (iii. q. 85, a. 5), who, in answer to the question, “Whether the source of penitence is from fear,” replies that the acts of the soul in re¬ pentance are the following : “ Faith, servile fear, by which one is restrained from sin by fear of punishments, hope, love, filial fear.” Accordingly: “ It is evident that the act of penitence proceeds from servile fear, as from the first motion of the affection inclining toward it.” Cf. also Biel, iv. d. 14, q. 1, a. 3, dub. 6 : “In beginners not yet perfect ... it frequently arises from fear of punishment, which arises from love of self, but in the perfect it arises from the love of God and of righteousness.” Durand (vid. supra): “ For peni¬ tence is conceived in fear.” SACRAMENTS AND CHURCH. 137 tion to make confessson. “ But if a penitent, prepared ;as far as in him lies, comes to confession, attrite but not contrite, I say that confession , with subjection to the will of the priest and sat¬ isfaction of the penance enjoined by the priest, is a sign and cause of the blotting out of guilt and penalty” (Alex. iv. q. 60, m. i, a. 3). Confession is made before the priest, because he only who can consecrate the eucharist has authority over the powers of grace (Thom, suppl. q. 8, a. 1 ; q. 10, a. 1. Alex, q. 76, m. 3, a. 1). Then follows absolution, which brings the divine forgiveness. But it is impossible “ that God should remit an offense to anyone without any change of the latter’s will ” (Thom. q. 86, a. 2). Hence : “ There can be no remission of sins except through infusion of grace” (ib. q. 89, a. 1). Ab¬ solution, therefore, brings divine forgiveness by effecting at the same time the abolition of the mortal sin by an infusion of grace (cf. supra, p. 120). If th z attrite person do not now himself interpose an obstacle, he receives grace through confession and absolution (Thom, suppl. q. 18, a. i).1 This effects the for¬ giveness of the liability ( reatus ) to eternal punishment, as well as “ something of ( aliquid de ) the temporal punishment. ’ ’ This lat¬ ter expression, which somewhat modifies the conception of Abe¬ lard, is to be attributed to a regard for the “ satisfaction,” which would otherwise be useless (ib. q. 18, a. 2). Such is the teach¬ ing of Thomas.2 Duns gives a different turn to the doctrine. Attritio , according to his view, when it has lasted for a definite time, establishes a merit of fitness (de congruo) , a claim to the favorable regard of God. The penitent must now make his confes¬ sion, whereupon grace is infused, or sin is destroyed by the conver¬ sion o i attritio into contritio , i. e. , since love is imparted, and thereby the informa attritio is transformed into the formirta contritio (sent, iv. d. 14, q. 2, 14 to 16). The outcome of this is essentially the same as in Thomas, for since absolution infuses grace, it creates love, and by this means transforms the attritio into contritio. The infusion of grace takes place through absolution. For the attrite , the process takes the following course : “ For it is suffi¬ cient that some displeasure, although imperfect (informis') , pre¬ cedes, and then he is capable of sacramental absolution, and through it contrition is awakened ” (iv. d. 16, q. 1. 7). And 1 If the confessing person is sufficiently contrite, absolution brings an in¬ crease of grace. 2 It became afterward the general scholastic doctrine. Alexander taught differently, i. 4- I, ad 2), because the validity of absolution always depends upon the regularity of the priestly jurisdiction, and this is wanting in the case of here¬ tics and schismatics ; as in their administration of all sacraments. Cf. Duns, report, iv. d. 25, q. 1, 16. 3 According to Thomas (q. 65, a. 1), polygamy contradicts natural law. Duns denies this, and considers it possible that after depopulating wars or pes¬ tilences polygamy may be revealed by God to the church as allowable (iv. d. 33, q- i- 6). 4 Because those established in sacred orders handle the sacred vessels and SACRAMENTS AND CHURCH. M3 with the church, is a sacrament. Its form consists of the words of consent, “but not the benediction of the priest, which is sacra¬ mental in character ’ * ( quoddam sacramenta/e) . This sacrament is, therefore, administered by him who uses it (q. 42, a. 1). In the consensus , there is an accompanying divine agency which hallows the married life (q. 45, a. i).1 Duns expresses himself most accurately, representing as the sacramental effect of mar¬ riage the gracious union of souls (gratiosa conjunctio animarum , iv. d. 2 6, § 15, 17). Inasmuch as the two persons desire to be¬ long to each other, God establishes an inner relation between them. As separate effects are mentioned marital fidelity, the repression of lust during the act of copulation, and the turning of its energy toward a useful union ( copula utilis, Bonav. iv. d. 26, a. 2, q. 2), i. e., the living together of the married pair and their co-operation in the rearing of children (Albert, iv. d. 26, a. 14). To these is to be added what Christian marriage has in in common with the natural ordinance, i. e. , that the copulative act, which is in itself unwortny of man, because for the time being depriving him of reason, is in marriage legitimized and excused in view of the blessings which it brings (Thom. q. 49, a. 1). These blessings are progeny and fidelity, to which Chris¬ tianity adds the sacrament (thus Lombard, iv. d. 31 A, follow¬ ing Augustine, De genesi ad litt. ix. 7. 12). We need not enter upon a discussion of the hindrances of marriage, which were considered at length by the Scholastics. 2 Eugene IV. describes as the efficient cause of marriage, the “ mutual consent expressed through words concerning the person present.” As the bless¬ ings of marriage, he enumerates : ‘ ‘ Children to be received and educated ; fidelity, which each of the married pair ought to ob¬ serve toward the other, ’ ’ and 4 ‘ the indivisibility of marriage on account of the fact that it signifies the indivisible union of Christ and the church.” It is very evident that this last of the sacraments attained but a loose and unfinished form. Neither is there a distinct definition of its material, nor is it clear how or sacraments, and it is, therefore, becoming (deceits') that they by continence preserve bodily purity (iv. q. 53, a. 3). 1 Bonaventura (iv. d. 26, a. 2, q. 3): “Matrimony receives a reason of spirituality and grace when consent is joined with the benediction, where its sig¬ nificance is explained ; and sanctification is obtained through the benediction, and thus in the sacerdotal benediction consists chiefly the spiritual reason.” It is remarkable that this idea is not, following the example of the sacrament of penance, crystallized in the formula, that the priestly benediction is the form, and the consent of the parties the material , of the sacrament. This was done only in sporadic instances during the Middle Ages, though more frequently at a later period. Vid. Kirchenlex. iv., ed. 2, 145 f. 2 Briefly presented in the Versus memoriales in Bonav. brevil. 6. 13. 144 HISTORY OF DOCTRINES. whence the consent of the contracting parties has a sacramental character.1 9. Such is the Catholic doctrine of the sacraments, as it was afterward adopted substantially unchanged by the Council of Trent. Two elements concurred from the beginning in its con¬ struction, the materializing of grace and the hierarchical concep¬ tion of the church (vid. Augustine). The sacraments infuse grace, but the priests make the sacraments. We have been con¬ sidering the conception of grace involved, and it remains for us to glance briefly at the conception of the church, where we will find that no advance has been made upon the utterances of Hugo. ( a ) “ The Church is the same thing as the assembly ( congrc - gatio ) of the faithful, and every Christian is, therefore, a mem¬ ber of the church. ” This definition (Thomas, exposit. symbol, opp. xvii. 69) asserts nothing more than that the Christian com¬ munity is the church. Thomas employs also, instead of this, the term communio fideliwti (summ. suppl. q. 23, a. i).2 In the church, as in Noah’s ark, there is salvation. That is to say, in the “communion of saints” is transmitted, i. e., participation in the sacraments, for this is Thomas’s conception of the term.3 1 It is true that, for those who express such consent, the creative benedic¬ tion becomes effective. It may be said, in case they are Christians, that the blessing of the kingdom of Christ is also theirs ; but can we think of a dis¬ play of grace here which would not be identical with that personally experi¬ enced ? The objection commonly urged by Protestants that, although mar¬ riage is acknowledged as a sacrament, virginity is regarded as a higher state, has no force, as a parallel to this is furnished in the case of repentance. 2 This is the current definition of the church. Vid. , e. g., Duns, report, iv. d. 24, q. I. 5 : universitasfidelium. In sent. iv. d. 1 9, § 15 : communio fidelium. The meaning is peculiarly clear in De perfec. statuum 34. 9 : the church is the congregatio of all believers, i. e ., the Saracens, for example, do not belong to it. Occam, dial. Goldast, monarchia, ii. pp. 402, 503, 471, 481, 498, 788, 799 : congregatio fidelium, or communitas fidelium or christia- norum, ib. p. 788 ff., 806 f., 810, 814, 923. Marsil. Defensor pac. ii. 2, p. 193 ; 6, p. 209, in Goldast, monarch, ii. Biel, expos, can. miss. lect. 22 D. Thomas Motter, doctrinale, ii. 9 ff. 3 The term, communio sanctorum , is very differently interpreted : of the sacraments , e. g ., Abelard (Mi. 178, p. 629), Ivo of Chartres (Mi. 162, 606), Thom. 1. c. ; of the saints , e.g., Bruno of Wurzburg (Mi. 142, 5°°)> in Schonbach’s Altd. Predigten, i. 42 f. 46; of the angels , e. g., Alexander (summ. iv. q. 37, $ 9); of the church triumphant (Gerson, opp. i. 240); of the saints and the sacraments, e.g., Bonav. centiloq. , p. 3, $ 38 — worthy of note is the remark of Joslenus of Soissons (Mi. 186, 1488), in which the two are thus combined: “I believe the truth of the sacraments, in which the saints took part, so that I believe what they, too, believed in regard to bap¬ tism and the Lord’s Supper; ” cf. Richard, iii. d. 25, princ. I, q. 2. Thom. Motter, doctrinale, v. 95 ; of fellowship of the saints and the spiritual bless¬ ings secured by them (vid. Hasack, Der chr. Glaube d. deutschen Volkes, etc., SACRAMENTS AND CHURCH. J45 But the sacraments bring us grace. They lead us, further, to the ministers ( ministri ) who have received from the apostles author¬ ity for the forgiveness of sins (expos, p. 70). Thus the defini¬ tion of the church as the congregation of believers fits in exactly with the conception of it as a body politic ( congregatio politico, > Thom, suppl. q. 26, a. 1), consisting of rulers ( rectores ) and subjects ( subditi ). (b) But since the church is an organized stat e (politia ordi- nata ), there is in it a gradation of rulers (Duns, iv. d. 24, § 3). In addition to the lawgivers, there must be some whose office it. shall be to adapt the laws to circumstances (Thom, suppl. q. 20, a. 1). All priests are authorized to administer the eucharist, but some sacraments are reserved for the bishop. In regard to the power of the keys, a distinction is made between the key of the order ( clavis ordinis ) and the key of jurisdiction ( jurisdic - Homs'). The former, which grants forgiveness, belongs to the priesthood. The latter belongs to the bishop alone, and is his power of spiritual dominion, the plenary authority ( potestas plena) to grant or refuse the sacraments, and also the jurisdiction in the administration of justice (in foro causarum). The bishop alone can grant to the priest the right to use the key which belongs ta the latter (Thom. sent. iv. d. 18, q. 1, a. 1), in doing which he reserves special cases for his own decision (Thom, suppl. q. 20, a. 2). Hence : “ The bishop alone is properly called a prelate ( praelatus ) of the church, and, therefore, he alone has plenary power in the dispensing of the sacraments and jurisdiction in the administration of justice, . . . but others, on account of that which is committed to them by him. But the priests who are set over the people are not simply prelates, but, as it were, assistants ’ ’ (ib. q. 26, a. 1). (c) But the church is One Body. In harmony with this is the solitary power of the pope (ib. q. 40, a. 6). “The supreme pontiff is the head of the whole church ’ ’ (Thom. summ. ii. ii. q. 1, a. 10). He possesses “ plenitude of power over ecclesiastical affairs” (ib. q. 89, a. 9). He rules in the church as a king in his kingdom, and the other bishops are admitted by him to a share in his care over the church (in partem sollicitudinis , Thom, sent. iv. d. 20, q. 1, a. 4). How then is the episcopal related to the papal power? The bishops, too, have by divine right the plenitudo potestatis in their own territories, but they have it to¬ gether with the pope and in subjection to him. Accordingly, the pope has direct jurisdiction (regimen immediatum) over all 1868, p. 90); finally, of the fellowship of the pious of all times and places , Wessel, opp. p. 809. ' Erasm. opp. v. 1174. IO 146 HISTORY OF DOCTRINES. souls, and can assert for himself episcopal rights in every terri¬ tory. This was of great importance for the mendicant orders in their preaching and confessionals (Thom. sent. iv. d. 17, q. 3, a. 3. Bonav., Quare fratres minores praedicent ? opp. vii. 340 ff. and Explicat. regul. ib. 324 b). To the pope belongs law-giving and government in the church. He is to decide what is correct faith, to publish upon occasion a new symbol of faith, and to summon general councils (Thom. summ. ii. ii. q. 1, a. 10). 1 He proclaims indulgences (ib. suppl. q. 38, a. 1). He stands above all princes as the vicar of Christ. If they rebel against him, he may punish them by removal from office and by releasing their subjects from the oath of allegiance to them (ib. ii. ii. q. 67, a. 1 ; q. 12, a. 2 ; sent. iv. d. 44, q. 2). The church attains its summit in the pope. With Aristotle, it was held : “But the best government of a multitude is that it be ruled by one” (c. gentil. iv. 76). As compared with the leaders of the Gregorian age, the later writers carried out many ideas to a further extent, and supported their views by more painstaking argument, but they furnish scarcely anything essentially new. The Second Council of Lyons (A. D. 1274) accepted this view of the Romish primacy (vid. Hefele, vi. 139 f. , 141). 10. We stand now at the close of our period. It had inher¬ ited an abundance of suggestive thoughts from its predecessor, which were all accepted and applied. Hence the wealth of views and ideas in this century. As in the days of Origen and Augustine, all contradictions seemed blended into a higher har¬ mony. Reason and faith have entered into covenant, ideal and reality, religion and science, contemplation and speculation, have joined hands, and the body serves the regnant spirit. More than this, the world appeared to be at length rendering due obedience to the kingdom of God. The lord of the church is lord of the world. Augustine and Aristotle, Anselm and Bernard, Hugo and Abelard, Gregory VII. and Francis of Assizi — all the results of their thought and efforts appeared melted into unity in the writings of Thomas of Aquino. It was then that Otto of Frei¬ sing wrote: “The kingdom ( civitas ) of Christ appears to have received already in the present almost all things promised to it except immortality” (Mon. Germ. scr. xx. 198). And yet, shortly after the year 1300, premonitions of the coming crisis began to appear. Of this our next chapter will treat. 1 Upon infallibility, vid., further, quodlib. ix. a. 1 6 ; contra errores Graecor. Also Albert, sent. iv. d. 20, a. 17. THEOLOGY OF DUNS SCOTUS. 147 CHAPTER III. THE GRADUAL DISSOLUTION OF THE SCHOLASTIC THEOLOGY. THE RELIGIOUS AND ECCLESIASTICAL CRISIS AT THE CLOSE OF THE MIDDLE AGES. §59. The Theology of Duns Scotus and Its Significance for the History of Doctrines . J. Duns Scoti, opp. ed. Wadding, 13 vols., 1639. Reprinted in the new Paris edition in Vives, 1891 ff. , 26 vols. We are chiefly interested in the Commentary upon the Sentences known as the Opus Oxoniense (which we •quote as “sent.”), and the abbreviated copy of it in the Reportata Parisiensia (which we quote as “report.”). Cf. Werner, Duns Scotus, 1881. Plezan- SKI, Essai sur la philosophic de Duns Scot., 1887. Seeberg, Die Theologie •des Duns Scotus, 1900, and in PRE. v., ed. 3, 62 ff. Ritter, Gesch. d. Philos, viii. 354 ff. Prantl, Gesch. d. Logik, iii. 202 f. Erdmann, Gesch. ■d. Philos, i., ed. 4, 446 ff. Stockl, Gesch. d. Philos, d. MA. ii. 778 ff. Baur, Lehre v. d. Dreieinigkeit, ii. 448 ff., 589 ff., 621 ff., 642 ff., 673 ff., -690 ff., 727 ff., 759 ff., 823 ft'., 861 ff. Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers. i. 73 ff. Kahl, Primat des Widens in Aug., Duns Scot., u. Descartes, 1886, p. 76 ff. Siebeck, Die Anfange der neueren Psychol, in d. Scholast., Ztschr. f. Philos, u. phil. Krit., vol. 94, p. 161 ff . ; 95, p. 245 ff. i. The history of the dogmatic movements at the close of the Middle Ages must begin with a study of Duns Scotus (f 1308). For, however true it may be that the masterly skill of this man in •dialectics and his acuteness carried the scholastic method to its point of highest development, yet it is equally true upon the •other hand — and this must determine his historical position — that the theological method which he pursued became the con¬ trolling influence leading to the dissolution of the scholastic theories and the crisis in theology. We must first briefly note the leading positions in the general ■conception of the universe entertained by Duns. Upon the •question of Universals he stood upon the basis of a modified Realism (vid. p. 104). The universal he held to be as well before as in and after an object. Everything which exists, exists also, since everything comes from God, as an eternal original image in the mind of God (sent. i. d. 35, q. 1, § 12). Here comes to light an important variation from the view of Thomas; as Duns lays the emphasis upon the singular, and no longer upon the universal. The individual being, the individuitas or haeccei- tas is, according to his view, the real goal of nature, and is therefore, as compared with the universal, the higher form of ex¬ istence (rep. i. d. 36, q. 4. 14). There is an ultimate reality of being ( ultima realitas entis ) which makes the particular object to 148 HISTORY OF DOCTRINES. be just what it is. From this results the emphasis laid upon ex¬ perience as a ground of knowledge (e. g., de anim. q. 15). In the theory of knowledge, Duns adopts, in a general way, the prevailing Aristotelian formulas. The intellect apprehends the intelligible form ( species intelligibilis') which is presented to it in the sensible object, and thus begets the conception. He does not, like Thomas, interject the “ intelligible form” be¬ tween the sensuous perception and the intellect, but it is already present in the perception and given with it. Hence, upon the Scotist theory of knowledge, the individual object is as such per¬ ceptible (de anim. q. 22. 4). But he very strongly emphasizes also the spontaneity of the spirit in the act of perception. The object dtoes not beget the conception in the (passive) spirit, but the intellect is the organ which,, apprehends the object and im¬ prints the conception. But here the will asserts itself. It impels to thought, or restrains from it ; it constrains to or prohibits agree¬ ment with the conception received (sent. ii. d. 42, q. 4. 5, 10 f. ).1 Thinking in itself occurs as a necessary and natural process (sent, i. d. 32, q. 1. 14; ii. d. 42, q. 4. 5). It is only through its connection with the will, which is free, as perception is not, from the necessity of the causal process, that it receives a personal and free character. From this originates one of the leading thoughts of Duns, i. e. , the doctrine of the primacy of the will. The entire inner and outer man, with all his thoughts, words, works, and impulses, is subject to the will. It is the will alone which makes human conduct good or bad (sent. ii. d. 42, q. 4). The will, and not the thought, is the organ for the appropriation of the highest objects and values. Faith does not arise without the con¬ sent of the will (iii. d. 25, q. 1. 11). Love is realized in the will, and blessedness is experienced by it (ii. d. 25, §13!., 19; iv. d. 49, quaest. ex latere, § 10 ff. ). According to Thomas, blessedness consists in the intellectual contemplation of the supreme end, from which contemplation results the joy of the pacified will (Thom. summ. ii. 1, q. 2-5). According to Duns, it consists in the apprehension of God, as the present supreme good, in the voluntary act of love, which brings with it the su¬ preme satisfaction of man’s longings. But this joy is only an accompanying experience, while the real blessedness consists in the apprehension of God (iv. d. 49, q. 4. 7, 8). The will is free, for as touching the same object the will has the choice of a velle or a nolle (ii. d. 25, § 6). Not in the object therefore lies the determining ground of the will, nor in the perception, 1 Except when the conception carries its own absolute evidence, Quaest.. subtiliss. in metaphys. 9. THEOLOGY OF DUNS SCOTUS. 149 which always but reflects the object, but in the will itself. “ Nothing else than the will is the cause of the entire volition in the will ” (ii. d. 25, § 22). Only upon the premise of freedom is the possibility of meritorious conduct intelligible (ib.). A strict proof of the freedom of the will, i. e., the existence of a contingent course of action, cannot, indeed, be produced, but it is attested by immediate experience. If anyone were to cast doubt upon contingent conduct and events, he ought to be flogged until he should acknowledge the possibility of not being flogged (i. d. 39. § *3)- This brief summary must here suffice. The interest of Duns centres, not in the universal, but in the singular and in the indi¬ vidual. And in his conception of man, the chief thing is that man himself freely wills. These are ideas which foreshadow a new conception of the universe. The emphasis is laid, not upon ideas nor the perception of them, but as, on the one hand, man himself is nothing more than his individual free will, so the final end, or goal, of the world is to be seen in the concrete separate objects which it contains. 2. What then is the task of Theology ? It presupposes revela¬ tion. The latter instructs man as to the end which his will should pursue and the means for attaining it (sent. prol. q. 1. 6 ff. ). These truths necessary to salvation are presented by the Holy Scriptures. The credibility of the latter is exhaustively proved. The resultant maybe stated in two propositions: “That the doctrine of the canon is true,” and “that the Sacred Scriptures sufficiently contain the doctrine necessary to the prilgrim ” (ib. q. 2. 14). Duns, like Thomas, maintains that this truth is sum¬ marized in the Apostles’ Creed, or, also, in the three symbols of the ancient catholic church (iii. d. 25, q. 1.4; i. d. 26, § 25 ; iv. d. 43, q. 1. 11). He, however, placed beside the authority of the Scriptures and these symbols, as of equal value, the teaching of “the authentic Fathers” and of the “ Romish church ” (i. d. 26, § 26). “ Nothing is to be held as of the substance of the faith except that which can be ex¬ pressly derived ( express e haberi') from Scripture, or which is ex¬ pressly declared by the church, or which follows evidently from something plainly contained in Scripture or plainly determined by the church ” (iv. d. 11, q. 3. 5). As the church has decided which books belong to the canon, the requirement of subjection to the Scriptures is equivalent to subjection to the church, which “approves and authorizes” the books of Scripture (iii. d. 23, q. 1. 4 ; i. d. 5, q. 1. 8). In the last resort, the Romish church is the only authority. Her utterance decides what is or is not heretical. Even if a doctrine be deprived of all other authority HISTORY OF DOCTRINES. I5° and all arguments drawn from reason, it must be accepted solely upon the authority of the Romish church (iv. d. 6, q. 9. 14, 16, 17). This is the churchly positivism of the later Scholasticism. The ecclesiastical doctrines are employed as so many legal pre¬ cepts, and orthodoxy receives a juristic flavor. But, as at a later period, so already in Duns, this positivism is only a counterpoise to an unlimited criticism of the traditional doctrines. He criti¬ cizes not only the contemporary theologians, but even Augustine and Aristotle (especially Thomas and Heinrich). In regard to many a traditional dogma, impossibility of proof and aimlessness are openly acknowledged (transubstantiation, habitus), or the possibility of the contrary opinion granted. The decision, how¬ ever, is always in favor of the Romish doctrine, although under the formal endorsement may lurk many a bold perversion of the sense. The complex of positive and practical truths1 of which theol¬ ogy treats is apprehended in faith. Duns acknowledged the possibility of explaining faith in a perfectly natural way, as as¬ sent to tradition ( fides acquisita , vid. iii. d. 23, § 1, 4 ff. ). But the “ authority of Scripture and the saints” demands the rec¬ ognition of a supernatural habitus, the fides infusa (ib. § 14). This is a habitus infused into the intellect, as the habitus of love is infused into the will. To speak more exactly, it is a habitus inclinans , which impels, but does not compel, the intellect to as¬ sent. There is thus retained even here some liberty of action for the will (§ 11). This assensus, as infused, has a perma¬ nence and certainty which does not characterize acquired faith (§ 15 f. ). In regard to implicit faith, his position agreed with that of Thomas (supra, p. 103). 3. In his discussion of separate doctrines, we will find almost everywhere in Duns suggestions which assumed great importance for later ages. We note first his conception of God. He en¬ deavors from the principles of causality, finality, and eminence to establish the necessity of an Infinity Being, which has its cause or end in nothing else, and which can be outranked by nothing (i. d. 2, q. 2. 10 ff.). But, as in this scheme God is viewed under the aspects of the First Cause ( primum ejficiens') and the Self-acting {per se agens ), there result a number of valuable 1 Duns strongly emphasized the positive character of theology (sent. prol. q. 2, lateral.). It has an independent sphere, and, as a number of contin¬ gent facts are embraced in it, other principles than those of metaphysics (1. c. , $ 29). He maintains likewise the practical nature of the propositions of the¬ ology ; for even such doctrines as those of the Trinity or the conception of the Son are of a practical nature, since their aim is to awaken love for the object presented (1. c. $ 32). THEOLOGY OF DUNS SCOTUS. I5I positive ideas. First of all, “ That the first cause is intelligent and volitional ’ ’ (inte llige ns et v olens) (§ 20). This is proved as follows : There is in the world contingent causality. Since now every second cause causes “ in so far as it is moved by the first,” the First Cause must also act contingently, i. e., it is free will(ib.). “Therefore either nothing happens contingently, i. e ., is evitably caused, or the First Cause thus causes imme¬ diately what it would be able also not to cause ” (§ 21). It is utterly impossible to derive contingency, with Aristotle, from second causes , for the necessity of the all-embracing activity of the First Cause would necessitate also the actions of the second causes (i. d. 39, § 12). God is, accordingly, to be represented as free will. This involves, further, that there can be found no reason for his willing or not willing, since all willing is abso¬ lutely without ground or reason : “ And, therefore, there is no reason ( causa ) why his will willed this, except that his will is will ” (i. d. 8, q. 5. 24). God, then, wills this or that, because he wills it. Good is, therefore, good because God wills it to be so ; he does not will it because it is good (iii. d. 19, § 7). All things, considered in themselves, may be said to be possible to the omnipotence of the divine will. This potentia absoluta of God has only one limit, i. e., the logically impossible (iv. d. 10, q. 2, 5, 11). God can, therefore, according to his absolute power, save the already lost Judas ; but he cannot give eternal blessedness to a stone, nor make undone what has been done. But by the side of this absolute power stands the ordained power ( potentia ordinata') of God, i. e.y the manifestations of divine power upon the ground and within the bounds of laws and ordi¬ nances fixed — arbitrarily — by God himself. God commonly works according to his ordained power, but it is also conceivable that he may, upon occasion, by virtue of his absolute power, vary from the course of the former, or entirely abolish it. For example, the rule that no one shall receive glory who has not ac¬ cepted grace might be abrogated (i. d. 44, § 1-4). Duns con¬ ducts this whole discussion under the heading of the conception of God as the absolute Being ; but it affords evidence that he held ideas of God far transcending the limits of such a scheme. This is proved especially by his important theory, that the sum total of the relations of God to the world is to be described as Love. This idea he develops as follows : God wills, or loves, himself. As now all being originates in God, it is subject to God as its final end, and has, therefore, a share in the love which God exercises toward himself (iii. d. 32, § 2). This love embraces, accordingly, the whole creation, its present and its future. But the creation is a composite with a gradation of its J52 HISTORY OF DOCTRINES. parts according to their relations to the final end. This relation¬ ship decides in every separate case the measure of the divine love to be bestowed. This produces the following scheme : (a) God loves himself. (6) He, therefore, loves that which has im¬ mediate relation to himself as its final end, or elect men, i. e., God wills that there shall be men who, with himself, love him, and this loving will is predestination. (V) The divine love then directs itself upon the means for the realizing of this predestina¬ tion, i. e.f the ordinances of grace, (h/) Finally, God, for the sake of the elect, wills the more remote means, i. e., the visible world (1. c., § 6).1 The doctrine of the Trinity need not long detain us. Duns, in the traditional way, deduces the Son from the divine thought, and the Spirit from the divine will (i. d. 2, q. 7, 3). But it is not at this point that the historical significance of Duns’ conception of God is to be seen, but in the fact that God is here, more clearly and distinctly than in the writings of Thomas, conceived as a thinking and willing personality, and that love is recognized as the content of the divine activity in the world. But since Duns made the arbitrary will of God the source of all things, faith in the traditional formulas concerning the harmony and order of the universe was shattered. It was, accordingly, 1 Some further remarks upon the views of Duns upon predestination are needful. Although he did not attach much practical importance to the doc¬ trine, he yet applied it theoretically with great zeal. The question, whether a predestinated person can be lost, he answers in the affirmative, since God might have willed the one as well as the other (i. d. 40, $ 1, 2). God can, therefore, predestinate any person, or he can fail to predestinate him. Duns answers the objection, that predestination leads to immortality, by asserting that the will of God cannot be limited from without ($3)- The current concep¬ tion, that predestination depends upon prescience, he refutes by observing that God always foresees all contingent events in their dependence upon the divine will, and, therefore, the good deeds of men appear as determined by the divine will (i. d. 41, $ 10). Besides, this would not apply to children dying in in¬ fancy, who are, without any deeds of theirs, either elected or reprobated. Duns himself teaches that predestination has no ground whatever upon man’s part ; for the divine will that any creature be saved exists before faith or good works, and hence the latter cannot under any circumstances constitute the ground of the former (ib. § 11). In reprobation, it is true, it appears neces¬ sary to grant such a ground in man, the foreseen final sin, since otherwise the justice of the sentence cannot well be conceived (ib.). The difficulties thus remaining were not overlooked by Duns. He suggests, further, that it be sup¬ posed that God, while predestinating Peter to glory and then to grace, in re¬ gard to Judas, determined nothing at all, but, on the contrary, willed that both belong to the “mass of perdition.” Inasmuch as the first-named act of the divine will had relation to Peter, he receives grace and eternal life, while Judas is simply left to perdition (£ 12). The discussion closes with a warning against prying into such matters, and an exhortation that everyone be allowed to hold his own opinion, only so that the divine freedom be guarded against any charge of unrighteousness ($ 13). THEOLOGY OF DUNS SCOTUS. *53 no longer eternal ideas and laws, but the positive activity of God, which constituted the material of religious knowledge. On the other hand, a powerful weapon was, by this new conception of God, placed in the hands of the critics of the traditional teach¬ ings of the church. If the illogical is to be acknowledged as frequently true, may not the logical also be false ? And when once the idea of absolute power has been admitted, may not anything be regarded asconceivable, as possible, or as allowable ? 4. The sinlessness of man in paradise was, in and of itself, only potential, since the will as such always involves the possibility of sinning. The actual innocence of the first pair can, therefore, be explained only by their possession of their additional endow¬ ment, the donum supe?'additum (ii. d. 23, § 6, 7). There is in man by nature, in consequence of the existence of the sensuous impulses together with the reason and will, an inward rebellion. Only the imparted supernatural habitus of grace is able to sub¬ ject the lower forces to the higher (ii. d. 29, § 4). If, there¬ fore, concupiscence, or the rebellion of the sensuous nature against the spirit, belongs to the original human nature, original sin cannot possibly consist in concupiscence. Original Sin, on the contrary, is to be described as only a want ( carentia ) of orig¬ inal righteousness (d. 30, q. 2. 3). It has as its material con¬ cupiscence, but this gains control and becomes sin only through the loss of the restraining rein ( frenum cohibens , d. 32, § 7). This view presents the question of the propagation of sin in a new light. Duns opposes the theory of physical inheritance. If sin is in the will, how can the latter make the whole body sick ? And if this were the case, why should the seed only, and not the spittle and blood as well, be infected? Or again, how should the inherited physical condition transform the will? (d. 32, § 4 f. ). The solution must be reached from another direction. Since the original righteousness was bestowed upon Adam for himself and his posterity, it is a righteousness which they now owe, a justitia debita. “By virtue of such a gift, the will of every child of his becomes a debtor ” (ib. § 8-1 2 ).1 Concep¬ tion demands attention in the case only as being that which makes man a child of Adam. Only as descended from Adam, is he a debtor to the righteousness granted to the latter (§ 17). It is evident that the Augustinian theory of original sin is here 1 It does not harmonize with this, that Duns asserts that our first parents could not have transmitted their righteousness to their posterity (ii. d. 20, q. 1,3). He maintains, therefore, in this passage that had Adam not fallen, God would by co-operation have regularly imparted grace to the children of the race. This is, however, nothing more than a postulate — to account in some way for the inheritance of sin — in the doctrinal system of Duns. *54 HISTORY OF DOCTRINES. surrendered in its fundamental principle. In place of the phys¬ ical propagation of the original concupiscence, is posited the ideal obligation of every child of Adam to the supernatural right¬ eousness once granted to Adam.1 The teaching of Duns in regard to Actual Sin is in keeping with this theory of original sin. The former is a defect in the will. Instead of loving the supreme good, or God, the will of man rests content with an earthly end as its supreme good. He thus offends also against the divine law revealed to him (d. 37, q. 1, 6 f. ). 5. We may, perhaps, venture the opinion that the Christology of Duns displays a higher appreciation of the human life of ( Christ than is manifested by the other great Scholastics. This is noticeable especially in his discussions of the impartation of grace to the soul of Jesus (iii. d. 13, q. 1. 3), and of the knowl¬ edge of Jesus (iii. d. 14), in which he maintains that the soul of Jesus by its union with the Logos possessed at least an in¬ herent ( habituale ) knowledge of all universals, but that it was subject to the necessity of gaining a progressive knowledge of the individual and the contingent, so that Lk. ii. 40 is to be under¬ stood of a real progress (1. c., q. 2. 16, 20; q. 3. 6£f.). It is granted also that pain could penetrate to the higher part of the soul of Jesus (ib. q. 15). Merit likewise is attributed to the human nature of Christ. He merited the favor of God, because he did not yield to his sensuous desires. He could merit by fasting, watching, and prayer (iii. d. 18, § 4-6). But all of this does not extend to the experiences and visions of the person of Jesus which occur so abundantly in the devotional literature of the Middle Ages (supra, p. 89 f. ). This is to be acounted for by the fact that Duns clings unalterably to' the christological scheme of the ancient church, which he, like the other Scholastics, in¬ terprets after the manner of Abelard. The union is a relation of subordination ( relatio ordi?iis ), a relation of dependence of the human upon the divine nature, a relation which maybe com¬ pared to that between attribute and substance (iii. d. 1, q. 1. 3). The divine nature is in no wise limited by its relation to the hu¬ man. The latter, in the moment of its genesis, subordinates itself to the divine nature and receives at once and thereby from 1 Duns abolished the conception of original sin, or substituted for it that of original debt. But the substitution, although aiming to maintain the idea of guilt, or debt, cannot be regarded as satisfactory, for it fails to afford that which it is the province of the theory of original- sin to furnish, i. Hiim had they not sinned. This was the person of Christ, who in his obedience offered the highest love in enduring death for righteousness’ sake (iv. d. 2, q. 1. 7). HISTORY OF DOCTRINES. 153 For the sake of the obedience and the love of Christ, God be¬ stows grace upon mankind. There is thus attested in the activity of Christ, as in the divine act of deliverance, the combined action of mercy and righteousness (ib. § 8). The theory of redemption held by Duns embraces thus two leading thoughts: (1) The pious obedience, or the love, of Jesus is, according to the will of God, acknowledged as meri¬ torious and employed as the means of bestowing grace upon man. (2) This activity of Christ, sealed by his death, has conquered mankind and incited them to love and gratitude. The obedi¬ ence and love of Jesus thus became the occasion, on the one hand,' for the bestowal of grace by God, and, on the other, for the renewal of mankind.1 8. The essential result of the work of Christ is, therefore, that he merited for us the impartation of Grace. This leads us to examine the conception of grace. By this term, as gratia creata (supra, p. n8f. ), Duns understands the habitus of love, created in man, which inclines the will to meritorious works (ii. d. 27, §3). Thi s habitus equips man with a worthiness (Kdignitas') , “which consists in a correspondence of merit to reward, ’ ’ by virtue of which man becomes dear to God (§ 4). Grace is a co-operating 1 Duns himself did not effect a combination of these two lines of thought, having treated the questions involved but briefly. This may be attempted in various ways. It may be said, for example, that the love of Christ trans¬ formed the character of men, and that this became the ground of God’s dis¬ play of grace toward them. If we would gain a proper understanding of the view of Duns, we must bear in mind that he conceived the entire work of sal¬ ivation and grace under the scheme of means and end (supra, p. 152). In the will of God, priority is given to the glorification and gracious acceptance of the elect above the mission of Christ as the means of effecting grace and of conse¬ quent glory. If we now apply this scheme, further, to the two aspects of the work of Christ in the writings of Duns, the logical priority must be given to the manward aspect, since the object of the work of Christ is to win the elect. From this we might derive the thought : that, in order to be able to awaken love and gratitude in men, Christ used his influence with the Father to secure the be¬ stowal of grace. But I doubt whether this was the idea of Duns, for he does not by a single word suggest that the granting of grace is the condition upon which alone the love and example of Christ can become effectual. On the contrary, Christ exerted the latter influence upon the Jews — before grace had been bestowed. If, on the other hand, we seek to combine the two aspects in the activity of Christ in the way first suggested, thus making the influence exerted upon God de¬ pendent upon the result secured in man, we come into direct conflict with the fundamental tenor of the discussion. It follows that the two conceptions are not to be subordinated the one to the other, but to be co-ordinated — perhaps somewhat as follows : Christ lived among men and prepared them for the grace which he secured from the Father, or, Christ secured grace from the Father for the men whom he by his life won for the Father. Thus, too, would the rela¬ tion of Christ and his work to the human race become intelligible. The im¬ portant thought, that Christ is the head of the race, which we find in Thomas, is lacking in Duns. THEOLOGY OF DUNS SCOTUS. *59 principle (principium co-operans) beside the will (ii. d. 7, § 15). Meritorius conduct results therefore from the working together of the will-power and the habitus (i. d. 17, q. 2. 8). Since the will without the habitus can produce an act, but not the habitus with¬ out the will, the leading part in this co-operation appears to be¬ long to the will. The habitus simply complements the act (ib. § 9), or it stimulates to its performance (§ 12). The habitus is, therefore, a certain supernatural influence which gives to the will an inclinatio to action and secures the performance of the action ‘ 4 with delight, promptly and expeditiously” (ib.). It appears, however, since action without the habitus is perfectly conceivable, that the former has no need of the latter. But then man would act meritoriously by his natural powers alone (ex solis naturalibus) , which would be a Pelagian doctrine. There must therefore be a supernatural form, which shall imprint its character upon man’s actions without limiting his own activity, and thus also his merit ! fib. q. 3. 18, 19). But it may be urged against the doctrine of the Habitus, that experience does not attest it, since the moral acts referred to may very readily be realized without it (q. 3. 21). Dunssilently acknowledges this. But it is not only our separate acts, he holds, which are acceptable to God, but our whole nature, and the ground of this is to be found in the habitus (ib. § 22). Of the habitus it is to be said : “ That this habitus, beyond that which is decorous, is a spiritual (power) inclining to determinate actions ’ ’ (§ 23). The acceptance of an act, on the other hand, as meritor¬ ious is entirely a matter of the divine will (iv. d. 22, qu. un. § 9 ) . We may, therefore, discriminate in an act between its substance and its meritorious quality. In the former aspect, the will occupies the place of prominence ; in the latter, the habitus has greater influ¬ ence, since an act appears more worthy of reward when begotten of love than when begotten of free will (§ 27). The act re¬ ceives its value in the sight of God — according to divine appoint¬ ment — from the fact that grace co-operates in its production. The habitus is the rider, the will the steed. As the steed can have value for anyone only in so far as it carries the rider to a definite goal, so the act, produced in the first instance by the will, is made valuable in the sight of God only through its connection with the habitus (§ 28). 1 It can hardly be said that this con- 1 Very interesting are the remarks of Duns, 1. c., $ 28 : As every intellec¬ tual capacity necessarily bears within itself the intelligible object, so must also the moral habituality, to a certain extent, bear in itself the lovable good. When now this habitus incites to activity, the resulting action will be directed toward the good embraced in the habitus. Since the habitus receives its power essentially from the object toward which it is directed, its influence may i6o HISTORY OF DOCTRINES. ception of the supernatural habitus has been made perfectly plain, still less that its necessity has been clearly demonstrated ! Duns retained the traditional physical conception of grace, but he sub¬ limated it as far as possible. Grace is for him not the material of Christian acts, but really only a something which gives to man a new direction, an inclination toward God, and a value in his sight. Duns recognized the fact that there was really no need of the gratia creata, and we can easily understand why he was unable to make use of it in his expositions of the moral life. Thus the will remained, after all, as the chief cause of human con¬ duct. But was not Duns, nevertheless, nearer in his views to the proper evangelical conception of the matter than Thomas, or even than Augustine himself? And what was his conception of Justification ? He discusses it in connection with the sacrament of repentance.1 We select the doctrine of the attritio as our starting-point. This is sup¬ posed to establish a merit of fitness (de co?igruo') , as a preparation for the achievement of justification. This half-penitence is, therefore, meritorious, and through it man merits justification (iv. d. 14, q. 2. 14, 15 ; cf. d. 19, § 32). But it must be borne in mind that the final cause is not really the human merit as such, but the will of God which has appointed this relation¬ ship. Duns discriminates in justification between the infusion of grace and the forgiveness of sins (iv. d. 16, q. 1. 4). The former is an actual change ( mutatio realis), for before grace is infused it has no existence. The forgiveness of sins, on the con¬ trary, is only an ideal change, since it calls into existence noth¬ ing essentially new in man (ib. § 6), and the guilt of man is no real entity, but only the ideal relationship to the desert of pun¬ ishment (§7). Even in God, the forgiveness of sins is no sep¬ arate act, but God never wills that any man be punished without also willing that — under certain definite conditions — he be no more punished, and he, likewise, never wills that any man be not pun¬ ished without willing also that, under certain conditions, punish- ment be meted out to him (ib. § 12). If the forgiveness of sins thus denotes only the ideal and conditional change, that the one lia¬ ble to punishment ( puniendus ) becomes no longer liable to pun¬ ishment ( non puniendus') , the infusion of grace is, on the con¬ trary, a real change. It is the factor which really effects justifi- be ascribed essentially to the activity of the said object. But that is merely to say, that the direction of man’s activity toward God gives to his conduct its value and character. 1 This is, therefore, the appropriate connection in which the conception of justification stands. Cf., e.g., Carthusian, iv. d. 17, q. I, 2. This corresponds with the practical situation of the day. THEOLOGY OF DUNS SCOTUS. 161 cation. And, as the infusion of grace is more intimately related to the object, i. e. , to the glorification and gracious acceptance of man, than is the forgiveness of sins, the former has the priority in the divine will ; but in the actual execution of that will in time, the order is reversed, and stands : first, forgiveness of sins, then infusion of grace (§ 19. Cf. i. d. 17, q. 3. 19 : “ that God naturally remits an offense before he gives grace to him, ’ ’ i. e. , the offender).1 Here, too, Thomas taught differently (supra, p. 1 21). Duns denies a causal connection of the two processes, since neither can be logically deduced from the other (§ 19). Such is the doctrine of grace according to Duns. By attrition man secures the merit of fitness. He is thereby prepared for the reception of justification, or the infusion of grace, particularly in the sacrament of repentance ; and this enables him to do meri¬ torious works. These are ideas which became controlling forces in the Scholasticism of the later Middle Ages. But along with them we note, as also characteristic, the separation of forgive¬ ness of sin and infusion of grace, and the spiritualizing of the conception of grace. The ideas of Duns served as a support for the superficial praxis of the church, but, considered in their en¬ tire connection, they were nearly always directed against the Augustinian foundations underlying this praxis. In illustration, we recall the statement, that there is really no such thing as “ merit ’ ’ in itself considered, but that God accepts certain definite acts as merits ; and, on the other hand, the challenge : If every¬ thing depends upon the divine acceptance, to what end then the gradation of merits ? 9. At this point the doctrine of the Sacraments finds its place, for it is through the latter that grace is infused into man. As we have already considered them in § 58, we here recall only the chief principle involved. The sacraments are symbols, which signify the working of grace, and which, by virtue of a divine covenant, pro¬ duce in the soul a creative act of God concurrent with their re¬ ception. We may describe the sacrament as, to a certain extent, a cause of grace {causa gratiae) , inasmuch as it, as it were, com¬ pels the accompanying presence of grace (sent. iv. d. i,q. 5. 12). The critical ability of Duns is here also displayed (criticism of the “ character ”), as well as a certain inclination to differently interpret and refine the traditional conceptions (repentance and the Lord’s Supper). 1 In this order, Duns follows, as far as I can see, the course of Robert Grosseteste in the tractate, De gratia et justificatione hominis (in Brown, Fascicul. rer. expetendarum et fugiendaruni, 1690, append. 282. Cf. Wiclif, De dominio divin. iii. 5» P* 246 £» ed. Poole). So also Wilhelm v. Paris, opp. ii. f., 48 v. Cf. also Carthusian, iv. d. 17, q. 2. 162 HISTORY OF DOCTRINES. io. It remains for us to characterize the position of Duns in the History of Doctrines. It is hardly saying too much to des¬ ignate his theology as the key to the dogmatic history of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. This is true primarily in a formal sense. The refinement of dialectic art to the point of hair-splitting, the tingling delight in logical proof and disproof, the complicating of linguistic expression — he wrestles with lan¬ guage, and, instead of creating new forms for new ideas, the old forms are split into shreds, — this was learned by latter theologians from Duns. But they also learned from him to apply dialectics ruthlessly and earnestly to even the deepest mysteries of reli¬ gion. There are no mysteries before which reason must halt. Almost everything is for him open to scrutiny,1 and the more fully the miraculous can be eliminated the better. “ I concede that, even in the things believed, nothing more should be posited without necessity, nor more miracles than necessary” (sent. iv. d. ii, q. 3. 14). All this tended, on the one hand, to hasten the dissolution and downfall of medieval thought ; but it was not only in view of this that it was “timely.” It provided for theology, at the proper moment, the forms which assured and directed to it the interest of the age. As to the material influence of the Scotist dogmatics, its method appears to be only the direct continuation of that of Thomas, i. e.y the authorities and reason are to be brought into harmony. But with how much greater enthusiasm and fervency did not Thomas address himself to the task ! For him, dogma and phi¬ losophy really coalesced to form one great system of religious philosophy embracing heaven and earth. Thomas yet believed, not only in the absolute truth of the church’s dogma, but also in its agreement with scientific knowledge. This second conviction has, in Duns, receded far into the background. Theology and metaphysics are sharply discriminated. It is not the province of theology to construct a universally applicable philosophical sys¬ tem, but a complex structure of practical truths, i. e. , truths bear¬ ing upon the conduct. Nor is it by any means to be taken for granted that these truths can always be made clear to reason. The criticism of Duns has a keener edge and loftier aim than that of Thomas. In regard to many a leading Romish doctrine he declares, that its suitability for attaining the end in view can¬ not be proved, and that not much is to be said against the oppo- 1 How much light it casts upon the position and tendency of Duns to ob¬ serve that he develops his theory of knowledge when treating of the doctrine of angels ; that he presents his psychology under the heading of eschatology ; and that the discussion of the sacrament of repentance gives him opportunity to expound his theory of political economy ! THEOLOGY OF DUNS SCOTUS. 163 site opinion. Duns is, indeed, particularly fond of throwing out hints of this nature, and yet in the end working out some sort of arguments in support of the proposition in question. But the at¬ tentive reader will observe, what is elsewhere openly declared, that the authority of the Romish church is, after all, the deci¬ sive consideration. Even the propositions incomprehensible to ^reason and incapable of proof are true — because Rome teaches them. Duns no longer believes in the agreement of dogma and philosophy ; but he believes in the authority of Rome. Like Thomas, and yet how different ! For, inasmuch as in Thomas these two principles coalesce, his faith in Rome retains a religious character. But since, in Duns, even the incomprehensible and unreasonable becomes truth through the authority of Rome, this authority begins to assume the aspect of positive law. Both the criticism of accepted dogmas and this ecclesiastical positivism exercised a controlling influence upon the theology of the future. But Duns is not to be counted among the leaders of thought who accomplish only negative results. He wrought also out of the materials of his age positive results for its advancement. And it was this fact that lent such force to his criticisms. His chief contribution of this character was his view of the will as the cen¬ tral function of the spirit, which dominates alike his anthropology and his theology. It is not the world in which man lives, nor the ideas which he derives from it, which explains his conduct and his aspirations — but his will. The will is the innermost faculty in man, the absolutely individual part of his nature. He no longer views with merely theoretic interest the divine pano¬ rama of the world’s history, but he has himself become a co¬ operating factor in the shifting scenes. In volition he experi¬ ences the highest satisfaction. Man can be understood only by appreciating this will, free in itself and determined by nothing outside of itself. His worth depends upon it. ( It is the modern man1 whose features are thus drawn in outlines The estimate of a man according to his own character and aeeds, personal re¬ sponsibility and self-determination, — these are ideas which are involved, at least implicitly, in the psychology of Duns, however imperfect and incomplete the latter may be in particular points. But this theory became even more significant when applied to God. Since God is conceived as the absolutely free Will, many of the categories of the traditional logic are dissolved, and the ground is swept from beneath all the speculations as to what God must do, and what must come to pass (cf. the criticism of 1 Vid. also the elaboration of the doctrine of states of the mind by Duns, in Siebeck, 1. c., vol. 95, p. 251 ff. 164 HISTORY OF DOCTRINES. Anselm). If the absolutely free, and even wanton Will is the ground of all things, then the truth can be learned only by the care¬ ful observation of objects and events. This explains the impor¬ tance attached to the concrete and the empirical, and the appeal to experience, and, at the same time, the unrestrained liberty of thought as over against traditional theories, as well as a certain skepticism, which time and again leads the thoughtful student to rest content with a “ probable ” or “ more probable.” This defi¬ nition of God betokens, however, a really deeper conception of the divine nature. The God of Duns is no longer the ‘ ‘ abso¬ lute Substance,” but a free, living Spirit. He did not venture even here, it is true, to cast aside the ancient formulas, but he conceived the large thought of God as the Loving-Will, the sum total of whose relations to the world is to be regarded from this point of view. Everything occurring in the world, as well as all divine activity, is — in religious reflection — to be viewed from the view-point of predestination. At this point Augustinian predilections exert their influence (cf. also Thomas, supra, p. 107), the Oxford circle from which Duns came being as distinctly Augustinian in temper as they were inclined to empirical investi¬ gation.1 Nevertheless, Duns was no Augustinian. It was upon the basis of the predestination pervading all things and the divine freedom ordering all things that the theory of merit and good Svorks first began to flourish. The ecclesiastical system is not in itself necessary, but it is — and this is more — positively deter¬ mined upon and ordained by God. Thus the apparently Augus¬ tinian premise is transformed into the popular Catholicism of the close of the Middle Ages. Finally, we can but point to the separate doctrines in which the theology of Duns scored an advance, i. e., a change as compared with the system of Thomas. In nearly all these instances, the later theologians followed in the steps of Duns. We have noted the divergencies in the question of first principles (skepticism and ecclesiastical positivism); the revision of the conception of 1 A history of theology would find it needful at this point to discuss especially the work of the great bishop of Lincoln, Robert Grosseteste (f A. D. 1253), who paved the way for the ideals of the mendicant orders in England and directed toward its goal the awakened scientific impulse (religion in the sense of Augustine, and empiricism in methods). It is to be regretted that we possess as yet neither a comprehensive biography of this great man, nor even an edition of his more important writings. Some material is furnished in Brown, Fasciculus, etc., appendix, London, 1690. Luard edited his letters (London, 1861). Vid. his introduction, and Lechler, Wiclif, i. 1 7 7 fT. Also, supra, p. 161 n., and Felton, Rob. Grosset., 1887. As to his theolog¬ ical position, see Seeberg, Duns Scot., p. 11 ff. Kropatscheck, Das Schriftprincip der luth. Kirche, i. (1904), 359 ff. HIERARCHICAL CONCEPTION OF THE CHURCH. 1 65 God ; the emphasis upon the will in psychology ; the doctrine of the original state and the minimizing, i. e. , elimination, of orig¬ inal sin ; the theory of redemption, with the co-ordination of the subjective and objective aspects of the atonement ; the criticism of the Augustinian definition of grace, i. e., the new definition of the habitus ; the significance of the meritum de congruo ; the Pelagianism in the order of salvation ; the logical apprehension of the relation between God and man under the scheme of the meritum; the symbolical interpretation of the sacraments, with the severance of sign and substance ; and the criticism of tran- substantiation. Such is the theology of Duns Scotus. It proclaims the ap¬ proaching downfall of the cosmology of the Middle Ages. Dogma and reason, church and world, threaten to part company. And yet — Thomas looks backward, Duns faces the future. § 60. Criticism of Hierarchical Conception of the Church. 1 . We must here assume the familiarity of the reader with the out¬ ward history of the papacy from the days of Benedict XI. , the suc¬ cessor of Boniface VIII. The papacy at Avignon reiterated, indeed, with lofty assumption the ancient claims of supremacy. But its de¬ pendence upon the course of French politics — the bull Unam sanc- tam was annulled, so far as France was concerned, and Boniface VIII. barely escaped condemnation for infidelity and frivolity — robbed its claims of all force or sacredness. The great contest against Louis of Bavaria (A. D. 1314-47), despite many humilia¬ tions inflicted upon the emperor, set loose a storm of criticism of the papacy, its legality and its claims, which penetrated to its very foundations. The Electoral Union at Rense declared (A. D. 1338) that the electors elect the emperor, and that this election confers upon him the right of government in the empire without any nomi¬ nation, approbation, or confirmation on the part of the Curia. The papacy, when again transferred to Rome, was rent by the great schism (A. D. 1378). The moral delinquencies of many mem¬ bers of the hierarchy were well known, but, above all, the avarice of the Romish Curia. The trade in spiritual offices, the indul¬ gences, the papal taxes, etc. , all served but one end, to procure money and much of it. The unnatural character of the papal dominion made this a necessity ; it was a civil government with¬ out the regular sources of revenue. With murmurings against the draining of national resources by the papacy were com¬ bined bitter complaints of the immorality and dissipation of the higher as well as the lower clergy.1 The widespread discontent 1 A striking portraiture of the times is given in the work of Nicholas of 1 66 HISTORY OF DOCTRINES. awakened by these abuses led to a constantly growing demand for a reformation of the church, which led to the so-called “ Re¬ form Councils ” at Pisa, A. D. 1409, at Constance, A. D. 1414-1 and at Basel, 1431-47. The exaltation of the church universal above the papacy was here asserted1 and utterance given to many pious laments and hopes touching the “ necessity of a reforma¬ tion of the church in head and in members.”2 But there was neither the power nor the courage requisite for a thoroughgoing reformation. And every politic compromise indicated a victory for the old order of things. Thus the popes always grasped again the sceptre, and, despite all the complaints of clergy and laity, the reformation still remained only a pious wish. In the bull, “ Pastor aeternus," Pope Leo X. announced to the world : “ Since also that only the Roman pontiff (in office) for the time being, as having authority over all councils, has the full right and power of summoning, transferring, and dissolving councils, is evident not only from the testimony of the Holy Scriptures, the sayings of the holy fathers, and of the other Roman pontiffs, . . . and the decrees of the holy canons, but even from the very con¬ fession of the councils themselves” (Binius, Concil. general, ix. 15 1). And yet the great spiritual agitation, which disturbed the minds of multitudes for almost two hundred years, was not in vain. The mistrust of Rome and the hierarchy, the critical attitude toward the church and her laws, and, combined with this, the conviction that there is a church of God which is more and better than the hierarchical system of Rome — these ideas were engraven more and more deeply upon the general con¬ sciousness. And, just in proportion as the sense of national in¬ dependence gained in strength and the value of earthly posses¬ sions increased, must these critical ideas become more extended in their scope and the unreasonableness of the Romish system Clemanges, De ruina ecclesiae (in Von D. Hardt, Constant, concil. i. 3). He writes, p. 21 : Everywhere they search for money ( quaeslu??i ); they are greatly concerned about money ; they think money is piety. They do noth¬ ing at all unless they believe that, upon their doing it, money may be voted for the increase of their gain. For this they dispute, fight, swear, go to law ; they would bear with much greater equanimity the casting away of ten millions of souls than of ten or twelve solidi. Vid. also the other writings col¬ lected in this volume — from D’Ailli, Gerson, etc.; also Dietrich v. Niem, De scismate, 11. 3 ed. Erler, 1890. 1 This council, assembled legitimately in the Holy Spirit, representing the Catholic church, has authority immediately from Christ, to which everyone of whatsoever rank or dignity, even the papal, he may be, is bound to render obedience in those things which pertain to the faith, . . . and to the general reformation of the said church in head and in members (Constanz sess. 5r vid. Mansi, xxvii. 590 ; Basel sess. 2, vid. Mansi, xxix. 21). 2 Title of a document in Hardt, i. 7, p. 277. HIERARCHICAL CONCEPTION OF THE CHURCH. 1 67 become more evident. Cf. Hefele, CG. vi. vii. Schwab, Gerson, 1858. Tschackert, Peter v. Ailli, 1877. Erler, Dietrich v. Niem, 1887. 2. The criticism of the hierarchical system in the new period found its fullest expression in the literature which was produced during the conflicts of Louis of Bavaria with the pope. Especially Marsilius of Padua and William Occam developed ideas which tapped the very roots of the dominant system (vid. Mars. , Defensor pacis. Occam, Octo quaestiones ; Compen¬ dium errorum papae ; Dialogus ; Opus XC dierum, — all to be found in Goldast, Monarchia ii. Frankf. 1614). The most characteristic feature of these publications is the distinct separa¬ tion of state and church, politics and religion. As all laws are to be traced back to the people, so the sovereign power lies also with them. They choose their princes and give them their authority ; they, therefore, may recall it again and remove the princes from office (Mars. i. 12, p. 169 ff. ; 9, p. 168 ; 18, p. 184 f. ). There is no necessity for a papal confirmation of the election, nor for an investiture by the pope, any more than the pope has authority to remove the emperor. The election gives the emperor his power; he stands directly under God (Occ. 8, quaest. 2. 7, 8 ; 4. 8, 9). As concerns the pope, further, it is held that he is subject to the emperor in all secular affairs, as even Christ allowed himself to be condemned by secular judges, and neither he nor anyone of the apostles ever laid claim to earthly dominion or any kind of cooperative jurisdiction (juris dictio coactiva ) whatever, even though the emperor had of his own free-will granted the Donation of Constantine (Mars, ii. 4, p. 195 ff. Occ. 8, quaest. 3. 3, 4; dial., p. 750 f., 785, 959, 956). According to Jerome, the bishops were originally the same as the priests, and it was only at a later day that one of the latter was selected to be, as it were, a superintendent. There can hence be no thought of any such thing as a divine authority of bishops or popes (Mars. ii. 15). The papacy, as such, can by no means be described as an institution absolutely necessary for the church. No more cogent arguments can be adduced for a monarchical than for an aristocratic form of civil government. And even though the monarchy be preferable in civil life, it can scarcely be so in the world-embracing government of the church. Here Christ reigns as the only supreme Head (Occ. dial., p. 818 f. ). Thus the question of the papal primacy is treated entirely from the view-point of the natural reason ; it has for our author no positively religious aspect. The discussion is regulated by the transfer of the idea of popular sovereignty to the church. The Scriptures, Occam holds, do not teach us that Christ i68 HISTORY OF DOCTRINES. appointed Peter as the prince of the apostles. All the apostles received the Spirit in the same way. Paul does not consider himself subordinate to Peter, and the latter does not preside at the first council. The injunction to feed the lambs is given to him only as the representative of the other apostles. Even in Matt. 16, Peter is only a in a certain way ” designated as a foundation. The real and absolutely necessary foundation of the church is Christ. It is only as an incidental historical foundation that Peter comes into view (dial., p. 846-863. Mars, ii. 22, p. 264). According to Marsilius, it yet remained to be proved from the Scriptures that Peter was ever at Rome ; and, in any event, Paul was certainly there before him (ii. 16). Accordingly, the papacy is to be regarded as an institution worthy of commendation upon practical considerations, but by no means as one enjoined by religious precept. The duties of the pope, as of the clergy in general, are purely spiritual. Christ bestowed upon Peter, as upon the other apostles, the keys of the kingdom of heaven and the power to bind and loose. They were commissioned to spread the teach¬ ing and the moral principles of Jesus, and to baptize believers. But the plenitude of power ( plenitudo potestatis') consists really in the exercise of the priestly functions of the sacrament of repent¬ ance. But, inasmuch as the forgiveness of sins and the imparting of grace are matters for God alone, the priestly absolution has merely a declarative signification. Beyond this, the pope — or any other priest — may allow the substitution of a temporal satis¬ faction for the pains of purgatory. It seems of doubtful propriety, on the other hand, to allow the clergy to administer the great excommunication. An unjust excommunication, it is true, does the victim no spiritual harm ( ‘ ‘ can do no harm for the state of the future world, because God does not always follow the church, i. 4ff.; 1892, 337 ff. K. Muller, KG. ii. 167 ff. p. 228 A. Z. 1 v. 1. The spiritual unrest of the fourteenth and fifteenth cen¬ turies constituted the starting-point for a revolution in the whole •conception of the universe and in the civilization of the world. The latter was accomplished beneath the banner of Individual¬ ism. The circle of interest extended beyond the limits of the church and her dogmas. The individual emerges. A man is ^something more than a member of the ecclesiastical or civil cor¬ poration, for he is himself a separate something. The world is looked upon with other eyes — it is not lying in wickedness. Nature and history, man in himself and in his association with his fellows, the state and society at large — are seen in a new light. New criteria are applied : the independence of the spiritual and political spheres, individual character, personal re¬ sponsibility and honor. In proportion as this spirit was propa¬ gated must ensue alienation from the existing order and criti¬ cism of it ; or, at least, the best men had neither time nor incli¬ nation to pursue that which was officially regarded as the best. The reformation of St. Francis, the spread of the Mystic type of piety, the criticism indulged in by Duns and the Nominalists, the revived interest in literature and art (Dante, Petrarch, Boc¬ caccio), and the political and social conditions, combined to create a new spiritual atmosphere. But the most powerful factor in this combination was antiquity. The treasures of the ancient world were brought to light and comprehended. In cultivated •circles, especially in Italy, antiquity assumed the leadership and, for not a few, took the place of the church. Its treasures were studied with an indescribable enthusiasm.1 The ancient world 1 d i-. 3^6). If the Christian has now learned to know that his natitre is nothing but love , he knows then ‘ ‘ that, so far as we are concerned, even his works of wrath must be nothing but love,” since they serve for the subjugation of our foes and to our “ test¬ ing ” (47. 21). “There is, therefore, with God no wrath nor disfavor, and his heart and thoughts are nothing but pure love, as may be seen in all his works before our very eyes ” (E. 19. 369, 370). Thus, whoever is “ separated ” from God experiences his wrath; the Christian knows him as “ nothing but love.”1 1 The believing Christian cannot and dare not by any means represent God to himself as angered and placated ( iratum et placatwn) , as the sacrifice of the mass requires ( W. 8. 441 ). Cf. 47.342: “ For he who thinks of God and believes that he is a wrathful God, will also find him such ; for as one holds, believes, and imagines concerning God, so is he also, and one finds him also yso, namely, a wrathful God.” 246 HISTORY OF DOCTRINES. He who considers the death of Christ recognizes 44 how im¬ measurably great and terrible is the wrath of God against sin, and again how unutterable, yea, how unsearchable, is the mercy and grace of God toward us condemned men” (E. 3. 100). 1 4. In his understanding of the relation between the Law and the Gospel, Luther also continued within the lines originally drawn by him (supra, p. 22 8). No one attains salvation, except as the law performs its work upon him before the gospel. Law and gospel are the word of God, but each in a peculiar sense (E. 19. 235). Not to have recognized this difference, is the greatest fault of the Romish theology. Luther never wearied of urging this distinction in ever-new applications. “This difference between the law and the gospel is the highest art in Christianity, which each and everyone who boasts or accepts the name of Christian should know and understand ” (E. 19. 235). (#) The Law is a divine requirement, rule, and mirror. It tells what man ought to do and has not done. 4 4 It reveals what man is, what he has been, and what he shall again become ’ ’ (E. 14. 151). What it says to the heart is confirmed by the conscience (14. 153). But what is here to be understood by the 44 Law?” The Mosaic law, in so far as it 44 made particular laws and ordinances, ? ’ i. e. , was a positive system of laws, is only a 44 Jewish-Saxony code.” But in so far as it coincides with inborn natural right , it is a permanent requirement valid for all times, which has received a peculiarly excellent ex¬ pression in the Mosaic law. 44 Where now the law of Moses and the law of nature are one thing, there the law remains and is not outwardly abolished, only spiritually through faith. . . . There¬ fore image-making and Sabbath and everything which Moses 1 Luther shared the vivid faith in devils and demons which characterized the close of the Middle Ages. But it must not be overlooked that he repre¬ sented the central processes of the religious life without making any essential use of these views. Large sections of his sermons may be searched in vain for any reference to the devil. His conceptions here also were more spiritual than those of the Middle Ages. He added, so to speak, a hellish majesty to the devil, and the comic aspects of the popular belief disappear entirely. Touching the work of the devil, he says: “When impurity abounds, the devil fills the arteries and bones as full of such evil lust as man permits” (E. 17. 3). “A Christian must know this, that he is sitting in the midst of devils, and that the devil is nearer to him than his coat or shirt, yea, nearer than his own skin, that he is round about us, and that we are always at dag¬ ger’s points with him” (17. 178, 180 ff. See also 11. 269 ff. ). The devils are very shrewd (17. 182, 195). They exist in great numbers (17. 1 9 1 ) : “ How many devils do you suppose were there ... at the Diet of Augsburg ? Every bishop had brought with him so many devils — as many as a dog has fleas on it about St. John’s Day” (ib. 210). Upon the fall of the devil, see 46. 3 f. ; upon angels and the protection rendered by them, 17. 177 ff., 182 f.> 189,202, 216, 219; 10. 1 5 1 . REPENTANCE, FAITH, SIN, GRACE, ATONEMENT. 247 appointed more than and beyond the natural law, since it has no natural law, is free, void, and done away with ” (E. 29. 156 f. ; 46. 84, 87 ; 47. 25). God’s law, or love, is natural law (E. 20. 125 ; 22. 104, 202). These written laws are to be included under the category of the reason, since they have flowed from it as from a fountain of law (E. 20. 106).1 As Luther shared the medieval conception of an inherited natural law (supra, p. 171b), he therefore recognized the “ Law ” only in so far as it agreed with the latter. In connection with it, he thought of other means of convincing us of our sins. From this point of view, the sufferings of Christ became also a preaching of the law (E. 13. 116 f. ; 11. 147). The entire law, however, in¬ cluding the decalogue, together with the laws of the church (Gal. 1. 18 1. W. 2. 527), does not give life, but slays (W. 2. 468; 6-353). It has not the power to move or renew man inwardly, but remains an inflexible, tormenting requirement (46. 75). Thus it calls forth the hatred of the sinner against itself (W. 2. 498, 532). The works which he performs without being inwardly conquered by the good, merely upon the requirement of the law, are done from fear of punishment (W. 2. 532), and are in the last analysis therefore hypocritical (2. 513; 6. 354). A “ servile spirit” arises in man’s heart (E. 7. 247). The law makes him really worse (W. 2. 525, 527), however far out¬ ward integrity may be secured by it (E. 7. 283, 284). The righteousness of works which it produces is no righteousness at all : “ That righteousness of works is most truly nothing else than to love sin, to hate righteousness, to detest God with his law, and to adore the greatest wickedness” (Gal. 2. 103). Since the law thus presses upon man and he cannot inwardly and actually meet its demands, there seizes him, on the one hand, a terror at the thought of God and desire to escape from him (E. 9. 179); he becomes an enemy of God, without being able to escape from him (E. 18. 73). But, on the other hand, a great longing fills his heart to be free from this pressure. This impels him toward Christ and the gospel (W. 2. 528, 532. E. 1 This passage is very instructive in showing Luther’s conception of the Old Testament law. It is indeed a divine revelation ; but it is universally valid only in so far as in harmony with the moral ideas inborn in man. We may here detect a remnant of the natural theology of the Middle Ages. The con¬ clusions which might be drawn from this position — denial of the total depravity of the natural man, the superfluity of the preaching of the law — Luther did not realize. From this point of view we may understand also his interpretation of the Third Commandment and his naturalistic and rationalizing way of regard¬ ing the observance of Sunday. See esp. the Larger Catechism, Symbol. Bucher (Muller), p. 401 f. In his works as early as 1518 : W. 1. 436 f. Cf. G. Hillner, L. Stellung in d. Sonntagsfrage in Mitteil, u. Nachr. f. die ev. K. in Russl., 1888, Sept. -Oct. * 2 48 HISTORY OF DOCTRINES. c 7. 289). It awakens displeasure with himself, the resolution to amend the life (6. 390, 339), and a thirst for the grace of God (E. 7. 251). (^) Preachers should begin with this preaching of the law, and never cease (E. 10. 123 f. ); for the world surely needs it (10. 283 ; 48. 210). The knowledge of sin must first be preached; the consciences of men must be terrified by the divine wrath ; the sinner must feel that he, with his sinful lust, belongs to the devil and is lost (E. 14. 15). Only then, after he recog¬ nizes his sin, can Christ and grace begin their work (E. 11. 328 ; 13. 295; 51. 270). Only after the preaching of the law has had its effect, follows the consolation of the gospel, according to Lk. 24. 47 (E. 29. 139 f.; 11. 327 f.; 27. 124. Gal. t. 186 f. ; 2. 1 1 5). Then should be preached, along with repent¬ ance, the forgiveness of sins (3. 354). “ That is all a preach¬ ing of the law, however or whenever it is done, which preaches of our sins and God’s wrath. Again, the gospel is such a preach¬ ing, which shows and gives nothing else than grace and forgive¬ ness in Christ. ... Yea, where is there a more earnest and terrible announcement and preaching of God’s wrath against sin than the sufferings and death of Christ ? . . . But so long as all this preaches God’s wrath and terrifies man, it is not yet the real preaching of the gospel nor of Christ, but a preaching of Moses and the law against the impenitent ” (E. 13. 116). 4 ‘The law is that which displays what we must do ; the gospel, where we are to get the power to do it. . . . The law reveals the sickness ; the gospel gives the medicine” (14. 14; cf. 19. 239 fi; 48. 200). “ The law has its goal, i. e., how far it is to go and what it is to accomplish, namely, to terrify the impenitent with God’s disfavor and wrath and (to lead up) to Christ ” (19. 236). He who rests under the law, is without grace and without the Holy Spirit (12. 1 1 2). If he is not to fall into despair, the gospel must soon come to his aid (E. 12. 372). With the gospel comes the Spirit ; Moses must now withdraw, and the law is robbed of its power (12. 251; 9. 251; 19. 246). The gospel proclaims the goodness of God and the forgiveness of sins (7. I5^, 327 ; 10. 89). With it, the Spirit enters and quickens the man inwardly, bringing with him Christ, who reigns in us. By this means faith, desire and love for the good, and a new pious life are produced in man (9. 240, 278; 13. 234, 265 ; 51. 302). The gospel effects the new birth (12. 323)7 The law inwardly transforms no one ; it is only the Holy Ghost who does this (52. 296). 1 But the new man needs no law. “Just as 1 The Holy Spirit does not therefore come through the preaching of the law, REPENTANCE, FAITH, SIN, GRACE, ATONEMENT. 249 three and seven — not ought to be, but are ten, nor is any law or rule to be sought for making them ten ... so a righteous man — not ought to, but does live well, nor does he need a law which may teach him to live well ” (W. 2. 596. E. 22. 66 f. ). The Christian has nothing to do with the law (E. 13. 35, 37, 39). “ It is therefore the highest art and wisdom of Christians not to know the law” (Gal. 1. 16). Christ has abolished it (W. 6. 354). Neither the Mosaic law nor the law of nature can longer require anything, since there is no longer need of any requirement. (