WartfeVl L'kar^ 
 
 SYLLABUS 
 
 -OF- 
 
 PROF. PATTON'S LECTURES 
 
 ON- 
 
 THEISM 
 
 irRXiTa?Ei3, 3^0 T 2=-crsxjis:^EiD. 
 
 (Hje Jriiutton JP'^^^s. 
 1888. 
 
•yip^i^i^ 
 
 Warlield Library 
 
 SYLLABUS 
 
 ^y 
 
 PROF. PATTON'S LECTURES 
 
 ON- 
 
 THEISM 
 
 I*DEaX2^rXEX), 3^0X I^XTSIjISHEXD. 
 
 je Jriuctton grtBs. 
 188 8. 
 
DEC S9192i 
 
 rii 
 
 rHElSM 
 
 INTODUCTOKY 
 
 Theism iniiv be considered reliu^iously or philosophically. 
 From the standpoint of relii^ious belief men may be re- 
 garded as believing or not believini^ in God. 
 
 Thus : 
 
 1. Theism. 
 
 iPolytlioisni. 
 r*aiitlieisin. 
 Moiiotlieisni. = 
 
 . Theism 
 par exellencp. 
 3. Atheism. 
 
 Theism, philosophically considered, is a theory of the 
 universe afHrming the existence of one Infinite, Personal 
 God ; the Creator, I'reserver, and Ruler of the Universe. 
 The theistic conception of the universe implies three things: 
 
 1. A finite, personal, and permanent self; or ego. 
 
 2. A totality of objective phenomena; or cosmos. ' 
 
 3. An infinite personal author of all dependent existence; 
 
 or God. 
 
 Opposed to Theism in this view of the subject would stand 
 Anti-theism in its various forms. 
 
 Adopting this philosophical c()nce[)tion of Theism, we 
 shall carry on the discussion under tliree main divisions : 
 Historical ; Constructive ; Polemic. 
 
 PART I. HISTORICAL. 
 
 Three topics fall under this head : 
 
 1. The phenomenology of Theism. 
 
 2. The genesis of Theism. 
 
 3. The discussion of Theism. 
 
 I. 'i'liE Phknomenology or Theism. 
 
 A. The Theism of the three great historic monotheistic 
 religions: Mohammedanism, C'bristianity, Judaism. 
 
 The discussion here concerns tlie purely monotheistic 
 character of Judaism. This has been attacked — though as 
 Ochler (Theo. of O. T. ii. 150) shews, without success — by 
 
2 
 
 a«em,)ting to prove („) Thnt .) 
 
 ;vo..n<i itself tiomV;iSi l^« ';.':;*-^-."''«'"J,graduall,-u.,. 
 
 P>nlv;. ^'"^ J*'"'" *''<-'t8 Of the or * <^:?s'ence of other 
 Po]ythmsm seen, to bo tl.ese regarding Theism and 
 
 thoisn.. '"'"^-^ *° '■'•■'"I'so mto idohnr^- or Poly 
 
 , „,;-'^'"- of nature. "^-'"""-^ '"'^^■'' o.i an animistic 
 
 "• -lliat a complex rdi.ri 
 
 '"• o?the";':::;!i|:;?-"'^ Monotheism 
 
 '•4osit!:;f'ti;;.:T"*'---na 
 
 ^ionothei.m ""'"■>' ^'0™ 
 
 '^M:;;c;jf:4r;jji-s«,.tcm, 
 ,, . Slt-^od^-"'^^^^^^^ 
 
 toliijP'K-'-'-' --on ot this... ,.,.,., 
 
 •"• i lio Theism of comparative Th<. .1 
 Accon n<' to tini, , • "'""^e Ihoology. 
 
 tion nr ''■''.'"'" '" t''e«e theis h. f/'''T'''''''''-^' "^ I'xlia 
 
 1 
 
C. The Theism of speculative philosophy. 
 Aocordiii,*;* to wliieh God is rc'ii;ur(le(l simply as a livpo- 
 thesis for "-iviiii:: rational exi)laiiati()ii of the universe. 
 
 ir. The Genesis of Theis.m. 
 
 There are four generic theories in explanation of our idea 
 of God, nam el}' : 
 
 1. Development. 2. Revelation. 
 
 3. Inference. 4. Intuition. 
 
 These are to be considered in their order. 
 
 First Theory. Development. 
 
 By which is meant that Monotheism sustains genetic re- 
 lations to antecedent impure or less pure forms of belief. 
 This theory assumes several forms. 
 
 A. Hume. 
 
 Polytheism, according to II., is prior to Monotheism. 
 The advance out of the one into the other is not due to 
 philosophic reflection and a growing appreciation of the 
 unity of nature, but is explained by the tendency to flatter 
 a local deity, to impute greatness, and so by degrees to in- 
 vest him with the attribute of inflnity. A view lacking 
 every element of plausibility, and speculatively worthless. 
 
 B. COMPTE. 
 
 The theory under notice is credited to Compte, not because 
 he is the originator of the term fetich, nor yet because he 
 has given the best account of fetichistic religions — for this 
 distinction is due to F. Schultze, (Fetichismus) — but because 
 Compte flrst presented in reasoned form the doctrine that 
 all religion begins in Fetichism and passes thence through 
 Polytheism to Monotheism. Discussing the fetich-theory 
 of religion (1) inquire into the origin and meaning of the 
 word fetich, and (2) consider reasons for and against this 
 view. 
 
 Account of the word given in Max MuUer's ITibbert 
 Lectures, p. 54. Introduced by De Bross, 1760. Origin of 
 the word found in the custom of Portuguese navigators, who 
 called the inanimate objects worshipped by the people of 
 West Africa — feiticos. 
 
Word used, though improperly, with great latitude, 
 Schultzc speaks of mountains, water, etc., as fetiches; 
 Tiele, of Heaven as a feticli. Compte gives the doctrine of 
 'anima mundi as illustration of fetich worship. And so an 
 ohject of special regard is termed a fetich ; a child's doll ; 
 a lock of hair; and by way of reproach, a theological opin- 
 ion; the Protestant's Bible; the Roman Catholic wafer. 
 This is wrong. The word is properly used to describe the 
 worship of tangible, inanimate objects. 
 
 So regarding it, consider the reasons for calling it the 
 earliest form of religion : 
 
 a. It is the lowest form. What is lowest was anterior. 
 But this needs proof. 
 
 b. Savages and uncivilized races are types of primitive 
 man. But this assumes there has been no degradation. 
 
 0. Empirical philosophy is under obligation to expound 
 a natural history of religion. But this necessity is only 
 condition by the exigencies of an erroneous philosophy. 
 
 As to the value of the theory, it is, however, to be re- 
 marked : 
 
 1. It does not satisfy one of the leading evolutionists, Mr. 
 
 Spencer. 
 
 2. It is ditticult to determine, from the evidence furnished 
 
 by savage tribes, whether the Fetich is a determina- 
 tion of a general belief in God, or whether the larger 
 belief in God is developed out of fetich-worship : 
 whether belief in God is the logical prius of the fetich 
 or vice versn. 
 
 3. And though the people of W. Africa had no knowledge 
 
 of God at all, there is nothing to shov/ that this con- 
 dition is not due to a degradation from a primitive 
 faith. 
 
 4. Tlif literature of India [U'oves thiit there was a prim- 
 
 iti\e Monotheism or l[enotheism lying back of the 
 Polytheism of a later day. 
 6. Spencer's criticism is good. Before the savage can 
 invest this or that stick or rag with life, he must 
 have a general animistic conception. Spencer is 
 trying to show that the ghost-theory is the true the- 
 ory ami that belief in ghosts antedates belief in the 
 fetirli. What is good against fetichism in favor of 
 ancestor worship is good also against fetichism in fa- 
 vor of primiti\«' Tlicism. 
 
C. Herbert Si'encer. 
 
 The primitive rclijLcion, ucconliiiir to this thiiikcr, was 
 ancestor-worship. llaving in droanis come to a knowl- 
 edge ot liis second self, that is, having reached the helief in 
 the soul, the step was easy to helief in the continued con- 
 scious existence of the dei)arted. Hence ancestor- worship. 
 And Mr. 8pencer is at great pains to show how what hegan 
 as worship of ancestors in time took on the form of wor- 
 ship [>aid to plants, animals, the heavenly bodies and finally 
 the infinite God. 
 
 Genenral Considerations. 
 
 Spencer lias faced the question his philosophy required 
 him to face, that of accounting for religion by natural causes. 
 To fail here would be the destruction of his system. But to 
 show that the origin of religion mai/ be as he describes it, 
 does not furnish proof that such is ij:s origin. The theory 
 of religion can have no more value than the ' First Princi- 
 ples.' Again, among naturalistic theories of religion this 
 must be considered the most thorouo^h-o:oinor : for while 
 fetichism leaves unanswered the question how men came to 
 worship a fetich, the theory of ancestor-worship [»rofesses at 
 least to e.\[)lain how belief in tlie post mortem existence of 
 ancestors came to be entertained. Omitting all reference to 
 criticisms against the theory and against the philosophical 
 system of which it is part, the most that could be claimed 
 for it would be that it presents a plausible naturalistic theory 
 of the origin of religion, as opposed to the supernaturalistic 
 theory of Christianity. 
 
 Special Considerations. 
 
 Spencer has failed, however, to make out even so strong 
 a case as this. 
 
 1. To prove his theory he should have showfi \hi>X when 
 
 homage was paid to ancestors, no homage was paid 
 to the gods. But the V'edahs seem to illustrate the 
 contrary idea (Sociology 306). 
 
 2. It is important to show that filial piety is worship or 
 
 such worship as is paid to the gods. Spencer talks 
 very loosely in regard to this. 
 
6 
 
 3. Because the savage regards God as his father, he is not 
 
 therefore worshipping his ancestors. To make much 
 of the case of Unkulunkulu in this direction would 
 require him to draw a similar inference form our use 
 of the Lord's Prayer. 
 
 4. The attempt to sliow how idolatry, animal worship and 
 
 nature worship were related to ancestor-worship is an 
 illustration of very far-fetched reasoning. Thus : fe- 
 tich worship from identification of deceased with 
 portions of his clothing: idol worship from the. habit 
 of making images of the deceased ; animal worship 
 from the frequenting of the home of the deceased 
 by certain animals, or from the fact that the deceased 
 hatl an animal name ; })lant-worshi[) from the intoxi- 
 cating liquors produced from some plants, supposed 
 in this way to be possessed by supernatural beings ; 
 mountain worship and worship of the sea from the 
 fact that their ancestors came from the mountain or 
 over the sea — origin in this sense was mistaken for 
 parentage. 
 
 5. The most ]»lausible argument in support of Spencer's 
 
 view would be derived from Greek and Roman my- 
 thology. Mr. Spencer is thoroughly committed to 
 the Euhemeristic theory of nn'thology ; but he has to 
 encounter the opposition even here of a very influ- 
 ential sehool of mytliologists. 
 
 6. Mr. Spencer must answer more fully tlian he has al- 
 
 ready done, the allegation that ancestor-worship is 
 confined to the inferior races and that no Indo- 
 European or Semitic nation, so far as we know, seems 
 to have made a religion of worship of the dead. Mr. 
 Spencer believes that the " divine man as conceived 
 "had everywhere for antecedent a powerful man as 
 perceircil " (Sociology, 438). This is supported by say- 
 ing that the Jews worshipped an ancestor in Jeho- 
 vah ; and this simple and absurd assertion is his an- 
 swer to the objection just quoted. 
 
 1). lIi:<:iiL. 
 
 There is notliiiig that calls for special remark so far as 
 the theistic problem in the Hegelian philosophy is concern- 
 ed. The d-'vclopiiicnt of Theism is a part of a system of 
 
development, and no criticism is called for beyond the crit- 
 icism of the system itself, which is obviously out of place 
 here. IIci::elianism is the idealistic form of the doctrine 
 of develo})ment. It is the anti^xxles of the philosophy of 
 Compte, yet presenting points of resemblance to it. In 
 the one case the problem is : Given atoms, to make a cos- 
 mos; and the solution is offered us in the First Principles 
 of Herbert Spencer. In the other case the problem is : 
 Given the Idea^ to explain the cosmos ; and for answer we 
 are told of a process of successive evolutions ending in con- 
 scious, thinking, praying num. Monotheism in this sys- 
 tem, as in that of Compte or Spencer, is the result of a pro- 
 cess which lias been going on silently through millenniums. 
 
 E. Max Muller. 
 
 It is not very easy to determine the position of this 
 author in religious thought. His didactic position does not 
 quite accord with that which his polemic would suggest. 
 
 1. In his attack on the Comptean theory of religion he 
 
 has conclusively shown that fetichism is not the 
 })rimitive religion. 
 
 2. In his Hil)bert Lectures he avows less heartily than 
 
 in an earlier work his belief in a religious instinct; 
 indeed he practically discards the idea. 
 
 3. The Max ^liiller of to-day is not the Max Miiller of 
 
 Chips from a German Workshop, (Transactions of 
 Victoria Institute, July 1881), and cannot be quot- 
 ed as the advocate of primitive Monotheism or 
 Henotheism. For while, as a student of literature, 
 he tells us that Vedic Writings show that belief in 
 one God (Henotheism) antedated Polytheism : as a 
 psychologist, asking what religion a man can learn 
 through his five senses, he tells us that whether 
 Monotheism be or be not the primitive religion is of 
 no consequence, since, before man had reached any 
 belief in God, he "had already accomplished half 
 his journey." The primitive Monotheism pointed 
 to in the Vedas is thus made of no avail by the sug- 
 gestion that the journey of progress was half done 
 before men came to the idea of God. Max Miiller 
 must be classed among the evolutionists; but it must 
 be noted that his recent conclusions regarding primi- 
 
tive relit^ions are in cc^nliict with the testimony of the 
 ancient literature of India which he has brought to 
 the attention of English readers. 
 
 F. SCIIELLING. 
 
 Schelling held that i>riniitive man had an intuitive or 
 instinctive knowledge of God ; but that his Theism was 
 relative, not absolute. From this original relative Mono- 
 theism have come two streams of tendency, one issuing in 
 Polytheism, the other in absolute Monotheism. 
 
 His reasons for this view are : 
 
 1. It furnishes a natural answer to the question how men 
 
 became Polytheists. Belief in one God did not ex- 
 clude belief in a i)lurality of gods. 
 
 2. Monotheism absolute, or belief in only one God, is 
 
 said to be a generalization derived through contact 
 with a previously existing Monotheism and through 
 protestinij: aijainst it. 
 
 Second Theory : Revelation. 
 
 1. Distinguish between revelation and tradition. The 
 
 question is not how we came to believe in God, but 
 how any belief in God originated. Tradition does 
 not originate anything, and hence, a traditional the- 
 ory ot the origin of religion is absurd. The genesis 
 of a belief is one thing and the perpetuation of a be- 
 lief another. 
 
 2. So distinguish between the correcting and the conserv- 
 
 ing influence of the Bible in regard to Theism and 
 the <^enesis of theistic belief. 
 Doubtless our i)ure Theism is due mainly to the inspired 
 Word, and we believe in one and only one God, be- 
 cause we have a revelation from God; but this is not 
 the question. 
 
 3. The question is wliether the genesis of primitive the- 
 
 ism is due to revelation. 
 A. Watson holds that man lirst knew God "by sensible 
 
 converse with Him." 
 Schelling objects to this view with great force, by declar- 
 ing; that this would imj)ly "a previous Atheism of con- 
 BciouHiiess." Cocker objects, by saying that if man had 
 
been devoid of the idea of (iod, it nexer c-oiild have been 
 taught liiin. (Christianity and (ireek IMiilosophy, ]>. 95. "^ 
 But Cocker (h)es not distinj^uisli sufficiently between ati in- 
 tutitive knowledge of God and <i priori bebefs tbat lead log- 
 ically and necessarily to the theistic inference. Watson 
 holds that the suecessive revelations made to tlie idiosen 
 people were disseminated by means ot commercial inter- 
 course between Jews and the (ientile world, and that this 
 accounts for the similarities of belief tonnd among so many 
 nations. 
 
 B. Gladstone accounts for these similarities by su[t[)osing 
 that prior to the dispersion ot nations there was a revela- 
 tion, comprehending not only Monotheism, but even the 
 more distinctive doctrines of grace. But his reasoning is 
 not convincing. 
 
 There is no evidence that Theism had its origin in Reve- 
 lation, undei-standing by Revelation what the writers just 
 referred to mean by it. 
 
 Third Theory : Inference. 
 
 It is held by some, in opposition to the doctrine that be- 
 lief in God is intuitional, that men reach Theism through 
 inference. Thus Dr. McCosh argues forcibly (Intuitions, 
 377) that Theism does not possess the character ot a simple, 
 original, unresolvable belief; and Dr. Flint aflirms that 
 belief in God is an inference, though, as he admits, an uncon- 
 scious inference. He illustrates and maintains his position 
 with great aptness and force. But it is to be remarked : 
 
 1. We must distinguish between the vindication of a be- 
 
 lief and its genesis. Because we can give reasons 
 for believing in God, it does not follow that we be- 
 lieve in God on account of reasons. 
 
 2. Yet it is not to be denied that a belief that can be de- 
 
 fended by reasons may be reached through reasons ; 
 and it is true that there are cases where men have 
 left Polytheism for Theism through force of reason- 
 ing. 
 
 3. There is force in the frequent remark that men be- 
 
 lieved God before they reasoned about him ; and this 
 force, though diminished, is not destroyed by Dr. 
 Flint's statement of the doctrine of unconscious in- 
 ference. 
 
10 
 
 Fourth Thbory: Intuition. 
 
 The word Intuition here is used in a broad sense, and 
 opinions that diifer widely, and are in some cases in open 
 conflict, will be grouped under this head. Different from 
 one another as they may be, they are at one in the state- 
 ment that belief in God does not owe its genesis either to 
 objective revelation or to a conscious inference. 
 
 (1.) ScHELLiNQ AND CousiN. — Both, though in difierent 
 forms, believed that we have an immediate knowledge of 
 God, the Absolute. 
 
 See on this Dr. Hodge's chapter, " Can God be known ?" 
 and Sir Wm. Hamilton's "Discussions." 
 
 (2.) Jacobi and Schleiermacher. — To have attention 
 turned to the feelings, as an offset to the purely ethical sys- 
 tems in vogue, was of great advantage : yet it was a mis- 
 take to call the sense of dependence, God-consciousness. 
 Mansel makes this mistake. (Limits of Religious Thought, 
 p. 115.) 
 
 (3.) Calderwood.— This writer says that belief in the ex- 
 istence of one infinite God is a necessary belief In sup- 
 porting this he affirms the inconclusiveness of all arguments 
 for the Divine existence — an unnecessary and unfortunate 
 mode of argument, since it stakes the validity of theistic 
 belief on the question of its intuitive character. 
 
 (4.) Hodge. Dr. Hodge says that the idea of God is in- 
 nate. Yet notice: (a) He maintains the validity of theistic 
 proof, [b) He does not believe that we have an innate idea 
 of the one living and true God. (c) He means that men had 
 an idea of God before any act of conscious inference. His 
 position does not differ materially from Dr. Flint's. 
 
 (5.) Caird. Thougli arguing against the intuitive view 
 in its .strict sense, Caird must be included under this head 
 when tiie word is used in the broad sense of this discussion. 
 He holds that it is " necessary for the mind to relate itself to 
 God." Belief in God is not an inference taken into the 
 soul through force of reasons. It is a belief, rather, that 
 flows by tlie influence of the Divine impulse into the chan- 
 nel of the soul's a(.'tivities. 
 
 Tiie.se difll'rent opinions represent several senses in which 
 the word intuition is used in theistic discussions. 
 
 1. By intuition we may mean an immediate knowledge 
 of God. Claims to this kind of knowledge have 
 been sufHcientlv refuted bv Sir W. Hamilton. 
 
11 
 
 2. By intuition may be meant an intuitive, self-evident, 
 
 and necessary judgment or belief. That belief in 
 God is not of this kind, Dr. McCosh and Dr. Flint 
 have shown. 
 
 3. Most men who say that their belief in God is intui- 
 
 tive mean only that we have a constitutional tenden- 
 cy or impulse toward belief in God. This, however, 
 is capable of being represented in different ways. 
 What is the explanation of this impulse, or instinct, 
 or tendency ? 
 
 (a) It may mean no more than the rapid, and so uncon- 
 
 scious inference, such as is involved in the recognition 
 of our fellow men. This is Dr. Flint's and substan- 
 tially Dr. Hodge's view. 
 
 (b) The idea of God may be the necessary correlative of 
 
 the idea of the finite, the conditioned. — Cousin. 
 
 (c) With some the idea of God is a moment in a process 
 
 wherein God himself is coming to consciousness. 
 Man's thought of God is therefore God's thought of 
 himself — Hegel. — Caird. 
 
 (d) Again, the idea of God may be God's testimony to His 
 
 own existence. Is there any objection to this view 
 of the genesis of an idea of God*? We live and move 
 and have our being in Him. Are there not good 
 reasons for believing that it is through the Spirit of 
 God within, and not merely by arguments without, 
 that we derive our first belief in God ? 
 
 This view would have these advantages, at least : 
 
 a. Objective theistic proof is not made unnecessary by 
 tliis explanation. 
 
 j3. The theistic belief, not originating in induction, is not 
 conditioned by the probability of inductive proof. 
 
 y. This view accounts for all forms of the a priori argu- 
 ment, and justifies, in a measure, the claims that are 
 made on behalf of intuitional Theism. 
 
 0. It falls in with the analogy of subsequent Revelation. 
 
 e. It makes it unnecessary to establish a schism between 
 Adam and his posterity, as to the mode of knowing 
 God. 
 
 ^. It is in harmony with the doctrine of God's omnipres- 
 ence to believe that His thought is so far ooufiuent 
 with ours, that we know Him through His direct re- 
 lation to the soul. 
 
12 
 
 III. Discussion of Theism. 
 
 Throe divisions : 
 
 1. The ancient period, extending to the 8th century A. 
 
 1). Greek and Konian philosophy. 
 
 2. The niedia'val, extending to the 15th century. Scho- 
 
 lasticism. 
 
 3. The modern. 
 
 I. FIRST PERIOD. 
 
 Greek pliilosophy falls into three divisions: The Pre- 
 Socratic; the Socratic-Aristotelian ; the Post-Aristotelian. 
 
 The Pre-Socratic period exhibits a developing process of 
 generalization. There is little Theism in it ; but it is less 
 Pantheistic, probably, than is commonly supposed. 
 
 Assuming that the generalizing process took on two 
 forms in the Ionic School, the mechanical and the dynamic, 
 Anaximander illustrates the latter. Under the idea of 
 TO djTeipuu, he construed the universe in a pantheistic, or as 
 Fortlage puts it, a cosmotheistic sense. 
 
 In the Eleatic school, the leading idea was the One ro iu. 
 As in tlie Ionic School, the effort of the Eleatics was, to 
 reacli unity, but in a different way. Anaximander con- 
 ceived of the multiplicity in the phenomenal world as modes 
 of existing matter : he was cosmotheistic. Parmenides, 
 on the other hand, reached unity by a process of abstrac- 
 tion, by stripping objects of their predicates. His unity 
 was a logical unitv — tlie hii2:hest catei^^ory, or Beinor. His 
 system was a Logo-theism. Xenophanes is the theist of the 
 Eleatics. lie protests against Polytheism, and ridicules 
 Anthro})omorphism. His Monotheism has been called Pan- 
 theism, but, probably, on insufficient ground. 
 
 The Eleatics give us the earliest form of the ontological 
 argument ; and they open the important discussion of the 
 relation of tlie One to the many. That relation may be 
 represented as that of 
 
 {a) (ienus and Sjiecies: Logo-theism. 
 
 (6) Substance and mode : Cosmo-theism. 
 
 (6^ Substance and mode: Cosmo-theism. 
 
 (c) Cause and effect : Theism. 
 
 In tlie second period of Greek philosoDhv 
 
 period of Greek }>hilo8ophy we find Anax- 
 agoras, who marks an advance in theistic discussion. 
 
 Anaxagoras recognized not only the unity of the world, 
 but also its order and adjustments*^; and these he accounted 
 
13 
 
 for by affirnnnc; the existence of a world-ordering voDc. He 
 is distinctly coniprnnented by Aristotle for this advance in 
 the explanation of tlie universe. There is no good reason 
 for denying to Anaxagoras the distinction of being the fa- 
 ther of the doctrine of Final Causes ; and the fact that, for 
 the most part, he explains plienoraena in a mechanical way, 
 does not disprove the fact that, arguing from the analogy 
 of his own intelligence, he referred the order of the uni- 
 verse also to Intelligence. 
 
 The Kleatic and the Anaxagorean doctrine differed thus : 
 The Eleatic atHrmed the existence of one, necessary -Being, 
 the ground of all phenomena ; Anaxagoras conceived of the 
 world, not as an existence merely, but as such an existence, 
 and suggested a voDc as its explanation. The Eleatic saw 
 the world of multitude and sought the unifying }>rinciple : 
 the Anaxagorean saw tlie world of ada[»tation and sought 
 the organising principle. 
 
 Socrates discussed Theism for practical ends; and Ikj was 
 the first among the Greeks, says Oesterley, to do so. Ilia 
 was not the Theism of speculation, but the practical The- 
 ism, that had good morals as its motive. Ilis statement of 
 the teleological argument is to be found in the Memorabilia, 
 Bk. 1., Ca[». 4, and is familiar. 
 
 Plato has been charged with Pantheism ; and his confused 
 sense respecting Personality, his interchangeable use of the 
 words God and Good, and his want of nice discrimination 
 between the First and the Final Cause, constitute the basis of 
 this charge, which Prof Jowett saj's is untrue. The Theism 
 of Plato embraces the following points : 
 
 1. But for prevalent Atheism, there would be no need of 
 
 proving God's existence. 
 
 2. The soul has a natural tendency to believe in God. 
 
 3. The orderly movements of the heavenly bodies sug- 
 
 gested to him a Divine author and presence. 
 The distinction now made between order and ends in 
 nature was understood. This argument (the Cos- 
 mological) is found in the tenth book of the Laws. 
 
 4. But in the Timaeus he argues teleologically, from the 
 
 adaptation of means to ends in our bodily organism. 
 
 5. The a^tiological argument, pure and simple, was also 
 
 recognized ; though it is the distinction of Aristotle 
 to have developed it. 
 
14 
 
 6. The inconiniensurable character of mind and matter 
 leads to the argument for a universal mind. His 
 view approaches the doctrine of the anima miindi, and 
 this may be the basis of the allegation that he was a 
 pantheist. But the doctrine of the anima mundi is 
 not l*antheism. 
 
 Aristotle found arguments for the existence of God in 
 the religious consciousness of men, and in the order of the 
 world. His great argument, howev^er, and the one most 
 characteristic of his philosophy, is found in his doctrine of 
 a First Mover. There is, he says, first that which is moved 
 but does not produce motion ; secondly, tliat which both 
 moves and causes motion ; and, thirdly, that which is un- 
 moved and produces motion. This first mover is incorpo- 
 real, immovable, without parts or passions. It is pure en- 
 ergy ; Absolute Being; God. God has no end outside of 
 Himself He is his own end. God's thought does not find 
 its object out of Himself Thought and thinker are one. 
 His thought is the thought of thought. 
 
 Aristotle has given us, says Zeller, the first scientific 
 foundation for Theism, inasmuch as in his system the defi- 
 nite thought of a self-conscious intelligence in God is not 
 due to a merely religious idea, but is rigidly deduced from 
 the principles of his philosophical system. 
 
 Yet, as Zeller goes on to shew, it is difficult to say what 
 Aristotle held, regarding the relation of God to the world; 
 and this difficulty has led some to say that his Theism was, 
 in realitv, a Pantheism, that is to sav, was not Theism at 
 all. 
 
 No one has recognized finality in nature more distinctly 
 than Aristotle. He was as cognizant as Paley of the adap- 
 tation of means to ends. But finality in nature does not 
 seem to shut him up to the necessity of conceiving God as 
 a designer. Nature, he says, has a tendency to realize the 
 good. God, says Aristotle, moves the world as the loved 
 object moves the one loving. And this, by some, is con- 
 strued to mean that God is the efficient cause, only as He is 
 the final cause. This, again, is capable of being understood 
 in a sense that destroys the distinction between God and the 
 world ; that is to say, is a juircly ]>antheistic sense. Is God 
 only another name lor the order, the finality, manifest in 
 the world ? U so, the Aristotelian doctrine is pantheistic. 
 
15 
 
 Or does the order and iiiiality exlii])ited in Nature exist as a 
 jyrius in the thouizht of God? This woidd he theistic, and 
 this seems to he Aristotle's idea, for he says " the world has 
 its principle in God^and this j>rin('i})le exists, not merely as 
 a form immanent in the world, like the order in an army, 
 hut also as a self-existent suhstanee, like the general in an 
 army." (Uebervveg, I, 163.) See, also, Sir Alex. Grant's 
 Ethics of Aristotle, Vol. I., 283. 
 
 The Ejncureans found their proof of God's existence in 
 the universality of the hclief. This was not the argument 
 e consensu ycnthim, nor was it, as Cicero su|)posed, the 
 doctrine that belief in God is innate. The 7i()6):fj(l^c(: of the 
 Epicureans was held to prove God's existence, by showing 
 that the gods universally nuuiifested themselves to men by 
 direct contact in sleep. The Stoics, with their doctrine of 
 the aninia mundi, are frequently quoted as pantheists. Yet 
 notice that they believed in the separate personality and 
 immortality of the individual soul, as well as in an intelli- 
 gent, world ordering soul of the world. 
 
 The conflicting sentiments of the Stoics, Epicureans, and 
 philosophers of the New Academy, were brought out in 
 Cicero's JDe Natura Deorum, the one work on Natural The- 
 ology that antiquity has furnished us. After the time of 
 Cicero, Greek philosophy was affected by Oriental influ- 
 ences ; but though it became more Theosophical, no con- 
 tribution to theistic discussion seems to have been made. 
 Among the church fathers, Clement and Origen denied 
 the possibility of proving the existence of God, and placed 
 this belief among the a priori elements of knowledge. Ath- 
 anasius recognized the moral argument as the strongest. 
 Augustine argues from the relatively good, great, and true 
 to the absolutely and inflnitely good, great, and true. His 
 discussion of the highest truth enters largely into the dis- 
 cussions of a later day. Boethius, (474 A. I).), in his De 
 Consolatione PliHosophiae^ enlarged upon the same idea. He 
 was the precursor of Anselm in this field, and is said by 
 Kostlin (Stud. u. Krit., 1875) to be the founder of onto- 
 logical theistic proof. 
 
 2. SECOND PERIOD. 
 
 The conditions did not exist in the ancient world for the 
 production of a reasoned Theism and of elaborate treatises 
 in Natural Theology. These conditions are. 
 
16 
 
 1. The antithesis between Natural and Revealed Religion, 
 
 tiie result of our having the Bible. 
 
 2. The existence of Dogmatic Theology. For when our 
 
 knowledge of God is system^ized, the question 
 whether God exists, at once becomes a locus. 
 
 3. The polemic relations of Theism to anti-theistic theo- 
 
 ries. 
 
 These conditions began to be realized in the Scholastic 
 philosophy, and they have been realized increasingly ever 
 since. The theistic discussions of Scholasticism are, for the 
 most part, a repetition of the arguments found in Greek 
 philosophy. Aristotle's argument based on motion, the 
 argument based on the highest good, etc., etc. 
 
 Two books, only, come to us from Scholasticism, devoted 
 specially to Theism : Anschn's Fros-logium and the Theologia 
 yaturalis, of Raymond De Sebonde. 
 
 Scholasticism falls under two periods : John Scotus Eri- 
 gena, Roscellin, Anselm, and Abelard mark the first period ; 
 Thomas Aquinas, Occam, and Duns Scotus, the second. 
 Phitonic pliil()S()j>hy was dominant in the first period. The 
 Aristotelian in the second. Anselm and Aquinas, respec- 
 tively, rei)resented these periods. Anselm was the heir of 
 Augustine and Boethius; as the former had argued on the 
 basis of the highest Truth, and the latter on the basis of 
 the relative and the imperfect; so Anselm's Theistic proof 
 in the Monologinm proceeded under the belief of the highest 
 (iood. 
 
 Dissatisfied with the Monologium, Anselm attempts in 
 the Proshjgium to make a complete demonstration of the 
 existence of God. The key to the argument is found in a 
 phrase which he uses in the beautiful prayer with which 
 the treatise begins : Thou art that <hlo nihil majus cogitari 
 possit. 
 
 1. Anselm's statement and Gaunilo's reply. 
 
 We i)elieve that God is that than which a greater cannot 
 be conceived. I^ut that which exists in re is greater than 
 that which exists in intdlectu. Therefore when we say that 
 we believe in a l)eing than whom a greater cannot be con- 
 ceived, we must think of a Ik'ing existing in re. For if God 
 did U(it exist in ri\ we could think of him as existing in re, 
 and this wouM be greater. I>ut we are thinking of a being 
 than which a greater cannot be conceived. Again, God 
 cannot be thought !iot to be. For if the Being of whom we 
 
17 
 
 think can be thought not to be, we can think of a Being 
 who cannot be thought not to be, and this would be greater. 
 But we are thinking of a Being than wl)oni a greater can- 
 not be conceived. (Jaunilo replies ])y saying, substantially, 
 that what exists subjectively does not necessarily exist objec- 
 tively. Between the greatest Being f/ioiff/lif as existing and 
 the greatest Being '^r/<^^f/(y existing, there is a wide diti'erence. 
 Then follows his famous illustration of the island. 
 
 Ansehn replies by saying that his argument is unique ; 
 that it a{)plies only to the Being, quo majns iio/i cogitari pos^ 
 sit ; that if (launilo could find anything to which his rea- 
 soning would apply except this being quo uiujus, etc., he 
 would make him a present of tlie lost island. 
 
 2. Criticisms of the Anselmian proof. See Runze : Brr 
 Ontoloc/ische Goitcsbeweis. 
 
 (a) AsswuptioKS. Fortlage, Hasse, and others say the 
 whole discussion depends on the Realism that underlies it. 
 Others say that Anselm first gets his idea of God from 
 Revelation, and then seeks to legitimate it by reasoning. 
 Then again it is said that his argument is an attempt to give 
 dialectical certitude to an idea derived through the witness 
 of the Holy Ghost. 
 
 (/>) The aim of the Anselmian proof has been criticised. 
 Schelling says that Anselm tried to prove God's existence as 
 if God were an individual to be coi^rdinated with other 
 individuals, whereas He is the ground of all Being. But 
 Anselm is not open to the charge of holding a merely me- 
 chanical Theism. 
 
 As little force is there in the objection that we cannot 
 prove God's existence a priori and deductively, because God, 
 being the suruymnn genus, cannot be included in a higher 
 genus. 
 
 (c) Objections based on the method of Anselm. It was 
 a mistake to seek to prove God's existence by syllogistic 
 process. God, says Fischer, is metalogical. Great unan- 
 imity of thinkers on this point. In fact, however sure we 
 are of God's existence, when we try to prove it, we only 
 transfer, it is said, the assumption from the conclusion to 
 the premises. 
 
 But there is no corresponding unanimity in regard to the 
 particular fallacy in the reasoning of Anselm. Identity of 
 premises, circle, petitio principH, four terms, not to speak of 
 other iallacies, have all been laid to his charge. 
 
18 
 
 (</) Viliiiar denounces the Anselraian proof in the inter- 
 ests of revealed truth, as the " most glaring illusions of a 
 most vicious pride." This, if valid against Anselm, is valid 
 against all reasoned Theism. 
 
 3. Remarks on the Anselmian proof 
 
 Anselm may be considered as reasoning from any of these 
 premises : 
 
 (a) What exists in inteUcclu exists in re. A Being ([uo 
 majtis^ etc. 
 
 This would justify Gaunilo's objection. But this is not 
 Anselm. 
 
 [h) What is necessarily in intellectu exists in re. A Being 
 quo /najas, etc. 
 
 This would make superfluous the statement that to exist 
 (/( re is greater than to exist in intellectu. Again, this is not 
 Anselm. 
 
 (<?) What is necessarily thought to exist in re, does exist 
 in re. But a Being q?/o rnojus, etc. Therefore, etc. 
 This is the Anselmian position ; and the minor 
 premise clearly needs proof. Anselm tries to prove 
 it. His argument is the one attempt in history to 
 give dialectical objectivity to an idea of the Infinite. 
 Hence the attention it has attracted. The nerve of the 
 argument is in the statement, " What exists in re is 
 greater than what exists in intellectu ; " and since we 
 are necessarily led to think of a Being than which a 
 greater cannot be conceived, we are supposed to be 
 necessarily led to think of such a Being as existing 
 in re. 
 
 To which it may be replied : 
 
 1. Tliat the predicate existence adds nothing to the con- 
 cept ; and so it may be denied that a thing in re is 
 greater than a thing in intellectu. 
 
 1. That if a thing /// re were greater, then the conclusion 
 would be either that a Being in re existed in intellectu, 
 wliich is absurd ; or that the Being it} intellectu was 
 not a Being quo mrijus, etc.; since it was not as great 
 as the Being in re. 
 
 Aquinas devotes two pages in his Su/nma {quuestio 2) to 
 the existence of God and adduces five arguments : 
 
 1. From motion. It is Aristotle's agument for a first 
 mover, and really means that a first cause which is 
 not a physical cause, is the only true cause. 
 
19 
 
 2. Tlie ari^uiiient based on the efficient cause — an iiii}>licit 
 
 statcnit'iit of the aeti()]()<;ical ar«^unioiit, 
 
 3. TliL* ar^mnoiit (.r possi/tili <f iicccssdrlo. There muHt be 
 
 some necessary lU'ini::, l»avin<i: its cause of existence 
 in itself, and tlieretore eternal. 
 
 4. The art^unient ex gradibus qui in rebus invcniuntur. 
 
 \'irtually, AuG^ustine's ari^unient as to the hii^liest 
 truth. 
 
 5. The ari^unient c.r (jnhiriKitionc nruin. : a compact state- 
 
 ment of the teleological Jirgument. 
 The last of the Schoolmen who deserve notice liere is 
 Raymond de 8ebonde, (1384 A.D., about), whose epoch- 
 niakin<yc book was tlie first Bystematic treatise on Natural 
 Theoloi^y. Raymond's book is an unsuccessful attempt to 
 prove from nature the doctrines of revealed religion. He 
 affirms that God has given us two revelations: crcalura and 
 Scriptimt. His book is entitled Liber 0)ratf/rorum. Best 
 account of his system given by Matzke. 
 
 3. THIRD PERIOD. 
 
 The publication of Descartes' (liscourse on Method, in 
 1639, marks the transition to the modern period in theistic 
 discussion. (.)f liis Theism there should be no doubt, for 
 he says : " By the name ot God I mean an infinite, eternal, 
 immutable, independent, omniscient, omnipotent substance 
 by which I and all other things which are, if it be true that 
 these things e.xist, have been created.'" Dr. Kunze, in 
 his recent history of the ontological proofs, complains that 
 his Theism is too Deistic, in this respect contrasting with 
 Anselm. Saisset, on tlie other hand, in his Modern Pan- 
 theism, begins with Descartes. His criticisms are acute. 
 But Descartes' doctrine of continuous creation, together 
 with his determinism, do not suflfice to i)rove the charge of 
 Pantheism. Mahaff'v idso i^^ives ])robablv too much weii2:ht 
 to a casual remark of Descartes, that " the Deity might be 
 identified with tlie order of Nature." 
 
 Before noticing the Cartesian argument, consider this 
 remarkable statement : " I very clearly see that the certitude 
 and truth of all science depends on the knowledge alone of 
 the true God, insomuch that before I knew Ilini, I could 
 have no j)erfect knowledge of any other thing." His argu- 
 ment is, that unless I know God I know nothing; since, if 
 
20 
 
 there be no God, how do I know that my senses do not 
 deceive me. This is substantially Sir W. Hamilton's argu- 
 ment for the veracity of consciousness. But is this not 
 reasoning in a circle? If I must know God before lean 
 know anything, how can I ever know God ? Confidence in 
 our knowing powers must condition confidence in our 
 knowledge of God. 
 
 Deseartes did not fall into such a palitablc tallacy. Rightly 
 or wrongly, Descartes was as sure of God's existence, as of 
 tlie truths of geometry. But it is conceivable, he says, that 
 he is ii:;[K)scd u])on in the ver}' constitution of his nature. 
 That 18, he sees that the reasonings in geometry are true, on 
 the supposition that there is such a thing as truth, and that 
 this postulate conditions them. Is not this Cartesian posi- 
 tion our own position in the debate of to-day ? The theistic 
 liypothesis is the only guarantee, in other words, of our intel- 
 lectual integrity. We can cast discredit upon all processes 
 of thinking, by a theory of knowledge that destroys the 
 possil)ility of knowledge; or we can make belief in God the 
 presup])osition and postulate of all knowledge. This is not 
 reasoning in a circle. 
 
 Descartes made use of three arguments for the existence 
 of God. 
 
 1. From the idea of a Perfect Being. lie sought to show 
 that existence was implied in the idea of a Perfect Being. 
 *' I found that tlie existence of the Being was comprised in 
 the idea, in the same way that the equality of its three angles 
 to two right angles is comprised in the idea of a triangle." 
 This argument is not as acute as Anselnrs, and is equally 
 open to criticism. 
 
 2. From the causal judgment in accounting for his own 
 existence. This is exhibited under several forms. 
 
 {(i) My continued existence from moment to moment re- 
 quires a cause as much as my beginning to exist 
 
 (h) The cause of my beginning to exist is either self ex- 
 istent, or is also a caused existence, and so back in 
 the regress of causes till we come to a first cause. 
 
 (c) But, really, my parents are not the cause of my ex- 
 istence : i. e., of my mind. " It does not follow that 
 I am conserved by them, or even that I was produced 
 by them, in so far as I am a thinking being." Cre- 
 ati(jMism, in other words, is, according to Descartes, 
 the only rational explanation of the origin of the soul. 
 
21 
 
 3. From the ciiusal judgment, as accounting for the idea 
 of God in man. It was impossihle, he said, that the idea of 
 a Perfect Being shoukl originate with himself, an imperfect 
 being; and " it but remained that it had been placed in me 
 by 11 nature which was, in reality, more perfect than mine, 
 and which possessed within itself all the perfections of which 
 I could form any idea : that is to say, in a single word, 
 which was God.'' (Method 77). 
 
 With the exception of the first, which is the ontological, 
 or Anselmian argument, the Cartesian proofs are a posteri- 
 ori, the second being the application of the causal judgment 
 to the author's own contingent existence ; and the third, 
 which contains the distinctive feature of Cartesian Theism, 
 afhrms that the existence of God will alone explain belief in 
 God. 
 
 Ivuno Fischer (I, 307) represents the Cartesian proofs as 
 proceeding according to the following stages : (1) The idea 
 of a Perfect Being ; this not significant unless necessary : 
 (2) the idea necessary; even this no guarantee of objective 
 reality : (3) the idea the product of the Perfect Being, for 
 the imperfect being could not have originated it. There 
 is, therefore, a God, for the idea of God is the revelation of 
 TTimsclf. 
 
 The ontological and the " anthropological " proof, as 
 Fischer calls it, go hand in hand. The union ot the two 
 makes the difterence between the Anselmian and the Car- 
 tesian proof. There is, doubtless, great force in this com- 
 bination ; but, as Kostlin says, the combination is Fischer's 
 not Descartes'. Xote, also, that Descartes held that the belief 
 in God is an * innate idea,' notwithstanding his statement 
 that it is an effect, the cause of which is God. Compare 
 this with what is said above on the genesis of- the idea of 
 God : Intuition. 
 
 Pantheist as he is, Spinoza is usually cited by the histo- 
 rians of Theism. Indeed, Schwegler regards his doctrine as 
 the " most abstract Theism." This is wrong. Spinoza will 
 be discussed later, under Antithcism. Notice the common 
 ground between Theism and Pantheism, as illustrated in 
 Spinoza's proof of God's existence. Both use arguments 
 based on cause ; both, the principle ex nihilo, etc. Both 
 affirm the necessity of a ground of all being. To both the 
 contingency of the phenomenal and the individual are ap- 
 parent. The difference, primarily, respects the relation of 
 
the One and the Many ; and, secondarily, the predicates 
 which are to be affixed to the One (See below, Samuel 
 Clarke). Malebranchc should be mentioned here, with the 
 query whether lie should be regarded as a theist or panthe- 
 ist. *Bowen stands bv him as not being a pantheist. (Mod. 
 Philosophy, 84). 
 
 Leibnitz, with his doctrine of monads and of pre-estab- 
 lished harmony, was led naturally to consider the teleolog- 
 ical facts of the world. Finality is necessarily part of his 
 system. Oidy two views were possible. His thought might 
 terminate on the order ^ calling it God ; or he might seek a 
 cause of this order, and so be a theist : and a theist we 
 believe him to have been. The Cartesian proof was char- 
 acterized as an " imperfect demonstration,'" and Leibnitz 
 said that Descartes ought lirst to have proved the 2^ossibitity 
 of God's existence. lie was the originator of the once com- 
 mon method of arguing the fact of God's existence from the 
 possibility of His existence. 
 
 Locke is the author of a theistic argument, based on the 
 existence of the hunum mind, which " Physicus " makes the 
 subject of elaborate criticism. Briefly stated it is: (ci) Since 
 something is, something must always have been ; (6) And 
 there has been a knowing being from all eternity, or else 
 there was a time when there was no knowledge; {c) If there 
 was a time when tliere was no knowing being, it is impossi- 
 ble that any knowing being ever could have been. That is 
 to say, oidy mind can be the cause of mind. 
 
 Locke's argument deserves consideration. It presents to 
 us a choice of hy])othe8es. Either God the jmas and pos- 
 tulate of all intelligence exists ; or else there was a time 
 when there was no knowing being in the universe. And 
 though the advocate of evolution would not say that it is as 
 impossible for mind to be the product of matter as for the 
 three angles of a triangle not to be equal to two right angles, 
 yet he must choose between an Infinite Intelligence and 
 some nuiximum finite intelligence. (See Kirknian. Phil- 
 OHophy y:ifh()iU Assaniptions.) How knowledge could ever 
 have arisen had there not been an eternally existing know- 
 ing being, is a question that has not been answered since 
 Locke's day; and, slightly changing the form of Locke's 
 alternatives, may we not say tliat^his argument still presents 
 to us the choice between Theism and "the most thorough- 
 paced Agnosticism? 
 
23 
 
 Schwegler represents Samuel Clarke as ItolongiDi; to the 
 Sehool of John Loeke, hut seareely on suilicient grounds. 
 (8ee Encye. J^rit.) Clarke's argument is often represented 
 as ontological, hut it is hardly that, ft is a comhination of 
 a pn'oii iun\ a posteriori arguments. The steps in the argu- 
 ment are these: 
 
 (rt) Something has existed trom etei-nity. 
 
 (b) That something is immutahle and independent. 
 
 (c) Existing without external eause of its existenee, it 
 
 must be self-existent ; /. t., necessarily existent. 
 
 (d) What its substance is we do not know ; but some of 
 
 its attributes are demonstral)le. 
 
 (e) The self-existent must be infinite, must be eternal, 
 
 must be one, etc. 
 
 So far Spinoza would have made no objection. The 
 problem of Theism is to invest the One with intelligence 
 and free will. Clarke admits the difficulty of doing this by 
 a priori arguments, though it is easily done by a posteriori 
 reasoning. lie uses, therefore, the ordinary aetiological 
 argument, employs Aristotle's argument from niotion, and 
 aflirms the impossibility of matter producing mind. Clarke's 
 argument is strong one. Xot new, but a new synthesis of 
 old arguments, and deservedly holds classical rank in theistic 
 literature. 
 
 Kant's criticism of theistic proofs marks an era in the 
 literature of this subject, because it was the first attempt to 
 state and classity all possible arguments for God's existence; 
 because it is the most thorough criticism of these proofs to 
 be found anywhere; and because of the effect produced by 
 it — some, as a consequence, falling back on authority, others 
 on intuition. 
 
 The criticism embraces these points : 
 
 1. That there can be but three arguments open to the 
 speculative reason, in [)roof of God's existence: the onto- 
 logical, the cosmological, and the physico-theological. 
 
 2. That each argument, in turn, is open to criticisms that 
 are fatal to its claim to be a proof of God's existence. 
 
 3. That the cosmological and teleological are ultimately 
 resolvable into the ontological; so that, strictly st)eaking, 
 all speculative proof is the proof commonly known as the 
 Anselmian, or Cartesian. 
 
 The only points that concern us are (2) and (3). 
 
24 
 
 Kant criticises the several proofs in succession. His objec- 
 tions to the ontological argument are, in the main, those 
 already referred to. (See Anselm.) 
 
 [a) The illustrations of correspondence between subjec- 
 tive and objective, have been drawn from judgments, 
 not from Tilings. Thus, in that of the triangle, the 
 proposition is not that the triangle exists, but that 
 if it exist, its three angles, etc. So of the perfect 
 Being. 
 (6) It is absurd to introduce into the conception of a thing 
 cogitated solely in reference to its possibility, the 
 conception of its existence. This he shows by asking 
 whether the proposition, this thing exists, is analytic 
 or synthetic. If it is analytic, we must either iden- 
 tify our thought and the thing, or else we must as- 
 sume that the thing exists, so making it a predicate 
 which is repeated in the proposition. If, however, 
 it is synthetic, there is no contradiction in removing 
 the predicate. But the ontological argument pro- 
 ceeds on the assumption that the proposition is ana- 
 lytical, 
 (c) Kant says, also, that existence is not a real predicate — 
 distinguishing between a logical and a real predicate. 
 A real predicate adds something to the concept. 
 p]xistence does not do this. If existence were a real 
 predicate, there never could be a correspondence be- 
 tween the concept and its object, since the object 
 would always be greater than the concept. 
 Kant's objections against the ontological argument are 
 valid, so long as dialectical objectivity is sought by means 
 of it. But Kant does not set aside the argument found in 
 the irresistible tendency of the mind to think of an Infinite 
 Being, of which the ontological argument is only a syllo- 
 gistic expression. Kant's " dollars" and Gaunilo's "island" 
 are, so far as this is concerned, hardly analogous to this 
 necessary idea of the Infinite. 
 
 The co.sniological argument is characterized by Kant, as 
 containing a " perfect nest of dialectical assumptions." 
 
 Among these dialectical assumptions are to be found the 
 following: (1) Tliat the doctrine of cause and efi^ect trans- 
 cends experience. (2) That an infinite regress of finite 
 causes is impossible, etc. 
 
26 
 
 But the strongest objectiou to the cosmological argument 
 is that it is idontical witl) tlie outological and tlieretbre falls 
 under the same condemnation. 
 
 The objections to the teleoloi^ical argument are not for- 
 midable, and may all be conceded without destroying the 
 value of the argument which Kant describes as ** the 
 oldest, the clearest, and the most in conformity with the 
 common reason of humanity." Reserving the right to 
 criticise the argument on the ground that it proceeds on a 
 basis of analogical reasoning, he calls attention to the fol- 
 lowing points : 
 
 1. The order and harmony of the world evidence the con- 
 tingency of itQ form, not of its matter. It is impossible there- 
 fore to deduce a creator of matter; the most we can get is 
 an arranger of matter — an architect. 
 
 2. From the order and harmony of the universe we may 
 infer the existence of a cause proportionate thereto. That 
 is to say : we cannot infer from the order of the universe 
 that the cause of that order is infinite. To this it is neces- 
 sary to rei)ly that every theistic argument is not intended to 
 prove the whole theistic position, and that the infinity 
 of God can be reached through otiier arguments than the 
 teleological. 
 
 The least noticed, but most subtle form of the Kantian 
 criticism of the theistic proofs is that in which he attempts 
 to reduce them all to the ontclogical. In making this 
 attempt he not only fails, but betrays inconsistency. For 
 after speaking of "that unfortunate ontological argument" 
 in most disparaging terms, he identifies with it the teleol- 
 ogical argument which he had spoken of as one that " always 
 deserves to be mentioned with respect." But it is difficult 
 to see how Kant establishes the identity of these three forms 
 of argument. 
 
 The physico-theological argument, he admits, entitles us 
 to infer a cause proportwiiatcto the " order and design visible 
 in the universe." But he says, this cause must be regarded 
 as the conception of an all-sufficient being. But an all- 
 sufficient being we cannot infer from the order and design 
 visible to us, /. e. from experience. And so after admiring 
 the wisdom and other attributes of the author of the world's 
 order, we leave the ground of empiricism and infer the con- 
 tingency of the world from the order that is observable in it. 
 From this contingency, and by the help of transcendental 
 
26 
 
 conceptions alone, we infer the existence of something 
 absolutely necessary, and " still advancing, proceed from the 
 absolute necessity of the first cause to the completely de- 
 termined or determining conception thereof, the conception 
 of an all-eml»racing reality." 
 
 Tiiis is Kant's account of the way in which the " physico- 
 theological, failing in its undertaking recurs in its embar- 
 rassment to the cosmological argument." 
 
 But observe : these three arguments may supplement 
 each other, and may severally contribute to the support of 
 the theistic position without being identical. Kant's argu- 
 ment only goes to show that they are mutually auxiliary. 
 He fails to make out the identity of the physico-theological 
 and the cosmological proof. 
 
 For, if the order and iinality of the universe demand as a 
 cause proportionate thereto an all-sufficient being, the 
 physico-theological argument by this ver}^ concession must 
 be held as offering a fair proof of the existence of such a 
 being. In that case it is clearly under no obligation to the 
 cosmological argument. If, on the other liand, as Kant 
 would seem at first to imply, the order and iinality of the 
 world demand a cause only proportinate thereto ; if that is 
 to say, they do not necessarily demand an infinite or all- 
 sufficient cause : then it is not an objection against the 
 ])liysico- theological proof that it will not justify us in in- 
 ferring an all-sufficient cause; and again, it is not under 
 obligation to, and still less is it identical with the cos- 
 mological argument. 
 
 Kant fails equally in the attempt to identify the cosmo- 
 logical and ontological proofs. The cosmological argument 
 proceeding empirically, infers the existence of a necessary 
 being. l>ut it gives no information concerning the nature 
 of that being. It leaves experience in order to seek a con- 
 ception adequate to that of a necessary being, and finds it in 
 the ens reaUsa'unum. 
 
 If now Kant had said there is an a priori as well as an 
 a yosUriori element in the cosmological argument, no ob- 
 jection could be made. But he says that in identifying the 
 eiis rcallssiinnin with the necessary being, we are returning 
 to the ontological argument. For, he continues, when we 
 Bay that the conception of ens realissimum is adequate to the 
 conception of a necessary being, we assume that we can 
 infer the latter from the former. The argument which pro- 
 
27 
 
 fosses to be cosmological and to proceed from ex})erieiice is 
 thus covertly ontoloi^ical (Criti<[ue, Mt'iklcjoliir.s trann, p. 
 378). 
 
 But tliis is not the case. The conception of an c/is real- 
 issimum is that of a being necessarily existing. But that 
 is no proot that the necessary being exists and the cosmo- 
 logical argument does not proceed upon that assumption. 
 The most that can be said is tliat the ontological argument 
 gives us the conception of an ms re<d(ssmnm as of a l)cing 
 necessarily existing, ))ut is impotent so far as proving tlie 
 existence of that being is concerned ; that the cosmological 
 argument proves the existence of a necessary being but that 
 it cannot give any determinate conception of that being; 
 and that the two arguments unite in the theistic proof. 
 Closely related they undoubtedly are, but identical they 
 are not. 
 
 In other words : A priori we know that if a necessary 
 being exists it must be ms realissimum ; but from the idea 
 of ens realissimum and its corresponding conception of ne- 
 necessarp existence, we cannot pass to the objective reality. 
 A posteriori^ however, we are led to infer the existence of a 
 necessary being. 
 
THEISM. 
 
 VWIT II. CONSTRUCTIVE. 
 
 The two questions to l»e dealt with in this division of our 
 subject are(l) the existeiiee of Cod and (2j the relation oi' 
 iiod to the woi-ld. 
 
 I. TlIK KXISTENCE OF (iOD. 
 
 Notice the pioper ai'LT'inientative attitude in reference t(» 
 theistic proof. 
 
 1. In ^ivini:: a reasone(l account of tlieistic belief we do 
 not prejudge the (piestion as to its icenesis. Tlie (piestion 
 is : Given an antecedent ])elief in Cod, (hie to whatever 
 cause, whether that belief" can ])e corroborated by argument. 
 
 2. We (U) not undertake to demonstrate the existence of 
 God. Physicus says that theism is not rationally probable. 
 AVe affirm that it is. We maintain that theism can be 
 rationally justiiied and that atheism is unreasonal)le. 
 
 3. Tlie tlieistic argument is complex and cumulative. In 
 theistic proof each argument gives adequate reason for the 
 theistic conclusion ; but this conclusion is strengthened by 
 the congruity and concurrence of all the arguments. 
 
 The theistic proof may be arranged under three principal 
 divisions. First: Argument based on idea of cause; Sec- 
 ond: Argument founded on our mond nature: Third: Argu- 
 ment based on idea ot the Intinite. 
 
 Division I.— Argument Based on Idea of Cause. 
 
 Hegarding the world under the concept of causation, we 
 may consider it first as contingent: secondly as a cosmos; 
 thirdly as exhibiting finality. Argument bjised nn the causal 
 judgment will therefore take •> forms : . Ktiological, Cos- 
 mological, Teleological. 
 
 A. Thk JvriuLocicAi. AK«;rMi:NT. 
 
 This treats phenomena sim[)ly as r<mfi/t(/ffit, and may be 
 considered in two ways: as applied to the totality of phe- 
 nomena or as applied to specific phenomcnu. We, therefore, 
 consider first : — 
 
:30 
 Basis <>! Thkistfc Inference in the Totality of Phe- 
 
 XOMENA. 
 
 Syllogism. Every effect has a cause. The world is an 
 effect, cVc. Hut is the world an effect ? Difficult to prove 
 this it' by 'world' we mean the substance of the world. 
 Hence soine say the a'tiolofi:ical argument is useless because 
 it assumes the non-eternity of matter. But we are not 
 required to raise this question. The world of our experience 
 is one of phenomenal successions in time and co-existences 
 in space. Does this world demand a first cause; if so what 
 cause ? Answer to this depends upon what is meant by 
 causation. We notice therefore the leading theories ot cau- 
 sation. 
 
 1. Mill's Theory. Mill (J. S.) says that '-the very essence 
 ot causation is incompatible with a tirst cause." " The cause 
 of any change is a prior change." " When I speak of the 
 cause of a phenomenon I do not mean a cause which is not 
 itself a phenomenon." By causation Mill means only the 
 relationships of phenomena in time-successions. His theory 
 being conceded the impossibility of inferring a first cause 
 undoubtedly follows. But to his theory in its relations to 
 theism we offer these objections. 
 
 (a.) Cause and effect express relations (according to Mill) 
 between phenomena. God as first cause is thus ruled out 
 by definition. 
 
 (/>.) Cause and efiect express time-relations of phenomena. 
 It is the fact that A is the invariable predecessor under cer- 
 tain circumstances of B that makes it possible to call A the 
 cause of B. But the essence of causation is not in invariable 
 relationshij* of succession for this invai'iability might be pre- 
 served where there is no suggestion of cause and effect. 
 
 (c.) Mill is shut u|> to an infinite regress of finite causes. 
 A cause is oidy a [>henomenon and Qvvry phenomenon that 
 ])eginK to l)e has a cause. 
 
 {(/.) There can be no law of cause and effect under con- 
 ditions where the law ol" the unilormity of nature is not in 
 force. Were events to happen without regularity, there 
 would be in Mill's view a susjjension of the law of cause 
 and efiect. l>ut no: the occurrence of an event makes it 
 imperative to call for a cause. It is the fact that the event 
 /<(/.^ happnied, not that it has happened regularly that makes 
 it necessarv to ask Ibi- its cause. 
 
31 
 
 {( .) Mill viohitcs the |»riiici|>l('s of his own i'iii|.iricnl pljil- 
 osouliy and (.ontradicts his (lociriiiu oi' causation hy appoal- 
 \n<r to wliat ho rails a |m rinanent clement in nature. * '' TIjcre 
 is a nature, a i)ern)anent element and also a c]ianL(ea])le : tlie 
 chani^es arc alway.s the eliects of previous cliani^es. The 
 permanent existences so far as wc know are not effects at 
 all." C^ierv: 1. If knowledL^'e is limited hy experience' 
 what do wc know of a permanent in Nature? 
 
 2. If this permanent, which is not an eifrct, he " cause 
 or con cause of evei'ythin<;- that takes j»la(.*e,*' how can it he 
 true that every cause is also an cllcct ? 
 
 (/.) It would he impossihle, as Mr Shiiir ha> shown, 
 accordin*!^ to Mill's definition of cause, ever to discover a 
 cause. For, accordin«^ to this doctrine, the cause of a phe- 
 nomenon is not a sinjj^le antecedent and necessarily related 
 phenomenon : hut that phenomenon as conditioned hy all the 
 circumstances near and more remote which have effected it. 
 
 MilTs doctrine amounts to sayini^ that the phvsical uni- 
 verse at any one moment is the eff'ect of all j)liysical ante- 
 cedents for all past time. Clearly from this view of causa- 
 tion we can infer no first cause. W the only causes of [)}ie- 
 nomena he themselves phenomena demanding causes in 
 explanation of them, then an uncaused cause is ahsunh 
 
 2. Theory of pure physical causation. If the factors of 
 the universe he matter and motion, then cause can only mean 
 the t)henomenal antecedents necessary to certain conse- 
 quents. And we conclude (1) every jdiysical phenomenon is 
 necessarily determined l)y physical antecedents: (2) there 
 has heen an infinite regress of physical antecedents: (3) all 
 so-called free actions liave heen physically determined. A 
 first cause in tlie sense demanded l)v theism is im|>ossil)le. 
 Moreover the i'vae action of our own wills is ohliterhted 
 and our volitions take their place in a row of physical an- 
 tecedents. 
 
 3. Theory of the persistence of Force. As taught hy 
 Spencer it is the doctrine that all forms of existence are 
 the manifestations of a ]»ower at once omnijiotent and in- 
 comjirehensihle. "In this consciousness of an omnipotent 
 power w (' have that consciousness in which luligion 
 dwells, and so we arrive at that jioint where lidigion and 
 Science coalesce" (Spencer). We agree with !)iman in say- 
 ing that the doctrine of a first cause has not heen wiped out 
 hy the doctrine oi force. If the idea of causation yielded 
 
32 
 
 this and iiotliiiii;- iiiorr, that there is an incomprehensible 
 but omnipotent power that is the ultimate cause of all phe- 
 nomenon, we should use thivS as the basis of a theistic 
 ari^uuK'iit. I)nt there are objections to this view of causa- 
 tion. It is half wav between theism and materialism. If 
 Force be an entity distinct from matter and its manifesta- 
 tions tile diti'erenee between this theory and theism is that 
 force is not invested with the attributes of Intelligence. The 
 theory as thus understood is semi theistic and consistency 
 will require it to advance to the full theistic position. If 
 on the other hand. Force be not an entity but a term ex- 
 pressing rate or ratio of motion, work done, kc, the theory 
 resolves itselt into that of pure physical causation. This 
 again is physical determinism, and to be complete, must 
 include mind and will. If, however, volition be not capa- 
 ble of physical explanation, as it is not, then we have a large 
 area of etfeets which cannot be explained by the doctrine of 
 the persistence of Force. Physical causation in other words 
 is not the only causation. 
 
 4. Accordingly we have the common doctrine of dual 
 causation whieh recognizes will as a cause — a first cause, 
 and physieal phenomena as second causes. It is held by many 
 that [jersonal agency is the type of all causation : that we speak 
 of physieal eauses because we impute to matter a power akin 
 to that of whieh we are conscious when we effect change by 
 the exercise of our wills. But whatever be the truth respect- 
 ing the nature of physical causation the theistic argument 
 based upon cause derives its force from our experience of 
 personal agency. The ^etiological argument is simply the 
 Aristotelian argument for a first mover. From our expe- 
 rience of power and from our belief in regard to the inabil- 
 ity of matter to orii^inate motion, we are led to believe that 
 however related to one another physical phenomena may 
 be, there must behind them all be a will as the original 
 cause of motion. 
 
 .'). Volitional theory of causation. It is held by many that 
 the only real cause in the world is a will. Whether this 
 volitional theory of causation be accepted or not, and whether 
 an infinite i-egress of pliysical antecedents be thinkable or 
 n(jt, it is certain that the mind naturally seeks for a case of 
 real beginning. We are not satisfied with a cause that is 
 also an effect. It is certain that the only thing in experience 
 answering to this demand is our will. So that contemplat- 
 
33 
 
 \n^ tlie world ol" pliciioniciia — anteccMloiit.s jiiid conscMiiifiits — 
 we are left to ac'ce|tt an inliriite re«;ress ot" plivHical cauHefl, 
 or to believe that jdivsical cliaiiue is diri'cth- or iiior«,' 
 remotely related to tlic will. 
 
 The arLTunient (f co/ifhif/cn/i/i mmuli concenis plu'uoineiia. 
 It does not cojiccrn itself with the ([Uestion of suhstance or 
 the eternity of matter. The non-eternity of matter may l)e 
 argued on the i^round of the law of jiarsimony (that is, the- 
 ism Ixiiii^- ( oiici'ded, thi'i'e is no need ol" helievin;^ in the 
 eternity of matter), as followini^ i'rom the doctrine of the dis- 
 sipation of enerii'y, or on tiie iz:round of a dynamic theory of 
 matter: hut it is not necessary to know that atoms had a 
 heginnin*]^ in order to come to the theistic inference through 
 the doctrine of causation. We consider next : 
 
 Basis of Thkistic rNFEKENCK in Spkcific Phenomena. 
 
 Certain phenomena, because they cannot be accounted for 
 by antecedent physical phenomena, suggest, if they do not 
 require, the hyi)othesis of the divine intelligence for their ex- 
 planation. Existence of life and the human mind are exam- 
 ples of these. Arguments for divine existence based upon 
 the human n;iiul have been presented in two forms; by John 
 Locke and Sir Wm. Hamilton. Locke's argument, given 
 in Part L, criticised l)y Physicus, who says that we liave no 
 proof that only mind can ]>roduce mind ; and moreover, 
 that it is as inconceivable tliat mind should be the cause o{' 
 matter as that matter should be the cause of niind. This, 
 however, is easily said, and for reply, each must refer to his 
 own consciousness. 
 
 Hamilton's argument is founded in the incommeasurable 
 character of the attributes of mind and matter. From mind 
 ill. man he found the [»assage easy to mind in nature. 
 fLamilton erred in discouraging all other theistic proof. 
 But iiis argument is not without force, and it cannot be 
 answered except by teaching physical determinism. In 
 other words, unless materialism succeeds in making men 
 skeptical about their (^wn minds tliere will always be an 
 open way from mind in man to the tnind of God. 
 
 P). The Cosmoiaxjk'al Ak<;iment. 
 
 Distinguish between the aigumeiit based on order and 
 that based on filial causes. All cases of tinalitv are instances 
 
34 
 
 of orcU'r, l>ut all instances of onk'r arc not a(la[>tatioiis of 
 moans to eiuls. Neither the eosmological nor the teleolog- 
 ioal art^^ument is affected hy a nieclianieal ex[>lanation of the 
 facts ot tlie world. In cosniolo2:ical ari::ument we see order 
 and infer a plan antecedently existing in an intellio:ent mind. 
 In the telcoloirical arii-nnient we see adai)tation of means to 
 ends and infer finality, and also infer mind as the cause of 
 that finality. The cosmological argument, that is to say, the 
 argument based upon order, proceeds upon the assumption 
 that order is the prochict of mind. The order of the world 
 is a great fact. Time, number, I'utc, ratio and volume, are 
 all matters oi most definite and precise nature, and the 
 j»liysical world is an exhibition on the grandest scale of 
 inalhematical relations. The fact of order is undeniable. 
 Some ex]»lanation of the fact is demanded. Theism is the 
 natural explanation. Those, how^ever, who deny the theistic 
 inference offer the following sul)stitutes for it: 
 
 1. The theory of Chance. Suppose we were to concede 
 the possibility that by a purely fortuitous concourse of atoms 
 the cosmos might have resulted. How much would theism 
 be damaged ? We should say that the credulity of the atheist 
 was amazing. "Imagine," sa3's Venn, "some being not a 
 creator, but a sort of demiurgus who has a quantity of 
 materials put into his hand and he assigns them their collo- 
 cations and lines of action l)lindly and at ha|)liazard ; what 
 are the odds tliat sucli a world as we actually experience 
 should have been brought about in this way?" His answer 
 is that " all the paper which the world has hitherto produced 
 would be used uji before we got far on the way in writing 
 them down." 
 
 '2. The theory of \n\\. The Duke of Argyll sliows in his 
 Jiti(/n of ]j(iir how we advance from the mere conception of 
 order to the idea of force or power in explanation of the 
 (»nler. We are not satisfied to say that bodies move with a 
 certain regularity — we seek an ex[)lanation of this regularity 
 and embody it in a forninla. Then we are not satisfied with 
 tiie formula — but we impute the fact to a force which we 
 call the Law of ( Jravitation. I>ut however the word Law is 
 used, it does not affect theism, for if it be not used in some 
 transcendental way it means only tlie order of sequence. 
 If it means more than order it is because it has been hypos- 
 tatiscd and treated as an entity. So that the idea of law 
 leaves us when' we wen,* before. We must be content to do 
 
85 
 
 Avitlioiit ail o.\i>laiiali(Hi of the world's ordur, or wu must 
 find an explanation in Thoisni. The world's order is proof 
 of mind. '' That whirh it rerpiires thuni^ht and reason to 
 understand nuist itself he thought and reason. That whieh 
 mind alone can investiicate or e.xpress must l)e itself mind." 
 This is liadi'ii i*oweli's way of |)Uttin<; the eosmoloirieal 
 argument. 
 
 3. Theory of the persistence ol force. A mechanical 
 oonception of the universe is in the highest degree theistie 
 provided that mechanical conception does not include mind. 
 The ohjection made hy Physicus proceeds upon the assump- 
 tion that mind has a physical genesis. The theory of tlic 
 persistence of fort-e, carried to its logical conclusions, re- 
 duees the universe to nnitter and motion. If mind in man 
 be denied, the Divine mind, ol course, will not he believed 
 in. No proof of the Divine existenee can survive belief in 
 the human mitid. The theory of the persistenee of force 
 when earried the length of materialisti*! monism, blots out 
 the theistie argument as Physicus shows. It l)lots out belief 
 by blotting out the basis of belief But it blots out the 
 possibility of rational belief in anything including the per- 
 sistenee of foree. 
 
 C. Tei.eolocical AR(^.UMENT. 
 
 Commonly known as argument from final eause or design. 
 By iinal eause is meant the end for whieh a thing or an 
 event exists. Distinguislied tlius from etlieient eause which 
 always means the agency by which anytliing is brought 
 about. Following Janet wo consider the teleologieal argu- 
 ment by instituting two inquiries : 
 
 1. Is finality a law of nature? 
 
 2. What is the cause of this finality? 
 
 T. Is JimiUlu a Inir of jSatior? Consider lirst, the nature 
 of the process by which we are led to believe that there are 
 ends in nature: Secondly, the specific proofs in supj^ort of 
 finality; Thirdly, the objections to the doctrine of finality. 
 
 1. Nature of teleologieal argument. Porter holds (in- 
 clusively) that the idea of final cause is an intuition. Mill 
 says that it is an inductive argument according to the 
 method of agreement. The latter view jjrobably correct. 
 We are unde'r no necessity to ask for the final cause as we 
 are for the efiicient cause of every phenomenon. In teleo- 
 logieal reasoning we argue analogically. The argument 
 
36 
 
 lias two stages. In the tirst lAave we know from our expe- 
 rience that a certain ideal future to be brouglit about stands 
 rehited to certain means necessary to the accomplishing of 
 this result. A and B are related to each other as means 
 and ends. Passing from our own consciousness to tacts 
 outside of consciousness we see phenomena related in a way 
 that irresistibly suggests the relation of means and ends: 
 we say B was the final cause of A. The tirst stage in the 
 argument ends in the realization of linality as a law of 
 nature. The phenomena of the world look as if they were 
 respectively means and ends. The next question is as to 
 the cause of the finality. Again we revert to our experience 
 and since the only finality of which he have any knowledge 
 is that of a purposing mind — in other words, since finality 
 im[)lies intentionality in our conscious experience the in- 
 ference from finality to intentionality is rational if not 
 necessary. 
 
 2. Specific evidence of finality. The proof of finality con- 
 sists in the cumulative force of a great multitude of as ifs. 
 It looks as if the wide domain of nature were a great sys- 
 tem of ideals, as if striving toward an end were the great 
 characteristic of nature. To prove finality we begin with the 
 purposive action of which we are ourselves conscious. Then 
 we see actions of our fellow men which seem to be dictated 
 by purpose and directed to attain an end. Descending a 
 step, the actions of the lower animals irresistibly impress 
 us as purposive. Lower still we come to a point where the 
 action as definitely suggests adaptation though we do not 
 credit the animal with intention. Analogy thus suggests 
 that action with reference to results whether consciously or 
 unconsciously is every where manifest throughout animal 
 life. We turn then to the relation of organ to function ; 
 the relation of the eye to vision. We find that there is a 
 close and apparently premeditated relation between organ 
 and organism, organism and environment. We argue: 
 These adaptations are not accidents. They are intentional. 
 They l)es|)eak pur|)ose and designing mind. The same 
 teleologieal trend of things is manifest in the world. Things 
 in the world sustain a relation of lower and higher. Finality 
 in nature is proved by showing that there is the closest 
 analogy between the relation of |)art and part, and part and 
 whole, in tlie organic world, that there is between means 
 and ends in the sphere of our purposive action. 
 
37 
 
 n. ( )li)L'cti()iis to tin- (InctriiH- <.r tiiinl caiiHeH, 'riichf tall 
 niMk'i' tliivc classrs. 
 
 1. Ii Trli'vant oltjcctioFis : 
 
 {<i ) liacou's otU'ii (juoted (>l>"n'rti<»n «1(U'> not apply l«> linal 
 cause as a fact, Imt to the seardi tor tiiial cause as useieiilitic 
 method. All that liaeoti says may l>e coneedejl. 
 
 {!).) 80 of Dos Cartes' ohjeetion. lie says wean* ii^noraiit 
 of ends. 80 we ari'. And if we were pretrndiiii; to know 
 the final cause of every event tiie ohjretion would l»e val'Hl. 
 
 (<'.) Irrelevant, also, the ol)jeetion that the doctrine ot' final 
 cause assumes that man is the final cause ot' creation. It is 
 surely not necessary to hold that every thinir was nuule for 
 man, hecause man's eye was made for sci-inir. 
 
 ((L) Nor can we ij^et rid of final cjiuse, hecause somi* have 
 abused it. Some have treated every possihlc tisc of an origan 
 as an intended use, and in tiiis wjjy have heaped ridicule 
 upon teleoloiry. 
 
 2. Biological objections. 
 
 It is said that the doctrine of final lause is hard to recon- 
 cile with the rudimentary and useless organs to he found in 
 animals. To this objection it is rejdied : 
 
 1. It is not affirmed that (fay detail of organization was 
 meant to serve a useful purpose. '2. Wc do not know that 
 an organ has no uses because we do not see its uses. 3. 
 Obvious finality in a multitude (»f cases is not set aside by 
 apparent lack of linality in other cases. 4. These rudimen- 
 tary organs are explaimd)le without denying teleology; and 
 by some are so ex[)lained so as to give emphasis to the 
 teleological idea. 
 
 3. Objections urged by the anli-teleological evolutionists. 
 Whether evolution be true is not the <piesti(»ii. If true, 
 
 is it contradictory to teleology? Can it dispense with 
 teleology ? 
 
 Jane't and others hold tluit evolution, in the first place, 
 does not contradict teleology. The process of evolution, 
 conceding the truth of the hypothesis, is only a mode of the 
 Divine procedure. That is to say the order, the ada|»tations, 
 the harmonies of the world are here and an- manifest, and 
 they suggest God, whatever the ])rocess may have been by 
 which tiiey have been brought about. But two cpiestions are 
 to be distinguished. It is one thing to say that the doctrme 
 of evolution tolerates theism, and another thing t(» say that 
 it gives support to theism. l\ belief in (b.d .an be arrived 
 
38 
 
 at through other channels, undoubtedly it is possible to say, 
 and it is the correct thing to say, that evolution is only the 
 mode of His working. 
 
 P>ut the more important question is, whether evolution, 
 in itself considered, is or is not antagonistic to teleology. 
 This (piestion lias been speciiically raised in regard to Dar- 
 win's doctrine of the Orifjia of Species. Upon this subject 
 two things are to be said : 
 
 (a.) That the unmodified Darwinian doctrine of tendency 
 to indetinite variation in all directions as the foundation of 
 species ends in giving us a chance world, so far as biology is 
 concerned. It is anti-teleological, therefore. 
 
 {h) That if variation be not in all directions; if there has 
 been a law of variation ; a law of selection manifest ; if it is 
 in accordance with some inner law of development that the 
 present system of ordered life has grown up, there is a 
 teleological principle evidently at work in nature. This 
 view is held by nuiny, and this is what Janet means when he 
 aifirnis that the doctrine of evolution cannot dispense with 
 teleology. 
 
 //. \V/"i/ is Ihe Expkinatlon of the Finality in Nature. 
 
 To this (jucstion four answers have been given: 1. Sub- 
 jective tinality. •!. Immanent finality. 3. Unconscious fin- 
 ality. 4. Intentional tinality. 
 
 1. Subjective finality. This is Kant's doctrine which 
 Jani't interprets to mean, that w^hile tinality is a necessary 
 liypothesis given the conformation of the human mind, 
 nothing warrants us to suppose that this hypothesis has an 
 objective foundation in reality. Tliis is simply the doctrine 
 of relativity. Upon this we remark : 
 
 {(I.) If we were under the necessity of seeing hnality in 
 every thitig, tlien subjective finality would be the best 
 guarantee of objective finality. It would be an a priori ivwih. 
 
 [h.) But there is no sucl) subjective necessity. And since 
 we see finality in some tlTnigs and not in others, there must 
 be some objective ground for this distinction. 
 
 '1. Immanent tinality. The Hegelian doctrine affirms 
 linality, but cre(lits it to the activity of luiture and denies a 
 personal (iod. Kant paved the way for it by noticing two 
 important points of distinction : First. That works of art 
 and those of nature differ in this respect, that in the former 
 
30 
 
 tlu' ai^oiit >iaiiiU (HiLsidf di Ins work; whili- iii naturr it in 
 aiiu'reiit. Xaimi' lias a torinative, reparative ami repro- 
 <luctivo power which (listiiiLriii?<hes her works trom those of 
 human art. Si-coiidls. Kant made the distinetioii between 
 extrinsic and intrinsic I'lids. It is l)y emphasisin*; extrinsic 
 ends that teleoK)i::y ^^'^^^ I'aih'n into disrepute. An or^aniHin 
 may serve some external and extrinsie purpose; l)Ut it 18 it- 
 self the realisation of an end in exhihitimr a certain type of 
 organic existence. An ideal has heen realised in the (»ri,M!i- 
 ism, whatever external end it nn«y afterwards serve. IIe<;el 
 emphasised intrinsic, or immanent, as ojtposed to extrinsie 
 finality. Upon this suhject, wc remark : 
 
 (a.) The Hegelian doctrine is an nnc<|uivocal concession 
 in favor of the teleological argument. 
 
 (6.) We must distinguish hetween finality and tlie eause of 
 finality. Ilegel agrees with the Theist in afHrming the fact. 
 He differs with him in his explanation of it. There is nothing 
 in immanent finality to interfere with legitimate teh-ology. 
 Theism is not compromised by immanence. 
 
 {('.) Though the distinction hetween external and internal 
 ends be a valid one, it is impossible always to se|»arate one 
 from the other. Our bodilv ori^anization is a system con- 
 sisting of the adaptation of part to jtart. The eye is a sy.s- 
 tem. The several parts of the ])ody are systems. Kaeh 
 system realises its end as being a system. But the whole 
 body realises its end as a system only by the cor)rdination 
 and adaptation of systems to each other. 
 
 (d.) Hegel affirms that the finality of the world is not con- 
 scious and free, but only the activity of nature. This, how- 
 ever, is not argument. 
 
 3. Unconscious finality. This is the doctrine of Scho- 
 penhauer and Hartmann. and difiers little from that of 
 Hegel. It admits the finality of nature; affirms intelligence 
 as accounting for that finality, but maintain that this is an 
 unconscious intelligence. This theory protests against an 
 anthropomorphic conce})ti()n of (iod, and gives us a zciMuor- 
 phic conce[)tion of nature. 
 
 4. Intentional finality. If it is true that finality is stamped 
 upon nature, the question is whether it is more rational to 
 say that this finality is the product of a blindly operating 
 nature, or that it is the result of intelligent foresight and 
 intention. By so much as the latter is more rational, by that 
 much is theism more worthv of our consideration than the 
 
40 
 
 substitutes tor it that liave been under consideration. 
 Theism is that theory of tlie universe that exphiins the 
 adaptation of means to ends in the universe by the doctrine 
 of intentional tinality. 
 
 Division II. Arcjument Based on Conscience. 
 
 The word conscience stands for both the ethical and the 
 rehi^ious side of man's nature. Accordin<^ly the theistic 
 proofs sui2:i;ested 1>\- the woi'd maN' l)e considered under two 
 heads. 
 
 A. The Ethical Argument. 
 
 Vro\'. Fhnt (h)es not think tliat tlie moral arij^ument is con- 
 cerned with the questions now under discussion regarding' 
 the genesis of conscience. His position seems to be that we 
 must choose between theism and absolute slcepticism. If 
 conscience tells the truth there is moral obligation and 
 a moral governor; if conscience does not tell the truth 
 authoritative morality is at an end. Professor Flint is 
 probably wrong in supposing that this theistic discussion can 
 ignore current debate on Ethical questions. 
 
 The great topics of Ethical study are: 1. Duty; 2. The 
 Good; 3. Virtue. {Janet Moral Science.) 
 
 I. Ethical Argument Based on Idea of Duty. 
 
 The two ideas under duty are Dtight and rif//tL If these 
 ideas are ultimate, the theistic inference is natural. It i» 
 held by some that they are not ultimate. Thus : 
 
 1. Some, as Schopenhauer, say there is no legitimate 
 place in ethics for the word duty. It is claimed that we may 
 describe' men as they are, and classify them as kind or cniel^ 
 but tluit the word ought has no meaning. 
 
 2. The ideas ought and right are held to be derived from 
 T^aw (Ilol)bes, Bain). Conscience is an imitation in the 
 individual life of the social forces without. A human gov- 
 ernment is a system of conimands and penalties. Moral 
 law is derived from it. Ought means the expedient. A 
 feeling that I ought not, is only " a strong sense of avoid- 
 ance " — a dread of penalty. No theistic inference from Idea 
 of I>nty, if this be (.'orrect view. 
 
 8. The rtilitarian theory. (Hentham, .Mill.) Kgoistic 
 Hedonism makes that conduct right which makes me happy. 
 
41 
 
 UniviMsalistic Hedonism ooiisidtTs tin* i^rcatrst liappiiie«rt of 
 the greatest nuinl)cr. To K^oist'u- Hedonist von say, '*('()n- 
 <luct can never ho ohliii^atorv. It ninst always lie in ternirt 
 of pleasnre." Hnt t(» Tniversalistie HedoniHt you way, 
 ** Why am I ImhukI to >e«'k tlie i^ri-atest happinesH of the 
 greatest numlicr." Hr postnhiti's ohhi;ati(»n in the Utilita- 
 rian nnixim. Uiit Im- does not explain it. Kxplained it 
 must he, liowevei-, it" intuitive morality is to i»e rtuecessfully 
 attacked. 
 
 Utilitarianism has t(> settle first whether tlie '' ^reatCHt 
 Iiappiness" tin-mnla is a i^eiierali/ation expressiiiLC afi altru- 
 istic instinct or a generalization expressing an altruistic 
 duty. If the former, it ii^nores the idea of ouLrhtness ; if 
 the latter, it postulates it. In neither case does it explain it. 
 
 4. The Kthics of evolution. .\ccordin<; to this theory, 
 morality is simply the conduct necessary to the continued 
 existence of society. It may he asked, however, first: how 
 it happens that the idea of ohli«ration has i)een evolved in 
 coimection with the evolution of a morality, which is only 
 one of expediency. Second : what is to he said to the nnm 
 who is told not to do wroni^ hecause (h)in«^ wroni^ will dam- 
 age social tissue, if he says that he (h)es not care anythiui^ 
 about social tissue ? Evolution ethics cannot he ()hli«xatory ; 
 but evolutionists cannot get rid of the fact that the idea of 
 obliscation is here. 
 
 The word oue^ht is a stumhliuir-hlock in the way of all 
 empirical thinkers. We i^rant that if oui^ht could he reduce(l 
 to lower terms, it would he hard to l)ase a theistic ari^ument 
 apon it. But the attempt so to reduce it has hitherto 
 proved unsuccessful. The same may l)e said tor the word 
 right. Oughtness and Rightness are the two irreducihle 
 words concerned in the idea of duty. To what do they 
 point ? 
 
 1. Some stop with the consciousness of ohiigation, and 
 see no theistic implications in it. Tliey recognize the cat- 
 egorical imperative as a psychological fact, without attempt- 
 ing any metaphysical inferences. 
 
 2. Some say that Right means conformity to the fitness 
 of things. 
 
 -3. Some hold that there is a principle of right to which 
 God and all moral things are coordinately related. 
 
 4. Others, again, say that morality depends upon the 
 Divine will. 
 
42 
 
 o. Wo holii've that the ideii of ouii^htiiess and Tightness 
 hoth witness to tlio Divine existence. 
 
 Assuming that God exists as a moral governor, these ideas 
 would he the natural correlatives of that truth. The sense 
 of oughtness would he tlie natural correlative of man's 
 relati()n to God as a moral governor, and the sense of Tight- 
 ness the natural correlative to God as the norm and model 
 of his moral existence. 
 
 II. Kthical Ar(Ument Based upon the Idea oe the Good. 
 
 By the Good is meant the Desirable. What is the rela- 
 tion of Good to Duty? 
 
 (t. Does Duty supersede the Good? Is it not possible to 
 have a law of duty defining conduct and also an unrealized 
 ideal inspiring it? Duty, as a matter of experience, does 
 not supersede Good. 
 
 b. Is the Good subordinated to Duty ? Can we say the 
 desirable is doing Right? Though Duty be regardless of 
 consequences, consequences enter largely into the motives of 
 life. There is in life an aspiration after the ideal as well as 
 conformity to law. 
 
 c. Can the Dutiful be subordinated to the Good? Is 
 obligation conditioned by consequences? Can we say that 
 we ought to do right because doing Right makes for our 
 highest happiness? Xo. This resolves obligation into ex- 
 pediency. This substantially is Janet's system of " rational 
 Eudemonism." 
 
 Duty and Good are coordinate. Both have place. What 
 then is the (iood ? What is the Desirable? Is it wealthy 
 power, iame, luxury? [n short is it pleasure? Suppose 
 with Descartes and othei-s, we say it is the perfection of our 
 being and its accom[)anying ha[)i>iness, then there is an ideal 
 that we desire to realize? There is an ideal (lood. What 
 are we to infer? 
 
 The Pessimist will say that this is the misery of human 
 nature that it sighs after unrealizable ideals. 
 
 But if we ai'e not pessimists we shall regard the ii'resisti- 
 ble idea of the (jood as prophetic of its realization. This 
 caji only l)e if we are immortal. Immortality therefore, 
 Hays Kant, is a postulate of our n)oral nature. This can 
 oidy l)e through the agency of a purposing and all-con- 
 trolling Being wlio shapes all ends. (Jod, says Kant, is the 
 postulate of our nioi-al nature. 
 
43 
 
 It is hard to sojmrate the thoiiLcht ot an ideal (iood as the 
 iiieasiire of our pei'Cer'tion tVom tliat ot an Ahsohiti' (tood as 
 of a heiiii^ wlio realizes ill liimselfall perfection. Seedaiiet: 
 MordI Sriowi. Harris: l*liil()soi)hi((tl llnsis of Tlnism. 
 
 Attain : The idea ot Duty re<^ardless of e()nse(iueiK'e8 and 
 tlie idea of the Good eoneerned altogether with consequences 
 are hoth factors in our moral life. They niiglit he in con- 
 flict. Su})j)ose tlie felicitic conduct were tlie uronir conduct. 
 Suppose doing right always made us miserahle. Ifow does 
 it haj)pen that duty and the gocxl are in such complete 
 accord ? We get hai)[)iness hy doing right, yet we are not 
 to do right for the sake of happiness. 'Jlieism will account 
 for this harmony. AV'^e do not know how otherwise it can 
 be accounted for. If God proposes to hring about the blessed 
 perfection of the individual it is not strange that what with 
 Him is an end should be foreshadowed in man as the good. 
 And if this perfection is to be brought about through per- 
 formance of right conduct it is not strange there should be 
 this harmony between Duty and Good. 
 
 in. Ethical Ar(;ument Based on Idea of Virtie. 
 
 Duty says what we ought to do. The Good wliat we de- 
 sire to become. Virtue is the realization of Duty in cliar- 
 acter. Under the word Virtue we have not the bare category 
 Right, but the category tilled with content. We say this or 
 that is right. How has this category of Right been tilled? 
 How, for cxamj)le, do we know that trutli telling is right ? Is 
 it by Intuition, Revelation or P^volution ? If through the tirst 
 or second the theistic inference will not be doubted. Supjiose 
 it is l)y tlie thir(L Then how does it ha})i)en that the same pro- 
 cess of evolution which has named as virtues the linesof con- 
 duct most promotive of social well-lieing has also generated 
 the feeling that well-being is not the reason ti)r performing the 
 con(bict. IR>w does it hai^pen that evolution has singled out 
 certain felicitic conduct as virtue and lias also generated the 
 maxim of obligation which tells us to(h><iuty without regard 
 to happiness. How does it lia})pen that the natural history 
 of virtue can be written under the hypothetical imperative : 
 "This is what you must do /V you wish to be happy"; 
 while the maxim uf virtue is the categorical imperative: 
 '* Do this, come what may." 
 
 There are two ways in which ethic of evoluti(»n may be re- 
 garded, Hii the one hand, W oitf/hfncts (unl rightness be 
 
44 
 
 siolvcii into simpkT constituents, you have no ethical atom in 
 either of these words, and can build no tlieistic argument 
 
 on them. . , , ^ „ 
 
 On the other hand, it society has been grackially moving 
 from the simple to the more complex, and has developed 
 these ideas of duty and good, fundamentally distinct, yet so 
 harmonious, it is not possible to account for the development 
 of tliese ideas, their harmony and their union in virtue, 
 without resorting to a teleological explanation — in short, 
 without presupposing God. The ethic of evolution does 
 not destroy, but it changes the form of the moral argument. 
 
 P>. The Religious Argument. 
 
 Under this would properly be discussed : 1. The psycho- 
 loo-y of reliicion. 2. The metaphysical inferences. It would 
 api^ear that religion is not exclusively a matter of intellect, 
 feelins: or life, but the synthesis of all. And the inference 
 to a being the objective counterpart of the universal religi- 
 ous tendency would be the outcome of the common argu- 
 ment E coKsensa (jotiiinii. 
 
 Division HI. Aikjument Based on the Idea of the 
 
 Infinite. 
 
 Distinguish between (1) the idea of the infinite, and (2) the 
 theistic signiticance of the idea. 
 
 1. The i<lea. Dr. McCosh puts it among the intuitions. 
 Locke and empirical philosophers generally account for it 
 V)y exercise of imagination in connection with experience of 
 the finite. P>ut whatever the conditions under which the 
 idea emerges as a fact of consciousness, it complies with the 
 canons of intuitionalism. The idea is not limited in applica- 
 tion to time and space. We cannot conceive of any degree 
 of knowledire as exhausting the knowable. We speak of 
 infinite truth, holiness, justice. So used, the word infinite 
 does not differ much from the perfect or the absolute. We 
 cannot realise dependent, finite, contingent existence with- 
 out tiiinking of infinite, perfect, absolute existence. We 
 cannot conceive the infinite in the sense of making a mental 
 image of it. On the other hand and in another sense, we 
 cannot help conceiving of it. 
 
2. Its Tiikistic Skinificanck. 
 
 1. Sc'lic'llini'" tanii:lit llial llic iiifiiiilc or absolute in iiiiuio- 
 diatoly known. This view was repeated l»y Sir William 
 Hamilton, wiio sliowed that aeeordini^ to tiie delinitioiis of 
 the words absolute and infinite, the iidinite cannot know and 
 cannot he known; cannot, because that a knowin«j: absolute 
 and a known absolute, is no absolute at all. 
 
 2. Hamilton's doctrine of Xescieiice. See I)r. Ilod^^e's 
 chai)ter, Can God be Knoicn? ILunilton tries to show that 
 wo can have no knowledge of God; that we must take our 
 choice between inconceivables, witli tiie assurance that these 
 inconceivaldes being conti'adictory lu'opositions, one or the 
 other must be ti'ue ; and ha\in<ij made it easy tor us by his 
 law' of the conditioned to believe the inconceivable, he tried 
 to make up for our lack of knowledi^e by loij:ical vindication 
 of our faith. Mansel followed in his Li/iiits of Jidifjiou.s 
 ThoiKjhi^ desi<2^ned to be a new apologetic, and intended to 
 show that the ditilculties of theology are oidy tiiose of all 
 thought, that since we must believe the im-onceivable in 
 philosojdiy, we may believe the inconceivable in theology. 
 The most popular application of the Ilamiltonian })hilos()phy 
 is not found in Mansel's a[)ologetic, but in S})encer's agnos- 
 ticism. 
 
 3. Dr. Calderwood holds that we have an intuitive know- 
 ledge of an iniinite personal God. Jle cannot be said to 
 have succeeded. Men do not have the same sort of intuitive 
 belief in an intinite God that they (\o in regard to time and 
 space, or tliere would be no atheists. 
 
 4. We do not immediately know the Infinite. Nor is it 
 true that we cannot thiid< of the Infinite except under con- 
 tradictory attributes. Nor do we have an intuitive and 
 necessary belief in the objective existence of an infinite 
 Being. Nevertheless the idea of the intinite i- an import- 
 ant factor in theistic inference. AVe have this idea. It 
 emerii^es in connection with every experience of what is 
 finiteand relative. It is involved in every <legree of emi)ir- 
 ical excellence, as the norm ov standard of excellence. We 
 cannot think of Right or (Jood without thiid<ing of an ab- 
 solute norm or standard. The infinite or absolute is another 
 w^ord for the ideal. What inlerpretation sliall we put upon 
 this ideal ? The (piestion is not how we get it, but wliat 
 it means. We believe that it is u strong conlirnuition of 
 
46 
 
 the theistic view of the world, partly because of the large 
 place it holds in the human mind and partly too because of 
 the inevitable impression into which we fall it we cone ude 
 there is no objective norm, no absolute standard by which 
 all upward <,rrowth is measured, by which all relative truth 
 and goodness is judged.