f tide 
 
 PRINCETON, N. J. 
 
 Shelf. 
 
 Division . 
 Section... 
 
 3 . ..i... 
 
 Number , 
 
Digitized by the Internet Archive 
 in 2016 
 
 https://archive.org/details/hinduphilosophypOObose 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY 
 
 POPULARLY EXPLAINED. 
 
 THE ORTHODOX SYSTEMS. 
 
 BY 
 
 RAM CHANDRA ‘'BOSE, A.M., 
 
 OF LUCKNOW, INDIA, 
 
 Author of “ Brahmoismf etc. 
 
 FUNK & WAGNALLS. 
 
 NEW YORK : 1884. 
 
 10 and 12 Dey Street. 
 
 All Rights Reserved. 
 
 LONDON : 
 
 44 Fleet Street. 
 
Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1884, by 
 PUNK & WAGNALLS, 
 
 In the Office of the Librarian of Congress at Washington, D. C. 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 Some of the papers embodied in this volume present 
 the substance of lectures delivered in various places in 
 India in furtherance of the work in which the author 
 has been engaged for years. Two of them — those on the 
 Sankhya Philosophy — appeared as articles in the Calcutta 
 Review , and the paper on Yoga Philosophy in the 
 Indian Evangelical Review j while the supplemental 
 paper, written years ago, was published as an article in the 
 Methodist Quarterly , then edited by Dr. D. D. Whedon. 
 The paper on “ Hindu and Christian Philosophy Con- 
 trasted ’ ’ was delivered as a lecture at Key East, under 
 the auspices of the American Institute of Christian Phi- 
 losophy. All the papers embodied are based on standard 
 translations of original works, and present the leading 
 principles of the schools in the words of their celebrated 
 founders and champions. There are a few works of 
 recognized merit on Hindu Philosophy in the English 
 language, barring the translations utilized in this vol- 
 ume ; but there is not one which makes such a copious 
 use of the original sources of information as the volume 
 now presented to the public, or which is better adapted 
 to give an insight into the contents of standard works on 
 the six great systems of Hindu Philosophy, as well as to 
 show the similarity that subsists between its broad prin- 
 ciples and those which modern philosophers are prone to 
 represent as original, the peculiar outgrowth of the 
 
IV 
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 advanced tli ought of tlie nineteenth century. The 
 writer’s humility trusts that the book may be of use to 
 those who, whether missionaries and clergymen or mere 
 lovers of literature, wish to have a bird’s-eye view of 
 Hindu Philosophy without taking the trouble of going 
 to the sources. The volume, if it be encouraged by the 
 public here, will be followed by another of the same size 
 on the Heterodox Systems of Hindu Philosophy. 
 
 Ram Chandra Bose. 
 
 July 28, 1884. 
 
CONTESTS. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 The Sources of Hindu Philosophy 7 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 The Sources of Hindu Philosophy Continued 36 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 The Age of Hindu Philosophy 69 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 The Sankhya Philosophy, or the Hindu Theory of 
 Evolution 96 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 The Sankhya Philosophy, or the Hindu Theory of 
 Evolution Continued 129 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 The Yoga Philosophy, or Hindu Asceticism 157 
 
VI 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 PACK 
 
 The Nayaya System, or the Hindu Logic 194 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 TnE Vaiseshika Philosophy, or the Hindu Atomic Theory. 22G 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 The Purva Mimansa, or Hindu Ritualism 259 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 The Vedanta System, or Hindu Pantheism 291 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 The Maya, or the Illusion Theory 327 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 The Hindu and Christian Philosophy Contrasted...... 3G1 
 
 SUPPLEMENT. 
 
 Hindu Eclecticism 39G 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 CHAPTEK I. 
 
 THE SOURCES OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 It is very interesting to trace a noble river, through 
 hundreds of miles of fertile land dotted with beautiful 
 cities, thriving towns, and romantic villages, to where 
 its broad sea-like expanse dwindles into a small, brawl- 
 ing mountain stream. It ought to be, if it is not, much 
 more interesting to trace a broad, expansive stream of 
 philosophic thought, which has moulded and fashioned 
 the inner life of a great though fallen people, and left 
 its mark also on their outer life, to where its omnipo- 
 tent influence is but faintly foreshadowed. India, as a 
 country, presents an accumulation of differentiating 
 marks, or such as are calculated to distinguish it from 
 the other countries of the world. It has a unique con- 
 figuration, unique features of beauty and grandeur, 
 and a unique history. But the most remarkable thing 
 one notices within its precincts is its universally adopt- 
 ed, all-embracing, all-comprehensive pantheism. 
 
 Pantheism in other lands is the monopoly of a few 
 gifted but misguided minds, and its influence is scarcely 
 felt outside of very narrow and narrowing circles. In 
 India, however, it is co-extensive with social or national 
 
8 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 life, being held both by the learned and the ignorant, 
 the rich and the poor, the high and the low. The 
 miracle Western scholars scarcely expect to see realized, 
 or transferred from the domain of possibility into the 
 domain of fact, is a great nation of pantheists ; and 
 this miracle is presented in all its entireness in India ! 
 Here pantheism of a thoroughly spiritual type is 
 preached and advocated, not only in temples of piety 
 and halls of learning, but in places of public resort, in 
 streets and thoroughfares ; not only in the seclusion of 
 cloisters and cells, but amid the din and bustle of hives 
 of industry and marts of commerce. 
 
 And it is very interesting to note that the phrase- 
 ology in which it is couched, the imagery by which it 
 is illustrated, and the arguments by which its positions 
 are fortified, are all as old as itself is, or the many- 
 sided, hydra-headed religion of which it professes to be 
 the essential part. The turns of expression, which are 
 to-day bandied backward and forward by the cham- 
 pions of pantheism in India, were coined under the 
 shade, so to speak, of a rich, sonorous, and remarkably 
 flexible language, about two thousand five hundred 
 years ago. The tropes and metaphors utilized to-day 
 by our countrymen to set forth the essential features 
 of their pantheistic belief were first pressed into such 
 service about the time when the prophet Isaiah was de- 
 nouncing with characteristic fervor the vices by which 
 his beloved country, the vineyard of the Lord of Glory, 
 was being ruined. And the varied lines of reasoning 
 by which this dreamy system is now defended by them 
 were first arrayed under its banner by their forefathers, 
 long before the initiation of their present forms of wor- 
 ship. India appears a scene of mental immobility, both 
 when the backward condition of its arts is taken into 
 
THE SOURCES OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 9 
 
 consideration, and when the significant fact is realized 
 that its rich literature has remained unimproved and 
 unexpanded for ages untold. 
 
 Had the influence of our national pantheism been 
 confined to our own country, and not felt anywhere 
 else, still, universal and all-powerful as its sway has for 
 ages been within its limits, an attempt to trace it to its 
 original source would have appeared very desirable. 
 But we have reason to believe that its influence has not 
 been thus confined. The varied forms of pantheistic 
 belief, which flourished in schools of philosophy, if not 
 in thoroughfares and market-places, in Western coun- 
 tries in ancient times, have confessedly a dash of 
 Orientalism about them ; and if not traceable to its 
 direct influence, a common origin of all these phases of 
 thought and of those associated with it must be sought 
 in some Eastern region which brought speculative phi- 
 losophy to the birth in some prehistoric age. Its influ- 
 ence, however, is most assuredly noticeable in the dis- 
 quisitions, and even in the phraseology in which the 
 idealistic and pantheistic speculations of modern times 
 are embodied. Pantheism certainly appears in these 
 days in a new garb, and in forms more apparently 
 rational and really attractive than it did in days long 
 since gone by, but the likeness of the ectypes of the 
 day to the archetypes of ancient times is so obvious 
 that their essential identity is one of those facts which 
 cannot possibly be ignored. At all events, it may 
 safely be assumed that Indian pantheism has, besides 
 moulding and fashioning the varied phases of our 
 national life, largely influenced the more advanced 
 philosophic notions of the age. An attempt, therefore, 
 to trace it through successive phases of development to 
 its original sources is doubly important, even more so 
 
10 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 than an attempt to trace the requirements of modern 
 jurisprudence to the well-known code of Justinian. 
 
 Fortunately an attempt of this description is not 
 likely to end in failure. Certain documents of unim- 
 peachable integrity have come down to us from a 
 remote antiquity, and in them we may discover the 
 germs not only of the universally adopted pantheism of 
 our country, but of the varied systems of philosophic 
 thought, which it has either swallowed up and assimi- 
 lated to its own nature, or overcome and thrown into 
 the shade. These are the Upanishads, or philosophical 
 treatises attached to the Vedas. Each of the four 
 Vedas, on which the Hindu concentrates his present 
 homage and retrospective veneration and builds up his 
 hopes of prospective bliss, consists of three parts — the 
 Mantra, the Brahmana, and the Hpanishad. The 
 hymns, prayers, and doxologies, which form its initial 
 and certainly the most fascinating part, make up its 
 Mantra division ; and the ceremonial directories, which 
 have to be consulted when the oblations and sacrifices 
 associated with the hymnology, are actually brought to 
 the altar, constitute its Brahmana portion. The Upan- 
 ishad or concluding portion embodies the philosophy by 
 which the occult meaning of the hymnology and the 
 ritual is inquired into, ascertained, and set forth. The 
 word Upanishad, like many words of a doubtful origin, 
 has been variously interpreted by Oriental scholars, 
 and an array of fanciful etymologies has been presented 
 in connection with it. But the meaning of the word is 
 plain — viz., that which destroys the sense-bred igno- 
 rance, which the hymnology and the ritual it explains 
 are fitted to nourish and mature. 
 
 Every Veda has its Mantras or hymns of prayer and 
 praise, its Brahmanas or ceremonial directories or ritual 
 
THE SOURCES OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 11 
 
 guide-books, and its Upanishads or philosophical trea- 
 tises of an explanatory and discursive character. The 
 number of the hymns may be fixed, if not with the 
 strictest accuracy, at least with a close approximation 
 to truth. A few of the hymns may have been lost, but 
 the vast body has come down almost as it existed in 
 primitive times. But the number of the supplementary 
 treatises, by which their right use and occult meaning 
 are indicated, cannot possibly be fixed, owing specially 
 to Oriental proneness to exaggeration. Lists are pre- 
 served, such as may encourage the belief that the num- 
 ber of the Upanishads alone exceeded two hundred and 
 thirty, but only a few of these are now extant ; and 
 the complete disappearance of the rest cannot be satis- 
 factorily explained except by representing their alleged 
 numerical bulk and strength as apocryphal. Nor is it 
 at all necessary to plunge ourselves into learned dis- 
 quisitions for the purpose of arriving at an approximate 
 conclusion with reference to the original number of 
 these treatises, as the few commented on by Sankar 
 Acharya, one of the acutest thinkers and most volumi- 
 nous writers India every saw, are represented by all 
 parties as the most important ; and these are, properly 
 speaking, the sources of Hindu Philosophy. 
 
 The eleven Upanishads commented upon by Sankar 
 Acharya may be divided into two classes, the major 
 and the minor ; the two larger Upanishads and the 
 nine smaller ones. It is possible that two or three of 
 the smaller of these treatises were extant before the 
 appearance of the larger ones ; but the logical precision 
 by which they are as a body characterized, together 
 with their lucidness of arrangement and coherence of 
 thought, speaking of course comparatively, leads us to 
 assign to their composition a date posterior to that of 
 
12 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the more bulky and certainly the more important docu- 
 ments in an archaeological point of view. 
 
 The two larger U pan i shads are the Chliandogya and 
 the Briliad Aranyaka, the former belonging to the 
 Sama Veda, and the latter to the collection of the 
 Yajur Veda, called Vajasaneyi or white ; and their 
 composition is traced by general consent to a period 
 prior to the appearance of Buddha on the stage of his- 
 tory. They have many legends in common, related 
 almost in the same words ; and this fact, if not any- 
 thing else or anything partaking of the nature of ex- 
 ternal evidence, may justify the presumption that one of 
 them was written before the other. But the question, 
 Which is the earlier of these two documents? cannot 
 be solved any more than the length of the interval be- 
 tween the composition of the one and that of the other 
 can be ascertained. The features of similarity in 
 thought and expression noticeable, together with the 
 want of system characteristic of both, tend to confirm 
 the views of those learned scholars who represent them 
 as contemporary documents based on sources of infor- 
 mation now lost, or on traditions and legends current 
 at the time when they were both composed by inde- 
 pendent writers. 
 
 As it is our intention to analyze in this paper the 
 contents of these two hoary documents, let us present 
 the evidences of a high antiquity we have noticed in 
 the course of a careful perusal, with pencil in hand, in 
 consecutive order. The translations we shall utilize are 
 that of the “ Chliandogya,” by Dr. Rajendra Lall 
 Mittra, and that of “ Briliad Aranyaka,” by Dr. Roer. 
 
 And first of all let it be observed that the imagery 
 presented is, together with the forms of expression, 
 emphatically archaic. The truths presented are cer- 
 
THE SOURCES OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 13 
 
 tainly of a recondite character, but the images pressed 
 into service are of the simplest order. The fire pro- 
 duced by the attrition of two pieces of wood, the spokes 
 issuing from the nave of a wheel, the athlete running a 
 race, cows suckling their calves, leaves attached to the 
 branches and the stocks, a bow strung, an arrow let 
 fly, a flaming fire, a rolling car, a bellowing ox, a drop 
 of water on a lotus leaf — such are the images which flit 
 across our minds as we turn page after page of these 
 ancient books. A favorite storehouse of figures is the 
 beehive and the honey squeezed from it, which is now 
 the best of gods, then the best of sacred writings, and 
 anon the best of ceremonial observances. It is cer- 
 tainly not proper to lay great stress on this feature of 
 these Upanishads, inasmuch as the polite literature of 
 our country, its poetry and romance, does not seem to 
 have gone very far beyond the archaic stage of develop- 
 ment. But yet, as the speculations of its philosophic 
 age were characterized by a remarkable stiffness of 
 style, the frequency with which such simple images 
 occur in these documents, together with the flexibility 
 of them style, is an indubitable proof of great antiquity. 
 
 And this may be said also of the want of artistic 
 finish manifested by the legends related, and the clumsy 
 way in which these are arranged, and the truths incul- 
 cated are presented. Not to speak of the remarkable 
 brevity and conciseness which characterized the pro- 
 ductions of what might in India be called the age of 
 philosophy, the minor Upanishads are ahead of the 
 major in the terseness of their style, in the concatenated 
 order in which their contents are presented, and in the 
 absence from them of mythical stories, such as are of a 
 puerile character. 
 
 Akin to this sort of evidence is that based on the 
 
14 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 longevity of the persons referred to, and in that pre- 
 supposed in the division of life into distinct periods 
 presented in chap, iii., sec. 16, of the Chhandagaya 
 Upanishad. Man is in this part represented as Yajna 
 or sacrifice, and the different periods of his life are thus 
 indicated. The first twenty-four years of his life, 
 during which he is under the special protection of the 
 Yashus or the fire-gods, are the matin sacrifice. The 
 period between the twenty-fourth and the forty-fourth 
 year of his life is the midday oblation ; and during these 
 years his presiding deities are the Rudras or storm-gods. 
 The afternoon sacrifice is the period intervening be- 
 tween the forty-fourth and the eighty-fourth year of 
 his life, when he is under the special guidance of the 
 Adityas or sun-gods. The closing period, which in the 
 case of a devotee, Mahidasa, son of Itara, extended 
 from the eighty-fourth to the one hundred and six- 
 teenth, may be represented as the evening sacrifice, 
 though it is not characterized as such, and the deities 
 protecting it are not named. It is, however, distinctly 
 stated that the person who knows the significance of 
 the first three periods of life will live for one hundred 
 and sixteen years. All this betokens general longevity, 
 which is an incontestable proof of great antiquity, 
 though, so far as we are aware, no stress has been laid 
 upon it by Oriental scholars. 
 
 The gods mentioned in these disquisitions are those 
 of the Yedas, not those of any post-Yedic period. The 
 productive and destructive energies of nature, which 
 appear under various names to have monopolized the 
 worship of our unsophisticated ancestors of simple 
 Yedic times, are the divinities around which the 
 legends, speculations, and reasonings of these venerable 
 documents revolve. And their number is set forth 
 
THE SOURCES OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 15 
 
 therein with the same indefiniteness which in the Rig 
 Veda makes it impossible for us to fix it. In one of 
 the many dialogues embodied, their number is given as 
 no less than “three and three thousand.” It, how- 
 ever, shrinks in the same dialogue into “three and 
 three hundred,” then into “thirty and three,” then 
 into “ six,” then into “three,” and ultimately into 
 “one.” But, as in the Rig Yeda, “ thirty-three” is 
 the number for which special partiality is shown when 
 the spirit of philosophical generalization is held in 
 abeyance for a moment ; and they are the eight 
 Yaslius, or various forms of the Fire-god, the eleven 
 Rudras or forms of the Storm-god, and the twelve 
 Adityas or forms of the Sun-god, besides Indra and 
 Prajapati, representing perhaps heaven and earth. 
 The God Brahma appears in these treatises either as 
 the quintessence of all essences, or as in the Rig Yeda, 
 not certainly as the first person of the Hindu Triad. 
 The all but perfect identity of the pantheon herein dis- 
 closed with that of which glimpses are presented in the 
 Yedas, particularly in the earliest of these venerable 
 books, as also its dissimilarity to that set up in post- 
 Yedic times, cannot but be regarded as an incontest- 
 able proof of great antiquity. 
 
 The ceremonies referred to in these disquisitions are 
 emphatically Yedic ceremonies, not those which were 
 initiated in post-Yedic times. The Aswamedha, or the 
 sacrifice of the horse, the crowning sacrifice of the 
 simple times pictured in the Yedas, is not only alluded 
 to again and again, but graphically described, ex- 
 plained, and philosophized upon, specially in the open- 
 ing section of the Brihad Aranyaka, in which the 
 supreme greatness of the animal sacrificed, and its iden- 
 tity with Brajapati, the lord of creatures, are shown by 
 
16 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 means of analogies and metaphors, the former far- 
 fetched and the latter incongruous. The Somayajna, 
 or the sacrifice of the Soma or moon-plant, which is 
 prominently brought forward in all the Yedas, and 
 which is the stock theme of one of them, the Sanaa 
 Yeda, is the subject of innumerable allusions and many 
 disquisitions in these treatises. The Pasu-medha, or 
 animal sacrifices of- an inferior order, are also referred 
 to, and the great sacrifice called Purush-medha, or the 
 sacrifice of the Lord of creatures for the good of those 
 who are now gods but were once men, is also alluded 
 to. Indeed an attempt is obviously made in these 
 books to merge the varieties of the sacrifices enumer- 
 ated in the Yedas into the supreme sacrifice of the 
 supreme Being for the supreme good of the universe, as 
 well as to sublimate the Yedic pantheon into one per- 
 vasive spiritual substance. 
 
 The literature alluded to is, like the pantheon dis- 
 closed and the ritual embodied, Yedic. The first three 
 Yedas, Pig, Yajur, and Sama, have numerous refer- 
 ences made to them ; and the last, Atharva, is also 
 alluded to, though rarely. But not a single hook 
 extant in post- Yedic times is referred to. Exception 
 may be taken to this statement, based on the two well- 
 known passages in the two Upanishads, in which 
 “ Phases and Purans” are mentioned along with the 
 Yedas, and the branches of literature embodied in or 
 closely associated with them. And certainty if these 
 two generic names were made to include the hooks now 
 comprehended by them, the objection would he both 
 well-grounded and unanswerable. But these names 
 had a meaning in primitive times very different indeed 
 from what they hear now. The name “Ithases,” 
 which now includes the epic poems, comprehended iu 
 
THE SOURCES OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 17 
 
 the age of the Upanishacls the legendary lore embodied 
 in the Yedas ; while by the Purans were understood 
 the varied cosmogonies and theogonies found in those 
 venerable records, not the obscene literature and my- 
 thology from which the senseless forms of worship now 
 prevalent in our country derive their sanction and 
 sanctity. 
 
 And lastly, the crude, undeveloped and unsystema- 
 tized form in which caste appears in these treatises is an 
 irrefragable argument in favor of their high antiquity. 
 The four original castes are mentioned distinctly and 
 emphatically, not merely hinted at, as in the Rig 
 Yeda ; but they do not appear separated from one an- 
 other by broad and well-defined lines of demarcation, 
 or guarded each by a network of iron rules. On the 
 contrary, the relative position of the orders, especially 
 of the two higher ones, appears left in uncertainty 
 rather than defined with precision. There are doubtless 
 passages which clearly show that the Brahmins were 
 rising, slowly but surely, up to the ascendency they 
 have for ages and centuries enjoyed ; but passages are 
 not wanting fitted to show that they were often beaten 
 by their rivals, the Ivshetryas, in their attempt to scale 
 the summit of sacerdotal power and authority. The 
 opening section of chap. ii. of the Brihad Aranyaka 
 presents a dialogue between a proud, self-complacent 
 and self-sufficient Brahmin, by name Gargya, and a 
 really learned and therefore humble Ivshetrya, Ajata- 
 satru, the moral of which is the abandonment by the 
 former of his ridiculous pretensions to knowledge and 
 his enrolment as a pupil of the latter. Such a thing 
 would have been an impossibility if the caste system 
 had been matured, as it subsequently was in the age of 
 Manu. 
 
18 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 But there is a dialogue in the Chhandogya eminently 
 fitted to show that in occult, divine knowledge the 
 Ivshetrya was most decidedly ahead of the Brahmin. 
 A Brahmin lad goes to Jaivali, the king of Panchala, 
 of course a Ivshetrya, and has five test questions regard- 
 ing the condition of the dead and ethereal regions put 
 to him. Unable to answer them, he returns to his 
 father and teacher chagrined, and solicits instruction on 
 those points. The father confesses his igDorance and 
 repairs to the court of the learned king for instruction. 
 The king receives him hospitably, but feels afflicted 
 when informed of his motive. However, after much 
 hesitation, he expresses his wish to teach him in these 
 significant words : “ Since you have thus inquired, and 
 inasmuch as no Brahmin ever knew it before, hence of 
 all people in the world the Ivshetryas alone have the 
 right of imparting instruction on this subject.” 
 
 The high antiquity of these documents having been 
 established, it remains for us to analyze their contents. 
 A word or two, however, on their style and the age 
 they portray would be a fitting preface to such analy- 
 sis. We have already had occasion to speak of the 
 extravagances of diction by which these treatises are, 
 along with the entire body of Sanscrit literature, char- 
 acterized. Transitions of the harshest kind from one 
 pronoun to another, from one figure of speech to an- 
 other, from one train of thought to another, and from 
 one line of reasoning to another, along with the ellipti- 
 cal nature of the sentences in general, throw an air of 
 obscurity over many of the passages on which the main 
 argument hinges ; while metaphors and allegories both 
 incongruous and far-fetched add to the mystification. 
 But the most repellent features of the disquisitions 
 embodied are tiresome repetitions, phonetic analogies, 
 
THE SOURCES OP HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 19 
 
 grotesque flights of the imagination, and inaccurate 
 reasonings. 
 
 Examples of all these varieties of defects cannot be 
 presented within the limits which we must prescribe to 
 ourselves ; but the following two strings of figures, one 
 culled from the Chhandogya and the other from the 
 Brihad Aranyaka, are pre-eminently fitted to set forth 
 the sort of extravagance we have to wade through 
 while perusing these books. Of the great Universal 
 soul it is said that “ The heaven is the head, the sun is 
 the eye, the wind is the breath, the sky is the trunk, 
 the moon is the fundament, and the earth is the feet. 
 The altar is his breast, the sacrificial grass constitutes 
 the hair of Ins body, the household fire forms his heart, 
 the Annoharyapachana fire forms his mind, Ahavarya 
 fire his face.” The exordium of the Brihad Aranyaka 
 sets forth the greatness of the sacrificial horse in these 
 words : “ The sun is the eye ; the wind, the breath ; 
 the fire, under the name Yaiswanara, the open mouth ; 
 the year, the body of the sacrificial horse ; the heaven 
 is the back ; the atmosphere, the belly ; the earth, the 
 footstool (hoof) ; the quarters, the sides ; the seasons, the 
 members ; the months, the half months, the joints ; 
 day and night, the feet ; the constellation, the bones ; 
 the sky, the muscles ; the half-digested food, the sand ; 
 the rivers, arteries and veins ; the liver and spleen, the 
 mountains ; the herbs and trees, the various kinds of 
 hair. The sun as long as he rises, the forepart of the 
 body ; the sun as long as he descends, the hind part of 
 the body. The lightning is like yawning ; the shaking 
 of the members is like the rolling of the thunder.” 
 Decency leads us to throw the veil over the concluding 
 portion of this series of grotesque metaphors and similes. 
 
 The utter contempt for matters of fact, associated in 
 
20 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 those treatises with the wildest flights of speculation, is 
 not perhaps a defect confined to Oriental Philosophy, 
 it being discoverable in the writings of philosophers 
 who in reasoning never appear egregiously at variance 
 with the approved rules of logic. But the facility with 
 which day-dreams are presented herein as facts of phi- 
 losophy, or science in general, is peculiarly Oriental. 
 The arteries, for instance, “ of the heart” are said in 
 the Chhandogya to “ exist in a brown ethereal fluid, 
 yea, in a white, a blue, a yellow, a red ethereal fluid.” 
 They are in the other Upanishad divided into two 
 classes, the good and the bad, and the number of the 
 good ones given is 72,000 ! But we shall have to refer 
 to this tendency to present dreams as established facts 
 when we speak of the eschatology of these books ; and 
 so we need not allow ourselves to be detained here by 
 this feature of extravagance. 
 
 The age depicted in the Upanishads has justly been 
 called an age of inquiry, of incipient rather than 
 matured speculation. The gods worshipped, originally 
 forces of nature, were many, and clothed with attri- 
 butes by no means godlike ; the forms of devotion util- 
 ized were apparently puerile and meaningless ;.and the 
 ceremonies reduced to practice were both cumbersome 
 and absurd. The mind naturally recoiled from the 
 surroundings of a pantheon so unworthy, and the para- 
 phernalia of a worship so sensuous and degrading, and 
 the question was naturally raised, Have these forms of 
 devotion and these oft-recurring ceremonies any mean- 
 ing, or are they absurdities to be exploded or cast over- 
 board ? The belief in the current creed and current 
 forms of worship was too strong even in the most 
 thoughtful minds to admit of a general leaning toward 
 the latter of these alternatives ; and so the conviction 
 
THE SOURCES OF IIIHDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 21 
 
 gained ground that there was some occult meaning in 
 the system of faith and devotion so apparently at vari- 
 ance with both reason and common-sense. What is this 
 occult meaning ? This was the question which philoso- 
 phy proposed for discussion and solution. And no 
 wonder that far-fetched analogies, fanciful etymologies, 
 phonetic resemblances, incongruous reasonings, and 
 extraordinary flights of the imagination Avere resorted 
 to for the purpose of extracting a meaning out of Avhat 
 Avas really meaningless ! But the spirit of generaliza- 
 tion Avas not pressed into service in vain, for in a very 
 short time the gods and goddesses adored, the forms of 
 worship resorted to, and the cumbrous ritual reduced 
 to practice, Avere all unified into a primal substance 
 spiritual on the Avhole, but spoken of at times as mate- 
 rial or quasi-material. But an age of Avavering faith 
 cannot develop the spirit of unshackled speculation ; 
 and so the disquisitions under notice are characterized 
 by an unsteadiness, a vacillation, a flexibility, and an 
 inconsistency fitted to render them enigmatical, incon- 
 clusive, and even puerile and absurd. 
 
 A word about the commentary of Sankar seems de- 
 sirable - here. That profound thinker, who flourished 
 during the latter part of the seventh and the earlier 
 part of the eighth century, falls evidently into the mis- 
 take into Avhich modern philosophers fall when engaged 
 in deciphering the contents of hoary documents, such 
 as those under notice. He carries to the comparatively 
 simple times of the Upanishads the well-conducted and 
 abstruse controversies of an era of thought and specu- 
 lation ten times more progressive. And therefore he 
 may justly be accused of importing meaning into the 
 text, rather than bringing meaning out of it, or rather 
 of torturing out of the passages, plain or obscure, a sense 
 
22 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 fitted to bolster up bis own foregone conclusions. But 
 liis acute exegetic dissertations are of great use, if not 
 in elucidating the contents of these treatises, at least in 
 exploding a notion which is now gaining ground in and 
 out of India, especially among people who have a 
 theory to advocate. The notion is that the form of 
 religion inculcated in the Upanishads is a pure and sub- 
 lime theism. It may suit the convenience of the theo- 
 rists of the day to see nothing but a rational system of 
 theism in these venerable documents ; but it is impor- 
 tant to note that the learned Pandits of Sankar Acha- 
 rya’s time saw in them forms of religion very different 
 indeed from such a system. Some, with the great 
 Sankar at their head, found pantheism in them, while 
 those with whom that redoubtable controversialist was 
 engaged in ceaseless discussion, saw in them nothing 
 but the nihilism to which they had been brought by 
 the atheistic speculations of Buddha. The position of 
 the theorists, who represent the teaching of the Upan- 
 ishads as thoroughly theistic, is similar to that of the 
 transcendentalists who pretend to find pantheism in the 
 teaching of our Lord, in spite of its obvious drift and 
 the concurrent testimony of the Church from its foun- 
 dation up to the present time. 
 
 Having disposed of the questions which naturally 
 arise about these two hoary and venerable documents, 
 let us endeavor to set forth what is in them. Their 
 contents are of a miscellaneous nature, and though the 
 main line of thought by which they may be unified 
 savors of pantheism of a thoroughly spiritual type, the 
 varied isms which flourished in Indian schools, over and 
 above that, in subsequent times may be supported or 
 upheld by them. The mistake into which some Orient- 
 alists have fallen is that of representing these books as 
 
THE SOURCES OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 23 
 
 sources exclusively of that system of pantheism which 
 was subsequently matured by the profound thinker and 
 the versatile writer Vyas, and the great commentator 
 Sankar himself. These books certainly present the 
 germs of this system, which has swallowed up all its 
 rivals and has maintained an undisputed sway over the 
 Indian intellect for more than two millenniums. But 
 it is to be observed that the rival orthodox systems 
 with which it had to contend, and over which its vic- 
 tory was complete and glorious, also derive their phrase- 
 ology, their principal outlines of thought, and their 
 salient features of reasoning, together with the divine 
 sanction to which they lay claim, from these treatises. 
 They may therefore be justly represented as the primal 
 sources not of this or that system of Indian philosophy, 
 but of Indian philosophy in general, or Indian philosophy 
 in all its orthodox branches at least. This appears from 
 the cosmogonies embodied in these books, from their ac- 
 counts of the Origin of Sin, and from their descriptions 
 of the Universal Soul, the individuated Soul or Self, 
 Elementary Substances, and such metaphysical ideas as 
 are conveyed by the terms Space, Immensity, etc. 
 
 The cosmogonies embodied in these Upanishads are 
 not merely fanciful, puerile, and absurd, but of a dubi- 
 ous significance, that is of a nature fitted to support 
 nihilism and materialism, as well as pantheism. Take, 
 for instance, the two following passages from the 
 Cbhandogya : 
 
 1. “ The sun is described as Brahma — its descrip- 
 tion : Verily at first all this was non-existent ; that 
 non-existence became existent, it developed — it became 
 an egg ; it remained quiet for a period of one year ; it 
 burst into two ; thence were formed two halves of gold 
 and silver.” 
 
24 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 2. “ Thereof the argentine half is the earth, and the 
 golden half the heaven. The inner thick membrane 
 (of the egg) became mountains, and the thin one cloudy 
 fog ; the blood-vessels became rivers, and, lastly, what 
 was born therefrom is the sun, Aditya” (chap. iii. 
 sec. 19). 
 
 1. “ Before, oh child, this was sat (being) one only 
 without a second. Thereof verily others say : ‘ Before 
 this was as at (non-being), one alone without a second ; 
 from that non-being proceeds being. 2. He (the 
 teacher) continued : But of a truth, oh child, how can 
 this be ? How can being proceed from non-being ? 
 Before, oh child, this was being, one without a second. 
 3. It willed, I shall multiply and be born ! It created 
 heat. That heat willed ! I shall multiply and be 
 born ! It created water” (chap. x. sec. 2). 
 
 The first of these passages traces creation to non- 
 existence or nonentity, and the second leaves it uncer- 
 tain whether being or non-being is to be held up as the 
 Creator of the universe. The same spirit of vacillation 
 is noticeable in the cosmogonies given in the other 
 Upanishad, the Brihad Aranyaka, as is seen in the 
 following passages : 
 
 “ There was not anything here before : this was in- 
 deed enveloped by death, who is voracity ; for voracity 
 is death. lie created this mind desiring : may I have 
 a soul. lie went forth worshipping. From him when 
 worshipping the waters were produced, etc.” (chap. i. 
 Second Brahmana). 
 
 “ This was before soul, bearing the shape of a man. 
 Looking around he beheld nothing but himself. He 
 said first : ‘This am L’ Hence the name of I was 
 produced. Therefore even now a man, when called, 
 says first, ‘ It is I, ’ and tells afterward any other name 
 
THE SOURCES OE IIIHDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 25 
 
 which belongs to him. And because he as the first of 
 all of them consumed by fire all the sins, therefore he is 
 called Purush. . . . lie did thus not feel delight. 
 Therefore no body when alone feels delight. lie was 
 desirous of a second. He was in the same state as hus- 
 band and wife are when in mutual embrace. He 
 divided this self twofold. Hence were husband and 
 wife produced. Therefore was this only a half of him- 
 self as a split pea is of the whole. Thus has Yajnanal- 
 kya declared it. This void is thus completed by 
 woman. He approached her. Hence men were born. 
 She verily reflected, How can he approach me whom 
 he has produced from himself ? Alas ! I will conceal 
 myself. Thus she became a cow, the other a bull. He 
 approached her. Hence kine were born. The one be- 
 came a mare and the other a stallion, the one a female 
 ass, the other a male ass. ... In this manner he 
 created every living pair whatsoever down to the ants” 
 (chap. i. Third Brahmana). 
 
 The first of these passages traces creation to nonenti- 
 ty called death, and according to Sankar it was eagerly 
 seized by the nihilists of his day and held up, along 
 with others of course, as a justification of their views. 
 Sankar, the redoubtable champion of pantheism, enters 
 of course into a series of very abstruse disquisitions to 
 prove that the word death or voracity or non-existence 
 in this and other passages of the sort means a spiritual 
 substance, originally unseen and unknown, but de- 
 veloped or evolved in the course of time into the varied 
 modes of existence we notice around and in us. But 
 the nihilists of his day had their reasons, and these by 
 no means weak, for adopting a different- construction. 
 The second passage seems at first sight fitted to bring 
 us to a conclusion the very antipodes of that supported 
 
20 
 
 JIINDV PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 by the first. But the" embodied “soul” to wliicli it 
 traces creation is confessedly a medial not the original 
 source. The discrepancies in the accounts of creation 
 presented in these books may be easily reconciled. 
 The cosmogony of the Vedas begins with an uncon- 
 scious substance spoken of as It, coming in the course 
 of ages to consciousness, and led by a perception of its 
 solitariness to wish to be “ many and if such sub- 
 stance were posited as the groundwork of the accounts 
 of creation presented in these two books, their apparent 
 contrariety or inconsistency would disappear. 
 
 "With reference to the origin of sin, both these Upan- 
 ishads present one and the same account, almost in the 
 same words. “ Twofold indeed is the offspring of 
 Prajapati (the Lord of Creation, elsewhere called 
 Purush or Brahma), the gods and the demons. There- 
 fore the gods are thus few in number, the demons 
 many.” The appositeness of the word “ therefore” in 
 this connection is seen in Sankar’s Commentary, in 
 which the numeric superiority of the demons is attrib. 
 uted, in of course a roundabout way, to the ascendency 
 of perception and sensation over thought and reflection. 
 The gods and the demons evolved from the essence of 
 the Creator “ rivalled in these worlds,” or contended 
 with each other for ascendency. The gods at first 
 resorted to speech for help, but the demons defeated 
 their object by vitiating speech, and making it a foun- 
 tain of “ improper words.” Breath was then resorted 
 to by the gods and contaminated by the demons, and 
 made a source of “improper odors.” The eye, the 
 car, and the mind were in this manner contaminated 
 and made sources of “improper colors,” “improper 
 sounds,” and “improper notions.” The last party 
 resorted to for help was life, and the demons in their 
 
THE SOURCES OF HINDU FHILOSOPHY. 
 
 27 
 
 attempt to contaminate it were annihilated, “ as a clod 
 of earth by falling upon a rock is destroyed.” Tho 
 demons being annihilated, speech and other organs of 
 the body were freed from the pollution brought on 
 them by contact. This account sanctions the current 
 notion of the Hindus that sin inheres in the body, and 
 does not reach the life or soul. 
 
 The perfect identity of the Universal with the indi- 
 vidual or individuated soul is set forth in many pas- 
 sages. A few selected at random are given below : 
 
 “ This soul, which is neither this nor aught else, 
 which is intangible, for it cannot be laid hold of ; not 
 to be dissipated, for it cannot be dissipated ; without 
 contact, for it cannot come into contact ; not limited, 
 not subject to pain, nor to destruction — this fearless 
 (soul) 0 Janaka, is obtained by thee” (“ Brihad Aran- 
 yaka,” chap. iv. Second Brahmana). 
 
 “ This great unborn soul is the same which abides as 
 the intelligent (soul) in all living creatures, the same 
 which abides as ether in the heart ; in him it sleeps ; 
 it is the subduer of all, the ruler of all, the sovereign 
 lord of all ; it does not become greater by good works, 
 nor less by evil works. It is the Buler of all, the sov- 
 ereign Lord of all beings, the Preserver of all beings, 
 the Bridge, the Upholder of the world, so that they 
 fall not to ruin” (“ Brihad Aranyaka,” chap. iv. Fourth 
 Brahmana). 
 
 “He who dwelling in the seed is within the seed,# 
 whom the seed does not know, whose body is the seed, 
 who from within rules the seed, is thy soul, the Inner 
 Ruler, immortal. Unseen, he sees ; unheard, he 
 hears ; unminded, he minds ; unknown, he knows. 
 There is none that sees but he, there is none that 
 knows but he. He is thy soul, the Inner Ruler, im- 
 
28 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 mortal. "Whatever is different from him is perishable” 
 (“ Brihad Aranyaka,” chap. iii. Seventh Brahmana). 
 
 £< Then asked him Ushasta, the son of Chakra : 
 ‘ Yajnanalkya,’ said he, 4 do explain to me that Brahma 
 who is a witness and present, that soul which is within 
 every (being).” [lie replied,] ‘ It is thy soul which is 
 within every (being).’ (“ Brihad Aranyaka,” chap, 
 iii. Fourth Brahmana.) 
 
 4 4 He became to every nature of every nature ; there- 
 fore to manifest the nature of him, Indra appears of 
 manifold nature by his Mayas (illusions) ; for his hun- 
 dred and ten senses are attached (to the body as horses 
 to a car) ; it (the soul) is the senses ; it is ten ; it is 
 many thousands, nay infinite ; it is Brahma who has 
 not a Before, nor an After, nor a Beside, nor a With- 
 out. This is the soul, Brahma, the perceiver of all ” 
 (“ Brihad Aranyaka,” chap. ii. Fifth Brahmana). 
 
 44 These rivers, my child, proceed from the East tow- 
 ard the West, thence from the ocean (they rise in the 
 form of vapor, and dropping again they flow toward 
 the South, and) merge into the ocean. Here, as they 
 do not remember what they were. 2. Even so all 
 these created beings, having proceeded from the truth, 
 know not that they have issued therefrom. They 
 therefore become of the form they had before, whether 
 that be of a tiger, a lion, a wolf, a bear, a worm, an 
 insect, a gnat, or a mosquito. 3. That particle which is 
 Hhe soul of all this is the Truth ; it is the Universal 
 Soul. O Swetaketu, thou art that” ( 44 Chhandogya,” 
 chap. vi. sec. 10). 
 
 Quotations might be multiplied almost endlessly ; but 
 these are enough to show that according to the teach- 
 ing of these Upanisliads the Universal Soul is not 
 merely identical with the individual soul called self, but 
 
THE SOURCES OE HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 29 
 
 tlie life of all that really is ; and they may be brought 
 forward in support of the views of those who see noth- 
 ing; but sublime idealism in them. But there are things 
 said about the soul eminently fitted to militate against 
 such a conclusion. For instance, the soul is said to 
 have extension, as in the following passage : “ Verily 
 the sonl extends from below, the soul extends from 
 above, the soul extends from behind, the soul extends 
 from before, the soul extends from the South, the soul 
 extends from the North — of a truth the soul is all 
 this.” 
 
 Again, the soul is identified with Immensity, which is 
 said to extend as it does, and to be “ all this” as it is. 
 It is, moreover, identified with space, speech, ether, 
 aliment, some material substances and some metaphysi- 
 cal ideas. Consequently there is scarcely a system of 
 philosophy, pantheistic, materialistic, and even nihilis- 
 tic, which cannot find an array of evidences in support 
 of its principles among the heterogeneous and conflict- 
 ing affirmations and disquisitions of these hoary docu- 
 ments. 
 
 It is desirable before bringing this paper to a close to 
 state what these two ancient books say about human 
 duty and its consequences, especially in the life to 
 come, or to give some idea of the practical religion and 
 eschatology embodied in them. Let it be observed that 
 these two books were written at a time when philoso- 
 phy was the science of the All, not one branch of 
 human knowledge, as in these days. Philosophy em- 
 braced religion, morality, psychology, medicine, phys- 
 iology — in a word, mathematics, physics, metaphysics, 
 and theology. Whatever the topic of inquiry might 
 be, or of whatever character the question raised might 
 he — mathematical, physical, psychological or metaphys- 
 
30 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ical — recourse must be had to philosophy for light, set- 
 tlement, or solution. Called into existence in such an 
 age, these philosophical treatises could not lay aside the 
 great problem of human duty, and its proximate and 
 ultimate results. The dissertations on this subject em- 
 bodied in them are too important to be passed over, in- 
 asmuch as they have, along with the characteristic ideas 
 on which they are based, moulded and fashioned the 
 religious life of our country for ages untold. One short 
 quotation on human duty will suffice. 
 
 “ Threefold is the division of Duty. Sacrifice, Study, 
 and Charity constitute the first ; Penance is the sec- 
 ond, and Residence by a Bralimacharin exclusively in 
 the house of a tutor is the third. All those who attend 
 to these duties attain virtuous regions ; the believer in 
 Brahma alone attains to immortality. ’ ’ 
 
 The great commentator, Sankar, enters into an elab- 
 orate disquisition, in his own dialectic or argumentative 
 style, to set forth the meaning of these verses. Ac- 
 cording to his comments there were, in those early 
 times as there have been in all subsequent ages, four 
 orders of devotees, those of the householder, the ascetic, 
 the Brahmacharin, or the student of the Vedas, and 
 Brahmasanstha or Paramahansa, one wholly devoted to 
 Brahma. The duty of the householder was to offer 
 sacrifices, or perform ceremonies diurnal, occasional, 
 optional, and expiatory, to study the Vedas, and to 
 bestow “ alms according to his resources” on “ parties 
 not seeking for the same.” The ascetic fits himself by 
 years of penance (tapas) in sequestered places for the 
 acquisition of saving knowledge, or the knowledge em- 
 bodied in the philosophical treatises attached to the 
 Vedas. When thus fitted by self-inflicted mortification 
 and the conscientious discharge of the duties of the 
 
THE SOURCES OE HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 31 
 
 liermit, he becomes a Brahmacharin, or looks for an 
 accredited teacher of Vedantic philosophy, and enrolls 
 himself as his pupil. Years of study and meditation 
 under his roof enable him to cast off the bondage of 
 what Sankar calls “ disjunctive knowledge,” or knowl- 
 edge which recognizes differences between “ agents, 
 actions, and objects,” acquires “identifying knowl- 
 edge,” the knowledge the watchwords of which are : 
 “ The truth is verily one without a second,” “ All this is 
 the divine soul,” “ All this is the Brahma” — and thus 
 attains immortality. The highest bliss, that of absorp- 
 tion in the Deity, is reserved for those who have been 
 liberated from ignorance by right knowledge, and who 
 see their perfect identity with the Universal Soul. 
 “ This is his true nature, which is free from desire, sin 
 (both sin and virtue), and fear. As in the embrace of a 
 beloved wife one is unconscious of aught, from without 
 and within, so embraced by the all-knowing soul, this 
 Purush is unconscious of all, without or within. This 
 is his (true) nature, where all desires are satisfied, where 
 the (only) desire is for the soul, where there is no desire, 
 where there is no grief.” There is a verse, however, 
 which is fitted to lead one to the conclusion that ab- 
 sorption in the Deity is reserved, not only for those 
 freed from desire, sin, and fear, but for all who die. 
 It runs thus : “ When a man departs (this life) his 
 speech merges into the mind ; the mind merges into 
 life ; the life into heat, and the heat into the supreme 
 Deity.” This like so many other verses, speaks of 
 speech, life, and mind as material substances or forces, 
 in the same category with heat, and represents the 
 supreme Deity as the ultimatum from which all things 
 proceed, and into which all things melt. The vacilla- 
 tion noticed in the statements regarding the universal 
 
32 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 and the individual soul is also noticeable in the disserta- 
 tions on future life. 
 
 But what will become of the members of the other 
 three orders of the pious and the godly, or of mankind 
 in general ? To this all-important question a reply is 
 furnished in the following passage : 
 
 1. “Of them (men so created) those who know this 
 (origin of Purush) and those who worship God with 
 faith and penance in a desert, repair after death to (the 
 region of) light ; thence to (that of) the day, thence to 
 (that of) the light half of the moon, thence to (that of) 
 the six months during which the sun has a northern 
 declination. 
 
 2. “ Thence to (that of) the year ; thence to (that 
 of) the sun ; thence to (that of) the moon ; and thence 
 to (that of) the lightning ; thence an inhuman being 
 takes them to (the region of) Brahma. This is the way 
 to the gods. 
 
 3. “ Now those villagers who accomplish their relig- 
 ious duties by the performance of sacrifices, by the 
 dedication of tanks, wells, halting-places, etc., and by 
 charity beyond the boundary of the altar, are borne, 
 after death, to (the region of) darkness. From (the 
 region of) darkness they proceed to (that of) the night ; 
 from (that of) the night to (that of) the dark fortnight ; 
 from the dark fortnight to (that of) the six months 
 during which the sun has a southern declination ; from 
 the six months of the winter solstice they attain not 
 the year. 
 
 4. “ (But) thence (they go) to (the region of) the 
 Pitris (Fathers) ; from (the region of) the Pitris (they 
 go) to the sky, and from the sky to the moon. That 
 moon is the King Soma. They are the food of the 
 gods. The gods do eat them. 
 
THE SOUKCES OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 o o 
 OO 
 
 5. “ After remaining- there for such tune as the 
 effects of their actions last, they return to the road to 
 be prescribed, i.e., thence to the sky, and from the sky 
 to the wind ; after becoming wind they become smoke, 
 and from the smoke the scattered cloud is formed. 
 
 6. “ From the scattered cloud proceeds condensed or 
 raining cloud, which rains. From that proceed rice, 
 corn, annuals, trees, sesamum, lentils, and the like. 
 Now verily it is difficult to descend therefrom. Those 
 who eat rice and procreate, become manifold. 
 
 7. “ Therefore he whose conduct is good quickly 
 attains to some good existence, such as that of a 
 Brahmana, a Kshetriya, Yaisya. Next, he who is vi- 
 ciously disposed soon assumes the form of some inferior 
 creature, such as that of a dog, a hog, or a Chandala. 
 
 8. “Now, those who have not come to either of 
 these two ways become small creatures of repeated 
 birth. They are born, and they die. This is the third 
 place or receptacle. This is the reason why the place 
 (where men go to after death) filleth not. This is the 
 reason why (this career) should be detested ; therefore 
 is the verse : 
 
 9. “ The robber of gold, the drunkard who drinks 
 spirits, the defiler of his master’s bed, and the murderer 
 of a Brahmin are debased and filthy, and fifthly, so is 
 he who associates with these four” (“ Chhandogya,” 
 chap. v. sec. 10). 
 
 "We present these long extracts for various reasons. 
 It is in the first place an index of the stuff we have to 
 wade through with a view to glean the few sporadic 
 jewels of philosophic thought scattered among the con- 
 tents of these books. It is one of the earliest detailed 
 statements of the doctrine of transmigration to be 
 met with within the compass of Sanscrit literature ; 
 
34 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 and it sets forth the eschatology of the Upanishads in 
 general, and of these two in particular. The assurance 
 with which dreams are herein presented as facts is 
 peculiarly Oriental, and may put to shame even the 
 coolness with which modern philosophers and scientists 
 evolve creation with all its glories out of substances and 
 forms posited by them ! The various regions of heav- 
 enly bliss dreamt of are within reach of the person who 
 knows himself, or the Universal Soul, which, though 
 infinite, is found confined in a “ minute vacuity” within 
 “ a lotus-like chamber” in his body, called Brahmapur 
 or habitation of Brahma, insomuch that if he simply 
 wishes to go into one of these, say the region of the 
 Fathers, or the Mothers, or the Brothers, or the 
 Friends, he is instantly translated thereto. The various 
 heavens of which so much was made by the followers 
 of Buddha, arc indicated in the minor Upanishads with 
 greater clearness than in these ; but the prominence 
 they enjoy herein is enough to throw the imaginative 
 Hindu into a perennial stream of feverish delight. 
 
 Some form of the doctrine of the Trinity, more or 
 less imaginative, more or less corrupt, has been at the 
 bottom of the varied systems of religion which have 
 successively won and lost ascendency in India, and even 
 its philosophical vagaries have received their color and 
 complexion from one species or another of triadism. 
 These two treatises, partly legendary and partly philo- 
 sophical, have their triadism, a triadism fitted to uphold 
 the thorough-paced phenomenalism of the Yedantic 
 school of subsequent times and the equally thorough- 
 going.nihilism of some classes of the Buddhists. Their 
 triad consists of Ham (name), Rupa (form), and Karma 
 (action) ; and from it the Buddhists derived not only 
 the phraseology in which their philosophic speculations 
 
THE SOURCES OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 are couched, but their god, the being or force by 
 which, when one state of existence is wound up, an- 
 other is forthwith called into existence, or by which 
 when one soul is annihilated another is called into ex- 
 istence to take the consequences of its deeds, good or 
 bad. "We see no tiling, says the philosopher of what 
 may be called the Upanishad school, but name and 
 form in the universe, setting aside human actions. Let 
 an underlying material substance be posited, and we 
 have the species of materialism which traces creation 
 to self-evolving matter in the shape of atoms or a 
 primordial form. Again, let an underlying spiritual 
 substance, originally unconscious but coming up in time 
 to consciousness, be assumed, and we have all the 
 varied forms of pantheism to which homage has been 
 paid both in and out of India. Once more, let an un- 
 derlying nonentity be taken for granted, or let it be 
 affirmed that there is no underlying substance beneath 
 the name and form we cognize, and we have the nihil- 
 ism with which pantheism had to wage a war of ex- 
 termination in the age of Sankar Acharaya. But how 
 is action, the third member of the triad of the Upan- 
 ishads, to be disposed of ? Simply by merging it in 
 name and form, making it a material evolute in the 
 first case, a phenomenon or mode of development in 
 the second, and an absolute nonentity in the third. 
 And in this manner the varied systems of philosophy or 
 speculation which have flourished in our country, one 
 after another in regular succession and sometimes simul- 
 taneously, may be traced to the statements and disquisi- 
 tions embodied in the hoary documents we have taken 
 the liberty to call the prime sources of Hindu Philoso- 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 THE SOURCES OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY CONTINUED. 
 
 In our inquiry and research relative to the sources of 
 Hindu Philosophy we should neither ignore nor over- 
 look the minor Upanishads, in which the crude ger- 
 minal speculations, embodied in the Chhandogya and 
 the Briliad Aranyaka, are carried forward to a pretty 
 advanced stage of development. The more important 
 of these philosophical treatises, those commented upon 
 by the celebrated Sankar, are eight in number, barring 
 the Swetaswatara ITpanishad, which cannot be property 
 represented as a source of Hindu Philosophy, and of 
 which, therefore, a detailed notice will be taken at the 
 proper time and in the proper place. These eight 
 minor Upanishads are : One belonging to the Rig 
 Veda, viz., Aitareya Upanishad ; one belonging to the 
 Black Yajur Veda, viz., Taittiriya Upanishad ; one be- 
 longing to the White Yajur Veda, viz., Vaiasaneyi- 
 Sanliita, or Isa Upanishad ; one belonging to the Sama 
 Veda, viz., Talavakara or Kena Upanishad ; and four 
 belonging to the Atharva Veda, viz., Prasna, Iuitha, 
 Mundaka, Mandukya Upanishads. 
 
 They seem to have been composed in different 
 periods, ranging between the appearance of the major 
 Upanishads and the regular organization of Indian 
 schools of philosophy. The composition of the last- 
 four, in which pantheism appears in a form much more 
 matured than that in which it is presented in the 
 
THE SOURCES OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY CONTINUED. 37 
 
 others, must he ascribed to a later period. As a body 
 of literature, all these treatises show a marked advance 
 on the modes of thought and reasoning, if not on the 
 habits of life, indicated in the two major Upanisliads. 
 They are written in a less extravagant style, and they 
 are decidedly less burdened, not merely with incongru- 
 ous metaphors and far-fetched allegories, but with such 
 irrelevant matter as makes it impossible to see clearly 
 what the earlier documents are in many places driving 
 at. And they are almost, if not entirely, free from the 
 legendary references, or rather the legends in which 
 their predecessors abound ; while scarcely any trace is 
 seen of the obscenity which makes some portions of the 
 major Upanisliads untranslatable and unpresentable. 
 
 There is, moreover, more method in their arrange- 
 ment, more appositeness in their forms of expression, 
 more acuteness in their lines of thought, more cogency 
 in their modes of reasoning, and more boldness in the 
 spirit of speculation they set forth. ISTor are they defi- 
 cient in the attractiveness attached to dry, philosophical 
 disquisitions by elevation of sentiment and sublimity of 
 diction, as well as by poetic fervor. Their chief fault, 
 however, is the obscurity thrown over their contents by 
 what may be called brevity carried to excess, the brev- 
 ity shown in short, elliptical sentences, easy to commit 
 to memory, but hard to understand ; necessary indeed 
 in an age when oral tradition was the only medium 
 through which knowledge could be preserved and com- 
 municated, but not the less vexatious at a time when 
 their meaning has to be ascertained with the help of 
 commentaries ten times more ponderous and abstruse. 
 
 All these documents have been translated by Dr. 
 Doer, whose introductory remarks and explanatory 
 notes are of the most valuable type. His translations 
 
38 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 are to be utilized in this paper, as his translation of the 
 Brihad Aranyaka was in the last, along with Dr. 
 Bajendra Lall Mitra’s translation of the Chhandogya 
 Upanishad. "With reference to the style and teaching 
 of the Upanishads in general, the following weighty 
 observations of Professor Cowell are quoted by Major 
 Jacob in his recently published translation of the 
 Vedanta Sar : “ The Upanishads are usually in the 
 form of dialogue ; they are generally written in prose, 
 with occasional snatches of verse, but sometimes they 
 are in verse altogether. They have no system or 
 method ; the authors are poets, who throw out their 
 unconnected and often contradictory rhapsodies on the 
 impulse of the moment, and have no thought of har- 
 monizing to-day’s feelings with those of yesterday or 
 to-morrow. . . . Through them all runs an unmistak- 
 able spirit of pantheism, often in its most offensive 
 form, as avowedly overriding all moral considerations ; 
 and it is this which has produced the general impression 
 that the religion of the Veda is monotheistic.” These 
 strictures are more thoroughly applicable to the major 
 than to the minor Upanishads. 
 
 The very style of the minor Upanishads, their 
 strength of expression and improved method of reason- 
 ing, and the boldness and consistency, comparatively 
 speaking, of the conclusions they are fitted to uphold, 
 conspire to prove their posteriority. Additional proofs 
 are scarcely needed. A few, however, noticed by us 
 in the course of a careful perusal of these ancient docu- 
 ments, may be presented in corroboration of the con- 
 clusion to which we are brought by the speculations 
 they embody, and their style and diction, with refer- 
 ence to the time of their composition. 
 
 And first let us observe that Brahminism, which ap- 
 
THE SOURCES OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY CONTINUED. 39 
 
 pears militant in the Chhandogya and Brikad Aranya- 
 ka, appears triumphant in these Upanisliads. We do 
 not see herein, as in the major Upanisliads, the Kshet- 
 riya marching alongside of the Brahman through the 
 highway of philosophical speculation, and even claim- 
 ing pre-eminence in knowledge, especially of the 
 esoteric meaning of the hymnology and ritual of the 
 Yedas. The Brahmin is the all-in-all in these treatises, 
 and the Kshetriya is scarcely mentioned. The Brah- 
 min appears as a Doctor of Divinity in theological 
 seminaries, an officiating Bishop at holy shrines, an 
 honored Guest in convivial meetings, and a spiritual 
 Guide to the most honored members of the inferior 
 castes. Not only as a leader of devotees has he pecul- 
 iar honors accorded to him ; but even as a devotee he 
 claims special privileges. And woe be to the wretch 
 who presumes to treat him as a guest without proper 
 respect or with neglect. “ A Brahmin guest enters the 
 house like Yaiswanara (fire). For him (the good) 
 make this peace offering. Take the water, O son of 
 Yivaswat (the sun). Hope, expectation, meeting (with 
 the good), friendly words, sacrifices, pious gifts, sons 
 and cattle — all these loses the man of little sense in 
 whose house a Brahmin dwells without taking food ” 
 (“Hatha Upanishad,” chap. i. sec. 1). In one of the 
 earliest of these Upanisliads, the Taittiriya, the pre- 
 eminence of the Brahmins is set forth in words almost 
 equally significant. The Brahmin evidently succeeded, 
 during the time intervening between the appearance of 
 the major and that of the minor Upanishads, in push- 
 ing back his rival, the Kshetriya, and raising himself 
 to the height of glory from which he now calmly looks 
 down on all outside the pale of his favored caste. 
 
 The fact that less stress is laid or less value set in 
 
40 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 these treatises on the worldly advantages accruing from 
 spiritual knowledge than in the major Upanishads, is a 
 proof of their posteriority. The great teachers of the 
 Yedic age, called Rishis, did not by any means live as 
 ascetics, though they have had for ages the reputation 
 of having done so. They lived in affluence and ease, 
 amid the endearments and pleasures of domestic life, 
 and they were evidently never tired of praying for 
 wealth, property, houses, wives, offspring, kine, sheep, 
 and instruments of husbandry. People were directed 
 by special revelations to approach them with gifts and 
 largesses ; and anathemas were hurled at the churlish 
 wretch who refused to reward them with becoming 
 munificence for their services. Traditions fitted to 
 render professorships in theological seminaries or 
 teacherships in private religious schools remunerative, 
 as well as honorable, were prevalent when the major 
 Upanishads were written, though the belief in ascetic 
 retirement as a necessary preparation for the study of 
 sacred philosophy, or the acquisition of the right knowl- 
 edge of Brahma, was gaining ground slowly but surely. 
 
 The minor Upanishads show this belief in a very 
 advanced stage of development, if not altogether tri- 
 umphant. They set a very great value on ascetic 
 renunciation, mortification, and penance ; and a pro- 
 portionately small value on the secular advantages re- 
 sulting from the position of one skilled or profoundly 
 read in theological or Brahma science. These, how- 
 ever, are not altogether thrown into the shade, espe- 
 cially in the earlier of these treatises. One skilled in 
 divine science is said in the Taittiriya Upanishad to 
 have offered up this prayer, so well calculated to 
 recall the simpler times of the Rig Yeda : “ The pros- 
 perity (sri) which simply brings me clothes, increases 
 
THE SOURCES OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY CONTINUED. 44 
 
 my cows, and prepares for me always food and drink, 
 this prosperity, rich wool-clad flocks and other cattle, 
 bring to me.” But these and such-like secular advan- 
 tages are much more rarely spoken of than in the other 
 treatises ; and the insignificant place they take in these 
 is a proof of an advance of spiritual ideas, or proper 
 appreciation of spiritual things, indicative, if not deter- 
 minative, of their posteriority. 
 
 Akin to this is the proof given of the advanced stage 
 of asceticism indicated in these treatises. Two of the 
 technical terms, which were subsequently made the 
 watchwords of various sects of ascetics, are met with 
 herein, viz., Dama, or subjugation of the senses, and 
 Yoga, or concentration of the mind. These are re- 
 ferred to in several passages, and they are uniformly 
 represented as essential to the' acquisition of right 
 knowledge. Their frequent occurrence in these docu- 
 ments, coupled with their entire absence from the 
 major Upanishads, coupled moreover with the more 
 artificial and repulsive forms of asceticism they are an 
 index to, might justly be advanced as an additional 
 proof of their posteriority. 
 
 The change indicated herein in the triad of the Yedas 
 is also a proof in this direction not to be passed over. 
 The triad of the Yedas consists of Agni (fire), repre- 
 senting things divine on the earth ; Yayu (air), repre- 
 senting those in the atmosphere, and Surya (sun), 
 representing those in the heavens. The third member 
 of this triumvirate or triad is dropped, and another sub- 
 stituted for it in the triad presented in the Talavakara 
 or Kena ITpanishad. Instead of Agni, Yayu, and 
 Snrya, we have Agni, Yayu, and Indra. Precedence 
 in this remodelled triad is given to Indra, and the way 
 in which he acquired it is indicated in a legend which 
 
42 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 does not place the divinities concerned in a very favor- 
 able light. These gods were placed above all others by 
 Brahma after a hard fight with the Asuras (demons) ; 
 but being thus raised, they forgot their benefactor so 
 far as to be induced to attribute their elevation to their 
 own might. To humble them Brahma manifested him- 
 self to them in an extraordinary manner. “ They did 
 not know him (and asked each other) : Is this (being) 
 worthy of adoration ?” They asked Agni, the first 
 member of the triad, to make suitable inquiries and 
 solve the perplexing question. He approaches the glo- 
 rious apparition, and introduces himself as one who 
 “ can burn whatsoever there is on earth.” lie is told 
 to burn a single blade of grass pointed out to him; he 
 fails, and returns to his companions humbled and de- 
 jected. Yayu then, at their request, approaches the 
 manifested god and introduces himself as one who 
 “ can sweep away whatsoever there is on earth.” He 
 being told to sweep away a blade of grass, tries, fails, 
 and returns humiliated. Indra then advances, continues 
 wrapped up in contemplation, till a beautiful female, 
 or, as Sankar explains it, Knowledge in the shape of a 
 beautiful female, dispels his ignorance. His persever- 
 ance is rewarded, and he becomes the head of the 
 triad. The object of this legend evidently is to show 
 the excellence of right knowledge, which not merely 
 ennobles and elevates men, but fixes the relative posi- 
 tion even of the gods. 
 
 Again, the cosmogonies embodied in these Upanishads 
 are an advance on those presented in the larger records, 
 and an approach to that of the Yedantic school con- 
 fessedly organized a long time after the era of incipient 
 philosophical speculation depicted in these treatises. 
 These cosmogonies, scattered among the contents of 
 
THE SOURCES OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY CONTINUED. 43 
 
 these hoary records, hut presented in a manner at times 
 mystical hut generally methodical, have as a rule for 
 their starting point the Absolute Spirit called Brahma, 
 a being described as “ existence, knowledge, and infin- 
 ity.” But though united in their origin, the source of 
 all being, the fountain-head of evolution, they present 
 in the development of what may be called their main 
 plot elements of discrepancy and discord, which, how- 
 ever, it is by no means difficult to reconcile. 
 
 Creation, according to some of these accounts, seems 
 to have proceeded immediately from the Absolute Spirit 
 in a stated order. Take, for instance, the following 
 passage from the last chapter of the Taittiriya : “ From 
 that soul (Brahma previously described ‘ as existence, 
 knowledge, and infinity ’) verily sprang forth the ether, 
 from the ether the air, from the air the fire, from the 
 fire the waters, from the waters the earth, from the 
 earth the annual herbs, and from the annual herbs 
 food, from food seed, and from seed man, and man is 
 verily the essence of food.” Again : “All creatures 
 which dwell on earth spring verily forth from food. 
 Again they live by food, again at last they return to 
 the same, for food is the oldest of all beings.” 
 
 In the fifth chapter of the Ivatha the ubiquity of the 
 human soul, identified with the Supreme Ruler, is thus 
 described : “As Hansa ( Aditya, sun) it dwells in the 
 heavens ; as Vasu (wind) it dwells in the atmosphere ; as 
 the invoker (of the gods) it dwells within the earth ; as 
 Soma (moon plant) in the water jar ; it dwells in man, 
 it dwells in truth, it dwells in the ether, it is born in 
 the waters (as aquatic animals), it is born in the earth 
 (as rice, etc.), it is born in the sacrifice, it is born on 
 the mountains (as the rivers, etc.), it is truth, it is the 
 great one (infinite).” 
 
44 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 These passages indisputably propound that theory of 
 evolution, the starting-point of which is the Divine 
 Essence, but there are others which place an interme- 
 diate link of gold between this self-evolving spiritual 
 substance and the chain of creation. They speak of 
 an inferior gold-colored Brahma springing out of the 
 Supreme Brahma, the Manifested (Vyakata) out of the 
 Unmanifested (Avyakta), the Known (Vijnata) out of 
 the Unknown (Avijnata), and causing creation to 
 evolve out of his substance in the order stated above. 
 This omnific principle or Demiurgus is called by a 
 variety of names — Brahma, the creator ; Indra, the 
 King of the gods ; Prajapati, the lord of creatures ; 
 Iliranyagarhha, the soul of creation, or the universal 
 soul in contradistinction to the Supreme, Unmanifested, 
 Unknown Spirit. 
 
 In the Aitareya, evidently the earliest of these trea- 
 tises, a different order of creation is presented, and a 
 regular theogony comes between its incipient and con- 
 cluding processes, between the creation of the spheres 
 — the sphere of waters ‘ ‘ above the heavens, ’ ’ the 
 sphere of the sunbeams, the “ atmosphere,” the sphere 
 of death, the earth, and the sphere of waters “ which 
 are beneath it,” and the creation of man in whom the 
 gods entered through the various openings of his body, 
 not excluding its innumerable and imperceptible pores. 
 The fanciful and grotesque character of this cosmogony 
 and its advancement of what may at first sight be 
 called an ex-nihilo theory of creation, stamps it as the 
 production of an intermediate era, an age intervening 
 between the appearance of the major and that of most 
 of the minor Upanishads. 
 
 The cosmogonies presented in these books, indicat- 
 ing, as they do, a gradual progress from the ludicrous 
 
THE SOURCES OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY CONTINUED. 45 
 
 fancies of the larger Upanishads toward what was sub- 
 sequently elaborated in the Yedantic school, are an in- 
 disputable proof of their posteriority. 
 
 Apropos of our remarks on the evidential value of 
 the cosmogonies embodied in these records, we may 
 observe that the idea of creation springing out of 
 matter and force, made so much of by the so-called 
 advanced science of the day, is one of the oldest we 
 come across in the world. It was found as a dominat- 
 ing principle in the oldest schools of Greek philosophy, 
 and it was elaborated into a consistent system in India 
 in the age immediately following that of the Upani- 
 shads. Hay, it is found in some of the declarations of 
 the Upanishads themselves, standing on a background 
 of an all-dilfusive and self-evolving divine substance, or 
 absolute existence, manifested or embodied in an 
 omnific principle or personality. The Prasna Upani- 
 shad, which consists of answers to a series of philo- 
 sophical questions propounded one after another by 
 anxious inquirers, opens with a cosmogony which pre- 
 sents the dualism of an active and a passive principle, 
 both springing from Prajapati, the inferior divinity 
 through whom derived existence in its multifarious 
 forms is to be traced to the Absolute and the Uncondi- 
 tioned. “ Prajapati,” it says, “ was desirous of off- 
 spring. lie performed austerity. Having performed 
 austerity, he produced a couple, matter and life or fire 
 or energy (with the intention) ; they shall in manifold 
 ways produce offspring for me. ’ ’ 
 
 Another important question has to be raised and set 
 at rest with reference to these cosmogonies. Do they 
 imply a real or an illusory change in the substance of 
 Brahma ? Does that substance actually become the 
 elements to which material creation is traced ? Or is 
 
46 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 it merely the substratum concealed beneath varieties of 
 deceptive phenomena ? Now no one can study the 
 Upanishads carefully without being induced to indorse 
 the opinion expressed by authorities like Cowell, viz., 
 that an actual change of substance, not merely an illu- 
 sory transformation, is indicated in the cosmogonies of 
 the Upanishads, though the illusion theory is in a few 
 solitary passages alluded to. The writers were Parina- 
 mavadins or Vikarvadins, or those who insisted upon 
 an actual metamorphosis of substance — not Mayavadins, 
 or those who maintained an illusory change to uphold 
 the doctrine of non-dualism in all its integrity. This 
 subject will have to be enlarged upon when we treat of 
 the Vedanta system ; and it need not be allowed to 
 detain us here. 
 
 Let us adduce one more proof of the posteriority of 
 these records, a proof insignificant indeed at first sight, 
 but one better adapted in our humble opinion to pro- 
 duce conviction than many ostensibly more important. 
 The proof is indicated in the well-known words of 
 Jacob : “Few and evil have the days of the years of 
 my life been, and have not attained unto the days of 
 the years of the life of my fathers.” The longevity 
 indicated in the smaller Upanishads is by no means so 
 marked as that shown in the larger, the length of life 
 having come down from one hundred and forty in the 
 latter to one hundred in the former. And less earnest- 
 ness in religious matters stamps these records of a 
 period when tricks, such as that set forth in the follow- 
 ingsentence, were unhappily becoming common : (“A 
 sacrifice!') who bestows (cows) which have drunk their 
 water, eaten their grass, given their milk, and which 
 arc barren, goes verily to the worlds of unhappiness.” 
 But the best proof decidedly of the posteriority of these 
 
THE SOUECES OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY CONTINUED. 47 
 
 treatises is to be found, as has already been said, in the 
 terseness of their style, in the method and logical pre- 
 cision by which they are, comparatively speaking, 
 characterized, and in the progress of speculative acute- 
 ness and analytic thought shown in the disquisitions 
 they embody. Their object is to teach the science of 
 Brahma, the absolute spirit ; and its superiority to 
 every other species of knowledge is shown by a dis- 
 closure of its inherent excellence, by the eulogy lav- 
 ished on those devotees who make it the sole object of 
 their search, and by the insight presented into its glo- 
 rious consequences. 
 
 It is said to be “ the foundation of all sciences,” “ the 
 highest science,” the “supreme path” to felicity, 
 “the last object of man,” and high-sounding adjec- 
 tives, or adjecti ves of the most imposing kind, are pressed 
 into service to set forth its excellence. It is, properly 
 speaking, the only correct science, the knowledge de- 
 rived through perception and inference being sheer 
 ignorance. All persons in this world under the guid- 
 ance of the senses are spoken of in terms by no means 
 complimentary. “In the midst of ignorance, fools 
 fancying themselves wise and learned go round and 
 round, oppressed by misery as blind people led by a 
 ( blind.” The few who liberate themselves from the cob- 
 webs of this sense-produced ignorance and eagerly run 
 after right knowledge, are praised in extravagant terms. 
 
 The legend with which the Katha Upanishad opens 
 is eminently fitted to show this. Xachikotas, being 
 devoted by his exasperated father to Death (Yama), 
 conciliates the monster by fasts and vigils, and is 
 offered “ three boons.” "With true filial piety he first 
 solicits a change in his father’s heart favorable to his 
 hope of reconciliation to him, then requests some knowl- 
 
48 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 edge about “the heavenly fire” or the fire by which 
 heaven is gained, and lastly propounds a question in 
 these words : “ Some say the soul exists after the 
 death of man, others say it does not exist. This I 
 should like to know, instructed by thee. Such is the 
 third of the boons.” Death, unwilling to communicate 
 the precious knowledge to him, asks him to choose 
 other gifts, such as “ sons and grandsons who may live 
 a hundred years,” “ herds of cattle,” “elephants,” 
 “ gold and horses,” “wealth and far-extending life. ” 
 lie, however, continues stubborn, although pleasures 
 unattainable by man, such as may be brought to him 
 by ‘ ‘ the fair ones of heaven with their cars and musical 
 instruments,” are offered him. Death ultimately 
 grants him the boon requested, with these words of 
 encouragement : “ One thing is what is good, another 
 what is pleasant. Both having different objects chain 
 man. Blessed is he who between them takes the good 
 (alone), but be who chooses what is pleasant loses the 
 last object of man.” The results of this knowledge 
 will have to be displayed after its object has been set 
 forth ; and they need not detain us here. Suffice it to 
 say that it is represented as that by virtue of which 
 “ all is manifested,” “ man is delivered from the mouth 
 of death,” and even the status of the gods is raised. 
 
 The excellency, moreover, of this science, the knowl- 
 edge of Brahma, is set forth in the very difficult man- 
 ner in which it is acquired. The path to it is not a 
 path strewn with roses, but a path of thorns, the path 
 of duty, renunciation, privation, study, meditation, and 
 austerity in its most appalling forms ; and it is justly 
 called “ the sharp edge of a razor.” One cannot group 
 and carefully study the many passages and texts in 
 which this path is indicated, without noticing much 
 
'HE SOURCES OP HINDU PHILOSOPHY CONTINUED. 49 
 
 confusion of thought, if not glaring contradiction ; hut 
 order can, we believe, be evolved out of the chaotic 
 mass. There are passages in which performance of the 
 duties of life, study of the Yedas under an accredited 
 teacher, austerity and penance are represented as indis- 
 pensable requisites for the attainment of supreme knowl- 
 edge, and there are others in which these are spoken 
 of in disparaging terms, and the mystic notion of a 
 beatific or tranquil vision is prominently brought for- 
 ward. And these two classes of texts are apparently 
 at variance, but in reality there is no contradiction. 
 
 The utilization of the means is necessary to the at- 
 tainment of the end ; and such exercises as worship, 
 study, and penance are the prescribed means, and as 
 such they should be earnestly resorted to ; but when 
 this preliminary process has been completed, it should 
 be entirely lost sight of, and nothing thought or even 
 dreamt of but sublime contemplation leading to beatific 
 vision, or rather a calm recognition of the real under 
 the phenomenal, the permanent under the imperma- 
 nent, the changeless under the fitful and the changeable. 
 
 The first thing the Brahma student must do is to 
 perform the duties of life called inferior in contradis- 
 tinction to those which bring him where the great 
 object of his career is gained, and he becomes liberated 
 from sense-bred ignorance. He must as a “ house- 
 holder” perform his duties “ toward the gods and the 
 forefathers” and all classes of people, not forgetting 
 even “ the beggars. ” He must conscientiously do the 
 threefold work of “ offering, reading of the Yedas, and 
 liberality,” and then “ renounce the world ” and “ ap- 
 proach, sacred wood in his hand, a teacher who knows 
 the Yedas and who is solely devoted to Brahma.” But 
 the question arises, Who is the accredited teacher to 
 
50 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 whose guidance he must implicitly and unreservedly 
 commit himself ? To be able to answer this question 
 an insight into the Hindu theory of apostolic succession 
 is needed. The accredited teacher of the hour is the 
 legitimate successor, through a bright line of inspired 
 teachers, of him who first learned the science of Brahma 
 from the Creator himself, the emergent Deity who 
 stands as a connecting link between the unmanifested 
 substance and the manifested forms in which it appears 
 in creation. “ Brahma, the Creator of the universe, 
 the preserver of the world, was first produced among 
 the gods. He taught the science of Brahma, the foun- 
 dation of all sciences, to Atharvan, his eldest son. 
 Atharvan revealed of old the science of Brahma, which 
 Brahma had explained to him, to Angis ; he explained 
 it to Satyavaha of the family of Bharadnaja, who 
 revealed the science traditionally obtained by the suc- 
 cession of teachers to Angiras” ( mundaka ). In this 
 manner “ the highest science” — in contradistinction to 
 the “ baser” which comprehends the Rig, the Yajur, 
 the Sama, and the Atharvan Yedas, accentuation, rit- 
 ual, grammar, glossary, prosody, and astronomy, the 
 Yedas and the Yedangas — has come down, through oral 
 tradition, to the teacher of the hour. 
 
 The necessity of resort to him is shown in almost in- 
 numerable passages, such as the following : 
 
 “ A wonderful teacher is required. Of the soul is 
 wonderful the speaker, ingenious the receiver, wonder- 
 ful the loiower, instructed by an ingenious teacher.” 
 
 “ Arise, awake, get to tlie teachers and attend.” 
 
 But the Brahma student must separate himself from 
 his teacher when thoroughly instructed, and have re- 
 course to hermit solitude, restraint of the senses and 
 
THE SOUIICES OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY CONTINUED. 51 
 
 'concentration of the mind before his object can be 
 gained. He must remember that the occult knowledge 
 he is in quest of cannot be acquired through the senses, 
 or through instruction of any kind, or even through 
 revelation. “ The soul’s nature is not placed in what is 
 visible. Hone beholds it by the eye.” “ With regard 
 to him (Brahma) the sun does not manifest, not the 
 moon, not the stars.” “ The soul cannot be gained by 
 the knowledge of the Veda, not by understanding its 
 meaning, not by manifold science.” “By the soul, 
 which is chosen, it (the soul) can be gained.” 
 
 Direct vision of the universal soul by the individual 
 soul, calm rather than beatific, is the sitmmum lonum , to 
 which he is to rise, in consequence, not so much of the 
 preparatory exercises he has gone through, as of ascetic 
 self-mortification and serene contemplation. “ It is not 
 apprehended by the eye, not by speech, not by the other 
 senses, not by devotion or rites ; but he, whose intellect 
 is purified by the fight of knowledge, beholds him, who 
 is without parts, through mediation” (Mundaka). 
 
 The important questions discussed in these venerable 
 records have reference to the nature of the Universal 
 Soul; called Brahma, and his relation to the individual 
 soul, and to the external world. They may be categor- 
 ically stated thus : (!) What is Brahma ? (2) How is 
 
 Brahma related to the human soul, mine or yours ? 
 (3) How is Brahma related to what in ordinary human 
 parlance is called the material world ? We cannot 
 better dive into the philosophy of these treatises than 
 by grouping the replies embodied in them to these im- 
 portant questions. 
 
 1. What is Brahma ? What do these books say 
 regarding his nature ? The answer is embodied in the 
 following passages : 
 
52 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ‘ 1 lie who is the ear of the ear, the raincl of the mind, 
 speech of speech, is verily the life of life, the eye of the 
 eye. The wise, who have abandoned (those individual 
 existences) when departing from this world become im- 
 mortal. Him (the Supreme Brahma) does not approach 
 the eye or speech or mind. We do not recognize 
 (Brahma as anything perceptible, therefore) we do not 
 know how to teach him (his nature to a disciple). It is 
 even different from what is known (from the unmani- 
 fested universe ; if you then say it must be the unmani- 
 fested universe, no) it is also beyond what is known (to 
 the senses, it is beyond the unmanifested universe). 
 Thus we heard from the former teachers who explained 
 it to us” (“ Talavakara,” sec. 1). 
 
 “ Whoever has understood (the nature of Brahma), 
 which is without sound, without touch, without form, 
 which does not waste, which is without taste, which is 
 eternal, without smell, without beginning, and without 
 end, higher than the great one (intellect), which is 
 firmly based, escapes from the mouth of death” 
 (“ Ivatha,” sec. 3). 
 
 £ ‘ Higher than the senses (and their objects) is the 
 mind, more excellent than the mind the intellect ; 
 above the intellect soars the great soul, more excellent 
 than the great one is the unmanifested. But higher 
 than the unmanifested is the soul which is all-pervad- 
 ing and without cause. Knowing this one gets liber- 
 ated and gains immortality” (“ Ivatha,” sec. 6). 
 
 “ Whoever, O beloved one, knows the indestructible 
 (soul), on which (the being) whose nature is knowledge, 
 and together with all the gods, the vital airs, and the 
 elements are formed, gets omniscient, penetrates all” 
 (“ Prasna,” sec. 4). 
 
 “ lie (Brahma) is verily luminous, without form, a 
 
THE SOURCES OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY CONTINUED. 53 
 
 spirit, he is without and within ; without origin, with- 
 out life, without mind, he is pure and greater than the 
 great indestructible one. From this Brahma are pro- 
 duced life, mind, and all the organs, ether, air, light, 
 the water (and), the earth, the support of all ’ ’ (Second 
 Mundaka). 
 
 “ I am the spirit (mover) of the tree (viz., of the tree 
 of the world which is to be cut down). (Thy) fame 
 (rises) like the top of the mountain. I am purified in 
 my root, as immortality is glorious in the nourisher 
 (viz., the sun). I am brilliant wealth, I am intelligent, 
 I am immortal, and without decay. (Or I am sprinkled 
 with immortality)” (“ Taittariya,” chap. i. sec. 10). 
 
 These passages present a confusion of nomenclature 
 which must be cleared up before the prominent idea set 
 forth can be grasped. Brahma is in many passages 
 called the Unmanifested (Avyakta) ; but in one of 
 these passages he is distinguished from and placed 
 above the unmanifested, and in another the unmani- 
 fested from which he is distinguished is called the un- 
 manifested universe. To set forth the distinction, wo 
 must ascertain what is meant by the manifested uni- 
 verse, and what by the unmanifested. By the mani- 
 fested universe we are to understand the various objects 
 of nature, the knowledge of which we derive through 
 perception. The material, perceptible world, that of 
 the existence of which we are assured by the varied 
 impressions made upon the senses, or the sensations 
 caused by it, is the manifested universe. The unmani- 
 fested universe is the world of tenuous substances, the 
 world in modern phraseology of causes and forces, of 
 the existence of which we are assured by inference, not 
 perception. Beyond the world of shifting phenomena, 
 beyond the world of imperceptible substances and 
 
54 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY, 
 
 occult forces, is Brahma, “ the foundation” of all we 
 perceive, and of all we cannot perceive, but legitimately 
 deduce from the coincidences, the successions, and the 
 transmutations of the phenomena perceived. 
 
 Again, Brahma is in one of these passages called 
 “the indestructible soul,” on which all forms of life, 
 all forms of organized and unorganized material and 
 mental existence are “ founded while in another he 
 is represented as “ greater than the great indestructible 
 one. ’ ’ Who is this being described as ‘ ‘ greater than 
 the great indestructible one” ? Sankar’s reply is, 
 “ Brahma in his unmanifested state.” The phrase, 
 however, is ambiguous, being applicable both to the 
 being described “ as greater than the great indestructi- 
 ble one,” and the being described as “ the indestructible 
 one.” The distinction set fortli is perhaps that be- 
 tween the Absolute, Unmanifested Spirit, and the 
 emanent or emergent Deity called Brahma, Prajapati, 
 Hiranyagarbha or Virat ; or simply that between the 
 human soul called “great” and the Supreme Spirit 
 called “ greater,” because of its freedom from the 
 bondage under which it groans. 
 
 It ought not to be forgotten that according to the 
 later speculations of the Yedantic school, a portion of 
 Brahma called the “The Fourth” always remains un- 
 connected with the detached portion manifested in the 
 phenomena of nature. 
 
 The last of these quotations presents a figure of 
 speech with which our countrymen are familiar. The 
 world is often in their sacred literature compared to 
 “an eternal, holy fig-tree, whose root is upward and 
 whose branches go downward,” and the very sap 
 which is the life thereof is Brahma, who may justly be 
 called the anima mundi, the life of the world. This 
 
THE SOURCES OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY CONTINUED. 55 
 
 image shows in what respect the Hindu theory of evo- 
 lution differs from what is propounded in these days. 
 It is a downward progression from spirit to matter, not 
 an upward progression from matter to spirit. 
 
 It is further to be observed that these passages merely 
 show the relative position of Brahma, or the position he 
 occupies in the scale of being, and what he is not. 
 They do not show what he is. 
 
 Brahma is, according to the philosophy of these 
 records, illimitable, and therefore undeterminable and 
 undefinable. The quibbles and puzzles, the riddles and 
 enigmas, to which the modern doctrine of the Absolute 
 and the Infinite has given rise, are found in these 
 hoary records and disposed of beautifully. To define 
 the infinite is tantamount to reducing the infinite to the 
 category of the finite, and therefore all definitions given 
 of the Supreme Brahma must be accepted with reserva- 
 tion. When, for instance, he is called a spirit, no line 
 of demarcation between spirit and matter should be 
 drawn, and no attempt made to lim it him, either by 
 assuming the existence of matter apart from him, or by 
 positing various orders of spirits essentially different 
 from him. He is, properly speaking, the all-absorbing 
 existence, and no form of being can be conceived of as 
 existing apart from him. Again, when he is said to be 
 “ without form,” “ without fife,” or “ without mind,” 
 we are not to posit existences, such as that of “ form” 
 or “ life” (mundane) or “ mind ” apart from him, and 
 thereby reduce him to the category of the finite. He 
 is, properly speaking, form, life, and mind, and no 
 entity exists apart from him. Again, when he is rep- 
 resented as the creator or the foundation of the world, 
 we are not to limit him by recognizing an essential, or 
 any but mere nominal distinction between the creator 
 
56 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 and the objects of creation. He is, to adopt the well- 
 known phrase of Spinoza, the natura naturans ; and 
 there is, properly speaking, no difference between him 
 and the universe, which is natura natureta. He is 
 therefore above the region of definitions and deter- 
 minations ; and the only thing that can be predicated 
 of him is existence, absolute and unconditioned. An d 
 this existence, moreover, ought not to be separated 
 by a broad line of demarcation from non-existence, as 
 the infinite must embrace all states, that of existence 
 and that of non-existence. Such at least is the modern 
 dictum ! 
 
 Brahma is called Sacchitananda, which is, being in- 
 terpreted, Existence, Knowledge, and Bliss. But when 
 the meaning attached to either of the two terms, knowl- 
 edge and bliss, in this connection is looked into, the 
 triad resolves itself into a monad. To this technical 
 phrase, made so much of in subsequent times, we shall 
 return after we have shown the perfect identity of the 
 universal with the individual soul and the material 
 world. 
 
 2. What is the human soul, and what its relation to 
 the universal spirit ? The following quotations will 
 furnish a reply to this question : 
 
 “ The knowing (soul) is not born, nor does it die ; it 
 was not produced from any one, nor was any produced 
 from it ; unborn, eternal, without decay, ancient as it 
 is, it is not slain, although the body is slain ” (“ Katha,” 
 sec. 2). 
 
 “ The perfect one (Purush) who, building desire after 
 desire, is awake in those that are asleej), is called even 
 pure, is called Brahma, is called even eternal. . . . 
 As the one fire, when entering the world, becomes to 
 every nature of every nature, so the one soul being of 
 
THE SOURCES OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY CONTINUED. 57 
 
 every nature to every nature is the internal soul of all 
 bemg ” (“ Katka ” sec. 5). 
 
 “ As from blazing fire in a thousand Yv T ays similar 
 sparks proceed, so, O beloved, are produced living souls 
 of various lcinds from- the indestructible Brahma , and 
 they also return to him” (Second Mundaka, sec. 1). 
 
 “ Within (the heart) which the arteries enter as the 
 spokes the nave of the wheel, he (Brahma) moves, be- 
 coming manifold ” (Second Mundaka, sec. 2). 
 
 “For this all (represented by ‘ Om ’) is Brahma, 
 this soul is Brahma. This soul has four conditions — 
 viz., waking, dreaming, profound sleep, and a state 
 different from any of the former” (Mandukya). 
 
 The italics are our own. It is impossible to find 
 words more adequate than these to set forth the perfect 
 identity of the universal with the individual ego. The 
 cosmogonies alluded to dwell, not merely on this iden- 
 tity, but on the method in which the Supreme Spirit 
 entered the human body previously created, and ani- 
 mated it. Its dwelling-place within the body is ‘ £ the 
 ether of the heart,” and it is incased within five 
 sheaths. The outer sheath is called the essence of food 
 ( annam ), which is also called Brahma, and is repre- 
 sented as an object of worship. The sheath immedi- 
 ately beneath this is called “vital air,” and is said 
 to be the embodied soul of the nutritious sheath, or the 
 outer garb. Beneath the vital sheath there is the 
 mental sheath or “the mind,” which has the Yajur 
 Veda for its head, the Rig for its right arm, and the 
 Sama for its left. Beneath that lies that of knowledge, 
 and beneath that is that of bliss, which covers the spirit 
 dwelling in its “ cavity” in the heart, the spirit which 
 is at one and the same time greater than space and 
 smaller than a grain of mustard seed. The body in 
 
58 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 which it dwells is called the Brahmapura, or the town 
 of Brama, and it is said to have eleven gates, the seven 
 openings in the face, the navel, the two openings below, 
 and the opening on the middle of the head. This last 
 opening needs an explanation, it being, according to 
 some of the Upanishads, the entrance through which 
 the ingress and egress of the soul are effected. The 
 explanation needed is offered in these two extracts, the 
 first from the Taittiriya, and the second from the 
 Aitariya. 
 
 “ In the ether, abiding within the heart, is placed 
 the Purush (soul), whose nature is knowledge — who is 
 immortal, radiant like gold. The artery, Sushumna by 
 name (the coronal artery), which springs forth from the 
 upper part of the heart, and proceeds between the two 
 arteries of the palate, and (within the piece of flesh) 
 which like a breast is hanging down, then, after having 
 made its way through the head and skull (terminates) 
 where the root of the hair is distributed — this (artery) 
 is the birthplace (road) of Brahma.” 
 
 “ Making an opening, where the hairs (of the head) 
 divide, he penetrated by that door. This is called the 
 door of division. This is the door of rejoicing (because 
 it is the road to the Supreme Brahma). 5 ’ 
 
 There is also a passage in one of the Upanishads 
 which distinctly affirms that when a man dies the 
 Brahma, dwelling in the ether of his heart, goes out of 
 his body through the coronal artery, or the artery 
 which is said to terminate where the hairs of his head 
 divide. The ether of the heart, whatever it may be, 
 is generally represented as the dwelling-place of the 
 Supreme Spirit, though at times Brahma is identified 
 with it. The following text from the third Prasna is 
 fitted in the first place to corroborate this assertion, and 
 
THE SOURCES OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY CONTINUED. 59 
 
 in the second to show the ease with which physiological 
 facts are manufactured and retailed : “ For the ether 
 (of the heart) is verily that soul (Brahma). There arise 
 the one hundred and one principal arteries ; each of 
 them is a hundred times divided ; 72,000 are the 
 branches of every branch artery ; within them moves 
 the circulating air.” According to this calculation, the 
 number of arteries in the human body is 727,210,201 ; 
 and when these and the five vital airs, the circulating 
 air, the equalizing air in the navel, which results in the 
 digestion of food and its assimilation, the air of respira- 
 tion, the ascending air, which rises up through the 
 coronal artery, and the descending air, are all coolly 
 manufactured, we need not be surprised at the physio- 
 logical “ consciousness,” which in its anxiety to find a 
 dwelling-place for the soul (which combines the oppo- 
 site extremes of immensity and exiguity), posits a little 
 ether in the heart ! 
 
 It may, however, bo said that all these physiological 
 speculations on the constitution of the body, the 
 entrance of Brahma into its inmost recess through an 
 arterial pathway, and the varied sheaths or cases in 
 which he lies enveloped, presuppose a distinction be- 
 tween the body and the indwelling spirit, and savor of 
 dualism. But the distinction indicated is, according to 
 the uniform teaching of these records, apparent rather 
 than real, or if real, derived rather than original — a 
 distinction, strictly speaking, modal. This will appear 
 when we look into 
 
 3. The relation of the Supreme Spirit to the material 
 world. It has already been shown that the cosmogo- 
 nies embodied in these records develop the theory of 
 evolution, which brings creation in all its diversified 
 forms, matter organized and unorganized, and mind 
 
CO 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 with its thoughts, feelings, and volitions, out of an all- 
 diffusive divine substance. Additional proof is scarcely 
 needed. We shall content ourselves with one or two 
 quotations under this head : “As the spider casts out 
 and draws in (its web), as on the earth the annual herbs 
 are produced, as from the living man the hairs of the 
 body spring forth, so is produced the universe from the 
 indestructible (Brahma).” “ From him also were pro- 
 duced in many ways the gods, the Sadhyas (a kind of 
 gods), men, quadrupeds, birds, and vital airs that go 
 forward and descend, rice and barley, devotion, faith, 
 truth, the duties of a Brahma student, and observ- 
 ance. ” Here is the theory of the consubstantiality of 
 the material world with the Creator set forth with the 
 greatest perspicuity and force. 
 
 Contradictory statements cannot but abound in trea- 
 tises which confessedly present a few grains of philo- 
 sophical thought amid a heap of irrelevant matter, and 
 which, though comparatively speaking well written, 
 bristle with extravagances of thought and expression, 
 as well as with tiresome repetitions. But the line of 
 thought which underlies the wild and grotesque specu- 
 lations in which they abound is thoroughly pantheistic, 
 opposed to dualism, opposed to the universally recog- 
 nized distinction between the Creator and creation, and 
 consequently between the soul and the body, mind and 
 matter. 
 
 The solution, then, of the problems discussed in these 
 treatises is that there is one divine being, Brahma, 
 manifested in various forms or modes, both spiritual 
 and material. This being is represented as Sat (Exist- 
 ence), Chit (Intelligence or Knowledge), and Ananda 
 (Happiness). The following quotations will establish 
 this : 
 
THE SOURCES OE HINDU PHILOSOPHY CONTINUED. G1 
 
 “ Whoever knows Brahma, who is existence, knowl- 
 edge, and infinity, . . . enjoys all desires at one and 
 the same time, together with the omniscient Brahma” 
 (“ Taittiriya,” chap. ii.). 
 
 “ The soul is to be perceived by (the notion of) exist- 
 ence, it is to be perceived by its true notion (that is to 
 say) by both of them ; the true nature of soul becomes 
 manifest when (first) it has been perceived by the 
 notion of existence” ( £t Katha,” chap. vi.). 
 
 “ For he is the beholder, the toucher, the hearer, the 
 smeller, the taster, the minder, the intelligent, the 
 agent, the being whose nature is knowledge, the spirit 
 (Purush). He is founded on the supreme indestructible 
 soul (Fourth Prasna). 
 
 “ They think the fourth him whose knowledge are 
 not internal objects, nor external, nor both, who has 
 not uniform knowledge, who is not intelligent and not 
 unintelligent, who is invisible, imperceptible, unseiz- 
 able, incapable of proof, beyond thought, not to be 
 defined, whose only proof is the belief in the soul, in 
 whom all the spheres have ceased, who is tranquil, bliss- 
 ful, and without duality” (Mandukya). 
 
 The third of these extracts speaks evidently of the 
 individual soul, but its identity with the universal soul 
 being established, the predicate knowledge reveals, not 
 only its own nature, but that of the Supreme Spirit on 
 which it is found. These and such like declarations we 
 cannot collate without being led to grasp the character- 
 istic idea embodied in the compound word Sacchita- 
 nanda, formally applied to the Supreme Brahma, and 
 made capital of in post-Vedic times. What is this 
 idea ? When God is represented as Existence, Knowl- 
 edge, and Bliss, have we not an idea as accurate, as 
 well as lofty, as that presented in the Bible ; God the 
 
02 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Father representing Existence, God the Son represent- 
 ing Knowledge, and God the Holy Spirit representing 
 Bliss ? Our answer would be “ Yes,” if the terms 
 knowledge and bliss were taken in the acceptation or 
 sense attached to them when they are applied to God. 
 But we have reason to conclude that they are not em- 
 ployed to mean what they ordinarily signify, either in 
 the Upanishads or in the philosophical discussions car- 
 ried on in ages subsequent to that of the Upanishads. 
 The last of the above extracts, which represents Brahma 
 as at one and the same time intelligent and unintelli- 
 gent, shows that the word knowledge at least is used in 
 this connection in a sense different from what, in com- 
 mon parlance, or even in schools of philosophy (barring 
 of course those of our own country), it bears. 
 
 Properly speaking, God, according to the teaching 
 of these books and the system of pantheism subse- 
 quently borrowed from them, is existence and nothing 
 more, the pure Being of some schools of Greek philoso- 
 phy, the unmanifested essence beneath manifested acci- 
 dents, the only noumenon beneath shifting phenomena. 
 Like many Greek philosophers, the authors of the 
 Upanishads strove to find something permanent be- 
 neath the ceaseless mutations of natural phenomena. 
 All nature appeared to them in a flux, earth melting 
 into water, water into heat, heat into air, air into ether, 
 and ether becoming earth by a process of solidification 
 embracing the other elements in a reverse order. Kor 
 did they see anything but ceaseless change in the vary- 
 ing moods of the mind, the shifting states of conscious- 
 ness, thoughts, emotions, and volitions. The question 
 naturally presented itself to their minds, Is there noth- 
 ing permanent beneath this ceaseless flow of change, 
 etxernal and internal ? And they solved this vexed 
 
THE SOURCES OE HINDU PHILOSOPHY CONTINUED. 03 
 
 question by positing a substance, absolute and un- 
 changeable, behind the transmutations of the material 
 and the changes of the mental world. 
 
 This existence, however, could not be an object of 
 knowledge without implying distinctions fitted to mar 
 its absoluteness ; nor could it be a subject of knowledge 
 without giving birth to a similar contradiction. The 
 knowledge, therefore, ascribed to this existence, is a 
 knowledge without distinction of subject and object, 
 and therefore essentially different from what we call 
 knowledge. The same may be said of the predicate 
 lliss as applied to this existence, it being happiness 
 without such consciousness or feeling as may cripple the 
 absoluteness of the absolute ! Besides, these three ex- 
 pressions are not used as predicates at all ; they form 
 the trinitarian essence of the Supreme Brahma, not his 
 attributes. 
 
 All, therefore, that is predicable of the God of the 
 Upanishads is infinite, unconditioned, absolute exist- 
 ence, which again should not be separated by a sharp 
 line of distinction from non-existence. This will ex- 
 plain the paradoxes in which the Upanishads abound ; 
 such, for instance, as are set forth when God is said to 
 be “ with knowledge and void of knowledge,” to “ re- 
 joice and not rejoice. ” Modern pantheism has made us 
 familiar with such paradoxes as Ego -nonego, Subject- 
 object, One-all, All-one ; but it will find itself distanced 
 by those in which the Hindu mind loves to indulge 
 when thinking and speaking of God, whom it loves to 
 represent as £ £ with form and without form, ” “ defined 
 and undefinable,” “ a foundation and without a foun- 
 dation,” as “ true and not true,” as one who “ moves” 
 and “ does not move,” “ who is far and also near,” 
 “ within this all,” and “out of this all.” Some of 
 
64 
 
 niKDtr PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 these contradictions are set forth in the following free 
 metrical version of a Well-known passage by Monier 
 Williams : 
 
 “ The slaver thinks he slays ; the slain 
 
 Believes himself destroyed ; the thoughts of both 
 Are false, the soul survives, nor kills, nor dies ; 
 
 ’Tis subtler than the smallest, greater than 
 The greatest, infinitely small, yet vast ; 
 
 Asleep, yet restless, moving everywhere 
 Among the bodies — ever bodiless — 
 
 Think not to grasp it by the reasoning mind, 
 
 The wicked ne’er can know it ; soul alone 
 
 Knows soul, to none but soul is soul revealed.” 
 
 The eschatology of the minor Upanishads is of a 
 piece with that of the major, and an additional disquisi- 
 tion is not needed to set it forth. Suffice it to say that 
 the two doctrines of the impeccability of the soul and 
 its final absorption into the Deity are much more cate- 
 gorically stated in these treatises. Sin inheres in tho 
 body, and may pollute the internal organs, and specially 
 the mind ; but it cannot possibly taint the pure spirit 
 that abides in the ether of the heart, guarded by the 
 fivefold sheath of bliss, knowledge, mind, vital air, and 
 nutrition. And because incapable of being polluted by 
 sin, the soul is impassible. “ As the one sun, the eye 
 of the whole world, is not sullied by the defects of the 
 eye or of external things, so the soul, as the inner soul 
 of all beings, is not sullied by the unhappiness of the 
 world, because it is also without it.” 
 
 The question, however may be asked, If the soul is as 
 tranquil and blissful in the body as out of it, where lies 
 the necessity of its liberation ? Why should a sensible 
 man spend years in sequestered places amid mollifica- 
 tions and penances to insure the emancipation of that 
 spirit which is so calm and imperturbable, if not happy 
 
THE SOURCES OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY CONTINUED. 65 
 
 in tlie ordinary sense of the term, in bondage as out of 
 it ? This question is not discussed properly in the 
 Upanishads ; but its solution was attempted in subse- 
 quent times, when the theory of illusion was elaborated, 
 and both bondage and liberation were represented as 
 fictitious. 
 
 The individuated souls are represented in almost in- 
 numerable passages as taking the consequences of their 
 actions in this life, or in the series of lives, which com- 
 pose the long ch&in of transmigration, and they even 
 drag the Supreme Spirit into the happiness and misery 
 in which they are involved. “ (The supreme and in- 
 ferior souls) drinking the due reward of their works in 
 this world, entered both the cave, the highest place of 
 the supreme soul.” The soul must consume the fruits, 
 good or bad, of its works, know itself, and then be lib- 
 erated from sense-bred ignorance. “ Whoever knows 
 the origin, the entrance, the locality, and the fivefold 
 power of fife (soul) enjoys immortality ; whoever knows 
 this enjoys immortality.” 
 
 The doctrine of absorption is set forth in the follow- 
 ing passages : 
 
 “As the flowing, sea-going rivers, when they have 
 reached the sea, are annihilated, as their names and 
 forms perish, and only the name of sea remains, so the 
 sixteen parts of the witness (soul) which are going to 
 the soul (as the rivers to the sea) when they have 
 reached the soul, are annihilated, their names and forms 
 perish, and only the name of soul remains ; it is then 
 without parts, it is immortal ” (“ Prasna,” sec. 4). 
 
 “ As the flowing rivers come to their end in the sea, 
 losing name and form, so, liberated from name and 
 form, proceeds the wise to the divine soul, which is 
 greater than the great. Whoever knows this Supreme 
 
CG 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Brahma, becomes even Brahma. In his family there 
 will be none ignorant of Brahma ; he overcomes grief, 
 lie overcomes sin, he becomes immortal, liberated from 
 the bonds of the cave (heart)” (“ Mandaka,” sec. 3). 
 
 The sixteen parts of the witness, soul, are the five 
 organs of knowledge, the five organs of action, the 
 eleventh organ, the mind, and the five gross elements 
 of which the body is composed, or perhaps the five vital 
 airs. Some of the categories of the Sankya school are 
 referred to in many parts of these books, and they may 
 at first sight lead us to the conclusion that some of 
 them at least were composed after its organization or 
 development. But it is just as reasonable to conclude 
 that the characteristic ideas of that school had existed, 
 and been, to some extent, matured before the appear- 
 ance of the Sankliya philosophy as an organized system. 
 
 Salvation is made dependent on knowledge of 
 Brahma, and when this is attained in all its fulness a 
 metamorphosis of the devotee takes place. lie himself 
 becomes Brahma, blissful, impassible, above the pollut- 
 ing touch of sin, for even when in this blessed condition 
 he does commit gross sins, such as adultery and murder, 
 he is left unpolluted, and therefore perfectly pure. Let 
 us conclude with an extract from one of Professor 
 Gough’s scholarly papers on the Upanishads, originally 
 published in the Calcutta Review , and since republished 
 in the form of a book, presented by Major Jacob in the 
 book already alluded to : 
 
 “ The theosophist liberated from metempsjmhosis, 
 but still in the body, is untouched by merit or demerit, 
 absolved from all works, good and evil, unsoiled by 
 sinful works, uninjured by what he has done and what 
 he has left undone. Good works, like evil works, and 
 like the God that recompenses them, belong to the un- 
 
THE SOURCES OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY CONTINUED. 67 
 
 real, to the fictitious duality, the world of semblances. 
 
 . . . Anandagiri : ‘ The theosophist, as long as he 
 lives, may do good and evil as he chooses, and incur no 
 stain, such is the efficiency of gnosis ? ’ And so in the 
 Taittiriya Upanishad (ii. 9) we read : ‘ The thought 
 afflicts not him ; what have I left undone ; what evil 
 done ? ’ And in the Buhadaranyaka : ‘ Here the thief 
 is no more a thief, the Chandala no more a Chandala, 
 the Paulkasa no more a Paulkasa, the sacred mendicant 
 no more a sacred mendicant : they are not followed by 
 good works, they are not followed by evil works. For 
 at last the sage has passed beyond all the sorrows of his 
 heart.’ Immoral inferences from this doctrine — the 
 quietists of all ages have been taxed with immorality — 
 are thus reargued by Nrisimhasaraswati : ‘ Some one 
 may say, It will follow from this the theosophist may 
 act as he chooses. That he can act as he pleases cannot 
 be denied in the presence of texts of revelation, tradi- 
 tionary texts, and arguments such as the following : 
 ‘ Hot by matricide, not by parricide.’ ‘ Tie that does 
 not identify not-self with self, whose inner faculty is 
 unsullied though he slay these people, neither slays 
 them, nor is slain. He that knows the truth is sullied 
 neither by good actions nor by evil actions. In answer 
 to all this we reply : True ; but as these texts are only 
 eulogistic of the theosophist, it is not intended that he 
 should thus act.’ ” 
 
 Does not this extract justify the assertion made by a 
 great thinker that pantheism is pan-diabolism ? It will 
 be shown, when V edanfem is treated of, that our 
 recognition of all distinctions, moral or material, is ac- 
 cording to the teaching of these records, and the great 
 system evolved from it in subsequent times, illusory ; 
 and the chief of those items of ignorance from the 
 
GS 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 trammels of which we have to free ourselves by right 
 knowledge. What we call good and what we call evil, 
 virtue and vice, holiness and sin, both emanate from the 
 diffusive Spirit from which we have sprung along with 
 the objects of creation around us, and into which we 
 shall be merged along with them when the season of 
 divine hibernation once more makes its appearance, to 
 be followed in due course by fresh acts of development 
 and reabsorption. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 THE AGE OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 In our analysis of the contents of the Upanishads, 
 commented upon by Sankar, we purposely left out one 
 as not entitled to a place among the Sources of Hindu 
 Philosophy. This is the Swetaswatara Upanishad, a 
 document which in bulk may justly be represented as 
 an intermediate link between the major and the minor 
 Upanishads, but which in chronological order leaves 
 them all very far indeed behind it. The Swetaswatara 
 is the most modern of the Upanishads, and its composi- 
 tion must be traced to a period posterior to the organi- 
 zation of the principal schools of Indian Philosophy, 
 and therefore to the era when the incipient speculations 
 embodied in these documents generally were systema- 
 tized and matured into permanent and conflicting types 
 of philosophic thought. 
 
 Unmistakable traces of its late origin are discoverable 
 among its miscellaneous contents. The mythology, for 
 instance, of which glimpses are presented in its pages, 
 is not that either of the Yedic or of the Heroic age of 
 Indian History ; but that spun out into grotesque forms 
 when the spirit of sectarianism gave birth to numerous 
 factions within the precincts of Hindu society. The 
 well-known triad, Brahma, Vishnu, and Maheshwar, 
 shrinks into what may be called the monad, Siva, who 
 again is identified with the Supreme Brahma, the 
 Source of all Being. This deity, Siva, and the energies 
 
TO 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 associated with him, each in the shape of a female 
 divinity, are set forth as objects of worship rather than 
 the gods and goddesses of the Yedic, or even of the 
 Heroic age. Besides three of the six schools of Hindu 
 Philosophy are referred toby name — viz., the Sankhya, 
 the Yoga, and the Vedant — and references to the 
 others, as well as citations from the minor Hpanishads, 
 are by no means few and far between. 
 
 But the object of the document itself sets forth, more 
 than the traces of its late origin already referred to, its 
 posteriority, or its composition in an age subsequent to 
 that, not only of the major, but of the minor Upani- 
 shads. That object is similar to, if not identical with, 
 that of the Bhagvada Gita — viz., to effect a reconcilia- 
 tion between the varied lines of philosophic thought 
 represented by the varied schools, especially between 
 the rank materialism of the Sankhya and the equally 
 rank pantheism of the Yedantic system. Its composi- 
 tion, therefore, should be traced to the time when prac- 
 tical difficulties arose from the ceaseless struggles of the 
 schools ; and when an attempt to obviate them by 
 means of a compromise, a truce, if not a lasting peace, 
 was peremptorily demanded. It must at the same time 
 be admitted that internal evidence does not warrant 
 the conclusion which sets forth the contemporaneity of 
 the Upanishad under review with the Bhagvada Gita. 
 The Krishna Cultus, which appears full} 7 developed in 
 the latter document, is not even referred to in the 
 former ; while the differences noticeable in the modes 
 of reconciliation proposed in the two documents presup- 
 pose an interval of several generations between the 
 composition of the one and that of the other. 
 
 The Swetaswatara Upanishad, though not entitled to 
 a place among the Sources of Hindu Philosophy, is a 
 
THE ACIE OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 71 
 
 very valuable document, presenting, as it does, a cor- 
 rect picture of what may emphatically be called the 
 Age of Hindu Philosophy. It may be regarded as an 
 index to the thoughts and struggles, the longings and 
 yearnings of an era, which in intellectual activity and 
 moral grandeur has scarcely been surpassed in the his- 
 tory of non-Christian lands, certainly never in the his- 
 tory of our own country. Let us give it prominence as 
 indicating : 
 
 1. The knotty problems which exercised the acute 
 and penetrating intellects of the great Schoolmen of 
 Ancient India ; 
 
 2. The varieties of expedients to which recourse was 
 had by these extraordinary thinkers for their solution ; 
 
 3. The temporal benefits to which they looked for- 
 ward as the reward of their toil ; 
 
 4. The conclusions at which they arrived ; 
 
 5. The controversies to which these gave rise ; and 
 
 G. The compromises by which these conclusions were, 
 
 when obviously at war with each other, reconciled. 
 
 In elucidating the contents of this Upanishad, we 
 shall have to go over the whole ground of Hindu Phi- 
 losophy, to repeat not a little of what we have already 
 said, and to anticipate much of what we shall have to 
 say, when we treat separately of each of the systems 
 matured in the schools. But as an apology for such 
 repetition and such anticipation we have to say that 
 careful study of this venerable document is a very good 
 preparation for an intelligent examination and apprecia- 
 tion of the great fines of thought enshrined in Hindu 
 Philosophy, and also to some extent that of ancient 
 Greece. 
 
 1. The problems which Hindu Philosophy strove to 
 I solve are indicated in the opening verses of this Hpani-' 
 
HINDU PHILO SO TOY. 
 
 sliatl : “ The inquirers after Brahma converse (among 
 themselves). What cause is Brahma ? Whence are 
 we produced ? By whom do we live, and where do we 
 (ultimately) abide ? By whom governed ? Do we 
 walk after a rule in happiness and unhappiness, 0 ye 
 knowers of Brahma ? Is time Brahma (as cause), or the 
 own nature of the things, or the necessary consequences 
 of work, or accident, or the elements, or nature (yone), 
 or the soul ? This must be considered : It is not the 
 union of them, because the soul remains ; the soul (in- 
 dividual soul) also is not powerful (to be the author of 
 the creation (since there is (independent of it) a cause 
 of happiness and unhappiness (viz., work).” 
 
 These are the Hindu versions of the problems of ex- 
 istence, and they indicate the path of inquiry fearlessly 
 trodden by great thinkers in ancient India. Trans- 
 lated into modern phraseology, they are : What is the 
 ultimate ground of existence in general ? What is the 
 ground of our own existence ? By what power are we 
 sustained in life, and where do we permanently abide 
 after death — in conscious existence, or in an endless 
 chain of atomic or molecular movements and changes ? 
 Why are we guided by desire and aversion, a natural 
 longing for pleasure and an instinctive shrinking from 
 pain ? What inflexible law leads to the apportionment 
 of the measure of pleasure we secure and the measure 
 of pain we groan under ? 
 
 It is not necessary for us to repeat that these are the 
 abstruse problems that have, from time immemorial, 
 exercised, puzzled, and wasted some of the loftiest in- 
 tellects the world has seen, and they are to-day as far 
 from solution in the region of boasted philosophy as 
 they were when the Upanishads, major and minor, 
 were composed. In one and all the important centres 
 
THE AGE OE HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 73 
 
 of ancient civilization, in India, in China, in Egypt, 
 and in Greece, they were deeply meditated upon in 
 solitudes ; earnestly discussed in schools frequently, 
 and the agora and forum at times ; patiently elaborated 
 into complicated though imposing theories ; and labori- 
 ously propagated in the shape of practical lessons among 
 people too busil} r engaged to recognize the vapory char- 
 acter of the speculations to which they were inseparably 
 linked. And in the most favored abodes of modern 
 civilization these very problems are once more passing 
 through a similar elaborative and transforming process 
 in the mental laboratory of some of the greatest think- 
 ers of the age. And it is a noteworthy fact that the 
 results arrived at, or attained now, are not essentially 
 different from those realized in the primitive age of 
 which we wish to present a picture in this and the fol- 
 lowing papers. The word failure might justly lie 
 inscribed on the lofty banner raised by ancient philoso- 
 phy ; and the same humiliating issue is what modern 
 philosophy can legitimately boast of ! 
 
 It is worthy of special notice tJiat the civilized world 
 seems to have been roused, at one and the same time, 
 from the slumber of ages, to take these important prob- 
 lems into consideration. The age of Indian philosophy 
 is not to be looked upon or represented as one of the 
 ordinary periods of human history. It was indeed an 
 extraordinary era, an era of giants both in the region 
 of philosophic thought and in that of practical moral 
 earnestness ; the age of Buddha, Zoroaster, Confucius, 
 and Pythagoras ; the age which, as regards the great- 
 ness of the men whose speculations and deeds rendered 
 it conspicuous, and the imposing nature, if not practical 
 efficacy, of the theoretical results attained, has scarcely 
 had its parallel in the history of the world. It saw the 
 
74 
 
 nixDu pniLosopnT. 
 
 loft} 7 - spirit of philosophic investigation roused from 
 dormancy and called into vigorous play, not in one or 
 two solitary localities, but in the most conspicuous 
 centres of civilization ; and, barring the disclosures of 
 revelation, the world has not been able to improve upon 
 the solutions of the problems of existence then pro- 
 posed, except in outward form and drapery. In phi- 
 losophy the interval between the sixth or seventh 
 century before the Christian era and the vaunted nine- 
 teenth century is almost nil ! 
 
 We cannot look upon what may in one sense be called 
 the universally developed mental activity of the period 
 in question without being led instinctively to ascertain 
 its cause. And the cause happily is not one of those 
 which, the more we are dazzled by their effects, retire 
 the more thoroughly from the narrow horizon of our 
 intellectual vision. It stands out in bold relief from the 
 history of the development of the human mind. 
 
 The problems of existence are among those which we 
 are naturally and instinctively led to take into our seri- 
 ous consideration ; and they have from the beginning 
 engaged the attention and exercised the brains of the 
 thoughtful members of the human family, if not of 
 mankind at large. In what may be called the twilight 
 period of human history, solutions were proposed, such 
 as failed to satisfy the world after it had made some 
 progress in knowledge and thought. The energies of 
 nature, originally represented as its creative and sus- 
 taining forces, gradually assumed gross and fetich 
 forms ; and a host of gods and goddesses of limited 
 potency and like passions with human beings, who 
 wasted a great deal of their strength in fighting with 
 one another, appeared on the stage and claimed human 
 homage. Here the blazing sun-god, there the terrific 
 
THE AGE OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 VO 
 
 being concealed within the dark folds of the lowering 
 clouds, and yonder the spirit of howling storms and 
 sweeping whirlwinds appeared in tangible and what 
 might be called stereotyped forms, clothed in the popu- 
 lar imagination with authority and power, such as made 
 it necessary for men to secure their favor by prayer and 
 supplication, and avert their wrath by bloody sacrifices. 
 But as knowledge advanced these causes appeared 
 utterly inadequate to minds freed from the trammels of 
 popular prejudice, and thereby trained to think and 
 judge for themselves. 
 
 Again, the multiplicity of the causes assigned could 
 not but repel minds bent on discovering a unity beneath 
 the complexity of natural phenomena, a something uni- 
 versal, permanent, and immutable beneath their ever- 
 shifting phases. An endless variety of finite or limited 
 forces, or an endless variety of local gods and goddesses 
 of circumscribed power cannot be held by thinking men 
 as fitted to constitute an omnific agency of boundless 
 potency, and so some unity of being or principle sup- 
 posed to be behind them became an object of anxious 
 inquiry as soon as current forms of thought appeared 
 unsatisfactory. An attempt to make the numerous 
 heroes of popular mythology coalesce into a single 
 Being of unerring wisdom and limitless power, or to 
 weld the jarring forces of nature into one primordial 
 force, was necessitated by a reaction against palpable 
 grossness of conception. 
 
 But are there not solutions of these problems which 
 may be called intuitive, or which are offered to our ac- 
 ceptance on the strength, either of the primary beliefs 
 of humanity, or of that primeval revelation which we 
 see imbedded in the varied religions of the world ? 
 The moment these solutions are accepted all difficulties 
 
7G 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 vanish into thin air, and the necessity of hatching the- 
 ory after theory in dark solitudes is obviated. Such 
 solutions were certainly within the reach of the philoso- 
 phers, who allowed themselves to be puzzled and bewil- 
 dered by speculations of a recondite character. But 
 they were too simple to commend themselves to their 
 ambitious minds ; and they were in consequence cast 
 overboard along with those embodied in popular song or 
 mythology. The explanations furnished by popular 
 literature were too gross, and those offered by intuition 
 were too simple to suit their taste, and therefore they 
 allowed themselves with all conceivable eagerness to be 
 entangled in the mazes of plausible error. 
 
 We have elsewhere shown that the rationalistic ten- 
 dencies of the period under consideration might be 
 traced to a reaction against ritualism. The age of phi- 
 losophy in India was ushered in by the age of external- 
 ism pictured in the Brahmanas ; and this was most un- 
 doubtedly true of all the other centres of civilization, 
 which felt the dominating influence of the spirit of 
 philosophic inquiry so simultaneously roused in so many 
 localities. The argument need not be reproduced here ; 
 but a reference to the solutions of the problems of ex- 
 istence, which were looked upon as heretical in India, 
 will not be deemed uncalled for. 
 
 The passage quoted above shows that an attempt was 
 made to trace existence in its multifarious forms to 
 Time, the Cronos of Greek mythology. Time has 
 always been represented, by a bold figure of speech, as 
 the beginner and the ender, the creator and destroyer 
 of things. Forms of existence in a state of nonentity, 
 or in an embryonic state are said to be in the womb of 
 time ; when they make themselves manifest among the 
 phenomena of life, they are its offspring ; and when 
 
THE AGE OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 77 
 
 they finally disappear from the stage, their disappear- 
 ance is traced to the sweeping action of its all-mowing 
 scythe. But tropes and metaphors are, in course of 
 time, or when the spirit of mythopoeic invention is 
 evoked .by what Grote calls retrospective veneration, 
 clothed with flesh, and become living realities. The 
 fast-moving old man, with the hour-glass in one hand 
 and scythe in the other, became in time the Ancient of 
 Days ; and the threefold work of creation, preserva- 
 tion, and destruction of the world was attributed to 
 him. Besides, how soothing is the thought that time 
 will itself remedy the evils of time ! The soul is entan- 
 gled by time in the meshes of mundane misery, but it 
 need not despair ; time itself will destroy the net and 
 bring the relief ! Is it a wonder that time was repre- 
 sented as the Creator of all things, and the incarcerator 
 and emancipator of the soul ? This theory, however, 
 was regarded as heretical by the learned in India when 
 they halted between materialism and pantheism, and 
 when therefore they could not brook the idea of a 
 mythological phantom rising up to claim the honor 
 conferred on a self-evolving material form or a self- 
 developing spiritual substance. 
 
 Another of the heretical opinions condemned merci- 
 lessly, revolved around what was called “the own 
 nature of things.” Every form of existence has its 
 vitality, the ground of its being concealed in itself ; 
 and it is absurd, as well as useless, to look for its creator 
 and preserver apart from it. The ground of man’s ex- 
 istence is man himself ; he is the author and sustainer 
 of his being, the tormentor of his own pure spirit, and 
 ultimately its glorious liberator. Man has no business 
 to look beyond himself, in the depths of his misery, for 
 help, his own recuperative power being enough to 
 
78 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 work out his deliverance in process of time. Manliness 
 and independence cannot go further ! 
 
 Then comes in the god of Buddhism, Karma, for his 
 share of condemnation. Karma, work, occupies a 
 prominent place in Hindu Philosophy. It is the great 
 incarcerator and tormentor of the passive soul. Its 
 causes are desire and aversion, which lead men to prac- 
 tise virtue or vice, and thus become recipients of re- 
 wards or punishments. It sends them up to heaven or 
 down to hell to take the consequences of their own 
 actions ; brings them back into mundane existence or 
 existence in corporeal frames to be once more tor- 
 mented by fresh desires and fresh actions ; hurls them 
 back to regions of reward and punishment ; and so on 
 through long, long series of births and deaths, till its 
 own power being consumed and itself annihilated, they 
 are liberated from its thraldom, and lost, either in the 
 material essence of nature to pass through an endless 
 series of such experiences after lengthened periods of 
 hibernation, or in the divine spiritual substance to be 
 compelled by the imperious law of development to reap- 
 pear, after long periods of quiescence, on the stage of 
 history with similarly gloomy prospects before them ! 
 But though conspicuous for its malignant activity, in 
 Hindu Philosophy, it is at first sight neither the start- 
 ing-point nor the terminus of creation. The Buddhists, 
 however, tried to make it such ; and so they drew upon 
 themselves the awful sentence of schism and heresy. 
 
 The Bible of the fool, the chapter of accidents, was 
 not unknown to our ancestors of the age of Hindu Phi- 
 losophy. Chance was represented as the creator and 
 preserver of the world, and all talk of teleology, or the 
 doctrine of final causes, was pronounced unmitigated 
 nonsense. Do not some of our redoubtable champions 
 
THE AGE OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 79 
 
 of science see their prototypes in ages which they are 
 apt to mention with contempt as eras of ignorance ancl 
 darkness ? Teleology, in the proper sense of the term, 
 Hindu theologians of the most orthodox school were by 
 no means averse to ; and chance appeared to them as 
 absolutely nothing, and the idea of bringing an entity 
 out of nonentity they could not possibly entertain for a 
 moment ; and therefore this theory also received the 
 brand of heresy. 
 
 The elements were by another class of heretics repre- 
 sented as the ultimate ground of existence. AY ho is not 
 reminded by this of the tendency in modern philosophy 
 to trace the universe to the evolution of what are 
 called the ultimate powers of nature ? The ultimate 
 powers, held up in these days as creative or self-evolv- 
 ing potencies, arc very different indeed from what were 
 represented as such in the primitive age of Indian phi- 
 losophy. Then the earth, water, fire, and air, with the 
 addition of ether in some quarters, were looked upon as 
 simple, uncompounded substances ; and to the action, 
 individual as well as collective, of these elements exist- 
 ence in its diversified forms of beauty and proportion 
 was not very unnaturally traced. But to the philo- 
 sophic mind of India, fond of subtle distinctions and 
 averse to grossness of conception, these substances, 
 though regarded as simple and uncompounded, ap- 
 peared too gross to deserve the place assigned them as 
 the productive causes of material and mental phe- 
 nomena. And therefore those who represented them 
 as the omnific powers of nature were regarded as a 
 body of heretics fit to be burned alive ! 
 
 Again Nature (Yoni) had also the honor, as it has 
 always had, of being pointed out as the ultimate ground 
 of existence. There is some doubt about the meaning 
 
80 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of the word yoni in this connection, but if it be taken 
 as meaning nature , a broad line of demarcation ought 
 to be drawn between it and Prakriti of the Sankhya 
 school, generally translated nature. Prakriti is a prin- 
 ciple of extreme tenuity, more spiritual than material, 
 a sort of primordial, self-evolving essence or form ; but 
 Yoni represents either all the phenomena of nature put 
 together, or the aggregate of all its forces and powers. 
 The theory which traces creation to Prakriti has always 
 been held as orthodox ; while that which makes Yoni 
 the ultimate ground of existence has always been repro- 
 bated as heterodox. In whatever sense the word nature 
 is used in this connection, the speculation which evolves 
 creation from it and thrusts the Creator, not merely 
 into the background, but out of existence, cannot but 
 appear fascinating to the materialists of the day ! 
 
 And lastly, a species of egoism, not unknown in these 
 days, was upheld in one of the numerous schools of 
 heresy which flourished side by side with elaborate sys- 
 tems of orthodox philosophy. The soul, the individual in 
 contradistinction to the universal soul, was represented 
 as the ultimate ground of existence ; but the spirit of 
 Hindu orthodoxy recoiled in horror from such repre- 
 sentation. The soul or the ego, both universal and in- 
 dividual, is, according to its champions, perfectly quies- 
 cent, and cannot therefore be an efficient cause. To 
 attribute to it the slightest degree of activity is to rob 
 it of its happiness, which in their opinion is synonymous 
 with the complete extinction of thought and desire, or 
 of mental and spiritual activity. 
 
 All these principles form, according to Hindu Philos- 
 ophy, a chain of second causes ; and if the series were 
 to terminate in a proper top or head principle, nothing 
 could lie said against them. Such a principle is indi- 
 
THE AGE OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 81 
 
 cated in this verse : “ They, who followed abstract 
 meditation (Dhyan) and concentration (Yoga) beheld 
 (as the cause of the creation) the power (Sakti) of the 
 divine soul concealed in its qualities, which alone super- 
 intends all these causes, of which time was the first, 
 and soul (the individual soul) the last. ’ ’ This and the 
 verses following set forth the attempt made in this 
 treatise to reconcile materialism to pantheism. 
 
 2. The verse quoted in the paragraph indicates also 
 the way in which solution of the great problems of fife 
 was sought ; and to it let us in the second place advert. 
 It is scarcely worth our while to observe that the expe- 
 dients resorted to in those primitive times are very 
 different indeed from those utilized in these days. A 
 well-filled library, a cushioned chair, reading, study, 
 and meditation, prolonged till what is called the mid- 
 night oil is consumed — these, with perhaps a pipe con- 
 cealed amid volumes of smoke, are the expedients 
 resorted to in these days for such a purpose. But books 
 were unknown, or, if not unknown, very rare in those 
 days, and midnight oil was never consumed, except in 
 religious and social festivities. The man of intellect, 
 determined to set the problems of existence at rest, had 
 to pass through a painful course of preparation. He 
 had to prepare himself for his proper study by perform- 
 ing the ordinary duties of life as well as going the 
 round of religious observances with punctilious care. 
 He had then to place himself under the guidance of an 
 accredited teacher, and spend years in listening to the 
 Yedas chanted by him ; he had, moreover, to propiti- 
 ate the teacher as well as the gods, by varied acts of 
 self-sacrifice, and by services of a menial nature. And 
 when by such sacrifices and such services he had ob- 
 tained what in modern phraseology would be called a 
 
82 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 pass-certificate, lie had to look for a proper place where, 
 wrapped up in intense meditation, he might seek un- 
 molested the right solution of the problems of life. 
 
 The Swetaswatara Upanisliad points out the sort of 
 place he must select as his rendezvous in the tenth verse 
 of the second chapter : “ At a level place, free from 
 pebbles and gravel, pleasant to the mind by its sounds, 
 water, and bowers, not painful to the eye, and repair- 
 ing to a cave, protected from the wind, let a person 
 apply (his mind to Clod).” He must sit down, not 
 
 “ . . . wander where the Muses haunt 
 Clear spring, or shady grove or sunny hill.” 
 
 The necessity of his retiring to a sequestered spot, 
 “pleasant to the mind by its sounds, water, and 
 bowers,” is obvious enough ; but why should the place 
 selected be “free from pebble and gravel”? Be- 
 cause “ bodily exercises” must be combined with those 
 of the mind and the spirit ; and a level, smooth piece 
 of ground was needed to render these practicable. 
 
 What was he to do in such a solitary place ? Let the 
 following verses, quoted from the same chapter, furnish 
 the reply : 
 
 “ Keeping the upper part (the chest, the neck, and 
 the head) erect, and equal to (the other parts of) the 
 body, subduing within the heart the senses together 
 with the mind, let the sense by the raft of Brahma 
 (Om) cross over all the fearful torrents (of the world).” 
 “ Keeping down the senses, subduing his desires, and 
 gently respiring by the nostrils, let the wise diligently 
 attend to the mind as (the charioteer) to a car drawn 
 by vicious horses.” 
 
 In plain English, the man anxious to have the prob- 
 lems of life solved must, in a solitary place, strive by 
 
THE AGE OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 83 
 
 varieties of bodily as well as mental exercises, to obtain 
 a thorough mastery over his passions and appetites, and 
 to subdue the restlessness or the vagrant tendency of 
 the mind. 
 
 When he has succeeded in doing this preliminary 
 work, he has to pass through various degrees of that 
 concentration which is to culminate in the direct vision 
 of God by his soul in itself, as well as in the varied 
 objects of Nature. The premonitory symptoms are 
 thus set forth : “ These appearances precede the con- 
 centration by which the manifestation of Brahma is 
 effected ; it (Brahma) assumes the form of frost, of 
 smoke, of hot air, of wind, of fire, of fire-flies, of light- 
 ning, of crystal, and of the moon.” The idea perhaps 
 is that the inquirer first sees the Divinity somewhat 
 veiled in the objects of Nature, and then in the fulness 
 of His unclouded glory in his own spirit. 
 
 This vision indicates the last degree of concentration. 
 “ When absorbed in this concentration (the Yogi) sees 
 by the true nature of his own self, which manifests like 
 a light the true nature of Brahma, which is not born, 
 eternal and free from all effects of Nature ; he gets 
 released from all bonds. For he (the Yogi) is the god 
 who is born before all the quarter, and intermediate 
 quarters (Hiranyagarbha) ; he is indeed within the 
 womb, he is born, he will be born ; in the shape of all 
 he dwells in every creature.” Words cannot more 
 clearly set forth the perfect identity of the individual 
 with the universal soul, or the fact that the Yogi’s de- 
 liverance means in reality the emancipation of the Deity 
 from the trammels of Nature. 
 
 The first degree of concentration is thus indicated : 
 “ When (in the Yogi’s body) composed of earth, water, 
 light, air, and ether, the fivefold qualities, which make 
 
84 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 concentration, are manifest, then there is no disease or 
 age or pain for him, who has obtained the body burn- 
 ing with the fire of concentration. When the body is 
 light, and without disease, the mind without desire, the 
 color is shining, sweet the voice, and pleasant the smell, 
 when the excrements are few, they say the first degree 
 of concentration is gained.” The intermediate degrees 
 between this and the stage associated with the direct 
 vision of Brahma are not indicated in this treatise ; but 
 we obtain an insight into their exalted character when 
 avc note that the very first landmark indicates a body 
 free from “ disease, age, or pain,” and a mind “ with- 
 out desire.” 
 
 But all this may justly be represented as a picture of 
 the age of the Upanishads as well as of that of the sys- 
 tems or schools of philosophy, of the age of inquiry as 
 Avell as that of mature thought and bold speculation. 
 Is there nothing to differentiate the one from the other 
 as regards the A T arieties of expedients resorted to with a 
 view to a proper solution of the knotty problems of ex- 
 istence ? Our decided reply is, Xot much. The pi’ob- 
 lems were the same, and the means utilized to insure 
 their solution Avere nearly the same. But there Avas a 
 manifest difference between the two periods in the 
 numbers of the persons by Avhom these problems were 
 handled and these means utilized. In the preparatory 
 period, or the age of inquiry, these Avere units scattered 
 here and there, each pursuing his oavh line of investiga- 
 tion in solitary grandeur, and the whole presenting the 
 appearance of an assemblage of inchoative particles 
 rather than a regularly organized body. But in the 
 age of philosophy, properly so called, these units de- 
 veloped into communities, and a series of sporadic and 
 unconnected attempts at philosophic thought Avere sys- 
 
THE AGE OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 85 
 
 tematized into well-organized schools. Another differ- 
 ence arose from the spirit of controversial wrangling, 
 which was called into vigorous activity, when school 
 was opposed to school, and system fought with system 
 for triumph and ascendency. In the simpler and purer 
 times of the Upanisliads, love of truth seems to have 
 been the reigning principle ; hut in those of the sys- 
 tems this amiable passion was all but annihilated by an 
 irrepressible love of controversy. And when the spirit 
 of wrangling had done its work and created dissensions 
 and discords of a fearful type, concessions and compro- 
 mises were resorted to, and hybrids in the region of 
 philosophy, such as those we notice in the Swetaswa- 
 tara Upanishad and the Bhagavada Gita, were called 
 into being. It should, moreover, be borne in mind that 
 motives of an earthly character played a more conspic- 
 uous part in the age of philosophy ; but these bring us 
 to our next point. 
 
 3. The advantages these devout inquirers looked for, 
 and for which they betook themselves to a life of 
 singular austerity and penance, were partly secular and 
 partly spiritual. The secular advantages were the ex- 
 traordinary powers attained by complete self-control 
 and intense meditation. These are, in the words of 
 Roer, whose translation we have utilized, “ assumption 
 of the smallest possible shape, of the greatest possible 
 shape, of the heaviest form, of the lightest form, the 
 power of obtaining everything, irresistible will, ruling 
 of all, and independency of all.” Furnished with such 
 powers, the devotee could dazzle the world by miracu- 
 lous feats, die could make himself at times visible and 
 at times invisible ; could move in the water as fishes 
 and fly in the air as birds ; could remain buried under 
 the earth for days and months and years ; could com- 
 
SG 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 mand a luscious fruit on the topmost branch of a giant 
 tree to fall down on his outspread hands, or call into 
 his clenched fist the diamond ring concealed beneath 
 the stony floor of the darkest chamber of a castellated 
 palace ; could make the strongest man weep as a child 
 or fall prostrate upon the earth by the simple force of 
 his indomitable will ; could bring the whole world 
 under his irresistible sway in the twinkling of an eye, 
 or hurl defiance at the powers that be with perfect im- 
 punity. And who can measure the influence he might 
 exert over a superstitious people by such dazzling dis- 
 plays of superhuman power ? Nor were immensity, 
 exiguity, gravity, levitation, irresistible will-power, 
 dominating influence, and perfect independence the 
 only powers by which he could dazzle the world into 
 admiration and reverence. He could by intense medi- 
 tation make himself omniscient, and work all the won- 
 ders connected with the powers known, in the phrase- 
 ology of Mesmerism, as prevision, intro vision, and 
 retrovision. lie could look back, as Buddha is re- 
 ported to have done, to the varied stages of existence 
 through which he had passed, before his migration into 
 his present body, and report varieties of incidents con- 
 nected with each. He could foretell future events with 
 prophetic minuteness and particularity ; and read and 
 make bare, so to speak, the inmost thoughts of his 
 neighbors. How much awe and reverence might he 
 not inspire by a display of such superhuman knowl- 
 edge ! His toil did not go unrewarded even in this 
 world. 
 
 But it must be observed that these powers, though 
 prized, should be looked upon as merely the subsidiary 
 advantages of his austere course of life. His main ob- 
 ject was knowledge of Brahma and the liberation con- 
 
THE AGE OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 87 
 
 sequent upon it. lie looked upon liimself as a slave to 
 desire, which led him to acts, good and bad, and these 
 to periods of rewards and punishment, and consequently 
 through an almost endless chain of transmigrations. 
 To deliver himself from the trammels of corporeal or 
 conscious existence, not the acquisition of extraordinary 
 powers, was the great object he had in view in forsak- 
 ing the occupation and pleasures of the world, and mak- 
 ing meditation the sole business of his life. He looked 
 for liberation, and he believed that he could not reach 
 the summit of his wishes except through what may be 
 called the ladder of right knowledge. For this knowl- 
 edge, therefore, he was willing to make all sacrifices, 
 undergo all privations, practise all austerities, and go 
 through, in a word , a long course of self-renunciation 
 and self-mortification. How he could reach the goal 
 he looked forward to is indicated in the following 
 extract from the third chapter of the Swetaswatara 
 Hpanishad : 
 
 “ Those who know Brahma, who is greater than the 
 universe, the great one, the infinite, who is concealed 
 within all beings according to their bodies, the only 
 pervader of the universe, the ruler become immortal. ’ ’ 
 
 “ I know that perfect, infinite spirit, who is like the 
 sun after darkness. Thus knowing him, a person over- 
 comes death, there is no other road for obtaining (libera- 
 tion).” 
 
 Extraordinary influence in this world and emancipa- 
 tion from the fetters of existence were the motives 
 which induced the devotee of these primitive times to 
 exchange the comforts of domestic life for the priva- 
 tions of that of an anchorite. It was not, therefore, to 
 gratify an idle curiosity of the mind, but to satisfy an 
 intense and irrepressible longing of the heart, that he 
 
88 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 betook himself to hermit solitude. Our modern phi- 
 losophers lack his earnestness because they are led 
 on by an intellectual rather than a moral impulse or 
 force. 
 
 The following extract from Dr. Geikie’s “ Life of 
 Christ” shows that the possibility of attaining super- 
 human knowledge and superhuman power by ascetic 
 self-denial and concentrated meditation was recognized 
 among the chosen people of God : “ The grand aim of 
 this amazing system of self denial and ascetic endurance 
 is told by Josephus in a brief sentence. 4 Consecrated 
 from childhood by many purifications, and familiar be- 
 yond thought with the Holy Books and the utterances 
 of the prophets, they (the Essenes) claim to see into the 
 future, and in truth there is scarcely an instance in 
 which their prophecies have been found false.’ The 
 belief that they could attain direct communion with 
 God by intense legal purification and mystic contem- 
 plation, and even pass, in the end, to such transcen- 
 dental vision as would reveal to them the secrets of the 
 future, was the supreme motive to endure a life of so 
 much privation and self-denial. A similar course had 
 been followed before their day as a means of prepara- 
 tion for divine visions and communion with high 
 powers. “ In those days,” says Daniel, “ I was 
 mourning three full weeks. I ate no pleasant bread, 
 neither came flesh nor wine in my mouth, neither did I 
 anoint myself at all till three whole weeks were ful- 
 filled. And on the four and twentieth day of the 
 month, as I was by the side of the great river, which 
 is Hiddekel, then I lifted up mine eyes, and looked, and 
 behold a certain man clothed in linen, whose loins were 
 girded with fine gold of Uphaz. ” In the same way 
 Esdras prepared himself for his visions : “ Go to the 
 
THE AGE OP HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 89 
 
 flowery open, where there is no house,” said the angel 
 to him, “ and eat only the herbs of the field ; taste no 
 flesh and drink no wine, but eat herbs only, and pray 
 unto the Highest continually ; then will I come and 
 talk with thee.” That the devotees in the promised 
 land were not so wild in their expectations as their 
 brethren in India is a proof of the decidedly better in- 
 fluence exerted over them by their sacred scriptures. 
 
 4. How let us advert to the conclusions at which the 
 inquirers arrived. These may be classed under two 
 heads, materialism and pantheism, the two poles around 
 which all speculations on the problems of existence have 
 revolved from the beginning of days. The Sankhya 
 philosophy was evidently the earliest outcome ; and it 
 traced creation through a succession of evolutes and 
 evolvent principles to a quasi-material, if not material 
 form, called Prakriti. The Upanishads had recognized 
 a principle called Unmanifested (Avyakta) behind the 
 perceptible universe, and the manifested (Yyakta) deity, 
 its reputed, and in some respects its real, creator. This 
 unmanifested principle was identified by the Sankhya 
 school with its Prakriti, and a process of evolution was 
 disclosed fitted to connect it, through the media of sub- 
 stances of extreme tenuity, with the gross, material 
 universe. But this solution was a little too atheistic to 
 suit the irrepressible religious tendencies of the Hindu 
 mind, and therefore a reaction in favor of pantheism 
 was realized not long after its appearance and prev- 
 alence. The apparent, if not real, dualism of the 
 Sankhya philosophy did therefore in time shrink into 
 the monism of the Vedantic school. The ultimate 
 ground of existence was declared to be, not a material 
 or quasi-material form, primordial and self-evolving, 
 but a divine substance or the Divinity acting under an 
 
90 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 automatic impulse. Such were the boasted results of 
 philosophic thought in India, and such have been the 
 boasted results of philosophic thought wheresoever and 
 whensoever it has been vigorously applied to the prob- 
 lems of existence both in ancient and modern times. 
 And their unsatisfactory character is fitted to set forth, 
 in an unmistakable manner, his inability to solve them 
 by dint of thought and speculation. Ilis business is to 
 accept, with childlike simplicity, the solution placed 
 within his reach by his subjective consciousness, as well 
 as by objective revelation. And when he so far forgets 
 himself as to shut his eye presumptuously to the dim 
 light of the one source and the meridian lustre of the 
 other, he cannot but get entangled in the mazes of gro- 
 tesque fancies and ludicrous errors ! 
 
 5. But these conclusions, antipodal as they are, could 
 not but give rise to fierce controversies. The opposite 
 schools of philosophy had themselves ranged under 
 different standards, and fought with might and main 
 for their respective shibboleths. The questions which 
 were hotly debated in those days have lost much of 
 their importance and exciting power ; the arguments 
 which were plied with extraordinary skill and pro- 
 fundity have lost much of their appositeness and 
 cogency ; and even the technical phrases bandied back- 
 ward and forward have lost much of their significance. 
 But the spirit of controversy, evoked when the jarring 
 systems fought for victory and ascendency, has not 
 died out ; and racy anecdotes fitted to set forth its 
 ardor and irrepressibility form a prominent and per- 
 haps the most amusing element of table-talk in India. 
 We are tempted to relate one of these to show what 
 controversy means in India now, and what it must have 
 meant when the champions of philosophy were arrayed 
 
THE AGE OE HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 91 
 
 under hostile banners to fight to the death for their re- 
 spective theories. 
 
 Two learned Pundits, who were bosom friends, sallied 
 out of a place of learning and walked on, engaged in 
 pleasant chit-chat. Unfortunately, they allowed them- 
 selves, in perhaps an unguarded moment, to be drawn 
 into a philosophic controversy, and then the cheerful 
 countenance, the bright smile, the musical voice, and 
 the entertaining talk vanished into thin air. Their 
 faces presented a gloomy aspect, their eyes flashed with 
 animation, their voices became agitated and loud, and 
 their attitude was that of men engaged in fierce con- 
 test. They went on adding fuel to the flame till they 
 reached the lofty mound of a spacious tank. Here 
 they came from words to blows, and a scuffle ensued, 
 the consequence of which was, they moved to the edge, 
 lost their footing, and fell down into the waters below. 
 Thus cooled, they returned to their respective homes by 
 different roads, ashamed perhaps of the controversial 
 ardor they had allowed to get the better of their reason 
 and sober sense ! 
 
 Hor were these controversies merely intellectual con- 
 tests. They received the greater portion of their ardor, 
 their vehemence, their rancor, and their virulence from 
 religion. The schools were schools of religion as well 
 as philosophy, for philosophy was in those primitive 
 times polymathy, the science of the All, the omnivorous 
 science in which were included physiology, psychology, 
 and theology. Again the schools were hopelessly at 
 war with popular superstitions, and the champions of 
 these, those who derived their position, wealth, and 
 honor from them, could not but stand up against specu- 
 lations so^ obviously subversive of them. So that there 
 was what might be called a double contest in progress, 
 
92 
 
 Hindu rniLOsoriiY. 
 
 the schools at war with one another, and popular super- 
 stitions at war with them all. The materialistic schools 
 hurled anathemas at the pantheistic, and the champions 
 of the popular religion prayed down imprecations on 
 both the classes of schools with perfect impartiality ! 
 
 But this state of tlmms could not last lonm The 
 
 O O 
 
 very fierceness with which the spirit of wrangling oper- 
 ated brought on a reaction, and the result was a decay 
 of earnestness in combination with a supple, vacillating 
 spirit of compromise. No wonder ! A compromise 
 was demanded commensurate to the requirements of 
 the hot controversy that was raging. A double com- 
 promise was needed because a double controversy was 
 raging. The schools must be reconciled with one an- 
 other, and a reconciliation must be effected between 
 them on one side, and the superstitions they despised 
 on the other. This was by no means an easy task, but 
 it was effected with an ingenuity which we cannot but 
 commend. It is not at all difficult to show how, just 
 as it was not at all difficult to show how the egg might 
 be able to stand on the table, after the successful effort 
 had been put forth. 
 
 The Sankhya philosophy, the philosophy around 
 which all materialistic views revolved, traced creation 
 through a succession of principles, productive and non- 
 productive, to Prakriti. Its cosmogony was admitted, 
 and its founder, Kapila, was praised and honored as a 
 favored child of heaven, nay, even as an incarnation. 
 “ He who alone superintends every source of produc- 
 tion, every form, and all the sources of production, who 
 endowed his son, the Rishi Kapila, at the commence- 
 ment of the creation with every kind of knowledge, 
 and who looked at him when he was born.” _. . . The 
 Vedantic system, the system around which all panthe- 
 
THE AGE OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 93 
 
 istio notions revolved, presented a cosmogony which, in 
 its broad features as well as in almost all its details, 
 was a facsimile of that of the Sanlchya schools. The 
 starting point, however, of the Yedantic cosmogony 
 was Maya, not Prakriti. But if Maya could be made 
 identical with Prakriti, and an all-comprehensive, all- 
 diffusive divine substance posited behind it, the inter- 
 necine warfare between the two jarring schools of 
 thought might cease. And this was precisely the ex- 
 pedient resorted to. “ Know delusion (Maya) as nature 
 (Prakriti), him who is united with her as the great 
 ruler (Maheswar) ; this whole world in truth is per- 
 vaded by (powers which are) his parts.” 
 
 This verse of chap. iv. of the Upanishad under review 
 not only sets forth the way in which rank materialism 
 was reconciled to rank pantheism, but shows the 
 manner in which transcendental philosophy was recon- 
 ciled to grovelling superstition. The diffusive sub- 
 stance back of the demiurgic principle, Maya or Pra- 
 kriti, was represented as no other than the third person 
 of the Hindu Triad, Maheswar or Rudra. In the third 
 chapter we have this prayer : “ May Rudra, the Lord 
 of the universe, the all-wise (Maharshi) who produced 
 the gods and gave them majesty, and who created at 
 first Hiranyagarhlia, strengthen us with auspicious in- 
 tellect !” The prayer is repeated in chap. iv. : “ May 
 Rudra, the Lord of the universe, the all- wise who pro- 
 duced the gods and gave them majesty, (and) who be- 
 held the birth of Hiranyagarhlia, strengthen us with 
 auspicious intellect !” In these and such passages the 
 triad is looked upon as a monad, concentrated, as it 
 were, in the third person ; and therefore the creator is 
 sometimes called Brahma, and sometimes Rudra ; and 
 Hiranyagarhlia is no other than Maya or Prakriti. 
 
94 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Iiow ingeniously is peace restored. Rudra identified 
 with the unmanifested divine substance is not merely 
 the Creator, but the Preserver and Destroyer of the 
 universe. In chap. iii. verse 2 we have these words : 
 “ For it is one Rudra only — (the lcnowers of Brahma) 
 acknowledge not a second — who rules these worlds with 
 his ruling powers, who dwells within every man, and 
 who, having created all the worlds, (and being their) 
 protector, gets wrathful at the time of the end (destroys 
 them).” It must also be borne in mind that this august 
 being cannot act except through an emanation called 
 Sakti (energy), and to this power the varied names of 
 Prakriti, Maya, and lliranyagarhha are applied. 
 
 The chronological order in which the six systems of 
 Indian Philosophy were developed cannot possibly be 
 set forth ; and the age in which they flourished can be 
 indicated only by means of shrewd guesses, not by 
 means of well-founded and therefore thoroughly reliable 
 calculations. The starting and the terminal links of the 
 chain may, however, be fixed with almost indisputable 
 accuracy. The varied systems of philosophic thought, 
 to which the homage of the country has been paid at 
 different times, if not simultaneously, and by which the 
 peculiar phases of our national life have been moulded, 
 have a clearly discernible vein of Sankhya speculation 
 running through it ; and therefore the Sankhya system 
 may justly be represented as the first outcome of sys- 
 tematized philosophy in India. And as these systems 
 appear swallowed up, assimilated, and incorporated in 
 Yedantism, it ought to be represented as the last link 
 of the chain. The Sankhya system, therefore, ought to 
 be treated of first in an attempt to trace the history of 
 Indian Philosophy from the time when the work of its 
 systematization was commenced to that when that 
 
THE AGE OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 S5 
 
 work was consummated. The Yoga Philosophy, which 
 is its counterpart, must next claim attention. The two 
 Logical or Analytical systems, the Myaiyaika and 
 Vaiseshika, should be disposed of before the two Yedic 
 systems are sifted and analyzed. Such a treatment of 
 this many-sided theme appears to be the best fitted to 
 do it justice, though arguments may be advanced, espe- 
 cially by people disposed to carp at it as against any 
 conceivable thing, from a plenum to a vacuum. 
 
 These six systems — called orthodox — are thus speci- 
 fied : 
 
 1. Sankhya, founded by Kapila. 
 
 2. Yoga, founded by Patanjali. 
 
 3. ISTyaiyaika, founded by Gautama or Gotama. 
 
 4. Vaiseshika, founded by Kanada. 
 
 5. The Purva Mimansa, founded by Jaimini. 
 
 6. The Uttra Mimansa or Vedanta, founded by Bada- 
 ray-una or Vyas. 
 
 They will be treated of in the following papers, one 
 after another, in the order in which they appear in this 
 enumeration. 
 
 / 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 
 TIIE SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY OF THE HINDU THEORY OF 
 EVOLUTION. 
 
 The Sankhya Philosophy and its counterpart, the 
 Yoga, have lately been invested with a peculiar interest 
 in the writings and peripatetic discourses of the cham- 
 pions of Theosophy in India. The speculations formu- 
 lated in the one, and developed in a series of practical 
 rules of the most stringent type in the other, have been 
 placed above the most improved science of the day ; 
 and results are anticipated, compared with which those 
 by which the comforts and conveniences of life are 
 being multiplied are as trifles. It is proposed in this 
 paper to show, by a careful analysis of the contents of 
 one of the two original documents from which our 
 knowledge of the Sankhya Philosophy is derived, how 
 far the glowing eulogy bestowed upon it by Indian 
 theosophists is well merited. 
 
 The founder of the Sankhya, the first of the six 
 schools of Indian Philosophy, was Kapila,.one of the 
 great thinkers whose speculations in the region of pure 
 thought have not merely left an indelible mark in the 
 literature of our country, but exercised a mighty influ- 
 ence on our national life. Nothing certain or reliable 
 is known about this great man ; and he must therefore 
 be held up as a mythic rather than a historical charac- 
 ter. The traditions current about him are such as are 
 manufactured, in an age of superstition, by what Grote 
 
THE SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 97 
 
 calls the retrospective veneration of a few devoted fol- 
 lowers, and accepted as invested with peculiar sacred- 
 ness, if not as positively and indisputably unexception- 
 able, by the unthinking masses. He is said by some 
 champions of his school to have been one of the seven 
 great sons of Brahma, who cut a figure in the theogo- 
 nies of the Purans ; while by others he is held up as an 
 incarnation of Yishnu himself. Others, again, led by 
 the etymology of the word Kapila, which means a 
 tawny brown color , as well as fire, look up to him as the 
 great Yedic god, Agni himself, in a human form. He 
 is, moreover, said to have been a descendant of the 
 celebrated Indian lawgiver, Manu, to have lived in 
 retirement as a recluse, to have successfully controlled 
 his appetites and passions, and to have been invested on 
 that account with various kinds of supernatural powers. 
 But if he is identified, as he has been, with the irascible 
 sage in the Ramayana, who destroyed the sixty thou- 
 sand sons of King Sagara of Ayodhya (Oudli) in a fit of 
 rage, consequent on their impudence in accusing him of 
 the great crime of having stolen their father’s sacrificial 
 horse, the complete self-control he is said to have 
 attained becomes problematical ! 
 
 Various other stories are told about him of a piece 
 with these ; and the best thing the inquirer can do is to 
 be content with the bare fact that Kapila was a Brah- 
 min and the founder of the school of philosophy the 
 speculations of which may be found as an underlying 
 vein of thought in the most advanced of the sj^stems 
 elaborated in ancient India. Kor are we in possession 
 of the writings of this great sage, the works ascribed 
 to him — viz., the Sankhya-Pravachana, or Sankhya- 
 Aphorisms and the Tattwa Samasa, or compendium of 
 principles — being decidedly more modern. The former, 
 
08 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 translated by Dr. Ballantyne years ago, is not even 
 mentioned by Sankara Ackarya, the great Vedantist 
 commentator, who lived in the latter part of the 
 seventh and the earlier part of the eighth century ; 
 and it is not even referred to in the Sarva-Darsana- 
 Sangraha, a philosophical treatise evidently composed 
 in the fourteenth century. The Sankhya-Pravachana, 
 however, is a standard document of the Sankhya 
 school ; and in our attempts to expound the principles 
 of the philosophy associated with this school we cannot 
 hut give it a prominent place. We shall, therefore, 
 present a synopsis of the contents of this work before 
 proceeding to an examination, in another paper, of 
 those of a treatise which is decidedly more ancient — 
 viz., the Sankhya Jvarika, or exposition of the Sankhya 
 Philosophy, recently translated by Mr. Davies, of the 
 Royal Asiatic Socict\ r . Another treatise, also recently 
 translated, we shall refer to, the treatise already 
 named, the Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha, or review of the 
 different systems of Hindu Philosophy, a work of very 
 great importance, which the student of our national 
 philosophy will do well to master with a view to an 
 intimate acquaintance with the lines of thought and 
 reasoning embodied in it. 
 
 The Sankhya-Pravachana consists of six books and 
 five hundred and twenty-six Sutras or Aphorisms. 
 The first four books present the principles of Kapila’s 
 philosophy, without, it must be confessed, much regard 
 to the advantage of a perspicuous or luminous arrange- 
 ment, but with considerable acuteness and force. The 
 fifth book grapples with and refutes some of the objec- 
 tions to his system current, if not in his age, at least in 
 subsequent times ; and the sixth, being a recapitulation 
 of the principles enunciated in the first four, hears to 
 
THE SANEHTA PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 9.9 
 
 the whole the same relation which the book of Deuter- 
 onomy bears to the Pentateuch. Several commentaries 
 fitted to elucidate the contents of this hoary document, 
 and demanded peremptorily by its studied brevity and 
 sententiousness, exist ; and a recourse to them is abso- 
 lutely needed to clear up its obscure passages and make 
 its many legendary and other references intelligible. 
 But great caution must be exercised in their use to 
 avoid the common fault of transferring the traditions 
 and associations among which the commentators were 
 brought up, to the age when the passages elucidated 
 were penned. The best of these commentaries is 
 Sankhya-Pravachana Bhashya, by Yijnana Bhikshu, 
 who seems to have been an ardent admirer and a re- 
 doubtable champion of the system, at a time when it 
 was attacked by certain phases of pantheistic and nihil- 
 istic thought, as well as by persons r ~ho derived their 
 inspiration from prevalent fonxio of theistic belief. 
 The Sankhya Aphorisms, together with valuable por- 
 tions of this commentary, were translated into English 
 by Dr. Ballantyne, whose accuracy as an interpreter or 
 expounder of Hindu Philosophy has been generally 
 acknowledged by Sanscrit scholars. These translations 
 are to be utilized in the following synopsis of the con- 
 tents of this memorable work. 
 
 The grand object of this philosophy is set forth in 
 the very first of the five hundred and twenty-six Apho- 
 risms of which the book consists : “ Well, the complete 
 cessation of pain, (which is) of three kinds, is the com- 
 plete end (summum, bonum) of man.” The three kinds 
 of pain are particularized, not so much by the author 
 of the book as by his commentators. Pain ‘ ‘ natural 
 and intrinsic,” or pain arising from bodily and mental 
 infirmities and weaknesses, is comprehended in the first 
 
100 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 class ; ancl that “ natural and extrinsic,” or pain aris- 
 ing from such external causes as “ cold, heat, wind, 
 rain, thunderbolts,” is included in the second class. 
 The third class comprehends, according to the com- 
 mentator Yachaspati Misra, pains proceeding from the 
 influence of planetary bodies, or from the malice of im- 
 pure spirits, such as Yackshases, Rakshases, etc. The 
 subjection of the soul to this threefold pain, or to pain 
 in its threefold aspect, is its bondage, and liberation 
 from it should be, if it is not, the sole object of earthly 
 and even heavenly existence. The object of Sankhya 
 and eveiy other system of Indian Philosophy is to show 
 how this consummation is to be brought about, or how 
 the final emancipation of the soul from the bondage of 
 pain in its threefold aspect is to be effected. 
 
 The diagnosis of a disease is the first step toward its 
 cure ; and, therefore, an attempt is made to set forth 
 the cause of this universal bondage before the sources 
 of emancipation are pointed out. The disquisition on 
 this cause is worthy of a detailed notice, inasmuch as it 
 points to the varied antagonistic forces witli which the 
 system had to contend in its advanced, if not in its in- 
 cipient stages of development. 
 
 The great Napoleon developed a principle of universal 
 applicability when, immediately after his coronation, he 
 said : “A new dynasty must be baptized with blood.” 
 A new school of philosophy, as well as a new empire or 
 a new dynasty, has to pass through a season of almost 
 ceaseless struggle for life ; and it is not established till 
 it has proved its right to live according to a law now 
 said to be universally operative, the law of the survival 
 of th.6 fittest. And it cannot but be very interesting 
 to notice the phalanx of antagonistic forces through 
 which it has, in its inception and development, to force 
 
THE SAJfKHYA PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 101 
 
 its way to maturity, renown, and far-extending- and 
 triumphant influence, if not to universal ascendency. 
 But this cannot be done in the case of the system of 
 philosophy under review, inasmuch as we are not in 
 possession of documents fitted to throw light on its 
 early development. But we can indicate the varied 
 hostile theories with which it had to contend when the 
 Sankhya-Pravachana was composed. 
 
 "What, then, is the cause of the universally admitted 
 bondage of the soul, or its subjection to the varied 
 kinds of pain, the complete cessation of which is the 
 object of philosophy or right knowledge ? Various 
 parties come forward with varied answers, which are 
 plausible enough at first sight, but which, when prop- 
 erly weighed in the balance of reason, are found want- 
 ing. The ordinary thinker, or one not far advanced in 
 philosophy, comes forward and points to time and place 
 as the cause, jointly and separately, of the bondage of 
 the soul. But his theory is very easily exploded, as, 
 both time and place being associated with all souls, 
 those which are in bondage and those which are beati- 
 fied, if they were the obnoxious cause, release or libera- 
 tion would be an impossibility. But liberation is a 
 fact, and souls released exist free from all pain, and 
 beatified. Time and place , therefore, cannot be the 
 cause we are in quest of. The metaphysician steps for- 
 ward and affirms that the bondage of the soul arises 
 from its being conditioned and therefore necessarily 
 defective. The reply to this is plain. The premises 
 are incorrect, and therefore the conclusion is faulty. 
 The soul is absolute and unconditioned ; a position 
 established both by Scripture and common-sense." But 
 this reply elicits the rejoinder, “ If the soul is absolute 
 and unconditioned, why talk of its bondage and subse- 
 
102 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 quent liberation ?” It is not at all difficult to dispose 
 of this demurrer. Forms of expression, conventional, 
 though not scientifically accurate, cannot be very well 
 avoided. When the bondage of the soul and its libera- 
 tion are talked of, the real meaning is not hidden, 
 though some homage is paid to usage. The body, with 
 its internal organ, the mind, is really in pain, the soul's 
 bondage is only reflectional, as the red color in a crystal 
 vase containing a China rose. 
 
 The metaphysician retires, giving place to the priest 
 or the champion of current orthodoxy, who holds up 
 works as the cause of the bondage of the soul. But 
 works cannot "weave a net for that to which they do 
 not appertain. Works belong to the mind, and their 
 influence, good or bad, does not and cannot extend to 
 the soul, to which they do not in the slightest degree 
 appertain. The Vedantin, or the pantheist of the 
 Vedantio school, then comes forward, and with an air 
 of triumph insists upon Avidya, or ignorance, as the 
 cause of this bondage. But ignorance, look upon it as 
 you will, or from whatever standpoint it may please 
 you to do so, cannot cause bondage. Ignorance, ac- 
 cording to the Yedantins, is unreal ; and that which is 
 merely a phantom cannot be the cause of that which, 
 like bondage, is a reality. If, however, it is affirmed that 
 ignorance is real and not phantom-like, the very founda- 
 tion of monism, or exclusive belief in or affirmation of 
 one entity, is shaken. But suppose ignorance is repre- 
 sented as both real and unreal, what then ? Such a 
 reconciliation of opposites, such a naked paradox, is 
 almost unthinkable, and cannot be accepted by any 
 but “children and madmen.” Such a thing, more- 
 over, which at one and the same time is both real and 
 unreal, is not included in the six all-embracing catego- 
 
THE SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 103 
 
 ries of the Vaiseshikas— viz., substance, quality, action, 
 generality, particularity, and inhesion. How, then, 
 can its existence be admitted ? 
 
 The idealist then advances and affirms that, as noth- 
 ing but thought exists, bondage is unreal and dreamy. 
 But here, again, the premises are not correct. Our 
 intuition of the external world proves its reality as de- 
 cidedly as our intuitive knowledge of thought proves 
 its reality. If intuition is to be set aside as fallacious 
 or unreliable in the one case, it ought to be cast over- 
 board in the other also. The believer in momentary 
 existences, or lie who believes that existence, instead of 
 being a continuous, connected chain, consists of distinct 
 and separate parts, each leaping into momentary exist- 
 ence only to be replaced immediately by its successor, 
 steps forward or walks into the arena with his theory, 
 which, but for the fact that nothing is too absurd in 
 the region of metaphysics or speculative science, might 
 be looked upon as too odd to be entertained by sensible 
 men even for a moment. He affirms that the bondage 
 of the soul is occasioned by the influence of external 
 objects of momentary duration. He, however, does 
 not clearly see that external objects, being locally sepa- 
 rate from the soul, cannot weave a net of bondage for 
 it, and that things ephemeral, which make their ap- 
 pearance one after another only to die, cannot have a 
 permanent effect, as the bondage of the soul confessedly 
 is. And the last gentleman whose opinions are 
 weighed and found wanting is the nihilist, who main- 
 tains that, as nothing exists but an eternal and unutter- 
 able void, bondage is supposititious, a myth, or a non- 
 entity. This gentleman has directed against him the 
 very weapons by which his brother champion, the 
 idealist, is chased out of the arena. 
 
104 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Some of these opponents are regarded as brethren 
 with mistaken notions, but the opprobrious epithet of 
 heretic is applied to the rest, especially to those who 
 uphold nihilism in one form or another. 
 
 The varied theories of the bondage of the soul which 
 Kapila’s system had to combat and overcome indicate 
 the forms of thought and belief current in what might 
 emphatically be called the Age of Indian Philosophy, 
 and in times immediately subsequent to it. There was 
 the tendency to reduce all forms of existence to space 
 and time, or to merge the sensuous objects of nature 
 into the supersensuous forms of thought. There were 
 the theories of the absolute and the relative, the un- 
 conditioned and the conditioned, propounded, matured, 
 held as life, and fought for, as well as forms of thought 
 arising from current superstition. There was, more- 
 over, the transcendental type of monism which, origi- 
 nating in pure Vedantic times, was being gradually 
 fitted, by an inflexible and uncompromising logic, for 
 that ascendency which it has enjoyed in our country for 
 ages untold. There was idealism ready to affirm the 
 existence of nothing but pure thought, side by side 
 with nihilism proclaiming an interminable and absolute 
 void under diversified forms of fictitious and deceptive 
 existence. And finally there was the strange and par- 
 adoxical theory of an endless chain of unconnected ex- 
 istences, an infinite concatenation of finite links with- 
 out anything like an interdependence or correlation of 
 parts. Do not our modern philosophers find some of 
 their most favorite whims anticipated in these forms of 
 thought ? 
 
 It is desirable to state here that Kapila’s system, 
 though thrown into the shade by the ascendant star of 
 Yedantism, has maintained its influence, in spite of 
 
THE SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 105 
 
 these forms of thought, so far as to give rise to the 
 saying, quoted by Monier Williams in his excellent 
 treatise, “ Indian Wisdom” — viz., “ there is no knowl- 
 edge like Sankhya, and no power like Yoga.” Let it 
 not, moreover, be forgotten that the ascendency of the 
 Yedanta has been secured and maintained by an assim- 
 ilative process — that is, in consequence of its adoption 
 and assimilation to itself of some of the characteristic 
 ideas of the Sankhya philosophy. The Sankhya philos- 
 ophy would exist in Yedantism in a noticeable form 
 even if its existence as a separate system were utterly 
 extinguished or thrown beyond the confines of possi- 
 bility. 
 
 The question must once more be raised, “ What is 
 the cause of the universally admitted bondage of the 
 soul ?” Two Aphorisms in Book I. are calculated to 
 bring us to the conclusion arrived at by the commenta- 
 tor Yijnana Bhikshu, who lived and flourished about 
 three hundred years ago — viz., that “the immediate 
 cause of the bondage of the soul is the conjunction of 
 Prakriti and of the soul.” But the commentator is of 
 course aware, as all students of Sankhya philosophy 
 are, that the real cause lies beyond this conjunction, 
 which, as Prakriti and soul are both pervasive and 
 fitted to attract each oilier by inherent laws, is inevita- 
 ble, and from which, therefore, there is no exemption 
 even for beatified souls. The true cause of the bond- 
 age of the soul is “non-discrimination.” The soul is 
 really different from Prakriti and its products — viz., 
 intelligence, egoism, mind, etc. ; but it is led by non- 
 discrimination to identify itself with them. Hence its 
 bondage ! 
 
 But the problem is not solved here. Another ques- 
 tion arises. If the earth stands upon the elephant, 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 106 
 
 wlaat does the elephant stand upon ? If non-discrimi- 
 nation is the cause of the bondage of the soul, what is 
 the cause of non-discrimination ? Some persons may 
 be prone to maintain that merit or demerit is the cause 
 of non-discrimination. But merit or demerit, desert, 
 good or bad, springs from non-discrimination ; and 
 therefore we must posit one non-discrimination to 
 explain another ; and there will in consequence be a 
 regressus ad infinitum. But suppose we have recourse 
 to the theory of spontaneity and affirm that non-dis- 
 crimination comes naturally and spontaneously into 
 being, will not such a hypothesis be enough ? No ; for 
 in that case there can be no guarantee that liberated 
 souls shall be freed from its molestation. Non-discrim- 
 ination is really “ beginningless.” But that which is 
 beginningless is really everlasting or endless, and there- 
 fore the emancipation of the soul, consequent on the 
 annihilation of non-discrimination, is an impossibility. 
 It is not, however, beginningless, indivisible, and end- 
 less in the sense in which the soul is ; but it is begin- 
 ningless “ like an onflow (which may be stopped).” 
 Nor is this to be wondered at, considering the fact that 
 the beginningless, antecedent nonentity of a jar termi- 
 nates as soon as it is made. Non-discrimination, though 
 without beginning, is happily annihilable ; and the 
 question how it may be annihilated is, properly speak- 
 in the burden of the book under review. 
 
 But before pointing out the means prescribed for 
 bringing about this happy consummation, the annihila- 
 tion of non-discrimination and the liberation of the soul 
 under its bondage, let us ascertain what is said in these 
 Aphorisms about the soul, and what about Prakriti, 
 or, in other words, let us look into the psychology and 
 physiology of this ancient document. 
 
THE SASKHYA PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 107 
 
 Let us, in the first place, group a number of its 
 declarations about the soul (Punish) : 
 
 “ But not without the conjunction thereof (i.e. of 
 Prakriti) is there the connection of that (i.e. of pain) 
 with that (viz., the soul), which is now essentially a 
 pure and free intelligence” (Book I. Aph. 19). 
 
 “ Because this is impossible for what is inactive (or, 
 in other words, without motion, as the soul is, because 
 all-pervading and therefore incapable of changing its 
 place)” (Book I. Aph. 49). 
 
 “ Soul is something else than body, etc. Because 
 that which is combined (and is therefore discerptible) 
 is for the sake of some other (not discerptible)” (Book 
 I. Aph. 139-140). 
 
 “ And (the soul is not material) because of its super- 
 intendence (over Prakriti). And (the soul is not mate- 
 rial) because of its being an experience’ ’ (Book I. Aph. 
 142-143). 
 
 “ From the several allotment of births, a multiplicity 
 of souls (is to be inferred)” (Book I. Aph. 149). 
 
 “ It (soul) is altogether free, (but seemingly) multi- 
 form (or different in appearance from a free thing) 
 through a delusive resemblance of being bound. It 
 (soul) is a witness through its sense-organs (which quit 
 it on liberation). The nature of soul is constant free- 
 dom. And finally (the nature of the soul is) indiffer- 
 ence (to pain and pleasure alike). Its (soul’s) fancy of 
 being an agent is from the proximity of intelligence” 
 (Book I. Aph. 160-164). 
 
 “ It cannot be of its own nature, (that is to say) 
 meditation cannot belong to soul essentially, because of 
 the immobility of the soul ” (Book II. Aph. 44). 
 
 “ Bondage and liberation do not belong naturally to 
 
108 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 soul (and would not even appear to be) but for non- 
 discrimination” (Book III. Aph. Tl). 
 
 “ Soul is, for there is no proof that it is not. This 
 (soul) is different from the body, etc., because of 
 heterogeneousness (or complete difference between the 
 two)” (Book YI. Aph. 102). 
 
 “ The plurality of soul is proved by the distribution 
 (announced by the Yeda itself in such texts as whoso 
 understand this, these are immortal, while others ex- 
 perience sorrow' ’ (Book Y. Aph. 45). 
 
 These texts are fitted to prove that, according to the 
 Sankhya system, souls are multitudinous, immaterial, 
 uncompounded, undiscerptible, all-pervading, immo- 
 bile, and inactive. They are uncreate and essentially 
 intelligence and freedom. They superintend or guide 
 the evolutions of Prakriti, and experience pleasure and 
 pain, but in a unique sense. 
 
 As regards the origin of souls, the theory of creation- 
 ism cannot but be discarded in a system which is essen- 
 tially atheistic, and which at the same time cannot 
 homologate so incongruous an idea as that of a pure 
 spirit emanating from impure matter or from non- 
 entity. Its great principle, ex nihilo nihil Jit , is em- 
 phatically stated in Aphorism 78 of the very first 
 Book : “A thing is not made out of nothing (that is 
 to say, it is not possible that out of nothing — i.e. out 
 of a nonentity — a thing should be made, i.e. an entity 
 should arise.” 
 
 The theory of what in theological parlance or phrase- 
 ology is called traducianism, or that of souls propagat- 
 ing souls by the laws of generation, is also repulsive to 
 a system which looks upon the absence of all desire and 
 all activity, voluntary if not automatic, as essential to 
 
THE SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 109 
 
 their perfect freedom from misery. And, therefore, 
 the remaining theory of the pre-existence of souls, 
 maintained by so many philosophers of so many differ- 
 ent schools in ancient times and in the church by no 
 less a man than Origen, is the only theory that can be 
 propounded in consistence with the principles of the 
 Sankhya school. Souls are, therefore, represented as 
 inereate ; but it is to be observed that the g'lory of 
 being so does not belong to them exclusively. 
 
 Again, they are said to be multitudinous, or rather 
 innumerable, to avoid another difficulty. The object 
 of creation or rather evolution being to effect the 
 liberation of souls from the power or influence of non- 
 discrimination, these must be numerous or innumerable 
 to prevent the premature collapse or cessation of omnific 
 work. The greater the number of souls, the longer is 
 the process which first enslaves them one after another, 
 and then effects their liberation singly, not en masse. 
 The idea of the diffusiveness of souls is but a corollary 
 deducible from their numerousness. It ought not to be 
 forgotten that the Hindu philosopher, like his brother 
 philosophers of other ancient schools, had at best but 
 gross ideas of spiritual substances, and was therefore 
 prone to confound them with material substances of a 
 tenuous nature, such as ether, etc. Souls could not 
 therefore be, according to him, multitudinous without 
 being all-diffusive and all-nervasive. But is not each 
 soul in itself, or apart from the congeries or mass of 
 souls, diffusive and pervasive ? To some extent it is ; 
 but perhaps not ail-diffusive and all -pervasive ; though 
 all that is said of souls and Prakrit! may lead one to the 
 conclusion that they overlap and interpenetrate one 
 another, and are, moreover, overlapped and interpene- 
 trated by Prakriti. The predications with reference 
 
110 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 either to the soul or Prakriti are by no means marked 
 by perfect consistency and harmony. 
 
 Activity, as has already been indicated, can on no 
 account be attributed to souls, it being invariably asso- 
 ciated with pain and misery through desire and aver- 
 sion. Souls, therefore, are passionless and perfectly 
 quiescent. But intelligence is certainly ascribed to 
 souls — they are said to be intelligence itself. It may 
 be said that intelligence and perfect quiescence cannot 
 coexist, and that, souls being subjects of knowledge, 
 they must pass through various states of consciousness, 
 such as sensations, intellections, emotions, and voli- 
 tions ; especially as omniscience, implying unchange- 
 able thought and feeling, is not ascribed to them. But 
 intelligence in this case, as in that of the Supreme 
 Spirit of the Upanishads, is tantamount to non-intelli- 
 gence, inasmuch as it makes or implies no distinction 
 between self and not-self, subject and object. The 
 Hindu philosopher is prone to look upon the pure spirit 
 as a material entity of extreme tenuity, and he speaks 
 of its intelligence as he speaks of the color of a colored 
 substance, as a material attribute inherent rather than 
 accidental. According to him, the intelligence of the 
 soul is its golden color, its transparency, its luminous- 
 ness. Its inherence in the soul can no more be the 
 cause of intellectual, emotional, and volitional activity 
 than the color of a colored substance, say the rosy hue 
 of a rose, can be the cause of any display of activity on 
 its part. Hor must it be forgotten that intelligence in 
 the proper sense of the term is, according to this 
 system, a product of Prakriti, the root -principle of 
 nature, not an attribute or predicate of the soul. 
 
 The soul’s essence is not merely intelligence, but free- 
 dom. Then why talk of its bondage, a thing which, 
 
THE SANKHTA PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Ill 
 
 as contradictory to its nature, cannot exist in it without 
 annihilating it. Here the Sankhya philosopher seems 
 to falter for a moment, but gets rid of the difficulty 
 with an ingenuity which may be commended. The 
 soul’s bondage is reflectional, not real. Its proximate 
 cause is contact with Prakriti, the root-principle of 
 nature, called the anmulam mulam , the rootless root, 
 or, in modern phraseology, the cause uncaused. This 
 principle attracts the soul just as loadstone attracts 
 iron ; or it is attracted by the soul which is represented 
 as thoroughly immobile. 
 
 In this description, however, our philosopher loses 
 the balance of his logic and gets entangled between the 
 horns of a dilemma. If he maintains that the soul is 
 attracted by Prakriti into juxtaposition with itself, the 
 doctrine of its immobility is neutralized ; while if the 
 conjunction of the two is attributed to the attractive 
 power of the soul, its complete passivity or quiescence 
 is made problematical. The Sankhya philosopher gets 
 out of the horns by ascribing to the soul some kind of 
 automatic influence or attractive power. Voluntary 
 activity is most emphatically thrown out of the circle 
 of the soul’s predicates ; but some irresistible influence 
 or virtue emanates from it in the same manner in which 
 some mysterious influence is exerted automatically by 
 the loadstone over a piece of iron. But our philoso- 
 pher does not see that there is absolutely no necessity 
 of his positing an attractive force either in the soul or 
 in Prakriti to account for their conjunction. Both the 
 substances are, in his opinion, all-pervasive ; and there- 
 fore their conjunction is inevitable. But here a fresh 
 difficulty of an appalling nature makes its appearance. 
 If Prakriti and souls are so universally diffusive that 
 their union, or rather interpenetration, is inevitable, 
 
112 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 why are not souls simultaneously brought into bondage, 
 and where are the beatified souls lodged ? 
 
 Leaving this difficulty unremoved, as the Sankhya 
 philosopher leaves it, 1st us advert to the lamentable 
 fruits of the inevitable contact of souls with Prakriti. 
 From it proceed all the troubles of the mind ( manas ), 
 which is a product of Prakriti, and therefore no portion 
 of the soul ; and its sufferings are only reflected in the 
 luminous and quiescent soul, and in this reflection con- 
 sists its fictitious bondage. The soul is, therefore, in a 
 very loose sense called an experiencer ; and all that 
 can properly be predicated of it is that the ephemeral 
 pleasures and pains brought upon the mind by its own 
 malignant activity are reflected in its tranquil sub- 
 stance. In a sense still looser, as we shall see, the soul 
 is called the ruler of Prakriti, and the witness and reg- 
 ulator of its evolutions. 
 
 But does not the Sankhya philosopher assume the 
 reality of the bondage of the soul in his argument with 
 the Vedanta and other philosophers of the phenomenal 
 school ? But by the bondage of the soul he means in 
 reality the bondage of the mind ; but as the mind is 
 only a material evolute, its bondage cannot be real, at 
 least in a spiritual sense. This is one of the glaring in- 
 consistencies into which our philosopher is betrayed in 
 spite of his logical acumen and philosophic penetration. 
 
 The existence of a soul distinct or different from the 
 innumerable souls posited by Sankhya philosophy, 
 bearing relation to them as that which the creator 
 bears to the creature, or the ruler to the subject, or the 
 benefactor to the dependent, or even the superior to 
 the inferior, is peremptorily denied. But is something 
 like realism maintained in the Aphorisms ascribed to 
 Kapila, such as may justify our looking upon multi- 
 
THE SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 113 
 
 tudinous souls as modifications of one primal soul, their 
 generic head ? Such an idea is not discoverable in 
 them, though it might have been, and perhaps was, 
 originated in his school in subsequent times. The idea 
 appears in Vijnana Bhikshu’s commentary in a connec- 
 tion, however, which makes it difficult to ascertain 
 whether the primal soul spoken of is the generic soul, 
 the pattern and exemplar of all, or whether it is noth- 
 ing less than the pervasive, all-embracing Spirit of God 
 Himself. 
 
 In the Sankhya Aphorisms are posited two, and only 
 two, entities, souls which are neither evolutes nor 
 evolvent, and Prakriti, the evolvent root-principle of 
 nature, and therefore not an evolute. Is there not a 
 third entity spoken of as eternal in the sense of having 
 existed throughout past eternity, but not everlasting in 
 the sense of being inherently fitted to exist throughout 
 future eternity ? Is not non-discrimination represented 
 as having existed throughout past eternity, though ter- 
 minable, or rather destined to pass into non-existence 
 and continue therein for an almost incalculable cycle of 
 ages ? Is non-discrimination real or non-real ? If 
 real, the dualism assumed vanishes into thin air, or 
 gives place to triadism. If unreal, how can it hold in 
 bondage realities like living souls ? Are we to look 
 upon it as the Vedantins look upon their Ignorance or 
 Nescience, or Maya, as both real and unreal ? But 
 such contraries cannot meet in an entity ; such union 
 in one substance is unthinkable. The very argument 
 which the Sankhya philosopher sets in battle array 
 against the Vedantic notion of the soul being held in 
 bondage by ignorance, may be marshalled in all its 
 entirety against his favorite non-discrimination. But 
 this he does not pause to consider. 
 
114 
 
 niNDIT PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 How let ns see what the Aphorisms say of the second 
 entity, Prakriti, the self-evolvent principle, to which 
 creation, or existence, in all its proteus-like forms, is to 
 he traced, as well as the temporary bondage and ulti- 
 mate emancipation of souls. The word Prakriti, we 
 may mention, by the way, has been, as a rule, trans- 
 lated “nature,” but by no means with accuracy. It 
 may be rendered, in deference to the scientific phrase- 
 ology of the day, “the primordial form but the 
 better word is “ the self-evolving principle, ” the root of 
 nature, called anmulam mulam , the rootless root. 
 
 The passages to be extracted in illustration of the 
 nature of Prakriti are these : 
 
 “ Prakriti is the state of equipoise of goodness 
 (sattwa), passion (rajas), and darkness (i tamas )” (Book 
 I. Aph. 61). 
 
 “ Since the root has no root, the root (of all) is root- 
 less (that is to say, there is no other cause of Prakriti, 
 because there would be a regressus ad infinitum , if we 
 were to suppose another cause, which by parity of rea- 
 soning would require another cause, and so on, without 
 end). Even if there be a succession, there is a halt at 
 some one point, and so it is merely a name (that we give 
 to the point in question) when we speak of the root of 
 things under the name of Prakriti. Alike in respect of 
 Prakriti and of both (Soul and Prakriti, is the argument 
 for the uncreated existence)” (Book I. Aph. 67-69). 
 
 “ ITer (Prakriti’s) imperceptibility arises from her 
 subtlety. (Prakriti) exists because her existence is 
 gathered from beholding of productions (which have 
 these qualities)” (Book I. Aph. 109-110). 
 
 “ Though she be unintelligent, yet Prakriti acts — as 
 is the case with milk (that is to say, as milk, without 
 reference to man’s efforts, quite of itself changes into 
 
THE SAHKHYA PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 115 
 
 the form of curd). Or, as is the case with acts (or on- 
 goings), for we see them, of time, etc. (the spontaneous 
 action of Prakriti is proved from what is seen). The 
 action of time, for instance, takes place cpiite spontane- 
 ously in the shape of one season’s now departing and 
 another’s coming on — let the behavior of Prakriti also 
 be thus — for the supposition conforms to observed facts. 
 But still a senseless Prakriti would never energize, or 
 would energize in a wrong way, less because of there 
 being (in her case) no such communing as, “ This is my 
 means of producing experience,” etc. To this he 
 replies, From her own nature she acts, not from 
 thought — -just as a servant (that is to say, as in the case 
 of an excellent servant, naturally, merely from habit, 
 the appointed and necessary service of the master is 
 engaged in, and not with a view to his own enjoyment, 
 just so does Prakriti energize from habit alone). Or, 
 from attraction by deserts which have been from eter- 
 nity” (Book III. Aph. 59-63). 
 
 Here we bring our string of quotations from the text 
 — as well as from the commentary — to a close, and 
 emphasize the points made. Prakriti is eternal, imper- 
 ceptible, indiscrete, unintelligent, and ever active, 
 except when in a state of equipoise. It resembles the 
 soul in eternal duration, imperceptibility, and undis- 
 cerptibility, but differs from it in activity or energy of 
 self- evolution, not in its want of intelligence, as the 
 intelligence of the soul, being destitute of the elements 
 of self-consciousness and world-consciousness, is equiva- 
 lent to non-intelligence. 
 
 Here a couple of questions ought to be raised and 
 disposed of. 
 
 The first is, If Prakriti is imperceptible, how are we 
 to be sure of its existence ? To be able to answer this 
 
116 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 question it is necessary to look into the laws of evidence 
 which are recognized in the Sankhya school. The cham- 
 pions of this school admit only three kinds of proof 
 — viz., perception (Prataksha), inference (Anuman), 
 and testimony (Sabda) ; and they discard comparison 
 (■ upamana ), which the Logical schools add to the list, as 
 well as the two others admitted in the Yedic schools. 
 The objects of the external world make their existence 
 known to us through the medium of perception, or the 
 impressions made upon the senses by them. But they 
 are, each of them, discerptible, and consequently de- 
 structible. Their discerptibility, or divisibility, proves 
 that they are not eternal, and that, therefore, they 
 cannot lie the ground of their own existence. The law 
 of inference leads the mind to look for the cause of 
 their existence or manifestation apart from them ; and 
 the ultimate ground at which we arrive, when we trace 
 the different lines of causation to their converging point, 
 is Prakriti. Its existence, therefore, is proved by infer- 
 ence based on perception. 
 
 Again, it is plain that these objects, evolved from 
 Prakriti, do not exist for themselves. Or, in other 
 words, Prakriti does not evolve for its own advantage. 
 With its varieties of evolutes, it exists for something 
 else, as “ axes for cutting,” or “ houses” for the ben- 
 efit of those who dwell in them. For whom, or for 
 what does Prakriti evolve, or do the evolutes of Prakriti 
 exist ? For souls, certainly. The laws of inference, 
 then, not merely establish the existence of Prakriti, 
 but that of souls also. And as Prakriti, like the soul, 
 is indiscerptible, it is uncreate and eternal. In this 
 piece of reasoning the doctrine of final causes is recog- 
 nized as in the preceding are the doctrines of efficient 
 and material causes. 
 
THE SAJiKHTA PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 117 
 
 Xoy comes the second question, IIo\v can Prakriti 
 be called discerptible, seeing that it consists of the 
 three qualities ( gunas ), goodness, passion, and darkness, 
 held in equipoise ? 
 
 What are these gunas or qualities ? Are they ele- 
 mentary substances of extreme tenuity, or are they ' 
 mere predicates or attributes of substances ? If they 
 are qualities or attributes, in the ordinary sense of the 
 term, of substances, their inherence in Prakriti does 
 not militate against its indiscerptibility. If, however, 
 they are elementary substances, their union in Prakriti 
 establishes its complex nature and its consequent dis- 
 cerptibility. Their nature should, therefore, be thor- 
 oughly looked into before the claim of indiscerptibility 
 advanced in favor of Prakriti can be adjudicated upon. 
 
 The word gima, generally translated “quality,” 
 means a cord, and the three gunas of the Sankliya 
 school are the three cords by which the soul, or rather 
 Prakriti itself, is fettered. They are sattwa , rajas , 
 and tamas. The word sattwa means purity and good- 
 ness, and the sattioa guna is that which enlightens, 
 soothes, purifies, causes virtue, and communicates 
 pleasure and happiness. It prevails in ethereal regions, 
 and causes the enlightenment, happiness, and joy char- 
 acteristic of those seats of purity and goodness. In the 
 world it predominates in fire, and that is the reason 
 why flame tapers toward the sky, and sparks fly up- 
 ward. When it abounds in man he becomes virtuous and 
 happy ; and to its preponderance must be ascribed the 
 acknowledged happiness of superior orders of beings, 
 such as Prajapatis, Indras, Pitris, Gfandharvas, Gods, 
 and Demigods. The word rajas means passion, energy, 
 and activity ; and the characteristics of the rajas-guna 
 are variability, activity, vehemence, and restlessness. 
 
118 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 It is accompanied by vice and misery, and when it pre- 
 vails in man he becomes a child of error and wretched- 
 ness. It abounds in the atmosphere, and accounts for 
 its fitful and erratic movements. Anti lastly, the word 
 tamas means stolidity and darkness ; and the tamas- 
 ' guna is that which produces sorrow, dulness, stupidity, 
 and inaction. It predominates in earth and water, 
 and accounts for their downward tendency ; and when 
 it abounds in man it makes him sorrowful, stupid, lazy, 
 and immobile. 
 
 The three qualities abound respectively in upper, 
 mundane, and nether creations. “ Aloft (above the 
 world of mortals) it (the creation) abounds in, the 
 quality of) purity. Beneath (that is to say, under the 
 world of mortals) (the creation) abounds in darkness. 
 In this midst, (that is, in the world of mortals, the 
 creation) abounds in passion” (Book III. Aph. 48-50). 
 
 But it is to be observed that they are, as a rule, if 
 not invariably, found mixed in varied proportions, 
 never almost dissevered or separated one from another. 
 In the highest ethereal regions, as in superior orders of 
 beings and the very best of men, purity abounds ; but 
 it is not altogether dissociated from its troublesome 
 companions, inasmuch as these exist, albeit in veiy 
 small proportions, along with it. And in the lowest 
 infernal regions, as in demons and evil spirits, as well 
 as the worst of men, some degree of purity, however 
 inconsiderable, is found in conjunction with the pre- 
 ponderant passion and darkness. This fact explains or 
 shows the distinction there is between these qualities, 
 or rather material attributes, and the substances in 
 which they are found mixed in varied proportions. 
 They are almost inseparable in reality, though separa- 
 ble in thought. They are a material trinity in unity, 
 
THE SAHKHYA PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 119 
 
 and unity in trinity. They are held in equipoise only 
 in Prakriti in its quiescent state, and their union in it 
 in equal proportions cannot militate against the theory 
 of its eternity and indiscerptibility. They are, more- 
 over, ubiquitous, existing in all the productions or 
 modifications of Prakriti, in all the regions of space, in 
 endlessly varied proportions. And they are, in their 
 joint capacity as well as singly, an evil ; they being 
 the cause of that bondage of the mind which is reflected 
 in the soul, and from the reflection of which it has to 
 be liberated. 
 
 Prakriti, in its Trinitarian essence, is the great 
 omnific principle, and it energizes spontaneously, as 
 milk coagulates into curd when let alone. Though 
 destitute of intelligence, and acting from a simple 
 automatic impulse, it never errs, as “ an excellent ser- 
 vant” anticipates and obeys the commands of his 
 master “from habit.” The order of creation is pre- 
 sented in Aph. Cl of Book I. : “ From Prakriti (pro- 
 ceeds) intelligence (Buddlii), from intelligence egoizer, 
 or I-maker (Ahankara), from egoizer the five subtle 
 elements (Tanmatras), and both sets (internal and ex- 
 ternal) of organs (Indriya), and from the subtle elements 
 the gross elements (Sthul bliuta).” Intelligence, the 
 first product, or evolute, of self-evolving Prakriti, is 
 called great (Mahat), because it is a principle of “ super- 
 lative purity,” and occupies in creation the same place 
 which the Prime Minister occupies in a well- organized 
 government. It gives birth to egoizer, which is the 
 cause of the distinction we make between self and not- 
 self, a distinction fictitious rather than real, and one 
 which proves to us a source of vexation and trouble. 
 Then come the five tenuous elements, imperceptible to 
 man, but perceptible to superior beings, or even to man 
 
120 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 when liis natural powers are indefinitely enlarged by 
 meditation — viz., sound, touch, color, taste or sapidity, 
 and smell. These seven principles are evolutes of Pra- 
 kriti, and evolvent ; and to their omnific activity, or 
 prolific energy, creation in its multifarious aspects is to 
 be traced. Then there are sixteen other principles, 
 which are evolutes or productions, not evolvents or pro- 
 ducers — viz., the five gross elements, earth, fire, water, 
 air, ether ; the five organs of knowledge (Gfyan-in- 
 driyani), the eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue, the 
 skin ; the five organs of action (Karma indriyani), the 
 hands, the feet, the larynx or the organ of speech, the 
 orifice, and the generative organ ; and the mind ( Manas), 
 called the eleventh organ, the real cause of the bondage 
 under which it itself groans, and from the reflection of 
 which the soul has to be freed. 
 
 The existence of these twenty-four tattwas, or cate- 
 gories, is proved by perception and inference, which 
 last is a process of demonstration rising from what is 
 perceptible to what is imperceptible. For instance, the 
 gross elements, earth, fire, water, air, are perceptible 
 to mortals ; and their existence is proved by the simple 
 testimony of the senses. But thej^ do not explain their 
 own existence, and therefore we are led by the laws of 
 reasoning to the tenuous principles, the subtle rudi- 
 ments from which they proceed, and by which their 
 existence is accounted for. But these subtle elements, 
 imperceptible to men in general, though perceptible to 
 superior beings, or even men endowed with powers of 
 perception keener and more expanded than human 
 beings ordinarily possess, are only modifications of the 
 I-maker, which again is a modification of intelligence, 
 the first-born of Prakriti increate. Again, the mind, 
 the eleventh organ, is another modification of the 
 
THE SAXKIIYA PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 121 
 
 I-maker, and its existence is proved by that of the per- 
 ceptible organs of knowledge and action. 
 
 The existence of the twenty-fifth category, the soul, 
 which is neither an evolute nor an evolvent, is proved 
 by the creative energy of Prakriti, which energizes, 
 not for its own advantage, but for that of an entity 
 apart from itself. This is emphatically stated in such 
 verses as these : “ From Brahma down to a post for its 
 (soul’s) sake is creation till there be discrimination 
 (between soul and Prakriti), on which its liberation 
 ensues.” “ Prakriti’ s creation is for the sake of an- 
 
 other, though it be spontaneous, for she is not the 
 experiencer, just like a cart’s carrying saffron for the 
 sake of its master. ’ ’ 
 
 But why not carry the arguments from inference a 
 step farther, and recognize a Lord (Iswara) behind the 
 varied manifestations of Prakriti, as the ultimate 
 ground of existence ? There are insuperable obstacles 
 in the way. A Lord cannot possibly be the creator of 
 the universe. If he exists, lie must either be free or 
 bound. If free, he cannot have a desire to create prev- 
 alent enough to determine his will, or lead to volition 
 and action. It is an established maxim of Hindu Phi- 
 losophy that a desire leading irresistibly to action, good 
 or bad, is bondage. Such a desire on the part of God 
 cannot but militate against His assumed freedom. If, 
 however, He is bound, how could He possibly create ? 
 The supposition, therefore, of a Lord behind the veil of 
 shifting phenomena is both irrational and useless. 
 
 How thoroughly the atheistic speculations of our 
 vaunted age of progress were anticipated in times 
 which may be called prehistoric, in India and other 
 countries ! The scientists and philosophers of the day 
 now and then betray a little weakness, to which their 
 
122 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 prototypes of ancient times were utter strangers. 
 Given matter and the laws immanent in it, they have 
 no difficulty whatever in explaining the wonders of 
 creation, or solving the knotty problems of existence. 
 But they manifest a little hesitation when they have to 
 settle the question, “ How came matter to be, and how 
 and by whom were its laws impressed upon it ?” 
 Their hesitation, however, is momentary, as they shake 
 it off b} r assuming the eternity of matter, and the eter- 
 nal inherence of its laws, as well as by upholding the 
 principle, ex nihilo niliil fit. But our redoubtable phi- 
 losophers of ancient times presented a braver front, and 
 did not hesitate for a moment in affirming with oracu- 
 lar assurance the eternity of matter ; and their dictum, 
 as has already been said, runs thus : “A thing is not 
 made out of nothing.” And even when they admitted 
 the existence of a God, their principle that an impure 
 thing, such as matter in their opinion is, cannot possi- 
 bly emanate from, or be created by, a pure Being, 
 made it impossible for them to represent such a Being 
 as its Creator. God or no God, matter, according to 
 their teaching, is eternal, along with the laws inherent 
 in it. 
 
 But the way in which our philosophers dispose of the 
 argument based on testimony, which is one of the three 
 kinds of proof admitted in his school, is worthy of con- 
 sideration. By testimony they understand, not only 
 what is ordinarily included in that term, but a great 
 deal more, even the teachings of revelation, and those 
 of devotees and adepts, who by virtue of intense medi- 
 tation have obtained, and may obtain, the power of 
 recalling to their minds the varied events which oc- 
 curred to them in several, if not all, of their past lives, 
 and that of discovering and bringing to light occult 
 
THE SAXKHYA PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 123 
 
 truths, or truths hidden among the arcana of nature. 
 But revelation distinctly affirms the existence of a 
 Lord. How is this to be accounted for ? Is revelation 
 to be discarded as a tissue of Old Wives’ Fables ? Our 
 time-serving philosophers did not allow themselves to 
 be ostensibly carried thus far by their scepticism. 
 They got rid of the difficulty by resorting to orbits of 
 shuffling criticism, not unknown to modern sceptics. 
 (“The Scriptural texts which make mention of ‘the 
 Lord ’ are) either glorifications of the liberated souls or 
 homages to the recognized (deities of the Hindu Pan- 
 theon).” And, besides, “There is Scripture for this 
 (world’s) being the production of Prakriti (not of a 
 Lord).” 
 
 It may be mentioned here that, even when Hindu 
 Philosophy allows the existence of a god, it makes him 
 so quiescent and inactive that creation cannot possibly 
 be attributed to him. We cannot ascribe creation to 
 him without making him subject to passion, the second 
 of the three qualities from which he must be free, and 
 therefore representing him as actually held in bond- 
 age. Hor can he be the governor of the universe with- 
 out being “selfish” and “liable to grief.” In Book 
 Y. we have these Aphorisms : 
 
 Aph. 3. “ (If a Lord were governor, then) having- 
 intended his own benefit, his government (would be 
 selfish) as is the case (with ordinary governors) in the 
 world. ’ ’ 
 
 “ (He must then be) just like a worldly lord (and) 
 otherwise (than you desire that we should conceive of 
 him) ; for if we agree that the Lord is also benefited, he 
 also must be something mundane — just like a worldly 
 lord — because, since his desires are (on that supposition) 
 not (previously) satisfied, he must be liable to grief.” 
 
124 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 And besides the supposition of a lord is useless. He 
 cannot create, cannot govern, cannot judge, cannot re- 
 ward or punish — the last prerogative, viz., that of be- 
 stowing rewards and inflicting punishments being a pre- 
 rogative of works, not of God. In Aph. 2 of this Book, 
 we have these words : “ Hot from its (the world’s) 
 being governed by the Lord, is there the effectuation 
 of the fruit, for it is by works (that is, by merit and 
 demerit) that this is accomplished — by works alone 
 which are indispensable — and if we do make the addi- 
 tional and cumbrous supposition of a Lord, he cannot 
 reward a man otherwise than according to his works.” 
 
 If there is no Lord, the question arises, Why believe 
 in a revelation at all ? The proper answer to this ques- 
 tion brings forward a theory which in absurdity has 
 not its parallel even in the history of wild speculation. 
 The Sankhya philosopher does not hold, like the Mim- 
 ansakas and the Vedantins, the eternity of the Vedas. 
 The forty- fifth Aphorism of the Fifth Book of the 
 work under review runs thus : “ The Veda is not from 
 eternity, for there is Scripture for its being a produc- 
 tion.” If not eternal, it must have been written either 
 by God or by some gifted man. It could not possibly 
 have been written, or vouchsafed through verbal com- 
 munication, or in any other way, by God, for the 
 Sankhya Philosophy does not recognize His existence. 
 Hor could it have been written by a gifted man : such 
 a man must be either liberated or in bondage. If lib- 
 erated, he could not have a prevailing desire leading to 
 its composition ; and if in bondage, he could not but 
 have lacked “the power” needed to bring about so 
 glorious a result. 
 
 The Vedas, therefore, could not have proceeded 
 either from God or from man, nor are they eternal. 
 
THE SAHKHYA PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 125 
 
 How then is the mystery involved in their existence to 
 be unravelled ? Here is the explanation : “ The 
 
 Yedas, just like an expiration, proceed of themselves 
 from the self-existent, through the force of fate, unper- 
 ceived by thought.” To explain this statement of the 
 commentator, A r ijnana Bhikshu, two questions have to 
 be raised. Who is the self-existent from whom the 
 Yedas are said to have emanated as an expiration ? 
 The self-existent must either be Prakriti itself, or some 
 evolute of Prakriti, there being nothing knowable or 
 within the reach of proof behind it, and the sold being 
 incapable of sending these venerated books out even as 
 an efflation. The Sankhya philosophers speak of an 
 emergent deity, whom they call Brahma when he cre- 
 ates, Yishnu when he preserves, and Siva or Mahadeva 
 when he destroys. This emergent deity is the first 
 evolute of Prakriti, intelligence, called Makat, the 
 Great One ; not, however, personal intelligence, but 
 something like general intelligence, the intelligence of 
 which personal intelligence, mine or thine, is only a 
 form. This great one, the first-born of Prakriti in- 
 create, is the unconscious author of the Yedas, because 
 they emanate from him as an expiration. 
 
 When do they emanate ? Here we have to unfold 
 the doctrine of metempsychosis, which underlies all 
 the philosophical speculations of ancient India ; which 
 even those bold spirits who, like Kapila and Buddha, 
 cast aside all faith in God, personal, if not impersonal, 
 did not dare abandon. Prakriti creates one world after 
 another in endless succession, to meet the exigencies of 
 human desert, or to afford scope for the consumption of 
 the fruits of work. One world is evolved after another 
 to reward or punish the accumulated work of those 
 which precede, and to furnish cause, by its own accu- 
 
126 
 
 HINDU THILOSOPIIT. 
 
 mulated work added to the tremendous load it inherits, 
 for the existence of those which succeed. Every reno- 
 vated world, with its shifting panorama of moral 
 actions and moral deserts, is thus connected with an 
 endless chain of antecedent, and an equally endless 
 chain of consequent stages of existence. Each of these 
 gradually unfolded stages of existence or works van- 
 ishes, when its appointed service is over, only to see 
 another springing up, and continuing its great work of 
 rewarding virtue and punishing vice. At each of these 
 renovations of the world, the Yedas issue out of the 
 emergent deity, called intelligence in the original 
 Sutras, and the self-existent, or Brahma, in subsequent 
 times, as an efflation. 
 
 In conclusion, let us ascertain what the work under 
 review says of liberation, the great object and scope of 
 all the speculations embodied in its pages. Prakriti 
 creates or energizes, to liberate the soul from the bond- 
 age of non-discrimination, or misapprehension, or mis- 
 conception. How is this effected ? Hot by worship, 
 for worship takes for granted what is not admitted, the 
 existence of a creative and controlling being behind the 
 veil of natural phenomena ; not by sacrifices, because 
 these, as they inflict pain upon the victims, cannot but 
 occasion pain to those by whom they are offered, by 
 the law of retribution ; not by rites and ceremonies of 
 a bloodless character, because whatever efficacy they 
 may have is of a transient, not a permanent, nature. 
 These all are certainly praised in various parts of 
 Scripture. The sacrifice of the horse is said to give 
 the offerer power to conquer all worlds, expiate sin, 
 overcome death, and attain immortality. The juice of 
 the soma, the moon plant ( Asclepias acida), is said to 
 have conferred victory, triumph, “effulgence,” and 
 
THE SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 127 
 
 “deathless being” on Indra himself, and the subordi- 
 nate gods and goddesses of the Indian Parnassus. But 
 it is to be borne in mind that the benefits conferred 
 by bloody and bloodless rites are evanescent, and that 
 even the gods perish at every dissolution of the world, 
 or at the consummation of every single stage of exist- 
 ence. “Many thousands of Indras and other gods 
 have passed away in successive periods, overcome by 
 time ; for time is hard to overcome.” Freedom from 
 the galling yoke of transmigration, from an almost in- 
 terminable chain of births and deaths, religious observ- 
 ances cannot possibly secure. 
 
 Such freedom is the result of right knowledge or dis- 
 crimination, which is obtained by meditation. “ From 
 knowledge (acquired during mundane existence) comes 
 salvation (soul’s chief end)” (Book III. Aph. 23). 
 Knowledge alone, dissociated from, not in conjunction 
 with, works, is the fountain of liberation, as the verse 
 following the one quoted assures us, “ Since this (viz., 
 knowledge) is the precise cause of liberation, there is 
 neither association (of anything else with it, e.g. good 
 works) nor alternativeness (e.g. of good works in its 
 stead).” This knowledge is attained by meditation, on 
 the nature and efficacy of which the following verses 
 give information : 
 
 “ Meditation is the cause of the removal of desire 
 (that affection of the mind by objects which is a hin- 
 derer of knowledge). It (meditation, from the effect- 
 uation of which, and not from merely communing upon 
 it) knowledge arises, is perfected by the repelling of the 
 modifications (of the mind which ought to be obstructed 
 from all thoughts of anything). This meditation is 
 perfected by restraint, postures, and one’s duties. Re- 
 straint (of the breath) is by means of expulsion and 
 
128 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 retention. Steady and (promoting) ease is a (suitable) 
 posture, (such as the crossing of the arms). One’s 
 duty is the performance of the actions prescribed for 
 one’s religious order” (Book III. Aph. 30-35). 
 
 The subject of meditation and its varied appliances 
 belongs, properly speaking, to Yoga philosophy, the 
 counterpart, not only of the Sankhya system, but in 
 some respects of every system of philosophy pro- 
 pounded in India, not excluding almost all of those 
 systems which, like Buddhism and its offshoots, are 
 branded heterodox. Meditation, not in its incipient 
 stages, but when perfected by years of close attention, 
 and rigid conformity to its almost endless varieties of 
 stringent rules, begets right knowledge, which dispels 
 non-discrimination, and brings on emancipation. The 
 essence of the knowledge begotten by meditation is the 
 distinction between the soul and non-soul, the passive, 
 quiescent, immobile spirit and the ever-active, plastic, 
 formative Prakriti. When this distinction is clearly 
 apprehended by the mind, the soul is set free from the 
 bondage of its desires and aversions, its good and bad 
 deeds, and their woeful consequences in an almost end- 
 less chain of transmigrations. 
 
 The soul is, of course, in a very loose sense said to be 
 set free, its bondage and liberation being nominal, not 
 real — reflections and shadows, not realities. The 
 bondage and liberation spoken of throughout this book 
 are in reality the bondage and liberation of Prakriti, 
 which, first of all, weaves a net for its own entangle- 
 ment by a process of evolution, and ultimately effects 
 its own emancipation by a process of meditation. And 
 to this mischievous activity it is impelled by passion 
 (rajas), the second of the three qualities which form its 
 Trinitarian essence. 
 
CHAPTER Y. 
 
 THE SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY, OK THE HINDU THEOKY OF 
 EVOLUTION CONTINUED. 
 
 An exposition of the principles of the Sankhya sys- 
 tem must be incomplete without some reference to a 
 treatise decidedly earlier than the one already exam- 
 ined— we mean the Sankhya-Karica, or exposition of 
 the Sankhya, by Iswara Krishna. That this document 
 is more ancient than the Sankhya Pravachana, or the 
 Sankhya Sutras, falsely ascribed to Kapila, is proved 
 both by internal and external evidence. The specula- 
 tions embodied in the Sankhya Pravachana about the 
 emergent Deity, who appears as Creator under the 
 name of Brahma, as Preserver under that of Yishnu, 
 and as Destroyer under that of Mahadeva, are suffi- 
 cient to trace its composition to the age when an 
 attempt was made to reconcile philosophy with current 
 superstitions ; and they would be enough, even if 
 other proofs were wanting, to establish its posteriority. 
 The book, however, abounds with references to the 
 varied systems of philosophy which are known to have 
 flourished in times posterior to the age of Kapila, who 
 in one important sense may be called the father of 
 Hindu Philosophy. Such references, both direct and 
 oblique, are scarcely met with in the Sankhya-Karica, 
 which, moreover, does not indicate any advance on the 
 part of Philosophy toward a reconciliation between the 
 transcendental speculations of the schools and the grov- 
 elling beliefs of the masses. 
 
130 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Tho Sankhya-Karica consists of seventy-two slokas, 
 or distichs, each, as a rule, bearing upon a distinct 
 topic. As specimens of conciseness of style, condensa- 
 tion of thought, and closeness of reasoning, these dis- 
 tichs are worthy of all praise ; though they are free, 
 comparatively speaking, from the tinge of controver- 
 sialism by which the later work is distinguished. The 
 hook has been very recently translated by Mr. John 
 Davies, whose elucidatory notes and extracts from 
 standard commentaries are helps without which it is 
 impossible for the ordinary reader to master its con- 
 tents. Of his translation we shall avail ourselves in our 
 attempt to present a synopsis of its contents. 
 
 Regarding the author of the Sankhya-Karica, very 
 little is known beyond what is indicated in the last 
 three of its distichs. These we deem it desirable to 
 transcribe : 
 
 “ This supreme purifying doctrine, the Sage (Kapila) 
 compassionately imparted to Asuri ; Asuri taught it to 
 Panchasikha, by whom it was extensively made known. 
 
 “ Handed down by disciples in succession, it has been 
 compendiously 'written in Arya metre by the noble- 
 minded Iswara Krishna, having fully learned the dem- 
 onstrated truth. 
 
 “ The subjects treated in seventy distichs are those 
 of the complete science, containing sixty topics, ex- 
 cludin'? illustrative tales, and omitting also eontrover- 
 sial questions. 
 
 “ Thus is completed the book of the Sankhya (Phi- 
 losophy) uttered by the venerable, the great-minded, 
 and divine Kapila. 
 
 ‘ May prosperity attend it ! ’ ” 
 
 In accordance with tho plan referred to, if not dis- 
 
THE SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY CONTINUED. 
 
 131 
 
 tinctly laid down in the last paper, we shall present a 
 synopsis of the contents of this book, allude cursorily 
 to an expository argument in the dissertation on this 
 Philosophy in the Sarva Darsana Sangraha, and con- 
 clude with a few general observations on the doctrines 
 and principles of the system under review. 
 
 And first, in accordance with our arrangement, we 
 shall inquire into what the book says about the soul 
 and Prakriti, the two entities admitted as existent in 
 the Sankhya school. But before we do so a prelimi- 
 nary observation is desirable. 
 
 The speculations embodied in Sankhya-Ivarica begin 
 exactly where those of Sankhya Pravachana begin, 
 that is, with the admission of the three lands of pain 
 begetting a longing for liberation, such as cannot possi- 
 bly be satisfied by ££ the visible means,” such as earthly 
 pleasures, medicine, etc. , or by £ £ the revealed means, ’ ’ 
 such as prayers, sacrifices, and other religious observ- 
 ances. The first two distichs set forth in a condensed 
 form the object and scope of Sankhya Philosophy, as 
 well as the universally admitted fact on which it is 
 based : 
 
 ££ From the injurious effects of the threefold kinds of 
 pain (arises) a desire to know the means of removing it 
 (pain). If from the visible (means of removing it) this 
 desire should seem to be superfluous, it is not so, for 
 these are neither absolutely complete nor abiding. 
 
 ££ The revealed (means) are like the visible (i.e. ineffi- 
 cient), for they are connected with impurity, destruc- 
 tion,. and excess. A contrary method is better, and 
 this consists in a discriminative knowledge of the mani- 
 fested (forms of matter), the unmanifested (Prakriti or 
 primeval matter), and the knowing (sold).” 
 
 Mr. Davies shows how religious observances are, 
 
i3a 
 
 HIXDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 according to Kapila, accompanied with “ impurity, 
 destruction, excess, or inequality.” The Yedic system 
 which is an embodiment of what the text calls “ re- 
 vealed means,” is imperfect and inefficient, because it 
 is inseparably linked to bloody sacrifices, which cannot 
 but result in impurity ; because the reward it promises 
 is temporary happiness, not the liberation implied in 
 the soul’s emancipation from all material influences ; 
 and, lastly, because it gives some persons, for instance, 
 the rich, who can offer bloody sacrifices more easily 
 than the poor, an undue advantage over others. 
 
 How let us group some of the passages in which the 
 antithesis between the soul and Prakriti is set forth : 
 
 3. “ Prakriti, the root (of material forms) is not pro- 
 duced. The great one (Mahat, Buddhi or Intellect) 
 and the rest (which spring from it) are seven (sub- 
 stances) producing and produced. Sixteen are produc- 
 tions (only). Soul is neither producing nor produced.” 
 
 11. “The manifested ( VyaJda) has the three modes 
 (yuna). It is indiscriminating, objective, generic, irra- 
 tional, and productive. So also is Pradhan (Prakriti). 
 Soul in these respects ; as in those (previously men- 
 tioned), is the reverse.” 
 
 15. “ From the finite nature of specific objects ; 
 from the homogeneous nature (of genera and species) ; 
 from the active energy of evolution (the constant pro- 
 gressive development of finite forms) ; from the sepa- 
 rateness of cause and effect ; and from the undivided- 
 ness (or the real unity) of the whole universe.” 
 
 1G. “ (It is proved that) there is a primary cause, 
 the unmanifested (Avyakta) which acts (or develops 
 itself) by three modes ; by blending and modification, 
 like water, from the difference of the receptacle or seat 
 of the modes as they are variously distributed.” 
 
THE SANKIIYA PHILOSOPHY CONTINUED. 
 
 133 
 
 17. “ Because an assemblage (of things) is for the 
 sake of another ; because the opposite of the three 
 modes and the rest (their modifications) must exist ; 
 because there must be a superintending power ; because 
 there must be a nature that enjoys, and because of (the 
 existence of) active exertion for the sake of abstraction 
 or isolation (from material contact) ; therefore soul 
 exists.” 
 
 18. “ From the separate allotment of birth, death, 
 and the organs ; from the diversity of occupations at 
 the same time ; and also from the different conditions 
 (or modifications) of the three modes ; it is proved that 
 there is a plurality of souls.” 
 
 19. “ And from that contrariety (of soul) it is con- 
 cluded that the witnessing soul is isolated, neutral, per- 
 ceptive, and inactive by nature. 5 ’ 
 
 20. “It is thus, from this union, that the unintelli- 
 gent body (the linga) appears to be intelligent, and 
 from the activity of the modes, the stranger (the soul) 
 appears to be an agent.” 
 
 These distichs set forth the contrast between Prakriti 
 and soul as well as the varied kinds of proof by which 
 their existence is demonstrated. Prakriti is the root of 
 the perceptible and inferrable universe, that is, the uni- 
 verse of which the grosser objects are perceived, and 
 the subtler inferred from those perceived. Prakriti is 
 the unmanifested (Avyakta) developing itself, in con- 
 sequence of an immanent law of cyclic evolution, into 
 the manifested (Vyakta) ; and it unfolds itself in forms 
 which may be classed in genera and in species. Prak- 
 riti is objective, irrational, unfitted to discriminate 
 one thing from another, and productive or evolvent. 
 The soul is the very antipodes in all these respects of 
 Prakriti. It is in its essence isolated from the universe 
 
134 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of material objects, the entity which always continues 
 unmanifested, is subjective, rational, fitted to discern 
 the differences subsisting between things which differ, 
 non-productive, and inactive. Its rationality and dis- 
 criminativeness are, however, problematical, as we 
 shall show by and by. Suffice it to say here that the 
 two entities are so decidedly opposed to one another 
 that, in order to produce either of them, we have only 
 to divest the other of its peculiar attributes and clothe 
 it with those which are their contrasts or opposites. 
 
 In one important respect the antithesis between Prak- 
 riti and soul is marked. Prakriti has the three (/anas, 
 or qualities, or modes, while the soul is entirely free 
 from their presence or influence. Let us see what the 
 Karica says about these constitutive elements of Prak- 
 riti : 
 
 12. “ The modes have a joyous, grievous, and stupe- 
 fying nature. They serve for manifestation, activity, 
 and restraint : they naturally subdue and support each 
 other, produce each other, consort together, and take 
 each other s condition. 
 
 13. “ ‘ Goodness ’ (Sattwa) is considered as light (or 
 subtle) and enlightening (or manifesting) ; ‘ passion ’ 
 or ‘ foulness ’ (Rajas) as exerting and mobile ; ‘ dark- 
 ness ’ (Tamas) as heavy or enveloping (or obstructive). 
 This action for the gaining of an end is like that of a 
 lamp. ’ ’ 
 
 14. “ In the higher world the quality (or mode) 
 called ‘ goodness ’ prevails ; below, the creation 
 abounds in ‘ darkness ; ’ in the midst foulness or pas- 
 sion abounds. Brahma and the rest (of the gods) and 
 a stock form the limits.” 
 
 The f/unas , it is to be observed, cannot, properly 
 speaking, be called moral dispositions, such as good- 
 
THE SANKUYA PHILOSOPHY CONTINUED. 
 
 135 
 
 ness, activity, and indolence are. They may be repre- 
 sented as producers of our moral dispositions, the mate- 
 rial essence of which both our intellectual and moral 
 affections are modifications or evolutes. Matter, ac- 
 cording to this system, may be defined as a double- 
 faced entity ; and it is presented in the universe in a 
 variety of forms more or less gross, more or less subtle 
 and tenuous. To its grosser forms we give the name 
 of material objects ; while its subtler invisible forms 
 we characterize as intellectual affections and moral dis- 
 positions. But the sharp line of demarcation that we 
 draw between matter and mind has no foundation in 
 truth, though held up as obviously just by the factitious 
 rules of our dictionaries and grammars ! 
 
 Another point of difference, or rather contrariety, 
 between Prakriti and Purush, or soul, liiuges on the 
 unity of the one and multeity of the other. Prakriti 
 is one indivisible substance, appearing in endless varie- 
 ties of forms under the influence of the quality called 
 “ passion,” which leads it irresistibly to pass through a 
 fixed process of evolution. Souls are, however, innu- 
 merable. Iiow is this to be proved ? Before it is 
 possible to answer this question satisfactorily it is neces- 
 sary to inquire, How is the existence of Prakriti itself, 
 or that of Purush, or soul, to be proved ? 
 
 Here we must notice that only three sources of 
 knowledge, or kinds of proof, are admitted in this 
 treatise, as in the Sanlchya Pravachana. In distich I 
 we have these stated : “ Perception, inference, and fit 
 testimony are the threefold (lands of) accepted proof, 
 because in them every mode of proof is fully contained. 
 The complete determination, or perfect knowledge, 
 of what is to be determined is by proof.” And in 
 distich G, the province, so to speak, of each of these 
 
13G 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 lines of evidence is indicated : “ The kn owledge of 
 formal or generic existence is by perception ; of things 
 beyond the senses by inference ; that which cannot be 
 determined by this (method) and cannot be perceived 
 must be determined by fitting means.” 
 
 The argument brought forward to prove the exist- 
 ence and multeity of souls is the same presented as that 
 in the Sankkya Pravachana with some new features 
 added. 
 
 We are assured of the existence of the objects of 
 nature by perception. But these objects are finite or 
 conditioned, and they cannot but lead us to look for 
 the ground of their existence apart from themselves. 
 They are, moreover, classed in genera and species, and 
 they consequently lead the mind toward an original or 
 primary genus. The process of evolution noticeable in 
 their production suggests an evolving principle ; while 
 the chain of second causes they point to leads us to a 
 recognition of a precedent first cause. And, lastly, the 
 unity of the universe indicates the operation in its pro- 
 duction of a principle, originally indiscerptible and in- 
 discrete, though susceptible of modification, such as 
 renders it now multiform, divisible, and divided. In- 
 ference, therefore, rising from a series of effects to the 
 primal cause, establishes the existence of Prakriti, 
 “ which develops itself by the three modes,” blended 
 into varieties of forms, as “ simple water coming from 
 the clouds is modified as sweet, sour, bitter, pungent 
 in the nature of the juice of the cocoanut-palm, bel- 
 Icarcmja , and wood-apple.” 
 
 But the vast assemblage of things into which Prakriti 
 has developed cannot exist for nothing ; and it there- 
 fore suggests the presence, somewhere, of one fitted to 
 own and enjoy it, as a well-furnished house necessarily 
 
THE SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY CONTINUED. 
 
 137 
 
 carries with-it the idea of a person dwelling in it. Be- 
 sides, this assemblage of inanimate things needs the 
 supervision and regulating power of an intelligent 
 ruler ; while the rush toward emancipation made by 
 Prakriti in some of its subtler forms leads the mind by 
 a transition, natural and easy, to ' the recognition of a 
 being enthralled, and therefore in need of deliverance. 
 The existence of the soul is therefore established ! The 
 argument, however, is a naked fallacy, inasmuch as the 
 soul, being perfectly inert and quiescent, is, properly 
 speaking, neither an enjoyer nor a ruler, while its 
 enthralment is a fiction, rather than reality. 
 
 Yarious facts are mentioned as tending to prove the 
 multeity or plurality of souls. The varied accidents of 
 birth and death form a series of indisputable facts fitted 
 to set forth their multitudinousness. If souls were one, 
 not many, the birth and death of one person would 
 synchronize with the birth and death of all other per- 
 sons ; or if there were only one soul, all human beings 
 would come into the world and go out of it at one and 
 the same time. But the fact is that they come in at 
 different times and go out at different times ; and the 
 endless diversity in their hours of ingress and egress is 
 a proof that souls are multitudinous, not one. Again, 
 if souls were one, the organs of perception and intellec- 
 tion attached to them would not present the variety of 
 aspects which is their most noticeable aspect. In one 
 man, for instance, the sense of hearing or sight is ten 
 times acuter than in another ; and in many the sense 
 itself does not exist at all. Why these differences ? 
 Owing certainly to the deserts of souls, to the merits or 
 demerits accumulated by them severally in former 
 states of existence. But if souls were one, and the 
 deserts the same, the organs would present a uniform 
 
138 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 aspect, the sense of sight or hearing would be acute or 
 dull in all human beings, and defects and imperfections 
 would be equally, not unequally, distributed. And, 
 lastly, all mankind would in that case be equally 
 affected by the modes or qualities. The fact, however, 
 is that there is an endless variety of ways in which 
 human beings are affected by them. Some are pecul- 
 iarly susceptible to the quality of goodness, and be- 
 come good almost instinctively ; while others are 
 enslaved, as it were, by the evil qualities almost from 
 their birth. The reasoning here is fallacious, as it 
 ascribes to the soul some responsibility, which in reality 
 belongs to Prakriti ! 
 
 One important question ought to be raised and dis- 
 posed of before we proceed to a detailed treatment of 
 the products or evolutes of Prakriti. If those disposi- 
 tions which are characterized as moral are foreign to 
 the soul, wherein do they inhere ? The Sankhya Phi- 
 losopher is penetrating enough to see that such disposi- 
 tions as goodness, passion, or indolence cannot inhere 
 in or form portions of our gross bodies. Nor can they 
 inhere in or form elements of the soul without leading 
 it to some kind of action inconsistent with the hypoth- 
 esis of its perfect quiescence. A habitation for these 
 dispositions is therefore a desideratum in the system. 
 The Sankhya philosopher meets the want by positing a 
 subtle body between the perfectly quiescent soul and 
 the gross, perceptible, and tangible body. This is 
 called the linga-sarir, and it migrates with the soul 
 from one gross body to another, and is dissolved only 
 when its perfect emancipation is effected by intense 
 meditation. The following distichs speak of this subtle 
 body : 
 
 39. “ Subtle (bodies), those which are born of father 
 
THE SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY CONTINUED. 
 
 139 
 
 and mother, with the gross forms of existence, are the 
 threefold species (of bodies). Of these the subtle are 
 permanent ; those which are born of father and mother 
 perish. 
 
 4-0. “ The subtle (body) linga , formed primevally, 
 unconlined, permanent, composed of intellect and the 
 rest, down to the subtle elements, migrates, never 
 enjoys, and is endowed with dispositions (Bhavas). 
 
 41. “Asa painting does not stand without a support 
 or receptacle, nor a shadow without a stake, etc. , so 
 the linga does not exist unsupported without specific 
 elements. 
 
 42. “ Formed for the sake of the soul, the linga , by 
 the connection of means and then results and by union 
 with the predominant Prakriti, plays its part like a 
 dramatic actor.” 
 
 All material objects are in these verses divided into 
 three classes, subtle bodies, gross bodies, or those which 
 are born of father and mother, and various forms of 
 unorganized matter. The subtle body or Unga-sarir is 
 composed of the three primal evolutes of Prakriti, in- 
 tellect or intelligence, egoism and Manas, or mind, and 
 the rudimental elements (the Tanmatras) ; and it is, 
 therefore, like these, imperceptible. It is more perma- 
 nent than our gross bodies, is unconfined because it 
 migrates from one gross body to another with the soul, 
 and is endowed with moral dispositions, though incapa- 
 ble of enjoyment, which is the prerogative of the soul, 
 supposititious rather than real. It, however, enthralls 
 the soul, which must cast aside this tenuous garment, 
 as well as its series of grosser bodies, before its libera- 
 tion or final separation from all material conditions is 
 effected. 
 
 It is time to advert to the productions or evolutes 
 
140 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of Prakriti. These are set forth in the following 
 distich s : 
 
 22. “ From Prakriti issues the great principle 
 (Maliat, Intellect), and from this the ego, or conscious- 
 ness, from this (consciousness) the whole assemblage of 
 the sixteen (principles or entities), and from five of the 
 sixteen the five gross elements. 
 
 23. “ Intellect is the distinguishing principle (Adhy- 
 a vasya). Virtue, knowledge, freedom from passion 
 and power denote it when affected by (the mode) 
 £ goodness ; ’ when affected by ‘ darkness ’ it is the 
 reverse of these. 
 
 24. “ Egoism is self-consciousness. From this pro- 
 ceeds a double creation (sarga, emanation), the series 
 of the eleven (principles) and the five (subtle) ele- 
 ments. 
 
 25. ££ From consciousness, modified (by £ goodness ’), 
 proceed the eleven good principles ; from this origin of 
 being as darkness come the subtle elements. Both 
 emanations are caused by the foul or active mode. 
 
 26. ££ The eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue, and 
 the skin are termed the organs of intellect (Buddhi) ; 
 the voice, the hands, the feet, (the organs of) excretion 
 and generation are called the organs of action. 
 
 27. ££ The Manas (mind) in this respect has the 
 nature of both (classes). It is formative (or determina- 
 tive) and a sense-organ, from having cognate functions 
 (with the organs). It is multifarious, from the specific 
 modifications of the modes and the diversity of exter- 
 nal things.” 
 
 These evolutes with the root evolvent, Prakriti and the 
 soul, which is neither an evolvent nor an evolute, form 
 the tweny-five tattwas , or categories of the Sankhya 
 Philosophy. For the sake of easy reference we give 
 
THE SAMHYA PHILOSOPHY CONTINUED. 
 
 141 
 
 them below in the order in which they are presented in 
 Mr. Davies’ excellent book : 
 
 1. Prakriti, or primordial, self-evolving matter. 
 
 2. Ahankara, the egoizer or consciousness. 
 
 3. Tanmatras, or subtle elements, five in number, 
 sound tangibleness or touch, odor or smell, visibility or 
 form, and sapidity or taste. 
 
 5. The five gross elements, (Mahabhuta) viz., ether 
 from the subtle element sound, air from touch, earth 
 from odor, fire from sight or visibility, and water from 
 taste or sapidity. 
 
 6. The five senses, the eye, the ear, the nose, the 
 tongue, and the skin (Gyan-Indryani, or organs of 
 knowledge). 
 
 7. The organs of action (Karma-Indryani), the voice, 
 the hands, the feet, (the organs of) excretion and gen- 
 eration. 
 
 8. Manas, or mind, which receives and works into 
 proper shapes the impressions made upon the senses, 
 and which is regarded as one of the three internal 
 organs, the other two being intelligence and conscious- 
 ness. 
 
 9. The soul (Atman or Purush), which is an entity 
 distinct from Prakriti. 
 
 Among the evolutes of Prakriti, the organs are 
 divided into internal and external, and the elements 
 into subtle and gross. 
 
 The internal organs are the intellect or intelligence, 
 consciousness or egoizer, and the mind or the thinking 
 principle. They are the gate-keepers of the soul, while 
 the external organs, the five organs of knowledge and 
 the five organs of action, are the gates. The external 
 objects of nature send their impressions through five 
 especially of these gates to the mind, which works 
 
142 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 them into appropriate forms or ideas, and communi- 
 cates them to consciousness, by which they are individ- 
 ualized and conveyed to the intellect, which forms gen- 
 eral concepts, such as are reflected in the soul, which is 
 erroneously said to be the cognat ive principle. This is 
 Mr. Davies’ view of the functions of these internal 
 organs, but the commentators whom he consults pre- 
 sent a very different and a much more confused notion 
 of their varied operations. Vachaspati speaks of the 
 mind thus : “ It gives form in a collective manner to 
 that which is perceived by an organ of sense, and says, 
 ‘ this is a thing, ’ ‘ this is compounded and that is not so ’ ; 
 and it discriminates or defines a thing by its specific 
 and unspecific nature.” And Gaudapada says : “As 
 a person going along a road sees an object at a dis- 
 tance and is in doubt whether it be a post or a man ; 
 he then observes some characteristic mark upon it, or a 
 bird perched there, and, doubt being thus dissipated by 
 the reflection of the mind, the understanding (Buddhi, 
 or intellect) discriminates that it is a post ; and then 
 egoism interposes for the sake of certainty, as £ verily, 
 or (I am certain) it is a post. ’ In this way the func- 
 tions of intellect, egoism, and mind, and the eye are 
 (successively) fulfilled.” 
 
 The functions of the internal organs are not categori- 
 cally stated in the Sankhya-Karica and the Sankhya 
 Pravachana ; and modern commentators mislead when 
 they speak of them in the phraseology current in mod- 
 ern schools of philosophy. Let us turn from what is 
 at least speculation to what is distinctly stated about 
 them. Intellect under the influence of “ goodness” is 
 distinguished by virtue, knowledge, dispassion, and 
 supernatural power ; but it is disfigured under the in- 
 fluence of “ darkness” by vice, ignorance, passionate- 
 
THE SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY CONTINUED. 
 
 143 
 
 ness, and weakness. The emancipation of the soul is 
 ultimately effected by it, when it clearly sees the dis- 
 tinction between soul and non-soul, the ego and the 
 non-ego. Yirtue and vice, therefore, as well as knowl- 
 edge and ignorance, are material conditions, not moral 
 dispositions and intellectual states in the proper sense 
 of these terms. 
 
 Intelligence, however, retires from the scene as soon 
 as its great offspring egoism, or self-consciousness, 
 makes its appearance. The work of creation is effected 
 by this principle. Under the control of “ goodness,” 
 it evolves out of its own substance the eleven organs, 
 which are all good, viz., the five organs of knowledge, 
 the five organs of action, and the eleventh organ, or 
 the mind, which, though one of the last of creations, 
 takes rank with the first, and its own producer, con- 
 sciousness. Under the control of ££ darkness” it creates 
 the subtle elements, and through them the gross ele- 
 ments, which in varieties of combinations are found in 
 the objects of nature. Consciousness evolves out of its 
 own substance the entire creation ; and if consciousness 
 were not a material product, an evolute of the assumed 
 primordial material form, the Sankhya system might 
 appropriately be characterized as a beautiful scheme of 
 idealistic philosophy. 
 
 The Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha presents in its disquisi- 
 tion on Sankhya Philosophy the categories of the 
 system in these words : ££ Now the Sastra of this 
 school may be concisely said to maintain four several 
 kinds of existences, viz. , that which is evolvent only, 
 that which is evolute only, that which is both evolute 
 and evolvent, and that which is neither.” 
 
 Regarding the bondage and liberation - of souls we 
 have these utterances : 
 
144 
 
 HINDU PIIILOSOFHY. 
 
 44. “ By virtue an ascent to a higher region is ob- 
 tained, by vice a descent into a lower region. Deliv- 
 erance is gained by knowledge, and bondage by the 
 contrary. 
 
 45. “ By the absence (or destruction) of passion 
 there is dissolution of Prakriti (or the power of Pra- 
 kriti is destroyed). Transmigration is from disorderly 
 passion. By power we gain destruction of obstacles, 
 and the reverse by the contrary. ’ ’ 
 
 The cause of the bondage of the soul is ignorance, 
 not vice ; and its liberation is effected by knowledge, 
 not virtue. This is one of those principles of Hindu 
 philosophy which are common to all the systems, many 
 of those called heterodox not excepted. According to 
 these, virtue is a source of bondage as well as vice. 
 Yirtue, as has already been said, proceeds from desire 
 for happiness and aversion to pain, which are in them- 
 selves wrong principles of action. Virtue results only 
 in the prolongation of the chain of transmigration, its 
 upshot being the translation of the soul into one of 
 those ethereal regions which rise in an ascending scale, 
 one above another, from this world, for the purpose of 
 temporary enjoyment of the fruits of its good works, 
 and its return in a bodily shape to this world, when 
 these are in the course of slow-circling ages consumed. 
 Permanent liberation of the soul, or its relegation to its 
 original state of non-contact with matter, virtue cannot 
 effect. That is the fruit of knowledge, knowledge of 
 the categories of the Sankhya system — or rather of the 
 difference between soul and non- soul ! 
 
 Gaudapada, one of the great commentators, without 
 whose help it is impossible to undertsand the book 
 under review, thus speaks of knowledge in general : 
 “ Knowledge is of two kinds, external and internal. 
 
THE SAHKHYA PHILOSOPHY CONTINUED. 
 
 145 
 
 Tlie former includes knowledge of the Vedas, and the 
 six branches of knowledge connected with them — reci- 
 tation, ritual, grammar, interpretation of words, pros- 
 ody and astronomy ; also of the Purans, and of knowl- 
 edge, theology, and law. Internal knowledge is the 
 knowledge of Prakriti and soul, or the discrimination 
 that “ this is Prakriti,” the equipoised condition of the 
 modes, and “ this is soul,” devoid of the modes, per- 
 manent and intelligent. By external knowledge 
 worldly distinction or admiration is obtained ; by in- 
 ternal knowledge, liberation, that is from the bondage 
 of matter. 5 ’ And in another place the same comment- 
 ator says : “ lie who knows the twenty-five principles, 
 whatever order of life he may enter, and whether he 
 wore braided hair, or top-knot only, or be shaven, ho 
 is free ; of this there is no doubt.” 
 
 But, after all, the bondage and liberation of the soul 
 are mere fictions. It is Prakriti that is in reality 
 bound and liberated, the soul being essentially free and 
 incapable of bondage ; nor is transmigration, the 
 perennial source of misery from which deliverance is to 
 be earnestly desired, a cause of trouble to the pure 
 spirit. Distich 62 of the Book runs thus : “Where- 
 fore not any soul is bound, or is liberated, or migrates. 
 It is Prakriti, which has many receptacles (or bodily 
 forms of being) which is bound, or is liberated, or 
 migrates. Again, in verse 3 we have the words : 
 “ Prakriti by herself binds herself by seven forms, she 
 causes deliverance for the benefit of soul by one form.” 
 Prakriti is said to be “generous” and “modest.” 
 She is generous, because all the trouble that she uncon- 
 sciously takes in evolving creation out of its substance 
 is for the benefit of the soul, not its own. But as she 
 is after all the incarcerator and liberator of the soul, 
 
146 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 her belauded generosity is problematical. She is more- 
 over called modest, because she retires as soon as she 
 has exhibited herself to the soul. “ As a dancer, hav- 
 ing exhibited herself on the stage, ceases to dance, so 
 does Prakriti cease (to produce) when she has made 
 herself manifest to soul” (59). “ Nothing is more 
 
 modest than Prakriti ; that is my judgment. Saying, 
 
 ‘ I have been seen ; ’ she does not expose herself again 
 to the view of the soul ” (61). But the fact remains 
 indisputable, that she creates or evolves only to be seen ; 
 and a girl who takes a world of trouble only to be 
 seen, cannot appropriately be called modest, even 
 though she has the good sense to retire as soon as she 
 is seen. 
 
 If bondage and liberation really belong to Prakriti, 
 why ascribe them at all to the soul ? Let the com- 
 mentator Yachaspati answer this question : “ These 
 circumstances are ascribed to and affect the soul, as the 
 superior, in the same manner that victory and defeat 
 are attributed to and relate to a king, though actually 
 occurring in his generals ; for they are his servants, and 
 the gain or loss is his, not theirs.” This is, however, 
 a string of words without meaning. The soul is in 
 reality nor king, nor master, nor gainer, nor loser ; nor 
 does it, properly speaking, see. Prakriti in all its 
 modifications is only reflected in the tranquil, immobile 
 and luminous soul, which, as it is destitute of volition 
 and vitality, cannot possibly recognize what is fitted to 
 make it miserable or happy. 
 
 To show in what respect the Sankhya system is 
 different from the forms of thought subsequently de- 
 veloped, let us refer for a moment to a discussion em- 
 bodied in the Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha. The author, 
 after having stated the categories of the system and' 
 
THE SANKHTA PHILOSOPHY CONTINUED. 
 
 147 
 
 grouped them under the heads evolvent only, evolutes 
 and evolvent, evolutes only, and non-evolvent and non- 
 evolute, thus raises the discussion alluded to : 
 
 ‘ ‘ Here a fourfold discussion arises as to the nature of 
 cause and effect. The Saugatas (Buddhists) maintain 
 that the existent is produced from non-existent ; the 
 Maiyayika, etc., that the (as yet) non-existent is pro- 
 duced from the existent ; the Yedantins that all effects 
 are an illusory emanation from the existent, and not 
 themselves really existent ; while the Sankhyas hold 
 that the existent is produced from the existent. ’ ’ 
 
 It is not our intention to follow the author through 
 the varied steps of his argument ; our object being 
 simply to show that, while Buddhism, the source of 
 the heterodox systems, maintains a species of rank 
 nihilism, the orthodox systems were based on the as- 
 sumption of a primordial substance, either material or 
 spiritual, and they were all evolved from the teaching 
 of the Llpanishads. Dr. Mullens, in his well-known 
 treatise on Hindu Philosophy, has fallen into the mis- 
 take of holding up these venerable documents as the 
 sources of Hindu Pantheism, not that of Hindu Philos- 
 ophy in all its phases of development from nihilism. 
 And men more profoundly versed in Hindu philosophy 
 than the lade doctor have shown a strong tendency to a 
 similar, or rather identical, mistake. But one cannot 
 study the Hpanishads in connection with the systems of 
 philosophy which have flourished in India in different 
 periods of its history, without being led to connect the 
 former with the latter, the Hpanishads with the sys- 
 tems, as cause and effect. 
 
 It is not denied that the prevalent line of philosophic 
 thought in the Hpanishads is pantheistic. Then great 
 motto, one without a second, is the battle-cry of Indian 
 
148 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 .and European, indigenous and foreign, pantheistic 
 forms of speculation. The cosmogonies presented in 
 them, the description given of man’s nature and of the 
 world itself, and the theory of salvation developed, 
 manifest a stronger leaning, so to speak, toward pan- 
 theism than toward any other form of speculative 
 thought. But there are lines of reasoning and forms of 
 expression in these records eminently fitted to uphold 
 forms of thought other than those which are properly 
 called pantheistic. The four well-known expressions, 
 Sat and Asat, Yyakta and Avyakta, which play so 
 conspicuous a part in the cosmogonies of the ITpan- 
 ishads, are certainly susceptible of nihilistic and mate- 
 rialistic, as well as pantheistic interpretation, and they 
 have in consequence been bandied backward and for- 
 ward by almost all the jarring schools of Indian phi- 
 losophy. 
 
 In one verse especially, quoted in a former paper, 
 creation is distinctly said to have flowed out of Asat, 
 non-being and non-existent ; and in several passages 
 the Avyakta, unmanifested, is represented as the 
 ground of the Yyakta or manifested aspects of nature, 
 and these passages may obviously be construed so as to 
 uphold any form of thought ranging between absolute 
 nihilism and absolute pantheism. The Buddhists, or 
 some classes of Buddhists, have evolved from them 
 their idea of an eternal void of non-being, developing 
 into innumberable forms of existence, more illusory 
 than real. The Sankhya school has derived from them 
 its notion of Prakriti, unmanifested in its undeveloped 
 form, but manifesting itself in various imperceptible 
 and perceptible shapes, in consequence of the mischiev- 
 ous activity of one of its three essential elements. And 
 the Yedantic thinker has elaborated these very utter- 
 
THE SANKIIYA PHILOSOPHY CONTINUED. 
 
 149 
 
 ances into bis theory of illusory existence, concealing 
 the real under the phenomenal, the one pure being 
 under various types of non-being. The Upanishads, 
 therefore, have given rise to the various lines of specu- 
 lation by which the intellect of the country, by no 
 means deficient in acuteness and depth, has been exer- 
 cised and moulded for centuries and ages untold. 
 
 The main principles of the Sankhya Philosophy have 
 been set forth in this and the preceding paper, in the 
 words mainly of the books which may be represented 
 as its standard and authoritative documents. A simple, 
 unvarnished statement of these is enough to show that 
 the glowing eulogy of which it has been made the 
 favored subject in some quarters is entirely misplaced 
 and fulsome. The system is a heap of nonsense, 
 dreamy in its character, self-contradictory in its state- 
 ments, and immoral in its principles and tendencies. 
 This will appear in the sequel. Meanwhile we raise 
 the question, How is the system to be characterized ? 
 With what system of philosophic thought is it to be 
 compared ? 
 
 It has been called, apparently with propriety, a sys- 
 tem of dualism, because it postulates the existence of 
 two entities, the passive soul and the active Prakriti. 
 But the description it gives of the soul tends to make it 
 an entity of no consequence whatever, in fact, a non- 
 entity. The soul is without volition, without intelli- 
 gence in the proper sense of the term, without sensi- 
 bility — a lump of passivity and quiescence. It is im- 
 possible to divine what use is subserved by its existence, 
 or why its existence is posited. It thinks not, feels 
 not, sees not, handles not. It plays no part whatever 
 in the varied work of creation, preservation and de- 
 struction ; and it is only falsely called a spectator and 
 
150 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 enjoyer of experience. It may therefore be appropri- 
 ately thrown out of calculation entirely. 
 
 The system, then, is rank materialism, and differs 
 from the materialism of the day in its arrangement 
 rather than in its principle. Modern materialism can- 
 not ignore the established facts and conclusions of 
 science, and consequently the theory of evolution it 
 brings forward goes up in an ascending scale from the 
 elements, the ultimate powers of nature, to their varied 
 combinations, from inorganic to organized matter, from 
 the lower to the higher types of life, from molecular 
 motion to thought, feeling, and volition. But the 
 founder of the Sankhya school was a stranger to that 
 insight into the mysteries of creation which a schoolboy 
 in these days may justly boast of ; and he, in conse- 
 quence, propounded a theory of evolution which comes 
 down in a descending scale, or rather moves fitfully or 
 irregularly. But the two classes of systems agree in 
 representing intelligence, consciousness, and mind with 
 all its affections, apprehension, sensibility, volition, etc. 
 as modifications of matter. The difference is that, in 
 accordance with one of these two sets of systems, 
 thought is evolved from gross matter ; while in accord- 
 ance with the other gross matter is evolved from 
 thought. Or, to express the same idea in a different 
 form, gross matter is sublimated into thought according 
 to the one set, while thought degenerates into gross 
 matter according to the other. 
 
 The two classes of systems also agree in another 
 respect. They make hair-splitting distinctions between 
 matter in its essence and matter in its grossness, be- 
 tween matter subtle and matter gross. The Sankhya 
 system discriminates between, as has already been 
 shown, a subtle body and a gross body, a body which 
 
THE SANKHYA. PHILOSOPHY CONTINUED. 
 
 151 
 
 migrates with the soul from one tenement of clay to 
 another, and does not dissolve till its final emancipation 
 from corporeal thraldom, and a body which is decom- 
 posed soon after death. ISTor does the discrimination 
 stop here. A distinction is made between the senses 
 and the powers inherent in them, between the sense, 
 for instance, of sight and the unseen power of sight in- 
 herent in the organ ; the sense of hearing and the 
 power of hearing inherent in the organ ; and so on. 
 Again, a distinction is made between subtle and gross 
 elements, between the elements perceptible to us and 
 those the existence of which is proved by inference, 
 and which are perceptible to beings endowed with 
 powers of sensation and intellection more enlarged 
 than ours. Materialism of the modern school is obliged 
 to make such subtle distinctions, as without them it is 
 impossible to place the functions of the mind in the 
 same category with the functions of the body. 
 
 A tendency has been growing up, especially since the 
 publication of the well-known treatise, the “ Unseen 
 Universe,” to laugh at the idea of a vacuum, and fill 
 the interminable regions of space, which were looked 
 upon as a boundless void in former times, with a mate- 
 rial, or quasi-material, luminiferous fluid of extreme 
 tenuity ; as well as to posit a sort of invisible material 
 organization or casement for the soul beneath the 
 body, which is obviously decomposed after death. 
 Many even of those persons who believe in the instinc- 
 tively recognized dualism in man are prone to believe 
 in the existence of a tenuous, subtle body between the 
 immaterial soul and the gross material body, a sort of 
 intermediate, permanent substance which death cannot 
 affect, and of which the soul never gets rid. These 
 advanced thinkers will rejoice, or be mortified, to find 
 
152 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 that their new-fangled theory was anticipated in India 
 about live centuries before the birth of Christ. The 
 existence of an all-pervacling substance, material or 
 quasi-material, consisting of three qualities, held in 
 equipoise, was assumed by Ivapila long before such 
 words as “nebulous matter” or “star-dust” were 
 coined. And the idea of a linga-sarir, or tenuous body 
 in contradistinction to, though intimately connected 
 with, the sthul-sarir, or gross body, is developed both 
 in the treatise under review in this discourse and that 
 taken notice of in the former. 
 
 This idea is somewhat differently stated and further 
 expanded in the Sankhya Sutras. The second Aphor- 
 ism of Book III. runs thus : “ Therefrom (i.e. from 
 the twenty-three principles there is the organization of) 
 the body (or pair of bodies, the gross and the subtle).’ ’ 
 The gross body ( sthul-sarir ) consists of the gross ele- 
 ments, or rather the grossest of the gross elements, the 
 earth ; and it is propagated by generation. It is in- 
 capable of experiencing pleasure or pain, and it is per- 
 ishable, and does actually perish. For purposes of 
 fruition it is of no use to the soul, or rather Prakriti, as 
 it cannot effect its liberation by consuming the fruits of 
 its merit or demerit. For such purposes another body 
 of subtler elements, of greater permanence, and of 
 capacities more expanded, must be posited. This is 
 the subtle body created at the commencement of the 
 creation or annus magnus , or at every renovation of 
 creation, not propagated by generation, consisting of 
 seventeen principles, the eleven organs, the five rudi- 
 ments, and the organ of consciousness, the egoizer. It 
 migrates from body to body, and disappears only when 
 the fruits of merit or demerit on the part of its associ- 
 ate, the soul, or rather the mind, are consumed, and 
 
TIIE SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY CONTINUED. 
 
 153 
 
 beatification is realized. This body is sentient, but it 
 is incapable of pleasure or pain, except in association 
 with the gross body, which is its counterpart, and the 
 existence of which is essential to the performance of its 
 functions. This body, moreover, has a case or sheath, 
 and that is called cinusthcmi-sarir, a sort of intermedi- 
 ate link between the impalpable, subtle, and the palpa- 
 ble, gross body. Are not our modern philosophers 
 beaten hollow by their prototypes of ancient times ? 
 
 The Sankhya philosopher cannot properly be said to 
 indicate the process of evolution. He states the mate- 
 rial categories, the formative principles, but does not 
 show how they combine or re-combine, integrate, dis- 
 integrate, and redintegrate ; or by what process they 
 develop into the innumerable forms of beauty and 
 proportion we see around us. But if he were asked to 
 indicate this process, he would very likely adopt the 
 language of Herbert Spencer, and affirm that the prog- 
 ress of creation was from homogeneity to heterogene- 
 ity, by a series of differentiations gradually effected. 
 2STor would he in the slightest degree object to apply 
 this law to social and moral development, as well as to 
 that which is material. The truth is, his school, as 
 that of Herbert Spencer, recognizes no real difference 
 between material and moral conditions ; and therefore 
 the attempts made by some Orientalists to identify his 
 system ’frith the idealism of Bishop Berkeley is futile 
 indeed. He certainly does represent consciousness as 
 the originator of material creation ; and if by con- 
 sciousness he understood what is now meant by it, as a 
 rule, he might be held up as an idealist of the first 
 water. But consciousness according to him is a mate- 
 rial organ or principle, not intellectual power, and in 
 the work of evolution it performs, if work it can be 
 
154 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 called at all, its own substance, not anything extrane- 
 ous, is utilized. 
 
 The comparison instituted between the Sankhya sys- 
 tem and that propounded by Pythagoras of Samos, 
 about the time when it was itself elaborated in India, 
 is juster. If the existing fragments of the work of 
 Philolaus, who was a contemporary of Socrates, be 
 regarded as correct exponents of the Pythagorean phi- 
 losophy, the two systems may be represented, with 
 some degree of justice, as similar, in many, if not all, 
 respects. The system, which traces the wonders of 
 creation through monadic and geometrical magnitudes 
 to the principles of numbers, limiting and illimitation, 
 may be placed in juxtaposition with one which per- 
 forms the same feat under the auspices of a trinitarian, 
 material essence called Prakriti, or Malia (Great) Prak- 
 xiti. But, barring the speculative wildness character- 
 istic of both the systems, there are two points of simi- 
 larity or contact to which prominence ought to be 
 given. The Pythagorean, like the Sankhya system, is 
 based on the doctrine of metempsychosis, and it repre- 
 sents the soul as enchained to the body, in which, as it 
 is material, it recognizes an inherent and irremovable 
 depravity. Add to this the fact that the outcome of 
 these two systems is one and the same process, the sys- 
 tematic mortification of the body by ascetic penance 
 with a view to complete emancipation of the soul from 
 its bondage. 
 
 The Indian system, however, is “ racy of the soil,” 
 and almost all the principal vocables, which figure in 
 the two systems, are used in it in a sense different from 
 that which is attached to them by its rival. When the 
 Indian system speaks of the bondage and liberation of 
 the soul, it simply means the bondage and liberation of 
 
THE SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY CONTINUED. 
 
 155 
 
 Prakriti and its products down to the gross body, and 
 the grossest of elements ; and it represents the extinc- 
 tion of conscious life, consequent on the extinction of 
 desire as the summum bonum , to be attained by a 
 species of mortification and penance before which the 
 most self -torturing Greek philosopher would have stood 
 .aghast. 
 
 But the emancipation of Prakriti cannot be perma- 
 nent, as it is fated to energize after long periods of 
 quiescence. Creation emanates from it, and is ulti- 
 mately absorbed in it, to be once more forced out and 
 forced in. And, as Prakriti is never to get rid of its 
 creative fits, it is fated to entangle and disentangle 
 itself throughout eternity. Nor can the emancipa- 
 tion of the soul be called permanent, inasmuch as, 
 in accordance with the principles of this philoso- 
 phy, it is neither bound nor liberated. The in- 
 numerable contradictions which the system betrays 
 in expression, if not in enunciation of principle, and 
 which the reader must have noticed in this brief 
 sketch, proceed mainly, if not entirely, from the fact 
 that such a thing as the soul, without life, energy, or 
 activity, mental, emotional or volitional, and without 
 material properties, is uselessly placed in juxtaposition 
 with an active and plastic material principle, which, 
 through the vicious activity of one of its elements, 
 evolves and gets entangled, and which laboriously pro- 
 cures its own emancipation by a series of self-inflicted 
 tortures of the most appalling nature ! 
 
 The Sankhya system is called Nirishwar, or godless, 
 in contradistinction to the Yoga Philosophy, which is 
 called Seishwar, or with God. But yet it is an offshoot 
 of a system of superstition and the fountain of an- 
 other. It is an intermediate link between the nature- 
 
15G 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 worship of V edic times and the polytheistic worship of 
 those of the Purans. The elemental gods of the Rio: 
 Yeda were, by a process of generalization not certainly 
 unnatural, unified by the spirit of philosophic inquiry 
 into a living, diffusive, and creative essence ; and this, 
 in process of time, became the active, formative princi- 
 ple of the Sankhya school, its Prakriti, or Pradkan. 
 But such a principle, too subtle to be grasped by the 
 common mind, could not possibly make the system 
 popular among the masses, or could not transfer it from 
 academic groves to the thoroughfare and the market. 
 It had therefore to be materialized or embalmed in a 
 tangible, cognizable material form ; and the trans- 
 formation was effected without much difficulty. The 
 trinitarian material essence was merged into the triad 
 of Hindu Mythology, Prakriti identified with Brahma 
 under the influence of the quality, goodness, into 
 Vishnu under that of passion, and into Mahadeva 
 under that of darkness. But other transformations 
 followed. The passionless, inactive, and dead soul, 
 uselessly posited by Sankhya Philosophy, ultimately 
 became the fountain-head, so to speak, of an almost 
 unbounded pantheon of male gods, who are all more or 
 less dronish ; while the active Prakriti became, under 
 the name of Sakti or Brahmi, the mother of the almost 
 innumerable female deities with whom these male gods 
 are consorted. And thus, in process of time, the recon- 
 dite speculations of Kapila were incorporated with the 
 popular religion of the Hindus, and a system of rank 
 Atheism culminated in a system of rank polytheism. 
 
CHAPTER VI. 
 
 THE TOGA PHILOSOPHY, OR HINDU ASCETICISM. 
 
 The Yoga Philosophy is the counterpart of the 
 Sankhya system, and it begins where the other ends. 
 The conclusion to which the Sankhya system brings us 
 is that the emancipation of the soul is effected by right 
 knowledge, or knowledge of the essential distinction 
 between the ego and the non-ego, the soul and the non- 
 soul. But a formal enunciation of this principle would 
 be not merely useless, but positively tantalizing, if the 
 means of attaining such knowledge were not indicated. 
 The question therefore is one of paramount importance, 
 How is right knowledge or knowledge of the essential 
 distinction between soul and non-soul to be obtained ? 
 The Sankhya Philosophy raises the question, but refers 
 to the Yoga Philosophy for its solution ; and therefore 
 the first form of philosophic thought is incomplete 
 without the second. 
 
 But the Yoga Philosophy may properly be repre- 
 sented as the counterpart, not only of the Sankhya 
 system, but of almost every other system of Indian 
 philosophy, theistic, atheistic, and pantheistic. Almost 
 every system of Indian philosophy makes salvation 
 dependent on right knowledge, and represents right 
 knowledge as attainable only by such ascetic exercises 
 as are prescribed in the Yoga Shastra. The exercises 
 may not be exactly the same in all the systems, but the 
 variations are so slight that we are justified in holding 
 
158 
 
 IIINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 out this philosophy as the counterpart, not only of the 
 scheme with which it is consorted, but of every other 
 form of philosophic thought which flourished in ancient 
 India, or which has flourished in India, both ancient 
 and modern, leaving out of course those which are 
 thoroughly Epicurean in their practical development. 
 The Yoga system does not deserve the name of phi- 
 losophy, it being an art rather than a science. The 
 science of the soul and the mind, as well as of the 
 powers known and unknown of nature, is embodied 
 in the standard Works of the Sankhya School, but the 
 varieties of bodily and mental exercises by which that 
 science is utilized or practically developed are enumer- 
 ated and described in the great treatise on Yoga Phi- 
 losophy to be taken notice of ; but it ought not to be 
 forgotten that the Y oga Philosophy properly so called 
 is the art by which the teaching, not only of the San- 
 khya school, but of every other prominent school of 
 Hindu Philosophy, is reduced to practice. It is the 
 art of asceticism, without which salvation is not attain- 
 able according to the approved maxims, not of one or 
 two, but of all the prominent schools of Indian thought, 
 from Buddhistic nihilism up to Yedantic pantheism. 
 Its importance therefore cannot be overrated, though 
 its claim to be recognized as a scheme of philosophic 
 thought may justly be questioned. 
 
 In its character of universality, in the importance it 
 enjoys in every prominent system of Hindu Philoso- 
 phy, it has a parallel only in the essential or distinctive 
 portion of the Nyaya philosophy", viz., logic. The 
 logic of the Hyaiyaika philosophy runs like a thread of 
 gold through one and all the dissertations on Hindu 
 thought extant in the Sanskrit language. Its forms of 
 expression and modes of reasoning are so thoroughly 
 
THE YOGA PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 159 
 
 intertwined with the original Shastras and the com- 
 mentaries by which they are elucidated, that it is im- 
 possible for a student of Hindu Philosophy to make any 
 progress whatever in his favorite task without intimate 
 acquaintance with them. How, as Indian logic is in 
 some respects an indispensable feature of the theoretic 
 developments of Hindu Philosophy, the stringent rules 
 of the asceticism represented by the Yoga School form 
 an essential and inseparable feature of its practical de- 
 velopments. 
 
 The reputed founder of the Yoga school was Patan- 
 jali, regarding whom almost nothing is known, barring 
 the fact that he was a man of a versatile genius, and 
 distinguished both as a philologist and as a philosopher. 
 The book ascribed to him, the Yoga Shastra, consists 
 of four chapters and 191 aphorisms, the contents of 
 which are thus analyzed in the Sarva-Darsana-San- 
 graha : 
 
 “ This school follows the so-called Yoga Sastra pro- 
 mulgated by Patanjali, and consisting of four chapters 
 which also bears the name of the ‘ Sankhya Prava- 
 chana,’ or detailed explanation of the Sankhya. In the 
 first chapter thereof the venerable Patanjali, having in 
 the opening aphorism — c How is the exposition of con- 
 centration (Yoga) ’ — announced his commencement of 
 the Shastra, proceeds in the second aphorism to give a 
 definition of his subject : c Concentration is the hinder- 
 ing of the modifications of the thinking principle ; ’ 
 and then he expounds at length the nature of Medita- 
 tion (Samadhi). 
 
 “ In the second chapter, in the series of aphorisms 
 commencing, ‘ The practical part of concentration is' 
 modification, muttering, and resignation to the Su- 
 preme,’ he expounds the practical part of Yoga proper 
 
160 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 to him whose mind is not yet thoroughly abstracted, 
 viz. , the five external subservients or means, ‘ forbear- 
 ance ’ and the rest. 
 
 “ In the third chapter, in the series commencing, 
 ‘ Attention is the fastening of the mind on some spot, ’ 
 he expounds three internal subservients, attention, con- 
 templation, and meditation, collectively called by the 
 name of ‘ subjugation ’ (Sanyana), and also the various 
 superhuman powers which are their subordinate fruit. 
 
 “In the fourth chapter, in the series commencing, 
 ‘ Perfections spring from birth, plants, spells, mortifica- 
 tion, and meditation,’ he expounds the highest end, 
 Emancipation, together with a detailed account of the 
 five so-called perfections (Siddhis).” 
 
 Two of the four chapters of the Yoga Shastra were 
 translated into English by Dr. J. It. Ballantyne, some 
 years ago ; while the first of these two has recently 
 been translated in the learned Professor Ivunte’s well- 
 known serial, “ Saddarsana Cliintanika, ” to which 
 special reference will have to be made in a separate 
 paper. But the whole book has been translated, also 
 recently, by our illustrious countryman, Babu Rajendra 
 Lala Mitra, LL.D., C.I.E., who has done so much to 
 popularize the knowledge enshrined in the sacred lit- 
 erature of the country. His translation, of which the 
 last instalment has just been issued, is prefaced by a 
 scholarly dissertation on Hindu Philosophy in general, 
 and Yoga Philosophy in particular, and is, moreover, 
 accompanied with a complete translation of the cele- 
 brated commentary of Bhoj Rajah, and his own valua- 
 ble notes. Of this work of his we shall avail ourselves 
 freely in our treatment of the subject as we did of his 
 translation of the Chandogya Upanisliad in a former 
 paper. 
 
THE TOGA PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 1G1 
 
 The fact that an enlightened king, like Bhoj, who is 
 said to have flourished in the latter part of the tenth 
 and the earlier part of the eleventh century, considered 
 it his duty to comment upon the Aphorisms of Patanjali, 
 is a proof of the importance attached to them, or 
 rather to the asceticism embodied in them in all ages 
 and by all classes of the people of India. His remarks 
 on commentaries in general and his own in particular 
 are worthy of notice : 
 
 “ All commentaries are the percenters of the mean- 
 ing of their authors ; they avoid those parts that are 
 most difficult to understand by saying that the meaning 
 there is obvious ; they dilate upon those parts with 
 useless compound words where the meaning is plain ; 
 they confound their hearers by misplaced and inappro- 
 priate dissertations without number. Avoiding volu- 
 minousness, keeping clear of all mystifying and obvi- 
 ously worthless network of words, and abstracting the 
 inmost meaning, I publish this exposition of the sage 
 Patanjali, for the edification of intelligent persons” 
 
 (p. 2). 
 
 The general accuracy of this exordium is unchal- 
 lenged, though the claim of perfect freedom from the 
 defects pointed out advanced in favor of Bhoj Rajah’s 
 own commentary may be disallowed. It may also be 
 affirmed in justification of these defects that the com- 
 mentaries cannot but partake of the confusedness, ob- 
 scurity, and mystification stamped on the originals. 
 
 The portion of the Yoga Shastra which may justly 
 be called philosophical, may be disposed of in a few 
 words. Dr. Rajendra Lala Mitra enters into a super- 
 fluous argument in his scholarly introduction, to prove 
 that the Yoga system was elaborated subsequently to 
 the organization of the Sankhya school. The fact that 
 
1G2 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 tlio former completes the latter is enough to sustain 
 this conclusion. ~W ere an additional reason needed, 
 the fact that the Yoga Shastra accepts the twenty- five 
 categories of the Sankhya system without attempting a 
 formal description or even enumeration, might he in- 
 sisted upon. The Yoga Shastra, however, adds an- 
 other category — viz. , God, whose existence is declared 
 unproven and undemonstrable in the Sankhya system. 
 Here are the verses in which God is spoken of : “Or 
 by devotion to God. God is a particular soul, which 
 is untouched by afflictions, works, deserts, and desires. 
 In Him the seed of the omniscient attains infinity. He 
 is the instructor of even ail early ones ; for he is not 
 defined by time. Ilis indicator is the Prana va” (Book 
 I. 23-27). 
 
 These verses point to an entity in addition to the two 
 entities, the existence of which is postulated in the 
 Sankhya system ; and they may in one sense be said to 
 convert the “ dualism” of Kapila into a sort of “ trial- 
 ism.” It is to be observed that God as described in 
 these extracts is obviously different from the sold or 
 souls posited by him. lie is not merely intelligence, 
 as the soul is, but unlimited intelligence ; omniscient, 
 not parviscient. He is the instructor of all the great 
 teachers of ancient times, even of Kapila and his great 
 teacher Maheshwara or Sayambhu, and lie is said to 
 be untouched by the afflictions — viz., ignorance, egoism, 
 desire, aversion, and tenacity of life, by works, good 
 and bad, and by deserts and desires, or the antecedents 
 and consequents of works. The soul, on the contrary, 
 is represented as limited in its being, circumscribed in 
 its knowledge, and held in bondage by ignorance, the 
 first of the afflictions and the source of the other four. 
 God therefore is a new entity, and His introduction 
 
THE YOGA PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 1G3 
 
 into the sacred circle divests the system of its dualistic, 
 and invests it with a trialistic, character. 
 
 Such doubtless appears to be the truth at first sight ; 
 but a closer examination brings us to the conclusion 
 that the addition does not, in the slightest degree, 
 interfere with the essentially monistic character of the 
 Sankhya system. The entity brought in to satisfy a 
 popular clamor or to humor current superstition, is as 
 thoroughly a nonentity as the soul is. There is in 
 reality no difference whatever between God and the 
 soul, the Paramatma and the Jivatma, as brought out 
 in this scheme of philosophic thought. God, like the 
 soul, is perfectly quiescent and inactive. lie does not 
 create, does not preserve, does not destroy — these im- 
 portant functions being all discharged by Prakriti, the 
 active principle which exists independently of Him and 
 over the evolutions of which He has only a nominal 
 rather than a real control. It may be said that the 
 soul is bound, while God is untouched by the afflic- 
 tions. But it has been shown that the soul is bound 
 nominally, not really. Prakriti, through the mischiev- 
 ous activity of one of its evolutes, viz., the mind, is 
 bound, passes through varieties of self-inflicted tortures, 
 and is finally liberated ; and its bondage, self-inflicted 
 tortures, and liberation are only reflected in the soul 
 in consequence of the proximity of the one to the other. 
 But it may be said that God is free even from this re- 
 flectional bondage. How can He be ? Is He not all- 
 pervasive, all-diffusive, as Prakriti is ? If so, how can 
 contact, such as that to which the troubles of the soul 
 are attributable, be avoided ? 
 
 There is, after all, no difference whatever between 
 the soul, as posited and described by Kapila, and the 
 God whose existence is postulated by Patanjali. The 
 
164 
 
 IIIKDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 soul is a useless entity, a nonentity rather than an 
 entity, devoid of moral qualities as well as of natural 
 properties, devoid therefore of all of those phenomena 
 by which alone existence can manifest itself. The 
 being called God, posited by the Yoga school, is pre- 
 cisely of this description. 
 
 It is instructive to note how the theistio conclusion 
 was arrived at by the champions of the Yoga Philoso- 
 phy. It was by an exoteric rather than by an esoteric 
 process that they were brought to a recognition or 
 assumption of an entity in addition to the two posited 
 by Kapila and his followers. 
 
 In this respect the Yoga philosophers occupied a 
 platform the very antipodes of that occupied by Fichte 
 and the Fichteans. These, like the Sankhya philoso- 
 phers, concentrated their attention first upon the soul, 
 called by them the individual ego. P>ut, unlike the 
 Sankhya philosopher, they proceeded a step farther. 
 From the individual ego they were brought by a pro- 
 cess of subjective reasoning to a recognition of the 
 Universal Ego, that of which the Ego within is a mode 
 or manifestation. But the Yoga philosopher was not 
 evidently brought to such recognition by a process of 
 esoteric reasoning. In his case the supposition of a 
 God was simply a contrivance or stratagem resorted to 
 for the purpose of meeting a popular demand rather 
 than a necessity of the reasoning mind. 
 
 A system of rank atheism could not be popular even 
 in countries like Greece, where the sensuous was 
 allowed admittedly to prevail over the intellectual life. 
 Far less could it prevail in a country where the reverse 
 of this process was noticeable — that is, where the intel- 
 lectual was allowed to swallow up the sensuous and 
 aesthetic natures of man. 
 
THE YOGA. PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 165 
 
 Besides, it vras not possible to make the Yoga Shastra 
 popular among the masses, or even among sensible 
 men, without the entity added by it. Could sensible 
 Hindus be persuaded to go through an extraordinary 
 process of mortification and penance without a divine 
 command behind, and a divine ideal before them 1 
 They must be assured that a command of the Almighty, 
 rather than a mere dictum of philosophy, was upon 
 them ; and they must be assured that the grand pros- 
 pect before them was no other than extinction of being, 
 along with all its misery, in God, before they could be 
 induced to exchange the comforts of domestic life for 
 the privations and tortures of the life of an anchorite. 
 The hypothesis of a God was therefore essential to the 
 success of the system, not only among the masses, but 
 among thinking men of all classes, and such a hypoth- 
 esis was in process of time resorted to. 
 
 It may, however, be said that the extraordinary 
 powers, represented as attainable by intense meditation, 
 might be enough to make the system popular, even 
 apart from the supposition of a God attached to but 
 not incorporated with it. That the hope of the ulti- 
 mate acquisition of such powers was a potent induce- 
 ment to many of those who actually did resort to 
 hermit solitude and self-inflicted mortification, cannot 
 be denied ; but this hope could be sustained amid trials 
 of a disheartening character, only by the hypothesis to 
 which recourse was had in the Yoga school. 
 
 But the God assumed was after all a mere nonentity, 
 a magnificent nothing. How, it may be asked, could 
 such an assumption promote the object of the framers 
 of the scheme ? How ! The framers of the scheme 
 could legitimately calculate upon popular inability to 
 reason, to analyze, and to comprehend. A phantom 
 
1G6 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 was enough to conciliate the masses ; while the think- 
 ing classes might gradually be persuaded to prefer a 
 perfectly quiescent God to one moved by a desire to 
 create and ready to create, for the purpose of supplying 
 a felt want. Why, the history of the world points to 
 more miracles wrought by chimeras, phantoms, and 
 shams, than by facts and realities of a stubborn charac- 
 ter ; and Patanjali could not be ignorant of human 
 life ! 
 
 This opinion, formed long before the publication of 
 the fourth part of Dr. Mitra’s translation and his Intro- 
 duction, is confirmed by the following extract from the 
 latter : 
 
 “ Still the coincidence of a number of names of a 
 given period is one which in Indian history cannot be 
 easily set aside as purely accidental. Confining, how- 
 ever, one’s attention to the text-books only, no one 
 who has read them carefully can fail to perceive that 
 Patanjali has contented himself by taking a theistic 
 appendage of no direct utility to a positively atheistic 
 model, without in any way blendiug the two ideas into 
 one homogeneity or consistency. Hence it is that the 
 Hindus call it Sesvara Sankhya, or Sankhya cum deo , 
 as opposed to the former, which is IN' ires war a Sankhya, 
 or Sankhya sine deo’’’’ (p. xxii.). 
 
 It is time to set forth the groat object of the Yoga 
 Philosophy ; and with a view to do this it is necessary 
 to inquire into the meaning of the word yoga. The 
 word is derived from the root yuj, which means “ join- 
 ing and it has therefore been explained by Yajna- 
 valkya as the u conjunction of the individual with the 
 supreme soul.” To this meaning two exceptions have 
 been taken by Madhavacharjya, and the author of the 
 Sarva-darsana-sangraha. The first is the impossibility 
 
THE TOR A PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 1G7 
 
 of the conjunction suggested according to the approved 
 rules of Indian logic, which maintain that two eternal 
 and infinite substances cannot possibly be conjoined. 
 The second is the present identity of the individual 
 and universal soul according to the pantheistic princi- 
 ples of the Yedantic school. 
 
 These objections are brought forward to gratify a 
 propensity to pugnaciousness rather than to remove 
 obstacles to the attainment of truth. For neither the 
 dictum of Indian logic on which the first is based, nor 
 the principle of pantheistic philosophy which upholds 
 the second, is recognized in the Yoga Shastra. The 
 word yoga is used to mean both the end proposed by 
 Yoga Philosophy and the means used according to its 
 teaching to compass it. The end proposed is the union 
 of the individual with the universal spirit ; and the 
 means indicated are varieties of exercises, culminating 
 in samadhi or concentration. But Yajnavalkya cannot 
 but admit that though this is the present meaning of 
 yoga, the word had a very different meaning in Patan- 
 jali’s time ; for he himself says in his commentary on 
 the Yoga Shastra : 
 
 “ Yoga means samadlii , concentration, in the sense 
 of the union of the subject and object — thought with 
 thought itself.” 
 
 The first two aphorisms of Patanjali’s great work 
 :lrus set forth the objects of Yoga Philosophy : 
 
 “ How the exposition of Yoga is to be made. Yoga 
 .8 the suppression of the functions of the thinking prin- 
 ciple. ’ ’ 
 
 The word translated “ the thinking principle” is 
 diitta, Avliich certainly means the mind, the principle 
 n us which receives impressions from the external 
 world through the senses, and passes in consequence 
 
108 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 through an almost endless series of transformations 
 and changes. 
 
 The Sanskrit word for these mutations or modifica- 
 tions is vritti , translated “functions” in the text. 
 These words, along with the word yoga , play an im- 
 portant part in this philosophy, and they must there- 
 fore be thoroughly understood. The following verses 
 show what is meant by “ functions” or vritti : 
 
 “ The functions are fivefold, and they are either 
 painful or not painful. The functions of the thinking 
 principle are right notion, misconception, fancy, sleep, 
 and memory. Right notions are perception, inference, 
 and testimony. Misconception is incorrect notion, or a 
 notion which abides in a form which is not that of its 
 object. Fancy is a notion founded on knowledge con- 
 veyed by words, but of which there is no object corre- 
 sponding in reality. Sleep is that function of the 
 thinking principle which has far its object the concep- 
 tion of nothing. Memory is the not letting go of an 
 object that has been recognized ” (chap. i. 5-11). 
 
 These five functions of the mind or of the thinking 
 principle are the sources of its unutterable changeable- 
 ness and restlessness. Right notions of the objects 
 around us, obtained through the sources of correct 
 knowledge, admitted in the Sankkya school, viz., per- 
 ception, inference, and testimony ; wrong notions aris- 
 ing from errors, such as we commit when we mistake a 
 rope for a serpent, or from doubt realized when we 
 cannot decide whether the object we see is a man or a 
 cow ; phantasms of things which have no existence 
 apart from a heated brain ; dreams of all kinds, from 
 those distinguished by some degree of reasonableness or 
 propriety down to those marred by the greatest wild- 
 ness and incoherence ; and the innumerable clusters of 
 
THE YOGA PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 169 
 
 ideas and associations recalled or revived by memory — 
 all these form the ever-shifting elements of our mental 
 existence, and they produce in us a restlessness similar 
 to that by which they themselves are characterized. 
 
 Here it ought to be noted that one of the universally 
 admitted maxims of Hindu Philosophy is that the mind 
 assumes the form of what it perceives ; and therefore 
 it necessarily becames, really not figuratively, a tree, a 
 tank, an animal, a sweet mango, a musical pipe, an 
 odoriferous flower, or a hard stone ; not only so, it is 
 changed into the grotesque forms and shapes conjured 
 up by fancy either when we are awake or when we are 
 asleep, or into the ideas, equally subjective, exhumed 
 by memory from the vaults of its own mausoleum. 
 Who can form an adequate idea of its volatility, its 
 fickleness, its restlessness ? Who can number the varie- 
 ties of mutations and transformations through which it 
 passes in the course of the day, not to say a year, a 
 decade, or the course of a long life ? To destroy this 
 fickleness, this changeableness, this restlessness, to lead 
 the mind to wade, so to speak, through these innumer- 
 able transformations to its original state of serene 
 repose — such is the object proposed by the Yoga Phi- 
 losophy. The idea of union with God is a later graft. 
 
 How can this be effected ? How are the modifica- 
 tions of the mind to be suppressed, and how is it to be 
 brought back to its primitive state of quiescence and 
 repose ? To this question the proper reply is given in 
 the twelfth aphorism of the first chapter : “ The sup- 
 pression of these functions is effected by Exercise and 
 Dispassion.” These two expressions or vocables make 
 up what is called Yoga, which consists of several mem- 
 bers or parts. But before we refer to them it is desir- 
 able to point out the obstructions which hinder our 
 
170 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 progress through ascetic exercises to the goal of Yoga 
 Philosophy. These are enumerated in Aphorism 30 
 (Book I.) : “ Disease, languor, doubt, carelessness, 
 idleness, worldly-mindedness, mistaken notions, unat- 
 tainment of any stage of abstraction, and instability 
 therein ; these, causing distractions, are the obstacles” 
 (p. 38). 
 
 Bodily ailments incapacitating the mind for close 
 thinking, intellectual lassitude and indolence, doubt as 
 to the feasibility and utility of meditation, careless or 
 slipshod methods of procedure, earthly ambition, illu- 
 sion, such as that which leads to a bit of mother-of-pearl 
 being mistaken for silver, inability to attain to a partic- 
 ular stage of contemplation, or to continue steady in it 
 when attained — these are hindrances to Yoga ; and 
 they are accompanied with, as the next aphorism 
 assures us, “ pain, distress, trembling, inspiration, and 
 expiration” — that is, pain in the threefold form referred 
 to in the Sankliya Philosophy ; shaking of the body 
 interfering with its proper posture, and irregular breath- 
 ing. These can be avoided only by long- continued and 
 persevering exercise. 
 
 But not only are these interruptions or hindrances to 
 meditation to be overcome, but efforts should be put 
 forward to annihilate the great causes of our bondage. 
 These are called “afflictions,” and they are described 
 in the following aphorisms : “ Ignorance, egoism, de- 
 sire, aversion, and ardent attachment to life are the 
 five afflictions. Ignorance is the field of those which 
 follow, whether they be dormant, weak, intercepted, 
 or simple. Ignorance is the assumption of that which 
 is non-eternal, impure, painful, and non -soul— to be 
 eternal, pure, joyous, and soul. Egoism is the identi- 
 fying of the power that sees with the power of seeing. 
 
THE YOGA PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 171 
 
 Desire is dwelling on pleasure. Aversion is dwelling 
 on pain. Tenacity of life is an attachment to the 
 body, which relates to the residua of one’s former life, 
 even on the part of the wise. These, the subtle ones, 
 should be avoided by an adverse course” (chap. ii. 
 3 - 9 ). 
 
 Five causes of our bondage are stated ; and the first 
 of these, viz. , ignorance, is declared to be the source of 
 the rest. Ignorance, therefore, is, according to this, as 
 to every other system of Hindu Philosophy, the ulti- 
 mate cause of that bondage from which deliverance is 
 to be ardently desired. Ignorance of what ? Hot of 
 God and His attributes ; nor of the teaching in His rev- 
 elation ; but of the essential and everlasting difference 
 between soul and non-soul. The characteristics of the 
 soul are in marked antithesis to the properties and 
 qualities of matter and its evolutes. The soul is eter- 
 nal, pure, and joyous ; while matter, in at least its 
 present forms, is non-eternal, impure, and painful. 
 But we are laboring under the hallucination that the 
 soul is impure and miserable, while the fact is that im- 
 purity and pain belong to matter, and cannot possibly 
 appertain to soul. And the consequence of this igno- 
 rance is that we wish to see the connection of the pure 
 spirit with impure and painful matter, perpetuated 
 rather than dissolved. 
 
 But how does ignorance bring us to a conclusion so 
 wretched ? The different stages of its operation are in- 
 dicated. Ignorance begets egoism, by which the seer 
 is identified with the seeing faculty, the enjoyer is con- 
 founded with the instrument of enjoyment, or the soul 
 is declared to be nothing more or less than one of its 
 own material organs. The soul is the enjoyer, and the 
 enjoyment is communicated to it through the internal 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 172 
 
 organ, intelligence or mind, which is an evolute of 
 Prakriti, and therefore a material form, though of the 
 subtlest kind and imperceptible. But this form, though 
 merely an instrument of enjoyment, is inflated with an 
 idea of its own importance, and says, “ I enjoy.” Its 
 ignorance of its own nature and position among the 
 admitted categories of the system is the cause of its 
 egoism. But, properly speaking, as it has been so often 
 said, the charge of ignorance or egoism cannot be le- 
 gitimately brought against it. It is in reality the 
 enjoyer, and its enjoyment is simply reflected in the 
 tranquil spirit, as the serene evening sky with its rosy 
 light is reflected upon the surface of a calm sheet of 
 water. The mistake does not rest therefore with the 
 internal organ, but with the philosopher, who, after 
 having extinguished all individuality on the part of the 
 human spirit, allows himself to be led by his instincts 
 to attribute some sort of responsibility to it. 
 
 From egoism proceed a longing for pleasure and a 
 recoil from pain ; and these instincts give birth to 
 tenacity of life, or an aversion to that dissolution of the 
 connection of the soul with material organs, on which 
 true emancipation hinges. IIow ? Men instinctively 
 desire happiness, and perform good works to secure it. 
 But good works are fructescent, and they necessarily 
 lead to their translation to regions of happiness, whence, 
 as soon as the fruits of their good works are consumed, 
 they have to come back in renewed bodies. Or, if they 
 are bent on present enjoyment and secure it by bad 
 works, they are sent into regions of punishment, 
 whence, the fruits of their evil deeds being consumed, 
 they also come back in fresh bodies. The chain of 
 transmigration is, therefore, necessarily lengthened by 
 works, which, whether good or bad, proceed from our 
 
THE TOGA PHILOSOPHY. 173 
 
 instinctive and fatuous desire for happiness and our 
 equally instinctive and foolish aversion to pain. An 
 additional reason is given for our shrinking from death 
 in the expression, “ The residua of one’s former life.” 
 What are the residua of a former life ? There are 
 varieties of such, but those referred to here are our own 
 recollections of the pains experienced in consequence of 
 death in former lives ; and these cannot but lead us to 
 shrink from even a temporary dissolution of the ma- 
 terial conditions by which the soul is enchained. 
 
 These products of ignorance are found in various 
 states in various individuals. In some they are “ dor- 
 mant,” or in a state of hibernation, from which they 
 are sure to come out with renewed vigor to torment us 
 and drive us to works, fruits, births, deaths, repeated 
 in all but endless chains. In some they are “ inter- 
 cepted,” or their development is checked by the undue 
 preponderance of one of them, such as the prevalence 
 of egoism decided enough to check the manifestation of 
 desire, aversion, and tenacity of life. In some they 
 have been weakened by the preliminary operations of 
 Yoga; while in some they have their full play, and are 
 therefore called “ simple.” 
 
 But in one case all the afflictions may justly be 
 represented as the “ residua” of former lives. To 
 understand this let attention be called to the following 
 aphorisms : 
 
 “ The residua of works have affliction for their root, 
 and are felt either in this manifested birth or in the 
 unmanifested one. The root existing, the deserts are 
 land, age and experience. They have joy or suffering 
 for their fruit according as their cause is virtue or vice. 
 To the discriminating all are verily painful, because of 
 the adversity of the actions of the three qualities, and 
 
174 
 
 HINDU rillLOSOPHY. 
 
 of tlie pains of sequence, anxiety, and residua” (chap, 
 ii. 12-15). 
 
 The afflictions — ignorance, etc. — are to be held ac- 
 countable not merely for the works performed by us in 
 this life, but for those we have performed in all the 
 transmigrations through which we have passed. The 
 remains, so to speak, of these works, we carry with us, 
 and their consequences we take in “ kind,” or in rank, 
 either in society or in the scale of being ; in “ age” or 
 in longevity or its reverse ; and lastly, in “ experi- 
 ence,” or in the delectation of pleasure, or the endur- 
 ance of pain. JSTor are their consequences or fruits, ex- 
 cept in rare cases, consumed in this life, they being dis- 
 played in that which is to come, and which, therefore, 
 is yet unmanifested. If they have been effectuated by 
 virtue, their present and future consequence must be 
 joy ; while if they have been caused by vice, their 
 present and future consequence is and will be sorrow. 
 The discriminating, however, look upon all the con- 
 sequences, joyful or sorrowful, as evils to be depre- 
 cated for four different reasons. In the first place, the 
 three cosmic qualities to which virtue, vice, and activity 
 benevolent or malevolent, are to be ascribed, are, when 
 their equipoise in Prakriti is once interrupted, in an- 
 tagonism to one another ; and their frequent contests 
 cannot but lead to disorder and misery. Pleasure, in 
 the second place, is invariably followed by pain, “ by 
 the law of sequence.” It is, moreover, accompanied 
 with a great deal of anxiety, arising mainly from our 
 consciousness of its evanescent character. And, lastly, 
 all our actions and feelings leave behind them impres- 
 sions, which revive the sensations of pleasure and pain 
 within us, leaving aside the consequences, which it is 
 absolutely impossible for us to evade or avert. 
 
TIIE YOGA PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 175 
 
 Now, we come to the means or accessories of Yoga. 
 These are — first, Yama, restraint ; second, Niyama, 
 obligation ; third, Asana, posture ; fourth, Prana 
 yama, regulation or restraint of the breath ; fifth, 
 Pratyahara, abstraction ; sixth, Dharana, devotion ; 
 seventh, Dhyana, contemplation ; eighth, Samadhi, 
 meditation. 
 
 The following are the aphorisms in which these are 
 set forth with their characteristics : 
 
 “ On the decay of impurity, through the practice of 
 the accessories of the Yoga, there is illumination of the 
 understanding till discriminative knowledge results. 
 Restraint, obligation, posture, regulation of the breath, 
 abstraction, devotion, contemplation, and meditation 
 are the eight accessories. Restraint includes abstinence 
 from slaughter, falsehood, theft, incontinence, and 
 avarice. The obligations are purification, contentment, 
 penance, study, and devotion to the Lord : Posture is 
 that which is firm and pleasant. On its being accom- 
 plished, the regulation of breath, which is interruption 
 in the flow of inspiration and expiration. Abstraction 
 is the assumption by the senses of the original nature 
 of the thinking principle, from want of application to 
 their respective objects” (chap. ii. 18-54, 114). 
 
 “ Steadfastness or devotion is the confinement of 
 the thinking principle to one place. Contemplation is 
 unison there of the understanding. When that con- 
 templation, existing as if without its own identity, 
 enlightens solely one object, it is meditation” (chap, 
 iii. 1-3). 
 
 These eight means of Yoga are called its members as 
 well as its accessories. The first five the outer, and 
 the last three the inner members ; and they indicate 
 the varied stages, incipient as well as advanced, of that 
 
17 G 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 laborious and painful exercise which terminates in the 
 extinction of the thinking principle. It being neces- 
 sary to draw particular attention to them, they are set 
 forth one after another, in the order in which they ap- 
 pear in the above extracts, with elucidating comments : 
 
 1. Restraint is the first step in all schemes of ref- 
 ormation, meaning, as it does, abstinence from gross 
 sins and sinful dispositions. The word “slaughter” 
 as used in the aphorism bearing upon it has a twofold 
 meaning. It means religious sacrifice as well as mur- 
 der. The Yoga Philosophy is as thoroughly opposed 
 to the doctrine of sacrifice as Buddhism ; and it brings 
 forward veracity as a substitute for the bloody rites 
 enjoined in the Vedas, while it promises “ jewels from 
 all sides” to him “ who is confirmed in abstinence from 
 theft,” and represents attainment of vigor as insepa- 
 rably associated with “continence.” It prohibits 
 avarice not only in the sense in which the word is ordi- 
 narily used, but in a sense unknown perhaps to all but 
 students of Hindu Philosophy. The avaricious longing 
 for fresh bodies and fresh births, of which we are sup- 
 posed to be conscious, is condemned, as well as cupidity 
 in the ordinary sense of the term. The first step of 
 Yoga is renunciation of sin in act, word, and even 
 thought. So far it is worthy of commendation. 
 
 2. The second step is the cultivation of right disposi- 
 tions within us by a strict conformity to the command- 
 ments and ordinances of religion. A careful study of 
 the Vedas, certain prescribed austerities and devotion 
 to the Lord are fitted to purify the soul from all its base 
 desires, and breed contentment in it. There would be 
 no objection to this statement, if by ‘ ‘ devotion to the 
 Lord” were meant something more than muttering 
 mechanically the two words Pranava and Om, which 
 
THE YOGA PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 177 
 
 are represented as His symbols. It is affirmed that the 
 frequent repetition of these symbols, or of some select 
 verses from the Yedas, such as the Gayatri, leads to 
 God- vision. Through muttering results vision , as ex- 
 plained by Bhoj Rajah, of the desiderated deity. But 
 God-vision according to this philosophy is tantamount 
 to nothing- vision- — the God posited being a nonentity ! 
 
 3. Here begin those bodily exercises which do not 
 profit. The varieties of postures recommended and 
 detailed for the attainment of firmness of mind and 
 cheerfulness of disposition are too numerous to be taken 
 notice of here. Yasistha, Yajnavalkya, and other 
 sages of the Yedic and Post-Yedic age fixed their 
 number at 84, stating that these had been prescribed 
 and described by Siva, the Father of Indian Yogis. 
 Goralcshanatha, a Yogi of a later date, disgusted with 
 their paucity, swelled their number to 84,000,000. Of 
 this number, however, ten are considered as the more 
 important, and three or four of these last we shall in- 
 dicate in the words of the learned translator. 
 
 (a) “ Padmasana. The right foot should be placed 
 on the left thigh, and the left foot on the right 
 thigh ; the hands should be crossed, and the two great 
 toes should be firmly held thereby ; the chin should be 
 bent down on the chest ; and in this posture the eyes 
 should be directed to the tip of the nose. It is called 
 Padmasana (lotus-posture), and is highly beneficial in 
 overcoming all diseases.” 
 
 (b) “ Put the right ankle on the leftside of the chest, 
 and similarly the left ankle on the right side, and the 
 posture will be Gomukha, or of the shape of a cow’s 
 mouth.” 
 
 (c) “ Having assumed the fowl posture, should the 
 two hands be placed on the sides of the neck, it would 
 
178 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 make the posture like that of the tortoise upset ; it is 
 called tortoise-upset posture.” 
 
 The fowl posture is thus described : £ ‘Having' estab- 
 lished the lotus posture, if the hand be passed between 
 the thigh and the knees and placed on the earth so as 
 to lift the body aloft, it will produce the fowl seat.” 
 
 (d ) “ Hold the great toes with the hands, and draw 
 them to the ears as in drawing a bowstring, and this is 
 called the bow posture” (p. 104). 
 
 The translator concludes his description of the prin- 
 cipal varieties of postures recommended with these 
 words : 
 
 “ Treating of a system of philosophy, Patanjali has 
 not thought proper to enter into details regarding age, 
 sex, caste, food, dwelling, etc., as bearing upon Yoga ; 
 but other works supply information about them to a 
 considerable extent. A few notes derived therefrom 
 may not be unfitly added here. The first question that 
 would arise would be, Who are fit to perform the 
 Yoga ? On this subject the “ Hatha dipika” fixes no 
 limit. It says, “By the practice of Y’oga, every one 
 may attain perfection, whether he be youthful, or old, 
 or very old, or diseased or decrepid. ” The next point 
 is the selection of a proper place. “ A small monastery, 
 a dwelling not larger than a cube of six feet, situated 
 in an out-of-the-way place, where there is no danger, 
 within a circuit of a bow, of hail, fire, and water, in a 
 country abounding in food, and free from danger of 
 wars and the like, where religion prevails in a thriving 
 kingdom,” is the most appropriate. The cell, or 
 mathika , should have a small door and no window ; it 
 should be free from holes, cavities, inequalities, high 
 steps, and low descents. It should be smeared with 
 cow-dung, devoid of dirt, not infested by vermin, with 
 
THE YOGA PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 179 
 
 a terrace in front, a good well, and the whole sur- 
 rounded by a wall. Dwelling in such a place, avoid- 
 ing all anxieties, the Yogi should follow the path 
 pointed out by his teachers in the exercise of the Yoga. 
 He should avoid all excess of food, violent exertions, 
 and vain disputations. His food should consist of 
 wheat, sali rice, barley, shasti rice (or that which 
 matures in six days), the syama and the nivara grains, 
 milk, clarified butter, coarse or candied sugar, butter, 
 honey, ginger, palval, fruits, five kinds of greens, mung 
 pulse, and water,” and all soothing sweet things in a 
 moderate quantity, avoiding flesh-meat, and too much 
 salt, acids, and all stale, putrid, decomposed, or acrid 
 substances. The quantity of food taken should be such as 
 to leave one fourth of his appetite unappeased ” (p. 110). 
 
 When the adept is able to assume any posture he 
 wishes to appear in, he is unaffected “ by the pairs,” 
 i.e. by the extremes of cold and heat, light and dark- 
 ness, storm and lull, etc. Neither is he tormented by 
 hunger and thirst. In a word, he becomes impassible ; 
 and his steadiness of posture no contingency can shake 
 for a moment. 
 
 4. Eegulation of breath is an important member of 
 Yoga, and the process consists of expiration, inspiration, 
 and retention of breath, according to fixed rules. To 
 give an insight into these, let us present an extract from 
 the translator’s notes (p. 43) on the subject : “ The 
 time devoted to inspiration is the shortest, and to reten- 
 tion the longest. A Yaishnava in his ordinary daily 
 prayer repeats the Yija-mantra (containing specific 
 mystic syllables) once while expiring, seven times while 
 inspiring, and twenty times while retaining. A Shakta 
 repeats the mantra 16 times while inspiring, 64 times 
 while retaining, and 32 times while expiring. These 
 
ISO 
 
 iiindu rniLosoniY. 
 
 periods are frequently modified. The details vary 
 according to each particular form of meditation and 
 the capacity of the performer. As a rule it may be 
 said that the longer the retention, the more proficient 
 is the Yogi. The usual mode of performing the Prana- 
 yama is, after assuming the posture prescribed, to place 
 the ring finger of the right hand on the left nostril, 
 pressing it so as to close it, and to expire with the 
 right, then to press the right nostril with the thumb, 
 and to inspire through the left nostril, and then to close 
 the two nostrils with the ring; finger and the thumb, 
 and to stop all breathing. The order is reversed in the 
 next operation, and in the third act the first form is 
 required. This constitutes the Pranayama, and it 
 may be repeated after short intervals, according to 
 choice, for hours. The Ilatha-dipika philosophizes on 
 this by saying, “ By the motion of the breath, the 
 thinking principle moves. When that motion is 
 stopped, it becomes motionless, and the Yogi becomes 
 firm as the trunk of a tree ; therefore the breath should 
 be stopped. As long as the breath remains in the 
 body, so long it is called living. Death is the exit of 
 the breath, therefore it should be stopped.” 
 
 5. Abstraction of the senses is effected by their with- 
 drawal from the objects toward which they are 
 attracted almost irresistibly, and by their concentration 
 on the thinking principle. The senses cannot be ex- 
 tinguished so long as the body of which they are in- 
 separable organs continues ; but their natural ten- 
 dency may not merely be counteracted, but completely 
 neutralized. Their natural tendency is to go outward 
 toward the varieties of tempting objects in which the 
 world abounds ; and when they have their full play 
 left unrestrained, they prove sources of ceaseless change 
 
THE YOGA PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 181 
 
 to the mind, and through it to the other internal 
 organs and the soul. Their natural action must there- 
 fore be, not only restrained and circumscribed, but 
 completely paralyzed, or rather annihilated, and an 
 action to which they are naturally averse substituted in 
 its place. In other words, their outward and objective 
 action must give place to action purely inward and sub- 
 jective. The mind must draw them in as a tortoise 
 draws its limbs within its shell ; and when thus fixed 
 upon the sotil itself they cease to be sources of rest- 
 lessness and trouble. 
 
 This consummation is the first great step attained in 
 meditation ; and the complete subjugation or abstrac- 
 tion of the soul ushers us into the inner temple of Yoga. 
 The three remaining members are said to be “ more 
 intimate” than those already described, and they are 
 therefore separated from the others and made to con- 
 stitute a class by themselves. One result of this classi- 
 fication is, that the number five plays an important 
 part in Yoga Philosophy, as the perfect number seven 
 does in Hebrew literature. We have, for instance, five 
 functions or modifications — right-notion, misconception, 
 purity, sleep, and memory ; five afflictions — ignorance, 
 egoism, desire, aversion, and tenacity of life ; five for- 
 bearances — slaughter, theft, falsehood, incontinence, 
 and avarice ; five obligations— purification, contentment, 
 penance, study, and devotion to the Lord ; five subsid- 
 iary means — restraint, obligation, posture, regulation 
 of the breath, and abstraction of the senses. To these 
 may be added th q five recognized sources of perfections 
 ( siddhis ), viz. , birth, works, incantations, austerity, and 
 samadhi. 
 
 6. The sixth step in this exercise is the confinement 
 of the thinking principle to one place. In the earlier 
 
182 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 stages of meditation, the mind is not fitted for con- 
 centration on its great theme of contemplation, viz., 
 the soul. It must therefore he fixed on an external 
 object, either through the eye or without the help of 
 any of the senses. That external object may be the tip 
 of the nose or the navel- wheel or a plexus of nerves in 
 the belly, or the crown of the head or the sky or ether. 
 When the thinking principle lias acquired by such exer- 
 cise the power of concentration, it may easily be trans- 
 ferred from an external to an internal object, from the 
 objective 11011-self to the subjective self. 
 
 7. Dhyan , or contemplation, is the concentration of 
 the thinking principle, not on an external object like 
 the tip of the nose, or the crown of the head, but on its 
 proper object of thought. Dliyau is not the finishing 
 stroke of the Yoga, because it is not accompanied with 
 the obliteration of all distinction between the thinking 
 principle, the object of thought, and thought itself. 
 The state of perfect unconsciousness, which is the goal 
 before the Yogi, is only a step ahead. 
 
 8. Samadhi , or concentration, is the final stage in 
 which the thinking principle loses its separate identity 
 and becomes merged in the object of thought and 
 thought itself ; or rather in which the thinking principle 
 is extinguished along with thought, and the object of 
 thought remains in its original state of solitude. This 
 state is called Tcaivalya, translated “ abstraction” by 
 Mr. Davies, and “ isolation” by Dr. Mitra. It is indi- 
 cated in the following extracts from Book IY. : 
 
 “ For the knower of the difference between soul and 
 non-soul, there is a cessation of the idea of self in the 
 thinking principle. Then the thinking principle is 
 turned toward discriminative knowledge, and bowed 
 down by the weight of commencing isolation.” 
 
THE YOGA PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 183 
 
 ££ On the completion of the series there is produced 
 the meditation called the £ Cloud of Virtue,’ even in 
 the case of the non-aspirant, from the appearance of 
 constant discrimination. Thence follows the cessation 
 of afflictions and works. Then the knowable becomes 
 small from the infiniteness of the knowledge free from 
 all coverings and impurities. Thereupon takes place 
 the termination of the succession of the modifications of 
 the qualities which have accomplished their ends.” 
 
 ££ Isolation is the regression of the qualities devoid of 
 the purpose of the soul, or it is the abidance of the 
 thinking power in its own nature.” 
 
 The process is plain. The devotee first recognizes 
 the fact that his self is different from the thinking 
 principle, and thus attains this discriminative knowledge. 
 Then a shower of virtues or rewards falls upon him un- 
 solicited, in spite of his aspirations being completely 
 withdrawn from them. Then the afflictions and works 
 disappear, and the objects of knowledge appear insignifi- 
 cant before its vastness and infinitude. Then the 
 cosmic gunas or qualities with all their modifications 
 abandon the soul forever, or retire leaving the soul in 
 its original state of quiescense and repose. Here is 
 emancipation, the soul’s liberation from the trammels 
 of Prakriti till a fresh renovation of the world, if not 
 forever. 
 
 It is to be noted here that Patanjali does not teach 
 the doctrine of the soul’s absorption into the deity. On 
 this important point let us hear what the learned trans- 
 lator says : 
 
 “ Professor Weber in his 1 History of Indian Litera- 
 ture ’ (pp. 238-39) has entirely misrepresented the case, 
 lie says : £ One very peculiar side of the Yoga doctrine, 
 and one which was more and more exclusively devel- 
 
184 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 oped as time went on, is the Yoga practice — that is, the 
 outward means, such as penances, mortifications, and 
 the like, whereby the absorption into the supreme God- 
 head is sought to be attained.’ To those who have 
 attentively read the preceding pages, it will be obvious 
 that the idea of absorption into the Godhead forms no 
 part of the Yoga theory. Indeed it is difficult to con- 
 ceive how so well read a scholar as the learned profes- 
 sor could have formed this opinion unless we behove 
 that he has not read the Yoga, and has borrowed his 
 theory from the Bhagavat Gita and Puranic and Tan- 
 tric modifications of Yoga. Patanjali, like Kapila, 
 rests satisfied with this isolation of the soul. He does 
 not pry into the how and the where the soul resides 
 after the separation” (p. 209). 
 
 Patanjali’s God being a phantom conjured up to 
 satisfy a popular clamor rather than to meet a necessity 
 of his philosophy, he is simply laid aside, as all phan- 
 toms deserve to be in the work of liberation as in that 
 of creation and entanglement of Prakriti in its own 
 meshes, and it must not be forgotten that the so-called 
 emancipation of the soul is in reality liberation of Pra- 
 kriti in the shape of the thinking principle from 
 troubles of its own creation. 
 
 But this highest consummation, this summum bonum, 
 is preceded by certain earthly advantages to the Yoga ; 
 and to these some reference must be made. They are 
 indicated in the following aphorisms : 
 
 “ The knowledge of the past and the future is ac- 
 quired by sanyama over the threefold modification. 
 A confused comprehension of word, meaning, and 
 knowledge arises from indiscriminate understanding. 
 By Sanyama with due discrimination is acquired an 
 understanding of the cry of all creatures. A knowl- 
 
THE YOGA PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 185 
 
 edge of former existence by making the residua ap- 
 parent. With reference to cognition, a knowledge of 
 another’s thinking principle” (Book III. 16-19). 
 
 “ From Sanyama with reference to the shape of the 
 body, the power of vision being diminished and the 
 correlation of light and sight being severed, there is 
 disappearance. Works are deliberate and non -de- 
 liberate, and by Sanyama about them a knowledge of 
 final end, or by portents. In powers, the powers of 
 the elephant and the like. From contemplation of the 
 light of the extremely luminous disposition, a knowl- 
 edge is acquired of the subtile, the intercepted, and 
 the remote. From Sanyama in the sun, a knowledge 
 of regions” (III. 21-26). “ In the coronal light, vision 
 of perfected ones’ ’ (III. 82). 
 
 These extracts are enough to show that all sorts of 
 extraordinary powers are derivable from the applica- 
 tion of the last three members of Yoga, called San- 
 yama in their joint capacity, to varieties of objects 
 perceptible and imperceptible — (a) knowledge of the 
 past and the future, of all sciences, of another’s mental 
 states, of one’s own adventures in past times, and the 
 coming rewards or punishments predestined on account 
 of them and of present works ; (5) ability to compre- 
 hend all inarticulate and indistinct sounds, even the 
 cries of inferior animals, which, be it observed, have 
 souls as well as men, and speak intelligibly ; (c) en- 
 larged powers of vision such as to enable a man to see 
 heavenly intelligences, things subtile, such as ether, 
 and concealed beneath the earth, such as the contents 
 of mines, and such things as the ehxir of life, found on 
 the other side of the mountain of Meru ; (d) physical 
 powers, such as those of the lion, the behemoth — nay, 
 much more expanded, even the powers that may enable 
 
18 G 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 us literally to remove mountains and dry up seas ; (e) 
 the power of intercepting’ the light between one’s own 
 body and the eyesight of all classes of spectators, and 
 thereby rendering one’s self either partially or wholly 
 invisible ; (f) power, in a word, to assume all shapes, 
 walk on the water, fly in the air, remain buried under 
 the earth for months and years, and then come up as 
 the dead are expected to do on the day of judgment, 
 or remain buried in the earth as a pillar of stone till a 
 mound is thrown up around the body of the entranced 
 devotee by ants, and nests are built by birds in his 
 tangled and clotted hairs. The varied powers attain- 
 able are classed under eight heads. And these are in- 
 dicated by Bhoj Rajah in the following order : 
 
 1. “ Attenuation (anima), the attainment of the form 
 of atoms— molecularity. 
 
 2. “ Levity ( laghima ), attainment of lightness, like 
 that of floss or cotton. 
 
 3. “ Ponderosity ( garima ), attainment of great 
 weight. 
 
 4. ct Illimitability ( mahinia ), attainment of great- 
 ness, or the power of touching the moon or the like 
 with the tip of one’s finger. 
 
 5. “ Irresistible will ( prakamya ), non-fructification 
 of one’s desires. 
 
 G. “ Supremacy ( 'isita ), highest authority over the 
 body and internal organs. 
 
 T. “ Subjection ( vasita ), prevailing everywhere, that 
 is, the elements, being subservient to him, do not dis- 
 obey his behests. 
 
 8. “Fulfilment of desires (ka rn a vasay itva ) , accom- 
 plishing one’s desires everywhere — that is, in whatever 
 object a desire is found, the Yogi becomes accomplished 
 in that, or brings it to fruition by attaining it ” (p. 158). 
 
THE YOGA PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 187 
 
 These perfections are not the products exclusively of 
 samadhi / other causes are mentioned in the first apho- 
 rism of the fourth or last chapter of the book under re- 
 view as co-operating- with it in their production. The 
 aphorism runs thus : “ The perfections are produced 
 by birth, herbs, incantations, austerity, or samadhi. ” 
 Actions performed in former lives must have their 
 fruits, and if they are unfavorable to the acquisition of 
 supernatural powers, they interfere with their attain- 
 ment in spite of the admitted efficacy of concentration. 
 And therefore merit acquired in past lives must co- 
 operate with Yoga in the generation of these marvel- 
 lous powers of the body and mind. Mor must such 
 things as herbs, amulets, and incantations be despised, 
 they being fitted as well to offer facilities for the ac- 
 quisition of these powers as to remove obstacles or 
 hindrances to the realization of the conditions on 
 which their attainment is based. And as to austerity, 
 nothing can be more meritorious than that to which 
 the great sages of the Yedic age, like Viswamitra, 
 owed that greatness and glory which subsequent writ- 
 ers have unanimously represented as even more than 
 divine. 
 
 It is, however, to be observed that these powers are 
 after all the subordinate fruits of samadhi or concen- 
 tration. They are accompaniments of the lower, not 
 of the higher kind of meditation. Meditation is said 
 to be with seed ( smija ) or seedless ( nirvija ) ; that is, 
 with distinct recognition of subject and object alive, 
 and such recognition dead. Meditation with seed is 
 the stage where the mind gets rid of all modifications 
 produced by external objects, but retains a distinct 
 recognition of self or its self-consciousness. The ex- 
 traordinary powers enumerated are the gorgeous ap- 
 
188 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 pendage of this stage ; and there is therefore some 
 degree of selfishness connected with it. But when the 
 mind passes to the higher stage and loses its recognition 
 of self or becomes unconscious, these powers are cast 
 aside as old garments, and complete absorption into 
 the object of thought is realized, and the soul is saved 
 from material conditions. 
 
 But a great trial awaits the devotee before the final 
 emancipation of his soul is realized. This is indicated 
 in aphorism 51 of Book III. : “ Avoidance should be 
 made of association with, and encouragement of, celes- 
 tial temptations, from apprehension of evil recurring.” 
 The holy gods become jealous of the man who, by pen- 
 ance and meditation, acquires extraordinary powers 
 and brings himself to the borders of complete emanci- 
 pation. Xo wonder ! Mortals have at times, if not 
 very frequently, made themselves terrors and scourges 
 to the gods themselves by means of extraordinary 
 powers attained by austerity and meditation, and their 
 deliverance is deprecated in heaven. And, therefore, 
 the gods most naturally throw obstacles in the way of 
 the devotee about to be beatified, by inducing their 
 king, Indra, to send down courtesans from his court, 
 and they make use of their charms and blandishments 
 to induce him to swerve from the path of meditation. 
 And when they fail, ghosts and hobgoblins, growling 
 tigers and hissing snakes are let loose with the same 
 object. But when the devotee succeeds in frustrating 
 all “ celestial ” attempts to cajole or frighten him out 
 of his chosen path, he is beatified, and his face becomes 
 radiant with celestial glory, and the sweet smile of con- 
 scious deliverance pla} r s upon his lips ; such at least 
 was the case with the great Buddha under the Bo-tree 
 at Gy a, though the temptations thrown in his way 
 
THE YOGA PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ISO 
 
 proceeded from the malice of Mara, not from the 
 jealousy of the gods ! 
 
 Such is Yoga Philosophy, if philosophy a series of 
 practical rules, having for their object the complete ex- 
 tinction of mental activity, can properly be called. 
 Contradictory statements are sure to be met in our ex- 
 position of its maxims, as the system itself veers about, 
 now assuming the existence of God, and then convert- 
 ing Him into a mere phantom or a useless appendage ; 
 now making the soul the object ' of thought, and then 
 making thought feed upon itself ; now representing 
 salvation as the extinction of happiness as well as pain ; 
 and then representing the “ saved ” man as happy 
 beyond description ! The system, however, can be 
 thoroughly understood only when we divest ourselves 
 of all our metaphysical ideas, and look, according to the 
 known principles of the Sankhya Philosophy, upon the 
 so-called internal organs, intelligence, self-conscious- 
 ness, and mind as material evolutes essentially uncon- 
 nected with the soul ; and the complete extinction of 
 all these subtle productions of matter as necessary to 
 its salvation from both the happiness and the misery 
 reflected in it on account of their existence and proxim- 
 ity to it. The process by which such extinction is 
 brought about is, not the skeleton merely, but the body 
 and soul of this philosophy. 
 
 The Yoga Philosophy has been compared to mesmer- 
 ism and spiritualism by philosophic thinkers, as well as 
 by the charlatans who, under the banner of so-called 
 Theosophy, are trying to revive its lost prestige in 
 India. But it has very little in common with mesmer- 
 ism, as it does not uphold that belief in animal magnet- 
 ism which its founder, Franz Mesmer, propagated ; 
 and that faith in magnetic somnambulism by which one 
 
190 
 
 HIXDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of his followers infused new life into it, when his theory 
 was condemned by a conclave of professional men. 
 Varieties of bodily exercises, rather than magnetization 
 of chosen “ subjects” by passes of hand, were the ap- 
 proved weapons of the Yoga philosopher, and self-con- 
 trol rather than control over others his main aim. 
 Some of the powers said to have been acquired by him, 
 such as introvision, prevision, and retrovision, resemble 
 those which are said to be realized under what is tech- 
 nically called clairvoyance ; but while these played only 
 a secondary part in Yoga Philosophy, they are the 
 very soul of mesmerism. 
 
 And as to Spiritism, there is one aphorism in Pa- 
 tanjali’s work, the verse in which the power of seeing 
 subtle evolutes of matter and spirits is represented as 
 attainable, that alone has the remotest reference to it. 
 The idea of seances and communication with the dis- 
 embodied spirits of the great men of the world, dead 
 and gone, may be represented as an innovation upon 
 the system, not, however, as one of its original ele- 
 ments. Nor did an investigation into the occult powers 
 of nature originally constitute any portion of the Yogi’s 
 business ; his aim being, not tlie acquisition of general 
 knowledge, but that of the knowledge of the essential 
 distinction between soul and non-soul. 
 
 It may, however, be admitted that truths, some- 
 what like those of Mesmerism and Spiritism, were su- 
 peradded to the system before it was many years old ; 
 and the Yogi appears, in consequence, as a juggler and 
 necromancer in Sanscrit poetry and drama. The sys- 
 tem deteriorated early ; and its success in a lower 
 sense and failure in a higher are exhibited in India to- 
 day. The power of self-torture the Yogi evinces now, 
 as he did in days gone by, is miraculous indeed. 
 
THE YOGA PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 191 
 
 Monier Williams in his “ Indian Wisdom” thus groups 
 the forms of self-torture resorted to : 
 
 “ We read of some who acquire the power of re- 
 maining under water for a space of time quite incredi- 
 ble ; of others who bury themselves up to the neck in 
 the ground or even below it, leaving only a little hole 
 through which to breathe ; of others who keep their 
 fists clenched for years till the nails grow through the 
 back of their hands ; of others who hold one or both 
 arms aloft till they become immovably fixed in that posi- 
 tion and withered to the bone ; of others who roll their 
 bodies for thousands of miles to some place of pilgrim- 
 age ; of others who sleep on beds of iron spikes . . . 
 others have been known to chain themselves for life to 
 trees ; others, again, to pass their lives, heavily 
 chained, in iron cages. Lastly, the extent to which 
 some Indian ascetics will carry fasting, far exceeds any- 
 thing ever heard of in Europe, as may be understood 
 by a reference to the rules of the lunar penance {chan- 
 dr ay ana) given by Mann. This penance is a kind of 
 fast, which consists in diminishing the consumption of 
 food every day by one mouthful for the waning half of 
 the lunar month, beginning with fifteen mouthfuls at 
 the full moon, until the quantity is reduced to nothing 
 at the new moon, and then increasing it in like manner 
 during the fortnight of the moon’s increase” (pp. 
 105-106). 
 
 But the Yogis, as a body, are for various reasons de- 
 spised, rather than honored, except perhaps among the 
 most ignorant and superstitious. They, in the first 
 place, associate varied acts of self-indulgence of a cul- 
 pable nature with the varieties of tortures they inflict 
 upon themselves. They make use of intoxicating 
 drugs, so as to be always in a state of partial insensi- 
 
192 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 bility ; and they never scruple to allow themselves to 
 be implicated in nefarious and libidinous intrigues. 
 They are, in the matter of self-control, the very anti- 
 podes of what they are expected to be, being as a rule 
 avaricious, irascible, quarrelsome, and turbulent. And 
 lastly, they never hesitate to resort to varieties of low 
 tricks for the purpose of imposing on the credulity of 
 those by whom, but for them, they would be held in 
 contempt. Their attitude proves to a demonstration 
 that bodily tortures are not necessarily accompanied 
 with spiritual renovation, even when inflicted by the 
 devotee upon his own self, with the most pious of 
 motives. It also shows that those missionaries who 
 advise native preachers to live as they do, do not place 
 before them very exalted models of character or types 
 of self-sacrifice ! 
 
 But why do they not give up those bodily tortures 
 which are trying to flesh and blood ? Because they 
 believe that they are, in spite of their freaks of temper 
 and aberrations of conduct, acquiring extra merit by 
 their chosen course of mortification and penance. The 
 idea that sin and virtue can on no account be united is 
 foreign to Hindu theology ; and external observances 
 of the most exacting stamp are eagerly resorted to in 
 our country by persons who never dream of giving up 
 their favorite sins as fitted, not merely to make an 
 atonement for these, but to secure a store of superero- 
 gatory merit in spite of them ! Can moral turpitude 
 go further ? 
 
 We cannot conclude without an opportune reference 
 to the farce played by the Hew Dispensationists under 
 color of the Yoga system. They call themselves dev- 
 otees of Yoga, entertain the public with a new species 
 of dance, and practise some species of sacred jugglery 
 
THE YOGA PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 193 
 
 within the walls of a splendid house, and amid comforts 
 spurned by the ancient Yogi as antagonistic to the 
 main object of his life. But they are utter strangers to 
 the sacrifices, privations, mortifications, and penances 
 as enjoined in the Yoga Sastra ; while as busybodies, 
 engaged in getting up sensational demonstrations for 
 the purpose of maintaining their sinking prestige, they 
 never dream of betaking themselves to that intense 
 meditation without which their loudly tallied of “ God- 
 vision’ ’ is unattainable, even according to books which 
 might be represented as a series of improvements upon 
 that Sastra. All this, and something more, may be 
 said of the self-constituted Theosophist, who, while talk- 
 ing aloud of Yoga as the best of sciences, never scruple 
 to live after the fashion of the world, and thereby set 
 forth the contrast between what they say and what 
 they do ! 
 
CHAPTER YII. 
 
 THE NAYAYA SYSTEM, OK THE HUTDU LOGIC. 
 
 Tiie two systems of philosophy, the Sankhya and 
 Yoga, are synthetic, the process adopted by them being 
 that of an evolution from a primordial, diffusive sub- 
 stance, through material forms of a tenuous, impercep- 
 tible character, into that complicated framework of 
 nature, the varied portions of which make suitable im- 
 pressions on the senses. But the two systems we have 
 to deal with in this and the succeeding paper — viz., the 
 Yyaiyaika and Yaiseshika — are analytic, as their 
 adopted method indicates a descent from complexity to 
 unity, not an ascent from the uniform to the multi- 
 form, the one to the many. They begin with classifica- 
 tion ; place the objects of nature, both imperceptible 
 and perceptible, under fixed categories ; state the prin- 
 ciples by which the cognition of the latter by the mind 
 is regulated, and the existence of the former is demon- 
 strated ; show how the soul is enslaved and distressed 
 by them ; proceed to the very source of its bitter 
 bondage, and the ultimate cause of creation ; and, 
 finally, point out the way in which its emancipation is 
 insured and effected. They therefore embrace a 
 variety of subjects, and can only be called Logical in 
 the most ancient and comprehensive sense of the term. 
 The philosophy of these schools is what was understood 
 in ancient times by the now rarely used term, Po- 
 lymathy, including, as it does, Logic, Physiology, Psy- 
 
THE NAYAYA SYSTEM. 
 
 195 
 
 chology, and Theology. It includes what is embraced 
 in the tripartite classification of the Hegelian system, 
 in which the Science of Logic, the Philosophy of Ma- 
 ture, and the Philosophy of the Spirit are all em- 
 bodied. 
 
 We shall in this paper confine ourselves to a portion 
 of the all-comprehensive philosophy of the Nyaiyaika 
 and Yaiseshika schools, the portion embodying its 
 Logic and Physiology, and reserve our exposition of its 
 Psychology and Theology for a separate paper. Our 
 desire is to present the salient features of this huge and 
 all-comprehensive system in the modes of reasoning, 
 the forms of expression, and, as far as possible, in the 
 very words in which these are set forth in its standard 
 works. 
 
 A word about the founders of these two schools of 
 Philosophy, and the original and standard documents in 
 which their principles are unfolded, ought to precede 
 our analysis of the system in question. The founder of 
 the Nyaiyaika school was Gfotama or Gautama, and the 
 founder of the Yaiseshika school was Kanada. These 
 two persons are mythical heroes, like Kapila and 
 Patanjali, the founders respectively of the Sankhya and 
 Yoga systems. Scarcely anything reliable is known 
 regarding them besides the undisputed fact that they 
 founded respectively the schools of thought with which 
 their names are inseparably associated. 
 
 Gautama is said in a sacred legend to have been born 
 in Northern India in the beginning of the Treta Yuga, 
 or the second of the four great eras into which the his- 
 tory of the world is divided by Hindu chronologists, 
 and to have married Ahalya, the daughter of Brahma 
 himself. But though thus highly connected, his family 
 life was by no means happy, inasmuch as his wife, 
 
196 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 albeit a goddess herself, was seduced by Indra, the 
 king of heaven, and ultimately changed into a rock for 
 her infidelity to the solemn vows of matrimony. Her 
 divine seducer and lover was also punished, but in a 
 manner over which decency compels us to draw the 
 veil. Scarcely any reliable report, good or scandalous, 
 has come down to us about Kanada ; but he appears 
 to have been the more austere devotee and the greater 
 thinker. On the whole, the two philosophers agreed 
 with each other, though their differences on minor 
 points have been noticed in the exegetic disquisitions by 
 which their writings have been elucidated by eminent 
 commentators. 
 
 The original works of these schools are the Sutras or 
 Aphorisms ascribed to Gautama, called the Ay ay a 
 Sutras, and those traced to Kanada, called the Yaise- 
 shika Sutras. These, like all the Aphorisms of all the 
 schools of the ancient philosophy of our country, are 
 elliptical, enigmatical, and obscure ; and they would, 
 but for the triple set of commentaries by which they 
 have been made to some extent clear, be positively un- 
 intelligible. 
 
 Gautama’s work, the Ay ay a Sutras, consists of five 
 books, each of which is divided into two Lessons. The 
 miscellaneous nature of its contents is set forth in the 
 following conspectus presented in the “ Sarva-Darsana- 
 Sangraha 
 
 “ The principle that final bliss, i.e. the absolute aboli- 
 tion of pain, arises from the knowledge of the truth 
 (though in a certain sense universally accepted), is 
 established in a special sense as a particular tenet of 
 the Ay ay a school, as is declared by the author of the 
 Aphorisms in the words, ‘ Proof, that which is to be 
 proved, etc. — from knowledge of the truth as to these 
 
THE NAYATA SYSTEM. 
 
 197 
 
 things, there is the attainment of final bliss.’ This is 
 the first aphorism of the Nyaya Sastra. Now the 
 Nyaya Sastra consists of five books, and each book 
 contains two ‘daily portions.’ In the first daily por- 
 tion of the first book the venerable Gautama discusses 
 the definitions of nine categories, beginning with 
 ‘ proof, ’ and in the second of those of the remaining 
 seven beginning with ‘discussion.’ In the first daily 
 portion of the second book he examines ‘ doubt, ’ dis- 
 cusses the four kinds of ‘ proof, ’ and refutes the sug- 
 gested objections to their being instruments of right 
 knowledge ; and in the second he says that ‘ presump- 
 tion,’ etc. are really included in the four kinds of proof 
 already given (and therefore need not be added by the 
 Mimansakas as separate ones). In the first daily por- 
 tion of the third book he examines the soul, the body, 
 the senses, and their objects ; in the second, ‘ intelli- 
 gence ’ (Buddhi) and ‘ mind ’ (Manas). In the first 
 daily portion of the fourth book he examines ‘ volition ’ 
 (Pravritti), the ‘ faults,’ ‘transmigration,’ ‘fruits’ (of 
 actions), ‘ pain,’ and ‘ final liberation ; ’ in the second 
 he investigates the truth as to the causes of the 
 ‘faults,’ and also ‘wholes’ and ‘parts.’ In the 'first 
 daily portion of the fifth book he discusses the various 
 kinds of ‘ futility ’ (Jati), and in the second the various 
 kinds of ‘ occasions for rebuke ’ (Xigrahastama or ‘ un- 
 fitness to be argued with ’).” 
 
 Four of the five books were edited and translated by 
 Dr. Ballantyne, with portions of one of the standard 
 modern commentaries. These, with a Compendium of 
 Indian Logic, called “ Tarka Sangraha,” edited and 
 translated by the same scholar with his own comments, 
 and the larger book, called “ Bhasa Parichheda,” with 
 its commentary, “ Sidhanta Muktavali,” both partially 
 
19S 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 edited and translated by him, and fully by Dr. Doer, 
 are the standard works on the system of logic to be un- 
 folded in these pages. Our remarks on the Vaiseshika 
 Sutras, edited and translated in a masterly manner by 
 Professor Gough, are reserved for our next paper, 
 though our determination to lay this great work under 
 contribution in this is freely expressed. The system of 
 Indian Logic belongs in its main features to both these 
 schools, and therefore a discrimination between them is 
 hardly desirable in an attempt to set forth its princi- 
 ples. 
 
 It cannot be asserted too often that the peculiar 
 phraseology of Indian Logic and its approved modes of 
 reasoning run like threads of gold through all the dis- 
 * sertations on Hindu Philosophy extant, insomuch that 
 the latter cannot be understood unless the former are 
 thoroughly mastered. A careful study of foreign logic 
 is by no means a proper preparation for a study of 
 indigenous philosophy. A person may be a perfect 
 master of Aristotelian logic and the varied systems to 
 which it has given birth in Europe ; but such mastery, 
 though acquired after years of toil, will not in the 
 slightest degree help him through the tangled webs of 
 logomachy and sophistry, as also of correct reasoning, 
 which stand out in bold relief from the pages of stand- 
 ard works on Hindu Philosophy. To be able to bring 
 this enterprise to a successful issue, he must master the 
 high-sounding terminology and the cumbrous modes of 
 reasoning by which the Indian Logical System is differ- 
 entiated from all other rival schemes. Of this fact he 
 will be convinced the moment he takes up a book like 
 the “ Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha,” opens it at random, 
 and begins the arduous task of understanding what is 
 set before him on the page on which his attention is con- 
 
THE KAYATA SYSTEM. 
 
 199 
 
 cent rated. Treatises like Sankar’s commentaries on 
 the Hpanishads or the Brahma Sutras, or the innumer- 
 able other commentaries piled up in the way of the 
 student of Hindu Philosophy, cannot possibly be under- 
 stood, not to say mastered, without an intimate ac- 
 quaintance with the peculiarities of the Logic, from 
 which they derive their most prominent, as well as 
 repellant, features. 
 
 Indian Logic is, to adopt a word current in mediaeval 
 schools, a trivium , or a complex system of grammar, 
 logic, and rhetoric. The following quotations from the 
 “ Tarka Sangraka” will show that even the most ordi- 
 nary principles of grammar are not forgotten in a 
 standard treatise on logic : 
 
 “ The cause of a sentence’s being .significant (is the 
 presence of) mutual correspondence, compatibility, and 
 juxtaposition (of words). 
 
 “ Mutual correspondence means the reverse of a dis- 
 position to indicate any other than the intended connec- 
 tion of one word with another. Compatibility consists 
 in (a word’s) not rendering futile the sense (of the sen- 
 tence). Juxtaposition consists in the enunciation of the 
 words without a (long) pause between each. 
 
 £ ‘ A collection of words devoid of mutual corre- 
 spondence, etc., is no valid sentence — for example, 
 ‘ Cow, horse, man, elephant ’ gives go information, 
 the words having no reference to one another. 
 
 “ The expression, ‘ He should irrigate with fire,’ is 
 no valid sentence, for there is no compatibility (between 
 fire and irrigation). 
 
 “The words, ‘Bring — the — cow,’ not pronounced 
 close together, but with an interval of some three hours 
 between each, constitute no valid sentence from the 
 absence of (the requisite) closeness of juxtaposition.” 
 
200 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 These extracts are not presented as instances of de- 
 fectiveness in the system, it being a well-known fact 
 that a little grammar must always be associated with 
 logic, especially in its classification of propositions and 
 its statement of the terms of which each distinct propo- 
 sition, positive or negative, universal or particular, con- 
 sists. The very second essay of Aristotle’s “ Organon” 
 is an essay on philology rather than logic, treating as it 
 does of what he represents as the component parts of 
 discourses, such as propositions and sentences. It must 
 he confessed that in its classification of propositions or 
 presentation of the peculiarities of sentences, Indian 
 Logic is poorer than the system of Aristotle. 
 
 In rhetoric it is perhaps richer. Rhetoric cannot be 
 dissociated from logic, inasmuch as the efficacy of a 
 logically conducted argument is often enhanced by 
 happy turns of expression, attractive illustrations, and 
 eloquent appeals to feeling. Inchan Logic has not 
 erred in enlisting on its side a few of the well-known 
 rules of grammar, and a few of the imposing embel- 
 lishments of rhetoric, as will be made manifest by 
 and by. 
 
 Indian Logic, like every other system of logic, treats 
 of the objects of knowledge and the laws of thought, 
 and its approved mode or method of discussion is indi- 
 cated by three words : (1) Enunciation (Uddesa), (2) 
 Definition (Lakshana), and (3) Investigation (Pariksha). 
 Enunciation is the formal statement of the subject to be 
 discussed ; Definition is a statement of the differentia 
 by which it is discriminated from all other subjects, 
 whether cognate or otherwise ; and Investigation is an 
 examination into and an analysis of these differentiat- 
 ing properties. 
 
 The subjects discussed in the Ryaya Sastra are six- 
 
THE XAYAYA SYSTEM. 
 
 201 
 
 teen in number, ancl they are categorically stated in the 
 first aphorism of the book. They are : 
 
 1. Pramana, or Proof or Instrument of Right Notion 
 or Knowledge. 
 
 2. Prameya, or Objects of Right Notion or Knowl- 
 edge. 
 
 3. Sansaya, or Doubt about the Point to be Dis- 
 cussed. 
 
 4. Prayajana, or Motive for Discussing it. 
 
 5. Drishtanta, or Familiar Example. 
 
 G. Siddhanta, or a Determinate Case or Tenet. 
 
 7. Avayava, or the Syllogism. 
 
 8. Tarka, or Refutation. 
 
 9. Nirnaya, or Ascertainment. 
 
 10. Yada, or Controversy. 
 
 11. Jalpa, or Wrangling. 
 
 12. Yitanda, or Cavilling. 
 
 13. Hetwabhasa, or Fallacies. 
 
 11. Chhala, or Frauds or Quibbling Artifices. 
 
 15. Jati, or Futile Replies. 
 
 16. Nirgahastana, or Conclusion by pointing out the 
 objector’s “ unfitness to be argued with.” 
 
 1. The first subject treated of is “ Proof,” in accord- 
 ance with the maxim given in the “ Sarva-Darsana-San- 
 graha,”in these words : “To know the thing to be 
 measured, you must first know the measure.” The 
 Nyaiyaikas admit four kinds of proof or instruments 
 of right knowledge, the three admitted in the Sankhya 
 school and one more. These are : ( a ) Perception, (Z>) 
 Inference, (c) Testimony, (d) Comparison. 
 
 a. The importance of Perception as an instrument of 
 knowledge need not be enlarged upon at a time when a 
 tendency is manifested by a class of philosophers to a 
 recognition of the evidence furnished by it as the only 
 
202 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 conclusive evidence available to us. It is, however, 
 desirable to sliow the process involved in every distinct 
 act of perception, according to the principles of this 
 school. Cognition is the result, not of an external 
 object only, not even of the conjunction of an external 
 object with a sense-organ, but of “ contiguity of soul, 
 organ, and object.” “That,” says Kanada, “is an 
 invalid argument (which affirms that sensible cognition 
 is an attribute either of the body or of the senses).” 
 The cognitive faculty is then transferred from the 
 material body and from the senses, both external and 
 internal, to the soul ; and in this a marked deviation 
 from the principles of the Sankhya school is realized. 
 
 It is distinctly affirmed that “consciousness” does 
 not inhere in the body or in the external senses, or in 
 the inner sensory or mind ; and that the process of 
 elaboration by which the raw materials of sensation are 
 worked up into appropriate ideas is not their work. 
 The soul, then, according to the theory of perception 
 propounded in this school, is not an unconscious recipi- 
 ent of reflected impressions, but a conscious, percipient 
 principle, and an active framer of ideas. This is a 
 great improvement on the Sankhya philosophy, which, 
 by positing an unconscious, inactive, perfectly quiescent 
 soul, has laid itself open to the charge of propagating 
 rank materialism. But it will be shown by and by 
 that the analytical schools are not thoroughly consistent 
 either in their representations of God, the universal, or 
 in their descriptions of the individual soul. 
 
 The peculiarity of the theory of perception propounded 
 in schools of Hindu Philosophy in general is set forth 
 when it is stated that the object of perception is identi- 
 cal with the subject of right notion. The percipient 
 faculty literally becomes the object perceived. For in- 
 
THE NAYAYA SYSTEM. 
 
 203 
 
 stance, when a jar is perceived, the percipient mind or 
 soul assumes the form of the jar ; and therefore the idea, 
 which is formed in the mind or into which the mind 
 is changed — viz., the subject of right notion— is not 
 different from the external object perceived. Accord- 
 ing to the Vedantic school, when an object is perceived " 
 an effluence comes out of the percipient soul and as- 
 sumes the form of that object, and all difference be- 
 tween the subjective idea and the objective reality is 
 annihilated. 
 
 I). Inference is represented, by no less a logician than 
 John Stuart Mill, as “ not only valid,” but “ the foun- 
 dation” of both induction and deduction, or syllogism. 
 Our great Indian logicians make as much of it as he 
 does, though they do not seem disposed to sympathize 
 with him in his avowed contempt for the syllogistic or 
 deductive process of reasoning. Inference, according to 
 them, is of three kinds, as perception is of six, the in- 
 struments of the latter being the five external and one 
 internal organ. “In the Ay ay a Aphorisms,” -says a 
 modern commentator, “ it is taught that inference is of 
 three kinds — from the antecedent, from the subsequent, 
 and that which is drawn generally. That which is 
 from antecedence (or progressive inference) has for its 
 mark a cause, or an invariable sequence. That which 
 is from subsequence (or regressive inference) has an 
 affect for its mark, or the incompatibility of other 
 causes. That which is general has for its mark some- 
 thing distinct from cause and effect, or is from concom- 
 itance and incompatibility.” The same commentator 
 slse where says : “ Inference is threefold, as produced 
 by illation from only positive conditions ; from only 
 negative conditions, and from both positive and nega- 
 tive conditions. For example : This is a proposition, 
 
204 
 
 HIXDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 inasmuch as it is knowable, etc., is an illation only 
 from positive conditions ; earth differs from other sub- 
 stances inasmuch as it is possessed of odors, etc., is an 
 illation from only negative conditions ; the mountain is 
 fiery inasmuch as it smokes, etc., is an illation from 
 both positive and negative conditions.” 
 
 In plainer terms, we have here set forth inference 
 a priori, or inference from cause to effect ; inference 
 a posteriori , or inference from effect to cause ; and in- 
 ference by analogy, as our inference that mango-trees 
 are generally blossoming from the sight of one blossom- 
 ing mango- tree. These three classes are subdivided into 
 various smaller ones, of which no notice need be taken 
 in a brief synopsis like what is attempted in this paper. 
 
 The ingenuity of Indian logicians is displayed in 
 what is said about inferential cognition in the first 
 aphorism of the Second Daily Lesson of the Ninth 
 Book of the Vaiseshika Sutras : “ Inferential cognition 
 is that one thing is the effect or cause of, conjunct 
 with, repugnant to, or coinherent in, another.” This 
 is thus explained by another commentator : “ Inference 
 results from a mark, which is an effect, as the inference 
 of fire, etc. from smoke, light, etc. ; also from a mark 
 which is in a cause, as where a deaf man infers a sound 
 from a particular conjunction of a drum with the drum- 
 stick. . . . This single connection, then, characterized 
 as the relation of cause and effect, has been stated in 
 two ways. Inference from a conjunct object is such as 
 inference of the organ of touch from observation of an 
 animal body. Inference from a repugnant object is 
 such as inference of an ichneumon concealed by bushes, 
 etc., from observation of an excited snake. Inference 
 from a coinherent object is such as the inference of fire 
 connected with water from the heat of the water.” 
 
THE NAYAYA SYSTEM. 
 
 205 
 
 c. Testimony, as an instrument of knowledge, is 
 twofold, divine, and human. The “ Tarka Sangraha” 
 thus sets forth the difference : “ Speech is of two kinds, 
 Sacred ( yaidika ) and Temporal or Profane ( laukiha ). 
 The former, being uttered by God, is all authoritative ; 
 but the latter, only if uttered by one who deserves con- 
 fidence, is authoritative, otherwise it is not so. ’ ’ Here 
 not only is revelation admitted, but its perpetuation 
 through the instrumentality of a succession of prophets 
 and seers. 
 
 The existence of objects not generally perceptible, 
 such as the soul, space, time, etc., is proved both by 
 inference and revelation. We say “ not generally per- 
 ceptible,” because it is possible, according to Hindu 
 Philosophy, to have our faculties of perception so far 
 expanded as to make it competent to us to perceive 
 those realities which are generally represented as im- 
 perceptible. The eleventh aphorism of the First Daily 
 Lesson of the Hi nth Book of the Vaisesliika Sutras 
 runs thus : “ Perception of the soul (results) from a 
 particular conjunction between the soul and the internal 
 organ in the soul.” On these words we have these 
 comments : “ Ascetics are of two kinds, those who 
 have meditated on the internal organ and are called 
 united, and those who have not meditated on the inter- 
 nal organ and are called disunited. Of these the 
 united, having reverently fixed on the object to be pre- 
 sented to it, are engaged in meditation ; and in them 
 cognition of the soul, whether of their own or of that 
 of others, is produced. Perception of the soul is that 
 cognition wherein the soul is the percept or object of 
 presentation. ’ ’ 
 
 cl. Comparison as a source of right notion is thus set 
 forth in the “Tarka Sangraha”: “Comparison 
 
206 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 (' upamana ) is tlie cause of an. inference from similarity 
 (' wpamiti ). Such an inference consists in the knowl- 
 edge of the relation between a name and the thing so 
 named. The recollection of the purport of a statement 
 of resemblance is a step involved in the process. For 
 example, a person not knowing what is meant by the 
 word gavaya ( Bos gavceus ) having heard from some in- 
 habitant of the forest that a gavaya is like a cow, goes 
 to the forest. Kemembering the purport of what he 
 has been told, he sees a body like that of a cow. Then 
 this inference from similarity arises (in his mind) that 
 this is what is meant by the word gavaya.’’’’ There is, 
 after all, not much difference between comparison, as 
 enunciated in this extract, and the third kind of infer- 
 ence already alluded to, inference from analogy ; and 
 hence the Sankyha philosophers are right in limiting the 
 number of the instruments of right knowledge to three. 
 
 Here it is desirable to observe that, in one respect, 
 the analytical schools concur thoroughly with the syn- 
 thetical. Both the classes of schools are arrayed 
 against the doctrine of innate ideas, and thus far they 
 may be patronized by the champions of materialism in 
 these days. There are no such things, according to 
 them, as a priori truths, those represented as such 
 being generalizations of experience. With reference to 
 axioms and intuitions, the primary beliefs of humanity, 
 scientific or moral, their champions might, with an air 
 of triumph, reiterate the words of Mill : “ They are 
 only a class, the most universal class, of inductions 
 from experience, the easiest and simplest generalizations 
 of the facts furnished by the senses and the conscious- 
 ness.” They would only add to these facts a new class 
 of facts, regarding things unseen and eternal furnished 
 by revelation ; while their view of the contents of 
 
THE NAY AT A SYSTEM. 
 
 207 
 
 human consciousness would appear ridiculously defec- 
 tive to a champion, not only of idealism, but of empi- 
 ricism also, in these days. 
 
 It remains to be added, under this head, that Gau- 
 tama in his Second Book proves that the additional 
 means of right knowledge assumed by the Mimansakas 
 — viz. , Bumor, Conjecture, Probability, and JSTon-exist- 
 ence — are superfluous. Rumor is included in testimony 
 or ‘ ‘ verbal evidence, ’ ’ while the rest may very well be 
 merged in inference. He also states and refutes some 
 of the objections raised against the instruments of 
 knowledge he himself points out, as that there may be 
 a conjunction of an organ of sense with an object with- 
 out leading to perception as in sleep, and inference may 
 be wrong, owing to the disjunction of a sign from the 
 tiling signified. But the objection against such testi- 
 mony as is embodied in the Yeda indicates the preva- 
 lence of scepticism. “ That (the Yeda) is no instrument 
 of right knowledge, because of its faults of untruth, 
 self-destructiveness, and tautology.” Its promises had 
 out been fulfilled in the case of well-known devotees ; 
 its inconsistencies and contradictions had been pointed 
 out as inconsistent with its assumed authoritativeness, 
 and its prolixity had passed into a proverb ! A feeble 
 attempt is made to rebut these objections. The non- 
 fulfilment of promise complained of results from un- 
 known faults perpetrated in a past fife, or from some 
 defect in the fulfilment of conditions on the part of a 
 devotee. The charge of inconsistency is repelled by an 
 assertion of the obvious truth that different classes of 
 instructions are demanded by the exigencies of different 
 times. And the tautology pointed out results from the 
 necessity of “re-inculcation,” especially in matters of 
 religion. 
 
20S 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 2. Prameya, or Objects of Right Knowledge, are pre- 
 sented in Aphorism IX. of the First Book of Gautama’s 
 Sutras : “ Soul, body, sense, sense-object, understand- 
 ing or intelligence, mind, activity, fault, transmigra- 
 tion, retribution, pain and emancipation — such are the 
 objects concerning which it is desirable that we should 
 have right notions.” 
 
 Let us pass over for the present the objects of knowl- 
 edge reserved for the next paper — viz. , soul, intelligence, 
 etc. — and confine our attention to what is said about 
 the body, its organs of sense, and the objects of sense 
 around it. 
 
 a. The body is, according to Gautama, “ the site of 
 muscular action, of the organs (of sense), and of the 
 sentiments (of pleasure or pain experienced by the 
 soul).” Kanada has the following utterances in the 
 Second Daily Lesson of the Fourth Book : “ The body 
 is not composed of the five elements, for the conjunc- 
 tion of things perceptible and imperceptible is imper- 
 ceptible.” “The body is not composed of three ele- 
 ments, because there is not manifested another quality. ” 
 “ Of these, body is twofold, uterine and non -uterine.” 
 
 The body is represented by some philosophers as 
 consisting of five elements — viz., odor, moisture, heat, 
 breath, and ether ; by others as consisting of four of 
 these. But the body cannot be such a compound, in- 
 asmuch as it is visible, while the component elements 
 are not. Again, the opinion that it consists of three of 
 these elements — viz., odor, moisture, and heat — is not 
 admissible, as a union of heterogeneous substances is 
 impossible. Bodies are of various kinds besides the 
 earthy — viz., aqueous, igneous, and aerial — seen in the 
 spheres respectively of Varuna, the sun, and the air. 
 These are not visible to ordinary mortals, but they can 
 
THE NAYAYA SYSTEM. 
 
 209 
 
 be seen by those ascetics who have had their visual 
 organ almost indefinitely expanded by dint of austerity 
 and meditation. 
 
 All classes of bodies are either uterine or non- 
 uterine, the former class including the varieties known 
 as the viviparous and the oviparous ; and the latter 
 bodies ungenerated, such as those of some classes of 
 gods and goddesses ; bodies generated in filth, such as 
 worms, maggots, and other vermin ; and vegetative 
 bodies, such as those of trees and plants. The body, 
 of whatever kind it may be, not even barring trees and 
 plants, which, according to Hindu notions, suffer pain 
 and are but human beings — nay, gods and goddesses in 
 embryo — is the seat of activity and the site of sensation 
 and of the soul’s enjoyment or suffering. 
 
 b. t£ The organs of sense,” says Gautama — “viz., 
 smell, taste, sight, touch, and hearing — are what appre- 
 hend the qualities of the elements and of things formed 
 of these” (Book I. Sec. 3, Aph. 12). To these must be 
 added the internal organ, mind, which communicates 
 with the external world through them, as its servitors. 
 
 Aphorism 11 of this section thus sets forth the ob- 
 jects of the senses : “ Their objects are the qualities 
 of the elements and of things formed of these— mean- 
 ing the qualities odor, savor, color, tangibility, and 
 sound.” These are divided into seven categories by 
 Kanada ; and these categories are substance, attribute, 
 action, generality, particularity, and inhesion. Ac- 
 cording to the established method of Hindu logicians, 
 these ought to be particularized under this head, but 
 we shall confine ourselves here to the first of the seven, 
 viz., substance. 
 
 Under the generic name “ substance” are specified 
 earth, water, light, air, ether, time, space, soul, and 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 210 
 
 the internal organ. Setting aside for the time being 
 the metaphysical ideas and entities called substances by 
 a misnomer, it is desirable to set forth what is said 
 about the five so-called elements. 
 
 “ Earth,” says Kanada, “ is possessed of color, taste, 
 smell, and touch” (Book II. Lesson First, Aph. 1). 
 Odor, however, is its distinguishing property. It is 
 eternal in its original form of atoms, but transient in 
 its present aggregate or complex shape. It has, of 
 course, the attributes common to most substances — 
 number, quantity, individuality, conjunction, disjunc- 
 tion, priority, posteriority, gravity, placidity, velocity, 
 elasticity. 
 
 Aphorism 2 of the same section thus speaks of water : 
 “ Water is possessed of color, taste, and touch, and is 
 fluid and viscid.” Its distinguishing property is taste 
 according to some, coolness or clamminess according to 
 others. It is also eternal as atoms and transient as 
 aggregates. Bodies made only of water or aqueous 
 bodies are seen in the realm of Yaruna. Odor when 
 perceived in water proceeds from some earthy particles 
 dissolved in it, and is therefore adscititious. 
 
 Aphorism 3 of the same runs thus : “ Light has color 
 and touch. Its peculiar characteristic is color, and 
 its work is to illumine other substances.” These are, 
 however, seen, not on account of luminous rays falling 
 upon and emitted by them, but on account of the visual 
 ray which issues out of the eye and makes them trans- 
 parent. Light is also eternal as atoms and non-eternal 
 as aggregates. Light and heat are inseparably associ- 
 ated ; and the united substance is said to be of four 
 kinds— terrestrial light, or that of which the fuel is 
 earthy ; celestial, or that of which the fuel is watery, 
 as lightning, meteoric lights, etc. ; alvine or stomachic, 
 
THE NATAYA SYSTEM. 
 
 211 
 
 of which the fuel is both earthy and watery, and which 
 digests both food and drink ; and mineral, or that 
 which is found in mines, as goM, which is simply light 
 solidified. Luminous bodies are to be found in the 
 realm of the sun. 
 
 Aphorism 4 represents air as “possessed of touch.” 
 It also is eternal as atoms and non-eternal as aggre- 
 gates. Aerial aggregates are of four kinds — organized 
 aerial bodies and evil spirits inhabiting the atmosphere ; 
 the organ of touch, which is air spread over the cuticle, 
 or an aerial integument ; mind, or unorganized air ; 
 and breath and other vital airs. 
 
 In aphorism 5 we have these words : “ These (quali- 
 ties) do not exist in ether.” Ether is, unlike other 
 elements, infinite- and eternal, and is the substance of 
 which the auditory organ is composed. It is posited, 
 as Dr. Ballantyne says in his comments on “ Tarka 
 Sangraha,” to account for sound, which is perceptible 
 on account of a peculiar virtue in the ether of the ear, 
 and which, where this peculiar virtue does not exist, as 
 in the ether of the ear of a deaf man, cannot possibly 
 be perceived. 
 
 3. The first section of the Second Book of Gautama’s 
 Aphorisms embodies a disquisition on the subject of 
 Doubt, and four aphorisms (17-20) of the Second Daily 
 Lesson of the Second Book of the Yaiseshika Sutras 
 treat of the same subject. According to Gautama, 
 doubt arises “ from the consideration of characters com- 
 mon (to more than one) or several (such as cannot really 
 belong to one and the same thing),” and “ from the con- 
 centration of (mutually exclusive) characters under the 
 aspect of an attributive. ’ ’ Doubt also arises from <; ‘ con- 
 flict of opinion” and “ from unsteadiness (in the recog- 
 nition of criteria as present or absent). ” The five sources 
 
212 
 
 HIHDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of doubt set forth in these obscure words may be thus put 
 in plain English. Doubt arises in the first place from 
 the possession by two distinct objects of a common at- 
 tribute, such as tallness, which may lead us to doubt 
 whether a particular tall object indistinctly seen is a 
 man or a post. In the second place, the two objects 
 seen may resemble in one respect and differ in another, 
 and a doubt may be generated in the mind by both the 
 similarity and the difference. That doubt, in the third 
 place, arises from a conflict of opinion is plain enough. 
 Again, doubt arises, in the words of the commentator, 
 from “unsteadiness in the recognition (of some mark 
 which, if we could make sure of it, would determine 
 the object to be so and so) or unsteadiness in the non- 
 recognition (of some mark which, were we sure of its 
 absence, would determine the object to be not so and 
 so).” 
 
 According to Tvanada, doubt arises “ from perception 
 of a general, non-perception of a particular, and remem- 
 brance of particularity also from “ knowledge and 
 want of knowledge.” These five sources of doubt — viz., 
 perception of a general or common property, non-per- 
 ception of a special or specific property, memory of an 
 attribute seen at a past time but not in the present mo- 
 ment, knowledge of the varieties of opinion held on a 
 particular subject, and partial ignorance — are almost 
 identical with those pointed out by Gautama. Our 
 philosophers did not fail to see that absolute knowledge 
 or absolute ignorance precludes doubt, it being a state 
 of hesitancy generated by two propositions, neither of 
 which has a preponderance of evidence hi its favor. 
 The well-known affirmation of Herbert Spencer, 
 “ Force is unknowable,” involves, therefore, a flagrant 
 contradiction in terms, an item of certain knowledge, 
 
THE NAYAYA SYSTEM. 
 
 213 
 
 its unknowableness, being authoritatively stated regard- 
 ing a thing not known. In other words, the attitude 
 of absolute knowledge and absolute ignorance is as- 
 sumed where that of dubiousness alone would be justifi- 
 able ! 
 
 4. The motive for discussing a particular subject 
 ought to be definitively stated in every properly con- 
 ducted argument, as without its timely disclosure the 
 importance of the controversy may be underrated. 
 Motive is defined by Gautama to be “that thing 
 which, when placed before us, causes us to act.” 
 
 5. A familar example is then brought forward, and 
 regarding it we have these words in Aphorism 25, Sec. 
 iv., Book I. : “In regard to (some fact respecting) 
 what thing both the ordinary man and the acute in- 
 vestigator entertain a sameness of opinion, that (thing) 
 is called a c familiar case’ (of the fact in question).” 
 In plain English an ordinary example, which may 
 appear admissible to both the parties engaged in dis- 
 cussion, ought to be adopted for use in the course of 
 the controversy in preference to other illustrations. 
 The example generally selected in the case of fire and 
 smoke is “ the culinary hearth.” 
 
 6. “A tenet,” says Gautama, “is that, the stead- 
 fastness of the acceptance of which rests on a treatise 
 (of might and authority).” Tenets are divided into 
 four classes — “Dogma of all the Schools,” “Dogma 
 peculiar to some one or more Schools,” “ A Hypotheti- 
 cal Dogma,” or one implied in a particular declaration. 
 What is meant under this head is simply a statement of 
 a single or of a series of truths, constituting what is 
 called common ground. 
 
 7. Then comes the syllogism, which is more complex 
 
214 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 a compound of tlie enthymeme and the syllogism. 
 Says Gautama : “ The members (of a syllogism) are 
 (1) the Proposition, (2) the Reason, (3) the Example, 
 (4) the Application, and (5) the Conclusion.” The fol- 
 lowing examples are generally brought forward to illus- 
 trate the five-membered syllogism of Hindu Logic : 
 
 1. The hill is fiery, .... Pralijna, or Proposition. 
 
 2. For it smokes, .... 1 lelu, or Eeason. 
 
 3. Whatever smokes is fiery, as a culi- 
 
 nary hearth, ..... Udaharan, or Example. 
 
 4. This hill is smoking, . . . Upanaya, or Application. 
 
 5. Therefore it is fiery, . . . Nujamana, or Conclusion. 
 
 Example Second. 
 
 1. Sound is non-eternal, . . . Proposition. ■ 
 
 2. Because it is produced, . . . Eeason. 
 
 3. Whatever is produced is non-eternal, 
 
 as pots, Example. 
 
 4. Sound is produced, .... Application. 
 
 5. Therefore it is non-eternal, . . Conclusion. 
 
 Here a peculiarity of Indian Logic ought to be set 
 forth. There are three terms which must be thor- 
 oughly understood before arguments couched in the 
 cumbrous phraseology and method of Indian Logic can 
 be comprehended or intelligently followed. The first 
 of these terms is Vyapati, which means invariable con- 
 comitance or pervasion. The second is Vyapaka or the 
 pervader, or invariably pervading attribute, and the 
 third is Yyapya , or invariably pervaded. An ordinary 
 example, capitalized so often in Hindu Logic, will illus- 
 trate the significance of these technical terms : “ Wher- 
 ever there is smoke there is fire.” Here the invariable 
 connection between smoke and fire is Yyapati, or inva- 
 riable concomitance or pervasion ; smoke is Yyapya, or 
 invariably pervaded, and fire the pervader, or Yyapaka. 
 
THE HAY AY A SYSTEM. 
 
 215 
 
 Translated into Aristotelian phraseology, Yyapati is 
 the connection between the two terms in the major 
 premiss ; Yyapaka is the major term ; and Yyapya, or 
 smoke, is the middle term. 
 
 It ought here to be mentioned that no regular classi- 
 fication of syllogisms, such as that of Aristotle, who 
 divides them into apodictic, dialectic, and sophistic, is 
 attempted in standard works on Indian Logic ; but the 
 syllogism is made neither too much of, as in the Aris- 
 totelian system, nor too little of, as in that of Mill. 
 
 8. Refutation or Confutation, is thus set forth in the 
 opening aphorism of Sec. 7, Book I. of Gautama’s Sutras : 
 “Confutation, (which is intended) for the ascertaining 
 of the truth in regard to anything, the truth in regard 
 to which is not thoroughly discerned, is reasoning from 
 the presence of the reason (which would not be present 
 if that which is to be established were not present).” 
 That is, when a disputant admits the premisses, but 
 refuses to accept the conclusion legitimately deduced 
 therefrom, a new method of refutation, reductio ad 
 (Jjsurdum, must be resorted to. 
 
 9. “ Ascertainment,” we are told in the following 
 aphorism, “ is the determination of a matter by dealing 
 with both sides of the question after having been in 
 doubt.”. It is the settlement of the question by setting 
 forth the legitimacy of the conclusion deduced and the 
 absurdity of the opposite one. The argument ought to 
 conclude here, but the Hindu love of wrangling renders 
 some additional steps necessary, and therefore we have 
 
 10. A fresh controversy or discussion, regarding 
 which we have these words in the opening aphorism of 
 Sec. 8 : “ Discussion is the undertaking (by two 
 parties respectively) of the one side and of the other in 
 regard to what (conclusion) has been arrived at by 
 
216 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 means of the five-membered (process of demonstration 
 already explained ; this discussion) consisting in the 
 defending (of the proposition) by proofs (on the part of 
 the one disputant), and the assailing it by objections (on 
 the part of the other), the discussion being conducted 
 on both sides without discordance in respect of the 
 tenets (or principles on which the conclusion is to de- 
 pend).” This simply implies another fight pro and con 
 over the conclusion arrived at by such a tedious process. 
 
 11. Wrangling, therefore, is not out of place: 
 “ Wrangling, consisting in the defence or attack (of a 
 proposition) by means of ‘frauds,’ ‘futilities,’ and 
 ‘what calls for nothing save an indignant rebuke,’ is 
 what takes place after the procedure aforesaid (that is 
 to say, after a fair course of argumentation) — supposing 
 this to have failed to bring the disputants to an agree- 
 ment.” Frauds are of three kinds — fraud “ in respect 
 of a term,” “ in respect of a genus,” and “ in respect 
 of a trope.” The first species of fraud is knowingly 
 attaching to a term employed a sense different from 
 what it is intended to convey ; the second is knowingly 
 deducing a fallacy from the similarity subsisting be- 
 tween two objects mentioned ; and the third is con- 
 scious misconstruction of figurative language. Futili- 
 ties result from attempts made to confound invariable 
 concomitance with a bare outward resemblance, and 
 that which calls for an indignant reproof is “ stupid- 
 ity,” assumed or real. 
 
 12. Then comes cavilling. “This (viz., wrangling), 
 when devoid of (any attempt made for) the establishing 
 of the opposite side of the question, is cavilling.” 
 
 13. Fallacies are divided into five classes : (1) “ Er- 
 ratic,” (2) “ contradictory, ” (3) “ equally available on 
 both sides,” (4) “in the same case with what is to 
 
THE KAYAYA SYSTEM. 
 
 217 
 
 be proved,” and (5) tlio u mistimed.’ ’ The u Tarka San- 
 graha, ’ ’ under the head of fallacies, has these words : 
 “ The five that merely present the appearance of a 
 reason are : (1) that which goes astray, (2) that which 
 would prove the contradictory, (3) that than which 
 there is a stronger argument on the other side, (d) the 
 inconclusive, and (5) the futile. In the Yaiseshika 
 Sutras we have one example given illustrative of all 
 the fallacies : “ Because this has horns, therefore it is 
 a horse.” On this we have these comments : “ Where 
 a hare or the like is the subject, and the being a horse 
 is that which is to be proved, and the notion of having 
 horns the argument, in such a case there exist all the 
 five fallacies.” 
 
 It is very difficult indeed to make this manifest, but 
 not impossible. The hare has horns, therefore it is a 
 horse. But it has no horns, and therefore the conclu- 
 sion is derived from a major premiss which is erroneous, 
 - — viz. , whatever has horns is a horse —and a minor pre- 
 miss equally erroneous. Again, granting that the 
 hare has horns, the conclusion deduced is the converse 
 of what is deducible. Supposing, again, the horse has 
 horns, the premises may prove that the subject is a 
 horse or not a horse. Again, the premises and the 
 conclusion are in the same predicament, the one need- 
 ing proof as well as the other. And lastly, the whole 
 argument is mistimed, as our senses prove that both 
 the hare and the horse have no horns. 
 
 But examples more apposite than this ought to be 
 adduced. The example of the first given in “ Tarka 
 Sangraha” is this : “ The mountain is fiery because 
 the existence of the mountain is capable of proof.” 
 Here the major premiss — whatever may be proved ex- 
 istent is fiery — is an error. Of the second the example 
 
21S 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 given is : “ Sound is eternal because it is created.” 
 Here the premises support the very opposite conclu- 
 sion. Of the third : “ Sound is eternal because it is 
 audible.” Its audibility may be brought forward with 
 equal cogency to prove its non-eternity. Of the 
 fourth : “ The sky- lotus is fragrant because the nature 
 of a lotus resides in it.” Here the nature of a lotus is 
 assumed to be invariably associated with fragrance. 
 And lastly, the fallacy called mistimed or futile is thus 
 illustrated : “For example : suppose one argues that 
 fire does not contain heat because it is factitious, the 
 argument is mistimed, if we have already ascertained, 
 by the superior evidence of the senses, that fire (grant- 
 ing it to be factitious) does contain heat.” 
 
 FTothing sets forth the crudeness of Hindu Logic more 
 than its disquisitions on the subject of Fallacy, the few 
 instances given being almost all reducible to the irregu- 
 lar fallacy non causa pro causae. 
 
 14-, 15, and 10. Quibbling artifices, or frauds, or 
 futile objections have already been taken notice of, and 
 it is not necessary to refer to them here, excepting for 
 the purpose of showing that their separate specification 
 in the text is an example of tautology. The conclusion 
 brings the discussion to a close by showing the oppo- 
 nent’s stupidity, and his inability in consequence to 
 carry on the argumentation any further, as well as by 
 upholding the proposition originally stated. 
 
 Dr. Ballantyne, always prone to whitewash Hindu 
 learning, offers a very ingenious explanation of this 
 cumbrous process of reasoning. He affirms that this 
 style of reasoning combines all the advantages of a logi- 
 cal process with those of what may be called a rhetorical 
 flourish. The objector is first of all led through the. 
 varied steps of a well-conducted argument, beginning 
 
THE NAYAYA SYSTEM. 
 
 219 
 
 with the proofs admitted, and rising up to a direct dem- 
 onstration in the form of a lucidly stated syllogism, and 
 an indirect demonstration fitted to reduce any conclu- 
 sion but the right one to an absurdity. He is then 
 allowed, if found stubborn, to plunge afresh into con- 
 troversy, get entangled in wrangling, resort to cavil- 
 ling, make use of naked fallacies, stoop to frauds and 
 futilities, and ultimately have himself “ voted a nui- 
 sance” amid the plaudits of a large body of spectators. 
 
 But whatever the advantage of the process may be in 
 a public discussion, conducted in a large hall under the 
 nose of innumerable spectators, it is, as a method of 
 arriving at truth, both prolix and cumbrous. - never- 
 theless the Pandits are so decidedly attached to it that 
 they look upon a simpler mode of argumentation as one 
 which it is beneath their dignity to have recourse to. 
 And if these incarnations of pedantry are to be influ- 
 enced at all in favor of a body of truth other than what 
 they are apt to look upon as worthy of acceptance, the 
 varied steps of this tedious and awkward process must 
 be utilized, and, if possible, they voted nuisances in the 
 presence of people thoroughly versed in their habits of 
 thought and modes of reasoning. And it is because 
 missionaries as a body cannot use this weapon with any 
 degree of dexterity, and the few who can will not wield 
 it, that their influence over the learned in Hindustan 
 has hitherto been almost nil. 
 
 We shall now refer to the subject of Cause and its 
 varieties as set forth in Indian Logic. The definition 
 given of cause in the “ Tarka Sangraha” is simple, 
 and on the whole unexceptionable : “ That which in- 
 variably precedes an effect, that cannot else be, is a 
 cause.” An effect is defined as “ that of which there 
 was antecedent non-existence.” The different kinds of 
 
220 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 causes are thus set forth : “ Cause is of three kinds, 
 according to the distinction of intimate, non-intimate, 
 and instrumental. That from which an intimately 
 relative effect arises is an intimate cause, as threads are 
 of cloth, and the cloth itself of its own color, etc. 
 Where this intimate relation exists, that cause, which 
 is associated in one and the same object with such 
 effect or cause, is non-intimate. Thus the conjunction 
 of threads is the non-intimate cause of the cloth, and 
 the color of the threads that of the color of the cloth. 
 The cause which is distinct from both of these is the 
 instrumental cause, as the weaver’s brush, loom, etc., 
 are of cloth. Among these three kinds of causes, that 
 only which is not a universally concurrent cause or 
 condition (of all effects, as God, time, place, etc. are) 
 is called the instrumental cause.” 
 
 Dr. Ballantyne shows that we have here the four 
 kinds of causes described in Aristotle’s logic — material, 
 efficient, formal, and final. The intimate cause, which 
 in the case of a piece of cloth is the threads of which it 
 is composed, corresponds evidently to his material 
 cause. The non-intimate cause, which is the conjunc- 
 tion of the threads into a particular shape, is the formal 
 cause. The piece of cloth itself is the final cause, if by 
 this expression we understand what seems to have been 
 understood by Aristotle himself — viz., the effect in its 
 completeness, not the use to which it is subservient. 
 The instrumental cause, properly so called, is by Aris- 
 totle included in his definition of efficient cause ; and 
 if we merge his efficient cause in the instrumental, we 
 have all the varieties of causes he enumerates treated of 
 in the ‘ ‘ Tarka Sangraha. ’ ’ 
 
 Professor Gough, in his elaborate translation of the 
 Yaiseshika Sutras, makes use of expressions different 
 
THE NAYAYA SYSTEM. 
 
 221 
 
 from these in his presentation of the view of causes 
 entertained in Indian schools of philosophy. Instead 
 of Ballantyne’s terms, “intimate,” “non-intimate,” 
 and “ instrumental,” he makes use of the terms “ coin- 
 herent,” “ non-coinherent,” and “efficient.” Let us 
 present a fe\Y of the many examples scattered in the 
 aphorisms and commentaries he translates to show that 
 the Hindu notion of an efficient cause is very peculiar. 
 Before doing so let us give the definition of an efficient 
 cause presented in the “ Tarka Sangraka :” “An 
 efficient cause not common to other causes is called a 
 special cause . 5 ’ 
 
 In the First Daily Lesson of Book VI II. the subject 
 of cognition is treated of, and its causes are thus set 
 forth : “ The causes of knowledge were stated in the 
 aphorism, that which is produced by contiguity of soul, 
 sense-organ, and object is other than those. The soul, 
 then, is the cause, is the coin herein or material cause of 
 cognition ; conjunction of the soul and internal sense 
 is the non-coinherent cause ; apposition of the object is 
 the occasional or efficient cause.” Here it should be 
 remembered that, according to an established maxim of 
 Hindu Philosophy, the soul is literally changed into the 
 object perceived, and that a line of distinction is 
 scarcely drawn between instrumental and efficient 
 causes. The soul is the matter of cognition, its con- 
 junction with the internal sense gives it a definitive 
 form, and the object placed before it is the instru- 
 mental cause. 
 
 Take another example. Aphorism IT of the First 
 Daily Lesson of Book V. runs thus : “ The first ac- 
 tion of the arrow is from impulse, the next is from 
 self-reproduction caused by that action, and in like 
 manner the next and the next.” On this we have 
 
222 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 these comments : “ The first action in an arrow when 
 discharged is produced by a bowstring drawn by 
 human volition. In this case the impulse is the non- 
 coinherent cause ; the arrow is the coinherent cause, 
 volition and gravity are the efficient causes. By this 
 first action self-reproduction, termed velocity, is pro- 
 duced in the-same substance.” Here there is evidently 
 a confusion of ideas according to modern notions, 
 though efficiency is traced to its proper source, if voli- 
 tion and gravity are not caused by some extraneous 
 power and influence. But both these are in reality 
 effects, and efficiency is traced to some mysterious 
 power called Destiny. 
 
 Aphorism 15 of this very section runs thus : “ The 
 movement of the gem and the approach of the needle 
 are caused by destiny.” The commentator thus eluci- 
 dates the passage : “ By the term gem are intended 
 vessels made of gold, etc., and filled with water. To 
 such a vessel magicians apply incantations for the 
 recovery of stolen property. The tradition of the an- 
 cients is that the vessel is set on the ground, and some 
 other person lays his hand upon it. The vessel accom- 
 panied with the hand, in consequence of the efficiency 
 of incantation, turns toward the spot where the stolen 
 property has been deposited. The reason of the move- 
 ment of such a vessel is not a particular volition, but 
 the efficient cause of the merit of the former possessor 
 or the demerit of the thief. The non-coinherent cause 
 is the conjunction of such a vessel with soul possessing 
 such destiny (or results of actions done in previous 
 states of existence), and the coinherent cause is such a 
 vessel. In like manner destiny is also the cause of the 
 attraction toward a loadstone which takes place in 
 needles or metallic rods when in proximity to the mag- 
 
THE NATAYA SYSTEM. 
 
 223 
 
 net.” All efficiency, wh ether apparently inherent in 
 volition or really immanent in the forces of nature, is 
 traced to merit or demerit, or to 'Work, (Karma) the 
 god not only of the Buddhists but of Hindu philosophers 
 in general. 
 
 Apropos of the subject of causes, it is desirable to 
 mention that our Indian logicians display a good deal 
 of acuteness and ingenuity in their classifications, as 
 well as considerable breadth of view in their generaliza- 
 tions. We have not only three kinds of causes enumer- 
 ated, but several subordinate ones not only coinherent, 
 but con-coinherent and con-con-coinherent causes, as 
 will be seen in the following extracts from the “ Tarka 
 Sangraha “ The relative proximity of the sense and 
 its object, which is the cause of perception, is of six 
 kinds : (1) conjunction, (2) intimate union with that 
 which is in conjunction, (3) intimate union with what 
 is intimately united with that which is in conjunction, 
 (I) intimate union, (5) intimate union with that which 
 is intimately united, (6) and the connection which arises 
 from the relation between that which qualifies and the 
 thing qualified. For example : when a jar is perceived 
 by the eye, there is (between the sense and the object) 
 the proximity of conjunction. In the perception of the 
 color of the jar there is the proximity of intimate 
 union with that which is in conjunction, because color 
 d is intimately united with the jar, which is in conjunc- 
 tion with the sense of vision. In the perception of the 
 fact that color generally is present, there is the prox- 
 imity of intimate union with what is intimately united 
 with that which is in conjunction, because the generic 
 property of being colored is inherent in the particular 
 color which is intimately united with the jar which is 
 in conjunction with the sense of vision. In the percep- 
 
224 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 tion of sound by the organ of hearing, there is the 
 proximity of intimate union, because the organ of hear- 
 ing consists of the ether which resides in the cavity of 
 the ear, and sound is a quality of ether ; and there is 
 intimate union between quality and that of which it is 
 a quality. In the perception of the nature of sound (in 
 a given sound of which we are cognizant) the proximity 
 is that of intimate union with what is intimately 
 united, because the nature of sound is inherent in 
 sound, which is intimately united with the organ of 
 hearing. In the perception of non-existence the prox- 
 imity is dependent on the relation between a distinctive 
 quality and that which is so distinguished, because 
 when the ground is (perceived to be) possessed of the 
 non-existence of a jar, the non-existence of a jar dis- 
 tinguishes the ground which is in conjunction with the 
 organ of vision.” 
 
 The system of logic, into which we have striven to 
 present an insight through the media of quotations and 
 extracts from standard works, displays a good deal of 
 acuteness ; but as a method of arriving at truth it has 
 failed. It has fostered, not the science of dialectics 
 properly so called, but what is justly called “ the 
 pseudo-dialectical science of dispute,” or Eristic ; and 
 its result has been scepticism rather than recognition, 
 spread, and preponderance of truth. It may be com- 
 pared to that lore of the Sophists of ancient Greece, 
 which led to individualism, pantheism, and nihilism, to 
 Stoic pride and Epicurean libertinism. It is, however, 
 a favorite study with the learned Pandits of India, and 
 the ascendency in their minds of its phraseology and 
 modes of reasoning make them inaccessible to truth 
 conveyed in a simpler manner. And the only way in 
 which their minds can be influenced in favor of truth 
 
THE HAY AT A SYSTEM. 
 
 225 
 
 unknown and unpalatable to them is, as has already 
 been said, a skilful use of the weapons borrowed from 
 this armory. The preachers of the Gospel in this 
 country have, as a rule, neglected them either on ac- 
 count of their ignorance of or distaste for the style of 
 reasoning in vogue ; but such neglect cannot be justi- 
 fied ; and when such neglect is the inevitable sequence 
 of an accumulation of non -missionary work, the pres- 
 ence in our systems of this heterogeneous element 
 cannot be condemned in terms too strong ! 
 
CHAPTER Till. 
 
 THE VAISESHIKA PHILOSOPHY, OR THE HINDU ATOMIC 
 THEORY. 
 
 We presented in our last paper several extracts from 
 the Vaiseshika Sutras, the Sutras ascribed to Kanada, 
 the reputed and doubtless real founder of the Vaiseshika 
 school, and embodied in ten books, each of which is 
 divided into two Daily Lessons, like each of the books 
 of the Nyaya Sastra. But we have yet to present, ac- 
 cording to our practice, a conspectus of the contents of 
 the Vaiseshika Sastra in the words of the “ Sarva- 
 Darsana-Sangraha 
 
 “ In the first book, consisting of two daily lessons, 
 he (Kanada) describes all the categories which are 
 capable of intimate relation. In the first ahinka (daily 
 lesson) lie defines those which possess ‘ genus ’ (jati) ; 
 in the second, ‘ genus ’ (or generality) itself, and ‘ par- 
 ticularity.’ In the similarly divided second hook he 
 discusses ‘substance,’ giving in the first ahinka the 
 characteristics of the five elements, and in the second 
 he establishes the existence of space and time. In the 
 third book he defines the soul and the internal sense — 
 the former in the first ahinka , the latter in the second. 
 In the fourth book he discusses the body and its ad- 
 juncts — the latter in the first ahinka, and the former in 
 the second. In the fifth book he investigates action ; 
 in the first ahinka he considers action as connected 
 with the body, in the second as belonging to the mind. 
 
THE VAISESHIKA PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 227 
 
 In the seventh book he discusses quality and intimate 
 relation ; in the first ahinJca he considers the qualities 
 independent of thought, in the second those qualities 
 which are related to it, and also intimate relation. In 
 the eighth book he examines ‘ indeterminate ’ and ‘ de- 
 terminate ’ perception and means of proof.” 
 
 The author of the “ Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha” falls 
 into an unaccountable mistake as to the contents of the 
 ninth and tenth books. Professor Cowel, who is the 
 translator of the paper on Yaiseshika Philosophy in the 
 book, thus speaks of their contents : “ The ninth book 
 treats of that perception which arises from supersensi- 
 ble contact, etc., and inference. The tenth treats of 
 the mutual difference of the qualities of the soul, and 
 the three causes.” It may be added that the con- 
 tents of each of these books are of such a miscellaneous 
 nature that it is difficult, if not impossible, to assign 
 it its distinctive character ; and consequently the clas- 
 sification given above may justly be called in ques- 
 tion. 
 
 The object of the work is one, though its contents 
 are varied and multiform. That object is set forth in 
 its first two aphorisms : “ How, then, we will explain 
 (what) merit (is). Merit is that from which (results) 
 attainment of elevation and of the highest good.” 
 The first result of merit acquired in a former state of 
 existence, or in a series of former states of existence, is 
 the acquisition of “ elevation” or knowledge of the 
 truth, or the true distinction between soul and non- 
 soul ; and the ultimate result is “the highest good,” 
 the summum ~bonum, which is cessation of pain. One 
 of the celebrated commentators, in commenting upon 
 these aphorisms, says : “ The attainment of paradise 
 by merit is with visible means, while the attainment of 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 OOQ 
 
 /C/vU 
 
 liberation is by means of knowledge of the truth ; con- 
 sequently there is a distinction.” 
 
 The Vaiseshika Aphorisms, though a unity as regards 
 their object, are a complexity as regards the variety of 
 subjects treated of. The lore they present is of the 
 most miscellaneous nature, consisting as it does of dis- 
 sertations on logic, physics, psychology, metaphysical 
 inquiries about the ultimate ground of existence, and 
 practical directions as to the best mode of insuring 
 liberation from the chains of transmigration. No one 
 can study the book without concluding that the modern 
 theory of the co-ordination of the sciences was not un- 
 known in ancient times in our country, and that an 
 approach at least was made to Comte’s vaunted “ hier- 
 archical classification.” 
 
 There is doubtless some beauty or attractiveness in 
 the thought that all the knowledge 'which we may ac- 
 quire by investigating into the facts and mysteries of 
 nature, as well as by prying into the realities of the 
 moral world, has a reflex bearing on the advancement 
 of the soul, and its final emancipation. But the prac- 
 tical influence emanating from such an idea is demoral- 
 izing, inasmuch as it leads to a concentration of one’s 
 gaze, while engaged in prosecuting a course of liberal 
 study, upon one’s own self, rather than upon some 
 object or being apart from self. But whether fitted to 
 exalt or calculated to degrade, the conception is the 
 root -principle of Hindu Philosophy ; and it is not a 
 matter of wonder that a knowledge of the categories of 
 the Vaiseshika system, the categories which set forth 
 the distinction between the ego and the non-ego, should 
 be represented as a stepping-stone to complete salva- 
 tion. 
 
 These categories, six in number, though, according to 
 
THE VAISESHIIvA PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 229 
 
 some champions of the school, seven, have already been 
 enumerated : (1) substance, (2) attribute, (3) action, 
 (4) generality, (5) particularity, and (6) inhesion. With 
 the exception of the first, the categories may be identi- 
 fied with Aristotle’s predicables — viz., genus, species, 
 difference, property, and accident. What the Yaise- 
 shika Sutras say with reference to these categories 
 ought now to be indicated in order. 
 
 1. The word substance is used in a philosophical 
 rather than in its ordinary acceptation, as a substrate 
 of attributes or qualities, and therefore we have under 
 this head not only earth, water, light, air, ether, but 
 time, space, soul, and the internal organ, or the mind. 
 Of these the physical entities have already been taken 
 notice of, and the others will be treated of by and by. 
 
 2. The attributes assumed originally were seventeen 
 — viz., color, taste, smell, touch, numbers, extensions, 
 individuality, conjunction and disjunction, priority and 
 posteriority, intellections, pleasure and pain, desire and 
 aversion, and volitions. To these seven were subse- 
 quently added gravity, fluidity, viscidity, self-restitu- 
 tion, merit, demerit, and sound. 
 
 3. Actions are ££ throwing upward, throwing down- 
 ward, contracting, expanding, and going. ” 
 
 4 and 5. Generality and particularity are what con- 
 stitute genus and species. Existence is represented 
 as'the summum genus, and it includes the first three of 
 the categories — substance, attribute, and action — while 
 the subaltern genera are substantiality ( dra/oyatya ), the 
 genus of quality or qualitativeness {gunatya ;), and the 
 genus of action (Jmrmatya). 
 
 Particularity may in one sense be said to indicate 
 the difference between the summum and subaltern 
 genera, as well as between genera and species. But 
 
230 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the word particularity (vises It), from which the school 
 derives its name Yaiseshika, indicates the peculiarity 
 by which such substances as ether, time, space, the 
 atomic minds, and the varied kinds of atoms, of which 
 earth, water, air, and fire are composed, are discrimi- 
 nated from others. It is, therefore, “ the ultimate 
 difference” between simple and compound substances. 
 It corresponds in some respects to the technical word 
 differentia or differentiae. 
 
 0. Inhesion or intimate relation is the relation in 
 which the series of relations pointed out by the Yaise- 
 shika doctrine of causality terminates when traced back- 
 ward. Colebrooke thus explains this in his essay on the 
 Nyaya and the Yaiseshika philosophy : “For the relation 
 of cause and effect, and for distinguishing different sorts 
 of cause connection (sambodha) or relation, in general, 
 must be considered. It is twofold : simple conjunction 
 (sanyoga) and aggregation, or intimate or constant re- 
 lation (samanaya) ; the latter being the connection of 
 things, whereof one, so long as they coexist, continues 
 united with the other — for example : parts and that 
 which is composed of them, as yarn and cloth ; for so 
 long as the yarn subsists the cloth remains. Here the 
 connection of the yarn and cloth is intimate relation ; 
 but that of the loom is simple con junction. Intimate 
 relation or inhesion is, in Aristotelian phraseology, the 
 material cause, and inseparable from the effect as long 
 as it continues what it is. 
 
 To set forth the order of the categories, let us present 
 an extract from the “ Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha ” : “If 
 you ask, ‘ What is the reason for this definite order of 
 categories ? ’ we answer as follows : Since ‘ substance ’ 
 
 O 
 
 is the chief, as being the substratum of all the catego- 
 ries, we enounce this first ; next, £ quality,’ since it 
 
THE VAISESHIKA PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 231 
 
 resides in its generic character in all substances (though 
 different substances have different qualities) ; then 
 ‘ action,’ as it agrees with ‘ substance ’ and ‘ quality ’ 
 in possessing ‘ generality then ‘generality,’ as resid- 
 ing in these ; then ‘ particularity,’ inasmuch as it pos- 
 sesses ‘ intimate relation ; ’ and lastly, intimate relation 
 itself ; such is the principle of arrangement.” 
 
 To these categories originally assumed, one was sub- 
 sequently added, viz., non-existence, which may be 
 represented as a peculiar feature of Indian Logic. Non- 
 existence is of four kinds — cmtecedent , subsequent, recip- 
 rocal, and absolute. 
 
 Antecedent non-existence is thus set forth in the first 
 aphorisln of the First Daily Lesson of Book IX : “ (An 
 effect) is antecedently non-existent, inasmuch as there 
 is non-existence of assertion of actions and qualities. ’ ’ 
 Let this be read in conjunction with these comments: 
 “ Antecedently, that is, before the production of an 
 effect, an effect or product, such as a water-pot or piece 
 of cloth, is non-existent ; that is, non-existent by self- 
 determined negation during that time. The reason 
 assigned is the absence of predication of actions and 
 qualities. If the effect, the water-pot, etc., were exist- 
 ent during that time, it would be affirmed to possess 
 actions and qualities, as in the case of a water-pot 
 already produced, such affirmations are made as that 
 the water-pot is at rest, or in motion, or seen to be 
 colored. There is no such assertion antecedent to its 
 production. It is, therefore, inferred that it is during 
 that time non-existent.” 
 
 Subsequent non-existence is simply destruction. 
 Aphorism 2 runs thus : “ The existent (becomes) non- 
 existent.” “It is proved,” says the commentator, 
 “ by perception and inference that an existent product, 
 
232 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 such as a water-pot, after the operation of a hammer, 
 etc., which destroys it, is now non-existent, in like 
 manner as it is proved by perception and inference that 
 an effect is, previous to the operation of its cause, non- 
 existent.” 
 
 Aphorism -f sets forth reciprocal non-existence in 
 these words: “The existent also is non-existent.” 
 “ For,” says the commentator, “ there are such cogni- 
 tions as that a horse is not identical with a cow, a cow 
 is non-existent as a horse, a piece of cloth is non-exist- 
 ent as a water-pot, a cow is not a horse, a horse is not 
 a cow. There appears then in such a cognition the fact 
 that a cow possesses reciprocal non-existence with a 
 horse, a water-pot is reciprocally non-existent -with a 
 piece of cloth ; and this reciprocal non-existence is 
 otherwise designated absence of identity.” 
 
 Absolute non-existence is set forth in Aphorism 5 : 
 “Whatever else, moreover, than these is non-existent 
 is (absolutely) non-existent.” Absolute non-existence 
 is that of which the three other kinds of non-existence 
 cannot be predicated— antecedent, emergent or subse- 
 quent, and reciprocal — which never was existent, and 
 never will be, and which does not exist now. An ex- 
 ample often adduced in Hindu Logic, viz., “ hare’s 
 horn,” may be brought forward in illustration of this 
 species of non-existence. 
 
 The logical schools may justly be characterized as 
 atomic, as the cosmology they teach traces creation 
 through successive stages of development to primordial 
 atoms of various kinds and properties. It is time to 
 set forth the atomic theoiy of these schools. Let the 
 following aphorisms be considered and weighed : 
 
 “ The common property of substance and quality is 
 that they originate things of the same class” (Book II. 
 
THE YAISESHIKA PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Lesson I. Aph. 9). The commentator has these words 
 in explanation : “ Terrene atoms originate a terrene 
 aggregate of two atoms ; blue color and the like in an 
 atom produce blue color and the like in an aggregate of 
 two atoms.” 
 
 “ The eternal is existent and uncaused ” (Book I A". 
 Lesson I. Aph. 1). 
 
 u The effect thereof is the mark of its existence” 
 (Book IY. Lesson I. Aph. 2). 
 
 £< The supposition that atoms are non- eternal is 
 nescience” (Book IY. Lesson I. Aph. 5). 
 
 “ The qualities have been stated. Also the color, 
 taste, smell, and touch of the earth, etc. , inasmuch as 
 substances are non-eternal. By this is declared their 
 eternity in things eternal ” (Book YII. Lesson I. Aph. 
 1-3). 
 
 “ In the non-eternal (extension) is non-eternal. In 
 the eternal it is eternal. Atomic extension is eternal ” 
 (Book YII. Lesson I. Aph. 18-20). 
 
 In these aphorisms the theory appears in a germinal 
 form, and it seems to have been matured in subsequent 
 times by the champions of these schools. Atoms are 
 the ultimate particles of matter, indivisible and eternal. 
 They are divided into four classes, according to the four 
 elements recognized in ancient times — terrene, aqueous, 
 aerial, and igneous. The terrene atoms have, as the 
 earth which they compose, color, taste, smell, and 
 touch. The aqueous atoms have, as water, color, taste, 
 and touch ; the aerial, as air, color and touch, and the 
 igneous color only. The atoms cohere or agglutinate, 
 not in consequence of the power of God, not in conse- 
 quence of an inherent efficacy, but owing to an ex- 
 traneous plastic influence or force. 
 
 AYhat is that influence or force ? A modern com- 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 234 
 
 mentator has these words on an aphorism already 
 quoted : “ It is to be inferred that destiny is the cause 
 of the motion of pieces of grass attracted by amber, of 
 the upward flaming of fire, of the horizontal motion of 
 wind, and of the action of primordial atoms.” The 
 same commentator says elsewhere : “The universal 
 pervasion of the soul is proved, inasmuch as conjunc- 
 tion with soul influenced by destiny is the cause of ac- 
 tion in the atoms at the time of creation.” 
 
 Atoms are made to act or set in motion by destiny 
 or the accumulated work of past states of existence, 
 together with the merit and demerit attached thereto. 
 And when set in motion by this mysterious and irresist- 
 ible force, the principle, like attracts like, is realized, 
 and atoms of one and the same class cohere. T wo of 
 them form a compound atom, and three a tertiary 
 atom, which is visible like a mote in a sunbeam. And 
 in this way, by a process of integration, disintegration, 
 and redintegration, the universe is evolved out of these 
 ultimate particles. 
 
 The atomic theory, propounded in ancient Greece by 
 Leucippus and Democritus of Abdera, is in some re- 
 spects essentially different from that of our Logical 
 schools. The motive power in it is derived, through 
 gravitation, from chance, not from the efficacy of accu- 
 mulated merit and demerit, called destiny. The atoms 
 posited by these philosophers are of different kinds, 
 differing in size, form, and weight. The higher ones 
 being heavier than the lower ones descend, causing the 
 latter to ascend ; and thus horizontal motion is gen- 
 erated. And this motion produces lateral motion by 
 means of percussion, the particles in their constant 
 ascent and descent striking and causing one another to 
 move laterally. In this way arose their rotary motion, 
 
THE VAISESHIKA PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 235 
 
 which resulted in their conglomeration into the huge 
 masses of matter called worlds. The earth, when small 
 in bulk and weight, was in motion, but it came to a 
 state of rest when increased in volume and gravity. 
 From its moisture arose organized beings, while souls 
 were formed of those nice, smooth, and round atoms 
 which are the constituent elements of fire. Such atoms 
 are diffused over the whole body, and exercise particu- 
 lar functions in its particular organs, generating thought 
 in the brain, anger in the heart, desire in the liver, and 
 so on. We inhale soul-atoms and exhale them, and we 
 live so long as this process of respiration lasts. 
 
 This statement makes the main difference between the 
 two systems manifest. While the one system makes 
 atoms the source of existence in all its forms, physical 
 and spiritual, the other looks upon the process which 
 evolves pure spirits out of the ultimate particles of im- 
 pure matter as thoroughly absurd. Hindu Philosophy, 
 in all its orthodox branches at least, affirms the eternal 
 existence and incorruptible purity of the soul, as well as 
 the eternity and impurity of matter. The antithesis 
 between matter and mind has nowhere such promi- 
 nence given it as in our national schools ; and whatever 
 scheme of thought is calculated to confound these two 
 irreconcilable entities is thrown aside as un-FIindu, un- 
 reasonable, and absurd. The atomic system of ancient 
 Greece presents such confusion, and all attempt to 
 assimilate it to what was elaborated in ancient India 
 must be pronounced futile. Besides, work as a primal 
 force has a methodical way of operating, and must not 
 be confounded with chance, the inscrutable and unin- 
 telligent force behind the varied movements and com- 
 binations of varieties of atoms assumed in the Greek 
 school referred to. 
 
230 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 We pass on now to the metaphysical ideas, time and 
 space, represented by Kant as subjective forms of 
 thought rather than objective realities. They are 
 called substances because either of them is a substratum 
 of certain qualities or attributes. The qualities of the 
 one are priority, posteriority, and simultaneity, and 
 those of the other are proximity and remoteness, both 
 included in the quality “extensions.” Here are the 
 aphorisms that speak of time and space : 
 
 “ The notions of posteriority in relation to posterior- 
 ity, of simultaneity, of slowness and quickness, are 
 marks of the existence of time. Its substantiality and 
 eternity are explained by air. Its unity is explained 
 by existence” (Book II. Daily Lesson II. Apli. 6-8). 
 
 “ The mark appertaining to space is that whence the 
 knowledge arises that one thing is remote and not 
 remote from another. The substantiality and eternity 
 (of space) are explained by air. Its unity (is explained) 
 by existence. Its diversity is (caused to be conceived) 
 by the difference of its effects. (Space is regarded as) 
 east because of a past, future, or present conjunction of 
 the sun. So likewise (space is regarded as) south, west, 
 and north” (Book II. Daily Lesson II. Aph. 10-15). 
 
 The meaning of these extracts is plain. Time is a 
 substance, because it is the substrate of certain attributes 
 or predicates. It is eternal as air, or the primary aerial 
 atom, and it is one as the summum genus existence is 
 one. Its marks have already been pointed out. 
 
 Space also is, for similar reasons, a substance eternal 
 and one ; but it appears diverse on account of its acci- 
 dental conjunction with other objects. “ One man,” 
 says a commentator, “ has the practical assurance that 
 this is the east because the conjunction of the sun in 
 the orient first took place yesterday. Another has the 
 
THE VAISESHIKA PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 237 
 
 notion of the east from observing that the conjunction 
 of the sun in the orient will first take place to-morrow. 
 Another has the notion of the east from observing that 
 there is a present conjunction of the sun now taking 
 place in that quarter.” “In like manner the practical 
 assurance of the south arises from past, future, or pres- 
 ent conjunction of the sun with the mountains, etc., in 
 the southern quarter. So also the notion of west and 
 north may be analogously accounted.” 
 
 From the metaphysical entities we pass on to what 
 is called the internal organ or the inner sensory, manas, 
 the mind. Let us, according to our usual course, pre- 
 sent in a group the aphorisms bearing on the subject, 
 and deduce proper conclusions from them. These, 
 however, may be prefaced by a quotation from the first 
 book of Gautama’s Sutras : “The characteristic of the 
 mind is this, that there does not arise (in a single soul) 
 more than one cognition at once.” The Yaiseshika 
 Sutras bearing on the subject are these : 
 
 “ Existence and non-existence of knowledge on con- 
 tact of the soul with the objects of sense are the mark 
 of the existence of an internal organ. Its substantiality 
 and eternity are explained by air. Because of non- 
 simultaneity of volitions and non-simultaneity of cog- 
 nitions it is one (in each body)” (Book III. Lesson II. 
 Aph. 1-3). 
 
 “ The upward flaming of fire, the sideward blowing 
 of wind, and the first action of atoms and of the inter- 
 nal organ are caused by destiny. The action of the 
 internal organ is explained by the action of the hand. 
 Pleasure and pain result from contact of soul, sense, 
 mind, and object. Absence of action in the internal 
 sensory reposing in the soul ; non-existence of pain in 
 the body — this is union. The egress and ingress (of 
 
238 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 internal sensories from and into bodies), conjunctions 
 with tilings eaten and drunk, conjunctions with other 
 effects — all these things are caused by destiny” (Book 
 Y. Lesson II. Aph. 13-17). 
 
 “ In consequence of the non-existence of that (univer- 
 sal pervasion), the internal organ is absolutely small” 
 (Book VII. Lesson I. Aph. 23). 
 
 To these extracts one from the paper on Vaiseshika 
 Philosophy in the “ Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha” ought 
 to lie added with a view to a comprehensive presenta- 
 tion of the idea of the mind as enounced in the Logical 
 schools : 
 
 “ The general terms atmatya and mancostya are the 
 respective definitions of soul ( atman ) and mind ( manas ). 
 The general idea of soul is that which is subordinate to 
 substance, being also found existing, with intimate re- 
 lation, in that which is without form ( amurta ). The 
 general idea of mind is that which is subordinate to 
 substance, being also found existing with intimate rela- 
 tion in an atom, but (unlike other atoms) not the inti- 
 mate cause of any substance.” In these extracts a 
 view of the mind is presented such as may justly be 
 represented as somewhat ambiguous. At first sight 
 the mind appears to be nothing more or less than a 
 material organ of communication between the soul and 
 the bodily senses. It is merely an organ of sensation 
 and intellection to the soul. The external world 
 makes, by its endless varieties of objects, suitable 
 impressions upon the bodily senses ; and these impres- 
 sions, called the raw materials of sensation, are one 
 after another communicated to the soul for cognition 
 by the mind. It is material, being small as an atom. 
 Its atomic character is set forth by the fact that it can 
 let in only one idea at a time. It has a form ( murta ), 
 
THE VAISESHIKA PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 239 
 
 and therefore differs from time, space, and ether, which 
 are amurta , or without form. It is not infinite like 
 ether, for had it been so it would have made simultane- 
 ity or cotemporaneity of cognitions and volitions on the 
 part of the soul a possibility. It is, like the soul, mul- 
 titudinous, its plurality being proved by the fact that 
 everybody in the world has a particular mind attached 
 to it. It moves to and fro, gets into and comes out of 
 bodies ; but all its movements are caused and regulated 
 by the mysterious, unseen power called destiny. It is in 
 reality the internal sensory, as Professor Gough calls it, 
 a material organ of communication attached to the soul, 
 and forming a sort of intermediate post-office between 
 the governor within and the external senses, its servitors. 
 
 This view of the mind appears at first sight to be a, 
 great advance on that of the Sankhya school. By the 
 Sankhya philosopher the mind is called the internal 
 sense, the eleventh organ, a material evolute ; but it is 
 not according to his views an unconscious, inactive in- 
 strument of communication between the soul and the 
 external world. On the contrary, it is the only active 
 principle in man ; it receives the impressions made 
 upon the senses, elaborates them into ideas, arranges 
 and classifies them, deduces general conclusions from 
 them, wills and acts, and desists from willing and act- 
 ing according as it is moved by preponderant and non- 
 preponderant motives. In a word, it performs all those 
 functions which are ascribed by general consent to the 
 soul, or to the mind as the soul itself, not as one of its 
 organs. The soul, again, is merely a passive, uncon- 
 scious, luminous substance, in which the sensations and 
 ideas elaborated by the mind are simply reflected. 
 
 But here in the Logical schools the order seems 
 reversed. The mind is the passive, unconscious sub- 
 
240 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 stance of atomic size and shape, and the soul is the 
 active principle in man. The mind is caused to find its 
 own level among its internal organs, while the soul 
 has its ceaseless activity restored to it, along with its 
 percipient, elaborative, volitionating power. Thus far 
 an improvement seems to have been realized. 
 
 But these schools waver, and there are aphorisms in 
 their standard works which indicate a tendency to 
 return to the Sankliya view, which, be it observed, is 
 in perfect accord with the most approved principles of 
 Hindu Philosophy in general. The aphorism, for in- 
 stance, already quoted : “ Absence of action in the 
 internal sensory reposing in the soul, non-existence of 
 pain in the body — this is union.” The meaning of 
 these words is elucidated in these comments : “ When 
 the internal sensory abides in the soul alone . . . there 
 results the non-commencement or non-production of the 
 action of the internal sensor} 7 . The sensory then be- 
 comes immovable. In this state there is non-existence 
 of pain in the body — that is, pain is not produced in 
 relation to the body. This is called the conjunction or 
 union with soul of the internal organ excluded from all 
 tilings external.” 
 
 Here the internal organ is represented as active, and 
 its action is a source of pain, and therefore a stum- 
 bling-block or an obstacle all but insuperable in the 
 way of emancipation. Its activity, moreover, is the 
 result of its outward move toward the objects of exter- 
 nal nature or the organs of sense. And the cessation 
 of its activity can be realized only when this outward 
 tendency is superseded by an inclination inward, or, in 
 plainer terms, when it is withdrawn from the objects of 
 sense, and made to repose, calm and imperturbable, in 
 the soul. 
 
THE YAISESHIKA PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 241 
 
 Tlie “ sixfold union” by which this change in the 
 mischievous outward tendency of the mind is brought 
 about is set forth in these comments : “ Sitting, check- 
 ing the vital airs, abstraction, suspension of the facul- 
 ties, meditation, and contemplation — these are the six 
 elements of union.” Here the course recommended for 
 the suppression of the mischievous activity of the mind, 
 and the insurance of its ultimate repose in the soul, is 
 nearly the same detailed in Patanjali’s treatise on Yoga 
 Philosophy. We notice, therefore, in the Hyaya and 
 Vaiseshika Sutras a sort of oscillation between the 
 views which ascribed perfect quiescence to the soul 
 and mischievous activity to the mind, and those which 
 reverse the order of the synthetic schools, and make the 
 soul active and the mind passive. 
 
 This vacillation, by no means unaccountable, will be 
 still more manifest when the aphorisms on the soul are 
 presented and thoroughly examined. Here are these 
 aphorisms : 
 
 “ The universal cognition of the objects of sense is an 
 argument for (the existence of) another object than the 
 objects of sense” (Book III. Lesson I. Aph. 2). 
 
 The aphorism embodies an argument in favor of the 
 existence of souls drawn out in the succeeding apho- 
 risms. It is very plain and forcible to the Hindu mind. 
 The objects of sense have no consciousness and percipi- 
 ent faculty, and therefore cannot cognize themselves. 
 Nor can the senses, which are also without conscious- 
 ness and percipient faculty, cognize them. The mind 
 being in the same predicament — a material organ — 
 cannot be the author of cognition. But the objects of 
 sense are cognized and made the bases of appropriate 
 ideas, general concepts, or judgments both simple and 
 complex ; and as the cognitive and elaborative faculty 
 
242 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 does not reside in them, nor in the instruments through 
 which they are perceived, something must be assumed 
 as its substratum or as in possession of it. That some- 
 thing is the conscious soul. 
 
 The marks of the existence of the soul are thus set 
 forth : 
 
 “ The ascending and descending vital airs, the open- 
 ing and closing of the eyes, lips, motions of the internal 
 organ, affections of the other organs, pleasure, pain, 
 desire and aversion, and volition, are marks of the ex- 
 istence of the soul ” (Book III. Lesson II. Aph. 4). 
 
 This continues the argument presented in the apho- 
 rism commented on above. Hot only is the existence of 
 the soul proved by “ the existence or non-existence of 
 knowledge,” by science and nescience, but by the 
 physical conditions of life, such as the horizontal and 
 circular motions of the vital airs within, by the impres- 
 sions made upon the organs of sense, by the activity of 
 the internal sensory, by the qualities of pleasure and 
 pain, desire and aversion, and lastly by volition. Are 
 all movements within the body voluntary ? If so, they 
 certainly indicate the presence of a volitionating princi- 
 ple, or the soul. But some of the movements of which 
 we are conscious, such as the action of the lungs, are in 
 reality automatic rather than voluntary. How can 
 these demonstrate the existence of the soul ? Here the 
 well-known argument of the Sankhya school is utilized. 
 Even action, which is called automatic, from which the 
 principle of volition is absent, is not objectless. What 
 can be the object of the varieties of physical movements 
 within us ? Certainly the gratification of the soul. 
 They, therefore, ought to be brought forward as fitted 
 to prove the existence of the soul. All this may be 
 predicated of the motions of the internal organs, which 
 
THE VAISESHIKA PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 243 
 
 also have for their object the gratification of the soul. 
 And as to pleasure and pain, desire and aversion, they 
 certainly indicate the existence of the soul, as they can- 
 not possibly be properties of inanimate matter. And 
 lastly, what can prove the existence of soul better than 
 volition ? 
 
 To this argument an exception may be taken. In 
 the case of a simple judgment, such as, This is Yajna 
 Datta, nothing is perceived beyond the conjunction of 
 an organ of sense and an object ; why should it be 
 regarded as an indication of the existence of some prin- 
 ciple behind the perceptible contact'* Besides, even if 
 we grant that desire and aversion, cognition and voli- 
 tion are indicative of a substratum in which they in- 
 here, why should we look upon that substratum as the 
 soul, not as something else ? It may therefore be con- 
 cluded that nothing short of revelation can prove the 
 existence of an imperceptible entity like the soul. To 
 this the proper reply is couched in Aphorism 9 of Les- 
 son II. of Book III. : 
 
 “ Existence of the soul being the conditio sine qua 
 non of the use of the word 1 is not evidenced only by 
 revelation. ” 
 
 Again, in Aphorism 1 8 we have these words : 
 
 “ The knowledge of the ego, being individually estab- 
 lished, like sound, as a conditio sine qua non , neither 
 too narrowly nor too widely affirmed, by its predomi- 
 nant and sensible attributes, does not depend upon rev- 
 elation. ’ ’ 
 
 These aphorisms indicate a fresh item of deviation 
 from the Sankhya and Yoga schools. Egoism or con- 
 sciousness is represented in these schools as an entity 
 distinct from the soul, which appears more like an un- 
 conscious lump of luminous matter than a spiritual 
 
244 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 principle. But in the Logical schools egoism is identi- 
 fied with the soul. Its predominant and sensible at- 
 tributes are pleasure, pain, etc., and these prove its ex- 
 istence as decidedly as sound proves the existence of 
 ether ; inasmuch as these attributes are not applicable 
 to the body as the quality sound is not applicable to 
 earth, water, air, or fire. It may, however, be said 
 that we do speak of the body being pained or of the 
 body moving or acting. But these expressions are 
 tropical or figurative, and they should not be taken in 
 a literal sense. The plurality of souls is maintained in 
 these, as well as in the synthetic schools. The follow- 
 ing quotations are enough to prove this : 
 
 “ Activity and inactivity observed in one’s own soul 
 are the mark of the existence of other souls” (Book 
 III. Lesson I. Aph. 19). 
 
 “Because of its circumstances, soul is manifold” 
 (Book III. Lesson II. Aph. 20). 
 
 It is not at all hard to explain the first of these 
 aphorisms. Activity and inactivity are generated by 
 desire and aversion, a natural longing for pleasure, and 
 an instinctive recoil from pain. Of this fact our con- 
 sciousness assures us, as well as the testimony of credi- 
 ble or trustworthy witnesses. But of all the activity 
 and inactivity noticed in the world, we are not the 
 centre. The largest quantity by far must needs be 
 traced to other individuals — our companions, fellow-citi- 
 zens, and fellow-men. Activity and inactivity in their 
 case indicate what they indicate in ours — viz., desire 
 and aversion. But these are properties or affections of 
 the soul, and consequently activity and inactivity in the 
 case of our fellow-men indicate the existence in them 
 of souls similar to ours. 
 
 But the plurality of souls is proved by another fine of 
 
THE VAISESIIIKA PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 245 
 
 reasoning. Our circumstances vary. Some among us 
 are rich, some poor ; some are respectable, some mean ; 
 some are liappy, and some miserable. This variety in 
 our circumstances is an indisputable evidence of the 
 plurality of souls. 
 
 These lines of proof, though shabbily stated in the 
 Sutras, may be adopted by a modern psychologist. 
 But there is one which may be described as “ racy of 
 the soil.” The existence of souls in general may be 
 proved, as has already been affirmed, by direct percep- 
 tion. Devotees have had their vision so far extended, 
 by dint of austerity and meditation, that they have been 
 able to see human souls— their own soul and the souls 
 of others — just as we see the visible objects of nature 
 around us. As a rule, souls are said to be impercepti- 
 ble. The second aphorism of the First Lesson of Book 
 VIII. sets forth its imperceptibility along with that of 
 the internal organ : “ Therein the sonl and the internal 
 organ are imperceptible. ’ ’ As an imperceptible object, 
 it is placed in the same category with ether, time, 
 space, air, and atoms. But cognition of the soul is the 
 result of a particular condition, which is set forth in 
 Aphorism 11 of the Second Daily Lesson of Book 
 VIII. : “ Perception of the soul (results) from a particu- 
 lar conjunction between the soul and the internal organ 
 in the soul.” The meaning' is clear. When the inter- 
 nal organ, having withdrawn itself from the external 
 objects of sense, as the tortoise draws its limbs within 
 its shell, merges itself in the soul, that which is invis- 
 ible becomes visible ; souls are seen, while the material 
 creation vanishes out of sight, except in its atomic forms. 
 
 Gautama, in Book I. Sec. 3, speaks of the soul in 
 these words : “ Desire, aversion, volition, pleasure, 
 pain, and knowledge are the sign of the soul.” 
 
240 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Let us now present in one focus all that is predicated 
 of the soul in these and other aphorisms of the stand- 
 ard works of these two schools of Hindu Philosophy. 
 
 The soul is an eternal, imperceptible, active principle, 
 not a passive substance endowed with the cognitive 
 faculty and volitionating power. It is, therefore, the 
 source of cognition, knowledge, emotion, every species 
 of noticeable activity, and every species of voluntary 
 abstinence from activity. Its characteristic features 
 are volition, desire, aversion, pleasure, pain, and knowl- 
 edge, both in its incipient and matured states. It com- 
 municates with the external world through the internal 
 organ, the mind, and the external organs of sense, hear- 
 ing, seeing, taste, smell, and touch. It has no innate 
 or supersensuous ideas. Thus far, barring the repre- 
 sentation of the mind as an internal organ, not as an- 
 other name for the soul itself, the description may in 
 all its entireness be adopted by those philosophers of 
 the sensational school who do not look upon it, as John 
 Stuart Mill does, as simply “ a permanent possibility 
 of sensation,” and therefore inferentially identical with 
 or not different from matter itself. 
 
 The view presented of the soul may at first sight 
 seem correct and consistent. But while studying Hindu 
 Philosophy we must never lose sight of the proverb, 
 
 “ Everything that ..glitters is not gold.” According to 
 its approved maxims, the properties or affections enunci- 
 ated are adventitious, not essential. Desire and aver- 
 sion are defects of which the soul must get rid before 
 emancipation can possibly be realized. Again, desire 
 and aversion are generated in the soul through the 
 cognitive faculty by the objects of the external world. _ 
 The cognitive faculty is, therefore, a mischievous princi- 
 ple, and must also be annihilated. Once more, desire 
 
THE VAISESIIIKA PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 247 
 
 and aversion lead the soul to activity or inactivity 
 through volition, which is, therefore, a mischievous 
 power to be suppressed or eradicated. The soul simply 
 goes back to its original condition of perfect quiescence 
 when its emancipation from the bondage of ignorance 
 is realized. A state of happy inactivity or blissful pas- 
 sivity is its starting-point and goal, and whatever is 
 calculated to bring it out of such state is an acci- 
 dent to be deprecated, and ruthlessly eradicated when 
 realized. 
 
 This point will have to be enlarged on before the 
 sequel. Meanwhile it is desirable to raise a question of 
 paramount importance — viz., Do the Sutras speak of a 
 Universal Soul of an unlimited power, and do they 
 represent Him as the creator of the world, the source 
 of all knowledge and bliss ? The aphorisms in which 
 God is spoken of in the Vaiseshika Sutras are very few 
 in number, and are by- no means of an unambiguous 
 nature. The first of these runs thus : 
 
 “ Authoritativeness belongs to revelation because it 
 is a declaration of that” (Book I. Lesson I. Aph. 3). 
 
 On this verse a modern commentator has the follow- 
 ing remarks : 
 
 “ The word Tat (that) signifies God, though He has 
 not been previously mentioned, it being inferred from 
 His being universally known, just as in the aphorism of 
 Gautama, ‘ That is unauthoritative, being vitiated by 
 falsity, self -contradictoriness, and repetition.’ By the 
 word ‘that’ the Veda is signified, though not pre- 
 viously mentioned. Accordingly an authoritativeness 
 belongs to revelation — the Veda— because it was de- 
 clared by Him — revealed by God.” 
 
 Another aphorism bearing on the subject runs thus : 
 ‘ £ But word and work are the mark of those beings 
 
248 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 who are distinguished from ourselves” (Book I. Lesson 
 II. Apli. 18). 
 
 An ancient commentator thus explains these ambigu- 
 ous words : 
 
 “ The word ‘ but ’ implies the exclusion of the marks 
 of touch, etc. A word is a name, a work an effect, 
 such as the earth, etc. Both of these are a mark of the 
 existence of God and the great sages who are more ex- 
 cellent than ourselves.’’ 
 
 The modern commentator referred to thus comments 
 upon these words : 
 
 “ The word ‘ but ’ expresses a division of the sec- 
 tions, and implies that the section treating of the Deity 
 is now commenced. A word is a name, such as air, a 
 boar, barley, a reed, and the like ; a work is an effect, 
 as the earth, a blade of grass, etc. These are both 
 marks inferring the existence of God and the great 
 sages, who are distinguished from ourselves, who are 
 able to produce this and that effect, and are possessed 
 of omniscience and omnipotence.” 
 
 The reader must not suppose that “ the section treat- 
 ing of the Deity” is of average length and breadth ; it 
 only consists of the aphorism quoted above and the fol- 
 lowing : 
 
 “ Because words and works are known by perception 
 to be produced.” 
 
 The ancient commentator thus explains these words : 
 
 “ As when the bodies of Chaitra, Maitra, and others 
 are objects of perception to a father and others, the 
 names Chaitra, Maitra are given, so the giving of 
 names to a water-pot, a piece of cloth, etc., is depen- 
 dent on the will of God. Whatever word God wills to 
 be the name of anything is applicable to it, in the same 
 manner that every herb that is touched by the edge of 
 
TIIE VAISESMKA PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 249 
 
 an ichneumon’s teeth is an antidote to the venom of a 
 snake. Therefore a name of this kind is a mark infer- 
 ential of those beings which are distinguished from our- 
 selves and others. ’ ’ 
 
 These aphorisms and these comments make it evident 
 that the argument resorted to or brought forward by 
 the ancient logicians of India is that based on design in 
 nature or the teleological argument. They sometimes 
 did bring forward explicit statements, culled from rev- 
 elation, in support of the fundamental doctrine of all 
 religion, the existence of God ; but even when this was 
 done, the point on which the greatest stress was laid 
 was not so much the testimony itself as the marks of 
 design in the testimony, as the following passage from 
 the “ Kusumanjali,” a work on Logic recently trans- 
 lated by Professor Cornell, will show : 
 
 “ An omniscient and indestructible Being is to be 
 proved from the existence of effects, from the combina- 
 tion of atoms, from the support of the earth in the sky, 
 from traditional arts, from belief in revelation, from 
 the Veda, from its sentences, and from particular 
 members. ’ ’ 
 
 In this extract, design in the construction of the sen- 
 tences of the Veda, and the clauses of which they are 
 composed, is insisted on, as well as the bare testimony 
 embodied in revelation. What a gap between the 
 teleological argument, as it was unfolded in those days, 
 when the best example of design available was a jar or 
 a water-pot, and the same argument as it is presented 
 in these days of steam-engines, locomotives, and tele- 
 graphic wires ! A modern audience might laugh if an 
 orator prone to enlarge upon the art of giving names, 
 or constructing sentences, or weaving cloths, or making 
 jars as an indisputable proof of the existence of God ; 
 
250 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 but it must not lie forgotten that the absurdity of the 
 theory of evolution, as propounded by those who do not 
 believe in design, has often been set forth in our day 
 by the hypothesis of an accidental agglomeration of 
 letters into words, words into sentences, sentences into 
 the beauty and pathos, the truth and depth of Shake- 
 speare. Our ancient philosophers had evidently no idea 
 either of the ontological or of the moral argument in 
 favor of the existence of God. 
 
 It may seem strange that a multitude of sages, 
 “ more excellent than ourselves,” are associated with 
 God in the aphorisms of Kanada quoted above, in the 
 work and word which demonstrate His and their ex- 
 istence. It is explicitly declared that the objects of 
 nature and the names given to many of them are proofs 
 of the existence, not only of God, but of other spiritual 
 beings imperceptible to our gross percipient faculties. 
 "Who are these ? Men raised to the position of the 
 gods by austerity and meditation, or angelic beings who 
 have always stood nearer to God than man ? Perhaps 
 both these classes of glorious beings are referred to, 
 though the word “ sages” used by the commentator is 
 more applicable to human adepts than to ethereal intel- 
 ligences. They are represented as co-sharers, both in 
 His attributes and in His works, with God. They are 
 expressly said to be “ possessed of omniscience and 
 omnipotence.” 
 
 But it is to be observed that this representation, 
 paradoxical though at first sight it may appear, is in 
 perfect keeping with the approved principles of Hindu 
 Philosophy. One of these is that a person literally be- 
 comes that which he makes the subject of long-contin- 
 ued and intense meditation. He can transform himself 
 into an atom by meditating intensely upon an atom, or 
 
THE YAISESHIKA PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 251 
 
 the diffusive ether by making that all-pervasive sub- 
 stance the subject of concentrated, self -oblivious con- 
 templation. By a similar process he can even change 
 himself into God. “ I will be God by meditating 
 upon God ” — such is the sublime aspiration of many a 
 devotee in India. And if the God believed in were 
 something more than a mere nonentity, such aspiration 
 would be higher than the highest ever cherished by a 
 human being 1 . But neither God nor the human soul is 
 anything better than a nonentity, according to Hindu 
 Philosophy ; and therefore this aspiration, at first 
 sight so high, resolves itself into a desire to pass from 
 troublesome existence into troubleless non-existence ! 
 
 In these verses God is certainly represented as the 
 Creator of the universe. In the paper on the Ay ay a 
 Philosophy in the “ Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha” there is 
 an elaborate argument presented to prove that lie is 
 such. The objections against the notion of attributing 
 creation to Him are by no means few or of a contemp- 
 tible order, according to Hindu Philosophy. God, you 
 say, is the Creator of the universe. Yery well ; the 
 question rises, What could lead Him to create ? His 
 own advantage or that of His creatures ? Hot cer- 
 tainly His advantage, because as the Absolute Being 
 He needed nothing, and can need nothing to complete 
 His perfection. Did He, then, create to make His 
 creatures happy ? If so, He must have miserably 
 failed, for His creatures are far from happy — are very 
 miserable indeed. This objection may be easily rebut- 
 ted. God’s determination to create proceeded from 
 “ compassion,” or a wish to make His creatures happy. 
 But these have by their own works made themselves 
 miserable. 
 
 There is, however, an insuperable objection to the 
 
252 
 
 hikdu rniLOsornY. 
 
 idea of God bringing Himself to a determination to 
 create. God cannot create without being moved by a 
 desire to do so. Hence creation on the part of God 
 implies on Ilis part a desire, and a preponderant desire, 
 or a desire leading to a volition and an action. How a 
 desire, according to Hindu Philosophy, is an evil and a 
 source of bondage, however good it may be. How 
 can that which is admittedly a source of misery be 
 evinced by a Being described as eternally free from all 
 pain as well as pleasure ? The Hindu philosopher 
 shows no little vacillation here, and escapes the horns 
 of a formidable dilemma by supposing a force behind 
 the Deity as the ultimate source of creation. That 
 force is in these Sutras called Destiny. 
 
 We have already had occasion to dwell upon the 
 many forms in which this mysterious primal force 
 manifests itself. It is, properly speaking, the source 
 of all material movements in creation. In commenting 
 upon a verse already quoted, one of the commentators 
 says : “ It is to be inferred that Destiny is the cause of 
 the motion of pieces of glass attracted by amber, of 
 the upward flaming of fire, of the horizontal motion of 
 wind, and of the action of primordial atoms in crea- 
 tion.” It is also the source of desire and aversion to 
 which every species of activity, other than material, is 
 traceable. Let the following aphorisms prove this : 
 
 “ From pleasure arises desire. And also through 
 that being ingrained. And also through destiny” 
 (Book V. Lesson II. Aph. 10-12). 
 
 From pleasure arises desire, and that is traceable to 
 Destiny. Destiny, therefore, generates and controls 
 all material movements, and all our thoughts, feelings, 
 and volitions. And Destiny originally caused the 
 atoms to combine, integrate and disintegrate, and de- 
 
THE YAISESHIKA rniLOSOPHY. 
 
 253 
 
 velop into the varied, objects of creation. Destiny, 
 then, is the ultimate ground of existence in its multi- 
 farious forms. Or if God were represented as the cre- 
 ative principle or power, the representation would not 
 be correct unless He were held up as a sort of demi- 
 urgic link between the creation and the Creator. God 
 could not create without being moved by a desire to do 
 so. But all desires proceed from Destiny, to which, 
 therefore, His desire to create must be traced. Des- 
 tiny, therefore, is the Creator, whether creation is 
 traced to it through God or through atoms ! 
 
 But why are two plans of creation set forth — the one 
 tracing it through a God, and the other directly through 
 innumerable atoms to Destiny \ Because perhaps the 
 philosophers of these schools oscillated between their 
 own and the popular notion of creation; or perhaps 
 they tried to conciliate popular sentiment by an intro- 
 duction into their scheme of some elements of belief, 
 without which it was sure to fall flat on the public. 
 And lastly, we may suppose that they identified Des- 
 tiny with God. The second of these hypotheses ap- 
 pears to us correct. The logicians posited a perfectly 
 inactive and quiescent God more to humor popular 
 prejudices than to serve any recognized purpose of their 
 essentially atheistic scheme of philosophy. 
 
 But what is Destiny, the Adrishta , Unseen Force 
 behind the phenomena of nature and evolutions of 
 Providence ? To settle this question we must examine 
 what is said about desire and aversion, and merit and 
 demerit. 
 
 Gautama describes the passions, or desire and aver- 
 sion, as having “ this characteristic, that they actuate,” 
 or cause actions. Kanada defines desire as a longing 
 for pleasure and aversion, as a recoil from pain. They 
 
254 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 both lead to activity, and therefore they are both mis- 
 chievous. We have already quoted the aphorism : 
 “ From pleasure arises desire.” The following com- 
 ments on these words are worthy of consideration : 
 
 “ Desire or wish arises from pleasure generated by 
 attachment to garlands, sandal-wood, women, and 
 other objects of sense, or in the pleasures of those suc- 
 cessive kinds, or in the means of those pleasures. It is 
 also to be considered that aversion arises from pain be- 
 gotten by snakes, thorns, etc. ; in these pains or in the 
 means of these pains. Desire, aversion, and infatua- 
 tion, in virtue of being incentives to activity, are 
 called defects. Accordingly the aphorism of Gautama, 
 Defects have for their characteristic incitement to 
 activitju” 
 
 Here the thing to be noted is, that pleasure and pain 
 are antecedent to desire and aversion, which again 
 lead to action, and that to bondage. The definitions 
 given of pleasure and pain are of the crudest type. 
 "What a gap between them and Sir William Hamilton’s 
 definition of pleasure as unimpeded energy, and of pain 
 as impeded energy ! How gross, again, are the ideas 
 of pleasure and pain presented ! The exquisite enjoy- 
 ments and the exquisite sufferings arising from the in- 
 tellectual and moral nature of man are almost entirely 
 thrown out of calculation ! 
 
 Let us now advert to the subject of merit and de- 
 merit. In Aph. 3 of the Second Lesson of Book Y. we 
 have these words : “ The duty of the four periods of 
 religious life (has been declared). Fidelities and infidel- 
 ities are the causes of merit and demerit. ” This is a 
 very important aphorism, inasmuch as it traces merit 
 and demerit, not only to external acts, such as the 
 duties performed by a Brahmin passing through the 
 
THE VAISESHIKA PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 255 
 
 four stages of studentship, householdership, hermitship, 
 and mendicancy, hut to states of the heart or internal 
 dispositions. In the aphorism following, infidelity is 
 said to be “a deficiency of faith,” and fidelity “ non- 
 deficiency.” 
 
 In aphorisms If and 15 of the same book and section 
 we have these words : “ Activity in merit and demerit 
 has for its antecedents desire and aversion. By these 
 are conjunction and disjunction.” 
 
 The ancient commentator explains the last few words 
 thus : 
 
 “ Existence in a future state is now declared to be 
 the occasion of merit and demerit. By these— by merit 
 and demerit — conjunction — that is, birth— is caused. 
 By conjunction is here intended connection with non- 
 previous pains of bodily organs. Disjunction is the dis- 
 junction of body and the internal sensory, characterized 
 as death. The meaning is, therefore, that this transi- 
 tory world, a series of births and deaths, otherwise 
 termed existence in a future state, is caused by merit 
 and demerit. ” 
 
 We shall only quote another aphorism from Book 
 IX. : “ The knowledge of inspired sages and perfect 
 vision result from merit.” 
 
 The ideas presented in these extracts may be thus 
 grouped : Our present life is the result of merit and 
 demerit accumulated in past lives. We are adding 
 constantly to this accumulated load by our conduct in 
 this life, our dispositions and acts. We acquire tran- 
 scendent knowledge and miraculous powers by such 
 meditation as is a result of merit, and our final eman- 
 cipation is also connected therewith. From these 
 statements it is plain that what is called Destiny is 
 identical with merit and demerit, or with work, the 
 
25G 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 source of merit and demerit. Work, then, rather than 
 God, is the creator of the universe, our creator and 
 incarcerator ; and it also ultimately leads to our eman- 
 cipation through the medium of that meditation by 
 which it is itself annihilated ! Here, again, is the im- 
 personal God of Buddhism ! 
 
 And lastly we come to what Gautama calls the chief 
 end of man, Emancipation. In Book V. Lesson II. 
 Aph. 18, we have this set forth : “ Where there is 
 non-existence of this (that is, of Destiny), there is non- 
 existence of conjunction, and non-existence of manifes- 
 tation, emancipation.” 
 
 Destiny or work is the cause of that all but endless 
 chain of births and deaths under which we groan. 
 But when its fruits are consumed and it itself is annihi- 
 lated, in the case of a spirit raised through successive 
 stages of exalted existence to the summit of concentra- 
 tion, its conjunction with material conditions disap- 
 pears, along with its manifestation in a bodil} r form, 
 and its final liberation is realized. 
 
 The means are indicated in this aphorism : “ Eman- 
 cipation is declared as dependent on the actions of the 
 soul ” (Book YI. Lesson II. Aph. 16). 
 
 These words are thus explained : “ This it is which 
 is separation of body and soul. When there exist the 
 actions of the soul, emancipation ensues. The actions 
 of the soul are as follows : Hearing, meditation, the 
 practice of devotion, abstraction, a sitting posture, re- 
 straining the vital airs, acquisition of quietism, and self- 
 subjugation, the presentation of one’s own and others’ 
 souls, knowledge of merit and demerit previously ac- 
 quired by fruition, and emancipation characterized as 
 removal of pain, consequent on the cessation of birth, 
 resulting from the cessation of activity, in consequence 
 
THE VAISESHIKA PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 257 
 
 of the non-production of further merit and demerit, by- 
 overcoming the mist of defects characterized as desire 
 and aversion. Of these, the primary act of soul is 
 knowledge of the real nature of the six categories.” 
 
 The concatenation ending in emancipation is else- 
 where set forth in these comments : “ Therefore the 
 practical application of this introductory section of two 
 aphorisms is that persons desirous of emancipation are 
 concerned in the non-existence of birth for the sake of 
 non-existence of pain ; in the non-existence of activity 
 for the sake of non-existence of birth ; in the non-exist- 
 ence of faults for the sake of non-existence of activity ; 
 in the cessation of false knowledge for the sake of non- 
 existence of faults ; and in forming a mental presenta- 
 tion of the soul for the sake of cessation of false knowl- 
 edge.” 
 
 The links to be successively destroyed are false 
 knowledge, faults, or desire and aversion, activity, 
 pain, birth ; and the means of destruction is right 
 knowledge of the soul and its difference from non-soul, 
 which right knowledge is attained by work and the 
 meditation which destroys work ! And when mundane 
 existence is rolled up as a scroll, we have the perma- 
 nent entities, God, Soul, Mind, Atoms, left — all im- 
 mobile and inactive except when operated upon by 
 Destiny. How came Destiny to exist before the be- 
 ginning of the chain of conjunction and disjunction, 
 births and deaths, to which it gave birth ; or how, when 
 destroyed by a process of self-destruction, it reappears, 
 Phoenix-like, at every renovation of creative work — 
 these mysteries are left unsolved. The only reply at- 
 tempted is, The process is eternal ! 
 
 Pandit Nehemiah Goreh praises the system in his 
 well-known book on Hindu Philosophy 7 - for its recogni- 
 
258 
 
 HIHDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 tion of God as the Creator of the universe. It is im- 
 possible to say how the truth has escaped his calm and 
 philosophical intellect, that God, according to it, has 
 nothing to do with our creation, our incarceration, and 
 our salvation. He is simply a superfluous entity, intro- 
 duced for conventional or utilitarian purposes, and 
 therefore perfectly dispensable, along with the soul, 
 and perhaps the mind. Destiny and atoms, matter and 
 force, are in reality the ground of existence. The ap- 
 parent trialism of these schools dwindles, when prop- 
 erly interpreted, into the materialistic monism of the 
 Sankhya system ! 
 
CHAPTER IX. 
 
 THE PUKVA MIMANSA, 0E HINDU EITUALISM. 
 
 The scliools directly and ostensibly associated with 
 the Yeda next claim attention — viz., the Pnrva and 
 the TTttara Mimansa. The words Purva and Uttar a 
 mean “prior” and “posterior,” “antecedent” and 
 “subsequent;” and in connection with the word 
 Mimansa the ideas they express are a prior and a pos- 
 terior decision. There is a little ambiguity attached to 
 the expressions at first sight, and it has plunged such 
 great thinkers as Dr. Ritter into error. Is the idea of 
 antecedence or subsequence in time conveyed by these 
 words in this connection ? Or are the predicates ap- 
 plicable to something lying beyond the confines of 
 chronology ? Some writers of eminence have fallen 
 into the mistake of attaching to them the ideas of 
 priority and posteriority in time ; and Dr. Ritter occu- 
 pies the foremost place among them. According to 
 them, the Uttara Mimansa school, or what is oftener 
 called the Yedantic school, was founded after the 
 Purva Mimansa school had been organized ; and this 
 circumstance sets forth the significance of the appella- 
 tives in question. But this notion is not obviously ten- 
 able, as in the Sutras ascribed to Jaimini, the acknowl- 
 edged founder of the Purva Mimansa or the prior 
 school, the name of Badarayana, the founder of the 
 later school, is distinctly mentioned as an authority. 
 In Book I. Sec. 1, Aph. 5, we have these words : 
 
2G0 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 1 1 But the natural connection of a word with its sense 
 is (the instrument of) the knowledge thereof (i.e. of 
 Duty), and the intimation (of Scripture, which is) 
 unerring, though given in respect of something imper- 
 ceptible. This (according to our opinion, as well as 
 that) of Badarayana (the author of Y edanta Aphorisms) 
 is the evidence (by means of which we recognize Duty), 
 for it has no respect (to any other evidence, such as 
 that of sense).” 
 
 This express mention of the founder of the later 
 school as an authority, co-ordinate, if not supraordi- 
 nate, in one of the opening Sutras of the standard doc- 
 ument of the prior school, militates against the princi- 
 ple of interpretation, to which the mistake alluded to is 
 attributable. The ideas of priority and posteriority in 
 time must be set aside altogether. These epithets 
 refer to the well-known divisions of the Yeda, to the 
 prior and posterior portions of that venerable work, 
 rather than to two successive divisions of time. 
 
 In the first of this series of papers, the three main 
 divisions of the Big and other Yedas were pointed out. 
 A fresh reference to them is needed to explain these 
 two important terms. The three principal divisions 
 of each of the Yedas are : (1) Mantra, or Hymns ; 
 (2) Brahmana, or Ritualistic Directory; and (3) Upan- 
 ishad, or Underlying Philosophy. The hymnology and 
 the ritual form the prior portion, while the philosophy 
 in which these two elements terminate constitutes the 
 later portion. The Purva Mimansa philosophizes on 
 the earlier portion of the Yeda, or the portion embrac- 
 ing the Mantra and the Brahmana; and the Uttara 
 Mimansa treats of the later portion, or that embracing 
 the Upanishad. The former school is, properly speak- 
 ing, called the Mimansa, and the latter the Yedanta. 
 
THE PUEVA MIMANSA. 
 
 2G1 
 
 The schools are also called the Exoteric and the 
 Esoteric. 
 
 It is to he observed that, though in one sense they 
 may justly be said to have appeared contemporane- 
 ously, the Yedantic school was not matured and per- 
 fected till the rival form of thought had nearly, if not 
 entirely, lost its prestige and dominating influence. 
 The Yedantic school may therefore be called the 
 Uttara Mimansa, both in a chronological as well as in 
 the sense of its philosophy being confined to the con- 
 cluding portion of the Yeda. 
 
 The founder of the Mimansa school was Jaimini, 
 who is more than once named in the Sutras ascribed 
 to him, but regarding whom little or nothing is 
 known besides the fact of his having founded one of 
 the six great schools of Hindu Philosophy, and ex- 
 pounded its principles, after the orthodox fashion, in a 
 series of aphorisms. The number of aphorisms ascribed 
 to him is no less than 2652, and they are classified into 
 915 AcUiikarans, or topical sections, and these again 
 are grouped into sixty chapters, which form twelve 
 books, each consisting of four chapters, besides the 
 third, sixth, and tenth, each of which has twice as 
 many, or eight chapters. 
 
 This mass of aphorisms would be thoroughly unintel- 
 ligible but for the glosses and scholias extant, or within 
 reach of the plodding student. The ancient commen- 
 tator, whose great commentary has been revised by 
 subsequent scholiasts, was Sabara Swami Bhatta, and 
 his great work is called after him, “ Sabara- Bhasliya.” 
 The greatest of the subsequent annotators was Kuma- 
 rilla Swami Bhatta, who is one of the great leaders of 
 the memorable crusade, the issue of which was the 
 almost complete banishment of Buddhism from the 
 
2G2 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 country of its birth. Of this great man Colebrooke 
 speaks thus : 
 
 “ Kumarilla Bhatta figures greatly in the tradition- 
 ary rehgious history of India. He was predecessor of 
 Sankar Acharya, and equally rigid in maintaining the 
 orthodox faith against heretics who reject the authority 
 of the Vedas. He is considered to have been the chief 
 antagonist of the sect of Buddha, and to have insti- 
 gated an exterminating persecution of that heresy. He 
 does indeed take every occasion of controverting the 
 authority and doctrine of Sakva or Buddha, as well 
 as Arhat or Jina, together with obscurer heretics, 
 Bodhyana and Umsaka ; and he denies them any con- 
 sideration, even when they do concur upon any point 
 with the Vedas. The age of Kumarilla, anterior to 
 Sankar, and corresponding with the period of the per- 
 secution of the Bandhas, goes back to an antiquity of 
 much more than a thousand years. ’ ’ 
 
 Another annotator of note ought to be named, as, 
 from references in the “ Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha,” he 
 appears to have led one great division of the Miman- 
 salcas, a division forming a sort of opposition to Kuma- 
 rilla Bhatta. Ilis name is Pravakara, and he might 
 have been a contemporary of his opponent, Kumarilla. 
 
 Ve give, as usual, the synopsis of the contents of 
 Jaimini’ s great work, as presented in the paper entitled 
 “ Jaimini Darsana” in the “ Sarva-Darsana-San- 
 graha 
 
 “ An objector may here ask, Are you not continually 
 repeating that merit (Dharma) comes from the practice 
 of duty (Dharma) ; but how is duty to be defined or 
 proved ? Listen attentively to my answer. A reply 
 to this question has been given in the older Mimansa 
 by the holy sage Jaimini. Kow the Mimansa consists 
 
THE PURVA HIM ANSA. 
 
 263 
 
 of twelve books. In the first book is discussed the 
 authoritativeness of those collections of words which 
 are severally meant by the terms £ injunction ’ ( vidhi ), 
 £ explanatory passage ’ ( arthavada ), ‘ hymn ’ ( mantra ), 
 ‘ tradition ’ ( smriii ), and £ name ’ (nam). In the second, 
 certain subsidiary discussions (as e.g. on Apurva) relat- 
 ing to the difference of various rites, refutation of 
 (erroneously alleged) proofs, and difference of perform- 
 ance (as in £ constant ’ and £ voluntary ’ offerings). 
 In the third sruti, £ sign, ’ or £ sense of the passage ’ 
 (ling a), £ context ’ ( vakya ;), etc. , and their respective 
 weight when in apparent opposition to one another, 
 the ceremonies c&Vlq(\. pratipatti-karmcmi ; things men- 
 tioned incidentally, things accessory to several main 
 objects, as prayajas, etc., and the duties of the sacri- 
 ficer. In the fourth, the influence on other rites of the 
 principal and subordinate rites, the fruit caused by the 
 jiihu being made of the hutea-prondosa, and the 
 dice-playing, etc., which form subordinate parts of the 
 vajasuya sacrifice. In the fifth, the relative order of 
 different passages of sruti, etc. , the order of different 
 parts of a sacrifice (as the seventeen animals at the 
 vajapeya), the multiplication and non -multiplication of 
 rites, and the respective force of words of sruti , order 
 of mention, etc., in determining the order of perform- 
 ance. In the sixth, the persons qualified to offer 
 sacrifices, them obligations, the substitute for enjoined 
 materials, supplies for the lost and injured offerings, 
 expiatory rites, the sattara offerings, things proper to 
 be given, and the different sacrificial fires. In the sev- 
 enth, transference of the ceremonies of one sacrifice to. 
 another by direct command in the Yedantic texts, and 
 then as inferred by £ name ’ or £ sign . 5 In the eighth, 
 transference by virtue of the clearly expressed or ob- 
 
204 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 scurely expressed ‘ sign,’ or by the predominant ‘ sign,’ 
 and cases where no transference takes place. In the 
 ninth, the beginning of the discussion on the adaptation 
 of hymns when quoted in a new connection ( uha ), the 
 adaptation of samans and mantras , and collateral ques- 
 tions connected therewith. In the tenth, the discus- 
 sion of occasions where the non-performance of the 
 primary rite involves the ‘ preclusion ’ and non-per- 
 formance of dependent rites, and of occasions where the 
 rites are precluded, because other rites produce their 
 special result; discussions connected with the cjraha 
 offerings, certain samans, and various other things, and 
 a discussion on different kinds of negation. In the 
 eleventh, the incidental mention and subsequently the 
 fuller discussion of tantra (where several acts are com- 
 bined into one). In the twelfth, a discussion on 
 jrrasanja (where the rite is performed for one chief 
 purpose, but with an incidental further reference) ; 
 tantra , cumulation of concurrent rites, and option. ” 
 From the foregoing conspectus it is evident that very 
 little of what is properly called philosophy is found in 
 this mass of aphorisms. The problems of existence are 
 not here even referred to. The soul, its nature, the 
 relation in which it stands to the non-ego or to the infi- 
 nite, the source of its bondage, and its emancipation — 
 subjects discussed with no little logical acumen and 
 philosophical insight in the other schools — are simply 
 thrust into the background. And practical directions 
 as to the sacred books to be invested with canonical 
 authority, the rites and ceremonies to be performed 
 with punctilious care, the varieties of sacrifices to be 
 offered, the mystical syllables and words to be re- 
 peated, the hymns to be chanted, and the incantations 
 to be muttered, are made to occupy the prominent posi- 
 
THE PUKVA MIMAHSA. 
 
 265 
 
 tion which in the other philosophical works of the 
 orthodox schools is assigned to dissertations on the 
 abstruse problems of life. 
 
 There is philosophy, however, in the method in 
 which the disquisitions embodied in this work, on a 
 variety of non-philosophical topics, are presented. The 
 logical acumen shown is deserving of all praise, though 
 the conviction forces itself on the mind that a great 
 deal of close and accurate reasoning is wasted on what 
 might justly be characterized as trash. As a repertory 
 of truth or a magazine of philosophic thought, the 
 book is exceedingly worthless ; but as a picture of an 
 age of ritualistic fervor, brought on by a reaction 
 against speculations of the wildest sort, it is not with- 
 out value. And therefore we are inclined, on the 
 whole, to sympathize in what Max Miiller says of it in 
 a private note published in the serial to be referred to : 
 “ To me these Mimansaka discussions are extremely 
 attractive, and for accuracy of reasoning they have no 
 equal anywhere.” As a specimen of the way in which 
 its discussions are conducted, we are tempted to tran- 
 scribe the section in which its approved doctrine — that 
 the connection between a word and its sense is eter- 
 nal— is set forth, with the reasons pro and con. 
 
 But before we yield to the temptation we must say 
 something on the translations which are to be utilized 
 in our exposition of the maxims of the Mimansa school. 
 Of the great work of this school a very small fragment 
 was translated by Dr. Ballantyne, with the accuracy 
 characteristic of all the versions made by that distin- 
 guished Orientalist. But a much larger portion has 
 been translated by our learned countryman, Pundit 
 Moreshwar Ivunte, B.A. and M.D., in his serial named 
 Saddarsa/na-Ohintanika , a magazine started in 1877, 
 
26 G 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 and edited up to date with an amount of ability and 
 erudition worthy of all praise. The work has been of 
 the greatest value to Oriental scholars as far as it has 
 gone, and it is to be hoped that the learned author will 
 live to finish it. He has translated more than a moiety 
 of the Sutras associated with the Mimansa school, a 
 considerable portion of the Yedanta Sutras, and a frag- 
 ment of the Yoga Sutras ; and the work before him is 
 more formidable by far in bulk, if not in importance, 
 than what he has so patiently and persistently accom- 
 plished. When the serial is completed it will present 
 complete translations of the standard original works of 
 the orthodox schools, with copious notes and comments, 
 which, barring the one-sided theory they are evidently 
 intended to bolster up, will be looked upon as very val- 
 uable indeed. From the second number of this series 
 we quote the arguments in favor of the doctrine alluded 
 to, the arguments for and against : 
 
 “ 5. Therefore the connection between a word and 
 its sense is eternal. The knowledge of this eternal 
 connection is a precept. Such a precept is never erro- 
 neous. (But) when the sense is unknown, then there 
 is an error. Therefore, according to Badasayana, a 
 precept is authoritative, (as) other knowledge is not 
 needed. 
 
 “ 6. Some (state) that a word is an action. It ap- 
 pears when pronounced. (This is a statement in oppo- 
 sition.) 
 
 “ 7. The sound of a word vanishes the moment it is 
 pronounced, therefore it is transitory. (Second state- 
 ment of an opponent.) 
 
 “ 8. The verb to make is used in relation to a sound ; 
 therefore it is transitory. (Third statement of an op- 
 ponent.) 
 
THE PURVA MIHANSA. 
 
 267 
 
 “ 9. Different animals simultaneously hear the same 
 sound ; therefore it is transitory. (Fourth statement 
 of an opponent.) 
 
 “10. A word has an original form and a modified 
 form ; therefore it is transitory. (Fifth statement of 
 an opponent.) 
 
 “11. By many making a sound, its increase (is seen). 
 (Sixth statement of an opponent.)” 
 
 Thus are the arguments against the theory of the 
 eternity of the connection between a word and its sense 
 methodically or categorically stated. The replies are 
 attached as pendants to these : 
 
 “ 12. On this subject there is a parity of reasoning, 
 therefore a word is not eternal.” The reasoning of 
 the opponent himself — viz. , a word appears when pro- 
 nounced — is enough to prove its non-transitoriness, be- 
 cause it presupposes the latent existence of a word pre- 
 vious to its utterance. Mr. Kunte thus explains what 
 is meant by “parity of reasoning”: “An example 
 
 will illustrate this logical contrivance. ‘Well,’ says 
 Jaimini to his opponent, ‘ you say a word appears when 
 pronounced ; your statement implies that a word exists 
 latent before its appearance. Well, its latent existence 
 is not against me. Tour statement shows that this is 
 not against you.’ This is a case of parity of reason- 
 ing.” 
 
 “ 13. When not an object (of sensuous) perception, 
 even an existing substance is not cognized.” The 
 transitoriness of a word is proved because its sound is 
 not perceived after it is uttered. This argument, how- 
 ever, will prove the non-existence of several things 
 which are not perceived, but which nevertheless are 
 proved to be existent, such as ether, etc. 
 
 “ 11. That which exists is cognized (only) after (its) 
 
2G8 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 application.” Sound is said to be made or employed 
 or applied when it is heard, but it exists before it is 
 heard, and its non-perception, except when employed, 
 is no argument against its eternity. 
 
 “ 15. Because sound is simultaneous (and universal) 
 like the sun.” As the sun is one and universal, sound 
 is one and universal ; hence the fact noticed by the op- 
 ponent — viz., that it is simultaneously heard by differ- 
 ent animals. 
 
 “ 16. The change of a letter is its non-modification.” 
 Here the opponent’s statement, that a word has a modi- 
 fied form, is emphatically denied. The original form is 
 in reality not changed when, in consequence of certain 
 slight changes of letter, it appears in so-called modified 
 forms. 
 
 “17. A word is augmented in proportion as sound is 
 augmented.” Sound, according to Hindu Philosophy, 
 is produced by vibrations in the air generating vibra- 
 tions in the ether in the cavity of the ear. The quan- 
 tity of ether in the ear stirred up varies in volume, 
 but in all such apparent modifications it remains un- 
 altered. 
 
 The objections having been refuted, the reasons for 
 maintaining the doctrine in question are categorically 
 stated. They are: (1) the impossibility of our grasping 
 the meaning conveyed by words, after they have been 
 uttered, but for the eternity of sound ; (2) the simul- 
 taneity of the recognition of sound by various parties 
 in different places ; (3) the non-applicability of the 
 predicate number to sound — the word “go,” for in- 
 stance, ten times repeated being simply the word 
 “go ;” (4) the indestructibility of sound or the absence 
 of a cause fitted to destroy it ; (5) the fact that sound 
 is not a modification of air, and therefore an effect ; and 
 
THE PURVA HIM ANSA. 
 
 269 
 
 (6) lastly, express declarations in the Scripture affirm- 
 ing the eternity of sound. 
 
 This is the precise though somewhat cumbrous way 
 in which the argument in favor of the eternity of 
 sound, or eternity of the connection between a word 
 and its meaning, is presented. Let it be observed that 
 this is by no means the method of conducting argu- 
 ments approved of in this school in all its entireness. 
 That method has five distinct parts : the first, the 
 enunciation of the subject ; the second, the statement 
 of a doubt arising from it ; the third, the formal ad- 
 vancement of the objections that may be started, to- 
 gether with their refutation in a consecutive order ; 
 the fourth, the declaration of the demonstrated conclu- 
 sion ; and the fifth, its connection and relevancy set 
 forth. The paper in “ Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha” on 
 the Mimansa of Jaimini or the Jaimini Darsana, brings 
 forward an example in illustration of this complicated 
 style of carrying on debates. But as a rule it is simpli- 
 fied, and the mode of argumentation utilized is that 
 shown in the quotations already presented in support 
 of the strange doctrine of the eternity of sound. 
 
 Before proceeding further it is proper to remark that 
 the Mimansa doctrine of the eternity of sound is essen- 
 tially different from the doctrine of permanence of 
 sound maintained by modem scientists. An impres- 
 sion made upon the atmosphere by a sound may last 
 forever. The ripples occasioned may go round and 
 round throughout eternity, or as long at least as the 
 atmosphere lasts ; and after millions or billions of ages 
 some gifted angel may, after carefully tracing the 
 vibrations to their source, get at the original sound by 
 which they are occasioned and perpetuated. A sound 
 once made lives in the atmosphere in vibrations and 
 
270 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 convolutions forever, according to established laws of 
 nature ; but such a statement is very different from the 
 one which represents sound as without beginning and 
 without end, and as having, moreover, a meaning 
 which usage did not originate and which usage cannot 
 change. And it is to us a matter of surprise that an 
 intelligent man like Dr. Ballantyne should have been 
 prone to confound the ancient Hindu and modern scien- 
 tific theory, and go so far as to represent them as one 
 and the same ! 
 
 Let us now advert to the various kinds of proof ad- 
 mitted in this school. They are six : (1) Perception, (2) 
 Inference, (3) Comparison, (4) Testimony, (5) Presump- 
 tion, and (6) Privation. Perception is thus defined in 
 Book I. Aph. 4 of the treatise under consideration : 
 
 “ Sensuous perception is the knowledge produced by 
 the senses coming in contact with the soul.” 
 
 This is Mr. Kunte’s translation. That of Dr. 
 Ballantyne is somewhat different, and it runs thus : 
 “ When a man’s organs of sense are rightly applied to 
 something extant, that birth of knowledge (which then 
 takes place) is Perception.” 
 
 Perhaps both the versions are more or less accurate. 
 According to the Nyaya and Yaiseshika Sutras, per- 
 ception results from a twofold conjunction — conjunction 
 of a sense-organ with an external object on one side, 
 and the indwelling soul on the other. The ancient 
 scholiast referred to thus defines four of the other 
 sources of knowledge or means of proof : 
 
 “ On sight of one member of a known association, 
 the consequent apprehension of the other part which is 
 not actually proximate is ( anuman ) Inference. The 
 association must be such as had been before directly 
 perceived, or had become known by analogy. 
 
THE PURVA MIMANSA. 
 
 271 
 
 “ Comparison ( 'upamana ) is knowledge arising from 
 resemblance more or less strong. It is apprehension of 
 the likeness which a thing presently seen bears to one 
 before observed ; and likeness or similitude is concomi- 
 tancy of associates or attributes v T itk one object, which 
 were associated with one another. 
 
 ‘ £ Presumption ( artliajpatli ) is deduction of a matter 
 from that which could not else be. It is assumption of 
 a thing not itself perceived, but necessarily implied by 
 another, which is seen, heard, or proven. 
 
 ‘ ‘ Knowledge of a thing which is not proximate (or 
 subject to perception), derived through understood 
 sound — that is, through words, the acceptation whereof 
 is known — is (sastras) ordinance or revelation. It is 
 (sabda) or verval communication.” 
 
 All classes of the Mimansakas accept these five 
 means of proof or sources of knowledge ; but those 
 under the guidance of Kumarilla Bhatta add another 
 kind of proof to this list — viz., Privation. This may 
 be explained by a simple- illustration. The presence of 
 an effect indicates the presence of its cause, as the pres- 
 ence of a jar indicates the presence of clay. The ab- 
 sence of an effect similarly indicates the absence of its 
 cause, and hence the conclusion — -no jar, no day. This 
 is Privation ( ' Abhab ). 
 
 Colebrooke shows how these various kinds of proof 
 are held by various schools of Indian Philosophy, in a 
 passage which ought to be quoted : 
 
 “ The Charvakas, as noticed in the first part of this 
 essay, recognize but one — viz., Perception. The fol- 
 lowers of Kanada and those of Sugata (Buddha) ac- 
 knowledge two — Perception and Inference. The San- 
 khyas recognize three, including Affirmation (or Revela- 
 tion). The Kaiyayikas or followers of Gautama count 
 
272 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 four — viz., the foregoing, together with Comparison. 
 Tiie Prabhakarars (or the Mimansakas under the guid- 
 ance of Prabhakara) admit five (adding Presumption). 
 And the rest of the Mimansakas enumerate six (adding 
 Privation). It does not appear that a greater number 
 has been alleged by any sect of Indian Philosophy.” 
 
 The statement that Panada’ s followers, or philoso- 
 phers of the Yaiseshika school, hold only two of these 
 proofs is not quite correct, though their tendency to 
 merge the others in the two accepted by the Baudhas 
 may be admitted. 
 
 The Mimansa Sutras may justly be said to embody 
 an encyclopaedia of exegesis ; and almost all the prob- 
 lems they attempt to solve are hermeneutical and 
 philological rather than philosophical. Here are some 
 of them stated by Mr. Kunte in his number for June, 
 1877 : “ What is the principal sentence ? a subordinate 
 sentence X an indirect subordinate sentence ? or a rea- 
 son or a causative statement X Whether subversion of 
 the synthetical order of words is advisable or not ? 
 What are the difficulties in the way of dividing a sen- 
 tence ? The solution of these develops the system of 
 exegetics.” 
 
 To what books are the canons of interpretation de- 
 veloped in this system applied ? To the Vedas, in the 
 first place. The authoritativeness of these venerable 
 documents was upheld in the teeth of the objections 
 raised by a school of rationalists, if not several such 
 schools, which had sprung up as a standing protest 
 against the dogmatism maintained by the champions of 
 orthodoxy. It is curious to note that the objections 
 raised by rationalism against the authoritativeness of 
 the Vedas, or their canonicity, are very nearly the 
 same which are advanced to-day against every book 
 
THE PUHY A MIMANSA. 
 
 273 
 
 professing to be a revelation directly or miraculously 
 vouchsafed by God. The principles needed for our 
 guidance in life were, it was affirmed with emphasis, 
 implanted in the human mind, and an examination or 
 analysis, subjective rather than objective, was enough 
 to bring them to light. Such being the case, where 
 was the necessity of an objective revelation granted in 
 a supernatural way ? Again, the Yedas might be 
 proved antagonistic to those moral principles regarding 
 the accuracy or acceptability of which no sane man had 
 ever or could ever doubt. The Y edas, moreover, were 
 rendered useless by the air of mysteriousness thrown 
 over many of their parts, and the mysteries coming 
 out in bold relief from their pages. This last objection 
 is stated in the following aphorism : “ (The Yedas are 
 to no purpose) because it is impossible to know the sense 
 (of some Yaidika texts).” 
 
 It was also affirmed that the Yedas were full of con- 
 tradictions as Avell as mystification, as appears from 
 these aphorisms : “ (The Yedas are to no purpose) be- 
 cause there are in them contradictory statements on the 
 subject.” “ (At the time of learning under a precep- 
 tor, as prescribed by sacred canons), the sense of the 
 texts (in this connection) is never taught, and therefore 
 (the Yedas are to no purpose).” 
 
 These objections — objections based on intuition, in- 
 consistence with the inner laws of our being, the pres- 
 ence of mysteries, obscurity of language, and self-con- 
 tradictoriness — are the stock-in-trade of our modern 
 rationalists, as they appear to have been of their proto- 
 types in bygone days. But some of the objections 
 against the canonical authority of the Yedas, brought 
 forward by the rationalists of ancient India, were pe- 
 culiarly Indian. Here, for instance, is one : “ (The 
 
274 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Vedas are to no purpose) because objects incapable of 
 knowing are described (as performing sacrifices). Mr. 
 Kunte thus explains this aphorism in bis notes : 
 
 £ £ An illustration will explain the Sutra : 1 Oh veg- 
 etable ! save him ! ’ This text occurs in the Taithriya 
 Sanliita (1. 2. 1). £ Being learned, oh stones ! listen ! ’ ” 
 This text occurs in the Taithriya Sanliita (1. 3. 13). 
 The opponent asks, How can stones listen, and how can 
 they be learned ?” There were also objections raised of 
 a purely grammatical type. These varieties of objec- 
 tions were advanced with an earnestness fitted to show 
 that Jaimini, in defending the great citadel of Hindu 
 orthodoxy and propping up its moribund rites and cere- 
 monies, had by no means an easy task to perform. 
 
 But the canons of criticism developed in his Sutras 
 are applied not only to the V edas, but also to the vast 
 body of literature which had gathered around these 
 sacred records. The Vedas of course have the prece- 
 dence, but other documents are regarded as authori- 
 tative, though not equally so. This appears from the 
 opening aphorisms of the third chapter of Book I. : 
 
 ££ All duty originates in the Vedas ; therefore what 
 is not to be found in the Vedas is not to be accepted. 
 (First statement of an opponent.) 
 
 “ No (though whatever is not to be found in the 
 Vedas is not to be accepted, yet) from their author (of 
 the Vedas and Smritis) being common, it is to be in- 
 ferred that what is not in the Vedas is to be accepted. 
 (Final statement.) 
 
 ££ For when that which is established by testimony 
 (sabda or sruti) is opposed to that which is not so estab- 
 lished (as asabda or smriti), the latter is not to be 
 recognized. (And) when the two are not opposed, in- 
 ference (smriti) is to be recognized. ’ ’ 
 
THE PUKVA MIMANSA. 
 
 275 
 
 The word sruti means that which is heard, and rep- 
 resents revelation. The Yedas alone form the sruti.; 
 and as authoritative records they are placed above all 
 other books or documents. The word smriti means 
 that which is remembered, and is applied to the body 
 of tradition that in the course of time gathered around 
 these venerable records. This body of tradition is au- 
 thoritative, but its authoritativeness is subject to one 
 limitation. Its authoritativeness must be disallowed 
 where there is within its compass a statement inconsis- 
 tent with the spirit or even the letter of what was con- 
 tradistinguished from it as the revelation heard from 
 the lips of the Supreme Spirit. Barring such state- 
 ments, and those in which “ a worldly motive is pat- 
 ent, ” the tradition is to be received as of co-ordinate 
 authority with the Yedas. 
 
 In one of the aphorisms quoted above, the authorita- 
 tiveness of smriti or tradition is affirmed, because the 
 author of the Yedas is also its author. But, properly 
 speaking, the Yedas have no author, and they are 
 therefore declared to be eternal. The eternity of the 
 Yedas is one of the peculiar doctrines of this school, 
 and is connected with its doctrine of the eternity of 
 sound, as a corollary is connected with the proposition 
 from which it is legitimately deduced. It is set forth 
 in the verses immediately following those in which the 
 theory of which it is a counterpart is propounded. We 
 quote these from Dr. Ballantyne’s Fragment : 
 
 “ And the Yedas some declare to be something 
 recent, (because) there are the names of men (in them.) 
 
 “ Because of our seeing uneternal persons (mentioned 
 in the Yedas). 
 
 “ But there has been declared (already) the priority 
 of sound (to any point of time). 
 
270 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 “ The name, (derived from that of some mortal, was 
 given to this or that section of the Yeda) because of 
 his reading it. 
 
 “ But the terms in the text (which seem to be names 
 of men) are common to other objects, and do not desig- 
 nate men. ’ ’ 
 
 These aphorisms affirm the eternity of the Yedas, 
 and refute one or two of the arguments advanced 
 against the doctrine by the champions or followers of 
 the Logical schools. Certain names are found at the 
 heads of certain sections of these records, such as 
 Kathaka, Karma, etc. ; and their appearance in such 
 connection indicates human authorship, and conse- 
 quent^ militates against this peculiar doctrine. Again, 
 there are sentences in the Yedas in which mortals, or 
 “ persons to whom belonged birth and death,” express 
 some wish or breathe some prayer — such as “ Babara, 
 the son of Pravahini, desired,” and “ Kusuruhinda, the 
 son of Uddulaki, desired.” These sentences could not 
 possibly have been penned before these persons were 
 born. These objections are rebutted in a very ingeni- 
 ous way. The persons named at the heads of certain 
 sections are the readers, not the authors, of these sec- 
 tions, while the mortals named or represented as desir- 
 ing are everlasting things, not human beings subject 
 to the law of birth and death. Let us quote the pas- 
 sage in which this piece of exegetical finesse appears : 
 “Although there is the name ‘babara’ or ‘Prava- 
 hini ’ (in the Yeda), yet in the text, the word Pravahini 
 or the like is common — that is, is expressive also of 
 some other thing (than it may appear at first sight to 
 denote). For example, (in the word Pravahini), the 
 prefix Pra implies ‘ excess,’ the word vah signifies 
 ‘motion,’ the final i represents ‘ the agent,’ and thus 
 
TIIE FTJRVA MIMANSA. 
 
 277 
 
 the word signifies mind which moves very fast, and this 
 is without beginning ; and (moreover) the word 
 ‘ Babara ’ is a word imitative of the sound of the mind, 
 so that there is not even a smell of inconsistency.” 
 
 Is not this precisely the way in which mythological 
 heroes are being converted into natural forces and ob- 
 jects by a class of critics in modern Europe ? Here an 
 extract from an article which appeared in the Hindu 
 Patriot years ago may be presented : “ The Mimansa 
 is by far the most important in connection with the 
 religion of the Hindus. Its object is to reconcile the 
 rituals of Hindu worship and the legends of the Puraus 
 with philosophy ; and the success with which the 
 reconcilement has been effected by Jaimini is worthy 
 of the highest praise. To quote an instance from the 
 writings of the Mimansists : ‘ European writers have 
 for a long time, and very justly, condemned the Hindu 
 Sastras for having attributed to Brahma the odious 
 charge of a disgusting incest. The Mimansists show 
 that the whole of it is a mere myth. Brahma is but 
 another name for Prajapati or the sun, and the dawn, 
 which p’recedes sunrise, is poetically and very aptly de- 
 scribed as a fair maiden born of the sun. Therefore, as 
 the sun follows the dawn, it is in poetry described as 
 chasing the maiden ; and since the dawn merges in the 
 sun as soon as the latter has risen above the horizon, 
 the allegory is complete. Other myths have been 
 treated in the same way, and it is no ordinary praise to 
 say that the Indian gymnosophists, some two thousand 
 years ago, adopted a line of philosophical argumenta- 
 tion which would not be unworthy of the greatest 
 German scholars of the present day. ’ ’ ’ 
 
 W e are certainly disposed to give our ancient philos- 
 ophers credit for originating a specious method of ex- 
 
278 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 plaining away the obscenities associated with the Hindu 
 faith, and the more so as it is our intention in this 
 treatise to show that the most ingenious speculations 
 and theories of the day were anticipated in the ancient 
 world in India and in other advanced countries. But 
 it ought always to be borne in mind that it is one thing 
 to explain away the obnoxious features of a book or 
 creed, and another to explain them. Nor must it be 
 forgotten that, after all such features have been ex- 
 plained away as are likely to bend under such handy 
 modes of interpretation, an immense residuum of ob- 
 scenity and filth remains, which no amount of exegetic 
 skill and finesse can clear away. The gain therefore is 
 very little indeed. Besides, what shall we say of the 
 prurient imagination which delighted to clothe ordinary 
 natural phenomena in various putrid shapes of vice, and 
 thereby corrupt the minds and morals of a nation ? 
 
 In the paper on the Mimansa in the “ Sarva-Darsana- 
 Sangraha,” an elaborate argument is presented in sup- 
 port of the eternity of the Yedas ; and in it, as in 
 almost all arguments in Hindu books, we notice a great 
 deal of acuteness in combination with much puerility 
 and sheer nonsense. One of the arguments brought 
 forward by the Mimansakas in favor of the doctrine in 
 question is thus expressed : “ But (asks the Mimansaka) 
 how can the Yeda have been uttered by the incorporeal 
 Parameswara, or God, who has no palate and no 
 organ of speech, and who therefore cannot have pro- 
 nounced the letters ?” “ This objection (answers the 
 
 Naiyayika) is not happy, because, though Parameswara 
 is by nature incorporeal, he can yet assume a body in 
 sport, in order to show kindness to his worshippers. 
 Consequently the arguments in favor of the doctrine 
 that the Veda had no personal author are inconclusive. *’ 
 
THE PURVA MIMANSA. 
 
 279 
 
 The argument on which the eternity of the Vedas is 
 made to hinge is a marvel of futility and inconclusive- 
 ness. Let us here present an extract from the “ Sarva- 
 Darsana-Sangraha” as illustrative of it, and the way in 
 which it was met by the followers of the Nyaya 
 system : “ Well, be it so (say the followers of the 
 Nyaya) ; but how can the Vedas be said to be unde- 
 rived from any personal author, when there is no evi- 
 dence to establish this ? Would you maintain that 
 they have no personal author because, although there is 
 an unbroken line of tradition, there is no remembrance 
 of any author, just as is the case with the soul ? This 
 argument is weak, because the alleged characteristics 
 (unbroken tradition, etc.) are not proved ; for those 
 who hold the human tradition of the Vedas maintain 
 that the line of tradition was interrupted at the time of 
 the dissolution of the universe. And again, what is 
 meant by this assertion that the author is not remem- 
 bered ? Is it (a) that no author is believed, or (b) that 
 no author is remembered ? The first alternative cannot 
 be accepted, since we hold that God is proved to have 
 been the author. Nor can the second, because it can- 
 not stand the test of the following dilemma — viz. , is it 
 meant (a) that no author of the Veda is remembered 
 by some person, or (b) by any person whatever ? The 
 former supposition breaks down, as it would prove too 
 much, since it would apply to such an isolated stanza 
 as “ He who is religious and has overcome pride and 
 anger,’ ’ etc. And the latter supposition is inadmissi- 
 ble, since it would be impossible for any person who 
 was not omniscient to know that no author of the 
 V eda was recollected by any person whatever. More- 
 over, there is actual proof that the Veda had a personal 
 author, for we argue as follows : “ The sentences of 
 
280 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the Vecla must have originated from a personal author, 
 since they have the character of sentences like those of 
 Kalidasa and other writers. And again, the sentences 
 of the Veda have been composed by a competent per- 
 son, since, while they possess authority, they have at 
 the same time the character of sentences like those of 
 Manu and other sages.” 
 
 There is one reasoning in these lines which will ap- 
 pear dark to a reader not versed in the philosophical 
 literature of India — the reasoning with pointed reference 
 to the stanza quoted. The meaning is that the author 
 of that stanza, though not generally known, might have 
 been known to some person. The argument that it is 
 necessary to be omniscient in order to prove a universal 
 negative, such as no person ever remembered the 
 author of any of the books of the V eda, shows a meas- 
 ure of penetration scarcely appreciated in the present 
 age, when it has been made familiar by many a philo- 
 sophical writer. 
 
 Is the body of tradition called smriti also eternal like 
 the V edas ? The aphorism quoted above — that which 
 ascribes the Vedas and the smritis to a “ common” 
 authorship — would seem at first sight to justify an 
 affirmative reply. The smriti , however, is by univer- 
 sal consent attributed to human authorship, to holy 
 sages deeply read in the Vedas. It consists, properly 
 speaking, of three parts : the first, in which Vedic 
 truths and precepts are found epitomized and classified; 
 the second, in which matter supplementary and elucida- 
 tory is embodied ; and the third, in which statements 
 occur either in direct contravention of some truth or 
 precept revealed, or apparently fitted to set forth the 
 selfishness or cupidity of the writers. The first part is 
 of course to be accepted in all its entireness, in conse- 
 
THE FURY A MIMANSA. 
 
 281 
 
 quence of its perfect harmony with revelation ; and the 
 second part on the supposition that it would be corrob- 
 orated if the entire revelation assumed eternally exist- 
 ent were within reach ; but the third part is to be re- 
 jected without ceremony. 
 
 Then there are other books which may be accepted 
 as authoritative only so far as they agree with Script- 
 ure and reason — viz., the Kalpa- Sutra and the Griiiya- 
 Grantha, etc. They are, however, not to be considered 
 as parts of revelation, and they must be placed far below 
 the Yedas and the smritis in authority and importance. 
 But as they are the productions of men conversant in 
 the Yedic literature, they may and should be consulted, 
 and treated moreover with some degree of reverence. 
 
 Established usages, customs, and institutions should 
 not be despised in our attempts to ascertain our duty. 
 These are of two kinds — universal and local. The lat- 
 ter, or festivals merely local, “ such as the Holoka 
 (Huh), or the spring festival in the East, the worship 
 of local tutelary deities hereditarily by families in the 
 South, the racing of oxen on the full moon of Jyeslititha 
 in the Horth, and the adoration of tribes of deities in 
 the West,” are not to be regarded as of much con- 
 sequence. 
 
 The great object of the Mimansa Philosophy is the 
 knowledge or ascertainment of duty, its watchword 
 being “ Duty-inquisitiveness” in contradistinction to 
 (e Brahma-inquisitiveness,” the watchword of the 
 Yedanta school. The very first aphorism of the book 
 under review makes this manifest : “ Yext, therefore, 
 (O student that hast attained thus far), a desire to know 
 Duty (Dharma) (is to be entertained by thee).” To 
 ascertain this, to know our duty, we have to consult 
 these sources of information, the Yedas, the srnriti, the 
 
282 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Kalpa-Sutras, etc., and the established customs and 
 institutions of a universal stamp, not merely of local 
 importance. These sources of knowledge ought to be 
 consulted as pointing to duty rather than to a Being 
 from whom duty derives its sanctity and authority or 
 imperativeness. The Mimansakas as a rule thrust God 
 into the background, and some of them even go so far 
 as to deny His existence. Pandit Nehemiah Hilkanta 
 Goreh, in his very able treatise, ‘ ‘ A Rational Refuta- 
 tion of the Hindu Philosophical Systems,” thus sum- 
 marizes the principles of this school : 
 
 “ It is not the design of the Mimansa, as it is of the 
 other systems, to consider bondage, and emancipation, 
 and soul, and what is not soul, but simply to treat of 
 the precepts of the Yeda, and of its cultus ; and I do 
 not purpose examining it as touching these heads. Its 
 points, which are here specially deserving of mention, 
 are as follows : First, it repudiates the idea of a God, 
 and, in the second place, it contends that the Yeda was 
 originated by no one, but has always existed. The in- 
 junctions, inhibitions, and good and evil fruits of works 
 rehearsed in it, are held indeed to be true. But the 
 accounts of the divinities given in the Yeda are reputed 
 to be false, and are written solely for the purpose of 
 magnifying works. With regard to this matter, the 
 surprising notions about to be noted are proposed. It is 
 recorded in the Yeda that Elysium is obtained by sacri- 
 fice. A n d a sacrificial observance consists in offering 
 in fire, clarified butter, flesh, etc., to Indra, Yanina, 
 Agni, and other divinities, with the recitation and 
 reiteration of hymns of praise from the Yeda, and 
 laudation of the exploits and virtues of the aforesaid 
 divinities. How, the Mimansakas assert that Indra 
 and those other divinities have no existence whatever, 
 
THE PURVA MIMANSA. 
 
 283 
 
 and that the prowess ascribed to them is entirely ficti- 
 tious. Nevertheless, there is such a wonderful potency 
 in the falling of offerings into the fire, in their name, 
 after the manner prescribed in the Yeda, in uttering 
 the syllables of the songs that hymn them, as to insure 
 attainment of celestial abodes.” 
 
 The learned Pandit does not quote a single text from 
 the Mimansa Sutras in support of his summary, and 
 specially in support of his assertion that the Miman- 
 sakas “ repudiate the idea of a God.” In a foot-note 
 he gives his reason in these words : “To name one 
 Mimansaka, Parthasarathi Misra, in the first chapter 
 of the Sastra Dipika, labors at length to overset the 
 arguments adducible to prove the existence of Deity.” 
 And with reference to his assertion that the gods men- 
 tioned in the Yedas, Indra, Yaruna, etc., are regarded 
 as myths rather than real persons, he quotes the fol- 
 lowing verse from a manuscript called Bhatta-Dipika : 
 “ Therefore it is not by any means to be acknowledged 
 that a god is an embodied form, and so forth ; but he 
 is to be regarded as ' a mere verbal expression of the 
 Yeda. As for the thing signified by that expression, 
 it is held to be, according to the expression, some sen- 
 tient being or unsentient object — not endowed, how- 
 ever, with a figure, etc., i.e. purely notional. But in 
 devotion and so forth, mere meditation on him, in pict- 
 uring to one’s self the unreal as real, is to be observed. 
 Such is the gist of the doctrine of Jaimini here consid- 
 ered. But, by the very repetition of this blasphemy, 
 my tongue contracts defilement — from which the re- 
 membrance of Hari is the only safeguard.” 
 
 The atheistic feature of the Mimansa as it now exists 
 in its fully developed form is certainly not inconsistent 
 with its original principles, and it perhaps grew out of 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 281 
 
 them when they were pushed to their legitimate conse- 
 quences. It was not brought into bold relief, and 
 perhaps not definitely apprehended at the time of 
 Jaimini, whose Sutras simply throw God and the Yedic 
 pantheon of gods and goddesses into the background. 
 The worshipper, according to these, does not need 
 either him or them to stir up devotion within him, or 
 to pave his way to the speedy realization of his object. 
 His attention is withdrawn from them, and concen- 
 trated on the work he has to do, and he is assured that 
 that work has an inherent potency, and will bear its 
 fruits, good or bad, in its own tune. Whether this 
 innate tendency is dependent on an econonvp unalter- 
 ably established by God, or whether it is entirely inde- 
 pendent of the power, will, or the decrees of God— these 
 questions the Mimansa Sutras do not meet in the face 
 or attempt to solve. But their tone is in favor of the 
 position that work derives its efficacy, its mysterious 
 power, from itself, rather than from a Being or force 
 apart from it, and that it would bear fruit even if God 
 and the array of beings called gods and goddesses did 
 not exist, or existed as mere ciphers rather than living, 
 working agents. There is therefore no use of looking 
 up to them or making them objects of contemplation, 
 and asking them to hear our prayers and answer them. 
 Let them live, if they live at all, behind the veil, and 
 let us perform conscientiously the work which will bear 
 its own fruits, whether they exist or not. 
 
 This mysterious power is called Apurva. Colebrookc 
 makes the following observations on it : “ The subject 
 which most engages attention throughout the Mimansa, 
 recurring at every turn, is the invisible or spiritual 
 operation of an act of merit. The action ceases, yet 
 the consequence does not immediately ensue. A virtue 
 
THE PUKVA MIMANSA. 
 
 285 
 
 mean time subsists unseen, but efficacious to connect 
 the consequence with its past and remote cause, and to 
 bring about at a distant period, or in another world, 
 the relative effect.” 
 
 It is to be observed that this mysterious potency is 
 acknowledged in almost all schools of Indian Philoso- 
 phy, and it is the characteristic feature of Buddhism, to 
 which the Mimansa is favorable in some respects and 
 hostile in others. Like it, the Mimansa throws God 
 and His worship into the background, and renders His 
 existence superfluous by maintaining the efficacy of 
 work, if not its creative power. And like it, the 
 Mimansa seems to maintain the eternity of the world, 
 or its successive evolutions and involutions in cycles, 
 beginningless and endless. But ivhile Buddhism de- 
 clares a war of extermination against the doctrine of 
 sacrifice, the Mimansa gives the greatest prominence to 
 it— upholds, enjoins, and exalts it in varieties of ways, 
 through varieties of express declarations, and by the 
 varieties of laudations of which it is made the favored 
 theme. Sacrifice, in short, is the duty enjoined in the 
 Mimansa, and paradise is the end proposed. 
 
 A sacrifice, according to the Mimansa, is a thing or 
 animal voluntarily and cheerfully offered. Sacrifices 
 are, therefore, of two kinds — bloodless and bloody. 
 The sacrifices connected with the soma-plant ( asclepias 
 ocida ) and the exhilarating juice expressed out of it, 
 being more or less like simple libations of wine, are 
 examples of bloodless sacrifice, as also simple oblations 
 called ishtis , and burnt-offerings called homa, consist- 
 ing of ghi or clarified butter, and other things thrown 
 into a fire raked up into a flame. The bloody sacri flees 
 of the Yedic Age, such as the asmci-medha , the horse- 
 sacrifice ; the pasu-medlxa , or the sacrifice of smaller 
 
286 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 animals, goats, sheep, etc. ; the nar-bali , or human 
 sacrifices, had received a check from the spread of 
 Buddhism, and were less common in the age of the 
 Mimansa. According to its teaching, while all these 
 are helps, paradise is secured by the model sacrifice, 
 called Jyotistoma , which is a permanent sacrifice, and 
 the complicated ceremony connected with which must 
 be performed by a Hindu at least once in his lifetime. 
 With reference to this sacrifice, let us present two ex- 
 tracts from Mr. Ivunte’s serial (Ho. for October, 1877) : 
 “ Jyotistoma is a big model sacrifice. Agnistoma, 
 Atyagni stoma, Ukthya, Sodeslii, Atiratra, Aptiryama, 
 and Yajapaya — these are the seven big sacrifices or 
 sansthas. They are modifications of Jyotistoma, the 
 model sacrifice.” 
 
 “ The Yaidikacharjya observes : ‘ It must not be 
 stated that the seven sacrifices and the Jyotistoma are 
 not all model sacrifices. Only the Jyotistoma sacrifice 
 is the model sacrifice, and the seven sacrifices are its 
 modifications.’ Baudhacliarjya, you will ask, why 
 such a distinction should be made ? Listen, then, to 
 what I have to say. The Jyotistoma sacrifice is a per- 
 manent and obligatory sacrifice, and is distinguished 
 from occasional or optional sacrifices. Every Ary a 
 must in his lifetime perform the Jyotistoma sacrifice. 
 The Jyotistoma sacrifice is not performed for accom- 
 plishing any human desire. He that seeks to obtain 
 heaven ought to perform the Jyotistoma sacrifice.” 
 
 This great sacrifice is offered twice every month at 
 the full and change of the moon, and it consists of vari- 
 ous parts — principal, subordinate, and those subsidiary 
 to the subordinate. Hot only does the whole sacrifice 
 exercise a mysterious and unseen influence, but each of 
 the subordinate and subsidiary parts has its peculiar 
 
THE PUltVA MIMANSA. 
 
 287 
 
 efficacy ; and they all combined prepare the soul for a 
 prolonged season of enjoyment in paradise. The 
 “ Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha” thus speaks of the efficacy 
 of each of the parts, principal or subordinate : ‘ ‘ These, 
 however, the new-moon and full-moon sacrifices, only 
 produce their unseen effect, which is the principal 
 apurva , by means of the various minor effects or sub- 
 ordinate apurvas, produced by the various subordinate 
 parts of the whole ceremony. ”... 
 
 It ought here to be mentioned that a mysterious 
 efficacy is attributed to the mere reading of the Y edas, 
 the chanting of the hymns, the repetition of certain mys- 
 tic words and syllables, as om , etc. , and the utterance 
 of certain prayers and imprecations. It is not necessary 
 to carry with us an intelligent appreciation of the 
 varied parts of this most complex ceremony, or to un- 
 derstand the hymns, chants, prayers, and exorcisms 
 connected with it. The bare repetition of them, even 
 when accompanied with an utter failure to comprehend 
 their meaning or keep in view the varied ends they are 
 intended to subserve, is enough to secure some degree, 
 if not the fulness, of the merit promised. A great deal 
 of care is taken to insure correct pronunciation and in- 
 tonation, but merit is not withheld even where the 
 words are mispronounced and the tones misapplied. A 
 more complete system of ritualism in its worst form it 
 is perhaps impossible to find apart from these records ! 
 
 But was self-immolation practised in the early times 
 of which the Sutras present so vivid a picture ? The 
 various kinds of religious suicide with which the student 
 of Indian history is most familiar — such as widows burn- 
 ing themselves on the funeral pyres of their deceased 
 husbands, or men drowning themselves in sacred rivers 
 and seas, or burying themselves alive, or throwing 
 
288 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 themselves headlong from precipices, or having them- 
 selves crushed underneath the wheels of a huge car — 
 were unknown. The only species of self-immolation 
 practised was that exemplified by the Indian devotee 
 Calanus, who accompanied Alexander’s army to Baby- 
 lon, and who, when ripe for immediate translation into 
 heaven, had a funeral pyre made and set on flame, 
 cheerfully mounted it, and had himself burned on it. 
 As has already been said, the Brahmin anxious to 
 secure extraordinary merit divided his life into four 
 parts, devoting the first to studentship, the second to 
 the duties of a householder, the third to those of a 
 hermit, and the fourth and last to those of a mendi- 
 cant. But before the last act of the drama was played 
 out, he burned himself alive, and passed into glory 
 through a path less tedious than that of disease and 
 death. Suicide was considered in India, as in other 
 lands demoralized by philosophy falsely so called, not 
 merely not censurable, but positively praiseworthy, at 
 least under particular circumstances ! 
 
 The Purva Mimansa has nothing directly to do with 
 the great subject of the schools, the emancipation of 
 the soul from the bonds of ignorance. It is not, how- 
 ever, wholly unconnected with that blessed state, as 
 the initiatory or preparatory work, without which com- 
 plete deliverance is unattainable, is the grand theme of 
 its dissertations. A devotee must pass through two 
 distinct stages before the liberation of his ignorance- 
 bound spirit can be an accomplished fact, or the sum- 
 mum bonum is realized. These are the Karma-Kand 
 and the Gyan -Kernel, the stage of Duty and the stage 
 of Knowledge, the Department of Works and the De- 
 partment of Contemplation. The exercises connected 
 with the initiatory stage are set forth in the Mimansa, 
 
THE PUBVA MIMANSA. 
 
 289 
 
 while those connected with the higher stage are set 
 forth in the Yedanta, which, therefore, is as decidedly 
 •the counterpart of this school as the Yoga is the coun- 
 terpart of the Sankhya. The reward promised in the 
 Mimansa to a faithful discharge of the duties enjoined 
 therein is only a temporary season of bliss in paradise 
 followed by a renewed life ; but ultimate emancipation 
 from the thraldom of transmigration must be attained 
 through exercises of a loftier order. 
 
 It is desirable, before taldng leave of this school, to 
 raise one important question : Has the Mimansa noth- 
 ing to do with worship ? It certainly has, the Karma- 
 Hand being divided into two subsidiary departments — 
 the Karma-Kand exclusively so called, and the ITpa- 
 sana-Kand, Duty and Worship. It is not, however, 
 necessary, according to its teaching, to have a god or 
 a pantheon of gods and goddesses to enforce the one 
 and render the other practicable. Elaborate forms are 
 prescribed, along with prayers, hymns, chants, impre- 
 cations, deprecations, incantations, and exorcisms ; and 
 if these are carefully attended to and rightly observed, 
 the preparatory work is completed and the reward 
 promised is insured. The champions of the Mimansa 
 do not rise up to the level of the progressive scientists 
 of the day, who maintain that no worship is needed be- 
 sides the performance of one’s own duty to society and 
 a calm contemplation of the order of nature. They 
 maintain the paramount necessity of devotional and 
 ritualistic observances ; and they act very wisely in 
 throwing such abstractions as the impersonal God of 
 Hindu Philosophy, and such phantasms as Cosmos and 
 Primal Force, into the background, together with deities 
 who are monsters either of cruelty or vice. How many 
 who believe in a personal God and in His brightest 
 
290 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 revelation in Christ Jesus look upon their mill-horse 
 method of going round a cycle of lifeless ceremonies, 
 with no thought beyond their stated return and mo- 
 notonous observance, as enough to make us happy here, 
 and pave our way to heavenly bliss ! 
 
CHAPTER X. 
 
 TEE VEDANTA SYSTEM, OK HINDU PANTHEISM. 
 
 How we come to the last of the systems called ortho- 
 dox, the Uttara Mimansa, or the Vedanta. The order 
 in which the systems were elaborated, one after an- 
 other, cannot possibly be set forth ; but the first and 
 last links of the chain may, as lias already been said, 
 be fixed with tolerable certainty. The systems began 
 with materialism of the rankest type, and terminated in 
 absolute pantheism. The Sankhya, with its apparent 
 dualism but real materialistic monism, was decidedly 
 the first of the varied forms in which orthodox specula- 
 tion appeared in ancient India, and its claim to ortho- 
 doxy was substantiated by the fact that its champions 
 appealed to the Vedas in support even of its most ob- 
 noxious theories. The Yoga system, its counterpart, 
 silenced popular clamor by adding to its admitted enti- 
 ties a god as passive, quiescent, and useless as the soul 
 posited by it. The atomic theory was then propounded 
 by the schools called Analytic, the Xaiyayika, and 
 Vaiseshika schools ; and creation was traced, not to 
 the quiescent and useless God, whose existence was 
 admitted by their champions ; not to the human soul, 
 equally quiescent and useless in their estimation, but to 
 an unseen, mysterious force called Adrishta, the accu- 
 mulated merit and demerit, or the work of all the past 
 stages of existence. The consequence of these schemes 
 of thought was, and could not but be, the prevalence 
 
292 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of a species of scepticism unfavorable, if not avowedly 
 hostile, to the popular faith ; and against this really, if 
 not avowedly, antagonistic force or influence a reaction 
 was brought about by the speculations of Jaimini, the 
 father of resuscitated ritualism. 
 
 Inchan Philosophy was in its inception and early prog- 
 ress a reaction against ritualism. The simple worship 
 of the forces and agencies of nature in the compara- 
 tively pure Vedic age had been supplanted by a cum- 
 brous system of ritualism ; and sacrifices, great and 
 small, each consisting of a regular paraphernalia of 
 ceremonial observances, accompanied with varieties of 
 hymns and chants, imprecations and deprecations, in- 
 cantations and exorcisms, washings and purifications, 
 and presided over by accredited representatives of a 
 hierarchy almost deified, had taken the place of prayers 
 and songs, rhapsodical indeed, but on the whole natural 
 and impassioned. But mummeries and tomfooleries, 
 however thoroughly systematized and sanctified by 
 religion, could only cast a veil over the important prob- 
 lems of life, but not burke them ; might bury the spirit 
 of inquiry for a time, but could not extinguish it. 
 And, therefore, when this system of externalism ap- 
 peared in its most obnoxious forms, a reaction was 
 realized, and rationalism made its appearance in forms 
 more or less attractive. 
 
 But rationalism is as wild and unmanageable as ritual- 
 ism, and it developed in India into a series of forms as 
 obnoxious as the types of ritualism from which it had 
 derived its existence. It is very common to laugh at a 
 person who attaches a great deal of importance not 
 only to certain prayers and hymns, but to the manner 
 in which the prayers are said and the hymns are 
 chanted ; who looks upon certain turnings of the face 
 
THE VEDANTA SYSTEM. 
 
 293 
 
 and postures of the body as peculiarly meritorious, and 
 others as fraught with mischievous consequences ; who 
 regards the proper intonation of certain mystical words 
 and syllables as fitted to send away impure spirits, and 
 bring in those whose presence is a source of strength 
 and consolation ; and who, in a word, converts religion 
 into a scheme of ceremonialism and casuistry, mimicry 
 and masquerade, hollow professions and wrong prac- 
 tices. But it should not be forgotten that our risibility 
 is equally stimulated by the absurdities into which 
 those thinkers are betrayed who find it hard to ascribe 
 creation to an intelligent voluntary Being, but exceed- 
 ingly easy to trace it to blind chance or an inscrutable 
 force ; who throw the Creator into the background, if 
 not into the limbo of non-existence, and at the same time 
 prescribe devotion to a phantom like the genius of hu- 
 manity, or the spirit of progress, or the shade of liberty, 
 or the beauty of womanhood ; who wipe away the 
 essential distinction between virtue and vice, and then 
 exhort us to be self-sacrificing in obedience to a code of 
 morality framed by selfishness ; and who, like Hindu 
 philosophers, recommend austerity, penance, and ascetic 
 contemplation, while refusing to recognize any being 
 higher than self, and reducing that self to the level of 
 inanimate matter by depriving it of its intelligence and 
 instinctive or volitional activity. If ritualism has its 
 absurdities, rationalism has its also ! 
 
 Rationalism in India developed into varied grotesque 
 and absurd forms, and its extravagance brought on a 
 reaction against it. This reaction was headed by 
 Jaimini, the founder of the Purva Mimansa school, 
 who strove successfully to draw away public attention 
 from the unsolvable problems of existence, and concen- 
 trate it on the practical portions of revelation — the por- 
 
294 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 tions in which human duty is pointed out in the clearest 
 terms possible. lie revived the age of the Brahmanas, 
 and applied to those hoary documents a system of ex- 
 egesis which he had elaborated with great care. The 
 question of the origin of the Yedas and their authorita- 
 tiveness did not engage his attention so thoroughly as 
 the principles involved in their correct interpretation. 
 "With unflinching logic he applied his own canons of in- 
 terpretation to their miscellaneous contents, and suc- 
 ceeded in evolving from them a system of ritualism 
 even more complicated than that from which the 
 rationalism of the Upanishads had been a relief. 
 
 But ritualism revived and carried to excess bore its 
 fruit, and rationalism once more made its appearance. 
 It appeared at first in its less repellent forms, and in- 
 stead of ostensibly or even really striving to overturn 
 the sacred Scriptures, it freely admitted their authori- 
 tativeness, and professed unreserved veneration for 
 them. It modestly represented its great work as 
 simple interpretation of its contents, not their modifica- 
 tion or revision. Jaimini had applied certain canons of 
 interpretation to the earlier portions of the Yedas, the 
 Mantras, and the Brahmanas ; and these had now to 
 be applied with logical force to the later portion, the 
 Upanishads. The whole of revelation must be accepted 
 and correctly interpreted, not merely a part, or the part 
 suited to our inclinations and tastes. The liymnology 
 and the ritual had been made the subjects of elaborate 
 exegetical dissertations, and thus far a great work had 
 been accomplished. But something remained to be 
 done. The concluding portions of these venerable 
 records had not been analyzed and explained ; and as 
 they, constituting part and parcel of revelation, could 
 not be dispensed with or neglected without a serious 
 
THE VEDAHTA SYSTE1T. 
 
 295 
 
 and irreparable loss, somebody must undertake the task 
 of elucidating their contents, as Jaimini had done in 
 the case of the earlier portions. 
 
 The great man who undertook this important task, 
 and who is honored and revered as the head of the 
 Vedantic school, was Badarayuna, or Yyas. He is 
 called Yeda-Yyas ; and a legend is preserved fitted to 
 show the propriety of his assumption of this title, or 
 ascription of it to him by general consent. He had in 
 a former life made himself ripe for beatitude by aus- 
 terity and meditation ; but he was sent back to the 
 world to do a work which no other person could do — 
 viz., that of compiling the Yedas, with which his name 
 is inseparably associated. A great many other legends 
 are related in the sacred books of the Hindus illustra- 
 tive of his greatness and manifold labors. In the 
 Purans he is said to have been an incarnation of 
 Yishnu, a fact which no amount of ingenuity can 
 reconcile to the notion of his having in a former life 
 worked up his way to complete emancipation, and 
 being sent back to perform a work of love when almost 
 in the arms of beatitude ; though Colebrooke sees no 
 difficulty in effecting the reconciliation. If all that is 
 said about him is reliable, he seems to have been the 
 most voluminous writer the country ever saw. He is 
 said to have composed the Mahabharat, written several 
 of the Purans, compiled the Yedas, and indited the 
 Sutras in which the principles of the Yedantic school 
 are set forth. But it is to be observed that the state- 
 ments which make him the author of such a hetero- 
 geneous mass of literature ascribe to him a great deal 
 of versatihty indeed, but very little of consistency and 
 of sound sense. It is by no means possible to reconcile 
 to one another the books he is said to have penned, or 
 
29G 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 to evolve out of them a consistent scheme of thought 
 or principle ; and therefore the supposition that there 
 were several persons of this name, who lived and wrote 
 at different times and under diverse circumstances, is 
 the only one that appears tenable. 
 
 The great work of Yyas, with which we have to do 
 in this paper, is the Saririka or Brahma Sutras. This 
 work consists of four books, each subdivided into four 
 chapters. The entire number of aphorisms thus classi- 
 fied is 555, and the number of topics treated of or sec- 
 tions is 191. In bulk, therefore, it is left behind by 
 the work of Jaimini ; but in the loftiness of its themes 
 and depth of its philosophy it surpasses its rival ; while 
 in logical precision and force both the documents are 
 on a par and equally deserving of the praise bestowed 
 upon the Mimansa Sutras by Max Muller. 
 
 The Brahma Sutras, however, are exceptionally ob- 
 scure in their phraseology and statements, and scholias 
 upon scholias have been written to elucidate their con- 
 tents. The greatest name among its ancient scholiasts 
 or commentators is Baudhayana, a title signifying that 
 the bearer of it was a religious devotee entitled to pe- 
 culiar reverence. But in modern times his exegetical 
 dissertations are rarely consulted, they having been 
 superseded by the works of the celebrated scholiast 
 Sankar Acharya, who lived about seven hundred years 
 after the birth of Christ, and whose comments on the 
 most important of the Upanishads and on the Saririka 
 Sutras are masterpieces of acute thought and philo- 
 sophical reasoning. 
 
 The first chapter of the first book of the Sutras, and 
 four aphorisms of the second were translated by the 
 Rev. K. M. Banerjea, LL.D., some years ago, along with 
 Sankar’s comments. It is to be regretted that Dr. 
 
THE VEDANTA SYSTEM. 
 
 297 
 
 Banerjea, the greatest native scholar in and out of the 
 native church, has not been able to continue this great 
 work of his. A fragment also was translated by Dr. 
 Ballantyne ; but we have failed in our efforts to pro- 
 cure a copy of his translation. Mr. Kunte, of Ahmed- 
 abad, has, in his serial, Saddarsana-Chintanilca, trans- 
 lated all the four chapters of the first book ; but he has, 
 instead of proceeding further, begun the work of trans- 
 lating the Yoga Sutras of Batanjali. His comments or 
 notes are very valuable so far as they go, inasmuch as 
 they embody the sentiments, not merely of the school 
 of Sankar Acharya, but of the rival school set up in 
 opposition to it by Ramanuja, who discarded absolute 
 pantheism and maintained the existence of three enti- 
 ties — the ego, the non-ego, and the infinite. These 
 translations we shall lay under contribution in our 
 treatment of the subject, and the copious extracts 
 presented from all the chapters of all the books of this 
 standard work in Colebrooke’s celebrated essay on the 
 Vedanta. 
 
 In treating of the Vedantic system, as perhaps of 
 every other system of philosophy, a broad line of dis- 
 tinction ought to drawn between its earlier forms and 
 later developments. A system of philosophy appears 
 at first in a crude, undigested form, very likely in a 
 series of unconnected aphorisms or statements. As it 
 makes progress its different parts appear loosely joined 
 or inconsistent with one another, and varieties of ques- 
 tions with reference to its essential truths and outer 
 garment of diction and phraseology are raised by the 
 inquisitive mind. To reconcile apparent and real in- 
 consistencies, to explain obscure statements and lop off 
 excrescences, new theories are formed and new specula- 
 tions are allowed to run high. And in process of time 
 
298 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 new elements of truth are superadded and fresh expla- 
 nations given ; and the original system appears in a 
 new form, with its inner life matured and even modi- 
 fied, and its outer garment renovated. And therefore 
 the historian of the system in question cannot do justice 
 to it without discriminating between its original prin- 
 ciples and later accretions. 
 
 It is to be feared that such discretion is not shown 
 by our learned and pious brother, Pandit Kehemiah 
 Goreh, in his excellent work entitled “ A Rational Refu- 
 tation of the Hindu Philosophical Systems.” lie pre- 
 sents his views of the systems with perspicuity and 
 force, hut he scarcely quotes from the original Sutras 
 or aphorisms in support of his statements. His foot- 
 notes are rich in citations, though the body of his work 
 is singularly free from them ; but the books he lays 
 under contribution are as a rule not the original works 
 of the founders of the systems — the Sutras of Kapila or 
 Patanjali or Gautama or Kanada or Jaimini or Bada- 
 rayana — but later documents, of great authority indeed, 
 but not such as are entitled to the honor ascribed or 
 the importance attached to the original sources of in- 
 formation. This is specially the case in the large por- 
 tion of his great work devoted to a treatment of the 
 Yedanta system. 
 
 The learned Pandit devotes about half of his work to 
 a very able exposition of the principles and errors asso- 
 ciated with the Yedanta system. But he does not sus- 
 tain his views of the system by quotations from the 
 Brahma Sutras, which are entirely thrown into the 
 shade in his very able disquisitions. He lays under 
 contribution such books as the Yedanta Paribhasa and 
 the Yedanta Sar, and such manuscripts as the Sank- 
 shepa Saririka and Sastra Dipika. His object does 
 
THE VEDANTA. SYSTEM. 
 
 299 
 
 not perhaps require a reference to or analysis of the 
 original Sutras ; but as he advocates a view different 
 from that ordinarily held and presented of Y edantism, 
 it is a pity that his sentiments are not corroborated by 
 quotations from the acknowledged writings of its 
 founder. 
 
 The Pandit in the first of the two scholarly pam- 
 phlets he has very recently published on “ Theism and 
 Christianity” goes so far as to affirm : “ First, I must 
 remove a great mistake which is generally made, that 
 of considering Vedantism as identical with pantheism. 
 They are not quite the same.” Why ? Because Yedant- 
 ism attributes a species of existence, called Yyavarika 
 or practical, to the external world. In the first chap- 
 ter of the third section of this great work, “A .Rational 
 Ref utation, ” etc., the section devoted to an analysis of 
 Yedantism and an exposure of the errors associated 
 with it, he treats of the three sorts of existence main- 
 tained by the Yedantins, and he quotes in one of his 
 foot-notes the follow ing verse from the Yedanta- 
 Paribhasa to set forth what they are : “ Existence is 
 of three sorts — true ( paramarthika ), practical ( vya/oa - 
 rika ), and apparent ( pratibhashika ). True existence is 
 that of Brahma ; practical, that of ether, etc. ; appar- 
 ent, that of nacrine silver and the like.” But the 
 Pandit must admit that these three sorts of existence 
 are nowhere found in the Upanishads and the Brahma 
 Sutras, the original documents of the Yedantic system, 
 and that there is no ground for denying that the form 
 of faith unfolded in them is pantheism. 
 
 Ray, the Pandit himself admits as much when in the 
 pamphlet alluded to he says : “If any one would say 
 that this phase of Yedantism, which sets forth the 
 theories of Maya, of the falseness of the world, and 
 
300 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 different kinds of existence, is not found clearly enunci- 
 ated in tlie Upanishads, but is rather a later develop- 
 ment, then I would answer, that if you would appeal to 
 that only which seems expressly stated in the Upan- 
 ishads, you will not mend the matter. For if, accord- 
 ing to the literal rendering of their words, Brahma 
 itself has become everything in reality — man, beast, 
 vfood, stone, yea, good men as well as most vicious 
 men — then Brahma’s omnipotence, omniscience, purity, 
 etc. are changed into feebleness, ignorance, impurity, 
 and even into inanimate substance. And it is, as I said 
 before, to save the Vedanta from this absurdity that 
 the Vedanta doctors explain its teaching by the theo- 
 ries of Maya and different kinds of existence.” 
 
 In this passage the Pandit virtually yields the point, 
 and admits that Vedantism, as taught in the Upan- 
 ishads, is pantheism, and implies a real change of the 
 divine into material substance, and the forms or modes 
 in which both appear. Vow the Brahma Sutras revive 
 the religion of the Upanishads as thoroughly as the 
 Sutras of Jaimini revive the religion of the other parts 
 of the Vedas, the Mantras, and the Brahmanas. And 
 whatever is predicated of the scheme of thought de- 
 veloped in the Upanishads must of needs be predicated 
 of that unfolded in the Sutras of Badarayuna. 
 
 We shall develop the system in this paper as it orig- 
 inally stood by quotations from the Saririka Sutras, 
 and reserve our remarks on its later developments for a 
 separate paper, of which we shall make the Vedanta 
 Sar, recently translated by Major Jacob, our text-book. 
 
 V T hat ground have we for stating that this is the last 
 of the systems of philosophy called orthodox ? In the 
 first place, let it be observed that all the other systems 
 are referred to in the Brahma Sutras and combated. 
 
THE VEDANTA SYSTEM. 
 
 301 
 
 The Sankhya cosmogony is adopted in its salient feat- 
 ures, but varieties of reasons are brought forward to 
 show that its Prakriti or Pradhau could not possibly 
 have been the creator of the universe. In the very 
 first chapter of the first book an attempt is made to 
 prove that the source of existence in its multifarious 
 forms could not possibly have been an unintelligent, 
 unsentient material form, and that the Sankhyas have 
 got their notions simply by perverting the Scriptures. 
 The atomic theory of Ivanada is made the subject of 
 many a denunciatory argument, while Jaimini is ex- 
 pressly named in the following aphorism : “ The opin- 
 ion of Jaimini is, The statement that the Supreme 
 Spirit is directly to be worshipped does not conflict 
 (with any text).” 
 
 But Badarayuna is also named in Jaimini’s Sutras as 
 well as in this. That he is named in his own Sutras 
 the following aphorism will show : “In the opinion of 
 Badarayuna, there are beings above man who have a 
 title to the contemplation of Brahma, because this is 
 possible.” On this apparent anomaly Colebrooke 
 makes the following remarks : 
 
 “ The name of Badarayuna frequently recurs in .the 
 Sutras ascribed to him, as does that of Jaimini, the 
 reputed author of the Purna Mimansa, in his. I have 
 already remarked in the preceding essay on the men- 
 tion of an author by his name, and in the third person, 
 in his own work. It is nothing unusual in the litera- 
 ture or science of the other nations ; but a Hindu com- 
 mentator will account for it by presuming the actual 
 composition to be that of a disciple recording the words 
 of his teacher.” 
 
 Badarayuna accepts the six proofs or sources of 
 knowledge admitted in the Purva-Mimansa school — • 
 
302 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 viz., Perception, Inference, Comparison, Presumption, 
 Revelation, or Testimony and Privation. Revelation, 
 however, is the only proof most thoroughly utilized in 
 his Sutras, and the others are brought forward only to 
 prop up its declarations, his avowed object being to 
 revive the philosophy embodied in it, not to initiate a 
 new scheme of thought. Badarayuna also adopts 
 •Jaimini’s method of treating of a subject or “ topic,” 
 which is represented as consisting of five parts — (1) the 
 subject or matter to be explained, (2) the doubt or ques- 
 tion concerning it, (3) the plausible solution or primd- 
 facie argument, (4) the answer or demonstrated conclu- 
 sion and true solution, (5) the pertinence or relevancy 
 and connection.” 
 
 It is superfluous to say that Badarayuna admits the 
 canonicity and authoritativeness of the Vedas, as 
 Jaimini does. He also adopts Jaimini's doctrine of the 
 eternity of sound and the eternity of the Veda. This 
 is distinctly stated by Colebrooke in the following pas- 
 sage : “ In the course of this disquisition the noted 
 question of the eternity of sound, of articulate sound in 
 particular, is mooted and examined. It is a favorite 
 topic in both Mimansas, being intimately connected 
 with that of the eternity of the Veda or revelation ac- 
 knowledged by them.” 
 
 But there are aphorisms in which the Veda is ex- 
 pressly traced to the authorship of God or Brahma. 
 The very third aphorism of the first book is a proof of 
 this statement : “ Because it is the cause of the Sastra, 
 (or) because the Sastra is its manifesting cause.” San- 
 kara in commenting on these words says : “ Brahma is 
 the cause of the great Sastra, the Rig Veda, etc., sup- 
 ported by numerous (subsidiary) systems of science ; 
 bringing to light, like a lamp, all objects, and being, as 
 
THE VEDANTA SYSTEM. 
 
 303 
 
 it were, all-knowing. Indeed, of sack a Sastra, defined 
 as the Big Yeda, etc., endowed with the quality of all- 
 knowledge, the production cannot be from any other 
 than the omniscient.” Again : “What shall I say, 
 then, of the supreme omniscience and omnipotence of 
 that Great Being, from which Great Being, as the 
 cause, proceeded without effort and as a mere sport, 
 after the manner of the human breath, that mine of all 
 knowledge called Eig Yeda, etc., diversified by many 
 varieties of Sakhas, and the source of the classification 
 into varna and asram , of gods, animals, and men V ’ 
 How are these two truths — the eternity of the Yeda 
 and its procession from Brahma — to be reconciled ? 
 Hot, certainly, without very great difficulty. One of 
 the theories regarding the Yeda is that it has from all 
 eternity issued from Brahma as a breath, just as light 
 lias issued from the sun since the very first moment of 
 his existence as a luminous body. In other words, as 
 breath is inseparable from a living person in this world, 
 as light is inseparable from a luminous body, as fluidity 
 is inseparable from water, so is the Yeda inseparable 
 from the Supreme Spirit, as well when in a state of 
 quiescence as when in its creative moods. It is, how- 
 ever, said to issue as an efflation from Brahma when, 
 after a long period of quiescence, it begins to develop 
 into a renewed creation “as a sport.” The Sankkya 
 doctrine, that at every renovation of creation the Yeda 
 issues like an efflation from Prakriti, is transferred 
 mutatis mutandis to the Yedanta school, with perhaps 
 this addition, that during the long periods of divine 
 quiescence, which alternate with periods of creative 
 activity, the sacred volume continues its manifestation 
 as a breath, although unperceived and unappreciated 
 by any rational being. And in this way the doctrine 
 
304 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of its eternity is made to harmonize with that of its 
 procession from the Supreme Spirit. Does not this 
 doctrine tend to remind the Church of its dogma of the 
 eternal procession of the Holy Spirit ? 
 
 The sacredness of the smritis is also admitted, though 
 many of the statements embodied in them are attacked 
 with unflinching severity. The twenty -third aphorism 
 of the third chapter of the First Book refers to these 
 writings as authorities : “ Again, in works called the 
 smritis (the same) is found.” The Sutras of the fore- 
 going champions of philosophy, or founders of philo- 
 sophical schools of an orthodox type, are ranked with 
 the smritis properly so called. But they are at the 
 same time criticised with the greatest freedom, and 
 condemned as if they were mere human compositions 
 when they appear as a whole or in part worthy of con- 
 demnation. Ivapila and his followers are referred to 
 with the veneration due to Maharishis or apostolic 
 teachers ; and yet an exterminating crusade is fought 
 by Badarayuna in his Sutras against their opinions and 
 principles. The Yoga Sastra or Patanjali is called 
 “ Yoga-smriti,” and yet the philosophy with which 
 its practical directions are inseparably associated is 
 made the subject of many a vehement denunciation. 
 The same may be said of the treatment with which 
 Kanada, whose writings are also classed with smritis, 
 is favored. 
 
 Such treatment of the writings to which the sacred 
 appellation of the Smritis is attached by universal con- 
 sent, proves what we said in our last paper — viz. , that 
 tradition is to be accepted only when it agrees with the 
 Scriptures. But when it obviously runs counter to 
 them, or has for its basis a misinterpretation of its 
 express declarations, it ought to be unceremoniously 
 
THE VEDANTA SYSTEM. 
 
 305 
 
 rejected as a thing of no authority or consequence 
 whatever. This is. we believe, the firm conviction of 
 all sensible men in the Church with reference to the 
 body of tradition it inherits. The traditions of the 
 Church are authoritative only when they agree with 
 the Scriptures ; but when they are, in spirit or in letter, 
 not in harmony with or in direct contradiction to the 
 word and the testimony, they should be thrown aside 
 as mere rubbish. But as in the Christian Church there 
 are those who raise the traditions above the Scriptures, 
 there are multitudes in India who throw the Vedas into 
 the background and transfer the homage due to them 
 to the writings called Smritis. 
 
 But why are the writings of Ivapila, Patanjali, and 
 Kanada regarded as Smritis or sacred traditions, while 
 those of Buddha and others are regarded as heretical ? 
 Because the systematists uphold the canonicity or 
 authoritativeness of the Vedas, while Buddha and his 
 followers looked upon them as human compositions — 
 venerable indeed, but of no authority — dust as large 
 bodies of professors in the Christian Church look upon 
 the writings of the fathers. Orthodoxy and heterodoxy 
 seem to have consisted in acceptance and rejection of 
 these records as authoritative, rather than of any for- 
 mulated schemes of doctrine and precept. And the 
 result was that doctrinal errors of the most obnoxious 
 type were promulgated, and irregularities of practice of 
 the most disastrous stamp were legah'zed by men who 
 ostensibly paid reverence to the Vedas, but secretly 
 undermined their authority. It may perhaps be proved 
 that Buddha and his followers were not entirely free 
 from the meanness and dishonesty associated with such 
 procedure, though as a rule they referred to the Vedas 
 as writings which should be accepted when they agreed 
 
306 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 with reason, but rejected when they were out of the 
 boundary line of such agreement. 
 
 The object of this philosophy is set forth in the open- 
 ing aphorism of this book : “ Then, therefore, Brahma- 
 inquisitiveness or Brahma-investigation.” The Sutras 
 of Jaimini direct our attention to Duty, and throw the 
 Being from whom Duty receives its power to challenge 
 obedience or its obligatory character, into the back- 
 ground. The Sutras of Badarayuna advance a step 
 further and make this being the object of inquiry and 
 investigation. IIow is this great inquiry or investiga- 
 tion to be conducted ? But before we settle this ques- 
 tion we have to set at rest another of a preliminary 
 nature — viz., Who are entitled to the honor of being 
 engaged in so important and glorious an investigation ? 
 
 In reply to this question, the first remark to be made 
 is that the Sudras (members of the lowest caste, or 
 rather outcasts) are excluded from the privilege, and 
 that peremptorily and unconditionally. Colebrooke 
 plainly states this : “ Hot to interrupt the connection 
 of the subjects, I have purposely passed by a digres- 
 sion, or rather several, comprised in two sections of this 
 chapter (third of Book I.), wherein it is inquired 
 whether any besides a regenerate man (a Hindu of the 
 first three tribes) is qualified for theological studies or 
 theognostic attainments ; and the solution of the doubt 
 is that a Sudra, or a man of an inferior tribe, is incom- 
 petent, and beings superior to man (the gods of mythol- 
 ogy) are qualified.” 
 
 Hor are all the members of the three higher castes 
 indiscriminately entitled to the privilege of being per- 
 mitted to carry on this sublime inquiry. The women 
 are looked upon as Sudras, and are excluded as a body ; 
 though solitary examples of learned females being 
 
THE VEDANTA SYSTEM. 
 
 307 
 
 engaged in such investigation, but not exactly in the 
 prescribed manner, are not wanting. In the Brihad 
 Aranyaka Upanishad a legend is preserved fitted to 
 show that some degree of encouragement was accorded 
 to such women ; but the privilege of being engaged 
 in the inquiry in the approved fashion or prescribed 
 manner is withheld. Yajnavalkya had two wives, 
 Maitreyi and Ivatyayani, the former “ fond of discuss- 
 ing the nature of Brahma,” and the latter “ wise in 
 the duties of a housewife.” Yajnavalkya made up his 
 mind to give up the duties of a householder, and to 
 retire to a forest for the purpose of seeking the right 
 knowledge of Brahma, and calling in his wife Maitreyi 
 expressed his determination to divide his property be- 
 tween his two wives and depart. She inquired if she 
 could “obtain immortality” by wealth. On being 
 assured that she could not, she signified her wish to 
 have that explained to her which might prove to her a 
 stepping-stone to immortality. Her husband was ex- 
 ceedingly pleased with the good sense she evinced, and 
 strove to satisfy her liberal curiosity in a long dis- 
 course. But when the discourse was over, Yajnavalkya 
 “ went to the forest” alone, she not being considered 
 entitled to the privilege of accompanying him. 
 Women, then, are excluded from this path of inquiry. 
 
 Of the male members of the higher castes, those only 
 are encouraged who have proper qualifications, or who 
 have passed through a preliminary course of training 
 and discipline. The candidates for Brahma knowledge 
 must have studied the Yedas under an accredited 
 teacher either in this or in a previous life. They must 
 have performed the ordinary and extraordinary rites, 
 gone through the prescribed devotions and penances, 
 and cleansed their minds from all impurity by avoiding 
 
308 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 vice and practising virtue, without any regard to re- 
 ward, present or prospective. The qualified person is 
 thus described in the Yedanta Sar : 
 
 “ The qualified person is one who possesses due in- 
 telligence — that is, one who, by reading the Yedas and 
 Yedangas according to rule, either in this life or in a 
 former one, has obtained a general idea of the meaning 
 of the whole ; who, by performing the constant and 
 occasional rites, the penances and devotional exercises, 
 and abstaining from things done with desire of reward 
 and from those forbidden, has got rid of all sin and so 
 thoroughly cleansed his mind, and who is possessed of 
 the four means.” 
 
 The four means are thus set forth : 
 
 “ The four means (Sadhana) are : (a) discrimination 
 between eternal and non-eternal substances, (6) indiffer- 
 ence to the enjoyment of rewards here and hereafter, 
 (c) the possession of quiescence, self-restraint, and {cl) 
 desire for release. ' ’ 
 
 We cannot read what is said in the Sutras and in the 
 Yedanta Sar of these preparatory exercises without 
 being reminded of parallel pasages or corresponding in- 
 junctions in the Upanishads. Brahma-inquisitiveness 
 is a stage to which man must pass, through Duty -in- 
 quisitiveness ; the Uttara Mimansa through the Purva 
 Mimansa ; the teaching of Badarayuna through the 
 teaching of Jaimini. But an attempt is made by the 
 most redoubtable of the champions of the Yedantic 
 school to undo this connection, or to make its philoso- 
 phy stand on its own legs. Sankara, in his comments 
 on the opening verse of the work, thus speaks of the 
 qualifications needed by the inquirer : “ The study of 
 the Yedas is a general antecedent (qualification). But, 
 then, is the comprehension of prescribed acts here the 
 
THE VEDAXTA SYSTEM. 
 
 309 
 
 special antecedent (qualification) ? By no means ; be- 
 cause even before Duty-inquisitiveness, Brahma-inquisi- 
 tiveness is possible in one that has studied the Vedanta.” 
 This, however, is a later development of the system 
 utterly at war with its earlier indications. 
 
 The great inquiry is conducted in these Sutras, and 
 ought therefore to be conducted by every sensible 
 Hindu by a rigid application of the rules of exegesis, 
 framed by Jaimini to the latter portion of the Yedas, 
 the Upanishads. These documents are sifted and 
 analyzed, and the conclusions they are fitted to uphold 
 are stated and supported by appropriate quotations and 
 conclusive arguments. They are, in a word, correctly 
 interpreted, and the untenable nature of the false con- 
 struction put upon many of their passages and state- 
 ments by the champions of Sankhya and Vaislieshika 
 Philosophy is set forth ; while apparent contradictions 
 are reconciled and obscurities cleared up. A great 
 portion of the Sariliika Sutras is therefore argumenta- 
 tive. Colebrooke, in his able analysis of its contents, 
 thus sets forth its controversial character : “ The 
 second chapter of the second lecture (book) is contro- 
 versial. The doctrine of the Sankhyas is confuted in 
 the first section, that of the Vaiseshikas in two more, 
 of the Baudhas in as many, of the Jainas iu one, of the 
 Pasupatas and Pancharatras likewise in one each. . . . 
 It is remarkable that the Ay ay a of Gautama is entirely 
 unnoticed in the text and commentaries of the V edant 
 Sutras. ’ ’ 
 
 It is to be observed that a correct interpretation of 
 the Upanishads cannot be attempted without resorting 
 to the approved weapons of logic. These documents 
 were roughly handled, twisted, and tortured by all 
 classes of thinkers, both orthodox and heterodox, by 
 
310 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 friend and foe. They were appealed to, not only by 
 the Sankhyas in support of their apparently dualistic 
 but really materialistic creed, not only by the Yaishe- 
 shikas in support of their theory of various kinds of 
 atoms led into varieties of combinations by an unseen 
 force, but even by the champions of heterodoxy in 
 favor of their anti-Yedic sentiments and theories. TCe 
 are tempted to quote from the Yedanta Sar a long pas- 
 sage to show how these venerable documents were 
 handled by the sects called heretical, as well as by the 
 orthodox : 
 
 “For example, the very illiterate man says that his 
 son is his self, on account of the text of the Yeda 
 (Satpatha Brahmana, Id. 3. d. 26) : ‘ Self is born as a 
 son ; ’ and because he sees that he has the same love 
 for his son as for himself, and because he finds that if it 
 is well or ill with his son, it is well or ill with himself. 
 
 “ A Charvaka says that the gross body is his self ; 
 on account of the text of the Yeda (Taithiriya Upan- 
 ishad, 2. 1) : ‘ This is man as made up of the extract of 
 food ; ’ and because he sees that a man leaving his own 
 son (to burn) departs himself from a burning house, and 
 because of the experience, ‘ I am fat,’ ‘ I am lean.’ 
 
 “Another Charvaka says that the organs of sense 
 are his self, on account of the text of the Yeda (Clilian- 
 dogya Upanishad, Y. I. 7) : ‘ They, the organs of 
 sense, went to Prajapati and said, (“ Lord, which of us 
 is the chief ?” He said unto them, “ lie is chief 
 among you whose departure makes the body seem 
 worthless”) ; ’ and because in the absence of the 
 organs of sense the functions of the body cease, and 
 because of the experience, ‘ I am blind of one eye, ’ 4 1 
 am deaf. ’ 
 
 ‘ 1 Another Charvaka says that the vital airs are his 
 
THE VEDANTA SYSTEM. 
 
 311 
 
 self, on account of the text of the Yeda (Taittiriya 
 IJ panishacl, 2. 2) : £ There is another, an inner self, 
 made of the vital airs, ’ and because in the absence of 
 the vital airs the organs of sense are inactive, and 
 because of the experience, ‘ I am hungry, ’ ‘ I am 
 thirsty. ’ 
 
 “ Another Charvaka says that the mind is his self, 
 on account of the text of the Yeda (Taittiriya Upan- 
 ishad, 2. 3) : ‘ There is another, inner self, made of the 
 mind,’ and because when the mind sleeps the vital airs 
 cease to be, and because of the experience, ‘ 1 resolve,’ 
 £ I doubt. ’ 
 
 ‘ ‘ A Baudha says that intellect is his self, on account 
 of the text of the Yeda (Taittiriya, 2. 4) : £ There is 
 another, an inner self, made of cognition,’ and because 
 in the absence of an agent an instrument is powerless, 
 and because of the experience, ‘ I am an agent, ’ ‘ I am 
 a patient. ’ 
 
 “The Prabhakara and the Tarkika say that igno- 
 rance is their self, on account of the text of the Yeda 
 (Taittiriya, 2. 5) : ‘ There is another, an inner self, 
 made up of bliss,’ and because, during sleep, intellect 
 and the rest are merged in ignorance, and because of 
 the experience, c I am ignorant. ’ 
 
 “ The Bhatta says that intelligence associated with 
 ignorance is his self, on account of the text of the Yeda 
 (Mandukya Upanishad, 5) : ‘ Self is a mass of knowl- 
 edge and comprised of bliss, ’ and because during sleep 
 there are both the light (of intelligence) and the dark- 
 ness (of ignorance), and because of the experience, 
 £ Myself I know not. ’ 
 
 “ Another Baudha says that nihility is his self, on 
 account of the text of the Yeda : ‘ In the beginning 
 this was a mere nonentity, ’ and because during sleep 
 
312 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 everything disappears, and because of the experience of 
 the man who lias just awoke from sleep — an experience 
 in the shape of a reflection on his own non-existence — 
 when he says, 1 1 slept ; during sleep I was not.’ ” 
 
 This long extract corroborates what we have so often 
 affirmed, that the Upanishads are the sources not only 
 of Hindu pantheism, but of Hindu Philosophy in all its 
 phases of development. But the Brahma Sutras make 
 it evident that if they were interpreted on fair princi- 
 ples, and if allowance were made for the contradictions 
 in which they abound, they could be legitimately mar- 
 shalled only in favor of that species of pantheism 
 which presupposes a real change of divine into material 
 substance. The great doctrine the Sutras prove is that 
 Brahma is both the efficient and material cause of the 
 universe. Dr. Mullens objects to the use of the term 
 “ materi til ? * 111 this connection, on the ground that the 
 substance of the world is after all spiritual and divine ; 
 but he forgets that, according to the teaching of the 
 Upanishads, the divine substance actually becomes 
 matter, and constitutes the world thus changed. Mat- 
 ter in these days is said to be a double-faced entity, 
 because it in particular conditions becomes mind, not 
 merely appears in spiritual forms. According to the 
 Avriters of the Upanishads, and to Badarayuna, who 
 merely revives in the Brahma Sutras the teaching of 
 these records, the divine substance is a double-faced 
 entity, and becomes matter, not merely appears in 
 material forms, in particular conditions. Such being 
 the case, Brahma may properly be called the material 
 cause of the world ; but his efficiency is problematical, 
 as we shall show in the proper place. 
 
 IIoav is the great doctrine that Brahma is the mate- 
 rial as well as the efficient cause of the world proved in 
 
THE VEDANTA SYSTEM. 
 
 313 
 
 the" Brahma Sutras ? In the first place, by citations 
 from and direct references to many passages in the 
 Upanishads. In the second place, by proving the iden- 
 tity of the elements or other substances here and there 
 represented as creative principles in the Upanishads 
 with the Supreme Spirit. In the third place, by a re- 
 production of the imagery by which the identity of the 
 universe with the Supreme Spirit is set forth. In the 
 fourth place, by proving the untenableness of the San- 
 khya and Vaiseshika and other theories of creation. 
 And lastly, by refuting the objections advanced against 
 the pantheistic notion of creation set forth in the Upan- 
 ishads and revived and defended in the Brahma Sutras. 
 
 1. We shall observe this order in our treatment of 
 the subject. In the first place, let us remark that 
 Brahma is set forth as the Creator, Preserver, and 
 Destroyer of the world, in the second aphorism of the 
 work : “From whom the production, etc., of this.” 
 Sankar, in his comments upon this verse, cites some of 
 the passages herein referred to. He expressly says 
 that the relation of Brahma as Creator, to the world as 
 the created, is proved neither by the direct testimony of 
 the senses nor by inference, but by the Scripture texts 
 alluded to. Hear what he says : “ Had Brahma been 
 an object of sense, it might have been held that this 
 work (the universe) was done by Brahma. But where 
 the work alone (and not its author) is receivable by the 
 senses, it is not possible to determine whether the work 
 was done by Brahma or some other agent. Therefore 
 the Sutra : ‘ From whom the Production,” etc., is not 
 for setting up Inference. What then ? It is for the 
 illustration of Yedanta texts. But what are the 
 Yedanta texts which are here designed to be illustrated 
 by the Sutra ? ‘ Bhrigu Yaruni resorted to his father 
 
314 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Yanina. Teach me, sir, Brahma ’ — thus introducing 
 the question, the Yeda concludes : £ From whom these 
 entities are produced, by whom the productions subsist, 
 in whom departing. they are resolved, inquire of Him. 
 He is Brahma” (Taittiriya). And the specifications of 
 that text, ‘ From Joy indeed these entities are pro- 
 duced, by Joy the productions subsist, in Joy departing 
 they are resolved ” (Taittiriya). And other texts are 
 also to be illustrated of the same kind relating to the 
 cause, which is verily eternal, pure, intelligent, free, 
 and all-knowing:. ” 
 
 According to Sankar, almost every text in this work 
 refers either directly or obliquely to several verses in 
 the Upanishads, and the quotations he presents are so 
 numerous that if they were abstracted from his work 
 its bulk would not be half so repelling as it is. It is 
 enough to give here one more of the almost innumer- 
 able verses referred to and cited in the Sutras and their 
 commentaries : ££ All this universe indeed is Brahma ; 
 from him does it proceed ; into him it is dissolved ; in 
 him it breathes. So let every one adore him calmly.” 
 Dr. Monier Williams very appropriately calls this the 
 Yedantist’s simple confession of faith. 
 
 2. But sometimes the elements, ether, fire, etc., or 
 such substances as life or the individual soul, are sepa- 
 rately and individually represented as the creator in 
 the Upanishads. How is the discrepancy to be ac- 
 counted for ? By a simple recognition of the fact that 
 they are, when set forth as omnific powers, identical 
 with Brahma. The following string of quotations from 
 the Upanishads make this clear : ££ The omnipotent, 
 omniscient, sentient cause of the universe is essentially 
 happy (Taittiriya). He is the brilliant, golden person 
 seen within the solar orb and the human eye (Chhan- 
 
THE VEDANTA SYSTEM. 
 
 315 
 
 (logy a). He is the ethereal element ( akcisa ) from which 
 all things proceed, and to which all return (Chhan- 
 dogya). lie is the breath (Prana), in which all beings 
 merge, into which they all rise (Udgitha). He is the 
 light ( jyotish ) which shines in heaven, and in all places, 
 high and low, everywhere throughout the world, and 
 within the human person. He is the breath (Prana) 
 and intelligent self, immortal, undecaying, and happy, 
 with which Inclra, in a dialogue with Pratardana, iden- 
 tifies himself (Kaushitaki).” 
 
 One of the substances represented as omnific is Yais- 
 wanara , which is fire, or, as Mr. Ivunte says, the gas- 
 tric fire. Let us see what is said about this substance 
 in the second chapter of the first book : 
 
 “ 21. Because there is a special sense of ordinary 
 words, the term Vaiswanara (signifies the Supreme 
 Spirit). 
 
 “ 25. That, which should be so remembered, would 
 be inference. 
 
 “ 26. If anybody objects that because such descrip- 
 tions — as he abides inside, and others — lead to the con- 
 clusion that he (Vaiswanara) is not the Supreme Spirit, 
 then the conclusion is wrong, because the Acharyas 
 state that there is a direct precept that there would be 
 absurdity, and that therefore Vaiswanara is the Person 
 (the Supreme Spirit). 
 
 “ 27. Therefore, indeed, any element or god is not 
 the Supreme Spirit (Vaiswanara). 
 
 “ 28. The opinion of Jaimini is, The statement, that 
 the Supreme Spirit is directly to be worshipped, does 
 not conflict (with any text). 
 
 “ 29. The opinion of Aswarathya Acharya is, (that a 
 description of a visible form is given) for manifesting 
 (the Supreme Spirit). 
 
aio 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 “ 30. The opinion of Badiri is, (that the statement 
 that the Supreme Spirit is as big as a span, is made) 
 that his form may be conceived. 
 
 “ 31. Jaimini shows that such descriptions are given 
 for showing the perfection of God.” 
 
 These verses set forth the obscure manner in which 
 discussions are conducted in this work. The proposi- 
 tion to be proved is that Yaiswanara, which is fire, is 
 no other than the Supreme Spirit. What line of dem- 
 onstration is adopted ? Objections to the correct inter- 
 pretation are stated and refuted in the first place. The 
 first objection is : Yaiswanara or fire has a visible 
 form, and cannot therefore be tire invisible Supreme 
 Spirit. In reply, the proof, which rises from the known 
 to the unknown, the visible to the invisible — viz., in- 
 ference is utilized. Yaiswanara is the form in which 
 the Supreme Spirit appears. But Yaiswanara, as gas- 
 tric fire, abides within us ; how can it be the Supreme 
 Spirit ? The objectors, however, forget that there is 
 direct affirmation in the Yeda in favor of the correct 
 interpretation. Mr. Kunte, whose translation of these 
 Sutras is given above, quotes the Upanishad texts con- 
 nected with them, and one of these runs thus : “ That 
 Yaiswanara, who by his light extends the earth and 
 the heavens.” This verse may be represented as “a 
 direct precept” in favor of the interpretation contended 
 for. Besides, any other interpretation involves a reduc- 
 tio ad dbsurdum. 
 
 Add to all this the testimony of Maharshis or demi- 
 gods like Jaimini, Aswarathya, and Badiri, and the 
 conclusion becomes irresistible. They all maintain that 
 sensible images are utilized in Yedic descriptions of 
 Brahma, because human minds fail to comprehend him 
 without their aid. Jaimini in particular maintains that 
 
THE VEDANTA SYSTEM. 
 
 317 
 
 such descriptions tend to set forth the perfection of 
 the Supreme Spirit, which is both great and small, 
 amorphous and with form, all-knowing and unknowing. 
 
 3. The imagery by which the essential identity of 
 the universe with Brahma is set forth in the Upan- 
 ishads is revived in the Brahma Sutras. Here is a 
 string of images revived : “ Him, invariable, the wise 
 contemplate as the source (or cause) of beings. As the 
 spider puts forth and draws in his thread, as plants 
 spring from the earth (and return to it), as hair of the 
 head and body grows from the living man, so does the 
 universe come of the unalterable.” . . . Here is an- 
 other : “As milk changes to curd, and water to ice, so 
 is Brahma variously transformed and diversified with- 
 out aid of tools or exterior means of any sort. In 
 like manner the spider spins his web out of his sub- 
 stance ; spirits assume various shapes ; cranes propa- 
 gate without male ; and the lotus proceeds from pond to 
 pond without organs of motion.” In many passages 
 Brahma is said to be related to the universe as yarn to 
 cloth, clay to the jar, gold to the bracelet. Some of 
 the images employed indicate a real change of sub- 
 stance, while others merely a change of form. 
 
 Though a real change of substance is shown in many 
 passages in which Brahma is described in the Sutras, 
 he is emphatically declared unchangeable in some. 
 Here is one of Colebrooke’s extracts from the Sutras, 
 and the comments : “ He is described in many pas- 
 sages of the Yeda as diversified, and endued with every 
 quality and particular character ; but in other and very 
 numerous texts as without form or quahty. The latter 
 only is truly applicable, not the former, nor yet both. 
 He is impassible, unaffected by worldly modifications, 
 as the clear crystal, seemingly colored by the red bios- 
 
318 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 som of a hibiscus, is not less really pellucid. He does 
 not vary with every disguising form or designation, for 
 all diversity is expressly denied by explicit texts ; and 
 the notion of variableness relative to him is distinctly 
 condemned in some sheikhas of the Veda.” 
 
 Here is a contradiction which is even more apparent, 
 in the following extracts presented by Colebrooke : 
 “ lie is amorphous, for so he is expressly declared to 
 be, but seemingly assuming form, as sunshine or moon- 
 light impinging on any object appears straight or 
 crooked.” “ The luminous sun, though single, yet 
 reflected in water becomes various, and so does the un- 
 born divine soul by disguise in diverse modes.” “ The 
 Veda so describes him as entering into and pervading 
 the corporeal shapes by him wrought. He framed 
 bodies, biped and quadruped ; and becoming a bird he 
 passed into those bodies, filling them as their informing 
 spirit.” 
 
 The last of these extracts embodies a principle by 
 which the passages in which a real change of substance 
 is indicated may be reconciled to those in which the 
 immutability of the divine spirit is set forth with equal 
 distinctness and emphasis. Brahma is the informing 
 spirit or inspiriting soul of all corporeal frames— bodies 
 of bipeds, quadrupeds, and centipeds, and of all material 
 substances. The idea of lifeless matter was scouted in 
 the V edantic school as thoroughly as it is in the writ- 
 ings of Professor Tyndall, who may be represented as 
 a champion of materialistic pantheism. Every particle 
 of matter is instinct with divine life, and its inspiriting 
 soul never changes, though it appears in endless varie- 
 ties of combinations. Brahma appears in various 
 bodies and frames, which are evolved out of his sub- 
 stance as the spider’s web is evolved out of its sub- 
 
THE VEDANTA SYSTEM. 
 
 319 
 
 stance; but underneath these infinitely diversified as- 
 sumed forms he remains unchanged and unchangeable. 
 This explanation, it must be confessed, does not entirely 
 free the descriptions of Brahma given in the Upan- 
 ishads and the Brahma Sutras from the charge of inco- 
 herence and contradictoriness. 
 
 4. One of the great objects of these Sutras seems to 
 be the explosion of the Sankhya notion that the word 
 Brahma is simply a synonym of the word Pradhan or 
 Prakriti. The Sankhya philosopher maintains, in other 
 words, that the source of creation in the Upanishads is 
 in reality his Pradhan or Prakriti, though called by a 
 different name, Brahma. The Sutras explode this 
 notion by pointing out the essential difference or dis- 
 tinction between the Brahma of the Yeda and the 
 Pradhan of Sankhya Philosophy. The axiom on which 
 they build their argument is that no unsentient and 
 unintelligent substance could possibly be the creator of 
 the world. The Yeda attributes creation to a percep- 
 tion of solitariness. The creator perceived his lonc- 
 someness, and said : “I am one ; let me be many.” 
 Sankar, in his comments on the fifth aphorism of the 
 book, “ Not so, because of observation, it is unheard,” 
 says : “ Unsentient Pradhan of Sankhya fabrication as 
 the cause of the universe has no place in Yedanta 
 texts.” lie makes the following observations to show 
 that there was perception or “observation” on the 
 part of the Creator before the commencement of His 
 omnific work : 
 
 “ Thus commencing with the texts, ‘ O gentle pupil, 
 this was in the beginning an entity,’ c One without a 
 second,’ it is added : ‘ It observed, “ Let me be multi- 
 plied, let me be produced,” and it “created the 
 right.”’ In these texts the universe manifested by 
 
320 
 
 HIHDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 names and forms and expressed here by the word idem 
 (this) being determined before production to be an 
 existing spirit, its creativeness, in its antecedent state 
 indicated by the word entity, of light and other things 
 after observation , is declared. Also in other texts, 
 ‘ This was in the beginning one (only) spirit. There 
 was nothing else. He observed (saying), Let us create 
 the worlds. He created these worlds. ’ These declare 
 also a creation after observation.” 
 
 The Pradhan of the Sankhyas is confessedly un- 
 sentient and unintelligent, and it could not therefore 
 have observed and created. The Sankhyas, however, 
 maintain that knowledge and sentience existed poten- 
 tially in Pradhan, or in one of the three gunas or quali- 
 ties of which it consists, and that therefore the possi- 
 bility of its being the source of creation must even on 
 Y edantic principles be admitted. The Y edantist retorts 
 that ignorance and stolidity also existed potentially in 
 Pradhan, and whatever of science existed in it was 
 neutralized by its nescience. “ If,” says Sankar, “ in 
 the equipoise of the (three) qualities, Pradhan can be 
 called all-knowing, by pleading the capacity for knowl- 
 edge, inherent in the sattwa (attribute), then it may 
 also be called little-knowing, on the plea of the capacity 
 of precluding knowledge inherent in (the other two 
 attributes) rajas and tamas. Further, the state of 
 sattwa without an observant (spirit) is not called 
 knowledge. Nor has unintelligent Pradhan any inhe- 
 rent observantness.” 
 
 The Yedantist adopts the cosmogony of the Sankhyas 
 in its main features, as will be shown in the next paper ; 
 but he attacks their assumption of a material form as 
 its starting-point with the greatest vehemence. Yor 
 does he spare the atomic theory of Gautama and 
 
THE VEDANTA SYSTEM. 
 
 321 
 
 Kanada. Many of tlie arguments arrayed against the 
 former are marshalled against the latter theory, and 
 the conclusion upheld is that of a divine rather than a 
 material substance evolving creation out of itself, con- 
 sequent on its perception of its own solitariness, and of 
 its determination to multiply itself. 
 
 5. The objections to this conclusion raised by the 
 Sankhyas and others are stated and confuted. The 
 first of these is based on the similarity which should, 
 according to Hindu logic, subsist between cause and 
 effect. The argument may be stated thus : An effect 
 must be of a piece with or similar to its material 
 cause ; but there is dissimilarity between the world 
 and Brahma ; therefore Brahma cannot be looked up 
 to as the cause of the world. In reply it is maintained 
 that apparent dissimilarity between a cause and its 
 effect is noticeable in many cases. “ Hair and nails, 
 which are insensible, grow from a sensible animal 
 body, and sentient vermin (scorpions, etc.) spring from 
 inanimate sources (cow-dung, etc.).” But the argu- 
 ment, it is added, may be advanced against the Sankhya 
 theory, which brings sentient beings out of an unsen- 
 tient material form. The atomic theory, or that which 
 brings creation out of a universal void, may be shown 
 as untenable precisely in this way. 
 
 Another of the objections advanced hinges on “ frui- 
 tion,” which discriminates between the party who 
 enjoys or suffers, and that which is enjoyed or suffered, 
 and which mars thereby the unity of Brahma. The 
 imagery brought forward in reply is that of the sea and 
 the numerous changes on its surface, the earth and its 
 contents and products, and the food eaten and the visi- 
 ble objects into which it is converted. “ The sea is 
 one, and not other than its waters ; yet waves, foam, 
 
322 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 spray, drops, froth, and other modifications of it differ 
 from each other.” Brahma is the sea, and the innu- 
 merable souls enjoying or suffering are, together with 
 the sources of their enjoyment and suffering, the 
 changeable currents, waves, froth, and foam. Again : 
 “An effect is not other than its cause. Brahma is 
 single, without a second. lie is not separate from the 
 embodied self. lie is sold, and the soul is he. Yet he 
 does not do that only which is agreeable and beneficial 
 to self. The same earth exhibits diamonds, rock crys- 
 tals, red orpiment, etc. ; the same soil produces a 
 diversity of plants, the same food is converted into 
 various excrescences, hairs, nails, etc.” Brahma’s ob- 
 ject in creation is, not self-enjoyment, not self -inflic- 
 tion, but mere “ sport” in diversity, self-manifestation 
 in matter and mind, in virtue and vice, joy and sorrow, 
 bondage and liberation ! 
 
 Again the objectors ask, How could Brahma act 
 without organs of action — hands, feet, etc. ? Creation 
 presupposes action, action presupposes organs ; but as 
 Brahma, a pure spirit, is without these, he cannot prop- 
 erly be represented as a creator and therefore actor. 
 This, in the estimation of some Hindu philosophers, is 
 a great objection, and it was urged against the theory 
 of the Indian atomists. Their reply, alluded to in 
 a foregoing paper, is that Brahma, though bodiless, 
 can assume bodies, and act through the organs at- 
 tached to them. The Brahma Sutras, however, ad- 
 vance a step further and maintain that Brahma can - 
 act without organs. “ Brahma is omnipotent, able 
 for every act without organ or instrument.” But the 
 old difficulty is here encountered : What motive could 
 Brahma possibly have for creating ? The Vedant- 
 ist’s reply is : “ Ho motive or special purpose need 
 
THE VEDANTA SYSTEM. 
 
 323 
 
 be assigned for his creation of the universe besides 
 his will.” 
 
 The most formidable objection and its reply we shall 
 state in Sankar’s words, as translated by Monier Will- 
 iams in his “ Indian Wisdom” : 
 
 “ It may be objected that God is proved not to be 
 the cause of the universe. Why ? From the visible 
 instances of injustice and cruelty. Some he makes 
 happy, as the gods, etc. ; some very miserable, as the 
 brutes, etc. ; and some in a middling condition, as 
 men, etc. Being the author of such an unjust creation, 
 he is proved to be subject to passions like other persons 
 — that is to say, to partiality and prejudice — and there- 
 fore his nature is found wanting in spotlessness. And 
 by dispensing pain and ruin He is chargeable with 
 malice and cruelty, deemed culpable even among the 
 wicked. Hence, because of the instances of injustice 
 and cruelty, God cannot be the cause of the universe. 
 To this we reply : Injustice and cruelty cannot be 
 charged upon God. Why ? Because lie did not act 
 independently. God, being dependent, creates this 
 world of inequalities. If you ask on what He is de- 
 pendent, we reply, on merit and demerit. That there 
 should be an unequal creation, dependent on the merit 
 or demerit of the souls created, is no fault of God. As 
 the rain is the common cause of the production of rice 
 and wheat, but the causes of their specific distinctions 
 as rice and wheat are the varying powers of the irrespec- 
 tive seeds, so is God the common cause in the creation 
 of gods, men, and others ; but of the distinctions be- 
 tween gods, men, and others, the causes are the vary- 
 ing works inherent in their respective souls.” 
 
 The original Sutras commented upon in the words 
 quoted above are thus translated by Dr. Mullens, whose 
 
324= 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 translation, by the way, is simpler than that of Cole- 
 brooke : “ Injustice cannot be attributed to Brahma 
 because some are happy, some miserable, and some 
 both. Every one has his lot in the world, according to 
 his merit in a former stage of the universe. So the 
 rain-cloud distributes his rain equally, but the plants 
 vary according to the seed whence they spring” 
 (Brahma Sutras, II. 31-37). 
 
 These aphorisms and these comments make it evident 
 that the ultimate source of creation is not the divine 
 will, but some power by which that will is determined, 
 the power of merit or demerit or of work. Why is, 
 then, creation expressly attributed to the will of God, 
 to His perception of His solitariness, and His determi- 
 nation to create ? Ko explanation can possibly be given 
 of this bit of inconsistency and contradiction, excepting 
 the acknowledged fact that Hindu logicians, like some 
 modem heroes, never scrupled to silence a body of 
 objectors by a recourse to principles inconsistent with 
 others for which they at other times were compelled 
 by their theories to stand up. The Sanldiya notion of 
 creation evolved out of a dead substance had to be ex- 
 ploded, and sentience and knowledge and desire and 
 determination were attributed unscrupulously to a 
 Being who was held up as incapable of being influenced 
 by these attributes and predicates. 
 
 But after all the universe cannot properly be said to 
 have been created at all ! And this brings us to an- 
 other objection and reply, which we shall present in 
 Sankar’s words, as translated by Monier Williams : 
 
 “ The Supreme Being existed at the beginning, one 
 without a second. Hence, before the creation there 
 could be no works in dependence on which inequalities 
 might be created. God may be dependent on works 
 
THE YE DA NT A SYSTEM. 
 
 325 
 
 after distinctions are made. But before the creation 
 there could be no works caused by varying instruments, 
 and therefore v T e ought to find a uniform. We reply : 
 This does not vitiate our doctrine, because the world is 
 without beginning. The world being without begin- 
 ning, nothing can prevent works and unequal creations 
 from continuing in the state of cause and effect, like 
 the seed and its plant. ’ ’ 
 
 Here is another flagrant inconsistency. But there is 
 one way of accounting for it. Brahma is uncaused, 
 and has therefore lived from eternity. How ? Either 
 in a state of quiescence, or in a state of activity, or in 
 states of activity alternating with states of quiescence. 
 The first two suppositions are untenable because of the 
 long, long seasons called haljoas, each preceded by the 
 consummation of one stage of mundane existence and 
 succeeded by another. Periods of activity alternating 
 with periods of quiescence are, properly speaking, the 
 salient features of the divine existence ; and they have 
 followed one another in succession throughout eternity. 
 Just as the Yeda has been breathed out and breathed 
 in by Brahma throughout eternity, the world has been 
 evolved out of his substance and swallowed up in it 
 throughout eternity ; and if he can properly be called 
 the author of the one, he may legitimately be called 
 the creator of the other. But the question arises, By 
 what law is this beginningless and endless series of 
 evolutions and involutions regulated — an inherent law 
 of necessity, or an extraneous force ? If by an inher- 
 ent law of necessity, all talk of freedom on the part of 
 Brahma is bosh. If by an extraneous force, such as 
 Karma (work), he cannot be the ultimate source of 
 creation ! 
 
 We reserve our remarks on the theory of bondage 
 
32G 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 and liberation propounded in these Sutras, as well as 
 on their physiological teaching, for our next paper. 
 Meanwhile we conclude with the remark that the con- 
 tradictions with which they abound are the inevitable 
 results of the attempt made in them to reconcile varied 
 and conflicting lines of thought. Some scholars incline 
 to the opinions expressed by Mr. Ivunte that in the 
 Vedanta Sutras we find the germ of the eclecticism, 
 which was brought to perfection in the Swetaswara 
 Upanishad and the Bhagvada-Gita. It is a matter of 
 fact that the Sankhya cosmogony is adopted, and the 
 Vaisheshika view of work. But all attempts to recon- 
 cile these systems to it are repelled with firmness and 
 even contumely. But the author does not seem to have 
 freed himself from the prevailing lines of philosophic 
 thought sufficiently to be able to elaborate a consistent 
 system of pantheism ; and to the homage he paid to 
 established schools is to be attributed the glaring con- 
 tradictions into which he seems to have been betrayed. 
 
CHAPTER XI. 
 
 THE MAYA, OE THE ILLUSION THEOEY. 
 
 The great teachers in ancient India of the orthodox 
 stamp may be divided into six classes — viz., the Rishis, 
 the Yedavadins, the Parinamavadins, the Sankhyas or 
 Dualists, the Vaiseshikas or Trialists, and the Maya- 
 vadins or Illusionists. 
 
 The Rishis were shepherd- warriors, who came into 
 the country with their hosts of brave followers, drove 
 the aborigines from some of its fertile provinces, and 
 organized colonial settlements within the precincts of 
 the territory thus vacated. They did not belong to the 
 most advanced branch of the great Aryan family, but 
 they had great natural abilities, which had crowned 
 their schemes of conquest and colonization with brill- 
 iant success, and which were called into vigorous play, 
 and sharpened and improved by the dangers by which 
 they found themselves surrounded, and the varied 
 exigencies of nascent communities which they had to 
 meet. Nor did the scenery around their new homes, in 
 vast plains overshadowed by ranges of magnificent 
 mountains, intersected by broad rivers, and surrounded 
 by dense forests, fail to stimulate their natural love of 
 the sublime and the beautiful, and stir up the poetic 
 fervor of their brave, generous natures. And conse- 
 quently, in the midst of their warlike pursuits, the 
 varied aspirations of their hearts evoked by present 
 necessities, rather than by a calm foresight of future 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 328 
 
 contingencies, were vented in strains of impassioned 
 poetry and metrical prayer. The hymnology thus 
 elaborated is characterized by archaic simplicity, natu- 
 ralness, and devotional enthusiasm, but it is lamentably 
 deficient in keenness of insight, depth of knowledge, 
 and breadth of view ; while the puerility characteristic 
 of it as a whole, and the obscenity by which not a 
 small portion of it is vitiated, are blemishes from which 
 it were to be wished it had been free. The Rishis 
 were worshippers of nature, had rites and ceremonies 
 of the simplest kind, and could justly claim some virtues 
 of a rugged but sterling nature ; and their teachings, 
 though below par judged by a modern standard, were 
 fitted to curb the ferocity of growing communities of 
 successful marauders, and raise them to a low stage 
 of civilization — the stage attained by their Iranian 
 brethren. 
 
 But simple naturalism gave place in course of time to 
 a complicated system of polytheism, the practical 
 requirements of which could not be met except by an 
 elaborate ritual. Nor could a cumbrous system of 
 ceremonial observances be reduced to practice without 
 a stated and recognized ministry, or rather priesthood. 
 And thus the Vedavadins sprung into existence. The 
 Rishis were poets and priests, as well as warriors and 
 statesmen ; and they supervised and controlled both the 
 secular and spiritual concerns of the new settlements, 
 of which they were recognized chieftains. But when 
 the objects of worship were multiplied, and a complex 
 ceremonial system was elaborated, a division of labor 
 was realized, and a broad fine of demarcation was 
 drawn between the functions of the State and the 
 functions of the Church. "While ldngs and statesmen 
 managed the concerns of the State, those of the Church 
 
THE HAYA, OR THE ILLUSION THEORY. 
 
 329 
 
 were left in the hands of a hierarchy, the members of 
 which enjoyed peculiar privileges, and gradually arro- 
 gated to themselves all power, temporal as well as 
 spiritual, regal as well as sacerdotal. The result was a 
 mock theocracy, under the blight of w T hich the spirit of 
 inquiry was crushed, poetry vanished into thin air, and 
 nothing remained but an endless round of mummeries 
 and tomfooleries. The age of the Brahmanas was em- 
 phatically an age of degrading superstition, priestcraft, 
 and formality ; of spirit crushed, mind enslaved, and the 
 noblest instincts and emotions of the heart paralyzed. 
 
 The Yedavadins or the royal-priests began to lose 
 their influence and ascendency as soon as the spirit of 
 inquiry was aroused by a rationalistic reaction against 
 lifeless externalism ; and the Parinamavadins appeared 
 on the stage to dispute their once unrestricted but now 
 limited sway. The Parinamavadins assumed a modest 
 tone, and professed to do nothing more than simply 
 disclose the esoteric meaning of the hymns, which had 
 been composed and sung by the Pisliis, and the ritual, 
 which had been elaborated and reduced to practice by 
 the Yedavadins. They did not ostensibly raise the 
 standard of revolt against current beliefs and supersti- 
 tions — perhaps they did not mean to do so. Neverthe- 
 less they undermined the influence of such beliefs and 
 superstitions by leading public attention, or the atten- 
 tion of the intelligent portion of the public, away 
 from them toward an all-embracing spiritual essence, 
 changed, by a necessitated process of evolution or self- 
 development, into the objects of nature and the phe- 
 nomena of life. The Parinamavadins are also called 
 Yikarvadins, or the teachers who insisted on a real 
 change of spiritual into material substance in the process 
 of development to which creation is to be traced. 
 
330 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Eut their scheme of thought, unfolded somewhat 
 incoherently in the Upanishads, had to pass through a 
 prolonged period of warfare waged against it by two, 
 if not several, antagonistic systems of philosophy. The 
 Sankliyas, with their dualism, which denied the 
 existence of God or divine substance altogether, and 
 affirmed that of an ever-active, self-evolving material 
 form and innumerable quiescent souls, maintained a 
 dire struggle with the Parinamavadins, and succeeded 
 in crippling their power and circumscribing their influ- 
 ence for a time. But they themselves had to retreat 
 before the triumphant flag of the Vaiseshikas, who 
 propounded the atomic theory, and courted popular 
 favor by admitting the existence of a quiescent God 
 as well as quiescent souls. The Yaiseshikas succeeded 
 in further undermining the influence of the Parinama 
 theory. 
 
 But the Parinamavadins had their triumph restored 
 to them by the ritualism revived and further developed 
 by Jaimini and the Purya-Mimansa school. But their 
 theory had to be remodelled, and the work of recon- 
 struction and renovation was effected by the Mayava- 
 dins or the illusionists. It is but fair to add that but 
 for this timely change the system of the Parinamavadins 
 could not have risen to that ascendency which it has 
 enjoyed for so many cycles of ages in India. 
 
 The defects which rendered its reconstruction a 
 necessity ought to be categorically stated and carefully 
 examined before the Maya or illusion theory is treated 
 of and explained. 
 
 1. The theory of the Parinamavadins is in antago- 
 nism to that monism which both the Upanishads and the 
 Brahma Sutras are so obviously intended to uphold. 
 The watchword of these documents is Ekamevadithjam , 
 
THE MAYA, OR THE ILLUSION THEORY. 331 
 
 One without a Second ; and the reasonings embodied 
 in them, together with the legendary matter introduced 
 and the illustrative imagery pressed into service, are all 
 fitted to bolster up non-dualism. But the Parinama 
 theory involves dualism, derivative, if not original ; 
 and it therefore runs counter to this, the central or 
 vital principle of Yedantic speculations. It will not 
 avail to say that the dualism we notice in creation is, 
 after all, monism ; that the diverse objects around us, 
 as well as the phenomena of our inner consciousness 
 and life, are evolutes of one primal substance, having 
 originally sprung from it, and being in process of reso- 
 lution into it. The fact is, that two classes of phe- 
 nomena, each obviously implying a substrate different 
 from that of the other, exist ; and the conclusion is 
 irresistible that there is at present a dualism, a dualism 
 emanating from monism and sure to terminate in 
 monism, but yet a dualism. The Parinama theory is, 
 therefore, incompatible with or hostile to the root-prin- 
 ciple of Yedantism, and it had in consequence to be 
 remodelled. 
 
 2. Again, the Parinama theory is inconsistent with 
 the Hindu notion of causality. According to this 
 notion, the effect must be of the same nature with the 
 cause. If the effect is spiritual, the cause must be 
 spiritual ; and if the effect is material, the cause must 
 be material. From spiritual substance material sub- 
 stance cannot be derived. Matter is the very antipodes 
 of Brahma, or the divine essence. Brahma is pure, 
 while matter is impure ; Brahma is intelligent and 
 sentient, while matter is unintelligent and insensible ; 
 Brahma is unchangeable, while matter is mutable. 
 How could matter have possibly sprung from Brahma ? 
 Besides, it ought not to be forgotten that the idea of 
 
332 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 impure matter emanating from pure spiritual substance 
 is abhorrent or most offensive to Hindu susceptibilities, 
 and cannot be entertained for a moment. Hence the 
 inconsistency in the reasonings of the Parinamavadins 
 in the Upanishads and the Saririka Sutras ; inconsis- 
 tency so glaring that some have gone so far as to deny 
 the existence of the theory in these documents. 
 
 3. The theory, moreover, is inconsistent with an ac- 
 knowledged attribute of Brahma. In the Upanishads 
 Brahma is described as impartite ( aklianda ), or without 
 parts. What is meant by this technical term when 
 apphed to the Deity ? Major Jacob, in his annotations 
 appended to his excellent translation of the Yedanta 
 Sar, thus discloses its meaning : “ According to the 
 commentator Trisemhasarasavati, this term (akhanda) 
 means ‘ devoid of anything of a like kind or of a differ- 
 ent kind, and without internal variety.’ A tree, for 
 example, has the ‘ internal variety ’ of leaves, flowers, 
 and fruit ; it has things ‘ of a hke kind ’ in other trees, 
 and things ‘ of a different kind ’ in stones, etc. But 
 Brahma is not so, he being absolute and unchangeable 
 unity.” According, however, to the theory con- 
 demned, the variety, resemblance, and dissimilarity 
 from which Brahma is declared free, may justly be 
 predicated of him. The theory had, therefore, to be 
 either abandoned or reconstructed. 
 
 4. But the most formidable objection to the theory is 
 its incompatibility with a proper scheme of theodicy. 
 Sin and misery exist in the world, and human life is 
 only a tissue of sighs and groans. What is the cause 
 of this anomalous state of things ? Wh} 7 - did God 
 knowingly allow the ingress of sin, with its interminable 
 train of distress and -wretchedness ? Is God omnipo- 
 tent ? If so, w r liy did He not interpose His all sufn- 
 
THE MAYA, 01t TIIE ILLUSION THEORY. 
 
 333 
 
 cient and limitless power between sin and the world 
 converted by it into a favored abode of disease and 
 death ? Is God omniscient and all-wise ? If so, why 
 did He not, while foreseeing the impending danger, 
 adopt judicious measures to avert it ? Maintain that 
 sin and misery are realities, and the justice and mercy 
 of God cannot but be impugned. But regard sin and 
 misery as illusions and dreams, and these attributes of 
 God are left intact. A proper system of theodicy is 
 possible only when the Parinama theory is abandoned. 
 
 These are some of the reasons assigned for the reno- 
 vation of the theory of real transformation propounded 
 in the Upanishads and the Brahma Sutras. The work 
 of reconstruction was accomplished when their cogency 
 was clearly seen, and the Parinama theory was super- 
 seded by the Yivarta or Illusion theory. The small 
 treatise in which this latter theory is unfolded is 
 Yedanta Sar, translated by Dr. Ballantyne years ago, 
 but very recently presented in an excellent translation, 
 with copious notes, by Major Jacob. Of his version we 
 shall avail ourselves in our attempt to set forth the 
 broad features of a doctrine which is one of the queerest 
 this world has seen, but which, though obviously lu- 
 dicrous, some modern philosophers have not been 
 ashamed to revive. 
 
 Yedantism appears in its incipient stage of develop- 
 ment in the Upanishads and the Sutras, in which the 
 doctrine of the Upanishads is simply revived, with its 
 approved arguments and stock illustrations. It appears 
 in a state of maturity in the Yedanta Sar, a compendi- 
 um of Yedanta principles of a much later date. But its 
 latest phasis of development is noticeable in another 
 standard treatise of a still later date, called Yedanta 
 Paribhasa, the contents of which are analyzed in 
 
334 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Pandit Nehemiah Goreh’s able and acute dissertations 
 on Yedantism, in his book already referred to. He 
 presents in liis footnotes numerous extracts from this 
 work, and of these we shall avail ourselves. And first 
 of all let us dwell, as the learned Pandit does, on the 
 three sorts of existence posited by the Yedantins of the 
 most modern school. 
 
 These three sorts of existence are Paramarthika or 
 True, Yyavaharika or Practical, and Pratibhasika or 
 Apparent. They are thus set forth in the Yedanta- 
 Paribhasa, p. 18 : “ Existence is of three sorts — time 
 (paramarthika), practical (Yyavaharika), and apparent 
 (pratibhasika). True existence is that of Brahma ; 
 practical, that of ether, etc. ; apparent, that of nacrine 
 silver and the like. ” Brahma truly exists, and therefore 
 he is really real ; the world exists practically, but not 
 truly, and therefore it is unreal ly real ; and nacre, mis- 
 taken for silver, or serpent imagined in a rope, has only 
 apparent, deceptive existence, and it is also unreally 
 real. Practical and apparent existence agree in one 
 respect, and differ on three points. They agree in 
 their being both false, though ignorantly imagined 
 real. They differ, inasmuch as apparent existence is 
 now and then mistaken for veritable existence, not con- 
 stantly as practical existence. Apparent existence, 
 moreover, cannot be the source or centre of practical 
 business, as nacre, mistaken for silver, can never be sold 
 as silver. In the third place, our belief in apparent ex- 
 istence is the result, not of ignorance only, as our belief 
 in practical existence, but of some defects superadded 
 to ignorance, such as distance, etc. 
 
 What is practical or, as Professor Banerjea calls it, 
 conventional existence ? Is it simply our assumption 
 of the existence of the world for purposes of business 
 
THE MAYA, Oil THE ILLUSION" THEOHY. 
 
 335 
 
 and pleasure ? Some of our modern philosophers do 
 not believe in an essential distinction between virtue 
 and vice ; but they kindly allow or overlook its recog- 
 nition by mankind in general for the benefit of society. 
 The moral beliefs of humanity are all myths in their 
 opinion ; but their utility is recognized, and their prac- 
 tical ascendency is left uninterrupted, that the business 
 of society in its present state of ignorance may go on 
 undisturbed. Do the Tedantins allow the existence of 
 the world only on this principle, or do they maintain 
 that after all it has a sort of existence to which the 
 name practical, in contradistinction to the real, ought 
 to be given ? Pandit Nehemiah- Goreli maintains that 
 their practical existence is a sort of existence, an inter- 
 mediate link, so to speak, between true existence and 
 non-existence. They divide objects into three classes 
 — those which are really real, those which are unreally 
 real, and those which are positive unrealities. Brahma 
 is truly existent, really real ; the world,' its creator, 
 souls, etc., are practically existent, but not non-exist- 
 ent, and therefore unreally unreal ; and such figments 
 of the head as “ a hare’s horn,” “ the son of a barren 
 woman,” etc., are non-existent or positive nonentities. 
 
 Mr. Goreli represents practical existence, as unfolded 
 by the Yedantin, “ as a combination of two contradic- 
 tory ideas.” The Pandit’s authorities are, however, 
 enemies, not friends, of the Yedanta system, Parthasa- 
 rathi Misia and Yijnana Bhikshu, “ writers on the 
 Mimansa and on the Sankhya, respectively.” The 
 former, Partliasarathi, in his Sastra Dipika, introduces 
 a Yedantic opponent, who speaks thus : “ We do not 
 say that the universe is unreal, since it is established, 
 by perception and other proofs, to exist. Nor do we 
 say that it has true existence, it being falsified by right 
 
33G 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 apprehension of spirit. The universe cannot, therefore, 
 he described either as true or as unreal.” The same 
 controversialist is also represented as saying : “ That 
 which never presents itself — as the horn of a hare — is 
 held for unreal ; and that which presents itself, and is 
 never falsified — as the true nature of spirit — is held for 
 true ; and, as for the universe, since it presents itself, 
 and yet is falsified by right apprehension, it is not to 
 be described as true, or yet as unreal.” 
 
 The other writer, Vijnana Bhikshu, the author of the 
 Sankhya-Pravachana-Bhashya, says, p. 25 : “ If it be 
 held that nescience is essentially of two contradictories? 
 But ‘ should ’ it be alleged that nescience ought to be 
 pronounced ‘ essentially of two contradictories,’ entity 
 and nonentity, or else to be different from both ; and 
 thus there would be no invalidation thereby — that is, by 
 nescience — of non-duality, the only true ( par am arth i ka) 
 state. Such is the case. . . . ‘Not so;’ for such a 
 thing is unknown.” These quotations certainly tend 
 to prove that practical existence is not tantamount to 
 non-existence. And therefore Ignorance or Nescience, 
 which according to the system has practical, not true, 
 existence, is said to be “ not describable as existent or 
 non-existent” in the Yedanta Sar. 
 
 But from one point of view practical existence ap- 
 pears sheer non-existence. From the point of view of 
 true existence, the objects practically existent appear 
 non-existent; as from the point of view of practical ex- 
 istence, even Brahma, the really and truly existent, 
 appears non-existent. The correct view is obtained by 
 the Vedantin, who occupies an intermediate station 
 between practical and true existence, and who sees on 
 one side objects practically but not really existent, and 
 on the other Brahma, really but not practically existent. 
 
T1IE MATA, OR THE ILLUSION THEORY. 337 
 
 A word about apparent existence, and we shall have 
 done with this portion of our knotty subject. Appar- 
 ent existence has also, according to Yedantic teach- 
 ing, a reality in it. When a rope is mistaken for 
 a snake, an apparent snake is really formed. Let us 
 reproduce Mr. Goreh’s own words and the proofs he 
 adduces in their support : “ Respecting apparent 
 
 things, the partisans of the Yedanta hold this language : 
 that when a man on seeing nacre takes it for silver, 
 apparent silver is really produced. If silver, I ask, is 
 then really produced, how is this proved to be a mis- 
 conception ? In reply I am told that, if the silver were 
 true or practical, there would be no room to speak of 
 misconception ; but since it is neither, but apparent, 
 misconception has place.’ ’ 
 
 Mr. Goreh’s proofs are all borrowed from Yedanta- 
 Paribhasa. His first extract is from page 10 : 
 “ Though by the efforts, however belying, of a misap- 
 prehensive person, to obtain possession of an illusory 
 object, such an object is established as existent ; yet 
 there is no proof that it, the misapprehension, has 
 reference to an apparent object, as silver, etc., pro- 
 duced at that time. For silver, which is extant else- 
 where, may be taken as its object. If this be said, I 
 demur, since that silver elsewhere, not being in contact 
 with an organ of sense, cannot be an object of percep- 
 tion.” 
 
 This extract is somewhat obscure, but it will become 
 luminous when we look upon the objector as pressing 
 into his service the JSTaiyayika theory, that when nacre 
 is mistaken for silver the memory is a factor in the pro- 
 duction of the mistake. The Yedantin in reply affirms 
 the principle that perception is possible only when 
 there is a contact between the thing perceived and a 
 
338 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 percipient organ, and that, therefore, silver not present 
 where the nacre is seen cannot possibly occasion the 
 mistake alluded to. 
 
 Lt is not necessary for us to take notice of Mr. 
 Goreh’s other extracts, besides the one in which the 
 process of the formation of apparent silver is set forth. 
 The apparent silver is evolved out of ignorance through 
 the media, so to speak, the “ nacreness” of nacre, its 
 “ glitter,” the impression of silver before seen, and some 
 defect, such as bile, or distance, etc. The Yedantic 
 theory of perception is not less strange than complicat- 
 ed, and it will have to be referred to before the sequel. 
 
 Meanwhile let us remark that the recondite disquisi- 
 tion on existence, embodied in books like Yedanta- 
 Paribhasa, is an after-growth, arising from the difficul- 
 ties with which the illusion theory appeared beset some 
 time after it had been propounded. The Yedanta Sar, 
 the compendium in which that theory is presented in 
 detail, says nothing about the three sorts of existence 
 by which it was rendered consistent with human con- 
 sciousness. Men cannot be easily led to believe that 
 the universe, which in varieties of ways manifests its 
 existence, is false ; and if a conclusion so obviously in- 
 compatible with all our instinctive beliefs has to be 
 naturalized, it must be backed by a mass of sophistic 
 reasoning. The Yedantic philosophers recognized such 
 necessity ; and they met it by manufacturing a theory 
 of existence which, while it loudly proclaimed the 
 falseness of the world, attributed what may be called a 
 subtle species of existence to it. And besides, this 
 queer theory of existence proved the salvation of the 
 world, inasmuch as it successfully counteracted that 
 tendency to indolence and dereliction which the illusion 
 theory is so eminently fitted to foster and mature. 
 
THE MATA, OR THE ILLUSION THEORY. 
 
 339 
 
 It must also be admitted that the great champions of 
 the Yedantic system could not emancipate themselves 
 thoroughly from the materialistic speculations of the 
 Sankhya school ; and, therefore, while denying most 
 emphatically the existence of gross matter, they seemed 
 inclined to achnit that of tenuous matter or material 
 principles, such as the unperceived principles immedi- 
 ately emanating from Prakriti, according to Sankhya 
 notions. This fact we hope to be able to prove after 
 we have set forth the nature of that ignorance to which 
 creation is traced by the Yedantin. . 
 
 blow we raise the important question, What is the 
 Illusion theory, by which the Parinama or Yikara the- 
 ory of the Upanishads and the Brahma Sutras was so 
 thoroughly superseded ? This question cannot be 
 rightly answered till another question is raised and set 
 at rest. What is Illusion or Ignorance ? There are 
 three well-known Sanscrit words which are met with 
 in almost every page of every standard work on 
 Yedantic philosophy. These are Ajnana, Ignorance ; 
 Avidya, Nescience ; and Maya, Illusion. These words 
 are interchangeable, or of the same import ; and it is 
 because they are somewhat indiscriminately used — the 
 first for the second, and the second for the third— that 
 uniformity of phraseology is endangered, and mystifi- 
 cation is realized. We shall, therefore, make use of 
 the word Ignorance, and avoid the use of the other two 
 synonyms as far as possible. 
 
 What is Ignorance ? The third section of the 
 Yedanta Sar thus furnishes the reply : — 
 
 “ Illusory attribution is the attributing to the real of 
 that which is unreal, as a snake is imagined in a rope 
 which is not a snake. 
 
 “ The ‘ real ’ is Brahma, existence, intelligence, and 
 
340 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 joy, without a second. The 1 unreal ’ is the whole mass 
 of unintelligent things, beginning with Ignorance. 
 
 “ Ignorance, they say, is not describable as existent 
 or non-existent— an entity composed of the three quali- 
 ties antagonistic to knowledge. 
 
 “ (Its existence is established) by one’s own con- 
 sciousness of being ignorant, and also by the Yeda, 
 (which speaks as) the own power of God, concealed by 
 its emanations” (Swetaswatara Upanishad). 
 
 Ignorance is in this passage called the ‘ ‘ unreal ’ ’ and 
 placed in sharp antithesis to Brahma, who is called the 
 “real.” It is, moreover, said to be “unreal,” along 
 with the whole mass of unintelligent things which has 
 emanated from it, as a source of existence. But the 
 moment the conjunction is indicated, or the causal rela- 
 tionship between Ignorance as the cause and the uni- 
 verse as the effect, a difficulty arises. IIow can that 
 which is unreal be a productive cause at all ? The 
 causal efficacy of Ignorance being admitted, its un- 
 reality must be qualified. It is, therefore, said to be 
 “ something not describable as existent and non- 
 existent,” having a subtle species of existence, a species 
 of existence which may be described as an intermediate 
 link between existence and non-existence. In these 
 words we may see the doctrine of varieties of existence 
 developed in Vedanta- Paribhasa foreshadowed. 
 
 It is also said to be an entity, not a positive unreality, 
 like the horn of a hare or the son of a barren woman. 
 And, moreover, it consists, like Prakriti of the San- 
 khyas, of three qualities — sattioa, the attribute which 
 generates and promotes goodness ; rajas, that which 
 generates and promotes activity, and tamas, or that 
 which leads to indolence and stolidity. 
 
 If Ignorance is an entity, eternal, all-diffusive, like 
 
THE MATA, OR THE ILLUSION THEORY. 341 
 
 ether, or rather like Prakriti, its dissolution or destruc- 
 tion is impossible. The Hindus maintain, like some 
 modern scientists, that what is eternal is indestructible. 
 Ignorance is eternal, and it is the source of our bond- 
 age, which will last as long as its cause lasts. Igno- 
 rance being eternal is everlasting, and consequently our 
 bondage, which is co-eternal with it, will last forever. 
 There can, therefore, be no hope of emancipation held 
 forth to alleviate the misery of suffering humanity. 
 But happily Ignorance, though eternal, is annihilable. 
 It is “ antagonistic to knowledge,” and flees before 
 knowledge as darkness flees before light. What the 
 Sankhyas say about their non-discrimination, as regards 
 its eternity and annihilability, the Yedantists predicate 
 of their Ignorance. 
 
 How is the existence of Ignorance proved ? By uni- 
 versal consciousness in the first place. We are all con- 
 scious of being Ignorance-bound, and all the varied 
 systems of Indian Philosophy concur in representing 
 man in his unregenerate state as fettered by Ignorance. 
 Its existence, therefore, is universally admitted. Its 
 existence is further proved by revelation. 
 
 How does Ignorance manifest itself ? Both as “ a 
 collective aggregate” and as “ a distributive aggre- 
 gate.” Every soul is, according to the Yedantic sys- 
 tem, a synthesis of a particle of Ignorance and a parti- 
 cle of Brahma invariably called Intelligence. Every 
 soul, therefore, represents Ignorance in its distributive 
 form or as a distributive a^gre^ate. The Ignorances 
 attached to the innumerable souls in the world ema- 
 nated from and are to be reabsorbed in one mass of 
 Ignorance, called “ Collective Ignorance.” This Col- 
 lective Ignorance, or totality of Ignorance, is called 
 Iswar or God, the Creator and Preserver and Destroyer 
 
342 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of the world. It is, however, not appropriately called 
 Iswar, for it forms only “the causal body” of t his 
 Being. Iswar, like the individual soul, is a synthesis, 
 and consists of the compound of all Ignorances, called 
 Collective Ignorance, and a very large portion of 
 Brahma, the sum total of all the particles of Brahma 
 attached to the innumerable souls in the world. Col- 
 lective Ignorance is, therefore, his causal body rather 
 than his entire self. Distributive Ignorance is in the 
 same way the “ causal body” of the individuated soul, 
 and not its entire self. The relationship between Col- 
 lective Ignorance and Distributive Ignorance is illus- 
 trated in the Yedanta Sar by that subsisting between a 
 “ forest” and “ the trees” of which it consists, or that 
 between a “ lake” and “ the waters” of which it con- 
 sists. 
 
 The relationship between Collective and Distributive 
 Ignorances is thus set forth in section four of Yedanta 
 Sar : “ As, when regarding a forest as a distributive 
 aggregate composed of trees, there is a perception of 
 its manifoldness, which is also perceived in the case of 
 a lake regarded as a distributive aggregate of waters ; 
 so, when viewing Ignorance distributively, we perceive 
 it to be multiplex. • As the Yeda says, ‘ Indra, by his 
 supernatural powers, appears multiform ’ ” (Big Yeda, 
 C, 47, 18). 
 
 “ Thus, then, a thing is regarded as a collective or 
 distributive ang-re^ate according as it is viewed as a 
 whole or as a collection of parts.” 
 
 The portion of Brahma associated with Collective 
 Ignorance, or forming the soul of Iswar, is called ‘ ‘ the 
 most excellent,” and has the qualities of “ omniscience, 
 omnipotence, and universal control ’ ’ attributed to it. 
 It is said to “ abound in pure goodness,” to be “real 
 
THE MATA, OR THE ILLUSION" THEORY. 
 
 343 
 
 and unreal,” ££ imperceptible, tlie internal ruler and the 
 cause of the world.” It will be shown in the proper 
 place that all these attributes belong, properly speak- 
 ing, to Collective Ignorance rather than to the portion 
 of Brahma associated with it ; to the causal body rather 
 than the indwelling soul of Iswar. 
 
 The very small portion or particle of Brahma associ- 
 ated with Distributive Ignorance, or forming the indi- 
 vidual soul, is called “ humble,” and it “ abounds in im- 
 pure goodness. ’ ’ It has ‘ £ the qualities of parvipotence 
 and parviscience” attributed to it. Distributive Igno- 
 rance is its causal body, ££ because it is the cause of the 
 making of, etc.” The portion of Brahma attached to 
 Collective Ignorance is called its Illuminator. ££ Om- 
 niscience is attributed to him (this portion of Brahma) 
 as the illuminator of the whole of Ignorance. As the 
 Yeda says, who knows all (generally), who knows 
 everything (particularly)” (Mundaka i. 1, 3). The por- 
 tion of Brahma attached to the individual soul, called 
 Prajna in contradistinction to Iswara, is parviscient 
 because it illuminates only one Ignorance. ££ The 
 smallness of its intelligence is owing to its being the 
 illuminator of one Ignorance only.” It will be shown 
 that both the collective portion of Brahma and the dis- 
 tributive portion are called Illuminators more by court- 
 esy than owing to any inherent fitness in them to do 
 the work for which they get credit. 
 
 There is, moreover, a disengaged portion of Brahma, 
 appropriated neither to Collective Ignorance nor to 
 Distributive Ignorance ; and this is called the Fourth, 
 the absolute, unrelated, unconditioned Brahma. Why 
 this term is applied to him will be shown when the 
 work of creation, or rather self -distribution, performed 
 by Collective Ignorance, is set forth. Meanwhile let us 
 
344 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 present a couple of extracts from the fourth section of 
 the hook under review in corroboration of our state- 
 ments : 
 
 “ For is there any difference between Iswara and 
 Prajna, who are associated respectively with these (col- 
 lective and distributive aggregates of Ignorance), just 
 as there is none between the ether appropriated (ie. the 
 space occupied) by the forest and that appropriated by 
 the trees composing it, or between the sky reflected in 
 the lake and that reflected in its waters. As it is 
 written in the Yeda, ‘ This is the Lord of all, omnis- 
 cient, the internal ruler, the source of all, for it is the 
 source and reabsorbent of all creatures ’ ’ ’ (Mandukva 
 [Jpanishad 6). 
 
 “ As there is an unappropriated ether, the source of 
 that appropriated by a forest or by its trees, and of 
 that reflected in a lake or its waters, so too there is In- 
 telligence (Brahma) which is not associated with Igno- 
 rance, the source of these two Ignorance-associated 
 Intelligences (Iswara and Prajna). It is called the 
 Fourth. As it is written in the Yeda, ‘ They consider 
 that calm, blissful, secondless one to be the Fourth. 
 That is Soul — that is to be known ’ ’ ’ (Mandukva 7)- 
 
 "Why the unassociated portion of Brahma, the abso- 
 lute, unrelated entity, is called the Fourth, will become 
 apparent when we have set forth the order of creation 
 according to this system. The creative power resides, 
 in reality, in Ignorance, not in the Brahma portion 
 associated with it. Ignorance has two powers — the 
 power of Concealment and that of Projection. 
 
 By its power of envelopment or concealment, Igno- 
 rance, though limited, throws a veil over the infinite 
 soul, and completely cuts it off from our view, just as a 
 small bit of cloud sometimes covers the entire disk of 
 
THE MAYA, OR THE ILLUSION THEORY. 
 
 345 
 
 the sun and makes the luminary invisible. On account 
 of this covering or overshadowing Ignorance, the 
 quiescent soul “ appears to be an agent and a patient, 
 and to experience pleasure, pain, and other mundane 
 conditions, just as a rope, covered by ignorance as to 
 its real nature, appears to be a snake.” 
 
 The power of concealment is the enveloping, not the 
 creative power. This last is the power of Projection, 
 and “ is such that just as Ignorance, regarding a rope 
 by its own power, raises up the form of a snake, etc. , 
 on the rope, which is covered by it ; so Ignorance too, 
 by its own power, raises up, on soul which is covered 
 by it, ether and the whole universe. As it has been 
 said, “ The projective power (of Ignorance) can create 
 the world, beginning with subtle bodies, and ending 
 with the terrene orb.” 
 
 It is to be observed here that Intelligence or Brahma 
 is associated with Ignorance in the work of creation, 
 and represented as the efficient cause. The fourth sec- 
 tion of the book concludes with this statement : “ In- 
 telligence, associated with Ignorance possessed of these 
 two powers, is, when itself is chiefly considered, the 
 efficient cause ; and when its associate is chiefly con- 
 sidered, is the material cause. Just as a spider, when 
 itself is chiefly considered, is the efficient cause of its 
 web, the effect ; and when its body is chiefly consid- 
 ered, is the material cause of it.” 
 
 This, however, is one of those statements in the book 
 which are obviously inconsistent with the spirit and 
 letter of all Vedantic teaching — nay, of all Hindu Phi- 
 losophy. Brahma is described in the latest of the 
 Upanishads, the Swetaswatara Upanishad, as “ with- 
 out parts, devoid of action, tranquil, irreproachable, 
 emotionless.” In this very book Brahma is called 
 
34G 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 “ the substrate of all” — that is, of all the creations of 
 Ignorance, but not certainly its associate in creation. 
 Brahma could not possibly have a desire to create, 
 could not possibly have displayed any activity in crea- 
 tion, without neutralizing that perfect quiescence in 
 which all that is characteristic of him is concentrated. 
 
 The creative power resides in Ignorance, not in the 
 portion of Brahma associated with it. But it may be 
 said that its juxtaposition or association is needed to 
 lead Ignorance to energize. "Why ? Is it because it 
 stirs up the creative power latent in Ignorance by a 
 voluntary action ? or is it because it makes Ignorance 
 fruitful by emitting unconsciously an automatic influ- 
 ence ? The Brahma portion attached to Ignorance 
 could not have led to its energization by a voluntary 
 exertion, because the absolute spirit is, under all circum- 
 stances, associated or unassociated, incapable of volition 
 and action. And its proximity is not needed to drive 
 Ignorance to action, because Ignorance is moved by an 
 inherent power to energize or evolve. Ignorance, 
 therefore, is both the efficient and the material cause 
 of the universe. 
 
 From Ignorance, “ attended by its projective power, 
 in which the quality of insensibility ( tamas ) abounds, 
 proceeds ether ; from ether, air ; from air, heat ; from 
 heat, water ; and from water, earth.” These are the 
 subtle, rudimentary, or non-quintuplicated elements ; 
 and in them “ arise the qualities pleasure, pain, and 
 insensibility in the proportion in which they exist in 
 their cause.” From them, when these qualities 
 manifest themselves, spring the subtle or rudimentary 
 bodies, each of which consists of seventeen mem- 
 bers — the five organs of sense, the five organs of action, 
 the five vital airs, mind, and intellect. The subtle 
 
THE MAYA, OR THE ILLUSION THEORY. 
 
 347 
 
 body consists of three sheaths — the intellectual or 
 cognitional (vij nanarnayalmsa) sheath, consisting of the 
 organs of sense, the ear, skin, eye, tongue, and nose, 
 and intellect ; the mental or sensorial ( manomayakosa ) 
 sheath, consisting of mind and the organs of action, 
 the mouth, hand, foot, excretory and generative 
 organs ; and respiratory ( prana-may akosa ) sheath, 
 consisting of the fire vital airs, respiration, inspiration, 
 flatuousness, expiration, and digestion. The subtle 
 body, consisting of these sheaths, migrates with the soul 
 from one body to another, and is not dissolved till its 
 final liberation and absorption into the universal soul. 
 
 These subtle organisms or bodies, brought into exist- 
 ence by the subtle elements, appear both as a collective 
 aggregate and as a distributive aggregate. “ Here, 
 too, the totality of subtle bodies, as the seat of one 
 intellect (i.e. Sutratma’s), is a collective aggregate, like 
 the forest or the lake ; or as the seat of many intellects 
 (viz., those of individual souls) is a distributive aggre- 
 gate, like the forest trees and the lake waters.” 
 
 The portion of Brahma ‘ ‘ associated with the collec- 
 tive aggregate (of subtle bodies) is called Sutratma 
 (thread-soul), Hiranyagarbha, or Prana, because it 
 passes as a thread through all (the subtle frames), and 
 on* account of the conceit that it is the five uncom- 
 pounded elements possessing the faculties of knowing, 
 desire, and activity {i.e. that it is the subtle body 
 itself).” And the portion of Brahma “ associated with 
 the distributive aggregate of subtle organisms is called 
 Taijasa (the brilliant), because it has the luminous in- 
 ternal organ as its associate.” 
 
 The subtle bodies, in their collective and distributive 
 forms, have an “ experience” which the gross frames 
 can never have. “ These two, the Thread-soul (Su- 
 
34S 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 tratma) and Taijasa, by means of the subtle modifica- 
 tions of the mind, have experience of subtle objects. 
 As it is said in the Yeda, ‘ Taijasa lias fruition of the 
 supersensible.’” It ought to be mentioned here that 
 of the three sheaths of the subtle organism, “ the intel- 
 lectual, being endowed with the faculty of knowing, is 
 an agent ; the mental, having the faculty of desire, is 
 an instrument, and the respiratory, having the faculty 
 of activity, is an effect. ’ ’ 
 
 The unity of the Thread-soul and Taijasa is thus set 
 forth : “ There is no difference between the collective 
 and distributive aggregates of the subtle frames, or be- 
 tween Sutratma and Taijasa, who are associated with 
 them, just as there is none between the forest and its 
 trees, or between the space occupied by each, or be- 
 tween the lake and its waters, and the sky reflected in 
 each.” 
 
 From subtle elements and subtle bodies let us proceed 
 to those of a grosser kind. The gross elements are 
 evolved out of the subtle ones by a process called quin- 
 tuplication. It is thus explained : “ After dividing 
 each of the five subtle elements, ether and the rest, 
 into two equal parts, and then subdividing each of the 
 first five of the ten moieties into four equal parts, mix 
 those four parts with the others, leaving the undivided 
 second moiety of each. As it has been said, ‘ After 
 dividing each into two parts, and the first halves again 
 into four parts, by uniting the latter to the second half 
 of each, each contains the five ’ ” (Panchadasi, i. 27). 
 
 These quintuplicated elements are earth, water, fire, 
 air, and ether. From them “ spring, one above the 
 other, the worlds Bhur, Bhuvar, Swar, Mahar, Janas, 
 Tapas, and Satya ; and, one below the other, the nether 
 worlds, called Atala, Yitala, Sutala, Itasatala, Talatala, 
 
THE MAYA, OR THE ILLUSION THEORY. 
 
 349 
 
 Mahatala, and Patala.” They also give birth to 
 “ Brahma’s egg, the four kinds of gross bodies in- 
 cluded in it, and food and drink.” These four kinds 
 “are the viviparous, the oviparous, the moisture- 
 engendered, and the germinating. 
 
 “ The viviparous are those produced from the womb, 
 as man and animals ; the oviparous are those born 
 from eggs, as birds and snakes ; the moisture-engen- 
 dered are those which spring from moisture, as lice and 
 gnats ; the germinating are those which shoot up from 
 the ground, as creepers and trees.” 
 
 The gross bodies, like the subtle ones, appear as a 
 collective aggregate and as a distributive aggregate. 
 “ In this case, too, the fourfold gross body, viewed as 
 the seat of one (collective) intellect or of many (indi- 
 vidual intellects), is a collective aggregate, like a forest 
 or a lake, or a distributive aggregate, like the forest 
 trees or the lake waters.” The portion of Brahma 
 associated to the collective gross body is called vais- 
 wanara (the spirit of humanity) or meat ; “ (the 
 former) because of the conceit that it is in the whole of 
 humanity, and (the latter) because it appears in various 
 forms. The portion of Brahma associated to each dis- 
 tributed body is called viswct, because, without aban- 
 doning the conceit of the subtle body, it enters into all 
 gross bodies. ” The gross body in its collective and 
 distributive form is called the nutrimentitious (anna- 
 mayakosa) sheath, “ on account of the changes of food 
 (which go on within it and build it up).” 
 
 It is time to refer in detail to the divisions and sub- 
 divisions of Brahma in creation. The Deity is, in the 
 first place, divided into two main portions, one left in 
 its original state of absolute, unconditioned existence, 
 and the other appropriated to Ignorance, which has 
 
350 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 three qualities. This portion of Brahma has various 
 titles, being called Brahma with qualities, Brahma 
 adulterate, illusion- associated Brahma, illusive Brahma. 
 This portion of Brahma is divided into innumerable 
 particles appropriated to the innumerable objects of 
 creation. A portion of it is attached to the collective 
 or universal subtle body, and through it appropriated 
 to all varieties of subtle bodies and the subtle elements 
 called Tanmatras. Another portion is attached to the 
 collective or universal gross body, and appropriated 
 through it to all varieties of gross bodies, and the gross 
 elements and their products, the seven upper and the 
 seven nether worlds. Brahma therefore is found in 
 four different states, which are thus indicated by Major 
 Jacob : 
 
 “ Firstly, with a causal body, composed of Ignorance 
 or Illusion, which in the aggregate is Iswar or God, 
 and distributively, individual souls or Prajna. It is 
 likened to a state of dreamless sleep. 
 
 “ Secondly, with a subtle body, composed of the five 
 organs of sense and of action, mind, intellect, and the 
 five vital airs, seventeen in all. This, in the aggregate, 
 is called Hiranyagarbha, or the Thread-soul, and in the 
 distributive state, Taijasa. It is likened to a state of 
 dream. 
 
 “ Thirdly, with a gross body, composed of the com- 
 pounded elements. Viewed in the aggregate, it is 
 called Vaiswanara, and distributively, Viswa. It is 
 likened to the waking state. 
 
 “ A fourth state is that of the unassociated pure 
 Brahma, who is technically styled the Fourth.” 
 
 But these divisions and subdivisions of Brahma into 
 innumerable parts, associated to various spheres of ex- 
 istence and various classes of objects, subtle and gross, 
 
THE MATA, OR THE ILLUSION THEORY. 351 
 
 cannot but suggest the idea of dualism. How is the 
 integrity of monism to be maintained in the teeth of 
 descriptions so obviously at war with it ? To under- 
 stand this it is necessary to comprehend theYedantic 
 notion of “ illusory attribution” and its “ withdrawal.” 
 Of the former we have the following definition in Sec- 
 tion 3 : “ Illusory attribution is the attributing to the 
 real of that which is unreal, as a snake is imagined in 
 a rope which is not a snake.” The meaning is obvious. 
 Brahma is real , absolute, unconditioned, unrelated 
 existence, without consciousness, without feeling, with- 
 out qualities. But in all ordinary descriptions of 
 Brahma certain attributes and operations are attributed 
 to him. He is represented as omnipotent and omni- 
 scient, as creator and preserver, as associated to various 
 spheres of existence and various classes of objects, as 
 enslaved by and emancipated from ignorance. But the 
 representations by which, he is set forth as conditioned 
 and related, determined by qualities, states, and acts, 
 are all “ false,” knowingly resorted to by the learned 
 for the purpose of making the absolute intelligible to 
 the unlearned. 
 
 The pupil who has qualified himself for Brahma lore 
 and found the accredited teacher, is not expected to 
 grasp the idea of the absolute all at once. He must 
 advance, step by step, from the related to the non- 
 related, from the conditioned to the unconditioned, 
 from the phenomenal to the real. And therefore, in 
 accommodation to his inferior capacities, descriptions 
 are resorted to such as lead him to look upon the abso- 
 lute Brahma as a being conditioned and related. But 
 when his understanding power is expanded, the illusory 
 attribution is gradually withdrawn, and the uncondi- 
 tioned is finally set forth in his original, immutable 
 
352 
 
 niNDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 state of absolute existence. It is therefore said in 
 Section 2 : “ That teacher, with great kindness, in- 
 structs him by the method of illusory attribution {adhy- 
 aropd), followed by its withdrawal (apavada).” 
 
 On this process of instruction Pandit Goreh makes 
 the following remarks : “ Then, an objector may urge, 
 the efficient causativity and material causativity of the 
 spider both appertain to its body ; for the internal 
 organ is called the subtle body, and it must therefore 
 be regarded as body ; and, this being the case, why is 
 a distinction taken between the spider and its body, 
 and the former called efficient cause, and the latter 
 material cause (of its web) ? My reply is that, in the 
 passage of the Yedanta Sar under discussion, the ex- 
 oteric notion is adopted. For when the Yedantins 
 speak of the origin of the world, for instance, they do 
 not believe its origin to be true. This mode of expres- 
 sion they call false imputation. It consists in holding 
 for true that which is false, in accommodation to the 
 intelligence of the uninitiated. At a further stage of 
 instruction, when the time has arrived for propounding 
 the esoteric view, the false imputation is gainsaid, and 
 this gainsaying is termed rescission.” 
 
 The divisions and subdivisions of Brahma set forth in 
 the Yedanta Sar, together with what is said about his 
 association with ignorance and the ignorance-imagined 
 creation, are examples of false attribution ; and all that 
 is needed to make Brahma intelligible in its original 
 essence is its “ withdrawal.” Section 7 shows how this 
 gradual withdrawal takes place, and the Absolute set 
 forth in his original state : 
 
 “ The ‘ withdrawal’ ( apavada ) is the assertion that 
 the whole of the unreal, beginning with Ignorance, 
 which is ail illusory effect of the Real, is nothing but 
 
THE MAYA, OH THE ILLUSION THEORY. 
 
 353 
 
 the Real ; just as a snake, which is the illusory effect 
 of a rope, is nothing whatsoever but the rope. 
 
 “ It has been said, ‘ An actual change of form is 
 called ViTcara, while a merely apparent change of form 
 is called Vivartta. ’ This shall now be illustrated. 
 
 “ The whole of the four classes of gross bodies con- 
 stituting the seat of enjoyment, food and drink neces- 
 sary for their use ; the fourteen worlds, Bhur and the 
 rest, the repository of these, and Brahma’s egg, which 
 is the receptacle of all these worlds — all these are noth- 
 ing more than the quintuplicated elements of which 
 they are made. 
 
 “ The quintuplicated elements, with sound and the 
 objects of sense, and the subtle bodies — all these are 
 nothing more than the non-quintuplicated elements of 
 which they are made. 
 
 “ The non-quintuplicated elements, with the qualities 
 of goodness and the rest, in the inverse order of their 
 production, are nothing more than Ignorance-associated 
 Intelligence, which is their material cause. 
 
 “ Ignorance, and Intelligence associated with it, con- 
 stituting Iswara, etc. , are nothing more than Brahma, 
 the Fourth, the unassociated Intelligence, which forms 
 their substrate.” 
 
 By this process of false imputation or illusory attri- 
 bution and its withdrawal, the meaning . of the great 
 Yedantic watchword, Tat Twam Asi, That art Thou, 
 is made manifest. The word “that” in this mystic 
 sentence embraces the first Yedantic triad — viz., Col- 
 lective aggregate of Ignorance, Intelligence associated 
 with it, called Iswar or God, and represented as pos- 
 sessed of such divine attributes as omnipotence, omni- 
 science, etc., and unassociated, unrelated Intelligence 
 destitute of qualities. Of this triad the first two 
 
354 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 members, Collective Ignorance and Intelligence associ- 
 ated with it, owe their existence to illusory attribution, 
 and have therefore no real existence. The word 
 “that” therefore means absolute, unrelated Brahma, 
 which really exists, and is the substrate of all that ex- 
 ists — viz. , of Ignorance and the Brahma-portion associ- 
 ated with it. The word “ thou” in this great sentence 
 embraces the second Yedantic triad — viz. , Ignorance in 
 its distributive aggregate, the Brahma-portion or Intel- 
 ligence associated with it, called Prajna, and repre- 
 sented as possessed of parviscience, parvipotence, etc., 
 and the portion not thus associated, or associated at 
 all. The first two members of this triad owe their 
 existence to false imputation, and are therefore really 
 non-existent. These being thrown out of calculation, 
 what is left is pure, unassociated Brahma. The sen- 
 tence, then, resolves itself into this : Brahma is 
 Brahma. Therefore the words inscribed on the banner 
 of Yedantism are : Brahma satyam Jag an mithya jiva 
 Brahmaiva naapara (Brahma is true, the ayorld is 
 
 FALSE, THE SOUL IS BRAnMA AND NOTHING ELSE). 
 
 Mr. Goreh proves clearly and indisputably that ac- 
 cording to Yedantic principles the \ T ery existence of 
 Brahma cannot be proved. The cosmological or teleo- 
 logical argument is the great argument by which the 
 Hindu philosopher proves the existence of God ; and 
 this argument cannot be arrayed in favor of divine 
 existence, according to Yedantic principles. The ex- 
 istence of the world must be presupposed before that of 
 God can be deduced as a corollary from it. But 
 Yedantism represents the world as non-existent, a mere 
 illusion, an unreality, a nonentity. The very founda- 
 tion, therefore, of the teleological argument is under- 
 mined. But Brahma, it may be said, is the illumina- 
 
THE MAYA, OR THE ILLUSION THEORY. 
 
 355 
 
 tor, and enables the internal organ or the inner sensory 
 to perceive and cognize ; and the teleological argument 
 may be based upon its operations, if not upon the phe- 
 nomena of nature. But Brahma is called the illumina- 
 tor or creator by courtesy only ; by false imputation 
 rather than with a due regard to truth. Besides, the 
 internal organ itself is an illusion, and all its operations 
 are illusions ! 
 
 But Ignorance exists both in a collective and in a 
 distributive capacity. May not the teleological argu- 
 ment be made to rest on it ? But Ignorance itself is 
 ignorantly imagined, and therefore false. Ignorance 
 certainly cannot be regarded as a material substance of 
 extreme tenuity, all-diffusive and all-embracing ; for 
 it is emphatically said to be different from the Prakriti 
 of the Sankhya school. Nor can Ignorance be regarded 
 as a spiritual substance, for by hypothesis spiritual sub- 
 stance, apart from Brahma, called Intelligence, does not 
 and cannot exist. It has what Dr. Banerjea calls 
 “ conventional existence,” which is, as he says, tanta- 
 mount to non-existence. 
 
 The conclusion, then, to which we are brought is 
 that, as nothing exists but Brahma, the great teleolog- 
 ical argument has not a peg to hang on in the Vedantic 
 system. The other arguments in favor of the existence 
 of God — those based on our intuitive convictions, our 
 sense of responsibility, and our moral nature in general — 
 share its fate. The only argument the Vedantin can 
 utilize is based on what he calls “ testimony” or revela- 
 tion. But, after all, revelation is an illusion, and there- 
 fore nothing in the shape of a reason can possibly be 
 assigned for his unequivocal statements regarding the 
 existence of Brahma. 
 
 Let it also be noted that Brahma, as described in the 
 
356 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 standard documents of tlie Maya school, if not of all 
 Yedantic schools, is a nonentity. Brahma is without 
 attributes, both material and moral. When he is de- 
 scribed as having extension and other material proper- 
 ties, the description is merely conventional, provision- 
 ally resorted to for the purpose of explaining his 
 unrelated and unqualified being. Again, when spiritual 
 powers and dispositions are attributed to him, the 
 attribution is illusory, and must be withdrawn before a 
 proper idea of his existence can be formed. Ife is 
 therefore destitute of both material and moral attri- 
 butes. lie is neither matter nor mind — an inconceivable 
 phantom, an illusion, a nonentity. Yedantism is equiv- 
 alent to the absolute nihilism of Buddha and his fol- 
 lowers ! 
 
 A brief reference to the Yedantic theory of bondage 
 and emancipation is enough to bring us to the conclu- 
 sion of our discourse. The cause of the bondage of the 
 soul is, as in all the schools, Ignorance, which leads to 
 desire, work, and the long chain of transmigration. 
 Ignorance, by its encompassing and projecting power, 
 conceals “ the Secondless, Indivisible Brahma” from the 
 view of the soul, breeds an idea of its difference from 
 the Being with which it is identical, generates a desire 
 to secure pleasure and avoid pain, and leads to works 
 which must bear their fruits in an almost interminable 
 series of births and deaths. And therefore to ensure 
 liberation, all that is necessary is to destroy ignorance or 
 supersede it by right knowledge. The devotee must 
 not only comprehend the meaning of the sentence 
 
 That art Thou,” but understand its counterpart, “ I 
 am Brahma.” lie must notice the illusory character 
 of all that appears to exist, or all that is besides the 
 absolute spirit, and thereby be in a position to say, “ I 
 
THE MAYA, OR THE ILLUSION THEORY. 
 
 357 
 
 am Brahma, the unchanging, pure, intelligent, free, 
 undecaying, supreme joy, eternal, secondless,” 
 
 How is such self-knowledge to be attained ? To 
 acquire that right knowledge which is a stepping-stone 
 to liberation "‘it is necessary to practise (a) hearing 
 ( sravancc ), (l) consideration (mananaf), (c) profound 
 contemplation ( nididhyasano ), and (d) meditation 
 ( samadhi ).” “ Hearing is the ascertaining of the drift 
 
 of all the Vedantic writings regarding the secondless 
 Reality.” “ Consideration is unceasing reflection on 
 the secondless Reality, which has been heard of in con- 
 junction with arguments in support of the Vedanta.” 
 “ Profound contemplation is the continuance of ideas 
 consistent with the secondless Reality, to the exclusion 
 of the notion of body and such-like things, which are 
 inconsistent (with Him).” “ Meditation is of two 
 
 kinds — viz., (1) with recognition of subject and ob- 
 ject (saviJcalpaJca), and (2) without such recognition 
 { 'virvikalpaJca ). ’ ’ 
 
 Here we have the "‘seeded” and the “seedless” 
 meditation of Toga Philosophy, the meditation in which 
 the triad of subject, object, and thought are recognized 
 as different entities, and that in which they are merged 
 into a unity. The means to the attainment of the 
 latter, enumerated in Chapter XIII. of the Vedanta Sar, 
 are the eight accessories of Yoga — viz., “ (1) For- 
 bearance (ijama) ; (2) Religious observances (niyama ) ; 
 (3) Religious postures ( asana ) ; (4) Regulation of breath 
 ( pranayama ) ; (5) Restraint of the organs of sense 
 (pratyahara) ; (6) Fixed attention ( dharana ) ; (7) 
 
 Contemplation ( dhyana ) ; (8) Meditation (samad- 
 hi)” 
 
 The hindrances to such meditation, or “ the medita- 
 tion without recognition of subject and object,” are not 
 
358 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 exactly those enumerated in the Yoga Sastra. They 
 are : 
 
 “1. Mental Inactivity {lay a). 
 
 “ 2. Distraction (vikshepa). 
 
 “ 3. Passion {kashaya), and 
 
 “ 4. The tasting of enjoyment ( rasaswada ).” 
 
 The first of these obstacles may strike us as strange 
 in a system which makes mental inactivity its goal. 
 But the explanation removes the difficulty : “ : Mental 
 inactivity ’ is the drowsiness of the modification of the 
 internal organ while not resting on the second! ess 
 Reality.” "When the obstacles are removed, and dis- 
 criminative knowledge followed by perfect quiescence 
 in, not apart from, the secondless Brahma is attained, 
 the state of the soul is called jivamnukti, which is, 
 being interpreted, “ liberated, but still living.” The 
 devotee in this state is in a manner petrified, though 
 alive. lie moves not, being “ as (the flame of) a lamp 
 standing in a sheltered spot”; ho sees not, hears not, 
 thinks not, breathes not as ordinary mortals do. 
 “ Though he has eyes, he is as though he had them 
 not ; though he has ears, he is as though he had them 
 not ; though he has a mind, he is as one without a 
 mind ; though he has vital airs, he is as though he had 
 them not.” Being alive, he cannot but see, but he 
 " sees not duality, or, if seeing it, regards it as non- 
 duality ;” and when he acts he “is free from (the 
 results of) actions. ” He is above responsibility, and all 
 distinctions, even those between virtue and vice, purity 
 and impurity, neatness and sliabbiness, etc., vanish 
 before him into thin air. “If he who knows the sec- 
 ondless Reality may act as he likes, what difference is 
 there between the lcnowers of truth and dogs in respect 
 of eating impure food ? Except the fact of knowing 
 
THE MAYA, OR THE ILLUSION THEORY. 
 
 359 
 
 Brahma, there is no difference ; the one knows the Self, 
 the other (the dog) does not.” 
 
 Such is the goal of the system ! The Paramhansa, 
 o? the Knower of Brahma, feeding as swine upon filth 
 and living as swine without self-consciousness, thought, 
 perception of physical and moral beauty, recognition of 
 distinction between good and had ; without taste, 
 refinement, sublimity of thought, elevation of feeling, 
 holiness of purpose, and grandeur of aspiration, left not 
 even to the guidance of instinct, and reserved for a state 
 of annihilation in a Being destitute of intelligence and 
 volition, as well as of material properties, and therefore 
 a nonentity ! 
 
 This system has proved a refuge of lies to many a 
 hardened sinner. The perplexed minds which have 
 found shelter in its solution of the problems of exist- 
 ence are few indeed ; but the number of the wicked 
 hearts which have been composed to sleep by the opiate 
 of its false hopes is incalculable. The astute politician, 
 whose past life is a record only of malversation and 
 successful intrigue ; the tyrant, whose progress in life 
 lias been marked by violence and wanton cruelty ; the 
 rake, whom a course of unblushing licentiousness has 
 brought to the verge of a premature grave ; the man 
 steeped in the vice of intoxication and determined not 
 to abandon ; the villain, the ruffian, the criminal, the 
 cunning cheat and the daring rogue, and the false 
 friend and the sneaking hypocrite — what a balm to the 
 seared but not deadened consciences of these, and others 
 as bad as they, in a system which assures them that all 
 their fears arising from their recognition of moral dis- 
 tinctions are groundless, and that perfect beatitude will 
 be their reward if they can only bring themselves to the 
 conclusion that there is no difference between God and 
 
3C0 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 man, virtue and vice, cleanliness and filth, heaven and 
 hell ! Nowhere has the system been so universally 
 tried as in India, and its results here are fitted to lead 
 any candid observer to re-echo the statement — Pan- 
 theism is Pandiabolism. 
 
CHAPTER XII. 
 
 THE HINDU AND CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY CONTRASTED. 
 
 A good deal of morbid sentimentalism is arrayed in 
 behalf of what is called the ancient civilization of 
 India. An attempt is made to give prominence to and 
 speak in terms of praise of the commendable features 
 of national life and the excellences of individual char- 
 acter it has fostered ; and thus far a work, not merely 
 unobjectionable but positively useful, is accomplished. 
 But when an argument is based on these admirable ele- 
 ments of an effete civilization in favor of its perpetua- 
 tion, or against its supersession by a higher and a 
 healthier civilization, a move in a direction on the 
 whole right is transformed into a drag on genuine 
 progress. The civilization of the country, though em- 
 balmed amid sacred recollections, is dead • and it is as 
 impossible to fnake it live as a plastic, formative power 
 as it is to convert the dead language with which it is 
 intimately associated into a living tongue ! 
 
 It is very easy to say that Western and Eastern 
 civilizations ought to help each other by an unrestricted 
 interchange of beauty and glory, the one being ready 
 to adopt and incorporate with its substance the peculiar 
 excellences of the other, and both being ready to co- 
 operate in the great work of raising fallen nationalities 
 and degraded peoples. But the two forces refuse to 
 march alongside of each other, raised above petty jeal- 
 ousies and unseemly antagonisms. The stronger over- 
 
302 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 comes the feebler, and evinces an irresistible tendency 
 to reign alone and unrivalled. The law of the survival 
 of the fittest reigns here as elsewhere ! Those who 
 have carefully watched the progress Western civiliza- 
 tion has made in the country will never hesitate to ad- 
 mit that no compromise is possible between it and the 
 decrepit civilization it has had to encounter ; and that, 
 if its superstructure is to be raised at all, it is to be 
 reared on the ruins of its rival ! 
 
 But Western civilization is by no means faultless, 
 and therefore the fatality in favor of its triumphant 
 march and ultimate ascendency cannot be contemplated 
 with unmixed satisfaction. And it were to be wished 
 that its progress had not been ensured till it had been 
 completely shorn of its objectionable features. But 
 this is not the case with the heaven- bestowed religion 
 with which the very best elements of that civilization 
 are intimately and indissolubly associated. Christianity 
 cannot amalgamate with the religions of the country, 
 and if it is at all to rear its superstructure on Hindu 
 soil, it will be on the ruins of the Hindu religion and 
 the others by which its sway has been for ages and is 
 now being curtailed. 
 
 Christianity represents a philosophy — a philosophy 
 not methodically developed, not intrenched behind a 
 network of definitions, propositions, and syllogisms, 
 but sublime and deep nevertheless, suited to man’s con- 
 dition in life, and in accord with his common-sense and 
 highest reason. Between this philosophy and that 
 enshrined in Sanscrit literature there is very little in- 
 deed that is common, while in all essential features the 
 one is the antipodes of the other. How is a compro- 
 mise possible ? A lasting peace or even a temporary 
 truce ? A compromise may be effected, a peace nego- 
 
HINDU AND CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY CONTRASTED. 363 
 
 tiated, between the dead civilization of Asia and the 
 living civilization of Europe, between languages dead 
 and gone and those which are full of life and vigor. 
 But a compromise between a God-given and a man- 
 invented religion, a philosophy true and a philosophy 
 falsely so called, is monstrous, and should be deprecated. 
 
 But is there not an indissoluble connection between 
 ancient and modern philosophy ? Yes ; there is that 
 sort of connection between the one and the other which 
 exists between the parent and his offspring, between 
 the cause and its effect, between the producing power 
 and the thing produced. Modern philosophy, falsely 
 so called, is the child of ancient philosophy, and differs 
 from it in external drapery rather than in any feature 
 of an essential character. Christianity does not ally 
 itself to the self-sufficient philosophy which in these 
 days is reviving some, if not all, of the aberrations of 
 ancient thought. And therefore a compromise between 
 the varied types of ancient and modem speculation does 
 not indicate any approach on the part of Christian phi- 
 losophy toward a reconciliation at once unnatural and 
 irrational. 
 
 It is our intention in this paper to set forth the 
 difference or rather the contrast between the vital doc- 
 trines of Christian philosophy and those of Hindu Phi- 
 losophy. But before we do so it is desirable to offer a 
 remark or two on the ingenious way in which the 
 sombre character of Hindu Philosophy is explained. 
 Hindu Philosophy is Pessimism. It begins with a recog- 
 nition of human sorrow, goes out in vain in quest of a 
 proper remedy, and ultimately arrives at annihilation 
 as the goal where human misery terminates only in the 
 extinction of life. Even Schopenhauer does not speak 
 of the phenomena of life in terms more lugubrious than 
 
3G4 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 those which form the prominent features of the phrase- 
 ology and nomenclature of philosophy in our country. 
 How is its gloomy character explained ? 
 
 According to Max Muller the Greek intellect was the 
 very antipodes of the Hindu intellect. The Greek was 
 sensuous, of a volatile temperament, alive to the varied 
 charms of the world of the eye, and the ear, and ab- 
 sorbed in its occupations and pleasures. His intellect 
 was vivacious, but not profound ; ready to catch the 
 significance that lies on the surface of things, but un- 
 able to apprehend the deep meaning that underlies it ; 
 while his earth-born impulses drove him toward the 
 present business of life and its ephemeral enjoyments. 
 He therefore distinguished himself as a man of busi- 
 ness, a statesman, an orator, a dramatist, an artist, a 
 son of Mars, or a devotee of pleasure ; and he failed to 
 unfold and expound the deep meaning of the universe 
 or the recondite truths of philosophy. The Hindu, on 
 the contrary, was highly intellectual, insensible to ex- 
 ternal charms, and averse to the grovelling realities of 
 sense and the commonplace incidents of life. His in- 
 tellect was deep, and led him to penetrate instinctively 
 beneath the surface of external nature, and to bring 
 out the jewels of profound truth hidden in its inmost 
 recesses ; while his feelings, chastened by domineering 
 intellectualism, tended to draw him away from the busy 
 scenes of life, with its monotonous round of occupations 
 and pleasures. And therefore he failed to distinguish 
 himself on the busy theatre of worldly success and 
 worldly renown, and succeeded only as an ascetic 
 thinker and recluse philosopher. This contrast can be 
 very beautifully drawn out from universals to particu- 
 lars, from the region of magnificent generalizations to 
 that of petty details. There are, however, some facts 
 
HINDU AND CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY CONTRASTED. 365 
 
 incompatible with the assumption of such a sharp an- 
 tithesis between the intellect of ancient Greece and an- 
 cient India. It is a matter of fact that the generality 
 of people in India were, as they are now, as thoroughly 
 immersed in the revocations and pleasures of life as the 
 generality of people in Greece ; while in that favored 
 cradle of taste and artistic beauty schools of philosophy 
 w T ere not wanting wherein the deep problems of life 
 were as earnestly and as fruitlessly pondered and 
 analyzed as in India. The peculiarly gloomy type of 
 Indian Philosophy cannot be satisfactorily explained by 
 a reference solely to the intellectual differences pointed 
 out by scholars like Max Muller. 
 
 Nor will the specious theory propounded in Buckle’s 
 £< History of Civilization in England ” of itself account 
 for the peculiar type of intellectual development no- 
 ticeable in Hindu Philosophy. Buckle traces all the 
 ethnological peculiarities by which one race is distin- 
 guished from the others to the omnipotent influence of 
 physical causes ; and, according to him, food, soil, cli- 
 mate, and general aspects of nature are enough to ex- 
 plain the idiosyncrasy of Hindu Philosophy, especially 
 as it was elaborated in a country and at a time where 
 and when man had not learned to modify nature, and 
 was therefore irresistibly propelled by its laws and 
 forces. Our Aryan ancestor had in the country a rich 
 5 soil, and much labor was not needed on his part to 
 make it yield enough for his sustenance. He was, 
 moreover, temperate and abstemious ; and his diet, 
 being simple and spare, combined with the enervating 
 influences of a tropical climate in making him indolent 
 and sluggish, prone to fruitless meditation, and averse 
 to the stirring incidents of an active and busy life. 
 Nor were the general aspects of nature in the plains 
 
366 
 
 HINDU PIIILOSOPIIY. 
 
 fitted to magnetize his intellect, during especially the 
 time justly called the season of universal lassitude and 
 languor. This beautiful theory might be adopted but 
 for one serious objection, besides the one which nullifies 
 Max Muller’s representation of the opposite tendencies 
 of the Greek and Hindu intellect. It is a matter of 
 fact that these identical physical causes did not prevent 
 the Rishis of the Rig Yeda times and their followers 
 from leading a life very much like that of the ancient 
 Greeks, and in marked contrast to that of the philoso- 
 phers whose excogitations assumed so gloomy a form. 
 It may be said that the physical causes enumerated by 
 Buckle had not produced their legitimate fruits among 
 the Aryans of Rig Yeda times, who, having come from 
 a colder climate, retained that mental activity and 
 bodily vigor which were impaired gradually under the 
 tropical heat of our country. But it must not be for- 
 gotten that this era of vaunted purity was long enough 
 to give the climate a fine opportunity of displaying its 
 disastrous power in deteriorated physique and enfeebled 
 intellect, the interval between the composition of the 
 earlier hymns and later ones being admittedly no less 
 than a period of three hundred years. It should, more- 
 over, be borne in mind that the Brahmana period, almost 
 equally long, and separated from it by an interval of at 
 least two hundred years, presents the same picture of 
 devotion to sensuous enjoyment which we find depicted 
 in the Rig Yeda. 
 
 The truth is, no single theory cut and dried can of 
 itself satisfactorily explain tne peculiar bent of the 
 Hindu intellect, and the sombre type of the philosophy 
 to which it gave birth. A variety of conditions tended 
 to give the one its introspective character and the other 
 its dark color. Food and climate had their appreci- 
 
HINDU AND CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY CONTRASTED. 3G7 
 
 able influence, but they did not constitute the sole 
 cause of the unique effect. The theocracy established 
 by our Aryan ancestors, so obviously fitted to lead to 
 political inaction by burking independence of thought 
 and freedom of speech in matters affecting the interests 
 even of this life, combined, with the absence of that 
 spirit of scientific inquiry which the ancient world 
 rarely if ewer saw evoked in its vigor and enthusiasm, 
 to breed in the Indian philosopher his habit of morbid 
 introspection, and give his speculations a gloomy char- 
 acter. His intellect was too lofty to allow him to rest 
 content, as common minds do, with the petty concerns 
 of life ; and as he was driven away from its nobler 
 objects and ambitions by the very constitution of the 
 society of which he was an integral part, he had to fall 
 back upon himself for the exercise of those powers of 
 which the world around him refused to make a proper 
 use. He made himself the subject of his study and 
 meditation, and the gloominess he saw within himself 
 was by an easy transition transferred to the picture he 
 drew of human life and the conclusions he based 
 thereon. The Greek philosopher, who had a grand 
 theatre of activity opened for him in a healthier politi- 
 cal atmosphere, looked out of himself \ and made happi- 
 ness the object of his search ; while the Hindu philoso- 
 pher, cut off from such stirring scenes, looked within 
 himself and made extinction of pain the object of his 
 life and thought. His philosophy was emphatically 
 esoteric , or subjective , while that of his Greek brother 
 was on the whole exoteric , or objective. 
 
 To return to the great object of this paper — to show 
 that in all important features the philosophy we have 
 been trying patiently to unfold is the very antipodes, 
 not of ancient Greek philosophy, which was its repro- 
 
368 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 duction in some respects and its counterpart in others ; 
 not of the boasted modern philosophy, in which almost 
 all its important doctrines are revived and presented in 
 fresh garments, but of the philosophy of the New Tes- 
 tament. This antithesis or antagonism will be manifest 
 if we take into consideration its descriptions of (1) God, 
 (2) Creation, (3) Providence, (4) Man, (5) his Duty in 
 Life, (6) the Source of his Present Degradation, (7) his 
 Salvation, and (8) the Prospect before him. 
 
 1. To begin with God. According to Hindu Phi- 
 losophy, God is a nonentity. One, the very first of its 
 six orthodox schools, declares Him non-existent, and 
 opposes a series of arguments, ingenious though incon- 
 clusive, to those brought forward by common-sense to 
 prove Ilis existence. The other schools, however, 
 thought fit to abandon its attitude of rank atheism, and 
 substitute for its appalling negation a Being wrapped 
 up in grandiloquent phraseology, but destitute of any 
 quality fitted to determine it or discriminate it from 
 nothing. God, when kindly allowed to exist, is with- 
 out power, without intelligence, without feeling, with- 
 out material properties and spiritual attributes, or, to 
 speak philosophically, without power, without quali- 
 ties, and without relations. lie is the Pure Being of 
 some schools of Greek philosophy ; but as, according 
 to no less a philosopher than Hegel, Pure Being equals 
 nothing, He is a nonentity. Ancient philosophy 
 labored, not only in India, but in all famous centres of 
 speculative thought, to reduce God to nothing ; and 
 such phrases as “ the Eternal Void,” “ the Everlasting 
 Night,” etc., were most ingeniously invented to set 
 forth Ilis real nothingness under a cloud of high-sound- 
 ing words. And modern philosophers are simply fol- 
 lowing their example in their attempts to maintain the 
 
HINDU AND CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY CONTRASTED. 3G9 
 
 nothingness of God behind an array of imposing tech- 
 nicalities. According to them, God is the Absolute and 
 the Unconditioned. If these technical expressions 
 mean anything, they represent God as Pure Being and 
 nothing more — that subtle, impalpable nonentity which 
 defies every attempt to determine it or give it some- 
 thing like a definite shape. God again is the Infinite, 
 and as such He fills all states and pervades all condi- 
 tions. He cannot be existent, for were He so He 
 would be out of the condition of non-existence. He 
 cannot be omnipotent, for if He were so He would not 
 fill the state of parvipotence. He cannot be perfect, 
 for imperfection is a condition He must pervade as 
 well as perfection. This miserable Being, hanging 
 between life and death, power and weakness, moral 
 excellency and moral turpitude, indeterminate, undefin- 
 able, out of relation to all things, yet the fountain of 
 creation, is the God of modern philosophy. Better by 
 far the idol of the semi-civilized man, which represents 
 some hero of a bygone age, who to a host of vices added 
 at least a few virtues ! Better by far the fetich of the 
 savage, which is in his opinion instinct with life and 
 armed with power, and which when propitiated is be- 
 lieved able to protect the worshipper from some tangi- 
 ble danger or calamity ! 
 
 The God of the Bible is not such a Being. He is not 
 an inscrutable force, a nondescript power of natural 
 selection, a mass of potentialities, a blind, self-evolv- 
 ing principle acting under an iron necessity immanent 
 in or foreign to it. He is a Person, intelligent, volun- 
 tary, infinite in power, wisdom, and holiness. He 
 pervades creation, and is at the same time above it, 
 immanent and transcendent, intramundane and extra- 
 mundane. He is not merely the Creator and Upholder, 
 
370 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 but the Ruler and Governor of the universe. He loves 
 and hates — loves order, harmony, righteousness ; hates 
 disorder, disharmony, and unrighteousness. lie has 
 not, therefore, that sentimental weakness which unfits 
 a ruler for the sterner elements of his vocation. The 
 consistency of the Bible picture of God, drawn by 
 different hands in different places and at different 
 times, under endless varieties of circumstances, and 
 presented in diversified modes — now in a series of provi- 
 dential dealings, then in denunciations of an appalhng 
 nature, and anon in exhortations and appeals which are 
 fitted to melt the hardest heart or bedew the driest 
 eye — is a standing miracle ; while prophetic announce- 
 ments of what God is to do combine with narratives of 
 what God has done in upholding that perfect character 
 of severity and tenderness which nature, through its 
 beneficent and destructive agencies, gives to its Author. 
 
 Yv r e do not wish here to insist on that crowning rev- 
 elation of God which is the characteristic glory of our 
 holy religion, Ilis revelation in Christ Jesus, in whom 
 lie is brought down to the level of our comprehension 
 more than in natural phenomena and providential deal- 
 ings, and in whom therefore He is presented in the 
 only form in which it is possible for us to know, love, 
 and serve Him. Nor do we wish to dwell upon His 
 great work, in which both the sterner and milder feat- 
 ures of the divine character are brought into bold relief, 
 and which therefore is pre-eminently fitted to discour- 
 age sin, and at the same time encourage the sinner to 
 come where pardon, peace, and joy are held in reserve 
 for him. 
 
 2. Let us next contrast the notion of creation em- 
 bodied in Hindu Philosophy with that presented in the 
 Bible. There is no such thing as the ex-nihilo theory 
 
HINDU AND CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY CONTRASTED. 371 
 
 of creation witliin the compass of Hindu literature in 
 general, or philosophy in particular. The maxim 
 navastunovastusiddki, which is the Sanscrit version of 
 ex nihilo nihil fit, underlies, runs through, or permeates 
 all the grotesque cosmogonies associated with it. The 
 Sankhya school assumes a self -evolving material princi- 
 ple called Prakriti, and evolves creation out of its trini- 
 tarian substance. The Yoga school adds God to its 
 categories, but the being whose existence is postulated 
 is a nonentity, and has consequently nothing to do 
 with the creation, preservation, and destruction of the 
 world, all which operations are left exactly where the 
 Sankhya school leaves them, hanging on the potential- 
 ities of its primordial principle. The Logical schools 
 have a God equally passive and quiescent, equally 
 devoid of power, quality, and relation ; while the orig- 
 ination and preservation of the universe are left in the 
 hands of a mysterious and irresistible force called 
 Adrishta, which has atoms of various kinds as its work- 
 ing material. And these four schools concur with one 
 another in maintaining the pre-existence of souls and 
 rendering them useless appendages by forcing them out 
 of all power, quality, and relation. The Mimansa 
 throws all questions of a recondite character into the 
 background, and seems to maintain the eternity of the 
 world along with the Yedas ; while to its champions it 
 is a matter of perfect indifference whether God exists 
 or not. And finally, the Yedantic system in its earlier 
 forms evolves creation out of the substance of God, 
 modified according to its exigencies, and in its later 
 forms represents the whole universe as a gigantic 
 dream. 
 
 In marked contrast to all this, the Bible represents 
 God as the Creator of the world, of its substance as 
 
s:2 
 
 HIXDU PHILOSOPHY, 
 
 well as of its form, as the Personal, Intelligent, and 
 Voluntary Agent who brought entity out of nonentity, 
 things that appear out of nothing, not as the Architect 
 who builded up the universe out of pre-existing mate- 
 rials. The Bible does not compel us to oppose the 
 modern theory of evolution ; but according to it the 
 process begins with an act of creation thoroughly 
 ex nihilo , and progresses in a line, not uninterrupted 
 by fresh acts of direct intervention, under the guidance 
 of infinite wisdom, backed by unlimited power and 
 infinite goodness. The idea of creation, or something 
 brought out of nothing, is as distasteful to modern 
 scientists as it was to our ancient philosophers ; and 
 that because it is inconceivable. But it is forgotten 
 that the theory of spontaneous generation, or of life 
 coming out of dead matter, or that of thought spring- 
 ing out of slime, is equally inconceivable. And if we 
 have to swallow the one theory, we may as well swal- 
 low the other ! 
 
 3. God, according to Hindu Philosophy, is a non- 
 entity, and therefore cannot rule or provide for the 
 exigencies of life. He is in the same predicament with 
 an idol of stone — nay, decidedly worse off. The idol of 
 stone has eyes, but it sees not ; ears, but it hears not ; 
 a nose, but it smells not ; but it consists of some mate- 
 rial of which a proper use may be made. But the God 
 of philosophy is a phantom, and has no existence be- 
 yond the compass of an imagination prone to frivolity, 
 though not destitute of creative power. How is it 
 possible for Him to govern, to control the laws of the 
 material world, guide human volitions, and regulate the 
 complicated machinery of life ? He is therefore very 
 properly thrust into the background ; and a material 
 form such as Prakriti, or metaphysical phantasms such 
 
HINDU AND CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY CONTRASTED. 373 
 
 as Karma or work, Maya or illusion, are posited to 
 regulate the evolutions of providence. Modern philos- 
 ophers have not been slow to follow the example, and 
 such fantastic creations of a prurient imagination as 
 .Natural Selection, Kosmos, Moral Order, Thought, 
 Idea, etc. , have been pressed into service, clothed with 
 gubernatorial powers, and placed at the head of the 
 economy of providence. The scientist substitutes his 
 immutable laws for these intangible chimeras ; but he 
 does not see that, apart from a moving or a regulating 
 power, they are as chimerical as the subtlest phantasy 
 conceived or invented by the spirit of metaphysical 
 refinement or generalization. 
 
 God, according to the Bible, is the Author of Crea- 
 tion and the God of Providence. Nor is TIis govern- 
 ment general, confined to operations and events which 
 are invested with peculiar importance and glory by 
 human beings. His government is minute, particular, 
 or individual, and it comprehends all material move- 
 ments, from those of the largest heavenly bodies the 
 advancing light of which has not yet reached our globe, 
 down to those of a mote scarcely visible in a bright ray 
 of light, and all events, from the political convulsions 
 by which great empires are shaken to their centres, or 
 sanguinary wars by which their boundary lines are ex- 
 tended, down to the pettiest occurrences of the most 
 prosaic of fives — the fife say of a shoeblack or a chim- 
 ney-sweep. “ Are there not two sparrows sold for a 
 farthing ? and one of them shall not fall on the ground 
 without your Father. But the very hairs of your head 
 are all numbered.” Some theistic philosophers are 
 willing to allow a sort of general government of the 
 world and its concerns by God, but they revolt from 
 the idea of representing Him as condescending enough 
 
374 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 to take an interest in tlie dry details of every-day life, 
 or in local idiosyncrasies and individual peculiarities. 
 These persons, however, forget that, as great things 
 are often evolved out of little things, there can he no 
 government at all unless the minutiae, of life are in- 
 cluded, and that our petty distinctions between great 
 and small are not recognized in heaven. Alexander 
 Yinet refers, in one of his very suggestive discourses, to 
 an event in the life of our Lord eminently fitted to 
 show that Heaven takes special notice of many things 
 passed over by us as uninteresting and useless. While 
 Ilis disciples were wrapped in admiration of the great 
 buildings of Jerusalem and its magnificent temple, 
 together with multitudes of rich and well-to-do people 
 passing to and fro in processions more or less pompous, 
 Ilis eyes were fixed on the poor widow who cast into 
 the treasury of the Lord all her living ! 
 
 4. Let us now advert to the picture of man as pre- 
 sented in Hindu Philosophy and that presented in the 
 Bible. Man, according to Hindu Philosophy, is either 
 a lump of matter, or a particle of the divinity, or a mere 
 dream. His dualistic nature is admitted apparently in 
 the Naturalistic and Logical schools ; but the soul to 
 which his body is attached is devoid, like the God gen- 
 erally admitted as existent by their champions, of power 
 and quality, and really, if not apparently, thrown out 
 of all relation to things heavenly as well as earthly. 
 The soul is doubtless said to be related to the body or 
 to nature in general through its material organ, the 
 mind, and is represented as witness of its sufferings and 
 ruler of its movements. But such representation is 
 meaningless, as its ability to see and rule is emphati- 
 cally denied ; and it is moreover neutralized by counter- 
 representations, which make it the passive and unfeel- 
 
HINDU AND CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY CONTRASTED. 375 
 
 ing recipient of impressions made upon the mind by 
 mischievous Prakriti, both pleasurable and painful. 
 But may not its proximity to nature, such as makes it 
 seem active and impressionable when it in reality is 
 thoroughly passive and impassible, suggest the idea of 
 relation ? But its proximity to nature, after having 
 been posited and made the basis of many a weighty 
 conclusion, is emphatically denied. Both its entangle- 
 ment and emancipation are declared fictitious, not 
 real ! The soul, therefore, being set aside, all that 
 remains of man is the body, a lump of matter moved 
 by a law over which he has no control whatever. The 
 Yedantic school converts this lump into a particle of 
 the essence of the divinity, or one of its modes. The 
 question, How the infinite becomes the finite ? is not 
 categorically stated and perspicuously treated of ; but 
 the theory of self- dirempt ion is in a somewhat clumsy 
 manner elaborated in the later documents of the sys- 
 tem. That the infinite is modified in all its infinitude, 
 now into a material form and then into a spirit, may be 
 the import of some passages at least in the Upani shads 
 and the Brahma Sutras ; but later expositions of 
 Vedantism ascribe to the deity an almost endless divis- 
 ibility, by virtue of which one portion remains absolute 
 and unrelated, and others are endlessly divided and 
 subdivided into the innumerable realities of life, both 
 material and spiritual. But the dualism or rather mul- 
 teity involved in such endless emissions and modifica- 
 tions of the divine substance is obviated by the Maya 
 or Illusion Theory, which represents everything, spirit- 
 ual or material, as unreal besides God — the real unity 
 mistaken for variety. According to this last refinement 
 of speculative thought, man is an illusion, or an unreal 
 mode of divine existence ! 
 
376 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 But whatever man is — a modification of the infinite 
 in its entirety, a particle of the divine essence, or an 
 illusion — he is not essentially different from the brute 
 that perisheth, or even from inanimate matter. Ac- 
 cording to Hindu Philosophy in its later manifestations, 
 the inferior animals have souls as well as man, and the 
 precedence the lord of creation might legitimately 
 claim is the superiority of degree rather than of hind, 
 lie is, moreover, not generically different from particles 
 of matter, as each of these either is or has a particle of 
 the universal soul latent in it. Ho where is the modern 
 theory of continuity carried to such perfection as in 
 India ! 
 
 Man, according to the Scriptures, is the crowning 
 apex of the pyramid of creation in this nether sphere. 
 He is dualistic, consisting of body and soul, indissolu- 
 bly or all but indissolubly united. Some Christian 
 philosophers maintain that the body and the soul 
 united in man form a third substance, a tertium quid ; 
 but though this theory may justly be represented as 
 suggesting a chemical fusion inconceivable, the sharp 
 lines of distinction by which the one is separated from 
 the other are by no means sanctioned by the Scripture 
 representations of man. According to these, man is a 
 dualism, the relation between his body and soul being 
 permanent, and involving interpenetration and constant 
 interaction ; and the current belief in a Hades peopled 
 with disembodied spirits needs, in the opinion of some 
 eminent Christian philosophers, correction. Man is 
 intelligent, and his intelligence is not either a particle 
 or a mode of the Divine Intelligence. There are even 
 among Christians habits of thought and expression to 
 which, when not properly explained, serious exceptions 
 may be taken. The relation, for instance, between a 
 
HINDU AND CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY CONTRASTED. 377 
 
 cause ancl effect has been, it is to be feared, pressed 
 too far by some Christian writers in its parallelism to 
 that subsisting between God and the universe. It is 
 affirmed that, as the effect must be potentially in the 
 cause, intelligence and fsee agency in man must poten- 
 tially exist in God. But it is not perceived that such 
 language tends to make human intelligence and will, in 
 all their weakness and perversity, simply modes of the 
 unerring intelligence and the absolutely uncontrolled 
 and uncontrollable will of God ; and that, as divine 
 attributes are inseparable from the divine essence, an 
 identity is established between the nature of God and 
 the nature of man. W e Christians believe in a sort of 
 anthropomorphism, not in pantheistic unity between 
 God and man ; and the Christian position is that man 
 was created in the image of God — that is, clothed with 
 intelligence, power, and free agency similar to but not 
 identical with these elements of the divine nature. 
 We have by anticipation already stated that man is a 
 free agent, and as such a first cause, capable of setting 
 in motion lines of second causes within certain limits 
 and under certain conditions. But is his free agency 
 absolute and uncontrolled ? Some Christian theolo- 
 gians maintain that his will is absolutely free, while 
 others admit some degree of control, not only in the 
 region of action, but in that of volition also. But 
 happily they all concur in maintaining that man is 
 responsible for his thoughts, words, and deeds, even 
 when they are placed under the control of God and 
 are made subservient to the grand purposes of His gov- 
 ernment. Christianity upholds divine sovereignty and 
 human responsibility without pointing out the line in 
 which these two apparent contradictions or, to adopt a 
 well-known Kantian phrase, antinomies, meet. 
 
378 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 5. "We now come to man’s duty in life. Representa- 
 tions of this embodied in Hindu Philosophy are low, 
 and fitted to demoralize him. Ilis aim, according to 
 them, is personal and seltish — his own deliverance from 
 pain. The Hindu philosopher is pre-eminently sub- 
 jective, but his views of pain are characterized by an 
 objectivity inconsistent with the general tenor of his 
 philosophy. Among the varieties of power from which 
 deliverance is described as desirable and necessary, those 
 of an external character — viz. , pains of the body resulting 
 from impurity, disease, and death, or from the inclem- 
 encies of the weather, or from the malignant influences 
 of evil stars, or from the cruelty of demons and hob- 
 goblins — occupy the most prominent place ; while the 
 excruciating mental sufferings attendant on sinful dis- 
 positions and vile passions are rarely, if at all, referred 
 to. The great Buddha attributed the awful amount of 
 suffering noticeable on the surface of the glebe to birth, 
 old age, disease, and death ; and the grossness of con- 
 ception he displayed on this head is characteristic of 
 Hindu Philosophy in general. It was, in short, derived 
 from one of its systems, and gave its color and com- 
 plexion to those elaborated after that reformer’s death. 
 Be this as it may, the aim of the Hindu philosopher 
 is essentially selfish : his own deliverance from pain in 
 its varieties of ghastly forms. That of the Greek phi- 
 losopher was by no means higher, his summmn bonum 
 being happiness. An aim so selfish cannot but lead a 
 man to concentrate his attention upon his own self, to 
 be self-centred and self-absorbed. Under its influence 
 he makes self the centre of his thoughts, feelings, and 
 desires, and all his schemes and projects revolve around 
 it as their pivot or pole. Is it possible for a per- 
 son to be thus absorbed in self without being de- 
 
HINDU AND CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY CONTRASTED. 379 
 
 graded and debased, enfeebled in mind and vitiated in 
 soul ? 
 
 Man’s duty in life is, according to the Bible, to glo- 
 rify God, bis Maker, Preserver, Ruler, and Redeemer. 
 Christianity requires him to renounce and mortify self, 
 and make God the centre of his thoughts and feelings, 
 the goal of his plans and projects, the end, in a word, 
 of his existence. Self-deliverance, self-improvement, 
 or self-glorification is not to be made the aim of life, 
 though these blessings are sure to crown his efforts to 
 serve God with a singleness of eye to His glory. He 
 is delivered from sorrow, exalted and glorified, not be- 
 cause he seeks with all his heart his own beatification, 
 but because his fife is unreservedly devoted to the 
 adoration and service of Him by whom he has been 
 redeemed. Hay, in proportion as his mind is with- 
 drawn from selfish aims and purposes and set “ on 
 things above,” his sorrow of heart disappears, his 
 thought becomes exalted, his feelings purified, and his 
 soul made instinct with an abiding sense of peace, tri- 
 umph, and gladness. The true philosophy of happiness 
 is with him, and him alone. Happiness flies the more 
 it is sought, and the Greek philosopher who eagerly 
 pursued it as the sole business of life found it receding 
 from his grasp in proportion as it was run after, and 
 was ultimately covered with disappointment and shame, 
 as the alchemist in the Middle Ages in his search after 
 the philosopher’s stone or the elixir of life ! This was 
 also true of the Hindu philosopher, ivhose pains multi- 
 plied in proportion as he sought deliverance from them, 
 and who therefore was forced to make self-annihilation, 
 in the literal sense of the term, his summum bonum. 
 The Christian, however, by following the principle 
 “not enjoyment and not sorrow,” does succeed, in a 
 
380 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 pre-eminent degree, in securing the one and fleeing 
 from the other. 
 
 But how is man to glorify God ? By properly and 
 conscientiously doing his work, not certainly by fleeing 
 from the world. Ilis work will become manifest if we 
 take into consideration the position he occupies in this 
 nether creation. lie is, in the first place, a king, and 
 as such he is to subdue the world, to people it, to de- 
 velop its resources, and to make all within his power 
 subservient to the varied purposes of life, the higher as 
 well as the lower. He is, in the second place, a Proph- 
 et, and as such he is to observe, reason, inquire, and 
 investigate, and in this way to rise from the varied ob- 
 jects of nature around him and the events of providence 
 to their correct ideas in the mind of God — the eternal 
 repertory of truth in all its entireness and glory. As 
 a Prophet man is to acquire and spread knowledge, 
 and thereby to benefit the world and his own self. 
 And in the third place, man is a Priest, and as such he 
 is to bring all the precious things in his possession, and 
 his own self as an offering to God, to be under His 
 direction utilized in promoting the highest welfare of 
 the world at large. This threefold duty presupposes a 
 standing revelation and perpetual guidance on the part 
 of God, and the full development of every side of his 
 nature on the part of man ; and it enables him to dis- 
 play, in what may be called the outgoings of his life, a 
 beautiful union of piety with activity, devotion with 
 philanthropy, the sublimity of contemplative retire- 
 ment with the enthusiasm of practical humanitarianism. 
 Man, therefore, glorifies God by making every force 
 within and without him do its appointed work, and so 
 prove conducive to the adornment of the inanimate and 
 the enjoyment of the sentient creation. 
 
HINDU AND CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY CONTRASTED. 381 
 
 G. But in the case of man the quid est is by no means 
 the quid ojporte. In his present condition he neither 
 occupies the lofty position intended for him, nor per- 
 forms the duty intrusted to him. He is obviously de- 
 graded very far below his natural station and voca- 
 tion, despised by the meanest of those over whom he is 
 appointed to rule, debased by error, enslaved by preju- 
 dice, brutalized by passion, and dragged into the lowest 
 depths of shame and misery by a downward tendency, 
 which has, in consequence of an anomalous state of 
 things introduced by his own folly, grown with his 
 growth, strengthened with his strength, and become 
 almost omnipotent and irresistible. One cannot look 
 at his present condition even cursorily without raising 
 the question, What is the cause of his not merely obvi- 
 ous but most obtrusive degradation ? Ignorance, says 
 the Hindu philosopher ; and his reply would not be far 
 from truth if by ignorance he meant ignorance of God. 
 Sin debases and ruins us by darkening our views of 
 God, and thereby leading us to commit the twofold 
 error of withholding confidence from Him and placing 
 it in our own selves. The history of the fall illustrates 
 the way in which moral apostasy in man is initiated 
 and consummated. Adam was induced to believe that 
 the only restriction by which his freedom of action was 
 curtailed was a hardship, not a blessing ; and he most 
 foolishly threw off all allegiance to a Being who had 
 resorted to a mean artifice to check his rise to a proper 
 level, became his own master and guide, and grievously 
 misdirected all the energies of his complex nature. 
 Ignorance may be represented as the cause of man’s 
 present degradation and misery ; and if the Hindu 
 philosopher had, in his theory of ignorance, any refer- 
 ence to the repulsive views of God entertained by man- 
 
3S2 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 land in general, much might he said in favor of his 
 position. Eut by ignorance he meant not ignorance of 
 God, but ignorance either of the difference between the 
 soul and non-soul, or of the essential identity of the ego, 
 non-ego, and the infinite — that is, ignorance in either 
 case of what is a palpable untruth, an ignorance which 
 is bliss indeed ! The Greek philosopher, especially 
 of the Socratic school, also traced human depravity to 
 the same cause — to ignorance of Duty, Moral Beauty, 
 and subtle moral distinctions ; to ignorance of the path 
 of justice to be trodden, and the path of injustice to be 
 avoided. Eut he failed to perceive, amid the cobwebs 
 of his subtleties and refinements, that knowledge of 
 duty is not in this life always associated with the power 
 to perform it ; and that, when not supplemented by 
 grace from on high, it is neither a restraint to vice nor 
 an incentive to virtue. The moral life of the philoso- 
 phers of antiquity in general was, alas ! a proof that 
 the knowledge of virtue is but too often accompanied 
 in this world with the practice of vice ! 
 
 The Christian traces human degradation and misery 
 to a deliberate and wilful transgression of a known law 
 of God. Adam, the progenitor of the human race, be- 
 came the author of sin by an act of disobedience delib- 
 erately committed ; and his sin has, by what may be 
 called incessant self-propagation, plunged into misery 
 all his descendants, one alone excepted, because pre- 
 ternaturally introduced into the all but endless chain of 
 life. The Christian believes in original sin ; and 
 science, after having laughed at it for centuries, finds 
 it convenient now to uphold his belief to maintain the 
 credit of its all-embracing theory of evolution and con- 
 tinuity. The Christian, moreover, believes that in- 
 herited sin is in every man of mature understanding 
 
HINDU AND CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY CONTBASTED. 383 
 
 aggravated by wilful transgression, and that, there 
 being no one that sinneth not, all flesh is guilty before 
 God. “ There is none righteous, no, not one. There 
 is none that nnderstandeth, there is none that seeketh 
 after God. They are all gone out of the way, they are 
 together become unprofitable ; there is none that doeth 
 good, no, not one.” This sad picture is justified by 
 every-day experience, and it sets forth the essence of 
 sin as well as its dire consequences. The essence of sin 
 is godlessness, of which even the man who fulfils the 
 duty of social life faithfully and passes for a man of 
 probity and benevolence is as guilty as the licentious 
 wretch who lias not what a brilliant writer calls “ a rag 
 of reputation. ” Ignorance of God, recoil from Him, 
 distrust in Ilis all-embracing goodness, aversion to 
 what is good, proneness to what is evil, unrighteous- 
 ness and unprofitableness, are all consequences of sin, 
 which therefore is the parent of all the degradation and 
 misery which we see heaped up in the world. 
 
 Sin makes us miserable in two different ways. It in 
 the first place separates us from God, the source of life, 
 light, and joy ; from that dependence without which 
 liberty is but license ; from that cheerful submission 
 without which our will becomes stubborn and intrac- 
 table ; that communion without which the soul is bereft 
 of its genuine enjoyment, and that grace without which 
 true progress is an impossibility. It then darkens our un- 
 derstandings, vitiates our affections and passions, and 
 proves thereby a source of ineffable restlessness and tor- 
 ment to our own selves, and to all around us. F or, though 
 its seat is the heart, it is perpetually issuing out in pu- 
 trid streams of corruption in our life and conversation. 
 The springs and fountains of life within are vitiated by 
 it, and its outgoings cannot but partake of the corrup- 
 
384 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 tion. The history of the world is the history of sin 
 incarnated in words and deeds ; and if the history of 
 the human heart could be written, it would be the his- 
 tory of sin in its original form, in its naked ghastliness. 
 Wilberforce’s argument, that the existence and univer- 
 sality of sin may be proved by the same sort of argu- 
 ment which led Newton to his discovery of the law of 
 gravitation, has not so much stress laid upon it in these 
 days as it deserves. All nature combines with all his- 
 tory to prove the universality of sin, its early develop- 
 ment, and its controlling power ; and it is the height 
 of unphilosophical temerity to deny its existence in the 
 teeth of the universal ruin around us, or to speak of it 
 in sentimental terms as “ virtue in the making.” 
 
 7 . Now we come to the plan of salvation embodied 
 in Hindu Philosophy. That salvation is, in the first 
 place, not universal. It does not embrace in its broad 
 sweep all races, nations, languages, and tongues, or 
 overleap all geographical, ethnological, social, and 
 chronological landmarks. Nor is this salvation the 
 common property of the Hindu nation at large. It is, 
 even within the narrow bounds of our own countiy, the 
 monopoly of the few, not the heritage of the many. 
 From it, as has already been indicated, all orders of 
 society below the sacerdotal are mercilessly excluded. 
 It is true that Kapila, the father of Hindu Philosophy, 
 did strive to include in his scheme distinguished appli- 
 cants from the lower orders, and even select members 
 of the weaker sex ; but his example, though backed by 
 the mighty reform of Buddha, was not followed ; and 
 the exclusiveness by which philosophical salvation had 
 been characterized became stereotyped. Again, the 
 female sex in almost all its entireness is excluded from 
 this salvation. Half the population of the country, 
 
HINDU AND CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY CONTRASTED. 385 
 
 therefore, and the greater portion by far of the remain- 
 ing half, must pine away under the sweeping ban of 
 exclusion. A sort of inferior salvation, with some tem- 
 poral and temporary advantages, is reserved for them ; 
 and the hope of their rise in a future birth to the dig- 
 nity of the priesthood, and therefore a share in the 
 privilege of final emancipation, is held out. But their 
 immediate exclusion is protected by a series of iron 
 rules which nothing can break or even relax. But 
 even of the Brahmin caste the majority are debarred 
 from this grand boon. Only those Brahmins who have 
 fitted themselves by a long and painful process of prep- 
 aration, have successively performed the duties of the 
 student and the householder, may aspire to the blessed 
 exercises which result in emancipation. The narrow- 
 ing process almost brings the privilege down to a 
 point ! Need we say that the Christian salvation is 
 for all mankind, who are invited to accept of it just as 
 they are ? 
 
 The way in which philosophic salvation is attained is 
 a way of thorns and briers, the rugged path of asceti- 
 cism. Separation from family life or family entangle- 
 ments, as the expression is ; retirement tp a forest, fast- 
 ing, mortification, and penance practised for many a 
 long year ; and, above all, self-oblivious meditation — - 
 these are the weapons of war, and the victory is literal 
 annihilation of self. There is no harm in making one’s 
 own self the subject of one’s meditation, provided the 
 object is the ascertainment of truth. From the partic- 
 ular ego within we are led by subjective or introspec- 
 tive meditation to the Universal Ego without, from 
 created intelligence to the primal intelligence, from the 
 will of limited potency to the will of unlimited power. 
 But such progress from the finite to the infinite is not 
 
386 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the object of the Hindu philosopher. His object is to 
 kill the varied states of the mind, thought, feeling, and 
 volition ; to paralyze the nerves and muscles of the 
 body, and deaden consciousness by sheer inaction. But 
 before this state of the positive death of the body and 
 the mind is attained, the devotee is raised above the 
 polarities of nature, and he cannot in consequence bo 
 affected by heat and cold, light and darkness, storm 
 and calm. The instincts of his aesthetic nature are ex- 
 tinguished, and he sees no difference between beauty 
 and ugliness, proportion and disproportion of form, 
 harmonious and heterogeneous mixture of colors. His 
 moral nature is extinguished, and he is raised above 
 moral distinctions, virtue and wisdom being to him in 
 no way different from vice and folly. It is a relief 
 that he does not continue long in this state, and that 
 absolute death comes apace to swallow up and remove 
 from the possibility of doing mischief a mind so com- 
 pletely separated from its legitimate functions ! 
 
 The salvation offered by Christianity is not depend- 
 ent on our righteousness. Our vows and prayers, our 
 devotions and meditations, our penances and mortifica- 
 tions cannot buy it. In its germinal state it is a gift 
 bestowed upon us freely the moment we accept Christ 
 as our Saviour by faith, and in its advanced stages it is 
 matured and perfected by the spiritual nourishment we 
 obtain by simply “looking unto Jesus.” The theory 
 of gratuitous salvation is a peculiarity of our religion, 
 and appears to be the soundest philosophy, when we 
 consider man’s utter helplessness in spiritual matters, 
 his inability to make an atonement for his past sins and 
 transgressions, and effect within himself that radical 
 change without which religion is a sham and an illu- 
 sion ; his inability, in a word, to make amends for past 
 
HINDU AND CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY CONTRASTED. 387 
 
 follies, to shun the bad and cleave to the good. The 
 history of the world, of philosophy and religion, proves 
 to a demonstration that man can neither find God by 
 wisdom nor save himself by work. Supernatural rev- 
 elation and supernatural help are needed from Alpha to 
 Omega to enable man to know, love, and serve God ; 
 and our heaven-bestowed religion embodies the one and 
 shows the way in which the other is obtained and 
 availed of. 
 
 The present result of this salvation, so gratuitously 
 bestowed and so mercifully matured and perfected, is 
 the complete development of man, or his development 
 as far as possible under present circumstances. The 
 result of Hindu salvation is not the subordination of his 
 lower nature to the higher, not the evolution under 
 proper culture of an exalted character, with varied ex- 
 cellences harmoniously blended, but the absolute extinc- 
 tion of his inner and outer nature. Greek philosophy 
 oscillated between sensationalism and intellectualism ; 
 and its aim was, under the guidance of the Sophists, 
 the extinction of intellectual life and the exclusive sway 
 of sensibility ; and under the guidance of the philoso- 
 phers of the Socratic school a reversal of this process — - 
 the death of feeling and the exclusive sway of 
 thought. Greek philosophy was, with reference to this 
 and other matters, onesided, while Hindu Philosophy 
 may be described as no-sided. Christianity recognizes 
 the undesirability and the absolute impracticability of 
 the Hindu ideal, and holds an even balance between 
 sensationalism and intellectualism. Asceticism has 
 prevailed in the Church, and has by no means been an 
 unmixed evil, its aim being not the extinction of human 
 nature, but the due subordination of its lower to its 
 higher element. But it must not be forgotten that 
 
388 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 asceticism was brought into the Church by heathen 
 philosophy, and it has never appeared but in apparent 
 disharmony with the genius of Christianity. The 
 Christian principle is the development of all the ele- 
 ments of the complex nature of man, and we fully 
 accept Buckle’s dictum , that if the religious nature of 
 man were exclusively developed and the other elements 
 thrown out of culture, the result would be a monk or a 
 saint, but not a complete man. Man has varieties of 
 instincts which may be repressed, but which cannot 
 possibly be extinguished. These are love of property, 
 love of comfort, love of society, love of esteem, love of 
 beauty, love of knowledge. Human nature being dis- 
 eased to the very core, it may be desirable under pecul- 
 iar circumstances to suppress a few of these instincts, 
 just as it is desirable in cases of bodily malady to ab- 
 stain from proper food. And God may call upon us to 
 hold a few of them in abeyance for the public weal ; but 
 it ought never to be forgotten that they are all God-given 
 and heaven-implanted, and therefore sacred and inviola- 
 ble. Properly cultivated and developed, they are sources 
 of pleasure and improvement, as when ill-cultured and 
 misdirected they occasion unutterable agony. Chris- 
 tianity does not stand up for their annihilation, but 
 for their proper culture and development. Christianity 
 therefore is not ascetic, nor anti-social, nor anti- 
 economical, nor communistic, nor subversive of order 
 either in human nature or in human society. It is the 
 only religion that has encouraged and fostered culture 
 of the broadest stamp — culture spiritual, intellectual, and 
 aesthetic, culture of piety and humanity in their highest 
 forms. The philosophy of the world extinguishes 
 either the religious nature of man, or his longing after 
 the infinite, or his social nature, or that principle of 
 
HINDU AND CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY CONTRASTED. 389 
 
 benevolence to which the amenities and charities of life 
 are to bo traced. But Christianity unfolds both these 
 apparently antagonistic elements of his nature ; and in 
 the character matured under its influence we have the 
 enthusiasm of humanity now so much talked of, plus 
 the enthusiasm of piety now thrown into the back- 
 ground ! 
 
 8. And lastly we come to the prospect before man, 
 first, according to Hindu Philosophy, and afterward 
 according to Christianity. The prospect according to 
 Hindu Philosophy is annihilation ! The soul, when 
 freed from bondage by mortifications and penances, 
 isolation and meditation, loses its being as a drop in 
 the ocean, either in the one physical or in the one 
 spiritual substance of the universe. The Greek philos- 
 opher did not always point to a better goal. Socrates, 
 not to speak of the schools that preceded him, did at 
 times speak of beatific abode with the gods in a better 
 world as the crowning reward of virtuous life ; but his 
 disciple, Plato, oscillated between materialism and 
 pantheism ; and his followers, the Heo-Platonists, held 
 up the theory of an eternal substance of a spiritual 
 nature engaged in the agreeable work of disgorging 
 and gorging world after world in endless succession ! 
 
 The Gospel has brought life and immortality to 
 light. Christian salvation has results which are proxi- 
 mate and results which are ultimate — a present and a 
 prospective efficacy. Under its auspices, if we are 
 allowed the expression, a new life is begun here, and 
 matured under varieties of conditions, each eminently 
 fitted to retard its development ; but it is not, it can- 
 not be perfected on this side the grave. But its perfec- 
 tion will be realized, under circumstances more propi- 
 tious, in a better and more durable world. Heavenly 
 
390 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 bliss is described in the Bible by images and symbols, 
 which, though not gross and debasing as those in the 
 Koran, are more or less material ; and these have 
 given birth to some grave misapprehensions in the 
 Church and some foolish objections out of it. Chris- 
 tianity is represented as an incentive to the dominant 
 selfishness of our nature, and the Christian is held up 
 as one who serves God and practises virtue solely with 
 a view to the glittering prize or crown placed before 
 him. His own aggrandizement, if not in this world, 
 at least in the world to come, is his paramount motive 
 — his own deliverance from the troubles of this life, his 
 own happiness, his own glorification. This objection 
 is perhaps not groundless when advanced against the 
 gross views of heaven entertained by ill-informed 
 Christians, but it is ludicrously groundless when 
 brought against the sublime views presented, though in 
 a material garb, in the Hew Testament. The crown 
 held up as the great reward of piety and virtue in the 
 other world is a crown of righteousness, the crown 
 which sets forth the immutable righteousness of God 
 and the completed righteousness of the beatified man : 
 the perfection of his nature and the happiness proceed- 
 ing. necessarily from it, not material comfort and pleas- 
 ure. lie looks away from himself in this life, and is 
 happy in proportion as he serves God with a singleness 
 of eye to His glory ; his happiness in heaven will pro- 
 ceed from the same source — service rendered to God 
 with all the powers of a perfected nature, and without 
 the hindrances of this life. Unselfish love to God 
 begun here and perfected in heaven — such is the soui’ce 
 of the happiness Christians experience here, and of 
 that they look forward to as their reward. 
 
 Men are consciously and unconsciously assimilated in 
 
HINDU AND CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY" CONTRASTED. 391 
 
 ■ t 
 
 character to the gods they worship. Augustine in his 
 Confessions sets forth the principle in these well-known 
 words : “ Terence introduces a profligate young man, 
 justifying his lewdness by the example of Jove, while 
 he beholds on the wall a picture of Jupiter and Danse, 
 and excites himself to lust as by divine intuition : 
 £ Shall he, who shakes heaven with his thunder, do 
 these things, and may not I, a poor mortal, do the 
 same ” The vices current in the country are in 
 nine instances out of ten fac similes of the vices of the 
 gods and goddesses adored by our countrymen. The wor- 
 shippers of Krishna become as a rule licentious ; of Ma- 
 hadeva, smokers of intoxicating drugs ; of Kali, blood- 
 thirsty Thugs. From this law of assimilation the phi- 
 losopher is not excluded. The object of his worship, or 
 rather contemplation, is a Being without power, qual- 
 ity, and relation, a magnificent Nothing ; and it is no 
 wonder that he should by a painful process of mortifi- 
 cation endeavor to reduce himself to nothing by extin- 
 guishing his consciousness, thought, feeling, and mus- 
 cular energy. That he does not succeed is no fault of 
 his. He wishes and strives to be like his god, and his 
 present aim as well as his future prospect is annihila- 
 tion. The Christian also tries to be like the object of 
 his worship — the Lord Jesus Christ — and he daily 
 grows in piety, humility, meekness, and benevolence ; 
 and the prospect before him is perfection in these and 
 other kindred virtues. Is it necessary to say that 
 while Hindu Philosophy is Pessimism Christian philoso- 
 phy is Optimism in the highest sense of the term ? 
 
 A word ought to be said under this head about what 
 Christian salvation has in reserve for the body. Ko 
 mercy was shown, no quarter given the human body in 
 the schools, generally speaking, of ancient philosophy, 
 
392 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 in our own or in foreign countries. It was described 
 as the seat of corruption and impurity, and its purifica- 
 tion was placed beyond the confines of possibility. 
 Matter and sin could not, according to approved phil- 
 osophical maxims, be dissociated from each other any 
 more than breath and physical life ; and the only way 
 in which the soul can be saved from sin is by its com- 
 plete deliverance from material claims. So irreclaim- 
 ably impure is matter, that God was thrown out of 
 direct relation to it that He might not be contaminated 
 by its inherent and inalienable corruption. The Hindus 
 made an emergent Deity the nexus between God and 
 creation, and the Heo-Platonists held the doctrine of 
 the transcendence of God at the expense of His imma- 
 nence, making a primal potency, the idea of ideas, the 
 intermediate link of connection. The mystics of the 
 Middle Ages adopted the notion, and in our time Swe- 
 denborg recognized in Christ the nexus between God 
 and the universe. Christianity, however, sets forth 
 the original purity if not the absolute impeccability of 
 the body, and offers it a share in its salvation. The 
 body is involved in the consequences of sin, and has 
 become the abode of deformity, disease, and death ; 
 but its deliverance from these fatal results and its ulti- 
 mate glorification are insured. The whole man sins, 
 the whole man is involved in the dire consequences of 
 sin, the whole man is delivered from these, and the 
 whole man is glorified — such is the glorious fruit of the 
 scheme of salvation revealed in the Gospel. 
 
 In conclusion let us ask, Is an amalgamation between 
 Hindu and Christian philosophy possible ? The ques- 
 tion is ahnost as absurd as the other, Is an amalgama- 
 tion between darkness and light possible ? A God 
 without power, quality, and relation amalgamated with 
 
HINDU AND CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY CONTRASTED. 393 
 
 a God with power, quality, and relation ! A man with 
 a perfectly quiescent soul, thoughtless, passionless, in- 
 voluntary, with a man with a soul endowed with 
 thought, emotion, and volition ! The idea of enthral- 
 ment occasioned by sin, with the idea of enthralment 
 occasioned by failure to recognize the essential distinc- 
 tion between soul and non-soul ! The idea of gratui- 
 tous salvation, with the idea of salvation wrought by a 
 painful process of penance and meditation ! Life in 
 an utterably more glorious stage of existence, with the 
 frightful void of absolute annihilation ! The reconcili- 
 ation is impossible, and the less people talk of it the 
 better ! 
 
 The history of the Church is full of warnings against 
 any attempt on our part to allow our doctrine to be in 
 the slightest degree influenced and modified by human 
 philosophy. The experiment was unhappily tried in 
 the Church not long after the days of the apostles, and 
 the result is known. Justin Martyr in the Sub- Apos- 
 tolic, and Tertullian and Origen in the Post- Apostolic 
 times incorporated a little of their philosophy with the 
 pure theology of the Xew Testament, and ages elapsed 
 before the Church was emancipated from the influence 
 of the heterogeneous mixture. Asceticism crept into 
 the Church and tinctured its theology and practical 
 morality ; and it was not till science had discovered 
 the correct principles of hygiene, sanitation, political 
 economy, and social science that its fetters began to be 
 broken and shaken off. Perhaps they have not been 
 entirely cast off yet ; but the day is not far off when 
 the influence of an asceticism imported from schools of 
 false philosophy and self-righteous Pharisaism will not 
 be felt, at least to an appreciable degree. Science has 
 in various ways benefited the Church. It has dis- 
 
394 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 enthralled it from many wrong notions and erroneous 
 interpretations of revealed truth, and it is destined to 
 he a potent antidote to those gloomy ideas of morality 
 which have placed Christianity in antagonism to the 
 spirit of broad and comprehensive progress it has fos- 
 tered. False science and false Christianity are antag- 
 onistic to each other, the object of the one being the 
 adornment of our temporal life to the exclusion of that 
 to which it is a stepping-stone, and that of the other 
 being the maintenance of the interests of the soul at 
 the expense of those of the body. 
 
 Christianity successfully points out the path of true 
 felicity in this life, as well as in that which is to come. 
 In its work of renovating man it begins with humility, 
 perfect self-distrust, and perfect self-abnegation. It 
 sets forth the feebleness, the utter inadequacy of our 
 own resources, so far as our spiritual emancipation and 
 elevation are concerned, and it leads us to look aloft 
 for that help which we cannot possibly derive from our 
 own selves. It begets faith in us, and leads us eagerly 
 to avail ourselves of the revelation which God has 
 made of Himself and our duty to Him, and of the 
 plenitude of help He has promised on condition of 
 simple reliance on His goodness and might. It invites 
 the soul to God, and the soul has freely communicated 
 to it that life of love and beneficence of which He is the 
 fountain. Nor are faith and love the only source of 
 felicity opened up in the tempest-tossed heart. Hope 
 is also generated which raises him above temporal 
 mists and clouds, and exultingly grasps the inheritance 
 which is incorruptible and undefiled, and which fadeth 
 not away. Without this lively hope our joy cannot 
 bo complete. Trials and temptations will cross our 
 path, and imperfections cling to us till the last moment 
 
HINDU AND CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY CONTRASTED. 395 
 
 of our earthly life. One of the great Fathers of the 
 Church said very justly : “ This is the only perfection 
 of men — to know themselves imperfect. ’ ’ And holy 
 men have in every age been conscious of imperfection 
 and impurity in proportion to the nearness attained by 
 them to God and heavenly things. Such conscious- 
 ness, growing as years roll on, will, in addition to the 
 inevitable trials of life, be a source of sorrow and de- 
 pression to the godly soul in the midst of its earnest 
 endeavors to serve God. Something is needed to sus- 
 tain it amid the fluctuations of the inner and the vicis- 
 situdes of the outer man ; something to prove a coun- 
 terpart to that intense longing for perfection which 
 the very best men are the most conscious of. Chris- 
 tianity, with the most complete knowledge of the deep- 
 est yearnings of the heart, supplies this something — - 
 a hope which will survive the crash of our earthly feel- 
 ings, and end only in fruition. The path of humility, 
 faith, love, hope is the path of pleasantness and peace 
 pointed out by our holy religion ; while the path of 
 self-sufficiency, self-dependence, self-deception, and 
 self-destruction is that which philosophy points its 
 finger to ! 
 
SUPPLEMENT. 
 
 HINDU ECLECTICISM. 
 
 One of the trials incident to missionary life in a 
 semi-civilized country like India has scarcely had due 
 prominence given it. The Indian missionary lives, like 
 his brother worker in less civilized heathen lands, in what 
 the late good Bishop Thompson very appropriately 
 called “ a moral pest-house and he has difficulties of 
 a general character, arising out of human nature, cur- 
 rent systems of belief, defective intellectual culture, a 
 low type of morality, and various other sources, to 
 grapple with. But he has some peculiar trials, and 
 these begin as soon as he begins his conscientious 
 preparation for his work. lie has to study languages 
 which, whatever might be said by the champions of 
 philology of their affinity to his, are to him a jargon to 
 be mastered with immense trouble. lie has, more- 
 over, to master a literature which is barren and unin- 
 structive, a philosophy which bewilders rather than 
 strengthens the mind, a mythology which is a tissue of 
 puerility and obscenity, and systems of religious belief 
 so corrupt that their ascendency is the best proof that 
 can be given of the Scripture doctrine of human de- 
 pravity. Is it a wonder that, in the teeth of such a 
 formidable mass of useless reading, a few missionaries 
 have proved recreant and taken to work less trouble- 
 some and apparently more productive ? 
 
HINDU ECLECTICISM. 
 
 397 
 
 The idea deserves expansion. Quiet and system- 
 atic study is a pleasure of the most refined if not the 
 sublimest stamp, to a minister of the Gospel in a 
 Christian land. His mind literally feasts and fattens 
 on the graces of genuine poetry, the facts of reliable 
 history, the verities of true science, and the truths of 
 sound philosophy ; and even when he has, in the due 
 discharge of his duty, to master current systems of er- 
 ror, he finds them embodied, as a rule, in readable 
 books, or propounded with some regard to approved 
 rules of taste in composition and logic in reasoning. 
 His reading is not only pleasant but profitable, and the 
 more thoroughly he gives himself to it the more thor- 
 oughly he expands his mind and broadens his sym- 
 pathies. His brother worker in the vineyard of the 
 Lord in Hindustan is very differently circumstanced in 
 this as in many other respects. Study is to him a 
 painful rather than a pleasurable duty, and the result 
 is often a burdened rather than an invigorated mind, a 
 bewildered rather than an expanded intellect. The 
 trouble he has to take in mastering foreign languages 
 and making them his own is not without profit, is 
 amply repaid by accessions of intellectual vigor, such as 
 linguistic study is invariably accompanied with and 
 followed by. But whatever study he applies himself to 
 after having done this preliminary work is a weari- 
 some task. If he wishes to study poetry, and through 
 it to obtain an insight into the manners and customs of 
 the people he has to deal with, he has to fight his way 
 not only through extravagances of an exceedingly 
 vicious style of composition, but through a heap of epi- 
 grams, anagrams, chronograms, and stuff such as his 
 sold abhorretli. If history attracts him, he has, in 
 order to glean a few sporadic facts of at best doubtful 
 
398 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 historical value, to vratle neck-deep through the rub- 
 bish of mythology and fable. If philosophy is his 
 forte, a tremendous mass of verbosity and logomachy, 
 of sophisms and quibbles, before which those embodied 
 in the wildest speculations of the Middle Ages are as 
 specimens of correct reasoning, is before him ; while 
 he can scarcely get a correct idea of the many-sided 
 and hoary religion he has to understand, face, and 
 overcome, except after being literally lost in the 
 dreary wastes of an unnaturally developed and corrupt 
 literature. 
 
 But what, it may be asked, has the missionary to do 
 with such literature and such philosophy ? He has to 
 preach Jesus Christ and Him crucified, and his busi- 
 ness is to fit himself by rapidly picking up a foreign 
 tongue for this work of paramount importance. Such 
 assertions have been more than once ventured by men 
 who, while earnestly engaged in doing good among a 
 nominally Christian people, find time to elaborate beau- 
 tiful theories on the best method of carrying on evan- 
 gelistic work among the heathen. That the simple 
 story of Jesus Christ and Him crucified is, after all, the 
 truth on which the regeneration of Christian and non- 
 Christian lands, as well as that of individual souls, 
 must ultimately hang, no sane Christian will venture 
 to deny. This story, ever fresh, is inherently fitted to 
 touch the dead heart into life and infuse vigor and 
 vitality into effete nationalities and paralyzed civili- 
 zations. But a great deal of rubbish has to be re- 
 moved, especially in heathen lands like our own, ere 
 its legitimate consequences can be realized ; and a 
 patient and persistent study of false religions, and the 
 complicated systems of false philosophy indissolubly 
 associated with them, enables the missionary to throw 
 
HINDU ECLECTICISM. 
 
 399 
 
 out of the way those heaps of prejudices and errors 
 which make it impossible for the simple story of the 
 cross to reach and influence the heart. The theorists 
 who think that modes of operation which have been 
 successful among nominal Christians must needs be suc- 
 cessful among the heathen, brought up amid time-hal- 
 lowed systems of theology and philosophy, falsely so 
 called, have only to migrate from the one department 
 of work to the other to be convinced of their error, and 
 forced to exclaim, with redoubled vehemence, “ Old 
 Adam is too strong for young Melanchthon !” 
 
 One of the many ancient books fitted to illustrate the 
 peculiar trial to which attention has been called is the 
 4 ‘ Bhagavad Gita , 5 ’ the precious book which may 
 justly be represented as the fountain-head of Hindu 
 eclecticism besides the Suaredasware Upanishad. The 
 missionary can scarcely maintain any intercourse with 
 the reading classes in India without hearing the work 
 eulogized and extolled in the most extravagant terms 
 possible. It embodies the loftiest flights of the 
 sublime philosophy of Asia, and presents the cream, 
 so to speak, of Hindu morality and Hindu religion. 
 It is replete with doctrines which stand unrivalled in 
 sublimity and grandeur, truths of a transcendental 
 order set off by sentiments of an elevated type, 
 and precepts which, if generally reduced to practice, 
 would convert this sin-stricken world into a veritable 
 paradise. As regards its style, human tongue can 
 scarcely describe its beauty and loftiness, while the 
 man must be a consummate dullard who fails to see 
 that it is a masterpiece of correct reasoning as well as 
 a model of composition. The missionary, moreover, 
 finds these testimonials indorsed by learned oriental- 
 ists, who, as a class, have the knack of perceiving 
 
400 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 beauty where ordinary mortals see nothing but deform- 
 ity, excellency of arrangement and cogency of reason- 
 ing where others see nothing but confusion worse con- 
 founded. With bright anticipations — anticipations 
 generated by recommendations both indigenous and 
 foreign — he opens the book and enthusiastically begins 
 its perusal, and lo ! his disappointment commences. 
 Instead of an elegant style, he finds extravagances of 
 diction from which even the worshippers of Dr. John- 
 son in his own country would recoil in horror. lie 
 sees incoherence rather than logical consistency, con- 
 fusion rather than lucidness of thought, naked sophisms 
 instead of convincing arguments, and crude notions and 
 jarring sentiments agglomerated into a philosophy of 
 the most heterogeneous and the wildest character, 
 while the harsh transitions, incongruous metaphors, and 
 tiresome repetitions he has to wade through would 
 justify even a prostrating fit of homesickness on his 
 part. 
 
 One must one’s own self read this book in the original, 
 or a literal, verbatim translation of it, such as Thomp- 
 son’s, which will be our itinerary or guide-book in our 
 research into its contents, to be convinced of the sound- 
 ness of these remarks. We do not expect the general 
 reader — we mean the reader who has not made Orien- 
 tal literature his specialty — to indorse our criticism or 
 to extend to the toil-worn foreign missionary the sym- 
 pathy we have always felt for him ; and we are afraid 
 that our self-imposed task of setting forth the contents 
 of this time-hallowed book may, after all, be thankless. 
 But we must correct an error carefully tended and 
 nourished by a class of philosophers in America who 
 are striving to naturalize the belief that the fundamen- 
 tal ideas of all religions are alike, and that an attempt 
 
HINDU ECLECTICISM. 
 
 401 
 
 to set up one religion on the ruins of others is unjust 
 as well as uncalled for. And we therefore raise the 
 question, What is Hindu eclecticism ? The proper 
 answer to this question is furnished by the Theol- 
 ogy, Anthropology, Soteriology, and Eschatology 
 of the “ Bhagavad Gita.” Let us call attention to 
 these departments of the book, or rather to the con- 
 tents of the book, which, though presented in promis- 
 cuous heaps, without much regard to the advantages of 
 a luminous, concatenated arrangement, may, by a not 
 unnatural application of the laws of analysis, be 
 classed under these heads. 
 
 To a correct appreciation of its teaching under these 
 heads some account of the work itself, its origin, its 
 relative position in Hindu literature, and its influence 
 in the development of religious life in our country is a 
 sine qua non. 
 
 Some preliminary remarks of a somewhat historical 
 character will therefore be first made. The “ Bha- 
 gavad Gita,” or the Song of Bhagavad or Krishna, ono 
 of the nine incarnations of Yishnu, appears in the “ Ma- 
 habharat ’ 3 as one of its multitudinous and grotesque 
 episodes, one of those almost innumerable legend- 
 ary tales to which, along with those enshrined in the 
 “ Itamayana,” the peculiar excellences and defects of 
 our national character are to be traced. It presents, in 
 poetical language, a philosophical dialogue between 
 Arjun, the most estimable of the characters depicted 
 in that epic, and the above-named god, Krishna, who, 
 in the form of man, acts in the humble capacity of his 
 charioteer. The origin of this dialogue, or rather 
 monologue, as Arjun appears more as a hearer than as 
 a speaker, is set forth with poetic coloring and exaggera- 
 tion. Arjun sees before him the two hostile branches 
 
402 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of tlie tribe to which he himself belongs — that is, his 
 own relatives and kinsmen — in battle array facing each 
 other, and ready to plunge in dire conflict, and the 
 siprht sends a chill of horror into a heart distinguished 
 alike by courage and tenderness. He is unnerved, his 
 limbs become palsied, the hairs on his body stand on 
 end, the blood of his heart is curdled, his head becomes 
 dizzy, and the great consecrated bow in his right hand 
 drops down as if from an arm suddenly struck with 
 paralysis. lie is unwilling to fight, to further schemes 
 of self-aggrandizement by slaughtering his own kins- 
 men in cruel, fratricidal war, or to wade through the 
 blood of his own relations to the unsubstantial and 
 ephemeral glory of an earthly throne. He recognizes 
 divine nature beneath the humble exterior of his char- 
 ioteer, and anxiously inquires if, under the circum- 
 stances, he is not justified in retiring from the field 
 before the clang of trumpets and the clash of arms 
 make retreat on his part dishonorable and cowardly. 
 This question and others, which as his mind grasps one 
 new truth after another he puts one by one, draw out 
 of the divine interlocutor a series of discourses which, 
 besides nerving him for the approaching conflict, open 
 the eyes of his mind to a variety of mystic truths re- 
 garding his own personality, that of the being he is 
 privileged to question, and the real, occult nature of 
 the inanimate world around him. The immediate re- 
 sult of the conversation is a great change in his con- 
 victions. lie sees truth both absolute and relative, 
 shakes off his temporary weakness, rushes into close 
 encounters, sweeps everything before him, and main- 
 tains, amid scenes of carnage and desolation, the char- 
 acter of a brave, all-conquering, but at the same time 
 noble-minded and generous warrior. 
 
miTDTT ECLECTICISM. 
 
 403 
 
 But though raised up in popular belief with the 
 “ Mahabharat,” and presented ordinarily as an inci- 
 dent of its great plot, it bears unmistakable marks of 
 a much later origin. It is, in the first place, replete 
 with references, both direct and incidental, to the 
 varied schools of philosophy which flourished in India 
 long after the stirring scenes of its Heroic Age had 
 been enacted. The Sankhya philosophy is frequently 
 referred to by name, and the author’s predilection for 
 or adherence to its fanciful cosmogony is discovered in 
 unmistakable terms. The Toga philosophy is the 
 subject of a number of direct as well as oblique allu- 
 sions, and its doctrine of emancipation consequent on 
 hermit solitude, meditation and penance stands out in 
 bold relief from its pages. And, lastly, the uncompro- 
 mising pantheism of theYedant, which is also named, is 
 the underlying basis of all its characteristic thoughts 
 and ideas. Again, the “ Bhagavad Gita” sets forth 
 the caste system, not in the crude, embryonic state in 
 which it appears in the “ Mahabharat, ” but in the 
 matured, fully developed state in which it appears in 
 the Institutes of Menu, our national legislator, whose 
 caste regulations have ruled India for ages untold. 
 The essential difference between the four primal castes 
 is herein dwelt upon with marked emphasis, and the 
 duties devolved upon each, and carried down by the 
 law of heredity from father to son, are particularized in 
 such a manner that its composition posterior to the age 
 of the compilation of the Institutes, and consequently to 
 that of the “ Mahabharat,” appears to be a certainty. 
 And, lastly, the Krishna cultus, with its mystic notions 
 of Bhakti or faith, is the most characteristic feat- 
 ure of this philosophico-religious treatise ; and no one 
 with even a superficial knowledge of the history of Hin- 
 
404 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 duisra will venture to call in question the compara- 
 tively recent origin of this worship. When these 
 chronological data are put together, the conclusion at 
 which orientalists like Monier Williams have arrived — 
 namely, that the book was written about the second 
 century of the Christian era, or about the time when 
 Greek eclecticism flourished at Alexandria — will appear 
 irresistible. 
 
 The state of things which led to its composition by 
 an unknown author, its ascription to the learned, ver- 
 satile author of the “ Mahabharat,” and its incorpora- 
 tion with that long epic, may be guessed rather than 
 ascertained by proper investigation. The philosophi- 
 cal systems which had been elaborated and matured in 
 the schools had popularized an ideal of piety which, 
 though incompatible apparently with the business of life, 
 has always proved peculiarly attractive to the Hindu 
 mind, if not to the human mind in general. Intense 
 contemplation in solitude, resulting in complete mastery 
 over self, stoic indifference to the occurrences of life, 
 painful or pleasurable, extinction of desire, holy calm, 
 and imperturbable quiescence — such had been the stand- 
 ard of piety set up by the philosophical speculations of 
 the varied schools of thought, of which the eclecticism of 
 the “ Gita” may justly be represented as an offshoot. 
 And the more its excellence had been appreciated the 
 more had a distaste for the avocations of life been 
 created and a rush toward hermit solitude realized. 
 Kor had the morbid hankering after the enjoyment of 
 undisturbed meditation in sequestered places been con- 
 fined to the higher orders of society, to the sacerdotal 
 and military castes ; it had come down from the apex 
 to the very base of the social pyramid, and the indus- 
 trious trader and even the vile serf had separated them- 
 
HINDU ECLECTICISM. 
 
 405 
 
 selves from useful and indispensable toil, and swelled 
 the ranks of devotees drawn away from the turmoil 
 of busy life to the repose of serene contemplation. 
 The social machinery, worked by the forces emanating 
 from the caste system, had been unhinged, and a reac- 
 tion against the results of philosophical speculation was 
 needed to secure its or their harmonious operation. 
 That reaction was initiated by the eclecticism of the 
 “ Gita,” which not merely restated with emphasis the 
 divine origin of the caste system, but made the duties 
 enjoined by it essential to salvation. But the author 
 of this ancient treatise, whoever he was, could not 
 emancipate himself from the influences either of the 
 philosophical speculations which he tried to work up 
 into a composite system, or of the ideal of piety popular- 
 ized thereby. And so he vibrates between conflicting 
 sentiments, and ultimately upholds what at first he 
 seems determined to oppose and counteract. The 
 eclecticism of the ‘ ‘ Gita, ’ ’ like every other syncretistic 
 movement, either in the history of philosophy or that 
 of religion, proved a failure ; but some of the ideas it 
 popularized have continued to influence Hindu society 
 ever since the period of its composition. Its attempt 
 to work heterogeneous systems of philosophic thought 
 into a homogeneous whole is scarcely appreciated, even 
 among people who would exhaust the vocabulary of 
 praise in speaking of its literary merit and ethical pu- 
 rity and excellence. But its attempt to uphold the 
 caste system and make the duties enjoined by it step- 
 ping-stones to the higher degrees of perfection attained 
 only by quiet meditation in sequestered places, has 
 proved a grand success, as we shall have an opportuni- 
 ty of showing. But the real excellence of some of the 
 principles to which it has given currency cannot screen 
 
40G 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 it from the charge of a lack of earnestness or laxity of 
 principle which makes its speculations incoherent and 
 its conclusions unsatisfactory. The lax accommodating 
 spirit of compromise, the evil star, so to speak, of all 
 systems of eclecticism, from the oldest of those which 
 flourished in times of yore down to that which was 
 recently transferred wholesale from Boston to Cal- 
 cutta, is at once the most characteristic and culpable 
 feature of this philosophico-religious treatise. 
 
 Having brought our notice of the state of things to 
 which the composition of the “ Bhagavad Gita” is to 
 be traced to a close, we are at liberty to call attention 
 to 
 
 I. Its Theology. The theology of the “ Gita” is 
 not merely tinctured with, but is nothing more or less 
 than the absolute pantheism of the Yedant. The 
 difference is not to be traced in the creed of the sys- 
 tems, which, in its important features, is one and the 
 same, but in the manner in which this creed seems to 
 have been arrived at. The Yedant arrived at its un- 
 mitigated pantheism through the pathway of judicious 
 rejection, while the “ Gita” arrived at the same goal 
 through the pathway of a somewhat unnatural though 
 dexterously effected amalgamation. The Yedant came 
 to its grand idea of unity of substance by rejecting two 
 of the three entities held by three of the foregoing 
 schools of philosophic thought, while the “ Gita” came 
 to its grand idea of unity by merging these three en- 
 tities into one substance. To explain this, a little refer- 
 ence to the foregoing schools of philosophy, or rather 
 to the principles inculcated in these schools, is neces- 
 sary. Let us begin with the Sankliya system of 
 Kapila, which is chronologically, perhaps, the first of 
 the six systems into which philosophical speculation 
 
HINDU ECLECTICISM. 
 
 407 
 
 developed in India about five or six centuries before the 
 birth of Christ. This system, apparently if not really, 
 is dualistic, and it admits the eternal co-existence of 
 two entities, the primordial, self-evolving form, called 
 Prakriti, and the human soul, Purush. The primordial 
 form, or nature in its original essence, passes through 
 varied processes of evolution, gives birth to intelli- 
 gence, egoism, the elements, both subtle and gross, 
 the senses, and the powers of action, and finally 
 the mind, called the eleventh organ, through which it 
 entraps the soul, eternal and pure, and makes it miser- 
 able by begetting in it desire and aversion, such as neces- 
 sarily lead to action. This system explains the phenom- 
 ena of creation on thoroughly atheistic principles ; 
 and its rampant atheism led to its condemnation among 
 a people more thoroughly religious than even the 
 Athenians, whose fervor in religious matters was eulo- 
 gized by the Apostle of the Gentiles. It was therefore 
 supplanted by the theistic Sankhya of Patanjali, who 
 to the two admitted entities of his atheistic prede- 
 cessor added another entity, namely, God. This 
 triadism was upheld by the two Logical schools which 
 eventually followed the Sankhya schools in the path- 
 way of philosophical investigation ; but, though fitted 
 to satisfy the religious longings and aspirations of the 
 Hindu heart, it was too complex to satisfy the 
 generalizing tendency of the Hindu mind. And so it 
 was made to shrink into monism under the auspices of 
 the Yedantic school, which retained God and cast over- 
 board the other two entities associated with Him. 
 But the pantheism of the “ Gita” is not elaborated in 
 this way. The “ Gita” admits the existence of the 
 three entities of the Sankhya philosophy of the the- 
 istic type, and of the Logical schools. The divine 
 
408 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 interlocutor, Krishna, dilates in the fifteenth chapter, 
 as in many other places, on his identity with the 
 world at large, but at the same time calls attention to 
 the existence of two entities beside or rather in himself. 
 Here are the words : 
 
 “ And I alone am known to be by all the Vedas, and 
 I am the composer of the Vedant, and also the inter- 
 preter of the Vedas. These two spirits exist in the 
 world, the divisible and also the indivisible. The di- 
 visible is every living being. The indivisible is said to 
 be that which pervades all. But there is another, the 
 highest spirit, designated by the name of the Supreme 
 Soul, which, as the imperishable master, penetrates 
 and sustains the triple world. Since I surpass the di- 
 visible and am higher than the indivisible, I am, there- 
 fore, celebrated in the world and in the Vedas as the 
 highest Person.” 
 
 This extract shows how the triadism of the theistic 
 Sankhya is made to consist with the monism of the V e- 
 dant. The divisible spirit is the essence of the soul, 
 dwelling in the Supreme Spirit as his better or superior 
 portion, and individualized in man — the individuated soul 
 being but a portion of this element of divinity. The in- 
 divisible spirit is the Prakriti of former schools, or es- 
 sence of matter, which forms the inferior part of the 
 divine nature, and which appears in varied forms in the 
 objects of nature around us. These two entities which 
 Vedantism casts overboard are merged in the all-em- 
 bracing divine nature by the author of the “ Gita,” ac- 
 cording to whom the Supreme Soul is a compound of 
 the essence of all individuated souls and the essence of 
 all material phenomena. The Supreme Spirit is repre- 
 sented as evolving the world out of his inferior element, 
 and the souls of men out of his superior element. The 
 
HINDU ECLECTICISM. 
 
 409 
 
 union, therefore, effected in the “ Gita” is exactly 
 similar to the union between the tiger and the lamb 
 when the latter was in the former ! 
 
 Pantheism thus elaborated is the theology of this 
 philosophico-religious dialogue or monologue ; and in- 
 numerable are the passages in which the divine inter- 
 locutor, Krishna, represents himself as the original, es- 
 sential, all-embracing, all-pervading Deity. The sub- 
 limest type of egoism with which even pantheism 
 familiarizes us are tame in comparison with that which 
 characterizes his discourses concerning his own mystic 
 personality. All the figures and images by which the 
 essential identity of the Creator with the creation is set 
 forth in the sacred books of the Hindus, and which, 
 moreover, give a peculiarly imposing aspect to their 
 voluminous literature, are heaped upon him in these 
 discourses. He represents himself as the luminous ele- 
 ment of the sun and moon, the heat of the fire, the 
 brilliance of the flame, the light of lights, and the radi- 
 ance of all radiant objects. He represents himself as 
 the sound of ether, the fragrance of the earth, the 
 everlasting seed of existing things, the life of all living 
 things, the father, mother, husband, forefather, sus- 
 tainer, friend, and lord of the world. According to 
 Monier Williams’s somewhat free version, he concludes 
 his description of his own all-pervading personality, or 
 rather essence, with these words : 
 
 . . . “ I am its (world’s) way and refuge, 
 
 Its habitation and receptacle. 
 
 I am its witness. I am victory 
 
 And energy ; I watch the universe 
 
 With eyes and face in all directions turned. 
 
 I dwell as wisdom in the heart of all ; 
 
 I am the goodness of the good ; I am 
 Beginning, middle, end, eternal time, 
 
410 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 The birth and death of all. I am the symbol A 
 Among the characters. I have created all 
 Out of one portion of myself.” 
 
 This passage, so decidedly instinct with lofty egoism, 
 gives prominence to the second of the fundamental ideas 
 of the system of theology propounded in this book. It 
 ought to be borne in mind that the “ Bhagavad Gita” 
 embodies an attempt not merely to reconcile jarring 
 schools of philosophic thought, but to effect a union 
 between philosophy and popular mythology. And so, 
 on the system of absolute pantheism evolved out of the 
 dissertations of the schools, we see grafted the theory 
 of incarnation, propounded and illustrated in popular 
 mythology. The speaker is not an ordinary emanation 
 from the Deity, but the Deity himself in the form of 
 man, and he calls himself not only Adhyatma, the 
 Supreme Soul ; Adhibhuta, the Supreme Exist- 
 ence ; Adhidaivata, the Supreme God ; but Adhi- 
 yajna, the Supreme Sacrifice. The Hindu doctrine 
 of the cyclic incarnation of Yishnu, the second per- 
 son of the Hindu triad, is clearly set forth, and the 
 object of these periodic manifestations of the Deity is 
 mentioned, namely, ‘ £ to establish righteousness. ’ ’ 
 The divine interlocutor not merely represents himself 
 as an incarnation of God, not merely refers to his past 
 incarnation, not merely dwells on the great object to 
 accomplish which he comes down periodically in va- 
 rious forms from on high, but, at Arjun’s special re- 
 quest, appears in his “ celestial form” (Monier 'Will- 
 iams’s translation) : 
 
 “ Endowed with countless mouths and countless eyes. 
 
 With countless faces turned to every quarter, 
 
 With ornaments and wreaths and robes divine. 
 
 With heavenly fragrance and celestial weapons, 
 
HINDU ECLECTICISM. 
 
 411 
 
 It was as if the firmament were filled, 
 
 All in an instant, with a thousand suns 
 Blazing with dazzling lustre ; so beheld he 
 The glories of the universe collected 
 In the one person of the God of gods.” 
 
 The last two lines are eminently fitted to correct the 
 mistakes into which Mr. Thompson has fallen, of as- 
 suming that the personality of the Godhead is clearly 
 set forth in the “ Gita.” God is certainly spoken of 
 in many places as a person endowed with attributes 
 generally ascribed to the Deity, and even moved by 
 infinite compassion to come down, in various forms, to 
 establish righteousness ; but the personality ascribed to 
 God is merely a collection of the “ glories of the uni- 
 verse.” A consistent, coherent system of theology 
 cannot possibly be evolved out of the jarring sentiments 
 brought into one focus in the “ Gita,” any more than a 
 homogeneous body of speculative divinity or practical 
 religion can be evolved out of the vaunted eclecticism 
 of the nineteenth century — the eclecticism, we mean, 
 which has been distilled from the writings of Theodore 
 Parker at Calcutta, if not transferred wholesale. But 
 the theology embodied therein settles down, after ap- 
 pearing in varied forms, into that pantheism which as- 
 sumes the existence of an all-pervading substance rather 
 than of an intelligent voluntary agent, as the founda- 
 tion of existence in all its diversified aspects or modes. 
 
 II. The Anthropology of the “ Gita” is in keeping 
 with its theology, and, like it, vibrates between the tran- 
 scendental notions of the schools and the coarse ideas 
 embedded in popular mythology and religion. Man is 
 represented as a union of body and soul, the former a 
 portion of the indivisible material essence in the Deity, 
 and the latter a portion of his higher nature, the spirit- 
 
412 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ual essence. The dualistic nature of man is set forth 
 in the following extract (Chapter XIII.): 
 
 “ This body, O Son of Kunti, is called Kshetra. 
 Those who know the truth of things call that which 
 knows this (Kshetra) Kshetrajna (knower of the 
 body). And know, also, that I am the Kshetrajna in 
 all Kshetras, Bharat. That which is the knowledge of 
 the Kshetra and Kshetrajna is considered by me spirit- 
 ual knowledge. The great elements, the egoism, the 
 intellect, and also the principle of life and the eleven 
 organs and the five objects of sense — desire, aversion, 
 happiness and unhappiness, multiplicity of condition, 
 reflection, resolution— (all) this is briefly denominated 
 Kshetra with its passions. ’ ’ 
 
 Place this in juxtaposition with the following quota- 
 tion from Chapter XY. : 
 
 “ An eternal portion of me only, having assumed life 
 in this world of life, attracts the mind and the five 
 senses, which belong to nature. Whatever body the 
 Sovereign Spirit enters or quits, it is connected with it by 
 snatching those senses from nature, even as the breeze 
 snatches perfumes from their very bed. This spirit ap- 
 proaches the objects of sense by presiding over the ear, 
 the eye, the touch, the taste, and the smell, and also 
 over the mind. The foolish do not perceive it when it 
 quits the body, nor when it remains (in it), nor when 
 actuated by the qualities it enjoys (the world). But 
 those who have the eyes of knowledge do perceive it. ’ ’ 
 
 These two extracts set forth the author’s predilection 
 for and belief in the cosmogony of the Sankhya school, 
 and his anxiety to infuse thereinto the pantheism of 
 the Yedant, as Yedantic philosophers themselves did 
 less conspicuously. Indeed, the author does nothing 
 more or less than transfer wholesale the cosmogony of 
 
HIMDU ECLECTICISM. 
 
 413 
 
 the former school and substitute for its self-evolving 
 material principle, Prakriti, the self-evolving spiritual 
 substance of the latter school. The process of evolu- 
 tion remains the same, intelligence giving birth to 
 egoism or consciousness, and through it to the subtle ele- 
 ments, namely, sound, feel, color, sapidity, and odor ; 
 and the five organs of action, namely, the larynx, hands, 
 feet, and the excretory and generative organs. And, 
 lastly, the mind or the eleventh organ is created, and all 
 the evils of life are realized through its ceaseless and 
 malignant activity. The ultimate power of this series 
 is, however, not the primordial form of materialism, but 
 the spiritual substance of pantheism, with its conscious- 
 ness and varied mental powers potentially, if not actu- 
 ally, present in it. This spiritual substance, it must be 
 borne in mind, appears in the “ Gita” embodied as a 
 rule in an all-embracing infinite personality with a two- 
 fold nature, the inferior element manifested in the va- 
 rious modes of material existence, and the superior in 
 those of spiritual life. 
 
 But how does the theory of cyclic incarnation, or of 
 a series of incarnations culminating in Krishna, the 
 divine interlocutor, consist with this view of pantheistic 
 thought ? Are ive to suppose that the modern theory 
 of incarnation, that we mean which makes the Lord 
 Jesus Christ the crowning point of a graduated scale of 
 incarnations, was anticipated in India about two millen- 
 niums ago ? We have no doubt but that it was, though 
 the theory does not appear stated with logical precision 
 either in this book or any other work on Hindu Phi- 
 losophy and Hindu religion. Plow little has modern 
 rationalism added to the results philosophical specula- 
 tion displayed in ancient times ! The theology of the 
 “ Gita” renders the essential unity of the human race 
 
414 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 a logical necessity or an inevitable logical sequence. 
 If all men are portions of the Deity, both as regards 
 their bodies and as regards their souls, whatever 
 difference we may notice among them must be a differ- 
 ence of degree, not a difference of kind — quantitative, 
 not qualitative. This irresistible conclusion is, how- 
 ever, evaded by the author. He is a Brahman as well 
 as a philosopher, and one of his main objects in the com- 
 position and circulation of this philosophico-religious 
 treatise is to uphold the caste system in its fully devel- 
 oped form at all hazards. And so he cheerfully sacri- 
 fices logical consistency at the altar of the social god, 
 whose ascendency must be re-established after the tem- 
 porary confusion created by philosophical speculation. 
 And he unhesitatingly maintains the essential difference 
 between the recognized castes. The following passage 
 shows that the division of labor introduced by that 
 system is dependent, according to our author, on original 
 propensities rather than on the mere accident of educa- 
 tion : 
 
 “ The offices of Brahmans, Ivshatriyas, Yaishyas, 
 and Sudras, O harasser of thy foes ! are distributed 
 according to the qualities which predominate in the 
 dispositions of each. Tranquillity, continence, mortifi- 
 cation, purity, patience, and also rectitude, spiritual 
 knowledge, and spiritual discernment, belief in the ex- 
 istence of another world, comprise the office of a Brah- 
 man, sprung from his disposition. Valor, glory, 
 strength, firmness, ability in warfare, and also keeping 
 one’s ground, liberality, and a lordly character, are the 
 office of a Kshatriya, sprung from his disposition. 
 Agriculture, herding of kine, and commerce are the 
 office of a Vaishya, sprung from his disposition. Ser- 
 vitude is the peculiar office of a Sudra, sprung from his 
 
HINDU ECLECTICISM. 
 
 415 
 
 disposition. Each man who is satisfied with his office 
 attains perfection.” — Chapter X'Y II. 
 
 III. The last line brings us to the Soteriology of 
 the “ Gita,” a subject of paramount importance, inas- 
 much as we see reflected in it the notions of salvation 
 now current among our countrymen. The soteriology 
 of the “ Gita” appears at first sight to have been a re- 
 action against that of the schools, the jarring theories 
 of which it endeavored to weld into a homogeneous 
 whole. The watchword of the schools was quiescence, 
 but that of the “ Gita” seems to have been action. 
 The schools systematically opposed action, and repre- 
 sented it as the source of all our trouble. According 
 to their teaching attachment to the world breeds desire, 
 and desire breeds action, and action breeds merit or 
 demerit, and merit or demerit brings in its train 
 reward or punishment and a fresh transmigration, and 
 all the evils associated with it. Action, therefore, with 
 its antecedents and consequents, should be annihilated 
 or superseded by meditative stillness and quiescence, 
 ere the vexed spirit can be liberated from the thral- 
 dom of transmigration and merged into the material 
 or divine essence as a drop in the ocean. The schools 
 were certainly at loggerheads with one another on many 
 of the fundamental questions of theology and science, 
 but they were unanimous in denouncing action and up- 
 holding passive contemplation as essential to salvation, 
 in the Hindu sense of the term — that is, absorption into 
 the Deity. Moreover, this doctrine of the schools was 
 by no means received by the people at large as a beau- 
 tiful theory to be revolved in the mind for a few min- 
 utes and then quietly shelved. On the contrary, ear- 
 nest souls from all ranks of society succumbed to its fas- 
 cinating influence, separated themselves from needed 
 
41G 
 
 IIINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 work, botook themselves to hermit solitude, and wasted 
 their energies in indolent meditation. To remedy this 
 growing evil the “ Gita' ’ appeared, with its watch- 
 word action , opposed to the passiveness and quiescence 
 of the schools ; and the arguments by which it sustains 
 its position are eminently fitted to influence for good 
 even the contemplative Hindu, who looks forward to 
 annihilation in the Deity as the sumrrmm bonum. 
 Action, the “ Gita” maintains, is inevitable. The dev- 
 otee must breathe, his blood must circulate, the varied 
 portions of his body must discharge their functions to 
 enable him to give himself to that quiet and contem- 
 plative life which has such an irresistible charm for 
 him. Moreover, he must eat and drink a little in 
 order to sustain life, and this means action. Action, 
 then, being inevitable, to denounce it as the cause of 
 all our sorrows and discomforts, and attempt its ex- 
 tinction, is not true philosophy. 
 
 But action, the schools maintain, is fructescent, and 
 must bear its fruit either in reward or in punishment, 
 and thereby prolong the chain of transmigrations. 
 The author of the “ Gita” admits that action is fruc- 
 tescent, but he maintains that it is not invariably so. 
 When action is performed with a view to rewards or 
 punishments — that is, when action is performed with 
 interested motives, it bears fruit, prolongs the chain of 
 transmigrations, and perpetuates the misery of exist- 
 ence. But when action is performed without any 
 regard to consequences its effect is salvation, not pro- 
 longed enthralment. Hot action in general, but ac- 
 tion with interested motives, action from selfish desires 
 and selfish aims, ought to be denounced. The neces- 
 sity of action being admitted, the question arises, W hat 
 course is action to take ? Or, in other words, What 
 
HINDU ECLECTICISM. 
 
 ■417 
 
 are men to do to be saved from the misery of pro- 
 longed existence % The “Gita,” in reply to this im- 
 portant cpiestion, does not give an uncertain sound. 
 Men are to perform the duties of their castes, nothing 
 more and nothing less. The track chalked out for a 
 man by the rules and regulations of his caste is to him 
 the path of righteousness and salvation ; and on it he 
 is safe, it being absolutely impossible for him to go 
 wrong while treading it patiently and perse veringly. 
 “ It is better to perform one’s own duty, even thougli 
 it be devoid of excellence, than another’s duty well. 
 He who fulfils the office obligated by his own nature 
 does not incur sin. One should not reject the duty to 
 which one is born, even if it be associated with error, 
 for all (human) undertakings are involved in error, as 
 fire is by smoke. ’ ’ 
 
 But the soteriology of the book, like its theology and 
 its anthropology, is involved inextricably in confusion, 
 because the author, while determined to give prominence 
 to some principles of a practical stamp, seems to have 
 been unable to free himself from the fascinating influ- 
 ence of the ideal of piety held up by the schools — the dev- 
 otee seated cross-legged or standing still and immova- 
 ble beneath the outstretched branches of a shady tree, 
 with his eyes fixed on the tip of his nose, his breath reg- 
 ulated according to fixed rules, his mi nd concentrated 
 on one theme or object of contemplation, his passions 
 and appetites not merely controlled but extinguished, 
 his desires and aspirations subsiding into a holy calm, 
 the serenity of his soul making him impassible or in- 
 different to hunger and thirst, heat and cold, pleasure 
 and pain, and his entire self, separated from its acciden- 
 tal surroundings, merged into the Deity. Ho Hindu 
 thinker, in the days of our author, however broad 
 
418 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 might lie his thoughts, could contemplate this picture 
 of tranquil meditation without being instinctively led 
 to recognize its immense superiority to the hustle and 
 turmoil of an active life. And so the author of the 
 “ Gita,” like the great Buddha himself, after flying 
 from it for a moment, swung back to it with redoubled 
 momentum. And its theory of salvation is the theory 
 to which universal homage is paid in Hindustan to- 
 day — the theory, we mean, which makes an inferior 
 degree of salvation hang on karmayoga, or the devo- 
 tion of works, while salvation in the fullest sense of the 
 term is only attainable through the pathway of gvan- 
 yoga, or the devotion of knowledge or hermit solitude 
 and concentrated meditation. 
 
 IV. The Eschatology of the book need not de- 
 tain us long. The Hindu doctrine of transmigration, 
 with its ascending and descending series of animated 
 bodies, innumerable births and deaths, terminating, 
 after the slow cycle of ages innumerable, in absorption 
 in the Deity, is the basis in all its speculations on this 
 subject. It, however, recognizes one principle which 
 should not be passed over unnoticed — namely, tlial? a 
 man’s condition in the world to come is determined by 
 his meditations rather than action in this life. 
 
 “ He who, remembering me at the moment of death, 
 quits the body and comes forth, enters my nature, 
 there is no doubt about that. Or again, whatever na- 
 ture he thinks on when he abandons the body at the 
 last, to that only does he go, O son of Ivunti ! having 
 been always conformed to that nature. Therefore 
 think of me at all times and fight. ” 
 
 It is impossible to enumerate the superstitions to 
 which this and other passages of the sort have given 
 birth, or the various expedients adopted to direct the 
 
HINDU ECLECTICISM. 
 
 419 
 
 thoughts of the dying Hindu to the incarnation of 
 Yishnu, who is the principal interlocutor in this dia- 
 logue. The Hindu father of the Yaishnab sect, or 
 the sect which upholds the worship of Yishnu in pref- 
 erence to that of any other god, to that either of 
 Brahma, the first, or Maheshwar, the third person in 
 the Hindu triad, gives names to his male children, 
 such as may in the hour of death recall the Deity to 
 his mind ; or he writes some of his hundred and eight 
 names on his sacred garments and on his arms and on 
 the palms of his hands, that his eyes may fall on them 
 and bring up associations fitted to pave his way to 
 heaven before they are closed forever. The immoral 
 principle that man, however bad his life has been, will 
 enter heaven if at the moment of his death he repeats 
 the name of Yishnu, is a legitimate deduction from 
 such a passage, though perhaps the author and his com- 
 peers did not foresee the wrong use which has been 
 made in subsequent ages of their unguarded state- 
 ments ! 
 
 We confess we do not rise from the perusal of this 
 time-hallowed and extravagantly venerated book with 
 a very high opinion of its contents. The devotee 
 who, amid the enlightenment of the nineteenth century, 
 represents God as the life of every living thing, from 
 man down to the meanest worm, and the aggregate of 
 all forces, mechanical, chemical, electric, and magnetic, 
 as the sum total, in short, of all forms of life and all 
 material agencies, may be in raptures when speaking 
 of its teachings. The self-styled anthropologist, who 
 throws overboard the supernatural element in Chris- 
 tianity, and represents it as a development of or an 
 outgrowth from pre-existing religious ideas, may see 
 in it a grand stepping-stone to the rapid progress made 
 
420 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 in subsequent ages in religion and morals. But we are 
 ordinary mortals, with no pompous titles, and we can- 
 not help representing its general teaching, theological 
 and moral, as on the whole pernicious, even while we 
 are not backward in recognizing the excellence of a few 
 truths and principles scattered up and down among its 
 miscellaneous contents. We have no hesitation what- 
 ever in affirming that this and other books of the sort 
 have, on the whole, been so many drags on rather than 
 incentives to the progress of the world in religion and 
 morals, and we fearlessly oppose this bold assertion to 
 the sentimental talk which is unhappily gaining ground 
 even in the churches of Christendom. 
 
DATE DUE