A DISSERTATION ON MIRACLES: CONTAINING AN EXAIUNATION OF THE PRINCIPLES ADVANCED BY DAVID HUME, Esq. IN AN ESSAY ON MIRACLES: WITH A CORRESPONDENCE ON THE SUBJECT BY MR HUME, DR CAMPBELL, AND DR BLAIR. TO WHICH ARE ADDED, SERMONS AND TRACTS. BY GEORGE CAMPBELL, D.D. PRINCIPAL OF THE MARISCHAL COLLEGE, AND ONE OF THE MINISTERS OF ABERDEEN ; AUTHOR OF THE TRANSLATION OF THE FOUR GOSPELS, &C. &C. TUe works tlictt I do in mi/ Father's name, Ihey bear witness of me. John x. 23. A NEW EDITION. LONDON PRINTED FOR T. TEGG & SON, 73. CHEAPSIDE; R. GRIFFIN «: CO. GLASGOW; AND JOHN GUMMING, DUBLIN. MDCCCXXXIV. MDCCCX Printed by Walker K- Greig, Edinburgh. ADVERTISEMENT. It is not the only, nor even the chief design of these sheets, to refute the reasoning and objections of Mr Hume with regard to miracles : the chief design of them is, to set the principal argument for Christianity in its proper light. On a subject that has been so often treated, it is impossible to avoid saying many things wliich have been said before. It may, however, with reason be affirmed, that there still re- mains, on this subject, great scope for new observations. Besides, it ought to be remembei-ed, that the evidence of any complex argument depends very much on the order into which the material circumstances are digested, and the man- ner in which they are displayed. The Essay on Miracles deserves to be considered as one of the most dangerous attacks that have been made on our religion. The danger results not solely from the merit of the inece ; it results much more from that of the author. The 'piece itself, like every other work of Mr Hume, is ingenious ; but its merit is more of the oratorial kind than of the philo- sophical. The merit of the author^ I acknowledge, is great. The many useful volumes he has published of history^ as well as on criticism, -politics, and trade, have justly procured him, with all persons of taste and discernment, the highest repu- tation as a writer. What pity is it that this reputation should have been sullied by attempts to undermine the foundation both of natural religion, and of revealed ! For my own part, I think it a piece of justice in me to acknowledge the obligations I owe the author, before I enter on the proposed examination. I have not only been much entertained and instructed by his works ; but, if I am pos- sessed of any talent in abstract reasoning, I am not a little indebted to what he has written on Human Nature, for the improvement of that talent. If therefore, in this Tract, I have refuted Mr Hume's Essay, the greater share of the merit is perhaps to be ascribed to Mr Hume himself. The compli- iv ADVERTISEMENT. ment which the Russian monarch, after the famous battle of Poltovva, paid the Swedish generals, when he gave them the honourable appellation of his masters in the art qfx 304 Introduction, 305 Chapter I. 307 Chapter II. 323 Chapter III. 348 PREFACE. I HERE offer to the Public a new and improved edition of my Dissertation on Miracles, first printed in the year 1762, together with some other Tracts related to it, as supplying additional evidences of the truth of our Religion, displaying its amiable spirit, and manifesting its beneficial tendency, in respect, notonly of individuals, but of communities and states. The first of these is a Sermon on the Spirit of the Gospel, preached before the Synod of Aberdeen in 1771. The se- cond, a Sermon preached before the Society in Scotland for Propagating Christian Knowledge in 1777; the scope of which is to show, that the success of the first publishers of the gospel is a proof of its truth. The third is a Sermon preached at the Assizes at Aberdeen, on the happy Influence of Religion on Civil Society. The fourth also is a Sermon, on the Duty of Allegiance, preached at Aberdeen in 1776, on the Fast- day on account of the Rebellion in America ; and the fifth, an Address to the People of Scotland on the Alarms that had been raised in regard to Popery. On the Dissertation itself I have made a few amendments, not very material I acknowledge, yet of some use for obvi- ating objections and preventing mistakes. It has been ob- served by several, that Mr Hume has, since the Dissertation first appeared in print, once and again republished the Essay to which it was intended as an answer; not only without taking the smallest notice that any thing reasonable, or even specious, had been urged in opposition to his doctrine, but without making any alteration of any consequence on what he had advanced. I know but one exception, if it shall be thought of moment enough to be called an exception, from this remark. What, in former editions, had been thus ex- pressed, as quoted in the Dissertation,* " Upon the whole it appears, that no testimony for any kind of nu'racle ca^i ever Tart I. Sect. 1. A 2 PREFACE. -possibly amount to a probability, much less to a proof," is made in the octavo edition, published in 1767, " Upon the whole it appears, that no testimony for any kind of miracle has ever amounted to a probability, much less to a proof." By this more moderate cleclaration, Mr Hume avoids the contradiction there was in the sentence to the concession he had subjoined in a note. But no correction is given to many other sentences, which needed correction not less glaringly than this. For this conduct it is not easy to account, unless on the hypothesis, that he had never read the Dissertation, or that he had so low an opinion of it, as not to think it con- tained any thing which either required an answer, or deserved his notice. What follows will probably satisfy the reader that neither of these suppositions was the fact. That Mr Hume had read this attempt to confute his argument, and did not think contemptuously of it, I have his own authority to affirm ; for, soon after its publication, I was honoured with a letter from him, one great purpose of which was to assign his rea- sons for not intending a reply. What he writes on this sub- ject shows sufficiently, though incidentally, that contempt was not the passion which the perusal of this Tract had raised in his mind. As there is nothing in the letter which can lead to an unfavourable reflection, either on the understanding or on the disposition of the writer, (for to me it appears to have an opposite tendency), and as it assigns his own reasons for not engaging farther in the controversy, I have been in- duced, in justice both to him and to myself, to publish it. I say, injustice to him; for I am convinced that Mr Hume would not have considered it as redounding to his honoui-, to have the construction above mentioned put upon his silence. Yet it must be owned, that, to those who have never heard himself on the subject, it is by far the most plausible construc- tion. The letter is word for word as follows : — " Sir, " It has so seldom happened, that controversies in philo- sophy, much more in theology, have been carried on without producing a personal quarrel between the parties, that I must regard my present situation as somewhat extraordinary, who PREFACE. 3 have reason to give you thanks for the civil and obliging man- ner in which you have conducted the dispute against me, on so interesting a subject as that of miracles. Any little symp- toms of vehemence, of which I formerly used the freedom to complain, when you favoured me with a sight of the manu- script, are either removed, or explained away, or atoned for by civilities, which are far beyond what I have any title to pretend to. It will be natural for you to imagine, that I will fall upon some shift to evade the force of your arguments, and to retain my former opinion in the point controverted be- tween us ; but it is impossible for me not to see the ingenuity of your performance, and the great learning which you have displayed against me. I consider myself as very much ho- noured in being thought worthy of an answer by a person of so much merit; and, as I find that the public does you jus- tice, with regard to the ingenuity and good composition of your piece, I hope you will have no reason to repent engag- ing with an antagonist, whom perhaps, in strictness, you might have ventured to neglect. I own to you, that I never felt so violent an inclination to defend myself as at present, when I am thus faii'ly challenged by you ; and I think I could find something specious, at least, to urge in my own defence : But as I had fixed a resolution, in the beginning of my life, always to leave the public to judge between my ad- versaries and me, without making any reply, I must adhere inviolably to this resolution, otherwise my silence, on any future occasion, would be construed to be an inability to answer, and would be matter of triumph against me.* " It may perhaps amuse you, to learn the first hint which suggested to me that argument which you have so strenuously * As far as I recollect, Mr Hume, whose curious theories have raised many able opponents, has, except in one instance, uniformly adhered to this resolution. But what no attack on his principles, either religious or philosophical, could effectuate, has been produced by a diflerence on an liistorical question, a point which lias indeed been long and mucii controverted ; but as to which we may say, with truth, that it would not be easy to conceive how the interests of indi- viduals, or of society, could at present be affected by the decision, on whichever side it were given. I believe IMr Hume's best friends wish, for his own sake, as I do sincerely, (for I respect his talents), that he had given no handle for this exception. 4» PREFACE. attacked. I was walking in the Cloisters of the Jesuits' Col- lege of La Fleche, (a town in which I passed two years of my youth), and was engaged in conversation with a Jesuit of some parts and learning, who was relating to me, and urging some nonsensical miracle performed lately in their Convent — when I was tempted to dispute against him ; and as my head was full of the topics of my Treatise of Human Nature, which I was at that time composing, this argument immediately oc- curred to me, and I thought it very much gravelled my com- panion. But at last he observed to me, that it was impossible for that argument to have any solidity, because it operated equally against the Gospel as the Catholic miracles ; which observation I thought proper to admit as a sufficient answer. I believe you will allow, that the freedom at least of this reasoning makes it somewhat extraordinary to have been the produce of a Convent of Jesuits ; though perhaps you may think that the sophistry of it savours plainly of the place of its birth. I beg my compliments to Mrs Campbell ; and am, with great regard. Sir, Your most obedient humble Servant, Edi7i. June 7. 1762. David Hume." The reader will perceive, from this letter, that Mr Hume had not only read my book since the publication, but had perused the manuscript before. The fact was, I had sent my papers to a very respectable Clergyman in Edinburgh, still living, who was well acquainted with that author, and who has, since that time, eminently distinguished himself in the world by his own writings ; of whose judgment, as I had a high and just esteem, I was desirous to have his opinion of my piece, in respect both of argument and of composition, before I should venture to lay it before the Public. This gentleman, in re- turn, after giving his opinion in a candid and friendly manner, added, that as he knew I was myself a little acquainted with Mr Hume, there would be at least no impropriety, if I con- sented, in his showing him the manuscript. To this I heartily agreed ; and did it the more readily, as I thought it very pos- sible that, in some things, I might have mistaken that autlior's PREFACE. 5 meaning ; in which case, he was surely better qualified than any other person to set me right. That, however, had not been the case ; for though Mr Hume remarks very freely on my examination of his Essay, he does not, in a single in- stance, charge me with either misunderstanding or misre- presenting him. In returning the manuscript, Mr Hume accompanied it with a letter to my friend, containing such observations as had occurred to him in the perusal. This letter, with the writer's permission, was transmitted to me. It is to it he alludes in the second sentence of that which he afterwards wrote to me, and which is inserted above. It cannot be denied, that, in the first letter, he appeared not a little hurt by the freedom of the manner in which his principles and reasoning had been canvassed. To complaints of this kind a few hints are subjoined, as suggesting topics from which a sufficient answer might be drawn to some of my refutations and objections. In regard to a few particular expressions complained of, I have, as he justly observes, either removed or softened them, that I might, as much as possible, avoid the offence, without impairing the argument. For the hints he has thrown out, by way of reply, I consider myself as indebted to him. They have suggested objections which had not occurred to me, and which required to be obviated, that the argument might have all the weight, and all the illustration of which it is capable. I did accordingly, where it appeared requisite, introduce, and, in my judgment, refute the suggested answer. Thus I was enabled to anticipate ob- jections, and remove difficulties, which might have occurred to other readers, and been thought by some vci'y momentous. But as the manuscript had, before then, been put into the hands of the printer at Edinburgh, I could not, at Aberdeen, avail myself of those hints so easily, as by making them the subject of notes which I could soon transmit to the printer, with directions in regard to the passages to which they refer. I was not a little surprised, that I could find nothing in reply to my refutation of his abstract and metaphysical argument on the evidence of testimony, displayed with so much osten- tation in the first part of his Essay, the production of which argument, to the public, seems to have been his principal 6 PREFACE. motive for writing on the subject. All his observations of any moment were levelled against the answers which had been given to his more familiar and popular topics, employed in the second part. — The letter, which is addressed to Dr Hugh Blair, Edinburgh, is as follows : — " Sir, " I have perused the ingenious performance which you was so obliging as to put into my hands, with all the atten- tion possible; though not perhaps with all the seriousness and gravity which you have so frequently recommended to me. But the fault lies not in the piece, which is certainly very acute, but in the subject. I know you will say it lies in neither, but in myself alone. If that be so, I am sorry to say that I believe it is incurable. " I could wish that your friend had not chosen to appear as a controversial writer, but had endeavoured to establish his principles, in genei'al, without any reference to a parti- cular book or person ; though I own he does me a great deal of honour, in thinking that any thing I have wrote deserves his attention : For, besides many inconveniences which at- tend that kind of writing, I see it is almost impossible to preserve decency and good manners in it. This author, for instance, says sometimes obliging things of me, much beyond what I can presume to deserve ; and I thence conclude, that in general he did not mean to insult me : yet I meet with some other passages more worthy of Warburton and his fol- lowers, than of so ingenious an author. " But as I am not apt to lose my temper, and would still less incline to do so with a friend of yours, I shall calmly com- municate to you some remarks on the argument, since you seem to desire it. I shall employ very few words, since a hint will suffice to a gentleman of this author's penetration. " Sect. 1. I would desire the author to consider, whether the medium by which we reason concerning human testimony, be different from that which leads us to draw any inferences concerning other human actions ; that is, our knowledge of human nature from experience ? Or why it is different .'' I suppose we conclude an honest man will not lie to us, in the PREFACE. 7 same manner as we conclude that he will not cheat us. As to the youthful propensity to believe, which is corrected by experience ; it seems obvious, that children adopt, blindfold, all the opinions, principles, sentiments, and passions, of their elders, as well as credit their testimony : Nor is this more strange, than that a hammer should make an impression on clay. " Sect. 2. No man can have any other experience but his own. The experience of others becomes his only by the credit wliich he gives to their testimony ; which proceeds from his own experience of human nature. " Sect. 3. There is no contradiction in saying, that all the testimony which ever was really given for any miracle, or ever will be given, is a subject of derision ; and yet forming a fiction or supposition of a testimony for a particular miracle, which might not only merit attention, but amount to a full proof of it : for instance, the absence of the sun during 48 hours : But reasonable men would only conclude from this fact, that the machine of the globe was disordered during the time. " Page 28. I find no difficulty to explain my meaning, and yet shall not probably do it in any future edition. The proof against a miracle, as it is founded on invariable experience, is of that species or kind of proof, which is full and certain when taken alone, because it implies no doubt, as is the case with all probabilities ; but there are degi'ees of this species, and when a weaker proof is opposed to a stronger, it is over- come. " Page 29. There is very little more delicacy in telling a man he speaks nonsense by implication, than in saying so directly. " Sect. 4. Does a man of sense run after every silly tale of witches, or hobgoblins, or fairies, and canvass particularly the evidence ? I never knew any one that examined and delibe- rated about nonsense, who did not believe it before the end of his inquiries. " Sect. 5. I wonder the author does not perceive the reason why Mr John Knox and Mr Alexander Henderson did not work as manv miracles as their brethren in otlier ciuu'ches. 8 PREFACE. Miracle-working was a popish trick, and discarded widi the other parts of that rehgion. Men must have new and oppo- site ways of estabhshing new and opposite foUies.* The same reason extends to Mahomet. The Greek priests, who were in the neighbourhood of Arabia, and many of them in it, were as great miracle- workers as the Romish ; and Maho- met would have been laughed at for so stale and simple a device. To cast out devils, and cure the blind, where every one almost can do as much, is not the way to get any extra- ordinary ascendant over men.-]- I never read of a miracle in my life, that was not meant to establish some new point of re- ligion. There are no miracles wrought in Spain to prove the gospel ; but St Francis Xavier wrought a thousand well at- tested ones for that purpose in the Indies. The miracles in Spain, which are also fully and completely attested, are wrought to prove the efficacy of a particular crucifix or relic, which is always a new point, or, at least, not universally received.^ " Sect. 6. If a miracle proves a doctrine to be revealed from God, and consequently true, a miracle can never be wrought for a contrary doctrine. The facts are therefore as incompatible as the doctrines. • On the observation, page 120, &c. that none of the Reformers, either abroad or at home, had ever pretended to the power of working miracles, notwithstand- ing the enthusiasm with which the Essayist charges them in his history, and notwithstanding the great facility which he affirms there is in this way of im- posing upon mankind. To this he replies as above, " / luonder the author does not perceive," &c. My return to this will be found in a note in the Dissertation. f The reply to the observation with regard to Mahomet, will be found in the place referred to, partly in the text, and partly in the note at the bottom of the page. I In page 94. of the former edition I had asserted, that the oracular predictions among the Pagans, and the pretended wonders performed by Capuchins and Friars, by itinerant or stationary teachers among the Roman Catholics, could not be denominated miracles ascribed to a new system of religion. This remark drew from Mr Hume the reply as above, " / never read," &C. To this objec- tion the note on that passage is intended as an answer : whether it be a suffi- cient one, the reader will judge. In any event, he will, I persuade myself, do me the justice to own, that I have not weakened my adversary's plea by my manner of stating it. To avoid this, I have kept as close to the objector's own words as I could properly, without naming and quoting him. Beside these observations, I hardly find any thing in the letter, having the appearance of argument, which affects my reasoning. PREFACE. 9 " I could wish your friend had not denominated me an infidel writer, on account of ten or twelve pages which seem to him to have that tendency ; while I have wrote so many volumes on history, literature, politics, trade, morals, which, in that particular at least, are entirely inoffensive. Is a man to be called a drunkard, because he has been seen fuddled once in his lifetime? " Having said so much to your friend, who is certainly a very ingenious man, though a little too zealous for a philo- sopher; permit me also the freedom of saying a word to yourself. Whenever I have had the pleasure to be in your company, if the discourse turned upon any common subject of literature or reasoning, I always parted from you both entertained and instructed. But when the conversation was diverted by you from this channel towards the subject of your profession ; though I doubt not but your intentions were very friendly towards me, I own I never received the same satisfaction : I was apt to be tired ; and you to be angry. I would therefore wish for the future, wherever my good fortune throws me in your way, that these topics should be forborne between us. I have, long since, done with all in- quiries on such subjects, and am become incapable of instruc- tion ; though I own no one is more capable of conveying it than yourself. " After having given you the liberty of communicating to your friend what part of this letter you think proper, I re- main. Sir, Your most obedient humble Servant, David Hume." It may not be improper, in order, as much as possible, to prevent misapprehension, to add, that though I know that several pieces on the same subject have been published since the first edition of my Dissertation, I have not had the good fortune to see any of them, except one printed along with other Tracts by the late learned and accurate Dr Price. There is one in particular by Dr Farmer, which I have oftener than once inquired about, but have not yet been 10 PREFACE. lucky enough to meet with. This, perhaps, is imputable to the lateness of my inquiries ; for I acknowledge that I was so much engrossed by other studies at the time of its first ap- pearing, that I did not think of reading more on that article, till an application to myself, for a new edition of the Disser- tation, suggested the propriety of consulting what may have been written by learned men on the subject posterior to the first edition. From some other works I have read of Dr Farmer's, I have reason to believe that the piece alluded to is both ingenious and acute ; and from some account of it, which I remember to have perused in a Review, I have ground to suspect that his principles and mine on that sub- ject do not in all things correspond. At the same time I recollect to have thought, when reading the account, that, on some points, the difference between us was more in expression than in sentiment. My only reason for mentioning this cir- cumstance here, is to prevent the misconstruction of my silence in regard to him and other writers on the same sub- ject, whose sentiments may either coincide with mine, or stand in opposition to them. My silence in such cases pro- ceeds neither from contemipt nor from jpolicy. They will come nearer the truth, and do me more justice, who shall ascribe it to ignorance. I shall only add, with respect to the gentleman who did me the honour to translate my Dissertation into French, that though, upon the whole, he has acquitted himself admirably of the task he had undertaken, and has, in many things, im- proved upon his original, there are a few places in which he seems not perfectly to have apprehended my meaning. The cause of his mistake I find to have sometimes been an ambi- guity or obscurity in the English expression I had employed. In such cases I have endeavoured to correct the fault in this edition, and give to the diction all the perspicuity possible. There is no quality in style more important, whatever be the subject ; but in argumentative writings it is indispensable. INTRODUCTION. " Christianity," it has been said, " is not founded in argument." If it were only meant by these words, that the rehgion of Jesus could not, by the single aid of reasoning, produce its full effect upon the heart, every true Clu'istian would cheerfully subscribe to them. No arguments, unac- companied by the influences of the Holy Spirit, can convert the soul from sin to God ; though even, to such conversion, arguments are, by the agency of the Spirit, rendered subser- vient. Again, if we were to understand, by this aphorism, that the principles of our religion could never have been dis- covered by the natural and unassisted faculties of man ; this position, I presume, would be as little disputed as the former. But if, on the contrary, under the colour of an ambiguous expression, it is intended to insinuate, that those principles, from their very nature, can admit no rational evidence of their truth, (and this, by the way, is the only meaning which can avail our antagonists), the gospel, as well as common sense, loudly reclaims against it. The Lord Jesus Christ, the author of our religion, often argued, both with his disciples and with his adversaries, as with reasonable men, on the principles of reason. With- out this faculty, he well knew, they could not be susceptible either of religion or of law. He argued from prophecy, and the conformity of the event to the prediction.* He argued from the testimony of John the Baptist, who was generally acknowledged to be a prophet.f He argued from the mira- cles which he himself performed,:]: as uncontrovertible evi- dences that God Almighty operated by him, and had sent him. He expostulates with his enemies, for not using their * Luke xxiv. 25, &c. ; John v, 39. and 46. f .Tohn v. 32, .33. t John V. 36. X. 25. 37, 38. xiv. 10, 11. 12 INTRODUCTION. reason on this subject. IVhi/, says he, eve?i of yourselves, judge ye not iiohat is right?* In like manner we are called upon by the apostles of our Loi'd, to act thepart of TOw^TJzt-n, and judge impartiall}/ of what they sai/.f Those who do so, are highly commended for the candour and prudence they discover in an affair of so great consequence.^ We are even commanded, to be always ready to give an answer to every man that asketh us a reason of our hope ;§ in meeJcness to instruct them that oppose themselves ; \\ and earnestly to contend for the faith which was once delivered to the saints.^ God has neither in natural nor in revealed religion left him- self without witness; but has in both given moral and exter- nal evidence, sufficient to convince the impartial, to silence the gainsayer, and to render inexcusable the atheist and the unbeliever. This evidence it is our duty to attend to, and candidly to examine. We nmsX. prove all things, as we are expressly enjoined in holy writ, if we would ever hope to holdfast that which is good.** Thus much I thought proper to premise, not to serve as an apology for the design of this Tract, (the design surely needs no apology, whatever tlie world may judge of the execution), but to expose the shallowness of that pretext, under which the advocates for infidelity, in this age, commonly take shelter. Whilst therefore we enforce an argument, which, in support of our religion, was so frequently insisted on by its divine founder, we will not dread the reproachful titles of dangerous friends, or disguised enemies of revelation. Such are the titles which the writer, whose sentiments I propose in these papers to canvass, has bestowed on his antagonists ;-t-f not, I believe, through malice against them, but as a sort of excuse for him- self, or at least a handle for introducing a very strange and unmeaning compliment to the religion of his country, after a very bold attempt to undermine it. We will however do him the justice to own, that he hath put it out of our power * Luke xii. 37. ■}■ 1 Cor. x. 13. \ Acts xvii. 11. § 1 Pet. iii. 13. II 2Tim. ii. 23. f Judeiii. ** 1 Thess. V. 21. ff Page 204.. INTRODUCTION, 13 to retort the charge. No inteUigent person, who hath care- fully perused the Essay on Miracles, will impute to the author either of those ignominious characters. M.y pri mart/ intention in undertaking an answer to the aforesaid Essay hath invariably been, to contribute all in my power to the defence of a religion, which I esteem the great- est blessing conferred by Heaven on the sons of men. It is at the same time a secondary motive of considerable weight, to vindicate philosophy, at least that most important branch of it which ascertains the rules of reasoning, from those absurd consequences which this author's theory naturally leads us to. The theme is arduous. The adversary is both subtle and powerful. With such an adversary, I should on very unequal terms enter the lists, had I not the advantage of being on the side of truth. And an eminent advantage this doubtless is, as it requires but moderate abilities to speak in defence of a good cause. A good cause demands but a distinct exposi- tion and a fair hearing ; and we may say, with great pro- priety, it will speak for itself But to adorn error wnth the semblance of truth, and make the worse appear the better reasoti, requires all the arts of ingenuity and invention; arts in which few or none have been more expert than Mr Hume. It is much to be regretted, that, on some occasions, he has so applied them. DISSERTATION ON MIRACLES. PART I. MIRACLES ARE CAPABLE OF PROOF FROM TESTIMONY, AND RELIGIOUS MIRACLES ARE NOT LESS CAPABLE OF THIS EVIDENCE THAN OTHERS. SECTION I. Mr Hume s Jctvourite argument is founded on afolse liypothesis. It is not the aim of this author to evince, that miracles, if admitted to be true, would not be a sufficient evidence of a di- vine mission : his design is solely to prove, that miracles which have not been the objects of our own senses, at least such as are said to have been performed in attestation of any religious system, cannot reasonably be admitted by us, or believed on the testimony of others. " A miracle," says he, " supported by any human testimony, is more properly a subject of derision than of argument."* Again, in the conclusion of his Essav, " Upon the whole it appears, that no testimony for a7iy kind of miracle can ever possibly amount to a probability, much less to a proof."f Here he concludes against all miracles : " -(4m/ it/«t? of miracle " are his express words. He seems, however, immediately sensible, that, in asserting this, he has gone too far ; and therefore, in the end of the same paragraph, retracts part of what he had advanced in the beginning : " We may establish it as a maxim, that no luiman testimony can * Page 191. f Page SOiJ.—Scc Preface, x,.2. 16 MIRACLES CAPABLE OF parti. have such force as to prove a miracle, and make it a just foundation for any system of rehgion." In the note on this passage he has these words : " I beg the hmitation here made may be remarked, when I say, that a miracle can never be proved, so as to be the foundation of a system of religion : For I own that othei-wise there may possibly be miracles, or violations of the usual course of nature, of such a kind as to admit of proof from human testimony." So much for that cardinal point which the Essayist labours so strenuously to evince ; and which, if true, will not only be subversive of revelation, as received by us on the testimony of the apostles, and prophets, and martyrs, but will directly lead to this general conclusion, " That it is impossible for God Almighty to give a revelation, attended with such evi- dence that it can be reasonably believed in after-ages, or even in the same age, by any person who hath not been an eye- witness of the miracles by which it is supported." Now by what wonderful process of reasoning is this strange conclusion made out ? Several topics have been employed for the purpose by this subtle disputant. Among these there is one principal argument, which he is at great pains to set off to the best advantage. Here indeed he claims a particular concern, having discovered it himself. His title to the honour of the discovery, it is not my business to controvert ; I con- fine myself entirely to the consideration of its importance. To this end I shall now lay before the reader the unanswerable argument, as he flatters himself it will be found ; taking the freedom, for brevity's sake, to compendize the reasoning, and to omit whatever is said merely for illustration. To do other- wise, would lay me under the necessity of transcribing the greater part of the Essay. " Experience," says he, " is our only guide in reasoning concerning matters of fact.* Experience is in some things variable, in some things uniform. A vai-iable experience gives rise only to probability ; an uniform experience amounts to a proof.f Probability always supposes an opposition of ex- periments and observations, where the one side is found to overbalance the other, and to produce a degree of evidence * Page 174. t I'age 175, 176. SECT. r. PROOF FROM TESTIMONY. 17 proportioned to the superiority. In such cases we must bahmce the opposite experiments, and deduct the lesser number from the greater, in order to know the exact force of the superior evidence.* Our belief or assurance of any fact, from the report of eye-witnesses, is derived from no other principle than experience ; that is, our obsei'vation of the veracity of human testimony, and of the usual conformity of facts to the reports of witnesses.f Now if the fact attested partakes of the marvellous, if it is such as has seldom fallen under our obser- vation, here is a contest of two opposite experiences, of which the one destroys the other, as far as its force goes, and the superior can only operate on the mind by the force which re- mains. The very same principle of experience, which gives a certain degree of assurance in the testimony of witnesses, gives us also, in this case, another degree of assurance against the fact which they endeavour to establish ; from which con- tradiction there necessarily arises a counterpoise, and mutual destruction of belief and authority.^ Further, if the fact affirmed by the witnesses, instead of being only marvellous, is really miraculous ; if, besides, the testimony considered apart and in itself amounts to an entire proof; in that case there is proof against proof, of which the strongest must prevail, but still with a diminution of its force, in proportion to that of its antagonist. A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature ; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire, as any argument from experience can possi- bly be imagined.§ And if so, it is an undeniable consequence, that it cannot be surmounted by any proof whatever from testimony. A miracle therefore, however attested, can never be rendered credible, even in the lowest degree." — This, in my apprehension, is the sum of the argument on which my ingenious opponent rests the strength of his cause. In answer to this I propose first to prove, that the whole is built upon a false hypothesis. That the evidence of testimony is derived solely from experience, which seems to be an axiom of this writer, is at least not so incontestable a truth as he * Page 176. f Ibid. t Page 179. § Page 180. B 18 MIRACLES CAPABLE OF part i. supposes it : that, on the contrary, testimony has a natural and original influence on belief, antecedent to experience, will, I imagine, easily be evinced. For this purpose let it be re- marked, that the earliest assent, which is given to testimony by children, and which is previous to all experience, is in fact the most unlimited ; that, by a gradual experience of mankind, it is gradually contracted, and reduced to narrower bounds. To say therefore that our diffidence in testimony is the result of experience, is more philosophical, because more consonant to truth, than to say that our faith in testimony has this foundation. Accordingly, youth, which is inex- perienced, is credulous ; age, on the contrary, is distrustful. Exactly the reverse would be the case, were this author's doctrine j ust. Perhaps it will be said. If experience is allowed to be the only measure of a logical or reasonable faith in testimony, the question. Whether the injiuence of testimony on belief he ori- ginal or derived ? if it be not entirely verbal, is at least of no importance in the present controversy. But I maintain it is of the greatest importance. The difference between us is by no means so inconsiderable, as to a careless view it may ap- pear. According to his philosophy, the presumption is against the testimony, or (which amounts to the same thing) there is not the smallest presumption in its favour, till properly sup- ported by experience. According to the explication given above, there is the strongest presumption in favour of the tes- timony, till properly refuted by experience. If it be objected by the author, that such a faith in testimony as is prior to experience, must be unreasonable and unphilo- sophical, because unaccountable; I should reply, that there are, and must be, in human nature, some original grounds of belief, beyond which our researches cannot proceed, and of which therefore it is vain to attempt a rational account. I should desire the objector to give a reasonable account of his faith in this principle, that similar causes always produce si- milar effects; or in this, that the course of nature will be the same to-morrow that it was yesterday, and is to-day: Prin- ciples, which he himself acknowledges, are neither intuitively evident, nor deduced from premises ; and which nevertheless sKCT. I. PROOF FROM TESTIMONY. 19 we are under a necessity of presupposing in all our reasoning from experience.* I should desire him to give a reasonable account of his faith in the clearest informations of his me- mory, which he will find it alike impossible either to doubt or to explain. Indeed, memory bears nearly the same relation to experience that testimony does. Certain it is, that the defects and misrepresentations of memory are often corrected by experience. Yet should any person hence infer, that me- mory derives all its evidence from experience, he would fall into a manifest absurdity. For, on the contrary, experience derives its origin solely fi-om memory, and is nothing else but the general maxims or conclusions we have formed, from the comparison of particular facts remembered. If we had not previously given an implicit faith to memory, we had never been able to acquire experience. When therefore we say that memory, which gives birth to experience, may nevertheless, in some instances, be corrected by experience, no more is im- plied, but that the inferences, formed from the most lively and perspicuous reports of memory, sometimes serve to rectify the mistakes which arise from such reports of this faculty as are most languid and confused. Thus memory, in these in- stances, may be said to correct itself. The case is often much the same with experience and testimony, as will appear more clearly in the second section, where I shall consider the am- biguity of the word experience, as used by this author. But how, says Mr Hume, is testimony then to be refuted ? Principally in one or other of these two ways :— first, and most directly, By contradictory testimony; that is, when an equal or greater number of witnesses, equally or more credi- ble, attest the contrary : secondly, By such evidence, either of the incapacity or of the bad character of the witnesses, as is sufficient to discredit them. What, rejoins my antagonist, cannot then testimony be confuted by the extraordinary na- ture of the fact attested ? Has this consideration no weight at all ? — That this consideration has no weight at all, it was never my intention to maintain ; that by itself it can very rarely, if ever, amount to a refutation against ample and imexception- ' Sceptical Doubts, Part 2. 20 MIRACLES CAPABLE OF pabti. able testimony, I hope to make extremely plain. Wlio has ever denied, that the uncommonness of an event related is a presumption against its reality ; and that chiefly on account of the tendency, which, experience teaches us, and this author has observed, some people have to sacrifice truth to the love of wonder?* The question only is, How far does this pre- sumption extend? In the extent which Mr Hume has as- signed it, he has greatly exceeded the limits of nature, and consequently of all just reasoning. In his opinion, " When the fact attested is such as has seldom fallen under our observation, there is a contest of two opposite experiences, of which the one destroys the other, as far as its force goes, and the superior can only operate on the mind by the force which remains."-f- — There is a metaphysical, I had almost said, a magical balance and arithmetic, for the weighing and subtracting of evidence, to which he frequent- ly recurs, and with which he seems to fancy he can perform wonders. I wish he had been a little more explicit in teach- ing us how these rare inventions must be used. When a writer of genius and elocution expi'esses himself in general terms, he will find it an easy matter to give a plausible appear- ance to things the most unintelligible in nature. Such some- times is this author's way of writing. In the instance before us, he is particularly happy in his choice of metaphors. They are such as are naturally adapted to prepossess a reader in his favour. What candid person can think of suspecting the impartiality of an inquirer, who is for voeighing in the scales of reason all the arguments on both sides ? Who can suspect his exactness, who determines every thing by a 7iumerical coni' jputation ? Hence it is, that to a superficial view his reasoning appears scarcely inferior to demonstration ; but, when nar- rowly canvassed, it is impracticable to find an application, of which, in a consistency with good sense, it is capable. In confirmation of the remark just now made, let us try how his manner of arguing on this point can be applied to a particular instance. For this purpose I make the following supposition. I have lived for some years near a ferry. It consists with my knowledge, that the passage-boat has a thou- * Page 184.. f Page 179. SECT. r. PROOF FROM TESTIMONY. 21 sand times crossed the river, and as many times returned safe. An unknown man, whom I have just now met, tells me, in a serious manner, that it is lost; and affirms, that he himself, standing on the bank, was a spectator of the scene ; that he saw the passengers carried down the stream, and the boat over- whelmed. No person who is influenced in his judgment of things, not by philosophical subtilties, but by common sense, a much surer guide, will hesitate to declare, that in such a testimony I have probable evidence of the fact asserted. But if, leaving common sense, I shall recur to metaphysics, and submit to be tutored in my way of judging by the Essayist, he will remind me, " that there is here a contest of two opposite experiences, of which the one destroys the other, as ftir as its force goes, and the superior can only operate on the mind by the force which remains." I am warned, that " the very same principle of experience, which gives me a certain degree of assurance in the testimony of the witness, gives me also, in this case, another degree of assurance against the fact which he endeavours to establish ; from which contradiction there arises a counterpoise, and mutual destruction of belief and authority."* Well, I would know the truth, if possible; and that I may conclude feirly and philosophically, how must I balance these opposite experiences, as you are pleased to term them ? Must I set the thousand, or rather the two thousand instances of the one side, against the single instance of the other ? In that case, it is easy to see, I have nineteen hundred and ninety-nine degrees of evidence, that my information is false. Or is it necessary, in order to make it credible, that the single instance have two thousand times as much evidence as any of the opposite instances, supposing them equal among themselves ; or supposing them unequal, as much as all the two thousand put together, that there may be at least an equi- librium ? This is impossible : I had for some of those in- stances the evidence of sense, which hardly any testimony can equal, much less exceed. Once more, must the evidence I have of the veracity of the witness, be a full equivalent to the two thousand instances which oppose the fact attested? By the supposition, I have no positive evidence for or against his ' Tagc 179. 22 MIRACLES CAPABLE OF part i. veracity, he being a person whom I never saw before. Yet if none of these be the balancing which the Essay wTiter means, I despair of being able to discover his meaning. Is then so weak a proof from testimony incapable of being refuted ? I am far from thinking so ; though even so weak a proof could not be overturned by such a contrary experience. How then may it be overturned ? Fhsi, By contradictory tes- timony. Going homewards I meet another person, whom I know as little as I did the former : finding that he comes from the ferry, I ask him concerning the truth of the I'eport. He affirms, that the whole is a fiction ; that he saw the boat, and all in it, come safe to land. This would do more to turn the scale, than fifty thousand such contrary instances as were supposed. Yet this would not remove suspicion. Indeed, if we were to consider the matter abstractly, one would think, that all suspicion would be removed ; that the two opposite testimonies would destroy each other, and leave the mind en- tirely under the influence of its former experience, in the same state as if neither testimony had been given. But this is by no means consonant to fact. When once testimonies are in- troduced, former experience is generally of no account in the reckoning ; it is but like the dust of the balance, which hath not any sensible effect upon the scales. The mind hangs in suspense between the two contrary declarations, and considers it as one to one, or equal in probability, that the i-eport is true, or that it is false. Afterwards a third, and a fourth, and a fifth, confirm the declaration of the second. I am then quite at ease. Is this the only effectual way of confuting false testimony ? No. I suppose again, that instead of meeting with any person who can inform me concerning the fact, I get from some, who are acquainted with the witness, information concerning his character. They tell me, he is notorious for lying; and that his lies are commonly forged, not with a view to interest, but merely to gratify a malicious pleasure which he takes in alarming strangers. This, though not so direct a refutation as the former, will be sufficient to discredit his re- port. In the former, where there is testimony contradicting testimony, the author's metaphor of a balance may be used with propriety. The things Aveighed are homogeneal : And SECT. r. PROOF FROM TESTIMONY. 23 when contradictory evidences are presented to the mind, tend- ing to prove positions which cannot be both true, the mind must decide on the comparative strength of the opposite evi- dences, before it yield to either. But is this the case in the supposition first made ? By no means. The two thousand instances formerly known, and the single instance attested, as they relate to different facts, though of a contrary nature, are not contradictory. There is no inconsistency in believing both. There is no incon- sistency in receiving the last on weaker evidence, (if it be sufficient evidence), not only than all the former together, but even than any of them singly. Will it be said, that though the former instances are not themselves contradictory to the fact recently attested, they lead to a conclusion that is contradictory ? I answer. It is true, that the experienced frequency of the conjunction of any two events, leads the mind to infer a similar conjunction in time to come: But let it at the same time be remarked, that no man considers this inference, as having equal evidence with any one of those past events on which it is founded, and for the belief of which we have had sufficient testimony. Before, then, the method recommended by this !?uthor can turn to any account, it will be necessary for him to compute and determine, with pre- cision, how many hundreds, how many thousands, I might say how many myriads of instances, will confer such evidence on the conclusion founded on them, as will prove an equipoise for the testimony of one ocular witness, a man of probity, in a case of which he is allowed to be a competent judge. There is in arithmetic a rule called reduction, by which numbei's of different denominations are brought to the same denomination. If this ingenious author shall invent a rule in logic analogous to this, for reducing different classes of evidejice to the same class, he will bless the world with a most important discovery. Then indeed lie will have the honour to establish an everlasting peace in the republic of letters ; then we shall have the happiness to see controversy of every kind, theological, historical, philosophical, receive its mortal wound : for though, in every questit)n, we could not even then determine, with certainty, on which side the 24 MIRACLES CAPABLE OF parti. truth lay, we could always determine (and that is the utmost the nature of the thing admits) with as much accuracy as geometry and algebra can afford, on which side the proba- bility lay, and in what degree. But till this metaphysical reduction be discovered, it will be impossible, where the evi- dences are of different orders, to ascertain by subtraction the superior evidence. We would not but esteem him a no- vice in arithmetic, who being asked, whether seven pounds or eleven pence make the greater sum, and what is the dif- ference ? should, by attending solely to the numbers, and overlooking the value, conclude that eleven pence were the greater, and that it exceeded the other by four. Must we not be equal novices in reasoning, if we follow the same method ? Must we not fall into as great blunders ? Of as little significancy do we find the balance. Is the value of things heterogeneal to be determined merely by weight? Shall silver be weighed against lead, or copper against iron ? If, in exchange for a piece of gold, I were offered some counters of baser metal, is it not obviovis, that till I know the comparative value of the metals, in vain shall I attempt to find what is equivalent, by the assistance either of scales or of arithmetic ? It is an excellent observation, and much to the purpose, which the late learned and pious Bishop of Durham, in his admirable performance on the Analogy of Religion to the Course of Nature, hath made on this subject. " There is a very strong presumption," says he, " against the most ordi- nary facts, before the proof of them, which yet is overcome by almost any proof. There is a presumption of millions to one against the story of Csesai', or of any other man. For suppose a number of common facts, so and so circumstanced, of which one had no kind of proof, should happen to come into one's thoughts, every one would, without any possible doubt, conclude them to be false. The like may be said of a single common fact."* What then, I may subjoin, shall be said of an uncommon fact ? And that an uncommon fact may be proved by testimony, has not yet been made a ques- tion. But, in order to illustrate the observation above cited, * Part IL chap. ii. § 3. SECT. I. PROOF FROM TESTIMONY. 25 suppose, first, one at random mentions, that at such an hour, of such a day, in such a part of the heavens, a comet iioill appear; the conchision from experience would not be as millions, but as infinite to one, that the proposition is false. Instead of this, suppose you have the testimony of but one ocular witness, a man of integrity, and skilled in astronomy, that at such an hour, of such a day, in such a part of the heavens, a comet did appear ; you will not hesitate one mo- ment to give him credit. Yet all the presumption that was against the truth of the first supposition, though almost as strong evidence as experience can afford, was also against the truth of the second, before it was thus attested. Is it necessary to urge further, in support of this doctrine, that as the water in the canal cannot be made to rise hiaher than the fountain whence it flows, so it is impossible that the evidence of testimony, if it proceeded from experience, should ever exceed that of experience, which is its source ? Yet that it greatly exceeds this evidence, appears not only from what has been observed already, but still more from what I shall have occasion to observe in the sequel. One may safely affirm, that no conceivable conclusion from experience can possess stronger evidence, than that which ascertains us of the regular succession and duration of day and night. The reason is, the instances on which this experience is founded, are both without nimiber and without exception. Yet even this conclusion, the author admits, as we shall see in the third section, may, in a particular instance, not only be sur- mounted, but even annihilated by testimony. Lastly, let it be observed, that the immediate conclusion from experience is always ge7ieral, and runs thus : — " This is the ordinary course of nature." " Such an event may rea- sonably be expected, where all the circumstances are entirely similar." But when we descend to particulars, the conclu- sion becomes weaker, being more indirect. For though all the Icnoison circumstances be similar, all the actual circum- stances may not be similar ; nor is it possible in any case to be assured (our knowledge of things being at best but super- ficial) that all the actual circumstances are hno'wn to us. On the contrary, the direct conclusion from testimony is 26 MIRACLES CAPABLE OF parti. always particular, and runs thus : — " This is the fact in such an individual instance." The remark now made will serve both to throw light on some of the preceding observations, and to indicate the proper sphere of each species of evidence. Experience of the past is the only rule whereby we can judge concerning the future : And as, when the sun is below the horizon, we must do the best we can by the light of the moon, or even of the stars ; so, in all cases where we have no testimony, we are under a necessity of recurring to expe- rience, and of balancing or numbei'ing contrary observa- tions.* But the evidence resulting hence, even in the clearest cases, is acknowledged to be so weak, compared with that which results from testimony, that the strongest conviction, built merely on the former, may be overturned by the slight- est proof exhibited by the latter. Accordingly, the future has, in all ages and nations, been denominated the province of conjecture and uncertainty. • Wherever such balancing or numbering can take place, the opposite evidences must be entirely similar. It will rarely assist us in judging of facts supported by testimony; for even where contradictory testimonies come to be considered, you will hardly find, that the characters of the witnesses on the opposite sides are so precisely equal, as that an arithmetical operation will evolve the credibility. In matters of pure experience it has often place. Hence the computations that have been made of the value of annuities, insurances, and several other com- mercial articles. In calculations concerning chances, the degree of probability may be determined with mathematical exactness. I shall here take the liberty, though the matter be not essential to the design of this tract, to correct an over- sight in the Essayist, who always supposes, that, where contrary evidences must be balanced, the probability lies in the remainder or surplus, when the less num- ber is subtracted from the greater. The probability does not consist in the sur- plus, but in the ratio, or geometrical proportion, which the numbers on the op- posite sides bear to each other. I explain myself thus. In favour of one sup- posed event there are 100 similar instances, against it 50. In another case under consideration, the favourable instances are 60, and only 10 imfavourable. Though the difference, or arithmetical proportion, which is 50, be the same in both cases, the probability is by no means equal, as the author's way of reasoning implies. The probability of the first event is as 100 to 50, or 2 to 1. The pro- bability of the second is as 60 to 10, or 6 to 1. Consequently, on comparing the different examples, though both be probable, the second is thrice as probable as the first. I am sensible that the precise degree of probability is not entirely determined, even by the ratio. There are other circumstances to be considered where the utmost accuracy is requisite : But it does not appear necessary, in the present inquirj-, to enter deeper into the subject. See Dr Price's Dissertation, Sect. 2. SECT. I. TROOF FROM TESTIMONY. 27 From what has been said, the attentive reader will easily discover, that the author's argument against miracles has not the least affinity to the argument used by Dr Tillotson against transuhstantiation^ with which Mr Hume has intro- duced his subject. Let us hear the argument, as it is re- lated in the Essay, from the writings of the Ai'ch bishop. " It is acknowledged on all hands," says that learned prelate, " that the authority either of the scripture or of tradition is founded merely on the testimony of the apostles, who were eye-witnesses to those miracles of our Saviour by which he proved his divine mission. Our evidence then for the truth of the Christian religion is less than the evidence for the truth of our senses ; because even in the first authors of our religion it was no greater; and it is evident, it must dimi- nish in passing from them to their disciples; nor can any one be so certain of the truth of their testimony, as of the immediate objects of his senses. But a weaker evidence can never destroy a stronger; and therefore, were the docti-ine of the real presence ever so clearly revealed in scripture, it were directly contrary to the rules of just reasoning to give our assent to it. It contradicts sense, though both the scripture and tradition, on which it is supposed to be built, carry not such evidence with them as sense, when they are considered merely as external evidences, and are not brought home to every one's breast by the immediate operation of the Holy Spirit."* That the evidence of testimony is less than the evidence of sense, is undeniable. Sense is the source of that evidence, which is first transferred to the memorx) of the individual, as to a general reservoir, and thence transmitted to others by the channel of testimony. That the original evidence can never gain any thing, but must lose, by the transmission, is beyond dispute. What has been rightly perceived, may be misremembered ; what is rightly remembered, may, through incapacity, or through ill intention, be misreported ; and what is rightly reported, may be misunderstood. In any of these four ways, therefore, cither by defect of memory, of elocution, or of veracity in the relater, or by misapprehension in the hearei*, there is a * Page 173, 174. 28 MIRACLES CAPABLE OF part i. chance that the truth received by the information of the senses may be misrepresented or mistaken : now, every such chance occasions a real diminution of the evidence. That the sacramental elements are bread and wine, not flesh and blood, our sight and touch and taste and smell concur in testifying. If these senses are not to be credited, the apostles themselves could not have evidence of the mission of their Master. For the greatest external evidence they had, or could have, of his mission, was that which their senses gave them of the reality of his miracles. But whatever strength there is in this argument, with regard to the apostles, the argument, with regard to us, who, for those miracles, have only the evidence, not of our own senses, but of their testi- mony, is incomparably stronger. In their case, it is sense contradicting sense ; in ovu*s, it is sense contradicting testi- mony. But what relation has this to the author's argument ? None at all. Testimony, it is acknowledged, is a weaker evidence than sense. But it has been already evinced, that its evidence for particular facts is infinitely sti'onger than that which the general conclusions from experience can afford us. Testimony holds directly of memory and sense. What- ever is duly attested, must be remembered by the witness; whatever is duly remembered, must once have been perceived. But nothing similar takes place with regard to experience, nor can testimony, with any appearance of meaning, be said to hold of it. Thus I have shown, as I proposed, that the author's rea- soning proceeds on a false hypothesis. — It supposes testimony to derive its evidence solely from experience, which is false. — It supposes by consequence, that contrary observations have a weight in opposing testimony, which the first and most ac- knowledged principles of human reason, or, if you like the term better, common sense, evidently shows that they have not. — It assigns a rule for discovering the superiority of con- trary evidences, which, in the latitude there given it, tends to mislead the judgment, and which it is impossible, by any explication, to render of real use. PROOF FROM TESTIMONY, 29 SECTION II. Mr Hume charged tvith some Jallacies in his ivaj/ of managlr^g the argument. In the Essay there is frequent mention of the word exj)e- rieticey and much use made of it. It is strange that the author has not favoured us with the definition of a term of so much moment to his argument. This defect I sliall endeavour to supply ; and the rather, as the word appears to be equivocal, and to be used by the Essayist in two very different senses. The first and most proper signification of the word, which, for distinction's sake, I shall call personal experience, is that given in the preceding section. " It is," as was observed, " founded in memorTj, and consists solely of the general max- ims or conclusions that each individual hath formed from the comparison of the particular facts remembered by him." In the other signification, in which the word is sometimes taken, and which I shall distinguish by the term derived, it may be thus defined : — " It is founded in testimony, and consists not only of all the experiences of others, which have, through that channel, been communicated to us, but of all the general maxims or conclusions we have formed, from the comparison of particular facts attested." In proposing his ai'gument, the author would surely be understood to mean only personal experience ; otherwise, his making testimony derive its light from an experience which derives its light from testimony, would be introducing what logicians term a circle i7i causes. It would exhibit tlie same things alternately, as causes and effects of each other. Yet nothing can be more limited than the sense which is convey- ed under the term experience, in the first acceptation. The merest clown or peasant derives incomparably more know- ledge from testimony, and the communicated experience of others, than, in the longest life, he could have amassed out of the treasure of his own memory'. Nay, to such a scanty por- tion the savage himself is not confined. If that therefore must be the rule, the only rule, by which every testimony is ulti- 30 MIRACLES CAPABLE OF paht i. mately to be judged, our belief in matters of fact must have very narrow bounds. No testimony ought to have any weight with us, that does not relate an event, similar at least to some one observation which we ourselves have made. For exam- ple, that there are such people on the earth as negroes, could not, on that hypothesis, be rendered credible to one who had never seen a negi'o, not even by the most numerous and the most unexceptionable attestations. Against the admission of such testimony, however strong, the whole force of the author's argument evidently operates. But that innumerable absurdities would flow from this principle, I might easily evince, did I not think the task superfluous. The author himself is aware of the consequences; and therefore, in whatever sense he uses the term experience in proposing his argument, in prosecuting it, he, with great dex- terity, shifts the sense, and, ere the reader is apprised, insi- nuates another. " It is a miracle," says he, " that a dead man should come to life, because that has never been observed in any age or countiy. There must thei'efore be an unifoi'm experience against every miraculous event, otherwise the event w^ould not merit that appellation."* Here the phrase, an uniform experience against an event, in the latter clause, is implicitly defined in the former, not what has never been observed by us, but (mark his words) tsohat has never been observed in any age or country. Now, what has been observed, and what has not been observed, in all ages and countries, pray how can you. Sir, or I, or any man, come to the knowledge of? Only I suppose by testimony, oral or written. The personal experience of every individual is limited to but a part of one age, and commonly to a narrow spot of one country. If there be any other way of being made acquainted with facts, it is to me, I own, an impene- trable secret ; I have no appi-ehension of it. If there be not any, what shall we make of that cardinal point, on which your argument turns ? It is in plain language, " Testimony is not entitled to the least degree of faith, but as far as it is supported by such an extensive experience as, if we had not had a previous and independent faith in testimony, we could never have acquired." * Pajre 181. SECT. II. PROOF FRCM TESTIMONY. 31 How natural is the transition from one sophism to another ! You will soon be convinced of this, if you attend but a little to the strain of the ai'gument. " A miracle," says he, " is a violation of the laws of nature ; and as a firm and imalterable experience hath established these laws, the proof against a miracle is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined."* Again, " As an uniform experience amounts to a proof, there is here a direct and full proof, from the nature of the fact, against the existence of any miracle."f I must once more ask the author, What is the precise meaning of the words^rw, imalterable, uniform ? An experience that admits no exception, is surely the only experience which can with propriety be termed uniform, Jirm, unalterable. Now since, as was remarked above, the far greater part of this experience, which comprises every age and every country, must be derived to us from testimony ; that the experience may hejii~m, uniform, unalterable, there mvist be no contrary testimony whatever. Yet, by the author's own hypothesis, the miracles he would thus confute are supported by testimony. At the same time, to give strength to his argument, he is under a necessity of supposing, that there is no exception from the testimonies against them. Thus he falls into that paralo- gism, which is called beggi^ig the question. What he gives with one hand, he takes with the other. He admits, in open- ing his design, what in his argument he implicitly denies. But that this, if possible, may be still more manifest, let us attend a little to some expressions, which one would imagine he had inadvertently dropt. " So long," says he, " as the world endures, I presume, will the accounts of miracles and prodigies be found in all profane history.":^ Wliy does he presvmie so? A man so much attached to experience, can hardly be suspected to have any other reason than this — be- cause such accounts have hitherto been found in all the his- tories, profane as well as sacred, of tunes past. But we need not recur to an inference to obtain this acknowledgment: it is often to be met with in the Essay. In one place we learn, * Page 180. f Page 18 1. I Page 17'k In the edition of the Essay, 1767, mentioned in the Preface, his words arc, ' in all histprj', sacred and profane.' 32 MIRACLES CAPABLE OF part i. that the witnesses for miracles are an infinite number;* in another, that all religious records of whatever kind abound with them.f I leave it therefore to the author to explain, with what consistency he can assert that the lav/s of nature are established by an uniform experience, (which experience is chiefly the result of testimony), and at the same time allow that almost all human histories are full of the relations of miracles and prodigies, which are violations of those laws. Here is, by his own confession, testimony against testimony, and very ample on both sides. How then can one side claim a firm, uniform, and unalterable support from testimony ? It will be in vain to object, that the testimony in support of the laws of nature greatly exceeds the testimony for the violations of these laws ; and that, if we are to be determined by the greater number of observations, we shall reject all mi- racles whatever. I ask, Why are the testimonies much more numerous in the one case than in the other ? The answer is obvious : Natural occurrences are much more frequent than such as are preternatural. But ai-e all the accounts we have of the pestilence to be rejected as incredible, because, in this country, we hear not so often of that disease as of the fever ? Or, because the number of natural births is infinitely greater than that of monsters, shall the evidence of the former be re- garded as a confutation of all that can be advanced in proof of the latter ? Such an objector needs to be reminded of what was proved in the foregoing section — that the opposite testi- monies relate to different facts, and are therefore not contra- dictory ; that the conclusion founded on them possesses not the evidence of the facts on which it is fovmded, but only such a presumptive evidence as may be surmounted by the slight- est positive proof. A general conclusion from experience is in comparison but presumptive and indirect ; sufficient testi- mony for a particular fact is direct and positive evidence. I shall remark one other fallacy in this author's reasoning, before I conclude this section. " The Indian prince," says he, " who refused to believe the first relations concerning the effects of frost, reasoned justly; and it naturally required very strong testimony to engage his assent to facts, which • Page 190. t Page 19L SKCT. II, PROOF FROM TESTIMONY. 33 arose from a state of nature witli which he was unacquainted, and bore so little analogy to those events of which he had had constant and uniform experience : Thougli they were not contrary to his experience, they were not conformable to it."* Here a distinction is artfully suggested, between what is con- trary to experience, and what is not conformable to it. The latter he allows may be proved by testimony, but not the former. A distinction, for which the author seems to have so great use, it will not be improper to examine. If my reader happen to be but little acquainted with Mr Hume's writings, or even with the piece here examined, I must entreat him, ere he proceed any farther, to give the Essay an attentive perusal ; and to take notice particularly, whether, in one single passage, he can find any other sense given to the terms contrary to experience, but that which has not been ex- perienced. Without this aid, I should not be surprised that I found it difficult to convince the judicious, that a man of so much acuteiiess, one so much a philosopher as this author, should, with such formality, make a distinction, which not only the Essay, but the whole tenor of his philosophical writings, shows evidently to have no meaning. Is that which is contrary to experience, a synonymous phrase for that which implies a contradiction ? If this were the case, there would be no need to recur to experience for a refutation; it would refute itself. But it is equitable that the author himself be heard, who ought to be the best interpreter of his own words. " When the fact attested," says he, " is such a one as has seldom fallen under our observation, here is a contest of two opposite experiences."f In this passage, not the being never experienced, but even the being seldom experienced, constitutes an opposite experience. I can conceive no way but one, that the author can evade the force of this quotation ; and that is, by obtruding on us some new distinction between an ojjposite and a contrary experience. In order to preclude sucli an attempt, I shall once more recur to his own authority. " It is no miracle that a man in seem- ing good health should die of a sudden." Why ? " Because such a kind of death, though more unusual than any other, liath yet been fi'cquently observed to happen. But it is a " rage 179. f Ibid. C 34 MIRACLES CAPABLE OF PxVRT i. miracle that a dead man should come to life." Why ? Not because of any inconsistency in the thing. That a body should be this hour inanimate and the next animated, is no more inconsistent than the reverse, that it should be this hour ani- mated and the next inanimate ; though the one be common, and not the other. But the author himself answers the ques- tion : " Because that has never been observed in any age or country." * All the conti'ariety then that there is in miracles to experience, does, by his own concession, consist solely in this, that they have never been observed ; that is, they are not conformable to experience. To his experience, personal or derived, he must certainly mean; to what he has learned of dif- ferent ages and countries. To speak beyond the knowledge he has attained, would be ridiculous. It would be first supposing a miracle, and then inferring a contrary experience, instead of concluding, from experience, that the fact is miraculous. Now I insist, that, as far as regards the author's argument, a fact perfectly unusual, or not conformable to our experience, such a fact as, for aught we know, was never observed in any age or country, is as incapable of proof from testimony as mira- cles are J that, if this writer would argue consistently, he could never, on his own principles, reject one, and admit the other. Both ought to be rejected, or neither. I would not by this be thought to signify, that there is no difference between a miracle and an extraordinary event. I know that the former implies the interposal of an invisible agent, which is not implied in the lat- ter. All that I intend to assert is, that the author's argument equally affects them both. Why does such interposal appear to him incredible? Not from any incongruity he discerns in the thing itself: he does not pretend it: but it is not conformable to his experience. " A miracle," says he, " is a transgression of a law of nature." f But how are the laws of nature known to us ? By experience. What is the criterion whereby we must judge whether the laws of nature are transgressed ? Solely the conformity or disconformity of events to our expe- rience. This writer surely will not pretend, that we can have any knowledge a priori, either of the lav,- or of the violation. * Page 181. f Page 182. in the note. SECT. II. PROOF FROM TESTlxMONY. 35 Let us then examine, by his own principles, whetlier tlie King of Siam, of whom the story he alkides to is related by Locke,* could have sufficient evidence, from testimony, of a fact so contrary to his experience as the freezing of water. He could just say as much of this event, as the author can say of a dead man's being restored to life : " Such a thing was never observed, as far as I could learn, in any age or country." If the things themselves too be impartially considered, and independently of the notions acquired by us in these northern climates, we should account the first at least as extraordinary as the second. — That so pliant a body as water should become hard like pavement, so as to bear up an elephant on its surface, is as unlikely, in itself, as that a body inanimate to-day should be animated to-morrow. Nay, to the Indian monarch, I must think, that the first would appear more a miracle, more contra- ry to experience, than the secontl. If he had been acquainted with ice or frozen water, and afterwards seen it become fluid, but had never seen nor learned, that after it was melted it be- came hard again, the relation must have appeared marvellous, as the process from fluidity to hardness never had been experi- enced, though the reverse often had. But I believe nobody will question, that on this supposition it would not have appeared quite so strange as it did. Yet this supposition makes the in- stance more parallel to the restoring of the dead to life. The process fi'om animate to inanimate we are all acquainted with; and what is such a restoration, but the reversing of tiiis process? So little reason had the author to insinuate, that the one was only ?ioi conjbrmable, the other contrary to experience. If there be a difference in this respect, the first, to one alike unacquaint- ed with both, must appear the more contrary of the two. Does it alter the matter, that he calls the former " a fact which arose from a state of nature with w^hich the Indian was unacquainted?" Was not such a state quite unconformable, or (which in the author's language I have shewn to be the same) contrai-y to his experience? Is then a state of nature, which is contrary to experience, more credible than a single fact con- trary to experience? I want the solution of one difficulty: the author, in ox'der to satisfy me, presents me with a thou- * Essay on Human Unrlcistanding, Book iv. cliap. 15. § 5. 36 MIRACLES CAPABLE OF part i. sand others. Is this suitable to the method he proposes in another place, of admitting always the less miracle, and reject- ing the greater?* Is it not, on the contrary, admitting with- out any difficulty the greater miracle, and thereby removing the difficulty which he otherwise would have had in admitting the less ? Does he forget, that to exhibit a state of nature en- tirely different from what we experience at present, is one of those enormous prodigies, which, in his account, render the Pentateuch unworthy of credit ?f " No Indian," says he in the note, " it is evident, could have experience that water did not freeze in cold climates. This is placing nature in a situation quite unknown to him ; and it is impossible for him to tell, a 'priori^ what will result from it." This is precisely as if, in reply to the author's objection from experience against the rais- ing of a dead man (suppose Lazarus) to life, I should retort: " Neither you, Sir, nor any who live in this century, can have experience, that a dead man could not be restored to life at the command of one divinely commissioned to give a revela- tion to men. This is placing nature in a situation quite un- known to you ; and it is impossible for you to tell, a priori., what will result from it. This therefore is not contrary to the course of nature, in cases where all the circumstances are the same. As you never saw one vested with such a commis- sion, you are as unexperienced, as ignorant of this point, as the inhabitants of Sumatra are of the frosts in Muscovy ; you cannot therefore reasonably, any more than they, be positive as to the consequences." X Should he rejoin, as doubtless he would, " This is not taking away the difficulty; but, like the elephant and the tortoise, in the account given by some bar- barians of the manner in which the earth is supported, it only shifts the difficulty a step further back : My objection still recurs — That any man should be endowed with such power is contrary to experience, (or, as I have shewn to be the same in this author's language, is not conformable to ni}' experience), and therefore incredible :" — Should he, I say, rejoin in this manner, I could only add, " Pray, Sir, revise }'Our own words lately quoted, and consider impartially, whether they be not * Page 182. f Page 206. 1 See the latter part of the note on the following paragraph. SECT. ir. PROOF FROM TESTIMONY. 37 as glaringly exposed to the like reply." For my part, I can only perceive one difference that is material between the two cases. You frankly confess, that with regaixl to the freezing of water, beside the absolute want of experience, there would be from analogy a presumption against it, which ought to weigh with a rational Indian. I think, on the contrary, in the case supposed by me, of one commissioned by Heaven, there is at least no presumption against the exertion of such a mira- culous power ; there is rather a presumption in its favour. Does the author then say, that no testimony could give the King of Siam sufficient evidence of the effects of cold on water ? No. By implication he says the contrary : " It re- quii'ed very strong testimony." Will he say, that those most astonishing effects of electricity lately discovered, so entirely unanalogous to every thing before experienced — will he say, that such facts no reasonable man could have sufficient evi- dence from testimony to believe? No. We may presume he will not, from his decision in the formei' case; and if he should, the common sense of mankind would reclaim against such extravagance. Yet it is obvious to every considerate reader,* that this argument concludes equally against those truly marvellous, as against miraculous events ; both being alike unconformable, or alike contrary, to former experience,* » I cannot forbear to observe, that many of the principal terms employed in the Essay, are used in a manner extremely vague and unphilosophical. I have remarked the confusion I find in the application of the words experience, contra- riettf, con/ormity. I might remark the same thing of the word miracle. " A miracle," it is said, p. 182. in the note, " may be accurately defined, ^ TRANS- GHESSION of a law of nature, hi/ a jMrticular voUlion of the Deity, or by the in- terposal of some invisible agent. The word transgression invariably denotes a cri- minal opposition to authority. Rapine, adultery, murder, are transgressions of the laws of nature, but have nothing in common with miracles. The author's accuracy in representing God as a transgressor, I have not indeed the perspica- city to discern. Does he intend, by throwing something monstrous into the definition, to infuse into the reader a prejudice against the thing defined ? But supposing that, through inadvertency, he had uicdUhmcrm transgression instead of suspension, which would have been more intelligible and proper; one would at least expect, that the word miracle, in the Essay, always expressed the sense of the definition. But this it evidently does not. Thus, in the instance of the miracle supposed, (p. 203. in the note), he calls it, in the beginning of the para- graph, " A violation of the usual course of nature ;" but in tlie end, after telling us that such a miracle, on the evidence supposed, " our present philosophers 38 MIRACLES CAPABLE OF parti. Thus I think I have shewn, that the author is chargeable with some fallacies in his way of managing the argument; — ought to receive for certain," he subjoins, (how consistently, let the reader judge), " and ought to search for the causes whence it might be derived." Thus it is insinuated, that though a fact apparently miraculous, and perfectly extraor- dinary, might be admitted by a philosopher, still the reality of the miracle must be denied. For if the interposal of the Deity be the proper solution of the phenomenon, why should we recur to other causes ? Hence a careless reader is insensibly led to think, that there is some special incredibility in such an inter- posal, distinct from its iincommonness. Yet the author's great argument is built on this single circumstance, and places such an interposition just on the same footing with every event that is equally uncommon. At one time, he uses the word miracle to denote a bare improbability, as will appear in the sixth section ; at another, absurd and miraculous are, with him, synonymous terms ; so are also the tniracvhms nature of an event, and its absolute impossibilitt/. Is this the style and manner of a reasoner? Let it, however, in further illustration of the question, be observed, that though, in one view, miracles may be said to imply a suspension of the laws of nature, by the interposition of an invisible agent, yet, in another and more exten- sive view, it may perhaps be affirmed, that, in strictness, nature's laws are never suspended. It will serve to remove the apparent inconsistency, to consider that, when we speak of the laws of nature, we commonly mean no more than those regarding the material world, or the laws of matter and motion with which we happen to be acquainted. Yet those which regard spiritual beings are as truly laws of nature as those which concern corporeal. Our acquaint- ance with the former, if we can call it acquaintance, is much more confined than with the latter ; because the means of knowledge in the one case are fewer, more subtle, and less accessible, than in the other. But we have reason from analogy to believe, that every thing in the invisible, that is, in the moral and intellectual, as well as in the visible or material world, is regulated by permanent laws. In this view of the universal system, there is ground to think that the respective powers of the different orders of beings, and their interpositions, and if so, divine illuminations themselves, are as really governed by general laws, as the events which result from physical causes, and take place in the material creation. In regard to these also, the term suspension is sometimes loosely used, where there is an interfering of powers, though it be acknowledged, on all sides, that, in the largest and most proper acceptation of the terms, there is no infringement of the laws of nature. Thus, by the law of gravitation, a heavy body moves dovcnwards, towards the centre of the earth, till it be stopped by some intervening object. By the law of magnetism, iron, one species of heavy bodies, may be attracted up- wards, from the earth, and kept hanging in the air. In familiar discourse we might say, that the law of gravity is suspended by the magnetical attraction ; which means no more than that, in this instance, gravity proves a less powerful attraction than magnetism. In other instances, magnetisin may be the weaker of the two. A loadstone, which will raise from the ground a piece of iron weigiiing an ounce, will produce no sensible effect upon one of a pound weight. But it is evident that, in a more enlarged view, the laws of nature luidergo no suspension in either case, in as much as one, who is well acqiuiinted with the SECT. ir. PROOF FROM TESTIMONY. 39 that he all along avails himself of an ambiguity in the word ex'perience; — that his reasoning includes a petitio principii in the bosom of it ; — and that, in supporting his argument, he must have recourse to distinctions, where, even himself being judge, there is no difference. SECTION III. Mr Hume himself gives up his favourite argument. " Mr Hume himself," methinks I hear my reader repeating with astonishment, " gives up his favourite argument !" To prove this point is indeed a very bold attempt : Yet that this attempt is not altogether so arduous as, at first hearing, he will possibly imagine, I hope, if favoured a while with his at- tention, fully to convince him. If to acknowledge, after all, that there may be miracles which admit of proof from human testimony ; if to acknowledge, that such miracles ought to be received, not as probable only, but as absolutely certain ; or, in other words, that the proof from human testimony may be such, as that all the contrary uniform experience should not only be overbalanced, but, to use the author's expression, should be annihilated : if such acknowledgments as these are subversive of his own principles ; if, by making them, he abandons his darling argument ; this strange part the Essayist evidently acts. " I own," these are his words, " there may possibly be mi- racles, or violations of the usual course of nature, of such a kind as to admit a proof from human testimony, though perhaps" (in this he is modest enough, he avers nothing ; 2^crhaps) " it will be impossible to find any such in all the records of history." attraction both of the magnet and of the earth, can, in any proposed experiment, tell for certain beforehand which will prevail. Thus, when we speak of mira- cles as suspensions of the laws of nature, the expression is admitted rather in apology for ignorance, than as what ought to be accounted philosophical or strict- ly proper. The intervention of superior agents, the comparative powers of these agents, and their operations, may be, and probably are, regulated by the immut- able laws of the universe, as much as whatever concerns the terraqueous globe, and the motions of the heavenly bodies. This will serve further to explain my retort upon Mr Hume in the preceding paragraph, in relation to the freezing of water, — which see. 40 MIRACLES CAPABLE OF part t To this declaration he subjoins the following supposition : — " Suppose all authors, in all languages, agree, that from the 1st of Januaiy 1600 there was a total darkness over the whole earth for eight days; suppose that the tradition of this extra- ordinary event is still strong and lively among the people ; that all travellers, who return from foreign countries, bring us ac- counts of the same tradition, without the least variation or con- tradiction — it is evident that our present philosophers, instead of doubting of that fact, ought to receive it for certain, and ought to search for the causes whence it might be derived."* Could one imagine that the person who had made the above acknowledgment, a person too who is justly allowed, by all who are acquainted with his writings, to possess uncommon penetration and philosophical abilities, that this were the same individual who had so short while before affirmed, that a " mi- racle," or a violation of the usual course of nature, " supported by any human testimony, is more properly a subject of deri- sion than of argument ;"f who had insisted, that " it is not requisite, in order to reject the fact, to be able accurately to disprove the testimony, and to trace its falsehood ; that such an evidence carries falsehood on the very face of it ;" J that " we need but oppose, even to a cloud of witnesses, the abso- lute impossibility, or," which is all one, " miraculous nature of the events which they relate ; that this, in the eyes of all reasonable people will alone be regarded as a sufficient refu- tation ;"§ and who, finally, to put an end to all altercation on the subject, had pronounced this oracle, " No testimony FOR ANY KIND OF MIRACLE can ever possibly AMOUNT TO A PROBABILITY, MUCH LESS TO A PROOF." || Was there ever a more glaring contradiction ? Yet for the event supposed by the Essayist, the testimony, in his judgment, would amount to a probability ; nay, to more than a probability, to a proof: let not the reader be astonish- ed, or, if he cannot fail to be astonished, let him not be incre- * Page 203. in the note. f Page 194.. \ Ibid. § Page 196, &c. II Page 202. There is a small alteration made on this sentence in the edi- tion of the Essays in 1767, which is posterior to the 2d edition of this Disserta- tion. See Preface, page .3. SECT. HI. PROOF FROM TESTIMONY, 41 dulous, when I add, to more than a }^rooJ\ more dian a full, entire, and direct proof — for even this I hope to make evident from the author's principles and reasoning. " And even sup- posing," says he, that is, granting for argument's sake, " that the testimony for a miracle amounted to a proof, it would be opposed by another proof, derived from the very nature of the fact which it would endeavour to establish."* Here is then, by his own reasoning, proof against proof, from which there could result no belief or opinion, unless the one is conceived to be in some degree superior to the other. " Of which proofs," says he, " the strongest must prevail, but still with a diminution of its force, in proportion to that of its antago- nist."f Before the author could believe such a miracle as he supposes, he must at least be satisfied that the proof of it from testimony is stronger than the proof against it from experience. That we may form an accurate judgment of the strength he here ascribes to testimony, let us consider what, b}^ his own account, is the strength of the opposite proof from experience. " A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature ; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be ima- gined. "4 Again, " As an uniform experience amounts to a proof, there is here a direct ixndfuU proof, from the nature of the fact, against the existence of any miracle."§ The proof then which the Essayist admits from testimony, is, by his own estimate, not only superior to a direct and Jidl proof, but even superior to as entire a proof as any argument from experience can possibl}' be imagined. Whence, I pray, doth testimony acquire such amazing evidence? " Testimony," says the au- thor, " hath no evidence, but what it derives from experience. These differ from each other only as the species from the ge- nus." Put then for testimony the word experience, which in this case is equivalent, and the conclusion will run thus : Here is a proof from experience, which is siqjcrior to as entire a proof from experience as can possibly be imagined, l^his deduction from the author's words, the reader will perceive, is strictly logical. What the meaning of it is, I leave to Mr Hume to explain. * Page20-i. f Page 180. \ Ibid. § Pago 181. 42 MIRACLES CAPABLE OF parti. What has been above deduced, how much soever it be ac- counted, is not all that is implied in the concession made by the author. He further says, that the miraculous fact, so at- tested, ought not only to be received, but to be received yo;* certain. Is it not enough, Sir, that you have shewn that your most full, most direct, most perfect argument may be over- come ? Will nothing satisfy you now but its destruction ? One wouldimagine, that you had conjured up this demon, by whose irresistible arm you proposed to give a mortal blow to religion, and render scepticism triumphant, (that you had conjured him up, I say), for no other purpose, but to show with what facility you could lay him. To be serious, does not this author remember, that he had oftener than once laid it down as a maxim. That when there is proof against proof, we must incline to the superior, still with a diminution of assurance, in proportion to the force of its antagonist ?* But when a fact is received yo;* certain, there can be no sensible diminution of assurance, such diminution always implying some doubt and uncertainty. Consequently the general proof from experience, though as entire as any argument from ex- perience can possibly be imagined, is not only surmounted, but is really in comparison as nothing, or, in Mr Hume's phrase, undergoes annihilation, when balanced with the par- ticular proof from testimony. Great indeed, it must be ac- knowledged, is the force of truth. This conclusion, on the principles I have been endeavouring to establish, has nothing in it but what is conceivable and just; but, on the principles of the Essay, which deduce all the force of testimony from experience, serves only to confound the understanding, and to involve the subject in midnight darkness. It is therefore manifest, that either this author's principles condemn his own method of judging with regard to miracu- lous fads; or that his method of judging subverts his princi- ples, and is a tacit desertion of them. Thus that impregna- ble fortress, the asylum of infidelity, which he so lately glo- ried in having erected, is in a moment abandoned by him as a place untenable. * Page 178. 180. PROOF FROM TESTIMONY. 4.3 SECTION IV. There is ?io peculiar presumption against such miracles as are said to have been tvrought in support of religion. Is it then so, that the decisive argument the Essayist flat- tered himself he had discovered,* which, with the wise and learned, was to prove an everlasting check to all kinds of su- perstitious delusion, and would consequently be useful as long as the world endures; is it so, that this boasted argument has in fact little or no influence on the discoverer himself? — But this author may well be excused. He cannot be always the metaphysician. He cannot soar incessantly in the clouds. Such constant elevation suits not the lot of humanity. He must sometimes, whether he will or not, descend to a level with other people, and fall into the humble track of common sense. One thincf however he is resolved on : If he cannot by metaphysic spells silence the most arrogant bigotry and superstition ; he will at any rate, though for this purpose he should borrow aid from what he hath no liking to, trite and popular topics — he will at any rate free himself from their impertinent solicitations. There are accordingly two principles in human nature, by which he accounts for all the relations, that have ever been in the world, concerning miracles. These principles are, the passion f 07' the marvellous, and the religious affection ;\ against either of which singly, the philosopher, he says, ought ever to be on his guard ; but incomparably more so, when both hap- pen to be in strict confederacy together : " For if the spirit of religion join itself to the love of wonder, there is an end of common sense ; and human testimony in these circumstances loses all pretensions to authority."! Notwithstanding this strong affirmation, there is reason to suspect that the author is not, in his heart, so great an enemy to the love of wonder as he affects to appear. No man can make a greater con- cession in favour of the wonderful, than he hath done in the passage quoted in the preceding section. No man was ever » Page 171.. i Page 184, 185. \ Page 185. 44 MIRACLES CAPABLE OF part i. fonder of pai'adox, and, in theoretical subjects, of every notion that is remote from sentiments universally received. This love of paradoxes, he ov/ns himself, that both his enemies and his friends reproach him with.* There must surely be some foundation for so universal a censure. If therefore, in respect of the passion for the marvellous, he differ from other people, the difference arises from a particular delicacy in this gentle- man, which makes him nauseate even to wonder with the crowd. He is of that singular turn, that where every body is struck with astonishment, he can see nothing wondrous in the least ; at the same time he discovers prodigies, where no soul but himself ever dreamed that there were any. We may therefore rest assured of it, that the author might be conciliated to the love of wonder, provided the spirit of re- ligion be kept at a distance, against which he hath unluckily contracted a mortal antipathy, against which he is resolved to wao-e eternal war. When he but touches this subject, he loses at once his philosophic equanimity, and speaks with an acri- mony vmusual to him on other occasions. Something of this kind appears from the citations already made. But if these should not satisf}', I shall produce one or two more, which certainly will. There is a second supposition the author makes, of a miraculous event, in a certain manner circum- stanced and attested, which he declares, and I think with par- ticular propriety, that he would " not have the least inclina- tion to believe."f At his want of inclination the reader will not be surprised, when he learns, that this supposed miracle is concerning a resurrection ; an event which bears too strong a resemblance both to the doctrine and to the miracles of holy writ, not to alarm a modern Pyrrhonist. To the above de- claration he sul:ijoins, " But should this miracle be ascribed to any new system of religion, men in all ages have been so much imposed on by ridiculous stories of that kind, that this very circumstance would be a full proof of a cheat, and sufficient, with all men of sense, not only to make them reject the fact, but even reject it ixsithout further examination.^'' Again, a little after, " As the violations of truth are more common in the testimony concerning religious miracles, than in that * Dedication to the four Dissertations. f Page 204. in the note. SECT. IV. PROOF FROM TESTIMONY. 45 concerning any other matter of fact," (a point in which the author is positive, though he produces neither facts nor ar- guments to support it), " this must diminish very much the authority of the former testimony, and" (pray observe his vi^ords) ^^ maJce us form a general resolution, never to lend any attention to it, tvifk iv/iatevcr sjjecious pretext it may he covered^ Never did the passion of an inflamed orator, or the intem- perate zeal of a rehgionist, carry him further against liis ad- versary, than this man of speculation is carried by his prejudice against religion. Demagogues and bigots have often warned the people against listening to the arguments of an envied and therefore detested rival, lest by his sophistry they should be seduced into the most fatal errors : The same part this author, a philosopher, a sceptic, a dispassionate inquirer after truth, as surely he chooses to be accounted, now acts in favour of in- fidelity. He thinks it not safe to give religion even a hearino-. Nay, so strange a turn have matters taken of late with the ma- nagers of this controversy', that it is now the free-thinker who preaches implicit faith ; it is the infidel who warns us of the danger of consulting reason. Beware, says he, I ad- monish you, of inquiring into the strength of the plea, or of bringing it to the deceitful test of reason ; for " those who will be so SILLY as to examine the affair by that medium, and seek particular flaws in the testimony, ai-e almost sure to be con- founded."*' That religion is concerned in the matter, is reckoned by these sages sufficient evidence of imposture. The proofs she offers in her own defence, we are told by tliese can- did judges, ought to be rejected, and rejected imth out exami- nation. The old way of scrutiny and argument must now be laid aside, having been at length discovered to be but a bungling, a tedious, and a dangerous way at best. What then shall we substitute in its place ? The Essayist has a most admirable expedient ; a shorter and surer method: he re- commends to us the expeditious w^^ o^ resolution. " Form," says he, " a general resolution, never to lend any atten- tion to testimonies or facts urged by religio?i, xcith lohatevcr specious pretext they may he covered.''' * Page 197. ill tlif note. 46 MIRACLES CAPABLE OF paut i. I had almost congratulated Mr Hume, and our enlightened age, on this happy invention, before I reflected, that though the application might be new, the expedient itself, of resolv- ing to be deaf to argument, was very ancient, having been often, with great success, employed against atheists and here- tics, and warmly recommended by Bellarmine and Scotus, and most others of that bright fraternity the schoolmen: per- sons, I acknowledge, to whom one could not, perhaps in any other instance, find a resemblance in my ingenious opponent. I am afraid that, after such a declai^ation, I must not pre- sume to consider myself as arguing with the author, who has, in so peremptory a manner, resolved to attend to nothing that can be said in opposition to his theory. " What judgment he has," to use his own expression, " he has renounced by principle, in these sublime and mysterious subjects."* If however it should prove the fate of these papers, the forbid- ding title of them notwithstanding, to be at any time honoured with the perusal of some infidel, not indeed so rivetted in un- belief as the Essayist, I would earnestly entreat such reader, in the solemn style of Mr Hume, " to lay his hand upon his heart, and after serious consideration declare, "f If any of the patrons of religion had acted this part, and warned people not to try by argument the metaphysical subtleties of the adversaries, affirming, that " they who were mad enough to examine the affair by that medium, and seek particular flaws in the reasonings were almost sure to be confounded ; that the only prudent method was, to form a general resolution never to lend any attention to what was advanced on the op- posite side, however specious ;" whether this conduct would not have afforded great matter of triumph to those gentlemen the deists; whether it would not have been construed by them, and even justly, into a tacit conviction of the weakness of our cause, which we were afraid of exposing in the light, and brinoinff to a fair trial ? But we scorn to take shelter in obscurity, and meanly to decline the combat ; confident as we are, that reason is our ally and our Jriend, and glad to find that the enemy at length so violently suspects her. * Page 183. f ^^ge 206. SECT, IV, PROOF FROM TESTIMONY. 47 As to die first method, by which the author accounts for the fabulous relations of monsters and prodigies, it is freely acknowledged, that the Creator has implanted in human nature, as a spur to the improvement of the understanding, a principle of curiosity , which makes the mind feel a particular pleasure in every new acquisition of knowledge. It is ac- knowledged also, that as every principle in our nature is liable to abuse, so this principle will often give the mind a bias to the marvellous ; for the moi*e marvellous any thing is, that is, the more unlike to all that has formerly been known, the more new it is; and this bias, in many instances, may induce belief on insufficient evidence. But the presumption that arises hence against tlie marvel- lous, is not stronger in the case of miracles (as will appear from an attentive perusal of the second section) than in the case of every flict that is perfectly extraordinary. Yet how easily this obstacle may be overcome by testimony, might be illustrated, if necessary, in almost every branch of science, in physiology, in geography, in history. On the contrary, what an immense impediment would tliis presumption prove to the progress of philosophy and letters, had it in reality one fiftieth part of the strength which the author seems to attribute to it. I shall not tire my reader or myself by recurring to the philosophic wonders in electricity, chemistry, magnetism, which, all the world sees, may be fully proved to us by tes- timony, before we make the experiments ourselves. But there is, it seems, additional to this, a peculiar pre- sumption against religious miracles. " The wise," as the author has observed with reason, " lend a very academic faith to every report which favours the passion of the reporter, whetlier it magnifies his country, his family, or himself, or in any other way strikes in with his natural inclinations and propensities." * Now, iis no object whatever operates more powerfully on the fancy than religio?i does, or works up the passion to a higher fervour ; so, in matters relating to this subject, if in any subject, we have reason to suspect that the imderstanding will prove a dupe to tlie passions. On this « Page 200. 4.8 MIRACLES CAPABLE OF parti. point, therefore, we ought to be pecuharly cautious that we be not hasty of belief. In this sentiment we all agree. But there is one circumstance which he has overlooked, and which is nevertheless of the greatest consequence in the debate. It is this, that the prejudice resulting from the religious affec- tion, may just as readily obstruct as promote our faith in a religious miracle. What things in nature are more contrary, than one religion is to another religion ? They are j ust as con- trary as light and darkness, truth and error. The affections with which they are contemplated by the same person, are just as opposite as desire and aversion, love and hatred. The same religious zeal which gives the mind of a Christian 2i ■propensity to the belief of a miracle in support of Christianity, will in- spire him with an aversion from the belief of a miracle in support of Mahometanism. The same principle which will make him acquiesce in evidence less than sufficient in one case, will make him require evidence more than sufficient in the other. Before, then, the remark of the author can be of any use in directing our judgment as to the evidence of miracles attested, we must consider whether the original tenets of the witnesses would naturally have biassed their minds m favour of the mira- cles, or in ojpposition to them. If the former was the case, the testimony is so much the less to be regarded ; if the latter, so much the more. Will it satisfy on this head to acquaint us, that the prejudices of the witnesses must have favoured the miracles, since they were zealous promoters of the doctrine in support of which those miracles are said to have been per- formed ? To answer thus would be to misunderstand the point. The question is, Was this doctrine the faith of the witnesses, before they saw, or fancied they saw, the miracles ? If it was, I agree with him. Great, very great allowance must be made for the prejudices of education, for principles, early perhaps, carefully and deeply rooted in their minds, and for the reli- gious affection founded in these principles ; which allowance must alwaj^s derogate from the weight of their testimony. But if the faith of the witnesses stood originally in opposition to the doctrine attested by the miracles ; if the only account that can be given of their conversion, is the conviction which the SECT. IV. PROOF FR03I TESTIMONY. +9 miracles produced in them ; it must be a preposterous way of arguing, to derive their conviction from a rehgious zeal, which would at first obstinately withstand, and for some time hinder such conviction. On the contrary, that the evidence arising from miracles performed in proof of a doctrine disbelieved, and consequently hated before, did in fact surmount that ob- stacle, and conquer all the opposition arising thence, is a very strong presumption in favour of that evidence; just as strong a presumption iia its favour, as it would have been against it, had all their former zeal, and principles, and prejudices, cooperated with the evidence, whatever it was, in gaining an entire assent. Hence there is the greatest disparity in this respect, a dis- parity which deserves to be particularly attended to, betwixt the evidence of miracles performed in proof of a religion to be established, and in contradiction to opinions generally re- ceived; and the evidence of miracles performed in support of a religion already established, and in confirmation of opinions generally received. Hence also the greatest disparity betwixt the miracles recorded by the evangelists, and those related by Mariana, Bede, or any monkish historian. There is then no peculiar presumption against religious miracles merely as such : if in certain circumstances there is a presumption against them, the presumption arises solely from the circumstances, insomuch that, in the opposite cir- cumstances, it is as strongly in their favour. SECTION V. There is a peculiar presumption in favour of such miracles as are said to have been ivrought in support of religion. In this section I propose to consider the reverse of the question treated in the former. In the former I proved, that there is no peculiar presumption against religious mii-acles ; I now inquire whether there be any in their favour. The ques- tion is important, and intimately connected with the subject. J) 50 MIRACLES CAPABLE OF parti. The boldest infidel Vv-ill not deny, that the immortality of the soul, a future and eternal state, and the connexion of our happiness or misery in that state with our present good or bad conduct, not to mention the doctrines concerning the divine unity and perfections, are tenets which carry no absur- dity in them. They may be true, for aught he knows. He disbelieves them, not because they are incredible in them- selves, but because he has not evidence of their truth. He pretends not to disprove them, nor does he think the task incumbent on him. He only pleads, that before he can yield them his assent, they must be proved. Now, as whatever is possible may be supposed, let us suppose that the doctrines above-mentioned are all infallible truths ; and let the unbeliever say, whether he can conceive an object worthier of the divine interposal, than to reveal these truths to mankind, and to enforce them in such a man- ner as may give them a suitable influence on the heart and life. Of all the inhabitants of the earth, man is incomparably the noblest. Whatever therefore regards the interests of the human species, is a grander concern than what regards either the inanimate or brute creation. If man was made, as is doubtless not impossible, for an after state of immortalitj^ ; whatever relates to that immortal state, or may conduce to prepare him for the fruition of it, must be immensely supe- I'ior to that which concerns merely the transient enjoyments of the present life. How sublime then is the object which religion, and religion only, exhibits as the ground of super- natural interpositions ! This object is no other than the in- terest of man, a reasonable and moral agent, the only being in this lower world which bears in his soul the imafje of his Maker; not the interest of an individual, but of the kind; not for a limited duration, but for eternity ; an object at least in one respect adequate to the majesty of God. Does this appear to the Essayist too much like arguing a priori, which I know he detests? It is just such an argument as, presupposing the most rational principles of Deism, results from those maxims concerning intelligent causes, and their operations, which are founded in general experience, and which uniformly lead us to expect, that the end will be pro- sicT. V. PROOF FROM TESTIMONY. 51 portionate to the means. Tlie Pagans of Rome had notions of their divinities infinitely inferior to tlie opinions concern- ing God, which in Christian countries are maintained even by those who, for distinction's sake, are called Deists. Yet such of the former as had any justness of taste, were offended with those poets who exhibited the Celestials on slight occa- sions, and for trivial purposes, interfering in the affairs of men. Why? Because such an exhibition shocked all the principles of probability. It had not that verisimilitude which is absolutely necessary to render fiction agreeable. Accord- ingly it is a precept, with relation to the machinery of the drama, given by one who was both a critic and a poet, T/iat a god must never he introdnced^ unless to accomplish some im- portant design, 'which could not be othermse effected.^ The foundation of this rule, which is that of my argument, is therefore one of those indisputable principles which are found every-where among the earlie,st results of experience. Thus it appears, that, from the dignity of the end, there arises a peculiar presumption in favour of such miracles a.s are said to have been wrought in support of religion. SECTION VI. Inquiry into the meaning and propriety of one of Mr Hume'x favourite maxims. There is a method truly curious, suggested by the author, for extricating the mind, should the evidence from testimony be so great, that its falsehood might, as he terms it, be ac- counted miraculous. In this puzzling case, when a man is so beset with miracles that he is under the necessity of admit- ting one, he must always take care it be the smallest; for it is an axiom in this writer's dialectic. That the probability of the fact is in the invose ratio of the (puantity of miracle there is in it. " I weigh," says he, " the one miracle against the other, and according to the superiority which I discover, * Nee Dens intersit, nisi digims vin