mmm^^ ^ir^ ■J- .-. > OF THE Theological Seminary, " PRINCETON, N. J. Case, Shelf, Book, .Q4.V , ..£.e.ctior, .-. M.o. ...1 7 .\' v \ N A Generai> TREATISE O F MORALITY, Form'd upon the Principles of Natural . Reajon onl^. jZ'^^f/^ WITH. ''''7/'^^S'/^/L_ A Preface in Anfwer to two Effiiys Jately publiflicd in the 'Eable of the Bees, And Ibme incidental Remarks upon an Inquiry concerning Virtue, by the Right Honourable lylnthony Earl of Shaft sbury. By R I C H A R D JF I D D F S, D. . D. Chaplain to the Ri^ Honourable the Earl of Oxford and Earl Mortimer. LONDON: Printed for S. Billingsley at the Jtidge^^ Head in Chanceny-Lane. M»dcc,xxiv, Digitized by the- Internet Arcinive in 2011 with funding from Princeton Theological Seminary Library http://www.archive.org/details/generaltreatiseoOOfidd T O T H E Right Honourable THE Earl of Pembroke, &c Knight of the moll noble Order of the Garter^ ^c. My Lord, N the Addrefs, wherewith I have the Ho^ nour to come before your Lordlhip^ I Ihal! notobferve A 2 the DEDICATION. the ufual Forms on the like Occafions ; but confine my feif tothefubjed Matter of the following Treatife. All the Topicks, indeed, which are proper to exhibit the /- dea of a great Man, have been already employed by the fineft Pens of the Age, in this Method of doing Ho- mage to your Lordfliip, as the known Patron of Learn- in a" in general : And 1 Ihall not pretend to copy after fo many of the beft Mafters, native and foreign. I was principalK^ induced to Re- queft; with all Humility, your DEDICATION. your Lordfhip's Patronage of this Work, from the Na- ture and Defign of it. For no Principles, or Rules of any Kind, ever operate with fo great Force, as when we confirm, and illuftrate them by living Examples, efpeci- ally, from very high, and confpicuous Stations ; or where moft, if not all, the great Offices in civil Life have been fucceflivelv fuf- tf ■ tained with a juft, but eafy, Dignity. For fuch Inftan- cesfliew, in the beft Light, that the Maxims of Morali- ty, which are fo reafonable, and I>EI>ICATION. and beautiful in the Theory^ •are alfo, in Fad:, truly a- dapted to the prefent State, and Condition of human Nature. Nothing , under fuch mighty Advantages, can contribute, to render the Influence of moral Virtue, more powerful and difFufive ; unlefs here we fee the Authority, the Wifdom^ and Experience of Age, con- fiftent, fofar as they can be conceived to cjonfift, with all the Vivacity, the Good- nefs, and Complacency of Youth. My T>ET>ICATTON, My Lord, I iliall add Nothing more, concerning the Motives to this Addrefs ; but that I was ambitious of acknow- ledging, on fo proper an Occafion, a late Inftance of your Lordfliip's Ge- nerofity^ in preventing my Application, for one of the greateft, and moft de- fireable Favours, for which I could have been inclined to ^pply. I DEDICATION. I am, with all poflible Re- <^'afcl to My Lord, Tour Lordjhifs moji humble^ ' and moJi dutiful Servant, Rich. Fiddes. THE •^ CONTENTS O F T H E PREFACE. -T^ H E Author s Defign in the -■- following Treatife. — The Motives to it. The Defers in Tull/s Book of Offices^ and in certain Chriftian Writers; with a Charafter of M. Malehranch and his Works. — - How far me- taphyfical Arguments employed by the Author. — - His Method, and particular Defign in the Pre- face. -'- Two Treatifes which the Author propofes to examine : ^n Inquiry into the Origin of n^ioral KirtuCy CONTENTS, ^c, Virtue^ and a Search into the Nature of Society. — - Aiifwer to the former. Vindication of the Principles alTerted by the Au- thor of the Chara&eriJiickSy in his Inquiry concerning Virtue, with a Confutation of the Argu- ments propofed by the Author of the Search againft him, and againft the real Diftindlion of moral Good and Evil. — - concerning Polygamy and Inceft. — - A Recapitulation. — - Concerning publick Affefliion, and publick Good, as oppofed to private Intereft. — A Difficulty propofed and obviated. -— An Attempt towards a Vindication of Dr. Radcliffe^ from the Afperfi- ons caft upon him in the Fahle. --' Remarks on two Prefentments by the Grand Jury of Middlejex, — - The Conclufion. THE THE PREFACE. T Deftgn, in the following Trea- tife, IS to efta- hlijlj the great Truths of Mo- rality upon their proper a7id na- tnral Trinciples. I have there- fore co7tfidered them, without drawing any Troofs in the Tro- a fecution ii PREFACE. Jecution of my Subject^ from dt- 'Dine Revelation. For tho federal Taj] ages are occafionally cited ly me from the Holy Scriptures ; yet they are not propofed, as ha- lving the Sanction of divine Au- thority^ hut only^ as conveying to the Mtnd certain natural Truths y relating to Morality ^ in a letter Light y and exprej/ing them with a peculiar y and more irrefiftible Force, 1. I was principally induced to undertake this JVork^ upon the two following Motives : A T>efire of ohviatingfuch ill FffeBs^ as might arifefrom the dangerous Tenden- cy, if not the formed T)efign of Jeveral 'Pieces, that have been lately puhlijhed towards jubvert- ing the very Trinciples oj natural Religion : And a Trojpect^ at the fame PREFACE. iii fame time:, of fupplyin^^ in fome meafure^ "what has heen reckoned among the things^ that are want- ing:, a general Treatife of Mora- lity in the Englifla Tongue. For tho we abound with great J^ariety of practical 'Difcourfes^ and many of them "very excellent as to particular moral Subjects ; yet I do not knoii/ one Englifli Writer :, who has undertaken to Jiate the Trinciples of Morality in one entire Syflem from natu- ral Reafon only, or to refohe them into their diflinct and pro- per Grounds, 3. None of the ancient Mora- lifls have treated this Subject in it s due extent, or after a manner, ^herein there is nothing defective, Cicero^ in his admirable Book of a X Offices, iv PREFACE. Offices, has gone farther than mo ft, if not than any of them, towards eftahlijhing moral "Duties, upon the natural Aptitude, Beau- ty, and Decency of them. He was a Lover of moral Truth, and had devoted himfelf much to her Service ; hut he did not follow her to the Tlace of her Habita- tion, He fought her every where upon Earth, in folitary Life, in private Families, andin the pub- lick Adminifiration of Affairs ; but foe is only to be found in Heaven ; and by contemplating^ there, the moral Perfections of the divine Nature, the Rule and Model of Ter feet ion to all other intelligent Beings. 4. J cannot fay, thatChriftian Writers them [elves have getter al- ly iinproved this Method of Rea- foning PREFACE. V Joning fo fay\ as might haveheen expected from the Lights, which revealed Religion has. afforded to them, Biitjome of them have fiifficiently demonflrated, to what excellent Uje it may he employed, towards ferving the Caufe of Morality ; and, in particular y the celehrated Author of the Search after Truth ; who has pro- pofed this Argument, to all the Advantage, that humanlVit , ani- mated with the mojl lively Sen- timents of Tiety, could he fuppo- fed capahle of giving to it. That admirahle Writer, in allhisWorks, has e/lahlijljed this Argument upon fuch clear and flrong Foun- dations, Juited to the heautiful and magnificent Structure he path raijed, as if he defigned to hiild for Eternity. His vi PREFACE. His Books for the Ad^i^ance- ment of ujeful Knowledge have teen rendered tn Englifli : But whether it he^ that the Englifh Soil is not of itfelf Jufficiently adapted^ or as yet generally pre- pared for the Culture of [o refi- ned a Thilofophy, it has not yet taken Root^ or fpread it f elf in proportion to thofe fruitful and generous Trinciples, wherewith it is every where replete : Even his excellent Treat if e of Morality is iut in few Hands ^ and among thofCy the Value of it is fome- times much better known hy the Name of the Author ^ than hy a proper life of the Book, There is\ indeed^ fomething in it^ fo far out of the common TVay of Thinkings and his Method of afcertaining the Truths of Mora- lity is fo different from that in uje PREFACE. vii ufe among our heft Writers upon moral or theological Suhjecls, that, it has not leen without Op- pojition, his JVorlzs hanje found here that favouralle Reception^ they are now thought to dejerve. So great is the Force ofTrejudice^ even with pious, learned, and good Men, againjl a differ e?it way of philojophiftng, thd upon the mojt [olid Trinciples, from that, to which they have leen accuflo- med, that I rememher a great T^r elate, eminent in all thefe Cha- raBers, who made it an Objection again ft one of the great eji meta- phyfical JVit s ,thisiiation produced in the late Age, that he affected to imitate Monfieur Malebranch. This which was Jpoken hy way of Reproach to Mr. Norris^ him- Jelf thought his greateft Glory. But all the Difcooeries he made i?i k viii PREFACE; in the Ideal Worlds iPhether rd- fpecting fpeculathe Truths^ or fuch as are more influential on the Duties of moral Life ^ did not meet either with the Reception^ or the Rewardy that was due to his Merit, '\ 6. Tho poj/ihly there 7nay lef, among other ah/iract Sciences, a more general 'Difpofition for Me- taphyficks at prefent, than for- merly di [covered itjelf, yet they are 7tot jo far encouraged or in- troduced, as to give a Writer ^ who fjall form his Reafonings wholly upon them., any great Hopes of Succefs : I have there- fore endeavoured in the following Treatife, fo much as pojjihle, to avoid them, and the Ufe of all nice a7id intricate 'Dif Unctions ; tho a Work of this Nature mufi be PREFACE. ix he very imperfect^ or rather whol- ly deficient^ as to the principal Dejign of it^ ivhcrein no nieta- phyfical Arguments are emph,yed. But to adapt my [elf mere to the common Ta/i and Capacity ^ and to prevent the firong Impref- Jions which are not eafily rejifted^ or ftiddainly ejfaced^ hy thofe^ who read the Treatife of Morality ahove referred to^ with any De- gree of Attention, I have declified in profecuting my prefent Stiljecl, to look into it ; not that I Jhould he afja7ned of copying after fo very great a Mafter ; hut hecaufe there is Jo much Beauty, as well as Strength and Energy in every thing he has written, that it is extremely difficult to conjult him, even where he is mo ft ah fir ad and metaphyfical, without tran- Jcrihing fro7n him, b / X PREFACE. I have y therefore, ivholly de- pended on my Memory, fojar as I am, on any account, indehted to a Book^ which, if all other hu- man Compofttions, in the IVorld, upon the Suhjecl of Morality, were lofl, is full of juch rich Treajures f Learning and Know- ledge, upon that Sub/e£i, as might afford an ample Supply towards repairing the Lofs of them. 7. In reference to ftich Oh- jedtions, which incidentally occur- red to myThoughtsfin profecuting any of the following Arguments, I have endeavoured to anjwer them, as fuccinctly, as the Na- ture of them would admit, with- out entring into perfonal Contro- verjy, where that could he avoid- ed, efpecially, with any modern Writers, But a Book having heen, lately PREFACE. xi lately puhli/Jjcd, wherein the yiit^ thor dire&ly attacks the moral T>iflinction of Good and Evil, Jometiynes in a humorous, then in a more grave argumentative way, and ofteft with an Air of Tri- umph ; And that Book, having, it is [aid, had a pretty brisk Cir- culation ; which is not improbable, from the loofe Trinciples diffemi- nated iri it, and the free, eajy, and lively Manner of the Author*^ I thought 7ny [elf concerned to ex- aynine hisReafonings {for I med- dle not with his l)ecorations) particularly, and apart, from the Body of yny Book, where the T)i[- cujjion of them wotdd not have [lilted [o well with the proper Defign and 'Plan of it, I pro- pojed therefore to do it by way of 'Preface, and efpe daily to the E?idy that the Prejudices which b X might xii PREFACE. might have heen imhthed from that Terformance again/I a Wor'k^ upon the following Sub- ject being femovedy the Rea- der^ if inclined to go along with me^ miglot find the JVay more open and eajy, 8. J foall only beg League occa- fionally to make a previous Re- flection concerning the infecure Grounds, upon which not only pro- feffed Atheifis, but even they^ who believe the Exifence of a God, would totally dejlroy, if they were able, the common 'prin- ciples of Morality. I. In reJpeB to Atheifls. The Arguments whereby we prove the Being of a God are jo clvious and coge?it, that few Terjoris are able to fupprefs or re fi/i the Force ofthein. There are^ indeed^ Men who PREFACE xiii nvho fay in their Hearts, there is no God, that is, whoje Impieties caufe them Jeer etlj to wiJJj, there may he no God ; hit, perhaps, no Man would ever totally, and at all times, extirpate this fimda- mental Ay^ticle of Religion out of his Mind ? Tho it may he que/li- oned, upon the Trinciples of At he- ijm itjelf, and on Suppofition, God really fJjoidd not exift, whe- ther therefore wicked Men could he fecure, there is no future State. For fnce the Operations of the Mind cannot he conceived to arije from the ConftruBion of the groffer Tarts of the Body, it will he impoffihle for the Athetfi to fjew that the Mind cannot operate, when in a feperate State from the Body, ff Thought he only a Rejult, according to the atheifiical Hypothejis of the more pure, xiv PREFACE. j)ure, [uhtle^ and active Tarts of Matter^ vjhy may not the Soul fubjijl and a£l in J ome proper Ve- hicle^ when the grojfer Tarts' and Mechanijm of the Body, to which it is now united, Jhall he dif- folved? It is much more proha- hle, that a colleBion of Mind and infenfate Atoyns once formed in- to a thinking Syftem, Jljould he ahle to continue or maintain it- felf in that /late, than that it fjould at firfi have fallen regu- larly into it. And if the thinking Syfiern iii an Athei/i, Jhall fuhfi/l after the 'Death of the Body, and he can never hiow^ upon his own Trinciples, that it Jhall not ; then^ in/lead of appearing i?i Judgment hereafter hefore a righteous and good God, he could have no ajju- rance, that he Jhould not he ex- pojed to the implacable Rage ^ Malice^ PREFACE. XV Malice, and Cruelty of other Spirits more wicked, and poiver- fill than him f elf . For why fjould this JVorldy we now inhabity which hears very title ^Propor- tion to the whole Mafs of Mat- ter every where extended, be- yond what the Eye, or even Imagination ca7i reach, yet be thought the only Scene of Action for Beings endowed with Intelli- gence ? Why fjould not a fortui- tous Coficourfe of Atoms, if In- telligence mufi be afcribed to fo chimerical a Caufe, have pro- duced in an infinite SucceJJion of Ages, and an infnite Vay^iety of Worlds, other Intelligences, bejides thofe, which inhabit this terra- queous Globe ? Wicked Men, therefore, if they will argue confiflently from their own xvi PREFACE. own Scheme:, that all Thought pro- ceeds from a certain accidental ComVmation of the Tarts of Mat- ter ^ can talie no Refuge in Atheifm^, again/l the Afprehen- fions of future Exifience or Mi- ferjy. a. Others y therefore ^ have en- dea'i^oured to find that fecuritf in gratifying their Inclinations and Taffons, which they were fenfi- Me could not le found inAtheijm^ hy perfuading themfehesy that there is no real Difiin&ion he- tween Virtue and Vice^ and that thefe are only different Names^ which Mankind have arbitrarily agreed to give to Things, 5. This heing an Opinion ^ e- qually pernicious y if not 7nore foy to the Caufe of Morality than yi- theifniy, P R E F A C "E. xvii Atheifm ( [uppqfingMen in a mere State of Nature) 1 fhinh it in- cumhe?it on me^ to exa7nine fo7ne of the mojt jpecious Argument Sy nvherehy it has heen fupported ; and pay^ticularly hy the modern Author referred to above, in two difiiict TreatifeSy one inti- tied. An Inquiry into the Origin of Moral Vertue ; the other ^ A Search into the Nature of So- ciety. In the former, he afferts that Lawgivers have found it advife- ahle to recomme?2d Self denial and Tuhlickfpirited7tefs to Men, as necejjary to the Ends of Civil Society. But hecauje this was a Sacrifice, which would not eaftly he made, without fome Equiva- lent \ and they ohjerved the pre- dominant Taffion of Aia?i was a c Ve- cc cc cc cc cc xviii PREFACE. T)efire of Traife^ they thought fuch Arguments ^ere likely to operate ivith the greateji Force upon him^ as tended to flatter his Vanity. With this VieW;, they hegan to inflruB him in the ISLotions of Honour and Shame, reprefenting the one as the wor/i of all Evils, and the other as the highe/l Good to which Mortals could afpireT "*" This is what the Author illuftrates with a great and agr^eahle Variety of ExpreJJion, But the Force of his Arguments^ which I am only ohltged to con- fider, lies in a narrow Com.- pafs, and they may all le redu- ced to this fingle Tropoftiony ^^ That moral Virtues are the " political Ojf-lpri7ig, which Flat- « ^Qy.y ye got upo72 Fride. t ■^ fag. 2>>. f Pa£,. 37. fFe PREFACE. xix TVe do not deny^ Man is caft in fnch a Mouldy as eafdy to yield to the ImpreJJlons of Vanity ; and that Tride is very often the fecret Motive, to which his left ABions, materially coitjidered, are owing. But it will, hy no 7neans, therefore follow, that a Man may not do good Actions, upon truly good and generous Mo- tives. If he cannot, his Incapa- city mufl either proceed from want of Knowledge, or of Tower. To fay Man cannot know the be/i Motives, upon which he ought to act, is to deny the life of Reafon and Trudence, in the chief In- fiance, wherein they can be of Ufe to him ; to [ay that he cannot aCl upon fuch Motives, which he knows to be the befi, is to [up- pofe his Knowledge was given c % bim^ XX PREFACE. hi7n^ not to direct^ lut only to reproach and condemn him ; to JJjew hhn his Mtjery^ aiid his "Defects, ; Now where feveral Motives ' may he reajonally ajfigned for any jiction^ it is more human ^ more jiifty and equitable y to afcrihe it to V the heft Motives ^ at leaf it is highly injurious to human Nature, and again ft all the Rules of com- mon Ingenuity, wholly to exclude the heft Motives, And therefore all this Gentle- man has [aid, concerning the Tovjer of Flattery, 7nay he al- lowed to him, without a7ty Confe- quence to his Argument. It not being the Sluefion, Whether fome of the mo ft celebrated Actions of Men, have not heen owing to Va- nity ; PREFACE. xxi n'lty ; lut whether Men may not he excited to do great and truly good Actions from a pure Motive of Virtue :, or fuch a laudable T)eftre ^ of Fame ^ which may very well co7tJifi with aVirtuousTrinciple? Neither is it denied, that To- liticians, may, hy a wife Manage- ment, mal^e Ufe of the very Er- rors and Defects of human Na- ture to ferve the Ends, in many Cafes, of Civil Government ; but hecaufe a good Ufe may be acci- dentally made by an artful Ap- plication of ill Inftruynents, will it therefore follow, that no proper Infirurnents could be found or employed to the fame UJe ? The Author, in this Cafe, ought] to have diflinguifjed between the\ natural Tendency, and the occa- fional xxli PREFACE. fional Application of Things : A T)efire of doino;^ good and generous Actions, is of it [elf a proper and reafonahle Motive to fuchA'ytions; neither does it lejjen the Merit of them that they are attended both with an imi'ard Complacency of Mind, and a certain 'Degree of ex- ternal B^eputaJ ion \ becauje thefe Motives are in the Nature of them proper to Influence a reafonahle Agent : tho it may ac- cidentally happen, vitious and in- direclMotives frorn Pride or Flat- tery, may alfo excite other Ter- fons to do the like ABions. It is therefore an In fiance hy no means conclufive, vjhith is m.ade ufe of, from a Saying of Alexander^ the Macedonian Madman^ if J^ harfh an Exprejfon can he allow- ed in one IV ho appears fo well to underfhmd the Rides of polite Writings^ PREFACE. xxili JVritingithat Traife is the only End of human Act io7ts : If it were Jo to Alexander^ there may yet he heroick Minds ^ who form and execute great T)e[igns upon true Moti'ves of puhiick Good ; tho it is not necejjary thofe of a lauda- Me Am'bition foculd he excluded, Tet the T)efnilion he makes of Glory from this fngle In/lance^ accordifig to the Generality of the Terms wherehy He exprejjeth it^ is irrefpective and abjolute, ^*" To defne then the Reward of Glory in the ample ji Manner^ the mo ft that can he jaid of it is^ hat it confifts in the juperlative Felicity which a Man^ who is conjcious of ha'oing perfrmed a noble Action^ enjoys in Self love, while he is thinking on the ylpplaufe he expects from ce cc cc cc ^ cc cc cc cc cc ^^ others. * Pag. 41. ff xxiv PREFACE. // is contrary to all the Rules of jufl Reafoning to infer general jPr opo fit ions ^ or Rules , from par- ^: ticular Inflames ; hut were this Hiii^^reaUy allow ah le, the Author was very unhappy in chufingy to ifi^ ufe his own T>ialecty a Madman for his In/lance, As we ought not to flatter human Nature, nei- ther are we ohliged to villi fy and difgrace it. And if Examples may he applied ;, to fie w, what the human Qualities are, they fhould rather he horrowed from the 7nofi perfect and iinproved, than froTH the irregular or depraved State of Mankind, And to do the Author juftice, indeed, he confeffeth afterwards, ^^ That among the Heathens there ^^ have he en Men, who when '' they cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc PREFACE. XXV thejy did good to others^ were fo far from fe eking Thanhs and Applaufe^ that they took all i?nagi?iahle Care to he for ever concealed from thoje on whom they be/towed their Be- nefits ; andconfeque7itly it may be argued^ that Tride has no hand in [purring Man 072 to the higheji Titch of Self-denial!' . But even in fuch extraordi- nary Cafes ^ which are confejjed to be very rare He is of Gpinio^t no fmall In /lances of Tride may ' be difcoveredy from the fenftble T lea fur e that proceeds fro7n vir- tuous Actions ; " which T lea jure ^ ^^ together with the Occafon of it^ are as certain Signs of Tride ^ as lookingpcle and trem- bling at any imminent T>angery are the Symptoms of Fearl" d Tride, xxvi PREFACE. Pride^ as ujed hy him in this Tlace^ is an equivocal Term. If we under fiand hj it^ a natural Conlcioujnejs of IVorth in a Many arijingfrom a Senfe of his having acted accordi?ig to the Order and 'Perfection of his Nature ^ there is nothing criminal or irregular in fuch a Tri?iciple. It is^ in this Senfe, fo far from heing an Oh- jecito7i again fl the natural and intrinfkk Reafons, upon njuhichwe found moral Virtue ; that it is a direclTroof id{ moral Virtue \ as fuppq/ing it to operate naturally in uSy if 'ive might not fay me- chanically^ like t he common Tajfi- ons of Fear or Shame, But if hy Pride le meant an n7i]ufl or fatter i?ig Opinio?!, which a Man has, above what he ought to PREFACE. xxvii to have, of his own Abilities oy^ Actions J this we grant to he high- ly irregular ; hut aff'ert, at the fame tirne^ there is no ISLeceJJity Hjuhy a wife or a good Man Jhould he juhject to this Irregularity ; and confequently, why Tride, except as commonly under flood, and as it feems to he taken hy this Au- thor, in the worjl Senfe, Jhould he an infeparahle Motive to hu- man Actions, Montaign^ who perhaps under- flood the weak a7id corrupt Side of human Kature, as well as the Author he fore me ; yet had Thoughts, in general, much lejs derogatory to the Dignity and Ho- nour of it. He Juppofes tho Men often acf- from indirect, yet they may aB, upon generous and good Trinciples, I have obferved:, iiiith d % hC:, xxviii PREFACE. he^ fpeahmg concerning the Htf- tory of Guiciaidine^ among fo many Events and Connfels^ about which he gives his Judgment^ he never afcribes any to Virtue^ Re- ligion^ or Confcience ; as if thofe Things were wholly baniflied out of the World : And he imputes all Adions^ tho' never fo fine^ to a vicious Principle of Self-intereft. It is impious to believe, that among fuch a vaft Number of Actions, none lliould have been produced by a reaibnable Motive : Men will never be fo generally corrupt, but fome will avoid the Contagion ; which giveth me a Sufpicion* that Guiciardine had a vicious Tail, and that he judged of others by himjelf. This Writer s /fpology^ left his notions^ concerning the Ori- gin PREFACE. xxix gin of moral Virtue ^ JIjguM he thought offenfive to Chriftianily^ is notverj^ intelltgible and is wit h- allimperfeEl. The Offence^ ivhich Chri/tians may take at his No- tions^ is not to he confidered mere- ly in Rejpect to them as Chrifti- ans ; hut^ as the Religioft they profefs^ jtippofes the Truth of na- tural Religion^ a haw written on the Hearts of Men^ accufmg^ or elje excufng them^ according to the good or ill Ufe they make of their Liberty. The poftive Laws ^ in the Go [pel, the Laws peculiar to Chrifiianity, are few in Com- parifon. But if there he no real 'Difiinction of 7noral Virtue y Chrifiianity is as much the Law of Ordinances^ as that given hy Mofes to the Jews ; and the Ex- cellency^ therefore of it will not lie in this^ that it has ahoUjIjed the XXX PREFACE. the ceremonial Law, hut that it has tnftittited a Religion con fi fl- ing of fewer Ceremonies : For all Laws, that depend upon the tuu- talk Nature of Things, are of equal Excellency, and only oblige 'by Virtue of their being corn- 7nanded. His apology therefore had been more full and adequate to the Offence taken, if he had endeavoured to f hew, that no 'Pre- judice could be done or defigned, from any thing he had [aid, to the Caufe of natural Religion. -{-Moral Virtue , andChriftianity confidered as a Rule of Life, are the fame Thing. JVe may there- fore fuppofe Morality tridy de- figned iy God as a Means of much phyfical Good, without interefting Chrifiianiiy in the ^.eflion. II. This PREFACE. xxxi II. This Author^ m his Scd.rch into the Nature of Society^ Je^s himjelf direElly to oppugn and overthrow a contrary Opinion of a noble Writer^ much read as he obj'erves^ by Men ^Senfe. Ac- cording to that Opinion y Men with- out any great Trouble or Violence to themjehesy may be really "virtuous ; Virtue and Vice are permanent Realities^ that 7nufi ever be the fame in all Countries^ and in all Ages ; a7id a Man of foundUnderJiandifig may not only find out the Beautiful and the Honeft;, both in Morality and the JVorks of Nature and Art, but likewife govern himjelf by his Reajon^ with as much Eafe and Readme fs, as a good Rider 7na- nages a well taught Horfe by the Bridle. In xxxii PREFACE. In Anfwer to this the Author of the Search propojes to dtfcujs^ iVhether there he a realJVorth * and Excellency in Things^ a 4M/t4.A, Tre^eminence of one Thing above ^l ,, „ another^ ivhich every Body will «^ always agree to^ that nvell un- der fiands them ? The Negative is what he propojes to maintaifi. But hefore I proceed to examine his Arguments^ it w.ay not he improper to cite the Author of the Charad:erifticks upon the Suh- jecl of Moral Virtue y in his own IVords ; fiot oiily^ as he hath af- Jerted the immutahle 'DiJiinCtion of Moral Good and Evil, in the jftronge/i Terms ^ hut hath aljo in lis inquiry concerning Virtue, errphyedjome very pertinent and leauiiful Jllu/lrattons in Troof of tt, 1 he Caie is the iame, faith he. PREFACE, xxxiti he, fpeaVing concerning t be Oh j eels of htmia?i yljjeci'w7i, in the men- tal or moral Subjefts, as in the ordinary Bodies^ or the cojiimon Subjeflis of Senfe; the Shapes, Motions, Colour^ and Proportions of thefe latter, being prefented to our Eye, there neccilarily re- fults a Beauty or Deformity, ac- cording to the different Meafure, Arrangement, and Difpolition of tjieir feveral Parts ; fo in Beha- viour and Aftions^ when prefented to the Underftanding, there mull be found, of NeceJJitf, an appa- rent Difference, according to the Regularity, or Irregularity of the Subjed:s. The Kom.^.\\ Orator, as J have cited hiyn in the foUowiJig Treat ije, hath made life of this verj Argument, with foine 'Dif- ference in the Rxprejfion ; hut there is no Keceflty of jiippofng e xxxiv PREFACE. this noble Author had harrowed from him : An Invention leji fer- tile^ than that of the late Earl ^ Sliaftsbury^ might eafily have eynbelUfjed an Argument^ with the fame Images^ which would naturally arife to an attentive Mind^ on the fame Subject, Bnt^ in what follows^ m/e may fay this noble JVriter has i/npro- vedhis Illuftration of moral Vir- tue from Jenfible Objects^, beyond the Roman Orator him f elf. If jail graph ; thd it is followed by others ^ which will be no lefi acceptable to thofe^ who will confult the Ori- ginal. ^' The Mind, which is Spec- ^^ tator^ or Auditor^ of other '' Minds ^ PREFACE. xxxv ^^ Minds, cannot le without its Eye and Ear, jo as to difcern Troportion, dtftingiujh Sound, arid jean each Sentiment, or Thought, which comes before it. It can let nothing efcape ifs Cenjure\ it feels the j oft, aiid harfj, the agreeable, or dif- agreeahle, in the yJfjeQions *, and finds a foul and faii% a harrnonious and a dijfonant, as really and truly here, as in any muftcal Numbers, or in the outward Forms and Reprefen- tat ions of [enfible Things : Nor ^^ can it withold its Admiration^ or Extajy, its Averfion and Scorn, any more in what re- lates to one, than to the other of theje Subjects. So that to d.eny the cpmmo7i and natural Senfe of the iliblime and beau- tiful in Things, will appear an iflihe, of our iiftng or difcontinuing the life of them ^ are mutahle^ according to the different Time^ Tlace, or Difpofition^ wherein we may he. To urge this, therefore, as an Ar- gument againfi fuch Things, as are faid hy us to he fotmded on natural and immutable Reajons, is to heg the ^efiion, and to ar- gue againfi that, which has not heen affertedor de?iied. And PREFACE. xli A7id therefore the following In fiance from the different 'Judg- ment of Painters^ as to the Works of eminent Maflers^ ts equally improper : This, according to his own Account^ not depending fo much Oft their intrinftck Worthy as their Antiquity^ or fome rela- tive CharaBery ifby Reafon of which life has given a current lvalue to them) can he no jufi II- luflration of his Argumeftt ; hut rather y indeed^ proves the intrin- ftck Difference of Virtue and Vice : For^ he owns^ fudges will never di [agree in Opifiion, when a fine Ticture is compared to the Dawhing of aNovice. But why not dif agree in this Cafe, as well as in the other? But only , hecaufe the Difference lies here, as it does hetween Virtue and Vice, in f a xlii PREFACE. a real Dijjlmilitude or Inequality. In the other Cafe^ the Difference may he only accidental and ima- ginary ; the federal Tieces heing done, perhaps, by Hands equally ma/lerly, and according to the fame Rules of Art, And this Author hiynfelfis obliged to con- fejs^ that this Difference among the Tieces y done by great Maj- terSy is from Conjiderations al- together foreign to their Art ; their different Kames, the Time of their Age :, the Scarcity of their Works y and jometimes the Ca- vity of TerfonSy in ni/hoje Toffef- fion they are. A more im- proper In/lance could not have been employed to overthrow a Dijiinclion of Things , which does not depend on temporary ^ but on certain fated Reafons ; and where y in his own Words y there is PREFACE. xUii is a Standard to go hj, that is ahv ays the fame \ if Re aj on, which \ I have proved in another Tlace /^ to he the Rule of moral Virtue y is\ always the \ame ; and if it he noty there is no certain IV ay of ^A Reafoning upon thisy or upon any other Subject, From the Worhs of Art, this Writer proceeds ^ with an equal .Air of Ajjurance in his Argu- ment ^ to thofe of JSLature ; and ohferveSy what is heautiful in one Country^ is not lo in another. If hy'^QTmty he meant aju/i Con- texture and Troportion of Tarts, Beauty is certainly, in the Nature of ityjomething real, tndepee\dent of common Opinion ; and there- fore not a proper Injiance in the prefent Cafe ; hut tending rather to prove the indepen- dent Notion of moral Virtue f z or xliv PREFACE. or Order. If^ on the other Hand, Iry Beauty he underjiood any Irregularity or T>efecty any yiffectationy or Artifice, which may he taken for real Beauty ^ this is all the Work of Imagina- tion ; and is of no more Force to deftroy the real Diflinction of Virtue, than it n4/ould he a Troof that there are no flated or jufl Rules of good Tainting, hecaufe an ignorant Terjon may compare thei)awbing of a Novice to afne Ticture. tVhat he adds concern- ing the different Choice of Flo- rifls is not more pertinent, or conclufhe : fo far, as a Flower is larger in its Kind, of a ?nore firong, hright, or diveyfified Co- lour, fo far it ha^s real Beauty, and is naturally more apt to pleafe and delight the Eye. If a Flower much inferior iri Colour or Shape is fometimes more e- f leaned; PREFACE. xlv fteemed\ this is not hecaufe Men confider it as more beautiful or valuable in itfelfy hut on Ac- count of its Rarity^ or lecaujcy perhaps^ it is the TroduB of Art, or fome ujeful Experiment : So that even in this refpe£l, there is a real Foundation for the E/ieem had for ity on Account of fome relative CharaBer^ if not pojfihly alfo of fome peculiar Ufe, There is no greater 'Difficulty ^ in accounting for the different Cu- fioms of Men, as to fliaving or wearing a long Beard^ and other Circumjlances relating to their different T>refs. Thefe are Modes purely arbitrary ^ except where they are refpe&ively at- tended with fome good Ufe, or Inconvenience ; in regard to which Reafon directs^ all Modes what- ever Ixvi PREFACE. ever JJjould ie regulated \ and fo far they have a real and intrtn- Jicky and not meerly an imagina- ry Utility in them. It may he arbitrary to apply his own fami- liar In/iancey in more temperate Countries^ to uje a narrow hrirrid Hat ; lut the other Extream would certainly he lefs conve- nient ^ if ever it could obtain as the Fajhion, under the Torrid Zone. Neither is the §itie/iion moved hy him, which is the hand- fomejl Mode in heing, to wear great Buttons, or [mall ones, of any more Signifcancy, in the pre - fent Argument ; there being no Standard in Nature, or hy civil Appointment , toregulate theTro- portion of them., as there is in all Things founded upon Reajons of real Convenience and Order, Andjuch we jay, and have pro- ved^ PREFACE. Ixvii ^edy are the Rules of 7noral Vir- tue. And if the ^e/iion is to ie examined hy this Rule^ it will not he fo "uer/ difficulty hut a mor- tal Man maj he ahle to decide it. For howe'ver arhitrary the Mode in general may he^ as to the Size of the Button^ yet if it he greater or lefs than is adapted to the particular Ufe^ for which it is deftgnedy it is certainly an irre- gular ^ and, therefore^ unreajon- ahle Fajhion. The like Anjwer may he given to his Infiance of laying out a Garden^ which might he defigned in great Variety of Tlats ; and every Troprietor of the^Groundy is at Liherty to make his Choice of them ; provide d^ Regard he had to the Quantity y Situation, and Boundaries of it ; for otherwife a Ixviii PREFACE. a Round may neither he fo com- modious^ nor Jopleafmg to the Eye^ as a Square, And when a Gar- den is actually laid out^ in any Form^ a Rule of Troportion and Correfpondency between the fe- deral Tarts of ity like thaty by JVay of Analogy y i^i moral Sub- jectSy ought neceffarily to be ob- ferved ; otherwije it is not to be computed^ according to his own Calculation y among the almoft in- numerable Ways of laying out a Garden judicioully. The two re- mainifig Exemplifications ^ which he ufes, are not more to his Tur- pofe. The Building of Chrijiian \ Churches y in Form of a Crofs, is founded upon a religious Regard for that Sign^ for Reajons known to the Author^ and which need not here be repeated: It is there- fore no Argument y this Form ought PREFACE. xlix ou^dt not to he kept toly a Chri^ ftian Architect^ in huilding a Church for the life ofChri/iians, if he would not commit a great Faulty thd Turks^ who are not concerned in thofe Reafons^ or do not apprehend themjehes affe£ied h/ them^ huild their Mofques af- ter another Fafljion. The la ft of his In fiances concerning Things of a THore indifferent Nature , is from the Act for Burying in Woollen^ to which Teople at the fir fl were not eafily reconciled^ hut^ hy "De- grees^ the Cufiom of Burying in IVoollen was introduced as a Mat- ter of Decency, This fbews^ in- deed, that our liking or dif liking any Thing, for which we have not a real Standard, very much depends on Mode or Cufiom, hut is as far from proving, as the refl of his Inflames, that virtuous Ac- g tionSy 1 PREFACE. tionSy which are founded upon im- Tnutable Reajons of Order and Terfectiony have therefore no other Foundation hut Mode and Cuilom. NoWy tho it might have ferved as a general Anfnver to all theje InftanceSy that if they relate to Objects of meer Humour or Fancjy they are of no Force ; and zf to real Beauty or 'Proportion^ they conclude not againfl the 'Difiin- ction of 7noral Virtue^ hut for it : Tet I was willing to defend to a fpecifick Anjwer to the fe- veral Tarts of this Aiithors Induction y lefl fome of them might he thought to have 7nore Weighty or to he propofed in a hetter Lights and to more Advan- tage than the rejl\ according to the different Ta/ie or hnagtnation PREFACE. li cfthe Reader : To which I will not dijfe7nhley he is fometimes happy enough in addrejfnig himjelf. But I am fo far from de/Jgning to wealzen his Arguinents in any refpect, that in order to a more dear 'Dijcoveyy of the Toint in Siueftion^ If jail endea'vour to give them an additional Force , hy ma- hng the following Concejfon, That a Cujlom, for In fiance^ may he introduced^ and puhlicMy approved^ not only concerning fuch Cafes y as are propofed hy him^ con- fejjedly in their own Nature ar- bitrary and indifferent ; hut con- cerning Things^ that muf he ac- Iznowledged to have fome real In- convenience and Irregularity i?: them. or T Hi PREFACE. I JJjall fuppofe, that in a cer- tain Nation^ or in a Tract of Land:, not 'verj remote ^ conji/iing of feveral NationSy hard drink- ing, fo as to di/iurh the Towers ^ and Ufe of Reafon, is thought no Crime. This comes much nearer to a Troofy that the Nature of Tnoral ji£lions depends on Mode or Opinion^ than the different Fafhion offhaving or wearing a long Beardy of a hroad or narrow irimmed Hat ; hecaufe upon the Principles of thofe, who contend for the innate Excellency or Tur- pitude of certain hu7nan Actions \ That is excellent y which tends to the greater Perfection of humafi Naturey to the Improvement of Reafony and towards the promo- ting of Order, That, on the con- trary y is ynorally unft or evily which PREFACE. liii njuldich tends to dehafe human Mature^ and to confound, as ^runkennefs does in particular^ all Reafon and Order, Shall we infer, then, from the Tract ice or Opinion, how e'ver general, ofthefe Nations, that there is no real T)if order or Immorality in 7)run' kennefs ? No ; the only Confe- quence we can draw from juch an Inflance, is, that Men, thro Ignorance, Stupidity, naturaVFem- per , the Air they breathe , or other accidental Occafions of Er- ror, may helie'oe there is no Crime in certain Things, of themjehes really criminal. It might, as juftly, he argued, that hecaufe the Genera- lity of the IVorld have he en Toly- theifis and Idolaters, therefore, in the Reafon of the Thing, there is no certain Troof of the Unity of God, When we fpeak of the un- liv PREFACE. unalterable Meafures of moral Virtue^ n^e fuppofe Men^ indeed^ reafondble Beings\ hut we do not fuppofe them all equally reafonahle^ either with refpect to the Towers y or the Exercife of Reafon, It isfufficient to eftablifh the Truth of Morality^ that Men ^ in all AgeSy have agreed in the ge- neral Notion of it. If they ha^ve ieen at any time divided in their Opinion concerning ity when they applied their general Notions of it to particular Subjects ^ fo as to transfer the Name of Virtue to VicC:, or of Vice to Virtue ; this ve- ry Mifapplic at ion fuppofe s Virtue and Vice to be two Things really fubftfiing and diftinguifjed ; for what is not cannot be mif applied, j4s Idolatry therefore proceeded from fame erroneous Belief of the one PREFACE. Iv one true God:, and, when traced up to its original^ rather fuppo fed his Exi/lencey than a Plurality of Beings, that were ly Nature no Gods ; [o the appropriating the Name of Virtue to certain Vices ^ does hy no means tend to prove y that there is no fuch thing in re- ality as Virtue ; lut only that Men are capalle of mijiaking the Nature of Things, and of draw- ing falfeConfequences from true Trinciples. This may he done through Ignorance ; hit, in moral Life, is very often the Effect of fome irregular Inclination : For we more eaftly ajjent to thoje Things without Scruple or Exa- mination, the Truth of which we are willing to believe*^ to which may he added as one Re a f on, why immoral Tract ices are fometimes openly introduced*, that tho Men really Ivi PREFACE. really know, and confefs them to he fo^ yet they look upon them aa Sins in their Kind more venial \ to 'which frail Nature is more fuhjeEly or which a merciful Gody on Account y in their Opinion^ of fome particular alleviating Cir- cumflances that attend them^ will not he extreme inpunifjing. I X. His Confequence, therefore ^ that in Morals there is no greater Certainty^ than in thefe Inflames ^ which are of a very different Con- ftderation from the SuhjeCts of Morality y is^ hy no means ^ jufl or well deduced ; Neither will what he urges further to confirm this Tropoftion, from the Cafes of Tolygamy and Incef, he of any life to corroborate it. All that can he inferred from thofe Cafes isy that the Trejudices imhihed in In- PREFACE. Ivii Infancy y the Force of Cuftom or Ex ample y or^ perhaps ^ jome com- plexional T)ilpo/itio7i, may hinder Men from examining moral Sub- ■je6lSy in ceriai7t In/ia7tces, with that Attention and Impartiality ^ which are reqtufite to the Dif co- very of Truth. How true a Foundation foever any moral Du- ty haSy in the Reafon of Things ^ it does not, therefore, follow^ tlmt all Men f jail fee thofe Rea- fonSy in the fame Light , or ar- gue upon theyn after the faiiie Manner ; hecaufe there are many accident al Occ a fions y as hath he en already confefjed, of Ignorance or Error y it is veyy unliecomirig a Vhi- lofopher to conclude^ there is no- thing therefore y in the Nature of ity concerning which, we can have any true or certain Know- ledge. h But k Iviii PREFACE. But heftdes this general An- Javer to the Cafes of Toligamy^ and Inceft ; which I propoje to treat of difiinclly^ in another Tlace, it may here he curforily ohfer'ved, that the SubjeUs of Morality may he confideredy as heing either of primary ^ or^ ac- cording as they have heen diflin- giiifhed by foyne learned Men, of fecondary Obligation: thofe, un- der the fr/i T)i/iin£liony arife from the immutable Reafon and Order of Things ^ and do not de- pend e'ven upon the JVill of the fupr erne Legifator, but are founded in thoje eternal and ef- fential Terfeclions of his Nature, whereby his M^ill it f elf is regula- lated; and which y m the natural Order of our Ideas ^ are therefore rmtecedent to his Will^juch Things as t jj.-»,- PREFACE. lix as are not meerly good hy Virtue of his Commandy or of any Cir- cumflanceSy wherein Man may ac- cident ly l>e place d\ hut fuch, as are co7nmandedy becauje they are ah- Joint ely goody a7idy under all Cir- cum/iances, in their 074/ n Nature. Thus it can never he a Virtue ; in Man^ who is a reajonahle Beings to he proudy as Tride imports an Opinion of him fe If y above what he ought to think y hecaufe it is contrary to Reafon\ contrary^ therefore y to the feature of Many as a reajonahle Beingy that he fjouldhey on any Account y obliged to make a wrong Judgment : Nei- ther can it be lawful for a Man, under any CircumJlanceSy not to love Gody to cafi of his Depen- dency on Gody to blafpheme or oppoje his TVill\ becauje theRea- Jons of loving Gody of T)ependance h X on Ix PREFACE. on him y of Honour and Ohedience to hiniy being eternal ^ and flow- ing from the efjential Terfe&ions of the divine Nature^ are immu- table^ as the divine Nature. But there are T>utieSy and fuch particularly as have relation to Man^ confidered as a focial Crea- ture ^ which are to le regulated by the good and proper Ends of Society, The intrinfck Excel- lency therefore, or Turpitude , of whichThings is always tobe confi- dered ^as they are more jubfervient ^ or prejudicial to thoje Ends. Thics^ fuppofing it necefary to the Tro- pagation of Mankind, that Ter- fons fijould marry, in the firfi 'Degrees of Conjanguinity, there would not appear to be any m.oral Turpitude, in fuch Marriages \ becaufe they would be agreeable to GodsDefign of multiply inghum an Race^ PREFACE. Ixi Race^ and of his endowing Man with natural Towers and pro- per T)i[po fit ions :, to that End. But, fuppoftng the TVor Id con fide- rally multiplied, and very great Incon'veniencies to arife in Society^ from a Toleration ofjuch Mar- riages, on Account of the inde- cent Coynmerce and Familiarities, which would he introduced among the nearefl Relations, if permit- ted to maize Love, and indifcri- minately to marry ; // is requifite, in this Cafe, that proper Re- firaints fbouldhe laid upon a Li- berty, where the original Rea- fons of permitting it no longer fuh/iji ; and the Ahufes whereof. It would he very difficult, if not morally impoj/tble, to prevent. To which may he added other Reafons of Convenience, relating to Society, from a vifible Means . . of Ixii PREFACE. of Jirengthning the Intere/i, en- larging the Correjpondence^ and cementing the Friendjhip of Fami- lies \ and ^ efpeciallj^ of preferring that regular^ and due Subordina- tion in the fame Family ; which would he altogether confounded, if Intermarriages were promijcu- oufy allowed in them. It is not denied, thefe are In- conveniences, ivith which the ju- preme Legifator, hy Virtue of his Soveratgn Tower over the Rights and haws of Society, may difpenfe ; hut, it does not therefore follow, they may he difpen fed with hy any human Con- fiitution ; or, that they are in their ownNature of arhitrayyU fe ,in any Hat ion \ whether the Laws allow, or prohibit them : Such Laws as do allow them, are of theyn [elves void. PREFACE. Ixiii <'ootd, and of ?io effe6i. For God, who foimded human Society, may model It as he pleafes ; yet no huynan Authority can ajjume a Tower over ayiy particular Socie- ty again/i that Order, which God has, in general, eftahliJJjed, for the Government of Mankind^ ex- cept ,poJfihly , where fome great Con- venience, hy a Breach "f fuch Or- der, wilhnore than over hallance the Co7tveniences, which would arife from obferving it. As [up- pojing all the Inhabitants of the Earth reduced to one Family, I will 7iot aver, but it might then be lawful to take the fame Me- thod towards theTrefervation or Increafe of Mankind, without any exprefs Revelation, that was taken originally, by the Children of Adam. As Ixiv PREFACE. As to the Cafe of Tolygamy^ the fame Anfiver may indiffer- ently ferve ; only it does not ap- pear^ there were ever the fame Reafons for it^ in order to the Multiplication of Mankind. Had more JVoynen ieen originally crea- ted than Men, the like Necef/ity Tnight have been alledged for the Tra&ice of it, as being fubfer- vient to the End of God, in crea- ting Mankind to replenifJj the Earth ; and, in that Cafe, per- haps, the Inconveniences to Socie- ty in allowing Toligamy, forjome- time, would . not have been in equal "Proportion to the Benefits, which might have an fen fro7n it : But when Mankind might otherwife be multiplied, in a Me- thod mofl proper to promote the Happinefs of private Families, a7id P R E F A C E. K'V and confequentfy of Imager Socie- ties, hy the Marriage of one Man to one JVomaii ; when this was found mo ft agreeable to all the proper Ends of the conjugal State the mutual Comfort and Satis- faction of the married Tarties ; the Carey Suhf/ience and Edu- cation of Children ; the Teacd and good Order of Families ; the Reftraint of a viole^tt Taf- fion ; and the Trevention of thofe T)iforderSy which are apt to drij'e from 1 00 gxt^tafz Indulgence of it\ andy when no Adi^antages froni Tolygamy could lallancQ all thefe Inconveniencies from a Tolera- tion of ity then the Law again ft Plurality oflViveshecame aLa^v\ if not in the primary Senfe unal- terable hy the fupreme Legijla- toTy yet fuchy as no human Au- thority could dijpenfe withy or re- i peal J Ixvi PREFACE. peal\ except in fuch Cafes ^ which prohahfy never happened^, or will happen^ when it might he more convenient, in re [peel to the ge- neral Good of Society, in all thefe Refpe&s^ or in mo ft of them, that. 'Polygamy fjould he permitted, than that it fhould he refrained. Befdes thefe Arguments to few, that Tolygamy is a Breach of the moral Law, another may be taken from the Intention of God, fo far as we can make a Judgment of it, from a very fig- nal hi fiance of his Trovidence. For if we can he under a moral Obligation on any Account, we are indifpuiahly obliged to conform, fo far as we are capable, to the Order and 'Defign of God, when^ hy any Means, or proper Indica- tion of his JVill, he may think ft to dijcover the?n to us. Kow PREFACE. Ixvii Now Experience Jloews^ that there is, commonly , an equal Tro- portion in JSiumher, hetii/een the two Sexes ; and that, if there le any T)i [parity, it is Jo inconfide- rahley as not to Tnake a Jen/tijle Alteration in the Cafe ; or to give the leaft occafion of con- tending for a Tlurality ofJVives, If we confider this admirable Effect of Trovidence, it appears to he a plain "Direction to us, that as there are not vifibly 7nore JVomen than Men, and that Mar- riage is the proper Means of pre- ferving the Succejfon of Human Race, fo one Man ought only to contract Marriage with one IVo- ma7i ; otherwife, a great Tart of Manki7td might he excluded^ a- gai?tfi their Confent, from the Means of contributing towards i X tie Ixviii PREFACE. the Support or Encreafe of it ; andy conjeqiiently^ of anfwertng one confderaile End of their Creation. Tlurality of Wives^ therefore^ is incon/lfient nvith that Order of Nature, which Trovidence has 7nar}id out to us, and from li/htch we cannot de- fart, without opening a T>Qor to that unbridled Licentioufnef, and thofe ahominable Crimes^ which (ire pra&ifed without Shame or Remorfe, where-ver Tolygam^ is folerate4* jdnd now I appeal to the fudg- ptent of the Reader, whether the Author had good Reafons for the following Ta/Jage ; or whether he 'has not green too jujl and great Qccajion of Offence h/ it f cc In cc cc cc cc in fuch a T>eftgn. Under thefe two different 2)i- fliiictions, of thofe, who argue from the T)efe£is, and of others, who argue from the proper Fa- culties of human Nature, a7id the End of God in them, the Authors of the Search into the JSlativre of Society, and of the Inquiry concerning J^irtue, have divided Ixxviii PREFACE. dhidedy and taken a feparate Tart. And it is acknowledged hy the Author of the Search, "^^ That tivo Syjiems cannot he more op- pojite; that the Notions of that ^' noble Writer^ which he endea- vours to confute^ are, at the fa7ne time^ more generous and refined ; that they are a high Compliment to human Kindy and capable, hy the help of a little Enthufiafmy ofinfpiring us with mojlnohle Sentiments concerning the 'Dignity of human Nature, He adds, '' What Tity it is they ^'^ fjjould not he true I J would ^^ not advance this much, if / had not already dcmonttrated, in almofi every Tage of this Treatifey that the Solidity of them is inconfi/lent with our daily Experience. "Demon- ic fC (C cc cc i- fiinClion of Virtue and Vice "wholly depends on Cuflom or Com.- pad; ; and here, I take it, we have a JlriQ ^Demonftration from the Or- der of Nature andTr evidence , that this T)i/lin&ion is, and muft ne- cejjariiy he acknowledged antece- ^£72t to Cujtom and Compact. This appears no lef from the following In fiance ; where T am to Jhew that Men, in a pure State of Nature, can have no arbitrary Tower of falffying in their JVords or Oaths. Not ill their IVords, hecaufe that *^' would PREFACE. Ixxxv qt/oiild he contrary to the UJe of Speech y and the many leneficial Ends which would ?nutually arife to Men, from a free a^id inge- ntioiis Communication of their Thoughts : Neither, in their Oaths, for this additional Rea- fon, That an Oath being the mofl Jolemn Sanation that can le gi- ^ven to the Truth of what nve fay, in the Name, and as, in the Jpecial Trefence of God, 'Per- jury is the highefi Infiance of Contempt and T>ifio7iour, that can he offered to his Divine ykfo- jefly ; and is, therefore, in the Nature of it, {and, ^inthout Re- gard to any fuhfequent Treaty, or exprefs Stipulation among Men that an Oath fjall ohlige) intrinficallv:, which is, what we call, morally. Evil. Bui Ixxxvi PREFACE. But where Society is once con- Jlituted^ and Men have agreed to fuhnit to the Articles and Conditions^ upon which it was formed ; fever al new Obliga- tions arife^ in relation to our Conduct towards other Men ; as to which we had before a much greater^ and^ in fome cafes y per- hapSy an intire Liberty of T>if cretion. Becaufe^ without a Re- firaint of Juch unbounded Li- berty ^ or^ fuppofing every Man had a lawful Right to any thing, to whichy in his private State^ he had a natural Right, Socie- ty could no longer jubfft in Teace, or maintain it [elf in the free Enjoyment of thofe Things , which the feveral Members of it already pofjejL For where all Things are in coiyrmoriy as all Things PREFACE. Ixxxvii Things are, or Jljould ICy to Man^ in private Life^ without which a- thers Tnay conveniently live or fupport them [elves, Troperty will he reduced into a much narrower Compajl. And, therefore, under all Forms of Government in the World, whether they he well or ill regulated. Men have exprefy, or interpret at ively confented to depart, in m^any cafes, from their natural Rights, in co72fi- deration of certain Benefits, which they propofed to reap, and do generally reap from. Society, as an equivalent , or more than an e- quivalent for them. And, if it was reafonahle for Men to enter into fuch Engagements, it is equally reafonahle, and, there- fore, we fay. Matter of moral Ohligation, flowing from the Law of Nature, that theyfljould afterwards i Ixxxviii PREFACE. afterwards Jland to thofe En- gagements, For^ as Grotius well ohfer-veSy the natural J^aw does not 07ily oblige^ in re/pe^i to fuch things as do 7iot depend on hu- man Will ; hit to Juch Appoint- 7nents as have heen made hy the general Confent of Mankind: As Dominion, he fuppojesy was origi7ially introduced by Compa& ; hut being once introduced, it is contrary to natural Right to take away what another has in pof- jeJ]io7iy again ft his Confent ; even^ thd it may be oj fuperfiuous Ufe to the Troprietor, and very convenient to him who takes it. And it is under this Condition only, I have ajferted above y that in a State of Nature, Troperty would he reduced into a much narrower Compajs : For that 710 Man can juJUy take away, by ForcCi PREFACE. Ixxxix Force ^ what is aCinally in Tof- JeJ/iojt of another^ and equally convenient for Idiniy appears to he repugnant to j^ural' Equity , even ab/ira&ing from all pofitive haw. And it is in this Senfe^ / conceive:^ Paulas^ the Lawyer^ as cited hy Grotius^ ajfir-ms^ That Theft is forhid hy the Law of Nature ; that Ulpran accounts it di/hone/i hy Nature ; and Eu- ripides^ hateful to God. But to Jay, it is contrary to the La^i/ of Nature to deprive a Man of what he can, without Injury to hijnfelf, part with ; and with- out %vhich another Terfon caji- not well f lib fifi, here 1 take it, the Law of Nature is only to he under ftoody in a fecondary, or confeque72tial Senfe, as fio%i/- ing from a Trinciple of natural Reajon, on Suppofttion of a m Mans \ xc PREFACE. M^ns hecoming an incorporated Member of a Common-wealthy and as having fubjecied himjelf to the haws of it. So that whether we conftder M^^ i^^ his more private^ or in his focial Capacity^ there are very good Reafons why he Jhould^ on Tnany Accounts^ give tip his per- fonal Rights for the good of o- ther private Terjons ; and, efpe- daily ^ for the pub lick Good. And if there are Reafo7is i?i the former Re, feci of Humanity , and Compaffion ; in the latter ^ of fufiice arid Honour^ why a Man Jhould do jo ; How can we account for the bold Afjer- tzon ofthofe Men, who fay, " Man ^^ never acts but fro7n a Rrin- ^^ ciple of vain if lory, or Self- ^^ Love ? This is what the Jln- thor PREFACE. xci thor of the Deceitfulnefs of hu- inaii Virtues^ formerly has ad- vanced, and endeavou7x^d to prove hy a large Indu&ion of Tartkulars^ which are well cho- Jen, and applied with much Art, And I have prejwned ahove, all the Sophifms and ill Trinciples of that Book are ftdly confutedhyme in another Tlace. I have here undertaken the fame Defence of moral Virtue, in anfwer to a modern Author, who, if he does not difcover fo much Rea- dings upon his Suhjeci, is, per- haps, on fome Accounts, no lef qualified to impofe upon his Rea- der, and to captivate weak Minds ly his Afjurance and /IddrefL I have not, it is ac- knowledged, particularly exami- 7ted all the Jixemplifications of his Argument ; hut I have rw X faid xcii PREFACE. f aid enough^ in general^ to obviate any ill Influence they may have upon the main fundamental Ar- ticles of Morality ; and what has heen J aid upon the former Tart of the Search^ may le indiffe- rently apply ed to all , the fol- lowing Parts, But there is one Argument^ which I leg leave to add^ as 'being a fjoy^t^ and^ if 1 miflake not J a fatisfa£lory Anfwer to every Thing ; that either Mr. Elprit^ or the Author of the Search^ has advanced to foew^ that a Man always acts from a Motive of Vanity^ or Self- love ; as Self love is oppofed to publick Affect io7t. ThisArgunie7ity in fiiiflance.y.vas urged before, but it may not be altogether unufeful topropofe it here^withjome Vari- ationy PREFACE. xciii at'ion, as to the form. If Man do not act from a Motive of puhUck Ajjecliony either hy vertue of thofe natural Inclinati- ons^ "which God has implanted in him ; or of thofe exprefs En- gagements which he is entered into ; it miifi he either for want • ^^ of Knowledge^ or Ahility,: Either his Reajon is not fujfcient to inforyn him^ how hejhould a£t conformably to thofe Inclinations and Engagements ; or if Rea- fon le Jtifficient to this End^ he has yet no Tower to fol- low the Light, or Direction of it. To jay God has placed us in a State of Lifey wherein certain "Duties are required of lis, neceffary to the End of it, which we neither know, nor are capable of knowing how to perforjn , can never he reconciled xciv PREFACE. reconciled with the Idea we have of the divine JVifdorn. And it is no leJS contrary to all the Ideas v/e have of the di- "Vine Goodnefi and Ju/lice, to fay, that God hath given Men a Light y which they have no Tower to follow \ and, therefore, ferves not fo much to conduct, as to reproach and condemn them. Nothing can he more derogato- ry to the Honour of God, or reproachful to human Nature, than to fuppofe Man cannot do, upon virtuous Motives, uhat God, or the State ^iherein he is placed by God, requires ^ he ihould do ; what he has uith- all proper Di/pofitions and A- hilities for doings and v.hat he has ohiiged himfelf to do hy exprejl Compact. And yet thefe Confequences uill unavoidably follow^ PREFACE. xcv folloiv, if it he once admitted, that Man J in puhliclz Life^ never acts from a ty^ue Motive oj publick Good. The great T>ifficulty, which I fjall not difjemble^ relating to the Matter in quefiton, has heeu thought to lie here. The End of Man^ that for which God created him, and which he in-^j ^i^,^ vincihly defires and pur [ties, is" ' . ^^^ HappinefiJ^ Kow it is /aid, the ^ ^yv^-^^ puhlick Good of Society often 7 requires that Man Jhould ja- crifce his private Happinefs to it. Here, therefore, Jeem to ie two different Ends, loth of them, hy Confejfion, agreeable to divine appointment , and which yet diredtly interfere^ a^id tend to deftroy one another. In this cafe, we are asked. What Me- thod xcvi PREFACE. thod of Reconciliation can he propojedy that the At^thor of human Nature^ and of human Go'vermnenty may appear to have a&ed according to his effential CharaBers of JVifdom and Good- nefsy 171 thefe two different Conftitutions ? Since ^ according to thefe Attributes, he could not have fo acted, iftherefpeciive 'Du- ties, or Intere/ls of themfhouldhe found abjolutely incompatible. I fay abfolutely incompatible, be- caufe it is confeffed, fome Compe- tition between the "Duties or In- terefls of private, and of fo- etal Life, may jubfifi, without their mutual Defiru&ion, or any jufi a7id neceffary Caufe of their Separation. In this cafe, as in all other Difputes, which will jometiynes unavoidably hap- pen among the neareft Relations and PREFACE. xcvii a7td the lejl of Friends ; Rea- fon, upon an impartial State of the Cafe on loth Sides, fhould determine:, nvhich Side ought to yield and fubmit. Now, if we nvill exaynine impartially, what the different Duties, or Interefts, of private and focial Life may require of us ? The difficulty of the ^e- /lion will 7tot, I apprehend, he jo great, hut we ?nay eafily come to a Rejolution upo7i it. As the End of private Life], s private Happinefs ; fo that of puhlich Life, ispuhlickGood. Tet, whereof private Happi- nefs is the priyne and origi- nal Foundation ; and, in which, therefore, we mufi always n prefume f xcviii PREFACE. prefume it to le included. So that no Man can he ohliged to any 'Duties of Society^ which v/ill more than over-ha- lance the Benefits^ avhich he ca7t propoje to reap from So- ciety. For this iifould he to propoje an End^ [which no wije^ or reafonahle Man will do) of lefs Kalue^ than that which is expended or gi'ven tip, in order to attain it. ^nd, there- fore, when a Man hecomes a Memher of Society, though he Tnay make a voluntary CeJJion of a great many natural Rights, towards qualifying himjelf to fljare in the coinmon and le- gal Rights of it : Tet there are certain fundamental Rights and 'Privileges, if they ought not rather to he called 'Properties belonging to human Nature, from ni/hich PREFACE. xcix avh'ich Men can never recede^ or he obliged to recede ^ upon any Confideration whatever. It can never he lawful^ for Inftance^ 7nuch lefs ohl'tgatory to a Man, to cormnit a Sm, though he mighty therehy, fave the Com- mompealth. Not only hecaufe no fuhfequent Relation or Com- pany in any Kind, can vacate the Ohligationy all Men are imder^ of Obedience to the fu- preme Legi/lator ; but hecaufe the Evil of Sin, and the dread- ful Co7iJequenceSy to which it expofes the Sinner y are great- ery than any Goody which he can enjoy y as a Member of Society y or on Account of his doing any Service to ity will ever he able to compenjate. n X Some c PREFACE. Some, indeed, have 7nade it a ^eftion, whether a Man can he oblige d^ for the Ser- "vice of the Tubliclz^ to expofe him [elf to certain and una- voidable Death ? Becaufe, by the Lofs of Life^ he lofes all the Benefits, which he expe£ied to reap from Society ; and for the Sake of which he became a Member of it. This ^le/lion is the 7nore difficultly accounted for, by thofe who refohe the Obligatioji Man- kind are under to the principal Du- ties of Society, into a certain original Contra^, whereby Men ag;reed to regulate their Beha- viour, before they fgned the yict of their Incorporation. Now, if the §liiefio7i had been antecedently PREFACE. ci antecedently propojedy whether they would jacr'ifice their Lives for the Service of the State, ify immediately y upon their ftgningy they Jljoidd he com- manded to do fo ? It is not very fiatural to helievey that m^any of them woidd have ar- ticled upon that Condition. Whereas y if the T)uties ow- ing to Society y or what I here principally intend, to the fu- preme Authority in it, is found- ed on the paternal Ri^jt, or on any Tower antecedently ap- pointed hy Gody for the bet- ter Adminiftration of civil Go- vernment ; then there is lefi Dif- pute, whether fuch Tower , for necejfary Ends of Government , may not coymyiand a Suhje£i to expofe himfelf to certain and unavoidalle cii PREFACE. unavoidable Death ; hecaufe, tho the civil Magtftrate can give a Man Nothing in Exchange for his Life ; jet, an all- powerful God can, and a wife and jufi God will repair any Lofs or Suffering, which his Creatures may fuflain, hy act- ing in Obedience to his own Infiitution, and towards attain- ing the proper Ends of it. So that, here, we have a full Anjwer to all the Ob- jedions, that can be made a- gainfl the Traciicablenefs of Jocial Duties, when they come in Coynpetition with the In- ter efts of private Life*, and which foew, indeed., that the Obligations, we are under in thefe two different Capacities, are^ after all, very conjijlent. For PREFACE. ciii For a Defire of Happinefs, the inmncible Motive to Ac- tion in private Life, does not only carry us towards prefent^ hut towards future Happinefs. Now it is very co7npatihle with fuch a 'Defire, that we JJjould give up fome Good, which we a&ually poffejs, to the cer- tain Expectation of a difiant^ tut far greater Good in Rever- fion. This Argument, I am fen- fible, is of no Confequence to thofe, who do not helieve a future State of Re tr Hut ion to Men, according to their good or evil Actions in this Life. But the Author of the Search thinks too ^uflly, to incur any Imputati- on of fuch a Character. And, therefore, I wifj, in accounting for civ PREFACE. for the Reafofty upon nvhkh^ he fuppofethy ToUtkians have under- taken to civilize Mankind^ he had omitted the following Remark. "^ That they being unaMe to give fo many realReivardSy as would Jatisfy all Terfons for every individual ABion^ they were forced to contrive an imaginary one ; that, as a general Equi- valent for the Trouble of Self- denial, fjould ferve on all Oc- cafions ; arid, without cofting any Thing either to them/elves, or others, be yet a mo/i accepta- ble Recompenfe to the Receivers. cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc This Recompenfe, as he pro-, ceeds to explain it, is Flattery. Concerning which, con/idered by him as the principal Spur to hu- man Action, I Jtall not repeat, what * Page 2c; . PREFACE. cv ivhat has heen Ja'icl already. The only Refleclion, I Jhall make upon the Tajjage here cited, is, that the Author wholly afcrihes to a finifter and indire£i Mot he, what naturally might have leen afcrihed, I will add, what a Man who helieves a future State, a7td attends to the proper Confe- quences of his Belief, would cer* tainly have afcribedto the Influence of it, upon much tetter Grounds. He will never he ahle to fjew, that theTerjons, hy whojePf^ifdom So- cieties were fir ft erected and mo- delled, andwho prejcrihedju/i and wholfome Laws for the Govern- ment of them, would not cofzfider, how Obedience to thofeLaws might he mofl effectually enforced-, and, particularly hy fuch Sanctions, as would have the mo fi powerful Kf- feci upon their Hope^^ and their o Fears ; cvi PREFACE. Fears ; Taffions^ which never opC" ratey or ought to operate^ with fo great Force and Energy ^ as when they are mo'ved hy Conftderations, taken from a firm Belief concern- ing a future State, Andy indeedy it may of itfelf he urged as a "very good Argument , in Troof of a future State^ that the "Duties which Men owe^ or the Sacrifice y which y in certain Cafes y they are obliged to make to Soci- ety y are greater, in Troportiony than theBenefts they receivefrom Society : At leafy their Service y perhaps their mofl meritorious Actions y for the puhlick Goody doy JometimeSy tend to their Ruin ; and eveny in vulgar Opinio7iy to their Dijgrace. Kow it is highly reajo- noble to believeytho fuch accide?i' talT)iforders,arifwg from thepre- PREFACE. evil fent State of Things, cannot he totally prevented, except God JJjotild interpofe to prevent them^ hy a miraculous Tower ; yet he will, fometime, abundantly fup- ply allT>eficiencies of that Kind in civil Life ; efpecially fuch, as hap- pen to good Men, in confequence of their adding hy Virtue of his own appointment. But there is no Occafion for me to inflame in fuch extraordinary Cafes ; or to enter upon a nice In- quiry, concerning all the Meafures of civil Obedience. JVhat the Au- thor has advanced again fl theTrac- t icahlenef^ of civil T)uties, from a truly virtuousTrinciple, is expref fed in ge^ieralTerms, and applicable to fuch Cafes, as ordinarily occur in civil htfe. His Arguments proceed, according to the comjnon Idea Men Q X have cviii PREFACE. have of Self-denial ; without con- Jidering it as exercifed on this or that particular^ and very pre f- Jing Occafwn ; for 'which Rea- [on his Notion^ that Self-denial is never pracii fed from a true Mo- tive of Virtue^ or puilick Affec- tion^ is more indefenfthle^ as his Endeavour to defend it is^ at the fame Time^ more off en five and injurious to human Kature ; which corrupt as it may appear in como- 7non Tra&icey or in the Wri- tings of Jo7?ie Men, yet, hlefjed he Gody is 7iot wholly, nor uni- veyfaUy, depraved in Principle, I have done with the Tri7ick- ples of this Writer, upon the Suljett of moral Virtue. And he can have no Reafon to co7n- platn, that he has, on a7iy ylc- count, been treated after an un- hecoming PREFACE. cix 'becoming or injurious Manner, I Jhally rather, perhaps, he thought hlameahley for exprejjing my [elf with fo much Tender^iefs^ in a Caufey which might feern to re- quire a greater Ardour and Se- 'verity of Expref/io?i. But the Author is jlill more ohnoxious^ when he reduces his pernicious fpeculative Opinions to Tra&ice ; and endeavours to corroborate what he had advanced uponfalfe^ at the lefty upon very precarious Grounds y hj a diftin£i and perfo- nal Application. However ^ I fijall only take Notice ^ in parti- cular, of the Inju/licey which he hath done to the Me7nory of a late mofl eminent Thyfician ; and of fever alThi7igSy which he hath fa'idy on that Occafion^ highly re~ fleSing upon the Honour of one of the mofl celehrated Seats of Learning ex PREFACE. - Learning in the World. The Relation, which, I have had the Honour of hearing hoth to the in- jured Tarty, and Tlace, would have jujiified the following Re- flections, though the Nature of mj Defign, in this Treface, had not Jo dire&lj opened a JVay to them. In an EflTay upon Charity and Charity Schools^ as a remarkahle Jnjiance of that Pride andY^.- nity, which this Gentleman maizes the general Springs of human Atlion, he particularly mentions a prodigious Gift^ {the Gift of Doctor Radciiffe to the Univerfity of Oxford) which had made a great Noife in the World. He propofeth to fet this Matter in the Liglit it deferves ; andhcg's Leave, for once J to pleafe Tenants, to treat PREFACE. CXI treat it fomewhat rhetorically. / do not enquire y what Sort of TerfonSy or what Body of Men^ he here compliments jo refpecl- fully with the Character of' Pe- dants. / a7n willing to helieve he did not defign^ what the Courfe of his rhetorical Effujions would naturally enough lead one to think he might deftgn. I f jail only ohferve concerning the Mo- tives^ to which he imputes the noble Benefaction of DoBor Rad- clifFe to the Univerfity^ that he has fcarce [aid any Thing, iiit upon fuch Suppofitions^ which if we may he allowed arbitrarily to make, there never was, or ever will he a generous and difinte- rejled Benefaciion in the JVorld. It will he impojfihle to in fiance in any one pious ^ or charitable Foundation^ cxii PREFACE. J^oundation^ where the Founder Tnight not he conceived^ if mere Surmifes would authorize a fini" Jier Judgment of their Intent ton^ to have been a&ed^ in one Re- fpe£t or other ^ hy jome indirect View. The greatefl Appearance of Argument^ whereby this JVriter would jupport his Judgment con- cerning DoElor Radclift V Bequejly isy that ^^ He left a Trifle to his Relations who flood in Keed of it^ and an immenje Treajure to an Univerfity^ that did not ^' wa7it it. The former Tart of this Charge is not altogether grou?idlefs ; and I would, by no Means, ^^f^^ ^^^ Motives of Tenciernefs and Com- pajfion, naturally, lynplanted in Men PREFACE. cxiii Men towards their nearejl Rela- tions, Tet there feems to le a greater dijcretionary hiherty left to thofey who have raifed an E/late^ in the Difpofition which they may think to maize of it to- wards any pious or publick Ufes, The Ties of Blood are fo firongy that there is feldom Occafion to ufe any Arguments to enforce them. Meny whe?i they hear the T^oice of Mature calVmg upon themy are rather apt y in following ity to be righteous overmuch. The Faulty if it he really a Faulty to prefer the piMicli Goody in any Kindy to private Ajfectiony doth not com- monly lie that way. Thisy at leafy may reafonahly he prefumedy that a Terjon who fjould po/ipone many private Conf derations to- wards the Adva7ic:me7it of fome ptihlick Goody difcovershotha much p greater cxiv PREFACE, greater Mind:, and a hetter Dlf- pofition of Heart ; than a Terfon, {which is the common Cafe of the World) who^ in a i:afi Fortune, centers all his "De fires in a^ran- dizing his private Family, with- out any Bowels of Compajjion to- wards the refi of Mankind \ or without exerci/ing any yl£ls of Bene ficence . in Troportion^ to the Opportunities, which he hath of do- ing Good. There is, after all, great T)if ficulty infixing theprecife Bounds, between private and publick Af fe£tion. And, in every Cafe, where the Meajures of our T>uty are lefs afcertained, the Rule, to all in- genuous Minds, is to follow the "Judgment of Charity, not, with this Gentleman, to proceed wholly upon precarious, arbitrary, and un- PREFACE. cxv uncharitable Trejumptions. T)r, Radcliffe feems, indeed, princi- pally to have incurred the viru- lent Cenfures here paffed upon him, not fimply, hecaufe he made a mojl beneficent Bequejl of his Eft ate ly Will ; luty hecaufe, he did not make a T)ifpofition of it^ exactly in this Writer s own Way : yet an Error in Judgment, if, upon a feigned Concejfion, the T)o£for had been really chargeable v/ith fuch Error, ought not to lejfen, neither, with Terjons of any Candour, will it lejfen, the Merit of a good and laudable In- tention. When, it is faid, the Univer- fitv did not ys-^XiX, fuch a Benefac- tion ; the Exprejjion is equivocal. If it be intended, the Doctor s Be que ft was not, abfolutely, necef p X fary cxvi PREFACE. fary to fupport the Honour and Dignity of the Univerjify\ this is readily granted \ hut feveral Con'oeniencies may he deJirahUy and^ i7t a Senje, wanting, with- out whichy Things may^ notwith- fiandingy fill Jt^h/i/i in a good State. And the Advantages to- TPards the Improvement of hear n- ing in Oxford, great as they are^ in many RefpeclSy are not yet fo greats as to admit no future Aug- 7nentations, Buty whatever might he the Mo- tives to 'Dr. RadclilFeV Benefi- cence \ why fjould an Occafon he taken from it^ to afperfe and depretiate him in his Chara&er^ as a Phyfician ? JVhy is he repre- fented, to mention none of the other Calumnies, wherehy this anonymous Writer would blacken his PREFACE. cxvii his Memory^ as ^^ having [mail Skill inTh//ick^ and [car ce any Learnings as one ivho infinu- ated himfelf into Tra&ice hy vile ^rts; and nvho [corned to confult with his Betters, on any E?nergency foever *, looking down with Contempt on the moji deferring of his Trofef- *^ Ji on \ and ntycr conferring with any other Thyfician\ hut what would pay Homage to his fupe- rigr Genius \ creep to his Hu- mour, and never approach him, hut with all the Jlavijh Ohfe- quioufnefs a Court, Flatterer ^^ can treat a Trince witK' Thefe are Matters of high Charge:, and, in the lajl Article^ not only the DoClor, hut other eminent Thyficians are concerned'. Two, ejpecially^ as great and hrighi cc efign of Jetting fuch a Charac- ter in a ftronger Light, I could not fucceed more happily, than hy op- pojing to it,thoJe very Inf lances of a juji and generous Manner. If the T>o&or did really look down wit^ Contempt upon any Terjons, it was upon thofe, and upon thofe only, who had Re- courfe to vile and ignohle Methods, towards opening a JVay to Trac- tice. And this might he, and I have Reafon to heheve, was the triiC Caufe, why he, foyyietimes, refufed to confer with others of the fame Facility, hifances might he PREFACE. cxxi he named where even they^ who had heen recomme^ided ly htm to Bufinefs^ nvhich through Ahfencey or fome Jpecial Avocations, he could not attend himfelf, made no Scruple of praBifing, on that very Occa/ion, certain little indi- re it Arts, which he could hy no Means approve. He underjtood the .Importance and Excellency of that Trofejfton, at the Head of which, under the T>ireclion of Trovidence, thepuhlick Judgment, andhi^ own Merits, had placed him ; and the Ahujes, which he ohferved, had crept into certain Branches of it, re^tdered him very cautious how he either con- fulted with thofe who comiived at Juch Ahufes, or employed any fuhordinate Inflruments in pro- moting them. He was, therefore^ particularly, careful i?i the Choice cxxii PREFACE. of his Apothecaries^ as 11/ ell as of the Thjficians, with who7n^ in Cafes of T)ifficulty^ he found it requifite to confer*^ and, on all fuch OccafonSy what he had, prin- cipally. Regard to, was the Ho- nour of his TrofeJJion, and the Good of his Tat tents : Thefe were the Ends which he preferred to all partial, and foreign Conjiderations whatever, jind he had always thofe Thyficians in the great e/i Efleem, who purfned thefe Ends ; and upon ' whom, therefore, his Btfinefs has fo juftly devolved ; Ge7ttlemen, who defpifed thofe little Arts of Addrejs, whether to the Apothecaries, or to the Topulace, which are, fometirnes, fou7id neceffary to give thofe Prac- titioners a current Value about the Town, who want, and are, perhaps, confcious to thernfelves they PREFACE. cxxiii they ivant an i?itrinjtck Value. Had T>r. Radcliffe really de- figned to encourage any mean JirtSy either towards acquiring^ or preferving the puhlick EJleem ; He who linew the IVorld Jo welly aftd^ on allOccafwnSy how to make his Court y would have employed proper Agents and Emijfaries to that End. And theje he could not have wanted.efpecially^among fuch Number of irregular Tretenders to Thy ficli ^native andf or eign ^where- with we ahound^ who yet know well enough to what Illufions the 'People are mojl jubject, ^ a7id how they may be jooneft captivated. But as he had no Need of fuch Operators^ fo he [corned to make UJe of them, and of thofe, who employed them. q X What' cxxiv PREFACE. Whatever^ they efore^ this Wri- ter might have [aid to the ^Dimi- nution of T)r. Radcliffe V Chara&er in general^ for he was not with- out his T)efe&s ; j^et it was verf wrong to lefjen him in that Tart of his Character^ wherein the great efi Glory of it confified : ^nd that was^ in a generous Contempt of every Things which he apprehended^ would ^ on any Account ^ tend to depretiate it. Neither was it, in the lea ft ^ an Argument of the Doctor sY^mty^ tho I would not he thought Pj ex- empt him from a Frailty too com- mon loth to great and little Men in all Trofejftons^ that in the Methods he took towards prefer- ring the Honour of his proper Faculty, he was^ efpecially^ care- ful to preferve his ow7i. Befides m PREFACE. cxxv Befides the Indecency of di/lur- ling the Ajl^es of the T)ead, and of treating thofe ivith Ohloquy and Reproach^ who are not ca- pable of anfo.eringfor them [elves ^ this Writer makes hut a very awk- ard Compliment to m.any^ if / might not fay to mofl of the Fa- milies of §}uality in the Kingdom^ in reprefenting the Terfon em- ployed hy them for Jo many Tear s^ and who was in fo great Reputa- tion with them for his Skill and Succefs in Thyfick ; yet as havings in Truth, very few, or rather none, of the Sltialijications pro- per to aThyfician. To which of our two Univerfi- ties this Gentleman owes his Edu- cation, or whether to any, 1 do not know, I f jail only ohferve far- cxxvi PREFACE. farther^ that his Reflections con- cerning the yihtife of commemora' tlve Traifes in Honour of the T)eady are indifferently applicable to all Univerjities , and to all other Tlaces^ vjhere Gratitude may oblige Men to pay them : Nay^ if 14/ e may argue in general , from, the Ahije of Things again ft the Re a jonahlenefs and Expediency of thern, it will he equally criminal to make any puhlick honorary Ac- Iznoii-ledgment to a living, and to a dead Benefactor, All his rhetorical Kx agger at ions ^ there- fore, on this Head, might he dif mijjed, at once, as proving too muchy if they he really intended to prove any Thing. Such are the bright and feleB Taj] ages folloiv- ing. ^^ A rich Mijer, who is tho- ^^ roughly [el/i/hy and would re- ^"^ ceive the Inter efl of his Money, ^"^ even PREFACE, cxxvii " even after his Death, has No- thing elfe to do, tha^t to de- fraud his Relations, and leave his Eft ate to [ome famous Uni- i^erftty. They are the leji Markets to buy Immortality at with little Merit.-— "^^ There^ extraordinary Bounties fjall, always, meet with an extraor- dinary Recompence\ and the Meajure of the Gift is ever the Standard of their Traifes^ whether the Donor he a Thy^ fician, or,- as he decently ex- ^^ prefleth himfelf, a Tinker." All thefe fine Stri&ures tend only to fhew, that good and laud- atle Defigns may le perverted to ill Ends. But there is no Necef- fity, why Terfo7is of ingenuous Minds Jhould f^ppoje, they will he Jo perverted, and always Jo perverted. It fjould rather he prefumedy^ CC ifficulty which may arife, VI. Ob'viated. VII. Efpecially from a TrofpeB of future Rewards and Tunifh- ments. VIII. A future State of Rewards and Tunifjments demonjlrated. IX. After a Manner ( TT ) M^tmier that cannot he difpu- ted hy thofe, who believe the moral Terfe[iions of the di- vine Nature. X. Another Ohje&ion propofed and^ XL anjwered, XII. The great Ad- vantages to Men in folloiving this Rule, I.T^HE RulC;, concerning which -*- I am now fpeaking, is the Rule of Order. A Rule that di- rects us to compare Things toge- ther^ to obferve their feveral Re- lations, Powers and Properties ; and from the Judgment we make of them, to employ the moft proper Means towards attaining our End. So that the Law of Order ^ is only another Appella- tion for the Law of Reafon ; for fuppofmg a reafonable Being to act^ if we intend any thing by D 4 Rea- ( f6 ) Reafon^ or if Reafon is of any Ufe to fuch a Being, the proper Office of it will confift in advifing him to chufe the neareft and left \^ way to his End. It is impoflibie, indeed;, to conceive of what good ufe Reafon can be to a Man, ex- cept by enabling him to judge when he lays Things together, and examines their diiferent Qua- lities, whether he ought to pre- fer or reject them ; whether they are really beneficial or injurious to him ; otherwife hisUnderftand- ing inftead of being attended with thofePrivileges Avith which the Au- thor of Nature deligned he fhould ' be diftinguifhed, might rather prove the Occalion of his greater Error or Prejudice; as tending, in frequent Inftances, to miflead and carry him ftill farther from his proper End. n. And ( T7 ) II. And therefore Cicero defines the moral Lavv^ or the Law of Na- ture^ to be ^'^ right Reafon^ agree-»^ '' able to the natural Conftitution '' of Man^ diffufed as a common ^' Principle^ through all human ^^ Race^ uniform^ and of perpetual *^ Force." T^era Ratio^natura Con- gruenSy diffuja in omnes^ Con- fians.perpetua. DeRepubl. Con- fonant to which Definition is that oi Ariftotle, who calls the Law of Nature immutable^ and of the fame Operation and Eifect every where ; like that of Fire^ faith he:, fpeaking of his native Coun- try, which burns here, and in PeTjld. To ft (^\}aei a-Kivmcr, >^ Trctvlct'^Q TMf vvlmv i^et duvctfjuv, (joG'xbi^ to irv^, ^ iv- Oa'cTf, % iv TTi^acuc, y,ale^. Chrilt. Ethc. III. In the Judgment of this Philofopher, as inanimate Beings )iaove and act in vertue of cer- tain ( t8 ) tain Laws agreeable to their Na- ture; and^ as they are in their proper and natural State, when fuch Laws are obeyed, which they conftantly do obey, if not obilructed in their Operations by fome foreign fuperiof Force ; fo Man, if he were to follow the proper Bent and Tendency of hu- man Nature, or to conduct him- felf^ by the Handing Law of it, the Law of Order and Reafon, would always act, as all other Beings, both animate and inani- mate are obferved to do, in a regular, conftant, and uniform Manner. IV. What I intend is, that as the Rule of all natural Agents to move and act, according to the feveral Powers and Qiialities im- prefled on them, by the Author of Nature : As the Rule to len- fible ( T9) fible Beings is to purfue fuch Things^as tend to thePrefervation and Support of the fenfible Life : So the Rule to Man is to fol- ^ low that Reafon^ which diftin- guifheth him ^ from other Crea- tures ; and which he always would follow invincibly, as the T>ireEi'ton proper to him, were it not for a Power^he has ofabufmg his Liber- ty ; and which renders him, what no other Being upon Earth is^ a proper Subject of Reward and Punifliment. y. If it be faid, this fhews^ indeed, what a Man has a natural Tendency to do ; and what he may do ; but yet does not appear fully to prove what he ou^t to do, or is under a ftrid: Ohligation of performing. Reafon may fhew * Separat haec nos a Grege Brutorum. Juv, Sat'i'). US / ( <^o ) . us the Way, it may direft, per- fuade, and invite ; but its Sug- geftions may want a binding and authoritative Sanation. It may perform the Office of a Monitor ; But how does it therefore follow, that we are to obey it as a Lmv- giver ? VI. In this Cafe we are to re- gulate our Judgments from the Ends, which the fupreme Being had, in making Man a reafonable Agent. For I here argue not againft Atheills, but upon Sup- polition of fuch a Being. Now we ftiall never be able to difcover how an all-perfe£t Being could have any other End in making Man a reafonable k^t\Vi\ but that he fliould aft according to Rea- fon. We may as naturally fup- pofe, God fhould imprefs a Ten- dency in Bodies towards their proper ( 61 ) proper Center without any Inten- tion, that they lliould move ac- cording to fuch Impreffion ; as that he fliould endow Man with Rea- fon, without intending he fhould follow Reafon. And if God had fuch an Intention, there can be no Difpute, but as he al- ways proportions the Means to the Ends defigned by him, io he has enforced the Law of Realbn after fuch a Manner, as to render it Jiri&l/ obligatory : For otherwife, we Ihould be un- der a Neceffity of fiippoling, that a Being of infinite Wifdom had propofed an End to himfelf, with- out taking competent Care, that fuch End might be attained. Since, according to the prefenf State and Situation of Man, a Law to him, which is not en- forced by proper Sandions, either penal i6z) penal or remunerative, will ne- ver be of fufficient Force to con- tain him within the Bounds of his Duty. VII. It is not neceffary Rewards or Punifhments to Man lliould be diftindly, or exprefly fpeci- fied, or that, in this prefent Life, God Ihould always immediately make him f elf known hy the Judg- ment which he executeth ; it is fufficient, if we know, that, in the Reafon of the Thing, the Supreme Law-giver ought to be obeyed ; and that the Ends of Government require, Difobedi- ence to his Laws fliould be punillied ; and if he does not, therefore, immediately proceed to punilh the Difobedient in this Life, it is becaufe there is a- nother State, wherein he will vindicate the Honour and Au- thority ( ^3 ) thority of his Laws, from the Contempt which is now done to them. I will add, that without fuppo- fing a future State of Retribu- tion, it will be impoflible to ac- count for the Wifiiom of God, in making Reafon the Law to Mankind of their Aftions. Since this would be evidently, to make a Law, without giving that obliging Force to it, which is necelTary, abfolutely neceflary, to make it operate. VIII. Seeing then, what I con- ceive will not be difputed, the Motives to obey the Law of Reafon, or the Law of God, are ijot, in all Cafes, if we confine our Views within the Compals of this Life, fufRcient to enforce Obedience ; it follows, undenia- bly, that there is another Life, wherein (64.) wherein we are to account our tranfgreffing that Law in this prefent Life: This^ indeed, is a moll necellary Confequence , on Suppoiition God governs the World as a ii/ife Legijlator ; as a Legillator, who propofes his Laws fhould be obeyed. IX. This is fo clear and full a Demonftration, concerning a future State of Retribution to Mankind, that I lliould be much fooner inclined to queftion. Whe- ther, at prefent, I am united to a Body, than whether, after this Life, I ihall be judged for the Things now done in the Body ? How far the Power of God may extend towards giving me Senfations of Things that are not, I cannot tell ; neither is it of any Importance to Re- ligion ( ^T) ligion, or Morality^ to deter- mine this Point ; the Ends of both being equally anfwered on Sup- polition^ either of a material^ or finiply of an ideal World ; if the latter Suppolition do not rather render the Work of an Omnipotent Agent more ftupen- dous and admirable. But^ on the other Hand^ if we may err in the cleareft Deduftions^ we can make from a Coniiderati- on of the Wifdom^ and other moral Attributes of God^, there is an End of all our reafoning, at once^ upon religious^ and mo- ral Subjefts. X. It feems to be a Que- ftion of much greater Difficul- ty^ That^ fuppoling the Law of Reafon, an obligatory Law of human A6lions, how does it appear to us^ in all Cafesy E what ( 66 ) what Reafon really is ? Or by what Marks^ or Charadlers of Diftinftion fliall we know^ when we are direfted by Reafon ? Rea- fon^ on this Account^ has been compared with Quick-lilver run- ning out of a Box^ which is car- ried with an indetermined Mo- tion, this way and that way, without fixing any where ; or to the changeable Colours of a Dove's Neck, which appear dif- ferent to thofe who are at a greater, or lefs Diltance, or Hand in a different Light. And to fhew, farther, how imperfed: our Reafonings are, we are told, what have been the different Opinions of Philolbphers ; dif- ferent Cuftoms of Nations ; and even different Laws, as Cir- cumftances have happened to vary, of the fame Nation. XL This (/7 ) XL This is an Obie6lion, which ought to be removed. The latter Branch of it will be con- fidered afterwards : In refpcfh to the Qiiellion^ What Realbn^ or the Rule of our Condud: re- ally is ? I have already laid down a general Rule ; that we fliould confult the original Rea- fon^ the Model of all reafona- ble Beings ; whofe Reafon^ as it is a Law to himfelf^ and wJiich he invincibly follows, ought^ fo far as we are able to difcover it, to be a Rule of Action to us. Now the Light of Reafon, when we confult it, will clearly difcover to us, that whenever the All-perfeiSi Being deligns to afl:, he propofes to himfelf an End worthy of his Ad;ion ; an End worthy to be attained by the nioft regular and hmple E X Means ; ( 68 ) Means,; a good and a beneficial End; an End^ either refpeftinghis own^ or what necellarily depenjis on hini:, the Happinefs ol' his Creatures. Whenever, therefore, in Imitation of this AU-perfefl: Being, we would regulate our Judgments concerning the reafo- nablenefs of what we propofe to do, let us examine it, by the Order of his Condudl ; let us conlider what, and why, we w^ork ; let us obferve in our Work an exad: Meafure and Pro- portion ; let us inquire what is worthy of ourfelves, and molt be- neficial toothers: This is a Rule in the Application of" which we cannot eafily miltake. XII. But lliould we happen to miftake, our Error, as pro- ceeding from fome Defed: of Underltanding, rather than of Will, ( ^9 ) Will, would be more excufable ; however^ we can never be in great Danger^, if we only put tlie Qiieftion to ourfelves^ What Order^ in any Cafe^ requires to be done, of Erring, in any ef- fential Point of Duty ; this is a Rule always at Hand ; and. Simple as it is, if we would con- ftantly attend to it, as the Voice ^ of Nature, the Oracle of God fpeaking continually to us, and within us, we fliould find it of infinite, and moft excellent Ufe ; and, I will be bold to affirm, worth all other Cafuifts in the World befides, for the Direction of our Confcience. Eg CHAP. ( 70 ) Chap. VI. J^hether the foregoing Rule is of fufficient Extent to re- gulate our moral Conduct ? I. The Grounds upon nvhich this ^ejiion is propojed. 11. In what Senfe the divine Terfec- tions are imitatle hy us ? III. The Reafons of our imitating them are not deftrcyed hy the T)iftinction between a Depen- dent^ and an Independent Be- ing. IV^ V. Neither is the Morality of fuch Actions here- by defiroyedy that are pro- perly Unman ; and^ which ^ as (71 ) as implying bnperfe&ion, have not direBly any exemplary Idea in the divine Kature ! I.npHE Reafon of this Inqui- -*- ry, whether the foregoing Rule be an adequate Rule to Man^ as a moral Agent, arifes from hence ; that God, as the Soveraign, AUiiighty, and Inde- pendent Being, muft neceflarily conduct himfelf, by other Mea- fures, than Man, liable to many Wants, and much Weaknefs ; in a State of Subje6lion and Depen- dance, not only on the Sove- raign Being, but, in many Re- fpefts, on his fellow Creatures, with whom he co-habits. Thefe different Conditions, it may be fuppofed, will necelfarily occafion, and require, a different Rule of Condud:. E 4 11. This (7x) II. This Difficulty will be eafily removed, if we confider, that, when God is propofed as the Exem- plary Objefl: of Imitation to Man ; he is propofed under that Conli- deration, not as a Being of abfo- lute and defpotick Tower^ or with refpefl to his incommuni- cable Attributes ; but as a wife, good, juft, and merciful Being ; as a Being endowed with thofe moral Attributes, which are ne- ceflarily included in the Idea of a Being infinitely perfefl; ; be- caufe the Want of them would neceffiirily imply fome great De- fe£l, and could only proceed from it. Even the divine Power itfelf, irrefiftable and unlimited as it is, abfolutely confidered, yet, whenever God proceeds to exert it, is always regulated in the Operations of it, by thefe At- tributes ( 7? ) tributes ; having no fupcrior Law to dircd: or rellrain his A<5lion; God is a Law to himfelf; that is^ the Perfcflions of his own Na- ture, are a Rule to him of his Conduct ; from which he can no more depart than he can oppofe his own Aftion, or deny himfelf \ for he never worketh, merely becaufe he will work^ or antece- dently to any wife^, good, or rea- fonable End of his working, but according to the Counfel of his JVill\ that is, after fuch a Man- ner, or for fuch Ends, as infinite Wifdom, Goodnefs, Mercy, or other moral Confiderations may dire(5l. III. Tho' a fenfible Difference does therefore arife between the Duties of Man, as a dependent created Being, and the Con- dud: of the liipreme God ; the Creator, ( 74 ) Creator, and the Fountain of all Power ; yet the general Reafon of our imitating him^ in thofe Perfeftions of his Nature^ which are, in any Degree imitable by US, does ftill hold good; and ob- ligeth us, as we are Creatures, to condufl ourfelves in that Rela- tion, as Reafon and Order require we fhould do; and according to which the uncreated Being himfelf conflantly regulates his own Ac- tions ; for he always does what in refped: to his own State, or the Relation, wherein he Hands to his Creatures, does require, he fhould do. IV. By following Reafon and Order, we may be faid then, in a Senfe, to be Imitators of God^ even while we are exerciiing cer- tain Virtues, of which his Sove- raignty and the abfolute Perfec- tion ( 75- ) tion of his Nature render him incapable; and tho' an Obliga- tion to them wholly arifeth from our prefent imperfefl: and depen- dent State. V. So that as to thofe moral Virtues of Sobriety^ Cha/iitfy and Humility^ ariling from the prefent Union of the Soul to the Body^ and from our Dependance on other Men^ or our Commerce with them^ which are properly human^ or focial Duties^ and can- not be afcribed to a Being of in- finite Perfection ; ( for we cannot diredlly argue from the Idea of fuch a Beings that thofe Things are morally good, which are not included in his Idea : ) The An- fwer is, tho' we cannot argue di- red;ly, in fuch a Way, yet to be fober, and chafte, and humble, is highly agreeable to our prefent State (76) State and Condition ; and^ there- fore^ tho' We do not find in the Idea of an all-perfefl: Being, and for that very Reafon becaufe he is all-perfeft, any Attributes di- reftly correfponding to thefe Du- ties; yet the general Reafon for the Morality of them Hill holds good ; we ought to render our- felves as perfefl:^ and, for that Reafon, to approach as near to God as poffible : Thefe Duties are proper Means of perfe£ling our Na- ture, and of bringing us nearer to God ; therefore they muft be fup- pofed to have an intrinlick, which is what we underlland by a moral Goodnefs in them. CHAP. ( 77 ) iP Chap. VIL Concerning the End of Man in refpeci to his Happinefs. I. The Oppofition between human Happifiejs and Terfeciion. IL The Reafon of it, HI. A §}ueftio?i ariftngfrom the Con- fli& hetween the Soul and the Body. IV, V. More eafily an- jivered^ on Suppofitton of a fu- ture State. VI. fFhat Reafon directs upon that View. VIL The Error of the Stoicks con- cerning Tain. VIIL Of he- ro ick Virtue. IX. The Error of the Epicureans concerning Tteajure. X. Tet the Argu- menty '^^ /^ (78 ) ment^ from the Conveniency of the moral Law, concludes n/ith greater Force againfi the Stoicks. IT HAVE already obferved, •*• that the Happiiiefs of Man, on Account of his prefent State, may be confidered asdiftm(3:froin his Terfe£iion ; becaufe we of- ten find ourfelves fenfibly pleafed, and, by confequence, really and adlually happy;^ even in the En- joyment of thofe things which oppofe our Perfedlion. For Plea- fure and Happinefs are fo infepa- rable, that they necefiarily in- fer one another, and cannot be fuppofed to fubfift apart. II. The Reafon of this Oppoli- tion between our prefent Happi- nefs, and our Perfection, arifes from the Union of Soul and Body, and ( 79 ) and the prefent Laws of Commu- nication between them. We are phced in a kind of middle State between two Worlds^, Heaven and Earth\ the Body is of the Earth, earthy^ and always tending to the Earth, as to its proper Center. The Soul being of nobler and fpiritual Extraftion, is, in the Nature of it, apt for the Contem- plation and Enjoyment of fpiri- tual Objefts ; but, as it receives, by reafon of its Union with the Body, painful or pleafing Senfa- tions, according to the good or ill State of the Body ; fo there is a Neceffity it fliould do fo, for the Prelervation of that Part ; for were it not for fiich pleafing or painful Senfations, the Body would be treated with great Negled:, if not with fuch an open Contempt, as would foon occafion its Death and Diflblution ( 8o ) Diflblution. But the Soul feelins: thefe Pains or Pleafures continu- ally^ does^ by Degrees^ fufter her- felf to be pofleffed by theni^ even to the Negled: of her own Perf cfti- on. The Reafon^ whereoi;, ha- ving been affigned before^ I Ihall not repeat it. It is fufficient to my prefent Purpole to obferve, that the corruptible Body does, in Fafl:, prejs down the incor- ruptible Soul: That this noble Principle, which ought to com- mand and give Laws to theSenfes, thofe corrupt Inftruments of the Body, is often enflaved to them * that Reafon quits the Throne to put thefe rebellious Subjefts into it; and even fometimes debafes herfelf fo far, as not only to ex- cufe, but to juftify the Violence and Diforders, whereof they are guilty : In fliort, that there is a Law ( 8i ) Law tn the Members^ i^arring again /I the Law in the Mind, and hri7iging Me7t into Captivity to the Law of Sin. III. The Qiieftion is^ during this Conflifl:^ or rather^ as the Event ordinarily proves^ under this fuperior Force of the Body^ whether it is not better for the Soul, as more conducing to her Eafe and HappinefS;, intirely to fubmit ; than to put herfelf con- tinually to the Shame and Dillio- nour of being defeated^, through a fruitlefs and impotent llefiftance? And if, confequently, the Or- der of Nature being thus in- verted^ it would not be more ad- vifeable to comply with Vvhat we cannot remedy, and wholly to lay ourfelves out in the Enjoy- ment of feniiblc Pieafures, or to- wards procuring flich Things as F chieflv ( 8z ) chiefly tend to the Prelervation of the fenfib! e Life ? For tho' our Per- fection^ fuppofing the Balance of Power^, which tlie Soul ought to hold, could be in any competent Meal are prefervcd, might deferve, at leaJl., an equal Regard ; yet fince fhe lias futlered herfelf to be lb much debafed and debilita- ted by the Weight of Concupif- cence, that her Empire cannot be re-eftablillied, except Men will refolve torelinquilh theirEafe.and their Intercity and thofe Things wherein they principally place their Happinefs and Security ; it deferves to be confidered^whether^ inthisCale^ Reafbnwill not rather dired: them to facrifice their Perle- ftion to their Happinefs^ than their Happinefs to their Perfection ? IV. Were this Qiiellion to be determined^ witlioul; any Regard to ( 8? ) to a future State, it would be more difficult to eftablifli the Dillinftion of moral Virtue, on account of the Tendency, which it has to promote our Happinefs. Becaufe it might frequently hap- pen, that the Virtues of good Men, inftead of rendring them happy, would here expole them, (for fuch Inftances are not un- common) to much Trouble and Mifery ; and, perhaps, even ren- der them fo unhappy, that, up- on a due Eftimate, the Benefits of Life would not be an equivalent Compenfation for the Evils which they have fuffcred. V. In this Cafe, as theDefire of Happineis is invincible; as a Man would evenfooner defire not to be, than not to be happy : It would be difficult to demonllrate, that any Man could be obliged to prac- F X tife ' ( 84 ) tife the Duties of a ftridl Morality: For that would fuppofe him ob- liged -to do a Thing contrary to the prime and elTential Incli- nation of human Nature ; and, confequently, to do anAftion al- together unnatural. AVhen we, therefore, refolve the Obligation to moral Virtue into this Mo- tive, that the Pradlice of it tends to the Happinefs, as well as to the Ferfeftion of human Nature, and is a Law of prefent Conve- niency ; we proceed upon one, or both of thefe Suppofitions ; either that the Pra6lice of moral Virtue, is, upon a general Con- fideration, more conducing to Man's prefent Happinefs ; tlio' Ibme extraordinary Cafes may oc- cur to the contrary; or elfc, when fuch extraordinary Cafes do oc- cur, that Wjiich is deficient to- wards ( 8r ) wards attaining the great End ^/ • of M-cXWy'^Happmel^ in this Life,^'^ ^ fliall be fupplied in a future ^^^^ Ca^v. State. -'[^ icr^^-u. cu VI. Upon this View^ the Law (u^^^^*^^ of Morality is the Law of Rea- fon ; becaufe Reafon will ever dired-^ that we ihould poft- pone a prefent^ to a future, certain^ and much greater Con- venience; or^ that we fhould chufe to fuffer a prefent Pain, to avoid a future, certain, and much greater Evil. I would not hereby inlinuate, as if, even with rcfpefl: to this Life, the Advan- tages of Happinefs and Profpe- rity are not, generally fpeaking, to be found on the fide of mo- ral Virtue ; but I argue, adjiiit- ting they fliould not, vvc ha^x yet a Demonftration from the Wiidom and Goodnefs of God, that, in F- 3 another ( 8^ ) another Life, that Happinefs, which we here feek for in the Praftice of a ftrid: Morality, will be found. Becaufe, other wife, God would fail of his End in creating Man to be happy. As a wife God, therefore, will pro- pofe fuch Means which are proper to attain his End ; and as a good God can only propofe a good End ; it neceflarily follows, that the End propofed by God, not be- ing, on the prelent Suppofition, attainable in this Life ; there is another State^, wherein it will certainly be attained. VILThere is no NecefTity, there- fore, of alTer ting with the Stoicks, that bodily Pain is not an Evil, rior bodily Pleafure a Good ; for whatever tends to make us un- cafy or milerable, is naturally jevii ; as whatever tends to make us (87 ) US happy, is, for tJiat Rcafon, naturally good. The Stoicks were forced upon tliefe Para- doxes, wherein they were confu- ted, both by Experience, and the Reafon of the Thing ; becaufe they held moral A^irtue would neceilarily render Men happy ; and that the proper Diltinftion of it was founded in this Con- fideration ; whereas their wife and virtuous Man was often ex- pofed to external Evils. Their Principle was juil in the main ; but it does not follow^ that, be- caufe moral Virtue tends, in the Nature of it, to make us happy, that we fliould, therefore, be al- ways actually happ)^ : 'Tis fuffi- cient^ if the future Happinefs, to which moral Virtue entitles us, will more than over balance the prefent Evils, as it certainly F 4 will ( S8 ) will do, to which it accidentally may expofe us. VIII. Men^ indeed, of great and generous Minds may delpife the Plealures of Senfe, or take Complacency in the Exercife of an heroick Virtue, tho' attended with Pain, and without Frofpeft of Reward ; becaufe Joy and Ex- ultation of Mind are naturally confequent to virtuous Actions. A Soul, confcious of its innate Dignity, will have Strength fuffi- cient to furmount many Obftacles ; the Spirit of a Man nvill JuJ- tain his Infirmity ; but it will not always have Force enough to refift Fieafure, or totally to over- come Fain. It was a fecrct Pride, and an Affeftation of Independen- cy, that kept the Stoicks, many of which had yet refined Notions of Morality,inCountcnance; for when no ( 89 ) no Body was prcfent, all their boaltcd WHdoin and Strength vanifhed ; jull as Kings of the Stage, when the Curtain is, drawn, ceafe to ad:, and lofe all their Bravery and Grandeur in a Moment. It is not fo with Believers, whofe Hopes are full of Immortalily^ and who are as perfed:ly allured, that all the acci- dental Deficiencies in this Life will be made up to them in a future Life, as that there is a ii/tje, ^ jtifl:, and ti good God. IX. The Error of the Epicureans confifted, on the other Hand, in their making preient Tleafure the Meafure oi human Happinefs. And becaulc Man is fometimes fenfible of Pleafurc, no lefs in vitious arid irregular, than in virtuous Adions; if he is not, in certain Inltanccs, more violently aftcclcd ( 90 ) affe6led with the former^ therefore it has been commonly thought, that this Sed:, by the very Prin- ciples of their Philofophy, let loofe the Reins to all manner of Licentioufnefs and Diforder. Yet it mull be acknowledged they ar- gued upon reafonable Grounds, in faying, that Pleafure was good for them ; as they were really convinced by an internal Senfa- tion, that it contributed to make them happy. But they ought to have coniidered, that traniient Pleafures could not make them always^ or folidly happy ; and that the Pleafures of the Mind were not only more lalling, but, in the Nature of them, more no- ble and generous, tlian thofe of the Body ; fo that, even upon the Epicurean Hypotheiis, with tliofe, who argued regularly and foberly / ( 91 ) foberly from it, the true Hap- piiiefs of Man, without any fu- ture Profpecl, was granted to con- fift in the Praftice of moral Virtue. But, in refpedl to the Stoicks, the moral Law was Itili, by a more evident Argument, the Law of Conveniency to Man ; and, confequently, the Law which right Reafon would have prefcribed to him, had he been under no pofttive or exprefs Ob- ligation to prad;ife it. CHAP. ( 90 Chap. VIII. The prefent and future Re^ "wards of moral Virtue, con- Jidered more difiin^ily. I. God intended the moral Law fiould oblige. II. The Tower of Confcience. Ill, IV. ^n- fwer to what is objected a- gain ft it from Prejudice and Cuftom, V, VI, Vll. The Rea. fonahlenefs of juppofing fuch a Trinciple, from the IVifdom and Good7tejs of a wife LegiJ- lator. Vlil. The Force of it in very wiched Men. IX. Ob- duracy of Heart, a judicial Effe£l of Gods 'Dijpleafure, X. ( 9? ) X. A flagrant Ahjurdtty would follow^ admitting there were no certain Tri7iciple of Cofi- fcience. XL Of Shame^ and XII. Ofhnptidence. XIII. XIV. PufFendorfV Opinion, concern- ing Shame, confidered. XV. XVI. Two Ends of it affgned. XVII, XVIII, XIX. The moral Law confidered, as a haw of Conveniencjf, XX. Kerj wick- ed Men, i7i their private Judg- ment, profefs and efieem Vir- tue. XXL Of Honour a7id Ej- teem, mentioned as the Re- wards of Virtue. XXII. Bui not adequate. XXIIL Not 7ie~ ceffary to know, diftinctly, the Nature of future Rewards to Man. XXIV. Tet, in gene- ral, they will confijl in hei7ig adapted to the Faculties of the Mind. XXV. IVhe~ ther ( 94 ) ther the Refurre&ion of the Body may he proved from na- tural Trinciples. XXVL Con- cerning future T?uni foments to wicked Men. XXVII. XXVIII. On what Accounts difficult to he conceived. XXIX. This no Ohje£tion again/i the Truth of them. XXX. A Taffage cited from the Art of Think- ing J concerning SenfationSy anfwering to thofe which are felt hy occafion of material Fire. I.np H E Law of Reafon is the -^ Law of human Nature ; and it Is fufhcient to flicw the obliga- tory Force of this Law^ that it was intended to be obligatory by the Author of our Being. We ouglit to follow his Order in Making us^ and in the Facul- ties ( 9r) ties he hath given iis^ tho' he had annexed no confeqiient Reward to our Obedience^ nor threatned to punifli our Diforders. But as fuch metaphyfical Confiderations, how reafonable foever m theni- felves^ would not have been for- cible enough to reftrain the Ap- petites^ or PalTions^ of Men^ ari- fnig from the Impreflion of fenfi- ble Objects ; God has enforced this Law^ not only^ as hath been above demonltrated^ by giving us the Aflurance of a future State of HappinefSj or MiferV;, according to our good and evil Actions in this Life^ but even by the Sanftion of prefent Re- wards and Punifhments ; in both relpefts^as aLaw-giver^<«Z'/^ ^o fave and to deftroy ; lince his Authority would, otherways^ be precarious. And thefe Rewards and Punifli- nients ( 96 ) iiients may be conlidered^ as af- fecting us either internalfyy or ex- ternally, 11. The Sanclion to Man of internal Rewards or Punifhments is from the Power and Judg- ment of Confcience. For as we experience in ourfelves^ when we follow Reafon^ and conform to Order, a fecret Joy and Compla- cency of Mind, teftifying an Ap- probation of what we have done ; \oy upon the Commiffion of Sin, efpecially , in any notorious Breach of our Duty, we natu- rally find the Mind full of Pain and Anguifli ; and cannot, there- fore, but condemn ourfelves in It/hat we allow. It is polTible, indeed. Men, by a long Habit of finning, may llupiiy tlieir Con- fcience to fuch a Degree, as to find no Remorfe for the molt a- trocious ( 97) trocious Crimes ; as fome People by taking repeated Opiates are not fenlible^ lor the Time^ of their ordinary and dangerous EfFefts. But we are to not judge^ concern- ing the Nature^ or proper Operati- on of Things^ from what happens in particular Cafes, for which Reafons, from an habitual Ufe of fuch Things, may be affigned ; but from fuch Effects, as are moft common, and natural ; and where- with, fuppofing the Subjefl: in a proper Difpofition, they will, moft probably be attended. Now, to judge whether a Perfon be in a right State, fo as to be affec- ted with the Force of Confcience; ^ we are not to conlider him a^ under the Power of anv invete- rate fmfui Habit, or Habits ; but as acting, after a Manner, with fuch Difpofitions, and upon fuch G Principles ( 98 ) $~ Principles as are common to Men. III. 1 am fenfible^ fome Perfons have endeavoured to account for the Force of Conference, upon other Principles than thofe who reprefent it as a 'Judge ^ appointed by God to give Sentence in his Name ; fince he doth not inter- pofe in the Government of Man- kind by a vifible Authority. Whenever his Laws, which are ^ written on the Tables of our Hearts in fo legible a Charafter, that they need no exprefs Pro- mulgation, are, at any time, ^ difobey'd, this Minifter of God has a Power of calling Men to an Recount, and is armed with Ter- ror: On the other Hand, by ver- tue of the Cuiie Authority, He not only abfolves tlie Innocent, but diipenfes proper Rewards ibr the C99) the Encouragement and Traife of thofe that do nvell. There are Perfons^ I lay, who make Confcience , inftead of afcri- bing it to fo high and autho- ritative a Conftitution, nothing but the Eifeft of thofe early Prejudices, which Men imbibe in their Infancy ; and wherein they are, afterwards, gradually con- firmed by Cuftom and Converfa- tion. lA^. The Force of Prejudice and Cuftom is, confefledly, very great. But we are not to con- clude, that every Thing we have learned in our Infancy, or where- in we have afterwards conformed to common Opinion, is, there- fore, wholly owing to Prejudice, or common Opinion. Children are early taught to believe there is a God \ and they are confirmed G X in / ( loo ) in this Belief^ by the publick Profeflion made of it^ and the Worfliip daily paid to God: Does it, therefore follow, there is no God ; or that the Belief of a . God has no true or real Foun- dation ? Is * it not more natural to fuppofe Men do generally agree in this Belief, becaufe they have Reafons for it, than that they mutually agree to deceive, and to be deceived, or only be- lieve his Exiftence, upon the mere fcore of Cultom, againft Reafon ? May we not argue af- ter the fame Manner, and up- on the Huiie Grounds, in re- fped: to Confcience ; that Men ^' are fenlible of tlie Force of it, not becaule it is cenerallv faid and believed, there is fuch a Thing"; but Men generally be- lieve ( loi ) lieve the Truth of the Thhig, bccaufe it really fiiblifls. V. Suppofing, indeed^ a God, who made, and who governs Mankind, it is very reafonable to conclude, that in the pre- fent Adniiniftration of his Go- vernment, he would not leave himfelf without a Witnefs or T internal Monitor to Man; by attending to which, tho' he lliould not hear God fpeak- ing to him with an audible Voice ; yet he would be- come bound to obey him, by attending to the Light of his own Mind, and the Refponfes * of inward Truth : The Autho- rity of enabling fuch a Law being the fame, in the Nature and Reafon of it, as if God had divulged it immediately by aVoice from Heaven. G I VI. There ( lox ) VI. There is then a reafonable Suppofition from the Ends of God's Government^ why He flioiild im- plant, in the Minds of Men, thofe lively and tender Senti- ments of Good and Evil, con- cerning which we are fpeaking ; fo that where there fliould be no pofitive or written Law, Men might be a Law to themfelves, their own Confciences hearing IVitnefs^ and their T bought s, in the mean while ^ accufing^ or elje excufingy one another. Now where natural, probable, and very ufeful Reafons may be af- figned for the Exiftence of Things, it is very unreafonable to afcribe fuch Things to Caufes ibreign to theNature of them, and without which they may, therefore, be naturally liippofed to cxilt. VIII. Befides ( 103 ) VIII. Befides, if the Force of Confcicnce were wholly ow- ing to the Prejudices of Edu- catioDj or popuhir Opinion^, What is the Reafon why Men of the greatell Freedom of Thought, yet find themfelves * fo incapa- ble of being difabufcd^ as to this Article ? Why do they find it fo difficult to flifle the Rey proaches of Confcience, as they can eafily do other frightful Ac- counts of Speflres and Appari- tions^ which they learned in the Nurfery, or by reading romantique Stories, when^ af- terward, they come to reafon, and refled: upon them. And yet it may be queflioned, if^ the moll abandoned Wretch, in any Age, even, whether he be- lieved a God, or not, could e- ver wholly, and at all- times o- G 4 vercome ( 104 ) vercome the Relu6lance^ or fti- fle the Remorfe of Confcience. IX. Perfons who are moll ob- durate^ and iiifenlible to all Im- preffions of Religion, have, com- monly, their Intervals of Re- flexion ; wherein God is repre- fpnted to them with a Rod of Vengeance in his Hand ; yet, fuppofing them really capable of cxtinguilhing all Fear of his Wrath, fuch a State of Infenli- bility ought not to be conlide- red, merely, as a natural Effedl of their finful Habits ; but, as a judicial Punifliment inflifted by God upon them : Who, as they did not like to retain him, or this vifible Charafter of his Power and Godhead, in their Knowledge, gave them up to a reprolate Mind. X. Again, ( loy ) X. Again^ were the Power of Confcience founded only on Pre- judice, or popular Opinion ; then, whenever a general Cor-. ruption of Principles or Man- ners is introduced, and Vice does become popular , Men would take the fame inward Com- placency in vicious Aftions, as they now do in Afliions, to which the Idea of Virtue is affixed. A Man, for Inftance, who fhould betray his Friend, his Trult, or his Country, would, on this Sup- pofition, than which Nothing can be more irrational or fliocking, experience the like Satisfadtioii and Complacency of Mind in reflefting on his Infidelity, as good Men, now really expe- rience, in doing beneficent, and generous Aftions. Nay, the Per- formance of fuch Adions, to a Perfon .( io6 ) Perfon^ who is fuppofed wholly to regulate his Judgment by the Pradlice and Sentiments of other People, ought to give him a fen- iible Pain and Unealinefs; fuppo- fmg their Judgment fo corrupted that they call Evil Good, and Good Evil. XL The Judgment which w^e make of our own Actions, a Judgment that cannot be eafi- ly bribed or eluded, has not only been urged as an Argument to enforce the Law of Nature, but even, antecedently, to any Confideration of fuch a Law, it is faid, a confcious Shame arifes, which difcovers itfelf in the me- chaaical Difpolition of the Body ; as prefaging that fome Evil, at which Confcience takes the A- larm, is approaching towards us. So careful has the wife Legifla- tor ( 107 ) tor been to fecure our Innocence and Diity^, by guarding the very Outworks, wherewith we are to defend them ; and by giving us Notice of the Enemy's Approach^ before we come to engage direftly with him. So that when we hap- pen to be furprized, which, after all our Caution, is fometimes un- avoidable, before Reafon has fuffi- cient Time to colleft her whole Strength ; this inward Shame, or Modefty, often fupplieth the Place, and doth the Duty of it ; and even, fometimes, when we are violently tempted, or inclined to betray the Succours nvhich Reafon offers^ Shame lays Re- Jiraints upon ingenuous Minds, which they cannot overcome without much Confulion, and a very fenfible RekKSance. XII. So ( io8 ) XII. So powerful^ indeed, is this Principle, (and lor which Rea- Ibn, we fiippoie it defignedly im- planted by the Author of Na- ture to enforce the Law of Na- ture) that one of the vileft Cha- rafters, of a Perfon abandoned to all Manner of Vice and Dif- lionour, is Impudence ; and, ac- cordingly, the Prophet, whom I here cite^ not under that Cha- rafter^ but, as fpeaking agreea- bly to the common Sentiments of Mankind, mentions it as a Sign of the moft corrupt and in- corrigible State of a wicked Peo- ple, that thej' are not ajljamedy neither do they _ blujh. XIII. Tuffendorf was fo fen- fible, an Argument might be formed contrary to his Opinion, fi'om this Principle of Shame, to prove the Diltuidion of moral Good ( 109 ) Good and Evil; that he hath particularly endeavoured to ob- viate the Confequence we would draw from it : The Sum of what lie fays is, that a Senfe of Shame, difcovering itfelf iii the Air of the Face, or fome other exterior Appearance, is only a mere phy- lical Efteft, proceeding, folely, from a phyfical Caufe, and not from a moral ; which he thinks it would be inconvenient to fup- pofe. But where lies the Incon- veniency in faying, that God may caufe a different Movement or Fermentation of the Blood, upon the leaft Apprehenfion of Danger to the Soul ? Seeing the Body and the Soul reciprocally ad: up- on one another, for their mu- tual Support, and Advantage. As the Soul takes fo much Care of the Body, and of ev-ery Thing relating ( no ) relating to its Safety^ Preferva- tioii^ and Eafe ; it is but realb- nable that the Body, in Return, in fome few Inftances at leaft, Ihould be the Occafion^ fince it cannot be a proper Caufe of cer- tain Sentiments in the Soul, ne- cellary to prevent any Injury, or Diforder, which may happen to her. XIV. And, therefore, this Au- thor himfelf, confeffeth, how confiftently I do not here exa- mine, that the all-wife Creator hath implanted this Affeflion of Shame in the Mind of Man, to be the Guard of his Virtue ; and a Reftraint upon him from all linful or irregular Appetites. Nay, he adds, it is probable, if it had not been the Intention of God, that Man Ihould conform his Actions to the divine Law, God 3 ( III ) God would not have rendred him fubiedl to this Paffion of Shame ; fmce without fuch an hitention, no proper Ufe of Shame could be difcovered. XV. Neither is it of any Force to overthrow the moral Senfe of Shame, that it does not only a- rife from the Apprehenfion of a lliameful or finful Ad:ion; but, frequently, on occafion of other things, which have, confefledly, no moral Turpitude in them, yet whereby we may, on fome Account, fuiFer in our Reputa- tion. As we obferve People, for Inftance, frequently to blufh, when any Thing happens to re- mind them of any natural De- fefl: of Body, or of Mind; of their Poverty ; their mean Ap- pearance, or Extraftion. Whence fome have concluded, that Shame shame, is nothing, but a fecret Motion of Self-love and Tride^ the predominant Paflion of hu- man Nature, which makes him extremely apprehenfive, and puts the Body in a State proper to fortify his Apprehenfion un- der any injurious Treatment ; or any Appearance of Difrefpeft, that may tend to impair his Ef- teem in the World ; for which Reafon, it is further obferved, that Perfons are principally af- fefted with Shame, and difcover the moil fenfible Marks of it, when confcious to themfelves, they are chargeable by others with fuch Things, as principally regard their Reputation ; or which reprefent them afting in civil Life, out of their proper Cha- rafter, or the Rules of common Decency. (113) Decency, or below the Dignity • of their Station. XVI. This only proves that an all-wife Architedl, in form- ing Man, might fo order the Conftru6tion of his Work, as to fervc two different Ends by the fame Movements in it. As Shame proceeds from Self-love, or a natural Dehre of Eftcem, with- out any Regard to the Mora- lity of our A^lions^ we may con- fider it is a mere phyflcal Ef- feft ; but as it is defigned a Monitoy^ to us^ that we fliould do Nothing really diflionourable or unworthy in itfelf^ tho' no hunian Eye ihould fee us^ nor any Confequence relating to our Commerce in the Worlds might affed: us ; it maybe confidered as having the Force of a moral Law to us, and to which God hereby H plainly ( 114 ) plainly lignifies his Intention, that we lliould conform. XVII. Befides this Enforce- ment of Morality from Confci- ence and Shame : God has far- ther encouraged us to the Pra- 6lice of moral Duties, by the natural Tendency they have to promote our prefent Happinefs ; io that if all Men would agree to regulate their Behaviour by the moral Laws, nothing could be fo inftrumental, either to our private, or the publick Happi- nefs, tho' we fhould confider it, merely, as a Law of Conveni- ency. XVIII. It is true, by Means of the Corruption which is in the World, through Lull ; the natural Courfe and Tendency of moral Virtue is much obftrucled, and often fails of its proper End. But i But this IS by accident, and not according to the primitive Will and Defign of God in Making us reafbnable Beings, capable of rendring ourfelves, by a due Ufe of our Liberty, happy, at pre- fent, and hereafter. XIX. This flievvs, that the Law of Nature, confidered in it- felf, and in its proper Tendency^ is the Law of Conveniency, and might generally be enforced, e- ven here, from that Conlidera- tion ; becaufe all wife and rea- fonable Perfons will conduct them- felves according to thofe Mea- fures, which commonly^ and more diredly, tend to their Happi- nefs, rather than by thofe, which only fucceed in particular Cafes, and by accident. However, tho' it is allowed fuch Cafes, may happen, we Hill affirm no Ar- H X gument ( 11^ ) gument can be drawn fr6m them, againfl the Truth of moral Vir- tue, as a Law of Conveniency; becaule it is, upon an evident Reafon, convenient, that a lefs Interelt Ihould be facriticed to a greater; and whatever Inequali- ties there are in the Condition of wicked and good Men, in particu- lar Cafes, at prefent, they Ihall be perfedly adjufted at a properTime: and the Proof, that they fhall be fo adjufted, is as clear and evident as any Conclulions that can, ina ftrifl: Way of Arguing, be drawn from the Wifdom and Goodnefs of God. And if we may miftake in our Reaibnings upon thefe divine Attributes, and when ourReafons are founded upon the moft clear and diltindt Ideas, which the Mind of Man is able to conceive of them : Should God conde- Icend I ( 117 ) fccnd to Jiiake a particular De- claration of any moral Duty to us ; I do not fee how we could^in this Cafe, certainly prove the Truth of fuch a Declaration. For^ were it not for thefe Attri- butes of Wifdom and Goodnefs in God, we could have no Affu- rance, either concerning the Truth of our Faculties, or our Obligation to obey his Com- mands. All our Reafonings, in- deed, on the Subjefts of Mora- lity, whether relating to the na- tural Law, or to divine Inftitu- tion, depend on our having right Notions concerning thefe divine Perfections; and if we argue, juilly, from them, we fliall find no Difficulties, refpefting the promifcuous Dillributions of Pro- vidence in this Life to wicked and good Men ; but what may H 2 eafilv ( "8 ) eafily be accounted for^, without deftroying the Notion of moral Virttiey as a Law of Con^venien- cy^ tending to promote our Hap- pinefs. XX. Another Argument, to prove the Truth of this Law, may be taken from the very judgment of thofe wicked Men themfelves, who, for the Sake of fome prefent Advantage, are yet tempted to tranfgrefs it. Vir- tue, in its greateft Diftrcfs, is ftill amiable, and fliines through all the Clouds which encompafs it, with a beautiful and furpri- fing Luftre. She commands, Refpefl:, and Veneration from thole who yet do not engage in her Service, or appear in her Kctinue. There is no Man, how vicious foever, but, in his own Judgment, muil cllccm a Pcrfon of ( 119 ) of Honour and Probity^ of Hu- manity and Piety, above one of a different Character, to whom he may, notwithftanding, give more fenfible Proofs of an ex- ternal Regard, as being more ne- ceflary to his Deligns and Inte- refts ; but notwithftanding the external and fallacious Homage, which Men do pay to very wick- ed Perfons, who are capable of ferving them, they commonly, in their Hearts, .fecretly deteft and defpife them, and are only reftrained from jfliewing their Contempt by Coniiderations mere ly refpefting themfelves. XXL Honour, therefore, and EJieem, may be conlidered as farther Rewards, defigned, by Providence, to enforce moral Vir- tue in this Life. Rewards^, in- deed, more general, more laft- H 4 ing. ( 1^0 ) iiig, andj equally difpenfcd^ than thofe which refpecl Man's tem- poral Profperity^ or Peace ; tho' it may too^ fometimes^ happen in a very corrupt Age, that Men fhall be raifed to the high- eft Dignities and Honours, by the moft diihonourable and unwor- thy Means, and, even, carefled and applauded by great Num- bers of mercenary Dependents, according to the Extent of their Power and Interefts. But thefe accidental Deviations from the common Meafure ol' what is truly great and honourable, be- ing the Etfe6l of a lalfe Judg- ment, are only of a very fliort and tranficnt Duration. When the partial Reaibns, and finifter Motives, upon which they were formed, ceafe to operate, the World ufually judges, concern- ing ( I^I ) ing the Charader of fuch Per- Ibns, by other Rules, and fees their Aftions in a very different Light from that wherein Flat- tery or Intereft before reprefen- ted them. Now, as a vicious Charafter is ufuallv followed with Obloquy and Reproach ; fo Juftice, one Time or other, is commonly done, (corrupt as the Judgments of the World fom.e- times are) to the Memory of in- jured and diftrefled Virtue. XXn. Still we fay thefe Re- wards, ordinarily annexed to the Obfervance, and thefe Punifh- ments to the Breach of the na- tural Law, are not, univerfally, of Force liifficient to bind Men to their Duty ; and, as it is re- quifite, that all Laws fliould be enforced by Rewards and Punilh- ments, the Hope, or Fear, of which. ( IZZ ) which^ refpe6lively^ may be llrong enough to fecure Obe- dience to them : So that the fu- ture Evil fliall be greater than the prefent Benefit of trangref- ling them^ and tlie future Good greater then the prefent Incon- veniency in Obeying ; and^ up- on this Confideration, in order to give the natural Law all the Force^ which it ought to have^ it is neceflary we fliould caft our Eyes forward^ upon the Rewards and Punifliments of another Life. XXII. It is not fo necellary that we fliould diftinclly know the Kind, or Degree, of that Re- ward, or Happinefs, to whicJi the Pra6lice of pure Morality will entitle us ; it is fufficient that we know, by confulting the Ideas of WiiUom and Goodncfs, in ( 1^3 ) in the Legiflatoi% that the Re- ward will be fuch^ as it is pro- per for him to give^, or for us to receive ; a Reward worthy of the Pains and Labour^ of all the Sufferings and Self-denial^ we can exercife in Purfuit of it. He that Cometh unto God, muji, by his very Accejs, helie^ve both that he is, and that he is a Rewarder of them avho diligently feeh him. This is a Truth which I cite^ not becaufe it is confirmed by a di- vine Authority^ but becaufe it is evident from the clear and incon- tefted Reafon of it. And if God hath interpofed to reward Man^, as his Ad:ion always bears the Charafter of his Attributes, it will afluredly be a God-like, a great, and a glorious Reward, which he will confer ; a Reward proportioned to the Faculties and all ( 1^4 ) all thofe reafonable DefireS;^ which are proper to Man. XXIV. Now, the two Facul- ties of Man being Underftanding and Will, his Reward, the Re- ward proper to him as Man, will conlift in their Improvement and Perfeftion ; in Man's knowing what is worthy to be known, and in his chufing and enjoying fuch Objefts as are moll worthy to be chofen and enjoyed. Whether the Soul will have the lame Senfations in a feparate State as at prefent^ by means of its Union with the Body, and the Commerce it main- tains with fenfiblc Objefts, is not evident from any natural Princi- ple: But it is evident, if it Ihould be the Pleafurc of God, whether in the Body or out of the Body, the like Scnfitions mav be con- tinucd in a feparate State. For as ( i^-r ) as the Body is only the Occafwn^ and not the efficient Caufe of con- veying Inch Senfations to the Mind; God may imprint them upon the Mind^ when no longer united to the Body, and appoint what other occafional Cauie he pleafes for that End. It is more probable, indeed, that the Soul, when releafed from the Body, and afting in its feparate and pure State, will receive new Seniliti- ons, and thofe augmented to a great Number, rather than lofe any of thofe which fhe has alrea- dy : provided. They will really tend to her Perfedlion. We can no more argue that an Occalion of fuch new Senfations, cr any indefinite Number of them, is im- pcffible; than a blind Man now" can argue againft the Poffibility of Colours, becaufe he can form no ( 11^ ) no Manner of Conception con- cerning them. XXV. Whether it may be proved from any Principles of na- tural Reafon^ that the Body will, any Time after Death, be reuni- ted to the Soul, does not fo evi- dently appear : Becaule the Pow- er of God is fufficient to com- penfate Man for all the good Ac- tions done in the Body, without fuch an Union ; and indeed to capacitate the Soul for fuch a Happinels, as will infinitely out- balance the Merit of them, ac- cording to the qualified Senfe wherein I underftand Merit. There is no Neceflity then, from the bare Confideration of a future Reward, of fuppofing a future Union of two Subftances, lb wliolly diftinft in the Nature and Properties of them. The Belief of ( 1^7 ) of that Article muft^ therefore^ de- pend upon other Confiderations, and efpecially upon the Autho- rity of divine Revelation^ where God hath interpofed, or may at any Time hereafter^, think fit to interpofe^ by that means. Some pious Men^ indeed^ have argued, that as the Body bears a Part in the Service, by Abftinence, Ma- ceration, and Self-denial, or other Exercifes proper to it ; it ought to Ihare in the Reward: But we are not always to confider the common Dialed:, not even that of learned Men, as ftri6lly true and philofophical. The Bo- dy, except in a metaphorical Way of fpeaking, is not capable of Re- ward, as having, conlideredfmi- ply in it felf, no Senlation of its Reward, nor any Pofiibility, ac- cording to the cleareft Notions we ( 1x8 ) we can form concerning the Bo- dy of having any. So that what- ever other Reafons God may have for reuniting Soul and Body^ there do not appear any Reafons from the Confideration of fuch a Uni- on^ in order to the Reward of our prefent moral Obedience. XXVI. As to the future Pu- niflnnents of wicked Men^ for the Breach of thofe immutable Laws of Reafon and Order^ which are prefcribed for the Rule of their Condufl:; they too will be fuch as are proportioned to their Na- ture and their Faculties. And whereof tliey may form fome No- tions^ by that Pain^ Diforder and Anguifli of Mind^ which Sinners do even now frequently feel, when they reflefl: upon their Sins and Impieties againll an almighty and avcngcing God. Only there is ( 1^9 ) is this Reafon to prcfume^ that when the Soul fees her Deformi- ty in a naked View ; and is fenfi- ble of her Lofs and Shame, and the Power of God in the PuniJla- ment inflifhed by him ; her Re- flexions will be, proportionably, more Hinging and grievous; and thefe Scourges, which Ihe fo or- dinarily feels at prefent, when a- wakened into a Senfe of her Guilt, to a Degree not calily fupporta- ble, will then be turned into fo many devouring Scorpions. How long thefe Punifliments may be continued ; or whether they will be perpetuated ; natural Reafon, I conceive, does not evidently deter- mine: For the Refolution of this Article, we muft haveRecourfe to the revealed Will of God'. Only thus much, I think, may be fiif- ficiently deduced from natural I Princi- ( I30 ) Principles, that the future Pu- niihments, to be inflidled after this Life, arefuch, asmay deter wick- ed Men from offending againft the Law of God ; and that they ought to believe fuch Punifh- ments will be fo great as may have fufficient Force, when duly confi- dered, to out-balance allthe Evils, they could have fuffered in this Life, in the Difcharge of their Duty. Otherwife a fufficient Sanc- tion to the moral Law, of which I have prov d the Neceffity, and which I all along fuppofe, would not have been given towards at- taining the proper End of it. Obe- dience. And if, for this Reafon, wicked Men ought to believe, and mull expeft, that God will inflift future Puniflimcnts upon them; there is great Reafon, if not an abiblute Neceffitv of believing, he (131) he tvill inflifl thofe Puniflinients : Othervvife^ he has put Men under an Obligation^ in order to the Attamment of his End^ of ma- king a falfe Judgment. XXVIL What has rendred it fo difficult for Men to conceive^ how the Soul^ in a feparate State, fliould be capable of Punifliment, efpecially of any other Punifh- ment, than that of reflefling up- on her own Vilenefs, Lofs, and Diforder, has proceeded from hence, that they look upon the Death of the Body, as a Kind oi Annihilation ; for, having here fcarce any pleafing or painful Notices, wherewith they are mo- ved, except by Means of the Sen- fes, and external Objeds, they imagine, when the Soul goes in- to thofe inviiible Regions, where the Spirits of Men departed are I X fup- ( in ) fuppofcd to refide ; flie can no longer be capable of the Pains and PleafureSj which Ihe now feels ; and wherewith her Capacity is, in a Manner, at prcfent, wholly taken up ; fo that, if they do not beheve her to be utterly extinft, as ignorant and unthinking Per- fons are apt to do ; their Ima- gination,reprefents her, as retiring into fuch a State of Indolence, or Infenfibility, as is but the next Remove to an utter Extinftion. XXVIII. This Error proceeds from a vulgar Notion, that the painful or pleafing Senfations of Men arc not primarily in the Soul, but in the Senfes ; and that the Senfes are necellary and' effi- cient Caufes of exciting them in the Soul: Whereas they, who con- lidcr the Properties of Matter at- tentively, will never be able to dilcover ( 133 ) difcover^ however^ it be modified^ or whatever Situation it is in, how it can produce the leall Ellay to- w^ards Thought^ or Perception : And^ therefore^ the Soul^, when in the Body, or when out of the Body, it may have the very iame Senfations, tho', probably, much more lively, ftrong, and opera- tive, out of the Bodv. To convince us of which, we need only conlider the Power of Ima- gination in delirous or dreaming Perfons ; who fee, feel, and tafte lliings, which have merely an imaginary Subfiftence, after as affefting a Manner, as they could have done, had fuch Things been the real and aftual Objedls of Senfe. XXIX. So that, in refpefl; to the pleafnig or painful Senfations of Men, it is indifferent, by what Occafion they are excited ; whe- ther by Means of circumam- I 3 bient ( 134 ) bient Bodies^ or any new Modi- fications of the Soul; provided, we do but feel them. In order to which, it is not neceflary, for Inftance, there fhould be a mate- rial Fire, to give us all thofe painful Senfations, which we now feel when we burn a Finger, or when any other Part of the Body is expofed fo near to the Flames, that the rapid Particles of Fire, that fly from it, penetrate the Pores of the Body like fo many pointed Needles, and lacerate the Parts expofed to them ; the Pain, that we then feel, not be- ing in the Body, or effected by the Body, but wholly produced in the Soul. We muft, therefore, look up for fome higher Caufe of our Senfations, than Matter,which has no Tendency of itfelf to pro- duce them ; which Caufe can be no ( I3T ) no other, than the Power and Will of God ; with whom it is equal to work with Means, or without Means ; and who can ef- feft whatever he will, only by "willing it. XXX. The Author oUhe Art of Thinking argued therefore phi- lofophically, in faying, '' It is poffible for a Soul feparated from the Body to be tormented by the Fire, either of Hell, or of Purgatory, and to feel the ^^ fame Smart which one feels ^^ when burnt ; fince even wliile ^^ the Soul was in the Body, the Smart of Burning was, in itfelf, not in the Body ; and was no ^^ other, than a Thought of Sor- row, which llie had, upon Oc- calion of what palled in the Body, to which God had united her." So that there is not I 4 Reafon cc cc cc cc Reafon to fuppofe it necef- fary "^ , in order to give the Soul thofe Senfations^ whether of Pain or Pleafure, which flie now has by Occalion of the Body, that flie lliould be afterward uni- ted tQ the fame Body, or to any material Vehicle whatever : Some other Being altogether immate- rial, or the Soul, by fome inter- nal Modification of herfelf, might produce the ia me EiFed:. If, now, in her Union with the Body, the Pain or Pleafure, which we feel, is ordinarily referred to fome parti- cular Part of the Body ; this pro- ceeds from the pofitive Will of God, and to the End greater Care may be taken towards pre- ferving the feveral Parts of the Machine : But were it not for * See Mr. Bayle under the Article Epicurus, this ( 137 ) this Caufe^ there could be no Rcafon, why the Soul fhould re- fer her Senfations to any parti- cular Part of the Body^, or^ in any Refped: out of herfelf But Ihe might be fenfible of Pain and Pleafure^ of Heat and Cold^ by her own proper AQ:^ without any foreign Caufe; or if fuch a Caulc flight be neceflary, there could^ however^ be no Grounds to fup- pofe^ why it fhould be a bodily or material Cd^uih. And from hence I argue (tho' it is not my prefent Bufmefs to enquire concerning the Nature of future Punillnnents to wicked Men^ and whether^ poffi- bly^ thofe Punilliments may conlift in their having certain Senfations^ .which will anfwer to the Pain we now feel by Occafion of material Fire) that there is no Necefiity^ why the Soul, in order to become capable ( 138 ) capable offuchPunifhments,fhould be reftored again to the fame Body^ or be united to any other Body. Chap. IX. The Grounds of Error con- cerning moral Truths with the {jMeans of removing them. I. yl T>'tfficulty moved. II. The Confequence drawn Jrom it de- nted ; and what may he juftly inferred. 5 . Reafons of Ig- norance in Men concerning mo- ral Truths. IV, V. The two main Sources of Error ^ and the Tendency of them. VI, VII. Concerning fVeaKueJs of Mindy ( 139 ) Mind, and the Effe£is of it. VIII. y4 ctdpalle "Diffidence in Men, IX. Why theTrinciples of Morality are not known with- out a competent Application, X. Concerning Liberty of Mind, XL Man not always governed by the Light of his Mind, XII. The Reafon, XUI, XIV. XV. JVhy Men of the greatejl Capacity are frequently oh- ferved to he more eminently "virtuous or wicked, XVI. A Conftderation refpe&ing Man- kind in general. XVII. The Levity of the Heart , how oc- casioned. XVIII. IVhyMenof Tarts fome times very ignorant in refpe£l to the Trinciples of Morality, XIX, XX. JVe are mo ft ajjeded with Things pre- fent, and which actually plea fe, XXI, XXII, XXIII, XXIV. the Method ( 14^ ) Method^ lA^hereiy the Canfes of Error may he remolded. I.T F the Laws of moral Virtue ■*- have that Force to oblige Men to Obedience^ and to oblige under thofe Sanctions we have afcribed to them, they ought, you will lay, to be written in fuch fiiir and legible Characters, that all Men, on every Occafion, may confult and apply them. For aLaw, the Senfe orDeiign whereof is not clear and intelligible, is, in Effefl: no Law. Men cannot follow a Light, which they do not fee; or pradlife an unknown Duty: And yet it may be faid, that Morality changes, in refpeft to Times and Places; that is Morality^ under the No- tion, it is frequently underftood and explained, as a received Rule for the Conduct of human Life ; ( I+I ) Life ; From whence fome have conchidcd^ there is no fixed or cer- tain Standard of Morality; but that the Rules of it are difterent and mutable^, according to the different Tempers^ Opinions^ or Circumftances of Men. So that what is reputed decent^ praife- worthy, and of good Report ( ail Characters of moral Virtue) at one Time^ or in one Place; at another Time^, and in another Place^ may be thought unbeco- ming, diflionourable and infa- mous ; the proper Charafters ^ on the other Hand, of moral Evil. 11. The Truth of this Obferva- tion is not denied ; but we deny the Confequence, that Men would draw from it. It mighty with e- qual Pretence be alledged, that there are no ftanding Laws to Men, ( 14^ ) Men^ for the Government of civil Society, for the Direftion of their Condud: in it; or the Decilion of thofe Differences, which may arife among them ; becaufe the Senfe of thofe Laws is fometimes perver- ted,and mifapplied^contrary to the real Intention, and fometimes to the very Letter of them. All,there- fore, we can infer from that Va- riety, which is obfervable among different Perlbns and different Na- tions, with relpefl; to their moral Condiid:, is, that they do not at- tend, as they ought, to the Rule of it ; or that they will not fee the Reafons, according to which it ought to be explained; thofe Rea- fons being oppofite to fome pre- vailing PaiTion, Habit, or Interell wherewith they are affefted. And how far fuch Prepolfeffions are of Force to blind the Eyes ; to cor- rupt ( 143 ) rupt the Judgment, or to vvreft the Conftrudlion of any Law, con- trary to its true, original and pro- per Senfe, it is unnecellary to prove by an Induction of Particulars. And if thefe Things be done, fome times, in the Face ofa Handing and vifible Legiflature ; which hath a Power of afferting and vindica- ting the Authority of the Laws, and may interpofe to that End by a vifible Authority ; we are not to be furprized, that Men, under the Power of fome violent Paifion, are diverted from attending to the Defign of a Law, the Mif- application whereof they do not apprehend, will be attended with any prefent Confequences injuri- ous to them. III. Other Perfons may, polTi- bly, mifapply the Laws of Na- ture, or be ignorant of them. Not ( 144 ) Not becaufe they are unwilling to undergo the Labour of Attention towards procuring better Light; but on account of fome natural Incapacity or Defefl: of Mind^ which renders them incapable of purfuing their Inquiries, till they are perfectly able to conipf ehend the Sub jeft Matter of them. For Things, how true or intelligible foever in themfelves, are not equal- ly clear or intelligible to all Men. SomePerfons/ either for Want of natural Abilities; of Inftruclion, or Education; being of fuch very flow Apprehenlions, and having the Eye of their Underllanding fo darkened ; that they are not able to difcover ; in a diftinfl: View, the Relation between moral Sub- jefts ; efpecially, in the more re- mote and confequential Dedufl:i- ons to be made from them. IV. ( i4r ) IV. Here, then, we have found the two main Sources of Error^, in the Mind of Man ; Want of Strength^ and Want of Liberty, V. I fliall confider, more parti- cularly, how both thefe Defects tend to deceive and millead Men in their Inquiries concerning mo- ral Truth. VI. And III, Where Men la- bour under any natural Weaknefs of Mind, and do not difcover the Truth, which they feek after, without much Difficulty, they foon grow weary, dull, and dil- couraged ; and fecretly delire to give over the Work, as being very painful, and, at the fame Time, without any certain Pro- fpe£l of Reward : As People of an infirm or llender Conltitu- tion of Body, when they are put upon attempting any Thing, to K which ( I4<^ ) which they apprehend themfelves unequal, are foon hitimidated with the Apprehenfion of their attempting a Thing above their Strength. And tho' th^y might, perhaps, by Degrees and repeated Application, proceed in the Work, with more Facility, and through frequent Exercife^acquire a ftrong- er Habit of Body ; yet they have not Refolution llifRcient to over- come the Refrftance, which renders their firft Endeavours fo painful and difcouraging to them. VII. Thus it is, with refped: to the Operation of weak Minds, in the Search after Truth ; and, what I now, particularly, confider, of ?^^r^/Truth. The great Lines of our Duty are vifible to every Eye ; but, when Men are to draw Inferences or Conclufions from them, tho' they proceed upon ( 147^) upon true and certain Principles, yet the Conne6tion^ in their Way of inferring one Thing from a- nother^, being lefs perceivable^ and their Views lliort and narrow^ the Mind grows impatient in the Puriuit^ and, inllead of Truth, what file cannot difcover without Pain, takes up with any Thing, true or falfe, that may proxure her Repojcy and free her from her prefent uneafy State : And tho', notwithftanding her Com- plaints, flie might, by reiterated Attempts, gather more Strength ; for the Powers of the Mind, as of the Body, arc augmented by Labour and Exercife, flill the Defire of prefent Eafe proves, upon the Competition, more pre- valent, than the Delire of a fu- ture, diflant, and as fhe appre- hends very precarious Reward, K X nut ( 148 ) not to be acquired, after alL without doing great Violence to herfelf VJIL Thefe are the lazy Pre- tences, whichMenofFer inExcufe of thenifelves, for neglefting the Culture and Improvement of their Minds. And they are not only the Pretences of Perfons, more na- turally weak and jaturnine ; but fometimes of thofe, to whom Na- ture has been more liberal of her Talents. There have been a great Number of Men, capable of di- Itinguifliing themfelvcs in their feveral Profeflions ; who yet, out of a weak Diftrull of fucceeding in their Endeavours, occalioned by their Idlenefs, and contrary to the natural Motions of Pride in moll other Cafes, have neglec- ted the Purfuit, to which they were hnppily formed, and where- in. ( 149 ) in, with a proper Application and Induftry, they might cer- tainly have liicceeded ; and ih have lived and died undi/hn- guiflied; but not unaccountable, for neglefting to improve the Ta- lents committed to. them : If^ perhaps, inftead of the generous and beneficent Ufes to which they fliould have employed them, they have not applied them in a Way of Commerce, rather tejiding to pervert, than to anfwer their pro- per End and Ufe ; by turning them wholly upon the Affairs or Bufmefs of the fenlible Life; and, inftead of employing them to augment the Strength, making them direfbly inftrumental to corrupt and debafe the Mind ; as the richeft Soul, if not well cultivated, ferves only to produce the ranker, and more noxious Weeds. K 3 IX. Nei- ( iro ) IX. Neither is it any Caufe of Objeftion^ againft the Clearnefs or Evidence of the natural Law, that the Knowledge of it is not to be attained^ without compe- tent Application. God hath given us Faculties with a Defign they fhould be employed. And it is fufficient to juftify the Reafons of his Procedure herein, that we can, in a fober and regular Ufe of thofe Faculties, attain the End, which he propofed to himfelf in giving them. It would rather have ar- gued a Defect in the divine Wif- dom, efpecially, in a probationary State of Man, where he is to give Tryal of his Abilities, had God rendred the Knowledge of his Duty, in all Cafes, fo very eafy and obvious, as wholly to fuper- fedc his Endeavours in order to the Difcovery of it. The Diffi- culty, ( ITI ) culty, therefore^ which is pre- tended in the Search of Man, con- cerning the Rule of his Duty, to ihew the Uncertainty of it, is io far irom being an Objediion againlt moral Truth, that the very Frame and Conftitution of human Na- ture^, under our prefent Circum- llances^ feem to require thd.t/he fiould only he found of ihoje, who diligently feek her. X. Another Source of Error in the human Mind, concerning moral Truth, proceeds from lier Want of Liberty. We have al- ways fufRcient Means or Capacities to difcover the neceflary Rules of our Condu6l. Where fuch Mcans^or Capacities are wanting. Men can- notj indeed, be, llridly conli- dered, as moral Agents, obliged by a Law, and under Tain of tranfgrefling it. For as it is not K 4 con- ( IT! ) coiififtent with Wifdojn, that a Man fhoiild be required to prac- tife what he doth not know; nei- ther is it confiftent with Juftice, that he fliould be puniflied for what he could not remedy. So that Man^ coniidercd as a moral Agent, mull always, in the ne- celiary Reafon of the Thing, have the Means or Capacity of know- ing what is requifite to denomi- nate him a moral Agent ; and to give him a Right of being treated ci^s fuch. And it is fufficient to my prefent Purpofe, that every Perfon, who is accountable for his Aftions, mull have a compe- tent Degree of Knowledge, for the moral Condufl of them ; tho' a ditferent Degree, of Knowledge, in Morality, may be communicated to dilicrentPerfons, in adiilerent Degree ; according as Qod has dealt ( IT3 ) dealt to every One the Meajure of his Abilities. XL But^ tho' every Man has^ if he attend to it, a fiifficient Mea- fure of Light, to dired: his mo- ral Condiift; it does not there- fore folio w^that every Man nv'tll at- tend to this Light : For there are other Motives of Aftion, in Man, befides that of pure and fnnple Underilanding. Nothing is more evident than that we do not al- ways govern ourfelves, according to the Principles of our Belief; even of thofe Principles, which are moll uncontefted ; whofe Truths wc acknowledge; and to the Conduft to which we profefs our felves obliged to fubmit. XII. This Contrariety between the Perfuaiion, and the Practice of Men, proceeds from hence, that we are ditfcrently affecT:ed with ( IT4 ) with what we feel, and with what we only /^^/ I do not mean with the fenfibleEye; for the Im- preffions of ObjeaS;, which enter there, are often fo ilrong, that it had been happy for us, if we could not have opened it : But I mean what we fee only by a naked View, or Speculation of the Mind. In the former Cafe, we often, indeed, find ourfelves carried away by a violent Impulfe, which proves too ftrong for a fine and beautiful Thought either to divert, or re- fill. XIII. The Liberty, therefore, of human Mind mav be confi- dered, upon reafonable Grounds, ^s dillincl from the Strength of it. If it do not frequently hap- pen, that Men ol' the greatelt Capacities, and ftrongcft Minds, have yet tlic Icalt Liherty : As With ( iTr ) with the greater Force a Torrent is carried^ and the higher it rifes, the more difficult it is to keep it in the proper Channel. And:, there- fore^ it has been a common Ob- fervation^ for which I fliall pre- fently affign a natural Reafon, that Men of extraordinary Ta- lents are commonly;, and more eminently diftinguifhed;, either for their Virtues^, or their Vices; according to the different CourfCy which they are inclined^, from Conftitution^, or fome prevailing Habit;, or Intereft;, to purfue. XIV. The Reafon of a tranfcen- dent and fuperior Virtue in fuch Perfons is^, that when they ap- ply their Minds to the Difcovery of Truth ; when the/ fearch for her as Silver:^ and feek for her as for hid Treajtire^ they do not only find her of lefs difficult Ac- ceis^ ( If^ ) cefs, and their Pains rewarded, at once, by a more eafy and more full Difcovery but they fee thofe great, beautiful and fublime Truths, that are proper to fitisfy their enlarged Delires of Knowledge; which lie more concealed from left penetrating Minds, and are lefs proportioned to the Capacities of them. And, if all Pleafure arifeth from the Agreement of the Objeft with the Faculty, by the fame Reafon, ill Proportion as the Faculty is of greater Extent, a greater Mea- furc of Pleafure muft neceflarily arife from the Contemplation and Enjoyinent of it. So that, as it is Pleafure which rendersMan hap- py; when Knowledge thus be- comes pleafant to the Soul, at once, by facilitating her Applica- tion, and by fatisfying her De- fires : ( in ) fires; How can a human Mind, refiefting upon its own Dignity, be lb worthily employed^ or, with equal Force and Aftivity, towards its proper End Happi- nefs^ than in an intimate Contem- plation of Truth ? And I do not doubtj but there are good Men of exalted Minds^ who, in fiich Con- templations of Truth, are ^o tran- fported with the Light and Beau- ) ty of it, that they enjoy, for the Time, a greater Pleafure, than the World, or any fenfible De- lights in it, can give ; a Pleafure fo great and refined, efpecially, when accompanied with a con- formable • Praftice, that neither - Life^ nor "Death, nor Things pre- Jent, nor Things to come, will he able to Jeparate them from the the Lo^e of Truth. For tho' we do not always follow the Light of our ( it8 ) our own Minds^ yet the more ftroiig^ diftind: and irradiating that Light is, we fhall follow it ftill with fo much greater Free- dom and Complacency. XV. It is no lefs eafy to account, why Men of extraordinary Capa- cities, when their Minds take a wrong and different Turn, are the moft luxuriant in Vice, and give themfelves up to the great- eft and moft extravagant Difor- ders. Befides the natural Force of Thought infuchPerfons, which hurries them away, and renders them impatient of the Means ne- ceflary to redlify the wrong Bent they have taken, and fo precipi- tates them into the very Excefs, to which Humour or Inclination may prompt them; they being Perfons of a fine, ftrong and co- pious Imagmation, eafily find, or ( ir9 ) or pretend to find fome phiufiblc Reiilbn, even for their greateft Crimes ; or where that cannot be founds fo as tofatisfy themfelves, or others, they yet paint thofc Crimes in fuch lively and deceit- ful Colours, as to give them an Air and Force which hides their natural Deformity; or, at leaft, diverts them, in fuch a Manner, from giving a juft Attentioji to it, that feeing they Jee^ and will not perceive. XVI. But the general Reafon why all Perfons, indifferently, are apt to be moved more by fenfi- ble, than by intelledual Objefts, is, what I obferved before ; that the ImprefTions of Senfe are llrong- er and more aftefting, than thole of naked Truth : Even the Minds of thofe, who are capable of a more Heady Contemplation of Truth, ( 1^0 ) Truth, and who take the greateft Delight in contemplating it, can- not always dwell or feed upon ab- ftrad: Speculations. When, there- fore, the Mind finds herfelf weary^ or her Strength is much impaired, we naturally turn our Thoughts forRelief and Diverfion, upon Objedls of another Kind ; and meeting in the Way fomething grateful and pleafmg in fenlible Objefts, ourDelire towards them is inflamed anew. As we may obferve of Perfons, who, upon reading a good Book, have been fo moved with fome fpiritual Truth inculcated to them, that they have thought, for the Time, Nothing could be able to with- ftand the Force of it ; but foon finding other Objefts, or Affairs of the World, ^ by Occafion of wliich the Mind taftes a prefent and ( ieriences in himfelf^ whether he may be able^ or not^ to give a philofophical Account of the Efteft^ and to anfvver all Difficul- ties on io very nice a Subject^ that //jere is a Law in his Mem- hers warring again/i the Law of his Mindy and hringing him iit- to Capti'vity to the Law of Sin which is in his Members. V. The firft Things therefore, we have to do^ if we would aflert the Authority of Reaibn, and re- eftablifli her in the Throne ; if we would give her that fovereign Command which flie ought to have. ( 174 ) havC;, and which flie is dcfign- ed by God to have over the whole Machine^ and all the Springs of Aftion in it^ is to con- lider wliere the main Strength of our Enemy doth lie ? What the Order and Number of their Forces are, and where they will moft probably attack us ? To the End, we may not only be better pre- pared to defend ourfelves, but to chaflife their rebellious Attempts ; and to make them fenfible, it does not become Subjefts to give^ but to receive Laws. VI. Now^ the moft dangerous Enemies to Reafon, the moft apt to excite rebellious Motions a- gainft her Orders and Authority, deriving their chief Force, either from the Senfes, the Imagina- tion, or Pafiions, what it princi- pally concerns us to do is, to pre- vent ( 175- ) vent their A6lion fo much aspoffi- bly we can; but, when that can- not be done, to reiift it with all our Might, and thereby to weaken their Force, till, by Degrees, we reduce them to Obedience. VII. I fliall apply this Rule fc- verally to the Senfes, Imagina- tion and Paffions, according to the Order wherein they are here Ipecified. VIII. In refpefl: to the Senfes, the Ufe of them is abfolutely ne- ceflary to the Prefervation of the fenfible Life ; to which End, in- deed, as they are admirably formed, they appear to be folely given. So that it is not only rea- fonable, if we would follow the Order of Nature, that we Ihould ufe them ; but we may, lawfully, in fome convenient Meafure, gra- tify and indulge them. IX, ( 17^ ) IX. The Dtjiigiij therefore^ of th()il\ who would lay down the Rules of a juft and practicable Morality, is not, with the myfti- cal Writers, to prefcribe liich "Denudations^ and abftraft; Flights of the Soul out of the Body, as if, for the Time, the Laws of Union, between thefe two Subftances,were of Jio more Ufe or Occalion to the Soul, than if llie really fublifted in a feparate State : Leaving thefe fublime Myfteries to thofe, who are able to explicate them intel- ligibly, or to regulate the Mo- tions of the Soul, and deftroy the natural Eftecls of thofe in the Bo- dy, by them: I fhall readily al- low, that Man, while he is in the Body, and Itands in his prefent Relation to other Bodies, ought, fb far as the neceifary Ends of fuch his prefent State may require, to ( 177 ) Bodies^ oughts fo far as tlie ne- cellary Ends of fiich his prefent State may require^, to maintain a Commerce in the fenfible World agreeable to it^ and to fupport himfelf in that State fo long as he can : Which yet he has no other Way of doings but by ufnig his Senies^ and by folio vving^, but ftill under the Direction and Reftraint of lleafon^ the Motions of them ; and ufing them no further^ than in purfuing the true Ends for which they were given. X. But^ becaufe it would carry me too far beyond the Bounds I have prefcribed myfelf^ to apply this Rule to every Senfe in parti- cular; I ihall confine my prefent Reflections to that of Siglit^ this being the molt capacious and ex- tended of all the Senfes^ and whereby^ indeed^ thofe other M Ob^ (178 ) Objedls of Senfe^ which have the greateft Power to move and cor- rupt us, are commonly firll taken in: Or, if fuchObjeasprevioufly occur to any other Senfe, it is yet the Light of the Eye, that fliews them to greater Advantage, and the Luft of it, which reprefents them more pleafant and deiir- able. XL But fliall we, therefore, fluit our Eyes to avoid the Dan- ger which may arife to us from the Impreffion of vifible Obied:s ? Shall we not look upon the IVine when it is red^ when it giveth its Colour in the Glafs, when it moveth it f elf aright^ becaufe wc may be tempted to talte more liberally of what appears fo agree- able to the Siglit ; or, becaufe this is, moreover, a Scnfe of fo quick and nice Difcernment, that it (I7P) it^ very rarely^ or iiever^ deceives us^ in the Report it makes con- cerning the Goodnefs or Agree- ablenefs of its Objefl: : Except where we are not in a true Si- tuation to judge of it^ or fome great Artifice is ufed to impofe upon us ? Or fliall we^, for the fame Reafons^ make a Covenant nvith our EyeSy not to fee any rich^ curious^ and beautiful Pro- dutlion of Nature;, or Art^ left certain Defires lliould be excited in us of Avarice^, Envy^ or crimi- nal Love ? Such aRule as this^ were it really prafticable^ yet, if re- duced to Praftice, would put ait End to fome of the moft agree- able, and, confidered, in them- felves, very innocent Pieafures of human Life, from which, it is not the Bufinefs of Morality to reftrain Men, abfolutely, but only M X to ( i8o ) to regulate their Ufe. Tho', in fome Cales^ indeed^, where the Danger of gratifying the Eye is more hazardous^ or has been more frequently experienced^ and attended with ill Confequences ; it is better to lofe the Benefit of it^ and even, by a voluntary Sa- crifice, in the Caufe of Honour and Innocence, to pluck it out, and cait it from us. XII. But, ordinarily, if the Government of the Eye be well regulated, there is no Neceflity for fuch Violences. If an indif- creet, or irregular Look has been occalioned by certain Objefts, it is in our Power to turn away the Eye from them ; but, if that can- not always be done, it is llill in our Power to prevent their Action, by meditating upon fome other Object, by calling the Mind off fiom ( i8i ) from a Train of Thought^ which, flic is inwardly confcious, ought not to be purfued ; and which, if purfued, mull end in Guilt, Shame, and Diibrder. Whatever Power we grant to fenlible Objects, even to thofe Objects of Sight, which are apt to excite in the Soul the moil ftrong and violent Agita- tions ; yet ftill we leave her in Polleffion of the Throne; and it is her Fault, if fhe fuffer it, on any Occalion, or by any other Power whatever, to be ufurped. M 3 CHAP. ( i8x ) Chap. XL Of the Imagination. Jy II. The different Effects of the SenfeSy and the Imagination, III. The Force and Extent of it, IV. A Means of regulating it, V. That Men of IVit are fome times mofi ^vicious ^ and VI. mo/i imprudent ; with a philofophical Conjecture^, rn^hy they are jo. VII. And how there happens fo great a "Dif- ference in the Imaginations of Men. VIII. And why Viva- city is rather the Character of the Female Sex^ than Strength of Mind, IX, X. How the Ima- ( i85 ) Imagination may he tifefidly employed, XL What was [aid exemplified. XII. Concerning the Imagination of Homer. XIII;, XIV. (9/ Seneca^, fuperior as a 7noral JVriter. XV. Of Ifaiah. And, XVI. of Job. XVII, XVIII, XIX, XX. The Reajon of mentioning thefe great Names, and the life to he made of them, hoth for En- couragement and Reproof XXL Moral Virtue has, in all Ages, leen afferted ly the greatefi Wits. L 'T' H E Senfes are afted by -*- fuch Objefls, which, be- ing prefent, caule an immedi- ate Impreffion upon the Organs of the Body; fo that the Objefts of them, as fuch, properly fubfill no longer, than we are converfant M 4 with ( i84) with them; or have an afliual Per- ception of their Force. But the Imagination is of much greater Ex- tent; it recalls Things paft to Re- membrance ; it reprefents Things that are not^, as if they were; it puts future Cafes^ not only upon probable Grounds^ and improbable Conje6lures; but often upon im- poffible^ and fometimes very chi- merical Suppofitions ; it quite al- ters the natural State and Order of Things ; flying to the remoteft Part of the Worlds and back again in a Moment ; and afliiming a Kind of creativePower, whereby it makes new Worlds, new Empires, Kings, and other Potentates; and annihi- lates them again, at Pleafure, in a Moment. All this the Imagi- nation of Man has a Power of pro- ducing, by painting, in his Mind, Refemblanccs of Things, that ex- exift^ (i8r) exift ; and fuppofing a thoufand Things^ that have no Exiftence. Upon both which Accounts^ the more ftrong^ lively and copious, the Imagination of any Perlon is, the more he will be expoied to the Danger, if it be not kept under a due Regulation, of having his Heart corrupted, and of being pre- cipitated into innumerable Follies^ and Dilorders. II. If the only Povvcr, which fenlible Objeflis have to afFed the Soul, fo as to be the Occafion ei- ther of Error, or of Sin, depended upon their prefent and immediate Aftion, by the Rules before laid down, we might moreeafily avoid the ill Confequences, wherewith our Commerce in this World is too frequently attended ; we might find Means, under the Appre- henfion of any dangerous Aflault, to ( i8^ ) to retire ; or if we have been fo unhappy^ at any Time, thro' Surprize or Importunity, to be too familiar with them, we might break oft^ theCorrefpondence, by a final Separation: But the Ima- gination will not fufFer us to part with them fo. It is the fame Thing, in a Manner, as to the ill Effedls relating to Morality, when the Imagination is much heated, whether we atliially fee and feel the Objed of it, or not. Nay, in certain more violent Commo- tions of the Brain, the Fibres of it are moved with as great a Force, as they would have been from an aftual Impreffion, by Means of external Objects ; from whence fome Philofophers have concluded, that the Senfes, and the Imagi- nation, differ only in the Degrees of more, and lefs. III. The ( i87 ) III. The Imagination afting with fo great Force^ and being capable of fpreading itfelf fo wide over the whole created IVorldy in a Manner^ at once^ and even be- yond it, into the extramundane Spaces ; particular Care Ihould be taken to lay it under Ibme whol- fome and convenient Reftraints; if we would not fuffer ourfelves to be carried away with it, with a blind Impulfe, belides the Rule of our Condud:, and beyond all Bounds. IV. It concerns us, in the firil Place, to avoid all Reflexions on fuch Things, orObjefts, by which the Imagination is moft apt to be mifled, or corrupted ; efpecially^ where, by natural Temper, by Cullom, or former Application of our Thoughts the fame Way, we are inclined to purfue, or defire fuch ( i88 ) fuch Things^ or Objects, after an irregular Manner. There have been but few Peifons, who were not naturally formed with parti- cular Difpofitions to certain Vices. And, as the Imagination of fuch Perfons is more ftrong and live- ly, fo much greater Difficulty they find in denying themfelves the Pleafure of indulging it, if theOb- jeft, which it paints, not only be, in itfelf, agreeable, but fet off^ with fuch adventitious Ornaments and Colourings, which are apt to give it ftill a greater Force and Advantage. V. Here we may difcover the Reafon, why Men of Wit, accord- ing to the popular Notion con- cerning that Qiiality, are not al- ways Men of the ftrifteft Virtue ; or rather, that they fometimes run into the moft extravagant Ex- ( 189 ) Excefles of Vice ; and are the moll flagrant Inftances of a loofe Morality. The lively and beau- tiful Images^ which they form in their Minds^ fo pleaiing to them- felves^ and wherewith they ob- ferve others^, perhaps^ both plea- fed and furprizedj, diverts them from attending to thQT)i£iates of Reafon, which they look upon as dry^ empty^ and tallelefs Confi- derations^ when compared to thofe gay, fprightly Scenes, that a luxu- riant Fancy prepares ibr them ; and which, at the fame Time, viiibly tends to gratify a fecret Pride, they take, in being carefled and admired. VI. So pernicious is this Qua- lity, that, however Men aflefl: the Reputation of it, it often proves the greateft Occafion of betraying them^ not only into the moll ( Ipo ) moft fcandalous Diforders^ but the moil extravagant Follies. Whe- ther it be that the Spirits of fuch Perions are carried towards the Bram^ the fuppofed Seat of thelma- gination^ with a more impetuous Force ; where^ like a Torrent^ they bear down all before them ; or^ that the Subftance of the Brain, in fuch Perfons, is capable of receiving more large and deep Imprelles ; or whether, on both thefe Accounts, from the ftronger Aftion of the Spirits on any fup- pofed Part of the Brain, and be- caufe the Temper of it is more dudlile and fufceptible of them, the Images, imprefled on it, are more clear, large, and diftin£l * as the Strokes, made by a graving Inftrument, are deeper, in Pro- portion to the moie hard or foft Contexture of the Piate ; and the Force, ( 191 ) Force, wherewith fuch Inftrnment is apphed. VII. From whence foiiie Ac- count may be given not only of that Variety of Imaginations, and of the different Degrees of Strength and AVeaknefs, of Vi- vacity and Dulhiefs of Fancy, ob- fervable in Men; but, probably_, by the Refearches of learned and able Phyficians into the more oc- cult interior Parts of the Ma- chine ; and by their difcovering the fecret Springs, whereby her Movements are performed; an Art, which, in other Refpefls, has been fo happily improved to reftify certain natural Indifpoii- tions, might be applied, in order both to invigorate the Imagina- tion, and to give it a greater Extent. VIII. Wc ( Ip^ ) VIII. We may alfo form ano- ther very probable Conjecture^ why the Charafter of the other Sex is rather Vivacity of Imagi- nation than Strength of Mmd. They fometimes^ indeed^ excel in the latter^ but generally in the former of theie Advantages. And the Reafon of their Superiority, herein, is naturally deducible from what has been faid, towards illuf- trating the prefent Subjeft. Wo- men, being, in their natural Frame and Conftitution, of a more ten- der, foft, and delicate Contexture, their Spirits find lefs Refiftance, in tJieir Paflage to the Brani ; and the Fibres of it being more flexi- ble, and eafily Ihaken, and its Subftance, in general, more paf- live and yield nig, the Images, which prefent themicivcs in it, are not only formed with greater Ce- ( 193 ) Celerity; but are^ at the Himc Tiine^ more cleai% lively, and diftindl. i .•;(> IX. But I retuni;, from thefe incidental Refletlions, to lliew, how the Imagination, which, if not well regulated, is more dan- gerous to our Innocence, in Pro- portion, as it is more quick, live- ly, and copious; how, I fay, this Faculty may not only be fecured from Danger, but rendered high- ly fubfervient to the Ends oi^ mo- ral Virtue. X. To fecure it from Danger, fince we cannot, many times whol- ly avoid the Action of thofe Ob- jeflis, which are molt apt to excite and inflame it ; for then we mull retire out of the World; and even in Solitude, in our Cioiets, or in our Beds, in Cells, or Defarts, where fuch Objects could not fol- N low (194 ) low us, the Images of them, the' involuntary, would, perhaps, too often arife ; if it may not be quef- tioned, whether the Imagination is not, fometimes, ftruck with the nioft violent Emotions, in folitary Life. Since this Method of Cure is imprafticable, we ought, how- ever, and that is always in our Power, whether^ in publick, or private, when any wicked or ir- regular Imagination does arile, fo foon as we perceive the Motion and Tendency of it, to check and reprefs it ; to turn our Thoughts upon fome other Obje6l; by that Means, to give the Spirits ano- ther Courfe, wliofe Diver fion is naturally followed with a differ- ent Train of Thought. And, if we are particularly happy in the Talents of Imagination, there are not wanting a valt Variety of Ob- jecls. ( 195- ) jedls, which may give it^ not on- ly a pleafing and innocent^ but a very ufeful Entertainment, even in refpeft to the Subjedl:s of Reli- gion, or Morality. XL I might obferve, to excite a generous Emulation, how hap- pily feveral, of the greateft Wits in the World, have employed the Imagination to thefe moft noble and excellent Ends. But I Ihall inftance only in four of them, Horner^ Sefteca^ IJaiah the Son of A?nos, and Joh. And tho' I fliall obferve a fenfible Dif- ference in the Imagination of thefe four great Charafters ; yet they all concurred,after a differentManner, in advancing the fame Defigri. XII. The Imagination of Ho- mer was vaft, lively, and com- prehenlive. The Greatnefs and Dignity of it is difcoverable, in N X the ( 19^ ) the Choice he makes of luch Things to furnilh out his Work with pro- per Materials; fiich, as are of the greateft Importance inNatm*e to excite our Admiration. With this View, he ranfacks Heaven and Earth, and feems to liirvey the whole Creation, at one Look, to find Something, which hemayfe- left, worthy to illuftrate and em- bellifn his Defign. But this great Genius, whatever his private Opi- nion was, conformed to the Reli- gion eftablilhed by the Laws; and did not think it proper to engage the civil Magiftrate m a theologi- cal Difpute. His principalLiiages are taken from the Chara6lers or Manners of theGods; which being, in many Refpedf s, oppolite to the common Principles of Morality, the Moral of his Poem is, upoji that Accountjand.contrarv to hisDefign, of ( 197 ) of much lefs Force, cither to m- llru(!:l^ or perluade. 1 lie Vivacity of his Imagination appears^ from his defcribing Things^ after a Manner^ as if they were really prefcj-^t Ob- jecls of Senfe; and the Extent of it, from his taking in, and regu- larly forting that Variety of Things and Circumftances, of Cau- fes, Aftions, and Events, which are the Materials of his Poem ; a Work lb happily conducted,, with fo much Eafe and Regulari- ty, that he feems, in the firft Plan of it, to have fcen every Par- ticular, from the Beginning to the End, according to the Order, wherein he proceeded to compofe it. XIII. The Imagination of Sene- ca is lefs regular and ftrong ; but fine, fprightly, and and adventu- rous; his Figures are beautifiil, N 3 well ( 198 ) well coloured and bold^ but fome- times^ loo glaring ; and his Dif- couries are rather framed to take the Reader by Surprize^ and pom- pous appearances, than by Force of jftrid: Argument ; though it is certain, he has laid down niany excellent Precepts, founded on co- gent Reafons. But what confirms my Obfervation is, that his Rea- fons are generally moil forcible, when they are deliver din a plain, hmple and natural Manner, with- out the Embellifhments of Art, which he has not always the Art to conceal. HisImagination,there- fore, may be compar'd to Homers, as a neat beautiful rural Seat, toaCaltle which overlooks all the Country, and at once fills the Eye with Pleafure and Altonifhment. XIV. But, whatever Advan- tage Homer had, on Account of the ( 199 ) the Force, or Extent of his Ge- nius ; it mull be allowed, Se- neca, in the Charafter of a mo- ral Writer, employed his Ima- gination more happily : As re- folving Morality into better Prin- ciples, and enforcing the Precepts of it, not by mere, loofe occa- lional Sentences, but by a Train of Arguments, in formed metho- dical Difcourfes. XV. IJaiah, whom I do not confider here as a Perfon inlpi- red, but as following the natural Bent of his Genius, was fuperior to both thefe celebrated Writers in the Talents of Imagination : Wherein he had not only Strength and Beauty, Extent and Vivacity ; but a Degree of Fire and Rapidity peculiar to him- felf; wherewith he is, fo^ne- times, 16 tranfported, that if we N 4. do ( aoo ) do not keep our Eye very Hea- dy, we are in Danger to lofe Sight of him, or fcarce able, if we have not a ftrong Eye, to bearthe Force and Luftre of his Images. Efpecially, when he raifes our Thoughts up to a Con- templation of the eternal Tower and Godhead^ when he defcribes the Works of Creation or Provi- dence; or any Glory, in parti- cular, of the vifible or invifible World. And, indeed, that his Images, on thefe Subjefts, are fo liiblime, lively and juft, is not, merely, owing to a great or tine natural Capacity, but to his having more true, adequate, and diftincl Apprehenfions, concern- ing the divine Nature and At- tributes; which, at once, tend to regulate, to enlarge, and re- fine the Imagination : So that, there ( ^01 ) there have been few Perfons^ if any, in the World, more happy either in a ftrong, lively and copious Imagination, or who improved it more by an acquired Knowledge; to which, there is no Doubt, but his Converfation, at Court, very much contributed. XVI. And, in that Refpeft, in- deed, he had the Advantage of another Perfon I propofed to name, which is Joh^ or whoever is the Author of the Book, that goes under this Name. Tho' as to the Boldncfs, the Fire, and furprizing Force of the Images in that Book, he does not ap- pear inferior to the Son of A- mos himfelf Nay he feems, up- on one Account, to rife higher in his Images; at leafl, to raife our Devotions by them, ftill to a higher Pitch ; and that is^ by his great ( zor ) great Skill in natural Knowledge; which he, every where, fo hap- pily applies, in order to ^noble and embcllifh his moral Inltruc- tions ; and, thereby, more ef- feclually to perfuade : For the Mind is never fooner captivated, than by fuch Images, which are taken from the admirable and llirprizing Works of God, in the external Effe(5ls of his Power, Wifdom, andGoodnefs. Particu- larly, when he fpeaks concern- ing the original Formation of Things, he defcribes the divine Aftion, and the ftupendous Ef- fects of it, in fo lively, ftrong and moving a Manner, as if he had aftually ihcn God Almighty layifig the Foundations of the Earth ; or had heard all the Sons of Cody upon the Conftrud;ion of Jiis glorious Work, Jbouting for ( ^og ) 'Joy, I do not hereby intend, as if the evangelical Prophet, as he is called^ had neglefted theStudy^or were deficient in the Knowledge of Nature; for he abounds with no- ble lUujftrations from her Works: Ail I intend is, that the Author of the Book of Joh feems to have a Claim to this Knowledge,, as his more peculiar Diftinttion. And, perhaps, there is no Book extant in the World, which, could any Perfon be found equal to the Undertaking, might be commen- ted upon more ufefuUy, in order to explain and eftablifli the true Principles of natural Philofophy. XVII. I mention thefe Names, among a great many others, to fhew, of what Advantage it may be, to have a fine, lively and great Imagination ; notwithftand- ing the Danger to Virtue, which may ( ^04 } may accidentally attend the A- bufe of this Talent ; for a great many Inftances^ tP the Shame, and Scandal of human Nature, may alfo be found of fuch A- bufes. XVIII. It may deferve the Conlideration of fuch Perfons, what Sentiments themfelves would have had, and ^11 the reft of the World ought to have had of the four great Writers laft mentioned, if, inftead of em- ploying the Talents of Imagina- tion, towards promoting Virtue and Pietv, thev had made *ufe of them, to confound the very DiftinClion of Virtue, and Vice ; lo call Good Evily and Evil Goody and after having thrown down the Boundaries between them ; and given Men a difcretionary Liberty, without any Rcltraijits of of Confcience^ to take whatever Way they might be inclined to chufe^ fliould^ upon the whole Matter, reconmiend Vice, where^ it could be praclifed with Safety and Impunity, as more eligible to them, in their private Capaci- ty; and, efpecially, as moft con- ducing to the flourifliing State of the Commonwealth ; or as ne- ceffiiry to preferve it in a flou- rifliing Condition. XlX.SuchaSyltem of Morality, inftead of tranfmitting the Names, or Works of anv Perfon down to Pofterity, with Honour and Luf- tre, would have rendered him the Objefl: of univerfiil Detefta- tion. 'Even Ep/curus and his Fol- lowers, tho' they deftroyed the Obligation and proper Motives to Virtue, yet fuppofed a cer- tain innate Decency and Come- linefs (zo6 ) linefs in it; for which it was of it felf defireable ; and many of them both praftifed it^ and re- commended the Pradlice of it to others, as moll conducing to the Happineft of private and publick Life. Lucretius diftinguifhed by that Kind of Wit, I am confider- ing, tho' more loofe, in feveral Refpefts, than the Matters from whom he copied ; yet never ad- vanced any Thing, to the Pre- judice of moral Life, like what we have feen in a Nation; I do not fay, profeffing Chriftianity, but formerly celebrated in the World, for writing ju/Il/y and thinking foherlj, XX. If Perlbns of no great Talents, in the corrupt Eflays of their Imagination, have yet been able to miflead weak and ignorant People, who cither cannot give the ( io7 ) the requifite Attention towards the Difcovery of Truth; or are incapable of detedling the Sophi- ftry of falfe Reafoning : What ill Effefts might have been appre- hended from them, had they been diftinguiflied by the Talents of a Homer, a Seneca, an Ifaiah, or a Job. It is by a happy Dif- poiition of Providence, that, as the Enemies of Religion are more audacious, and dely the fiving God with a higher Hand, their Abilities fhould, in Proportion, be lefs, and the Force of their Attacks more eafily broken. XXI. I grant. Men of very ill Principles have, fometimes, had an uncommon Meafure of Wit; which they have eiiiployed as well, as they could, to defend thofe Principles : But ftill it may be obferved, to the Advantage of ( ao8 ) of Morality, that the greateft Wits have always declared on the Side of moral Virtue ; and even many of thofe, who have been far from conducing them- felveSj according to thofe very Rules, which they confefled to be pious, juft, and reafonable. Few have been able, fo far, to throw off all the Regards of De- cency and Confcience, as openly to teach a loofe Morality ; but Icarce any, who have had the Effrontery to encourage it, as be- neficial to Society ; Attempts of this Nature, one would be ftrong- ly inclined to fufpeft, could only be formed by Men of the moft abandoned Principles, upon aPre- fumption of their living in the moft corrupt and degenerate Age, CHAP, (io9) Chap. XI I. Of the Vajfwns. I. How they differ from the Sen- fes and Imagination. 11^, III, IV, V. The Laws of Coinmn- nication hetween the Soul and Body only to he refohed i7ito the WAX of God. y\. The pro- per Inquiry concerning the Taf- Jtons. VII. How they are to he regidated. VIII. particu- larly^ with refpe£l to a?iy com- plexional Vice. IX. Why ftro7ig Tqfjions render Men capable of higher Attainment s\ with the Advantages of a good and generous Birth. X. The End O of ( ^lo ) of that Reflection. XL Bene- ficial Ufes of the Tajfions.yjl. \A 'Dtffimlty concerning thern moved. And XIII. A Rule laid down. XIV. Another Rule. XV. The Taffions are apt to impofe upon us. XVI. A Third Rule. XVII. When ive are, more efpecially, to take Care of them. XVIII. The Fourth and Lafi Rule towards their letter Regulation. I. nPHE great Obftacle to the -■- Pradlice of moral Virtue ftill remains to be confidered. There is fome Difficulty in re- ftraining the Ufe of our Senfes, and in refilling the Ad:ion of fen- fible Obie£ls ; but ftill more Dif- ficulty in governing the Imagina- tion^ when it is lively^ ftrong and much heated, and moved, by ( III ) by Occafion of them ; cfpecially, when the Blood and animal Spi- rits are put into a violent Mo- tion^ which fenlibly affects the Soul, and even renders the Ope- rations of it, by the Air of thq Face, or fome other ordinary ex- ternal Appearance, fenfible to o- thers. And thefe are what we call the Paffions; which, tho^ they have a great Dependance on the Imagination and Senfes, may yet be conhdered as different Princi- ples of Afliion ; but as differing only from the Inclination, accor- ding to the Degrees of more or lefs. For we do not defire, or find our felves inclined to purfue any Thing, but what is, in fome Meafure, capable of affe6ling us. Our Inclinations, indeed, to Good in general, are neceflary, and un- interrupted. We invincibly and O X alwaV'S ( ^I^ ) always defire to be happy : But our Faflions are excited^ occajio- nally^ and by particular Objefts; and^ principally^ by Means of fuch Things as relate to the Bo- dy; to the good or ill State^ to the Safety or Deftruftion of it. II. We no fooner perceive any Things confidered as pleafing^ or hurtful to us^but the animal Spi- rits difperfe themfelves through the feveral Parts of the Body^ and put it in a proper Difpofition to advance or retire^ to chufe or re- fufe, according to the Qiiality^ good or bad^ of the ObjeCl pre- lented ; that fo the Soul and the Body niay^ reciprocally^ aft, and be aftcd upon^ and continually hold themfelves in Rcadinefs to afilll:^ and llipport each other. III. By what Laws this Com- munication is fettled ; or how thcfe ( ii3 ) thefe mutual Offices are per- formed^ fo that when the Alind wills, the Hand moves^ and when the Hand is wounded, the Soul feels Pain ; this is a Problem not to be accounted for by any me- chanical Principles ; nay, it is contrary to the cleareft Ideas we have, concerning a material and thinking Subftance, (and there is no Way of arguing concerning the Nature of Things, but from the Ideas w^e have of their Na- ture and Properties) that there lliould be any Manner of Union between them. And, therefore, it is only to be refolved into the Inllitution, and Will of God, that, by Means of certain Im- preflions made upon the Body, the Mind lliould be atleCled with Pain, or Pleafure; and thole Im- prcflions be followed with Paf O 3 lions ( ^-H ) lions in the Soul, according as the Objeft is apprehended more lahitary, or pernicious to the Body. So that if God fliould fuf- pend his Will, or the ordinary Eife6l of it, in any Perfon, but for one Moment, his Soul, du- ring that Sufpenlion, would have no more Dependancy on his Bo- dy, than on the Body of any o- ther Peribn. IV. It is eafy to conceive, iji- deed, how two Bodies, meeting, Ihould communicate fome De- gree of Motion to each other, or receive by the CoUifion fome Change in their Size, Figure or Contexture ; but what are all thcfe different Circumftances to- wards producing a Paflion in the Mind ? What Relation is there between a Blow upon the Head bv an P!,nemv, and the Paflion of Anger ( ^li- ) Anger and Revenge? And why flioiild not fiich a Blow^ if we merely confider it;, as caiifmg a certain Vibration of the Fibres in the Brain^, as wxll produce the Paffion of Love ? There is no Reafon from the fimple Confide- ration of two or more Bodies^, for Number and Magnitude make no Difference in the Cafe^, why fuch a CoUifion fhould produce one of thefe PaffionS;, rather than the other. Nay^ upon an im- poffible Suppofition^ that Matter could produce any Sentiment in- the Mind^ a Blow^, elpecially a more forcible Blow^, upon the Head^ ought rather to produce^, in the Party who receives it^ the Paflion of Love ; becaufe if one Part of Matter could be^, in any Degree^, capable of fenfibly affec- ting another;, Love^ not-only im- O 4 porting ( ZI^ ) porting an Inclination to Union, but being cncreafed by it, the more the Parts of Matter fliould incorporate, or impel one ano- ther, the greater Affection ought naturally to be the Refult of fach an Incorporation and Im- pulfe. V. But the Mind and Body are, in the Nature of them, fo oppo- fite, that there can be no imagi- nable Concourfe or Action be- tween them. So that they, wlio think the Paffions of the Soul na- turally, and necefliarily follow the Motion of the Blood and Spirits, argue not fo much upon improba- ble, as, according to the clearelt Kotions we have of Matter and Mind, upon impoflible Grounds. YL It is evident, liowever the Paffions are occafioned, tliat wc really experience the Elfccls, and fomc^ ( ^17 ) fometiuies feel the Commotion and Power of them^ to fuch aDe- gree^, as is fufficient for the Exer- cife of the moft improved Minds; and;, therefore, it concerns us much rather to inquire, how the PalTions may be regulated and rendered fubfervient to the great Ends of moral Virtue, than how they are excited ? VII. And here the fame Rules, in general, may be applied to the Government of the Paffions, which have been prefcribed for the Government of the Senfes, and Imagination ; but with this Difference; that where fenlible Objects, orthofe of the Imaginati- on, have proved dangerous, at any Time, to our Innocence, or, jt may be apprehended, will aft upon us with the like Force, on the prelent^ or fome future Occa- fion. ( zi8 ) {ion. Prudence will direft us to fave our felves by Flighty in or- der to avoid the Aftion of them. But^ the Paffions beings in their own Nature innocent^ and alio the great Inftruments of Adlion and a more fublime Virtue in mo- ral Life, we do not feem under any prudential Reftraints, totally, to fupprefs them, even where they have proved the Occafion of betraying us ; fo much as to mo- derate the Force, or to divert the Current of them; except in fuch Cafes, where the Danger of Abufe, or Diforder from them, maybe ap- parently greater, than the Ad- vantage that can be propofcd by giving Way, for a Time, to them. There are, forlnitance, many law- ful Occafions of Anger ; and fuch particularly, when the Honour of God, or the Interefts of Religion, arc ( ^19 ) are concerned ; or when thofe^ over whom we have any Authority, are guilty of Mifconduft, where- in we may do well to ie angry ; and to fhew our felves fo : But^ if we are^ at the fame Time^ of a Temper more apt to be inflamed, and the Provocation be fuch, as may^ probably^, precipitate us in- to the more violent Excefles of thisPalTion; fo as to deprive us of the Ufe of our Reafon^ and expofe us to many Indecencies^ to fay Nothing of the more finful and dangerous EfFefts of this Paffion ; it is certainly;, in this Cafe^, much fafer and more prudent to relift the firft Motions of Anger^, though the Incitement to it might be juft, than to run the Hazard of thofe evil ConfequcnceS;, by giving Way to it;, which would more than o- ver-balance the good Effects we could ( ^^o ) could propofe to our felves by in- dulging it. VIII. In this, and the like Ca- fes with refped: to the other Paf- iions, every Man is to confider his own Strength ; and, efpecial- ly, fliould have an Eye to his predominant, and complexional Temper ; for we are never fooner overcome, than when we fight againft the Sin that more eajily hejets lis ; the Sin of our Inclina- tion. The greateft Difficulty, therefore, will be in governing the Pallion by which we are prompted to gratify it. Which yet may be done by reflraining all irregular Incitements towards the more immediate Objed: of it, without extirpating the Pafiion it fclf For, indeed, the llrongcr tlie Paflions of a Man naturally are, provided they are kept -with- in ( ^^I ) in due Bounds, the more capable he is, for the nioft Part, of at- taining the Things, that are ex- cellent \ and of diftinguifliing him- felf by a more a^live and heroick Virtue. For Paffions proceed from the more violent Emotion of the Blood and Spirits, or fome other fluid Part of the Microcofm, whatever that is, which caufes a fenfible Change in it; which Change difcovers itlelf in the exterior Parts of the Body, efpe- cially, in the Eye and the Face; from which we may generally conclude, in what Dilpolition the Perfons are, with whom we con- verfe ; but it is always eafy from thefe Parts to perceive, when Men are tranfported with Paf- fion ; and, for the moit Part, with what Paffion in particular ; al- moft every Pallion imprinting on them ( XXX ) them a different Signature vifible to others, who will obferve it with any Degree of Attention. IX. Now, according to the Laws of Union between Soul and Body, the more forcible or vio- lent the Aftions of thofe Parts of the Body are, by Means of which we receive our Senfations, the more, in Proportion, is the Soul affefted and put in Motion. So that it is not only true in Ex- perience, that Men of the ftrong- eft Paffions are the moft a6live, enterprizing, and capable of the greateft Atchievements in Life ; But a natural Reafon may be af- ligned, why tJiey fliould be fb, from the Confl:ru6tion and Tem- per of the Machine, to which the Soul is united. And upon this Account it is, that Pcrfons well born, and defcendcd, value them- ( ^^3 ) themfelveSj not altogether with- out Reafon^ upon their Birth or Defcent. For tho' the Soul is of celeftial Extraftion, and cannot be generated^ yet the Operations of it fo much depend upon the Frame and Temper of the Bo- dy, that Men generally excel in the Endowments of Mind, as the Body is more happily orga- nized and difpofed. And as a good, happy and generous Tem- per is, confefledly, as well as a vicious, crazy and weak one, tranfmitted from Parents to Chil- dren, there is a natural Trefump- tton in Favour of Perfons well born, that they fliould be en- dowed with an hereditary Vir- tue ; for Virtue, tho' there are Inftances to the contrary, is al- ways to be fuppofed the natural Confequence of great natural Abi- lities : ( ^u ) bilities : For which Reafon, when Perfons of Birth fail in the Qiia- lificationSj or Conduft expeflred from theni^ they are^ by a forci- ble and fignificant Expreffion, faid to degenerate : To avoid which dilhonourable Imputation^ in thofe Parts of the Worlds, where Perfons moft vahie themfelves, upon the Advantages or Honour of their Birth, they are moft careful to preferve an ancient Defcent, from ignoble, and de- baling Intermarriages. It is pof- fible, in fome other Nations, where this Rule hath been lefs obferved, tliere may have, fome- times, happened a Degeneracy in Perlbns of noble Birth, from the ancient Virtue, and Spirit of their Family ; which has not fo much fhewn a fenfible Alteration, in the Blood of it, as a total Corruption. X. My ( ^'^S ) X. My Defign, in this Digref- fion, is to Jlievv, by a pertinent, and I hope, not uniifcful Inftance; how, by Means of the Union of Soul and Body, certain Senti- ments^ which we call PalTions, are excited in the Soul, the Force whereof ihe has yet a Power fo to moderate, that, as they were de- figned to raife her to a higher Pitch, (and are, therefore, called the Wings of the Soul,) they may be improved to that End, with- out being diverted, by an irregu- lar or indirect Ufe of them, to any other End. XL We do not, therefore, con- demn Men for being fubje6t to Paffions; nor, even, for being of a Temper naturally more incli- ned to fome particular Paffion. The Intention of Nature, inform- ing them with fuch a Temper P was ( Xld ) was good ; and the Abiifes con- fequential to it^ which they ought to have prevented^are whol- ly owing to themfelves. . A Man, indeed, without Paffion will na- turally be both indifpofed, and unfit for Aftion. It is then ra- ther a Benefit of Nature, than a Subjeft Matter of Complaint, that we are born with certain Pallions, which are proper, un- der a due Regulation of them, to render us more aftive and con- fiderable ; more ufeful to our felves, to our Friends, and to hu- man Society in general. XII. The Qiieftion now is, fup- poling our Pallions not only in- nocent, but, in certain Cafes, and to a certain Degree, requifite ; what Methods are we to take, ib ihot the Degree given may not be exceeded ? 1 he Pallions, as we ( ^^7 ) we have defcribed them^ are oc- cafioned in the Soul by a more violent Commotion of the Blood and Spirits ; and, according to the Force of that Commotion^ are, proportionably, more ftrong and impetuous : How then can we be fecure, that when they are once put in Motion, we ihall be able to ftop them, at Plea- fure, and exaftly at the Place, beyond which if we fuft'er them to go, they pafs their proper Bounds, and become criminal and dangerous. Xm. The Rule, in this Cafe, is always to keep a llrifl: Guard, and watchful Eye over them ; and never to indulge them to the ut- moft Extent of what is /imply lawful ; for befides that it is very difficult to difcover where Virtue precifely ends, and Vice begins ; P X their ( ^^^ ) their Frontiers are divided by fuch thin Partitions^ that thePal- fage^ from one Side to the other, is eafy and infenfible. And, there- fore, all prudent Perfons, who would preferve their Virtue, will rather confider, how far they may go with Safety, than how far Innocence will ftriftly permit them to go ? He that loveth Dan- ger Jhallperi/h therein. A Man may, perhaps, walk upon the ve- ry Brink of a Precipice without falling ; but he maj fall ; and, if he efcape with Life, repent of his Folly, with the Lofs of a Leg, or an Arm ; Accidents, comparatively fpeaking, of little Conlideration to him. Even the Lofs of Life, to a wife and good Man, is of no farther Importance, than the good or ill State of his Soul is affec- ted with it. But the Lofs of In- nocence ! ( ^^9 ) noccnce ! A Breach in the iiitel- lediual Syfteni ! A reafonable Soul of Mrh, in a State of Confufion, Difordcr^ and fpiritual Death ! This is fuch a Departure from thofe Principles, which are the Glory and proper Charafter of Man, and dillinguifli him from all other Creatures, that Nothing can be faid to aggravate the Fol- ly or Madnefs of a ConduiS, that jQiould lead to it. And therefore XIV. Another Rule, for the bet- ter Government of the Paffions,and towards reftraining them with- in due Bounds, is to conlider the pernicious Effe6ls of them, when permitted to exceed their Bounds; for as they may be very inftru- mental to Virtue, if kept in Sub- jeftion; fowhen they are permit- ted to ufurp the Throne, and to reign ; they fubjedl the Soul^ P 3 which ( ^3o ) which ought to govern not on- ly to the vileft and nioft abjea Slavery ; but introduce a Multi- tude of Evils into the State of the animal OEconomy it felf The Diforders^ both of Body and Mindj which they occafion^ are too mfible to be mentioned : But they are alfo very pernicious^ if we confider them^ in Relation to our civil Commerce. The Maxim, that we fliould make no Friend/Jjtp with an angry Man^ will hold equally true, if we change the Term angry, for any otherTerm,that denotes a different Paffion, to which a Perfon is vio- lently addidled, and that has got the Dominion over him. Our Paffions, indeed, when we are, in any extraordinary Degree, agi- tated by them, do not only caule us to break the Rules of ilri6l Juf- tice^ ( asi ) tice^ and Fidelity towards thofc^ with whom we converfe, but^ fre- quently, all the Meafures of cojn- nion Decency and Refped: ; and even^ iii certain Cafes^, betray us^ fo blind and precipitate are we^ when tranfported with thein^ not only to do Things contrary to our ftanding Inclinations^ Principles, and Interefts ; but to the Preju- ' dice^ and J perhaps, to the Dilhon- our of thofe, whofe Interefts are, at other Times, as dear, in a Manner, to us, as our own. So that whether in refpe6t to Confe- quences that concern our felves, or others ; whether we confult the good State of the Body or Mind ; it imports us to take particular Care about the Government of the Paflions. XV. This Care is ftill more re- quifite, if we conlider how apt the P 4 Paffions ( ^3^ ) Paflions are to impofe upon us, under falfe Appearances and Sug- geftions ; to confound the Nature pf Things about which they are converfant; and to put hitter for Jweet^ andfweetfor hitter \ be- ing, in themfelves, innocent, and given to us with an Intention to promote our Good, particularly, the Good of the fenfible Life, they are fo ready to ^Qc upon the lealt Notice of any Thing which is pleafnig, or hurtful to us, that, even, on fuchOccalions, they of- ten aft fpontaneoujlyy without confulting Reafon, or waiting for her Orders. And, upon this Account of their Ufe and Facility in difcharging the Functions pro- per to them, we lefs fufpefl: them capable of betraying us, or of deligning any Injury. But a little Experience will fliew, we ought not ( ^33 ) not to truft too much to them ; whateverProfeflion theymay make ofafincereand dilinterefted Inten- tion to ferve us. For notvvith- ftanding they are very capable of promoting our true Interefts^ and of being, on many Accounts, ve- ry ferviceable to us, and do a6lu- ally promife fome real Good, and contribute towards it ; yet they always fpeak, though lefs direct- ly, for themfelves, Like thole Minifters, who propofe Things, under a fpecious Pretence, and, perhaps, fome good Appearance of ferving the Publick, but are, principally, adled by a finifter Regard to their own Interefts, or fome common Service of a Fafti- on; and, upon that View, lead the Sovereign very wide of the Mea- fures, and beyond the Bounds firft defigned, into innumerable Errors ( ^3+ ) Errors fatal to himfelf, and to the Commonwealth. XVI. The third Rule, there- fore, for the Government of the Paffions is, that, however obfe- quious they appear, we fliould obferve the Suggeftions and Mo- tions of them with a jealoiis Eye; in order to prevent thofe Illufions, to which we are fubjeft, when we hearken too much to them. For as they fpeak for the Body, and promife us prefent Delight, or the Removal of fome prefent Evil, they always find us acceffi- ble ; and, even, when they have through falfe and flattering Inii- nuations mifled us, they are often fo audacious as not only to Juftify themfelves; but to perfuade Rea- fon to defend them, as well as flie can, by any Appearances of Argu- ment, and fo to make Ufe of her very ( ^55- ) very Name and Commiflion^againft her own Authority. For it is the Nature of the Paffions to be al- ways in the Right ; and from the lenfible Conveniencies^ that at- tend them^ the Mind is fo apt to give a partial Judgment in what relates to them^ and to declare on their Side ; that there is con- tinual Occafion for examining, previoufly, • whither they really tend ? And, afterwards, if they have not deceived or mifled us ? XVn. Thefe Rules ought to be obferved, even where the Ob- jed: of our Defire is fomething, in the Nature of it, and fimply con- iidered, innocent, good, or lau- dable. For with all thefe Charac- ters, if we do not carefully ob- ferve the Tendency and Confe- quences of fuch Delire, it may prove the Occafion of betraying us : US : but if theObjefl: of our Delirc Ihould not be fo qualified ; if it is, in itfelf;, criminal, unjuft, or im- pure ; Reafon will direct us to fupprefs the very firft Volitions towards it; and at the AJoment, when they begin to rife. On the other Hand, Nothing ought to excite the contrary Paffion of Ha- tred, or Averfation, but what is really evil and off enfive to us ; or what we are obliged to deteil, from fome Motive of Piety to- wards God ; of Safety and real Benefit to ourfelves; ofjuftice or Charity to others. XVIII. Ifhall prefcribe but one Rule more, relating to the Con- dud: of our Paflions, whether irafcible, as they are commonly di- ftinguiihed, or concupifcible. And that is, upon Suppofition, they are perfectly regular, both in refpe£l to ( ^37 ) to the Origin^ and tlic Tendency of them; yet a certain Proportion of Activity ought to be obferved in applying them, according to the different Degrees of Excel- lency, or Evil, in their feveral Ob jecls. The beft, the moll noble, iifeful, folid and lafting Things, are to be profecuted with greater Ardor, than Things inlignificant, or little ; Things vain, tranfient, and of lliort Duration. The Rea- fons of Order and Proportion, up- on which Morality is founded, require, thatTlimgs lliould be va- lued in the fame Degree, wherein they appear in themielves, really valuable. And, by this Rule, whatever is abfolutely, and of its own Nature, without De- pendance on any other Being, wor- thy of our Love; that is to be loved primarily, and on Account ot ( ^^9 ) of its own Dignity and Perfection. As what is^ merely^ inftrumental or fubfervient toward fome greater End;, is only to be defired in the fame Meafure^ as it has a Tenden- cy to promote that End: That the fupreme Good, therefore, ought to be the fupreme Objed: of our Love ; and that every Thing, which tends to obftrud: our Enjoyment of it, is to be rejected with Deteftation : That fuch Things, which refpedl the prefent Life; belides that they are of a more ignoble Kind, more unfa- tisfadiory, mixed, and tranlient, are to be purfued with lefs Solli- citude ; but never to be defired, when they come in Competition with our main End, the Happi- nefs and Perfection of our Souls, fo far as we may be able to attain them, whether in this, or in a future ( ^39 ) future Life. Thefe are Coiiclu- fions fo evidently arifing from the natural Rcafon of Things ; fo ftrong and cogent ; that^ however. Men oppofe the praftical Infer- ences from them : Yet, in Theory, they muft neceflarily alfent to the Truth of them. As^ on the other Hand^ whatever is^ in the Nature of it^ more noxious^ or more natu- rally tends to make us miferable; efpecially^ to bring us into fuch a State of Diforder^ as may render us by a natural Efficiency^ or thro* theEftedlofan ill Habit, d'/^r;^^/^ miferable : This is what we ought to hate , with a perfect Ha- tred ; and which to avoid, we fliould be willing to fufter, were that a neceflary Condition of avoiding it, any prefent Evil, or temporary Z)i/gr^/c^ whatever, to which we might be expofed. CHAP. ( ^40 ) Chap. XIII. Of Dejire and Inclination in general. I. Of the Import ofthefe Terms, II. In what Re fpe£t^the fame In- clination is common to all Men, III. This illujlrated. IV. The Error of the ancientThiloJophers concerning the fupreme Good of Man. V.H^T^ Epicurus thought more juftfy as to that Art tele y than the other Thilojophers, VI. TheTrejudice under which he fuffered. VII. Two of his fundamental Errors obferved. I. I ( ^41 ) I. T Here ufe Defire, and Incli- •*■ nation^ as Terms, indiffer- ently expreffing the fame Thing; and as properly importing that Motion of Man's Will, whereby he is invincibly, and, at all Times, carried towards Ci^^^. Now, tho* the Paffions are infeparable from the Inclination, and always fup- pofe it, in one Degree, or other; yet, as they are, in a certain Degree, more lively, active and fenfibly moving, the Inclination may be conveniently diftinguiflied, under a feparate Head, from the Paffions; efpecially, iince there are good Grounds, from Experi- ence for a vifible Diftinfliion be- tween them. 11. SomePerfons are of fo calm and fed ate a Temper, that they Q^ are < M^^ ) are rarely moved^ or difcompofed by any Paffion. The good or ill UfeJVIen have jformerly made of -their Liberty^ their ^particular •Circumftances/ Temper^ Edwcati- oiijandManner pf Life,ex:pofo thenii to many different Paffions; which a6l upon them with a very, diffe- rent^ ^nd unequal Force. But Men, under all Circvuiift^nces^ have the fame, general Itanding Inclination to render themfelves happy. So that it may be faid, notwithftand- ing that Variety;; of Purfuits and PatTionSj wherewith Men compals Sea. and Laiiid^; to gain their, fevci- ral Ends, that they have, proper- ly fpeaking, if w^ would refolve Things, philofophically, in their true Origin, hup. one Inclination. This is the Center, towards whicJi all the Lines of Motion, in Man, tend; and wherein they will ulti- mate! v ( M5 ) niately terminate^ though he ihoiiki draw them from every C^iarter^ or every Pointy of the Worlds about him. III. So that thcy^ who appear to direft their Views^, towards very ditferent Ends, and to place their Happinefs in the Attam- ment of them ; as of Riches, Power, Fame, or lenfual Pleafures ; yet are really a£led with the fame ge- neral Delire of Happinefs : As Perfons at an Entertainment, which is furnilhed with all the Variety of Diflies that Luxury could prepare, do feverally chu:fe what is moll agreeable to their Tafte ; but all are fuppofed to have one common End, in their differ- ent Choice, which is to pleafe the Appetite. IV. Had the ancient Philofo- phers confidered this, there would Q^ X not ( ^44 ) not have been any Neceffity for their differing fo much^ in Rela- tion to the fuj)r erne End of Man; concerning which, according to /^^rr^'s Computation, there were, in his Time, two hundred eighty eight fe veral Opinions, Here lay the Ground of their Error ; which might have been very eafily cor- retled. It is evident they conli- dered Happinefs, not in refped: to the proper and formal Notion of it; but to its efficient Caufe; that is, they called that Happinefs, which, in any Meafure, or De- gree, contributed to make Men happy, or to put the Soul in a happy State ; but they did not de- fine, what that State of the Soul was, wherein fhe found, and actu- ally felt herfelf happy. It might, to refume tlie former Inftance, be asjullly laid, that thcPleafure with ( ^45- ) with which a Man eats, when he is hungry, does not lie in his Palate, but in the A61 of eat- ing, tho' helliould have noTalte; as that Riches, or other external Advantages of Life, make Men happy ; and not an inward Confci- oulnefs of Delight; to which yet we do not deny, they may be, in many Refpefts, inftrumental. V. Epicurus, great as his Er- rors, and impiou3 as his Princi- ples, were, on other Accounts^ yet thought more regularly upon this Article, than the reft of the Philofophcrs : He confidered Hap- pmels, forinaliy, as it was to be confidered, in itfelf ; not as it de- pended on external or foreign Caufes; without which, how con- venient Ibever they may be ap- prelicnded, yet the Soul may be conceived to fubfill in a State of iX. ^ Eafe ( ^4^ ) Eafe and Pleafure. As fuppoling^ on the other Hand, a Man in the full and entire PolTeffion of them, yet if he feel any inward Diforder, or Unealinefs of Mind , he is, ne- celTarily, in Proportion, mifera- ble and unhappy. VI. His Maxim, therefore, was true, that the Happinefs of Man confifted in his being eafy and pleafed ; but it was a wrong Inference, to fay. He taught, as he hath been charged, that Men had Nothing to do, but to give a full Scope to the Appetites of eating, and drinking; or to in- dulge themfelves in Excefles of any Kind, to which their Inclinations might prompt them. For it ap- pears fufficiently iroinCicero, that he prefcribed Temperance and So- briety as proper Means of mode- rating the Paffions, and of prevent- ing ( ^^^ .) ing theti*^ irregular 'EfFecas ; and:, as tending, on that Account, di- redly to' iiiake Men happy. For there; cart be no 'Haippinels with- out Freedom froni Bun; tho' we are, indeed, morq "perfeaiy hap- py in the Enjoyment of adlual Pleafure. "' ' But the AVord Pleafure carrying in it an ambiguous Sig- nification, and importing both innocent and criminal Pleafures, the other Se£ls of Philofophers having a Jealoufy from the athe- iftical Principles oiEpkunis^ that he intended Pleafure in the worft Senfe, united in decrying his Doc- trine, and in rjendering his Memo- ry odious; pretending, that his Svftem, as it had Relation to the Conduct of human Life, di- re6lly opened a Way to all Manner of criminal Liberties; and, par- ticularly, to that of an impure Q, 4 Com- ( ^+8 ) Commerce between the two Sexes. VII. His Notions, however, in general, as to the formal Caufe of Happinefs, were true and w^ell founded ; but in thefe two Re- fpefts falfe : That he did not make God the Author of our Happi- nefs, who alone can produce, in the Soul, thofe Scnllitions, which make us happy ; and that he de- nied the Exiftence of immaterial Beings ; which alone can have any Senfations, cither of Happinefs, or Mifery. C H A P. ( ^49 ) Chap. XIV. TVhether moral Virtue is re- ally practicable ? I. One Reafon of propofmg the ^eftion^ from what had leen laid he fore concerning the Taf- ftons. II, III, IV, V. The Dif ficiilty on that Occafion remo- <\)ed\ and of the T.aJJions of Envy, and Ambition, in par- ticular, VI. Ho Confequence from the latter of thefe Tajjions^ efpecially ^ to the Trejudice of moral Virtue, VII. Other Arguments tending tofhew^ that moral Virtue is impracticable^ propofed to he examined. ( ^To ) examined, VIII. Concerning^ ^ •' the T>epramty of human Na- ture^ and the Deceitfulnefs of human Virtues. IX. Ohjeclions from them formerly confidered ' rhj the.jSlihor, :X. ' But . why here frppo fed to :lbe -fummarily examined XI, XII/XIII, XI V, ^ XV^XVI, XVII, XVIII, XIX, \S^!'SeA)eral Arguments in '"■- Confutation of them. XXL A 'vfu/i Sentiment of St. Auftin. 'XXII, Man sDefiruci ion from himfeif ■ ' '^ * I. A FTER all that has been -^^ faid, in the laft Chapter, concerning the Paflions; it may, perhaps, be pretended, that if moral Virtue lliould depend on the Government of them, accord- ing to the Rules there laid down, there is little Probability, that wc A ( ^-Si ) we fliould be capable of praftifmg moral Virtue. For totally to era- dicate the Paflions is impoflible ; or^.(iwere that pollible^ it would not yet be proper^ or convenient, to oppofe the End and Defign of Nature in them; an End, on many Accounts, falutary and be- neficial both to ourfelves, and to others. There is, therefore, not only a phylical Neceffity, that we fliould be fubjecl to the firft Impulfes of Paflion, which are na- turally unavoidable, and operate in Virtue of a mechanical Con- ftru6lion of our Body ; but a mo- ral Expediency, that they fliould very often be gratified. But yet we know the Nature of them is fuch, that they grow more bold, extravagant, and ungovern- able, by Indulgence : The Confe- quence of which is, that inftead of ( '^S'^ ) of animating us^inPurfuit of what is really beneficial^ and falutary ; or in avoiding any Thing noxious and prejudicial to us; they per- vert the very Ufe of Reafon; caufe fuch Emotions in the Bo- dy; and fpread fuch a Darknefs over the Mind ; that we fee No- thing in a true Lights but blind- ly chufe the worfe inltead of the better Part : And even^ ibmetimes. Men are tranfported by Paffion^ to commit the moil fliameful and execrable Crimes. To this it is added, thatPerfons of the greatelt Reputation for Wifdom, and other Abilities, have been, on certain Occaiions, excited, by their Paf- lions, to do Things that arc not convenient ; Things inconfiftcnt witli their known Principles, and below their Chararter; Thcmcek- eit Men have been provoked by giving giving Way to Anger, to Ipeak unadvijedly with their Lips \ and Perfons of eminent Sandity and Devotion, by hearkening to the Delires of impure Love, have in- volved themfelves in the Guilt of very impious and unjuft Anions. And the like ill Confequences might be exemplified in refpeft to all the other Paffions ; concerning which it has been farther obferved, that as we find it difficult, at all Times, to oppofe our Inclina- tions, efpecially, when more vio- lently provoked, and put in Mo- tion; fo there are fome Paffions which appear to be, in themfelves^ diredly criminal; and, astothefe, we are told. Men ought not fo much to confider the Method of Regulation, as how they may to- tally extirpate them. 11. That ( ^^4 ) 11. That I may not be thought to have prefcribed anyThing^in the Nature of it^ above human Capa- city ; it may be proper to fajr Something diftindly in Anfwer t6 thefe feveral Ob je6l:ions. ' ' IIL As to the Power of the PaffionSj in order to pervert the Ufeof Reafon; we grant this to be an Elfed:^ which hath frequent- ly happened; but it is an acciden- tal and irregular Effe61: ; which Men might have prevented, thro* a good Ufe of their Reafon and Liberty, by which their Paflions ought always to be regulated . The Fault, therefore, was not in the Paflions, but in the Abufe of their Power and Liberty; and in ex- ceeding thofe Bounds, wherein the Pafl[ions were intended by the Author of Nature to be reftrained. IV. As (( ^ST ) IV. As tQ, the Examples of greats and^ in refpefl: . to their general Character^ of good and pi- ous Men ; all that caii be; inferred from the Excefles^ into vyhich they have been betirayed, i^ ; tliiit there are Seaibnsy wherein Pcrfons ani- mated Avith a" ftrong and lively Senfe of Virtue; are yet more un- guarded ; or^, .wherein^ there are Ibme peculiar unhappy Gircum- ilances of Temptation,: adapted; in one Kind, Mr other, to the Si- tuation they are in, attended with a Force, they .ate iels . able, or, at; -the Time, lefs inclined to riefift. But, whatever, the vio- lent Motives to fuch Dilbrders may be in great or good Men; their Condudl: is no farther a Pre- cedent to us, than it is agreeable to Reafon ; the common Law, by which all reafonable Beings are to ( rs6 ) to be governed. Precedents, where there is any competent Authori- ty to recommend them, may rea- Ibnably be followed, if no certain or ftated Judgment can be made, in the Cafe, from the Letter, or Intention of the Law ; but they are never to be followed, or upon any Pretence of Authority what- ever, againft Law. And, as to the laftSuggeftion, that there are fomePaffions, of which Nature En- vy is, pretended to be direftly evil, and unreafonable in themlelves: This is precarioufly fpoken, and without Grounds. All the Paf- fions, {b far as they are natural, are good ; Envy therefore, as it imports a State of Uneafinefs, or Difcontent, at the Happinefs, or fuperior Merit of another Perfon, not being a reafonable, cannot be a natural Paffion, it being the De- ( ^T7 ) Defign of Nature ; which always proceeds according to a certain and well regulated Order^ that there may be no oppolite in- confiftent Principles in her Work ; but that the governing Principle in Man^ fliould govern every Part ; that there fhould be no Schifm in the Body, or natural Syilem; but a due Harmony and Subordination of every Member to the Head. Tho' even^ in re- fpefl; to Envy itfelf, that moll ungenerous and ignoble Paffion, as proceeding from the Motives be- fore mentioned ; yet if it only hnported an Emulation of thofe Things^ wherein Perfons of real Merit excels and a fecret Regret at our ownDefe6ls^ followed with an Endeavour to repair and amend them ; it would be fo far from being a culpable Paffiorr, R that ( ayS ) that it might be attended with many happy Confequences advan- tageous to ourfelves^ and to So- ciety. The Sorrow or Grief^ which attends it^ is not^ as fuch^ criminal, but indiiferent; and becomes good, or ill, according to the Occafion whereby it is excited, or the End which is propofed by it. V. The fame may be obferved concerning another Paffion; which, tho' not criminal in a qualified Senfe,yet, in popular Acceptation, is reputed among the irregular Paflions, I mean that oi Ambi- tion ; to which Men of great Minds, of an aftive and en- terprizing Spirit^ are, in Propor- tion, commonly more add idled. But if the End of it be only a De- fire, which a Man hath to diftin- guifli himfelf by great and noble Attions, or to be put in a better ( ^T9 ) Capacity of doing Good ; or of ap- pearing in a better Light to that End; for without this Advantage,, the fineft Qiialities in the World will be of little Significancy ; Am- bition^ if confined to thefe Views, and regulated in all its Furfuits by theni^ is not only innocent, but highly laudable. Nay, a Man, to whom Nature has given a greater Extent and Elevation of Mind, is wanting to himfelf^ and to her Intention, if his Views are not raifed and extended in Proportion. The Difficulty is, left, in affeCling to ftrike too high or quick a Note on this String, he fhould give it too ftrong a Tone : Temerity and Boldnefs be- ing more incident to fuch, who have more Fire and Spirit in their Temper. And, therefore, it is too common for the ambitious, R % in- ■( i6o ) inftead of endeavouring regularly to eftablifli a Reputation by great^ generous^ and ufeful Services^ in that Sphere of Action which Pro- vidence has afligned to them^, to oblerve no Meafures of Confcience towards God, or towards Man; fo they may be able to remove every Thing, and every Perfon, that Hands in their Way : For, when Ambition breaks out into this Tumour, there is no Confide - ration either of publick Good, or of private Right; no Refpetl of Juftice, or Humanity ; of Truth, or Honour; that will be of Force fujfficient to reftrain it. Bribery and Corruption, Cruelty and Op- preffion. Breach of Faith and Friendlhip, and of all Laws hu- man and divine, even, in more brutal Tempers, thofe of com- mon Decency, and good Nature, will ( 1^1 ) will be thought lawful ; at Icalt very exculable ; under a Pretence of being neceflary to the main End propofed. VI. But thefe Confequences of an irregular Ambition^ or what- ever particular Effects of it might be enumerated^ as deftruclive to the Peace and Tranquillity of pri- vate Men^ of private Families, and frequently of whole Commu- nities^ which are made a Sacrifice to it, are only to be conlidered as Deviations from thofe Rules, whereby truly great Minds ought to regulate their Deiires. Such abufive Characters of Ambition, may, however, afford an excel- lent Caution againll all irregular Motions of it ; and ought not to pre- judice a Delire, which the Reader, if he pleafes, may call Ambition, of excelling in fuch Things, where- R 3 by by a Man may really diftinguifli himfelf, as a more iil'eful^ or ho- nourable Member of Society. An Ambition to be, and to do good, being an Ambition to be more like the moil per fed and holy Being, the Fountain of all Goodnefs. This PalTion^ therefore, which is thought fo peculiarly impatient of Reftraint, and to fet itfelf above all Rules, which are, indeed, in- feparable Charaflers of it, when immoderate; is yet, when regu- lated by the Intention and Ends of Nature, capable of being very fubfervient, if not, of all other Paffions, the molt fubfervient, to great and glorious Actions. VII. We mult leek, therefore, for fome other Reafons to lliew, that moral Virtue is impractica- ble, than thofe, which arc pre- tended from the Difficulty of go- verning ( ^(^l ) vcrning the Paflions. For fuppo- ling our AfFeclions perfeftly well regulated according to Nature^ in refpecl to fuch Things as are Objeflis of our Love, or Averfa- tion : There is fbill Something further requifite to the Morality of our Actions; namely, that they fhould be performed in fuch a Manner, and with fuch Purity, and Simplicity of Intention, as may render them acceptable to God. For our Happinefs, the End of all ourAclions, depending upon the goodPieafure of God, if we cannot perform an acceptable Service to him, a Service which it may pleafe him to reward with a Happinefs proper to our State and Condition, we fhould in vain endeavour to perform it. VIII. Now, it is pretended, that whatever the Reditude of R 4 hu- ( ^<^4 ) human Nature might be^ when Man was originally formed by a wife^ holy^ and good God ; yet human Nature ( by what Mean^ it is not here neceflary to in- quire ) hath much declined from the fuppofed Order and Per- feftion of that State. So that even when Man does not appear to aft from any particular Im- pulfe of Paffion^ yet his Aftion isfeldom or never conformable^ in all Refpefts, to the Rule of it ; which requires, that Man, in his Charad:er of a moral Agent, fliould always ad: with a virtuous and good Intention. And yet were his belt Actions, thofe which are materially good and regular, as to the external Manner of their Performance, to be examined by this Rule; we are told, they would not only be found deficient, but many ( ^^5" ) many Times very blameable and vicious. It is owing, fay they, toPride^, Vanity, Eafe, Decency, aDefire of obliging in order to be obliged, the Awe of Superiors, Cuftom, Education, natural Tem- per, or acquired Habits, the Fear of Shame, of Punifhment, orLofs, that Men perform certain exte- rior Duties in common Efteem, without any Regard, any feparate Regard, to a Principle of Confci- ence. It was this Want of a vir- tuous and good Intention, that, in the Opinion of fome Perfons e- minent for human, as well as the- ological Knowledge, rendered the moil heroick Virtues of the Hea- thens, as they appeared in the Eye of the World, only fo many fplendid Sins. And there are fome, w^ho pafs the like Cenfure upon thofe, who profefs to believe the { x66 ) the Truths and to be conducted by the Rules of a divine Revela- tion. There are modern Wits^ philofophical Wits, who will not allow^ that there are any Perfons in the Worlds except a fe- led: Number diftinguiflied^ from the reft of human Race^ by a fpecialSandlification; who are ca- pable of performing the leaft Act of moral Obedience, that God can approve; or which can forward them towards the Ends all Men invincibly purfue. Freedom from Pain, and Happinefs. So that the moral World, how beautiful fb- ever Morality is, in the Theory, yet, in Fad:, is only made up of Appearances ; and the beft Acti- ons of Men, could we fee upon what Motives, with what Tem- per, and for what Ends they aft, would have a very different Sen- tence ( ^^7 ) tence palled upon them by him^ \v]io feeth not as Man feeth, and ivhoje Judgment is always accord- ing to Truth. It isj ill particular to Pride^, that^ they fay. Men owe the Reputation of many Aftions, which the holy and righteous God detefts. IX. I have, on another Occa- lion, mentioned and confuted a Principle, which I conlidered not only as highly injurious to human Nature, but to the Honour and Goodnefs of God : And it being aflerted by certain Names of Di- ftinfliion in the politer Parts of Literature, I particularly exami- ned fome of the principal Reafbns, whereby they endeavoured to fupport it ; not that I had to do with weak or artlefs Adverfaries ; but the Love and Force of Truth was fuperior to all other Confide- rations : ( id8 ) rations; and now conftrain me to obfervC;, what occurs to my Thoughts towards a general An- fwer^ of fo pernicious a Principle; without defcending to take Notice the particular Arguments ad- vanced to maintain it. X. And it is the more incum- bent on one^ who would write a Treatife of Morality, to refute this Principle ; as it is not only cfpoufcd by Authors, who are fup- pofed to have written with great- er Freedom of Thought, and not to have been remarkable for a very ftridl Morality : But, as fome Perfons of great Learning, and Piety, have maintained the fame Principle, as a fpecial Article of Belief, and a necellary Confe- quence of human Depravity ; how- ever, it was originally occaiioned, or has been lincc propagated. And, XL If ( 16^ ) XL If Man^in his natural State, for I confine myfelf to that^ be under an abfolute Incapacity of doing any Thing,, really accepta- ble to God; any Thing, but what is highly offenlive and provoking to God ; and which, therefore, tho' Man ufes his bell Endeavours to pleafe him, muft be necellarily dif- plealing to hun ; this Incapacity muft proceed, either from Want of Direfl:ion,orAirittance : EitherMan has not fufficient Light to inform him concerning his Obligation to a moral Condud: ; or it is, fuch a Light, as ferves only to fhew him his Way, and dired him to his End, whilft he has no Power, or perhaps, no Inclination to follow it. XII. That Man does not want a competent Light for his Direc- tion appears from what has been faid ; and, indeed, fuppoling Man wanted ( ^7o ) wanted fuch Lights he could be under no moral Obligation to a6l; for the Morality of any Ad:ion neceliarily fuppofes a previous Knowledge of what we ought to do^and a Conformity of Behaviour to fome ftated Rule. So that we can never be obliged to aft^ but in Confequence of what we know to be our Duty ; at leaft^ by fome general Law. Neither can we be obliged to ad: any further^ than ac- cording to the Extent of our Knowledge. XIII. Andj therefore^ the ge- neral Opinion is^ that Man's utter Deficiency^ in difcharging what we call moral Duty, does not pro- ceed from Want of Knowledge, but oi Strength : The Light which is in him being fufficient to re- prove, to rebuke and exhort him, and fo to render him felf condem- ned ( ^71 ) ned ; while no natural Means arc afforded to him, whereby he may- be enabled to act according to it. Yet fuch a Light, which on- ly fliews a Man his End, to render him more miierable, by the In- capacity, he apprehends himfelf under, of attaining it, and which diredls him to no Remedy, or Method of Cure, does not give us that Idea of the divine Good- nefs, which naturally arifes in the Mind, wiien we contemplate it. Neither is it more conliftent with the Juftice of God to deprive Men of Happinefs on Account of Offen- ces, if fuch can be Offences, which it is naturally impoffible for them to avoid ; than it is confiftent with his Goodnefs to give them«the De- fire, and Knowledge of Things, which after all their Endeavours they mull ever defpair of poffef- fing. / ( ^7^ ) fiiig. And yet on Suppofition that Man^ in his natural State, has not a competent Meafure of Light, and Strength, whereby he may be qualified to know and prad:iie moral Duty, in fome acceptable /^ Manner to God, both thefe Con- fequences appear to be unavoida- ^ ble. XIV. So that whatever the Ad- vantages of revealed Religion may be, which will be confidered in the Sequal. it feems more hono- rary to thefe glorious Perfeftions of God, his Jufticc and Goodnefs, to which may be added his Attri- bute of Holinefs, that Men, in a mere State of natural Religion, may aft from truly religious Mo- tives, #nd upon aPrinciple of Sin- ■ cerity ; and it is alfo more human and candid to believe that leveral of the Heathens did acl in that Man- ( ^73 ) Manner^ than to refolve all thofc fhining A6lions,which they perfor- iiiedj and for which we now ad- mire theni^ folely^ into a Motive of Pride^ or Vanity. XV. To render an Adion ac- ceptable to God, if any Qualifi- cations can be conceived proper to that End, it is requifite that we fliould love him, that we flioiild refer what we do to his Honour and Glory ; that we fhould efteem Virtue for the na- tive Beauty , and Excellency, as well as for the confequential Re- wards of it ; and, efpecially, as it brings us nearer to an AlTimilation with the nioft perfeft Being ; the Rule and Model of Perfection to all other Beings. A divine Reve- ^ lation, we grant, will very much tend to ftrengthenthefe Motives; and caufe them to operate with S far ( ^74 ) far greater Force : Yet to thofe, who will attend to the natural Principles of Religion, it mull be owned, they do not want their due Weight to perfuade ; at leaft, it will be impoflible for any Man to lliew, that they are, in all Cafes, too weak to perfuade. Be- ing, confelfedly, reafonable in thenifelves, why fhould it be im- poffible for reafonable Agents to be conduced by them ? Why iliould a Man's Reafon have the leaft Power to determine him, where the Decifions of it are the moft clear, ftrong, and incontes- table ; and where it is his Intereft withall that he fliould be deter- mined? If Men will not attend to thefe Motives, that is not to be charged to any Want, either of Light, Strength, or Convenien- cy in them; but to their own cui- culpable Negleft: The EtFeds of wliich they might, by duly confidering them, have prevent- ed ; and fuch a Confideration would readily have difcovered to them, that the Motives, I have here mentioned, to moral Virtue, are, in their own Nature, more powerful to perfuade to the Prac- tice of it, than any temporal Con- liderations can be to induce a con- trary Prafliice. And why fliould not Men, in an Affair of the great- eft Concernment to them, and where they are now prefumed to a<5l deliberately, with Knowledge and Convitlion, be as capable of afting conformably to what Rea- fon and Prudence direct, as in other Cafes of far lefs Confequence to them ? Why Ihould they not, in this Cafe, govern themfelves ac- cording to that Maxim bv whicli S X ' all ( rn6 ) all wife and prudent Pcrfons are governed in every Cafe ; that is^ to prefer a more ftrong and ex- cellent Motive^ to a weak and unjuft Motive. XVI. Thofe very Perfons, who fay, Man, in his natural State, never a£ls from a true Principle of Virtue, will not deny, the Light of Reafon is fufficient to inform him, that he ought to love, to fear, to honour God; and to purine his own Happinefs; his true Happinefs; by all thofe Means, which God has appointed towards the Attainment of it. Several of tlie Philoftjphers dilcovered thefe truths; and they are fo obvious, indeed, w]ien we give the leaft Attention to them, that they feemed rather to flow from the primary Conceptions of Nature, than to be the Ileliilt of Art, or any ( ^77 ) any philofophical Inquiry. Now, on Siippofition, Maji n lights, by the Light of Nature, know thefe Principles^ it will be inipollible to flieWj they neither^ in Fa£^t, had, nor^ viy^tualfy, could have^ any Re- gard to them in their Conducl. XVII. Upon a general Conlide- ration, were we not other wife con- vinced by Experience^ it would be an Inference fupported by much ftronger Appearances of Probabi- lity, that reafbnable Agents have always acled, upon the moll clear, powerful and reafbnable Motives: And fuch are, inconteftably, the Motives above mentioned, to all thofe, who will confider them,with any becoming Degree of Attention. XVin. It is, therefore, not only a more pious and charitable, but alfo a more natural Conclu- lion, that feveral of thofe, who S 3 had /f ( ^78 ) j had no other Light to dire£l them, but that of their own Reafon ; fiich of them^ efpecially^ who have been much^ and publickly, eitecmed for their Wifdom and Probity^ did aft upon a virtuous Principle^ than that they had no other End in all their A6lions, but Vanity^ Intereft, Regard to external Decency, or fonie like foreign^ and^ merely, human Motive. It will be impoffible to prove, that the Heathens did not do, what was, in the Nature of the Thing, reafonable to be done ; and what it, principally, concerned them to do, in Point of their true Intereft. XIX. It is a Truth flowing from the eflential Pe_rfeclions of the di- vine Nature, that God, in crea- ting Mankind, defigned tlieir H^'ip- pinefs ; and wiileth, confequently. Thai ( ^79 ) That all Men Jljoidd he faved. For, whatever that Expreffion may be extended to fignify, in the holy Scriptures, it only im- ports, according to the prefent Acceptation of it, that God will- eth, all Men fliould he happy ; happy, in fome Meafure, porpor- tioned to their natural Powers and Capacities; at leaft, in fuch Meafure, that the Miferies, to which they may be here expo- fed, fliall not exceed the Bene- fits of Life to them, unlefs thro' a culpable Abufe of their Li- berty. This being admitted, the firft Confequence is, that God, who always adapts proper Means to the End defigned by him, will have all Men come to the Know- ledge of the Truth '^ that being the Light, the true Light, where- S 4 by ( ^8o ) by every Man is to condufl: him- felf, in his Way to Happinels. And^ therefore, it is necellary, in this Method of arguing from the Perfe(^lions of the divine Nature, (which, of all other Methods, is the moil certain and conclufive, upon the Subject of Morality) / that fuch a Meafure of Know- ■ ledge fhould be communicated to Man, as is fufRcient, when he I follow^s the Direftion of it, to ! render him happy. For, other- wife, contrary to ourSuppofition, God, having propofed an End^ a moft excellent and beneficial End, an End worthy of himfelf, in the Creation of Man, had yet left him without the necellary / Means, that fliould lead to it. A fecond Confequ ence is, that every Man in, his natural State, mull farther be liippofed, to have competent ( x8i ) competent Abilities in order to attain, what the natural Light of his Mind direfts him to pur- flie. For, othervvife again, be- fides the Inconveniencies before mentioned, on Suppofition of God^s dilpenfmg a Light to Man, which would ferve only to re- proach and condemn him, to Ihew him his Defefts and his Mi- fery, the Confequence immedi- ately foregoing, with refped: to God's Failure of the End propofed- by him, a Confequence, highly derogatory to his Honour, would here alio equally hold good. XX. So certain, therefore, as it is, that God defigns the Hap- pniefs of Man; and that moral Virtue is neceflary to Man s Hap- pinefs; fo certain we may be, God did intend to aftbrd Man the Means, and hath actually aftbrd- ed ( ^8x ) ed him the Means of praftifing moral Virtue^ in fuch a competent Degree , as may tend to render him happy. It is neceflary^ in- deed^ we fliould form this Con- ckilion;, not only for the Reafon here mentioned^, but^ to the End, we may avoid, at leaft, one of thefe two impious Suppofitions ; either that God hath implanted in Man ftrong and invincible, but, at the fame Time, vain de- lufory Defires of Happinefs; or that, he has commanded Men to do, what, in the Nature of the Thing, is impoffible to be done, ill order to attain Happinefs. XXI. A learned and pious Fa- ther of the Church hath, indeed, in the Heat of Difpute, advanced fome Things lefs favourable to Mankind, and to the greatelt and bell of Men, in a mere State of natural ( ^83 ) natural Religion. Yet the Force of Truths when he did not di- reftly attack the Telagians^ or his Zeal againft them, was, pro- bably, leis inflamed, drew this moft juftExpoftulation from him. Who would not exclaim againft the Folly of a Man, that fhould. pretend to dired: one, who is known not to be capable of following his Direftions; or that lliould condemn any Per- fon for Difobedience, who had^ confefledly, no Power of obey- cc ing "^ ". Reflexions of this Kind are fo natural and obvious, and the Force of them fo irre- fiftible, that it is furprizing to conflder. Men ftiould ever have * Quis mn clamet ftultum ejfe prxcepta dare ei a.i lilerum mn eji^ quodpracipitUYy facere-, & ini- quum eJfe eum dmnnare-i cut mn fuit poteftas jujfa implere. S- Augufl. been <( C€ CC • f x84 ) been put under a Neceffity of af- ferting the Reafonablenefs of them. XXII. I do not here enter in- to the Inquiry, concerning the different Degrees of Happinefs to Men in another Life, accord- ing to the different Degrees of Light or Grace, communicated to them, in this Life : It is fuffi- cient for my prefent Purpofe, to aflert, that all Men, how unequal Ibever their prefent Condition may be, in both thefe Refpeffcs, have yet not onlyfufficient Light, but Strength, except by their own Default, to qualify them lor a competent Meafure of Happi- nefs; and that their De/hti&ion, confequently , is of themjehes^ and only of themfelves. CHAP. ( a8y ) Chap. XV. Of common J or fufficient ; and fpecial Grace. I^ II. 77?^ Grounds of this Difiinc- tion. III. Concerning the Inca- pacity Man is f aid to he under ^ in his natural St ate ^ of doing any Thing that is good. IV. Two Suppo fit ions, on either of which a Principle of di'Dine Grace may he afjerted. V. And the Juflice and Good?iefs of God "vindicated. VL A natu- ral and flrong Reafon, why God fljouid caufe Man to de- pend continually on the Affift- ance of his Grace, VII. The 7iatural ( ^8^ ) natural Grounds of Trayer, VIII. Of moral Ad;tons^ as op- pofedto fpirituah IX., A State of moral Virtue ^ in this Lifey not a State of Terfe£iion. X, XI, XII. Tet moral Virtue jtippojes a Conduct y ifi general^ agreeable to the moral Law, XIII. JVe are to di/iinguijh be- tween moral Duties ^ and mo- ral Virtue, XIV, XV. This 7)i/iin£iion illujlrated from the Character of Fortitude in Men^ and of Chaflity in Wo- men. XVI. The proper Infe- rence from it, I. YY/'HAT hath chiefly given ^ Rife to the Difpute, whe- ther Man is now capable of act- ing upon a virtuous and truly moral Principle, is a popular No- tion, that towards enabling him, • in ( i87 ) in his prefent degenerate State, to perform an Obedience in any- Kind^ or Degree, acceptable to God; or rather an Obedience, which is not directly difpleafnig andofFenfive to God ; there is not only Occafion for a natural Light to dired: his Fratlice, and a compe- tent Meafiire of natural Strength, to excite and engage it; but a Neceffity, to both thefe Ends, ef- pecially, to the latter of them, that he ihould be affilled with a fupernatural Grace. II. It is here, then, convenient to diftinguilli between that com- mon Liglit, or that common Grace, which is, abfolutely, ne- ceflary to qualify Man for a competent Difcharge of his Duty, from fuch a fpecial Light or Grace, as God may think fit to difpenfe to a feled: Number of Perfons \ ( x88 ) Perfons^ towards rendering the Knowledge of their Duty, at once, more extenfive and diftind:, and their Practice of it more uniform and perfed:. And they, whom God has been pieafed to illumi- nate and fanftify, by fuch a fpe- cial Grace, are, certainly, as will appear from the Sequel of this Difcourfe, in a much better Ca- pacity of performing to him an acceptable Service, and of 7i/or' king out theiy^ 074/71 Salvation. III. But, ftill, we fay, God never doth, or can require, that Men Ihould work to any End; but where he gives them tliofe Abili- ties, which may be nccelfary to efFed: fuch End ; nccelfary, in the Meafure and Proportion, wliat- ever that is, according to w]iich, God intends, it fliould be effect- ed. All, therefore, any Man can prove ( ^-89 ) prove, from the prefcnt degene- rate State of human Nature^ is, that Man.confidered^merely^in his natural Capacity, can do Nothing pleafing to God. This has not only been tlie Opinion of private Perfons, and among them, of many learned Men ; but the pub- lick Decjlions of Authority, in fome Cliurches, have been alledg- ed to fupport it. Now, admit- ting thole Decifions to be incon- teftably true, and well founded; how will it, therefore, follow, that God does not, by fome fecret \ Method of his Will, afford to e- very Man a Meafure of common Grace, which may" be fuflicient to repair his natural Diforders or Defeats, in fuch a Manner, as, may recommend his moral Con- duft to God's Acceptance.? T iV, And A' ( ^-9^^ ) IV. And whether moral Agents, in the Difcharge of their Duty, aft by Virtue of any natural inhe- rent Power ; or of a preventing celeftial Grace; the Equity of God s Procedure, in relation to them, is the fame ; fince, on ei- ther Suppofition, the Obedience prerequired of Man to his Hap- pinefs, and to God s Acceptance, is ilill practicable. V. Upon a ConcclTion, there- fore, that Man, in his natural St ate ^ cannot turn, or prepare hmifelf for good JVorks ; no Man- ner of Inconvenience, refpefting cither the Goodnefs, or the Ju- itice of God, will folloVv* provi- ded, what Man cannot m by his natural Strength, he may^et be enabled to do by the Alfiftance of divine Grace, fpccial or com- mon; according to the Nature, or ( ^91 ) or Defign of the Work, to which he is appointed. I will add, that, in a human Way of reafoning upon this Ar- ticle, it is more probable, tliat God Ihould, by a particular Do- nation or Will, confer on Man the Grace, in whate^ cr Degree^ necellary to a Conduct truly vir- tuous; than that he lliould give to Man fuch a Power of regula- ting his moral Behaviour, as jnight be wholly arbitrary, and independent : Since, by this Means, the natural Pride of Man, the nioft common Source of Corrup- tion in him, would not only be kept under a continual Reftraint, from a Senfe of his own Imbecil- lity : But the Apprehenfion, that God's Affiftancc is always necef- fary to him, in the Difcharge of his Duty, would render him, at T z once^ ' • f ^-9^- ) oncey more cautious of provoking God to withdraw it; and excite him^ under all the more difficult Tryals of his Obedience^ hy Trac- er and Supplication.with Thankf- giving, to make known his Re- <^ que ft s unto God. VI. This Confideration difco- vers to us the natural Grounds of \ Prayer^ as a religious Duty ; with a very wife and cogent Reafon^ why Men fliould continue injiant in Trayer. " It being one principal Delign of Religion to keep Men in a conltant De- pendance on God^, this beings indeed^ one of the moft pow- erful Motives to a religious Life ; what could be more rea- fonable^ than for God to make ^' that the Condition of an ac- ^'^ ceptable Obedience to him^ " whicii might caulb Men to de- ^^ pend ( ^9? ) *■*' pendj more iibiblutel>%upon him. VII. So that the Notion of an | inward and divine Power, fup- plying the natural Dcfe6ls, and animating the religious Endea- vours of Men, is fo far from bq- ing an Objection, as fome weak and ignorant Pretenders to Rea- fon have made it, againft divine,* /\ Revelation ; that Nothing can be more reafonable, than to fuppofe, God has appointed fuch a Power, as a Handing and ordinary Means to Men, of performing an ac- ceptable Obedience to him, even^ in a State of natural Religion. Vin. The Diftincliou between moral and fpiritual Adions, tho' in a Senfe, very proper and com- modious ; yet as to the Scope of my Argument, and the Nature of human Liberty, makes no icn- fible DijfFerence. But to evince T 3 that ( ^9+ ) that it does not^ inftead of my own Thoughts upon the Subjeft, I fiiall cite an Argument from Bi- fliop Taylor^ which^ in the Con- ftruclion of it^ appears to me e- qually beautiful^ and ilrong. '^ The Cafe of moral Actions and /^ fpiritual is all one; for that ^^ Action is morale which is done in Obedience to a Law ; and a fpiritual Aftion is no more; fave only it relates to another Law^ to the evangelical^, or fpiritual Law of Liberty: But, in the Nature of the Things, it is the fame ; and one may as *^ well be chofen as the other, ^'' when tlicy are equally taught, •^ and alike commanded, and ^^ propounded under the fame " proportionable Amability; and *^ till they be fo propounded, <^ they arc not equally Laws. '' Befid cs ( ^9S- ) Bcfides this; the dcnyiiig Li- berty in all moral Things ; tliat is, in all Tilings of Manners, in all Things ol" Oledletice to the Laws of God and Man ; and the allowing it in Thuigs, un- '^ der no Law, is a Dcltr action '' of the very Nature and Pur- '' pofe of Liberty. For the only " End of Liberty is to make us capable of Laws, of Virtue and Reward, and to diltinguilh us from Bealts, by a dillincl Manner of Approach to God , and a Way of Conformity to him proper to us; and except ^"^ in the Matter of divine and human Laws; except in the Matter of Virtue and Vice ; ex- cept in order to Reward and Punifliment; Libertv andChoice " were good for Nothing : For to ^^ keep our fclvcs from Harm, T 4- " iVom cc cc cc €C CC ( x9(> ) from Poifon^ and Enemies^ a natural Inftinft^ and lower Ap- petites^ would ferve our Needs, as well as the Needs of Birds, ^' and Beafts. And therefore to allow it where it is good for Nothing, and to deny it, where only it can be ufeful, and rea- fonable, and fit to be done, and is given by the wife Father of all his Creatures, muft needs ^^ be amifs ^^. IX. It is not intended, by any Thing, that has been here advan- ced, as if Man, by the bell Ufe he can make of his Liberty,in Con- currence with the common Grace afforded to him, were in this Life capable of an abfolute, or Stoical Perfeflion; we only contend for fuch a Degree of moral Virtue, * Due. Dub. B. IV. p. 75;, 75^ ( ^97 ) as is fufficient, in general, not- withftanding the many Failures in his Duty^ to denominate a Man virtuous; and entitle him to that Happinefs^ for which God originally endowed him with pro- per Capacities and invincible Defires. X. But whether, and how far, particular Deviations from the. Rule of moral Virtue, in certain Cafes, do deftroy the general Character of a virtuous or good Man, will, more, particularly ap- pear from the following Conli- derations. XL Moral Virtue may be de- fined a Habit, formed by delibe- rate repeated A£ls, exciting us, on all Occalions, to difcharge our Duty faithfully, and enabling us to difcharge it^ with greater faci- litv. XII. What ( 198 ) XII. What I am principally con- cerned to fliew, at prefent3 is, that moral Virtue ought to be denominated, not from this, or that particular Inftance, but from repeated Afts of our Duty, and and the general Tenour of our Conduct, as reafonable and free Agents. For the flime Rcafbn, which directs us, in one Cafe, to regulate our Choice or Action, by the natural Law, doth require, that they fliould be regulated, ac- cordingly, in all Cafes. The Rule of our moral Conduct, being al- ways the fame, fliould always ope- rate witli the like Force, and pro- duce the fame Ettbft; at leaft, no Perfon has a Right to be called a moral good Man, where fuch an Efted: does not difcover itfelf, upon a common Survey of his Aftionsw XIII. We ( ^99 ) Xlll.We iniift here, then, d ift iii- guifli between two Things, which Men are very apt, by ufing them promifcuoufly^to confound ; moral "Duties^ and moral Virtue. A Man may perform a conliderable moral Duty, or many fliining moral Duties, without being mo- rally virtuous. Duties refpe(5l: every particular Choice or A(5lion, to which we may be obliged: Virtue is the governing Princi- ple, which preiides over all our AcT:ions; and from a Conformity to which, an habitual, if not al- ways an actual Conformity , we can only be termed virtuous. XIV. The principal moral Di- ftinftion, for Inftance, of the two Sexes, are Fortitude ^ and Chajiity ; and yet no Man or Wo- man, except in a partial popular Senfe, can be reputed virtuous from ( 300 ) from either of thefe Charaflers, limply coniidered^ and. without Regard to their moral Behaviour in other Refpe6ls. It is often founds that^ even^ thofe very Men, who are brave and valiant hf Tro- feffioTiy and who difcover all the Effects of a gallant and intrepid Courage, w^henever they are cal- led upon to exert it, are not yet, always, of the moll Uriel and re- gular Condufl:, in every Refpeft. So that the Camp and the Army, wherein we lliould naturally ex- ped: to fee this Virtue in all its Lullre and Dignity , yet would not, I fuppofe, be the yir// Places,, where we Hiould go to feek for a pure and fcrupulous Morality. XV. As Challity, indeed, is the peculiar Ornament and Glory of the female Sex, we more readily attribute moral Virtue to them (301 ) them under a general Notion of it, on that Account; which yet we ra- ther do from a favourable Preju- dice^ that they^ ivho are faithful in much) ivill he faithful in that avhich is little, than from any ne- ceflary or certain Confequence in Fafl:; for how nice and exaftfoever Women may be in preferving this Charaflier^ and in conforming to all the Meafures and Decencies of it, yet we fometimes find it in Conjund:ion with other Qualities, that are not to be examined too ftriaiy by the general Rules of moral Virtue. And, in fuch Cafes, we cannot, upon the fole Merit of it, admit them to be limply, or abfolutely fpeaking, virtuous. Efpccially, when there is obfcrved a vifiblc Deficiency in fuch other Parts of their Duty, as have a more fpecial Reference to ( 3^^ ) to the tender and delicate For- mation of the Sex; Affability, Piety, and Complacency of Man- ners, with all the Ornaments of a meeh and quiet Spirit. A ma- nifeft Failure in thefe feminine Qualifications, even fliould the Sex be fo prudent and cautious, as, in refpetl to the principal Character of it, never to be chargeable with an indifcreet Look, Word, or Action, would nevertlielefs preclude them from a jull Claim or Title to. moral Virtue, in the true Acceptation, and full Latitude of it. XVI. Thefe two Inllances are fufRcient to fhew, that moral Virtue confifts in afting conform- ably to Rcaibn, tlie Rule of it, not in particular Cafes, but at all Times, in all Places, and under every Relation: And, indeed. Morality ( 303 ) Morality^when confidered by Men with refped: to the Subjed: of it, tlie Regulation of their Manners^ does evidently imply the whole Extent of their Duty ; Manners, in the direft Signification of the Term, importing, not limply any particular KGi or Inftance of Bchavicrur in Men, but the gene- ral Current and Character of their Actions. CHAP. ( 304 ) ^.*i.^^<^.^ we can neither, as moral Agents, U X con- - ( 3o8 ) confefledly, are^ be capable^, in a ftriaSenfeof Blame^ orPraife; of Reward^ or Punifliment : We may commend a Man^ indeed^ for his Strength, good Shape, or Confti- tution of Body ; or for an extra- ordinary Capacity of Mind ; as we may do other Creatures that excel in their feveral Kinds, in Strength, Beauty, or Ulefulnefs; but, in a moral Senfe, the great- eft natural Advantages make no Difference among Men, except they have been improved by a regular Conduft upon virtuous Principles, to promote the great Ends of Morality. But fuch a Conduft, however it might have been attained by a gradual, and, perhaps, infenfible Growth in Vir- tue, had Man continued in a State of Innocence ; yet, in his prefent degenerate State, is not attainable, as ( 309 ) as a happy Conflitution of his Body may be preferved, by the mere Strength of his natural Powers; but with much Diligence and Application; and, in many Cafes, not without fome Violence and Oppofition to his natural Temper : Whereas, all natural Habits, as all other A6lions of Na- ture, are eafy, fweet, and plea- fan t, and fo far from being oppo- lite to our Inclinations, that a Reftraint from exerciling them is always attended with a fenlible Pain. To which it is added, that all natural Qiialities,or Powers pre- cede the proper Ads of them. As, in the Order of our Ideas, the Faculty of feeing is fuppofed pri- or to the Objeft of Sight. And fo, in refpe£t to all the other Senfes ; whereas Men are only denominated virtuous from tiie U 3 fub' ( 3IO ) fubfequent Aftion; or on Suppo- fition^ at leaft^ of an Aftion ef- fe£lualfy chofen : Thiis^ before a Man can acquire the Reputation of Fortitude^ he mu/l,^Q:\x7i\\Y, fur- mount^or give fenlible Proofs of his being prepared to furmount^ fuch Difficulties and Dangers^ where- with he may be expoled to con- flift : As he^ who would be thought temperate^ mull lay a Reftraint upon his irregular Appetites^ and previoufly exercife many proper Afts of Self-denial. From whence it is concluded, that moral Vir- tue, efpecially, a Habit of moral Virtue, is not a natural or infufed Quality, but is formed or acqui- red by repeated Ails. III. As moral Habits are dillin- guiflied from fuch, which we term natural ; fo it may be convenient to obferve the Diftinction be- tween ( 311 ) twccn them^ and fiich Habits^ as may be called artificial. In mo- ral Habits Men are termed good, not only from their Capacity of acling, or of doing what they ouglit to dO;, with the greateit Addrefs and Facility ; but from an actual Application of their moral Abilities^ whenever a proper Oc- cafion of exerting them may pre- fent. He cannot preferve the Charafter of a good Man, wlio neglects to improve flichOccaiions to the Ends of moral Virtue. It is otherwife in Habits artificial. A good Phyfician is denominated from his Skill in the medicinal Art, and would not forfeit that Chara£ler, tho' he lliould refufe to vifit a fick Perfon in Extremi- ty, and, upon no otlier Pretence, than that he is engaged in Com- pany with a Number of feled: U 4 Friends. ( 31^ ) Friends. However^ fuch a Refu- fal might expofe him to juft Cen- fure^ as a Man of Humour^ of Pride^ of Infenfibility^ or Negli- gence; yet^ as a Man oi Art^ he would ftill fufFer no Imputation. It is the fame^ in refpecl to a good Painter, we call a Man fo, who draws, in juft Proportion; with Life and Vigour, with ftrong, lively and lafting Colours ; with a due Conformation and Stru6lure of Parts; a good Mein, and all the heightening Advantages of Shade and Light ; tho' he Ihould^ for fome time, intend or refolve for the future, wholly to difcon- tinue the Ufe of his Art. There is alfo this remarkable Difference between moral and artificial Ha- bits ; that, in Morality, we are lefs culpable the more we fm out pi Ignorance, or through Con- ftraint. ( 313 ) ftraint. But the Mailer of any Art^ or who pretends to be fb, does not expofe himfelf fo much ^to Reproach^ when he offends againft the Rules of his Art, by Defign, as when he does fo, out of pure Ignorance. Thus a Statuary, if he fhould not intend a perfeft Piece, would lofe no Reputation, if it lliould appear lefs regular ; but fliould he undertake to Ihew his Art in finifhing a Piece, and after all his Care and Pains to that End, it fhould come out of his Hands very ill deligned, or pro- portioned, or, on any other Ac- count, notorioufly defeftive, it mull neceffarily tend, in Ibme Meafure, to the Diminution of his Credit. The Cafe is very dif- ferent inJVIorality. Ignorance here excufes; and we have the Charac- ter of doing well or ill, not {o much (314) much from the Afts of the Un- derftanding, as from thofe of the WilU and the Intention. IV. Novv^ in order to know^ more particularly^ how a Habit of moral Virtue may be acquired^ it is firft requilite we fliould enquire concerning the proper Caufes of it. I do not here fpeak of fuch fupernatural Infufions of Lights or Grace-, whereby God may think fit^ in an extraordinary Manner, and to ferve fome extraordinary Ends of hisProvidence^ to dittin- guilh fome particular Perfons ; and, cfpecially, on a Suppofition, of his deligning to reveal his Will to Mankind, oi* to raife up any chofcn Perfon or Perfons, whom he intends to make the Inllru- ments of fome great Revolution in the World ; admitting, what I now, all along, fuppole a divine Pro- ( 315- ) Providence, there is Nothing re- pugnant to our natural Notions of Things; Nothing, but what is ra- ther highly agreeable to theni, in conceivingGod may,rometimes,in- terpofe in the Government of the World, by fuch fupernatural Me- thods. But I am here only fpeak- ing concerning the common and ordinary Principles, into which moral Habits are to be refolved. V. We muft feek for the more remote Origin of them, in the Formation and Strufture of the Body; for without the Body, cer- tain moral Actions cannot be per- formed, nor, confequently, a Ha- bit of them acquired. And lince, by the Laws of Union God has eilabliflied between the Soul and the Body, the Soul commonly follows the bodily Temper and Difpofition, it happens that fome Perfons ( 31^) Perfons are much more capable, than others^ of receiving Impref- fions of Virtue and Goodnefs, both on Account of a finer, and a more forward^ Inclination : For not only the Strength, but the Liber- ty of the Mind, is very much ow- ing to a more happy Texture or Conformation of the Machine, to which it is united. And, cer- tainly, a natural and ingenuous Difpofition to virtuous A61:ions in general, or even in particular In- ftances, is one of the greateft Blef- lings of Providence, to which we could have been born. For tho', by ill Education, through the Force of Cuftom, or bad Example, a contrary Temper may be, and is, God knows, fometimes intro- duced ; yet fuch a Change cannot be etFed:cd without great Oppofi- tion and Reluclance ; and again/l much ( 317 ) much ftronger Checks and Con- flicts of Mind, than other Perfons feel in being corrupted, who are naturally of a Temper lefs fen- fible and ingenuous. And yet, even they, whom Nature has formed after fuch a Manner, may through a good Ufe of their Li- berty, and the Exercife of virtu- ous Acls, by Degrees, new model themfelvcs, and, at length, ac- quire not only a Fropenlion to fuch Things, to which they were before more averfe, but a Faci- lity in praclifing them ; which will be attended with much Satis- faftion, if not with a fenlible and permanent Delight. The Endea- vour here, it is true, will be, at the firft, and, for fome Time, more painful and difficult ; but the Glory of the Triumph will be greater^ in Proportion, to the Ob- ( 3i8 ) Obftacles furmounted in the Way to it. It was this Confideration which rendered Socrates fo much admired in his own, and in fuc- ceedingAges; not limply, becaule he had acquired a Habit of living according to the Rules of a more pure Morality; there was No- thing here fingular in a Profellbr of Philofophy ; but becaufe he had been able, by a ftrid, fevere and uniform Courfe of Life, to overcome a perverfe and vicious Temper, which rendered him na- turally lefs capable of virtuous Attainments. VI. Yet we are not, in our En- deavours either to improve a good, or to corred: a bad Difpofi- tion, to rely wholly on our own Strength. I have affigned the Reafons before, why God has ob- liged us, for a Supply of all our WantSj ( ^19 ) Wants^ to have Recourfc to him by Prayer. And, if our Prayers are, therefore, necellary, or will be heard by him, on any Occafion; we have the greatelt Reafon both to pray, and to cxped: our Pray- ers will be heard, for fuch Things, which are melt neceliary to the Ends, for which God created us^ that is, to our .Happinefs, and to our Perfeftion. If we^ heing e- vil, know honv to give good Things, Things phylically good, or re- Ipedling only the prefent Conve- niencies of Life, to tboje that ash us\ we may conclude, with much ftronger Aifurance, that a wife, good, and all-powerful God, will hear our Prayers to him, for thofe Things which he fees realr ly beneficial and falutary to us; and, efpecially, for fuch a common Meafure of Light and Grace, as he ( 3^o ) he hath determined to confer in- differently on all Men^ in fiich Proportion^ as may render them capable of attaining the Ends^ for which, in his Wifdom and Goodnefs, he hath created them. VII. But the Caufe, by Means of which, under the divine Direction we acquire a Habit of moral Virtue, are repeated Afl:s of moral Duties; for, how- ever, we may be naturally form- ed, or inclined to do any Thing; yet through Ufe and Applica- tion we fhall ftill be enabled, to do it with much greater Facility. The Truth of this is not only confirmed by Experi- ence; but Philofophers have af- figned natural, if they may not be termed, mechanical Reafons for it. VIII. The ( 5^1 ) VIII. The Operations of the Soulof Maiij as united^ at prefent^ to his Body^ do, in great Meafure^ depend upon the State of his Bo- dy^ efpecially, upon the Motions, which are excited, or performed in it, by Means of the animal Spi- rits; or of certain material A- gents, whatever fpecifick Name we give to them, which aftuate the feveral Parts of the Body ; and, particularly, the Brain, the occafional, and moft immediate Caufe of our Senfations. For it is not neceflary towards an Ex- plication of the prefent Subjed, that we fliould exailly define what the animal Spirits are. Let our Conceptions about them be true or falfe, the internal Mo- tions which are performed, in the Brain and Nerves, by Means of any material Particles, whatever X the-y ( 3" ) they may be, will equally tend to inform us concerning the Pow- er of moral, or other Habits. Since, if the animal Spirits are not the occafional Caufes of mo- ving the Soul ; it is, at leaft, mo- ved by the Aftion, of fome other fubtile and aftive Parts of Mat- ter; much after a Manner, from which we may draw the like Con- fequences. IX. It is vifible, for Inftance, that when the Body is much de- bilitated by Sicknefs, or for Want of Nourifhment, how defirous foever the Soul may be of put- ting any Part of it upon a brisk Motion, it cannot always fupply, to that End, fufficient Recruits. Whereas a Man, in perfed: Health, no Iboner wills, his Leg or his Arm Ihould be extended, but tiiere is a vifible Inflation of his Mufcles, ( 3^3 ) Mufcles; which could not be made, except fome bodily Parti- cles, whatever thofe may be, were, in Obedience to the Order of the Will, received into the Mufcles. From whence it is con- cluded, that the Soul exercifes her Authority over the Body, by Virtue of certain corpufcular E- miflaries, which, from the Life, Aftivity, and Force of them, are called animal Spirits ; and, per- haps , not without good and reafonable Grounds. Now the Brain being the principal Place, where the Notices of the Soul, from external Objefe, are recei- ved, and her Orders ifliied out : There is, always, in fome Part of it, when it is in a regular State, a fufficient Number of thefe Spi- rits or Meilengers, to take the Courfe, and to go direcllv to the X X " Place ( 3^4 ) Place^ for which they are order- ed. And the more^ the Paths, thro' which they convey them- felves, are frequented and beaten, the fmoother, and ealier, and, confequently, the more pleafant will their PafTage be. Nay, after frequent Journies, the Spirits will, by Occaiion of any Objefts, where- by they have formerly been put in Motion, flow fortuitoufly, as it were, and of themfelves, with- out waiting for the Orders of the Will , into the Channels where- in they were ufed to run. This is the Reafon, why Habits are not only more eafy, in the Practice, but render us more fufceptible of fuch Impreflions, as are principal- ly apt to effetl us, or have much, and, frequently, afteded us for- merly ; lor, by the continual Ac- tion of the Spirits, the Way is made ( S'^r ) made fo plain to them^ and all Manner of Obftruaion ib entire- ly removed:, that Light does not more naturally infmuate its felf into any Aperture proper to trans- mit it^ than the Spirits into fuch Pipes^ or Paflages of the Body, which lye open to receive them. X. From this Explication, it is eafy to conclude, why neither in the Works of Art, or the Of- fices of moral Life, we, at firit, acquire that Facility of adling, to which afterwards we attain by Ufe and Application: Why, for Example, a Man, when he is firft taught to play on a mulical In- llrument, does not move his Fin- gers with that Agility, which he will be able to do after repeated Tryals ; when the animal Spirits, or whatever we call the Inilru- ments of a more quick and eafy X Q Motion ( 3^^ ) Motion of the Parts which com- pofe the Body^ have gained a free^ and more open Current, through the Canals proper to con- vey them. XL It is, for the like Reafons, that Habits of any Kind are fooner formed in Children, than in aged Perfons. Nature, while we are young, being tender and duftile, eafily gives Way to the leaft Im- preffions, and long retains them : In an advanced Age, it is more difficult, from the firmer Contex- ture of the Parts of the Body, to open new Pallages in it ; or new Traces in the Brain; or if, at any Time, fuch Palfagcs, or Traces arc opened, they are not eafily kept clear, and without any fo- reign Mixture from Spirits of a contrary Nature, and apt to ex- cite contrary Paliions, or Senti- ments. ( 3^7 ) ments. For though, througli fome extraordinary Emotion of the Soul, occafioncd by any very moving Providence, Difcourfe, or Accident, the Spirits may, for the Time, take a different Courfe; yet fo foon as fuch Emotion, pro- ceeding from any fuch particular Caufe, is over, they will natural- ly return again into their old Channel. XII. This is the Reafon, why we, fometimes, obferve fo little Effects of thofe pious Refoluti- ons, however animated they may appear, whicli Men make upon the near, and, as they ap- prehend it, certain, ProfpeCl of Death ; or upon any other Occa- fion, when the great Truths, of Morality, by Reading, Medita- .tion, or Difcourie, appear to them, as they often do to the moil obdu- X 4, rate ( 3^8 ) durate Sinners^ with a Light and Evidence, that cannot be refilled. I will add, that divine Grace, it felf, whether fpecial, or more com- mon, while the Mind is enlighten- ed, or the Heart powerfully moved by it, yet does not work Miracles upon the Body. A Man, who approaches the Throne of divine Grace, with the moft holy and landtified Difpofitions; who forms the moft lively and ftrong Refolutions of entering upon a vir- tuous Courfe of Life, yet is not to exped:, without a Miracle, to be freed from the Power of his evil Habits, but in the ftme Method, whereby he acquuxd them ; that 3S, by repeated Ads: But by Afts, which require a Revidlion, and contrary Courfe of the Spirits. There is no other Way, or natu- ral Means of his Recovery. He may ( 3^9 ) may as well, hope, immediately, upon his Prayers to God, and without anyphyfical Application, to recover the Ufe of a Limb, which he has loft, or is morti- fied ; as to expeft, that God will give, and, miraculoufly, continue to him, a different Motion of his Blood, or Spirits, or excite different Sentiments in his Mind by Occafion of them, from thofe to which he has been accuftomed. I repeat it again, God does not convert the Soul of Man, by al- tering the mechanical Conftrudii- on of his Body. The Grace of God, indeed gives us thofe Af- fiftances, whereby w^e may be enabled to correal our ill Habits, and the Dilbrder they occafion in the animal Oeconomy; but he does not, by an immediate and po- fitive ( 33c> ) fitiye A£l of his Will^ free us from the Power of them. XIIL If, therefore, upon our praying to God, that we may be enabled to overcome the Power of our evil Habits^ we do not, immediately, find our felves freed from them ; let us not conclude our Prayers fruitlefs, or infigni- ficant, God hears them, and will anfwer them^ fo far as it is con- fiftent with the Methods of his Grace; which are agreeable to thofe of his Providence ; in the Courfe whereof, notwdthllanding his abfolute Power over fccond Caufes,he, ordinarily, leaves tlicni to acl according to ftated Laws, without interpofing in the Govera- ment of them, by a miraculous Power. Thus he will afford the common Meafurcs of liis Grace, towards reforming our ill Habits; thro' ( 331 ) thro' which we may^ by a good Ufc of our Liberty, gradually, iilduce a contrary Habit of Vir- tue: But it is not to be expected, in ordinary Cafes, that God fliould convert us by a miraculous Power. XIV. Thefe Things deferve very well to be confidered, in order to reftrain us from contrafling ill Ha- bits; efpecially, in our younger Age, when the foft, delicate, and flexible Contexture of the Parts of the Body, render them capable of receiving any Form. And the fame Reafon, if we have been fo unhappy as to contract any ill Habits, and are confirmed in them, at a riper Age, Ihould ex- cite us, immediately, with all the Force we can apply, to fet about the Work of our Converlion : A Workfo painful and difficult, and diftafteful, that to fuccced in it may ( in ) may, without a forced Expreffion, in Regard to fiich Perfons, be termed a nevjCreation^ aTutting on the new Man ; a Renewal of the Spirit of our Minds. The Organs, whereby the Soul afts, by the Miniftry of the animal Spirits, being grown dry, harden- ed, and Itubborn with Age, and unapt, on all thefe Accounts, to llifFer any confiderable Change. It is almoft, in a human Way of Argument, as natural to put the Qiieftion, Can dry Bones live, or Can a dead Body be rai- fedtoLife again? As, Can an old, habitual^and obdurate Sinner,turn from the Evil of his Way, and iuperinduce a contrary Habit of Virtue; or bring forth Fruits meet for Repe?itance. XV. Yet 1 do not fpeak this to difcourage a Sinner, under the Power ( 333 ) Power of the moll inveterate Habits^ from endeavouring his Converfion^ but to lliew the Necef- fity he is under^ if he would not look upon his Converlion as de- fperate> of attempting fo impor- tant a Work^ without farther Delay ; and by beginning to with- draw the Supplies, which have fed his corrupt Habits, as foon as poffible : For without doing this, or endeavouring to give a diffe- rent Courfe to the Spirits ; it will be as impoffible for him, to effeft a Cure; as it is for a Wound to be healed, while it is continually probed, or kept open. XVI. This being a Confideration of great Importance, it may not be improper to illuftrate, farther, the Power of moral Habits, from certain natural Etfects, in other Inltences, befides thofe I have inentioned. ( 354 ) mentioned. By Ufe, fuch Things as have been lefs palatable, and, even, offenfive to the Tafte, have become grateful and pleafant ; not from any real Change in the Qua- lity, or Relifh of the Meat; but, becaufe, by Degrees, the Organs of Tafte conform and affimilate themfelves to the Particles of it. So that the Inequality, which was before, in their Configuration, is removed, and a more exaft Pro- portion arifes between the Pores of the Palate, and the Particles of Meat: Which AfTimilation occalions that Agreeablenefs of Tafte, which was before wanting. Thus it is in moral Habits. Our Delire and Appetites, naturally,in- cline, and conform themfelves to fuch Ob lefts, to which they have been accuitomcd: And, upon this Account, wc lay that Cultom is ( 355" ) is a fecond Nature; or has the like Elfe£l^ by rendering any Ob- jedl familiar to us ; which we ex- perience^ when we are conver- fant, or employed about fuch Aflions^ for which Nature origi- nally formed and difpofed us. XVII. This is fo true in Fact, and common Experience^ that Habit, and Cuiftom are Terms indifferently ufed to exprefs the fame Thing. And, Cuftom, in the natural and obvious Notion of it, always implies a Repetition of the fame Aflis; but not to infift upon Words of an ambiguous, or indefinite Senfe; that Habits proceed from repeated Acts, and can only be produced by them, is evident from the Reafon of the Thing. For a Habit, ac- cording to the common and na- tural tural Idea of it, always fuppofts an eafy Manner of Aftion ; which yet is not to be acquired, by a lingle Aft or Endeavour, but by frequent Ufe. As Engines newly made, and never before tried, will not play fo well, or readily, as after the Parts of them, by Ufe, are grown fmooth, pliant, and bet- ter adapted to the Aftion of one another: This Illuftration, from artificial Conftruftions, is not im- proper to reprefent that Facili- ty of Aftion in Man, which pro- ceeds from a more open, free, and gentle Current of the Spi- rits, through thofe feveral Parts, or Organs of his Body, which Nature has defigned as the Inftru- ments of their Conveyance. XVIII. And as a Habit cannot be acquired, inftantaneolly, or by a fingle A6l^ neither can it be ^o ' loft. ( 337 ) loft. A temperate Perfon^ who, through Surprize^ or^ perhaps, on Ibme particular Occalioii;, drinks, knowingly, to Excefs, does not, therefore, wholly forfeit his ge- neral Character, of being a Man of Sobriety ; much lefs, doth an intemperate Man, by a fingle Afl; of Abftinence, or Self-denial, when an Occafion may be pre- fented of indulging his ftanding Inclination to Excefs, thereby, acquire the Charafler of a fober Man. XIX. There is, however, this remarkable Difference to be ob- ferved, between virtuous and vi- cious Habits ; that finful, and fenfible Pleafures, for Reafons refpe(3:ing the prefent State of Man, which I (hall not repeat, aftefting the Soul after a more powerful, 'and lively Manner; Y than ( 33B ) than the Pleafiires, arifing from a virtuous Condufl: ; fewer AQ:s, and a lefs intenfe Endeavour, are requifite to form a Habit of Vice, than a Habit of Virtue. I will not fay, but it may, poffibly, hap- pen, that even a fingle Diforder, accompanied with an extraordi- nary Emotion of the Blood and Spirits, may have the fame dan- gerous EfleCls, towards corrupt- ing the Heart, as leveral parti- cular Afts of the like Kind, per- formed under lefs aggravating and violent Circumltances : As, to keep to the former Comparifbn, a greater Force, applied to a new Engine, may lupply the Want of that eafy Motion, or Lubri- city of the Parts, which might, gradually, have been produced, by a more frequent Uie of it. XX, It ( 539 ) XX. It would be infignificaiit, herC;, to objeft^ that if one A61 be not of Force fufficient to intro- duce a Habit, neither would a fe- cond or third; upon aPretence^that the feveral AiSs, fuppofed necef- • fary towards introducing fuch a Habit, do not concur, or operate, at the fame Time: For though we may eafily conceive, how fe- veral Pcrfons, with united Force, may move a heavy Body, which could not be moved by any fingle Hand ; yet the Cafe is very diffe- rent, when we rcafon concerning the Nature of moral Habits. The Application of thofe Ads, which are proper to produce them, is not fimultaneous, like that of Men, who, go Hand in Hand, to effect any Work, but fucceffive. So that, if the firft Act of Power, in their Way of Y X realbn- ( 340 ) reafoning, do not produce a Ha- bit of Virtue, neither will a fe- cond or third ; the Force of them;, feparately confidered, being e- qualiy nifufficicnt , towards at- taining the End propofed. XXL In Anfwcr to this^, it may be laid^, though a fingle Ad; does not produce a Habit of Vir- tuC;, yet it is not;, wholly, fruitlefs; but, infomeProportion;, influenti- al towards the Production of it. As a Man, though he cannot;, by his own Strength;, move a StonC;, ■y^t may communicate fome De- gree of Force ;, according as he has more Strength;, to the com- mon Endeavour;, whereby it is anoved. As to all the F'orce con- curring;, at the lame TimC;, that is accidental, and docs not afleft the Nature of the Thing. Nei- ther;, indeed^ can the lUullration be 1 ( 541 ) be applicable to moral Habits; becaufe, it is not pratlicable^ that feveral Acls fliould concur^ at the fame Time , towards forming . them. And^ therefore^ to flicw the gradual Improvements of a virtuous Agent to that End^ it would be more proper^ to com- pare the feveral A6ls of Virtue^ in order to the Formation of a Habit of Virtue^ to the repeat- ed Strokes of an Ax at the Root of a Tree; upon which tho' feveral of them may make but fmall Im- preffion^ yet every one of them contributes^ more or lefs^ to- wards cutting it down. XXII. The Objeclion, which I now proceed to confider^ appears to be more difficult. It is pretend- cAy that if a Habit gives a great- er Facility and Freedom of Ac- tion; it will follow; there is lefs Y ^ Meritj, ( 34^ ) Merit, becaufe lefs Difficulty and Oppofition, in afting from a con- firmed Habit of Virtue; than there is in fuch virtuous Aftions, which wicked Men themfelves, may, fometimes, be induced to perform. XXIII. In Anfwer to this, we fay, that the Difficulty, which at- tends any A6lion, may be conli- dered, either in refpefl: to the Nature of the Thing done, or to the Party, by whom it is done; that the Nature, or inherent Qua- lity, indeed, of any Action, mo- rally, good, always enhances the Value of it; but that the Dif- ficulty, proceeding from the pro- per Default of the Agent, and not from the Nature of the Ac- tion, cannot be fuppofed to add any Excellency, or Advantage, ip any Kind to it : By Default of the ( 343 ) the Agent; I mean fomc acciden- tal Incapacity^, which he liath brought hinifelf under, by his own Irregularity, or Neglect. As, when a Man, for Inftance, has, for a long Time, habituated hini- felf to hard Drinking, and, there- fore, finds greater Difficulty in the Pratlice of Sobriety, than a Per- fon of a fober and regular Life : He is not, therefore, more praife- worthy for a fmgle Act of Tem- perance, than a Perfon, who is, habitually, temperate. XXIV. Yet, though upon a general Confideration, a fingle A61 of Vice may not produce a vicious Habit; nor a lingle A(Sl of Virtue a virtuous Habit : There are certain Cafes, w herein, as to their Confequences, the dif- ferent Ad:s of Virtue, or Vice, may have the like permanent and y 4 power- ( 344 ) powerful EfFefls, as if they had really proceeded from fettled Ha- bits. As there are fome unwhole- fome Meats^ which do not de- •ftroy the Conftitution^ except by Degrees, and by repeated Ufe; but fome Poifons, which if they do not;, at once^put a Stop to all the Motions and Springs of Life, yet occalion fuch Diforder in the a- nimal Oeconomy, and deprave it in fuch a Manner, as will ter- minate, at length, in its Dillblu- tion. On the other Hand, when the Soul of Man, fometimes, exerts itfelf with that Ardor, and thofe generous Efforts of Zeal, in the Caufe of Virtue, Truth and Ho- nour, where Men chufe rather to dye, than to purchafe Life by bafe, and ignoble Submiffions; fuch Ads of heroick Refolution, if they be not really productive of ( 545- ) of virtuous Habits ; yet fuppofe fo exalted a State of Virtue^ and of that inflamed Charity which cafteth out Fea?^ ; that it is pious to believe, they, at leaft, ingene- rate, in the Soul, fuch a fettled, and excellent Difpolition, as is e- quivalent to the Force of a Habit; and which a good and righteous God will, accordingly, reward. XXV. It might not be im- proper^ to add certain Rules to- wards confirming a Habit of Vir- tue. But the only Rule, I would here lay down, is, that the Acts, proper to produce it, fliould not be too much intermitted ; but that having begun a good Work, A- dlionsof a like Kind fhould follow, before the Lnpreffion of the for- mer is worn out. Ashe that would learn any manual Art; will make a better Progrefs in it, by a con- ftant ( 34^) ftant Attendance upon the proper Means of learning it for one Year, than he would do m feveral Years, if, through long Intervals, or Difufe, he fhould afterward have Need to be taught again the firft Rudiments of it. Chap. XVIL How good Hcthits may he pre- Jervedy or augmented^ and ill Habits defiroyed. I. Repeated A£ls necejfary to pre- ferve, 11. y4nd to deflroy mo- ral Hahits, III. The gradual Acqiiijit'ton and 'Decreaje loth of good, IV. And had Hahits. V. The Difficulty in extirpa- ting ( 347 ) thig them. VI. The proper In- ference from that Con jt dera- tion. VII. An Ohjeclion re- moved. VIII. An unjufi Ex- cufe of Men^ vljo have con- traded vicious Hahits, 7iot to he admitted. IX. How a Man may dij cover the true State of his Soul^ as well in refpeEt to good as ill 1)1 fpojit ions y or Ha- bits. LAS Habits are acquired, they •^^" are alfo confirmed and augmented by repeated A6ls, or rather repeated Afts are, abfo- lutely^neceflary to preferve them ; for if thofe Channels, wherein the Spirits, which we fuppofe the inftrumental Caufe of their Ope- ration, are either choaked up, or replete with Spirits proper to ex- cite a different Difpofition, differ- ent ( U8 ) ent Sentiments in the Soul^ will^ naturally^ follow fuch a Change in the bodily Syftem. Since the Uni- on of the Soul and Body, a ( Truth, frequently, neceflary to be repeat- ed, is Nothing but the Correfpon- dency between the Thoughts of the Soul, and the Motions of the Body ; not by Virtue of any na- tural Law of Contact, or Commu- nication between them, but, pure- ly, in Confequence of the Will of God ; who has eftabliflied fuch an Order between them, that certain Impreffions, made upon the Body, fliall excite particular Senfations in the Soul. And, therefore, the Authority of Hip- pocrates need not be urged to fhew, that the Inclinations of the Soul change at the fame Time with the Blood, and Humour; Wine, taken in a moderate Qiian- tity. ( 349 ) tity, exhilarates a Man ; and, in a larger, difturbsReafon: A good or ill State of Body; a Transport of Paflion, and even external Ac- cidents; the Sight of a Perfon whom we much love, or by whom we have been very ill ufed; a bright, or a cloudy Day; a mo- derate, or violent Exercife, often give fuch a Turn to our Thoughts, and fo different an Air to ourCon- verfation ; that we appear, both to OLirfelves and others, to be, in a Manner, different Perfons. II. As Habits are acquired, and preferved by repeated A<3:s, they may, by a Difufe of thofe Ad:s, be, gradually, impaired, or, at length, totally deftroyed ; efpeci- ally, by Aflions contrary to them, or apt to ingenerate a different? Temper. For in Morality, as in Phyficks, whatever is capable of Aug- ( 35-0 ) Augmentation is fubjeft to De- cay. But^ then^ neither theTran- fition of Men from good to bad, or from bad to good Qualities^ is inftantaneous, but gradual, like the Growth and Decreafe of Plants or Animals. Between thofe two Extremes, there are feveral in- termediate Spaces^ through which a Man mull neceflarily pafs, be- fore he can arrive at either Point. III. But nothwithftanding vi- cious and evil Habits are more fuited to the Inclinations of cor- rupt Nature; are of a quick Growth ; take deeper Root in Icfs Time, and fooner come to Matu- rity : Yet even before wicked Men can contraft a fettled Habit of Vice, and, efpecially, before they can fill up the Meafurc of their Iniquity, they mull over- come feveral Checks and A^ln^o- nitions ( 35-1 ) nit ions of Confcience, and fur- mount many other Difficulties in refpe I underftand only a morp exa,lted State of Virtue, arifing commonly from a fuperior Force and Greatnefs of Mmd; I mentioned flich Things as are true : which, perhaps, may occa- fion fome Scruple in my Readers, as if I fuppofed Truth, not ftricl- ly as being of neceflary Obliga- tion; but among the Things, wherein that Liberty may be ufed, which is fometimes necef- fary to a n\(KQ ferfqSi State of Virtue. . . i VIL.To prevent any Alifcon- ftruclion of this Kind, I would obferve, that Truth may be coh- fidered, as oppofed to Lyi^ig and Deceit, negatively, or pofitively. In the latter Senie, it can never be ( 371 ) be lawful^ under any Circumftan- ces, to aflert a downright and, efpecially, a j^ernicious Falfliood. But it yet may, fometimcs, be lawful to difguife or conceal the Truth. And in refpecl to this negative Acceptation of Truth, a a Man, without dired:ly offending againft it, may often ufe a great- er Liberty of' Difcretion. And, accordingly, feveral great Autho- rities are cited by Grotius'^\ to fliew, and among the reft, that ofCkerOy in feveral Places ; that it is lawful, efpecialiy, in Perfons entrufted with the publick Ad- miniftration, on many Occafions, to ufe Artifice in dillembiing the Truth. But, however, this Li- berty may be contended for, it is more laudable, generous, more a- * De Jny. ^ell & Pac, Lih.3. Cap. i. A a X gree- ( 57X ) grccablc to the Dignity of' human Nature^ and, in all theie Refpefts, to tlic Rules of Honour, that Men Uiould never liave Recourfe to Dilliniulation; that being, con- ieflbdiyjan Argument of Imbecil- lity, accompanied with Fear and Diitrufl:. And, therefore, Tlato, who allows the Ufe of it, in cer- tain Caies, to Men, yet juftly ac- knowledgeth, that God, notwith- ftanding his fovercign Dominion over Men, cannot make ufe of fuch a Refuge ; as always imply- ing atacitConicflion of Weaknefs. So that wiien Cicero, in another nace,al]erts, that Fraud and Dif- fniiulation ought to be banifhed out of human Life, to make him confiftent with himfelf we muft fuppofe, he fpeaks here agreeably to the Diftniclion, which occurs fo often in his admirable Book of Offices ; ( 373 ) Offices) where he puts a Diffe- rence between iuch Things and Adlions as are^, fimply, lawful^ and inch as are really laudable. The Neceflity of Affairs^ in the Com- monwealth^ iiiay^) Ibmetimes^ pof- fibly^ render it no indired: Breach of moral Honelly^ to diilemble the Truth; but Hill it is more honourable:, in every State of Life, private or publick, to avoid the veryAppearances of Falfliood ; and to reftrain our felves from the Ufe of a Liberty, which, however, it may be fuccefsfuUy employed, is,at the bell, but an ignoble, and in- glorious Means of Succefs, VIII. And, therefore, Grotius having enumerated the Icveral Authorities and Arguments, com- monly, ufed to excufe, or defend, political Lying; to correal the ill ImprelTions, which Men ol A a 3 more ( 374 ) more loofe Principles might make from fuch Conceffions, delivers himfelf like a Cafuift, who had a Seiife of Honour^ as well as Juftice;, in the following Words : *^^ We know there are fome Kinds ^"^ of "Deceit^ which tho' naturally permitted^ yet are condemned and exploded by feveral Per- fons; not ftriftly on Account of their Unlawjulnejsy but out of a certain Grandeur of Mind, ^^ and fometimes from a fecret ^' Confcioufnefs of their own '"^ Strength, Which Opinion he confirms by feveral remarkable Authorities, efpecially in refped: to Princes, from the bell of the ancient Moralifts; and his Citati- ons from them deferve very well to be confulted. 1 X. Having thus endeavoured to ftatc the true Notion of Honour, my €C ( 375^ ) jny next Bufinefs is to flievv^ what the popular,, or 7io7ninal Idea of it, does, ordinarily, import? X. And herCj there is a proper Occafion oi' obferving, that the moll common Terms .ar^ often the moJtconfufed and ambiguous. Every Man, bev:aufe they arc fre- quently ufed in Converfation, or Writing, apprehends, he perfect- ly underltands them; while few annex to them the fame Ideas, and others appear to have no certain or diltind: Idea of them at all. Among feveral Words of this Kind, w^hich Ufe has made current, without impreffing any real Charader upon them; fucli as Conicience, Liberty, publick Good, and Loyalty; and, in fome Cafes, Law and Juitice itfelf, I am here, particularly to add, that of Honour ; than which, if A a 4 we ( 37 concerning Things that are only founded on mere prudential Con- liderations. So that Men would be at a continual Lofs to know, whether Truth and Juftice, So- briety and Chaility ; to which the Idea of Praife and Virtue are now affixed ; would not, in fome future Time, when the Lcgillature ihoM fo ( 379 ) fo enaft;, juftly expofe Men to Punifhment and Difgrace. XIII. No Obligation^ for thefe Reafons^ can lie upon a Man in Point of Honour, by Virtue of any human Conftitution or Au- thority whatever, to an Aftion, notorioufly, finful: This can ad- mit no Dilpute. But there is an- other falfe Notion of Honour, which, fometimes, obtains among Perfons of weak, or ill-inform- ed Minds, which ought , alfo, to be removed. It is common for Men, when they have once, o- penly, committed fome Error or Folly, to think themfelves obli- ged in Honour, and that they may avoid the Reproach of Le- vity or Inconftancy, to proceed in it. So that though their Hearts fecretly accufe them of Temerity^ or Indifcretion ; yet they ( 38o ) they will defend what they have faid^ or done : And the Defence of their Condufl, frequently, is worfe, and expofes them to great- er Cenfure, than the very Fault, wherewith they are charged. As a Perfon once guilty, or fufpeft- ed to be guilty, of a Lye; to a- void Detection, often, brings him- felf under a Neceflity of cover- ing it, by a Train of additional Lies, or, perhaps, of horrid Im- precations. XIV. And if a Notion of Ho- nour cannot oblige againft Rea- fons of Prudence, or in refped: to fuch Things, as have, perhaps. Nothing direftly criminal in them ; much Icfs can it oblige to any Afts of Injuftice, to the Pre- judice, or Provocation of other Perfons; notwithftanding Cuf- tom may, in great Meafurc, have leflened ( 38i ) leflened the Infamy^, wherewith iiich Afts ought to have been^ and would have been^ otherwife^ at- tended. XV. I refer, here, to that falfe Notion of Honour, which puts Men upon revenging themfelves, where any real, or imaginary. In- dignity is offered them, by fhed- ding the Blood of the Offender : No lefs a Sacrifice being thought fufficient to attone for the Inju- ries they have fuftained. I do not, here, inquire, how far, in a State of Nature, and Independen- cy, one Man may have a Power over the Body, or Life, of ano- ther, where he is violently at- tacked, in his Perfon, or Reputa- tion ; and cannot, otherwife, de- fend either of them, but by re- pelling his Ad verfary by Violence. But where Men are incorporated into ( 38x ) into regular Societies^ and have fubmitted to be governed by cer- tain Laws, which take Cogni- zance of all Offences^ that may arife among them; to the Deci- fion whereof^ the Judgment, con- cerning fuch Offences^ is referred. In this Cafe, for a private Perfon, to take the Power of the Sword into his own Hands, upon any Pretence, is, directly, to make himfelf a Ruler ^ and a Judge ; and to tranfgrefs the Laws, in the higheft Initance of Contempt and Difobedience, that of invading the Right, the proper Right, of the civil Magiftrate. XVI. Now, an Obligation to all human Laws, fo far as they are juft and equitable, being founded in the Laws of Nature and Reafon, they have, confe- quently, in them the Force of a divine ( 38? ) divine Law. And the fame Ar- gumenty whereby we prove that Ni>thing^ which is contrary, to the natural Law^, can be agree- able to the Laws of Honour, will ipvincibly prove , that Honour can never oblige us to adl in Breach of thofe human Laws, to which we profefs, and owe. Sub- jeftion. XVII. I will add, that even, ab- ftracling from human Laws, and, on Suppofition, that a certain Number of Men lliould meet, or be call fortuitcufly, upon any Part of the uninhabited World, where upon their iirll Congrefs, no one could pretend to have any Power, or Authority, over another ; yet, even here, in Cafe of any Injury ofibred, the Party injured could have no Right to demand, or feek. Reparation^ ex- iafh) , cept ( 384) cept iti a reafonable Degree of Proportion to the Injury done to him. For though he is not re- itrained by any pofitive Compadl^ to which they have by Confent fubmitted ; ftill the common Law of Reafon^ of Humanity, and Charity; that Law, in particular, of not doing to another what, in a fuppofed Change of Circumftances, a Man would not have done to himfelf; a Law, univerfally, binding in every State and Con- dition of Life, will oblige him, not to extend his Demands of Sa- tisfaftion, beyond the Degree of fuch Injury, as he hath received. Nay, he will rather, in many Cafes of lefs Concernment, chufe to fuffer U^rong^ and even to re- cede from thofe Methods of Re- taliation, which he might, in ftrift Jullice, take, than endea- vour ( 38y ) vour to revenge himfelf, for flight or trival Offences. XVm. Would Men, in civil Society, moderate their Paffions and Refentments, by thefe Rules, they would not, fo readily, work themfelves up, or fly out (efpeci- ally, when the Injury apprehend- ed, or received, is inconfiderable) into thofe violent Heats, which Nothing but Blood can allay; and which frequently, therefore, ter- minate in their own, or their Ad- verfaries Death ; and, fometimes^ in the Deftrudion of both ; and that upon a vain fantaftick Noti- on, of what they call Honour: Which, faith, the excellent Gro- tins, upon this Stihje£i : ^^ ap- ^' pears no lefs contrary to Rea- ^^ fon, than the Maxims of found " Piety. For Honour, import- ^^ ing an Idea of fome Excellency B b '' and ( 38^ ) " and Merit; he that can put ^^ up an Afti'ont, difcovering a Superiority of Mind, as being above the Senfe of it, rather augments his Honour, than does any Thing to the Di- ^^ niinution of it. Neither is it of any Significancy, that fome Men, through a corrupt Judg- ment, traduce this Virtue with ^^ falfe and opprobrious Names. ^^ For the Errors, or falfe Judg- ^^ ments, of weak, or wicked *^ Men, do not alter the Nature *^ of Things. Neither are they, '^ who believe the Chrillian Re- *^ velation, only, of this Opinion; '^ but even the Philofophcrs have '^ argued, from a common Prin- ciple of natural Reafon, that it is the Sign of a weak, mean, ^' or eftcminate Soul in Man, not re (387) '^ not to be able to bear Inju- ^"^ ries XIX. I would not^ hereby, in- finuate, as if Men could be too cautious in preferving their Ho- nour ; provided, this may be done in a juft and honourable Way. But Honour, as every Thing elfe, that is excellent, ought to have fome diftindt Charaderiftick , whereby it may be known and afcertained. Now, by what Rule can we fo properly try and exa- mine a Quality, wherein fome pe- culiar Perogative of a human Mind is fuppofed to lie; as by that Reafon, whereby human Na- ture, itfelf, is dignified and di- ftinguiflied ? that Reafon, by ail- ing in Conformity to which, we * Grot. De Jur. Bel & Pac. Lib. 2. Ca^. i. />. 10. B b X alone ( ?88 ) alone approach nearer to the Ori- ginal Source of all Excellency. XX. Nothing is^ therefore, here intended to the Diminution of Honour, in the true, but on- ly in the improper, or abufive. Notion of it. No Charader, in- deed, is of fuch Importance, I do not fay, toward efFefting our more private Defigns (an Advan- tage, by no Means, in itfelf, contemptible) but towards a hap- py Condu6l, and Execution, of any great, or publick, Enter- prize. This is fo vilible, that let two Perfons of equal Fortune, Capacity, or Addrefs, exprefs themfelves in the fame Terms; giv€ the fame Advice; and nego- tiate the fameAifair; yet what they fay, or do, fhall operate, af- ter a very different Manner; or be attended, wdth very different Succefi, ( 389 ) Succefs^ as they are differently thought of, or eftecmed. If wc entertain a good Opinion of any Perfon^ or confider him as a Ma?t of Honour y all his Motions are well received; all his Actions fuppofed to proceed from good Motives^ to be conduced by the wifeft Means, and to profecute the bell Ends. His Advice, his Perfuafions, his very Reproofs, find an eafy Accefs to the Heart. But a Perfon, who lies under any Calumny, or Sufpicions, cannot exert himfelf to the Benefit of others, even when his Meafures are well concerted, his Admoni- tions jufl, and his Deiigns and Aftions prudently conducted , without committing fome Kind of Violence upon them. XXI. It is not, therefore, fuf- ficient to a Man, who would ren- B b 3 der ( 390 ) der himfelfj in any fuperior De- gree^ ufeful^ or confiderable, in So- ciety, that he fhould be negathely honeft, or honourable; that is, conduft himfelf after fuch a Manner, as not to offend, direftly, or openly, againft publick Fame ; it is incumbent on him, if he will preferve that Degree of E- fteem in the World, which will give him any Weight, or Autho- rity in his Station, not only to provide Things hone/i in the Sight of God, and Men ; but to approve the Things that are excel- lent, XXII. I will here add, that Honour always fuppofes fome Quality, or Aftion, more peculi- arly, relating to Men, conlider- ed as Members of Society, And, therefore, the Signification of it is properly reftrained to fuch In- Itances ( 391 ) ftances of our Duty, whereby we promote^ in one Kind^or othcr^ the Good of other Men; or difcover, at leaft, a generous Difpofition, where we want Power, to that End. A Man of Piety, of Meek- nefs, and Sobriety, will, on ac- count of thefe Qualities, render himfelf accepted of God, and ap- proved of Men; but the more proper Subjetls of Honour^ are Ad:s of Juftice, whether commu- tative, or dillributive; and, ef- pecially y of Beneficence. And the Idea of Honour, indeed, is lb reftrained to thefe Subjefts, that the Charafter of it is, in a Man- ner, by common Ufe, appropri- ated to Perfons of Diftinclion in the World ; who have larger A- bilities, on one Account, or other, and a wider Compafs, with more B b 4 Occafions ( 39^ ) Occafions of doing Good, in civil Life. XXIII. From which Confider- ation, a farther Argument may be formed, to fhew, that Honour ought never to be feparated from Honelly ; as all Perfons in Pro- portion to the Advantages they enjoy, of a more liberal Educa- tion, and improved Underftand- ing, are under a ftronger Obliga- tion to allert, recommend, and exemplify, a ftri^l Morality. XXIV. It appears, then, with- out any long Recapitulation of what has been faid upon this Head, that Honour, when di- ftinguilhed from moral Virtue, is not, in Reality, any Charadler, really, feparable from it, but only imports a different Manner of conceiving moral Virtue, particu- larly. L". ( 395 ) larly^ in refpe6l to the Branches of it juft before mentioned^ Ju- Jtice, and Beneficence. Honour^ therefore^ in the Language of wicked Men, who acknowledge not a real Diilinftion of Virtue and Vice, of lawful, or unlawful 3 but what arifes from common Opinion, feems to be one of the moft pernicious Principles, that the human Mind is capable of entertaining. For, in this Way of Reafoning, a Man of Honour, as he is called, can only be obliged to confult his external Reputati- on. No human Laws, or Com- patls, can reach the Heart, orj lay any Obligation upon the Con- fcience. Nothing can do this, ; but the internal Monitor, which fpeaks, continually, within us ; the filent, and ftill Voice whereof is heard in our greateft Privacies, and r ( 594 ) and* Retirements. But to one who difowns the Power and Au- thority of this internal Monitor, He cannot be of the leaft Ufe^ or Sgnificancy. And, therefore, the Man of Honour, according to his Notion of Honour, may commit, without Shame, or Remorfe, the moft unjuft and abominable Ac- tions, provided he can do it with Security, and in private, that is, without offending againft publick Fame , or what the World has agreed, at prefent, to call Ho- nour; whatever may happen to be called fo, in any Time future; for the Opinion of the World, if there be no real Difference in the Nature of Things, cannot affeft the Nature of them ; fo that a Man is at Liberty, provided he can efcape the Eye, or Cenfure, of the World ; to acl, in fuch a Cafe, ( 39^ ) Cafe^ as private Paflion^ or Inte- reft, fliall direft him. This Opi- nion, therefore, which deftroys all the inward Reftraints of Ho- nour, (and it is eafy, on a thou- fand Occalions, to evade the out- ward) is fo pernicious, that 1 do not know, whether it be of more fatal Confequence in moral Life, to fay there is no God; / than to acknowledge the Being of a God, and to alTert, at the fame Time, he has given no cer- tain, or ftated. Rules ; no Rules, but what depend upon the muta- ble Humour, or Opinions, of Men, for the Condud: of moral Life. XXV. I do not fay, but that fome Men have naturally \^o good and generous Difpofitions , that they cannot ealily do a bafc, or uniuft Adion, without offering much ( ^9^) much Violence to themfelves. And it mull be owned^ this Dif- pofition docs often carry Men^ not otherwife very fcrupulous in Matters of Confcience, a great Way^ in all the Appearances of Honour. But it is not to be de- pended upon, efpecially, in Cafes of Extremity, which much affed: us, except it be animated and en- forced with that internal Prin- ciple, of which I have been fpeaking. We may call Honour, in fuch Perfons, Humour, Fa- Jhion, good Nature, Senlibility of Temper, a higher Fermenta- tion of the Blood, or fome other occafional Caufe, of giving a more violent Agitation to the Spirits, whereby the Soul is powerfully affefted. But, Nothing, to con- clude, can deferve the Name of /rue ( 397 ) true Honour, but what is found- ed in Reafon and Conjcience, Chap. XIX. Some hijiorical Ohfervations^ upon the Trogrefs of moral Thilofophy^ among the An- cients ; and concerning their Authority. I. The general Trinciple upon "which the Author proceeds. II. The Morality of Chrijtian Writers the mo ft pure ^ and perfect. III, IV. Tet that of Thilofophers^ in a State of na- tural Re ligio7t, the proper Suh- je£l of Inquiry at prefent. V. What we owe to them. VI, VII, (398) VII, VIIL IX. Of the Stokhs:, particularly^ Zeno, Chryiippus, <^;/<^ Seneca. X, XI, XII. Of Socrates, Plato, Ariftotle, XIII, XIV, XV, XVI. AndCi^tm, I. T Proceed, every where, upon •*• this Principle ; that Reafon is the proper Rule of human Judgment, and Adlion. Reafon, whereby a Man endeavours to difcover the trueNature of Things, with the feveral Relations, where- in they ftand towards one ano- ther; and, thereupon, having formed the Scheme of his Con- du6l, determines efFeftually to follow it. To this End, every Man mult aflert that natural in- herent Right of judging for him- felf, from which no Man, confi- I dered as a reafonable Agent, is (excluded. But it is very confi- ftent with private Judgment, that ( 399 ) that we fhould inquire, efpecial- ly, in more nice and intricate Cafes, relating to moral Life, (fince the Reafon of all Duties is not equally evident) what has been the Opinion of other M6n concerning them? efpecially, of of fuch Men, if they can be found, who have had, for Ages pall, an eftablilhed Reputation throughout the World, for their great Wifdom, and Knowledge. 11. Were I thought worthy to be confulted, by any Perfon, up- on fuch an Inquiry, I lliould di- rect him to feveral ancient Chri- Jiian Writers ; yet not, ftridly, under that Charafter, or as they confirm the moral Truths and In- ftrudions delivered in their Wri- tings, by a divine Authority ; but becaufe theix is certainly to be difcovered in them^ without any Regard ( 400 ) Regard to divine Authority, a more ftrifl:, pure, and perfpicu- ous, a more uniform and confi- ftent Scheme of Morality, than can be found in the moral Trails of any ancient Heathen Writer whatever: Which Aflertion, tho' it be not admitted, neither, in this Place, do Idelign it Ihould be admitted, as an Argument, to prove the divine Infpiration of the holy Scriptures; yet it is a very ftrong Argument in Proof of their Excellency and Perfe6li- on, as a Rule of moral Life. III. But fince he, who Ihould move the Queftion, might poffi- bly except againft Chriftian Wri- ters, as being prepoflelled with Chriftian Principles, and, confe- quently, as lefs equal, or compe- tent Judges in the Cafe. I lliould, in the next Place, propofe to lead him 1 ( 401 ) him into the philofophical World, not to take a minute and dillindt Survey of it; that would be an Attempt of more Trouble and Curiolity, than Ufe ; but only to make fuch tranfient Difcoveries, upon which fome general Ac- count might be given, concern- ing the Temper and Produce of the Country. IV. And here to quit the Me- taphor, and examine the Thing in a plain and natural Manner, it is readily granted, that we find, in the Writings of the Philofb- phers, many excellent Rules and Precepts, here and there difper- fed, for the Conduct of moral Life. And if they did not al- ways refolve thofe Precepts into their true and proper Grounds, it was not from any invincible De- fect in human Reafon, but for C c Want ( 40^ ) Want of particular Attention^ in themfelves ; or ^ becaufe they did not make that Ufe^ in every Re- fpedt^ they might have made of thofe reafoning Powers, where- with God had endowed thejii. For human Reafon is the fame in all Ages: The great Ditference lies in the Exercife and Applica- tion of it; which, tho' it much depends on the native Strength, or Liberty, of our own Minds; may, yet, produce different Dif- coveries, in different Ages, rela- ting to Morality, by Means of feveral accidental Caufes, under the Direftion of divine Provi- dence. V. It mult, however, be ac- knowledged, that with all the new Lights, that are now aftbrd- ed to us in moral Philolbphy, we owe ( 403 ) owe very much to the ancient moral Writers; if not for the Purity and Strid:nefs of their Rules^ yet for the lively^ beau- tiful^ and natural Manner^ where- with they did fo happily embellifh^ and recommend them. VI. It feemS;, indeed^ much more difficult to refolve^ why the Philofophers have not left us any juft^ or perfect^ Syftem of Morality; than, why many of them, celebrated for their great Wildom and Learnhig, fo grofly erred, concerning fome of the molt fundamental, and even com- mon. Duties of" moral Life; The Morality of the Stoicks, more llrift, than pure or perfect^ was, particularly, taught by Zeno and Chryfippiis^ as two oi\hQ grand Mafters^ or Heads of thatSed:, if the former was not the original C c X Found- { 4'=>+ ) Founder of it. Yet we arc not to expect much Light froni him^ towards "difcovenng cither the true Principles^, or the proper Duties of Morality. His Way of reafoning, upon -all Subjefls^ being rather to amufe and ])er- plex, than to eftablifii any Things as certain. His Bufineis was to take the Fields and fight againft all Comers ; and if he could not fubdue his Adverfaries by main Strength^ to circumvent them by any Artifice, or Stratagem, that a fubtle and ready Wit could, fupply. When he fet himielf to confute an Opinion, or baffle an Opponent;, all lie propofcd was to triumph, without Regard to the Truth, to the Probability, or even Poflibility of the Matter in Conteft: And, upon this Account, Seneca^ enumerating leveral ab- furd ( 4oy ) furd DoftriiieS;, advanced by the SceptickS;, reprefents none of them ib extravagant in his Notions, as Ze/w. Sojiie of them denied the Truth of one Thing, fome of an- other; but, '"'' according to Zenoy there was no Truth or Certainty in any Thing. It cannot be pre- tended, tliis Obfervation ought to be confined to Subjetls of natural Philolbphy ; fince Sex/ us Einperi- cus has proved, both, according to Zeno, and Chryjippus^ that there is no real, or certain. Difference between Virtue and Vice. We are not to be furprized, if upon fuch an uncertain and fluftuating Scheme, thefe tv\'o Fathers of the Stoical Sect, erred very much^ when they came to explain them- * Si Zsiioni^ neumim quidem. Settee. Ep, §8.. C c 3 felvcs ( 4o<5 ) felves upon particular moral Du- ties: That the former of them^ for Inftance, taught^ Men ought to permit, to one another, a pro- mifcuous Ufe of their Wives; and is violently fufpefted to have pradlifed, if he did not teach, a Sin which ought not to be na- med : That the latter of them aflerted the Lawfulnels of an in- ceftous Commerce, between Per- fons in the firft Degrees of Con- fanguinity; and that both of them filled their Writings with fuch obfcene Paflages, which could not be read byPerfons, who had any Senfe of Shame, or Mo- defty. VII. The fucceeding Stoicks being fenfible, that according to the primitive and fundamental Doctrines of that Se6l, the Ho- nour of it could not, pollibly, be defended. ( 407 ) defended^ endeavoured, in fonic xMeaiure, to reform and foften them ; and to bring them nearer to the Principles of a pure Mo- rality: Particularly^, about the Time when the Chriftian Doc- trine began to fpread, and to en- lighten the World. Yet the No- tion that all Crimes are equal, as that it was indifferent in the Na- ture and Reafon oi the Thing, whether a Man fliould murther his Father ^, or kill a Cock, did ftill, generally, obtain among them. VIII. An Affeftation of Subtle- ty feems, indeed, to have been, no lefs, the Charafter of Chryjip- puSy than of Zeno ; but it, fome- times, engaged him in Difficul- ties, out of which he could find * Tall po. MuYxna. C c 4 no ( 4o8 ) no Way of extricating himfelf.' He would propofe Objeftions with fuch Force^ and in fo good a Lights that his Anfwers were neither^ always^ fo folid^ nor fo clear^ as to oblige an Aflent to the contrary Opinion. At other Times, he advanced Notions, not fo much unworthy of a Philofo- pher, as altogether chimerical; as that Virtue and Vice, Arts and Sciences, were corporeal, and ra- tional Animals; which, befides, the Temerity of the Aflertion, without Proof, or the leaft Ap- pearance of Probability, by uni- ting the Ideas of corporeal, and rational, in thefame Subjeft, I- deas the moll foreign, and incom- patible in Nature, is, of itfelf, Sufficient to difcover to us, that with all his Subtlety, this Philo- foph^r did not propofe it as a Rule ( 409 ) Rule to himfelf^ always to argue, from clear and dillinft Ideas. Moft of the Abfurdities, indeed, and Paradoxes, objefted by Tlu- tarchy againft the Stoicks, are taken from Chryftppus, IX. Among all the Stoicks, no Perfon appears to have endeavour- ed more to recommend Morality in its full Compafs and Extent, or to have made greater Im- provements in the Theory of it^ than Seneca. Yet, he has rather declaimed, like a Man of Wit and Experience, againft Vice, than eftablilhed moral Virtue, upon its true Foundation. He under- ftood the Strength, and Defefts of human Nature; and knew, how to adorn his Subjed: with all thofe Ornaments, which were proper to f^t it off to Advantage; but> ( 41^ ) biit^ dcligning, if we may judge concerning his Intention^ from the Eifect of hisWrit ings^rather to fur- prize and pleafe^, than to convince, he feldom went to the Bottom of Things, or reduced the fine and beautiful Reflections, wherewith he abounds, to any true, or cer- tain Standard.' This being the Character of a Perfon, mucli cele- brated for his moral Writings, which are in the Hands of many Chriftians, and in feveral Lan- guages, I think my felf obliged to confirm it by two Authorities, againft which , there will lie no Exception; the firit is from Se- neca himlelf^ as cited by St. y^u- ftin ; who, on Occafion of what he had written, concerning certain impure, and wicked Rites of Pa- gan Superllition, reprefents him, laying, that a wife Man will con- form ( 411 ) form to thofe Rites^ not on Ac- count of their being acceptable to God, but in Obedience to hu- man Laws "'; founding the Obli- gation of obferving them, not in the Law of Nature, but in poli- tive Inllitution, contrary to the Law of Nature. tThe other Autho- rity is that oi §iuintilian^ whofe Character of this Moralift imports, that tho' he had an excellent Fa- culty of expofing the Vices of Mankind ; yet he was far from be- ing exa6l in his Refearches, conli- dered, ftridily, as a Philofopher. X. But may we not expeft greater Difcoveries, in Morality, from thofe three fhining Lights which appeared in the philoib- phical Worlds in the liime Age; * S. AuJ. Civ. Dei. L. 6. C. lo. + Li Philofphia panim diligens, egregius tamen Wiorum injcciutor. Liji. L. lo. C. i8. So- ( 41^ ) Socrates, Tlato, and Arijiotle^ As to the former, if we confider moral Philofophy, as reduced in- to a Method for the Conduct of human Life ; or as a ufeful and pradical Part of Knowledge ; the greateft Improvements,, to that End, have been afcribed to him. Before his Time, the Principles of it lay loofe and difperfed, in certain fliort Aphorifms or Sen- tences, without any regular, much lefs, any entire Dependence of one Thing upon another. But what- ever Improvements this excellent Perfon made in the moral, and praftical Parts of Philofophy , they appear to have been, folely, owing to the Light of his own Mind; foi*,lince he did not travel, as others of his Country Men did, in Search of Knowledge abroad, neither was there any Occafion, that ( 413 ) that he fliould take this Method, in order to inform hinifelf, con- cerning that, which by attend- ing to the common Principles of natural Reafon, he might, at any Time, difcover, in his clofeft Re- tirements; and the fooner, for being retired. Yet we know lit- tle of his Difcourfes, upon mo- ral, or other Subjefts, but what has been tranfmitted down to us, in the Writings of Tlato^ and Xenophon ; the former of whom, efpecially, is fuppofed to have made him the Author of feveral * Things which he never faid. From whom, however, it ap- pears, how orthodox foever, ge- nerally fpeaking, Socrates has been in his Dodlrine relating to Mo- rality itfelf, yet in the Method he took to propagate it, he difcovered much ( 41+ ) much Diffidence, and Uncertain- ty. XL Tlato improved, upon the Principles of this Philofopher; but, notwithftanding the eafy , flow, the happy Cadence, and Beauty of his Expreffion ; he is not, always, perfectly clear in his Sentiments: Concerning which, therefore, we muft, fometimes, latisfy our felves, at laft, with making the moft probable Con- jeftures. But the Difficulty we are under, of finding out his Meaning, in certain Cafes, does not afford io juft Matter of Re- gret, or Complaint, as certain grofs and notorious Errors which occur in his Writings. For he not only held, with Socrates^ a Community oi Wives lawfial; but he delivered it as his Opinion, that ( 4ir ) that Infants might lawfully be de- llroycd, or cxpolcd to Itarve. And, herein, he is followed by AriftotU^ who yet might, here^ have found a much better, and more juft Caufe, of contradifting him, than on feveral other Occa- fions, wliich he affects to improve to that End. What feems more unaccountable is, that Tlutarch, who had, with much Care, exa- mined, and confuted, the Errors of feveral other moral Writers; yet, fjpeaking concerning the Laws of Lycurgiis, obferves, he found Nothing \\\ them repugnant to the Laws of Julhce, or Honefty: And, yet, not only, thele two Errors, relating to a Community of Wives, and the Murthering oflnfmts, if weak or fickly; but Theft, alfo, \^'as legitimated by thofe Laws. Xll. Ari^ ( 41^ ) Xn. Arlftotle hath, indeed, left us a methodical Svftem of Morality, wherein moft of the Duties relating to private, and focial. Life, are, according to his Scheme, very well deduced and eftabliihed; but, belides, that in his Ethkks, as in his other Works. He is, fometimes, obfcure ; if he did not really affe6l to hide him- felf, as there is Reafon to believe, from the Apology he made to Alexander^ for the Publication of fbme of his Books, contrary to the Sentiments of that Hero; ^^ That they were publilhed,and, *^ in EfFeft, not publiflied, becaufe *^ not intelligible". It may be, farther, obferved, concerning A- riftotle^ in common with other Philofophers, that he never efta- bliihed the Truths of Morality, upon their true and proper Grounds; •( 417 ) iGrounds; or hath fliewedthcOl^ ligation we arc under to prac- tile theni, in Conformity to the Will of God; the Rcafonablcnefs^ and Piety^ of imitating him^ iii all his imitable Perfeftions * and from a Conlidcration of fu- ture Rewards, aaid Punilliments. XIII. Cicero, himfelf^ was defi- .tient;, in not giving thefe feveral Sanclions^ to the Duties of moral Life. And^ therefore^ it mav be faid, concerning thofe admira- ble Rules of Virtue^ which he hath laid down in his Works^ that there is a great deal more Beauty in theni; than Strength; that they want that Forcc^ which they would have had^ toper- fuade, had he fupcrfirudcd upon the truCj, and fure Foundations, of Virtue. Even^, in a Court of publick Judicature^ where he was D d plead" :( 4lg ) pleading, he endeavoured to expofe the Dofti ine, concerning a future State of Punifliment to wicked Men^as a groundlefs Fiftion '''\ And, }On another Occalion^this grave and learned Orator did not think it inconfiftent with his Charafter;, in either Rcfpeft^ openly^ to apolo- gize^, for the criminal and im- pure Liberties^ wherewith iVf. Celius was charged: Not^ as^ it might have been expefted^ a Phi- lofopher would have attempted^ at leaft to do^ from the Nature or Reafon of Things; but mere- ly, from the Licentioufnefs of the Age, and former Cuflom, and Connivance. Which was, in Ef- fect:, to teach, before the great- eft Audience, at that Time, in the World ; that where Men ha\e Pro Cluejitio^ been <(4i9 ) hccn able, by Means of fuperior Force, or Numbers, to introduce, or fupport, any wicked Cuftoni, contrary to natural Order, or the Law of God ; fuch Cuftom, and confequently. Men, ought to be obeyed, rather than God. XIV. We are not to be furpri- ^ed, if ^ Perfon, who did not carry his Refearches after moral Virtue, to the true Original of it, and where it is only to be found, was ealily retained to plead for a loofe Morality; and that, after ■all the excellent Rules he hath laid down, for the Conduft of moral Life, he was fcarce fure, or pofitive in any Thing. I fliall give a remarkable Inftance, of the doubtful, and infecure Grounds, upon which he proceeded in his moral Philofophy, from what I fliall, prefentlv,obferve,relal ing to D d 1 Car^ Carnend^s, In the ine^il Tim^, i helve noDefign, on any Account^ to jdetraft from Cicero s Merit, or the Glory, whereof he has been fo juftly poflefled, in all fud- ceeding Ages, and among the bell Judges, for the xnany admirable Maxims, relating to moral Life, which he has interfperfed in all his Works; but, whereof^ in his Book of Offices^ he has formed a very regular, and beautiful. Plan ; though he has no where, as hath been obferved, eitablifli- ed Morality upon its true Balis; nor, always, upon the bell Prin- ciples, which himfelf has, fome- times, advanced. An Argument, that his Notions were fludluatiiig, and uncertain; as fhofe, of all Men, naturally are, who build either upon talfe, or more pre- carious Grounds. XV. Moft i Ciix') XV. Moll of the Arguments, which he employs to ellablilh^, and recomuiend moral Virtue, are taken from the Conveniency of it, with Refpeft to the Tran- quillity of the Mind, or thg Health of the Body ; to our Eafe, our Reputation^ or Intereft, in the Commerce we, maintain \yith other Men. All theft are very proper, and reafonable Topicks of Perfuafion, b^caufe they, fe- verally, fuppofe fome phylical Good; to whigh moral Good na- turally tends, and which it has, indeed, a very po\yerful Influence, to promote. But yet thefe a;:q IVlotives, wherewith, as the)^ are founded in Confideration? merely prudential and tcin- porary, very wickecj Men^ evepi Men^ ' wlio. believe Nothing of 4. D d 3 Gpd^ ( 4^^ God, or Religion^ may be, in cer- tain Cafes, much afFe6led. XVL That, upon which Cice- f^ appears to lay the greateft Strefs, towards fecuring the In- terefts of Virtue, is a Senfe of Glory. His Sentiments upon this Head, were fublime, and agree- able, to his Charafter, as a Ro- man; hnt^ befides, the Influence which the Genius of his Country, iand the Principles of his Educa- tion, might be prefumed to have upon him, in this Refpedl; his vi- olent Thirft after Praif e feems ta have proceeded, in great Mea- furc, from Conftitution. It was owing to this Motive, that when he deiired Lucceius to write the Hillory of his Adminiftrati- on, he authorized him, plainly, tbnegled: the Rules of hiftorical Truths (( 4^^3 ) Truth, in his Favour. He wrote on tJic Tame Occalion> as if there had been Nothing new^ or cxcep' tionable in the Requcft to his Friend Attkits, Tlie Account, of tiiis his irregular Ambition 3 remains ; while the Hiftory of his Adniinillration, if it was ever written, hath periflicd. C n A p. XX, Jin Argument of Carneades^^ relating to the Subject of mo- ral Virtue^ pirticularly^ cmfdered. \ A general Chara6ier of this- Thilofopher. 11. His Arguy vxent propr)fed, IIL. Cicero E e 4. bad: Jsad too formiddble AppreheTtA [tons of it. TV, V. What might -have been jdid in Anfiuer to />. Vi; VII. The Rights of Nature y and the Law of Na- ture , dijiingui/hed.' VIII. iXy^ X. The Argument of Carnea? 1 • des^ ' in one Brandy of it, proves too mtich. XI;, XII. Inconchiftve on. another Account, XIII. f/r- ged^ hy the Author, with ^ an addational Force, XIV. And anfwered. XV, XVI, XVII, XVIIL The 'Dejign of thefe hi^ ftorical Remarks 'j and, in ge^ neral, concerning, the Me a [tires of.^iihnlflion tQ Anthoriij/^. I T Mention Carneades, diG:inS:lyy -^ in the lalt Piace^, as his Argu - nients relating to Morality^, thau great Branch q£ fu/Zice, appeared, k) vei.y Idi'midable to Cic"^? vs^/fkat ^ ' ■ he ( 4^-T ) he declined to anfwer them. The general Character of this Philofo- phcr waS;, that in Reference to the Condiifl: oi moral Life^, he al- lowed Nothing but Probabilities ; he believed there was, upon that Head of Inquiry, no Certainty, or Evidence, in any Thing '*'. And, therefore, after the Ex- ample of Socrates^ and Arcefilas^ his Bufinefs was rather to dif- pute, than prove; to propofe and (^onfider Difficulties, than to efta- blilh, or afcertain Truth, upon clear and diftinft Grounds. When he was fent on an Embally to Rome:, with Critolaus and Dio- genes, to follicit the Mitigation of a Fine, impofcd upon the ^- the?zianSy the ' Reputation, and ^\ Qua quanqnain non pmipe/'entur, tanten quia 'vifim hdberent quendam inji^nem ^ illuftrem^ his J.ipimtii liia rege'retur, CiQ. de Nat, Deor. •"' "' Force, ( 42.n any Examples^ the Condition of Men is fuch, that if they have a Mind to be jult, they mull art imprndenf- •/ ly, and foolilhlv. And if tftcy '^huvc cc cc cc cc cc cc