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NORTHWESTEEN UNIVERSITY
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NORTHWESTERN
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Bequest of
Charles G. Dawes
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Nonhwcstem Universi^-1926
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LEE ON THE SUSQUEHANNA IN 1563.
A MILITARY CRITICISM.
BY
J. WATTS DE PEYSTER. *
** The writer is aware that in this present age of indifferentism he must submit to the
charge of bigotry, * ♦ ♦ As regards the charge of reviving ' the eviP whici^ history has
buried, we should remember that the wisdom of the Present is based upon the experience of
the Past ; that so far from being our duty, in charity, to cast a veil ♦ * ♦ it is a charity to
the human race to unmask their enemy, and to warn the present generation of the onslaught
of an insidious foe."—Rev. William Bramlev Moore, in Preface to his historical romance,
" The Six Sisters of the Valleys," VIII. and XVI.
" History is built up of two distinct parts. One of these, fAepublic or notoriousPari^
consists of facts. The other part is that which is secret. It * * ♦ includes the mo¬
tives and causes of events. The official and confidential communications remain on the
archives and the day comes when they are picked out of the dust."—Napibr-Klinkow-
strom's Metternich. Vol. I., page 172.
After the completion of a carefully digested work, fully en¬
dorsed by Maj.-Gen. Humphreys, Chief of Staff Army of the
Potomac, and Commandant of the combined Second and Third
Corps, originally published in the New York Citizen and Round
Table, " La Royale"—which completed a series of pamphlets on
the "Slaveholders' Rebellion," relating to the closing scenes of
one of the ipost momentous conflicts in which humanity ever
engaged—a conflict in which armies were extemporized whose
supèriors in the moral discipline, which alone makes nations in¬
vincible, have never existed on this planet—a few additional
words may be added in regard to the inexpressible value of time; in
deprecation of half measures; in an exposition of the want of
common sense which demonstrated a lack of true genius in the
chief Rebel commander. In the course of this conflict the writer
published a pamphlet on "Winter Campaigns, the Test of
Generalship," which was, curiously enough, followed by a sudden
change in the operations of our armies. In 1863, another pamph¬
let on " Practical Strategy" appeared, which attracted so much
attention that General (British Army) Hon. Sir Edward Cust, D.
C. L., author of the "Annals of the Wars," 9 vols., and " Lives of
the Warriors," 6 vols., prefaced his last issue, in 1869, with a
Letter Dedicatory (of xxxvii. pages), to the writer of this Re¬
view, in which he admits the full force of the " Practical
Strategy " \Strategie Pratique] which, while it acknowledges every
rule, is conscious that exceptions prove the rule, and "may
be even the first germs of a new rule," and while it restrains mere
Talent within the limits of the rule, proper, permits Genius to
bridge any gulf which arrests Talent; because Genius is creative
2
Talent merely applicative. General Cust, in his " Letter Dedica¬
tory" to the writer, remarks on pages XIX., XX. ; " Now, in the
PKACTicE of war, as we learn it from history, there have been a
great many sound strategical contingencies, which permitted and
even obliged the commanding general to depart altogether from
any base of operations. In honest truth, I believe tliat our own
Wellington is the only great general who, under every phase of his
career, adhered consistently to the maintenance of a base; but then,
for the greater part of his career,/¿w base was his ships, (i.) [His
base was the whole coast of Spain which was in his control. This
view exactly corresponds with the idea of Washington, whose base
for the tim® being was the district he occupied, because it sufficed.]
The famous Torstenson marched an army from Moravia to the
Baltic, altogether in the face of the enemy the entire way, and sub¬
sisted his army effectively in that long and arduous movement 7£/ff//!-
out any base. Marlborough marched from the Netherlands to the
Danube without a base; and Marshal von Traun, in like manner,
carried his army from the Rhine to the Elbe, and crossed both
rivers in the teeth of the enemy, and had 7ieither magazines nor
hospitals for his soldiers. Take the example of Napoleon, in his
masterly campaign of 1814, when it was quite impossible for him
to pay any regard whatever to any base of operations. These
facts of undisputed history will prove to the reviewer that in the
practice of war a base is not absolutely necessary, although it
must be admitted to be so in theory. Besides, it will be found in
the history of many campaigns, that it has been often found" ne¬
cessary in effect to change a base in the midst of ' operations.'
Some established line of retreat must always, of course, be indis¬
pensable, since every well-ordered army'must have its communi¬
cations' wifli magazines and hospitals ; yet, if war is ever to feed
itself according to the French Republican school, a base is
scarcely practicable, except when it is a whole district."
Washington, for Example, with the small armies he com¬
manded, made each position which he successively occupied serve
as a base for his comparatively insignificant forces, since he could
derive all the "supplies for the mouth" from the country immedi¬
ately surrounding him. The difficulty of making the term base
comprehensible generally is that almost every one confounds base
with contour of base which in some respects are the same and, never¬
theless, are entirely different.
This paragraph is the text on which the writer proposes to
found a criticism on the operations of Lee in one especial regard,
in the summer of 1863. This criticism was written down years
ago and immediately after visiting the country between Philadel¬
phia and Gettysburg, the battlefield itself, and the district between
3
the latter and the Potomac in its course from Williamsport past
the arena of Antietam or Sharpsburg. They were not published
at that time, because the people were so wild in t¿eir judgment of
men and events, especially in regard to military operations, that a
calm consideration of any campaign was impossible while pre- *
judice was in the ascendancy, and the touchstone of political suc¬
cess deemed the only criterion whereby to judge of a science and
an art which, however much politics had and has to do with it,
yet, if it hopes to perfect itself, should have as little as possible to
do with politics. That these are not, however, opinions formed
" after the fact" (après coup) is susceptible of the best proof. They
were first submitted to one of our ablest corps commanders, who
perfectly coincided therewith, and laid before a military friend
' who was in Pennsylvania at the time and knew the temper and
dispositions of the people and of things. More recently another
major-general, U. S. A., who has drawn up the most admirable
plans, day by day, of Lee's Gettysburg campaign, has enunciated
the same doctrine. Maj.-Gen. G. K. Warren, and others of high
rank, coincided in every particular with the writer. Previously,
and at the time when these considerations would have particu¬
larly interested the public, they were withheld, because they were
utterly opposed to the views of men who at the time, in this
country, were considered infallible judges in all military matters,
just exactly what they, in reality, were not, as events and they
themselves proved.
A theoretic general and a theoretic critic, such as the author
of the " History of the Army of the Potomac," styled by another
theoretical teacher "the Napier of our War," must ever place a
/a/se estimate upon the absolute necessity of maintaining uninter¬
rupted communications with a fixed base, just as a tethered
animal can not exceed the length of the cord or lariat by which it
is attached to the picket or " base." Genius will tear up the picket
and " go it loose"—not a slang expression, but a regular military
phrase in the "Iron Age," the XVIIth, a century of continuous
and the bloodiest war—when the opportunity presents itself. On
such occasions to be trammeled by any iron-clad rule indicates a
destitution of that common sense which, in its immediate applica¬
tion to the fitting occasion, is simply another expression of genius,
and this (Genius) is a direct interposition of God through an indi¬
vidual human brain to the opportunity.
One of the best exemplifications of the want of common
sense is the course of General Robert E. Lee in Pennsylvania, in
June-July 1863, firstly in that he seemed to be totally blind to
the immense results which must have resulted in an audacious
"Forward" in his last "sortieand, secondly, in that he forgot
4
that the object of a sortie is to do as much damage as possible to
the investing forces, but particularly to their material, their sup¬
plies and their works. He forgot that many great generals, who
dared to cut loose from their communications and, like Torsten-
son, " make war support war," have thereby achieved the great¬
est triumphs, on record, for their country. Why ? Because in so
doing he continually created new bases. Sherman's March to the
Sea was simply a change of base of a railroad to the base of marine
transportation. One of the severest charges brought against Gus-
tavus Adolphus was that he did not march direct on Vienna after
his victory of Leipsic, 7th September, 1631, and dictate peace in the
enemy's capital, (2) just as Frederic began with violating the laws
of theoretic-martinet-strategy with his operations in Silesia in 1741.
Frederic may be said to have been always " cut loose," vibrat¬
ing, shooting to and fro like a shuttle. Napoleon compelled a
peace on his own terms in 1797 and 1805 ; in both cases by paying
no attention to what was happening in his rear, but looking stead¬
fastly to Vienna and to the main army of the enemy immediately
opposed to him, as his objectives. His campaigns of Jena to some
extent, and of Eylau, were in reality made in violation of the mili¬
tary rule of " securing his communications," in the ordinary sense
of this misunderstood term. Thus Blucher operated in the fall of
1813, in i8r4 and in 1815, and saw triumph crown his audacity.
Although Blucher cut loose from his base on the Rhine after Ligny,
yet, nevertheless, he simply changed his base, beause the British
army then constituted a new base to him.
Hannibal, and all who did greatly like him, succeeded through
their own consummate common sense, or audacious genius, since
it is admitted " the Carihaginians did not beat the Romans, but
Hannibal the Roman generals." He got no victory but by his
own individual conduct." {^Scarce Tract, No. 10, Series pro and con
a Standing Army, 1697. Page 9.) How often have great generals
cut loose from their comiflunications and achieved wonders com¬
mensurate with the risk. One of the severest charges—repeated
for emphasis—against Gustavus-Adolphus was that he did not
march directly upon Vienna after Leipsic, 1632, and dictate peace
in the enemy's capital. Oxenstiern, one of the wisest heads that
ever lived, urged this very course. (3.) Chancellorsville, in Lee's
case, corresponded to Leipsic. From Leipsic to Vienna, as the crow
flies, is three hundred miles ; from Chancellorsville to Philadelphia,
by the same route Lee followed, is about the same distance. In
1632 roads were only such in name : in 1863, these were not only
macadamized, but there were parallel railroads. Between Leipsic
and Vienna rise fearful mountains and rivers, as a rule not ford-
able and subject to sudden floods.
5
It is more than likely that had Napoleon, in 1813, carried out
his own plan, which he projected at Düben, which, was traversed
by his marshals, and operated "Forward on Berlin!" with his
left, the campaign would have terminated just the contrary of
what it did immediately afterwards at Leipsic. Oxenstiern,
one of the wisest heads that ever planned and counseled (who,
in after years, 1641-45, found a perfect executive in Torsten-
son), urged his master Gustavus to move onwards to the Danube
after his Leipsic, in September, 1631, as did Horn after his sub¬
sequent astonishing passage of the Lech in 1632. Thalheimer
places this in the clearest light. Recent researches have de¬
monstrated in a great measure, that politics, not strategy, influenced
the Swedish monarch not to march southwards, and the lure of
ambitious aggrandizement blinded him to the prize of military
success. The very political reasons which arrested or diverted
Gustavus should have urged Lee onwards, for the recognition of
the Confederacy lay in the direction of Philadelphia, which was
open, and not on the route to Washington, which was barred by
the army of the Potomac. (See note Lech, Bridging, &c.)
Chancellorsville, in Lee's case, corresponded to Leipsic. From
Leipsic to Vienna, as the crow flies, is some three hundred hiiles.
From Chancellorsville to Philadelphia, by the route Lee followed,
is almost the same distance.
Throughout the campaign of Chancellorsville-Gettysburg—
for the two battles and concurrent operations in reality constituted
but one campaign—and the writer will even maintain that Gettys¬
burg was the fruit of the flower-Chancellorsville—Lee was con¬
stantly demonstrating the inferiority of his generalship. If ever a
commander was outgeneraled, Lee was by Hooker in the initia¬
tive operations around Fredericksburg. Little credit is due to
Lee for what was done in the Wilderness to retrieve the first baulk.
(Exactly force of Napoleon's Table Talk, pages 19 and 21.)
That Lee was not utterly defeated there, is not due to his own
capacity, but to the incapacity of those who could have delivered
mortal blows more than once and did not. (4.) After this, when pre¬
paring his "last sortie," Pleasonton developed his whole plan of
operations, and had Hooker enjoyed the full powers to which he
was entitled, he could scarcely have failed to have crushed Lee.
When the first reliable news of Lee's invasion of the North, in
June-July, 1863, reached Tivoli, I pronounced the movement "the
last desperate throw of a gambler, who recklessly stakes all his
remaining fortune on a single cast of the dice." Satisfied of what
must be the inevitable result, if the Government displayed com¬
mon-place energy, and profited by the examples furnished by the
conduct of great generals in parallel situations—lessons with which
6
military history abounds—^^the letter, following, was written and ad¬
dressed to the President. As was afterwards discovered, the view
taken of the case therein coincided, almost word for word, with the
counsels of the wronged but prescient Hooker. This letter was held
back by a person. Jas. H. Woods, Esq., deceased, to whom it was en¬
trusted to forward, and, when too late to have any effect, was re¬
turned. Subsequently the editor of a leadingjournal, friendly to Gen.
Hooker, desired to publish it. Such was the disgust—if the expres¬
sion is permissible—however, consequent upon the escape of Lee,
that it seemed useless either to propose anything like a common-
sense plan of operations, or hope for better things as long,as any
trusted one, or whoever directed or controlled military movements,
was retained as supreme military director atWashington, or exercised
influence or authority there over the generals in the field; since it
seemed to be understood that the general interests of the country,
especially in June-July, 1863, had been sacrificed in a great
measure to prejudices or personal dislikes, want of comprehensive
views and consequent errors in judgment. The result proved the
correctness of Hooker's judgment, and this letter is printed to prove
that he was not alone in his convictions of what measures were
necessary to insure success. A few thousand veteran troops (A),
in addition to those on hand in Maryland and at Washington,
thrown upon Lee's communications, would have terminated the
career of that Army of Northern Virginia which escaped from
Gettysburg to protract the war for twenty months and cost the
country hundreds of millions of dollars and the lives of more
soldiers than had been squandered in the two preceding years at
the East. That the Rebels feared this very movement is abund¬
antly proved by the following extracts from the journal of a Union
general, taken prisoner, 2d July, at Gettysburg. "At Martinsburg,
which was crowded with Rebel wounded, it was authoritatively
reported that a brigade of our cavalry was not far distant, and its
, coming was momentaril^expected. Fears were entertained that
the two brigades of Pickett's division, which had been stationed on
the Peninsula, and were hastening to join Lee, would be cut off."
"Both in Martinsburg and Winchester, Loyalists were jubilant and
Rebels dispirited at the prospect. The latter anticipated the
failure of Lee's army to recross the Potomac and admitted, even if
it did, it would only be to fall into the hands of troops they expected
we would cross over on otir ponton bridges below Williamsport for
the purpose."
■ "Tivoli, June 30th, 1863.
" His Excellency, President Lincoln.
"Sir:—You hesitate to abandon unimportant posts in order
to concentrate their garrisons around Lee, the papers say because
7
it would not look well abroad to give up any ground we have won.
Was such the Practical Strategy of Bonaparte in his most glorious
campaign in Italy in 1796? When it was necessary to oppose
Wurmser he abandoned the siege of Mantua, left his one hundred
and forty siege guns in his works, marched to meet and beat the
Austrians, and, then, when the armies of succor were disposed of,
returned before Mantua and settled its fate. No great general,
no sensible man, no man of average judgment, hesitates to
sacrifice a lesser good to secure a greater. Great generals look
to ends and weigh means only in their relation to the attainment
of great ends.
" If chronic lethargy, or rather apparent chronic lethargy of
conception can be shaken off, Lee is between the upper and
nether mill-stone, provided the concentration of troops affords
sufficient power to the machinery to grind him to atoms there.
"Your Excellency may consider this letter as of even less im¬
portance than the offer I once made you of good troops, and sub¬
sequently of a good officer, W . P. W ; but history and
eternity will hold you responsible for the partial or entire ruin of
the North, when we offered you our blood, and our children, and
our means, without (I am speaking of the people, not politicians)
stint or selfish thoughts of ourselves.
"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
[Signed] "J. Watts nte Peyster."
[From pamphlet " The Decisive Conflicts of the Late Civil
War, or Slaveholders' Rebellion : Battles Morally, Territorially
and Militarily Decisive." New York, 1867.]
Escaping through a series of chances, the occurrence and suc¬
cess of which no human being could have taken into consideration,
Lee had an opportunity of immortalizing himself. Had he pro¬
fited by his gain of time, he could have struck a blow at the North
—he could have plunged his steel so deep into its vitals—that,
even if it eventually did recuperate, the shock would have given
a long lease of life, if not foreign recognition and independence to
the Confederacy. Had he crossed the Susquehanna, Philadel¬
phia could not have been preserved from the visitation of his
army, and New York might have seen the "Stars and Bars" upon
the heights of Weehawken and felt its shells and other missiles,
even if a superior navy had prevented the triumphal entry of the
invader. Pennsylvania was full of food—food of every kind for
an army—and Lee should have recollected the promotion of a
Russian sergeant by Suworrow, "the greatest soldier Russia has
ever produced or, perhaps, ever will produce" (Marston, 274), for
a saying erroneously assigned, like so many other good things, to
8
Napoleon. Suworrow having propounded the question, "how an
army threatened with starvation should supply itself with pro¬
visions," and getting no satisfactory reply from his generals or
, staff, was delighted with a response from the ranks, '■'Fro7n the
enemy!" Lee could have acquired everything that his army
needed, that the revolted States required, from the enemy, and if
Meade did not (to use Doubleday's expression) let Lee "severely
alone," Meade would not have greatly embarrassed Lee; not from
want of will, not from lack, perhaps, of inherent skill ; but from a
defective moral organization which, in crises, seemed to paralyze
great gifts and neutralize his application of the superior forces
under his control.
July 27 th Lee's main army was at Chambersburg. Examine ■
Swinton's "Twelve Decisive Battles," 318, and see what the
" Napier of the Rebellion " (sic) has to say on the subject.
Simultaneously with the appearance of the Rebels in the '
vicinity of, or before, the Capital of Pennsylvania, June 26-28,
Hooker crossed the Army of the Potomac into Maryland. To
all intents and purposes, if Lee had intended to push ahead, he
had at least three days the start of Hooker. On the same day,
27th June, Ewell was already operating at Carlisle and York, the
divisions of his corps scattered over a front of forty miles, so that
they could have forded the Susquehanna at several points at once,
' scattering the provisional defensive levies like chaff. Supposing
that Lee had ninety to one hundred thousand men, which he had
before he turned back to Gettysburg, he could have sent one col¬
umn of twenty-five thousand (one of our ablest strategists says five
thousand would have been sufficient) due north-east into the coal
regions, where tens of thousands were expecting him, and would
have welcomed him with a destruction of property almost beyond
calculation. This inroad would have put an end to getting out the
coal needed by our navy and manufactories, especially for articles
for the use of both army and navy. The main body could have
kept on to Philadelphia, wTiile to the right a flying column could
have made a circuit through Elkton, Wilmington and Chester.
This may seem chimerical, but people are too apt to forget how
near Early came to capturing Washington in 1864, with a column
variously estimated at from ten to twenty-five thousand men, after
defeating an army equal in numbers, but composed of troops in¬
ferior to the Rebel veterans, on the Monocacy. (5.) All that saved
the National Capital was the arrival of the old Sixth Corps,
brought round by water from the lines before Petersburg.
As to any resistance that could be offered to the veterans of
the Army of Northern Virginia by troops newly mustered into
the service, volunteers or militia, the idea is simply preposterous.
o
The whole of Pennsylvania was alive with militia, both in 1862
and 1863, and it is very doubtful if the Rebel generals took them
into account. Policy keeps a great many regular and competent
officers silent as to the utter inefficiency of any but a few thorough¬
ly organized regiments, such as came from New York, and it is
very doubtful if even these could have stood up for an instant
against good tried troops, acclimated to battle in the open field.
Ewell was already operating at York and Carlisle, the divi¬
sions of his corps scattered over a line of forty miles between
these places—a line perpendicular to Lee's line of advance, and
within this angle, more or less concentrated on interior lines, stood
the Union forces. Now had Lee been actually dependept for
great success on maintaining his line of communications intact,
and if this consideration applied to his own direct or his perpen¬
dicular line, how much more applicable to the line which ex¬
tended from this at a right angle down the Susquehanna. His
sortie had been as much endangered throughout his whole ad¬
vance to the Susquehanna, as it would have been beyond the Sus¬
quehanna ; that is to say if, at first. Hooker had been permitted to
carry out his plans, or if at last Meade had acted with promptness
and vigor. Lee had about ninety to one hundred thousand men
of all arms. His extreme advanced troops, as had been stated,
were before Harrisburg. The defences of that city, the capital of
Pennsylvania, in reality amounted to nothing. As regarded such
an army as Lee had. Fort Washington, which commanded the
passage of the Susquehanna, even if it had been tenaciously held,
was no obstacle, since it could be easily turned to the right or
south. The writer examined into this when at Harrisburg, in
May, 1867, with Maj.-Gen. S. W. Crawford. That this was so, no
military mind could question. The passage of the river was not
dependent on the bridges, since, if these had been destroyed,
there is a ford at Harrisburg, easy and safe at low water, which
was the case in June, 1863. The Duke de Rochefoucauld-Lian¬
court testifies it was so, when he visited this country shortly after
the Revolution of 1776-83. No one can dispute this, because
market wagons used to avail themselves of it to avoid the pay¬
ment of tolls, and even sheep, the most timid and helpless of ani¬
mals to handle in the water, have been driven across. If the river
could fall so low when the forests and marshes were as yet com¬
paratively intact, what must it be (1863) when so much of the former
have disappeared and the latter have been drained. Besides this
ford in front of Harrisburg, there is another between fifteen and
twenty miles below, farther down at Bainbridge, above Marietta,
and a third below the dam below the Columbia Bridge, and the
dàm built to create slack water for the Susquehanna Water Canal.
10
[It is said there are other fords, one even as far down as near
Havre-de-Grace.]
The last two fords designated, however, can only be used at
very low water, but such was actually the case 2oth"June-ist
July, 1863. These facts were collected from a variety of sources
after careful investigation. Much information was derived from
D. Wills, Esq., a gentleman of very great knowledge of local
matters and of the highest standing, at Gettysburg. His state¬
ments were corroborated by Hon. D. McConaughy, Esq.,
formerly State Senator and Sheriff of Adams County—a county
bounded on the east by the Susquehanna—who added that the
lower ford (only) is difficult for wagons on account of submerged
rocks. That troops, foot and horse, could gel across was proved
by the fact that some of the local organizations for defence, when
their retreat was cut off by the premature burning of the Colum¬
bia Bridge, effected their escape by these very fords.
It is well known that the Susquehanna is fordable, in many
places, with no enemy to oppose a passage through it and a suf¬
ficiency of materials and mechanical skill to repair the bridges, so
that, at most. Lee's crossing could not have been delayed but a
few hours; whereas it was far different with the Army of the Po¬
tomac, which would have encountered ready, organized, ex¬
perienced opposition. In fact. Lee's having got over had every
advantage, for if the Union forces had attempted to cross, the Rebels
could have fallen upon them in detachments as they gained the
Eastern shore. Again, it must be remembered that between Lee
and his objective, Philadelphia (6), there were no organized forces;
he had no resistance to expect in his front. Lee's position on the
left bank placed at his disposal all the military and other resources
of the country between the Susquehanna and the Delaware. The
only course by which the Army of the Potomac could have hoped
to anticipate Lee and save Philadelphia was the Wilmington Rail¬
road route, and to avail itself of that there wa? not sufficient time.
The Army of the Potomac could receive no considerable valid
reinforcement from the country East of the Susquehanna ; Phila¬
delphia was an open place and utterly defenceless, and, once
there, Lee could have concentrated all his troops to fight a battle
near it ; for he had no necessity to leave any garrison behind. When
Lee selected Philadelphia as his objective, he must have considered
his Army of Northern Virginia capable of whipping the Army of
the Potomac on any field he might select, and that this was his
conclusion—the complete superiority of his army to that of his
opponent—constitutes the only excuse for his utter madness pf
fighting at Gettysburg. It may be therefore assumed as demon¬
strated that Lee could have taken possession of the whole country
11
between the Susquehanna and the Delaware; his inability to hold
it depended on the answer to the question whether combatting
on a fair field of battle, Lee's army could, to a certainty, beat the
Army of the Potomac, which the Rebel generals assuredly con¬
sidered that it could.
Putting the fords out of the question, however, there are several
points where military bridges can be thrown across the Susquehanna
with great facility, inasmuch as the river, although broad, is not deep
and is obstructed by islands and bars, while the woods and build¬
ings on either shore would afford more than sufificient material, ready
at hand, for any number of bridges such as an army as that under
Lee would have required. After the battle of Rosbach, Frederic
bridged the Unstrut, says Muffling, in three or four hours, and
Blucher repeated the operation after Leipsic under the foreman-
ship of an aged carpenter, who actually had, many years previous,
worked on the bridge of the great king. Gustavus crossed the
Rhine on every kind of temporary buoyant materials, himself on a
barn-door, and Traun, in 1644, established his bridges over the
same river in the face of a large army and retreated across that
river with equal success in the course of one moonlight night.
P'rederic, it is true, was following up allying panic-stricken foe;
but such was not the case with either Gustavus or with Traun.
There was nothing before Lee which could have stopped a
veteran army for a single hour. The majority of the nominal
troops were at Harrisburg, and in the presence of veteran troops
they would have counted as nothing. The temporary Pennsylvania
levies were as though they were not, and the unnecessarily total
destruction of the Columbia Bridge presents uncontrovertable
proof of their condition of mind, and of the military capacity of
their commanders.
Simultaneously with the movements of Early down the west
bank of the Susquehanna, as far south as the Columbia Bridge
and York, the shire town of Adams County, Jenkins' brigade of
cavalry was demonstrating before Harrisburg, and this insignifi¬
cant force was driving people wild with apprehension. The de¬
fenses of Harrisburg—as stated—amounted to nothing, and Fort
Washington, which defended the passage of the Susquehanna
(repeated to emphasize), could be easily turned to the right or
south.
From Frederick City to Gettysburg is twenty-three miles;
thence to Chambersburg twenty-four miles; to Harrisburg thirty-
five miles by the most direct route. From PYederick City to
Hagerstown is twenty-four miles; from Hagerstown to Chambers¬
burg is twenty miles, In either case the Army of the Potomac was at
least two days' hard marches behind the Army of Northern Virginia.
12
The latter always outmarched the former in the ratio of three to
two, often two to one. In a country full of timber and wooden
buildings, an army of Americans—natural mechanics, like the
Finns of Gustavus, who were excellent substitutes for pontoneers
—could bridge the Susquehanna in twenty-four hours in a quiet
or low stage of the water, as was the case at this time, June 26th-
July ist, 1863. Now, conceding that the Army of the Potomac
would have had to lose or devote one day to the repair of
bridges, &c., then, even if Lee left no rearguard to dispute the
passage of the Susquehanna, it would still have been a full day's
march behind the Rebel invading force. From Hairisburg or
York to PhiladeljDhia is one hundred miles, with railroads, direct,
between these points and Philadelphia. There were no troops in
his front that could have stopped Lee for an instant. The troops
constituting the garrison of Harrisburg were not trustworthy
against the veterans of the Army of Northern Virginia. Officers
who had seen service spoke in most depreciating terms of them.
Those who were in the place at the time said there was a scare on
the people; that they were stampeded. The description given of
them by eye-witnesses recalls Voltaire's remarks upon the Parisian
troops in 1649. (Gust's Condé, 156.) '
Phil. Kearny looked forward to such a master-stroke in 1862.
Leland, in his "Abraham Lincoln," page 149, says that Lee ought
to have gone to Philadelphia. General A. A. Humphreys, Chief
of Engineers, U. S. A., in his Obituary Address on Meade, i8th
November, 1872, page 8, observes, ^'■the great object of his \Lee's\
campaign. It was the capture of this city, Philadelphia." (7.) Lee
could have lived off the country, could have levied a heavy contribu¬
tion on Philadelphia and other cities or towns along the route, and
could have made his way back with scarcely any possibility of
being overtaken or intercepted by the Army of the Potomac or
any other army the United States possessed or could assemble
after the blundering which preceded Hooker's concentration at
Frederick City and subsequently led to his resignation.
A stem chase, even at sea and in sight, is always a long chase.
A pursuit by a vessel of equal speed with the fugitive could only
base a remote hope of success on almost incalculable contingen¬
cies. In this case, on land, the pursued would have been swifter
than the pursuer. The latter, the Army of the Potomac, could
have only hoped to succeed in overtaking the Army of Northern
Virginia in case that Lee was delayed-or stopped, and there was
nothing in existence, or that could be improvised, to delay or stop
him.
It is difficult to conceive the extent of the obstacle to a large
army with its materials presented by a broad, rapid and uncertain
13
river, if vigilantly watched or guarded, especially if this river is
not too broad for the artillery of the day, and is yet too broad to
enable an army (seeking to force a passage) to establish a cross fire
sufficiently effective to cover a disembarkation and sweep away
every obstacle to the throwing over, or construction of, a bridge.
The Susquehanna is not so broad that field artillery can not play
with deadly effect on a detachment of engineer troops attempting
to throw or build any kind of a military bridge, and yet it is too
broad for field artillery to clear out batteries posted to prevent a
passage, provided these are skilfully placed, covered, or concealed
and worked.
Any one who will study up the details of our Revolutionary
War, will comprehend at once how it was that the Catawba, only
five hundred yards wide at an ordinary stage of water, the Yad¬
kin, and the Dan proved such impediments to Cornwallis in pur¬
suing Greene—in fact saved Greene. Sudden rains so swelled
these streams that Greene's escape was looked upon as being due
to the special interposition of Providence. Cornwallis had, at this
time, as fine an army for its size as there was in the world. His
light infantry was unexceptionable. All his troops were in prime
condition, stripped for pursuit and fight. Nevertheless, if Greene's
troops had enjoyed any equality, notwithstanding their inferiority
of numbers, they could have stopped Cornwallis at the Catawba,
and again at the Yadkin, without any assistance from the rain.
How often have the Rappahannock and Rapid Anna above
their junction, mere creeks in comparison to the Susquehanna,
arrested the Army of the Potomac. Mine Run, a marshy trickle
traversed one of the best planned movements of the war. The
pursuit of Morgan after the Cowpens, and of Greene after 25th
January by Cornwallis, in January and February, rySi, demon¬
strated the impediments presented by insignificant streams to the
best of troops and in the best condition, even when following up
forces in every way inferior—that is to say "by streams compara¬
tively insignificant " when swollen by heavy and sudden rains.
(Steadman, folio 325. Gordon, IV. 37-46.)
The overflow, 29th-3oth January, 1781, of the Catawba, usually
perfectly fordable, arrested the British two days. The Catawba,
in the ordinary stage of water about 500 yards in width, although
with a rapid current and bottom of loose stones, would not have
stopped and did not stop the pursuers for an hour. The Yadkin
might have served as an impassible barrier had it been properly
defended by the weak American rear-guard—but even as David¬
son was out-generaled at McCowan's ford, even so the riflemen
fled as soon as the main body of the British had passed over. And
yet both the Catawba and Yadkin could have been easily defended
u
by a few steady troops well handled even against Cornwallis, who
had a veteran light infantry second to none in the world. The
Dan, over which Greene passed in one day, stopped Cornwallis
entirely. (Steadman, folio 332. Gordon, TV., 45, 46. Cornwallis
marched twenty to thirty miles in a day.)
Is it not perfectly just to assert that the Susquehanna, four
times as wide and strong as the above mentioned Carolinian
streams, presented an insuperable barrier to any number of troops,
however good, when its fordable or smooth crossings—i. e., free
from rapids—were defended by five or ten thousand resolute
veteran infantry, with plenty of artillery. In the same way as
the Catawba and Yadkin against Cornwallis, likewise the Dan,
and, although by the time Greene reached the latter river, the
militia had nearly all deserted him, Cornwallis with 3000 of the
finest troops in the world was unable to overtake the 2000 Ameri¬
cans, of whom a great number had not a rag of clothing except a
piece ofblanket. (Tomes, Div.V.,Part2,Chap.xcvii.and xcviii.,&c.
The most extraordinary case, however, of the utter disregard
of a base and line of communication was when Frederic the Great
in 1760 moved from Saxony into Silesia to relieve the latter pro¬
vince from the presence and pressure of the enemy. An Austrian
army under Lascy, and another under Daun, followed close in his
rear, so that the Prussians seemed as if they were escorted by the
Imperialists.. Yet, notwithstanding Frederic had a huge wagon
train with him, such was the dread which he inspired that he did
not lose a single carriage, and with all their vastly superior forces
the enemy did not dare to attack him.
Any one who will take the trouble to compare the remarkable
incidents which attended the escape of Morgan, 1780, and, again,
of Greene, in 1781, and those of Coligny (Besant's "Gaspard de
Coligny," 184-185), will be compelled to admit that, if certain men
representing causes, and causes themselves, are not under the pro¬
tection of God, there is no/ruth in anything. On the 29th August,
1568, Coligny, encumbered with women and children, with but a
feeble military escort, had to fiy to escape the persecuting pursuit
of the troops under the young Duke of Guise. " In the morning
they arrived at the river [Loire]. It was impossible to wait. The
river must be forded. While they hesitated, a single voice was
raised, ' When Israel came out of Egypt.' All joined in the psalm,
and, so singing, the ford was crossed. Fortunately, the waters were
low. Protestant historians loved afterwards to tell how a miracle
was wrought, and how, when the enemy appeared on the banks,
the water rose and flooded the ford, so that they, the enemy, could
not get across. On the 20th of September, the fugitives rode into La
Rochelle." Michelet (IX., 351-2) says that The " Re'fuge of Coligny,
15
Conde, and their families and friends, was at Noyers, in Burgundy.
The Asylum was La Rochelle, four hundred and fifty miles distant.
To fly from the Serin to the ocean, traverse rivers, escape pursu¬
ing troops and hostile cities, was to accomplish the improbable;
nevertheless it succeeded as it were by a miracle. The Loire
shrunk to allow their fording, swelled full again to stop those who
pursued, so that the pursuers were captured in the toils they set
for the Huguenots. [The Linth is an insignificant stream, and
yet, on the 26th September, 1799, if the Austrian General Hotze
had not been surprised and killed by the sudden chance fire of a
platoon, the French could not have made good their footing on
the other bank. The death of Hotze (a very able general) led to
the utter defeat of his corps or army division, as it may be styled,
and determined the fate of the campaign.] [Examine Dunlap's
" New York." (Schuyler stopped by breaking of ice on Hudson,
which had previously served as bridge for flying French, February,
1693.) I., 221, Edition of 1840, II.; Red Man's Thermopylae, a
log over an unfordable stream, 159, &c.
The Rhine is nothing like as ugly or so dangerous to cross as
the Susquehanna, and yet a " Flying Column" of two battalions
of the Sixth Wurtemberg Infantry, a squadron of the Third
Cavalry and a Reserve Battery kept the German, or Right, bank
of the Rhine inviolate during the Franco-German War. In fact,
this Wurtemberg detachment of the " Black Forest" created a
general panic all over Alsatia, in which the Seventh (Douay's) Corps
[French] was involved. Only once, 31st August, did the French
F7-anc-Tireurs, favored by a thick fog, succeed in crossing the
Rhine and they retreated very quickly after doing infinitesimal
damage.
" By making constant demonstrations of various kinds, chang¬
ing position almost daily, making forced night marches and
countermarches along the river, and by suddenly appearing and
vanishing at .a great many points, this little column continued to
create for itself a certain amount of importance in the minds of
the French, so that it was by them soon magnified into the " Corps
d'Armée of the Black Forest," and created in Alsatia no slight
alarm and an apprehension that a passage of the Upper Rhine was
contemplated by the Germans. As will be seen further on, the
exaggerated accounts of the concentration of large bodies of
troops in the Black Forest, current in France, and which were
wholly owing to the untiring activity of this Detachment, were the
real cause of the sudden retreat of the Second and Third Divisions
of the French Seventh Corps d'Armée from Mühlhausen to Bel-
fort."
After the Wurtemberg Black Forest Detachment had been
16
broken up, one, the Second Battalion of the Sixth Baden Infantry,
and the Rçserve Battery of Artillery, sufficed to guard a river shore
from Basel to Rastadt, one hundred miles. Is it any exaggeration
to claim that a veteran division from the "Army of Northern Vir¬
ginia" could have effectually defended the crossings of the Sus¬
quehanna from above Harrisburg to its mouth—at all events for
a sufficient space of time to have enabled Lee to obtain such a
start that it would have been impossible for Meade to overtake
him ? This was the more probable since Meade was making ar¬
rangements to concentrate on Pipe Creek—sixteen miles before
reaching Gettysburg, where, as General Doubleday says, in his tes¬
timony before the " Committee on the Conduct of the War," " It
appears to me that the result of occupying that line (Pipe Creek)
would have been that the enemy would simply have let us
severely alone and either have taken Harrisburg or gone on ad
infinitum plundering the State of Pennsylvania."
Kearny had indicated such a course in his letter written a
whole year previous, and Swinton, who appears to have been,
more than any other writer, in the secrets of the Rebels, says, at
page 321, of his and Pond's " Twelve Battles," that Lee originally
designed crossing the Susquehanna and (326) was desirous of hus¬
banding his strength for the execution of his ulterior purpose,
[since it was not a mere blow and return [a " sortie"] that the
Confederates meditated, but a permanent lodgment on Northern
soil]. Indeed, it is affirmed that the Confederates were promised
recognition, if Lee could establish himself on Northern soil in the
Loyal States, north of Mason and Dixon's line.
Meade was actually affording every chance to Lee to carry
out his original intention, when Lee, always a "blunderer," ac¬
cording to Lossing (Vol. II., p. ICI, No. 2,) and "smitten by
idiocy" at Gettysburg, as Lieut.-Gen. Dick Taylor, son of the
Buena Vista General and President Taylor, insinuates at p. 230
of his "Personal ExperiÄices of the Late War," threw away all the
magnificent advantages which fortune had vouchsafed and placed
on his hands and precipitated the battle upon Meade—a battle
which the latter would gladly have avoided at the point where it oc¬
curred. Thus Lee, at his own expense, made the reputation of
Meade, and re-established the North at the expense of the most
devoted army that ever followed an over-estimated leader, in
whom it nevertheless implicitly trusted.
Swinton and other wiseacres say that Lee's forward was ar¬
rested and that he was enticed to Gettysburg through a blind
dread of being cut off from his base, as soon as his communica¬
tions were menaced. This is sufficient to prove that Lee was no
genius or first-class general.
17
The majority of all the truly great achievements in war, in
reliable history, all the magnificent thunderbolt shocks which have
settled questions in regard to the destinies of nations and let loose
the torrents of force to desolate and overturn, or civilize and es¬
tablish, have been absolute strokes of audacity, complete " cuttings
loose" from theoretical bases. Alexander, Frederic the Great
and Napoleon—likewise two lesser lights, considered lesser ones
by human ignorance, but equal to the first three in individual com¬
mon sense, intelligence, self-consciousness of power—moved to
their most marvellous achievements frompracticalhz.ses in total dis¬
regard to theoretical bases. Wellington, throughout his triumphant
operations in Spain, had no fixed base, since his base was the navy.
Even so the finest campaign of our great war, involving a suc¬
cession of victorious collisions, was Grant's campaign from the
South against Vicksburg, where his base was his steamers on the
Mississippi ; a campaign which, undertaken previously from a fixed
base, ended in the fiasco of Holly Springs. Hannibal, greatest of
generals of all time, according to Napoleon, Frederic the Great,
Wellington, and all the experts in war, moved like a shuttle, as
did in a measure Frederic for about six years. The great Prussian
had no more of a base than he made for the time being, and he
never hesitated to cut loose from any base when he launched to
victory. It was by converting such an idea into a reality—an
idea expressed in Holy Writ as to spiritual success, "the King¬
dom of Heaven [ar it were\ suffereth violence and the violent
[persevering, ardent, energetic] take it by force. (Matthew xi. 12.)
Moreover, the engineering art and science were in their infancy
two hundred years ago. All the great leaders of the Thirty Years'
War never hesitated to cut loose from their bases when they were
determined to accomplish great results. In many respects the
rules which applied to the great German War are pertinent to
the Great American Conflict, since, in many respects, the latter
presents a marked resemblance to the former, especially in its
confusion of details and in its want of system during the first two
years; in the total absence of a grand, general, digested plan. Had
Torstenson paid any attention to his communications in 1644, he
would not have conquered Denmark, nor recuperated his army
in Holstein, nor have ruined the Imperial armies. Again, nothing
made the peace, concluded in 1648, possible but Torstenson's
plunging loose into Bohemia to gain his crowning victory almost
in sight of its capital and carrying the horrors of war down to the
Danube and up to the walls ofVienna. Similar conduct, had he been
let alone, would have taken Moreau to Vienna in 1800. Such re¬
solution enabled Napoleon to dictate the peace of Campo Formio
in 1797; of Pressburg in 1805; of Tilsit in 1807; of Vienna in
18
1809, &c., and always actuated Suworrow. Had Suworrow paid
any attention to theoretical rules of war, he never would have
swept the French out of Italy in five months, as he did in 1800.
Generals, possessed simply of talent, conquer at times by obedience
to rules; generals of genius triumph by ignoring them. Had
Blucher been the slave to the theoretical principles of war, as or¬
dinary generals invariably are, he never would have carried the
Prussian eagles from the Oder to the French capital in 1813-14,
from Ligny to Waterloo in 1815, and thence to Paris in 1815.
This miserable subserviency to iron-clad rule, allowed Lee to es¬
cape after Antietam (Lee's Cunning, Gould's Alison, 80) in 1862,
after Gettysburg in 1863. It proved McClellan was no general,
Meade no general in any grand sense of the word, as Geo.
H. Thomas always showed himself to be, or as other men of
the same ever trustworthy class. The contrary—the prin¬
ciple of Ecclesiasticus (x. 26), "be not slow to act on an
emergency,"—made Grant supreme general, and Sherman
lieutenant-general. * * Lee became great in the estimation
of the ignorant masses through the horrible blunders of those op¬
posed to him. No more is needed to prove that Lee was anything
but great than his campaign in West Virginia in 1861 ; or his
letting McClellan escape in 1862; or his not going to Philadel¬
phia in 1863; or his going to Gettysburg in the same year, and
his fighting an offensive battle there, or any battle at all in this
district. [The moral effect of Lee's movement on Philadelphia
would have been momentous, for as a world accepted expert has
declared with truth, the effect of the moral to the physical is as
three to one. Such a movement would have demoralized the
North and invested treason with a strength which it seems upon
calm consideration could scarcely have been met or overcome.
The Army of the Potomac could only have been reinforced with
good troops from the West. This would have occasioned new
complications, and would the administration, have had the courage
to act like the Roman Senate after Cannœ and stand fast and firm
because any relief at the crisis required time—" time the hardest
horse to beat." The weakest point in our national armies was the
necessity of defending Washington, a necessity which has become
inevitable from political not military necessity.] ^
Lee's campaign in Western Virginia in 1861, was a failure,
and the hopes centered on him were signally disappointed. The
Confederate historian of the war. Pollard,-commenting on Lee's
failure to attack Rosecrans, says (I., 171): "Thus the second op¬
portunity of a decisive battle in Western Virginia was blindly lost.
General Lee making no attempt to follow up the enemy who had
so skillfully eluded him; the excuse alleged for his not doing so
19
being mud, swollen streams, and the leanness of his artillery
horses." See Lossing ii, lot, 2.]
Lee should have crossed the Susquehanna. The writer never
hesitated to say so. He pronounced this judgment an hundred
times since the Army of Northern Virginia broke acro.ss the Po¬
tomac in 1863, and urged as the most conclusive proof that Lee
was not a great general in the highest sense—in the sense in which
he is regarded by the South and by sympathizers at home and
abroad—as the most satisfactory evidence, the simple fact that
he did not cross the Susquehanna in June-July, 1863, and try for
PhiladelJ)hia; aye further on, and, if necessary, come back by water,
following the example of the greatest strategist of antiquity—Alex¬
ander, who had to bring back his plunder from India coastwise in
ships guarded by a remnant of the veterans who had seen
the " elephant" in its home and despoiled it. This return by
sea has been considered by some critics as by no means a
chimerical plan. A rapid march on Philadelphia would have
doubtless given him steamers enough to begin the enterprise. It
would not have been difficult to escape in steamers if Lee had
been very rapid in his movements. A column sent down the west
bank of the Delaware, and thence across to Newcastle, could have
posted batteries which could have sunk any but regular war
steamers which attempted to escape to sea, and, after that, it
would be a mere question of patriotism whether Northerners
would sacrifice their wealth, as Rotopschin did his own and that
of his peers and fellow citizens in Moscow, to prevent its benefit¬
ting the enemy, and thus checkmate the victorious invader; or
whether they would yield it in the hope of attaining a larger in¬
fluence in the conqueror's train and, by even baser than Southern
adulation, thus rise in his estimation over his original followers.
Alexander sacrificed those who assisted him to conquer, and
without whom he could not have become so great, because they
resented and resisted their being supplanted by his deposition of
them in favorofthe elevation of the supple Persians andfarther East¬
erns; considering that such favorites were unworthy of an influence
even equal, much less superior, to their own. Why ? Because
men like Parmenio and Clitus were of stern stuff, unsuitable to
"a republican court" whereas such flatterers as Callisthenes of
Olynthus were fit for any court. The former died loyal, and
the latter naturally degenerated into conspirators, just as the
Copperheads at the North were more ultra and baser in their
views than the Southerners proper, out-Heroding Herod, and
meaner than the worst Secession elements.
Summa, Lee was neither a great man nor a great leader of
men, as such terms must be applied to George H. Thomas, to
whom are most applicable the ringing lines of Browning;
20
" Thither our path lies—wind we up the heights—
Wait ye the warning ?
Our low life was the level's and the night's;
He's for the mornmg/
Step to a tune, square shoulders, erect the head,
'Ware the beholders !
This is our master, fa?nous, calm and dead,
Borne on our shoulders,
Here's the top peak / * *
Bury this man there /
Lofty designs must close in like effects ;
Loftily lying,
Leave him—still loftier than the world suspects,
Living and dying !"
ISrOTES.
(Note i, page 2.) To demonstrate the almost incalculable value
of a base on the sea, when the Continental Dominion of Denmark
was completely overrun by Tilly and Wallenstein, the Danish navy
was still so much a source of trouble to the Imperialists as to exert a
most favorable influence upon the Peace of Lübeck, 7 th June, 1629.
Again, the defence of Stralsund, which broke the back of Wallen-
stein's hitherto invincibility and cost him twelve thousand of his
best troops, was only rendered possible by the fact that the town
was always open to reinforcements and supplies by the Baltic.
For nearly a century, Sweden fought almost a life and death
struggle to keep the Russians from getting possession of any part
of the coast of the Baltic, being well aware that the moment that
the Czar had ports on that, the East Sea, Sweden itself was no longer
secure. It was the basg of the sea that made England a nest of
hornets against Spain under Elizabeth and a deadly weapon against
Napoleon. The British ships enabled the 10,000 to 15,000 Spaniards
of the Marquis de la Romana to escape from the clutches of the
tyrant in Denmark, lyth-zoth August, 1808, at Nyborg and Sven-
borg, to embark on the British fleet and return to assist in freeing
their Fatherland, in fact checked, crushed the arch-traitor to liberty,
the false Frenchman, typical Corsican, and finally, over the sea
bore him to where he died the victim, not of his captivity, but of
his own real littleness which cramped and burned him out on the
far distant isle in mid-ocean.
(Note 2, page 4.) " History of the Civil Wars in Germany,"
1630-35, from the Manuscript Memoirs of a Shropshire Gentleman,
21
page 70. " And pray what news had you at Vienna ? " asked Gus-
tavus Adolphus, » * * what is the common opinion there [at
Vienna] about these affairs ? " " The common people are terrified
to the last degree," replied the English Volunteer, and when your
Majesty took Frankfort upon Oder [April, 1631], if your army had
marched but 20 miles into Silesia, half the people would have run
out of Vienna, and I left them fortifying it." How much more
true this of the feeling in Vienna after Leipsic and the Lech ? Car¬
dinal Passman, on receiving the news of the Passage of the Lech,
exclaimed, ^'■Factim est/" (It is all over!).
The great German Jomini or Tactician, H. D. von Bulow,
declared that the Passage of the Lech displayed the highest tactical
ability on the part of the Swedes ; but the subsequent utilization
thereof was not strictly strategical. General Horn was correct.
He wanted Gustavus to march against Wallenstein in Bohemia,
clear away that, the only obstacle, an army newly drawn together,
and march on Vienna.
(Note 3, page 4.) " I would have far preferred," said Oxen-
stiern, " to have paid homage to your Majesty within the walls of
Vienna in the heart of the Austrian Monarchy, than here [in
Frankfurt] on the banks of the Main, so far distant from the real
objective (Ziele) of the War."—" Swedischer Plutarch" (Oxen-
stjerna), by J. F. von Lundblad, Stralsund 1831, page 66. "Gus¬
tav Adolf der Grosse," by von Rango, Leipsic, 1824, page 334.
"Gustav II. Adolf: in Germany," by von Bulow, Vol. II, page 32.
" Minutes of the Council in 1650," Palmstr. Mss., t. 190. Geijer,
271 (I). Putnam's "Gindely," IL, 143.
(Note. " Lech, Bridging, &c.," page 5.)
"The following account of the Bridging of the Lech, in 1632, by
Gustavus Adolphus, was discovered in a rare book entitled, "The
History of the Civil Wars in Germany from the year 1630-1635.
Written by a Shro])shire Gentleman. Newark: Printed by James
Tomlinson for the Publisher in 1782." In this book was pasted the
following manuscript note :
" E. Staveley, the Editor, informed me that he was once a sub¬
stantial farmer and dealt a little in the corn trade, but through
losses, &c., had failed; that the Mss. from which this was printed
was found among the refuse of the library of Ld (Lord) Abingdon
at Naith when that estate was sold about the year 1762 and given
to him, the Editor, by Collingwood, the Steward. 2-97. 17-10^.
J. L. (S?) Freeman."
This book must have belonged to the library of my grandfather,
Hon. John Watts, Junior, and come to him from Lord Abingdon,
with whom he was connected and with whom my great grandfather,
Hon. John Watts, Senior, Member of the King's Council, N. Y.,
22
was in constant correspondence at the breaking out of tlie Ameri¬
can Revolution. The letters of my great grandfather, Hon. John
Wa.tts, Senior, to Lord Abingdon, picked up by accident in Lon¬
don, were considered so valuable by the Massachusetts Historical
Society that they were published in their Vol. X., Fourth Series,
1871.
The author of the original manuscript was an Englishman, who
first took service with the Great King as a simple Volunteer, and
finally rose to command a regiment under him. He afterwards
distinguished himself in the Army of Charles I., during the Great
English Rebellion, 1650.
•' I shall be the longer in relating this account of the Lech, be¬
ing esteemed in those days as great an action as any battle or
siege of that age, and particularly famous for the disaster of the
gallant old General Tilly, and for that I can be more particular
in it than other accounts, having been an eye-witness to every
part.
" The King being truly informed of the dispositions of the Ba¬
varian army, was once of the mind to have left the banks of the
Lech, have repassed the Da7iube, and so sitting down before Ingol-
stat, the Duke's capital city, by the taking that strong town to
have made his entrance into Bavaria, and the conquest of such
a fortress, one entire action ; but the strength of the place and the
difficulty of maintaining his leaguer in an enemy's country, while
Tilly was so strong in the field, diverted him from that design, he
therefore concluded that Tilly was first to be beaten out of the
country, and then the siege of Lngolstat would be the easier.
" Whereupon, the King resolved to go and view the situation
of the enemy; his Majesty went out the 2nd oí April with a strong
party of horse, which I had the honor to command; we marched
as near as we could to the banks of the river, not to be too much
exposed to the enemy's cannon, and having gained a little height,
where the whole course of the river might be seen, the King halted,
and commanded to draw up. His Majesty alighted, and calling
me to him, examined every reach and turning of the river by his
[field] glass, but finding it run a long and almost a straight course,
he could find no place that he liked, but at last turning himself
north, and looking down the stream, he found the river fetching a
long reach, doubles short upon itself, making a round and very
narrow point, "There's a point will do our business (said the
King), and if the ground be good I will pass there, let Tilly do his
worst."
" He immediately ordered a small party of horse to view the
ground, and to bring him word particularly how high the bank
was on each side and at the point ; and he shall have 50 dollars.
23
says the King, that will bring me word how deep the water is. I
asked his Majesty leave to let me go, which he would by no means
allow ; but as the party were drawing out, a sergeant of dragoons
told the King, if he pleased to let him go disguised as a boor, he
would bring him an account of everything he desired. The King
liked the motion very well, and the fellow being well acquainted
with the country, puts on a ploughman's habit, and went away
immediately with a long poll [pole] upon his shoulder; the horse
lay all this while in the woods, and the King stood undiscerned
by the enemy on the little hill aforesaid. The dragoon with his
long poll comes down boldly to the bank of the river, and calling
to the centinels which Tilly had placed on the other bank, talked
with them, asked if they could not help him over the river, and
pretended he wanted to come to them ; at last, being come to the
point where, as I said, the river makes a short turn, he stands
parleying with them a great while, and sometimes pretended to
wade over, he puts his long poll into the water, then finding it
pretty shallow, pulls off his hose [trowsers] and goes in, still thrust¬
ing his poll in before him, till being got up to the middle, he
could reach beyond him, where it was too deep, and so shaking
his head, comes back again. The soldiers on the other side laugh¬
ing at him, asked him if he could swim. He said no. Why, you
fool you, says one of the centinels, the channel of the rivet is
twenty feet deep. How do you know that, says the dragoon. Why
our engineer, says he, measured it yesterday. This was what he
wanted, but not yet fully satisfied; aye, but, says he, may be it
may not be very broad, and if one of you would wade in to meet
me till I could reach you with my poll, I would give him half a
ducat to pull me over. The innocent way of his discourse so de¬
luded the soldiers that one of them immediately strips and goes in
up to the shoulders, and our dragoon goes in on this side to meet
him ; but the stream took the other soldier away, and he being a
good swimmer, came over to this side. The dragoon was then in
a great deal of pain for fear of being discovered, and was once
going to kill the fellow, and make off; but at last resolved to carry
on the humor, and having entertained the man with a tale of a
tub, about the Swedes stealing his oats, the fellow being cold
wanted to be gone, and he as willing to be rid of him, pretended
to be very sorry he could not get over the river, and so makes
off. " By this, however, he learned both the depth and breadth
of the channel, the bottom and nature of both shores, and every¬
thing the King wanted to know; we could see him from the hill
by our glasses very plain, and could see the soldier naked with
him ; he is a fool, says the King, he does not kill the fellow and
run off; but when the dragoon told his tale, the King was ex-
2i
tremely well satisfied with him, gave him loo dollars and made
him a quarter-master to a troop of cuirassiers.
" The King having farther examined the dragoon, he gave him
a very distinct account of the ground on this side, which he found
to be higher than the enemy's by io or 12 feet, and a hard gravel.
Hereupon the King resolved to pass there, and in order to it
gives, himself, particular directions for such a bridge as I believe
never army passed a river on before or since.
" His bridge was only loose planks laid upon large tressels in
the same homely manner I have seen bricklayers raise a low scaf¬
fold to build a brick wall; the tressels were made higher than one
another to answer to the river as it becomes deeper or shallower,
and was all framed and fitted before any appearance was made of
attempting to pass.—When all were ready the King brings his
army down to the bank of the river, and plants his cannon as the
enemy had done, some here and some there, to amuse them.
" At night, April 4th, the King commanded about 2000 men
to march to the point, and to throw up a trench on either side,
and quite round it with a battery of six pieces of cannon at each
end, beside three small mounts, one at the point and one at each
side, which had each two pieces upon them. This work was begun
so briskly, and so well carried on, the King firing all night from
the other parts of the river, that by daylight all the batteries at
the new work were mounted, the trench lined with 2000 musque-
teers, and all the utensils [materials] of the bridge lay ready to be
put together.
"Now the Imperialists discovered the design, but it was too
late to hinder it, the musqueteers in the great trench, and the five
new batteries, made such continual fire that the other bank, which,
as before, lay 12 feet below them, was too hot for the Imperialists,
whereupon Tilly, to be provided for the King at his coming over,
falls to work in a wood right against the point, and raises a great
battery for 20 pieces of cannon, with a breast-work, or line, as near
the river as he could, takeover his men, thinking that when the
King had built his bridge he might easily beat it down with his
cannon.
" But the King had doubly prevented him, first by laying his
bridge so low that none of Tilly's shot could hurt it; for the bridge
lay not above half a foot above the water's surface, by which means
the King, who in that showed himself an excellent engineer, had
secured it from any batteries being made within the land, and the
angle of the bank secured it from the remoter batteries, on the
other side, and the continual fire of the cannon and small shot,
beat the Imperialists from their station just against it, they having
no works to cover them.
25
"And in the second place, to secure his passage, he sent over
about 200 men, and after that 200 more, who had orders to cast
up a large ravelin on the other bank, just where he designed to
land his bridge; this was done with such expedition too, that it
was finished before night, and in a condition to receive all the shot
of Tilly's great battery, and effectually covered his bridge. While
this was doing the King on his side lays over his bridge. Both
sides wrought hard all day and all night, as if the spade, not the
sword, had been to decide the controversy, and that he had got
the victory whose trenches and batteries were first ready ; in the
mean time the cannon and musquet bullets flew like hail, and made
the service so hot, that both sides had enough to do to make their
men stand to their work; the King in the hottest of it, animated
his men by his presence, and Tilly^ to give him his due, did the
same ; for the execution was so great and so many officers killed.
General Attringer [Aldringer] wounded, and two sergeant-majors
killed, that at last Tilly himself was obliged to be exposed and to
come up to the very face of our line to encourage his men, and
give his necessary orders.
"And here about i o'clock, much about the time that the
King's bridge and works were finished, and just as they said he
had ordered to fall on upon our ravelin with 3000 foot, was the
brave old Tilly slain with a musquet bullet in the thigh [kneej ; he
was carried off" to Ligolsiat, and lived some days after, but died of
the wound the same day that the King had his horse shot under
him at the siege of that town.
"We made no question of passing the river here, having
brought everything so forward, and with such extraordinary suc¬
cess, but we should have found it a very hot piece of work if Tilly
had lived one day more; and if I may give my opinion of it, hav¬
ing seen Tilly's battery and breast-work, in the face of which we
must have passed the river, I must say that whenever we had
marched, if Tilly had fallen in with his horse and foot, placed in
that trench, the whole army would have passed as much in danger
as in the face of a strong town in the storming a counterscarp.
The King himself, when he saw with what judgment 2illy had
prepared his works, and what danger he must have run, would
often say, that day's success was every way equal to the victory
of Leipsick.
"Tilly being hurt and carried off, as if the soul of the army had
been lost, they begun to draw off; the Duke of Bavaria took horse
and rode away as if he had fled out of battle for life." (Pages
I lo-i 17.)
Since the publication of my Collection of Notes on " Bridging
and Fording," constituting an Appendix to the Pamphlet edited by
26
me, "Sailors' Creek to Appomattox Court House," being "War
Memoranda" by General H. Edwin Tremain, and my " La
Royale," Part VIII., treating of the Surrender at Appomattox Court
House, the following letter, dated Weathersfield, Vermont, 27th
June, 1886, has been received from Col. Leavitt Hunt, who was
senior Aid-de-Camp to General Heintzleman, first Commandant
of the Third Corps.
" When I was in the Federal (Swiss) Military School or West
Point Academy "Fortbildtmgschule" at Thun of which I am or was
the only foreign graduate (except Louis Napoleon), I had the ex¬
perience of throwing a ponton bridge over 150 |feet] long (and on
which all arms [infantry, cavalry and artillery] traversed) in twenty-
two minutes, the current [of the Aare] seven miles an hour. The
interesting point was that it was the fastest current on which it is
safe to throw such bridge, so they taught.
"Your tradition of experience in throwing a bridge of wagons
over the Mohawk [mentioned among J. W. de P.'s anecdotes of
" Bridging and Fording," page xl.], as attested by Lewis N.
Morris, is interesting, because he lived from about 1807 five (25 ?)
miles below us on the Connecticut, on a fine estate, and had for his
third wife my aunt, eldest daughter of my grandfather, Governor
Hunt, of Vermont. She died about twenty years ago."
(Note 4, page 5 .), " Be not slow to act on an emergency," says
Ecclesiasticus (x. 26) and if ever a battle was won and lost in
obedience to, or violation of, this principle, Chancellorsville was.
Again and again the Rebels exposed their unprotected fianks to
mortal blows and none were delivered. Webb, among others,
saw opportunities, as Stuart advanced against Sickles and the
Third Corps at Hazel Grove, begged to be permitted to strike,
and was forbidden and withheld.
A summing-up of the battle of Chancellorsville, as a military
criticism, may be of interest at this date, as Chancellorsville and
Gettysburg are inseparably connected; the latter was the result of
the first. Hooker's planfor this battle was perfect; equal to any
simple or single stroke ever conceived by any of the greatest
captains. It was in the exact style of the most consummate gene¬
rals; bold, brilliant and bewildering to Lee. The practical-stra-
tegy, which left Sedgwick in front of Fredericksburg, to amuse Lee
and chain his attention, coupled with the demonstrations of the
First and Third Corps, while the rest of the Army of the Potomac
were carried over the Rappahannock and Rapidan, and planted
across the lines of communication and supply of the Army of
Northern Virginia, were unsurpassed in merit, both of conception
and execution. The quiet abstraction of the Third Corps from the
force in front of Lee, and its transferral to swell the mass in his
27
rear and make the event more certain, was a manœuvre considered
worthy of citation.
On the morning of Friday, the first of May, Hooker held Lee,
as it were, in the hollow of his hand. All he had to do was to
close his fingers and compress the Rebel leader's throat, and his
orders of that morning read as though he comprehended what had
to be done and as if he was about to do the thing that was right,
viz. : to get his army out of the woods (the Wilderness) into the
clearings ; to advance through the comparatively open country,
swinging forward his right to co-operate with Sedgwick in closing
the Bowling Green road ; to close in upon Lee, as the Prussians
narrowed .the circle of their hunt until they shut Bazaine up in
Metz; until they crippled and took McMahon in Sedan. Up to
this point all was lovely, that is up to 2. p. m., Friday, May ist.
Had Hooker gone ahead, he had troops enough to meet Lee,
the more particularly as the Third Corps was rapidly coming up
in reserve.
A simultaneous attack by Hooker from the west, Sedgwick
from the east. Hooker's right closing in and giving the hand to
Sedgwick's left, thus completing the circuit on the south, while the
Rappahannock precluded escape to the north. Such a vigorous
nip would have made Chancellorsville another UJm, or Sedan, in
the open field.
Hooker had 48,000 men, besides the Third Corps 18,000,
equal to 66,000; Lee 49,000 or 50,000 facing West; Sedgwick
25,000 to 30,000, besides the First Corps, not yet withdrawn,
17,000, equal to 42,000 to 47,000, to^crush Early with 9,000 to
10,000 facing East.
The fearful mistake of the recall of the advance of attack of
Friday noon on Hooker's side, is chargeable to the Union com¬
mander. This is his own fault and cannot be shifted in whole or
part to any other shoulders. It'was an awful military error. Per¬
haps—taking into consideration circumstances, possibilities, pro¬
babilities—viewed, weighed and judged from a strictly military
standpoint, it was the greatest mistake of the war. Still it may be
entirely excused or satisfactorily explained on other than military
grounds, for no one, except those within the Ring, can know what
reasons, moral influences, actuated Hooker—led to this, for him,
ruinous reversal of the programme.
The dispositions of Friday p. m. for defensive battle, if any¬
thing could excuse the passage from an exhilarating offensive to a
depressing defensive, were well enough. The whole paralysis of
Saturday, both as regards Sedgwick and Hooker, are inexplicable
and inexcusable, supposing Hooker to have been himself, which
the writer has always doubted; not í?7'ír-stimulated—no, no, no;
but ■wa7iHng stimulants—tired out or worn down.
28
Jackson's flank march with 30,000 veterans and his attack on
the Union right on Saturday evening were magnificent, but not
more magnificent than Sickles' and Pleasonton's stoppage of
his onward; the latter with twenty-two guns and 1,000 troopers.
Lee's separation of his army should have inevitably insured
his defeat, just as the dispositions of the French army, in 1870,
under McMahon and Frossard, right and left, without a centre,
scarcely feeling to each other, occasioned its utter overthrow, dis¬
solution and dispersion, and was the dawn of the noon at Sedan.
Lee's dislocation of his forces on Saturday could have had but
one result—disastrous defeat—had there been a Gustavus, a Tors-
tenson, a Traun, a Frederic, a Massena, a Dessaix, a Thomas, or
a von Moltke at the head of the Union army.
The nocturnal operations of the Third Corps on Saturday night
2d-3d May, were, in petto, as daring and effective as the preceding
action of Jackson on a grander scale.
The order to abandon Hazel Grove on Sunday morning,
3<1 May, was on a par with many other of the military madnesses
of the campaign ; but necessary, if its maintenance was not to be,
or could not be, adequately supported. The latter was not the
case. If it was held, Lee was split in two. His left, assaulting
Hazel Grove and Chacellorsville, was exposed to a ci'tishmgflank
attack from Reynolds with the First Corps, 17,000 strong, fresh
and ready. Reynolds here laid himself open to a similar rebuke
that Lord Raglan launched at LordLucan after his prodigal expend-
diture of the British cavalry at Balaklava. Lee's right—20,000—
held by a thin skirmish line under Miles, in front, was open to an
annihilating blow in rear from Sedgwick, had the latter obeyed
orders, shown any head or any alacrity. At 7, a. m., Sunday,
May 3d, it was in the power of the Army of the Potomac to have
dissolved the Army of Northern Virginia. Say Lee had still, all
told, 50,000. Of these, 30,000 under Stuart, minus losses (A.
H. G. says 27,000), were attacking Sickles' 18,000 and Slocum
and French from the East, say together 30,000; 20,000 under his
(Lee's) own supervision; Slocum and Hancock, say 15,000, from
the East; while 10,000 were confronting, not as yet fighting,
Sedgwick. On the right flank of Stuart, Reynolds could have
thrown 17,000, equal in their fire and freshness to 25,000 fasting,
fought-out troops. Thus Jackson's successor would have been
compressed between forces eleven to six, equal, under the circum¬
stances, to two (Union) to his one (Rebel). Meanwhile Lee's
10,000 would have been faced by Slocum and Hancock, say
13,000, a.r\á flanked by Meade, 12,000 fresh and good troops—
overwhelming odds, over two to one. Sedgwick had, at first,
nearly three to Early's one.
29
Sedgwick has done nothing; Reynolds and Meade were not
used, did nothing. The Eleventh Corps is counted out after i, p. m.,
Saturday, 2d May. The crisis was at 9, A. M., Sunday, yi Alay.
No Sedgwick yet—not even heard from ; Hooker disabled. From
this hour Hooker is not responsible. Couch is now, henceforward,
in a primary degree, answerable. It was the case of the sick St.
Arnaud after the Alma and before Sebastopol. No successor
willing to take the responsibility or act, consequently everything
went awry. Meade was, in a secondary degree, responsible; then
Reynolds, even Reynolds ; he might have played the part of the
Maharbal of Placentia and Thrasymene and other victorious fields ;
of Richepanse at Hohenlinden; of Kellerman at Marengo; of
Blucher at Waterloo. Sedgwick could have come in, as, at least,
Kleist at Culm, and Lee would have gone up like Vandamme;
Sickles at Hazel Grove (Chancellorsville) and the Peach Orchard
(Gettysburg) playing the noble part of Osterman, at Culm, which
dissolved all Napoleotfs plans, and like the gallant Russian losing
a limb.
Italian independence failed of success at Santa Lucia, 6lh May,
1848, through just exactly such a want of simultaneousness of the
aggressive. Whoever will take the trouble to study out the phases
of the brief campaign from Goito (8th April, 1848) to Custozza-
Somma Campagna, 25th July, not the Custozza fight of 24th July
—will find the same violations of military rules and common sense,
and very many perfect parallels distributed over a long space of
time, but having the same fatal results to the Italian cause as to
the Union cause at Chancellorsville. Carlo Alberto began well,
like Hooker; lost the impulse and inspiration of the aggressive; sub¬
sided into an inoffensive defensive, and "went up," just as Hooker
did. It took a little longer, but the course of events and the re¬
sult were the same.
Although Sedgwick was three hours behind hand, give him
every possible excuse, and although he h ad lost so much time, there
was still time enough to do something decisive all day on Sunday,
had whoever possessed the power co-operated to the same end.
Lee had reunited his 40,000 at noon, but still they formed a con¬
cave encircling and opposed to an egg-point convex, comprising
60,000 good, nay, excellent troops. At 2, p. m., this 40,000 was
reduced to 27,000, and Sedgwick was opposed to 23,000 to
25,000; for, heaping error on error, he had left 5,000 behind.
Awful spectacle at 4, p. m.—70,000 paralyzed by 20,000, while
within six miles a battle had come on between Early, or rather
Wilcox, McLaws, Mahone, and Sedgwick, which might have been
made as decisive for the Union cause as any other collision, had
our main army only moved. Stunned, it seemed, all Sunday after-
30
noon ; stupefied almost all Monday, Sedgwick fighting one to one
when he might have had two to one, had he kept Gibbon in hand
and been reinforced by Banks' Fôrd. The latter movement would
have taken the Rebel line at any time on Monday morning in
flank and rolled it up Rosbach style, and even Missionary Ridge
style, when Hooker fell on Bragg's right flank.
Curious spectacle—Hooker quiescent in his pan-coupée-, Lee
watching him in his crescent, parallel to its flattened or excised
triangle ; McLaws and Mahone six miles from Hooker, confront¬
ing two sides of Sedgwick's U or hollow square, of which the Rap¬
pahannock constituted the fourth side or base; E^rly, the third
side, paying no attention to Gibbon, who, finally, had put the
river between him and the fight, and who, if he had been a little
further back and higher up, and had the ground favored, might
have looked on a grand gladiatorial encounter with firearms—^just
as Vendôme observed of a large portion of the French army at
Oudenarde and Hooker of 30,000 of the Union army at Williams¬
burg—whereas he ought to have fallen on Early's rear in co¬
operation with Sedgwick.
Gibbon might, with justice, say he had our camps and stores to
protect. Often the temptation of plundering a camp has given a
victory to the party who lost their impedimenta, all their traps.
Janikau, Sohr, Shiloh, Cedar Creek, are four among many examples
of what such conveying of a neighbor's goods often costs an ap¬
parently successful army.
Tuesday, May 5, Hooker or Couch, or Couch-Meade still quiet.
Sedgwick back across the river. H^d Sedgwick only held on.
Hooker might have recrossed to the North bank at United States
Ford, marched down the left bank, crossed again to the South
side at Banks' Ford, and fought a new battle on the plateau mid¬
way Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg, in a comparatively open
country.
Wednesday, May 6th, ^he Army of the Potomac home across
the Rappahannock.
Result—a moral victory to the Rebels, worth, at this time, a
real one; 36,000 men killed, wounded and prisoners, the loss
about equally divided. Union gain, the killing of Stonewall Jack¬
son and the flower of the Rebel infantry. The nation's loss, the
apparent defeat and red-tape victory, the restoration of the credit
of the Commander-in-Chief (who was so severely accused by
Burnside and was individually hostile to Hooker), and his return
to pristine power.
Fortunately for the loyal party, the same red-tape and Ring
which kept down merit and precluded success at the North, was
equally in the ascendant at the South. _ Witness the prompt pro-
31
motion of such men as Bragg and Pemberton—the tardy justice
to their antipodes, the remarkable Gordon and the second Stone¬
wall Jackson, Mahone.
(Note to line 4 from bottom of page 5. Sentence ending
" single cast of the dice.")
[" Napoleon was going through the painful experience of a
gambler who, after a long run of luck, has calculated every chance
and staked handfuls of gold—and then finds himself beaten after
all, just because he has played too elaborately."—Tolstoi's "War
and Peace," Series III., I., 81.]
(Note A. Page 6.) The superiority of old troops, acclimated
to suffering and battle, as compared with the best of new troops,
can scarcely be sufficiently estimated. Had Tilly not allowed him¬
self to be forced to accept the battle of Leipsic, in 1631, by the
'taunts and headstrong valor or "fiery nature" of Pappenheim,
and had he waited for the arrival of the veterans whom Aldringer
and Tiefenbach were leading back to his assistance, from the con¬
quest and sack of Mantua—the hand on the clock of human pro¬
gress and religious freedom would have been arrested then and
there. Never, perhaps, was a violation of the rule to concentrate
forces for an impending battle more suddenly punished. Austria
lost the whole gain of thirteen years by sending off a veteran array
on a good as foreign expedition wherein success could have no in¬
fluence on the terrible conflict at home. Napoleon modernized
pithy maxims as old as war, which is, perhaps, the natural state of
man, and one of these was simply this : "When a battle is impend¬
ing, scrape together every accessible man."
Had the forces sent to plunder Mantua been kept in Germany,
the campaigns of Gustavus, culminating at Leipsic, would have
been utterly impossible. Divided forces and counsels, armies
frittered away, and perhaps 200,000 troops scattered over vast ex¬
tents of territory to find subsistence, alone made it possible for the
Swedish 30,000 to penetrate into and subjugate the country.
Never, except in the Thirty Years' War, in many respects a per¬
fect parallel to the " Slaveholders' Rebellion," was there in any con¬
flict of war such a waste of strength as was again and again displayed
by the Imperial States in Europe and by the North in America, and
at no time so manifestly as when Halleck drove Hooker to resign
by refusing him the control of every man who could be assembled
to fall with crushing force upon Lee. When the troops refused to
Hooker were accorded to Meade, it was either too late or Meade
could not handle them or what he had.
" Yet war was his true vocation. If ever any one was born for
war, Charles Napier was the man. He studied its theory from
boyhood. He followed Alexander from the Granicus to the Indus,
32
and critically analyzed the structure of his campaigns. He had
meditated profoundly upon the large principles and strategic laws
of war before he was required to put them in practice. The
maxims which he evolved in the study were the principles which
he afterwards illustrated in the field. And in this, as in everything
else—but in this pre-eminently—he went at once, with direct de¬
cisive insight, to the root of the matter. To the professional
student his disquisitions on strategy must prove invaluable; even
to tlie general reader—the laws which regulate a military campaign
being not remotely derived from those which rule the still larger
campaign of life—they are full of interest ! 'A commander should
concentrate his own forces, divide his enemies, and never
think himself strong enough when he can be stronger.
Yet he should remember that additional numbers do not always
give strength. Always attack if you cannot avoid an action. If
your e7iemy is strongest, fall on his weakest points, and avoid his
strongones. [SkobolefFs maxim.] If you are more powerful, fasten
on his vitals, and destroy him. if he is strong, provoke him to separate;
if he is weak, drive him into a corner! ' These maxims were penned
many years before he went to the East; his Scindian campaign
was their application."—" Essays on History and Biography," by
John Skilton, L L.D. (Edin.), Advocate. Edinburg and London,
1883. Page 278.
[" But force is the product of the mass multiplied by the velo¬
city. And in war the force of the troops is also the product of the
mass, but the multiplier is an unknown quantity."—Tolstoi's "War
and Peace," Series HI., II., 136.J
["Those who are most eager to fight will always be in the best
condition for a struggle. The Spirit of the troops is the multiplier
which, taking the mass as the multiplicand, will give the strength
as a product. The real problem for the Science of War is to ascer¬
tain and formulate its value, and it will never be able to do so,
until it ceases to substitlite for this unknown quantity such factors
as the commander's plan or the accoutrements of the soldier; then
only, by expre.ssing certain historical facts by equations and com¬
paring their relative value, can we hope to ascertain that of this
unknown xP—Tolstoi's "War and Peace," series III., II., 137.]
[" It would appear that, having rejected the belief of older
historians in the submission of People's to the Divine Will, and in
predestined objects—towards the fulfilment of which Mankind is
unconsciously borne—modern history ought surely to study and
investigate, not so much the fact and manifestation of Power, as
the reasons which dominate its existence."—Tolstoi's " War and
Peace," Series HI., II., 325.]
33
(Note 5, page 8.) [" If Early [9th-10th July, 1864,] bad been but om
day earlier he might have entered the Capital before the arrival of the
reinforcements I [Grant] had sent. Whether the tórty caused by the battle
amounted to a day or not, General Wallace contributed on this occasion
by the defeat of the troops under him a greater benefit to a cause than
often falls to the lot of a commander of an equal force toj render by
means of a victory."—Grant's " Personal Memoirs," II., 306.]
(Note 6, page 10.) [ " It is true [spring of 1864] the Confederates had,
so far, held their Capital, and they claimed this to be their sole object.
But previously they had boldly proclaimed their intention to capture
Philadelphia, NewYork and the national Capital, and had made several
attempts to do so."—Grant's "Personal Memoirs," II., 177-178.]
In regard to Lee's objective being Philadelphia, see William Swinton's
"Army of the Potomac," page 335, text and note* ; likewise his " Twelve
Decisive Battles of the War," page 331. Examine in connection with
" On to Philadelphia," Colonel Fletcher, B. A., " History of the American
War," II. 403; Professor Draper's " Civii War in America," III. 135 ;
Lossing's "Civil War in America," III., 57 ; Pollard's (Rebel) " "Third Y ear
of the War," 38 ; Grant's " Personal Memoirs," II. 177,178 ; Count of Paris,
"Civil War in America," 506-533, &c. It remains to be seen what the
publication of tbe Official Records of the Rebellion is going to reveal.
Tf Bridging.—The more often and the more closely the critical military
mind dwells upon the losses of time and the waste of opportunities be¬
tween the 3d and 9th of April, and during the flight of Lee and pursuit
of Grant, but most particularly at Farmville, throughout pretty much
the whole of 7th of April, 1865—near which town the war might, should,
could and would have been ended in a blaze of glory, with chief credit to
Humphreys and his combined Second and Third Corps and to the better
satisfaction of the troops and to the nation—the more vividly occurs to
memory the remark of the French marshal, the Duke of Berwick, after a
similar failure to profit by, and rejection of, fortunes' offer with both hands
full of her best favors.
"The suspension of operations leads inevitably to a conviction as
replete with regret as the criticism, so eminently just, so dignified and so
temperate, pronounced by Field Marshal the Duke of Berwick, upon the
failure, on the part of the French, to profit by their opportunities and at¬
tack the Allies at the Abbey de Pure, or Pare, near Louvain, on (seventh)
June, 1693. William III. had between fifty and sixty thousand men—
only fifty thousand according to some accounts ; the Freneh about one
hundred and twenty thousand.
" Thereupon Berwick, lamenting tbe remembrance of such chances
absolutely thrown away, remarked : " The King's retreat * * * (was)
incomprehensible. As there could have been no good reasons for it, and
never having been able to learn any [to justify it], neither from the mi¬
nisters [of war] (nor from those cognizant of such affairs), nor from the
generals, one needs must conclude, that God did not will the execution of
these heautif al plans."
The more frequently the parallel of circumstance are considered the
more inexplicable Grant's blindness or inertion appears to be. Grant had
no genius and his mind did not work quickly. His successes were all
won by pouring out blood like water. Nothing was denied to him and
he used everything without mercy. With what ease the Appomattox
could have been bridged at once in various ways, Humphreys reinforced
and Lee destroyed on that spring afternoon, is susceptible of clear proof.
As the abutments of the railroad and the wagon road bridge at Farm¬
ville were intact, bridges on the cantilever principle (see illustration)
were easiest and simplest. There was a superfluity of force, men and
teams, and an exuberance of material ; tall trees near by to fell for the
principal beams, and a town at hand, to demolish, for smaller timber and
lumber. There was the enemy, exhausted and depleted, within three
miles, held all that afternoon and evening by the combined Second and
Third Corps, about one-third as strong, and all this within hearing, almost
within sight of a huge army indifferent to the occasion, leaving Hum¬
phreys "to take care of himself." Meanwhile all that interposed between
glory and inertion was a stream, not deep nor rapid, about one hundred
feet wide, which brains and will could have bridged strongly and suffi¬
ciently in two hours.
""This [cantilever] bridgeât Wangtuis a fine specimen of the Hima¬
layan construction, wherever a solid roadway is required. It is built
entirely on tbe principle of leverage. Several large trees are felled on each
side of the river, and their trunks are laid on either shore, with the nar¬
rower ends [apices] projecting over the river, and heavy stones laid over
34
the thick ends [butts] to increase their counterweiglit. Cross-bars of wood
are then laid over the projecting ends. Thus the first layer is complete.
The process is repeated again and again, each layer of trees projecting
some feet beyond the last, till the two sets of timber almost meet in mid¬
air, and one more layer crowns both. Then planks, laid crosswise from the
roadway. The base of the timbers on either side is imbedded in solid
masonry. Strong railings guard against accidents, and an excellent sub¬
stantial bridge is thus formed. The timber generally used is lleudar
[Himalayan Cedar'\, which seems almost imperishable, proof alike against
heat and wet, and all other influences tending to decay. The same prin¬
ciple of bridge-making, but in rough-and-ready style, is to be seen on a small
scale on many little streams, suchbridges being occasionally rapidly made just
when required! Rough logs are laid on either bank, weighted by stones.
On these are laid others, tied together with coarse ropes of goat's-hair
[prolonges would answer at a pinch] and, of course, overlapping the first
layer, then a final layer unites both, iitill narrower torrents are bridged by
a cou pie of tall trees, felled sous to fall across the stream side by side; on these
are laid flat slabs of stone, and the bridge is complete."—"In the Hima¬
layas and on the Indian Plains." By C. F. Gordon Gumming. Page 391.
London, 18H4. N. Y. S. L.
Cantilever bridge at wandei-oke.
"Oneof the greatest impediments to the progress of an army in all
mountainous districts, is the cataracts, which frequently bound from the
hills with an impetuosity that nothing can resist. * * * The engrav¬
ing [above, of view near Wandepore (Wandipoor), 18 miles east by
south of Tassisudon, capital of Boutan] will give some idea of the sort of
bridges employed in the vast chains of the Himalaya and Caucasus, being
taken in Boutan. The bridge repre.sented in the print is thrown over a
rapid stream in these hills [a branch from the north of the Brahmapootra],
and is a very favorable specimen of that description of architecture in
this mountainous region. Its construction is somewhat singular. Several
strong beams are imbedded in masonry, and supported by the rocks on
the precipitous banks of the stream. They are securely fixed in the in¬
terstices of these natural receptacles, and clamped together by means of
strong wooden wedges, inserted into mortises—for there the workmen
employ no iron in any of their structures. A space of several inches is
left between the beams, which increa.se in length from the buttress formed
by the rocky sides of the channel, the longest on either side reaching to
within about a fourth part of the span of the bridge. Planks upwards of
two feet wide, are then placed on the uppermost and longest of the pro¬
jecting beams on each side of the stream ; upon these planks small trans¬
verse joists are laid, and other planks again placed over them, the whole
forming a steady and substantial floor. These bridges may be passed
with perfect safety, and are no doubt precisel)' the same as those em¬
ployed in the days of Timour.'"—Owntof Annual, for 1837. London.
While these pages were passing through the press, the writer met
his friend, Rear-Admiral Chas. A. Baldwin, U. S. N., lOth-llth August,
1886, at the United States Hotel, Saratoga Springs, N. Y. The admiral
said that, while in command of the Yanderbilt in pursuit of the "Pirate
Semmes," he ran into .fames Town, St. Helena. Sir Charles Elliot, re-
35
cently appointed governor, had just arrived from London, having
been dropped, a few days previous, by a passing steamer. Sir
Charles had been a great deal in America ; had been British Com¬
missioner to Texas before its annexation to the United States; had
been intimately acquainted with a number of our prominent private
citizens and politicians; understood the feelings of the people and
the workings of the government; had spent quite a long time in
Washington, and knew all the country around, thoroughly, in
which the armies were operating in the summer of 1863. In fact,
he was completely posted and prepared to talk, and he brought
out an extremely good map of Northern Virginia, Maryland and
South-Eastern or Southern Pennsylvania. He had, beside this,
all the advantage of the latest British official information, up to the
time he left London, only a few days previous, and knew that Lee
•had crossed the border into Pennsylvania with go,000 to 100,000
of the very best Rebel troops and a thoroughly appointed army.
Sir Charles was satisfied that, if the Rebels were successful in the
first collision—could win the first battle, which must take place
sooner or later—Philadelphia was their direct objective; that they
must take it; that meanwhile they would ravage the country to
their heart's content; that their purpose was not to destroy, but to
levy enormous contributions. [A very able educated soldier had
previously prophesied, as did Gen. Philip Kearny afterwards, in
1862, that if they were successful in the field, Philadelphia would
be the Rebel objective, and the former gentleman told the writer
to go to Thurlow Weed from him, an old friend, and say that if
the North was not more in earnest in providing adequate troops,
" the Pelicans" [alluding to the symbol of Louisiana, the remote
Southwest] " would be shaking their tails over New York from the
heights of Weehawken." Sir Charles added that the effect of
Lee's winning the first battle on Northern soil would throw Mary¬
land into the Rebel hands and give them a great additional force
of men. He concluded by emphasizing that the great mistake of
the United States government was in paralyzing so many good
troops in guarding Harper's Ferry and Washington, The former,
he observed, was altogether Halleck's fault, who had Harper's
Ferry on the brain. [It was insisting upon leaving a whole strong
division at Harper's Ferry and refusing to concede their control
to Hooker that led to that general's resignation, although he had
already traversed Lee's designs, and threw the Army of the Poto¬
mac into the hands of Meade, whose first order was " to have a
grand review," and who, according to General Doubleday, wanted
to assume a position at Pipe Creek, where Lee might have chosen
to let it severely alone and have kept on depredating Pennsylvania
after capturing Harrisburg.]
36
hooker's effect on gettysburg.
"San Francisco, Presidio of S. F., Cal, June i8, 1886.
" Major-General Joseph Hooker, U. S. Army,
" Grand Hotel, San Francisco, Gal.
" Dear General :
" I received your note of the 17th inst. this morning, and I have
directed copies of certain papers in my possession to be made for
you, and I know no one more entitled to them than yourself, con¬
nected as they are with the battle of Gettysburg, up to the dates
included in the orders of which you will be sent copies.
"You remember that I was detached from the command of a
line division of the Second Army Corps, which I had organized
and fought at Antietam, Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville,
men of whom Sumner testified before the Committee on the Con¬
duct of the War, that ' the enemy had never seen their backs,' to
take command of the troops on Maryland Heights, part the
debris of Milroy's Manchester fiasco, and that you followed me
there on the 27th June, 1863, and ordered the immediate evacua¬
tion of the place, and that the troops, numbering about 11,000 of all
arms, should join the Army of the Potomac, then converging to¬
wards Emettsburg. Whilst at lunch, at 2 p. m., your order was
countermanded by Halleck, and you left for Frederick, where you
resigned the command. On the following day, an A. D. C. of
General Meade's ordered me to evacuate the Heights, ordering
such property as could be put in boats (canal) to be sent to
Washington. Leaving General Elliott with 3,000 men to execute
the last part of the order, I moved at once with the remaining
8,000 men to Frederick, and immediately put myself en rapport
with Meade, as the enclosed papers testify. Stretching a line to¬
wards Baltimore, on one side of Frederick, and opening com¬
munications upon which the Army of the Potomac were dependent
for supplies, I sent other troops to occupy South Mountain and
other passes, and pushed the cavalry as far as the Potomac, who
destroyed the pontoon bridge over which Lee's army had crossed,
thus depressing the morale of the enemy, whilst our own was pro¬
portionately raised—lowered, as it appears in these papers, it had
been for the first two or three days of the fight.
"The order placing me in command of the Third Army Corps
was given by General Meade, in consequence of my service during
the battle of Gettysburg with the Harpers Ferry troops, for de¬
manding whom you were obliged to throw up your command.
It is a matter of history, that my ' cordon ' shut out Stewart's
cavalry from taking any part in the contest, or in the least molest¬
ing the base of Meade's operations. The day previous to my
37
arrival, a train from Baltimore of two hundred wagons had been
cut off.
" I have no desire to obtrude my record, my services were given
with all the zeal and ability I possessed, but as the war closed
places became more valuable to politicians than the men who
occupied them and those having most influence secured them.
" To leave a fair reputation for my children will satisfy me, and
long since I have ceased to expect more.
"Very sincerely, [Signed.] Wm. H. French,
" Brev't Maj.-Gen'l, U. S. A."
" I certify the foregoing is a true copy of the original, now in
mv possession. "J. Hooker,
"Maj.-Gen'l."
" The following is a copy, if not the identical words, of the
substance of my telegram to General Butterfield regarding the
cavalry.
" Point of Rocks, June 27th, 1863.
" General Butterfield,
" Frederick, Md.
" Send the cavalry in the direction of Gettysburg and Emetts-
burg to ascertain the whereabouts of the enemy, and to report
to me. [Signed.] Maj.-Gen'l Hooker."
"Dear Beale:—In overhttuling some war papers I found some
that may be of use to you in preparing your address (or which I
think should be), the history of that battle, as I think you have,
or can soon have all the data necessary for the purpose. Copies
of my orders for the advance from Frederick, on three lines of the
whole army, can be obtained by application to the Adjutant-
General of the Army, and these orders were only departed from
by the troops on the most easterly line. See Butterfield's tes¬
timony, Vol. I., page 419, series 65. Also, in the same volume,
page 329 (near the bottom). General Meade's testimony :
' that I gave him no information of my plans,' &c., and, also, in
the same volume, the report of committee, pages 53,54,55. Gene¬
ral Butterfield informs me that he delivered the above telegram to
General Pleasanton verbally. ^p°It seems, therefore, that General
Meade only began to blunder the moment he passed from under
the influence of my orders. I left him my plans, my orders, my
staff and my army (except two aides-de-camp)..,^!
"Yours truly and sincerely, "J- Hooker,
" Maj.-Gen'l."
38
SICKLES AT GETTYSBURG.
" If you had asked me as to my opinion of that battle [Gettys¬
burg] I would have answered decidedly in favor of Sickles, and
would say that no man with a military eye that takes in the topo¬
graphy of the battlefield of Gettysburg but could see at once the
necessity of Sickles occupying the high Peach Orchard ground.
Had he not done so, Lee would have planted his artillery there
and have swept our army from the gradual sloping plain below
from our left to our right flank, cutting us to pieces by a flank fire.
I have never seen a better position to accomplish this, than in the
lay of this land, and have been told that it was Lee's plan to do
so, for he had looked at it. I have no question of doubt but Sickles
by this move saved to our army the day.
"You know that my command was on the left-centre, at the
Emettsburg road, and that the destruction of my nth New Jersey
Regiment was from a flank fire ; the front fire from Barksdale's
command was severe, but the flank fire was terrible. I am sure
that General Sickles will win this contest [discussion as to his ad¬
vance] as he did at Gettysburg."
Extract from a letter of Major-General Robert McAllister, of
New Jersey, to General J. Watts de Peyster, dated 31st August,
1886.
" General Sickles did not send misleading orders to his com¬
mander of the Second Division (General Humphreys), on the oc¬
casion of his night march to Gettysburg, July ist, at which time
Humphreys nearly marched his division within the Confederate
lines. The proof of my assertion is the published report of the
Committee on the Conduct of the War, wherein General Hum¬
phreys testifies 'that the error was his own' in not correctly con¬
struing General Sickles' order. This fact should settle that point
for all time. If it is true that General Sickles ' did receive orders
from General Meade assigning him to his position—in substance
to continue Hancock's left and cover Round Top'—it is also true
that such position was untenable. It was low, swampy ground,
entirely commanded at short rifle range by the Emettsburg ridge,
which commanding ground it was the enemy's intention to gain
by Longstreet's attack. Sickles, knowing that the ground as¬
signed him offered no advantage for attack or defence, with the
instinct of the true soldier, promptly advanced his corps and oc¬
cupied that important commanding ground, and there received the
enemy's attack. He fought his corps of 10,000 splendidly, losing
in killed and wounded 4,280—and held it against Longstreet's
30,000 until Meade sent reinforcements, and by occupying both
Round Tops made our left secure.
39
" I claim that General Sickles, in promptly seizing the Emetts-
burg ridge, instead of allowing the enemy to gain that vantage
ground, showed the highest soldierly qualities."—St. Paul and
Minneapolis Pioneer Press, Sunday, 29th August, 1886.
(Note to "Smitten by idiocy," line 31, page 16.) A great
many commanders-in-chief exercise as little influence, or not much
more, upon the successes attributed to their ability and force than
the old Exemplar-Muscovite, who was hailed as the conqueror, in
1812, of the Corsican-French-Attila. The fact is, " History, that
vast Mississippi of lies," on its freshets or floods floats high the
lighter wood, while the heavier and more valuable is always either
concealed in the turbid flow or partially if not altogether sub¬
merged.
^Fatality.—" So far as their own free will was concerned, Na-
' poleon and Alexander contributed no more by their actions to the
accomplishment of such or such an event than the private soldier
who was compelled to fight for them as a recruit or a conscript.
Indeed, how could it be otherwise ? For the fulfilment of their
will, which apparently ruled the course of the world, the concur¬
rence was needed of an infinite number of factors, all the thousands
of individuals who were the active instruments of their purpose—
all these soldiers, ready to fight or to transport cannon and victuals
—had severally to consent to obey the orders of two feeble human
units, and their obedience was the result of endlessly varied and
complicated motives.
" Fatalism is the only clew to history when we endeavor to
understand its illogical phenomena; or, shall we say, those phe¬
nomena of which we see the causation but darkly, and which only
seem the more illogical the more earnestly we strive to account
for them. * * #
" The life of man is twofold—one side of it is his own personal
experience, which is free and independent in proportion as his in¬
terests are lofty and transcendental; the other is his social life, as
an atom in the human swarm which binds him down with its laws
and forces him to submit to them. For although a man has a
conscious individual existence, do what he will he is but the in¬
conscient tool of history and humanity. The higher he stands on
the social ladder, the more numerous the fellow beings whom he
can influence, the more absolute his power, the more clearly do
we perceive the predestined and irresistible necessity of his every
action.
" The heart of kings is in the hands of God. Kings [all Rulers
and Leaders in factj are the slaves of history.
" History—that is to say, the collective life of the aggregate of
human beings—turns each moment of a monarch's life to account.
40
and binds kings to its own ends."—"War and Peace," second series.
Harper's Franklin Square Library, No. 521, page 46 (i).]
(Note * * line 18, page 18.) [The influence of the majority
of generals, so lauded, upon the victories attributed to their judg¬
ment and gallantry, about answers to the picture descriptive of
the Russian commander-in-chief, the idol of the people, at Boro¬
dino :
" Koutouzow, with his head bent and sunk all into a heap,
from his own weight, sat all day where Pierre had seen him in the
morning, on a bench covered with a rug; he gave no orders, but
merely approved or disapproved of what was suggested to him.
"'That is it—yes, yes, do so,' he would say; or, 'Go and see,
my good friend, go and see!' or, again: 'That is of no use; we
must wait.'"—Tolstoi's "War and Peace," Series III., I., 84.],
[Note to line 10, page 19, "Fording of the Susquehanna."
—"As to the coal-mountain expedition [f. <?., irruption into the
mining districts of Pennsylvania] and the paralytic effect it might
have produced, it seems to me you are right. As to the fact that
people confound a.basis with a baseline, you are right. As to there
being as good a basis for provisions before as behind Lee, you are
right. As to a basis for a supply of ammunition, I don't know. As to
crossing the Susquehanna, I once walked aXongtht Susquehannafrom
Wilkesbarre to Havre-de-Grace. There is not, I fancy, in the tvorld
another river of such great breadth which is so shalloiti. Fordable with
short intervals^ one might say, everywhere until within five miles of
Havre-de-Grace (Port Deposit), I should say there would have been
little more difßculty in crossing below Columbia than above it, and
what with our being able to send gunboats into the Delaware,
possibly the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal might have been
used for small ones ; and with the sort of angle into which. he
would have entered, it seems to me,. Lee would have run a tre¬
mendous risk in going to Philadelphia without first beating Meade's
army.
" For us, as you mention, there was always that tremendous
clog on the neck, of defending Washington. If the original plan
of having there a permanent garrison of 40,000 men had been fol¬
lowed out, and the place had been made a grand camp of instruc¬
tion, it would not have been so. But, to my mind, everything that
depended on the War Department was managed as only civilians,
and politicians at that, would have managed it; i. e., worse than it
could have been managed by any honest errors. It was one great
trouble with the August, 1862, campaign that Washington must
be defended by the army in the field.
" But, after all, as you say, the Southern troops were (in esse^
the best, excepting, of course, the artillery. In posse, I think, ours
41
were the best, if we could have got as good officers; as good, that
is by the definition as to getting work out of the men. Their [the
Rebel] officers were the best, and as marksmen, I think, their
men were our superiors in general. Richmond was no clog to
them, for they could depend on the citizens to garrison it. Their
War Department had a bad man, I fear, but a soldier (Davis
[meaning in his exercise of absolute power over every department])
at its head. They had no Halleck, timid and rash and an ignoramus,
to baulk their generals and select to gratify his animosities. Man¬
gold [the Prussian critic on the American Civil War] says Lee was
" naturally disposed to take risks," and Lee must have, at least,
fancied [or conceived there would be] difficulties in this case
[his sortie of 1863]. Possibly the loss of Jackson made the dif¬
ference. Little doubt Jackson would have marched on Philadel-
• phia.
"Under military bridges have you ever considered those Mc¬
Dowell says he and Haupt threw across Potomac Creek and
in nine days four stories of trestle and crib-work, and for long
carrying railway trains?" General W P W to
General de P. July, 1866.]
hood's report on gettysburg.*
"Accordingly my troops moved out of camp, crossed the Ra-
pidan about the 5th June, 1863, and joined in the general move
in the direction of the Potomac. We crossed the river about the
middle of the same month, and marched into Pennsylvania. Hill's
and Ewell's Corps were in advance, and were reported to be in
the vicinity of Carlisle. Whilst lying in camp, not far distant from
Chambersburg, information was received that Ewell and Hill were
about to come in contact with the enemy near Gettysburg. My
troops, together with McLaw's Division, were put in motion upon
the most direct road to that point, which, after a hard march, we
reached before or at sunrise on the 2d of July. So imperative had
been the orders to hasten forward with all possible speed that, on
the march, my troops were allowed to halt and rest only about
two hours, during the night from the ist to the 2d of July.
" I arrived with my staff in front of the heights of Gettysburg
shortly after daybreak, as I have already stated, on the morning
of the 2d of July. My division soon commenced filing into an
open field near me, where the troops were allowed to stack arras
and rest until further orders. A short distance in advance of this
point, and during the early part of that same morning, we were
both engaged, in company with Generals Lee and A. P. Hill, in
* This is a note to line 31, page 16.
42
observing the position of the Federals. General Lee—with coat
buttoned to the throat, sabre-belt buckled around the waist, and
field-glasses pending at his side—walked up and down in the shade
of the large trees near us, halting now and then to observe the
enemy. He seemed full of hope, yet, at times, buried in deep
thought. Colonel Freemantle, of England, was ensconced in the
forks of a tree not far off, with glass in constant use, examining
the lofty position of the Federal army.
'"General Lee was, seemingly, anxious you should attack that
morning,' he remarked to me. 'The enemy is here, and if we do
not whip him, he will whip us. You [Longstreet] thought it better
to await the arrival of Pickett's Division—at that time still in the
rear—in order to make the attack; and you said to me, subse¬
quently, whilst we were seated together near the trunk of a tree :
' The General is a little nervous this morning; he wishes me to
attack; I do not wish to do so without Pickett. ■ I never like to
go into battle with one boot off.'" See Maj.-Gen. S. W. Crowford's
Testimony, Gen. de Peyster's " Soldiers' Monument Inaugural Ad¬
dress." Pages 94-103.
" Thus passed the forenoon of that eventful day, when in the
afternoon—about three o'clock—it was decided to no longer await
Pickett's Division, but to proceed to our extreme right and attack
up the Emmetsburg road. McLaws moved off, and I followed
with my division. In a short time I was ordered to quicken the
march of my troops, and to pass to the front of McLaws.
"This movement was accomplished by throwing out an ad¬
vanced force to tear down fences and clear the way. The instruc¬
tions I received were to place my division across the Emmetsburg
road, form line of battle, and attack. Before reaching this road,
however, I had sent forward some of my picked Texan scouts, to
ascertain the position of the enemy's extreme left flank. Thf^y soon
reported to 7ne that it rested upon Round Top Mountain; that the
country was open, and thg.t I could march through an open wood¬
land pasture aroimd Round Top, and assault the e?iemy in flank and
rear; that their wagon trains were packed in rear of their line, and
were badly exposed to our attack in that direction. As soon as I ar¬
rived upon the Emmetsburg road, I placed one or two batteries
in position and opened fire. A reply from the enemy's guns soon
developed his lines. His left rested on or near Round Top, with
line bending back and again forward, forming, as it were, a con¬
cave line, as approached by the Emmetsburg road. A consider¬
able body of troops was posted in front of their main line, between
the Emmetsburg road and Round Top Mountain. This force
[Third CorpsJ was in line of battle upon an eminence near a peach
orchard.
43
" I found that, in making the attack according to orders, viz.: up
the Emmetsburg road, I should have first to encounter and drive off
this advanced line of battle ; secondly, at the base and along the
slope of the mountain, to confront immense boulders of stone, so
massed together as to form narrow openings, which would break our
ranks and cause the men to scatter whilst climbing up the rocky
precipice. I found, moreover, that my division would be exposed
to a heavy fire from the main line of the enemy [to which the Third
Corps was advanced in echelonj in position on the crest of the
high range, of which Round Top was the extreme left, and, by
reason of the concavity of the enemy's main line, that we would
be subject to a destructive fire in flank and rear, as well as in front;
and deemed it almost an impossibility to clamber along the
boulders up this steep and rugged mountain, and, under this
' number of cross-fires, put the enemy to flight. I knew that, if the
feat was accomplished, it must be at a most fearful sacrifice of as
brave and gallant soldiers as ever engaged in battle.
" The reconnoissance of my Texas scouts, and the development
of the Federal lines, were effected in a very short space of time;
in truth, shorter than I have taken time to recall and jot down
these facts, although the scenes and events of that day are as clear
to my mind as if the great battle had been fought yesterday. I
was in possession of these important facts so shortly after reach¬
ing the Emmetsburg road, that I considered it my duty to report
to you [Longstreet], at once, my opinion that it was unwise to at¬
tack up the Emmetsburg road, as ordered, and to urge that you
allow me to turn Round Top, and attack the enemy iti flank and
rear. Accordingly, I despatched a staff-officer, bearing to you my
request to be allowed to make the proposed movement on account
of the above stated reasons. Your reply was quickly received,
' General Lee's orders are to attack up the Emmetsburg road.' I
sent another officer to say thát I feared nothing could be accom¬
plished by such an attack, and renewed my request to turn Round
Top. Again your answer was, ' General Lee's orders are to attack
up the Emmetsburg road.' During this interim, I had continued
the use of the batteries upon the enemy, and had become more
and more convinced that the Federal line extended to Round
Top, and that I could not reasonably hope to accomplish much
by the attack as ordered. In fact, it seemed to 7ne the enemy oc¬
cupied a position by nature so strong—I may say impregnable—that,
independently of their flank fire, they could easily repel our attack
by merely throwing and rolling stones down the mountain side as
we approached.
"A third time I despatched one of my staff to explain fully in
regard to the situation, and suggest that you had better come and
44
look for yourself. I selected, in this instance, my adjutant-general,
Colonel Harry Sellers, whom you know to be, not only an officer
of great courage, but also of marked ability. Colonel Sellers re¬
turned with the same message, ' General Lee's orders are to attack
up the Enimetsburg road.' Almost simultaneously, Colonel Fair¬
fax, of your staff, rode up and repeated the above orders.
"After this urgent protest of entering the battle of Gettysburg
according to instructions—which protest is the first and only one
I ever made during my entire military career—I ordered my line
to advance and make the assault. [J. W. de P. worked out the
same idea correctly in his "Gettysburg." See Gen. Tremain's
Testimony, 154, No. III. of "The Decisive Conflicts of the late
Civil War or Slaveholders' Rebellion," pages 63, &c., 154, &c.
The work is worthy of examination, as written between summer
of 1863 and spring of 1867, in the light of more recent and
constantly developing revelations.]
"As my troops were moving forward, you [Longstreet] rode
up in person; a brief conversation passed between us, during
which I again expressed the fears above mentioned, and regret at
not being allowed to attack in flank around Round Top. 2^^ You
answered to this effect, ' We must obey the orders of General Lee.'
I then rode forward with my line under a heavy fire. In about
twenty minutes, after reaching the Peach Orchard, I was severely
wounded in the arm, and borne from the field.
"With this wound terminated my participation in this great
battle. 2^^As I was borne off on a litter to the rear, I could but
experience deep distress of mind and heart at the thought of the
inevitable fate of my brave fellow-soldiers who formed one of the
grandest divisions of that world-renowned army; and I shall ever
believe that, had I been permitted to turn Round Top Mountain,
we would not only have gained that position, but have been able
finally to rout the enemy.,,^^^
"I am, respeetfully, yours, J. B. Hood."
Notwithstanding the seemingly impregnable character of the
enemy's position upon Round Top Mountain, Benning's Brigade,
in concert with the First Texas Regiment, succeeded in gaining
temporary possession of the Federal line; they captured three
guns, and sent them to the rear. Unfortunately, the other com¬
mands, whose advance up a steep ascent was impeded by immense
boulders and sharp ledges of rock, were unable to keep pace up
the mountain side in their front, and render the necessary support.
Never did a grander, more heroic division enter into battle; nor
did ever troops fight more desperately to overcome the insur¬
mountable difficulties against which they had to contend, as Law,
45
Banning, Anderson and Robertson nobly led their brave men to
this unsuccessful assault. General Law [? McLaws], after I was
wounded, assumed command of the division, and proved himself,
by his courage and ability, fully equal to the responsibilities of the
position.
The losses were very heavy, as shown by the reports, and have
often caused me the more bitterly to regret that I was notper/nitted
to turn Round Top Mountain.—"Advance and Retreat : Personal
Experiences in the United States and Confederate States Armies."
By J. B. Hood, Lieutenant-General in the Confederate Army.
r88o." Pages 56-60.
(From The Soldier s Friend^ March 27,1869.)
► AFTER GETTYSBURG AND AT WILLIAMSPORT.
We have scotched the snake, not killed it."
" Letting ' I dare not' wait upon * I would.' "—Macbeth.
With the cheers which rang along the Union line like a feu-
de-joie or rolling fire of musketry, saluting the appearance, at the
point of collision, of the commander of the victorious Army of the
Potomac, the war-churm of the decisive battle, as our people have
elected to style it, at the East, ceased. The three days' contest
was over; the sickle had strewn the field with the harvest, but
that harvest was gleaned, not garnered. That evening, the roar of
the wheeled-flood-tide which had hitherto flowed from east to
west subsided into the slack-water of the repulse. When it broke
again upon the strained ear of expectancy, it was ebbing, with
the waning moon, from east to west, thither, whence for so many
anxious days previous it had poured. Already, under the impulse
of the fiery Pleasanton, our cavalry, let loose, were picking up
scattered sheafs where our army should have piled the groaning
wains with shocks of trophies. On the 6th, back toward the
Potomac commenced the retreat of the Army of Northern Vir¬
ginia, " streaming," a confused mass, which a close pursuit would
have soon converted into a rout. Horse, slashed and gashed ;
infantry, decimated—fought out, wrought out, and despondent ;
artillery with almost empty ammunition-boxes and exhausted
teams; wagons laden with the spoils of Pennsylvania; and pris¬
oners so buoyed up with the assurance of rescue, that, even
although starving, they refused the parole offered—nay, pressed
upon them. "Streaming" was the expression of the toll-gate
keepers and of the spoiled inhabitants, who beheld that flood
amid the darkness and the rain, and under the blazing sun of mid¬
summer, toil onward through the mountain passes by which they
had advanced, elate with faith in the star of Lee, and the con-
46
fidence of speedy victory over the only host which stood be¬
tween their tattered battalions and their triumphant revel in the
fertile country districts and the wealthy marts and cities of the
North. Blackened with powder and with gore; travel-stained,
begrimed with the soil on which they confidently hoped to
camp on as conquerors; bemired and besmirched with the stains
of marches, battle and travail of soul—this horde, which issued
forth to subvert freedom, pursued its wearied way amid the shrieks
of agony from multitudes of dead and dying, which filled the air
with sounds of horror and the fields with hasty graves scooped
to receive the dead cast forth from the impressed cavalcade of
vehicles, swept together from the surrounding country to receive
the mutilated forms of heroes; for, if ever heroism was displayed,
it was shown by the South as well as by the North at Gettysburg :
on the part of the South, " the poor man's fight in the rich man's
war;" on the part of the North, the " soldiers' battle," even as was
said of Inkerman by the most prominent general on the field.
Sir Charles Wyndham, afterward the Hero of the Redan—Inker-
man, the greatest of the Crimean fights, fought to defend a stretch
of heights, ending, like Gettysburg, in the slaughterous repulse
and defeat of hosts fierce in their championship of ideas dominant
in the past.
With Gregg slashing in and slicing off fragments on the
flank, and Kilpatrick thundering with his artillery, carving with
his cavalry, burning miles of wagons in their midst—for in the
part he played on this occasion, Kilpatrick seemed to make a very
sport of his brave and perilous work, very much as Mokanna
amused himself in his forced flight—with this difference, that the
" Veiled Prophet " was cutting down his own men, who would not
stand up for him any longer, and Kilpatrick was cutting off the
enemy who could not stand up any longer as an array against
the followers of the true faith. Liberal Institutions—the rebels
continued on toward thq Potomac by the direct road, the chord
of the arc along whose curve the Army of the Potomac escorted
them, so to speak, after a partial and faint demonstration toward
the Monterey pass against the rear guard, almost devoid of am¬
munition for its guns ; so short of supplies, that Scheibert, a Prus¬
sian officer present with the rebel army, admits—corroborating
the testimony of our General Howe, himself an artillery officer—
that dearth of ordnance supplies rendered a retrogade compulsory
upon Lee. " Nothing but the excessive need of ammunition de¬
termined the retreat. General R. E. Lee had not over one
hundred charges per gun left, and could not therefore offer an¬
other battle which might last over a day. He saw himself com¬
pelled to return to his base of operations, and this—his base—was
47
the—Rappahannock."—" Seven Months in the Rebel States dur¬
ing the North American War." i868. By Scheibert. Stettin,
(Prussia), 1868. [The only copy, the author believes, in this
country.]
Howe swore that a captured rebel artillery officer told him
there were not two rounds per gun left for the rear guard. Yet,
notwithstanding, the Union army were not permitted to press the
rebel rout.
Around Hagerstown a series of combats ensued, most glori¬
ous to our cavalry, striving to arrest the retreating rebels and
interpose a barrier between them and the Potomac, and cut off
the vast wagon-train, laden with confiscations and contributions
which Imboden was conducting farther west, and more directly
southward, through Greencastle, upon the ford or crossing at
» Williamsport.
At first our cavalry had the best of it, and would have suc¬
ceeded in effecting their object had not the rebels received a stif¬
fening of infantry, which gave them sufficient backbone to enable
them to restore their communications with the river. Here
Providence befriended us again and arrested their crossing by
such heavy down-pours of rain that the Potomac, ordinarily
fordable at the usual low stage of water in the summer, fiowed
" swimming," as Pleasanton quaintly expressed it. It was utterly
impassable. The column detached by French, for the purpose,
had destroyed the rebel bridges at Falling Waters. Meanwhile,
Kelly, from West Virginia, having under him the indefatigable and
resolute Averill, was sweeping down to intercept their line of
retreat and cut off stragglers, and another column was advancing
up the Peninsula upon Richmond, if for no other purpose, with
the intent of detaining reinforcements from being sent north¬
ward. The troops with whom Averill was present did not make
time, or rather get up in time, while the expedition toward Rich¬
mond terminated, as a participant expressed it, in a " blackberry
raid," alluding to the profuse enjoyment of that luscious wild fruit
with which the soldiers refreshed themselves upon their hot and
sultry march.
Nevertheless, the rebels were in a trap, notwithstanding their
cavalry, starched with the first arrivals of their infantry, had frayed
the way for the main body. The rebel exodus was arrested by
waters, if not as wide to them, still for a time as impassable as the
Red Sea, and though the pursuers, like the hosts of Pharoah,
drave heavily and came lumbering after, no miraculous way was
open to their Moses through the waves. To pass over it, bridge
material was needed ; it had to be sought with time, labor and
difficulties. As thus the defeated army drew toward the Poto-
48
mac, their depleted numbers—the depth of whose depletion has
never yet been vouchsafed by those who knew, and can only be
arrived at by circumstantial evidence by those who had not the
immediate means of knowing—drew toward the Potomac and
gradually assumed that curved chain of positions, July iith-i2th,
from nine to eleven miles, certainly ten, in extent, between its left
wing established in the fields, 'in the air,'just west of the borough
of Hagerstown, astraddle of the National Road or Turnpike, and
its right on some lofty hills, and in some wooded, broken ground,
subsiding to the Potomac below Falling Waters. As the Prussian
eye-witness is a disinterested one at the best, and may certainly
be set down as one partial to the rebels from his tone, his testi¬
mony at this point is very valuable. " On the nth our position
was entrenched," says he, "because the enemy was drawing nearer
and nearer along a front from six to eight English miles, which ap¬
peared to me a much too attenuated line for our 70,000 men, since
it assigned only four men to every pace." If this line of six to eight
miles was too thinly manned, how much more so was it in reality
if Lee had only 45,000 to 60,000 men to distribute along ten to
eleven miles of front, of whom a large number must have been
occupied in sweeping up provisions, food having almost failed,
and in collecting materials for the bridges which constituted the
only ultimate hope of salvation.
Let us again resort to Scheibert's work for a concise express¬
ion of current events :
" Near Hagerstown, General Lee rested and waited to see
what Meade would do—Meade did nothing."
Again alluding to Lee's thin lines, he intimates, quoting:
" Colonel Long, of the rebel staff, said smiling, that: ' Since Frede¬
ricksburg, the Yankees had a most prodigious respect for such
lines of rifle-pits.'"
It has often been stated that a certain hill, about at the centre
of the rebel line and opposite St. James' College, was the key to their
position ; that thence their lines could be enfiladed northward to
their left and westward to their right. Its occupation in force by
them was a strong if not the strongest motive for withholding an
attack, because it was averred that it rendered that portion of
Lee's position unattackable. Concede this, and the failure to
attack becomes incomprehensible, because General Pleasanton
declares that, " On the day of the council (July 12th), the brigade
of cavalry that was in front of General Slocum's command, under
Colonel (Huey, not) Henry (a young Quaker from Philadelphia),
of the (8th) Pennsylvania Cavalry, near St. James' College, drove
in the enemy and reported to me (Pleasanton), that he could have
held, NOT carried, as his language was erroneously taken down.
49
that position, but that General Slocum had ordered him to halt
for fear of bringing on a general engagement." When he was
withdrawn, the re,bels occupied that point in force and garnished
it very heavily with artillery. " The enemy afterward brought a
strong force," continued Pleasonton, " there, to hold that point."
Demoralized in everything but courage, the rebels may have been
said to have " bluffed " us off, until they had improvised bridges,
and then, in the midst of pouring rain and bitter cold and un¬
seasonable weather, the withdrawal took place. The outposts
were first called in on the night of i3th-i4th. This night was
pitch dark ; a man could not see his hand before his very eyes.
Horses stuck fast—men mired. Ice-cold rain fell, and beyond the
river the wheels sunk down to the hubs and [roads] were " so cram¬
med," to use Scheibert's words, " that no one could get along."
^Brevet Colonel W. H. Paine corroborates this, particularly the
cold. "The ground," he says, "on the dark, dismal morning of
the 14th, had the appearance in places of being frozen from the
hail or sleet of the previous night." But it is needless to dwell
upon what seemed a calamity, which honest common-sense Lin¬
coln looked upon as such, and expressed himself in a homely
way, which, however pregnant with truth, to repeat, might shock
the pious-minded. Afterward he spoke to the same effect, but
in more orthodox language. In either case, he was right. The
nation felt as he did, and the military critic can only unite with
the poet in wishing for "one hour of Dundee" at that crisis; or
with Campbell for the " Bruce of Bannockbum." But it needs
not the flight of poetry to find fitting words. In opposition to the
remark sworn to by Warren, in answer to the question, "What, in
your opinion, as a military man, would have been the effect of a
general assault upon the enemy's position there by the river ? "
" I think we should have cut them all to pieces ; that's my opin¬
ion." It is set down that Meade observed that " if the enemy fell
back across the river (the Potomac), he could follow them into
their own country and give them battle, under probably as favor¬
able circumstances as were there presented to him—that is, he
thought, if he lost that opportunity, he could have another one."
How differently" Marshal Forwards," the "old Blucher," would
have answered, even as he spoke out the honest convictions of a
soldier after his Gettysburg victory, on the Katzbach : "You must
pay no attention to the complaints of cavalry " (or even of starved
and exhausted infantry), "for when so great a result as the obli¬
teration of a whole army of the enemy can be attained, the State
can well sacrifice a few hundred horses which fall dead from fa¬
tigue. The neglect to utilize a victory to the uttermost involves,
as an inevitable consequence, the fighting of a new battle, in which
50
everything done (or won) may be undone (or lost)."—[Blucher to
York, 31st August, 1813.—Scherr., III., 159.
" The General-in-Chief," is the comment of the distinguished
Müffling, " had shown that he well knew how to seize the proper
moment for passing from a prudent defence to a bold attack,
which must produce great results." After the battle, he had done
everything to instigate them all to exert their utmost strength in
the pursuit ; and his words—" with some bodily exertion now, you
may spare a new battle "—had turned out true.—" Passages from
My Life and Writings." By Baron von Müffling. London, 1853,
page 327.
The most inexplicable phase of the escape of Lee across
the Potomac, on the morning of June 14th, 1863, is the total
ignorance within the Union lines that any such retrograde move¬
ment was in progress. As before mentioned, it was a night of
inky darkness and ice-cold, beating rain. Following the sinuosi¬
ties of the rough and miry roads, some of the rebel troops and
artillery had to move from ten to twelve miles from their left
wing, west of Hagerstown to the bridge at Falling Waters. [The
distances in this article have been submitted to Colonel W. H.
Paine, U. S. Volunteers, Topographical Staff, and have met with
his entire approval.] In such obscurity, and amid such difficulties,
it must have taken the enemy's troops the whole night to over¬
come that distance. The rebel outposts were first withdrawn in
the night. The sun rose at ten minutes before 5 a. m. The rebel
bridge was not taken up until i p. m. No move appears to have
been contemplated before 7 a. m. Our cavalry attacked between
8 and 10.30 a.m. What was our army doing between sunrise
and noon ?—seven hours. Where were our spies, scouts and
pickets ? Ought we not to have made a sharp reconnoissance
early that morning ? How was it that we saw nothing and
heard nothing ? Although there is a great deal of wood in that
district, there are ver)i»extensive clearings which are commanded
by heights, which present extensive views ; moreover, the country,
although rolling, subsides toward the river. In active campaign¬
ing, in the presence of an enemy, with the expectation of a colli¬
sion, a well-organized army ought to keep a bright lookout, and,
where it cannot SQQ,feel for the enemy. The inactivity of those few
hours, on that eventful morning, present more of the incompre¬
hensible than any other period of the war. Paine records in his
"Journal," 14th July, Tuesday: " Mortified by the report that the
rebels have crossed the Potomac in the night and left. All the corps
were to advance at 8 a.m." Afterwards he added: "Was cha¬
grined that the rebels had all crossed the Potomac. t^^Our troops
are all advancing very rapidly now the enemy has gone ! ",¿5=11
51
It has been argued that, even if our generals had been aware
that Lee was withdrawing, the broken country, within the arc of
the rebel line, presented admirable positions for troops accustomed
to " bushwhacking " to arrest the pursuit of masses dislocated by the
accidents of the ground. This would be true if the retreating
forces had been as well supplied and fed as their opponents, or if
the country had offered commanding ridges, on which to make a
stand, such as afforded some excuse after Gettysburg.
In the first place, Frederic, at Torgau, in 1760, and Napo¬
leon in his " Forest Fights," in 1809, obtained the most brilliant ad¬
vantages over superior forces, in selected positions, under exactly
identical circumstances. But this is not all ; the ground did not
favor the rebels. The country fell away in successive waves, and
gradually contracted toward the two points of crossing at Williams-
r port and Falling Waters, within the segment formed by the curve
of Lee's earthworks, and his line of retreat from his left to Williams-
port, and from his right to Falling Waters. The rebel columns
must have drawn together, and men, horses, artillery, and trains
have become huddled as they crowded down to the ford and to
the bridge. Then and there, at the crisis, they must have been
exposed to a concentric fire from the last range of heights, like
that poured upon the French right at Waterloo, which high
ground dominated every avenue of escape. (See anecdote of
Lincoln and Meade, pages 52 and 53.)
Here again the suggestion of such a plunging fire has been
met by a counter-argument that the heights on the Virginia shore,
beyond the Potomac, command the ridge on this, the eastern,
the Maryland bank. Grant this; but how long would it have
taken a superior artillery, amply supplied with ammunition, to
silence, drive off, or destroy an inferior artillery, very short of
ammunition, especially whei) the rebel generals themselves ad¬
mitted that a contest between the two artilleries "was a farce,"
always ending to the disadvantage of the rebels, as was invari¬
ably demonstrated during the Maryland campaign of September,
1862, but never so pointedly as in the trial between our batteries
around the Cemetery and the rebel guns on Benner's Ridge, on
the second day of Gettysburg. It did not take twenty minutes
for the former, after they got the range, to dispose of the latter,
and cover their position with wrecks and mutilations. A few
years hence, when this escape of Lee's is criticised by military
writers, it will rank with that of the Prince de Vaudemont, in
1795, from before Marshal Villeroy, in which the great William
declared the Prince had " shown himself a greater master of his
art than if he had won a pitched battle "—a retreat of which the
success ranks among some of thç inexplicable marvels recorded
here and there in the annals of military operations. Anchor.
52
conclusion.
At one time it was intended to greatly augment this pamphlet
with interesting notes and trustworthy authorities, but as new
works appear and are welcomed by public opinion as guiding lights
when they are mere will-o'-the-whisps, it seems useless to endeavor
to present the truth. Most of our histories are mere efforts of
memory, or offsprings of prejudice or partiality, or bids for public
favor, or panegyrics worthy of the venal writers of the Lower Em¬
pire. History is unworthy of acceptance which cannot appeal to
the law and the testimony. In regard to the trustworthiness of
long deferred post facto statements, a writer on historical subjects
is justified in feeling the strongest doubt of any such assertion
not based on memoranda made at the moment. Strong men's
memories have often been found to be utterly at variance with their
diaries; so much so that one who has had occasion to compare
the two has become pretty well convinced that not more than
in one case out of one thousand is human memory—unassisted by
notes made at the time and upon the spot—trustworthy after the
lapse of a few years. It is this fact, not absolute black-hearted
falsehood, that makes men so reckless in their assertiveness, and
in the Sickles controversy, which has aroused so many advocates,
champions and antagonisms, men state what they wish to believe,
not because they desire or intend to tell untruths or pervert, but
because the human memory is such a curious thing that often,
through much thinking on a subject, wishes become realities to
the imagination, and what would originally have been rejected as
false eventually assumes the form and force of truth. So it is with
everything connected with or dependent upon the frailties of our
being. As the Romans said, "Times change, and we change with
them."
As a further evidence of the difficulty of arriving at the bed¬
rock facts, take the following anecdote, which has been related again
and again, in regard teethe telegram which Lincoln is said to have
sent privately to Meade when he came up with Lee after Gettys¬
burg, at Williamsport, 12th July, 1863. It is derived, for one, from
the lips of a distinguished Major-General, remarkably careful in
his statements and not prejudiced against Meade. He afterwards
asked me to recall and record my recollections of what long since
occurred, to assist in ferreting out the truth. It is stated that not
only was this telegram known to have existed, but that it had been
actually shown, when written, to a gentleman of high position and
the largest opportunities, still living. The story is this. Lincoln tele¬
graphed to Meade, 12th July, 1863, to attack Lee '■peremptorily f
cost what it might, and if he failed to produce the telegram as his
53
excuse and justification ; but, if he succeeded, to destroy the tele¬
gram and take all the glory of the victory to himself—and that
Meade had not the stuff in him to do so.
Injustice, the suppression or distortion of facts, the disappear¬
ance or destruction of documents, accidental or wilful, have suc¬
ceeded in elevating Grant and Lee, Sherman, Meade, Sheridan,
Hancock, Schofield, and others, at the expense of George H.
Thomas, Andrew Atkinson Humphreys, and others, as well as
some on lower planes who, sick and sad at injustice and ingrati¬
tude, sleep in comparatively unknown and unnoted graves.
As FrankWilkeson observes in his "Recollections," "The history
of the fighting to suppress the Slaveholders' Rebellion, thus far writ¬
ten [January, 1887], has been the work of commanding generals."
" Most of this war history has l^een written to repair damaged or
• wholly ruined military reputations." "And it is susceptible of de¬
monstration that the almost ruinous delay in suppressing the Re¬
bellion and restoring the Union, the deadly campaigns year after
year, the awful waste of the best soldiers the world has seen, and
the piling up of the public debt into the billions, was wholly due
to West Point influence and West Point commanders." There is
a very large percentage of truth in the last sentence, applicable
South as well as North; but, without due consideration, it, never¬
theless, conveys a very false impression. West Point is a close
corporation, like a college of priests regarding all outside merit as
heretical and damnable; but there are exceptions to the rule, such
as George H. Thomas, Andrew Atkinson Humphreys, Abner
Doubleday, &c., with McClellan and his Gefolge, and lots of others,
too numerous to mention. Wilkeson was justified in a bitterness
founded on what he saw and suffered; but a West Point, or rather
West Points, are necessary to a country to prepare officers for the
routine of military life, and with all its evils and even with all its de¬
relictions—for through esoteric influence the cruellest wrongs have
been committed—an academy, or academies, must be maintained
for thorough education in the military art and science. How to
provide against its hierarchical secret brotherhood, its " union is
strength," is a problem yet to be solved and very difficult of so-
.lution. The legislator who can devise the ways and means to
eliminate the evil or neutralize its poison, and yet retain all the
good, will, indeed, be a public benefactor. There is one officer
perfectly competent to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth, a fearless writer when aroused, a close observer, a
clear, concise and classical author when he pleases, who might rec¬
tify many errors in history were he not "cribbed, cabined and
confined," shut up, enveloped, impregnated with a hierophantic
reverence for that awful humbug of sanctity. West Point. Mat-
54
thew Arnold, quoting Homer, observes, " Wide is the range of
w®rds! words may make this way or that way." Indeed, they
may, and they have been misapplied, as for one instance already
alluded to, to elevate Meade and to defame Sickles at Gettysburg.
Again, to restrict high command to West Point is a great injustice
to genius and talent at large ; for Goethe was perfectly justified in
" feeling so strongly how much the discipline of a great public life
and of practical affairs has to do with intelligence." "What else
is Culture," he asks, " but a higher conception of political and
military relations ? " How a party, or faction, or hierarchy, apply¬
ing the term to administrative and military as well as priestly or¬
ganization, can get the control so as to act almost independently
of the wishes of the nation and its head, is shown by the attested
fact that Christina, Queen of Sweden, to bring about the Peace of
Westphalia, had to conspire against her ministry and military chiefs
and actually to gather together a party of her own, a secret adminis¬
tration within a recognized administration, and to send a repre¬
sentative of her own to the Congress at Osnabrück to checkmate
and traverse the plans of a colleague selected and accredited by
the ministry and the ruling party of the country. The ability of
Adler Salvias accomplished all that the Queen desired; whether
wisely or unwisely is not here in question. The anecdote is told
simply to show that a class or caste like that which West Point
produces can even dispute the will of autocracy and of the people,
until overthrown or neutralized by greater astuteness coupled
with unusual ability.
The preceding considerations will serve as an introduction to
some common sense views of
the union of practice and theory in military matters.
What now follows are the remarks of a bridge builder who did
not have the slightest idea of their suitable application to the
Carrying on of War. Nevertheless their pertinence invites attention.
The combination of toeory and practice must be superior to
either by itself. The professional soldier is the mechanic ; he may
handle his tools admirably without being able to construct any¬
thing beyond the scope of his daily labor. The architect who
plans the structure is the theorist who, in a great measure, learns
his science from books. He may never have handled a tool, nor
have entered a workshop, and, notwithstanding, be a proficient.
The same holds good with regard to marine and military matters.
Some of the most wonderful steps in advance in both, did not ori¬
ginate with professional men, but with theorists, or thinkers, ob¬
servers as well as students. A highly gifted man like Lucullus or
Spinola or Phipps may take the command of an army and make a
55
far more truly great captain than myriads of men who have risen
from the ranks to be generals by routine or through a West Point.
They might not be able to make an army, but they might be com¬
petent to handle an army far better than those who made it. Poets
are born and so are generals ; likewise all men exceedingly great
in their line ; but as long as professionals, like the graduates of a West
Point, continue to be considered by the people the only class from
which great generals can be drawn, so long will no man, even if
as gifted as either of the few of the first class of great captains,
have a chance to exhibit his innate powers. West Point and
Regulars are, in so far, no better than the Knights of Labor, in
that they will allow no man to enter into competition with them
or maintain himself if they can prevent it.
" But, if a union of talents were once accomplished, the me-
* chanic, in the course of his practical experiments, would be assisted
by the sound calculations of the mathematician, and his work
would be sooner perfected. Also, the mathematician would un¬
doubtedly find no small degree of profit from the practical de¬
monstrations which the ingenious mechanic alone is able to pro¬
duce." [In a few words, successful result is the child of practice
and theory.]
" Olinthus Gregory, in the preface to his excellent work on
Statics, illustrates this subject in a manner which ought not to be
here omitted. There are few artists but will admire his candor
and agree with his sound remarks.
He begins thus: "For some years I have seen, or thought I
have seen, and often regretted, that a forbidding distance and
awkward jealousy seem to subsist between the theorists and the
practical men engaged in the cultivation of mechanics in this
country [England], and it is a desire to shorten this distance and
to eradicate this jealousy, that has been a principal stimulant in
the execution of the following work.
" I have by long habit, combined, perhaps, with early acquired
prejudices, been much delighted with the investigations of Theorists,
but, while I prize the deductions of sound theory as highly as any
person, and rest as firmly upon them ; yet am I desirous not to
forget that, as all general principles imply the experience of abstrac¬
tion, it would be highly injudicious not to regard them in their
practical applications as approximations; the defects of which
must be supplied, as, indeed, the principles themselves are de¬
duced from experience.
" Habits of abstraction and theorizing may be carried to ex¬
cess ; and crude experience without reflection will never be pro¬
ductive of essential good.
" But as an eminent philosopher [Professor Dugald Stewart,
56
' Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind,' pages 221, &c.],
for whose talents and virtues I entertain great respect, remarks,
' Care should be take to guard against both these extremes, and
to unite habits of abstraction with habits of business, in such a
manner as to enable men to consider things either in general or in
detail, as the occasion may require. Whichever of these habits
may happen to gain an undue ascendant over the mind, it will
necessarily produce a character limited in its powers, and fitted
only for particular exertion. When theoretical knowledge and
practical skill are happily combined in the same person, the intel¬
lectual power of man appears in its full perfection, and fits him
equally to conduct with a masterly hand the details of ordinary
business, and to contend successfully with the untried difficulties
of new and hazardous situations. In conducting the former, mere
experience may frequently be a sufficient guide, but experience
and speculation must be combined together to prepare us for the
latter.' ' Expert men,' says Lord Bacon, 'can execute and judge
of particulars, one by one ; but the general counsels, the plots,
and the marshalling of affairs, comes best from those that are
learned. Admitting the truth of these observations, it will thence
follow, that theoretical and practical men will most effectually pro¬
mote their mutual interests, not by affecting to despise each
other, but by blending their efforts ; and further, that an essen¬
tial service will be done to mechanical science, by endeavoring to
make all the scattered rays of light they have separately thrown
upon this region of human knowledge, converge to one point.'
"The above elegant and impartial hints, afforded us by the
aforesaid friend to science, Olinthus Gregory, merit the author's
most sincere and ardent wishes, that they may be received by the
mathematicians and mechanics of the United States, with all that
attention and regard, a conviction- of their truth must ever in¬
spire."—" Pope's Architect and Landscape Gardener." New
York; 1811. Preface jpciii.-xxvi.
bridge over lake cayuga.
■ Note.—"The bridge over the Cayuga lake, in New York
State, on the Turnpike road from Albany to Niagara, stands on
two hundred and ten trestles, each consisting of three posts con¬
nected by four girths and four braces. The posts are sunk to hard
gravel, which is generally about thirty feet from the surface of
the water. They are twenty-five feet apart. The whole length of
the woodwork is one mile, and it cost twenty thousand dollars."—
See Rees' Cyclopedia: "A Treatise on Bridge Architecture, in
which the superior advantages of the Flying Pendant Lever Bridge
are fully proved." By Thomas Pope, Architect and Landscape
Gardener. New York; 1811. Pages 128-29.
SAILORS' CREEK
to
mm
01 COUBT Hous
7th, 8th, 9th April, 1865 ;
or,
THE LAST HOURS OF SHERIDAN'S CAVALRY.
- CQemoi^anda
OF
henry edwin tremain,
MAJOR AND A. D. C., BREV. BRIG.-GEN., U. S. V.
Edited, witlj Notes and Cljapters on Formville, Fording, Sue,
by
★ J. WATTS DE PEYSTER.
gew lotfe :
Charles H. Ludwig, Printer, 10 & 12 Reade Street.
1 88 5.
CoPYiuciiiT, 1885, by J. Watts de Peyster.
INTRODUCTORY.
"IIow ulíterUdiiiiiíj TvemduCs pnper ions; it hroii¡/ht crcrythiiKj to a
focus." Humphkeys to de Peysteu, 1 Nov., 1872.
• This i)am¡)hlet constitutes the Second Part of a Series of Me¬
moranda hastily thrown together by General Treinain, who was
aide-de-camp to General Crook, and was an eye-witness and actor
in the scenes which he undertakes to record ; consequently they
may be considered almost Notes of Occurrences, jotted down on
the spot. General Tremain placed his manuscript—the majority
written while in camp, about Washington, in the summer of
1865, on paper with superscription, " Headcpiarters District of
Wilmington, N. C., 1865 "—in my hands to revise, edit and publish,
in 1871-2,and the first part, entitled, "The Closing Days About
Richmond; or, the Last Days of Sheridan's Cavalry," was printed
under my supervision in a pamphlet for private circulation (brevier
type, 66 pages), in 1873. A copy of this pamphlet was sent out
to the Clarendon Historical Society, of Edinburg, Scotland, of
which I am an Honorary Member, and they deemed it of sufficient
value to reprint it among their annual issues, in No. 13, January
and February, and in No. 14, March and April, 1884.
To enhance the value of the work I have added some maps,
which were prepared under the supervision of my dear deceased
friend, Maj.-Cen. A. A. Humphreys (for over fifteen months Chief
of Staff of the Army of the Potomac, and from the 24th Novem¬
ber, 1864, to the close of the operations of the Army of the Po¬
tomac, in command of the combined Second-Third Corps,
which did the hardest work and fighting throughout the pursuit of
Lee, and who, if he had been adequately supported and rein¬
forced on the afternoon of 7th April, 1865, would have finished
3
4
the campaign at Cumberland Church, near Farm ville; whereas, not
being so, the labors and losses dragged on, to be terminated less
gloriously two days afterwards at Appomattox Court House)—
which maps were originally prepared for my own " La Royale ;
or, the Grand Hunt of the Army of the Potomac," that ap¬
peared in eight numbers during the years 1872-73-74. I liave
also inserted a chapter on the battle of Cumberland Church or
Heights of Farmville, and on Fording, together with some Notes,
which have been added, chiefly in brackets ( [ ] ), on which great
labor has been expended.
The original manuscript, written in great haste and amid diffi¬
culties, was so involved and nearly illegible in places that it had
to be recopied before it could go into the hands of the printer. I
not only read the copy with the original, but also compared the
copy and proofs several times, in whole or in part, with the auto¬
graph. This labor of love was cheerfully undergone, because the
Narrative contains facts which have never elsewhere been pre¬
sented to the public.
As an Appendix will be added a biographical sketch of Gene¬
ral Tremain, prepared by me in the winter of 1883, when he
was a candidate for the office of U. S. Senator from the State of
New York.
As General Tremain is a cherished member of the old Third
Corps, Army of the Potomac, this little work is affectionately de¬
dicated to the Third Army Corps Union.
[Signed,] ★ J. WATTS de PEYSTER. ★
Honorary Menil.er of tlie Clarendon Historical
Society, Edinburg, Scotland.
First Honorary Member, Third Army Corps Union.
Brevet Major-General, S. N. Y.
&c., &c., &c.
CHAPTER I.
(original chapter xr. of complete memoranda.)
" If the thing is pressed, I think Lee will surrender," says
Sheridan, in his official dispatch to Grant, at the close of to-day
[Thursday, 6th April, 1865]. The next day [Friday, 7th April,
p. p. m.] Grant wrote first to Lee on the subject.
Long before dawn, the next morning [7th April] the cavalry
bugles were echoing through the bivouacs a lively reveille, and
everybody was astir. It was with cheerful, hopeful spirits that
^ the sleepy soldiers obeyed the summons. They lit their little
coffee-fires, groomed and saddled their horses and mules (for the
latter were now an important ingredient of "Sheridan's Ca¬
valry " ), rolled up their packs, breakfasted frugally on their salt
meat and hard-tack, and at the first break of day only awaited
the order to move. Any particular headquarters might be dis¬
tinguished by a movable flagstaff, surmounted by a carriage
lamp, planted in the ground before a fire rather more blazing than
its neighbors, around which a group of officers might be seen
crawling from under their blankets, or making a hurried toilet;
while just behind was a candle in a bottle candlestick, flickering
upon some rude structure intended to serve as a table and show¬
ing a unicjue set of tin and crockery table furniture, no two of
whose dishes belonged to the same set. Here was an army
wagon backed almost upon the table, with its tailboard let down,
exhibiting its load of tents, pots, kettles, valises, boxes, barrels
and all such paraphernalia, waiting to be reinforced by the table
and its contents. The hot coffee fumed in delicious fragrance
over bright and burning rails, and was not unfrequently upset by
some careless fellow as he moved around the fire at every change
of wind to avoid the smoke ; the ham and bacon, or tough beef¬
steak, if anybody was s > fortunate as to have it, " sizzled " away
in the frying-pan, while the cold, uninviting, huge plate of hard¬
tack announced to the general and staff that breakfast was ready.
Some few might be able to find seats, but more usually was this
simple, weird-like meal sleepily partaken of by all "standingand
in silence." All was over by daylight. The hum of busy pre¬
paration was passed; a division general and staff quietly mount;
the bugles sound, " To horse ! " " Forward ! " the confused mass of
horses and mules and men takes shape; and a column files out from
among them to follow their leader.
5
6
Every soldier appreciated what the cavalry were to do to-day.
In their comprehensive phraseology it was nothing else but to
"pitch in." "If we could only once get the Rebs started" . . .
they used to say in less encouraging times. But now they were
really " started," and all were eager to keep them " on the wing."
In the cavalry operations of to-day it was intended that the im¬
mediate pursuit of the enemy should be resumed ; that he should
be attacked and harassed wherever found ; and the subsequent
movements of the day were to be determined by events. Crook's
column was given the advance. Shortly after starting it, how¬
ever, Sheridan learned that a command of General Ord (of the
Army of the James) having, during the fight of the day before,
met a strong and formidable line of the enemy on the railroad
between Burkesville and Rice Station, had not been able to press
far enough to prevent the possibility of Lee's escape by moving his
main body around the left flank, and Grant's armies, and thus get
ahead of him on the road, south, to Danville. Especially might
this be attempted on the part of the enemy, as a good and wide
road ran from Lee's bivouacs near Farmville through Prince Ed¬
ward Court House in the very direction to assist such a move¬
ment. Fearing an attempt of this kind on the part of the Rebels,
which, if successful, would undo all the strategic advantages of the
day before, Sheridan divided his forces and sent General Merritt's
corps to march around the rear of the Army of the James and to
strike the road mentioned at Prince Edward Court House as soon
as possible. Deeming this matter of the utmost importance Sheri¬
dan rode himself with this column, which constituted about
two-thirds of his entire command—Custer's and Devin's Di¬
visions.
I do not believe that Lee could have attempted any move of
the nature indicated, with the shadow of success, esjiecially with
the deficiencies in his supply trains. Besides, he was much nearer
Lynchburg than Danville, and had a better chance of reaching
Lynchburg. He miftt have thought so then, for no move was
made in the direction feared by Sheridan, and the long march of
iMerritt's corps on this day was without further incident than is
afforded by uncertain country roads and the passage of two or
three deep and sluggish branches of the Appomattox—the Sandy
river, the Bush river and the Briary river.
It should be added, however, that this move afterwards proved
the best that could possibly be made for the main body of the
cavalry, as it located them again on the extreme left flank of
Grant's lines and placed Sheridan so as to be able to operate
away from the entanglements of our infantry columns, while it
situated him most favorably for that grand march of the day fol-
7
lowing [Saturday, 8th April], when the enemy was intercepted,
his last supplies captured, his reserve artillery parks attacked ; and
his army commanded [compelled ?] to halt for the night, that
Grant's infantry might march up and demand a surrender.
The main pursuit, then, by the cavalry, on the 7th of April,
fell to General Crook's division, the oui cavalry of the Army of the
Potomac. Soon after starting and marching in the direction
the enemy had traveled, as indicated by the wreckage and re¬
mains of wagons, baggage, caissons, destroyed ammunition, cloth¬
ing, documents and stragglers, Crook found that the gallant Hum¬
phreys, ever vigilant and earnest, was already marching on his
right with the veterans of the combined Second-Third Army
Corps. Each had calculated upon marching by the same road ;
but, giving way to the infantry, the cavalry sought its way through
' the woods and across plantations, and neither column halted in
the eager pursuit. It was a clear and glorious morning, and the
sun seemed to smile in triumph over the beaten tracks and the
abundant evidence of a defeated and flying foe.
The Lynchburg railroad between Rice's Station and Farm-
ville, as may be seen by the map, curves like a siphon between
the two stations, crossing the Appomattox river nearly equi¬
distant from each, at High Bridge. Here is also a country bridge
for ordinary vehicles. Thither Humphreys marched at once,
hoping to overtake the enemy and effect captures before he could
cross, and prevent, if possible, the destruction of this valuable
structure. In this he was only partially successful, reaching the
river just as the wagon bridge was being fired by the enemy's
rear-guard, and while the second span of the railroad bridge was
burning. The smaller bridge, fortunately, was secured, and Bar¬
low's Division, having the advance, at once prepared to cross.
The ground on both sides of the river is high and affords most
commanding positions, and on the opposite bank appeared a con¬
siderable force of the enemy, drawn up to oppose the passage, in
a good position strengthened by redoubts. Artillery was posted
to cover the attack and Barlow advanced. The enemy's skir¬
mishers were quickly driven from the bridge and ten pieces of
artillery captured from him in the works he abandoned on the
north bank, while on the south side eight more pieces were taken.
But, the fort blown up, the Rebel column moved off without
awaiting further attack.
Meanwhile Crook diverged from Humphreys to the left and
west, marching by the most direct route towards Fannville,
where the railroad again crosses the Aj)pomattox and where in all
probability important captures would be effected. Leaving the
combined Second-Third Corps and crossing the railroad, two
8
small tributaries to the Appomattox, the Sandy and Bush rivers,
lay on his route. Reaching the former. Rebel cavalry appeared
on the opposite bank, while a few men made a bungling attempt
to fire the bridge. The infantry skirmishers of General Ord's
column at the same time appeared. The enemy fled without a
shot and all hands went to work to put out the fire. Rather a
difficult task for men provided with nothing more serviceable
for this purpose than muskets and sabres. The bridge was high,
too, and forty feet long ; its beams were already burning. There
were no pails there either; but the fire was put out. Exactly
how, it is pretty difficult to tell ; it did not take long either; but
" where there is a will, there is a way," and some soldiers carried
water in their hats. This was the vicinity of that terrible
slaughter of the day before, where a detachment from the Army
of the James, under General Reed, its adjutant-general, sought to
march around the enemy's rear, reach High Bridge and destroy
it and all the crossings of the Appomattox before the enemy had
yet crossed it. But when near Sandy river they had marched into
a snare. They found the enemy on all sides of them, as a "V,"
and out of the little picked brigade of about 1,500 men scarcely
a .third escaped. General Reed was killed, the colonel of his
cavalry (the 4th Massachusetts) was seriously wounded, and all
the command was killed, wounded, captured or scattered. The
II6th and 123d Ohio were almost destroyed and the wonder of
the sad affair is that any survived it.
This was the most serious reverse of the campaign, but fortu¬
nately did not in the least affect its results. But while the loss in
life is deplorable, the dangerous character of the important ser¬
vice purposed, the enthusiasm which prompted and led the whole
affair and the fruitless gallantry and heroism of those engaged,
commands universal admiration. It was a part of the war.
After crossing Sandy river. Crook soon again encountered
Rebel cavalry and ^ome very sharp skirmishing continued for
about a mile, until reaching the Bush river near its junction with
the Appomattox, to which it is tributary. The road to Farm ville,
on which the column proceeded, here crossed this little stream by
a country bridge within sight of High Bridge, and while Hum¬
phreys' operations were going on there, the Rebels also attempted
to hold Crook in check until the bridge ahead of him should be
destroyed. Here, too, the banks were steep, the bridge low, and
the grounds on each side of it swampy and impracticable for
cavalry. Smith's brigade was dismounted and, while skirmishing,
the head of General Ord's infantry column arrived. The destruc¬
tion of the bridge was prevented and after some little delay in
fighting and manœuvring the enemy retired with our advance
9
dose in pursuit, at about the same time that Humphreys crossed
High Bridge. [Mark! the infantry were up with the cavalry!]
Taking now a short but rugged plantation by-way, the cav¬
alry moved quickly towards Farmville, leaving the better and
more common road on the left to the infantry following.
Farmville is a pretty little town nestling at the foot of its sur¬
rounding hills, in Prince Edward county, near the junction of the
Buffalo with the Appomattox rivers, and before the war of about
fifteen hundred inhabitants. It is old enough to look thoroughly
Virginian, is the principal point on the railroad between Peters¬
burg and Lynchburg, about sixty-eight miles W. S. W. from the
latter. It is therefore an important tobacco depot and much of
the weed was found stored here. During the war it has been
the location of extensive work and repair shops. Ambulances,
wagons and many other manufactures for army use were here
made and repaired by the Confederates. Near the railroad depot
there was a firm trestle bridge across the Appomattox, which is here
ordinarily not fordable [error ?] [and " is navigable for batteaux
from Farmville to its mouth " ]. Arriving at the top of the
cleared hills overlooking the town, the Rebels were found to be in
occupation, with strong rear guards of cavalry to defend the
neighboring heights. Fighting at once ensued and after an hour's
heavy skirmishing, assisted greatly by Lord's battery of horse
artillery, the enemy sullenly retired down the hills towards the
town, when our men, suddenly emerging from the woods, found
themselves on the brow of most commanding heights, in a most
beautiful and open country, with Farmville at their feet. On the
bridge over the Appomattox a train of cars was standing, while
the fields on the opposite bank were black with a multitude of
men. Who could these be ? Humphreys, it was known, had
crossed the river below, but he could not have marched the main
body of his corps around there so quickly. It could not be the
enemy. He must have known on which road we were marching,
and it was not usual for him to treat us with such bad general¬
ship as thus to expose a whole corps to destruction.
It was probably, then, some strong body, suddenly detached
by Grant from one of the extremes of his army, and which had
succeeded in forcing some extraordinary march. If so, good, for
here was a considerable body of Rebel cavalry intercepted. The
sky had clouded over and the distance was too great to distin¬
guish uniforms. Whoever tiiey might be, there they were beneath
us—one vast crowd of men, not resting in lines, but wandering
in disorder over the field. They seemed completely under our con¬
trol ; their lives at our command. From the water's edge to the
wooded brow ot the hill beyond, they appeared a moving, rest-
10
less mob. Now a few men were observed on the railroad bridge,
and soon a little tuft of smoke puffs out from one of the cars ;
the wind fans it into a flame."
" They have not been able to get that train off the bridge,"
says one officer, " so they are burning it."
" No," replies somebody else, " it is our men destroying the
bridge to prevent the Rebel cavalry down in the town from cross¬
ing and will "gobble up " the whole lot of them certain."
To open fire on them would surely entail a most fearful loss of
life. To justify it there must not remain a single doubt that it is
not the enemy. If Rebels, every moment was precious to us.
Generals peered through their glasses and staff officers gal¬
loped off to find a negro citizen or somebody who might decide
the question, and thus passed several minutes of terrible uncer¬
tainty. We can wait no longer ; it must be the enemy ; at any
rate it will soon be determined.
"Tell General Smith to charge down through the town," was
a simple order which now needed no further explanation; and
" Train those guns on those men ! " indicated that somebody
would be hurt. The bursting flames and black heavy smoke
arose from the railroad bridge. Helpless to prevent it and before
our very eyes almost, under our feet was the destruction now
being completed. Two Napoleon guns were at once rolled to
the brow of the hill and trained as if for a pleasure salute towards
the mass of men on the low fields beyond [the river]. A shot
was fired and in their very midst a shell exploded. Another
quickly followed, and another, and another, as fast as two brass
guns could be loaded and fired for a few rounds. Had there
been here a few more guns, J doubt if many of those men would
have escaped with their lives; as it was, they were jiowerless.
What could they do ? Not fight! They were infantry. A river
was between us, and they were down on a plain under our guns,
and musket fire could not injure us. So they quickly glided
away. What were the actual casualties just at this particular
time can never be known. General Lee himself was there and
under his personal direction a section of artillery was posted and
answered to our fire. But its shots were wild and futile and were
only laughed at by our officers.
The Rebels of course sought safety in flight; yet so great
among them was the general demoralization of their forces and
so worn out with continual marching and fightingof the campaign
that many exhibited no desire for escape. They seemed resigned
to the chances of death or the sure fate of capture and evinced much
reluctance to retreat any further. So plain were the evidences of
this fact that a mounted guard was seen to encircle the whole
11
field with a full skirmish line and by force drive away the multi¬
tude of stragglers beyond the range of the guns now playing upon
them. Such being the morale of an army no wonder the sur¬
render of its remnants followed within forty-eight hours.
These troops proved to be of Anderson's corps and had re¬
tired on Farmville after the battles of the day before [6thJ. Part
of the army, however—as has already been seen—retreated from
[LittleJ Sailors' Creek by way of High Bridge. Lee himself was
with the former portion, which reached Farmville during the
night, the troops crossing the river and bivouacking where they
were first seen by the cavalry, while their venerated commander
took up quarters in the town of Farmville. In the morning, fully
appreciating the close pursuit and straitened circumstances of the
Rebel army, many of the citizens had begged General Lee to re¬
move his men from the vicinity of the town as soon as possible
and thus avoid, perhaps, its entire destruction, which would be a
likely consequence of any battle in the immediate neighborhood.
IVe shall presently see with how 7nuch consideration these hihabi-
tants were treated by their rebellious countrymen.
Meanwhile, Smith, with his gallant little brigade of the ist
Maine, 6th and 13th Ohio and 2d New York, had ridden down
towards the edge of the town. There was no " masked " fighting
here ; no manoeuvre was hidden ; the Rebels saw him coming and
were prepared. It is common for historians to tell of bloody
charges up to the deadly crest ; how brilliantly and gallantly this
command stormed a position; or that one scaled a height. But
you do not often read of a charge down hill, least of all such a
cavalry charge. Yet here it was. Gen. Putnam, a name always
revered by Americans, than whom [according to ¡¡opular opinion]
none bore a more honorable part in the nation's virgin war, acci-
dently helped himself to immortality by a John Gilpin escape
down a flight of stone steps! Connecticut people to-day will take
visitors to the field and, with no little pride, jjoint out the hill and
]irecise location of the now obliterated steps. Why may not
Virginians do likewise? To be sure there are no stone steps there,
but there might have been if rocks had been more plenty, and
then this deficiency is compensated by numbers. In Connecticut
only one warrior rode down hill [in the defense of the nation ; in
this case there were a thousand patriots as true as any Putnam].
By this time the remainder of Crook's cavalry had-come uj)
and were marching into the town. Davies' brigade arriving as a
support to Smith, had taken charge of the place, while the latter
was pursuing the enemy to a safe distance and recalling and re¬
forming his regiments. Guards and patrols were placed about the
streets and, while the troops were passing through, the bands
12
played, colors waved, and the soldiers were filled with content¬
ment and enthusiasm. But there was no answering sympathy
among the people. Stores were shut up, houses closed, frightened
women peeped through dilapidated doorways, sullen men lolled
about the porches, obsequious and venerable negroes attempted
to bow in respectful salutation to each individual soldier of the line,
while others, less reverent, attired in such dazzling colors as their
own or their former proprietor's limited wardrobe might afford, saun¬
tered carelessly through the streets, as if they were celebrating a
holiday and the arrival of the blessed Yankees, which they inno¬
cently believed bestowed, finally and forever, upon them that
complete and practical freedom which their crude intelligence
conceived as the only result of emancipation.
The infantry of the Army of the James and the head of the
Sixth Corps now appeared and massed on the neighboring hills,
while Humphreys with his [combined] Second-Third Corps had
pushed on after the retreating enemy from High Bridge on the
direci road to Ly?ichbitrg, sending Barlow's Division, however, to¬
wards Farmville, as a matter of judicious precaution and to inter¬
cept any part of the enemy who might yet remain there. This
excellent disposition of H^í7nphreys greatly accelerated the retirement
of Lee's forces from Farmville and its vicinity, and a large por¬
tion of them narrowly escaped capture. Barlow had considerable
skirmishing, but the enemy was well posted on commanding hills
and was enabled to check an advance until his main body, from
Farmville, had retired well on the road before him. Barlow's at¬
tacks, however, more than annoyed the enemy. In abandoning
the town and its environs the Rebels were compelled to burn about
one hundred and thirty of his wagons which he was unable to get
away. Retiring, then, before Humphreys' main column, as well as
Barlow's detachment, the enemy fell back to a well-chosen position,
some four or five [three] miles from Farmville.
During these operations, Brigadier-General Smythe, com¬
manding one of Général Barlow's brigades, a gallant young offi¬
cer who had risen rapidly in the service and whose Irish extrac¬
tion had only added notoriety to a well-earned reputation, was
mortally wounded while conducting in person the operations of
his skirmish line. General Humphreys mentions in his official
report that the fall of General Smythe " led to the loss of some
part of our skirmish line." It is claimed that he was the last
Union officer killed in the war. [But let it not be forgotten that
Maj.-Gen. Gershom Mott, of New Jersey, who commanded the
Third Division (representing all that remained of the Old Third
Corps) of the combined Second and Third Corps, had been
severely wounded the preceding day, 6th April.]
13
lt^°Marching through Farmville, Crook's cavalry sought to
ford across the Appomattox and by a slow and tedious crossing,
over a deep and difficult ford, succeeded in the course of the
afternoon in forming itself for further operations on the other side.
Barlow's Division was here met, and after a short deliberation be¬
tween the generals, the advance was continued by General Crook,
while Barlow moved oft further to the right to rejoin the main
body of his corps. The Sixth Corps was visible on the hills to
the south of the river and it was supposed that they would cross at
once and follow the cavalry. The difficulties in crossing infantry,
however, and the destruction of the bridges prevented, and they
occupied the afternoon in preparing a suitable bridge. This was
not accomplished until after dark, so that no further operations
took place during the afternoon of the 7th [April] in the imme-
► diate vicinity of the enemy, except the attacks upon him of Gene¬
rals Humphreys and Crook.
The road to Lynchburg from High Bridge was the main road
of that section of the country, and over this it was now quite evi¬
dent that Lee with his main body was retreating. The principal
part of Humphreys' Corps was following on the same road. This
road, however, was intercepted by two nearly parallel roads from
Farmville, which were also the main routes for country travel
from the latter town to Lynchburg. On one of these Barlow
moved and again, about dark, established himself in connection
with the remainder of his corps, while on the other and a mile or
two further to the left [west] Crook marched with his cavalry divi¬
sion, hopmg to intercept the trains or at least some part of the forces
whom the Second Corps was pursuing. Four or five miles [3] north
of Farmville, near where the two roads above spoken of unite.
General Humphreys found the enemy strongly ejitrejiched, cover¬
ing both these roads, known as the Stage and Plank roads. This
Rebel force were posted apparently with the purpose of remaining
there and resisting all attacks, until the trains, whose movements
it was thus covering, should be well out of the way. General
Humphreys at once formed his troops for attack, advanced his
skirmishers, and developed the position of the enemy in his front
to be one naturally strong and well entrenched. They had chosen
the crest of a hill which gradually sloped off in front over open
ground, well swept by artillery, leaving no opportunity for a front
attack. A ftank manœuvre was attempted, but the Rebel line was
found to extend far beyond our own. General Humphreys
having as yet only two divisions with him, and finding so strong
a portion of Lee's army thus posted in the front—indeed the in¬
dications were that it was the main portion of the Rebel army-
occupied himself with watching and manœuvring until Barlow's
• 14
division, which was now ordered up, could arrive. Not being
aware of the difficulties of crossiftg the river, at this time,, at
Fariiiville, owing to the destruction of the bridge. General Hum¬
phreys in sending information of his own situation to General
Meade, naturally suggested that an attack should be made at
once by troops—the Sixth Ciorps, for instance—from the diréction
of Farm ville. The suggestion, hoiuerer, proved unavailing.
General Humphreys with his Combined Second-Third Corjts
disposed in the immediate front of the enemy, and just at this time
the only portion of Grant's army halted and so situated, awaited with
appropriate demonstrations the arrival of General Barlow's division
before any more serious attack should be made. While doing so,
however, he heard firing from the direction of Farmville and sup¬
posed that the Sixth Cojps had attaclied the enetny, as he had sug¬
gested to General Meade. He at once ordered an attack on his ex¬
treme right with a part of General Miles' division. This was made
by three regiments from the First Brigade, General Ramsey's ;
but it was unsuccessful and resulted in considerable loss. The
enemy had not reduced his strength in his front, nor had he yet
given Humphreys an opportunity to turn his flank. But the
firing heard by Humphreys did not proceed from an attack of
the Sixth Corps, as he had premised, that command not having
yet crossed the river. It resulted from an engagement between
the enemy and General Crook's cavalry, and this affair is, ¡;er-
haps, more distinctly than any other in that vicinity, entitled to
be known as the Battle of Fannville. To be sure, there was a
kind of a battle at Farmville in the morning, when the charges
were made, and constant smaller engagements in its immediate
neighborhood had been going on all day. But this jrarticular con¬
test can be described separately; it hatl a well-defined beginning
and end, and enjoyed a complete entirety unusual to combats be¬
tween the opposing forces in a running campaign. It deserves a
little narrative of its own. Crook's cavalry, having crossed the
river and formed, tool^up the line of march along the Old Plank
road and moved without encountering any enemy directly to¬
wards the right flank and rear of the Rebels, whose centre and
left were in front of Humphreys.
The fording of a stream by a cavalry column is an occasion of
very general interest and amusement. In the first place it usually
affoids an excellent oj)portunity for refreshing the animals with¬
out any delay, while the fresh ripjjling of the waters seems to
stir up the dry jokes among the soldiers. The boys, too, have a
keen sense of the ludicrous and find no little enjoyment in the
various mishaps of their comrades in the middle of the stream.
The eftbrts of a " pack train" are especially amusing. The " pack
15
train" of a column beggars description. It generally contains
more mules than horses, and often more contrabands than either.
It takes the place of wagons and is intended to consist of
extra-horses and animals of burden, carrying rations and blankets,
officers' and pack-horse feed. Practically it is a sort of " omniu7ii
gaihenim" of all the little necessary traps used in camp and
bivouac comprising a column which, when marching, stretches out
to the length of a regiment wherein every man rides one animal
and pulls another half way alocgside of him, in vain attempts to
lead him in the way he should go—both creatures stepping to the
flapping music of loose dishes and hard tack, as improvised
paniers shake at every trot their unmentionable contents. When
equipped and ready foj- the move, the demure mule, who usually
bears the heavy packs, stands before you in his natural plaintive at-
^titude, betokening compulsorysubmission to two large champagne-
baskets or cracker-boxes strapped tightly to his sides, while on the
top of his back are huge piles of brown blankets, shelter tents,
tent flies, india rubber ponchos, and massive bags ot corn or oats.
On top of this, indeed, will often be fastened an extra camp chair
or two, a valise, a tin wash basin, iron coffee kettle, a venerable
looking axe, spade, and hatchets, with sometimes an extra saddle
or two. Indeed, a roll of hay or corn-fodder sometimes sur¬
mounts all this, and not unfrequently is a poor animal so com¬
pletely hidden with his burden that head, tail, legs and ears ap¬
pear as only the animate protuberances of a concentration of stable,
kitchen and household-ware. Overcome with such weighty em¬
barrassments, it will easily be seen why that pulling at the halter
of laden animals is a greater inducement for him to attempt an
elongation of the neck than to accept the earnest tugs at his head
as a pressing invitation to speedy locomotion. Encumbrances of
this character require considerable care in their adjustment, and,
unless well-secured, accidents often occur, so that is not unusual
in crossing a stream to observe an unexpected stumble of a faith¬
ful mule cause his unevenly balanced burden to descril)e a graceful
evolution from the back and poise itself beneath the animal in a
position more interesting than "convenient. Should the water be
deep and the current swift, some hungry shivering officer mourns
the following night the loss of his bivouac Penates.
When General Crook's column was again on the march after
crossing the stream. Gen. Irwin Greggs' brigade was in advance,
followed closely by that of Davies and of Smith's and Lord's Bat¬
tery. Light showers had lain the dust, and the brilliant successes
of the morning added to the zeal which inspired the troops.
There were no signs of an enemy visible, and officers and soldiers
rode quietly and carelesly along, discussing incidents of the day
16
and the prospects of the pursuit. The road lay through culti¬
vated farms, fine timber, and was lined with well-built fences, an
item always noted by campaigners. After a march of two or three
[one] miles, a wagon train was discovered moving in the direction oí
Lynchburg and cutting across the road on which Crook was
travelling. The white covers of the wagons were partially screened
by the woods, yet nothing more than a picket guard appeared to
intervene. At the same moment a column of Rebel cavalry was
espied moving with the train. \Vithout a moment's delay the
advance regiment under Colonel Young (4th Pennsylvania
Cavalry) charged down the road, severing the enemy's column
and attacking his train. The success bid fair to be speedy and
complete, but before one brigade could deploy, the Rebel cavalry,
comprising in all about two brigades, quickly rallied under cover
of the hills, one to the right of the road and one to the left. Gal¬
lantly charging, they enclosed Gregg's column on the narrow road
in perfect V. There was little chance to fight, and the high fences
on each side prevented countercharges. While our first attack
had thus been sudden and without resistance, the return of the
compliment was now impetuous and irresistible. To retreat was
to expose the whole column to utter disorganization, by turning
in its head upon itself. Pistols and carbines at short range was
the order of things. Sabres might have been but for the fences,
and before they could be removed, the inimitable " pack train"
decided the present issues, sustaining their general reputation
in the army of never being on hand when wanted and always be¬
ing where they were not wanted. By some mishap a portion of
one had fallen into the column, not far from its head. The result
was that the contrabands, mules, and all the various camp-para¬
phernalia thereunto appertaining, were not just at this unfortunate
moment in a situation appropriate to non-combatants. They
found themselves in plain view of more Rebel cavalry than they
had any reason to believe existed in the entire Confederacy,
and, with that quick appreciation of danger so characteristic of
non-combatants, the conclusion was speedily arrived at that
masterly inactivity was not then and there entirely appropriate.
Thus, seriously exposed to the fire of the Rebels, retreat was
instantly determined upon, and extra horses, beasts of burden,
lazy mules, and frightened contrabands united, suddenly, in one
glorious charge, invincible—but, to the rear. The same impetuos¬
ity of this handful of animals, if propelled in the other direction,
must certainly have seriously damaged any foe with which they
came in contact. As it was, dashing headlong down the narrow
lane, they carried to the rear everything before them. Regiments
calmly marching forward to their places, suddenly found them-
lY
selves completely broken by a contagious panic, while the pack
animals and their leaders flew on as if messengers of destruction.
Of course, these things seriously interfered with the formation of
the troops, as well as with their morale, while the Rebels, appre¬
ciating the advantage, pressed on and doubled the head of the
column comjfleteiy back upon itself. The First Brigade was entirely
broken up and its commander. Brevet Brig.-Gen. Irwin Gregg, was
fence-cornered and taken prisoner in the melee while attempting
to reform his men. General Crook also narrowly escaped cap¬
ture. The rout at this time bid fair to be complete ; but the
next brigade (the First, under General Davies) at this time coming
up and meeting the retreating and pursued fo'rces, where the
country was more open, quickly formed and checked the enemy.
Broken up by the countercharge, while the enemy rallied for an-
other,^a line of battle was quickly assumed, with Davies on the
right of the road and what was rallied of Gregg's Brigade under
Colonel Young on the left. Lord's Battery was posted to com¬
mand all parts of the field and Smith's Brigade held in reserve.
Prisoners taken now brought out the fact that Crook's advance, in
attacking the enemy's wagon train, had actually ridden into the
lines of a large force of infantry belonging to Anderson's corps,
and that this corps was now posted in our front under cover of
the. dense woods. Further attacks on our part were just then and yet
unadvisable. The Rebels, too, relieved us of the responsibility by
again advancing their cavalry to the attack. When cavalry fight
cavalry, both will naturally choose open country, and, probably,
there are no more really exciting scenes in war than to witness
the charges and countercharges of cavalry. This was one of them.
Every movement of the Rebels here was plainly visible, and the
gallantry with which the colors were waved in the advance, urging
forward the reluctant, displayed a spirit worthy of a better cause,
and told more plainly than South Carolina bombast that the old
éla?i and military ardor was not yet lost in the defeated army.
The moral effect of the few artillery shots that were now fired by
Lord's Battery was instantly perceived. Well directed and effect¬
ive, the " rude throats" of these mortal enemies spoke in loud
tones of warning, and, after one or two unsuccessful attacks, no
further aggressions were attempted on our lines. IfyThe
skillful operations and manoeuvres of General Humphreys about
the same time seriously aided in producing this effect.
There was no other road leading to Lynchburg on this [the
north or left] side of the river, except the one in use by the enemy,
and General Crook remained in his position until he could hear
from his superiors. Before Sheridan, who was now at Prince Edward
Court House, could be heard from, it was after sunset. Mean-
18
while General Grant had arrived at Farmville [see collection ofTele-
grams and Desi">atches, collated and appended] and had ordered
General Crook's division to recross the river, and to march to¬
wards Lynchburg by the nearest route, south of the river, along
the railroad, and to liait at Prospect Station. The cavalry, there¬
fore, recrossed the Appomattox, marched again through the town,
and arrived about midnight without further incident at its destina¬
tion. This evening had given quite a new appearance to the quiet
little town of Farmville. îiy' The country about it became one vast
bivouac for the Army of the James and the Sixth Corps of the
Army of the Potomac, while the fields were filled with parks of
artillery and wagon trains.„#=11 Eligible houses on the outskirts
of the town were occupied as various headquarters, at some of
which the sweet strains of serenade softened tiie asperity of war,
subduing the boisterous groups about the bivouac fires. Many a
weary soldier after a tedious day march gazed musingly into the
curling flames of his camp fire, and was carried back to comfort¬
able homes, cherished voices and loving faces, as the night
breezes wafted over tlie fields the notes of a familiar selection. With
the twinkling stars unhidden, the blazing, crackling rails, the little
cup of " sizzling" coffee, the steady tramp of the sentry, the dim
outlines of tents and wagon covers, the " munching" of the
animals, the otherwise hushed quiet of the^ sleeping camp about
him, the soldier muses on the day gone by and conjectures the
changes of the morrow. Who—but those have once experienced
it—can tell the effect, with this weird scene, of the solemn strains
of the Miserere, the wild notes of Robert le Diable, the voluptuous
serenade from Don Pasquale, or the stirring marches from Ernani2
Who, then, will taunt military music as a superfluous expense, as
only the "pomp and circumstance of glorious war! " None know
better than commanders the silent potent influence of the
" Bands."
Near Prospect Station several roads crossed the railroad lead¬
ing south in the directiourof Dan'.ille from the roads on which
Lee was known to be moving. Apprehensive that by these means
the Rebel general might even yet make an attempt to change the
direction of his retreat towards Dan\ ille, Sheridati, on his arrival
at Prince Edward Court House, sent McKenzie with his cavalry to
cross the Buffitlo river, and to tnake a reconnoissance to Prospect
Station. This was accotnplished by the latter without meeting
anything but stragglers from the enemy. McKenzie had scarcely
been gone half an hour from the station, -when the head of
General Crook's column arrived there, and at once went into
camp. The station house was filled with tobacco, and the only
other building in the locality seemed to be occupied by a "lone
19
widow," her children and servants. It has been amazing how
many " widders" the Yankees found in the Confederacy. This
particular one had a story a little different from many others. "She
did not know"—on enquiry—''where her husband was." " Had
she a husband at all ? " "Yes, she did have one 1 " "Well, what had
become of him, then ?" "She didn't know ; he went down the road
one day to get some rations, and she never had heard of him since.
This was some months ago, and she supposed now that he had been
cut off."
Arriving at Prospect Station, it was a little difficult to learn
from the intelligent contrabands whether a column of Lee's army
had passed that point or not. So great had been the number of
Rebel stragglers that they were by many mistaken for regular or¬
ganizations of regiments and brigades on the march. This may
account somewhat for the reports brought to Sheridan's head¬
quarters, by scouts and others, that part of the enemy were
believed to be moving towards Danville. The country over
which we were now operating had not before been visited by
large bodies of soldiers, and the simple inhabitants were deceived
by the squads and crowds of stragglers which travelled every
road. Many of these soldiers were accompanied by their line
officers, and with most the conclusion had been arrived at that
the war was now about finished.
The operations of the 7th of April, of the tenth day of the
campaign [the " Last Hunt,"] may be summed up in brief to be
the close pursuit of Lee's army from daylight until dai^ for about
the distance of fifteen miles, during which skirmishes had taken
place at the crossing of every creek, the Sandy river. Bush river.
High Bridge, Farmville, and again a few miles beyond. The loss
of the enemy was nineteen pieces of artillery and the destruction
of about one hundred and thirty wagons of their train, and this
was inflicted by the Combined Second-Third Corps alone. The
loss, also,~"of the stores, machinery and material at Farmville was
not inconsiderable. No accurate mention can be made of the
number of prisoners taken during the day, or the number of
stragglers induced away from their commands by the vigor of the
pursuit. Among the Rebel generals known to have been severely
wounded, was Brigadier-General Lewis, commandant of a brigade
in Walker's division, Gordon's corps, who fell into our hands.
The loss on our part was principally in the Combined Second-
Third Corps, although Crook's cavalry also lost quite heavily.
Humphrey.s loss was six [five] hundred and seventy-one in killed
and wounded [since he started on this hunt ; how many on the 7th
has never been separately stated. This statement (if erroneous)
originated with William Swinton. As soon as one wolf howls, the
20
pack, without cause, will join in a chorus of discord ; so it has
been in this matter.] Probably one thousand is a large estimate
for Grant's entire loss ; among the officers were Brigadier-General
Smyth, mortally wounded, and Brevet Brig.-Gen. John J. [not the
famous David McGregor] Gregg, taken prisoner.
General Gregg, it will be remembered, was captured in the
heat of battle near Farmville, on the 7th, p. m., and at the same
time his watch, pocket-book and valuables demanded of him as
the price of his life, a threat which could have easily been en¬
forced, and his death charged to the general conflict. Discretion,
however, was the better part of valor, and two days afterwards
General Gregg was released, his captors being themselves cajj-
tured with the army.
The movements during the day of the various corps under
General Grant may be easily traced on the map. The combined
Second Third Corps moved from Sailors' Creek across the Ap-
pomattox^via High Bridge, to Farmville, and about five miles
beyond on the Lynchburg road. The Sixth Corps, direct from
the battlefield of Little Sailors'Creek, via Rice's Station, to Farm¬
ville. General Ord's column of the Army of the James also
moved from its position near Rice's Station direct on Farmville.
The Fifth Corps, which was early in the morning near the com¬
bined Second-Third, followed the latter corps to High Bridge,
when it moved directly across the rear of the army, from its ex¬
treme right to its extreme left, and halted for the night at Prince
Edward Court House Thither also Sheridan had moved Mer-
ritt's cavalry corps, via Rice's Station, from [Little] Sailors' Creek.
Crook's wing of cavalry moved in the front and centre of the
army, on the left of the combined Second-Third Corps; but after
crossing the river at Farmville [to no pur])ose except to show that
it could be forded] recrossed again and encamped about midnight
at Prospect Station. To the latter ¡mint McKenzie's cavalry also
had made a reconnoissance from Prince Edward Court House.
No indications, howevet^ had yet a])j)eared that Lee was disposed
to attempt a retreat on Danville. His object seemed to be to get
out of Grant's way by the most available routes, without i)aying
any special attention to their general direction. Lee, too, was out
of rations, and the account of the operations of 8th April will in¬
dicate his prospects as to a retreat towards Lynchburg and how
they were baffled.
A last, but a most important item of to-day's results are the
two little notes which passed between the commanders of the op¬
posing forces, beginning the correspondence which terminated
the contest. General Grant's first letter was written on this day,
wherein he expresses his conviction that the result of the last
21
week must convince General Lee " of the hopelessness of further
resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia in this
struggle." He regards it, therefore, as his duty to shift from him¬
self the responsibility of any further effusion of blood, by asking
the surrender of his enemy. An interesting preface to this note—
perhaps its inspiration—is read in a dispatch from General Sheri¬
dan, dated the previous evening, 6th April, 11.15, p. m., and re¬
porting his engagement of that day. This characteristic dispatch
tersely concludes, "If the thing is pressed, I think Lee will sur¬
render." (The " thing" was " pressed," and I.ee did surrender.)
Lee replied to General Grant's note under the same date, recipro¬
cating the "desire to avoid useless effusion of blood." But
General Grant did not receive this answer until the following
morning (8th). [Be it remembered in this connection that all the
corresj)ondence, to and fro, of the 7 th and 8th, passed through
the lines of the combined Second-Third Corps under Humphreys,
who alone was persistently pressing and almost the whole time in
contact or treading on the very heels of Lee, on the 6th, 7th, 8th
and 9th, and ready, with the help of the Sixth Corps, to demolish
him on the 9th. Had the Sixth Corps reinforced Humphreys
on the 7th (so has he often declared by letter and in conversation)
it would have been done at Cumberland Church, on the 7th.]
CHAPTER XL
(original chapter xii.)
. Step by step we have marched over the great eleven days'
campaign, and now we come lo the last day of its continuance.
The record of April 8th will be unusually dull and without bril¬
liancy ; yet, it was on this day that the marches and masterly [?]
movements were made, which the next morning brought at bay
the Grand Army of Northern Virginia, checked its fruitless
attempts at escape, repelled its assaults, doubled it back upon
itself, and encircled the |iroud and weary host witii a final "ana¬
conda." April 8th was the day and the night when legs usurped
the rights of valor, and fleetness, not impetuosity, won the victory.
It is curious under these circumstances that the operations of the
Army of the Potomac for this day should be officially detailed in
two lines; but official reports should be brief. General Meade's
is especially so in this instance; his account of this day's move-
I
22
ments being contained in the remark, that "the next day, April 8th,
the pursuit was continued on tlie Lynchburg Stage Road."
From the position of Grant's forces the night before, of
course, the combined Second-Third Corps had the advance, and
took up the direct pursuit. Lee had encamped for the night
along " the Stage Road," just mentioned, many of his troops ex¬
tending south as far as the Appomattox river. The camp fires
of his numerous stragglers spread his forces out in every direc¬
tion, but the main body rested a considerable distance beyond
the advance of the combined Second-Third Corps ; so that when
Humphreys resumed his march, on the morning of the 8th, he did
not come up with the enemy for several hours. Lee's march,
however, could not have been perfectly serene. Four pieces of
artillery were abandoned, the usual rubbish cast away by encum¬
bered troops and wagon trains still lined the roads. After a
march of nearly fifteen miles, at New Store, the combined Second-
Third Corps came up with the enemy's cavalry pickets. The
corps had but one road to march on, and in his report Hum¬
phreys says that " a halt was made of about two hours at sunset,
when the march was resumed with the object of coming up with
the main force of the enemy ; but, finding no probability of doing
so during the night, and the men being much exhausted from want
of food and from fatigue, the head of the column was halted at
midnight. The rear did not get up until morning, and the supply
train of two days' rations later." Thus did the combined
Second-Third Corps pass the day.
Following the combined Second-Third was the Sixth Corps,
which during the night had constructed such a bridge over the
Appomattox at Farmville as answered the present purposes. The
Sixth, therefore, played no important part during the day [but
might have played the most important, if they had improvised a
bridge on the 7th, and hurried across to the support of the com¬
bined Second-Third Corps.]
On the south side of the river, by the same route used by
Crook's cavalry the night'beiore. General Ord's command moved
from Farmville along the railroad towards Lynchburg, followed
by the Fifth Corps under General Griffin. These movements
were under the personal direction of the Lieutenant-General, as
the following brief dispatch will show, while, at the same time, it
illustrates General Grant's judicious generalship in seizing the op¬
portune moment, and giving to his subordinates orders for their
guidance too explicit and direct to admit of any mistake or modi¬
fication.
[If this book expressed the Editor's sentiments, the preceding
sentence would be obliterated and quite another substituted.]
23
Headquarters Armies of the United States.
Farmville, April 7, 1865.
General Meade :
Order the Fifth Corps to follow the Twenty-fourth, at 6, a. m.,
up the Lynchburg road, the Second and Sixth to follow the enemy
north of the river. [Signed,] U. S. Grant,
Lieutenant-General.
Here was the programme for the infantry. Brief and complete,
it offers another explanation to the harmony and success of the
campaign. The vigilance of the Lieutenant-General suffered
nothing to escape him, and on this occasion he himself arranged
the details for the march of his armies, lest another such mistake
[Whose ? Grant's ! that of nobody else Meade, in this case was
blameless, but saddled with the blunder] as that after the battle
of Jetersville might again lose him a few hours and golden op¬
portunity.
Sheridan, with the cavalry of Merritt and McKenzie, resumed
the march at daylight from Prince Edward Court House direct to
Prospect Station, where General Crook awaited his arrival. West
of this point the railroad makes a considerable bend to the south¬
ward. The cavalry moved to the west, therefore, in two columns,
one along the railroad, and one by roads further to the north ;
Merritt's corps taking the latter, with his two divisions, under
Custer and Devins, moving for a while parallel to each other,
while Crook's wing marched along the railroad.
This order of march placed the latter more distant from the
enemy, and left General Merritt to manage affairs in their im¬
mediate vicinity. Although the Rebels were supposed to be
moving on the Lynchburg Pike, yet, early in the day, little had
been heard of them. Custer, however, whose division was nearest
to this road, began soon to gaiher in quite a number of stragglers,
and, from all he could learn, deemed it of great importance that
his march should be prosecuted with every diligence. Hence he
arrived first at the point where his road was crossed by the one
over which Devins was marching, and, therefore, assumed the
responsibility of continuing his progress, although the advance
to-day properly belonged to Devins' (First) Division.
(In explanation,— It was the custom in most ¡tarts of the
Union Army, in forming the daily programme for march, to assign
the advance to the various commands in regular rotation.)
Sheridan himself accompanied the former [Custer]. The
cavalry were followed on these routes by the Fifth and Twenty-
fourth Corps. The march continued during the greater part of
day, without anymore special interest tlian would be awakened by
24
the reception of a great variety of reports from the different sec¬
tions of country through which the column was marching. The
large number of stragglers from Lee's army, who had been seen
in some quarters, completely deceived the people. They had
scarcely any definite idea as to the whereabouts of the Rebel
army. Some thought that it had gone towards Danville, others
that it was pretty well dispersed and all united in confirming the
broken spirits of its soldiers. Some of the simple people, when
asked what would be done, now that Richmond had fallen, re¬
joined with an expression of the most implicit confidence in
General Lee. Two elderly ladies strolled quietly into the lines during
one of the short halts, and, calling an officer aside, one cautiously
remarked that she " didn't 'zactly know, but she didn't see how they
could fight any more now, nohow. Fact is," she added, in a
much more confidential manner, and with a significant nod to¬
wards her companion, indicative of a suspicion that she might
betray her, " they won't fight any more; they'll surrender. I
think they'll really surrender." It is almost useless to say that
the old lady at once became a favorite, although the veterans of
the Army of the Potomac could scarcely credit the belief that
their antagonist, for so long a time at the head of the Rebel army,
should, under any circumstances, succumb thus early in the usual
spring campaign.
At Pamplin's Station, [about 8] miles from Prospect, were
found some cars and disabled locomotives, while in the depot
were stored sorghum and some boxes of fine new Springfield
muskets. Meanwhile, Sheridan had learned through his ubiqui¬
tous scouts, that at Appomattox Station, about ten miles beyond,
there were four trains of cars laden with commissary stores and
supplies of various kinds for the Rebel army ; and the cavalry
pressed on with more vigor. It was a long day's march with but
one short halt. While nothing had been seen of the enemy, a
brush, more or less serious, was, of course, anticipated when the
trains were reached. Of course a considerable force of Lee's
army must, by this time, have reached that vicinity. It could
scarcely be possible that Sheridan was completely in their ad¬
vance, and I do not think I am wrong in stating it as the general
anticipation that, on encountering the force in the neighborhood
of this new depot, we would be in the very midst of a large camp
of the enemy.
In reply to Custer's despatches to Sheridan, reporting his pro¬
gress and observations, the latter replied that, " if those trains
can be taken work enough will be done for one day." But this
was not the end of this day's work.
Lee was more than weakened. His army was retreating.
25
where, or for what good purposes, who could tell. The Confede¬
rate capital had fallen and its President taken flight. Defeat and
demoralization had dispersed the Army of Northern Virginia.
Officers had told their men that they might as well go home now,
everything was lost. Many arms had been thrown away. Artil¬
lery by batteries and wagons by hundreds abandoned, burned.
Every calculation during the campaign for the supply of his com¬
missariat had been thwarted. The fall of Richmond, although
perhaps anticipated and partially provided for, was sudden and
premature. I'here was no opportunity to care for the preserva¬
tion of the immense stores there, so necessary but now lost to the
supply of Lee's army. Rebel officers are fond of inveighing
against the Confederate authorities for the large amount of stores
abandoned in Richmond. They might better, it was thought,
have Jaeen given away to the soldiers and to the needy in the
city, rather than to have been destroyed. Quantities of coffee,
flour and sugar were found there. It was a long and harassing
march by night and by day, with skirmishes, and without the
best of roads, from Petersburg, on its fall, on the 2d, to the Dan¬
ville railroad, which was reached two days afterwards. But here
the supplies expected and so confidently telegraphed for were cut
off and Lee detained to watch and to fight. Again he pushed for
Lynchburg and succeeded, with a portion of his army, in meet¬
ing a few cars at Farmville. But his army received therefrom no
substantial additions to its commissariat, and retreating, fighting,
wearied, heartsick and almost without hope, his men marched on
to the west again. The stores there awaiting their arrival were
doomed to become spoils for Sheridan. Is it a wonder that this
army, so closely pursued, harassed, pushed back from one road to
another, away from the course it would follow, its supplies cap¬
tured and without any base of operations in the present or in
prospective; is it a wonder that these men lost spirit, dispersed,
and, in a short ten days, from a large, well-appointed army dwin¬
dled away, down to a mere handful scarcely enough to constitute
a good division. [This remark can only allude to those who had
arms in their hands—some 9000—when they surrendered, and
cannot refer to over three times that number who had weapons
and ammunition and were opposing the Union troops desperately
or sullenly an hour or so previous.] This, too, while its commander,
whom all so revered, was corres])onding with his adversary for
surrender. The wonder, rather, is, that any army was left, or that
there yet remained any of that military esprit which delights in
victory, which exhibited itself in some of the closing charges of
the Rebel cavalry on the morning of the final surrender.
Custer's Division, having the advance, first struck Appomattox
26
Station, defended only by a squad of cavalry, and by quick man¬
oeuvring surrounded and captured the trains, from which wagons
were being loaded, before any force could appear for their relief ;
even before they could steam away—so complete was the sur¬
prise. The railroad at this point is about two miles south of the
Lynchburg stage road, which runs through Ajjpomattox Court
House, and along which the main body of Lee's army was mov¬
ing. Near this point was a camp of hospital train, a large park
of wagons and a park of surplus artillery, estimated by some offi¬
cers at twenty-five and by others at fifty pieces. Being well in
Lee's advance these troublesome encumbrances to the speedy
movements of an army were preparing to bivouac for the night in
fancied security. The artillery was guarded by a small division
of infantry and a division of cavalry. A detachment from Lee's
advance also reached the depot about the same time with our
cavalry. They were at once driven back, however, when the trains
were captured, and followed closely by Custer. A portion of the
wagon trains nearly succeeded in moving off, but there now oc¬
curred, here, however, one of the hottest and hardlv contested col¬
lisions of the campaign. It was one of those affairs that did not
really occupy a very great length of time and of which official re¬
ports would have nothing more interesting to say, than that " a
short engagement with the enemy here took place." According to
General Sheridan's official report, " General Devin coming up
went in on the right of Custer. The fighting continued until
after dark and the enemy were driven." But this brilliant little
fight is entitled to more consideration. It took place near the
Lynchburg stage road and was brought on by Custer m his at¬
tempts to drive the enemy and secure the possession of this great
highway. It was the only route now open for Lee towards
Lynchburg, or, indeed, the only main route that he could travel
in any direction, in his efforts to escape our forces. Could Sheri¬
dan obtain and hold possession of this road thus directly in Lee's
front, and there remain, w^ll established, until a good portion of
the strong corps of infantry following him should arrive for his
relief I support or stiffening], Lee would be completely surrounded,
■with no possible means of escape. To the north of him and
parallel with his line of march, wound the Appomattox, unford-
able and with no established crossing for many miles. Even if
any such had existed, a journey in that direction would have been
of no avail to the enemy. In his rear the main body of the
Army of the Potomac (the combined Second-Third and Sixth
Corps, under Humphreys and Wright, respectively), was in close
pursuit and [the former] constantly harassing him. On his left
flank, towards the south, Sheridan's cavalry column, followed by
27
the Fifth and Twenty-fourth Corps, were marching almost directly
parallel and endeavoring to intercept him, in which intention,
should Sheridan be successful, reach and hold a point on the road
beyond Lee's advance, there offered the Rebel leader no [¡ossible
means of escape, other than to pierce the lines surrounding him.
The appearance of Sheridan at Appomattox Depot, almost as
Lee's extreme advance had arrived, was therefore an additional
disaster, and sound military policy dictated that no effort should
be spared to repel any further advance of the Union troops in
this direction. But the small force of cavalry and infantry guard¬
ing the trains and surplus artillery, which had reached this point in
advancg of the main body in order to escape the uncertainties of
battle, was not sufficient to delay, permanently, the onward pro¬
gress of Sheridan. It is a doubtful principle, but one held by
some of our most successful cavalry leaders, that it is the pro¬
vince ^f cavalry never to hesitate in making an attack ; that no
time should be lost in cautious reconnoitering. [This was Suwar-
row's idea.] If anything is to be gained, the more precipitate
and unexpected the attack, the greater its probable success. The
chances in its favor greatly overbalance the risks of serious disaster
incurred by attacking an enemy with a position and force uncer¬
tainly ascertained, and, should the movement prove injudicious, a
skillful general will usually discover it in time to prevent any great
misfortune to a well-disciplined cavalry. It was in strict accord¬
ance with views of this character that Sheridan and his generals
pursued this stirring campaign. Without " note or comment "
the Rebels were attacked wherever found. No time was pre¬
viously consumed in reconnoisances and dispositions, but when
the occasion presented itself a fight ensued. Thus it was in the
attacks of each division, successively, at different points, of the
enemy's line of march on the morning of the 6th (April) near [but
south of] Deatonsville. [Let there be no mistake; not on the
road on which Humphreys fought, over and ahead, fourteen
miles and for eleven hours The cavalry, always claiming the lion's
share of the glory of this pursuit, which justice cannot assign to
them, is said to have been " in Deatonsville." Justly does Hum¬
phreys remark (i2, lo, 71): "The dispatch from Meade to me
(signed "Webb, Chief of Staff "), telling me about Deatonsville,
was received by me after I had got two ??nles beyond Deatonsville
and had left it behind me for more than an hour. If any one will
look at the map, on which the operations of the different corps
and services are distinctly marked, he will see that the cavalry
were at work upon a mere side issue and moving on a lateral road.
The whole district thereabouts may have been known by the prin¬
cipal settlement, as Deatonsville, but there was no " station."
28
General Custer admitted the cavalry were not on the line or route
thecombined Second-Third Corps fought over,driving the Rebels
before them, from one strong and strengthened position after
another. The fact is, history, "that vast Mississippi of false¬
hoods," as Matthew Arnold styled it—particularly military his¬
tory, is simply an aggregation of special pleas tor this one or that. J
It was again on the afternoon of the 7th, near Farmville,
when Crook's column was brought so quickly to a halt. Inde¬
pendently of the principle that the pursuers should always Itarass
the pursued, the cavalry of Sheridan owes much of its success in
previous campaigns, but especially in this one, to the dashing
com[)liance of its leaders with this interesting theory.
So on this evening of the 8th April, Custer had captured the
railroad trains near the station of Appomattox, while the proba¬
bility was that he should soon encounter a large camp of the
enemy, or perhaps his main body. The facts are, that with the
small force at his command and without awaiting further advice
or instructions, he at once opened a battle. The trains being
captured, the enemy began a most destructive artillery fire upon
the station and there was great danger of the prize being lost.
Upon this, just as when the Massachusetts 6th and New York 7th
were on their first journey to Washington, at the breaking out of
the war, and a call was made for engineers, to put the locomo¬
tives in order and start them out with the troops from Annapolis
to Washington, there was a ready and competent response; so,
now, at the close of the war, during the hasty movements conse¬
quent upon a cavalry engagement and while the shots flew over
and through the newly-made prizes, and when each soldier had a
duty to perform which might pardon him for not remembering
what was his former civil occupation or whether he ever had any
at all, a call was made for engineers from the ranks. " Who could
engineer these trains from the danger of recapture ?" A re¬
sponse was ready in the Harris Light Cavalry and the new engin¬
eers assumed their posts^ Soon a timorous whistle and labor¬
ious puffs announced the struggles of the iron monsters and in a
short ume a long bold whoop and the regular sounds of move¬
ments over the rails aroused the curiosity of the troops not yet
arrived. The track being in order the trains were run into better
established positions within our lines. They passed by columns of
our men, awakening the most intense interest and curiosity
among the soldiers of Devins and Crook, who were also march¬
ing up along the railroad.
Meantime Custer continued his fight, to assure his position at
Appomattox Station and to advance his troops, if possible, as far
as the Lynchburg pike, capturing such artillery and trains as
29
might be between him and that road and holding a position here,
directly across Lee's line of march, until further orders should be
received from his superiors. This was the true plan and it was
most skilfully and successfully executed.
Pennington's and Capehart's brigades, numerically known as
the First and Third Brigades, being the leading commands in the
columns, were brought into action as soon as on the ground, and
strong efforts were at once made to capture the artillery, which
was doing considerable damage among the troops. Canister
was freely used by the enemy, and it was at one time quite doubt¬
ful whether the trains could be run off successfully. The extem¬
porized engineers from the " Harris' Light" did their work well,
however, and the prizes were secured. The position of the enemy
was covered by thick woods, on every approach, and night was
fast chiming on. But Custer maintained the fight by repeated
charges, now on the right, now on the left, now in the centre.
The enemy was kept thoroughly occupied and no opportunity
was given him to reconnoitre or test the strength of the attack¬
ing force. Had he done so, with a well-disciplined although
small force of infantry, the wooded character of the country was
greatly in his favor as against cavalry. Custer's charges were re¬
pulsed or only a few rods would be gained. The Second Bri¬
gade (third in column), under Wells, was then brought into action
and fresh charges made, both mounted and dismounted, against
the enemy's position. His guns continued to grow more destruc¬
tive at each approach. Men and officers were becoming dis¬
couraged in these attempts, apparently so futile. Custer himself
now led the charges and seemed ubiquitous, exerting his every
effort to maintain every inch he could gain, and to imbue his men
with the enthusiasm of his own nature. In this latter endeavor
his mercurial temperament usually helped him to success. No
rail fences were converted into slight breastworks, no defensive
line attempted; but bold, persistent and determined personal efforts
were made to break the enemy's front. Many officers, however,
engaged in this contest, expressed the belief that it was impossible
to gain tbe position desired, and urged that further efforts be de¬
sisted from at present. Not the slightest anxiety, however, was
manifested as to Custer's ability to hold his own position before
what opposition might here be brought against him
The whole fighting force of the three brigades was kept in ac¬
tion. Darkness came on, and, guided by the flashes of the ene¬
my's guns, Custer was still pushing and pressing here and there
along the line. His officers kept track of him with difficulty and
sought him by recognition of his voice in words of command, or
by the blasts of his bugle as ever and anon it sounded the " For-
30
ward!" and " Charge ! " It must have been about nine o'clock
in the evening, which had been ])assed in this entertaining manner,
when, as though impatient of further delay, he shouted to a staff
officer (Brevet Col. E. W. Whittaker, Chief of Staff and Lieut.-
Col. ist Connecticut Cavalry), that " those guns must be taken in
five minutes." The officer quickly passed the word along the line,
which responded in renewed and hearty cheers. The shout was
taken up from man to man and simultaneously the lines moved
forwárd. The Rebels heard it and did not rejoice, but began to
retire. They were discovered to be abandoning their guns, many
of which had been taken off to the pike running from Appomat¬
tox Court House to Lynchburg, which road was not far distant
from the scene of the fight. With cheer upon cheer the line ad¬
vanced and swept everything before it. The enemy's position
was abandoned and an indiscriminate mass of guns, caissons
and baggage-trains captured. Without stopping to lose them¬
selves among these trophies, under the lead of Custer, in the
darkness, by a narrow obscure road and through the thickest un¬
derbrush, our men pushed on in pursuit. The column was
obliged to march "by fours" only, but the random shots of stray
pieces of artillery, by which the Rebels sought to intimidate our
men, were now without result. The advance was continued and
over an uncertain by-road the pike was finally reached.
The enemy now took both routes of retreat; one toward
Lynchburg and the other toward Appomattox Court House, not
two miles distant, where Lee's army was bivouacking for the night.
Here the troops emerged into an open country, while over un¬
dulating fields, and, glimmering like fire-flies, on the hills just be¬
yond the liitle villàge, broke into view the camp-fires of all that
remained of the Rebel host. Will the soldiers who saw them that
night ever forget the scene ?
But there was no time for contemplation. The road was
packed with trains of baggage, supplies and artillery in one grand
inextricable confusion, sofhe headed one way and some another,
and all so thoroughly interlocked and obstructing the road, that
over this excellent highway, ordinarily passable for several wagons
travelling abreast of each other, a single horseman could with
difficulty select a bridle path. But the enemy was not yet dis¬
posed to abandon the hope of holding this road. They seemed
to feel assured that our cavalry could not remain long upon it,
and that portion of them who fled toward Lynchburg now un-
limbered guns on our men from that direction, while those fleeing
for rescue toward Appomattox Court House assisted in the an¬
noyance. While incidents of this character frequently gave com¬
manding generals the most anxious solicitude and attention, it
31
sometimes happens that the quick impulse of some officer meets
the emergency. So it was here. Before any provision could be
made for disi)osing, in the darkness, of the somewhat scattered
troops to silence this fire, now in the rear, a group of horsemen,
which was afterwards proved to consist, in great part, of officers led
by the enthusiastic proposition of one of their number, guided by
the flash of the guns, suddenly charged this new fire, silenced it,
and captured the guns. All the plunder seemed now in our posses¬
sion, as well as the road by which Lee was retreating, and over
which he must pass to escape the " anaconda."
Custer did not halt, however, but continued his advance
toward the Court House, until he encountered an infantry barri¬
cade, when a halt was ordered, and a line in front thereof estab¬
lished. Directions were given to secure the artillery and valuable
portion# of the captured wagon trains as speedily as possible by
running them off to the south side of the railroad at the station.
About this time, General Devin's Division dismounted, and
reached the road on which Custer was operating from across the
fields at his right. Devin's troops had been dismounted early in
the action, and disposed on the right of Custer's line, where the
service they rendered was chiefly to distract the enemy by the ap¬
pearance of" Yankees" upon every quarter. The dense character
of the country rendered communication between tiie different
generals exceedingly slow and difficult, especially after dark.
Hence, Devin's troops did not become seriously engaged.
It was now arranged that General Devin's troops should as¬
sume a line of one brigade, facing Lee's army toward the Court
House, and one also toward Lynchburg at the west, thus reliev¬
ing General Custer's men, while the latter should be occupied in
clearing the field of the captures. These, it was found, amounted
to twenty-five pieces of artillery and over two hundred wagons,
the latter filled mostly with baggage. It was midnight before
Custer himself left the field, when he rode to the hospital and
visited his wounded. Had it been daylight, then, he would have
seen the green saplings, about which his men so valiantly and
successfully fought, bent and split by canister from the artillery.
The trees and the artillery carriages in the park were perforated
with bullet holes ; horses wallowed in bloody mud, and the first
dawn of day upon the spot would tell any observer of the deadly
character of that evening's contest. Surgeons of wide experience
in the cavalry remarked that they never treated so many extreme
cases in so short a fight The wounds were chiefly made by artil¬
lery, and were serious; many patients being badly mangled. This
battle, fought on the eve of surrender, when the Rebel general
knew too well that further resistance was in vain, entailed, as usual.
32
its sad sacrifices. Lieutenant-Colonel Aug. J. Root, of the 15th
New York Cavalry, a noble and brave man, was killed in the last
charge on the " pike," near Appomattox Court House. His body
fell into the hands of the enemy, and was found with Lee's army
on the next morning after surrender, stripped of all clothing.
Major Howe, of the ist West Virginia Cavalry, was also instantly
killed in this action. But my ];en fails me to do justice to the
memory of all these faithful soldiers. Their name, too, is legion,
and I leave the task for better hands.
Sheridan, of course, lost no time in notifying General Grant
of the result of his day's operations, as well as Generals Ord and
Griffin, commanding the infantry on this wing and in this vicin¬
ity, respectively, of the Army of the James and of the Fifth Corps,
which had started in the morning in rear of the cavalry. Know¬
ing that daylight would again appear before General Grant might
be able to receive his message and to issue fresh orders upon his
report, he urged the generals just mentioned to press on with all
possible energy, and that, if they could reach him in time, there
was no possible means of escape for the enemy. " The last ditch"
had been discovered. These commanders judiciously determined
to force the march, and the head of their columns reached Appo¬
mattox Depot about two o'clock on the morning of the 9th, thus
having marched all day and the greater part of the night. The
march, too, at times, was to some of the troops exceedingly
tedious, owing to the frequent halts, which are often unavoidable
when so large a column uses only one road of travel.
["I" (Capt. Charles W. Greene, iiith Colored Troops, U. S.
Volunteers), " belonged to Ord's column of the Army of the James.
I think it was on the 6th of April, 1865, that we arrived near
Farmville [Rice's Station ?]. We encamped in dense young woods,
and lay there till the 7th. We lay in shelter tents on the 7th.
We marched eastward across a beautiful valley, fording two or
three wide streams, waist deep, and encamped near Farmville.
Early on the morning pf the 8th we awoke, passed through
Farmville in the early twilight, and made a splendid march of
forty-seven miles (so it was said) to a point near Appomattox
Court House. We had not a straggler—every man was in his
place when, near midnight, we fell upon the damp April ground,
and slept sweetly till 4, a. m. ; then a rapid march, a halt for cof¬
fee (drunk boiling hot) and for a hard-tack bolted in haste ; a sharp
cannonade, a swift double-quick, a headlong run, a rush of our
cavalry out of the woods with some Rebel battle flags, with the
news that Langdon's Battery was lost to the Johnnies. We rush
in, our left in front, a hurrying deployment of two companies of
skirmishers, a fine march into a field by the rear rank in our haste.
33
my company with the colors ; a halt, news from one of Sheridan's
staff that Lee was about to surrender ; then a dozen or two hur¬
rahs, with tears of joy unnumberçd ; then written orders from
Grant to move no men, but to remain where we were ; then direc¬
tions from Sheridan to move undercover of a hill to an unguarded
road, by which, I doubt not, many of Lee's men might have
escaped, if some did not ; then news of the Surreiider; and a clos¬
ing in of the lines and the exit of a large number of our prisoners
from Lee's lines. That was news enough for one day ! "]
That portion of Sheridan's cavalry which had not been en¬
gaged, aware of the length of the day's march they had accom¬
plished, went into bivouac, long after dark, and were astonished
at the first break of the_day, in answering to reveille, to find in the
same field with themselves long stacks of trusty muskets. A
cavalry soldier may feign a want of respect for infantry; but he
usually expresses a certain sense of relief on learnmg of the
proximity of troops from that branch of the service ! So on the
morning of the 9th ; conscious of the importance of the next few
hours, these men answered in silent sympathy to each other.
This infantry obtained little sleep during the night. Many
were marching all night (Sth-çth), some not arriving until (9th)
morning. The same was the case with the other wing of Grant's
army, who were following Lee more directly, where the rear of
the Second Corps did not get up until (9th) morning." If the
pursuers were obliged to make these extraordinary exertions,
what must have been the efforts of the pursued? But it was these
forced marches during the day and night of the Sth-pth of April,
which settled the fact of Lee's surrender on April 9th. The
cavalry could not have withstood by itself the attacks which, on
the morrow, were brought against it. The march of a strong body
of infantry, with a fleetness unknown, because, perhaps, unneces¬
sary, during many of the former operations against which Lee
had contended, was unexpected to him ; and, as we shall see in
recounting the affairs of to-morrow—9th April—when once he
learned the fact, hostilities were suspended. It is universally ad¬
mitted in military circles, that the unusual march of thetroojis just-
mentioned was the most effective among the intermediate causes
of the final surrender.
Before daylight, the next morning, the rubbish which encum¬
bered the Lynchburg Pike had been cleared away by Custer's
veterans ; and the bugles awakened the weary troops before the
break of dawn. All were in the saddle, fully prepared for the grand
contest anticipated. The unexpected sight of the infantry, too,
served to impress the soldiers with the belief that their command¬
ers deemed hearty work to be before them, and the extraordinary
34
tnarch accomi)lislied made the infantry earnest of success. The
hostilities of the day were opened by the Rebels in an attempt to
dislodge the troops at the Lynchburg Pike, who rvere now halt¬
ing Lee's army. There has been quite a popular impression
that, on the morning of the gth, seeing the difficulty of his position,
Lee quietly determined to surrender without an engagement, and
acted accordingly.
This, however, is a serious error. ,.#=¡1 It is true that some of
his most prominent subordinates believed that nothing but cavalry
was in his front, and that a strong attack with infantry would
open the way for his continued retreat. It was not thought that
the Union infantry could possibly have marched so completely
around the Rebels, and it was confidently e.\pected, therefore,
that the line in the latter's front toward Lynchburg might be forced
early in the morning, before succor could arrive from the infantry
corps presumed to be marching to the support of the cavalry.
[The operations of the 8th and gth would have been superfluous
if the afternoon of the 7th had been properly utilised.] At
an interview between the opposing generals, which took place
later in the day, these sentiments were acknowledged, although
there were one or two Confederate generals present who were en¬
gaged in the battle of the morning, and who expressed it as their
opinion at the time that our infantry had arrived, and that it was
useless to continue further hostilities. It was a contrary senti¬
ment, however, which induced the action, and the spirit which
seemed to animate a considerable portion of the Rebel cavalry, in
their manœuvres of this morning, indicated that they were antici¬
pating an easy success. Under these circumstances a determined
effort was made to break through the Union cavalry on the Lynch¬
burg road, clear the country in that direction and open a way for
the further retreat of the Rebel army. Crook's Division, having
been more fortunate than any other part of the cavalry corps in
securing a few hours rest during the night, moved from its bivouac
before the dawn, and «by sunrise had relieved the troops of
General Devins at the extreme front, allowing the latter to move
off toward the railroad, across the fields on the right, that they
might there attend to their horses and prepare for the work of the
day. But the enemy was already alive. The fog of the morning
was just rising from the open fields over which his movements
were now obliged to be made. The sharp ring of carbines greeted
the rising sun,and an occasional discharge of artillery ["the dia¬
pason of the cannonade"], harmonized with the clamor, intensify¬
ing a warlike prelude whose significance at this early hour every
veteran appreciates.
The Union infantry, for the present, remained near Appomat-
35
tox Depot to obtain some slight rest and refreshments, and the
new dispositions of cavalry were quickly made. The extreme left,
or the whole of the care of the Lynchburg Pike, was now left to
General Crook, McKenzie's command being sent to support him.
Merritt's Corps reorganized, and was disposed to meet any emer¬
gency which might arise on the right oí General Crook, and to
protect the latter from being flanked from this direction, until
the infantry of the Fifth and Twenty-fourth Corps could be
brought up into a proper position. Sheridan himself had remained
at his headquarters during the night, near Appomattox Depot,
where, early in the hiorning, he was able to consult with General
Ord as to the prospective labors of the day. The task assigned to
General Crook soon proved to be of no little importance and diffi¬
culty. Smith's (Third) Brigade, with a section of Lord's Battery
(First Lk S. Artillery), supported by J. Irwin Gregg's Brigade
(Second), under Colonel Young, and McKenzie's brigade of
cavalry from the Army of the James, were posted on a rising
slope across the road; and, while attempting to repel the ad¬
vances of the enemy in their front, also essayed, by patrols and
detachments, to glean all possible information regarding their
movements in other quarters. Davies' Brigade was sent to the
north and west, militarily described as the left and rear, to give
speedy warning and to cut off and prevent, if possible, any move¬
ment indicating an attempt of the Rebels to march around the
flank of those now confronting them. All of these commands
soon became more or less engaged; some of them quite seriously.
With the clear sunrise, advancing toward Smith across the open
fields, came the glittering lines of battle, with colors plainly
flying. Not far behind them lay the little village of Appomattox
Court House, surrounded by a most beautiful and undulating
farming country. Just out of sight, beyond, were supposed to rest
the remainder of the Rebel army; while even within the view a
few wagons and a bivouac fire here and there appeared as a dis¬
tant feature of the picture.
The Rebel lines of infantry seemed not to advance with that
mobility and elasticity which usually characterized their move¬
ments, and the number of colors in the lines was remarkable.
This latter fact was afterwards explained by the general demorali¬
zation of Lee's army, which was already so great that the men
were gathered together irrespective of the particular command to
which they may have belonged and as if by military instinct grouped
themselves under the nearest colors convenient. Officers had for¬
borne to insist that every man should be present with his own regi¬
ment. Many commands had no representatives and men were
collected and marshalled under any flag, in a manner most uncere-
3()
momous and expeditious. The troops in front of Sheridan consisted
chiefly of Gordon's and Longstreet's Corps and Fitz Hugh Lee's
cavalry. [This is an error. Longstreet's Corps was opposed to
Humphreys' combined Second-Third Corps, in the opposite direc¬
tion, towards the east ; the cavalry were to the west of the Rebel
lines and position.] The direct attack on Crook's fropt was not
at flrst successful. Some sturdy men from Maine were there and
Smith's Brigade were not accustomed to retire without the most seri¬
ous persuasion. The enemy then attempted to outflank Sheridan by
sending cavalry completely around the left of his lines, with a
view of striking the pike again nearer Lynchburg and then, by
vigorously attacking his rear, break through his troops, effect a
junction with Lee's main body and thus open the road for further
retreat. In making this effort Davies' Brigade was enconutered,
and this portion of the field being more wooded than others af¬
forded the latter the advantage of concealing his real strength,
which was quite small, and allowed him to display a force at
whatever point circumstances might require. Davies established
a long, circular-shaped line, extending from the left of Smith
around again to the pike, which he was obliged to defend against
any movement from the direction of Lynchburg. While his at¬
tention was thus occupied, however, the fighting grew louder and
heavier at the front. Warned by their first unsuccessful attempt,
the enemy were now making a second stronger attack, directly in
Crook's front. It was the last time that the infantry of the Rebel
Army of Northern Virginia ever advanced upon the defenders of
the Union. The latter occupied a well-chosen position over¬
looking the whole country, over which their assailants were obliged
to manœuvre; and, behind hastily constructed rail barricades the
Union dismounted carbineers, with four light pieces of artillery,
held out manfully against many times their number. But the
Rebel lines extended much beyond ours, both to the right and
left.^^3 Merritt's corps had not yet gone into position on the right
and there was imminerft danger of Crook's flanks being turned.
The Rebel officers could be seen encouraging their men and
leading them on in a manner most confident and valorous. The
country to the right of Crook, as far as the railroad, was mostly
thickly wooded and had afforded a convenient and appropriate
location for a considerable number of his extra horses. Not
meeting with much resistance in this quarter among these, the
Rebels soon made their appearance. Our men [horse-holders]
ran off the animals so speedily that few, however, were lost.
About the same time also the right of the Rebel line of infantry
overlapped our own left and compelled us to retire, while the di¬
rect advance pressed up closely to the overworked guns. The
ammunition, too, was giving out. The brigades heretofore held
in reserve, under Colonel Young and General McKenzie, had
been ordered into action, respectively, one to the left and the other
to the right, and they temporarily checked the enemy's advance.
The gallant little band in front, however, were becoming unable
longer to protect their guns and, finally, sought to withdraw them.
Many of the artillery horses had been killed. Amid smoke and
fire and the whistle of bullets the pieces were dragged away, but
one of them, becoming stalled, was abandoned. It was now an
unsuccessful battle ; the Rebels had partially dislodged our cavalry
a?id were pressing with a force strong enough to co7nplete its retire¬
ment. Nothing appeared to prevent their entire occupation of
the coveted highway ; and while our men were rallying, a column
of Rebel cavalry approached to charge the road. Officers were
gallopiçg to and fro, men were wandering about to find their
companies, no lines were definitely established, and there was
a lull of that "dread clamor" of glorious war; yet all was
hopeful expectation. It was known that the infantry were
not far distant and it must not be long before they would arrive
on the ground. It was not more than eight o'clock and the mist
of the morning had hardly cleared away. The air was thick with
the smoke and dust of battle. The fresh sunbeams breaking
through, lifted into view the Rebel horsemen. Slowly and confi¬
dently they rode in solid columns towards us. Their peculiar
cheers [yells] broke the stillness of the temporary lull and their
sabres waved with a joyful flourish. There seemed to be a re¬
newal of their ancient spirits. They had passed the spot where
our guns this morning had first opened and where the Union
lines had given way. The way seemed clear before them and the
road to Lynchburg once more secured.
But joy was turned to grief. The sounds of battle had not
fallen unconcernedly on the troops in bivouac. General Ord's
infantry had already started from Appomattox Depot, and with
scarce an hour for rest, after a night-long march, were hurrying to
the scene of action. Foster's Division was in advance and had
already reached the Lynchburg pike. Seeing the condition of
affairs a regiment was at once formed across and a second one
was going into line at its side. The column of Rebel cavalry at
the same moment, by a little rise in the road, suddenly discovered
the new enemy across their path. How their hearts must have
shrunk with bitter disappointment ! Not a shot was fired. The
officers, plainly visible, riding quietly at the head, quickly halted.
General Foster and staff were in front of their troops, in person di¬
recting the dispositions. There was a moment of silent suspense,
while the infantry hurried at double-quick into position. A Rebel
38
officer wheeled and gave a brief word of command. Sabres fell,
cheers ceased ; one, two, three, a dozen shots were now quickly
exchanged. A volley followed and before the smoke could clear
away the Rebel cavalry was gone and the lines of General Fos¬
ter were sweeping forward in close pursuit. Some colored troops
appeared on the field, quickly assumed their positions, and, as
frequently happens with troops when brought for the first time
into action, opened a noisy volley, which was not without its effect
in accelerating the enemy's movements. (This can not be con¬
strued into a reflection on the efficiency of the negro troops ; it is
an occurrence by no means unusual, even among veteran regi¬
ments.) The Rebel infantry was soon met and the firing con¬
tinued with renewed vigor. Foster's and a part of Birney's (Col¬
ored) Divisions were about to become seriously engaged. All
was activity and preparation. Fresh artillery was going into po¬
sition. The lines of infantry were readjusted. The morning had
become bright and clear and on the open fields now before the
Unionists was spread out an enemy whose complete destruction
was most imminent. Seeing their danger the Rebel cavalry again
attempted to move around the command of General Davies and
to strike the Lynchburg road beyond him. By making a wide
detour, they were finally enabled to accomplish this result, though
not without some loss in wounded and prisoners, caused by the
constant charges of Davies on their flanks. Once in possession of
a portion of the Lynchburg pike they proceeded by a dashing
charge to break through Davies and overtake the rear of the
forces advancing toward Appomattox Court House. But this
attempt was unsuccessful. The cavalry under McKenzie and
Colonel Young, which by this time had reformed without serious
loss and which had captured from the enemy during the short
fight several stands of colors, was ordered to reinforce Davies,
and the latter was instructed to whip anything he could find
worth fighting and then hasten to join in a grand charge on the
enemy at AppomattoxCourt House. Meanwhile Sheridan had
formed Davies and Custer on the slopes of the hills surrounding
the little village, for an impetuous charge on the main body of
J.ee's army, which now appeared plainly visible on the hills and
in the valley beyond.
Meanwhile the Fifth Corps, which had bivouacked for the
night close to General Ord's command, moved forward at dawn
and marching directly across the country from the railroad, about
six o'clock had reached the vicinity of Aj)pomattox Court
House. Learning through Sheridan that a portion of the cavalry
was heavily engaged and hard pressed, Ayres' division was
pushed forward at a double-quick, two Pennsylvania regiments (the
39
igoth and 191st Pennsylvania Volunteers), armed with Spencer
- rifles, deployed as skirmishers and the main part of the division
formed at once in two lines of battle. General Bartlett's (First)
Division, formed likewise on the right of Ayres, was covered with
a heavy skirmish line (155th and 198th Pennsylvania and 185th
New York Volunteers). Thus disposed, the corps moved forward
and attacked the enemy.
At the same time Sheridan had formed the two divisions of
Merritt's cavalry corps, under Devins and Custer, to the right of
the infantry (Fifth-Corps), on the slopes of the hills to the west¬
ward of the little village of Appomattox Court House, for a grand
simultaneous charge on the main body of Lee's army, spread
out before them on the flelds in the valley beyond.
It was a thrilling spectacle, on this beautiful spring morning,
to witness the advancing lines of the Union grand army. All its
movements were now in fair and open view and could be taken
in at a glance. The troops here may be said to have constituted
one wing of Grant's army; while the combined Second-Third
and the Sixth Corps, following directly in the rear of Lee
and more immediately under the command of General Meade
[so to speak; Humphreys was in actual command] may
properly be named as the other. (The Ninth Corps did
not advance beyond Farmville during the campaign.) Sheri¬
dan was the leading spirit of the [west] wing now more
immediately referred to, and amid the various- colors which
moved rapidly among the troops, followed by a group of horse¬
men, his headquarter pennant was especially distinguishable.
Custer's gay color was likewise conspicuous, and, while the at¬
tack by the infantry was progressing, his division was sweeping
along the hills and forming nearer the village for a charge in col¬
umn of squadrons. It was one grandjubilee of warfare ! The sight
to every soldier was inspiriting. Advancing lines of battle " to the
right of him and to the left of him ; " the steel glistening in the morn¬
ing sunlight; hundreds of colors proudly waving along the lines;
the eager generals, with their staffs and escorts, here and there dot¬
ting the fields ; the artillery rumbling ponderously by battery front,
now hurriedly unliinbering its guns and now skilfully limbering-up
again; aides and orderlies dashing gaily over the plain ; while at
right angles to the grand advance, and almost within sight of every
man, the squadrons of cavalry swept along the slopes in a style
peculiarly attractive. It was about nine o'clock. The enemy, no
longer able to maintain the semblance of organized resistance,
retreating, kept a good distance beyond our advance. But retir¬
ing directly over the country whence they came, they must soon
encounter the rest of the Army of the Potomac under General
40
Meade. Who now could doubt that capture or annihilation was
before them. The panoramic view and the moral spectacle of this
morning was unparalleled. Long and patiently had many a
weary soldier waited for this day. Proud and haughty had many
a noble-spirited youth felt it postponed by " strategic " retreat.
Brave and valiant had many gallant soldiers found their graves in
fighting, that we might see it. Hopeful and sincere had noble
women prayed that it might come. Silent and obedient the vete¬
rans longed for it. Industrious, energetic, intelligent and faith¬
ful, the army had worked for it. Powerful and unyielding the
whole nation demanded it. Quiet and persistent the Lieutenant-
General determined it. A short time longer and this pomp and
circumstance of battle would be turned to combat and slaughter.
Weary, hungry, defeated, pursued, harassed, surrounded, the
Rebel " Army of Northern Virginia " was helpless. When,
therefore, its further defiance was complete destruction. Captain
Simms, of General Longstreet's staff, hailed General Custer, bear■»
ing a large white towel, asking, in the names of Generals Lee and
Longstreet, a suspension of hostilities.
Colonel Whittaker, of General Custer's staff, was, thereupon,
sent with Captain Simms to General Longstreet, to reply that
General Custer was not in chief command, and he could not,
therefore, avert his impending charge without the announcement
of unconditional surrender. General Longstreet hoped he would
do so, and replied that Grant and Lee were in " conference,"
which was not the fact. General Grant did not reach the field
until afternoon; for, under his own hand, we are informed that at
11.50, A. M., on that day, he was " about four miles west of Walker's
Church," which was nearly ten miles distant.
General Custer, however, stayed his column, aud quickly sent
to General Sheridan information of the state of affairs. The pre¬
caution was taken, also, to form the troops in a defensive attitude
with carbines at a " ready," to be prepared for any emergency.
Colonel Whittaker also Carried the same flag of truce to our in¬
fantry. Their advance was halted, and neutral ground was
marked out between the opposing forces, it being generally con¬
sidered that the surrender was virtual.
When Sheridan received Custer's message, he rode at once to
Appomattox Court House. On ap[)roaching this place, he was
fired into by some parties of the enemy, who, doubtless, miscon¬
ceived his staff and escort to be an advance detachment of the
cavalry whose charge had so recently been averted. It is
miraculous that among so large a group this fire was harmless,
while it is equally curious that men accustomed to distinguish one
part of an army from another should have mistaken a general
41
officer, accompanied by his staff, color bearer and a few orderlies,
riding in advance of well-defined bodies of troops, for a charging
squadron of cavalry. Sheridan was about to order his lines in¬
stantly forward again; but the mistake (?) was soon rectified.
Soon afterwards he met Generals Gordon, Wilcox, Longstreet
and others of the Rebel service, and, at their request, a suspension
of hostilities was agreed upon, pending negotiations for a sur¬
render then said to be progressing between Generals Grant and
Lee. It seems the latter had expected to meet General Grant
personally, at ten o'clock this morning, " on the Old Stage Road
to Richmond, between the picket lines of the two armies." In
the same note in which this was stated, and which was written
late on the day before (8th), General Lee had also said that, "to
be frank, he did not think the emergency had arisen to call for a
surrender." This would indicate that he thought there was yet a
possibility for the escape of his army, (¡y which opinion he cer¬
tainly could have not entertained, had he been acquainted with the
massed and speedy movements of Union troops marching to in¬
tercept and to occupy the only route, at that time, open for the
further march of the Rebel army.^^J Lee, therefore, desired to
meet General Grant only to learn whether he had any " proposals
that would tend to the restoration of peace ! " General Grant
had previously informed General Lee of the single condition
u))on which a surrender would be accepted, and, hence, in a note
written early on the morning of the 9th, he declined to meet
General Lee. So, when the latter rode out towards the rear of
his own army, the next morning, to see General Grant at ten
o'clock, as he had appointed, he, there, received this note of
Grant, last referred to.
It is worthy of remark, here, that no proposition had yet been
made by Lee for the surrenderof his army, and that, about the very
hour now spoken of, his subordinates, generals in front ofSheridan,
having been for several hours convinced of the impracticability of
escape, in their own name requested the susfensioîi of hostilities.
While Lee was going to the rear for the purpose of conferring with
General Grant on "terms of peace," his troops were making one
more final effort to escape. The news of this unsuccessful attempt
was fresh in the mind of Lee, when he learned, on the picket line,
that the Lieutenant-General had declined to meet him. It was
then, and not before, that Lee again requested an interview, with
direct reference to the surrender of his army. Therefore, be it
said that, next to Lieutenant-General Grant [Gen. A. A. Hum¬
phreys], to General Sheridan, more than to any other one man, is
the country indebted for the speedy and complete success of the
great " Eleven Days' Campaign."
42
The temporary truce being agreed upon, as soon as assurance
was given that a surrender was intended, and of which there could
be no doubt, General Forsyth, of Sheridan's staff, was sent by the
shortest route, directly through the enemy's camps, to inform
General Meade of the truce agreed upon in this part of the field.
The infantry and cavalry, under Generals Ord and Sheridan,
rested just where they had halted in their lines on the sloping
fields. Before them lay the little village, and about it a confused
mass of troops and wagons; our soldiers strained their eyes to
observe every feature of the scene.
They sought to observe it more accurately, and, while there
was naturally among them some vacant curiosity, there were more
speculative whispers, or else a proud triumphant silence. The
various commanding generals, being notified, repaired without
delay to the Court House, which remained between the lines of
the two armies. Here were soon assembled : General Ord (the
ranking officer of this, the left, wing of the army), commander of
the Army of the James; General Gibbon, commanding the
Twenty-fourth Corps, only two divisions of which were in this
campaign; Generals Foster,Turner and Birney, division command¬
ers ; General Griffin, commanding Fifth Army Corps ; Generals
[Crawford] Ayers, Bartlett, and other principal general officers from
the Fifth Corps; General Sheridan, commander of all the cavalry
and of such infantry corps as, from time to time, might be assigned
to him ; Generals Merritt, Crook and the other principal cavalry
generals whose names have been, heretofore, so frequently men¬
tioned—being, in fact, all the chief officers of the wing of the
army now under Ord and Sheridan; together with Generals Long-
street, Gordon, " Runy" Lee, Wilcox, and a number of other lead¬
ing generals of the enemy. These gentlemen exchanged such
simple courtesies as might be expected between officers of rank
who had fought in opposing armies through many campaigns, and
whose troops had, as a consequence, come to regard each other
with no little respect. Indeed, soldiers as well as officers strike a
bond of sympathy, as between brothers in a foreign land, when
unexpectedly acquaintances are formed between those who stood
face to face' in the same battle. It is true, too, that the veterans
of either army habitually entertain a higher regard for the soldiers
of the other than they do for those bombastic patriots whose love
for the cause, be it good or bad, has been expended in urging
others to the field of action. If we were to search the whole
country for the elements of the Northern and the Southern popu¬
lation best calculated to harmonize in the great work of "recon¬
struction," "rehabilitation," "regeneration," "restoration," or by
whatever title is indicated a general fixing up of our national af-
43
fairs, we should be most successful in bringing together the old
soldiers who fought under Lee, and the sturdy veterans of the
old Army of the Potomac.
About twelve o'clock, when the head of his column was not
more than three miles from Appomattox Court House, General
Meade received a note from General Lee, requesting, for the pre¬
sent a suspension of hostilities, and, about the same time. General
Sheridan's staff officer arrived with information of the state of
affairs on the other side of the enemy^ camp. General Meade
consented to a truce of two hours, and communicated this arrange¬
ment to General Grant. The combined Second-Third Corps had
the advance of this wing of the army, but had not been able to
begin thp day's march before eight o'clock, on account of un¬
avoidable delay in receiving and distributing the supplies just ar¬
rivée}, A march of about three hours was made before the final
halt, although many temporary interruptions were occasioned by
the passage across the advancing line of the communications
already spoken of.
There is one other feature of the military operations of the
day, already casually referred to, which deserves mention again,
as in all probability representing the very last contest between
any portions of these two great armies. It will be remembered
that, early in the day, shortly after the infantry arrived on the field,
Davies, who had been defending the left and rear of Sheridan's
or Ord's wing of the army, was ordered to engage all the Rebel
cavalry he could find and to whip them, and then to repair to
Appomattox Court House for further service. Apparently a good
force of the anemy's cavalry had succeeded in marching toward
Lynchburg around the flank of Sheridan's position, and these troops
it was designed to defeat cotemporaneously with the first flag of
truce to Custer; they were stationed across the Lynchburg pike
and Davies was disposing his troops to charge thein.
The country was quite broken and troublesome fences inter¬
vened. Before we were prepared to advance the Rebel cavalry
made an impetuous attempt to break through our lines ; but they
were beaten back by Davies' brigade. A second charge met with
the same success, while by this time General McKenzie and Colo¬
nel Young had arrived, each with a brigade from a different part
of the field, and were ready for the fresh and exciting task just
assigned them.
The soldiers had learned of the grand advance, and success
cotemporaneously progressing in that part of the field nearer
Appomattox Court House, and evinced a laudable desire of emu¬
lation. Skirmishing was brisk ; many of the fences had been
leveled. " To horse ! " sounded ; battalions and squadrons dis-
44
posed for a charge, according to the nature of the ground, and
all was ready for a fight. was to be successful ; everybody said so
and felt so ; and then there was to be a grand pursuit which might
take the pursuers half-way or even as fardas Lynchburg itself. It
was to be fuore, too, than a simple success. It was to destroy the
Rebel cavalry force in front, known to be a portion of Fitzhugh
Lee's Division. This was the work in hand.
It was just at this critical moment, when a short time longer
would have made it impossible, quickly, to stop the fight, that an
aide arrived from the Court House other [East] front, bringing the
startling but welcome intelligence that hostilities were suspended;
that Grant and Lee were holding negotiations for a surrender !
I said welcome intelligence. But there were some among
these troops who were anxious to witness a real enthusiastic suc¬
cess. It had been the good fortune of most of them to have had
experience of many battles, but to have participated in few or none
where the opposing forces were comparatively annihilated. JVoui
total destruction only was being anticipated.
But orders for the truce arrived and the charge was averted.
Not, however, until some time after the general cessation of hos¬
tilities along the main lines of the army. So that there could be
no doubt that the last hostile shots between the " Army of North¬
ern Virginia" and the Army of the Potomac were exchanged by
the cavalry of whom we now speak.
As to what particular regiment fired the last bullet, that is most
difficult to say.
CHAPTER III.
(original chapter xiii.)
The next morning Sheridan's Cavalry was early on the move,
and marched through thaibivouacs of the armyc« route again to
Petersburg. There was not a little disappointment in many
quarters that no opportunity was given the victorious soldiers to ob¬
serve more closely the men and ofßcers of Lee''s army. Thousands
expressed their dissatisfaction at the unprecedented liberality granted
to the Army of Northern Virginia, and at the manner in which it
was allowed to disperse. Our soldiers did not cherish any spirit of
revenge, nor any desire to see brave men humiliated, but there was a
most natural anxiety on their part to catch an interior view of the
remnants of the Rebel forces, or to witness a formal surrender of the
veteran host which they had so long confronted on the field of deadly
strife.,^
45
The two armies lay hidden from each other, and while some
of our men straggled within the enemy's lines for a coveted
glimpse of the combined strength of Lee's army, the weary and
destitute soldiers of the latter visited our camps and gratefully
shared our soldiers' rations. They woods were filled with those
who, not yet paroled, were availing themselves of the permission
"to go where they pleased."
There was, too, not a Utile chagrin in some quarters that
Pickett and other ofßcers of distinction who were deserting from
the United States service at the outbreak of the war, should be allowed
the same generous terms accorded to the others.But there was,
notwithstanding, a quiet acquiescence in the final settlement which
said, in the plainest terms; "Well, I guess. Grant is right after
all ! " [He was not.] The disposition to murmur soon died
away,and was speedily swallowed up in the joy of victory. [Am¬
erican patience 1]
The infantry corps remained near Appomattox Court House
a day or two for rest, but the cavalry, being in need of forage,
marched from the memorable field without an hour's delay. The
news of the surrender was received by the whole army with quiet
enthusiasm—if such a term be proper. An unfeigned pleasure
possessed every heart, but the victory [to the Army of the Potomac]
was without one-tenth part of that exaltation and sensation
with which it inspired the North. There was among the soldiers
an unexplainable feeling of wonder at what would come next. [J ust
my sensation at the time, inserted the copyist, a conscript who
served in the Shenandoah Valley and elsewhere]. There was
scarce a single instance of that wild fervor which assembled the
thrift and intelligence ot Wall Street around the steps of the
Custom House and gave the key to that grand chorus of voices
which, at midday, and at the busy exchange, swelled in unison
thousands of voices in praising " Cod from whom all blessings
flow." Not that any soldier failed to appreciate the gredt success,
but the habitual quiet acceptance of facts as they are, surrounded
every proud member of the victorious army with an halo of dig¬
nified reserve. As to the number of men actually surrendered,
accounts have much differed. It has been, however, authorita¬
tively stated recently, " from the rolls in possession of the govern¬
ment, General Lee's army, when it surrendered, contained 28,000
men [this is a very low estimate] and General Johnston's 37,000."
[Associated Press dispatch from Washington.] The number
actually paroled at Appomattox by General Sharpe, of General
Grant's staff, was a trifle over 26,000.
A low estimate of the strength of the Army of Northern Vir¬
ginia when the campaign opened [pursuit commenced], places it
46
" between 40,000 and 50,000 "—perhaps nearer the latter; that it
lost over 10,000 men in killed and wounded ; over 20,000 in pri¬
soners and deserters, including those taken in battle and those
picked up in the pursuit. The actual number of muskets surren¬
dered, however, was not over 8,000 or 10,000, although more
than twice that number of men were present. This, however, in¬
cluded teamsters, hospital and quartermaster's employees and
other non-combatants, while many of the soldiers had no arms.
At any rate the available fighting force at the time of the surren¬
der could not have exceeded 12,000 or 15,000 men. [Great error.]
The total amount of artillery captured during the battles and
pursuit amounted to about 17b guns. As to the number of wa¬
gons taken and destroyed, the only possible method of arriving
at any accurate calculation is to ascertain from General Lee, or
his responsible officer, the number which started with his army
from Richmond and Petersburg, and, deducting therefrom the 200
or 250 wagons surrendered, we have the immense number previ¬
ously destroyed or captured by our troops. The Rebel trains
during this movement were large and cumbersome, and the ani¬
mals were in bad condition and overworked. Had Lee chosen to
have abandoned all his trains., his chances of escape, m several
instances, would have been excellent. [Editor always said this, in
conversation, communication and print.]
In the agreement for surrender the officers gave their own
parole for the men within their command. The following form
of the personal jiarole of officers is taken from that given by
General Lee and a portion of his staff :
"We, the undersigned, prisoners of war belonging to the Army
of Northern Virginia, having been this day surrendered by Gene¬
ral R. E. Lee, commanding said army, to Lieutenant-General
Grant, commanding the Armies of the United States, do hereby
give our solemn parole of honor that we will not hereafter serve
in the armies of the Confederate States, or in any military capacity
whatever, against the United States of America, or render aid to
the enemies of the latter, until properly exchanged in such man¬
ner as shall be mutually approved by the respective authorities.
R. E. Lee, General.
W. H. Taylor, Lieut.-Col. and A. A. G.
Chas. S. Venable, Lieut.-Col. and A. A. G.
Chasí Marshall, Lieut.-Col. and A. A. G.
H. E. Praton, Lieut.-Col. and Ins.-Gen.
Giles Booke, Major and A. A. Surgeon-Gen.
H. S. Young, A. A. G.
" Done at Appomattox Court House, Va., this ninth (9th) day
of April, 1865. "
47,
The above parole is the same given by all officers, and is
countersigned as follows :
"The above-named officers will not be disturbed by United
States authorities as long as they observe their j)arole, and the
laws in force where they may reside.
George H. Sharpe, Gen. Asst. Provost-Marshal."
The obligation of officers for the subdivisions under their com¬
mand is in form as follows :
" I, the undersigned, commanding officer of , do, for
the within-named prisoners of war, belonging to the Army of
Northern Virginia, who have been this day surrendered by Gene¬
ral Rdbert E. Lee, Confederate States Army, commanding said
army, to Lieutenant-General Grant, commanding Armies of the
United States, hereby give my solemn parole of honor that the
within-named shall not hereafter serve in the armies of the Con¬
federate States, or in military, or any capacity whatever, against
the United States of America, or render aid to the enemies of the
latter, until properly exchanged in such manner as shall be mu¬
tually approved by the respective authorities.
" Done at Appomattox Court House, Virginia, this 9th day of
April, 1865."
" The within-named will not be disturbed by the United States
authorities so long as they observe their parole and the laws in
force where they may reside."
On the tenth of April Lee published his farewell to his army.
General Lee's Farewell to his Army.
Headquarters Army Northern Virginia.
April 10, 1865.
General Order No. 9.—After four years of arduous ser-
vipe, marked by unsurpassed courage and fortitude, the Army of
Northern Virginia has been compelled to yield to overwhelming
numbers and resources. 1 need not tell the survivors of so many
hard-fought battles, who have remained steadfast to the last, that
I have consented to this result from ño distrust of them, but
holding that valor and devotion could accomplish nothing that
could compensate for the loss that would attend the continuation
of the contest, I have determined to avoid the useless sacrifice of
those whose past vigor has endeared them to their countrymen.
By the terms of agreement officers and men can return to
48
their homes and remain there until exchanged. You will take
with you the satisfaction that proceeds from the consequences of
duty faithfully performed, and I earnestly pray that a merciful
God will extend you his blessing and protection. With an in¬
creasing admiration of your constancy and devotion to your
country, and a grateful remembrance of your kind and generous
consideration of myself, I bid you an affectionate farewell.
(Signed,) . R. E. Lee, General.
* * * #
To Brevet Major-General Merritt was assigned the duty of [la-
roling the Rebel cavalry, and, after completing this work, rejoined
his command at Nottoway [Court House] on the 15th April,
1865. On the road thither he met Gen. W. H. F. Lee and stafi",
coming in to surrender, their men having almost entirely deserted
them.
A correspondent of the daily press shrewdly remarked, con¬
cerning the general surrender: "The Rebel army laid down
their arms by brigades, but au officer remarked thai a large number
of men appeared without arms of any kind. # # # *
It was noticed also that all the good horses m Led s army were pri¬
vate property. General Gordon's private baggage is said to have
filled four or five army wagons which were furnished to take it
away. (Which fact, the author [H. E. T.] thinks, is quite doubtful.)
In a volume entitled "The Fourth Year of the War," written
in the interest of the South by Pollard, and whose author is not
famous for reliability. Lee's surrender is thus spoken of:
" There can be no doubt in history that Gen. Lee, in taking
his army away from Richmond and Petersburg, had decided, in his
own mind, upon the hopelessness of the war, and had predetermined
its surrender. The most striking proof of this is, that on his re¬
treat there was no order published against straggling—a thing
unprecedented in all deliberate and strategic retreats—and no¬
thing whatever done to anaintain discipline. The men were not
animated by the style of^general orders usual on such occasions.
They straggled and deserted almost at will. An idea ran through
the Virginia troops that, with the abandonment of Richmond,
the war was hopeless, and that they would be justified in refusing
to fight outside the limits of their State. Nothing was done to
check the notorious circulation of this notion in the army. The
Virginia troops scattered off to their homes at almost every mile
of the route. We have seen that Pickett was left with only a
handful of men. [Note.—Sheridan can also tell why " Pickett
was left with only a handful of men." H. E. T.] Some of the
brigade commanders had not hesitated to advise their men that
49
the war was virtually over, and that they had better go home and
' make crops.'
" But there are other proofs, besides the omission of the mea¬
sures against straggling usual on retreats, that General Lee had
prevised a surrender of his army. He carried off from Peters¬
burg and Richmond all the transportation of his army, sufficient,
perhaps, for one hundred thousand men—certainly largely in ex¬
cess of the actual needs of the retreat. The excessive number
of Virginia troops who were permitted to drop out of the ranks
and return to their homes shows very well that there was no firm
purpose to carry the war out of the limits of that State. Prison¬
ers taken on the retreat invariably reported that the army was
soon to be halted for a surrender; and General Custis Lee, when
captured by the enemy, is alleged to have made the same revela¬
tion ofchis father's designs."
The return march of Sheridan's cavalry was continued, with¬
out any special interest, towards Burkesville, and, except at nights,
no halts were made until the column arrived at Nottoway Court
House, a little station on the Southside railroad and the county-
seat, as its name implies. Here the command expected to re¬
cuperate.
General Grant had hastened to Petersburg and thence to
Washington, for conference as to the future. While North, he
took occasion to make a flying visit to his family and thus nar¬
rowly escaped the blow of the assassin prepared for him. Not
so with the lamented Lincoln. The crowning martyr to a glori¬
ous, but tedious though successful war, he had shared its trials and
hardships, had watched its struggles with paternal care, had
guided its issues. The vicissitudes of the contest had educed his
wisdom and the bloody scenes of this national drama were closed
with the vile and mournful tragedy of his death.
It had been a warm spring day. The camps were basking in
the sun. The soldiers lolled carelessly about, or built little fires
and washed their clothes along the banks of the Nottoway. In
the absence of the blacksmith they tinkered at a loose horseshoe
or burnished a cherished carbine, polished an honored sabre,
wiped Virginia mud from equipments, patched a dilapidated
bridle, or straggled out of camp in search of chickens, horses and
other good things, or amused themselves with divers employ¬
ments congenial to the modern disciples of Mars. More than an
ordinary halt in the march, it was one of those well-defined pe¬
riods in a campaign whence each one dates a fresh experience, a
" landmark" of time about which to group facts of history. It
was really the first cabn after the stortn, the first resting spell which
the cavalry had enjoyed since leaving Petersburg to begin the
50
grand advance of this spring campaign, and a convenient oppor¬
tunity to review the eventful doings of the past ten days. Sol¬
diers only can appreciate these periods.
Martial music appropriately toned the evening scenes and the
bands had concluded their indifferent attempts. There was no
moon, the stars were shining brightly. A cheerful rail fire broke the
night chill and crackled merrily on the neat grass plot of an old
door yard, fitfully lighting into view the background of white folds
of open and inviting tents. A group of officers lazily reclined
in Turkish postures on blankets and overcoats, smoking, recount¬
ing experiences and chatting over the scenes of the past two
weeks as only such groups can talk. The virtues of the slain
were feelingly narrated, the successes of the living freely dis¬
cussed. There was a sense of relief, freedom from care, an
appreciation of the absence of all possible alarm, a quiet content¬
ment that nothing was likely to disturb, and a general relish of
security and peace. Not only was the campaign ended, but the
conclusion of the war seemed now inevitable. The serenity and
quiet of the evening was only broken by the soft notes of the
bugles as the night breeze wafted their musical " tattoo." Com¬
fort and contentment were reigning supreme.
The spurs and sabre of an officer on duty suddenly rattled by
the group.
" What's your hurry ? " says one, making room for another in
the little circle.
" Bad news to-night, boys," briefly answers the aide, as he
hurries by towards the general's quarters.
" What is it ? What is it ? " is eagerly asked, and the whis¬
pering reply is caught ;
" The President is assassinated ! "
Who believed it ? Each man sought an explanation in the
amazed and saddened countenance of his neighbor. Who dared
repeat the message ? Did you understand him correctly ? There
must be some mistake. Silent and contemplative faces waited
around that camp-fire. Presently the aide reappeared. He ex¬
plained, reading a brief dispatch from the War Department (from
Major Eckhart) to General Meade, who in turn had sent it from
Burkesville to General Sheridan. It announced that President
Lincoln had been assassinated at Ford's Theatre; he
was insetisible and wotild not likely recover. Verily was a pall
cast over the nation, as, on the next morning (April i6th) after
this tragic deed, men of one accord closed their places of busi¬
ness, and, instead of celebrating the nuptials of a re-united people,
felt that the country was turned into an house of mourning. But
51
the silent anger and grievous sadness in the army ! Who will
depict it ? Every soldier felt the loss of a personal friend !
Revenge and retribution found no little favor among many
natures; sadness was in all. " 'Twas well" said one, " ihatthis
did not happen before the surrender of General Lee ! " and the sig¬
nificant sentiment met with a deep response. The soldiers
gathered in groups, discussing the subject in a subdued and reve¬
rential manner. Strong and hardy men, commanders, too, of
others, bent in tears among their comrades. Who shall tell the
stories of the next day as the sad news floated through the
camps? The army wept!
[" There was one man in the Army of the Potomac who saw
all this clearly, and spoke out in trumpet tones—Major-General
Horatio G. Wright. He has not been mentioned in the course of
the Third Corps biography more than was indispensably necessary,
because the writer was desirous of avoiding any side issues, but
by no means because the noble commander of the Sixth Corps
was not fully appreciated. Were it necessary to cite proofs of
the nobility of soul possessed by the " Burster into Petersburg,"
one would be almost sufficient to demonstrate the man, viz., his
dispatch to Maj.-Gen. A. S. Webb,.Chief of Staff, Army of the
Potomac, of the 15th April, 1865, in connection with the death
of Lincoln :
" Headquarters Sixth Army Corps.
April isth, 1865.
Major-General Webb, Chief of Staff;
With deepest so row the dispatch, announcing the assassin¬
ation of the President of the United States and the Secretary
and Assistant-Secretary of State, is received, and I advise that
every officer of the Rebel army within control of the Army of
the Potomac be at once closely confined, with a view to retalia¬
tion upon their persons for so horrible an outrage.
H. G. Wright, Major-General."]
The march of the cavalry towards Petersburg was resumed
and continued, without further incident, under General Crook,
General Sheridan having preceded the command for better com¬
munication with General Halleck at Richmond and General
Grant at Washington.
A corps having been left at Appomattox Court House, to at¬
tend to the details of matters connected with the paroling and
disbanding of Lee's army, the Army of the Potomac withdrew to
Burkesville Junction and the Ninth Corps was distributed along
the Southside railroad. Sheridan camped his cavalry corps at
Petersburg. All eyes were now turned towards North Carolina
and Johnston's army. The fate of the latter was certain, yet.
52
without an immediate surrender, an active campaign in North
Carolina was inevitable.
General Grant had sped to Washington immediately after
Lee's surrender, and the first orders from the government were is¬
sued looking towards a retrenchment of necessary military expen¬
ditures. The victories around Petersburg ; its fall ; the capture
of Richmond; the successful battles in the hasty pursuit; the
final surrender of the Rebel Army of Northern Virginia ; the
assassination of the President ; and the simultaneous attacks
on the lives of the nation's leaders ; had thrilled the country with
the intensest excitement. The public mind was prepared for any
news and yet could scarcely comprehend the passing events of
day to day.
But the skill and wisdom of the head of the Union armies did
not stand startled and quiescent at success. Each moment was
appreciated and every opportunity grasped. Johnston's Rebel
army had acknowledged itself to be at bay before those marching
hosts of Sherman, and the wily Rebel leaders sought to take ad¬
vantage, themselves, of the discomfiture of their brethren else¬
where to gain wide and retrieving terms in support of their falling
fortunes. Sherman's "arrangement," which it is not proposed to
discuss, was quickly vetoed in Washington and the Lieutenant-
General himself became the messenger of a new programme. He
started at once for Sherman's headquarters in North Carolina,
having first, however, taken such preparatory measures as would
be rendered necessary in case Johnston should decline the " uncon¬
ditional surrender" which was now to be demanded and enforced.
As far as Sheridan and the Army of the Potomac were con¬
cerned, these wise precautions comprised orders to the former to
be prepared to move his whole force, with such a number of rations
and light supplies as indicated a long campaign without an im¬
mediate base, and to the latter for the detachment of the Sixth
Army Corps, under Gqperal Wright, which was to be ready to
'march under similar conditions.
Nothing more favorable being heard from Johnston, these two
columns were put in motion, both under the command of General
Sheridan, the Sixth Corps moving from Burkesville on Sunday the
24th and the cavalry from Petersburg on Monday, 25th April. The
infantry column marched directly south along the Richmond and
Danville Railroad, towards Danville, while the cavalry left Peters¬
burg by the now famous Boydton plankroad. It was expected,
therefore, that after three or four days the two columns would unite
near the southern boundary of Virginia and march thence into
North Carolina, to operate as circumstances might require. The
march of the cavalry was without special interest, the country
53
traveled over being well worn out with war and possessing natur¬
ally but few attractions. The spring weather was becoming
warm and the roads dry and dusty. The Boydton plankroad
bore painful evidences of having once been a " plank " road and
its dilapidated condition added seriously to the difficulties of the'
march. Troublesome creeks and rivers, where bridges had been
destroyed, were to be crossed and occasioned no little delay.
Rebel officers and soldiers of Lee's army now and then were met,
many of whom were not yet paroled, strolled to the column for
protection, a parole, or out of idle curiosity.
At the crossing of Stony Creek, the ford was found to be im¬
practicable, but the abutments and piers of the bridge appeared
in good order ; all else was destroyed. With tools and a few
skilled workmen the bridge might, in ordinary times, have been
repaired in a day or two. Now a few beams floated about in the
stream as the only material, axes the only implements and soldiers
the only workmen on hand. The bridge must be rebuilt. A regi¬
ment of troopers dismounted and their officers set to work in
right earnest. It was in the middle of the day and every hour
delayed the march. Sheridan, Crook, Davies, and other generals
who happened to be near the head of the column, watched and
nursed the work, so that m less than three hours a complete bridge,
flfteen feet high and thirty to forty feet long, was ready for the
passage of cavalry, artillery and trains. J^'dThis activity is no¬
table and contrasts with the inactivity at Farmville, yth April.
Meanwhile two Rebel officers rode up and watched the scene.
After a short time said one to a soldier near him, "No wonder you
Yankees always get along so fast. Our men would never have
gone to work to rebuild this bridge in that way."
"What would you have done ? "
" We would have waited for the ' construction corps ' and the
niggers to come up, or else dashed in and forded the river anyhow."
" Suppose you had artillery ? "
ly" Oh, we would have emptied the caissons, carried the
ammunition across the foot-bridge and pushed ahead.it
To have adopted this course would have crossed a few men,
rendered the ford impracticable, separated the command and thus
delayed the march. This was the difference between Southern en¬
terprise and Yankee ingenuity. The latter would give the entire
column a short halt and an unimpeded passage of the river, the
former would have created accident and delay. The compliment,
however, to Sheridan's soldiers, was gracefully paid by one of
the foemen who had fought them, and as kindly received as it was
intended.
The general impression of the people along the route of march
54
was that Johnston's army had already surrendered. They had
heard of the first truce which was agreed upon between Sherman
and his opponent and taken it for granted that the latter's terms
would be acceded to, or that the armistice must end in a sur¬
render. They believed that the present march of Sheridan
through the country was entirely uncalled for. They were unable
to appreciate the policy of subjecting their beautiful country of
Southern Virginia, hitherto scarcely visited by troops from either
army, to the devastation and scourge of war.
The chief feature of this peaceful march of Sheridan was
the new experience of traveling through the enemy's country
without the ordinary precautions of war. Four years of life a
la gui vive, which is, or should be the normal condition of a sol¬
dier, gave to a journey, without it, a joyous and reckless character.
The weather was pleasant, the beauties of spring just budding
and the country betokening comparatively few evidences of the
civil strife now happily drawing to a close. Brigades and divi¬
sions marched without advanced guards or the delays of recon-
noitering. Officers preceded the columns daily for miles, to select
appropriate bivouacs, a convenient practice not heretofore within
the bounds of prudence. Regular and irregular foraging parties
scoured the country for miles on each flank of the column, and
woe to the innocent quadrupeds which fell in their path. [This
reads like Michelet's paragraph summing up the conquest of the
kingdom of Naples in 1495, " A captain without soldiers was sent
into Calabria to require the submission of the province," the most
savage of barbarous districts, the ancient Bruttii, so faithful or sub¬
missive to Hannibal, a country and people which, between the great
" Carthaginian " and earthquakes, have not recuperated in 2,000
years. " In every direction the French soldiers, armor laid aside,
in undress, their feet in slippers, went about with pieces of chalk,
marking their lodgings." The famous and infamous Borgia said,
that "the French expedition of (six-toed and six-fingered) Charles
VIII., (in this respect like the Philistine giant of the Hebrew
Chronicles, or the six-toed Henry the Pious ; or the two-thumbed
Princess Hedwig Sophia, of Sweden),—had conquered Italy, not
with steel, but with chalk;" and, Macaulay observes, "The only
exploit which they had found necessary, for the purpose of taking
military occupation of any place, had been to mark [with chalk]
the doors of the houses where they meant to quarter." To cite
another example, the " court chaplain, in speaking of this expe¬
dition " (the campaign of Gustavus Adolphus in Kurland, Semi-
gallia and East Prussia, in 1826), "said, 'The King took cities
with as much promptitude as he crossed the country on horse¬
back.'"—Stevens, 137-]
55
The region along the Dan and Staunton rivers always enjoyed
a favorable reputation for its stock, and knowing, as the soldiers
did, that few, if any, troops had ever visited it, every nerve was
strained to discover and seize its horses. Every negro was inter¬
rogated, every stable searched. The news of our approach
spread through the country as if by telegraph, and farmers rushed
their animals to the woods and swamps, endeavoring in every im¬
aginable way to secrete them from the search of the omnipresent
troopers. The " intelligent contraband," however, appeared in
his old character, as an unfailing well of information, and, either
from natural sympathy, or personal fear, in nine cases out of ten
revealed the concealments of the coveted animals. Many a val¬
uable steed was thus obtained. Indeed it was scarcely possible
that for ten and often for twenty-five miles off each flank of the
line of march, a single horse could escape capture, so thorough
was the search for a prize most highly esteemed among these
energetic troopers. It seemed hard, often, to take from his com¬
fortable stall the pet of the family, or to lead out a clean-limbed,
nimble little mare for the heavy packs and saddle of the cavalry¬
man. But was it inappropriate for the stern-eyed, haughty
and wilful stallion to be " drafted into the armie." Yet it was
harsh to leave the plow standing in the furrow, and who could
fail to be moved by the pitiful appeals of the poor people, begging
that their animals might be spared, lest the crop should fail and
children ask for bread in vain.
" Sheridan's scouts," on this expedition, were more ubiquitous
than ever. Being in appearance un distinguishable from the ex-Rebel
soldiers, who were by this time well dispersed through the country,
and being relieved of the natural caution exercised by campaigners
in the presence of the enemy, these enterprising individuals extended
their rides for many miles in every direction, meeting with numer¬
ous opportunities to expedite their journeys by the resident relays
awaiting them on every farm. Their incursions and excursions,
however, were not without profit in a strictly military, as well as
personal, point of view. They learned the character of the coun¬
try, its resources and the various roads, and, thus, each night as¬
sisted the commander to determine the most feasible line of
march for the day following. If a bridge had disappeared they
learned all about the fords or the probable length of time it would
take to rebuild an old or to construct a new one.
Their most remarkable success, however, about this time, was
the construction of a complete bridge over the Staunton river, near
its confluence with the Dan. The stream at this point is wide
and turbulent (?) and Sheridan's cavalry column was not provided
with a pontoon train [! ?]. Unless a crossing could be effected in this
56
locality, a detour of many miles, causing a delay of several days,
would be necessary in marching higher up the stream to a more
established crossing. The Sixth Corps had crossed the Staunton
river near the Richmond and Danville railroad ; but, if Sheridan
should now be obliged to cross at the same point, the cavalry
would be in the awkward position of two or three days' march
behind the infantry. This, on approaching an enemy, would be
almost inexcusable in any commander. Under these circum¬
stances it was not a little embarrassing to find that the excellent
road along which we were now marching led only to an ordinary
flat-boat ferry, over which to transport five thousand cavalry, with
its light trains and artillery, would occupy perhaps a week.
The scouts dispersed up and down the river banks for miles.
Clarksville, a little village to the south, was visited, and, on one
pretext or another and by the compulsory employment of any
negroes whose labor could be made available in one day, a large
number of flatboats were collected and "poled" to the ferry.
These boats were about twenty-five feet long and just wide
enough to admit a wagon. The river could not have been less
than two hundred feet broad and was quite deep. The current
was rapid and it seemed inevitable that the column must halt
and paddle itself across with great delay in small detachments.
It appeared impossible to bridge it. Yet, one by one the flat-
boats arrived from up and down the stream, and, as it happened, all
were of the same size. It was at once determined to fasten them
together as firmly as the odd ropes and chains collected would
permit. It was ascertained that there were just enough boats to
reach across the stream and with remarkable ingenuity they were
soon swinging into the current, a few of them anchored and, in
almost as short a time as it takes to lay a pontoon bridge of the
same length, a secure passage for the column was provided. It
could scarcely be supposed that this frail structure would have
supported the burden of a large cavalry force, yet, without
a moment's delay, the whole command crossed without a single
accident. The scouts, however, accustomed to move with the
advance, did not watch the result of their engineering skill with
the ardor of and, with the troops fairly across, left the
bridge to look after itself, so that, when the lumbering commissary
trains attempted to cross, they found themselves too late. The
bridge was just broken and the flatboats were floating carelessly
down the stream.
The impromptu construction of this bridge and the rapid
crossing over it of Sheridan's cavalry column is an episode worthy
of serious attention by the military student. Had it occurred
during more active operations, in the presence of an enemy, it
57
would have been recorded as one oí the most remarkable instances
of industry and enterprise in the history of war. [A similar
conception was that of Colonel Bailey, when he bridged (i8th
May, 1864) the Atchafalaya, at Simms' Port, over 1,800 feet
(about a third of a mile) across with steamboats, over which the
wagon train passed 19th May, p. m.] How will the work of ener¬
getic unprofessionals, so successfully and skilfully completed,
compare with the efforts of those military savants, which were
manifested earlier in the war in digging earth before an inferior
foe and in purposing that a victorious and pursuing army should
construct a line of defense as a protection from a retreating
enemy. [See Chapter, in/ra, on " Fording and Bridging."]
11 may not be generally known that, after the battle of Wil¬
liamsburg [5th May, 1862], on the Peninsula, in May, 1862, one
of General McClellan's representatives asked General Heintzel-
man (commanding the troops of Hooker and Kearny, by whom
the battle was won) if he did not think it would be advisable to
construct a military road across the Peninsula, to aid the com¬
munication between the wings of the army in the new Ihie of de¬
fence which was about to be assumed. At this moment the
fighting was over and the enemy under Magruder [Longstreet]
were in full retreat. General Heintzelman also received orders
the next morning not to advance his troops without further
authority. Kearny's division was at that moment pursuing the
rear-guard.
At the Staunton river, Sheridan had learned that Wright, with
the advance of the Sixth Corps, had entered Danville without
opposition. The cavalry therefore pushed on up the Dan river for
the first available crossing, with the intention of marching by the
shortest route for Greensboro, North Carolina, or if the enemy
was found to be too troublesome, to unite with the Sixth Corps
at some convenient point south of the Dan. The bridge over
the latter, at South Boston Station on the Danville Railroad, pre¬
sented the first opportunity, and on the afternoon of Friday, April
28th, Sheridan here encamped. Crook's command being crossed
to the south bank. Early in the afternoon, while the troops
were being assigned to their various bivouacs. General Sheridan
received a dispatch from General Flalleck at Richmond, inform¬
ing him of the final surrender of Johnston to Sherman upon the
same terms accorded by General Grant to General Lee at Appo¬
mattox Court House, and ordering General Sheridan with his
troops to return at once to Petersburg.
1'he necessity of obtaining forage and the eager horse hunts
had scattered small parties through the country in every direction.
Some even penetrated as far south as Roxbury and Yancey ville
58
and several visited Milton, North Carolina. Every flat-boat ferry
over the Dan was used by one or more of these venturesome for¬
agers, who met with not a few interesting adventures. They
became thoroughly acquainted with the spirit and temper of the
inhabitants, as well as with the resources of the country. The
news of the presence of these foragers in any particular locality
was quickly noised abroad, and, as Johnston's surrender was
in these parts believed to have taken place at the time of
the original truce between Sherman and himself, not a few of the
people openly disputed the right of roving troopers to inspect
their stables. This fact only increased their misfortunes and led
to a more vigilant and determined search. As parties from
Wheeler's Rebel cavalry were riding about North Carolina, pil¬
laging and helping themselves to stock in some localities, the citi¬
zens had improvised small bodies to protect themselves. It
therefore happened sometimes that our men narrowly escaped
eerious encounters and in a few instances single collisions ac¬
tually occurred, one of which was fatal. Some of these foragers
had extended their operations so far from the main body of the
corps that they did not succeed in rejoining Sheridan until after
he had reached the camp at Petersburg.
The return march was without noteworthy incident, unless the
parade of the cavalry corps through the city be recorded. Dusty
and triumphant, that series of reviews through Petersburg, Rich¬
mond and Washington, of Sheridan's, Sherman's and Meade's
grand armies commenced one pleasant afternoon in the streets of
the city around which for now nearly a year great hosts had
battled and where the skill, science, industry and magnitude of
war was without a parallel. The people naturally were worn out
with battle and manifested little or no interest in the affair, while
the irrepressible negro watched the passing array with unobtru¬
sive grinning satisfaction. The cavalry corps was encamped on
the north bank of the Appomattox.
The Army of the Potomac soon arrived in Richmond and
these war-worn veterans marched as victors through the city at
which they had toiled and fought for nearly four bloody years.
Generals Halleck and Meade reviewed them en passant. The
troops continued their course over the old battle-grounds of Vir¬
ginia, across war-worn fields, through destroyed villages, old
encampments half hidden in the underbrush, and passing unculti¬
vated wastes on which solitary chimneys stood as monuments of
a complete desolation. Did not the hand of Providence guide
those hosts on their homeward march along the former fields of
strife, to impress on each the image of " grim-visaged war " and
the " wrinkled front " of its declining days, that the veteran might
59
the more appreciate his home of happiness and prosperity, peace
and virtue.
Sherman's armies, after most expeditious marches, were soon
reviewed in Petersburg and followed on to Richmond. Sheridan
now turned over the command of his cavalry to Major-General
George Crook and himself repaired to Washington for consulta¬
tion with the Lieutenant-General.
Before the corps was placed en route for Washington, how¬
ever, General Gregg's brigade of Crook's Division was sent to
garrison Lynchburg and the surrounding country, and General
Smith's Brigade was assigned to the same duty at Petersburg.
Taking up, then, the line of march, the remainder of the corps
started north, passing General Sherman's armies in camp near
Manchester. Marching through Richmond without display it
continued towards Washington by a westerly route via Louisa
Court House and Warrenton Junction, crossing the Rapidan at
Raccoon Ford and the Rappahannock at Kelly's Ford. This
detour was rendered judicious in order to leave the more direct
roads unobstructed for the march of Sherman's infantry, artillery
and trains. By this route many scenes of former conflicts were
visited and reminiscences revived of Sheridan's first raid about
Richmond. This, it will be remembered,had occurred just a year
previous, during that memorable campaign of Grant from the
Rappahannock to the James. Ity ' Yellow Tavern " was passed,
scarcely a mile or two out of Richmond, where fell the famous
Rebel cavalryman, J. E. B. Stuart, and whence—as his followers
now acknowledge—nothing could have seriously prevented the
march of Sheridan's troopers through the streets of the Rebel capi-
tal.^^g^ The line of the Virginia Central railroad was observed
until the column approached another battlefield at Trevellian
Station. The railroad was lined with evidences of destruction
and decay; violence and want "of repairs, in some instances, had
rendered it scarcely passable. Temporary shanties or silent ruins
were often all that remained of the former depots.
Stevensburg was passed, with its existence known only by a
name on the map, one or two houses were standing and only an
experienced antiquarian could have discovered evidences of a •
village. The beautiful country between the Rapidan and the
north fork of the Rappahannock was rich with the verdure of in¬
nocent spring, but it afforded scarce an object of animate life.
Not even the "intelligent contraband " greeted the "true blues."
Of fences there were none. The fresh sunlight of heaven smiled
anew across the overgrown fields ; the old log huts of the army
camps were falling to decay, as if conscious of approaching peace;
the feathered songsters chirped merrily through the pleasant
60
woods ; the little streams rejoiced again in mountain purity ; " vain
man " seemed to have departed and his lands regenerated and re-
dedicated to freedom.
The valley of the Rapidan, the beautiful slopes of rolling
Culpepper charmed the eye; the desolate hearthstones chilled
the heart; the ruined homes awakened sympathy. Then a little
ways beyond the half-covered grave reopened that wound and an
ill-fated battle ground recalled the present triumph. From the
Rappahannock to Centreville, every inch of the ground might
tell a battle story. Who will attempt to conjecture the silent
emotions of these homeward bound veterans, as they marched
finally and peacefully across the historic fields of Virginia.
CHAPTER IV.
[original chapter xiv.]
By the middle of May [1865], two hundred thousand vete¬
rans had encamped about the [national] capital. South of the
Potomac the country was for miles a vast camp. It was but an
item of the host that you might view from any one of the forti¬
fied hills ; yet, glance in any direction, toward any point of the
compass, and in that line ot vision alone an army appeared,
stronger than that which was supported by [or at the disposal of]
the Continental Congress [during the Revolutionary War, or our
First Struggle for Independence]. The garrisons of the numer¬
ous forts straightened themselves up and looked with pride on the
less punctilious but honored campaigners about them.
It had been scarcely three years since the first grand army of
the republic [alluding to the Army of the Potomac in 1862] had
moved from the same g(ounds in search of an enemy who fled ere
its first advance. War-worn and weather-beaten, after perils and
adventures by land and by sea, after retreats and victories, battles
and sieges, the vicissitudes of burning summers or shivering win¬
ters, after pleasant marches, or experiences of snow, ice and mud,
these veterans now returned to end their military career where it
had voluntarily begun. The dome of the Capitol was visible
from every camp. The soldiers saw it and remembered that when
they started it was unfinished. Now it typified their success.
Freedom was triumphant! The nation was entire ! When the
fiat of emancipation was proclaimed the Queen of Freedom was
enthroned. It was only then that the Statue of Liberty sur¬
mounted and adorned the nation's capitol !
61
Preparations were now commenced for the Grand Review
with which it was proposed to honor the triumphant armies as
well as to give the country and the troops an opportunity to ap¬
preciate the military power which was about to be dissolved and
the strength and energy of which was soon to be absorbed in the
arts of peace.
Objections in some quarters had been hinted against any pa¬
geant or attempt at a holiday display so soon after the death of
him for whom the nation was mourning. But its propriety was
very generally conceded, and, in view of all the circumstances,
the close of so severe a struggle, the inauguration of a new Presi¬
dent, the assembling at the capitol of the grandest and one of
the largest armies the world ever saw, the discharge and dissolu¬
tion of tliese veterans so soon to occur, and the universal desire
of the people to give the soldiers who had won their victories
every official and substantial recognition of the value of their
services within the power of the United States to bestow, the
wise consideration prevailed, so that the motives for the proposed
review could not be misconceived, while its effect, both on the
troops themselves, on the officials at the head of the government,
on the people at large and on the powers and populations of
foreign nations, all justified its propriety and usefulness.
Soon after the arrival of the various armies about Washington
the city began to be rapidly filled up with strangers from all sec¬
tions of the country. When the time of the review was formally
announced, eyery train brought hosts of the relatives and friends
of the troops. By the tinie the actual display occurred, it was
estimated that there were more people in Washington than at any
inauguration within the memory of the oldest inhabitant. Hotels
reaped a harvest and in the usual Washington style. Men stood
behind each others' chairs at table and took their turn in attempt¬
ing to make a meal.
On the 18th of May the initiatory order for the review was
thus announced ;******
The troops which were here named to participate in review
comprised commands which had served in every insurrectionary
district and were representatives from every loyal state. There were
in Sherman's army men who had been with Grant at Shiloh ; who
had campaigned in Missouri and Arkansas ; who had fought at
the siege and in the battles about Vicksburg ; who had accom¬
panied Sherman in his famous unsuccessful raid from the Missis¬
sippi to Meridian ; who had been transferred from the Mississippi
to Tennessee ; who had participated in the glorious summer
campaign culminating at Atlanta; who had made the " March to
the Sea " and through the Carolinas, in those series of extensive
62
operations which ended at Chappel Hill in the surrender of John¬
ston's Rebel army ; who had thence walked across the broad and
beautiful state of Virginia to the fallen capital of the enemy ; who
had trodden the sacred grounds of the Potomac battlefields and
who had finished at the nation's capital a military career, perhaps
begun on the Ohio and including in its varied experience the
vallies of the principal rivers, from the Missouri to the Potomac.
Few soldiers, indeed, can boast of fortunes so diverse, yet there
were such veterans gaily cooking coffee around the bivouac fires,
the smoke of which girdled in close and small or farther and
farther and more expansive circles, the White House.
It was regretted on the part of many, who had some definite
notion of the nature of a military review, that there was not to
be a formation of all the troops, so that the grand whole of their
imposing lines might be enjoyed from some eligible locality by a
comprehensive view. But the number of troops would have made
a mass too unwieldy to manoeuvre on any locality adjacent to the
national capital. The topography of the country about Washing¬
ton is at best unfavorable, while the presence of the river between
the proposed scene of the review and the main camps of the
army presented another very serious difficulty. A marching re¬
view only was practicable, and this informal display would, per¬
haps, be the more appropriate in any case, in view of the
recent public bereavement. As soon as it was known, however,
that Pennsylvania Avenue was to become the ground to be
made classic by the tread of this veteran and triumphant host,
the whole country was alive for the sight. The fact was quite
forgotten that was to be simply a " march " of the troops through
the city and that one regiment and one brigade looked very like
another, and that each day would witness the same constant,
never-ending stream of bayonets and blue.
Workmen had already commenced to prepare stands for the
accommodation of the reyiewing officers and the military and civil
dignitaries who were expected to be present on the occasion. Im¬
mediately in front of the Wifiite House the main stand was erected
and directly opposite another stand for certain staff officers and
others who were fortunate enough to secure places thereon. Not
far distant were other smaller stands, erected by different officials
for the accommodation of disabled soldiers and their friends and
whoever else could get on them. Near Major-General Augur's
headquarters, at the corner of Pennsylvania Avenue and Six¬
teenth street, another stand was constructed by the military;
while near the Treasury building, at the head of the avenue on
Fifteenth street, and looking straight down this spacious thorough-
are to the Capitol, some enterprising individuals had built a stand
63
on their own account and for a consideration of one, two or three
dollars, in greenbacks, be the same more or less, an eligible posi¬
tion was to be obtained, whence, at a glance, a mile of solid,
moving, glistening bayonets came before the spectator. As he
looked thence, down towards the Capitol, and saw, for eight
hours each day, this close column of marching soldiers, their tat¬
tered banners waving joyously, their steel shining in the sun,
heard the inspiriting music to which they walked in cadence, saw
the prancing war-steeds who seemed to know the day, and
watched the bronzed and happy countenances of officers and
men, or caught the firm lines in the face of a famous commander,
an unexplainable thrill crept over the beholder; delight amaze¬
ment, chagrin and triumph in turn possessed him. Could it be
possible that the great war was over and so many soldiers left ?
Couldiit be possible that so many soldiers had fought and the war
not ceased before ? Could it be possible that this was only a
portion of that grand army which for four long years had waged
so many bloody conflicts with another army not much smaller in
size and equal in determination and valor? Now it was possible
to begin to appreciate the magnitude of the recent contest and to
rejoice that peace was at hand.
But this is diverging. To return to the official history of this
event. General Grant's order was succeeded by two other
orders, respectively issued by the officers who had been tem¬
porarily assigned to the command of the troops on each day of
the review, viz. ; General Meade on the first day and General
Sherman on the second ;*****
The camp of the cavalry corps was about halfway way between
Alexandria and Washington, while the camps of all the other
armies stretched along the hills, up and down the Potomac. With
only two bridges across the river it would be impossible on the
day of the review to pass troops over fast enough to keep a large
body moving in close column. It became necessary, therefore,
that some should cross before, and another camp was selected for
the cavalry corps in the vicinity of Bladensburg, Maryland, whither
they were ordered to move on Sunday morning.
General Sheridan had not yet rejoined the command since
leaving it at Petersburg, but, being at Willard's Hotel, the cavalry
corps continued to move under his directions. His subordinate
generals, however, found it convenient in making this change of
location to pass directly by the quarters of their favorite com¬
mander, who, it was now generally known, was about to depart for
new and distant scenes of service. Sunday morning [21st May],
unfortunately, was stormy, and the column moved in the mud and
dirt usually accompanying such weather. Early and unheralded.
64
however, the clatter of squadrons, as they splashed slowly across
Pennsylvania Avenue, awakened the citizens and in a short time
Sheridan and staff appeared on the balcony to receive the infor¬
mal and impromptu compliment of a marching review.
The soldiers were without the trappings of a holiday parade
and were encumbered with the usual unmentionable paraphernalia
belonging to a moving cavalry column. The spirits of the men
were light and gay, but the weather was dull and heavy and these
famous troopers were reviewed by that portion of the population
enthusiastic enough to see the "pomp and panoply " of war as it
looked in the drenching rain. The column occupied a good part
of the morning in passing through the city, and wagons followed
during the whole day.
The affair created no little stir among the good people of
Washington and the more demonstrative evinced a practical pa¬
triotism in setting out in front of their houses all the bread and
biscuits that happened to have been cooked, while others heated
their ovens and according to their capacity and ability dispensed
the warm food from their thresholds to troopers who had already
had a comfortable soldiers' breakfast before breaking camp, but
who, true to martial instinct, never lost an opportunity to eat or
drink. It was a happy sight, however, and not without its
good effect on the mind and heart of every soldier, to see the
little ones run to~the edge of the sidewalk with a plate of hot
biscuit in one hand and a glass of water in the other and a pretty
speech, like " Mister, have a bite, sir," and without dismounting
one thankfully accepted the hospitality and wondered if this is but
the beginning of the cheerful reception which awaited the veterans
throughout the country [sadly forgotten in a short time in favor
of rum-sellers, political dead-beats and bums]. It was new and
unexpected and awakened a lively appreciation of the fact that
the troopers were no longer in an enemy's country.
One venerable patriarch, more patriotic than thoughtful, and
unmindful of the martial distinctions between a mounted squad¬
ron and an awkward four-mule team, enthusiastically received
the troops under the joyous folds of his household's " star-
spangled banner," and even after the column had passed, gaily
continued waving his flag at every individual, mule and wagon-
master in the baggage train.
The whole affair was simply an unavoidable march of the
corps through Washington City, but it was telegraphed [with the
usual accuracy of such reports] all over the land that Sheridan
had held a grand preliminary review of his cavalry.
Tuesday, May 23d, dawned bright and pleasant and none
who saw them can ever forget the scenes of that day at the capi-
65
tal. The walks were just drying in the morning sun after a most
delightful shower and the streets of the city presented every ap¬
pearance of a holiday. There was, however, a notable defi¬
ciency of that private enterprise which, had this grand review
taken place in any other city, would have exhibited itself in
numerous banners, arches and every possible civic adornment.
The preparations for the reception of the troops, however, seemed
to have been chiefly made by those expressly directed to do so by
the officials to whom the charge was confided. This was appropri¬
ate, but the fact involves comparison to the streets of New York
city on the occasion of some simple militia parade.
By eight o'clock the whole of Sheridan's cavalry were formed
in column on Capitol Hill, the head resting near the famous
" Old Capitol." Not far distant was the infantry of the Ninth
Corps, which, by the order of march, was immediately to follow
the ci^alry. The old Army of the Potomac, proper, which com¬
prised the chief part of the troops reviewed, were now marching
across Long Bridge and so forming as to be ready to assume
their appropriate place in the line. All the troops were to move
in heavy column.
Soon Major-General Meade, the commander of this day's re¬
view, appeared with his staff and escort. General Sheridan, the
day previous, had left for his new post in the Southwest and
General Crook, the next ranking officer, had been allowed a leave
of absence. Thus Major-General Merritt, whose acquaintance
the reader has already made, assumed command of the cavalry
corps for the review. General Custer and himself, heretofore
only brevet major-generals, had just received promotions to full
major-generalships.
Before nine o'clock the bugles sounded, and promptly at that
hour the commanding general appeared at the head of Pennsyl¬
vania Avenue.
As the head of the column passed the Capitol every niche
and window, every conceivable standing place on the porticos
and around the pillars, were crowded with "fair nymphs and well-
dressed youths." The children of the public schools had been
gathered there in holiday attire, and, rich with gay ribbons, fresh
toilets, appropriate mottoes inscribed on tasty banners, and with
flowery garlands, they had assembled to do honor to the soldiery.
What big heart, throbbing under bronze features, did not melt at
this unexpected homage, to sturdy veterans, from childish purity
and innocence. There seemed no limit to the fragrant luxury of
the spring wreaths and bouquets, of all shapes and sizes, rained on
the head of the column. The horsemen caught some as they
flew over their heads, others fell on the ground and were trampled
66
under the following squadron ; so that soon the very street over
which they rode was carpeted with flowers. Children's voices
broke in unison upon the cheerful morning air, as they sang with
glee the words of happiness and welcome.
The people elsewhere had scarcely believed that so immense
a military display could be entirely prom[)t to the hour appointed
and the streets were as yet comparatively quiet ; few persons had
assembled. Indeed it would seem that high officials agreed in
this opinion, for the President, Secretary of War and General Grant
did not reach the reviewing stand until after General Meade and
several other officers had passed. General Sherman accidentally
rode up the avenue about the same time, on his way to the re¬
viewing stand. His triumphal ride occurred twenty-four hours
later, when he rode up the same street at the head of those
armies who had campaigned from the Mississippi to the Potomac.
The cavalry, as well as the other troops, marched in close
column, and of the former not the least noticeable feature after
the many days heavy work they had so recently experienced, was
the excellent appearance and condition of the horses, than which
nothing, after a march, will more quickly indicate the efficiency
of cavalry.
Without intending to give a detailed account of this review,
the cavalry would never excuse my omission to mention that no¬
torious incident which bereft one of its favorite generals of the
dignified circumstance of martial array and carried him past the
reviewing officer, the President of the United States, his Cabinet,
the military, civil and diplomatic functionaries of this and many
other countries, not in the stately and sedate manner of a war¬
rior-chief on his prancing charger, but shooting like the wind.
On an Arabian race-horse, with dishevelled locks, uncovered
head, aye, lost helmet, dangling scabbard, no trusty blade at his
shoulder, but hands, arms and bare head working to check the
frantic steed, the pomp of generalship was completely enveloped
in the unexpected character of John Gilpin ! Was this a disap¬
pointment or was the Sensation agreeable ? Who among the
spectators or performers at this state occasion will forget " how
Custer's horse ran away with him ? " But there was nobody hurt
and the review continued.
The most correct schedule of this Grand Reception which
has yet been published, is to be found in the Army and Navy
Jourîial of 27 th May, 1865, and these cursory sketches cannot
better be closed than by acknowleding indebtedness to that num¬
ber—92 (Vol. II., No. 40), pages 628-29 ^3^—[where the
programme is to be found] which constitutes one of the most
comprehensive and interesting exhibits that has yet been published
67
regarding a martial occasion, which for the present—thank God
—practically ended the career of the American armies. [Re¬
member these pages were thrown together in the summer of
1665.]
A few days after the review, the cavalry removed its camp
again from Bladensburg to the Alexandria and Fairfax Court
House turnpike. As a corps it retained its nominal organization
for some time afterwards, but its regiments were consolidated or
mustered out of the service as fast as the orders and the neces¬
sary papers could be prepared. A brigade was placed eti route
to Missouri, where it was supposed it would soon follow Sheridan
to Texas; another was sent to Kentucky; another to West Vir¬
ginia. Several New York and Pennsylvania regiments were,
after some little difficulty, consolidated with others from the same
States, and some were likewise ordered home to be mustered out.
Oikthe fourth of July, 1865, only one small brigade was left
in camp to rejiresent the corps. Meanwhile General Crook had
been ordered North to await further orders; Generals Merritt and
Custer had left for the Southwest, under orders, immediately after
the review. In the course of the last month or six weeks of its
life, therefore, necessitated by the various changes, the cavalry
corps came under the command, successively, of Generals Crook,
Brevet Major-General Devins, Brigadier-General Wells, Brevet
Brigadier-Generals Thompson and Avery.
By the middle of July the last regiment was en route for home,
the last staff officer had been ordered away, and the books, pa¬
pers and headquarters establishment of the cavalry corps were
engulfed in the depths of the quartermaster's department. No
formal order of the Secretary of War had disbanded it, but Sheri¬
dan's cavalry was forever dispersed.
APPENDIX.
, Regarding the conference (informal) at Appomattox Court
House between a few of the prominent generals of each army,
of which mention is made in Chapter II. (original Chapter XII.),
there are to be inserted the following facts.
The conference at Appomattox Court House, about eleven
o'clock on the morning of the 9th, was merely to arrange the
suspension of hostilities, until Generals Grant and Lee could ad¬
just the terms of the surrender. Among the Union generals
68
present were Sheridan, Crook, Merritt, Ord, Griffin, Barlow, Gib¬
bon, Ayres and Forsythe, and among the Rebel generals were
Longstreet, Heth, Wilcox and Gordon; "Rooney" Lee was near
by, but did not join the circle. The tone of conversation at this
interview was very friendly and both sides appeared glad to see
each other [Rebels and Southerners were generally always amiable
and conciliatory when they had points to gain and Northerners to
take in. '^Ti/neo Dañaos" &c., &c., a trite proverb, always apposite
in every place, &c.] Many mutual inquiries were made after old
friends and acquaintances. Heth said that he would rather fight
the politicians who brought on these difficulties, than the soldiers
arrayed against them. Gordon said that for himself he had fought
conscientiously and had established somewhat of a reputation as a
fighting man, but had he known that his friends would have been
received so kindly and treated so magnanimously by their ene¬
mies, he would have long since laid down his arms. Wilcox,
alluding to an obsolete idea entertained by some of the Southern
people, facetiou.sly inquired how high the grass had grown in the
streets of New York?
Copy from a New York daily of Sept. loth or nth inst., 1862 :
(From Richmond Dispatch, Sept. 8th, 1862.)
The following named Yankee citizen and negro prisoners were
received at the C. S. prison, corner of Cary and Twentieth
streets, Saturday, Sept. 6th, from Gordonsville, via Central Rail¬
road, at nine o'clock, viz, :
(Here follow the names of fifty-eight officers, including H.
E. "Tremain, A. A. A. G., Sickles' Brigade.)
*******
Besides these there were about fifty-seven members of the ist,
2d and 3d Virginia regiments (Pierpoint's Sattelites) mostly with
very outlandish names for persons claiming.to be. Virginia Volun¬
teers. The following citizens were also in the group, having been
found in suspicious company, viz. : (7 names.)
Negroes.—Tann Genns, from New York, free boy; Geo.
Jordan, do., Pennsylvania; Tom Jackson, do.. New York, do;
Esau, slave of Wm. Bowen, who has taken the oath of allegiance to
Lincoln's government;'Chas. Montgomery, free, from Washing¬
ton; R. B.Wilson, free, Ohio; and John Williams, free, from
Alexandria, Va.
All the white men in the above lot who bore commissions are
considered as helongifig to Pope's army, and are therefore not pri¬
soners of war." Were hostages—to suffer death—by lot—
by hanging.
GEN. H. EDWIN TREMAIN.
Having devoted a number of years to the studies necessary
to complete a History of the Third Corps, Army of the Potomac,
it was but natural in the course of the work to prepare a series
of Biographical Sketches of officers who made themselves promi¬
nent in it. Among these was the present Brevet Brig.-Gen. Henry
Edwin Tremain.
It is wonderful how soon,"when red tape or routine are tem¬
porarily dethroned and a nation appeals to the patriotism of its
population, what numbers of admirable officers are furnished by
the learned professions. That doctors should make good soldiers
is not surprising, as carving and killing is their natural trade; but
why the study of the law should lend a peculiar dash to the wearer
of a uniform is enough to awaken reflection. During the Revolu¬
tionary war certainly the cavalry commander who acquired the
most world-wide notice was Tarleton, who, if he never practiced
law, certainly studied it, and passed from the quill to the sabre.
What is more curious, when it is necessary to embody volunteers
and the legal profession form an organization apart, they are
almost invariably known as the " Devil's Own." Why such things
should be has no solution, but many exemplars. One of them
constitutes the subject of the present sketch.
Henry Edwin Tremain, like so many of the distinguished men
of the Third Corps—like Kearny, like Sickles, like Graham, is a
New Yorker born, grew up in this city, and in i860 was graduated
at the College of the City of New York, aged twenty, and imme¬
diately entered upon the study of the law at Columbia College
Law School. April 17, 1861, he enlisted as a private in the New
York Seventh Regiment, and served in the ranks during its first
brief campaign. Soon after, in company with a younger brother
(Lieut. Walter R. Tremain, who died in the service), he recruited
a company ip the city of New York, and went to the front as First
Lieutenant in the Second Regiment Fire Zouaves (Seventy-third
N. Y. Volunteers), which was attached to the deservedly famous
Excelsior Brigade. He served until April, 1862, in the line, and
as adjutant of this regiment. At the siege of Yorktown he was
promoted to the staff of General Nelson Taylor, commanding the
Excelsior Brigade, in which capacity he served during the Penin-
70
sular Campaign under McClellan and the final operations of Pope,
his brigade being attached to Hooker's glorious second division,
the " White Diamonds," of Heintzelman's Corps. He partici¬
pated in the engagements at Williamsburg, Fair Oaks, Williams¬
burg Road, of June 25; Savage Station, Glendale and Malvern
Hill the operations of the Seven Days' Retreat, the battle of
Bristow Station and the Second Bull Run, under Pope.
At the Battle of Williamsburg he was one of the aids on the
staff of Gen. Nelson Taylor, commanding the brigade, and in his
official report of that engagement General Taylor takes occasion
to express his satisfaction with the able manner in which Lieu¬
tenant Tremain's duties were performed. General Sickles' official
report of the Battle of Fair Oaks thus speaks of him:
" My particular acknowledgements are due to Lieutenant H.
E. Tremain, A. D. C. and A. A. Gen., upon whom I relied for
nearly all the staff duty in the field through the day. His arduous
duties were performed wifh courage, zeal and ability."
The official report of the battle of Malvern Hill also says;
" Lieutenant Tremain, the only officer of my staff able to re¬
port for duty, was, as usual, distinguished for zeal and gallantry,
although suffering throughout the day with severe indisposition."
During the Second Battle of Manassas, participating in a
charge, he was taken prisoner and sent to Libby Prison at Rich¬
mond. On arriving in the Rebel capital the authorities announced
that Lieutenant Tremain and other officers should be held as
hostages to prevent the execution of Pope's obnoxious order in
regard to the destruction of Confederate property, and in case
the same was enforced these officers were to suffer death. [See
page 68, supra¡\
General Nelson Taylor, in his report of the participation of
his Brigade dn the Second Battle of Bull Run, makes this allusion
to Tremain : " His bravery and gallantry excited my admiration
and have my warmest thanks; he was taken prisoner while en¬
deavoring to check l;Jie panic and the rapid advance of the
enemy."
When the Army of Virginia had failed, through causes beyond
the control of its commander, officers belonging to the army corps
that had been serving in. McClellan's Peninsular army were re¬
leased on parole. Less than thirty days found Lieutenant Tre¬
main in Washington negotiating through the War Department for
a special exchange. This being accomplished, and his parole
canceled, he resumed the field on the §taff of General Hooker's
old division (Second Division of Third Army Corps), at this time
under the command of General Sickles. In 1862, Lieutenant
Tremain was promoted to be captain, and served on the staff of
71
General Sickles at the battle of Fredericksburg, and until the re¬
organization of the army.
Shortly after General Hooker assumed command of the Army
of the Potomac, Captain Tremain was, on 25th April, 1863, com¬
missioned as Major and Aide-de-Camp, U. S. Vols., for the staft
of the Third Army Corps. Here he served with great efficiency,
as shown by the army records and extracts from special reports.
For gallant services at the battle of Chancellorsville he was spe¬
cially recommended for a brevet, which he received in 1805.
General Tremain's connection with this battle of Chancellors¬
ville is worthy of special note. [See "Anchor's " (J. W. de P.)
publications and criticisms on " Chancellorsville."]
" Early on Sunday morning. Sickles' front, the apex or salient
of the Union line, was fiercely attacked by the Confederates, ac¬
cording to their wont, in successive lines. Furious as were the
onslaughts, they were met by resistance no less fiery in its de¬
termination. Indeed, the weight of the battle fell on this point,
and the resistance was worthy of the assault. On this day Sickles
was severely injured in repulsing, or checking, the enemy; and
Maine's grand volunteer representative. Berry—the noble Berry—
fell in a charge worthy of mention with any of the loudly trum¬
peted efforts of modern war.
"Again and again did Sickles send to Hooker, asking for re¬
inforcements. They did not come. Then, about 8 to 9 o'clock,
A. M., Major Tremain, senior aide to General Sickles, bore to
Hooker his last and most urgent appeal for support—a support
indispensible, since the last reserves at the disposition of Sickles
had been put into position. When Tremain reached the well-
riddled Chancellorsville House—afterwards destroyed and con¬
verted into a pile of ruins—Hooker, who saw him coming, and
was eager to receive his report—one of many of similar import
brought in that day—bent over the rail in his anxiety to hear it,
when a heavy missile—a twelve-pounder solid shot, it is said—
struck the column against which Hooker had been leaning, tore
it from its base, dashed it against his body and head, and struck
him down apparently lifeless. Well might Tremain, in narrating
this catastrophe, dilate with horror upon his feelings at that
moment. It would have been terrible enough at any time to see
his commander-in-chief thus smitten down before his eyes and at
his feet; but, at that supreme moment, the awful consequences of
this disabling of the directing mind and central source of power
was a still heavier shock to the comprehensive mind of the able
and experienced aide-de-camp. He says the result (that result
the compulsory abandonment of another key-point—a dreadful
necessity when, west and east, to right and left, disaster and de¬
lay had already lost so much), was the crisis."
72
After nus campaign, while visiting New York, hearing of Lee's
second invasion of Maryland, Tremain' telegraphed to General
Hooker, volunteering his services in any capacity until his own
general (Sickles) should return to the field. General Hooker
promptly thanked him and requested him to join his headquarters
at once. Tremain thereafter served on the staff of the command¬
ing general until Hooker was relieved by Meade. General
Hooker thus wrote to Governor Fenton of Major Tremain's ser¬
vices:
" He served in my command during the whole time that I
was connected with the Army of the Potomac in a capacity which
brought him within my immediate notice. I have always regarded
him as an officer of uncommon promise ; he is capable, energetic
and devoted in the discharge of his duties, brave in battle and of
unexceptionable moral character."
When General Hooker's command of the anriy ceased. Major
Tremain resumed duty at the headquarters of the Third Corps,
and, as the chief staff officer of that organization, played an im¬
portant part in the battle of Gettysburg. In 1864, Major Tre¬
main was sent with General Sickles, by order of President Lin¬
coln, on special service to the West, and he visited every army in
the field. While with Sherman's army at Chattanooga, he volun¬
teered to act on the staff of Maj.-Gen. Butterfield, in response to
a request to this effect, and served in this capacity in the
Twentieth Army Corps during the operations before Dalton, and
in the engagements at Buzzard's Roost and Resaca; and at the
latter battle General Paul A. Oliver and he were the two staff of¬
ficers selected to accompany and direct the storming column. On
the occasion of Major Tremain's departure from the Twentieth
Corps, under orders. General Butterfield wroté :
"As you are about to leave us, with a feeling of sincere regret
at losing your valuable services, it is a great pleasure to thank you
for them. Your devotion and energy in camp and on the march,
your gallantry at our afesault of the enemy's works at Resaca, and
your genial qualities have endeared yqu to us all. Our best wishes
go with you. I speak not only'for myself, but for all the staff.
* * * I shall always be grateful for your generous services
at so opportune a moment." # » »
Upon his return East, Major Tremain was ordered to remain
with General Sickles, who was at home in New York awaiting
orders. But, after the election in 1864, Tremain was unwilling to
retain his commission unless his services were desired in some
more active field. Upon communicating this determination to the
War Department, Secretary Stanton promptly ordered Major
Tremain to report to General Meade for assignment in the Army
of the Potomac.
73
Hastening to comply, he was soon, at his own request, as¬
signed to the cavalry corps. Here he served in the operations
about Petersburg, on the staff of General D. McGregor Gregg,
and his successor. General Crook, and participated in the battles
of Hatcher's Run, Dinwiddle Court House, Five Forks, Amelia
Court House, Sailor's Creek, Farmville and Appomattox Court
House.
At the termination of this campaign. Major Tremain, on re¬
commendation of General Sheridan, was breveted lieutenant-
colonel, " for gallant and meritorious services." Shortly afterward
he was breveted colonel. He also served a short time on the
staff of General Mott, commanding Second Division [combined]
Second [Third] Corps, in front of Petersburg.
By reason of his services, from time to time, at so many and
varieus headquarters, he was probably more generally personally
known in the Army of the Potomac than any other ofhcer of his
rank in that army. In 1865, as the armies dispersed. Col. Tremain
was ordered on reconstruction duty at Wilmington, N. C., on the
staff of General Crook; but, in November, 1865, he asked to be
mustered out of service, and returned to his home. While awaiting
his discharge, he resumed his legal studies at Columbia College
Law School. Instead of his muster-out, as desired and expected, he
was ordered to duty at headquarters. Department of South Caro¬
lina, and was also breveted brigadier-general. He continued on
duty in South Carolina until April, 1866, when, after completing
five years of continuous military service, he resigned his commis¬
sion and returned to New York city, where he opened, a law of¬
fice and commenced his civil professional work.
With the military services of the present presiding officer of
the "Third Army Corps Union" (1880) this biographical sketch ap¬
propriately terminates. Still, in civil life, it is pleasant to be enabled
to have recourse to the synopsis of a career which demonstrates
that the young lawyer who achieved so much when transmuted
into a soldier, did not fall below the high mark which he set for
himself when he resumed the practice of his original profession.
During a temporary absence« from the field, in 1864, he had
submitted himself to the usual examination of applicants, and had
been admitted to the bar. He was graduated at Columbia Col¬
lege Law School in 1867, having already acquired no little pro-
fe.ssional experience and a most promising business. His practice
and clientage speedily increasing, in 1869 he organized with
Colonel Mason W. Tyler (a young officer from Massachusetts,
and a graduate of Mr. Evarts' law office) the present well-known
firm of Tremain & Tyler. In 1870, Mr. Tremain received the
nomination for Judge of the Court of Common Pleas, in the city
74
of New York. Although Tremain, received more votes than any
of his associates on the county ticket, he was defeated, his party
being in its usual hopeless minority on New York island. In 1870,
the United States Marshal employed Mr. Tremain as special
counsel to aid in the prosecution of cases for infringement of the
census law, and in enforcing the United States election laws, then
for the first time applied and tested.
Mr. Tremain has often been employed by the Government as
special counsel, both before and after his appointment as first As¬
sistant United States District-Attorney at New York. This posi¬
tion he occupied with signal, ability during the second term of
President Grant's administration, and until some months after
President Hayes' inauguration, when he resigned. Subsequently
the Treasury Department at Washington employed Mr. Tremain
to conduct the trial of some important revenue suits, in which he
was remarkably successful. For four years there was scarcely
a notable case tried to which the Government was a party
where Mr. Tremain was not of counsel. While in the United
States District Attorney's office, the cases he conducted were
generally of such prominence that he was obliged to encounter an
imposing array of skillful adversaries. The questions also were
such as required settlement by the United States Supreme Court,
before either party would give up the controversy. On questions
of law the result before appellate tribunals generally justified his
advice. Before juries Mr. Tremain was rarely unsuccessful. Dur¬
ing his experience at the bar he has probably conducted the trial
of more civil causes than any man who is not his senior in years
in the profession.
In 1871, Mr. Tremain was elected President of the Alumni of
the College of the City of New York, to which position he was
annually re-elected for five terms. He took an active interest in
all matters relating to public education, and was frequently called
upon to make public addresses in that connection. In 1869, he
was elected by the Columbia College Law School to deliver the
Annual Alumni Address at the Academy of Music, before the
graduating class, and his address, entitled " Lawyers and the Ad¬
ministration of Justice," was received with marked appreciation.
At the same place, he addressed the Literary Societies of the
New York College, in 1877, in favor of higher and more extended
means of public education. Among Mr. Tremain's many literary
efforts, his address, delivered by special invitation, on the occasion
of the Centennial at the "Gospel lent," in New York city, in
1876, has been given extensive circulation among the clergy of
the country, in a work entitled " Under Canvas." Mr. Tremain
had not unfrequently been a contributor to the press. Dining the
75
war he was often a correspondent of the New York Evening Post.
While stationed at Wilmington, in 1865, he wrote editorially for
the Wilmington Herald. He has also been employed editorially
in professional publications. In May, 1879, he was elected Pre¬
sident of the Third Army Corps Union.
If this record of a life still young is read carefully and calmly
reflected upon, it will demonstrate a length of service, and a strict¬
ness, a success, and an honorable discharge of duty in the most
opposite careers, to which it will not be easy to find a parallel.
Anchor (J. W. de P.)
Copyright, 1885, by J. Watts de Peyster.
Marches, Operations, Engagements and Positions of the combined Second-Third Corps,
Army of the Potomac, under Major-Gen. Andrew Atkinson Humphreys,
on the Bth and Tth April,, 18G5.
LA ROYALE!
[Fanfare, or Call on the Hunting Horn, sounded when the Hounds
arouse and attack a " Stag of Ten" Antlers.]
PART VIII.
''The ' toils were set,' and the ' Stag' of Ten ' was to die at bay."
• —(^'Pickett's Alen," /JÓ.)
[Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1872, by J, Watts de Pevster, in the
Office of the Librarian of Congress, Washington, D. C.]
REMARKS, INTRODUCTORY AND EXPLANATORY.
As soon as the " Great American Conflict " had terminated
and our " Boys in Blue " commenced returning home, the writer
lost no time in beginning to collect and jot down information in
regard to the terrible struggle of four years. In the seven years
ensuing, the mass of memoranda, manuscripts, &c.—such as let¬
ters, statements and rei)orts—gradually accumulated, until they
constituted a huge mass of crude facts for historical mastication
and digestion. In addition to this, shelf after shelf became
loaded with valuable publications, such as the " Rebellion
Record;" likewise with so-called Histories, Regimental Bio¬
graphies, Biographies proper, &c., some of which, in their hun¬
dreds of pages, have no other value than to establish or corro¬
borate a single fact.
All these, all this had to be melted in the crucible of critical
examination by the fire of patient labor, to draw off from the
black fusion and repulsive scoriae the bright and precious metal of
truth :—^Truth which is intended to constitute the biography of the
" Glorious Old Fighting Third Corps," which is, in fact, the his¬
tory of the Army of the Potomac, since some of tlie constituents
of the Third Corps participated in the first battle of Bull Run
and witnessed the surrender at Appomattox Court House—four
years of war such as the world had never yet witnessed ; crowned
with a triumph such as no such a period of conflict had ever yet
achieved ; rewarded with a victory greater and more decisive
than had ever yet been won by force of arms.
i.
ii.
As one of the noblest of living historians, Scherr, remarks :
"The youthful might of Trans-Atlantic Democracy had fought
out, in four years, a gigantic conflict for human development,
which servile Europe could not have accomplished in an hundred
years " by all the internal and external arguments of its states-
craftmen and standing armies, written with steel, in blood, upon
the ashes and ruins of civilization.
In order to reduce the accretion of manuscript and print into
manageable shape, the writer published a series of works and
pamphlets which enabled him to survey his route, construct his
road-bed and gather together materials for the superstructure.
His " Personal and Military History of Major-General Philip
Kearny ; " his " Decisive Conflicts ; " his " Third Corps at Get¬
tysburg;" his " Fredericksburgh," " Chancellorsville," and " Get¬
tysburg," in Captain Mayne Reid's magazine Onward, serve as
bridges across deep gulfs. Other minor articles in Onward, in
other magazines, in weeklies such as the Ledger, Volunteer, Era,
and in daily papers such as the Daily Times, the Evenitig Mail,
&c., were tramways for the transport of filling.
His uninterrupted series of articles—besides previous sporadic
biographical sketches, &c., in the Neiv York Citizen, commencing
2oth August, 1870, and running on continually for a period of
nineteen months, to the 23d March, 1872, constitute a temporary
roadway, whose sharp curves, in any event, must be shortened,
even if the majority is not wholly rebuilt.
This pamphlet, " La Royale," Part VIII., is the station house
and structures at the terminus, which will serve every purpose un¬
til the permanent track is relaid. It may take years to finish up
this work, but the passengers or readers can now make their four
years' journey, rough or smooth as it may prove, with a com¬
plete understanding what the ultimate result will be.
The publications which have already appeared have met with
the highest approbation of experts and competent judges. They
will carry all the weight that can be imposed upon them, for they
are laid on the rock of conscientious investigation, and have been
set up with painstaking labor, without a single bolt headed with
prejudice of nutted with personal bias. Where the timbers are
only scored or rough hewn, it is because the architect did not
deem it worth while to waste time in trimming them ; where they
are planed and ornamented, it was because it was due to the
beauty of their surroundings, their utility and the situation.
No traveller across the continent ever heard the whistle an¬
nouncing the end of the journey attained with greater gladness
than the author, in penning the closing tribute to Major-General
A. A. Humphreys, last commander of the glorious old Fighting
iii.
Third Corps, which never lost nor permitted any man or men to
deprive it of its identity when combined with the Second Corps.
To this great soldier, eminent engineer, admirable chief of
staff and unsurpassed general, in every command intrusted to
him, he was indebted for invaluable assistance, and who actually
corrected and annotated the original edition from which this was
printed; likewise, for many courtesies, to Major-General E. D.
Townsend, Adj.-Gen. U. S. A.; likewise to Major Generals Mott
and McAllister, U. S. V. ; and likewise to Brevet Colonel W. H.
Paine, " the Pathfinder " of the Army of the Potomac.
But to cite by name all who have lent him their aid would
require too much space. Nevertheless, perhaps he cannot con¬
clude better than by quoting the words of a letter from Brig.-Gen.
Joshua T. Owen. It was A¿s regiment, the 69th Pennsylvania
Volunteers, who held, and held triumphantly, the most dangerous
point of the Union line, on the third day of Gettysburg, in front
of the famous umbrella-shaped clump of trees on Cemetery
Ridge. General Owen's flattering communication is among the
precious rewards of the writer's trying and exhausting labors of
seven years.
New York, March 22, 1872.
My dear General :
I have read with much pleasure and derived much valuable
information therefrom, the articles on the " Third Corps at Get¬
tysburg," published in The Volunieer. I thank you for the loan
of the two numbers, which I herewith return you.
I 'oeg to express my sense of obligation as a volunteer soldier,
to you personally, for your efforts to rescue from unmerited ob¬
scurity the names of such officers belonging to the volunteer ser¬
vice, as were distinguished for capacity and gallantry.
Without any desire to detract from the merits of any officer
belonging to the regular army, or who had graduated at West
Point Academy, I am constrained to believe that the volunteer
officers were not treated with entire fairness or equal justice in
the General Reports of the operations of the Army.
I am, with great respect.
Your Ob't Servant,
(Signed,) Joshua T. Owen.
LA ROYALE!
The Last Twenty-Four Hours of the Army of Northern Virginia.
BAYING THE STAG OF TEN.
In my history of the Last Campaign, or Hunt of the Army
of the Potomac, the narrative of the events and details was
brought down (in " La Royale," Part VIL) to the afternoon ot
the 8th of April. The last article was set up for the Citizen of
30th March, 1872, but that weekly had already ceased to exist
with its last issue of March i6th.
Under these circumstances, a paragraph is necessary to de¬
monstrate the relative positions of the Union and Rebel forces on
the afternoon of that day. The Army of Northern Virginia, in
round numbers—including infantry, artillery and cavalry, also the
special services—about 30,000 strong, was falling back, retreat¬
ing, or^ying, as the phrase pleases best or is most suitable, on the
Richmond and Lynchburg Plank Road and Turnpike towards
Appomattox Court House. It reached this point between after
sundown of the 8th and some time before daybreak of the 9th,
Gordon leading with the Rebel Second Corps ; Longstreet with the
main body and the rear, comprising his own, the First and the
Third (A. P. Hill's) Corps. The latter, after Hill's death before
Petersburg, had no corps-commander, but was combined (?) with
Longstreet's.
Immediately on the heels of Field's Rebel Division, constitut¬
ing the rearguard, followed Humphreys with the combined
Second-Third Corps of the Army of the Potomac, clinging to it,
harassing it, skirmishing with it, deaf to all Lee's cajoleries to let
up the pressure.
A few miles behind, closing up to the preceding, came the
Sixth (Wright's) Corps.
Away to the southward, from ten or twelve or even more
miles distant, the Fifth (formerly Warren's) Corps, Army of the
Potomac, and the Twenty-fourth Corps, two divisions, and one
division of the Twenty-fifth Corps—these last two belonging to
the Army of the James—were marching westward in support of
V.
Sheridan, who, with the cavalry cut loose was spurring towards
the setting sun—at once the sinking orb of day, of the tempest-
period of internecine war and of the " Slaveholders' Rebellion"—
to head off Lee at Appomattox Court House. Between the Fifth,
the Twenty-fourth and Twenty-fifth Corps, and the Cavalry and the
combined Second-Third and the Sixth Corps, flowed the Appo¬
mattox and its numerous affluents, destitute of bridges.
Thus Humphreys, with the combined Second-Third Corps, at
this time about 12,000 effectives, was the Union general and
troops pegging at Lee and " slambanging " into the Army of
Northern Virginia, proper, as they alone had been—since Hum¬
phreys discovered the actual route of the Rebel retreat—on the
6th, 7th and 8th April.
Thus (8th April) the pursuit was kept up by the indefatigable
Hunjphreys. At 5 p. m., 8th April, according to his dispatch to
Webb, Chief of Staff, Army of the Potomac (U. B. 5,39, 23), he
had learned from the country people, and from prisoners picked
up, that the rear of the enemy's infantry was about four miles
ahead of him ; their cavalry less. At this hour—5 p. m.—Wright
informs Webb, that the head of his column—Sixth Corps—has
reached Curdsville, about eight miles N. N. W. of Farmville, on
the Plank Road. He was still seven miles from New Store
where he encamped that night, which point (New Store) Hum¬
phreys had attained—still pushing on, however—in the course of
the afternoon. At New Store the Rebel cavalry were again in
sight of the combined Second-Third Corps, which was, indeed,
" close upon them." At 6.30 p. m. Humphreys' First and Second
Divisions (old Second) were two miles beyond the hamlet styled
" New Store," which is twelve (fifteen?) miles, if not more,from
Cumberland Church—the scene of the Army of Northern Vir¬
ginia's last stricken field—by the route they had followed.
Humphreys' Third Division (old Third Corps) was about one-
third of a mile in rear of his other two. His men had marched
seventeen miles this day, but his advance had been retarded by
the failure of his trains to keep up with his troops.
Humphreys was ordered to '' push on to-night (8th, 5h. 4Sm.
p. m.) so as to be in the presence of the enemy," and be " up to him."
At 6.55 p. M. he was still "pushing on," .Although the men
were somewhat exhausted by the want of their rations, Hum¬
phreys " moved forward with the First and Second Divisions (old
Second) on the night of the 8ti) before their trains of rations got
up. The Third Division's (old Third) train got up on (the even¬
ing of the 8th, and Humphreys left it at the ground where
overtaken, to get its rations and follow on afterwards."
Humphreys' leading (First) division commander. Miles, had,
vi.
at this hour, just reported that the enemy were encamped on the
first high ground in front of him, and Humphreys, as usual, on
fire at the announcement, had ordered Miles to push forward his
skirmishers and feel them, to try and find out from prisoners what
force he actually had opposed to him. (Rossel, Renseignments,
^2, 119.)
At this point it is necessary to correct an erroneous statement
in a previous portion of Part VII. of this work, " La Royale."
The second communication from Lee to Grant (fourth sent and
received) was not received through Humphreys until he had
halted at dusk two miles west of (beyond) New Store.
At 8.35 p. m. General Meade, through Webb, ordered Hum¬
phreys to encamp. He " did not intend to require a night
march." Meade then adds the highest commendation from a
superior to an inferior : " You have done all, in getting up to the
enemy."
At 9 p. m. (D. B. 5, 46, 27) Meade follows up the foregoing
with the order :
" The Second [combined Second-Third] and Sixth Corps will
move at 5 a. m. to-morrow and the Second [combined Second-
Third] Corps will attack the enemy [now in its front] at once, the
Sixth Corps supporting."
The relative positions of the headquarters on the night of the
Sth-qth were as follows :
Lieutenant-General Grant and Meade on the Lynchburg
Stage Road near Curdsville, about seven miles W. N. W. of Cum¬
berland Church.
Wright (Sixth Corps) at New Store, seven miles further to the
W. N. W., at the Junction of the Lynchburg Plank Road and the
Pike.
Humphreys (combined Second-Third Corps) about seven
miles farther on W. at Rain's, on the now combined roads.
At dusk Humphreys was skirmishing with the Rebel rear¬
guard, but it would seem as if Lee's troops kept steadily on all
night, leaving a small torce to cover their movements. Gordon s
corps, leading, had struck a better road about midday of the 8th
and made rapid progress till dark (Captain [Confederate] J. C.
Gorman, p. 27), when the head of the column had reached Appo¬
mattox Court House and the rear was witliin four miles. (Gor¬
man is evidently all wrong here, for he says, just after it, that
Gordon's corps was aroused and moved hurriedly at 2 o'clock
a. m. of the 9th. When they reached Appomattox Court House
they found their [Confederate] cavalry confronting Custer's
cavalry.) These troops went into camp early in the evening ; the
bands of the divisions enlivened the departing hours of the day
vii.
with martial music and were applauded with the usual cheers of
the troops. Before dark all had partaken of their food. This
proves that the Rebels were not as destitute of food as has been
represented, and the bands must have had considerable strength
to play after such a march. In fact, the same authority. Captain
Gorman, says, in his " Lee's Last Campaign," that in the vicinity
of Farmville, on tlie morning of the 7th, the haversacks of many
of the men were replenished for the first time since leaving
Petersburg. It has been previously established by Humphreys,
de Trobriand and others that the country between Jetersville and
Appomattox Court House was by no means destitute, or even, to ap¬
pearance, short of provisions. " The old spirit seemed to be return¬
ing." " We had begun to congratulate ourselves that the pursuit
was over and felt sure that we ^ould make the trip to Lynchburg,
whish was only twenty-four miles off."
BUT—" before we had completed our meal the rumbling of
distant cannonading sounded warningly in front." # # #
" The fact was, that the enemy's cavalry, in heavy force at Appo¬
mattox, had disputed our advance—had cut off a train of wagons
and artillery."
This same cannonading to which the Confederate Captain
Gorman alludes, had been heard at Humphreys' halting place in
the early part of the night.
The distant "diapason of the cannonade " broke in sullenly
upon the ears of the combined Second-Third Corps about dusk
on the evening of the 8th. This cannonade was many miles
away, perhaps nine or even more miles off to the southwest and
was the bellowing of Sheridan's horse-batteries, engaging with the
thirty Rebel guns and upwards, covering the desperate effort to
break through " the Circle of the Hunt," making, and about to be
made, in greater force, by the Rebel General Walker, with the
leading divisions or brigades of Gordon's command.
Thus the Union and Rebel troops were sinking down into
their bivouacs or seeking their camping grounds to the porten¬
tous echoes of those " fire-throats," whose hoarse roar and duller
echoes were for the last time reverberating amid the Blue Hills of
ancient Virginia and breaking the early slumbers of the rebellious
but now completely conquered dwellers in the Old Dominion.
##*##*
As some changes took place during the night, it is of interest
to every reader to learn the relative positions of the Rebel and
Union forces on the morning of the 9th. As is well known,
Sheridan's cavalry had struck the enemy on the evening of the
8th, at Appomattox Station and captured four large trains of cars
viii.
and a number of wagons and twenty-four guns. The reader
will do well to compare Colonel Newshall's (Union) " With Gene¬
ral Sheridan," and Captain J. C. Gorman's " Lee's Last Cam¬
paign " as to incidents; also Gen. H. Edwin Tremain's War-
Memoranda, Chapter II.—original XII.
Custer reports that the last train was guarded by about two
divisions of Rebel infantry, with over thirty pieces of artillery, all
under command of Major-General Walker, of the Third Division
of Gordon's [Rebel Second) Corps. The main attack occurred
about 9 p. M. The fighting was not over until between 9 and 10
f m., when the Rebels fell back rapidly upon Appomattox Court
House. The Union cavalry bivouacked for the night, in close
vicinity to this centre, where daylight of the 9th found them
ready and eager for the work of'the summa dies—" the day of
decision " for Rebeldom.
The Fifth Corps, following the Twenty-fourth Corps, bi¬
vouacked about 2 a. m. of the 9th, within two miles of Appo¬
mattox Court House. It moved again at 4 a.m. and about 6 a. m.
reached General Sheridan's headquarters nearer the Court
House and manoeuvred into position so as to support the cavalry
who soon needed this backing. (Compare Extracts from the
Infantry and Cavalry Reports in the Citizen, of the i6th and 23d
Dec., 1871.)
The two corps, or portions of the one, the Twenty-fourth, and
a division of the Second, Twenty-fifth, composing the Army of
the James, after having been, as reported, on the march from
daylight of the 8th, till 10 a. m. on the 9th April, except three
hours, were deployed across the outlet, through which Gordon,
with Lee's advance, was making his desperate attempt to escape,
and were " barely in time." Ord intimates that Gordon would
have succeeded, " in spite of Sheridan's attempt to hold him,"—
" our cavalry were falling back in confusion before Lee's infan¬
try,"—had not our " Blue Coats " developed théir lines behind
our horsemen. This was to the south and southwest of Appo¬
mattox Court House, or Clover Hill, although the writer has seen
the latter designation given to an eminence in close vicinity to
the left flank of Humphreys' front. Cavalry Devin would seem
to indicate still another position for Clover Hill. (Bates, History
of Pennsylvania, Vol IL, 706.) (See his Report, V., Citizen, 23d
Dec., 1871.)
(This " blending" or " masking " of artillery and infantry
with cavalry is by no means novel. It is impossible to fix any
date when artillery, sufficiently light to accompany the move¬
ments of cavalry, was brought into the field, but a French work,
"Curiosités Militaires," pp. 170-172, says that the novel and
ix.
prompt manner of employing artillery masked hy cavalry was the
idea of Charles Brise, a Norman naval artillerist, and it was util¬
ized by Henry IV., in 1589, in one of the engagements near
Arques. The " Journal of the Military Service Institution," for
September, 1885, states that the introduction of Horse Artillery,
in the French service, was due to Lafayette after a visit to
Prussia; but it has been asserted that his first suggestions and
efforts in this direction were made after his return from service
under Washington, and I have seen a picture which leads me to
believe that the supposition of his getting the idea in America
is correct. What is more, the Spaniards, during the Dutch War
for Independence, were accustomed to mask the presence of
artillery by blindages of the other arms, and I have seen an ac¬
count of cavalry drawn aside, exactly as at Appomattox Court
House, to reveal the startling and decisive presence of infantry.
The fact is, such a manoeuvre has been practised again and again,
with the same satisfactory and startling results, on a variety of
occasions.)
Meanwhile the mass of Lee's army, under Longstreet, was
entrenched across the Lynchburg Plank Road and Pike, about
three to four miles N. W. of Appomattox Court House. Their
left, fronting east, was in some woods which fed the head waters
of Devil's Creek, their right on Wolf's Creek. Their centre was
for a short space at New Hope Church. This, if significant,
was but very short-lived, as much so as their stand there. It was
afterwards within Humphreys' lines.
Colonel Paine says "Wolf Creek Church or New Hope
Church," a curious association of names, unless the New Hope
came in after the wolves were cleared out.
Longstreet's or Lee's headquarters was in a house at a locality
known as Pleasant Retreat, certainly the least indicative of the
actual condition of Rebel affairs which well could be imagined.
According to Col. M. W. Burns, 73d N. Y. V., Longstreet's
own headquarters were in the first small house on the combined
plank road and pike inside the Rebel lines, designated Pleasant
Retreat.
According to a letter from an officer of high rank and the
clearest observation, the troops in front of Humphreys were as
follows ; " On the Confederate right of the road, came first
Heth's division, then Wilcox's, then Mahone's. (Heth's First,
Second and Third Divisions—all Third, Rebel, Corps.) On the
Confederate left of the road, came first Pickett's remnant (800),
then Field's division, then Humphreys' (of Mississippi) division,
(formerly Kershaw's). L. L, 3.
At 9 A. M. April 9th, Humphreys informed Meade that the
X.
head of his column had gone into camp at midnight. At ii
a. m. he reported that the head of his Third Division (Old Third)
had not been able to reach the halting place till 4 a. m. of the
same morning. As the train with two days' rations followed this
division, the delay in their distribution must have retarded forward
movements till 8 a. m. ; likewise the fact of Humphreys' " push-
forward " during the night, from the camp which Meade, 8.35
p. M. 8th (D. B. 5, 46, 27), had ordered him to occupy, but from
which he advanced at 8 p. m. 8th (D. B. 5, 51, 30.) About 6 a. m.
ot the 9th the supply train was up and rations were at once
distributed (7, 4, 72), so that when Humphreys did move on
again, he writes : " My men are marching finely, the effect of the
rations." This shows that our men, as well as the rebels, were
fatigued, indeed, almost fagged out and faint, from want of food.
One of the officers on this pursuit said he did not eat for forty-
eight hours.
Humphreys was pressing Field's division, which had resumed
its last march in retreat at fuidnight of the Sth. (This is taken
from information 1 (Humphreys) obtained and sent in a dispatch
to Meade—but it is in confiict with what Gorman says.) It will
be remembered that Fields commanded a division, four or five
thousand strong, to the very last. It was the Second of the
Rebel First (Longstreet's) Corps.
How could this be if Gorman is right : " Gordon's Corps
was aroused at 2 o'clock, morning of the 9th," &c., &c.
Immediately in front, that is, leading Fields, were Wilcox's
(Second) and Heth's (First) divisions of the Rebel Thir4 (prior
April 3d, A. P. Hill's) Corps ; Mahone with the Third Division of
the same corps was in front of these two corps and already en¬
trenching in the last defensive position occupied by the Army of
Northern Virginia.
Besides the troops thus indicated, Longstreet had with him
the remnant of Pickett's Division and the remains of Kershaw's
(or Mississippi Humplgreys') Third Division of Longstreet's own
Rebel First Corps.
The nearest Union troops to Lee's main force, at this time,
were undoubtedly those of Humphreys. The Sixth, following the
combined Second-Third Corps, was not in close support, till near
noon of the 9th. This is shown by Webb's dispatch, 10.30 a. m.,
in which he tells Humphreys, " General Wright is ordered to
pass your train and to push up."
Readers may have supposed that in the presentation of this
history, incidents have been invested with rose-colored tints to
render A. A. Humphreys' conduct more conspicuous. So far
from this being the case, the narrative is a sober statement of
xi.
clear facts : " You will see in my report (A. A. H.) that when on
the 6th April I discovered Lee in retreat and had opened artillery
on him, and had directed a brigade of Mott's to feel him, I re¬
ported what I had seen and done to General Meade, and then
made all the dispositions to cross the whole corps at Amelia
Springs to attack Lee, so that when the direction from Meade
came, I was ready, and moved at once across the [Flat] creek.
From that time forward, until late on the 8th April, my movements
and operations were directed solely by myself, as it was proper
they should be." It has been shown that Grant and Lee's corres¬
pondence on the 7th and 8th passed through Humphreys'lines,
under the escort of his staff officers. It will now be seen that this
continued to be the case on the 9th, until Grant, by a detour, had
left the direct route followed by Humphreys, and had passed
around to the vicinity of Appomattox Court House, which, about
midday on the 9th, was on neutral ground, between the picket
lines, when the flags of truce were passing.
This is not intended to detract in the least from General Sheri¬
dan's activity, but neither he nor his troopers were in direct con¬
tact with the Army of Northern Virginia proper, after the fights
of the evening of the 6th, with the exception of Crook's repulse
on the 7th, until the evening of the 8th and the morning of the
9th, and then only with Lee's advance under Gordon (compris¬
ing the divisions in whole or in part of Early's old Army of the
Shenandoah) ; Humphreys still confronting Lee's main force un¬
der Longstreet.
In the Citizen, March 23d, 1872, the first four notes of the
7th and 8th April were presented, with the circumstances of their
transmittal and delivery.
When Grant wrote his third communication to Lee (Note 5)
(Reb. Ree. XL, 357) he was at his camp for the night of the 8th-
9th at Curdsville, rather nearer New Store than Cumberland
Church, and two-thirds of the way from Farmville to New Store.
This communication was brought to Major-General Humphreys
while on the march on the morning of the 9th. The bearer of it
was Major Chas. E. Pease, A. A. G., Headquarters Army of the
Potomac. He it was (A. A. H., 6, 9, '71) who took General
Lee's letter (Note 6) to General Grant, after it had been brought
in by Colonel Whittier to Humphreys, on the march, between 10
and IIA. M. (9th), as is narrated by that officer in his own letter,
yet to be quoted at length. Whittier delivered Note 6 to General
Meade, and Meade sent it by Major Pease to General Grant,
overtaking the latter about five miles from Appomattox Court
House [11.50 A. M. (Cannon, 446). Midway between Ker's
xii.
Church and Appomattox Court House (Greeley, ii. TAa)\- Gen¬
eral Grant at once opened and read the letter, and his reply
thereto is Note 7.
The same staff officer of Lee, who was the bearer of Note 6,
subsequently brought two successive messages from Lee to Hum¬
phreys, urging the latter to halt his troops and not press on the
Confederate forces—messages which Humphreys, with whom war
meant fighting, rejected and paid no heed to, jtist as a good sol¬
dier should always do and should have done.
Lee was " on the picket line " in front of Humphreys when
he received Grant's third note (5), and while he wrote his third
communication (Note 6) on the morning of the 9th April. The
circumstances attending its delivery are narrated at length by Col.
C. A. Whittier—(in April, 1865, A. A. G. on the staff of Maj.- •
Gen. A. A. Humphreys, commanding the combined Second-Third
Corps)—as will appear from the following extracts from his letter,
dated Boston, 8th August, 1871.
[Colonel Whittier belongs to Boston, went out in the 20th
Massachusetts Volunteers—"the crack regiment" from that
State; in the summer of 1862 became an aide to Sedgwick, then
commanding the Second Division, Second Corps, Army of the
Potomac ; remained with the general until he was killed, going
with him as Major A. D. C. when Sedgwick was assigned to the
command of the Sixth Corps, in the winter of 1862-63. From
this (Sixth) corps he came to Humphreys, in the winter of 1864-
65, and remained with him to the last. (A. A. H. 30, 3, 72)].
" On the next morning, the 8th April, General Williams rode
up, and, as he was going out on our front with a flag of truce, I
accompanied him, each of us having an orderly. We were fired
upon and General Williams' orderly (behind us) was shot in the
leg ; the letter was delivered to one of Fitzhugh Lee's staff
officers. General Williams saying that these letters or this commu¬
nication was in no way to interfe»e with the operations then being
conducted. At noon OÍ the same day (the 8th) it was announced
to us that the enemy was showing a flag of truce. I was sent by
you (A. A. H.) to meet it. I met one of Fitzhugh Lee's staff,
whose inquiry was whether the flag, before sent, was to affect, in
any way, impending operations. As I had already heard this
thing provided for by General Williams, I answered, without
communicating with higher authorities, in the negative. (It was
at this time I sent a regiment to protect our trains of supplies
coming up in the rear [12^ p. m., 8, 4, 65], A. A. H.)
" The same night (as I remember, though I can't at all remem¬
ber any letter from the enemy being brought in—we were
bivouacking at the time in woods just at dusk and the men
xiii.
eating and resting) I was sent by you to General Meade's head¬
quarters—a ride of two or three hours—and delivered a note to
General Meade and waited for him to go to General Grant. I
started back to you about midnight with no answer, I think. The
cor]is had moved. I overtook you about daylight * * *
took a nap, from which I was awakened by you * * * You
said that as I had gone out with the other flags, you would like
me to take this one, unless I was too much fatigued—(this letter
must have been'Note 5). I started out and at last I met a per¬
son (chief of General Lee's couriers, so he said), who asked me
if I had a letter for General Lee. 'Yes,' I replied. ' I will take
it,' said he. ' Pardon,' said I, 'but I must deliver it to a com¬
missioned officer.' ' We will meet one if we ride on a short
distance.'
•" We soon met Colonel Marshall, of General Lee's staff", who
took the letter and asked me to ride up the road with him. We
soon met General Lee, who read the note brought by me and
commenced dictating (to Colonel Marshall) an answer.
" Heavy flring in the direction of Appomattox was then
heard and a Confederate officer (with but one arm) of fine ap¬
pearance, well mounted, &c., rode rapidly towards us; after
speaking with General I.ee, the latter, apparently, hurriedly fin¬
ished his letter (Note 6, I suppose), which was handed to me by
Colonel Marshall, who said, ' Please say to General Grant, that
General Lee came here expecting to meet him—that he (General
Lee) understood that all movements were to be suspended
—that he is just informed that a heavy engagement is taking
place at Appomattox and he would like to know when and where
he can meet General Grant 1'
" I at once reported back to you, thence to General Meade.
General Grant had gone across country to Appomattox Court
House. I returned to you. Later—at about noon—General
Meajde sent a note (which I think only stated that General Grant
had gone to Appomattox Court House) ; this I started with and
soon came in sight of the enemy in their last ditch—the pickets
saw ine—my flag was a large one. They fired upon me—(en
passa7it, Pd like here to make this claim—thatihe last hostile bul¬
le t fired by the Anny of Northerti Virginia was at ?ne.) (Combined
Second-Third Corps.) I dismounted; being told after a short
interval to advance, I met an officer who called himseli Lieuten¬
ant Lamar of Georgia, or Alabama ; to my indignant protest at
being fired on (stating that General Williams' orderly had been
wounded on the preceding day). Lieutenant Lamar replied, '/
have no mstruetmis not to fire upoti flags of trucel ! me-
thought, but said nothing.
xiv.
" Our line was then formed for an advance upon the enemy
in position, and in five minutes, at least, a confiict would have
commenced. * * General Meade joined us at about this
time and a suspension of hostilities for an hour, either through
his or some one else's agency, was ordered. At the expiration
of the hour, an advance was directed, and, as we were im close
proximity to the enemy's line, we were met by Forsyth of Gene¬
ral Sheridan's, Marshall of General Lee's staff and one or two
others, who announced an extension of the truce."
le halali ! habet !
The reader will perceive from the wording of Note 6 [(the
third from Lee in response to the third from Grant), (Tenney, 696,
2)], that Lee must have-been "on the (Rebel) picket line," which
our Humphreys' moving or " all alive, oh ! " skirmish line was
pressing or feeling-to all the time. He was there on the morning
of the 9th of April, asking for and awaiting an interview with
General Grant, to ascertain definitely the terms of surrender
offered by our Lieutenant-General. This was between 10 and
i r o'clock a. m. Lee remained there, close to the officer of his
staff, by whom he sent urgent requests to Humphreys for the lat
ter to halt; this was as late an hour as 11 o'clock a. m. This
is all-sufficient evidence that, while Sheridan and Ord were dis¬
cussing matters, preliminary to a truce, with tlie Rebel Lieuten¬
ant-General Longstreet and Major-General Gordon, as related
by "A Staff Officer" in "With General Sheridan," Major-General
Humphreys was in direct communication with General Lee.
Lieutenant-General Grant, however, after writing his first let¬
ter (Note s) to Lee, on the morning of the 9th, had ridden across
by Walker's Church towards Appomattox Court House. Before
reaching the Court House, and while yet five or six miles from it,
the messenger sent by Humphreys, Major Pease, overtook him
with Lee's letter (Note 6), which was written immediately in
Humphreys' front. '
As a "Staff Officer" inserts a copy of the same letter (Note
6), originally sent to Grant by Major Pease, and states that Gene¬
ral Longstreet was at Appomattox Court House about the hour
mentioned, and that he (Longstreet) bore a dispatch from Lee to
Grant, this dispatch must have been a duplicate of the commu¬
nication (Note 6) sent first to Humphreys, and by him sent to his
rear by Major Pease, and thence to Lieutenant-General Grant.
This must be the letter referred to in the dispatch of Major-
General Meade of 10 a. m., 9th April, in which he mentions an
answer from himself to Lee, recapitulating Grant's terms, and
advises an interview with the Rebel general. Meade was at
XV.
this time on Humphreys' route, and his language not only con¬
firms Humphreys' claim, but seenis to clear up the matter beyond
a doubt.
All this time Lee was in Humphreys' front, repeatedly urging
the halting of the latter's troops, to which Humphreys did not feel
authorized to accede.
About a mile beyond the last flag of truce, and about fifteen
or twenty minutes after Humphreys had ordered Lee's staff offi¬
cer out of his way, and just as Humphreys was about opening
fire upon Lee, General Meade came up, and, having received a
communication from Lee, assented to a truce.
Meade's communication to Lee (dated Headquarters, Army
of the Potomac, 9th April, 1865), is the first mention of his
knowledge of any cessation of hostilities between Ord and any
portion of Lee's command. As Meade was on Humplireys'front
it is important to note the time, 12M., and the information of Ord's
truce with Longstreet was brought to Meade by General Forsyth,
of Sheridan's staff, and was undoubtedly received by Meade
within half an hour after it was granted by Ord and Sheridan.
This may all seem unimportant, but it establishes several facts.
First, where Lee was while Ord, Sheridan, Longstreet and Gor¬
don were treating—i. e. in front of Humphreys. Second, that
Grant had not yet reached Appomattox Court House to receive,
there, the last letter of Lee (Note 6) which passed through Hum¬
phreys—that is, the last letter of Lee before Grant and Lee were
communicating with each other directly, at first with the lips
(Notes 8 and 9) and then with the pen—at the Court House, at
which time the retreat and pursuit, the attack and defense, the
fighting was all over. To make it perfectly clear. Notes 8 and 9
followed the personal interview between Grant and Lee, and
simply put on record what had been agreed upon. Grant's own
report establishes this curious fact. Third, that while hostilities
were still ablaze, so to speak, all communications between Grant
and Lee passed through Humphreys, because Humphreys with the
combined Second-Third Corps was the nearest to Lee all the
time and the most persistently pressing him.
Note 6, as several times stated, was the last which passed be¬
tween Grant and Lee through Humphreys. The next (Note 7)
is not to be found in all the histories of the war, but is given by
Tenney, 696 (2). It undoubtedly passed through Sheridan's
lines, as has always been admitted in these articles.
Col. Newhall,in his "With General Sheridan,&c.," must refer
to this note (No. 7) at page 216, confounding it with Note 6,
which was delivered at 11.30, when the subordinate Union and
Relel generals were already in conference at Appomattox Court
House.
xvi.
Grant was at the time, as stated therein, four miles W. ot
Walker's Church, that is, still six to eight miles, by the road, east
of Appomattox Court House. This was some time before Note
8 from Grant to Lee, and Note 9, in response, were written.
Grant says, in his own report (Reb. Ree., XI. 357), "The inter¬
view (between Grant and Lee) was held at Appomattox Court
House, the result of which is set forth in the following corres¬
pondence " (Notes 8 and 9). [The capitulation was signed 3.30
p. m. (A. and N. J., ir, 545—2-)]
Grant and Lee, however, had not yet 7net, A cavalry officer,
(" A Volunteer Cavalryman ") mentioned that he had heard at
the time, that Lee's last note passed through Whittaker of Cus¬
ter's staff, a name which might have easily been confounded with
that of Whittier, Humphreys' staff officer.
It would be very interesting and in some respects profitable to
get Lee's own account of his whereabouts at different hours—a
time-table of his movements—during this 9th of April and the
five, particularly the three—6th, 7th and 8th April—preceding
days.
Lieutenant-General Grant, when he wrote his fourth commu¬
nication (No. 7), at 11.50 a. m. of the 9th—to impress the fact—
was four miles west of Walker's Church and still about eight or
ten miles east of Appomattox Court House. This Walker's
Church is on a road running south from New Store—near which
place Humphreys received Note 4 from Lee to Grant—through
Planterstown by Cut Banks Ford (mentioned in his report by
cavalry General Devin, Citizen, 23, 12, 71), to the south
of the Appomattox, and stands near the junction of this road
with another east and west, about the same course as that river,
eventually leading to Appomattox Court House. These roads
Grant took on the morning of the 9th.
To close up the whole matter of the correspondence, so as not
to have to refer to it again, two last communications (Nos. 8, from
Grant to Lee, and 9, from Lee in return) can scarely be consid¬
ered as written pending hostilities. They were written after
Grant and Lee's personal interview. Grant's last (No. 8) is
headed "Appomattox Court House" (no hour) ; but at 12 m.
Meade, in a note to Lee, mentions that he had sanctioned a ces¬
sation of hostilities that had been agreed on between Ord and
Lee's command, which suspension Meade extended for two hours,
2. e. to 2 p. m. Lee's fourth and last note (Note 9) is headed:
" Headquarters Army Northern Virginia." Lee was then at or
near Appomattox Court House, and it is supposed that his head¬
quarters were wherever he was. Undoubtedly, judging from
concurrent circumstances, the last two notes of Grant and Lee
xvü.
(5th of Grant, 4th of Lee) were written at the same place. Ac¬
cording to the Army and Navy Journal, 11.545 [2], " Lee's Let¬
ter of Acceptance [Note 9 ?] was signed in the farm-house at
Appomattox Court House, which will always be memorable as
the place of surrender."
Having thus disposed of this matter, which is of more impor¬
tance in its bearing than in itself, in establishing beyond question
who was unceasingly nearest the enemy—i. e. Humphreys—the
reader must now revert back to the antagonistic positions of
Humphreys and Lee at the latter's " Pleasant Retreat." It has
been so much the fashion to underestimate the number of troops
at Lee's disposal on the morning of the 9th and depreciate their
physical condition that a very false impression has been created,
and would be perpetuated were no voice or pen uplifted in de¬
fence of the truth. That this underestimation and depreciation
should be done by Rebel writers to lessen the humiliation of the
catastrophe, is excusable, and would be almost commendable
could the perversion of history be pardoned for any cause.
That, however. Northern writers, calling themselves Union,
should minister to this delusion, is a sort of treason to the brave
army which compelled the catastrophe.
While writing and running back through the past, how many
cases occur where a defeated army abandoned or destroyed its
arms, and an army about to capitulate concealed all that could
prove trophies to the conquerors ? European armies, the French
especially, consider this course as commendable, as well as justi¬
fiable. After Aughrim, which decided the fate of Ireland, in 1691,
the Irish army, which had fought with distinguished pertinacity
and valor up to a certain moment, threw away their firelocks in
such numbers that Ginkel, the victor, lowered the price of each
musket turned in, to twopence. After Woerth, the French tore
off and cast aside everything that impeded retreat. Moreover, it
is considered the acme of Bazaine's disgrace that he surrendered
all his material intact, to the minutest article.
Some of Napoleon's greatest successes were founded on de¬
ceptions. Among the notable, remark the stratagem by which
Lannes and Murat and Belliard obtained possession of the Tha-
bor bridge across the Danube, 13th November, 1805. The
Russians are accused of a similar ruse to escape pursuit prior to,
and towards, Austerlitz, which occasioned Napoleon's remark
that, " if the Russian varnish is simply scratched off, the original
Tartar will be found underneath." Even the upright [Lebrechi)
Blucher is averred to have resorted to such " a very questionable
military stratagem to secure his escape," after Jena, 1806,
although this is another French story.
** * * * * * **
xviii.
It is no criterion to judge of how many men under arms con¬
fronted Humphreys on the morning of the 9th, to cite those who
actually stacked arms when the surrender became a fact. In an
European army the number of 7nen in imifonn would have formed
a sure basis for calculating the magnitude of the force capitu¬
lating. But what was to determine this fact in an army whose
costume realized the expression " un-uniformed troops ? " This
idea recalls Macaulay's remark that, when the Irish troops op¬
posed to William's had laid aside, their firelocks, there was no
means of distinguishing between the pitiless combatant of one
moment and the peaceful countryman of the next.
Histories range, as to the numbers surrendered by Lee, from
26,000 to over 28,000 ; Lossing figures out 26,000 ; Draper (who
wrote under the best of auspices) states 27,805 ; Harper's His¬
tory, generally very accurate, agrees with the preceding; Cannon
(British) says 28,078 paroled, of whom 22,000 showed upon the
12th, the day of receiving certificates. The report of the Secre¬
tary of War sets down the number paroled at 27,805. Colonel
Fletcher (British) reads 8,000 armed men and 18,000 too weak
to carry their muskets. Maj.-Gen. A. S. Webb, Chief of Staff,
Army of the Potomac, in this case one of the most competent of
critics, discussing the surrender, asked, most pertinently, how it
was possible to recognize a soldier, with no distinctive uniform, in
a man whose only designative tokens of a soldier were in his
arms and accoutrements, which he had thrown away on purpose ;
most likely in the hope of avoiding the responsibilities which their
possession entailed.
One of the most observant of our major-generals and expe¬
rienced division commanders, who kept notes, in discussing the
matter, stated that he believed, if the truth could be discovered,
that Lee had between 30,000 and 40,000 men of all sorts and
descriptions with him at Appomattox Court House, but that, as
soon as the surrender became a fixed fact, a large number " put
for home," without standing on any of the ceremonies either of
war or propriety.
The following examination will expose the fallacy hitherto re¬
ceived as fact :
In front of Humphreys, Mahone had just about 4,000 in A i
fighting condition and more than this number is claimed for
Fields. With them were three other divisions. Is it possible—
is it reasonable—that even half of these were unarmed ? Besides
these, Pickett's remnant. This accounts for many more than are
stated to have stacked arms : men occjtpying e7itrenched tifies, re¬
sisting and determined to resist. This will be shown by the testi¬
mony of three competent witnesses.
xix.
Humphreys saw these entrenchments. In a letter (6, 9, 71)
he says that Major Pease [already referred to, who took Lee's
letter (Note 6) through Hhmphreys to Grant and accompanied
General Grant to Appomattox Court House], in returning to
General Meade's headquarters [just after the surrender], passed
through the enemy's lines. Their line, fronting Sheridan and
Qrd, he is understood to have reported, was not entrenched.
" That facing the combined Second-Third Corps was entrenched
fully breast-high, and had an abattis of felled trees in front. An
opening had to be cut to enable him [Major Pease] to pass."
Col. M. W. Burns (73d N. Y. V.) went into Longstreet's lines
about the time of the surrender. He is very explicit as to what
he saw. Some of the Rebel troops in front of Humphreys be¬
longed to their Third, formerly A. P. Hill's Corps, and he thought
that*portions of their First [Longstreet's] Corps were also or, the
same front, because Longstreet's headquarters were in the first
small housebisecting the opposing positions—Pleasant Retreat, as
before stated—inside of the Rebel lines. He was not able to
furnish any data as to brigades and divisions, but wás of opinion
that one division in Humphreys' front was commanded by Gene¬
ral Mahone. This is well known to have been the case. He
judged, from what he could see, that there were about 10,000 men
who had stacked arms along the road. They were entrenched, as
far as he could discern, on each side of this roqd. They were
about ten minutes walk from Humphreys' headquarters.
Colonel Fletcher [(British) HI., iii., 212-219] who mainly (?)
derived his information from Confederate sources, implies that the
reason why Lee gave up at last was because Gordon announced
" that he was being driven back." " He [Lee] perceived that
Longstreet with difficulty held his ground against the force ac¬
cumulating in his front"—Humphreys' combined Second-Third
and Wright's Sixth Corps. This corroborates Burns as to where
Longstreet was.
Now for Colonel Paine. In his diai;y, jotted down on the
spot, he says :
" Being near the enemy's pickets, I noticed they were gathering
in knots, and seeing a negro come through their lines and towards
us, I hailed him and asked him how he came to be allowed to
come through. He said that they were not agoing to let him
through, but he told them that ' Lee had done gone sur¬
rendered,' and ' they began to talk to each other and he came on
and left them, and some throwed down their arms and went away,'
he thought.
" I returned to ride up through the gap and by the squad ot
perplexed pickets, and on into their lines, where I found consider-
XX.
able confusion, enough to cover my movements. I let my horse
walk, but did not stop, and, although spoken to, was not halted.
I carefully noted the courses and distances in my memory, count¬
ing my horse's paces, and glancing at a small compass, passed
along their lines of earthworks.
'' Took a circuitous route back and through the same gap in the
picket line, returned, and hastily sketched my work, so that I
could designate positions that would enfilade their lines with ar¬
tillery."
Right immediately within lines which Paine inspected, as he
told the writer [7, 8, 71], i. e. within the earthworks in front of
Humphreys—the Confederate troops were in good normal con--
dition. Outside (2. e. beyond) these lines, back and around,
many troops were in a broken-up condition, which showed that
while some organizations were in good order, others were com¬
paratively demoralized.
Col. Paine said (21, 8, 71), " Holding intrenchments in Hum¬
phreys' front and vicinity were more than 8,000 men seen by me,
and I am a pretty good judge of numbers; and yet I did not
examine this line to any considerable distance, as it was in tim¬
ber. I was on Humphreys' front on the day of Lee's surrender."
Colonel Whittier, in his letter previously quoted (Boston,
8th Aug. 1871), is even more pointed than Burns or Paine. He
says :
" Immediately after the surrender, in company with Colonel
Bache, of General Meade's staff, I rode into the enemy's line. I
remember Field's Division ; can't call to mind the commanders
of any others— the force was strong for the extent of the line ; a
breastwork of medium strength at the front for the pickets and
two lines of stronger works in the rear—there being a continuous
slight acclivity from their front to rear work.
" I thought at the time this position a pretty strong one
against any front attack—it probably could have been easily
turned—and they seemed to have troops at that particular point
to impede us for a while." * * *
What "particular point?" "Yes, at the point where they
could be turned (A. A. H) there were Rebel troops {en potence')
posted there to prevent their right from being flanked or taken in
reverse."
Opposed to Sheridan were Gordon's troops, actually fighting
till the last minute. Of these, Devin speaks as " the enemy ad¬
vancing in two heavy lines of battle." Crook reports first a " very
heavy line ; " again, " a strong attack on my front and flanks with
a large force of infantry, while their cavalry attacked my rear; "
again, "overwhelming numbers." Custer mentions "two divi-
xxi.
sions of infantry, in addition to over thirty pieces of artillery."
Merritt corroborates Crook with the same words, " overwhelming
numbers."
These are Union accounts. Cooke, the Southern historian and
biographer of Lee, says, Gordon's " own force, less than 5,000
muskets," which certainly must mean between 4,000 and 5,000.
Add these to the force in front of Humphreys, and we have
double the number of those said to have surrendered in arms.
This aggregate, however, is not yet complete. Fitzhugh Lee
and Rosser, with the Rebel cavalry, made their escape to the
mountains (Fletcher, III., 518-19). Also, according to the author
of "Pickett's Men" (172-3, 175), a battalion and battery of Pick¬
ett's Division got off to Lynchburg. Undoubtedly many others
of all arms made their escape secretly when it was found that Lee
was,actually treating for a definite surrender. This they might
have done without detection through the gap to the northward,
which was unwatched by Grant's troops.
The writer can never be brought to believe that Lee had less
than 25,000 veterans—infantry, cavalry and artillery—men tried
and true, ready to execute his will down to the very minute when
he signed the act of surrender—besides those who got off or stole
off and very numerous stragglers.
And this is the estimate of men who fought it out to the last
against the Army of Northern Virginia, generals who kept the
run of every day's occurrences, men who never misrepresented,
whose statements, however disputed at the time, have been borne
out by after-investigations and admissions.
Take the example of Humphreys' fight on the 5th February.
His rough estimate of the force opposed to him, and its compo¬
sition, was completely verified by Gordon's own admissions to
Major-General McAllister; and yet subordinate Rebel officers
claimed that Humphreys only fought brigades, where Gordon
conceded divisions, with every chance in their favor. (Major-
General McAllister's Statement, Citizen, 16, 9, 71.)
xxii.
la mort! the valley of jesreel !
" I am watching for the morning ;
The night is long and dreary.
I have waited for the dawning
Till I am sad and weary."
" An end is come, the end is come ; it watcheth for thee ; behold it
is come. The morning is come unto thee." * * * Ezbkiel vii. 6, 7.
"And the end thereof shall be with a flood, and unto the end of the
war desolations are determined."—Daniel ix. 26.
In consequence of the difficulty of bringing forward the train
with rations, it 'was eight o'clock, 9th April, 1865, before the
combined Second-Third Corps resumed its advance. In fact, the
troops had been in movement pretty much the whole night,
striving to gain ground in spite of hindrances. Humphreys ac¬
tually advanced five miles during the thick night, hoping to
come up with the enemy ; but finding his men falling out rapidly
through fasting and fatigue, he was compelled to halt his First
and Second Divisions about midnight. His Third, followed by
the supply train, did not begin to arrive until about 4 a. m. , (The
[Third] Division was not up until 4 a. m., probably, and the
supply train some considerable time later, perhaps 6 o'clock, or
even later before it was all up.—A. A. H.) As soon as the rations
could be issued the troops moved forward again with alacrity.
It is broad daylight by 5 a. m. at this time of the year, when
the weather is clear, as the writer well knows, as he has often
seen the morning break after a night spent in work upon this
pamphlet. Colonel Paine notes in his diary that it was a " beau¬
tiful, fine, pleasant Sabbath morning." Richardson (483) says it
" was damp and foggy." This involves no contradiction, for
there is often fog on the bottom-lands, when it is perfectly clear
upon the ridges. * * * As at Thrasimene I
All at once, three ,pr four miles away to the front, a vigorous
cannonade and interchanges of musketry, sounding to the expe¬
rienced ear like a pin drawn sharply across the teeth of a comb,
only a thousand times louder, in thunder-crashes, nigh at hand,
and duller and more ominous when heard at a distance. Hear¬
ing tliis, every one shouted, " Sheridan is there ! bully for Sheri¬
dan 1 " As related in a previous chapter, the combined Second-
Third Corps had sunk down in their first bivouacs (fith-pth) to
the rough music of the same horse-batteries. So they shouted
with knowledge. It was the last convulsion of the Rebel Army
in its death throe! its condition, what a contrast to the season,
day, and weather, and the awakening Sabbath 1
xxiii.
At 9 A. M. Humphreys notifies Webb: "The head of my
column is noW about (i^) one and a half miles from the halting-
place (during the night) and near to tlie rear of the enemy, according
to the report of a negro who came from Lynchburg yesterday
morning (Saturday, 8th April). Our troops were then three miles
from Lynchburg. He passed through Appomattox Court House
about sunset. The fighting there was then going on. It was
resumed this morning and is still continuing. About daylight he
passed the last of the enemy, and then lay in the woods some
time, coming in to us when he thought it was safe. He was told
as he passed through Lee's army that the troops would move
again about midnight (8th-9th April). We are about (lo) ten
miles from Appomattox Court House."
Few questions caused greater trouble than the discovery ot
wliAt Union troops this negro could have referred to. No appli¬
cations to headquarters furnished any satisfactory clue ; but on
turning to the Army and Navy Journal, of the 22d April, 1865,
it appears from Major-General Stoneman's report that it was a
portion of his command. "Major Wagner, after striking the
railroad at Big Lick, pushed on toward Lynchburg, destroying on
his way the important bridges over the Big and Little Otter, and
got to within four miles of Lynchburg." This is confirmed by
Major-General Cullum in his " Biographical Register," IL 162,
§§1304, wherein he states that Stoneman was engaged in the
" Destruction of the Lynchburg and Bristol Railroad, April 3-7,
1865 " (compare the " Last Ninety Days of the War," p. 197).
This exactly corroborates the statement which the negro fugitive
made to Humphreys.
At II A. M. the combined Second-Third Corps came up with
the enemy's skirmishers, in front of the entrenched position,
hereinbefore described. Up to this hour, if not an hour later,
Lee had been in command in Humphreys' front. When news came
to him that Gordon's attempt had failed, Lee mounted his horse
and started for the rear, saying, " General Longstreet, I leave
you in charge ; I am going to hold a conference with General
Grant." (Richardson, 483.)
Finding the Rebels in force, in defensible positions, and
strongly entrenched, Humphreys made immediate dispositions
for a fight, if fight there was to be. They were as follows:
Humphreys' right, his First (Miles') Division (old Second Corps),
was h cheval (or astraddle) the Plank and Turnpike Road, with
one brigade in line to the right or north of it, and one to the
left or south of it, while the other brigade was in column to the
north of the road, supporting Miles' right. The Second (Bar¬
low's) Division (old Second Corps) on the left, was disposed in
xxiv.
the same manner, having two brigades deployed in the front line
and a third in reserve opposite the centre and the interval between
them. His Third (de Trobriand's) Division (old Ihird Corps)
also presented two brigades deployed in the front line, and one
in support to the rear of the eentre interval of the first line of
battle of the corps.
Accordingly (says de Trobriand, II., 48r) our division was
massed to the right and left of the road. Half an hour after¬
wards the troops were notified that the truce had been prolonged
up till 2 p. M. As the watch hands pointed to the hour of two
the Old Third commenced to move forward again, but the First
Brigade, wearing the Red Diamond Badge, or " patch," had not
advanced a hundred yards when a new order directed it to halt.
Before the Union troops stretched a thin curtain of wood. Be¬
yond this an open space alone separated the " blue coats " from
the " gray-backs " whose pickets remained perfectly quiet. This
locality is known on the map which the writer has examined as
Clover Hill. On pointing this out to Colonel Paine, he stated
{21, 8, 71) that this name is applied to a cleared elevation to the
left {i. e. S.) of Humphreys' front and somewhat in advance, i. e.
W. of it—i. e. S. W. of Humphreys' left. Scarcely two maps
agree as to the position of " Clover Hill," and the Secretary of
War's map makes Appomattox Court House and Clover Hill
synonymous. (See Bates' History of the Pennsylvania Volun¬
teers, ii., 706.)
If the map first cited and Brevet Col. W. H. Paine are correct,
there is a curious significance in this. The official badge of the
combined Second-Third Corps was a Trefoil, or Three-leaved
Clover ; and now it was the badge of a commander whom the
Third Corps honors as honest, impartial, true; in every sense one
of themselves. That which some of them might deny to his next
two predecessors—to the first from one motive, to the second
from another—all would willingly concede to Humphreys. There
are many other curioifS unions of the two symbols, the Diamond
of the Third and the Trefoil of the Second Corps. Napier, in his
" History of Florence," alludes to one, and another might be
cited. When the Medici, especially Giuliano, the real Penseroso of
Michael Angelo, formed two companies of youths to associate
these Fl(;rence youths in friendly [manly] games and exercises, he
joined those wearing the badge " il Diammiíe " (the Diamond)
and " il Broncone '' (the Branch, or Trefoil). The last array in
arms of the Trefoil or Three-leaved Clover (and the Diamond)
was thus curiously made on the field of Lee's surrender, " Clover
Hill," and in front of Lee's " peculiars " was the Diamond Badge.
Diamonds were trumps !
Copyright, 1883, by J. Watts de Peyster.
Appomattox Court House.
Positions of the combined Second-Third Corps, under Maj.-Gen. Andrew
Atkinson Humphreys, 9th April (Palm Sunday), 1865, m. and p.m.,
at the epoch of the surrender of GeN. R. E. LeE
and the Army of Northern Virginia.
XXV.
It is another curious fact that Colonel Whittier, A. A. G. on
Humphreys' staff, makes " this claim, that the last hostile bullet
fired by the army of Northern Virginia was at me," an old com¬
bined Second-Third Corps man.
LA RETRAITE PRISE! AD LEONEM!
Thus the organized and more or less disorganized constituents
of Lee's command were completely enveloped. " The once
proud array of the Army of Northern Virginia now presented
this sorry spectacle," &c., &c. (Swinton, 619.) It is impossible to
comprehend why Northern writers will seek to depreciate the
number and condition of this Rebel Army, to lessen their own
people's triumph, and glorify the enemy, as bitter and unforgiving
in their enmity as ever. It has been herein stated that one of our
major-generals present at the surrender calculated that Lee still
had, on the 8th-9th April, from 30,000 to 40,000 men. Although
this has been gone into quite fully on previous pages, the follow¬
ing calculations from Richardson's tables (491-492), " compiled
from the official reports," are worthy of consideration. He says
that Lee's " effective force, on the 20th March, 1865, must have
been fully 70,000 men." Two chiefs of staff. Army of the Poto¬
mac, and one corps commander, all three agree about as to this
estimate. Lee lost at Fort Steedman, 25th March, 2,783, and
from the 29th of March to the 9th April, 18,979, together 21,-
762. This leaves 58,238. Of these, " Two brigades of his
cavalry escaped before his surrender;" likewise, according to
"Pickett's Men" (172-173, 175), a battalion, and certainly one
battery of artillery, which got off to Lynchburg. How many
more escaped ? " No one familiar with armies in the field will
need to be told that the number of stragglers on such a campaign
must have been very large. Ten thousand men seems to be a
moderate estimate for the stragglers and the two brigades of
cavalry. This leaves in round numbers 48,000 effectives. Con¬
cede 8,000 killed and wounded, and there remain 40,000. Still
there is one element of strength which has not been credited to
Lee. On abandoning Petersburg-Richmond, Lee dragged off
with him every military organization, local or otherwise; so that
our major-general, after all, may have been nearer the truth than
any one else. But, taking the other view of the case and conced¬
ing that Lee had not over 8,000 to 10,000 men " up to the
mark " in fighting condition, then no one possessed the right, in
justice to the North, to accord the terms on the 9th, which were
even too lenient for the 7th or even for the 3d April. Some men
ought to have been made examples of, and, from the following ex¬
tracts from the Army and Navy J^ournal [ii. 545 (2)], it would
xxvi.
seem to the writer that the Tiibune, in publishing the remarks in
•[j 2, must have held different views at that time from those since
and at present held by its senior editor.
" When, however, it was known how completely the enemy
had been in our power, some of the troops were a little distressed
at the magnanimity of the terms offered.
" An Associated Press dispatch of the 12 th says ;
(i.) "The final arrangements for the surrender of Lee's army
were completed yesterday, and to-day they are at liberty to pro¬
ceed to their homes, or elsewhere, as they choose. The terms
granted were certainly of a very liberal character. ' A large num¬
ber of officers, together with thousands of the men of this army,
express their dissatisfaction, not only at the unprecedented liber¬
ality granted to the Army of Northern Virginia, but at the manner
in which they were paroled and allowed to go their way, without
our men being permitted to enjoy the results of their long struggle
in the passage through the lines of General Lee and his army ;
but it is claimed that this would have been humiliating to General
Lee and his officers, and that it is not the wish or desire of our
government or commanders to act toward them in any way that
would tend to irritate their feelings or make their position more
intolerable than it actually is. The policy pursued may have been
for the best, and our soldiers will submit, as they always do, to
what is judged most wise. During Sunday night and Monday
large numbers of the Rebels, as well as some of the officers, made
their escape from the lines and scattered through the woods,
many no doubt intending to return home. Our camps last night
were filled with them, ¡¡ybegging something to eat, which, of
course, was freely given. These men, when asked if they had
been paroled, invariably replied, "No; but we are allowed to
gô where we please. ",^5
" A letter to the Tributie on the same subject says :
(2) "The intelligence that negotiations were pending on
Saturday for the surrender of the enemy was hailed with joyful
demonstrations by our men, but when the terms of the capitula¬
tion became known 'their feelings were those of disappointment
and chagrin. Ewell, Pickett and several other officers of dis¬
tinction, deserters from the United States service at the beginning
of the war, it was claimed, had no right to expect the treat¬
ment accorded their more honorable brethren in Rebellion.
Î^^The brutal murder of the thirty-nine men hung by Pickett
in North Carolina, is still remembered and still awakens a spirit
of resentment among the men.^^^3 No formal surrender took
place, and our troops were consequectly not gratified with a sight
of the ragged remnants of Lee's once great and formidable army.
xxvii.
except as they confronted each other in battle. Both armies lay
hidden from each other, for the most part in dense woods, and
although many of our men afterward straggled into the enemy's
camps, they were not favored by the coveted glimpse of the
whole strength of Lee massed in a compact body."
That the enemy were in the woods, is corroborated by Paine
(21,8,71); " Humphreys' last stand was in a piece of open ground
the enemy were sheltered [as usual] in the timber ! " " Before
us," are de Trobriand's words (II., 382), " beyond a thin cur¬
tain of woods stretched an open space, which alone separated
us from the enemies' pickets, which did not budge." This lo¬
cality is styled " Clover Hill." The United States Engineer maps
show dense woods in every direction in front of Humphreys.
For Lee's forces, however—were they more or less numerous
—" the toils were set and the ' Stag at Ten' (La Royale !) was
to die at bay." Stopped in front to their left by Sheridan's
cavalry, backed by the infantry of the Army of the James, they
were shut in upon their right or north flank by the Fifth Corps
(see extracts from reports. Citizen, i6th and 23d December, 1871),
with their rear closely pressed by the combined Second-Third
Corps, supported by the Sixth Corps, which had gradually closed
up and was now in contact, and finally brought to a stand by the
obstacle of the James [Appomattox] River, whose elbow put an
effectual barrier on the W. and W. by N., the only possible
avenue of escape \Army and Navy Journal, ii. 569 (3)] towards
the goal of Lynchburg, now less than twenty-one miles distant
in the same direction.
Gordon had received imperative orders to cut his way
through (examine a curious coincidence, H. Kings, iii., 26)
Sheridan's cavalry by a supremé effort of despair. He made his
desperate dash, thinking he had only cavalry in his front. His
attack was made with all the wonted Rebel fire. The cavalry,
who had dismounted to arrest his plunge—like that of ahull upon
a picador in the amphitheatre—had to give ground. Then our
troopers were drawn aside like the front-sliding-scene in a theatre,
revealing the unexpected presence of our blue-coated infantry.
[There are numerous instances of this masking of infantry, the
strength of an army, with cavalry, to delude and induce an
attack. Cassius, in the Partliian War (^'■Military Ends a7id Moral
Means," 271, 272, &c.), having ranged his cavalry in a front line,
with his infantry in a second line behind them ; then, by the sud¬
den retiring of his cavalry, drew the Parthians into the snare
which he had prepared for them. At Wattignies, Jourdain
masked the presence of field pieces with infantry. Tlie footmen
"skillfully wheeling back portions of their line to allow the light
xxviii.
battery to fire " through the intervals thus opened. The Span¬
iards used such an identical manoeuvre in street fighting against
the Hollanders in the sixteenth century; and Henry IV., in one
of the combats preliminary to or near Arques, in 1589, employed
a similar strategem. Having masked two heavy couleuvrines
(16 pounders?) with cavalry, he invited a charge of the Cheva¬
liers of the Duke de Mayenne, who, when they expected to en¬
counter only horsemen, like themselves, were astonished to see the
opposing ranks open and found themselves overwhelmed with an
artillery fire. This new and prompt method of employing heavy
artillery is said to have been the idea of a Norman naval gunner,
named Charles Brise, who, after long service at sea, brought his
varied experience to the aid of the King of Navarre.]
The result vvas a perfect theatrical winding-up. It paralyzed
the Rebels. They caved in at once! The end had come ! Mean¬
while Sheridan's troopers, with uplifted sabres, were only awaiting
.the trumpet-blast to spur in and drown out the Rebellion in its
own best blood. Each horseman grasped his sabre with the de¬
termination of Custer, or of Alp in Byron's " Siege of Corinth."
It is a pity, perhaps, for the peace of the country, the re¬
organization of society down South and a warning to treason for
the future, that every arm had not been permitted to realize
Byron's simile throughout :
" Swifter to smite and never to spare."
The writer has always thought it an error of judgment that
Sheridan was not allowed to " go in," as he is said to have wished
to do, and " finish up those people." Fiery Phil in such matters,
if reported correctly, had common sense and honest enthusiasm ;—
red blood, not white blood ; such seldom, if ever, make mistakes.
All this is mightily well told by " A (Union) Staff Officer," in
" With General Sheridan " (pages 210-217), ^^^d by (Confederate)
Captain J. C. Gorman, in " Lee's Last Campaign " (page 21, &c.)
As to the influence of the cavalry upon this decisive result,
there is much to be said for and against.
For instance, " An officer in the Sixth Corps " [Army and
Navy Journal, açtlr April, 1865, II., 562, 3) " writes that he is a
little disgusted at the cheeky way in which the cavalry assumes
to have accomplished so much. For example, after the fight at
Little Sailors' Creek, Sheridan reports that he ' went in ' with two
divisions of the Sixth Corps, &c., &c. But he omits to state the
not unimportant fact, that, before the arrival of the Sixth Corps,
he had ' gone in ' and been whipped off the ground in the very
quickest sort of way. Indeed, the same thing usually happens
when the cavalry attempts to carry works without infantry. The
xxix.
very last action—the final skirmish in which Lee's army was en¬
gaged—was with McKenzie's cavalry division, and it was just
sent kiting, with the loss of two guns. Such trifies as these it is
sometimes convenient not to report." * # #
" But, with regard to the capture of Ewell and Custis Lee at
Sailor's Creek, the.former has stated over his own signature that
he surrendered to the Sixth Corps, in a paper on file at the head¬
quarters of the corps."
Let us loyal men fervently pray that the mistaken magnan¬
imity shown this day towards an adversary even more wickedly
inexcusable than Ben Hadad, may not be brought home to us
through the shortsightedness of those in authority on this occa¬
sion, and the North realize in the near future the ominous warning
spoken by the prophet to the victorious but mistaken Ahab.
Kings, xx. 42.) "Because ihou hast let go out of thy tiand a
man whom I appointed to utter destruction, therefore thy life shall
go forhis life, and thy people for his people." (1884 !) (Compare
IL Kings, xiii., 14-19, and 22; also Jeremiah, L., 2, 13, 14, 15.)
"Some of the troops (Union) were a little distressed at the mag¬
nanimity (?) of the terms offered." \Army and Navy Journal,
XL, 445 (2.)] It is a pity that those who had the control gave
occasion to this "distress" at the time and to greater distress, at
the consequences, soon after, and thenceforward until now, April,
1872. (November, 1884.)
There was one man in the Army of the Potomac who saw all
this clearly, and spoke out in trumpet tones—Maj.-Gen. Horatio
G. Wright. He has not been mentioned in the course of this
corps-biography more than was idispensably necessary, because
the writer was desirous of avoiding any side issues, but by no
means because the noble commander of the Sixth Corps was not
appreciated at his full and great value. Were it necessary to cite
proofs of the nobility of soul possessed by the " Burster into
Petersburg," one would be almost sufficient to demonstrate the
man, viz.: his dispatch to Maj.-Gen. A. S. Webb, Chief of Staff,
Army of the Potomac, of the 15th April, 1865, in connection with
the death of Lincoln :
Headquarters Sixth Army Corps.
April 15th, 1865.
" Major-General Webb, Chief of Staff:
" With deepest sorrow the dispatch announcing the assas¬
sination of the President of the United States, and the Secretary
and Assistant Secretary of State, is received, and I advise that
XXX.
every officer of the Rebel army, within control of the Army ot
the Potomac, be at once closely confined, with a view to retali¬
ation upon their persons for so horrible an outrage.
H, G. Wright, Major-General."
*********
Any one who takes a sufficient interest in the truth and will
compare Paine's Field Map, as reduced in Harper's " History of
the Great Rebellion," and several other narratives of the Union
Civil War, will be convinced—despite all the mystification, inten¬
tional or unintentional, with which partial, interested or preju¬
diced pens have invested or involved the story—that Humjjhreys,
with his combined Second-Third Corps, was the chief agent in
the happy result of this festival. They, it was, and his " tried
and true," who all the time clung to Lee's army, proper, and
while suffering as much, if not more, than any other corps or
arm, so impeded his retreat by their very weight—as a sail tow¬
ing behind a clipper frigate clogs her way and enables a duller
squadron to overhaul her—and hourly harassed it, so as to enable
the cavalry, the Fifth Corps, the Twenty-fourth Corps ancf
Twenty-fifth Corps to finally head off the enemy at Appomattox
Station and Court House. It maybe argued that the part which
fell to Humphreys was the result of hick. The writer does not
believe in luck as affecting great events. With him, luck is God,
who puts the right man in the right place—when something is to
be achieved which affects human rights and human progress.
(See J. Fennimore Cooper's " Oak Openings, or the Bee Hunter,"
Chap. XXVIII., p. 425). Other men had equal opportunitie.s
with Humphreys, and were never up to time, could never be
brought up to time ; morally, could never be made to face the
music—in a word, with far greater means accomplished compara¬
tively nothing. When Humphreys found the trace ; when he
struck the scent; he was like the sleuth or Iwie hound, as vividly
described by Somerville. (Book I., pp. 21 and 23.)
Following Lee step by step, never losing trace of him, even
if temporarily losing sight of him, hitting him, pressing him with
bayonet in his reins ; thus, for seventy-six hours, and a distance
of sixty to seventy miles, Humphreys never let him slip away.
Finally, where do we find Humphreys on the morning of the 9th
April ? At New Hope Church, near Appomattox Court House,
confronting on this sunny—sunny in every point of view—Sab¬
bath morning, the bone and sinew of the remaining organizations
of Lee's old army. New Hope Church!—title of happy omen
for us—" Devil's Creek," to the north, overcome and passed " by
queer coincidence " of nomenclature)—and " Pleasant Retreat!"
xxxi.
about as inappropriate a term for Lee's situation at this time as
well could be imagined. These he, Humphreys, now supported
by Wright, held so tightly, pressed so closely, that Lee could not
have strengthened Gordon to operate against the Fifth Corps,
the Army of the James and the cavalry, however much he might
have been so minded.
Without exaggeration, was there anything like Humphreys'
prescient advance, persistent pressure, unrelaxing pursuit or in¬
cessant combat, exemplified on any other previous occasion dur¬
ing the war ? Did he not utilize " the golden hours " and the
" diamond minutes " so often lost, so frequently thrown away ?
"Ask me," exclaimed Napoleon, "for anything but time!"
There is nothing like the fighting of the 6th April in our records.
It comes up to the pursuit after Ulm; after Jena. Not a mo¬
ment lost, not an opportunity neglected. And then at Cumber¬
land Church, what perfect tactics ! Butting an inexpugnable
front, how admirable his flanking ! Even although the first at¬
tempts were unsuccessful, where, after being reinforced, does the
critic find Humphreys when night set in? Ready for the renewal
of the enveloping assault of the morrow, menacing the enemy's
sole line of retreat, his sole avenue of escape. No glancing off,
as day after day, from the Rapidan to the James, allowing the
foe to fall back from one strong position to another, to renew the
same unsatisfactory sacrifices ; but a " rubbing out " as unremit¬
ting as the regular succession of the hours, and of the sunrise and
the sunset.' And so it went on, from Amelia Salt Sulphur Springs,
on the morning of the 6th, until the noon of Lee's surrender.
Why the popular mind has been so beclouded, and why the
conspicuous merits of the man and his men have been so lost
sight of, is one or those curious questions affecting the popular
distribution of military credit in this country, that can only be
explained by the willingness of the general public to accept the
flowery in diction, and the superficial in examination, for the less
elegant, but infinitely more precious results of investigation and
close comparison of facts; which last are absolutely inseparable
from true military criticism and the enduring commentaries of
war.
xxxii.
la retraite prise! surrender!
" Sweet April, many a thought
Is wedded unto tliee, as hearts are wed ;
Nor shall they fail."—Longfellow.
" The hounds of war shall turn from our fair fields,
The cannon .shall become a trump of praise.
" Napoleon Fallen : a Lyrical Drama," by Robert Buchanan, Lon¬
don, 1871.
The Army of Northern Virginia surrendered!
The white flag appeared ! General Grant received a ine.s-
sage from Lee requesting an interview, which was granted, and
the two generals repaired to the neat brick dwelling of William or
Wilmer McLean, at Appomattox Court House.
The memorable interview between Generals Grant and Lee
took place at a little after 2 ?. m., in the " town " of Ajipomattox
Court House. The town, according to description, had little in¬
deed to recommend it for the scene of so great an event as the
pacification of a continent. It might boast, indeed, its public
building, the Court House, but it consisted solely of one street,
and one end of that was boarded up to keep the cattle out. Such
was the little place upon which fame, for centuries to come, was
suddenly thrust, this Sunday afternoon, 9th April, 1865. The
best house in the street was lent for the occasion by its owner,
Mr. Wilmer McLean. It is an old-fashioned structure, with a
long verandah in its front and a flight of steps leading up to the
entrance thereon. " Appomattox Court House boasted five
dwellings. The largest—a square building of brick, iTith a yard
smiling with roses, violets and daffodils—belonging to one Wilmer
McLean."
Lossing states that this McLean resided in a dwelling on a
portion of the first battlefield of the war, between the Confeder¬
ate " Army of Nortltern Virginia," under Beauregard, and the
Union "Army of North-eastern Virginia"—under the accom¬
plished but unlucky McDowell—which was the nucleus or embryo
of the " Army of the Potomac." Beauregard had his head¬
quarters in McLean's house, which was situated to the right or
south of the Centreville road, about equidistant from Mitchell's,
Blackburn's and McLean's Fords. McLean, having seen enough,
as he thought, of war, removed to a spot whereto he was confi¬
dent war could never come, but whither the fighting did come,
after a lapse of three years and nearly nine months, in its circle
of blood and fire. And now, on this bright Sunday, 9th April,
xxxiii.
1865, his household gods were tottering to the roar of the same
fire-throats which had shaken them on that other sultry battle
Sabbath, 21st July, 1861.
If McLean had ever delved into the earliest English drama¬
tists, he may have had the lines of worthy Christopher Marlow
on his lips :
" The northern borderers, seeing their houses burned,
* * * Run up and down cursing "
the hour " he lent " his house, " the best on the street," " for the
occasion ; " for, if Richardson (484) is correct, he " was moving
wildly about, nearly driven out of his senses by the great events
of the day " and the subsequent forcible purchase of his furni¬
ture. [Ibid., 485-6.)
• This " circle of events " presents a curious coincidence, but
more curious than many others which incontestably prove that
there is no escaping Schicksal, " the inevitable "—the " Fortune
or Chance " of Catherine de Medici, Turenne and Suworrow;
the " chance or good luck " of the astute observer, Montaigne ;
the "lot" and "chance" of Proverbs and Ecclesiastes; the
"Fate"of the Romans and the Greeks; the "Accident" of the
scoffer and unbeliever; the " Providence" of the devout; but, in
immutable (or'unflexible') Law," the unalterable de¬
cree of the God of Baitles and the Lord of Hosts. As Sir
Walter Scott observed : " Fortune will fly her flight, let man
hallo himself hoarse." Indeed, it is true, " Ma7i denkt, Gott
lenkt J 'Man proposes and God disposes;'" or, as the Tuscan
reads, " L'uo7no tepe, e la Forttma tm77ia^ ' Man sets the woof and
Fortune throws the warp.' " This acknowledged fact runs
through all time and teaching. Lord Kames says, " a delusive
sense of liberty is wisely implanted in the mind of man, which
fits him to fulfil the ends of action to better advantage than he
could do, if he knew the 7iecessity which really attends him."
Some of the names of the battlefields, even, are significant,
and not the least so is the fact that this surrender occurred on
Palm Sunday. Palm Sunday is the next before Easter, the beginning
of the " Great Week," the " Holy Week," when the " Prince of
Peace " made his triumphant entry into the "possession or inheri¬
tance of peace," for such is the translation of the word Jerusalem,
the multitude strewing his path with palm branches. How appro¬
priate the surrender on this Palm Sunday, 9th April, 1865, when
a " chosen people," in arms, entered through the gate of victory
into the possession of peace, which they had purchased with
half a million of lives and an expenditure of money almost appal¬
ling in its aggregate of public outlay and private munificence.
xxxiv.
As soon as General Grant accorded this meeting to Lee, an
order was promulgated (Paine's Diary), suspending hostilities for
an hour.
" Our skirmishers are within range of the rearguard of the
enemy. The enemy has developed a picket line, which indicates
a stand."
"Sunday, gth April, 12.20. A cessation of hostilities pro¬
posed by General Lee was rejected by General Meade, who was
still pressing on, when word came that a truce of one hour was
granted by General Sheridan, to which General Meade submitted.
General Forsythe came from General L , through the enemy's
lines, under a flag of truce."
It will be rerñembered that Colonel Paine was on Humphreys'
front on the eventful day up to noon ; Lee himself had been with
the troops confronting the combined Second-Third Corps—all
that remained of the Army of Northern Virginia, except Gor¬
don's command, in contact with Sheridan, Ord and Griffin—
nearly or fully up to the same hour, 12 m.
When, in the course of the morning (9th), Humphreys' troops
began to overtake Lee, the Rebel general sent to Humphreys at
least two earnest requests (verbal) by a staff officer and flag of
truce, not to press forward upon him but to halt ; that negotia¬
tions were going on for a surrender. Humphreys did not deem
himself authorized to comply with Lee's requests, since he had
not received such information and authority from General Meade
or from General Grant as would sanction it, and so replied to
General Lee, and continued to press forward. Humphreys was
at the head of the column. When the request was made the
last time. Lee's staff officer was very urgent, so urgent that Hum¬
phreys had to send him word twice that the request could not be
complied with, and that he must withdraw from the ground at
once. He was in full sight on the road, a hundred yards distant
from Humphreys. (The ground was wooded.) As soon as
Humphreys' staff ofScer reached him, Humphreys himself began
to ride forward. A mile beyond this, as the skirmishers of the
combined Second-Third Corps were closing in on Lee's—the
Union troops being within fighting distance—Meade overtook
Humphreys, and soon after informed him that a truce had been
granted until a certain hour of the day. (2 p. m., Reb. Ree. XL,
643, I.) At this time, according to Meade's report, the combined
Second-Third Corps were within three miles of Appomattox Court
House, to the eastward. Humphreys remained on the line of
battle near the road with his staff about him, and as the hour for
the termination of the truce approached, he took out his watch
and held it in his hand. Exactly as the hands pointed to the
XXXV.
hour of 2 p. M., Humphreys mounted and gave the order to
advance; but his troops had scarcely moved " twenty paces," or
" one hundred yards," when a message from General Meade in¬
formed him that the truce had been extended " until further
orders," and he halted the corps in the position marked on the
United States Engineer Map, "Appomattox Court House," close
up against Lee. Before long the notice of the surrender of Lee
was received, and he had to issue orders at once to the skirmish¬
ers, now become pickets, to prevent his officers and men from
passing over into Lee's camps.
" General Humphreys' engagement on the night of the 7th
(at Cumberland Church) was the last fighting of any importance "
—said Brevet Col. W. H. Paine, (26, 6, 71)—"if I recollect
aright, and 1 thvik General Humphreys was only prevented from
ahpost annihilating the enemy, by the truce on the day of siirrender.
(9th April.) I was on his front at that time."
*********
While the conditions of the surrender were under discussion,
the troops became impatient, and impatience grew to a fever heat.
The soldiers—who, as a rule, always saw farther than the run of
the leaders, whom policy, not propriety, had given them—deemed
that the delay was only another Confederate stratagem to throw
us off our guard ; that underneath the color of treating, Lee in¬
tended to play us an Antietam trick. " Let us finish up the
matter," they cried, " before night comes on again. If they do
not intend to surrender, let us go in at once."
LA CURÉE ! SPOLIARIUM !
" C'est moins que la guerre, c'est la chasse, c'est la curée."—Miciielet.
" Our troops were just commencing to advance again (reads
Paine's Diary), when they were again halted by authority from
General Grant. It was during this truce that General Lee sur¬
rendered, of which we were soon apprised (a memento of which
I secured by tearing a strip from the lower edge of the white
cloth which served as a flag of truce, which the bearer allowed
to trail while he was resting, partially asleep). General Meade,
not feeling well to-day, was in his carriage at the front, but was
obliged to return on horseback, the road was so crowded with
troops. An officer had just passed down the road announcing the
surrender, as General Meade passed, followed by his staff; everyone
crowded forward, leaving scarcely room for the horses to pass,
jeopardizing their lives and limbs, cheering, and making the most
frantic demonstrations of joy."
xxxvi.
All at once a tempest of hurrahs shivered the air along our
front. "Lee has surrendered!" Without having actually dis¬
tinguished the words, the whole Union army, present, compre¬
hended their import. The wildest acclamations rolled like peals
of thunder over the field, through the woods, along the road,
echoed and re-echoed, prolonged in solemn mutterings of hur¬
rahs among the trains which followed, at a distance, the Sixth
Corps. Hats and caps filled the air. The flags waved and
saluted, unfurling to the caresses of the winds their tattered frag¬
ments, glorious attestations and relics of nearly four years of
battle, of over a hundred first-class stricken fields—
" Flag of the brave ! thy folds shall fly.
The sign of Hope and Triumph, high ! "
******
" There shall thy Victor glances glow.
And cowering foes shall sink beneath
Each gallant arm that strikes below
The lovely Messenger of Death ! "
and all the bands poured forth to heaven—which answered with
the sympathetic smile of unclouded sunshine—their accompani¬
ments of rejoicing, either in the lively notes of " Yankee Doodle "
or the majestic strains of " Hail Columbia."
" The wildest excitement prevailed (Paine's Diary again) ;
everyone was cheering to the extent of his power. Every band
was playing its loudest, drum corps vieing with each other, while
artillery lent its aid. The very horses entered into the spirit of
the occasion and pranced proudly. Flags waved, hats, haver¬
sacks and canteens were raised on muskets or thrown along the
route of the general and staff. Trees and fences were climbed
along the route, and in the most perilous positions were soldiers
and, even on horseb,^ck, officers were seen embracing each other
in delirium of joy ; nor did this decrease in intensity until the
general had passed through the whole line and gone to his caipp,
when the demonstration became less concentrated, but still per¬
vaded the whole army, and was lost only in the darkness of the
night."
" On the evening of the 8th April and morning of the 9th,"
to quote a letter (29, 8, '71) of Lieutenant-Colonel Schoonover,
commanding the nth New Jersey Volunteers—"the air was full
of rumors about the surrender of Lee and his army. Flags of
truce had been passed back and forth. We were moving slowly
along on the morning of the 9th, when the column was suddenly
XXX vi i.
halted. This looked favorable and strengthened the reports won¬
derfully. Every one put on a significant look. The men took it
for granted, and, as if they could not wait for the announcement
of the news, shouts were heard on every side. How anxiously
we waited and how eagerly we listened. We caught up every¬
thing. Nothing was too good nor too great. About noon it was
known that the generals of the two armies were in conference and
the result was impatiently awaited. About four o'clock in the
afternoon General Meade and staff came in from the front. His
Chief of Staff, General Webb, preceded him, and announced to
the troops that lined the road on either side, that General Lee and
his army had surrendered. It is useless to attempt to describe the
scene that followed. The very ground seemed to shake with the
cheers and yells of triumph that burst forth from that memor-
aj)le field. A thousand hats went up at once. The men seemed
almost wild with joy. General Meade and staff rode through
the dense mass and imagination would now tell me that he was
obscured from sight with the shouts of a thousand mouths and
the waving and hurling of as many hats."
[Major-General McAllister at this point makes an observa¬
tion which would seem to imply that the old Third cheered rather
the event than any one man. "The men cheered him (General
Meade) as they never did before."]
" Officers and men grasped each others hands in wild delight.
The old war-worn and battle-stained colors seemed to wave ex¬
pressions of joy. Our men gathered around General McAllister,
who spoke to them amidst continuous cheers. America never
saw such a scene before, and I never expect to witness another.
That day the fate of the Rebellion was sealed and the soldier
knew and felt that the shot and shell from that army would never
again sweep a comrade from their side. All who were there felt
proud of it, and rejoiced that they had been participators in tlie
grand closing scene."
The writer's " labor of love " is finished with the war, for the
war terminated with the surrender of Lee. Every succeeding
shot was nothing more than the distant and dying echoes of the
thunderbolt which burst between the Appomattox and the James.
There, as when the clouds first gathered, the rattle of the Third
Corps musketry and the roar of their guns blent with the awful
uproar which ushered in and which terminated the great American
Conflict. Oh, glorious body of heroes ! how grateful the duty of
commemorating your achievements, whiclt demonstrated in fire
and attested in blood the truth of your claim of having ever
been
xxxviii.
" first in attack, last in retreat, third only in
name ! "
About seven years [this was originally published in 1872J
have elapsed since the last organized Confederate force submitted
to the Union administration. Not only has Nature healed the
scars inflicted by the struggle ; not only has industry effaced the
damages occasioned by the most terrible engines of war; but
even the bones of the fallen—whether washed out of their shal¬
low graves by the rain, or thrown up by the frost, or uprooted by
the beasts of prey—have disintegrated and dissolved, mingling
with their kindred clay, until not a vestige remains of the san¬
guinary convulsions upon the various battlefields, moistened with
the blood of hundreds of thousands of victims, and fattened with
the corpses of half as many thousands of the slain. Under these
circumstances, since nature, art and industry are so rapidly effacing
every memento of our civil war, it behooves the government and
the historian not to lose a single moment in their endeavors to
rescue from the darkness of oblivion the achievements of those
gallant men consigned to the gloom of the grave by their unsel¬
fish patriotism and voluntary immolation for the preservation of
their country and its institutions.
As it has been observed by one of our most popular writers,
Longfellow, in his " Gleam of Sunshine,"
" Let me review the scene.
And summon from the shadowy past
The forms that once had been."
Even so, let the pen of the poet and the historian plant their
own peculiar flowers over the tombs of the fallen, to grow, bud,
blossom and flourish in amaranthine beauty and freshness, that
their odor and charms may keep in everlasting remembrance the
devotion and the glpry of the illustrious dead, and perpetuate the
remembrance of the living who emulated their virtues, partook of
their labors, shared their sufferings and participated in their dan¬
gers. Among these last the prominent figure in this little Memo¬
rial is the commander of the combined Second-Third Corps,
Maj.-Gen. Andrew Atkinson Humphreys, the best soldier,
according to the Greek understanding, of the War : " Thus every¬
body who commands a [large] force [of armed and disciplined |
men, is indeed commonly called dégénérai ; yet, he who is able,
in a crisis, to collect himself and see his way through, he is the
real general; the other is a mere general-officer."
Lecourbe, the faithful lieutenant of Masséna at Zurich, and
xxxix.
of Moreau upon the Rhine, was " an incomparable general, at
once an intrepid soldier and a highly enlightened officer, who
united to a rare sagacity in regard to the knowledge of localities,
very uncommon audacity and an admirable tact." How aptly
these attestations apply to Humphreys, wonderful in his power
of seeing what had to be done and in doing it promptly—
a consummate handlef of troops. Colonel Paine, " the Path¬
finder of the Army of the Potomac," who served beside and
under Humphreys while the latter was chief of its staff, said a
very handsome thing of his superior, in making the following
analysis of his character, which tallies exactly with Dumas' esti¬
mate of the upright l.ecourbe : " For general, as well as inti¬
mate, acquaintance with the country in which he [Humphreys]
was operating, and the troops against whom he was engaged—
i» fact, the general relative situation of affairs—Humphreys was
second to no other Union general. * * From his usual
quiescent suavity he was metamorphosed into the impersonation '
of enthusiasm, in action."
[Note.—After the consolidation or combination of the Third
Corps with the Second (one of the most flagrant injustices of the
war) Birney's Division (First of the old Third, and now Third of
the combined Second-Third Corps) headquarter flag was re/izVc,
with a RED (Kearny, original') diamond in the centre. Mott's
Division (Second of the old Third, and now Fourth of the com¬
bined Second-Third Corps) flag was blue, with a white (Hooker,
original) diamond in the centre. The flag of the consolidated
divisions (First and Second of the Third Corps, and Third of the
combined Second-Third Corps)—at the close of the war com¬
manded by Mott, and finally by De Trobriand—was a swallow¬
tail, blue, with, in the centre, a combined red and white diamond :
or a white diamond within a red diamond, to recall both the
former First and Second Divisions (Kearny's and Hooker's) of
the original old Third Corps. The inner diamond was white,
upon a larger diamond red, so that the latter should show like a
red border around, the former; in the centre of the inner, the
white diamond, was a small blue trefoil, the badge of the Second
Corps. This is the statement of Major-General Mott (4, 5, 72),
correcting the previous description of his Aid, Captain Demarest,
published as note f, in the Citizen of 17th February, 1872.]
FARMYILLE, BRIDGING AND FORDING.
The Battle of the Heights of Farmville, or at Cumberland
Church, yth April, 1865.
Ina series of articles, which comprise reproductions of diaries,
reports, &c., published in the Neiv York Citizen and Round Table,
and in a series of pamphlets (I. to VI., VII. and VIII.), were pre¬
sented the gist of the labors of about three years, and a great deal
of additional information interwoven. The latter appeared between
1872 and 1874, and met with the full approbation of Major-Gene¬
ral A. A. Humphreys and other officers, prominent actors. The
first-named, on page VI. of the Preface to his "Virginia Campaign
of 1864-65," makes this allusion : " I am also indebted to Major-
General de Peyster for the valuable information contained in his
elaborate work, " La Royale," published at his own expense for
])rivate circulation, and for the aid I have derived from his cor¬
respondence with Confederate officers."
Of all the men esteemed great whom I have met in quite a
long life, the two who made the strongest impression of unquali¬
fied superiority were Major-General George H. Thomas and
Major-General Andrew Atkinson Humphreys. None others ap¬
proached them; Thomas was the grandest and Humphreys was
the most learned or scientific. Greater intimacy than existed
between Humphreys and the writer could scarcely be. Again,
and again, and again, in discussion, Humphreys expressed the
strongest indignatioif in regard to his not having been reinforced
on the afternoon of the 7th April, 1865, and he indorsed, in the
completes! degree, the utterances and decided judgments pub¬
lished in " La Royale," No. VIII.
Nothing could surpass the astonishment felt on reading in
Humphrey's book a concession that the river was " not fordable
for the infantry," was " impassable." He had not visited the spot
in the meanwhile, i. e. since he had fought there, and he must
have relied on the statements of others. I have had the river ex¬
amined, and if a regiment of generals were to rise up and main¬
tain the contrary, it would not shake my belief that it could have
been rendered passable for any Arm, for all the Arms in about
xli.
two hours. I have seen too much of the wonderful results of the
application of practical labor in the case of railroad accidents and
private enterprise not to feel perfectly certain on the subject. An
attempt will now be made to prove the correctness of the opinion
that any stream about one hundred feet wide and from three to
six feet deep, without a violent current and with abundance of
material handy, should be bridged so that troops could be passing,
platoon front, in about two hours. The object of this article or
chapter is to prove such to be the fact.
It would, perhaps, be no exaggeration to claim that no writer
on military subjects ever devoted more thought, time, labor and
even personal expense to the consideration of an operation in war
than the writer bestowed upon the pursuit of Lee from Petersburg
to Appomattox Court House. Every incident of the flight and
Chase v/as investigated with the greatest care, with the assistance
of every available authority in manuscript or print, and the help
and advice of Colonel W. H. Paine, " the Pathfinder of the Army
of the Potomac," Major-General Alexanders. Webb, and Major-
General A. A. Humphreys, who commanded the combined Second
and Third Corps, which did the bulk of the fighting, and persist¬
ently clung to and impeded or prevented the escape of the enemy.
In the course of this pursuit a problem presented itself which
proved unsolvable, and now must ever remain so, because the only
one who could have furnished the solution is in his grave. It has
always seemed incomprehensible why Grant did not reinforce
Humphreys at Cumberland Church or Heights of Farmville, send
across the Twenty-fourth and Sixth Corps, and keep Crook's cavalry
on the north side of the Apjiomattox an d finish up the business before
the night of the 7th April, 1865, instead of continuing the pur¬
suit forty to fifty miles as the roads run, and thirty-six to forty hours.
Even if Lee had got away in fragments from Cumberland Church
on the night of the yth-Sth April, 1865—that is supposing the
Sixth and Twenty-fourth Corps had crossed to the north side to
the assistance of Humphreys—there were still the Fifth Corps and
Sheridan's cavalry on the south side to head him off—as they after¬
wards did at Appomattox Court House. One of the excuses
made for not reinforcing Humphreys was that the Appomattox
was " impassable " at Farmville. The answer to this is clear;
Crook's cavalry did get across by fording or wading, belly deep,
and, according to Gen. Tremain, of Crook's staff, when across they
got into a muddle, were roughly handled, repulsed, and repassed
the river, fording or wading the stream a second time. No in¬
fantry attempted to cross until late at night, when they could be
of no use.
In this article it is proposed to show that the Appomattox was
xlii.
not "impassable" at Farmville; that it could have been bridged
with ordinary diligence within about two hours, and that the only
reason it was not crossed or bridged was because the will was
wanting ; on whose part who shall, or rather, can say ; " shall,"
as a matter at this moment of sentimental excitement in favor of
a far too highly estimated man ; " can," because it is impossible
to enter into the heart and brain of an impassive and reticent in¬
dividual, there to discover reasons or motives. An opinion I
have ; and if any one, who has the right, asks me that opinion the
answer is ready ; no one has a right to publish an opinion as a
fact when only circumstantial evidence, indirect, however simi¬
larly corroborated, can be presented.
When Gustavus found some military works which he had
ordered to be made had been delayed, and among other excuses
brought forward for the tardiness was the frost in the ground;
the King answered : " The harder the ground the harder they
should have worked," and that " A good will would have sur¬
mounted all obstacles ; " and then, to show what good will can
effect, a few days afterwards cow-cribs and stable-racks, obtained
from the neighboring farms, supplied the want of scaling ladders.
On these they mounted to the assault and took a fortress (Frank-
fort-on-the-Oder), within whose walls there was an army rather
than a garrison. (Exact parallel. Larpent, I., 5-6. Welling¬
ton's novel scaling ladders.) The Thirty Year's War is the best
horn-book for a soldier wherein to learn what energy, courage,
capacity and real cavalry can effect.
There is a very curious parallel to the operations of the 7th,
8th and 9th April, 1865, in those narrated by Koch, in his " His¬
tory of tire German Empire during the reign of Ferdinand III.,"
Vienna, 1865. II., 261-263. Baner was retreating after his
attempt to surprise Ratisbon, with the sole thought of saving his
army. Fighting was continuous between the pursuers and pur¬
sued, and Baner only escaped destruction by being a half-hour
ahead. He got througfi the Pressnitz Pass just sufficiently in advance
to avoid the ruinous effects of a very smart and energetic attempt
to outflank him and cut him off on the part of the Imperial com¬
mander-in-chief, Piccolomini, who was at the head of forces far
superior in efficiency to those of the Swedes. The circumstances,
if duly examined and weighed, were very similar to those at Farm¬
ville on the afternoon of the 7th April, 1865. The Swedes had
suffered a great loss (similar to that experienced by the Rebels
on Sailor's Creek, Proper, and " Little ; " the latter where Wright's
Sixth Corps and Sheridan fought) and were sharply pressed and
clung to by the Imperial General Geleen, playing the very part
of Humphreys during Lee's retreat.
xliii.
Now comes the point, Geleen was doing all that man could
do and hammering at the Swedish rear-guard, holding and delay¬
ing, so to speak, the retreating forces at Pressnitz, as I am con¬
vinced was the case at Farmville. Piccolomini, in our case Grant,
could have finished Baner (Lee) there. By some writers Picco-
lomini's action was excused as an error ; by others it was imputed
to intention. The latter held that Piccolomini was determined
that no one but himself should enjoy the honor of capturing
Baner. Those who take the part of Piccolomini ex.plain his con¬
duct on the plea that he found Baner in such a strong position
that he turned aside to Kaden. This is exactly equivalent to
Grant's not reinforcing and assisting Humphreys, and, instead,
pushing on to Appomattox Court House where Sheridan was to
reap the greater part of the glory ; whereas, if Grant had reinforced
and assisted Humphreys at Cumberland Church, the lion's share
tf the credit must have fallen to that officer. In our case, in
April, 1865, Humphreys was roughly handling the enemy all the
time, and pressing him at Cumberland Church, just exactly as an
Imperial corps commander was giving no respite to Baner; and
roughly handled the Swedes at Mies, in the same way that
Humphreys, at the very least, might have inflicted a defeat on
Lee on the Heights of Farmville. Humphreys never got over
the temporary suppression or withholding of his telegrams on the
6th-7th, by which the credit which belonged to him remained
unknown to the public and inured to the glory of others. I have
always maintained, and nothing can convince me to the contrary,
that a close examination of the facts will show, that if opportuni¬
ties had been utilized as they had been on other occasions, but
as they only were to the full, and as advantage was taken of
them only once, and then by Thomas after Nashville, under far
more difficult circumstances. Lee's fate would have been decided
on the 7th April, p. m., 1865, and not unnecessarily postponed to
the 9th M., forty miles farther on.
[Note.—In Note 1 to pages 53 and 54, Lieutenant Owen,
in his " In Camp and Battle with the Washington Artillery
of New Orleans," states that " Colonel Walton was at once
appointed by General Beauregard Chief of Artillery of the 'Army
of the Potomac' (as the Confederate Army in Virginia was then
called." This afterwards was Lee's "Army of Northern Virginia."
At that time the embryo Union grand army of the Atlantic zone
was styled the "Army of North-eastern Virginia," which became
the famous " Army of the Potomac," and as such, alone, will live
in history. This statement of Lieutenant Owen is new to almost
everyone ; but it is not more novel that there were two Third
xliv.
Corps in the Union Armies in Virginia in 1862, although there
was only one, in unique grandeur, the Third Army Corps, Army
of the Potomac. There were two corps recognized as Third in
the summer of 1862; one " the Old Fighting Third Corps as we
understand it" of which the First and Second Divisions (in
reality all that remained of the original Third Corps, commanded
by Heintzleman under McClellan on the Peninsula, and after¬
wards under Pope) were consolidated with the Second Corps, and
the Third Division, an entire stranger to the old Third and added
to it after Gettysburg, which was consolidated in the spring of
1864 with the Sixth. This disruption or assassination of the Third
Corps was one of the most unjust and morally unauthorized actions
of tyranny done during the war. The other Third Corps, in the
Army of Virginia under Pope, was commanded by McDowell,
who previously had what was known as the First Corps of the
Army of the Potomac. This double enumeration has led to mis¬
apprehensions, because, in the summer of 1862, there were two
corps known as the Third, one under Heintzleman, one under
McDowell^ the latter entirely distinct, serving under Pope.]
Over three years (repeating to emphasize) was occupied in
collecting information in connection with the last six months of
the career of the two armies of the Potomac. At that time no
idea was entertained that the Official Records of the Rebellion
would ever be collected, collated and published. At the rate
they are printed, it will be years before the transactions of the
spring of 1865 can be expected to appear. Consequently, with¬
out them, any narrative must be based on what is accessible; the
inaccessible cannot be taken into account. The plans which
appear with this battle were prepared with great care, under the
supervision of Major-General A. A. Humphreys, Chief of Engi¬
neers, U. S. A., for a work which was published in eight parts
in 1872 and 1873, entitled "La Royale;" or "the Grand
Hunt of the Army of the [Union] Potomac." To this General
Humphreys alludes, knd cites it as an authority in the Preface of
his " Virginia Campaigns of 1864 and 1865," published in 1883, is¬
sued by Charles Scribner's Sons, as the concluding number of their
War Series. No expense nor labor was spared in preparing " La
Royale," and the author is greatly indebted to a number of
individuals for assistance in the shape of communications, state¬
ments, diaries and reports, and likewise the loan of pamphlets and
rare books which he was not able to purchase or even to hear of
except by accident. If any errors have occurred they are the
result, NOT of prejudice, but of accident.
The other two maps or plans likewise appearing in this con-
xlv.
nection were prepared under the supervision of General Humph¬
reys. The writer is also in possession of the, or an original,
map of Colonel W. H. Paine, " Pathfinder of the Army of the
Potomac." It is on a very large scale and all the movements or
marches of the Union or loyal columns were marked upon it by
Colonel Paine. The writer had also a number of small maps or
diagrams, as well as those published in rough or in detail. The
dispatches and telegrams were copied from the collection made
for and in the possession of Major-General Alexander S. Webb,
during the winter and spring of 1864-5, Chief of Staff of the
Army of the Potomac, or from copies furnished from Washington.
The reports cited are from copies made at Washington. All
possible assistance to render the result correct was furnished by
different officers of the combined Second-Third Corps, and other
friends and accquaintances who participated in the events under
"consideration.
Why Lee made any stand at all at Cumberland Church, or the
Heights of Farmville, seems inexplicable. The only troops har¬
assing him after he had got across the Appomattox were the
combined Second-Third Corps, under Humphreys, which had
followed him across High Bridge, and Crook's cavalry, which had
fired into his stragglers ; but this cavalry had been stopped by
the burning of the bridges at Farmville, which occurred under their
noses [Tremain]. A time-table of events would be very instructive.
Adjutant Owen, in his book, "In Camp and Battle" (page 377),
says that Longstreet's command, including that formerly under
Hill, reached Farmville early this morning, and the Washington
Artillery "went into park to rest." " Provisions were distributed
for the first time."
[A comparatively small stiffening of infantry, such as both
Pleasonton and J. E. B. Stuart had at Brandy Station, would have
either made Gregg's charge effective or else saved him from the
panic which ensued, as Tremain admits, and have enabled him to
hold his ground. To get this infantry across, if they were unable
to imitate the fording by Humphreys troops through Flat Creek,
jtist about as wide as the Appomattox at Farmville, eighty to one
l^undred feet (376), with the water up to their arm-pits (378),
while bridges were built in an incredibly short space of time for
the passage of the rest of the infantry and of the artillery and
ambulances, " a temporary bridge might have been improvised
with wagons loaded with stones at intervals instead of trestles."
When the militiaunder General Robert van Rensalaer, in October,
1780, in pursuit of Sir John Johnson, refused to ford the Mohawk
River, " the wagons were driven into the river, behind each other,
and the troops passed from one to the other by wading on the
xlvi.
tongues." The Mohawk is great deal wider, fully as deep, if not
much deeper in the channel near Fort Rensalaer, and much more
rapid than the Appomattox at Farmville. This method of fording
is quoted from the proceedings of a court martial and the testi¬
mony of Major Lewis R. Morris.]
Owen is brevity itself, but he seems to refer to Lee's general's dis¬
positions to make a stand. Lee had gained sufficient upon Humph¬
reys " to intrench strongly." This looks like as if hours had been
thrown away and the gain of a few hours would have brought his
van to Appomattox Station in time for his infantry to have saved the
train of cars which were captured by Custer. About 1.20 p. m.
Humphreys again struck Lee, and made such an impression that
he claims to have got in among the Rebel batteries, which were
afterwards silenced by his own. About the same time the head of
the Twenty-fourth Corps, to which a pontoon train was attached,
was at Farmville. At 2.20 p. m. Wright's Sixth Corps was in
Farmville. Humphreys had asked the direct support of the Fifth
Corps, which was most handy and which might have followed him
straight, without delay or difficulty, across High Bridge.
Consider the situation. The Army of Northern Virginia,
whatever was its real strength, was at Cumberland Church in a
strong position, strongly entrenched, with every apparent inten¬
tion of making a decided stand. Humphreys had two divisions,
twelve thousand nominally, and, within three miles, Barlow's
division, six thousand men. Deducting stragglers, &c., he may
not have had two-thirds of that number in hand. At Farmville,
four miles away, was the Twenty-fourth Corps, say ten thou¬
sand, allowing for straggling, besides a portion of the Twenty-
fifth Corps; in fact, Ord's Army of the James, immediately with
him, over fifteen thousand men ; the Sixth Corps, eighteen thou¬
sand men, and Crook's division of cavalry, five thousand men.
The Fifth Corps numbered about seventeen thousand ; it is im¬
possible to arrive at actual strength, for very large allowances
must be made for syagglers and malingerers and honestly used
up men. Deduct one-quarter or more from the returns on paper
and there were forty to forty-five thousand effectives, gradually
piling up and piled up in Farmville before, at, and after noon, 7th
April, 1865.
Lee, according to Humphreys, was in his presence until 8 p. m.,
and how much longer he could not tell. What was being done,
except by Humphreys, between i p. m. and whatever hour Lee
moved off in the darkness, by the Union infantry—nothing.
Meade, to his credit be it chronicled, was urging energetic action
and promising support and assistance to Humphreys, which was
not given. The cavalry forded belly-deep; no hour is given. Adju-
xlvii.
tant Owen (378), says it was in the afternoon, which may mean
any hour after midday. At 2 p. m. the Twenty-fourth Corps ought
to have been marching across the river ; the Sixth Corps at 4
p. M., on improvised bridges. That Lee had not budged, is
plainly shown that late in the afternoon (4.30 p. m., A. A. H.)
Miles undertook to make a flank attack in reverse and was bloodily
repulsed, although the Rebel attempt to follow up their success
also came to grief.
Now turn to the maps. The main road to Lynchburg crosses
the Appomattox at Farmville, and runs from a mile to a mile and
a half in the rear of Lee's position—that is to the west of Cum¬
berland Church. Adjutant Owen admits that, if the Union
cavalry had not been repulsed, Lee might have been taken
prisoner. These are his words (379) : " It was fortunate that we
A^ere there just on the nick of time, for had Gregg obtained pos¬
session of the road, he stood a good chance of cutting off General
Lee and staff and capturing them.
If any of the cavalry and infantry who were on the south
of the Appomattox had crossed it further up, west of Farm¬
ville, and there were several fords in that direction and a bridge
at Sand's, they could have struck the Lynchburg road in the
direction of Concord Church (Court House ?) or certainly at
New Store, which was reached by the Rebel forces in the course
of the night of the yth-Sth. For this inaction, inertion, Meade
certainly does not seem to have been to blame in the least until
towards night, when he appears to have given up in despair ; for
he telegraphed to Humphreys : " You will have to take care of
yourself." Meade had been right and Grant wrong at Amelia Salt
Sulphur Springs on the early morning of the 6th. Grant him¬
self was at Farmville somewhere between four and five o'clock
on the 7th, because Wright telegraphs the fact at the latter hour.
It may be sacrilege to the masses to criticise Lee in this
retreat, or Grant in following him up, but Lt. Mangold of the
Prussian Artillery, in his consideration of tjie Army of Virginia in
August, 1862, makes use of an expression in regard to Pope
which is not inapplicable to whoever is responsible for what was
done and what was not done at Farmville on the 7th April after
twelve o'clock. " He did not appear to have had the ability to
think himself into the situation." In regard to Pope, far be it
from the writer, vvho is his friend, to endorse the' opinion that
that this remark applies, or is just, to Pope.
When the great object of a three years' struggle, the destruction
of the Army of Northern Virginia, and the opportunity was so
promising and near at hand at Cumberland Church, what was the
use of postponing it a day and half or two days, and thirty to fifty
xlviii.
miles (according to writers) farther on, to occur at Appomattox
Court House.
Quite an able, bold, highly educated soldier and author wrote
an article for the Galaxy, entitled " Broken Idols," and he
certainly proved his case if correct in his facts, and as facts are
yet established, he was right and did so. Lee was one of the
" Broken Idols," and he proved himself so by losing so many
precious hours at Cumberland Church. It is true that Humphreys
was close upon his heels, and had torn him sorely and bled him
severely on the preceding day, never relaxing the pressure. Lee
was in a very bad spot at Antietam when McClellan let him go,
although McClellan can shift a portion of the blame on the
shoulders of very bad counselors. Lee was in a worse place at
Williamsport and Falling Waters. Meade let him escape, although
it has been asserted that Lincoln telegraphed to him to attack,
and if failure resulted to show that the President's orders as his
complete exoneration, and if he triumphed to destroy the dis¬
patch and assume all the glory. In other words, Lincoln was
willing to assume the whole responsibility of failure and to relin¬
quish every claim of credit for success.
Compare the pursuit by Thomas after Nashville with that
made by any other Union general after a victory. Thomas had to
get everything ready to profit by a success to follow up a victory.
He had to mount his cavalry as well as to organize his troops; to
gather up the reins after he had harnessed the team. To make
his own command complete Sherman had depleted Thomas, and
yet, when the army which fronted Thomas before Nashville had
been defeated, the following it up left nothing but scattered
wrecks, resembling the shattered timbers of a mighty ship which
had struck a mightier rock, and the sea is covered with fragments
to reward the bold wrecker who amid the tempest puts forth to
harvest them. Had Sherman left Thomas the pontoon train
which the latter asserted belonged to him, he could have crossed
Duck River once, and then there would have been nothing left of
Hood but chips.
It is all true. Lee broke away on the ad-ßd April, 1865, and
the casting about, search and pursuit, in many senses, began on
the 3d ; but the real hunt, the chase, with all the excitement of
catching sight of the magnificent game and again losing sight of
it, and following the tracks and droppings and scent, did not begin
until the 6th, when Humphreys, alwaS s vigilant, alacritous and
ready, took in the whole revelation of Lee's apparition and move¬
ments at a glance, and never lost track or hold, more or less
strong, until noon of the 9th, when nothing but orders prevented
the combined Second-Third Corps, supported by the Sixth,
xlix.
i
from settling the question, as it should have been settled, not by
muchas palabras, but vi et armis—destruction, as it should have
been. '■'■Fauca verba, Sir John;" or "paucapallabris," as Shakes¬
peare reads in divers places.
So much eulogy has been expended on the following up of
Lee, and Grant has been declared a greater general than Frede¬
ric the Great, or Hannibal, and that perhaps he equalled a
J ulius Caesar, it may seem like sacrilege to question the sagacity
of even his most insignificant movements. Why, however, Julius
Caesar was placed ahead of Hannibal is difficult to conceive, since
Frederic the Great, Napoleon, Wellington, and a number of other
competent judges unite in the decision that Hannibal—Montes¬
quieu's " Colossus of Antiquity "—was the greatest captain that
ever appeared on this planet.
General Humphreys, the soul of energy or strength and
despatch, was always of the opinion that, after the victory of
Miles, if he had continued his march in force towards Suther¬
land's Station, pursuing the enemy by the Claiborne Road, instead,
as ordered, of leaving the work to Miles' Division alone, it is
probable that the whole Rebel force Would have been captured
on the morning of the 2d April. As it was. Miles gained a bril¬
liant little victory; but the majority of the enemy retreated and
moved up the Appomattox toward Amelia Court House, where
they arrived about midday on the 4th April. As it was, the com¬
bined Second-Third Corps was recalled towards Petersburg,
and in the unnecessary movements to and fro Lee gained a start
of twenty hours. _ Sheridan seems to have coincided in this view.
Lee's second loss of time was on the 5th, when he actually
made a movement towards Jetersville with a view of attacking
Sheridan. This involved another of those night marches which
were more wearing on his tired troops than even the want of pro¬
visions, on which so much stress has been laid. It is utterly im¬
possible in this summary to go into anything like details, but the
facts will be found on pages 374-'90.—Owen's " In Camp and
Battle."
Thus it will be seen that Lee's tergivisations or delays were
as suicidal and fatal to his escape as any retarding was to the
other side, whoever may have been to blame. Still, as the chief
got the glory, he ought to bear it ; at all events, it is easy enough
to add and subtract. Lee lost hours of inestimable value on
the 5th, and again on the 7th. To compensate for this in¬
volved night-work—most telling on well-fed men and absolutely
killing to fasting mortals, when no rest was afforded on an en¬
suing day. Without the delays which can safely be set down as
at least equivalent to a day's march, if Lee had kept straight on
1.
he would have reached Appomattox Court House by noon of the
8th, at latest. From Petersburg to that point is not over one
hundred miles by the longest route ; which, to get over, certainly
does not require more than three days of forced march, equal to
that made by the Sixth Corps hurrying on to Gettysburg, or of
the Fifth Corps and of the Ninth Corps hastening to Appomat¬
tox Court House.
[Note. Marching.—Simply to exhibit what infantry can do
with their legs. General Crawford brought up "3000 fresh troops"
to join Wellington on the battlefield of Taleveira, 29th July, 1809,
" having passed over, in regular order, sixty-two English miles in the
preceding twenty-six hours" (Alison, HI., 321 [2]); and Lord
Lake, with the English cavalry, ist April, 1805, made a forced
march to surprise the Mahratta horse, came upon them unawares,
utterly routed them, dispersed them, slew one thousand, and re¬
turned to his camp the same day, after a march, in twelve hours,
of fifty miles (A., III., 169 [i]). Even this was exceeded by
Lord Lake's pursuit and defeat of Holkar at Furrackabad, when
the greater part of the English cavalry had ridden seventy miles
within twenty-four hours, besides fighting and routing the whole
of those horsemen which had been the terror of that region.
\Ibid, 166 (2).]
" Nicholson's Indian Mutiny" (374-5) : "The splendid, admir¬
able and effective Punjab Guards, says Wilson in his ' Zanskar, or
the Abode of Man,' half foot, half horsemen, marched (at the
outbreak of the great Indian Mutiny) from Mudan six hours after
it got the order, and was at Attok (thirty miles off) next morning,
fully equipped for service. This legion was pushed on to Delhi,
a distance of 580 miles or thirty regular marches, which they ac¬
complished in twenty-one regular marches. After thus marching
twenty-seven miles a day for three weeks, the Guards reached
Delhi on 9th June^and three hours afterwards engaged the
enemy hand to hand, every officer being more or less wounded."
Lynchburg is one hundred and twenty miles W. S. W. of
Richmond ; Appomattox Court House, as stated, less than one
hundred. In view of the tremendous marches made at different
times by troops, and kept up day after day, six days of energetic
progresswould havecarried Lee to Lynchburg without necessitating
any of the fighting to which he was subjected. [Farmville to Appo¬
mattox Court House twenty-five miles in a bee-line, Petersburg to
Jetersville forty miles, Jetersville to Farmville about twenty.]
On the 6th the combined Second-Third Corps marched and
fought from Jetersville to the mouth f Sailor's Creek, 6th. They
Ii.
were on the move from early morning to dark night, fighting all
the time over fourteen miles, having already moved from their
camps in the morning three or four miles before they struck the
enemy. It has been called one hundred miles in round numbers
from Petersburg to Appomattox Court House by the routes
followed. Perhaps the most direct march would have greatly
shortened the distance, but, at all events, Lee had from the night
of the ad-ßd to the early afternoon of the 8th to do the distance,
and at that time no Union troops whatever were there to annoy
him, to stop him or to gobble his trains of provisions.
" Livre de Guerre Moderne a l'usage des Militaires de toutes
les .-Xrmes et de tous les Pays, par César L. D'Albeca, ancien
officier supérieur d'état-major, ingénieur civil, &c. Londres :
Berlin: La Haye; Paris: St. Petersbourg: Rome: Turin: 1872." .
In the above work, pages 261, &c.. Section " Military Bridges,"
a great deal of information will be found pertinent to the circum¬
stances under treatment. M. D'Albeca, speaking of the em¬
ployment of casks as floats, omits to mention that large [tobacco]
hogsheads [of which there were plenty in Farmville] might have
been used instead of trestles, filled with stones or any rubbish, as
piers ; as we have seen that the Appomattox is not over one hun¬
dred and twenty feet wide, five such piers would have permitted the
use of beams from houses of the most ordinary size. Perhaps
this would have been the handiest and most substantial way of
building a strong temporary bridge, to give strength to the piers
which would have required the placing of the hogsheads in tiers.
They might have been simply girded with ropes, with no use of
anchors, because there was no freshet in the river at the time. In
fact I received a letter from Farmville, in answer to questions in
regard to Ford, stating that, owing to the dam above the rail¬
road bridge, the water does not deepen in the spring.
General Humphreys perfectly agreed with me as long as I
continued to write and publish on this subject, and I was as¬
tonished to find in his "Virginia Campaigns of 1864 and 1865"
(page 388) the following paragraph : " The bridges were burnt
and our troops concentrated about Farmville during the day
were, with the exception of Crook's cavalry, prevented from cross¬
ing, as the river was not fordable for infantry, and barely for
cavalry."
[There seems to be little use, then, of discussing the matter
ofFordingand Bridging the Appomattox, 7th April, 1865. Troops
recruited from brave peoples or races, disciplined, and well offi¬
cered, have never failed to respond to the will and wishes of a chief
in whom they have confidence. Ever since the noted day on
which Perdiccas forded the Nile to attack Ptolemy Soter, and his
Iii.
brave troops fought breast deep in that river, B. C. 321, no stream
four to four and a half feet deep has ever stopped troops deter¬
mined to get across. According to Tremain, Crook's battery
animals forded with their owners ; under such circumstances infan¬
try sufficient to stiffen the cavalry could have waded or have been
carried across, " en croupe" behind the troopers. Much as I have
studied and talked upon this matter, one fact has been overlooked
until this very day (17, 3, '86) which disproves the impassability
of the Appomattox by infantry and cavalry.—At page 17 of his
"War Memoranda," part II, published herewith, Tremain mentions
Lord's Battery as being with the cavalry that waded or forded^
and among the "Errata" noted by Tremain himself, under date
17th December, 1885, he says "this line [that is a new line of
battle to meet the victorious rebels] was formed, and Reade's
Battery put in position under his [Tremain's] personal direction,
while Crook was rallying Gregg's brigade." General Tremain is
a lawyer of high standing and experience, and therefore perfectly
acquainted with the force and effect of language and testimony,
and until anyone can disprove his personal evidence, the fact re¬
mains incontrovertible that the Appomattox at Farmville was not
" impassable," but was passable for cavalry and their pack trains and
artillery, and therefore fordable for itifantry. Here rests MY
case as to Fording at Farmville, 7th April, 1865.]
Why General Humphreys altered his opinion I could never
understand. His book was published in 1883, and he died in the
ensuing winter, so that there was no opportunity of discovering
his reasons for the above paragraph. We were in constant
correspondence, exchanging letters once a week as a rule, some¬
times offener, much offener. Humphreys was a very affectionate
man, very determined at the moment, none more so) but very
easily influenced by those that he loved, and he was particularly fond
of Wright, who (the latter) was worthy of any man's love. Although
an immense amount of information had been accumulated, I was
determined to obtaiif facts which could not be controverted, and
Mr. C. M. Bissell, Superintendent of the Hudson R. R. R.,
wrote to the Superintendent of the Norfolk and Western R. R.,
and the latter kindly sent, not only a plan, but answers to various
queries.
Between the piers of the railroad bridge at Farmville the
distance is one hundred and four to one hundred and eight feet,
and the length of the wagon-bridge one hundred and nineteen
feet, out to out. The banks of the river are low about six to
eight feet'over ordinary water, soil sandy, and the depth of the
stream at ordinary stage of water two and one half to three feet.
It will be remembered that Mr. Hooper stated that the water, if
not affected by freshets below the dam, and there was no freshet
in the river at the time now treated of. Superintendant Sands, N.
& W. R, R., says there is no ford near the town. Does this
mean at this date, 1885? because the statement directly contra¬
dicts several letters written from the spot by other parties twelve
to twenty years ago. Maps and facts. One of the facts is. Crook's
division of cavalry forded belly-deep, five-thousand strong, heavily
laden battery animals, and batteries; some of the Sixth (?) Corps ar¬
tillery forded, also infantry. While dictating this very paragraph
a neighbor, who served in the Nineteenth Corps, told me that this
very day he drove a loaded wagon through a ford two feet and
nine inches deep, clay-bottom and rutted, and that for personal
and peculiar reasons he measured the depth. Thirty-three inches
is more than belly-deep ordinary horses.
* Conceding that the Appomattox is one hundred and twenty
feet wide wide out and out, and thirty to thirty-six inches deep,
these measurements exactly accord with the conditions established
by the work—"The Book of Modern War"—in regard to military
trestle bridges, which says that they are proper for rivers less than
fifty yards across, between twelve and thirteen feet deep, with
a current equivalent to about four miles an hour; maximum
height of trestles twelve to fifteen feet; the bottom ought to be
firm and comparatively level. In extreme cases a depth of ten
to twelve feet justifies the Use of trestles if the current is not strong.
In river of little depth and jiot rapid the body of the bridge
supports may be constituted of wagons and gun-carriages.
When General van Renselaer was following up Sir John
Johnson, in the autumn of 1780, he improvised a bridge with
ordinary country wagons across the Mohawk, near Ft. Renselaer,
and the Mohawk, except after long droughts, is a wider and more
rapid and difficult stream to ford than the Appomattox, or at all
events was so over one hundred years ago—yes, forty years ago;
but since the piers of the railroad bridge were standing, and
there were any quantity of large trees and buildings in close
vicinity to furnish material, a cantilever bridge, even supposing
that there had to be a single support or pier in the centre, could
have been immediately thrown.
William H. Spanburgh, now Superintendent of the Hudson
Bridge Works, has done a great deal of work in the region around
my home. He enlistened as private in the 159th Regiment N.
Y. V. I., was wounded five times, four times in one battle, and
was promoted to a lieutenancy. He is a practical man, prompt
boss, and able mechanic. He came on a place with five men
and, with ordinary lumber, in half a day—about four hours work¬
ing time—built a temporary bridge across a ravine eighty-four feet
liv.
wide, sufficiently strong to bear the transportation of the iron¬
work for the perrrianent structure. Some of the supports had to
he about twenty feet high. With such an example the matter
can he reduced down to a simple rule of three. If five men with
material brought to them as they worked could put up a viaduct
which would enable men to cross with very heavy weights in four
or five hours, how long ought it to have taken veteran engineers,
after several years of active service, with an unlimited supply of
practiced laborers and adequate material, to bridge the Appo¬
mattox at Farmville so that a couple of corps, with their guns and
trains, could cross ?
The feasibility, or impossibility, of Bridging or Fording the
Appomattox was not an insoluble problem, but one based on
facts demonstrable then, as now ; the ordinary depth of water is
given by scientific testimony.
A resident, an eye-witness, wrote there was no freshet in the
stream at that date. Crook's cavalry, wading or fording it back¬
wards and forwards, verifies these statements. Over and above
this fording by the cavalry, certain localities are designated on
the maps as fords;
If infantry and artillery could not ford, the river was not so
deep but that workmen could wade in and place trestles.
The span of the railroad bridge is 109 feet ; that of the wagon-
bridge 119 feet. There are five hundred buildings in the town.
There are few buildings which will not furnish beams 20 feet
long. Concede the greatest width of the stream 120 feet. Five
very strong, ten strong trestles would have been sufficient, and they
could have been put together, placed, ballasted and secured in an
hour. Meanwhile the rest of the material could have been
selected and brought to the spot, and another hour would have
more than sufficed to have completed a bridge over which fifteen
men could have marched abreast, eight mounted men, or two
equipages. A division of cavalry, however, did pass to and fro,
having forded belly deep—this is incontrovertible proof of depth
and condition of stream, and therefore it could have been forded
again by other troops.
Four or five mechanics came on my place under a boss who
had been an old soldier. Dne team brought the materials, and
in half a day they built a structure in some places twenty feet
high, over which they were enabled to carry with safety the iron
for a permanent bridge strong enough to permit the passage of
heavily-loaded teams ; a bridge which was guaranteed to permit
the passage of 33 cwt., and they said that they made the guaran¬
tee far below the actual carrying power.
Iv.
Reduce these facts to a simple rule of three. If one team and
five jnen could construct a temporary viaduct in half a day, what
ought not the thousands under the direction of military authority
and scientific proficiency, with ample materials at- hand, have
accomplished in one hour. My bridge was 84 feet long; the
bridge of Farmville would have been less than half longer ; the
supports of my bridge had to be twice as high. The fact that the
men at Farmville had to work in water up to their waists is a
consideration not worthy of being taken into account ; railroad rails
would have answered for beams and ties, simple boards cris-
crossed would have'constituted a roadway capable of sustaining
any weight. All the difficulty would have been the trestles, or
cob-piers. Ingenuity would have found no difficulty in making
and placing them. The will and the directing mind was want¬
ing. Why ? Echo answers, why ! and the echo would be repeated
by every effort at investigation.
In regard to bridging. Captain James Chester, Third United
States Artillery, in " Correspondence," page 276, September, 1855,
number of the "yourtial of the U. S. Military Service Instiiutioti,
says that yesterday [23d June, 1885], I attended the Military
Exhibition in Agricultural Hall. " I saw two trestle bays of a
bridge laid by pontoo7Úers, and a piece of artillery driven over it in¬
side five minutes." As no figures are given it is impossible to be
definite, but in the Aide Mémoire, published in England, 22 feet is
given as the length of the main beam, and thus five trestle bayä
would have sufficed to bridge the Appomattox at Farmville, and
if two bays—all the appliances prepared and ready at hand—
were laid and artillery passed in five minutes, certainly five bays
ought to have been improvised with all kinds of material in abun¬
dance, and any amount of labor disposable. There was no abso¬
lute need, however, of constructing a trestle bridge. It appears
the railroad bridge piers were there, plenty of trees, lumber, &c.,
for a cantilever bridge. If Suworrow, when the arch of the
Devil's Bridge on the St. Gothard's route was destroyed, leaving
a chasm 30 feet wide, and Suworrow was able to improvise a
bridge out of trunks of trees lashed together with the sashes of
his officers, practical Americans ought to have been able to
bridge the Appomattox without a moment's delay. I am not
engineer enough to use technical terms, but educated officers
ought to know that there is exactly such a method of laying a
bridge described as would have been precisely applicable to the
case of Farmville. Prolonges spliced would have been amply
sufficient for hauling and for lashing, shoving out long timbers
from either pier with what it would seem are termed " end-ties"
in the centre.
Ivi.
[In England they hold what are called Royal Military tourna¬
ments, in which all the different Arms exhibit their efficiency. In
tlie "Illustrated Naval and Military Magazine" for October,
1885, Vol. 3, No. 16, are two illustrations: r. " Royal Engineer
Bridge Equipment, or Field Wagon ; " 2. " Royal Engineers
Constructing a Flying Bridge over a River protected by Artillery
and Infantry," with a text in explanation which is hereinafter
presented. If a bridge could be thrown over a stream fifteen
feet wide in four minutes, a bridge at that rate ought to have
been thrown over a stream one hundred and five feet wide in
twenty-eight minutes ; allowing for ignorance of the depth and
bottom double the time, and then it would take fifty-six minutes ;
this with a simple detachment just sufficient to handle the
material. Take into consideration, as on the 7th April, 1865, no
necessity of any preparations for protection, a redundancy of
materials, close at hand, and a positive superfluity of disciplined
labor ; and double that time, two hours, ought to have sufficed
for the construction of means of crossing a stream one hundred
and five feet wide and fordable by cavalry, " belly deep," in less
than two hours.
"A fairly representative stream being laid down, fordable by
infantry, but impassable for guns, a mixed force essayed to cross
with artillery, and storm a work on the other side. For the first
time, a body of Royal engineers and infantry had a chance of
showing their ability before an audience at the Royal Military
Tournament. Covered by the fire of artillery and infantry,
the Royal engineers threw a bridge over a stream fifteen
feet wide in less than four minutes. The infantry, having
first topped a twelve-foot wall "like birds," kept down the fire
of the fort until the bridge was completed, then rushed the bridge,
followed by the guns, and escaladed a " practicable " wall with great
dash and vigor. Of course, many things were taken for granted.
Real rivers, real enemies, and real bullets are not to be found in
the arena at Islington, but, as a military spectacle, the infantry
display of 1885 marks a fresh advance in the work of the Royal
Military Tournament. The gymnastic training of the infantry,
the technical skill and speed of the Royal Engineers, and the
protective and covering work of the fire of infantry and artillery,
were as well illustrated as was possible in their space available.
All branches of the service are having a fair turn, and all efforts
are in the direction of persistent and continuous improvement."]
What makes me dwell upon this subject and repeat with so
much emphasis, is the incapability of understanding how it was
that when there was every chance of ending a terrible struggle of
four years within three or four miles and with amply sufficient
Ivii.
numbers to make the attempt then and there almost a certainty,
and a surplus of numbers to send ahead to make the matter a cer¬
tainty somewhere else, Grant did not see it. Grant never saw
anything he did not choose to see. These facts, which appear to
be susceptible of perfettly clear proof, have always awakened
questions as to the Why no really strenuous effort was made
to finish on the afternoon of the 7th, and Why the tremendous
strain was kept up for the further distance of thirty or forty miles
and forty-four hours.
Imagine the scene and the idea of a large army collected on
the south shore of a small stream, watching the smoke and hear¬
ing the rattle and roar of a battle which could decide and ter¬
minate a long contest, not crossing or being allowed to cross to
the assistance of their comrades engaged within three or four
miles. It was almost the same aggravating case as that of the
battle of Prague, 6th May, 1657, when the whole division or
column of Prince Maurice were prevented from crossing by the
want of sufficient pontoons to bridge the Moldau. The famous
cavalry General Sedlitz was so excited that he attempted to ford
or swim to the assistance of his comrades. He spurred his horse
into the Moldau, became entangled in a quicksand, and was with
difficulty extricated. There is a vast difference between the Mol¬
dau and the Appomattox; and in the latter case there was a
ponton train present, and if it had been absent plenty of ma¬
terials to build a bridge. Moreover, there was a ford by which
cavalry crossed " belly deep," with their pack-teams and artillery.
(Study up Alexander on the Hydaspes, B. C. 326, and his method
of crossing in the face of the army of Porus.)
All military histories, as a rule, are perfectly unsatisfactory on
the subject of Bridging and Fording. They deal in generalities,
and not in details. They are as blank in this respect as Csesar in
regard to the hygeine of his camps, or sanitary measures, which
led almost every writer to declare that there was no medical pro¬
visions or organizations in the Roman armies.
Under practical, energetic and audacious generals, with in¬
telligent troops, improvised bridges have been thrown, which
render the usual excuses almost ridiculous. Throughout read¬
ing and study, most extensive and careful, sufficient examples
were discovered to prove that in ninety-nine cases out of one
hundred, where a stream proved any obstacle, it did not exist in
nature, but in the general which it stopped. If the curious reader
takes up a book to learn the rules of fording, he will find set
down : " A ford should not be more than thirty to thirty-six
inches in depth for infantry, and forty inches for artillery ; though
there are many examples of fords having been crossed, which
Iviii.
were four feet in depth ; but, in such cases, there must be hardly
any current." (Jervis' " Manual of Field Operations," page 381.)
Forty inches never stopped any one whose personal interest
beckoned him across. Captain Leopold von Orlich, Prussian
Army, in his " Notes in India," speaking of the Ravee River,
gives its breadth as 200 feet, " with a depth of three and-a-half
feet, so that it is fordable at many places." I know a farmer who
is accustomed to ford with loaded team through a measured depth
of three and-a-half feet, and never considered it a matter of any
more than inconvenience.
How often have troops forded up to the waist, up to the arm¬
pits, up to the shoulders, up to the chin. Humphreys' infantry
forded Flat Creek arm-pit deep on the morning of the 6th April,
1865.
It is very remarkable, and almost unaccountable, how little
is related in detail of many extraordinary cases of improvising
bridges and fording of streams and rivers. Even technical works
are strangely silent on such important subjects, dealing in gener¬
alities when and where they should be most attentive to par¬
ticulars. One of the best examples of bold and successful Ford¬
ing is related in H. B. McClellan's " Campaigns of Stuart's
Cavalry," at pages 323, 324. " It had been necessary to halt the
command several times since the 25th June, 1863, to graze the
horses, for the country was destitute of provisions, and Stuart had
brought no vehicles with him, save ambulances. Upon reaching
Dranesville, Hampton's Brigade was sent to Rowser's Ford,
and made the passage early in the night ; but the Potomac was
so wide, the water so deep, and the current so strong, that the
ford was reported impracticable for the artillery and ambulances.
Another ford in the vicinity was examined, under circumstances
of great danger, by Captain R. B. Kennon of Stuart's staff, but it
was found to offer no better prospect of success, and Stuart de¬
termined to cross at Rowser's, if it were within the limits of
possibility. The causons and lunber-chesis were emptied on the
Virginia shore, a7id the am77iunitio7i was carried over by the cavalry-
me7i Í7i their ha7ids. The guns and caissons, although entirely sub-
77ierged during nearly the whole crossing, were safely dragged
through the river and up the steep and slippery bank, and by
three o'clock on the morning of the 28th the rear-guard had
crossed, and the whole command was established upon Maryland
soil. No more difficult achievement was accomplished by the
cavalry during the war. The night was calm and without a
moon. No prominent object marked the entrance to the ford on
either side, but horse followed horse through nearly a mile of
water, which ofte7i covered the saddles of the riders. When the
Ivix.
current was strong the line would unconsciously be borne down
the river, sometimes so far as to cause danger of missing the ford,
when some bold rider would advance from the opposite shore
and correct the alignment. Energy, endurance and skill were
taxed to the utmost ; but the crossing was effected, and so silently
that the nearest neighbors were not aware of it until daylight."
Extract from pages 323 and 324 of McClellan's " Life and Cam¬
paigns of Major-General J. E. B. Stuart." Boston, 1885.
" When the cavalry reached Columbia [middle of March,
1862] the bridge over Duck River was found in flames and the
river at flood stage " [bridges were constructed and thrown and
completed on the 30th]. On the same day the river became
fordable. " General Nelson succeeded in getting part of his di¬
vision across by fording on the 29th." Most of his troops crossed
by fording on the 30th. Buell was up at Shiloh, 6 p. m., dis¬
tance ninety miles from Columbia ; say eighteen miles a day.
—Major General Don Carlos Buell in Century, March, 1886
(pages 751-2), "Shiloh Reviewed."
[" His (Wellington's) clearness of judgment in military matters
was wonderful. It was shown once by his observation that two
villages stood directly opposite each other on either side of a
river, and consequently some means of communication must exist
between them. His guides declared there was no ford, but his
determined will told him to look for himself; he found a ford,
crossed, and won the decisive battle of Assye. Wellington was a
typical Englishman in his tenacity of purpose."—Page 105. " The
Will Power," by J. Milner Fothergill, M.D. London, 1885.]
Pertinent to fording where there was no opposition, as at
Farmville, according to Note from my Knapsack, " Putnam's
Magazine," vol. 4, April, 1854, page 372, 374, the United States
dragoons found no difficulty in fording the Rio Grande, where
the river was 272 yards wide and 51 inches deep, with a rapid
current; it is true the bottom was hard.
" When the Mail in which I [Godfrey T. Vigne, who traveled
in the United States in 1831, and wrote ' Six Months in
America,' published in America in 1833, page 100] was travel¬
ing, arrived at the North Branch of the Potomac, we found it
so swollen by the late rains that a passage seemed not only
dangerous but impracticable. The coachman, however, a cool
and determined fellow, crossed over on horseback ; he then re¬
turned, placed one of the passengers on the near leader, and re¬
solutely drove his four horses into the running torrent, which
was sixty or seventy yards in width, running like a mill-race, and
so deep that it reached nearly up to the backs of the horses. I
was with him on the box. The inside passengers pulled off" their
Ix.
coats and prepared to swim. The water forced itself into the
coach ; but we reached the opposite bank without disaster. On
the preceding evening the coachman had only prevented the mail
from being entirely carried away, by turning the horses' heads
down the stream, so that the coach and horses were swimming
for nearly thirty yards."—Page 107. " Six Months in America," by
Godfrey T. Vigne, Eng. Philadelphia, 1833.
As to fording arm-pit deep, shoulder or neck deep, and even
chin-deep, by infantry, there are plenty of examples. Ewell's
corps, or division, escaped in that way on the night of i3th-i4th
July, 1863. »
Parkman, in his " Montcalm and Wolfe," 1,412, states, August,
1756: "Early in the morning Montcalm had ordered Rigaud
to cross the river with the Canadians and Indians. There was a
ford three-quarters of a league above the forts, and here they
passed over unopposed, the English not having discovered the
movement. The only danger was from the river. Some of the
men were forced to swim, others waded to the waist, and others
to the neck : but they all crossed safely, and presently showed
themselves at the edge of the woods, yelling and firing their guns,
too far for much execution, but not too far to discourage the
garrison."
Another remarkable case of fording was that of the Elbe, near
Tangermund, by the Swedish cavalry and artillery, under Gus-
tavus. ("Harte," I., 363). "The bare recital of this act of
intrepedity, for nothing was lost, but here and thqre an empty
wagon, amazed Tilly beyond measure, as the stream in that
part was not supposed to be fordable."
" A few days after, when the Swedes took Havelburg by
assault, Winkel's Blue Brigade advanced to the attack through
the Havel, though the water reached up to the men's shoulders
(" Harte," I., 364). When Gustavus captured Frankfort-on-the-
Oder, on Palm Sunday, 1631 (Festival of the surrender of Lee,
1865), Monroe's regirnpnt, assaulting, crossed the wet ditch among
mud and water, which came up to their gorgets " [throat deep,
and won the bastion].
In 1572, during the war fought against Spain for the in¬
dependence of the United States of Holland (Watson's " Philip
II.," New York Society Library copy, i-3i5-'i6) "Tergoes was
relieved by P'ording the Hondt or Western Scheldt, seven miles
across, by the Spanish, German and Walloon troops."
" On 28th of September, 1575, as soon as it was dark, and
the tide had begun to retire, Ulloa entered the water [the Ford
between the islet of Philipsland and Duveland] at the head
of his troops, with the guides before him. The troops were fol-
Ixi.
lowed by two hundred pioneers ; and the rear-guard was formed
hy a company of Walloons, commanded hy an officer of the
name of Peralta. They could march only three men abreast,
on the top of a ridge of earth or sand, and were often obliged
to wade up to the shoulders, and to bear their muskets on
their heads to preserve them from the water. They had ad¬
vanced but a little way when the Dutch and Zealanders ap¬
proached, and began a furious discharge of their small arms
and artillery. And not satisfied with this, many of them leaped
into the water, and with hooks fastened to the ends of long poles
laid hold of the soldiers oppressed with the weight of the elements
through which they toiled ; massacring some, and plunging
others in the waves. Nothing but the darkness of the night,
which prevented the two squadrons of the enemy's ships from
feting in concert, could have saved the royalists from destruction.
But, notwithstanding the difficulties under which they labored,
they persisted, bold and dauntless, in their course, exhorting and
assisting one another ; and without quitting their ranks, repelling
the enemy, and defending themselves as well as their desperate
circumstances would allow. Their calamities increased as they
approached to the opposite shore. For besides that their vigor
was impaired, they had deeper water to pass, and the enemy's
ships could come nearer to the ford. At last, however, they reached
the land in time to save themselves from destruction. The banks
were lined with a numerous body of troops, and if these troops
had behaved with an ordinary degree of resolution, it is impossible
that the Spaniards, drenched as they were with mud and water,
and exhausted with fatigue, could have stood before them. But
unfortunately, in the beginning of the attack, their" commander
was killed by an accidental shot of one of his own men. Con¬
sternation seized his troops and they fled in a most dastardly
manner before an enemy unable to pursue."—("Watson's" His¬
tory Reign Philip II. of Spain, Vol. II., page 164. London, 1813.)
In October, 1651, Admiral Blake, in the service of the Com¬
monwealth, was ordered to make a descent upon the Island of
Jersey (Dixon's "Blake," 148). # * # #
"At eleven o'clock at night, Carteret, the Royal Governor, could
no longer keep his men together. They had been under arms
three days and two nights, during which time the rain had
fallen without intermission ; they had made several marches
and counter-marches over bad roads and broken ground ; and
they stood the fierce though intermittent fire from the enemy's
ships. At sunset he allowed them to depart, for the neighboring
villages in search of refreshment and repose ; he himself with a
few dragoons_alone remaining on the beach, along which, how-
Ixii.
ever, he had all the camp fires lighted. The weather changed in
the night. The rain ceased, the wind died away, and the swell
of the sea abated ; but not a star was visible, no moon arose to
tell the tale of preparation ; for years, the pitchy darkness of
the sky that night was recollected as the omen of disaster. The
fires along the shore appeared to warn the Admiral that his en¬
deavor to throw Hayne's regiment on shore at that point would
be attended with other difficulties than a threatening sea and
a rocky coast on a dark night. Yet nothing could check his
ardor. So long familiar with success, he despised obstacles;
and towards the close of the Civil War even the Roundhead
soldiers had learned to feel that contempt for Cavalier prowess,
which at an earlier period the Cavaliers had affected to feel for
the valor of tailors and serving-men. At eleven o'clock at night
the boats were again lowered, and by a desperate and gallant
effort were run ashore. Holding their arms above their heads,
the men leaped into the surf, many of them up to the neck in
water, and pushed for land. While struggling to obtain firm
footing and to free themselves from the returning surges, Carteret
rode down furiously with the hope of forcing them back into the
sea, but, forming his men in the dark midnight, Haynes led them
to the charge, and after a conflict of half an hour, he drove the
Cavalier horse from the field, and pursued them inland more than
a mile."—Page 148. " Robert Blake," by W. H. Dixon. London,
^^55- ' . . ■ .
In 1812, 8th November, Colonel Delfante with his grenadiers
forded the Wop, waist-deep, and wagons followed, and even
artillery. This was a very difficult ford, because the channel was
far below the neighboring ground, and the banks were steej) ;
moreover the river was half frozen and full of accumulated ice.
Nevertheless the troops did pass. Waist-deep is equal to from forty
to fifty inches, which is more than belly-deep for horses. Crook's
cavalry forded or waded belly-deep, and as this fact is admitted,
and the Rebel infantry did ford the river below Farmville, every¬
thing seems to demonstrate that the existing impediments did
not depend upon natural obstacles and causes.
As to prompt bridging there is no end of examples, and with
the most incongruous, and apparently the most incompatible
materiab It was not until a question arose which aroused feel¬
ing that the writer in reading began to note down examples of
improvised or rapid bridging, and referred to various accessible
works. Unfortunately he had given away to different institutions
hundreds, perhaps thousands, of military works in which illustra¬
tions of this subject occurred. On turning to Major-General J.
G. Barnard, U. S. A., article on Bridges, published in "Johnson's
Ixiii.
Cyclopaedia, some very interesting information will be found.
One remarkable example of rapid construction is first worthy of
citation ;
" In the month of February, 1862, a pontoon bridge, composed
of about sixty boats of the reserve train, was thrown across the
Potomac at Harper's Ferry. The river was then a perfect
torrent, the water being fifteen feet above the summer level, and
filled with drift wood and floating ice. The greatest difficulty
was experienced in pulling the pontoons into position, and it was
necessary to make use of ship anchors and chain cables to hold
them in place. Notwithstanding these unfavorable circumstances
the bridge was completed in about eight hours, and the corps
commanded by General Banks, with all its trains and artillery,
passed over it without accident or delay."—"Johnson's Cyclo-
{)3edia," 1,626, I and 2.
The famous bridge across the Chickahominy cannot come
under the head of improvised bridges, but when its magnitude is
considered in connection with the time occupied in its construc¬
tion, it becomes apposite in this connection. It was begun dur¬
ing the forenoon of the 14th June, 1864, and was completed by
midnight. Brigadier-General Weitzel located the position and
prepared the approaches. Brigadier-General Benham laid the
bridge, and the following is a description of it :
Johnson 1,626-4. "On reaching the James River, a bridge was
laid opposite Charles City Court House (at a point selected by
the writer of this article) about two thousand feet in length.
The water was so deep and rapid that the pontoons could not be
held by their own anchors, and it was found necessary to attach
their cables to schooners anchored above and below the bridge.
" For the next forty hours a continuous stream of wagons
passed over the bridge, from 4,000 to 6,000 wagons, some said
fifty miles of wagons, and nearly all the artillery of this Army,
and by far the larger portion of the infantry and all its cavalry
present, and even to its heads of 3,000 or more of beef cattle
—the most injurious of all—without an accident to man or
beast."—Report of Ge7ieral Benham.
"The length of the bridge was made up of 200 feet in trestle
work and 2,000 feet in pontoons (one hundred in all); depth of
the river, 85 feet."—"Johnson," 1,626-2.
Now, do a simple rule of three. If a bridge 2,200 feet in
length, capable of any strain, was thrown across a rapid river
85 feet deep within the hours of a long working day— say between
sunrise and sunset, fifteen hours,—how long ought it to have
taken to have thrown on a mild April day, one or even two or
three bridges adequate for the passage of a corps and its ma-
Ixiv.
1
terial, or several corps, across a stream from loo to 120 feet
wide, and not deeper than the Berisina, where the pontoniers had
to work up to their shoulders in freezing water with a rapid current
buffeting them with continual fields of ice brought down by that
rapid current.
To the possible objection of inadequate materials the answer
is pertinent, in accordance with the motto of a Scotch family of
note, Fortinon deficittclum," wifich, without perverting the mean¬
ing, might be thus paraphrased : " Materials are never wanting to
resolute or energetic men." This recalls the anecdote of the great
painter who, when a young artist, regretted that he could not pro¬
duce an effect without proper materials, caught up a stick and
dashed off a very efiective head with some dark-colored filth on a
shutter or the wall.
Major-General Barnard gives the following illustrations (John¬
son, 1,625) ;
" The Austrians, after satisfactory trials in the passage of the
broad, deep and rapid current of the Danube, adopted in 1841 a
system named from its inventor. Colonel Birago, of the Austrian
Imperial Engineers.
" This equipage has fixed and floating bridge-supports, the
former consisting of abutments and trestles, and the latter of
pontoons of one to six pieces, assembled together according to
the requirements of the bridge for the passage of infantry, cavalry
or artillery, and whether designed for one, two or three distinct
roadways.
" The Birago trestle is composed of a cap and two legs, to the
lower ends of which shoes are attached to increase their bearing
surface, and to give greater stability to the trestle.
^'■Each pontoon division is complete in itself, containing all the
material necessary for constructing a bridge of eleven bays, or
225 feet in length."—"Johnson," 1,627.
" During the campaign of 1864, trains composed of fourteen
pontoons and two trestles accompanied each of the three army
corps of the Army of the Potomac."—"Johnson," 1,626 (3).
" Previous to the battle of Gettysburg, a ponton bridge over
the Potomac at Harper's Ferry was destroyed, the pontons being
scuttled and set adrift above the rapids. About three weeks after,
the water having fallen, the boats were recovered, ly" repaired
with pieces of hard-bread boxes obtained from the commis¬
sary, and used in constructing a bridge at Berlin, over
which the entire army passed into Virginia."—"Johnson, 1,626.
Substitute for hard-bread boxes, hogsheads, wagons, timber
and lumber of buildings at hand which could have been torn
down, large trees standing close at hand, and what becomes of
Ixv.
every excuse for inaction. Oh wise Bible, wisest of common-
sense books ! See verses as to shigs;^ish or half hearted action !
"Very few citizens who have not served with an army in the
field have an adequate idea of its hnpedmmita. On February
13th, 1863, there were with the army of the Potomac two (2)
bridge trains of forty-four (44) boats, in charge of four (4) com¬
panies of the Fifteenth New York Engineers, located about two
miles from Falmouth, one-half mile west from Falmouth to Staf¬
ford Court House, and four miles from Headquarters of the
Army. To this train were attached 551 animals, two bridge
trains of forty-four boats in charge of six companies of the Fiftieth
New York Engineers, in the same locality, with 591 animals.
One train of thirty-two boats mounted, but without teams, was
on its way to a place on the right hand of Muddy Creek, about
• three miles from Seddon's place, and two miles from Head¬
quarters; one bridge of twenty-two boats, without wagons or
teams, and at Belle Plaine thirty boats afloat.^ A requisition had
been made for 226 more animals. These wooden boats weighed
1,570 pounds each. The ponton and trestle wagons had eight
animals and two teamsters each ; the other wagons six animals
and one teamster each. The canvas ponton boats laid by Cap¬
tain Comstock at Kelly's Ford, came afterwards, twenty from
Washington and sixty from New York, and weighed 640 pounds
each."—Note in Atnerican Magazme (page 377), April, 1886,
" History of Chancellorsville," by William Howard Mills, late
Major U. S. A.
In using the expression improvised bridges, the term may
almost be considered technical, scientific, " L' Encylopedie (1751)
C. Suppt." styles bridges such as are thrown over water-courses
or streams from ten to twenty metres in breadth, " Ponts-h-coup-
de main" A metre is 39.368 American inches, or about i 1-12
' yards, so that twenty metres about accords with the breadth of
the Appomattox at Farmville, between the piers or abutments of
the railroad viaduct. Bardin, in his Military Dictionary, admits
that as late as 1779 there was, as yet, no treatise on Military
Bridges and their application. The digested " Dictionary of the
Sciences " shows how circumscribed were even the theories of
throwing bridges. Only a single work had been conceived on
the subject, due to a M. de Guille, a French general of brigade
who served in the war of 1741 under Marshal Saxe; but this
treatise was never printed. Nevertheless, in spite of instruction,
pontoneering works were ably done during this war. In 1745
three bridges of boats were thrown opposite Piacenza, across the
Po, where it is 1,200 to 1,500 feet wide (wide as the Rhine at
Mannheim), and very deep in places, and in spite of the rapid
Ixvi.
current the work was finished in seven hours. In 1757 Brigadier
de Guille rapidly established two bridges over the Rhine, opposite
VVesel, some 2,000 feet in width.
If there is any truth in the ^statement accepted as trustworthy,
of the restoration of the Devil's Bridge by the Russians of
Suworrow, on 26th September, 1799, there is no excuse for not
bridging the Appomattox at Farmville, 7th April, 1865 ; and
farther, it is totally unsusceptible of explanation why the pontoon
trains were not up simultaneously with the artillery of the pur¬
suing columns. One pontoon train, that of the Twenty-fourth
Corps, was up, and that it was not thrown in time cannot be under¬
stood except by those who know the secrets of the war. Accept¬
ing, however, as the supposition that the pontoon train was delayed,
that was no reason for not bridging the Appomattox at once,
conceding (simply for argument sake) that it was not fordable,
although the contrary was demonstrated both by the Union
cavalry and by the Rebel infantry, and by the testimony' of those
who were acquainted with the stream.
Where there is a will there is a way. If there were no other
ropes to be had, there were sufficient prolonges at hand to drag
large and handy trees to the abutments of the old railroad via¬
duct and haul them into position to form a cantilever bridge
strong enough for elephants to cross ; because those same pro¬
longes could have been used as lashings for the main tim¬
bers and neighboring buildings would have furnished ample
supplies of ties or cross-beams, braces and flooring stuff.
Any practical mechanic who was not devoid of positive
comprehension of the most common details of his trade could,
by utilizing the natural and manufactured material within a
few hundred yards have constructed a bridge all-sufficient for the
heaviest wheel-carriages and the loads that they would carry. It
is utterly useless to argue to the contrary, and it may be em¬
phatically asserted that the failure to construct a bridge all-
sufficient, if not elegant, wide as the piers of the old railroad via¬
duct, or for two or even three equipages to cross abreast, or a
column at least twelve men front, was due to some unknown
reason or invisible cause.
No! the plum—the ruin of Lee—was not to fall into the
mouth of Humphreys, and if all the theorists on the face of this
earth were to argue to the contrary, practical mechanics suffi¬
ciently numerous to outweigh their book-knowledge could be
readily found to establish the feasibility of adequately bridging
the Appomattox for the passage of an army, its guns and its
trains, within two hours. There is too much corroboration of this
fact in military history to disprove this positive charge. The
Ixvií.
same spirit which ruled the course of the wl)ole operation,
beginning with the miss-moves of the 3rd, left Humphreys un¬
supported on the 7th, and deferred the culmination and left
it doubtful until midday on the 9th. After consultation with a
scientific officer who has built bridges with comparatively very
feeble means, it was decided that two thousand men, such as our
troops, ought, under existing circumstances, to have bridged the
Appomattox " in about two hours."
; " General P. B. Porter, of Black Rock, to whom the public
are indebted for the construction of this bridge [across the Rapids
above Niagara Falls to Bath Island], informed me that its erection
was not effected without considerable danger. Two large trees,
hewed to correspond with their shape, were first constructed into
a temporary bridge, the butts fastened to the shore, with the
,lightest ends projecting over the rapids. At the extremity of the
projection, a small butment of stone was first placed in the river,
and when this became secure, logs were sunk around it, locked
in such a manner as to form a frame, which was filled with stone.
A bridge was then made to this butment, the temporary bridge
shoved farther out and forward, and another butment formed,
until the whole was completed. One man fell into the Rapids
during the work. At first, owing to the velocity with which he
was carried forward, he was unable to hold upon the projecting
rocks ; but through great bodily exertions, to lessen the motion
by swimming against the current, he was enabled to seize upon a
rock, from which he was taken by means of ropes."—Extract
from "The Journal of a Tour in the State of New York in 1830,"
by John Fowler, at page 145. (Notes). (London, r83i.)
Any reader who has the slightest conception of military mat-'
ters, who will take the trouble of examining, with care, the maps
accompanying this little work, will at once perceive how strongly
Humphreys had hold of the Army of Northern Virginia at Cum¬
berland Church ; how easily he might have been supported, and
if so, in time, how the whole affair might have been ended then
and there with augmented glory ;—that is, if any one from Grant
down, in command at Farmville, had acted with energy and
celerity. Humphrey's hold was that of the bull dog; the clutch
of the eagle's talons with which Humphreys held the enemy in
his front. He kept pressed up close against him, feeling his
rapier, ready to thrust or parry ; the position of the experienced
master-at-arms, attent and with eye, ear and hand ready for every
movement. Humphreys was the completest general, except
Geo. H. Thomas, the war evolved. He would have crushed Lee
in the fall of 1863 had he been Commander of the Army of the
Potomac (instead of Chief of Staff, with a temporary superior
Ixviii.
unequal to comprehending his plans or act upon them). Colonel
Fletcher, the British historian of the Rebellion, is the only writer
who ever alluded to this understandingly.
From Farmville two roads led almost directly north, slightly
diverging. The easterly one to the Cumberland Court House
road, bisected the Rebel position (at Cumberland Church),
which, in miniature, exactly resembled the Union dispositions at
Gettysburg—strangely so—the other, the Old Plank Road, which,
some two miles away, bifurcated, both forks continuing on for a
mile and a quarter to a mile and a half in the rear of IMahone's
(afterwards Lee's) headquarters at Cumberland Church, on
this occasion located about the same, relatively, as those of
Meade on Powers' Hill, 3d July, 1863. The road from P'arm-
ville to Cumberland Court House fullfilled about the same re¬
lation to Lee's lines 7th April, 1865, as the Taneytown road did
to Meade's 3d July, 1863, and the Old Plank Road nearly the
same as the Baltimore Pike to the Union position at Gettysburg.
After Humphreys' fight at dark at Perkinson's Mills at the mouth
of Sailors' Creek, Wright and Sheridan's engagement on Little
Sailors' Creek, late on the afternoon of the 6th, the Rebels fell
back during the night and early morning of the 7th across the Ap¬
pomattox. The only remaining direct viaduct across that stream
was High Bridge, which, after they had taken advantage of it, the
Rebels fired. Humphreys' celerity and audacity saved this structure.
So that it was soon made available. Gordon had crossed it, but
Fields' division forded the river, perhaps, at Venable's Ford, some
three miles below Farmville, where Longstreet passed over the
bridge at that place, and then burned it.
One fact which will hereafter be more strongly emphasized was
proved. The Appomattox was fordable for infantry at more than
one point between High Bridge and a mile above Farmville.
Humphreys with his first division. Miles, and his third, deTro-
briand, followed up the enemy on the dirt roads from High
Bridge over five mies to Cumberland Church. He had about
9,500 men. He found the Rebels already entrenched in a strong
position and their forces concentrated, amounting to about 25,000
men, not including the cavalry (La R., vii., 76). Mahone was
on the left, thrown back, and thence their lines curved, present¬
ing a convex front continuously on the crest of elevations (from
which the ground sloped E., like a glacis), for about two miles from
their extreme right, over two miles, to opposite Farmville. Their
line was not solid, but was occupied. Humphreys' Second Divi¬
sion, Barlow's, 5,000 strong, pursued along the railroad from
High Bridge towards Farmville.
Humphreys' Chief of Artillery claims to have succeeded in
Copyright, 1885, by J. Watts de Peyster.
Batti-e op Cumberland Church, or the Heights of Farmville.
combined Second-Third Corps, Army of the Potomac, under Maj.-Gen.
A. A. Humphreys, pitted against the Army of Korthern
Virginia, under Gen. Robert E. Lee.
7th April, 1865, p. m.
Ixix.
silencing the battery, Poague's, on the Rebel extreme left-centre,
and that the leading Union troops acquired temporary possession
of the guns. Mahone's veterans, aided by a portion of Gordon's
division under Grimes, recovered the cannon and drove out the
Unionists. A second attack likewise failed. Humphreys be¬
coming satisfied that the Army of Northern Virginia, entire, was
in his front, felt that he was altogether too weak to do more than
hold the attention of the enemy until he was reinforced, and he
recalled Barlow, who had found a strong force in his front about
a mile and a half to the south. When Barlow got up, and late
in the day (4.30 p. m.). Miles tried to flank the Rebel wing under
Mahone, and was repulsed with loss. The attack failed on
account of the difficult nature of the ground, broken by numerous
sharp ravines, which prevented an orderly advance. The enemy
^ undertook to make a counter attack, but were quickly repulsed.
William Swinton, the first in point of time of the historians of
the war, makes Lee come off with flying colors as victorious, whereas,
he simply held his own, and inflicted upon Humphreys a loss of
571, not 671. This general, who was truth itself, says that these
figures are erroneous ; that his First Division lost 424, the Second
121, and thq Third 16—571. (B. S. B., 189).
All day long Humphreys was anxiously expecting reinforce¬
ments from Farmville, where Union troops had been piling up
all the day. If two corps had crossed they could have taken the
road to the Coal Pits, got in Lee's rear and settled the matter
then and there. The excuse alleged for not doing so is that the
bridge was burned and the Appomattox not fordable. All this has
been distinctly stated and argued out in " La Royale," part VIL,
and the whole demonstration would be reproduced in this pam¬
phlet if it did not require too much space. An analysis of the
telegrams and despatches will settle the truth of all this. As an
excuse for not crossing troops to the assistance of Humphreys, it
was alleged that the Ajjpomattox was not fordable, and that a
bridge could not be built in time. Immediately after the war
General Humphreys was, decidedly of the opinion that the
Appomattox could not only have been forded (Crook's cavalry
proved the fact), but peremptorily bridged.
There is a boss-carpenter, in the neighborhood of the study in
which this was prepared, who was once in railroad employ and
lost his situation from bad temper and habits, whose services
were invaluable at crises. That man with an ordinary powerful
wrecking-gang would have bridged the Appomattox in an hour,
with the physical force disposable to handle his materials. He
would have laughed at such an obstacle arresting progress nearly
ten hours, a day's working time. Col. W. H. Paine, U. S. Vol.
Ixx.
Engineers; agrees with me in these opinions. I know from my
personal experience with material and mechanics, that if I had un¬
limited command of human labor and teams with timber close at
hand, as it was on the 7th April, I could have constructed a
bridge over the Appomattox all-sufficient for the heaviest artillery
and trains within two hours. It might not have been an elegant
or even a respectable piece of work as to appearance, but for
practical purposes the troops, horse and foot, artillery and wagons
could have marched and rolled over it with safety and ex-
peditiousness.
"Woodsworth in his sonnet, "In the Pass of Killicranky,''
considering the victorious effects of audacity,celerity and address,
due to the hero, Claverhouse, Viscount of Dundee, concludes
with these stirring lines :
" Oh for a single hour of that Dundee,
Who on that day the wo}-d of onset gave !
Like conquest would the Men of England see.
And her Foes find a like inglorious grave."
Humphreys might justly have groaned out, on the after¬
noon of the 7th April, 1865, " Oh for one hour of Blucher,"
" Marshal Forwarts," that nothing stopped. General Von Muffling,
in his " Passages from my Life," states, page 377, that during the
battle of Leip^ig, i8r3, Blucher resolved to force the Parthe.
" The first portion of infantry encountered no other difficulties
in crossing at Mockau than having to wade through the
water up to the waist. A very imperfect flying-bridge was sub¬
sequently formed of barn doors, gates, &c." Again, during the
pursuit after Leipzig, Blucher was in reality hunting (not es¬
corting—as was Lee escorted out of Penn.sylvania in 1863)—
the French out of Germany when he came to the Saale (Von
Muffling, 384), he " summoned the carpenters of the town to con¬
struct, with the utmost speed, a bridge of boats or rafts to enable
him to cross over before evening. There was no lack of wood—
the whole river was covered with rafts and planks. There was an
old master carpenter in the place, who, as apprentice in 1757, had
helped to build the bridge by which Frederic the Great had
crossed at Weissenfels before the battle of Rossbach. He pro¬
posed to place the bridge on the same spot, promising that it should
be ready in a few hours. The man kept his word, and the whole
army was [across] on the left bank of the Saale in the evening."
A cantilever bridge might easily have been engineered with
the great trees, of which there were plenty in the vicinity, and
the cross timbers and planking derived from the buildings of
the neighboring town. When Gustavus was preparing for his
Ixxi.
bridge over the Leek he found himself compelled to pull down
all the gentlemen's houses, farm and village buildings around him
in order to procure useful and solid timber. The same determi¬
nation, not sparing even consecrated buildings, saved the French
forces under d'Oyssel in Scotland, in January, 1560, when from
Leith they crossed the Firth and made a raid on the north shore
of the Firth, and burned and wasted to their hearts' content. The
arrival of the English Admiral Winter deprived the French of
their provision ships, and the country afforded nothing but drink¬
ing water. They seemed in extremity. " Queen's Ferry was
commanded by Winter [with his English fleet]. There was a
bridge at Alloa, across the River Firth (thirty miles W. N. W. of
Edinburgh), but William Kirkaldy promptly broke it; and so
satisfied were the congregation that d'Oyssel could not escape,
• that they left him, as they believed, to starve, and proceeded at
their utmost leisure to call their men about them to receive his
surrender."
The Gazetteer of Scotland (1856) tells this story somewhat
differently. "If was in the month of , 2eaA at the break¬
ing up of a great storm, William Kirkcaldy, of Grange, attentive to
the circumstances in which the French were caught, took ad¬
vantage of their situation, marched with great expedition towards
Stirling, and cut the Bridge of Tullibody, which is over the Devon
[a furious torrent after storms] [" | of a mile north of its con¬
fluence with the Firth], to prevent their retreat. The French,
finding no other means of escape, took the roof off the church,
and laid it along the bridge, where it was cut, and got safe to
Stirling. It is generally believed that this church remained in
the same dismantled state till some years ago " [about 1850].
" The Frejich had now an opportunity of showmg what disciplined
troops could do in the face of tremefidous diffculties. They were
beyond the Leven [outlet of Loch Leven ?] when they discovered
their situation. In their first consternation they rested for a
night in the field. In the morning, wet, chilled, and hungry,
they commenced their rapid retreat. Not a loaf of bread could
.they hope to touch till they crossed the water. The tempest
broke again, and the western gale drove the rain into their faces
as they struggled across those melancholy moors. On the even-
. ing of the third day, they reached Alloa to find the bridge gone
and the river, it is likely, pouring down in a [as well known it
would after a great storm] winter flood.
D'Oyssel was a man of prompt expedients. In an instant the
nearest parish church was unroofed; the timbers were dragged to
the water-side and laid across the piers of the broken arches.
The army itself brought the news of its escape to Stirling, and
Ixxii.
once there, they were safe. The Congregation were loitering at
Glasgow, congratulating themselves over a victory which they
had allowed to slip through their hands. D'Oyssel refreshed his
famished but gallant little force, and fell back at his leisure into
Leith." (Froude, vii., 192-3.)
People, superficial as a rule, even thinkers, prattle a great
deal about the efficiency of Napoleonic and Frederician ad¬
ministration, but there was more practical soldiership, engineer¬
ing and generalship evinced during the Thirty Years' War than
in any since, except in our great conflict, in which the rank and
file could j-lways supply mechanics fit for every occasion. It is
pretty certain that more valuable lessons can be learned from the
details of the operations of the Thirty Years' War than any other
of which authentic details are known. Again and again were
impetuous rivers crossed, and retreating and flying armies saved by
improvised bridges. One of the most remarkable of the achieve¬
ments of Gustavus Adolphus was the passage of the Lech, a
very furious stream (so violent no dam can be made to stand
its fiiry) during freshets as at no time, 5th April, 1632, in the
face bf an entrenched veteran army equal in numbers to the assail¬
ants. This torrent, rather than river, was one hundred and ninety
feet across, with very high, steep banks with bad ground beyond,
and very deep ; of different depths. What is more, the bridge
was constructed under a heavy fire of artillery and musketry
(" Harte," IL, 197). In the space of a few hours the bridge was
fixed, trestles with legs of an unequal length {Ibid, 198-202), the
surface planked and roughened and the sides guarded, which
happened to be effected the more speedily as the king's Fin-
landers could all exercise the business of carpenters, as in their
native country each man was his own mechanic." Doubtless, if
detailed reports were accessible, there would be numerous in¬
stances found of the successful peremptory bridging and fording
of rivers and the particulars of the methods by which success was
achieved. The fart that such things were done, and well done,
is indisputable, but of very few among them are any of the
measures dwelt upon.
Chapman (308) describing the Bridging of the Lech by Gus¬
tavus Adolphus in 1632, says the trestles had stones and other
weights attached to their legs to sink them and keep them in po¬
sition, and the length of the legs varied (bridge-floor just above
surface) from a maximum of 4 yards, 12 feet. The Finnish horse
forded, not swam, just above bridge.
[Note.—In the course of very extensive military reading,
numerous instances were found of Fording by large bodies of troops
at such depths that an increase of an inch or two would have render-
Lxxiü.
ed it impossible for men of ordinary stature. These memoranda
were carefully noted at the time, but, now, when it has become ne¬
cessary to use them, the note-books are not accessible. The re¬
marks upon Fording, and even upon Bridges in Military Treatises,
are inexplicably meagre.]
In order to relieve Tergoes, the Spanish general actually
marched 3,poo picked troops, Germans, Spaniards and Walloons,
loaded with food and military stores, over six miles through an
estuary considered unfordable at low water, on account of the miry
bottom and the channels of several rivulets, and in spite of every
danger and difficulty absolutely succeeded through the very audac¬
ity of the attempt. On the night of the aSth-agth September, 1575
(ibid II., 163.165), the Spanish General, Requesens, authorized a
still more audacious enterprise for the purpose of subduing Zealand.
The English army determined to make a desperate attempt
to retrieve their affairs in France in 1450. About 6,000 strong
had been collected for a vigorous attempt to relieve the be¬
leaguered town of Caen, and were opposed by superior forces
of veteran French. They landed on the peninsula of Cotentin,so
famous for the fortified port of Cherbourg, and took the town of
Valognes. The most difficult task, however, was forcing the dan¬
gerous fords of the River Douve, and afterwards those of the Vire.
Nevertheless they succeeded. Like Perdiccas (B. C. 321), they
fought even in the water, but with better fortune, for they drove
back the French and established themselves on the right bank,
and, in spite of their fatigues, fought the battle of Formigny (i8th
April, 1450), a town about twelve miles from Bayeux, and nearly
inflicted upon the French a defeat which, ending in a slaughter,
was such a complete disaster that, although small in comparison
to numbers engaged, it deserves to rank with the greatest of the
English reverses on the soil of France.—Oman's "Art of War in
the Middle Ages," pages 113, 114, Von Kausler's "Wortenbuch
der Schlacten aller Volker," IV. (2), 1146-7.
At Aughrim, 1691, the British had to struggle through a marsh
waist deep to get at the enemy behind defences ; and at Blen¬
heim, 1744, the English cavalry had to flounder through the
Nebelbach and its morasses to reach the French on firm ground;
yet in both cases the bold assailants were victorious.
In November, 1645 (i8th October?), the British General
Gust states that Turenne, not finding the River Rhine fordable
near Wimpfen, the whole army swam across it—the horses carry¬
ing the foot on their cruppers. Such examples might be multi¬
plied, but the whole question could be summed up in a very few
words. Troops in force should have been crossed to the assist¬
ance of Humphreys, since the Appomattox was fordable. Meade's
Ixxiv.
telegram (i6) states that " the cavalry has forded belly-deep,"
which is not too deep for infantry, and Tremain confirms this in his
narrative (" War Memoranda"), pages 14, 15 and 18, supra.
If there had been no ford, a perfectly sufficient bridge should
have been constructed in two hours. A collection of dispatches
between Generals Humphreys, Wright, Meade and Grant fur¬
nishes a basis for a time-table, and also confirmation. The secret
history of the war has never been told, and may never be told.
It is not the interest of those who won the prizes to have it told.
I had to stop writing my history for fear of injuring the prospects
of the living by quoting the revelations and documents furnished
for it, by friends since deceased. During the pursuit of Lee,
Humphreys and Wright have never received the credit due to
them. Humphreys never could get over the suppression of one
of his telegrams or dispatches which, even when it was allowed
to become public, he claimed, did not appear as he sent it. It
seems as if it was predetermined to whom the glory of the last days
should inure, and it was so. On the 6th, the day of the Sailor
Creek and Little Sailor Creek fights, Humphreys and Wright
deserve the credit ; on the 7th all the credit belongs to Hum¬
phreys; on the 8th Humphreys did more than any one ; on the
9th he did as much as any other, and might have done more, and
marvellously, if he had been let alone. All the opinions hereby
presented are founded on consultations with General Humphreys,
my dearest friend, his letters, and evidence of other officers.
copies of despatches between generals humphreys, wright,
meade and grant, friday, 7th april, 1865.
High Bridge, Hd. Qrs. A. P. )
1. April 7, 1865. f
Lieut-Gen. U. S. Grant:
Major-Gen. Humphreys about 9 a. m. crossed the Appomattox
at this point driving in the enemy's rear-guard-skirmishers. The
enemy abandoned (8) eight guns on this side of the river and (10)
ten [guns] are reported as left on the other side. Humphreys
has advanced four miles on the railroad towards Farmville and
will continue to press them on that road. Wright is moving to¬
wards Farmville on this |the south] side of the river. I under¬
stand Mahone's Division is between him [Humphreys] and Farm¬
ville, and that he is after him. Griffin is moving rapidly [south
side of river] to Prince Edward's Court House. He will pass
through Rice's Station. You will find him on the road if neces¬
sary to leave him orders. Geo. G. Meade, Major-General.
Ixxv.
2. April 7 [1865J, 12 m.
Major-Gen. Meade :
So far as my information goes Wright, at Farmville, would be
in supporthig distance. I have sent Barlow up the railroad to
Farmville. He is quite close to it and is skirmishing with the
enemy there. Supposing the enemy would attempt to reach
Lynchburg by the road from Farmville on the north side of the
Appomattox, I have moved Miles and de Trobriand and the
artillery to that road. They will strike it about three miles from
[north of] Farmville. t^^A column of our cavalry [Crook's] 07i
the south side of Appornattox, which I a)n moving, will reach Farm¬
ville about the same tinie as Barlow [on the north side].,,^¡¡ Ar¬
tillery cannot move along Barlow's route.
A. A. Humphreys, M. G.
I will advise you promptly of any further information or
change of condition. A. A. H.
Hd. Qrs. 6th a. €., Sandy Riyer, )
3. April 7, 12.15 Noon. )
Maj.-Gen. Webb :
The officer sent toward Farmville has returned, and reports
that that place is not taken. I shall therefore move at once to¬
wards that point. General Grifß^i \p¡th Corps\ is now here, and
the head of his column nearly up. He is going to Prince Ed¬
ward's C. H. H. G. Wright, Maj.-Genl. Comdg.
Hd. Qr. 2D. A. C., 1.20 p. M. 1
4. April 7th. j
Gen. Meade :
I have come up to Mahone's Division. I am with Miles and
deTrobriand's Divisions, about four miles [north] from Farmville,
and shall attack. If Griffin or some o?ie else can strike Farm¬
ville [/. e. cross to my support] they will cut ofFMahone^s line of re-
treat.,^% A. A. Humphreys, M. G.
Hd. Qrs. 6th A. C. Farmville, |
5. April 7, 2.20 p. m. [
Brevet Maj.-Gen'l Webb:
I am at Farmville, which is occitpied by the 2\th Corps, and,
from all I can learn, the Rebel forces on, this side of the Ap¬
pomattox passed through the place. If this be true, it would
seem the enemy is moving on Lynchburg, where it is possible
he might intend forming a junction with Johnson, instead of
effecting it at Danville, as I have hitherto supposed he intended
Ixxvi.
to do. Î^^There are so many troops and trains now here in my
front, that it would be impossible for me to advance now, even if
it were desirable to do so. I will therefore await instructions.
H. G. Wright, Maj.-Gen'l. Command'g.
6. Hd. Qrs., a. p., April 7, 2.30 p. m.
Maj.-Gen'l Humphreys :
Wright is moving on Farmville. I have sent him your dis¬
patch and urged him forward. Do you think the enemy is
making for Lynchburg or Danville ? G. G. M.
7. Hd. Qrs. A. P., April 7, 1865, 2.30 p. m.
Maj.-Gen'l Wright:
I send you a dispatch just received from Maj.-Gen. Hum¬
phreys. ^^You will see the necessity of pushing vigorously for
Farmville. If there are any troops on your left communicate
with them and urge them forward. G. G. M.
Hd. Qrs. 2D A. Corps, 1
8. April 7, 3 o'clock p. m. j
Maj.-Gen'l Meade :
From the prisoners I have, it appears that Lee's army is
moving from Farmville to Lynchburg, and Wright and Griffin
should come up to the front near the Farynville and Lynchburg road,
at a distance four miles [north] from Farmville [/. e. attack Lee in
reverse and cut off his retreat]. I have but two divisions here, but
have sent for Barlow, who is on the railroad near [north of] Farm¬
ville. " A. A. Humphreys, Maj.-Gen'l Comd'g.
9. Hd. Qrs. 2D A. C., April 7, 3.20 p. m.
Brt. Maj.-Gen'l Webb, Chief of Staff :
We have Heth, Mahone and, I believe, the rest of Lee's army
here in my front, tnoving towards Lynchburg. They are intrenched
in too strong a positwn for me to attack them in front, and their
flanks extend further than mine. They are extending their flank
to my right. I have sent for Barlow, but I don't know at what
time he will be up. I have just received a dispatch dated r.20,
saying that Fan?iville was in our possession, that the cavalry was
moving through it.
A. A. Humphreys, Maj.-Gen'l Command'g.
10. High Bridge, April 7th, 3.40 p. m.
Maj.-Gen'l Wright, commanding 6th Corps:
The Major-Gen'l commanding directs that, in case you are
not called upon by Gen'l Humphreys for assistance, you halt at
Ixxvíi.
FarmvilJe ancF endeavor to hurry up > your trains. Cyin that
case, or in any case, put yourself in communication with the
commanding officer of the 24th Corps troops, and let him know
Gen'l Meade's views and intentions as urged by your movements,
and that yon are retarded by his being in your road.^^py^
Alex. S. Webb, B. M. Gen'l, C. of Staff.
High Bridge, Hd. Qrs. A. Potomac, )
11. April 7, 3.50 p. m. j
Maj.-Gen'l Wright;
Gen. Humphreys reports that he is confronted by Led s whole
army. They are moving to outflank him. |i^°If you cannot
move at once to his assistance order up the 24th Corps in Gen'l
Meade's name. Gen. Lee is intrenched.
Alex. S. Webb, B. M. G. & C. of Staff.
Hd. Qrs. Army Potomac, >
12. April 7th, 4 p. m. )
Maj.-Gen'l Humphreys, Comd'g 2d Corps :
I informed you this morning your movements should be
governed by your own security with your own forces. I have
made every effort to 'get the 6th Corps forward, but ^^the road
has been blocked by the Cavalry and 2/\th Corps.^j^^ iWI have
tioiv sent orders to the 2yth Corps, who occupy Farniville, to move
up \i. e. cross] to your support. If you are pressed you must with¬
draw to this position. (Sgd.) Geo. G. Meade, M. Gen'l.
13. 3 p. m. Received (4.40 p. m.)
Maj.-Gen'l Webb:
Your dispatch of 2.30 p. m. by Major Bache is just received.
I reached Farniville at 2 p. m. and immediately sent the dis¬
patch to you by Major Farrar. J^^Gen'l Grant passed here a
short time since, and is now in the town. He has directed me to
remain massed until further orders.
(Signed.) Gen. Wright.
Hdqrs. a. p., 4.30 p. m., )
U. April 7, '65. [
Maj.-Gen. Humphreys :
ly I have sent orders to Gen. Wright to order forward in my
name the 24th Corps from Farmville and to follow it with the
6th. iS^I fully indicated your position and the necessity of
support being given you. Before my dispatch could have reached
Gen. Wright I received one from him stating the Lieut.-Gen. was
at Farmville. I have no doubt, therefore, troops will be hur-
Ixxviii.
ried forward if not already moving. We hear artillery and
musketry in a westerly (condition) direction from here, which is
more to the left than your position, which I take to be about
northwest. This may be the 24th Corps [it was Crook's cavalry
fightj. When Barlow comes up if you hear firing on the left I
would attack with the whole force, but of course I leave this
entirely to your own judgment, giving you the best information I
can get. G. G. Meade, Maj.-Gen'l Comd'g.
15. April, 7, 5.10 p. m.
To Gen. Webb :
|^°Yourdispatch of 3.50 p.m. ordering me to assist Gen. Hum¬
phreys in reference to affairs in front of Second Corps is received
and I have shown it to Gen. Grant, who is here and who will
direct in the absence of Gen. Meade. The pontoon train of the
Twenty-fourth Corps has been ordered up [why not sooner?] and
as soon as it is thrown I will cross and come promptly to the sup¬
port of the Second Corps. Yours of 4.30 just received.
(Signed.) Gen. Wright.
16. .\PRIL 7, 6.15 p. M.
Maj.-Gen. Humphreys :
I have just learned that there is no bridge at Farmville and
that the cavalry has forded belly-deep. Yoll will have to
take care of yourself. Geo. G. Meade, Maj.-Gen.
April 7, 6.30 p. m. )
17. Hd. Qes. 2d. A. C. [
Maj.-Gen. Meade, Commanding Army Potomac :
Barlow is up and taking position on the right, so as to
be ready to attack their left flank at the msta?it an attack is com¬
menced from the direction of Farmville, The firing you heard was
Crook's attempt from the direction of Farmville. Immediately
upon hearing it I moved Miles and de Trobriand to the right to
attack (Barlow was not up then), but the firing soon ceased.
Miles attacked from his right, but without success. The position
they have is strong and it is intrenched. We are across the State
road from Farmville to Lynchburg, and from our right see a train
of wagons moving about the West; some troops with it. It is so
late that neither the Twenty-fourth Corps nor Wright can get up
in time to attack this evening. Qi^^To-morrow the enemy will
be gone. If they are not, I will attack understandingly with the
troops from Farmville.
My position is about N.W. from High Bridge.
A. A. Humphreys, Maj.-Gen. Commanding.
Ixxix.
Headquarters A. P., )
18. April 7 th, 7 p. M. )
Lt.-Gen. Grant;
There has been heavy firing in the direction of Humphreys,
but no report as yet. I send the bearer for any orders you may
have for to-morrow. The Fifth Corps is at or near Prince Ed¬
ward C. H., the Sixth at Farmville, and the Second across the
Appomattox, across the road from Farmville to Lynchburg.
As far as I can judge the enemy is making for Lynchburg.
Perhaps only making a greater detour than he originally designed
to get around us, and he yet meditates going to Danville.
Since writing the foregoing the following dispatch has been
received from General Humphreys: [Dispatch evidently omitted.]
Had I been advised of the state of affairs at Farmville I
^vould either have crossed the Sixth after the Second, or retained
the Fifth for that purpose. I never knew till 4 p. m. that the
enemy had destroyed the bridge there ; nor did I know till late this
afternoon the causes of the delay in the advance of the Sixth
Corps. Resp'y, &c., Geo. G. Meade, Maj.-Gen.
[Duplicate.]
Headquarters 2d A. Corps, 1
19. April 7, 7.30 p. [a. ?] m. j
Bvt. Maj-Gen. H. S. Webb, Chief of Staff :
Our last fight, just before dark [6th] at Sailors' Creek, gave
us two guns, three (3) flags and considerable No. of prisoners,
200 wagons, 70 ambulances, with mules and horses to almost
one-half wagons and ambulances. There are between 30 and 50
wagons in addition abandoned and destroyed along the road,
some battery wagons, forges and limbers. I have already reported
the capture of one gun, two flags and some prisoners, and the
fact that the road for nearly two miles is strewn with tents, bag¬
gage, cooking utensils, some ammunition and material of all
kinds. The wagons are in a great mass across the approach to
the bridge, and it will take some time to clear it. The enemy is
in position on the heights beyond with artillery. The bridge is
partially destroyed, and the approaches to it on either side are
soft bottom land. We can't advance to-night [óth-yth] in the
same manner that we have been to-day. As soon as I get straight¬
ened up my troops a little (they are considerably mixed) I might
push a column down the road and deploy it, but it is evident that
I cannot follow rapidly during the night.
P. S.—I find that we have 850 prisoners this morning, in all
960 men, 30 officers. A. A. Humphreys, M. G.
Ixxx.
20. Hd. Qrs. 6th Army Corps, April 7 [no hour], '65.
Maj.-General Webb :
I have the honor to report that H^^the infantry of tlie Corps
has crossed the river^^^J and aj-e now in ca7np, but owin^ to the
difficulty in fording the streafn the artillery and trams are obliged
to wait until the pontoon bridge is laid. [Crook's artillery and
baggage animals had crossed and re-crossed fording with his
troops]. My Hdqrs. are near a small house in the vicinity of
the Burnt Bridge [Farmville], and near the road.
H. G. Wright, Maj.-Gen. Comd'g.
21. Farmville, g.30 p. m., April 7, 1865.
Major-Gen'l Meade :
I enclose you a copy of a dispatch sent to you this evening
by signal. The Fifth Corps is here. I will send copy of dispatch
to Gens. Griffin and Wright. Sheridan with the cavalry is at
Brospect Station. The enemy cannot go to Lynchburg possibly.
I think there is no doubt but that Stoneman entered that city
this morning. I will move my headquarters up with the troops
in the morning, probably to Prospect Hill Station. Have the
prisoners been sent to City Point yet ? If not they should go at
once under strong escort. U. S. Grant, Lt.-Gen'l.
Hdqrs. Armies U. S., Farmville, )
22. April 7 th, '65. [
Gen'l Meade :
Order the 5th Corps to follow the 24th at 6 a. m. up the
Lynchburg road. The 2d and 6th to follow the enemy north of
the river. U. S. Grant, Lt.-Gen'l.
N. B.—Italics, and^^^f, a?id 1] 1] [ ], inserted by the
copyist and editor to attract the attetition of the reader.
It is a somewhat remarkable fact that, notwithstanding the
importance of the subject, so little attention has been paid to
digested statistical information in connection with the Marching
of troops, especially extraordinary or exemplary marches ; the
length of road or extent of route occupied by a given force with
its appropriate artillery and train, ordinary complement, and the
time required by such an organization to pass from column of
route into proper disposition for an engagement or deployment
into line of battle. Sir Edward Gust, a general in the Britisli
army, who served and distinguished himself in the Spanisli
Peninsula, a voluminous writer of distinction on military subjects.
"Ixxxi.
remarks in his " Annals of the Wars of the i8th and 19th Cen¬
turies," that Wellington stated that he had one rule by which he
was always guided in regard to the moving of troops; that 5,000
men in the ordinary formation of two ranks—the regular inter¬
vals, &c., being understood—occupied one mile of front and,
averaging time, it took exactly one hour to move 5,000 men one
mile and get them into a new position, or the proper formation
for a fight or into line of battle." These are not the exact words ;
but as a clearer presentation of the idea, when the question was
presented to Major-General A. A. Humphreys, as to how long
columns strung out, and what constituted a day's march, he re¬
plied : " The body of troops you mention, ten thousand men
with thirty guns, with ammunition, subsistence and ambulance
trains and medical wagons, such as are essential in our wooded
• and sparsely settled country [United States, speaking particularly of
Virginia] should not, at the very most, stretch out a greater distance
than five miles, and might be limited to three. The roads are sup¬
posed to be ordinarily good country roads. They could easily
get over eighteen miles a day. In pursuit, from Petersburg to
Appomattox Court House, which distance, putting it at one
hundred miles (which is sufficiently correct), we [combined
Second and Third Corps] were delayed the first day out (the 3d
April, 1865,) materially by the necessity of bridging streams that
were not fordable. On the 4th I made but a short march, owing
to the cavalry coming in on the road and having precedence.
My troops were put to working on the roads while the cavalry
stopped us, to insure the trains following. We had but very few
wagons with us; only some ammunition, ambulance and surgical
wagons." I fought over fourteen miles on the 6th April, having
marched four miles at least before coming into contact with the
enemy ; then had to cross Flat Creek, bidld two bridges over it, and
repair the road bridge before I could get at the enemy. On the
7th, marched some twelve miles to Heights of Farmville in pur¬
suit, encountering the whole of Led s force there at i o'clock p. m.
On the 8th, marched twenty-six miles, halting at midnight. On
the 9th, by midday, was up with Lee at Appomattox. By look¬
ing at Appendix L. [XII. Scribner's Military Series] you will find
the [combined] Second [Third] Corps, on the 31st March, had
eighteen thousand five hundred and seven enlisted men of in¬
fantry present for duty equipped. Lost in action during the
operations, about two thousand ; straggled or fell out, between
one and two thousand. [Major-General John Mitchell, British
Army, calculates the proportion of stragglers as equal to about
one-fifth, 20,000, out of 110,000, or, deducting casualties, 98,000.
Ixxxii.
Humphreys makes the ratio much less, Marmont says one-fifth,
but Bonaparte increased it to one-quarter, including the honestly
sick and otherwise actually temporarily disabled.]
" I see the [my] number of guns is put down at seventy, four of
which were mortars, and therefore were not taken with us on the
march. We had, therefore, eléven batteries, or sixty-six guns. I
do not recollect the number of wagons that belonged to the
corps, and I could only get at it by diving into a great mass of
papers. With the exception of the fighting trains, the trains
followed us at some considerable distance. From Fredericksburg
to Gettysburg [Third Corps] there were so many halts for two,
three, or more days, that they can give no average per day. The
Sixth Corps marched over thirty miles continuously, getting to
Gettysburg on the afternoon of the 2d July. The Second Division,
Third Corps, marched from Rappahannock River (part of it were
covering railroad crossing ofthat river), evening of 14th June, 1863,
and reached Manassas Junction night of isth, a march of twenty-
nine miles, isth, an excessively oppressive day. Again, on the
25th June, marched twenty-five miles to mouth of Monocacy,
part of it in night, under a heavy rain on the canal towpath."
With all this and other instances before me, I repeat that
with a most extensive military library in Englisli, German and
French, nothing can be more unsatisfactory than the works which
pretend to treat on Marching. General Mitchell, B. A., already
referred to, here again comes to the front with facts, not theories, in
his " Fall of Napoleon." London, 1846, Vol. III. He says :
" On comparing a great number of marches it appears that an
army of 40,000 men requires about eight hours to traverse in
average weather a distance of fifteen miles, which may be called
an average military march. And if we make the necessary allow¬
ance for the length of cavalry columns—which are endless—for the
lumbering trains of artillery, for the intervals between the corps
and divisions, as well as for the openings that owing to the most
trifling obstacles a#e constantly taking place, such an army will
need thirteen hours before it can be formed into position, ready
for battle—that is if it has been marching upon a single,
moderately good road. Marshal Ney's corps [on the day of
Quatre Bras] formed the left of an army [Napoleon's] of about
130,000 men, which divided into three columns, had performed
two marches. Each column might be about 40,000 strong, but
the centre column alone had traversed a good high road ; the
left and right columns had followed by-roads, one of which is
described as having been very bad, while for the march of armies
such roads are seldom very good. It is, therefore, no very un¬
reasonable supposition to say that Ney's troops could not have
reached Quatre Bras before the time specified."
Ixxxiii.
Thè distances covered by troops infected by panic, flying
from a lost field, seem almost incredible. Extracting from the
exaggerated general statements to be found in various military
works, the following are too well authenticated to be questioned ;
although, if, investigation was carried back to the Thirty Years'
War, the number might be greatly augmented. As, for instance,
the flight of the Imperialists after the defeat of Tilly by Gustavus
in 1631; that of the Duke of Lorraine from the field, back across
the Rhine (" Harte's Gustavus," II., 76) in 1631 ; that of the troops
of Wallenstein from Lützen to Prague, over 100 miles, in 1632. One
of the most disgraceful flights of a leader was that of James II.
from the Boyne, 20th June, 1690, even across sea to France. Its
effect justified the stress laid upon such a defection in the Bible,
where the prophet Isaiah (X., 18) declares, 'they [soul and bodyj
• shall be as when a standard bearer fainteth.' From the battle
field, which he watched from a safe distance, the bigoted Romanist,
without faith in his own bigotry, spurred, without drawing rein,
to Dublin, rested one night, and ' next morning he fled, though
no man pursued him, and never rested till the ship, his [cowardly]
foresight had provided, bore him in safety to France.' After the
engagement at Prestonpans, 21st September, 1745, the English
general. Sir John Cope, and his officers and fugitives reached
Coldstream, forty to fifty miles, the same night, and after some
repose continued their flight to Berwick, some twenty miles
further. After Rosbach, 5th November, 1757, the Allies did not
stop until they found refuge in Freyburg, and had put the
Unstrut, ten or twelve miles distant, between them and immediate
pursuit ; many regiments not halting until they reached the Rhine,
200 miles away.' " Nor let there be forgotten the flight and pur¬
suit to the Waxhaws, in South Carolina, in 1780 (Tarleton covered
over 100 miles in about 48 hours), or from Bull Run, first, in 1861.
" When, in 1758, the rapacious Duke of Richelieu was recalled,
a churchman, the Count de Clermont, took his place at the
head of 80,000 French. Clermont arrived at Hanover on the
14th February. At once Prince Ferdinand fell upon him and the
French 'fled without pause or intermission (Cust, 2,2,45) across the
snow-covered plains of Westphalia,' and ' by the end of the month '
were all across the Weser, thirty miles to the S. and W. Bruns¬
wick and Hanover were successively evacuated, and within two
months he was back 200 miles across the Rhine. The French
abandoned their magazines, forgot, and thus lost a complete train
of battering artillery and some 11,000 prisoners. It was like the
breaking up of a rotten ice-dam in the spring—a complete dis¬
solution. The Austrians had not done very much better after
Leuthen or Lissa, 5th December, 1757, where Frederic with about
Ixxxiv.
30,000 men defeated their 90,000, and hunted them oiit from
Breslau in Silesia over the Giant mountains back upon their
strongholds and fortresses in northeastern Bohemia, where it is
claimed that, with difficulty, one-third of the numbers which had
assumed the aggressive in November could again be reassembled
after less than a few weeks' campaign of disappointed hopes."
" During the American Revolution, the presumi)tuous Gates,
advancing, boasted he would crush Cornwallis at Camden, i6th
August, 1780, with what he styled his " Grand Army," It was so
completely shattered that it ceased to exist. Gates himself went
off among the first runaways, and with almost the speed of an
express rider, and 'scarcely halted till he reached Hillsborough [in N.
E. North Carolina, 180 miles from the field of battle.'] ("Mercy
Warren," II., 245.) Generals Smallwood and Gist, with a few of
the regulars, succeeded in reaching Charlotte, N. C., 80 to 90 miles
in 36 to 48 hours. The militia scattered and ran wildly, never
stopping until they reached their homes, however distant. Never
was anything more disgraceful, except the flight of some of the
English troops during what was styled the " Castlebar Races,"
after their abandonment of a good position at Castlebar before an
inferior number of French. Gordon (III., 390) states that some
of the riflemen did not bring up until they reached Athlone, fear
having given them such potent wings that they fled eighty miles
in twenty-seven hours, as the roads ran."
But all these evidences of the influence of terror on what
might be styled inexperienced troops is transcended by the flight
of the veteran French from Waterloo. The British General
Mitchell, in his " Fall of Napoleon," Vol. 3, page 153, furnishes
a statement which is positively astounding. It was dusk, or, at
earliest, just after sundown, when the French broke away, i8th
June, 1815. "Between four and five o'clock in the morning
[19th] we find the Emperor at Charleroi endeavoring to rally
fugitives who had already reached that point, though twenty
miles from the field of battle. Failing in his efforts to collect
these men, he proceeded to Philipville, where fugitives again
appeared, but as little inclined for resistance as before. He
therefore proceeds to Laon, and on the following day [20th] is
again haunted by the shadows of his vamjuished host. Informed
that a body of troops was seen advancing towards the town, he
sent an aide-de-camp to ascertain what the appearance could
mean, and learned that it was his brother Jerome, with Generals
Soult, Morand, Colbert, Pelet de Movans and about 3,000 men,
cavalry and infantry, who had gathered round them. Were it
not attested beyond a doubt, the fact would seem almost in¬
credible; for this was on the 20th, and Laon is nearly a hun-
Ixxxv.
dred miles from the field of battle—a space which these fugitives
must have traversed in less than forty-eight hours. Like the
sufferings of the retreat from Moscow, the speed of the flight
from Waterloo stands altogether without parallel in history."
One thing is certain, the rebels, during the retreat from
Petersburg, were never stampeded. Stupid from want of sleep,
beat out through fatigue, exhausted from want of food, staggered
by constant driving and defeated at every stand they may have
been—but stampeded, never.
[This concluding chapter is nothing more than facts thrown
together. It was intended to be much more comprehensive, but
I became too much disgusted with the blindness of mortals as to
facts and with their subservience to assertions to deem it worthy
the trouble of re-writing and digesting. The list of testimony
might be swelled into a large volume, but with what good result ?
Very few would take the trouble to investigate and reflect. It is
impossible to overcome the ingrained effects of ignorance backed
by self-conceit and prejudice, the latter founded on caste, weak¬
ness, interest, or public opinion, the most fallacious of guides.
The Bible, wisest of books, says ; " The prOphet is not without
honor, save Ui his own country and house," and " truth upon the
scaffold," is one of the proverbs which cannot be gainsaid. Had
this article been subjected to the file, a great many of the opinions
might have been modified, but not a fact. " The evolution of to¬
day " has come to the conclusion, " It was in mind, not in body,
that God made man in His own image," but this must be qualified
by the pregnant remark of the wisest of kings, " God hath made
man upright; but they have sought out many inventions," and
the Love of Truth is certainly not one of the inventions they have
sought after or out.]
Experts speak of the art of carrying on war. War is an art
and a science, but there is something requisite in and far above it.
A campaign, an operation, or a battle is not a matter of the
application of mathematical rules, always keeping in mind a most
important element, the qualities and courage of the troops, but of
magnetism, the personal influence of the general commanding and
his lieutenants. There is something in War far above all acquired
knowledge.—Inspiration, Genius, that something which at once
bridges the chasm that arrests Talent ; before which Talent stands
helpless, stupified or aghast. War depends on the physical and
material, but far more upon the mental or moral ; the first requires
preparation, study, labor, and thought. It is a very great mistake
to imagine that generalship was not perfectly comprehended in
antiquity. Solomon certainly understood the basis of it, when he
indited the proverb, " For by wise counsel thou shalt make thy
Ixxxvi.
war." " Every purpose is established by counsel ; and with good
advice make war." " Where no counsel is, the people fall." The
administrative services of the ancients were far better arranged
than the vast majority can conceive, and its discipline perfect.
Modern times know nothing like it, because they would not per¬
mit its savage application. Generalship, as far as it depends
upon science and art, is not so very uncommon. Take one in¬
stance ; the Duke of Berwick was a consummate "practical
strategist"—expert in the art of carrying on war. Nevertheless he
is scarcely ever cited as an exemplar. Inspiration is a direct
effect through the individual upon the masses, especially in battle,
from the God of Hosts and of Battles. Lucullus, a sensualist,
in antiquity, cited by Frederic the Great, and Vendôme, the same
kind of a man, in modern times, were thus gifted ; Spinola, the
banker or merchant; Cavalier, the baker's apprentice; Suwor-
row, the Cossack; Blucher, the liberator of Germany ;—Turenne
was talent incarnate ; Conde, genius. Genius has never been
restricted to any time or place. It is the child of circumstances
and the mood. The six greatest generals of all time, those
generally conceded as the " big sixes," Alexander, the Strategist ;
Hannibal, " the Collosus of Antiquity ; Caesar, the Expert ; Gus-
tavus, the Restorer; Frederic, the Non-parœil; Bonaparte, the
Child of Destiny or Fortune : these six have been arbitrarily
selected. Nunc pro tu7jc, there are others who are worthy to rank
with them.—Fpaminondas, Timoleon, Torstenson, Marlborough,
Traun. The list might be greatly enlarged, but it would be
piping to deaf ears to mention their names or allude to their
deeds. " The world knows nothing of its greatest men." This
country has produced three men who are regarded as the embodi¬
ment of the genius of war, whereas they were simply creatures of
accident. Neither of them had the genius that bridges unexpected
and unforseen gulfs. They were what Kleber justly styled Bona¬
parte, " generals at six thousand lives a day." For instance.
Grant did not display^ny genius in the Wilderness campaign. He
did not do as well as Sherman, jvith Thomas as his inspiration
and balance-wheel, did in the Atlanta campaign, or as Thomas,
alone, at Nashville. And it would seem as if at Farmville, 7th
April, 1865, he demonstrated his want of genius or perception in
not reinforcing Humphreys as much as he did at Shiloh in
neglecting to make the most of his position and provide against
surprise and accidents. " Defensive battles [Lee's strong point]
may be looked upon as professional battles. Offensive battles,
ivell prepared and delivered, are [when so] the emanations of
genius."—Marmont's " Spirit of Military Institutions."
Ixxxvii.
[Note.—The question of Bridging or Fording the Appomattox
to reinforce Humphreys, on the afternoon, 6th April, 1865, is a very
curious one, and its comprehension involves a great deal of study
and practical observation. Finally, it resolves itself into the sim¬
pler question rather of the exertion of will power than of physical
ability. The proverb, " Where there is a will there is a way," holds
good on almost every occasion in war. The Appomattox at Farm-
ville is a comparatively small stream and it would not have taken
very long to tear down a number of neighboring buildings and
construct a temporary bridge, amply strong enough and enduring
enough for the occasion. Besides being a railroad station, there
were lots of material that could be utilized and there were woods
in close vicinity. No enemy on the north bank was present or
at hand to molest the work, which could have been prosecuted
on both sides simultaneously, and the only difficulty in bridging
the much broader and deeper ' Rappahannock in December,
1862, ceased the moment the rebel sharpshooters, on the right
bank and under cover, were dislodged. Again, where was the pon¬
toon train which should have moved with each corps and have been
in readiness for instant use? Humphreys had shown, 6th, a. m.,
how rapidly bridges could be restored or constructed. On the
morning of the 6th his men forded armpit deep and also bridged
Flat Creek, about one hundred feet wide. It is no pedantry to
instance examples in former days, because they always hold good
from the first development of modern war, as when Gustavus Adol-
phus crossed the Rhine on a barn door, and Bernard of Saxe
Weimar, imitating Maximin, A. D. 238, and imitated by the
Germans in 1870, substituted hogsheads or beer barrels for pon¬
toons, and threw bridges sufficient for all practical purposes in
an almost incredibly short space of time. There are a great many
curious examples of spontaneous engineering which demonstrate
what energy or despair will effect. In 1560 D'Qysell made a raid
into Fife, on the north side of the Firth of Forth, and found him¬
self beset by superior forces. Before him lay a deep and broad
stream, the bridge across which had been destroyed. His enemies
thought he was entrapped. The experienced French commander
did not hesitate a moment ; he caused a church and other neigh¬
boring buildings to be torn down, and with the timbers, &c., he
constructed a bridge, to the astonishment of the Scotch, who
thought they had him sure. As to fording, practice sets rules at
defiance. Near, or at Farmville, Col. W. H. Paine, "Pathfinder
of the Army of the Potomac," stated there was a ford used by
those frequenting the mill, and a little above a crossing path over
a tree, which had fallen or been felled so as to constitute a foot¬
bridge.]
Ixxxviii.
It has been reported, and the story has never been contra¬
dicted, that when the French, in 1799, destroyed the- Devil's
Bridge, Suworrow's troops restored communication by lashing
trees together with the sashes of their officers. It is true that the
span is only twenty-five or thirty feet, but the horrors of the situa¬
tion more than made up for the narrowness of the gulf. What
made it far worse, fighting was going on and the slightest dis¬
abling wound was equivalent to death. The effect on the mind
made this bridging of twenty-five feet far more difficult and ap¬
palling than five times greater breadth of placid water. There
are instances of making bridges by thrusting wagons into the
stream in continuous lines across.
Where there are plenty of large trees and plenty of men to
handle them, a cob or a cantilever bridge over a small stream
does not present much difficulty. The writer has seen a great
many curious pieces of snap-'fioxk done with celerity and success.
The Rœliff Jansen, a large and furious stream, burst its bounds
and nearly scooped out a village. No trouble was experienced
in constructing a cob dam across the new channel, which, while
it allowed the water to pass freely, constituted a bridge, as it were,
to get the materials in place. Had it been planked, it would have
been a bridge.
"Thirty-six inches for infantry, forty inches for artillery and cav¬
alry," are the figures in books ás the depths set down as rules for
fording. Infantry have often laughed at greater depths. Ewell,
in July, 1863, forded the Potomac shoulder deep ; Humphreys, on
the 6th April, Flat Creek arm-pit deep—that is, at least, from
forty-eight to fifty-two inches. When Ginkel's grenadiers carried
Athlone in the teeth of a sheltered defence, they forded the broad
and impetuous Shannon under fire, cravat deep, which must have
been from fifty-two to sixty inches, since grenadiers were men
picked out for their height. At any time and under any circum¬
stances it was considered "a dangerous ford." How deep cavalry
can ford depends upon the horses, and if the rule holds good,
as it is consistent with common sense, infantry can ford, not swim,
through as great a depth of water as cavalry, if the bottom is firm,
because horses deepen a ford with their shod hoofs, whereas in¬
fantry often pack it. A spirited horse will not ford quietly when
the water is as deep as his back ; he rises and wants to surge.
The writer knows this by experience. Fifteen hands makes sixty
inches, which would bring water over the seat of the saddle of
average horses,, and arm-pit or shoulder deep, say fifty inches,
would bring water over the backs of average horses. Memory
recalls at this moment Baner's infantry forded the Oder shoulder
deep, dragging by hand their artillery after them.—" Decisive
Conflicts," Gettysburg, 107.
Ixxxix.
On reflection it is astonishing how often such feats of audacity
have been attempted and succeeded. At the passage of the
Boyne, 1690, the English, in fact the whole infantry of their centre,
struggled through the river up to their arm-pits in water, under
fire, to attack an enemy of equal force in position and to some ex¬
tent protected by artificial defences. At the capture of Cork by
Marlborough, 1690, four English regiments advanced through the
Rape Marsh up to their shoulders in water. At Athlone, 1691,
William's troops plunged, up to their cravats in water, into the
Shannon, running not only deep but strong, forded the river under
fire, and captured strongly occupied works. Numerous other in¬
stances might be cited; the most remarkable, Villar's advance
through an inundated country, in the spring of 1706, to the cap¬
ture of fortified towns and strongly occupied works. On this
occasion the French infantry charged about a mile through water
up to their shoulders, and the horses of the cavalry were in many
places compelled to swim (Moret's "Quinze Ans du Régne de Louis
XIV." [1700-1715J, II., pages 149-151). In the operations
around Savannah, and after its capture, 1864, on more than one
occasion (according to letters received) short men had to swim
for their lives.
Meade telegraphed to Humphreys, "7th April, 6.15 p. m., the
[Crook's] cavalry has forded belly deep." [The writer had his mare
measured, and with her belly deep was equal to thirty-four inches,
and, under the saddle, back deep was equal to about sixty inches,
ecfual to about arm-pit deep of a man standing five feet ten in his
boots. This argument, showing that the Appomattox should have
been crossed some way or another to the support of Humphreys,
was fortified by measurements received from Farmville a number of
years ago, which are doubtless among the writer's papers af home
far distant, and at present inaccessible. Communications have
been addressed requesting duplicate information, but as yet have
met with no response.]
[(Fording and Fighting in the Water.)—"These fords
[those of the 'most easterly branch of the Nile, the Pelusaic']
[which'may be forded on horseback when the Nile is at the
lowest, or even by men on foot if they do not mind being wet to
the waist '] the troops of Perdiccas bravely attempted to pass, in
the face of the first Ptolemy's army. One [branch or arm] they
crossed, but were routed at the second, while fighting up to their
breasts m the water."—Bartlett's " Forty Days in the Desert."
London, 1862. Page 24.]
" Several different systems for a Ponton Equipment have been
adopted in different countries, and it is therefore still a matter
for military study as to which of them is best, in whole or in part,
or what improvements or substitutes can be suggested for all.
xc.
" Pontons of ordinary shape are not exclusively applicable for
forming a bridge ; when insufficient for that object they may be
used as boats or in rafts to convey bodies of troops across a river;
the horses being made to swim with their heads held up by their
bridles at the sides of each ponton ; the artillery in such cases
being carried over on rafts. Indeed, it was in this way that, in
1814, a preliminary footing was rapidly established on the right
bank of the Adour, about three miles below Bayonne, capable of
resisting the strong sortie sent out from that garrison to oppose it.
"Of numerous similar instances of the service which even an
extemporized pontoon-train has rendered to an army, I will select
only the following one, recorded by Captain Connolly in his
"History of the Royal Sappers and Miners," Vol. I., page 254:
"A reinforcement of thirty men, under Lieutenant Rutherford,
R. E., arrived at the Cape of Good Hope on the 24th of July,
iSrg. In consequence of hostilities with the Kaffirs, the detach¬
ment marched seven hundred miles to the south-eastern frontier.
It traversed a wild and thickly wooded country, where there were
neither bridges nor roads ; and, in the absence of soldiers of the
Quartermaster-General's Department, facilitated by their exer¬
tions the progress of the troops. In places where civil artificers
could not be procured at any rate of wages, they executed various
services and works of defence for the security and tranquillity of
the settlement. On one occasion they constructed a temporary
bridge, of chance material, to span ope of the principal rivers of
the country, which was swollen with fioods and rendered deep,
rapid, and dangerous. The bridge was thrown in six hours, and
the whole of the force, about two thousand horse aud foot, a
demi-battery of guns with ammunition wagons, about one hun¬
dred baggage wagons with commissariat supplies, camp equipage,
&c., crossed in perfect safety in three hours."—Extract from "The
Royal Engineer." By the Rt. Hon. Sir Francis B. Head, Bart.
London, 1869. At pages 36 and 37.
"As soon as tliis [Lassoo] experiment was concluded and the
drivers had reattached themselves to their wagons, the whole train
was ordered to advance in file—that is, one ponton carriage, &:c.,
guarded by its sappers, following another. After they had pro¬
ceeded in this shape for a short distance. Captain Micklem very
sharply uttered the word of command : ' Form for defence against
cavalry,' and in less than two minutes, by a movement exactly the
reverse of that described by the lines :
'These are Clan-Alpine's warriors true;
And, Saxon,—I am Roderick Dhu ! '
he, his horses, his drivers, and his sappers, became the invis-
xci.
ible garrison of a fort or polygon pf twenty sides, formed by his
pontoon and covered wagons, drawn up so close to each other
that, in several instances, they almost touched, and in otliers left
an interstice or embrasure of about a foot or eighteen inches on
the outside.
"As I rode around and close to this rapidly constructed fort,
wherever I came to an interstice a sapper on one knee, with his
sword in bayonet form attached to his firearm, with two others
standing one behind the other above him, each and all looking
direct at me, nearly together snapped their Sniders in my face.
Others beneath the wagons shot at me from between the wheels;
and I have no hesitation in saying that the officer's word of com¬
mand was so completely carried into practical effect that the ram¬
part formed by his wagons was totally impenetrable, pot only to
cavalry using swords, but also to lancers."—Extract from " Head's
Royal Engineer." London, 1869. At pages 44 and 45.
" Eortification is the art of enabling a small body of men to
resist, for a considerable time, the attack of a greater number."—
Extract from "Head's Royal Engineer." London, 1869. At
' page 155.
" Now, to obliterate [Impossible !] that word from future engin¬
eering proceedings, the ' trench-railway ' has been invented, or,
as there is really nothing new in its principle, it would be more
correct to say that the ordinary railway of the firm of Stephenson,
Brunei & Co. has been at Chatham adopted and adapted to the
parallels and approaches of a siege.
"The facility with which it can be so adapted has been de¬
monstrated by the fact, that during last summer a squad of twenty-
five sappers, who had been duly instructed in the work, with the
assistance of twenty-five fatigue men-, laid down four-hundred
yards of line in instruction trenches, at Brompton, in twenty-five
minutes, so that the trollies or trucks for carrying guns, ammuni¬
tion, &c., were able to pass along the iron road. The materials
had been previously prepared and brought up, but the whole of
the laying of sleepers and rails, and spiking down the latter were,
it is alleged, done in the time mentioned. And very nearly at
that rate I myself saw the work proceed."—Extract from " Head's
Royal Engineer." London, 1869. At pages 156 and 157.
"A certain number of barrels, usually the ordinary ones used
by the navy or commissariat for provisions and rum, according to
their size and power of flotation, are firmly lashed together
side by side, and in this form take the place of the piers of an or¬
dinary permanent bridge or of the pontoons of a floating bridge.
"The seventy barrels I witnessed would enable an army
without pontoons, with its cavalry, field artillery and infantry, four
xcíí.
deep, to cross a river fifty yards broad. The wooden cases lined
with metal, used for carrying on board ship ammunition for the
new heavy guns, can be adapted by the pontoon train for this pur¬
pose."—"Royal Engineer." By Sir F. B. Head. London, i86g.
At pages 56 and 57.
" Royal Engineer Establishment.
" Chatham, 186-.
"i.—Lieutenant , Royal Engineers, will prepare a
project for a military bridge of piles, to support twelve-pounder
Armstrong guns, to be made of Fir poles, 8" diameter and length
as required, over a river one hundred yards wide and six feet
deep, with tidal rise of five feet, banks and bottom of river of
solid clay. Reports to describe how the poles would be driven,
no boat being available; pile-engine to be made on the spot;
monkey 13" shell roadway to be covered with fascines, as no
planks are available.
"2.—A general description of the proposed bridge, and of the
method of constructing it, with an abstract estimate of the men,
tools, materials and time required for its formation.
" 3.—A practical analysis of the data, showing the load to be
borne, and its action upon the constituent parts of the bridge, the
width of roadway required, &c., with a detailed examination into
the powers of the parts of the bridge to resist the forces, &c., to
which they will be subjected.
"4.—A detailed description of the arrangement and construc¬
tion, and of the method of putting together and securing the parts
to the bridge.
" 5.—A detailed description of the subdivision of the work
and the organization of the working parties, with separate esti¬
mates of the number of men and tools, of the quantity of material,
and the length of time required for each successive operation in
forming the bridge.
"6.—A general plan, with the necessary sections and eleva¬
tions of the bridge, g,ccompanied by drawings on a larger scale of
those details which cannot be clearly explained otherwise.
"The dates of beginning and ending the project to be written
on the plan and memoir."
"[Signed,] Superintendent of Field Works."
"Royal Engineer." By Sir F. B. Head, pages 168-9. Lon¬
don, 1869.
According to the report of Edward Maguire, Lieutenant U.
S. Engineers, in his " Exploration and Survey in the Department
of Dakota," 30th June, 1877 ;
"While in the field the attention of the detachment was
xciii.
devoted to topographical work. * * * In addition to
topographical work I was engaged in the superintendence of the
Bridging and Crossing of streams and in such road-making as
was found to be necessary in order to allow the passage of the
train [page 1337]. The next morning (i8th May, 1876) the com¬
mand moved again, crossing Heart River. The Heart at this
point is about thirty yards wide, three feet deep, with a fairly
firm sandy bed and a slight current. The water was clear and
good. A great deal of work was required in corduroying the
bank to enable the train to cross, and it was only after a delay of
three hours that the head of the column commenced its march
for the Sweetbriar [page 1341].
" The next day's march of thirteen and a half miles brought
us to Crow's Nest, or Buzzard's Roost Butte. The first portion
of the route lay over an exceedingly rough country covered with
drift. After struggling over a distance of one and a quarter miles,
we arrived on the banks of the Sweetbriar. It was found to be
a rushing torrent fully fifty feet wide and much over ten feet in
depth. To cross it with the means at hand was impossible, so it
was determined to go southward and turn the stream. This was
done, and skirting the valley we passed out into an open, flat and
marshy prairie, in a north-westerly direction towards Crow's Nest.
The ground was very soft, and interspersed with fragments of slate,
and the last four and and a half miles were passed over a swamp,
double teams being necessary for each wagon. At noon a terrible
storm arose—the rain came down as in sheets, while, for twenty
minutes, hail five-eighths of an inch in diameter descended with
great violence. # # *
"Crow's Nest consists of two peaks, the eastern one being
considerably taller than the other. It is so called from the fact
that large numbers of crows formerly built their nests and brooded
there. Twin Buttes are plainly visible from the eastern peak.
" The only water at this camp was that in ' coulées ' and ' buffalo
wallows.' There was no wood easily accessible, and the grass
was poor. The bridge was laid once during this march [page
1341]. The flowers were very beautiful, and as they were crushed
under the horses' feet they gave forth a protest of the most deli¬
cate and welcome odor [page 1342].
" These Indians were bold enough to assemble on the bluffs
on the south side of the Yellowstone, and dare the troops on the
other side to an encounter [page 1344].
" It is thought that a few remarks in reference to one serious
defect in the organization of the columns operating in the field
during the campaign will not be out of place. (^^That defect was
the absence of a good bridge train. On leaving Fort Lincoln
xciv.
there were placed, under my orders, two wagons containing tools
and some one and a half inch pine plank, and some, two by four
and three by six, pine pieces. # # # though simple
it was of incalculable benefit, and shows how useful and valuable
a small canvas ponton train would have been; I am free to say
that I think no supply-train should be sent into that western
country without at least two trestles, four canvas pontons, and
the accompanying bridge material. Four pontons are estimated,
because a substantial raft could be made of that number for cross¬
ing the larger streams. If these could not be obtained from the
regular Engineer depot, the Quartermaster's department shoxJd be
called upon to construct them in accordance with proper plans
and specifications.
" Last season the material mentioned above saved the column
many miles of hard marching and great loss of time ; but, unfortu¬
nately, the supply was soon exhausted and it then became neces¬
sary to resort to the long, tedious and uninteresting operation of
filling in the bed of the stream to be crossed. It is thought, also,
that there should accompany each column a detail of men whose
sole duty should be to construct and care for the bridges. Much
time would be saved by thus having men who would be familiar
with the work, and who would take a greater interest in it than
can be expected of those who are detailed from day to day.
"The wagon train made fifty-nine crossings in all, and the
average time consumed in making these crossings was forty
minutes each. As a matter of interest, there will follow a de¬
scription of some of the methods of crossing streams, which have
been or can be employed by our troops in the western country.
"ist.—By filling in the bed of the stream or ravine with logs,
covering these with a layer of brush, and in turn covering the
brush with a thick layer of sod or earth. It is very seldom that
the time can be allowed for carrying this structure high enough,
and consequently the approaches must be cut quite deep ; and
experience has showp that there is not more than one teamster
in twenty who will not let his team run down the slope of the ap¬
proach and strike the causeway with a heavy thud, thus breaking
through the roadbed and requiring constant work of refilling.
The brush used may be sage, willow and young cottonwood.
The sage is by far the most easily manipulated and the most en¬
during. Logs, to act as side-rails, should be laid, and the road¬
way should be at least fifteen feet broad. The axes of the ap¬
proaches and the crossing should be in the same plane, perpen¬
dicular to the axis of the stream. This would seem a trivial
remark, but it was observed last summer that, unless closely
watched, the men would, unconsciously, deviate from the proper
xcv.
direction, and the crossing would be oblique to the stream.
Whenever that happened, there was trouble with the teamsters.
" 2d.—By making a crib-work of spare wagon-tongues, and
laying others covered with sod to form the roadwa^f. The wagon-
pole is of oak, and ten and seven-tenths feet long.
"3d.—By employing the bull-ropes or fifth-chains as suspen¬
sion cables, and laying at the bottom of the catenary three or
four wagon-tongues to act as a species of girder. The flooring
is laid with other wagon-tongues, and the whole covered with sod.
To prevent swaying, lariats may be fastend to the ropes and
anchored to tbe shore. This method is, of course, limited to
timbered streams and to those which are a little less in width
than twice the length of a wagon-tongue, or twenty-one feet.
[This is something on the principle of Tressilian's telegraph wire
suspension bridges.]
"4th.—By employing floating piers, each consisting of a wagon-
body placed over the number of empty water-kegs that can be con¬
fined within the body. The roadway, as before, is formed of wagon-
tongues. Lariats can be used as anchoring cables for the piers.
"A keg is capable of sustaining a weight of 458.69 pounds.
" The interior dimensions of the six-mule army wagon-body
are as follows : depth, 2 feet ; length, 10 feet; width, 3.58 feet.
"Fourteen ten-gallon kegs will about fill a wagon-body of the
above dimensions; and hence each set of kegs will virtually sustain
a weight of fourteen times 458.69 pounds, or 6,421.66 pounds.
Subtracting from this the average weight of the body, 423 pounds,
we shall have 5,998.66 pounds as the weight which can be borne
by each pier.
. "The dimensions of the wagon-tongue are as follows;
" Length of tongue, ... 10.7 feet.
Breadth at point, . . . B' = 2.5 inches.
Depth at point, .... D'= 2.5 "
Breadth at butt, . . . B"= 3.88 "
Depth at butt, .... D"= 2.75 "
Mean breadth, . . . . B' = 3.19 "
Mean depth, D'= 2.625 "
" Supposing the tongues not to lap on the piers, we shall have
for the length of the tongue between supports, 7 feet, 12 inches.
"The average weight of the army wagon is 1,800 pounds, and
assuming the weight of a.mule as 1,000 pounds, we shall have
7,800 pounds as the weight of the wagon and six-mule team.
Assuming, now, the average weight of the load to be 4,000
pounds, we shall have 11,800 pounds as the weight on the bridge.
xcvi.
The total length of bridge occupied by wagon and team is
forty-nine feet, and consequently the load per running foot is 241
pounds, nearly._ Referring to the breaking weight of the tongue,
we see that four tongues laid as balks are sufficient; forty tongues
will be required for flooring, if laid close. There will then be in
all forty-four tongues, weighing twenty-eight pounds each. In
other words, each bay, exclusive of the piers, will weigh 1,232
pounds, or 115.1 pounds per running foot. We have, as the
weight of forty-nine feet of bridge, with load, ii,íoo pounds
plus 115.1 pounds, X 49, or 17,440 pounds, nearly. This weight
will be borne by at least five piers; but we have seen above that
each pier will support 5,998.66 pounds, and consequently five
piers would support 29,993.3. In other words, the bridge would
have nearly double the strength absolutely necessary. It is also
to be seen that any field-battery can be crossed on such a bridge.
A similar bridge can be constructed by using simply the kegs,
lashed together, for piers; but the other method is preferable, as
the wagon-body keeps the kegs together, besides furnishing a
level bed on which to lay the balks.
"5th.—By felling four trees, which, with the butts resting on
the banks, will [Cantilever], by crossing each other two and two,
form supports for a girder, and then laying a flooring. They
should either be spiked or lashed together where they cross.
"6th.—By forming rude trestles, which may be either simply
notched, or, what is better, spiked with lariat pins. The girder
timbers can be squared off on the upper side and the stringers be
notched so as to hold better. The main pieces of the legs may
be anchored to the shore by lariats. A tripod trestle-bridge can
be formed of simple tripods connected at the bottom by braces.
A bar is lashed or pinned across two legs of the tripod, and on
this rests the cap-piece, as in the Figure 6.
"7th.—By various combinations of saplings forming what are
termed single or double lever bridges.
"A small worlron field fortification, by Major W. W. Knollys,
F. R. G. S., Ninety-third Southerland Highlanders, contains a
very good description of such bridges.
"A single-lever bridge is composed of two frames which lock
into each other. A full sized section of the stream or gap should
be first traced on the ground. The line representing the breadth
should be bisected. Two standards should then be laid down on
the section and on them marked the places wheie the main tran¬
soms, the fork transom, and the ledges will come. The frames
should then be constructed. These distances should be between
standards at the transom, nine feet six inches, and at the ledger
ten feet six inches. In the other frame the distances should be
xcix.
«
[" The troops were set to work at once to construct a bridge
across the South Fork of the Bayou Pierre (near Port Gibson,
ist May, 1863). At this time the water was high and current
rapid. What might be called a raft bridge was soon constructed
from material obtained from wooden buildings^ stables, fences,
&c., which sufficed for carrying the whole army over safely.—
XXXIV, 485. See Map to face page 466. " Personal Memoirs
of U. S. Grant, 1885."]
[Every battle or engagement has its fellow or parallel, either in
whole or in part. At Prague, 6th May, 1757, if Prince Moritz
could have got across the Moldau at Branik, a little south of
Prague, the Austrian army might have been annihilated. Prince
Moritz was three pontons short, and the Moldau was not ford-
able; whereas there were more than sufficient pontons at Farm-
• ville, and the Appomattox was fordable. In assaulting the
Austrian lines Prince Henry waded through a soft marsh waist-
deep, which is about forty-four inches, or nearly back-deep for a
horse. Belly-deep for ordinary horses is not much over thirty
inches. 'From the utter impossibility of getting over or through
the Moldau, Prince Moritz was compelled to stand idly by and
see the Austrians, thoroughly whipped, withdraw and find refuge
behind the fortifications of Prague, or march off to reinforce Daun
and win at Koltin. At Farmville abundant troops, which could
easily have got across, leit Humphreys to take care of himself,
and allowed Lee to escape, affording him another chance to get
off, and necessitating a terribly harassing pursuit of about forty
miles in about as many hours, just the unsatisfactory case of Prague
followed by the necessity of another fight within a few days.
This" was exactly Blucher's idea of the folly of not profiting by
every opportunity, especially of the defeat of an çnemy.]
[" The rates of march, for Russian troops, under good condi¬
tions of weather and roads, are as follows, per hour :
For Infantry 2^ miles.
For Foot Artillery, 31/3 "
For Cavalry and Horse Artillery, at
a walk, . 3^ "
For Cavalry and Horse Artillery,
alternately at walk and trot, . 4^ "
For Horse Train, 2^ "
For Ox Train, 2 "
The length of a division of Infantry on the march, in column
of double files or sections, is from 3,000 to 4,000 paces; and in¬
cluding its wagon train, from 9,000 (21,000 feet) to 13,000 (17,-
000 feet) paces. The length of a Cavalry division on the march.
c.
in column of threes, is from 4,000 to 5,000 paces, and including
its train, from 9,000 to 10,000 paces."—"The Russian Army and
its Campaigns in Turkey in 1877 and 1878." By F. V. Greene.
New York; 1879. Page 136.]
copy of an inscription appended to a picture in the old
war department building, in washington, which has
disappeared. it is pertinent to fording.
General Geo. Rogers Clarke was born in Albemarle Co., Va.,
in 1752, but spent the greater part of his life in Kentucky and
Indiana. In 1778 he raised a small volunteer force in Virginia,
crossed the Ohio, reduced nearly all the British posts between the
Mississippi and the Great Lakes, and arrested the incursions of
the Western Indians. His marches through the pathless wilder¬
ness were so rapid that he generally took the enemy by surprise,
his prudence so great that he rarely lost a man, and his daring
has never been surpassed. In attacking Vincennes in February,
1779, he was five days in wading his army across the valley of the
Wabash, fiooded with tnelted snows for a breadth of six miles, gene¬
rally waist deep, and sometifnes up to the shoulders, aii exploit that
parallels Hannibal's crossing of the Tlu-asymene Marsh.
General Clarke was variously employed by the State of Vir¬
ginia and the United States up to 1786, in maintaining possession
of the Western country and suppressing Indian hostilities. He
died in 1818, near Louisville, Kentucky.
This conquest and armed occupation of the Northwestesn
Territory by General Clarke, was made the ground on which the
Count de Vergennes and the American Commissioners obtained
for the United States, by the treaty of 1783, a boundary on the
line of the Great Lakes instead of the Ohio River.
I have become so thoroughly disgusted with the wilful or un¬
intentional perversion of facts recently published, or special pleas
presented as histoifes of the American Rebellion by first hands,
politicians, flatterers, partisans, parasites, perverters, or purveyors
for the diseased public taste, that I have not attempted to con¬
cise or correct this chapter on Fording, &c., but give it just as I
found my notes, some of them long since jotted down, others
studied shortly after the occurrences on which they bear as testi¬
mony, corroborative of opinions then expressed. They were sub¬
mitted to one of the bravest men I ever knew, and also to one of
the most honest men I ever met. The one is where " the wicked
cease from troubling and the weary are at rest," but the other
survives to bear witness to the correctness of the foregoing state¬
ments and deductions, and herewith, to attest the fact, his letter,
ci.
one of a number of similar communications received from him, is
published, and immediately follows.
Dear General de Peyster; New York, April 23d, 1886.
* * * It was not until last evening that I succeeded
in finishing the reading of the papers you gave me. I am very
sorry that all of my memoranda concerning army matters are for
the time being,locked up in a storehouse and ,not conveniently
accessible. My recollection of the events narrated corresponds fully
with the account as you have it. You have given IIu7nphreys that
fust credit which was his due, a credit which he himself did not
strive or ask for, being so absorbed in that ifitelligent, energetic and
fearless perforrnance of all that not simply duty, but the highest pa¬
triotism, combined with military ability, led hitn to attempt and to
perform.
At one time I wrote you in regard to some fords above, one
at a mill ; also of a place where a fallen tree served as a foot
bridge. Also of the fact of the river being fordable at ordinary
stages in many places ; of guiding and accompanying Hon. E. B.
Washburn from General Meade's headquarters to and across the
river by a ford the next night after leaving Farmville. The
proximity of large trees near the left bank, and buildings on the
right bank, all of which would have furnished materials for a bridge.
I ought, and perhaps did, mention that Gen. Meade, who re¬
mained for a time where Gen. Humphreys crossed [High Bridge?],
received reports that the engineers were constructing a bridge at
•Farmville, in consonance with his instructions, and not until quite
late in the day [7th April], did he learn that that was not being
accomplished as he expected.
Where Gen. Humphreys crossed, the bank and bluif was very
steep and abrupt, the wagon road making quite a detour to reach
the bottom. The slope on the opposite side bein^ less steep and
farther from the stream. There was originally 35 spans in the
R. R. bridge, 100 feet each in length; earth had been filled in,
shortening the bridge to 29 spans, if I recollect right, of which
two or three had been injured or partially destroyed by the enemy
when we arrived. Gen. Humphreys' route diverged to the right
over a gradual rise, but coming to a very rough, broken region
just before reaching the place [Cumberland Church] of his en¬
gagement with the enemy. After reaching the height of ground,
about a half mile from the river [south side, right bank ?], a road
ran in the direction of Farmville ; this was the road taken by the
cavalry. Nearer the river the country was a succession of spurs
and deep ravines. ..t , ,
Yours very truly,
cii.
WILLIAMSBURG FARMVILLE.
[It is extraordinary how exactly history often repeats itself.
At pages LVII. and XCIX. mention is made that, during the
battle of Prague, 6th May, 1757, the corps, or division, of Prince
' Moritz had to stand idle and see the wrecks of the Austrian army
escape, in consequence of the want of three pontons. Just so the
plans of Wellington were traversed before the battle of Toulouse,
27th March, 1814, at Portel on the Garonne, for the want of five
pontons (Larpent, 458). Had the British column been provided
with five more boats, the slaughter, fourteen days afterwards, ex¬
perienced in carrying the French positions might have been
avoided. These, however, were accidents irremediable at the
moment. At Farmville, 7th April, 1865, any difficulty might have
been obviated at once. Humphreys might have, after Cumber¬
land Church, in justice, quoted the bitter remark of Hooker in
regard to his abandonment at Williamsburg, 5th May, 1862 :
" History will not be believed when it is told that the noble of¬
ficers and men of my division were permitted to carry on this un¬
equal struggle from morning until night, unaided, in the presence
of more than thirty thousand of their comrades with arms in their
hands. Nevertheless, it is true."- (Rebellion Record, Vol. V.,
Doc. page 16, i.)
This example does not stand alone. After the great French
disaster at Gudenarde, Marshal Vendóme wrote to Louis XIV. :
" It was impossible for me to imagine that fifty battalions and
about one hundred and eighty squadrons, comprising the best
troops in this [the French] army, would be satisfied to look on
and see us [the French right] fighting for six hours, they looking
on exactly as, at the opera, the audience watches what is being
acted upon the stage, from the upper boxes." Hooker, in his
report, seemed simply quoting and applying the language of the
French duke, writing one hundred and sixty years previous.
On the same page, XCIX., reference is made to Wading or
Fording and Marclîîng. Lieut.-Col. Townshend Wilson, in his
"The Duke of Berwick, Marshal of France" (211), tells us how
"in the dark and rainy night of the 25th October, 1708, Lange-
ron's grenadiers, wading up to their waists through the Wash, burst
into Leffingham and captured stronghold and strong garrison, all
at the cost of eight grenadiers killed and twenty wounded." As
to Marching, Berwick's Spanish infantry marched seven long
leagues (say thirty miles) without water and in intense heat
{^Ibid. 141), and this same Spanish infantry marched forty-five
long leagues (about one hundred and ninety miles) in eight
days, in a rough country, destitute of roads and supplies.
This was something terrible, considering the heavy firearms and
xcvii.
eleven feet and twelve feet, respectively. As the frame lies on the
ground with its butts toward the stream, the transom should be
under and the ledger above the standards. The diagonal dimen¬
sions of the frames are measured to ascertain whether the posi¬
tions of the pieces of the latter have not changed. Of the di¬
agonals, one is altogether above the frame, the other has its butt
over and its top under. The diagonals are lashed to each other
where they cross, and also to the standards. The frames are
raised and lowered into their positions by means of foot and guy
ropes. The pickets for the foot ropes are driven into the ground
about two paces from the edge of the bank and four paces on
each side of the centre of the frame. The foot ropes are attached
to the butts and passed twice around the pickets. The pickets
for the guy ropes are driven in about twenty paces from the bank
and ten paces from the central line. The fore and back guys are
fastened to the tips, the ends of the fore guys being thrown across
the stream and those of the back guys being passed twice around
their respective pickets. The frames are then raised by hand
and carried to the edge of the bank. The butts are then gradu¬
ally lowered into position, one frame being hauled over till it is a
little beyond the perpendicular, in which position it is secured by
fastening the back guys to their pickets ; the other frame is dealt
with in a similar manner. Both frames are then lowered till they
interlock. A spar is laid across the fork formed by the crossing
of the standards, to serve as a support to the road beams. The
roadway is composed of balks lashed to each other, and covered
with planks, spiked or rack-lashed down, or by fascines covered
with loose brushwood, earth or heather. The ends of the balks
should be attached to a beam or stout spar, half buried in
the ground and picketed down, its direction being perpendic¬
ular to the length of the bridge. It is desirable to place rails or
breast lines at the edges of the bridge. At each transom the
road beams should be all tips or all butts, and the ends of each
pair should be lashed together. It must be noted that the frames
should not make a greater angle with each other than 120°.
"A double-lever bridge is formed in a manner similar to that
in which a single-lever bridge is constructed, with the exception
that the two frames do not cross each other, but are connected
by means of a second frame, which has no diagonals. Double-
lever bridges are suited for openings of forty feet. Even open¬
ings of sixty feet have been spanned by a double lever bridge.
"Another combination can be made by forming a lever truss
bridge. The frames are made as in the case just cited, but an
extra support is given to the roadway by the rope at the centre."
The figures annexed explain themselves. {Ibid, pages 1354-1358.)
xcviii.
[F. B. Tressilian, a young officer who suggested the idea of con¬
structing imprmñsed suspension bridges crrer streams not over two
htmdred feet wide, using telegraph wire for the cables, was one of
the brightest and most original men I ever met. He had all the
expedients of war at his finger ends. Like Korner, he was a sol¬
dier-poet. One of his lyrics, jotted down on a shingle, while on
duty in the trenches before Vicksburg, which he also set to music
(in the same way that Roget de L'Isle composed the words and
notes of " The Marseillaise), was like a trumpet peal, worthy of
Tyrtœus. He afterwards became a Fenian, and started from New
York, with other noted bloods, in a schooner, intending to land
in Ireland and organize armed resistance against the British Gov¬
ernment. After hovering around the coast for some time, and find¬
ing nothing could be done, he returned, and suddenly turned up
in New York again—then disappeared.
An article, which he partly jotted down in his Diary and partly
related to me, I furnished to The Historical Magazine, for August,
lèôg, pages 89-97. It is entitled, " IX.—Incidents connected
with the History of the 'Army of the Tennessee.' " From the
Diary of one its officers. [The author of the following Diary was
Captain (afterward Lieutenant-Colonel) F. B. Tressilian, U. S. V.,
Aid-de-Camp and Engineer on the Staff of Major-General John
A. Logan. He was a man of uncommon ability and courage ;
never at a loss for expedients; and competent to produce great
results with what, to ordinary men, would have proved utterly
insufficient means. He was a very warm friend of the writer ;
and, as a memento of his regards, copied out the following from
his Diary to oblige Major-General de Peyster, who has never ne¬
glected an opportunity to collect such reminiscences of the great
American conflict. It is almost a misfortune for the future his-
tarian that Colonel Tressilian did not at least set in order his
recollections of the decisive battle of Shiloh, but more particu¬
larly of the siege of Vicksburg, in which he played a conspicuous
part—gctually converting Stumps into Mortars, and on another oc¬
casion BUILDING A BRIDGE OUT OF TELEGRAPH WIRE, wheU mili¬
tary professionals were noJiplussed at the absence of what they
deemed suitable or necessary material.] This Diary is most interest¬
ing. It terminates abruptly with the disembarking of the Union
troops at Pittsburg Landing [Shiloh], 1862. Tressilian's opinion of
the position was anything but favorable. It is a great loss to his¬
tory that his graphic Diary, with its practical observations, was
never printed in full. If there ever was a genius, in the ordinary
acceptation of the term, Tressilian was eminently such a one.]
ciii.
accoutrements, and inattention to every rule of hygiene in those
days, when the " common soldier " was indeed regarded as " com¬
mon," and of as little account as a serviceable brute beast.
{Ibid. [1708] 271-2). Finally, in regard to Panics, at Sherifif-
muir, Sunday, 13th November, 1715, the English centre, in¬
fantry ' and dragoons, fell into total rout at the onslaught of
the opposing clans; and "the dastard leader" of the English
army. General Witham, gallopped to Sterling, ten miles off,
"frantically proclaiming that 'all was lost'" {Ibid. 397). Any
amount of similar examples might be brought forward, blit the
space accorded is now filled up; still numerous authorities, beam¬
ing with such illustrations, are easily accessible to the curious or
critical on such subjects.
ADDITIONAL AUTHORITIES.
Passages des Rivières, et la Construction des Ponts Militaires à
l'usage des Troupes de toutes Armes. Par C. A. Haillot, Cap¬
itaine [&c.] Plates. 8vo. Part III., page 524. Paris: 1835.
Hand-Book of Field Fortifications, &c., &c. By Major W. AV.
Knollys, Ninty-third Sutherland Highlanders. Illustrated.
i2mo. Page 273. Philadelphia [London] : 1873.
General Theory of Bridge Construction. With practical Illustra¬
tions. By Herman Haupt, A. M., C. E. 16 plates. 8vo.
Page 268. New York: 1856.
Treatise on Bridge Architecture, in which the superior advan¬
tages of the flying pendent-lever bridge are fully proved.
With an historical account and description of the different
bridges erected in various parts of the world, from an ancient
period down to the present time. By Thomas Pope, Archi¬
tect, &c. Plates. 8yo. Part XXXIL, pages 288. New
York: 1811.
Bridges and Draw-bridges. Ecole d'Application de l'Artillerie
de Mechanique appliquée aux Machines. Plates. Folio.
Pages 47. [Metz : no date.]
Description of a System of Military Bridges, with India Rubber
Pontons. Prepared for the use of the United States Army.
By George W. Cullum, Captain United States Corps of En¬
gineers. Plates. 8vo. Pages [143]. New York: 1849. [Pro¬
fessional Papers, No. 4, Corps of Engineers, U. S. A.]
Systems of Military Bridges in Use by the United States Army,
those adopted by the Great European Powers, and such as
are employed in British India. AVith directions for the pre¬
servation, destruction and reëstablishment of bridges. By
civ.
Brigadier-General George W. Cullum, Lieutenant-Colonel,
Corps of Engineers. 8 plates. 8vo. Part VI., Pages 226.
New York: 1863.
War Series. No. III. Information from Abroad. Report of the
British Naval and Military Operations in Egypt, 1882, by
Lieutenant-Commander Caspar F. Goodrich, U. S. Navy.
Office of Naval Intelligence, Bureau of Navigation, Navy De¬
partment: 1883. Washington Government Printing Office:
1885. XXIII.—"The Royal Engineers' Ponton Troop."
Pages 253-258.
ERRATA.—TREMAIN'S WAR MEMORANDA.
Prepared by Gen. H. Edwin Tremain.
Page 4, line 20.—For " 1883," read " 1880-1."
Page 6, line 16.—For "around the left flank and Grant's
armies and thus get ahead of him" read "around the left flank
of Grant's armies and thus get ahead of them"
Page 7, line 6.—Italicized portion should read, " the old cav¬
alry division of the Army of the Potomac."
Page 9, lines 18, 19.—E.xpungéportion in brackets: [ ]
Page 10,line 8.—Instead of " for and will," read "and we will."
Page 17, line 15.—Gen. Tremain claims that this line was
formed and Reade's battery put in position under his personal
direction, while Crook was rallying Gregg's brigade.
Page 20, line 4.—For "John J.," read "John Irwin."
Page 36, line 3-6.—Gen. Tremain asks, "May not both state¬
ments be true ? "
Page 37, line 37.—For "formed across," read "formed across
this road."
Page 38, line 35.—For " Davies and Custer," read "Devin
and Custer."
Page 43, line i.—For "in," read "by."
Page 45, line 5.—For " they," read " the."
Page 48, line 11—For "reformed," read "he rejoined."
Page 55, lines 44, 45.—(?) and (! ?) signifies that the original
MSS. was almost illegible.
Page 63, lines 44,45—For "thorough-are," read "thoroughfare."
Page 64, lines 29, 30.—Expunge portion in brackets : [ ]
Page 65, line 10.—For "to," read "with."
*
Farmville, Bridging and Fording.
Page Iii, line 3.—For " battery," read " bat or pack."
(Typographical errors not noticed.)
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