NORTHWESTERN
UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY
Bequest of
Charles G. Dawes
^•5»
HISTORY
OF THF
Army of the Potomac.
BY
J. H. STINB,
Historian of tlie First Army Corps.
SECOND EDITION.
COPYRIGHTED, 1893.
BY J. H. STINE.
Gibson Bros.,
Printers and Bookbinders,
washington, d. o.
TD
THDSE WHG FELL
TD SÄIZE
THE UNIDN.
CONTENTS.
CHAPTBR PACE
I. First Buti, Run i
IL Dranesviuub. The First Victory 30
III. Peninsuear Campaign 42
IV. From First to Second Buee Run 99
V. Second Buee Run 118
VI. South Mountain 154
VII. AnTietam 176
VIII. From Antietam to Rectortown 221
IX. Fredericksburg 244
X. Chanceeeoksvieee 309
XL From Fredericksburg to P'rederick 415
XII. Gettysburg 447
XIII. From Gettysburg to the Rappahannock 555
XIV. Mine Run 581
XV. The Wiedernrss 593
XVI. Spottsyevania 613
XVII. Sheridan's Great Raid prom Spottsyevania to the
James 629
v
vi CONTENTS.
CHAPTER PAGE
XVIII. Preparing to Move in the Direction of Richmond. 637
XIX. Coed Harbor 645
XX. Cavaery Transactions from the North Anna to
the James 650
XXL The Siege of Petersburg 660
XXII. Wieson's Raid on the South Side and Weedon Raie-
roads and Battee at Ream's Station 682
XXIII. Deep Bottom and Weedon Raieroad 689
XXIV. Cavaery Operations of the Army of the Potomac . 693
XXV. Five Forks 699
XXVI. Lee's Finae Struggee at Petersburg and Feight—
Surrender at Appomattox 707
XXVII. Misceeeaneous 712
Organization of the Society of the First Corps,
Army of the Potomac 750
ILLUSTRATIONS.
Facing Page
J. H. Stine Frontispiece.
General John S. McCalmont 32
Col. John H. Taggart 40
Gen. Geo. B. McCeellan 42
Gen. Darius N. Couch 95
Gen. S. Van Vliet 106
Gen. W. S. Rosecrans 113
Gen. Franz Sigel .... 123
Hon. A. R. Bushnell ' 136
Gen. Rufus King 140
Gen. Louis Wagner 149
Ex-President R. B. Hayes 165
Capt. James Thompson 184
Gen. A. J. Warner 191
Col. B. F. Cook 199
President A. Lincoln 247
Burnside and his Generals 245
Gen. W. Cooper Talley 267
Gen. Daniel Butterfield 280
Gen. Joseph Hooker 308
Gen. Daniel E. Sickles 332
Gen. William J. Sewell 365
Gen. Geo. G. Meade 447
Gen. J. B. Carr 448
Gen. J. F. Reynolds 453
Gen. Abner Doubleday 454
Gen. Sol. Meredith 486
Gen. R. R. Dawes 461
Capt. L. E. Pond 464
Col. Geo. N. Reichard 468
Capt. J. H. Cooper 470
Gen. JuDSON Kilpatrick 472
Gen. Adrian R. Root 474
vüi
ILL US TR A 7L ON S.
Facing Page.
Gen. W,. W. Dudley 480
Lt.-Col. W. W. Grout 484
Brevet_Col. A. J. Sellers 500
Gen. J. H. Kidd 509
Col. R. Bruce Ricketts 518
Gen. H. J. Hunt 523
Col. John N. Craig 525
Gen. Geo. J. Stannard 529
Gen. Alexander S. Webb 531
Capt. Michael Wiedrich 536
Gen. John Newton 515
Gen. D. McM. Gregg 545
Col. Redfield Proctor 550
Gen. U. S. Grant 595
Col. Jos. A. Moesch 600
Col. S. J. Williams 602
Gen. E. S. Osborne 606
Capt. P. De Lacy 608
Gen. L. A. Grant 611
Col. Charles E. Phelps 616
Hon. W. H. Harries 623
Gen. Jas. A. Beaver 665
Gen. Joshua L. Chamberlain 668
Gen. D. B. Birney 670
Gen. H. G. Wright 672
Gen. George H. Chapman 684
Col. D. B. Dailey 692
Gen. John A. Kellogg 701
Capt. John Palmer, Past Commander-in-Chief, G. A. R. 702
Col. Norm. G. Cooper 714
Lieut. A. J. Buckles 722
Gen. Ebenezer Dumont 7^6
Capt. J. V. Hadley 72S
Hon. C. E. Coon 7^9
Gen. Horatio C. King 73^
Gov. O. P. Morton 739
PREFACE.
^T^HIS work is presented to the public with extreme dif-
fidence, even under the circumstances which directed
me to write it. The First Corps elected me as its historian
without my solicitation, or knowledge thirty minutes before¬
hand, that such a position had been provided for by the Com¬
mittee. Without time to consider its great responsibility in
a session of the corps, and no opportunity to consult with
friends, I accepted it with an inward feeling of mental reser¬
vation. I would have gladly nominated another. Then I
began stud^dng over the work before me, and decided to visit
the battlefields in company with the prominent actors on
both sides. As these were the only historical visits ever
made to the battlefields, and were participated in by the offi¬
cers and veterans of all the corps, I was urged by many to
broaden the scope and write the ' ' History of the Army of
the Potomac." Generals H. J. Hunt, John Newton, L,. A.
Grant, W. S. Rosecrans, J. C. Robinson, Abner Doubleday,
E. B. Fowler, D. E. Sickles, Geo. J. Stannard, Lucius Fair-
child, E. S. Bragg, Slocum, Wright, Ayres, and many other
officers and soldiers on our side, including Hon. A. G. Cur tin,
Pennsylvania's war governor, gave me fully and freely what
they knew of the movements on the different battlefields in
which the Army of the Potomac was engaged.
On the Confederate side Longstreet, Heth, Mahone, Fields,
Fitzhugh Lee, W. H. F. Lee, Eppa Hunton, Kemper, Hagood,
ix
X
PREFA CK.
Beauregard, Wright, and numerous other officers and Con¬
federate veterans have assisted me. With the aid of those
who were active participants in the two contending armies,
and the guidance of the completed Rebellion Records, I have
endeavored to submit a history free from bias, and as justly
correct as I could. Where a point was in dispute, I have
carefully weighed all the evidence, to give honor to whom
honor was due. And in many cases I have given the different
statements, so the readers can decide in their own judgments.
With these frank statements, I have only to say that I
have honestly performed my duty to the best of my ability,
and if I have fallen short of what ought to have been
expected of me, I have to beg an indulgent public to let me
have the benefit of the ' ' mantle of charity ' ' which so
frequently has to shield frail humanity.
J. H. Stine;.
INTRODUCTORY.
"T N writing this introduction to the History of the Army
of the Potomac, the causes which led to the late war
will merely be alluded to, as the people are fully conversant
with them.
When the colonies declared their independence and pre¬
pared for war to gain it, they laid the foundation of a new
system of government in which the will of the people
should be supreme.
Although the colonies united in a common defense
against England, yet in several instances they acted, in a
certain sense, on an independent line, and some jealousies
arose which caused bickerings. When their independence
was achieved, delegates assembled to form a Constitution
to govern as a whole. There were strong differences, which
were hard to reconcile, but the steady hand of Washington,
as President of the Convention, controlled, and a Constitu¬
tion was adopted which was finally ratified. Jealousy of the
power of the monarchical governments of the Old World,
perhaps, bred the doctrine of ' ' state rights, ' ' which has had
a strong following in this country, and which had its effect
in bringing on the war.
Slavery, countenanced by the Constitution in a limited
form, proved the great barrier between the North and the
South after it had ceased in the North. But a gradual
xi
xii
IN TRO DUCTORY.
emancipation could have set all the slaves free in due time,
had ambitious men not used it as a pretext to increase their
power and popularity in the South.
That slavery was profitable and congenial to the south¬
ern climate is a fact beyond dispute. The escaping of
enterprising slaves into the North to obtain their freedom
wrought a bitter feeling between the two sections. But the
great cause of the war was the overvaulting ambition of
John C. Calhoun and Jefferson Davis. Calhoun was greatly
embittered against President Jackson because the latter
would not allow him to be placed on the ticket with him
the second time ' ' Old Hickory ' ' ran for President. Cal¬
houn knew full well that Jackson's second Vice-President
would, in all probability, be his successor in the White
House. Calhoun had no superior in ability, and wanted
to be President.
Then began a bitter war between Jackson and Calhoun,
the latter springing his noted "nullification" doctrine,
which, of itself, was poison to the Union of the States, and
charged with danger. Jackson rigorously laid his heavy
hand upon it, and threatened Calhoun. It, apparently, had
no vital strength ; but the frequent presidential elections
afforded fresh opportunities to increase the ill-feeling be¬
tween the sections. Washington was wise in declining a
third term, and had the Constitution, at any period pre¬
vious to i860, been changed to one term of six years, the
war might have been averted for a time ; but it was bound to
come, for Jefferson Davis, ambitious, and voicing the dis¬
turbed feeling at the South, was fully resolved to establish a
Southern Confederacy, based upon the corner stone of
slavery. He left the Senate of the United States to put
this resolution into effect.
INTRO ÜUCTORY.
xiii
He was a graduate of West Point and had great influence
over the army officers coming from that section. Up to
this time the South had a large share of the officers of the
army and the navy ; who, while they were officers of the
General Government, were more in sympathy with the doc¬
trine of state rights, and held their duty to be, as between
the two, first with the State.
Had Jefferson Davis been merely a politician he could
not have headed so formidable a rebellion as occurred from
1861 to 1865. His will was obeyed in the South, notwith¬
standing Virginia and North Carolina were opposed to
secession. The momentum of its power coerced all into
line, and in Virginia, which had cast a heavy vote against
secession, was located his future Capital, and the State
itself made the principal theater of war. Here his best
equipped and best officered army met, and aftër fonr years
was destroyed by, that of the Government, which had its
base of operations on the Potomac, whence it derives its
historic name, the Army of the Potomac, which will live in
history until the end of time.
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
CHAPTER I
FIRST BUIvL RUN.
"^HE history of the first battle of Bull Run naturally
belongs in the history of the First Corps, for various
reasons ; although the corps were not distinctively arranged
until some time after that. General McDowell was its first
commander, and organized it, and the first battle of Bull
Run was wholly his, so far as the Federal side was con¬
cerned. In fact, the names of McDowell and Beauregard
will be known in history principally in connection with
that battle. When Sumter was fired on, and war was a
reality for the new administration to face, it was extremely
difficult to find officers who had experience in handling
large commands.
General Scott was then too far advanced in yçars (nearly
eighty) to take the field, but he well knew the great work
to be performed. It had been given out by prominent men
and officials that it would be a short war ; Secretary Seward
placed its duration at sixty days, therefore the first volun¬
teers were called for ninety days only. The zeal of the
Crusaders did not surpass the activity in both sections, and
thousands enlisted through the recruiting officers, and regi¬
ment after regiment was formed, officered, equipped, and
dispatched to the front with wonderful rapidity.
Soon large armies were facing each other. Butler at
2
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Fortress Monroe was met by Magruder ; at Harper's Ferry
Patterson and Johnston were organizing large commands.
In the mountainous region of West Virginia several com¬
mands were menacing each other for the mastery. The Con¬
federate forces were pressed to within a few miles of Wash¬
ington, while Alexandria was a rendezvous—in fact, their
■rear guard was just leaving when Colonel Ellsworth's com¬
mand entered the city on the fatal morning when Jackson
shot him dead for hauling down the Confederate flag.
The work of receiving and assigning the regiments to
their places around Washington was done, almost exclu¬
sively, by Major Irwin McDowell.
In the mean time Congress had been convened by the
President on the fourth of July. It was decidedly appro¬
priate for that body to meet on that day ; if there was any¬
thing that would warm them up in the South it was the
remembrance of the day designated by an illustrious son of
the South as Independence Day ; it was the olive branch
kindly extended by President Lincoln.
To meet the great emergency, a bill, providing for three
major generals and additional brigadier generals, was
passed and signed at once by the President.
The first thing to be done was to. select the major
generals.
Salmon P. Chase, who was Secretary of the Treasury,
was the most active and, at that time, one of the most pow¬
erful members of the Cabinet. He not only controlled the
finances, but he gave a large share of his time to military
matters.
When the Cabinet met to select the three major generals
(I now repeat what General McDowell said to Major E. P.
Halstead and myself, which fact will give one substantial
witness to its correctness) Secretary Chase sent a letter to
Major McDowell to come to the White House immediately.
He was then absent assigning pew troops to their temporary
quarters. When he returned to the War Department, he
found Secretary Chase's note. He went at once to the
FIRST BULL RUN.
3
White House, and sent his card up to Mr. Chase, who came
down and told him that the Cabinet was then in session
for the purpose of selecting the three major generals, and
that he (Chase) intended to present his (McDowell's) name
as one of them.
To this proposition McDowell stoutly demurred, saying
that it would create great jealousy, and that he feared it
would be greatly against him. McDowell explained to us
that he never had any hope of attaining a rank higher than
colonel, and even that was beyond his expectation ; he said
he was glad to start early in the war with the rank of brig¬
adier in the regular army, and, as he said to Chase, he pre¬
ferred that rank.
He then suggested to Chase as the three major generals
MeClellan, Halleck, and Frémont. But the evidence before
me is quite clear that Chase did not select the major gen¬
erals, although it is said that he was strong enough afterwards
to name Hooker as the commander of the Army of the Poto¬
mac. I am greatly indebted to General Schuyler Hamilton,
who was General Scott's military secretary, and who
saw Lincoln then, on official business, more than any other
man in Washington, for valuable information, which is
given in his exact language. He says ; "In regard to the
appointments of Frémont, Halleek, and MeClellan, General
Frémont as a defeated candidate for the Presidency, and a
soldier by profession, did not need anybody to urge his claim
to be major general. General Halleek owed his appointment
as major general to a letter, written by him from San
Francisco, setting forth the condition of affairs on the Pa¬
cific coast. This letter was laid before General Scott, and
by him submitted to President Lincoln. It impressed both
greatly. General Scott remarked that in thinking of men
suitable for the position of major general, they had omitted
one of the trump cards in the pack. Within twenty-four
hours General Halleck was notified by telegraph of his ap¬
pointment as major general." He added: "MeClellan
was also selected by General Scott. ' ' When Colonel Schuy-
4
THE A EM y OF THE POTOMAC.
1er Hamilton took the news to the President of the great
victory at Rich Mountain, he added a word in McClellan's
favor.
In the mean time the three months' volunteers would
soon be out of the service, and nothing really practical had
been done—only a mere beginning.
Butler was holding Fortress Monroe. His name was a
tower of strength at that time to the Union cause, for the
reason that in the Charleston convention he had voted
(twenty-seven times) for Jefferson Davis as the nominee of
the Democratic party for President.
In answer to a question in regard to his vote he sent me
the following :
Boston, November 3, 1890.
Dear Sir :—I have your letter in which you say you have put
into your book that I voted for Jefferson Davis twenty-seven times.
You have made a mistake ; I voted for him fifty-seven (57) times.
Yours truly, Benj. F. Butler.
J. H. Stine, Esq., 323 C Street, S. E., Washington, D. C.
But when Davis attempted to disrupt or destroy the
Union, Butler marched at ouce to stamp out the treasonable
action of the man who had had honor thrust upon him by
the Nation, and who had taken an oath as an army officer.
Secretary of War, and Senator that he would support the
Constitution and obey the laws. His action at Baltimore
gave additional value to his name. But the enemy was com¬
mitting heavy depredations all around him. The navy yard
opposite Norfolk had been destroyed, and the enemy's flag
floated triumphantly near him. But Butler was not sup¬
posed to conquer the enemy at once. At Harper's Ferry
General Patterson, an officer of the Mexican War, was in
command. Great deeds were prophesied of him, and
it was said that he would soon advance on General John¬
ston and drive him from the valley. Every day added to the
confidence of the South, as no battle was forced on them.
Their old idea, that the true military men of the Nation
were born in the South and that on the field of battle one
FIRST BULL RUN.
5
Southern man was equal to four Northern men, was begin¬
ning to be the settled opinion in their armies.
Beauregard, with his headquarters in the Weir house,
near Manassas Junction, was evidently aiming to repeat
some of Napoleon's strategic moves, for he mapped out a plan
by which he was to receive reënforcements enough to hurl
the Union army back on Washington, then unite with John¬
ston, pounce on Patterson—merely lunch on him—rush on
the Union forces in West Virginia, and drive them
from the State. This programme was a nice one, and
would have well-nigh freed the Confederacy ; but it
was suddenly spoiled in West Virginia, very unexpectedly
and unceremoniously, by an officer who had served sev¬
eral years as a professor at West Point, and was an able
engineer.
When the base of Rich Mountain was touched his
eagle eye took in the situation, and he at once asked
General McClellan to permit him to make a detour of
the mountain which would place him in the rear of the
enemy.
General Rosecrans having obtained that permission from
General McClellan, set out on his perilous march, following
the guide who lived near the camp of the enemy. After a
difficult march he finally reached the desired point and threw
forward his brigade (the Nineteenth Ohio, and the Eighth,
Tenth, and Thirteenth Indiana) in line of battle. The re¬
sult of that strategic move and bold assault was the first
substantial victory of the war. The brilliant campaign of
General Rosecrans, of only one day, had the effect of
paralyzing the enemy in all that mountainous region. The
news was hailed with delight and joy throughoiit the North,
while the South adroitly concealed its mortification over
the result.
As the soldiers are dying off so rapidly, and every day
lessens the opportunity to secure and preserve valuable his¬
tory, the following letter, giving Scott's opinion of Rose¬
crans is here inserted :
6
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
The Arlington,
Washington, D. C., February 12, 1887.
Dear Sir:—About May 19-22, 1861, General Rosecrans calléd
at the official headquarters of General Scott. He was in Washing¬
ton to procure the money to pay for clothing, &c., for the Ohio three
months' volunteers. We met; he mentioned his object; we con¬
versed awhile. I mentioned General Scott could not at that moment
receive him, but begged him to wait for a short time. Presently I
informed him General Scott would be glad to see him. They had
quite a detailed conversation. General Scott put to him many inci¬
sive questions, and gave his views about gunboats, and an army of
iron, &c., &c. Very shortly after General Rosecrans left President
Lincoln entered. Presently General Scott repeated to President
Lincoln the important points of General Rosecràns' information.
He added, "Mr. President, he ought to be made a brigadier general
of the regular army. He is a graduate of West Point, an accom¬
plished officer of engineers. He is full of the rough vigor we so much
need. He is a rough diamond, sir, but a diapiond all the same."
General Rosecrans was very shortlj'^ afterwards appointed a
brigadier general of the regular army—viz, June 16, 1861.
Yours truly, Schuyler Hamilton,
Major General.
J. H. Stine, Esq.
Immediately on the heels of that victory the Northern
press, reflecting the excited and anxious feeling of the peo¬
ple, not only clamored, but virtually demanded that the
army in front of Washington move forw^ard to victory, and
repeat the crushing defeat of the enemy at Rich Mountain
by Rosecrans.
There were but two officers presented to command the
army in front of Washington—McDowell and Mansfield.
A choice must be made without delay. General Hamilton,
who knows more about this than au)'^ man, said : ' ' General
Mansfield, when Jefferson Davis was Secretary of War, had
been preferred for inspector general of the army as against
Henry L. Scott, General Scott's son-in-law, who was adju¬
tant general of the army under Scott in Mexico. Though
there were the kindest relations between Generals Scott and
Mansfield, that caused the weight of Scott's influence in.
favor of McDowell.
FIRST BULL RUN.
7
"McDowell had been on Scott's staff for several years
in New York City. He was taken on Scott's staff as as¬
sistant adjutant general, which brought his wife near her
kin, he having married the daughter of Mr. Borden, the
great ironmaster of Troy, and therefore knew McDowell
well. ' '
Mansfield was given the command of the troops in the
city of Washington. McDowell entered on his new and
responsible duties with great alacrity, working night and
day to prepare his command for the approaching conflict.
He realized the fact that his troops were not prepared for
battle, and so stated, but he was met with the reply that the
enemy was equally as green. That statement was not true.
Lincoln, who will live in history and in the hearts of the
people perhaps next to Washington, was an eminent lawyer
and statesman. Jefferson Davis was a military man, having
served in the Mexican War, and had been Secretary of
War for four years under Pierce, which gave him great
military advantages. Besides, almost every prominent
man in the South possessed a military training, which,
at that critical moment, was of great value, so that the
retort that the South was as green as the North was not
true in a military sense, and the fact that the bold Stone¬
wall Jackson wanted to invade the North immediately after
the first Bull Run was a true gauge of their military
training.
McDowell was laboring at a great disadvantage—drilling
and preparing his troops as best he could—under the heavy
pressure from the North to deliver battle to the enemy in
his front.
Secretary Chase was the champion, in the Cabinet, of the
intense feeling in the North that the war should be pushed
at once, with a vigor that would end it soon ; that was a
correct view if the army had been prepared to advance and
hold its ground.
There is no doubt that General Scott was weakened
with the administration, for the reason that he did not be-
8
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
lieve in the prevailing opinion that a few days would crush
the rebellion ; and the more the old hero insisted, or faith¬
fully stood by his views, the more it antagonized the opinion
of those who hoped and said it would end speedily.
At the Cabinet meeting a week before. General Hamil¬
ton säys : ' ' General Montgomery Blair said he would march
to Richmond with ten thousand men, armed with lathes. ' '
"Yes," said General Scott, "as prisoners of war." Con¬
tinuing General Hamilton's statement of the events which
occurred prior to the battle and during its progress, he says :
' ' On the Sunday preceding the battle of Bull Run, Scott
directed me, his military secretary, to say to McDowell that
he wished him to dine with him without fail. At the din¬
ner, at which General McDowell appeared, General Scott
used every possible argument to dissuade General McDowell
from fighting the first battle of Bull Run under the then
existing condition of public affairs. Reminding him even
of the personal obligations he (General McDowell) was
under to him (General Scott) in the matter of appointing
him on his staff, previously referred to, he stated that it was
his intention and wish that he (General McDowell) should
organize in the vicinity of Xenia, Ohio, an army of iron of
not less than one hundred thousand men, while in the
mean time, iron gunboats were constructed suitable for the
waters of the Ohio and the Mississippi, by combination of
which land and naval forces the rebellion should be envel¬
oped on the one hand, by the iron serpent of gunboats, while
the army of iron penetrated the interior. .He then begged
General McDowell to go to Secretary Chase, his kinsman,
and aid him (General Scott) in preventing a forward move¬
ment at that moment ; one of the arguments used by Gen¬
eral Scott being that the Union sentiment of the South had
been surprised by the suddenness and promptitude of the
movement in favor of secéssion ; that he (General Scott)
was well advised that the Union sentiment was recoverine:
itself, and gaining head in the South ; that from the mo¬
ment blood was shed the South would be made a unit.
FIRST BULL RUN.
9
General McDowell regretted that he could not agree with
General Scott in his views, and arose and retired. A few
moments after his retirement General Scott said to me,
' Did you ever see such a man of stone ? He was not moved
by any of my appeals. ' He added : ' Put on your sword
and follow General McDowell, and say to him, he must
either go to Secretary Chase and do what I have urged, or
he must report to me by midnight that he is at Arlington.
I will not leave that army on the other side of the Potomac
without a commander. General McDowell will say that he
has no staff. Tell him that I have ordered you to accom¬
pany him to General Mansfield to supply him with as many
young men who have just arrived from West Point as he
may desire, as staff officers. And further, direct General
Mansfield that he see that thosé young men are furnished
with horses and all necessary equipments for the service.'
"I overtook General McDowell on Seventeenth Street,
just near the old War Office, and communicated General
Scott's orders. He declined to ùse his influence vdth Sec¬
retary Chase, as General Scott requested. He also declined,
on some private misunderstandings between Mansfield and
himself, to call upon General Mansfield as General Scott
had directed he should. I urged upon him that private
misunderstandings could not be allowed for a moment to
interfere with great public interests ; that I knew my duty,
and however painful it might be, I should be constrained to
do it—that was, to order him (General McDowell) to repoit
to General Scott in arrest, because of his positive refusal to
obey General Scott's orders, communicated by me. On
this presentation of the matter. General McDowell recon¬
sidered his determination, accompanied me to General
Mansfield, and was furnished with the staff of young men
from West Point indicated by General Scott. He reported
by telegraph at midnight that he was at the Arlington
House in command of that army. In the course of the
succeeding week General McDowell reported to General
Scott his proposed plan of battle. It was hung upon the
10 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
wall, and I followed with a pointer the positions indicated
by General McDowell as those he intended the forces under
his command should occupy. After General McDowell had
gone through a detailed statement of his plan, and had fin¬
ished, General Scott remarked, ' General McDowell, that is
as good a plan of battle as I ever saw upon paper. '
' ' General McDowell said in reply : ' General Scott, the
success of this whole plan depends upon General Patterson
holding General Johnston in check at Winchester.' Gen¬
eral Scott remarked that General Johnston was a very able
soldier, that he had a railroad at his command with which
to move his troops, and if General McDowell's plan of
battle, which had just been presented to him, depended
upon General Patterson holding General Johnston in check,
his plan was not worth the paper it was drawn upon. ' '
That ended that interview. In regard to the condi¬
tion of the troops, as to the proximate determination of
their enlistment, the following circumstances are men¬
tioned ;
"The time of the Sixty-ninth New York, Colonel Cor¬
coran's regiment, had actually expired, or was on the point
of expiring, before the battle of' Bull Run was fought, and
it was so uncertain that they would move forward, that
General Scott sent me to that regiment with the message
that if the Sixty-ninth refused to move forward, it was the
first time in history that Irishmen had ever been known to
turn their backs on friend or foe. This determined that
regiment to go forward. Other regiments, not remem¬
bered, were appealed to in a similar manner, and all went
forward. ' '
General Hamilton is mistaken wherein he states that all
the regiments appealed to, whose time had expired, went
forward. The Fourth Pennsylvania positively refused after
an earnest appeal, and the Colonel, John F. Hartranft, re¬
fused to return home with his command, but volunteered
as an aid and went into the battle. Afterwards he became
major general. Governor of Pennsylvania for two terms,
FIRST BULL RUN.
il
and held many other high positions of honor and trust. It
was the turning point in his life.
McDowell considered that his chances were good to suc¬
ceed, and, if he did, the dazzling star of fame was rising
near enough to him to be seen without a field glass.
General Scott did his duty sternly, and General Schuyler
Hamilton, the grandson of Alexander Hamilton, displayed
an executive capacity and nerve that were worthy of his
illustrious grandsire.
The fiat had gone forth that the army must offer battle,
and the order was issued to march. So, on the morning of
the seventeenth of July the army left Arlington Heights,
opposite Washington, for Bull Run. On the eighteenth the
vanguard reached Centerville, from which place the enemy
had retired, as Beauregard had selected Bull Run as his line
of defense. McDowell organized his army into four divi¬
sions, commanded respectively by Tyler, Hunter, Heintzel-
man, and Miles.
From Centerville there are three roads running in the
direction of Bull Run ; that on the right hand crosses it at
the famous Stone Bridge, the middle road at Blackburn's
Ford, which leads direct to Manassas, and the left-hand
road crosses some four miles lower down.
It was the intention of McDowell to turn Beauregard's
right flank and take him in reverse and real.
He sent Tyler forward to feel the enemy, and make a
reconnoissance, which was a fatal error, as that gave due
warning to the enemy, though the right was already guarded
with their best officers.
But especially was that true of Tyler, for he was an am¬
bitious officer, without sufficient discretion. Instead of be¬
ing contented to obey orders, and merely reconnoiter, he
advanced opposite Blackburn's Ford, and, after shelling the
enemy, advanced his infantry to the edge of the stream and
opened a fusilade, expecting to scare them, and declar¬
ing that he would go to Manassas that night. He was not
aware that he was annoying General Longstreet, who proved
12
THE ARMY OF THE PC TOMA c.
to be the Ney of the Confederate army, as the war developed,
and became interesting. Longstreet advanced his infantry
and severely punished Tyler for his rashness.
In fact his left, the Twelfth New York, was thrown into
confusion by a force of the enemy crossing the stream lower
down, and pouring in an enfilading fire. This compelled a
hasty retreat, which had an exceedingly bad effect on our
troops. They were surprised by the flank movement, and
suffered from it.
The news flew over the country, and Beauregard claimed
a victory, declaring it was a battle.
This reverse led McDowell to change his plans, and seek
to turn the left flank, which it was decided by the engineers
could be done. Therefore, on the morning of the twenty-
first, at two o'clock, the order was given for the army to
begin its circuitous march around the enemy's left, crossing
Bull Run at Sudley's Ford, nearly a mile above the extreme
left of the enemy. That was an admirable move, and took
the enemy completely by surprise. At the ford is the
Sudley Mill, antiquated in its appearance ; also a spring and
church by the same name. The church stands in a little
grove, quite a distance from the stream, near the edge of
the brow of the hill.
[It was at this place that the party lunched in October,
1883, when we were reviewing the battlefield. Among
those present were Generals Rosecrans, Longstreet, and
Hunt ; Colonel Frey, the Swiss Minister ; Generals Fair-
child and Dudley ; Colonel Wood, Hon. C. C. Matson, Mr.
Becker, of Frank Leslie's Magazine^ and many other news¬
paper men, and veterans. This historical visit was made
under the auspices of the Society of the First Corps, with
General Rosecrans as president, in the interest of the pres¬
ent history.]
The Confederate forces were drawn up along Bull Run
as follows : Ewell's brigade was on the extreme right near
Union Mills, with General Holmes' brigade in reserve.
General Jones' was on the left of Ewell, with Early's bri-
FIRST BULL RUN.
13
gade as a support. Then came Longstreet, with Bee's and
Barton's brigades in his rear, lapping over to McLean's
Ford. Still farther in the rear was Barksdale's Mississippi
regiment. Benham was supported by Jackson. Cocke's
brigade was between Benham and Evans, with infantry,
cavalry, and artillery in reserve. Evans held the extreme
left of their line, coming down to the Stone bridge, and
also covering a small ford some distance above, and farther
up the stream. Hampton's legion of infantry had arrived
on the twentieth, the day before the battle, and yas sta¬
tioned near the Lewis House. Walton's and Pendleton's
batteries were in rear of the center, or nearly so. It will be
observed that General Johnston was already with Beaure¬
gard, and" a part of his command had arrived before the
battle, as Jackson's brigade was a part of it. General Pat¬
terson had been urged by General Scott to either engage
Johnston, or to threaten him strongly enough to prevent, if
possible, his reënforcing Beauregard. That could be done
only by throwing his left well forward, and strongly feeling
the position of the enemy ; then he could tell, perhaps, if
troops were being sent away. Patterson's movement was
more to the right, while Johnston moved all of his army
away, but a mere skeleton, which was left as a blind to de¬
tain Patterson. McDowell had to contend with more than
the combined forces of Beauregard and Johnston, as Holmes,
who was supporting Ewell, had been ordered from Aquia
Creek, thus stripping the Potomac, in response to the urgent
requests of Beauregard, who had sent several staff officers
to Richmond to explain the situation and urge that more
troops be sent to him.
The burden of McDowell's fears was that Johnston
would detail a part of his command and reënforce Beaure¬
gard.
On the morning of the twenty-first, at two o'clock, Tyler
was to move his division forward to the Stone bridge, and
earnestly engage the enemy, as if he intended to force a
crossing there. He was placed in the advance to cover the
14
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
movements of Hunter and Heintzelman, who were to take
a blind country road which, in a circuitous way, finally
crossed Bull Run at Sudley's Ford. At Cub Run Hunter
left the main road, with Heintzelman closely following, and
Miles, in reserve near Centerville, was, if possible, to en¬
gage the enemy's center and right to further shield the
movements of Hunter and Heintzelman. Tyler behaved
quite well that morning, for he made a vigorous attack at
six o'clock, the time designated to begin, and which was the
hour fixed for Hunter and Heintzelman to arrive at Sud¬
ley's Ford. Tyler's division was tardy in starting, how¬
ever, and that wasted much precious time, but the troops
were new, and could not be handled like veterans ; and as
Tyler did such good work when he arrived in front of the
enemy, it seems hardly fair to charge him with the delay
during the night. He pounded the enemy hard, but it
■vyas a long time to keep up the deception, for the head of
Hunter's column did not reach Sudley's Ford until half-
past nine—three hours and a half of heavy strain on Tyler.
It is now said Beauregard claims that he knew of
McDowell's change, yet it was not until nearly ten o'clock
that Evans changed his front to meet Hunter's forces,
and dispatched an aid to Beauregard notifying him of the
threatened danger on their left, and called for assistance
that he might make disposition to meet the advance.
There was not even a vedette at or near Sudley's Ford.
Our troops crossed it as did Caesar the Rubicon, unopposed.
Hunter was still marching in column, and, as he advanced,
Evans placed batteries in position to enfilade him. Burn-
side's brigade was heading the column, and was not de¬
ployed in line of battle until the open fields were gained,
when it had to be done at great disadvantage and sacrifice.
Colonel Porter's brigade deployed and formed on Bumside's
right, with Sykes' regulars on his left. This was a splen¬
did line of battle, and the enemy, after an hour's hard
fighting, was forced back across the Warrenton turnpike
and Young's Branch.
FIRST BULL RUN.
15
This movement uncovered the Stone bridge, and Tyler
ordered Sherman's and Keyes' brigades to cross Bull Run,
pass to the rear of Hunter, and form on his right.
It was at this exciting moment that Sherman displayed
the tact which made him a distinguished general afterwards.
He had seen a horseman that morning cross the stream
quite a distance above the Stone bridge, so when he received
the order to advance, he took his brigade to that point and
found a good ford, and at once rapidly advanced to the line
of battle assigned to him. The Second Wisconsin was in
his command there, and the boys are very proud of their
first brigade commander. That regiment won a position in
history second to none in the army. Ricketts' battery was
by that time in position on the right of Sudley's road
(which crosses the Warrenton turnpike not far from the
noted Henry House) and was doing splendid service. At
noon McDowell was in possession of the pbteau south of
Young's Branch ; the central point on that plateau being
the Henry House, which like the cluster of trees at Gettys¬
burg, was the prominent mark to be gained in the Pickett
charge.
The enemv had been forced back a mile and a half and
was in great confusion. Bee's troops were in full retreat,
when he, seeing Jackson's brigade of five regiments in line
of battle, some distance back, in front of the pine woods,
said, "There is Jackson standing like a stone wall."
Jackson came forward only to receive a very severe punish¬
ment, his brigade being badly cut up ; the Federal right
swept around to the Henry House, and the batteries of
Griffin and Ricketts were brought up near there.
Then came a lull in the action on the part of the
Federals ; the men were tired and thirsty, and they went
back to the branch for water. This suspension proved
fatal to the Union cause and to the star of McDowell. A
little more good work at that moment and the Confederate
army would have been in full retreat toward Richmond.
But now came one of the most unfortunate events of the
16
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
day. Ricketts' and Griffin's batteries were necessarily
posted in close proximity. Griffin had two guns on the
right of Ricketts, and was playing on a battery not more
than three hundred yards away, when he saw a regiment
come out of a piece of woods not very far from his right.
He suspected it to be a Confederate regiment, and ordered
his guns double-shotted to give them a volley, when Major
Barry rode up and said : ' ' Captain, that is your support, ' '
(He thought it was the Fourteenth Brooklyn.) Griffin
insisted that it was the enemy. ' ' But, ' ' said Major Barry,
' ' I know. ' ' The commander of the regiment was appa¬
rently making a speech to his men. The regiment was
then moved by the left flank along the edge of the woods,
then advanced to within fifty yards of the batteries, where
a murderous fire was opened, killing and disabling the
horses of both batteries, and strewing the ground with the
killed and wounded, not only of the batteries, but the
supports ; it was a terrible disaster to our arms, and was
never really recovered.
Beauregard and Johnston had both arrived on the field,
and were inspiring the men to hold their lines until fresh
troops could arrive. The Fourteenth Brooklyn, which
had been well on the right all day, had behaved with a
gallantry worthy of the Old Guard of Napoleon. They
had been attacked in a piece of woods by the Seventh and
Eighth Georgia regiments, and had held their ground
heroically. In supporting the batteries of Ricketts and
Griffin, Colonel A. M. Wood was severely wounded ; it
was thought mortally. Eieutenant-Colonel E. B. Fowler
then assumed command, and was distinguished during the
war as the commander of that gallant and heroic regiment.
The Federal forces, after the loss of Ricketts' and Grif¬
fin's batteries, were driven back across Young's Branch and
the turnpike, when they rallied and made a determined
dash to retake the batteries ; again our flags were planted
on the plateau. But the battle had swayed to and fro with
success first on one side, then on the other, until more of
FIRST BULL RLN.
17
Johnston's troops arrived, and, falling on the right flank
of the Federals, decided the fate of the day. General
Schenck's brigade had been ordered up, but did not
reach the field in fime to strike the enemy opposite the
Stone bridge, which was his left engaged ; Schenck
had been skirmishing during the forenoon across the
stream.
A squadron or so of their cavalry made a charge up the
Sudley road, which did great damage, and won for them a
wonderful name over the country as the Black Horse Cav¬
alry, which was a terror for a long time. Our troops re¬
treated mainly by Sudley's Ford, some crossing above and
some below.
It was evidently Beauregard's intention to entirely de¬
stroy McDowell ; for in the morning he ordered his right,
under Ewell, Jones, and Longstreet, to advance across Bull
Run and proceed in the direction of Centerville, so as to
intercept and cut off his retreat. It is claimed that the
orderly sent with the order was killed ; at least, it was
never received ; so the Confederate extreme right stood
still all day, faced by Miles' division of perhaps equal
numbers.
There is no doubt, from all the evidence, that the Con¬
federates had more men engaged there than the Federals.
On page 129 of Colonel Roman's Life of Beauregard,
the following order will be found :
Headquarters Army oe the Potomac,
Manassas Junction, July 7, 1861.
The General Commanding directs that you take prompt and
effective measures to provide forthwith, at your depot near these
headquarters, ample provisions, including cattle, for 25,000 men for
two weeks, and that amount at least must be constantly main¬
tained on hand, subject to requisition, until otherwise ordered.
Thomas Jourdan, A. A. G.
Captain W. H. FowuEE.
What was the necessity of this order if he had not about
that number of men ?
II
18
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Holmes' brigade from Aquia Creek, and the larger part
of Johnston's army from the Shenandoah, added to his
command, made Beauregard formidable enough to receive
McDowell.
For new troops our men performed herculean work.
After the break came, and the Union line was driven
back, the terrible enfilading fire poured in on our right
flank by the fresh arrivals from Johnston's army made re¬
treat inevitable. The troops were mixed, and in great
confusion. Many prisoners were captured at that time,
the Second Wisconsin and Fifteenth Massachusetts suffer¬
ing heavily in that way. It seemed that the Fifteenth
Massachusetts was doomed to bad luck early in the war ;
the regiment was in the Ball's Bluff disaster later in the
year.
In the mean time Colonel Wood, of the 14th Brooklyn,
was lying on the ground shot through the body. His faith¬
ful friend, H. U. Cranford, who afterwards distinguished
hittiself as a staff officer, decided to take the colonel from
the field, or remain with him and share his fate. He suc¬
ceeded in placing him in an ambulance. When they
arrived at Bull Run, the driver was directed to cross and
follow the regiment. Cranford, who was an officer of the
Fourteenth Brooklyn, thought the colonel was entirely
safe, and hastened forward to join his command, believing
he might be needed. Suddenly there was a great jam at
the ford, the ambulance was forced aside "and Colonel Wood
was captured. He was taken to Charlottesville, where the
surgeon of the regiment attended him until he was re¬
moved to Richmond as a prisoner of war.
The United States had captured the ' ' Savannah, ' ' a pri¬
vateer, and Smith of that vessel was convicted and sentenced
to death. In retaliation the Confederates prepared to select
an officer to be executed. Others were also selected at the
same time for other privateers, already captured by the
United States, whom they feared would be similarly dealt
with. On the loth of November, General Winder, accom-
FIRST BULL RUN.
19
panied by his staff, entered the officers' quarters, and tak¬
ing a central position, addressed them by stating that he
had been directed to execute the order he held in his hand,
which he then read.
The order is as follows :
C. S. A., War Department,
Richmond, November 9, 1861.
Sir You are hereby instructed to choose by lot from among
the prisoners of war, of highest rank, one who is to be confined in
a cell appropriated to convicted felons, and who is to be treated in
all respects as if such convict, and to be held for execution of the
prisoner of war Smith, recently condemned to death in Philadelphia.
You will also select thirteen other prisoners of war, the high¬
est in rank captured by our forces, to be confined in the cells re¬
served for prisoners accused of infamous crimes, and will treat them
as such so long as the enemy shall continue so to treat the like num¬
ber of prisoners of war captured by them at sea, and now held for
trial in New York as pirates.
As these measures are intended to repress the infamous attempt
now made by the enemy to commit judicial murder on prisoners of
war, you will execute them strictly, as the mode best calculated
to prevent the commission of so heinous a crime.
Your obedient servant, J. P. Benjamin,
Acting Secretary of War.
To Brig. Gen. John H. Winder.
After the order was read, he gave Colonel W. R. Lee,
of the Twentieth Massachusetts, six slips of paper on
which were written the names of the colonels. At first
Colonel Lee declined, then took the slips and examined
them. He then folded each one carefully, placed them in
a tin box, about a foot in depth, and just large enough to
admit a hand. After General Winder had shaken up the
ballots well he requested the Hon. Alfred Ely, a member
of Congress from New York, to draw the lots. Mr. Ely
was captured near Centerville, while looking at the battle,
and was taken to Richmond and confined in the officers'
prison. This gave him great notoriety. North and South,
at the time. Mr. Ely was loath to make the selection, but,
being urged by the officers to do so, consented. Colonel
20 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Michael Corcoran had been sent to Castle Pinckney, but,
during his stay in Richmond he and Ely were messmates.
The first slip drawn by Ely, when opened, was found to
contain the name of Colonel Corcoran, who was thus
selected for execution in retaliation for Smith of the ' ' Sa¬
vannah." The other colonels drawn were Eee, Wilcox
(afterwards General Wilcox), Cogswell, Wood (of the
Fourteenth Brooklyn), and Woodruff. After Colonel Wood
returned from imprisonment General McDowell said :
"A braver man never lived than Colonel Wood;" and
he took him to the War Department and introduced
him to Secretary Stanton, saying : ' ' Mr. Secretary, if all
my officers and men had fought as well as Colonel Wood
and his men, the day at Bull Run would have been dif¬
ferent. ' '
The lieutenant colonels who were drawn were Bowman
and Neff. The majors were Potter, Revere, and Vogdes.
The captains were Rockwood, Bowman, Kieffer, Roswell
A. Fish, and Arthur. Captains Fish and Arthur were
selected in retaliation for the execution of Mumford, who
was hanged by Butler at New Orleans for hauling down
the American flag. They were confined at Salisbury.
Fish was on crutches ; he was wounded when captured.
The time of their execution was fixed, and they had given
all of their personal effects to their friends, as they fully
expected to meet their fate, when the death sentence was
countermanded just two hours before the time at which it
was ordered to be executed. Our Government had noti¬
fied the Confederate authorities that for every Federal offi¬
cer executed in retaliation for the hanging of Mumford,
ten Confederate officers in our hands would be similarly
dealt with, and to this decisive action our officers owed
their lives.
Each rank was drawn by itself. When the names of
the captains were placed in the box, Mr. Ely drew Cap¬
tains J. B. Ricketts (afterwards General Ricketts), J. K.
Rockwood, and H. W. McQuade. Ricketts was badly
FIRST BULL RUN.
21
wounded when in command of his battery, and was then
at the hospital, where his faithful wife was taking care of
him, with little hope of his recovery. When Ricketts'
name was announced. Captain Thomas Cox, of Ohio,
stepped forward and asked that his name be put on the
list, in place of Ricketts, as he was at the hospital, badly
wounded. The next day General Winder came to the
prison and said that he was directed by the Secretary of
War to exempt all wounded officers, so the names of Rick¬
etts and McQuade were stricken from the list, and the
next drawing resulted in the selection of the officers pre¬
viously named. After the battle of Bull Run was over the
news came that Captain Ricketts was severely wounded
and a prisoner of war.
His young wife, then only twenty-three years of age,
went to General Scott and requested a pass through our
lines to join her husband. The excitement was at such a
high state, and the undertaking so great, that General
Scott hesitated, but she pleaded so hard that the General
said to her: "You are a woman of good judgment. I
have known you from infancy, and held you in my arms
when you were christened. I cannot well refuse you."
The pass was soon made out, and she hastily bought a
light double team, and started at once for the battlefield.
In his article, in the Century MagazMe.^ General Beau¬
regard claimed that when he learned that Ricketts was
wounded he sent his chief of staff to him to see what could
be done for him, and endeavored otherwise to assist him.
The armies were commanded on both sides by graduates of
West Point, and they were generally ready to extend broth¬
erly assistance, if an officer, whom they formerly knew in
the regular service, fell into their hands wounded.
Althongh Captain Ricketts was almost mortally wounded,
he was in full possession of his mind, and he lay by the
side of his guns—as fine a battery as was ever com¬
manded. He had a full right to the expectation that
Beauregard would gladly befriend him in his helpless
22 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
condition, as they knew each other well in the regular
service.
When Beauregard rode up to him, Ricketts asked him
to protect him, as there was danger of his being pinioned
to the ground by the soldiers, who were greatly infuriated
because the battery had made sad havoc in their ranks,
and the first families of the South had suffered. Beaure¬
gard replied : "You will receive the same treatment that
our privateers in New York receive ; " and then ordered his
men to put Captain Ricketts in an army wagon drawn by
mules, in which was a Confederate soldier badly wounded
in the head and delirious, who rolled and fought over
Captain Ricketts in his dying agonies ; after being twice
pitched out of the wagon Captain Ricketts was laid on the
porch of the Weir House, surrounded by the dead and
dying, and was there found the next morning by a volun¬
teer surgeon. Dr. Lewis, of Wisconsin, who carried him
to the small room occupied by Colonel Wilcox, command¬
ing Michigan Volunteers, and five other officers who were
wounded prisoners, where he remained until taken ta
Richmond, some weeks later. Both General and Mrs.
Ricketts remember this incident distinctly, and were
greatly astonished to see Beauregard's article appear with
the statement " that he kindly cared for Ricketts." Mrs.
Ricketts has a rsfre memory. She can call to mind inci¬
dents which occurred at that time as if they had happened
but yesterday ; and she is positive about this matter. Cap¬
tain Ricketts was so badly wounded that when he arrivèd
at Richmond he was taken to an almshouse used for a
hospital. Mrs. Ricketts was given a cot by the side of her
husband. The room was full of the wounded. There
Mrs. Ricketts had to stay all day and sleep at night. The
only protection given her was made by cutting down the
legs of her cot, which made it lower and shielded her a
little from view, which was done by the other prisoners,
who highly esteemed her. There she remained for six
months and a half, faithfully watching her husband.
FIRST BULL RUN.
23
Never did a wife's devotion shine with brighter luster.
She washed her clothes in that room (what little she had,
for she took no extra suits with her ; she thought only of
her husband and his condition, ) and dried and ironed them
on her bed by sleeping on them at night ; a rough experi¬
ence indeed. A charming-looking woman came in one day,
and in a low, sweet voice asked Mrs. Ricketts if she was
well supplied with clothing. Mrs. Ricketts replied that
she had brought nothing extra, because she expected to
.return soon. Her visitor said that she was closely watched,
but that she would bring her some ; in a few days she
came with a small parcel, and silently dropped it on Mrs.
Ricketts' bed. After awhile it was opened, and was found
to contain a nice calicO wrapper and other articles.
The fare was pretty severe on the wounded, nothing but
browned rice for coffee, and a scanty meal of bread and
meat. For dinner rice soup and a piece of bread, with a
very small piece of meat. For supper rice soup, a piece of
bread, and a small piece of meat.
The visitor referred to called one day, and said she had
permissim to bring something on Sunday mornings for
their breakfast. Mrs. Ricketts thanked her, and divided it
among all in the room, although it really was intended for
herself. Every Sunday morning they looked anxiously
for the welcome basket of good things, brought to them by
a colored man. Months rolled away, but the constancy of
this good Samaritan never flagged in the least ; every
Sunday morning she sent the basket filled with the best in
the land. Mrs. Ricketts said she never saw a handsomer
woman or one with more charming ways.
There was no exchange of prisoners, but Mrs. Jefferson
Davis had a relative (Captain Lee Langel) who was cap¬
tured in West Virginia, and there was an understanding
that Captain Ricketts and he were to be taken out into the
middle of the James River, and be virtually exchanged,
though it was not called that. In the mean time Mrs.
Ricketts had had a faithful friend in the surgeon of the
24
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
hospital, Dr. Charles Gibbon, a son of the noted Dr. Gib¬
bon, whose works on surgery are high authority. He was
a Philadelphian, and knew Major Ricketts, her uncle. Mrs.
Ricketts was a Miss Lawrence, but was related to the
Ricketts family, and was a fourth cousin of her husband.
Dr. Gibbon had quietly befriended her for his early as¬
sociations, and said nothing.
As the time for their departure was drawing near he
asked her to step into his office. In that farewell conversa¬
tion, among other things, he asked Mrs. Ricketts if she
knew the person who had been so constant and faithful.
Mrs. Ricketts said she did not.
"Well," said the Doctor, "she is the mistress of a
noted gambler in Richmond. The Sunday morning
breakfast you receive is what is left Saturday night."
He then added, ' ' That night the official cares are laid
aside, and many high officials, among them Judah P.
Benjamin, go down there, and during the evening have an
elegant supper. The remnants are saved by that lady for
you next morning." He added: ''She was the wife of a
prosperous man in the North. He took her and their
little child to Cape May ; there she met Mr. T., of
Richmond, and fell desperately and blindly in love with
him. She deserted her husband and child and eloped
with him ; that was just before the war broke out."
But this lady had another visit to pay to Mrs. Ricketts,
and perhaps had the doctor break the ice for her. She
wanted to send letters North by Mrs. Ricketts, to inquire
after her child.
When she came she fell on her knees, and was crawling
toward Mrs. Ricketts, who sprang to help her up, but she
would not rise ; hiding her face in the folds of Mrs.
Ricketts' dress, she said she was unworthy to see her, but
that she had endeavored to atone for all her sins by doing
all she could for the wounded prisoners, and hoped that
Mrs. Ricketts would go and try to find her child.
Mrs. Ricketts said it was a new cup of sorrow filled to
FIRST BULL RUN.
25
overflowing ; her burden before had been heavy, she
thought, but there before her was an object of unconsolable
pity, as handsome and charming a woman as she had ever
looked upon, inwardly dying with grief for her wayward
and misguided course.
Mrs. Ricketts took the letters and promised to find her
child, if possible. She brought her husband North, and
then, after he was comfortably situated, she set out on her
mission to find the deserted child. The family were readily
found, for they were prominent people in a prosperous city.
They were almost heart-broken over their relative's conduct,
but were pleased to receive a visit from Mrs. Ricketts.
Nothing more was heard of Mrs. Ricketts' prison visitor
until the fall of Richmond. As the Sixth Corps entered
that city a colored boy handed General Ricketts a note
from a priest, from which he learned that this woman,
deserted by every one, was in a dying condition. The
General called immediately on the priest, and was taken to
her bedside. As the Sixth Corps was ordered forward to
Danville, and would march at daylight, the General could
not remain, but he gave fifty dollars to the priest for the
funeral expenses.
Thus was closed by death one of the most thrilling
chapters of the war.
One of the saddest incidents which occurred in the prison,
was the death of Calvin Huson, Jr., of Rochester, N. Y.,
who was the democratic candidate for Congress against Mr.
Ely. They went out together in the same carriage, in
company with Senator Foster, of Connecticut ; at Center-
ville they became separated, and Ely and Huson were cap¬
tured and taken to prison.
The South was greatly infuriated over the presence ol
members of Congress near the battlefield to encourage the
troops.
Senator Henry Wilson, and Representative John P. C.
Shanks were there, and it is said that John A. Logan
fought in the ranks.
26
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Mr. Ely was given a long imprisonment for his rashness ;
he had to pay the debt of all the members, as he was the
only one captured. But poor Mr. Huson was a private
citizen. Mr. Ely stated the facts in his case, and begged
the authorities to release him. Mr. Huson was well known
to many of the high officials at Richmond, and time after
time his release was promised, but it never came from his
captors. He was finally taken with typhoid fever, which
soon released him from prison. It was a hard lot indeed,
and there was no apparent excuse for it, unless it was to
make an example of him, and thereby deter noncombatant
citizens from visiting battlefields where their presence
might inspire the troops to greater deeds of valor.
Turning now to the army as it retreated toward Center-
ville—there was confusion, it is true, for General Stannard,
who was then a lieutenant colonel, said to me : " The com¬
mands were badly mixed before they reached the stream of
Bull Run, but the enemy was not hotly pursuing." An
army of observers had followed and were greatly frightened
when our soldiers began to retreat. They soon managed
to turn the retreat into a panic, and the road from Center-
ville to Washington presented a wild pandemonium. The
First New Jersey (3 years) Infantry marched from Vienna
that afternoon, and when but a short distance from Cen-
terville met the van guard dtf" the retreating army. The
colonel, William A. Montgomery, an officer of the old
army, who had served in the Mexican War, halted his
regiment, and throwing Company G, which was on the
right at that time, across the road, endeavored to check the
retreat.
The scene presented at this point was one which cannot
easily be forgotten. Soldiers and civilians, army wagons,
ambulances, and private conveyances were coming up the
broad turnpike in dire confusion. Wounded men were
hobbling along, some stopping by the roadside to tighten
the bandages around their wounds, while others quenched
their thirst with the muddy and blood-tinged water from
FIRST BULL RUN.
27
the ditches along the way. The greater part of the men
on foot, who were unhurt, climbed the fences on either side
of the road, and taking to the fields went on unmolested
toward Washington. The colonel and his staff officers suc¬
ceeded in halting some of the fugitives, and heard from
them only the most discouraging accounts of the battle ;
the burden of their story being that our army was not only
beaten, but was almost destroyed, and in full retreat.
Among the civilians who told this tale was ' ' Bull Run
Russell," the valiant (!) correspondent of the London
Times. Finding it impossible to stay the tide of retreat,
Colonel Montgomery marched the regiment to Centerville,
where it arrived about sundown, remaining until after mid¬
night and was among the last of our troops to leave the
place.
Dr. Taylor, the surgeon of the regiment, remained at
Centerville in charge of the wounded ; he was, of course,
captured the next day, sent to Richmond, and was after¬
wards exchanged.
There is also testimony to prove that a part of our
troops, at least, made that retreat in good order and with¬
out confusion. In this connection Major Roswell A. Fish,
who was captured August 13, iSói, while skirmishing
near Fairfax Court House, says ;
"The retreat was not an entire rout. Miles' division
had not been engaged during that Sunday, and when the
retreat began. Miles having mysteriously disappeared some
time during the day (he was drunk before twelve o' clock,
noon), the colonels of the regiments, having no brigade
commander, marched their commands off toward Alexan¬
dria as they felt inclined, most of them hurriedly ; but
Colonel Matheson, of the Thirty-second New York, known
also as the First California, who was killed in 1862 at
Crampton Gap, took position about five p. m. near Center¬
ville with the Eighteenth Massachusetts, a Maine regi¬
ment, and his own regiment, formed a line of battle, and
checked the enemy. Those regiments remained in that
28 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
position until about three p. m. next day, when they retired
in perfect order to Fairfax Court House. While taking our
coffee at six a. m., in the grounds of the Ladies' Seminary
in that village, we saw the enemy coming over the brow of
the hill leading into the village, when the Thirty-Second
left, and halted at the intersection of the old Braddock road
and Alexandria pike, about one mile from Fairfax Court
House, where it stopped and supported two guns of Green's
battery. The Confederates were checked here by this
movement," and finding opposition, and not being aware
of its strength, made no regular advance beyond Fairfax.
The Thirty-second, in the afternoon of that day, Monday,
22d, leisurely marched to its old encampment, near
Katt's Tavern and Fort Ellsworth, where its tents had
remained pitched since the i6th of July, in possession of
a sergeant and guard, as we had a notion when we left
that we might want their shelter again. The next day
the Thirty-second was marched into Alexandria, except
one company, left in charge of camp, where it did provost
guard duty for several months. ' '
The first battle of Bull Run seemed to mark an era in
the history of the country, for the North was there duly
notified that it meant a hard struggle, and, as Major Rit-
tenhouse says : "It was the best thing that could have
happened—the defeat of our troops there—for it gave us
to understand that the South ihtended to fight."
I will close this chapter with a quotation from General
Schuyler Hamilton's description of the scene at Scott's
quarters while the battle was going on that evening. He
says :
"At three o'clock, on Sunday, July 21, a victory in
favor of the Union army was reported at General Scott's
quarters. President Lincoln and several members of his
Cabinet being present. Very shortly afterwards the news
came that the panic that General Scott had indicated in
the Cabinet meeting previously referred to as likely to
ensue had taken place, and the supposed victory had
F J RSI- BULL RUN.
29
turned into a stampede of the Union forces. That night
General Scott's quarters were filled by the President, mem¬
bers of the Cabinet, Senators, Representatives, and Gov¬
ernors of States. There was a good deal of trepidation
among them. General Scott said to Mr. Lincoln : ' There
is terror in high quarters. It is needless ; with the aid of
the gunboats stationed in the Potomac, and the troops
under General Mansfield, which I have reserved here for
just such a contingency, the enemy cannot cross either the
Long Bridge, or the Chain Bridge. I would get into my
cabriolet and head the troops myself, were it necessary.
But, Mr. President, the enemy have not wings, and I am
assured that they have no transportation.' At that mo¬
ment some person in high official position said : ' Our sol¬
diers behaved like cowards.' General Scott immediately
spoke out : ' That is not true ! The only coward, ^Ir.
President, is Winfield Scott. When I was urging that
this untoward battle should not be fought (at the Cabinet
meeting to which I have referred), I should have insisted
that my resignation be accepted rather than the battle
should be fought.'
" Winfield Scott was the only coward !"
CHAPTER II.
DRANESVILLE—THE FIRST VICTORY.
^ I ^HE battle of Dranesville resulted in the first Federal
victory south of the Potomac, and was of great im¬
portance to the Union cause. The people of the North
were gloomy and discouraged ; on the other hand, the dis¬
loyal sentiment throughout the entire country was rapidly
increasing. The South was confident and boastful ; the
sympathizers with the ' ' cause ' ' elsewhere were defiant ;
therefore, this victory, though not great in regard to the
numbers engaged, was, notwithstanding, most decisive
and important to the Union side and correspondingly de¬
pressing to the Confederate. It reanimated the people of
the North and restored confidence to their troops. A his¬
tory of the First Corps, or any other history relating to the
actions of the Army of the Potomac, would be incomplete
without reference to Dranesville—the bright morning of
our success—the beginning of the end.
General McCall's division of Pennsylvania Reserves,
consisting of three brigades, commanded by Generals John
F- Reynolds, George G. Meade, and E. O. C. Ord, was in
camp at Langley, called Camp Pierpont. This division as
yet had never crossed swords with the enemy. They were
untried in battle, though officers and men had been selected
with the greatest care, and had been closely examined as
to age, health, and efficiency, for a campaign of three
years ; also, they had been thoroughly drilled in the art
of war for six months by officers among the best in the
country. All the generals, and a number of the field
officers and staff, were graduates of West Point, and all of
30
DR ANES VILLE—THE FIRST VICTORY. 31
whom highly distinguished themselves during the great
conflict. Of course the bravery aifd success of the volun¬
teer officers and men of that celebrated division are notori¬
ous and historical facts, of which I have written elsewhere
in this history.
On the morning of December 20, 1861, General McCall
directed General Ord, with the Third Brigade, to move out
on the Dranesville road at daylight. Before Ord started,
McCall thus addressed him : "The object of the expedi¬
tion is twofold. In the first place, to drive back the
enemy's pickets, which have advanced within foiir or five
miles of our lines, and have carried off two good Union
men and threatened others ; and secondly, to procure a
supply of forage. ' '
In case an engagement of any magnitude should be
brought on, the First Brigade, under General Reynolds,
was to be in readiness to support Ord, and the Second
Brigade, under General Meade, held in reserve.
Ord's expedition consisted of the Bucktail Regiment,
Lieutenant Colonel Kane, to be employed as skirmishers ;
The Tenth Regiment, Colonel McCalmont ; the Sixth,
Lieutenant Colonel Penrose ; the Ninth, commanded by
Colonel Jackson, and the Twelfth, Colonel Taggart ; to¬
gether with a detachment of cavalry under Lieutenant
Colonel Higgins, and Eastman's battery, consisting of
two 24-pound howitzers, and two 12-pounders. On the
march each regiment threw out two companies of flankers
to prevent a surprise. One who was there says: "The
march was as regular and as prompt as that of a body of
old veterans. ' ' When the head of the column arrived at
Dranesville, and while awaiting the regiments in the rear.
General Ord disposed of what troops he had, by posting in
advantageous positions the cavalry and artillery, supported
by the Ninth Regiment, and a portion of Kane's regiment.
Sypher, in his History of the Reserves, says, and doubtless
he received his facts from those who took part in the en¬
gagement, which are therefore accurate, that : ' ' The
32
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
presence of the enemy, mounted men on the slopes behind
a wooded hollow south* of the road, and also the appearance
of a broad mass of smoke in the direction of Centerville,
convinced General Ord of the enemy's presence.
"To meet an attack from the Centerville road, the bri¬
gade was faced southward, and Lieutenant Colonel Kane
was sent with his regiment to occupy the roads in the rear,
on which it was believed the enemy had a considerable
force. The Tenth, Colonel McCalmont, followed by the
Sixth, Lieutenant Colonel Penrose, and the Twelfth, Col¬
onel Taggart, which formed the rear guard, closed up
promptly. Colonel Taggart's flankers discovered the
enemy on the south side of the Leesburg pike. General
Ord had dispatched a messenger to General McCall to
inform him of the situation in front, and McCall immedi¬
ately proceeded to Dranesville, and arrived about the close
of the battle. He approved of the disposition and conduct
of battle made by General Ord.
' ' Believing the enemy would attack simultaneously on
both sides of the turnpike, Ord directed Colonel McCal¬
mont to place his regiment on the north side of the road in
the woods, and bring it forward into line and attack the
enemy if he advanced on that side of the road. Colonel
Jackson was ordered to occupy a corresponding position on
the south side of the road. The Bucktails were placed
between these two flanking regiments, with orders to defend
the column against an attack in the rear. The cavalry
formed in the road west of the Bucktails ; the artillery
was placed in the center, and the Sixth and Twelfth Regi¬
ments were on the turnpike ; and when the brigade faced
the south toward the Centerville road it formed the left of
the line. This, it appears, was the formation of our lines
of battle in order to meet the enemy.
' ' General Stuart was in command of the Confederate
forces, which consistedof the Eleventh Virginia Regiment,
Colonel Garland ; the Sixth South Carolina, Lieutenant
Colonel Secrest; the Tenth Alabama, Colonel Forney;
GEN. JOHN S. McCALMONT,
D RANKS VILLE—THE FIRST VICTORY. 33
the First Kentucky, Colonel Tom Taylor ; the Sumter
Artillery, Captain Cutts, and Ransom's and Radford's Cav¬
alry.
' ' Stuart arranged his lines as follows : The Eleventh
Virginia and Tenth Alabama Regiments on the right of
the Centerville road ; the Sixth South Carolina and First
Kentucky Regiments on the left ; the artillery was advanced
in the road between the columns of infantry, and the cav¬
alry regiments covered the flanks. In this order General
Stuart moved his command forward until he encountered
our troops.
' ' General Ord immediately ordered the cavalry to the
left flank ; and selecting a position for the artillery, directed
Captain Eastman to open on the enemy's battery. The
battery came down the pike in a full gallop, capsized one
gun, placed the others quickly in position, ànd Captain
Eastman opened on the enemy with three guns, and
shelled the woods, taking aim at the rising smoke, as the
enemy's battery could not be seen. The third discharge
exploded one of the enemy's caissons, killing a number of
men and horses, as was seen after the battle. It was first
thought the enemy would attack on each side of the road,
but instead, his whole force was on the south side. Gen¬
eral Ord quickly made the necessary change of his troops.
Colonel McCalmont was ordered to the support of the
battery. Colonel Jackson faced his regiment to the front,
and with Kane's Rifles on his left, was formed in the
woods on the right, west of the Centerville road, moved
up the hill ; the men required no urging forward, but were
restrained by the oiflcers from rushing upon the enemy in
a double-quick charge. Captain Eastman's gunners soon
demolished the Confederate battery..
' ' The Ninth Regiment came close upon the enemy in the
woods, but the undergrowth rendered it difficult to distin¬
guish foe from friend. An officer in the bushes called to
Jackson that the troops in his front were the Bucktails ; he
therefore reserved his fire, until just as Captain Galway was
III
34 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
reporting that they were the enemy, he received a volley
from the First Kentucky. The Ninth promptly returned
the fire and charged upon them and drove them from the
woods. The Bucktails engaged the enemy from both sides
of the road, and drove the Confederates back and hotly pur¬
sued them, led by Colonel Kane, who was soon shot in the
face and fell to the ground, but quickly rose, bound up
his wound, and joined his command.
' ' Meantime the Sixth Regiment moved forward, between
the Centerville road and the Alexandria pike, and engaged
the Confederate regiments that were advancing to turn the
left of Ord's position.
' ' The Twelfth received the order to advance with
cheers to capture the battery, but the enemy hurriedly
withdrew his guns beyond the reach of the advancing regi¬
ment. General McCall ordered the whole line to advance
against the enemy, who was giving way in every part, of
the field ; the retreat soon became a rout, and the enemy
fled, leaving his dead and wounded, and a large number of
arms with ammunition, and clothing on the field."
The battle lasted an hour and a half. The casualties
on the Union side in this battle, were 6 killed and 6i
wounded. The enemy reported Stuart's loss at 43 killed,
143 wounded, and 44 missing.
General Ord detailed several companies of his command
to accompany the forage wagons. General McCall, in his
report of the victory, says : "Last, but not least, I brought
in sixteen wagon loads of excellent hay, and twenty-two of
corn. ' '
Colonel John S. McCalmont, who was one of the heroes
of Dranesville, gives the following in regard to the battle :
"You ask me to give you, in brief, my recollections of
the engagement between the Union forces under command
of General Edward O. C. Ord, and the Confederate forces
linder command of General J. E. B. Stuart, at Dranesville,
Va., on Friday, the 20th of December, 1861.
" Perhaps it would be as well to take a short survey of
DRANESVILLE—THE FIRST VICTORY. 35
the operations of the brigade which General Ord com¬
manded prior to that time, and with which I was con¬
nected.
' ' The regiments composing the Pennsylvania Reserve
Corps, were ordered to Washington immediately after the
first battle of Bull Run. The Tenth Regiment, which I
commanded, encamped for a few days east of the Capitol
building, near Lincoln Park. When General McClellan
arrived at Washington and assumed the command of the
Army of the Potomac, the regiments of the Pennsylvania
Reserve Corps were moved to Tennallytown, where they
took position ; were formed into a division, called McCall's
division—after General McCall, who commanded it, and
which division was divided into three brigades, commanded,
respectively, by Brigadier General John F. Reynolds, Brig¬
adier General George G. Meade, and Colonel John S. Mc-
Calmont. The command of the latter was but temporary.
1 understood from General McCall that he wished a Penn¬
sylvania general to command the Third Brigade, and that
he had requested, or intended the appointment for General
John G. Parke, then with Burnside's expedition to North
Carolina.
"McCall's division remained at Tennallytown, occupied
in drilling, picket and grand guard duties, building forts and
reconnoissances to Great Falls and other points, until be¬
tween the 3d and 13th of October, 1861, when the division
was ordered to advance and to take position at Langley,
Va., where the camp of the division was named in official
orders, ' Camp Pierpont, ' in honor of the then Union
Governor of Virginia.
"Previous to the advance of McCall's division, the Army
of the Potomac had been held mostly on the defensive ;
drilling and building the fortifications ; the line south of
the river, I believe, being scarcely connected, and the
right of it resting on Chain Bridge. After the advance in
October, McCall's division occupied the right of the line,
and the alignment of the whole Army of the Potomac, or
36
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
that part of it south of the river, was completed and some
miles in advance of its former position.
"There was very little to engage the attention of the
troops, except drilling and picket duty and the usual rou¬
tine of the camps, until about the 20th of October, when
McCall's division was ordered to make a reconnoissance to
Dranesville. The division marched on the 19th, and re¬
turned to camp on the 21st.
"The orders given General McCall were not to proceed
beyond Dranesville. On the 19th or 20th, General Mc-
Clellan visited McCall's advance, and found that McCall
had gone somewhat beyond Dranesville, and, as I under¬
stood from some one at the time, found fault with him.
General McCall excused himself by saying that he did not
see any town on the way. As there were only a few strag¬
gling houses in Dranesville General AicCall did not know
when he was passing through the town.
' ' The advance brigade of the division on this reconnois¬
sance was the First, commanded by General Reynolds.
Meade's brigade rested a few miles in the rear, and the
Third Brigade, commanded by Colonel McCalmont, of the
Tenth Regiment, rested a few miles nearer camp, at Diffi¬
cult Creek. On the 21st, the latter received orders from
General McCall, through General Meade, to return to
camp, left in front, as the object of thç reconnoissance had
been accomplished.
" In the Third Brigade all was quiet, and on the 20th no
sound of cannon was heard. It was with some surprise,
therefore, when it returned to camp, that the news was
learned that a reverse had happened to some of the forces
of the Army of the Potomac, and that the brigade should
not break ranks, but should hold itself in readiness for a
night's march. After some hours a dispatch came from
General McClellan to General McCall that Stone's com¬
mand at Ball's Bluff had succeeded in recrossing the river,
and therefore the march of the division was ended and the
men returned to their tents.
DRANES VILLE—THE EIRST VICTORY. 37
This disaster at Ball's Bluff, following after the rout at
Bull Run, coupled with the manifest disposition to avoid
forcing a general engagement of the armies, had a depress¬
ing influence upon the officers as well as the men. The
men were beginning to express, if not to entertain, the
belief that they would not be ordered into battle. But if
any in the Third Brigade had such ideas they were soon
awakened from the delusion.
"In November, when I—to drop the third person of the
pronoun and assume again the first—was on a short leave
of absence, I found on my return to Camp Pierpont that
Brigadier General Ord had been assigned to command the
Third Brigade ; and I found him in possession of brigade
headquarters, the tents of which he had pitched near my
regiment, and I returned to my old command.
" My relations with General Ord were of the most agree¬
able kind. He was a frank, communicative, considerate, and
very gallant officer. On the evening of the 19th of Decem¬
ber he sent for me, to communicate the orders for the regi¬
ment to march with the brigade the next morning by day¬
light, on a reconnoissance toward Dranesville. The object
of it was to cover a foraging party of the brigade that was
to be detailed to gather hay, corn, etc., from some farmers
near the Potomac. The foraging party was to be guided
by a man by the name of Sherman, who was said to be a
Union man, having knowledge of the country and in the
confidence of General McCall.
"Early on the morning of the 20th of December, 1861,
it being Friday,, and a very pleasant, sunshiny day—the
atmosphere being somewhat hazy, but dry—the Third Bri¬
gade marched. Two of my companies were on picket duty.
On the march General Ord detailed three of my companies,
under charge of Uieutenant Colonel Kirk, to make up the
foraging party. The arranging of the foraging party took
some time, and thus threw the Tenth—or what remained of
it—as well as the Sixth and Twelfth Regiments of the Re¬
serves, which were in the rear of it, some distance behind
38
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
the cavalry, Eastman's battery, and the Bucktails (or
'Rifles') and Ninth Regiments, which were in the ad¬
vance.
"Within a mile or so of Dranesville we were met by
Lieutenant Sharp, General Ord's aid, stating that there
were symptoms of an attack, and for us to hurry forward.
When I arrived at Dranesville, at the further end of the town,
on a hill where is a little church, General Ord had two of
the four guns of Eastman's battery in position, pointing on
a road toward the southwest, where a few horsemen ap¬
peared, as if Confederate vedettes, at a halt across the road.
' ' After looking some time and observing no motion.
General Ord said to me it was time to return to camp, and
for me to get ready to put my men in motion ; so returning
to them in the lane in the hollow of Dranesville, just as I
was about giving them some orders. General Ord passed me
on a gallop, saying, ' Colonel, we are attacked. ; put your¬
self under cover and await orders.' Looking to our
rear up the hill, I observed a confusion as if men were being
scattered by a fire, and at that moment the cavalry had
halted directly in our rear, and the two pieces of artillery,
with their caissons, came rapidly toward us from the front
to pass. The lane being narrow between the fences, it
seemed for the moment as if we would be crushed between
our own troops. I had a splendid pioneer corps. They
were provided with their axes, and in a moment they
cut down panels of the fence and we marched through and
along the inside of the fence toward the fire. When we
got to the intersection of the Leesburg and Alexandria turn¬
pike with the road we were on, at the entrance of Dranes¬
ville, we marched right through the line of fire from the
enemy's guns, which were placed within easy rifle shot of
us. At that moment General Ord, who had been putting
his artillery in position very rapidly, seeing me, ordered me
to take position on the left of the .guns. My regiment were
the only troops—except the cavalry—on the left of the
artillery. I detached Captain McConnell's company as
DEANES VILLE—THE E/RST VICTORY.
39
skirmishers on the left to watch their opportunity and to
see that our position was not turned by the enemy.
" The captain placed his men in some natural rifle-pits
on the left, and very close to the enemy's troops, two regi¬
ments of which were deployed immediately in front of
him. He kept up, with his men, a constant fire during
the whole of the engagement.
' ' The artillery on both sides kept up a rapid and concen¬
trated fire on each other ; but soon the Union guns got the
advantage. A shot through the house behind which the
enemy was sheltering, and another which served to blow
up a caisson, together with their losses from Captain Mc-
Connell's firing, seemed to decide the day, and the enemy,
taking advantage of the thick woods that covered his re¬
treat, was soon beyond pursuit. The engagement lasted
less than two hours.
" From the position I occupied during the firing, ver^^
close to the left piece of artillery, the aim of whose gunner
I at one time directed, I could see the movements on the
roads in front, and advance of the Bucktails when the
cannon ceased firing, but could not see the Ninth, Twelfth
or Sixth ; nor did I see General Ord, nor Captain Eastman
after the battle rightly opened, until the close of it. They
were on the right of the field and I on the left. My im¬
pression is that the Ninth Regiment, after becoming en¬
gaged in the beginning of the battle, and with the Sixth,
and other regiments on the right of the line taking their
part under the eye of the general, were hidden from my
view by a hillock or ridge between where I was and their
respective positions.
"General McCall and his staff came up before and near
the close of the battle. They had-heard the firing at Camp
Pierpont and made haste to come to our aid. General
Reynolds also came up on a gallop in advance of his brigade.
But as the enemy had gone beyond pursuit, General Ord,
after firing, near dusk, a random shot or two, ordered the
troops to return to camp.
40 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
"The Union loss was so small, the Confederate loss so
great, and the victory so decisive, in a contest of about
equal forces, that the march of the troops back to camp was
with a light step ; and though late at night, after a long
day of marching and fighting, they seemed to be fresh and
invigorated by the success of the battle. ' '
The loyal people of the country were greatly rejoiced,
especially those of Pennsylvania. Letters of thanks and
congratulations poured in upon the victorious brigade from
every direction. Among others, the following was re¬
ceived from the Secretary of War :
War Department, December 28, 1861.
Camp Pierpont, Virginia.
General :—I have read your report of the battle of Dranesville,
and, although no reply is necessary on my part, yet as a citizen of
the same Commonwealth as yourself and the troops engaged in that
brilliant affair, I cannot refrain from expressing to you my admira¬
tion of the gallant conduct displayed, both by oflhcers and men, in
this their first contest with the enemy. Nearly all your command
upon that occasion are either my personal friends, or sons of those
with whom, for long years, I have been, more or less, intimately
associated. I feel that I have just cause to be proud that, animated
by no other motive than patriotism, they are among the first to re¬
vive the glory shed upon our country by the men of the Revolution
and soldiers of the war of 1812. It is one of the bright spots that
gives assurance of the success of coming events ; and its effect
must be to inspire confidence in the belief that hereafter, as hereto¬
fore, the cause of our country will triumph.
I am especially gratified that a Pennsylvania artillery corps,
commanded by ofi&cers who have necessarily had but limited sys¬
tematic instruction, have won, not only the commendation of their
friends, but an unwilling compliment from the enemy, for the won¬
derful rapidity and accuracy of their fire.
I wish I could designate all the men who, nobly discharging
their duty to the country, have added to the glory of our great
Commonwealth. Other portions of the army will be stimulated by
their brave deeds, and men will be proud to say that at Dranesville
they served under McCall and Ord.
I am, General, your obedient servant,
Simon Cameron,
Secretary of War.
Brigadier-General G. A. McCall, Commanding Division.
COL. JOHN H. TAGGART.
DR ANES VILLE—THE EIRST VICTORY. 41
Governor Curtin hastened to Camp Pierpont to provide
for the care of the wounded soldiers, and to congratulate
the Reserves for the honor they had conferred on the
State. He issued the following order :
The gallantry of our troops in the late affair at Dranesville,
demands a public acknowledgment.
Their courage, conduct, and high discipline are honorable to
the Corps and to the Commonwealth by whose forecast it was raised
and formed, in anticipation of the exigencies of the country, and
whose sons fill its ranks.
General McCall and Brigadier General Ord, and the officers
and men who were engaged under their command, may be assured
that Pennsylvania is not insensible to their martial virtue, and from
them and their fellows confidently looks for as many further illus¬
trations of it as there shall be opportunities afforded them.
A. G. Curtin,
Governor of Pennsylvania.
A. L. Russell, Aid-de-Camp.
The colors of the regiments that were engaged in the
battle were taken to Washington, and on each flag
" Dranesville, December 20, 1861," was painted in golden
letters.
CHAPTER III.
PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN.
PRELIMINARY.
^ THEN, on the 13th of March, 1862, the council
^ ^ of corps commanders called by order of the
President in Washington, mapped out the plan of opera¬
tions which they confidently expected would result in the
defeat of the Confederates and the capture of Richmond, and
adopted Fortress Monroe as a base of supplies, it was ex¬
pected by the council that the four army corps then com¬
posing the Army of the Potomac, viz, the First, Second,
Third, and Fourth Corps, would be employed as a solid mass
in addition to the 10,000 men then at Fortress Monroe, under
command of General Wool, that post being thought to be
amply protected by the naval force in its vicinity, so that
it might safely be left with a small garrison.
At the same time the cooperation of the navy was
desired and expected in the projected attack upon the bat¬
teries at York town and Gloucester, as well as in controlling
the York and James Rivers, for the protection of our fianks
and of the transports bringing troops and supplies to the
army. With these expectations General McClellan began
the embarkation of troops and supplies at Alexandria, Va.
It was intended at this time to embark McDowell's
corps in mass and land them near Yorktown or on the
Gloucester side of the York River ; but circumstances which
IMcClellan could not control seemed to balk his efforts
from the start, and McDowell's corps, as a whole, was
not permitted to join the main army until just before the
second battle of Bull Run.
42
GEN. GEO. B. McCLELLAN.
PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN.
43
On the 17th March Hamilton's division of the Third
Corps embarked, and on the 22d Fitz John Porter's divi¬
sion of the same corps followed. On the ist of April
General McClellan started for Fortress Monroe, reaching
there on the 2d. On the 3d they were at the base of sup¬
plies and ready to move two divisions of the Third Corps,
two divisions of the Fourth Corps, one division of the Second
Corps, four regiments of cavaliy, and Hunt's artillery
reserve ; in all about 58,000 men and 100 guns. Richard¬
son's and Hooker's divisions of Second and Third Corps
had not arrived, and Casey's division (Fourth Corps) was
unable to move for want of wagons.
At the time General McClellan left Washington the
War Department had issued an order placing Fortress Mon¬
roe and dependencies under his control, and authorizing
him to draw from the troops under General Wool 10,000
men to form one of the divisions of the First Corps, which
was then supposed to be embarked and on its way down
the Potomac.
During the night of the 3d, however, McClellan re¬
ceived a severe set-back through a telegram from the War
Department revoking the order placing him in control
over Fortress Monroe, and ordering him not to interfere with
General Wool or his command, and forbidding him taking
the 10,000 men stationed there.
About this time the naval flag officer, Goldsborough, de¬
clared that the James River was closed to the operations of
the Union vessels by the combined influence of the enemy's
batteries on its banks and the Confederate war vessels,
particularly the ' ' Merrimac, ' ' all the efforts of our naval
vessels being concentrated in Hampton Roads in an en¬
deavor to destroy that ship. All this was contrary to what
General McClellan declared he had been told before leav¬
ing Washington, and it seriously and materially affected
his plans, for he had hoped by a series of rapid movements
to capture the enemy on the Peninsula or drive them be¬
fore him, open the James River, and press on to Richmond
44
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
before they could be heavily reènforced from other parts of
their territory.
He then determined to move the two divisions of the
Fourth Corps via Newport News and Williamsburg road,
to take position between Yorktown and Williamsburg,
while two divisions of the Third Corps moved direct upon
Yorktown, the reserves to move to snpport either corps
should it become necessary, designing also to land the
First Corps (should the works at Williamsburg or York-
town offer serious resistance), on the York or Severn
Rivers, and move it on to Gloucester and West Point in
order to take in reverse whatever force the enemy might
have on the Peninsula and compel them to abandon their
positions.
Another thing that seriously hampered McClellan at
this time was the want of accurate topographic informa¬
tion. Correct local maps were not to be had, and though
tl:e general features of the locality were known, the only
papers to which he had access were found inaccurate in
essential particulars. Reconnoissances proved to be the
only trustworthy means of information, as events subse¬
quently proved.
On the 3d and 4th of April the divisions of the Third
and Fourth Corps moved as stated above, and on the after¬
noon of the 4th General Keyes, commanding the Fourth
Corps, obtained information that a heavy force of the
•enemy was stationed in a strong position at Lee's Mill.
General McÇlellan, at that time not knowing that this
position was the key to the Warwick, instructed General
Keyes to attack and carry it upon coming in front of it.
Early in the afternoon of the next day (5th) the advance
of each column was brought to a halt ; that of Heintzelman
in front of Yorktown, after some severe fighting at Big
Bethel and Howard's Bridge, while Keyes was unexpectedly
brought to a stand before the enemy's works at Lee's Mill,
where the road from Newport News to Williamsburg crosses
the Warwick River. The progress of the army had been
PEN INS ULAR CA MPAIGN.
45
retarded by incessant rain on that day, which made the
roads almost impassable for infantry, while only a small
portion of the artillery could be brought up, and the am¬
munition, subsistence, and forage trains could not move
at all.
When the Fourth Corps reached Lee's Mill their left
flank was assaulted by a heavy artillery fire from the oppo¬
site side of the Warwick River, and on approaching the
vicinity of the mill they found it stronger than was ex¬
pected and incapable of being carried by assault. All the
troops in each column were under a warm artillery fire
during this afternoon, even the right column being engaged
when covering reconnoissances.
Just at this time and during this engagement General
McClellan received the following dispatch from the War
Department :
Adjutant General's Office,
April 4, 1861.
General McClELLAN :
By direction of the President General McDowell's army corps
has been detached from the force under your immediate command
and the general is ordered to report to the Secretary of War.
D. Thomas,
Adjutant General.
Though McClellan had been promised io,ooomen from
Blenker, and that order had been rescinded, as well as the
order placing the io,ooo men of General Wool's command
under his orders—this last revocation was the heaviest blow
he had yet received. He was then in front of the enemy,
and only waiting for McDowell's corps in order to inaugu¬
rate a series of operations which the withdrawal of this
corps rendered futile. The loss of 30,000 men was a calam¬
ity he could not overcome, and he was compelled to adopt
another and less effective mode of campaign. It made
rapid and brilliant operations impossible. With these pre¬
liminary remarks we will now proceed to the record of his
operations on the Peninsula, which began with the siege of
Yorktown and the battle of Williamsburg, and ended with
46
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
the reëmbarkation of the remnants of his army at Harri¬
son's Landing three months afterwards.
SIEGE OF YORKTOWN AND BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG.
On April 4, Porter's division (Third Corps) with the
Third Pennsylvania Cavalry moved to Big Bethel, Howard's
Bridge, and Cockletown, repairing at Big Bethel the bridge
destroyed by the enemy and clearing the road, being detained
four hours by this cause. On reaching Howard's Bridge they
found two pieces of artillery in position, supported by a small
cavalry force and about four hundred infantry. After firing
a few shots this force retired, and Porter sent forward Morell's
brigade and Griffin's battery with a squadron of cavalry to
Cockletown to occupy the junction of the Yorktown and
Ship Point roads, thus cutting off the garrison, in case there
was one, at Ship Point, and enabling him to control the
avenue of communication between Warwick Court House
and Yorktown, while Averell's cavalry was dispatched to
Ship Point to ascertain the character of the defenses and
garrison. Averell returned in the evening and reported
them abandoned. The rest of the division encamped at
Howard's Bridge.
On the 5th the division united at Cockletown and moved
toward Yorktown over a marshy road, rendered almost im¬
passable by heavy rain. When the skirmish line reached
the junction of the Warwick Court House and Yorktown
roads they became engaged with that of the enemy. Cav¬
alry and artillery were moving in advance, and close at
hand were extensive defenses of the Confederates, from
which they were immediately saluted with a warm artillery
fire. Skirmishers were at once advanced to drive back the
enemy's troops, find out what was in front, and cover the
deployment of Morell's brigade, which quickly formed on
both sides of the road, so as to resist attack or advance,
should a favorable occasion arise. Weeden's and Griffin's
batteries were posted by the latter to shell the Confederates,
who, as the mists arose, were seen crowding the ramparts.
PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN.
47
Shots from both batteries were fired with skill and judg¬
ment, and the enemy driven from their camp and ramparts
to seek shelter in the timber in the rear of their works.
The Confederates warmly returned the fire, but their artil¬
lery, though of superior caliber, produced no effect upon
Porter's well-served pieces, which soon drove their artil¬
lerists to cover, and at the same time Berdan's sharp¬
shooters did good service in picking them off whenever
they showed themselves.
Martindale's brigade now moved to the left to relieve
Morell, whilé Butterfield's brigade and the cavalry were
held in reserve to support either Martindale or Morell
should they need it.
At this time a reconnoissance showed Porter that a
marsh intervened between the Confederate works on the
left and Martindale's brigade, and that they dare not cross
it to attack his forces. Porter's division camped on the
ground it had been directed to occupy.
Smith's division of the Third Corps also moved on
April 4 toward Young's Mills. After crossing Watts' Creek,
his skirmishers frequently encountered the enemy's pickets
who retreated as he advanced. On reaching Young's Mills
they deserted their works, and his forces occupied
them, having only one man wounded during the opera¬
tions. On the 5th the division moved toward Williams¬
burg, the Second Brigade watching the road to Deep Creek,
the Third Brigade in the center, and the First Brigade
watching the right. On arriving at Warwick Court House,
the Third Brigade moved across the stream with Wi:eeler's
battery, while the rest of the division remained in the
open fields on the opposite side of the creek. Soon after¬
wards the division was again moved about two miles, when
the fortifications around and about Lee's Mill appeared in
full view. Davidson's brigade was. at once deployed out
of sight along the edge of the woods with orders to hold
the front. Hancock's brigade covered the right flank, and
Brooks' brigade was brought up about half way through
48
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
the woods and held in reseiwe ; they held these positions
till the 7th, when they were retired about a mile back,
still maintaining the same relative positions.
Porter's division still occupied the position taken .by it
on arrival before Yorktown, namely, one brigade in the
woods skirting the upper part of Wormley's Creek, one
brigade in the rear just west of the milldam on that creek,
and the third brigade in the angle between the roads to
Yorktown from Fortress Monroe and Warwick Court
House ; while batteries were attached to each brigade and
posted to sweep all approaches and the front of each com¬
mand. He remained in this position till the loth, being
all the time in range of the enemy's guns, when the division
was moved to the south of Wormley's Creek, and ordered
to picket from York River to the Yorktown road, where
they were joined by the pickets of Hamilton's division,
which had arrived in the mean time. Hooker's division
came up soon afterwards and encamped on Porter's left,
and, closing the gap between him and Hamilton, com¬
pleted the line from the Warwick to York River.
From this time till the close of the siege the troops
were engaged in building the necessary approaches and
bridges, batteries, etc. It was intended to have all the
batteries in readiness to open fire on May 5 ; but on the
night of the 3d, the Confederates hastily evacuated and
abandoned their works on the Warwick and Yorktown, and
the Union forces took possession without having to undergo
the terrible ordeal of battle. On the night of May i, one
of Porter's batteries had opened fire on the town and
wharves, driving away vessels that were apparently land¬
ing troops and ammunition ; and it is believed that the
destructive effects of this battery and the knowledge of the
enemy that but a few days must elapse before the other
batteries would open, caused the abandonment.
As soon as it was discovered that the works had been
abandoned, the cavalry division was ordered forward to
harass the rear guard, and Hooker's division was ordered to
PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN.
49
follow and support the cavalry. Cooke's cavalry division
pushed forward and engaged the enemy about two miles
below Yorktown ; here they had an encounter with the
rear guard, who were forced to retire, leaving a spiked
howitzer. On reaching a strip of swampy woods, Cooke
learned that to his right and beyond the woods there were
field works, which, however, were found on investigation
to be abandoned. Receiving word that there was another
road to the left, and by carrying which he might turn the
left flank of the Confederates, who had once more made a
stand, Cooke sent the Sixth United States Cavalry, under
Major Williams, up that road to attack their left flank. Gib¬
son's battery now opened fire at the outlet of the road, they
warmly returning it from a battery perhaps i,ooo yards to
the left front. Everything now looked as though the
Southerners were trying to bring on a general engagement.
Cooke was forced to advance to open ground where he
might use both cavalry and artillery to advantage. The
enemy now reoccupied the works on his right front, and
opening a new battery from a fort not over 400 yards away,
their cross-fire of shell and shrapnel was very destructive,
as they got an accurate range, killing and wounding many
horses and a number of officers and men. In the mean
time the Sixth Cavalry, who had gone to attack the left
flank, had suddenly found themselves at the enemy's works,
where they were confronted by a vastly superior force of
infantry, cavalry, and artillery, and were compelled to re¬
treat after hard fighting, the rear squadrons suffering se¬
verely from the fire of the Confederate cavalry. In this
skirmish the cavalry lost 35 killed and wounded. Finding
that Hooker did not come up to support them (it was sub¬
sequently learned that he had been stopped by General
Smith), and learning that the enemy had sent a large force
to endeavor to surround them, the cavalry retreated to the
open ground.
About four o'clock p.m. of the 4th of May, Sumner's corps
arrived at the position Stoneman held and found he had been
IV
m THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
engaged with the enemy ; after a conference with Stoneman,
Sumner moved Smith's division forward in two columns,
but after advancing a short distance and finding that the
underbrush was so thick that it entangled his lines, and
night coming on, the division was halted and ordered to
lie on their arms. One of the reasons given by Sumner for
not pushing forward his troops was that Smith's division
had marched without rations and he had to wait till the
subsistence train came. On the morning of the 5th, after
a careful reconnoissance, two of the forts on their left
were found to be unoccupied and Hancock's brigade was or¬
dered forward with ten pieces of artillery to seize and hold
them, so that Sumner might force their left. This led to
an attack upon Hancock by a superior force of the enemy
which he repulsed in splendid style. He placed the artil¬
lery on the crest of a hill in front of the Confederate fort in
short range and deployed the Fifth Wisconsin, preceded by
skirmishers and followed by the Sixth Maine in column of
assault across the dam and into the work, and finding it
abandoned moved forward to the rear of work in open field
in line of battle, with the artillery in the centre. A fort
about 1,200 yards in his front commanding his position, he
sent to General Smith for reënforcements, being deter¬
mined to take it at all hazards. Smith sent word that he
would send four regiments and a battery of artillery imme¬
diately. On this Hancock advanced his line sufficiently to
drive the enemy out of the two works nearest to his front,
and also to make a diversion in favor of the forces at that
time engaged with the Confederates in front of Fort
Magruder. Seeing that his present position was a very
important point, giving him space enough to develop his
front and entirely command the plain between him and
Fort Magruder, Hancock placed three companies of the
33d New York in the redoubt, with his artillery on the
right and left, moved his skirmish line 1,000 yards in
advance, covering the whole breadth of the plain, and
so continued to Fort Magruder.
PENINSULAR CAMPA IG uY.
51
On arriving at the second redoubt, and the skirmishers
still advancing, he found that the enemy were uncertain as
to what troops were in front of them. In answer to signals
from the enemy he ordered the national flag to be unfurled
on the parapet, on seeing which the opposing force deployed
their skirmishers and began firing. Hancock's skirmishers
were then but a few hundred yards distant. The enemy
were soon driven off and Hancock's skirmishers took up
their position at a line of fence separating them from the
Confederates and extending across the plain.
At this time Wheeler's battery joined Hancock, and with¬
out waiting for further reënforcements he advanced his line
600 yards beyond the second redoubt, and ordering his infan¬
try to lie down opened an assault on the redoubts in front
of him. The Confederate infantry now lined the parapet
of the two redoubts in front of him and poured a galling
fire of musketry into his line and then opened upon the
Union forces with artillery. Hancock's artillery replied,
and finally, after hard fighting, drove them out of their
works, his skirmishers killing many as they debouched
from the gorges on the right side of each work as they
stood in regard to them. Had the promised reënforce¬
ments arrived the Union troops would have encountered no
serious obstacles in taking and holding these works, but at
this juncture Hancock received an order from General
Sumner to fall back to his first position, as he could not be
reënforced on account of movements on the left. Hancock
sent back a message showing the advantage he had gained,
the bad impression it would make on his troops, and the
inspiration it would give the enemy should he fall back, and
again asked for reënforcements. While awaiting an answer
the crisis in front of Fort Magruder appeared to have ar¬
rived, and Hancock aided our troops by pouring an efiective
fire of artillery into the fort. This annoyed the enemy so
much that they brought two pieces of artillery to bear on
Hancock's line and exploded shell within the line of his
skirmishers, in one instance reaching the battery, killing
52
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
and wounding a number of his men. Hancock's artillery,
however, was superior in efficiency to theirs, and perceiving
this they soon ceased firing. It was now after five o'clock
p.m. and receiving no answer to his message, and the rain
pouring in torrents and drenching his troops, Hancock was
about giving orders to fall back and occupy the crest on
which the first redoubt was situated, when he observed that
the enemy were throwing infantry into the redoubts on
his front and firing on his skirmishers. At the same
instant a column of Confederate cavalry appeared in the
woods on his right. The skirmishers kept up a constant
fire on the cavalry, doing good execution at 400 yards
distance.
The enemy still persisting in an attempt to form, pre¬
paring for a charge on the artillery, Hancock shelled them
for a few moments and then ordered the artillery to retire
rapidly piece by piece to his second line. At this time he
was informed that a Confederate regiment had gone iri the
woods on his left with the intention of flanking him there,
and seeing their infantry break through the woods in front
of the right flank of his advanced line, he ordered the two
regiments on the left of the battery to fall back in line of
battle to the crest on the left of the redoubt, which they
did in as good order as though on dress parade. The
Fifth Wisconsin, on the right of the battery, seeing the
cavalry debouch from the woods, formed square to repel
assault. The Confederate cavalry having been checked,
and a brigade of infantry having broken through the woods
and deployed, the Fifth fell back in line of battle fighting.
The last piece of artillery having thrown several charges
of canister into the enemy when within a hundred yards,
now retreated as rapidly as possible.
The line of infantry now being reformed on the crest,
and the artillery being retired to a third position between
them and the dam, and the advance of the enemy being
within thirty paces of his command, Hancock ordered an
advance movement to the crest.
PE NIX s U LAR CA MRA IG N.
53
The whole line advanced cheering, and on arriving
there fired two volleys, doing great execution ; they then
charged down the slope and advanced in line of battle.
A few of the enemy were bayoneted ; the remainder
broke and ran. The column was halted and fifteen or
twenty rounds fired with terrific effect. The plunging
fire from the redoubt, the direct fire from the right, and
the oblique fire from the left were so destructive that it
seemed after the firing had ceased and the smoke cleared
away that no man had escaped unhurt who had advanced
within 500 yards of his lines. The enemy were com¬
pletely routed and dispersed.
The Confederate assault was of the most determined
character. The Fifth North Carolina was annihilated ;
nearly all its superior officers were killed or wounded.
The Twenty-fourth Virginia was about as badly cut up.
The Fifth Wisconsin captured a Confederate battle flag.
For 600 yards in front of Hancock's lines the whole
field was strewed with Confederate dead and wounded.
Shortly after the engagement was over the Third Vermont
arrived, then General Naglee's brigade followed, and soon
after the Forty-ninth and Seventy-seventh New York
Regiments, and these were followed by Ayres' and Mott's
artillery. That night they bivouacked in the rain on the
ground they had won.
Hancock in this engagement had but 1,600 men, as he
had to detach many at various points to protect his flanks.
The enemy in his front consisted of six regiments, num¬
bering about 5,000 men, under the command of Early.
While the battle had been going on as related above,
Hooker's division had its share. This division was ordered
to support Stoneman and aid him in cutting off the retreat
of the enemy. They moved from in front of Yorktown to¬
ward Williamsburg, and, after marching five or six miles,
learned that Stoneman had fallen on the rear of the enemy
and was waiting for the infantry in order to attack them.
Hooker proceeded to the front, some six miles in advance
54 THE AT MV OF THE POTOMAC.
of his colimin, and found that Smith's division was in his
lead, and that his column must wait till Smith had
passed. Finding that Smith's support would be sufficient
to aid Stoneman, Hooker moved his column on to the
Hampton road, which intersected the one on which Stone-
man had halted at the point the Confederates occupied. Once
on this road they pressed forward in order to come up with
the enemy before morning. Owing to the roads being in
frightful condition, and the men exhausted from want of
sleep and from labor in the trenches the night previous, this
was found to be impossible ; the troops were halted about
eleven o'clock, rested till daylight of the 5th, when they
again advanced and came in sight of the enemy's works in
front of Williamsburg about half past five o'clock p. m.
Here the column was halted in the woods while Hooker rode
to the front to find what could be learned of the enemy's
position. At the junction of the Yorktown and Hampton
roads was Fort Magruder, and on each side was a cordon of
thirteen redoubts extending, as far as could be seen, across
the Peninsula from the York to the James River.
Grover's brigade began the attack by sending the
First Massachusetts as skirmishers into the felled timber
on the left of the road on which they were standing, and
the Second New Hampshire to the right with directions to
skirmish up to the edge of the felled timber and there turn
their attention to the occupants of the rifle-pits and the
enemy's sharpshooters and gunners in Fort Magruder, while
the Eleventh Massachusetts and Twenty-sixth Pennsyl¬
vania formed on the right of the Second New Hampshire,
and also advanced as skirmishers.
Webber's battery was thrown forward in advance of the
felled timber and brought into action on the right of the
road about 700 yards from the fort ; as soon as it emerged
from the timber the four guns from the fort opened on it,
and before it reached its position they received the fife from
two more, two officers and two privates being shot before
they had a chance to fire a single gun and the cannoneers
PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN.
55
were driven away in spite of the sharpshooters picking
off the Confederate gunners. Volunteers were called for
to man the guns now in position, and the officers and men
of Osborn's battery jumped in and manned the battery and
in a few minutes had the guns well at work. Bramhall's
battery came into action on the right of Webber's, and by
nine o'clock had silenced every gun in the fort and all the
troops in the plain had dispersed. The guns in the fort
were not again heard of till late in the afternoon. The
Fifth New Jersey, of Patterson's brigade, supported these
batteries during the day. The remaining regiments of
Patterson's brigade moved through the forest on the left
of the road in anticipation of an attack from that quarter.
Bodies of Confederates were seen drifting in that direction,
and heavy musketry fire showed that many others were flock¬
ing there whom the dense forest (near a mile wide here)
prevented the Union forces from seeing. Patterson now had
a heavy force of the enemy in his front and was actively en¬
gaged, and the First Massachusetts, Seventy-second and
Seventieth New York came to his aid.
It was now after one o'clock, and the battle had in¬
creased till it was of gigantic proportions. The left had
been reënforced by the Seventy-third and Seventy-fourth
New York, and all were desperately engaged.
Three times the enemy advanced to within eighty yards
of the road which was the center of Hooker's operations,
and as often were they forced to retreat with great slaughter.
Each time their advance was made with fresh troops, and
each succeeding one seemed to be in greater force and deter¬
mination. The Eleventh Massachusetts moved to the left,
while the Second New Hampshire was withdrawn from its
advanced position in front to where they could look after
the front and the left at the same time. About this time
the enemy was reënforced by Longstreet's division. His
troops had passed through Williamsburg on the retreat
from Yorktown, and were recalled to strengthen their
lines in Patterson's front. No sooner had they joined than
56 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
they moved forward to drive in his left. After a violent
and protracted struggle they were repulsed with great loss.
Simultaneous with this movement an attack was made on
Hooker's front and an attempt made to seize the bat¬
teries by the troops from Fort Magruder aided by reënforce-
ments from the redoubts on the left The withdrawal of
the supports invited this attack, and it was at this time that
four of Hooker's guns were captured. Between four and
five o'clock General Kearny's division arrived and took up
position in Hooker's front, while his division retired and
was held as a reserve till dark. Kearny's division kept up
a strong and unremitting fire on the enemy but were unable
to advance further than the position first taken by them
when relieving Hooker. The Thirty-eighth and Fortieth
New York were ordered to make a charge on the rifle-pits
and a battery in their front, which they did with great gal¬
lantry, and turning their flank got in the rear of the enemy
and caused them to relinquish their cover. This silenced
their light artillery and the battle was won.
On the right, Peck's brigade, of Couch's division, got
into action about twelve o'clock ; he had five regiments and
two batteries. The One hundred and second Pennsylvania
was-deployed on the right of the road while the Fifty-fifth
New York was deployed on the left and was afterwards
moved further to the left to support a battery ; to the left
of the Fifty-fifth, the Sixty-second New York was placed
in position, where it found cover and held on till its ammu¬
nition was expended. A movement was made against Peck's
front by a large body of Confederates who displayed Union
colors and under heavy fire pressed his line back. At this
juncture the Ninety-third Pennsylvania moved to the left
center and by its steady fire and splendid execution he was
enabled to recover the ground from which he had been
forced to recede. The enemy then moved to the right
opposite to the One hundred and second Pennsylvania,
where they tried repeatedly to get into the woods and
secure a permanent lodgment. After repeated onslaughts
PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN.
57
the One hundred and second was forced to give way to
superior numbers and retired for some distance, but soon
reformed. At this crisis the Ninety-eighth Pennsylvania
came forward to the right and front and the enemy were
quickly repulsed along the whole line. Before night Gen¬
eral Devens came up with the Seventh Massachusetts and
Second Rhode Island, and shortly after General Palmer with
two regiments and General Keim with three regiments
came to the support of Peck. His supply of ammunition
being exhausted six of these later regiments relieved his
brigade and prepared to resist a night attack in case it
should be made ; his pickets were thrown out in front and
extended on the right to those of General Smith, but
could not connect on the left with those of Hooker. His
brigade also recaptured the four guns which had been taken
from Hooker, as mentioned above.
At three o'clock a.m. of the 6th the enemy abandoned
their position before Williamsburg, leaving the Union
troops in possession.
WEST POINT.
On May 7, about two o'clock a.m.. Franklin's division
of the First Corps landed on York River near West Point,
and at daylight discovered the woods surrounding the plain
on which they landed was full of Confederate infantry and
cavalry. Extraordinary precautions were at once taken to
prevent a successful attack—large trees were felled, senti¬
nels posted thickly, and the woods thoroughly watched.
Franklin was unacquainted with the country, and in com¬
pany with General Newton made a reconnoissance of the
position, which convinced him that his right and left flanks
and front were protected by creeks, and that the only
dangerous point was a space 200 yards wide at the right of
his left flank. The road from the interior entered the plain
through this space and was flanked on both sides by thick
woods. There was a dam in his front, but this he protected
b}* a strong picket.
58 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
About nine o'clock firing began on the picket line in the
vicinity of the road entering the plain from the interior.
Hexamer's battery at once moved to that point, where it
did excellent service ; but by eleven o' clock the pickets and
reconnoitering parties were driven in and two regiments of
Newton's brigade moved forward to reënforce them ; at the
same time he moved into the woods in the right front four
regiments with directions to feel the enemy and hold their
ground at all hazards. General Slocnm's brigade held the
left of the line, but not being actively engaged, sent the
Fifth Maine and the Sixteenth and Twenty-seventh New
York to Newton's support. The fight raged with great
fierceness from nine a.m. till three p.m. The Thirty-first
New York charged the enemy in the woods and drove them
till they gained an advantageous position, which, supported
by the First New Jersey, they kept till the close of the
action. The Thirty-second New York made a brilliant ad¬
vance, driving superior forces with the bayonet for a con¬
siderable distance till their progress was arrested by the
enemy's reserves and artillery, when they retired in good
order to their position. The Eighteenth New York, Fifth
Maine and Ninety-fifth Pennsylvania did excellent work,
the Ninety-fifth bringing on the action and keeping the
enemy well in hand during the fight. The Union loss in
this fight was 200. The enemy were not only repulsed in
their attempt on Franklin's position, but at the end of the
day he held a position in advance of that occupied by him
when the battle began.
From this time till the 27 th there were no important
engagements, the period being taken up in armed recon-
noissances, in which several skirmishes occurred without
much loss.
HANOVER COURT HOUSE.
On the morning of May 27 Porter's corps broke camp
and started to clear the Upper Peninsula of the enemy and
destroy the railroad and other bridges over the South Anna
PE N INS U LAR CA MRA JGN.
59
and Pamunkey Rivers and thus protect the right flank of
McClellan's army on the road to Richmond ; also to pre¬
vent the enemy getting in his rear from that direction, and
lastly to cut the line of his communication between Rich¬
mond and Northern Virginia.
The Fifth New York, First Connecticut, Sixth Pennsyl¬
vania Cavalry and Weeden's Rhode Island battery were
brigaded and posted at Old Church under Colonel Warren,
of the Fifth New York, from which point they engaged in
destroying all means of communication over the Pamunkey
as far toward Hanover Court House as was deemed prudent
without cooperation of a large force. At the same time
Morell's division of the Fifth Corps (Porter's) started from
New Bridge with an advanced guard of two cavalry regi¬
ments and a light battery, under command of General Emory.
Morell's command was to take the enemy in front, while
Warren, taking the road along the Pamunkey, was to fall
upon his flank and rear. The command, through a pelting
rain, deep mud and water, pushed its way to Peake's Station,
on the Virginia Central Railroad, about two miles from
Hanover, when they came in the presence of the enemy.
The Twenty-fifth New York and Berdan Sharpshooters
were at once thrown forward to engage the enemy's skir¬
mishers and hold them in check till Morell's division could
be brought up and deployed under the protection of Benson's
battery, which was thrown into position to sweep the road.
In the mean time a squadron of cavalry, and a section of
artillery supported by other cavalry, was sent to the left on
the Ashland road to guard his flank and destroy the railroad
and telegraph at the crossing, where they soon became
engaged with a portion of the enemy who were attempting
to outflank the main body. At th^'s point they were re-
ënforced by Martindale's brigade (Twenty-fifth New York,
Twenty-second Massachusetts, Second Maine and Martin's
battery). The Twenty-second Massachusetts marched in
line of battle, till they came in sight of the railroad and found
a train of cars there with the enemy in great force. Martin-
60
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
dale at once advanced his artillery to the line occupied by
the Twenty-second Massachusetts and opened fire upon
the enemy. They at once responded from a masked
battery near the junction of the highway and railroad, but
this was soon silenced by Griffin's battery. The Second
Maine in the mean time had torn up part of the railroad.
Martindale now perceiving the enemy on his left, and that
they were superior in numbers to his force, sent to Porter
for a couple of regiments to help him, and formed "his
brigade on the Hanover road in the hope that he could form
a rear guard sufficiently strong to protect not only the
battery but his line of communication. Not being able to
get the reënforcenients he expected, and in order to prevent
the enemy getting in his rear, Martindale ordered the
Twenty-second Massachusetts to go through the woods to
the railroad and follow it up, and the Second Maine to pro¬
tect the battery and the column in rear. The Twenty-second
had hardly turned the corner of the woods when information
was received that the enemy were advancing and had reached
the position where the battery had first been planted. This
was within 700 yards of the rear of his position. The Second
Maine at once changed front and then marched back across
the road from New Bridge and halted, throwing out skir¬
mishers. The Forty-fourth New York now coming up from
New Bridge, joined Martindale and formed under cover of
a ravine toward the woods on the left of the open ground
in front, and threw skirmishers into the woods. Martin's
battery was placed on the left of the Second Maine, and the
skirmishers being engaged with the enemy, the battery at
once opened fire. It being reported that his hospital, about
a mile to the rear, was in possession of the enemy, one wing
of the Forty-fourth New York was sent to relieve it.
Hardly had they passed out of sight, when a Confederate regi¬
ment deployed in line of battle before the Second Maine and
opened fire on them. The Second responded with terrific
effect, and the enemy at once retreated into the woods in the
direction the Forty-fourth had taken. About 150 of the
PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN.
61
Twenty-fifth New York, together with the Forty-fourth
New York (which had been recalled) formed a line of battle
on the left toward the woods, where the fire of the enemy
now crossed on them and the battery. The firing was so
hot that Martindale's center was forced to give way, and the
Twenty-fifth retreated as well as the Forty-fourth. At
length Martindale succeeded in reforming his line on the
colors of the Twenty-fifth. The Second Maine, however,
still held their ground on the right, though assailed by four
times their number. The battle had lasted over one hour
when reënforcements arrived, the Fourteenth New York
coming to relieve the Second Maine, while the Ninth
Massachusetts and Sixty-second Pennsylvania deployed into
the woods on the right, assailing the enemy in the rear,
while the Fourteenth New York held them in front and on
the flank. This move routed the enemy and ended the
battle, though the Thirteenth New York, which went to
the relief of the Forty-fourth, advanced so as to catch the
last volleys of the enemy and drove them from the shelter
of the woods in that direction.
While Martindale was engaged as above described,
Butterfield's brigade arrived on the field and took position
where Benson's battery was in action, having in his first
line the Seventeenth New York on his right, and Eighty-
third Pennsylvania on the left, with skirmish line in front ;
on his second line the Twelfth New York was in rear of
the Seventeenth, while the Sixteenth Michigan was in rear
of the Eighty-third Pennsylvania. Finding the enemy
drawn up in line near the house and orchard afterwards
used by Porter as headquarters, he at once moved his com¬
mand in that direction in the ordér stated above, the rapid
firing of his skirmishers greatly hastening their movements.
Here they charged on the enemy and drove them back,
capturing one of their cannon, with caisson and ammuni¬
tion, then pursuing rapidly, captured many prisoners, and
completely routed them. Shortly afterwards, Martindale
being strongly pressed, Butterfield pushed forward to assist
62
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
him, and camé up on the flank of the enemy in time to help
in driving and capturing many of them, and found him¬
self in front of the Ninth Massachusetts, with his line
perpendicular to theirs.
Night now came on, and, with the enemy routed and
beaten at all points and retreating, the battle was won.
FAIR OAKS OR SEVEN PINES.
This battle was fought by the Second, Third and Fourth
Corps, and the part they each took will be related in the
order stated above, commencing with Sumner's corps.
On the 31st of May Sumner received orders from
McClellan to be prepared to move at a moment's notice.
He at once advanced"Sedgwick's and Richardson's divisions
to the two bridges they had built across the Chickahoniiny,
and ordered them to halt there, with heads of columns on
the bridges, till further orders. When these came, in the
afternoon, the columns were ordered forward to support
Heintzelman, and rapidly moved to the field of battle by
two roads. Sedgwick, marching by the shortest road,
reached there first, and found Couch's division and Kirby's
and Brady's batteries. These were drawn up in line of
battle near Adams' house. June i the brunt of the battle
was borne by Richardson's division. On the night previous
this division had been placed parallel with the railroad, and
the enemy advanced across the railroad to attack them.
This was an obstinately contested fight, lasting over four
hours, and here Richardson's men showed the greatest
determination and gallantry, and at length succeeded in
driving the Confederates from the field. Richardson's
division consisted of Howard's, Meagher's and French's
brigades, and three batteries of light artillery, all of whom
were actively engaged ; the battle raged so fiercely that the
Confederates changed their regiments five different times in
the first hour and a half in order that they might replenish
their ammunition.
French's brigade was in the front line at the beginning
PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN.
63
of the fight on the morning of the ist of June, and the
enemy opened attack on him at the distance of fifty } ards.
Although this attack was bold and sudden, his men held
their line with great steadiness, and did not swerve, but
fired coolly and deliberately, repulsing the enemy. After
a few minutes' pause the heads of the several columns again
threw themselves upon the spaces between the regiments
to the right and left of the Fifty-second New York, making
the most desperate efforts to break his lines. The left of
the Fifty-seventh Pennsylvania time and again repulsed
them. The Fifty-second New York finding their left flank
was being turned threw back three companies to receive
them and repulse them there. At this time, French's men
finding themselves short of ammunition, Howard came
up with the Sixty-first, Sixty-fourth, and Eighty-first New
York and took their places, and immediately moved forward
into the woods with them. The fire of the Confederates
was rapid and fatal. General Howard here lost his arm
and Colonel Parker took command of his brigade, pressing
back the enemy to and across the old road which General
Casey's division had held the day before, and advancing to
within thirty yards of their line found them in superior
force here.
The Fifth New Hampshire were on the edge of the
woods, where they were actively engaged, and had taken
quite a number of prisoners when the command of the bri¬
gade fell upon Colonel Parker. Finding the other regiments
of the brigade had been severely handled, he ordered them
to move out of the woods and form in rear of Meao-her's
o
brigade, while the Fifth New Hampshire moved forward
to occupy their ground. While nfoving forward in line of
battle, they encountered the enemy about 300 yards from
the railroad and a fierce fight began. Twice the Fifth ad¬
vanced, and each time the enemy fell back ; the firing was
very close and deadly, the opposing forces being not over
thirty yards apart. The brigade fought with great cour¬
age during the entire engagement, making two successful
ü4 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
bayonet charges and driving the enemy from the field,
leaving their killed and wounded behind. Meagher's b:'-
gade was in the third line on Sunday morning, when a
brisk firing in the woods, in front of which they were bivou¬
acked, informed them of the immediate presence of the
enemy. The brigade was drawn up in line of battle when
Meagher received orders to throw the Sixty-ninth New
York upon the railroad a little below where it was drawn
up. Shortly afterwards the Eighty-eighth New York
moved by flank to the left and occupied the railroad to the
left of the Fifth New Hampshire, which regiment was on
the left of the Sixty-ninth New York. A countermand was
given to the Eighty-eighth New York during this move¬
ment, and, through the whole of the regiment not under¬
standing it, some confusion occurred, the two leading
companies deployed on the railroad, and received a brisk
fire from the enemy, till, the countermand being recalled,
they were vigorously supported by the balance of the regi¬
ment. While the Sixty-ninth and Eighty-eighth were thus
deployed to the right and left of the railroad, Howard and
French were maintaining their positions in front and hold¬
ing the enemy in check. The Sixty-third New York was
detached the night previous to help the batteries in the
rear that were stuck in the mud and could not be brought
up without assistance.
While Richardson's division was doing its part, as
above stated, Sedgwick's division was no less actively
engaged. On May 31 they broke camp near Tyler's
house and marched for Fair Oaks Station as follows :
Gorman's brigade with Kirby's battery. Bums' and Dana's
brigades, with Tompkins', Owen's and Bartlett's batteries.
With much delay and difficulty they succeeded iñ crossing
the Chickahominy and pushed on the point near which
they understood Heiptzelman and Keyes were fighting.
The First Minnesota, the leading regiment, formed into
line of battle under a sharp fire and was posted on the
right of Abercrombie's brigade, the balance of Gorman's
PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 65
brigade formed on Abercrombie's left, where they became
instantly and hotly engaged, and after sustaining, without
wavering, repeated and furious charges of the enemy,
in turn finally charged them at the. point of the bayonet
with such vigor and impetuosity as to drive them from
their position. Just before this charge Kirby's battery was
run up within loo yards of the Confederates and opened
a terrific fire with case and canister which materially helped
to rout them. Dana, with the Twentieth Massachusetts
and the Seventh Michigan, pushed on to the front on Gor¬
man's left, where they immediately went into action and
participated in the brilliant and decisive charge just spoken
of, driving the enemy from point to point. Burns, with
two regiments, took post on the right of the First Minne¬
sota, holding the balance of his brigade in reserve ; fighting
continued all day, the troops retaining their position and
resting on their arms. On Sunday (June i) parts of Gor¬
man's and Dana's brigades, with a section of Bartlett's
artillery, were again engaged with the enemy. No sooner
had they come within 150 yards of the Confederate lines
than they became engaged in a deadly confiict ; the whole
line along the railroad for nearl}'- a mile seemed one constant
blaze of musketry. After withstanding, as on the previous
day, repeated charges of the enemy, they had the satisfac¬
tion of seeing them abandon the field and precipitately
retire toward Richmond, leaving their dead and wounded.
The Third and Fourth Corps were placed under charge of
Heintzelman on May 25, and he ordered Keyes (com¬
manding Fourth Corps) to advance to Seven Pines, on the
Williamsburg road, while he crossed the Chickahominy at
Bottom's Bridge and moved to occupy a position two miles
in advance of it. Casey's division, on May 31, occupied the
advanced position of the army, about three-quarters of a
mile from the crossroads at Seven Pines, where he had
rifle-pits and a redoubt thrown up, and an abattis began in
front of the pits. About twelve o'clock he received word
that the enemy in force were approaching on the Richmond
V
66
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
road, and ordered a regiment forward to strengthen his
picket line. Believing that they intended to bring on a
general engagement, he immediately ordered the division
niider arms and at once prepared to give them battle, dis¬
posing of his forces to the best advantage. The Confederates
now advancing, attacked him in large force on the center
and both wings, and a heavy fire of musketry commenced
along the whole line on both sides, his artillery throwing
canister into the enemy's ranks with great effect. Repeated
requests for reënforcements having been ignored, and find¬
ing at length that the enemy were threatening both his
flanks, and that their columns still pressed on, in order to
save his artillery Casey ordered a bayonet charge by the four
supporting regiments in the center, which was executed in
a brilliant and successful manner under command of Gen¬
eral Naglee, the Confederates being driven back. When
the charge ceased, as the troops reached the edge of the
woods in their front, a terrible musketry fire began. The
enemy again advanced in force and threatened Casey's
flanks so severely that he was forced to retreat to his works.
Here the fighting continued with great fierceness, his
troops stubbornly contesting every step of the way, till,
the rifle pits being enveloped by the enemy, he was again
forced to retreat to his second line in possession of Couch's
division. Two pieces of artillery were placed in the road
between the two lines, which did good execution on the
advancing enemy. Arriving at the second line he suc¬
ceeded in rallying a portion of his division, and, with
Kearny's assistance, who had arrived at the head of one of
the brigades of his division, attempted to regain possession
of his works, but could not do so. Couch's division being also
driven back, though reënforced by the Third Coi-ps. Gen¬
eral Naglee received four wounds in this engagement.
General Casey ascribes his defeat in this engagement to
the fact that eight of his regiments were raw men who had
never been under fire, but says that, notwithstanding the
fact that he had only 5,000 men in his first line of battle,
PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN.
67
they withstood for three hours the attack of an overwhelm¬
ing force of the enemy without any reënforcement ; and
concludes his report of the engagement by saying : "If a
portion of the division did not behave so well as could have
been wished, it must be remembered to what a terrible
ordeal they were subjected. Still, those that behaved dis¬
creditably were exceptional cases. It is true that the divi¬
sion, after being nearly surrounded by the enemy, and
losing one-third of the number actually engaged, retreated
to the second line. They would all have been prisoners of
war had they delayed their retreat a few minutes longer.
In my humble opinion, from what I witnessed on the 31st,
I am convinced that the stubborn and desperate resistance
of my division saved the army on the right bank of the
Chickahominy from a severe repulse, which might have re¬
sulted in a disastrous defeat. The blood of the gallant
dead would cry to me from the ground on which they fell
fighting for their country, had I not said what I have to
vindicate them from the unmerited aspersions which have
been cast upon them. ' '
Couch's division moved up to support Casey, Peck's
brigade being ordered to the left, Devens' brigade covered
the road leading to his center, Miller's, Flood's and Mc¬
Carthy's batteries were in position covering the same roads
and fianks, Abercrombie's brigade was to the right of
Devens, on the crossroads leading from Couch's center to
Fair Oaks, which was three-fourths of a mile to the right
and front, through a mass of thicket and heavy woods ; the
First Long Island lay in rifle pits, supported by Miller's
battery, then came the Twenty-third and Sixty-first Penn¬
sylvania, while the First United States Chasseurs and
Thirty-first Pennsylvania lay at Fair Oaks with Brady's
battery. The Twenty-third Pennsylvania was ordered up
to feel the enemy (Casey's troops being in front), which
they did with great vigor, twice repulsing them and then
retired to their first position. Keyes now ordered the
Fifty-fifth New York into some rifle pits to support Casey's
68 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
center, Casey's right at this time being forced back on
Couch's right and being opposed by a vastly superior force.
Couch advanced with two regiments from the right and at¬
tempted to overthrow the Confederate left, which caused his
artillery to cease firing on that flank. Pushing forward,
they at once came upon a large force of the enemy's reserve,
apparently moving toward Fair Oaks, in the edge of the
woods. They immediately engaged but were finally com¬
pelled to retire, bringing in a few prisoners. In twenty
minutes' time the Confederates had passed over the road
leading to Couch's center, cutting off the advance at Fair
Oaks, now reënforced by two more regiments that had been
ordered up by Keyes. Being now separated from the main
body of his division, and deeming it suicidal to attempt to
cut through and rejoin them, and perceiving that large
masses of the enemy were moving across the railroad to the
right and front, with intention of surrounding and captur¬
ing his force, Couch, with Abercrombie, the four regiments
and prisoners moved off toward Grapevine Bridge for a half
a mile and took position facing Fair Oaks. Here word
was brought that Sumner was at hand. On receiving this
information Couch at once sent word to Heintzelman and
Keyes that he would hold his position till Sumner came up.
Sumner soon arrived and, as related before, drove back the
enemy with great slaughter. The balance of Couch's di¬
vision during this time were heavily engaged. Peck's
brigade was placed on the principal road connecting the
Richmond stage road with the Charles City road to hold
the left flank. The Ninety-third Pennsylvania was de¬
tached from this brigade when the engagement began and
placed on left of Casey's division, but returned with flying
colors in the afternoon. Later Peck received word that the
enemy were assaulting the right flank, and he at once moved
to its support across the open field under a concentrated fire
of artillery from numerous batteries and heavy musketry
from the right. The brigade came into line, however, as
coolly as though on parade, and used their best efforts to
PE N INS U LAR CA MRA IG N.
69
sustain their comrades who were contesting inch by inch
the advancing foe. During an hour his lines swayed for¬
ward and backward repeatedly, till at last, unable to with¬
stand the pressure from successive reënforcements of the
enemy, they were compelled slowly to fall back to the woods
across the main road. Pushing forward to the road leading
to the sawmill Peck endeavored to rally his men and re¬
form his line, but was ordered by Kearny to retire his force
by way of the sawmill to the entrenched camp and rifle pits.
Here, finding nearly all the forces, he took position in the
rifle pits with Berry's brigade, and rested during the night.
Devens' brigade was moved forward to the crossroads
leading to Fair Oaks, where they took position about
1:30 p. m., when the Tenth Massachusetts was moved for¬
ward to the left side of the Richmond road, supporting-
Flood's battery, and the Thirty-sixth New York thrown
forward on the right side of same road in front of Fair
Oaks road; the right of this regiment was screened by some
rifle pits but the left suffered terribly. About four o'clock,
Casey's line having been driven in, and an ineffectual
attempt to recover a portion of the ground having been
made by the Fifty-fifth New York, the Tenth Massachusetts
was ordered to advance up the Richmond road through the
felled trees and endeavor to hold the gTound in front.
Moving by the flank, as directed, they soon found them¬
selves assailed on the left flank and rear by heavy volleys
of musketry, showing that the eneni)' had outflanked in
considerable force the position held by them. They
struggled, however, to hold their position, but the fallen
timber entirely covering the ground on which they stood
rendered this impossible, and they were soon thrown .into
confusion by the heavy fire from the enemy thus advan¬
tageously posted in regard to it. Devens now directed them
to retire, but so much confusion ensued from the fire in the
rear, and the left wing of the regiment being badh- broken,
that they retreated precipitately and fled to some distance
behind the Fair Oaks road before the}- could be rallied and
70 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
reformed to move to the position indicated for them to take.
Reënforcements soon arrived and were at once engaged in
opposing the advance of the enemy. The attack becoming
very heavy in front of the troops to the right of his brigade,
Devens started to support it, but soon returned to his own
regiments on the Richmond road where he was severely
wounded, and Colonel Jones took command. Within a
few minutes Jones received an order to retire to the in¬
trenched camp, which he did in good order.
Kearny's division had quite a share in this battle,
though a number of his regiments were taken from his-
command and ordered to positions to help out the other
divisions. Jameson's brigade (three regiments) had moved
up the Richmond road, and Heintzehnan detached one of
his regiments to assist Peck ; with the other two regiments
he filed off through the woods to the left of the road and
meeting Kearny was ordered to clear the abattis on both
sides of the road of the enemy who were then entering from
the opposite side in force ; this they succeeded in doing
after a sharp fight lasting near two hours. Soon after the
brigade had become engaged, the enemy's heavy firing on his
right showed Jameson that they were pressing hard at that
point, and shortly after the line began wavering and the
Union troops on the right of the abattis, in the rifle pits,
broke and ran. Jameson spurred toward them and at¬
tempted to rally them, but to no purpose, as they appeared
to be panic-stricken. By this time the Confederates had
succeeded in turning the right of the line and the Union
troops were all running from the field. Seeing this, Jame¬
son returned with great difficulty to his own command
whom he found charging the enemy through the camp in
front of the abattis. They were at once ordered to fall
back and to the left, which they did with miich difficulty.
Before they succeeded in withdrawing, one of the Fourth
Corps batteries began shelling the abattis and camp they
were occupying, thus subjecting them to the fire of both
friend and foe.
PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN.
71
Birney's brigade (3:15 p. m.) was moved to the rifle pits
on the Williamsburg and Richmond road, being Kearny's
second line, and was deployed on the railroad, Casey's
troops pouring through them in a demoralized condition.
Birney attempted to stop them and reform the line, but
was unable to do so. At four o'clock the brigade was
moved, by order of Heintzelman, up the railroad to sup¬
port Keyes' corps. After advancing about a mile hp the
road the Confederates opened a scattering fire on them from
a wood that ran to the railroad, and the brigade was de¬
ployed into line of battle.
Finding that the firing on the left was getting more to
the rear, Birney advanced with two regiments into the
woods and succeeded after a shárp fight in repulsing the
enemy in their attempt to turn the right flank of the Union
lines. Word came at this time from Couch that his com¬
mand had been cut off but if Birney could hold the rail¬
road and prevent the enemy cutting him off he could extri¬
cate himself. At the same time Heintzelman sent him an
order to advance still further up the railroad. This he
did, advancing till his lines reached the woods near Fair
Oaks, when the foe began shelling him obliquely from the
rio-ht. He now received orders from Sumner to connect
O
with French, commanding his (Sumner's) left, and advance
with him ; at this time the Seventh Massachusetts was sent
to reënforce his brigade, as the position held by him was
deemed very important. Upon connecting with French
(ten p. m. ) the brigade was posted behind the railroad em¬
bankment and bivouacked for the night. At daylight next
morning Birney was, by Heintzelman's order, relieved from
command and placed under arrest [when tried by court-
martial there were no charges made and he was restored to
his command] and the command of the brigade turned over
to Col. Hobart Ward. About nine o'clock on Sunday
morning the enemy opened in the woods to the right and
front of the brigade, and Ward changed-front diagonally to
meet it. As the enemy advanced on him and their volleys
72
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
increased he gave orders to fire and then charge. This was
brilliantly executed, and they drove the Confederates before
them, who, retreating to the opening beyond, were met
with a destructive fire by two regiments of the brigade still
stationed on the railroad. The enemy made an attempt to
rally shortly afterwards, but failed—it was a complete rout.
The brigade lost heavily, but succeeded in capturing many
prisoners.
Berry's brigade was ordered to position in rear of the
intrenchments as a reserve (May 31) ; but had hardly
reached their station when the Third Michigan was moved
to the woods on the left of the Williamsburg road in their
front, and within a few minutes the balance of the brigade
was ordered to the front. The Fifth Michigan advanced,
and by hard fighting drove the enemy about a mile to the
left of the woods into and through the slashings. Berry
now relieved the Third with the Fifth Michigan, and
placed the Third in reserve to the Fifth. About an hour
afterwards parts of regiments of other brigades coming up.
Berry formed them on the left of his brigade into the tim¬
ber, and drove the enemy so far that he had serious fears
that his troops would be flanked by them, as they were
driving the Union troops down the road and plain as well
as on the right of the road. At this time Berry's troops
were in the woods, his line extending from the edge of
the slashings below up the woods and on the left of the camp¬
ing-ground of Casey's division, completely commanding his
old camp and the earthworks. Here they held the enemy
in check, and could have driven them back farther had the
center and right of the Union line been able to hold their
position. About six p. m. Berry began falling back, and
retired in good order to the intrenched camp.
Hooker's division was not engaged on the 31st ; but on
Sunday morning Sickles' brigade was ordered to follow
Patterson's brigade along the stage road to the front.
Hardly had they moved 300 yards when they were ordered
by Heintzelman to form in line on the right of the road in
PEN INS UL AR CA MRA IG N.
73
a large field with thick oak undergrowth, being part of
Snead's plantation. The column had hardly got into po¬
sition when two of the regiments were ordered to the left
of the road in an opening bordered on the left and front by
woods ; the balance of the brigade were already in line on
the right. While making these movements, the enemy's
skirmishers and sharpshooters in the woods in front kept
up an annoying fire on the brigade, their object being to
pick off the mounted officers.
Skirmishers were thrown forward to silence this, and
the brigade moved forward briskly under a heavy fire, the
regiments immediately to the right and left of the road re¬
ceiving the worst of it. After receiving two volleys, these
regiments 'were double-quicked across the field, and with
a loud cheer charged into the timber, the Confederates fly¬
ing before them. The right of the brigade was now ad¬
vanced, and, penetrating the timber and crossing some
swampy ground, found the enemy in an open space and
drove them back across the clearing at the point of the
bayonet until they disappeared in the woods beyond. The
brigade having advanced beyond the line Sickles had been
directed to hold, they were recalled. The enemy having
retired. Sickles was ordered to send two regiments to sup¬
port Richardson, who was then hotly engaged on the right
in the direction of the railroad ; this was done, and after
helping to drive the enemy from that part of the line, they
returned to the brigade, which now moved forward and
occupied a portion of the battle-ground of the day before
at Seven Pines. Here they remained during the night,
resting on their arms. During the night the Confederates
fell back a mile or more toward Richmond, moving
their artillery and wagons on a road leading from the left
of Casey's camp. Two regiments of Patterson's brigade,
under command of Colonel Starr (Patterson being sick),
supported Sickles during this fight, and in the charge upon
the Confederate lines were led by Hooker in person, losing
heavily in officers and men. The remainder of this brigade,
74
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
as well as Grover's brigade, had been left at Oak Bottom
swamp and the rifle pits at Bottom's Bridge to defend those
places in case of attack, and so were not present during
this battle. The Union loss in killed, wounded and miss¬
ing was 5,031 ; Confederate loss, 4,283.
OPERATIONS JUNE 2-25, 1862.
After much importunity on the part of General McClel-
lan, McCall's division of the First Corps was detached from
McDowell in the early part of June, 1862, and sent to reën-
force the Army of the Potomac on the Peninsula, where it
arrived on the 12th and 13th. They were immediately
placed under Fitz John Porter, and became the Third
Division of the Fifth Corps. At this time McCall's divi¬
sion consisted of three brigades of infantry (the Pennsyl-
v^ania Reserves), four batteries of light artillery, and the
4th Pennsylvania Cavalry. The First Brigade, com¬
prising the ist, 2d, 5th, 8th and 13th Pennsylvania Re¬
serves, was commanded first by Brig, (afterwards Major)
Gen. John F. Reynolds (who was afterwards killed while
in command of the First Corps, on July i, 1863, Gettys¬
burg), who was captured at Gaines' Mills ; then by Col. S.
G. Simmons, who was killed June 30, 1862, and lastly by
Col. R. Biddle Roberts. The Second Brigade was com¬
posed of the 3d, 4th, 7th and nth Pennsylvania Reserves,
and its commanders were Brig, (afterwards Major-General
in Command of the Army of the Potomac) Gen. George G.
Meade, who was wounded June 30, 1862, and Col. A. L.
IMagilton. The Third Brigade consisted of the 6th, 9th,
loth and 12th Pennsylvania Reserves, commanded first by
Brig. Gen. Truman Seymour, who succeeded to the com¬
mand of the division when Gen. McCall was taken pris¬
oner, and then by Col. C. F. Jackson. The artillery
consisted of Fight Batteries A, B, G, ist Pennsylvania
Artillery, and Battery C, 5th U. S. Artillery ; this, with
Childs' (4th Pennsylvania) cavalry, completed the organ¬
ization.
PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN.
75
Nothing of importance occurred between June 2 and
23, the time being taken up in reconnoissances, skirmishes,
etc., among which was the daring cavalry and artillery
raid made by Stuart on June 13, which came around the
right flank of the Army of the Potomac, attacked and drove
in the picket guard at Old Church (two squadrons of cav¬
alry), then, proceeded to a landing three miles above White
House, where they destroyed some wagons and burned two
forage schooners ; from thence they went to Tnnstall Sta¬
tion, on the railroad, where they fired into a train of cars
killing several. Shortly after they left Tunstall's (about
midnight), Reynolds' brigade of McCall's division came
lip, and about noon of the 14th, Warren's brigade, of the
same corps, made its appearance with the cavalry division
under Cooke, but as Stuart had disappeared twelve hours
previous there was nothing for them to do. June 15,
Casey made an armed reconnoissance to New Market ; and
the same day there was a heavy skirmish on the picket line
at Seven Pines. On this day also a parley was held be¬
tween Colonel Key and Howell Cobb to make arrangements
for exchange of prisoners. June 18, there was a skirmish
between the i6th Massachusetts and the enemy near Fair
Oaks, while the former were making a reconnoissance.
June 19, there was a skirmish between the enemy and the
20th Indiana on the Charles City road. On the 20th
there was an artillery duel near New Bridge, Va., and on
the 22d Casey made a reconnoissance to White Oak Swamp.
23d to 26th of June, skirmishes near Ashland, at Atlee's
Station, at Meadow Bridge, and at Point of Rocks. In
advancing the picket line at Oak Grove a battle ensued,
that object being accomplished with heavy loss of life on
both sides.
OAK GROVE.
On the night of June 24 orders were received, through
General Heintzelman, from McClellan to push forward the
picket line covering the advance of the army before Rich-
76
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
iiiond, and early on the morning of the 25th the First and
Second Brigades of the Third Corps were ordered to estab¬
lish their line of battle immediately in rear of the picket
line preparatory to beginning the movement. Sickles' (2d)
brigade was drawn up across the Williamsburg road, with
Grover's (ist) brigade on its left extending to the south,
while Carr's (3d) brigade was posted behind Hooker's lines
of defense, to hold them or furnish support for Sickles or
Grover as might be required.
A belt of swampy soil surrounded by a heavy forest was
situated about half a mile in front of Hooker's position on
which the picket line was posted, and from the great diffi¬
culty in relieving the picket line at this point, in many
places waist deep, this swamp had tacitly become re¬
garded as the advanced picket lines of the opposing armies,
and any invasion of it was looked upon as an aggressive
encroachment to be repelled, if possible, at once. At eight
o'clock the advance began along the entire line by sending
forward skirmishers while the brigades followed within easy
supporting distance. Grover's skirmish line became en¬
gaged at once, and as the enemy's fire increased they were
strengthened from time to time to insure a vigorous and
successful advance, one of Carr's regiments rendering good
service in this movement. Sickles' brigade was slower in
coming up with the enemy, but soon the musketry in his
front showed that he had found them, and that they were
also resisting his advance. They still pressed forward and
had almost reached the edge of the woods, when the in¬
creased fire from the Confederate forces showed Hooker that
Sickles was outnumbered. Carr at once sent a regiment to
support him, and again the whole line pressed forward
under a galling fire from the enemy. Grover, on the left,
had fought his way up to the line and established his picket.
It was now eleven o'clock, and, owing to some misunder¬
standing of Hooker's true condition at general headquarters,
he received orders to withdraw his command from the con¬
test, and although General Birney tendered the services of
PE .y INS ULAR CA MRA IG N.
77
his brigade at this juncture to Hooker, he was, under his in¬
structions, compelled to decline them, and the division was
returned to its camp. As they reached camp McClellan ap¬
peared, and on learning the true state of affairs, ordered
Hooker to resume and finish the duty given him the night
before. Another regiment of Carr's brigade now took the
place of the one that had been withdrawn during the suspen¬
sion of operations, and the line again moved forward under
a severe fire from the enemy and established itself on the
line it was to occupy. At this time Palmer's brigade, of
Couch's division, arrived, and soon after a section of De
Russy's battery, which being brought into action by that
officer, opened to the right and left of the Williamsburg
road and literally swept the jungles of the enemy ; a part
of Palmer's brigade supported the battery, while the re¬
mainder of the brigade deployed and took the advance of
the infantry in this part of the field and immediately moved
forward to the outer edge of the woods. As soon as the
undergrowth had been cleared of the foe the artillery
opened with great effect on their encampment on the side of
the field opposite their position. This continued till seven
p.m., when Hooker's command was withdrawn and Palmer's
brigade left to defend the position for the night. Birney's
brigade of Kearny's division again came up in the after¬
noon, but the principal fighting had been done before they
arrived, and in the evening they relieved Grover and took
up his position and remained till two a. m., when they were
withdrawn and moved to various positions to strengthen the
picket line. Robinson's brigade, Kearny's division, also
moved forward for the purpose of extending the line of
pickets in conjunction with those of Hooker, and his skir¬
mish line had a sharp encounter with the enemy, whom
they steadily drove back until they came abreast of Hooker's
line, when they rested till about six p.m., when the Con¬
federates made a desperate assault on his left flank with a
heavy body of infantry. The 20th Indiana was ordéred to
the left for support, and while advancing received repeated
78 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
volleys from the enem}', which they met by a charge,
and, pouring a deadly fire on them in return, sent them
flying from the field. At this time some one called out
that the Confederates were bringing a battery to bear on the
left, when the 87th New York became panic-stricken and
broke and fled, and though their commander tried in every
way to rally them, he was unsuccessfnl, and they did not
again appear on the field. The 20th Indiana was now
hard pressed by reënforcements of the enemy, and was forced
to give way and retreated a short distance, but soon re¬
formed and again advanced to the attack. At this time
Kearny appeared with Birney's brigade, and with this sup¬
port they succeeded in driving the enemy from the field, after
which Birney's brigade was withdrawn and relieved Grover,
as before stated. Robinson's brigade remained in this
position during the night, when the enemy made another
attack upon him, which he easily repulsed.
We now come to the series of great battles that ended
with McClellan abandoning the Peninsula, beginning with
the battle, on June 26, of Mechanicsville, or Beaver Dam
Creek :
MECHANICSVILLE, OR BEAVER DAM CREEK.
On June 19, the First and Third Brigades of McCall's
division moved from Gaines' Farm, where they had been en¬
camped, to Beaver Dam Creek, about a mile from Mechan¬
icsville, then the extreme right of the army, and relieved
Taylor's brigade of Franklin's division. The position se¬
lected on the creek was naturally a strong one. The left
resting on the Chickahominy and the right extending to the
thick woods beyond the upper Mechanicsville road, which
they occupied. The creek, however, was not fordable for the
greater part of the front of the line, and there was but one
road, that crossing at Ellison's Mills, over which it was
practicable to move the artillery. Here an epaulement for
a section of artillery was hastily thrown up, while rifle pits
capable of holding a regiment were dug in front of each
PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN.
79
brigade. Cooper's battery on the right, and Smead's bat¬
tery on the left, commanded the approaches from the upper
road, while DeHart's battery, stationed near the front
center, commanded a more distant view of the same road
as well as the lower direct road to Mechanicsville ; at the
same time Meade's brigade was held in reserve at Gaines'
Farm, so as to be in readiness to support'Reynolds and Sey¬
mour, or to oppose the enemy's crossing at New Bridge,
should they attempt it.
In this position the Reserves awaited any movements
the Confederates should make. Howell Cobb's legion was
encamped in full view across the Chickahominy, while A.
P. Hill's division lay about half* a mile in the rear of
Cobb, and had an extensive line of rifle pits and two re¬
doubts overlooking the river.
Quiet prevailed until the 26th, when the Confederates
were discovered to be advancing, and about noon McCall's
pickets were driven in at Meadow Bridge. As their head
of column approached, Meade's brigade was ordered up from
Gaines' Farm and formed in the rear of the line, where they
would be within supporting distance of any part of the
fleld. At this time the division's line of battle was ; On
the extreme right six companies of the 2d Pennsylvania
Reserves, next, six companies of the ist, then the 5th,
8th, loth and 9th, the 12th being on the extreme left,
while, as stated above, Meade's brigade was in reserve,
together with Eastoir's and Kern's batteries.
About three o'clock p.m. the enemy formed in front of
McCall's division, and, throwing out skirmishers, rapidly
advanced on his lines, keeping up a brisk flre. They
were in heavy force and were commanded by Gen. R. E.
Lee. They attacked McCall's entire position from right
to left, but he soon saw that they were concentrating
their greatest efforts on his extreme right. Their efforts,
however, were frustrated, though the battle raged at that
point for quite a while with great fury, for Kern's battery
had moved up to that place, supported by the 3d Re-
80 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
serves, and the accurate and deadly fire of the battery caused
them to retreat with a fearful loss. At the same time the
Georgians rushed with almost resistless energy against the
2d Reserves, only to be slaughtered like sheep in the sham¬
bles by the gallant Pennsylvanians.
For a time the enemy retired from close contest on the
right, but they kept up during the balance of the day a heavy
general fire both of artillery and musketry ; this, with the
rapid and steady firing of McCall's men, sounded at times
like peals of never-ending thunder. Soon, however, they
rallied again, and launched down the road to Ellison's
Mills, where they made a determined effort to turn McCall's
extreme left (Seymour's .brigade) and flank him by crossing
the stream below the mill. The 7th Pennsylvania now came
to Seymour's rescue, and once more the Reserves sustained
their character for steadiness in splendid style. Hour
after hour they stood there, never flinching, never losing a
foot of ground, hotly contesting the battle with the enemy's
finest and bravest troops fighting under the eye of their
most distinguished general. Yet it was noted that though
the Union artillery dealt death unremittingly and to an
awful extent, the greatly superior force of the enemy en¬
abled them to throw against McCall column after column
of fresh troops, while his men were almost exhausted.
About sunset Griffin's brigade, with Edwards' battery, ar¬
rived and was placed on McCall's extreme right, but as the
enemy had advanced before they could all get into position
only a portion of the brigade got into the action. Then,
shortly before the engagement closed, the 4th Michigan re¬
lieved the 5th Pennsylvania, whose ammunition was ex¬
hausted. Edwards' battery having been left in reserve by
Griffin, it was, late in the evening, turned over to Seymour
and placed on his left. About nine p.m. this engagement
closed, by the enemy withdrawing with heavy loss. At one
a.m. McClellan ordered McCall to withdraw his forces to the
rear of Gaines' Mills, but it was daylight before he received
it. Meade's brigade was the first withdrawn, but before it was
PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN.
81
completed the enemy opened fire. Their fire was promptly
returned, and soon the action became general all along the
line. Griffin's brigade and Edwards' battery followed Meade
and then Reynolds' brigade retired, keeping np a scattering
musketry fire and firing one piece of artillery. Seymour's
brigade was the last to retire, and was brought out in hand¬
some style. McCall buried his dead, sent off his wounded,
saved all his artillery, and his brigades filed off the field as
steadily as though leaving a dress parade, and it was some
time before the Confederates discovered they had left, as they
did not follow immediately. McCall's division marched
leisurely, and reached their designated position at ten a. m.
of the 27th, where we will leave them for the present.
Morell came up to Mechanicsville with Griffin's brigade
between five and six o'clock p.m., and found McCall en¬
gaged on the defensive, with Reynolds severely pressed,
and he at once stationed Griffin and ordered him to support
Reynolds and take care of the gap between him and Mar-
tindale, who was near Richardson's division. Martindale
was in position on the Hanover Court House road about
three-quarters of a mile from Mechanicsville (to repel any
approach from that quarter) and near McCall, ready to re¬
sist any effort to turn his right and assail him in the rear.
The 8th Illinois Cavalry was stationed at this place and
had been skirmishing with the enemy during the entire day.
The battle had opened on Martindale's left, and he sent two
regiments to support Reynolds, and with the rest of his
brigade waited demonstrations in his front, where the ene¬
my's artillery opened on him, without, however, doing any
damage. At one o'clock a.m. he received orders to with¬
draw his brigade and retire before daylight, which he did
in good order, and reached his camp in the Chickahominy
Valley about one mile from New Bridge, shortly after
daylight.
Butterfield's brigade received orders at three a.m. of the
27th to remove, by hand the heavy gnus in battery
near Hogan's house to a point on the hill, near Adams'
VI
82
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
house, east of Gaines' house, and guard them with his
brigade, taking up position on the hills east of Gaines'
house across the ravine during the passage of McCall's and
Martindale's troops to the rear, and having accomplished
this, by order took up a new position in the rear of the one
last mentioned, with his left resting on the Chickahominy
Valley, leaving the battery on the hill, where it had been
stationed till the passage of all the troops and flying artil¬
lery had been effected, after which he brought the battery
back and destroyed all the bridges.
GAINES' MILE.
On the morning of June 27, Porter's (5th) corps was
disposed in a semicircle, having its extremities resting on
the Chickahominy, while part of his front was covered by
the ravine of the Gaines' Mill stream, covered with trees
and nnderbrush which partially masked his force and
screened his reserves. By this disposition the roads from
Mechanics ville and Cold Harbor were covered and defended.
On the front as formed were Sykes' and Morell's di¬
visions, each brigade having two of its own regiments in
reserve, while their artillery was posted to sweep the ave¬
nues of approach. McCall's division formed the second
line in the rear of the woods skirting the ravine, Reynolds
being on the extreme right, to cover the approaches from
Cold Harbor and Dispatch Station to Sumner's Bridge.
Cooke's cavalry were at the same time posted under the hill
in the Chickahominy Valley to watch the left flank, and,
should he have a chance, to strike the enemy on the plains.
The dust from the immense columns of the enemy could
be seen for miles, and Porter's scouts and pickets warned
him that they were approaching along his entire front.
About twelve o'clock p.m. they began to attack from the
direction of New Cold Harbor on Morell's right, which was
handsomely repulsed by Griffin's brigade. Again advancing,
the Confederates made a second attack about 2:3o, and again
about half past five, each time extending along the entire
PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN.
83
front of Morell's division, and each time being repulsed.
At 6:30, however, they made a final attack, coming in irre¬
sistible force, throwing themselves against his center and
left, and swept Morell's division from the ground, compel¬
ling them to retire. As Morell retired the artillery opened
on the enemy from the left and rear, but the pressure was so
great that his troops could not be rallied except in small
bodies to support the artillery. Besides, Cooke's cavalry,
having been repulsed in a charge on the Confederate right,
added confusion to the Union line by riding at full speed
obliquely through a large portion of the artillery, carrying
men and horses along with them. The cavalry, however,
reformed under the hill, beyond the reach of the musketry,
and, advancing to the vicinity of Adams' house, imparted
some steadiness to the retreating infantry near them ; at this
time they received an order from Cooke to retire from the
field, and rode briskly to the rear. The infantry followed
and, finally rallied in the valley near the hospital, while
Butterfield's brigade crossed the Chickahominy and bivou¬
acked with Smith's division of Franklin's corps.
I think the weight of evidence is that General Cooke's
cavalry charge at Gaines' Mill was made at the opportune
moment, and arrested the advance of the enemy after the
infantry supports had fallen back and left the guns of the
several batteries exposed to inevitable capture.
It is difficult to see how the capture could have been
avoided, with the enemy within fifty or sixty yards of the
guns, and their infantry supports in retreat.
No doubt a repulsed cavalry charge would create some
confusion, but in this instance it created sufficient confu¬
sion among the advancing enemy to enable the unsup¬
ported artillery to get away, and accomplished just what
cavalry are intended to do in emergencies.
The weight öf evidence is also that the cavalry were the
last troops to cross the river. (See ' ' Battles and Leaders
of the War, ' ' vol. ii, page 344. )
Sykes' division was on Morell's right ; his troops oc-
84 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
cupying the crest of a bill in an open field partly covered
by a fence, and partly by the inequalities of the ground,
McGeehee's house, in rear of his right center, being the
commanding point of his position, while his front was
masked 400 yards distant by heavy timber bordering a
ravine. Buchanan's and Warren's brigades were deployed
to the right and left, while Lovell's brigade was in reserve.
About eleven a.m. the Confederates appeared in his front,
and, with their artillery, tried to shake the center of his
line, and from that time till two p.m., with successive bat¬
talions of fresh troops, assailed his center and flanks, and
were as often repulsed. About noon Weed's and Tidball's
batteries took position on Sykes' right, and so effective
and deadly was their fire that they broke up every attack
of the enemy on his right flank, and finally drove them to
their main body on his left. From this time until night
the battle raged furiously, attack after attack being met
and repulsed, till the center of Porter's army was pierced,
the troops in his front driven in, his left flank exposed, and
his position no longer tenable, when, out of ammunition
and thoroughly exhausted, they sullenly retreated, meeting
with Meagher's and French's brigades about half a mile to
the rear of the fiejd. These had been sent to relieve Sykes,
but arrived too late to take part in the battle. At mid¬
night the division retired across the Chickahominy and
bivouacked on the heights commanding the approaches
from the river. At 3:30 p.m. Meade's and Seymour's bri¬
gades, of McCall's division, were ordered up to support the
front line, and soon after Reynolds' brigade followed, and
the whole division became warmly engaged, while his bat¬
teries also advanced and shelled the enemy over the heads
of the men in line. The action soon became general, and
the fire in front of this division, which was near the center
of the battle, increased to a deafening roar of musketry,
above which, the artillery, at times, could scarcely be
heard. The Confederates were drawn up in five lines at this
point, and one line after another was thrown forward on his
PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN.
85
front as fast as the preceding ones recoiled from the mur¬
derous fire of the Pennsylvania Reserves, or at such short
intervals that their overheated muskets had no time to
cool. In this way this division was under steady fire over
three hours, when on the left one of Meade's regiments was
driven in. They soon reformed, however, and resumed
their place in the fight. Reynolds' men were now forced
to retire from the right for want of ammunition, and soon
the whole division was ordered to retire, which they did,
crossing the Chickahominy and destroying the bridge (op¬
posite Trent's Hill) upon which they crossed, and en¬
camped for the night. The next morning the enemy cap¬
tured General Reynolds of this division, they having got
in his rear when he retired to the woods, where he passed
the night. At three p.m. Slocum's division of Frank¬
lin's corps crossed to the left bank of the Chickahominy
to support Porter, and at once moved up to the front line,
where Newton's brigade was placed on the right of the
line and Taylor's New Jersey brigade on Newton's left,
while Bartlett's brigade took position on the extreme left
on the road leading from Gaines' house to Alexander's
Bridge. On arriving at his position Bartlett supported
Sykes' troops, who were nearly overpowered by the over¬
whelming numbers of the enemy, and remained in action
at this point till the battle was over. Newton's brigade
advanced in two columns to the woods in their front,
which were then occupied by the enemy in strong force,
and maintained their position over two hours, under a
galling fire and against greatly superior numbers, until
their ammunition was expended, when they retired to
the rear and forrtled a new line. Taylor's brigade was
also advanced into the woods, the 4th New Jersey being
detached from the brigade and ordered to an advanced
position in the woods, where, being cut off from the rest
of the troops, the greater part of the regiment was cap¬
tured. The rest of the brigade maintained their position,
doing deadly execution, till their ammunition was all
86 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
gone, when they, too, were retired to the rear. Hexamer's
New Jersey battery accompanied and supported Taylor's
brigade, and did good and effective work. Porter's bat¬
tery was assigned to Bartlett's brigade, which it sup¬
ported and remained with during the battle, while Up¬
ton's battery did the same for Newton. Slocum's divi¬
sion in this action lost over 2,000 men.
GARNETT'S FARM.
While Porter was fighting at Gaines' Mill on the 27th
of June, part of Smith's division of Franklin's corps had
quite an engagement at Garnett's, on the Nine Mile road
across the Chickahominy, Hancock's brigade, with six bat¬
teries of the reserve artillery, doing the fighting. About ten
a.m. the Confederate artillery opened fire from the crest
of the hill on Hancock's brigade and his batteries. This
was replied to by Ames' battery, and after an artillery duel
of an hour the enemy's batteries were silenced. After sun¬
down a body of Confederate infantry assaulted Hancock's
brigade. They drove in his pickets and advanced to a little
crest in the field separating them, about forty yards from
his lines, and fired. The brigade responded bravely, and stood
squarely up to their work. This continued till long after
dark, when the enemy were at length repulsed with great
loss. During this action the 6th Vermont came to Han¬
cock's relief and took position so as to take the enemy in the
rear of their left flank, and General Brooks, with the 4th
Vermont, took charge of Hancock's right and rendered
great assistance at this point. At the beginning of the fight
Lieutenant Colonel Buck, in command of the pickets of the
New Jersey brigade on Hancock's left,'threw his reserves
into the rifle pits, where they, with a company of Berdan
Sharpshooters did good execution, driving^back the enemy's
skirmishers who threatened an attack on Hancock's left
flank, while the artillery also did their full share in repulsing
their advance.
This victory was, at this juncture, of the greatest impor-
PEN INS ULAR CA M PA IG N.
87
tance, fro;n the fact that the Confederates had gained a bat¬
tle on the opposite side of the Chickahominy over Porter,
and had they been successful in this assault on Hancock
and enabled to force their way through the Union lines
at this point, they would have separated the two positions
of McClellan's army on either bank of that stream.
PEACH ORCHARD AND SAVAGE STATION.
On June 29, Richardson's and Sedgwick's divisions of the
Second Corps started for Savage Station from Fair Oaks.
On arriving at Allen's farm (Peach Orchard), distant some
two miles, Richardson was directed to form line of battle
facing toward Richmond, his left flank resting on the right
of Sedgwick, both being on the right of the railroad. He
formed line, with French's brigade in front and Caldwell's
brigade in rear (Meagher's brigade had been detached the
day previous, and was at McClellan's headquarters at Savage
Station), and obtained Sumner's permission to use a large
house and some outbuildings in his front as an advance
redoubt, they being occupied by the 53d Pennsylvania,
Hazzard's battery being placed on an elevation a little to
the rear of the 53d and supported by two regiments,
this being considered the key to his position. Hardly had
these arrangements been completed when the enemy ap¬
peared in force, attacking his left and Sedgwick's right with
great fury. The •53d was soon engaged with the enemy,
who made great efforts to dislodge them, but aided by the
battery and a regiment from Sedgwick's right, they re¬
pulsed the Confederates, who soon disappeared in the woods.
Soon afterwards Sumner ordered both divisions to fall back
to Savage Station as fast as possible, which was at once
done, and on their arrival at the hills in the rear of the sta¬
tion were ordered to form in line nearly opposite the road
which had been cut for the purpose of crossing White Oaks
Swamp. This was about four p.m., and here Meagher's
brigade came up and reported for duty. The different corps
had already gained this new position when the enCmy again
88 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
appeared and opened fire on the commands of Franklin and
Sedgwick. Parts of Caldwell's and Meagher's'brigades,
with Hazzard's and Pettit's batteries, were detached from
Richardson and went to their assistance, while French's
brigade prepared to resist an attack in their immediate front
toward which a heavy body of the enemy was reported to
be moving, while the remaining portion of Meagher's and
Caldwell's brigades, Richardson's second and third line, and
one brigade of Smith's division formed on his right. The
enemy, however, did not attack his front, and they were
held in reserve, while in Sedgwick's front the enemy
attacked again in strong force but more impetuously, but
was gallantly resisted and driven back, the engagement
lasting till dark. In the mean time Smith's division of
Franklin's corps, on the 28th, while changing their position
in order to get out of range of the Confederate artillery, who
were firing on them from Gaines' Hill, found themselves
shelled from Garnett Hill, though but little damage was
done, and they had just evacuated their works, when two
Confederate regiments attempted to occupy them, but were
repulsed with great slaughter by his picket line, assisted
by Mott's battery, which threw shrapnel into the enemy's
ranks with terrific effect. At daylight on the 29th, the divi¬
sion formed in line of battle at the Trent house, covering
the retreat of the wagon train and preventing the enem}-
crossing the Chickahominy by the bridges in their front,
and then fell back to the front of Savage Station, where,
finding both his flanks unprotected and the enemy in force
in his front. Smith retired to the back of the station, formed
junction with Sumner, and formed line of battle. Han¬
cock's brigade was thrown into the woods on the right to
hold the railroad. Brooks' brigade was placed in the woods
on the left, while Davidson's brigade (under command of
Colonel Taylor, General Davidson having had a sunstroke)
was held in reserve. Brooks soon engaged the enemy and
fought them till dark, and remained with the brigade,
though wounded, and at ten p. m. the division moved to
White Oak Swamp.
PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN.
89
WHITE OAK SWAMP—G LEND ALE—NEW MARKET.
Slocum's division received orders to move across the
White Oak Swamp, and marched to a point on the Long
Bridge road about one and one-half miles beyond the
swamp, where they relieved Couch's and Peck's divisions
(on the morning of June 30) who were under orders to
proceed to the James River, and then took position on the
Charles City road not far from its junction with the Long
Bridge road and about a mile from Braekett's Ford, and
blockaded the road as much as possible, getting into line of
battle, placing artillery in position with infantry supporting
the flanks of the batteries, and then destroyed the bridge
near Braekett's Ford. About eleven a. m., the enemy drove
in his pickets on the Charles City road and appeared in force
in a Targe field in his front, opening on his line with two
batteries, which were replied to by his artillery, and which
was kept up till nearly dark. Word coming at this time
that the left of the line (Heintzelman's corps) was being
severely pressed, Slocum ordered Bartlett's brigade to
advance to the front and endeavor to gain possession of the
field on which the enemy had appeared in the morning.
They at once encountered the enemy in strong force drawn
up in line a short distance beyond a creek separating the
opposing forces. Upton's battery was at once moved up to
support Bartlett, and, opening on the enemy with canister,
soon caused them to retreat. Taylor's brigade was ordered
to the support of General Kearny, on Slocum's left, with
his left (Robinson's brigade) posted on the New Market
road, and Birney's brigade on the right, with Berry's bri¬
gade in reserve. The enemy began their attack on Kearny
about four o'clock p.m. They charged on his lines re¬
peatedly, but were repulsed principally by the fearful execu¬
tion of Thompson's battery, which mowed them down by-
scores, seemingly, however, without much effeet, as the
gaps were instantly filled and the advance continued till
they were almost up to the muzzles of the battery, when
90
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
the 63d Pennsylvania and 37tli New York coming to
the support of the battery, with determined charge and
repeated volleys drove them back in confusion. Three
times the enemy advanced, each time being repulsed
with great slaughter, till finding they could not break
Kearny's line, they retired a short distance and kept up a
rapid musketry fire on the troops. McCall's division
having been overpowered and having abandoned their posi¬
tion on the left of Kearny, Taylor's brigade took their
place and held it till the battle was over ; while Caldwell's
brigade, after firing one volley, charged on the enemy and
drove them through the open field, capturing a stand of
colors, and, after fighting till théir ammunition was ex¬
hausted, took position on the right of the field and
remained there till withdrawn. On the morning of
June 30, McCall's division (reduced to about 6,000- men
from his losses at Mechanicsville and Gaines' Mill) formed
in position on the New Market road, just in advance of
where a lane turns off to Quaker Church, and it was at this
point that they withstood for a time the combined onslaught
of Hill's and Longstreet's divisions (from 18,000 to 20,000
troops). The Second Brigade was on the right of the road,,
the Third on the left and the First in reserve. The division
was hardly in position before the enemy's artillery attacked
the left of his line. The pickets were driven in upon the
main body, which at short range delivered their fire on the
advancing foe, cutting one of their regiments to pieces. The
position of the 3d Reserves being in the way of the artillery
range, it fell back and was unfortunately fired upon by
some of their own regiments and retired in confusion, re¬
forming only late in the day. The enemy pressed forward,
however, on the left of McCall's line, and though for a
time- it resisted the advance, was at length compelled to
give way before the overwhelming avalanche the enemy
brought to bear at that point. As soon as the Parrott bat¬
tery was subjected to the musketry fire they were with¬
drawn and caused much confusion, which was added to by
PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN
91
the cavalry doing the same. They soon reformed further
in the rear, but not in position to do any further service.
Cooper's men stood by their guns jtill there were so few of
them left that they could not get them from the field and
they were abandoned, while Anderson only retired his bat¬
tery when their ammunition was exhausted. On the right,
Meade's brigade met a severe attack, but the excellent
.firing of Randol's and Thompson's batteries for awhile
kept the Confederates at bay. At last they made a deter¬
mined attack on these batteries, which Meade met, keeping
his men well to the ground till close at hand, then firing,
followed by a bayonet charge—a desperate hand-to-hand
encounter—till by overwhelming force—Meade being
severely wounded—the brigade gave way. Just at this
moment a part of Richardson's division came to their
relief. McCall in trying to reform his troops and make a
new stand, rode forward to where he supposed a portion of
his line was stationed, but it urffortunately happened to be
a Confederate regiment, and he was taken prisoner.
Sedgwick's division of Sumner's corps was in reserve
on the left of McCall's, and when McCall's division gave
way, it brought Burns' brigade directly to the front (Dana's
and Sully's brigades had been sent to help Franklin), and
they at once gave battle to the foe, while Dana and Sully
were recalled and came at the double-quick, and at once
dashed against the enemy. The entire division was now
hotly engaged, and not only did they meet and repulse the
attack of the enemy, but were forced to withstand the de¬
moralizing influence of the panic of the men of the first
line, who, in many instances, broke through their lines in
their haste to move out of reach of the enemy's fire.
Hooker's division took position about nine a. m. on a
crossroad leading to the Williamsburg road near St. Paul's
Church, his right resting on this road and running parallel
with and a mile in advance of the Quaker road, a forest
covering the area between his position and the road, and
his division being on the right of Sumner's corps, and
92
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
McCall on his right and stretching off in an obtuse angle
with the direction of his own division. When McCall's
line gave way, the enemy pursued them until brought to a
halt by the destructive fire poured into them from Hooker's
right wing, which now advanced, and after a hot contest
drove the enemy toward Sumner, who punished them severe¬
ly in passing and threw them over toward Kearny's front,
where the firing was kept up till a late hour of the night.
On June 29 Porter had been ordered to move the whole
of the material of the army to a position on the James
River near Turkey Island. He moved his command at
sundown, and succeeded in reaching his destination about
nine a. 111. of the 30th, and took up a position on Malvern
Hill west of Turkey Bridge, posting his two divisions, thor¬
oughly covering the River road and all the debouches from
the New Market, Charles City and Williamsburg roads.
Warren's brigade of Sykes' division being posted in the
valley of the creek across the river road to prevent the left
flank being turned by an advance from Richmond along
that road. The supply trains of many of the divisions
passed safely through the lines as well as the reserve artil¬
lery, which all reached a place of safety by four p. m.
About this time the enemy appeared in Porter's front,
began feeling the strength of his position, and about five
o'clock showed themselves in force and attempted to turn
his left flank ; under cover of the woods skirting the River
road, the enemy planted their artillery to engage Porter's
main body on Malvern Hill, while his infantry with some
artillery moved direct on Warren's brigade, with whom they
were soon engaged. These demonstrations soon brought
upon them the concentrated fire of Porter's thirty guns and
the infantry fire of Warren's brigade, the destructive effects
of which caused them to immediately retreat. The Con¬
federate force making this assault was under Gen. H. A.
Wise, and numbered 15,000 men, being part of the divi¬
sion of General Holmes. This fight is known as the battle
of Turkey Bridge.
PE N INS U LAR CA M PA IG N.
93
MALVERN HILL.
On the morning of July i McClellan had concen¬
trated his entire army on the right bank of the Chicka-
hominy, with the view of making Harrison's and Hax-
all's Landings, on the James, his base of supplies, as he
could there be aided by the gunboat flotilla under com¬
mand of Commodore Rodgers. This design was success¬
fully carried out, his entire wagon trains reaching Haxall's
in safety, and the army being placed in position to offer battle
to the enemy should they attack him again. The troops
were placed from left to right as follows : On the left,
occupying an admirable position on Malvern Hill, was Por¬
ter's corps ; Sykes' division, with the reserve artillery
being on the crest of the hill, and ten siege guns posted
to control the river road and sweep the left bank, placed
at such elevation as to fire over the heads of Porter's
men and reach the enemy advancing on the Charles
City road, while on his right was Morell, then Couch's
division, Keyes' corps, with the division of the Pennsyl¬
vania Reserves, under General Seymour, in reserve to them ;
then the divisions of Kearny and Hooker, of Heintzelman's
corps ; then Sedgwick and Richardson (Sumner's corps) ;
then Smith and Slocum (Franklin's corps) ; while on the
extreme right was Peck's division of Keyes' corps, with
their right resting nearly on the James, and on the James
itself the flotilla of Rodgers. Though an extensive line for
such a force, McClellan felt that he must there meet the
enemy and fight him regardless of the cost of life. His posi¬
tion on Malvern Hill was naturally a strong one, and the
right of the line was strengthened by felling trees and
blocking the roads. This done McClellan awaited the at¬
tack which he foresaw was imminent.
Magruder's corps, about one p.m., appeared in Porter's
front and opened up along his whole line with artillery and a
strong skirmish line ; this continued till about four o'clock,
inflicting, however, but small loss on Porter's troops, when
94
THE ARMY UF THE POTOMAC.
the firing stopped and the skirmishers withdrew to their
main body. About 5:30 p.m. Magruder made a deter¬
mined attack on the right of Morell's and left of Couch's
divisions, while a portion of the Confederate troops stealth¬
ily made their way along the valley, concealed by a growth
of bushes and a mist prevailing at the time, to attack Mo¬
rell's left and rear. Martindale's and Butterfield's brigades
were at once placed in position to meet them, and after a
sharp engagement, in which the enemy were three times re¬
pulsed, at last succeeded in driving them away from his left
and rear, and they did not again renew the attack in that
quarter. At the same time they attacked his rear Magru¬
der's troops also made a powerful attack on Morell's left
front. They advanced in great force from the woods, and
notwithstanding the destructive fire from the batteries on
the crest of the hill moved steadily forward till they arrived
near the batteries, when the supporting regiments (the 4th
Michigan, 9th Massachusetts and bad Pennsylvania) gal¬
lantly sprang forward and repulsed them. The enemy, how¬
ever, being constantly reënforced by fresh troops, who ex¬
tended their lines right and left, these supports were com¬
pelled to fall back to their first position, which they held
till they were out of ammunition, when they were relieved
by Butterfield's brigade, supported by Martindale's brigade,
who continued the fight against treble their numbers, until
they in turn were relieved by part of Sykes' division and
Meagher's brigade, which latter was led into the fight by its
own commander and General Porter. The Confederates,
constantly reënforced, advanced to the attack on Morell's
front time and again, each attack being repulsed, and fought
with great obstinacy and determination, continuing the
struggle till after dark, when, exhausted, they sullenly re¬
tired, leaving the field in his front in Morell's possession.
Couch's division was posted on the right of the James
River road, looking westward, with Kingsbury's battery on
his left front, Porter's corps being on his left on the oppo¬
site side of the road. Palmer's brigade was in a wooded
GEN. DARIUS N. COUCH.
PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN.
95
ravine on the right of the battery, while one regiment of
Howe's brigade was in a peach orchard to the rear, between
the battery and Palmer. On Palmer's right was a sloping
oat field bordered on the right by a tangled marsh and
wooded bank. The balance of Howe's brigade held this
position with part of Abercrombie's brigade and was the
right of Couch's line, connecting with the left of Kearny's
division. About three p.fti. a Confederate brigade broke
through the woods in front of Palmer and Abercrombie
(making a feint attack to draw these troops to a disadvan¬
tageous position) but Kingsbury's battery and the steady
firing of the infantry, together with a charge by the loth
Massachusetts (in which they captured the colors of the 14th
North Carolina), drove them back in confusion, rendering
their attempt unsuccessful. The Confederates now massed
heavy columns of troops in Couch's front, and kept up an
incessant cannonading on his lines, which continued till
about 4:30, when they pushed forward a large column from
their right to assail Griffin's (of Mbrell's division) position.
The fire of three batteries was concentrated on them, but
they kept on, constantly reënforced, until they came within
the range of Griffin's muskets, when they stopped and
formed line.
The battle now becoming general. Couch assumed com¬
mand of the whole front line for a time, ordered up the re¬
serves on the left, placed in position regiments falling back,
and halted those bravely moving forward, as many of them
had already masked the fire of his batteries. On seeing the
Confederate advance on the left, both Abercrombie and Pal¬
mer pushed forward their brigades in front of the artillery
in order to drive back the foe. The enemy constantly reën¬
forced their column of attack and advanced heavy reserves
in support. Palmer and Abercrombie became engaged on
their right and left. Caldwell's brigade having been sent
by Sumner to help Couch, joined his division and became
fiercely engaged. Heintzelman sent Seeley' s battery, which
was posted with Howe's brigade, and it, too, went into the
96 TITE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
fight doing its whole duty. Shortly after six o'clock Hpoker
came up with three regiments and led them into the action,
relieving some of Couch's troops who had exhausted their
ammunition, while about seven o'clock up came the gallant
Irish Brigade, under Meagher, advancing with rapid step
and displaying their colors, marked by an alacrity and en¬
thusiasm which found expression in frequent cheers, and
had the effect of rallying several fragments of regiments
that had, after bravely sustaining themselves under an over¬
powering fire, been forced to retire from the fçont. As they
came under fire they were met by General Butterfield, who,
grasping the distinctive green flag of the leading regiment
of the brigade, exhibited the ardor of a leader personally
interested in its honor, thereby reëxciting and renewing the
spirit of the advance. The two leading regiments (the 69th
and 88th New York) on coming into contact with the foe
poured into them such an oblique incessant and murderous
discharge that it had the effect of silencing for some moments
a fire that seemed overwhelming, retaining the position they
had taken till the enemy retired. The second line of the
brigade also maintained their position, though under a
heavy fire from the enemy, which they were not in a posi¬
tion to either return or resist, while the 63d New York was
sent to support a battery, relieving another on the line
which had exhausted its ammunition.
Sickles' also reported to Couch, and proceeded to
relieve with two of his regiments two regiments posted
in an open field in front of a belt of woods, behind which a
battery was posted, and they were at once engaged with the
enemy, while another was posted about 100 yards to the rear
and left of the road in advance of another battery and far
enough to its left to unmask it ; the fourth regiment sup¬
ported another battery on the right, while his last regiment
relieved the U. S. Chasseurs, and the whole brigade thus
placed gallantly fought the enemy till the close of the battle.
The brigade remained in these positions during the fight, a
detachment being engaged in supplying Couch's troops
with fresh ammunition.
PE N INS UL AR CA M PA IG N.
97
Caldwell's brigade (of Richardson's division) also came
to the support of Conch between five and six p.m., the 5th
New Hampshire supporting a battery on the right and the
other three regiments engaging the enemy on the extreme
right of Conch's division, under the immediate command
of Colonel Barlow, fighting steadily and pouring a most
destructive fire on the enemy until their ammunition gave
out, and then held their position without flinching, receiv¬
ing the enemy's fire though unable to return it.
A portion of Birney's brigade (the 4th Maine and four
companies of 3d Maine) held the wooded ravine in front of
Kearny's division, and when Couch's right flank was in
danger of being driven back by a furious onslaught of the
enemy, gallantly came to the rescue and aided him in driv¬
ing them back.
The positions occupied by the divisions of Sedgwick,
Hooker, Richardson (his brigades sent to Couch's assistance
have already been mentioned). Peck, Slocum (with excep¬
tion of Caldwell's brigade already mentioned). Smith and
the Pennsylvania Reserves, were not assailed by the infantry
of the enemy, although at times the artillery fired at them,
doing little damage. The flotilla also poured a deadly fire
of shells into the enemy's reserves and advancing columns.
During the day the heavy artillery on the line of Sykes'
division, ranging far up the valley toward the enemy,
assisted greatly in holding them at bay, and toward night
Buchanan's and Lovell's brigades marched on to the field.
These brigades were posted to cover the left of the line, and
were not discovered by the enemy, who were advancing
for a last attack on the Union lines, until their left
flank was completely exposed, when they poured into
them a well-directed and effective fire, which so completely
shattered their lines that they were thrown into con¬
fusion and retreated precipitately and in disorder. This
ended the battle, leaving the Union troops in possession of
the field, the Confederate forces not again attacking Mc-
Clellan in force while he remained on the Peninsula.
VII
98 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Between the 25th of June and the 2d of July the Union
losses were, in killed, wounded and missing, 15,849, while
the Confederate losses were 16,872.
From this time forward to the 24th of August, Mc-
Clellan's army was engaged in reorganizing, recuperating
and being forwarded to Alexandria and Aquia Creek, Mc-
Clellan himself arriving in, and taking charge of the forces
around, Alexandria on the evening of August 26, where
we will leave him for the present.
CHAPTER IV.
FROM THE FIRST TO THE SECOND BULL RUN.
OUR defeat at the" first battle of Bull Run was the
signal for the retreat of our armies to the front of
Washington, and the news spread over the North and filled
it with consternation. This result, so unexpected, shat¬
tered the hopes of many who were watching the battle with
great anxiety, while it suddenly awoke the Government to
the pressing needs of the hour. One of the first of these
was the selection of a new commander, on whose ability
and courage the country could rely, to relieve the National
Capital of its new dangers. It was well understood that if
the Confederates captured the city, though they held it no
longer than the British in 1814, the effect on the loyal
States might be disastrous ; and in addition, it might
furnish the coveted opportunity to certain European
powers to interfere in the Union cause at the outset, or to
recognize the Confederacy.
General Scott seemed favorable to McClellan ; and
Schuyler Hamilton, Scott's military secretary, who had to
go to the White House probably two or three times during
the night, concurred in Scott's opinion. McClellan was
accordingly called to Washington by telegraph a few days
after to assume command of the defeated army which
required a man at its head who had confidence in himself,
and was able to imbue the men who were to serve under
him with his own spirit.
At that time Washington had but one railroad connect¬
ing with the North, viz, the Baltimore and Ohio ; while
Baltimore had three, viz, the Baltimore and Ohio ; the
Northern Central ; and the Philadelphia, Wilmington and
99
100
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Baltimore. New regiments, however, came pouring into
the city and neighborhood for "three years or during the
war;" and the work at once began of organizing that
grand army into brigades and divisions. The locations of
these troops as they arrived cannot be given with any cer¬
tainty, and even if they could it would be of little value to
history, as their positions were so rapidly changed. But
some of the regiments became a part of the history of the
places where they were stationed. Pleasonton's head¬
quarters were at the Park Hotel, on yth Street, just north
of the city ; there also the famous cavalry general prepared
his command for future service.
The 2d, 6th and yth Wisconsin and the 19th Indiana, lay
on Kalorama Heights, then a quiet place north of Washing¬
ton. The heights occupy a bend in Rock Creek, on the
east side of the stream, and are deeply fringed with a forest
of oaks, presenting a beautiful picture to the visitor.
There these regiments were formed into a brigade, and
Genl. Rufus King, of Wisconsin, was placed in command
as brigadier general. This was afterwards known as the
"Iron Brigade," and served in the First Corps until
that corps was abolished by Meade.
General Augur's brigade lay at Upton's Hill, Virginia,
nearly four miles from Washington, and in the vicinity of
Munson's Hill and Bailey's Cross Roads. McClellan had
a review of the troops where the pretty village of Mount
Pleasant now stands. It is to Washington what Glendale
is to Cincinnati.
Of the number of generals present there were McClellan,
McDowell, Marcy, King, and probably "Baldy" Smith;
this was the first time the soldiers had the privilege of
seeing a general, and they were much interested in the
review, although it was a rainy, miserable day. Then
came the drill—squad, company, regimental, brigade and
division.
In the mean time a circle of fortifications had to be
built around Washington for its safety. There were only
FROM FIRST TO SECOND BULL RUN 101
two before the war, and these were at the south end of the
Long Bridge, which leads into Virginia, but neither was
manned.
Necessarily the army was kept busy and, when not em¬
ployed at drill, men were put to work on the forts which
pressed for completion. King's brigade was marched
across the Chain Bridge into Virginia and was first under
General Hancock. Here an exciting event occurred. A
soldier named Scott, of the 3d Vermont, fell asleep on his
picket post, which was supposed to be near the enemy.
His commanding officer preferred charges against him ; he
was court-martialed and sentenced to be shot. He was
confined in a little, old log house, perhaps a smoke house,
only a few rods from where the 19th Indiana lay. He
was a short, thick-set boy, of somewhat stolid disposi¬
tion, though an honest, noble youth. Being new to the
service, it was very exciting to see a soldier bound hand
and foot while preparations were being made for his
execution. Finally the hour came to remove him to the
place where he was to be shot. Lieut. D. B. Castle, Co.
B, 19th Indiana, had charge of the guard. Young Scott
was taken out, seated upon his coffin, with his hands clasp¬
ing a Testament. Three sides of a hollow square were
formed. The charge and findings of the court-martial, as
well as the order for his execution, were read. The guns
were handed to the guard, half of them being loaded, so
that no one knew whether he was to fire a blank cartridge
or a ball. The order was given to ' ' shoulder arms, ' ' and
in less than a minute more he would have been in eternity.
In the mean time a devoted sister had come from Ver¬
mont to plead with the President for her brother's life.
President Lincoln was not the man to turn a deaf ear to
the maiden's prayer. He listened favorably and signed a
reprieve, which was given to a courier mounted on a fleet
horse. When the order was given to the guard " shoulder
arms!" the head of the courier's horse could just be seen
coming up the hill. He was forcing the animal to its
102
THE ARMY OF THE 'POTOMAC.
utmost speed, and it seemed as if he came like a bird
through the air. Thousands of soldiers were standing look¬
ing on in breathless silence. The officers seeing the
courier coming so rapidly delayed the execution until his
arrival ; he came into the square on a "dead run," and
stopped his horse in a manner that might have led to a
tragedy. Taking from beneath his belt a large envelope,
he handed it to an officer, when the President's pardon was
read. The prisoner was instantly released, and many, in¬
cluding the officers, very cordially shook hands with him,
and not a few shed tears of joy. He was granted a leave
of absence, and returned home with his loving and de¬
lighted sister to Vermont.
This event created quite a sensation throughout the
country. Scott promised Lincoln that he would be a good
soldier, and he was the first in the works at Williamsburg,
where he gave up his life that the nation might live.
Gen. George J. Stannard, then lieutenant colonel of the
regiment, frequently told me that Scott ought not to have
been court-martialed, and that the colonel was not justified
in preferring charges against him.
The next incident of any moment was a reconnois-
sance toward Lewinsville by Lieutenant Colonel Stannard.
McClellan directed him to reconnoiter the enemy's posi¬
tion and report to him. The enemy met us with five bat¬
teries, and for new troops, unaccustomed to war, it was
an important event. In fact, the firing became so heavy
that several regiments were sent out, the 19th Indiana
being among the number, this being the first time that
regiment was under fire. McClellan came from Wash¬
ington, fearing that it would result in a general engage¬
ment, as Longstreet was in command of the Confederate
forces.
King's brigade was then moved lower down the Poto¬
mac, and built and garrisoned Fort Baker, named in honor
of Colonel Baker, a Senator from California. Colonel Baker
exhibited true patriotism. While others went to the bat-
FROM FIRST TO SECOND BULL RUN.
103
tlefield to fight their way to the Senate, he left the Senate
to assist in saving his country.
McDowell soon moved his headquarters to Arlington,
and King's brigade recrossed the Potomac at the Chain
Bridge, and marched to that place, where he made his
quarters for the winter, and created the famous cemetery
on part of the Dee estate by the interment of the soldiers
of that brigade, several of whom died there. The first sol¬
dier buried at Arlington was laid to rest on the bank of the
ravine, opposite where George Washington Parke Custis
and his wife were buried.
The next important service was preparing the field for
]\IcClellan's grand review near Bailey's Cross Roads. That
was done by King's brigade, under the immediate super¬
vision of McDowell.
An amusing though somewhat startling incident oc¬
curred on the afternoon before the review. The brigade
had been marching from Arlington for several days. The
soldiers complained of the weight of the cartridge boxes ;
therefore tacit permission was given them to remove the
cartridges. McDowell had the brigade marched in review
before him, in order that he might ascertain, as he alleged,
whether the field was adapted for the review of 120,000
troops the next day.
After the brigade had performed that service, and
" stacked arms," the enemy's artillery attacked the picket
line, perhaps a mile and a half away. General McDowell
ordered General King to take his brigade to the assistance
of the picket line at the front. Then came the ' ' tug of
war." There was no dodging the fact that the brigade
was without ammunition. General McDowell gave the
order to General King in the presence of the troops.
General King turned to the colonels and repeated the
order. Lieut. Col. Lucius Fairchild — afterwards com¬
mander-in-chief of the G. A. R. — studied a moment, then
replied to General King, " I am informed that the 2d Wis¬
consin is without ammunition. ' ' Immediately the colonels
104 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
of the 6th and 7th Wisconsin, and the 19th Indiana, made a
similar report. General King appeared displeased, though
I believe he knew it, but could not, of course, at the time
confess it.
General McDowell was in a great rage, and ordered the
brigade to quarters with a sharp rebuke, and sent a stafl
officer post haste for Augur's brigade, which came forward
at a double quick. We passed them not far from the cross¬
roads. They were simply swearing mad at us, and did not
hesitate to express themselves as they passed.
General Johnston had serious intentions of interfering
with the review, but upon the approach of Augur's brigade
his force retired, and quiet was restored along the lines.
McClellan had taken command of the Army of the Poto¬
mac shortly after the disaster of Bull Run ; the country
had been waiting with bated breath to hear of a forward
movement, hoping that a crushing defeat of the enemy
would be the result, but that feverish hope was destined to
receive a terrible chill.
McClellan wanted to learn the strength of the enemy at
Leesburg, and accordingly, on the 19th of October General
McCall, who commanded the Pennsylvania Reserves, was
ordered to make a reconnoissance on Dranesville, to assist in
shielding the move on Leesburg. In the afternoon Gor¬
man's brigade was sent to Edwards' Ferry to make a dis¬
play of his force there, while Colonel Devens, with the 15th
Massachusetts, was sent to Harrison's Landing on the Poto¬
mac. He sent out a scouting party which reported a small
encampment near Leesburg. Colonel Devens was ordered
to take five companies, cross the river, advance under cover
of the night, surprise the enemy at daybreak, and destroy
their camp. When he arrived he was unable to find the
camp as reported. He therefore concealed his men in the
woods, as he knew the enemy was near. About eight
o'clock in the morning the enemy discovered his position,
and he retired in the direction of Balls Bluff, but again
advanced in the direction of Leesburg.
FROM FIRST TO SECOND BULL RUN. 105
Colonel Evans, who was in command of the Confed¬
erates, was a skillful military officer ; it was he who bore
the brunt of Hunter's advance at Bull Run. He pre¬
sumed, in all probability, that Colonel Devens had no
means by which to recross the Potomac, and that he was in
a trap unless well supported. He accordingly advanced
with four regiments—one thrown forward to feel the way.
In the mean time General Stone, whose headquarters
were at Poolesville, Maryland, had directed Colonel Baker
to assume command there. Baker, knowing that Gorman
was at Edwards' Ferry, decided to risk an attack, but as
there was no concert of action on the part of the Federal
forces, he received no assistance, and the result was a ter¬
rible disaster to our troops. Baker fell mortally wounded,
which greatly disheartened his men, who retreated down
the bluff, only to be followed by the enemy, where no re¬
sistance could be offered. By this time the four Confed¬
erate regiments were lined along the bluff, pouring a
well-aimed and deadly fire into the remnant of Colonel
Baker's troops, who rushed into the few imperfect boats,
which were filled but to sink and drown the occupants.
Some attempted to swim the river, but at that point the
current was so swift that many met a watery grave. The
few who succeeded in reaching the Maryland shore of the
Potomac presented a sad sight indeed. ' ' It was perfectly
sickening, ' ' said a soldier to me, ' ' to see our men suffer
from the fire of the enemy on the other shore. ' '
The news was received in Washington with mortifica¬
tion and chagrin and the excitement over the disaster was
at fever heat.
Senator Sumner was seriously opposed to Gen. Charles
P. Stone, and perhaps his influence greatly determined the
Government to imprison him in Fort La Fayette, as ac¬
countable for this disaster, as General McClellan kept silent
on the subject. The battle at Balls Bluff was a heavy blow
to the Union cause. It was not a defeat but a disaster.
The eyes of the country were now fixed on the Anny of
106
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
the Potomac. Time wore away, but no forward movement
was made. Finally McClellan was taken sick, which had a
depressing effect upon the troops and upon the country
•financially. Lincoln became so distressed that he went to
McClellan's house to see him, but the general wàs too un¬
well to be seen, therefore the President was denied an in¬
terview. Alarmed at the condition matters were in the
President sent notes to Generals McDowell and Franklin,
asking them if they could safely leave their commands to
come to the White House that evening at eight o'clock.
Seward, Chase, and the Assistant Secretary of War were
there, beside Generals McDowell and Franklin. It was
evident, from what McDowell told me, that the President
was greatly troubled over the situation of affairs ; but the
simple fact that he called McDowell and Franklin to the
White House for consultation was abundant evidence that
he was seriously alarmed.
General McDowell said he advised advancing again in
the direction of Bull Run. He also recommended that the
army be divided into four corps. He had four divisions at
Bull Run, and suggested that the right should rest near
Vienna, the center at Fairfax Court House, the left at
Fairfax Station. It was McDowell's opinion that that was
the route to follow. He said Franklin favored approach¬
ing Richmond by the way of the Peninsula. As no decision
had been reached, the President arranged that the consul¬
tation should be renewed the following evening. The next
morning McDowell and Franklin called upon Secretary
Chase, Colonel Kingsbury, Chief of Ordnance of the Army
of the Potomac, General Van Vliet, Chief Quartermaster,
and Major Shiras, Commissary of Subsistence, for informa¬
tion to be laid before the Executive.
It occurred to General Franklin that they, McDowell
and himself, ought to report to McClellan the nature of the
work in which they were engaged. To that McDowell dis¬
sented and urged that they were obeying the orders of the
President, the Commander-in-Chief. Finally they agreed
GEN. S. VAN VLIET.
FROM FIRST TO SECOND BULL RUN.
107
to obtain, the views of Secretary Chase, which was done,
and they received a decision, which accorded with Mc¬
Dowell's, "that as they were ordered by the President to
do that work, there was no necessity for reporting to
McClellan."
In the evening Postmaster General Blair came in. He
was decidedly opposed to the " McDowell forward move¬
ment," and intimated that it would be "Bull Run" over
àgain. He advocated making the York River or Fortress
Monroe the base of operation. His favorite idea was for
our army to move to Suffolk. That would cut off Norfolk,
and endanger the enemy's southern communication.
Secretaries Chase and Seward favored McDowell's plan.
They were of the opinion that a victory at one place was as
valuable as at another, and that it would take considerable
time to reach Suffolk. General Meigs thought it would
take from four to six weeks to get the transportation ready.
As yet there was nothing definite decided upon. Each line
had strong and earnest advocates. It was evident from
McDowell's statements that Lincoln reserved his judgment.
In a day or two McClellan was well enough to again as¬
sume command, and on the 13th of January there was an¬
other consultation at the White House, which was attended
by General McClellan. It was then that he became aware
of all that had transpired, which was a strong intimation
that he must make a forward movement soon. At last,
March 10, 1862, the day fixed for McClellan to advance,
dawned upon the world ; and early that morning the
columns were ready to move. Nothing unusual occurred
until we "arrived at Fairfax Court House. There McClellan
with several generals held a short consultation as they sat
mounted. It was a novel spectacle to see a consultation of
war held on horseback, and it inspired the troops with fresh
hopes that the war would soon be over.
After a short halt that magnificent army again took up
its line of march with quickened step ; the men expecting
to meet the enemy and crush him in a single battle on the
IOS THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
following morning. Such was the faith which. snstained
their courage.
The troops commenced going into camp shortly after
leaving the historic village of Fairfax Court House, which
was nothing in comparison with the large and wealth}-
cities of the North, as there were so few houses around
it. There is where Ford Fairfax lived and George Wash¬
ington transacted business, events which gave it its historic
interest, even antedating the Revolution.
It was soon learned that the enemy had evacuated his
position and retreated behind the Rappahannock, and the
long-expected battle was deferred.
Great disappointment, ensued, as the larger part of the
army had sacrificed comfortable homes, and left lucrative
business to go to ruin for the sake of defending the Union.
After an absence of five days McClellan marched his
force back in the direction of Washington. What this act
meant was shrouded in mystery.
Soon a heavy rain began, one of the worst which vete¬
rans ever experienced in the service, and continued all that
day and well into the night. The next day, Sunday, found
the whole army hovering around Alexandria. Then word
came that McClellan would advance by way of the Penin¬
sula, to save his troops from marching, for which considera¬
tion he received great credit ; but in less than a week the
men would not have complained of any route to Richmond.
The excitement of sailing down the Potomac and on
the Chesapeake was thrilling beyond degree. The ground
where the British armies were defeated in the Revolution
was to be the scene of another conflict between two great
armies. But Washington was to be protected, and McDow¬
ell's command, the First Corps, was designated to remain.
On the i2th of March, 1862, the President relieved McClel¬
lan as commander-in-chief, and assigned him to the com¬
mand of the Army of the Potomac. The next day, the
13th, the First Corps was officially designated, and McDow¬
ell assigned to the command of it. It was composed of
FROM FIRST TO SECOND BULL RUN. 10?
three divisions, Franklin's, McCall's and King's, and he
was ordered to report direct to the War Department. As
McClellan had decided to take the Peninsular route, he
could not protect Washington, so McDowell was given
an independent command for that purpose to be directly
under the orders of the Secretary of War. The first natu¬
ral military line being the Rappahannock, McDowell was
directed to proceed to Fredericksburg, make his headquar¬
ters there, and picket the river to prevent a flank move¬
ment by General Anderson's force in his front, which was
also acting as a corps of observation to prevent McDowell
from uniting with McClellan's right and closing in on the
city of Richmond. Occasionally a force would be sent out
to feel of the enemy and ascertain its whereabouts ; yet
there was nothing of great importance the corps did until
it was ordered to join Pope at Cedar Mountain ; then began
its great work on the battlefield, lasting until the surren¬
der of the Confederate army at Appomattox. It was a diffi¬
cult matter to keep so constant and vigilant a watch day
and night of so extended a front. Its position on the Rappa¬
hannock was highly necessary to protect Washington, which
the Confederates were eager to take, for two reasons : first,
it would give them possession of the great military stores, of
which they were so much in need, and dishearten the peo¬
ple of the Northern States who were loyal to the Union ;
likewise it would have been a plausible excuse for foreign
recognition of the Southern Confederacy, which, as yet, was
not acknowledged as a nation, only an attempted revo¬
lution to form one. Then, again, but for the First Corps
holding the Rappahannock, McClellan could not have
made the Peninsular campaign. It was a sore disappoint¬
ment to the First Corps not to be allowed to accompany
McClellan, but McDowell started for Fredericksburg, to
hold the line of the Rappahannock.
McDowell was said to be able to "safely cover Wash¬
ington from Fredericksburg." He could cover Washing¬
ton from that position and aid McClellan, if an opportunity
110 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
was presented, which was seriously contemplated, and
greatly feared by the enemy ; in order to prevent such sup¬
port by McDowell, Jackson made a raid into the valley,
slashing everything before him, as if he was in earnest
in trying to capture Washington.
McDowell really advanced as far as Bowling Green,
only twenty-seven miles from McClellan's right, under
Porter. Lincoln fully intended to assist McClellan with
McDowell's command, having due regard to the safety of
Washington ; he gave him Franklin's division, which was
a magnificent body of men, composed of four brigades.
Slocum commanded the 5th Maine, i6th and 27th New
York and the 96th Pennsylvania. The personnel of the
brigade was excellent, exhibiting conspicuous gallantry
which, perhaps, increased the fame of its commander.
Phil. Kearny commanded the First New Jersey Brigade,
composed of the ist, 2d, 3d and 4th New Jersey Regiments,
which imbibed at once their commander's military spirit, as
all through the war that brigade marched only to the sound
of battle, seeking the hottest parts of the contest, until
their decimated ranks were relieved by the close of the
action. The State should present a medal to the survivors
of the brigade, stamped with the impress of the hero of
Cherubusco and Chantilly.
General Newton commanded the i8th, 31st, and 32d
New York, and the 95th Pennsylvania Regiments. These
were made up of the best citizens of the Empire and
Keystone States. If Slocum and Kearny were ever in
a fight, Newton and his brigade could be depended upon to
arrive and contest for the first fire.
The President again robbed the corps to aid McClellan
when Fredericksburg had been reached. This time the
Pennsylvania Reserves were withdrawn, but they were wel¬
comed back again shortly after the Seven Days' fight, under
the command of that model soldier. Gen. John F. Reynolds,
who soon prepared to take an important part in the second
battle of Bull Run.
FROM FIRST TO SECOND BULL RUN. Ill
In addition to the President taking two divisions of the
First Corps to send to McClellan on the Peninsula, the
following letters breathe the spirit of true friendship on the
part of the great man who sat in the White House during
that trjdng and perilous period. If McClellan had enemies,
or those who were opposed to him, Lincoln was not one of
them. The simplicity of his noble character is fully por¬
trayed in these letters :—
Washington, D. C., May 23, 1862.
I left General McDowell's camp at dark last evening. Shields'
command is there, but is so worn that he cannot move before Mon¬
day morning, the 26th. We have so thinned our line to get troops
for other places that it was broken yesterday at Front Royal, with a
probable loss to us of one regiment of infantry, two companies of
cavalry, and putting General Banks in some peril.
The enemy's forces, under General Anderson, now opposing
General McDowell's advance, have as their line of supply and re¬
treat the road to Richmond.
If in conjunction with McDowell's movement against Ander¬
son you could send a force from your right to cut off the enemy's
supplies from Richmond, preserve the railroad bridge across the two
banks of the Pamunkey, and intercept the enemy's retreat, you will
prevent the army now opposed to you from receiving accession of
numbers of nearly 15,000 men, and if you succeed in saving the
bridges you will secure a line of railroad for supplies in addition to
the one you now have. Can you not do this almost as well as not
while you are building the Chickahominy bridges ?
McDowell and Shields both say they can and positively will
move Monday morning. I wish you to move continuously and
safely. You will have command of McDowell after he joins you,
precisely as you indicated in your long dispatches to us on the 21st.
A. Lincoln,
Maj. Gen. Geo. B. McClellan. President.
Washington, D. C., May 24—6:24 p. m.
In consequence of General Banks' critical copdition, I have
been compelled to suspend General McDowell's movements- to join
you._ The enemy is making a desperate push upon Harper's Ferry,
and we are trying to throw General Frémont's force and part of
General McDowell's on their rear.
A. Lincoln,
Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan. President.
112
IHK ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Again, he more fully telegraphed McClellan :
Washington, D. C., May 25, 1862,
Your dispatch received. General Banks was at Strasburg with
about 6,000 men. Shields having been taken from him to swell a
column for McDowell to aid you at Richmond, and the rest of his
force scattered at various places. On the 23d a rebel force of
7,000 to 10,000 fell upon one regiment and two companies guarding
the bridge at Front Royal, destroying it entirely, crossed the Shen¬
andoah, and on the 24th (yesterday) pushed on to get north of Banks,
on the road to Winchester. -General Banks ran a race with them,
beating them into Winchester yesterday evening. This morning a
battle ensued between the two forces, in which General Banks was
beaten back into full retreat toward Martin.sburg, and probably is
broken up into a total rout.
Geary, on the Manassas Gap Railroad, just now reports that
Jackson is near Front Royal, with 10,000 troops, following up and
supporting, as I understand, the force now pursuing Banks, also
that another force of 10,000 is near Orleans, following on in the same
direction. Stripped bare as we are here, we will do all we can to
prevent their crossing the Potomac at Harper's Ferry or above.
McDowell has about 20,000 of his forces marching back to the
vicinit}' of Front Royal, and Frémont, who was at Franklin, is mov¬
ing to Harrisonburg, both these movements intended to get in the
enemy's- rear. One more of McDowell's brigades is ordered through
here to Harper's Ferry, the rest of his force remains for the present
at Fredericksburg.
We are sending such regiments and batteries from here and
Baltimore as we can spare to Harper's Ferry to supply their places
in some sort by calling in militia from the adjacent States. We
have also eighteen cannon on the road to Harper's Ferry, "of which
there is not a single one at that point. This is now our situation.
If INIcDowell's force was now beyond our reach, we should be entirely
helpless. Apprehensive of something like this, and no unwilling¬
ness to sustain you, have always been my reasons for withholding
McDowell's force from you.
Please understand this, and dö the best you can with the forces
you have.
A. Lincoln,
Major General McClellan. President.
How kindly he talks to McClellan, even gave Shields to
McDowell, to swell his command to assist him before Rich¬
mond.
GEN. W. S. ROSECRANS.
FROM FIRST TO SECOND BULL RUN. IIS
Blenker's division had been withdrawn from McClellan,
and ordered to Fremont.
General Rosecrans was ordered to Washington, and he
was directed by the Secretary of War to take Blenker's
division to its destination, and while he was there to see
General Banks, and make such suggestions as he deemed of
advantage to the service.
After looking over the situation of the different com¬
mands, it occurred to General Rosecrans that if they were
all united in one, including McDowell's, it would make an
army of about 85,000. It could then in a short time sweep
down to Gordonsville, where it could unite with McClellan's
right, and blockade the entrance to the Shenandoah Valley,
which would then be in their rear. General Rosecrans
called upon General Banks and told him of the idea. He
at once agreed with Rosecrans, and hoped it would be done,
and added, ' ' It makes no difference to me who commands. ' '
General Rosecrans sent the plan to Secretary Stanton,
who replied, " It is now too late to adopt it ; " which answer
admitted the excellence of the proposed military movement.
As McDowell advanced on Fredericksburg he attempted
to surprise the enemy—perhaps for various reasons—to save
the bridge over the Rappahannock, and capture their stores
before the dawn of day. The Harris Light and the 3d
Indiana Cavalry were followed closely by the 14th Brooklyn
Infantry, and Battery B, of the 4th U. S. Artillery. A
cavalryman stated that the 14th Brooklyn Infantry kept
well up with the cavalry, which was marching splendidly.
The night advance was anticipated, and a barricade was
made across the road, some two miles northeast of Fal¬
mouth, which is a little town almost opposite Fredericks¬
burg on the east of the river. The cavalry charged,
and were thrown into confusion for a moment, when they
struck the obstruction. The enemy were in the woods close
by, and poured in a well-directed fire upon the cavalry in
the road, but were compelled to beat a hasty retreat in the
direction of Falmouth.
VIII
114
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
They had prepared the bridges for destruction, and when
the Union forces arrived, early in the morning, it was only
to find that the wagon bridge leading over from Falmouth,
the railroad bridge, and several steamboats in the river, were
all burning at the same time. But McDowell's advance
was not materially checked, as pontoon bridges were put
down, over which a whole army could cross. The corps
remained there for some time. The railroad bridge was
rebuilt, and the railroad to Brooks' station, at Aquia Creek,
on the Potomac, was repaired and put in running order.
While at Fredericksburg, on the Fourth of July, an
amusing incident occurred in the 2d Wisconsin. The boys
had resolved to have some fun. They organized a plan to
capture the officers' coats, which were to be donned by a
full set of new ones for the occasion. It was not long until
they appeared in regular uniforms. Then the regular officers
were all arrested and compelled to do police duty. They
all submitted gracefully except one. The quartermaster
took umbrage at it, and refused to be arrested. Lucius
Fairchild was the lieutenant colonel. He took it quite good
naturedly, and worked well. Gen. Rufus King was greatly
taken with the joke, and said that if he had known it
he would have permitted them to capture his coat, sword
and sash, and permitted them to arrest him ; but he would
not take off his coat on purpose.
The only time General Bragg (then major of the 6th
Wisconsin) went to church was one Sunday while in Fred¬
ericksburg ; he was accompanied by Captain Marsh. The
usher invited them into the gallery ; Bragg looked up and
saw none but colored people there. Said he to the usher ;
"The gallery is for 'niggers,' ain't it?" The usher
answered in the affirmative. "Well," said Bragg, "show
me the minister's pew." That frightened the usher, so that
he at once conveyed them to the dominie's reserved seats,
and the two officers sat there and listened to the service
and greatly enjoyed it, as the guests of the pastor.
New combinations were forming, and the corps ex-
FROM FIRST TO SECOND BULL RUN. 115
pected hot work. There had been so many disasters in
front of Washington and on the Shenandoah, that the Pres¬
ident resolved to bring a general from the West, who had
been very successful every time he met the enemy, and
place him in command. He was a personal friend of the
President, and had accompanied him to Washington when
he came to be inaugurated. So General Pope was given a
command, with powers similar to those suggested by Gen¬
eral Rosecrans, though Fremont's command was not in¬
cluded.
Pope saw that Gordonsville was a great military key to
the Confederates, and he at once advanced in that direction,
with Banks, followed closely by Ricketts' division of the
First Corps. King's division, at Fredericksburg, was ordered
to join the main body at Culpeper. McDowell's head¬
quarters were at Fredericksburg, and he rode with the
division on the forced march.
Before reaching his destination, however. Banks had
marched some distance beyond Culpeper, where he was
met by Jackson, who was aware that General Hatch had
been ordered to Gordonsville to tear up the railroad track.
Jackson had advanced in the direction of Culpeper to
checkmate Hatch's move, who, having only a brigade,
stopped at Madison Court House on learning that Jackson
was at Gordonsville with his whole corps.
When the forces under Banks and Jackson suddenly
faced each other, both generals prepared for battle. Banks,
as Governor of Massachusetts and as Speaker of the House
of Representatives, had a national reputation before the
war. His unfortunate assignment to the Shenandoah,
where so many disastrous raids had been made by a
superior force under Jackson, chafed him, and he was aching
for a favorable chance to face the enemy on a fair field.
Hence, when he met Jackson at Cedar Mountain, he at
once resolved to make a stubborn fight.
Men wh© were engaged in the battle said : ' ' Banks
was present everywhere on the field, cheering the men. At
116 THE AT MV OF THE POTOMAC.
one place he rode his horse in the line of battle. It greatly
nerved the men to see such courage in their commander,
and the result v/as they fought and really worsted double
their number under Jackson."
"The Comte de Paris says that it was in truth a victory
for the Federal side. The Union forces fought with such
desperation that, in order to keep his line from breaking,
Jackson had to rush on the field at the head of his old
troops.
Augur and Geary were both wounded and General Prince
was taken prisoner. Col. James A. Tait, of Washington
City, commanded a brigade on the extreme left of the
Union line, where he greatly distinguished himself for
coolness and bravery.
Ricketts hearing the battle, pressed forward with his
splendid division to assist Banks, "but the contest was
ended when he arrived, ' ' says the Comte de Paris. About
one o'clock that night King's division arrived on the battle¬
field ready for work. Sigel was there also, and had begged
permission to lead the attack in the morning.
Every command was ready by the dawn of day, but as
the fog cleared up, and the site of the enemy's former posi¬
tion could be seen, there were no troops in view. Jackson
had received such a pounding from Banks that he was glad
to avail himself of the night to escape, and sent in a flag of
truce asking hostilities to cease until the dead could be
buried.
As this chapter is made up of miscellaneous incidents
which occurred, and is not intended to be a regular narra¬
tive, some Confederate niatters are here given.
Being one evening in company with General Heth, I
asked him what was the cause of the coolness between Jeff.
Davis and Joseph E. Johnston? He said: "It originally
began when General Jessup died. Davis wanted Floyd to
appoint Albert Sydney Johnson quartermaster general, to
fill the vacancy occasioned by the death of General Jessup.
Joseph E. Johnston was successful in his efforts to succeed
FROM FIRST TO SECOND BULL RUN. 117
Jessup. Then, when the Confederate Congress provided
for five generals, Davis appointed them in the following
order : S. Cooper, Albert Sidney Johnson, R. E. Eee, and
Joseph E. Johnston. The latter was the quartermaster
general in the United States Army when the war began ;
S. Cooper was colonel and adjutant general ; Albert Sidney
Johnson was colonel, and R. E. Eee was lieutenant colonel
of cavalry. Pitting Johnston fourth greatly displeased
him, and he expressed his dissatisfaction to Davis very
plainly. Davis replied that as quartermaster general he
had no power outside of that department, and declined to
rectify it.
' ' It was evident he was not held in high esteem by Mr.
Davis, for I was tendered his command in the west by the
President ; but some of the Senators objected to me on the
ground that I was a Virginian, and there were so many
Virginians occupying prominent places in the army—Eee
was in command of the largest and most important army in
the Confederacy. I did not want it, and Hood of Tennes¬
see succeeded Johnston.
"That reminds me that one day Davis sent for me and
said : 'Heth, how much rank do you think yon can stand?'
I replied : ' I do not think I can stand very much. ' He
then said : ' I was thinking of giving you command of the
troops west of the Mississippi, in place of Price.' The
western Senators Raming of it, raised an objection to me
on account of my being so young. They did not want Price
removed. As I did not want the place, I went to the Sec¬
retary of War, and said : 'Mr. Secretary, I do not desire to
supersede Price in his command, and I hope my name will
not be further considered in connection with it. '
"That ended the matter, and I remained with Eee's
army."
CHAPTER V.
SECOND BUEE RUN.
FTER the battle of Cedar Mountain, which was a
great rebufí" to Jackson, who, with double the num¬
ber of troops, compelled Banks to retire his line ; but the
stubborn resistance made by the Federals, and with Ric-
ketts and Sigel on the field ready to renew the confiict in the
morning, made it advisable for him to retire behind the Raoi-
dan, or, perhaps, to draw Pope on. Ricketts came up just as
the battle was closing, and his troops were engaged a short
time. Jackson then retired to Gordonsville, and called for
more troops, while Eee was greatly perplexed as towhat mili¬
tary move was to be executed. Was it a wily deception on
the part of the Federals for Pope to boldly throw his army
forward to Culpeper, as if threatening Richmond from that
direction—while McClellan would pretend to retreat, and
then, if Lee supported Jackson with any material numbers,
and weakened the force at Richmond—so that McClellan
could suddenly head his columns for Richmond, and either
capture the Confederate officers or compel them to fly for
safety ?
General Pleasonton found the forces around Richmond
so weakened, when Lee was sending troops to reënforce
Jackson against Pope, after the former was hurled back on
Gordonsville, when the battle of Cedar Mountain was fought,
that he dare not advance, and therefore Pleasonton wrote
the following letter to Gen. R. B. Marcy, chief of staff :
General :—Your note of this date received. There are moments
when the most decided action is necessary to save us from great dis¬
aster. I think such a moment has arrived. The enemy before us
118
SECOND BULL RUN.
119
is weak. A crushing Slow by this army at this time would be in¬
valuable to disconcert the troops of the enemy to the north of us.
That blow can be made in forty-eight hours. Two corps would do
it, and be in position to go whenever they may be ordered by that
time.
From all I can learn there are not 36,000 men between this and
Richmond, nor do I believe they can get more before we can whip
them. I have guides ready, and know the roads sufficiently well to
accomplish anything the general wants.
I write this as a friend. I shall willingly carry out the general's
orders, be they what they may, but I think he has an opportunity
at this time few men ever attain. Destroy this, and whatever I
have said shall not be repeated by me.
Very truly yours, A. PlkasOnton.
This remarkable letter is dated Haxall's, August 11,
1862. It is published on page 369 in the third part of
volume eleven of the "Rebellion Official Record of the
Union and Confederate Armies." It mnst have been sent
to the War Department with the papers of General Marcy,
as it was out of Pleasonton's possession, and by him re¬
quested to be destroyed.
General Pleasonton was in Washington. I called on
him, and asked him if the light of a quarter of a century
still supported that letter of his. He said most assuredly,
and more clearly now than then.
McClellan telegraphed it to Halleck the next day at four
o'clock p.m., but these two generals were not in hearty
accord ; they distrusted each other, and Halleck made no
response to him. It has been suggested to me by a promi¬
nent officer, that if Pleasonton had sent his dispatch direct
to Halleck he would have ordered an advance on Richmond.
From the following correspondence it is plain that Lee
was apprehensive of that move :
Headquartkrs Army of Northfrn Virginia,
August 12, 1862.
General :—It is reported to these headquarters that the enemy
is advancing by the way of Malvern Hill. General Lee directs me
to say that he desires you to proceed at once to New Market, and
120 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
make such disposition of your troops as may be necessary to oppose
the enemy and drive him back.
I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
A. L. Long,
Colonel and Military Secretary.
Maj, Gen. G. W. Smith, Commanding Division.
Headquarters Army of Northern Virginia,
August 13, 1862.
General :—Having received information that Burnside's forces
have left Fredericksburg to join Pope, unless you know to the con¬
trary I desire you to march at once with your command to Gordons-
ville and report to General Longstreet.
I am. General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
R. E. Lee, General.
Brig. Gen. John B. Hood, Commanding Division.
Headquarters near Richmond, Va.,
August 14, 1862.
General :—Your letter of this date received. From every in¬
dication it appears that McClellan's forces on the James River are
being withdrawn and sent to reënforce Pope. Under these circum¬
stances I think it will be necessary to withdraw R. H. Anderson's
division from Drewry's Bluff and send it in the direction of Gordons-
ville. Colonel Gibbs' regiment and the 57th North Carolina, Col.
H. C. Jones, had better be ordered for the present to that point. In
case Anderson is removed these troops will serve for the defense of
Drewry's Bluff; and since they are new, they can be drilled and
accustomed to camp, &c.
I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
R. E. Lee, General.
Hon. George W. Randolph, Secretary of War.
It is quite plain that Pleasonton whs right.
Had our army advanced and captured Richmond and
liberated our prisoners confined in Libby and Belle Isle, it
would have been a great victory. McClellan would have
been in Lee's fortifications and in a position to cut off his
supplies from the South. If he could not have followed
Lee, he could have held Richmond and destroyed the rail¬
road between Gordonsville and Lynchburg, the only way
for relief from the southwest.
SECOND BULL RUN.
121
Pope and Burnside had within a few thousand as many
men as Lee. So, if Lee had paid no attention to Mc-
Clellan's occupying Richmond in his rear, and marched for
Washington, with Pope and Burnside in his front, it would
have taken him ten days or more to force his way there.
There were 12,000 troops at Harper's Ferry ; Washing-
ton and Baltimore could have added 10,000 more ; then our
army in front of Washington would have lacked 13,000
of being equal in numbers to Lee's, with Philadelphia,
New York, Boston, Harrisburg, and Cincinnati to draw
from to make up that difference, with over a week to
do it in.
Besides, McClellan could have sent a corps to Washing¬
ton and still held Richmond, as the fortifications around
Richmond were equal to 20,000 troops.
But it was thought advisable to withdraw McClellan
from the Peninsula, and unite the two armies in front of
Washington, with the Rappahannock as the line.
There were enough of McClellan's men who never fired
a gun at the Second Bull Run to have captured Richmond
and held it. Franklin and Sumner never reached the field.
Pope had camped on the battlefield of Cedar Mountain
ever since the battle on the 9th. Why, no one could tell.
The stench was very offensive from the dead horses ; and
the Confederate dead were scarcely covered up in many
instances, although they were supposed to have been
buried under a flag of truce. Jackson sent in a flag for the
purpose of burying their dead ; with all the advantage in
our favor, the proposition for hostilities to cease until the
dead could be buried was agreed to. If Jackson had been
granted the same advantage on the second morning that
Pope had, there would have been more dead to bury before
that solemn act was performed. In other words, Jackson
neX^er stopped for anything when he had a chance to win a
victory. The battlefield was full of soldiers from both
armies while the dead were being buried. The Confederate
soldiers repeatedly said that the next evening they expected
122 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
to eat their supper in Culpeper ; a genteel way of boasting
that they expected to win the next battle. During the
suspension of hostilities the two armies lay almost two
miles apart, concealed in the woods. When the truce ex¬
pired, and our army advanced, there was no enemy there.
Ricketts' division moved forward to the Rapidan, and
marched up the river for some distance in the direction of
Gordonsville. Captain Smith, of the 97th New York,
said : ' ' One night the colonel called the officers aside and
said to them, 'We are in a trap, and must retire quietly
and then added, ' Give your commands in a low tone until
we get out of this. ' ' '
Jackson had been rëenforced by Dongstreet, and they
were weaving a net around Ricketts ; but he was too wary
an officer to be caught that way. Sigel's command fol¬
lowed Ricketts to the front. Pope was notified of the ad¬
vance of Longstreet and Jackson by a staff officer, who
returned from Ricketts and Sigel. No doubt Pope had
his reasons for remaining on the field. I heard him remark
' ' that it was twenty-six miles before we would be uuder
McClellan." That would indicate that at that time the
orders to McClellan might be revoked, and both generals
push on to Richmond.
Three days' rations were cooked and served for a for¬
ward movement. A letter of Lee's had been captured,
giving all the information regarding the disposition of their
commands, with the probable strength of each. Such
letters are frequently lost purposely, to mislead the enemy.
It is certain that Pope did not act on that letter at once, as
it was captured on the i6th. Our cooked rations came in
good on the retreat to the Rappahannock, whither we
started very soon, without stopping on the way to gather
daisies and sweet williams ; we left them for the country
maidens and children of that region.
Pope crossed the Rappahannock on the left side, and
placed his army as follows : McDowell at Rappahannock
Ford; Banks at Rappahannock Station; Reno at Kelly's
GEN. FRANZ SIGEL.
SECOND BULL RUN.
123
Ford on the left ; and Sigel ori the extreme right. Such
was the position of Pope's army when he faced again to
confront the advancing foe. The majority of McClellan's
troops were to land at Aquia Creek, on the Potomac, twelve
miles north of Fredericksburg, where Burnside was then
in commänd. From Aquia Creek they could be conveyed
by rail to Fredericksburg, where they would take the route
up the Rappahannock ; the last command all the time
serving as Pope's left.
This was a dangerous move ; the line was entirely too
long, reaching from Fredericksburg to Sulphur Springs,
opposite Warrenton ; the line was weak and liable to be
pierced at any point by either Longstreet or Jackson ; but
that was the plan decided upon by Halleck, and orders from
him had to be obeyed. He was.managing the battle from
his office at Washington. It was frequently observed by
military men that he ought to take command in person on
the field.
On the 2 ist the forces of Rongstreet and Jackson lined
the right bank of the Rappahannock. Soon cannonading
commenced, and was continued for some time, but no
strong attempt was made to cross the river. There were
one or two advances, as if they intended to force a passage,
but subsequent events proved that they were simply feeling
our position. On the 2 2d Longstreet extended his lines
up the river to cover the space which Jackson occupied
the day before, Jackson having already begun his flank
movement of Pope's army. At Hazel River Milroy
attacked his rear, but did not delay him much, Finding
Freeman's Ford well guarded, he passed on to Waterloo
Bridge, where only a light guard was posted; this was
brushed aside by General Early, who crossed to .the same
side with Pope, who had anticipated that move, and really
welcomed it, for he wanted a part of their forces to get far
enough over to crush them before they could receive assist¬
ance.
In the mean time Pope changed his mind, and was going
124 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
to cross to the right side of the Rappahannock and attack
Longstreet while Jackson was seeking a crossing higher up
the river. He thought there were enough troops coming
from Washington to take care of Jackson, as Halleck had
written him on the 21st: "Do your best to keep possession
■of the Rappahannock. To-morrow large rëenforôements.
Defend every inch of ground ; fight like the devil until we
can rëenforce you. In forty-eight hours you shall have all
the troops you want."
On the night of the 2 2d a terrible storm raged in that
part of the State. The Rappahannock is a short river at
best, and the two armies lay at the foot of the mountains
on either side of the river, so that in a few hours the rush¬
ing torrents from the mountain sides began to swell the
quiet little river into a roaring stream of power and force.
It struck the Waterloo Bridge and swept it away ; which
left Early in a bad predicament. He could neither get
back, nor could they assist him. If Pope could grapple
him before the river fell he would have been captured ; but
Pope had arranged his forces with reference to crossing the
river and attacking Longstreet ; so it took some time to
countermand the orders and have them march on Early.
Sigel was ordered to Waterloo Bridge to cut off his retreat,
or prevent any assistance being rendered him by Jackson.
Reno and Banks were to closely follow him, while Mc¬
Dowell and Reynolds were ordered to Waterloo.
Sigel had the hardest part of the. work to perform, as his
route was parallel with the river, and he was compelled to
cross its tributaries, which were so swollen that it greatly-
retarded his progress. Jackson knew Early's perilous posi¬
tion, and hastily constructed a trestle bridge, by which
communication was reestablished between the forces during
the night, and at daybreak Early recrossed the river.
Buford arrived there a few hours later, only to meet
with a sad disappointment. But there was a superabund¬
ance of that on hand during that campaign. It was just
then learned that Stuart was at Catletts Station, and had
SECOND BULL RUN.
12&
captured General Pope's papers, which contained informa¬
tion valuable to the enemy. It sent a shudder through our
forces, for there seemed to be lurking in every move some
disaster to our armies. The Orange and Alexandria Rail¬
road had to furnish our supplies, and Stuart, as a matter of
course, would tear up the track, and destroy the telegraph,
leaving us completely cut off from Washington. R was a
gloomy state of affairs, yet the soldiers kept in good spirits,
hoping for the best.
We were yet holding on to the line of the Rappahannock
with powerful tenacity, anxiously looking for the promised
reënforcements Halleck said would arrive within forty-
eight hours.
The Rappahannock was still very high, and the artillery
of both armies kept up a constant fire without producing
any material results.
On the 24th, Pope's command was as follows : Sigel at
Waterloo Bridge, with Banks on his left ; Reno at Sulphur
Springs, Ricketts was east of Waterloo Bridge, and King
was near Sulphur Springs, Porter's corps was marching
up the river from Fredericksburg, while Heintzelman, who
landed on the 22d at Alexandria, sent forward Kearny's
division to Manassas by rail. The next day the remainder
of his corps, and a division under General Sturgis, followed
Kearny.
The Stuart raid, in Pope's rear. Caused great consterna¬
tion ; the trains were cautiously run, fearing at any time to
suffer from Stuart's removing a rail to wreck and capture
them.
Jackson was aware of the great alarm that Stuart had
caused, and knew his cavalry would be defeated if met by
the Federal forces ; he therefore hurried forward to assist
in the great destruction in Pope's rear, following the
Hedgeman River (the Rappahannock assumes that name
above Waterloo) until he reached Hinson's Ford, where he
crossed and passed through Orleans.
The range of the Bull Run Mountains lay between him
120
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
and the Federal forces, though he was much farther in the
direction of Washington, and twenty miles from Thorough¬
fare Gap, which was the nearest place he could cross the
mountain. It is a great wonder that Halleck did not send
a division forward from Washington to block that gap,
knowing how passionately fond Jackson was of such mili¬
tary moves. McClellan's troops were already arriving, and
his work must be done at once. Jackson took his infantry
across fields, through woods, and bypaths, pushing forward
as rapidly to the front as possible, his soldiers eating their
scanty rations while marching.
The artillery and the wagons were left to come up as
best they could, there being no enemy in or near the gap,
it made no difference where the artillery was.
Passing through the gap unmolested he took the .shortest
route to reach the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, which
was the feeder of Pope's army. What damage Stuart hastily
did it he feared would soon be repaired and of little conse¬
quence.
Pope was not aware that Jackson, with his entire corps,
was directly between him and Washington. The water of
the Rappahannock was falling, and Pope feared an attack
from Longstreet, who could then cross the river.
On the evening of the 24th he decided to form a line of
battle along the railroad, with Aquia Creek at his back, in
order that reënforcements could reach him either from Alex¬
andria or Fredericksburg. The order was not delivered to
Sigel correctly, and he remained at Waterloo all day of the
25th. In the evening he learned that all the rest of Pope's
army had moved, and that he was occupying an isolated
position, so he made a night march, and joined McDowell
at Warrenton.
Pope now fully aware that Jackson was in his rear, de¬
stroying his line of communication with Washington and
attempting to prevent troops from joining him from the
Capital, decided to march on him at once, before Longstreet
could form a junction, which was now evident that he
SECOND BULL RUN.
127
would attempt, by taking the same route through Thorough¬
fare Gap. The order was given for the different commands
to fall back in the direction of Washington.
The pike running through Thoroughfare Gap and cross-
in» the railroad at Gainesville, which connects with a roa(i
leading to Warrenton, made it the strategic point on the
Second Bull Run battlefield. If Pope had captured and
held that point it would have prevented Tongstreet from
joining Jackson, who was posted along and behind the
old railroad bed which has never been finished to this
day.
There was a heavy fall in front of a part of his line ; while
immediately on the right of the fall was a deep cut, making
a splendid position for defense, and which conld not be as¬
sailed without great loss.
The left wing, as it moved north, was commanded by
McDowell. Two corps, comprising Sigel's command and
his own, composed of three splendid divisions—Ricketts',
King's, and Reynolds' (the Pennsylvania Reserves)—had
rejoined the corps under the command of General Rey¬
nolds.
Kearny and Reno went to Greenwich. Pope came with
the right wing, along the railroad, with Hooker's division
of Heintzelman's corps, while Porter was to remain at
Warrenton Junction, and was to move forward as soon as
Banks came up to relieve him.
Near Bristoe Statioñ, Hooker's division came up with
Ewell's division of Jackson's corps. The rear guard of
Ewell and the advance of Hooker's forces at once began fir¬
ing ; Hooker heard it, and rapidly rode to where he supposed
General Pope was. He soçn found Pope with other general
officers, and asked him about the firing. Pope said he did
not know what forces were engaged. Hooker then said he
would ride forward and ascertain. When he came up with
his command he at once observed a force of the enemy in
his front.
Ewell had resolved to make a stubborn resistance to
128
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Hooker's advance, and soon the battle raged all along^
Hooker's front with terrific fury.
Pope came forward and witnessed the battle, saying
afterwards that it was a grand thing to see General Hooker
ride the line on his white horse at almost full speed. It
was the first time he had ever met Hooker, and he
was greatly impressed with his commanding manner in
battle.
Bwell was compelled to retire in the direction of Ma¬
nassas, where Jackson was resting with the remainder of
his corps. That fight took place on the evening of the
27th, and it seems that it had the effect to mislead Pope,
he supposing that Jackson would remain at or near
Manassas Junction to give him battle, which would give
McDowell a chance to encircle him by the way of Gaines¬
ville.
Reno and Kearny moved forward from Greenwich, and
Porter and Banks followed Hooker. On the 27th McDowell
moved north through Warrenton, and encamped about ten
o'clock that night at New Baltimore. Ricketts' division
had been sent to Thoroughfare Gap, to impede the advance
of Longstreet, while McDowell hurried forward to Gaines¬
ville, to occupy the key of the field, where the conflict was
soon to take place.
King's division started early on the morning of the 28th,
and marched steadily all day, until about four o' clock, when
it halted to rest and to make coffee. There is no doubt but
that while resting there, a Confederate spy dressed as a Fed¬
eral cavalryman came to the 19th Indiana, and casually
made an observation of the strength of the command, then
retired as if going to the front, then posted off to the enemy
and reported. Only Gibbons' brigade was in sight ; the
others were shielded from him by woods. He had to make
an excuse for coming to us, so he said Jackson was posted
just beyond, and that we would soon encounter him. A
prominent staff officer of the division has since informed
me that we had no cavalry where he came from then. It
SECOND BULL RUN.
129
was evidently Jackson's intention to fight our commands in
detail.
The march was soon resumed in the following order :
Hatch led, followed by Gibbon, Doubleday, and Patrick.
Hatch drew out first upon the road about half an hour in
advance of the other brigades. General Gibbon, with his
brigade, had just straightened out on the pike, when the
head of Doubleday's column reached the road, and found
General Patrick watching a group of horsemen upon a
slight elevation, a few hundred yards to the northwest.
After a brief consultation it was decided that they were
Confederate officers, taking observations of our position and
numbers. They almost instantly opened fire from a bat¬
tery.
General Gibbon halted his column, faced toward the
enemy, and placed his brigade behind the fence, along the
pike in the woods. General Doubleday hastened forward,
his brigade marching along the pike, until he reached
General Gibbon, who informed him that General King,
the division commander, not being present, and General
Hatch, the rankijig brigade commander, a half an hour's
march in advance, that he was the senior officer present,
and asked what should be done. Doubleday's reply was :
"What are the troops opposed to us?" Gibbon said he
thought there was a force of cavalry, with a light battery.
Lieutenant Brooks, of the 6th Wisconsin, who was then
serving on Pope's staff, had just arrived with an ordei. He
and Gibbon had been in consultation before Doubleday rode
up, and they were of the impression, as stated above, that
the forces were only cavalry and a light battery. The
pickets fired on Brooks as he came up the pike to deliver
the order.
Doubleday then said to Gibbon : "I think we ought to
charge them, but we have officers superior to us on the
field and it is for General King or General McDowell to
say what shall be done." "Very well," said Gibbon,
' ' give the order, and I will put my brigade in. ' '
IX
130
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
General Doubleday accordingly gave the order to
charge. Gibbon replied, ' ' By heavens, I will do it, ' ' and
ordered the 2d Wisconsin in under Colonel O'Conner. I
did not know, and Gibbon I think did not know, that Mc¬
Dowell had left the field, and the Iron Brigade, already in
line of battle, moved forward like veterans, led by General
Gibbon in person. They were immediately engaged with
an overwhelming force of the enemy—infantry and artillery.
Doubleday's brigade, consisting of three regiments, were
ordered by him (Doubleday) to assist Gibbon—the 56th
Pennsylvania and 76th New York forming a part of Gib¬
bon's line, while the 95th New York supported Battery B,
4th Regular Artillery, Gibbon sent for Battery B, and posted
it on the right of the line, keeping the 95th New York in
reserve.
This was one of the most stubborn and sanguinary con¬
flicts of the war, considering the short time the battle lasted.
As the above expression seems pretty strong, I support
it by the testimony of a disinterested witness, who has
written a work on the late war.
On p. 285, 2d vol.. Comte de Paris says: "An artillery
battle had just commenced between King and Jackson,
when the latter was informed by Stuart that his right flank
was not menaced by the enemy at the Gainesville road.
Finding himself then free in his movements, he ordered
Ewell to bring his and Taliaferro's divisions to the attack,
and to fall upon the flank of the Federals, who were seen
marching in column from the other side of the road.
Stuart's brigade of Taliaferro's division, supported by
the fire of three batteries, advanced first as skirmishers ; but
the Federal guns soon silenced those of the Confederates.
The other divisions, supported on the left by two of Ewell's
brigades, came up to restore the fortunes of the fight. Gal¬
lantly led by their chiefs, the six brigades rushed furiously
upon the two Federal brigades of Gibbon and Doubleday,
posted in a large orchard. Both sides defended their posi¬
tions with great stubbornness ; the two Confederate division
SECOND BULL RUN.
131
commanders were severely wounded. Ewell lost a leg,
while charging at the head of his soldiers. The latter,
however, despite their efforts and numerical superiority,
could not succeed in dislodging their adversaries. Night
alone put an end to the battle. ' '
Accepting this statement of a foreigner, who had no
jealousies to warp his judgment, it is not only compliment¬
ary to Generals Doubleday, and Gibbon, but it gives great
credit to their military skill. If every battle had been
fought as well, the war would not have lasted so long. They
were both artillery officers when the war broke out. Double-
day directed the first gun fired by our batteries at Sumter,
ill response to the Confederate guns from Charleston ; while
Gibbon was captain of Battery B, 4th Artillery. When he
was promoted to brigadier general, his old battery remained
with him, and this is the one the Comte de Paris says,
silenced three batteries of the enemy.
Mr. John Johnson, who was a member of the battery,
and present in that action, says : ' ' Our cannoneers soon got
the range of the enemy's batteries, and poured in an enfilad¬
ing fire on them until they were silenced. ' '
While Gibbon was captain of the battery, he filled it
with recruits from the brigade, which was composed of the
2d, 6th, and 7th Wisconsin, and 19th Indiana.
The officers and men vied with each other in pressing
forward when the order was given to charge. Many sug¬
gestions were made in the ranks, which from an officer
would have been a command. The 19th Indiana was on
the extreme left, and suffered terribly from Taliaferro's flank
movement. It was a terrible contest. The lines of battle
were close enough to do effective work. The regiment
held its position until Major May gave Capt. W. W. Dud¬
ley, of Company B, an order to take his own and Company
G, and charge a battery, which had taken position in ad¬
vance of their extreme right and a little to the front, so
that their fire enfiladed the center and right of the 19th In¬
diana and the left of the 7th Wisconsin.
132
THE A A'MV OF THE POTOMAC.
When Dudley charged the battery their infantry ad¬
vanced, and attempted to fill the gap. The regiment
greatly felt the loss of those two companies, and swung
back a little. In the mean time General Gibbon came over
to the left, and assisted Dudley until he got back in line ;
for he had to force the enemy's infantry back to assume his
place in line with the regiment.
General Gibbon tied his sorrel horse to a peach tree
limb, examined the ground to our left, and waited for some
support to come in on his left from General Patrick, whose
brigade lay back beyond the pike, less than half a mile
from the battle.
Gibbon's horse became so frightened that he broke loose
and ran away, leaving the general in a dangerous and ex¬
posed position. Col. Solomon Meredith met with a serious
accident in the fight. His horse, ' ' Old Roan, ' ' was shot in
the neck, and fell on the colonel's leg, but the horn of the
saddle saved it. He was taken off of the field by Dient.
Col. A. O. Bachman, and Captain Dudley.*
Capt. D. B. Wilson, of Company B, had no sword, but
he led his company into action—standing there with his
arms folded, he looked every inch a soldier. Sergt. Wil¬
liam B. Murray was wounded in the ankle, which disabled
him from active service.
Lieutenants Cook and Newman, of Company C, were
both wounded, and the company was taken off the field by
Corporal Nelson Pegg.
The 2d Wisconsin sustained heavy losses—74 were killed
in the action, as against 43 at Gettysburg, Colonel O'Con¬
ner, commanding the regiment, a graduate of West Point,
being among the number. That afternoon, when he dis¬
mounted to go into battle, I thought I never saw a hand-
* General Patrick informed me at the Dayton Home, after the
war, that he declined to put his brigade in there on Gibbon's left,
for the reason that he disapproved of Gibbon's making the attack
without more consideration and knowledge of the strength of the
enemy.
SECOND BULL RUN.
133
somer man. It was not long before he was mortally
wounded, and the command devolved on Lieutenant Colonel
Fairchild, whose reputation as a soldier and an officer is
well known all over the country.
The 6th Wisconsin had hot work. It had not been en¬
gaged long when Colonel Cutler was severely wounded, and
Lieut. Col. E. S. Bragg took command. The regiment was
getting a heavy fire from the front and oblique.
Bragg in his report says : "I cannot speak too highly of
the conduct of both officers and men during and subsequent
to the engagement. It was hardly possible to be placed
under a hotter fire, but there was no confusion, no faltering.
The regiment fought as brave men only can fight. The
wounded went to the rear without a murmur, or died where
they fell without a groan. The list of casualties is as fol¬
lows : Colonel Cutler severely wounded ; Lieut. J. B. John¬
son, Company E, wounded and a prisoner ; Capt. J. F.
Marsh, slightly wounded. Enlisted men wounded, 6i ;
killed, 8 ; missing, 3 ; total, 72. Total engaged, 504.
"In conclusion, I cannot refrain from referring especi¬
ally to Corporal John H. Burns, and Private Harry G. Drum,
of Company E, and Sergeant William Campbell, Company
K, who left the ambulance upon the sound of the first fire,
procured muskets and ammunition, and joined the regiment
and fought to the last."
The 7th Wisconsin, under Col. W. W. Robinson, did
heroic work that afternoon. The valor of the regiment was
that day put to the test, and stood it well.
Lieut. Col. Charles Hamilton, who went into the fight
mounted,, was wounded through the thighs early in the ac¬
tion, but maintained his seat in the saddle with his boots
full of blood, and limbs about paralyzed, and had at the
close of the engagement to be lifted from his horse, and
carried to the hospital in a swooning condition.
The 56th Pennsylvania did valuable service in that en¬
gagement. There then occurred a curious incident : the
left wing of the brigade had been forced back quite a dis-
134 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
tance, and the Confederate right advanced to within a few
feet of our first line, where the writer lay wounded. One
of our regiments was coming on the field, when the Con¬
federates said : ' ' The 56th Pennsylvania ! ' ' and ran back to
the position they had previously held. It is said the enemy
knew the regiment by Hofmann's voice, which was one of
the best in the service.
There were four captains wounded (Captain Corman
died), two lieutenants, and 55 enlisted men.
The 76th New York, under Colonel Wainwright, ac¬
quitted itself well. Colonel Wainwright threw Captain
Grover forward with eight men—Whitney, Knapp, Fox,
John W. Seever, Ripley, Moore, Marvin Maynard, and
Norman Maynard, as skirmishers.
They advanced a short distance to a fence, close enough
to hear the commands given by the enemy, which they
communicated to General Doubleday, and the information
greatly assisted him in arranging the lines.
This small skirmi.sh line also did another gallant deed ;
they commenced and kept up a brisk fire on the enemy's
line of battle, loading on the ground, and then rising and
firing, which was so annoying to the enemy that it drew
the fire from the 76th New York.
Judge A. P. Smith, who was quartermaster of the regi¬
ment, in his history of the regiment, says, ' ' Captain Grover
and two of the skirmish line were severely wounded."
Noble band of heroes; I wonder where they are now.
(Grover was made lieutenant colonel, and was killed at
Gettysburg, his next battle.)
During a lull in the action, a body of men were seen mov¬
ing on the extreme left flank. As they came forward they
shouted, " Don't shoot our own men." It was at first un¬
certain who they were, but it was soon perceived that they
were trying one of their tricks at the first battle of Bull
Run.
The colonel gave the command, ' ' By the left oblique !
Aim ! Fire !" It was at short range, and it seemed as if
SECOND BULL RUN.
135
every bullet did its work, for the ground was literally
covered with the wounded and dying. At some places the
distance between the two lines was scarcely the width of
a street. The line of the enemy was melting away on the
left front of the 76th New York.
Colonel Wainwright wanted to find the rest of the bri¬
gade. He decided to let them remain where they were,
and send some one to find General Donbleday. If he
moved his regiment he might march right into the enemy's
line, and all be captured, as it was then dark.
Corporal (afterwards) Captain Bartholomew, of Company
C., and Private Redman, of Company I., promptly and
coolly stepped forward and tendered their services.
Judge Smith says : ' ' Bartholomew was afterwards killed
in the Wilderness, on the 5th of May, 1864. Private Red¬
man was an old soldier, having served twelve years in
the English army, and was present at the attack upon
Sebastopol, during the Crimean war." His wife went
along with the regiment, and was a great favorite. He
further says ; ' ' Though Ann did not shoulder a musket,
she should be set down as much more useful to the army
than many who did. ' '
In the mean time Captain Halstead withdrew the regi¬
ment from the field by the direction of General Donbleday.
There were several cases of heroism so deserving that
they are here recorded, although the chapter is lengthening
out wonderfully, and the whole is not told by any means.
William H. Miller, 76th New York, was wounded in
the foot, so badly that he could not stand ; he lay upon the
ground and loaded his gun, then raised up and fired. John
L. Wood, of Company C., who was not quite eighteen, had
his thumb shot off, but continued in the fight until he was
mortally wounded.
Daniel McGregor, of Company C., received a wound in
his thigh, from the effects of which he died. He continued
to load and fire, resting upon the other knee, until, from
loss of blood, he was unable to load or hold his gun.
136
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Sergeant Laurence M. Baker, of Company F, fell mor¬
tally wounded. On hearing of it his brother Isaac went to
him. He had scarcely got there when the bugle sounded,
indicating that a new movement was to be made. ' ' Leave
me and rush to the front ! ' ' shouted the dying sergeant ;
and in a short time he was numbered with the dead.
The roll of honor of the 76th New York is quite lengthy,
and I will content myself with giving some of their names :
Thomas H. Hoffman, Albert Clin, James J. Card, Captain
Fox, Captain Sager, and Captain Swan, are among the
noted ones ; though there was scarcely a member of the
regiment who was not a true soldier, deserving of honor¬
able mention. The firing ceased, after dark, almost simul¬
taneously, and both armies occupied the ground upon which
they fought until half-past ten o'clock. General Hatch,
hearing the firing, returned to ascertain the cause, and like
a true soldier went to the sound of battle. He reached the
field about the time the action was over, having counter¬
marched his brigade.
Gen. John F- Reynolds, who commanded the Pennsyl¬
vania Reserves, heard the firing and came to us, attended
only by an orderly. He said he would return and bring
up his division. General King in the mean time had as¬
sumed command and called a council of war on the side of
the pike in the evening perhaps between nine and ten
o'clock, at which the four brigade commanders were con¬
sulted as to what should be done.
General Gibbon being the junior brigadier, was first
asked his opinion. He decided that General King should
withdraw from the field towards Manassas Junction.
General Patrick was then asked for his opinion, who
inquired what General King's orders were. On being
informed that they were to move to Centerville, by the
way of the pike, said ' ' Then I should go to Centerville,
sir. ' '
General Doubleday expressed himself decidedly of Gen¬
eral Patrick's opinion. General Hatch said in 1892, " that
HON. A. R. BUSHNELL, M. C.
SECOND BULL RUN.
137
he did not understand it was a regular council of war, but
that they got together and gave their opinions. He says
he advised King to go to Centerville by the way of Ma¬
nassas for the reason that he would avoid a heavy force of
the enemy and obtain rations at Manassas." McDowell
was in command of Pope's left wing ; he did not delegate
his powers to King or any other officer when he rode ahead
to consult Pope, so King had no authority to act except as
he did. McDowell did not return to his command until
ten o'clock the next day, then Dongstreet was arriving on
the field and McDowell's opportunity forever gone.
If McDowell, who had ridden on ahead, had returned
like Hatch when he heard the battle commence, he could
have held his ground, and not only have fought Jackson,
but have won a victory over him. Only six of his regi¬
ments had been engaged against six brigades of the enemy,
and the Comte de Paris says, "They held their ground
until darkness put an end to the 'conflict. ' '
It is true those two brigades, with the exception of the
95th New York, were badly cut up. But there were
Patrick's magnificent brigade and Hatch's ; neither had
been engaged, and they were in splendid condition. The
Pennsylvania Reserves were close at hand.
Sigel's Corps opened the fight next morning at half
past six, with Reno and Heintzelman at Greenwich to be
hastened forward, as they never lagged when there was a
chance to engage the enemy. McDowell was in good con¬
dition to go at his work next morning. Here is McDowell's
view of it. At a conference at the Riggs House, after the
war, when Major Halstead told him of the council of war,
the night of the 28th, and what transpired at it, he turned
to Halstead with a look of surprise and indignation, and
said " Major, this is the first I ever knew that King called
a council of war, and I never knew before why the divi¬
sion went to Manassas Junction. I always felt very hard
at my brigadiers, who were all West Point graduates for
leaving the field unless they came to Centerville according
138
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
to orders. I feel aggrieved that Gibbon should have disap¬
pointed me so, after I promoted him from captain of a battery
and made him a brigadier, and otherwise greatly supported
him, which " McDowell said "was a permanent benefit to
Gibbon, ' ' I listened closely when this conversation took
place, and took note of it at the time, so as to give Mc¬
Dowell the benefit of his statement.
No officer or veteran will be written up or down in thi-s
work ; it shall be as correct, after years of study, as I can
make it. This was but a short time before McDowell died,
and he seemed to be greatly hurt over Major Halstead's
statement. From that conversation he gave us to fully
understand that he did not presume the division would
leave its position after the battle that evening. He said :
"Two brigades had held their ground against two of Jack¬
son's divisions and, at the close of a severe action were in
good spirits. We were feeling for Jackson, and when his
real position was developed that evening, the division
should have remained there and renewed the battle early
next morning,"
While McDowell felt thus toward his generals, for leav¬
ing the field after the battle on the 28th, which resulted, as he
said, in King's division abandoning the position, which was
the key of the whole field, yet he was just ahead of Hatch
when the firing began, and said to me that he distinctly
heard it, yet he kept on, although he was in command of
the left wing, two-thirds of Pope's army. It certainly was
his bonnden duty to return and assume command.
The enemy had thrown two out of three divisions on
Doubleday and Gibbon, and were badly handled. Hill's
division alone had not been engaged.
If McDowell* had returned, on the evening of the
28th, and assumed command of his troops, and directed
*Iii answer to my question, if he heard the battle of Gainesville,
he said he did. I asked him where he was? "Not far from the
Stone Bridge." In answer to my question why he did not return
and assume command, he said he wanted to see Pope.
SECOND BULL RUN.
139
Ricketts to fall back slowly in front of Longstreet, contest¬
ing every inch of ground, and hurled Hatch, Patrick,
Reynolds, and Sigel at Jackson, he would have flanked
him and driven him out of his hiding place behind the old
railroad embankment and sent him flying to the mountains.
If he had thrown himself on Jackson and defeated him
before Rongstreet arrived it would have retrieved his
fortunes shattered in the first Bull Run.
We will now turn to Ricketts, at Thoroughfare Gap,
who, upon nearing the Gap, learned that Rongstreet's ad¬
vance was already occupying it. Ricketts hoped by a
desperate move to force them back, and he threw forward the
Third Brigade, supported by the First, Second, and Fourth.
Colonel Stiles, of the 8oth New York, commanded the
advancing brigade. Ricketts had excellent artillery with
him, but the road was full of timber, and it was difficult to
get a position for the artillery to play upon the gap.
General Ricketts learned that heavy-columns of troops
were crossing the mountains north and south of him and
would soon gain his rear, so he retired in the direction of
Gainesville, but having learned that King had forsaken that
point, he took a road leading to Bristoe to avoid being
crushed between Jackson and Rongstreet.
In 1883, when we were looking over these fields, Rong¬
street said to me "that the time for the Federals to win the
battle was to attack and defeat Jackson before he arrived."
If King's division had held its ground and assisted Sigel, on
the morning of the 29th, the victory would have been ours.
When Rongstreet arrived he formed his left near the
pike, with his right resting on the Manassas Gap Railroad,
which formed an obtuse angle. If he had simply formed
on Jackson's right, extending his line, it would not have
been difficult for Pope to advance and attack. The angle
put our troops in a dilemma; if they advanced against
Jackson, Rongstreet's artillery had a converging fire over
the ground upon which our attack had to be made.
On the morning of the 29th, Sigel made an attack on
140
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Jackson's right ; the fighting was stubborn on both sides,
Milroy and Schenck having brought their commands in.
The fight had already lasted for a considerable length of
time, and Schurz's division was pressed hard ; although
the Confederates were forced back, Schenck attempted to
assist Schurz, but receiving a vigorous attack, was unable
to do so. Kearny came up and formed on the right of
Sigel, while Hooker arrived soon after and put his division
in front"of A. P. Hill's division, which rested on the Sud-
ley Springs. Reynolds came up with his Pennsylvania
Reserves and formed the extreme left. There was no one
on the field to order a general assault, and Jackson con¬
tented himself with keeping them at bay, by a heavy can¬
nonade, assisted by infantry, until Longstreet could get
into position, and rake the Union line with his artillery.
Pope, in the mean time, had arrived and ordered Hooker
to charge ; which he objected to, but Grover's brigade
made a charge, and penetrated between the brigades of
Gregg and Thomas. The rest of Hooker's division came
to their assistance ; but General Early advanced and re¬
pulsed them. Kearny took the place of Hooker ; he
charged the Confederate right, and rolled it up on the
center, but that move was not supported, and all the
ground gained was afterwards lost.
King had not been well for a number of days, and Gen¬
eral Hatch had taken command of his division. Just after
Kearny had been forced back. Hatch arrived upon the
field. Major Halstead was sent to McDowell to inform
him that the division was ready for action. His reply was :
' ' The enemy is retreating, pursue them at double quick,
and gobble all the prisoners you can. Go tell your gen¬
eral that, and go at double quick. ' '
Hatch charged with three brigades, Doubleday's,
Patrick's, and his own. The firing was so heavy from
the left that General Hatch directed Major Cranford to
order his old brigade, then commanded by Colonel Sulli¬
van, to face obliquely to the left, and meet the heavy fire
GEN. RUFUS KING.
SECOND BULL RUN.
141
coming from that direction. An attempt was made by the
enemy to steal upon Colonel Fowler, in the uniforms of
the 14th Brooklyn, which they had captured at Manassas
a few days before. But that was foiled by Fowler, who
commanded that regiment, and knew that it must be a de¬
ception. They shouted: "For God's sake don't fire on
your friends." But few of the alleged 14th Brooklyn
were taken prisoners there.
The Comte de Paris says: "They returned to the
charge several times, but in vain ; they could not make
these fresh troops falter."
The Confederates knew that this was the division they
met the day before, and they advanced to meet it with
several lines of battle. The 2d Regiment of Berdan Sharp¬
shooters went forward as skirmishers. The enemy did not
respond to their fire, though it was galling and severe.
After a desperate fight, the attack was repulsed with
considerable loss. When Kilpatrick saw the division
of which his regiment constituted a part until a few days
before, suifering so, he begged of General Bayard to be
allowed to charge with his regiment, the Harris Light
Cavalry. This being accorded, he charged with a squadron,
supported by the regiment. They cut their way through
the enemy's lines, and attempted to rejoin our forces by
going around the left flank of the enemy, but were captured.
Every man of that squadron was either killed or wounded.
Over fifty of them were buried there the next day.
Hatch's adjutant general, Capt. J. A. Judson, and Cap¬
tain Garrish of the ist New Hampshire Light Battery,
artillery, were captured. They were splendid officers,
and the service suffered by their capture. Garrish lost
one gun. Maj. H. L. Cranford, of the 14th Brooklyn,
took the place of Captain Judson as adjutant general on
Hatch's staff.
Our troops were repulsed, which ended the contest for
that day, with Jackson holding the position behind the
old railroad bed and Longstreet well posted on his right
142
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
ready for work in the morning. The position of the Con¬
federate line was as follows : A. P. Hill commanded the left
division of Jackson's forces, while the center was com¬
manded by Lawton, as Ewell had been wounded in the
leg, which was amputated upon the field. * Starke com¬
manded the right division in place of Taliaferro, who
also had been wounded the day before.
The Federal line was as follows : Kearny and Hooker
upon the extreme right, then Reno reaching toward Si-
gel ; Hatch's division, of McDowell's corps, was upon
Reynolds' right, and in advance of Sigel. Ricketts had
gone to Kearny on the right. Porter had been brought
up and passed in front of the Federal line, halting on
the left of Hatch, to be ready to charge. In the mean
time the Federal left had opened, about one o'clock, a
sharp musketry fire. It must be remembered that all
the Federal forces were massed in front of Jackson ; not
a single command yet faced Longstreet.
The charge was made by Porter's corps in the center.
They were supported by Hatch on the right. As
Porter's troops moved forward over the field in front of
the railroad bed where Jackson's men were concealed
and waiting, Longstreet ordered his artillery to open
on them with an enfilading fire. This was a severe
ordeal—in fact it was too much ; the skeletons of the
regiments were hurled back on Sigel. Hatch and Sigel
held their own remarkably well.
Ricketts' division was hurried from the right to their
assistance. Grand old man ; his troops were kept flying
from one point of the field to the other, wherever
the storm of battle raged with the greatest fury ; soon
you find them over on the left helping Reynolds, with
his Pennsylvania Reserves, stay the advancing columns
of Longstreet.
The only wonder is that a charge was not made
* The author saw it taken off.
SECOND BULL RUN.
143
on the extreme right by Kearny, and then rolled along
toward the left. In such case victory might yet have
crowned the work of the Federals. McDowell, seeing
heavy columns of Longstreet's troops advancing to envel¬
ope and turn our left, had ordered Reynolds to checkmate
it. Two great generals faced each other when Reynolds
and Rongstreet met.
Porter's charge has passed into history as being the
charge of that battle, as Pickett's was at Gettysburg.
Not wishing to pluck one single honor from the brave
boys of the Fifth Corps, I still think that there never was
a grander charge made on any field of battle than the
Pennsylvania Reserves made to save the Warrenton Pike.
Colonel Talley, ist Pennsylvania Reserves, says, in
speaking of the battle :
Immediately after the defeat of our troops, and while in rapid
retreat, Gen. John F. Reynolds saved the Union Army from an
overwhelming disaster, if not from utter ruin. When our forces
were in rapid retreat, and the enemy in hot pursuit. General Rey¬
nolds discovered that the latter's aim was to seize the Warrenton
pike in rear of our broken masses. He at once threw his division
of Pennsylvania Reserves in the breach and saved the army. He
galloped to the artillery on the crest, sighted each gun, gave orders to
the officers and cannoneers, mounted, dashed along his line, and
called upon his men to charge upon the advancing foe. The brave
Reserves immediately charged with a cheer and yell across an open
field, and met the enemy advancing in great numbers. The con¬
test was desperate. Sypher states, and I know it to be true, that
the " ist and 2d Regiments of Reserves were engaged in an almost
hand-to-hand encounter ; the left was pressed and the right gave
way. At this critical moment the gallant Reynolds, observing that
the flagstaff of the 2d Regiment had been pierced by a bullet and
broken, seized the flag from the color-bearer, and dashing to the
right, rode twice up and down his entire division line waving the
flag about his head and cheering on his men. The Reserves, in¬
spired by the intrepidity of their leader, rent the air with cheers,
plied their tremendous musket fire with renewed energy and vigor,
and in a few moments the ranks of the Confederate regiments gave
way before the steady and unrelenting volleys poured upon them."
Night came on and put an end to the contest, but the famous Stone
144 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Bridge over Bull Run was, by the genius and heroic daring of
General Reynolds, and the valor of his brave men, preserved for the
use of the national army. The enemy, thus beaten back, retired
beyond the range of our guns, appalled at the havoc they wit¬
nessed in their ranks, and confounded by their failure to reach the
turnpike. The sun was now setting and the battle had ended.
John F. Reynolds was my beau ideal of an officer and a soldier. No
braver man lived, and he was as able and patriotic as brave.
The fighting became so desperate that the Pennsylva¬
nia Reserves were being mowed down like grass. The
ist and 2d Regiments were engaged in an almost hand-to-
hand confiict. The left was being turned, and the troops
on the right of the Reserves were being forced back. Just
then Reynolds saw that the colors of the 2d had been shot
from the staff as his lines were melting away, and weaken¬
ing in the face of the furious attack of Longstreet's troops.
He seized the colors, and waving them, as he rode the line
of his division, urged his men to save the pike. As he
rode up and down the line, with the colors in his hand,
the boys cheered him, and rushed at the enemy with
renewed determination to hold their ground ; then oc¬
curred one of the most sanguinary struggles of the war.
The enemy fired volley after volley at Reynolds as he car¬
ried the colors along the line, but Providence saved him to
perform deeds of valor until he reached his native State,
where, early in the action at Gettysburg, he received his
death wound.
So thoroughly am I convinced of the great valor of the
work performed by the Reserves there, that Reynolds' re¬
port is here quoted :
On the morning of the 30th I was directed to take post with my
division on the left of the pike, near the Henry House, and ordered
by Major General Pope to form my division in columns by com¬
pany, at full distance, with the whole of my artillery on the left ;
that I would be the first in that attack which Porter's corps was to
make on the enemy's right, then supposed to be on thej)ike and in
retreat. Having formed my division in the position ind^icated, and
opened with my rifled batteries to drive the enemy from the first
SECOND BULL RUN.
145
ridge, the skirmishers advanced and the attack by Porter's corps
commenced. When the skirmishers arrived in the thick woods op¬
posite Groveton, I found the resistance so great that another regi¬
ment was deployed to support them, and finally a second ; in all
three regiments.
The advanced skirmishers were the ist Rifles, Colonel McNeill,
and the ist Infantry, Colonel Roberts, supported by the 7th Infan¬
try, lyieutenant Colonel Henderson. The 6th Regiment, Colonel
Sinclair, was thrown through the woods on our left flank. Becom¬
ing convinced that the enemy was not in retreat, but was posted in
force on our left flank, I pushed through the skirmishers to the
edge of the woods on the left, gaining sight of the open ground be¬
yond ; and advancing myself into the open ground, I found a line
of skirmishers of the enemy nearly parallel to the line of skir¬
mishers covering my left flank, with cavalry formed behind them,
perfectly stationary, evidently making a column of the enemy,
formed for attack on my left flank when our lines should be suflfl-
ciently advanced. The skirmishers opened fire upon me, and I was
obliged to run the gauntlet of a heavy fire to gain the rear of my di¬
vision, losing one of my orderlies who had followed me through the
woods. I immediately communicated this to the commanding gen¬
eral of the corps, who came upon the ground and directed me to
form my division to resist this attack, the dispositions for which
were rapidly completed.
Other troops were to be sent to my support, when the command¬
ing general, observing the attack of Porter to have been repulsed,
ordered me with my division across the field to the rear of Porter, to
form a line behind which the troops might be rallied. I immedi¬
ately started my division in the direction indicated ; but before the
rear of my column left the position the threatened attack of
the enemy's right began to be felt, and the rear brigade, under
Colonel Anderson, with three batteries of artillery, was obliged
to form on the ground on which they found themselves, to op¬
pose it. Passing across the field to the right, with Meade's and
Seymour's brigades and Rosecrans' battery, my course was di¬
verted by the difficult nature of the ground, and the retreating
masses of the broken columns, among troops of Heintzelman's
corps, already formed, by which much time was lost and confusion
created, which allowed the enemy to sweep up with his right so far
as almost to cut us off from the pike, leaving nothing but the rear
brigade and the three batteries of artillery of my division, and
scattered troops of other commands to resist the advance of the ene¬
my upon our left. It was here that the most severe loss of the
division was sustained, both in men and material. Kern losing
X
146 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
his four guns, but not until wounded and left on the field. Col¬
onel Hardin, eommanding the 12th Regiment, was here severely
wounded.
The brigade under command of Colonel Anderson sustained it¬
self most gallantly, and though severely pushed on front and flank
maintained its position until overwhelmed by numbers, when it fell
back, taking up new positions wherever the advantage of ground
permitted. The two brigades and battery of artillery under my im¬
mediate command, finding ourselves perfectly out of place, moved,
by the direction of an ofiicer of General Pope's staff, to a position
to the right of the Henry House, which position was most gallantly
maintained by the commands of Meade and Seymour, and Ransom's
battery, for nearly two hours, when they were relieved by the divi¬
sion of regular troops under Colonel Buchanan.
The report of General Hatch has so many valuable
points in it that it is given in full :
Camp near Frederick, Md.,
September 13, 1862.
Captain ;—I have the honor to submit the following reports
of the movements of the First Division, Third Corps, temporarily
under my command during parts of the 29th and 30th days of
August :
Late on the afternoon of the 29th ultimo I was ordered by
General McDowell, in person, (who was at the time stationed near
the Stone House, on the turnpike from Gainesville to Centerville)
to move the division on the Gainesville road in the pursuit of the
enemy, who, he informed me, were retreating.
Gibbon's brigade had been detached to support some batteries.
With the three other brigades of the division, and Garrish's batteiy-
of howitzers, I proceeded with all the speed possible, hoping by
harassing the enemy's rear to turn their retreat into a rout. After
marching about three-quarters of a mile the 2d Regiment of
U. S. Sharpshooters was deployed to the front as skirmishers, the
column continuing up the road in support. The advance almost
immediately became warmly engaged on the left of the road. Two
howitzers were then placed in position, one on each side of the road,
and Doubleday's brigade was deplo3^ed to the front, on the left of
the road, and moved up'to the support of the skirmishers. We
were met by a force consisting of three brigades of infantry, one of
which was posted in the woods on the left, parallel to and about an
eighth of a mile from the road. The two other brigades were drawn
up in line of battle, one on each side of the road. These were in turn
SECOND BULL RUN.
147
supported by a large portion of the Confederate forces, estimated by
a prisoner, who was taken to their rear, at about 30,000 men, drawn
up in successive lines, extending one and a half miles to the rear.
Doubleday's brigade moved to the front under a very heavy fire,
which they gallantly sustained ; but the firing continued ver}-
heavy. Hatch's brigade, commanded by Colonel Sullivan, was also
deployed, and moved to the support of General Doubleday. Pat¬
rick's brigade, which had been held in reserve, took up a position
on the opposite side of the road, completely commanding it. The
struggle, lasting some three-quarters of an hour, was a desperate
one, being in many instances a hand-to-hand confiict.
Night had now come on, our loss had been severe, and the enemy
occupying a position in the woods on our left, which gave them a
flank fire upon us, I was forced to give the order for a retreat. The
retreat was executed in good order, the attempt of the enemy to fol¬
low being defeated by a few well directed volleys from Patrick's
brigade.
On the afternoon of the 30th ultimo I was directed to report with
the division to General Fitz-John Porter, who, as I was informed,
held us as a reserve to support the attack on the enemy's center. I
found General Porter's troops formed in the rear of a piece of woods
about one-half mile to the right of the front, at which the division
had been engaged the day previous. On reporting to General
Porter, and informing him of the order under which I came, he
directed me to post the division on the right of his own troops, and
to make the attack simultaneously with himself.
The division was drawn up in seven lines, composed as follows :
First and Second, Hatch's brigade ; Third and Fourth, Patrick's
brigade ; Fifth and Sixth, Gibbon's brigade ; Seventh, Double-
day's brigade ; the 2d U. S. Sharpshooters being advanced as
skirmishers in the woods. At the word given by General Porter
the division advanced, with an interval of fifty yards between the
lines. The enemy were .very strongly posted behind an old disused
railroad embankment where, according to their own statement, the}^
had been awaiting us for two days. This railroad embankment,
which runs parallel to the edge of the woods where we entered in
front of our right wing, bears more to the rear on reaching a piece
of open ground in front of our left wing.
After passing through the woods and reaching the open space
the left wing of the first line was obliged to make a partial wheel to
the right, to enable them to approach the enemy. This movement
was executed under a heavy fire of artillery on the left and of
musketry from the woods directly in our front.
Seeing the great disadvantagès under which the first and second
148
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
lines labored, the others, as they came up, were ordered to oblique
more to the right, to enable them to attack the troops behind thè
railroad embankment, and also to get a partial flank fire upon that
portion of the embankment which crosses the open field. The con¬
test for the possession of this embankment was most desperate.
The troops on both sides fought with the most determined courage,
and I doubt not that the conflict at this point was one of the most
bloody of the war. Having myself received a wound which dis¬
abled me, I was forced to leave the field before the struggle
terminated. * * * * General Doubleday exhibited the greatest
gallantry in leading on his brigade under a terrible fire on the night
of the 29th, and with his aid-de-camp, Maj. U. Doubleday, and
Capt. E. P. Halstead, assistant adjutant general, did much of reck¬
less daring toward keeping this brigade from giving way when hard
pressed.
Capt. Robert Chandler, assistant adjutant general, (King's
staff) and Capt. J. A. Judson, assistant adjutant general (who was
taken prisoner while carrying an order on the field), were distin¬
guished for their good conduct on the 29th.
***** ****
Lieutenants Bennett and Lyon are also noted for their gallantry
on the field. John P. Hatch.
Capt. R. Chandler.
On the morning of the 30th, General Ricketts was
ordered to send two brigades to the assistance of Kearny
on the right. Taking the First, under Duryea, composed
of the 97th, 104th, and 105th New York Regiments, and
the 107th Pennsylvania, and the Fourth Brigade under
Colonel Joseph Thoburn, composed of the 84th Pennsyl¬
vania, iioth Pennsylvania, ist West Virginia, and 7th
Indiana, he immediately marched to Kearny's assistance.
Colonel Thoburn's brigade relieved a portion of Kear¬
ny's command, while Duryea advanced on his left, through
the woods, attacking the enemy along the old railroad ex¬
cavation. His command, as it neared the enemy's posi¬
tion, received a very severe fire from artillery and infantry.
Duryea received a wound from a piece of shell, but re¬
mained in command. At this critical time in the battle,
Captain Fisher, of Ricketts' staff, had his horse shot under
him, and was taken prisoner.
GEN. LOUIS WAGNER.
SECOND BULL RUN.
149
While the First and Fourth Brigades were thus hotly
engaged (Kearny never called for assistance except in great
need), the Second and Third Brigades were advanced on
the left, under the command of Gen. Z. B. Tower. The
Second Brigade, which was Tower's, was composed of the
26th and 94th New York, and the 88th and 90th Penn¬
sylvania Regiments. The Third Brigade (Hartsuff's)
had the 12th, and 13th Massachusetts, 83d New York, and
nth Pennsylvania. These two brigades fought with a
valor and heroism never excelled on the field of battle.
Quite an incident oecurred in the 88th Pennsylvania.
Two officers, Louis Wagner and R. B. Beath, were both
wounded. They were devoted friends, and both have been
Commander-in-chief of the Grand Army of the Republic.
Not only are they held in high esteem by the ex-soldiers,
but they are eminent and useful citizens.
Hall's and Leppien's Maine batteries were engaged on
Tower's left. While Ricketts' division was thus disposed,
he was ordered to advance on the road leading from Sudley
Springs to New Market, and follow along the road, "in
pursuit of the enemy." He gave the order and reported to
General Heintzelman as directed. Ricketts finding his
division was being hard pressed by the enemy, reported it
to McDowell, when the order was revoked.
Thompson's battery was moved to the right of the line
to assist in checking the enemy, but was outnumbered in
guns, so it was withdrawn and ordered to the right of
Stevens' division to assist Matthews' battery.
Ricketts' division had fought most gallantly, but the
tide of battle was setting in against the Union_ troops, and
a retrograde movement was gradually being made all along
the line.
Longstreet was forcing Reynolds back off of Bald
Hill which uncovered McLean's brigade on the right.
Sigel seeing the perilous position of McLean sent Milroy's
brigade to his assistance, but the latter, failing to close up
on Mcl^ean, left a gap through which the enemy poured,
150 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
and threw our line into confusion. Sigel again seeing the
necessity of holding Bald Hill directed Koltes' brigade to
go to their assistance. He made a gallant charge in which
he surrendered up his life, but the hill was not retaken.
General Schenck was wounded while leading a charge.
As our troops came back, lyongstreet attempted to take
possession of the hill where the Henry House stands, turn
our left, and get possession of the road to the Stone Bridge,
but was thwarted by Buchanan's Regulars, assisted by the
two brigades under General Tower.
Reynolds here reformed his lines with those commands
which formed a nucleus for other troops to rally round,
and checked the great tidal wave of Longstreet's troops.
Pope had left the field and put Hooker in command,
who directed General Gibbon to cover the retreat. He
(Gibbon) then gave the order to retire. When the troops of
Gibbon's brigade arrived near the Stone Bridge, Kearny
rode up to Battery B, 4th United States Artillery, and
directed it to hold that position until he gave orders for it
to be relieved. Companies B and G of the 19th Indiana,
under the command of Capt. W. W. Dudley, supported
the battery, and destroyed the bridge after all the troops
had crossed. It was then well into night, and confusion
again began to reign as it did a year previous when the
first Bull Run was fought.
The commands of Sumner and Franklin lay within a
few miles of the battlefield on the 30th, and that, too, right
in rear of Jackson's corps. If these troops had been
hurled on Jackson he could not have maintained his posi¬
tion a single hour ; and there was ample time for their
arrival on the field, as the last assault began about half-
past four in the afternoon and continued until the Union
Army gave way. If they had attacked as late as five
o'clock defeat would have been changed into victory.
While the Confederate army was following up the re¬
treating columns of the Union forces. General Lee was
seated on a log, in company with some officers, when his
SECOND BULL RUN.
151
horse got frightened, and so badly hurt or sprained the
general's ann in his attempt to hold him that he could not
ride on horseback, and was compelled to go in an ambu¬
lance until he arrived at Sharpsburg just before the battle
of Antietam.
That there was rank jealousy against Pope, everyone
in the army knew. In speaking of that matter to me,
Pleasonton said that Pope came from the Western army to
take command at a time when misfortune, more or less,
had attended our operations ; that already the spirit of
jealousy was exhibiting itself at home, but to have a foreign
officer, so to speak, come and to take command, even if he
had had success in the West, was more than our officers
could bear. He said he declined service in the West on
that very account,
Pleasonton was a clear-headed officer, who seldom ex¬
hibited jealousy against other officers, and never in but one
instance did I ever hear him so speak during the time that
he assisted me in this work, and then in no unkind manner.
There was one element that was always loyal to every
commander, and that was the rank and file—they wished
everyone a victory and did all in their power to accom¬
plish that end, A more patriotic and intelligent army I do
not think was ever organized, and many of them "have
since occupied positions on the bench—two from the 19th
Indiana—Gibson and Buckles stand high as judges in
California, while others have been governors of States ;
W, W, Brown, of the Pennsylvania Reserves, served four
years in Congress where he made his mark. Their loyalty
to the Constitution and their country has never flagged.
Many of them were the descendants of the soldiers of the
Revolution, and the country with one flag will ever be safe
in their hands either in peace or war.
Pope's army lay around Centerville on August 31,
Sigel on the south. Franklin immediately around the
village, and Porter at the north.
On September i Pope, learning that Jackson was men-
152
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
acing his right and rear, hastily moved his army to Fairfax
Court House.
Hooker was again placed in command and took the
lyittle River road. In marching in the direction of Chan¬
tilly he passed through Germantown, with McDowell and
Franklin taking position to his left and rear, at the angle
of the roads.
Reno formed on Hooker's left, with Heintzelman's
corps supporting, Kearny's division leading. Ricketts' di¬
vision, of the First Corps, and a part of King's division,
acted in conjunction with Reno.
Patrick's brigade was pushed forward in the direction
of Chantilly, and the 20th New York (Ulster Guard) was
especially detailed to report to Hooker, who directed
Colonel Gates to take possession of a piece of woods and
hold it near where the enemy appeared to be fixing to place
a battery in position. Colonel Gates deployed the regi¬
ment, and held the position until relieved.
As Jackson marched in the direction of Fairfax, he
struck Hooker, and opened his artillery without effect. In
the mean time he had formed his corps to the right of the
road, with Starke's division first, then Uawton's, and finally
A. P. Hill's. The latter opened the battle, with Brocken-
borough's and Branch's brigades upon the Union left.
These forces made no impression upon Reno who, in turn,
drove them back in disorder. Hill at once ordered Thomas,
Pender, and Gregg, with a part of Uawton's division, to
their assistance.
The second attack fell heavily on Stevens' division,
which gave way when its gallant commander was killed.
Here a sad occurrence took place. As the battle raged
with desperate fury, Stevens took the colors of a regiment
and was in the act of riding to the front with them, when
he was informed that his son, who was on his staff, had
been mortally wounded on the left of the line! He turned
to a chaplain, and asked him to go to his son. He had
scarcely finished his request when he was killed.
SECOND BULL RUN.
153
This movement forced back Reno. Kearny coming up
with the advanced division of Heintzelman' s corps, ordered
Bimey's brigade into the gap made by Stevens' division.
Then Kearny rode forward to examine the situation at the
front, when he soon found himself right up to the enemy's
lines, who ordered him to halt. Turning his horse sud¬
denly to retrace his steps, a volley from the enemy mortally
wounded him. Thus ended the life and military career of
an officer booked for fame. As an officer of dash, coolness,
decision, and military spirit Kearny was not excelled, and
his death was a great loss to the Union cause.
This battle was fought while a thunderstorm was rag¬
ing with a madness that seemed livid with its fury.
The next morning Pope's army moved bn unmolested
to its destination in front of Washington, where the differ¬
ent commands took their old quarters, while their chief.
General Pope, reported to the War Department, and asked
to be relieved, which was speedily done, and his army van¬
ished from existence as if it had never been created. So
ended one of the distinctive events of the war, remembered
in history for its bright prospects and monumental failure.
CHAPTER V.
SOUTH MOUNTAIN.
^ I ^HE Army of the Potomac had again suffered defeat
on the same inglorious field of Bull Run, and that
stream had proven itself bitter waters to the Union forces.
The defeat of the second Bull Run was more severe than
the first, for that was fought at the beginning of the war ;
both armies had been seasoned and disciplined with the
Peninsular Campaign, and having met after that, were
more fully prepared for war in the second.
After the first battle our troops were not pursued much
this side of Centerville, but Chantilly was fought after the
second, where we lost Kearny and Stevens.
Eee had pursued the Union Army almost to Washing¬
ton, where it rested inside of the fortifications.
What should he do? Wherever the two armies had
met the Confederates had decidedly the advantage, and
now he was pausing only a few miles from Arlington, his
old home, which came to him from Colonel Custis. Lee
married his granddaughter.
Victorious he could not retire to Richmond without con¬
fessing a weakness or timidity. If he remained where he
was he might be flanked with a heavy army, and suffer
defeat, which would neutralize his former work.
Maryland was a slave State, and there were many bit¬
ter secessionists in it who were loud in their professions of
that fact. The State was rich in many respects ; no army
had marched through it to consume its fine products. Her
pastures were filled with fat cattle and splendid horses.
154
sou TH MO UNI A IN.
155
lyce's army was hungry and poorly clad. Lee had
strong hopes that he would recruit his wasting army with
the Sonthern sympathizers, who perhaps had had no favor¬
able opportunity to enlist.
That he also had an idea of making Pennsylvania pay
tribute is undoubtedly a fact, for Chambersburg will soon
testify to that fact. If he still continued successful in bat¬
tle Harrisburg was in easy reach, where the Pennsylvania
and Northern Central Railroads could have been destroyed
and the rich coal fields of that part of the Keystone State
fired, which would have greatly crippled the Union cause.
On that snbject Gen. Bradley T. Johnson says :
General Lee's purpose, then, in transferring the seat of the
war to the north of the Potomac was : ist. To relieve Virginia from
the pressure of the contending armies and delay anothér invasion
until the next season. 2d. To inflict as great an injury—material
and moral—to his enemy as was practicable. 3d. To reënforce the
Confederacy by the alliance of Maryland, which could have been
certainly secured by a permanent occupation and by an exhibition
of superior force. 4th. As a consequence, the occupation of the
Federal capital, the evacuation of it by the Federal Government,
the acknowledgment of the Confederate Government as a Govern¬
ment de jure as well as de facto by France and England, and the
necessary achievement of the independence of the Confederate
States. During the summer of 1862 the Emperor of the Prench had
been openly in sympathy with the cause of the Confederate States,
and under the name of sometimes mediation, sometimes recogni¬
tion, had always been anxious to intervene in their behalf. He was
pressing the English Government without ceasing to unite with
him in acknowledging the existence of the new government, and
recognition, as all the world knew at that time, meant independ¬
ence. Therefore when Lee crossed the Potomac he was playing
for a great stake.
This is what one of Lee's generals said in Richmond in
October, 1884, before the Virginia division of the Associa¬
tion of the Army of Northern Virginia.
No doubt General Johnson was one of the men who in¬
sisted on his marching into Maryland, as he had lived
there before the war.
156 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
L/ce put his army in motion for Leesburg on the 3d
of September. He knew his purpose would not be under¬
stood until he had ample time to throw his whole r iny
into Maryland, for it might be supposed he was going back
to the Shenandoah, which would put the mountains between
the two armies and give him a chance again to rush
through some gap and pounce on the Union Army while
marching by the flank, and- give it a stunning blow.
It had never been hinted that he had designs of a North¬
ern invasion, hence his movements were not understood
in Washington.
On the 5th of September Jackson crossed the Potomac
at White's Ford near Leesburg—he was then in " »«j
Maryland. ' '
Marching toward Frederick, which is in an easterly
direction from South Mountain, he halted his command
on the right bank of the Monocacy to prevent a snrprise or
an attack from Washington. But it took some time to
reorganize the Army of the Potomac, so there was no dan¬
ger from that source.
General Pope had requested to be relieved from his com¬
mand and McClellan had again been restored, to the great
joy of the majority of the officers and men.
McDowell was relieved of the command of the First
Corps and it was placed under General Hooker,—an excel¬
lent selection.
Sumner remained in charge of the Second and also the
Twelfth under Mansfield, which was the center grand
division ; Porter had the Fifth and Franklin the Sixth
Corps, composed of the divisions of Generals W. F. Smith,
Slocum, and Couch. The Ninth (Burnsides' old corps)
was given to Reno, and Burnside placed in command of
the right wing. Gen. H. J. Hunt was assigned to the
command of the artillery and General Pleasonton the cav¬
alry.
The troops were now ready to march up the left bank
of the Potomac to meet the enemy then known to be in
SOUTH MOUNTAIN.
157
Maryland ; though their position was not definitely known,
it might well have been easily surmised, for General White
with 4,000 troops had been compelled to retire from Mar¬
tinsburg to Harper's Ferry, when he swelled Miles' com¬
mand to nearly 12,000 with immense stores, greatly needed
by Fee's half clad and hungry army.
Although Jackson had crossed below Harper's Ferry on
the 5th of September, Fee did not expect Halleck would
attempt to hold that position, for, though a very strong mili¬
tary point, it was then utterly worthless as a key or even
an ordinary position with the whole of Fee's army weav¬
ing itself around it—it was a great stake to play for indeed.
It was more than Fee hoped for—rashness beyond degree to
leave the troops there ; and it was the worst military blind¬
ness for Miles to remain there, for he knew the enemy had
crossed between him and Washington, and cut the wires,
and there was no way to communicate with him but by
courier, and also great danger of important dispatches
being lost.
Gen. George J. Stannard, then commanding the 9th
Vermont, was at Harper's Ferry. Just before his death he
gave me a full account of it, and made an engagement
to go up there to see where he formed his line of battle
with his regiment, and kept the enemy at bay for 24
hours, all the time begging Miles to follow Davis out, who
had crossed the Potomac along the Maryland Heights, and,
evading the right wing of McFaws, continued up the left
bank of the Potomac until near Sharpsburg, then march¬
ing northward struck and captured Fongstreet's train.
But we must now turn our attention to Fee. He had
received positive information that Miles was still holding
Harper's Ferry, and he resolved to capture that prize, for
he could make prisoners and parole about 12,000 men,
one-eighth of the Army of the Potomac, and they could
not fight him again that year, besides which he would
capture nearly $1,000,000 worth of stores.
So far, his çeception in Maryland had been cold. It
158
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
was not close enough to Baltimore to breathe the secession
air as it was borne on the breeze up the Chesapeake from
the South. Nearer the Federal Capital there was a good
wholesome Union sentiment largely in the ascendency, while
the neutral men were stolid and gave no expression, leav¬
ing the secessionists alone to their glory—they, seeing the
ragged and jaded condition of the soldiers of the Confed¬
erate army, decided to stay at home yet a little while and
take care of their families.
Lee was not slow to observe the cold manner in which
he had been received.
If he had crossed the Potomac at or near the Chain
Bridge, and passing around closely to Washington, marched
rapidly on Baltimore, compelling its surrender, he might
have induced many to join his standard. Simply to enter
the State at one side, and march only one day toward the
interior was not enough evidence that he was master of
the situation. But his immediate move was to capture
Harper's Ferry.
The Comte de Paris says : "He (Lee) determined to take
advantage of this strange imprudence." Strange, I should
say, with no hope but certain capture if our troops re¬
mained there ; it was a key to the door which had been left
open !
Accordingly Lee issued the following order to capture
Harper's Ferry before McClellan's army could attack him :
Headquarters Army of Northern Virginia,
September 9, 1862.
This army will resume its march to-morrow, taking the
Hagerstown road. General Jackson's command will form the ad¬
vance, and after passing Middletown with such portion as he may
select, take the route toward Sharpsburg, cross the Potomac, and
by Friday night take possession of the Baltimore and Ohio Rail¬
road, capture such of the enemy as may be at Martinsburg,
and intercept such of the enemy as may attempt to escape from
Harper's Ferry. General Longstreet's command will pursue the
same road as far as Boonsboro, where it will halt with the re¬
serve supply baggage trains of the army.
SOUTH MOUNTAIN.
159
General McLaws, with his own division and that of Gen. R.
H. Anderson, will follow General Longstreet. On reaching Mid-
dletown he will take the route to Harper's Ferry, and by Friday
morning possess himself of the Maryland Heights, and en¬
deavor to capture the enemy at Harper's Ferry and vicinity.
General Walker, with his division, after accomplishing the ob¬
ject in which he is now engaged, will cross the Potomac at Cheek's
Ford, ascend its right bank to Lovettsville, and take possession of
Loudon Heights, if practicable, by Friday morning. Key's Ford
on his left and the road between the end of the mountain and
the Potomac on his right. He will, as far as practicable, co¬
operate with General McLaws and General Jackson in intercept¬
ing the retreat of the enemy.
General D. H. Hill's division will form the rear guard" of
the army pursuing the road taken by the main body. The re¬
serve artillery, ordnance and supply trains, etc., will precede
General Hill ; General Stuart will detach a squadron of cavalry
to accompany the commands of Generals Longstreet, Jackson and
McLaws, and with the main body of the cavalry will cover the
route of the army, and bring up all stragglers that may be left
behind. The commands of Generals Jackson, McLaws and Walker,
after accomplishing the object for which they have been detached,
will join the main body of the army at Boonsboro or Hagers-
town. Each regiment on the march will habitually carry its
axes in the regimental ordnance wagon, for use of the men at
their encampments to procure wood, etc.
By command of Gen. R. E. Lee :
R. H. Chilton, Assistant Adjutant General.
Major General D. H. Hill, Commanding-Division.
McClellan's army arrived at Frederick on the 13th ; the
Twelfth Corps, under General Mansfield, encamped on the
same ground occupied by Gen. D. H. Hill. First Ser¬
geant John M. Bloss and Private B. W. Mitchell, of Com¬
pany F, 27th Indiana,, an excellent regiment, found Lee's
order wrapped around three cigars. It was taken imme¬
diately to McClellan, and gave him full knowledge of Lee's
intentions and movements.
Buriiside was on the right, in command of the First and
Ninth Corps, under Hooker and Reno, Sumner in the
center, with his own—the Second Corps—and the Twelfth
under Mansfield, Franklin, with the Sixth Corps, was
160
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
forging his way up the river, on the left, while Hooker,
with the First Corps, was on the old national road on the
extreme right.
Fee's orders exploded Halleck's theory that Lee was
perhaps making a feint in crossing the Potomac into Mary¬
land, and that his real intention was to draw McClellan as
far away from Washington as possible, and then recross
the Potomac, make a forced march and capture Washing¬
ton before the Army of the Potomac could be counter¬
marched to checkmate the move. McClellan claimed that
he was moving very cautiously to suit Halleck's fears.
But he was in possession of Lee's plans on the 13th,
and there was no more danger of Washington than there
was of Boston. Furthermore Lee had divided up and dis¬
tributed his army to suit McClellan's wishes as much as if
General Marcy (his father-in-law and chief of staff) had
made the arrangements. Jackson had to march from the
vicinity of Middletown to Martinsburg, then move back on
Harper's Ferry, approaching it so as to prevent an escape
of the troops there up the left bank of the Shenandoah—
which would compel him to throw a part of his command
around south, and let his right sweep the bank of the She¬
nandoah, hugging it closely. That was a long distance,
and much of the road was rough and difficult to march
over.
Walker was directed to occupy Loudon Heights, McLaws
marching on Maryland Heights, Jackson off in Virginia,
marching around to come in the rear of Bolivar Heights,
Longstreet directed to Hagerstown, and D. H. Hill near
Boonsboro—a mile or so west of the base of South Moun¬
tain on the old national road. This placed Lee's army in
the best possible condition to attack. A single blow at
any of these commands might be fatal to Lee.
This was McClellan's golden opportunity to place his
name by the side of Napoleon's. The distance was not
very far from Frederick to Harper's Ferry. The army was
in good condition and spirits, and marching on South
SOUTH MOUNTAIN.
161
Mountain. Franklin was bearing on Crampton's Gap,
while Reno was taking the old Braddock route through
Sharpsburg, crossing the mountain at Foxe's Gap. Hooker
was on the old national road which crosses the mountain
at Turner's Gap. Near its base he left it, and took the old
Hagerstown road, which makes a deflection from the na¬
tional road north, and again comes into it at the Mountain
House, a romantic country inn on the top of the mountain,
where the weary traveler could rest and enjoy one of the
most fascinating landscapes in America.
Mrs. Admiral Dalghren has purchased it since the ad¬
miral's death, and fitted it up in an elegant manner for a
summer residence. It was the headquarters of Generals
Hill and Colquitt during the battle of South Mountain.
Hooker formed his line of battle as follows : Gibbon's
brigade on the pike—but that brigade was temporarily de¬
tached from the First Corps to support and assist Reno's
right, as he was meeting with stubborn resistance.
After leaving Washington on its march toward Rock-
ville the Iron Brigade was pretty thoroughly reorganized
and many new recruits joined the different regiments—
especially the 19th Indiana—having been forwarded to
them after the battle of Second Bull Run, to fill up their
decimated ranks.
Quite a halt was made at Rockville and the company
officers were very busy getting up their muster rolls and
performing duties necessary after a long and arduous
campaign.
After leaving Rockville the column moved very steadily
and rapidly across the Monocacy River through Frederick,
and on Sunday morning, the 14th of September, it passed
over the eastern range of the Blue Hills and had spread out
before it the purple fields of Pleasant Valley beyond which
the South Mountain range loomed up, and upon which the
brigade knew the enemy had formed his lines to dispute its
farther progress westward. The spirit of the men was
never better ; and the enthusiastic loyalty exhibited by the
XI
162
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
citizens of Frederick, as they passed through, did much to
fill the brigade with ardor for the fight they knew was
before them and the necessity for repelling the invasion of
Fee. About three o'clock in the afternoon of Sunday, they
were halted upon the western side of the valley near the
foot of the hills, their line stretching on either side of the
national road. The noncombatants were sent to the rear,
and the word came that their task had been assigned them,
viz. : to carry Turner's Gap, through which the national
turnpike passes. Far off to the left and on the right they
could see the troops advancing to the attack, and about
five o'clock came the word for the Iron Brigade to move
forward. The 2d Wisconsin was placed in the rear of the
other three regiments, which were in line of battle, the
6th and 7th Wisconsin on the right of the turnpike and the
19th Indiana on the left. After moving forward across a
creek through an orchard. Company B of the 2d Wisconsin
passed through between the 19th and 7th, and moved
rapidly to the front, deploying as skirmishers, the line halt¬
ing in the mean time, while Captain Caldwell developed
the skirmishers of the enemy in their front. Very soon the
firing commenced along the skirmish line, and as the line
of battle moved forward, the skirmishers preceding the Con¬
federate line of battle moved a little back toward the base
of the hill, the 6th Wisconsin skirmishing with the enemy
among the large bowlders on the side of the mountain on
the right hand side of the pass. About this juncture Captain
Caldwell sent back word to the 19th Indiana that the enemy
were preparing to concentrate the fire of several batteries
upon our line, and suggested that Battery B, 4th U. S.
Artillery, be brought as close as possible to the line of
battle to respond. We had now come within easy rifle
range of the base of the mountain, and the Confederate
sharpshooters were beginning to annoy t?he Union line very
much by their marksmanship in picking off officers in the
line of battle. At this time Captain Caldwell, who was a
magnificent looking soldier, fell mortally wounded, and his
SOUTH MO UNTAIN.
163
line retired while the line of battle pushed still farther for¬
ward. As the gorge contracted it became necessary to
change the formation somewhat, and the command was
given by Colonel Meredith, "By the right of companies to
the front. " While marching forward in this formation they
were subjected to a ricochetting fire of solid shot, which
fortunately did but little damage, owing to the peculiar
front presented, the shots, most of them, passing through
between the companies ; but it was evident, as the artillery
fire was increasing and as they should meet with the line of
battle of the enemy, that the column formation must be
'abandoned and the lines of battle resumed. On our right
Colonel Bragg, commanding the 6th Wisconsin, had met
with the same conditions, and to meet it had thrown his
line, owing to the narrowness of the field through which he
was advancing, into the form of column by wing, and as his
right wing advanced his left wing halted, and when the
right had delivered its volley it halted and the left passed
over it.
This formation was quickly adopted in rotation by the
brigade, and they were soon pressing the enemy by succes¬
sive wing volleys to a point beyond which to retire on their
part meant a rout ; they consequently made a stand at
what was known as the ' ' stone wall ' ' line, which ran
across the gorge and up the right side of the defile—the
only opening in it being that made by the national road
turnpike. Here the two wings were deployed, and the
single line of battle formed by moving the 19th Indiana
well off to the left in the field, and the 7th Wisconsin fol¬
lowing it, leaving a gap between the turnpike and the 6th
Wisconsin which was immediately filled by Colonel Fair-
child, who moved the 2d at once into action. It was now
getting dusk, and the contest over the stone wall was
very severe, our men forcing their way to one side of the
wall while the Confederates held the other with a courage
worthy of a better cause. It became necessary to flank
them ont of this position, and the darkness made it easy to
164 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
do so. Colonel Meredith ordered Companies B and G,
under command of Captain Dudley, to withdraw from the
line of battle, and gave him instructions to move rapidly to
the extreme left of the gorge, climb the side of the moun¬
tain and press far enough forward to get an enfilading fire
upon the western side of the wall. This movement was
accomplished without encountering any of the enemy ; and
very soon our fire seemed to have the desired effect, for
with a shout our men soon had the foe in full retreat up
the side of the mountain, and the battle of South Moun¬
tain was over.
I should have spoken of the work done by two guns of
Battery B, which at Colonel Meredith's request were, by
order of General Gibbon, following the line of battle to
the road behind us ; and while we were suffering from the
fire of the sharpshooters located in the frame building to
the west side of the defile, he planted a few well-directed
shells into the building and put a stop to that pastime ; for
immediately after the shells had struck the roof the Con¬
federate riflemen deserted the building and made good
haste in climbing the hill to get out of the way of Stew¬
art's shot. A little spherical case followed the shells, and
our left was relieved from the galling fire of their marks¬
men. When we occupied the ground we found several of
them wounded in the house, and could easily see what ter¬
rible havoc had been done by the well-directed fire of
Stewart's guns.
Skirmishers were at once thrown forward to follow the
retreating enemy ; they gained the crest of the mountain,
and the brigade rested upon its laurels about ten o'clock at
night, gathered up the wounded and slain and gave them
proper attention, relieved the agonies of our fallen enemies
as far as possible, and bivouacked upon the field that night.
The next morning at daybreak we started in pursuit, and
from the Mountain House, which is located at the side of
the turnpike at the summit, to Boonsboro, and off to the
left to Keedysville and Antietam Creek, the command
EX-PRESIDENT PIAYES.
SOUTH MOUNTAIN.
165
moved very rapidly, hardly stopping to gather up the
prisoners, who, having thrown everything away, were ly¬
ing along the roadside, apparently glad to be captured. The
enemy who opposed the Iron Brigade on the night of Sep¬
tember 14 were found to be Georgia troops under command
of General Colquitt, afterwards United States Senator from
that State.
Hatch's division, composed of Patrick's, Doubleday's
and Col. Walter Phelps' brigades, were on the right of Gib¬
bon, the Pennsylvania Reserves forming the extreme right
under General Meade. Governor Cnrtin, anticipating
an invasion of Pennsylvania, had called for 75,000 volun¬
teers to defend the State, and General Reynolds was or¬
dered to Harrisbnrg to command them, while General
Meade was placed in temporary command of the Penn¬
sylvania Reserve Division.
Now let us turn from Hooker's line of battle, formed
near the base of the mountain on the north side of the
pike, and see how the gallant Reno is faring south of it,
up the old Braddock route. Gen. J. D. Cox, commanding
the Kanawha Division of Reno's corps, directed Colonel
Scammon to feel the enemy with his brigade, and Colonel
Crook followed with his brigade in supporting distance.
General Cox sent word back to Reno that he was ad¬
vancing with his whole division, and that if a severe en¬
gagement took place he wanted Pleasonton to command
until he (Reno) could come up.
Col. R. B. Hayes, afterwards President of the United
States, was directed to take the 23d Ohio and turn the
enemy's right if possible.
The fighting was severe ; if the Confederates were re¬
pulsed then the command of McLaws could scarcely escape
capture, and that would ruin Lee's army. South Moun¬
tain was a good defensive position ; a few hours would
be sufficient to pile up a stone wall behind which troops
could pour a deadly fire into the lines of battle as they ad¬
vanced up the side of the mountain. Besides, it was a
166
THE AU MV OF THE POTOMAC.
grand position for artillery, while the Union artillery
could do but little effective work. The only thing that
operated against the Confederate artillery at short range
was to get its guns depressed enough.
General Garland commanded the enemy at that point.
He was a determined and brave officer, and fought with
great desperation. The mountain has two crests there ;
our troops gained and held the first one by noon.
Garland, in a bold assault, was mortally wounded,
which depressed his men, and they gave way, but soon the
brigades of Anderson, Ripley, and a part of Colquitt's re-
enforced them.
In the mean time Wilcox's division of Reno's corps ar¬
rived and formed on Cox's right, and with Harlan's bri¬
gade of Rodman's division extended well over to the Na¬
tional road. Fairchild's brigade of Rodman's division
had been sent to the left to help Colonel Hayes. Sturges'
division supported Wilcox.
The Comte de Paris, on page 321 of his second volume,
says : "Hill's right, which defended the ridge south of the
pass, only consisted of Garland's brigade; its numerical
inferiority, however, was fully compensated by the defen¬
sive advantages of the ground it occupied."
When Wilcox was forming he was attacked so severely
by Longstreet's men, who had hurried forward to save
Hill, that his command was thrown into confusion mo¬
mentarily, and the gunners of one of the batteries retreated
on seeing that the enemy sprang forward to capture them,
but the 79th New York and 17th Michigan made a sally,
drove back the enemy and restored Wilcox's line.
When the advance was made Meade ordered Lieutenant
Colonel Clarke, commanding the 3d Regiment, to move to
the right and occupy an eminence to protect the right
flank, and also observe the movements of the enemy.
The Bucktails were thrown forward as skirmishers, fol¬
lowed by the 2d as a support. The Second Brigade,
commanded by Colonel Magilton, was on the left, the
SOUTH MOUNTAIN.
167
Third, commanded by Colonel Gallagher, was in the center,
while on the extreme right was the First Brigade, com¬
manded by General Seymour. In this formation they ad¬
vanced over the uneven ground. It was utterly impossible
to keep any alignments—in fact each brigade was almost
an independent command, except as they could tell where
the others were by the firing. The enemy took advantage
of hiding places in ravines, behind bowlders, on the side of
the mountain, stone walls, or anything that would shelter
them.
That gallant and fearless regiment, the Bucktails, was
firing and advancing as if they were going to take the crest
of the mountain itself. Suddenly they came to a cornfield
where the enemy were thickly posted. A terrific fire soon
brought the skirmish line to a halt. General Seymour,
seeing his work clear, directed Colonel Biddle Roberts of
the ist to charge up the mountain. Observing Colonel
Fisher of the 5th coming up with a splendid line of battle,
Seymour said : "Colonel put your regiment into that corn¬
field and hurt somebody." "I will. General, and I'll catch
one alive for you." This repartee between General Seymour
and Colonel Fisher so amused the men that they scaled the
stone wall and soon captured eleven, which they sent back
to the general. A cheer went up along the whole line,
and the 2d Regiment, under Captain Byrnes, and the 6th
under Colonel Sinclair, went forward to gain the crest be¬
fore the ist or 5th if possible.
Colonel Gallagher, commanding the Third Brigade, fell
badly wounded while leading the charge of his brigade,
and Colonel Anderson of the 9th took command of the bri¬
gade. The nth, under command of Col. S. M. Jackson,
was ordered to drive the enemy from a deep ravine. As they
advanced, a single volley from the concealed enemy played
sad havoc with the officers ; one-half had fallen, but the
regiment, infuriated by their loss, rushed on them, and
drove them up the mountain. The Second Brigade, on
the left, moved up the slope over toward the pike. They
168 THE- ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
had heavy work, and moved slowly up the mountain.
The 8th, on the extreme left of the brigade, suffered heav¬
ily, losing more than all the rest of the brigade. Meade
feared his right flank would be turned, and called for
help.
Duryea's brigade of Ricketts' division was sent to his
assistance. It had a very rough road to travel to reach
that part of the line. When Duryea reported it was a little
late, and he was directed to go in on the left of Seymour,
who was holding his position, and in fact pressing back
the enemy. Ricketts' division was supporting Hatch and
Meade.
The losses of the Pennsylvania Reserve Division are as
follows :—The ist, commanded by Colonel Roberts, 3
officers and 7 men killed, 3 officers and 27 men wounded ;
in the 2d, commanded by Captain Byrnes, 7 men killed,
I officer and 9 men wounded. The 3d, on the plank
road, not engaged. The 4th, commanded by Capt. F.
B. F. Fisher, 5 men killed and 22 wounded ; in the 5th,
commanded by Colonel Fisher, i man was killed and 12
wounded ; in the 6th, commanded by Colonel Sinclair, 12
men were killed, i officer and 39 men were wounded ; in the
7th, commanded by Colonel Bolinger, 5 men were killed,
and" Colonel Bolinger and 11 men were wounded, leaving
Maj. C. A. Lyman in command ; in the 8th, command¬
ed by S. W. Baily, i officer and 13 men were killed, and
I officer and 36 men were wounded—when Colonel Ander¬
son took command of the brigade, Capt. Samuel B. Dick
assumed command of the regiment ; in the loth, com¬
manded by Lieutenant Colonel Warner, 4 men were killed,
I officer and 18 men were wounded; in the nth, com¬
manded by Lieut. Col. S. W. Jackson, 2 officers and 10 men
were killed, and 5 officers and 24 men were wounded ; and
in the 12th, commanded by Capt. J. A. Boler, 6 men
were killed, and i officer and 19 men were wounded. In the
Bucktail Regiment, commanded by Colonel McNeil, i offi¬
cer and 15 men were killed, and 2 officers and 32 men were
SOUTH MOUNTAIN.
169
wounded. The artillery could not be used, and suffered no
loss.
The casualties among the officers were as follows :—In
the ist Capt. Thomas P. Diven, and Lieuts. John H. Tay¬
lor and John D. Sadler were killed, and Lieuts. Joseph Tag-
gert, F. McManus, and H. N. Minnigh were wounded.
In the 2d Lieut. Richard Clendenning was wounded. In
the 6th Capt. C. D. Roush was wounded. In the 7th
Colonel Bolinger was severely wounded. In the 8th Lieut.
William M. Carter was killed, and Lieut. Samuel Mc-
Candless was wounded. In the 9th Lieut. William Hope
was wounded. In the loth Lieut. H. I. Howe was wounded.
In the nth Capt. E. R. Brady and Lieut. W. F. Jackson
were killed, and Col. Thomas F. Gallagher, Capts. Evard
Rierer and Nathaniel Nesbits, Quartermaster H. A. Tor-
rence, and Lieut. J. S. Kennedy were wounded. In the
12th Lieut. E. Kelly was wounded. In the Bucktails Lieut.
Charles Bitterling was killed, and Capt. E. A. Irvin and
Lieut. Samuel A. Mack were wounded.
General Meade gives the following report of this battle :
I have the honor to submit the following report of the opera¬
tions of the division of the Pennsylvania Reserves under my com¬
mand during the action of South Mountain Gap, on the 14th inst. :
The division left its camp on the Monocacy early on the morn¬
ing of the 14th instant, and marched to Middletown and beyond,
where it was halted about one p. m. of that day, General Reno's
corps being in front and engaged with the enemy. About two p.m.
this division was ordered to the front to his support. The enemy
was disputing our passage over the turnpike through the South
Mountain, and had been attacked on the left by General Reno.
After some consultation with the general comriianding the right
wing and the corps, I was directed to move the division on a road
leading oíF to the right of the turnpike and toward the enemy's left.
After advancing for over a mile on this road, the division, which
was in advance of the corps, was turned across the field to the left
and moved in an advantageous position to support Cooper's battery,
which it was proposed to establish on an adjoining eminence. The
enemy perceiving these dispositions, opened on the column from a
battery on the mountain side, but without inflicting any injury.
170 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Captain Cooper's battery of three-inch ordnance guns was imme¬
diately put in position on the ridge above referred to, and at the
same time, by direction of the general commanding the corps, the
regiment of ist Rifles of the division was sent forward as skirmish¬
ers to feel the enemy.
Being well satisfled from various indications that the enemy
occupied the mountain in force with his infantry, the general com¬
manding the corps directed me to advance my division to the right,
so as if possible to outflank him, and then to move forward to the
attack. A slight description of the features of the ground is neces¬
sary to properly describe the movements of the division. The turn¬
pike from Frederick to Hagerstown, in crossing the mountain,
takes a general direction of. northwest and southeast. The moun¬
tain ridge occupied by the enemy was perpendicular in its general
direction to the road ; parallel to the mountain was another ridge,
separated from it at the turnpike by a deep valley, but connected at
the upper end by a very small depression ; over this second ridge
there was a road, along which I advanced Seymour's brigade of the
division, directing him to push forward and feel for the enemy. Soon
after advancing General Seymour reported that he could take the
crest of the first ridge along which ran the road, and could then ad¬
vance across the ravine to the second ridge, which I immediately
directed him to do ; at the same time I deployed Gallagher's Third
Brigade and also Magilton's Second Brigade on the same line, but
down in the valley, and when the line of battle was completely
formed, directed a general advance of the whole. Seymour soon
gained the crest of the first ridge, and then moved in the same
direction as the other two brigades. Anderson and Magilton ad¬
vanced steadily to the foot of the mountain, where they found the
enemy's infantry ; in a short time the action became general
throughout the whole line. Steadily the line advanced up the
mountain side, where the enemy was posted behind trees and rocks,
from whence he was slowly but gradually dislodged, Seymour first
gaining the crest and driving the enemy to our left along the ridge,
where he was met by the fire of the other two brigades. Soon after
the action commeijced, having reason to believe the enemy was ex¬
tending his left flank to outflank us, I sent to the general commanding
the corps for reënforcements, which were promptly furnished by send¬
ing General Duryea's brigade, of Ricketts' division. Owing, how¬
ever, to the distance to be traveled to reach the scene of action,
Duryea's did not arrive on the ground till just at the close of the
engagement. Flis men were promptly formed in line of battle and
advanced on the left of Seymour, but only one regiment had an
opportunity to open fire before the enemy retired and darkness
intervened.
SOUTH MOUNTAIN.
171
The conduct of the division on this occasion was such as to up¬
hold its well-earned reputation for steadiness and gallantry, and
fortunately was witnessed by the general commanding the corps, as
well as others. I am greatly indebted to Brigadier General Seymour
for the skill with which he handled his brigade on the extreme flank,
securing by this manœuver the great object of our movement, viz,
the outflanking the enemy. To Colonel McNeil, of the ist Rifles,
who with his regiment has always been in advance, I was indebted
for ascertaining the exact position of the enemy. Colonels Magil-
ton and Gallagher, in command of the Second and Third Brigades,
formed their men and carried them to the summit of the mountain
in the most creditable manner. I regret to report that Colonel
Gallagher, while gallantly leading his brigade, received a severe
wound, and was compelled to leave the field. To my personal staff,
consisting of Capt. E. C. Baird, assistant adjutant general ; Capt.
J. Adair, commissary of subsistence ; and Lieuts. William Riddle
and A. G. Mason, 5th Pennsylvania Reserves, acting aids-de-camp, I
am indebted for the prompt execution of all my orders, carried under
a severe fire across rocks, stone walls and the most rugged country
1 almost ever saw.
The command rested on their arms during the night. The
ammunition train was brought up and the men's cartridge boxes filled,
and every preparation made to renew the contest at daylight the
next morning, should the enemy be in force ; unfortunately the
morning opened with a heavy mist, which prevented any view of the
country being obtained. So that it was not till seven a.m. that it
was ascertained the enemy had retired entirely from the mountain.
Geo. G. IMeade.
Gen, John P. Hatch, who had commanded the First Divi¬
sion of the First Corps from just prior to the second battle of
Bull Run, was ordered by Gen. Joseph Hooker with three
brigades to advance by a detour to the north of the old
United States turnpike and dislodge the enemy from the
mountain. These brigades were commanded by Brig. Gen.
Abner Doubleday, Brig. Gen. M. R. Patrick, and Col. Walter
Phelps. The First Brigade, Phelps', was composed of the
2 2d, 24th, and 30th New York, the 14th Brooklyn (New
York Militia), 84th New York Volunteers, and the 2d U.
S. Sharpshooters ; the Second Brigade, Doubleday's, of
the 56th Pennsylvania Volunteers, 76th and 95th New
York Volunteers, and 7th Indiana; the Third Brigade, Pat-
ir2 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
rick's, of the 20th, 21st, 23d, and 35th New York Volun¬
teers. Brig. Gen. John Gibbon, with his (Iron) brigade of the
2d, 6th, and 7th Wisconsin Volunteers and the 19th Indi¬
ana Volunteers, with Battery B, 4th United States Artillery,
of Hateh's division, received orders from Major General
McClellan to move up the United States turnpike and carry
the pass, which he did by advancing the battery along the
turnpike and his infantry north and south of it. Gen¬
eral Hatch was a brave and skillful soldier, possessed of
indomitable energy and dash. He moved from the turn¬
pike to the north, along a narrow wagon road at the base of
the South Mountain about half a mile, then turned to the
westward and ascended the mountain where it was so steep
in places that his officers were obliged to walk and lead
their horses. When he reached a bench about three-quar¬
ters of the way up toward the summit, he formed his
brigade in three lines, with Patrick's in advance as skir¬
mishers, then Colonel Phelps', with Doubleday's in the
third line of battle. The lines were .formed on the eastern
edge of the wood which covered the side of the mountain
to near the top, and with his usual impetuosity he ordered
General Patrick to charge and uncover the enemy. After
waiting some time and hearing little or no firing from
Patrick, who had gone to the left of the enemy, he became
impatient and ordered the second line to advance and
clear the mountain, directing the charge himself. Phelps'
men responded with alacrity, as they always did, went for¬
ward rapidly, and drove the enemy from what seemed
almost an impregnable position. In this charge Phelps
lost some men killed and wounded, but held the »"round
' o
taken. General Hatch was severely wounded in the calf of
the leg, which kept him from the field nearly a year, and
he never entirely recovered from its effects. The loss of
his services was sorely felt, he being one of the best officeis
in the corps. When wounded and compelled to leave the
field, he went quietly and alone to avoid attraeting the
attention of his troops.
SOUTH MOUNTAIN.
173
As soon as he was gone Capt. H. L. Cranford, his acting
adjutant general, rode rapidly down the mountain and or¬
dered General Doubleday, in the name of General Hatch,
to advance. His troops being in line awaiting orders,
General Doubleday instantly gave the command "for¬
ward, ' ' and rode with his staff in advance of his line until
he had passed through the woods to the edge of a clearing
and occupied the line held by Colonel Phelps' brigade,
which he ordered to fall back ten paces and have his men
lie down, holding himself in readiness for any sudden emer¬
gency.
On the way up the mountain General Doubleday was in¬
formed that General Hatch had been wounded and left the
field. He at once assumed command of the division,
which he held till after the battle of Fredericksburg in
December, 1862, when he was assigned to the command of
the Third Division of the Corps.
When General Hatch was wounded he left no orders for
the division, but Captain Cranford at once assumed the re¬
sponsibility of ordering up General Doubleday in General
Hatch's name.
It was nearly dark when General Doubleday received
the order, and the enemy fought so stubbornly that it was
after nine o'clock at night before the firing ceased. Some
time after nine o'clock, when General Doubleday's bri¬
gade had nearly exhausted its ammunition. General Rick-
etts came groping his way through the woods in the direc¬
tion of the firing, and when he arrived said Doubleday, I
thought you were having a hard time here and might need
help ; I have brought my division here without orders. ' '
Doubleday ordered his men to lie down and General Rick-
etts moved his men over them, fired a few volleys, and the
victory was ours. General Ricketts' division went into
the action on the right of Doubleday^ and General Meade's
division on the extreme right of our line of battle. This
movement flanked the enemy out of the pass, and the old
United States turnpike was free to our advance. General
174 THE A EM y OF THE POTOMAC.
Ricketts' noble conduct in this instance needs no comment ;
it reflects greater glory upon him than any words can do.
General Doubleday continued in command of his brigade
until the battle was over, when he formally assumed com¬
mand of the division. The fighting was stubborn and
severe. Colonel Wainwright of the 76th New York was
wounded in the arm and left the field, which left Double-
day's old brigade in command of Lt. Col. J. Wm. Hof-
mann, of the 56th Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, a
gallant and efficient officer.
Among the brave men who fell in that action was one
who deserves special mention, Charles B. Stamp of the
76th Regiment, New York Volunteers, a lad of immature
years, tall and handsome, with a smooth face, full of reso¬
lution, and who seemed inspired with patriotism at the
second battle of Bull Run. When the color-bearer was
shot down—as several had been before him—young Stamp
stepped out in front of the" line and asked General Double-
day to let him carry the colors ; his request was granted,
and he bore them with great pride and apparent satisfac¬
tion. At this battle the regimental line, while charging
up through the woods, became somewhat broken in passing
so many trees ; seeing this irregular line, and mistaking it
for a lack of courage in the men. Stamp stepped forward
into the clearing a few feet or yards, put his standard on a
rock, turned to the regiment, and said : ' ' Boys, come up to
that ! ' ' The regiment assumed a correct alignment on the
colors as if by magic ; but the spirit of the young hero had
fled, a minie ball having pierced his brain.
An incident worthy of note occurred on the day follow¬
ing the battle, September 15 ; Corporal Benjamin Van
Valkenburg, of Company I, 76th New York Volunteers,
who had been detailed as an orderly at division headquar¬
ters, was sent out in search of provisions for the mess, when,
on coming to a small mountain stream in the road, he sud¬
denly discovered five Confederate soldiers filling their can¬
teens. Van said he was frightened nearly to death, but
SOUTH MOUNTAIN.
17.3
knew if he ran they would kill him, so drawing his revol¬
ver he rushed at them and demanded their instant surren¬
der ; there was some little hesitation, but as he threatened
to shoot, and some of them had laid down their guns, the
others followed suit, and all came in and were marched
back to headquarters.
CHAPTER VII.
ANTIETAM.
"T ^ THEN the heavy mist on South Mountain tardily
^ ^ cleared away on the morning of the 15th of
September, it was ascertained that the enemy had retreated
down the western slope.
McClellan knew, from Tee's own order, where the
enemy was, as well as the Confederate commander himself
^ 7
did. Tongstreet and D. H. Hill were near Boonsboro, a
small town on the old national road, not far from the
western base of the mountain. But it possessed a military
advantage from the fact that there were several roads
diverging from it to points in that vicinity. The national
road runs northwest to Williamsport ; one leads south to
Rohersville ; while another, in a southwesterly direction,
passes through Keedysville, crossing the Antietam midway
between that little railroad village and Sharpsburg, thence
across the Potomac, where it greets Shepherdstown on the
West Virginia side.
Jackson's corps was to take a circuitous route so as to
invest Bolivar Heights, his left resting on the Potomac,
with his right on the Shenandoah. Walker's division was
to occupy Loudon Heights, and McLaws, with his own and
R. H. Anderson's divisions, was to move up in the rear of
Maryland Heights and invest them.
Thus McClellan had a full and perfect knowledge of
the movements of the whole of Lee's army, and that, too,
before he fought the battle of South Mountain. The
mountain range is rent in twain by the Potomac, while
176
ANTIETAM.
177
two higli peaks—Maryland and Loudon Heights—are the
natural military fortifications of that place;
Harper's Ferry is an amphitheater at the confluence of
the Potomac and the Shenandoah, hundreds of feet below
these two majestic points. McClellan could either throw
his army to the left, and fall on the two divisions of
McLaws on Maryland Heights, where he was isolated from
Jackson and Walker entirely, without any hope of aid
from Longstreet and Hill. It is quite evident that Mc-
Laws would have been a sure prey to McClellan, if
he, McClellan, had boldly assaulted him with his army,
except the First Corps, which was on the extreme right
and held the national road, and would have prevented
Longstreet and D. H. Hill from returning from Boonsboro.
Besides the attack on McLaws it would have been a
notice to Miles to ' ' hold the fort ' ' a little while longer,
until he could be relieved.
With McClellan's army surrounding McLaws on three
sides, there was but little hope of more than a short re¬
sistance on his part with a mere handful of men in com¬
parison to McClellan's army.
It is true that McLaws would have made those heights
famous in a desperate struggle to hold them, but it would
have been a short and bloody conflict.
McClellan's army was massed too far to the ' right.
Three corps and one division remained idle on the 14th,
the Second, Fifth, and Twelfth, and Couch's division.
Fitz-John Porter, in his report, says :
On the morning of the 14th of September, I reported in person
to the major general commanding the Army of the Potomac and
troops engaged in the defense of Washington, and resumed com¬
mand of Sykes' division and that portion of the Reserve Artillery
not distributed to the corps. This portion of the command was held
in readiness to take part in the battle of South Mountain, but so
gallantly and successfully were the enemy driven from the heights
by Burnside and Sumner that its services were not called for.
The First Corps carried the heights known as Turner's
XII
178
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Gap, through which the national road passes, while the
Ninth Corps followed Braddock's route more to the left or
south of it. Mcl^aws, fearing he would be hemmed in, sent
a force back to Crampton's Gap with orders to hold it if the
' ' last man was lost in the endeavor. ' '
Not only did McLaws have fears of Crampton's Gap, but
of Brownsville, about a mile south of it, and his troops
were stationed on the mountain to be ready to march to
either or both as necessity might require.
But Weverton Pass, near the Potomac, afforded another
approach to Maryland Heights that McClellan might ad¬
vance through and at once relieve Harper's Ferry, as it was
on the river but a few miles below, and if that point was
attacked and carried, McLaws would be compelled to aban¬
don his siege on Maryland Heights. Then again, if a heavy
force of the Union Army had appeared at Weverton Pass
the battle could have been distinctly heard at the ferry above
and greatly delayed the surrender.
Gen. George J. Stannard, of Vermont, whose record on
the field of battle shines with a golden luster, was a colonel
then, under the command of General Miles. His statement
to the writer, just before he died, was that the sound of
battle seemed to die away, instead of growing nearer, which
would not have been the case if Weverton Pass had been
attacked. Stannard advised Miles to follow the cavalry out
and abandon the ferry, leaving only the stores for the
enemy to capture. If this advice had been followed Mc¬
Laws would have been in a still worse condition, for Miles'
force would then have constituted the right wing of the
attack on the morning of the 15th.
Weverton Pass was occupied by two brigades of Ander¬
son's division—Wright's and Pryor's. If the Twelfth
Corps, under Mansfield, had been left as a reserve to Reno
and Hooker, and the Second Corps sent to Weverton Pass
on the afternoon of the 14th and attacked Wright and Pryor,
those two brigades must have yielded to the superior force
of the veterans of that corps. Then Fitz-John Porter's
A NT/ETA M.
179
corps, assisting Franklin's at Crampton and Brownsville
Gaps, would have swept the enemy from those two points,
and placed McLaws, on the morning of the 15th, at the
mercy of three corps and Couch's division. That would
have left two corps, the Ninth and Twelfth, within easy
reach if needed.
The effective force of the Second, Fifth, and Sixth
Corps and Conch's division was too overwhelming for Mc¬
Laws to have successfully resisted. But for him Harper's
Ferry was in no danger, and he is entitled to the credit"
of its capture. If he had retired, as directed by General
Lee, there would have been, in all probability, no sur¬
render. Walker's artillery, on Loudon Heights, did but
little damage, and even if Jackson had strongly pressed the
works, Miles could have retired to Maryland Heights and
saved his command but for McLaws' presence. Besides,
Jackson could not have compelled a surrender until
McClellan's army, tardily as it moved, came to its
relief.
Lee was fearful that a copy of his order was in Mc¬
Clellan's possession, and he was greatly distressed for Mc¬
Laws' safety, as evidenced by the dispatch, received by
courier during the night of the 14th by McLaws, from
General Lee's headquarters, signed by R. H. Chilton,
adjutant general, which reads as follows :
Huadquarturs Army Northern Virginia,
September 14, 1862—8 p. m.
General :—The daj'^ has gone against us, and the army will go
"by Sharpsburg and cross the river. It is necessary for you to aban¬
don your position to-night. Send your trains not required on the
road to cross the river ; your troops you must have well in hand to
unite with this command, which will retire by Sharpsburg. Send for¬
ward oíñcers to explore the way and ascertain the best crossings of
the Potomac, and if you can find between yourself and Shepherds-
town any road for the command, send an officer to report to me, on
the Shepherdstown road, where you are and what crossing you will
take. * * * Respectfully yours, R. H. Chilton,
Assistant Adjutant General.
180 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
lyater in the night he received another dispatch from
General Lee :
Headquarters Army Northern Virginia,
September 14—11:15 p. m.
Generad :—In addition to what has been said relative to the
abandonment of Weverton * * * i will mention that you might
cross the Potomac below Weverton into Virginia. I believe there
is a ford at the Point of Rocks at Berlin below, but do not know if
it is accessible to you. The enemy from Jefferson seems to have
forced a passage at Crampton's Gap, which may leave all on the
river clear. This portion of the command will take position at Cen-
terville, commonly called Ritersville, two and one-half miles from
Boonsboro, on the Sharpsburg Road, with a view of preventing the
enemy, that may enter the gap at Boonsboro, from cutting you off,
etc. If you can pass the river hard by Harper's Ferry, or pass the
mountain below Crampton's Gap, toward Sharpsburg, let me know.
I will be found at or near Centerville. * * *
By order of General Tee : R. H. Chilton,
Assistant Adjutant General.
He also received the following, sent him by Colonel
Mnnford :
Headquarters Army Northern Virginia,
September 14, 1862—10:15 P- m-
Colonel :—Hold your position at Rohersville, if possible, and if
you can discover or hear of a practical road by which McTaws, at
Weverton at present, can pass over the mountains to Sharpsburg,
send him a messenger to guide him immediately to Colonel Mun-
ford, Rohersville.
By order of General Teg : R. H. Chilton,
Assistant Adjutant General.
Lee's official orders, qnored above, fully give McLaws the
credit of the capture of Harper's Ferry. If he had aban¬
doned the heights on the 14th, as directed. Franklin's
command would have arrived in time to prevent the
surrender, as there would have been no enemy in his front
to retard his march. The fact of the evacuation of Mary¬
land Heights would have been enough to have assured
the officers and soldiers of Miles' command that McClellan's
army was so near at hand that McLaws was compelled to
retreat. Besides, Franklin's advance would have soon
ANTÍETAM.
181
made its appearance on the Maryland side, if McLaws had
withdrawn during the night of the 14th, as directed by
'General Lee.
As it was, the firing did not cease until ten o'clock a.m.
of the t5th, and then began the usual preliminaries fora
surrender, which occupied considerable time. Then the
officers began their work of paroling, and the disgraceful
surrender was completed.
If McClellan had pressed his army well to the left, and
forced McLaws to surrender, he would have saved the
troops at the ferry. Then Lee would have been com¬
pelled to retreat back into Virginia in a very damaged con¬
dition. One of Lee's generals—Longstreet—said to me :
■" If he (McClellan) had attacked and captured McLaws, it
would have been hard for him (Lee) to have effectually
reorganized his army."
General McLaws, a graduate of West Point, was a very
able officer, and a man of candor—whose opinions on that
battle are the best authority, hence the length of my quo¬
tation from him. He further said :
If General Jackson had failed in the assault, no one who will
consider the condition of the Confederate forces, scattered and sepa¬
rated from each other, those with General Lee pressed by a largely
superior force, with General Jackson across the river from him, near
to a large force that had repulsed his assault, ready and in position
to attack in his rear should he attempt to join General Lee ; with my
two divisions between the force in Harper's Ferry and Franklin, and
no way to join General Lee, or to receive aid from him ; and Walker's
division across both the Potomac and Shenandoah, with the force in
Harper's Ferry between him and General Lee, you will see that the
situation of each of the scattered commands would have been pre¬
carious in the extreme. The hoisting of the white flag upon the
o iter works was not regarded as a request to cease firing until it had
bien hoisted over the town as well ; and it was ten o'clock before the
firing ceased. This cannot be refuted. General Franklin certainly
did not • know anything about it, and had done nothing to inform
himself as to the condition of affairs in Harper's Ferry. It, there¬
fore, cannot be accepted as an excuse for not advancing against me
on the morning of the 15th, when he says, "that Harper's Ferry
182 THE ARMY UF THE POTOMAC.
surrendered at eight o'clock," quoting General McClellan as author¬
ity, who wrote what was quoted after the battle of Antietam, and
who was more ignorant upon the subject than Franklin, as he was
five miles more distant ; Harper's Ferry did not surrender at eight
o'clock, nor did the Confederate cannon cease firing upon the town
until ten o'clock, for the reasons heretofore given, and it ^vas not
until after the firing had ceased that a white flag was received,
acknowledged by General Jackson, and a conference agreed on.
And then the preliminaries before the interview, and the interview
itself, must have taken some time, and the terms offered, I suppose,
were submitted to the consideration of a council comprised of the
ranking officers of the command. Therefore, I think it reasonable
to suppose that the actual agreement to surrender did not take place
before twelve o'clock on the 15th, and that up to eleven o'clock
nothing positive had been done. General White says that General
Miles at or about nine o'clock called a council of the ofiicers com¬
manding brigades and conferred with theni upon the propriety of
surrendering. This took some time. Then, after it was determined
to hoist the white flags, they were hoisted on the lines outside the
cit3% more than a mile distant. After this was done General Miles
was wounded by the cannonade which was still kept up. So I think
that the time stated when the firing ceased against Harper's Ferry,
at ten o'clock, is correct and confirmed by Federal reports. My
object is to show that General Franklin had ample time, on the
morning of the 15th, to advance his forces and engage mine, which
were in line but a mile and a half distant from Crampton's Gap, and
that the sound of his cannon would have been a notice to the garri¬
son in Harper's Ferry that relief was coming, and as his guns would
have been fired directly towards Harper's Ferry, which was not three
miles distant, in an air-line, they would have been doubtless heard
by the garrison. Even if it should have so happened that Franklin
had not advanced until negotiations had been actually commenced,
the sound of his cannon would have changed the possibilities of ex¬
trication from the surrounding fire that the garrison would have had
a right to obtain, and certainly it was reasonable to ask for more
liberal terms than could be expected when there was no likelihood
of rescue. They could have asked that they be allowed to march
out with arms in their hatids and with colors flying, or they would
stand an assault and defend the place a Voutrance.
If General Franklin's orders contemplated the relief of the be¬
sieged garrison in Harper's Ferry, he would have effected it with
more chances of success if he had made Weverton Pass his point
of attack, for a mere demonstration there would have made known
to the garrison that McClellan's forces were coming and that they
ANTJE TA M.
183
must " hold the fort." And it would have diminished the chances
for the escape of my command should Harper's Ferry not surrender.
But by going to Crampton's Gap, although he feared it, a way was
left for me to retire through Weverton to the ford at Point of Rocks,
below at Weverton. General Fee's anxiety was from the belief that
McClellan would send reënforcements to Franklin with orders to
press me at once, and accordingly presented front to McClellan at
Rohersville and trailed him away from me, leaving Franklin without
reënforcements. Having done this he apparently felt no longer any
anxiety on my account so far as Franklin's forces were con¬
cerned, but formed line of battle against McClellan at Sharps-
burg in order to keep him where he was, on the Antietam, intend¬
ing probably to carry out his original intention to cross the river
at Sharpsburg, should McClellan push him before General Jackson
arrived. But McClellan not doing so, and Harper's Ferry in the
mean time having surrendered, Jackson's force was free to join the
main body ; but I suppose that General Fee, then believing that he
could reunite his forces in time to offer battle with his whole army,
determined to try it. I think that enough has been taken from the
Records of the War of the Rebellion, to show that the campaign of
1862 really hinged on Harper's Ferry ; that General Miles, by hold¬
ing on to the town, as he was most positively ordered to do, gave
the opportunity to McClellan to engage General Fee's forces in de¬
tail, each separate force with a vastly superior one, and that McClel¬
lan failed to avail himself of it, although he had been made aware
of the scattered condition of Fee's army by finding a copy of Special
Order, No. 191, heretofore given, which was picked up in the camp
of one of General Fee's commands at Frederick, Maryland, and
handed to General McClellan when his army arrived there, follow¬
ing General Fee, wherein the position of each division was given.
It will be observed that General McLaws fully confirms
my view that McClellan should have reènforced Franklin
heavily, as he positively knew the position and location of
the whole of Fee's army.
Mansfield's corps was a sufficient reserve to the forces
under Hooker and Reno against D. H. Hill and Longstreet.
As Fitz-John Porter said in his report, the reserve force was
not called into action, as Hooker and Reno carried the
mountain without assistance. Franklin had also been suc¬
cessful on the extreme left.
Gen. Howell Cobb, who was directed by General Me-
184 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Laws to return with his brigade and assume command, said
in his official report ;
When I reached the gap I found both General Munford and
Colonel Parkham active and energetic in the discharge of their duty,
which continued to the end of the fight. Shortly after the lines
were broken, and I was endeavoring to rally the troops. General
Semmes appeared on the field, and, at great exposure and with great
coolness and courage, gave me his cordial aid and cooperation.
If it had not been wisdom to place Sumner with the
Second Corps at Weverton Pass, and Fitz-John Porter
with Franklin in the beginning of the action, undoubtedly
the proper thing would have been to reënforce Franklin
with at least two corps the moment the whole of South
Mountain was carried.
The Second, Fifth, and Twelfth Corps, which had not
been engaged, could have marched on the 14th to the assist¬
ance of Franklin and arrived there shortly after dark.
Then McLaws could have been attacked early on the morn¬
ing of the 15th with four corps and Couch's strong division.
McLaws formed a line of battle in Pleasant Valley early
on the morning of the 15th with his whole command, ex¬
cept one regiment left on Maryland Heights. Suppose the
Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Twelfth Corps had borne down
on him by nine o'clock, could he or any other gênerai
have withstood such an overwhelming force, and would
not only McLaws' command have been compelled to sur¬
render, but Miles, in Harper's Ferry would have refused
to capitulate, but on the other hand would have likely
followed and attacked Jackson in his retreat.
Then, instead of a battle at Antietam, the fight with
McLaws would have ended the campaign in Maryland, for
Lee would have retreated across the Potomac at Shepherds-
town, while Walker and Jackson would have retired up the
valley sadder but wiser generals. Lee then could have
been rapidly forced up the valley and could not have de¬
fended Richmond.
The following, from General Rosecrans, explains itself :
CAPT. JAMES THOMPSON.
ANTIETAM.
185
Treasury Department, Register's Office,
July 23, 1889.
Dear Sir I have read your manuscript chapter of the opera¬
tions of the Army of the Potomac on the 14th and 15th of September,
1862.
It demonstrates that we lost a garrison and a great opportunity
to do irreparable injury to the Confederate army under General Dee.
Yours truly, W. S. Rosecrans.
J. H. Stine, Washington, D. C.
Maj. C. A. Richardson, of the 126th New York Regi¬
ment, is under the impression that the surrender took place
earlier than McLaws states. That regiment was stationed
on Maryland Heights until the abandonment of that strong
military position by the order of Colonel Ford. The regi¬
ment had just entered the service when it was ordered to
Harper's Ferry at that perilous moment. It received an
uncalled-for, unsavory record, through the statements of
the acting adjutant, S. A. Barras, who fled to the rear
when the firing began, and reported to Miles and Ford,
and to a correspondent of the New York Tribune^ that
he was there to stop the cowards from the 126th New
York Regiment from running away. This false and sen¬
sational story was believed at the time and widely published,
especially in New York State. It greatly damaged the
record of the regiment, and caused the major to be dismissed
from the service ; but on the War Department learning
that Adjutant Barras' statements were false, Maj. William
H. Baird was restored to his rank and served until in front
of Petersburg, where he was killed.
When Maryland Heights was abandoned the 126th New
York was ordered to occupy Bolivar Heights. The regi¬
ment was in no sympathy with the idea of surrendering.
To such extent were they opposed to it, that when Colonel
Trim ble was carrying the white flag one of our batteries
fired four or five shots more, and the Confederate batteries
again opened on the whole line.
Capt. Truman N. Burrill, of the 126th New York, says
*'that just at that juncture General Miles walked up and
186 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
directed Captain Phillips, of the 126th New York, to get
something white and wave it. Captain Phillips said "I
shall do nothing of the kind ; I never played the coward's
act and I shall not commence it this morning." Miles
said, "Do you know to whom you are talking?" Phillips
replied, "I suppose I am talking to Colonel Miles ; I know
I am talking to a d—d traitor."
General Miles intimated to Captain Phillips that ' ' he
would prefer charges against him when the battle was over. ''
The above is the statement of Captain Burrill, who was
only a few feet away.
Major Richardson, who was then a lieutenant, says :
"When General Miles was shot on Bolivar Heights, Sep¬
tember 15, he was in my rear about 40 feet distant He
had ordered Captain Phillips to raise something white,
which Phillips refused to do. When Miles was shot Phil¬
lips said aloud, so that Miles' staff must have heard it,
' Good ; ' we all felt it, if we did not say it, and the feeling
of the men was so bitter against Miles that it was difiicult
to find enough who were willing to carry him from the
field. The remark of Captain Phillips was well known to
have been made and was published, but no attention was ever
given to it by superior officers or any friends of Miles."
Captain Burrill said: "Immediately after the colloquy
between General Miles and Captain Phillips, Miles received
his mortal wound, only a short distance from them."
Whereupon Burrill, and he thinks Phillips, joined with
him in directing him (Miles) to be taken off the field to the
hospital, where he was attended to by the surgeon of the
126th New York, Dr. Fletcher M. Hammond.
Thus sadly ended the military and earthly career of one
who, if he had placed nearly all of his batteries and a
strong force of men on Maryland Heights, would have sent
his name thundering down through the corridors of time as
a military genius of great renown. If McClellan had at¬
tacked McLaws, that battle would have been the Auster-
litz of America, and McClellan's fame would have shone as
brightly in America as Napoleon's or Wellington's in Europe.
ANTJE TA M.
187
Headlysays: "When it is remembered that just one
month had elapsed since Napoleon took command of the
Army of Italy at Nice, that only sixteen days had inter¬
vened between the time when his headquarters were at
Savona and when they were at Cherasco, that in that in¬
terval the combined armies of Austria and Sardinia had
been severed, and one driven in confusion and disgrace to¬
ward Milan, and the other annihilated ; that the haughty
and selfish Kingdoms of Piedmont, Sardinia and Savoy had
been precipitated into the dust ; that the Alps had been
passed, and the immortal battles of Montenotte, Milessimo,
Dego and Mondovi had been fought," is it surprising that
had McClellan done half such work as Napoleon did in Italy
on that campaign it would have so seriously crippled Lee,
after South Mountain, that he would have never crossed the
Potomac ? But it seems that the enemy rather presumed
that INIcClellan would follow Longstreet and D. H. Hill, so
Jackson hastily left Harper's P'erry, with the divisions of
Starke and Lawton, for Sharpsburg. These divisions were
commanded at Gainesville by Ewell and Taliaferro, who
were both wounded there.
Longstreet and D. H. Hill fell back on the 13th across
the Antietam ; Longstreet formed on the right of the road
before described, coming from Boonsboro through Keedys-
ville, and tracing across the Potomac at Shepherdstown.
It was important for them to guard that road with more
than jealous care, for it was their only route of retreat if a
great reverse happened. Longstreet's line stretched well
down the Antietam, below bridge number 3, known as the
Burnside Bridge. D. H. Hill formed on the left of that
road, with his left resting in the direction of the celebrated
Dunker Church, which is on the road from Sharpsburg to
Hagerstown, perhaps a mile from Sharpsburg. The Army
of the Potomac pursued with Richardson in the advance,
followed closely by Hooker, Sumner and Mansfield.
When Sykes struck the Antietam he filed to the left,
while Richardson formed on the right of the road leading
188
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
from Keedysville to Sharpsburg. The other two divisions
of Sumner were massed behind Richardson, while Hookèr
formed the First Corps on the right of Richardson, with
Pleasonton's cavalry on his flank, and Mansfield support¬
ing him. It was late in the afternoon of the 15th when
the two armies were again facing each other across the
sluggish waters of the Antiçtam. The Comte de Paris
says, in his second volume : ' ' Thus McClellan had in
hand thirteen divisions of infantry and one of cavalry,
raising the nominal effective to 66,000 men, no less than
45,000 or 50,000 of whom were certainly ready for bat¬
tle. Lee, who had scarcely more than 25,000 men to oppose
him, had confined himself to rectifying his line of battle."
It must be remembered that the Comte de Paris,
who is an eminent military scholar, came over from
France and was appointed an aid on McClellan's staff
so he could fully understand our war. This explanation
is made to show that he was personally friendly to Mc¬
Clellan. If he was partial to any of our generals it
was "Little Mac." But he would not sacrifice the truth;
that would ruin his work, and reduce it to the scale of fiction.
Lee was not wishing "for night or a Blucher," but
for night or a Jackson.
McClellan occupied the whole of that afternoon in mak¬
ing observations and studying the battlefield without ad¬
vancing. Both armies rested near each other expecting
that at the dawn in the morning another great battle would
begin. To their great disappointment all was quiet along
tlie line, which was, however, ascribed to a heavy fog that
lingered in the valley, as if warning the combatants that
they had no right to commence the work of death and
destruction there.
It was not until one or two o'clock on the i6th that
McClellan fully decided how he was going to fight the
battle. The Antietam is a quiet stream, but difficult to
ford with infantry and artillery.
Where the national cemetery is, Lee placed all of his
A NT/E TA M.
18í>
available artillery. It is a high point just east of Sharps-
burg on the right of the road to Keedysville. From that
position he could sweep Richardson's and Sykes' front, and
greatly annoy Burnside's right down to our extreme left.
That disposition of hjs artillery was made to enable him to
rob the center of infantry to reènforce the left, where he
anticipated McClellan would make his main attack. Their
troops, after the first day, were well concealed until the
action began, while all of ours, except on the extreme right,
were in full view. Lee was an able general, and studied
the ground where he was going to give or accept battle.
By the time McClellan ordered an advance, on the
afternoon of the lóth, Jackson had formed on D. H. Hill's
left. Hood holding the extreme left in the woods around
the Dunker Church.
About two o'clock on the afternoon of the i6th General
Hooker received orders to advance and turn the left flank
of the enemy under Hood, the corps, as indicated above,
marching in columns until the right division under Double-
day reached nearer to the Hagerstown pike. The skirmish
line of this division was thrown forward west of the pike,
in the direction of the Potomac, by E. P. Halstead, adju¬
tant general of the division. It was a critical work to per¬
form in view of the fact that Meade's pickets were so hotly
engaged during the night that more than once a battle was
quite imminent. It was not until after midnight that
Halstead considered it safe to leave the line and return to
report to Doubleday, whom he found sleeping under his
blanket in the midst of his men. Hooker directed a
squadron of the 3d Pennsylvania Cavalry forward to de¬
velop the enemy. In the mean time General Meade, who
was in command of the Pennsylvania Reserves, was ordered
to cross the main stem of the Antietam and engage the
enemy—the divisions of Doubleday and Ricketts moving
abreast, with Meade's division formed in columns of attack,
with the artillery well closed up, as the enemy was evidently
massed but a short distance in his front.
190 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
General Meade directed Colonel McNeil to deploy his
regiment of Bucktails as skirmishers, and Captain Byrnes,
commanding the 3d Regiment, was also directed to ad¬
vance four companies as skirmishers to occupy the woods
on the right. The skirmish line met with such a stubborn
resistance that General Seymour, commanding the First
Brigade, was ordered forward to their support with Cooper's
battery. Here the ist Rifles (Bucktails) met with a severe
loss—Colonel McNeil was killed while leading forward his
regiment. Col. R. Biddle Roberts, of the ist Regiment of
the Reserves, was assigned temporarily to the command of
the brigade, and Capt. W. Cooper Talley was placed in
command of the regiment at midnight by General Warren.
Immediately upon assuming command. Captain Talley
doubled the picket line in front of his regiment, and in
person advanced it a distance of from 50 to 100 yards and
drove back the enemy's pickets. The decided vantage
ground thus gained was maintained during the engagement.
Meade put Ransom's battery in position, supported by
Magilton's and Anderson's (Second and Third) brigades.
Simpson's battery was posted in the rear, and played effect¬
ively on a battery of the enemy that was attempting to
drive back Seymour's brigade. The enemy was concealed
in a cornfield near the Dunker Church, which at first gave
him a great advantage, until the corn was partly mowed
down by the artillery ; then he retreated to the woods
around the Dunker Church, where a great portion of Dee's
left wing was well protected by ledges of rocks and timber.
But an army acting on the defensive has the advantage of
choosing positions which are aimed to be as detrimental to
the attacking force as possible, and that was especially
Lee's idea on his extreme left at Antietam, for McClellan
had been on the left bank from the afternoon of the 15th,
and given ample ncftice where he would deal the heaviest
blow. Lee did not care whether Longstreet had more than
one light brigade to defend the whole of his line from the
center of Sharpsburg to his extreme right or not.
ANTIETAM.
191
Everything was devoted to the left center and extreme
left. The two picket lines were so close to each other,
during the night of the i6th, that the firing several times
seemed as if a battle was imminent. Hooker and Meade
-were both called to the front from the Poifenberger barn,
where their headquarters were that night, to see the condi¬
tion of affairs.
Doubleday had arranged his division for the conflict,
with General Patrick's brigade on the extreme right in a
piece of woods. Lieutenant Colonel Hofmann's brigade on
his left connecting with Meade's right, holding the brigades
of Gibbon and Phelps massed in the rear as reserves.
On the left of the corps Ricketts had thrown forward
the Third Brigade under that gallant soldier. General Hart-
suif ; with the Second Brigade, commanded by Col. Wm.
A. Christian, toward the left of the Third, and the First
Brigade, under General Duryea, in reserve. When day be¬
gan to dawn in the east both armies were ready for their
deadly work.
The enemy made a heavy attack not only on Meade's
front, but along the line of the First Corps. Meade had
placed Magilton and Anderson on the right of Seymour,
so that his whole division was engaged with the exception
of the loth Reserves, under Lieut. Col. A. J. Warner, which
was detached and sent to the right to resist an anticipated
flank movement by the enemy. In the action there Warner
did such valuable work that Meade highly recommended
him for promotion.
Hooker was overhopeful that morning; he was never
himself unless he was riding the line of battle almost at full
speed. He courted danger and laughed at fear.
When the battle opened that morning four generals.
Hooker, Meade, Doubleday, and Ricketts, whose names are
household words, were on the'line of battle before the stars
had fairly disappeared from the heavens.
As Ricketts moved forward he encountered the three
brigades of D. H. Hill, while Meade in the center struck
192 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Starke's division, and with the aid of Doubleday's left, after
an hour's desperate fighting, swept Starke back on the
Dunker Church.
Meade was well advanced into the cornfield and attempted
to cross the Hagerstown road near the Dunker Church.
Early in the morning Doubleday on the right had re¬
arranged his division, giving Gibbon the advance, sup¬
ported by Phelps' brigade and Patrick to follow in twenty
minutes.
Hofmanû's brigade, by order of Hooker, was left to sup¬
port the batteries and prevent a flank attack from the right,
with his brigade facing west.
Gibbon advanced the 2d and 6th Wisconsin Regiments
as a heavy skirmish line, supported by the 7th Wisconsin
and 19th Indiana. Quite an amusing incident occurred as
the skirmish line was advancing through the woods in the
rear of Miller's house. Gibbon sent his compliments by
Lieutenant Haskell, of his staff, to Lieut. Col. E. S. Bragg,
commanding the 6th Wisconsin, "to advance as far as it
was safe." Bragg said to Haskell, "Give General Gibbon
my compliments, and tell him it has been d—d unsafe here
for the last thirty minutes ; ' ' and pulling his hat down over
his face said, "Forward, 6th Wisconsin !" The two regi¬
ments on the skirmish line forged ahead until they reached
the edge of the cornfield so noted in history ; then the 7th
Wisconsin and 19th Indiana were deployed in line of bat¬
tle on the right, when the Iron Brigade moved forward on
Meade's right, facing a deadly fire from the front, and suf¬
fering heavily from an enfilading fire from the woods on
the right,, where General Stuart, with a battery of horse
artillery, and a body of Confederate cavalry was well
posted for work.
The 2d and 6th Wisconsin, on the left of the Iron Bri¬
gade, were under equally as heavy fire as the right wing,
and Phelps' and Patrick's brigades ; many brave boys from
those two Wisconsin regiments surrendered their lives for
the perpetuity of the Union. Lieutenant Colonel Allen of
ANTIETAM.
193
the 2d, and lyieutenant Colonel Bragg of the 6th were
both wounded.
The 19th Indiana lost heavily in a gallant but ill-ad¬
vised charge, ordered and led by Lieutenant Colonel A. O.
Bachman, to capture a section of artillery posted in the
cornfield to the front and left. This battery was supported
by a Texas regiment that suddenly rose up and delivered a
most fatal volley into the 19th Indiana when it was charg¬
ing. Bachman was mortally wounded, and the regiment
almost annihilated.
Capt. W. W. Dudley then assumed command of the
regiment, and ordered his command to fall back to the reg¬
ular line of battle, the 19th Indiana being far in advance.
Sergeant W. W. Macy ordered John Yost, Thomas,
and Henry Kirby to bring back Lieutenant Colonel Bach¬
man, who was dying. While Sergeant Macy was caring
for Bachman in his expiring moments he (Macy) was hit
in the head. He had to make his way through Patrick's
brigade. As he went back all covered with blood. Gene¬
ral Patrick turned to his command and said : "Make way
and let that brave man through. ' '
General Gates, in his excellent history of the Ulster
Guard, relates the following : ' ' Passing back again through
the woods, two Confederate colonels and one brigadier
were found on the ground, and interspersed with the mul¬
titudes of their fallen, there were so many of those Na¬
tional uniforms that at a glance one might see how fearful
was the cost of the victory. Upon one dead body was
found a large black dog that had been killed from some
chance shot which had struck him whilst stretched upon
his master's break.—W. J. Pollock of the Ulster Guard."
When the left of the 20th New York made a charge
under Major Hardenburgh to help save the 6th Wisconsin,
(the enemy were so determined to capture Battery B,
Jackson had ordered it taken at any sacrifice), the two lines
were so near to each other that Isaac Thomas, of the Ulster
Guard, shot the color-bearer and captured the flag.
XIII
194
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
General Doubleday was fearful of a flank movement
from the right, and therefore ordered the Second Brigade,
under Lieutenant Colonel Hofmann, to hold a position near
the Hagerstown pike, in the rear of the line of battle, to
checkmate any movement of that kind. No army in the
world ever had a better brigade commander than Hofmann.
Always on the alert, there was no danger that the enemy
would steal a march on him. The magic of his voice in
battle has thrilled the soldiers of the Army of the Potomac
on more than one battlefield. The 95th New York was
detached by Hooker to support a battery near the front,
leaving the 7th Indiana, 76th New York and 56th Pennsyl¬
vania under the direct command of Hofmann.
Ricketts was so sorely pressed that Hooker directed
Meade to send him a brigade. To comply with the request
would leave a gap in his line, yet he must obey the order,
as Hooker knew the whole line better than any other offi¬
cer, and was handling his corps with great skill.
The following letter from General McClellan will fully
substantiate the above statement :
Headquarters Army of the Potomac.
Sharpsburg, September 20, 1862.
My Dear Hooker :—I bave been very sick the last few days,
and just able to go where my presence was absolutely necessary, so
I could not come to see you and thank you for what you did the
other day, and express my intense regret and sympathy for your un¬
fortunate wound.
Had you not been wounded when you were, I believe the result
of the battle would have been the entire destruction of the Confed¬
erate army, for I know that with you at its head your corps would
have kept on until it gained the main road. As a slight expression
of what I think of your merit, I have requested» that the brigadier
general's commission, rendered vacant by Mansfield's death, maybe
given to you. I will this evening write a private note to the Presi¬
dent on the subject, and I am glad to assure you that, so far as I
can learn, it is the universal feeling of the army that you are the
most deserving in it.
With the sincere hope that your health will soon be restored, so
that you may again be with us in the field, I am, dear general, your
sincere friend, George B. McCeEEEAn, Major General.
Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, Commanding Corps.
A NT/E TA M.
195
When Meade took Magilton out of the center and di¬
rected him to go to Ricketts' assistance, the enemy made a
dash and filled the gap, with the hope of piercing our cen¬
ter. Meade saw that it was a critical condition, and that
soon our line would be broken unless the enemy was re¬
pulsed at once. He directed Ransom to turn his battery
on their advancing column in the gap, and also ordered
Seymour and Anderson to pour in an enfilading fire, that
compelled them to retreat into the cornfield.
Ricketts seeing Meade's dangerous position came to his
assistance. Doubleday's Third Brigade, the First (Phelps')
and the Fourth (Gibbon's) were already engaged. Patrick's
was a solid New York brigade: 21st, under Colonel Wm.
F. Rogers ; 23d, commanded by Colonel Henry C. Hof-
mann ; the 25th, Colonel Newton B. Lord, with the 80th,
commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Gates ; the last regi¬
ment is known in the history of the Empire State as
the Ulster Guard. The latter was ordered to support
Battery B ; the left was thrown forward to strengthen
the 6th Wisconsin. When Patrick arrived at the front
he was directed to advance his brigade to the right of
the turnpike. As he moved up he discovered a force
of the enemy moving around our right flank, and at¬
tempting to gain our rear. He notified General Double-
day, who directed that the 30th New York be sent to
checkmate the move.
Patrick, stripped of two of his regiments, moved for¬
ward with the 2 ist and 35th New York Regiments to assist
Gibbon and Phelps. At this juncture our troops in the
cornfield were being forced back on Patrick's left.
Colonel Hofmann had been relieved from his work on
the right and reported to Patrick, when he (Patrick) directed
the 2ist, 23d, and 30th New York, 19th Indiana, and 7th
Wisconsin to make a dash on the advancing enemy to help
save Gibbon's left and Battery B. The 35th New York,
under Lord, dashed forward and captured the colors of the
regiment that was trying to take Battery B.
196 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
The enemy rallied again, forced our line back, and at
the same time renewed the attack on our right flank, which
compelled Patrick to take advantage of a line of rocks,
which he held ; in the mean time Doubleday ordered Hof-
mann to put his brigade in to assist Gibbon, who had suffered
so severely, but Hooker revoked Doubleday's order, and
said he wanted Hofmann to remain where he had been
posted.
The troops in that small space swung to and fro like a
pendulum, for three corps, the First, Twelfth, and Second,
all fought over the same ground, only to have it held later
in the day by Franklin until night put an end to the
conflict.
The best way to convey a correct idea how the Pennsyl¬
vania Reserves suffered in that battle, will be to take the
9th Regiment, as the sheet of leaden hail greeted the whole
division about the same. Sergeant Blanchard was wounded
with the colors ; Walter Beatly had scarcely raised them up
when he fell mortally wounded ; Roberts next took them,
but no time had elapsed until he was killed ; then Edward
Doran gave a splendid illustration of the genuine rich char¬
acter and presence of mind, by seizing the colors, and lying
on his back, held them up until the line was relieved by the
Twelfth Corps. For that gallant and heroic act Doran was
made a noncommissioned officer on the field.
The Iron Brigade, under Gibbon, was melting away under
the steady fire in front and the raking, enfilading fire from
the right, so General Doubleday ordered Col. Walter
Phelps, Jr., to bring up his brigade, composed of the 22d
New York, under Capt. John D. O'Brian ; 30th New York,
under Col. William M. Searing ; 14th Brooklyn, under
William H. de Bevoise, and the 2d United States Sharp¬
shooters, commanded by Col. Henry A. V. Post.
When Colonel Phelps moved up the fire from the right
was so severe that he ordered Colonel Post to take his Sharp¬
shooters and dislodge the enemy in that direction if possible.
No regiment in the service went to the front with more
ANTIETAM.
197
alacrity than the Sharpshooters. Col. Post gave the com¬
mand and the gallant boys were soon at their work. Phelps
soon observed that the Sharpshooters were fighting against
great odds, and he assisted them with the remainder of the
brigade. In the mean time Colonel Post was wounded.
Although these two brigades were holding their ground,
they were failing from great losses, and Gen. Marsena R.
Patrick was ordered by Doubleday to.bring forward Rien-
tenant Stewart, of Battery B, 4th United States Artillery,
who advanced with one section and took position in front of
Miller's barn, just to the right of the road, followed shortly
by Captain Campbell with the other four guns, going into
battery on Stewart's left, and commencing to fire canister
at the enemy in the cornfield on the east of the pike, at
fifteen or twenty yards distance.
The loss of the battery whilst in this position was i
captain wounded, 3 sergeants, 4 corporals, 32 privates killed
and wounded ; 26 horses were killed and seven wounded ;
one of Stewart's pieces had only two men left—Packard
and Johnson.
Ricketts' division was formed, the Third Brigade in the
center, with General Hartsuff supported on the left by the
Second Brigade, commanded by Col. William A. Christian,
with the First Brigade on Hartsuff s right.
The division moved forward closely followed by Battery
F, ist Pennsylvania, under Captain Mathews, and Captain
Thompson's Independent Pennsylvania Battery, each con¬
sisting of four three-inch rifled guns. Both batteries suc¬
ceeded in getting into position and opened an effective and
deadly fire on the enemy.
Hartsuff s brigade was formed with the 12th Massachu¬
setts on the right, the nth Pennsylvania next, then the
13th Massachusetts, with the 83d New York on the left.
The other regiment of the brigade, the i6th Maine, was
guarding a railroad, hence not in action. The 12th Massa¬
chusetts selected Sergt. George Kimball to furnish data for
that regiment. Since the war he has been serving on the
198
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Boston Journal. His account of the regiment in that battle
is used in full, as it really represents the brigade :
The 12th Massachusetts Volunteers (Webster's regiment) reached
Keedysville about noon of the 15th.
At South Mountain it had been its good fortune to be pitted
against a portion of Garnett's (afterwards Pickett's) Confederate
division—the very troops that had made a successful flank attack
upon the 12th and other regiments of Ricketts' division at the Second
Bull Run—and the issue this time had proved most satisfactory and
creditable to the Massachusetts men. Consequently the esprit de
corps of this fine body of troops was now particularly high. The
men felt that if any shadow of discredit had attached to them on
account of the disaster at Manassas, it had been swept away by the
brilliant flank movement at South Mountain.
The regiment was under command of Maj. Elisha M. Burbank,
Col. Fletcher Webster having been mortally wounded at Bull Run
August 30, and Eieut. Col. Timothy M. Bryan, Jr., being absent on
sick leave.
It numbered (nine companies) 325 ofl&cers and men. One of its
companies (H), Capt. James L. Bates (afterwards Colonel Bates),
was at this time detached as provost guard at brigade headquar¬
ters. During the afternoon and night of the 15th the regiment lay
in an open field just beyond the town of Keedysville, awaiting orders.
Early on the morning of the i6th the men were awakened by
heavy firing in front, and preparations were immediately begun for
a move. Rations were issued and cartridge boxes replenished. The
men knew that a great battle was pending and were ready to do their
whole duty. Besides the forty rounds that the cartridge boxes con¬
tained, each man put twenty rounds more into his haversack. After
a hasty breakfast, the regiment marched with its brigade toward the
right of McClellan's line of battle. A wide detour was made
to screen the movement from the enemy and to avoid his artil¬
lery fire.
Antietam Creek was crossed by the bridge known as Number i,
and the column then filed sharply to the left, soon coming out into
a large cornfield near Joseph Poffenberger's house. Here the bri¬
gade halted, formed line of battle, and began preparations for supper.
The march had been a short one, but much time was consumed in
waits and measures, and the day was far spent.
The men were comparatively safe in this position, as only occa¬
sionally did shells burst in their midst and they were out of range
of the enemy's infantry.
Not so, however, with Meade's brave Pennsylvania Reserves and
COL. B. F. COOK.
ANTIETAM. 199
the other troops whose lot it was to be nearer the foe. All through
that long, cold, dismal night the crack of rifles greeted the ears of
Hartsufif's troops. Occasionally Doubleday's artillery thundered
out its defiance, only to be answered by the heavy roar of the
enemy's guns as they savagely belched forth their acceptance of the
challenge.
Everything betokened a desperate battle on the morrow, and no
one who lay that night among Hartsuif's men will ever forget'the
terror, the anxieties, and the discomforts of his experience. Hooker,
before going to sleep, is reported to have said : " To-morrow we fight
a battle that will decide the fate of the Republic."
With the first gray streaks of coming day, that memorable 17th
of September, the men of the 12th Massachusetts were awake and
ready for any duty—any sacrifice their country might require of
them. The battle began in earnest. From the extreme right, held
by Doubleday, all along the front the fighting raged with a ferocity
born of desperation.
Hartsufif's brigade was compelled to remain for some time in¬
active, but finally, it becoming apparent that Jackson's division was
advancing, and Hooker seeing that more troops were needed, and
that it was necessary to make a grand heroic eflfort to check this
Confederate onslaught, dispatched Colonel Candler of his stafif
with orders for Hartsufif to advance. The men never obeyed a sum¬
mons with greater alacrity. They moved forward as if on parade.
At the foot of the little rise of ground upon which they had been
standing, a double row of fences, inclosing a farm road, was encoun¬
tered, the rails passing through the posts. It was impossible to
throw them down, and there was therefore no recourse but to climb
over. The Confederate skirmishers had already gained the large
cornfield on the opposite side ; bullets were flying. Many of the
12th were killed or wounded while climbing the fences. On the
other side the line was reformed. Companies K and E were thrown
out as skirmishers, under Capt. B. F. Cook, and the regiment moved
forward again. It was soon discovered that one company of skir¬
mishers was sufficient, and Company E returned to the line.
On they swept through the waving corn, reaching far above
their heads, the bullets of the enemy doing deadly work at every
step and shells bursting all about them, while the yells of the foe,
more exultant because of their easy victory at Harper's Ferr}-,
pierced every Union ear and nerved every loyal heart—on, on they
pressed, closing up every gap made by the enemy's missiles, their
noble leader riding personally behind them and encouraging them
forward. As they passed General Hooker his handsome face was
wreathed in smiles, and he remarked to one of his stafif ; " I think
200
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
they will hold it." Jackson, too, was moving forward. His skir¬
mishers had been checked by ours, but the main line was still in
motion. The 12th at last reached the other edge of the cornfield.
Here another fence was encountered, but this one was easily removed.
Beyond this point the ground rose slightly, culminating in a small
knoll some fifty yards from the fence.
When the men of the 12th reached the summit of this knoll,
th^y found themselves actually face to face with the enem3^ They
needed no order, for their dut^' was a plain one. Every musket was
leveled at once and fired simultaneously, and the effect was distinctly
noticeable. So near was the foe it is undoubtedly true that every
bullet did its work. The enemy wavered and recoiled before this
fearful storm of lead, but soon rallied and returned the fire, and the
men of Massachusetts met their onslaught with a fortitude not ex¬
celled on any battlefield of the war.
For three hours it was give and take, with no thought on the
Union side of giving up the contest so long as a man was left.
Stewart's battery, to the right of the 12th, did murderous work. The
Massachusetts boys were falling by the score, but still they fought
on, and kept closing up on their colors as fast as gaps were made in
their line—Hooker and Hartsuff were both wounded. The latter,
while being borne to the rear, begged of those who carried him not
to tell his brave men of his mishap, feeling that their love for him
and their confidence in his leadership might perhaps create a tem¬
porary feeling of discouragement.
Major Burbank fell mortally wounded, and every ofiicer of the
12th Massachusetts but three was either killed or wounded. But
the enemy's advance was checked and victory for the Army of the
Potomac made possible, for had it not been for the heroic resistance
of Hartsuff's brigade to Jackson's advance, who can predict what
the result would have been at Antietam ? This grand result, how¬
ever, was not secured without frightful losses. Out of the 325
ofl&cers and men of the 12th Massachusetts who entered the fight,
47 were killed and 166 wounded—a total of 213.
It is doubtful if any Union regiment in the battle of Antietam
can show a larger percentage of loss than the 12th, and it was cer¬
tainly not many times exceeded on any battlefield of the war. The
ofiicers killed or who died of their wounds were Maj. Elisha M.
Burbank, Asst. Surgeon Albert A. Kendall, First Eieuts. William G.
White and Lysander F. Gushing, and Second Eieut. George W.
Orme. When relieved by the brigades of Crawford and Gordon, of
Mansfield's corps, but a handful were left. The colors of the 12th
were toward the close of the fight flying from their poles while the
latter were stuck in the ground. As the regiment started for the
AliTIETAM.
201
rear Lieut. Arthur^ Dehon picked them up from where they had
fallen. They were literally covered with dead heroes—those who
had been killed beneath them or had been wounded and crawled
upon them to die. It was only with difíiculty that Dehon could get
possession of these sacred emblems of patriotism and valor. The
young lieutenant was made a captain for his bravery, and while
serving as an aid upon the staff of General Meade at Fredericksburg
was killed. When the regiment reached the rear it numbered but
thirty-two, but these were even still willing to render further ser¬
vice, as was evidenced by their voluntarily going forward again to
support a battery. A number of the men left the ranks when the
regiment fell back to help off wounded comrades. None of the men
were captured by the enemy.
The circumstances were in no way exceptional. It was not an
ambuscade. The 12th Massachusetts did not fall into a trap. It
was one of the fairest tests of bravery upon any battlefield of the
war. It abundantly proved the regiment to be possessed of the
highest discipline and to have the best of fighting qualities. They
honored themselves and reflected immortal honor upon the First
Army Corps at Antietam. Two-thirds of their number was their
percentage of loss.
Thus Sergeant Kimball graphically describes the part
taken by the 12th Massachusetts in the bloody battle of
Antietam—the Borodino of America.
Though such heroism was displayed by the 12th Massa¬
chusetts, the other three regiments of the brigade—the i ith
Pennsylvania, 13th Massachusetts, and 83d New York—
fought with as much valor, and would have sacrificed the
last man to save the nation. To be a member of Hartsuif's
brigade is a proud distinction that of itself ought to be a
passport even in foreign lands.
To support this famous brigade Ricketts ordered the
Second Brigade, nnder Col. William A. Christian, on its left,
which formed line of battle with the 26th New York on the
left, the 94th New York next ; then the 88th Pennsylvania
and the 90th Pennsylvania on the right of the brigade, and
on the left of the 83d New York.
Lieut. Col. R. H. Richardson commanded the 26th New
York, Lieut. Col. Calvin Littlefield, the 94th New York,
Maj. George W. Gill the 88th Pennsylvania, until he was
202
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
wounded, then Capt. Henry R. Myers assumed command
of it ; the 90th Pennsylvania was commanded by Col.
Peter Lyle.
Colonel Christian was a brave officer, and had a brigade
second to none in the service, and on that field it added
another star of great brilliancy to its glory.
On the right of Hartsnff was the fighting brigade of
Abram Duryea, composed of the 97th New York, under
Maj. Charles Northup; 104th New York, commanded by
Maj. Lewis C. Skinner; 105th New York, led by Col.
Howard Carroll", and 107th Pennsylvania, commanded by
Capt. James Mac. Thompson. General Ricketts, in his
report, says : "I commend the general good conduct of the
division," and among those he personally mentions are
General Duryea, Colonel Coulter and Capt. John W. Wil¬
liams, his assistant adjutant general.
"When night had stilled the battle's hum" Ricketts had
the supreme pleasure of knowing that his division had
crowned itself with glory that day, while his command at
night was a mere handful, yet his heroes lay thick on the
line of battle. *
* A singular coincident occurred to the 13th Massachusetts. At
the second battle of Bull Run the regiment lost their knapsacks,
having filled them before going into action, and as our army re¬
treated the knapsacks fell into the hands of the enemy. At South
Mountain many of these knapsacks were recovered, having been left
in haste by a Georgia regiment, as the Confederate force retreated.
Some of them had not been disturbed in the least.
Another similar coincident in that regiment's history occurred
there. In the early days of the war the regiment had seen service
on the upper Potomac, and the boys knew every ford in the Poto¬
mac, from Sandy Hook to Hancock. It had been camped in nearly
every grove, had marched over every road, had visited every village
and hamlet, and had become acquainted with many of the people.
Their winter camp in 1861-62 was at "Williamsport, but they had
spent considerable time in camp at Sharpsburg during the fall of
1861. It was their mission, during these months, to picket the
river, guard the fords, see that no hostile bands disturbed the
Maryland side. They were well acquainted with the Antietam
ANTIETAM.
203
Several histories have it that Hooker, in his extreme
anguish, cried out to Doubleday to send him his best bri¬
gade, when HartsufF was dispatched to him. HartsufF
never was under the command oF Doubleday. As will be
seen in this chapter, he (HartsufF) commanded a brigade
in Ricketts' division.
When he was ordered to Meade's assistance the other
two brigades oF the division gallantly supported him.
In that movement HartsufF was severely wounded,
and taken From the field ; wherepon the brigade was com¬
manded by Colonel Coulter oF the nth Pennsylvania. The
artillery did valuable service in that great battle, being
skillfully and ably managed.
Gen. H. J. Hunt had command of the artillery of the
army, with Capt. J. Albert Monroe in charge of that of
the First Division of the First Corps.
Hooker directed Company L, ist New York Artillery,
Capt. J. A. Reynolds, to take a position on the left of
Thompson's battery, which was busily engaged in adminis¬
tering canister in heavy doses to the enemy advancing on
Duryea's brigade, then being forced back. Reynolds
could not select even a swell in the ground enough to op¬
erate his guns on, and he moved his battery farther to the
right, where he went into action, and silenced a battery of
the enemy on the west side of the pike. Then General
Gibbon directed him to move to the right still farther, and
with Battery B, 4th United States Artillery, to shell the
Creek, with the South Mountain range, with Pleasant Valley, and
all the country. On the 17th of September, 1861, the regiment had
a skirmish at Lockport, a station on the canal just below Sharps-
burg. The enemy was engaged in throwing up an earthwork on
the Virginia side, and had one cannon. The 13th Massachusetts
had a rifled 12-pounder which was drawn into position in order to
conceal it. Suddenly the Union boys surprised the Confederates by
firing two shells into their midst. Then came a brisk musketry
skirmish across the river. It seemed rather strange to the members
of that regiment that one year from that day they should be parti¬
cipating in a heavy battle in the same locality.
204
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
woods. Both of these batteries were then retired to the
ridge ill the rear to receive ammunition and rearrange, as
both had lost heavily in men and horses.
Hooker directed Captain Monroe, Company D, ist
Rhode Island Artillery, to advance to the edge of the corn¬
field ; Lieutenant Bdgell and ist New Hampshire Battery
to follow and take position about lOO yards in the rear. A
battery of the e'nemy opened on them at once, but the fire
was not returned. Monroe observing a column of their in¬
fantry retreating, and only about 125 yards distant, the
captain directed one section to play on them, throwing
them into great confusion ; the other four guns opened
with canister upon a large force of the enemy advancing in
front. The New Hampshire Battery directed a well-aimed
and heavy fire on the same column of the enemy. The
combined fire of these two batteries compelled the enemy
to fall back.
After the most stubborn fighting from early dawn until
eleven o'clock the corps, infantry and artillery, having suf¬
fered frightful losses, and nearly expended their ammunition,
retired from the position which they had taken and held in
front of the Miller house to a position just north of the
Poffenberger barn.
To cover that retrograde movement General Gibbon
was directed by General Ûoubleday to form a line in the
skirt of woods through which the corps had passed in going
into the battle. Lieutenant Colonel Hofmann was thrown
forward on to the rise of ground west of the Hagerstown
pike. These precautions were deemed necessary to prevent
the enemy from making a flank attack. The First Divi¬
sion of the corps held the extreme right of the line of battle
from the commencement to the close, and was not replaced
by any other troops. The Twelfth and Second Corps, in
their advance, passed over the ground which had been oc¬
cupied by Meade's and Ricketts' divisions. There was no
further fighting on the extreme right after the corps retired
to the heights on the Poffenberger farm.
ANTIETAM. 205
As the artillery did such heroic and valuable service, it
is but simple justice to the gallant officers and men to give
as full an account of them as possible, consequently I have
decided to quote from the able and clear report of J. Albert
Monroe, commanding artillery, First Division, First Army
Corps. He says :
In an extraordinarily short time all the division batteries, ex¬
cept Company B, Fourth Artillery, were in position on the ridge
upon which they had been during the night, and which ran nearly
parallel with the position occupied by the enemy's guns, and about
800 or 1,000 yards from it. Before the enemy's batteries were
silenced, which was done in about one hour and a quarter. Company
L, ist New York Artillery, was ordered through the woods at the
left into the plowed land beyond, leaving in the position but Com¬
pany D, Rhode Island Artillery, commanded by myself, and the
ist New Hampshire Battery, Lieutenant Edgell. But two bat¬
teries from another division came up and took position on the
right.
Company B, Fourth Artillery, Capt. J. B. Campbell, accom¬
panied General Gibbon's brigade through the woods to the open
ground beyond, where Lieutenant Stewart's section was detached
from the battery, and ordered to a position near the turnpike, to
shell the woods beyond. Here the section suffered severely in men
and horses, but it did excellent service, throwing a body of the
enemy, 400 or 500 strong, into considerable confusion, so that they
partially broke and ran through a hollow, gaining the cover of some
fence rails.
About this time Captain Campbell placed his other four guns in
position on the left of Lieutenant Stewart's section. In the mean
time the enemy had crept into a cornfield near the battery and on
the left of the turnpike, and opened a murderous fire, which was re¬
plied to with canister with good effect. Captain Campbell was here
seriously wounded in the shoulder, and the command of the com¬
pany devolved upon Lieutenant Stewart. The battery was sup¬
ported by General Gibbon's brigade and 20th New York. Being
very much weakened, General Gibbon directed Lieutenant Stewart
to change position to the right, out of range of the enemy's mus¬
ketry, and to shell the woods in front ; but only one section went
into position, on account of the great number of wounded men and
horses in the other two sections. Company L, ist New York
Artillery, Captain J. A. Reynolds, after moving through the woods,
was ordered to move forward into the plowed ground, where it took
206 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
position and opened upon one of the enemy's batteries in the field
beyond the turnpike, silencing it after sharp fire for some time.
From this position Captain Reynolds was ordered by General
Gibbon to move to the right and shell the woods in front, with Com¬
pany h and the section of Company B on the left of Company L.
Soon after both of these batteries were ordered to the rear. Captain
Reynolds went back to the advance train to obtain a supply of am¬
munition, and upon his return was ordered to the extreme right,
where he had no opportunity to use his guns. Lieutenant Stewart
retired to the rear of the woods through which he had advanced,
moved his disabled horses, and regulated his men and horses
throughout.
Shortly after the enemy's batteries upon the hill were silenced,
and about the time Company B, 4th Artillery, and Company L,
New York Artillery, were ordered to the rear. Company D, Rhode
Island Artillery, commanded by myself, was ordered through the
wood, and immediately after the ist New Hampshire Battery,
Lieutenant Edgell, was ordered to follow. General Hooker directed
me to move forward beyond the second cornfield, if possible, and
take position as near the woods as the ground would admit.
I advanced, followed by Lieutenant Edgell, ist New Hamp¬
shire Battery, and went into battery about 50 yards from the wood,
the New Hampshire Battery taking position about 100 yards in the
rear. A battery of the enemy here opened upon me, but no atten¬
tion was paid to it, and its fire was perfectly ineffective ; but the
battery with one section opened upon a body of the enemy, which
was seen retreating at the left of their front, and about 120 yards
distant, throwing them into great confusion. The other four guns
opened with canister and case upon a large force advancing through
the woods in front, which were very open, and with the assistance
of the other section, which had accomplished its object by a few
shots, and the ist New Hampshire Battery, checked the enemy,
and he retired out of sight.
While engaged forcing the enemy in the woods, a body of
sharpshooters had, unobserved, crept along under a little ridge that
ran diagonally to the front of the Rhode Island Battery and opened
a most unerring fire upon it, killing and disabling many horses
and men. As quickly as possible a section was directed to open
upon them with canister, which, though it caused them no injury,
they lying down under the ridge, kept them almost silent, they
firing but an occasional shot without effect.
While this section was keeping the sharpshooters silent, the
other four guns, with the guns of Lieutenant Edgell, opened upon
the battery that was still firing, and soon silenced it. I then or-
AN TIE TA M.
207
dered my battery to limber to the rear. The sharpshooters took ad¬
vantage of the opportunity thus offered, and opened most briskly,
severely wounding a number of men and killing and disabling a
large number of horses. My own horse was pierced with six bullets.
All the horses but one lead horse of one piece were either killed or
disabled, and the piece had to be drawn away by hand by means of
a prolonge. The timber was left, but was subsequently recovered.
The New Hampshire Battery left its position at the same time, and
went back to its original position. After securing the piece that
was drawn away by hand to its caisson, I moved my battery into
the lot between the second cornfield and the plowed land beyond
the first cornfield, and went into position with five guns, and
shelled the woods beyond the turnpike. After firing a short time I
retired to my original position, when the disabled piece was sent to
the rear.
The battlefield of Antietam, besides being the bloodiest
in the late war, presented as many deeds of heroism as
any battle recorded in history. Generals leading their
commands rode to death in the face of the enemy, but it
was left to a mere youth to quietly and fearlessly exhibit a
spirit of valor that astonished officers of the regular arm\-
who were veterans of the Mexican war. He modestly rode
up to General Hooker and requested to be assigned to duty
as an aid on his staff. The battle was raging with great
fury at the time. Wherever the daring and intrepid
general, on his white horse, rode to cheer his men, there
was this youth. After a little all of Hooker's staff were
either absent taking orders or wounded, so he had no one
to assist him, and seeing the coolness of the youth he
appointed him a volunteer aid on his staff in the midst of
the battle, and at once gave him orders to deliver on
different parts of the field.
The Comte de Paris in his work has severely criticised
Hooker for not taking Allen's Hill, where J. E. B. Stuart
had his artillery stationed near our right flank. It was the
key of the field ; once in the hands of the Union forces, the
enemy's line was untenable.
Hooker had opened the battle where he was directed.
He was then only commanding the First Corps, and did
208 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
not have the general management of the battle. With their
field-glasses at headquarters those in common could see
Hooker in the midst of the fight, and should have ordered
Mansfield to his right, or Sumner, who went in third.
When the First Corps was ordered forward, the desperation
with which the enemy pressed it made it almost imperative
for Hooker to cheer his men with his presence, so he dashed
to the front and rode his horse at great speed along the
line, which greatly encouraged the soldiers and did much
to make that part of the field famous.
Notwithstanding the fact that Hooker was chained down
to a particular work, yet he grasped the situation that the
hill on our right, the point above alluded to, needed atten¬
tion, and proceeded to examine it with this volunteer aid,
who proved to be George W. Smalley, the correspondent of
the New York Tribune.^ and since the war its London cor¬
respondent. Hè had dismounted to go a little farther to the
front to make a more careful examination, and on returning
just after he mounted he was wounded. In a few minutes
he swayed unsteadily in his saddle from the loss of blood.
Then turning to Mr. Smalley Hooker said: "There is a
regiment to the right. Order it forward ! Crawford and
Gordon are coming up. Tell them to carry those woods and
hold them, and it is our fight." But Mr. Smalley had to
assist the general from his horse before he could deliver the
orders, as he was rapidly losing strength and liable to fall at
any minute. Thus a youth unaccustomed to war made a
most valuable staff officer.
When Hooker was wounded Meade was placed in com¬
mand of the First Corps, and ably managed it until the
battle was ended. He remained in commaifd of the First
Corps for twelve days, until Reynolds returned and assumed
command, and Meade returned to the command of the
Pennsylvania Reserves.
Mansfield arrived with the Twelfth Corps, composed of
two divisions. General Williams commanded the right
division and Green the left. Williams was a very keen,
ANTIETAM.
209
observing officer, and at once saw that he must flank the
Dunker Church and take it in reverse. Dee was promptly-
advised of this movement, and D. H. Hill was moved to
the left to face Green, while Hood, who was in reserve, was
ordered to the extreme left to meet Williams. Hood had
his men well ensconced behind stone walls and ledges of
rock, so Williams was in heavy luck.
Green, on the left, had forged his way well up to the
Dunker Church, but General Mansfleld, who accompanied
the left, had been mortally wounded, and General Williams
was placed in command of the corps. Crawford took com¬
mand of Williams' division. The losses were heavy on
both sides. Starke, who commanded one of Jackson's
divisions, had been killed, and Lawton, who commanded
another, was wounded. As they were bearing away Hooker
and Mansfield from the field, it was announced that Hart-
suff and Gordon were also wounded. Death and destruction
seemed to reign supreme. There appeared to be a lull ;
from sheer exhaustion neither could advance, but both
anxiously waited for reënforcements, for it was almost im¬
possible to hold the lines much longer.
General Sumner arrived with the Second Corps, and it
seemed as if victory was going to perch on our banners
with the troops of that corps, that had been almost invin¬
cible in the presence of the enemy. When the Second
Corps arrived on the field Green and Williams were holding
their ground with two small knots of soldiers, instead of
divisions. Sedgwick was the first on the field. He at once
advanced, soon passing Green and Williams, driving Hood
back beyond the Dunker Church, and the nearer he ap¬
proached the enemy the more he quickened his pace. The
Dunker Church and the woods around it was taken, the
key to Lee's left, and the Confederates were retreating in
the direction of the Potomac.
But here comes another simoon. French's and Richard¬
son's divisions of Sumner's corps have not arrived on the
field. Sedgwick's flanks are exposed" and McLaws and
XIV
210
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Walker are both advancing on him, and many of Hood's
men have taken fresh courage and have returned to the
attack. M chaws, in command, saw there was a gap be¬
tween Sedgwick's left and Green's right, and he pushed
Renshaw's brigade into the unoccupied space. Falling on
Green's right, he was compelled to yield ground, while
Sedgwick's left, under Howard, was taken in reverse and
thrown into confusion ; at the same time Crawford's brigade,
which was supporting Howard, yielded to the confusion and
gave way ; the other two brigades of Sedgwick, supposing
their rear was being gained and that they might be sur¬
rounded, abandoned their position around the Dunker
Church, notwithstanding Sedgwick did everything in his
power to prevent the disorder. Although he had been
wounded three times, he remained in his saddle, trying to
regain the ground he had captured only a short time before.
Williams then ordered Gordon to take his brigade and
attempt to carry the Dunker Church. The brigade ad¬
vanced under cover of the dense cloud of smoke until it
penetrated the woods near the church, when it was com¬
pelled to retire before a concentric fire of the enemy.
If French and Richardson had only appeared on the
field when Sedgwick did, Sumner would have greatly
changed the conflict. McLaws did not follow Sedgwick,
but contented himself in holding his position around the
Dunker Church. It was a defensive battle on their part.
McLaws pretended to follow him, but a few shots from our
batteries sufficed to quiet his nerves, and he returned to the
shades of the church—perhaps to worship. The next one
who went to church was French, taking with him Max
Weber, Morris, and Kimball. To his utter astonishment,
while he found McLaws at church, yet he had serious doubts
about his pious intentions, for he at once assailed his right
and attempted to mash it, which was not a Christian act, to
say the least of it.
Max Weber moved straight forward. Morris was ex¬
posed to an enfilading fire and his troops had seen but little
ANTIETAM.
211
service, and were thrown into confusion, but the veterans
under Kimball passed them and deployed on Weber's left,
while Richardson advanced still on the left of French, with
Meagher in front, supported by Caldwell and Brooks.
Richardson swept past the Roulette farm, over the first
range of hills toward Piper's. Between these ranges of
hills winds a deep ravine, meandering from the Hagerstown
pike to the Keedysville road. That ravine had been con¬
nected with a country road, known before the battle as the
Sunken road ; since then it is called "the Bloody Fane."
Meagher met a heavy force of the enemy ; that only in¬
creased his determination, and dashing forward, his Irish
Brigade was only too glad to follow him, no difference
where he led them. Meagher was wounded, and the com¬
mand devolved on Colonel Burke, who proved himself
worthy to command the brigade that Meagher had led in
battle so often. The contest at this point in the line
amounted to desperation ; the enemy had massed his forces
and attempted to break our lines, but the Irish Brigade,
although it suffered greatly, maintained a splendid line.
Finally it was relieved by Caldwell's brigade.
The enemy was safely posted in that sunken road where
neither artillery nor infantry fire could annoy them.
Col. Francis C. Barlow, commanding two regiments in
Caldwell's brigade, took the hollow in flank, compelling
them to hastily abandon that position, though not without
great loss, including 300 prisoners and three flags.
Just before that flank movement, there was one of the
most gallant and admirable feats performed that occurred
on the field. The 4th Alabama stuck their colors in the
ground. Maj. Theodore W. Greig, serving under Colonel
Barlow, saw the flag flying ; he sprang forward, captured it,
and returned to his regiment unharmed, though imme¬
diately after that flank movement he was severely wounded
in the neck. He received a medal of honor for capturing
the flag.
General Caldwell rallied the 7th New York, which was
212 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
suflfering under such a deadly fire it seemed they would
give way, but when Caldwell offered to lead them in per¬
son, they fought with great determination. The enemy
attempted to turn Caldwell's left by moving behind a ridge
in a cornfield. Colonel Cross, of the 5th New Hampshire,
instantly changed front forward and met the advancing foe
with a well-directed volley, which checked and drove him
back. But rallying, he made another attempt to still
farther turn our left, when the 8ist Pennsylvania moved to
the left to assist the 5th New Hampshire, and the enemy
was finally repulsed at that point with great loss. In the
last conflict the 5 th New Hampshire captured the colors of
the 4th North Carolina.
These two regiments were drawn so far to the left to
prevent the enemy from turning that flank, that quite a
gap was made in Caldwell's brigade, which was filled with
a regiment from Colonel Brooke's brigade.
There was no enemy then in the front of Caldwell, and
as they had attempted to steal around the left flank under
cover of a ridge in the cornfield, Barlow's suspicions were
aroused, and making a hasty examination, he found they were
attempting to turn the right in the same manner they had
just previously the left. Moving his two regiments ob¬
liquely to the right, about 300 yards to a hill, he opened a
severe fire .on them, which compelled them to break and
hastily retreat.
Then an attempt was made to force Caldwell's center ;
as soon as the heavy firing indicated that the battle was
renewed there, Barlow immediately moved to the left, and
uniting with the rest of the brigade, moved forward, driving
the enemy out of the cornfield and through the Piper
orchard.
While leading his men forward Barlow was danger¬
ously wounded by a grape shot in the groin. French's
left was being forced back, when Brooke moved his brigade
to the right to check the enemy's advance in that direction.
Richardson had driven back the brigades of Rodes and
AN TIE TA M.
213
•G. B. Anderson, of D. H. Hill's division, at the point of
the bayonet beyond the Piper house, and was nearly to the
Hagerstown road, and very close to Sharpsburg, and would
have pierced Lee's line, gained the rear of his left wing,
and at the same time have taken Lee's reserve artillery in
reverse and rear had he succeeded. French on the right
was held back by the artillery of the enemy at the Dunker
Church, but Richardson had almost broken the center.
"Can't you go a little farther, general? Pleasonton is on
your left with three batteries of artillery, and fully believes
the center is failing. " As Van Manning's regiment moved to
the left, Pleasonton's artillery struck it in column, wounding
many and killing quite a number, but Van Manning moved
steadily forward to his position. There, brave boys ! they
have gone as far as they can without assistance. Fitz-John
Porter is just across the Antietam, and has not fired a shot.
If he will only rush down the Keedysville road, in thirty
minutes the victory will be ours. No support comes and
Richardson's heroes are compelled to fall back and form a
line in the rear.
The Comte de Paris has this to say on that point : " But
Richardson could not follow up his advantage alone. On
the right Sedgwick was mixed up with the débris of the
corps of Hooker and Mansfield. French was arrested by
the enemy's batteries posted in the vicinity of Dunker
Church, which enfiladed him every time he attempted to
advance. Porter remained in reserve at the very time
when he should have come to attack the troops opposed to
Burnside in the rear. In short, this latter general had not
yet emerged from his fatal immobility. ' '
It was then about one o'clock. General Richardson
was mortally wounded, which was a severe blow for the
Union side ; his soldiers had great confidence in him in
battle. McClellan immediately ordered Hancock to take
charge of his division—a good selection. He \yas not only
making a reputation on every field where he fought, but
his presence inspired the men and aroused in them fresh
214
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
enthusiasm. But the action was mainly over in that part
of the field ; it was only necessary to hold their lines intact
and be prepared to meet a new attack. That the enemy
was very weak is beyond question. I heard General Long-
street tell General Rosecrans that he held Richardson back
for quite a time with a section of artillery supported only
by one North Carolina regiment. The general held the
horses of two of his aids while they handled the guns.
Genl. D. H. Hill says in his report :
Gen. G. B. Anderson still nobly held his ground, but the
Yankees began to pour in through the gap made by the retreat of
Rodes. Anderson himself was mortally wounded and his brigade
was totally routed. Colonel Bennett, of the 14th, and Major Sillers,
of the 30th North Carolina Regiments, rallied a portion of their
men. There were no troops near to hold the center except a few
hundred rallied from various brigades. The Yankees crossed the
old road which we had occupied in the morning and occupied a
cornfield and orchard in advance of it. They had now got within a
few hundred yards of the hill which commanded Sharpsburg and
our rear. Affairs looked very critical.
The enemy received reënforcements on the left and
made another desperate struggle, forcing back Richardson's
division, and pressing French so hard that Brooke's brigade
of Smith's division. Franklin's corps, was ordered to his
assistance.
Swinton says : " The arrival of Franklin was opportune,
for Lee had now accumulated so heavily on his left, and
the repulse of Sumner's right under Sedgwick had been so
easily effected that the enemy began to show a disposition
to resume the offensive, directing his efforts against that
still loose-jointed portion of Sumner's harness between his
right and center. ' '
The losses of Sumner had made it impossible for him to
present a solid front to the enemy. As Smith came on the
field with his division Lieutenant Colonel Taylor, of Sum¬
ner's staff, informed him that a battery on the right center
was unsupported. He sent two regiments of Hancock's
brigade to support it, and soon ordered the remaining regi-
AN TIE TA M.
215
ments of the brigade and two batteries to that point. The
enemy was well massed there and attempted to pierce that
point in the line. Col. W- H. Irwin, commanding the
Third Brigade, was ordered to charge the enemy. The
fury of that charge hurled him back until the brigade ad¬
vanced far enough to receive an enfilading fire from the woods
on the right, which threw the 37th and 77th New York
into confusion that lasted only for a moment, when they
faced by the rear rank, poured a well-directed fire into the
enemy, and drove him back in that direction. A battery
of the enemy advanced and opened fire on the 20th New
York, raking its entire front. Sharpshooters on the right
and extreme left opened a deadly fire on Irwin's brigade,
which made the position perilous. In order to relieve his
front he ordered forward the 7th Maine, under Maj. Thomas
W. Hyde.
That regiment fixed bayonets and charging, forced the
enemy back a quarter of a mile, flanking them on the
left in an orchard, where they broke and ran, while those
in front hastily retreated, leaving their colors. The regi¬
ment dashed forward up a hill in hot pursuit, until a regiment
of the enemy rose up behind a stone wall and delivered a
volley at short range and then double quicked around to the
left to cut off their retreat. Those in front seeing that move
returned to the fight, and it seemed as if the 7th Maine
would be captured.
Colonel Irwin's orders were so positive that he could not
rescue them, nor the other regiments of the brigade, nor
could the right regiment of Brooke's brigade assist them
without orders. Colonel Hyde, seeing his critical position,
marched his regiment by the left flank, delivering a volley
into the troops that were attempting to cut him off, and
then faced those pursuing in front. He finally succeeded
in reaching the orchard ; by that time the enemy was ad¬
vancing on him from three opposite directions. A battery
at short range was firing canister but the trees in the
orchard shielded them partially, and in a short time he man-
216 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
aged to rescue the brigade. There was great joy in the
brigade over the return of that regiment, for they expected
those who were not killed or wounded would be captured.
The battle lulled on that part of the field and was taken up
on the left under Burnside. It is said that Sumner was
afraid to throw Franklin's corps in there, as it was the only
one that had not been cut up in the fight, and he held that
command for an emergency, in case the enemy attempted
to turn the right flank or make another attack.
The situation was desperate on both sides. More men
had been lost on that field than any other in the great inter¬
necine war. It challenged the noted battles of Austerlitz,
Marengo, and Waterloo for heavier losses.
Although virtually a drawn battle. Tee was severely
punished and several times stood that day on the brink of
ruin. Their victories had placed an artificial value on their
valor, with a corresponding depreciating one on ours.
Although posted on the side of a stream which at the
time was thought to be too deep to be crossed except at the
bridges, which gave them great advantage, yet at the
Dunker Church, where the two forces met, the modest
yeomanry of the North met the dashing chivalry of the
South in such a soldierly manner, that argued we were one
people, each posssessing courage, honor, and pride that the
world would admire, and which we could not afford to
waste in such a war. May never such occur again.
Burnside is opposite Bridge No.^ 3, below Sharpsburg,
with the Ninth Corps. Jacob D. Cox at that juncture of
the battle was in command. When McClellan moved from
Washington he gave Burnside command of a grand division,
the First Corps, under Hooker, and the Ninth, under Reno.
The brave Reno was killed at South Mountain and General
Cox took command of the corps. When Hooker was moved
to the right at Antietam Burnside did not relieve Cox from
the command of the Ninth Corps. Burnside,. however,
gave direction how it should be placed in position, with
General Crook's brigade of the Kanawha Division on
AN TIE TA M.
217
the right, supported by Sturges' division ; Rodman's divi¬
sion on the left, supported in the rear by Ewing's brigade
of the Kanawha Division.
The troops were far enough away to be well shielded
from the enemy's artillery, which opened at early dawn,
and was replied to by Benjamin's and Dnrell's batteries.
About seven o'clock Burnside ordered an advance to the
ridge nearest the Antietam, to be in readiness to carry the
bridge by storm.
The right, under Eongstreet, was posted on the high
cliffs on the riffht side of the stream—a natural Gibraltar.
General Cox thus describes it :
The bridge itself is a stone structure of three arches, with stone
parapet above, this parapet to some extent flanking the approach
to the bridge at either end. The vallej' in which the stream runs is
quite narrow, the steep slope on the right bank approaching quite
to the water's edge. On this slope the roadway is scarped, running
both ways from the bridge end, and passing to the higher land
above by ascending through ravines above and below ; the other
ravine being some 600 yards above the bridge, the turn about is half
that distance below. On the hillside immediately above the bridge
was a strong stone fence running parallel to the stream. The turns
of the roadway were covered by rifle-pits and breastworks, made of
rails and stone, all of which defenses, as well as the woods which
covered the slope, were filled with the enemy's infantry and sharp¬
shooters. Besides the infantry defenses, batteries were placed to
enfilade the bridge and all its approaches. Longstreet had displayed
great capacity in handling his artillery at the first, and especially
the second. Bull Run, where he placed his command on Jackson's
right so as to form an acute angle, that would enable his artillery to
plow the attacking columns of the Union army and break them be¬
fore they could reach the infantry. Here he was provided with
another natural fortification that he could defend against great odds,
and we will again see his ability equal to the occasion, although he
is opposed by such officers as Cox, Sturges, Rodman, Hartranft,
Wilcox, and Crook—the name of the latter to-day is a full guaranty
that he knows but one kind of warfare, and that is to whip the
enemy. One might as well accuse General Wayne of toying with
the Indians as to breathe a suspicion that Crook would not fight to
the utmost capacity of the command. The names of these generals
are referred to in this manner because McClellan had a fear that
218 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Burnside sold him out, as he (Burnside) was his successor in com¬
mand of the Army of the Potomac in so short a time, Swinton and
the Comte de Paris both sympathize with McClellan's view of it ; but
there were too many officers engaged in that corps who would have
spurned an intimatioñ of that kind, besides Cox was in command
of the corps, and not Burnside.
I have carefully studied that bridge and its approaches. I
wonder it was taken at all ; but it seems to me strange that Rodman,
down on the left, supported by Ewing's brigade could not cross the
ford, yet I would not do the memory of that gallant man any in¬
justice by even breathing it, for he sacrificed his life on that field.
"Speak lightly of the dead."
In order to protect the assaulting column, Durell's,
Clark's, Muhlenberg's, Crook's, Benjamin's and one section
of Simmond's batteries were placed in position to open on
the enemy when the infantry were ready to charge.
The First Corps, on the extreme right, had suffered
terribly, and McClellan was anxious for the Ninth, on the
extreme left, to cross the Antietam and relieve the heavy
pressure on the right.
About nine o'clock the nth Connecticut, under Colonel
Kingsbury of Rodman's division, was deployed as skir¬
mishers, followed closely by Crook's brigade and Sturgis*
division.
The stream where the bridge crosses is slow, and too
deep to be forded by infantry. The 2d Maryland and 6th
New Hampshire charged with fixed bayonets, but the
heavy concentrated fire on the bridge compelled them to
fall back. These regiments again and again attempted to
take it, but were repulsed with heavy losses. Then the
51st New York and 51st Pennsylvania were ordered up,
and about one o'clock carried the bridge, planting their
banners on the opposite bank. The remainder of Sturgis'
division then marched over, when he deployed one brigade
to the right and the other to the left. Advancing, they
carried the heights. Crook immediately followed Sturgis
and formed on his right. Rodman carried the ford below
at about the same time, which placed the Ninth Corps on the
AN TIE TA M.
219
right bank of the Antietam, though with but little ammu¬
nition, which the stubborn fighting had well nigh ex¬
hausted. As Sturgis had borne the brunt of the fight all
day, Cox sent a request to Burnside to move forward the
division of Wilcox to take the place of Sturgis.
Cox says: "It was three o'clock when the necessary
changes in the line of battle were completed, and the com¬
mand to advance was given. Wilcox had no trouble in
forcing the enemy back on the right until the village of
Sharpsburg was nearly reached. Rodman was ordered to
move in the same direction, bringing his command en eche¬
lon on the left of General Wilcox."
Rodman made desperate efforts to clear his front and
preserve his connection with Wilcox, but his extreme left
was being crushed by the enemy attacking his flank.
While attempting to change front of a part of his command
he fell severely wounded.
A. P. Hill arrived at half past two, and formed his divi¬
sion facing the Antietam, connecting with the right of
Jones' division, which was facing Wilcox.
The brigades of Archer, Gregg and Branch formed
Hill's left, while Pender and Brockenborough were on the
right ; this long line overlapped Rodman, and gave Hill a
splendid opportunity to fall on his flank with Archer,
Gregg and Branch.
Cox, seeing that he could not hold his position, with
the left so sorely pressed, withdrew the line to a ridge along
the Antietam. The enemy did not pursue, so that virtually
ended the great battle.
Lee's, Jackson's, A. P. Hill's and Longstreet's head¬
quarters were at Mr. Grove's house in Sharpsburg, an old-
fashioned brick house with large halls and rooms. Long-
street wanted to see his lines, and was consequently late
reporting to Lee. All the other generals were there, but no
word came from Longstreet. Lee began to be quite uneasy
about him, and wondered if he had been wounded or killed.
None of the generals had seen him since the battle. Just
220 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
then Longstreet rode up in the dark, and dismounted in
front of the house ; no one recognized him for an instant.
When Lee realized who it was, he said, ' ' Here comes my¬
oid stand-by. ' ' The next day both parties lay in front of
■each other, but as McClellan did not advance, the next
night Lee retreated across the Potomac. Major A. J.
Sellers of the 90th Pennsylvania, who was on picket,
learned of Lee's retreat, wrote it on a shingle and sent it to
McClellan.
The First Corps lost in that engagement 417 killed and
wounded and 122 missing. The Second Corps had 15,000
on the field and lost 883 killed, 3,859 wounded, and 396
missing. The Ninth Corps had 438 killed, 1,796 wounded,
and 115 missing. The Twelfth Corps had 12,300 on the
field, and lost 275 killed, 1,386 wounded, and 85 missing.
The casualties in the other corps were comparatively
light.
CHAPTER VIII.
FROM ANTIETAM TO RECTORTOWN.
ON the morning of the i8th of September, 1862, the
soldiers of McClellan's army fully expected a renewal
of the battle. Burnside was across the Antietam on the
left, with Warren's brigade of Porter's corps, ready to assist
him. Hancock, who had succeeded Richardson in com¬
mand of the left division of the Second Corps, was holding
his ground, which gave Porter a splendid opportunity, with
his fresh corps, to move forward and attack Lee's center ;
French's and Sedgwick's, the other two divisions of Sum¬
ner's corps, were badly used up ; but Franklin's corps had
suffered but little, except Irwin's brigade. The First
Corps, on the extreme right under Meade, was in excellent
spirits and condition. Hofmann's brigade, of Doubleday's
division, had been in reserve, and consequently suffered but
few casualties.
Hofmann would leave a banquet any time to fight a
battle, and his brigade had greatly acquired his nature.
Couch and Humphreys arrived in the morning with their
divisions. They were in excellent condition, and com¬
manded by two such generals they would have struck a
fearful blow to the enemy.
With two full corps, two divisions, and one brigade,
which had not been engaged the day before, McClellan was
in prime condition to renew the contest. But it seems
that Sumner stubbornly opposed a renewal, although in
his report he does not even allude to it. McClellan feared
he was fighting a greater number of the enemy than he
221
222 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
really was—though, in my opinion, L^ee had more troops
in that battle than he had credit for.
Gen, H. J. Hunt, chief of artillery of the Army of the
Potomac, stated that question the best. After the war was
over he was down South, and they told him of the size of
their armies in this and that engagement. "Well," said
the general, "where were your men? They were too
brave to shirk a battle, yet when your reports were made,
there were only a few present for duty. ' '
Along Jackson and D. H. Hill's front there were
repeated rumors that an armistice had been declared to
bury the dead and to care for the wounded. That was an
old trick of Jackson's when he got worsted ; he always
mourned for the wounded and the dying, but, strange to
say, when his colors were advancing he never thought of
them.
The enemy approached General Hancock's front with a
flag. The general sent out to see about it, and on finding
that it was accompanied by General Pryor, he sent General
Meagher out to meet him. But it was soon learned that it
was not a flag of truce ; Pryor said if Hancock would send
a request to care for the wounded and bury the dead, he
thought it would be honored. Of course it would, for they
were simply wearing the day away in the most plausible
manner, so they could retreat under cover of the night.
Hancock very properly sent word that he had no occasion
to make such a request ; that the majority of the wounded
lying between the lines were Confederates. Longstreet
became alarmed at the critical condition of affairs, and wrote
a note to Lee to get ready to retreat across the Potomac at
early candle light, and be sure to not light the candle
either. Longstreet knew they would be crushed if au
attack was made. Lee in the mean time came to Long-
street's headquarters, which then were with his corps, for
Burnside was menacing him all the time, and at any
moment might make an attack.
That night they silently stole away, and when the
ANTIETAM TO RECTORTOWN. 223
morning sun shone on Sharpsburg the "Grove's Mansion,"
where I^ee and his generals had had their headquarters,
"knew them no more forever."
When it was learned that Lee had retreated across the
Potomac into Virginia, McClellan ordered Porter to pur¬
sue ; accordingly Griffin, with his own and Barnes' brigade,
crossed the Potomac, and encountered the rear guard under
Lawton, and after a sharp action, drove him and followed
him in his retreat. Lawton lost four guns, which fell into
Griffin's hands.
Griffin's success elated Porter very much who next
morning pressed on after the enemy.
Jackson was given the position of bringing up the Con¬
federate rear, with instructions to watch the advancing foe,
for the country was full of disabled men from the Confed¬
erate army, who would join their commands in a few days
if not captured ; the number is even put as high as 30,000.
They never crossed into Maryland. Citizens of Shepherds-
town fully confirm this.
Learning that the Confederates established a hospital in
Shepherdstown during the battle, I visited that place sub¬
sequent to the war to hear the citizens' statements. They
said every house and barn were full of men who had been
compelled to fall out of ranks to rest and seek food, in addi¬
tion to the wounded from the battlefield. The ladies said
they were baking for days, and taking the utmost care of
the disabled soldiers, so they could return to the army.
Hence Lee must keep McClellan on the Maryland side of
the Potomac to give him (Lee) time to collect together one-
third of his army, which was straggling and certain to be
captured if McClellan forced him up the valley. For that
reason Lee placed Jackson in the rear, knowing that he
would make desperate efforts to prevent his forces being
pursued.
Lee placed his command behind the Opequan, a tribu¬
tary of the Potomac, and was thus lying in wait, with A. P.
Hill's division in broad view in front, while Early was con-
224 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
cealed in ambush where he could strike any advance move¬
ment on the flank.
When Porter.came up Hill opened with a vigorous fire
to draw him still closer, so that Early could enfilade his
flank. In due time Early opened a murderous fire from
his concealed position, and Porter was driven back across
the Potomac. In this engagement the Corn Exchange
Regiment—a magnificent body of men of Philadelphia—
suffered severely. Eee had succeeded in accomplishing
just what he wanted to—prevent an advance for a few days,
as he might then gather up his straggling soldiers and feed
his half famished army on the abundance of that rich, bounti¬
ful and beautiful country—the Shenandoah.
It was a golden opportunity, for the country was as the
"Land of Goshen," and the citizens gave with alacrity as a
a rule, for they were intensely Southern in their sympathies.
On the 19th General Stuart recrossed the Potomac at
Williamsport with a heavy force of cavalry and infantry,
supported by a few field pieces. General Couch was ordered
to go in pursuit of him. But Stuart had performed the
task assigned to him and avoided a battle, although he
sustained losses.
The authorities at Washington, urged on by an impa¬
tient press in the North, were unceasing in their endeavors
to have McClellan make a forward movement.
Although Lee had collected his stragglers and again
possessed a large army, yet if he could keep McClellan
from advancing a little longer it would be too late for a fall
campaign, and the Confederacy might receive foreign re¬
cognition by spring. He was not only playing the part of
a shrewed general, but that of a skillful diplomate.
On the 6th of October the enemy appeared in force in
the valley of Sir John's Run. Waiting to see the effect of
that move, Lee soon received the glad tidings that Averell
had been ordered post haste to that point.
Pleasonton was weakened by the absence of Averell,
and Lee knew that Stuart could then undertake a circuit
ANTIETAM TO RECTORTOWN.
225
of McClellan's army, which would alarm the North, and
perhaps retain McClellan where he was awhile longer.
So, on the loth of October, Stuart, with three brigades
of cavalry, under Hampton, Fitzhugh Fee and Jones, set
out on that perilous march and crossed the Potomac at
McCoy's Ferry. He evaded Cox's division on its way to
West Virginia, and hurried forward, as his work must be
done quickly, or his whole command would be sacrificed,
as Averell was returning with all speed possible, in ac¬
cordance with an order from McClellan. Avoiding
Hagerstown, which Stuart feared was well defended, he
pressed on to Mercersburg, continuing in a northeasterly
direction, and arrived at Chambersburg the same evening.
This bold movement had already caused great alarm and
anxiety, as the following correspondence will show :
Harrisburg, Pa., October lo, 1862.
I am just informed that à bodj' of rebel cavalrj' have occupied
Mercersburg, said to be 3,000 strong. They have cut the telegraph
wires, and are thought to be advancing on Chambersburg. The
Anderson Cavalry are at Carlisle, and we have 2,500 cavalry unarmed,
none of them mounted.
Will you not order Anderson's Cavalry up to Chambersburg,
and send arms for them here? The rebels have taken all property
they could move, but have not taken life. A. G. Curtin.
Hon. E. M. Stanton.
Harrisburg, Pa., October 10, 1862.
The following is just received from provost marshal :
Chambersburg, October 10, 1862.
About 15 on horseback, in town, with carbines and a flag of
truce. Want to see the principal men of town. Have large force
about one mile from town. Will enter in an hour.
F. M. Kimmeu, Provost Marshal.
Andrew G. Curtin.
The Anderson Cavalry should be ordered at once, and the troops
in camp here. We can't get Chambersburg by telegraph.
A. G. Curtin, Governor.
XV
226 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Harrisburg, Pa., October lo, 1862.
The people have surrendered Chambersburg.
Hon. E. M. Stanton. A, G. Curtin.
Harrisburg, Pa., October 10, 1862.
I have a dispatch from Shippensburg, 11 miles from Chambers¬
burg, saying that Chambersburg surrendered at 7 o'clock p. m., and
is now in possession of rebels. No doubt they will retire before
we reach there with troops from Carlisle, and am preparing all here
for service.
Maj. Gen. H. W. Hauleck. A. G. Curtin, Governor.
War Department, Washington, D. C.,
Octobei; 10, 1862.
Communicate with General McClellan and General Wool, and
use any troops within your reach to cut off the rebels at Cham¬
bersburg. I have telegraphed to General McClellan, but am uncer¬
tain about his getting the message. H. W. Haleeck,
Governor Curtin, Harrisburg, Pa. General-in-Chief.
Baltimore, October 10, 1862.
I have received a dispatch from Governor Curtin that the rebels
are in force at Chambersburg. I will send several regiments from
this city, and I will be at Harrisburg as soon as possible.
John E. Wool, Major General.
Maj. Gen. McClellan, Knoxville, Md.
Headquarters Cavalry Division,
October 11, 1862, 4 a. m.
Your dispatch of 10 p. m. of last evening is received. I cannot
find out where McCoy's Ferry is, but presume it is near Hancock, I
shall therefore move towards Hagerstown, and make inquiries as I
proceed. My command is very small, from the fact of many Horses
being unshod, and shoes could not be had. The 8th Pennsylvania
has not been able to obtain horses to replace the old ones of the
Peninsula, now used up. Shall, however, do the best I can under
the circumstances. Very respectfully,
A. Pleasonton,
Brigadier General, Commanding Cavalry Division.
General R. B. Marcy, Chief of Staff.
Headquarters First Army Corps,
October 11, 1862, 11 p.m.
General :—General Reynolds directs that you send a brigade
of your troops out to-night, and occupy that strip of woods on the
ANTIETAM TO RECTORTOWN. 227
Sharpsburg turnpike at the Dunker Church, near the center of the
battlefield. We have a few cavalry out to picket that road toward
Hagerstown, and they are the only forces on the immediate approach
to our rear in that direction.
This force is desired to occupy the position indicated that it may
protect the batteries from an attack of cavalry in the event of an
attempt to cross towards Mercersville.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Chas. B. Lamborn,
A. A. A. G.
To Brigadier General DoublEday, Commanding First Division.
(Indorsed :) Headquarters First Division,
October ii, 1862.
Colonel Hofmann will forward with his brigade and battery to
comply with the within orders and directions.
By command of Brigadier General Doubleday.
E. P. Haestead,
Captain and A. A. G.
Headquarters First Army Corps,
October 13, 1862.
The general commanding having received information that the
rebel cavalryman Stuart arrived near the mouth of the Monocacy
yesterday about noon, directs that you recall brigade from the
Sharpsburg road.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant.
Chas. B. Hamborn,
A. A. A. G.
Brigadier General DoubeEday, Commanding First Division.
CoEONEE You will withdraw your brigade immediately.
By command of Brigadier General Doubleday.
E. P. Haestead,
To Colonel Hofmann, Second Brigade. .Captain and A. A. G.
There were some State militia stationed at Chambers-
burg, but they had never been under fire, and the night
being dark and gloomy added, perhaps, to the confusion ;
but they offered no resistance to the entry of the Confeder¬
ate cavalry—the first on Northern soil.
They conducted themselves well, as no pillaging was
allowed. The men promenaded the streets in the most
228 THE A EM y OF THE POTOMAC.
orderly manner, with the intention, no doubt, of creating a
favorable impression on the minds of the people. However,
the depots of the Government were destroyed. They took
a great many horses from the farmers, leading away many
of their own jaded animals.
Before daylight next morning Stuart was off, taking the
Gettysburg road to deceive his pursuers ; but soon turned
to the right, passed through Emmittsburg, continued south¬
ward, and kept the South Mountain range between him and
McClellan. As all the telegraph wires were cut, no news
could be received as to the direction in which he was
marching. Finally, however, news was received by Mc¬
Clellan that he was taking the eastern route. Pleasonton
was immediately ordered to Mechanicsville ; Burnside, then
in Pleasant Valley, was ordered to occupy the railroad
bridge across the Monocacy ; Cox was to halt and guard
the upper Potomac ; while Stoneman, at Poolsville, was to
distribute his troops so as to protect all the lower fords of
the Potomac.
Stuart followed down the right bank of the Monocacy
until near Frederick, when fearing that troops were de¬
tained there, he turned suddenly to the left, crossed the
Monocacy, and continued in the direction of Monrovia.
Although night had overtaken him while near Frederick,
there was no time to be lost for the reason that thousands
of Federal soldiers were in pursuit of him.
When Pleasonton reached Mechanicsville he learned
that Stuart was not more than an hour in advance. Be¬
lieving that Stuart would attempt to cross the Potomac as
early next morning as possible, Pleasonton pushed forward,
reached the mouth of the Monocacy about eight in the
morning of the 12th, where he found a regiment of infan¬
try, but no tidings could be learned of the Confederate
raiders. At daylight Stuart passed through Hyattsville,
took the road to Barnesville, and continued in the direction
of Poolsville, where Stoneman had his headquarters.
Just before he reached the town he threw his command
AN TI ETA M TO RECTOR TO IVN.
22Ô
into the woods, passed around it, and struck the George¬
town and Hauling Ford road. While Pleasonton was inov-
ing on that road down the Potomac, his advance soon
struck the Confederate cavalry, but were too few in num¬
bers to make much impression upon the enemy, as they
were four times as many.
Stuart formed a line of skirmishers, then made a detour
to the left and crossed the Potomac at White's Ford. When
he reached the Virginia shore he saw Pleasonton's whole
column arrive ; also a brigade of infantry from Poolsville
that was expected at that point much earlier in the day.
It was fortunate for him that he reached that ford so early
in the morning. Every move he made from the time he
left Chambersburg showed the work of a guide thoroughly
posted, -^yho could lead him around the towns where troops
were stationed.
Nothing more of interest occurred until the army was
ordered to move. On September 29 Gen. John F. Rey¬
nolds, having joined the army from detached service, was
assigned to the command of the First Army Corps.
General Meade took command of the Pennsylvania Re¬
serve Division. Although he had commanded the First
Corps only twelve days, yet their confidence in him on the
field was great, and they were proud of him when, later in
the war, he commanded the Army of the Potomac.
The First Corps had two of Pennsylvania's illustrious
soldiers in it—Reynolds commanding the corps and Meade
the Pennsylvania Reserves. That division had suffered so
severely that Governor Curtin endeavored ito have it rcr
turned to the State to be recruited to its maximum, and
accordingly addressed the following letter to the President
on that subject :
Pennsylvania Executive Mansion,
Harrisburg, September 30, 1862.
Sir :—I have the honor to refer to some of the topics of our
conversation last week, at which time you were pleased to say, that
you desired the Governors of the loyal States present to put their
suggestions in writing.
230
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
I proposed, at that time, to fill the regiments in service most
reduced by the casualties of war, by retiring a given number from
the more active service with the armies in the presence 6f the enemy,
and having filled them and obtained a perfect reorganization, re¬
turn them to the field and retire others until they were all filled to
the standard established by the Government, in the mean time sup-
pi jdng their places in the field with new regiments. I named ten
regiments as the number to be retired at each time from this State.
Most of our regiments that have participated in the recent battles
are reduced to mere skeletons, and although we have furnished
about fifteen thousand recruits for regiments from this State, no
efiScient strength has been given to any of them.
The Pennsylvania Reserve Corps, numbering thirteen regiments
of infantry, one regiment of cavalry, and one of artillery, with a
numerical strength of fifteen thousand seven hundred and sixty
men, were taken into the service of the United States in July, 1861,
immediately after the first battle of Manassas.
The thirteen regiments of infantry did not muster fouf thousand
men after the battle of Antietam.
All of these regiments are much reduced in number, whilst
many of them can scarcely be said to retain regimental organiza¬
tions. The brilliant history of the Resenve Corps in the war, and
the State pride, which has followed them since they entered the serv¬
ice, together with the circumstances surrounding their organiza¬
tion, would I have no doubt, prove such incentives to enlistment
that the corps could be filled to the maximum in a short space of
time.
I suggest that the corps be returned to the State, and placed in
the camp at this Capital, and, if I am correct in my impression, the
success would affect the minds of our people favorably and other
regiments in the service could be filled in their turn promptly.
It is proper that, in this connection, I should say that the sug¬
gestion reflects the opinion of all the officers of the corps. I take
this opportunity of again renewing the suggestions of all the Gov¬
ernors on the occasion referred to, that so far as consistent with the
interests of the public service, sick and wounded volunteers be taken
to the hospitals within the State in which they were enlisted.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant.
A. G. curtin.
To His Excellency A. eincoln, President.
That was a wise proposition, but the President was
afraid to drain the army of the brave old soldiers in face of
the-enemy. On that account Governor Curtin's request
ANTIETAM TO RECTOR TO IVN-
231
for the Pennsylvania Reserves to be sent home, was not
granted, and the regiments were reorganized as best they
could be.
Colonel Roberts, of the ist Regiment, who had won dis¬
tinction on the Peninsula, and had displayed great soldierly
qualities in command of a brigade, had been recommended
for brigadier general, but by some failure or accident, his
name was not forwarded by the War Department to the
Senate. After the battle of Antietam, Governor Curtin
asked General McClellan to accept his resignation, so. that
he could appoint him on his staff. On the urgent request
of Curtin, McClellan accepted it, and he at once entered on
• duty in the military office of the Executive Department at
Harrisbnrg, and served on Curtin's staff until the close of
his second administration. Capt. William Cooper Talley,
who had gallantly commanded the regiment at Antietam,
was commissioned colonel. A worthy and deserved pro¬
motion.
In the 3d Regiment there were many changes, and the
.regiment hailed with delight the return of Colonel Sickles,
who was a great favorite. In the 8th Regiment Eientenant
Colonel Oliphant was in such bad health that he was com¬
pelled to leave the service, and Major Bailey was made col¬
onel. The loth was brought into the service by Col. John
S. McCalmont, a classmate of Rosecrans, Doubleday and
Longstreet at West Point, but who was then on the bench
which he left when the tocsin of war sounded. He was an
able officer, but in consequence of his bad health, he was
forced to resign in May, 1862, to save his life. The service
lost a valuable man. Meade and Reynolds had great con¬
fidence in him, and both were loath to lose him. McCal¬
mont in appearance is tall and angular, and not unlike
Lincoln. He also possesses much of that quiet, quaint
way of reasoning for which qualities the martyred Pres¬
ident was so distinguished. Colonel McCalmont displayed
bravery and military skill in the battle of Dranesville.
Lieut. Col. James T. Kirk was promotedho be colonel of
232 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
the regiment, but the Peninsular campaign had ruined his
health, and he was also compelled to resign. In turn he
was succeeded in the command of the regiment by A. J.
Warner, an excellent officer, and who since has been
an able and distinguished member of Congress from Ohio,
to which State he removed soon after the war.
In the 12th Capt. D. N. Mathewson resigned on account
of sickness, though he afterwards entered the service as
lieutenant colonel of the 30th Regiment of the Pennsyl¬
vania emergency troops of 1863.
Col. J. H. Taggart resigned at Harrison's Landing, to.
return home to attend to business, which had been neglected
during an absence of more than a year. General Truman'
Seymour indorsed the following on Colonel Taggart's
resignation : ' ' Colonel Taggart has rendered useful and
honorable service during these last battles. At Mechanics-
ville his regiment occupied the post of honor on the left,
and held the enemy firmly in check and behaved with great
gallantry. "
General McCall, in his report on the battle of Mechanics-
ville, thus refers to some of his officers: "Where all so
gallantly supported the honor- of the flag, it would appear
invidious to particularize, but my thanks are particularly
due to Generals Reynolds, Meade, and Seymour ; to Colonels
Simmons and Taggart ; to Lieutenant Colonel McCandless
and Major Stone, all of the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps,,
and who were zealous and active, as well as gallant, in the
discharge of their arduous duties throughout this well-
fought action."
In 1864 Colonel Taggart was appointed chief preceptor
of the Free Military School for Officers for Colored Troops,
organized in Philadelphia by the supervisory committee
for recruiting colored troops, designed to instruct white
officers for such troops, there being a demand for white
commissioned officers. This school was under the direction
and patronage gf Secretary Stanton.
Col. Hugh McNeil, of the Bucktail Regiment, was
AN TIE TA M TO RE CTOR TO IVN.
233
tilled on the afternoon of the i6th, when he was advancing
the skirmish line. Xhe command of the regiment was given
to Capt. Charles Frederick Taylor, the youngest brother of
Bayard Taylor, who earned fame later in the service. In
addition to the different changes and promotions the division
was materially strengthened by the accession of two new
regiments.
The 12ist Pennsylvania, commanded by Col. Chapman
Biddle, was added to the First Brigade, and the i42d, com¬
manded by Col. Robert P. Cummins, joined the Second
Brigade.
In the mean time McClellan and Lee had been using
their utmost endeavors to put their armies in the best pos¬
sible condition. The month of October was quietly steal¬
ing away, and as yet the Army of the Potomac had not
moved. A growing impatience pervaded Washington, and
the bickerings between Halleck and McClellan were ripen¬
ing into bitter feelings, though Halleck also expressed the
sentiments of the Secretary of War.
Finally a forward movement was decided on, and Berlin,
five miles below Harper's Ferry, selected as the place to
cross the Potomac. McClellan had decided to take the line
in the valley east of the Blue Ridge range, while Lee was
in the Shenandoah Valley just west of the Blue Ridge. It
was evident that McClellan had chosen that line for the
reason that Lincoln promised him help from Washington if
he did so. Lincoln did not oppose McClellan's following
Lee up the Shenandoah Valley and driving him out of it.
On the contrary, he would have been glad if such had oc¬
curred, if he attacked him as early as possible.
While Berlin was selected as the main place of crossing,
bridges were thrown across the Potomac and Shenandoah
at Harper's Ferry, and the army commenced crossing into
Virginia on the 26th. The Ninth Corps, under Wilcox,
was the first to cross at Berlin, followed by the reserve
artillery, Stoneman's division, the First and Sixth Corps.
The Second and Fifth Corps crossed at the ferry; Slocum
234 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
with the Twelfth remained at Harper's Ferry. Morrell had
three brigades of infantry and one of cavalry with which to
guard the upper Potomac from the mouth of the Monocacy
to the Cumberland.
Now that McClellan's army was marching up the valley
between the Bull Run and Blue Ridge Mountains, with only
the Blue Ridge between the two armies, the passes in that
range suddenly assumed a value of great importance ; as
either army might suddenly dash through one of them and
strike the other on the march and overwhelm it before it
could prepare for battle. Napoleon would not have peace¬
ably marched parallel with the enemy without attempting
to take advantage of his adversary when strung out on a
march. Hampton came very near defeating Kilpatrick in
just such a march. All that saved him was his artillerymen
raking a road in Hampton's rear, when he supposed the guns
were manned by his own men, whereas they were Kilpatrick's,
hid in a corn-crib to avoid being captured when Hampton
made his charge. They left their gnns loaded and hid in the
crib when Hampton swept past them. Then they ran out to
the guns and fired them down the narrow road where Hamp¬
ton's victorious cavalry were charging, which compelled them
to seek safety in the woods. Just then Kilpatrick came from
the swamp, where he had fled for safety, and mounted on a
horse without saddle, and no clothing on except a shirt,
he fell on his adversary with a fury that knew no bounds,
driving the South Carolina cavalier from the field.
The passes of the Blue Ridge beginning at the Potomac,
are Vestal's Gap, Gregory's Gap, Snicker's Gap, Ashby's
Gap, Manassas Gap and Chester Gap.
As a matter of course McClellan would have to get his
supplies from Berlin, on the Potomac until he could strike
the Manassas Gap Railway, running from Manassas Junc¬
tion through Thoroughfare Gap in the Bull Run Moun¬
tains, and passing on through Manassas Gap in the Blue
Ridge. Pleasonton's cavalry marched along the east base
of the Blue Ridge to clear McClellan's front, as Tee was
Ai\T/ETAM TO RECTOR TO WN.
235-
using his cavalry to guard the gaps in the mountain. On
October 31 Pleasonton reported to McClellan that from sev¬
eral sonrces he learned there were 6,000 men in Snicker's
Gap. He asked for a support of infantry, and Hofmann's
brigade of Doubleday's division of the First Corps was
sent to him. When Hofmann arrived he found Pleasonton
engaged with the enemy in front of the town of Philmont.
The Confederates were shelling him with considerable
rapidity. Pleasonton immediately directed Hofmann to put
two of his regiments in the woods on the left of the road.
Accordingly the 56th Pennsylvania, under Major Smith,
and the 95th New York, under Lieutenant Colonel Post,
were directed by Hofmann to deploy in obedience to the
order of Pleasonton. These two regiments having cleared
their front, they were recalled, and Hofmann was directed
to take his brigade and advance through the town and hold
it. As the brigade was advancing Pleasonton sent for a
regiment to support a battery to the left and rear ; the 76th
New York, under Major Livingston, was directed by Hof¬
mann to perform that duty.
After Hofmann had passed through the town, he sent
the 95th New York and two companies of the 56th Penn¬
sylvania to take possession of a strip of woods to the left
of the road, and some three hundred yards to the front.
Two companies of the 7th Indiana, commanded by Lieu¬
tenant Colonel Cheek, were directed to picket the road
into the town.
Hofmann sent back for some artillery, which Pleasonton
immediately brought up in person. Pleasonton then directed
Hofmann to advance again, still leaving the 76th New York
on duty in the town. The enemy's artillery opened at
once, one shell striking the colors of the 7th Indiana, kill¬
ing the color sergeant, and wounding several others. When
onr artillery arrived and got into position, the enemy retired
about three-quarters of a mile, Hofmann pursuing. The
56th Pennsylvania suffered in crossing a field, but the
regiment never faltered, the gap was at once closed up,,
23tí THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
and they moved forward as if on dress parade. The
brigade was then shielded behind a stone wall while our
artillery again played on the enemy with considerable effect.
The 95 th New York was ordered to go to the left to support
a section of artillery ; soon it was deemed advisable to reën-
force that point with the 56th Pennsylvania. The enemy
again retreated, and darkness put an end to the action.
Pleasonton ordered these two regiments to take posses¬
sion of and occupy a hill a little to the left and front. In
the morning Pleasonton directed Hofmann to bring forward
the 7th Indiana and the battery, to hold the hill. While
that regiment was coming up the 56th Pennsylvania was
thrown forward on the right to feel the enemy in that di¬
rection in a piece of woods, which was accordingly taken
and held until evening.
One section of the battery was advanced about half a
mile when it became hotly engaged with a battery of the
enemy, posted under cover of a large house and barn on
our left front.
Finally Pleasonton decided that the position of the
enemy at the house and barn would have to be carried by* a
charge. Plofmann ordered the 95th New York to comply
with Pleasonton's order, and as soon as Lieutenant Colonel
Post gave the order to advance they dashed forward in
magnificent style, soon taking the position, while the
enemy prudently retired.
The brigade was not advanced any farther, but Pleas¬
onton followed with his cavalry, taking with him Lieuten¬
ant Edgell with two sections of his battery.
In the evening General Pleasonton directed Hofmann to
return with his brigade to his division, and give his com¬
pliments to General Doubleday for the valuable assistance
of so excellent a brigade. The boys had won golden opin¬
ions from the cavalry commander, and highly pleased their
brigade commander.
It was evident to Lee that he could not hold his position
in the Shenandoah Valley with McClellan moving up the
ANTIETAM TO RECTORTOWN.
237
valley on the east side of the range, as he (McClellan) would
soon gain his rear and cut off his communication with
Richmond, and as there were about 70,000 troops in and
about Washington under Banks, there was no hope of his
turning suddenly and making a forced march, appearing
before Washington, and demanding its surrender before
McClellan could overtake him. The 70,000 at Washington
would warmly greet him, and, with the aid of the artillery,
be amply able to repel any assault made.
If he had again attempted to invade the North, with
McClellan in his rear, thè chances were that his army
would have been ruined, and the Confederacy have been
placed in its death throes.
So, assuming that prudence was the better part of valor,
he at once commenced a rapid retrograde movement up the
valley to forestall the movement of McClellan. His stores
and a considerable portion of his artillery passed through
Thornton's Gap for Culpeper Court House on the ist of
November, followed by Longstreet, who moved up the val¬
ley, crossed the Shenandoah at Front Royal, passed through
the Blue Ridge at Chester Gap, and fell back on Culpeper.
With Tongstreet at Culpeper, D. H. Hill's division at
Chester Gap, and Jackson in the valley at Millwood, nearly
100 miles from Fongstreet, it would have been an easy mat¬
ter for the Army of the Potomac to fall on and crush D. H.
Hill, and then, facing down the valley annihilate Jackson.
I say annihilate, for the Army of the Potomac had just
been reënforced by Sigel's corps and Sickles' division. If
two-thirds of the army had marched down the Shenan¬
doah, and one-third had countermarched down the same
valley it came up, Jackson would have been ruined.
It is not known what McClellan intended to do aside
from the fact of making Warrenton "his headquarters.
Many officers and soldiers deplored his removal. Many do
to this day. He had embittered Stanton and Halleck, and
had more than once hurt the feelings of President Lincoln^
which mortified many of his friends.
238 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
On the 6th of November McClellan's army was sta¬
tioned as follows : The First Corps at Warrenton ; the
Second at Rectortown, on the Manassas Gap Railroad ; the
Eleventh, under Sigel, was at New Baltimore ; Sickles' di¬
vision was at Warrenton Junction ; the Fifth Corps was at
Snicker's Gap, and the Sixth at Upperville, bringing up
the rear.
No one then dreamed of McClellan's removal, although
he had had a lurking suspicion that he would be ; but as
he was marching, it came on him like a clap of thunder in
a clear sky, when he was making every arrangement for
the fall campaign.
One of his last orders was appointing General Patrick
provost marshal general of the Army of the Potomac, and
assigning him to duty at his headquarters.
The following is General Patrick's order communicating
it to his brigade :
Hdqrs Third Brigade;, First Div., First Army Corps,
General Orders, No. 64. Camp Barrett, October 7, 1862.
The Brigadier-General commanding having been assigned to
duty at the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac by General
Orders, No. 161, of the 6th inst., hereby relinquishes to Colonel
Rodgers, of the 21st New York Volunteers, the command of the
brigade he received from him seven months ago. Only seven months
ago he assumed command ; yet the ties that bind those who,
like ourselves, have shared each other's hardships and dangers, who
have followed the standard through so many battles, and gathered
around it with their ranks thinned, but unbroken, when the combat
was over—such ties cannot be broken by the order that relieves your
gfeneral from the command. That he must continue to take the
liveliest interest in the welfare of a brigade that has never failed in
the hour of peril, whether in daylight or darkness, to honor his
every command, no one can doubt ; and he trusts that both officers
and men will touch lightly upon his faults, in the full conviction
that, as their commander, he has endeavored to discharge his duties
to them, to his country and to his God. He leaves you with fervent
wishes for your prosperity, and the earnest hope that an honorable
peace may soon be won, so that we may once more return to our
loved homes by the broad rivers and lakes of the Empire State.
By order of General Patrick.
ANTIETAM TO RECTORTO WN.
239
On the evening of November 7 General McClellan was
seated in his tent at Rectortown. A furious snowstorm
was raging in the State that once claimed to be the mother
of Presidents ; now this sacred soil was the heart of a for¬
midable rebellion to destroy the Government that George
Washington, Patrick Henry, and Thomas Jefferson greatly
assisted to bring into existence. While thus meditating,
little did the young American Napoleon dream that he
soon would be deposed from the high and responsible
position he held, never again to enjoy it. It was a
great shock to the Army of the Potomac, for the officers
and men adored him. No one knows to this day, posi¬
tively, why he was relieved. The half insinuation that
he was removed for political reasons is scarcely true in the
face of the fact that Grant, Rosecrans, Logan, Meade, Rey¬
nolds (who fell at Gettysburg), Hooker, Hunt (the great
artilleryman), Sickles, Slocum, and other prominent gen¬
erals were Democrats whom the country trusted then and
honor still, certainly forever removes any such suspicion of
that kind ; and the candid individual or historian must look
for some other reason.
McClellan had been Lincoln's favorite, and he never
consented to his removal except upon what appeared to
him not only justifiable grounds, but a necessity, for, so
noble was Lincoln that he would not harm his bitterest
enemy ; and the. Southern people sincerely regretted his
assassination, for they knew he was sympathetic beyond
degree ; that his charity had enough in it to make a mantle
for the whole South ; while his simplicity and honesty was
more Godlike than manlike.
He never "wronged McClellan—he simply did his duty as
President. He had his reasons, which were forced upon
his convictions notwithstanding his attachment for this
brilliant and popular officer.
The following orders are given in full that the public
may be in possession of them, and free to form their own
opinions :
240
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Executive Mansion,
Washington, November 5, 1862.
By direction of the President, it is ordered that Major General
McClellan be relieved from the command of the Army of the Poto¬
mac, and that Major General Burnside take command of that army.
Also that Major General Hunter take command of the corps in said
ariiiy which is now commanded by General Burnside. That Major-
General Fitz-John Porter be relieved from the command of the corps
he now commands in said army, and that Major General Hooker
take command of said corps.
The General-in-Chief is authorized in (his) discretion, to issue
an order substantially as the above, forthwith, or as soon as he may
deem proper. A. Lincoln.
Headquarters of the Army.
Washington, November 5, 1862.
General :—On receipt of this order of the President, sent here¬
with, you will immediately turn over your command to Major Gen¬
eral Burnside, and repair to Trenton, New Jersey, reporting, on your
arrival at that place, by telegraph, for further orders.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
H. W. HallECK, General-in-Chief.
To Major General McClELLAN, Commanding, &c.
General Orders, | War Department, Adj. Gen.'s OfiELce,
No. 182. i Washington, Novembers, 1862.
By the direction of the President of the United States, it is or¬
dered that Major General McClellan be relieved from the command
of the Army of the Potomac, and that Major General Burnside take
the command of that army.
By order of the Secretary of War :
Ed. D. Townsend, Asst. Adj. General.
Headquarters of the Army,
Washington, D. C., Novembers, 1862.
General :—Immediately on assuming command of the Army
of the Potomac, you will report the position of your troops, and
what you purpose doing-with them.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
H. W. HallECk, General-in-Chief.
To Major General Burnside, Commanding, &c.
These orders were giX'en to General Buckingham, with
instructions to proceed to the front and deliver them to
General McClellan. As the historians do not agree about
A N TIE TA M TO RECTO R T O WN.
241
this matter, I have decided to give General Buckingham's
own statement of it :
I was at the time on special duty at the War Department, my
ofiSce being adjoining the Secretary's private room. On the even¬
ing of the 6th of November, about ten o'clock, the Secretary sent
for me to come to his office, where I found him with General Hal-
leck. He told me that he wanted me to go and find the Army of
the Potomac, and spent some time in giving minute directions as to
the route I should take. Just before I left he handed me two envel¬
opes, unsealed, telling me to take them to my room, and, having
read them, to seal them up. I was thunderstruck to find that one
of the envelopes contained two orders for McClellan—one from the
President, relieving him from the command of the army, and the
other from General Halleck, ordering him to report to some town in
New Jersey and report by letter to the War Department. The other
envelope contained two orders to Burnside—one from the President,
assigning him to the command of the army, vice McClellan, and
the other from General Halleck, directing him to report what his
plans were. Before leaving next morning, I saw the Secretary at
his home, and he explained to me his reasons for sending an officer
of my rank on an errand like that. The first was that he feared
Burnside would not accept the command, and my instructions were
to use, if necessary, the strongest arguments to induce him not to
refuse. The second reason, though a characteristic one, had very
little foundation.
The Secretary had not only no confidence in McClellan's mili¬
tary skill, but he very much doubted his patriotism, and even loy¬
alty, and he expressed to me some fear that McClellan would not
give up the command, and he wished, therefore, that the order shovild
be presented by an officer of high rank, direct from the War Depart¬
ment, so as to carry the full weight of the President's authority.
He directed me to see Burnside first and get his decision. If he
consented to accept, I was to see McClellan ; but if not I was to re¬
turn to Washington.
I found Burnside about fifteen miles south of Salem, where his
division was halted and he alone in a little chamber. Closing the
door, I made known my errand. He at once declined the command.
Whatever my private opinion may have been, my duty was to fol¬
low the directions of the Secretary of War, and, if possible, over¬
come his objections. It happened, however, knowing, as I did, that
the President was resolved at all events to remove McClellan, that I
felt fully satisfied that he (Burnside) ought to accept, and urged
him to do so. Among other objections, he urged his want of confi-
XVI
242 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
dence in himself, and his particularly friendly relations to McClel-
lan, to whom he felt under the strongest obligations. I met these
objections by stating that McClellan's removal was resolved upon
at any rate, and that if he (Burnside) did not accept the command,
it would be given to Hooker, who became, in fact, Burnside's suc¬
cessor. He at length consented to obey the order, and I requested
him to go with me to find McClellan. We returned to Salem, whence
I had ridden on horseback through a snowstorm, and I had my lo¬
comotive fired up the same evening, and on it we proceeded about
five miles up the railroad to McClellan's camp.
About eleven o'clock we found him alone in his tent, examining
papers, and as we both entered together, he received us in his usual
kind and cordial manner.
My task was not only a painful one, but particularly distasteful
to me in view of my friendly feelings for McClellan. But as the
blow had to come, I was glad that it was not to be given through
an unkind hand, and in a mortifying way.
General McClellan has himself borne testimony to the kind
manner in which I communicated the order, and I can bear testimony
to his prompt and cheerful obedience.
This is Buckingham's statement of it.
The Comte de Paris, on page 555, second volume of
his work, says that Burnside was in McClellan's tent
' ' when the bearer of a dispatch from the President was
announced. This was General Buckingham, an officer un¬
known to the Army of the Potomac, who brought him an
order contained in three lines, signed by Halleck."
Buckingham has made two mistakes in his statement.
He says McClellan was to report by letter, whereas the
order says by telegraph ; he says he found Burnside at
Salem in command of a division—that is one-third of a
corps. At that time Burnside was in command of a grand
division—two corps.
They both agree that there was the strongest friendship
existing between McClellan and Burnside, for McClellan
turned the order over to Burnside with the remark : "Well,
Burnside, you are to command the army." On Burnside's
part, he paid McClellan the highest respect in his power
ordered the troops out to pass in review before him.
ANTIETAM TO RECTORTOWN.
243
It was a just and noble act on the part of Burnside. Mc-
Clellan was simply relieved from command, the same as
Pope had been, and Burnside and Hooker were soon to be.
He passed on hastily to Trenton, and in accordance with
orders telegraphed to the War Department, which ended
his military career.
A prominent general of the Army of the Potomac said :
McClellan will live in the history of his country, and occupy a
■ very prominent place in it. He did valuable service in organizing
the Army of the Potomac. He had only been a captain, when he
was made a general. It was not long until he was given a command
next to General Scott. He was promoted too rapidly. If he had
risen more gradually he would have been surer of success. Hancock
never had more magnetism than McClellan possessed.
Swinton says of him :
To General McClellan, personally, it was a misfortune that he
became so prominent a figure at the commencement of the contest ;
for it was inevitable that the first leaders should be sacrificed to the
nation's ignorance of war. Taking this into account, estimating
both what he accomplished and what he failed to accomplish, in the
actual circumstances of his performance, I have endeavored in the
critique of his campaigns to strike a just balance between McClellan
and histor}^. Of him it may be said, that if he does not belong to
that foremost category of commanders, made up of those who have
always been successful, and including but few illustrious names,
neither does he rank with that numerous class who have ruined
their armies without fighting. He ranges with that middle
category of meritorious commanders, who, like Sertorius, Wallen-
stein, and William of Orange, generally unfortunate in war, jet
were, in the words of Marmont, "never destroyed nor discouraged,
but were always able to oppose a menacing front, and make the
enemy pay dear for what he gained."
CHAPTER IX.
FREDERICKSBURG.
^ I AhERE were many reasons why Burnside should be
the successor of McClellan. He was the acknowl¬
edged and avowed friend of the General-in-Chief, to the ex¬
tent that he did all in his power to hold him at the head of
the army. Burnside had been twice offered the command
befpre, but positively refused it,
McClellan gave him the command of two corps, a grand
division, in the Maryland campaign, an honor that he did
not confer on any other general, and that must have given
Burnside the idea of foriying grand divisions, which he pro¬
ceeded to do as soon as he assumed command. The warm
friendship between them probably made it easier for Burn¬
side to succeed him than any other general. He accom¬
panied Burnside from Rectortown to Warrenton, where he
bade him farewell, after reviewing the army, and proceeded
to Trenton, N. J., to which place he had been ordered by
General Halleck.
Burnside had succeeded well in North Carolina and, that,
perhaps, gave additional confidence in him at Washington
and throughout the country.
It was claimed by the friends of McClellan that he was
about to strike a fatal blow to the enemy, though no one
ever gave his plans to the public. Gen, J. C. Duane, his
engineer, informs me that McClellan would have forced a
battle in forty-eight hours if he had not been relieved.
Burnside knew the position of the Confederate forces,
and there could be no delay, or else the fleet-footed Jack¬
son would soon unite his forces with Eongstreet, and
244
White
PERRERO _
Getty
burnside and generals of the 9"^
í 1861 7^ 1865 a.
Griffin
FREDERICKSB UR G.
245
the valuable opportunity would be lost. Would he hurl
his army on D. H. Hill's division, at Chester Gap, and
then turn down the valley, crush Jackson or compel his
command to scatter and fly to the mountains ; or, would
he march, with all possible haste, on Culpeper and attack
Longstreet before he could receive assistance ? He knew
the authorities at Washington wanted him to make a
vigorous campaign, and his plan was demanded by Halleck.
Day after day witnessed his army still hovering around
Warrenton, while he was reorganizing it, which he should
have done in one night, and then issued orders to move
the next morning by daylight. When Meade relieved
Hooker the army moved on just as if no change had
been made in commanders. Burnside's success depended
on the celerity of his movements while the enemy was
divided.
Jackson's fame for rapid marching already filled the
whole land with wonder, and as he was nearly one hundred
miles from Dongstreet, it gave Burnside a good chance
to defeat one of them, and he could take his choice.
But he decided to pay no attention to the enemy, and to go
on with his grand scheme of reorganization. He did not
take Governor Curtin's plan, when he sent a force into
Delaware to save the Dupont powder works. His attorney-
general told him that it was unconstitutional to send troops
into another State without a request. "Well," said the
Governor, "I will save the powder, and then consider the
constitutionality of it." Had Burnside fought a great
battle and been victorious, he would have had plenty of
time to reorganize his army, and have an admiring world
looking on while the great chieftain prepared to strike
another blow. But we still find the new commander hard
at work arranging his commands, which, when settled, were
not such great changes after all.
The army under the new régime gave Sumner the right
grand division ; that was all that was new in that wing, for
Couch already commanded the Second and Wilcox the Ninth
24Ö
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Corps. The center grand division was placed under Hooker,
with the Third Corps under Stoneman, while Butterfield re¬
lieved Porter in the Fifth. The left grand division was com¬
manded by Franklin, with the First Corps under Reynolds,
and the Sixth under W. F. Smith, known as " Old Baldy."
The new regiments had been assigned by McClellan before
he crossed the Potomac, so Burnside had no heavy task in
that matter. The 24th Michigan had been assigned to the
Fourth Brigade of the First Division of the First Corps.
The 136th Pennsylvania was added to the Second Bri¬
gade of the Second Division of the First Corps. It was a val¬
uable addition indeed, for it returned to the great State of
Pennsylvania with the proud record of having valiantly
fought on the field and won distinction for bravery, under its
gallant colonel, Thomas M. Bayne, who has since served his
State many years as a distinguished member of Congress.
That regiment also furnished another able member of the
House of Representatives—afterwards United States Sena¬
tor—John 1. Mitchell, of Pennsylvania, who was a captain
in it. The i6th Maine," which had been on detached serv¬
ice since the 13th of September (it rejoined on the 9th),
' was assigned to the Third Brigade of the Second Division
of the First Corps. These were all the new regiments re¬
ceived by the First Corps. The corps had great reason to
be proud of every one of them, for their banners always
floated where the battle raged with the greatest fury.
The 19th Maine was assigned to Howard's brigade of
the Second Corps.
On the 9th, Burnside made a plan which was not satis¬
factory to the President, Secretary of War, or General Hal-
leck, but it was decided to permit him to follow his own
judgment, as he had been so successful in North Carolina.
It was evidently his intention to avoid a battle until spring,
and then take the old route up the Peninsula, where Mc¬
Clellan led the army the year before, but was compelled to
retire after he had pressed close enough to see the spires in
the city of Richmond.
PRESIDENT LINCOLN.
FREDERICKSBURG.
247
Halleck went to Warrenton to consult with Burnside,
but it is quite evident, from his report to Secretary Stanton,
on the 15 th of November, 1862, that they did not agree,
for Halleck says in his report :
On reaching Warrenton, however, General Burnside proposed
to give up the pursuit of Lee's army toward Richmond, and to move
down the north side of the Rappahannock to Falmouth, and estab¬
lish a new base of supplies at Aquia Creek or Belle Plain.
This proposed change of base was not approved by me, and in
a personal interview at Warrenton I strongly urged him to retain
his present base, and continue his march toward Richmond in the
manner pointed out in the President's letter of October 13 to General
McClellan.
General Burnside did not fully concur in the President's views,
but finally consented to so modify his plan to cross his army by the
fords of the upper Rappahannock, and then move down and seize
the heights south of Fredericksburg, while a small force was to be
sent north of the river to enable General Haupt to reopen the rail¬
road and to rebuild the bridges, the materials for which were nearly
ready in Alexandria.
I, however, refused to give my ofldcial approval of this devia¬
tion from the President's instructions until his assent was obtained.
On my return to Washington, on the 13th, I submitted to him the
proposed change in the plan of campaign, and on receiving his
assent, rather than approval, I telegraphed, on the 14th, authority
to General Burnside to adopt it. I here refer, not to General Burn-
side's written plan to Falmouth, but to that of crossing the Rappa¬
hannock above its junction with the Rapidan.
*********
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
H. W. Halleck,
To Hon. E. M. Stanton, General-in-Chief.
Secretary of War.
Lincoln's letter to McClellan, referred to by Halleck, is
so remarkable that it is here given in full :
Executive Mansion,
Washington, D. C., October 13, 1862.
My Dear Sir :—You remember my speaking to you of what I
called your overcautiousness. Are you not overcautious when j^ou
assume that you cannot do what the enemy is constantly doing ?
Should you not claim to be at least his equal in prowess, and act
248
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
upon the claim ? As I understand, you telegraphed General Halleck
that you cannot subsist your army at Winchester, unless the rail¬
road from Harper's Ferry to that point be put in working order.
But the enemy does now subsist his army at Winchester, at a dis¬
tance nearly twice as great from railroad transportation as you would
have to do, without the railroad last named. He now wagons from
Culpepef Court House, which is just about twice as far as you
would have to do from Harper's Ferry. He is certainly not more
than half as well provided with wagons as you are. I certainly
should be pleased for you to have the advantage of the railroad from
Harper's Ferry to Winchester, but it wastes all the remainder of
autumn to give it to you, and in fact ignores the question of time,
which cannot and must not be ignored. Again, one of the standard
maxims of war, as you know, is to operate upon the enemy's com¬
munications as much as possible without exposing your own. You
seem to act as if this applies against you, but cannot apply in your
favor. Change positions with the enemy, and think you not he
would break your communications with Richmond within the next
twenty-four hours? You dread his going into Pennsylvania, but if
he does so in full force he gives up his communications to you ab¬
solutely, and you have nothing to do but to follow and ruin him.
If he does so with less than full force, fall upon and beat what is
left behind all the easier. Exclusive of the water line, you are now
nearer Richmond than the enemy is by the route that you can and
he must take. Why can you not reach there before him, unless you
admit that he is more than your equal on a march ? His route is
the arc of a circle, while yours is the chord. The roads are as good
on yours as on his. You know I desired, but did not order, you to
cross the Potomac below instead of above the Shenandoah and Blue
Ridge. My idea was that this would at once menace the enemy's
communications, which I would seize if he would permit.
If he should move northward, I would follow him closely, hold¬
ing his communications. If he should prevent our seizing his com¬
munications and move toward Richmond, I would press closely to
him, fight him, if a favorable opportunity should present, and at
least try to beat him to Richmond on the inside track. I say ' ' trv : ' '
if we never try, we shall never succeed. If he makes a stand at
Winchester, moving neither north nor south, I would fight him
there, on the idea that if we cannot beat him when he bears the
wastage of coming to us, we never can when we bear the wastage
of going to him. This proposition is a simple truth, and is too im¬
portant to be lost sight of for a moment. In coming to us he
tenders us an advantage' which we should not waive. We should
not so operate as merely to drive him away. As we must beat him
FRED ER ICKSB UR G.
249
somewhere or fail finally, we can do it, if at all, easiernear to us than
far away. If we cannot beat the enemy where he now is, we never
can, he again being within the intrenchments of Richmond.
Recurring to the idea of going to Richmond on the inside track,
the facility of supplying from the side away from the enemy is re¬
markable, as it were, by different spokes of a wheel, extending from
the hub toward the rim, and this whether you move directly by the
chord or on the inside arc, hugging the Blue Ridge more closely.
The chord line, as you see, carnes you by Aldie, Haymarket, and
Fredericksburg; and you see how turnpikes, railroads, and finally
the Potomac, by Aquia Creek, meets you at all points from Wash¬
ington ; the same, only the lines lengthened a little, if you press
closer to the Blue Ridge part of the way.
The gaps through the Blue Ridge I understand to be about the
following distances from Harper's Ferry, to wit : Vestal's, 5 miles ;
Gregory's, 13 ; Snicker's, 18 ; A.shby's, 28 ; Manassas, 38 ; Chester,
45 ; and Thornton's, 53 miles. I should think it preferable to take
the route nearest the enemy, disabling him to make an important
move without your knowledge, and compelling him to keep his
forces together for dread of you. The gaps would enable 3'ou to
attack if you should wish. For a great part of the wa}- you would
be practically between the enemy and both Washington and Rich¬
mond, enabling us to spare you the greatest number of troops from
here. When at length running for Richmond ahead of him, en¬
abling him to move this wa^', if he does so, turn and attack him in
the rear. But I think he should be engaged long before such
point is reached. It is all easy if our troops march as well as the
enemy, and it is unmanly to say they cannot do it. This letter is
in no sense an order. Yours truly, A. Lincoln.
Major General McClELLAN.
Wlien Burnside received Halleck's telegram, stating
that the President consented to his plan, he at once put his
army in motion for Fredericksburg, though keeping it on
the north side of the river, contrary to the understanding
that at least a large portion of it was to be thrown on the
south bank above the confluence of the Rappahannock and
Rapidan.
The Rappahannock is a short river rising in the moun¬
tains, meandering its way down through Virginia ; it is not
much more than a mountain stream until Warrenton is
reached, then several tributaries assist in swelling it into a
250
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
river, the principal one being the Rapidan. At Fredericks¬
burg it is quite deep below the falls, and cannot be crossed
except by bridges. When the army started from Warren-
ton, Sumner's grand division was given the advance ; the
Second Corps arrived on the 17th at Falmouth, a little town
on the left bank of the Rappahannock opposite the upper
edge of Fredericksburg. They are river towns and, as a
matter of course, are built facing it.
The only particular enterprise in either place consisted
of numerous flouring mills, old-fashioned stone mills that
had been erected there in earlier days. A conduit or canal
which tapped the river at the dam wound its way back of
the city, and finally emptied into Hazel Run about a mile
below it. The canal had been a feeder to mills on that
side of the river, about four feet deep and the same in
width. This stream proved a great source of annoyance to
the right and center grand divisions when charging on the
heights in the rear of the city.
When Sumner arrived at Falmouth, Fredericksburg was
occupied only by a small force commanded by Barksdale.
As soon as the Union troops appeared on the Stafford
Heights (Stafford County lies on the left bank), an artillery
duel began between Pettit's battery, under the direction of
General Couch, and Lewis' light battery, státioned in Fred¬
ericksburg. The enemy was soon driven from his guns ;
as they stood there unmanned, it was a great • temptation to
cross the river and capture them. Burnside's orders were
so imperative not to cross the river, that even Sumner
would not permit a volunteer force to go over and get them.
That night Sumner sent a note to Burnside asking per¬
mission to take Fredericksburg, if he (Sumner) could find
a crossing. There is no doubt but that he could have
crossed at the dam, or a few miles above it without trouble.
He said afterwards that he knew where he could have
crossed.
Burnside, however, declined to give the desired permis¬
sion, stating that it was not advisable to take Fredericks-
FREDERICKSË URG.
251
burg until he had fully established his communications.
That ended the matter, and the troops went into camp
waiting for orders until the pontoons could be brought
around from Berlin, on ^ the Potomac, where McClellan
crossed, east of Harper's Ferry.
McClellan had issued an order for their removal to
Washington before he was relieved. When Halleck visited
Burnside it was agreed that they were to be rapidly trans¬
ported south, to be used in crossing the Rappahannock ; as
the bridges were burned when the army arrived opposite
Fredericksburg, they were still at Washington, Burnside
supposing that Halleck would forward them without delay.
Halleck returned to Washington and resumed the duties
of his office, evidently not understanding that he was to
charge himself with this special duty, therefore an apparent
unaccountable delay occurred in forwarding them. A
part of them arrived at Bell Plain, near Aquia Creek, on
the i8th, but the teams to convey them to Fredericks¬
burg were still in Washington. Had Burnside been
aware of that fact he could have sent wagons from the
army to haul them over, but he was entirely ignorant of
their arrival. General Woodbury, who would have had
them in charge when they arrived, was an officer of great
zeal and intelligence, but it does not seem that he was
informed of the contemplated move of Burnside (though
it seems he divined it), as he suggested to Halleck that
the pontoons ought to arrive simultaneously with the
army, to which suggestion he received no definite reply
or instructions.
As Burnside, in his march to Fredericksburg, was cut
off from all communication with Washington for several
days, it was impossible for him to superintend that mat¬
ter, unless he delegated an officer for that special purpose,
which seemed entirely unnecessary, as General Woodbury
understood his business thoroughly. The only valuable
service that officer could have rendered would have been to
telegraph to Washington for Burnside, which he could
252
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
have done through Woodbury. If General Woodbury had
been sent to Washington to superintend their transportation
it would have saved much annoyance and great disappoint¬
ment.
Had Burnside been able to cross on the 25th or 26th
of November his chances of success would have been still
quite good, as Lee was in great doubt as to what Bumside
intended to do, and in fact he had not decided upon his plans.
General Burns, who possessed the confidence of Burnside
as much as any general, says that Burnside contemplated
crossing the river at Hamilton's Crossing, while a portion
of Lee's army was several miles below at Port Royal, which
place was guarded by D. H. Hill's division. Jackson was
still at Orange Court House waiting for developments. He
could, from that point, dispute the passage of the upper
or march to the lower Potomac, in case that point was at¬
tacked. Longstreet had not fortified the heights which he
occupied, and if he had done so it would have been an easy
matter to have flanked him, as Sherman did at Atlanta.
On the 26th Lee became so well satisfied of the ultimate
intentions of his adversary that he ordered Jackson to come
to Fredericksburg, which place he reached in about two
days, and placed his ^troops on Longstreet's right, extend¬
ing the Confederate line to the Massaponax, a tributary of
the Rappahannock, some distance below Hamilton's Cross¬
ing. Longstreet's left overlapped the plank road, leading
to Salem Church and Chancellorsville. The cavalry
guarded the river above and below the city.
Thus, with a river swollen by heavy rains for the Army
of the Potomac to cross in face of an intrenched enemy,
seemed, as it proved, a forlorn hope ; in fact disaster was
waiting to attend that effort with deep chagrin and sad disap¬
pointment. In front of Longstreet was a heavy stone fence,
put there before the war, behind which his soldiers could
crouch and be almost out of harm's way, while Jackson pre¬
pared his pits of death in case he was attacked.
The Union armies in the West had defeated the enemy
FREDERICKSBURG.
253-
at almost every point, while the country witnessed the Army
of the Potomac still near Washington. It had valiantly
fought several battles, but as yet to no purpose ; the inju¬
ries it had received were greater than those inflicted on the
enemy, a condition of things which caused a restless im¬
patience at the North, and an anxiety on, the part of the sol¬
diers to again meet the foe in their front, and measure the
standard of valor with them. South Mountain and Antie-
tam had awakened their desire for another conflict, and
they were anxious for the bugles to sound ' ' to arms. ' '
Burnside labored under the great disadvantage of being
in the enemy's country, where every move he made was
instantly reported to Lee. This fact was so apparent that
Halleck telegraphed him not to report to Washington what
he intended to do. Every conceivable and ingenious way
was devised and used to secure news, which was at once re¬
ported to Lee, and the utmost diligence to prevent it was
of no avail. A sutler's establishment occupied a'little
house at the edge of the river. On the main floor goods
were kept and sold to the soldiers of the Union army.
General Pleasonton conceived the idea that something was
wrong there, and disguising himself in a citizen's suit one
dark night, took some officers with him to investigate it.
One of them ordered something for the party, while
Pleasonton examined the floor. Finding a trap-door, he
ordered it opened, when he descended into a basement filled
with goods to be conveyed over to Fredericksburg after night
to Lee's army. In one corner sat a man at a telegrapK in¬
strument sending information to the enemy on the other
side of the river. He was sending a message when Pleas¬
onton suddenly entered the room by means of the trap¬
door, which had remained a secret to the alleged sutlers.
Pleasonton asked him what was the message he was send¬
ing ? He attempted to deny that he was engaged in that
nefarious business, but he soon learned that the cavalry
commander was not to be trifled with ; then he owned up.
"Then," said Pleasonton, "you send this message
254
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
over "—which he did : " The great number of recruits are
rapidly swelling Burnside's army, and he will soon have a
larger one, and better equipped, than McClellan advanced
up the Peuinsula with." He sent over several messages
dictated by Pleasonton, when they wired back to know
what was the reason of the sudden change in the communi¬
cations. Being compelled to tell the general what they
asked, Pleasonton said, ' ' Send this to them, ' ' which was
in effect that another great victory had been won in the
West by Rosecrans. They immediately answered : " That
is a lie." Pleasonton then ordered the wires cut, the men
arrested, and the establishment placed in charge of an offi¬
cer ; then he reported all the facts to Burnside.
The hum and activity before a battle began to be felt
in the army, for Burnside had resolved to attack Lee in his
most strongly-fortified position, which he had given him
due notice of from the 17th of November to the nth of
December. Did he want more time ?
It is an approved maxim in war never to do what the enemy
wishes you to do, for this reason alone—that he desires it. A field
of battle, therefore, which he has previously studied and reconnoi-
tered should be avoided, and double care should be taken where he
has had time to fortify or intrench. One consequence deducible
from this principle is never to attack a position in front which you
can gain by turning.—Napoleon.
The following report of General Burnside states quite
clearly his idea of the crossing of the Rappahannock, and
in justice to him it is given in full :
Headquarters Army of the Potomac,
November 22, 1862.
Generad :—By reference to my plan of operations, submitted
by order of the Commander-in-Chief, it will be found that one of
the necessary parts of that plan was to have started from Washing¬
ton at once pontoon trains suflhcient to span the Rappahannock at
Fredericksburg twice ; and I was assured that at least one train
would leave as soon as the General-in-Chief and General Meigs re¬
turned ; and I proposed that if an escort was required, and I was
informed of the departure of the train by telegraph, I would furnish
FR E D ERICKSB UR G.
255
it from my cavalry. Receiving no information of its departure, I
ordered Lieutenant Comstock to telegraph in reference to it. It is
very clear that my object was to make the move to Fredericksburg
very rapidly, and to throw a heavy force across the river before the
enemy could concentrate a force to oppose the crossing, and sup¬
posed the pontoon train would arrive at this place nearly simulta¬
neously with the head of the column. Had that been the case, the
whole of General Sumner's column—33,000 strong—would have
crossed into Fredericksburg at once over a pontoon bridge, in front
of a city filled with families of rebel officers and sympathizers with
the rebel cause, and garrisoned by a small squadron of cavalry and
a battery of artillery which General Sumner silenced within an
hour after his arrival.
Had the pontoon bridge arrived on the 19th or 20th, the army
could have crossed with trifling opposition, but now the opposite
side of the river is occupied by a large rebel force under General
Longstreet, with batteries ready to be placed in position to operate
against the working parties building the bridge and the troops
crossing.
The pontoon train has not yet arrived and the river is too high
for the troops to cross at any of the fords.
You can readily see that much delay may occur in the general
movement, and I deem it my duty to lay these facts before you, and
to say that I cannot make the promise of probable success with the
faith that I did when I supposed that all the parts of the plan would
be carried ojit. Another very material part of the proposition, which
I understood to be approved as a whole, was that all the surplus
wagons that were in Washington were to be loaded with bread and
small commissary stores and sent to this place at once, which would
probably have supplied our army with from five to ten days' provi¬
sions.
These trains could have moved with perfect safety, as they
would have been protected by the movements of this army. I do
not recall these facts in any captious spirit, but simply to impress
upon the General-in-Chief that he can not expect me to do as much
as if all the parts of the plan had been carried out. In fact a force
can be arrqyed against us at this place that would materially re¬
tard us.
The work of the Quartermaster's and Commissary Departments
at Aquia Creek, or Bell Plain, has been most completely accom¬
plished, and I am not prepared to say that every effort has not been
made to carry out the other parts of the plans, but I must, in hon¬
esty and candor, say that I cannot feel that the move indicated in
my plan of operations will be successful after two very important
256
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
parts of the plan have not been carried out, no matter for what
reason.
The President said that the movement, in order to be successful
must be made quickly, and I thought the same.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
A. E. Burnside.
General G. W. Cuelum, Chief of Staff,
Washington, D. C.
The pickets of both armies were along the banks of the
river, watching each other's movements closely ; sometimes
they would chat where the river was narrow enough to be
within hailing distance of each other.
As the enemy held the Fredericksburg side of the Rap¬
pahannock, it was evident that the river would not be
spanned by the pontoons without a desperate struggle.
There were many stone houses near the river where Barks-
dale could secrete his men ; thus shielded they could carry
on their work of death to those engaged in putting down
the pontoons, and be comparatively safe themselves. Fred¬
ericksburg was full of their soldiers, and it seemed impos¬
sible to get the pontoons down. That situation of affairs
called General Hunt into action with the reserve artillery ;
he soon lined Stafford Heights with all of the available
guns at his command. On the right he placed Battery E,
2d United States ; A, 4th United States ; G, ist Rhode
Island ; L, 2d New York ; a Pennsylvania battery under
Captain Durell ; B, ist New York; and D, 5th United
States. These batteries composed the right, and were
under the immediate command of Lieutenant Colonel Hays.
The 4th New York; K, ist United States ; G, 4th
United States; K,'5th United States; D, ist New York;
C, ist Rhode Island ; and H, ist Ohio, were the right
center under Colonel Tompkins.
B, ist Connecticut; M, ist Connecticut; A, ist New
York ; B, ist New York ; 3d New York Battery ; G and D,
ist Pennsylvania, constituted the left center, commanded
by Col. R. O. Tyler.
FR ED ER ICKSB UR G.
257
The 5tli New York ; C, ist New York ; B, ist Mary¬
land ; 2d Maine ; ist New York ; L, ist New York ; 4th
Pennsylvania; F and G, ist Pennsylvania, was the left,
under the command of Capt. G. A. DeRussy.
On the morning of the nth of December, the construc¬
tion of the bridges commenced before day. There was no
attempt to disturb the men at that work until they had
reached near the middle of the river ; then they were in
safe range, and the deadly work of their concealed sharp¬
shooters began, and continued until the remaining few who
had not found a grave in the bottom of the river were
hastily brought back. Those who were wounded or killed
and fell in the boats were rescued after night by their
comrades.
Then General Hunt ordered his batteries to play on the
enemy, especially on the houses along the bank of the
river. That to a great extent silenced their fire ; but
another attempt to continue putting down the pontoons was
the signal for them to renew their attack on the men in the
river.
When all of those batteries were pouring in their shot
and shell, it seemed as if no human being could live in the
town, yet the sharpshooters along the shore were concealed
so well that it was impossible to complete the work until
they were dislodged. To accomplish that General Hunt
suggested that the batteaux be filled with volunteers ; that
as soon as they started he would have every gun belching
its fiery flame and smoke so the sharpshooters could not see
to execute their work so well ; when they neared the other
shore the artillery was to cease, and before the smoke
cleared away enough for them to be seen, they would be so
near the shore that they could not be beaten back again.
The honor of that forlorn hope was awarded to the 7th
Michigan and the 19th and 20th Massachusetts, of How¬
ard's division of the Second Corps, and the 89th New
York, of Hawkins' brigade of the Ninth Corps. They
soon cleared not only the river front, but drove the enemy
xvii
258
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
well back into the town, though not without a fearful loss
of their own numbers. Those regiments made a fame that
day that will last as long as the nation has an existence.
The opposition at the crossing below the city was not
so stubborn, as the valley along the right bank of the river
did not aftord so much protection to the sharpshooters ;
though the passage of the river was disputed to the last
extremity, yet the grand division of Franklin, composed of
the First and Sixth Corps, readily effected a landing on the
other shore, and were ready to meet the foe even in his
stronghold on the heights back from the river. The First
and Sixth Corps crossed over on the 12th inst. ; the divi¬
sions of Sickles and Birney of the Third Corps were held as
a reserve on the left bank of the Rappahannock.
It must be remembered that there were only two corps
in Lee's army—Longstreet's and Jackson's—but at the
same time it must not be forgotten that a division of their
army almost corresponded to a corps in ours. In that re¬
spect their army was better organized for effective work.
In our army there were so many corps that it gave a chance
for some one to misunderstand the orders and not move in
conjunction with the others, thereby paralyzing the move¬
ments, perhaps at a vital time. We have just seen how the
vexatious delay in the arrival of the pontoons utterly ruined
all of Burnside's plans, for he aimed to cross ten days be¬
fore Jackson joined Lee. If our army had crossed even by
November 25, Longstreet would have been unable to seri¬
ously oppose the passage of the river, nor could he have
held his position on Marye's Heights, for Franklin crossed
some three miles below him and would soon have been able
to cut off his communication with Richmond, forcing him
back in the direction of Chancellorsville. But on the morn¬
ing of the 13th of December, when our army lay along the
river in the dense fog, Jaekson was well intrenched on the
heights with four divisions, D. H. Hill's division having
been added to his command that morning.
In order to facilitate their movements a military road
FREDERICKSB URG.
259
had been cut just back of the crest so that troops could be
speedily sent from one part of the line to the other unob¬
served from our position, which not only gave Jackson a
better chance to handle his own troops to advantage, but
also to get reënforcements from Longstreet if he was heavily
pressed, for Longstreet's position was so strongly fortified
behind the stone wall and the parapet on the crest of the
heights above and to the rear of the stone wall, that he
needed but a scanty number of infantry, with his artillery
frowning along his whole front, to beat back and destroy
any column that might be hurled against him.
hongstreet said in a speech, delivered from his former
headquarters on Marye's Heights, in May, 1884, when the
First Corps was making a historical examination of the
field, that just prior to the battle Lee came along and saw a
section of a battery not in position, and called his attention
to it. Longstreet said to him ' ' that he had no place for it ;
that with his artillery already in position he could rake the
ground in front as if with a fine-tooth comb. ' ' Longstreet
needed but a small infantry force behind the stone wall to
assist his artillery. *
* During the war there was a very-intense secession element in
Fredericksburg.
When the historical visit was made there in May, 1884, under
the auspices of the First Corps, the city did everything in its power
to welcome the veterans of the Army of the Potomac, members of
Congress, and others to the place where a great battle had been
fought. The mayor had convened the council, which not only
officially welcomed us, but in addition provided for a grand ban¬
quet.
The special train passed through the city without stopping, un¬
til it reached Hamilton's Crossing, where Franklin fought on the left.
After that part of the field was fully examined where Jackson occu¬
pied the ridge, and the valley below where Reynolds advanced, the
train moved back to the town, where Mayor Sener in a very elo¬
quent speech welcomed us to their historic city. General Rosecrans,
as Chairman of the Congressional Committee, replied in a very
appropriate and brief address. Then we were escorted to the new
opera building, there to partake of the banquet in waiting for us.
260
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
When Buniside ordered Franklin to attack the enemy
on the left with a division, it was his judgment that the
position of the corps would indicate that it should be made
by the First, and its commander was so notified.
It was but natural that General Reynolds should select
the Pennsylvania Reserves to make the attack on our ex¬
treme left. He came out in command of a brigade of the
Reserves and commanded the division at the second battle
of Bull Run, and then when he was in command of the
First Corps it was his duty tc give them the position of
honor.
On entering the hall we were welcomed by the committee and greeted
by loo ladies, who had volunteered their service for the occasion.
The Chairman of the Committee, who owned the Opera build¬
ing, was a Sixth Corps man of the name of Hunter, who settled
there after the war, and had amassed quite a little fortune in the
foundry business.
The newspaper men were especially gracious to us, and the
friendliness of S. J. Quinn, R. B. Merchant, and J. W. Woltz was of
the most cordial character.
The address of welcome was made by Judge Goolrich, who had
served in the Confederate army. Hon. George B. Boring, of Massa¬
chusetts, was called on to reply to him. Congress was represented
by addresses from Belford of. Colorado, Herbert of Alabama, and
Cutcheon of Michigan. Generals Longstreet, Newton, and Rose-
crans were called on and loudly applauded. Among the guests
were Generals H. J. Hunt, Abner Doubleday, George J. Stannard,
Roy Stone, James S. Robinson, H. W. Slocum, W. W. Dudley,
and John C. Robinson ; also Colonels Bliss and Jackson of New¬
ton's staff, Kniffin, Tichenor and Thompson ; Major Craig of
General Hunt's staff, Maj. Isaac Hall, Major Cranford, Capt. A.
H. Van Deusen, Drs. Little and Donohue, D. W. Cleaver and many
other officers and veteram. and members of Congress—nearly a
hundred members of the House were present.
Senator Dolph, of the Senate, accompanied by his family, was
quite an interested spectator. Ex-Govemor Dingle}^ of Maine ;
Major Haynes, of New Hampshire; Bagley, of New York; Murray,
of Ohio, and Hon. W. W. Brown, of Pennsylvania, formerly of the
Bucktails, were deeply interested in the review of the field. The
press of the country was represented from Washington and other
cities.
FR ED ER ICKSB UR G.
261
They had fought so valiantly on the right at South
Mountain that General Hooker was filled with admira¬
tion, and said, as they struggled up the mountain, "That
it was as- splendid a line of battle as the world ever
saw. ' '
They opened the battle of Antietam under Meade, and
won distinction on that field that will always be a bright
gem in the history of the State. Now they were to open
another great battle under two of their old brigade com¬
manders, one commanding the corps, the other the division.
No wonder they had every confidence of success, considering
that their tried and capable generals were to lead them. It
was like Charlemagne's troops, when he galloped to the
front, none doubted the result.
The First Brigade was commanded by Colonel William
Sinclair, of the 6th Regiment. It was composed of the
Bucktails, Capt. C. F. Taylor; the ist. Col. Win. C. Tal-
ley ; 2d Col. Wm. McCandless, and 6th Regiments, Maj.
W. H. Ent, of the Reserves, and the 12 ist Pennsylvania,
which was a new regiment, and had recently joined the
army.
It may be well here to briefly explain the Pennsylvania
Reserves' organization :
Recognizing the danger to which Pennsylvania, by its
long line of border on States seriously disaffected, was ex¬
posed, and finding that adequate provisions did not exist by
law to make the military power of the State available for
its protection. Governor Curtin issued his proclamation on
the 20th of April, 1861, calling the Legislature to convene
in extra session on the 30th instant. In his message,
which was delivered at the opening of the session, the Gov¬
ernor said :
• ' The time has passed for temporizing or forbearing with the
rebellion, the most causeless in history. * * * The insurrection
must be met by force of arms ; and to reestablish the Government
upon an enduring basis by asseiting its entire supremacy ; tore-
possess the forts and other Government property so unlawfully
262
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
seized and heid, to insure personal freedom and safety to the people
and commerce of the Union in every section, the people of the loyal
States demand, as with one voice, and will contend for, as with one
heart, and a quarter of million of Pennsylvania's sons will answer
the call to arms, if need be, to wrest us from the reign of anarchy
and plunder, and secure for. themselves and children, for ages to
come, the perpetuity of this Government and its beneficent institu¬
tions. * * *
It is impossible to predict the lengths to which the madness
that rules the hour in the rebellious States shall lead us, or when
the calamities which threaten our hitherto happy country shall ter¬
minate * * * To furnish ready support to those who have gone out,
and to protect our borders, we should have a well regulated military
force. I, therefore recommend the immediate organization, disci¬
plining and arming of at least fifteen regiments of cavalry and in¬
fantry, exclusive of those called into the service of the United States.
As we have already ample warning of the necessity of preparing for
any sudden exigency that may arise, I cannot too much impress
this upon you.
This message from the patriotic Governor of the grand
old State was immediately referred to a select committee
of the House. In compliance with the recommendations,
a bill was reported on the 2d of May to create a loan and to
provide foi arming the State, which, in the nstial cotirse of
legislation, became a law on the 15th.
The Reserves were very desirous of retaining their or¬
ganization as a division, and were permitted to do so after
they entered the army.
In compliance with the provisions of this act. Governor
Curtin issued his call for men to compose the corps, and
apportioned the number that would be received from each
county, according to its population, in order that every sec¬
tion of the State and every class of its people should be
duly represented in it. Great enthusiasm was everywhere
manifested to enlist, and a strong desire was felt to be ad¬
mitted to its ranks. Four camps of instruction were estab¬
lished : Easton, West Chester, Harrisburg and Pittsburg.
George A. McCall, a graduate of the West Point Mili¬
tary Academy, was appointed a major general to command
FR ED ER I CK SB UR G
263
the corps, and Brig. Gens. John F. Reynolds, George G.
Meade, and E. O. C. Ord were placed in command of the
three brigades. Thus was officered and equipped 15,000 of
as fine men as ever marched out of the State to defend their
country.
The ist Regiment of the Reserves was the 30th from
the State, consequently the Bucktails, which was the 13th
in the division, was the qad from the State. It will be ob¬
served that there were two 11 th Pennsylvania Regiments
in the First Corps at Fredericksburg ; the other nth was
in the Third Brigade of the Second Division, under Gene¬
ral Gibbon; the last-mentioned one was the regular nth.
This account of the Pennsylvania Reserves is made to
avoid confusion by the reader years hence, when all the par¬
ticipants have passed away, leaving no one to explain.
The Second Brigade, under the command of Col. A. E.
Magilton, of the 4th Regiment, was composed of the 3d,
4th, 7th, and 8th of the Reserves, with the i42d Pennsyl¬
vania under Col. Robert P. Cummings. The Third Bri¬
gade was the 5th, 9th, loth, nth, and 12th Reserves, com¬
manded by Gen. C. F. Jackson.
When Meade crossed the Rappahannock on the after¬
noon of the 12th, the Bucktails were thrown forward as
skirmishers, and the 2d Regiment was detailed to occupy
the buildings and outhouses of Smithfield. Batteries A, B,
and G, of the ist Pennsylvania Eight Artillery, were posted
in front of Meade's First Brigade. The other battery of the
division. Battery C of the 5th United States, had been sent
to Captain De Russy. The Second Brigade was placed
three hundred paces in the rear of the First Brigade,
while the Third Brigade occupied a position in rear of the
Second in column by regiments.
Early on the morning of the 13th, Meade accompanied
Reynolds to Franklin's headquarters, when Franklin indi¬
cated where Burnside desired the attack to be made, and
informed Meade that his division had been selected to
make it.
264 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
The heavy fog along the river was clearing away, when
Meade retnrned to his division to prepare for the impending
assault on the enemy's position on the hills back some dis¬
tance from the river. He made some minor changes in the
disposition of his troops—the 6th was thrown forward as
skirmishers, while the rest of the First Brigade was moved
in front of his artillery. The Second Brigade held its posi¬
tion three hundred paces in the rear. The Third Brigade
came by the flank well up to the First Brigade. The 9th
Regiment, of this brigade, was deployed as skirmishers on
the flank—this made three regiments on the skirmish line,
Bucktails, 6th and 9th, of the Reserves.
The enemy was keenly observing all of these movements
from the heights above, and seeing the impending attack,
opened a heavy artillery fire from a battery posted on the
Bowling Green road, down toward the Massaponax and
Prospect Hill, giving it an enfilading fire on the left and rear
of Meade's division. The general at once faced the Third
Brigade to the left, thus forming with the first two sides of
a square. Simpson's battery was at once placed on the left
of the Third Brigade, while Cooper's and Ransom's were
ordered to occupy a position on the left of the First Brigade.
These batteries, with some of Donbleday's, soon silenced
the enemy's batteries, but in the mean time, under cover of
the smoke and the quite dense copse on the slope of the hill
in their front, sharpshooters had advanced to the Bowling
Green road, but were soon dislodged by General Jackson,
commanding the Third Brigade.
Meade now decided to prepare for the attack, and or¬
dered the batteries to shell the woods in front. He changed
Ransom's battery to the right of the First Brigade, but
Amsden, who had just returned from detailed duty, took
a position near Cooper.
In about thirty minutes the guns of the enemy were
silenced, as the well-directed shots from our batteries had
caused a serious explosion. Meade's Third Brigade was
still facing down the river. Reynolds directed him to put
FREDERICKSBURG.
265
it on the left of the First Brigade facing the enemy, in
order to give Doubleday a chance to bring his division on
the extreme left, extending as far as possible in the direction
of the banks of the Massaponax.
General Burnside had sent General Hardie of his staff
to General Franklin, so that he could report the movements
of the troops on the left—presumably with a view to giving
Burnside an idea how to press the troops in the center and
right.
General Hardie's telegrams to Burnside are given as
they were written during the battle—describing the scene
just as he saw it :
IIA. M.—Meade advances half a mile, and holds on. Infantry
of enemy in wood in front of extreme left ; also in front of Howe.
No loss, so far, of great importance. General Vinton badly, but not
dangerously, wounded.
Later.—Reynolds has been forced to develop his whole line.
An attack of some force of enemy's troops on our left seems probable,
as far as can now be judged. Stoneman has been directed to cross
one division to support our left. Report of cavalry pickets from the
other side of the river that enemy's troops were moving down the
river on this side, during the latter part of the night. Howe's
pickets reported movement in their front, same direction ; still they
have a strong force, well posted with batteries here.
12 NOON.—Birney's division is now getting into position. That
done, Reynolds will order Meade to advance. Batteries over the.
river are to shell the enemy's position in the wood in front of Rey¬
nolds' left. He thinks the effect will be to promote Meade's ad¬
vance. A column of the enemy's infantry is passing along the crest
of the hills from right to left, as we look at it.
12:05 P- —General Meade's line is advancing in the direction
you prescribed this morning.
I p. M.—Enemy opened a battery on Reynolds, enfilading
Meade. Reynolds has opened all his batteries on it. No report yet.
Reynolds hotly engaged at this moment. Will report in a few mo¬
ments again.
1:15 p. M.—Heavy engagement of infantry (enemy in force) where
battery is. Meade is assaulting the hill. Will report again in a
few moments.
1:25 p. M.—Meade is in the wood, in his front. Seems to be able
to hold on. Reynolds will push Gibbon in, if necessar}'. The bat-
266
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
tery and wood referred to must be near Hamilton's house. The in¬
fantry firing is prolonged and quite heavy. Things, look well enough»
Men in fine spirits.
1:4o p. M.—Meade having carried a portion of the enemy's posir
tion in the wood, we have 300 prisoners. Enemy's batteries on our
extreme left retire. Tough work. Men fight well. Gibbon has ad¬
vanced to JMeade's right. Men fight well. Driving the enemy.
Meade has suffered severely ; Doubleday, to Meade's left, not en¬
gaged.
Col. William Cooper Talley, in command of the ist Regi¬
ment of the Reserves, was on the right of the First Brigade,
with the 2d on the left of the brigade, and the 121st Penn¬
sylvania, under Col. Chapman Biddle, in the center.
In this charge, which was longer and equally as bril¬
liant and daring as that of the famous Pickett charge at
Gettysburg, or McDonald's celebrated charge at Wagram,
the command was exposed to a heavy artillery fire not only
in front, but from the flanks. Col. William Sinclair was
wounded, and Colonel McCandless of the 2d took com¬
mand of the brigade, when Colonel Talley on the right
struck the railroad ; he at once came under a severe infan¬
try fire.
Colonel Talley was a young officer, of unpretending
manners, and was not ambitions for promotion. C. H.
Ingram of Talley's regiment said to me that he kept his eye
on the pale face of the young colonel as they advanced.
Ingram again looked at Colonel Talley as the regiment
reached the slope to make their charge on the enemy's
works ; he said Colonel Talley was one of the coolest men
he ever saw in action. He guarded his right against a
surprise, and at the same time with intrepidity led the
charge in front.
Bates, in his valuable history of " Pennsylvania Volun¬
teers," in speaking of Colonel Talley in the celebrated
Fredericksburg charge, says :
In the battle of Fredericksburg, the ist Regiment of Pennsylva¬
nia Reserves, commanded by Colonel Talley, the regiment occupied
GEN. W. COOPER TALLEY.
FREDERICKSB URG.
267
the right of the brigade, and moved in steady, unwavering line
across an open plain, under a heavy enfilading artillery fire ; and
when the order was given, charged the enemy with resistless energy,
crossing the railroad and ditches, driving him two hundred yards
beyond the intrenchments. Colonel Talley, finding his regiment
outflanked on the right, with the enemy strongly reënforced in
front, and no support coming up in rear, was compelled to retire,
after having opened the way to victory. In this engagement Colonel
Talley led the regiment with great gallantry. * * * The signal
advantage gained in the whole battle, was gained by this part of the
line ; and had the successful assault here made been vigorously fol¬
lowed up it would doubtless have resulted in a brilliant victory, in¬
stead of that bloody repulse which filled the land with gloom.
We give the following graphic description of Meade's
charge, from "Burnside and the Ninth Corps : "
By twelve o'clock, most of the dispositions on our side were
made, and General Meade began to advance with earnestness and
vigor. ■ His division consisted of three brigades (of Pennsylvania
Reserves), of which the Third was on the left, the First on the right,
closely followed by the Second. General Gibbon's division was or¬
dered to hold itself ready as a support. The troops went forward
with great spirit and resolution. In handsome style they charged
up the road, regardless of a hot fire from the enemy, crossed the
railroad, ascended the heights beyond, broke through the enemy's
first line, under General Taliaferro, and gained a position near Cap¬
tain Hamilton's house, capturing and sending back three hundred
prisoners and more. Nothing could be better than this gallant
charge. It was made in the midst of a destructive fire of artillery,
and for a time carried everything before it. Finding an interval in
the enemy's line, between the brigades of Archer and Lane, General
Meade took advantage of it, and wedged his advance in turning the
flanks of both brigades and throwing them into confusion. He next
struck Gregg's brigade and broke it to pieces, with the loss of its
commanding otficer. Gen. A. P. Hill's line was then pierced, and
General Meade's next duty was to break the line of General Talia¬
ferro. But that was not so easy. For an hour and a half had the
gallant little division pushed forward in its successful career. But
it was now bearing the brunt of a contest with the entire corps of
General Jackson, which had been ordered to meet the audacious at¬
tack, and it could not maintain itself without continued support. * *
General Meade had come within a hair's breath of achieving a
great success. His attack had been so vigorous as to be almost a
268
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
surprise. His troops had come upon the enemy, in some cases, be¬
fore he had time to take the muskets from the stacks.
Biddle's new regiment caught the enthusiasm of war,
and in that charge exhibited the coolness of veterans of
long experience ; in fact, they were quite loath to retire,
when they were being surrounded by the enemy on all
sides. But the 2d Regiment of the Reserves, under com¬
mand of Captain Meally, was forging well to the front ; A.
P. Hill's first line of battle was routed; Archer's left was
forced back, and Lane's right brushed aside ; the First
Brigade of the Reserves advanced rapidly on A. P. Hill's
second line commanded by Gregg and Thomas, and the
19th Georgia surrendered a few minutes afterwards to Ad¬
jutant Woodward of the 2d Regiment of the Reserves.
Gregg was mortally wounded, and his command thrown
into great confusion. Gregg was a young man of great
valor, and was the Governor elect of South Carolina.
The Third Brigade was fighting desperately on the left,
and suffered so terribly from the artillery fire on the heights
on Jackson's extreme right that it was unable to make the
headway that the First Brigade did.
Meade was watching the progress of the battle on the
left and sent Lieutenant Dehon of his staff, with orders to
General Jackson "to move to the right flank till he could
clear the open ground in front of the battery, and then,
ascending the heights through the woods, sweep round to
the left and take the battery. Unfortunately, Lieutenant
Dehon fell just as he reached General Jackson, and a short
time after the latter officer was killed." Of these two
officers General Meade thus feelingly speaks in his report :
The loss of Lieutenant Arthur Dehon, 12th Massachusetts
Regiment, my aid, is greatly to be deplored, as he was a young
man of high promise, endeared to all that knew him for his manly
virtues and amiable character. The public service has also to
mourn the loss of Brig. Gen. C. Feger Jackson, an officer of merit
and reputation, who owed his position to his gallantry and good
conduct in previous actions.
FREDERICKSBURG.
26»
Col. Joseph W. Fisher, of the 5th Regiment, assumed
command of the Third Brigade when Jackson fell mortally
wounded. The brigade was unable to execute the move¬
ment Meade desired it to. The Second Brigade of the Re¬
serves followed the First Brigade promptly. Col. A. T.
Magilton commanding, gave orders to press the First as
closely as possible, and led the advance in person. The 4th
Regiment, on the right of the brigade, suifered so severely
from an enfilading fire from the right that Fieutenant
Colonel Woolworth, commanding the regiment, faced
to the right to meet it. He succeeded after a stubborn
fight in driving the enemy back. The 8th Reserves and
the I42d Pennsylvania were blocked off at the railroad—
they were suffering from a heavy oblique fire and could not
advance. The 3d Regiment, under Colonel Sickel, which
was on the left of the brigade, obliqued over to the left, to
meet the heavy ■ musketry from that direction. The 7th
Regiment, under Colonel Bolinger pulled, up by the side of
the 3d, and during the time the Reserves Division was on
the crest of the hill, it entertained the enemy in a
manner decidedly interesting.
A. P. Hill's division of six brigades was not sufficient
to prevent the advance of the Reserves, but when Early's
and Taliaferro's divisions both joined in the assault on
them, with assistance from D. H. Hill's division still
farther in reserve, that Spartan band of soldier patriots,
known as the Pennsylvania Reserves, sullenly retired down
the hill " from whence they came."
The Third Brigade again changed commanders, and
Lieut. Col. Robert Anderson, of the 9th, withdraws the
brigade, because they are heavily pressed and the last round
of ammunition is exhausted. Meade repeatedly sent back for
assistance, but none arriving in time, he fell back this side of
the railroad, and then rallied the remnant of his division
with the assistance of Sickel, Talley, McCandless and
others.
It was in vain to attempt to charge that hill again with
"270 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
the Reserves, they were too much exhausted by the valorous
deeds they had performed that morning. Meade in person
called on Birney for reënforcements, and was given Ward's
brigade, but it was too late. Why Meade was not sup¬
ported in his grand charge which resulted in such terrible
loss of life is a disputed question.
General Birney, in his report, says :
The enemy's batteries commanded the open field, and my loss
being heavy, General Reynolds ordered me to retire my command
from the field, holding it in hand behind the embankment. When
the movement consequent on this order was half completed. General
Meade's division was being sorel}' pressed, and he sent to me for as¬
sistance. I immediately reversed the movement of Ward's brigade,
placing the 99th Regiment, Pennsylvania Volunteers, Colonel Leidy ;
57th Regiment, Pennsylvania Volunteers, Colonel Campbell, and
55tli New York Volunteers, Colonel De Trobriand, in support of
Meade's batteries, ordering forward the 30th Regiment of New York
Volunteers, Lieutenant Colonel Birney; 40th New York Volunteers,
Lieutenant Colonel Gesner, and 4th Regiment, Maine Volunteers,
Colonel Walker, under General Ward, to the support of the troops
in front.
That enabled Meade to extricate his command from the
maelstrom which threatened its destruction.
Gen. John C. Robinson, of Birney's division, had just
crossed the river as Meade was retiring. Seeing that Liv¬
ingston and Randolph's batteries were in danger of being
captured. General Robinson hurried two of his regiments,
the only two he had in line, to the support of these batteries.
These two regiments delivered a volley, and then made a
charge, hurling the enemy back into his intrenchments.
His other regiments getting into line, Robinson advanced
his line of battle to the crest of the hill, and throwing for¬
ward a strong skirmish line succeeded in capturing a col¬
onel, a captain, Lawton, assistant adjutant general to
General Early, and some sixty men. Gibbon's, divi¬
sion was on the right of the First Corps, with the Third
Brigade in front, commanded by Gen. Nelson Taylor, and
FREDERICKSBURG.
271
that supported by the Second Brigade, commanded by Col.
Peter L,yle.
The First Brigade, commanded by Col. Adrian R. Root,
was formed in close column by regiments, and supported
Hall's battery, which was on the left of Taylor's brigade.
Taylor ordered the 13th Massachusetts forward as skir¬
mishers, and formed the brigade in line of battle in the fol¬
lowing order from right to left : The 88th Pennsylvania on
the right, then the 97th New York, with the 83d New
York next, and nth Pennsylvania on the left.
The valley on the right bank of the Rappahannock at
that point being quite wide aud rather level, all of Rey¬
nolds' troops were greatly exposed to the artillery of the
enemy. When Taylor advanced, the fury of their batteries
was turned on his brigade.
The 88th Pennsylvania was advanced to the front under
cover of a slight elevation, from which point it was hoped
their muskets would reach the battery that was doing such
great damage ; they were successful, and the battery was at
once silenced. General Taylor was then ordered, to ad¬
vance his line of battle, which he did to near the railroad,
when the enemy concentrated such a heavy fire on the two
regiments on his left—the nth Pennsylvania and 83d New
York-r-that the general in his report says: "They were
soon melted away." Col. Richard Coulter, of the nth
Pennsylvania, was wounded, and Capt. Christian Kuhn
took command of the regiment. The fire on the 83d New
York was so severe that the regiment changed commanders
three times in a very few minutes, in the following order :
Capts. John Hendrickson and Joseph A. Moesch, and Lieut.
Isaac B. Hoagland. The heavy losses of these two regi¬
ments caused General Taylor to halt. Lyle's brigade was
ordered up to relieve these two regiments, and the 97th
New York and 88th Pennsylvania were marched a short
distance to the right to give Lyle a chance to un¬
mask. The brigade formed with the 136th Pennsylvania
on the left, then the 90th Pennsylvania, with the 26th
272
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
New York on the right. The 12th Massachusetts was
unable to take a position between the 26th and 97th New
York Regiments, on account of the retiring troops of Tay¬
lor's brigade, whom they were relieving ; but the regiment
was commanded independently by Colonel Bates. It was
no difference how they fought, so the leaden hail was fired
at the enemy.
In the mean time the 13th Massachusetts, having ex¬
hausted all of its ammunition, had been withdrawn to the
right and left of the brigade ; Colonel Leonard remained
with four companies on the left in support of Hall's bat¬
tery, which had advanced beyond the Bowling Green road.
When Lyle's brigade advanced, the 136th Pennsylvania
was given a very responsible position, the left fiank of the
brigade ; and although it was a new regiment it fought with
a valor unsurpassed. It forged its way across the railroad
into the wood, and held that position for two hours and
forty minutes, and having exhausted all of its ammunition,
60 rounds, and having no support on the left, it had to
defend itself against a force which presented a front
twice its length, occupying a chosen position, protected by
a dense wood and supported by a battery. Colonel Bayne
though seeing the enemy was overlapping him and would
soon endanger his flank and rear, still held his position,
hoping that the advance of the enemy would be checked by
troops coming to his assistance, but finally, seeing the great
peril his regiment was in, he retired until he could join
other troops of the division, who were fighting somewhat
at will, as the brigades were mixed np by that time more
or less, for Colonel Root's brigade had been ordered np by
General Taylor to make a charge—Gibbon had been
wounded, Taylor was in command of the division, and
Colonel Leonard took command of Taylor's brigade. As
Colonel Root was sweeping down like a mountain eagle to
make his charge, he passed the 12th Massachusetts going
to the rear for ammunition. Colonel Root said to Colonel
Bates, ' ' Don't retire. ' ' Colonel Bates told him their con-
FREDERICKSBURG.
273
dition. "Nevermind," said he, "I am going to make a
charge." Colonel Bates at once gave the order to fix bay¬
onets and file to the right of Root's brigade, and the gal¬
lant 12th Massachusetts again went into the fight on
the right fiank with not a single cartridge—but the reg¬
iment that had followed Fletcher Webster until he fell
mortally wounded at second Bull Run, would follow any
officer who had the courage to lead them, and Colonel
Bates was brave to a fault.
Colonel Root, in his report, says : "I wish to acknowl¬
edge my obligations to Colonel Bates, 12th Massachusetts
Volunteers, for his prompt and generous response to my
request for his cooperation. He promptly united his reg¬
iment with my brigade and charged upon the enemy's
position with fixed bayonets and empty cartridge boxes. ' '
Colonel Root arranged his brigade as follows for the
charge : the 107th Pennsylvania on the left, with the 105th
New York in the center, and the i6th Maine on the right.
These regiments were deployed to the right of Hall's bat¬
tery, and were supported by the 94th and 104th New York
Regiments. That was as grand a charge as was ever made,
and the troops engaged in it deserved the highest credit for
their work there. Colonel McCoy, commanding the 107th
Pennsylvania, knew he had a regiment that was steeled
against danger, so he concluded he would lead the bri¬
gade.
The 16th Maine, under Colonel Tilden, rushed to the
front like the foaming waters of a cataract; the 105 th New
York, under Major Sharp, was abreast of the 107th Penn-
sylvánia, while the 12th Massachusetts was crowding the
16th Maine ; the 97th New York, under Colonel Wheelock,
was forging its way well to the front, and the 88th Penn¬
sylvania held a good alignment, while the 90th Pennsyl¬
vania contributed to the charge.
But here are two regiments disobeying orders—the 94th
and 104th New York had been directed to support the charge,
and they now are mingling with the front line, and there
XVIII
274 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
is no support to Root's line of battle. As that determined
line was almost on a dead run when it struck the enem}', it
forced the Confederate line back up the hill.
The 16th Maine crossed bayonets with the enemy, and
the awful carnage of death began. Taliaferro's line
yielded with sullenness—the two lines were yet near each
other. Otis Libby, of the i6th Maine, was so badly clubbed
over the head with a musket that he was crazed with pain,
and rushing at their line pierced two soldiers through with
his bayonet. Monroe Tayford, seeing his brother killed,
rushed at the one who killed him, saying, ' ' Curse you, you
killed my brother," ran his bayonet through him in än
instant. The shock was too heavy for the enemy to with¬
stand, and he recoiled like the retiring movement of a
powerful gun. For the time being Reynolds' right divi¬
sion had cleared its front, but there were no troops within
supporting distance, and the enemy soon, heavily reën-
forced, again cautiously coming down the hill covered with
timber which afforded shelter and protection, and gave
him great advantage, it seemed rash to remain there. Gen¬
eral Taylor, who accompanied the charge and greatly
cheered the boys by his presence, told Colonel Root to
withdraw his command whenever he deemed it advisable.
Colonel Root says :
It was with real pain that I gave the order for the brigade to
fall back. The officers and men received it with surprise and grief,
and retired so reluctantly that the enemy was enabled to close up on
the rear of the brigade and inflict a loss exceeding that incurred
during the charge itself.
He further adds :
I am happy in being able to bear testimony to the gallant man¬
ner in which the regimental commanders took their men into action,
and I deem it a duty no less than a pleasure to make especial men¬
tion of the i6th Maine Volunteers, Lieutenant Colonel Tilden com¬
manding. This regiment is a new one, and here fought its first bat¬
tle, and I felt some apprehension lest the terrible fire from the ene¬
my's concealed rifle pits would be too severe a trial for its men. But
FR ED ER ICKSB UR G.
275
the gallant manner in which this regiment charged the enemy's po¬
sition excited my surprise and admiration, and reflected the highest
honor upon its oflflcers. Previous to the battle 38 men of this regi¬
ment had volunteered to do duty with Hall's battery, and their con¬
duct is represented by Captain Hall to have been creditable in the
highest degree. The 94th New York Volunteers, Major Kress com¬
manding ; the 104th New York Volunteers, Colonel Prey ; the 105th
N*ew York Volunteers, Major Sharp commanding, and the 107th
Pennsylvania Volunteers, Colonel McCoy, are comparatively vet¬
eran regiments, and have been tried upon a number of hard-fought
battlefields. In doing their entire auty during the recent engage¬
ment they did what I expected of them.
He also especially mentioned Lieut. Charles E. Scoville,
94th New York Volunteers, acting assistant adjutant gene¬
ral, and Lieut. Abner R. Small, i6th Maine, acting aid-de¬
camp.
There were two regiments of Taylor's brigade on the
front line all the time—the 97th New York and the 88th
Pennsylvania—they retired only with Root's brigade. In
the charge Major Sharp, commanding the 105th New York,
was wounded. Capt. Isaac S. Tichenor then assumed
command and led the regiment gallantly, until a shell
burst near him ; he fell to the ground unconscious, and was
left for dead. Then it fell to Captain Moore to command
the regiment and take it off the field.
General Hardie sent the following dispatches to Burn-
side ;
2-15 p. M.—Gibbon and Meade driven back from the wood;
Newton gone forward. Jackson's corps, of the enemy, attack on the
left. General Gibbon slightly wounded. Bayard mortally, by a
shell. Things do not look so well on Reynolds' front ; still, we
will have new troops in soon.
2:25 P.M.—Dispatch received. Franklin will do his best. New
troops gone in. Will report soon again.
3 p. M.—Reynolds seems to be holding his own. Things look
better somewhat.
3:40 p. M.—Gibbon's and Meade's divisions are badly used up,
and I fear another advance on the enemy on our left cannot be made
this afternoon. Doubleday's division will replace Meade's as soon
276
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
as it can be collected, and if it be done in time, of course another
attack will be made.
The enemy are in force in the wood on our left, toward Hamil¬
ton's, and threatening the safety of that portion of our line. They
seem to have detached a portion of their force to our front, where
Howe and Brooks are now engaged.
Brooks has some prisoners, and is down the railroad. Justas
soon as the left is safe our forces here will be prepared for a front
attack ; but it may be too late this afternoon. Indeed, we are en¬
gaged in front now, anyhow.
Notwithstanding the unpleasant items I relate, the morale of
the troops is generally good.
P. S.—Engaged now heavily in front.
4:30 p. M.—The enemy is still in force on our left and front. An
attack on our batteries in front has been repulsed. A new attack has
been opened on our left, but the left is safe, though it is too late to
advance, either to the left or front.
Meade had been relieved by Birney, Sickles took the
place of Gibbon, and these two divisions of the First Corps,
that had stood the brunt of the battle all day, were re¬
lieved.
We now turn to Doubleday's division on the left of the
First Corps. While the troops of the corps were crossing-
the lower bridge, Reynolds directed Doubleday to station
Colonel Gavin's brigade at the bridge to guard it. In ac¬
cordance with this order Gavin ordered the 7th Indiana
and 76th New York to the right bank of the river, while
the 95th New York and 56th Pennsylvania remained on
the left side.
Doubleday, with the other three brigades of his division,
faced down the river and marched until he gained a position
a little to the left of Bernard's house, nearly three-fourths of
a mile from the crossing, where he halted for the remainder
of the day and the night. As he was in reserve, he placed
his command in column by regiments, 100 paces apart;
thus parking in rear of Meade and Gibbon.
Doubleday says : ' ' While thus posted we were shelled
by enemy's long-range guns." Jackson had 47 guns on
his front—14 on his right and 33 on his left—at Bernard's
FREDERICKSBURG.
277
Cabin. In addition to this.^ J. E. B. Stuart's command was
on Jackson's right, with all of his artillery posted as near
his right as possible. The combined artillery of Stuart and
Jackson could rake the whole valley to the right of Smith's
corps.
On the morning of the 13th Colonel Gavin reported
with his brigade to Doubleday, having been relieved from
duty at the pontoon bridge. The enemy held a wood along
the river bank which was intersected with ravines, and was
quite a strong position, as it not only concealed him, but at
the same time shielded well his troops from our artillery
and sharpshooters. Captain Gerrish's New Hampshire
Battery was placed on the right of Doubleday's line, vhile
Lieutenant Stewart's battery, B, 4th United States Artillei^-,
was posted on the left for the purpose of shelling this wood.
After these two batteries had shelled it sufficiently. Double-
day ordered General Meredith to take the wood with his
brigade.
The 2d United States Sharpshooters was directed to
deploy as skirmishers. As usual, that regiment ad¬
vanced to its work with as much alacrity as if preparing
for a dress parade or to be reviewed by the President.
Grand soldiers ! they were the pride of the division. The
24th Michigan and 7th Wisconsin advanced in line of
battle, with the 2d Wisconsin and 19th Indiana supporting,
followed by the 6th Wisconsin in the second line in good
supporting distance. In the wood were masked batteries of
eight guns with which to sweep the river. Quite a number of
soldiers and horses were captured here by the Iron Brigade.
General Doubleday was greatly pleased with the conduct of
the 24th Michigan, and took occasion to highly commend
it to General Reynolds. This was its maiden fight, and its
action was watched by the veterans with considerable solic¬
itude. It was commanded by Col. Henry A. Morrow, who
won distinction later in the war, and served after the war as
colonel of the 21st United States Infantry.
The 7th Wisconsin was commanded by Col. W. W.
278
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Robinson. That regiment came out early in 1861, and its
colonel was an old officer who was capable of a much
higher command—he afterwards commanded the Iron
Brigade, and as an officer stands high in the estimation of
the Army of the Potomac. Col. W- F. Rogers, command¬
ing the Third Brigade of the First Division, advanced and
took a position on Meredith's right, advancing to the Bowl¬
ing Green road. The sharpshooters of the enemy were
holding that road, and clung to it with great tenacity when
Rogers moved forward. A battery some 500 or 600 yards
in rear of them was doing considerable damage, but was
compelled to retire by this brigade. Gerrish's battery was
then moved to a position at the intersection of a road with
the Bowling Green road, when Colonel Rogers threw out
skirmishers to protect the battery, and then retired his
brigade some distance to the rear to support it.
Col. Walter Phelps, Jr., commanding the First Brigade,
moved forward and took position on the right of Colonel
Rogers, placing three companies on the Bowling Green
road as skirmishers. Colonel Gavin, commanding the
Second Brigade, moved forward on Phelps' right ; Double-
day's division was now all in line of battle. Reynolds'
battery was taken from the left of the command and placed
between Phelps and Gavin.
It is certain that Doubleday's division was handi¬
capped by Stuart clinging to the Rappahannock this side
of the Massaponax, and preventing his advance by that
means so as to assist Meade's charge.
After the battle Jackson inquired of one of our officers
who accompanied a flag of truce what division that was on
the left. He highly complimented its marching under the
heavy artillery fire it was subjected to.
Doubleday all the time had to refuse his left to guard
against an attack in the direction of the Massaponax.
Burnside or Franklin ought to have given Reynolds
enough troops to have swept the left bank of the Massa¬
ponax from its confluence with the Rappahannock ; then a
FREDERICKSBURG.
279
simultaneous attack of all of Reynolds' divisions, Double-
day's, Meade's, and Gibbon's, might have broken through
Jackson's troops. Doubleday would have been able to evade
to a certain extent the fourteen guns of Jackson on Prospect
Hill, though he would have suffered some from them, and,
in addition, would have felt the whole power of Stuart's
artillery and cavalry. The Comte de Paris thus speaks of
Jackson's position :
The one on the right was almost as formidable as the first, for
its defenders being concealed among the woods and able to move
about unperceived by their adversaries, were admirably'posted for
observing the latter at a distance in the plain, and crushing them
with the fire of their artillery so soon as they should cross the rail¬
way track to climb the acclivities which rose to the margin of the
wood. In the wood itself the chances would have been more equal,
but the knowledge of the roads which traversed it was a great ad¬
vantage to its defenders.
Hon. W. C. Gates, a member of Congress from Alabama,
who was in Hoke's brigade and with his command came
forward to assist in repelling Meade's attack, said to me
that "If Franklin had made the attack with 40,000, it is
my opinion that he could not have driven Jackson from his
strong position. I think it was the wisest thing to do—to
retire across the river."
Gates is a very candid man and avoids all appearance of
prejudice, but certainly is mistaken in the "40,000" matter,
as the troops on each side displayed equal determination at
that part of the line. Yet Jackson and Stuart evidently
commanded from 40,000 to 50,000—the evidence in my
possession fully confirms that. Then, taking into considera¬
tion their strongly intrenched position on those heights,
honeycombed with roads made by them, perhaps it was
well that the Army of the Potomac was quietly withdrawn
under the somber shades of night.
Late in the afternoon Doubleday drew in his left wing,
under Meredith and Rogers, as there were strong indications
280
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
of an attack by the enemy, and his center was then being
very hard pressed.
Jackson determined late in the afternoon to attack Frank¬
lin, but after a careful reconnoissance of the Union line he
desisted. Had he advanced over that valley to drive
Franklin into the river, he might have deeply regretted it,
and given Franklin a chance to follow his defeated troops
to the crest of the hill with a good chance of victory. It
was a safe plan to quietly remain in their positions and
await the attacks of the Union Army.
Doubleday had another reason for contracting his lines
on the léft. If a night attack was made, he had a better
opportunity to handle his command and could more easily
reënforce any point that was furiously assailed. If the
enemy had made an attack at night it would have been of
a most determined character.
The shattered divisions of Meade and Gibbon were in
reserve, where they could come to Doubleday's assistance.
But the night wore away and the light of another Sunday
morning came with its "olive branch of peace," its morn¬
ing greeting to all mankind, to pay due homage on that
blessed day to the Lord God of Hosts. Although Jackson
had the reputation of being a devout Christian, yet there is
no evidence of his being religiously inclined that day, ex¬
cept through the thunderings of his cannon as they
belched forth their missiles of death at the boys in blue
in the valley below.
It is seldom, in this country at least, that the artillery
played such an important part in a battle as it did at
Fredericksburg. In my humble judgment there never
was a better artillery officer than Gen. H. J. Hunt, chief of
artillery of the Army of the Potomac. He had picked his
subordinate officers with great care, so that that arm of the
service was well prepared for the great struggle between the
two armies.
Col. C. S. Wain Wright, chief of artillery of the First
Corps, displayed the qualities of an excellent officer. He
GEN. DANIEL BUTTERFIELD.
PRE DER ICKSB UR G.
281
was present wherever danger threatened, to post the artil¬
lery where it could do the greatest execution. If Meade
and Gibbon were engaged in a charge, he was there. If
Doubleday was pressed on the flank and in front with a
heavy fire from the enemy's artillery, Wainwright was at
the side of the artilleryman who fired the first shot in the
war.
Believing that the artillery deserve great credit for their
services in that battle, and thinking that the highest praise
that can be bestowed on them is to quote from General
Reynolds' report what he said of the artillery, it is here
given with great cheerfulness :
To Captains Ransom, Cooper and Simpson, commanding batte¬
ries of Meade's division ; Captains Reynolds, Hall, Gerrish, and
Lieutenant Stewart commanding those of the other divisions as well
as Captain Wolcott, commanding a battery of Smith's corps, great
credit is due for the intrepidity with which they maintained their
positions, and the coolness and judgment with which they managed
their command under the severe fire of the enemy's batteries, so
advantageously posted during the whole day of the 13th.
Captain Cooper and Lieutenant Stewart maintained the most
advanced position with the steadiness for which their commands
had been noted on former fields. To Colonel Wainwright, ist New
York Artillery, chief of artillery, I am indebted for the excellent
judgment he displayed in the management and disposition of the
whole artillery of the corps, and for the admirable manner in which
the damages it received were repaired on the field and the guns
again brought into action under his supervision.
What General Reynolds then said of the artillery is
simply a cold fact, which is the highest tribute that can be
paid to Wainwright and his command. The general over¬
looked the fact that the 5th Maine, under Capt. George F.
Rippien ; Battery C, Pennsylvania Light, under Capt.
James Thompson, and Battery G, of same regiment, under
Capt. Frank P. Amsden, had also been engaged, but Wain¬
wright acknowledges their services. Captain Rippien was in
command of the artillery of Meade's division. Although
the troops were yet on the south side of the Rappahannock,
282 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
the battle would not be renewed, for Jackson had industri¬
ously employed all of the time, since the charges of Meade
and Gibbon, to deepen his rifle-pits and otherwise strengthen
his position, so that he was much better prepared to with¬
stand an attack now than he was yesterday.
Jackson had had twenty-four hours to come down
in the valley and drive Franklin into the river, but so far
not even a sign of a move indicated that he would pay the
fraternal visit he was so enthusiastic over yesterday ; time
and a good observation of Franklin's lines had cooled his
fiery ardor.
Franklin was well prepared to take care of his host, if
he would only ' ' Come into my (valley) parlor. ' ' Burns'
division on the right, under the gritty little general, was
hoping for a chance to display its mettle ; Smith's corps
on his left was ready any moment, with Sickles and
Birney of the Third Corps, two splendid divisions, com¬
manded by able generals, who resting on their arms, while
Doubleday on the extreme left had his division well in hand
for any emergency, even a night attack.
With this magnificent line of battle in full view of Jack¬
son, there was no danger that he would attack.
Reynolds highly commends Lieutenant Rogers of
Doubleday's staff for his skillful manner of withdrawing
the pickets in front of Doubleday.
Reynolds returns his thanks to Doubleday, Meade
and Taylor, who succeeded Gibbon, after the latter was
wounded.
Doubleday says : "I was much indebted to Surg. Ed¬
ward Shippen, medical director, for his care and attention
to the wounded. He also exposed himself a great deal on
the field. ' ' He speaks highly of the behavior of his staff.
Major Livingston, Captains Bloodgood and C. F. Noyes,
Lieuts. J. B. Martin, L. A. Bartlett, H. T. Lace, and W. H.
Wilcox. Meade thanks his brigade commanders, and ' ' To
Colonel Sinclair particularly, who had command of the ad¬
vance during the whole day, and who was severely wounded,
FREDERIC KS BURG.
285
I desire to express my obligations for assistance rendered
me. ' '
Reynolds' staff was constantly in the saddle until the
battle was over, and so was his escort, Company L, ist
Maine Cavalry, under Capt. Constantine Taylor, but this
company was noted for its good discipline and readiness to
go at once, regardless of danger, or else it would not have
been selected by Reynolds, who never was rash, but fear to
him was a stranger, and he quietly impressed those around
him with a courage that made them court danger, if neces¬
sary.
Taylor performed quite important service in connection
with the pontoon trains, as will be seen by the following
report ;
Halfway between Dumfries and Occoquan,
On the road to Alexandria, Va.,
November 21, 1862—5 p. m.
General :—The pontoon train commenced crossing the Occo-
quan this morning. I am within five miles of the Occoquan, but
no pontoon train has been met with. I send this as the first news
from our train. I shall continue moving until I meet the train.
I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant.
C. Taylor,
Capt. ist Maine Cavalry, Commanding Battalion.
To General Franklin,
Stafford Court-house.
Gibbon speaks in complimentary terms of his staff, and
personally mentions Captains Wood and Lee, and Lieu¬
tenants Haskell and Moale.
General Taylor acknowledges his indebtedness to his
two aids. Captain Hartz and Lieutenant Post. Colonel
Magilton, commanding the Second Brigade under Meade,
says: "Lieutenants Wilson and Campbell deserve great
praise for the manner in which they conveyed orders under
such a terrific fire, showing great coolness and courage,
although both were slightly wounded."
Lieutenant Colonel Robert Anderson, who took the
Third Brigade of Meade's off of the field, does not forget
28i THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
his staff—Captain Swearingen, and Lieutenants Bemus and
Chamberlain. Colonel Lyle commanding Gibbon's Second
Brigade says :
I take pleasure in bearing testimony to the coolness and bravery
of Colonel Bates, commanding 12th Massachusetts; Colonel Bayne,
commanding 136th Pennsylvania Volunteers ; Lieutenant Colonel
Jannings, commanding 26th New York Volunteers (who was
wounded in the early part of the action) ; Lieutenant Colonels Allen
and Wright ; Majors Sellers and Wetmore, and to the line ofl&cers of
the several regiments of the brigade. The steadiness and good be¬
havior of the men, in my opinion, have never been excelled.
Colonel Adrian R. Root, who commanded the First Bri¬
gade in Gibbon's division, that so heroically charged the
enemy, says :
I desire to render a general tribute of honest praise and gratitude
to the officers and soldiers of my brigade.
Meredith in his report, speaks in commendable terms
of his staff—W. W. Dudley, J. D. Wood, J. W. Shaefer,
Samuel H. Meredith, and J. M. Howard, Jr.
Colonel Rogers, of Doubleday's Third Brigade, closes
his report by saying :
I take pleasure in referring to the promptness with which I was
supported by Colonels Hofmann and Lord, Lieutenant Colonel
Hardenbergh and Captain Lay ton.
I take pleasure also in testifying to the very efficient service
rendered by the 2d United States Sharpshooters, under Major Stough-
ton, of Colonel Phelps' Brigade.
Of his staff, Lieutenants Taylor, Cook and Bridges, he
says :
They performed their duties with great coolness and bravery
under the severe artillery fire to which all were subjected.
Colonel Gavin, commanding Doubleday's Second Bri¬
gade, says :
FREDERÍCKSB LRG.
285
Officers and men behaved admirably on.the retreat, as they did
during the entire fight. I cannot speak too highly of the conduct
of both officers and men during the severe cannonading. I can only
say that the brigade sustained fully its well-earned reputation. Men
all behaved so well I shall not attempt to speak of individual good
conduct.
On our left it might well be termed a drawn battle—
while Franklin was unable to carry Jackson's strongly for¬
tified position, yet he was master of the valley, and it was
equally as hazardous for Jackson to attack him, although
Franklin had no breastworks, but the unalloyed valor of the
troops would have vigorously met the enemy in an open
field contest.
Let us now see how the tide of battle has raged on the
right—has our artillery been successful in making a breach
in the stone wall, or has our infantry been able to take it
by storm?
General Sumner, in command of the right grand divi¬
sion, gave the order to Couch, commanding the Second
Corps, to attack with his command and carry Marye's
Heights. Couch directed French to take the lead with his
division. He advanced with Kimball's brigade, supported
by Andrews', and that in turn by Palmer's.
The following telegrams announced the fact that French
was marching :
12 m.—The advance has started. D. N. Couch.
To General Sumner.
From the signal station in the top of the courthouse
steeple came the second dispatch ;
12:45 P- —Our infantry have advanced, and are hotly engaged.
The enemy hold their own ; they have about two batteries in action
on a hill and are playing into our infantry.
To General BurnsidE. B. F.
Kimball with great courage and bravery led his brigade
on the enemy's works amid a storm of canister from the
286
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
batteries concentrati-ng their fire on him as he steadily ad¬
vanced, besides a deadly fire from Cobb's and Cook's
brigades. When within fifty paces of their works the
sheet of flame was so terrible that his brigade was com¬
pelled to halt. Their commander being severely wounded,
had a depressing effect on the men, but Colonel Mason
of the 4th Ohio assumed command in Kimball's place and
valiantly fought the brigade. Andrews and Palmer were
unable to push any farther to the front, and there the divi¬
sion stood and received the deadly fire of the enemy,
which is thus described by the Comte de Paris : ' ' When
within two hundred meters of the enemy, they were re¬
ceived by discharges of musketry, every shot of which,
aimed at leisure, made sure of a victim." Their ranks
melting away like snow on a southern hillside from
the sun at noonday, they fired a volley at the enemy and
retired.
The third dispatch from the court house steeple says :
i p. m.—Our troops are under a severe cross fire, but stand firm.
To General Burnside. B. F.
Hancock was then ordered to French's assistance, ad¬
vancing with Zook in front, then Meagher and Caldwell
two hundred paces apart. Long before Hancock reached
the outskirts of the city his division was suffering severely
from Longstreet's artillery. As Hancock swept past the
remnant of French's division at the head of Zook's brigade,
Kimball's men joined him ; but he was able to go only
some twenty-five paces farther when Zook's brigade was
threatened with annihilation if it advanced.
Then Meagher, the impulsive Irish patriot, attempted
to pass to the front, but his brigade fell like grass before
the reaper.
After Zook's and Meagher's brigades lay stranded, Han-,
cock turned to Caldwell to have him try his luck. He
advanced with a determination to scale the enemy's worksj.
FREDERICKSBURG.
287
but the third and last brigade of Hancock was sacrificed
without even disturbing the enemy.
1:30 p. m.—Two of our divisions are now engaging the enemy.
To General Burnside;.
1:35 p. M.—Send the ammunition to the Lacy House ; Hancock
and French are so hotly engaged, I need reënforcements.
To General Burnside. D. N. Couch.
If you can send a good division, I think the left flank of the
enemy can be turned ; it will only be necessary now, I have not a
division for the purpose.
To General Burnside. D. N. Couch.
Couch undertook to use Howard's division for that pur¬
pose, but when French and Hancock were so badly cut up
he was compelled to order Howard to their support.
Howard directed Owen's brigade to advance, followed
by Hall's, with Sully remaining near the edge of the city.
Although these troops fought with great valor, their efforts
were all in vain. While the enemy had lost General Cobb,
and General Cook was wounded, their casualties so far had
been little more than those of a heavy skirmish, while the
gallant corps of the Army of the Potomac had suffered a
loss that was sickening to behold—the ground was covered
with the wounded and dying. When INIeagher made his
charge, two brothers of the 88th New York lay clasped in
each other's embrace, dead in each other's arms; no one
knows whether they spoke after they put their arms lov¬
ingly around each other—nor does it matter now.
So far Cobb's and Cook's brigades, with the artillery,
were the troops engaged under Longstreet. The desperate
fighting of the Second Corps made it advisable for these
two brigades to be strengthened ; consequently Ransom's
and Kershaw's brigades were advanced to their assistance,
Kershaw assuming command. Willcox attempted to relieve
the right by pushing Sturgis in on the left of Hancock, Ac¬
cordingly Ferrero's brigade, under cover of Dickenson's bat-
288 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
tery, marched rapidly over the open space and up the hill,
which checked the advance of the enemy, as his infantry had
sallied over their works and were attempting to assail Han¬
cock's left. Ferrero compelled the enemy to retire behind
his works, but that drew a concentrated fire on Dickenson's
battery. Of Perrero's troops Willcox says: "But the
gallant Dickenson gloriously fell at his post, and his
battery suffered considerably in men and horses, under a
concentrated fire of artillery and some musketry." While
Ferrero was advancing under a galling fire, it was evident
that his troops would be overpowered soon, and Gen¬
eral Nagle's brigade was ordered to his support. General
Whipple seeing that Sturgis' small division was struggling
up the slope in face of a concealed foe, sent him Carroll's
brigade.
But the hour demanded more victims, and Getty's divi¬
sion, which had been held near Hazel Run as a reserve,
where observations could be made of the battle on the left
and right, advanced. Willcox, as a last resort, to save his
own troops under Sturgis and to relieve the Second Corps
on the right, ordered Getty forward. He advanced with
Hawkins' brigade until it nearly reached the enemy's
works, when his infantry opened such a well-aimed fire
that Hawkins' brigade soon lost heavily and was badly
crippled. Harland's brigade coming to their relief fought
with great valor, but Getty was finally compelled to fall
back in front of such a destructive fire—where it was noth¬
ing but sacrifice to remain.
General Grifi&n is relieving General Sturgis, who is holding on
in spite of everything until he is relieved.
To General Sumnkr. Wilucox.
The left and right grand divisions had been engaged,
and it now devolved on Hooker to bring up the center,
composed of the Third and Fifth Corps. But Birney's
and Sickles' divisions of the Third Corps had taken
the place of Meade and Gibbon on the left ; while Car-
FR ED ER I CK SB UR G.
289
roll's brigade of Whipple's division of that corps had
been sent to the aid of Willcox, leaving only Piatt's brigade
of Whipple's division of the Third Corps.
Griffin's division of the Fifth Corps had gone to relieve
Stnrgis, so it left Hooker with Piatt's brigade of the Third
Corps, and Humphrey's and Sykes' division of the Fifth
Corps to make his charge, but Piatt's brigade was too
far to the left to be of any service in that trying ordeal.
As he calmly looked over the work of the day—for it was
then late in the afternoon—Hooker regarded it as a forlorn
hope to lead two divisions against the enemy's works,
which several corps had attempted to storm and signally
failed. It is true that Smith's corps, and Burns' division,
on Smith's, right, had not been fighting very hard, but
Reynolds, on the left, with Birney's and Sickles' divi¬
sions, had been heavily engaged, while the Second and
Ninth Corps, on the right, had suffered great losses. Hooker
saw nothing but disaster in another assault under the cir¬
cumstances.
From the engagement at Williamsburg, where Hooker
fought Longstreet, to the battle of Antietam, which he
opened on the right, and electrified his troops by riding
where danger seemed the greatest, no one doubted Hooker's
anxiety to fight a battle. He had won, and justly so, too, the
soubriquet of "Fighting Joe." For the first time in the
war he was averse to fighting, and dispatched an aid to Burn-
side, at the Phillips House, begging him to desist from
a further attempt to carry a position which it was utterly
impossible to take. The aid reported to Bnrnside Hooker's
message, but the commander-in-chief was inflexible, and
declined to consider Hooker's suggestion. When the
officer returned with Burnside's answer. Hooker resolved to
go and tell Bnrnside in person what he thought of again
attempting to charge the.enemy's works.
Pleasonton, who had been with Bnrnside nearly all day,
looked out and saw Hooker ride up on his white charger.
When he dismounted Pleasonton said to me he thought
xix
290
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Hooker was the maddest man that he ever saw. Burnside
was not aware that he was coming, so Pleasonton slipped
out and went into another part of the house, as he did not
want to be present when they met, for he knew there
would be a high time. Pleasonton said Hooker made the
air blue with adjectives over the management of the battle.
But Hooker was unable to make Burnside yield, and he re¬
turned to his command to carry out the imperative orders
of his superior.
Hooker's report is such a clear and condensed descrip¬
tion of the battle that it is here given ;
At 1:30 o'clock, or thereabouts, I received orders to cross this
corps and attack. Before the corps had fully crossed, I was directed
to send a division to support General Sturgis. General Griffin's
division, the largest of the three, being nearest the position, for the
purpose, was assigned to this duty. General Butterfield was then
left with the two smaller divisions of his corps to make an attack
upon the right, where General Sumner's (Second) and a portion of
the Ninth Corps, greatly outnumbering this force, had been at work
all day without making any impression.
A prisoner, in the morning, had given to General Burnside,
General Sumner and myself full information of the position and
defenses of the enemy, stating that it was their desire that we should
attack at that point, in rear of Fredericksburg on the Telegraph
road ; that it was perfectly impossible for any troops to carry the
position ; that if the first line was carried a second line of batteries
commanded it.
The result of the operations of General Sumner's corps, which
had made a determined, spirited attack, without success, fully con¬
firmed the statements of this prisoner. I carefully surveyed the
point of attack, and, after conversation with several of the general
officers of Sumner's and my own command, I was convinced that it
would be a useless waste of life to attack with the force at my dis¬
posal. I dispatched an aid to General Burnside, to say that I ad¬
vised him not to attack. The reply came that the attack must be
made. Under ordinary circumstances I should have complied at
once, but so impressed was I with the conviction heretofore stated,
that I determined it to be my duty to the troops under my command
to give General Burnside a fuller explanation and dissuade him, if
possible, from what I considered a hopeless attack, especially as the
few moments it would take for this purpose could not possibly affect
FREDERICKSBURG.
291
the result of the attack in the slightest degree. Accordingly I did
so. The general insisted upon the attack being made. I returned
and brought up every available battery, with the intention of break¬
ing their barriers, to enable Butterfield's attacking column to carry
the crest. This artillery fire was continued with great vigor until
near sunset, when the attack with bayonets was made by Humphrey's
division. General Sykes' division moving on its right, to assault
echelon and support. This attack was made with a spirit and de¬
termination seldom if ever equaled in war. The impregnable posi¬
tion of the enemy had given them so strong an advantage that the
attack was almost immediately repulsed, and Sykes' division re¬
called, without having fully assaulted, to cover the withdrawal of
Humphrey's. This movement was a necessity, for the loss and re¬
pulse of the attacking columns had been so severe that, should the
enemy have followed up their advantage, without this precaution,
the result could not have failed to be of the most disastrous char¬
acter.
This is a fair and graphic description of the battle on
the right and center.
When Sumner's and Hooker's men assailed lyongstreet
—the annals of history do not furnish an instance where
greater heroism was displayed on a battlefield than that
shown by the gallant soldiers of these two generals—less
than i,ooo of Tongstreet's men suffered any injury, because
even cannon could not make a breach in the works behind
which they were ensconced.
Burnside, as he paced up and down the veranda of the
Phillips House while the battle was raging, said ; ' ' That
height must be carried this evening. ' '
He became desperate as the day wore away. Hooker,
with only two small divisions, was ordered in the center,
while an order was sent to Franklin to attack on the left
with his whole command. That was an impossibility—it
could be done only by massing his columns, when his flanks
would have been exposed ; then, again, there was no time to
execute this hasty order. Franklin's front was fully two
miles long, and the columns could not be massed in time to
make an attack that evening. Had General Burnside
adhered to Lincoln's urgent request for him to cross the
292 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Rappahannock above its junction with the Rapidan, where
his troops could ford the river, with no troops strong enough
to dispute its passage, he would have occupied Fredericks^
burg without having to fight the great battle which had just
terminated. Then if he had met the enemy, it would have
been on a field where he would have had nearly equal chances
—not attacking a Gibraltar. Furthermore, he solemnly
promised that he would obey the wishes of the President in
that matter, but utterly failed in its execution. It was the
mistake of his life. He did not want to fight a battle that
late in thfe fall, but if he had occupied Fredericksburg, and
repaired his railroad to Aquia Creek, there is scarcely a
doubt that he would have had a chance to meet the enemy.
Lee would, in all probability, have taken a position some
distance .from him, and before the two armies could have
met, the winter would have forced an armistice until
spring, when Burnside would have been in excellent con¬
dition to pursue his adversary. Since the war, referring to
the repulse of Humphreys and Sykes, who were forced
back with fearful loss. General Burns observed to General
Rosecrans and myself, that Hooker said " that he had lost
about as many menas he was ordered'to sacrifice," then
gave the signal to retreat. And the Comte de Paris attrib¬
utes the very same language to the irate general.
The great struggle had ended. It was an awful night
for the Army of the Potomac—the wounded and the dying
lay on the frozen ground, while those who had been for¬
tunate enough to escape unharmed stood in groups, cold
and hungry, without any fire, wondering whether the
battle was to be renewed again in the morning. It was
known that Burnside was anxious to renew the battle, and
that he was going to lead his old corps, the Ninth, and
storm the enemy's works.
The battle had been so badly managed that both officers
and men were opposed to its renewal. There were not
half a dozen officers who shared Burnside's opinion on that
question.
FREDERICKSBURG.
293
Longstreet said : ' ' They fully expected Burnside would
renew the battle the next day. They knew that another
day would nearly ruin the Army of the Potomac. If
Burnside would attack such a strongly fortified position, it
was reasonable to suppose that he would repeat his folly
the next day ; ' ' but, thanks to Sumner, Hooker and other
officers who had the nerve to tell him .of the fatal conse¬
quences of another defeat, he was forced to yield. He was
unyielding in his purpose until he was told that the
officers and men were all opposed to it ; and even then he
wonld not be satisfied until he had visited some of the
troops.
Some have censured Lee for not attacking the Union
Army, and that astnte general has given to the world the
reason he did not. It was because he fully expected
Burnside to renew the attack ; he never had a serions
thought of risking the great victory that he had gained b}^
advancing on the Army of the Potomac in the open plain.
It was enough to state after the battle that he thus lost
a golden opportunity that deeply pained him the remainder
of his life. His artillery might have done some damage,.
that was all. If his infantry had advanced, the joy of Sum¬
ner, Hooker, Franklin, Reynolds, Meade, Doubleday,
Smith, Bnrns, Willcox, Couch, Humphreys, Hancock and
French would have known no bonnds, while the Union
troops would have made a charge that would have paled
the desperate assaults of the French at Waterloo.
Besides, Hunt's artillery was admirably posted on Staf¬
ford Heights to warmly greet any advance. The only
thing that Lee could do was to patiently remain behind
his fortifications and destroy Buniside's columns as they
advanced.
When Burnside determined to give up the contest the
order was issued for the troops to quietly retire, on the eve¬
ning of the 15th, across the same bridges that they had
marched over to offer battle to the enemy. The retreat
was made in good order, which fully showed that there was
294 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
no demoralization in the army. It suffered great losses,
but it retained its unwavering faith in the final triumph of
the Union cause, though every one seemed to realize the
fact that a great mistake had been made.
On the 2ist of December Generals Franklin and Smith
sent a plan to the President to take the old Peninsular route,
but advised that the army march up both banks of the
James River with the aid of the gunboats in the river.
Franklin had been quite a confidant at the White House on
former occasions, and that may have stimulated them to
prepare and send their views. It is evident from Lincoln's
laconic reply that he did not greatly relish it ; and it may
have been against Franklin's interest that he assisted in it,
as it was not long before he was relieved of his command.
There is no doubt of their honest intentions, and that the
plan was very good, but it seems that the Peninsular route
had greatly annoyed the President. The following is the
President's reply :
Executive Mansion,
Washington, December 22, 1862.
Yours of the 21st, suggesting a plan of operation for the Army
of the Potomac, is received. I have hastily read the plan and shall
yet try to give it more deliberate consideration with the aid of mili¬
tary men. Meanwhile let me say it seems to me to present the old
questions of preference between the line of the Peninsula and the
line you are now upon. The difficulties you point out pertaining to
the Fredericksburg line are obvious and palpable. But now, as
heretofore, if you go to the James River a large part of the army
must remain on or near the Fredericksburg line to protect Wash¬
ington. It is the old difficulty. Wfien I saw General Franklin at
Harrison's Landing on James River,* last July, I cannot be mistaken
in saying that he distinctly advised the bringing of the army away
from there. Yours, very truly, A. Lincoen.
Major General Franklin and Major General Smith.
To which Franklin made the following reply :
Headquarters Left Grand Division,
December 26, 1862.
I respectfully acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 22d
FREDERICKSBURG.
295
inst. In arguing the propriety of a campaign on the James River,
we supposed Washington to be garrisoned sufficiently, and
the Potomac impassable, except by bridges. The fortification of
Harper's Ferry is another important requisite. These matters were
considered as of course, and did not enter into discussion of the two
plans of campaign. I presume you are right in supposing that I
advised the withdrawal of the army from James River in July last.
I think that under the same circumstances I would give the same
advice.
The army was debilitated by what it had already gone through,
was in an unhealthy position, its sick list was enormous, and there
was a prospect that we would have to remain in that position during
the two worst months—August and September. The effect of this
would have been to ruin the army in health. Circumstances are
very different now. The army is in good health, and the best
months of the year are before us.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
W. B. Franklin, Major General.
To the Prlsidlnt.
It will be seen by this correspondence that there was an
active antagonism to Burnside ; it was widespread and gen¬
eral, though he apparently knew nothing about it. In the
mean time the commander-in-chief set to work to try to re¬
trieve his fast-waning popularity as a general.
His next idea was to prepare to cross his army lower
down the Rappahannock, and by that means gain Lee's
rear and cut off his communications with Richmond. That
was a good plan, except that it involved the crossing of the
river in face of the enemy ; for it is presuming too much to
suppose Lee would not have watched his movements close
enough to have been fully aware of the design the moment
it was commenced in earnest.
The cavalry, under Averell, was to pass the Rappahan¬
nock at Kelley's Ford, then cross the Rapidan, strike the
railroad in Lee's rear and tear it up ; then proceed in the
direction of Suffolk. Averell arrived at the ford on the
30th of December, and the infantry was preparing to march,
when Burnside received a telegram from the President not
to make the move until further orders.
296
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Then he became aware that his subordinate officers were
nnderinining him at Washington. He then asked the
President to permit him to make a move or relieve him.
Mr. lyincoln consented, and Burnside prepared to cross the
river above Fredericksburg, and he lent all of his energies
to achieve success. He placed Couch on the lower Rappa¬
hannock to again draw the attention of the enemy in that
direction, as if that was his real point of attack. Sigel
was posted at Falmouth. The weather was fine, and the
troops cut new roads back from the river so the enemy
could not observe their movements, and hope seemed to
crown the movements of the general-in-chief, and had he
been successful the mutterings against him would have died
away like the receding noise of a passing storm.
Franklin's and Hooker's grand divisions bivouacked on
the 2oth near Banks' Ford, where Burnside intended to
cross. That ford was easily passed in summer, but in
winter it was quite deep and very rapid ; hence the pontoons
had to be put down for the army to cross on. As the river
was narrow at that point it would have taken only a short
time to throw a bridge across it. So far the enemy was de¬
ceived as to his real movements and designs. Couch had
been vigilantly watched, for Burnside had a weakness for
crossing several miles below Fredericksburg. He strongly
contemplated that before the battle ; then he thought he
could cross some three miles below the city and get posses¬
sion of the Telegraph road before Lee's forces could arrive
from Port Royal. His design to cross his whole army
about Port Royal or Skinker's Neck on December 30, when
the President stopped him, was well known to Lee, so his
move up the river a few days later took the enemy by
surprise.
Up to the evening of the 20th the weather had been
perfectly splendid, and if Burnside had had three more days
of good weather, or if he had moved three days earlier, he
would have been able to cross the river and fight a battle in
the open plain between Salem Church and Chancellorsville,
FREDERIC KS BURG.
297
where Hooker intended to fight when he crossed, and fought
the ill-fated battle of Chancellorsville. Even at this late
date, a quarter of a century after the war, it seems strangely
cruel that Burnside, with such well-laid plans, which would
have given him a victory beyond a doubt—for the arm}-
would have fought with a desperation never excelled—
should so suddenly be enveloped in a storm that raged with
a fury as if two storm centers had met.
During the night of the 20th the rain began, and by the
morning of the 21st the earth was soaked and the river
banks had the appearance of a quagmire. Already fifteen
pontoons were on the river, nearly spanning it, and five
more were amply sufficient. Burnside began at once to bring
up his artillery, which had the effect of making a perfect
mortar bed for a considerable area around the ford. All
day the men worked in the rain, but to little purpose.
Quite a number of cannon were advanced near the ford, but
the 22d only added to the storm, and the artillery, caissons,
and even wagons were swamped in the mud.
The storm had delayed Burnside's movements, giving
Eee ample time to line the other shore with his army,
though there was no attempt to interfere with his crossing
except from the sharpshooters, who peppered away on all
occasions. No doubt Lee was hoping Burnside would effect
a crossing, with a swollen river in his rear. It would have
been a sorry predicament for the Union Army indeed. But
Burnside finally became resigned to his fate and gave the
order for the army to retire to its quarters, and thus ended
the famous mud march.
His last ill luck was too much for his heretofore appar¬
ent good nature. Up to that time he had paid no attention
to the criticisms made on him, but then he let loose the
flood-gates of his resentment and issued an order peremp¬
torily dismissing Generals Hooker, Brooks, Newton, and
Cochrane from the service of the United States, and depriv¬
ing Generals Eranklin, Smith, Sturgis, and Perrero, and
Colonel Taylor of their respective commands. This most
29S
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
extraordinary order had to have the approval of the Presi¬
dent. Mr. Lincoln as usual looked the matter over with a
view to best serve the interests of the country. I said 'to
Rosecrans on this subject that I did not think Lincoln had
a particle of jealousy against a living being, and that he
was so in earnest to preserve the Union, that if it had de¬
pended on his pl^ce as Chief Executive of the nation he
would have left the White House promptly and without a
regret.
After due deliberation over the remarkable paper pre¬
sented by Burnside to dismiss several prominent generals,
and deprive several others of their commands, or accept his
resignation, the President decided to relieve him as com¬
mander-in-chief of the Army of the Potomac, but not to
accept his resignation ; and on the 26th of January he
severed his connection with the army as its commander,
although he continued to the close of the war as a corps
commander. The fact that Burnside never sought the
position of commander-in-chief, and had twice before de¬
clined it on the ground that he did not consider himself
competent to command it, was greatly in his favor with the
army, the authorities at Washington, and the country;
though he lost the battle of Fredericksburg by mistakes,
yet he never lost a due respect with the authorities or the
country.
But few generals have the peculiar ability to command
great armies like the Army of the Potomac ; though Meade
did it, and that other Pennsylvania soldier, who fell, at
Gettysburg on the first day, was able to command any arm}\
Burnside stands well in history as a corps commander,
but as commander-in-chief, a position thrust on him against
his judgment and wishes, if guilty of errors or lacking in
judgment, the mantle of charity should cover all.
An unpleasant duty presents itself in recording the fact
that General Meade is about to leave the First Corps—his
ability attracted the attention of his superiors, and he is
assigned to the command of the Fifth Corps. But the news
FREDERICKSB URÜ.
299
of his promotion was by no means a surprise after the bat¬
tles of South Mountain, Antietam, and Fredericksburg,
where he distinguished himself so notably, and displayed
great capacity. He was selected as a corps commander,
where his sphere of usefulness was extended.
In the following farewell order to the Pennsylvania
Reserves he justly gives them great credit for his rapid
advancement ;
General Orders, ) Headquarters Third Division,
No. loi. Í December 25, 1862.
In announcing the above order, which separates the command¬
ing general from the division, he takes occasion to express to the
ofi&cers and men, notwithstanding his just pride at being promoted
to a higher command, he experiences a deep feeling of regret at
parting from them with whom he has been so long associated, and
to whose services he here acknowledges his indebtedness for what¬
ever reputation he may have acquired.
The commanding general will never cease to remember that he
belonged to the Reserve Corps ; he will watch with eagerness for the
deeds of fame which he feels sure they will meet under the com¬
mand of his successors ; and though sadly reduced in numbers from
casualties of battle, yet he knows the Reserves will always be ready
and prompt to uphold the honor and glory of their State.
By command of Major General Meade ;
(Signed) Edward C. Baird, A. A. G.
The ranking officer of the division was Colonel Sickel,
of the 3d Regiment, and to him was intrusted, through
General Meade, the command of the Reserves. Sickel had
highly deserved the star for his gallant conduct on more
than one field, and his being placed in command of the
division was evidence enough of that fact.
But the loss of General Meade to the First Corps, which
was a heavy blow, did not fill the measure of its sore
trial, for it was rumored that Governor Curtin, Generals
Reynolds and Meade, were again requesting that the Re¬
serves be returned to the State, or at least to Washington,
to have their depleted ranks recruited to their full comple¬
ment. And on the 5th of February a telegram from Gen-
300
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
eral Doiibleday, directed Colonel Sickel to repair with the
division to'the defenses of Washington, and consequently,
the three brigades encamped at Fairfax Court House,
Upton's Hill, and Alexandria for the remainder of the
winter.
It was one of the original divisions of the First Corps.
It had not only been the stepping-stone of Reynolds and
Meade to fame, but it placed a crown of glory on the First
Corps that will be as enduring as the existence of the nation.
While its services in the future are not to be identified
directly with the First Corps, yet we will keep its place
vacant, hoping some time to welcome it back.
The First Corps at this time underwent a reorganization
in a certain sense. A new division was added to it, com¬
posed of two brigades. This new division took the number
made vacant by the Pennsylvania Reserve Division, and
consequently was No. 3.
Gen. Abner Doubleday, who commanded the First
Division, was assigned to the command of the new Third
Division. But before entering into detail of this new
division, Doubleday's farewell order to his old division is
given, because the general was warmly attached to the
officers and men of that command. His old brigade was
in the division, and his devotion to it knew no bounds :
In taking leave of this command I desire to say one word of
farewell. Wherever the service may call me, and whatever may be
my future lot, I shall never forget the ties which bind me to this
brigade, and this division. I shall never cease to remember the
brave men who stood by my side in some of the most stupendous
battles the world ever saw. Men who fought against such heav}'
odds at Gainesville, and the first day at Bull Run ; who stormed the
heights at South Mountain, took eight standards from the enemy at
Antietam, and held their ground so bravely at Fredericksburg, have
won my admiration and regard. I am happy to have fought b}-
their side, and proud of the honor of having commanded them. I
wish them now at parting, individually and collectively, all honor
and success.
Thus spoke the brave general to his did command.
FR ED ER ICKSB UR G.
301
which was a good guaranty that he would be faithful to
the new one of which he was about to assume command.
Time proved that he extended the same care, ability, and
devotion to them ; and in return they loved, respected, and
followed him in battle wherever he went. To this day his
name fills them with delight.
This new division, infantry and artillery, was solidly
from Pennsylvania. The First Brigade, commanded by
Gen. Thomas A. Rowley, was composed of the 12ist,
135th, i42d, and 151st Pennsylvania. The Second Brigade,
made up of the 143d, 149th, and 150th, was under the
command of Col. Roy Stone. Maj. Ezra W. Mathews was
chief of artillery of the division, with Batteries B, F, and
G, Phrst Pennsylvania Eight Artillery. Such was the or¬
ganization of the new division that ere long made its mark
on the field of battle.
Gen. James S. Wadsworth—that grand old man whose
hair was then as white as the driven snow, and with his
millions came out to share the lot of a common soldier,
was assigned to the command of the First Division. There
was no duty assigned to him that he did not cheerfully
perform, and no danger that he did not defy for the sake of
his country. *
* General Wadsworth turned his salary over for the benefit of our soldiers in
Southern prisons.
He not only took his boys—except James W., who was then a mere lad,—
but his son-in-law into the service with him. The generàl was killed in the Wilder¬
ness, on the Lacy farm, by Longstreet's corps.
It was thought at the time by the enemy that Grant was killed, and cheer after
cheer rolled down their lines several times with great joy, but Longstreet at once
recognized Wadsworth and sent his body to our lines under a flag of truce.
Craig Wadsworth, his son, a fine officer, died of disease contracted in the serv¬
ice. So did his son-in-law. When James W. was sixteen, the general was going
to put him in the ranks as a private soldier, but Major Kress and Captain Hal-
stead of his staff, remonstrated with the general, that he was too young for such
heavy service. So the general desisted from his purpose. However, in the winter
of 1864 he voluntarily entered the army, and was appointed captain and aid-de¬
camp on Gen. G. K. Warren's staff", remaining in the service until after the battle of
Five Forks. He has since the war served in Congress, and is now one of the lead¬
ing men of the Empire State.
302
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
The First Brigade, Phelps', remained the same, with
the exception that it had been deprived of the 2d United
States Sharpshooters ; while to the Second, then com¬
manded by Gen. Uysander Cutler, the 147th New York
was added.
General Patrick took his brigade with him to the head¬
quarters of the Army of the Potomac when he was made
Provost Marshal General, and in its place came a new
brigade composed of the 22d, 29th, 30th, and 31st New
Jersey Regiments, with the 137th Pennsylvania, under the
command of that gallant hero who lost his eyes in the
battle of Gettysburg, Gabriel R. Paul. The Fourth, the
Iron Brigade, stood the same, with General Meredith in
command. The artillery of the division was the ist New
Hampshire Tight, Battery L, ist New York, and Battery
B, 4th United States, with Capt. John A. Reynolds chief.
The Second Division had been commanded by General
Gibbon, who was succeeded by Gen. John C. Robinson
of New York. His division stood the same, with the ex¬
ception that Gen. Henry Baxter succeeded Colonel Lyle
in command of the Second Brigade. The only change
made in Robinson's artillery was, that in place of Battery
F, First Pennsylvania Light Artillery, he was given Bat¬
tery C, 5th United States, with Captain Ransom acting
chief of artillery of the division. This completed the
reorganization of the First Corps before it entered upon the
campaign of 1863.
There are many incidents of real worth which would
be interesting to note concerning nearly every regiment,
but the length of this chapter admonishes us to bring it
to a close.
Captain Smith, in his history of the 76th New York,
graphically relates an account of such cheerfulness, by a
member of that regiment, as he lay mortally wounded on
the field, that it is here given in order that generations yet
unborn may know what sacrifices were made for the sake
of the perpetuity of the Union, by vouchsafing to them the
FREDE RICK SB UR G.
303
unity of a happy country with all the rich blessings of
peace. He says :
During this engagement, Henry McFall, of Company F, fell
mortally wounded in the thigh, by the bursting of a shell. Colonel
Wainwright says of him : "He was attended to very bravely, under
fire, by a little assistant surgeon of the 95th New York. Probably
he sank under the shock, for he died very shortly. On leaving, the
brave fellow called out cheerfully, 'Good-bye, Colonel,' evidently,
as I thought, with the intention of keeping up the spirits of his
comrades. I have always admired him, and should like to know
how his family are doing."
Truth is stranger than fiction, and the pathetic acconnt
of this soldier's tragic death could be duplicated in every
company in the Army. Years hence the people will little
know how dearly their freedom was saved with the precious
lives of men just budding into manhood, they voluntarily
gave np That the nation under God should have a new
birth of freedom."
But all the sacrifice, devotion and heroism cannot be
justly claimed by the men. The devotion of the women
on both sides was very intense. However, but few of the
gentler sex went squarely into battle ; but an instance is
given by Major Small, in his history of the i6th Maine,
where a girl disguised her sex and attired in a soldier's
uniform, joined Company I of that regiment, and fought
until she was captured in the charge on Taliaferro's divi¬
sion. She is thus spoken of by the Richmond Whig :
Yesterday a rather prepossessing lass was discovered on Belle
Isle, among the prisoners of war held there. She gave her real
name as Mary Jane Johnson, belonging to the i6th Maine Regiment.
She gave as an excuse for adopting soldier's toggery, that she was
following her lover to shield and protect him when in danger. He
had been.killed, and now she had no objection to return to the more
peaceful sphere for which nature, by her sex, h^d better fitted her.
Upon the discovery of her sex. Miss Johnson was removed from
Belle Isle to Castle Thunder. She will probably go North by the
next flag of truce. She is about sixteen years of age.
304 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Return of casualties in the Union forces, commanded
by Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside, U. S. A. at the battle
of Fredericksburg, Va., December 11-15, 1862.
FIRST ARMY CORPS, Maj. Gen. J. F. Reynolds.
First Division, Brig. Gen. Abner Doubleday.
First Brigade—Col. Walter Phelps, jr 30
Second Brigade—Col. James Gavin 26
Third Brigade—Col. William F. Rogers 67
Fourth Brigade / Meredith 1
t Col. Lysander Cutler ... . . /
Artillery—Capt. Geo. A. Gerrish and Capt. J. A. Reynolds 26
General Headquarters Escort 3
Total First Division, including Escort 217
Second Division /
L Brig. Gen. Nelson Taylor.
First Brigade—Col. Adrian R. Root 475
Second Brigade—Col. Peter Lyle 460
Third Brigade—Col. S H. Leonard 314
Artillery—Capt. George F. Leppien 17
Division Staff I
Total Second Division I >267
Third Division—Maj. Gen. George G. Meade.
Col. William Sinclair.
First Brigade / ^°'- I „a
I Col. William McCandless j ^
Second Brigade—Col. A. L. Magilton 632
f Brig. Gen. C. F. Jackson, (killed) . . . -k
Third Brigade-! Col. Joseph W. Fisher I 681
(. Lieut. Col. Robert Anderson J
Artillery 30
Total Third Division 1)853
Total First Army Corps 3)337
SECOND ARMY CORPS—Maj. Gen. Darius N. Couch.
First Division—Brig. Gen. W. S. Hancock.
Corps and Division Staff 4
IT- .. o • J Í Brig. Gen. John C. Caldwell •>
First Brigade I ^ } 95,
Second Brigade—Brig. Gen. Thomas F. Meagher 545
Third Brigade—Col. Samuel K. Zook 527
Artillery—(4th U. S., Battery " C.") 5
Total First Division 2,033,
FREDERICK SB UR G. 305
Second Division—Brig. Gen. O. O. Howard.
Staff I
First Brigade—Brig. Cíen. Alfred Sully 122
Second Brigade—Col. Joshua T. Owen 258
Third Brigade —Col. N. J. Hall and Col. Wm. R. Lee . . . 515
Artillery 18
Total Second Division 914
Third Division—Brig. Cen. Wm. H. French.
First Brigade—Brig. Gen. N. Kimball, Col. J. S. Mason . 520
Second Brigade—Col. O. H. Palmer 29I
Third Brigade—Col. J. W. Andrews, Lt. Col. Marshall . . . 342
Artillery 7, and Artillery Reserve 7 ; total I4
Total Third Division I)i67
Total Second Army Corps 4)it4
THIRD ARMY CORPS—Brig. Cen. George Stoneman.
First Division—Brig. Cen. D. B. Bimey.
First Brigade—Brig. Cen. John C. Robinson 146
Second Brigade—Brig. Cen. J. H. Hobart Ward 629
Third Brigade—Brig. Cen. Hiram C. Berry 165
Artillery—Capt. George E. Randolph 10
Total First Division 950
Second Division—Brig Cen. D. E. Sickles.
First Brigade—Brig. Cen. Joseph B. Carr 81
Second Brigade—Col. George B. Hall 16
Third Brigade—Brig. Cen. Joseph W. Revere 2
Artillery—(4th U. S., Battery " K ") i
Total Second Division ICO
Third Division—Brig. Cen. A. W. Whipple.
First Brigade—Brig. Cen. A. S. Piatt, Col. E. Franklin . . 9
Second Brigade—Col. Samuel S. Carroll II8
Artillery i, and Division Staff I, total 2
Total Third Division 129
Total Third Army Corps t>i79
FIFTH ARMY CORPS—Brig. Cen. Daniel Butterfield.
First Division—Brig. Cen. Charles Griffin. .
First Brigade—Col. James Barnes 500
Second Brigade—Col. Jacob B. Sweitzer .1 222
xx
806
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Third Brigade Col. T. B. W. Stockton .... . 201
Artillery 3, General Staff 2 ; total 5
Total First Division 928
Second Division—Brig. Gen. Geo. Sykes.
First Brigade—Col. Robert C. Buchanan 51
Second Brigade—Maj. G. L. Andrews, Maj. C. S. Lovell . I40
Third Brigade—Brig. Gen. Gouverneur K. Warren .... 36
Artillery—(5th U. S. Battery"!") i
Total Second Division 228
Third Division—Brig. Gen. A. A. Humphreys.
First Brigade—Brig. Gen. E. B. Tyler 454
Second Brigade—Col. Peter H. Allabach 562
Division Staff 3, Cavalry (4th Pa.,) i 4
Total Third Division 1,020
Total Fifth Army Corps 2,176
SIXTH ARMY CORPS—Maj. Gen. Wm. F. Smith.
First Division—Brig. Gen. Wm. T. H. Brooks.
First Brigade—Col. Alfred T. A. Torbert 162
Second Brigade—Col. Henry L. Cake . 17
Third Brigade—Brig. Gen. D. A. Russell 10
Artillery 8
Total First Division ". 197
Second Division—Brig. Gen. A. P. Howe.
First Brigade—Brig. Gen. Calvin E. Pratt 26
Second Brigade—Col. Henry Whiting • . . 144
ÍBrig. Gen. F. L. Vinton \
Col. Robert F. Taylor l 15
Brig. Gen. F. H. Neill J
Artillery—(5th U. S., " F ") i
Total Second Division 186
Third Division—Brig. Gen. John Newton.
First Brigade Brig. Gen. John Cochrane 24
Second Brigade—Brig. Gen. Charles Deven, Jr 17
Third Brigade—Col. T. A. Rowley, Brig. Gen. F, Wheaton . 12
.r- 1 T> • J f Brig. Gen. G. D. Bayard ^
Caval^. Brigade | ^ j 4
Artillery—(2d U. S., " G '^) 10
Total Third Division 67
Total Sixth Corps 450
FR ED ER IC KS B UR G. 307
NINTH ARMY CORPS—Brig. Gen. O. B. Willcox.
First Division—Brig. Gen. Wm. W. Burns.
First Brigade—Col. O. M. Foe 13
;Second Brigade—Col. Benjamin C. Christ 8
Third Brigade—Col. Daniel Leasure 3
Artillery—(ist New York, Battery " D ") 3
Total First Division 27
Second Division—Brig. Gen. S. D. Sturgis.
Staff I
First Brigade—Brig. Gen. James Nagle 5°°
Secgnd Brigade—Brig. Gen. Edward Ferrero 491
Artillery—(ist Rhode Isl'd, " D," 2; 4th U. S., "E," 13) 15
Total Second Division 1007
Third Division—Brig. Gen. G. W. Getty.
First Brigade—Col. Rush C. Hawkins 255
Second Brigade—Col. Edward Harland ^i
Total Third Division 296
Total Ninth Army Corps 133°
Engineer Brigade—Brig. Gen. D. P. Woodbury 59
Artillery Reserves—Lieut. Col. William Hays 8
RECAPITULATION.
Right Grand Division—(Second and Ninth Corps) .... 5444
Center Grand Division—(Third and Fifth Corps) 3355
Left Grand Division—(First and Sixth Corps) 3787
Engineers and Artillery Reserve 67
Total Casualties Army of the Potomac 12,653
Return of casualties of the Confederate forces at the
hattle of Fredericksburg, Va., December 11-15, 1862, com¬
manded by Maj. Gen. R. E. Lee, as shown by the "Offi¬
cial Records of the Union and Confederate Armies."
FIRST ARMY CORPS.
McLaws' Division.
Cobb's Brigade 234
Barksdale's Brigade 242
Kershaw's Brigade 373
Washington Artillery 26
Total McLaws' Division
875
308
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Stuart's (Cavalry) Division.
W. H. F. Lee's Brigade I3
Anderson's Division.
Perry's Brigade 89-
Featherston's Brigade 43
Wright's Brigade 3.
Wilcox's Brigade 9
Mahone's Brigade 159
Total Anderson's Division 3°3
Pickett's Division.
KempePs Brigade 46»
Jenkins' Brigade 8
Total Pickett's Division 54
Ransom's Division.
Cook's Brigade 3^®
Ransom's Brigade 154
Total Ransom's Division 534
Hood's Division.
Law's Brigade 3^5
Toomb's Brigade 12
Robertson's Brigade 6
Anderson's Brigade 10
Total Hood's Division 343
Total First Army Corps 2,122
SECOND ARMY CORPS.
(As corrected returns, by brigades, are not given, for the Second Corps, this
list can only be shown by Divisions).
A. P. Hill's Division 2,120
D. H. Hill's Division 173
Ewell's Division 932
Taliaferro's (Jackson's) Division 190
Total Second Army Corps 3>4I5
Total First anä Second Army Corps 5 ,537
GEN. JOSEPH HOOKER.
CHAPTER X.
CHANCELLORSVILLE.
~r T seems eminently fit and proper to begin the chapter
on the battle of Chancellorsville with the order
assigning Hooker to the command of the Army of the
Potomac, and Lincoln's letter to him. They are both a
part of the history of the country :
Executive Mansion,
Washington, D. C., Jan. 25, 1863.
My Dear Sir :—Please meet General Burnside here at ten
o'clock this morning. Yours, truly,
A. Lincoln.
Major General Halleck.
General Orders, 1 War Dept., Adj't Gen.'s Office,
No. 20. i Washington, D. C., Jan. 25, 1863.
I. The President of the United States has directed :
ist. That Maj. Gen. A. E. Burnside, at his own request, be
relieved from the command of the Army of the Potomac.
2d. That Maj. Gen. E. V. Sumner, at his own request, be
relieved from duty in the Army of the Potomac.
3d. That Maj. Gen. W. B. Franklin be relieved from duty in
the Army of the Potomac.
4th. That Maj. Gen. J. Hooker be assigned to the command
of the Army of the Potomac.
H. The officers relieved as above will report in person to the
Adjutant-General of the Army.
By order of the Secretary of War :
E. D. Townsend,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
Executive Mansion,
Washington, D. C., Jan. 26, 1863.
General :—I have placed you at the head of the Army of the
Potomac. Of course I have done this upon what appears to me to
309
310 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
be sufficient reasons, and yet I think it best for you to know that
there are some things in regard to which I'am not quite satisfied
with you. I believe you to be a brave and skillful soldier, which of
course I like. I also believe you do not mix politics with your pro¬
fession, in which you are right. You have confidence in yourself,
which is a valuable, if not an indispensable quality. You are am¬
bitious, which, within reasonable bounds, does good rather than
harm ; but I think that, during General Burnside's command of
the Army, you have taken counsel of your ambition, and thwarted
him as much as you could, in which you did a great wrong to the
country and to a most meritorious and honorable brother officer. I
have heard, in such a wa}' as to believe it, of your recently saying
that both the army and the Government needed a dictator. Of
course it was not for this, but in spite of it, that I have given you
the command. Only those generals who gain successes can set up
as dictators. What I now ask of you is military success, and I will
risk the dictatorship. The Government will support you to the
utmost of its ability, which is neither more nor less than it has
done and will do for all commanders. I much fear that the spirit
which you have aided to infuse into the army, of criticising their
commander and withholding confidence from him, will now turn
upon you. I shall assist you as far as I can to put it down.
Neither you nor Napoleon, if he were alive again, could get any
good out of an army while such a spirit prevails in it. And now
beware of rashness, but with energy and sleepless vigilance go for¬
ward and give us victories. Yours, very truly,
A. Lincoi<n.
Major General Hooker.
lyincoln's letter fully confirms what was said in the
preceding chapter of the jealousies, bickerings and distrust
that prevailed among the officers of the Army of the
Potomac, while the rank and file had obeyed every order
with promptness. Failure after failure, with the famous
"Mud March" as a closing melodrama, was too much.for
the 7norale of the troops. They were disheartened, for
from the time the army crossed the Long Bridge over the
Potomac to the time Hooker took command, misfortune
had pursued it like an evil spirit, and many soldiers began
to believe that the generals of the Confederate army over¬
matched ours ; the prophetic statement that the war would
last only ninety days had been already lengthened inta
CHA N CELLO R SVILL E.
311
years, with only one decisive victory in its favor—South
Mountain. It is a great wonder that more were not dis¬
couraged at the gloomy prospects. Suits of clothing were
sent by friends at home to soldiers, who, on receiving them,
walked out of camp as citizens. They were loyal to the
Government, but one victory in so many battles was not
winding-up the war very fast. At that rate the Confeder¬
acy would win.its independence.
Another thing that added to the misfortunes on the
field, was the fact that Lincoln was not supported by all the
leaders, even in his own party. There were prominent
men who did not consider him aggressive enough, while it
was a well-known fact that Chase, one of his Cabinet
officers, was seeking a nomination against him. The high
games of political chance in Washington could not be
played without the world knowing them ; arid the army was
keenly watching every move that affected the final settle¬
ment and the end of that terrible internecine war, where
neighbor met neighbor, and brother was arrayed against
brother. It was heartrending to soldiers, but perhaps
the wire-pullers were not annoyed by any such unpleasant
occurrences, as brave men were between them and the
enemy. In the midst of the war every hand should have
upheld the President, and statesmen above all men should
have warmly and unitedly supported him. Fortunately a
large number did support him. The writer was a Chase
man, but not as against Lincoln ; Chase was an eminent
statesman, but his ambition led him into a grave error.
Lincoln exhibited one of his many noble traits of char¬
acter when he appointed him Chief Justice, after the treat¬
ment he had received from him while he was Secretary of
the Treasury. But Chase is gone, "peace to his ashes."
Hooker visited the regiments, and made a thorough
inspection. The officers were required to have all ab¬
sentees return to their commands. A regular system of
furloughs was established by which the officers and men
of each company and regiment were entitled to a given
312
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
number, and when they returned others were to be allowed
the privilege of going home. Lincoln sustained Hooker by
issuing a proclamation on the loth of March, granting am¬
nesty to all deserters who returned by the ist of April.
The people at the North took new heart, and instead of
encouraging desertions, recruits began to arrive, and the
busy scenes in camp once more betokened a healthful state.
Hooker reorganized his army, and abolished the grand
divisions. Gen. John F. Reynolds remained in command
of-the First Corps, Conch of the Second, while Sickles was
assigned to the Third. Meade had taken the place of But-
terfield in the Fifth, Sedgwick retained the Sixth, while the
Ninth, Burnside's old corps, was detached and sent to Suf¬
folk, and in its stead came the Eleventh and Twelfth. The
Eleventh had been Sigel's, but Howard now assumed the
command.
That corps was mainly composed of Germans, and it is
not quite certain that a change in the commanders by tak¬
ing away a German and substituting a man of the religious
principle of Howard, was thé best for the service. Howard
was a devout Christian, while the Germans had their own
views of religion, which may be said to have been alto¬
gether different from his, so they had no interest in common
with him. Braver men never marched to battle than the
Germans, but they are a peculiar people, and if opposed too
much in their ideas they become refractory. They were
greatly disappointed when Sigel was relieved, and came
near taking it as a direct affront to them.
No American could command that corps with the same
success as one of their own nationality, and Howard, as
the Havelock of the army, certainly was not the man.
Hooker put the cavalry under Stoneman, an officer of
ability, but certainly no great cavalry leader, as he lacked
the dash of Sheridan or Buford.
A new spirit was infused into the army. Activity was
exhibited everywhere. Men were returning under Lincoln's
proclamation, and Hooker found himself at the head of a
CHANCELLO RSVILLE.
313
large array, which lie styled ' ' the finest array on the
planet." But there were some drawbacks. The time of
some of the regiments would soon expire, and if there was
no favorable opportunity to offer battle to the enemy in the
near future, he would lose the trained men of eight reg¬
iments from Pennsylvania, enlisted only for nine months ;
two regiments from Maine, and thirty-three from New York ;
the latter being two years' troops. That would take awa}*
from him oyer 20,000 effective soldiers. Their time expired
on the ist of May. A majority of these had signified their
intention of reënlisting, but desired to go home to see their
friends, and get the bounty offered by the different States.
So Hooker had to offer battle to the enemy early in the
spring, or lose the assistance of forty-one regiments, equal to
a large corps. It was advisable for these troops to return to
their States, for they would not only reënlist, but would
induce other young men to join their ranks.
lyincoln visited the army and reviewed the troops, which
gave them new cheer, and every visit he made to the army
was equal to the addition of a new brigade. The troops
knew he was an earnest, honest man, and their friend in
time of trouble. When the officers were too severe he
would interpose clemency in a mild way, and save them ;
and for that they loved him. If he had been stern and
harsh the history of this country might have been different.
He listened to all complaints patiently, and then usually
made his decision. Respectful and kind to all, he won the
esteem and affection of his countryjnen, and his name is
linked with Washington's in history, the highest honor
that could be conferred. While he was hurlinsf gfreat
O o
armies at the South to compel its people to obey the laws,
he nightly prayed that they would see the error of their
ways, and return in peace. He "would save the Union
with or without slavery." And when the assassin's bullet
ended that great man's life there was mourning in the
South.
There was another great reason why Hooker should
314
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
make an early move ; General Longstreet with two divi¬
sions, Hood's and Pickett's, of his corps, had been tempo¬
rarily detached, and was appearing before Suffolk, to lay
siege to it. Then was the time to strike Lee, when he was
weakened by the absence of that great general, as it was
far better to fight Lee without him. Lee was recruiting his
army with the utmost vigor, as he had now a general to
face who Had won distinction on every field in which he
engaged. He knew he was a bold officer in battle, and
led his forces with the enthusiasm of a Marshal of
France. And now that Hooker was at the head of
the army, if he continued to infuse his troops with the
same spirit, he would be as dangerous to meet as Prince
Eugene, who crossed the Theiss, killed 20,000 of the
enemy, and drove 10,000 into the river at the battle of
Zentha.
Lee's cavalry was badly worn down and jaded by the
hard service of making raids in the rear of the Union
Army during the winter. It greatly needed rest and re¬
cruiting, for it had been used to its last physical endurance.
The Confederate commander was endeavoring to fit it for
the ensuing campaign, as he knew it would be a desperate
one.
The work of our artillery at Fredericksburg, under
General Hunt, must have made an impression upon Lee, for
his batteries had been, independent of each other, assigned
to the different divisions. After that battle he organized
his artillery into one Qommand, and placed it under General
Pendleton.
The authorities at Richmond, in the mean time, were not
idle by any means. New conscription laws had been en¬
acted, which were enforced with a* rigor that would have
made Russia bow to their mandates. The patrols sys¬
tematically scoured the country, leaving no chance for
deserters to keep in concealment, as the women of the
South, true to their cause, aided by informing them
where deserters were located. Indeed, so earnest were the
C//A NCEL L O RSVIL L E.
315
women in this work, that their information was given with
great care and exactness, and men hid in caves were readily
found. As an illustration in point, one man was living on
a hill by the side of the road. He went into his cellar, and
dug a tunnel leading under the road ; and, coming out in a
grove on the other side, he could get air, and watch the
movements of the patrol at the house. He was successful
in evading them for a long time ; but one day he was spied
by a neighboring lady, who made" haste to give the news.
When the patrol visited there again, a file of men were
stationed close to the opening, while others proceeded to
the house to scare him out. When he appeared at his sup¬
posed secure place of observation, he found himself in the
clutches of the men left there to capture him. From these
two elements, added to the sick and wounded, who had
recovered enough to rejoin their regiments, Fee found his
army rapidly swelling. If that had not been the case, he
could not have spared Longstreet to attack Suffolk ; for he
had a river front of about twenty-five miles to guard, from
Skinker's Neck, below Fredericksburg, to United States
Ford, just below the confluence of the Rapidan and Rap¬
pahannock—which was a very extended line in the face of
an army like Hooker's, with an able commander ; and he was
liable to have his lines pierced at any given point, and
driven from his base. Such an attack really was made.; for
Lee's position was suddenly turned by four of Hooker's
corps pressing down on his left and rear before he was
aware of it.
The exigencies of the service required great activity on
the part of the Confederates before the spring campaign
opened, in the way of garnering supplies, Guiney Station,
where Stonewall Jackson died, after Chancellorsville, being
the principal depot.
But few changes were made in the general officers of
Lee's army. D. H. Hill was sent to North Carolina to
superintend matters there, and his division was given to
General Rodes. Early, who commanded Ewell's division.
31(1 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
in the battle of Fredericksburg, still retained command,
while Trimble was assigned to Jackson's old division.
A new excitement spread over the country at that time.
Mosby at midnight wound his way through our lines,
evaded the pickets, entered General Stoughton's room, and
in person waked him up and informed him that he was a
prisoner of war to be abducted through our lines and taken
to Richmond. General Stoughton was in command at Fair¬
fax Court House, and had no right to occupy quarters
where he was in danger. He was a very promising officer,
and those who knew him well expected much from him.
He was colonel of the 4th Vermont Infantry, and had been
nominated to be a brigadier general by Lincoln on the 5th
of November, 1862, but the Senate did not act on his case ;
consequently, on the 4th of March, 1863, his appointment
as brigadier general expired by limitation, four days before
he was captured. The late General Stannard said to me :
' ' Stoughton was one of the most capable officers in the serv¬
ice, but sacrificed his future by allowing women to con¬
trol him."
The following version of Stoughton's capture was given
to me by General Stannard, a short time before his death,
in Washington, D. C. He gave Stoughton's idea of it, as
related by him to Stannard only a short time before
he died :
Stoughton's headquarters were at a residence where lived a
lady whom he permitted to visit a lady cousin outside of our
lines. He also permitted this lady cousin to visit the family where
he had his headquarters ; that young damsel from beyond the lines
made a diagram of the house, and the position of the troops, so that
Mosby could evade the camps, and reach Stoughton's room unob¬
served ; this he did with such great confidence that he boldly walked
into Stoughton's room without hesitation or molestation.
The family declared their utter ignorance of the matter;
but it is unreasonable to suppose that Mosby, with his
great caution, would have attempted so bold and hazard¬
ous a movement without .being well advised, as he had
C//A NCELLOR S VIL L E.
317
only 29 men with him, and near Stoiighton's headquarters
was his brigade well on the alert, and ready at the least
alarm to move at once.
Mosby also attempted to capture other officers, but in
that he failed; which is conclusive evidence that he vi^as
well advised.
Colonel Mosby has personally informed me that he was
not assisted by those young ladies but by a sergeant,* who
had deserted from the Army of the Potomac because he
had been severely punished.
* This innocent plea of the fami|j^ recalls the case of the dashing young lieu¬
tenant of the 24th Wisconsin, serving in Sheridan's division of Rosecrans' army.
He was young and not a little fond of having his picture taken. His servant
had one in his possession one day when he was out in search of something for his
table. He called at the house of a spruce young widow, to see if there were any
chickens for sale there. She plied her questions to Sambo to know whose servant
he was. He was very proud of his dashing master, who afterwards commanded a
brigade with great credit. The colored man was not long in exhibiting his picture.
She at once declared that he was the handsomest officer she ever saw, and she
would be ever so much delighted to have him dine with her. This was eagerly
conveyed to him by his loyal valet. He told Sheridan of it. Quick as a flash the
General saw through it, and said, " She simply wants to beguile you, so that you
can be captured." Said Sheridan, "Don't you think of going to dine with her un¬
less you take about three companies with you to surround the 'premise^, concealing^
them from view." That just suited him, so he sent the fair widow word that he
would accept her pressing invitation to dine with her. The day was fixed and the
order received from Sheridan to make a reconnoissance ; that enabled him to take a
part of the regiment with him.
When he reached the house he halted in the woods and gave instructions that
placed his men in full possession of the secret. Then they deployed to the right
and left, encircling the premises at a distance far enough from the house to be un¬
observed, but where they could see every movement there. He told them if he
fired his revolver it was a signal of distress to them, and they were to rapidly ad¬
vance to his assistance. He then mounted his horse and proceeded alone to the
house, where he was greeted in the most winsome manner by the young and fasci¬
nating widow. They soon sat down to an elegant dinner prepared for the occasion.
When they were about half through a rap came at the door, which she affected
not to hear. Then the door was opened by a major of the Confederate army, ac¬
companied by about fifteen men.
He turned to the Confederate officer and- asked him if it was not a little in¬
trusion on his part, and added that he wsb greatly enjoying his dinner. The major
admitted that it did seem as if it was a slight intrusion, but that he could not help
it. He was compelled to request him to quit the table.
318
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Jones, who commanded a brigade of Confederate cavalry,
was remarkably active during the latter part of the winter
and spring. He made a raid through West Virginia in
the latter part of January ; failing to force his way through
Greenland Gap of the Alleghanies, he passed through Bev¬
erly and Philippi, continuing as far as Morgantown, levying
heavy contributions on the country through which he
passed. Doubling back through the mountains at Fair¬
mont, he encountered a detachment of Union soldiers
guarding the bridge over the Monongahela, whom he cap¬
tured, and then destroyed the valuable railroad bridge of
the Baltimore and Ohio. Again he is in the Shenandoah
Valley, where he surprised two regiments of Milroy's cav¬
alry sent to dispute his advance. The encounter took
place near Strasburg, where he dispersed those regiments
and took about 200 prisoners. A part of his brigade pushed
In the yard, before they started with their prisoner, he declared he was the
best shot in the Army of the Cumberland, and that he could shoot a chicken's head
off when it was running. The major said if he could do that he would escort him
to the Union lines, and set him free ; if not he was to remain a prisoner. The
chicken was started up, when he drew his revolver and fired at it—he not only
missed the chicken's head, but was not sure he came within three feet of the
chicken. He said he believed they were gp-eatly in hopes he would shoot its head
off, for a look of disappointment settled on their countenances when he missed it.
The major said that decided it, he would be compelled to retain him as a prisoner.
When he fired his men began to close in on the house with their arms at a trail.
Soon the Confederate major looked up and saw their line advancing—he took in
the situation, and acknowledged the matter as being very clever. When the Union
soldiers surrounded the house with the Confederates in the yard, the widow was
standing in the door, strongly protesting her entire innocence in the matter ; he
said to her that it might be so, but it smacked of suspicion in his opinion, and he
added he had half a mind to take her with the soldiers to Sheridan's headquarters.
But he finally decided to permit her to return to the meal he had been so rudely
taken away from. It is scarcely to be presumed that she enjoyed it after her con¬
federates were marched away in triumph, " who never would return." This is an
authentic example, what treachery sometimes lurked beneath the charms of the
gentler sex, to ensnare the susceptible, like Stoughton, who fell through weakness,
and some years ago died in New York City a broken-hearted man. General Stan-
nard saw him a short time before his deatfi, when he unbosomed himself, and gave
vent to his deep chagrin and mortification over the unfortunate affair which clouded
his military career so early in the war and really compelled him to leave the service.
CHANCELLO RSVILLE, 319
on to the Potomac, and crossing the river in a boat, they
surprised a detachment of Union troops, nearly a company
strong, and took them prisoners, near Poolesville, Maryland.
Gen. W. H. F. Lee's brigade attempted to surprise and
take GV^ucester Point, on the York River, failing in which
they turned north and shelled the Union gunboats in the
Rappahannock, while Fitzhugh Lee crossed the river and
surprised and captured a post of icq men at Leedstown.
The activity of the Confederate cavalry only spurred up
the Union cavalry to increased effort ; and the former soon
had to pay pretty dearly for their bold and daring raids.
They attempted to appear at several places at the same time
in order to create the impression that they were numerically
strong, whereas that arm of the service was much depleted.
The Union cavalry were compelled to go in large bodies,
being in the enemy's country, where their movements and
strength were closely observed by the citizens, who were
ready to convey any intelligence to the Confederates that
would give them the advantage. Besides, they were'in
almost continual danger of ambuscades. As the ides of
March approached, the Union cavalry prepared to measure
skill and strength with their enemy in the saddle ; so
Averell's division, composed of Duffié's and Mcintosh's
brigades, with two regiments, the ist and 5th Regu¬
lars, under Captain Reno, quietly took up the line of
march for the upper Rappahannock. When he reached
the Rappahannock, at Kelley's Ford, Averell found that
the passage of the river was to be stubbornly contested,
the Confederate cavalry being dismounted and lined the
south bank as sharpshooters. Lieut. S. A. Brown, of the
ist Rhode Island, was ordered to charge across the river
and endeavor to clear the right bank of the enemy so that
the division could cross. Brown and his men made a gal¬
lant charge ; not only did they clear the bank, but they
captured about 25 prisoners. The enemy then made great
efforts to secure their horses before Averell could get his
command over. The river was so high that it took a
320 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
long time for the whole division to cross ; so long, in fact,
that it gave the enemy time to gain their horses and send
word back to L,ee that the Union cavalry was on the south
bank of the Rappahannock in force. Averell being now
on the right bank, threw out skirmishers to avoid an am¬
buscade and advanced the division, moving very cautiously
and slowly. Fitzhugh Uee knew of the proposed advance
the day before, no doubt through some kind friend in citizen's
suit, who started off post haste to Culpeper to tell the Con¬
federate commander of his impending danger. The river
was thought to be too high for the Union forces to cross ;
hence there was no especial preparation made to dispute its
passage, except to line its banks with sharpshooters. The
Union cavalry had scored one bold and aggressive move,
however, much to the discomfiture of their opponents.
As soon as Uee learned of the passage of the Rappahan¬
nock he hastily advanced his. brigade to meet Averell.
The two forces met more than a mile from the river. Uee
imagined that he was meeting only the advance guard,
which he intended to vanquish before a support could arrive,
and in that wa}'^ defeat his adversary in detail, so he at once
ordered a charge. But Averell's men were well posted at
the edge of a wood behind a stone wall. As Lee's troops
advanced over the fields the telling fire of the "Union forces
made them retreat in disorder.
Averell had drawn up his command with Duffié's brigade
on the left, the 5th Regulars in the center, and Mcintosh's
brigade on *the right, with the ist Re'gulars in reserve.
The 3d Virginia was hurled against the 5th Regulars in the
center. The regiment dashed up to the stone wall in the
face of a severe fire and were attempting to make a break
in it, when Duffié directed the ist Rhode Island to charge
in reverse and rear. Seeing that move the 2d Virginia ad¬
vanced to the assistance of the 3d, but both were compelled
to retire, with the loss of the commander of the 2d, who
was captured.
Lee evidently was not aware of the strength of the force
CHA NCELLORS VIL L E.
321
in his front, because, immediately after the repulse of the
2d and 3d Virginia, he ordered Colonel Bower, of the 5th
Virginia, to charge Mcintosh's brigade on the right, but it
received such a heavy fire from the artillery, advanta¬
geously posted to support Mcintosh, that he retreated at
once. Lee seeing he was badly beaten began to retreat.
Averell thought that he was engaged with a much
heavier force than he actually was, and it required an
effort on the part of Stuart and Lee to keep their forces
well enough organized to deceive Averell as to their
strength. If he had charged with one brigade Lee's com¬
mand would have been seriously crippled, if not captured.
Major Pelham was mortally wounded. He was a fine
young artillery officer, and had scarcely passed twenty-one
years of age.
The enemy were driven to Brandy Station, a distance
of eight miles, where Lee made another stand behind a
stone wall, where he placed all the men that he could col¬
lect, some 300 or 400. It was the most favorable place for
Lee to make a fight with a small number, and if Averell
was allowed to pursue him much farther, not only Culpeper,
but Gordonsville, with its immense stores for Lee's army,
would fall into Averell's hands, and the railroad to Rich¬
mond by that route be destroyed. It was a case of despera¬
tion with the Confederate cavalry commander. After Lee
had placed this line behind the stone wall, with his artillery
posted just in the rear, he headed the 3d Virginia, and, lead¬
ing the charge in person, came down on Averell with great
fuIy^ The 5th Regular Cavalry lay in ambush, and re¬
ceived them with a volley, while Mcintosh ordered the 3d
Pennsylvania to charge them in flank and rear, forcing the
Confederates to retire, but leaving the impression on Averell
that Fitzhugh Lee had been reënforced with a brigade of
infantry. Laboring under that delusion Averell decided to
return to the Rappahannock. This was gratifying to the
enemy, who had thus adroitly deceived him. Had he pur¬
sued at this opportune moment Lee's force would have been
XXI
322
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
badly cut to pieces. It was Averell's golden chance to
achieve greatness, but he let it pass. Fortune knocks once
at a door, but seldom returns. Had Averell pressed Lee
with courage, and either captured his force or scattered it,
and taken Gordonsville, he would have ranked with Sheri¬
dan at Winchester. As it was, he really accomplished
nothing of importance to present to Hooker on his return.
The rainy season prevented any more movements until
the second week in April, when Hooker directed Stoneman
to take his cavalry and proceed to the upper fords of the
Rappahannock, where Averell had crossed a short time
before. Stoneman, with his three divisions, could have
crossed the country and taken Gordonsville had there been
celerity in his movement. One division had crossed the
river, and advanced to Brandy Station, but a heavy rain
compelled it to beat a hasty retreat, as the Rappahannock
was rising rapidly and would soon be impassable.
What Lincoln thought of this movement is given in
the following letter to Hooker :
Executive Mansion,
Washington, D. C., April 15, 1863.
It is now 10:15 p. m. An hour ago I received your letter of this
morning, and a few moments later your dispatch of this evening.
The latter gives me considerable uneasiness. The rain and mud, of
course, were to be calculated upon. General S. is not moving
rapidly enough to make the expedition come to anything. He has
now been out three days, two of which were unusually fair weather,
and all .three without hindrance from the enemy. By arithmetic,
how many days will it take him to do it ? I do not know that any
better can be done, but I greatly fear it is another failure already.
Write me often. I am very anxious. A. Lincoln.
To Major General Hooker.
It had proved just what Lincoln predicted, a gigantic
failure. He never even crossed the Rappahannock until
the infantry did, and then broke up into such small guer¬
rilla bands that he accomplished nothing. Pleasonton did
more by far with his skeleton brigade.
C//A NCELL ORS VILLE.
323
It was now about the 20th, and the waters were still too
iigh for an advance. Stoneman's intention was to throw
cavalry around by the way of Gordonsville, and, after tearing
up tlie railroad there, to rapidly march in the direction of
Hanover Court House, there to strike the only line of com¬
munication lyce had with Richmond, destroy that, and
march north to join Hooker, who was to cross his army
below, at or near Hamilton's Crossing and Skinker's
Neck.
By that move Hooker intended to turn Lee's right and
take possession of the Telegraph road leading to Rich¬
mond, thus compelling Lee to abandon his strong position
on the heights back of Fredericksburg. The two armies
would then meet on a field selected hastily, without any
fortifications, which would at least give Hooker an equal
chance. The only danger would have been the crossing of
the Rappahannock in the face of the enemy. It is barely
possible that, had he held a portion of his army in its posi¬
tion in front of Fredericksburg, he could have crossed at
Skinker's Neck, back from the river, and effected a land¬
ing on the right bank before he would have been seriously
opposed. The river there is quite wide, and might be
•called an arm of the sea.
As a matter of history this intended move of Hooker's is
given for the benefit of those who may desire to study all the
maneuvers of the war, and to show what great strategic
movements were made by our generals to save the nation.
The river continued so high that Hooker abandoned this
plan, and began a series of feint movements in order to
deceive Lee. Doubleday, on the 19th of April, was sent
with a part of his division to make a reconnoissance to Port
Conway. On the 23d, the 24th Michigan and 14th Brook¬
lyn, under Colonel Morrow, crossed the river and took pos¬
session of that town, captured a number of prisoners, horses
and mules, and a large Confederate mail. The regiments
recrossed the river that evening, and proceeded to their
quarters at Belle Plain. These two demonstrations indi-
324
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
cated that Hooker was still feeling his way, with a view to
crossing there with his whole army in the near future.
Stoneman was still on the north side of the Rappahan¬
nock, where he had arrived on the 17th.
Hooker determined to divide his army, and throw a
heavy force under Sedgwick below the city, while two divis¬
ions of the Second, with the Fifth, Eleventh, and Twelfth
Corps were to follow Stoneman on the upper Rappahan¬
nock and make a detour back from the river, so that the
maneuver could not be observed by the enemy occupying
the right bank. As the river was still very high there was
not much probability that a citizen would give the alarm.
Besides, Hooker had kept his counsel so well that but few
officers were aware where and how the real movement was
to be made. He knew how disastrous it had been to Mc-
Clellan and to Burnside that their plans were so publicly
known, and he resolved to keep his movements as secret as
possible. The corps commanders only knew his plans
when they received their orders to march. The President
was notified by General Butterfield, Hooker's chief of
staff, in person. *
* When General Butterfield arrived at the White House, and sent his card to
Lincoln with the request that he desired to see him alone, he was at once
ushered into the room where the President was, surrounded by members of his
Cabinet, Senators and Members of Congress.
When General Butterfield glanced at those present he gracefully said to
the President that he bore a message from Hooker, under strict orders not to
impart it to anyone but the President of the United States; that under those
positive instructions he would be compelled to withdraw until he could see him
alone. Thereupon the President requested those present to retire. It was with
great reluctance that some of them complied with the request made by Lincoln—
especially was it the case wtth the Secretary of War, whose eyes flashed as he
turned them on General Butterfield, as if to say that there was no secret or im¬
portant move of the army that ought to be kept from him.
Soon the room was cleared with the exception of a distinguished Senator from
New England, whose majestic eloquence had charmed the nation on many occa¬
sions. He sat still, holding a large bundle of papers in his hand, with his eyes
intently fixed on General Butterfield. Lincoln glanced at the Senator, and asked
if there was anything he could do for him. " Yes," said the statesman, drawing
out one of the papers, " I would like to have this appointment." " It is granted,"
CHA NCELLORS VIL L E.
325
Hooker gained great credit in the army for his soldierly
manner. The army only asked to be led against the eneni}-
with reasonable skill on the part of the commander-in-
chief, and had learned to look up to Hooker as a general
whom it could follow and have confidence in. Aside from
his service in the war of the rebellion, he had been in the
Mexican war, where he served on the staff of General
Pillow with considerable distinction.
It was the intention of the enemy to take Sufiblk, and
have the forces under Longstreet rejoin Lee before Hooker
could move. As Longstreet conceived the idea of going to
the assistance of Bragg, when he fought Rosecrans at
Chickamauga, it is to be presumed that it was one of his
deep-laid plans to lay siege to Suffolk, while the army were
in winter quarters, with a river between them. *
That both armies appreciated that fact, is well supported
by the following correspondence :
Suffolk, Va., April 21, 1863.
General Halleck has just left my headquarters. General Long-
street is here, waiting Hill or other troops. I hold everything yet.
How do you get along? John J. Peck, Major General.
Major General Hooker, Army of the Potomac.
April 21, 1863—10 p. m.
Am glad to hear good tidings from you. You must be patient
with me. I must play these devils before I can spring. Remember
that my army is at the bottom of a well and the enemy holds- the
top. Joseph Hooker, Major General Commanding.
Major General Peck, Suffolk, Virginia.
said the President. " Is there anything else ? " He proceeded with a long list of
business, and succeeded in getting more favors granted in a few minutes than he
could have secured in a year. He finally wanted to make an argument before
the President on a war measure, but Lincoln shrewdly parried that move,
and bowed his distinguished guest out, so that he could hear General Butterfield's
report.
* I had it from Longstreet that he urged Lee for a month, before he would
consent to his letting his corps go, as he fully expected then, " to crush Rose¬
crans " at Chickamauga.
326 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Thus matters were on a strain at every point. Hooker
was making great haste to throw his army across the
Rappahannock to relieve Peck at Sufifolk. On the 26th
of April Hooker directed General Williams to issue the
order to the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps to ' ' Begin their
march at sunrise to-morrow morning, the former to encamp
as near Kelley's Ford as practicable, without discovering
itself to the enemy, and the latter as nearly in the rear as
circumstances will permit."
General Butterfield sent a similar order to the Fifth
Corps to follow. On the same date Hooker wrote General
Peck, at Suffolk, saying :
Your dispatch received. I have been delayed in my operations
by the severe storm. I have communicated to no one what my in¬
tentions are. If you were here I could properly and willingly im¬
part them to you. So much is found out by the enemy on my front
with regard to movements that I hiive concealed my designs from
my own staff, and I dare not intrust them to the wires, knowing as
I do that they are so often tapped.
JosKPH Hooker, Major General.
Couch, of the Second Corps, was directed to leave one
division opposite Fredericksburg, as Gibbon held the posi¬
tion most exposed to view that remained ; the other two
divisions, French's and Hancock's, were to march opposite
Banks' Ford. One brigade was to be detached and sent to
United States Ford, which is situated below the confluence
of the Rappahannock and Rapidan opposite Chancellors-
ville. General Hunt was to remain with the Second Corps
to direct the artillery, as it was supposed there might be a
stubborn resistance to the attempt to cross at Banks' Ford, as
it was less than three miles above Fredericksburg, and Eee
could easily throw a force there on short notice.
The Rappahannock being a very swift river, there was
no other place at which it could be crossed until United
States Ford was reached, some six miles above Banks'
C//A NC EL LORS VIL L E.
327
Ford. The former ford takes its name from a mine in that
vicinity, once worked by the Government.
When Slocum, Howard and Meade had crossed the
Rappahannock they were in a narrow peninsula between
the Rappahannock and Rapidan, varying from two to five
miles in width. There were two fords across the Rapidan,
Ely's and Germanna ; the first is about four miles above the
confluence of the two rivers, while the latter is about ten
miles. The brigade of the Second Corps sent to United
States Ford was only intended to keep a vigilant watch on
the movements of the enemy, as that ford would be cleared
the moment Slocum, Howard and Meade marched down
the right bank of the Rapidan in the direction of Chan-
cellorsville. It also prevented sympathizers from cross¬
ing there, or signaling information of Hooker's move¬
ments.
When Slocum arrived at Germanna Ford with two
corps he found the engineer of Lee's army constructing a
trestle bridge at that place. Pleasonton at once dashed
across with his cavalry and captured some prisoners, while
the rest escaped by scattering in different directions. Stuart
was waiting to be attacked, but Slocum passed to his left
and was not aware of his presence. When Stuart learned
that a very heavy force had passed southward, he at once
understood the movement, and attempted by all possible
haste to get possession of Germanna Ford, and delay if not
prevent the passage of the river at that point. He seems
to have been taken wholly by surprise ; had he been suc¬
cessful in preventing the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps from
crossing at Germanna Ford, while Meade was crossing
unopposed at Ely's Ford only a few miles below, Slocum
could have marched down the left bank of the Rapidan
until he reached that point, leaving a force large enough
to deceive Stuart. Nor was even that necessary, for Stuart
only had the brigades of the two Lees. Stoneman, with
his three divisions, was still in the rear. If he had exhib¬
ited one-tenth of the energy of Stuart, he would have pur-
328
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
sued him, and either captured or dispersed his command,
which would have greatly crippled Lee at that critical
time. Fearing Stoneman's heavy force of cavalry, Stuart
directed W. H. F. Lee to watch his movements, and keep
between him and Gordonsville, where heavy supplies were
stored for Lee's army, while he (Stuart) took Fitz-Hugh
Lee's brigade and attempted to go round the right flank of
Slocum's advancing columns, and inform Mahone and
Posey, of Anderson's division, posted opposite United
States Ford, for fear they might slumber in blissful ignor¬
ance of the strategic movement that was being successfully
executed and suffer the loss of a part of their commands.
Then, again, it was all-important that Gen. Robert E. Lee
should be notified of the great efforts being made to gain
the rear of his army.
If Stoneman had pursued Stuart and broken up his com¬
mand, Lee could not have been able to learn the situation
of affairs on the upper Rappahannock. Even with the
tardiness and great delay at Chancellorsville, the Union
army, in all probability, would have passed out of the
wilderness into the plateau, reaching as far as Salem Church
on the plank road and Banks' Ford on the river, where two
divisions of the Second Corps were ready to cross and join
Hooker's advancing columns. No power could have saved
Lee then. The soldiers would have marched victoriously
on the works they stormed in vain a few months before with
such heavy loss. But Stoneman failed even to annoy
Stuart or retard his movements. Driven almost to despera¬
tion with chagrin and mortification at permitting a heavy
column of the enemy to pass him without his knowledge,
which imperiled Lee's position, Stuart pressed forward at
the head of a single brigade and on sight attacked the
Union army with ferocity and impetuosity. It is true that
he made the charge near Madden's farm, where he had had
his headquarters a short time before and, from that fact,
knew the ground well ; but that advantage was not of much
value in such an undertaking. One of Stuart's regiments
CHA N CELLO R S VIL L E.
329
made the circuit of the Union army and attempted to pass
in front of Slocum, Howard, and Meade over the river to
warn Mahone and Posey of impending danger. Stuart
attempted to force his way along the plank road, but he
soon found the Union forces too strongly posted there, and
he turned and took the Brock road to Todd's Tavern.
There he left Fitz-Hugh Fee, as the Catharpin road starts
from Todd's Tavern, on the Brock road, and intersects the
Plank road west of the Tabernacle Church, and it was im¬
portant for Stuart to retain possession of it to watch the
movements of Hooker's advance. Then taking a regiment
with him he started, by the way of Spottsylvania Court
House, to inform Lee that Hooker was coming from the
west.
In the mean time Pleasonton had sent a regiment, the
6th New York Cavalry, to Spottsylvania to make a recon-
noissance in that direction. While Stuart was proceeding
on his way to Lee in the night, he met the 6th New York
Cavalry, under the command of the bold and high-mettled
Lieut. Col. Duncan McVicar.
Although Stuart had with him a regiment, and the 6th
New York only numbered about 200, he sent back to Lee
for another regiment, but finally changed the request and
ordered forward the brigade. The two commands met and
fought by moonlight. It was one of the most tragical
affairs of the war. The Union cavalry was surrounded, but
they cut their way out with the loss of their commander,
who was mortally wounded.
We now turn to the movements of Sedgwick on the
left, for he has the First, Third, and Sixth Corps—nearh*
half of the Army of the Potomac. The Sixth Corps was
marched to Hamilton's Crossing, where two bridges
were put down for Brooks' division to cross on, while
Howe's and Newton's divisions were held in close readiness
on the left bank to cross at a moment's notice. Reynolds'
corps was directed to move below some distance, near Pol¬
lock's mill, where bridges were to be put down for Wads-
330 THE A EM y OF THE POTOMAC.
worth's division to pass over ; Doubleday's and J. C. Robin-
son's divisions were held in readiness on the Stafford side to
snpport Wadsworth. The Third Corps, under Sickles, occu¬
pied a position where it could easily reènforce either or
both corps without delay, in case of an engagement or a
bold feint might lead to a heavy battle.
The engineers were directed to put down bridges
across the Rappahannock during the night of the 28th,
but some orders had not been received which evidently
had been issued, so that it was near morning when the
work of putting down the bridges for Reynolds really
began. The enemy were on the alert and quickly per¬
ceived the movement, and at once opened a severe fire on
the troops of the First Corps as they approached the bank
of the river.
In the mean time Col. Charles S. Wainwright, chief of
artillery of the corps, posted his batteries in the best
possible manner to cover the crossing. Reynolds', Hall's,
Amsden's, and Cooper's above, and Edgell's, Thompson's,
and Ricketts' batteries below Pollock's mill. Ransom's
was posted on a rise between the road and the river. Col.
Walter Phelps, Jr., commanding First Brigade of the
First Division, was directed to have the boats taken to the
river, and, in accordance with that order, he detailed
the 22d, 24th, and 30th New York Volunteers to carry
them by hand to the crossing. His other regiment, the
14th Brooklyn, was thrown forward as skirmishers. After¬
wards the 30th was relieved from the duty of assisting in
carrying the boats to the river, and the regiment was
directed to remain in reserve. Colonel Fairchild, of the
2d Wisconsin, detailed Companies B, E, and D of that regi¬
ment to run the pontoon wagons to the river. The other
companies of the regiment were directed to advance and
engage the enemy on the opposite bank of the river while
the boats were being launched. It soon became evident
that the bridges could not be put down while the enemy
held the other bank. It was simply a repetition of the cross-
CHANCELL ORS VILLE.
331
ing under Burnside in the noted battle a few months before.
So the order was given for the 6th Wisconsin, under Colonel
Bragg, and the 24th Michigan, nnder Colonel Morrow, to
cross the river in boats and take possession of the other
bank.
The infantry opened fire to distract the attention of the
enemy from the two regiments crossing the river in boats.
The artillery also trained its guns on the rifle-pits and pre¬
vented reënforcements. A regiment was broken up in
confusion as it advanced, and was compelled to retreat.
Though the 6th Wisconsin landed first, it was but a moment
until the 24th Michigan was bounding up the bank and
pursuing the enemy. The boats then returned to convey
over the 2d and 7th Wisconsin and 19th Indiana. In this
movement General Wadsworth, who commanded the divis¬
ion, occupied a seat in one of the first boats that went over
and swam his horse by the side of the boat. I have been
told since the war by Confederates that they so admired
that gallant act in General Wadsworth that they refrained
from firing at him.
The general was so delighted over the conduct of the
brigade that he caused the following order to be issued :
General Orders ) Hdqrs. ist Division, ist Army Corps,
No. 40. ) May 9, 1863.
The general commanding, availing himself of the temporary re¬
pose now enjoyed by his command to review the operations of the
past few days, deems it proper to express his thanks to Colonel
Bragg, 6th Wisconsin Volunteers ; Colonel Morrow, 24th Michigan
Volunteers, and the gallant men under their command, for the
heroic manner in which they crossed the Rappahannock and seized
the heights on the opposite shorè on the 29th of April ; and likewise
to Brigadier General Meredith and the whole of the Fourth Brigade,
for the promptness with which they followed in this daring enter¬
prise. The skill and courage with which Captain Reynolds' Bat¬
tery D, ist New York Artillery, returned the enemy's fire, the bold¬
ness exhibited by the 14th New York State Militia as skirmishers,
and the steadiness of the whole command during the advance and
retreat, have afforded the general commanding the highest gratifi-
332
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
cation, and inspired him with entire confidence in the troops of this
division. By command of Brigadier General Wadsworth ;
John A. Kress.
Lieutenant Colonel and Acting Assistant Inspector General.
The Second Brigade of Wadsworth's division, nnder
Cutler, was engaged in putting the bridges down. When
the bridges were completed the three remaining brigades of
the division marched over and formed as follows : Mere¬
dith on the left, Phelps in the center and Cutler on the
right, with Paul's New Jersey Brigade supporting.
Stewart's battery was advanced to a position in front of
Phelps. The enemy threatened to mass in front of Mere¬
dith, and Phelps was moved over close to him to assist in
repelling the expected attack, as Stewart was supported by
Paul. The enemy evidently by that time understood the
mission of Sedgwick, and the threatened movement on the
left was simply checkmating Sedgwick, for Tee, having
learned of Hooker's move at Chancellorsville, lightly re¬
garded Sedgwick in the valley below the city. Ransom's
battery, which had crossed the river with Stewart's, was
withdrawn, and Reynolds took his place. A section of
Taft's was posted on the road above Traveler's Rest, where
it did good service. On May i Amsden's battery was
moved down to Traveler's Rest to replace a battery of
the reserve artillery, which had been ordered to Banks'
Ford.
Wadsworth's division had made a brilliant passage of
the river in the face of the enemy, and seriously threatened
his l-eft and greatly annoyed him, while the troops on the
left bank of the Rappahannock, and Robinson's division
of the First Corps, with Newton's and Howe's of the Sixth
Cqrps, as well as the Third Corps, under Sickles, were dis¬
played to advantage by Sedgwick. This was intended to
create the impression in Lee's mind that Hooker really in¬
tended to cross there and fight his battle where Franklin's
grand division had made its attack in the previous battle.
Added to these commands was Gibbon's division, of the
GEN. DANIEL E. SICKLES.
CHA NCEL LORS VIL L E.
Second Corps, still in camp in full view from Stafford
Heights. It was an important but unsatisfactory service that
was performed by the First and Sixth Corps on the left. On
May I Sickles, who had been ordered to join Hooker,
taking a route unobserved by the enemy, rapidly marched
to Chancellorsville. Reynolds says :
On April 30 the troops remained in position, the division
across the river throwing up some light defense, rifle-pits, etc., and
during the day two batteries (Ransom's and Stewart's) were crossed
and placed so as to cover the bridges.
About five p. m. the enemy opened fire from their battery on
the hill, near Captain Hamilton's, on our working parties and the
bridges, which was replied to by our batteries on the north side of
the river. The fire was kept up until nearly dark, during which
time it became necessary to niove the Second Division (massed in
the ravines, where it sustained some loss) to the shelter of the
river road. One boat of the bridge was struck and disabled. It
was, however, promptly replaced. The engineers received orders to
take up one of the bridges at dark and move it to Banks' Ford.
The 136th Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers was placed at the dis¬
posal of the engineer ofiicer for that purpose, and accompanied the
train to the ford, returning about noon the next day. At dark Ran¬
som's battery was replaced by Reynolds', of rifiçd guns.
May I was passed with the troops occupying the same position.
The enemy's force opposite to us was very much diminished, though
still strong on their extreme right, where their battery was posted.
The pickets along the Bowling Green road showed the same. The
order for the demonstration at one o'clock did not reach me until
six p. m. The troops were at once put under arms, and a division
of the Sixth Corps moved in the direction of the lower bridge, the
skirmishers on the left being advanced to the Massaponax, in which
position they remained until dark.
At seven a. m., on May 2, I received orders to withdraw the forces
from the right bank of the river, take up the bridge, and proceed
with my command to report to the commanding general, near
Chancellorsville.
Doubleday's and Robinson's divisions were at once put
in motion for Chancellorsville.
When Wadsworth's division began to cross the river the
batteries of the enemy opened a vigorous fire, which was
replied to by our batteries. Reynolds' battery, which was
334 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
on the right bank, did effective service. As soon as their
batteries were silenced, Reynolds rode forward to overtake
the other two divisions of the corps ; Reynolds was under
the impression he could cross at Banks' Ford, but there
was no bridge there, and he was compelled to proceed to
United States Ford. Leaving the column, he made great
haste to report to Hooker in person.
Chancellorsville is in the country called the Wilderness,
which is bounded on the north by the Rapidan and Rappa¬
hannock Rivers, on the west by Wilderness Run, which
rises near Major Lacy's farm, on which the battle of the
Wilderness was fought later in the war. On the south the
high table-land, which is nothing more than a watershed,
forms the headwaters of the Ny River, near which Sickles
followed Jackson when the latter was making his detour to
strike Howard. Lewis Creek rises near the Catharine Fur¬
nace, and uniting with another stream coming from the
south, west of the Catharpin road, forms the Ny River,
which in turn is one of the four streams which unite and
form the Mattapony. East of the Wilderness this ridge
widens out into a beautiful plateau, dotted over with
farms, and it is this open plain that Hooker must occupy
in order to handle his large army against the forces of
Lee.
In the direction of Fredericksburg Hooker had three
roads on which to move his army in order to reach the
open plain referred to. The left one, called the River road,
hugs the right bank of the Rappahannock River ; the mid¬
dle one is called the old turnpike road, and it is not over
three-fourths of a mile to Absalom McGee's on this, which
is the eastern, edge of that dreary forest ; the right-hand
one is the Plank road, quite a distance before the open plain
is reached.
While Hooker's army mainly moved on these roads, the
one leading to the west was the route by which he was to
protect his right flank. Chancellorsville is located at the
intersection of the road from Ely's Ford, United States
C//A NC EL LORS VIL L E.
335
Vord, and the roads leading to Fredericksburg, with the
turnpike and Plank roads blending into one at this point
in their westerly course, until they pass Dowdall's Tavern
on the left and the Wilderness Church on the right ; then,
when they ascend the next ridge, the Plank road bears a
little to the left, and the old turnpike inclines to the right.
In less than half a mile they both cross the Brook road,
which starts at the old turnpike, crosses the Orange plank
road, and intersects the Brock road about two miles distant,
which is the direct route to Spottsylvania Court House.
That road was of great importance to Hooker, for it enabled
him to turn Lee's left flank ; and at Todd's Tavern, his
troops could take the Catharpin road and strike the Plank
road east of the Wilderness, which contains perhaps some
20,000 to 30,000 acres, cleared off before the war to supply the
furnaces in that vicinity. Spottswood, a Colonial governor,
is said to have lived in this county, not far distant from the
noted battlefield.
The following order was issued preparatory to advancing
on the enemy from Chancellorsville :
Headquarters Army oe the Potomac,
April 30, 1863—2:15 p. m.
The general directs that no advance be made from Chancellors¬
ville until the columns are concentrated. He expects to be at
Chancellorsville to-night. Daniee Buttereield,
Major General, Chief of Staff.
To Captain Comstock.
In order to show Hooker's original design, where he
fully expected to fight the battle, the following order issued
by him is given :
Chanceeeorsviele, Va.,
May I, 1863—II a. m.
The Fifth Corps, including three batteries, will be thrown on to
the River road by most direct route, the head of it advanced to near
midway between Mott's and Colin Runs, the movement to be masked
by small parties thrown out in advance, and to be completed at two
o'clock.
The Twelfth Corps, including its batteries, will be massed below
the Plank road, the head of it resting near Tabernacle Church, and
33ö
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
masked from the view of the enemy by small advanced parties, and
the movement to be completed at 12 o'clock, to enable the Eleventh
Corps to take its position. The Eleventh Corps, with its batteries,
will be masked on the Plank road, about one mile in rear of the
Twelfth. This movement to be completed at two o'clock.
One division of the Second Corps, with one battery, will take a
position at Todd's Tavern, and will throw out strong detachments
on the approaches in the direction of the enemy.
The other divisions and batteries of the corps will be massed out
of the road near Chancellorsville, these dispositions to be made at
once.
The Third Corps will be massed as fast as it arrives about one
mile from Chancellorsville, on the United States Ford road, except¬
ing one brigade, with a battery, which will take position at Dow-
dall's Tavern.
General Pleasonton will hold his command, excepting those
otherwise engaged, at Chancellorsville.
After the movement commences, headquarters will be at Taber¬
nacle Church.
By command of Major General Hooker :
William L. CandllR,
Captain and Aid-de-Camp.
It seems that this order, although not revoked in orders,,
was changed materially.
The division of the Second Corps designated to proceed
to Todd's Tavern was French's, but it remained near Chan,
cellorsville until it was moved forward to support the retir¬
ing troops. The Eleventh Corps, instead of supporting the
Twelfth, moved to the right and took a position at Dow-
dall's Tavern, where a brigade of the Third Corps had
been ordered. Meade advanced Griffin on the river road
with his left resting on the river, and Sykes on the old
turnpike on Griffin's right, extending over to Williams'
division of the Twelfth Corps, with Geary's division on
Williams' right. " Humphreys was ordered to follow
Griffin, to be held in reserve to reënforce Griffin or Sykes
as the exigencies might require."
It seems that the alignment was not well preserved.
Sykes' left failed to connect with Griffin's right or Slocum's
left under Williams, so that when he emerged from the
CHANCELLORSVILLE.
337
Wilderness he found the enemy strongly posted and deter¬
mined to resist his advance. The enemy's line of battle
overlapped his front, and was turning his flanks when
Warren reported the condition of affairs to Hooker, and
the army was ordered back to Chancellorsville.
It was a great mistake, for Griffin, followed by Hum¬
phreys, had reached Decker's, within full view of Banks'
Ford, without serious opposition, and Colonel Abbott, of the
ist Michigan, who led Griffin's division, says, "We were
almost to Banks' Ford." They were surprised to receive
the order to retire and surrender the ground they had
acquired. Thus it will be seen that Meade had forged the
whole front of his corps from the river to Zoan Church on
the old turnpike, out of the Wilderness, and held a good
tenable position, with the exception of Sykes, who could
have been reënforced by either Humphreys and Griffin or
Hancock, as he was in no serious peril, though heavily
pressed by McDaws. * The left flank of Williams' corps
was well through—having passed the swamp. Neither
Sykes, Williams nor Geary suffered that afternoon a tithe
of what they did afterwards in that battle. When the
order was received Williams' left was abreast with Absa¬
lom McGee's, and advancing in an open field, while the
right was still struggling in the dense and almost impen¬
etrable thicket. When the order came from Hooker to
retire the line back in the direction of Chancellorsville the
whole army deplored it, and several urgent requests were
sent back to him to let them move ahead. Especially was
this the case with Griffin and Humphreys, who were
already in sight of Banks' Ford, and could have relieved
Sykes' left by throwing a division on the enemy's right,
and compelling him to fall back in the direction of Taber¬
nacle Church. Such a move would have let Sykes swing
out full into the cleared land with Griffin stretching to the
* The swamp is but little more than a low, wide place in which rises Matt River
formed just north of the Plank road, and winds its way through the forest, across
the old turnpike just west of Absalom McGee's, and thence to the river,
xxir
338 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
left in command of Banks' Ford, leaving only Slocum on
the extreme right to struggle through the dense forest, with
three corps to assist him, the Second, Third and Eleventh.
It was in vain that Humphreys and other officers begged
Hooker to countermand his order. It is alleged that he
was misinformed as to the real situation at the front, or
else he would not have issued the order.
Some of Hooker's friends claim that his plans were
greatly disarranged by the irregular advance of his army.
He seemed to place stress on following the Orange plank
road, for in his circular order he stated that his head¬
quarters would be at Tabernacle Church, which is on the
Old Mine road, only a short distance from the Plank road.
But his troops had achieved marked success on the left by
the river, enough to give him great encouragement. If he
had permitted Griffin and Humphreys to advance they
would have secured Banks' Ford. Gibbon's division of
the Second Corps, the First, and the Sixth Corps, under
Sedgwick, could have hastily crossed there, formed on
Griffin's left, and swept forward in the direction of the
Plank road, which would have compelled the enemy to form
in line of battle facing north to meet Hooker's forces
moving up from Banks' Ford. Then Slocum would have
been operating on Tee's left flank as Jackson did on
Howard's subsequently. Hooker only used Sedgwick
below Fredericksburg to deceive Tee as to his real inten¬
tions, which is fully corroborated by the following order,
and there was no necessity of retaining him there after
Banks' Ford was in his possession, as it was ascertained
that only Early's division and Barksdale's brigade, with
a part of the reserve artillery under Pendleton, were
left at Fredericksburg to watch Sedgwick with a large
corps :
Camp near Faemouth, Va., April 30, 1863.
General I am directed by the major general commanding to
inform you that his headquarters will be at Chancellorsville to-night.
It is proposed that the army now at that point will assume the ini-
CHANCELLORS VILLE,
339
tiative to-morrow morning, and will advance along the line of the
Plank road, uncovering what is called Banks' Ford, where bridges
will be at once thrown across the river, which route will then be¬
come the shortest line of communication between the two wings of
the army. Major General Butterfield will remain at the present
headquarters, and will at once transmit to the major general com¬
manding any communications you may desire to send him. It is
not known, of course, what effect the advance will have upon the
enemy, and the general commanding directs that you observe his
movements with the utmost vigilance, and should he expose a weak
point, attack him in full force and destroy him. If he should show
any symptoms of falling back, the general directs that you throw
your whole force on the Bowling Green road, and pursue him with
the utmost vigor, turning his fortified position by the numerous by¬
roads which you can make use of for that purpose. If any portion-
of his organized forces should pass off to the rear of the railroad,
you will, by detachments, pursue until you destroy or capture him.
Simultaneous with the advance of your column on the Bowling
Green road, if at all, a column will also advance on the Telegraph
road, and between you will sweep the country between the two high¬
ways and the railroad. You will be within easy communication, and
both columns will spring to one another's assistance in case of en¬
countering any considerable resistance, which can best be judged by
the magnitude of the fire. Keep your provisions and ammunition
and forage replenished, leaving as much of your train to be brought
afterwards as practicable.
Trains will only embarrass and check your forward movement,
and must not accompany you, unless it be the pack train.
It may be expedient for you to join the right wing on the south
bank of the river, and under cover of it to Fredericksburg. Be ob¬
servant of your opportunities, and when you strike let it be done to
destroy. When you move forward, if you want all your artillery,
the batteries of the reserve here can be called for. The enemy have
at Hamilton's a pontoon train. The general expects that you will
not permit them to cross the river. You will find an able com¬
mander in Major General Reynolds.
I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Daniel Buttereield, Major General,
To Major General Sedgwick, Chief of Staff.
Commanding Deft Wing, Army of the Potomac.
This order, which was issued on the eve of the contem¬
plated battle, showed the great importance of Banks' Ford,
and if Hooker had permitted the troops to advance they
340
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
would have swung around, as above indicated, and hurled
Lee back in the direction of Spottsylvania, as his fortifica¬
tions in the rear of Fredericksburg were then untenable.
The ground Hooker would have occupied was equally good
with any position Lee could have chosen, unless he had
retired to some line farther south than the Plank road.
That position would have been quite as good for Hooker,
for while he was pressing Lee from this direction of Banks'
Ford, he could have thrown a force around on the Brock
road at Todd's Tavern, and operated on Lee's left and rear ;
as the force in Lee's front was equal in strength to the Con¬
federate commander's whole army, and, led by such generals
âs Meade, Reynolds, Sedgwick, Couch, Humphreys, Griffin,
Sykes, Williams, Geary, and Slocum, there was no danger
of disaster if the two armies should meet in an open field
to measure strength and military science on an equal
basis.
As to the possibility of Hooker's left wing being able to
gain possession of Banks' Ford, and receive reënforce-
ments from Sedgwick, strong enough to meet any force of
the enemy, the following, taken from General Meade's
report, seems to be conclusive :
The next day (May i), under the orders of the major general
commanding, the corps was put en route to take a position to un¬
cover Banks' Ford, the left resting on the river, the right extending
on the Plank road. For this purpose, Sykes' division was ordered
to advance on the old Richmond turnpike until after crossing Mott's
Run, when he was to move to the left, deploy, and open communi¬
cation with Griffin on his left and Slocum on his right, and, when
all were in position, to advance simultaneously against the enemy,
supposed to be in position from the Plank road to the river. Griffin
was ordered to move down the river, or the Mott road, until in the
presence of the enemy, when he was to deploy, his left resting on
the river and his right extending toward Sykes. Humphreys was
ordered to follow Griffin, to be held in reserve to reënforce Griffin or
Sykes, as the exigencies might require.
These movements were commenced about eleven p. m. Sykes
moved out on the old pike, and, after proceeding over a mile, met
the enemy's skirmishers. He immediately deployed, and, after a
CHA NC EL LORS VIL LE.
UL
spirited engagement, drove the enemy for a considerable distance.
Finding the enemy in force and making dispositions to outflank him
on both flanks, without any communication either on the right or
left with a supporting force. General Sykes reported the condition
of affairs to the major general commanding the army, and by him
was ordered to withdraw. T¿is he did in good order, returning to
Chancellors ville.
In the mean time the column of Griffin and Humphreys pro¬
ceeded on the river road, and had reached Decker's house, within
view of Banks' Ford, without any opposition from the enemy, when
the order of recall was received, and the column returned to Chan-
cellorsville.
The advance of Griffin and Humphreys imperiled the
enemy's right flank, and Sykes was not in great danger,
as Meade could have thrown Humphreys on the enemy's
right and rear and relieved him at once.
In support of the theory that if Griffin and Humphreys
had been ordered, through Meade, to attack Mchaws' right
and rear, which would have forced him (McL/aws) to
retreat from his position and compelled Anderson also to
have given way in front , of Slocum without being attacked
by the latter. General Warren, in his report, says ;
In General Sykes' front the enemy deployed to the right and
left, in line far outreaching the whole of ours, and I have never seen
che steadiness of our troops more tried and proved. Captain Weed
brought his battery into the front line on the ridge where it could
operate against the enemy, and was able to reply to him within
musket range, and used his guns with great effect. When the divi¬
sion had all been deployed to extend the line of battle, the lack of
numbers compelled a regiment to be deployed as skirmishers. No
connection, however, could even thus be made with our troops on
the right, and my aid. Dieu ten ant James, in attempting to commu¬
nicate with the presumed position of General Slocum, ran against
the enemy's skirmishers, from which he fortunately escaped, though
many shots were fired after him. A similar effort by one of General
Sykes' aids was foiled in the same way.
General Sykes bravely resolved to hold the position assigned
him, which his command had so gallantly won from the enemy, and
I set out with all possible speed to report the condition to the com¬
manding general.
342
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
From information received since the advance began, the general
decided to countermand it and receive the enemy in the line occu¬
pied the night before. Unfortunately, this line had been taken up
the day before by tired troops toward the close of the day and with¬
out much prospect of fighting a pitched battle upon it. It was a
bad line, and had several commanding positions in its front for the
enemy to occupy. It was, perhaps, the best that could be designated
for such a sudden change of programme in the face of an enemy. I
carried to General Sykes the order to fall back, and he then with¬
drew his command in perfect order, bringing off his wounded, with
the exception of a few who were cut oft" on the extreme right of his
extended skirmish line. All the other columns withdrew to- the
vicinity of Chancellorsville without having engaged the enemy.
The enemy advanced cautiously till he came upon our new lines,
and made some feeble demonstrations, easily repulsed, and the day
closed without any real trial of strength. During the evening the
Third Corps joined us at Chancellorsville.
Two general plans of operations were now considered. One was
to choose a position and intrench ; the other, to choose our point of
attack, and advance with our whole force of five corps upon it. The
saving of our men and the advantages of resuming the offensive
after a successful repulse favored the one ; the increased elan of our
men and the choice of our point of attack the other. I was in favor
of advancing, and urged it with more zeal than convincing argu¬
ment. I thought, with our position and numbers, to beat the ene¬
my's right wing. This could be done by advancing in force on the
two main roads toward Fredericksburg, each being in good sup¬
porting distance, at the same time throwing a heavy force on the
enemy's right flank by the river road. If this attack found the
enemy in extended line across our front, or in motion toward our
right flank, it would have secured the defeat of his right wing, and
consequently the retreat of the whole.
Such was Warren's opinion how best to renew the
battle after Hooker had ordered the army to fall back
around Chancellorsville when McLaws attacked Sykes on
the first advance. If that was the better plan on the second
day, it would have been wisdom to have permitted Meade
to proceed on the first day, as Griffin had turned the right
flank of Lee's army without firing a shot, and could within
half an hour have uncovered Banks' Ford, when Sedgwick's
force of three corps could have crossed that night, and
CHA NCELLORS VIL L E.
343
formed on Meade's left in the open country, where the
soldiers of the Union army would have gained a glo¬
rious victory without a doubt. Sykes had only lost 28
killed, 167 wounded, and 91 missing, 286—not much more
than the loss of a single regiment in some battles—when
he was peremptorily ordered to retire. The above figures
are from Sykes' official report.
Mahone's and Posey's brigades, of R. H. Andersons
division, were stationed near the United States Ford when
Hooker's forces crossed at Germanna and Ely's Fords.
As Meade marched down the south bank of the Rapidan,
these two Confederate brigades retired in the direction of
Fredericksburg, until they met reënforcements near Taber¬
nacle Church. At midnight, on the night of the 30th,
McUaws marched with the rest of his command, Wofford,
Semmes and Kershaw's brigades toward Chancellorsville.
Jackson followed early the next morning, reaching the
position of General Anderson near Tabernacle Church at
eight a. m. At eleven a. m. the Confederate lines advanced
in the direction of Chancellorsville, evidently with the in¬
tention of intercepting Hooker's advance before it reached
the eastern edge of the Wilderness, to prevent his maneu¬
vering his large army in the open country. It will be seen
that both armies began their advance at the same hour. If
Hooker had moved promptly in the morning, his right wing
would have succeeded in arriving at Aldrich's, on the Plank
road, where the Catharpin branches off to Todd's Tavern
on the Brock road, while the center would have rested near
Zoan Church on the old turnpike, with the left on the
River road under Meade, farther advanced in the direction
of Banks' Ford before he met the enemy.
Wright and Posey advanced on the Plank road, while
McLaws advanced on the old turnpike with Mahone's
brigade, of Anderson's division, in the advance. The
brigades of Wilcox and Perry also assisted McLaws, which
made six brigades on Sykes' front, with only three brigades
in his command. In the action with Sykes, the brigade of
844
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Semmes suffered most. In his report of the battle, Lee
does not speak of losses in the other brigades, therefore they
must have been comparatively few. Anderson took the line
of the unfinished railroad to the left, with the hope of
turning Hooker's right.
When Hooker withdrew his army to a position near
Chancellorsville, Lee did not follow him that night through
the Wilderness ; he simply felt his position as best he
could. By Hooker's retiring, Lee did not believe he would
advance again, hence he began to study his position at
Chancellorsville. The following, taken from his report,
most clearly gives his views :
It was evident that a direct attack upon the enemy would be
attended with great loss, in view of the strength of his position and
his superiority of numbers. It was, therefore, resolved to endeavor
to turn his right flank and gain his rear, leaving a force in front to
hold him in check and conceal the movement. The execution of
this plan was intrusted to Lieutenant General Jackson, with his three
divisions.
The commands of Generals McLaws and Anderson, with the
exception of Wilcox's brigade, which during the night had been
ordered back to Banks' Ford, remained in front of the enemy.
Just before dark, Jackson sent word to Lee that his
advance was checked, which brought the Confederate com¬
mander to the front at once. They held a consultation at
the point where the Catharine Furnace road diverges to the
left from the Plank road. Two pines stand near each other
where these two notable generals studied the situation, and
finally decided on a plan that crowned their efforts with
success. Colonel Long, who was on Lee's staff, and
Captain Boswell "were sent out to make a moonlight
reconnoissance, the result of which was reported about ten
p. m. and was not favorable to an attack in the front. ' '
Thus Long speaks in his Life of Lee.
As Hooker's front was well protected, it seemed useless
for Lee to attack an army superior in numbers.
Lee questioned Jackson about Hooker's right. The
CHANCE LLORSVILLE.
345
information indicated that Howard was badly posted. Rev.
Mr. Lacy, a chaplain in Jackson's corps, was sent for, and
he told Lee that he had preached in a chnrch near Chan-
cellorsville, and knew all the roads through the country.
' ' That troops could be conducted to a designated point
beyond Chancellorsville by a road sufficiently remote from
the Federal position to prevent discovery." Long says
that with that information Lee decided to turn the Federal
position from a point where an attack was unexpected.
•Captain Carter was selected as a guide. But Jackson had
several men who were raised in that vicinity and knew all
the numerous byroads in that section. A son of Melzi
Chancellor also assisted Jackson that day.
J. E. B. Stuart's adjutant general, Fitzhugh, was an old
regular army officer, educated at West Point, who had re¬
signed before the war, and was living near United States
Ford, consequently his services were of great importance
in that battle. It was no vain boast of theirs to attempt to
capture United States Ford, as Fitzhugh could have led
them there beyond a doubt, but the chances were they
could not have held it.
When Jackson reached a position opposite Hazel Grove,
he turned toward the Brock road, and crossing it, followed
a blind track where his march was shielded from the
direction of Chancellorsville. Already his movements had
been discovered, and Sickles had pursued him, attacking
his rear guard vigorously ; Birney's division captured the
23d Georgia.
Williamson's brigade of Slocum's corps, and Barlow's
brigade of Howard's corps had been sent to Sickles.
Strengthened by these forces, and fully believing that he was
between the forces of Jackson and those of Anderson and
McLaws, he prepared to pursue a contrary course to that
of Jackson, which would throw him on the left flank of
Anderson and roll him up on McLaws. If that move had
been made and the rest of the line reaching to the river had
moved forward simultaneously. Hooker's forces would have
«46
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
hurled the troops of Anderson and McLaws back in the
direction of Fredericksburg, and would have compelled
Jackson to beat a hasty retreat in the direction of Spott-
sylvania Court House. Hooker had directed Col. Alexan¬
der Moore, of his staff, to go to Sickles and tell him to
reconnoiter, but not bring on an engagement. When
Sickles convinced Colonel Moore of the situation there, he
returned to Hooker for orders. Hooker returned his aid
with instructions for Sickles to make a vigorous attack, but
before he could reach him it was too late.
Hooker had overtaxed himself since he was placed in
command of the army, and the vigorous intellect that he
had exhibited up to that moment then seemed paralyzed.
He knew the condition of affairs well, and really anticipated
what came, as the following order evinces :
Headquarters Army of the Potomac,
Chancellorsville, Va., May 2—9:30 a.m.
I am directed by the major general commanding to say that the
disposition you have made of your corps has been with a view to a
front attack by the enemy. If he should throw himself upon your
flank, he wishes you to examine the ground and detërmine upon the
position you will take in that event, in order that you may be pre¬
pared for him in whatever direction he advances. He suggests that
you have heavy reserves well in hand to meet the contingency. The
right of your line does not appear to be strong enough. No artificial
defenses worth naming have been thrown up, and there appears to
be a scarcity of troops at that point, and not, in the general's opinion,
as favorably posted as might be.
We have good reason to suppose that the enemy is moving ta
our right. Please advance your pickets for purpose of observation
as far as may be safe, in order to obtain timely information of their
approach. James H. Van Aden,
Brigadier General and Aid-de-Camp.
Major General Slocum and
Major General Howard.
Howard held the extreme right of Hooker's army, and
to him this order was particularly addressed. His corps
rested on the Plank road, with the right beyond Talley's
and a brigade facing west to protect his flank, which
CHA NC EL L O R S VIL L E.
347
was not strong enough to oppose a heavy force. His
headquarters were at Dowdall's Tavern or Melzi Chancel¬
lor's. Dowdall and Chancellor had both .owned this hotel
at different times. From Chancellorsville to Dowdall's
Tavern it is perhaps two miles. This was Howard's
headquarters, while his right rested beyond Talley's house
about a mile farther to the west. Von Gilsa's brigade held
the extreme right in a dense woods where it was impos¬
sible to see over a hundred yards. There Jackson found
Fitz Lee with his brigade of cavalry. Jackson asked him
if he knew where Howard's position was, to which General
Lee said, "Yes, come with me and I will show you his
whole command."
The above was fully confirmed by Gen. Fitz Lee, when
he was Governor of Virginia, in a letter to the writer.
Reaching the Orange plank road, General Jackson himself rode
with General Fitz Lee to reconnoiter the position of Howard, and
then sent the Stonewall Brigade of Virginia troops, under Brigadier
General Paxton, to hold the point where the Germanna plank road
obliquely enters the Orange road. Leading the main column of his
force farther on the Brook road to hold the turnpike, the head of the
column turned sharply eastward toward Chancellorsville. About a
mile had been passed, when he halted and began the disposition of
his force to attack Howard.
Rodes' division, at the head of the column, was thrown into
line of battle, with Colston's forming the second line and A. P.
Hill the third, while the artillery, under Col. Stapleton Crutchfield,
moved in column on the road, or was parked in a field on the right.
Well-trained skirmishers of Rodes' division, under Maj. Eu¬
gene Blackford, were thrown to the front. It must have been be¬
tween five and six o'clock in the evening, Saturday, May 2, when
these dispositions were completed.
Upon his stout-built, long-paced little sorrel. General Jackson
sat, with visor low over his eyes, and lips compressed, and with his
watch in his hand. Upon his right sat Gen. Robert E. Rodes, the
very picture of a soldier, and every inch all that he appeared. Upon
his right sat Major Blackford. "Are you ready. General Rodes?"
said Jackson. "Yes, sir," said Rodes, impatient for the advance.
"You can go forward, then," said Jackson.
A nod from Rodes was order enough for Blackford, and then
348 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
suddenly the woods rang with the bugle call, and back came the
responses from bugles on the right and left, and the long line of
skirmishers through the wild thicket of undergrowth sprang eagerly
to their work, followed promptly by the quick steps of the line of
battle. For a moment all the troops seemed buried in the depths
of the gloomy forest, and then suddenly the echoes waked and swept
the country for miles, never failing until heard at the headquarters
of Hooker, at Chancellorsville, the wild "rebel yell" of the long
Confederate lines.
Never was assault delivered with grander enthusiasm. Fresh from
the long winter's waiting, and confident from the preparation of the
spring, the troops were in fine condition and in high spirits. The
boys were all back from home or sick leave. ' ' Old Jack ' ' was there
upon the road in their midst ; there could be no mistake and no fail¬
ure. And there were Rodes and A. P. Hill. Had they not seen and
cheered, as long and as loud as they were permitted, the gay-hearted
Stuart and the splendid Fitz Lee with long beard and fiery charger ?
Was not Crutchfield's array of brass and iron "dogs of war" at
hand, with Poague and Palmer, and all the rest, ready to bark loud
and deep with half a chance ? Alas ! for Howard and his unformed
lines, and his brigades with guns stacked, and ofiBcers at dinner or
asleep under the trees, and butchers deep in the blood of beeves !
Scattered through field and forest, his men were preparing their eve¬
ning meal. A little show of earth-work facing the south was quickly
taken by us in reverse from the west. Flying battalions are not
flying buttresses for an army's stability. Across Talley's fields the
rout begins. Over at Hawkins' Hill, on the north of the road, Carl
Schurz makes a stand, soon to be driven into the same hopeless
panic.
By the quiet Wilderness Church in the vale, leaving wounded
and dead everywhere, by Melzi Chancellor's, on into the deep thicket
again, the Confederate lines press forward, now broken and all dis-
aligned by the density of bush that tears the clothes away ; now
halting to load and deliver a volley upon some regiment or fragment
of the enemy that will not move as fast as others. Thus the attack
upon Hooker's flank was a grand success, beyond the most san¬
guine expectation.
The writer of this narrative, an aid-de-camp of Jackson's, was
ordered to remain at the point where the advance began, to be a
center of communication between the general and the cavalry on
the flanks, and to deliver orders to detachments of artillery still
moving up from the rear.
The above is an extract from the Rev. James Power
CHAN CELL OES VILLE.
34^
Smith's account, in an able review in the Ce^ihiry.^ of Jack¬
son's move around Hooker's army until he struck Howard.
Smith served on Jackson's staff as an aid, and after the war
he became prominent as a divine at Fredericksburg.
It will be observed that Jackson and Fee approached
within three-fourths of a mile of Howard without being
seen. There is not a military man in the world but will
say that Von Gilsa's front should have been protected with
heavy picket guards to have prevented a surprise. On the
approach of Fee's cavalry they would have been able to
have given him a warm reception, as Von Gilsa was
posted in the thick undergrowth, where his cavalry could
not have charged. This would have warned the other
picket posts, and sent alarm to Howard's headquarters.
Then he could have received reënforcements and extended
his line of battle farther to the west, and been prepared
to face the enemy.
In fact, a regular line of pickets should have been
thrown around his corps at a distance far enough away to
have prevented any surprise. The cattle were in the forest
on the right of the road ; when Jackson made his advance
they joined in the wild excitement of the hour and greatly
added to the confusion.
Howard had three divisions in his corps, each composed
of two brigades. Gen. Chas. Devens, Jr., commanded the
First Division, and occupied the right of the line, with his
First Brigade, under Colonel Von Gilsa, on the extreme
right. That brigade was composed of the 41st, 45th, and
54th New York Regiments, and the 153d Pennsylvania.
Only half of the brigade was refused back, facing west
when the attack was made. The 54th New York was on
the extreme right, while the 153d Pennsylvania was on its
left, with the 41st New York holding the extreme front on
the Plank road, and the 45th New York on its left.
Devens' Second Brigade, under Gen. Nathaniel C. Mc-
Fean, was the 25th, 55th, 75th and 107th Ohio troops, with
the 17th Connecticut.
350
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
On Devens' left was Schurz's division, with Steinwehr
on the left in the direction of Chancellorsville as the corps
held the road. But it must be remembered that only Bush-
beck's brigade of his division was engaged, as Gen. Fran¬
cis C. Barlow's brigade, which had been on reserve, was
sent to Sickles a short time before ; so Howard really had
but seven brigades to resist Jackson's corps. General
Doubleday and the Comte de Paris in their histories say
that the first known of Jackson's premeditated attack was
the wild game coming from that direction.
While these two distinguished authors correctly repre¬
sent Howard's headquarters, yet there were many in the corps
who fully expected the attack and knew of the advance.
Capt. David B. Castle, of the Signal Service, sighted
the column at quite a distance off, and sent the news to
Howard, but he informed me that his information was not
credited, and no attention was paid to it.
Col. James S. Robinson, of the Sad Ohio, said he was
aware of the advance of Jackson, and wondered why no
precaution was taken to meet it. When Rodes' division
(D. H. iiill's) arrived at the turnpike he formed his com¬
mand with Colquitt on the right, Doles next, with his left
resting on the turnpike. Rodes' old brigade (commanded
by O'Neal) on the left of the turnpike, with its right rest¬
ing on it. Iverson was on the extreme left. As the troops
advanced it was understood that the turnpike was to be the
guide, while Iverson was to get possession of Talley's house,
because that was supposed to command Howard's headquar¬
ters at Dowdall's Tavern.
Doles first struck Howard's outposts with two guns.
Flanking with two regiments, he swept right over the
Union troops.
The position at Talley's was taken, where five more
guns were lost ; which compelled Howard's reserve to retreat,
as it suffered from a reverse as well as an enfilading fire,
while his main line of battle was telescoped by Jackson's
advance. Devens was hurled on Schurz suddenly.
CHA NCELL ORSVILLE.
351
At Dowdall's Tavern Colston's division hurried forward
and joined in the pursuit. Schurz attempted to stem the
tide, but Rodes and Colston were both upon him, with A.
P. Hill hurrying forward to assist in the attack. Bushbeck
made a gallant stand, but he was soon overpowered and his
brigade swept back.
Howard and Schurz had appeared on the scene and
attempted to form a new line of battle. In the mean time
Sickles had been apprised of the disaster, and he hastily
marched back in the direction of Hazel Grove. Pleasonton,
who was with Sickles, returned with his cavalry to Hazel
Grove in advance of the latter. The flying battalions of
Howard were forcing their way in the direction of Chan-
cellorsville, unable to check the onward charge of Jackson's
corps, retreat being their only safety. Howard sent to
Pleasonton for assistance at that critical moment. Taking
in Howard's trouble at a glance, Pleasonton saw that some¬
thing desperate must be done to stay Jackson's victorious
columns.
Hazel Grove is near a half mile south of the Plank road.
From it a small road leads through the woods,* and inter¬
sects the Plank road near where Jackson fell. Pleasonton
directed the 8th Pennsylvania Cavalry to take that road
and fall on the enemy at the first favorable opportunity.
Every officer and man in the regiment well knew that
meant a ride to death, but not a lip quivered or a voice
trembled in the whole command. The regiment swept
through the woods at a full gallop, scattering the advancing
Confederates of Jackson's right. A small open field lies on
the south side of the Plank road, just west of where Jack¬
son was wounded. When the 8th Pennsylvania Cavalry
struck that open field it turned to the left, and charged into
the advancing columns of Confederate infantry, knowing
full well that they were thrown into that maelstrom to save
* Hazel Grove is the name of a farm west of Fairview. It takes its name
from the hazel bushes growing along a small stream that skirts the farm, and is a
branch of Lewis' Creek.
352
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Hooker's army, every man of them resolved to sell his life
as dearly as possible. This was, perhaps, their last day on
earth ; and the command to charge lessened the time to min¬
utes and seconds for some of them to live. In a moment more
they were on the infantry of the enemy, using sabers with
a valor that would have received the highest praise from
Wellington. Of the five officers who led the charge three
were killed—Maj. Peter Keenan, Capt. Charles Arrowsmith,
and Adjt. John Hazeltine Haddock. The horse of Capt. J.
Edward Carpenter was shot under him. Major Busy was
the only officer who escaped unharmed.
Pleasonton at once took command of all the artillery
near him, and taking a good position, prepared to receive
the enemy, who had quickly rallied after the fearful as¬
sault of the 8th Pennsylvania Cavalry. Having an abiding
faith in his double-shotted guns, he bade his gunners
reserve their fire until the enemy was in safe range,
and then directing" the guns to be depressed, gave the
order to fire. The awful carnage that followed would
blanch the cheek of ' ' the Lion-hearted. ' ' Although the
enemy had suffered so fearfully from Pleasonton's artillery,
yet the gaps in their ranks were closed up and they were
advanced again as if to get another taste of death.
Hooker seeing the great disaster to his right, rushed from
his headquarters, and, like Gustavus Adolphus at Leutzen,
brought up his old division, then commanded by Gen¬
eral Berry, to rush on the enemy and impale them on their
bayonets if they could not otherwise break their lines.
Berry and Williams advanced from Chancellorsville,
hoping to assist in reforming the Eleventh Corps, and to
check the advance of Jackson. Sickles, with his two divi¬
sions, Berry and Whipple, and Barlow's brigade of the
Eleventh Corps, were making great efforts to counter¬
march, to attack the right flank of Jackson. It was
a perilous place, and Hooker feared at one time that
Sickles' whole command was lost, and told one of his officers
to state his fears to Col. William Birney, who was a volun-
CHA NC ELL ORS VILLE.
353
teer aid on Hooker's staff during that battle. Colonel
Birney, whose brother, David B. Birney, commanded one
of Sickles' divisions, kept a faithful watch until the head
of Sickles' column made its appearance in the direction of
Hazel Grove.
If Jackson had been able to force his way in the direc¬
tion of Chancellorsville until his right occupied Fairview,
Geary's right would have been untenable, which would have
forced those on his left to give way ; and if Sickles' com¬
mand had not arrived in time to have struck Jackson's right
and rear, there is no telling where disaster to Hooker's
army would have ended that night. He might have been
swept from Chancellorsville. His attack, however, was
rather too late for that, and Pleasonton with great impet¬
uosity threw his small command on Jackson to make the
impression that he was encountering a heavy force. That
gave Sickles time to arrive and reënforce the ' ' gallant little
cavalry commander, ' ' and hold the enemy permanently in
check.
In his great haste to return, Whipple lost a part of his
ammunition (mule) train, and caissons of his batteries, and
two or three of his cannon, which were in the woods occu¬
pied by the enemy between Sickles' line of battle and the
Plank road. Both Jackson and Sickles were preparing for
a night attack at the same time. Sickles wanted to recover
Whipple's lost cannon and ammunition, and he also anti¬
cipated an advance of the enemy. In fact there was a
general expectancy all along the line that the battle would
be renewed during the night. Berry, Williams and Birney
formed two sides of a quadrangle as they prepared that
night to advance on Jackson. Berry and Williams moved
west, taking the Plank road as their guide, while Birney
formed from Hazel Grove and advanced north toward the
Plank road, striking the enemy on the right flank. Hooker
had given permission to Sickles to renew the attack, so
that when Colonel Hart, of Sickles' staff, returned from
headquarters with the request granted. Sickles directed
XXIII
354 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Birney to prepare his division for an advance. Ward's bri¬
gade formed the first line, with Hayman's following a
hundred yards in the rear. The guns were uncapped, and
orders were given not to fire until the Plank road and the
breastworks of Steinwehr, from which Bushbeck's brigade
had been driven, were retaken. It was a beautiful night ;
the moon, nearly full, made it light enough to enable the
troops to advance. The forest was thick enough to prevent
an alignment, but. the veterans of the Third Corps were
well disciplined for the perilous duty they were required to
perform, and while the artillery of the enemy, and as they
grew closer, the musketry in addition, stubbornly resisted
the advancing columns of Birney, yet that division forced its
way to the front until the enemy was compelled to attack
Berry's division and Knipe's brigade of Williams' division,
in the direction of Chancellorsville along the Plank road.
Williams' division, of the Twelfth Corps, which was
ordered back by Hooker when he gave up the advance on
Fredericksburg, returned to the position it had previously
occupied, its right resting on the Plank road with the left
near Fairview. There it connected with Geary's right,
which faced southeast, holding the same general direction
it did in the advance. The two divisions formed a right
angle near Fairview. In the evening the enemy approached
that point, and made so strong a disposition to attack it,
that Ruger, of Williams' division, was compelled to throw
forward the 27th Indiana and 3d Wisconsin to protect the
position.
On the following morning. May 2, Williams fol¬
lowed Sickles in his advance beyond Hazel Grove. Wil¬
liams was strongly feeling Anderson's lines, and really
pressing him back, when the news came that Jackson was
crushing Howard. With all possible haste Williams
marched back to take up his old position from Fairview to
the Plank road in order to assist Howard. It was with
difficulty that his command could form in line of battle
because of the flying fugitives of Howard's corps. Ber-
CHANCELL OES VIL L E.
355
ry's division of the Third Corps had taken a position on
the right of Williams, his left extending to the Plank
road. Berry overlapped a little, but Williams relieved
those troops. These two divisions hurried to the rescue of
Howard.
Ruger with his brigade held the left of the line near
Fairview. He had formed two lines of battle to save that
point ; the ^th Indiana on the left, the 2d Massachusetts
in the center, and the 3d Wisconsin on the right. The
13th New Jersey and 107th New York were in the second
line.
Hooker's position at that moment was very critical, and
Jackson came very near forcing him from Chancellorsville
in the evening. A statement from John Bresnahan, a brave
and gallant soldier of the 27th Indiana, who lost his arm
there next morning, says :
While approaching the scene just described, there was danger
of our regiment being swept off the field by the fleeing multitude ;
but Colonel Colgrove was equal to the emergency. The boys
touched elbows and moved to the top of a cleared ridge, about six
hundred yards to the left of our original works, where the regiment
halted, facing a ravine and heavy woods beyond, abcut three hun¬
dred yards from our line, out of which the men of Howard's corps
were pouring, with the enemy yelling after them. The enemy at
this point was checked by a well-directed fire of shell and canister
from Lewis' battery, which came very timely to our assistance.
Thus ended the desperate combat between the two
armies until Sickles began that famous night attack.
The battle at night was described so graphically, just
after it, by General Williams, that it is here inserted :
A tremendous roll of infantry fire, mingled with yellings and
shoutings almost diabolical and infernal, opened the conflict on the
side of Sickles' division. For some time my infantry and artillerj-
kept silent, and in the intervals of the musketry I could distinctly
hear the oaths and imprecations of the rebel officers, evidently hav¬
ing hard work to keep their men from stampeding. In the mean
time Sickles' artillery opened, firing over the heads of the infantry,
and the din of arms and inhuman yellings and cursings redoubled.
356 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
All at once Berry's division, across the road on our right, opened in
heavy volleys, and Knipe (commanding my right brigade next to
the Plank road on the south) followed suit. Best (chief of artillery
of the Twelfth Corps) began to thunder with his thirty-odd pieces.
In front and on the flanks, shell, and shot, and bullets were poured
into these woods, which were evidently crowded with rebel masses
preparing for the morning attack. Along our front and Sickles'
flank probably 15,000 or more musketry were belching an almost in¬
cessant stream of flame, while from the elevation just in the rear
of each line from forty to fifty pieces of artillery kept up an uninter¬
rupted roar, reechoed from the woods with a redoubled echo, from
the bursting shells which seemed to fill every part of them with fire
and fury. Human language can give no idea of such a scene—such
an infernal and yet sublime combination of sound, and flame, and
smoke, and dreadful yells of rage, of pain, of triumph, or of defiance.
Suddenly, almost on the instant, the tumult is hushed ; hardly a
voice can be heard. One would almost suppose that the combatants
were holding breath to listen for one another's movements. But the
contest was not renewed.
Thus spoke one of the bravest generals in praise of
others on the field.
Then came a scene that has been well pictured in his¬
tory. Jackson was never himself when he was not per¬
forming some daring deed. Sickles was not only holding
on to Hazel Grove, but Birney was pressing in Jackson's
right flank. Then Jackson determined to attack Berry be¬
fore Birney could reach the Plank road, and ordered A. P.
Hill's division, which had been in reserve, to advance and
relieve the front line of battle, which was then in confusion,
as the commands were badly mixed with each other and
decimated by casualties in the action. Jackson knew he
must continue his work that night, or the chances were
that he would pay dearly in the morning for his delay, for
Sickles was pressing his right flank from Hazel Grove with
Williams' and Berry's divisions, and Hay's brigade of
French's division confronting him, while Reynolds, with
the First Corps, closing well on his left flank, placed him
in an uncomfortable position, though a mistake the next
morning added fame to his name.
As Jackson was advancing along the Plank road to
CHA NCELLORS VIL L E.
357
reconnoiter the Union position, in order to direct A. P. Hill,
who was moving forward his division to make an attack on
Berry, he was mortally wounded. Doubleday says :
Pending this movement he rode out on the Plank road with part
of his staff and a few orderlies to reconnoiter, cautioning his pickets
not to fire on his return. When he came back new men had been
posted, and his approach was mistaken for the advance of Pleasonton's
cavalry. His own men fired into him with fatal effect. Nearly all
his escort were killed or wounded and he received three balls, which
shattered both arms. His horse ran towards the Union lines, and
although he succeeded in turning him back, he was dashed against
the trees and nearly unhorsed. He reached the Confederate lines
about the time our artillery again opened up the Plank road
with a fire which swept everything from its front. Several of his
attendants were killed and others wounded.
The Rev. James Power Smith, an aid on Jackson's staff,
says :
Regretting the necessity of relieving the troops in front. General
Jackson had ordered A. P. Hill's division, his third and reserve line
to be placed in front. While this change was being effected, impa¬
tient and anxious, the general rode forward on the turnpike, followed
by two or three of his staff and a number of couriers and signal ser¬
geants. He passed the swampy depression and began the ascent of
the hill toward Chancellorsville, when he came upon a line of the
Federal infantry lying on their arms. Fired at by one or two musk¬
ets (two musket balls from the enemy whistled over my head as I
came to the front), he turned and came back toward his line, upon
the side of the road to his left. As he rode near to the Confederate
troops just placed in position, and ignorant that he was in the front,
the left company began firing to the front, and two of his party fell
from their saddles dead.
Captain Boswell of the Engineers, and Sergeant Cunliffe of the
Signal Corps, spurring his horse across the road to his right, he was
met by a second volley from the right company of Pender's North
Carolina Brigade. Under this volley, when not two rods from the
troops, the general received three balls at the same instant. One
penetrated the palm of his right hand and was cut out that night
from the back of his hand. A second passed around the wrist of
the left arm and out through the left hand. But a third ball passed
through the left arm, half way from shoulder to elbow. The large
bone of the upper arm was splintered to the elbow-joint, and the
wound bled freely.
358
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
His horse turned quickly from the fire, through the thick bushes^
which swept the cap from the general's head, and scratched his-
forehead, leaving drops of blood to stain his face. As he lost his
hold upon the bridle-rein, he reeled from the saddle, and was caught
by the arms of Captain Milbourne of the Signal Corps. Laid upon
the ground, there came at once to his succor. Gen. A. P. Hill and
members of his staff. The writer reached his side a minute after to
find General Hill holding the head and shoulders of the wounded
chief. Cutting open the coat sleeve from wrist to shoulder, I found
the wound in the upper arm, and with my handkerchief I bound the
arm above the wound to stem the flow of blood. Couriers were sent
for Dr. Hunter McGuire, the surgeon of the corps and the general's
trusted friend, and for an ambulance. Being outside of our lines,
it was urgent that he should be moved at once. With difiiculty lit¬
ter bearers were brought from the line near by, the general placed
upon the litter, and carefully raised to the shoulder, I myself bear¬
ing one corner. A moment after, artillery from the Federal side
was opened upon us ; great broadsides thundered over the woods ;
hissing shells searched the dark thickets through, and shrapnela
swept the road along which we moved. Two or three steps farther,
and the litter-bearer at my side was struck and fell, but, as the litter
turned, Maj. Watkins Leigh, of Hill's staff, happily caught it. But
the fright of the men was so great that we were obliged to lay the
litter and its burden down upon the road. As the litter-bearers ran
to the cover of the trees, I threw myself by the general's side, and
held him firmly to the ground as he attempted to rise. Over us-
swept the rapid fire of shot and shell—grape-shot striking fire upon
the flinty rock of the road all around us, and sweeping from their
feet horses and men of the artillery just moved to the front. Soon
the firing veered to the other side of the road, and I sprang to my
feet, assisted the general to rise, passed my arm around him, and
with the wounded man's weight thrown heavily upon me, we for¬
sook the road. Entering the woods, he sank to the ground from
exhaustion, but the litter was soon brought, and again rallying a
few men, we essayed to carry him farther, when a second bearer fell
at my side. This time, with none to assist, the litter careened, and
the general fell to the ground with a groan of deep pain. Greatly
alarmed, I sprang to his head, and, lifting his head as a stray beam
of moonlight came through clouds and leaves, he opened his eyes
and wearily said, "Never mind me. Captain, never mind me!"
Raising him again to his feet, he was accosted by Brigadier General
Pender: "Oh, general, I hope you are not seriously wounded. I
will have to retire my troops to reform them, they are so much
broken by this fire." But Jackson, rallying his strength, with firm
CHA NCELLORS VIL L E.
359
voice said, "You must hold your ground, General Pender ; you must
hold your ground, sir;" and so uttered his last command on the
field.
Charles W. Hath way, Company K, ist Massachusetts,
says :
Their version agrees with the ist Massachusetts', with one ex¬
ception—^that is, which fired at the general first, they (the Confed¬
erates) or the Union troops. The Confederates claim -that he and
his guide were lost, and rode almost into our lines, but finding his
mistake retreated, and was first fired upon by his own men, and
some Union soldiers immediately in front returned the fire, and
the firing then became general.
We of the ist Massachusetts claim that he rode near our lines,
and was ordered to halt by Sergeant Dan Kelly, of Company K,
when he wheeled his horse and rode into the woods upon the right
of the Flank road, and a portion of the three left companies (H, K
and F) fired upon him.
The firing was immediately returned by the Confederate picket
line, and then the firing became general upon both sides, and our
artillery opened with double-shotted canister, which came too near
us for comfort, as it went crashing through the woods just above
our heads. It seems as if the woods were one sheet of flame for a
few minutes, the musketry rolling forth from both Union and Con¬
federate lines.
General Berry that night desiring to consult with Gen¬
eral Hooker, placed General Carr temporarily in command
of the division. Colonel Michael Burns perceiving the fact
that the enemy was massing on the front, sent for General
Carr. On arriving there. General Carr became convinced
that a night attack was contemplated soon ; he went to the
rear, and gave Colonel Osborn an order to open with all of
the artillery, which was promptly obeyed. General Carr
said :
Gen. Stonewall Jackson was killed in that night attack by our
men, and not by his own troops. From what I could see when called
to the advanced line by Colonel Burns, previous to the opening of
our artillery fire, I am satisfied General Jackson could not get in
front of his picket line without running into our lines.
Now the evidence on both sides is impartially laid
360 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
before the reader, and each one can arrive at his own con¬
clusions.
After hearing and studying carefully both sides, it is
difficult to decide which army wounded him. It seems the
historians of the North have accepted the theory that he was
killed by his own men. Both sides agree that he rode very
near to our picket line, and the members of the ist Mas¬
sachusetts claim that they fired the volley that ended his
life. This statement seems quite probable, and ordinarily
would be accepted, but the Confederates so stubbornly
claim it that manyare disposed to concede it to them.
They fully believe it, and the Comte de Paris, after weigh¬
ing the accounts on both sides, decided that Jackson was
wounded by his own men. I have avoided prejudice in the
matter, and there is new and positive evidence introduced
here never before laid before the public. If I have an
opinion at all in the matter, it is that Sickles' soldiers shot
him. General Carr stated to me in a letter, that the two
lines at that point were within twenty feet of each other.
It will always remain a mystery, and perhaps be the subject
of much discussion.
A. P. Hill, while leaning over Jackson, was wounded
by a shot from a section of Dimick's battery planted on
the Plank road, and supported by Berry's division. Jack¬
son and A. P. Hill both being wounded in the night battle,
it so discouraged the enemy that he withdrew to Dow-
dall's Tavern, when our troops reoccupied the position that
Bushbeck had been forced from, and Whipple recovered
all of his lost cannon and ammunition, besides capturing
some guns from the enemy.
Thus ended the battle on the first day at Chancellors-
ville. The first great advantage of the enemy had been
nearly overcome, and Jackson's corps, then without a com¬
mander, was in a very precarious condition. Reynolds,
who had left his (First) corps at United States Ford, went
in person to report to Hooker ; who, on learning the con¬
dition of affairs, sent an order to Doubleday, whom he
C//A NCELLORS VILLE.
361
had placed in temporary command, to march rapidly to the
front, where he was assigned a position on the right of the
troops of French's division, which was the extension of the
line from Fairview, with Williams on the left.
With the exception of occasional firing, the battle
ceased, and the weary soldiers lay on their arms for much-
needed rest. Hooker's dispositions for the battle next
morning were most admirable. Meade had taken a posi¬
tion on the right of Berry, while Reynolds, with the First
Corps, had arrived and occupied a position near the Bul¬
lock or White House on Meade's right, so that in the
morning Jackson's troops had Birney and Whipple on
their right flank, with Williams, Berry, Griffin, Sykes and
Humphreys in support of and confronting them, and Rey¬
nolds in position to move on the left flank. This was a crit¬
ical position for Jackson's corps to occupy, but, as General
Stannard said of some of the mistakes in the war, ' ' If they
had not been made the war would have been brought to a
close before the object had been accomplished for which it
was fought."
Instead of holding his lines firmly and pressing Jack¬
son's troops on the morning of the 3d, at early dawn,
before they had been reorganized by Stuart, who had
taken command at the request of General Rodes and
Jackson's adjutant general, and forcing them beyond the
Brock road, so that Anderson's left would have been un¬
protected and Stuart compelled to go to Todd's Tavern to
take the Catharpin road to reunite with Lee, Hooker
made no attempt to destroy his adversary. If the course
indicated had been taken Anderson and McLaws would
have been pressed back toward vSalem Church, while Sedg¬
wick was rapidly advancing from Fredericksburg. McLaws
and Anderson would have had to retreat either over the
Catharpin or taken the road at the Tabernacle Church for
Spottsylvania. But instead of using his army as it was
established in line of battle, Reynolds was never required
to advance or fire a gun. Sickles was ordered to bring
362 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Birney and Whipple from Hazel Grove and surrender the
ground they had so gallantly fought for at night But that
was not all ; the moment Sickles surrendered Hazel Grove,
the key to the position was gone, and it was clear Hooker
had made a fatal mistake.
A. P. Hill, who had been wounded, was superseded by
Heth. When the new commander of Hill's troops observed
Sickles retire in the direction of Fairview, he followed him
with the brigades of Lane, McGowan, Archer and Brock-
enborough. Some have censured Stuart for not pressing
more to the left the next morning, in the same direction
Jackson was the evening before. It was well he did not,
for Reynolds, with 17,000 meii, lay there ready to receive
him "with hospitable hands to bloody graves." But in¬
stead he pursued the much wiser course of pressing forward
his right under Heth, which connected him with Ander¬
son, and at the same time gave him Hazel Grove, from
where he could sweep Fairview with his artillery. When
Sickles received orders, at daylight Sunday morning, to
withdraw from Hazel Grove and proceed to Fairview,
Graham's brigade was directed to cover the movement and
bring up the rear. The enemy perceiving the movement
pressed Graham very hard, when Graham directed Hunt¬
ington's battery to open fire, which proved so effective that
the Confederates were handsomely repulsed. A battery
from Fairview was also directed to open on the enemy, as
Huntington's battery would again be attacked when it at¬
tempted to move. A brigade having also been instructed
to assist Graham, the enemy having opened the fight with
renewed zeal, Heth's troops leaving their breakfast and
flying to their guns with the cry, "Let us remember
Jackson."
Hooker had more troops than could be used to advan¬
tage at Chancellorsville. If he had reënforced Sedgwick
on the night of the 2d with two corps, Marye's Heights
could have been carried and held with ease. Hooker
might then have retired across United States Ford, and
CHA NCELL ORS VILL E.
363
taken command in person, left Lee in the Wilderness,
where he could have been held or compelled to retreat in
the direction of Gordonsville, when he could have fallen on
his rear with his splendid army and harassed and damaged
him as eifectually as the Russians did Napoleon on his re¬
treat from Moscow. But he neither reënforced Sedgwick
nor transferred his army. He did not even press Jackson's
troops next morning.
Archer, rendered desperate, attacked the position of
Fairview with maddened fury ; but Ruger's brigade, of
Williams' division, met his attack with a firmness that
hurled him back in the direction of Hazel Grove. Mc-
Gowan then advanced, but he suffered a similar fate to that
of Archer, and was compelled to retire. The artillery of
Hooker at Fairview was doing effective work. Graham's
brigade, of Birney's division, came to the assistance of Ru-
ger, it being evident that the enemy was making great ef¬
forts to carry Fairview. Stuart was advancing in three
lines of battle which, he says, became ' ' more or less merged
into one." Berry was pressing Stuart's left so hard that
Colquitt was sent from the right to the left to support Pen¬
der, while Iverson was ordered up to his assistance.
When the mist cleared away sufficiently for Stuart to
see the field, he observed that Hooker, in abandoning Hazel
Grove, gave away the key to the situation, and he at once
ordered 30 pieces of artillery to that point to concentrate
their fire on Fairview. Again Stuart ordered another as¬
sault all along the line. Why Hooker did not hurl Rey¬
nolds on Stuart's left flank, supported by Sykes and Griffin
on his left, is strange.
On the north of the road Berry had fallen and General
Hays was wounded and a prisoner. The contest was again
renewed at Fairview, and Whipple's division bore the brunt
of the struggle. The enemy made a desperate assault on
the salient point, which was nearly carried, when Colonel
Bowman ordered his brigade forward, and was again com¬
pelled to retire, though Bowman lost heavily. In the 12th
364 THE A EM y OF THE POTOMAC.
New Hampshire, Colonel Potter, Lieutenant Colonel
Marsh, Major Savage, Capt. A. J. Huntoon and others
were severely wounded ; of 537 men who went into the ac¬
tion, only 212 could be mustered for duty after it was over,
which shows the severity of the conflict.
McLaws was on the extreme right of the Confederate
line of battle, Wofford on the turnpike, with Kershaw on
his left and Semines on the Plank road leading to Fred¬
ericksburg. These brigades were hovering on Hancock's
front, though unable to give him battle. Anderson pressed
hard on Geary's front, which was all the assistance he was
able to give the assaulting columns from Hazel Grove and
Dowdall's Tavern, where Stuart was making such determined
charges to force his way to Chancellorsville. Again had
Hooker sent a division by the river road and turned Mc¬
Laws' right, and rolled him up on Anderson, who in turn
would have been compelled to retire in the direction of
Hazel Grove, the victory would have been his, for the
reason that he would then have been in possession of the
roads to Fredericksburg, on which Sedgwick was ap¬
proaching.
At Fairview Doles came around a hill and then follow¬
ing the bed of a small branch, was enabled to strike Wil¬
liams on the flank. A gap between Geary's right and
Williams' left made a favorable point for attack. Doles
was being driven back, when Paxton, in command of the
old Stonewall Brigade, came to his support.
Williams' division had been in the fight from early
morn ; a good part of it was out of ammunition, and the
men were faint from exhaustion. As his line wavered, it
left Graham's brigade uncovered ; but Birney seeing Gra¬
ham's danger, took a portion of Dayman's brigade and led
the charge in person to save him. Whipple's division had
been ordered to support Berry, but that gallant officer had
given his last command. When it was known that
Whipple was mortally wounded. General Revere marched
his brigade and a part of another out of the line of battle
GEN. W. J. SEWELL.
CHA NC ELL ORS VILLE.
365
in the direction of United States Ford. He was a very
brave officer, and his action on that occasion was most
singular. Doubleday, in his work, says : ' ' General Revere,
probably considering further contest hopeless, led his
men out of the action without authority. ' ' In the mean
time Gen. J. B. Carr had assumed command of the division,
and sent a staff officer to order Revere to return to his
place in line of battle. But the break in the line had
already produced serious results, as the enemy was on the
alert to take advantage of every mistake.
The division also suffered another severe loss. General
Mott, who commanded the Third Brigade of the division
was wounded. Before Capt. T. W. Bayre, the assistant
adjutant general, could select a brigade commander, the
two ranking colonels—Burling and Park, had been
wounded ; therefore Colonel Sewell, of the 5th New Jersey,
was assigned to the command. It proved a very fortunate
selection, as the brigade came out of the battle with a
record second to none in the history of the war. The
enemy made desperate efforts at that point to break the
Union line, and hurled regiment after regiment on young
Sewell, only to sacrifice their colors. The 5th New Jersey
took three stands of colors, and the 7th took five ; while
the brigade took 1,000 prisoners. Such heroic service
richly deserves and has obtained a place in history. The
brigade was composed of the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th New
Jersey, the 2d New York, and 115th Pennsylvania. Its
ammunition was nearly exhausted, and the enemy turned
Sewell's right flank, so that he was exposed to a strong en¬
filading fire. Hurrying to that point he requested Colonel
McAllister, of the nth New Jersey, to come to his assist¬
ance, which was promptly responded to by a charge of that
regiment. The enemy was forced back, but the position
could not be long held without reënforcements, for which
Sickles was appealed to by Sewell, but the general simply
replied that every man of the Third Corps was in line of
battle, and he could give him no aid. The line at that
366
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
point was slowly retired behind the batteries, but Sewell,
thinking that another attack might break the enemy's
lines, again ordered a charge at double quick. He retook
the works thrown up for the protection of our guns, and
planted the colors of the brigade on the parapet. When
the last round of ammunition was fired with no prospect of
assistance, Sewell retired the brigade to the rear of the
Chancellor House, where he reported to General Carr in
command of the division.
The artillery of the enemy posted on the Plank road
was planting its shells all around the Chancellor House,
while the enemy at Hazel Grove, prompted with a hope that
victory would soon be his, was thundering away at Fair-
view. Sickles seeing him make another advance, sent
Major Tremaine again for assistance, but when he arrived
he found the commander-in-chief had been stunned with
a shell, and no one was at headquarters to hear his request.
General Bntterfield, his chief of staff, was^ at Falmouth ;
Warren had gone to Sedgwick ; General Van Alen thought
he had no authority to act, and Couch, the senior corps
commander, was not at headquarters. Perry's brigade, on
the left of Anderson, had ascended Lewis' Creek and joined
with Archer in the attack on Fairview. General Lee had
evidently been watching that vital point, as he accompanied
Perry and Archer, and gave the order to renew the at¬
tack. Geary's right was forced back, and the whole Union
line facing west gave way and retired in the direction of
the Chancellor House, notwithstanding the last stubborn
fight made by Carr, as well as by Graham and Whipple,
who had gone to Carr's relief. The Union line was
defeated and compelled to retire. Major Tremaine was
again sent to headquarters for aid, but had no better suc¬
cess than before. Meade was present, and the request of
Sickles, through Major Tremaine, was referred to him, but
he felt a delicacy of assuming the responsibility at that
critical moment ; perhaps for the reason that three corps,
the First, Fifth and Eleventh, had remained idle all the
CHA NCELLORS VIL L E.
367
morning to the full knowledge of the commander-in-chief,
whereas, if the First and Fifth had been thrown on Stuart's
left flank, he would have been crushed at once ; or, as
General Sickles said to me, ' ' In fifteen minutes. ' '
Meade was one of the junior corps commanders. It is
true he had commanded the First .Corps for twelve days,
but that was a temporary assignment on the field, when
Hooker was wounded at Antietam. Couch, Slocum and
Reynolds all ranked Meade, and were on the battlefield,
and his declination to virtually assume command was cer¬
tainly made in good taste, although the service greatly
suffered by it at that critical moment. Couch afterwards
declined to assume command pending Hooker's prospect of
an early recovery.
Hooker rallied enough to understand that his army was
suffering a great defeat—that it was his Austerlitz—and he
begged Geary to retake the position he had retired from,
and promised him if he would that he would give him sup¬
port at once. The soldiers of Geary's division once more
advanced, and really retook their old position and held it
for some time, but their ranks were melting away from a
concentrated fire from the enemy, which finally compelled
them to yield in their weakness, and they once more retired
never to advance again. Even at that late and critical
moment, if the First Corps, under Reynolds, and the Fifth,
under Meade, had advanced on Stuart's left flank and rear,
defeat would have been turned into victory. So anxious
was Doubleday, who commanded a division of the corps,
to assist, that he begged Reynolds to get orders to at¬
tack. Reynolds, who was a great soldier, was chafing for
an opportunity to crush Stuart's left and thereby relieve
Sickles and Slocum. Finally he ordered Doubleday to make
a reconnoissance. Accordingly Doubleday directed Roy
Stone to take his brigade and advance in the direction of
the Plank road, which resulted in finding no enemy in force
in their front, but the corps never received orders to
advance.
368 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Sickles, although he had been just placed in command
of a corps for the first time, had fought with great valor and
handled his corps with a skill that gave his men confidence.
So the Third Corps, although it was forced back to the
Chancellor House, would have rallied with spirit and dash
and again retaken their works just abandoned and in the
hands of the enemy, but for the fact that the spirit of
Hooker was gone, and he mounted his horse and rode
silently to the rear, where the new line was being formed
by Couch, and thus abandoned the roads to Fredericksburg
over which he had ordered Sedgwick to advance that morn¬
ing and form a junction with him. No one desired to in¬
form him of his real mental condition, though afterwards
he said to Doubleday : ' ' That for once he lost confidence
in Hooker;" and there was no doubt that his injury was
far worse than was supposed at the time.
Anderson, Perry, and Archer rushed on to Fairview for
the purpose of occupying that point, lest Hooker might
attempt to retake it with fresh troops.
The Confederate artillery was hastily brought from
Hazel Grove and planted at Fairview, where it had a short
and sweeping range on the Union troops around the Chan¬
cellor House, as a temporary line of battle was formed there
to aid in directing the commands to the new position on a
line with the Bullock or White House. The Chancellor
House was on fire from the shells of the enemy, and even
the woods, where our wounded lay unable to escape.
Sickles, Knipe, and other officers were attempting to
prevent a panic, for the commands were all in confusion
and consequently uncontrollable. The Chancellor House
was rapidly burning to the ground, while the woods in the
front where our wounded lay were on fire, and the flames
rapidly approaching them as they lay helpless on the
ground.
Great confusion prevailed in the ranks of both armies,
and it took a considerable time for the soldiers to find
their commands. The Confederate forces came on like
CHA NCELLORS VILLE.
369
a mob, the three lines being merged into one. Couch had
ample time to form on the new line selected, for the enemy
was slow to pursue, even with the prestige of victory on his
side, which was full evidence that the Confederate troops
were exhausted.
Reynolds held the right and Meade next, while Sickles
occupied the apex between Meade and Couch, and Slocum's
position was between Couch and Howard, the latter's left
resting on the Rappahannock.
hee felt Hooker's new position cautiously. He pos-.
sessed a wily shrewdness that indicated danger, and while
he had recklessly hurled his trooj)S on Hooker at Chancel-
lorsville, where he knew the Union commander was cooped
up in a small area, with his lines of battle in almost every
conceivable shape, he could neither successfully resist an
attack nor with confidence advance ; he therefore moved on
the Union position with timidity. While he was thus feel¬
ing Hooker's new line his attention was called to the battle
at Fredericksburg between Sedgwick and Early. A new
danger was threatening him in an unexpected quarter, for he
knew that Sedgwick had, in addition to the Sixth Corps, the
division of Gibbon of the Second Corps, while Early only
had his division of four brigades—Hay's, Hoke's, William
Smith's, and Gordon's, with Barkesdale's brigade of Mc-
Eaws' division. Wilcox was near Banks' Ford, from which
point he could reënforce Early ; but with his assistance it
would give Early only six brigades against four divisions,
composed of eleven brigades, under Sedgwick, and, as a
celebrated general once said, ' ' God was always on the side
of the largest army. ' ' Lee was a little afraid that Early
might receive unkind treatment at the hands of Sedgwick ;
so he desisted from pressing Hooker until he could hear from
Fredericksburg. Warren had been dispatched by Hooker
to go to Sedgwick in person and direct him to attack Early
on the morning of the 3d and then make all possible haste
in the direction of Chancellorsville. At this time Sedg¬
wick was at Hamilton's Crossing with his corps, ready
XXIV
370
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
to pursue Early on the Bowling Green road. The com¬
mander of the Sixth Corps was entirely ignorant of
what had transpired on Hooker's right, and even then
did not know that a most terrible battle was going on at
night while he was reading the following order from
Hooker :
Headquarters Army of the Potomac,
May 2, 1863, 9 p.m.
The major general commanding directs that General Sedgwick
cross the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg on the receipt of this
order and at once take up his line of march on the Chancellorsville
road until you connect with us, and he will attack and destroy any
force he may fall in with on the road. He will leave all his trains,
except the pack-train of small ammunition, and march to be in our
vicinity at daylight. He will probably fall upon the rear of the
forces commanded by General Lee, and between us we will use him
up. Send word to General Gibbon to take possession of Fredericks¬
burg. Be sure not' to fail. Deliver this by your swiftest messenger.
Send word that it is delivered to General Sedgwick.
J. H. Van Alen,
Brigadier General and Aid-de-Camp.
To General Butterfield.
General Sedgwick, in his report, says :
The order to cross at Fredericksburg found me with my entire
command on the south bank of the river, ready to pursue by the
Bowling Green road. To recross for the purpose of crossing again at
Fredericksburg, where no bridges had been laid, would have occu¬
pied until long after daylight. I commenced, therefore, to move by
the flank in the direction of Fredericksbnrg, on the Bowling Green
road ; General Newton taking the advance, followed by the Light
Brigade and Howe's division.
The enemy was on the alert, and resisted his advance
with stubbornness, skirmishing, and falling back when
compelled to, in the direction of Fredericksbnrg. At the
Bernard House an attempt was made to surprise the Con¬
federate forces and capture the heights; but it did not
succeed. Then Sedgwick, when he reached Fredericks¬
burg, in the gray of the morning, attempted to carry
Marye's Heights by surprise before the fog had lifted
CHANCELLORSVILLE.
371
enough to disclose the advance' of his troops ; but Early
was fully alarmed by his night march, and was prepared for
an assault at any moment; consequently when Wheaton
and Shaler advanced in the early morn they were allowed
to approach within twenty yards of the enemy's works, at
which point they received a sudden and destructive fire.
The repulse of Wheaton ^nd Shaler was a great disap¬
pointment to Sedgwick, who remembered the 13th of
December, when charge after charge was made to carry the
heights that were then frowning on him, as if to say ; "hurl
not your soldiers against me again." But Sedgwick had
Hooker's order to come to him, and his faithful friend.
General Warren, was there watching and superintending
every move with a view of aiding Sedgwick in his en¬
deavors to comply with that order.
Two attempts had failed, but it was still hoped that the
left flank of the enemy's position could be turned. Gib¬
bon, who had succeeded in getting a bridge thrown across
the river at the Lacy House, had marched over, when he was
directed to move to the right, which would have thrown
him on the Confederate left, but that the bridge across the
canal had been removed, and he was therefore compelled
to repair it under heavy artillery fire. As the canal greatly
impeded the advance of both the right and center grand
divisions in the battle in December, it is a great wonder
that the precaution had not been taken by Sedgwick or
Gibbon to collect planks enough in Fredericksburg before
the division started, .carry them at the head of the col¬
umn, lay them almost in an instant, and then proceed.
But instead of that, the column was halted, and men sent
to the nearest house, some little distance away, to tear off
its boards to make the bridge. Had a brigade, or even a
regiment, of Gibbon's men crossed over the canal, it might
have saved, or aided in saving, a direct assault in front,
which cost Sedgwick a thousand men before noon.
When the flank movement of Gibbon's failed, Newton
was ordered to prepare to charge the heights in front, where
372
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
our columns had suffered so much a few months before,
Howe was ordered to move to the left of Hazel Run with
his division, while Brooks remained near Hamilton's
Crossing.
But it fell to Newton's lot to bear the brunt of the
battle, as Gibbon could neither advance on the right, nor
could Howe on the left carry the heights in his front, as
the enemy enfiladed him from the second line of works,
while he advanced on the first. Newton's division was
formed, Burnham's brigade being on the left, the right
wing of the 5th Wisconsin, under Colonel Allen, advanced
as skirmishers, closely followed the 31st New York on the
left, and the 6th Maine on the right ; while the left wing
of the 5th Wisconsin formed the third line. On the left of
Burnham was the Vermont brigade of Howe's division
under General Grant. Grant, an honor to the famous
name, was appointed Assistant Secretary of War under
Proctor, a deserved recognition of one of the most gallant
Union soldiers. On the right of the Light Brigade, under
Colonel Burnham, was the 7th Massachusetts, Colonel Johns,
and the 36th New York, Colonel Walsh. The right col¬
umn of Newton's division near the Plank road was headed
by the 6ist Pennsylvania, Colonel Spear ; the 43d New
York, Colonel Baker, supported by the Sid Pennsylvania,
and the 67th New York (the ist Long Island). Doubleday
says :
Spear's column, advancing through a narrow gorge, was broken
and enfiladed by the artillery—indeed almost literally swept away,
and Spear himself was compelled to advance up a broken, stony
gulch, swept by two rebel howitzers. The head of his column was
twice broken, but he rallied each time. He was then badly wounded,
and there was a brief pause, but Colonel Walsh, of the 36th New
York, rallied the men again, and they kept straight on over the
works.
Just as these two columns on the right received such
a heavy volley from the enemy Colonel Burnham - was
wounded, and fell from his horse, when Colonel Allen, of
the 5th Wisconsin, assumed command of the brigade, and
CHANCELLO RS VILLE.
373
said to the men, "When the signal 'forward' is given, you
will start at double quick, you will not fire a gun, and you
will not stop until you get the order to halt. You will
never get that order." The charge was then sounded,
when every man in the first line, with a cheer which reechoed
from the heights, sprang like a tiger from his lair, followed
at thirty steps by the second and third lines. That was
signal enough to set all the enginery of war in motion.
The flánking batteries on Tee's Hill enfiladed the lines of
the Tight Brigade with shell and shrapnel ; the batteries on
the right poured in their volleys of canièter, while the rifle-
pits, in front and on the flanks, threw torrents of leaden
hail with deadly precision.
As the right wing of the 5th Wisconsin passed over
the fatal ground in December, the 6th Maine pressed
them closely, and both regiments were rushing forward to
plant their colors first on the enemy's works. In the mean
time the left wing of the 5th Wisconsin made a dash and
joined the first line and mingled with the troops of the 31st
New York and 6th Maine. When the stone wall was
reached a short rest was taken before the parapet above
was attacked, then the 6th Maine had the honor of plant¬
ing its colors first on the enemy's redoubts.
Grant's Vermont Brigade of Howe's division, at the
time of Newton's advance, was a little to the left, with his
right resting on Hazel Run, and in the attack one regi¬
ment—the 6th Vermont—obliqued to the right and became
engaged with Newton's division, and was the second regi¬
ment that gained Marye's Heights. The rest of the Ver¬
mont brigade charged up the principal heights and cap¬
tured several pieces of artillery, and drove the enemy from
his commanding position. In this attack the 2d Vermont
alone lost 106 killed and wounded.
Howe carried the works in his front, and the heights
that Burnside had attempted to take only a few months be¬
fore were in the possession of Sedgwick.
Early was evidently surprised at the result, as he hastily
374 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
retreated on the Telegraph road in the direction of Rich¬
mond with part of his command, while Hays and Wilcox
took the Plank road in the direction of Chancellorsville.
Sedgwick decided to order up Brooks from near Frank¬
lin's Crossing before he took the line of march to attempt
to join Hooker. That gave Hays an opportunity to make
a detour around Sedgwick, in order that he might join
Early, and Wilcox retired toward Salem Church on the
Plank road, to await the advance of Sedgwick. When
Brooks came up he was directed to take the advance, as his
troops had not beeri engaged. The many delays which oc¬
curred to annoy Sedgwick had greatly worn away the day,
and the advance was made with great caution.
In the third volume of the Comte de Paris, he thus
speaks of the second battle of Fredericksburg :
At half-past eleven Sedgwick was in possession of the famous
heights which for three months the two armies had been ac¬
customed to look upon as impregnable. The assault had cost him
about i,ooo men. The center of the enemy's line, too much ex¬
tended for the number of its defenders, had been broken, and the
latter, having dispersed north and south, were hastily retreating,
leaving prisoners, cannon, and what was still more precious, the
possession of the Chancellorsville road, in the hands of the assail¬
ants. It was of great importance to take immediate advantage of
this. The sound of Hooker's cannon was no longer heard, but this
could afford no excuse for delay. Unfortunately, Sedgwick insisted
upon pushing Brooks' division to the front line, and as the latter
was still near the bridges, this inexcusable maneuver made him lose
nearly four hours.
GibbtDu's division, on the extreme right, was in very good
condition, and as it was near the Plank road, over which
Hays and Wilcox had retired with their brigades, he
might have given a very harassing and damaging pursuit.
Newton's division had suffered severely, and not only
needed but deserved to be left at Fredericksburg perform¬
ing guard duty, a position assigned to Gibbon ; he left one
brigade in the city with outposts on the heights ; the other
two brigades returned to the left side of the river to protect
CHANCELL ORS VILLE.
375
stores at Falmouth. With the exception of the Vermont
Brigade, Howe's division had suffered but slightly.
If Newton's division had been left at Fredericksburg
and Gibbon had rapidly followed Hays and Wilcox, with
Howe closely supporting him, and Brooks making a forced
march to sustain Gibbon and Howe, it seems hardly proba¬
ble that Wilcox could have made a stand at Landram's
blacksmith shop, which is about half a mile east of Salem
Church. In fact, it seems barely possible for Wilcox to
have made a successful stand before McLaws had united
with him ; and that would have been near the eastern edge
of the Wilderness, with Sedgwick occupying a position in
an open plateau, where he could have welcomed the enemy
with no larger a force than McLaws' division and Wilcox's
brigade, and he could not have been outnumbered if he
used his artillery to advantage.
The battle would have been so near to Hooker's left,
under Howard, that it would have certainly been an incen¬
tive to press forward in the direction of the battle to assist
Sedgwick, which would have revealed the fact that there
was nothing in front of Howard and Slocum but a thin
line that afternoon while Sedgwick was fighting at Salem
Church. When McLaws advanced to Salem Church An¬
derson's division was massed at the Mine Run and River
road ; Heth took Anderson's position there and held it
until the battle was over. Sedgwick resolved to put
Brooks in the advance, with Bartlett's brigade on the left
of the Plank road, in two lines of battle, and the New
Jersey Brigade, under Col. Henry W. Brown, was forméd
on the right of the road in similar order. Brooks' ad¬
vance was 'stubbornly contested, and the first stand màde
was at Landram's blacksmith shop, which was seemingly
to give Wilcox an opportunity to select a line of battle in
the rear or west of Salem Church. This was the only posi¬
tion the enemy could select to give him the advantage east
of the Wilderness. From Landram's shop the ground is
quite level until the edge of a thick undergrowth and wood
376 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
is reached, which is not more than a quarter of a mile wide,
then there is a rise in front of the church, which faces east.
The church itself was an assistance to the enemy, being
built of brick and standing so far to the left that our bat¬
teries were unable to reach it. In addition a log school-
house stood southeast of the church, which afforded shelter
for the Confederate sharpshooters.
A temporary breastwork had been hastily thrown up
between the church and schoolhouse running north across
the road. It was in front of this position that Bartlett
formed his brigade, with the 5th Maine on the left, and the
99th Pennsylvania on the right of the 5th Maine, with the
12 ist New York extending north in the direction of the
Plank road, the i6th New York supporting. With this
formation Bartlett advanced, when a most sanguinary strug¬
gle took place.
Finding that the 23d New Jersey was failing under the
deadly fire, Bartlett ordered in the i6th New York, and
carried the log schoolhouse and was forcing back the enemy
from the church when McLaws' troops arrived just in time
to save the day on the left.
The First Brigade of Brooks' division, under Colonel
Brown, formed on the right of Bartlett, with the 23d New
Jersey, under Colonel Grubb, on the left of the Plank road
and the ist and 3d New Jersey on the right of it. The 2d
New York had occupied the advance as a slÂrmish line
until it reached the Tabernacle Church, where it was
passed by the regular line of battle. This resistance
brought Colonel Penrose with the 15th New Jersey and
four companies of the 2d to the front. Sedgwick, seeing
that Penrose had arrived, directed him to the right of the
3d, hoping to turn the enemy's left if possible, but Colonel
Brown, commanding the brigade, met Colonel Penrose and
ordered him to support the 3d Regiment, as it was evident
that it could not hold its position without assistance. Pen¬
rose moved up in support, and soon ordered his regiment—
the 15th New Jersey—to take the place of the 3d on the
CHA NCELLORS VILLE.
377
front line of battle, the former line having been with¬
drawn.
The New Jersey Brigade lost heavily in officers and
men. Colonel Brown, commanding the brigade, was
wounded, and Col. M. W. Collett, of the ist New Jersey,
was killed. General Newton was closely supporting Brooks,
though his division was marching by the flank, and when
the engagement began at Salem Church it required time to
get into position on the right of Brooks.
The Second and Third Brigades of Newton, under Col.
William H. Brown and Gen. Frank Wheaton, were en¬
gaged, and suffered heavy losses. It was not long before
Brooks was wounded, when Eustis assumed command of
the brigade. Shaler's brigade had suffered so severely in
the charge on Marye's Heights that it was held in reserve.
When McEaws arrived at Salem Church he found Wil¬
cox in line of battle across the Plank road. He immedi¬
ately placed Woffbrd on the right, with Kershaw between
them. Mahone, who came up on Wilcox's left, was di¬
rected to move more toward the river, so that Semmes
could form on the left of Wilcox. This made a heavy line
of battle for Sedgwick to face. Bartlett's brigade faced
Woffbrd's, Kershaw's, and a part of Wilcox's commands,
while the New Jersey Brigade faced Wilcox's left and
Semmes'. Mahone faced Newton, and the determined attack
made by the latter endangered Mahone so much that Mc-
Laws ordered Woffbrd to send reënforcements to him. It
was a short but sanguinary action, in which neither side
gained the mastery. Night coming on put an end to' the
engagement. The two armies lay on their arms facing
each other, expecting to renew it early next morning.
Everything being quiet along Hooker's front, the battle at
Salem Church could be distinctly heard by the army lying
idle under Hooker. If any effbrt had been made to feel the
enemy on Howard's front, the fact would have been devel¬
oped that McLaws had gone to fight Sedgwick, leaving
Stuart and Anderson alone on Hooker's whole front. Had
378 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Howard taken the River road he would have found no
troops to oppose his advance but Anderson's division at
the crossing of the Mine and River roads, which could
have been easily brushed away with his whole corps. Then
he could have continued on the River road until he arrived
opposite Mahone ; then facing south, he could have struck
him on the left flank, and rolled him upon Semmes and
Wilcox, which would have enabled Newton and Brooks to
renew the attack with new spirit and bright hopes, and
forced McLaws and Wilcox from their strong position at
Salem Church. Failing to attempt to assist Sedgwick,
whose guns were loudly calling for help in close proximity
to Hooker's left, it would seem as if the night would bring
forth a strong resolution to act in some decided way, either
to move forward and burst the fetters that environed his
army, which Hooker could do by ordering the troops to
make an attack all along the line, for Anderson had de¬
serted Hooker's front to go and assist in vanquishing Sedg¬
wick, leaving only Stuart to cover the whole of Hooker's
front from Reynolds' right to Howard's left, a distance of
miles, compelling him to make his line so thin that Kil-
patrick or Custer with a squadron of cavalry could have
pierced it at almost any point. Or Hooker could have
transferred a part or the whole of his army to the aid of
Sedgwick by the United States Ford, which was in his
possession and in his rear, out of view of the enemy,
and marching down the left bank of the Rappahannock,
recrossing at Banks' Ford, and forming on Newton's right,
havê compelled Mahone to give way. The enemy was so
weak on Hooker's front that even his whole army could
have retired without opposition. The position of the
United States Ford was such that troops could have
quietly marched under cover of the darkness of the night
and not been observed or discovered until the next morn¬
ing, for at that very moment Lee was preparing to with¬
draw Anderson for the purpose of environing Sedgwick at
Salem Church.
CHANCELLO RS VILLE.
379
McLaws sent Maj. E. L. Costin to find Early, and inform
him of the situation. When Sedgwick carried the works
on Marye's Heights Early's force was cut in two. Hays
retreated to the right over the Plank road, whik Early,
with the rest of his command, retreated down the Tele¬
graph road, supposing he would be pursued by Sedgwick,
which was Hooker's original order. Being disappointed in
this he halted and anxiously awaited developments. When
Major Costin came to him with news from McEaws, he at
once prepared to return to reoccupy Marye's Heights, which
should have been held by Gibbon instead of leaving a
brigade in Fredericksburg with simply outposts to occupy
the works captured from the enemy, with the other two
brigades placed on the north side of the Rappahannock.
The order of the division should have been reversed, that
is. Gibbon's division should have occupied the position de¬
serted by the enemy, and guards sent to Falmouth to pro¬
tect the stores. There was no danger of the enemy
surprising and capturing them, for he had no transports
with which to cross the river below ; Lee could not cross
the Potomac below Washington after the second battle of
Bull Run for the same reason, and was compelled to seek a
crossing near Harper's Ferry, where the river was ford-
able. Hooker not only wasted the night of the 3d without
attempting to reënforce Sedgwick, but the next day wit¬
nessed the same inactivity. He was not himself. Though
he could have withdrawn his troops better at night, there
was really no time during the forenoon of the 4th that he
could not have retired at his own pleasure, with scarcely
a feeble resistance. Only Stuart remained in his front
with a corps that had fought two days, which, while it
had been victorious, had suffered great losses, its commander
lying dangerously wounded in the rear, and many of its
soldiers wounded and killed. Stuart sought no battle with
Hooker. He simply remained in his front to deceive him
until Lee, who had gone with McLaws and Anderson, could
drive Sedgwick across the Rappahannock, or, what was
380 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
better, capture him. Lee intended to hold McLaws at
Salem Church with his division, with Wilcox's brigade
facing east. Anderson's division was to connect with
Early's left and face north, there being a large gap between
Anderson's left and McLaws' right, which it was thought
would close up when the attack was made ; while Early
faced west, forming three sides of a quadrangle, and the
Rappahannock made the fourth.
Sedgwick was fully aware of the critical condition he
was in. Leaving Newton to face McLaws, he ordered
Brooks to refuse back his left and face Anderson, while
Howe was directed to face east and confront Early.
Thus Lee labored assiduously to environ the position of
Sedgwick, either for his destruction or expulsion from the
south side of the river.
Sedgwick, on his part, made every preparation possible
to meet the attack from so vastly superior a force. The
sun was low in the west, and no assistance had come to
Sedgwick from Hooker, nor had there been any effort to
relieve him by advancing on Stuart, who could have been
swept out of existence the moment a forward movement
had been ordered. Howard, on the left, could have taken
the river road and forced Heth back and fallen on McLaws'
left, while Slocum could have marched on the old turnpike,
with Couch on the Plank road, leaving Sickles, Meade,
and Reynolds to pursue Stuart, for Reynolds alone with the
First Corps could have defeated him.
Those three corps—the First, Third and Fifth—would
have sent Stuart back over the groiind lost by Howard,
while Howard, Slocum, and Couch would have relieved
Newton and forced McLaws to retreat south toward the
Brock road, and Hooker's great hopes would have been
realized ; but he silently held his position near Chancellors-
ville while Sedgwick was attacked and fought another
desperate engagement on the evening of the 4th without
assistance, although six corps lay within five or six miles,
and half of them had never participated in the battle.
CHANCELLO RS VILLE.
381
Hooker not being attacked on the 4th, presumed or
feared that Lee was planning to attack Sedgwick, and
Griffin, with his division of the Fifth Corps, was ordered to
make a demonstration to the right of Bullock's house. In
this action Griffin lost about 500 men without accomplish¬
ing anything of value to the commander. Reynolds, on the
extreme right, remained idle, although his soldiers were
chafing for orders to attack the enemy. He could have
easily turned Stuart's left flank and compelled him to re¬
treat ; but one division of the Fifth Corps was ordered to
advance with no support on the right or left. *
Early advanced with Hoke on the left. Hays in the
center, and Gordon .on the right, followed by Barksdale and
Smith. Early, thinking he could turn the left flank of
Howe and cut him off from Banks' Ford, advanced Smith
on the right for that purpose, but he met with a repulse,
besides a heavy loss of prisoners.
Grant's Vermont brigade was" on the left of Howe's
line. In his report, Grant says :
While this was transpiring on the right, and the enemy were
gaining the crest in front of the main line and endeavoring to get
possession of the skirt of woods in our front, by direction of the
general commanding the division I ordered Lieutenant Colonel
Martindale to throw the 26th New Jersey to the front and right, to
hold possession of the ravine, and to prevent, if possible, the enemy
from gaining the woods ; and at the same time Colonel Walbridge,
of the 2d Vermont, was ordered to move to the left, to the former
position of the 26th New Jersey, and Colonel Seaver, 3d Vermont, to
take the position just occupied by the 2d Vermont, thus leaving the
6th Vermont and the battery on the right. The efforts of Lieutenant
* Fredericksburg, Va., February 26, 1889.
Sir:—Yours to band and contents noted. In regard to the Bullock House, I
would state that the Bullock House and the White House are one and the same,
and was formerly owned by Col. Lorman Chancellor. He gave it the name of
" Woodlawn," and sold it to a man by the name of E. F. Bullock, and it was called
the Bullock House until the war, and to my knowledge was not known as the
White House until after the battle of Chancellorsville.
Yes Chancellor.
To J. H. Stine, Esq.
382
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Colonel Martindale at this juncture were not entirely successful ; the
left of the regiment broke and came back in confusion. The enemy
gained the skirt of woods, and in great force bore directly toward
the 2d Vermont, when that regiment rose, and poured a well-
directed fire into the enemy's front, and continued it with remark¬
able rapidity. This regiment was supplied with new waterproof
cartridges, and the firing was so rapid as to resemble a continuation
of volleys. The 26th New Jersey passed away from the front, so
that the 3d Vermont opened, and with the 2d Vermont poured its
terrible fire full upon the already confused masses of the enemy.
The enemy were here checked, broken, and held at bay. Still farther
to the left, as the enemy advanced, the 4th Vermont became engaged.
As the enemy appeared obliquely, the 4th Vermont would have been
exposed to a cross fire, but Colonel Stoughton, with great coolness,
threw back his right wing, presenting a bold front, and opened a
murderous fire. The enemy still pressed forvC^ard, gaining the ravine
in front of the 4th Vermont, and at the same time a force farther to
the left threatened to turn our left and cut us off from the river.
Colonel Stoughton now changed front forward to his original posi¬
tion and poured in fresh volleys, holding the enemy in check. In
the mean time the 5th Vernjont had arrived from th'e right, and been
posted behind the crest to support the 2d and 3d Vermont ; but, per¬
ceiving that Colonels Walbridge and Seaver were able to hold their
own, I ordered Lieutenant Colonel Lewis to take the 5th Vermont
farther to the left, and to a position completely commanding the
ravine and crest to the left, should the enemy succeed in fianking
the 4th Vermont.
At this time the enemy had a large force in front of our entire
line, attempting with desperate vigor to turn it ; but the Vermont
regiments remained firm and unbroken, closely hugging the crest
and literall}' presenting a wall of fire. Baffled in his efforts to break
our line, and perceiving that the battery on our right had changed
its position, the enemy rallied, and made an attempt to turn our
right, but the 6th Vermont was there. The enemy rushed desper¬
ately forward, and nearly gained the crest immediately in front of
the 6th Vermont, when that regiment suddenly rose and gave him a
terrible volley, and immediately charged upon him down the slope
and through the ravine and on to the crest which had been pre¬
viously held by the Third Brigade. In the mean time Lieutenant
Colonel Martindale, with great gallantry and perseverance, rallied
the 26th New Jersey, and then charged down on the right of the 6th
Vermont. The enemy was utterly routed.
Thus is officially and graphically told the struggle on
CHA NC ELL ORS VILLE.
383
the left of Howe's line, where the Confederates made des¬
perate attempts to get possession of Banks' Ford, and
prevent Sedgwick from crossing to the north side of the
Rappahannock. This was in accordance with the well-laid
plan of Fee, who hoped to take Banks' Ford and capture
the Sixth Corps. To the valor of the Vermont Brigade is
greatly due the frustration of the Confederate commander's
bold plan. He had taken nearly that number at Harper's
Ferry after the battle of South Mountain, and he believed
that Hooker was unable to come to the rescue of Sedgwick
if he (Lee) could cut him off from Banks' Ford,
There can be no discredit attached to the 26th New
Jersey when its left broke in confusion under the deadly
fire of the enemy. Lieutenant Colonel Martindale dis¬
played great coolness in handling his regiment, as was
evidenced in the charge by the regiment made that after¬
noon. He highly commended Maj. William W. Morris
and Acting Adjutant Terhune, and particularly the con¬
duct of Sergt. Maj. Amos J. Cummings, whom he placed in
command of Companies C and F, whose officers had been
separated from the regiment. Since the war Cummings
has been a noted journalist and is now a distinguished
member of Congress from the Ninth District of New York.
The folly of not holding Marye's Heights with Gibbon's
division was then fully exemplified, for Early could not
have retaken the works he had been forced out of the day
before, and in addition he would have confronted two divi¬
sions instead of one. Howe held a line of some two miles
with his small division of two brigades, which when
attacked was compelled to yield before the combined
assault of Early and Anderson. Had Gibbon with his
three brigades been in line with Howe it would have
prevented Sedgwick being forced across the river that
night. But, as before stated, one of Gibbon's brigades was
stationed in Fredericksburg, while the other two had been
ordered to the Stafford side, so that Gibbon was unable to
render any assistance to Howe, except to prevent the enemy
384
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
from advancing through the city in the direction of Banks''
Ford. Lee directed Anderson's right and Early's left to
attack the apex or right angle formed by Howe's right and
Brooks' left, which was near the Dowman House. Wright
and Hoke advanced, with Posey supporting on the left
and Hays on the right. The Union forces yielded, and
retired under cover of darkness in the direction of Banks'
Ford.
From the following dispatches, it will be seen that
Hooker relied greatly on the judgment of Sedgwick to
control his movements :
Headquarters Army of the Potomac,
May 4, 1863.
I have reported your situation to General Hooker. I find that
we contracted our lines here somewhat during the morning, and re¬
pulsed the enemy's last assault with ease. The troops are in good
position. General Hooker says you are separated from him so far
that he cannot advise you how to act. You need not try to force the
position you attacked at five p. m. Look to the safety of your corps,
you can retire, if necessary, by way of Fredericksburg or Banks'
Ford. The latter would enable you to join us more readily.
G. K. Warren, Brigadier General.
To General Sedgwick.
May 4, 1863—2:15 p. m.
I shall do my utmost to hold a position on the bank of the Rap¬
pahannock until to-morrom^ John Sedgwick, Major General.
To General Hooker.
Headquarters, May 4, 1863—7:15 p. m.
The general directs a full report of j'our position, the number of
the enemy's forces opposed to you, and your dispositions. He wishes
this report as soon as possible that he may act advisedly.
Daniel Butterfield.
To Major General Sedgwick.
Headquarters Army of the Potomac.
May 4, 1863—7:40 p. m.
The atmosphere being thick with smoke, it is impossible for the
signal officers to see the movements of General Sedgwick or those
of the enemy. The artillery firing is very heavy. The musketry-
fire seems to have sensibly diminished.
S. Williams, Asst. Adj. General.
To General Hooker.
CHA NC ELLO RS VILLE.
385
Banks' Ford, Va., May 4, 1863—9:50 p. m.
General Sedgwick is in direct communication with me, and is
about half a mile south of my bridges, in the upper rifle-pits. I in¬
formed him in due time of when I expected my bridges to be shelled,
but I presume he could not prevent it.
Rebel skirmishers are reported to me now as on the left bank,
below this, but I do not believe it.
H.W. Benham, Brigadier General.
To General ButTERFiEED.
F Signal Station, May 4, 1863—10 p. m.
I reported to headquarters what forces were engaged. The ene¬
my attacked Sedgwick. It was his right and center that they were
driving.
James S. Hall,
To General ButterpiELD, Capt. and Signal Oflflcer.
Chief of Staff.
Headquarters, May 4, 1863—10:20 p. m.
I am now going to General Sedgwick ; expect to see him in
twenty minutes. Shot and shell flew all around my bridges several
times ; most fortunately did not hit them. I had only one sergeant
killed. Have two bridges ready at this moment.
A strong infantry fire has just burst out to the right and front,
apparently within one-half to three-quarters of a mile.
H. W. Benham.
To D. ButterpiELD, United States Ford, Va.
Banks' Ford, Va., May 4, 1863—11:30 p. m.
(Received May 5—i a. m.)
My army is hemmed in upon the slope, covered by the guns
from the north side of Banks' Ford. If I had only this army to
care for, I would withdraw it to-night. Do your operations require
that I should jeopardize it by retaining it here? An immediate re¬
ply is indispensable, or I may feel obliged to withdraw.
John Sedgwick, Major General.
To General Hooker, United States Ford.
May 5,1863—12:30 a. m.
Communication with General Sedgwick is at present full and
open by two bridges and by messenger or telegraph. His main body
is, however, below the crest of the hill, opposite the ford, under
full fire of artillery.
I consider his command in great danger.
R. O. Tyler, Brigadier General.
To Major General ButterpiELD, Chief of Staff.
XXV
386 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Banks' Ford, Va., May 5, 1863.
(Received i a. m.)
I shall hold my position, as ordered, on south of Rappahannock.
Sedgwick,
To General Hooker.
Headquarters, May 5, 1863—i a. m.
(Received 2 a. m.)
Dispatch this moment received. Withdraw. Cover the river,
and prevent any force crossing. Acknowledge this.
By command of Major General Hooker :
Daniel Butterfield.
To General Sedgwick.
Banks' Ford, May 5, 1863—2 a. m.
General Hooker's order received. Will withdraw my forces im¬
mediately.
John Sedgwick, Major General.
To Major General Butterfield.
Headquarters, May 5, 1863—1:20 a. m.
Yours received, saying you should hold position. Order to
withdraw countermanded. Acknowledge both.
Hooker, General.
To General Sedgwick.
Headquarters Sixth Army Corps,
May 5, 1863—3:20 a. m.
Yours just received, countermanding order to withdraw. Almost
my entire command has crossed over,
John Sedgwick, Major General.
To Major General Hooker.
May 5, 1863—5 a. m.
The bridges at Banks' Ford are swung and in process of being
taken up. The troops are much exhausted. The dispatch counter¬
manding my movements over the river was received after the troops
had crossed.
John Sedgwick, Major General.
To General Butterfield.
Falmouth, Va., May 5, 1863—5:20 a. m.
Have arrived with my command in rear of Falmouth. There is
a dense fog. Everything is quiet, as far as I can ascertain. An
ofi&cer of the Fifth Artillery reports that Sedgwick's corps has re-
CHA N GEL LORS VIL L E.
387
crossed at Banks' Ford, with the exception of one brigade, taken
prisoners.
A. Pleasonton, Brigadier General.
To Major General Butterfield,
Headquarters Army of the Potomac.
Near Chanceeeorsville, Va.
May 5, 1863—6:15 a. m.
The commanding general directs that as soon as your bridges
are taken up at Banks' Ford they be removed immediately, and
packed in the rear of the former camps of Sickles' corps.
By command of Major General Hooker :
Daniee Butterfieed, Major General,
To Brigadier General Benham. Chief of Staff.
Headquarters Sixth Corps,
IVfey 5, 1863—7 a. m.
I recrossed to the north bank of the Rappahannock last night,
and am in camp about a mile back from the ford. The bridges
have been taken up.
John Sedgwick, Major General.
To General Butterfieed.
This practically ended the noted battle of Chancellors-
ville, which will live in history for its brilliant conception
and its unfortunate ending.
Hooker failed to reënforce Sedgwick until it was too
late. If he had withdrawn two of his corps and sent them
to Sedgwick by four o'clock on the afternoon of the 4th,
he could have defeated Lee with great ease. Gibbon's
division held Fredericksburg. If a corps had crossed over
the bridge at the Lacy House, and the other one crossed at
Banks' Ford, and been ready to participate in the attack
made on Sedgwick late in the evening, the Union forces
could have held Marye's Heights, and the ridge extending
west to Salem Church—a stretch of several miles, where a
large army could have been operated. Then that night he
could have transferred the other corps by the way of United
States Ford, and then down the left bank of the Rappa¬
hannock to Banks' Ford, when Lee would have been per¬
fectly outgeneraled. Of the seven infantry corps under
388 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Hooker's commaiKj, but three were engaged, as the follow¬
ing telegrams fully state :
New York, May 6, 1863—3 p. m.
Nothing will so cheer the hearts of all good men as the imme¬
diate reënforcement of General Hooker by troops from around Wash¬
ington, Fort Monroe and Suffolk.
E. D. Morgan, Governor of New York.
To His Excellency Abraham Eincoen,
President of the United States.
Washington, D. C.,
May 6, 1863.
General Hooker has had, has now, and will have, everything
he asks for by telegraph, which is always in full connection with the
War Department. He knpws best what he wants, and when and
where, and directs everything according to his own plans. He re¬
ports confidentially that only three corps of his army, all told, have
been engaged. You need not be told that this is less than half the
army in his command and actually with him.
Further accumulation of troops, not called for by him, would
exhaust his supplies and endanger his plans. Be patient.
WiELiAM H. Seward,
Secretary of State.
Governor Morgan, New York.
Headquarters Army of the Potomac,
May 6, 1863—4:30 p. m.
Have this moment returned to camp. On my way received your
telegrams of 11 a. m. and 12:30. The army had previously re-
crossed the river and was on its return to camp. As it had none of its
trains of supplies with it, I deemed this advisable. Above I see no
way of giving the enemy a general battle with the prospect of suc¬
cess which I desire. Not to exceed three corps, all told, of my troops
have been engaged. For the whole to go in, there is a better place
nearer at hand.
Will write you at length to-night. Am glad to hear that a por¬
tion of the cavalry have at length turned up. One portion did nothing.
Joseph Hooker,
Major General.
His Excellency Abraham Lincoen,
President of the United States.
This dispatch of Hooker's states it in full, "There is a
CHA NC EL LORS VIL L E.
389
better place nearer at hand." That position was held by
Sedgwick until five o'clock on the evening of the 4th, then
he was forced down to Banks' Ford, which he crossed under
cover of darkness. Gen. Martin McMahon, Sedgwick's
chief of staff, superintended the crossing of the troops
under a heavy fire from the enemy's artillery. Hooker
closes his dispatch by an expression of gladness that the
cavalry had finally turned up. Hooker made a mistake
when he placed Stoneman in command of the cavalry. He
lacked dash and foresight in such a degree, qualities so
necessary for a cavalry leader, that his circuit around Fee's
army really was a failure. If Hooker had held him closer,
he might have made better use of him and, when Lee
began to retreat, have ordered him to throw his cavalr}-
in the advance to destroy the railroads, and intercept
supplies and reènforcements for the Confederate army.
Hooker knew that Longstreet might suddenly return
from Suffolk with Pickett's and Hood's divisions, and his
idea for Stoneman to approach as near Richmond as pos¬
sible and destroy the railroad for several miles, would have
not only prevented supplies being sent to Lee, but would
have prevented reenforcements either, by Longstreet or by
any other command that might be convenient to move for¬
ward to Fredericksburg. The dispatches of Hooker and
Sedgwick crossed each other, which produced great con¬
fusion. When Hooker found that Sedgwick was on the
left bank of the Rappahannock, and the Confederate forces
were in full possession of Marye's Heights and the plain
west of Chancellorsville, the only place where a great
battle could be fought, and knowing that he was hemmed
in on the right bank, where he could not maneuver his
army without risk, he decided to withdraw immediately.
Then he resolved to call a council of war, composed of his
corps commanders, to decide the question whether battle
should be offered to the enemy, or retire across the Rappa¬
hannock. But it seems that the matter was not fully
settled at that consultation. Reynolds, Meade and Howard
390 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
were for attacking the enemy, while Couch had not studied
the situation full enough to desire to give a positive opinion,
but inclined to support the position taken by Reynolds,
Meade and Howard. Hancock testified before the com¬
mittee on the conduct of the war : "I understood from
him (Couch) always that he was in favor of fighting them."
Slocum came in late and apparently did not receive his
notice in due time.
Sickles was the only corps commander who seriously
opposed an attack on the enemy. He was the only volun¬
teer in command of a corp. All the others were West
Point graduates, though none had fought more skillfully or
valiantly than he (Sickles). His night fight against Jack¬
son was one of the most gallant efforts of the war, and was
certainly one of the most brilliant moves recorded in
history. As a volunteer officer he modestly refused to pit
his opinion against officers whose scientific training had
especially fitted them to judge, but he based his reason on
a political standpoint. He was fearful, if they persisted in
still further keeping up the battle on a field where there had
been four days of solid disaster to the Union army, that it
would have a very depressing effect throughout the coun¬
try. It seems that this fear was shared by Governor
Morgan, from his telegram to the President :
Headquarters Fifth Army Corps,
May 22, 1863.
General :—An issue having been raised between the command¬
ing general and myself in regard to the construction to be placed
on the language I used at the consultation of corps commanders
held on the night of. May 4, I would esteem it a personal favor if
you would, at your earliest convenience, state your recollection of
what I said, and the impression it made on you at the time.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Geo. G. Meade,
Major General.
Hdqrs. First Army Corps, Army of Potomac,
May 24, 1863.
General :—Your note of the 22d instant has been received. My
recollection of the substance of the remarks made by you at the
CHANCELLORS VILLE. 391
consultation of the corps commanders, held on the night of the 4th
of May, is that you were decidedly in favor of an advance in the
direction of Fredericksburg at daylight the next morning ; that you
considered this army had already too long been made subservient
to the safety of Washington, and you threw that out of the question
altogether. This drew the remarks from General Sickles. I simply
said, as my corps was the only one which had not been engaged, I
could not urge my opinion, but that I agreed with you.
I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
John F. Reynolds,
Major General Volunteers.
To Major General George G. Meade,
Commanding Fifth Army Corps, Army of Potomac.
If Hooker needed encouragement from his generals to
attack the enemy, he most assuredly had it. Sickles alone
opposed an advance. But if it had been decided to make
an assault on the enemy, Sickles would have led the
Third Corps as gallantly as Marshal McDonald did his at
Wagram, when he pierced the Austrian center and won
the victory. Hooker was discouraged, a^id decided to
retire across the Rappahannock. But it was not advisable
to begin the movement in daylight, lest the enemy might
observe it and attack him when his columns were break¬
ing to the rear and illy prepared to repel an attack ; so
every preparation was made to recross the river that night.
In the mean time the heavy rain in the mountains had so
swollen the Rappahannock that the bridges were greatly
endangered and, but for the good judgment of Gen. H.
J. Hunt, chief of artillery, it is probable that all three
would have broken from their moorings and left Hooker's
army on the south bank. But there was no immediate
dänger, even if his bridges had been swept away, for Lee
made no great haste to press Hooker. It is true he made
every preparation to strike him if an opportunity presented
itself. After Sedgwick crossed to the Stafford side of the
Rappahannock at Banks' Ford, and Gibbon had retraced
his steps over the bridge at the Lacy House, opposite Fred¬
ericksburg, Barksdale was placed in command of Marye's
Heights, and Early was directed to take a position opposite
392
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Banks' Ford ; while Lee returned to Hooker's front at
Chancellorsville, with McLaws and Anderson forming his
right wing as before, and Stuart's corps was moved to the
left, and the whole line strengthened.
On the morning of the 5th the fog was so dense that it
was impossible for Lee to make a good reconnoissance of
Hooker's position, as his line mainly occupied a dense
wooded front, and the heavy clouds retained the fog until
late in the day.
No attack was made that day, and at seven o'clock in
the evening the artillery began to cross. When darkness
came on the army was crowded around United States Ford,
in a drenching rain, with the river rising at the rate of a
foot an hour. Soon the bridges were entirely submerged
and a delay occurred before the bridges could be repaired
enough for the artillery to resume crossing. Meade, who
had favored attacking the enemy in the council of war,
and who had been charged with covering the rear, at¬
tempted to get the order countermanded when the bridges
were submerged, and have the corps return to their posi¬
tion and be ready to meet Lee in the morning. But
no communication could be had with Hooker, as his head¬
quarters were on the north bank of the Rappahannock, and
the attempted signals of Meade failed to be understood at
Hooker's headquarters—at least they were not responded to.
When the morning dawn of the 6th came the Army of
the Potomac had nearly passed over the river, with the
Fifth Corps bringing up the rear, and marched over with
Sykes' Regulars, the last division to cross.
The Confederate skirmishers soon appeared on the oppo¬
site bank and made but little resistance to the taking up of
the bridges by the Engineer Brigade, and at four o'clock in
the afternoon they were removed.
The storm still raged with unabated fury, and Lee see¬
ing no chance farther to harass Hooker, marched his army
back to Fredericksburg with the prestige of another battle
in his favor.
CHA NCELLORS VIL LE.
393
Hooker retired more through the injury his brain had
received by the blow at Chancellorsville than otherwise.
On all previous battlefields he was like a raging lion, all
the time leading and cheering his men ; at Chancellors¬
ville his courage failed him and he did not fight half of his
army. Both armies reached their old quarters on the 7th
and took some greatly needed rest.
War Department, May 7, 1863.
The President and General-in-chief have just returned from the
Army of the Potomac. The principal operation of General Hooker
failed, but there has been no serious disaster to the organization and
efficiency of the army. It is now occupying its position on the
Rappahannock, having recrossed the river without loss in the move¬
ment. Not more than one-third of General Hooker's force was
engaged. General Stoneman's operations have been a brilliant suc¬
cess. A part of his force advanced to within two miles of Richmond,
and the enemy's communications have been cut in every direction.
The Army of the Potomac will speedily resume offensive operations.
Edwin Stanton, Secretary of War.*
Major General Burnside, Cincinnati, Ohio.
Headquarters Army of the Potomac,
May 7, 1863.
My dear Sir :—The recent movement of your army is ended
without effecting its object, except, perhaps, some important break
ings of the enemy's communications. What next? If possible, I
would be glad of another movement early enough to give us some
benefit from the fact of the enemy's communications being broken ;
but neither for this reason nor any other do I wish anything done in
desperation or rashness. An early movement would also help to
supersede the bad moral effect of the recent one, which is said to be
considerably injurious. Have you in your mind a plan wholly or
partially formed? If you have, prosecute it without interference
from me. If you have not, please inform me, so that I, incompetent
as I may be, can try and assist in the formation of some plan for
the army. Yours, as ever, A. Lincoln.
To Major General Hooker.
Camp near Falmouth, V.a.., May 7, 1863.
I have the honor to acknowledge your communication of this
date, and in answer have to state that I do not deem it expedient to
*This letter was sent to Generals Grant, Rosecrans, Dix, Pope, and Curtis,
and the Governors of the loyal States.
394
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
suspend operations on this line from the reverse we have experi¬
enced in endeavoring to extricate the army from its present position.
If in the first effort we failed, it was not for want of strength or con¬
duct of the small number of the troops actually engaged, but from
a cause which could not be foreseen, and could not be provided
against. After its occurrence, the chances of success were so much
lessened that I felt another plan might be adopted in place of that
we were engaged in, which would be more certain in its results. At
all events a failure would not involve a disaster, while in the other
case it was certain to follow the chance of success. I may add that
this consideration almost wholly determined me in ordering the
army to return to its old camp. As to the best time for renewing
our advance upon the enemy, I can only decide after an opportunity
has been afforded to learn the feeling of the troops. They should
not be discouraged or depressed, for it is no fault of theirs (if I ex¬
cept one corps) that our last efforts were not crowned with glorious
victory, I suppose details are not wanting of me at this time. I
have decided in my own mind the plan to be adopted in our next
effort, if it should be your wish to have one made. It has this to
recommend it, it will be one in which the operations of all the
corps, unless it be a part of the cavalry, will be within my personal
supervision. Very respectfully, &c., Joseph Hooker,
Major General Commanding.
His Excellency the President of the United States.
Thus ended one of- the great struggles in the late war.
The reports are quoted from quite freely to aid the reader
in the future to form his own conclusion, for there are
many reasons alleged why Hooker lost the battle. The
prevailing opinion seems to be that with a quick move he
would have had Lee in his grasp. There are many crim¬
inations and recriminations as to a lack of support. So it
seems but fair, in a history where candor should reign
supreme, that official papers made then should, to a great
extent, decide the question at issue.
There is no doubt but that Lee was a thorough military
student, for he fought Grant in a similar manner only a few
miles away in the Wilderness, the next year. Chancellors-
ville no doubt aided him in making the fight of the
Wilderness.
Gen. H. J. Hunt was not satisfied with the manage-
C//A NC ELL ORS VILLE.
ment of the battle, and more than once said so to me. He
said : " Hooker would not listen to my suggestions. I did
not want Hazel Grove evacuated, which gave J. E. B.
Stuart an opportunity to place some thirty pieces there,
which made the angle near Fairview untenable." Gen¬
eral Hunt said much more which I took down at the time,
which is not given to the public. Hooker's telegram to
the President that he had only fought three corps, states the
whole matter. If at any time he had given the command
to the whole army to "forward," Lee's army would have
been not only defeated, but routed from the field. Espe¬
cially was that so on Sunday morning, when Reynolds with
the First Corps, and Meade with the Fifth Corps, lay on
Stuart's left flank with some thirty thousand men, and
were never ordered to fire a gun. Reynolds was within a
half mile of Stuart's left flank, and could have rolled him
up on Hazel Grove any minute, where Sickles should have
been held ; then an Austerlitz would have been in store for
Lee's army.
The history of this noted battle is concluded by Gen¬
eral Heth, who commanded a division in Stonewall Jack¬
son's corps at Chancellorsville, who made the following
statement to me in relation to that battle, and what should
have been the result of it. He said :
My reasons for thinking so are these : General Lee, Longstreet's
corps being absent, when in front of Hooker, had between 40,00a
and 45,000 men in his command. He found that the position occu¬
pied by General Hooker was too strong to attack in front. This in¬
duced him to detach Jackson with from 20,000 to 25,000 men to make
an attack on what may be termed Hooker's right. Hooker had sent
his cavalry, under Stoneman, to break up the railroads leading into
Richmond and destroy the James River and Kanawha Canal. Gen¬
eral Howard's (Eleventh) corps occupied a very strong position on
Hooker's right. Now it is hardly possible that General Lee could
have expected that Jackson's attack on Hooker's right—Howard's
corps - would be an utter and entire surprise. Nevertheless this
was so. None of the roads leading to the points where Jackson
formed three lines of battle, the first line being within 500 or 600
yards of Howard's position, were found to be picketed. Jackson's
SÍ6 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
force ran over long lines of muskets, stacked, Howard's people
being engaged in butchering beeves and in thus procuring their
evening meal. Had these roads been picketed Howard would have
been apprised of Jackson's approach, and would have been prepared
to receive his attack in a position naturally very strong. He could
with his corps certainly have held Jackson in check until he could
have been reënforced by as many men as Jackson had under his
command, for I have understood that there were 40,0.00 men in
Hooker's army present at Chancellorsville who never fired a shot, or
who, from the configuration of the ground, could do but little fight¬
ing. It has always been my opinion that with the superior numbers of
Hooker that Jackson could have been crushed ; and the forces under
General Lee should have met the same fate after Jackson was de¬
stroyed, as Hooker's army lay between these two forces, and which
could or should have virtually ended the war.
List of casualties of Army of the Potomac, Maj.
Gen. Joseph Hooker commanding, at the battle of Chan¬
cellorsville, Va., May 1-3, 1863 (including skirmishes
along the lines May 4-6, 1863) ;
FIRST ARMY CORPS—Maj. Gen. John F. Reynolds.
First Division—Brig. Gen. James S. Wadsworth.
First Brigade—Col. Walter Phelps, Jr.
General Headquarters Staff I
24th New York, Col. Samuel R. Beardsley i
30th New York, Col. Wm. M. Searing 1
Total First Brigade 3
Second Brigade—Brig. Gen. Lysander Cutler,
76th New York, Col. William P. Wainwright 2
95th New York, Col. George H. Biddle 2
i ■
Total Second Brigade 4
Third Brigade—Brig. Gen. Gabriel R. Paul.
29th New Jersey, Col. William R. Taylor 5
30th New Jersey, Col. John J. Cladek 3
Total Third Brigade 10
Artillery—Capt. John A. Reynolds.
4th U. S., Battery B, Lieut. James -Stewart 2
Total First Division 19
CHA N GEL LORS VI L.L E. 397
Second Division—Brig. Gen. John C. Robinson.
First Brigade—Col. Adrian R. Root.
94th New York, Capt. Samuel A. Moffett I
104th New York, Col. Gilbert G. Prey 3
Total First Brigade . 4
Second Brigade—Brig. Gen. Henry Baxter.
5th Massachusetts, Col. James L. Bates 7
Total Second Brigade 7
Third Brigade—Col Samuel H. Leonard.
13th Massachusetts, Lieut. Col. N. W. Batchelder 6
83d New York (9th Militia) Lieut. Col. J. A. Moesh .... 4
88th Pennsylvania, Lieut. Col. Louis Wagner 2
Total Third Brigade 12
Artillery—Capt. Dunbar R. Ransom.
Maine Light, 5th Battery E, Capt. Geo. F. Leppein 28
Pennsylvania Light, Battery C, Capt. James Thompson ... 4
Total Artillery 32
Total Second Division 55
Third Division—Maj. Gen. Abner Doubleday.
First Brigade—Brig. Gen. Thomas A. Rowley.
I2lst Pennsylvania, Col. Chapman Biddle 3
135th Pennsylvania, Col. James R. Porter 29
151st Pennsylvania, Col. Harrison Allen 16
Total First Brigade 48
Second Brigade~Co\. Roy Stone.
143d Pennsylvania, Col. E. L. Dana i
149th Pennsylvania, Lieut. Col. Walton Dwight i
150th Pennsylvania, Col. Langhom Wistar i
Total Second Brigade 3
Artillery—Maj. Ezra W. Matthews.
1st Pennsylvania Light, Battery G, Capt. F. P. Amsden ... 11
Total Third Division 62
Total First Army Corps 135
398 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
SECOND ARMY CORPS—Maj. Gen. Darius N. Couch.
Staff I
Escort, Companies D and K, 6th New York Cavalry .... 2
Total Staff and Escort 3
First Division—Maj. Gen. W. S. Hancock.
First Brigade—Brig. Gen. John C. Caldwell.
Staff I
5th New Hampshire, Col. Edward E. Cross 25
6ist New York, Col. Nelson A. Miles 27
Sist Pennsylvania, Col. H. Boyd McKeen 6i
148th Pennsylvania, Col. James A. Beaver 164
Total First Brigade 278
Second Brigade—Brig. Gen. Thos. F. Meagher.
28th Massachusetts, Col. Richard Byrnes 16
63d New York, Lieut. Col. R. C. Bentley 6
■69th New York, Capt. James E. McGee 10
88th New York, Col. Patrick Kelly 46
II6th Pennsylvania (battalion) Maj. St. C. A. Mulholland . . 24
Total Second Brigade 102
Third Brigade—Brig. Gen. Samuel K. Zook.
52d New York, Col. Paul Frank 43
57th New York, Lieut. Col. Alfred B. Chapman 31
66th New York, Col. Orlando H. Morris 7®
140th Pennsylvania, Col. Richard P. Roberts 44
Total Third Brigade 188
Fourth Brigade—Col. John R. Brooke.
27th Connecticut, Col. R. S. Bostwick 291
2d Delaware, Lieut. Col. David. L. Strieker 61
64th New York, Col. Daniel G. Bingham 44
53d Pennsylvania, Lieut. Col. R. McMichael 11
145th Pennsylvania, Col. Hiram L. Brown 122
Total Fourth Brigade 529
Artillery—Capt. Rufus D. Pettit.
jst New York Light, Battery B, Capt. R. D. Pettit 12
4th United States, Battery C, Lieut. Evan Thomas 15
Total Artillery 27
Total First Division 1124
C HAN CELL ORS VILLE.
399
Third Division—Maj. Gen. William H. French.
First Brigade—Col. Samuel C. Carroll.
14th Indiana, Col. John Coons 64
24th New Jersey, Col. Wm. B. Robertson 36
28th New Jersey, Lieut. Col. John A. Wildrick 59
4th Ohio, Lieut. Col. Leonard W. Carpenter 73
8th Ohio, Lieut. Col. Franklin Sawyer 12
7th West Virginia, Col. Joseph Snider 24
Total First Brigade 268
Seœnd Brigade [ Gen. William Hajs.
t Col. Charles J. Powers.
Staff 4
14th Connecticut, Maj. Theodore G. Ellis 56
I2th New Jersey, Col. J. Howard Willets . .
Maj. John T. Hill ....
Io8th New York, Col. Charles J. Powers. . .
Lieut. Col. Francis E. Pierce
130th Pennsylvania, Col. Levi Maish
Maj. Joseph S. Jenkins .
Total Second Brigade 319
Third Brimdei^'"'^- ^^^Gregor.
^ t Col. Charles Albright.
1st Delaware, Col. Thomas A. Smith 55
I32d Pennsylvania, Col. Charles Albright \
Lieut. Col. Jos. E. Shreve j
Total Third Brigade 99
Total Third Division . 686
Reserve Artillery.
1st United States, Battery I, Lieut. Edmund Kirby 2
Total Second Army Corps 1.815
THIRD ARMY CORPS—Maj. Gen. Daniel E. Sickles.
Staff I
First Division—Brig. Gen. David B. Bimey.
Staff 2
Z7" J r> • J f Prig. Gen. Chas. K. Graham.
Col Thomas W.Eg„.
57th Pennsylvania, Col. Peter Sides 7*
400
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
63d Pennsylvania, Lieut. Col. Wm. S. Kirkwood , . .
Capt. James F. Ryan
68th Pennsylvania, Col. Andrew H. Tippin
105th Pennsylvania, Col. Amor A. McKnight
Lieut. Col. Calvin A. Craig. . . .
114th Pennsylvania, Col. Chas. H. T. Collis
Lieut. Col. Frederick F. Cavada. .
141st Peimsylvania, Col. Henry J. Madill
Total First Brigade • . . 75^
Second Brigade—Brig. Gen. J. H. Hobart Ward.
20th Indiana, Col. John Wheeler 24
3d Maine, Col. Moses B. Lakeman 28
4th Maine, Col. Elijah Walker 28
38th New York, Col. P. Regis de Trobriand 37
40th New York, Col. Thomas W. Egan 70
99th Pennsylvania, Col. Asher S. Leidy 26
}
• 75
I 76
J '
1 181
• 235
Total Second Brigade 248
Third Brigade—Col. Samuel B. Hayman.
17th Maine, Lieut. Col. Charles, B. Merrill
Col. Thomas A. Roberts
}
"3
3d Michigan, Col. Byron R. Pierce 1
Lieut. Col. Edwin S. Pierce J
5th Michigan, Lieut. Col. Edward T. Sherlock ■>
Maj. John Pulford |
1st New York, Lieut. Col. Francis L. Leland 80
37th New York, Lieut. Col. Gilbert Riordan 222
Total Third Brigade 566
Artillery—Capt. A. Judson Clark.
New Jersey Light, Battery B, Lieut. Robert Sims 10
1st Rhode Island Light, Battery E, Lieut. P. S. Jastram . . 17
3d U. S., Batteries F and K, Lieut. J. G, Tumbull 8
Total Artillery 35
Total First Division i»6o7
Second Division
I Bng. Gen. Joseph B. Carr.
Staff
CHANCELLORS VILLE.
First Brigade i
1 Col. William Blaisdell.
1st Massachusetts, Col. N. B. McLaughlen 95
I Ith Massachusetts, Col. William Blaisdell
Lieut. Col. Porter D. Tripp J
l6th Massachusetts, Lieut. Col. Waldo Merriam 73
lith New Jersey, Col. Robert McAllister 169
26th Pennsylvania, Col. Benjamin C. Tilghman -i
Maj. Robert L. Bodine j
Total First Brigade 5^4
o J r> ■ J f Brig. Gen. Jos. W. Revere.
Second Brigade i ^
t Col. J. Lgbert barn um.
Staff I
70th New York, Lieut. Col. Thomas Holt 32
71st New York, Col. Henry L. Potter 39
72d New York, Col. William O. Stevens
Maj. John Leonard
73d New York, Maj. Michael W. Burns 38
74th New York, Lieut. Col. William H. Lounsbury . . . ^
Capt. Henry M. Alles I 40
Capt. Francis E. Tyler i
120th New York, Lieut. Col. Cornelius D. Westbrook ... 66
Total Second Brigade 317
}
01
■-ni ■ J n • J Í Brig, Gen. G. Mott (wounded).
Third Brigades „ ^
I Col. William T. Sewell.
}
, Col. William J. Sewell.
Staff 2
5th New Jersey, Maj. Ashbel W. Angel
Capt. Virgil M. Healy.
6th New Jersey, Col. Geo. C. Burling 1
Lieut. Col. S. R. Gilkyson /
7th New Jersey, Col. Louis R. Francine ■»
Lieut. Col. Francis Price j
8th New Jersey, Col. John Ramsey
L.01. jonn icamsey -i
Capt. J. G. Langston j" ^^5
} 54
2d New York, Col. Sidney W. Park
Lieut. Col. William A. Olmstead ...
115th Pennsylvania, Col. Francis A. Lancaster ^
Maj. John P. Dunne j
Total Third Brigade 527
XXVI
402 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
\
21
Artillery—Capt. Thos. W. Osborn.
ist New York Light, Battery D, Lieut. Geo. W. Winslow . . 14
1st U. S., Battery H, Lieut. Justin E. Dimick ....
Lieut. James A. Sanderson. . .
4th U. S., Battery K, Lieut. Francis W. Seeley 45
Total Artillery 80
Total Second Division . i>429
Third Division j Whipple (mortally wounded),
I Brig. Gen. Charles K. Graham.
Staff I
First Brigade—Col. Emlen Franklin.
86th New York, Lieut. Col. Barna J. Chapin -|
Capt. Jacob H. Lansing /
124th New York, Col. A. Van Home Ellis 204
X22d Pennsylvania, Lieut. Col. Edward McGovern 102
Total First Brigade 383
Second Brigade—Col. Samuel M. Bowman.
12th New Hampshire, Col. Joseph H. Potter
84th Pennsylvania, Lieut. Col. Milton'Opp .
Iioth Pennsylvania, Col. James Crowther. .
Maj. David M. Jones . .
Total Second Brigade 577
Third Brigade—Col. Hiram Berdan.
1st U. S. Sharpshooters, Lieut. Col. Casper Trepp 68
2d U. S. Sharpshooters, Maj. Homer R. Stoughton 16
Total Third Brigade 84
Artille ■( Puttkammer.
I Capt. James F. Huntington.
New York Light, loth Battery, Lieut. Samuel Lewis .... 18
New York Light, I Ith Battery, Lieut. John E. Burton ... 11
1st Ohio Light, Battery H, Capt. J. F. Huntington 8
Total Artillery 37
Total Third Division 1,082
Total Third Army Corps 4,119
CHAN CELLO RS VILLE. 403
FIFTH ARMY CORPS—Maj. Gen. George G. Meade.
First Division—Brig. Gen. Charles Griffin.
First Brigade—Gen. James Barnes.
2d Maine, Col. George Vamey 3
i8th Massachusetts, Col. Joseph Hayes 13
2d Company Mass. Sharpshooters, Lieut. R. Smith .... i
1st Michigan, Col. Ira C. Abbott 15
13th New York, (battalion) Capt. Wm. Downey .... 5
25th New York, Col. Charles A. Johnson 3
118th Pennsylvania, Col. Charles M. Prévost 8
Total First Brigade 48
c J r, ■ J ( Col. James McQuade.
Seeond Brigade \ ^
I Col. Jacob B. Sweitzer.
9th Massachusetts, Col. Patrick R. Guiney 13
32d Massachusetts, Lieut. Col. Luther Stevenson 11
4th Michigan, Col. Harrison H. Jeffords 20
14th New York, Lieut. Col. Thomas M. Davies 3
62d Pennsylvania, Col. Jacob B. Sweitzer -i
Lieut. Col. James C. Hull /
Total Second Brigade 62
Third Brigade—Col. Thos. B. W. Stockton.
Michigan Sharpshooters, Brady's company I
l6th Michigan, Lieut. Col. Norval E. Welch 6
17th New York, Lieut. Col. Nelson B. Bartram 5
44th New York, Col. James C. Rice 4
83d Pennsylvania, Col. Strong Vincent 4
Total Third Brigade 20
Artillery—Capt. Augustus P. Martin,
ist Rhode Island Light Battery C, Capt. R. Waterman ... 8
Total First Division 138
Second Division—Maj. Gen. George Sykes.
First Brigade—Brig. Gen. Romeyn B. Ayres.
3d U. S., Companies B, C, F, G, I and K 9
4th U. S., Companies C, F, H and K 4
12th U. S., Companies A, B, C, D and G, ist Battalion, and
Companies A, C and D, 2d Battalion 23
14th U. S., Companies A, B, D, E, F. and G, ist Battalion,
and Companies F and G, 2d Battalion 13
Total First Brigade 31
404
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Second Brigade—Col. Sidney Burbank.
2d U. S., Companies B, C, F, I and K 28
6th U. S., Companies D, F, G, H and I 28
7th U. S., Companies A, B, E and I 16
loth U. S., Companies D, G and H 12
nth U. S., Companies B, C, D, E, F and G, ist Battalion,
and Companies C and D, 2d Battalion 28
17th U. S., Companies A, C, D, G, and H, ist Battalion, and
Companies A and B, 2d Battalion 35
Total Second Brigade 147
Third Brigade—Col. Patrick H. O'Rorke.
140th New York, Lieut. Col. Louis Ernst 21
146th New York, Col. Kenner Garrard 50
Total Third Brigade 71
ArtilleryStephen H. Weed.
ist Ohio Light Battery L, Capt. Frank C. Gihhs il
5th U. S., Battery I, Lieut. M. F. Watson 5
Total Artillery 16
Total Second Division 285
Third Division—Brig. Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys.
First Brigade—Brig. Gen. Erastus P. Tyler.
91st Pennsylvania, Col. Edgar M. Gregory ^
Lieut. Col. Joseph H. Sinex /
126th Pennsylvania, Lieut. Col. D. W. Rowe 77
129th Pennsylvania, Col. Jacob G. Frick 42
134th Pennsylvania, Col. Edward O'Brien 45
Total First Brigade 240
Second Brigade—Col. Peter H. Allahach.
123d Pennsylvania, Col. John B. Clark 8
131st Pennsylvania, Maj. Robert W. Patton 4
133d Pennsylvania, Col. Frank B. Speakman 11
155th Pennsylvania, Lieut. Col. Jno. H. Cain 14
Total Second Brigade 37
Total Third Division 277
Total Fifth Army Corps 700
C//A NCELL ORS VILLE.
ELEVENTH ARMY CORPS—Maj. Gen. Oliver 0. Howard.
First Division ( Charles Devens, Jr. (wounded).
I Brig. Gen. Nathaniel C. McLean.
Staff I
First Brigade—Col. Leopold Von Gilsa.
41st New York, Maj. Detleo von Einsiedel 61
45th New York, Col. Geo. von Arnsberg 76
54th New York, Lieut. Col. Charles Ashby ^
Maj. Stephen Kovacs j
153d Pennsylvania, Col. Charles Glanz \
Lieut. Col. J. Dachrodt » • i
Total First Brigade 264
o J D ■ J f Brig- Gen. N. C. McLean.
Second Brigade ,
(. Col. John C. Lee.
Staff 3
17th Connecticut, Col. Wm. H. Noble -j
Maj. Allen G. Brady
25th Ohio, Col. William P. Richardson -i
Maj. Jeremiah Williams J '5^
5Sth Ohio, Col. John C. Lee
Lieut. Col. Charles B. Gambee
75th Ohio, Col. Robert Reily
} 153
COI. Kooerc Keiiy ^
Capt. Benj. Morgan | HO
133
107th Ohio, Col. Seraphim Meyer .
Lieut. Col. Charles Mueller
}
Total Second Brigade 692
»
Artillery—Capt. Michael Wiedrich.
1st New York Light, Battery I 13
Total Second Division 519
Third Division—Maj. Gen. Carl Schurz.
Staff I
First Brigade—Brig. Gen. Alex. Schimmelfennig.
Sad Illinois, Col. Frederick Hecker -v
Maj. F. H. Rolshausen- f '55
Capt. Jacob Lasalle '
68th New York, Col. Gotthilf Bourry 54
157th New York, Col. Philip P. Brown, Jr 98
61st Ohio, Col. Stephen J. McGroarty 60
74th Pennsylvania, Lieut. Col. Adolph von Härtung .... 52
Total First Brigade
419
406 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Second Brigade—Col. W. Krzyzanowski,
58th New York, Capt. Frederick Braun
Capt. Emil Koenig j
119th New York, Col. Elias Peissner •>
Lieut. Col. John T. Lockman j
75th Pennsylvania, Col. Francis Mahler 59
26th Wisconsin, Col. Wm. H. Jacobs 198
Total Second Brigade 408
Unattached.
82d Ohio, Col. James S. Robinson 81
Artillery.
1st Ohio Light, Battery I, Capt. Hubert Dilger II
Total Third Division 920
Reserve Artillery—Lieut. Col. Louis Schirmer.
1st Ohio Light, Battery K, Capt. Wm. L. DeBeck .... 3
Total Eleventh Army Corps 2,412
TWELFTH ARMY CORPS—Maj. Gen. H. W. Slocum.
Provost Guard.
loth Maine (battalion) Capt. John D. Beardsley 3
First Division—Brig. Gen. Alpheus S. Williams.
Staff I
First Brigade—Brig. Gen. Jos. F. Knipe.
5 th Connecticut, Col. Warren W. Packer
Lieut. Col. James A. Betts V 63
Maj. David F. Lane
28th New York, Lieut. Col. Elliott W. Cook . . . .
Maj. Theophilus Fitzgerald . . . .
46th Pennsylvania, Maj. Cyrus Strous
Capt. Edward L. Witman . . . .
128th Pennsylvania, Col. James A. Mathews . . . .
Maj. Cephas W. Dyer
Total First Brigade 452
Second Brigade—Col. Samuel Ross.
Staff" 2
20th Connecticut, Lieut. Col. Wm. B. Wooster ■>
Maj. Philo B. Buckingham | '69
3d Maryland, Lieut. Col. Gilbert P. Robinson....... 85
CHANCELLORS VILLE. 407
123d New York, Col. Arch. L. McDougall 148
145th New York, Col. E. Livingston Price 1
Capt. George W. Reid |
Total Second Brigade 499
Third Brigade—Brig. Gen. Thomas H. Ruger.
Staff I
27th Indiana, Col. Silas Colgrove 150
2d Massachusetts, Col. Samuel M. Quincy 138
13th New Jersey, Col. Ezra A. Carman \
Maj. John Grimes J 141
Capt. George A. Beardsley '
107th New York, Col. Alex. S. Diven 83
3d Wisconsin, Col. William Hawley . 101
Total Third Brigade 614
ArtilleryRobert H. Fitzhugh.
Staff I
1st New York Light, Battery K, Lieut. E. L. Bailey .... 7
1st New York Light, Battery M, Lieut. Charles E. Winegar-»
Lieut. J. D. Woodbury . j
4tb U. S., Battery F, Lieut. Franklin B. Crosby ■>
Lieut. E. D. Muhlenberg j '
Total Artillery 46
Total First Division 1612
Second Division—Brig. Gen. John W. Geary.
First Brigade—Col. Charles Candy.
5th Ohio, Lieut. Col. Robert L. Kilpatrick
Maj. Henry E. Symmes j
7th Ohio, Col. William R. Creighton 99
29th Ohio, Lieut. Col. Thomas Clark 72
66th Ohio, Lieut. Col. Eugene Powell 73
28th Pennsylvania, Maj. Lansford F. Chapman •>
Capt. Conrad U. Meyer | loi
147th Pennsylvania, Lieut. Col. Ario Pardee, Jr 94
Total First Brigade 521
Second Brigade—Brig. Gen. Thomas L. Kane.
Staff I
29th Pennsylvania, Lieut. Col. Wm. Rickards, Jr 21
109th Pennsylvania, Col. Henry J. Stainrook -|
Capt. John Young, Jr. j
408 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
11 Ith Pennsylvania, Col. George A. Cobham, Jr 26
124th Pennsylvania, Lieut. Col. Simon Litzenberg 20
125th Pennsylvania, Col. Jacob Higgins 49
Total Second Brigade 139
Third Brigade—Brig. Gen. Geo. S. Greene.
Staff I
60th New York, Lieut. Col. Jno. C. O. Redington .... 66
78th New York, Maj. Henry R. Stagg -i
Capt. William H. Randall j
I02d New York, Col. James C. Lane 90
137th New York, Col. David Ireland 54
149th New York, Maj. Abel G. Cook
Capt. Oliver T. May I 186
Lieut. Col. Koert S. VanVoorhis ... J
Total Third Brigade 528
Artillery—Capt. Joseph M. Knap.
Pennsylvania Light, Battery E, Lieut. C. A. Atwell . . . ■»
Lieut. James D. McGill . j ^
Pennsylvania Light, Battery F, Capt. R. B. Hampton . . ^
Lieut. James P. Fleming . j ^
Total Artillery 18
Total Second Division 1,206
Total Twelfth Army Corps 2,822
Cavalry, First Division—Brig. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton.
Second Brigade—Col. Thomas C. Devin.
6th New York, Lieut. Col. Duncan McVicar •>
Capt. William F. Beardsley j
17th Pennsylvania, Col. Josiah H. Kellogg 14
8th Pennsylvania, Maj. Pennock Huey 102
New York Light Artillery, 6th Battery, Lieut. Joseph W.
Martin 6
Total Second Brigade 141
RECAPITULATION.
General Headquarters i
First Army Corps 135
.Second Army Corps 1,815
Third Army Corps 4.II9
Fifth Army Corps 700
CHANCELLO RS VILLE. 409
Eleventh Army Corps 2,412
Twelfth Army Corps 2,822
Cavalry 141
Grand Total 12,145
Return of casualties at Fredericksburg (or Marye's
Heights), and Salem Heights (or Salem Church), and near
Banks' Ford, Va., May 3-4, 1863.
SECOND ARMY CORPS—Maj. Gen. Darius N. Couch.
Second Division—Brig. Gen. John Gibbon.
Ç Brig. Gen. Alfred Sully,
E¿rs¿ Brigade Col. Henry W. Hudson,
t Col. Byron Laflin.
15th Massachusetts, Maj. George C. Joslin t . . 2
1st Minnesota, Lieut. Col. William Colville, Jr 9
34th New York, Col. Byron Laflin
Lieut. Col. John Beverly j ^
82d New York, (2d Militia) Col. H. W. Hudson . . . . ^
Lieut. Col. James Huston . . /
Total First Brigade 20
Third Brigade—Col. Norman J. Hall.
19th Massachusetts, Lieut. Col. Arthur F. Devereux , . . . 9
20th Massachusetts, Lieut. Col. Geo. N. Macy 17
7th Michigan, Capt. Amos E. Steele, Jr 7
42d New York, Col. James E. Mallon 9
59th New York, Lieut. Col. Max A. Thoman 15
127th Pennsylvania, Col. William W. Jennings lo
Total Third Brigade • 67
Artillery.
1st Rhode Island Light, Battery G, Capt. Geo. W. Adams . 23
Total Second Division 110
SIXTH ARMY CORPS—Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick.
Staff
First Division—Brig. Gen. William T. H. Brooks.
Staff
410 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Provost Guard.
4th New Jersey, Co.'s A, C, and H, Capt. Chas. Ewing . . I
Col. Henry W. Brown, (wounded)
First Brigade\
Col. Samuel L. Buck, (woundéd)
Col. William H. Penrose.
1st New Jersey, Col. Mark W. Collett -i
Lieut. Col. William Henry, Jr J
2d New Jersey, Col. Saml. L. Buck ■>
Lieut. Col. Charles Wiebecke j
3d New Jersey, Maj. J. W. H. Stickney 95
iSth New Jersey, Col. William H. Penrose ■»
Lieut. Col. Ed. L, Campbell |
23d New Jersey, Col. E. Burd Grubb 108
Total First Brigade 511
Second Brigade—Brig. Gen. Jos. J. Bartlett.
5th Maine, Col. Clark S. Edwards 96
i6th New York, Col. Joel J. Seaver 142
27th Naw York, Col. Alex. D. Adams 19
I2ist New York, Col. Emery Upton 276
96th Pennsylvania, Maj. Wm. H. Lessig 79
Total Second Brigade 612
Third Brigade—Brig. Gen. David A. Russell.
iSth New York, Col. George R. Myers 34
32d New York, Col. Francis E. Pinto 43
49th Pennsylvania, Lieut. Col. Thos H. Hulings 6
95th Pennsylvania, Col. Gustavus W. Town \
Lieut. Col. Elisha Hall r iS3
Capt. Theodore H. McCalla J
119th Pennsylvania, Col. Peter C. Ellmaker 122
Total Third Brigade 358
Artillery—Maj. John A. Tompkins.
Massachusetts Light, Battery A, Capt. W. H. McCartney . . 2
New Jersey Light, Battery A, Lieut. A. N. Parsons .... i
Maryland Light, Battery A, Capt. Jas. H. Rigby 3
2d U. S., Battery D, Lieut. E. B. Williston i
Total Artillery 7
Total First Division
1,490
CHANCELLO RS VILLE.
Second Division—Brig. Gen. Albion P. Howe,
Second Brigade—Col. Lewis A. Grant.
26th New Jersey, Col. A. J. Morrison ■>
Lieut. Col. Ed. Martindale 1*^4
2d Vermont, Col. James H. Walbridge 132
3d Vermont, Col. Thomas O. Seaver ■»
Lieut. Col. Samuel E. Pingree j
4th Vermont, Col. Charles B. Stoughton 53
5th Vermont, Lieut. Col. John R. Lewis 23
6th Vermont, Col. Elisha L. Bamey 74
Total Second Brigade 431
Third Brigade—Brig. Gen. Thos. H. Neill.
7th Maine, Lieut. Col. Seiden Connor 92
2ist New Jersey, Col. Gilliam Van Honten -i
Lieut. Col. Isaac S. Mettler j- 211
20th New York, Col. Ernst von Vegesack 208
33d New York, Col. Robert F. Taylor 221
49th New York, Col. Daniel B. Bidwell 35
77th New York, Lieut. Col. Winsor B. French 83
Total Third Brigade 850
Artillery—Maj. J. Watts De Peyster,
5th U. S., Battery F, Lieut. Leonard Martin 9
Total Second Division 1,290
Third Division—Maj. Gen. John Newton.
First Brigade—Col. Alex. Shaler.
6sth New York, Lieut. Col. Joseph E. Hamblin 17
67th New York, Col. Nelson Cross 29
I22d New York, Col. Silas Titus 7
23d Pennsylvania, Col. John Ely 61
82d Pennsylvania, Maj. Isaac C. Bassett 46
Total First Brigade 160
Second Brigade [ (-ounded).
I Col. Henry L. Eustis.
7th Massachusetts, Col. Thomas D. Johns ■>
Lieut. Col. Franklin P. Harlow . . . | ^5°
lOth Massachusetts, Lieut. Col. Jos. B. Parsons 69
37th Massachusetts, Col. Oliver Edwards x6
36th New York, Lieut. Col. James J. Walsh 26
2d Rhode Island, Col. Horatio Rogers, jr 81
Total Second Brigade 342
412 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Third Brigade—Brig, Gen. Frank Wheaton.
62d New York, Lieut. Col. Theo. B. Hamilton 120
93d Pennsylvania, Capt. John S. Long 79
98th Pennsylvania, Col. John F. Ballier ■»
Lieut. Col. Geo. Wyncoop /
I02d Pennsylvania, Col. Joseph M. Kinkead 169
139th Pennsylvania, Col. Frederick H. Collier 76
Total Third Brigade 485
Artillery—Capt. Jer. McCarthy.
1st Pennsylvania, Light Batteries C, and D, Capt. J. McCarthy 9
2d United States, Battery G, Lieut. John H. Butler .... 14
Total Artillery 23
Total Third Division 1,010
Light Division—Col. Hiram Burnham.
6th Maine, Lieut. Col. Benjamin F. Harris . . .
31st New York, Col. Frank Jones
43d New York, Col. Benjamin F. Baker ....
61 St Pennsylvania, Col. Geo. C. Spear
Maj. George W. Dawson . .
5th Wisconsin, Col. Thomas S. Allen
New York Light, 3d Battery, Lieut. W. A. Harn
Total Light Division 798
Total Sixth Army Corps 4>590
. 169
• 143
. 204
I 88
• 193
RECAPITULATION.
Second Division, Second Army Corps 110
Sixth Army Corps 4,59°
Total Fredericksburg 4>7oo
Total Chancellorsville 12,145
Grand total Hooker's and Sedgwick's losses 16,845
Report of Surgeon L. L. Guild, Confederate States
Army, medical director, of Confederate casualties at the
battle of Chancellorsville and Marye's Heights, and Sa¬
lem Heights, (Fredericksburg) May 4-6, 1863, as modified
and corrected by reports of officers commanding Confed¬
erate forces in Chancellorsville campaign :
CHAN CELL OES VILLE.
FIRST CORPS.
McLaws' Division —Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws.
Wofford's Brigade, Brig. Gen, W. T. Wofford ^62
Kershaw's Brigade, Brig. Gen. Jos. B. Kershaw 104
Barksdale's Brigade, Brig. Gen. Wm. Barksdale 592
Semmes' Brigade, Brig. Gen. Paul J. Semmes 603
Cabell's Artillery Battalion 28
Total McLaws' Division ... 1,889
Anderson's Division—Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson.
Mahone's Brigade, Brig. Gen. Wm. Mahone 217
Perry's Brigade, Brig. Gen. E. A. Perry 109
Wilcox's Brigade, Brig. Gen. C. M. Wilcox 535
Posey's Brigade, Brig. Gen. Carnot Posey 290
Wright's Brigade, Brig. Gen. A. R. Wright 296
Total Anderson's Division 1,447
Alexander's Artillery, Col. E. P. Alexander 40
Lee's Cavalry Brigade, Stuart's Division Ii
Total First Corps 3,387
SECOND CORPS.
Lieut. Gen. Thomas J. Jackson. Brig- Gen. R. E. Rodes,
Maj. Gen. Ambrose P. Hill. Maj. Gen, J. E. B. Stuart.
A. P. Hill's Division.
Maj. Gen. A. P. Hill. Brig. Gen. Henry Heth.
Brig. Gen. W. D. Pender. Brig. Gen. J. J. Archer.
General IJeadquarters Staff 4
General's Escort 4
Signal Corps i
Heth's Brigade, Brig. Gen. Henry Heth 279
McGowan's Brigade, Brig. Gen. S. McGowan 455
Thomas' Brigade, Brig. Gen. E. L. Thomas 177
Lane's Brigade, Brig. Gen. J. H. Lane 739
Archer's Brigade, Brig. Gen. J. J. Archer 365
Pender's Brigade, Brig. Gen. W. D. Pender 706
Total A. P. Hill's Division 2,730
D. H. Hill's Division.
Rodes' Brigade, Brig. Gen. R. E. Rodes 816
Doles' Brigade, Brig. Gen. George Doles 437
Colquitt's Brigade, Brig. Gen, A. H. Colquitt 449
4.14 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Iverson's Brigade, Brig. Gen. Alfred Iverson 486
Ramseur's Brigade, Brig. Gen. S. D. Ramseur 7^8
Total D. H. Hill's Division 2,976
Early's Division—Maj. Gen. Jubal A. Early.
Gordon's Brigade, Brig. Gen. John B. Gordon 161
Smith's Brigade, Brig.* Gen. William Smith 86
Hoke's Brigade, Brig. Gen. Robert F. Hoke 230
Hays' Brigade, Brig. Gen. Harry T. Hays 369
Total Early's Division 846
Trimble's Division—Brig. Gen. R. E. Colston.
Staff and Pioneer Corps 6
Paxton's Brigade, Brig. Gen. E. F. Paxton 493
Jones' Brigade, Brig. Gen. J. R. Jones 472
Colston's Brigade, Col. E. T. H. Warren 802
Nicholls' Brigade, Brig. Gen. F. T. Nicholls 463
Total Trimble's Division 2,236
Total Second Corps 8,788
Total First and Second Corps 12,175
CHAPTER XI.
FREDERICKSBURG TO FREDERICK.
FTER the battle of Chaiicellorsville was fought, it
was well known to both Hooker and Lee that hos¬
tilities would soon be resumed between the two armies ;
so both commanders began to prepare their campaigns.
Lee knew that if Hooker crossed the Rappahannock
again, he would probably strike Gordonsville, with its
supplies, and attempt to beat him (Lêe) to Richmond, and
again environ the capital of the Confederacy, or take some
other route that might prove disastrous to the Confederate
cause.
Lee also knew that Hooker had lost about a corps from
his army by the expiration of their term of service, as
Hooker had hastened the battle of Chancellorsville on that
account. It seemed a most opportune time for Lee to
again march North, and draw the Army of the Potomac
away from Richmond. It might ruin Hooker's plan until
autumn. It seemed to be Lee's idea to procrastinate the
war as much as possible, in order to induce foreign inter¬
vention, and to strengthen the peace party in the North,
which was the natural ally of the South.
Lee plainly states to Jefferson Davis the above-named
reasons'for again marching North. So, on the 3d of June,
1863, directed Longstreet to move to Culpeper Court
House. McLaws' division, then at Fredericksburg, was
secretly marched away ; while Hood, who was on the Rap-
idan, was also directed to move to Culpeper. Pickett's
division joined with Longstreet there.
The next morning Rodes' division of Ewell's corps
415
416
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
received orders to follow. It was the intention of Lee to
withdraw his army quietly before Hooker was aware of it.
On the following day Early and Johnson's divisions of
Ewell's corps followed, leaving A. P. Hill's corps to hold
the heights of Fredericksburg. Hooker was aware that
Lee was making some important movement, and so noti¬
fied the authorities at Washington. On the 6th he threw
Sedgwick across the Rappahannock at Hamilton's Cross¬
ing to feci the enemy. Lee, seeing the movement, sent
orders to Ewell to halt until the real intentions of Hooker
were developed. As Sedgwick did not attack in force,
Lee saw that it was only for observation, gave orders to
Ewell to continue his march, and left the next evening for
Culpeper himself.
As soon as Hooker learned that Longstreet and Ewell
had disappeared, leaving only Hill in his front, he sus¬
pected that Lee was marching North again ; therefore he
resolved to frustrate his designs by crossing over and crush¬
ing Hill with his army, and compel Lee to fall back. But
Halleck again interfered, and directed Hooker to not
attack Hill. Thus was lost another golden opportunity to
seriously cripple Lee, whose army of three corps stretched
from Fredericksburg to the headwaters of the Shenandoah—-
ICO miles—with Longstreet in the center at Culpeper.
Had Frederick the Great commanded the Army of the
Potomac, Lee's army would have been defeated in detail,
and the fragments scattered in the mountains in less than
two weeks. Hooker was sensibly aware of the situation, and
realized that it was his duty to cross his army over and
surround Hill, as Ewell did Milroy a few days later. Hal¬
leck, seeing the determination of Hooker to attack Hill,
reported the matter to the President, urging him to direct
Hooker to move between Lee's forces and Washington.
So Lincoln wrote one of his laconic letters to Hooker. He
said :
If Lee should leave a rear force at Fredericksburg, tempting
you to fall upon it, he would fight you in intrenchraents, and have
FREDERICKSBURG TO FREDERICK. 417
you at a disadvantage, and so, man for man, worst you at that
point, while his main force would, in some way, be getting an ad¬
vantage of you northward. In a word, I would not take any risk
of being entangled upon the river, like an ox jumped half over a
fence, and liable to be torn by dogs front and rear, without a fair
chance to gore one way or to kick the other.
There is scarcely a doubt but that lyincoln, if he had been
in the field, would have been a great general. That he was
sensitive of the safety of Washington is a fact beyond dis¬
pute ; for if it had fallen into the hands of the enemy even
for a short time, there was great danger of foreign recognition
of the Confederacy ; yet there were enough troops in and
around Washington to have saved it from any such terrible
fate.
If Hooker had crossed his whole army over the Rappa¬
hannock, and surrounded Hill's corps, it could not have
held out forty-eight hours. The rear of the heights was
not intrenched, .so an assault from that direction could
easily have been made. Hooker could have crossed half
of his army at Skinker's Neck, and then marched up the
Telegraph road from Richmond, cut Hill off from retreating
in that direction, until he arrived near Hamilton's Cross¬
ing, then by making a detour to the left his force would
have been directly in the rear of Hill's position while the
other half of his army could have ascended the left bank
of the Rappahannock until it reached United States Ford,
and there crossing and taking possession of the road to Cul-
peper Court House, moving eastwardly, and uniting with
the other wing of his army, hold Hill in his position until
he could crush him with his combined force before Uong-
street could have returned to his relief. If any number of
Hill's troops had cut their way out through Hooker's lines,
Pleasonton's three divisions of cavalry could have over¬
taken them with ease. Besides, our cavalry, by crossing
first at United States Ford, could have prevented any in¬
formation being sent to Culpeper, by taking possession of
Spottsylvania Court House and Todd's Tavern, at the
xxvn
418
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
junction of the Brock and Catharpin roads. But Halleck,
whose military genius was only successful in opposing his
own generals in the field, thought he knew the true
situation, and was able to compel Hooker to take up his
march in the direction of Washington, leaving Hill to
follow kongstreet at his pleasure.
It is insinuated that Hooker's conversation with some
of his officers was secretly sent to Washington. It is
claimed that Hooker said : " If he (Lee) wants to exchange
queen for queen, then all right." That is, Richmond for
Washington. If Hooker had crushed Hill and then
marched on Richmond, it would have been evacuated before
he appeared before it, for Keyes was on the Peninsula
with about 15,000 troops and would have cooperated with
him.
But Davis could have chosen another city for his cap¬
ital, and perhaps it would have made little difference to his
government. Lee, on the other hand, if he had appeared
before Washington, with the corps of Bwell and Long-
street, would not have outnumbered the troops inside of
the fortifications, including Schenck's force drawn from
Baltimore and Harper's Ferry. Then Hooker could have
arrived in Washington with a part of his forces, by
steamer up the bay, almost as soon as Lee could have
reached there and so have been rçady.to deal him a heavy
blow. Thus it is alleged that Hooker soliloquized over the
situation, which was written to Washington and greatly
alarmed Halleck, and the fiat went forth for Hooker to
march between Lee and Washington.
The Comte de Paris in his work says on that point :
"All that we propose to demonstrate at present is that
Hooker's idea was correct and suggestive. He did not suc¬
ceed in convincing either the President or General Halleck.
' ' He was told in reply not to mind Richmond, but to
attend to Lee's army, and to pursue or attack the latter on
the march or in its encampment ; as if the movement
against Hill was not the best way to strike at the weak
FREDERICKSBURG TO FREDERICK. 419
point of this army and to thwart all the projects of its
chief?"
Lee had not, as yet, developed his plans sufficiently for
either Hooker or the authorities at Washington to under¬
stand them. Was he aiming to take the route of 1862, and
make the field of Bull Run famous for a third battle there ?
Twice had the Confederates, scored a victory on that ground,
and it would seem more likely for Lee to do that than for
him to take the Shenandoah Valley route for the North,
where he had suffered one defeat (South Mountain), fought
a drawn battle at Antietam, and came so near having
his army ruined and routed. It was Hooker's duty to learn
what were the intentions of the Confederate commander,
so he directed Pleasonton to proceed to the upper Rappa¬
hannock with his whole cavalry force and three brigades of
infantry, there cross it, and move in the .direction of Cul-
peper until he struck the enemy.
On the 8th of June Stuart's cavalry, nearly 10,000
strong, was reviewed by Lee near Culpeper, and witnessed
by Longstreet's whole corps. Stuart was a fine cavalry
commander, and, like Marshal Murat, was excessively fond
of show. On the review he was not contented to pass
before his commanding general, as is the usual custom
on such occasions, but he went through all the different
movements of a real battle—making dashes on the enemy
with his cavalry, while artillery was brought into action,
and the roar of cannon sounded in the distance like the
fury of the hostile armies at Waterloo or Austerlitz. As
Pleasonton marched up the left bank of the Rappahannock,
he could hear the mutterings of Stuart's cannon, which
convinced him that a heavy force was near Brandy Station,
distant four or five miles from Rappahannock Station.
Pleasonton decided to send Buford's division of cavalry
and Ames' brigade of infantry up to Beverly Ford, two
miles above Rappahannock Station, while the divisions of
Gregg and Duffié, with Russell's brigade of infantry, the
7th Wisconsin, two companies of the 2d Wisconsin, and
420 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
the 56th Pennsylvania, the whole detail under command of
Col. W. W. Robinson, of the 7th Wisconsin, were left at
Kelley's Ford, lower down, with instructions for Duffié to
bear to the left, and see if there was any Confederate force
on the road from Fredericksburg to Culpeper.
Gregg was to move between Duffié and Buford, with his
infantry on his right flank, extending in the direction of
Buford's left. Russell's brigade of infantry moved on the
immediate right of Gregg's cavalry, while Colonel Robin¬
son's command marched up the river about a mile, and
then, turning to the left, touched Russell's right, while
Colonel Hofmann, commanding the 56th Pennsylvania, on
the right of Robinson's command, received orders from
Buford at different times during the day ; recrossed the
Rappahannock under his orders that evening, Gregg taking
the direct road to Brandy Station, while Duffié, in bearing
to the left, would strike the road from Ely's Ford to Ste¬
vensburg at Willis Madden's.
The column at Kelley's Ford was delayed in crossing by
the failure of Colonel Duffié to arrive at the proper time, it
being near nine a. m. when the head of his column was
ready to cross. He had been ordered to rendezvous at Mor-
risville the night before. When Duffié began to move in
the morning he took the wrong road. Col. John I. Gregg,
commanding one of his brigades, knowing Duffié was
making a mistake, informed him of the fact ; he, however,
took no notice of the information for some time, but con¬
tinued his march. It was then impossible for him to arrive
at Kelley's Ford to cross at the appointed time. When
Duffle's division arrived. Gen. D. McM. Gregg, who com¬
manded the division, asked Col. John I. Gregg,- what caused
the delay, when he was told that Colonel Duffié took the
wrong road. It was supposed that Russell, by taking a
short cut, would arrive in time with his infantry brigade to
be of valuable service in the battle. The river was crossed
at daybreak by Buford's force under cover of a heavy fog.
Gregg and Duffié crossed Kelley's Ford without any opposi-
FREDERICKSBURG TO FREDERICK. 421
tion, but the movement was closely watched, and Captain
White reported to Gen, B. H. Robertson, whose headquar¬
ters were on John Minor Botts' farm, that the enemy was
•crossing in heavy force. Robertson at once communicated
the intelligence to General Stuart, who ordered him to ad¬
vance in that direction and check the enemy, so as to pro¬
tect the right flank of the forces engaged with Buford.
Robertson advanced about two miles, when he met the
eneni}-. He dismounted part of his command, and formed
a skirmish line to feel the force in his front, when the fact
was developed that he was facing Russell's brigade of infan¬
try, while Duffié had taken the road by Willis Madden's to
Stevensburg, and Gregg had passed his right flank with his
division of cavalry, and was marching in the direction of
Brandy Station ; these facts were hastily forwarded to
Stuart, who ordered him to fall rapidly back, as Gregg was
gaining his rear.
Colonel Davis' brigade of Buford's division encountered
the outposts of Jones at Beverly Ford, but they were easih'
driven back. Stuart was so elated over his grand review
the day before, in the presence of General Lee, that he
made no disposition of his troops for defense against a sud¬
den attack from the Union forces, and he came very near
losing four batteries of his mounted artillery in the charge
-of Davis ; but for the fact that they were not observed by
the Union cavalry, ■ they would have all been captured, for
the horses were picketed and the men on fatigue duty. A
piece of woods shielded them from view as the Union
cavalry pursued the Confederate pickets, thus pressing near
the artillery.
As it was Stuart's intention to cross the Rappahannock
on the 9th, Jones was ordered to .Beverly Ford, while W. H.
F. Lee was bivouacked near Wellsford, and Fitz-Hugh Lee's
brigade, under Munford, was encamped for the night at
Oak Shade, the old-fashioned church built of brick brought
from England, on the left of Hazel River. Thus Stuart's
cavalry lay closely along the right bank of the Rappahan-
422
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
nock on the morning of the 9th of June, when our cavalry
on the left bank began crossing at daylight. It was a bold
and unexpected move on the part of Pleasonton. For the
first time our cavalry took the offensive, and charged well
up to Lee's infantry ; Gregg was only a short distance from
Ewell's troops when he was at Brandy Station.
As Buford advanced against Jones, his right flank was
endangered from W. H. F. Lee and Munford, who were
higher up the river. Lee soon formed on the left of Jones,
and attacked Buford's right flank with considerable success.
Stuart's headquarters were at Fleetwood Hill, the old
homestead of John S. Barbour, the father of Hon. J. S. Bar¬
bour, who was elected United States Senator from Virginia
in 1889. Near him was the brigade of Hampton. The
firing in the direction of the river brought Jones' troopers
to the scene of action, where they formed the pickets on
foot, contesting the advance of Davies' brigade. The 8th
New York was severely attacked, and the combatants met
in a hand-to-hand encounter with sabers and pistols. In
that struggle the Union troops displayed great valor.
Stuart's force, in front of Buford, was greatly superior to
that of Buford's, however. The latter was hotly engaging
Stuart until Gregg could arrive at Brandy Station and
attack the Confederates in the rear.
Pleasanton sent Hooker the following dispatch :
Headquarters Cavalry Corps,
June 9, 1863—II a. m. (Received 12:45 P- m.)
General :—All the enemy's forces are engaged with me. I am
holding them until Gregg can come up. Gregg's guns are being-
heard in the enemy's rear.
A. Pleasonton,
Brigadier General, Commanding.
To Gen. S. Williams,
Asst. Adjt. Gen., Army of the Potomac.
General Gregg had gained the rear of Stuart's position,
and was directly between him and Lee's army near Cul-
peper. He at once prepared to strike a hard blow at
FREDERICKSBURG TO FREDERICK. 423
Stuart. Accordingly he sent a courier to Duffié at Stevens-
burg to hasten up with his division from that point, as
Gregg had already succeeded in swinging around and
striking the road from Brandy Station to Stevensburg,
that the force was light in that direction, and as Duffié was
only sent to Stevensburg to learn that fact it was unneces¬
sary for him to remain there. There were only two regi¬
ments of the enemy in that vicinity—the 4th Virginia,
under Colonel Wickham, and the 2d South Carolina, under
M. C. Butler, now a distinguished member of the United
States Senate.
Butler's regiment was advantageously posted, with his
right resting at Norman's mill-pond, on Mountain Run,
which courses its way from beyond Culpeper, and flows
into the Rappahannock below Kelley's Ford, after passing
Jack Stone's mill. Quite a curious and interesting history
is connected with the battle at that point. In early days a
Miss Norman married Mr. Stanton, the father of Edwin M.
Stanton, whose army, as Secretary of War, was then-fight¬
ing where his mother in childhood days had played on the
banks of that meandering and romantic stream.
A shell burst and killed Eieut. Col. Frank Hampton,
brother of Wade Hampton, Captain Farley, volunteer aid-
de-camp to General Stuart, and carried away the foot of
Col. M. C. Butler. That was a severe blow to the regi¬
ment, but it held its ground as well as possible until over¬
powered, then retired in the direction of Culpeper.
Wickham's regiment faced John I. Gregg's brigade, but
avoided an engagement. So in reality one regiment of the
enemy detained Duffié's division there, while Gen. D. McM.
Gregg was sending courier after courier to induce him to
come to his (Gregg's) assistance at Brandy Station, where
the two forces were engaged in a pitched battle of a most
desperate character.
Gregg longed for Duffié to come in time to turn the tide
of battle at Fleetwood Hill, which would drive Stuart on
the forces of Buford, which were ready ' ' to welcome them
424 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
to hospitable graves." Arriving at Brandy Station, Gen.
D. McM. Gregg saw heavy columns of the enemy at
the Barbour House. Stuart had ordered Jones and Hamp¬
ton to retire from the front of Buford to meet the forces
under Gregg that had turned his right flank and gained his
rear. In addition to the commands of Jones and Hampton,
Robertson's brigade had returned from the direction of
Kelley's Ford, and Stuart was again able to present a strong
front where danger most threatened him.
Gregg hesitated to attack without the assistance of
Duffié' s division, but there was no time to be lost ; he must
either charge with the troops at his command or retire, and
as he had made such a successful circuit of Stuart's posi¬
tion, he felt compelled by his orders to attack at once and
trust to Duffle's arrival in time to support and assist his
forces engaged. He therefore ordered Percy Wyndham to
charge. The enemy had a battery posted at the Barbour
House. A section of artillery was hastily put in position
and opened on it. At the same time Major Russell was
directed to charge on the enemy's cavalry that was break¬
ing away to the left.
As the battery at the Barbour House slackened its fire,
the artillery of Wyndham was advanced ; at the same time
he ordered the ist New Jersey to charge on the battery sta¬
tioned in the rear of the Barbour House. The ist Penn¬
sylvania Cavalry and the balance of the ist Maryland
were thrown forward to support the charge of the ist New
Jersey.
The ist Maryland, led by Lieutenant Colonel Deems,"
charged the enemy posted behind the buildings in the
garden and orchard. The ist Pennsylvania divided ; one
wing, under Colonel Taylor, struck the enemy in front,
while the other wing, under the command of Lieutenant
Colonel Gardner, dashed on the enemy's flank. This com¬
bined movement forced the enemy back on the plain below.
Percy Wyndham led the ist New Jersey, assisted by Lieu¬
tenant Colonel Broderick. The eneiii)' was driven from his
FREDERICKSBURG TO FREDERICK. 425
guns. Then a desperate struggle was made to retake them,
but Wyndham's forces were again successful in repelling
the attack.
Gregg seeing that Wyndham would soon be overpowered,
ordered Kilpatrick forward on his right, who formed line
of battle en echelon of regiments, directing a section of
artillery on the right of the second regiment. Wyndham
had just been forced from the hill. Kilpatrfck directed
Colonel Irvine, of the loth New York, who was on the left
of his brigade, to advance and retake the hill if possible.
Kilpatrick's artillery then opened, and Colonel Da vi es
with one battalion of the Harris Dight was also ordered in,
but Irvine and Davies were at once met by two heavy
columns of the enemy, and seeing this Kilpatrick ordered
Colonel Douty, of the ist Maine, to sweep to the right and
charge the enemy on the flank. It was a new regiment,
seeking maiden honors, and the record it made there that
day was equal to that of any lancers in history. In
the mean tilne Kilpatrick ordered Irvine and Davies to
withdraw and rally their commands to the support of the
ist Maine. Passing over the batteries and driving the
gunners into a safe hiding place, the troops of that new but
gallant regiment were forcing everything before them for
more than a mile.
Of that charge Adjutant E. W- Whitaker, of the
Harris Light, said, "It was one of the grandest I ever
witnessed on any battlefield." The bits of the adjutant's
bridle broke and his horse ran away and kept with the ist
Maine to the end of its charge, which gave him an oppor¬
tunity of ascertaining the facts. The gunners of the Con¬
federate batteries sprang to their places and began firing
again with great rapidity, as if in revenge for being driven
away. Their cavalry had collected and were ready to
attack the brave Maine men. Receiving their orders to
wheel and cut their way back, they gallantly began their
ride, many of them to death, for they were suffering from a
fire not only in front but from both flanks.
426
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Just as the guns, heavily shotted, were ready to fire on
the regiment. Lieutenant Colonel Smith suddenly changed
direction to the right, and the murderous fire passed harm¬
lessly in their wake, and before they could be reloaded the
regiment had cut its way out. General Gregg seeing that
there was no hope of Duffié coming on the field in time to
assist him, while trains from Culpeper had already arrived
with infantry to assist Stuart, decided to retire.
Buford hearing the guns of Gregg, again attacked,
hoping the combined assault would rout the Confederate
cavalry, but a most stubborn resistance was made to his
advance. Gen. W. H. F. Lee was severely wounded,
which compelled him to leave the field. Pleasonton having
accomplished all that Hooker desired, and feeling that he
was unable to win a decisive victory because Duffié failed
to support Gregg at Brandy Station at the proper time,
gave the order to recross the Rappahannock.
Thus ended a fierce and desperate struggle between the
two cavalry commanders, which was only a prelude to other
engagements where heroism and dash were displayed with
great skill on both sides. Stuart was now opposed by a
cavalry commander whose prowess on the field met the
Confederate general with equal ability, supported by such
gallant officers as Buford, the Greggs, Kilpatrick, Percy,
Wyndham, Davies and others. The Union cavalry was
officered and ready to meet the Confederate horsemen on
the field. Stuart was well supported by officers who were
trained and daring. Robertson, Fitz Hugh Lee, W. H.
F. Lee, Jones and Hampton were ever ready to follow his
lead.
It was Stuart's purpose to shield the movements of Lee's
infantry on its march North, so that Hooker would not be
able to concentrate his army at any given point and pierce
his columns while on the march. As it was Pleasonton's
duty to learn the movements of the whole of Lee's army if
possible, he was compelled to attack the cavalry, and get that
out of the way to uncover what was going on behind the
FREDERICKSBURG TO FREDERICK. 427
mountains. For that reason we will soon be compelled to
record the battles in the valley between the Bull Run and
Blue Ridge Mountains, beginning at Aldie. Lee's com¬
prehensive plan was to blind Hooker as to his real inten¬
tions, so he ordered General Imboden, with his brigade of
cavalry, to go in the direction of Romney to cut the Balti¬
more and Ohio Railroad, in order that the Army of the
Potomac could not be reënforced from the Northwest.
Jenkins' brigade of cavalry preceded Ewell's corps,
which began its march on the loth of June, making
forced marches so as to arrive at Winchester before the
authorities at Washington would learn of the movement,
and either reënforce Milroy or order him to evacuate, before
he was attacked by an overwhelming force. Lee well knew
that Hooker's cavalry was not sufficiently strong in num¬
bers to make a circuit of the Confederate forces then lying
at Culpeper, and from which point the advance into the
valley was to be made immediately.
Bwell passed through Chester Gap in the Blue Ridge,
and bivouacked on the night of the 12th at Front Royal.
There he turned Rodes' division down the Shenandoah in
the direction of Berry ville, to capture the Union force sta¬
tioned there as a sort of outpost to Winchester—it being
near midway between the Shenandoah River and Win¬
chester, and cut off Milroy's retreat to Harper's Ferry.
The divisions of Early and Johnson marched direct upon
Winchester until they arrived within a few miles of it.
There Early bore to the left and attacked Milroy's force at
Kernstown, which was another outpost in that direction.
It seems that the scouts and cavalry coming in failed to
appreciate the actual strength of the approaching enemy,
and led Milroy to believe there was no danger. It never
once dawned on their minds that it was one-third of the
Confederate army rapidly bearing down on a comparatives-
small command.
On the evening of the 13th Ewell arrived within three
or four miles of Winchester, and began to prepare to cap-
428
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
ture the whole force there. Ewell directed Early to send
Gordon" s brigade square in front of the town to make a
strong demonstration, as if that constituted the attacking
party, while the brigades of Hays, Smith, and Hoke were
to make a detour far enough away from the town not to be
observed, and pass west of it until the woods leading to Rom¬
ney and Pughtown were reached and held. Then Colonel
Jones was ordered to run his artillery into position by hand.
The movement was shielded by a piece of woods, and
twelve guns were placed in an orchard, while eight were in
a cornfield north of the woods. After the artillery had
played about three-quarters of an hour on the outer works.
Hays' brigade was directed to advance and carry them,
which was quite easily accomplished. As the artillery did
not begin firing until about an hour by sun, it was nearly
dark when Hays carried the works to the northwest. That
ended the battle for the day.
It was presumed by the Confederate generals that Mil¬
roy would evacuate the town during the night. Early held
the roads to Roniney and Pughtown, while Johnson was
sent east of Winchester with his division. The latter was
ordered to leave Jones to hold that position, while the
brigades of Stewart, Nicholls, and Walker were directed to
make a circuit and gain the Martinsburg road and form line
of battle facing Winchester, so as to cut off any attempted
retreat at night. Milroy, who was a brave soldier, had not
been warned in time of the danger that then surrounded
him, and resolved to cut his way out during the night (for
it was impossible to do so by daylight) or sell his life as
dearly as possible.
Then came one of the most desperate night struggles of
the war. Milroy struck the Confederate forces with mas¬
terly skill and cut his way out with a part of his command.
The remainder of his troops were taken prisoners.
Rodes appeared before Berry ville, threw Jenkins' brigade
of cavalry between that point and Winchester, and while
he left one brigade in front he attempted to send the other
FREDERICKSB URG TO FREDERICK.
42&
three brigades around to the north and capture the whole
force, but Col. A. T. McReynolds, who was in command
there, had left a few soldiers at that point to make a bold
demonstration, while he had quietly retreated before the
snare was laid for him. That swept the valley of the
Union forces, and Ewell nressed on for Martinsburg with
unprecedented zeal.
The ease with which Lee concealed the movements of
one-third of his army nntil it appeared before Winchester,
and was ready within a few hours to surround and capture
it, is proof positive that it was highly essential that a divi¬
sion of cavalry be stationed at Front Royal to impede the
progress of a heavy force of the enemy suddenly issuing
through the gaps of the Blue Ridge, and descending on the
forces stationed in the valley at Winchester, Martinsburg,
and Harper's Ferry.
In fact, the plan of General Rosecrans, which he made
to the Secretary of War when he was directed to conduct
Blenker's division to General Fremont, and on his retnrn
to report anything he might see that would benefit the
service, was the better plan by far. In looking the matter
over, it was his opinion that all commands in that section
ought to be consolidated into one and thrown forward to
Gordonsville, or some point in that vicinity, to protect the
Shenandoah Valley and also constitute the right wing of
the Army of the Potomac in its advance. This was a
proposition of great military sagacity, and wonld have pre¬
vented several disastrous campaigns to our arms in the
valley.
No infantry force stationed in the Shenandoah could
protect itself from surprise except with the aid of a strong
division of cavalry under the command of a general like
Buford or Sheridan ; as General Heth said, ' ' The cavalry
of any army is its eyes and ears. ' '
When Milroy was attacked he fought with an iron will,
but his pickets were too feeble in strength to pierce the
movements of the advance to.test its force. The reports to
4;jU THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
him were that it was the advance of the force which had
been in his front.
After the cavalr)* fight at Beverly Ford, Brandy Sta¬
tion, and Stevensburg, on the 9th of June, 1863, Pleas-
onton fell back to the vicinity of Warrenton Junction,
where he could watch the movements of the enemy and at
the same time shield the movements of Hooker's infantry,
which was ready to abandon its position along the Rappa¬
hannock and again retrace its steps in the direction of
Washington. In making that movement the right wing of
the army became the left in its reverse movement.
On the nth the Third Corps marched from its quarters
near Falmouth to Hartwood Church, which is nearly oppo¬
site the United States Ford.
General Reynolds was directed the following day to
break camp at Fitzhugh's plantation and White Oak Church
and proceed to Deep Run, a tributary of the Rappahannock
that empties into it several miles above the junction of the
Rappahannock, while the Third Corps moved to Bealeton,
with Humphreys' (Third) division advanced to the Rappa¬
hannock, the Eleventh Corps having moved from Brookes'
Station to Hartwood Church.
On the 13th the First Corps moved to Bealeton, while
the Fifth marched from the vicinity of Banks' Ford to
Morrisville, and the Eleventh to Catlett's Station. Hooker's
left wing was composed of four corps—the First, Third,
Fifth, and Eleventh, with Pleasonton's cavalry.
The right wing began its movement on the 13th by the
Sixth Corps leaving Franklin Crossing, below Fredericks¬
burg, and moving to Potomac Creek, while the Twelfth moved
from Stafford Court House and Aquia Creek to Dumfries,
where Hooker made his headquarters on the following day.
The Sixth moved up and took the position the Twelfth
had just vacated, while the artillery reserve, under General
Hunt, moved from Stafford Court House to Wolf Run Shoal.
The Eleventh Corps, leading the left wing, came up to
Catlett's Station. On the 15th Hooker moved his head-
FREDERICKSB URÜ TO FREDERICK. 431
quarters to Fairfax Station, directing Slocnm to Fairfax
Court House and Sedgwick to Dumfries. As yet the
Second Corps was facing A. P. Hill on the Rappahannock,
but General Couch on the nth had been ordered to Harris-
burg to take command of the forces in defense of that city,
in anticipation of Lee's movement into Pennsylvania. At
the same time General Brooke was assigned to the Depart¬
ment of the Monongahela, with headquarters at Pittsburg.
Hancock, who had succeeded Couch in command of the
corps, was ordered to follow the right wing, moving to
Aquia Creek.
On the 16th the Sixth Corps arrived at headquarters,
Fairfax Station, while the Second marched to Wolf Run
Shoals. The cavalry moved from Union Mills and Bristoe
Station to Manassas Junction and Bull Run.
On the 17th Pleasonton was directed by Hooker to
make a reconnoissance of the valley between the Blue
Ride and Bull Run Mountains. D. McM. Gregg's divi¬
sion of cavalry moved to Aldie, a gap in the Bull Run
Mountain. Kilpatrick's brigade had the advance, and on
entering that quaint little hamlet encountered the pickets
of the enemy, for the head of Stuart's forces had been ad¬
vanced to that place that morning. Fitz-Hugh Lee's bri¬
gade, commanded by Col. T. T. Munford, lay not far dis¬
tant near Dover.
Robertson's brigade was at Rector's Crossroads, and
W. H. F. Lee's brigade, commanded by Colonel Chambliss,
was kept near Salem to picket Thoroughfare Gap, and to
keep open communication with Hampton, who was still in
the rear near the Rappahannock. Thus Stuart's cavalry
occupied the valley between the mountains. Both sides
were apparently surprised when they met, but instantly
prepared for action.
At Aldie the road divides, one branch running north¬
west in the direction of Snicker's Gap, while the other pur¬
sues a westwardly course through Middleburg, toward
Ashby's Gap in the Blue Ridge. Munford at once placed
432
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
his brigade on the hill, between the two roads, which gave
him quite an advantageous position for his artillery ; and
dismounting a part of his cavalry behind a fence where
quite a ditch had been cut, made his position almost im¬
pregnable, for he could then double his forces on the two
roads where his flanks rested. Kilpatrick dismounted the 2d
New York, and with drawn sabers attacked the Con¬
federates in that position ; while a number of prisoners were
taken by this regiment it was almost impossible to dislodge
Munford's men behind the barricade.
On the right the 4th New York, under Colonel Di Ces-
nola, who had 'been placed under arrest, charged unarmed
at the head of his troops up the Snicker's Gap road. Seeing
his great gallantry Kilpatrick handed him his own saber in
the midst of the fight. He was seriously wounded and fell
into the hands of the enemy.
Although the two opposing forces were about equal in
numbers, Munford was so well posted that Kilpatrick was
unable to dislodge him, and D. McM. Gregg sent the ist
Maine to his assistance. As it came on the field Kilpatrick
inquired what regiment it was, and when told it was the
ist Maine, he said, "Forward, ist Maine; you saved the
field at Brandy, and you can do it here ! Are there twelve
men who will follow me ? " But instead of twelve men re¬
sponding to his request the regiment gave a deafening yell
and charged up the Snicker's Gap road with such mo¬
mentum that Munford's left was swept back, and his posi¬
tion behind the fence endangered.
It greatly pleased the Maine boys as they passed . Kil¬
patrick in the charge ; the gallant general's horse had been
shot in the neck and disabled. In that charge Colonel
Douty and Captain Summat, two gallant officers of the ist
Maine, were killed. The death of Colonel Douty was a
great blow to the regiment, for he was a gallant and capable
officer.
The regiment had two other good field officers. Lieu¬
tenant Colonel Smith and Major Boothby, who distin-
FREDERICKSBURG TO FREDERICK. 433
guislied themselves on that field, so that it was ready for
action at a moment's warning. However, the regiment
was composed of such material that had it lost all of the
field officers it would have moved right along, as it had
many men in the ranks capable and brave enough to have
led it.
Mnnford retired from the field, and it was the impres¬
sion then of the Union officers that he had been compelled
to retreat. His right, on the Snicker's Gap road, had been
turned, but the road to Middlebnrg, around which the
other brigades of Stuart's cavalry were concentrated, was
open to him. But it was not our forces in his front that
compelled him to leave the field, but an order from Stuart
for him to hastily retire to Middlebnrg. When Pleasonton
advanced with D. McM. Gregg's division to Aldie, Col.
A. N. Dufñé, commanding the ist Rhode Island Cavalry,
had been directed to make a detour to the left, according
to the following order : "You will proceed with your regi¬
ment from Manassas Junction by way of Thoroughfare
Gap to Middlebnrg ; there yon will camp for the night and
communicate with the headquarters of the Second Cavalry
Brigade. From • Middlebnrg you will proceed to Union,
thence to Snickersville, from Snickersville to Percyville ;
thence to Wheatland, and passing through Waterford, to
Nolan's Ferry, where you will join your brigade."
The regiment moved out on the morning of the 17th of
June, the anniversary of the battle of Bunker Hill, which,
to a New England regiment, was enough to inspire it with
sufficient patriotism to face death to save the country.
And it had a full test before the sun rose the next morning.
As it approached Thoroughfare Gap, the advance en¬
countered the pickets of Colonel Chambliss, but they re¬
tired in the direction of Salem, leaving the road open to
Middlebnrg, whither Duffié's orders carried him. It was a
beautiful day, and as the regiment marched in the direction
of Middlebnrg, the valley appeared most lovely, and the
bluish tinge on the mountains made it an interesting and
XXVIII
434 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
picturesque scene to behold. The birds sang their sweetest
notes, and the boys were more than happy.
It must be remembered that Gen. W. H. F. Lee's bri¬
gade, under the command of Colonel Chambliss, had been
left in their rear—a force at least four times that of the ist
Rhode Island, which only encountered Chambliss' pickets,
and was not aware that a brigade was left to block its
retreat next day. At about four p.m., the ist Rhode
Island struck Stuart's pickets, and at once charged them,
drove Stuart and his staff out of Middleburg on the gallop,
who escaped capture only by reason of the superior speed of
their fresh horses. At this time Fitz Lee's brigade, under
the command of Colonel Munford, was fighting at Aldie,
five miles away. Stuart had only a squadron of cavalry at
Middleburg when Duffié charged on the town. It was
strange to him that a mere regiment could penetrate the
center of his command. His surprise induced him to send
Capt. Frank Robertson of his staff with an order to Mun¬
ford to fall back to Middleburg. Duffié and the whole
regiment knew that they had captured Stuart's head¬
quarters, but that it would be almost a miracle to escape
with the brigades of Chambliss, Robertson and Munford
closing in on them. Duffié's orders were to remain at
Middleburg that night, and report to Kilpatrick at Aldie.
He was a French officer, and insisted on strictly obeying
orders without regard to the change of circumstances. He
was going to stay in Middleburg that night if it cost his
life. Capt. George N. Bliss wanted the regiment to move
at once to Aldie before the Confederates could surround
them. He claimed it would save the regiment, and when
the order was issued to remain in Middleburg that night
no one supposed it was the point of concentration of
Stuart's forces.
If Duffié had moved on the road to Aldie it would have
aided Kilpatrick in his struggle with Munford, for a reg¬
iment coming up in the rear would have decided the day
against the Confederates, and placed our troops in better
FREDERICKSBURG TO FREDERICK. 435
condition to have followed up Stuart the next day. But
Duffié decided to meet his fate, and sent Capt. Frank Allen
with two men to Aldie to report to Pleasonton, while he
barricaded the roads coming into the town. His reserve he
placed on the road leading to Aldie. Before dark Stuart
returned with the 4th and 5 th North Carolina Cavalry, and
attacked Duffié. The men at the barricades fought
bravely, but were outflanked by superior numbers, and fell
back on the reserve. Companies G and F were ordered to
dismount and conceal their horses in a grove, and take a
position behind a stone wall that bounded one side of the
road.
It was quite dark when the enemy charged down this
road until he arrived at the stone wall, when a volley was
poured into his ranks at short range. It produced great
consternation and confusion by the wounding of the men
and horses. The enemy retreated a safe distance and again
charged, only to be discomfited by another volley from the
carbines of Duffié's troops. The third charge was made,
and resulted in the enemy being hurled back again with
considerable loss. It was evident that the Confederates
were endeavoring to flank the position, therefore Duffié de¬
cided to withdraw from the town before all his forces were
captured. In doing so Major Farrington, who was in com¬
mand of the men behind the stone wall, was ordered to
retire. The next morning the Confederates again hotl}-
pursued Duffié and, as a matter of course, the regiment
was compelled to divide into small squads, and escape as
best they could on foot over the Bull Run Mountains.
The following is taken from the "Campaign of Stuart's Cav¬
alry," by Maj. H. B. McClellan, Stuart's adjutant general :
Early in the morning Col. A. N. Duffié had crossed the Bull Run
Mountain at Thoroughfare Gap. His orders directed him to encamp
at Middleburg on the night of the 17th and to proceed the next day
toward Nolan's Ferry, extending his march to the west as far as
Snickersville. These orders seem to have contemplated a somewhat
extended scout by this regiment, on the left flank of General Gregg's
436
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
division—a hazardous movement in the presence of an enterprising^
enemy. Colonel Duffié reached Thoroughfare Gap at 9:30 a. m., and
was somewhat delayed in crossing the mountain by the picket from
Chambliss' command. By eleven o'clock, however, he was fairly on
his way toward Middleburg. At four o'clock, p. m., he struck the
pickets which Stuart had established for his own safety outside the
town, and drove them in so quickly that Stuart and his staff were
compelled to make a retreat more rapid than was consistent with
dignity and comfort. Having with him no force adequate to contest
the ground with Duffié's regiment, Stuart retired towards Rector's-
Crossroads. Munford was notified of his danger, and directed to
withdraw from Aldie, and Robertson and Chambliss were ordered to
move immediately upon Middleburg. The only hope for Dufiiè's
regiment now lay in an immediate advance upon Aldie, where he
might have created considerable commotion by attacking the rear
of the loth Virginia Cavalry on the Middleburg road. But he did
not know this, and his orders were positive, requiring him to encamp
for the night at Middleburg. He therefore made the best of his sit¬
uation by dismounting one-half of his regiment behind stone walls
and barricades, hoping that he might be able to hold his position
until reënforced from Aldie, whither he sent Capt. Frank Allen to
make known his situation at brigade headquarters. Captain Allen
reached Aldie, after encountering many difiiculties, at nine o'clock,
p. m. He says in his report, "General Kilpatrick informed me that
his brigade was so worn out that he could not send any reënforce-
ments to Middleburg, but that he would report the situation of our
regiment to General Gregg. Returning he said that General Gregg
had gone to state the facts to General Pleasonton, and directed me
to remain at Aldie until he heard from General Pleasonton. I re¬
mained, but received no further orders." Thus Colonel Dufíié was
left to meet his fate.
At seven o'clock in the evening he was attacked by Robertson's
brigade. His men fought bravely, and repelled more than one charge
before they were driven from the town, retiring by the same road by
which they had advanced. Unfortunately for Duffié, this road was
now closed by Chambliss' brigade, which surrounded him during
the night, and captured, early the next morning, the greater part of
those who had escaped from Robertson on the previous evening.
Colonel Duffié himself escaped capture, and reached Centerville
early in the afternoon of the next day, with four of his officers and
twenty-seven men. He reports the loss in his regiment at 20 officers
and 248 men. This, however, was an exaggeration of the calamity ;
for other officers beside himself had taken to the woods, and suc¬
ceeded in making their way back to the Federal lines. On the iSth
FREDERICKSBURG TO FREDERICK.
437
and 19th, Major Farrington, who was separated from his regiment
on the night of the 17th, in Middleburg, thus brought in 2 ofibcers
and 23 men; Lieutenant Colonel Thompson brought in 18 men;
Sergeant Palmer 12 men, and Capt. George N. Bliss 6 men. Color
Sergeant Robbins, who was wounded and captured, was left in Mid¬
dleburg, and fell into the hands of his friends when Stuart retired
from that place. This reduces the loss to 200.
This regiment was composed of good material, and it rapidly
recuperated.
On the 17th of August following it assembled 300 men at War-
renton, and was attached to Mcintosh's brigade, of Gregg'sdivision.
This statement, made by the adjutant general of Stuart,
IS as high an encomium as could be passed on the valor of
the ist Rhode Island, and I deem it unnecessary to add
more.
Pleasonton followed Stuart as the latter suddenly retired
tnrough Upperville, where he made a stubborn stand, but
was finally compelled to fall back through Ashby's Gap,
Pleasonton then learned from some prisoners that Long-
street was moving along the eastern side of the Blue Ridge.
General Lee, in a report to Jefferson Davis, dated June
18, 1863, says :
lyongstreet's corps has moved east of the Blue Ridge, with the
view of creating embarrassment as to our plans, while Bwell, having
driven the enemy from Winchester and Martinsburg, has seized upon
the Potomac, so as to enable General Hill's corps to move up from
F redericks burg.
Again, General Lee, on the 20th, says ;
General Longstreet's corps, with Stuart's cavalry, still occupy
the Blue Ridge, between the roads leading through Ashby's and
Snicker's Gaps, holding in check a large force of the enemy, con¬
sisting of cavalry, infantry and artillery.
Genefal Bwell was then north of the Potomac at Sharps-
burg, the battlefield of Antietam, Boonsborough and
Hagerstown, with Jenkins' cavalry in his advance, Imbo-
den was actively operating on the left flank of Lee's army,
A, P, Hill's corps, following in the wake of Bwell, was
438
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
coming up, and Longstreet was ordered to cross to the west
side of the Blue Ridge and intrust the gaps to Stuart.
Here begins one of the most interesting pieces of history
in connection with the battle of Gettysburg. Lee says ;
General Stuart was directed to hold the mountain passes with
part of his command as long as the enemy remained south of the
Potomac, and, with the remainder, to cross into Maryland, and place
himself on the right of General Ewell. Upon the suggestion of the
former officer that he could damage the enemy and delay his passage
of the river by getting in his rear, he was authorized to do so, and
it was left to his discretion whether to enter Maryland east or west
of the Blue Ridge ; but he was instructed to lose no time in placing
his command on the right of our column as soon as he should per¬
ceive the enemy moving northwest.
Stuart at once started on his raid to get between Hooker
and Washington, hoping thereby to capture supplies on the
way to the Union army. He had not mueh diffieulty in
making the cireuit of our army ; but he utterly failed in
intercepting any provisions or artillery, and was unable to
rejoin Lee's army. He finally succeeded in crossing the
Potomac near Roekville, where he captured an immense
train with supplies for Hooker's army, which he took with
him. That compelled him to move so slowly that he was
never able to unite with Lee's army. He was at Carlisle
on the afternoon of the ist of July, and was not aware that
a great battle had been fought at Gettysburg that day.
We now turn to Ewell, who had the advance of Lee's
army. He (Ewell) took the divisions of Rodes and John¬
son, with Jenkins' cavalry brigade, and proceeded through
Chambersburg to Carlisle, where he arrived on the 27th.
Early's division was directed to march from Boonsborough
to Greenwood, and thence to York. On the 24th Long-
street and Hill were put in motion to follow Ewell, and
they arrived at Chambersburg when Ewell reached Carlisle.
Thus the whole of Lee's army was in the State of Penn¬
sylvania, and the advance guard threatening Harrisburg.
As yet Lee supposed Hooker was in Virginia.
FREDERICKSBURG TO FREDERICK.
439
Early was to strike the Northern Central Railroad at
York, tear it up, and proceed to Wrightsville. As he
approached the latter place the militia of the State of Penn¬
sylvania retreated across the bridge and fired it, thus pre¬
venting the enemy from crossing to the left bank of the
Susquehanna. Early then rejoined his corps.
The movement on Harrisburg was arrested by informa¬
tion given Eee by one of his scouts, who learned that
Hooker had crossed the Potomac, and was approaching
South Mountain.
When Pleasonton returned from his reconnoissance of
the valley from Aldie to Ashby's Gap, and reported that
Eongstreet was on the east side of the Blue Ridge, it
caused the perplexity that Eee desired and induced Hooker
to move with great caution. He was all the time con¬
centrating his army near the south bank of the Potomac,
to cross it rapidly if necessary, as will be seen by the fol¬
lowing :
Headquarters Army op the Potomac,
June 22, 1863.
General Wadsworth is bridging Goose Creek near the pike. Can
you bridge Goose Creek near the mouth, on a road that will conduct
to Edwards' Ferry ?
Daniel Butterfield, Major General.
To Captain Turnbull, Edwards' Ferry.
In order to fully express the great anxiety of Hooker
over the situation, the following official paper is given in
full :
Camp near Fairfax Court House,
June 24, 1863.
General :—in accordance with your request, I present the fol¬
lowing reasons for moving our army at once to the neighborhood of
Harper's Ferry :
1. The whole of Lee's army is reported to be on the Potomac,
above that place, part of it across the river, and threatening an ad¬
vance upon Harrisburg.
2. There we can protect Washington as well, and Baltimore
better than here, and preserve our communications and wants of
supply.
440
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
3. It is the shortest line to reach Lee's army ; will enable us to
operate on his communications, if he advances ; to throw overwhelm¬
ing forces on either portion of his army that he allows the river to
divide ; and is too strong a position for him to attack us in, even if
we make heavy detachments.
4. It will enable us to pass South Mountain without fighting
for the passes, if we wish to move upon him, and will thus destroy
any advantages these mountains would give as a protection to his
right flank.
5. It will prevent Lee from detaching a corps to invade Pennsyl¬
vania with, as it would expose the rest of his army to our attack in
superior force.
6. These opinions are based upon the idea that we are not to try
and go round his army, and drive it out of Maryland, as we did last
year, but to paralyze all its movements by threatening its flank and
rear if it advances, and gain time to collect reënforcements sufficient
to render us the stronger army of the two, if we are not so already.
Respectfully submitted.
G. K. Warren, Brig. Gen. Vols.,
Chief Engineer, Army of the Potomac.
Major General Hooker,
Commanding Army of the Potomac.
In accordance with the report General Warren made to
Hooker, he immediately began his preparations to concen¬
trate the army on the north bank of the Potomac, and dis¬
patched General Bntterfield to Washington and Baltimore
to secure as many troops from these two points as possible
to swell the Army of the Potomac ; when Bntterfield ar¬
rived in Washington, he called on Halleck for assistance ;
but receiving no encouragement from him, he then called
on the President, who listened earnestly to his statement,
and at once sent for Halleck. Halleck said there were no
troops which were not needed to take care of the property
and other necessary duty in Washington. Lincoln seemed
worried, but said to Bntterfield : "You hear Halleck's an¬
swer." Bntterfield then proceeded to Schenck's headquar¬
ters in Baltimore, where he received a warm reception,
but was only able to get one brigade (Lockwood's) from
the forces stationed there. As a matter of course, the force
at Harper's Ferry Schenck was perfectly willing should be
FREDERICKSBURG TO FREDERICK.
441
under the authority of Hooker ; but Halleck again inter¬
fered as he did before, when McClellan fought .South
Mountain and Antietam. Halleck then arbitrarily com¬
pelled Miles to remain, even when he knew his forces
were in danger of being captured.
It was natural to suppose that he would have yielded
when the two armies faced each other again, in almost the
same way they did before the battle of South Mountain ;
yet he boldly interfered, though aware that Lee's army
had been increased to its maximum strength. Longstreet's
corps had leceived the addition of Pickett's division. Lee
had urged Davis to strip the other commands, in order to
give him an army strong enough to defeat Hooker, with
the hope that Washington, Baltimore, Harrisburg and
Philadelphia would be at his mercy. If he (Lee) could
have taken Philadelphia, and established his headquarters
in Independence Hall, the Confederacy would have been
well nigh assured. Hooker, like McClellan, wanted the
troops in Harper's Ferry subject to his orders, and to be¬
come a part of his army, and to temporarily abandon it
after the stores were removed. He visited Harper's Ferr}',
and ordered General French, who was in command there,
to have three days' rations prepared for his men, and be
prepared on a moment's warning to move with the army.
Hooker telegraphed Halleck that it was utterl}- useless
to leave over 8000 men at that point, after Lee's whole
army had passed to the north, when he so greatly needed
the assistance of French in the struggle with Lee, well
knowing that the two armies must meet and fight a great
battle in a few days. General Gates, who commanded the
Ulster Guard, says in his history :
I have very conclusive evidence of the fact that some reënforce-
ments arrived to General Lee after "the three corps" had marched
from Chambersburg, and, in fact, during the battle. This I have in
the record kept of the marches of the 14th \'irginia Regiment, by
its colonel, James M. Hodges, on the back of a pocket map of the
State of Virginia, and whose regiment was in the final charge made
442
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
by Pickett's division (Armistead's brigade), on the third day of July,
and Colonel Hodges was killed within a hundred feet of me.
This record shows that Colonel Hodges was at Richmond in May.
June 3 he was at Hanover Junction (Fredericksburg and Richmond
Railroad). June 8 he left Hanover Junction and crossed the Poto¬
mac on the 25th. On the 2d of July he marched twenty-three miles,
and "camped within three miles of Gettysburg." He was just in
time to participate in the closing scenes, and he led his regiment up
almost to the muzzles of the muskets of my men, through a fire that
thinned his ranks at every step.
There need be no further proof added that from nearly
every point troops had been sent to Tee. This is fully
demonstrated in the answer of Davis to Tee, when the lat¬
ter stiggested that Beauregard be directed to make a demon¬
stration in the direction of Culpeper to divert Hooker's
attention from Tee, when Davis informed him that not
enough troops were left .to accomplish such a purpose.
On the 25th the left wing of Hooker's army, composed
of the First, Third, and Eleventh Corps, under General
Reynolds, crossed the Potomac at Edwards' Ferry and
bivouacked at Barnesville, Edwards' Ferry, and Jefferson,
Maryland.
On the 26th the headquarters of the Army of the Poto¬
mac moved from Fairfax Court House, Virginia, to Pooles-
ville, Maryland. The other corps rapidly followed the left
wing across the Potomac, as Hooker then had definite in¬
formation as to the movements of Tee, and the great danger
of Harrisburg being captured and the Pennsylvania Central
destroyed by the enemy.
On the 27th Hooker's headquarters were moved from
Poolesville to Frederick. The First Corps was directed to
move from Jefferson to Middletown, Maryland ; the Second
Corps from near Edwards' Ferry to Barnesville, Maryland ;
the Third Corps from Point of Rocks to Middletown, Mary¬
land ; the Fifth Corps to Ballinger's Creek, near Frederick
City, Maryland ; the Sixth Corps from Dranesville, Virginia,
to Poolesville, Maryland ; the Twelfth Corps from near the
mouth of the Monocacy to Knoxville, Maryland ; Buford's
FREDERICKSBURG TO FREDERICK. 44a
cavalry division from Leesburg, Virginia, to near Jefferson,
Maryland ; Gregg's cavalry division from Leesburg toward
Frederick " City, Maryland ; the artillery reserve from
Poolesville to Frederick, Maryland ; Stahel's cavalry divi¬
sion reached Frederick City, Maryland, and Crawford's
Pennsylvania Reserves moved from Goose Creek, Virginia,
to the mouth of the Monocacy, Maryland.
Thus, it will be observed that Hooker was rapidly press¬
ing on in the direction of Gettysburg, where the battle was
fought inside of four days.
Hooker was displeased that French, commanding a divi¬
sion of fresh troops, should remain idle at Harper's Ferry,
and he accordingly telegraphed Halleck as follows :
Sandy Hook, June 27, 1863.
I have received your telegram in regard to Harper's Ferry. I
find 10,000 men here in condition to take the field. Here they are of
no earthly account. They cannot defend a ford of the river ; and so
far as Harper's Ferry is concerned, there is nothing in it. As for
the fortifications, the work of the troops, they remain when the
troops are withdrawn. No enemy will ever take possession of it for
them. This is my opinion. All the public property could have been
secured to-night, and the troops marched to where they could have
been of some service. Now, they are but a bait for the rebels, should
they return. I beg that this may be presented to the Secretary of
War, and His Excellency, the President.
Joseph Hooker, Major General.
To Major General HaleECk, General in Chief.
To this dispatch Hooker received a negative answer.
He then sent the following :
Sandy Hook, June 27, 1863—i p. m.
(Received 3 p. m.)
My original instructions require me to cover Harper's Ferry and
Washington. I have now imposed upon me, in addition, an enemy
in my front of more than my number. I beg to be understood, res¬
pectfully, but firmly, that I am unable to comply with this condition
with the means at my disposal, and earnestly request that I may at
once be relieved from the position I occupy.
Joseph Hooker, Major General.
To Maj. Gen. H. W. Haleeck, General-in-Chief.
444 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Washington, D. C., June 27, 1863—8 p. m.
Your application to be relieved from your present command is re¬
ceived. As you were appointed to this command by the President,
I have no power to relieve you. Your dispatch has been duly referred
for Executive action.
H. W. Halleck, General-in-Chief.
To Major General Hooker, Army of the Potomac.
General Orders, > War Department, Adjt. Gen.'s Office,
No. 197. ) Washington, June 27, 1863.
By direction of the President, Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker is re¬
lieved from command of the Army of the Potomac, and Maj. Gen.
George G. Meade is appointed to the command of that army, and
of the troops temporarily assigned to duty with it.
By order of the Secretary of War.
E. D. Townsend, Asst. Adjt. General.
That evening a special train was sent to Frederick,
bearing Asst. Adjt. Gen. James A. Hardie with the double
orders—one relieving Hooker, and the other appointing
General Meade to the command of the Army of the
Potomac.
There were many officers in Washington extremely
anxious to go to the army, and this was a most acceptable
opportunity. Besides, it concealed the real motive of
sending the special train to the army. Notably among the
number was General Butterfield, who chatted with Hardie
on the train, little dreaming that he had the order for his
chief's removal. Nor did Generals Sickles, Marston, or
any of the other officers have a suspicion that Colonel
Hardie was on any such important mission.
When the train arrived at Frederick, Hardie at once
ordered a conveyance to take him to headquarters. Arriv¬
ing there he handed to Meade the order, and officially
informed him that he was no longer a corps commander,
but in supreme command of the Army of the Potomac.
How steadily he was pressing Hooker's star of fame, and
how events repeated themselves ! He then went to
Hooker's headquarters and notified him that he was
relieved.
FREDERICKSBURG TO FREDERICK.
445
On the field of Antietam, Hooker commanded the First
Corps, and Meade the Pennsylvania Reserves under him.
When the battle was raging with fury on the right, Mans¬
field was mortally wounded, and Hooker was taken from
his horse so badly wounded that he was compelled to
leave the field, Meade assumed command of the First
Corps. Hooker's confidence in Meade is indicated in the
following farewell order to the Army :
General Orders, ) H^adquartbrs Army of the Potomac,
No. 66. i June 28, 1863.
In conformity with the orders of the War Department, dated
June 27, 1863,1 relinquish the command of the Army of the Potomac.
It is transferred to Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, a brave and accom¬
plished officer, who has nobly earned the confidence and esteem of
this army in many a well-fought field. Impressed with the belief
that my usefulness as the commander of the Army of the Potomac
is impaired, I part from it, yet not without the deepest emotion.
The sorrow of parting with the comrades of so many battles is
relieved by the conviction that the courage and devotion of this army
will never cease nor fail, that it will yield to my successor, as it has
to me, a willing and hearty support. With the earnest prayer that
the triumphs of its arms may bring success worthy of it and the na¬
tion, I bid it farewell. Joseph Hooker, Major General.
Hardie remained the next day with the army, and sent
the following telegram :
Headquarters Army of the Potomac,
Frederick, Md., June 28, 1863—2;30 p. ni.
(Received 3:20 p. m.)
I shall return to-night. I have been waiting for the formal is¬
sue of the order of the late commander, before telegraphing. This
is now written. I have had a chance to ascertain the state of feeling
and internal condition of the army. There is cause for satisfaction
with it. The late commander leaves for Baltimore this afternoon.
Jas. a. Hardie, Asst. Adj. General.
To Maj. Gen. H. W. Halleck, General-in-Chief.
Hooker was ordered to Baltimore to await orders,
whither he went immediately after issuing his farewell
order to the Army of the Potomac. General Gates says,
that while there on waiting orders he visited Washington,
and was arrested by Halleck, but was soon released.
446
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
This unexpected change in the command of the Army
of the Potomac was made in a very quiet and soldierly
manner. Great precaution was taken to prevent Hooker,
as in the case of McClellan, from disobeying the order.
Neither attempted or thought of anything but entire sub¬
mission to the orders from the War Department. Hooker
was severely criticised for his rashness in tendering his
resignation, and some critics have said that Hooker seized
upon that pretense to avoid the responsibility of another
battle with Lee, but that savors of enmity and jealousy.
Hooker never turned his back on a foe in battle. He was
goaded to desperation by an enemy in Halleck, who was
bitterly opposed to his being placed in command of that
army, and sought every opportunity to disparage and
cripple his movements. When Hooker was advancing
north, he was handicapped by orders from Halleck, and
would have crossed the Potomac days before he did but
for the orders of Halleck, and he evidently took advantage
of Hooker's impetuous request to be relieved with eager¬
ness and gratification, which was evidenced by the fact
that on the evening of the same day that he received
Hooker's dispatch, asking to be relieved. Colonel Hardie
was sent on a special train with the double orders relieving
Hooker, and placing Meade in command, lest Hooker
might recall his request by dispatch.
It is hard to rate Hooker's place in history as a gen¬
eral. He never fought a battle iu which he did not only
display great gallantry on the field, but was successful,
except Chancellorsville, and in that his plans were equal
to those of any generals recorded in the military history of
the world. That they failed in execution is fully known
to the world. His record in the West afterwards was of the
most brilliant character. He fought among the clouds on
Lookout Mountain, and won a fame that shines with a
golden luster. If he had been victorious at the battle of
Chancellorsville, he would have rivaled Prince Eugene
and Turenne in history.
GEN. MEADE.
CHAPTER XII.
GETTYSBURG.
ON assuming command of the army Meade issued an
order so charged with modesty that the excellence
of his character shines like a diamond through it :
General Orders, ] Hdqrs. Army of thf Potomac,
No.-67. i June 28, 1863.
By direction of the President of the United States, I hereby as¬
sume command of the Army of the Potomac. As a soldier, in obey¬
ing this order—an order totally unexpected and unsolicited—I have
no promises or pledges to make. The country looks to this army
to relieve it from the devastation and disgrace of a hostile invasion.
Whatever fatigues and sacrifices we may be called upon to undergo,
let us have in view constantly the magnitude of the interests in¬
volved, and let each man determine to do his duty, leaving to an
All-controlling Providence the decision of the contest.
It is with just diffidence that I relieve in the command of this
army an eminent and accomplished soldier, whose name must ever
appear conspicuous in the history of its achievements ; but I rely
upon the hearty support of my companions in arms to assist me in
the discharge of the duties of the important trust which has been
confided to me.
Gforge G. Meade,
Major-General, Commanding.
Feeling the great necessity for active operations against
the enemy, for Stuart, in command of Lee's cavalry, was
on Meade's right flank and making desperate efforts to gain
the head of the columns of the Army of the Potomac in
order to reach Lee and impart the information he had
gathered from being on its right flank from Fairfax Court
House, Meade issued an order, dated the same day, direct¬
ing the army to move the next morning at four o'clock.
447
448
THE ARMY UF THE POTOMAC.
As General Heth, who opened the battle on the Con¬
federate side, has since said : "It was a great misfortune to
lis in that campaign not to have had the benefit of the cav¬
alry service, for it is the eyes and ears of every army."
Lee was still in the dark as to the- whereabouts of his cav¬
alry, or the movements of the Army of the Potomac.
General Heth also said : "If Lee had had his cavalry
with him he would have known the movements of his ad¬
versary ; and if he had been compelled to meet him at Get¬
tysburg he could have concentrated his army there two
days before and held the choice of positions. As it was,
we stumbled in there, on the morning of the ist of July^
when my division was hotly engaged almost immediately."
It was remarkable foresight and great generalship on
the part of Meade to throw his army forward with the left
resting at Emmitsburg, the center at Taneytown, and the
right at Frizellburg, Union, and New Windsor ; for Stuart
was again foiled in his attempt to pass Meade's front, and
was brushed to the right where he encountered Kilpatrick
at Hanover.
In the mean time Buford had been ordered by Pleasonton
to advance to Gettysburg, a central and strategic place
where the armies would be very likely to concentrate.
Meade hastening to the front, arrived there the evening
of the ist day of July, taking up his headquarters near the
cemetery. Meade's strategy in keeping Lee's infantry and
cavalry apart surpassed that of Hannibal and Scipio, for
his achievements were of greater value ; and as the cycle of
time revolves it will greatly add to his military fame.
After assuming command of the army on the eve of one
of the greatest battles recorded in history, the military
genius he displayed was most remarkable ; and his memory
richly deserves a monument on that field.
Hooker had taken the line on the east side of South
Mountain, because that was the shortest one leading in the
direction of Gettysburg, which is a little southeast of Cham-
bersburg, where two of Lee's corps were, and some twenty
GEN. J. B. CARR.
GETTYSBURG.
449
miles distant. He could protect Washington and Balti¬
more, and perhaps prevent hee from attempting to march
on Philadelphia, and at thé same time more quickly relieve
Harrisburg, for as yet Hooker had no positive information
that hee was concentrating his army at Cashtown, with a
view of feeling for the advance of the Army of the Potomac.
When Meade assumed command he followed out the plans
of Hooker for the same reasons. If the army had been, de¬
bouched through passes in the South Mountain range into
the Cumberland Valley, and cut off L/ce's communication
with Richmond, he (Lee) might have taken the route
through Gettysburg to Baltimore, and not only endangered
that city but Washington. Meade directed the left wing
under Reynolds, on the ist of July, to march to Gettys¬
burg; the First Corps arriving about nine o'clock on the
field where the great battle was fought.
We now turn to the Confederate army, and give its
movements. General Heth, who opened the battle by an
attack on Buford, made the following statement for this
history :
In June, 1863, when Lee's army was moving north down the
Shenandoah Valley, to invade Maryland and Pennsylvania, Long-
street was ordered to hold the gaps in the Blue Ridge, and in turn
to be relieved of that duty by Stuart, so as to permit him (Long-
street) to cross the Potomac. Stuart went to Lee and urged him to
modify his order, so as to permit him (Stuart) to go down the river,
where he could strike the Federal army a heavy blow and cripple
him. After hearing the appeal of Stuart, he consented to his request,
providing he would hasten back with what information he gained,
and take his position on the right flank as it moved northward into
Pennsylvania. All of which Stuart promptly assented to. When
the cavalry commander qvaded Hooker, and got between him and
Washington, no opportunity seemed to present itself for him to im¬
pede, or even harass, the Army of the Potomac. When Stuart be¬
gan his movement to return to Lee's right flank, he encountered
Hancock at Edwards' Ferry, where Stuart himself expected to cross
the river. That compelled him to go lower down and cross at a ford
nearer Washington. After he had gained the north bank of the Po¬
tomac, when he made another attempt to join Lee, he again struck
the troops of the Army of the Potomac, and was again compelled to
XXIX
450 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
bear to the right in the direction of Hanover, where he came in con¬
tact with another portion of the Union forces causing him consider¬
able delay ; for he had with him an immense wagon train, captured
near Rockville, which necessarily compelled him to march very
slowly. He then resumed his march in the direction of York, where
he hoped to find some of Ewell's command ; but he had suffered
many delays and was again doomed to disappointment. Then he
marched in the direction of Carlisle ; arriving there he found it oc¬
cupied by State militia. The commanding officer refused to sur¬
render the city, although Stuart threatened to shell it. He was then
far beyond Lee's army, it being at that time concentrated at Gettys- •
burg and fighting the battle.
When General Heth visited Lee's headquarters, Lee
asked him, ' ' Harry, where is my cavalry ? Where is Stuart ?
I hope nothing has happened to him." Heth said :
It was a great misfortune to us in that campaign not to have the
benefit of the cavalry service, for it is the eyes and ears of every army.
I attach no blame to Stuart, for he went with the full consent of
Lee—it is one of the fates of war. If Lee had had his cavalry with
him, he would have known the movements of his adversary, and if
he had been compelled to meet him at Gettysburg he could have
concentrated his army there two days before, and held the choice
of positions. As it was, we stumbled in there on the morning of
the ist of July, when my division was hotly engaged almost imme¬
diately. Lee was in the dark as to the movements of Hooker, and
said to me, " If Hooker does not find me, I must find him." Lee
wanted to fight the battle at Cashtown, with the mountain at
his back, so his flanks would be well protected ; there he could have
whipped any army in the world. But not knowing where Hooker
was he became restive, and began to prepare to concentrate his
army, for as yet he knew nothing of the movements of the enemy,
but he well knew that great efforts were being made to bring on a
battle, and that it must take place soon, so he desired to unite.his
forces at Cashtown.
So far as the battle of Gettysburg is concerned, that battle was
fought by my (Heth's) going there after shoes for my division. On
the 30th of June I directed Pettigrew to take his brigade and go to
Gettysburg and get some shoes. On arriving near Gettysburg he
found it occupied by a Union force, so he returned without securing
any shoes. When he made his report to me on his return I said to
him there was no considerable force there. Just then Hill came up
and I said to Pettigrew to repeat to the general what you said to me.
GETTYSBURG.
451
After it was stated again by Pettigrew, Plill and myself both said
there were no troops there of any moment. I turned to Hill and
said, ' ' I will take my division and go down there and get the shoes
myself," which was assented to by him. Arriving near the town I
saw a few individuals, but yet presumed the enemy was not there
in force. I ordered my batteries to whale away on the woods for
half an hour and then stop. Then I ordered Davis to advance on
the left of the road, while Archer was directed to move through the
woods on the right. This advance was stubbornly resisted. In fact
those two brigades suffered most severely. Archer on the right got
cramped under the brow of a hill with Willoughby Run immediately
in his rear. The Iron Brigade of Wadsworth's division charging
down the hill, he was compelled to surrender with a part of his men.
On the left, while Davis' brigade fought most gallantly, yet a part
of his command was overpowered in a railroad cut, and were com¬
pelled to surrender. When these two brigades were repulsed I went
back to my artillery and there found Generals Dee and A. P. Hill. I
asked his permission to put in my whole division. But he said no,
that Dongstreet was not up, and that he did not want to bring on a
general engagement that day. General Rodes, who was on his way
to Cashtown heard my cannon, faced by the left flank, and came to
my assistance.
General Hill had followed Heth, with Pender's division,
and was on the field while Heth was engaged.
On the 30th of June Longstreet, who was at Chambers-
burg, was ordered to take McLaws' and Hood's divisions
and proceed to Cashtown, leaving Pickett's division at
Chambersburg to guard the rear until relieved* by Imboden,
while Ewell was ordered to countermarch from Carlisle and
join the army at Cashtown or Gettysburg. So Lee was
able, on the evening of the ist of July, to concentrate his
army in the vicinity of Gettysburg, with the exception of
Pickett.
While the Confederate commander had thus thrown
forward his army to Gettysburg, yet he hoped to lure the
Army of the Potomac on while he withdrew to Cashtown
to have the advantage of the mountain at his back, but the
forces of Buford and Heth meeting on the morning of the
ist of July, and becoming hotly engaged, dispelled all of
Lee's hopes of drawing the Union army to Cashtown.
452 THE AT MV OF THE POTOMAC.
Meade, on the other hand, while he advanced Reynolds to
Gettysburg to support Buford, was hoping to fight at Pipe
Creek. Both were disappointed at the unexpected turn in
events, and both generals ordered their commands to march
rapidly on Gettysburg.
In the forenoon of June 30 Buford entered Gettysburg^
with Gamble's and Devin's brigades ; his reserve brigade,
under General Merritt, was at Mechanicstown guarding
trains. Soon Buford sighted the enemy, which was Petti-
grew's brigade of Heth's division, ordered to Gettysburg to
get a supply of shoes for A. P. Hill's corps. But Petti-
grew retired when he saw the forces of Buford, as given in
the statement of General Heth.
Early on the morning of July i Gamble's brigade,
composed of the 8th Illinois, under Maj. John E. Beveridge,
four companies of the 12th Illinois, and six companies of
the 3d Indiana, under Col. George H. Chapman, and the
8th . New York, commanded by Lient. Col. William L.
Markell, was directed by Buford to move out on the Cash-
town road to impede the progress of the enemy, which was
advancing from that direction. About eight o'clock Gam¬
ble's skirmishers notified him that the Confederates were
advancing in heavy force. Gamble at once^ reported the
fact to General Buford, who gave orders for Gamble to ad¬
vance his brigade in line of battle about a mile from the
seminary in support of the pickets. Tidball's battery,
2d United States Artillery, commanded by Lieutenant
Calef, was placed in position with a section on each side of
the Cashtown road, while the other section was placed on
the right of the left regiment. This battery was composed
of three-inch rifled guns. Buford says :
It fought on this occasion as is seldom witnessed. At one time
the enemy had a concentric fire upon this battery of twelve guns,
all at short range. Calef held his own gloriously, worked his guns
deliberately, with great judgment and skill, and with wonderful
effect upon the enemy.
Gamble dismounted the troopers of the 12th Illinois,
GETTYSBURG.
453
3d Indiana, and half of the 8th New York, and posted
them behind a stone wall and under cover of trees ; from
this position they poured a deadly fire into the advancing
columns of Davis and Archer under Heth, When the
■enemy pressed them so closely that their horses were in
danger of capture, they mounted and retired to the next
ridge in their rear, where the artillery was posted. The 3d
Indiana remained and fought, with the Wisconsin boys, on
the right of the Iron Brigade. Devin's brigade, composed
of the 6th New York, under Maj. William E. Beardsley,
the 9th New York, commanded by Col. William Sackett,
the 17th Pennsylvania, under Josiah H. Kellogg, and two
companies of the 3d West Virginia, commanded by Capt.
Seymour B. Conger, was directed to take a position on the
right of Gamble's brigade. Devin formed with his right
resting on the Mummasburg road. He sent forward a
squadron of the 6th New York to the front and left as skir¬
mishers, and pieketed the roads to Carlisle, thus establish¬
ing a eontinuous line from the York road on the extreme
right.
Devin held this position until foreed baek by the Con¬
federates coming up from Heidelberg. He dismounted all
of his eommand exeept the 9th New York, which was
placed in reserve, and held his position until the Eleventh
Corps arrived ; then he was direeted to mass his brigade on
the right of the York road, and hold that approaeh to
Gettysburg.
Reynolds gave orders to Wads worth to mareh his divi¬
sion as rapidly as possible, as the battle eould be distinetly
heard. Entering Gettysburg, he rode to the Eagle Hotel,
where he met Peter Culp, a citizen of that place, who was
acting as a scout for our army. After questioning him
about the situation, he direeted him (Culp) to take him to
the Lutheran Seminary, where Buford was in the belfry
watching the battle. Here these two noted generals exam¬
ined the field with their field-glasses for a short time, when
they descended, and walked to the rear of the seminary,
454 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
in the direction where Gamble was engaged. After a short
consultation, Reynolds rode to the front as Wadsworth's
division was arriving, preceding this division as it hurriedly
passed the seminary to the front where Gamble was engaged.
Several officers gathered around Reynolds and Buford, as
they stood viewing the battle between Heth's division and
Gamble's cavalry ; among the number was Maj. E. P. Hal-
stead, of Doubleday's staff, and Captain Hall, of the 2d
Maine Battery. The latter had rode forward with Reynolds
to get instructions. Hall says :
I was at Reynolds' side for some little time at tlie Seminary
Ridge, having gone ahead of my battery at his request, and I rode
from Seminary Ridge out to the position taken by my guns, some
half mile beyond the ridge, by his side, and all his remarks and ap¬
pearance he gave me the impression that he had gone there to stay.
Captain Weld, an aid-de-camp on Reynolds' staff, says :
At eight o'clock Reynolds and his staff started to the front. On
the crest of the hills beyond we could see the enemy's guns going
into position ; a few hurried words from General Buford showed the
condition of affairs. General Reynolds, turning to me (Weld), said,
' ' Ride at once at your utmost speed to General Meade, tell him the
enemy is advancing in strong force, and I fear he will get to the
heights beyond the town.before I can. I will fight him inch by inch,
and if driven into the town I will barricade the streets, and hold him
back as long as possible. ' '
Cutler's brigade had the lead, and he was directed to
form his brigade on the right of the Chambersburg pike.
Then he rode to the left, directed Meredith, who commanded
the Iron Brigade, to face by the_ left flank and advance
through an oak grove, to which Buford reported the enemy
advancing to take possession. The 2d Wisconsin was in
advance, and at once formed line of battle, and moved on
the right of the woods overlapping into the McPherson
farm, the 7th Wisconsin coming up on its left ; then the
19th Indiana, with the 24th Michigan on the extreme left
of the brigade. While the brigade was getting into posi¬
tion Reynolds rode into the edge of the grove, where a
GEN. ABNER DOUBLEDAY.
GETTYSBURG.
455
sharpshooter of Archer's brigade mortally wounded him.
Maj. J. G. Rosengarten, of his staff, says:
General Reynolds was personally attending to the hasty forma¬
tion for the charge of the Iron Brigade when he was fatally wounded
by one of Archer's skirmishers, at a moment when his aids were
riding to the various regiments carrying the instructions of the
general to charge as fast as they arrived. He was immediately
borne from the field by four of the 76th New York, who carried Rey¬
nolds back to a little stone house on the Emmitsburg road. His
bearers were Milo Morgan, Melvin Reed, France Brace, and B. F.
Taylor. He was taken to the seminary first, then to the small brick
house at the edge of the town, on the Emmitsburg road.
The country had lost one of its ablest defenders. He had won
high commendation as an artillery officer in the Mexican war. On
the Peninsula he displayed great gallantry. In the Second Bull Run,
in command of the Pennsylvania Reserves Division, his generalship
prevented Fongstreet from crushing our fprces near the Henry House,
At Fredericksburg he commanded the First Corps under
Franklin on the left, where he again displayed such marked
military skill that the entire army united in praise of him.
At the battle of Chancellorsville Reynolds' corps was on
Stuart's left flank. Reynolds was anxious to attack Stuart
and hurl him from the field, but he received no orders to
that effect. He never sought advancement, and twice when
he was tendered the command of the Army of the Potomac
he modestly refused it. His star of military fame rose
evenly, but with remarkable rapidity. True to the inter¬
ests of his superiors, he was no less mindful of those below
him in rank ; he received the humblest soldier with the
utmost kindness and consideration. His name is deeply
ingrafted in the hearts of his countrymen, while his martial
deeds will be emulated and admired in foreign lands. He
took in the strong and weak points of a battlefield with the
keen perception of Charlemagne, although the latter had an
experience of a thirty-two-year war with the Saxons, while
Reynolds had only the advantage of the Mexican and some
two years of the late war, yet his generalship impressed all
with the fact that he was a great soldier.
456
THE AT MV OF THE POTOMAC.
Buford and Reynolds are as much entitled to the honor
of selecting Gettysburg as the field on which to fight the
battle as anyone else. Taking in the situation, they threw
their forces in front of Lee's columns and stubbornly resisted
the advance of the Confederate army. They had both
passed over Pipe Creek and had noted its advantages.
When they arrived at Gettysburg they saw the value of that
position, and both resolved to compel Lee to fight there.
If they had chosen the Pipe Creek position rather than
Gettysburg, they would have slowly fallen back and allowed
Lee to have followed to Pipe Creek, for Reynolds sent a
message to Meade that he (Reynolds) was not ordered to
bring on a battle, but that he had decided to hold the enemy
in check until he (Meade) could come up and decide the
matter himself. When Howard arrived on the field the
First Corps had been fighting about three hours, and nearly
two brigades of Heth's division had been captured with
Generals Archer and Davis. When Reynolds fell Double-
day, who was in command of the First Corps, carried out
Reynolds' ideas and held the line where the dying general
directed the First Corps to go into action. It would seem
only fair to presume, therefore, that Doubleday was entitled
to at least as much credit for selecting Gettysburg as
Howard, who came on the field after Lee, Hill, Heth, and
Pender were there, and two of Ewell's divisions close at
hand. Meade was unaware of the situation at the front.
He had the fullest confidence in Reynolds, whom he had
placed in command of the left wing and given the advance.
When Meade learned that Reynolds was killed he sent
Hancock forward to select a place to fight the battle ; that
at once was evidence enough that, while he considered Pipe
Creek a good position to meet the enemy, he desired to ob¬
tain the best place. A position cannot be selected to fight
a battle after it has been raging for three to four hours ; the
time to select it is before the armies meet. General Bank-
head says, "No one selected Gettysburg; the two armies
met there and immediately prepared for action. ' ' When
GETTYSBURG.
457
Reynolds fell he was in front of the Iron Brigade, nearly
on a line with the left of the 2d Wisconsin and the right of
the 7th Wisconsin as they advanced. When he was borne
to the rear in a dying condition a deep shudder passed over
the troops, for they not only dearly loved him, but had
great confidence in his ability. Gen. John C. Robinson,
who commanded a division in the First Corps, said to me
that, ' ' If Reynolds had lived there would have been a differ¬
ent historv of that battle."
Col. Fucius Fairchild, who was in command of the 2d
Wisconsin, observing the effect of Reynolds' death on the
sofdiers, sprang forward and led his regiment in the charge
in obedience to General Reynolds' order, which had just
been given. The regiment had advanced but a short dis¬
tance when Lieutenant Colonel Stevens was killed. A.low
place in the woods that bore off to the left in the direction
of Willoughby Run was passed, and as the regiment was
ascending the rise on the other side of that low place Fair-
child was wounded in the right arm and was compelled, on
account of great loss of blood, to leave the field and turn the
command of the regiment over to Major Mansfield. Fair-
child was taken back to Gettysburg, where his arm was
amputated that afternoon. When our forces were driven
back through the town Fairchild had the soldiers in the
house with him carry him out in a chair on the porch, and
as the 2d Wisconsin passed he waved his left hand and said
to his regiment, "Give it to them, boys ; we must win this
battle. " The 7th Wisconsin swept into the woods and soon
came abreast with the 2d, while the 19th Indiana was com¬
ing up át a rapid pace. The last-named regiment had been
on picket duty the night before and their guns were loaded,
while the Wisconsin regiments and the 24th Michigan were
compelled to load as they advanced.
While the 7th Wisconsin was forming in the field east
of the grove where Reynolds was killed, the first infantry
soldier wounded on the Union side was Capt. L. E. Pond,
Company E, of this command. He was a gallant soldier,
458
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
and has since served his State in its Senate, where he pro¬
cured an appropriation to erect monuments to the memory
of those from Wisconsin, who fell at Gettysburg in that
memorable battle. President Harrison selected him as the
agent to pay the soldiers at the Milwaukee Agency.
The 19th Indiana and 24th Michigan had an open field
to advance through, consequently they rapidly gained on
the Wisconsin regiments on the right, because Archer's
brigade was heavier in the front of the 2d and 7th Wis¬
consin, and was making a desperate struggle to hold the
ridge in the woods on the right bank of Willoughby Run,
but as the Iron Brigade rushed on. Archer's men w^e
forced under the bluif, with the Wisconsin regiments
closely pursuing them. The force in front of the 19th
Indiana and 24th Michigan gave way and crowded under
the bluff with the center and left of Archer's brigade.
Then the 19th Indiana and 24th Michigan were thrown
forward on Archer's right flank. The brigade then formed
in its new position two sides of a square, with Archer
hemmed in the bend of Willoughby Run, which was at
his back ; the Wisconsin regiments facing him and coming
down the bluff, while the 19th Indiana and 24th Michigan
were on his right flank ready to enfilade him at short
range. Under these circumstances Archer decided to sur¬
render, as the movement had been made so quickly that
he had been unable to notify Heth of his perilous posi¬
tion, and his surrender took place at once. Col. D. B.
Dailey, then a lieutenant, and aid on General Meredith's
staff was the person to whom Archer delivered his sword,
and surrendered at Gettysburg ; but to Private Patrick
Maloney, of Co. G, 2d Wisconsin Infantry, belongs the
credit of overtaking and capturing him. Dailey was an
officer of Co. B, 2d Wisconsin Infantry, at the time. His
company was on the right of the regiment, and the reg¬
iment on right of brigade, in that engagement. Just as
Archer's men broke in front of his company, the lines were
within fifteen paces of one another. General Archer was
GETTYSBURG.
459
with the left of his command. After the contest was over,
his company had fairly reached the edge of the woods
when General Archer's line gave way. They pursued
them vigorously, and captured Archer with a number of
his men, about thirty paces west of Willoughby's Run.
Patrick Maloney, the brave, patriotic and fervent young
Irishman, doubly risked his life for the capture of Archer,
by going in advance of his comrades and among the fleeing
Confederates, for the sake of his prize. Archer at first
resisted arrest, but soon Maloney had help, and the sullen
general was subdued. When Dailey arrived on the spot.
General Archer appealed to him for protection from
Maloney. He then requested him to give him his sword
and belt, which he did with great reluctance, saying that
courtesy permitted him to retain his side arms. Dailey di¬
rected that he be taken back to General Meredith's head¬
quarters ; which was the last he saw of him. General
Archer's sword being much lighter than his own, he put it
on and sent his to the rear. About four o'clock in the
afternoon of that day he was severely wounded, and was
carried into the house of a Mr. Scott in Gettysburg, where
he found the late Col. Henry A. Morrow, of the 24th
Michigan, who was also wounded. He could not have
been in the house more than ten minutes before he heard
theory: "The enemy is coming." He immediately un¬
buckled his lately acquired trophy, and handed it to a
young lady of the house, whom he afterwards learned was
Miss Mary McAllister, and who did as much to alleviate
the suffering of our soldiers during and after the ' battle as
any lady in Gettysburg, where she still resides, with the
request that she conceal it if possible ; telling her that it
was General Archer's sword. With characteristic prompt¬
ness and fidelity, she took the sword and belt, threw them
into a wood-box in the parlor ; carelessly throwing a news¬
paper over them, where they lay until after the battle.
Dailey and other wounded were taken from the house by a
Confederate guard, and carried to their rear ; during Gen-
460 THE AR MV OF THE POTOMAC.
eral Pickett's charge they were under the fire of our own
artillery, and many of our men being wounded, they re¬
quested Colonel Jenks, who had charge of the prisoners, to
remove them farther back. His reply was that he could
not do so without orders. On the night of the 4th, while
in camp midway between Gettysburg and Millerstown, he
made an arrangement with two of the 7th Virginia In¬
fantry, who were guarding them, to escape, but as the op¬
portune moment approached, the guard was doubled and
their plans thwarted. On the night of the 5th, while the
enemy was rapidly retreating over the ridge leading to the
Hagerstown Valley, he eluded the guard by leaving the
road and taking shelter in the dense timber and under¬
brush. There he remained until the afternoon of the 6th.
When the rear of the enemy had entirely passed over into
the valley, he made his way slowly, and with great diffi¬
culty, back to Gettysburg, and to the house of Miss Mary
McAllister, who informed him that Colonel Morrow had
taken his sword and belt, with the promise to her, that he
should have them on his return. After remaining a few
days at Gettysburg, he set out for his command and over¬
took it at South Mountain, where he received the sword
from Colonel Morrow. In the fall of that year, while in
the vicinity of Rappahannock Station, he presented the
sword and belt to General Meredith, who commanded
the Iron Brigade in its memorable and deadly combat with
Archer, but it was returned to him after Meredith's death
and he still has it.
General Doubleday rode up, and as he knew Archer
well, he in his gentle and affectionate way, offered to shake
hands, and said, ' ' General Archer, I am glad to meet you. ' '
Archer refused Doubleday's hand, and said, " I am not
glad to meet you, sir. ' '
The great success of the Iron Brigade had thrown it far
ahead of Cutler's brigade on the right of the Chambersburg
pike. Captain Richardson, of the brigade staff, then bronght
the order from General Meredith to retire the two left regí-
GEN. R. R. DAWES.
GE TTYSB URO.
461
ments to the east side of Willoughby Run and to prolong
the new line he was forming. In that movement the 7th
Wisconsin took the right of the brigade, while the 19th
Indiana changed position with the 24th Michigan, and took
the left of the brigade. It was then back near midway in
the grove, where it halted for orders. While the Iron
Brigade had been successful in capturing Archer in the
woods. Cutler's brigade had suffered, severely. Cutler
put the brigade in line of battle with the 76th New
York on the right, the 56th Pennsylvania on its left,
and the 147th New York between the 56th Pennsyl¬
vania and the railroad cut and the Chambersburg pike-,
which runs through Cashtown, where Reynolds had
posted James A. Hall's Maine Battery. The brigade
was divided, and Colonel B. B. Fowler was sent to the
left of the railroad cut with his own regiment, the 14th
Brooklyn, and the 95th New York, under Colonel George
H. Biddle. Thus five of Cutler's regiments were in line
of battle, while the remaining regiment, the 7th Indiana,
under Colonel Ira G. Grover, was guarding the train
from Marsh Creek to Gettysburg ; it was not therefore on
the field the first day of the battle. Hall, in his report,
says :
At nine a. m. marched, following the advance brigade of the First
Division, First Corps, to the battlefield, about a half mile south and
west of town, where we were ordered into position by General Rey¬
nolds on the right of the Cashtown road, some 400 yards beyond
Seminary Hill. The enemy had previously opened a battery of six
guns directly in our front at 1,300 yards distance, which they con¬
centrated upon me as I went into position, but with very little ef¬
fect. We opened upon this battery with shot and shell at 10:45
a. m., our first six shots causing the enemy to change the position
of two of his guns and place them under cover behind a barn. In
twenty-five minutes from the time he opened fire, a column of the
enemy's infantry charged up a ravine on our right flank, within
sixty yards of my right piece, when they commenced shooting
down my horses and wounding my men. I ordered the right and
center sections to open upon the column with canister, and kept the
left firing upon the enemy's artillery. This canister fire was very
462 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
effective, and broke the charge of the enemy, when just at this mo¬
ment, to my surprise, I saw my support falling back without any
order having been given me to retire. Feeling that if the position
was too advanced for infantry it was equally so for artillery, I or¬
dered the battery to retire by sections, although having no order to
do so. The support falling back rapidly, the right section of the
battery which I ordered to take position some seventy-five yards to
the rear, to cover the retiring of the other four pieces, was charged
upon by the enemy's skirmishers and four of the horses from one of
the guns shot. The men of the section dragged this gun off by hand.
As the last piece of the battery was coming away, all its horses
were shot, and I was about to return for it myself when General
Wadsworth gave me a peremptory order to lose no time, but get my
battery in position near the town on the heights to cover the retir¬
ing of the troops.
The force of the enemy which attacked Hall's battery
also struck the three regiments under Cutler on the right
of the railroad cut. The 76th New York, on the right, suf¬
fered so heavily from an enfilading fire from the right that
Major Grover, in command of the regiment, ordered the
right wing to change front to the rear to oppose the new
force. Simultaneously with that he fell mortally wounded,
and the brigade commander ordered the regiment to fall
back. This was done in good order, and the line reformed
on the railroad track near the seminary. Colonel Hofmann
retired the 56th Pennsylvania under the same order and at
the same time. The 147th New York, on the left of the
56th Pennsylvania, received the order to retire, but just at
that moment Lieut. Col. Francis C. Miller, who was in
command, was wounded and unable to repeat the order to
Major Harney, who immediately assumed command. Gen¬
eral Doubleday says the regiment lost 207 killed and
wounded out of 380. At that time the regiment was un¬
aware that an order had been given to retire with the other
regiments on the right. All the reports of the officers, in¬
cluding General Doubleday's, assert that the regiment held
its ground most bravely, and that it was hemmed in while
thus fighting until relieved subsequently by the movement
of the 14th Brooklyn, 95th New York, and 6th Wisconsin.
GETTYSBURG.
463
To these reports the surviving members of the regiment
strenuously object. They claim they were never relieved
as reported. Gen. J. V. Pierce, then captain in the regi¬
ment, made the following statement on the field in the pres¬
ence of General Dawes, who commanded the 6th Wiscon¬
sin, and to the latter regiment is given the honor and credit
of securing the remnant of the 147th New York. At the
time there was no official report made of the operations of
that regiment at Gettysburg. I quote from General Pierce's
statement, made at the railroad cut in 1888 in presence of
hundreds. He says :
The firing of the enemy in my immediate front slackened and
the enemy retired toward the right. I moved my men forward with
the men of Company C, and discovered a line of Confederate skir¬
mishers on our front advancing from the valley up a slope toward a
rail fence, firing as they advanced into Hall's battery, while the bat¬
tery was fighting for dear life. A detachment of Confederates gath¬
ered in a fence corner a short distance beyond the cut. I imme¬
diately ordered, "Left oblique, fire " The order was responded to
by the two left companies, G and C. Several rounds were fired into
the skirmish lines. It became too hot, and I saw them return down
the hill with several of their number stretched on the hillside.
Hall's battery had been fighting that skirmish line in a death grap¬
ple. Artillery against skirmishers is like shooting mosquitoes
with a riñe. The Confederate skirmishers had the best of it up to
the time the left of the 147th Regiment opened on them. The
moment the battery was relieved from the force of the attack it be¬
gan to limber to the rear, and as the Confederate skirmishers fell
back the battery disappeared in a cloud of dust up Chambersburg
pike. While this was taking place on the left, the battle reopened
on the right with redoubled fury, and the cry came down the line,
"They are flanking us on the right." The right companies, bj-
Major Harney's orders, swung back on the south side of the rail
fence ; the left front of the regiment was relieved of pressure from
the enemy, who either lay concealed close under the ridge near the
west end of the railroad cut, or had passed toward our right to crush
that. The fight was again fierce and hot ; the boys on the right were
falling like autumn leaves ; the air was full of lead. Men fell all
along the line.
I saw an officer ride down from Oak Hill in our rear and wave
his cap in retreat. To venture into this maelstrom between the rail-
464 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC
road cut and that fence on the right was death. Fierce flamed the
fire around the altar of the Union from the guns of the 147th New-
York. The smoke of carnage rose as an incense and wrapped the
folds of .the flag defended within its shortened lines. Not a man
flinched; none left the field except the wounded; the untouched
living and the dead remained.
You may point to Thermopylae and its Spartans, but a greater
Thermopylae was here, and a more than Spartan heroism stood
within the dead angle on this ground. Never was a grander fight
made against triple odds ; never greater readiness to do and die on
duty's line; never greater results hung trembling in the balance,than
swayed in the battle front of the 147th New York. Shall the battle of
Gettysburg be fought ? Shall the high tide of the Rebellion ebb from
these fields Into the peaceful waters at Appomattox ? Shall foreign
nations recognize the Confederacy ? Sh all the great struggle be fought
now and here to a finish ? The answer came back from the smoking
guns of the 147th New York : " Our whole duty shall be done. We
are here to stay."
Closer pressed the enemy. A regiment, the 55th North Carolina,
was pressing far to our right and rear and came over to the south side
of the rail fence, their colors drooped to the front. An officer in front
of the center corrected the alignment as if passing in review. It was
the finest exhibition of discipline and drill I ever saw before or
since on the battlefield. The battery was gone from our left ; the
signal was repeated by an aid-de-camp from Wadsworth's staffi
Gallant Harney recognized the signal and gave the command, " In
retreat, march ! ' ' As I started with my men to the rear I found
Edwin Aylsworth mortally wounded, who begged me not to leave
him. I stopped, and with the sergeant, Peter Shuttz, assisted him
to his feet and tried to carry him, but could not, and had to lay him
down. His piteous appeal, "Don't leave me, boys," has rung in
my ears and lived in my memory these five and twenty years.
Sergeant. Shuttz was killed soon after near Oak Ridge. The
time spent in assisting Aylsworth delayed me so I was among the
last to leave the field.
Finding the enemy so close upon us and the way open the route
we came in by, I followed several of my men into the railroad cut.
A squad of Confederates were at the west end of the cut behind
some rails, and as we struck the bottom of that railroad cut saluted
us with all their guns, and every one loaded with bullets. I did not
stay to dispute possession, for they evidently intended "to welcome
us Yanks with bloody hands to hospitable graves," and I climbed
up the rocky face of the cut on the south side, and made my way
with many of our men across the meadow between the railroad cut
CAPT. L. E. POND,
GETTYSBURG.
465
and the Chambersburg pike ; crossed the pike into a small peach
orchard and overtook the colors in the hands of Sergt. Wm. A.
Wybem. Just as I joined him he received a shot and fell on the
colors as if dead. I tried to remove them, but he held to them with
true Irish grit; I commanded him to let go, and to my surprise
he answered, " Hold on, I'll be up in a minute !" rolled over and
staggered to his feet and carried them all through the fight, and
was breveted for his courage.
Both statements are given to the public, so that the his¬
tory will be entirely impartial.
Col. E. B. Fowler, who was in command of the 14th
Brooklyn and 95th New York, observed the retreat of Cut¬
ler to Seminary Ridge, retired his two regiments until on
a line with the railroad cut, then, changing front, he marched
in the direction of it. The Confederates changed front to
meet him and gained the cut before Fowler did, and imme¬
diately occupied it. In the mean time the 6th Wisconsin
had been ordered to that point to assist Cutler in retaking
the ground he had lost on the right of the cut. General
Dawes says :
We could see that the thin regiments of Cutler's brigade, beyond
the turnpike, were being almost destroyed. The rebel line swayed
and bent, and the men suddenly stopped firing and ran into the rail¬
road cut, which is parallel to the Cashtown turnpike. I now ordered
the men to climb over the turnpike fences and advance upon them.
I was not aware of the existence of a railroad cut, and mistook the
maneuver of the enemy for a retreat, but was soon undeceived by
the heavy fire which they began at once to pour upon us from their
cover in the cut. Capt. John Ticknor, a dashing soldier, one of our
finest officers, fell dead while climbing the second fence, and others
were struck, but the line pushed on. When over the fences and in
the field, and subjected to an infernal fire, I saw the 95th New York
Regiment coming gallantly into line upon our left. I did not then
know or care where they came from, but was rejoiced to see them.
Farther to the left was the 14th Brooklyn Regiment, but we were
ignorant of the fact. The 95th New York had about 100 men in ac¬
tion. Maj. Edward Pye appeared to be in command. Running
hastily to the major, I said, " We must charge," and asked him if
they were with us. The gallant major replied, "Charge it is," and
they were with us to the end. " Forward, charge ! " was the order
XXX
466
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
given by both the major and myself. We were now receiving a fear¬
fully destructive fire from the hidden enemy. Men who had been
shot were leaving the ranks in crowds. Any correct picture of this
charge would represent a V-shaped crowd of men with the colors at
the advance point, moving firmly and hurriedly forward, while the
whole field behind is streaming with men who had been shot, and
who are struggling to the rear or sinking in death upon the ground.
The only commands I gave, as we advanced, were "Aligp on the
colors ! Close up on that color ! Close up on that color ! The regi¬
ment was being broken up so that this order alone could hold the
body together. Meanwhile the colors were down upon the ground
several times, but were raised at once by the heroes of the color
guard. Not one of the guard escaped, every man being killed or
wounded. Four hundred and twenty men started as a regiment
from the turnpike fence, of whom 240 reached the railroad cut. Years
afterwards I found the distance passed over to be 175 paces. Every
oflhcer proved himself brave, true, and heroic in encouraging the
men to breast this deadly storm, but the real impetus was the eager,
determined valor of the men who carried muskets in the ranks. The
rebel colors could be seen waving defiantly just above the edge of the
railroad cut. A heroic ambition to capture it took possession of
several of our men. Corporal Eggleston, of Company H, a mere
boy, sprang forward to seize it, and was shot dead the moment his
hand touched the colors. Private Anderson, of his company, furious
at the killing of his brave young comrade, recked little for the rebel
colors, but he swung aloft his musket and with a terrific blow split
the skull of the rebel who had shot young Eggleston. This soldier
was well known in the regiment as " Rocky Mountain Anderson."
Lieutenant Remington was severely wounded in the shoulder while
reaching for the colors. Into this deadly melee rushed Corp.
Francis A. Waller, who seized and held the rebel battle-flag. His
name will remain upon the historic record, as he received from Con¬
gress a medal for this deed.
It would require many pages to justly recount the heroic deeds
of all, but one incident is so touching in its character that it should
be preserved. Corp. James Kelly, of Company B, turned from the
ranks, and stepped beside me, as we both moved hurriedly forward
on the charge. He pulled open his woolen shirt, and a mark where
the deadly minnie ball had entered his breast was visible. He said :
" Colonel, won't you please write to my folks that I died a soldier?"
My first notice that we were immediately upon the enemy was
a general cry from our men of : " Throw down your muskets. Down
with your muskets." Running quickly forward through the line of
men, I found myself face to face with at least a thousand rebels.
GETTYSBUR G.
467
^honi I looked down upon in the railroad cut,.which was here about
four feet deep. Adjutant Brooks, equal to the emergency, had
quickly placed men across the cut in position to fire through it. I
have always congratulated myself upon getting in the first word. I
shouted : " Where is the colonel of this regiment.?" An officer in
gray, with stars on his collar, who stood among the men in the cut,
said: " Who are you ?" I said : " I am commander of this regiment.
Surrender, or I will fire on you." The officer replied not a word, but
promptly handed me his sword, and all his men, who still held them,
threw down their muskets. The coolness, self-possession, and dis¬
cipline which held back our men from pouring in a volley saved a
hundred lives, and as my mind goes back to the fearful excitement
of that moment, I marvel at it. The fighting around the rebel colors
had not entirely ceased when this surrender was demanded. I took
the sword. It would have been the handsome thing to say, " Keep
your sword, sir," but I was new to such occasions, and, when six
other officers came up and handed me their swords, I took them also,
and held the awkward bundle in my arms until relieved by Adjutant
Brooks. I directed the officer in command, who proved to be Maj.
John A. Blair, of the 2d Mississippi Regiment, to have his men fall
in without arms. He gave the command, and his men, to the num¬
ber of 7 officers and 225 enlisted men, obeyed. To our major, John
F. Hauser, I assigned the duty of marching this body to the provost
guard. Major Hauser, a thorough soldier, had been educated at a
military school at Thun, Switzerland, and he had served with Gari¬
baldi. His shout of " Forwarts, forwarts," as we charged, is well
remembered by all of us who yet survive.
Corporal Waller now brought me the captured battle-flag. It
was the flag of the 2d Mississippi Volunteers, one of the oldest and
most distinguished regiments in the Confederate army. It belonged
to the brigade commanded by the nephew of Jefferson Davis. It is
a rule in battle never to allow sound men to leave the ranks. Serg.
William Evans, a brave and true man, had been severely wounded
in the thighs. He had to use two muskets as crutches. To him I
intrusted the keeping of the battle-flag. Wrapping the flag around
his body, he started for Gettysburg. Weak and faint from loss of
blood, he became exhausted in the street. Brave and faithful friends
came to his relief. Two young women assisted the wounded soldier
to their home, and placed him upon a bed. The Union troops had
then begun to retreat in confusion through the town, and the cheers
of the victorious enemy could be plainly heard. Evans begged of
his friends to hide the rebel flag. They cut a hole in the bed-tick
beneath him, and, thrusting in the flag; sewed úp the rent. The
flag was soaked with Evans' blood, where he had lain upon it, but
468 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
it was safely concealed until the enemy had retreated from Gettys¬
burg, and on the morning of July 4 he brought his precious trophy
to Gulp's Hill.
Adjutant Brooks buckled on one of the captured swords, but
the other six were given to a wounded man to be delivered to our
chief surgeon. The enemy, when they took the town, captured the
hospital and the swords. No discredit to the doctor is implied, as
his hands were full of work with wounded men.
There was now a lull in the battle. Our comrades of the Iron
Brigade, who had charged so brilliantly into the McPherson Woods,
had been, according to their usual custom, completely victorious.
They had routed Archer's brigade, capturing its commander and
many of its men, and then changed front to move to the relief of
Cutler ; but the charge upon the railroad cut, and its success, pre¬
vented that necessity. By this charge upon the cut Joseph R. Davis'
brigade was captured of scattered. Wadsworth's division* had
bravely opened the battle. They had fairly defeated, upon an open
field, a superior force of the veterans of the army of General Lee.
It was a short, sharp, and desperate fight, but the honors were with
the boys in blue. In his ofiicial report General Doubleday says that
when Cutler's regiments were overpowered and driven back "the
moment was a critical one, involvingthe defeat, perhaps theutterrout,
of our forces." Defeat was never more swiftly turned into victory.
The general falls into the time-honored line of battle fiction,
when he says that the cut was ' ' carried at the point of the bayonet."
Not a single bayonet was fixed for use in the regiment. He says
also that "two rebel regiments, with their battle-flags," were cap¬
tured. There was really only one regiment captured as an organi¬
zation, and only a part of that. One of our punsters, however, has
said it was a " major " part. The 95th New York took prisoners, as
did also the 14th Brooklyn. All the troops in the railroad cut threw
down their muskets, and the men either surrendered themselves, or
ran away out of the other end of the cut. Later in the day we
marched through this railroad cut, and at least one thousand mus¬
kets lay in the bottom of it.
During the brief period of quiet on the battlefield, we moved
into a piece of timber on the Seminary Ridge, just north of the deep
railroad cut through that ridge, and here half an hour was spent in
organizing the shattered companies. Seven of the twelve company
commanders had been shot in the battle :
* The activity, efficiency, and, if I may so express it, ubiquity, of Gen. James
S. Wadsworth in the battle was remarkable. He was of venerable and command¬
ing appearance, and was absolutely fearless in exposing himself to danger.
COL. GEORGE N. REICHARD.
gettysb urg.
4GÍ)
Capt. John Ticknor,* Company K, killed ; Lieut. O. D. Chap¬
man, Company C, killed ; Lieut. Howard F. Pruyn, Company A,
wounded ; Lieut. W. M. Remington, Company K, wounded ; Lieut.
John Beeley, Company H, wounded ; Lieut. Lloyd G. Harri.s, (now a
banker in St. Louis, Mo.) Brigade Guard No. i, wounded ; Lieut.
Levi Showalter, Brigade Guard No. 2, wounded.
When the nephew of Jefferson Davis was captured, that
gave Cutler a chance to reform his lines. But it was evi¬
dent to Doubleday that he could not hold that ridge with
only two brigades which had already suffered greatly, and
as heavy lines of the enemy could be seen advancing,
Doubleday directed Gen. Thomas A. Rowley, who then
commanded the Third Division after Doubleday assumed
command of the corps, to put Col. Roy Stone's brigade in
between Meredith and Cutler. That was a small brigade,
composed of three regiments ; the 143d Pennsylvania, under
Col. Edmund E. Dana, 149th Pennsylvania, commanded by
Lieut. Col. Walton Dwight, and the 150th Pennsylvania,
under Col. Langhorne Wister. Col. Roy Stone had been a
captain in the Bucktail Regiment in the Pennsylvania Re¬
serve Division, and was given permission by the Governor
to recruit a brigade of a similar organization, the 149th and
150th Regiments, the members of which wore bucktails on
their caps the same as the original regiment of the Pennsyl¬
vania Reserves did. Until after the battle of Gettysburg
there was considerable feeling over the regiments in Roy
Stone's brigade wearing the distinguished insignia worn by
the regiment which was enlisted early in the war, and the
149th and I50tli Regiments were dubbed by the First Buck-
*The line officers, in addition to this list, were: Capt. J. H. Marston, com-
Tnanded Company E ; Lieut. Michael Mangan, Company E, lost a leg ; Lieut. Oscar
Graetz, commanded Company F ; Capt. Thomas Kerr, commanded Company D ;
Lieut. James L. Converse, commanded Company G ; Lieut. John Timmons, Com¬
pany G; Lieut. H. B. Merchant, Company H, wounded; Lieut. Earl M. Rogers,
commanded Company I ; Lieut. Howard J. Huntington, Company A ; Lieut. Wm.
Golterman, Company F ; Capt. R. P. Converse, commanded Company B ; Lieut. C.
P. Hyatt, Company B.
470 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
tails as the bogus Bucktails. The gallant and heroic part
taken by Roy Stone's brigade in that famous battle was so
fully recognized by their comrades who originally wore that
conspicuous mark on their caps, that all asperities soon dis¬
appeared and nothing was thought of but the common good
of the country.
The First Brigade of the Third Division, under the
command of Col. Chapman Biddle, was directed to take a
position on the left of the Iron Brigade en echelon.^ with the
following formation: The i42d Pennsylvania, commanded
by Col. Robert P. Cummins, on the right ; the 20th New
York, under Col. Theodore P. Gates, in the center; and the
12ist Pennsylvania, commanded by Maj. Alexander Biddle,
on the left. The 151st Pennsylvania, under the command
of Lieut. Col. George F. McFarland, had been detached,
like the 6th Wisconsin, and held in reserve near the semi¬
nary, lest another contingency might arise like the one at
the railroad cut, where the 6th Wisconsin changed defeat
into victory in a very few minutes. Capt. James H. Cooper's
Pennsylvania Battery was directed to take a position on the
left of the I42d Pennsylvania and on the right of the 20th
New York. Colonel Wainwright, chief of artillery of the
First Corps, directed Cooper to open on a battery in the
direction of the Cash town road that was engaged with Hall's
artillery. While Doubleday had thus put in these two divi¬
sions of the First Corps, the second one, under Gen. John
C. Robinson, was in reserve near the seminary.
A lull had come in the action for the reason that Heth's
two brigades, which had been advanced, were badly cut up,
and Archer captured. Lee, who was with Heth and Hill,
hesitated to permit Heth to again attack, even with Pender
in supporting distance. A new danger now began to
threaten the First Corps ; Ewell, whose headquarters on the
night of the 30th was at Heidelberg, received orders from
General Lee to proceed to Cashtown or Gettysburg, as cir¬
cumstances might dictate. Rodes' division was at Heidel¬
berg, Early's three miles off, on the road to Berlin, and
CAPT. J. H. COOPER.
GETTYSB URG.
471
Johnson's, with Colonel Brown's reserve artillery, between
Green Village and Scotland. The next morning Ewell
started with Rodes' division for Cashtown, and at the same
time he ordered Early to move by the way of Hunterstown.
When Ewell was near Middletown he received information
from Hill that he was moving on Gettysburg. Ewell im¬
mediately changed direction and took the Middletown road
for Gettysburg with Rodes, while he directed Early to take
the Heidelberg road. Ewell, at the same time, notified Eee
of his new movements ; he was answered by the latter that
if he (Ewell) found the enemy in strong force he did not
desire him to bring on a general engagement. While Ewell
was receiving the message he could distinctly hear the
engagement of Hill in the direction of Gettysburg. Eee's
admonition to Ewell made him approach Gettysburg with
due caution. After reconnoitering the position. Rodes
formed line of battle with Iverson on the right. Colonel
O'Neal, in command of Rodes' old brigade, in the center,
and Doles on the left. Iverson and O'Neal were posted on
Oak Ridge, while Doles was down in the plain. But there
was a considerable gap between O'Neal's left and Doles'
right. Into that Rodes had put the 5th Alabama, of
O'Neal's brigade. The brigades of Daniel and Ramseur
were placed in reserve. To meet this force General Baxter,
of Robinson's division, directed Colonel Coulter, of the
I Ith Pennsylvania, to take his regiment and the 97th New
York, under Colonel Wheelock, and move in the direction
of Rodes' right. Coulter advanced about a quarter of a
mile beyond the railroad track with his skirmishers. That
left a wide interval between Cutler's right and Coulter's
left. Robinson then ordered Baxter to advance with the
other regiments of his brigade, which he did, and assumed
command of the brigade, and formed it in line of battle
from left to right, with the nth Pennsylvania on the left,
the 97th New York and 83d New York next, then the 88th
Pennsylvania and the 12th Massachusetts on its right, with
the 90th Pennsylvania on the extreme right.
472 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Howard, with the Eleventh Corps, had arrived from
Emmittsburg, and halting at the cemetery, which is the
abrupt northern termination of the ridge, threw forward
Schimmelfennig and Barlow. Col. Thomas H. Carter, who
commanded Rodes' artillery, had hastily placed his batteries
in position, and was enfilading the ridge occupied by the
First Corps, and at the same time replied 'to Dilger and
Wheelock's batteries, of the Eleventh Corps, posted on
Schimmelfennig's left. O'Neal had been directed to strike
Baxter's right flank. One of his regiments, the 5th Ala¬
bama, had just been ordered to the left, and the 3d Alabama,
by mistake, remained with Daniel's brigade in reserve,
leaving O'Neal to advance with the 6th, 12th, and 26th
Alabama Regiments to attack Baxter ; the latter, observing
the movement, removed back his right behind a stone wall,
and awaited O'Neal's advance until within a short range;
then his (Baxter's) men delivered such a fatal fire that
O'Neal was badly repulsed, although the 5th Alabama was
sent to his support. Iverson was ordered to attack Baxter's
left.
In the mean time Cutler, who was facing west, saw Iver¬
son threatening his right flank, and not knowing that
Robinson had moved Baxter to the left to connect with his
right, faced north, which threw him on Iverson's right
flank, and as the latter advanced on Baxter, who was again
occupying a position behind a stone wall, and well concealed
from view, Iverson approached within a short distance
without being aware of Baxter's presence, as he was but a
few moments before farther to the right facing O'Neal, and
driving him northward. Then his brigade faced west.
When Iverson was close up to the wall, Baxter's brigade
rose and delivered a volley into the North Carolina brigade,
composed of the 5th, 12th, 20th, and 23d from the "Tar¬
heel State." At the same time Cutler and Roy Stone's
brigades poured an enfilading fire on Iverson's right flank.
It was but the work of a few minutes. Baxter's men, at
the opportune moment, sprang over the wall, and made a
GEN. JUDSON KILPATRICK.
GETTYSBURG.
473
■charge which resulted in capturing Iverson's brigade, with
the exception of the 12th, which stole to the rear under
a flag of truce carried by it. The other regiments hoisted
white flags and surrendered. This was one of the most
brilliant and successful feats in military history.
Iverson says :
I again sent Capt. D. P. Halsey, assistant adjutant general, to
ask General Daniel, who informs me that he met his staff officer,
and was told that one regiment had been sent, and no more could
be spared. I then found that this regiment had been formed on the
right of the 3d Alabama, which was on my right, and could not be
used in time to save my brigade, for Colonel O'Neal's Alabama
brigade had in the mean time advanced on my left, and been almost
instantaneously driven back, upon which the enemy, being relieved
from pressure, charged in overwhelming force upon and captured
nearly all that was left unhurt in three regiments of my brigade.
When I saw white handkerchiefs raised, and my line of battle still
lying down in position, I characterized the surrender as disgraceful ;
but whén I found afterward that 500 of my men were left lying dead
and wounded on a line as straight as a dress parade, I exonerated,
with one or two disgraceful individual exceptions, the survivors,
and claim for the brigade that they nobly fought and died without
a man running to the rear. No greater gallantry and heroism has
been displayed during the war.
In the mean time Robinson had ordered Paul, who was
on the reserve at the seminary, to advance and take a posi¬
tion on Baxter's right. That gallant brigade, composed of
the 16th Maine, under Colonel Tilden, the 13th Massachu¬
setts, commanded by Colonel Reonard, the 94th New York,
under Col. Adrian R. Root, the 104th New York, com¬
manded by Col. Gilbert G. Prey, and the 107th Pennsyl¬
vania, under Lieutenant Colonel McThonison, advanced
with great spirit, and promptly took the position first occu¬
pied by Baxter's brigade, and took part in the repulse of
Iverson. *
* 107th Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry at Gettysburg.—On the
inarch from Rappahannock to Gettysburg Col. T. F. McCoy took sick at Center-
ville and did not march with the regiment. Lieut. Col. James McThompson was
in command. It was understood between the lieutenant colonel and Maj. H. J.
Sheafer that in case they got into action he, the lieutenant colonel, would take
474
THE AT MV OF THE POTOMAC.
Daniel, who had been unable to succor Iverson, whom
he was supporting, moved to the right to endeavor to force
his way down the Chambersburg pike, and in so doing
encountered Roy Stone's brigade, when a most desperate
encounter ensued.
Roy Stone, when he moved to take his position between
Meredith and Cutler, formed his brigade facing west with
the .150th Pennsylvania on Meredith's right, the 143d
Pennsylvania on its right, between McPherson's house and
barn, while the 149th Pennsylvania was on the right of the
brigade. Stone then detailed Capt. G. W. Jones with his
company, of the 150th ; Capt. C. M. Conyngham, of the
143d ; and Capt. J. C. Johnson, of the 149th, as skirmishers
in the direction of Willoughby Run, from where A. P. Hill
was advancing. These companies fought most gallantly^
and greatly impeded the advance of Hill's troops.
The brigade was so much exposed to the artillery of the
enemy that Stone made the following change, which shel-
care of the right and the major the left of the regiment. When the brigade and
division halted on the night of the 30th of June at Marsh Creek, General Paul
ordered the muskets emptied and cleaned. When the brigade was back of the
seminary building waiting orders, Major Sheafer called the attention of the lieu¬
tenant colonel to the fact that the guns were empty. The lieutenant colonel said
he would not take the responsibility of loading, as General Paul had given no
orders. When the quick movement of the brigade to the right along Oak Ridge
was ordered, the major rode to the head of the regiment and as each company
passed over the railroad cut he ordered them to load, which they did on the run.
When near the Mummasburg road, the regiment by the left flank went into line and
charged with the brigade up the ridge at a low stone wall. The enemy was met,
driven back, and our brigade captured many of Iverson's Confederate brigade.
Here both Baxter's and Paul's brigades did splendid work. While the battle
was raging the major saw Lieutenant Colonel Thompson spring from his horse on
the right. His horse ran down the line and when close to the major's a bullet
struck him in the neck and he fell forward. To prevent the horse falling on him.
Major Sheafer pulled back his horse, and then the major was shot in the groin.
He ran his horse down the hill and was taken in an ambulance to the Lutheran
Church in the village. This was now used for hospital purposes. He would not
go in, but remained in the ambulance. Shortly the enemy had the town and when
they got to the square, a short distance from the church, the major asked to be
helped on his horse and rode down the street through a shower of bullets. At the
intersection of the Chambersburg and Fairfield roads he met General Wadsworth,
GEN. ADRIAN R. ROOT.
GETTYSBURG.
475
tered his men from that fire : In this second position the
150th faced west with its right resting on the Chambers-
burg pike ; the 149th on the pike facing north, its left
forming on the 150th ; the 143d on the right of the latter.
The brigade then formed two sides of a right angle. When
Daniel advanced the 149th and the 143d faced him. Being
then in good range the brigade fired two volleys, and then
Colonel Dwight charged at the head of the 149th Pennsyl¬
vania, 'driving back Daniel's forces.
Roy Stone being wounded turned over the command
of the brigade to Col. Danghorne Wister, of the 150th,
who directed Lieutenant Colonel Huidekoper to take com¬
mand of the regiment. Seeing that Daniel would soon
return to the assault, the 150th Pennsylvania was divided
into two wings. The left wing was placed under the com¬
mand of Maj. Thomas Chamberlin, which held its position
facing west. Lieutenant Colonel Huidekoper posted the
right wing on the left of the 149th on the Chambersburg
of the First Division, who had with him two guns of battery and a'remainder of
his men. The major told him of the situation of the town, and they skirted the
south part of the town and reached the foot of Cemetery Hill on the Taneytown
road. There General Wadsworth said to the major, " For God s sake help me, if
you can, to get these men into line "—soldiers then running in all directions.
The major, in the excitement, forgetting his wound, did all he could and soon a
line was formed along a stone wall on the right of Steinwehr's division of the
Eleventh.
Robinson's division held Oak Ridge until the enemy were getting in its rear,
the Eleventh Corps having given way, and then fell back along the ridge and into
the town, many being captured in the town, the loyth among them. In the evening
the major met the remnant of the regiment, and lying on the grass on Cemetery
Ridge, had a talk with the lieutenant colonel, adjutant, and others. The colonel
said he was completely used up and could do no more and wished to go back-
The major begged him not to do so and said, " Colonel, I cannot walk, and possi¬
bly on the morrow we may have another heavy battle, and that I cannot follow
with my horse."
The next morning (second day) the lieutenant colonel was yet unable to com¬
mand, and the major turned over the command to Captain Roath, in case certain
movements were made, and Captain Roath was in immediate command of the
regiment in the remainder of the second and third days' fighting, although the
major did not leave the field until after Pickett's charge, most of the time being
at division headquarters, in Zeigler's woods adjoining the cemetery.
47o
THE A EM Y OF THE POTOMAC.
pike so as to strengthen the threatened point of attack by
Daniel and Davis' remnant of Hill's corps which had not
been captured, whom Daniel endeavored to persuade to
unite with him in his first charge. By this time Daniel
had prepared for his second advance, and had reached the
railroad cut again, when Colonel Wister ordered the right
wing of the 150th, under Huidekoper, and the 149th, under
Dwight, to charge, and again Daniel was compelled to
yield. Colonel Huidekoper says :—
One of the bravest men I ever saw was Sergt. Samuel Phifer,
color-bearer of the 150th Pennsylvania. Three different times when
we had been swept back, and it seemed impossible to live under the
fire, he advanced, knowing it was certain death sooner or later, by
my simply saying, " Sergeant, you must try it once more, for I can¬
not get the regiment up unless you do."
During the last charge Lieutenant Colonels Dwight and
Huidekoper, Major Chamberlin, and Adj. R. L. Ashurst
were wounded. In five minutes Colonel Wister was wounded
in the mouth, and compelled to retire from the field, so
Colonel Dana, of the 143d Pennsylvania, assumed command
of the brigade. Htiidekoper would not leave the field tintil
he received a second wound, when he was taken into the
McPherson barn, btit was soon removed to the Catholic
Church in Gettysburg, where, while on the table to have
an amputation performed, he, with the others in the
church, was taken prisoner.
Early, of Ewell's division, having arrived on the field,
a combined attack all along the line was made. As the
battle raged, color-bearers fell, only to have others take
their places, meet the same fate, and give other patriots
a chance to seize them. As the brigade was being forced
back off the ridge. Color Sergeant Crippen, of the 143d,
fell mortally wounded, and the regiment would have lost
its colors, but Sergt. Patrick DeLacy saw them, and called
out to Major Conyngham to rally the regiment on the
colors, which was instantly done, and they were saved.
GETTYSB URG.
477
Colonel Dana said in his report :
At about this point in the action, Colonels Stone, of the 149th,
and Wister, of the 150th, having been wounded, I took command of
the brigade. The contest soon became severe and close. Three suc¬
cessive assaults upon our line were repulsed, in which we sustained
heavy losses in killed and wounded, but the enemy evidently, from
the numbers left upon the ground at each repulse, suffered still more
severely.
General Doubleday says :
I relied greatly on Stone's brigade to hold the post assigned
them. My confidence in this noble body of men was not misplaced.
They repulsed the repeated attacks of vastly superior numbers at
close quarters, and maintained their position until the final retreat
of the whole line. I have said the losses were exceedingly heavy ;
more than half of those who went into the battle were killed or
wounded. In the 2d Wisconsin, 69 came back out of 302 ; in the
19th Indiana, 78 returned of 288. The 150th Pennsylvania lost 316
men out of 400, and 16 officers out of 17 ; the 149th Pennsylvania in
the same proportion.
The First Corps only consisted of about 8,200 when it entered
the field. It was reduced, at the close of the engagement, to about
2,400. My thanks are specially due to a citizen of Gettysburg named
John Burns, who although seventy years of age, shouldered his
musket and offered his services to Colonel Wister, of the 150th Penn¬
sylvania. He was wounded in three places.
Colonel Wister advised Burns to go to the left and fight
in the woods, which he did, with the Iron Brigade. This in¬
cident of Burns has been rendered in verse by Bret Harte
in a poem entitled "John Burns at Gettysburg."
Meredith having been wounded and taken to Gettys¬
burg by an aid on his staff (Gilbert M. Woodward), Colo¬
nel Robinson, of the 7th Michigan, succeeded to the com¬
mand of the Iron Brigade.
When Daniel and Davis made the attack on Roy Stone,
Brockenborough and Pettigrew advanced on the brigade,
but failed to force it from its position in the woods. Mor¬
row was then severely wounded.
Tidball's battery, under Calef, had again been ordered
to the front line, and Reynolds' famous New York battery
478 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
was directed to take a position on the same ridge near
him. Reynolds had considerable difficulty in getting into
position on account of the severe infantry fire. These bat¬
teries were soon compelled to retire.
Captain Reynolds, receiving a severe wound, was no
longer able to remain on "the field, and Rieutenant Breck,
an excellent artillery officer, assumed command of the bat¬
tery, and selected a position about 500 yards to the rear,
where the battery opened. Rient. • B. W. Wilber was
directed to take the right section farther to the left.
General Wadsworth rodé to the extreme left of the line
of the First Corps, where Chapman Biddle's brigade was
posted, and riding up to the Ulster Guard, directed Colonel
Gates to throw a company of his regiment into the house
and outbuildings of E. Harman, in a field on the farther
side of, and some thirty rods beyond, Willoughby Run.
Colonel Gates detailed Capt. Ambrose N. Baldwin, Com¬
pany K, who was killed on the last day of the battle, to
perform that perilous duty. At this time the enemy occu¬
pied Harman's buildings; but after a spirited contest,
they were compelled to retire, when Baldwin took
possession. Hill cautiously advanced, and, as his lines
pressed forward, Baldwin reported that fact. Colonel Gates
at once reënforced him with Captain Conyngham, who had
to fight his way to get to the Harman buildings, where
Baldwin was stàtioned. These two companies succeeded
iu holding the right of Hill's corps in check for two hours.
In the mean time Doubleday, finding he was reduced to
desperate straits, ordered his last regiment on reserve, the
151st Pennsylvania, under Lieutenant Colonel McFarland,
to advance on the right of Biddle's brigade (the regi¬
ment belonged to that brigade), and assist in preventing
the enemy from sweeping the First Corps from the ridge
until he could send to Howard for assistance. Lieutenant
Slagle was sent in great haste to Howard for a part of
Steinwehr's division, then on reserve on Cemetery Hill,
to assist Doubleday ; but Howard declined to send them.
GETTYSBURG.
479
While the left was thus sorely pressed, Early's division
was forming in line of battle on the hills along Rock Creek,
north of the town. Gordon, on the right, relieved the pres¬
sure on Doles' from Schurz's division, while Hays, in the
center, and Hoke, on the left, prolonged Ewell's line of
battle far beyond Barlow's right, under Von Gilsa, who
was again unfortunate enough to have the extreme right,
the same as at Chancellorsville, when Howard was hurled
from his position. Barlow, seeing the movement of Hoke
to outflank him, made a desperate effort to force Gordon
back on the right, which would compel Hays and Hoke
to retire from his right. But Barlow falling severely
wounded, his division yielded ground, but rallied on the
reserve. This was a better position than the first, with,
the Almshouse buildings as a protection to his troops, and
where he had a battery stationed. But Hoke and Hays
had made too much progress for Barlow's division to re¬
form and make a successful stand. While attempting to
ward off the attack of Hoke and Hays on the right flank,
Gordon was pressing in front with great desperation, fol¬
lowed closely by Smith in reserve ; and the gallant Barlow
was left on the field wounded several times and a prisoner,
while the division retreated from the last position in which
it could make a stand. That movement uncovered Schim-
melfennig's right, and placed it in danger from Gordon on
the left. Doles immediately advanced on Von Am berg's
brigade, and forced it back on the Second Brigade, which
was supporting Von Amberg en echelon. This last move de¬
cided the fate of the day north of the town, and the Elev¬
enth Corps at once began a retreat for Cemetery Hill, pass¬
ing through the streets of Gettysburg, closely pursued by
Ewell. Doubleday says :
I now sent my adjutant general (Halstead) to reiterate the re¬
quest for assistance, or to obtain for me an order to retreat, as it was
impossible for me to remain where I was, in the face of the con¬
stantly increasing forces which were approaching from the west.
Howard insisted that Halstead mistook rail fences for troops in the
480 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
distance. The lorgnettes of his staff finally convinced him of his
error ; he still, however, refused to order me to retire, but sent Hal-
stead off to find Buford's cavalry and order it to report to me.
Pender's division was then moving forward, with Lane
on the right, Colonels Perrin and Scales on the left. Scales
struck Robinson, in command of the Iron Brigade, but was
compelled to retire and wait for reënforcements. Pender
and Scales were both wounded in that advance. Immedi¬
ately after, the attack was renewed on the Iron Brigade and
a most desperate struggle took place between the two con¬
tending forces. Men seemed to seek death by rushing to
raise a flag that had fallen from the hand of the color-
bearer, who lay mortally wounded. Colonel Morrow, of
the 24th Michigan, after he had lost the third color-bearer,
directed the fourth one to stick it in the ground where he
(Morrow) could rally the regiment on it, but he, too, was
wounded. Then Morrow picked up the colors himself,
but they were taken from him by Private William Kelley,
of Company E, remarking as he did : ' ' The colonel of the
24th shall never carry the flag while I am alive. ' ' He was
killed instantly. The colors then were taken by Private
Lilbnrn A. Spaulding, of Company K, who carried them
until Morrow took them to rally the regiment, when he
was severely wounded. By this time eight color-bearers
had gone down in the 19th Indiana. They were then
seized by Lieut. Col. W. W. Dudley, who waved them
with a cheer, when he fell wounded in the right leg. Since
the war Colonel Dudley has been Commissioner of Pen¬
sions, and is one of the best known men in the country.
He was one of the most gallant soldiers of the Army of the
Potomac.
Sergt. Maj. Asa W. Blanchard, a noble-hearted youth,
took the colors and was mortally wounded, and died on the
field. As the regiment retired Lieut. W. W. Macy saw
that the colors were left and soon would be in possession
of the enemy. He lan back under a heavy fire and secured
them. Just then Captain Hollon Richardson rode up,
GEN. W. W. DUDLEY.
GE TTYSB URG.
481
when Macy gave them to him to rally the brigade. As
the enemy pressed the Iron Brigade, Benin's brigade had
forced back Biddle on the left of this command, which
exposed its left flank, when Doubleday ordered the Iron
Brigade, and Dana, in command of Roy Stone's brigade,
to retire in the direction of the seminary.
Buford had arrived on the left of Biddle, and by threat¬
ening to charge with Gamble's brigade of cavalry, which had
done such heroic service in the morning, compelled Lane
to form squares, which greatly impeded the advance of the
enemy's right, which he had intended to swing around and
thus cut off the retreat of the Iron Brigade, then fighting
under Robinson, of the 7th Wisconsin, after Meredith was
wounded. Buford deserves to have a.monument erected on
the spot where he defied Lane to advance, thereby greatly
frustrating the well-conceived designs of the enemy.
As Pemn rushed on he struck the 151st Pennsylvania,
under Lieut. Col. George F. McFarland. It was that regi¬
ment's maiden fight, and it acquitted itself so gallantly that
no praise bestowed on it can be fulsome. Fearing he could
not control the regiment to fire by volleys, McFarland gave
the order to fire at will, which was so splendidly executed
that every patriot can rejoice over the work done by that
gallant body of men. Colonel McFarland says :
Not a man left the ranks, even to carry a wounded comrade to
the rear. But the regiment had lost terribly, and now did not num¬
ber one-fourth of what it did two hours earlier in the day. The
enemy, on the contrary, had increased, and was now rapidly
forming on my left. All support had left both flanks and were
already well to the rear. Hence I ordered the shattered remnants of
as brave a regiment as entered the field to fall back, and accom¬
panied it a few paces.
In a few minutes Colonel McFarland was hit in both
legs at the same instant, which caused the amputation of
his right leg and seriously injured his left one for life.
Cutler, who had been the first on the field, was unable
to hold out longer ; his decimated ranks too well told the
XXXI
482 THE A EM y OF THE POTOMAC.
great struggle he had made to maintain the position as¬
signed to him. One of his colonels rejoiced in the fact
that his regiment was the first to fire in that noted battle.
Colonel Hofmann, of the 56th Pennsylvania, was fully
determined to do all in his power to repel the invasion of
the Confederate army from the State of Pennsylvania, and
as he ordered his regiment ''forward into line, fire !" he
was eagerly going at his work. Several years after the bat¬
tle he said to me : ' ' My regiment fired the first volley at
Gettysburg." The 2d Wisconsin also claims that honor,
and that gallant soldier, diplomat, and statesman. Col.
Lucius Fairchild, earnestly believes it. The 76th New
York, which was on the right of Cutler's brigade, and first
into line, also claims the honor of firing the first volley, and
thus opening the battle. Cutler's brigade was in the ad¬
vance, and formed line of battle before Meredith's did,
which, it is claimed, rather gives the preponderance of evi¬
dence in favor of Cutler's brigade, but Fairchild crowded
Cutler so closely in the matter that it is clear these three
regiments should each have a medal of honor from Congress.
The 76th New York, on the right of the 56th Pennsyl¬
vania, had suffered an extraordinarily heavy loss. Judge
Smith, in his history of the regiment, says :
All the regiments in this advance brigade were fearfully eut up.
The 76th went into the fight with 348 men and 27 officers, and in
half an hour it lost 2 officers killed, and 16 wounded ; 27 men killed,
and 124 wounded; making a total killed and wounded in the half
hour of x8 officers and 151 men, or over half the officers, and nearly
half the men expended in that brief period.
Among the number killed was Major Grover, who was
in command of the regiment. General Cutler, in his report
of the battle, says :
Major Grover, commanding the 76th New York Volunteers, a
brave and efficient officer, was killed early in the action of the ist
instant, and the command devolved upon Capt. John E. Cook ; and
most ably and faithfully did he perform the duty. With him lay on
that part of the field Captain Story, Lieutenants Cahill, P. S. Clark,
GETTYSBURG.
483
Carter, and Button. Serg. Maj. Thomas Martin was killed.
Sergeant M. M. Whitney of the 76th New York, who held the
right of the first line of battle, was severely injured but did not
forsake his post of duty. He was a gallant soldier.
Orderly Sergeant Henry ClifF, of Company F., fell
severely wounded in the left leg. Of him Jndge Smith says :
And there, for five days, the sergeant lay with a broken limb,
unable to stir, almost dying from thirst and hunger, and nearly
roasting, while day after day he watched the cool shade in its slow
journey around the tree, never quite reaching him, but advancing
toward him and then retreating, as though tantalizing him for his
loyalty ! He was finally found by our men, his limb amputated,
and he still lives to tell his story.
Baxter's brigade was nearly out of ammunition when
Paul's arrived, but it remained on the field, getting what it
could from the boxes of those who had been shot. While
the brigade had hurled O'Neal's brigade back with heavy
loss, and had captured Iverson's, yet it had suffered heavily.
It held a position on the crest with fixed bayonets, with
not a single cartridge. Colonel Bates commanded the 12th
Massachusetts a part of the time, and so did Lieut. Col.
David Allen, Jr. Col. Charles W. Wheelock, of the 97th
New York, a brave and determined officer, got separated
from his regiment on retiring from Seminary Ridge, and
was taken prisoner in the house of Elias Sheads under the
following circumstances : The enemy was so close that he
entered Mr. Sheads' house, just under the brow of the hill,
between the seminary and the town. A Confederate colo¬
nel and some men followed him in the house to capture
him. While their attention was distracted Miss Carrie
Sheads hid Colonel Wheelock's sword in the folds of her
dress and thus concealed it. He was taken prisoner, but
escaped after the battle. When the Confederates were re¬
treating, he returned, secured his sword and joined his
command. The regiment was commanded by Maj. Charles
Northup until the colonel returned.
The nth Pennsylvania had three regimental com-
484
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
manders : Colonel Coulter, Capt. Benjamin F. Haines and
Capt. John B. Overinyer. In the 88th Pennsylvania Major
Foust was wounded, whereupon Capt. Henry Whiteside
assumed command and gallantly fought it to the close of
the battle. This regiment captured the colors of the i6th
Alabama and the 23d North Carolina Regiments in the
surrender of Iverson's brigade. Bates says :
The reg-iment lost 7 killed, 30 wounded, and about 40 prisoners,
among whom were Captains Mass and Schell, and Lieutenants Grant
and Boone. * * * The 90th Pennsylvania Regiment had two
regimental commanders ; after four commanders of the First Brigade,
of Robinson's division, had been wounded. Colonel Lyle was put in
command of it, and Major Sellers commanded the 90th Pennsyl¬
vania. He was a brilliant young ofldcer of fine military genius.
Paul's brigade occupied the extreme right of the First
Corps when thé final attack came that compelled the corps
to retire to Seminary Ridge. A sad calamity had just oc¬
curred to the brigade. General Paul received a wound that
carried away both of his eyes. He lived many years after
the war in Washington, but always had to be led. Colonel
Leonard, then of the 13th Massachusetts, took command of
the brigade, but soon being wounded, was succeeded in the
command by Colonel Root, of the 94th New York. It was
not long until Colonel Root was wounded, when Colonel
Coulter assumed command, only to be wounded, and his
place was filled by Colonel Lyle, of the 90th Pennsylvania.
Four commanders of the brigade wounded shows the suffer¬
ing of the troops on that part of the field. The brigade
was well up to the Mummasburg road, with the 13th
Massachusetts facing north, and occupied the apex in
the right angle formed by Hill's corps on the west, and
Ewell's on the north. Baxter was out of ammunition,
and on that account had to lead the retreat of Robin¬
son's division. Then came Paul's brigade, with the i6th
Maine, bringing up the rear, slowly pursued by the ad¬
vancing foe. But the history of the world furnishes no
retreat that was conducted more masterly by the generals
LIEUT. COL. W. W. GROUT, M. C.
GETTYSBORG.
485
tior more orderly by the troops than that of the First Corps
as it retired back to Seminary Ridge to make another stand
in the face of overwhelming numbers. A sight most grand
to see was Doubleday, Wadsworth and Robinson guiding
their men with a coolness as if on dress parade. Robin¬
son had two horses shot from under him, yet he came up
from the right, leading his valiant soldiers with a steady
nérve. The 7th Wisconsin retired, with Capt. Hollon
Richardson carrying the flag of the 19th Indiana on horse¬
back at the head of the Iron Brigade. The captain was on
the brigade staff, and heroically performed his duty.
The regiments of the corps would retire a hundred and
fifty or two hundred yards, and then turn and deliver a
volley into the front line of the Confederates as they ad¬
vanced, until Seminary Ridge was reached ; there the
infantry took a position behind the temporary breastworks,
hastily made in the morning by Robinson's division, and
in support of the batteries posted on the ridge. The color-
bearer of the 2d Wisconsin was shot while the regiment
was retreating to Seminary Ridge, when Corp. J. J. Lit¬
tle ran back and got the colors, otherwise they would
have been captured. General Meredith, who was badly
injured in Gettysburg, on hearing of the gallant act of
Corporal Little, said he would issue an order commendatory
of his bravery. Little has served many years since the
war in the Architect's Office of the Treasury Department.
Before the infantry retired from the line of McPherson's
woods, Capt. James A. Hall sent back for the gun he was
compelled to leave early in the day by order of General
Wadsworth.
Pender's and Heth's divisions were both in front of the
First Corps when it retired from the position it had held
from the time Reynolds put it there in the morning before
he fell. The enemy did not hotly pursue Doubleday as he
retired to Seminary Ridge, but halted to rearrange his lines,
which gave Col. C. S. Wainwright, chief of artillery of the
First Corps, time to arrange his batteries near the seminary
486 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
before the Confederate infantry columns peered over the
McPherson Ridge, stretching from the south nearly*to the
Fairfield road ; Hill's left rested beyond the Chambersburg
pike, while Rodes' division, which had forced in Rob¬
inson on the right, came forward abreast with Hill's troops
under Pender and Heth, their line reaching to the Mum-
masburg road, where, making a right angle. Doles, Gordon,
Hays, and Hoke were converging on Gettysburg from the
north, in an endeavor to cut off the retreat of the First
Corps to Cemetery Hill. Colonel Wainwright says :
Having heard incidentally some directions given to General
Doubleday about holding Cemetery Hill, and not knowing that
there was such a place, while the seminary was called indiscrimi¬
nately " Cemetery " and " Seminary," I supposed the latter was meant.
I therefore directed Captain Cooper to take a good position in front
of the professor's house on this ridge, and sent an order to Captain
Stevens, of the 5th Maine Battery, to occupy the position first assigned
to Lieutenant Stewart. Soon after this the enemy filed in two strong
columns out of the woods, about five hundred yards to our front,
and marched steadily down to our left until they outflanked us
yearly a third of a mile. They then formed in double line of battle
and came directly up the crest. During this movement Battery L
opened on the columns, but the firing of Lieutenant Breck's four
guns was much interfered with by our own infantry moving in front
of his pieces. As we had no regular line of battle on this crest, and
the enemy outnumbered us five to one I withdrew Lieutenant Breck's
two sections when their first line was within about 200 yards, and
ordered him behind a strong stone wall on the seminary crest.
Meantime General Doubleday had removed Captain Stevens'
battery to the right of Captain Cooper's, and Lieutenant Wilber's
section falling back with its support, came into position at the same
point, thus concentrating twelve guns in so small a space that they
were hardly five yards apart. Lieutenant Stewart's battery was also
in position on the same line, half the battery between the Cash town
pike and the railroad, the other half across the railroad in the corner
oí a wood. The enemy's lines continued to advance steadily across
the space between the two crests, but when the first line was within
about 100 yards of the seminary. Lieutenant Davison, commanding
the left half of Stewart's battery, swung his guns around on the
Cashtown pike, so as to enfilade the whole line. This, with the fire
of the other batteries, checked them for a moment at this point, but
GEN. SOL. MEREDITH.
GETTYSB ORG.
487
it was only for a moment, as their second line did not halt, but
pushed on, strongly reënforced by a third column deploying from
the Cashtown road. An order was now received by Captain Stevens
from General "Wadsworth to withdraw his battery. Not knowing
that he had received such an order, and still under the false impres¬
sion as to the importance attached to holding Seminary Hill, I
directed all the batteries to remain in position. A few minutes,
however, showed me that our infantry was rapidly retreating to the
town.
The above is an extract from Colonel Wainwright's offi¬
cial report of this engagement. He was a great artillery
officer, and especially on this occasion greatly added to the
fame of the First Corps by the skillful handling of his guns.
The infantry aided the batteries by firing on the advancing
columns of the enemy, and inflicted great damage to him
as he neared the seminary, although, as N. B. Prentice,
of the 7th Wisconsin, who was wounded there, and for
his good record as a soldier made quartermaster of the
37th Wisconsin, said to me: "We cut great gaps in their
lines which were instantly closed up, yet their columns
never faltered." Brave to a fault, it is to be hoped that
these Southern soldiers will, if the occasion requires, defend
the flag as heroically as they desperately endeavored to
destroy it and ruin its supremacy on land and sea.
Stewart had a brass battery of Napoleon 12-pounder
guns, smoothbore, and effective at short range. Perhaps
no battery ever did better execution on a battlefield than
Battery B, 4th U. S. Artillery, that day. These brass guns,
loaded with canister, hurled death and destruction through
the columns of infantry as they advanced within a few
yards.
But the Eleventh Corps was no longer a hindrance to
Ewell. He was rapidly swinging his left round in Double-
day's rear to hem him in. Wainwright said, in his
report, that their right had so overlapped our left that
retreat from Seminary Ridge was inevitable. Although
Howard had sent Custer's brigade to help save the Eleventh
Corps, yet, even at that perilous moment, Doubleday
488
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
had received no order to retire to Cemetery Hill. But
seeing that to remain there longer was to sacrifice the
whole corps, he gave the order to abandon the position on
Seminary Ridge and fall back to Cemetery Hill, south of
the town. The corps suffered greatly in passing through
the town from the fire of Ewell. Early entered the town
and occupied the Diamond, which is considered the center.
The soldiers of both sides occupied the town at the same
time. The First Corps obliqued to the right and evaded
the center. Cemetery Hill lying south at the end of Balti¬
more Street. Many of the First Corps were captured in
the town. Major Gerker, a staff officer in the First Corps,
was so hotly pursued, that he dodged into the Lutheran
Church, which had been turned into a hospital for our
soldiers. The surgeons were all busy attending to the
wounded, and therefore paid but little attention to Major
Gerker as he entered. He spied a surgeon's sash, put it on,
took a canteen and gave the boys water. Thus playing
surgeon, he expected to soon quietly leave and join the
corps. But just then in came Harry Gilmore, a Confed¬
erate officer of considerable fame. He and Gerker had
been chums from" boyhood. The Gerkers lived in Phila¬
delphia, and the Gihnores were Baltimoreans. Gilmore
seeing Gerker with a surgeon's sash on, knew in a moment
he was playing a game to get away, so he walked up to
him and said, "Gerker, where in the devil did you study
medicine?" Gerker said "his heart went down in his
boots," for Harry Gilmore knew him well. In a minute
Gilmore said to him in a low tone, "Gerker, play your
game, that is all right," and immediately left the church.
In a short time Major Gerker put in an appearance on Cem¬
etery Hill, and inquired for the First Corps.
While utter confusion reigned in Gettysburg, Early,
who had rode forward to the town, where Hays' brigade was
capturing many Union soldiers, looked up Baltimore Street
at Cemetery Hill, where the First and Eleventh Corps were
being posted, with a view of pressing on and attacking that
GE T T YSBLRG.
position before the Union army had time to intrench it¬
self on the heights overlooking the city. But Hays'
brigade was not strong enough to accomplish the purpose.
Smith, who had been in reserve, had moved over to the
York road, and sent word to Early that there were troops
moving in their rear. Kilpatrick was facing for Carlisle to
prevent Stuart from joining Lee. On receiving word from
Smith, Gordon was sent to his (Smith's) support, so that
Early only had the brigades of Hoke and Hays at hand to
follow up the Union forces as they retired to Cemetery Hill.
The Twelfth Corps was also sighted by the enemy, as it
arrived about that time. Slocum directed Williams to take
possession of Wolf's Hill, until he (Slocum) could ascertain
the position of the two forces engaged. It is quite probable
that when Williams' division came in view on Wolf's Hill
it was supposed that other commands would soon arrive over
other roads. Rodes was in no condition to follow up and
attack Cemetery Hill, for all of Iverson's brigade had been
captured, except one regiment, and that had sustained con¬
siderable loss, and O'Neal's brigade had been so badly
crippled that it was of but little service, leaving but Ram-
seur and Daniel, who had also been fighting heavily. So
Ewell waited for Johnson's division to arrive before attempt¬
ing to take Cemetery Hill. Johnson had about eighteen
miles to march that day, and did »not arrive until about
siinset. Perhaps he could have arrived earlier, but Ander¬
son, of Hill's corps, had received peremptory orders to
hurry forward, and Johnson was compelled to follow him.
While Anderson halted at Willoughby Run with Hill's
corps, Johnson moved to the left of Early, and took
up position on Rock Creek, with the idea of taking pos¬
session of Culp's Hill, which almost joins Cemetery Hill on
the east ; a mere depression separates them. Could John¬
son have secretly mounted a battery on Culp's Hill, and
supported it, the Union position on Cemetery Hill, nov
much more than a quarter of a mile distant, would have
been untenable. In the evening Lee visited Ewell to
490
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
examine the position in his, EJwell's, front, and he was half
inclined to draw him back on Seminary Ridge, which cer¬
tainly would have been a good move. Eweil had studied
the Rock Creek line well, and thought he could push John¬
son up that stream and turn the Union position on Ceme¬
tery Hill by getting possession of Culp's Hill.
We turn now to the movements of the Union generals,
and see what disposition they made of their forces. Double-
day was directed to occupy the cemetery with a part of the
First Corps, while Wadsworth's division was sent to occupy
Culp's Hill. Hancock, who had been very active in station¬
ing the troops after he arrived, surrendered the command
to Slocum, when the latter came to the cemetery. In the
mean time Howard objected to Hancock assuming command
of the forces, for the reason that he, Howard, outranked
him. It seems that Meade had, in reality, sent Hancock
to the front invested temporarily with, full powers as
commander-in-chief of the army in his absence.
General Hancock, in his official report, says :
A few minutes before one p. m. I received orders to proceed in
person to the front, and assume command of the First, Third, and
Eleventh Corps, in consequence of the death of Major General Rey¬
nolds. Having been fully informed by the Major General Command¬
ing as to his intentions, I was instructed by him to give the neces¬
sary directions, upon my arrival at the front, for the movement of
the troops and trains to the rear, toward the line of battle he had
selected, should I deem it expedient to do so. If the ground was
suitable, and circumstances made it wdse, I was directed to establish
the line of battle at Gettysburg.
Geary arrived with the two brigades of the Second
Division of the Twelfth Corps, when Doubleday was falling
back, and took a position on Cemetery Hill to prevent the
enemy from turning his left flank, and planting himself
farther south on that ridge. The Second Brigade, of
Geary's division, was halted some two miles back from
Gettysburg with a section of Battery K, 5th United States
Artillery, pursuant to orders by General Slocum. At two
GETTYSB ORG.
491
o'clock Sickles received an urgent request from Howard for
help, as the First and Eleventh Corps were being hard
pressed by a superior force of the enemy. At that time
Humphreys was making an examination of the country
around Emmittsburg with a probable view of fighting the
battle there. Sickles had received no orders to proceed to
Gettysburg. As yet Meade was uncertain where the battle
would be fought, and had strongly talked of the Pipe Creek
line to his corps commanders ; thus Sickles was left in great
doubt. When Howard implored him for assistance, he did
not wait for Humphreys to return, but at once gave orders
for the First and Second Brigades, of Humphreys' division,
with two brigades and three batteries of Birney's division,
to march immediately to Gettysburg, leaving de Trobriand's
brigade of Birney's division, and Burling's brigade of Hum¬
phreys' division, to hold the position there and guard the
supply trains. The roads were badly cut up by the passage
of the First and Eleventh Corps, including artillery, and
the supply trains which were ahead of the troops ; but
Birney pressed forward and arrived on the field about half-
past five that afternoon, while Humphreys, who received
orders to come on direct to Gettysburg, encountered the
enemy after dark, but not being observed, countermarched
his division and took another road, which delayed him so
much that he did not arrive until one o'clock the next
morning. These were all the troops that arrived that
night.
Geary's division and Sickles' corps lay stretched on
Cemetery Ridge in the direction of the Roimd Tops. The
Second Corps arrived at Taneytown at eleven o'clock on
July I. Hancock now reported to Meade in person, when
he was directed to proceed to the front and take com¬
mand, as General Reynolds, who was in command of the
left wing, then in the advance, had been killed. When
Hancock was directed by Meade to proceed to the front
and assume command of the forces at Gettysburg, he (Han¬
cock) assigned Gibbon to the command of the Second
492 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Corps. In the afternoon the corps marched to within three
miles of Gettysburg, and halted for the night. At seven
a. m., on July 2, it appeared on the field and was placed
in position by General Hancock, who had joined his corps
before it arrived. Before Hancock turned over the com¬
mand at Gettysburg to Slocuni, he sent Major Mitchell to
Meade with the message that he would hold the position
until night, and informed him of the state of affairs at the
front. Shortly after that Hancock sent a second message
to the general commanding, giving in detail the movements
which had taken place, and his opinion that Gettysburg
was a very strong position. Just after dark Hancock
started to Taneytown to consult with Meade. Upon his
arrival at headquarters he found that Meade had issued
orders for the other corps in the rear to advance at once to
Gettysburg, and was himself ready to go there in person.
Meade arrived at the cemetery about one o'clock that
night, and at onpe consulted with the generals present on
the situation.
No movement took place during the night, except by
the left wing of Ewell under Johnson. Ewell had im¬
pressed upon Lee that he could carry Cemetery Hill
when Longstreet attacked the left of the Union line. If
Ewell could gain a foothold on Gulp's Hill during the
night he imagined he would be in possession of the key
to Meade's position on Cemetery Hill. In the night
some of Johnson's officers and men attempted to recon-
noiter Gulp's Hill. When Wadsworth was directed to
occupy it the evening before on his way there, he found
on the Baltimore pike the 7th Indiana, which had guarded
the First Corps train from Marsh Creek that day, and
consequently had not been engaged in the battle. It
was in good condition, and nearly as large as the two
brigades which had been in action that day ; therefore
he directed it to the right of the division on Gulp's
Hill. This hill faces north, and, like Cemetery Hill, over¬
looks the town, both being m close proximity. After it
GETTYSB ORG.
49a
approaches near Rock Creek it abruptly breaks off to the
west, facing easterly on the creek, with "Wolf's Hill be¬
yond that historic stream. What few were left of Wads-
worth's two brigades were worn out, and the yth
Indiana was assigned to picket duty, with Company B
on the extreme right of the line. It was stationed near
where the hill turns to the west. On the picket post on
the extreme right of the line was Sergeant Hussey,
with Privates Harshberger and W. S. Odell. A noise
was heard as of men moving cautiously in the timber
some distance to their right. As they advanced to in¬
vestigate, before the enemy discovered them, they got be¬
hind some bowlders, permitting the officer leading to pass
them, when Sergeant Hussey dashed out and seized the
officer, while Harshberger and Odell fired on the advancing
body .of troops. Other members of the company running
up, poured in such a rapid fire that the enemy turned and
fled in the direction of Rock Creek, where Johnson's divi¬
sion lay. Some prisoners were captured in that night's
encounter. Bwell was greatly astonished to find a force
on Culp's Hill and abandoned the project of trying to
take it that night. The Comte de Paris says : "These in¬
cidents exercised a powerful influence over the battle the
following day. ' '
A noted general said that a linchpin might even de¬
cide a battle. There is no doubt but the rebuff of that
small party from Johnson's division at that point was of
great value, and it greatly aided in the success of our
army in the ensuing battle. The 7th Indiana will ever
have the proud distinction of the valorous work done that
night.
There was great activity at Meade's headquarters in
establishing and connecting regular lines of battle. While
Wadsworth held a firm position on Culp's Hill, with
Stevens' 5th Maine Battery on his left, yet there was
quite an interval from his right to where Williams' di¬
vision, of the Twelfth Corps, bivouacked for the night.
494 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
The Eleventh Corps held a position just outside and
west of the cemetery, its left extending about to the south¬
west corner. Then came John C. Robinson's division of
the First Corps on the left of Howard, which closely
hugged a stone wall in front of it, crossing over the
Taney town road. Geary's division, which during the
night was stationed on Cemetery Ridge, was in the morn¬
ing sent to the right of Wadsworth on Culp's Hill. Then
Geary formed two lines of battle. Greene's brigade took
a position on the right of Wadsworth's division, of the First
Corps, with his Second Brigade, under Kane, on the right
of Greene, which was Geary's front line.
In support of Greene and Kane, Candy's brigade was
massed in double columns of battalions. Geary was facing
east, and Wadsworth on his left faced north, thus forming
a salient point at Wadsworth's right and Geary's left ; yet
the line was well protected from artillery by large bowlders
and heavy timber.
About nine o'clock General Ruger, who was assigned
to the command of General Williams' division, the latter
having been placed in the command of the Twelfth Corps,
moved the division to the right of Geary, and posted the
First Brigade, under Colonel McDougall, on the right of
Kane, and in prolongation of the line occupied by Geary.
Only a part of the brigade occupied the front line, while
the other part was placed behind a stone wall, some 75
yards to the rear, in support of the first line. The Third
Brigade, under Colonel Colgrove, was directed to McDou¬
gall's right, with the right of the brigade well refused
back, facing southeast. With this completion of the line
of battle on Culp's Hill, we now turn to Cemetery Ridge,
and witness the movements there.
The Second Corps, under Hancock, arrived on the field
at seven o'clock, and immediately moved to Cemetery
Ridge. The division of Alexander Hayes relieved John
C. Robinson, which placed Hayes' division on the left of
the Eleventh Corps. Gibbon's division was assigned the
GETTYSB URG.
495
centei', and Caldwell's division formed the left of the vSec-
ond Corps. At seven a. in. Sickles directed Birney to re¬
lieve Geary and take a position with his left resting on
Little Round Top and his right thrown on a direct line
toward the cemetery.
In the mean time Meade had ordered de Trobriand and
Burling up from Emmittsburg, where they had been left
by Sickles the day before. Arriving about nine a. m., de
Trobriand was placed in the center of Birney's division,
with Wárd on his left, and Graham on his right. Hum¬
phreys was not ordered to put his division in line of battle
until midday. Moving up to fill the space between Birney
and Caldwell, Carr's brigade, with the 71st New York,
under Colonel Potter, filled the space between Caldwell
and Birney. The Second Brigade, commanded by Col.
W. R. Brewster, was massed in line by battalions 200
yards in rear of the front line, while the Third Brigade,
under Col. George C. Burling, was massed 200 yards in
rear of the second line.
Birney's picket line had been on the Emmittsburg road,
with his sharpshooters some 300 yards in advance. The
constant firing at the front led Birney to believe that the
enemy was massing in his front ; so he requested Sickles
to permit him to strengthen the sharpshooters in order to
ascertain the movements of Lee's troops in the timber
beyond the Emmittsburg road. Birney sent Capt. J. C.
Briscoe of his staff with Colonel Berdan, who was directed to
take 100 of Berdan's. Sharpshooters, with the 3d Maine,
and feel the enemy's right. Berdan advanced along the
Millerstown road, and entered the woods to strike the right
flank of the Confederates, which would unmask their
movement. This heavy force of sharpshooters, drove
the enemy's pickets in, and revealed the fact that three
columns of their forces were marching to our left. Berdan
was immediately attacked by a heavy force under Long-
street, and driven back in the peach orchard, with a
loss of about 60 icilled and wounded. Berdan did very
496 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
valuable service that day with his sharpshooters. It was
equal to a much larger force with those repeating rifles in
the hands of skilled marksmen ; his men could hit a Con¬
federate distant almost a half mile with exactness. Scattered
as they were, and sheltered in every instance possible, the
enemy was discomfited by their fire.
When Berdan discovered heavy columns of the enemy
moving on our left flank, he immediately reported it to
Birney, who communicated it to Sickles. It was then that
Sickles gave the order to Birney to throw forwarc^ his line
of battle to the Emmitsburg road, which had been held by
his skirmishers all forenoon. Birney's left at this time rested
on the northern slope of Eittle Round Top. Ward, on the
left, was advanced five hundred yards, while de Trobriand
in the center, and Graham on the right, were swung around
so that Graham's right rested on the Emmittsburg road
at the peach orchard. Along the northern bases of Little
and Big Round Tops flows Plum Run, and immediately
on its right is the Devil's Den, composed of large bowlders,
behind which the enemy, compara.tively safe, would be able
to deliver such a deadly fire, if advanced upon, that would
make it impossible to be taken. Smith's battery of rifled
guns was placed at the Devil's Den so as to sweep the low
depression made by Plum Run. Thus Smith held the ex¬
treme left .position of the Third Corps. Winslow's battery,
from Hunt's artillery reserve, was placed on the right
of Ward. The batteries of Clark and Ames were posted
in the rear of the peach orchard. Graham, at the peach
orchard, had been strengthened by the 3d Michigan from
de Trobriand's brigade, and the 3d Maine from Ward's..
Near the Emmittsburg road Randolph's, Seeley's, and Turn-
bull's batteries were placed.
In front of Humphreys' center was a log house sur¬
rounded by an orchard between him and the Emmittsburg
road, which he occupied with the 73d New York, com¬
manded by Maj. M. W. Burns. From that position the
enemy were watched and held at bay. That regiment was
GETTYSBURG.
497
subsequently relieved by the lótli Massachusetts. Hum¬
phreys then received an order to send Burling's (Third)
brigade to the support of Graham. About four p. m.
Humphreys again received an order to move forward and
occupy the Emmittsburg road with his first line under
General Carr, while Brewster moved up in supporting
distance. Birney faced south and Humphreys faced west.
This position formed a salient angle at the peach orchard
where Graham and Carr united.
The Fifth Corps had arrived and took a position on the
right of the Twelfth. In that position Sykes could easily
turn Ewell's left flank, while Slocum, with Wadsworth's
division of the First Corps, and the Twelfth, could attack
him in front from Culp's Hill. Meade was seriously con¬
sidering an attack on Ewell as he lay stretched along Rock
Creek like a snake, with the head of Johnson's division
well up in front of Culp's Hill. But Slocum and Warren
both urged that the ground was too rough, and the idea
was abandoned. If that plan had been fully developed
before Sykes arrived, and he had been directed to form a
line of battle, and advance over Wolf's Hill and Benner's
Hill, he would have struck Ewell in the rear, and although
the steep declivity down Culp's Hill to Rock Creek would
have prevented any alignment of the troops under Slocum,
yet Johnson would have had to hastily retreat back in the
direction of the almshouse, where the Eleventh Corps
fought on the previous day, which was a very poor position.
It is but just to say that the Eleventh Corps, although it
was compelled to make a hasty retreat from its position on
the afternoon of the first day, fought bravely, considering
the fact that it was enfiladed by the artillery on Oak Hill,
and the infantry force in front occupied a far more advan¬
tageous position. Had Meade attacked Ewell, he would
have been compelled to push him back from Oak Hill, or
else have gained no permanent advantage by the move¬
ment. In that case the whole of Meade's army necessarily
would have been advanced to Seminary Ridge, which would
XXXII
498 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
have made the Union army the one to assault. It was a
strange coincidence that while Meade was contemplating
an attack on Ewell, Lee was studying the advisability of
Ewell attacking Slocum on Gulp's Hill. Both command¬
ers abandoned their movements on that part of the field on
the morning of the 2d. Then Lee, turning back, rode past
his headquarters over to his right where Longstreet was
posted, and carefully examined the Union line in his
front. That seemed to him the best point to begin the
main attack, though Ewell, when he heard the guns of
Longstreet, was to assault Gulp's Hill, and in that way
threaten Meade's center from the rear and endanger his
reserve artillery and ammunition on Powers' Hill, beyond
the Baltimore pike. A. P. Hill was to watch the progress
of the battle, and if he could strike a favorable blow, he
was to attack in the center. Lee could see the depression
in the ground between Little Round Top and the eminence
where Gibbon lay, and there he resolved to strike, and if
possible to carry Little Round Top, which had been
pointed out to him by moonlight the night before by
Ewell. Longstreet looked on the work before him with
deep forebodings of disaster, and was opposed to it. He
wanted to march around Big Round Top, and, moving to
the left flank of the Union army, take a position behind
Pipe Greek, which had just been abandoned by Meade, or
some other strong position, and then, being between Meade
and Washington, compel him to attack the Gonfederate
army in a position where it would have the advantage. On
that point Longstreet says :
As General Lee rode to the summit of Seminary Ridge and
looked down upon the town he saw the Federals in full retreat, and
concentrating on the rock-ribbed hill that served as a burying-ground
for the city. He sent orders to Ewell to follow up the success, if he
found it practicable, and to occupy the hill on which the enemy was
concentrating. As the order was not positive, and left discretionary
with General Ewell, the latter thought it better to give his troops a
little rest, and wait for more definite instructions. I was following
the Third Corps as fast as possible, and as soon as I got possession
GETTYSBURG.
49y
of the road went rapidly forward to join General Lee. I found him
on the summit of Seminary Ridge watching the enemy concentrate
on the opposite hill. He pointed out their position to me, I took
my glasses and made as careful a survey as I could from that point.
After five or ten minutes I turned to General Lee and said, "If we
could have chosen a point to meet our plans of operation, I do not
think we could have found a better one than that upon which they
are now concentrating. All we have to do is to throw our army
around by their left, and we shall interpose between the Federal
army and Washington. We can get a strong position and wait, and
if they fail to attack us, we shall have everything in condition to
move back to-morrow night in the direction of Washington, select¬
ing beforehand a good position into which we can place our troops
to receive battle next day. Finding our object is Washington or
that army, the Federals will be sure to attack us. When they attack
we shall beat them, as we proposed to do before we left Fredericks¬
burg, and the probabilities are that the fruits of our success will be
great."
" No," said General Lee, " the enemy is there, and I am going
to attack him there."
I suggested that such a move as I proposed would give us con¬
trol of the roads leading to Washington and Baltimore, and reminded
General Lee of our original plans.
If we had fallen behind Meade, and had insisted on staying be¬
tween him and Washington, he would have been compelled to
attack, and would have been badly beaten.
Lee was not disposed to accept the reasoning of Long-
street, although military men of far less fame wotild have
recognized its force at once. That move would have placed
the Confederate army between Meade and his supplies at
Westminster and greatly jeopardized Baltimore and Wash¬
ington. It is no wonder Meade kept a jealous eye on his
rear and was fully prepared for a retrograde movement if
circumstances dictated. I consider the criticisms on him, in
view of Longstreet's persistent attempts to have Lee move
around Meade's left and gain his rear, far from just or laden
with too much patriotism. Meade was anxious to meet Lee
at Gettysburg or any other place where he could safely win
a victory, but he did not desire to blindly have another
defeat stamped on the escutcheon of the Army of the
Potomac.
500
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Lee well remembered the Peninsular campaign, First
and Second Bull Run, Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville,
where he had been successful. Those victories inspired
him with a confidence that he could win a victory wherever
he met the Union army. His soldiers greatly shared his
confidence and fully relied upon his judgment, and were
ready and anxious for battle at his command. The firm
opposition of Longstreet to attacking the Union position
nettled Lee, and he resolved to discard the advice of his
hitherto trusted lieutenant. Perhaps he feared it would be
a token of doubt and would lessen the morale of his. army.
There was another move he could make, viz, withdraw to
the passes in the South Mountain range and there await
Meade's attack ; but as he had just left Cashtown, where he
desired to meet Meade, for-him then to waver was to admit
that disaster might follow a conflict between the two armies ;
therefore he resolved to attack the position occupied by the
Third Corps, and Longstreet was accordingly ordered to
prepare for action. The attempt was then made to move
his two divisions. Hood's and McLaws', around to the left
through the woods and behind a ridge, so as to conceal the
movement from the Union signal station on Little Round
Top. If that could be accomplished the attack would be
made a surprise, for there was then no cavalry on the imme¬
diate left of the Union army to observe the movements of
the enemy or to give warning of his approach. Buford,
who had suffered so severely on the morning of the first
day, had been ordered from near Big Round Top to West¬
minster on the morning of the second, while Merritt lay at
Emmittsburg, miles away. Kilpatrick and Gregg were on
the right flank. But another reason other than his con¬
cealed movement influenced the delay of the attack by
Longstreet, namely. Law's brigade of Hood's division, for
which he was waiting, had not yet arrived. Law arrived a
little before twelve o'clock, and was at once directed to
move to the extreme right of the Confederate line, which
was to sweep up Plum Run. When Law moved to the
BREVET COL. A. J. SELLERS.
GETTYSBURG.
501
place assigned him his right rested at the base of Big
Round Top, Taking a hasty survey of the country around
him, he saw no cavalry occupying the countr>^ south of that
bold mountain and wondered at its absence, and then queried
if the Union soldiers occupied that great natural fortifica¬
tion ; but as none were visible he decided to send a scouting
party up its steep side to discover, if possible, the location
and strength of the Union force there, if any. In a short time
one of them returned to him with the information that they
had ascended to the summit and found that it was not held
by the Federals. Uaw made haste to communicate this im¬
portant information to Hood, who speedily sent it to Uong-
street. As no attention was paid to it, Uaw again called
Hood's attention to the fact, and added thati he (Uaw) had
captured some Union soldiers, who claimed to be going to
the rear in the direction of Emmittsburg on surgeons' cer¬
tificates. Uaw questioned them as to the position of the
reserve hospital and reserve artillery, which they located, and
said a road east of Round Top led there. Again Uongstreet
was urged to move farthér to the right and at least occup\'
Big Round Top, but he sent word to Hood that Uee's
orders were positive to make an attack where he (Uong¬
street) had posted the two divisions, and that they must be
obeyed.
On the receipt of that order from Uongstreet, Hood
directed his division to prepare for action and directed his
artillery to open on the Union left at the Devil's Den and
to the right of it. The cannonading did not continue long
before Hood was wounded in the arm, when Uaw succeeded
to the command of the division. Uaw commanded an Ala¬
bama brigade, composed of the 4th, 15th, 44th, 47th, and
49th Alabama. Colonel Sheffield, of the latter regiment,
assumed command of the brigade when Uaw was assigned
to the division. On the left of the Alabama Brigade was
Robertson's Texas Brigade. This line was supported by
the Georgia Brigades, commanded by Benning and G. T.
Anderson. McUaws' line on the left was formed with Ker-
502
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
shaw on the left of Robertson, and Barksdale on Kershaw's
left, supported by Seinmes and Woiford. Thus the Con¬
federate line was prepared to advance on Sickles, who was
awaiting the assault. Each division had four batteries.
Eaw says he had twenty guns in action. If this is true, it
is fair to presume that McLaws had twenty, and thus Long-
street opened' the battle on the afternoon of the 2d with at
least forty guns.
Law advanced up the Valley of Death, through which
Plum Run flows, with his brigade on the right, which, instead
of following in the valley, veered to the right to avoid the
heavy and well-aimed fire of Smith's battery, stationed on
the rocks of Devil's Den. An interval was thus left between
that brigade and the right of Robertson's Texas Brigade.
Benning's brigade was ordered forward to fill the interval.
At the same time Anderson's brigade was directed to move
to the left of Robertson, and Law hurled his whole division
on the left of Birney's division with great force.
Captain Smith had posted four of his guns at Devil's
Den while he left the other section 150 yards in the rear.
The 4th Maine supported his battery. General Hunt,
chief of artillery, had just ridden along inspecting espe-.
cially the position of batteries. As he passed Smith, and
saw his cannon on that advanced position, he remarked that
the guns were well posted, but would be difficult to remove
in case the enemy forced back our infantry. Smith knew
it was a desperate fight, and worked his guns with great
efiect.
Winslow's battery, on the right of Ward's brigade,
opened at the same time, but these batteries were unable to
check the advancing line of battle under Law. When
it reached within 200 yards of Ward, he opened fire, which
checked the enemy's advance long enough for Ward's
men to reload. Ward ordered a second volley as soon as
the guns were reloaded. This produced considerable dis¬
order and confusion for a time in the ranks of Law's divi¬
sion, and gave Ward a chance to advance his right and
GETTYSBURG.
503
center about i6o rods to the front, and occupy a stone wall
which the enemy was endeavoring to secure.
Our troops on the left being compelled to give ground,
Ward sent to Birney for assistance. The 40th New York,
from de Trobriand, was sent to him, and directed to the left
of Smith's battery, where, under Colonel Egan, it fought
most valiantly. Ward had been driven back several times,
and as many times had he forced the enemy to retreat.
De Trobriand was holding his own with two regiments, the
5th Michigan, and the iioth Pennsylvania. He had reën-
forced the skirmish line at the peach orchard with the 3d
Michigan, under Colonel Pierce, while the 17th Maine and
40th New York had gone to Ward's assistance. De Tro¬
briand had a ravine in his front in a heavy forest, across
which the enemy was unable to advance under the severe
fire from those two regiments.
The 5th Michigan suffered severely, losing more than
half its members. Had de Trobriand been reënforced then,
it is quite evident he could have turned Daw's left, which
would have endangered McLaws' right ; but troops not
arriving in time, and the enemy advancing on his left and
right, he fell back to avoid being surrounded.
In the council of war, held about three o'clock, Meade
directed Sykes to Little Round Top with the Fifth Corps.
Longstreet began his attack while it was in session, and
Sickles merely reported and immediately returned to the
front. When Sykes arrived at the base of Little Round
Top, he had been preceded by Warren, for the council had
been speedily closed, and the generals prepared for action.
When Warren arrived on the summit of Little Round
Top the soldiers of the signal station were rolling up their
flags to retire, as the enemy under Law were pressing so
closely that their lives were already in great danger, and it
was always understood that the signal stations were not to be
exposed to the enemy's fire. Warren directed them to
unfurl their flags and continue their work of signaling with
Meade's headquarters. Seeing Vincent's brigade, of Barnes'
504 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
division, of the Fifth Corps, approaching. Warren rode up
to Sykes and Barnes, and requested that Vincent be moved
on Little Round Top, and hold it, as the Alabama Biigade
was hurrying up its side from the direction of Plum Run
to take possession of the summit. Vincent's men seized
two guns of Hazlett's battery and dragged them to the crest,
where they were placed in position to bear on Law near the
Devil's Den. Sykes hurried forward, and seeing Smith's
battery at the Devil's Den was in peril he (Sykes) galloped
to Birney and explained to him the necessity of protecting
Smith's guns, as they swept "the Valley of Death," from
which the enemy was approaching and endeavoring to
take the Round Tops. Sykes said to Birney: "Your
troops are nearest at hand ; close to the left in the rear
of Devil's Den, and I will fill the gap made on your
right with the brigades of Sweitzer and Tilton of Barnes'
division. ' ' Sweitzer moved to the position assigned to him
with the ózd Pennsylvania on the left, 4th Michigan in the
center, and the 32d Massachusetts on the right. His other
regiment, the 9th Massachusetts, was on picket duty. Tilton
arriving, deployed his brigade to the right of Sweitzer, with
the 22d Massachusetts on Sweitzer's right, the ist Michigan
in the center, supported on its right by the 118th Pennsyl¬
vania, with its right refused back at a right angle. The
18th Massachusetts was posted in rear of the center as a
reserve.
The enemy attacked Tilton's whole front and the
32d Massachusetts. Sweitzer's left and center not being
pressed, he directed the ózd Pennsylvania and 4th Michi¬
gan to form lines in the rear of the 32d Massachusetts to
aid it and Tilton. In the mean time the enemy was moving
around Tilton's right flank, beyond the 118th Pennsylva¬
nia; consequently Tilton retired about 300 yards to the
right and rear. Sweitzer, on his left, at the same time fell
back.
Caldwell's division of the Second Corps having been
ordered to that part of the line, the First Brigade, under
GETTYSBURG.
505
Colonel Cross, was directed by Caldwell to advance through
the wheat field, the Second Brigade, under command of
Col Patrick Kelly, formed on the right of the First Bri¬
gade, while General Zook, commanding the Third Brigade,
still extended Caldwell's line to the right in the direction
of the Emmittsburg road at the peach orchard. Colonel
Brooke, commanding the Fourth Brigade, was held in re¬
serve. Colonel Cross, commanding Caldwell's First Bri¬
gade, fell mortally wounded, and Colonel McKeen, of the
8 ist Pennsylvania, assumed command. The brigade having
exhausted its ammunition. Colonel Brooke was ordered to
its relief.
Cross had fought his way through the wheat field under
a very heavy fire. Zook, on the right, had driven the
enemy back, who now occupied a woods at the farther side
of the wheat field, and was partially protected, while the
Union troops, as they crossed the field, were fully exposed
to a deadly fire. Caldwell, seeing the frightful carnage of
his division, called on Barnes for assistance. Sweitzer's
brigade being then near the head of the "Valley of Death"
on the crossroad running from the Taneytown to the Em¬
mittsburg road, he was directed to assist Caldwell. Brooke
was attempting to seize the crest of a hill in front, which
Caldwell greatly coveted, hoping to stay the tide of battle
there. Caldwell rode to the left to see Ayres, whose divi¬
sion of the Fifth Corps was coming on the field. Weed's
Third Brigade was directed to Tittle Round Top, where
Vincent, of Barnes' division, had been. Ayres directed
Col. Sidney Burbank, commanding the Second Brigade,
to advance across Plum Run and connect with Sweitzer,
who had been ordered on Caldwell's left. The First Bri¬
gade of Ayres, under Colonel Day, was directed to support
the Second.
Ayres' division was known as Sykes' regulars, notwith¬
standing the fact that the Third Brigade was composed
entirely of volûnteers. Caldwell, turning to his own divi¬
sion, found that Brooke had made a most gallant charge.
506 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
and had advanced far into the woods, but was wounded.
Sergeant F. C. Jones of the 64th New York, afterwards
promoted to a captaincy for bravery on the field, says :
"Brooke went farther to the front than any other troops."
Proceeding to his right, he found Zook outflanked, and
the enemy moving rapidly around to get in his rear. That
compelled him to fall back, and of necessity carried with
him Ayres' right flank. The Confederates fought with
great desperation, while Caldwell and Ayres made a most
gallant stand. Both sides suffered fearful losses. Among
the number General Zook, a brave and capable officer, was
killed. The valley fairly ran red with blood from the
wounded and killed of both armies.
The Union forces under Ayres and Caldwell, after the
most desperate fighting and heavy losses, were compelled to
yield ground. In fact our entire line immediately in front
of Tittle Round Top was broken, the troops in rapid re¬
treat, while the enemy had reached the foot of the rocky
ridge and their columns were advancing in hot pursuit.
This was a critical juncture in the battle, and led to one of
the most brilliant and successful charges, for the number
engaged, which occurred during the battle.
Gen. Samuel W. Crawford, commanding two brigades
of the Pennsylvania Reserves, (the First and Third) attached
to the Fifth Corps, under General Sykes, had arrived on
the field and were ready for the emergency. These troops
had been rested and refreshed, after a long, forced march,
and were prepared to use their greatest effort iñ assisting to
drive the invaders from their native State.
Company K, of Colonel Talley's regiment, was from
Gettysburg, and, from the summit of Round Top, in sight
of their homes. This celebrated company had been re¬
cruited and taken to the front by its distinguished captain,
Hon. Edward McPherson.
GETTYSBbRG.
507
CHARGE OF THE FIRST BRIGADE, WRITTEN BY A PARTICIPANT.
The charge of the First Brigade of Pennsylvania Reserves at
Little Round Top is celebrated in history and in song. Its achieve¬
ment is one of the leading topics in the discussion of the battle of
Gettysburg.
*******
The fact that the commands of Ayres and Caldwell gave way
does not detract from the skill of the officers nor the valor of their
men. No more determined effort was ever made in the defense of a
cause or of a country than that by the Union soldiers on the second
day to hold Little Round Top. Nor does the fact that a brigade of
fresh, determined Pennsylvanians dashed down the mountain side
like an avalanche, and swept the advancing rebels before them
in confusion, prove that the latter were not terribly brave. Both
of the contending forces were nearly exhausted, their ranks
thinned, and their ammunition, in some cases, expended. It had
been a charge and countercharge—an alternate advance and re¬
treat. Along the entire line the fighting was, at times, terrific ;
there was no less bravery displayed on the right and center of the
line of battle. But I am speaking of our left and the enem3-'s
right.
From the dawn of the second day the only well-grounded hope
oí success entertained by Lee was to break the left center and get
possession of Little Round Top. The Pickett charge was but a for¬
lorn hope. It was made by a large number of troops, and was an
exhibition of wonderful desperation and a wanton recklessness. It
was the last spasmodic struggle in death, nothing more.
When the advancing enemy came in range with Hancock's
guns, that gallant_officer opened a discharge of shell and canister,
making havoc through their masses. Yet they advanced to within
a short distance of the guns, driving away the gunners at the point
of the bayonet. Just as the hordes were sure of success, two reserve
batteries that had been placed in position by General Warren, of
Meade's staff, opened a murderous, enfilading fire, and swept them
from the hill ; at the same time a portion of the infantry of the
Second Corps sent volleys of musketry into the fleeing foe, recap¬
tured our guns and immediately opened them on the enemy's
lines. Great was the carnage, and yet Lee would not abandon
his effort. More men must be slain in the effort. When
Sickles' corps had cleared the front of the Fifth Corps, Sykes
ordered a countercharge upon the again advancing enemy. His
division of Regulars led the charge and drove him back upon the
center. But on the left the enemy outflanked the Regulars, and in
508
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
turn drove them back up the hill in hot pursuit. It now looked as
though our little Gibraltar would be taken by storm. ^This was the
opportune moment for the regiments of the First Brigade to do
their work. The brigade was commanded by Col. William McCand-
less, and consisted of the following five regiments : ist, commanded
by Col. William Cooper Talley ; 2d, by Lieut. Col. George W. Wood¬
ward ; 6th, Col. Wellington H. Ent ; nth. Col. Samuel M. Jackson,
and the 13th, or Bucktails, by Col. Charles Frederick Taylor. These
troops had arrived on the field from a long forced march a sufficient
length of time to recuperate, and were ready and anxious to defend
their native State. General Meade commanded, in a voice clearly
heard and fully understood ; " Bring up the Pennsylvania Keserves,
double-quick." Whereupon General Crawford ordered Colonel Mc-
Candless to move the First Brigade, which was near at hand, in
line, ready for an emergency. Colonel McCandless accordingly ex¬
ecuted the order as quickly as it was given. The regiments went
into position under almost a full run, halted suddenly, fronted,
aligned at one glance, aimed accurately and delivered two death-
dealing volleys into the advancing foe, who were struggling to
reach the crest, and then, with a shout and a.j^ell that rang along
thehillsides and through the "Valley of Death," with fixed bayonets,
charged down the rugged declivit\', crossed the open marshy space
in front, cleared the rocky face of the slope beyond and halted not
until they reached the stone wall bordering the skirt of the woods,
where the enemy made a last desperate rally. In that charge there
was a 3^oung officer by the name of John Taylor, in command of the
color company of the 2d Regiment, who distinguished himself by
charging over the stone wall and planting the colors of his regiment
some 30 feet be3'ond it, but the fire from the enemy was too deadl3',
and he was compelled to fall back behind it. After the battle he
served on the staff of Colonel McCandless. Since the war he has
been Quartermaster General of the Grand Army of the Republic.
The Confederates were driven in confusion and dismay. They
were never again allowed to recross the historic "stone wall." The
ke3- to the situation was securely held by the First Brigade. This
wàll, though poorly constructed, became a breastwork for " the five
regiments of Reserves." No concentration of the enemy's forces
did or could dislodge them. Any who approached sufficiently near
received death from behind the wall. Thus ended the first charge
of the First Brigade of Pennsylvania Reserves in the second
day's battle of Gettysburg.
General Meade, in his official report, speaking of the great
conflict on the left of our line, says : "Notwithstanding the stub¬
born resistance of the Third Corps, under Major General Birne3'
GEN. J. H. KIDD
GETTYSBURG.
50»
(Major General Sickles having been wounded early in the action)^
the superiority of numbers of the enemy enabling him to outflank
the corps in its advanced position, General Birney was compelled ta
fall back and reform behind the line originally designed to be held."
In the mean time, perceiving the great exertions of the enemy,
the Sixth Corps and part of the First Corps, with detachments from
the Second Corps, succeeded, with the gallant resistance of the Fifth
Corps, in checking, and finally repulsing, the assault of the enemy,
who, about sunset, retired in confusion and disorder, and ceased any
further efforts on our extreme left.
General Crawford, in his report of the battle of Little Round
Top, says : " Our troops in front, after a determined resistance, un¬
able to withstand the force of the enemy, fell back, and some finally
gave way. The plain to my front was covered with fugitives from
all divisions, who rushed through my lines and along the road to
the rear. Fragments of regiments came back in disorder, and with¬
out their arms, and for a moment all seemed lost. The enemy's
skirmishers had reached the front of the rocky ridge ; his columns
were following rapidly. My command (Pennsylvania Reserves) was
formed in two lines, the second massed on the first. The 6th Regi¬
ment, Lieutenant Colonel Ent, on the right ; the ist Regiment, Col¬
onel Talley, on the left, and the i ith Regiment, Colonel Jackson, in
the center. The second line consisted of the ist .Rifles (Bucktails),
Colonel Taylor, and the 2d, Lieutenant Colonel Woodward. Colonel
McCandless commanded the whole.
" Not a moment was to be lost. Uncovering our front, I ordered
an immediate advance. The brigade advanced gallantly with loud
cheers. Two well-directed volleys were delivered upon the advancing
masses of the enemy, when the whole column charged at a run
down the slope, driving the enemy back across the space beyond,
and across the stone wall, for the possession of which there was a
short but determined struggle. The enemy retired to the wheat field
and the woods. * * * * As night was approaching and m}-
flanks were unprotected, I directed Colonel McCandless to hold the
line of the stone wall and the woods on the right. Heavy lines of
skirmishers were thrown cut, and the ground firmly and permanently
held. ' '
Colonel McCandless, in his ofiicial report of the Little Round
Top charge, says :
' ' Our first position was naturally strong, being a rocky, woody
hillside, with good cover, sloping steeply down to a plain, which ex¬
tended from the .base about seven hundred yards to a stone wall.
This plain was marshy and difficult to cross ; over it, however,
the enemy passed his infantry in a disordered mass, driving our
510
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
forces back on my position. I immediately formed my brigade in
two lines, the first line being composed of the 6th Regiment, Lieu¬
tenant Colonel Ent, on the right ; the ist. Colonel Talley, on the
left, and the nth. Colonel Jackson, in the center. The second line
was massed on the first, and was composed of the ivSt Rifles (Buck-
tails), Colonel Taylor, and 2d Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Wood¬
ward. As soon as our front was uncovered the brigade advanced in
gallant style, the first line delivering a volley ; then the whole
brigade charged at a full run down the hillside and across the plain,
driving the advancing masses of the enemy back upon the stone
wall, for the possession of which there was a desperate struggle, we
finally carrying it. Prior to reaching the wall, however, my left
flank being exposed to a galling fire, I deployed the second line to
the left, forming a prolongation of my first line, along with which
they steadily advanced. It was at this time, and when within a
short distance of the wall, that the brave and lamented Col. Charles
F. Taylor fell while gallantly leading his regiment. Being ordered
not to advance beyond the stone wall, I formed a line along it, threw
a strong line of skirmishers on my front and flankers on my right
and left. I remained in this position up to six p. m. of the 3d instant,
the enemy shelling the position without effect."
The testimony of all the living officers and men who took part
could be given, corroborative of the importance, brilliancy and suc¬
cess of "The charge of the First Brigade at Little Round Top."
While the Union forces had been compelled to yield
ground under Ayres and Caldwell, yet Uaw saw that he
could not get possession of Little Round Top by following
these two generals, as he would have to advance over an
open space where he would be exposed to a fire that would
greatly deplete his ranks before he could arrive where
Ayres and Caldwell were posted, who would then in turn
charge him back over the wheat field, and perhaps break
his weakened lines. Before the action began, he wanted
to take possession of Big Round Top, but was compelled
to follow up the "Valley of Death" according to Lee's
orders. He then thought he saw a chance to drive our
troops from Little Round Top by sending a force up the
secluded depression between the Round Tops, which was
only a few rods wide and covered with woods, which would
shield his movements ; but again his efforts were foiled, for
GETTYSBURG.
511
Vincent had formed his brigade in a semicircle, with the
right of the i6th Michigan resting not far from Hazlett's
battery, the 44th New York, on its left, tracing along the
side of the mountain, the 83d Pennsylvania, on its left,
stretching down to the depression between the two moun¬
tains, and the 20th Maine, under Colonel Chamberlain,
was on the left of the brigade, and occupying a position
between the two mountains. Law attacked vigorously the
whole front of Vincent. The 44th New York and 83d
Pennsylvania repulsed several assaults ; when the i6th
Michigan on the right was attacked, a part of that regi¬
ment gave way ; but Patrick H. O' Rourke, commanding
the 140th New York, at once threw his regiment in and
saved that point.
General Weed had been mortally wounded and Lieu¬
tenant Hazlett, while stooping over him to receive what he
supposed was his last command, was shot and died with his
arms around him. As O'Rourke charged Vincent was
mortally wounded, and soon Patrick O'Rourke heroically
surrendered up his life. Thus Weed, Vincent, O'Rourke,
and Hazlett lay near each other, silent in death, on Little
Round Top. The battle still waged with great ferocity
for, as yet, the enemy had not given up the hope of carry¬
ing Little Round Top, the key to the situation. Failing
in the effort to break through the right and capture Haz¬
lett's guns, and possess the summit. Law moved his troops
back and again attacked the center and the left. While the
assault on Vincent's center was made with great determina¬
tion, the left, under Chamberlain, was assailed with des¬
peration.
Vincent having fallen mortally wounded. Col. James C.
Rice, of the 44th New York, assumed command of the
brigade. Of the last attack he says :
Now occurred the most critical time of the action. For above
half an hour the struggle was desperate. At length the enemy
pressed so strongly upon the left flank of Colonel Chamberlain's
regiment that he wisely determined to change the order of battle,
512 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
and commanded his left wing to fall back at right angles to his
right. He then ordered a charge, and repulsed the enemy at every
point.
General Crawford having arrived with two brigades of
the Pennsylvania Reserves, Fisher's brigade was directed
to support Vincent's brigade on Round Top and was posted
in the rear. At dusk Colonels Rice, Chamberlain, and
Fisher held a consultation and decided that it would be un¬
wise to permit the enemy to hold the crest of Big Round
Top, as it would be fortified during the night and would
compel Little Round Top to be evacuated in the morning
if artillery were posted on it. It was therefore decided tfiat
Fisher with two of his regiments and Chamberlain with his
regiment should charge up the mountain at once and dislodge
Law's force there. Accordingly these two officers, with the
2oth Maine and 5th and 12th Pennsylvania Reserves,
ascended the mountain and drove the enemy before them,
capturing some thirty prisoners, including one of General
Law's staff. Chamberlain in the darkness was unable tO'
tell whether he was near a heavy body of the enemy or not,
and sent back for the 83d Pennsylvania and 44th New York.
Fisher had moved to the right of Chamberlain and occupied
a position on the side of Big Round. Top, but in the night
sent two regiments to Chamberlain's left. Thus ended the
conflict on the Round Tops, leaving both in possession
of the Union troops, but which had cost so many precious
lives.
Graham, who held the right of Birney's line* at the
peach orchard, was exposed to a fire from two directions.
Although he had been heavily reënforced, his position was
one of great peril.
The 141st Pennsylvania was advanced to the road lead¬
ing from Little Round Top to the Emmittsburg road, with
the 2d New Hampshire on its right, occupying the salient
with its right wing on the Emmittsburg road, the 68th
Pennsylvania prolonging the line of the right wing of the
2d New Hampshire on the Emmittsburg road. When Ker-
GETTYSB URG.
513
shaw advanced, the 3d Michigan, 3d Maine, 2d New Hamp¬
shire, and 63d Pennsylvania moved forward to the south side
of the peach orchard, and checked his advance, but when
Barksdale's movement, from the west, threatened their
rear, they fell back to the road leading to Little Round
Top from the Emniittsburg road. Thus Hood, with Ker¬
shaw, and Semmes' divisions from the south, and Barksdale
and Wofford's from the west, were attacking Sickles'
salient at the peach orchard, and melting it away ; Long-
street had directed his batteries to follow closely the infan¬
try and take a position to enfilade Humphreys' front, along
the Emmittsburg road, which was receiving a galling fire
from Barksdale. When the salient gave way the enemy
was rapidly gaining Çarr's rear, who held, the right of
Humphreys' line. In order to meet this new move he
threw back his left with his right, still holding on to the
Emmittsburg road. The struggle had been one to the
death. Semmes and Wofford had pressed forward and had
greatly aided Kershaw and Barksdale. Graham had been
wounded, and was a prisoner, the impetuous Barksdale had
fallen mortally wounded, but on pressed the Confederate
forces. The losses on both sides were appalling ; it was a
death grapple ; men fell like the leaves before an autumn
wind.
General Patterson, then a captain in the 2d New
Hampshire, said, that his regiment had 21 out of 23 officers
wounded or killed. Scarcely had this taken place when
Carr's right fiank was endangered from Anderson, who
sought to occupy the interval between the right of the
Third Corps and the left of the Second. Hancock had
ordered two regiments forward to protect Humphreys'
right, but they were not strong enough to prevent or im¬
pede Anderson's advance, and Carr retired his right before
Willard's brigade of Hay's division could arrive.
R. H. Anderson, of Hill's corps, who was on the left of
McLaws' was ordered to aid McLaws' attack as the battle
rolled from Hood's right, around toward the seminary.
XXXIII
514 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Anderson had formed his line connecting with McLaws'
left in the following order, Wilcox, Perry, Wright, and
Posey. When Barksdale, holding McLaws' left, advanced,
Wilcox, on Anderson's right, received orders to move.
Perry, and Wright received the same order, and all three
brigades advanced on Humphreys ; Carr receiving the
weight of these three brigades retired his right to a point
on a line with his left, which he had thrown back when the
salient at the peach orchard gave way.
Wilcox kept steadily to the front while Perry halted his
brigade at the Bmmittsburg road. Wright on his left,
like Wilcox, pushed ahead and attacked the new line of
battle. Doubleday says, "Wright pierced our line of battle
more eflfectually than Lee did with, Pickett the following
day." But Anderson did not support Wilcox and Wright
with Posey and Mahone, nor did he order Perry forward
when he halted at the Emmittsburg road.
Wilcox and Wright made a most gallant charge, and if
they had been supported. Lee's chance to break the Union
line at that point would have been far better than on the
following day, when he ordered the Pickett charge with¬
out any probability of success, although it has passed into
history with great celebrity and fame. Three of Ander¬
son's brigades. Perry, Posey, and Mahone, were not pressed
in at the opportune moment ; the divisions of Heth and
Pender rendered very feeble assistance. But the last-men¬
tioned two divisions had fought the First Corps the day
before, and were in no condition to make an assault.
Sickles receiving a severe wound near the Trostle House,
could no longer command.
When Sickles fell it was considered advisable to remove
him from the field at once for fear it might have a demora¬
lizing effect on the men, therefore Capt. M. J. Foote, of
the 70th New York, Sickles' old regimerit, made a detail
of a sergeant and six men to take him back to a place of
safety. Meade, learning of Sickles' fate, left his headqnar-
ters hastily, and galloped to where the battle was raging
GEN. JOHN NEWTON.
GETTYSBURG.
Ö15
with great fury, and at once placed Hancock in com¬
mand.
The condition of affairs is well portrayed in the follow¬
ing extract from Hancock's report ; he says :
I directed General Humphreys to form his command on the
ground from which General Caldwell had moved to the support of
the Third Corps, which was promptly done. The number of his
troops collected was, however, very small, scarcely equal to an ordi¬
nary battalion, but with many colors ; this small command being
composed of the fragments of many shattered regiments. Three
guns of one of its batteries had been left on the field, owing to the
losses of horses and men. I established Colonel Willard's brigade
at the point through which General Birney's division had retired,
and fronting the approach of the enemy, who were pressing vigor¬
ously on. There were no other troops on the right or left, and the
brigade soon became engaged, losing its commander. Colonel Wil-
lard, and many officers and men.
Hancock had sent a staff officer to Meade for reënforce-
ments, as it seemed Longstreet was determined to break the
line of battle on our left, and take possession of the Round
Tops. Newton, who had been placed in command of the
First Corps the evening before,' directed Doubleday and
Robinson to report to Hancock. Their divisions had
suffered severely the day before, yet they quickly responded
to the command. Doubleday formed his division in lines
by regiments ready to charge. The left wing of the 13th
Vermont was supporting a battery. At the head of the
division was the right of that regiment, under the com¬
mand of Colonel Randall. When Doubleday halted for
orders, it was observed that the enemy had captured one of
our regular batteries. Colonel Randall rode up to Han¬
cock and requested permission to charge and retake it.
Hancock said: "There it is, retake it if you desire to."
In a moment the Vermont boys were charging on that
point of the Confederate line retreating with the battery.
They not only rbtook four of our guns, but captured two
from the enemy.
516
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
In rear of the new line formed by Hancock, General
Hunt posted several fresh batterieí» from the reserve artil¬
lery, which greatly aided in repulsing the advance of the
enemy. The interval between the right of the Third Corps
and the left of the Second was penetrated by the enemy,
when Meade in person led two regiments of Tockwood's
brigade and drove him back. A heavy force of the enemy
had appeared under cover of some undergrowth, which
Hancock discovering, directed the ist Minnesota to charge
it. The order was obeyed in most gallant style, routing
the enemy and capturing a stand of colors.
So desperate was the conflict that Meade ordered Wil¬
liams and Geary's divisions, of the Twelfth Corps, except
Greene's brigade, to reënforce Sickles ; these troops, how¬
ever, did not arrive until the battle was lulling.
A. P. Hill, who held the center of Lee's army, did not
vigorously advance against our troops on the left of Long-
street, or else he might have pierced our lines at Ziegler's
grove, as Hancock had stripped that part of the line to save
Sickles. Hill's right division, under Anderson, had aided
McLaws in his attack on Humphreys. As the two ex¬
hausted lines of battle watched each other, the shades of
night began to settle down, and the conflict on that part of
the field ceased. The troops of the Twelfth Corps were
directed to return to their former position on Culp's Hill.
It was Lee's intention to have Hill and Ewell attack when
they heard* Longstreet's guns ; but his orders were only
provisional, not peremptory. Johnson, who lay along
Rock Creek, facing Culp's Hill, directed Major Latimer to
begin cannonading about four o'clock, but his infantry did
not advance until" later. Wads worth and Greene were
alone defending Culp's Hill. Greene seeing great danger
of having his right flank turned, deployed farther in the
direction of the Baltimore pike to prevent it. Although
his. line was strengthened with the 14th Brooklyn, 6th
Wisconsin, and 147th New York, from the First Corps,
and the Sad Illinois, 45th New York, and 6ist Ohio, from
GETTYSB URG.
517
the Eleventh Corps, yet Greene was compelled to yield
ground on the right, when the Confederates took posses¬
sion of the temporary works which had been evacuated by
Ruger and Geary to go to the rescue of Sickles.
The 6th Wisconsin arrived about eight p. m,, while the
enemy was making a desperate attempt to drive the io2d
New York from behind the temporary breastworks it occu¬
pied. That regiment held the center of Greene's brigade,
and had the line been broken there the Union reserve artil¬
lery and supply train would have been in danger of capture,
and our center pierced. When Colonel Dawes arrived with
the 6th Wisconsin, Colonel, then Captain Stegman, in
command of the load New York, requested him to support
his right wing, as that was heavily pressed. The timely
aid given by the " Badgers" has been often acknowledged
by that grand soldier, Eewis R. Stegman, who, to me, has
frequently praised the 6th Wisconsin for coming up at a
time when he most needed help to hold his position. Shortly
afterwards the 45th New York arrived and supported the
left wing of the load New York. It was said by an officer
that the Confederate dead were so thick in front of these
three regiments that the enemy could have made breast¬
works of them. The work done that night on Culp's Hill
saved the position of Meade's army.
Ruger rapidly marched to the position where Sickles
was fighting. Geary being ordered to follow him (Ruger),
withdrew from his position and moved to the Baltimore
pike, but, being unable to tell what direction Ruger had
taken, did not move any farther. Almost as soon as the
battle had ceased in front of Sickles, Ruger and Geary
were ordered to move back to their former positions.
When Colgrovc's brigade of Ruger's division arrived at
Spangler's Spring the head of his column was right among
the Confederates, developing the fact that the enemy
held the position so recently evacuated by Ruger and
Geary. Unable to make a successful attack in the night
Ruger retired to McCallister's Hill, with McDougall's left
518
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
resting near the Baltimore pike, while Cplgrove's right
rested on Rock Creek. Geary, advancing from the Balti¬
more pike, was met by a volley from the enemy occupying
his intrenchments ; he therefore placed his two brigades on
a crest, thus preventing Johnston's force from advancing to
the Baltimore pike, and reported to Generals Slocum and
Williams the situation of affairs on the right "of the Union
army on the night of the 2d of July.
At the same time Early made an attack on Cemetery
Hill with the brigades of Hays and Avery, supported by
Gordon ; but the latter did not advance far enough to par¬
ticipate. Early saw the movement was going to fail, as
he was not being supported on his right by Rodes as he
expected. Hays and Avery had received their orders
to attack Cemetery Hill, and they boldly advanced to their
work about seven o'clock. Hays, on the right, struck Von
Gilsa at a stone wall at the base of the hill, while Avery
attacked Ames' brigade. After a stubborn fight these two
brigades of the Eleventh Corps were forced up the hill
through Wiedrich's and Ricketts' batteries.
Stewart's, Reynolds', and Stevens' batteries, which had
been cut up on the first day, were then brought into action.
Stevens' battery had an enfilading fire on Avery and greatly
retarded his progress, but Hays, on the right, gained the
crest of the hill and captured Wiedrich's battery and two
guns of Ricketts'. The cannoneers fought with great
bravery, using their rammers on the enemy ; a desperate
hand-to-hand conflict took place over the guns. One Con¬
federate was killed with a stone by a gunner. The 33d
Massachusetts poured in an oblique fire which was very
destructive. Hancock sent Carroll's brigade to the point
when the fighting was going on over thQ guns, for the
soldiers of these two batteries had decided to die there rather
than surrender their pieces. Carroll's brigade made a
charole and drove the Confederates down the hill, which
o /
virtually ended the conflict for the second day, for Early
retreated back to his former position, while Rodes, who had
COL. R. BRUCE RICKETTS.
GETTYSBURG.
519
advanced through Gettysburg and was then close up iu line
of battle, did not make au attack.
The night of the 2d was spent on the Round Tops
by the Union soldiers in building breastworks of loose
stones that thickly covered both. Uongstreet's troops were
close in front of Big Round Top engaged in the same work.
A soldier said when they were placing rocks in position he
could distinctly hear the enemy building his line of works
in anticipation of the renewal of the battle next day.
Ewell, seeing that Johnson had occupied the position of
Geary and Riiger, knew he would be attacked early in the
morning; he therefore sent Daniel's, O'Neal's, and Smith's
brigades to him. Walker, who had halted the evening be¬
fore to oppose a force on his right, moved his brigade up
and joined Johnson's division; so on the morning of the
3d Johnson had six brigades with which to withstand the
attack of Ruger and Geary, who had only four brigades
of old troops ; Dock wood's small brigade had arrived from
Baltimore, but it had never been seasoned in battle.
The enemy held a stone wall that rendered an attack by
Geary from the pike decidedly hazardous. At one a.m.,
after the consultation of Slocum, Williams, and Geary, the
latter took position, with Kane on the left and Candy on
the right, in double line of battle along a narrow lane
which ran from the Baltimore pike to the stone wall.
Geary formed his line of battle with great secrecy within a
few rods of the enemy.
Lieut. E. D. Muhlenberg, chief of artillery of the
Twelfth Corps, was directed to place fourteen pieces in josi-
tion about five hundred yards west of the pike, while
Knapp's battery was posted at the headquarters of Slocum.
Lockwood's brigade was directed to support Muhlenberg's
artillery. Just as day was breaking the artillery opened on
the Confederates and continued about a quarter of an hour ;
then Geary charged with Kane's and Candy's brigades. At
first the enemy wavered, but soon advanced in three lines
of battle, which was received with deadly fire from Greene
520 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
and Kane. Again Muhlenberg's artillery was ordered to
open, Geary personally superintending it. Muhlenberg's
guns prevented the enemy from turning Ruger's left and
separating the divisions of Geary and Ruger. When the
artillery ceased' the 147th Pennsylvania charged and drove
the Confederates from the stone wall. Then the 5th Ohio,
on Candy's left, received an enfilading fire, but held its
ground. The 66th Ohio was ordered in perpendicular to
Greene's position in order to enfilade the enemy. Greene's
men being out of ammunition, the 28th Pennsylvania, 29th
and 7th Ohio were ordered into the intrenchments to their
relief. Lockwood's brigade then came to Geary's assist¬
ance and was posted in the rear of Greene's position and
relieved the regiments that were out of ammunition.
About eight o'clock Johnson renewed the attack with
great determination, when Slocum called for assistance.
The 14th Brooklyn and the 147th New York of the First
Corps, and Shaler's brigade of the Sixth were ordered to
assist Geary.
Ruger, in order to maintain a connection with Geary's
right, ordered the 20th Connecticut, of McDougall's bri¬
gade, to occupy the edge of the woods across the swale from
the Baltimore pike, while the 107th New York, of Col-
grove's brigade, was placed in reserve to the 20th Connec¬
ticut between the pike and the swale to the left of McDou-
gall. Colgrove occupied a position on McAllister's Hill,
between McDougall's right and Rock Creek, with the 3d
Wisconsin on the left, then the 2d Massachusetts on its
right, the 27th Indiana, with the 13th New Jersey, under
Colonel Carman, on the extreme right facing Rock Creek.
The 20th Connecticut had been hotly engaged from early
in the morning. About eight o'clock Colgrove charged
across the swale, made by the water from Spangler's Spring,
which made its way to Rock Creek on Colgrove's right,
with the 2d Massachusetts and 27th Indiana. The point of
attack by Colgrove was the Confederate position at Span¬
gler's Spring which was surrounded by a forest, in which
GETTYSBURG. 521
Johnson's men were well posted, and protected by the
forest and temporary breastworks. When Colgrove crossed
the marsh, which was an open space, he was met with a
deadly fire from the enemy, whom he was unable to harm
or dislodge. Beigg compelled to fall back upon McAllis¬
ter's Hill, from which position he had moved, the Confed¬
erates charged his retiring regiments, but at the proper time,
when they had gained the open space, Colgrove about-faced
his command, and suddenly delivered such a deadly volley
into their ranks that they hastily retired back to their
position. McDougall's right did not advance with Col¬
grove, but the 123d New York, on his left, moved up on
the right of the 20th Connecticut, which, with Geary's
right, drove the enemy from the stone wall along the lane
leading to the pike. That position being carried, fully dis¬
sipated Johnson's hopes of seizing the Baltimore pike in
the rear of Meade's headquarters, and endangering the sup¬
ply trains at Powers' Hill.
About half past ten, Johnson, with two brigades, made
another attempt to turn Geary's right, but were - met
and repulsed by Kane. Then Geary charged and retook
his works, taking many prisoners. Johnson, who had been
anxiously waiting to hear the guns of Longstreet and Hill
open along their part of the line, had waited in vain, and
after several hours of desperate fighting, fell back too much
exhausted to renew the confiict, but still clung to the base
of Gulp's Hill. That ended the battle on that part of the
field. Though Johnson had been disappointed at the inaction
of Hill and Tongstreet, yet they had not been idle. Lee
had visited that part of the line, and made a careful inspec¬
tion of it in company with Longstreet, who again urged the
propriety of moving around Big Round Top, instead of
again- attacking in front. Lee asked Wofford if he could
not break the Union line again. But he said no, that the
enemy had had time to strengthen his position, and that it
could not be done. Woftord held the same opinion that
Law and Longstreet did, but notwithstanding all the
522 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
evidence and arguments of the generals on the right, Lee
decided to repeat the operations of the day before, and gave
orders for the artillery to be put in position, preparatory to
the final assault.
On the third day it would have beey more difficult to
execute a flank movement around Big Round Top than
on the 2d, for Kilpatrick had arrived there with Mer-
ritt's and Farnsworth's brigades, and taken a position
south of Big Round Top to prevent that move, and, if pos¬
sible, turn Longstreet's right and capture the supply trains
of the Confederate army. It was a little late in the battle
to make that move. Besides, the Sixth Corps had been
well posted to support Kilpatrick's cavalry. Grant's Ver¬
mont brigade, which was the extreme left of the Union
army, was so far out in the direction of Emmittsburg
that Eongstreet would have encountered him. If it had
been attempted. Lee's army would have been in dan¬
ger of being attacked and broken up, for Bwell was in
a bad position to have been left without a support on
his right. Gregg's division of cavalry was in his rear,
and if he had attempted to retire, Slocum's infantry on
Culp's Hill, v<^ith Gregg on his flank, could have dealt
him a severe blow before he reached Seminary Ridge, while
in all probability Robinson's division of the First and
Eleventh Corps could have intervened between him and
Lee's retiring columns, and compelled him (Ewell) to retreat
in the direction of Cashtown. With a divided army Lee
would have been in no condition to have dictated to Meade
where the battle should be fought to à finish and leave one
or the other victorious.
Every moment Lee remained in front of Meade sur¬
rounded him with new difficulties, which he was unable to
surmount, and, being blinded to the situation, was" fully
resolved to hurl his army on Meade and strike the fatal
blow.
While Johnson was attempting to hold his position on
Culp's Hill Colonel Alexander placed the six reserve bat-
GETTYSBURG.
523
teries of Longstreet's corps along the Emmittsburg road.
Soon Colonel Walton, Longstreet's chief of artillery, posted
the rest of the batteries, reaching from the peach orchard to
the Codori House, thus occupying the position which Hum¬
phreys had occupied the day before. Major Henry's four
batteries were posted on the right of the orchard in order to
have a cross fire. Hearing's artillery was posted where
Pickett was to make his charge, with the Washington Artil¬
lery on his right and Cabell's battalion on his left.
The Comte de Paris estimates that Longstreet had 75
and Hill 63 cannon in that action. General Hunt, chief of
artillery of the Army of the Potomac, made a careful in¬
spection just before the fury of these war dogs began, and
estimated them at 100 to 120 ; and then says ; "To oppose
these we could not, frorn our restricted position, bring more
than 80 to reply effectively. ' '
General Hunt knew very well that the oppressive silence
from eleven to one "was only the calm before the storm,"
and accordingly he arranged his artillery to meet the im¬
pending conflict. He directed Colonel Wainwright, in com¬
mand of the artillery of the First Corps, to post it outside
of the cemetery gate, and north of the Baltimore pike, in
the following ord.er from right to left : Stevens, Reynolds,
Ricketts, Wiedrich and Stewart. Major Osborn, chief of
artillery of the Eleventh Corps, was ordered to place Dilger
on Stewart's left, then Bancroft,. Eskin, Wheeler, Hill and
Taft. Then of the Second Corps came Woodruff, Arnold,
Cushing, Brown, and Rorty, under command of Captain
Hazard. Next Thomas, with Major McGilvery's command,
consisting of Thompsoii, Phillips, Hart, Sterling, Rank,
Dow, and Ames, and Cooper, of the First Corps, with Rit-
tenhouse and Gibbs on Little Round Top. Rittenhouse was
then in command of the battery that Warren hurried on Lit¬
tle Round Top the day before when Lieutenant Hazlett, its
commander, was killed while stooping over the dying form
of General Weed to receive his last order. General Hunt,
accompanied by Lieutenant Colonel Craig, his assistant
524
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
adjutant general, had just finished his tour of inspection
from the right of the line to the left on Little Round
Top, and was talking to Rittenhouse when two guns,
a minute apart, were fired by the Washington Artil¬
lery. This was the signal for Lee's batteries to open up
along the front of Longstreet and Hill. The signal had
been delayed a considerable time, Longstreet having no
faith in the success of the movement. He directed Colonel
Alexander to take a position in the edge of the woods near
Warfield's, there to observe the effect of the cannonade, and
apprise Pickett when the moment had arrived to make the
charge. But in a note to him after he (Alexander) had
arrived at the place designated, advised him not to give the
order to Pickett, unless the Union line was sufficiently dis¬
organized by the cannonade to have some show of success.
Alexander, seeing that he was being made responsible for
the whole movement, declined to assume the risk. Then
Longstreet, knowing that Lee was determined to have the
charge made, directed Colonel Walton to have the signal
guns fired, which was an order for every gun on the line
to open.
General Hunt remained on Little Round Top to observe
the effect on both armies. He had directed his center to
remain quiet, while the batteries of both wings imme¬
diately opened and continued firing. The guns in the
center soon began firing slowly.
As soon as General Hunt had decided in his mind the
nature of the attack, he went to the park artillery reserve,
and ordered all the batteries to be ready at a moment's notice
to move to the front, after which he went to report to
the commander-in-chief ; but the casualties had been so
great there that Meade, upon urgent advice, had moved
his headquarters temporarily over to Slocum's on Powers'
Hill. Hunt then proceeded along the line to see the
effects of the cannonade and to replace the disabled bat¬
teries. It was now half-past two, and, according to his
opinion, the enemy's artillery would soon cease. His own
COL. JOHN N. CRAIG.
GETTYSBURG.
525
ammunition was running low ; several caissons had been,
exploded, and he therefore considered it unsafe to bring
more up at that time. So he directed the batteries to fire
slowly, and cool their guns preparatory to rapid firing
when the charging column moved. About three o'clock
the enemy's guns ceased firing ; then Hunt, seeing where
the charge was going to be made, ordered the batteries of
Fitz Hugh, Parsons,' Weir and Lowan forward to take
position in front of the advancing enemy. He then went to
the left to McGilvery's batteries, and directed him to take
the enemy in the flank as he approached. When Pickett
arrived at the Emmittsburg road, he brushed back the Union
skirmish line, and boldly dashed forward. This brought
him within full sweep of the Union batteries from Ritten-
house, on Eittle Round Top, to the right of the Second
Corps. Rittenhouse could only use his right section on
the advancing column ; but with those two guns he cut
great gaps in Kemper's brigade, which was on the right.
When the column had advanced a little farther, Garnett,
in the center, suffered from McGilvery's batteries, as well
as Kemper. Armistead, on the left, had not kept pace
with the other two brigades. Hazard's guns were heavily
loaded, with canister, which made great havoc in the ad¬
vancing column ; but their ranks were kept closed up,
as if nothing had happened, and forward they pressed to
the stone wall, behind which was Gibbon's division of the
Second Corps. Pickett had suffered so much from this con¬
centrated fire on his division that he began to look for his
support. Eang and Wilcox, on the right, had been una¬
ble to get into position in time to render any service to
him, and his troops could not be seen. On the left Petti-
grew had put his men in motion ; but, being posted in the
rear of Pickett, he was unable to keep abreast with him.
Besides, he had a division that fought the First Corps on
the first day, and his troops were in no condition to make
a charge with Pickett's division of fresh troops, that came
leisurely up in the rear of Tee's army, having remained
626 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
idle during the battle. But Pettigrew formed his line with
Archer's brigade on the left of Armistead, then his old
brigade under Colonel Marshall, next Davis, with Brock-
enborough on the left Trimble supported this line with
Scales' brigade in rear of Archer's, while Lane on his left
supported Pettigrew. Of this line of battle. General Hays,
who commanded the division on the right of Gibbon, said
in his report :
Their march was as steady as if impelled by machinery, un¬
broken by our artillery, which played upon them a storm of missiles.
When within one hundred yards of our line of infantry the fire of
our men could no longer be restrained. Four lines rose from behind
our stone wall, and before the smoke of our first volley had cleared
away the enemy, in dismay and consternation, were seeking safety
in flight. Fvery attempt by their officers to rally them was vain.
In less time than I can recount it they were throwing away their
arms and appealing mo.st piteously for merCy. The "Angel of
Death ' ' alone can produce such a field as was presented. The divi¬
sion captured and turned into corps headquarters fifteen battle flags
or banners.
Thus, as Pickett's support on the left had been van¬
quished, and on his right had not been able to appear on
the field, it was a forlorn hope for him to hnrl his division
on Gibbon, with Doubleday's division on his left to support
and assist him, but on he pressed with a frenzy. Garnett
in the center, who, though sick, would not turn his com¬
mand over to another, was mortally wounded when only a
short distance from the stone Wall in front of Gibbon.
When Garnett fell, his brigade hesitated for a moment, which
gave Kemper time enough to come up with the center
brigade. Kemper ordered his men to open fire, which was
also obeyed by Garnett's brigade. Armistead, who had not
marched quite so fast, was then np, when Pickett ordered a
charge, as the double-shotted guns of Hazard and McGil-
very with canister were causing great havoc on Pickett's
men as they advanced in close range, while the infantry of
Gibbon and Doubleday had both united with the artillery
and were pouring in heavy volleys. The 151st Pennsyl-
GETTYSBURG.
527
vania and the Ulster Guard of New York, under Colonel
Gates, on Gibbon's immediate left, united with Gibbon's
men in the conflict. Men were firing at will, while, officers
were unable to be heard. Gibbon had ordered a charge, but
in the din of battle his voice was not heard and the men
continued to fire at will.
Three days before General Stannard's death I took his
last or dying statement with reference to the part his
brigade took in that battle. It is given in his own language
as he dictated it that night, for the reason that he emphat¬
ically said that if he did not complete it then he never
would. The next day he was brought home sick and in a
few hours he became delirious. He was very unwell the
evening before when he made it. A member of Stannard's
staff was present when he gave it :
Washington, D. C., July 26, 1891.
Dear Sir : —In compliance with your request I have the honor
to state that I was present at the bedside of General Stannard, a few
days before his death, when he related to you the details of the
movements of the three regiments of the Second Vermont Brigade
in repelling Pickett's assault upon the Union line on the third day
of the battle of Gettysburg, and the counter-charge upon Wilcox's
supporting column.
He stated with vehement earnestness that their movements
were made upon his own discretion, and that he received no orders
from any one relative thereto. I was on General Stannard's staff
while he was in command of the Second Vermont Brigade, and was
with him at Gettysburg. I have visited the battlefield with him
many times, and have heard him indignantly complain many times
that he had been robbed of his due credit by the official report of
his superior officer. Respectfully, John R. Thompson.
To J. h. Stine.
stannard's dying statement.
I was standing almost alone when Pickett's division crossed
the Emmittsburg road, coming in the direction of my front. The
i6th was immediately recalled from the skirmish line in front of me,
and placed in close column by division in my immediate rear. The
enemy apparently veering off to my-right, I directed the 13th and
14th Regiments to pour an oblique fire into their advancing columns.
The 13th changed front forward on first company ; the i6th, after
528
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
deploying, performed the same, and formed on the left of the 13th,
at right angles to the main line of our army, bringing them
in line of battle upon the flank of the charging division of the
enemy, and immediately opened a destructive flre at short range.
Unable to return the fire, many surrendered. While I was in
the act of throwing the 13th and i6th at right angles to the
regular line of battle, Hancock rode up to me and wanted to
know what I was going to do ? When I told him, he said I would
leave a gap in our line of battle for a column on the right of Pickett
to force its way into and break our line of battle. I assured him I
could resume my position in the regular line of battle before a sup¬
port to Pickett on his right could advance, as there was none in
sight. Hancock still insisted that I was making a great mistake,
but I knew I could handle my regiments with agility enough to put
them back on the line of battle before a body of troops could march
a mile, so I declined to rescind my order. He was soon wounded near
me, but he was not home from the field until he saw that my move¬
ment was a complete success, and he afterward promised me to cor¬
rect his report, in which he took the credit of giving me the order
to throw my regiments on Pickett's right flank, but he died before
he made the correction. Not only did he not give me the order, but
at the time was bitterly opposed to it, for the reason that he feared
that a column of the enemy would be able to wedge itself in there
before I could make a counter-movement, and bring my regiment
back into line. When the charge of Pickett had failed, and his men
were retreating, I was about to order the regiments back into their
former position, when I saw another rebel column charging imme¬
diately upon our left. I directed the i6th to attack its flank, while
I ordered Uieutenant Colonel Rose, of the 14th, to advance four com¬
panies on the left of the i6th, and pour in an enfilading fire, while
the six companies of the 14th checked its advance with a deadly fire
from the front. This column, which proved to be the brigades of
Lang and Wilcox, soon gave way. The i6th captured the colors of
the 2d Florida and the colors of two other regiments. That vir¬
tually ended the battle of Gettysburg.
I received no advice or suggestion from any one with reference
to these two flank movements, and, as it was vigorously opposed, I
knew if I failed to hold my position in the line of battle, and pre¬
vent its being pierced there, I would be court-martialed.
I had no fears of the result, as I could easily maneuver my
troops in face of the enemy, for I had been able to do that for tw&
days under a severe fire.
As General Hancock was speaking to Stannard, having
turned his horse to the front, he was struck by a bullet,
GEN. GEORGE J. STANNARD.
GETTYSBURG.
529
which passed through the pommel of his saddle and deep
into the upper part of his thigh, carrying with it a piece of
wood and a nail from the saddle. Seeing Hancock reel in
his saddle, Lieutenants Benedict and Hooker, who were at
Stannard's side, sprang to the wounded general, caught him
in their arms as he sank from his horse, and laid him upon
the ground. He was bleeding profusely, and fearing that
he might bleed to death before a surgeon could arrive. Gen¬
eral Stannard took his own handkerchief and, with the
assistance of Lieutenant Benedict, bound it around the
wound, twisting it tightly with a pistol barrel and stopping
the flow of blood. General Hancock lay where he fell till
the fate of Pickett's charge had been decided, and he had
sent a message to General Meade announcing the complete
repulse of the enemy. He was then lifted by General
Stannard's aids into an ambulance and taken to the rear.
New York, January 17, 1877.
Dear Sir:— * * * At the time your book, "Vermont at
Gettysburg," was published, I read it with great interest, and I haye
since had occasion to consult it with reference to matters connected
with that battle. I have especial reasons to remember yourself and
Colonel Hooker on that field, for to you both I am indebted for your
kindly aid in assisting me from my horse when I was struck and
about to fall to the ground, and that incident is, of course, indelibly
impressed upon my memory. I am, truly yours,
wineield S. Hancock.
To Col. G. G. Benedict, Burlington, Vt.
Stannard said to me further, "That there was some
danger of Hancock's bleeding to death there, right under
fire, when the Confederate army was making its great effort
to give the Confederacy a permanency among the nations of
the earth."
When Stannard made his attack on the right, the 8th
Ohio, which had been on the skirmish line, closed in on
Pickett and fired with such deadly aim that for a moment
that part of the line wavered.
XXXIV
530 THE A EM y OF THE POTOMAC.
Webb, in front of Armistead with the 72d Pennsylvania
and a portion of the 71st Pennsylvania behind the fence,
bravely met thé enemy ; while the 69th Pennsylvania and
the remainder of the 71st Pennsylvania were posted in a
copse of trees firing as rapidly as possible. Gushing's Bat¬
tery A, 4th United States Artillery, and Brown's Rhode
Island Battery, on his left, had been so crippled that they
were of little use. Gushing was mortally wounded, being
shot through both thighs, but he ordered his three remain¬
ing guns which were fit for service to be run down to the
fence and fired into the advancing enemy, even though he
had reported to General Webb an hour and a half before
that he was severely wounded. Wlien his last gun was
fired he fell dead near it.
When Pickett's line struck the Union forces. Gibbon's
left brigade, under Harrow, was not heavily pressed, so
Harrow advanced and partially turned Kemper's right flank.
Hall, in the center, held his own, but saw Webb on his right
attacked by Armistead. Turning to the left he (Hall) saw
two regiments in reserve. He directed them to move by
the right flank, intending to take them to Webb, but in the
confusion these troops joined Hall's brigade. When Webb
was forced back Hall was again attacked and compelled to
yield, slowly retiring and firing every step or two. Hall
was an artillery officer in Fort Sumter when the war broke
out, and a clear-headed soldier of splendid nerve. His re¬
port of the final result is given in such a way as to impress
one with its simplicity and correctness. Part of it is here
given :
During this time the 15th Massachusetts Volunteers, ist Minne¬
sota, and içth Maine Volunteers, from the First Brigade of this
division, had joined the line, and are entitled to a full share in the
credit of the final repulse. The line remained in this way about ten
minutes, rather giving way than advancing, when, by a simultane¬
ous effort upon the part of all the officers I could instruct, aided by
the general advance of many of the colors, the line closed with the
enemy, and, after a few minutes of desperate, often hand-to-hand
GEN. ALEXANDER S. WEBB.
GETTYSBURG.
531
fighting, the crowd—for such had become that part of the enemy's
column that had passed the fence—threw down their arms and were
then taken prisoners of war, while the remainder broke and fied in
great disorder. The Second Brigade had again joined the right of
my line, which now occupied the position originally held by the
command. Generals Garnett and Armistead were picked up near
this point, together with many colonels and ofl&cers of their grade.
General Webb says :
General Armistead pa.ssed over the fence with probably over loo
of his command and several battle-flags. The 72d Pennsylvania
Volunteers were ordered up to hold the crest, and advanced to within
forty paces of the enemy's fire. Colonel Smith, commanding the
71st Pennsylvania, threw two companies of his command behind a
stone wall on the right of Gushing's battery, fifty paces retired from
the point of attack. This disposition of his troops was most impor¬
tant. Colo ael.Smith showed true military intelligence on the field.
The 69th Pennsylvania, and most of the 71st Pennsylvania, even
after the enemy were in the rear, held their position. The 72d
Pennsylvania fought steadily and persistently, but the enemy would
probably have succeeded in piercing our lines had not Colonel Hall
advanced with several regiments to my support. Defeated, routed,
the enemy fied in disorder. General Armistead was left mortally
wounded within my lines, and 42 of the enemy who crossed the
fence lay dead.
Armistead was a regular officer before the war, but re¬
signed to enter the service of the Confederacy. Like many
others, he was in great doubt in his mind to know what to
do, whether to remain in the United States service or cast
his lot with the Confederacy. I heard Longstreet tell a son
of Gen. John P. Hatch that his mother begged him to re¬
main in the United States service. As Armistead lay dying,
he said : ' ' Tell Hancock I wronged him and wronged my
country." It appears that he was aware that Hancock
commanded that part of the field. They had been very
intimate, and when he was breathing his last, inside of
Hancock's lines, his remorse was most intense. Pickett,
seeing that he would suffer the loss of his whole command,
ordered a retreat. The Union troops realized that a great
532
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
victory had been won, and were anxious to follow Pickett
back to the Confederate line. There was great consterna¬
tion in their ranks. Tee rode among them to restore order
and confidence. Longstreet rearranged his lines as best he
could, and posted his artillery to the best advantage to re¬
sist the attack, if one was made. Perhaps some batteries
had a reasonable supply on hand, but there is no evi¬
dence that the Confederate army had enough ammunition
on hand to have made a stubborn resistance against a
heavy attack. But Meade was not strongly urged to make
a countercharge ; before arrangements could be made it was
too late, and both armies rested on the field during the
night of the 3d of July, in the position they had occupied
for two days. That battle was fought much like Chalons,
which is considered one of thé fifteen important battles of
the world, and its results are similar.
Aetins, the Roman general, posted his left on a sloping
hill, which Attila furiously charged, but, like Pickett, was
repulsed with great loss. He had robbed his center to re-
ënforce his right, which was then in no condition to with¬
stand the victorious cavalry, who forced back his right
wing, and then turned on his center.-
But the Hunnish general, like Lee, remained on the
field, and apparently retired at his own pleasure. Meade,
like Aetius, permitted Lee to remain in his front, after he
had mastered him all along the line.
A standard author says : "It is probable that the crafty
Aetius was unwilling to be too victorious." The same
can be said of Meade ; it was a safe victory. Lee expected
Longstreet would sustain Pickett in his charge, with Laws'
and McLaws' divisions. As Longstreet was preparing to
advance these two divisions, a new danger threatened his
right and rear, where the reserve trains were parked. Kil-
patrick had appeared there about one o'clock, when the
cannonading began, but was not observed for some time.
Deploying the brigades of Merritt and Farnsworth he at¬
tempted to capture Longstreet's reserve train.
GETTYSBURG.
533
Maj. H. C. Parsons thus graphically describes that
memorable charge :
On the morning of the 3d of July, General Kilpatrick was
ordered to move with his two brigades, from the right to the left oí
Meade's position. By some mistake in the order or direction Custer
took his brigade to the position held by General Gregg, and when
the mistake was discovered Merritt was ordered to report to Kilpat¬
rick in his place. We rode with a single brigade into the position
at the left and rear of Round Top, near the Emmittsburg pike. Kil¬
patrick and Farnsworth rode to the ridge on which the pike is lo¬
cated, and after inspecting the field sent for me. I was that day in
command of ist Battälion of the ist Vermont and at the right of
the brigade. A regiment of infantry was, at the moment, marching
through the wheat field from the ridge beyond the turnpike to the
.support of Pickett's charge ; it was then about 12 o'clock. I was
ordered to take one squadron to charge down the turnpike with
sabers and then ride to the left along their skirmish line, charging
as foragers, and to cover of a stone house very near their batteries.
We drove in their line with a loss of two men and three horses, and
the regiment evidently expected a general advance and fell back to
its original position. This is the charge referred to in the Confed¬
erate reports as creating the fatal diversion, and sometimes credited
to Merritt, but it was made more than an hour before Merritt came
to the -field, and his command was at no time upon the pike.
At 5 o'clock in the afternoon we were in position in the woods
on the low ridge directly in the rear of Big Round Top. When the
order came for Kilpatrick to attack the Confederate position and
break their lines or create a diversion, the 5th New York was upon
the skirmish line ; the i8th Pennsylvania was resting with its
left near the Emmittsburg road; the ist West Virginia in the center,
and the ist Vermont on the right; except one squadron of the 5th.
New York and one squadron of the i8th Pennsylvania, which were
directly in the rear of our batteries.
The first charge was made by the i8th Pennsylvania upon the
9th Georgia. The regiment fell back in confusion and without loss ;
the ist West Virginia was then hurled against the ist Texas, which
was protected by a rail fence across the open field ; the charge was
gallantly made but was repulsed with great loss, except at one point,
where a squadron led by Farnsworth broke through the line and
charged a battery—which was abandoned for a moment by the gun¬
ners—so closely that an officer. Lieutenant Robinett, fell wounded
between their guns ; here Farnsworth's horse was shot. The 2d
Battalion of the ist Vermont was thrown out on the right as skirm-
534 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
ishers ; the 3d Battalion, vinder Major Wells, was led to the charge
by Farns worth ; a few moments afterwards I was ordered by Colonel
Preston to lead my battalion in their support, but in the detour
through the woods we crossed their course and came first into action.
We rode across the open field, past the Slider House, and were met
at the foot of the mountain by the 4th Alabama, which had been
faced about from its position and at short range, less than 100 yards,
we received the volley that was referred to in the Confederate report
as having emptied half our saddles, but it passed over, only one
horse being shot.
The first squadron cleared the wall at the right and reformed
under the protection of the hill ; the second squadron fell back and
joined Wells, following him in the main charge. Farnsworth's
horse had been shot in the charge leading the ist West Virginia, but
Private Ellis, of Company E, leapt from his saddle, giving the gen¬
eral his horse, coolly unstrapped the general's saddle, and escaped
with his trophy on foot. General Farnsworth was first hit as he
rode out of the woods in the second charge, but continued to lead
his men.
I was ordered forward shortly after his charge and we entered
the walled field on the hill, from opposite directions ; his command
swept through the 15th Alabama, and the principal part, under Major
Wells, rode past the Confederate batteries and cut its way out through
the ist Texas, taking prisoners with them.
Farnsworth and Lieutenant Cushman and about twenty men,
turned back near the batteries to cut their way out through the 15th
Alabama. In their lines he fell with four wounds in his body, two
of them, at least, mortal ; and Lieutenant Cushman, whose horse
was shot and who was terribly wounded in the face, fell by hi" side.
As I charged into the field. Sergeant Duncan, who was at my
left, fiew past me with an exultant shout, with his raised saber,—
threw up his left arm and fell under my horse. My horse recoiled
over his dead body and I was surrounded and commanded to sur¬
render. As I raised my saber, however, a ball pierced my right side
and another grazed my right elbow, paralyzing my sword arm,—at
this moment my horse was struck and frantically broke through
their lines, carrying me out before he fell. Corporal Waller, and an
aid of Farnsworth's, rode up and supported me on my horse, and
told me how Farnsworth and Cushman fell together.
There has been some dispute as to the moment of this charge.
Lieutenant Cheney, of Compan}'^ E, was shot through the body, a
ball striking his watch and falling into his boot ; the watch stopped
at twenty-six minutes past five, and thus fixed definitely the mo¬
ment of the final charge. In this charge, which rode twice through.
GETTYSBURG.
535
their lines, drew one regiment out of position, and drew the fire of
two batteries, there were about 300 men ; the losses were 65, the
prisoners were reported at 103. They rode more than a mile within
the enemy's ; lines convinced General Lee that a forward move¬
ment was undertaken, and changed his entire plans. I carried my
command over four walls—three under fire—but Wells' charge led
by Farnsworth, was the thunderbolt. The horses flew over rocks,
walls and fallen timber, under a close enfilading fire, where the
boldest hunter would not ride to-day. It demonstrated the power of
cavalry, if properly hurled. If its results had been followed up by
a general advance, the line from which we had already drawn three
regiments could have offered ver}' little resistance and the victory of
Gettysburg would have been complete.
Famsworth's "star" was taken by Colonel Gates and afterward
lost ; his pistol by Lieutenant Adrian, and his gauntlets are now
held by a member of the 15th Alabama, who will return them upon
my order, to his family. He was the only general officer that fell at
Gettysburg within the enemy's lines, and yet he has received neither
mention in Meade's report, in history, nor is any monument erected
to him.
This charge, had it occurred on any other part of the field, or at
an earlier time in the engagement, would have received the attention
of the army and, perhaps, of the world. The scene as witnessed from
Elder's farm has been graphically told : The column as it marched
around the point of the hill and through the broken lines of the 15th
Alabama, rode over the roughest country, perhaps, ever ridden in
such an engagement. The enfilading fire gave the appearance of an
infantry battle, while in its front and through its smoke flew the
maddened horses with their riders and gleaming sabers. Everything
gave way before it. They demonstrated, as perhaps in no other en¬
gagement, the perfect power of a small column of horse when car¬
ried under cover close upon infantry lines and hurled with its full
momentum.
Meade first prepared an order written in all recognition and
gratitude, but when it was reported to him that three-fourths of the
men were killed, he recalled it rather than to take the responsibility
for the order, which was, however, freely accepted by Pleasonton.
Measured by results alone, the first charge ordered by Farns-
worth stopped a brigade on its way to Pickett's support, and drew
the ist Texas out of its position on Round Top ; the second charge
drew the two regiments out of position, broke the entire front of
Hood's division and so fatally exposed it that a squad of my own
men rode through the gap left by the ist Texas, into our own lines,
and did not rejoin the regiment for several days. The loss of horses
536
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
was greater than of men, but Company L, which went into the ac¬
tion with 65 men, and reported only 17 for duty in the morning,
really lost only-one fourth of their number.
As usual, the infantry fired high, and the surprise and the swift
movement of the troops protected them.
Such is an account of one of the most desperate cavalry
charges in the world's history. While the charge of the Light
Brigade at Balaklava, led by Lord Cardigan, challenged the
admiration of the world, and has been crystallized in
poetry, the prowess of Farnsworth and Adjutant General
Estes, of Kilpatrick's staff, will ever be remembered as one
of the most gallant military feats in the annals of history.
While Cardigan rode silently at the head of his brigade,
Farns worth led his troopers with a determination that
steeled them against death. While Cardigan rode through
a battery blazing its missiles of destruction at him, and
rushed 011 the Russian cavalry and engaged in a hand-to
hand conflict with a body of Cossacks, Farnsworth scaled
stone walls and broke three lines of battle before he was
mortally wounded. Cardigan returned, with only a bleed¬
ing wound ; but the troopers of the lamented Farnsworth
left him dead on the field. But few of Cardigan's men
returned from that charge, although it lasted only about
twenty minutes. Farns worth's loss was equally as great, but
it caused the divisions of Law and McLaws to stand still
while Pickett's men, unsupported, were enveloped in the
maelstrom of destruction before the Union line, and the last
hope of the Confederacy died in battle and smoke there on
that blood-stained field, while the second charge paral)'zed
Lee's right, and came near stampeding the Confederate
army. The high-water mark of the Confederacy had been
reached, and it was that day rolled back, sounding down
the long corridors of time, that there would be one country,
one flag, one people, and one sentiment, "For the Union,
one and indivisible, now and forever. ' '
Merritt, on the left of Farnsworth, advanced on the
Emmittsburg road to get in Longstreet's rear, but Ander-
CAPT. MICHAEL WEIDRICH.
GETTYSBURG.
537
son's Georgia Brigade, 7th, 8th, çtli, nth, and 59th, faced
to the rear and stubbornly resisted "Merritt's advance, for
if the supply trains were captured they were ruined. Mer-
ritt seeing it was impossible to charge so heavy a bod}^ of
infantry, dismounted his command and fought as infantry.
After fighting some time Merritt withdrew, because it was
impossible for him to seize the trains ; besides, if he had
overcome Anderson, Kershaw, Barksdale, Senimes, and
Woiford were in easy supporting distance, so it was wisdom
on his part to withdraw.
On page -215 of his volume on Gettysburg, the Comte
de Paris says of Pickett's charge :
Armistead, urging his men forward, has reached the front rank
between Kemper and Garnett—if it be yet possible to distinguish
the regiments and brigades in this compact mass of human beings,
which, all covered with blood, seems to be driven by an irresistible
force superior to the individual will of those composing it—and
throws himself like a solid body upon the Union line.
I can find no evidence to sustain the assertion that when
the Confederate column under Pickett struck the Union
line Armistead held the central position between Kemper
and Garnett. ön the contrary, all the evidence I have been
able to collect from those now alive, who were in the
charge, is decidedly against that statement. It is here
given that the reader may judge for himself.
General Kemper says, ' ' he was not aware of Armistead
coming up in the center."
Washington, D. C.,
June 4, 1891.
Dkar Sir :—Your favor of this date is just to hand. You wish
to know of me if Pickett's division, in the charge on Cemetery
Heights at Gettysburg, maintained the same relative organization
when it struck the Union forces as when it commenced the charg-e.
• o
I was in the charge, the colonel of the 8th Virginia Infantry, of
Garnett's brigade. The relative order of the several brigades when
the charge began, was Kemper on the right, Garnett in the center,
and Armistead on the left. This relative order was not changed
during the entire charge. Respectfully, etc.,
To J. H. Stine. Eppa Hunton.
538
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Aylett's p. O., King Wii^liam County, Va.,
June id, 1891.
Dear Sir :—Yours of the 6th instant has just been received,
and I reply at once. The assertion of'the Comte de Paris in his
history, that Armistead and Garnett's brigades "exchanged posi¬
tions just before the Pickett charge struck the Union line," is incor¬
rect. I never heard of it before. In the final charge there was much
blending of the attacking columns, from the terrible losses and gaps
created by the fire of the Union artillery and infantry, but no swap¬
ping of positions. In the original formation of the line of battle,
before Pickett's advance, Kemper's brigade held the right, Garnett's
was on his left, and Armistead's, for which there was not room in
the extended line of battle, was formed immediately in rear of the
others. Fences, obstructions, the fire of the enemy in front and
from Round Top, and the loss of officers, caused the brigades to mix
before they struck the Union line. Not only is this my personal
recollection, but Col. Walter Harrison, Pickett's assistant adjutant
general and inspector general, in his book called " Pickett's Men,'^
at pages 90 and 91, sustains me. My regiment, the 53d Virginia,
was the central and directing regiment of Armistead's brigade, and
he marched right in front of my colors. I did not see either Gar-
nett or Armistead fall. Yours, very truly.
To J. H. Stine. Wm. R. Avlett
Williamsburg, Virginia
June 8, 1891.
Dear Sir :—Your letter of the 3d instant to hand, and in answer
allow me to say, the position of the brigades was at start like dia¬
gram below. After our left supports retired, Armistead moved into
line with Garnett. He was placed as you see in diagram for the
purpose of taking said position, as before the charge General Pickett
knew they would be needed to do this.
Garnett. Kemper.
Armistead.
I have nothing to guide me as to the farthest point General
Pickett reached in person. We started in where Armistead's right
was in diagram, and at the Emmittsburg road General" Pickett sent
me to General Longstreet to tell him that he would take the enemy's
position, but could not hold it without help ; when I returned to
General Pickett with. General Longstreet's answer, I found General
Pickett between the Emmittsburg road and Cemetery Heights.
Then three of us, one directly after the other, were sent to urge
GETTYSBURG.
539
General Wilcox to bring his brigade to our assiátance. On my re¬
turn I found him near the descent of the last hill, facing the Federal
works. Then I called his attention to a column of the enemy which
was moving by head of column around our left flank, which was
much too short. He sent me at once to Heering s artillery battalion
to order them to open on the column, and in this way protect his
flank. Lieutenant Marshall was on left of battalion, and I came ta
him first. He said his battery had only three rounds of shot. He
opened at once with them, after which I rode to General Pickett,
who ordered our men back, so as to get out before being inclosed.
At this time he was near the last valley in front of Cemetery Ridge.
When I gave Kemper the order to charge, his objective point, by
order of General Pickett, was a red barn. The only members of the
general's staff that went in with him on that day were Maj. Charles
Pickett, Capt. E. R. Baird, Capt. W. S. Symington, and myself.
Respectfully, R. A. Bright.
To J, H. Stine. Late Captain on General Pickett's Staff.
Norfolk, Va., July 3, 1891.
My Dear Sir :—It singularly happens that your communication
of June 22, 1891, asking certain questions about the charge of
Pickett's division at Gettysburg, has reached me on the anniversary
of that memorable day. The facts you ask for in relation to the
formation, etc., of that division are given you below, according to
the best of my recollection after such a long lapse of time. Con¬
sidering the magnitude of that battle, its wonderful surroundings
and effects, I can but think that the impressions that were made on
even a nonparticipayit, to say nothing of one who was engaged in
it, could scarcely wear out, even after these many years. Garnett
and Kemper's brigades were formed in front ; Armistead, with his
brigade, slightly in rear and left of same. This formation was, I
think, fully preserved (although great gaps, during the advance,
were made by the concentrated fire of batteries from front and flank,
and well-delivered volleys of musketry all along the line, yet con¬
stantly filled up by closing in, as on dress parade) until the division
got into the works on Cemetery Ridge, after which everjdhing be¬
came a regular melee ; after that, the Deluge.
Very respectfully, C. Pickett,
Late Major and Assistant Adjutant General,
To J. Ô. Stine. General Pickett's Division."
Baltimore, July 27, 1891.
Dear Sir :—I have your favor of the 25th instant, asking me
my recollections of General Armistead's position in the charge at
Gettysburg on the third day.
540
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
When we started Garnett and Kemper's brigades were a first
line, and Arinistead's brigade was in the rear, forming a second line.
After moving forward some distance the troops on our left wavered,
and finally broke badly. Pickett then ordered Armistead to move
up and take position on the left of our first line. This movement
was made promptly, and while we were still moving to the front.
Almost as soon as Armistead came on line with the other two bri¬
gades, the direction of the charge was changed somewhat to the
left, and all three brigades were massed somewhere about the point
where the Federal infantry struck our right flank.
To the best of my recollection the troops directly in front (if I
ma}^ so call it) did not stand, but those coming in from toward our
right flank struck us both in front and flank.
The three brigades being, as I said before, somewhat massed, I
can not say exactly where in the line Armistead was killed. It was,
though, across the stone fence, and after we had taken some of the
Federal guns. I have not read the account written by the Comte de
Paris, and of course, therefore, do not know where he says that
Armistead was killed. Yours, very truly,
W. Stuart Symington,
Captain and Aid-de Camp on Pickett's Staff".
To J. H. Stine, Esq.,
No. 323 C St., S. E., "Washington, D. C.
White Sulphur Springs, W. Va.,
August 17, 1891.
My Dear Sir ;—Yours of the 27th ultimo has been forwarded
to me at this place. In reply to your inquiry I beg to say, that in
the memorable charge of Pickett's division at Gettysburg, there
were engaged only three of the brigades of the division, which were
arranged as follows : Kemper's and Garnett's brigades constituted
the first line, Kemper's being on the right of Garnett's ; Armistead's
brigade followed in the rear of Garnett's. This was the order in
which the charge was made.
The line of Kemper and Garnett was supported on the left by a
line of North Carolina troops, which had advanced in line of Kemp¬
er's and Garnett's ; but these North Carolina troops broke and left
the line of Kemper and Garnett unsupported on the left^
I was' adjutant of the 9th Virginia Regiment, which was the
left regiment of Armistead's brigade. I have the impression, made
on me at the time, that Garnett's brigade had become so reduced,
that as it advanced, it appeared to me as a skirmish line. Armis¬
tead's brigade struck the " Bloody Angle," as it was called. I wish
it were permitted me to speak of the gallant conduct of General
GETTYSBURG.
541
Armistead ; how, holding his hat on the point of his sword, he
strode along before his brigade, until within a hundreçl yards of the
stone fence, a person on horseback (I have been told that it was
General Garnett) engaged him in conversation for a few moments,
when his regiments passed him ; and then when he eame up to the
stone fence, he strode over it, calling on his men to follow, and ad¬
vanced to the abandoned artillery guns oí the enemy and placed his
hands upon them as if to turn them upon his foes, and in that act
was shot down. Very respectfully,
J. F. Crocker.
To J. H. Stine, Esq., Washington, D. C.
General Huidekoper was taken to the Catholic Church,
the belfry of which was used by Bwell and his staff for ob¬
servation. When these officers came down, they talked
over the situation. It was repeatedly said that Ewell's
Corps was out of ammunition, and the cartridge boxes of
the dead were resorted to to replenish their supply.
Robert I. Patterson, of the 19th Indiana, was taken
prisoner on the first day, and was held in the rear of the
Confederate line. When Pickett's charge was repulsed,
Lee and his staff rode near him, when he could hear their
conversation and Lee's orders. Patterson sa)'s :
The utmost consternation prevailed in the Confederate army,
and arrangements for the immediate removal of their supply trains
was made, with the army to follow. But as a countercharge was
not made, their lines were rearranged to hold their position.
Meade rode to the front to consider the advisability of
attacking with his left wing, but he feared that in crossing
the plain where Pickett had just suffered a disaster
the Union army would in turn meet the same fate, as he
was not aware of the scanty amount of ammunition of the
Confederate batteries as given by Pickett's staff, so he de¬
cided to feel Lee's position, and ordered McCandless'
brigade to advance.
The enemy's sharpshooters, with a battery in their im¬
mediate front, were defiant and troublesome, therefore, in
accordance with orders, McCandless, with his First Bri-
542 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
gade, at once proceeded to silence or capture them. The
Bucktails, "Major Hartshorne ; ist, Colonel Talley ; 2d,
Lieutenant Colonel Woodward; nth. Colonel Jackson,
crossed the ' ' wall ' ' and advanced through the woods to an
open field, waving with golden grain ; while Colonel Brit,
with the 6th Regiment, crept cautiously up to the battery
which he stormed and captured. While the 6th was fairly
engaged taking the battery, McCandless, with the afore¬
mentioned regiments of the brigade, which, after attracting
the attention of the enemy, and drawing his fire, had
dropped upon the ground, now moved by the right flank,
and filing left forward in line of battle in a woods at right
angles with the "stone wall," and deployed skirmishers to
the front, right, and left, charged on double-quick over the
field for half a mile, receiving the enemy's fire from the
woods on three sides. Half wheeling to the right and
pouring a few volleys into the enemy in the woods, the
brigade charged up the crest.
Halting a few moments, it faced about, wheeled a little
to the right, and, with a shout, charged through the woods
in their rear, through the meadow, and up over the steep
acclivity on the opposite side, taking the enemy in the
flank, driving him in confusion, and penetrating far into
his lines. The trophies of this brilliant movement, besides
the capture of the battery, were 6,000 stand of arms ; the
flag of the 15th Georgia, and three hundred prisoners, in-
cludine a colonel and several line officers. The Confeder-
ate colonel surrendered to Colonel Talley, who conducted
him to the Union lines as one of his prizes. The ground
of the previous day's fight was retrieved, and with it the
wounded who had lain where they fell.
This was the last fighting done along the line of the
field. The battle of Gettysburg was ended. It was late
twilight when the First Brigade returned to the main lines
heavily laden with their trophies of war, physically ex¬
hausted, but mentally happy. Pennsylvania was redeemed,
the Union cause sustained. It is worthy of note that Gen.
GETTYSB URG.
543
John F. Reynolds' first command in the army was the First
Brigade of Pennsylvania Reserves, that he opened the fight,
and that his old brigade closed it.
Company K of Colonel Talley's regiment should have
special mention in history. It was from Gettysburg, and
during the three days' terrible fighting at their homes not
a man asked leave to visit his family. The entire company,
who were not killed or wounded, followed the retreating
enemy and remained with the command to the end of their
term of service. The company was commanded in the
battle by Capt. Henry M. Minnigh and Lieut. George B.
Kitzmiller. It was recruited by Capt. Edward McPher-
son, from among young men of the best families of that
now historic town. McPherson resigned* to take a seat in
Congress, but his patriotic zeal induced him to volunteer as
a staff officer, in which capacity he did valuable service for
his country.
RIGHT FRANK AT GETTYSBURG.
The momentous events that occurred at Gettysburg on
the ist, 2d, and 3d of July, 1863, were so transcendently
important, and so attracted the attention of the whole
country and riveted it upon the main battle that ebbed and
flowed from Seminary Ridge to and around Cemetery Hill
and the Round Tops that many minor events occurring
on both flanks of the contending armies, which exerted an
important influence on the successful issue of the greatest
battle of modern times, were forgotten or lost sight of for a
long time.
It is not the intention of this history to enter into a de¬
tailed account of the fighting that occurred on this flank,
therefore much that would be interesting must be omitted,
and the reader referred to the accounts of Miller, Carpenter,
Brooke, and Kidd. Only such events as are necessary to
connect this brilliant cavalry fight with the main battle are
narrated.
The 30th of June found the Army of the Potomac on
544 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
the move on all the roads leading north and- northeast from
Frederick toward Pennsylvania. Buford was at Gettys¬
burg, Kilpatrick at Hanover, where he encountered Stuart,
and forced him off the direct road to Gettysburg, obliging
him to make a long detour which carried him to Carlisle,
Gregg was at Manchester ; from thence on the morning of
the ist of July, he marched to Hanover Junction, and from
thence, on the night of the ist, to Hanover, with Mcintosh's
and Irvin Gregg's brigades. Huey's brigade was sent to
Westminster. Early on the morning of the 2d the march
was resumed via the Baughnatown road to Gettysburg, and
the command marched to the extreme right of our line on
Cross Creek about twelve m., having passed Crawford's
division of Pennsylvania Reserves on the road. At the
Revere House the command turned to the left and pro¬
ceeded as far as the Baltimore pike at White's Run ; at this
point it was turned back, again encountering Crawford
hurrying to the front, and retraced its steps to the Han¬
over road, and took up a position, about two p. m., on
the eastern slope of Brinkerhoff's Hill, relieving some
infantry posted on the left or south of the road. This
regiment on being relieved immediately withdrew by its
left, and Irvin Gregg's brigade at once became engaged in
skirmishing with the enemy occupying the western slope
of the same hill. During the afternoon the artillery was
brought into play, and toward nightfall Mcintosh's brigade
became engaged on the right, and a spirited contest
occurred along the summit of the ridge between the dis¬
mounted cavalrymen and Walker's infantry brigade of
Johnson's division for the possession of a stone fence; but
the cavalry got and held it. After nightfall the division
withdrew and bivouacked on the Baltimore pike east of
White's Run.
During the forenoon of the 3d Irvin Gregg's brigade was
ordered to report to the division commander, on the Taney-
town road in the vicinity of General Meade's headquarters,
and on the arrival of the head of the column Colonel Gregg
GEN. GREGG.
GETTYSBURG.
545
was informed that General Meade was in doubt as to where
General hee was and what he was doings, and desired him
to move up the road into Gettysburg and try to find out ;
however, before the order could be executed, General Meade
was advised as to General Gee's position and intentions, the
order was countermanded, and the brigade was directed to
resume its position of the day before.
Before reaching the Hanover road the column was de¬
flected to the left opposite Rhiel's house, and took up a
position south of Deodorf's house, connecting with Neill's
brigade of the Sixth Corps. While the Third Brigade was
moving toward Gettysburg the First Brigade moved to the
Gow Dutch or Salem road, about three-fourths of a mile
from its junction with the Hanover road.
Early on the morning of the 3d Custer had been directed
to report to Kilpatrick on the left of the army, and was, as
he states, in the act of complying with instructions, when
an order from Gen. D. McM. Gregg directed him to take
position across the Hanover road on the extreme right of
the army. This order he complied with, placing his brigade
in position facing Gettysburg near the Spangler House. At
twelve m. Custer received another order, directing him, on
being relieved by a brigade of the Second Division, to pro¬
ceed to join General Kilpatrick.
On the same morning General Gregg was again directed
to take up his position on the right of our line, and he
posted the First and Third Brigades on the right of the
infantry, but about three-fourths of a mile nearer the Balti¬
more pike, because, as he states in his report, he under¬
stood General Custer was occupying with his brigade his
position of the previous day, which was the extreme, right
of the cavalry forces.
At 12 m.. General Gregg received an order from Gene¬
ral Pleasonton, commanding the Cavalry Corps, to send
General Custer to report to General Kilpatrick, and he
sent the First Brigade of his division to relieve him. This
change having been made, and the enemy displaying a
XXXV
546
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
strong line of skirmishers evidently with a view to attack,
he determined, notwithstanding his orders, to retain Gene¬
ral Custer's brigade until after the impending attack was
repulsed, realizing the disastrous consequences that must
result if the enemy succeeded in driving him from his po¬
sition.
During the forenoon Custer had noticed some move¬
ments of the enemy, and was convinced that an attack
would be made, and had made his arrangements to meet
it ; but just as Mcintosh arrived, he received an order to
report to General Kilpatrick on the left of the army, and
he informed Mcintosh that some trouble was brewing on
his right and front. Custer at once took the necessary
steps to develop the designs of the enemy, by advancing
his skirmishers and pushing forward a mounted force
toward the York pike, on the road leading by Stolsmith's
house.
From Stuart's position along Cress Ridge, the slope
and summit of which were covered with timber, and which
extended from Rummel's farm to Stolsmith's, the whole
country to the south and east lay like an open map ex¬
posed to the gaze of the Confederate commander. The
position and every movement of the Union troops could be
distinctly seen, whilst his men were perfectly screened.
Custer soon found out that he was in the presence of a
formidable force, and sent word to General Gregg to that
effect, asking that Col. Irvin Gregg's brigade be brought
up at once. General Gregg, however, had received a dis¬
patch from General Howard, who, from Cemetery Ridge,
had observed the movement of Stuart toward our right,
informing him of that fact ; and coming on the, field, he
averted Custer's movement toward the left, and Col. Irvin
Gregg was ordered to move as rapidly as possible and mass
his brigade at the junction of the Plum Creek and Hano¬
ver roads at the Revere House, about a mile directly south
from Rummel's farm buildings, behind which the right
center of Stuart's line rested, while his skirmishers were
GETTYSBURG.
547
thrown forward to the buildings, which they occupied, as
well as the fences in advance.
Mcintosh observing this, and entirely discerning Stuart's
position, dismounted the ist New Jersey and deployed it in
the direction of Rummel's, the enemy extending his skir¬
mish line south along the fence, and opened with his bat¬
teries from the summit of the ridge. Two squadrons of the
3d Pennsylvania and Duvall's troops were moved across the
fields between the Lott House and Rummel's in support of
the left of the ist New Jersey, and two squadrons were
moved out on the Low Dutch road to protect our right, and
one squadron was drawn up facing northwest, its right ex¬
tending toward the junction of the Low Dutch road and
that leading by Stolsmith's to the York pike, the left of
Stuart's line. Custer ordered Pennington's battery in
position in front of the Spangler House, north of the Han¬
over road, while Randol was put in position near the Lott
House west of the Low Dutch road. The ist Maryland was
in reserve near the Lott House, and Custer was in the act of
withdrawing, in compliance with his orders to report to
General Kilpatrick on the extreme left of the army. At
this junction General Gregg, who had been apprised of the
formidable force in his front by General Howard's dispatch,.
appeared upon the field, arrested Custer's movement, took
command, and assumed directiop. of the battle about to
ensue.
The ist Maryland Cavalry, which was stationed near
Lott's house, was moved to the Low Dutch road to
strengthen the right, the 5th Michigan was put in to sup¬
port the left, and under its gallant colonel, Russell A.
Alger, made one of the most brilliant charges of the war,
but was finally obliged to fall back for want of ammunition,
when the enemy charged our right and center. The 7th
Michigan advanced to meet the charge, but the enemy,
pushing in fresh troops, that gallant regiment was forced
back. The charge of the ist Virginia was determined and
vigorous, but they became scattered by the flank fire of our
548 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
carbines and the artillery fire, and were in turn compelled
to retire on their supports.
While this fighting, charging, and countercharging was
going on in the fields between the Lott House and Rum¬
mel's, Stuart was forming Hampton's and Fitz Lee's bri¬
gades behind the belt of timber near Stolsmith's for a final
charge to crush the Union forces and drive them from the
field. Irvin Gregg's brigade began to arrive and was mas¬
sing near the Revere House on the Hanover road on our
left flank and in plain view of Stuart. Of this part of the
action, and the end of the fight. Captain Miller, in his arti¬
cle on "Battles and Leaders of the War, No. 21," says:
The afternbon was passing away, the sun was declining in the
heavens, and the shadows were beginning to lengthen, when there
was seen to emerge from behind the screen of woods in front of
Stolsmith's the head of a column which grew as it advanced into a
mighty mass until the brigades of Hampton and Lee stood revealed
to the gaze of the Union commander ; steadily forward they moved
as if on parade, directing their march on the Spangler House, the
center of the Union line. For an instant the Union forces were
mute with admiration at the magnificent spectacle, then the guns
of Pennington opened with a roar of shot and shell whirled across
the plain, tearing great gaps through and through the gray mass ;
but filling the vacant places, on they came. Canister was substi¬
tuted for shell, and the head of the column melted away, but noth¬
ing could stay that mighty mass. Suddenly, at the opportune
moment, Gregg, who had quietly and intently watched the move¬
ment from its commencement, directed the ist Michigan to charge,
and with Custer and Town at their head, the gallant Wolverines
dashed forward with a ringing shout full upon the head of the ad¬
vancing force. The meeting was as the crash of ocean waves break¬
ing on a rock-bound coast, and men and horses rolled and tossed
like foam upon the crest. Alger with the 8th and part of the 7th
Michigan, charged the column upon its right flank. Mcintosh's
squadrons, each acting for itself, charged on the right and left pierc¬
ing it through, whilst Town's charge entered its front like a wedge
and the mighty engine was broken to pieces, its individual mem¬
bers driven from the field, and the right flank was won.
General Stuart, in his report of this fight, says that he
withdrew after this repulse for the reason that all his avail-
GETTYSBURG.
549
able forces had been put in, and that Gregg had a large
brigade (Col. Irvin Gregg's) massed upon his left that had
not been engaged, and that he did not deem it advisable to
renew the contest.
Of the commander of the Union forces it is hardly neces¬
sary to speak, but we cannot forbear to quote from the
address of Gen. James H. Kidd, at the dedication of the
Michigan monuments :
If Custer's presence on the field was opportune, and, as has often
been said, providential, it is to Gen. D. McM-Uregg to whom, under
Providence, the credit for beeping him there was due. Gregg was a
great and a modest soldier, and to him let us pause a moment before
we enter on a description of the coming battle, to pay the tribute of
our admiration. In the light of all the official reports put together
link by link, so as to make one connected chain of evidence, we can
see that the engagement that took place here almost twenty-six years
ago was, from first to last, a well-planned battle, in which the differ¬
ent commands were maneuvered and placed with the sagacity dis¬
played by a skillful chess player in moving the pawns upon a chess
board ; in which every detail was the fruit of the brain of one man
who, from the time he turned Custer to the northward until he sent
the ist Michigan thundering against the brigades of Hampton and
Fitz-Hugh Lee, made not a single false move ; who was distinguished
not" less for his intuitive foresight than for his quick perceptions at
critical moments. That man was Gen. D. McM. Gregg.
As Lee retreated, and our army advanced, T. J. Shannon,
of the 14th Regulars, saw a Confederate leaning forward on
a rock at the Devil's Den, while a Union soldier was in the
same position behind a rock near the base of Little Round
Top. Both had evidently fired at the same time, and both
had expired and remained in the position they occupied
when the fatal bullet ended their lives and sent both souls
into eternity.
While Meade advanced in the direction of Gettysburg,
he was compelled to make his base of supplies at Westmin¬
ster, on the Western Maryland Railroad. From there the
army was supplied by wagons. When the battle began.
550
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Westminster was a great source of anxiety to Meade lest
J. E. B. Stuart should return there and seize all of the stores.
So he detailed several picked regiments to protect arid
guard it in case Stuart did attempt it. Looking over the
regiments, the 15th Vermont, under Col. Redfield Proctor,
and Lieut. Col. W. W. Grout, was selected. It belonged
to the brigade of General Stannard, which won such great
fame in that flank charge on Pickett's division. Time has
proven that the selection was a wise one, for Redfield Proc¬
tor's executive ability has since elevated him to be Gover¬
nor of Vermont, arid Secretary of War under Harrison. In
the latter position his capacity ha^ ranked him as one of
the ablest Secretaries since the days of General Knox, and
the momentum of its force placed him in the United States
Senate as the successor of Senator Edmunds. Lieutenant
Colonel Grout, has been brigadier general of militia of
Vermont, and many years a member of Congress, serving
on some of the most important committees. If the appre¬
hended attack on Westminster had been made by Stuart
it would have been stubbornly resisted.
The losses of the Union army at Gettysburg, were as
follows, in the aggregate for the three days, stated by
brigades ;
FIRST CORPS.
Headquarters—Staff 7
First Division, First Brigade i.US
First Division, Second Brigade • 1,002
Second Division, First Brigade 1,041
Second Division, Second Brigade 648
Third Division, First Brigade 898
Third Division, Second Brigade 853
Third Division, Third Brigade 351
Light Artillery Brigade 106
Total 6,059
COL. REDFIELD PROCTOR.
GETTYSBIRG. 551
SECOND CORPS.
Staff and Unassigned i8
First Division, First Brigade 330
First Division, Second Brigade 198
First Division, Third Brigade 358
First Division, Fourth Brigade 389
Second Division, First Brigade 768
Second Division, Second Brigade 491
Second Division, Third Brigade 377
Third Division, First Brigade 211
Third Division, Second Brigade 366
Third Division, Third Brigade 714
Light Artillery Brigade 149
Total 4.369
THIRD CORPS.
Staff. 13
First Division, First Brigade 740
First Division, Second Brigade 781
First Division, Third Brigade 490
Second Division, First Brigade 790
Second Division, Second Brigade 778
Second Division, Third Brigade 513
Light Artillery Brigade 106
Total 4,211
FIFTH CORPS.
Ambulance Corps i
First Division, First Brigade 125
First Division, Second Brigade 427
First Division, Third Brigade 352
Second Division, First Brigade 382
Second Division, Second Brigade 447
Second Division, Third Brigade 200
Third Division, First Brigade 155
Third Division, Second Brigade 55
Light Artillery Brigade 43
Total 2,187
SIXTH CORPS.*
First Division, First Brigade 11
*Not engaged at Gettysburg. At Funkstown, in pursuit of Lee's army, was
engaged with slight loss.
552 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
First Division, Second Brigade 5
First Division, Third Brigade 2
Second Division, Second Brigade i
Second Division, Third Brigade 15
Third Division, First Brigade 74
Third Division, Second Brigade 69
Third Division, Third Brigade 53
Light Artillery Brigade 12
Total 242
ELEVENTH CORPS.
Staff. 6
First Division, First Brigade 5^7
First Division, Second Brigade 77^
Second Division, First Brigade 5^7
Second Division, Second Brigade 348
Third Division, First Brigade 807
Third Division, Second Brigade 669
Light Artillery Brigade 69
Total 3,801
TWELFTH CORPS.
First Division, Fiist Brigade 80
First Division, Second Brigade 174
First Division, Third Brigade 279
Second Division, First Brigade 139
Second Division, Second Brigade 98
Second Division, Third Brigade 303
Light Artillery Brigade 9
Total 1,082
ARTILLERY RESERVE.
First Regular Brigade 68
First Volunteer Brigade 93
Second Volunteer Brigade 8
Third Volunteer Brigade 37
Fourth Volunteer Brigade 36
t
Total 242
CAVALRY CORPS.
First Division, First Brigade 99
First Division, Second Brigade 28
GETTYSBURG. 553
First Division, Reserve Brigade 291
Total 418
Second Division, First Brigade 35
Second Division, Third Brigade 21
Total 5^
Third Division, First Brigade 98
Third Division, Second Brigade 257
Total 355
HORSE ARTILLERY.
First Brigade 8
Second Brigade 15
Total 23
Total Casualties Cavalry Corps 852
RECAPITULATION.
General Headquarters 4
First Army Corps 6,059
Second Army Corps 41369
Third Army Corps 4.211
Fifth Army Corps 2,187
Sixth Army Corps 242
Eleventh Army Corps 3,801
Twelfth Army Corps 1,082
Cavalry Corps 852
Artillery Reserves 242
Total Union Loss 23,049
The First Corps alone lost 6,059, which was more than
one-fourth of the loss of Meade's army, where seven infantry
corps, cavalry and artillery were engaged. This record of
losses for the First Corps is not surpassed in the history of
the world.
The heaviest loss suffered by any brigade was that of
the First Brigade, First Division, First 'Corps—the Iron
Brigade—1,153, heaviest loss of any regiment was
that of the 24th Michigan of that brigade, 363. The
largest loss of any brigade by percentage of numbers en¬
gaged was also that of this same Iron Brigade, but of regi-
554
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
ments it was tliat of the ist Minnesota, 86 per cent., as
against 8i for the 24th Michigan.
Other extraordinary regimental losses were, the 151st
Pennsylvania, 337 ; the 149th Pennnsylvania, 336, and the
157th New York, 307 ; in each case over 70 per cent, of
those engaged.
Excessive losses of light batteries were the following :
Cushing's (A), 4th Regulars 39 43
Stewart's (B); 4th Regulars 36 40
Arnold's (A), ist Rhode Island 32 36
Sheldon's (B), ist New York 26
Brown's (B), ist Rhode Island 28
Freeborn's (E), ist Rhode Island 30 33
Thompson's (C), Pennsylvania Light 28
Biglow's 9th Massachusetts 28 31
The figures given in the second column represent state¬
ments of losses other than those of the ' ' revised returns, ' '
which include only losses of men borne on the battery rolls.
The Confederate losses were as follows :
First Corps (Longstreet's) 7.539
Second Corps (Ewell's) 5,937
Third Corps (A. P. Hill's) 6,735
Stuart's Cavalry Division 240
Total Confederate Loss 20,451
Total Union Loss 23,049
Grand Total (both sides) 43.500
CHAPTER XIII.
FROM GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPPAHANNOCK.
JULY 4 TO OCTOBER 30.
After the grapple of the giants, the Army of the
Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia, at
Gettysburg, on the ist, 2d, and 3d days of July, 1863,
which ended with the repulse of Pickett's magnificent
charge on the Union center on Cemetery Ridge and the foil¬
ing of Stuart's splendid cavalry dash on the right flank.
General Tee, disappointed in the confident hope and antici¬
pation of crushing the Union army, was obliged to solve
the problem of successfully withdrawing his shattered army
from its position in front of Meade's victorious legions.
For this purpose the weather was most propitious. The
heavy cannonading of the previous three days brought on
violent thunder storms. During the night of the 3d the
rain fell in torrents, and a darkness like that of Egypt set¬
tled down upon the field of battle, concealing from view all
movement of troops, while volleys of reverberating thunder
drowned the rumbling of trains and artillery. During the
4th the rain continued without cessation. Nevertheless,
reconnoissances, made in all directions, disclosed the fact
that General Lee had withdrawn his left and taken up a new
position parallel with the Blue Ridge, covering the roads
over that range, on which his immense trains, artillery and
wounded, were moving on the night of the 3d and all day
of the 4th.
During the night of the 4th the Confederate army with¬
drew, and on the morning of the 5th were discovered to be
555
556 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
in full retreat on the Fairfield and Cashtown roads. The
Sixth Corps being the strongest, was at once pushed for¬
ward in pursuit on the Fairfield road, and Col. Irvin Gregg's
brigade of Gregg's cavalry division on the Cashtown road.
General Sedgwick, commanding the Sixth Corps, found the
retreating army strongly posted in the Fairfield Pass, and
after closely reconnoitering the position deemed it too strong
to be successfully attacked. Leaving Neil's brigade of infan¬
try and Mcintosh's cavalry brigade to harass and annoy the
enemy, the army was put in motion for Middletown, Mary¬
land, and every effort was put forth to head off the retreat¬
ing army, whose line of march must necessarily lead, via
Hagerstown, to Williamsport on the Potomac. Buford's
division marched from Westminster on the 4th, via Frede¬
rick, Maryland, across the Catoctin and South Mountain
Passes, en route for Williamsport, on the Potomac, and at
five o'clock p.m. on the 6th came up with the enemy's
pickets near St. James' College, between Boonsboro and
the Antietam.
Kilpatrick, marching on the 4th, reached Emmittsbnrg
at three o'clock p.m., where he found Huey's (Second) bri¬
gade of Gregg's cavalry division. Pushing forward at once
on the Monterey pike, he encountered some of Stuart's cav¬
alry, which he brushed aside, and, moving on to Monterey,
struck, captured, and destroyed Ewell's trains, taking a
number of prisoners. He then moved by Smithsburg to
Boonsboro, foiling Stuart's attempt to cut him off.
The infantry corps moved promptly on all roads leading
from Gettysburg through the mountain passes, and were
concentrated in the vicinity of Boonsboro, west of the Blue
Ridge, on the evening of the 9th. On the loth Meade's
headquarters moved from Turner's Gap to Beaver Creek, a
tributary of the Antietam, between Boonsboro and Williams-
port. The Second, Third, Fifth, and Twelfth Corps were
across the Antietam in front of the enemy's right, and the
First, Sixth, and Eleventh Corps in position in front of
Hagerstown and Funkstown. On the 9th and loth the
GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 557
cavalry of the two armies (which covered Lee's retiring
infantry columns and preceded the advance of Meade's
corps) had numerous and spirited engagements.
General Lee, moving steadily in retreat through Hagers-
town (the head of his columns arrived at Williamsport on the
evening of the 6th and the rear on the morning of the 7th),
found the river, swollen by the recent rains, impassable,
and his pontoons, which had been left there to facilitate his
crossing, destroyed. Being thus brought to a halt, he- took
up a strong position between the fords at Williamsport and
Falling Waters, his right resting on the Potomac and his left
on the ConocQcheague, near Hagerstown, Maryland. This
line ran along a range of heights west of Marsh Creek, and
was strongly intrenched, while the fording places on the
river were put in condition to cover the crossing of his army.
To the commander of the Union forces this position ap¬
peared too formidable for successful attack without a full
examination ; and with this view General Meade determined
to make a reconnoissance in force, supported by the entire
army, early on the morning of the 13th ; but his corps com¬
manders were so decidedly averse to an advance that he
postponed it until the following day. During the night the
enemy withdrew from this position and crossed the Potomac.
An examination of the position occupied by the Confed¬
erates showed it to be very strong, quite as much so as
Marye's Heights at Fredericksburg. To have blindly
hurled his masses upon this position in the hope that some
weak point would be found might have been splendid blun¬
dering, but certainly could not be characterized as judicious
and scientific w^arfare. From all the facts known at the
time, and from subsequent light thrown upon the subject
by the publication of Confederate records, the calm view of
all military men capable of forming a correct estimate of
military operations must be that General Meade was gov¬
erned by sound military principles in refraining from an
immediate and direct attack.
What might have been accomplished by a movement
558 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
acros the Potomac by way of Shepherdstown and Harper's
Ferry with two corps of infantry and two divisions of
cavalry, commenced from Boonsboro on the morning of
the nth, it is, perhaps, now useless to speculate upon.
However that may be, one cannot help thinking that great
results must have followed.
General Meade, backed by tUe strong positions afforded
by the passes through and over the Blue Ridge, with reën-
forcements (French had already joined with 6,500 fresh
troops) constantly coming up from his base, and the accu¬
mulating bodies of Northern militia under Couch gathering
on his right flank, would certainly have been as secure
against any forward movement, had the enemy been in con¬
dition to make it, as General Lee was behind the Antietam.
This formidable flanking force, marching from Boonsboro
on the nth, would have been across General Lee's line of
retreat, between Williamspoit and Martinsburg, some time
during the night of the 12th or morning of the 13th' ; and
as General Lee's erossing did not commence until the night
of that day, he would have been in the position of General
Mack at Ulm, or the Roman Consuls in the Candine Forks.
But as no movement of this kind seems to have been con¬
templated by anyone having the authority to make or pro¬
pose it, no good purpose can be subserved by discussing it
further.
The movement of Gregg's cavalry division across the
Potomac at Harper's Ferry on the 14th accomplished
.lOthing, although a severe engagement took place between
Col. Irvin Gregg's (Third) brigade and the bulk of Stuart's
cavalry near Shepherdstown, which lasted from one o'clock
until nine p.m. on the i6th, and in which a large number
of people on both sides were killed arid wounded.
On the morning of the 14th, General Meade was ap¬
prised that the enemy had slipped away during the night,
and his army was put in motion with all practicable dis¬
patch, directed upon Williamsport, but was unable to over¬
take him.
GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 559
Buford and Kilpatrick, however, overtook the rear
guard at Falling Waters, attacked and captured two can¬
non, three flags and many prisoners. On the 15th, head¬
quarters of the army were moved to Berlin, and the col¬
umns were all put in motion by various roads for that place
and Harper's Ferry, On the i6th and 17th the army
crossed the Potomac, and moved along the eastern side of
the Blue Ridge, keeping pace with the Confederate army
in its retreat up the valley of Virginia, and preventing it
from debouching through the various passes of that moun¬
tain barrier into the rich valleys of Loudoun and Fauquier
Counties, which General Lee designed to occupy, and
threatened his communications with Richmond.
Longstreet and Hill, moving rapidly on the 20th and
22d, passed safely through Chester Gap ; but Ewell essaying
to pass through on the 23d, met the heads of the Third,
Fifth and Second Corps advancing through the gap, and a
spirited contest ensued, which resulted in forcing him back
and compelling him to continue his march up the valley as
far as Luray, and to cross over by way of Thornton's Gap.
General Lee, having safely passed the Blue Ridge, massed
his army around Culpeper Court House.
General Meade, under instructions from Washington,
took up a strong and threatening position behind the Rap¬
pahannock, with Gregg's cavalry division thrown forward
to Amissville, but being directed not to advance against
Lee's position at Culpeper, all active operations between
the two armies ceased.
On the ist of August, Buford's cavalry division crossed
the river on a reconnoissance ; and at or near Brandy Sta¬
tion encountered Hampton's and Jones' brigades, com¬
manded by Stuart in person, which they drove back to
within a mile and a half of Culpeper, and found that place
occupied by A. P. Hill's corps. They then fell back and
recrossed the river at Rappahannock Station. After this
the two armies remained quietly watching each other.
During the month of August the Army of the Potomac
560 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
was considerably reduced in strength by the detachment of
troops for duty elsewhere, and it was ascertained that Gen¬
eral Gongstreet's corps had been sent to Tennessee to
reènforce Bragg, and arrived at its destination in time to
be present at the great battle of Chickamauga, which was
fought on the 19th and 20th of September. On the 13th
of September, Meade directed a reconnoissance in force,
with the entire Cavalry Corps, supported by the Second
Corps. Kilpatrick, with his division, crossed at Kelley's
Ford, and Buford, with his division, at Beverly Ford, fol¬
lowed by the Second Corps, while Gregg moved from his
camp between Sulphur Springs and Jefferson.
The enemy were encountered on all the roads converg¬
ing toward Culpeper, and driven through that town—the
heads of the three cavalry columns meeting at noon in the
town. The pursuit was continued until nightfall and the
enemy forced across the Rapidan, but were found to be too
strongly posted on the opposite bank to be dislodged by a
direct attack.
The army crossed the Rappahannock and took up a
position around Culpeper. Buford made a reconnoissance
toward the upper Rapidan and a movement by the right
was contemplated ; but before it could be put into execu¬
tion two corps, the Eleventh and Twelfth, were withdrawn
froni the army and sent to Tennessee to reënforce Rose-
crans, whose army was shut up in Chattanooga.
General Lee's army was at Orange Court House and
Gordonsville, with strong advanced posts intrenched behind
the fords along the Rapidan, holding tenaciously the line of
that river, with uninterrupted communication with Rich¬
mond and Lynchburg from which to draw supplies. In
these positions the two armies lay until the 9th of October.
The Army of the Potomac was disposed in the following
order from right to left : The Second Corps on the Sperry-
ville pike, in the vicinity of Stone House Mountain ; the
Third across the roads leading from Culpeper via James
City, to Madison Court House ; the Fifth and Sixth facing
GE TT YS BURG TO THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 561
Cedar Mountain, and the First in the neighborhood of
Stevensburg. Buford's cavalry division was on the left,
Kilpatrick's on the right, and Gregg's division north of the
Rappahannock at Bealton ; and, as was the oustom, their
vedettes encircled the entire army and kept out observation
parties toward the enemy.
During the 8th and 9th of October information from
various sources reached General Meade that a movement of
some kind was imminent. The unusual activity observed by
our signal officers in the Confederate camps on those days,
and the movement of long trains and columns of infantry
and artillery on the 9th toward Madison Court House, was
attributed by some as preliminary to the evacuation of Vir¬
ginia, by others to a direct advance against the Union army
in, its position at Culpeper, and by still others to a movement
around General Meade's right flank, by the roads leading
north, along the eastern base of the Blue Ridge.
Increased vigilance was enjoined upon Kilpatrick, and
on the evening of the 9th orders were sent to General Buford,
which he received on the morning of the loth, directing
him to force a crossing of the Rapidan at Germanna Ford,
and, sweeping up the river, endeavor to uncover Morton's
Ford in front of General Newton's corps, the First, which
was then to cross, and, if the movement was successful, to
be followed by the Fifth and Sixth Corps at the fords higher
up. This movement was successfully executed by General
Buford with his usual soldierly promptness. The crossing
was forced at Germanna, and the enemy rapidly pushed back
until Morton's Ford was uncovered. But before this was
accomplished night had fallen, and Buford bivouacked
within the outer works of the enemy, leaving them in pos¬
session of the works immediately at the ford. Meantime
the enemy crossed the Robertson River at Madison Court
House, and forced Kilpatrick's cavalry back to James City,
where he was supported by Prince's division of the Third
Corps, and the Second Brigade of Gregg's division of cav¬
alry, under Col. Irvin Gregg.
XXXVI
562 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
This movement seemed to be so formidable that General
Meade changed his orders for the passage of the Rapidan,
and issued orders for a retrograde movement which carried
his army to-the north bank of the Rappahannock on the
nth. This movement was covered by Kilpatrick's division
of cavalry, until it reached Brandy Station, where he was
joiped by Buford, who, finding that our infantry had moved
during the night, drove the enemy from- Morton's Ford, re-
crossed the Rapidan, and moving via Stevensburg, reached
Brandy Station in time to sustain Kilpatrick, who was
contending against the entire force of the enemy's cavalr}-.
In falling back from the positions occupied around Cul-
peper, the First, Fifth, and Sixth Corps marched along the
south side of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, the
Second along the north side, and the Third Corps via Wçll-
ford's Ford, on the Hazel River, to Freeman's Ford on the
Hedgeman River.
Gregg was instructed to take up a position across the
Sperryville pike until after the withdrawal of the Third
Corps, and then to move with his division to Sulphur
Springs, via Rixeyville and Jefferson, with his Second
Brigade, and with his First Brigade by the most direct route
from its position on the Rappahannock. This brigade
reached Sulphur Springs before dark on the evening of the
I Ith, while the Second Brigade did not arrive at Jeffersonton
until eight p. m., and bivouacked between that place and
the springs. Nightfall of the nth found the Army of the
Potomac (with the exception of the Second Brigade, Second
Cavalry Division, Col. Irvin Gregg) north of the Rappa¬
hannock, and its commander master of the situation and in
a position to foil any attempt against his communications
by General Lee, and reduced Lee to the necessity of deliver¬
ing battle on ground chosen by his enemy, or the abandon¬
ment of his enterprise.
General Gregg was instructed that the movement of
his command, via Jefferson and Sulphur Springs, was to
watch the roads leading to the Shenandoah Valley by
GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 563
Thornton's and Chester Gaps, and to Warrenton by way
of Amissville ; that it was information of the movements
of General Lee's army that was wanted, and that it was
important that any which might be received should be
promptly communicated to army headquarters. No indi¬
cation of any movement of troops was observed by General
Gregg on the march from Culpeper, via Rixeyville, to
JeiFerson. About midnight on the night of the nth,
General Gregg received a communication from General
Humphreys, chief of staff, asking him to obtain certain
and early information of the enemy's movements in the
direction of Sperryville and Little Washington. As this
was the route followed by General Jackson in his cele¬
brated and successful march around General Pope's right
flank in August, 1862, General Meade may be supposed to
have been naturally somewhat apprehensive of a similar
attempt on the part of General Lee. To prevent the re¬
currence of such a march, the movement of the previous
day, which placed his army on the Washington side of the
Rappahannock, was admirably adapted ; and if the move¬
ment on Warrenton, originally contemplated by General
Meade, had been carried out, it would have been rendered
absolutely impossible. The position of General Meade's
army around Warrenton would have been impregnable to
any but a vastly superior force.
General Lee, in his advance report, says he broke up
his camps at Orange Court House and Gordonsville on the
9th, with a view to bring on a general engagement with
General Meade's army at Culpeper Court House ; that he
reached the vicinity of the court house on the nth, and
found that the enemy had evacuated the position ; that he
was obliged to halt for the • remainder of the day to pro¬
vision his army ; that he determined to make another
attempt to strike General Meade's communications north
of the Rappahannock, and force his army still farther
toward Washington ; and with that view he moved on the
morning of the 12th in two columns. It was the move-
564
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
ment of these columns • that was the source of so much
anxiety to the Union commander, and the direction of
which General Gregg had been requested, at midnight on
the nth, to obtain early and accurate information.
The duty assigned to General Gregg's division was
both delicate and arduous. The character of the country
through which the movement was made not being favor¬
able for distant observation, and the march of the columns
being veiled behind a cloud of cavalry, commanded by
Gen. J. E. B. Stuart, upon whom the eyes of the world
were fixed as the most accomplished and successful cavalry
leader that up to that time the war had produced, rendered
the obtaining such definite knowledge as General Meade
required absolutely impossible except by actual contact,
involving a severe and protracted contest.
The measures taken by General Gregg to procure this
information were well adapted to the purpose. The 13th
Pennsylvania Cavalry, on the night of the nth, was
posted between the village of Jefferson and Rixey's Ford,
with vedettes thrown forward as far as the crossing;
and early on the morning of the 12th, the ist Maine
Cavalry was sent, via Amissville, Gaines' Crossroads and
Little Washington, to Sperryville. The other regiments
of the brigade crossed the river and took up a position
covering the roads to Fayetteville and Warrenton. About
nine o'clock a. m., on the 12th, Major Kerwin, com¬
manding the 13th Pennsylvania, sent a dispatch to General
Gregg that the enemy's cavalry were pressing his vedettes.
This dispatch .reached him at Sulphur Springs, on the
north bank of the Hedgeman River, at ten a.m. Col. Irvin
Gregg, to whose brigade the 13th Pennsylvania and ist
Maine Cavalry belonged, was ordered to immediately re-
cross the river, taking with him an additional regiment.
Selecting for that purpose the 4th Pennsylvania, he pro¬
ceeded to the front to ascertain what was going on. Colonel
Gregg reached the village of Jefferson about 12:30 p.m.,
where he met the 13th retiring in good order, to get a good
GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 565
defensive position nearer to its support. The movement to
the rear was arrested, the village reoccupied, and prepara¬
tions made to offer such resistance to the enemy's advance
as would compel him to develop the nature and number of
his forces. These dispositions were scarcely completed
when a strong attack on the village was made by Stuart's
dismounted cavalry, which was repulsed with severe loss.
General Lee being present when General Stuart arrived
upon the ground with Funsten's brigade, he was directed
by him to send a regiment, the 12th Virginia, to the right,
and another, the 7th Virginia, to the left, while the nth
Virginia, wdiich had been repulsed, was remounted and
sent to the left to attack the right of the Union troops in
the village. During this time the skirmish firing was con¬
tinuous and rapid. Up to three o'clock p.m. no infantry
force had made its appearance ; at about that hour Maj. S.
B. i\I. Young, commanding the 4th Pennsylvania Cavalry,
on the left, sent word to Colonel Gregg, who had just re¬
turned from the extreme right, from where he had observed
a movement of the Confederate cavalry to his right rear,
that it was infantry that were opposing him (men with knap¬
sacks on), and that he could not long maintain his position.
This was conclusive as to the forces opposing us, and the
information was at once sent to General Gregg by Lieut.
Archer N. Martin, of the i6th Pennsylvania Cavalry, one
of Colonel Gregg's aids ; but it did not reach him, as Lieu¬
tenant Martin ran into Funsten's command, the 12th Vir¬
ginia Cavalry, had his horse killed, and was himself severely
wounded. Meanwhile Colonel Gregg, having acquired the
information he was seeking, and ascertained that he had
the whole, or a large part, of Lee's army on his hands, at¬
tempted to withdraw. But the enemy pressing on with
cavalry on both flanks, and infantry on his front, his troops
became somewhat demoralized. No time being given for
effecting any organization as the men came in from the
skirmish line, the broken regiments got across the river
under cover of the loth New York Cavalry, and almost
566
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
simultaneous with the crossing the enemy opened upon
our position on the northern bank of the river, from the
opposite bluffs, with two batteries of General Ewell's artil¬
lery ; at the same time the heads of his infantry columns
appeared in sight.
It was now between four and five o'clock p.m., and at
4:50 p.m. the following dispatch was sent to General Pleas-
onton, whose headquarters were supposed to be with Gen¬
eral Meade :
Headquarters Second Cavalry Division,
October 12, 1863—450 p. m.
Colonel :—We have been fighting all afternoon. This morn¬
ing at daylight I sent a regiment to make a reconnoissance toward
Tittle Washington. I placed a regiment at Jefferson to support the
reconnoissance. The enemy forced the crossing at Rixeyville, and
columns of infantry and cavalry crossed and advanced upon Jeffer¬
son. I got the regiments across to resist the advance of the enemy,
but the force was so overwhelming that after a stubborn resistance
the regiments were driven back and effected a crossing under my
guns. A column of infantry is now moving up the right bank. The
officer commanding my brigade near Warrenton reports columns of
infantry moving up the west bank toward the mountains. The
columns of infantry moving in plain sight are large. I am much
concerned for the regiment sent to Little Washington. The loss in
the regiment engaged to-day is very heavy ; I cannot give it yet.
The enemy have opened with twenty pieces of artillery, and are
driving me from my position at the springs.
Very respectfully,
D. McM. Gregg,
Brigadier General of Volunteers.
Col. Ross Smith, Chief of Staff.
Up to the date of this dispatch General Gregg had no
information of General Lee's army, except that he was en¬
gaged with his cavalry. Col. C. H. Smith, with the ist
Maine Cavalry, pushed on through Amissville, passed
Gaines' Crossroads, to Little Washington, which point he
reached before twelve m. without having met with anything
to ipdicate any movement of General Lee's army in that
direction. From Little Washington Lieutenant Harris was
sent back with twelve men to communicate this information.
GETTYSBURG TO THE RA F PA H A N N O CK. 567
He passed Amissville on his return (no enemy in sight), and
on his arrival near Jefferson found the enemy's cavalry
between that place and his party and a fight going on. He
at once retraced his steps in the attempt to rejoin his regi¬
ment ; but on his arrival at Amissville he found all the roads
in possession of the enemy.
Colonel Smith sent Majors Boothby and Brown on to
Sperry ville, from which point they returned to Little Wash¬
ington at sundown, not having seen ány enemy. Colonel
Smith at once commenced his return march toward Jeffer¬
son, and after nightfall ran into Gen. A. P. Hill's corps,
at Amissville. He was thus cut off from his direct road,
and in an extremely critical position, from which he extri¬
cated himself and command with signal ability ; and after a
march of ninety miles reached Bristoe Station, on the
Orange and Alexandria Railroad, early on the morning of
the 13th.
Lieutenant Harris being unable to reach General Gregg,
and cut off from his regiment by the advance of General
Hill's corps, concealed his party in a dense thicket of old
field pines, which everywhere abound in Virginia, until
nightfall, when he made his way through the Confederate
outposts, crossed the river, and when near the Bull Run
Mountains ran into Mosby's command, was captured, and
while being conducted, via Warrenton, to the south side of
the Hedgeman River, again made his escape alone, recrossed
the river, and several days afterwards reported to his regi¬
mental commander near Bealton.
Moving from his camps on the Sperryville pike, early on
the morning of the 12th, to head off General Meade's army,
which had twenty-four hours' start of him and was well con¬
centrated on the north bank of the Rappahannock, General
Lee, the right wing of whose army had about sixteen or eight¬
een miles to march to reach Sulphur Springs, must have
moved with the utmost dispatch. He arrived with the advance
of General Ewell's corps within two miles of Jefferson,
where Funsten, who moved from Brandy Station early the
568
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
same morning, said he found the head of Ewell's corps.
None of these officers give the time of day, but the hour
could not have been later than eleven or 11:3o a. m. The pace
at which they were marching would have brought them to
the Sulphur Springs Crossing of the Hedgeman River at an
hour certainly not later than one o'clock p. m.
General Lee, in his report, says :
After a skirmish with some of the Federal cavalry at Jefferson,
we reached the Rappahannock in the afternoon, where the passage
of the river was disputed by cavalry and artillery. Early next
morning the march was resumed and the two columns reunited at
Warrenton in the afternoon.
Gen. J. E. B. Stuart says, in his very detailed report of
this skirmish :
After a hard struggle they retreated rapidly down the roaa ; the
horse artillery not having come up (General Long commanding),
the artillery of General Ewell's corps opened fire with eight guns on
the batteries and supporting squadrons of the enemy on the oppo¬
site side of the river. As it was nearly dark, my first care, after
crossing, was to have the bridge relaid, so that the infantry might
cross directly over.
General Lee's advance was, therefore, delayed by the
disposition and the resistance made by these two regiments
of cavalry, the 13th and 4th Pennsylvania, from eleven or
half-past eleven a. m., until dark, at six or seven o'clock
p. m., a period of seven or eight hours, in marching a dis¬
tance of six or seven miles.
General Meade not receiving such information as he
wanted up to ten or eleven o'clock a. m., and being inspired
with the belief, occasioned by the representations made by
Generals Pleasonton and Sykes, that Lee was in his rear at
Cnlpeper, determined, for some reasons not explained at
the time, nor understood since, to send, at one o'clock
p. m., the Second, Fifth and Sixth Corps, with Buford's
cavalry division, back across the river on a reconnoissance
toward Cnlpeper. The enemy's cavalry were encountered
GErTYSBURO TO THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 569
near Brandy Station, and not being in force were rapidly
pushed back on Culpeper. But the place was unoccupied,
except by a small body of cavalry. The object of the
reconnoissance, however, was accomplished and a day
lost.
General Buford's report that General Lee's army was
not at or in the vicinity of Culpeper, demonstrated the in¬
correctness of the surmises of the corps commanders before
mentioned, but did not disclose the position of Lee's army ;
nor does General Meade appear to have received any infor¬
mation, until, as he says in his report :
During the night dispatches were received from General Gregg,
commanding a cavalry division guarding the upper fords of the
Rappahannock and Hazel Rivers, that he had been forced back early
in the morning from the Hazel River, and in the afternoon from the
Rappahannock, and that the enemy were crossing at Sulphur Springs
and Waterloo in heavy force.
The dispatches here alluded to, we have seen, were
dated at 4:50 p. m. ; the distance from Sulphur Springs to
Rappahannock Station did not exceed ten or eleven miles ;
the roads were good and unobstructed, and there is no reason
why the distance should not have been covered in an hour
or an hour and a quarter. It is therefore inexplicable how
this delay, which came so near being fatal, could have oc¬
curred. Late as the hour was, it gave General Meade the
definite information for which he was looking, and revealed
to him the critical position in which his army had been
placed by his backward movement of the morning. He
was, however, prompt in remedying the mistake, and the
troops were at once recalled.
Warren's corps, being nearest the river, was directed to
proceed, via Bealeton, to support General Gregg, and cover
the Third Army Corps, which was at Freeman's Ford.
The order for this march was received by General Warren,
at his position about two and one-half miles from Rappa¬
hannock Station, at eleven o'clock p. m. on the 12th, and
570
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
he says in his report : "The movement was immediately
begun. We marched all night, and by one o'clock a. m.
joined General Gregg at Fayetteville. ' '
After sending the 4:50 p. m. dispatch, General Gregg
continued to hold the crossing at Sulphur Springs, resist¬
ing every attempt of the enemy to force him from it until
his accumulating force rendered any further resistance
hopeless. He then withdrew slowly, followed by the
enemy's cavalry, and several charges and countercharges
were made on the Warrenton pike between the First Bri¬
gade, under Colonel Taylor, and the Confederate cavalry.
Night put an end to the fighting, which had been raging
with more or less fury since one p. m., and Gregg withdrew
to Fayetteville.
On the morning of the 13th, Lee's right wing crossed
the river and moved to Warrenton. Hill moved at the
same time ; and on the afternoon of that day the two wings
of his arm}' were united at that place. General Meade,
having lost the day of the 12th in the execution of his rear¬
ward movement and failed to secure the position at War¬
renton, put his army in motion, marching all night to
regain the time lost, and on the morning of the 13th moved
on all the roads leading through Auburn, Greenwich, and
Catlett's Station, to Bri§toe and Manassas.
The First, Fifth and Sixth Corps, the trains, and
Buford's cavalry moved along the railroad, and by the after¬
noon .of the 13th had reached Catlett's Station; the troops
were camped, and the trains parked between there and
Warrenton Junction.
During the night of the 12th Kilpatrick covered the
road leading from Fayetteville to Warrenton. The Third
Corps withdrew from Freeman's Ford, passed through Fay¬
etteville, and marched via Auburn to Greenwich, preceded
by Kilpatrick, who was relieved by Gregg. After the pas¬
sage of the Third Corps Warren moved to Auburn, on the
road leading by Three-Mile Station, and bivouacked west
of Cedar Run after dark. Gregg brought up the rear, and
GETTYSBURG TO IHK RAPPAHANNOCK. 571
went into position between the Second Corps and Warren-
ton long after dark.
Lee, having arrived at Warrenton during the morning,
sent Stuart on a reconnoissance toward Catlett's ; that officer,
taking with him the brigades of Lomax, Gordon, and Fau¬
sten,-proceeded at once on the road leading from Warrenton
to Catlett's, via Auburn ; arriving at the latter place, he left
Lomax to watch and guard his rear. Pushing on with
Gordon and Fnnsten in the direction of Catlett's, as he
cautiously approa.ched St. Stephen's Church, the whole
plain around Catlett's, covered by our trains, came under
his observation, and they were for a time probably at his
mercy. Carefully concealing his force in a dense thicket of
old field pine, he sent a report of the situation to General
Lee at Warrenton. Not hearing from Lomax, who had
been driven from Auburn by the advance of General Kil-
patrick and the Third Corps, he determined to remain in
his position during the night ; meantime the advance of
the Second Corps and Gregg's cavalry isolated him com¬
pletely from the main army at Warrenton. At early dawn
on the 14th the perilous position in which he was placed
was revealed ; but presuming that General Lee had received
the information sent him the previous day, and would be
advancing to the attack from the direction of Warrenton
with his entire army, he immediately opened fire with his
guns on Caldwell's division of the Second Corps, which
was drawn up in line of battle on a hill east of Cedar Run,
facing toward Warrenton. This unexpected fire, coming
from the rear, somewhat startled these veteran troops ; but
they changed front without confusion, and Caldwell's bat¬
teries soon got into position, making the shelter of old field
pine hot for the daring cavalrymen.
Ewell, however, advancing from the direction of War¬
renton, attacked General Gregg, and affairs now began to
look serious for the Union armv. But Warren was on the
move, and Gen. Alexander Hays' division, marching
rapidly in the direction of Catlett's, forced Stuart out of
-372
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
his concealed position, from which he withdrew by his left,
crossing Cedar Run between Auburn and Catlett's, and
passing around Gregg's rear, between Auburn and the
Warrenton Railroad.
The road being now clear, the Second Corps moved
rapidly in the direction of Bristoe Station, covered by the
Second Cavalry Division. The advance. General Webb's
Second Division, reached the station about two p. m., while
the rear of the Fifth Corps was moving off beyond Cedar
Run, and the enemy was advancing in Une of battle from
the direction of Greenwich. General Warren, in his re¬
port, says :
A more inspiring scene could not be imagined. The enemy's
line of battle boldly moving forward, one part of our own steadily
awaiting it, and another moving against it at the double quick,
while the artillery was taking up position at a gallop and going into
action.
Webb's division was faced to the left, occupying the
railroad cut and embankment. Hays' division prolonged
the line to the left and Caldwell's to his left as it arrived
on the field. Brown's battery went into action on the
north side of. Broad Run, without support, and .Ricketts'
on the heights south of the bridge. Gregg's cavalry divi¬
sion followed Caldwell. The First Brigade crossed Kettle
Creek under fire from the troops of Ewell's corps, which
was beginning to arrive, and took position on Caldwell's
left.
When the advance of Gregg's (Second) brigade ap¬
proached Kettle Creek the road and railroad bridge were
found to be in possession of the enemy. The way being
thus blocked, this brigade moved to the right and took up
a position, covering our hospitals, near the Brentville road.
The attack was gallantly made and as gallantly repulsed,
the advantage remaining with the Union forces. Night
put an end to the fighting, and the Bristoe campaign was
ended. General Meade issued the following congratulatory
order :
GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 573
General Orders, ] Headquarters Army of the Potomac,
No. 96. i October 15, 1863.
The major general commanding announces to the army that the
rear guard, consisting of the Second Corps, was attacked yesterday
while marching by the flank.
The enemy, after a spirited contest, was repulsed, losing two
colors, a battery of five guns, and 450 prisoners.
The skill and promptitude of Major General Warren, and the
gallantry and bearing- of the oflicers and soldiers of the Second
Corps are entitled to high admiration.
By command of Major General Meade :
S. Williams, Assistant Adjutant General.
This is a very graceful acknowledgment of the services
of the Second Corps, which was well, deserved ; but it
brought no rejoicing to the camps of the weary cavalrymen
whose services were entirely ignored. This disparaging
order was partially modified by the commanding general,
in General Orders, No. 97, October 17, 1863 ; but it empha¬
sized the fact, evinced on more than one occasion before
and subsequently, that General Meade's sympathies were
with his infantry and artillery rather than his cavalry.
Of this campaign it may be said that it was conducted
on the part of the Union commander under a misappre¬
hension as to the designs of his opponent not warranted by
what ought to have been known of his character nor by
past experiences. First : That the movements of General
Lee's army were preliminary to evacuating the line of the
Rapidan. Second : That the apparent movement to turn
his right had been given up for the less important one of
occupying the abandoned position of the Federals at Cul-
peper. Third : That having placed his army in an admir¬
able position on the nth, it was not prudent to abandon it
on the 12th without waiting for information as to General
Lee's movements on the mere supposition that Lee might,
after all, have only designed to get possession of the
town of Culpeper. Lee's object being to attack Meade's
army at Culpeper, that general might have waited in his
position, which had been prepared for such a contin-'
574
THE ARMY OF THE POTO MAC.
geiicy, for twelve hours, and, if then desired, could have
withdrawn his army to the north bank of the Rappahan¬
nock during the night of the nth, and had time to reach
Warrenton in advance of the enemy. Had General L<ee
attacked at Cnlpeper, he undoubtedly would have been
repulsed ; and the Union army could have seized the posi¬
tion at Orange Court House and Gordonsville, and inter¬
posed between Lee and Richmond, thùs forcing that gen¬
eral back upon Lynchburg. The strategy as well as the
tactics of the Union commander were faulty in the extreme
throughout this campaign.
General Lee, after following the Union army to Bull
Run, fell back, destroying the Orange and Alexandria
Railroad as he went, and took up a position behind the
Rappahannock with a strong force of infantry and cavalry
intrenched on the north or east bank at the railroad cross¬
ing, which he held until the 7th of November, when Gen¬
eral Sedgwick, with the Fifth and Sixth Corps, advanced
and carried the position by assault, capturing four pieces of
artillery, 1,600 prisoners and 1,200 small arms. The as¬
sault was made by the Second and Third Brigades of the
First Division of the Sixth Corps, commanded by Gen.
David A. Russell.
On the 8th and 9th the army crossed the river and took
up a position from Kelley's Ford, through Brandy Station,
to Welford's Ford on the Hazel River, and at once com¬
menced to repair the railroad.
The foregoing brief account is taken entirely from the
official records (Series I, Vol. XXIX, Part I, Bristoe Sta¬
tion and Mine Run, Serial 48), except so much as relates
to the ist Maine Cavalry.
I now turn to the account of this day's operations given
in his " History of the American War," by the Comte de
Paris, in his chapter on Bristoe Station. The distinguished
author of this history—usually so fair in his statements, so
correct in his criticisms, and so just in his conclusions—is
not only incorrect in his facts, but unwarranted in his de-
GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 575
ductioiis in reference to the operations of the Second Cav¬
alry Division on the 12th of October, 1863. His account
is too long to quote in full ; but the substance of it is this ;
That General Meade, on the night of the nth, was
north of the Rappahannock, and master of the situation ;
that on the morning of the 12th, not receiving the infor-
matioti from General Gregg that he expected in reference
to the movements of General Lee's army, he became im¬
patient, and, by an unhappy inspiration, sent General Bu-
ford's cavalry and three corps of infantry back across the
river to Culpeper, and lost his power to control affairs ; that
he waited still, in his position at Rappahannock Station,
until "dark, when he learned from Buford's report that
General Lee's army was not at Culpeper ; that at 10:30
o'clock that night he received a dispatch from General
Gregg, dated at Fayetteville, saying that Lee had been
crossing his army at Sulphur Springs and Waterloo for
several hours ; that General Gregg, when he discovered the
advance of Lee's army, was too intent upon fighting to
think of sending reports to his superior ; that the command¬
ing officer of the 13th Pennsylvania forgot to send reports
to General Gregg, and that the colonel of the ist Maine
CaValryj driven back from Amissviile and unable to reach
Sulphur Springs, disappeared for several days ; and that it
would have been better if General Gregg had not fought so
much and written more.
Now the Comte de Paris, in all this, ignores the very
important fact that General Lee was moving rapidly and
secretly ; that he was veiling the march of his infantry
columns behind his cavalry, and that that cavalry was led by
one of the most successful and distinguished cavalry leaders
of this or any country or age ; and that if any information
was to be obtained it would have to be fought for, and the
fight once joined, must be a desperate one.
It must be obvious to any impartial critic that any in¬
formation sent to General Meade at any time prior to the
4:50 p.m. dispatch, before mentioned, could not have con-
576
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
veyed to him any correct intimation of the condition of
affairs ; nor is it probable that freqnent communication of
such information as General Gregg had, hp to four p. m.,
would have exercised any influence upon the commanding
general's actions.
The Comte de Paris says that in the interval between,
the two engagements—the respite allowed him by General
Stuart—General Gregg should have sent a report to Gene¬
ral Meade. There was no interval, no respite, from the
time the fight was joined, about one o'clock p. m., until
Gregg was forced across the river at four p. m. There was
no cessation or let-np ; and the first intimation that Gene¬
ral Gregg had of the presence of the enemy's infantry was
the almost simultaneous appearance of the heads of Ewell's
columns and the opening of his guns from the opposite
bluffs. The crossing of the river was not forced until
about dark, at least an hour and a half after the 4:50 p. m.
dispatch was sent. He also says (page 762) :
All necessary precautions—the leaving of the 13th Pennsylva¬
nia at Jefferson ; the dispatch of the ist Maine to Amissville and
the First Brigade, under Taylor, to scout the country toward War-
renton—seemed to be taken to learn if Lee is endeavoring to turn
the Federal right wing ; but neither Gregg nor Meade is promptly
informed of the fact. These precautions will be of no use, however,
owing to a singular occurrence of fortuitous circumstances and
culpable negligence.
In the first place, the ist Maine, coming back from Amissville
in the night, falls unexpectedly, near Jefferson, on the outposts
of the nth Virginia. Dreading some ambush, the former falls back
on Little Washington, and thus it cannot give any information to
Gregg, from whom it will be separated for several days.
This account, which is entirely incorrect, 'is suificiently
confuted in the relation of the operations of the ist Maine,
as is also the statement in reference to the 13th Pennsyl¬
vania. Again the comte says (page 764) :
How could Gregg have left his chief so long without sending
information as to what was taking place on the right of the army ?
We haye said that Gregg himself, no doubt, did not receive any in-
GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 577
formation from his detachments which he had sent to scout the
country ; the enemy making his appearance on Hedgeman River,
the surprise made him neglect that important duty ; but he com¬
mitted an inexcusable error in not taking advantage of the respite
which Stuart gave him after the first engagement.
In reference to this severe criticism, it is to be said that
it is not only not just and fair, but that it is extremely unjust
and unfair, and is not warranted by the facts in the case.
Neither Gregg nor any of his detachments had* any infor¬
mation of the whereabouts of General Lee's infantry columns
up to three or half-past three o'clock. It was after Colonel
Gregg had sent information to General Gregg that a large
body of the enemy's cavalry were moving to their left—his
right—that the po.sition was no longer tenable, and instruc¬
tions had been received to retire, that information came to
Colonel Gregg, which came not from the observance of any
infantry columns, but from Capt. (afterward Col.) S. B. M.
Young, of the 4th Pennsylvania Cavalry, now major of the
3d United States Cavalry, then in command of the skirmish
line on his left, to the effect that it was infantry that was
opposing him—men with knapsacks. This information was
immediately sent to General Gregg by Lieut. Archer N.
Martin, i6th Pennsylvania Cavalry, one of Colonel Gregg's
aids.
The time had now arrived when the pressure of the
enemy could no longer be resisted ; so that, like a weak
embankment, pressed by the accumulated waters behind it,
this thin skirmish line began to yield before the united
strength of General Lee's right wing, crumbled and went
to pieces.
Colonel Gregg's dispatch to General Gregg, conveying
the information of the presence of General Lee's infantry,
did not reach him ; for it was here, with the 7th and nth
Virginia on his right, the 12th Virginia on his left and
rear, and the advancing infantry columns pressing upon
his center, that Colonel Young, pale and bleeding, informed
Colonel Gregg that he had been shot at close range by an
XXXVII
578
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
infantryman. lyieutenant Martin, on foot and covered
with blood, approached and reported that the enemy were
holding the road in his rear ; that his horse had been killed
and himself wounded. And Lieutenant Cutler, ist Maine,
another aid, rode up wounded in the arm, and reported :
"We are fast being surrounded."
Maj. H. H. Gregg, 13th Pennsylvania Cavalry, whose
battalion had been holding the position behind the stone
wall that áurrounded the cemetery, came up from the front
on foot exhausted, and reported everything in confusion
and the enemy advancing rapidly. This officer, who was
furnished a horse, was no sooner mounted than the horse
was killed and he was himself captured, informed Colonel
Gregg subsequently, after his return from Libby Prison,
that fifteen minutes had not intervened between the time
he reported to him and the arrival of Gen. R. E. Lee on
the field.
Colonel Gregg, with the fragments of these broken and
exhausted regiments, recrossed the river, covered the loth
New York, which was then forced back and crossed under
cover of the guns and skirmishers on the north bank.
General Gregg, riding up the slope to near the summit of
the hill, observed the advance of the enemy's cavalry and
infantry columns, and was astounded by the almost simul¬
taneous opening of his batteries from the opposite bluffs.
It was then that the 4:50 p. m. dispatch was written and
forwarded to General Meade's headquarters.
As the distance from General Gregg's position on the
Fayetteville road to Rappahannock Station would not ex¬
ceed ten or eleven miles, and ought to have been covered
in an hour, it is unaccountable how the delay in delivering
this dispatch, which came so near being fatal, could have
occurred.
The Comte de Paris goes on to say, same page ; ' ' He,
Gregg, endeavored to retrieve it (this inexcusable error) by
dispatching several couriers to Meade during the battle of
Sulphur Springs, but they were killed or lost their way."
GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 579
Here the comte confuses Colonel Gregg, whose couriers
were stopped between Jefferson and Sulphur Springs, and
General Gregg, whose couriers were not killed. There
was no enemy on the road ; they conld not have lost their
way, because all of General Gregg's staff officers or order¬
lies were familiar with the roads. Finally, there were no
couriers sent ; for after the 4:50 p. m. dispatch, there was
no information to communicate ; and General Gregg's plain
duty was to retard the crossing of Lee's army as long as
possible, which the comte admits was done. He, how¬
ever, deduces from the events which he has so incorrectly
but so graphically described, this extraordinary conclusion :
It would have been better for the army had he not given battle,
and had he done more to communicate with his chief, [and] in fact
the position of the army is very critical.
This latter is doubtless a correct inference. The heads
of Lee's columns massed at Sulphur Springs and Waterloo,
three of General Meade's corps near Culpeper, and the
other corps strung along the river from Freeman's Ford to
Kelley's, at dark on the evening of the 12th, might well
excite apprehension in the mind of any general. But what
if General Gregg had allowed himself to be forced from
his position at Sulphur Springs by Stuart's cavalry brigade
back upon the road to Fayetteville, without having seen
Lee's infantry? What if that infantry, uninterrupted in
its rapid march, had crossed the Hedgeman at three p.m.,
and by nightfall reached Warrenton? What then? It was
not anything that General Gregg or his cavalry did or
failed to do that endangered the army. It was the false re¬
ports that were responsible for the days and nights of march¬
ings in retreat, rearguard actions, and general scramble
for the fortifications around Washington, before an army
numerically inferior, and certainly not superior in morale.^
to that which Meade commanded.
It seems necessary, for the truth of history, that the
foregoing account should receive a place in this work, for
680
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
the reason that General Meade, in his report of operations,,
and General Humphreys, chief of staff. Army of the Poto¬
mac, in his "Gettysburg to the Rapidan," and the Comte
de Paris, in his history, appear to have construed General
Gregg's 4:50 p. m. dispatch as communicating intelligence
of General Lee's movements which had been obtained early
on the morning of the 12th, and retained during the whole
of that eventful day, whereas it is evident from the facts he
states, the inference was, at the date of the dispatch, that
General Lee crossed the Hazel River in the morning, be¬
cause at 4:50 p. m. his cavalry, infantry, and artillery
appeared simultaneously, with his broken regiments, on the
south bank of the Hedgeman.
General Meade's army had present for duty 76,153 effec¬
tive troops, while General Lee's army had present for duty
only 56,088. (See "War Records," Vol. XXIX, Part I,
pages 226 and 823.)
CHAPTER XIV.
MINE RUN.
T" EE, having failed to surprise Meade in his flank move-
^ ment which ended with the Bristoe action, fell
back behind the Rappahannock, with his headquarters at
Culpeper.
When the Confederate army retreated from Gettys¬
burg, Longstreet regarded the cause of the Confederacy
as lost, unless the Army of the Cumberland could be over¬
whelmed or destroyed. He urged Eee to permit him to
take his corps and reenforce Bragg, who was opposing
Rosecrans. Lee hesitated to give his consent, but, after
nearly a month's persuasion on the part of Longstreet, he
finally yielded under the impression, as Longstreet assured
him, that both Lee's and Meade's armies would go into
winter quarters, and he (Longstreet) would not be needed
there. Longstreet said to me; "»That that was the only
hope of saving the Confederacy, ' ' and that, ' ' Rosecrans
was a much abler general than Bragg, and had he been let
alone, Rosecrans would have driven him into the sea."
He further stated : "I thought with my corps and Bragg's
army Rosecrans could be crushed, which would perhaps
save the waning fortunes of the Confederacy, and counter¬
act the defeat at Gettysburg ; but, as it was, while Rosecrans
was driven back, I lost 10,000 of my corps, who could not
be replaced, and left us that much worse off."
The above statement by Longstreet was made in the fall
of 1882. We had spent the evening before with Rosecrans,
when those military operations were all gone over. After
we left Rosecrans, Longstreet said : " I deeply regret that I
581
582
THE A RAI Y OF THE POTOMAC.
ever took part in the battle of Chickamauga against Rose-
crans, for I did the Confederacy no good, while perhaps I
marred his fame, as I regard him- one of the ablest officers
of the army, and without my troops against him it would
have given him great prestige."
Thus it will be seen that Lee had only the corps of
Ewell and Hill. It might be estimated that one-third of
his army was absent with Longstreet. He had placed his
army on the right bank of the Rappahannock, in much the
same position he occupied when Burnside assumed com¬
mand, before the battle of Fredericksburg, while the Union
army held the same relative position. Lee holding the
fords of the Rappahannock* from Sulphur Springs down to
Kelley's Ford, hoped to detain Meade on the north bank
until the late fall storms set in, when both armies would
go into winter quarters. If Meade attempted to move
down the river to Fredericksburg, Lee thought it would be
the same old race of 1862 over again, when the Confederate
army, by forced marches, gained the heights back of Fred¬
ericksburg, and held them until after the battle. Meade
was strongly of the opinion that he could conceal his move¬
ments until he could strike the river at Fredericksburg or
Banks' Ford, and succeed in crossing and get possession of
the heights before Lee would be aware of it ; but Halleck
emphatically declined to have that route considered at all.
He claimed it would abandon the Alexandria and Orange
Railroad which crosses the Rappahannock at the station of
that name. This would not necessarily have been the
case, for the move, if successful, would have given Meade
possession of the road to Culpeper, and had he been able
to master Lee on the field of battle, he could have com¬
pelled him to retreat. Though Lee had only two-thirds
of his army to oppose Meade, it must be remembered that
the Army of the Potomac had been stripped of three corps,
Ninth, Eleventh and Twelfth, which had been sent west.
So Meade had also lost one-third of his corps, and in round
numbers one-tliird of his army, which left the two armies
MINE RUN.
583
numerically about as before. The movement around Lee's
right flank having been abandoned, if Meade had made a for¬
ward movement he would have been compelled to advance
his army, and make a front attack. The Indian summer,
the balmiest part of the season, gave hopes that there would
be ample time for the Army of the Potomac to make a for¬
ward movement, and the battle of Gettysburg had increased
the confidence of the Union soldiers, who then looked with
bright hopes to a speedy termination of the war. Meade
felt its growing confidence in that respect, and he decided
to have the railway repaired in his front, toward the Rap¬
pahannock, preparatory to an advance.
The Confederate forces were" posted with Hill on the left
of the railroad and Ewell on the right. On the 7th of
November Sedgwick left Warrenton with the Sixth Corps
and marched to Fayetteville. The Second, Third and
Fifth Corps moved to Auburn, Catlett's Station and
Warrenton Junction. Meade then divided his army into
two wings ; the left one, composed of the First, Second
and Third Corps, under General French, moved in the
direction of Kelley's Ford, while the right wing, composed
of the Fifth and Sixth Corps, with Sedgwick leading,
marched on to Rappahannock Station. When the left
wing arrived in rear of the crest opposite Kelley's Ford, an
examination of the troops on the bank was made ; as yet
the pickets of the enemy were unaware of the presence of
the Union army. The Third Corps was then advanced,
with de Trobriand's brigade making the attack, sending
forward sharpshooters under Colonel Trepp. The 2d North
Carolina, under Colonel Stallings, at once opened a rapid
fire on Trepp's sharpshooters, but the latter's telescopic rifles
soon compelled them to seek shelter in a ditch, when the
13th North Carolina came to their rescue. The right bank
of the Rappahannock was low at the ford, and Rodes, who
was in command, had to keep his artillery and his reserve
back about a mile on the way leading to Stevensburg.
When de Trobriand advanced to the bank of the river,
584
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Rodes ordered a battery to the rescue of the North Caroli¬
nians ; but Birney's artillery had been rapidly put in posi¬
tion, and compelled it to retreat. Rodes had formed his
division to advance to the ford, but suffered so much from
the Union artillery that he was unable, without fright¬
ful loss, to come to the rescue of his troops there. De
Trobriand taking advantage of the situation, threw his
brigade across the river, and captured the 2d South Caro¬
lina. The pontoons were soon laid, and Meade's left wing
marched over Kelley's Ford without serious opposition.
Rodes seeing the heavy force opposed to him, fell back
with his right in the direction of Stevensburg, at the same
time notifying Ewell of the events which had taken place,
who ordered Johnson to Rodes' assistance, and to form a
line of battle closing the angle from the Rappahannock. to
Mountain Run.
Meade did not attempt to pursue Rodes, consequently
did not attack the new line of battle formed by Ewell, but
waited to hear from his right, under Sedgwick, at Rappa¬
hannock Station. At that point it seems that Fee had a
desii'e to cling to the north bank of the river, and occupied
the works there with Hays' brigade of Louisiana troops and
Green's battery. Early, who had just relieved Johnson, had
the brigades* of Gordon, Hoke and Pegram back near
Brandy Station. It was certainly a very peculiar idea of
Lee's to leave a single brigade on the opposite bank of a
river exposed to the attacks of a heavy force from the
enemy. But, nevertheless. Hays was occup}'ing these old
works which had been in tiirn occupied by both armies.
They had been reformed and strengthened with a view to
withstand a heavy siege. Early ordered Hoke's brigade
forward to assist Hays. Sedgwick had formed his line with
the Fifth Corps on the left of the railroad, and the Sixth
Corps on the right. General Wright, who was in command
of the latter corps, directed the First Division, under Rus¬
sell, to connect with the Fifth Corps at the railroad, and
Howe's division, on Russell's right, was ordered to advance
MINE R UN. 585
and seize a hill some three-quarters of a mile from the
enemy's works. Upon that hill Waterman and Martin'.s
batteries, and four 20-pounder Parrot guns from the artillery
reserve, were posted. In the iñean time Gen. R. O. Tyler,
of the Fifth, had brought up ten guns to enfilade the re¬
doubts of the enemy from the left. It soon became evident
to Sedgwick that the enemy was very strongly posted, and
he continued the artillery firing until dark, when he could
assault the works with infantry. Russell taking the 5th Wis¬
consin and 6th Maine, closely supported by the 49th and
119th Pennsylvania, advanced as secretly as possible to
storm the works, upon which the artillery had been un¬
able during the afternoon to make much impression or to
destroy. When the 5th Wisconsin and 6th Maine scaled
the parapets there took place a hand-to-hand encounter of
a most desperate character ; but the Union troops were
victorious, with a loss of half their number. The 5th
Maine and 121st New York subsequently carried the rifle-
pits on the right, capturing a large number of prisoners.
The 96th Pennsylvania gallantly rushed to the enemy's
pontoon bridge and prevented the escape of Hoke and
Hays' soldiers who had not already been taken prisoners.
The 95th Pennsylvania, seeing the 96th cut off their retreat,
was prompt in guarding the prisoners and conducting them
to the rear. General Russell in his report says :
Much praise is due Captain Morrill of the 20th Regiment Maine
Volunteers, who commanded a skirmish detail of 75 Maine volun¬
teers, and on learning their works in the front were to be stormed,
he called for volunteers to aid their sister regiment. Major Fuller,
commanding the 6th Maine skirmishers, reports that some 50 men
responded to the call, and by their valor and dash rendered most
efficient aid.
The character of this night's charge is clearly stated in
the following ;
Headquarters Army of the Potomac,
November 12, 1863.
Sir :—I have the honor herewith to transmit, in charge of Brig.
Oen. D. A. Russell, seven battle-flags and one staff, the flag of
586
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
which was torn off by the standard-bearers to prevent it being cap¬
tured. These .trophies were taken in the recent gallant assault on
the enemy's intrenched position at Rappahannock Station, and
Brigadier General Russell has .been designated by Major General
Sedgwick to deliver them to you, because of his conspicuous con¬
duct as the leader of the storming party on the occasion.
Very respectfully, etc.,
George G. Meade,
Major General Commanding.
To Adjutant General of the Army.
The appreciation of the Government is expressed in the
following communication :
War Department, Adjutant General's Ofeice,
Washington, November 19, 1863.
General :—The Secretary of War received with great satisfac¬
tion at the hands of Brig. Gen. D. A. Russell, the seven battle-flags^
and one staff taken in the recent assault on the enemy's intrenched
position at Rappahannock Station, by the storming party led by the
gallant General Russell.
The Secretary desires me to convey his thanks to the officers and
men engaged in those operations of the army, which reflect such
high credit upon the skill which planned and the bravery which
successfully executed them.
I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,
E. D. Townsend,
Assistant Adjutant General.
To Major General Meade, U. S. Volunteers,
Commanding Army of the Potomac.
Lee seeing that the left wing.of the Army of the Potomac
had, without difficulty, crossed to the south side of the Rap¬
pahannock, while its right had succeeded in capturing two
of his (Lee's) brigades at Rappahannoek Station, placing
his army in a most embarrassing dilemma, retreated behind
the Rapidan, and again bade defiance to his old adversary.
With Ewell and Hill retreating on dmerent roads, was
Meade's golden opportunity to strike one or the other of
these corps a blow, and then, facing the other, attack that
one. He had surprised Lee at the Rappahannock, cap¬
tured two of his brigades, and crossed the river in his face,
when both armies were about equal in numbers. Lee mor-
MINE RUN.
587
tified at the manner in which he had been outgeneraled,
flew to the jungles of the Wilderness behind the Rapidan,
and there, crouched panther-like in his lair, waited for
Meàde to come up again. If the wings of Meade's army
had hotly pursued the corps of Ewell and Hill, and not
permitted time for them to form a line of battle without
attacking it, the chances were greatly in Meade's favor.
But he stopped to repair the railroad as he advanced, which
gave Lee all the time he desired to select the place and in¬
trench himself where it was not only hazardous but almost
ruinons to attack him.
On the 7th of November the Army of the Potomac
moved on the Rappahannock, but not until the 27th did
Meade cross the peninsula between the Rappahannock and
the Rapidan, which he should have accomplished in a single
day. So desperate was Lee that he moved to Orange
Court House, then returned to the right bank of the
Rapidan, finally taking a position on its right bank with
his right resting on Mine Run. It was even a better posi¬
tion than Chancellorsville, though in the same vicinity, for
a part of Meade's army had to march over the same ground
as before in order to reach that ill-fated field. This was the
only position Lee could take to make a successful stand
against Meade ; for if he retreated in the direction of Freder¬
icksburg, the moment he passed the confines of the Wilder¬
ness, his rear would be exposed in an open country to a pur¬
suing army, when he would lose many soldiers captured on
the march by the cavalry. His army would thus be de¬
pleted and his ability to resist would soon be exhausted.
Besides, the military stores at Gordonsville had to be pro¬
tected if possible.
When Meade discovered Lee's position he decided to
cross at the lower fords, and, seizing the plank road and
turnpike running from Fredericksburg to Orange Court
House, turn Lee's right flank or compel him to retreat.
These two roads separate at Dowdall's Tavern, some two
miles west of Chancellorsville. The turnpike leads to the
¿88 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
right, while the plank road runs almost parallel with it on
the left. Meade's plan was to concentrate his army in the
vicinity of Robertson's Tavern on the turnpike, about two
miles east of where it is crossed by Mine Run. In accordance
therewith. General French, commanding the Third Corps,
was directed to proceed to Jacobs' Mill, cross the Rapidan
at that point, and continue his march on the road leading to
Robertson's Tavern, while General Warren, in command
of the Second Corps, crossed at Germanna Ford, and took
the turnpike for the same place. General Sykes, who
with the Fifth Corps crossed at Culpeper Ford, was
ordered to take the plank road to Parker's Store, and if
practicable proceed to the crossroad leading to Robertson's
Tavern. Gregg's division of cavalry crossed the Rapidan
River to protect the left flank of the army. Custer's divi¬
sion held the upper fords of the Rapidan, while Merritt was
left at Richardsville to guard the trains. Sedgwick fol¬
lowed the Third Corps, and Newton, in command of the
First Corps, took two divisions ; the Third Division was
left on the railroad to follow the Fifth. Warren arrived
at Robertson's Tavern about ten o'clock and began skir¬
mishing with the enemy, but Meade ordered him to simply
hold his position until French arrived. An hour later
French reported that the head of his column was near the
plank road and he was waiting for Warren. He was
directed to move promptly to Robertson's Tavern, but in that
he utterly failed. Prince, who commanded his leading
division, came to the fork in the road, and French com¬
pelled him to take the right-hand one, which threw him on
the Raccoon Ford road away from Warren. Then Prince
was ordered to countermarch and take the other road to
Robertson's Tavern.
The enemy followed Prince and attacked his and Carr's
divisions which had been deployed on his left. One of
Carr's brigades was driven back, and the others being out
of ammunition, Birney advanced with his division and re¬
lieved Carr. French had failed to ob^ or understand
MINE RUN.
589
Meade's orders, and toward evening Meade sent for Newton
with the First Corps to move over from the plank road to
Warren's support on the turnpike at Robertson's Tavern.
General Gregg, who was on the plank road, advanced to
New Hope Church, which is near the intersection of the
plank road and the crossroad leading to Robertson's Tavern.
There he (Gregg) met Stuart's cavalry, and had a se¬
vere engagement, driving them back until reënforced with
infantry, when Sykes relieved Gregg. Meade having
formed his line of battle, began the examination of the
enemy's position, which resulted in the' officers opposing
an attack upon that position. Tee occupied the west¬
ern bank of Mine Run, which was icq feet high, back
perhaps looo yards from the stream. With artillery
posted on it, our troops would have been 'cut to pieces before
they could have reached the summit, and then, exhausted,
could not have forced the Confederates from their position.
Warren, who had taken the lead, and had been the inspi¬
ration of that campaign, was directed to take the Second
Corps, with a division of the Sixth, and move to the left
and attempt to turn Lee's right. It was Meade's intention to
support Warren's move with a column in the center, com¬
posed of the First and Third Corps, and another on the right,
composed of the Fifth and Sixth Corps. But now came
another unexpected change ; while General French, who had
commanded the center, reported that he was fearful he could
not succeed, Warren and other officers reported Warren's
position so favorably on the left that the enemy was ex¬
pected to retreat during the night. Meade now decided
to still farther reënforce Warren with two divisions of the
Third Corps, which gave him six divisions, nearly half of
thé Army of the Potomac. The batteries of the right and
center were to open at eight o'clock on the 30th. In the
center, the skirmishers of the First Corps and one division
of the Third, advanced across Mine Run, and drove back
the enemy's line of skirmishers.
About nine o'clock Meade received a dispatch from
590
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Warren, stating that the position of the enemy in his front
then was so strongly fortified that he advised against
making the attack. The Confederates saw our army
moving on the plank road, and knew that that point
would be strongly assaulted early in the morning ; conse¬
quently they worked all night making abattis and in-
trenchments preparatory to the great struggle that was to
take place the following day. Warren feared that the
enemy had divined the real movement, and early next
morning a critical examination was made of the position
he was to attack. The more he studied it, the more he
was convinced that it was almost impossible, without an ex¬
cessive sacrifice of life, to make a successful assault. The
position was of no importance whatever ; it was the de¬
struction of Lee's army he wished to accomplish. So War¬
ren, ever clear-headed and honest, decided not to attack
the enemy in the strongest position Lee could have selected,
and accordingly sent the following dispatch to Meade :
The position and strength of the enemy seem so formidable in
my present front that I advise against making the attack here—the
full light of the sun shows me I cannot succeed.
General Meade says :
As Sedgwick's attack was subsidiary to Warren's, and as, owing
to Warren's confidence of the night before I had given him so large
a part of the army that I had not the means of supporting Sedg¬
wick in case of a repulse or reënforcing him in the event of success,
I was obliged to suspend the attack of Sedgwick on the enemy's
left, which I did just in time ; and immediately proceeded to General
Warren's column, some four miles distant, in the hope of arranging
some plan by which the two attacks might yet take place in the
afternoon. I reached General Warren between lo and ii a. m., and
foand his views were unchangeable, and that it was his decided
opinion it was hopeless to make any attack. It was too late to move
the troops back and make an attack on the center that day, and
General Warren was so far separated from the right that his move¬
ment to turn the enemy's right could not be continued without
moving up the rest of the army in support, and abandoning the
Turnpike road, our main line of communications.
MINE RUN.
591
After fiirtner consulting with Warren, Meade said :
Under these circumstances I could see no other course to pursue
than either to hazard an assault, which I knew to be hopeless, and
which I believed would be attended with certain disaster, or, ac¬
knowledging the whole movement a failure, withdraw the arm}' to
the north bank of the Rapidan.
The rank and file understood quite as well as the generals
that it was a forlorn hope to attack the position which Lee
had so carefully selected ; and many of the men pinned
their names on their coats so they might be identified.
The Confederate position at Mine Rtm was still better
than the Union position at Gettysburg ; the latter was in
the shape of a fish-hook, while the enemy's position here
was semicircular, and any threatened point could be reën-
forced with promptness, and the condition of the coun¬
try was such that either of their wings could be extended
and a new line fortified in a single night against an
attack. Meade and Warren fully realized this fact, and
resolved not to waste time in front of a position that could
not be carried. The weather was exceedingly cold, and
the troops found it necessary to keep in constant motion in
order to prevent freezing, and several perished on the re¬
treat. In speaking of Mine Run, Colonel Talley says :
In accordance with instructions, I marched m}- eommand, the
ist Pennsylvania Reserves, to the right of our line and to the foot
of that terrible hill, the entire side of which was covered with an
abattis—trees and branches of trees, sharpened and laid with their
points outward—ditehes thinly covered with brush, and other
death-traps, constructed for the purpose of preventing the assailants
from ascending.
It was night—a cold, gloomy night, the coldest that was ex¬
perienced by the army during any other engagement or attempted
engagement ; everything was gloomy ; the impregnable defenses,
the frowning forts, the leafless trees, the earth and the heavens, all
seemed to frown and threaten ; the daring men, generally, even
amid dangers, so witty, cheerful and hopeful, could not be heard to
speak above a whisper. A dreadful silence reigned, but slightly
broken by the cautious, ghost-like steps of the troops, who trod a
Ö92
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
few paces to and fro, in order to prevent the blood from congealing,
so low was the temperature. Silence was important, that our posi¬
tion and intention might not be known by the enemy.
I was instructed to await the order to charge the works in my
immediate front, which would be given during the night, when the
other line was ready. Every man could see the fearful abattis, anti¬
cipate the trenches, see the steep ascent of the hill, and almost meas¬
ure the distance to the summit. Every moment I expected to re¬
ceive the order to charge. Certain death faced us, yet not one of my
brave, noble men left the ranks. I moved among them frequently
to quietly encourage them ; they did not seem to need it ; they fully
understood the situation, and were firm, unflinching and ready
to meet their fate, though madness they believed it to be, in a gen¬
eral commanding, to require such a sacrifice. I had full confidence
in my old, tried soldiers, who had fought on many fields, and whom
I had led in the charges at Fredericksburg, Gettysburg, and other
battles. We remained for hours in this position. The order did not
arrive.
Had it come, the charge would have been made, with all the
force and courage men possess ; yet but few, if any, would have
reached the summit. While endeavoring to climb over the trees
and branches and pass the ditches we would have been raked by
the rebel grape and canister, and those who might have reached a
sufficient distance would have received the concentrated fire of their
musketry. And thus would have ended the remainder of the ist
Reserves.
Finally we fell back, and marched during the remainder of the
night toward the place of beginning. No battle was fought. The
army, perhaps the Union cause, was saved, due to the clear judg¬
ment and military skill of thqse grand ofiicers, Meade and Warren.
If ofiicers less cautious and less able had been in command, the
battle, likely, would have been fought there and then. It is very
tempting to a commanding officer—after marching far and maneu¬
vering much, with the people at home so anxious and so urging,
though so ignorant of the surroundings, for forward movements
and dashing fights—when he has reached the enemy, to attack him,
however strong his position.
Had the two armies fought at Mine Run the result would have
been the greatest slaughter recorded in the history of the United
States. It was the part of wisdom to retire in due season, which
Meade did ; and the army returned to winter quarters to be reorgan¬
ized under a new commander, that indefatigable soldier, General
Grant.
CHAPTER XV.
THE WILDERNESS.
"X ^THEN Meade returned to the north side of the
^ ^ Rapidan after Mine Run he at once proceeded to
put the army in winter quarters in the peninsula formed
by the Rappahannock and Rapidan, with the exception of
one corps. The First and Third Corps occnpied positions
two miles south of Culpeper Court House, the Second
Corps near Stevensburg, while the Fifth Corps guarded the
railroad from the Rappahannock back to Bristoe Station.
The Sixth Corps was at Wilsford, on the Hazel River.
Neither army could move, so there was comparative
quiet until April, when the Ninth Corps was ordered to
rejoin the Army of the Potomac, and by the 3d of May had
relieved the Fifth Corps from guard duty north of the
Rappahannock. The war had raged with unabated fury
for three years, yet the Southern Confederacy was still in
existence, and its authorities at Richmond were hoping it
could hold on until the nations of Europe would recognize
it as an independent and sovereign power.
Though Eee had been defeated at Gettysburg, yet the
Army of the Potomac had been nnable to strike him a blow
sufficiently hard on his retreat to cripple him in his future
movements. Circumstances had conspired to permit him to
retreat across the Rappahannock with his defeated army ;
and during the Winter he had been able to recruit its ranks
to such an extent that he had a powerful army ready to take
the field and fight most desperately. This army, Vhich
had fought under him from the Peninsular Campaign to
that time, regarded him as a great general, and were ready
xxxvni 593
594
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
to follow his lead in the future the same as in the past.
The few reverses his army had suffered when attempting
to invade the North did not weigh heavily with them.
They still thought on Southern soil—at home—they were
unconquerable. Lee's life was wrecked unless the Confed¬
eracy succeeded. The game became a more desperate one
with him as the war neared its close. While Longstreet
and other officers thought it was hopeless to prolong the
struggle after Gettysburg, Lee continued firm in his belief
that he could yet pull the Confederacy through.
He had resigned his position in the United States Army
and declined the command of the Army of the Potomac
when it was tendered to him after Lincoln was inaugurated.
His valuable possessions of Arlington and other estates,
which had descended to him through Colonel Custis from
George Washington, would in case of defeat be confiscated,
and he would be an outcast from society where once he had
been received with distinguished honor. With a general so
determined the Confederate army, composed of veterans
seasoned to the hardships and privations of war, was almost
invincible. The Union authorities were fully aware of this,
as well also of the important fact that the war was lengthen¬
ing ont beyond a point of safety to the nation. There had
been no grand system by which all the armies had worked
together, while the Confederates could easily reënforce any
one of their armies liable to attack, and were able, with a
far less number of soldiers, to throw an overwhelming force
on any Union general who attempted to advance.
When McDowell advanced on Beauregard at Bull Run,
Johnson put his troops on the cars, arrived on the field in
time to render the latter assistance, and thus turned defeat
into victory, while the forces under Patterson were stationed
in his front. Jackson victorious, marched down the Shen¬
andoah, then turning rapidly, returned to Richmond, and
was soon attacking the Army of the Potomac under Mc-
Clellan. After the battle of Fredericksburg, Longstreet
went to lay siege to Suffolk. When Rosecrans was march-
GEN. U. S. GRANT.
THE WILDERNESS.
595
ing on Chattanooga, Longstreet went to Bragg's assistance,
and most stubbornly fought Rosecrans at Chickaniauga.
Then returning, his corps lay near Gordonsville, prepared
to move at a moment's notice to any point Lee directed.
Thus having the interior lines, it was an easy matter to re-
ënforce any army in danger. The Administration saw that
bloody battles were being fought without success ; that time
was being wasted as well as money with the different armies
actiiig independent of each other. Therefore Congress passed
an act, which was approved on February 29, 1864, reviving
the grade of lieutenant general in the army. That move
was made in order to appoint a general who would have
command of all the armies, and have concert of action,
which would prevent the Confederate armies reënforcing at
any one point without suffering at the place from which
their troops had been taken. On the 9th of March, Gen¬
eral Grant received his commission as lieutenant general.
It was made quite an occasion at the White House, when
Lincoln presented his commission to him. The Cabinet
and Grant's staff in Washington were present, with a few
other visitors. In presenting the commission the President
took occasion to make one of those elegant little addresses
which are living monuments of his goodness and greatness.
He said :
General Grant, the Nation's appreciation of what yoxi have
done, and its reliance upon you for what remains to be done in the
existing struggle, are now presented, with commission constituting
you Ivieutenant General in the Army of the United States. With
this high honor, devolves upon you also a corresponding responsi¬
bility. As the country herein trusts you, so, under God, it will sus¬
tain you. I scarcely need add that, with what I here speak for the
Nation, goes my own hearty concurrence.
To which Grant replied :
Mr, President, I accept the commission, with gratitude for the
high honor conferred. With the aid of noble armies that have fought
in so many fields for our common country, it will be my earnest
endeavor not to disappoint your expectations. I feel the full weight
596 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
of the responsibilities now devolving on me; and I know that if they
are met, it will be due to those armies, and above all, to the favor
of that Providence which leads both nations and men.
The next day Grant visited the Army of the Potomac.
Meade had his headquarters at Brandy Station. These
two generals had not met since the Mexican war, when
they were both subalterns. Grant became attached to
Meade and retained him in command of the Army of the
Potomac, notwithstanding he offered to resign, so that
Grant could put Sherman or some other Western officer in
command. But Grant held Meade in high respect for his
work at Gettysburg, and refused to accept his resignation.
It was some time before Grant finally took up his
headquarters with the Army of the Potomac at Culpeper
Court House. He had to return to the West to arrange
matters there for the grand plan of moving all the armies,
at once as soon as the spring opened. Meeting Sherman
at St. Louis, he gave him his old command, promoted
McPherson to the position Sherman had held, and advanced
Logan to the command of McPherson's corps.
In the mean time Meade determined to reorganize the
Army of the Potomac. There were more corps in it than
he desired. Lee's army had been well managed with only
three corps, while the Army of the Potomac had more
than double that number ; on various occasions the corps
commanders had not fully complied with the commander-
in-chief's wishes, and this, perhaps, had much to do with,
the reorganization. At Gettysburg Sickles moved his corps-
from the line of battle, extending from Little Round Top to
the seminary, forward to the Emmittsburg road, a distance
of a half mile or more. During that battle and ever since
there has been an acrimonious discussion carried on in
regard to the matter; Meade would have drawn Sickles
back to the regular line on the second day, but Longstreet
was ready to begin the attack on him, and for that reason
Meade desisted from issuing an order for him to retire,
and threw half or more of the army in to support him.
COL. C. M. CONYNGHAM.
THE WILDERNESS.
597
The reason assigned by Meade for consolidating the
corps was the reduced strength of the regiments. As Meade
had served in the First Corps in the battles of second Bull
Run, South Mountain, Antietam (where he commanded the
corps after Hooker was wounded) and Fredericksburg, it
seemed strange to the officers and men of that corps that it
should be selected to lose its place among the corps, when it
had fought so valiantly on so many fields, and had particu-
larlv distinguished itself when Meade had led it into action.
w o
At Gettysburg it held in check, with the assistance of two
divisions of the Eleventh Corps, two-thirds of the Confed¬
erate army, until the other corps of the Army of the Poto¬
mac arrived. It had in reality closed the battle of Gettys¬
burg with the charge of General Stannard. No prouder
record was ever made in the military history of the world
than the First Corps had. While Meade was popular
with the officers and men, yet there has ever been a sin¬
cere regret in the minds of the gallant soldiers of that
corps that it was blotted out as a distinctive organization.
That it was a mistake is manifest from the statement of
General Humphreys, in his history of "The Virginia Cam¬
paign of 1864 and 1865," in which he says :
But it caused some dissatisfaction with both officers and enlisted
men, owing to the spirit of rivalry between the several corps, the
divisions of a corps, and the brigades of a division. The history
and associations of these organizations were-different, and when
they were merged in other organizations their identity was lost and
their pride and esprit de corps wounded.
But the old First Corps submitted without a murmur,
and in the battles until the final surrender at Appomattox
it maintained its former record on the field. Many valua¬
ble officers were left without commands. General Newton,
who was in command of the corps then, and after Hancock
was wounded at Gettysburg was put in command of the
First, Second, and Third Corps until the close of that
battle, was one of those who had suffered by the consolida-
598
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
tion. The three divisions of the First Corps, commanded
respectively by Gens. James C. Rice, John C. Robinson,
and John R. Kenly, were consolidated and formed two
divisions of the Fifth Corps. In the new organization of
the Fifth Corps, three of the four divisions came from the
First Corps; for Crawford's division of Pennsylvania Re¬
serves was one of the original divisions of the First Corps,
when the corps was so designated under McDowell in the
spring of 1862. It was detached at Fredericksburg to join
McClellan on the Peninsula, and there fought in the Fifth
Corps. When McClellan's army came to the assistance of
Pope, it rejoined the First Corps, and fought the battles of
second Bull Run, South Mountain, Antietam, and Fred¬
ericksburg in it ; then it was again put in the Fifth Corps.
Under the reorganization it was the Third Division of the
Fifth Corps. John C. Robinson was given the Second
Division, of three brigades. The Third Corps was made
the Third and Fourth Divisions of the Second Corps.
When Grant visited Meade on the loth, he informed
him that Butler was directed to move up the right bank
of the James at the same time that the Army of the Po¬
tomac would, so as to sever the communications between
Richmond and the South. This would cut off supplies
and reënforcements. He also informed Meade that General
Sigel would be directed to move his forces with a view to
a concentration near Lynchburg. Sigel, who was in the
Shenandoah Valley, would ascend it, while General Crook,
commanding the other column under Sigel, was to march
from the Great Kanawha through Lewisburg, when the
latter would join the Army of the Potomac by the way of
Gordonsville and become its right wing.
Grant had already seen the necessity of remaining with
the Army of the Potomac. To remain in the West in com¬
mand of all the armies would be to neglect the Army of the
Potomac, which had the most important work to do ; if the
latter failed what the other armies did would be of no avail.
Besides, Grant knew that Halleck would still exercise a
THE WILDERNESS.
599
great influence over the Army of the Potomac if he (Grant)
remained in the West. Grant and Halleck had had differ¬
ences in the West, and Halleck had made serious blunders in
directing the Army of the Potomac. But for his stubborn¬
ness Miles' force would never have been surrendered, and his
blind folly again came very near stranding the Army of the
Potomac in its pursuit of Lee, when he was marching on
Harrisburg and Philadelphia. His refusal to permit Hooker
to direct French tempoiarily to abandon Harper's Ferry
and unite with the Army of the Potomac, caused Hooker
to ask to be relieved. Grant first settled where his head¬
quarters would be with the Army of the Potomac ; next the
route he would take. There were four from which to
choose. He could turn Lee's left flank and take the Gor-
donsville line ; that had the advantage of having Sigel's
command unite with him and swell the size of the Army
of the Potomac. It would necessarily have to be a short
campaign to enable the men to carry their rations ; and
Grant believed that to supply the Army of the Potomac by
wagons would make such an immense train that it would
be cumbersome. He could take the line up the south bank of
the James, but Butler was already there with two corps.
Then there was the old route up the Peninsula between the
James and York Rivers, which McClellan had stranded on.
The two latter routes would not have protected Washington.
The last and fourth route was to turn Lee's right flank,
which would prevent a countermovement on Washington,
and force him back on Richmond and destroy his army as
soon as possible.
At midnight on the 3d of May the army was put in
motion to cross the Rapidan. Warren with the Fifth
Corps was directed do cross at Germanna Ford. Wilson's
cavalry division had preceded him and taken possession of
the ford so that a bridge could be thrown across. Warren's
corps arrived at six a.m. and began crossing at seven. By
one o'clock the whole corps was across. Wilson's cavalry,
leading the way for some distance, turned off to the right
600 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
in the direction of Robertson's Tavern in order to see if
the enemy was advancing. Griffin's division followed
Wilson's cavalry. Warren kept on to old Wilderness
Tavern road, with Crawford's, Wadsworth's and Robinson's
divisions in the order named. Not seeing the enemy Wil¬
son withdrew and moved on to Parker's Store, in front of
Warren. Hancock, preceded by Gregg's division of cav¬
alry, crossed at Ely's Ford and took the road to Chancel-
lorsville, where he encamped for the night. Sedgwick was
ordered to follow Warren, while Torbert's division of cav¬
alry was left to protect the rear. When the troops had
crossed the Rapidan, Grant sent orders to Burnside to unite
with the army south of the Rapidan. Making a forced
march, he arrived there the next day, some of his troops
having marched forty miles. When Warren crossed Grant
left his headquarters at Culpeper and proceeded to the front.
On the 2d of May Lee summoned his corps and division
commanders to him at the signal station on Clark's Moun¬
tain. He then said to them that he thought the enemy
would cross at the lower fords on the Rapidan and turn his
right flank. When Warren crossed the Rapidan and moved
to old Wilderness Tavern, Ewell, who was aware of the
movement, by reports from the ist North Carolina Cavalry,
which he had sent down in the direction of Germanna Ford,
sent Major Campbell, of his staff, to inform General Lee.
Ewell received an order to regulate his advance so as to
keep abreast with A. F. Hill on the plank road, but not to
bring on an engagement, if possible, until Longstreet could
come up. Johnson's division was leading, with Jones' brig¬
ade thrown forward to skirmish. Griffin encountered the
advance of Johnson's division and pushed Jones back, when
the brigfades of Battle and Doles were ordered to his assist-
anee. As Ewell was ordered to simply hold the Union
army in check and observe its movements, these three
brigades slowly fell back, pressed by Griffin, supported by
Wadsworth on his left with the Third Brigade of Robinson's
division. Crawford's division was formed on the extreme
COL. JOS. H. MOESCH.
THE WILDERNESS.
601
left of the corps, as it was in the advance. The Fifth
Corps had pressed back the brigades of Jones, Battle,
and Doles on Ewell's corps, which then formed in line of
battle from right to left in the following order : Daniel's,
Doles', Battle's, Stewart's, Walker's, Stafford's, Pegram's,
Hay's, and Gordon's brigades. The conflict which ensued
was most sanguinary. Wright's division of the Sixth
Corps was ordered up on Griffin's right, as Johnson was
overlapping his right flank, but was unable to get into
position on account of the heavy undergrowth which he
encountered. Getty's division of the Sixth Corps was
directed to move in the rear of the Fifth Corps and take a
position at the Brock and Plank roads to arrest the advance
of A. P. Hill until Hancock, who had marched to Todd's
Tavern on the Brock road, in the direction of Spottsylvania
Court House, could get into position. In the mean time the
battle raged between Ewell's and Warren's corps. Ayres'
Regulars on the right were compelled to yield ground,
which carried the other brigades of Griffin back. Griffin
lost two guns in that movement, which were captured by the
enemy. Wadsworth's division formed line of battle with
Cutler's brigade on the right, Roy Stone in the center, and
Rice on the left. Advancing against the enemy the right
wing of Ewell's corps was struck. The woods were so
thick that alignment could not be maintained, and much
confusion prevailed. In the advance a gap was made be¬
tween Cutler and Stone, of which the enemy quickly took
advantage, and forcing his troops into it compelled Stone
to fall back. Then Rice, Cutler, and the Maryland Brigade
sufferèd from a flank fire, which compelled that part of the
line under Wadsworth to fall back. McCandless' brigade,
of Crawford's division, did not move as soon as Wads-
worth's troops did, and really acted in consequence as an
independent command. It became enveloped with the
right of Ewell' s corps, under Gordon, and lost many killed
and wounded, besides some prisoners. Crawford's Third
on the left meeting with a severe fire. Col. Ira Ayr,
602
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Jr., commanding the Tenth Regiment fell severely
wounded.
Meade and Grant had watched the progress of the battle
from a rise not far from the Lacy House. Fearing that
Hill would seize the position of the intersection at the
Brock and Plank roads, Hancock was hurried back to
Getty's assistance, who only had three brigades with which
to impede Hill's advance, as Neill's brigade had been de¬
tached and was with Wright. Although Heth had arrived
in front of Getty, he made no attempt to attack him, which
was evidence to Grant and Meade that Hill, too, had instruc¬
tions not to bring on a general engagement until Long-
street could arrive. Ewell had fought most desperately on
the right, but Warren had checked him by driving back
his advance brigades on the main body of his corps. Bwell
and Warren had begun throwing up temporary breastworks,
to await the result of the action on the left, and to let
Wright get into position. Ricketts was still back at Ger-
manna Ford waiting to be relieved by the advance of Burn-
side, who was marching rapidly under the orders of Grant.
When Hancock received the order to countermarch his
corps, he at once gave the order and rode back to Getty to get
an idea where to put in the Second Corps. Getty had formed
his three brigades with Eustis on the right, Wheaton in the
center and Grant on the left. Birney's division coming up
was placed in two lines on Getty's left. When Mott and
Gibbon arrived they extended the line to the left in the
same formation. Barlow's division coming up last, formed
Hancock's extreme left, with the exception of Frank's bri¬
gade, which was posted at the intersection of the road lead¬
ing to the Catharpin Furnace and the Brock road. Barlow
was thrown forward across the Brock road on a farm which
had some elevated positions in the fields, with his left
pushed back across the Brock road. This was the only
point on Hancock's front where artillery could be used,
the dense forest almost entirely precluding the use of artil¬
lery along the whole line. Hancock posted all his artil-
COL. S. J. WILLIAMS.
THE WILDERNESS.
G03
lery there on his extreme left, with the exception of one
section of Ricketts' Pennsylvania Battery, and Dow's 6th
Maine, which was posted on Barlow's right, on a line
with Mott's reserve force. One section of Ricketts' bat¬
tery was placed by Getty where the line of battle crossed
the Orange plank road. About four o'clock Getty at¬
tacked the enemy in pursuance to orders received before
Hancock's arrival. He had gone but a short distance
up the Orange plank road when he struck the enemy
well posted. Hancock, seeing that Getty had met the
enemy in heavy force, ordered Birney in to assist him,
which, advancing, he did ; Birney's own division on Get¬
ty's right with Mott's division on Getty's left. The bat¬
tle raged with such severity that Carroll's and Owen's
brigades, of Gibbon's division, were detached to go to
the right of Getty to assist at that point. In the action
two of Barlow's brigades, the Irish and Colonel Brooke's,
became involved with the enemy and drove the right of
his line some distance. The section of Ricketts' battery
which had accompanied Getty and Birney lost so many
horses and men that the guns were captured, but were
retaken, under the direction of Captain Butterfield, of
Carroll's staff, by detachments from the 14th Indiana
and 8th Ohio, of Carroll's brigade. The action closed
about eight o'clock without any material advantage to
either side. That afternoon the Army of the Potomac
lost one of its most gallant officers, who had been a class¬
mate at 'West Point with General Grant. When Grant
learned that General Hays had been killed he was deeply
affected. Although it was so far a drawn battle, the Union
forces were in condition to drive Hill from the field and win
a victory had they had a little more daylight or a Joshua
commanding the sun to stand still.
In order to crush Hill before Anderson and Uongstreet
arrived. Grant and Meade decided to throw Wadsworth, with
Baxter's brigade, on Hill's left and rear ; but it was late in
the afternoon, and these very troops had already had a severe
«04 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
«ngagement. When Wads worth received orders to report to
Hancock, who was then hotly engaged with the enemy at
the intersection of the Brock road and Orange plank road,
he at once obeyed. He was then near the Lacy House, facing
west. Changing the direction of his division to face south
he deployed in line of battle, preceded by a strong line of
skirmishers, and moved to the support of the Second Corps,
guided by the musket-firing of the engagement there being
hotly contested. The troops were soon in the wilderness of
second growth pine, marching in the direction of the left
rear of the Confederate troops engaged with the Second
Corps, and opposed by a strong line of pickets, with strong
reserves, protecting the Confederate flank. The skirmish
firing gave the Confederates warning of the approach of
troops on the rear and flank, probably not unexpected from
General Warren's position. It being after dark, firing in
Hancock's front ceased, and the Confederate line withdrew
to relieve the flank from Wadsworth's threatened attack.
General Wadsworth halted when the darkness was so great
that no alignment could be kept up. Firing having ceased,
save an occasional shot, that general was unable to judge of
the distance intervening between his troops and the Second
Corps, while the Confederate pickets were close in his front.
The thick branches of the pines kept out the starlight, and
the night was one of darkness in its fullest sense.
Wadsworth had not, dwing to obstructions and the
density of the forest, connected with Hancock or struck
the Confederate left when he halted. The regiments rested
on their arms in line of battle. The regimental comman¬
ders were called upon to report the number of cartridges in
possession of the men. At eleven p. m. the reports showed
that nearly all the cartridges had been expended in the en¬
gagement during the day. General Wadsworth's orders
were to proceed quietly. The conflict with the Confederate
pickets, and Col. Roy Stone's enthusiasm, made it a howl¬
ing wilderness. Captain Monteith, aid-de-camp, was sent
back to report to General Warren the situation, and bring
THE WILDERNESS.
60^
some ammunition. The captain received orders from Gen¬
eral Warren to move forward and attack at a specified time,
five a. m., being the earliest dawn. Monteith then proceeded
to the supply train, where Sergt. J. A. Watrous packed ten
mules, that had never before been "cinched," each carrying
2,000 cartridges. He started to return by two a. m., and
reached the line of troops, after much trouble and twisting-
around trees, a few minutes before the time to open the
morning service in behalf of the United States Government.
The troops had had no supper, save dry hard tack, and no
time to prepare breakfast, but were regaled with cartridges.
At five a. m. Wadsworth ordered the advance, and soon was
in front of the Second Corps, which was advancing to attack.
Hancock withdrew to the left of the Orange plank road ;
General Wadsworth made a half wheel to the right, his left
resting on the plank road, making a prolongation of the
Second Corps line, with his right exposed in the Wilder¬
ness.
Owing to the density of the woods, small pine trees,
and low long limbs, mounted officers had much trouble at
times in the saddle. General Wadsworth reined to the road,
and rode with the line of battle. The Confederate line of
battle was soon reached, when it stubbornly resisted the ad¬
vance, but yielded ground. The general's horse was shot
while ridiAg near the road ; mounting the second horse, he
rode into the line of troops engaged, when that horse, too,
was killed. He then mounted the third one. Information
came to him that the enemy was massing and extending his
lines on his (Wadsworth's) right. He asked Hancock for a
brigade, which was promptly sent from the Ninth Corps,
which he placed in support of the troops near his left, believ¬
ing the commotion on the right to be an attempt to call
attention that way, • and then assault on the Orange plank
road. Now there was a lull in the battle which had shivered
the Wilderness into splinters. Men had advanced where
pine trees could not stand, and for a brief space of time a
silence, ominous and portending, prevailed. The thick
606 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
smoke that lurked near the ground, raised and hung heavily
overhead.
The general had eaten neither supper nor breakfast, but
opportunely at this lull his cook came with some coffee and
hardtack. His aids joined him, for they, too, had had thirty
hours of hard work and compulsory fasting. A commotion
and a yell at the front announced the fact that Tongstreet
had arrived, and his men were forming line of battle on
Hill's right. The Union line again advanced. Soon a mes¬
senger came from Hancock with the information that his
(Hancock's) left was yielding, and for Wadsworth to be
watchful, and to govern himself according to circumstances
along his front and on his left. Across the plank road the
Second Corps was seen to be yielding, the Confederate line
passing, and exposing General Wadsworth's left flank.
Directly in front, and only a few yards distant, was an Ala¬
bama brigade lying on the ground. The general wheeled
a regiment near the plank road to the left to fire into the
Confederate flank, which was pursuing the Secortd Corps
back, when suddenly the Alabama brigade arose with a yell
and a volley, causing disorder in the Union lines, which
retired to the Brock road.
General Wads worth sat on his horse in the line of battle,
attended by E. M. Rogers and E. S. Osborne, aids on his
staff, when the Alabamians fired their volley only a few
yards distant. The general seemed to be unmindful of the
perilous position, and, for an instant, held his horse reined
to the front. His troops were routed, and he faced the
Confederate line, his aids with him. Wadsworth was
prancing to the rear when a ball went crashing through
his head, the blood spattering on Lieutenant Rogers' coat,
which still stains hiß uniform. The general fell from his
horse to the ground upon his back. Lieutenant Rogers'
horse was shot by the same volley. Seeing the general
l}'ing with his face upward and mortally wounded, Lieu¬
tenant Rogers attempted to take the general's watch and
other valuables from his pockets, but as the Confederate
GEN. EDWIN S. OSBORNE.
THE WILDERNESS.
607
line was pressing so closely, he was compelled to fly or be
captured. In making t® the rear he found Wadsworth's
horse, his bridle rein having caught on g. snag. Vaulting
into the saddle, Rogers soon reached the troops of the divi¬
sion, while the brave division commander, hero, patriot,
and one of nature's finest noblemen lay almost lifeless
within the enemy's lines. The whole Confederate line was
shouting with joy, under the impression that Grant had
been killed, until it was discovered to be Wadsworth.
Gen. then (Col. ) E. S. Osborne, of Wadsworth's staff, took as
many of the troops as he could rally to the left of the Brock
road, and from there to the intersection of the Orange plank
and Brock roads. At this time the latter road was full of
troops of the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Corps. The con¬
fusion was so great that Osborne had considerable difficulty
in holding the regiments of Roy Stone's brigade at that
point. Having restored order, Osborne moved the troops
along the plank road a short distance, then filed into the
woods and stacked arms, and then found he had the brigade
headquarters colors, and the colors of the 12 ist, I42d, 143d,
149th, and 150th Pennsylvania Regiments, with small
detachments of each regiment. On looking at the offi¬
cers, Osborne found that Lieut. Col. John Irvin, of the
149th, was the ranking officer present. Therefore, Osborne
and Irvin, after consulting, decided to let the men rest and
make coffee, as the battle was liable to be renewed at any
moment. Osborne then placed the headquarters flag near
the Orange plank road, so it could be seen from the cross¬
ing, and advised Lieut. Col. Irvin to take command of the
brigade. General Rice, commanding the Second Brigade,
of Wadsworth's division, had been detailed on special dut^•
by Hancock, and Colonel Hofmann, of the 56th Pennsylva¬
nia, was put in command of the brigade by Rice. Hofmann
at once proceeded to form the troops of that brigade back
on the Brock road, near the remnant of Roy Stone's bri¬
gade. When Hancock gave the order for these two brigades
of the old First Corps to charge the works which had
608
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
been held by the Second Corps, and were then occupied by
the Confederates, these two brigades advanced together and
retook them. Hofqiann displayed great coolness and gallan¬
try in this charge, and well earned the rank of major gen¬
eral for his heroic conduct. The brigade under Cutler had.
been forced back in the direction of the Tacy House early
in the day, and was rallied by Cutler near the old Wilder¬
ness Tavern, and did not participate in the subsequent
charges of the division that day. There were two pieces
of artillery near the crossing, and shortly after coffee had
been taken, this section of the artillery opened on the
enemy, and there was considerable commotion near one of
the guns. While waiting for results Osborne saw two offi¬
cers riding toward him from the crossing. They both
came up at once, when Osborne saw they were Hancock and
Captain Wilson of his staff. General Hancock said, in a sharp
tone of voice : ' ' What troops are these? ' ' Osborne answered :
' ' They are what is left of the old First Corps. ' ' He then
remarked : "Those are just the troops I want. Take them
up there and drive the enemy out of our works. ' ' Colonel
Irvin and Capt. William M. Dalgleish then came up, and
the order was repeated to them by Captain Wilson ; then
Hancock and Wilson rode away. Osborne and Irvin got
the troops in line, and, at double-quick, went to the cross¬
roads, leaving the gun at the road. The enemy had driven
the troops of the Second Corps out of the works, and were
using them as shelter against our attack. The command
moved on the right into line, and with Hofmann's brigade
charged the works that had been abandoned by the Second
Corps, and drove the enemy from them. This was one of
the most brilliant exploits that was performed during the
war. Again had the soldiers of the old First Corps added
another wreath of fame to their accumulated laurels. The
credit of that work was assumed by others, who, an officer
in high repute says, ' ' Were not in the engagement at the
supreme moment at all. ' ' The officers entitled to special
mention for distinguished conduct there, were Gen. E. S.
CAPT. P. De LACY.
THE WILDERNESS.
609
Osborne, then lieutenant colonel and inspector on Wads-
worth's staff ; Lieut. Col. John Irvin, of the 149th Pennsyl¬
vania ; Capt. Win. L. Dalgleish ; Maj. C. M. Conyngham,
of the 143d Pennsylvania ; Major Jones, of the 150th Penn¬
sylvania ; and Colonel Hofinann, of the 56th Pennsylvania.
There were many other acts of valor performed on the
part of officers and men that placed them high on the roll
of honor that day. Captain Bell, of the 150th Pennsylva¬
nia, was killed while on the works defending the flag of
his regiment. Capt. P. De Lacy, of the 143d Pennsylvania,
captured a Confederate battle-flag. On the morning of the
6th, Gibbon was placed in command of his own and Bar¬
low's divisions, the latter holding the extreme left of the
Union line, with Sheridan at Todd's Tavern to guard his
flanks. Getty's division of the Ninth Corps advanced up
the Orange plank road, with Grant's brigade on the left of
the road, Wheaton in the center, and Eustis on the right.
At five a. m., the right, under Birney, advanced according
to orders, and the enemy was driven back, but not without
a stubborn resistance. After Birney had advanced about a
mile and a half, he halted to arrange his lines. The troops
were compelled to lie down in loading, and then partly
rise and fire, the enemy doing the same. Grant had forged
ahead with his Vermont Brigade until his right flank was
endangered, when Wheaton directed his brigade to ad¬
vance, with its right moved back to protect Grant. At
seven a. m., Hancock sent an order to Gibbon to advance
and relieve the heavy press.ure on Birney. For some rea¬
son Gibbon did not attack in heavy force, which disap¬
pointed Hancock ; but he supposed Gibbon feared that
Longstreet was approaching and preparing to turn his left
and gain our rear. Hill had been driven back a mile and
a half, and the divisions of both Wilcox and Heth were
almost exhausted, and could no longer withstand the force
in front of them. Just at this critical moment for the en¬
emy, the head of Longstreet's force, under Kershaw, came
up, and, filing to the right of the Orange plank road, took
XXXIX
610 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
the place of Heth ; at the same time, Field's division re¬
lieved Wilcox.
Hancock's plan was a good one to hurl Hill off of the
field before Longstreet could get his troops in position ; and
if the divisions of Barlow and Gibbon on the left, under
Gibbon, had promptly responded to the order of Hancock,
Longstreet would not have been able, in time, to have
thrown the brigades of G. T. Anderson, Mahone, and Wof-
ford on Barlow's left, which came very near rolling Han¬
cock up on Warren, and would have proved a great dis¬
aster. And it likely would have been much worse for our
troops, but for the wounding of Longstreet, which suspended
all operations on that part of the field until Lee came up,
he having been notified that Longstreet had been severely
wounded.
The Union line had retired about three-quarters of a
mile on account of the heavy attack on the left, which also
endangered Birney. From the fact that Longstreet had
been wounded by the troops attacking Hancock's left, Lee
decided to rectify his line. In the mean time Eustis'
brigade, of Getty's division, and Leasure's brigade, of
Stevenson's division, had been ordered to the left to assist
Barlow.
Near two p. m. the First Brigade of Robinson's division,
and two regiments of heavy artillery, were ordered to
Hancock.
Late in the evening Early made an attack on Wright's
division of the Sixth Corps, and by throwing Gordon's and
Johnson's brigades on Wright's rear and flank, rolled up
Shaler's brigade with a heavy loss of prisoners, including
Shaler himself. Seymour's brigade did not suffer so much,
though the general was taken prisoner. This appears to
have been more the work of Gordon than anyone else.
He had been urging that movement earlier in the day, but
Early had been watching Burnside's movements until
nearly sunset, when he conceded to the request of Gordon
to permit him to move around General Shaler's position.
GEN. L. A. GRANT.
THE WILDERNESS.
611
Although it created a great commotion and confusion at
the time, it was an independent movement of Early's divi¬
sion and was not ordered by Eee, or his whole line would
have advanced. Early drew back his line, while Wright
rectified his, the Sixth Corps being put in touch with the
Fifth. Thus ended the great battle of the morning of the
6th. The Confederate army had fallen back, while Grant,
instead of ordering a forward movement and attacking
them in the jungles of the Wilderness, decided to move by
the left flank on Spottsylvania, perhaps to compel Eee to
fight on more open ground. His order for that movement
was as follows :
Headquarters Armies of the United States,
May 7, 1864-6:30 a. m.
Make all preparations during the day for a night march to take
position at Spottsylvania C. H. with one army corps, at Todd's
Tavern with one, and another near the intersection of the Piney
Branch and Spottsylvania road with the road from Alsop's to old
Court House. If this move is made the trains should be thrown
forward early in the morning to the Ny River.
I think it would be advisable in making the change to leave
Hancock where he is until Warren passes him. He could then fol¬
low and become the right of the new line. Burnside will move to
Piney Branch Church. Sedgwick can move along the pike to Chan-
cellorsville and on to his destination. Burnside will move on the
Plank road to the intersection of it with the Orange and Fredericks¬
burg plank road, then follow Sedgwick to his place of destination.
All vehicles should be got out of hearing of the enemy before
the troops move, and then move off quietly. It is more than prob¬
able that the enemy concentrated for a heavy attack on Hancock
this afternoon. In case they do we must be prepared to resist them,
and follow up any success we may gain with our whole force.
Such a result would necessarily modify these instructions.
All the hospitals should be moved to-day to Chancellorsville.
U. S. Grant, Uieutenant General.
To Major General Meade,
Commanding Army of the Potomac.
Early on the morning of the 7th, Craig Wadsworth, a
son of the general, and Lieut. E. M. Rogers induced the
officers to organize a party of skirmishers to go and try to
612 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
get the body of General Wadsworth. The request was
granted, but the detachment did not proceed far until the
major in command was severely wounded with several of his
men. Seeing that it was impossible to recover the general's
body, Rogers and young Wadsworth gave it up. However,
it was sent into our lines under a flag of truce. Wadsworth
stood high in the South, notwithstanding the fact that he
was doing all in his power to disconcert their plans to form
a Southern Confederacy. But few men in the world pos¬
sessing his vast wealth ever used it to so good a purpose.
He disposed of it as though it were not his own, and had
carefully to account for all he possessed. He did not seek
the fleld for renown, but to assist in the restoration of the
Union. He cast aside the position of Military Governor of
the District of Columbia, where he was a central figure at
the Capital, having untold honors bestowed upon him by
statesmen, officers of the navy and army, and foreign diplo¬
mats, and where he could have wielded an immense power
at the White House and War Department, and in time
could have made for himself a great name over the country.
He not only resigned as Military Governor of the Dis¬
trict of Columbia, in the face of earnest protests of leading
men up to the President, but he demanded that he be given
a position at the front, though ever so humble. Having
fallen mortally wounded, at the head of his division, he
sacrificed his life ' ' on the altar of his country, ' ' that future
generations might enjoy the blessings of a united nation—
the best Government on the globe—erected by the people,
and defended for the inheritance of the people.
CHAPTER XVL
SPOTTSYLVANIA.
RANT and Lee had met and had fonght the great
battle of the Wilderness. The result of this engage¬
ment had not been wholly satisfactory to either. Grant
had come from the West, where he had steadily risen
from the rank of colonel to be the most prominent general
of the Union armies. The siege of Vicksburg had crowned
his efforts with success, and the country turned to him
with a full reliance, that, as lieutenant general in command
of all the armies, he would be able, in a combined move¬
ment, to crush the rebellion. He had taken up his head¬
quarters with the Army of the Potomac in order to direct
its movements against the most powerful army of the Con¬
federacy ; but he had to cope with a general, who, as a
defensive officer, had no superior in the annals of military
history. Lee, as a native of Virginia, knew its strong mil¬
itary positions, and was confident of ultimate success from
that standpoint. Grant hoped to cripple Lee's army or
destroy it when he moved, but the battle of the Wilderness
closed with no such results. In fact, Lee thought he had
so worsted the Army of the Potomac that Grant was ready
to fall back ; and he ordered Anderson, who had succeeded
Longstreet when he was wounded, to move his corps to
Spottsylvania, so as to be in position to fall on Grant's re¬
treating columns in case the latter made an attempt at a
backward movement.
The woods being on fire compelled Anderson to move
sooner than was intended, in order to seek a safe place for
his troops to rest. His march would have been retarded by
613
614
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Sheridan if Meade had not changed the orders, for Sheridan
would have taken charge of the bridges over the Po River,
and prevented his advance until the Fifth Corps could have
occupied Spottsylvania Court House. Butler had been
ordered to move on Richmond ; and Grant wanted to hold
Lee in his front, so as to give Butler an opportunity to lay
siege to Richmond, and cut off communication with the
South by destroying the railroads. Both generals were
unaware of each other's designs until the two armies met at
Spottsylvania. Then came another struggle for the mas¬
tery, in which a most desperate battle was fought on the
same plan as that of the Wilderness. But for the accident
of Merritt being ordered to relieve Sheridan in his work of
holding the bridges over the Po River, the Army of the
Potomac would have marched unopposed into Spottsylvania,
where Lee would have been crowded off to the right, plac¬
ing the Army of the Potomac between Lee and Richmond.
Lee had fought but one offensive battle (Gettysburg),
and in that had signally failed to grasp the situation, even
when, time and again, he was warned by Longstreet not to
repeat the blunder of the Union army at Fredericksburg,
but to move around the left of the Army of the Potomac
and take a position that would compel Meade to attack the
Confederate army where it would have a decided advantage.
Lee's remorse, after that famous battle, led him to resign
the command of the Confederate army; but Jeff Davis knew
his great capacity as a defensive general, and declined to
accept his resignation.
Lee's movements were shielded by the Wilderness, and
he took the risk of moving his army by the flank, beginning
the movement with his right wing under Anderson.
Grant moved with caution, so as to keep his army in¬
tact in case Lee attempted to attack him. Hancock, on the
left, remained in his position, while Warren was directed
to take the advance with the Fifth Corps. This would
leave the Army of the Potomac intact to repel a movement
of the Confederate army, with Warren at Todd's Tavern,
SPOTTSYLVAN lA.
615
where he could easily countermarch and form on Hancock's
left. General Robinson's division had the advance. When
it arrived at Todd's Tavern, the way was blocked with the
cavalry escort of General Meade. As the troops advanced,
with the 12th Massachusetts in the lead. Colonel Cook, in
his history of that regiment, says :
A solitary horseman rode out from the forest and reined his
horse in front of our adjutant.
" What regiment is this ? "
"The 12th Massachusetts."
' ' Order them to deploy on the left of the road. What regiment
comes next ? ' '
"The 9th New York."
" Order them to deploy on the right of the road."
" By whose order ? "
The figure raised the flapping brim of his felt hat, and answered
with a single word, " Sheridan."
By that time Colonel Coulter, in command of the brigade
(Baxter had been wounded in the Wilderness), rode up and
received Sheridan's order, which was promptly executed.
This brigade advanced rapidly some two miles in the direc¬
tion of Spottsylvania, where Merritt's cavalry was over¬
taken, Then Robinson formed the division with Tyle's
brigade on the left, Dennison's on the right, with Coulter's
left in the rear to protect Lyle' s left flank. The division
crossed Alsop's farm and a wood, when it suddenly received
a galling fire from infantry, accompanied by artillery. In
this fire General Robinson was severely wounded in the leg
(causing its loss by amputation, which ended his military
service), when the division fell back to the woods in the
rear. Griffin coming up, bore to the right and deployed
Bartlett's brigade, with Sweitzer and Ayres marching on
the way that led in the direction of the Po River. As
Bartlett advanced across the Alsop farm his advance was
checked by a heavy fire and his troops forced to retire some
distance, when the division was quickly formed on Ayres'
brigade, which lay in a low place in the road. The divi¬
sion again advanced and occupied a position which was held
61G THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
by our troops. Crawford coming up, formed between Coul¬
ter, who had taken command of Robinson's division, and
Griffin and drove the enemy back out of the woods.
Colonel McCandless, in command of the First Brigade
of Pennsylvania Reserves, was wounded after the division
left Todd's Tavern, when Col. W. Cooper Talley, of the ist
Regiment, took command of the brigade. When the divi¬
sion arrived at the Alsop farm, Crawford directed Talley to
charge with his brigade, which he did, but was unable to
take the Confederate line. Another charge was made by
that brigade, which also proved unsuccessful. Then Talley
sent his assistant adjutant general, Rupert, to the rear to
report to General Crawford, whom he found sitting- against
a tree, suffering from a blow from a limb that had been cut
off by a cannon ball. Talley sent word to him that he had
charged twice and had been unable to force the enemy from
his lines. Crawford told Rupert to tell Talley to go to the
troops on the left and give the officer in command his com¬
pliments, and ask him to unite in the charge. But Talley
reminded Crawford that there was a space on his right, about
a quarter of a mile, that was not occupied by our troops,
and that he was liable to be flanked. Crawford made some
inquiry as to what troops were on the right, beyond that in¬
terval. Talley said that he believed it to be Penrose's
brigade. Crawford then directed him to go and request the
officer in command to close to the left and unite in the
charge. Had this request been made by Warren, in com¬
mand of the corps, it would have been obeyed with alacrity
by the Maryland Brigade ; but in the confusion of a repulse,
with their division commander lying badly wounded, they
looked to the corps commander for orders, which was correct.
No brigade on that field fought with greater valor than the
Maryland brigade, and Col. Charles E. Phelp's gallantry on
that as on every occasion was most admirable. He was
taken prisoner.
It would have made no difference if the brigades on the
left and right had united in the third charge of the Pennsyl-
COL. CHARLES E. PHELPS.
SPOTTSYL VA NIA.
617
vania Reserves, for General Ewell had arrived with two
divisions of his corps to strengthen Anderson, so the Fifth
Corps and the New Jersey Brigade of the Sixth Corps alone
faced nearly two-thirds of Fee's army, then in line of battle ;
and it was well that no further attempt was made to storm
their position with so slender a force. Talley made the
third charge, and was again compelled to fall back. He
then decided to go to the troops on his right, beyond the
interval, and see what arrangement could be perfected for
another attack. On his way to the right he was captured
by a company of Confederates who had concealed them¬
selves in the dense woods where he had to pass. Seeing
that he was completely surrounded, with no chance to
escape, he surrendered. As he passed over the line of
breastworks held by the enemy, he scanned them closely
and observed their strength, as he had just made three
charges against them. Being taken to General Ewell, he
was asked his name and what troops he commanded. On
his replying that he commanded the First Brigade of the
Pennsylvania Reserves, Ewell said: "Yes, we have met
them frequently on the field. ' ' He then paid them a very
high compliment, and said that he was pleased to meet one
of them ; that he was stationed at Carlisle before the war,
where he had formed the acquaintance of many people whom
he highly esteemed ; and that he did not order the barracks
burned there, and was sorry that it had been done. Talley
said to him that there were two companies from Cumber¬
land County in the brigade. Ewell wondered if any of them
knew Judge Graham. Upon being told that Judge Graham's
son was a captain in]the brigade, he was greatly pleased and
offered to parole him, but Talley thanked him with a decli¬
nation. He with other prisoners was started for Richmond,
but Sheridan, in his raid, recaptured them a few days after¬
wards, when Talley again resumed command of his brigade.
He said when he crossed their line of works, on his way
to Ewell, he saw the uselessness of attempting to storm them
with the troops then present. Instead of Eongstreet's
618
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
corps, then under Anderson, Ewell was present with two
divisions in line of battle behind formidable breastworks.
Wadsworth's division, then commanded by Cutler,
came up and formed on Griffin's right. That division
made a vigorous attaek on the enemy, and drove him
baek quite a distanee ; but Field's division of Anderson's
corps had arrived, and, meeting the troops of Cutler and
Griffin, the battle beeame stubborn without Warren being
able to advanee, as Sedgwick, who had been ordered to
follow him, had not yet arrived ; and the day wore away,
with only his advance coming up in time for Penrose's
brigade to get into aetion.
An ineident of this day's encounter is related by Capt.
P. De Lacy, of the 143d Pennsylvania, now of Seranton,
Pennsylvania. He says :
A little incident of the fight at Laurel Hill, after the Wilderness
battle, on the 8th of May, 1864, occurred, which I will relate. I
was at the time a member of the 143d Pennsylvania Volunteers,
Third Brigade, Fourth Division (Wadsworth's), then, I think, com¬
manded by General Cutler, and formed a part of the Fifth Corps.
We went into action that morning, soon after passing the cavalry,
in a woods where they had evidently been hotly engaged. We
emerged into a large clearing, and soon formed line ; we then moved
forward about a quarter of a mile, when we received quite a brisk
fire from a ridge running nearly parallel with our line of battle, and
nearly in the middle of the clearing. The ridge was partly wooded
and formed like a hog's back, with considerable of an elevation,
and quite an extensive clearing beyond. The position was a good
one to hold our advance or to check us ; for the enemy's main line
was not very far distant, and this ridge, for a few hours at least,
became the scene of a very spirited contest. We took the ridge ;
the enemy rallied and drove us back ; we rallied and retook it ; the
enemy again rallied and pushed us back a short distance ; but we
went for them again, and drove them away beyond the ridge. This
time we held it ; but the enemy again charged and made one more
attempt to retake it, and it is at this point the incident which I
have alluded to occurred, which I will relate as I remember it.
I was, at the time, sergeant in Company A, 143d Pennsylvania
Volunteers, and we were the right company and connected with the
left of the 19th Indiana ; or, in other words, the 19th was on our right.
The force of the last charge fell heavily on the 19th, and pushed
SPO TPS VL VA NIA .
619
the men of that regiment back up the slope of the ridge a short dis¬
tance, probably 30 or 40 paces, although the}^ continued their fire ;
but the color-bearer of the 19th did not move back, but manfully
held up his colors, although the Confederates had reached to within
30 or 40 steps of him. At that critical moment, the writer and
George W. Engle, of Company A, 143d Penns3dvania, by permis¬
sion of Major Charles M. Conyngham, then commanding the 143d,
went to the rescue of the colors of the 19th.
The position of the lines at the time was almost at right angles,
and we reached the color-bearer in less than one minute ; he was
alone and down on one knee holding up his flag. I went to his
right, and George W. Engle to his left. He was at the side of an
old rail fence which was partly broken down, along which the regi¬
ment had been in line. Soon after we had reached him, he ran his
arm high up, supporting the flag, when a ball struck the staff" and
shattered his arm. He partially fell back with his flag against the
writer, who was on one knee by his side, at the same time the flag
falling over both of us. I assisted in raising him up to his knees ;
then he dropped his wounded arm to the ground, and ran up his
good arm and grasped the colors firmly, while he fairly groaned
with pain, but called out to us: "Stay with me, boys." "We
told him to keep up the flag, we would stay with him ; and we did,
and used our guns the very best we could.
It was one of the hottest locations I ever got. into ; thç enemy
not thirty steps in our front, lying down in a little depression in the
field. We could see their ramrods glisten every time they turned
them to load their guns. For fifteen or twenty minutes this was the
actual condition, though the regiment continued to fire, and other
troops that had been rallied and brought up took part and made it
so hot that the enemy made a break for the woods. "Very manj' of
them were killed or wounded.
At about this time the men of the 19th closed in on their colors
and we started for the 143d Pennsylvania, which was not over fiftj'
yards to the left. As we moved back from their colors, the officer in
command of the 19th asked us what company we belonged to (evi¬
dently thinking we belonged to the 19th). George W. Engle re¬
mained a short time, and, I think, gave our names, company, and
regiment ; at all events, a short time after, I noticed that officer and
Maj. Chas. Conyngham, of the 143d Pennsylvania, talking together.
No braver man than that color-bearer ever lived. I would like
to know if he still lives.
Investigation shows that the colors of the 19th Indiana
were carried that day by Corp. Andrew J. Wood,
620
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
In the morning Wilson's cavalry had driven a brigade
out of Spottsylvania ; but • it seems Sheridan needed his
assistance, and ordered him (Wilson) to retire. Later in the
day Wilson again attempted to occupy it, but Wofford's,
Brian's, and a brigade of Fitz-Hugh Lee arrived, which again
compelled Wilson to retire. When Sedgwick arrived he
was posted on Warren's left, while Burnside, still later, ex¬
tended the line in that direction. Hancock was the last to
leave the Wilderness, and when he arrived at Todd's Tavern
he was halted to watch the movements of the enemy. As
Grant and Lee were moving on parallel roads, not over two
miles apart, it was easy for Hancock to make a reconnois-
sance to observe the enemy's movements. Ascertaining
that Lee's arm)'^ were all concentrating at Spottsylvania,
Hancock moved up on Warren's right. Thus the Union
line, from right to left, was Hancock, Warren, Sedgwick,
and Burnside.
The following day was occupied in rearranging the lines
and intrenching. The sharpshooters kept up a constant
fire, and early in the morning General Sedgwick was killed
by one of them. His death was a great shock to the army
and to the country.
The skirmish lines of the Fifth and Sixth Corps were
pressed forward to develop the enemy's position, and ascer¬
tain, if possible, a weak place to attack.
Colonel Coulter, who assumed command of the Second
Division after General Robinson was wounded, pays him
the following compliment in his official report. He says :
During the advance General Robinson was severely wounded
and taken from the field. His being disabled at this juncture was a
severe blow to the division, and certainly influenced the fortunes of
the day. The want of our commanding officer prevented that con¬
cert of action which alone could have overcome the enemy in front.
On the evening of the 9th the division was temporarily
disbanded, mainly, it was supposed, because it became so
reduced in strength, and of the loss of its commanding
SPOTTS YL VA NIA.
621
officer, Gen. John C. Robinson. The First Brigade, under
Colonel Lyle, was temporarily assigned to the Fourth Divi¬
sion, commanded by Cutler ; the Second Brigade, com¬
manded by Colonel Coulter, was »assigned to the Third
Division, under Crawford, while the Third Brigade was
made independent, to report direct to Warren.
Lee's army, from left to right, was Anderson, Ewell,
and Early. The latter had been placed in command of
Hill's corps during the march from the Wilderness to Spott-
sylvania. The Confederate army lay in a new-moon shape,
v/ith the disk open to the southeast.
Spottsylvania is situated on the ridge between the Ny
and Po Rivers of the historical Mattapony, composed of the
Mat, Ta, Po, and Ny. The last named rises in the Wilder¬
ness, flowing southeasterly around and north of Spottsyl¬
vania, and unites with the Po some distance from that
place. The Po rises also in the Wilderness, near Todd's
Tavern, courses its way eastwardly, but winds around to
the south of Spottsylvania Court House. Near Anderson's
left it changes its course, running almost due south, and
then again resumes its eastwardly course.
When Hancock, on the evening of the 9th, arrived with
Barlow's, Gibbon's, and Birney's divisions (Mott's division
being left at Todd's Tavern), he crossed the Poso as to turn
Anderson's left. Lee seeing that movement, drew troops
from Early on the right, and posted them on Anderson's
left, covering the front of the Po where it runs south.
While the stream is small, yet the bluffs are steep, and
Early held a position which Hancock could not take by
assault. Mott had been ordered up from Todd's Tavern,
and had been posted on Wright's left, as there was a big
gap between the left of Wright and Burnside's right.
Grant seeing that the movement to turn xA-uderson's left
had been foiled by Lee posting a part of Early's corps
along the east side of the Po, determined to advance the
left under Bnrnside, and the center under Wright and
Warren. But before bringing on the engagement Warren
622 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
and Wright were ordered to feel their fronts, to test its
advisability. Warren, after he made two reconnoissances,
reported in favor of the movement. The advance was
ordered, when Warren directed Cutler and Crawford to
attack, while Griffin was held in reserve. In order to assist
this movement, Hancock was given command of that part
of the field, and directed to bring the divisions of Gibbon
and Birney across the Po, Gibbon being placed on the right
of Warren, with Birney in reserve. The enemy observing
the withdrawal of Gibbon and Birney, attacked Barlow,
who was isolated from the Army of the Potomac across the
Po, but they were repulsed with heavy loss.
Wright, on Warren's left, had advanced a force (a division
under Upton) and carried the works in his front in most
gallant style, pressing the enemy back both right and left,
at the same time capturing some cannon ; but Mott, on his
left, failing to come up, and Warren, on his right, being
repulsed. Grant ordered him to retire. The troops under
Upton grumbling at the order. Grant countermanded it ;
but as a sufficient force could not be sent to that part of the
field in time, Upton was compelled to retire.
As Early's line in front of Burnside had been weak¬
ened to reënforce Anderson's left, Burnside advanced
nearly to the courthouse, but was drawn back to connect
with Mott's left. If Burnside had been rushed forward,
his movement would have aided Upton and Lee's right
flank been turned, when he would have been placed in a
very precarious condition. As it was. Grant and Meade
had paid so little attention to the left that they were una¬
ware of Burnside's success until it was too late to take
advantage of it ; though had Burnside made a report to
Grant, the situation would have been understood and recti¬
fied. Grant says in his work, that he ought to have had a
staff officer with Burnside to report to him, for Burnside,
though, with the Army of the Potomac, was not included
in it, because he outranked Meade.
Barlow, on the right, had again been attacked, but
t
HON. W. H. HARRIES, M. C.
SPOTTS YL VA NIA.
623
repulsed the enemy the second time, inflicting severe loss
on him. Hancock fearing for his safety, then went to his
support, and ordered him to cross the Po.
When the work of the day was closed, and the examina¬
tion made of the situation, it was learned that Barlow, on
the right, had successfully withstood two heavy assaults, and
Burnside, on the left, had turned the enemy's left flank.
This was the Union success. On the other hand, the
enemy had repulsed our center, where, as a matter of
course, our loss had been heavy, so that, with Burnside fall¬
ing back to connect with Mott, and Barlow giving up his
position across the Po, it would seem that it was a drawn
battle.
Among the casualties. General Stevenson, of Burnside's
corps, was killed ; the gallant Upton, who was promoted on
the field by Grant, was severely wounded, while General
Rice, of the Fifth Corps, was killed.
A most gallant act was performed by Lieut. Wm. H.
Harries, of the Second Wisconsin, who was afterwards
elected to the Fifty-second Congress. Seeing the lifeless form
of Capt. Robert Hughes, of that regiment, in danger of the
approaching fire in the grass, he gallantly rescued his body
from the flames.
The nth was passed without any forward movement,
except a reconnoissance by Mott, who moved close enough
to the enemy's works to see a salient point, which Grant
decided to assault, and issued the following order in accord-
nace with that purpose :
Headquarters Armies Untied States.,
May ii, 1864—3 p. m.
Move three divisions of the Second Corps by the rear of the
Fifth and Sixth Corps, under cover of night, so as to join the Ninth
Corps in a vigorous assault on the enemy at four o'clock a.m. to¬
morrow. I will send one or two staff officers over to-night to stay
with Burnside, and impress him with the importance of a prompt
and vigorous attack. Warren and Wright should hold their corps
as close to the enemy às possible, to take advantage of any diversion
caused by this attack, and to push in if any opportunity presents
624
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
itself. There is but little doubt in my mind that the assault last
evening would have been entirely successful if it had commenced
one hour earlier, and had been heartily entered into by Mott's divi¬
sion and the Ninth Corps. U. S. Grant,
Major General Meade, Lieutenant General.
Commanding Army of the Potomac.
On the night of the nth Hancock began the movement
of the divisions of Barlow, Birney, and Gibbon, in the
rear of the army, under the guidance of Major Mendel! of
the Engineers, in a drenching rain. The head of the
column arrived about midnight near the Brown House,
where it was proposed to prepare for the attack. Barlow
was formed on the left, with Brooke's and Miles' brigades in
front, supported by Brown's and Smith's. Birney deployed
in two lines on the right of Barlow, with Mott's division
formed in rear. Gibbon was held in reserve.
Hancock's orders were to begin the assault at four o'clock,
but the fog was so dense, after the heavy rain, that he
delayed it about half an hour, until day began to dawn, so
the troops could see where to march. When Hancock gave
the order, both divisions moved promptly, and kept a per¬
fect alignment, notwithstanding the fact that Birney had to
move over a marsh. As they advanced, the Confederate
pickets retreated back on their reserve, which had already
begun to fire on the Union line, but not a shot was fired by
Hancock's men. As the reserve retired, the advancing
line broke out in a hearty cheer, when both divisions
rushed forward to the works of the enemy at the salient.
The Confederates attempted to prevent them from crossing
over, but in a moment Barlow's and Birney's divisions had
scaled the breastworks, or had torn them away ; men were
bayoneted, muskets were used over the heads of each other,
sabers performed their deadly work ; in fact it was a hand-
to-hand conflict. The Confederates were surrounded, and
Hancock says that he took 40CXD prisoners of Johnson's
division of Ewell's corps, 20 pieces of artillery, and 30
stands of colors. Those who were not captured fled in the
SPOTTS YL VA NIA.
625
direction of Spottsylvania, hotly pursued by the boys iu
blue, who thought they had broken lice's center and routed
his army. About half a mile farther on they came upon
another line of works which was well defended. In the
mean time Hancock had ordered Mott and Gibbon to take
possession of the works which Barlow and Birney had cap¬
tured but had left to pursue the enemy.
Gee's army lay iu a semicircle, so he could rapidly reëu-
force any given point, especially the center. He at once
ordered heavy reënforcements to Ewell's assistance, who was
trying to force Barlow and Birney to retire outside of the
works which they had so recently captured. But the Union
boys held the opposite side, and when the Confederates
attempted to retake them they were hurled back with great
slaughter. Time and again did they come with fresh troops
to charge on the works which had been built by them, and
which, until recently, they had occupied ; but each time
they were repulsed with heavy loss.
About six a. m. General Wright's corps moved up on
the right of Hancock and took possession of the works to
the right of the salient. Mott joined him on the left, with
Birney next, and Barlow on the extreme left. At eight a. m.
Wright called on Hancock for reënforcements, when Brooke's
brigade was sent to him. Marching to the relief of Wright
he relieved a part of Wheaton's division, and fought in the
front line of battle until his ammunition was exhausted,
when he returned to Hancock.
Hancock directed artillery to be posted to the right of the
Uandrum House, some 300 yards in rear of the works. One
section of Gilliss' battery was taken up to the salient, and
fired canister into the advancing columns of the enemy. A
section of Brown's battery (B, ist Rhode Island Artillery),
was posted to the left of the salient, close to their fortifica¬
tions, where it did most effective work. On the left, Bnrn-
side's effort was not strong enough to achieve success. He
failed to crush Lee's right, and, as a consequence, added bul
little assistance to the assault made by Hancock.
XL
626 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Warren, on the right, was unable to advance as far as
the Sixth Corps on his left. In his report he says :
May 12.—At daybreak General Hancock surprised Johnson's
division in bis lines, and captured nearly all of it, with i8 pieces of
artillery. The enemy fought furiously to regain them. General
Wright attacked near the Second Corps with two divisions. I also
again assailed the enemy's intrenchments, suffering heavy loss, but
failed to get in. The enemy's direct and flank fire was too destruc¬
tive. Tost very heavily. The enemy continuing to fire [on] the
Second and Sixth Corps, [I was] compelled to withdraw Griffin's and
Cutler's divisions and send [them] to the left to their support, where
they again became engaged. My whole front was held by Crawford's
division and Colonel Kitching and the Maryland Brigade, presenting
a line of battle not as strong as a single rank. The enemy made no
serious effort to force it. My divisions on the left were relieved
during the night from their position, and returned to the right in
the morning, having been kept awake nearly all night, which was
rainy.
Warren's report is quoted from in order to give his ver¬
sion of the battle that day, as Grant became dissatisfied with
his movements, and took the divisions of Griffin and Cutler
from him, and left Humphreys with him to superintend
Crawford's division, which alone remained under Warren.
General Cutler, commanding the Fourth Division of
General Warren's corps, says :
On the 12th we were underarms at daylight, and again assaulted
the enemy's works without success. After being under fire four
hours, I was ordered to report with my command to Major-General
Wright. Colonel Lyle, with his brigade (which was serving tem¬
porarily with me), was ordered to hold the works on the right of the
Sixth Corps. My Third Brigade (Colonel Bragg) was sent to hold
the works captured that morning from the enemy, and my First and
Second Brigades were sent to the assistance of the Sixth Corps, who
were endeavoring to carry the enemy's works in front of the Sixth
Corps, where they remained under fire until two a. m. of the 13th,
having been constantly under fire for twenty-two hours, when they
were relieved and moved back to the right, going into position again
in the trenches, the line having been held during my absence by a
skirmish line.
SPO TTS YL VA NIA.
627
The enemy retired to the second line of works, about
half a mile in rear of the first which Hancock had captured
from Johnson. This was one of the bloodiest conflicts of
the war ; and the Union army there gained its first valuable
victory in that campaign, fighting from early dawn until
midnight.
There was no movement of the army on the 13th ; but
that night Warren and Wright were moved to the left of
Burnside, in a heavy rain. Warren's corps led the march,
in intense darkness, over muddy roads, sometimes having
to corduroy them in order to pass. They crossed the Ny
River, which was swollen from the rains. Many of the
troops gave out from exhaustion and lost their way.
Mounted men were posted as guides ; but even this precau¬
tion could not keep the troops on the proper line of march
through the dense forests and swamps. But Warren suc¬
ceeded in getting to the designated place with a part of his
command, while those who had given out came up the
next day, when they were able to see their way and gain a
little strength.
Wright's movement was detected, and Upton was at¬
tacked ; but with the aid of Ayres' brigade the enemy was
repulsed. The next night, Uee moved in front of Warren
and Wright, which left Hancock with no enemy in his
front. He therefore moved his position to the rear of
Warren and Wright.
On the 15th both armies remained quiet, except a dem¬
onstration in front of Burnside, which was not carried into
execution, perhaps on account of the rain.
The ground was so soft from the continued heavy rains
that the infantry could scarcely march, while it was impos¬
sible to move the artillery. On the i8th Wright and Han¬
cock were moved back to the right of Burnside, to strike
Uee on his left flank ; but he was advised of the movement
in time to check it.
Warren had been ordered to open with his artillery so
as to deceive Uee as to the mövements of Warren and Han-
628 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
cock. Colonel Coulter, commanding a brigade under War¬
ren, was severely wounded. Warren remained stationary
while the army marched past him and took a position on
his left. This movement induced Ewell to attack War¬
ren's right flank, which would give him possession of the
road from Spottsylvania to Fredericksburg, over which the
supplies of the army were received. Kitching's and
the Maryland Brigades, with Tyler's division of new troops,
just arriving from Fredericksburg, met the attack of Ewell,
and repulsed him with considerable loss. Crawford's, Bir-
ney's, and Gibbon's divisions came to the support of War¬
ren's right. Grant, seeing the movement, ordered Warren
to advance and prevent Ewell from returning to his in-
trenchnients. But he (Warren) was unable to do that. A
division of colored troops, under General Ferrero, guarded
the road to Fredericksburg. It was evident that Lee was
attempting to get possession of that road to cut off Grant's
supplies. Ferrero was ordered to throw forward his cavalry,
and, if he was defeated, to fall back toward Fredericksburg,
When Ferrero's division was attacked, his colored troops
fought most gallantly, and retook some twenty-five or thirty
wagons which had been captured by the enemy by a sudden
dash at the commencement of the action. This division
belonged to the Ninth Corps, but had been detached for that
special duty.
Thus ended the battle of Spottsylvania ; for Grant, see¬
ing that Lee held a position naturally very strong, which
would cost many lives to take, resolved to move again by
the left, in the direction of Richmond, with the hope of
meeting him on an open field.
CHAPTER XVII.
SHERIDAN'S GREAT RAID FROM SPOTTSYEVANIA TO
THE JAMES.
FTER the successful passage of the Rapidan, on
May 4, 1864, and the subsequent terrific fighting
on the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th, in the Wilderness, in which the
cavalry bore its full share, Sheridan, in obedience to orders
from General Grant, concentrated his divisions in the
vicinity of Aldrich's, on the plank road ; and, on the
morning of the 9th, moved out on his famous expedition
around the right flank of General Lee's army, with the
view of cutting his communications with his base, destroy¬
ing the lines of railroad by which his army was supplied,
and with the expectation and hope of drawing after him the
enemy's cavalry, which he thought he could, if opportu¬
nity offered, defeat and destroy, and thus inflict irreparable
loss upon the Confederacy.
Worn out and exhausted as the men were by four days
of constant fighting, there was not much rest for them dur¬
ing the night of the 8th. Horses were to be shod, forage and
rations drawn, and the numberless little things to be at¬
tended to on the eve of a protracted march looked after ;
besides all this, a constant succession of ambulances,
filled with wounded men, were passing over the plank road
along which, on either side, our bivouacs were stretched for
miles ; and this evidence of the tremendous fighting that
had been going on beneath the somber shadows of the
dense thickets of the Wilderness, filled the minds of all
MAY 9 TO MAY 24, 1864.
629
630
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
with sadness, for many of our comrades were among these
sufferers.
The night passed, and with the first faint streaks of the
dawning day the camps were instinct with life and motion.
' ' Reveille, " " Boots and Saddles, ' ' and ' ' To Horse ' ' fol¬
lowed each other in rapid succession, and the first rays of
the rising sun saw the heads of columns, divisions, and
brigades moving from their several camps ; along the plank
road they moved in the direction of Fredericksburg as
far as Tabernacle Church, thence crossed over to the Tele¬
graph road by Childsburg to Anderson's Crossing of the
North Anna River. The First Division, Gen. Wesley
Merritt commanding, was in advance, followed by the
Third Division, Gen. James H. Wilson, and the Second
Division, Gen. D. McM. Gregg, bringing up the rear.
The march was without incident until the rear-guard,,
consisting of the 6th Ohio Cavalry, which arrived about
four o'clock p. m. near a small place called Davenport,
was rather fiercely attacked, and a stubborn little fight oc¬
curred, resulting in the repulse of the Confederates, after a
loss of one officer. Captain Abell, of the 6th Ohio, killed,
and 47 men killed and wounded from the 6th Ohio and
ist Massachusetts. The advance brigade of General Mer¬
ritt's division, commanded by General Custer, forced the
crossing of the North Anna at Anderson's Mills, and be¬
fore reaching Beaver Dam Station, on the Virginia Central
Railroad, he recaptured a train of ambulances and about
400 of our men, who had been taken during the fights in
the Wilderness ; among these were a large number of
officers, one of them being Gen. W. C. Talley, of the ist
Pennsylvania Reserves, commanding brigade, also Colonel
Phelps, of the 7th Maryland Regiment, and Capt. George
Michaels, of one of the Pennsylvania regiments.
Pushing on, Custer got possession of Beaver Dam Sta¬
tion, together with three large trains heavily laden with
supplies for Lee's army, two new locomotives, and a large
amount of stores of various kinds, including hospital tents
SHERIDAN' s GREAT RAID.
631
and several hundred stand of arms ; all of these, except so
much as was required to supply the immediate wants of
our own troops, were burned or otherwise destroyed, while
a happier set of fellows than the 400 recaptured pris¬
oners, it would be a difficult matter to imagine.
The Second and Third Divisions bivouacked in line of bat¬
tle on the north side of the river where they were feebly at¬
tacked on the morning of the loth. The attack was soon
repulsed, the divisions crossed the ford, and on reaching the
station the Second Brigade, Second Division, took the
advance, the ist Maine Cavalry leading ; the command
had proceeded but a short distance until the enemy were
encountered in some force, and quite a brisk skirmish oc¬
curred, in which Major Boothby, ist Maine Cavalry, re¬
ceived a wound in the shoulder, from the effects of which
he died in a few days.
Notwithstanding this opposition, the march of the col¬
umn was not delayed or retarded, but moved steadily on,
crossed the South Anna at Ground Squirrel Bridge, and
went into camp near an old church of that name, about one
mile south of the river. The entire corps crossed the South
Anna on the evening of the loth ; during the night the
First and Third Divisions, and the First Brigade of the
Second Division, moved in the direction of Richmond,
crossing the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad at
Negro Foot Station, destroying the road for a distance on
both sides of the station. General Davies proceeded to
Ashland, where he encountered the enemy, captured and
destroyed a train of supplies for Tee's army,» and a locomo¬
tive, and, after destroying the railroad for some distance,
rejoined the main force at Allen's Station, on the Richmond
and Fredericksburg Railroad.
From this point the entire command moved on Yellow
Tavern, where Stuart, with his main force in a strong posi¬
tion, which he had gained after an exhausting march round
our left during the day and night of the loth, awaited our
attack. The First Division had the advance, followed by
632 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
the Third, and Davies' brigade of the Second Division
brought up the rear. Immediately on coming in sight of
the enemy Merritt attacked and got possession of the
Brooks pike and the tavern, while Stuart reformed his line
some distance to the eastward of the pike, which he enfila¬
ded with his guns, making the position of Devin and
Gibbs at the tavern somewhat hot ; but supported by the
artillery they held on. Meantime Custer, supported by
Chapman's brigade, charged and broke the Confederate
line, capturing two of his guns, and driving the separate
parts of his divided force, the one in the direction of Rich¬
mond, the other toward Ashland. Davies' brigade was
held in reserve.
In this brilliant action General Stuart, commanding the
enemy's cavalry, was mortally wounded, and died a few
da}'s after ; the prestige arrd the fruits of victory remained
with the Union forces.
While these operations were going on in front. Col.
Irvdn Gregg's brigade, which had been left at Ground
Squirrel Church to bring up the rear, was impetuously
attacked by Gordon's Confederate brigade. The ist Maine
Cavalry was on picket in the direction of the bridge across
the South Anna. The loth New York had been directed
to report to the colonel of the ist Maine, as the enemy was
making some demonstrations ; and a section of artillery
was left at the church for the colonel of the ist Maine to
pick up as his command fell back. The other regiments of
the Second Brigade had already moved on in the direction
of Richmond, e'xcept one squadron of the i6th Pennsyl¬
vania, which was returning from the left with forage.
Colonel Gregg and staff were with the section of artil¬
lery at the church, waiting for the ist Maine and loth
New York, before proceeding to the head of the command,
when suddenly, like a clap of thunder from a clear sky,
several volleys were heard, a wild Confederate yell, and a
crashing of branches, as the broken and routed ist Maine
o '
and loth New York came tearing back along the road and
SHERIDAN's GREAT RAID.
633
through the woods, with the victorious enemy close upon
their heels ; clouds of dust filled the woods and the road ;
the artillerymen were excited and lamenting the loss oi
their guns, brass 12-pounders; everything seemed to be
lost The Second Brigade, struck in rear by the exulting
Confederates, would be most likely rolled up and sent pell-
mell on the rear of the troops contending with Stuart at
Yellow Tavern ; Colonel Gregg, on whom rested the respon¬
sibility for this part of the field, did not feel disposed to let
the enemy have everything his own way, but quietly
directed the officer in command of the guns to fill them
to the muzzle with canister ; the command was obeyed with
a will, and the men, as soon as they found there was a
chance to fight, became calm and collected. On came the
maddened and exultant enemy, imagining victory within
their grasp. The dust lifted. The deadly Napoleons
belched forth their fearful and fatal contents into the very
faces of the foe. The squadron of the i6th before men¬
tioned, Capt. A. J. Snyder commanding, charged with a
shout. Captain Gleason's two squadrons of the ist Massa¬
chusetts, a few paces in rear of the guns, wheeled about by
fours, drew saber and awaited orders to charge ; but the
guns had done their work—had stopped in mid-career this
impetuous charge. They then quietly and leisurely lim¬
bered up and withdrew, greatly pleased with their brilliant
success. The brigade was not again molested during the
day ; although the enemy made his appearance once or
twice, he did not attempt another charge or attack.
General Sheridan, in his final report, says ; ' ' Gregg,
about the same time—while the contest was in progress at
Yellow Tavern—charged the force in rear with equal suc¬
cess, and ended the engagement. ' '
It was, as has been seen, the other way ; Stuart, in send¬
ing Gordon's brigade to harass the rear of Sheridan's
column, hoped to distract his attention from his front where
he meditated his main attack ; but, whatever may have been
Stuart's object, this impetuous charge, made at the critical
634 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
period when a position was about to be abandoned, came
near being successful, and possibly would have been en¬
tirely so, but for the fact that these Napoleon guns were in
position where they were, and the brigade commander with
them, awaiting the arrival of his rear guard.
This episode serves to illustrate the power of these guns
at short range, and the necessity for coolness and self-
possession in sudden emergencies or great dangers. Doubt¬
less all the disastrous consequences of this sudden and reso¬
lute attack, if successful, flashed through Colonel Gregg's
mind when he saw his advance regiments struck in the rear,
rolled up like a scroll, broken and scattered as were his
rear guard, and realized the importance of so utilizing his
guns as to gain the time required for putting the remainder
of his troops in position to cope with this apparently victo¬
rious foe ; so, dispatching his aids to the front with orders
to his regimental commanders to get into line, face to the
rear, and the commanding officer of his rear guard to get
his men rallied in rear of the other regiments, he calmly
waited for developments, and was rewarded by success be¬
yond his most sanguine expectations—indeed, contrary to
any expectations, for the case seemed utterly hopeless, and
only death or capture appeared possible.
At eleven o'clock on the night of the nth, after
caring for the wounded and burying the dead, the entire
command moved south toward Richmond, Wilson's Third
Division in advance, followed by Merritt's First, and Gregg's
Second bringing up the rear.
Daylight on the morning of the 12th found the entire
command inside the outer line of fortifications, massed upon
a plateau which overlooked the Meadow Bridges over the
Chickahominy, which were destroyed, and the opposite, or
Mechanicsville, side held in strong force by the enemy.
Wilson's advance on the direct road to Mechanicsville was
opposed by the enemy's batteries so formidably that he
could not pass them, and Custer's brigade was directed to
cross the Meadow Bridges ; but they were so strongly de-
SHERIDAN' s GREAT RAID.
635
fended that Merritt's entire division was directed to force
the crossing at all hazards.
While this was going on in front of the bridges, the
enemy advanced from his works and attacked Wilson and
Gregg. Wilson was at first obliged to fall back, so fierce
was the Confederate onset, but Davies' brigade, of Gregg's
division, being advantageously posted in a wooded ravine,
checked the advance of the enemy, and held them. Mean¬
while a strong force coming up the Brook turnpike, attacked
Col. Irvin Gregg's Second Brigade, and the battle raged
from right to left, until late in the afternoon, when the
bridge war. completed, the command safely crossed to the
south side of the river, and, brushing the enemy out of
the way, went into camp between Walnut Grove Church
and Gaines' Mill. On the morning of the 13th the march
was resumed, and the command reached Haxall's without
further incident, except that when the Confederates were
massed on the summit of Malvern Hill, in full view of the
James River, our gunboats opened on them with their big
guns, and compelled their cavalry to beat a hasty retreat.
There the weary troopers found grateful rest, with rations
and forage. After resting for three days, the return march
was commenced, and on the 24th, after sixteen days and
nights of marching and fighting, the Cavalry Corps rejoined
the main army at or near Chesterfield, on the north side of
the North Anna.
This raid demonstrated what could be accomplished by
a well organized cavalry force, under a competent leader,
ably seconded by his subordinate officers and men. Of these.
General Sheridan, in closing his report, which comprises
all the operations in which the cavalry were engaged,
to August I, 1864, says: "To Generals D. McM. Gregg,
Torbert, Wilson, Merritt, Custer, Devin, J. Irvin Gregg,
Davies, and Gibbs, to the gallant officers and men of their
commands, I return my sincere thanks. ' ' Thus the cavalry
of the Army of the Potomac, which (from the time Hooker
is alleged to have said he would give one hundred doU
€36
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
lars for a dead cavalryman), through the cavalry fights at
Kelley's Ford, on St. Patrick's Day, in 1863, Brandy Sta¬
tion, Aldie, Middlebnrg, Upperville, Gettysburg, Monte¬
rey, Falling Waters, Shepherdstown, Cnlpeper Court
House, Bristoe Station, and Mine Run, became fused in
the fire of innumerable combats, was, under Sheridan,
welded in a homogeneous whole, to be launched, like a
thunderbolt, splintering and tearing to pieces whatever
stood in its way. It was 10,000 wills subordinated by dis¬
cipline to the control of one master mind, the force of
10,000 men controlling 10,000 horses hurled by one arm
against our country's foes, its blows were relentless, destruc¬
tive, deadly.
CHAPTER XVIIL
PREPARING TO MOVE IN THE DIRECTION OF RICHMOND.
1 )EFORE Grant issued the order to move from his
— position in front of Eee at Spotteylvania, he di¬
rected that over icq pieces of artillery be sent back to
Washington. From the time the army had crossed the
Rapidan, but few batteries had been used ; and Grant did
not believe that artillery would play a prominent part in
that campaign. He, at the same time, took a retrospective
view of the movements of the different armies. While
Sherman was advancing to suit him, Sigel had been de¬
feated in the Shenandoah, which gave the Confederates a
chance to reënforce Fee.
He at once resolved to relieve Sigel, and General Hun¬
ter's name being mentioned. Grant consented to his being
placed in command. Hunter was then directed by Grant
to push forward his column up the Shenandoah and unite
with Averell and Crook near Staunton, from which place he
was to move, by way of Eexington, to Lynchburg, and in
that manner draw from Lee's forces, or else unite with the
Army of the Potomac, in case he was not opposed, and
become its right wing.
Appearing before that Gibraltar, Hunter found it too
strongly defended for him to storm ; so he withdrew down
the Kanawha, fearing to follow the line of the Virginia
Central Railway, lest he would be overtaken. This pre¬
vented his army from assisting Grant for weeks, until it
emerged from the mountain fastnesses of West Virginia.
Turning his eye on General Butler, who was south of
the James River, Grant found that he was shut up ia
637
638 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Bermuda Hundred by Beauregard, and that reenforce-
ments were coming from the South to again assist in the
defense of Richmond. When General Butler landed at
Bermuda Hundred there were but few troops in that
vicinity ; but when he sent an expedition, on the 7th of
May, to destroy the Petersburg and Richmond Railroad,
he found it guarded by a strong force. Brooks, who was
in command of this expedition, attacked the enemy, and
drove him back ; but he, rallying, charged Brooks. Finally
both parties withdrew.
On the 9th another advance was made, when the troops
got within three miles of Petersburg. Butler had two
corps, one under Gilmore and the other under General W.
F. Smith. The latter was on the right. On the morning
of the 16th, under cover of a dense fog, Beauregard ad¬
vanced a column on Smith's right, which was a mile and
a half from the James River, and guarded only by a small
squadron of colored cavalry on his right. When Heckman
was struck, on Smith's right, his troops were thrown into
confusion; but the 9th Maine and the 112th New York
coming up, led Beauregard to believe that Smith's line lay
further to the right, en echelon. When his troops charged
in front, they were tripped by wires which Smith had had
stretched there to protect his front. When the Confeder¬
ates fell, they were fired on by the Union troops.
Being repulsed, Beauregard made an examination, and
resolved to make another attack, but this time to move his
flanking column closer to the James. Smith, seeing that
Beauregard was attempting to gain his rear and seize Ber¬
muda Hundred, where Butler's depot of supplies was
located, fell back in that direction.
General Gilmore, who was on Smith's left, had not been
pressed by the enemy. Whiting's division at Petersburg
had been ordered by Beauregard to assault Gilmore when
Smith was attacked. If Gilmore had swept forward, he
could have turned the flank of the troops attacking Smith,
and forced them to retire. But when Smith fell back on
ON TO RICHMOND.
639
Iiis right, he ordered his corps to retire ; and soon both
corps were shut up in Bermuda Hundred,
Thus, when Grant was ready to move the Army of the
Potomac south on Richmond, the .armies of Hunter and
Butler were both powerless to assist in the siege of that
place.
Hancock was ordered to move at two o'clock, on the
night of the 20th, in the direction of Guinea Station ; but
he requested to be permitted to move at dark,, so as to pass
the enemy's signal stations unobserved. Torbert's cavalry
moved in his advance. When Guinea Station was reached,
early in the morning, a small force of troops was encoun¬
tered, but it did not delay the march.
At Milford Station a part of Kemper's brigade was en¬
countered, but was repulsed by Torbert before the infantry
came up, and the bridge over the Mattapony was saved
from destruction. Hancock's troops began to cross as soon
as the head of the column arrived.
Kemper appeared to be the advance of Pickett's division,
on its way to reënforce Lee, and he was evidently sur¬
prised by the sudden appearance of Torbert at that place,
for the right bank of the Mattapony was a very strong posi¬
tion from which to dispute its passage. As Pickett was on
his way to join Lee, he had no expectation that any Union
force was in that vicinity, and perhaps he doubted the
propriety of attacking a force of whose strength he knew
nothing.
Crossing his command to the south side of the Matta¬
pony, Hancock took a strong position until Warren, Wright,
and Burnside came up. On the 21st, at half past ten a.m.,
the artillery of the Fifth Corps started to follow Hancock,
with Crawford's division moving closely in its rear. At
noon Warren started, with Griffin's and Cutler's divisions.
The Fifth Corps arrived at Guinea Station at half past five
that afternoon.
Next morning Warren sent the Iron Brigade to the west
of the Telegraph road, to learn if the enemy was also mov-
640 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
ing south. The information gained was to the efifect that
Ewell's and Longstreet's corps had marched south all night
on the Telegraph road. About the time that this informa¬
tion was received, an order came fromWarren to move to
Harris' Store. In the morning Cutler's division, which
was given the lead, started promptly at five o'clock.
By one o'clock Warren had reached the North Anna
River, and began to cross at Jericho Ford about three
o'clock in the afternoon. Griffin's division, wading,
crossed over without opposition, and formed line of battle.
Cutler was directed to cross and form on his right. The
Iron Brigade, being in the advance, was ordered to the
right of Griffin, while Colonel Bragg, in command of Roy
Stone's Bucktail Brigade, was to take position on the right
of the Iron Brigade. Colonel Hofmann, in command of
the Second Brigade, which was Cutler's old brigade, was
ordered to support them, while L-yle was held in reserve.
Crawford had taken position on the left of Griffin, so
that Warren's line, from left to right, was Crawford, Grif¬
fin, and Cutler. Griffin had scarcely taken his position
when he was furiously assaulted ; but he repulsed the
enemy.
While Hancock's passage of the North Anna was stub¬
bornly resisted. Warren, several miles above, crossed un¬
opposed ; but as soon as he had crossed his center was
attacked. Failing to drive Griffin, the Confederate force
moved to the right just as Cutler, with Captain Mink, was
riding on the line that he was to occupy to select a posi¬
tion for Mink's battery.
As the Iron Brigade was moving into position it was
struck by the force that had assaulted Griffin. Not yet
in position, the brigade was unable to withstand so heavy
a force, the assaulting troops being Wilcox's division, com¬
posed of Brown's, Scales', Gordon's, and Thomas's bri¬
gades, followed by Heth's division. Mink hurriedly threw
his battery into position, and the Iron Brigade, falling back,
reformed in its rear.
ON TO RICHMOND.
641
This movement uncovered Griffin's right. At the same
time Bartlett's brigade was sent to assist in restoring the
lines. As the troops were rushing to their positions, the
83d Pennsylvania, under Lieutenant Colonel McCoy, came
in contact with one of Brown's regiments, while both were
marching. McCoy instantly formed line and fired the first
volley, which wounded and killed many, and paralyzed the
enemy. Seeing an officer of rank, the 83d boys sprang for¬
ward and caught him. It proved to be Colonel Brown, in
command of the brigade. Colonel Bates reported to Cutler
with his brigade ; two of his regiments were sent to the
right, where the enemy was repulsed with heavy loss.
Hancock was on the Chesterfield road, which crosses the
North Anna, about a mile west of the railroad bridge. And
here occurred another blunder on the part of the enemy—
that of leaving troops in an intrenched position on the side
of a river which had been evacuated by the main portion of
his army, only to be overpowered by the Army of the
Potomac when it came up. The same thing was done at
Rappahannock Station, when Lee was retreating south,
after the battle of Fredericksburg. General Mahone said
to me that it was Early's work at Rappahannock Station.
It was, indeed, a strange performance on the part of the
Confederates ; for all night Hancock's soldiers had to keep
a vigilant watch to prevent the bridge from being burned.
It was late in the afternoon when Hancock began his move¬
ment to take it ; so no attempt was made to cross the river
that night.
The Confederate troops on the north bank of the North
Anna were protected with strong intrenchments ; but when
the order to assault was given, the veterans of Pierce's and
Egan's brigades, of Birney's division, made short work of
it, and all were made prisoners who did not escape, or were
pushed off the bridge and drowned.
In the morning, when the Second Corps was put in
motion, it was discovered that the enemy had evacuated the
south bank.
XLI
642 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
I^ee had fought many of his battles with his army formed
in a semicircle. This gave him an opportunity to quickly
reënforce any given point he desired. He had formed his
line of battle at the North Anna on the same plan. His
right was thrown back and rested on a swamp, while his
left, being refused back, rested on Tittle River ; with a
small front he clung to, and occupied, the North Anna,
thus preventing Grant from uniting the wings of his army
under Hancock and Warren. Burnside coming up in the
center, and attempting to cross the river, first felt the position
in which Lee had placed his army. Crittenden's division,
advancing to cross, received a heavy rebuff from Mahone.
Grant, ascertaining the strong position that Lee occupied,
and knowing that he had been reënforced by Pickett's and
Breckinridge's divisions, and Hoke's brigade from North
Carolina, saw that Lee was able to make a stubborn de¬
fense ; so he decided to withdraw his army to the north
side of the river.
In order to do that, he directed Wilson to move with his
division of cavalry on Lee's left flank, near Little River, as
if to turn it. This gave Lee the impression that an attack
would be made with the right wing of the Army of the
Potomac. During the night of the 26th Warren and Wright
recrossed the North Anna. Then the Sixth, followed by
the Fifth and Ninth Corps, marched down the left bank of
the North Anna, then tu;rning south crossed the Pamunkey,
formed by the North and South Anna Rivers. Hancock
remained until the following day, and then took up the line
of march in the wake of the other corps. Grant was in a
most critical if not dangerous position when he crossed the
North Anna and attempted to attack, with his army sepa¬
rated by several miles ; and it is strange that Lee did not
take advantage of the situation and hurl his army on Han¬
cock, or attack Warren and Wright. Perhaps he was wait¬
ing for a favorable opportunity, which Grant evidently feared,
for he retired across the North Anna as soon as he could
deceive Lee as to his purpose.
ON TO RICHMOND.
643
Grant then gave orders to change the base of supplies
from Port Royal, on the Rappahannock, to the White
House, on the Pamunkey, as steamers could traverse the
Chesapeake and ascend the York and the Pamunkey, the
latter with the Mattapony forming the York River.
On the 25th, Grant gave orders for General Smith's
corps to unite with the Army of the Potomac on the
Pamunkey, This made five corps of infantry in Grant's
army.
Sheridan, with two divisions of cavalry, preceded the
Sixth Corps, and on the morning of the 27th crossed the
Pamunkey at Hanovertown. There Wright halted to let
the Fifth and Ninth Corps come up, for it was well known
that Lee would make a retrograde movement so as to place
himself again between Grant and Richmond ; it was, there¬
fore, unsafe for Wright to advance without having other
corps within supporting distance.
Hancock crossed the Pamunkey four miles above Han¬
overtown. This placed the entire Army of the Potomac
south of the Pamunkey, except Wilson's.cavalry division,
which brought up the rear.
Lee, who moved on an interior line, had again placed
his army across Grant's line of march, and taken a posi¬
tion in front of the Chickahominy, at the crossing of the
Virginia Central and Fredericksburg and Richmond Rail¬
roads. The Union cavalry was ordered to advance in the
direction of Hanover to feel the position of the enemy.
When it reached Ha we's Shop, the Confederate cavalry,
under Hampton and Fitz-Hugh Lee, were encountered, and,
on the afternoon of the 28th, the brigades of Custer, Gregg,
and DavieS had a stubborn fight with them which lasted
for several hours. Sheridan ordered the troopers to dis¬
mount and fight as infantry.
The Union cavalry holding the position, the infantry of
the Army of the Potomac advanced and took a position in
advance of the cavalry, when the Confederates fell back
behind the Tolopotomoy.
644 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
The next day a reconnoissance in force was made with
three corps to ascertain Lee's position, Wright was
directed to proceed to Hanover Court House, while Han¬
cock moved toward Tolopotomoy Creek, with Warren on
the left, who moved on the Shady Grove Church road.
Burnside was held in reserve,
Wright advanced to Hanover Court House without seri¬
ous opposition ; but Hancock, on his left, found the enemy
in strong force at Tolopotomoy Creek, Burnside was moved
up on the left of Hancock so as to fill the gap between
him and Warren, When Warren arrived near Huntley
Corners, on the Shady Grove Church road. Early attempted
to turn his left flank, attacking Crawford's division, and
'Colonel Hardin's brigade was driven back in confusion.
In order to relieve Warren, Hancock was ordered ta
attack the enemy who were in his front, which he did,
taking and holding the rifle-pits occupied by the Confeder¬
ates, Wilson, with his division of cavalry, had come up
on the right of the Sixth Corps, after having destroyed all
that he could of the Virginia Central Railroad,
Sheridan was on the left of Warren and pressing in the
direction of Cold Harbor, where he arrived on the 31st and
found the enemy intrenched.
CHAPTER XIX.
COLD HARBOR.
Army of the Potomac was now on historic mili-
tary ground ; in its rear was Yorktown, where the
famous battle was fought which ended the war of the
Revolution, while it occupied the position held by the
right of McClellàn's army in the Peninsular Campaign of
1862.
As the Confederates had always feared that the Penin¬
sula would again be the route of the Union army to cap¬
ture Richmond, they had been constantly preparing lines
of fortifications to checkmate a movement in that direction ;
the Army of the Potomac had therefore bloody work be¬
fore it, whether it succeeded or not. Eee was again in
Grant and Meade's front to assume the defensive and pre¬
vent the crossing of the Chickahominy, which empties into
the James, by the Army of the Potomac, which, then only ten
miles distant from Richmond, had to meet the impenetrable
barriers behind which was Eee's army ; consequently Grant
and Meade made another flank movement to the left, with
Cold Harbor as the objective, as Sheridan had reported that
position weakly defended. Wright, with the Sixth Corps,
was ordered from the right of the army to pass in rear of
the other corps and proceed hastily to Cold Harbor, while
General Smith was directed to follow and take up a position
on the right of the Sixth Corps. Hancock, who held the
right after Wright had been withdrawn, was ordered to
march in rear of Burnside and Warren and form on Wright's
left, when it was discovered that there was a wide interval
645
646
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
between Warren's left and Smith's right, which Warren
was directed to occupy ; but, as he already had a front of
over three miles, it was quite difficult for him to connect
with Smith.
The Union line of battle, as then formed at Cold Harbor,
from left to right, was Hancock, Wright, Smith, Warren,
and Burnside. Grant and Meade knew they were in the
enemy's country, where at least a majority of the people
were loyal to the Confederate cause ; hence they presumed
that the newly-formed lines had been quickly reported to
Lee. This made it necessary to support the weak line of
Warren, and Burnside was directed to withdraw from his
(Warren's) right and mass the Ninth Corps in the rear and
right of the Fifth, to sustain Warren in case he was
attacked. When Burnside began to execute the order, on
the afternoon of the 2d of June, he was attacked and a part
of his forces driven through a swamp, the enemy capturing
many prisoners. Warren's front was at the same time
assailed, when Griffin was thrown forward with his division
to assist Burnside. Griffin hastily formed his division, with
Ayres on the left, Bartlett in the center, and Sweitzer on
tlie right and rapidly advanced to meet the enemy, as a
dense cloud of dust indicated that a heavy force was ap¬
proaching.
Bartlett's advance was on the north side of the Mechanics-
ville road, and when his skirmish line encountered the
enemy. Griffin ordered Stewart, with Battery B, 4th United
States Artillery, to take a position on the front line, which
he promptly did. He soon silenced a battery of the enemy,
which was abandoned, and with short fuses he checked the
advance of Rodes' division. Cutler, on the left of Griffin,
not being heavily attacked, sent Hofmann's brigade to
Griffin's assistance; while Crawford, on Cutler's left, was
expected to join Devens' right of Smith's corps.
On the morning of the 3d of June, Grant gave orders
for Hancock, Wright, and Smith to make an attack at half
past four.
COLD HARBOR.
647
The Second Corps was formed with Barlow on the left
and Gibbon on the right, Bimey supporting.
R. H. Anderson, who commanded Longstreet's corps,
had been moved to the right to meet the movements of
Hancock, Wright, and Smith, Hoke coming up first. On
the ist and 2d Anderson had been fighting Sheridan and
Wright ; but on the 3d Kershaw formed on his left, with
Pickett and Field, extending the line to meet Early's right.
On the morning of the 3d, Barlow formed his division
in two lines of battle, the brigades of Brooke and Miles in
the front line, with McDoiigall and Byrnes supporting.
Gibbon did the same, placing Smith and Tyler in front,
with Owen and McKeon supporting in close column by
regiments. Barlow's first line captured the salient on the
road from Dispatch Station ; but McDougall and Byrnes
not getting up immediately, they were forced out by Hill
and Breckinridge, though Barlow only fell back a short
distance, where he took up a position behind a small eleva¬
tion, which he held. Barlow's loss was very heavy.
Among the killed were Colonel Morris, of the 68th New
York, and Colonel Byrnes, of the 28th Massachusetts, and
Colonel Brooke fell severely .wounded as the troops entered
the enemy's works.
When Gibbon advanced, McKeon supported Tyler ; but
the latter fell almost immediately. McKeon then came up
on the right of Tyler's brigade, but he, too, soon fell, mor¬
tally wounded, under the severe fire. By this time Mc-
Keon's brigade, then commanded by Colonel Haskell, of the
32d Wisconsin, but which was only a mere skirmish line, it
having suffered so heavily, was ordered by Haskell to again
advance, when he was fatally wounded. Gibbon encoun¬
tered a swamp in his front. Tyler and McKeon had gone to
the right of it, with the exception of Colonel McMahon, of
the 164th New York, who was on the left of McKeon's
brigade. McMahon in the advance got separated from his
brigade and went to the left of the swamp. He there gal¬
lantly charged over the enemy's works, but fell by the side
648 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC
of his colors, pierced by several bullets. Dying in the
lines of the Confederates, his colors were captured, and
scarcely a man of his regiment escaped being taken prisoner,
Owen was to support Smith ; but as soon as Smith
became hotly engaged, Owen moved up on his left flank,
and thus became unable to support Smith when he carried
the works in his front, which he did at the same time Mc-
Mahon stormed them. Owen is to be commended for his
valor ; but his judgment was at fault in not remaining in
Smith's rear, to aid him when he drove the enemy from his
position. Gibbou was then compelled to retire.
Wright formed his corps with Russell on the left, Rick-
etts in the center, and Neill (Getty's) on the right. Russell
and Ricketts advanced close to the enemy's position ;
Neill on the right carried the rifle-pits in his front, but was
unable to successfully advance any farther ; yet Wright
maintained himself within forty or fifty yards in some
places.
Smith formed his line with Brooks on the left, Martin-
dale in the center, and Devens on the right. Smith dis¬
covered a ravine in front of his left and center, deep enough
to shelter the troops. He conceived the idea that he could
suddenly make a charge from that ravine at an opportune
moment, and dash on the enemy's works and succeed in
forcing him back. Accordingly he ordered Martindale,
when he heard the fire from Bropks' division, to advance.
When Wright advanced, Martindale supposed it was
Brooks, and ordered Stannard to charge, which he did three
times. Stannard in relating this occurrence to me, said:
I begged Martindale to go to Smith and have the order counter¬
manded, for I knew my brigade would be nearly destroyed without
effecting anything ; Martindale went to Smith and gave Stannard's
message, saying: " He will lose his brigade;" but Smith said to
Martindale that Grant had ordered the enemy's works to be assaulted,
and would not yield in his purpose. When Martindale returned and
told me what Smith said, I pulled my hat down over my eyes, and,
advancing, ordered the brigade to follow me. When I arrived near
the enemy's position every staff officer and orderly had been killed
COLD HARBOR.
649
or wounded, and I was compelled to get the brigade back myself as
best I could. Grant was at my headquarters, as he was riding the
line of battle. After listening to the roar of the battle on Hancock's
and Wright's front, he said; " Stannard, this is a heavy battle
with that he galloped to the left, not giving me time to express my
opinion, and for that reason I asked Martindale to go to General
Smith to try to persuade him to countermand the order to charge.
Anderson held a position where all his artillery could
be brought to bear on our advancing columns, and that,
too, with an enfilading fire from either right or left, which
plowed great gaps in our advancing lines. Hancock,
Wright, and Smith all suffered alike from it, while our
artillery was unable to aid the infantry, because there were
no prominences upon which to get positions.
Warren and Burnside were ordered to watch the move¬
ments of the enemy closely, and if there was an oppor¬
tunity to turii Lee's left fiank, they were to embrace it ;
but it seemed never to come.
Grant and Meade seeing there was no hope of breaking
through at any point, -ordered the corps commanders to in¬
trench their positions, until a new plan of action could be
conceived ; for it was evident that Lee was fully able to
prevent the Army of the Potomac from entering Rich¬
mond, with his troops behind formidable breastworks.
Grant was the commander-in-chief of all the armies, and
if he turned back then it would have cast a heavy gloom
over the country and chilled the hopes of the armies ; so
he at once boldly resolved to cross the James, and cut off
the supplies for Richmond and Lee's army. This would
give Lee an opportunity to march on Washington ; but
Grant decided to risk it, and at once gave orders to prepare
to cross the James River.
CHAPTER XX.
CAVALRY TRANSACTIONS FROM THE NORTH ANNA TO
THE JAMES.
PON the return of the Cavalry Corps from its expedi¬
tion around Lee's right flank to the army at Ches¬
terfield, north of the Anna, on the Fredericksburg and
Richmond Railroad, on the 25th of May, 1864, it moved
again, on the evening of the 26th, in advance of the army
on the road to Hanover Ferry on the Pamnnkey.
Arriving there early on the morning of the 27th, the
crossing of the run was speedily effected by Custer's brigade
of Torbert's division, which had the advance. The oppo¬
site, or southern bank of the run was held by a small force
of the enemy, who were soon driven away by Custer's lead¬
ing regiments, under cover of the fire from which two can¬
vas pontoons were launched and two squadrons ferried
over to hold the approaches to the ferry until the bridge
could be laid. In an hour this was accomplished, under
charge of Captain Howell, of the 50th New York Engineers,
and the whole of Torbert's division crossed over.
Custer, still in the advance, met the enemy about one
mile from the ferry, near Dr. Brockenborough's house,
where the road to Hanover Court House branches from the
road leading from the ferry to Haws' Shop. Two of his
regiments were sent on each road. Devin's brigade fol¬
lowed on the Hanover Court House road in support, in
that direction, and Merritt's brigade on the Haws' Shop
road. The enemy being in strong force on the Hanover
Court House road, Custer's two regiments and Devin's entire
brigade soon became engaged. Custer, with the other two
650
CAVALRY TRANSACTIONS.
651
regiments of his brigade, followed by Merritt, proceeded to
Haws' Shop, and, as directed, took the road leading from
there to Hanover Court House, and came into the road
on which Devin was engaged in rear of the enemy in his
front. Immediately on the appearance of Merritt on this
road, the enemy abandoned his position and retired pre¬
cipitately in the direction of Hanover Court House. Mer¬
ritt went into position midway between Crump Creek bridge
and Haws' Shop, Devin and Custer occupied the ground
abandoned by the enemy. The road leading from the
town of Hanover to the White House and Richmond road
enters it at Haws' Shop. This road crosses the Tolopoto-
moy about one and a half or two miles east of the shop, and
runs parallel to it until it enters the road leading from
Hanover Court House to Mechanicsville, about the same
distance to the west of the shop, at or near Polly Hunt¬
ley's Corners or Crossroads, through which the road lead¬
ing from Mechanicsville to Hanover Court House passes.
The Second Division (Gregg's), encamped for the night
about one mile north of the shop. Russell's division of the
Sixth Corps came up during the day, somewhat nearer the
shop than the cavalry, and went into camp.
Early on the morning of the 28th, the Second Division
moved out on the road from White House to Richmond, at
Haws' Shop, and, after marching a short distance in the
direction of Mechanicsville, encountered the enemy in
strong force, advantageously posted near .¿Enon Church, at
which point a road leading from Hanover Court House
via Cash Corners enters the Richmond and White House
road, and soon became engaged. The Confederates were
stubborn, and regiment after regiment was put in until the
entire brigade were in battle array and heavy fighting
going on along the entire front.
The Second Brigade, Irvin Gregg's, was moved up, and
the i6th Pennsylvania Cavalry was put in on the right
of Davies' line and the 13th on the left ; but even as
thus reënforced, this officer was barely able to hold his posi-
652 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
tion. The fire of the enemy was heavy and continuous ;
his batteries enfiladed all the ground in rear of the line of
battle and did some damage to the regiments of the Second
Brigade, which was in reserve, and to our hospitals. About
three p. m. Custer's brigade, of Torbert's division, came
up, dismounted, and crossed the open field in rear of the
center of General Davies' line, deploying to the right and
left of the road : their advance was irresistible, and the
wearied troops of the Second Division being inspired by
this timely aid, advanced along the entire line with a cheer,
while the enemy abandoned the field, leaving his dead and
wounded and many prisoners in our possession. These
consisted mainly of Butler's South Carolinians, which had
just joined Lee's army.
Merritt's and Devin's brigades of Torbert's division
were on the road leading from Haws' Shop to Hanover
Court House, holding the line of Crump's Creek, a small
but swift stream which has its source in the vicinity of
.i^non- Church, and flows northeasterly, emptying in the
Pamunkey near Hanovertown, and affording a good defen¬
sive line.
During the day of the 28th, while the cavalry fight¬
ing was going on, the army crossed the Pamunkey at
Hanovertown without molestation. On the same night,
after the battle in .front of Haws' Shop, the cavalry with¬
drew and went into camp on the Tolopotomoy, between
Hanovertown and New Castle Ferry, where it remained
during the 29th and 30th. The First Division having some
severe fighting on the road leading from Old Church to
Cold Harbor, and drawing the enemy to within a mile and
a half of the latter place, on the following morning Torbert
advanced and drew the enemy from Cold Harbor, and held
the position against very determined efforts on his part to
regain it, until the arrival of our own infantry, on the ist
of June. On the morning of the 31st the Second Brigade
of the Second Cavalry Division (Irvin Gregg's), was sent
to White House to report to Gen. William F. Smith, whose
CA VA LR V TRANSA CTIONS.
653
corps of 16,000 men had just urrived at that point from
Bermuda Hundred, Colonel Gregg's command arrived at
White House about three p. m., and, upon reporting to Gen¬
eral Smith, he was directed to so post his brigade as to cover
his left flank on his march to join the army, as his orders
directed, at New Castle Ferry on the Pamunkey. This
order was a mistake, "New Castle" being substituted, in
the order directing the march, for ' ' Cold Harbor. ' '
General Smith's corps moved on the afternoon of the
31st, and early the following morning, June i. Colonel
Gregg's command moved on the Cold Harbor road, and
arrived in the vicinity of that place in the evening of the
same day.
On the 2d, the ist and 2d Cavalry made reconnois-
sances to Sumner's Upper Bridge, and Bottom Bridge,
and held the left of the line until the arrival of Hancock's
corps, after which they withdrew and took up a position
further down the Chickahominy, opposite Bottom Bridge,
the enemy's cavalry occupying the northern bank, and
shelling our camps at long range. Meanwhile Wilson's
Third Division was operating on the right of the army,
burning bridges, destroying railroads, and being en¬
gaged with the enemy around the sources of the Tolopo-
tomoy.
On the 4th, the First Division moved to Old Church,
and on the 6th, Gregg's Second Division, being relieved by
one of Wilson's brigades, marched to the same place : from
thence both divisions moved to New Castle Ferry, where
they met the trains from the White House with supplies
for an extended march, known in history as the ' ' Trevil-
ian Raid." This expedition had for its objective, first,
the destruction of the railroad between Richmond and
Lynchburg ; second, a junction with the forces under
General Hunter, supposed to be at or in the vicinity of
Charlottesville ; and third, the withdrawal of the enemy's
cavalry from the front of our army, whose presence would
have interfered seriously with any movement for its with-
654
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
drawal from its position at Cold Harbor across the Chicka-
hominy and White Oak Swamp toward the James.
Everything being in readiness, horses shod, rations,
forage, and ammunition being distributed, everj'thing to last,
with what could be picked up in the country, for an indefi¬
nite period, the command, in high spirits, crossed the
Pamunkey, and after a march of i6 or i8 miles went into
camp between Aylett's and Dunkirk.
The march continued along the north bank of the Anna
during the 8th, 9th, and loth, without incident, and on
the evening of the latter date the entire command went
into camp on the south bank of the North Anna, about
four or five miles north of Trevilian Station, where, for the
first time during the march, they encountered the enemy's
scouts, who attacked the head of their column.
On the morning of the nth the march was resumed in
the direction of Trevilian Station. Torbert had the ad¬
vance, but had not proceeded far until the enemy were en¬
countered in full force. Devin and Merritt were at once
engaged in a fierce contest, Custer having been detached
and sent to the left to get to the station or in the rear of
the enemy. Following a wood road which leads from the
Louisa Court House road to Trevilian, Custer passed be¬
tween Hampton's division, which had passed the station and
was engaging Torbert, and Fitz Lee's division, which was
still on the road leading from Louisa Court House to Char-
lotte.sville ; and thus, meeting no opposition, reached and
took possession of the station.
Sheridan, having received information that Custer had
posssession of the station, dismounted the brigades of De¬
vin and Merritt, and, forming in line, drove Hampton
back upon Custer. But Fitz-Hugh Lee coming up, Custer
was obliged to form his command to face in two direc¬
tions, and was being hard pressed ; meantime, Merritt and
Devin drove back Hampton, and Irvin Gregg's brigade,
being brought up and put in on Fitz Lee's right flank,
attacked vigorously, and drove him from the road and
CAVALRY TRANSA C TIONS.
655
back in the direction of Louisa Court House. Night put
an end to the fighting.
Hampton moved toward Gordonsville, and Fitz Lee,
during the night, joined him by a detour westward. Da-
vies' brigade of Gregg's division guarded the trains.
On the morning of the 12th the work of destroying the
railroad commenced, and Sheridan, having learned that
Hunter was moving away from Charlottesville instead of
toward that place, concluded to return ; and with a view
to secure a byroad leading to Mallory's Ford, which led
to the Catharpin road, sent Torbert to make a reconnois-
sance on the Gordonsville road, which movement brought
on a fight in which his entire force became engaged with¬
out being able to drive the enemy from his strong position.
On the night of the 12th, as soon as darkness set in,
all the wounded being provided for in ambulances, wagons,
and vehicles picked up in the country, and such of their
wounded (about 100) as could not be transported being
left in hospitals near the station, the command was put in
motion, and reached the North Anna at Carpenter's Ford
during the night, and in the morning crossed over and
moved, via Troyman's Store, to the Catharpin road, and
encamped at Shady Grove Church ; next day passed over
the Spottsylvania Court House battlefield, and so on along
the north bank of the Mattapony, until, on the i8th, the
command arrived at and encamped in the vicinity of King
and Queen Court House ; here, learning that the depot at
White House was not broken up. General Sheridan sent
his wounded on to West Point under an escort of two regi¬
ments, and with the remainder of his command returned
to Dunkirk, at which point he crossed the Mattapony
on the pontoons which had been carried with the expe¬
dition.
On the 20th the march was resnmed at an early honr ;
the sound of artillery firing was heard from the direc¬
tion of White House, and dispatches were received from
General Abercrombie that that place was attacked ; but
656
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
learning from an advance party, which had been sent for¬
ward on hearing the firing, that there was no danger, the
command moved leisurely to the Pamunkey, and went
into camp on the north side, opposite White House, the
enemy holding the bluff about one mile back from the
river, and surrounding the plain in the form of a semi¬
circle.
During the night Col. Irvin Gregg, who had become
familiar with the topography of the country around the
White House during the Peninsular Campaign of 1862, was
sent for, and received instructions to cross his brigade early
on the following morning, dismounted, and make a recon-
noissance toward Black Creek and Tunstall's Station, on
the York River and Richmond Railroad, as soon as it was
light enough to see. The brigade crossed over, and pro¬
ceeded to Dr. Macon's farm, about two miles west from
the White House, the house being situated on the bluff
and overlooking the plain from Black Creek to White
House. From Dr. Macon's house several roads lead toward
Tunstall's Station, which is concealed from view by the
dense woods that cover the hill which slopes from the
house to Black Creek. Halting the main force here, strong
parties were sent out on these several roads ; but no enemy
was encountered until they reached the vicinity of Tun¬
stall's Station, where the enemy were discovered in strong
force on the opposite side of Black Creek. During the
afternoon the Confederates advanced a strong skirmish
line ; but being unable to make any impression upon
Gregg's lines, retired about sunset.
At White House, Sheridan found a train of 900 wagons^
which, after breaking up the depot at that place, he was
directed to bring over to the James River, directing his
march on Bermuda Hundred, where General Butler had a
pontoon bridge. This involved a flank march of three
days, in the face of a vigilant and daring enemy ; and as
the trains would occupy more than ten miles of road, was
an extremely hazardous undertaking. However, Sheridan
CA VALR V TRANSA CTIONS.
657
and his troopers were equal to the task imposed upon
them.
On the morning of the 22d, Torbert was sent in advance
of the trains to secure the crossing at Jones' Bridge, whilst
Gregg moved on a parallel road on the right flank of the
long line of wagons. The march was undisturbed, and on
the evening of the 23d the trains were all safely parked on
the south side of the Chickahominy ; the night passed
quietly, and on the morning of the 24th Torbert again
moved in ad vance on the Charles City Court House road, as
escort to the trains. When Torbert's advance reached the
courthouse it encountered the enemy and drew him across
Herring Creek, on the western or Harrison's Landing road.
Torbert pushed his entire division to the front, and the
trains, which had passed beyond the courthouse, were all
parked, and their direction changed to Wilcox Landing, on
the James, instead of Bermuda Hundred, their original
destination. Gregg moved on the road leading by St.
Mary's Church to Haxall's Landing, covering, as on the
previous day, the right flank of the trains.
The Second Division, with the Second Brigade (Col.
Irvin Gregg's) in the advance, reached the vicinity of St.
Mary's Church about noon, where it encountered a small
mounted force of the enemy, which it drove away. Gregg
having received intelligence of the change of affairs in
front, and being directed to hold on to his position near the
church, took up a strong position across the St. Mary's
Church and Haxall's Landing road, the right and left of his
line resting on a swamp, and his artillery posted upon com¬
manding ground in the center, Randol on the right near
the road, and Dennison on the left. It was known that a
large force of the enemy were in his front across the Haxall
road, and the sound of axes could be distinctly heard in the
intervals between the firing, showing that they were obstruct¬
ing the road. The morning passed, and through the after¬
noon, hot and sultry, until the shadows began to lengthen,
the sharp reports of the carbines rolled from right to left,
XLII
658 THE ARMY OF THE POT^OMAC.
and back again ; the woods became hazy from the smoke,
and as the pressnre of the-enemy's skirmishers became
heavier, one after another of the regiments of the Second
Brigade were dismounted and placed in line in front of the
gnns.
At fonr o'clock p. m., the enemy being apprised by
a captnred dispatch from Sheridan to Gregg that we were
acting on the defensive, massed his troops for an attack.
Their onset strnck the ist Maine and 13th Pennsylvania
on the right, and was repnlsed. Swinging to the right, it
strnck the 2d, 4th, and 8th Pennsylvania ; was again re¬
pnlsed. Swinging still fnrther around to the right, and
under cover of the woods, the left of the Second Brigade
was pnshed back, and the enemy gained the edge of the
woods midway between Randol's and Dennison's batteries.
Then those gnns began to thunder. Shot and shell, case
and canister were poured in rapid succession into the ad¬
vancing enemy. Attempt after attempt was made to
debouch from the woods ; but for more than an hour did
those heroic cannoneers sweep the plain in front of their
guns. On the right the dismounted men of the Second Bri¬
gade poured in incessant volleys ; on the left the mounted
troopers of the First held the open fields in their front.
And so the fight raged around the center. The horses of
Randol and Dennison were falling rapidly under the with¬
ering fire from the woods. Dust and smoke obscured the
field ; the sun was already sunken behind the trees ; but
the fight still went on around the center, where the enemy
seemed to have massed his forces, determined to break
through.
At this juncture an order came to Colonel Gregg to
withdraw from the right and form his brigade at Hopewell
Church, on the Charles City road. It being impracticable to
comply with this order. Colonel Gregg sent the i6th Penn¬
sylvania Cavalry, which had remained mounted and in sup¬
port of Randol's battery, to take up this position, while the
dismounted regiments withdrew, disputing every inch of
CA VA LR V TR A NSA C TIONS.
659
the ground. Near Hopewell Church they found their led
horses, and mounting and returning, formed a formidable
line behind the i6th, in which position they repulsed the
last attack, long after dark, and then withdrew to Charles
City without molestation.
The above order to Colonel Gregg, directing him to
withdraw from the right and form his brigade at Hopewell
Church, at the same time informed him that General
Davies' brigade, being mounted, would cover the crossing
of the swamp ; and the dismounted regiments prepared to
withdraw. General Davies, being under the impression
that the Second Brigade had, in compliance with orders,
fallen back to the new position, withdrew, and thus un¬
covered the left of the Second Brigade before its leading
regiments had reached the swamp over which we had to
pass. The enemy, finding the opposition on his right
withdrawn, debouched from the woods and moved rapidly
across the field of battle toward the road on which we had
advanced in the morning, and along which the dismounted
men of the 2d, 4th, 8th, and 13th Pennsylvania and ist
Maine Cavalry were in the act of retiring.
This road being sunk several feet below the level of the
surrounding fields, these advancing and retiring troops
were not aware of their proximity to each other, until Col¬
onel Covode of the 4th Pennsylvania, who had mounted to
the summit of the bank, supposing the advancing lines to
be friends, called out to know who they were, when he was
immediately shot and fell, mortally wounded. The retir¬
ing regiments promptly faced to the right and poured in a
volley which checked momentarily the advance of the
enemy ; and, under cover of the increasing darkness, these
regiments crossed the swamp, slowly and sullenly disput¬
ing every inch of the ground.
Of this affair, Sheridan says : ' ' This very creditable en¬
gagement saved the train, which never should have been
left for the cavalry to escort. ' '
CHAPTER XXL
THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG.
y\ FTER several days of desperate fighting at Cold Har-
^ bor, in which the Army of the Potomac lost heavily,
Grant decided against Halleck's suggestion of attempting
to take Richmond by the Peninsular route, and at once laid
his plans to cross to the south side of the James and cut off
the enemy's communications with the southeast by tapping
the railroads. In the mean time he had sent Sheridan with
two divisions of cavalry to more effectually tear up and
destroy the railroads north of Richmond ; also to take
orders to Hunter, who had met Jones at Piedmont and
defeated him—taking some 1500 prisoners. Lee, learning
of Sheridan's movements, directed Hampton and Fitz-Hugh
Lee to pursue him with their divisions of cavalry, while
Breckinridge's division of infantry was directed to return to
the valley. Also, seeing the gravity of the situation from a
junction of the forces under Hunter, he ordered Early to
follow Breckinridge and take command of the forces
threatening Washington, which would relieve Lynchburg.
Thus the two commanders were playing a desperate game
for success—Grant to save the nation established by the
heroes of the Revolution, Lee to destroy it. Grant, in his
proposition to transfer the Army of the Potomac to the
south side of the James River, uncovered Washington, but
Lee could not afford to leave Grant so near Richmond, while
trying to capture Washington, for two corps could have
taken Richmond with Lee's army marching on Washington,
and the other corps of the Army of the Potomac could
have taken steamers and been in the fortifications in front
660
THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG.
661
of Washington before the Confederates could have arrived
there. As Grant could not weave a net around Richmond
while he remained on the north side of the James, and
the Peninsula had been fortified almost to perfection,
and it would have cost thousands of lives for the Army of
the Potomac to have forced its way through them, while
the enemy could have retired to another line of works if
driven, he gave orders for the army to prepare to cross the
James River. General Smith, known as "Old Baldy,"
was directed to return by the way of the White House,
thence by steamer around to Butler at Bermuda Hundred,
where upon landing he was to rapidly march on Peters¬
burg and capture it before Lee was aware of the new
movement.
The heights four miles out of Petersburg had been forti¬
fied by the Confederates, it being the highest point, and
readily commanded the front with artillery. Their line of
works extended around from the Appomattox in a semi¬
circular form until it reached Rives' house, near the Jeru¬
salem plank road ; there it abruptly turned west, crossing
the road, and continued in the direction of the Weldon
Railroad. It was these works on the east of the Cockade
City that Smith was expected to attack and take. Smith
arrived at Bermuda Hundred on the evening of the 14th,
and immediately prepared to advance on Petersburg and
attack the fortifications, then occupied by Wise with his
brigade and what militia could be secured in the vicinity.
Martindale's division moved on the right, and was expected
to strike the City Point Railroad ; Brooks, on his left, with
the division of colored troops was to follow up and support
Kautz's cavalry, which was to cover the left flank of Smith's
forces. Kautz was to move so as to threaten the fortifica¬
tions at the Norfolk and Petersburg Railroad. Some two
miles from Bermuda Hundred Kautz struck some intrench-
ments, when he veered to the left, which let up the colored
troops, who spiritedly advanced and took them, capturing
one gun.
662
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
When Smith came up to the line of fortifications they
appeared so formidable, and the artillery was so active that
"Old Baldy" feared a sufficient force of infantry was
at hand to support the artillery, and desisted from attacking
until he could make an examination and be sure that he
would not suffer a repulse before the Army of the Potomac
arrived to sustain him. His belief was sustained perhaps
by the fact that Lee had been able to divine the proposed
movements of Grant, and place himself in his front in time
to thwart the Union commander's intentions. But in this
case Lee had been deceived by Warren's movement on the
night of the 12th, as if he intended to turn Lee's right by
the White Oak Swamp road. Crossing the Chickahominy
at Long Bridge, Warren advanced two divisions in the
direction of Richmond to support Wilson's cavalry. Late
in the day the enemy appeared in Warren's front, but find¬
ing him in line of battle, did not attack him, but began
throwing up intrenchments which expressed a fear that
Grant would attempt to force his way to Richmond by the
river route. In the mean time the different corps were
marched to the James River to be crossed to the south side.
The trains were moved across the Peninsula at Windsor
Shades and Cole's Ferry, while the Army of the Potomac
crossed above. Thus the whole army was transferred to
the south side of the James by noon of the i6th ; Hancock
had crossed the river on the morning of the 15th, and it was
Grant's intention for him to press forward and assist Smith
in the assault on Petersburg. It seems that no one except
Grant understood that, and Hancock waited for rations un¬
til half past ten, when he received orders to march without
them. This so delayed him that the Second Corps did not
arrive near Smith's position until late in the evening, when
Hancock reported to Smith in advance of his columns.
In the mean time Smith had ordered a heavy line of
skirmishers to advance on the works, instead of a line of
battle, as the enemy's artillery would do less damage to the
skirmish line. The colored troops on the left under
THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. 663
Hicks, and Brooks' soldiers in the center, carried over a mile
and a half front of the enemy's works with sixteen cannon.
Then Smith's line of battle advanced and occupied the for¬
tifications. Hoke's division had been sent to Petersburg
on Beauregard's urgent request to Lee to reènforce him.
Lee was ready to cross his army above Drnry's Bluff, but
he seemed uncertain as to Grant's movements. It is true
if Grant could have induced Lee to throw his whole army
into Petersburg he (Grant) could then have marched up the
peninsular route and taken Richmond, so Lee's tardiness in
reenforcing Beauregard was not without its value. His
troops were there in ample time to prevent the fall of the
Cockade City. There was certainly a great mistake in not
hurrying forward the troops after the James was crossed.
Grant had delayed one day on account of his trains from
the White House which crossed the Peninsula lower down.
If Hancock had been aware of the urgent necessity of his
presence at Petersburg he could have arrived there four hours
earlier, which would have been half past two. As it was,
the head of Birney's column came in sight about half past
six ; even then, if Birney's and Gibbon's divisions had been
put in, the intrenchments and fortifications between the
Appomattox River and City Point Railroad could have been
easily carried, and occupied before Hagood's brigade of
Hoke's division could have taken its position there. With
the whole of their front in possession of the Union forces,
Petersburg would have fallen an easy prey, and saved the
long and desperate siege, with its heavy list of killed and
wounded ; for the Confederate forces could not have held on
to their works on the left with our troops marching on
their base from the right. No attempt was made to ad¬
vance that night, but Smith requested Hancock to relieve
his troops, which he did about eleven o'clock. Hancock,
who ranked Smith, received a dispatch from Grant to hold
his position until the other corps could come up, as Lee had
forwarded reënforcements to Beauregard.
General Burnside was ordered to cross the James on the
664 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
morning of the 15th and follow Hancock, and take a posi'
tion between him and Smith. Warren followed Burnside,
and at midnight on the i6th halted a few miles in the rear.
Wright, with the Sixth Corps, brought up the rear, and
crossed over after he called in the cavalry, and had them
precede him.
On the evening of the 15th Beauregard saw his lines
partially in possession of the Union forces, but so far Lee
had received his urgent appeals in silence, with the excep¬
tion of returning Hoke's division to him. On the arrival of
Hancock two corps were facing him (Beauregard) and his
right center for nearly two miles had been captured and held.
He could not cling to his position on the extreme right, be¬
tween the Appomattox River and the City Point Railroad,
and on the left, unless he could be reënforced and retake that
position of the line occupied by Smith and Hancock. So
during the night of the 15th he withdrew Johnson's divi¬
sion, posted near the James above Bermuda Hundred. At
the same time he notified Lee of his action about two o'clock
on the morning of the i6th. This compelled Lee to occupy
the position which Johnson had vacated on the order of
Beauregard. Just before day Lee moved Pickett's division
to Drury's Bluff, on the James, to cross and occupy the po¬
sition Johnson had, for only Grade's brigade had been left
to occupy a long line, and, if Beauregard's statement in
his telegram to Lee was correct, that Grant was crossing his
army to the south side of the James, which Lee answered
by telegraph that he (Lee) was not aware of it. Grant could
send a force against Gracie and brush him away ; so Lee
at once decided to put Pickett on the south side of the river,
and ordered Field to follow him, while Hill remained at
Riddell's Shop and Kershaw at Malvern Hill. At that
very time Wright was preparing to have Wilson's cavalry
march over before the Peninsula was evacuated by the last
corps of the Army of the Potomac. Butler had directed
Terry to move on the position occupied by Gracie, but he
encountered Pickett and Field and withdrew.
GEX. JAMES A. BEAVER.
THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG.
665
On the morning of the i6th Hancock directed Egan to
assault Redan No. 12, which he carried in the most gallant
manner. The two forces rested in close proximity to each
other until late in the afternoon, when Meade arrived and,
after examining the enemy's position, directed Hancock to
make an attack, which he did about six o'clock p. m. He
was supported by two brigades on his left of the Ninth
Corps, and on his right by two of Smith's. On the left
Redans 13 and 14 were carried, while No. 4, on the right,
fell into our hands. Our losses were very heavy in that as¬
sault. Among the dead was numbered Col. Patrick Kelly,
of the 88th New York, who fell gallantly leading his
brigade. Colonel Beaver, of the 148th Pennsylvania, was
severely wounded. He has since been Governor of the
Keystone State and a prominent man in national affairs.
That evening orders were given to advance at early dawn
on the 17th. This important work was assigned to Griffin,
who worked all night getting his command ready for the
attack. It was executed in a most skillful manner. He
says :
I then spent the entire night moving my troops through the
felled timber, getting them in proper position, and preparing for
attack. I placed my brigade on the left of the Second Corps in a
ravine immediately in front of the Shade House, which the enemy
held, and within one hundred yards of their lines, with Curtin on
my left and a little further to the rear on account of the conforma¬
tion of the ground. We were so near the enemy that all our move¬
ments had to be made with the utmost care and caution ; canteens
were placed in knapsacks to prevent rattling, and all commands
were given in whispers. I formed my brigade in two lines * * *
Colonel Curtin formed in the same way. * * * ]My orders were
not to fire a shot, but to depend wholly on the bayonet in carrying
the lines.
Just as the dawn began to light up in the east, I gave the com¬
mand, "Forward." It passed along the lines in a whisper, the men
sprang to their feet and both brigades moved forward at once in
well-formed lines, sweeping directly over the enemy's works, taking
them completely by surprise, and carrying all before us.
One gunner saw us approaching and fired his piece. That was
all we heard from them, and almost the only shot fired on either
666 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
side. The Confederates were asleep with their arms in their hands^
and many of them sprang up and ran away as we came over, others
surrendered without resistance. We swept their lines for a mile
from where my right rested, gathering in prisoners and abandoned
arms and equipments all the way. Four pieces of artillery, with
caissons and horses, a stand of colors, six hundred prisoners, fifteen
hundred stand of arms, and some ammunition fell into our hands.
The enemy was pursued by Potter to Harrison's Creek,
where he was found strongly posted on its west bank, Wil¬
cox then made an attack on that part of the line, but was
unable to carry it, although he was supported by Barlow on
the right, who always fought with great intrepidity. Late
in the day Colonel Gould, of the 59th Massachusetts, com¬
manding Ledlie's division, was ordered to attack where Wil¬
cox failed. Gould was supported on the left by Crawford and
Barlow, and on the right with the assistance of all our artil¬
lery, while the advance of Gibbon and Birney to Harri¬
son's Creek aided this movement. This effort of Gould's
was partly successful. After a fearful loss he carried
a part of the enemy's works, but his men being out of am¬
munition, were driven back by Gracie's brigade. That
ended the conflict for the day, with Beauregard cling¬
ing to the west side of Harrison's Creek to the Norfolk
Railroad, and on the extreme right from the Appomattox
to Redan No. 3.
Beauregard had been fighting heavily all day, and had
stubbornly resisted the advance of the Union army over
Harrison's Creek, yet Lee was not certain that Grant had
crossed the James, so he sent his son, W- H. F. Lee, with
a division of cavalry, to ascertain if it was a feint on Grant's
part to induce him to vacate the Peninsula, and then march
up the left bank of the James and capture Richmond.
Beauregard was uncertain whether Lee would reënforce
him or not, as he had practically turned a deaf ear to him
for two days. It was evident that he could not long hold
the line on the west side of Harrison's Creek, for he had
been strained to the last extremity to withstand the attacks
THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG.
667
of that day, and night did not come too soon for his safety,
for the Fifth Corps had arrived and took a position to assist
the Ninth Corps, and participated in the night attack on
his lines. His line was too long for the troops he had,
and Lee was astride of the James, not knowing until late
in the afternoon of the 17th where Grant's army was, and
then he did not telegraph Beauregard, but ordered Kershaw
and Field, about three o'clock on the morning of the i8th,
to march from in front of Bermuda Hundred to Petersburg,
In the mean time Beauregard had removed back to a
position in advance of the Jerusalem plank road, which in
all probability had been selected before in case of neces¬
sity. This line was much shorter, and as a consequence
could be better defended with the same number of troops.
It intersected the first line at Rives' house near the Jeru¬
salem plank road where it turned west across the road. Lee
had decided to transfer his headquarters to Petersburg, and
arrived there with Kershaw and Field. Kershaw relieved
Johnson's division while Field took position on the right of
Kershaw. Hill coming up during the day extended the
Confederate line still farther to the right. While the night
attack of the 17th was not successful, yet it warranted
Meade in the belief that the next morning with the Second,
Ninth, and Fifth Corps, in line from right to left in the
order named, he could successfully break Beauregard's line ;
but this movement was delayed until about noon. When
the advance was made, it was discovered that only a strong
skirmish line held Harrison's Creek, which rapidly retreated
back on Beauregard's new position.
The Second Corps, on the right, under Birney (Han¬
cock's wound having broken out, he was compelled to
yield up the command of the Second), had a shorter distance
to march, and were first to arrive in front of the new
position. The Ninth Corps, in the center, struck the enemy
at the Norfolk Railroad cut, which he was holding concealed
in a ravine. Here Burnside met stubborn resistance.
Warren, on his left, attempted to relieve him, but having
668 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
to mardi over a mile came under the same galling fire that
Bnrnside had been subjected to from the railroad cut, and
from ravines in his front. Finally that part of the Confed¬
erate line was forced into the works when Bnrnside got
within loo yards of them. Warren swung around and
placed his line only a few feet from them, when Col. Joshua
F. Chamberlain, in command of a newly organized brigade
composed of Roy Stone's old brigade, the 121st Pennsylva¬
nia, and the i42d Pennsylvania of Rowley's brigade, with
the 187th Pennsylvania, was severely wounded, or else it
was quite probable that that brigade of seven regiments
would have carried the works at that point. General
Grant, learning of Chamberlain's great gallantry there,
promoted him to brigadier general on the field, and re¬
quested his nomination to be sent immediately to the
United States Senate for confirmation. Colonel Tilden of
the 16th Maine assumed command of the brigade when
Colonel Chamberlain fell.
Smith had returned to the Bermuda Hundred part of the
line under Butler, with the exception of Martindale's divi¬
sion, which was temporarily detained to assist in the assault
on the 18th. Advancing on the right of the Second Corps
he succeeded in taking some rifle-pits immediately in front
of the main line, but was unable to advance any farther.
A most gallant and persistent assault had been made all
along the line by Martindale, Birney, Bnrnside, and War¬
ren, but the enemy had been able to hold his position in
the works, which had been made hastily in a few hours.
General Grant studied over the situation, and deeming it
wise to desist from further attack, directed .the troops to be
put under shelter, and given a much needed rest in a cam¬
paign which began at the Rapidan on the 4th of May
and ended at Petersburg on the i8th of June.
The First Maine Heavy Artillery made a charge at five
o'clock which was as distinguished as the Light Brigade
at Balaklava. Although Colonel Chaplin carried the colors
off the field, yet, in less than twenty minutes, he left 603
GEN. JOSHUA L. CHAMBERLAIN.
THE SIEGE OF PETERSB URG.
669
men out of 900, who were either killed or wounded. The
regiment lost 423 killed during its term of service.
That night the Union army made a line of works from
the Appomattox to the Jerusalem plank road, in front of
the Confederate line, again hugging the last position of
Beauregard, so when day appeared the enemy saw that a
regular line of fortifications was well under way, and that it
could be completed under cover from sharpshooters and the
fire of infantry. Both armies began perfecting their intrench-
ments, and nothing occurred for a few days except the con¬
stant firing of the sharpshooters, with now and then an artil¬
lery duel. Capt. A. M. Judson, of the 83d Pennsylvania,
in Baitlett's brigade, thus describes the works of our line :
The breastworks were from ten to twelve feet in thickness, and
under them bonibproofs were constructed for shelter in case of a
shelling from the mortar batteries of the enemy.
Bombproofs were also made for the officers, whose quarters
were not so close to the breastworks, and who were in danger of
being blown into the air at any moment the Confederates should see
proper to drop a bombshell over into our midst. The proofs were
constructed as follows :
A hole was dug in the ground in the shape of a cellar, say four
feet deep,-and eight or ten feet square. Blocks, cut from pine trees,
a foot in thickness, were placed as uprights at the corners of the
excavations, and upon these pine logs were laid, completely cover¬
ing the cellar. Dirt was then thrown upon them and packed down
until there was a covering of several feet of solid earth In this
manner thousands of bombproofs were built along the whole line
of both armies. They were much cooler than tents, and sheltered us
from the hot rays of the sun as well as from the shells of the enemy.
The line of works from the Appomattox to the Jerusa¬
lem plank road was so well completed that all the troops
were not needed on that front, so preparations were made
to extend our line to the left bevond that road. Wrieht,
^ o /
who had been ordered to go to Butler's assistance with two
divisions, had then joined the Army of the Potomac. Bir-
ney yvas directed to withdraw from the intrenchments, and
the Ninth Corps stretched to the right, occupying the po-
670
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
sition vacated by the Second Corps. Thus the front from
the Appomattox to the Jerusalem plank road was occupied
by the Ninth and Fifth Corps,
Birney was directed to cross the Jerusalem road near
where Fort Hell was afterwards built. Griffin's division of
the Fifth Corps rested on that road. Gibbon formed on Grif¬
fin's left, while Mott moved past Gibbon, with Barlow form¬
ing the left of the Second, and the extreme left of our army.
Wright's corps marched in the rear of Birney quite a distance,
and was expected to move on , and strike the Weldon Rail¬
road. Lee anticipated the movement, and directed Wilcox
to move out and form across Wright's front, which would
take him in fiank. But Wilcox returned that evening with
his division, and reported that he found no enemy. On the
2 2d, when the Second Corps had moved out beyond the
Jerusalem road in front of Fort Mahone, called by our troops
Fort Damnation, Lee, Hill, an,d Mahone stood observing the
movements of the Second Corps. In the mean time, Wil¬
cox had been sent again to intercept the advance of Wright.
Lee said those trooops ought to be prevented from ex¬
tending in the direction of the Weldon Railroad. Mahone
said to him, "If you desire me to attack them, I will."
"Well," said Lee, "I wish you would." Mahone then
gave orders to his brigade commanders to move the troops
back into the ravine, then proceed westerly nearly a mile,
when the direction was changed south, gaining a piece of
woods. There Mahone formed line of battle facing east,
and advancing struck Barlow while his men had their arms
stacked. It was impossible for Barlow to get his men in
line to resist the impetuous charge of the fiery Mahone.
Mott's division at once yielded to the onward advance of
the Confederate force which struck Gibbon's left. Several
of Gibbon's regiments lost their colors and many prisoners
Mahone says he captured over i,6oo prisoners and four guns,
Mahone's right flank marched close to the Sixth Corps,
but the movement was so rapid that Wright was unable to
assist Birney, as Wilcox had again appeared in his front
GEN. D. B. BIRNEY.
THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG.
671
with a heavy skirmish line. Wilcox did not attempt to
attack Wright, but merely impeded his advance to the
Weldon Railroad. It was a brilliant and successful charge
on the part of Mahone, though unassisted by the artillery
which had been ordered to open fire as he advanced. Birney
reformed his corps in the evening, and prepared to resume
the position from which he had been driven early the next
morning. Mahone retired with his prisoners, cannon, and
other things he had captured, while Wilcox retired in the rear
of Mahone, which movement gave Wright the opportunity
of forming on the left of Birney with his left refused back
and his pickets thrown out in the direction of the Weldon
Railroad. Our line then being established from the Appo¬
mattox to near the Weldon Railroad, the troops again began
intrenching and building fortifications. Lyle's brigade, of
Crawford's division, composed of the i6th Maine, 13th
Massachusetts, 39th Massachusetts, 104th New York, 90th
Pennsylvania, and 107th Pennsylvania, constructed Fort
Davis, in memory of Colonel Davis, of the 39th Massachu¬
setts, who was mortally wounded there. At the Jerusalem
plank road Fort Sedgwick, better known as Fort Hell, was
built. It received the latter name from the Confederates
who suffered from the artillery in the fort. It was uni¬
versally known in both armies as Fort Hell, and should be
so recorded in history. The Jerusalem road runs in a
southerly direction at that point, and the fort was mainly
built on the east side of it. Its outlines are still well pre¬
served to this day ; being in the edge of a wood it has never
been disturbed. It was finished and occupied about the
loth of July.
No one more fully understood that Grant was weaving
a web around him than Lee. Hunter was approaching
Lynchburg, and with the Confederate force there it was
sure to fall into Hunter's hands ; then his communications
with the southwest would be cut off, and, as Wilson had
just destroyed the routes south, Lee was compelled to act
at once or be shut up in the fortifications around Richmond
672
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
without the hope of any new supplies, which would compel
him to surrender in a very short time. He occupied the
interior line at Petersburg, which was then so well in¬
trenched that, with a comparatively small number of troops,
he could keep the Army of the Potomac at bay ; so he de¬
tached Early with his corps, to go to the relief of Lynch¬
burg, where he arrived just in time to prevent its capture.
Hunter's ammunition giving out, he retired by the Gauley
and Kanawha Rivers, which left the route of the Shenan¬
doah open to Early to march on Washington, as it was im¬
possible for Hunter to gain the Ohio River and transport
his army there in time to intercept him. Early had ample
time. Grant was fully aware of Early's movements, and
directed Ricketts to be sent to the aid of Lew Wallace, to
assist in impeding Early's advance on Washington.
When Early crossed the Potomac Lew Wallace left Bal¬
timore to meet him. When Ricketts arrived and found
Gen. Lew Wallace gone, he at once followed and overtook
him on the left bank of the Monocacy. There a stubborn
battle was fought, in which Wallace and Ricketts displayed
great generalship ; and, although overpowered, yet they
delayed Early long enough for Wright to get to Washing¬
ton with Russell's and Getty's divisions, which advanced
out beyond Brightwood, and formed line of battle in time
to confront Early there. Wright was reënforeed by General
Emory with the Nineteenth Corps. With these two corps an
extended line of battle was formed in a semicircle around
the city ; and the clerks and employées from the diiferent
departments were formed into battalions. Early, seeing that
the city was guarded by a heavy force, did not press his suit,
but retreated in the direction from which he had come.
It is alleged on apparently good authority—although
stoutly denied by General Early—that his delay was partly
caused by some of his officers getting into the wine cellar
at the country residence of Montgomery Blair, and getting
so " funny" that they put on the dresses left there by the
ladies of the Blair family, and had a dance in the door-yard.
gen. h. g. wright.
THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. 67S
While the Union army lay in front of Petersburg,
stretched from the Jerusalem plank road to the James. River,
many plans to break through the enemy's works were sug¬
gested, for it was known that Lee could be easily routed if
only a breach in his fortifications could be made. Gen.
(then Maj.) Hollon Richardson, of the Iron Brigade, went
to Warren and offered to carry a point in Lee's line if he
(Warren) would give him looo tried men.
Warren agreed to it, and the men were selected, but the
assault was never made by Richardson. In the mean time.
Colonel Pleasants induced Burnside to mine up to the
enemy's works and blow up one of their forts. About the
25th of July the different approaches, or mines, were under
way. It was a most ingenious scheme on a gigantic scale,
well planned and admirably executed.
The only failure consisted in our forces not advancing
when the mine was blown up on the morning of the 30th
of July, for Lee had weakened his line by sending Wilcox,
Kershaw, and Heth to checkmate Hancock's movement on
Richmond, for, on the 26th, four days before the mine was
to be exploded. Grant had sent Hancock and Sheridan
across the James to draw as much of Lee's force away as
possible, as in case he did not do that, Richmond was at
their mercy. But Lee was too wily to permit Richmond
to be taken ; so he reduced his forces in front of Petersburg
so much that when the mine was exploded, just at dawn
on the morning of the 30th, his troops would have been
unable to hold their fortifications if Hollon Richardson
had been permitted to lead his proposed charge with his
picked and drilled men. Some picked officer, like Sheri¬
dan, should have led that charge. I have carefully exam¬
ined the lines and the Crater, in company with General
Mahone, and I so fully believe that he clearly and correctly
states the situation that I invited him to write the history
of that action. The following is his statement of the
work there that day :
XLIII
674
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
The Crater, Petersburg, Va., Juey 30, 1864.
After the first battle of Manassas the Confederates and much of
their press ridiculed the Federal army for "shooting too high," till
that army learned to shoot to kill. So, likewise, they laughed at
the plans of the Federal generals for the capture of the Confederate
capital, insisting that the consummation of that object could only
be accomplished by an approach from the south. So, after all the
terrific efforts which had been made from the North and General
McClellan's inglorious failure on the Peninsula, General Grant, by
the sliding yet costly process from the Wilderness, landed, as the
last resort, on the south bank of the James and marched upon Peters¬
burg—the back door to the Confederate capital—making City Point
on the James, only nine miles away, the base of his operations.
Petersburg, twenty-two miles south of Richmond, had been en¬
circled with a cordon of forts and connecting curtains far too elabo¬
rate and extensive for occupation by an army of the proportions to
which General Lee's had never really reached, when it had also to
cover Richmond and the intervening space between the two rivers—
the James and Appomattox. At Petersburg General Beauregard was
in command. When General Burnside's corps advanced upon the
works of the city. General Lee had not yet crossed the James. Gen¬
eral Beauregard's force at this moment consisted of General Hooke's
division and General Wise's brigade, with the usual complement of
artillery.
This force, wholly inadequate to the efldcient occupancy even of
that very limited portion of the line of works established for the
defense of the city, against which the Federals advanced, was quickly
overrun and compelled to retire nearer the city ; just where they
halted and refaced the enemy, now nigh. The future line of defense
was now taken up haphazard, and extended to a junction with the
permanent line of fortifications, at a point commonly called on the
Confederate side, the " Rives Salient," about three miles from and
south of the Appomattox River. The Federals now occupied that
portion of the permanent works which had been established for the
defense of Petersburg, opposite this haphazard new line of the Con¬
federates. Thus General Lee found the situation when he reached
Petersburg on the iSth.
Presuming, as he always did, that I knew the country around
Petersburg, and restive under the idea of being pent up, he came
upon the field near the Rives Salient, and, after having taken in the
situation, the Federal army now rapidly occnpying our line, asked
me what had best be done. My division was not then in line, nor
was any part of Hill's corps.
My advice was that he abandon the line of permanent works and
THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG.
675
extend the newly adopted line from the Rives Salient along the Je¬
rusalem plank road to Second Swamp—some three miles away—using
that barrier for protection to his right flank, thus reducing, immense¬
ly, the length of the line he would have to cover, and leaving him
in better shape for meeting any attempt to turn his right, or for re¬
pelling, a direct attack. But he said, "No, we cannot afford to sit
down and become invested." He was always for battle.
General Lee subsequently asked me to examine the line carefully
between the Rives Salient and the river—the haphazard portion of
the line. I did, and reported it—the haphazard line—as untenable,
and could be taken at almost any point whenever a vigorous assault
should be made. The weaker points, after the battle of the Crater,
were reenforced by supplemental works. For some time it was
known in all the army —certainly that around Petersburg—that the
enemy were mining, and if not at other points, certainly at the de¬
fenseless salient known as the Elliott Salient, or Pegram's batter}-.
General Beauregard's command was known to cover this part of the
line, and his reputation as an engineer ofiicer went largely to com¬
pose the fears of all, when it was understood that under his direction
a " countermine''was underway. Unfortunately the countermine
was not a success. It was made above the enemy's mine. On the
night of the 29th of July General Eee had reason to anticipate that
the enemy designed somewhere an assault the next morning, and so
sent around an order that all should be under arms at daylight on
the morning of the 30th of July. No such order was issued to hold
myself in readiness to move at a moment's notice, in such emergen¬
cy ; and this is verified by Colonels Taylor and Venable, of General
Lee's staff. Field's division and Gen. Bushrod Johnson's, embracing
the Elliott Salient (shortly to become the Crater), were in the trenches
between my division and it. The left of my division rested at the
terrible Rives Salient, and thence for about one mile toward the
Weldon Railroad ; and along this portion of my front the enemy's
line, only here and there observable, was quite half a mile away.
An inspection of the map, which gives the position of the two
armies at this time, leaves the imagination no play as to the peril
to which General Lee's army was exposed. If the mine—itself a
success, making an immense breach in General Lee's works, unsup¬
ported by any reserve force, and consternation all around the breach
rampant—had been followed up by a vigorous attacking column, and
the force was there, it may not be too much to say that the retreat to
which he was compelled nine months later, woqld then have been
unavoidable and most likely in the order of the d 1 take the hind¬
most. After the explosion there was nothing on the Confederate
side to prevent the orderly projection of any column through the
676
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
breach which had been eíFected, cutting the Confederate army in
twain, rendering the rescue of the larger portion of its artillery quite
impossible, the retirement of its infantry, now in the trenches, to
chance, and opening wide the gates to the rear of the Confederate
capital.
On the Federal side the troops for a column of 45,000 muskets,
according to accounts, was there—right at the spot. The corps of
Burnside, Ord and Warren were at hand, but the directing general
was too far away, and the attacking corps seemed to have been lack¬
ing the requisite presence and direction of integral commanders who
knew the plan and the thing to do.
I was near the middle of my division and quickly realized that
elsewhere than my front the fight was to be, and the first I knew of
the Crater, beyond the tremendous report of the explosion, came
from a soldier, who, from thereabouts, hatless and shoeless, passed
me, still going, and only time to say, "H—1 has busted." About
this time. Colonel Venable, of General Lee's staff, rode up and said r
' ' General Lee requests that you send two of the brigades of your
division to the support of Gen. Bushrod Johnson." Subsequently,
and while on the way, I said to Colonel Venable : "I can't send my
brigades to General Johnson. I will go with them myself." The
Virginia and Georgia Brigades were on the right and were ordered
to drop back in such order to the ravine in the rear as to avoid pos¬
sible disclosure of this denuding of my front. They were so con¬
ducted by ravines in the general direction of the Crater as to conceal
the march of the limited column from the enemy. The morning
was warm and sultry. Before reaching the covered way which led
up to the rear of General Johnson's line covering the Crater the
brigades were halted and ordered to strip.
Reaching the entrance of the covered way, the head of the column
was turned into it, and I rode over to General Johnson's headquarters,
which were on the lee or north side of Blandford Heights, interven¬
ing his headquarters and the scene of the disaster which had oc¬
curred on his front, fiill one mile away. The primary object of my
visit to General Johnson's headquarters was to see General Hill, my
corps commander, whom I had been informed was there. I, of course,
did not expect to find General Johnson anywhere else than on the
ground where his front had been pierced. General Hill was not at
General Johnson's headquarters, but General Beauregard was. Sa¬
luting him, I said : " General, I have, by direction of General Lee,
two brigades of my. division on the way, near at hand, for the reën-
forcement of General Johnson." General Beauregard, calling up
General Johnson, whom I did not personally know, and who ap¬
peared to be about ready to take his breakfast, said : " General, you
THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG.
677
had better turn over any outlying troops you may have to General
Mahone, and let him make the attack," to which General John¬
son cheerfully replied in the affirmative.
Then I asked General Johnson what frontage on his line the
«nemy occupied. "The retrenched cavalier," he answered, and I
rejoined: "In feet I want to know, General Johnson, that, as you
may imagine, I may determine the face of my attacking force, ' ' and
then he said about one hundred yards. I then asked General John¬
son to show me the way to the Crater. Whereupon, calling to some
lieutenant of his staff, he said to him : " Show General Mahone the
way to the Elliott Salient, or Pegram's battery."
Leaving General Johnson and his headquarters and with the
lieutenant I proceeded hurriedly along the Jerusalem plank road
till I reached the point at which it crossed the covered way up
which my two brigades were moving, the head of the leading or
Virginia brigade having just reached that point. I dismounted,
-entered the covered way with the lieutenant and hurried on in the
direction of the disaster.
The covered way debouched into a ravin& or gulch from which
there made up a depression to the right quite parallel to that por¬
tion of General Johnson's line, where the blow-up had taken place,
and about two hundred yards away. At this point where the cov¬
ered way debouched the lieutenant said to me : "If you will go up
that slope there you can see the Yankees." Moving quickly to the
high ground next to the Crater I found myself suddenly in full view
of General Johnson's "retrenched cavalier," now crammed with Fed¬
eral soldiers and thickly studded with Federal flags. For the mo¬
ment I could scarcel}' take in the reality, and the very danger to
which I was for the moment exposed came to my relief and bade
me stand still as the surest course for personal safety, and so I stood
where I could keep one eye on the adversary while I directed my
own command, every moment in fearful perfl if the enemy should
advance while my two brigades were yet in the covered way so
deep and narrow as to render defense ineffectual.
A moment's survey of the situation impressed me with the be¬
lief, so crowded were the enemy and his flags—eleven flags in less
than one hundred yards—that he was greatly disordered, but there
in large force.
At once and the first thing I did was to send back to my line in
the trenches—full two miles away—for the Alabama Brigade to be
brought me quickly by the route the two brigades had come, then
indicating to Captain Girardy, a volunteer staff officer, the ground on
which I desired the Virginia Brigade formed—facing General John-
ion's " retrenched cavalier." That brigade, under Girardy's imme-
678 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
diate superintendence had but shortly come to an order, bayonets^
fixed—the Georgia Brigade now debouching from the covered way,
when he sang out to me " General, they are coming." The left of
the Virginia Brigade was not more than eighty feet from my po¬
sition, and Girardy about midway. Turning my head to the left—
for at that moment I was instructing the Georgia Brigade as it was
filing up the depression—I saw the Federals jumping out of Gene¬
ral Johnson's "retrenched cavalier," and coming on desultory line,
as if to charge us. In a tone of voice, so raised that the v>7hole of
the Virginia Brigade might hear, I said to Girardy : " Tell Weisiger
to forward." Captain Girardy, like the brilliant officer he was,
never failing to do precisely the right thing at the right time,
rushed with uplifted sword to the front of the brigade himself, re¬
peated the command " forward," and led the brigade, which, as if
on dress parade, and with the steadiness and resolution of regulars,
and regulars they were in that every sense which makes the soldier
effective, moved forward to meet the desultory advance of the Fede^
ral host. Reserving their fire they pushed on, when the enemy
turning, the Virginia Brigade, with a plunging fire, went into the
works pell-mell with them. Here and now the fight was hand to
hand,, and the work of death by the bayonet and the butt of the
musket went on till all of General Johnson's line was retaken, to
the left of the traverse which flanked his " retrenched cavalier " on
the south and to the right of which the enemy occupied some fifty
feet of his line, leaving it and the pit yet occupied by him.
This heroic charge of the Virginia Brigade, which the enemy
had precipitated was made about 9:15 a. m.
First getting the Georgia Brigade in position to meet any possi¬
ble reverse to which the Virginia Brigade might be subjected, I hur¬
ried up to the works which the Virginia Brigade had retaken, and
after making a thorough examination of the situation so disposed
the same as to increase the ability of the brigade to hold the works
retaken, at the same time causing sharpshooters to be so posted as to
make death the penalty to those of the enemy who were attempting
to escape and get back to their lines. At 9:15 a. m.. General War¬
ren, who, with his corps, besides General Ords, had been placed in
position to support or follow up the success of the mine adventure,
telegraphed General Meade (perhaps too far away for one directing
the operations of such a scheme) : "Just before receiving your dis¬
patch to assault the battery on the left (south) of the Crater, occu¬
pied by General Burnside, the enemy drove his troops out of the
place and I think now hold it." And again at 9:45 a. m.. General
Warren telegraphed General Meade: "I find that the flag I saw
was the enemy's and that they have reoccupied all the line we drove
THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG.
679
them from, except a little around the Crater, which a small force of
ours still hold." The small force here referred to was that occupy¬
ing still some fifty feet of our main line to the south of the traverse,
butting up against it at the junction of the main line and the Cra¬
ter, for the Crater was yet cram full of the enemy and from which
there was subsequently taken eleven hundred and one prisoners.
It was now to clean up the job and to restore the full integrity of
our line and to remove absolutely the peril to which General Lee's
army had been fearfully exposed by the success of the mine, (for as
General Warren says in his dispatch to General Meade, at 6 a. m.,
" the enemy has been running from his first line in front of General
Burnside's right for some minutes," and at the same time General
Meade notified General Burnside "that prisoners taken say that
there is no line in their rear and that their men are falling back
when ours advanced") that the Georgia Brigade, after having ex¬
plained to it thoroughly the duties before it was ordered to charge
and retake that small part of our main line still occupied by the
enemy to the left of the traverse.
The terrific fire of the enemy to which this brigade was subject¬
ed while passing over the intervening open ground caused it to
slide to the north and fail of the object the charge was designed
to accomplish.
A general of the Federal artillery (C. W. S.) overlooking the
scene at this moment says : ' ' The canister, pieces of shell and
other missiles striking the slope (over which this charge was made)
produced an effect upon it similar to the heavy drops of rain in a
thunder shower falling upon a placid sheet of water. ' '
Still I realized that we were masters of the situátion, while eager
to remove any lingering danger to it, which might come from a re-
enforced effort by the enemy to regain the breach in our lines, which,
he had so successfully effected.
At this juncture Gen. Bushrod Johnson came upon the ground
in the depression on which my brigades had formed for the charge,
and agreed that he would have his men in the main line to the
south of the traverse to push down upon the enemy occupying the
fifty feet, between them and the traverse when I should renew
the assault upon it by the Alabama Brigade, now arriving, and fixed
one o'clock as the hour when he would be ready so to cooperate.
Meanwhile Colonel Haskill, a brilliant officer of our artillery, always
hunting the place where he could strike a blow at our adversary,
presented himself for any service I could advise. There were two
Cohorn mortars which had been located in the bottom on which my
brigades formed for the charge, and I suggested that if he could
serve them I would have them taken up to the outside of the Crater^
680 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
where he could amuse himself till one o'clock, and perhaps no such
opportunity had ever occurred or would likely occur for the effective
employment of these juvenile implements of death.
Quickly Colonel Haskill was emptying the contents of the two
Cohorns upon the crowded mass which had been left in and confined
to the horrible pit, which I estimated was, at this time, in the shape
of a goose egg, cut half in two—120 feet long, 80 feet wide and 60
feet deep. While this deadly work of the Cohorns was going on,
sharpshooters sent back to the pit, dead or wounded, every man who
attempted to scale its sides and get away, and bayoneted muskets
of the dead, were, like javelins, hurled into the pit by those who
could do nothing more to hasten the completion of the work all were
anxious to close out.
Meanwhile, the Alabama Brigade having been formed on the
line from which the Georgia Brigade had proceeded to retake that
portion of our main line south of the traverse, yet occupied by the
enemy, and the hour of one having come, that brigade, commanded
by Colonel Saunders, imitating the steady and resolute step of the
Virginia Brigade, and its magnificent alignment all the way, com¬
pleted the restoration of General Johnson's line to the control of
General Bee's army, leaving the enemy now occupying only the
Crater, or pit, and because he could not safely retreat.
At this moment I called for one hundred volunteers to go into
the pit, not content that any of the enemy should remain so near,
subordinated though I felt he was to our control, when a white flag
or handkerchief was raised in the pit, and upon the response to come
in, eleven hundred and one, like swallows out of a chimney, came
pouring over the crest, and in passing to our rear, over the dreadful
slope, were hurried on—many to the grave—by the mistaken fire
from the guns of the Federal batteries that had previously so fear¬
fully blistered all the ground in our rear.
The Federal loss in this well-conceived undertaking to cut in
twain General Lee s army may be fairly stated at not less than 5,640
in killed, wounded and missing, with many flags, and the loss in
my brigade was 250, and the larger share of the loss fell to the lot
of the Georgia Brigade. Among the large number of ofiicers that
came out of the Crater was General Bartlett, of Massachusetts, who,
while in the dreadful pit had his wooden leg exploded by a bomb
from the Cohorns, and his perilous trip to the rear was made by the
support of one of his comrades on either side. I gave him mj' horse to
ride out and away from the field, which I left later in the day and only
after I had seen that every proper disposition of my two brigades
had been made and to make certain their ability to hold against
any force, that portion of General Johnson's line which they had
THE SIEGE OF PETERSBbRG. 681
gallantly reclaimed. During the night my ambulance corps, with
a detail of the prisoners taken, was employed in removing the
wounded and in burying the dead of their respective sides—all
that were within reach. Although General Lee had directed that my
brigades should be relieved that night, they were not till the
second night thereafter.
Taking the average estimate given by several authorities on the
Federal side, the troops congregated for this assault upon General
Lee's lines may be safely stated at not less than 45,000, while that
of my brigades did not exceed 1,800.
It was fortunate for General Lee's army that the Federal assault,
after the mine had proved a signal success, did not receive that
polarity and energy of action to which immediate presence and
supreme direction are essential, for through the ample breach, which
had been so suddenly made in his main line and the consternation
which for the moment followed, there was nothing to arrest the
steady projection of the Federal column fully and destructively into
his rear, exposing to capture fairly that of his army from the
breach to the Appomattox on the one side, and on the other to cap¬
ture and rout that part of his army from it to his right flank, and
by the capture of Petersburg compel the hasty withdrawal of his
forces more directly covering the Confederate Capital.
Mahone.
CHAPTER XXIL
WII^ON'S RAID ON THE SOUTH SIDE AND WELDON
RAILROADS AND BATTLE AT REAM'S STATION.
"T ^ THIEE Hampton and Fitz Eee were fighting Sheri-
^ ^ dan, it was thought desirable that a raid be
made by Wilson and Kautz to cut the Weldon and South
Side Railroads.
Mahone was the president of the railroad, and he had
directed his superintendent to run some cars loaded with
cotton to a station on the South Side Road, about midway
between Petersburg and Richmond. As soon as he heard
of the raid he directed the cars to be returned to Peters¬
burg, which was barely done in time to escape capture ; in
fact, the car with Mahone's personal effects was captured.
Being deeply interested in the movements of our cavalry,
he at once began planning to intercept their return, while
Gen. W. H. F. Lee's division of cavalry was directed in
pursuit. Wilson going to Ream's Station, on the Weldon
Railroad, destroyed it ; thence to a point on the South Side
Road about fourteen miles from Petersburg. Kautz's divi¬
sion reached ForTs Station about four p. m. and at once
began burning the depot buildings, water tanks, ties, wood,
and other property. The advance was so sudden that two
locomotives and sixteen cars were still at the station.
Wilson's division moved more slowly to complete its work.
Coming to a large sawmill used by the road to prepare ties
it was burned.
It was near midnight when Wilson's division completed
its work at that point. Chapman'ß brigade, constituting the
rear guard, was attacked by Lee, but repulsed him. At two
682
WILSON'S LAID.
68a
a. m. on the 23d Kautz proceeded to Burkesville Junction,
where he arrived that afternoon, and at once proceeded to
destroy the depots, water tanks, and other property. It
seems that Kautz was misled in approaching this place,
which caused Wilson's division to leave the direct road and
cross the Nottaway River. This gave Lee a chance to inter¬
pose between Kautz and Wilson, when a most stubborn
battle began. Chapman's brigade was at once deployed
and ordered to attack the enemy.
With his usual gallantry he forced Lee back and got
possession of a'battery, but was compelled to retire and
leave it. Wilson, in his report, says the conflict lasted ' ' from
one p. m. until nearly nine p. m. " Chapman stood the
brunt of it. He was an able and courageous officer, pos¬
sessed of a natural genius for that arm of the service, and
he divided the laurels with oflicers of a higher rank as a
cavalry leader. Wilson directed Captain Whitaker to take
a squadron and find Kautz so the two divisions could unite.
Finding that Kautz had already destroyed Burkesville
Junction and was ready to move on the Danville road, he
was directed to wait until the two divisions could be united,
as Lee might interpose between them again and perhaps
fall on Kautz, who had a weak division of two small
brigades, which would seriously cripple the command and
destroy its further progress.
When Wilson's division came up, the march on the
Danville line was resumed on the 25th, destroying the road
and burning the sawmills along its line, to prevent new
ties being sawed by which to rebuild the track. The iron
was heated by rail fires, then bent so it could not be used
again. At six o'clock in the evening of the 25th the ad¬
vance of Kautz's division arrived at Roanoke Station, and
attempted to reach the north end of the bridge across
Staunton River so as to fire it, but the enemy had a battery
of six guns posted in fortifications on the south side, sup¬
ported by militia from eight counties, with a small force
from Danville. Kautz continued his attack on the bridge
684
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
with great spirit until after dark. While the Union forces
were assaulting the bridge, W. H. F. Fee came up and
attacked Wilson's rear under Chapman, who faced his bri¬
gade to the rear and met the enemy with such boldness that
the Confederate cavalry retired. It was then determined to
get to the bridge under cover of the darkness, and a com¬
pany of the ist Connecticut Cavalry under command of
Captain Morehouse was ordered to fire it, and had nearly
reached it when the burning of buildings at the station
revealed the movement to the enemy intrenched on the
southern side of the river, when a heavy fire was at once
opened upon Captain Morehouse's company by the artillery
and infantry, which compelled him to retreat. General
Wilson, in his report, says :
Finding that the bridge could not be carried without severe loss,
if at all, the enemy being again upon our rear, the Staunton too
deep for fording, and unprovided with bridges or steam ferries, I
determined to push no farther south, but endeavor to reach the army
by retreating toward Petersburg.
So at midnight the line of march was taken up, with
Mcintosh's brigade in the advance, followed by the train,
while Kautz's division and Chapman's brigade moved in
the rear, ready to repel an attack from Lee's cavalry. Ar¬
riving at Wyliesburg by daylight the next morning, the
command was halted two hours to rest the horses and allow
the men to make coffee. Then the march was resumed
through Christiansburg and Greensboro, to Buckhorn
Creek, in Mecklenburg County, where Wilson halted for
the night. In the forenoon of the 27th the Meherrin was
crossed at Safford Bridge, thence east to Great Creek, on the
Boydtown plank road, from there through Greenville
County to the Nottaway, striking it at the Double Bridges
about noon on the 28th. At the same time Wilson arrived
at the Nottaway, Hampton reached Stony Creek Depot
on the Weldon Railroad, which placed him between Wilson
and the left of the Anny of the Potomac.
Fitz Lee, with his division, had halted at Ream's Station,
GEN. GEORGE H. CHAPMAN.
WILSON'S RAID.
68&
which is about ten miles north of Stony Creek Depot, and
about midway between Petersburg and that station. When
this expedition was being organized and studied with refer¬
ence to all the contingencies that might arise to embarrass
it, Meade said to Captain Whitaker, of Wilson's staff,
"Tell the general that the left of the Army of the Poto¬
mac will, on his return, be occupying the Weldon Rail¬
road at Ream's Station,"
When Wilson reached the Nottaway and crossed it, he
considered himself back safe from one of the most success¬
ful raids that had been made by the cavalry of either army.
He little dreamed of the maelstrom he was just entering.
Wilson had learned that there was a Confederate force at
Stony Creek Depot, but was led to believe that it was a
small part of W. H. F. Lee's command that could not or
did not follow Wilson.
The road Wilson was on passed two miles to the west¬
ward of Stony Creek Depot. He knew that the force
posted there would attempt to impede his advance at the
crossing of the road from Double Bridges to Prince George
Court House and the one from Stony Creek Depot to Din-
widdie Court House. As the advance neared the cross¬
roads he directed Captain Whitaker to move forward and
clear the way for the main column. That order Wilson
says, ' ' was handsomely executed. ' ' But soon the advance
was attacked by a strong force of dismounted cavalry, when
Mcintosh's brigade was deployed and forced the enemy
back to Sappony Church. From the prisoners taken Wil¬
son learned that it was Hampton in his front. The stub¬
born fight made by Hampton made it evident that he
intended to prevent Wilson's advance at all hazards, for the
fight had lasted into the night until ten o'clock, and Wilson
then decided to make a detour to the we§t around Hamp¬
ton, and accordingly ordered Kautz at once ' ' to take a
road to the westward leading to the old stage road to Peters¬
burg." That road intersected the stage road to Petersburg
at Ream's Station. At the latter place, as I have stated^
€86
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Fitz Lee was posted, also the infantry division of Mahone.
Wilson thought from the understanding when he set out
on his raid, that Ream's Station would be held by Wright
on his return, and if he reached there in safety his men and
horses would get a much needed rest. He knew that his
position at Sappony Church was a perilous one, for all the
cavalry of the Confederate army was in that vicinity, which
was too heavy a body for him to withstand, especially after
a raid of ten days, when his men had scarcely been out of
the saddle.
Wilson had a long train to protect, which moved in
Kautz's rear while Wilson's division still faced Hampton.
It was not until daylight that the road was clear in Wil¬
son's front for him to begin to withdraw Mcintosh and
Chapman. Hampton, knowing that Wilson was in a snare,
had been strengthening his line all night to do well his
part of the work. Wilson withdrew his first line without
serious opposition, but by the time the second commenced
a retrograde movement a heavy attack was made from
front and fiank. The latter movement crowded Chapman
back on the road to Double Bridges, and he was unable to
join the main command until later in the day. About
eight o'clock Kautz's advance came in sight of Ream's Sta¬
tion, which was heavily guarded with Fitz Lee's division
of cavalry and Mahone's division of infantry. Mahone,
wno was in command there, had ordered a section of artil¬
lery to be concealed near the station, which was not to be
fired until Kautz came near enough to give also the infan-
ti'N' which had been posted on either side of the road, a
chance to get a concentrating fire on the Union cavalry.
Mahone had placed a brigade on each side of the road,
somewhat in the shape of a V with the apex just in the rear
of the artillery, then each brigade was stretched along and
close enough to get a deadly fire on our cavalry as it ad¬
vanced. The artillery was prematurely fired, which warned
Kautz of the impending danger, when he at once prepared
for action.
WILSON'S RAID.
687
Seeing that Kautz had given back, Mahone took his
Third Brigade and made a detour through the woods to the
right, and gave orders that when he had had sufficient time
to get on Kautz' s flank his other two brigades and the sec¬
tion of artillery were to advance. Wilson coming up, was
not long in taking in the situation, and knowing his peri¬
lous position, directed Captain Whitaker of his staff to
take 40 men, charge through the Confederate lines, and
carry the news to Grant or Meade. Whitaker was suc¬
cessful in getting through, but he lost 23 men. Taking
the highest rate of speed he could, he reached Meade's
headquarters twenty minutes after ten o'clock. Whitaker
was unable to make Meade realize the great peril Wilson
was in, so no attempt was made to immediately move a
heavy body to his relief, and Wilson was compelled to fight
it out ' ' on that line ' ' without help, although he had been
promised aid at Ream's Station on his return.
Mahone told me when we went over the field recently,
that Wright was not over three miles distant, and had he
moved at once could have crushed him between his (Wright's)
forces and Wilson's cavalry, so he attacked Kautz without
delay. Moving in the woods, he was entirely concealed from
view ; and bringing the Third Brigade into line, he began
the attack in front and flank. Wilson could not retire on the
road, for Hampton was close in his rear. His only way to
save his command was to leave the road in the woods, which
compelled him to abandon his artillery and train, and that
had to be done without hesitation or he could not have
saved his troopers, who were so worn out that they fell
asleep in their saddles.
Some 16 pieces of artillery and an immense train fell
into Mahone's hands, but Wilson brought his command off,
and taking a circuitous route gained the Union lines in
safety. It was one of the most brilliant cavalry expedi¬
tions which had been conducted by either army, and but
for the unfortunate disaster which closed it, the Capital of
the Confederacy would have quaked with fear. Captain
688 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Whitaker, who had so faithfully executed Wilson's orders,
and had cut his way through the enemy's lines at Ream's
Station to inform Meade of, Wilson's peril, was promoted
to major for gallantry. Wilson highly praises him for his
services during all the expedition, and Whitaker seems to
have been the staff officer he constantly relied on. His
charge through the enemy's lines near Ream's Station and
taking the news to Meade was one of the most brilliant
and successful acts that a cavalry officer ever did in the war
with a small command.
It seems to me when Wilson was fighting so desperately
near Ream's Station, the sound of battle could have been
distinctly heard by Meade, and should have induced an
immediate attempt for his relief. The cavalry had by
that time raised the standard of valor to such a height that
the other two arms of the service, artillery and infantry
looked on with admiration, and welcomed Wilson back
with joy.
Grant said of that expedition that though the losses
were heavy it was fully compensated for by the destruction
of the enemy's communications and demoralization.
CHAPTER XXIII.
DEEP BOTTOM AND WELDON RAIEROAD.
ON the 13th of August Hancock was directed to take
the Second and Tenth Corps, the latter under D. B.
Birney, with Gregg's cavalry division, and proceed to the
north bank of the James River and then move in the direc¬
tion of Richmond. Grant wanted to make that movement
for three purposes : to prevent Eee from reënforcing Early
in the Shenandoah Valley ; to give Warren a chance to seize
and tear up the Weldon Railroad ; and thirdly, if Hancock
could take them unawares, he might capture Richmond, or
if found too weak, to oppose him.
Eee felt himself so well intrenched around Peters¬
burg that he could spare a part of his forces to re-
enforce other armies, and as Early was most convenient,
and could with a large army threaten Washington and
Baltimore, Kershaw had been sent to him. Parties had in¬
formed Grant that three divisions of infantry and one
of cavalry had been sent to Early ; if such were the
case Hancock with two corps could have captured Rich¬
mond and produced consternation in all the Southern
armies,
Hancock advanced, with Birney on the left, close to the
James, Mott was on his right ; then Barlow, in command
of two divisions of Hancock's corps. Barlow's right was
to be protected and assisted by Gregg's cavalry division.
Barlow was to bring on the engagement, and if successful
was to move to the left and assist Mott, while Gregg was to
watch his opportunity and, if he could, make a dash on
Richmond. When Barlow moved forward he found Fields*
XLiv 689
690
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
division at Deep Bottom, wliich was soon reenforced by Wil¬
cox from Chapin's Bluff, while Mahone had been ordered
from Petersburg with W. H. F. Lee's and Hampton's divi¬
sions of cavalry. As a result, the enemy was found too
strongly posted to be forced out of his works ; but the
information thus obtained was that Early had not been
heavily reënforçed. Birney alone had been able to make
any progress, for when Wilcox weakened his lines to assist
Fields, Birney took four of his guns, though unable to carry
his works. During the night Birney was directed to move
in the rear of Mott and Barlow and endeavor to turn the
enemy's left, but he took such a wide circuit that he did
not reach the enemy's front until late the next afternoon.
The next morning, the i6th, he was directed to attack,
while Miles was to move up the Charles City road to make
a diversion in his favor. Terry and William Birney, the
latter commanding colored troops, advanced against the
enemy's works above Fassett's Mill and carried them, but
was unable to hold them, only retaining possession of the
advanced line of rifle-pits. Hancock remained on the north
side of the James until dark of the 20th, when he recrossed
and took his old position in front of Petersburg. In the
mean time^ Warren, on the i8th, had been directed to move
to the left and take possession of the Weldon Railroad. He
was to move at four o'clock in the morning and strike the
railroad near the Gurley House, which was not over two
miles from the enemy's lines. Griffin struck the railroad
at the Globe Tavern and began tearing it up. Ayres' divi¬
sion moved up the railroad a mile or more from Griffin in
the direction of Petersburg, with Dushane's Maryland Bri¬
gade on the left and Hays on the right. Crawford came
up on the right of Ayres, with his right resting in dense
pine woods, while in front of his left and Ayres' right a
field of corn shut out only a short view ; thus Warren's
position was very precarious. I have recently visited the
field in company with General Mahone, who followed this
track when he crept up on Bragg the second day. But to
DEEP BOTTOM AND WELDON R. R. 691
go on with the narrative. Cutler's division was held as a
support on the i8th, when Warren moved out. In the
mean time, Deering, in command of a brigade of cavalry,
was holding the railroad when Warren approached. Retir¬
ing in the direction of Petersburg, he notified Beauregard,
who directed Heth, with the brigades of Walker and Davis,
to go to Deering's assistance. Heth struck the Maryland
Brigade with such force that it was compelled to yield
ground. Ayres drew back his line of battle some distance,
then he attacked Heth and drove him from the field.
Only Dyle's brigade, on Crawford's left, assisted Ayres.
Warren's move in capturing the Weldon Railroad greatly
discomfited the Confederates, and that night arrangements
were made to dislodge him on the following day. In order
to protect Crawford's right, for Warren was some distance
from the left of the Ninth Corps, Bragg's brigade, of Cut¬
ler's division, was ordered to form a skirmish line to connect
with the Ninth Corps, but it seems the connection was not
well made, for Mahone, who had been returned to Peters¬
burg, marched up a ravine until he reached a dense growth
of young pine, thence south until he pierced Bragg's right,
then faced west, rushed on the gritty little Badger, and
knocked him from the field, struck Crawford's right, rolled
it up on its left, and captured some i,6oo prisoners.
When Mahone went over this field he pointed out to me
where he marched to strike Bragg. You cannot see one
hundred feet in the thick pine undergrowth. This was in
Mahone's favor, for he knew well the ground.
Our lines were rectified and prepared to meet him, so he
knew he could not surprise us again at that point. That
closed the battle for the second day. Mahone then suggested
to Lee that he could withdraw his division, pass near enough
to Petersburg to be unobserved by the Union forces, from
there march west until after he had passed Warren's left,
then turning south could reach a point where by facing
east he could fall on Warren's left, surprise it, and roll it
up as he had the right two days before. While doing
692 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
that Heth was to attack in front, while W. H, F. Fee's
cavalry division was to take a road running east, ad¬
vance on it until he arrived in Warren's rear, then he was
to charge him from that direction, making an attack from
front, left flank, and rear all at the same time. It was
Mahone's idea that Warren could thus be driven from the
Weldon Railroad. Whether to conceal the movements of
Mahone or not, A. P. Hill, with his own corps, part of
Hoke's division, and five batteries had attacked Warren in
the forenoon, but was repulsed. When Mahone advanced
later in the day, our artillery opened such a deadly fire on
his infantry that the charge was broken so near our works
that the Confederate troops were greatly confused, and
Hagood's South Carolina Brigade was in the act of surren¬
dering to Col. D. B. Dailey, when Hagood rushed up to
Dailey, who sat on his horse, and demanded that he (Dailey)
should give up the Confederate colors and return to his
own lines.
But a moment more and Hagood's whole brigade would
have surrendered. Dailey told Hagood it was no use to
hold out as the brigade was nearly surrounded. As Dailey
declined to give him a positive answer, Hagood shot him
through the body. Dailey falling from his horse on one side,
Hagood vaulted into the saddle from the other, and by that
daring act saved a part of his brigade. Since the war these
two officers have been devoted friends Dailey urged me to
have Hagood's portrait in my work. I forwarded his letter
to General Hagood, and would have complied with it cheer¬
fully had Hagood responded.
It was a hard fought battle, and skillfully managed on
both sides ; but Warren ' ' held the fort. ' ' There were many
gallant acts performed which I would be glad to mention,
but I must content myself by noticing an aid on Bragg'.^;
staff, who did faithful work there when Mahone was
driving back our people, J. Newport Potts; he had served
on Wadsworth's and Warren's staffs, and later on for a
brief period on Grant's.
COL. D. B. DAILEY.
CHAPTER XXIV.
CAVALRY OPERATIONS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
From the Crossing of the James River, June 25-27, 1864, to
Hatcher's Run, February, 1865.
ON the night of the 24th and morning of the 25th, the
trains were moved back through Charles City
Court House to Douthat's Eanding, and ferried across the
James, followed by the cavalry on the 26th and 27th.
Before this crossing was completed, General Sheridan
received orders from General Meade to hasten to the sup¬
port of General Wilson, who, during the absence of the
First and Second Divisions, had, with Kautz' small cavalry
brigade, been sent on an expedition to destroy the South
Side and Richmond and Danville Railroads, in which he
was successful, having done great damage to those tho¬
roughfares over which the supplies for General Lee's army
in and around Petersburg had to be transported.
Having reached, however, the left of our army, near
Ream's Station, his march was intercepted by a large in¬
fantry force moving down the Weldon Railroad from
Petersburg, and, at the same time was attacked on his
flank by their cavalry. His command was defeated and
forced south across the Nottoway River, in the vicinity of
Poplar Hill ; here he was comparatively safe, but obliged
to march by a roundabout way to reach the army.
Sheridan, immediately on receipt of the order, moved
rapidly, with Torbert's and Gregg's divisions, by way of
Prince George Court House and Lee's Mills to Ream's
Station, where he found the Sixth Corps ; but both forces
693
694
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
were too late to render Wilson any assistance. Wilson's
failure to return in triumph to the army was probably due
to General Meade's inability to carry out his plans in refer¬
ence to the occupation of the Weldon and South Side Rail¬
road. After this move the cavalry returned to the vicinity
of Light-House Point to rest and refit, after marching and
fighting for fifty-six consecutive days ; here it remained
comparatively at rest, except the picket duty required of it,
until the 26th of July.
On the afternoon of that day, Sheridan, with Torbert's
and Gregg's divisions, crossed the Appomattox, and,
marching all night, crossed the James River at Deep Bot¬
tom, in rear of the Second Corps ; here, Kautz' cavalry
division, of the Army of the James, joined us, and thus re-
ënforced, Sheridan proceeded to the right of the Second
Corps, where he found the enemy strongly intrenched
across the New Market and Central roads leading to Rich¬
mond.
Torbert's division was immediately deployed on the
high ground in front of Ruffin's house, whilst Gregg con¬
tinued the line to the right across the road leading from
Malvern Hill to Richmond. The enemy advanced across
the open fields in magnificent line of battle, on a front of
two divisions ; but was unable to dislodge the First Divi¬
sion and Davies' brigade of the Second. The ground in
front of the Second Brigade being open, and favorable to a
mounted charge, its commander*was directed to make it.
The pioneers advanced and leveled the fences ; the bri¬
gade formed in three lines, on a front of two regiments, and
were in the act of moving to the charge, when, for some
reason, the order was countermanded, and the division
moved off in the direction of Malvern Hill.
During the 28th and 29th, the cavalry remained in po¬
sition on the right of the Second Corps, their line extend¬
ing across Strawberry Plain to Malvern Hill, Kautz skir¬
mishing lightly on the extreme right. On the night of the
29th, as soon as it was dark, the Second Corps recrossed
CA VA LR Y OPERA TIONS.
695
the river, and was followed by the cavalry ; moving contin-
nously during the night, the entire command was across
the river early on the morning of the 30th.
The object of this movement was to induce General Lee
to detach largely from his force around Petersburg, so that
they might be out of the way when the mine in front of the
Ninth Corps was sprung, from which so much was expect¬
ed, and so little accomplished.
This movement to the north of the James was a success ;
but the mine was badly managed, not yielding the result
anticipated. As the long line of cavalry moved from the
James to the Appomattox a dull, heavy sound reached their
ears, and they knew the supreme moment had come. The
most intense anxiety filled their minds. Would it be a suc¬
cess, and the rebellion be ended? Or would it be a failure,
and long months of campaigning remâin? The suspense
was not protracted ; it was not long before they realized that
it was a failure.
The cavalry passed in rear of the army and proceeded
to Lee's Mills, on the Black Water, where, a month before,
they had found a beautiful sheet of water. Everything was
changed. The water all gone, and in its place a broad ex¬
panse of mud, through which fiowed a shallow, sluggish
stream ; the opposite bank, which was lined with woods,
was in possession of the enemy in some force, preventing
their access to the water, and they were compelled to dis¬
lodge him before their thirsty horses could be watered ; this
was speedily accomplished by sending one regiment,
mounted, to cross the stream a mile below the mill, dis¬
mounting and deploying one regiment as skirmishers, and
another to move in column across the breast of the dam.
Here, on the ist of August, 1864, General Sheridan was
relieved from the command of the Cavalry Corps, and or¬
dered to the Valley of the Shenandoah. Torbert's and
Wilson's divisions were detached from the Army of the
Potomac and directed to join General Sheridan in the val¬
ley ; and thus this formidable organization was broken up
696 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
for the time. From this time on until the closing cam¬
paign began, all of the cavalry operations of the Army of
the Potomac were directed by that consummate cavalry
soldier, Gen. D. McM. Gregg ; how faithfully, conscien¬
tiously and skillfully they were performed, history abun¬
dantly testifies.
After the assignment of General Sheridan to the com¬
mand of the Army of the Shenandoah, and the detachment
of Torbert's and Wilson's divisions from the Army of the
Potomac, its cavalry, consisting of the Second Cavalry
Division, was composed as follows :
Brig. Gen. Henry E. Davies, First Brigade.
ist Massachusetts Maj. Lucius M. Sargent.
ist New Jersey Lieut. Col. John W. Kester.
6th Ohio Col. William Stedman.
ist Penns3dvani¿i Col. John P. Taylor.
loth New York Maj. Henrj' M. Aver3^
Colonel J. Irvin Gregg, Second Brigade.
ist Maine Cavalry- Col. Charles H. Smith.
ad Pennsylvania Cavalry- Lieut. Col. Joseph P. Brinton.
4th Pennsylvania Cavalry Lieut. Col. George H. Covode.
8th Penn.sylvania Cavalry Col. Pennock Huej'.
13th Pennsylvania Cavalry Col. Michael Kenion.
i6th Pennsylvania Cavalry Lieut. Col. John K. Robinson.
Henceforth, until the closing scene in the tragedy
begins, this Second Division of the Cavalry Corps is to be
tlie eyes, ears and fingers of the Army of the Potomac.
There are to be no more formidable expeditions around the
flank, or in the rear of the enemy, but constant watchful¬
ness, bold tactics and desperate fighting. Always on the
alert, marching and fighting by day, picketing by night, it
took the hard knocks and wearisome duties with a philo¬
sophic composure and a steadfast devotion to duty that
entitle its members to rank amongst the best soldiers the
world has produced.
From the ist of August until the 13th, the Second
Cavalry Division lay in camp, resting and recuperating
CAVALRY OPERATICNS.
697
from its severe labors, and getting ready for future service,
having a regular cordon of pickets surrounding the army
from the Jerusalem plank road to the north of the Peters¬
burg and Norfolk Railroad.
On the 13th, it broke up its camp, crossed the Appo¬
mattox, and marched to and crossed the James at the pon¬
toon bridge at Curl's Neck, opposite Deep Bottom, during
the night of the 13th and 14th. The infantry, which had
been conveyed by boat from City Point, had not completed
its debarkation when the cavalry and artillery crossed to
the north bank.
The cavalry at once took up a position near the junction
of the River and Long Bridge roads, to cover the right of
the infantry.
On the 15th, reconnoissances were made on various
roads, with some skirmishing in the evening. On the
night of the 15th the entire division bivouacked near Wil¬
liams' house, on the Charles City road ; early on the morn¬
ing of the 16th it advanced up the road in the direction of
Richmond, in connection with General Miles' brigade of
Barlow's division—the cavalry on the road and the infantry
moving through the woods on the left. The advance was
without opposition until it arrived at Deep Creek, a small
but difficult stream, with marshy banks, flowing north
into White Oak Creek; the enemy's skirmishers were en¬
countered on the opposite side of this stream ; on the north
side of the road the country was cleared and open fields ex¬
tended for a distance of, perhaps, three hundred yards in
front and farther to the north ; the country to the south of
the road was covered with timber.
The advance regiment of the Second Brigade was dis¬
mounted and pushed across the creek, deployed and rapidly
advanced across the open ground, gaining the woods be¬
yond. Just at this point the timber had been cut off from
the south side of the road, and an open field extended in
front of the infantry. Beyond this field the enemy were in
force, prepared to dispute our advance ; but Miles push-
698
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
ing forward on the left, and the dismounted cavalry on the
right, compelled them to fall back ; at the same time their
cavalry appearing in the road, they were charged by the i6th
Pennsylvania Cavalry, and General Chambliss was killed.
Meantime Col. Irvin Gregg was severely wounded in the
right wrist and obliged to leave the field.
The enemy were rapidly driven back until our advance
reached White's Tavern ; but the infantry, not being
able to hold the enemy's works near Fussel's Mill, from
which they had driven them in the morning, they were
enabled to turn their forces against Gregg and Miles at the
tavern, which they did promptly, and drove them back in
some confusion and with considerable loss beyond. Deep
Creek.
While these operations were going on north of the
James, Kautz's cavalry division operated on the left of the
army. Hancock and Gregg remained north of the James
River during the 17th, i8th, 19th and 20th, and during
the night of the 20th they withdrew and took up their for¬
mer position.
Generil Grant, having determined to break up the Wel-
don Railroad and render it useless as a means of supply to
Lee's army, sent Hancock, with Miles' and Gibbons' divi¬
sions of his corps, and Gregg's cavalry division, to Ream's
Station, on Warren's left, to complete the destruction of
the road as far as Rowanty Creek ; but before this could be
accomplished Hill, with a large force, attacked Hancock at
the station and forced him to retire ; and Hampton com¬
ing on his left, with the rebel yell, threatened to sweep him
from the field, when he was checked by the fire from
Gregg's dismounted men, holding the return of the works.
General Beaver, commanding one of the brigades of
Gibbon's division, who had just rejoined his command, had
his leg shot oif near the hip and was carried from the field
by Chief Bugler Rohme, of the i6th Pennsylvania Cavalry,
just as he was about to fall into the hands of the enemy.
CHAPTER XXV.
FIVE FORKS, APRIL i, 1865.
ON the morning of April i the Confederate lines ex¬
tended from Appomattox to Hatcher's Run, a dis¬
tance so great that to cover them they only averaged one
man to every five yards of front. Opposed to and facing
them was the Union line, formed by the Second, Sixth
and Ninth Corps, Army of the Potomac, and the Army of
the James under Major General Ord.
To Tee, however, the point of vital importance seemed
to be an isolated position about four miles to the west of
his main works, at what was known as the "Five Forks,"
and at this place he had massed all the troops he could
spare from his main body, and placed them under the com¬
mand of Major General Pickett, who here intrenched his
infantry east and west of the forks for about a mile in
each direction, refusing his line about 100 yards on his left.
W. H. F. Fee's cavalry was on his right, then followed in
order Corse's, Terry's, Stewart's, Ransom's and Wallace's
brigades, with Pegram's battery (three guns on Corse's
right and three guns at Five Forks), and McGregor's bat¬
tery (on the left of the line), while Munford's dismounted
cavalry division covered the left, from Wallace's position to
Hatcher's Run. Such was the Confederate position when
at noon, April i, Sheridan determined to attack at this
point, with the view of isolating Pickett from the main
body of Fee's army, and either capture his forces or drive
him westward.
At one o'clock p. m. Sheridan ordered Warren to bring
up his (Fifth) corps and form line to the right of Devin's
699
700
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
division, about six hundred yards south of the White Oak
road, on the Gravelly Run Church road. Crawford's divi¬
sion was in the advance, and took position on the right of
this road in such manner that the center of his line would
strike the angle of the Confederate line (as was supposed),
and be first to encounter their works. Griffin's division
took position in the rear of Crawford, while Ayres' division
was placed on the left of the road to engage the enemy in
their front and prevent reenforcements being sent to the
angle, which Warren believed (from the information re¬
ceived from, and the. instructions given by Sheridan), that
Crawford's center would assail and, with Griffin's assistance,
carry, and take advantage of any success they might have.
Mackenzie's cavalry (Twenty-fifth Corps), which had
marched from Dinwiddie Court House to get possession of
the White Oak road, about three miles distant from Five
Forks, having accomplished this object after a sharp skir¬
mish with the enemy, moved to the right of, and formed a
junction with the Fifth Corps, and were directed to move
and cooperate with them so as to come on the flank and rear
of the enemy, and hold the Ford road crossing of Gravelly
Run to intercept their retreat in that direction.
About four p. m., the Union line being formed as above
described, the order to advance and attack was given. Ad¬
vancing, and meeting with only a slight resistance from a
thin skirmish line in his front on crossing White Oak road.
Warren came to the conclusion that the enemy's line of
battle was in the edge of a dense wood some three hundred
yards north of the road, and so continued his advance in
the direction the line had started ; but soon after crossing
the road, Ayres (who had the smallest and weakest division
in the corps) received a heavy musketry and artillery fire on
his left, which at once showed that the enemy's intrench-
ments did not, as had been supposed, extend to anywhere
near the Gravelly Run Church road, but were, in fact, about
eight hundred yards west of it. Ayres immediately changed
front, facing the return, bringing up Winthrop's brigade
GEN. JOHN A. KELLOGG.
FIVE FORKS.
701
(which had been in reserve) double-quick on the left of the
new line, and advanced against the return under a heavy fire,
his right overlapping it, and finally, after a desperate effort,
carried the works—the enemy stubbornly contesting every
inch of ground with the energy of men who felt that this
was their last hope—this being the key to the position—
and capturing many prisoners and battle-flags.
Warren, seeing that Ayres was heavily engaged with the
enemy, that his information as to their position was incor¬
rect, and that the heavy fighting would fall on Ayres', in¬
stead of on Crawford's center, at once directed Winthrop to
form on Ayres' left and fill the gap between him and Devin,
sent orders to Griffin to bring in his troops to support Ayres
on the right, and to Crawford to change direction to the left
and move at right angles to his then line. By this time,
however, a large portion of both these divisions had entered
the woods north of the open space along the White Oak
road.
When Warren had sent these orders to Crawford and
Griffin he ordered Kellogg's brigade to form at right angles
to its former direction and hold it there for Crawford's divi¬
sion to form on, and then ordered Coulter's brigade to form
on Kellogg's.
General Kellogg, who was in command of the old Iron
Brigade, now consisting of the 6th and 7th Wisconsin and
91st New York, says :
The right of my line connected with Baxter's brigade, the left
with the Second Division, Fifth Corps. Receiving orders, I ad¬
vanced to a road half a mile in my front, at which point we exe¬
cuted a left wheel, and here became engaged with the enemy, the
command moving forward and firing as it advanced, driving the
enemy. In moving through a dense thicket the connection was
broken between my line and the Second Division, causing a large
gap, which was taken advantage of by the enemy, who threw a
force on my left flank and opened fire, evidently with the desire of
arresting the forward movement of the line of battle. I ordered my
front line (6th and 7th Wisconsin) to keep advancing, and one bat¬
talion of the 91st New York to deploy on the left flank of the bri-
702 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
gade, covering that flank, then advance and engage the enemy at
-short range. This order was promptly executed, and held the
enemy at bay until Coulter's brigade came up and filled the gap.
My brigade now held the center of the line, with Baxter and Coul¬
ter on either side, and continued in that position until we reached
the enemy's works. We drove them from their intrenchments
across an open field, pursuing them closely for three-quarters of a
mile, killing and wounding many, until, in compliance with orders,
the brigade was moved into camp for the night.
During this fight Captain Palmer, of the 91st New
York (now commander-in-chief of the Grand Army of the
Republic), was severely injured, from the effects of which he
is still suffering, though nearly thirty years have elapsed.
On returning to where he had left Kellogg, Warren
found the position vacated, one of Sheridan's staff having
taken the brigade to the rear of the enemy's intrenchments.
By this time every member of Warren's staff and many of
Sheridan's aids had been sent to hunt Crawford and Grif¬
fin, and bring them to the rear of the Confederate position ;
and soon both of them entered the open ground about eight
hundred yards from the enemy's works, near the return.
Here Warren found Griffin moving southwest against the
rear of the enemy's intrenchments, and at once directed
him to attack the new line of breastworks (Ransom's and
Wallace's brigades) which had been hastily thrown up, and
were connected with and at right angles to their main line
of works, in order to oppose the farther advance of the
Fifth Corps, for at this time Ayres had taken the return.
Griffin at once started to carry out his orders, and was finally
successful, being reënforced by Coulter's brigade of Craw¬
ford's, and Gwyn's brigade of Ayres' divisions, though for
half an hour he met with great resistance, the enemy keep¬
ing up a steady and murderous fire.
At the same time Crawford's division, which was moving
farther to the right, advanced steadily in rear of the Confed¬
erate line, driving Munford's dismounted cavalry division
westward before them and continually turning the left of the
forces which were opposing Ayres and Griffin until they
j2¿áu'n/^(A('^'í/.
FIVE FORKS.
703
finally gained possession of the Ford road, which ran di¬
rectly north from the center of the Confederate rear and
thence across Hatcher's Run, where Warren found him,
with his command facing westward in good order, and com¬
pletely closing the outlet for the escape of the enemy to¬
ward the north ; changing the division to face south. War¬
ren, in person, led it on the Ford road toward the rear of
the rebel works, meeting, at the edge of the woods, a sharp
fire from the enemy, who had here formed a line across the
road. Devin's cavalry division was formed in front of the
Confederate works, with its left on the road fiom Dinwiddle
Court House to Five Forks ; and when the Fifth Corps ad¬
vanced to the attack they dismounted and moved against
the works, keeping up a constant fire upon them and re¬
ceiving the fire of the infantry and the three guns at the
Five Forks battery. Pennington's brigade (dismounted) of
Custer's division, on the Union left of the Five Forks bat¬
tery, kept up a constant fire on the works held by Corse's
and Terry's (Confederate) brigades, while with the re¬
mainder of his division Custer made a charge on W. H. F.
Dee's right. Lee advanced to meet him, and after a bril¬
liant encounter, repelled the Union cavalry and maintained
his position.
William Swinton, the war correspondent of the New
York Tribune.^ and the most brilliant writer in the Army
of the Potomac, says, in describing the closing scenes of
this engagement :
The Confederates were now completely entrapped. Held as in
a vise by the cavalry which enveloped their whole front and right,
stung them with a biting fire, and charged at the signal of the mus¬
ketry of the infantry, they now found a line of battle sweeping
down on their rear. Thus placed, they did all that men may.
Forming front both north and south, they met, with a desperate
valor, this double onset. But all in vain. From the rear Warren
swept down toward the White Oak road, Crawford taking four guns ;
and simultaneously, the cavalry from the front charged upon this
road with resistless impetuosity. The whole center was now car¬
ried, as the left had been before, and the Confederates, pressed front.
704 THE AJÍ M Y OF THE POTOMAC.
flank and rear, mostly threw down their arms. Having gained the
White Oak road, Warren changed front again and advanced west¬
ward to continuously take in flank and rear whatever hostile force
still continued to hold the right of the Confederate line. This
had originally been about three miles in extent, but above two-thirds
of it were now carried. Yet, vital in all its parts, what of the two
divisions remained still continued the combat with unyielding met¬
tle. Parrying the thrusts of the cavalry from the front, this poor
scratch of a force threw back its left in a new and short crotchet, so
as to meet the advance of Warren, who continued to press in at
right angles with the White Oak road. When the infantry, greatly
elated at their success, but somewhat disorganized by marching and
fighting so long in the woods, arrived before his new line, they
halted and opened an untimely fusilade, though there had been
orders not to halt ; the officers, indeed, urged their men forward,
but they continued to fire without advancing. Seeing this hesita¬
tion Warren dashed forward, calling to those near him to follow.
Inspired by his example, the color-bearers and officers all along the
front sprang out, and, without more firing, the men charged at the
pas de course, capturing all that remained of the enemy. The his¬
tory of the war presents no equally splendid illustration of personal
magnetism. Warren led the van of the rushing lines ; his horse
was fatally shot within a few feet of the breastworks, and he him¬
self was in imminent peril, when a gallant officer. Colonel Richard¬
son, of the 7th Wisconsin (old Iron Brigade), sprang between him
and the enemy, receiving a severe wound, but shielding from hurt
the person of his loved commander.
A charge of the cavalry completed the rout, and the remnants
of the divisions of Pickett and Johnson filed westward from Five
Forks, pursued for many miles by the mounted divisions of Merritt
and McKenzie. The trophies of the day included many colors and
guns, and above 5000 prisoners, of which number 3244 were taken
by the Fifth Corps. Brilliant as the victory was, it was won with¬
out great sacrifice of life, the losses of the cavalry being but a few
hundred, and those of the infantry, 634 killed and wounded.
There has always seemed to be one grave blot upon this
otherwise great victory, and that is the removal of Warren,
by Sheridan, from the command of the Fifth Corps at the
close of this battle. The order is very short, and is couched
in an order to Sheridan from Grant, "to relieve General
Warren if, in his judgment, it was for the best interests of
the service to do so. ' '
FIV£ FOB KS.
705
During the campaign beginning in May, 1864, there
had been misunderstandings between Meade and Warren,
the latter sometimes modifying the plans of operations
prescribed by the orders of the day for the Fifth Corps, so
as to make them accord with his own judgment as the day
went on ; modifications which Meade sometimes did not
approve, and, therefore, something like controversy grew
up occasionally in the dispatches that passed between them.
It appears probable that Grant apprehended that something
of this kind might occur between Sheridan and Warren,
and, considering the time to be a critical one, sent the mes¬
sage to Sheridan.
On the 16th of May, 1865, Sheridan makes a report of
this battle, and in it states that, in bringing up and forming
his corps at Gravelly Run Church—
General Warren did not exert himself to get up his corps as
rapidly as he might have done ; and his manner gave me the impres¬
sion that he wished the sun to go down before dispositions for the
attack could be completed.
Further on, he says :
During this attack (that of the Fifth Corps and the cavalry upon
Pickett's intrenched position) I again became dissatisfied with Gen¬
eral Warren. During the engagement portions of his line gave way
when not exposed to a heavy fire, and simply for want of confidence
on the part of his troops, which General Warren did not exert him¬
self to inspire. I therefore relieved him from the command of the
Fifth Corps, authority for the action having been sent to me, before
the battle, unsolicited.
How different was the action of Fogan when ordered to
relieve General Thomas ! But comparisons are odious.
Warren grew very restive under these imputations, and
repeatedly demanded a court of inquiry, which was at length
ordered by the President, and the eourt, composed of officers
of high rank, after having a host of witnesses before them,
Sheridan among the number, who gave at great length his
reasons for believing and acting as he did, made a report to
706 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
the President completely exonerating General Warren,
stating there was no unnecessary delay, and that Warren
took the usual methods of a corps commander to prevent
delay ; as to the imputation that he wished ' ' the sun to go
down before dispositions for the attack could be completed,"
they say : ' ' His actions, as shown by the evidence, do not
appear to have corresponded with such a wish, if ever he
entertained it."
And so the Court went on and decided against Sheri¬
dan's charges in every instance, and in the end brought in
a report completely justifying Warren in his every action,
and to-day, nearly thirty years after the events we have re¬
lated transpired, there is no man who fought under Warren
but will say he possessed the love and esteem and confi¬
dence of the rank and file of the Fifth Corps.
CHAPTER XXVL
LEE'S FINAL STRUGGLE AT PETERSBURG AND FLIGHT.
SURRENDER AT APPOMATTOX.
N the 2d of April Eee saw that he could not hold
his lines any longer, so he notified Jeff Davis, who
was at church, of that fact. Davis immediately left the
church to prepare for his flight, with the Confederate
archives and what specie there was in Richmond.
In order to deceive Grant as to his real movements he
ordered a vigorous assault on Fort Stedman as if he wanted
to break through Grant's right ; in fact it was a most desper¬
ate attack on the part of the Confederates which was re¬
pulsed by Parke. It was one of the most brilliant efforts
of General Parke's during the whole war.
When Wright broke through the Confederate lines at
Hatcher's Run, his troops moved to the right in the direc¬
tion of Petersburg. Parke had forced the enemy back to the
Jerusalem plank road. Gordon made several strong efforts
to force Parke back but failed. Humphrey directed Miles,
Hays and Mott to attack Heth, who had the brigades of
Cook, Scales, McRae, and McGowan, and had been cut off
from Petersburg by Wright.
Miles, being in command, attacked Cook, who was then
in command, as Heth had gone to Petersburg, and was re¬
pulsed. Another attack shared the same fate. A third time
Miles threw his skirmishers around Cook's right and at¬
tacked his left with Ramsey's brigade, by which he gained
Cook's rear and took several hundred prisoners, a section of
artillery, and a battle flag. The fortifications around
Petersburg having been carried, Anderson retreated up the
707
708 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Appomattox to be reënforced by Cook's command, and
Pickett. At eight o'clock all of the Confederate army be¬
gan its retreat up the Appomattox River. Ewell who was in
front of Richmond on the left of the James in command of
the divisions of Kershaw and Custis Ree, R. B. Bee's eldest
son, crossed the James at and below Richmond. General
Fitz Bee with his cavalry brought up the rear. It was
Bee's intention to fly to Johnson, crush Sherman before
Grant could reach there, and then he hoped with the two
armies to again be able to fight Grant. While Bee was
moving westwardly to strike the Danville Railroad, where
he expected rations to feed his half famished army, which
he had ordered to meet him at Amelia Court House, Sheri-
don with the cavalry and Fifth Corps was keeping pace
with him and moving with great celerity. While Meade with
the Second and Sixth Corps were following Sheridan,
Parke with the Ninth Corps was moving along the South.
Side Railroad, followed by Ord with the Army of the James.
In the mean time Weitzel marched into Richmond, which
had been fired by some parties before our troops arrived.
Pandemonium reigned supreme in the city which had just
been evacuated by the Confederate officials. Our troops
at once began to control the fire and save as much of
the city as possible. On the 4th Bee arrived at Amelia
Court House, where he had ordered rations for his army,
only to find that the conductor had taken the whole train
to Richmond where it had been consumed in the conflagra¬
tion. His troops were exhausted, and he was compelled to
rest there and endeavor to secure something by foraging
parties over the country. Sheridan having learned that
Bee was there pressed on to tap the Danville Railroad to
intercept his flight. Crook was ordered to strike the Dan¬
ville road between Burke's Junction and Jetersville, with
orders for the troops to concentrate at the latter place.
Sheridan sent Meade word of the situation at the front, when
the Second and Sixth Corps were ordered to Jetersville.
On the morning of the 5th Sheridan sent Davies north
LEE'S SURRENDER AT APPOMATTOX. 709
to see if Lee was attempting to escape, when he (Davies)
struck a heavy train moving in the direction of Lynchburg,
which he captured and burned. It is said that Lee's papers
were in that train and burned up. Beyond doubt other
valuable papers were consumed there.
Lee having fed his army as best he could, continued the
retreat on the night of the 5th. On the morning of the
6th Sheridan ordered Cropk to move to Deatonsville, with
Merritt to follow him, but the enemy was passing through
there when Crook arrived.
Crook, Merritt, and Custer moved on the flank of the
enemy to impede its progress and to strike it a blow when
opportunity presented. Finally Custer struck a train in the
column, which he destroyed, capturing twelve guns from
Huger's batteries. In the afternoon of the 6th Humphreys
and Gordon had a running fight for several miles, which
night put an end to. General Wright attacked the ene¬
my at Sailor's Creek, and with the aid of the cavalry cut
Ewell off and captured his whole force ; Anderson, who had
attempted to assist him, retreated. Longstreet had waited
all day at Rice's Station for Ewell, Gordon, and Anderson,
only to learn that disaster had befallen Ewell, while An¬
derson and Gordon had greatly suffered in loss of prisoners.
That evening Longstreet, with Wilcox, Heth, and Field
proceeded to Farm ville, where they crossed to the north
bank of the Appomattox, and the next morning attempted
to escape to Lynchburg. At Farm ville rations were given
to the Confederate army. Crook and Ord moved on Farm-
ville, while Merritt marched to Prince Edward's Court
House, with Griffin to follow him. Wright followed Ord
to Farmville. Humphreys moved to the Lynchburg stage
road to prevent Lee from escaping in that direction, when
he suddenly came up on the whole of Lee's army. It was
then resolved to attack him with all of our forces, but it
was soon learned that those in Farmville under Wright
and Gibbon could not get across the Appomattox, as the
enemy had destroyed the bridges.
710
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
On the evening of the 7th Grant began negotiations
for the surrender of Lee's army by sending him the fol¬
lowing :
April 7, 1865.
General :—The result of the last week must convince you of
the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of
Northern Virginia in this struggle. I feel that it is so, and regard
it as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of any further
effusion of blood by asking of you the surrender of that portion of
the Confederate States Army known as the Army of Northern Vir¬
ginia. U. S. Grant,
Lieutenant General.
To General R. E. LEE.
April 7, 1865.
General :—I have received your note of this date. Though not
entertaining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of further
resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia, I recipro¬
cate your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and therefore,
before considering your proposition, ask the terms you will offer on
condition of its surrender. R. E. Lee,
General.
To Lieut. Gen. U. S. Grant.
As yet Lee hoped to escape. Grant sent the following
reply :
April 8, 1865.
General :—Your note of last evening in reply to mine of same
date, asking the condition on which I will accept the surrender of
the Army of Northern Virginia is just received. In reply, I would say
that peace being my great desire, there is but one condition I would
insist upon, namely, that the men and officers surrendered shall be
disqualified for taking up arms again against the Government of the
United States until properly exchanged. I will meet you, or will
designate officers to meet any officers you may name for the same
purpose, at any point agreeable to you, for the purpose of arranging
definitely the terms upon which the surrender of the Army of
Northern Virginia will be received. U. 8. Grant,
Lieutenant General.
To General R. E. LEE.
To which Lee replied ;
April 8, 1865.
General :—I received at a late hour your note of to-day In
mine yesterday I did not intend to propose the surrender of the
LEE'S SURRENDER AT APPOMATTOX. 711
Army of Northern Virginia, but to ask the terms of your proposi¬
tion. To be frank, I do not think the emergency has arisen to call
for the surrender of this army, but as the restoration of peace should
be the sole object of all, I desire to know whether your proposal
would lead to that end. I cannot, therefore, meet you with a view
to surrender the Army of Northern Virginia, but as far as your pro¬
posal may affect the Confederate States forces under my command,
and tend to the restoration of peace, I should be pleased to meet you
at ten a. m. to-morrow on the old stage road tg Richmond, between
the picket lines of the two armies. R. E. EEE,
General.
To Eieut. Gen. U. 8. Grant.
The next morning Lee directed Gordon to attack the
cavalry which Sheridan had placed across his front, and
drove it back quite a distance, but as Sheridan ordered in¬
fantry up to support the cavalry, Gordon desisted from
further efforts to force a way by which Lee's troops could
escape. Then began the preparation in earnest for the sur¬
render. Before, Lee was only endeavoring to gain time for
a chance to get away. On the afternoon of the 9th the final
arrangements were made. The Union boys fed the Con¬
federates. The officers of both armies mingled together
and had a splendid time. Grant asked Heth and others
whom he had known in the service before the war to smoke
with him. It was a strange thing to see these two hostile
armies lying together without pickets. The Army of the
Potomac marched to Richmond. From there it was sent
to Washington, where it remained until Sherman's army
arrived, when both were reviewed by the President, Cabi¬
net, Generals Grant, Sherman and other officers, after which
the Army of the Potomac was disbanded, its troops mustered
out of the service, to again become civilians, leaving a
name to live in American history for all time.
CHAPTER XXVIL
MISCELLANEOUS.
T N the written accounts of the various transactions that
comprise the history of the late war, more than their
proportionate share of credit for acts of valor that distin¬
guished all ranks and grades of our volunteer soldiers, in
both the Union and Confederate armies, has been accorded
to those who bore high rank.
In describing skirmishes, battles and campaigns, the
part that has been borne by those in command has always
been particularly described, while the acts of devotion to
the principles by which the rank and file of our armies were
impelled to perform those deeds of valor and heroism so
necessary to success, were rarely, if ever, referred to in the
official reports. This, perhaps, was the result of the con¬
ditions that surrounded transactions at the front. Partic¬
ular movements of divisions, brigades, regiments, or
detachments of troops, and the apparent, or actual necessity
for them and their results, can only be described in a gen¬
eral way on account of the many hundreds or thousands of
men engaged in them ; and thus, individual examples of
heroism and conspicuous bravery and patriotism are passed
over.
No army, or detachment of an army in the world's
history, ever furnished a greater proportionate number of
individual examples of heroic bravery than were to be
found in the ranks of every regiment and brigade, not only
of the First Army Corps, but of each corps comprising the
entire army. Not that blind, stoical, mechanical kind of
bravery which comes from military discipline, which com-
712
MIS CELL A NE O US.
713
pels obedience to the commands of officers, and impels men
to march up to the cannon's mouth in the face of certain
death ; but the bravery that is born of intelligent, disinter¬
ested patriotism and heroic devotion to principle, so many
conspicuous examples of which were to be found in every
command.
Greer N. Williams.
Among the many enlisted men who earned the right to
honorable and particular mention for their gallantry and
faithfulness, is Greer N. Williams, who enlisted under the
first call for three years' men, under Capt. W. W. Dudley,
in Company B, 19th Indiana Volunteers. He was present
with this company when it was first organized in 1861, and
in every march, raid, skirmish or battle, in which the reg¬
iment was engaged until its final muster out in July, 1865,
he was present and participated with the exception of about
three months, during which time he was in hospital at Phil¬
adelphia on account of severe wounds received at the battle
of Gettysburg, where he was hit seven times ; and except¬
ing, also, his absence on veteran furlough at the time the
reeiment veteranized. No officer or comrade ever heard
O
him complain at any necessary duty, however arduous or
dangerous. He resides near Fountain City, Indiana, on a
farm, and still has the musket and accouterments which he
carried through the war, together with quite an extensive
museum of trophies and souvenirs of the war of which he
is pardonably proud.
Norm G. Cooper
Was a native of Waterloo, N. Y., and born in 1838. He
enlisted under the first call for troops in April, 1861, in
Company E, Twenty-fourth New York Infantry, as a pri¬
vate.
Descended from Revolutionary stock, he thought that
he ought to sustain a Government which was made impact
by the assistance of Colonel Cooper of the Revolutionary
714 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
war. On August 29, 1862, at Groveton, Virginia (Second
Bull Run), he was wounded in his right arm and captured
by the Confederates, but was soon exchanged, however, and
promoted to sergeant and second lieutenant in the marches
and battles following. He was at the ' 'front, ' ' was a great
favorite in his company and regiment, and was mustered
out with them at the expiration of their term of service.
He now publishes "Cooper's Coffee Cooler," of Sturgis,
Mich., a rollicking soldier monthly paper.
He has been commander of his post, department inspector,
and is now assistant inspector general G. A. R. Has been
twice sent to the Sons of Veterans National Encampment
as delegate at large from Michigan; is aid to Commander
in Chief Yoder, U. V. U. ; President of the New York So¬
ciety of Soldiers and Sailors residing in Michigan, and
Secretary of the State Prisoners of War Association.
Personai. Recollections of Abraham Eincoln.
By A. D. Shaw, Company D, Nineteenth Indiana.
The name of Abraham Lincoln is with us a very precious
one. It recalls to us scenes in our past lives that are graven
deeply in our hearts. The first time I had the pleasure
of seeing Mr. Lincoln was, when on his way to Wash¬
ington to take his seat as President of the United States.
Indianapolis, by previous arrangements, was designated as
one of the cities where he would stop for a brief period,
while en route. I can see him now as the people, in their
love and admiration for him, carry him up the Bates House
steps on their shoulders. I saw him on the balcony- as he
spoke his words of comfort and words of promise to the as¬
sembled thousands. How cheering and full of inspiration
was every sentence ! I remember how he introduced his son
Robert, to the people, calling him ' ' my son Bob. " I re¬
member his farewell words as he again turned his face to
the east, and how every ear was strained to lose not a word
which he might say.
COL. NORM. G. COOPER.
MIS CELL A NE O US.
715-
It was not very long—only a few months—until I had
the pleasure of again seeing this remarkable man, but, oh,
what a change those few months had made ! The war was
on, and I, with the old Nineteenth Indiana, eleven hundred
strong, marched up Pennsylvania Avenue, past the White
House, one hot morning in August. There in the door,
with head uncovered, stood ' ' that man of the people, ' ' and
watched our noble regiment pass by. I could even at that
distance recognize the sympathetic expression on his homely
face. No doubt he felt in his great heart pity for the loved
ones at home and pride in the men passing by.
About the ist of September, 1861, fifty thousand troops
passed in review before him, in which our regiment partic¬
ipated. The review took place about four miles from the
city, near the Chain Bridge, on the Virginia side of the
river, and General McClellan was in command. General
Mansfield and other distinguished officers were there, proud
in their bearing and able in their work ; but there was one
who towered above them all. On him all eyes were fixed,
and in him all hopes seemed centered, and as he looked with
pride over that vast army before him, his face beaming with
joy, there seemed to come a strength and courage and de¬
termination to every heart. It was Mr. Tincoln.
Just previous to the review, as our regiment was drawn
up in line and at rest, I heard the clatter of hoofs in the
rear, and naturally, as soldiers will do, especially raw men
like us, I looked around to see what and who it was. It
was Mr. Lincoln and General McClellan. They halted
their horses directly in my rear. Their object was this :
General McClellan was very much dissatisfied with our
arms—the old Springfield muskets—and he had discovered
that the 19th, like quite a number of others, had them,
and he wished to have Mr. Lincoln give them a per¬
sonal inspection. I happened to be the person who was
singled out to have my gun inspected. Great heavens, how
I did shake ! Of course I was not aware just then what
their object was. My gun was so conspicuously dirty that
716 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
I presumed that was the reason it was asked for. General
McClellan handed it to Mr. Lincoln who examined it and
remarked that it would not answer—"must have better
ones." After they were through examining it, General
McClellan returned it to me, saying, ' ' Thank you. ' ' How
relieved I was ; and I do believe it was the first, and per¬
haps, only instance on record where an officer thanked a
private for carrying a dirty gun. The next time I saw Mr.
Lincoln was at the funeral of General Baker, who was
killed at Ball's Bluff. I can see him now as he stood there
that day. Well might he feel sad, for he had lost a true
and tried friend, who with his life had sealed his devotion
to his country.
Again I remember him as I saw him at the funeral of Gen¬
eral Gibson, Commissary General United States Army, who
died in Washington the following winter. I was on detached
duty at headquarters, and having some little leisure, as ' ' all
was quiet on the Potomac" just at that season, I went
around to the residence of the deceased general. There I
saw, standing on the large flat flag-step of the residence,
with his back against the wall of the house, his eye wan¬
dering up and down the line of soldiers that were drawn up
in front, that form which was familiar to all though they
had never seen him, the sturdy old patriot. Gen. Winfleld
Scott. Though old and infirm, this illustrious soldier was
true as steel. Presently, there came out of the house two
other persons whose names will be handed down from gen¬
eration to generation as great and good men. One was
Mr. Lincoln and the other Mr. Seward. Just as the service
closed they came out arm in arm. It was raining at the
time and Mr. Lincoln carried an umbrella, and I recollect
how amused I was, even though sad the occasion, to see
how Mr. Lincoln had to stoop to hold the umbrella over
Mr. Seward, as Mr. Seward, you will remember, was a
very small man.
Later on I had a severe attack of camp fever. My life
had been despaired of, and my wife had been advised to
Mis CELL A NE O US.
717
come and see me. She came, bringing with her our only
child, a little boy two years of age. Under her watchful
care I improved, and in course of time was permitted to go
out for a little exercise. One morning we walked in the
direction of the White House, and when directly opposite
it we crossed the street. About the middle of the crossing
we met Mr, Uincoln, and it being very muddy, he stepped
aside and stood in the mud until we passed. Of course I
saluted him and he returned it ; but his eyes seemed to see
only our little boy walking by my side, with his little mil¬
itary cap and the letters and figures " 19th Regt, lud. Vol,"
on the front, I have often thought of v/hat he might have
been thinking, and I doubt not that one thought was "God
grant that the father may be spared to his little one, ' '
Again, I saw him come out of the White House, to
cross the street on his way to McClellan's headquarters,
when an old gentleman—a farmer I should say, by his
dress—hailed him, Lincoln stopped, and, seeing who it
was, turned and almost ran to meet him. It was an old
neighbor from home, I am sure, from the familiar way in
which they talked. He asked Mr, Lincoln how he was
getting along, about the health of the family, etc., and
to all Mr, Lincoln replied in a verry happy mood, and as
he grasped the hand of the old farmer to say good-by,
it was the shake of an old friend. They seemed loath to
part.
This was the last time I saw Mr, Lincoln alive. At
last the lowering clouds of war began to rise and the blessed
rays of peace came struggling through the rifts. In the
midst of rejoicing such as, I believe, was never known on
earth before, the light of this great man's life went out,
and a pall of sorrow covered every loyal heart. Oh what a
sad time this was to us, my comrades ! Not all the sorrow¬
ful events of the war seemed worthy of remembrance in
this, our greater grief. Stout hearts that had never
quailed in the presence of what seemed certain death gave
way beneath this stroke of an assassin, I was at home,
718
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
at Indianapolis, when all that was left in the visible form of
our martyred President lay in state in our old capitol build¬
ing, and with a heart bowed with grief I looked for the last
time on his face. To me it seemed still troubled, yet re¬
signed. I need not say that I wept as for a father or
brother, for he was both to every man who stood up to de¬
fend his country.
At the dead hour of midnight, with the rain falling and
the bells tolling, his remains were taken to the depot, and,
as the multitude stood with uncovered heads until the
hearse passed by, I heard the expressions of many blessing
his memory.
Corp. Cyrus Macy
Was a member of Company A, 6th Wisconsin Veteran Vol¬
unteer Infantry. He was wounded in the left knee at the
battle of the Wilderness ; he was also wounded in the head
at Hatcher's Run, Virginia, February 7, 1865, causing loss
of the sight of the left eye and total deafness of the left ear.
This soldier was conspicuous for his bravery, which
amounted almost to recklessness, as the following incident
will show :
About sunrise July 30, 1864, at the " Mine explosion " in
front of Petersburg, Virginia, while all eyes were turned to
the mine, the order came for a special detail of 60 select men
from the ' ' Iron Brigade ' ' to double a picket force between
the Union and Confederate breastworks. Corporal Macy
became one of this detail. When the detail was made,
each man was shown the picket pit in which he was to find
shelter from the enemy's bullets; the picket holes were
about two rods apart, and about 30 rods from the foe's
breastworks, in front of the Confederate army.
At a given signal each man jumped the Union breast¬
works and made for his pit. It being a very warm day, the
men could hardly stay in their pits, and it soon became
a] parent that without water their suffering from thirst and
the heat would be unendurable ; it could only be obtained
MISCELLANEO US.
719
back of the Union breastworks. To attempt to get it
would expose anyone making the attempt to almost certain
destruction, as the ground that must be crossed was exposed
to the bullets from the Confederate rifle-pits. But water
was a necessity, and in this extremity. Corporal Macy pro¬
posed to his comrades that if they would throw him some
of their canteens he would try to procure the water. This
they did ; and taking off all his clothing except pantaloons
and shirt, and strapping eight or ten canteens to his back,
he started for the Union lines, which fortunately, he reached
in safety.
When he reached his regiment, his officers upbraided
him soundly for the needless exposure, as they thought, and
tried to dissuade him from returning ; but he replied that
without water the men in the pits would perish from thirst.
So, filling the canteens with fresh water and strapping them,
as before, upon his back, he again jumped the breastworks
and made a dash for the pit from which he had come, which
he reached amidst a dizzy shower of Confederate bullets,
but without injury. Thus the men were, in a measure,
relieved from their thirst ; and they remained in the pits
until they could be removed under cover of the night.
Benjamin B. Duke
Enlisted as a private in Company B, 19th Regiment
Indiana Volunteers, and was mustered into the service of
the United States on the 29th of July, 1861. December
31, 1863, he reënlisted as a veteran and served until the
close of the war, and was finally mustered out with the
regiment on the 27th day of July, 1865.
He was present with and participated in all the move¬
ments of his regiment from first to last, except during a
time while he was a prisoner of war, and excepting, also, a
short time he was with Sherman's army, which he and his
prison comrades joined at or near Columbia, S. C., having
escaped from a prison pen situated a few miles north of
720 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
that place, the approach of that army affording them an
excellent opportunity for escape.
He was twice a prisoner of war. He was first captured
July I, 1863, 3.t Gettysburg, while on the skirmish line,
together with Lieut. G. W. Bunch, Comrades William
Lock, John Markle, William Castater of Company B, and
John Gump, I. S. Pruitt, R. I. Patterson, and Wesley
Galyean of Company B, and Sergeant Henderson, Jack
Oliver, and Jet. Darah of Company D. Henderson and
Galyean were wounded at the time. Companies B, D and
B had been deployed on the skirmish line in the wheat
field, on the left front of the regiment, with orders to hold
this point as long as possible ; but the Confederate charge
upon the line at this point was so sudden and vigorous that
these comrades were soon overpowered and captured. They
were taken to the provost headquarters of Lee's army, situ¬
ated just west of the seminary, where they were kept until
late on the evening of the 3d, when they were paroled. They
were sent to West Chester, Pennsylvania, where they re¬
mained until September, when they were returned to the
regiment for duty without exchange, it having been discov¬
ered that their parol was not regular and was therefore void.
At the battle of the Wilderness, May 5, 1864, Com¬
rade Duke was again captured, together with Robert G.
Conley and William Sykes of the same company. Sergeant
Hiatt, Sergeant McGee, John Pitman and George Banner of
Company A, Benjamin Turner of Company G, and Lieut.
G. B. Finney, adjutant.
They were taken to Andersonville prison, where, for
several months, they experienced the horrors of that pen,
which they characterize as "a veritable hell on earth."
Here the robust constitution, the vigorous temperament
and active habits of Comrade Duke, together with his kind¬
ness of heart and comradeship of feeling were utilized to
the benefit, not only of those of his own regiment, but of
other regiments who, reduced by wounds or disease and
confinement in that horrible place, would never have re-
MIS CELLA NE O US.
721
turned to home and friends but for his kindly offices. It
is asserted by those who were with him during this trying
time, that his kind and cheering words, his gentle nursing,
his trading and trafficking and many times' dividing his
last ration, although scant, with a sick and weak com¬
rade, and his general activity in their behalf, saved the
life of many a dishearteiied and discouraged comrade. W.
A. W. Daly and Calvin Bngle, of the 5th Indiana Cav¬
alry, who live in Randolph County, Indiana, will verify
this statement. After their confinement at Andersonville
for several months they were moved about from one prison
pen to another, and finally to a prison near Columbia, S. C.,
where they were at the time Sherman's army passed that
way on its ' ' March to the sea. ' ' The appearance of such
an enemy in their vicinity compelled the withdrawal of
most of the guards from the prison to assist in repelling his
advance. Many of the prisoners, among whom were Com¬
rade Duke and his conirades, as before stated, took ad¬
vantage of the opportunity and escaped to Sherman's lines.
Captain Dee Yaryan,
of Richmond, Indiana, enlisted as first lieutenant in Com¬
pany G, 19th Indiana, July, 1861. He served with this
regiment until January, 1862, when he was transferred to
and became adjutant of the 58th Indiana Volunteers, which
at that time was at Bardstown, Kentucky, with the Army
of the Cumberland.
In April, 1862, at Shiloh, he was promoted to captain
and assistant division commander on the staff of Maj. Gen.
Thomas J. Wood, then commanding First Division of the
Twenty-first Corps. He served with distinction, and was
in all the battles the Army of the Cumberland engaged in
under Buell, Rosecrans, Thomas and Grant ; at Shiloh,
Stone River, Chickamauga, Mission Ridge, Perryville, re¬
lief of Burnside at Knoxville, etc.
XLVI
722
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Abram J. Buckles,
Compa^iy E, .19th Indiana, was born at Muncie, Indiana,
enlisted July, 1861, asa private, and served until May 15,
1865. He was color-bearer of the regiment at the battle
of the Wilderness May 5, 1864. He had been wounded
through the right thigh at second Bull Run and through
the shoulder at Gettysburg, and although he was suflfering
severely at the time of the battle of the Wilderness from his
Gettysburg wound, which had not yet healed, he had no
thought of remaining back ; and when the order came to
move forward into the woods and make the attack, he took
his place, with the flag over his left shoulder, the right be¬
ing disabled, as above stated.
The enemy's line was soon struck and pushed back, the
woods in many places being so thick with undergrowth
that the men had to crawl through it on their hands and
knees.
The line soon came to a cleared place, through and be¬
yond which the retreating enemy had gone and reformed
their line on the opposite side. As soon as the Union line
could be straightened out it started across the open field,
with the colors in the lead, when almost immediately Com¬
rade Buckles received a Confederate bullet through the
body. Staggering, but not falling, he supported himself
by the flag-staff until relieved by young Divelbuss, one of
the color-guard, who was killed a short time afterwards.
Comrade Buckles, having been carried a mile to the rear,
found himself completely exhausted. The men who had
been carrying him on a stretcher, believing him to be dead,
let ■ him down, but finding him still alive, carried him to
the hospital, where the doctor told him that his wound was
fatal and that he must soon die. The chaplain was sent in
to impart the same information and to prepare the wounded
man for his approaching dissolution. Being of a very
strong constitution, and temperate in his habits, however,
he was able to pull through.
LIEUT. A. J. BUCKLES.
MIS CELL A NE O US.
723
Although his wound was not healed, and did not, until
1870, he sufficiently recovered to return to his regiment in
November, 1864. He was commissioned a second lieuten¬
ant, and on March 25, 1865, in an engagementon Hatcher's
Run, on the left of the line at Petersburg, he lost his right
leg above the knee.
Returning to Indiana, he studied law, and in 1875 emi¬
grated to California, of which State he is now a resident
and honored citizen. He was elected district attorney of
Solano County in 1879, reelected in 1882, and in 1884 was
elected superior judge, and reelected Nov. 1890, a position
he now holds. He has also been department commander,
G. A, R., of the Department of California and Nevada.
Capt. Don. Makepeace.
On the evening of July i, 1863, Capt. Don. Makepeace
of Company A, Capt. G. W. Green of Company E, Capt.
P. Hart of Company H, and Dient. Harley Richardson of
Company D, all of the 19th Indiana Volunteer Infantry, were
captured at Gettysburg, near the close of the first day of that
memorable contest. They were taken to the rear of the
Confederate army, where they were kept until early on the
morning of the 4th, when they moved, in front of the re¬
treating Confederate forces, toward the Potomac River,
which they crossed at Williamsport, from whence they were
marched to Staunton, Virginia, where they were put on
board of the cars and taken to Richmond, and thence to
Dibby prison, where they arrived on or about July 18, where
they remained until the following May.
They were then taken to Danville, Virginia, thence to
Salisbury, South Carolina, and afterwards to Macon, Georgia,
and finally to Charleston, South Carolina, where they re¬
mained for some time. They were afterward removed to
Columbia, where Captain Makepeace, together with Captain
Kendall of the 73d Indiana, and a lieutenant of an Indiana
battery, managed to make their escape. They wandered
about through the swamps and thickets of the Confederate
724 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
country for forty-eight days, traveling more than 400 miles,
several times chased by bloodhounds through swamps and
canebrakes. But they were finally recaptured and taken back
to Columbia, South Carolina. Here they remained until
finally exchanged, which occurred on the ist day of March,
1865, at which time they were sent through the lines at Wil¬
mington, North Carolina, twenty months after their first
capture.
Lieut. George W. Bunch.
This comrade enlisted into the service of the United
States in September, 1861, as a recruit in Company B,
19th Indiana Volunteer Infantry. He was mustered out as
senior officer of that company, as first lieutenant in Com¬
pany C, 20th Indiana (consolidated), July 12, 1865. He
was in all the marches and battles of his regiment from the
date of his enlistment until his final muster-out.
An Incident of Gainesvieee.
On the evening of the 29th of August, 1862, an incident
occurred, which we mention to illustrate the necessity, at
times, of a quick grasp of a situation, and how the reputa¬
tion of a body of men may be made or marred in a
moment.
King's division late in the afternoon were slowly mak¬
ing their way along the Gainesville turnpike, marching in
column, when suddenly a Confederate battery posted in a bit
of timber only a few hundred yards to the left of the road,
opened fire, and the report of the guns was followed so quickly
by the explosion of the shells, that it seemed as if the troops
had stumbled upon the very guns themselves. The cavalry
column immediately sought shelter in a piece of timber to
the right of the pike ; the infantry were ordered to lie down
on the roadside, protected somewhat by the ditches, while
Battery B, of the Fourth U. S. Artillery, hauled out into the
field through openings made in the fences, and in the short¬
est possible time brought all of their Napoleon guns into
action.
MIS CELLANEOUS.
725
Before, however, they got a single piece unlimbered, a
projectile from one of the Confederate gnns had struck one of
their caissons, exploding all the ammunition in it, with a re¬
port that could be heard for miles. The 30th New York In¬
fantry Regiment being on the left of the famous Iron Brigade
(then consisting of the 19th Indiana, and the 2d, 6th, and 7th
Regiments of Wisconsin Volunteers), was marching in the
column immediately in front of the artillery and directly
abreast of the Confederate battery when it opened fire.
The first shot carried away the head of a private in the
ranks and hurled his body in the ditch. Other casualties
followed, and the suddenness of the onslaught was creat¬
ing a panic in the regiment ; but as the first soldier started
to the rear, Rieutenant Andrews, jumping to his feet, placed
his revolver at the man's breast and ordered him back to
his place in the ranks.
The man did not dare hesitate, but obeyed the order at
once, returning to his post, and a score of others who were
about to follow his example, which must have stampeded
the regiment, regained their senses, and never afterwards
flinched, no matter how trying the circumstances.
Thus began the battle of Gainesville. The following
day Col. Edward Frisby complimented this officer in orders
for his gallantry, but even more for the alertness with
which he carried out his command of the situation.
Eientenant, afterwards Captain, Andrews was attending
a military school at the breaking out of the rebellion ; but
on the ist of May, 1861, left his books and entered the serv¬
ice, as an enlisted man, at 17 years of age ; but he was
immediately afterward made a lieutenant, and it is claimed
by many that he was the youngest commissioned officer in
the service. In the autumn of 1861, while foraging near
Fairfax Court House, Virginia, some Federal troops were cap¬
tured after a skirmish, Eieutenant Andrews among them ;
and for many months he was confined in Libby Prison, in
Richmond, his i8th birthday being passed there before his
exchange.
726
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Captain Andrews came of a soldierly stock. His two
great-grandfathers having served in the Revolution, one of
them in Colonel Walcott's Connecticut Militia Regiment
in the campaign in the defense of Boston in 1775 and 1776,
the other serving in three different campaigns in 1776,
1777, and i78o-'8i. His grandfather, although only a boy,
served as a volunteer aid on the staff of General Sulli¬
van in the campaign at Saratoga. An uncle attained the
rank of major in the war of 1812 ; and now he has a son,
Lieut. J. M. Andrews, Jr., who graduated at West Point in
the class of 1890, and in the same year went through the
late campaign against the Sioux Indians with his regiment,
the ist Cavalry, United States Army.
Gen. E. Dumont
Was born at Vevay, Indiana, April 21, 1821. He was
lieutenant colonel of the 4th Indiana Regiment during the
Mexican war.
When the first war meeting was called, at Indianapo¬
lis, after Fort Sumter was fired upon, several speeches
were made to encourage the enlistment of soldiers. Three
prominent farmers were present and made speeches, and
closed with the offer of a horse each to any soldier who
would go and ride it. Dumont, being called out for a
speech, in response, said, he, too, would give a horse and
ride it himself. Thus began enlistments in that city.
The 7th Regiment Indiana Volunteers was organized,
and mustered into the service for three months, with
Dumont as its colonel. Proceeding immediately to the
front, they soon became engaged in the conflict that en¬
sued and won distinction in their short term of service. In
August, 1861, the 7th Indiana reënlisted for three years,
with Dumont as colonel
On September 3, 1861, he was promoted to brigadier
general of volunteers, and in the following month was
transferred to Kentucky, where he commanded a brigade
in the Army of the Cumberland until March, 1862, when
GEN. EBENEZER DUMONT.
MISCELLANEOUS.
727
he was assigned to the command of the post at Nashville,
Tennessee. While General Dumont was in command at
this post, Gen. John Morgan, of Confederate fame, was con¬
stantly destroying our lines of communication. General
Dumont asked, and obtained an order to organize a force
sufficient to drive Morgan from his lines of operation. On
the 3d of May, 1862, a Federal force of 1000 men was or¬
ganized at Murfreesboro, and pursuit of Morgan immediately
began ; Morgan, in the mean time, with 1500 cavalry was
heading for Gallatin, Tennessee, with the intention of des¬
troying the Ivouisville and Nashville Railroad at various
points. On the 5th of May the Federal cavalry overtook
Morgan's command at Lebanon, Tennessee, where a severe
battle took place, lasting several hours, in which Morgan was
defeated with heavy loss in killed, wounded and prisoners.
This was Morgan's first defeat, and it was so overwhelming
that General Buell, the department commander, congratu¬
lated Dumont and his little army over their brilliant vic¬
tory.
After this spirited campaign of a few days the Federal
troops returned to Nashville. When Kirby Smith, with
the advance of Bragg's army, invaded Kentucky, General
Dumont was assigned to the command of the Twelfth Divi¬
sion of the Army of the Cumberland, and moved from
Louisville, by way of Shelbyville and Frankfort, Kentucky,
and succeeded in driving out of Kentucky various bands of
Confederate cavalry which were very troublesome as bush¬
whackers.
During the month of December, 1862, Dumont's divi¬
sion reached Gallatin, Tenn, where, on account of ill health,
he resigned.
The day after the capture of Nashville, General Dumont
ordered an officer of his staff, Capt. David Braden, A. A. G.,
to proceed out on the Murfreesboro pike and post some
pickets ; while engaged in executing this order, he was cap¬
tured by some of Morgan's command. The captain was
at the time riding a very fine horse belonging to General
728 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Diimont, which he also was politely, but firmly, requested
to give up to Morgan. Having no discretion in the mat¬
ter, the captain very gracefully yielded to the inevitable,
and was given in exchange a unique specimen of a worn-
out Confederate cavalry horse, without flesh or hair. The
captain's graceful manner in accepting the situation had
the effect to throw his captors temporarily off their guard ;
and, while studying the mettle of his new horse, he con¬
cluded to make an attempt to regain his liberty. So,
making a sudden dash from his captors, he was soon out
of their reach, and was borne safely back to camp, a dis¬
tance of 20 miles. When General Dumont saw him, after
his return to camp, he remarked: "Captain Braden, I am
d d glad to see you back, but you played h kin
swapping horses with Morgan."
In October, 1862, General Dumont was elected to Con¬
gress by the Republicans of the (then) Sixth Congressional
District of Indiana, by 1500 majority ; he was reëlected in
1864, by 7000 majority.
On the day previous to his death he was appointed
governor of Idaho.
John V. Hadley (Danville, Indiana.)
Was born October 31, 1839, in Hendricks County, Indiana,
and was raised on a farm in that county. He left Butler
University, Indianapolis, to enlist into the service of his
country, and was mustered into the United States serv¬
ice as a member of the 7th Indiana Volunteers, September
13, 1861 ; was severely wounded at the second battle of Bull
Run, August 30, 1862, and again at the battle of the
Wilderness, May 5, 1864. He was promoted from the
ranks to be first lieutenant, October i, 1862, and shortly
afterwards detailed as a member of the staff of Gen. J. C.
Rice, where he did service until the 5th day of May, 1864,
when, being severely wounded and left upon the battlefield,
he was captured and sent South as a prisoner of war. He
was confined at Macon, Savannah, Charlèston, and Colum-
CAPT. J. V. HADLEY.
HON. C. E. COON.
MISCELLANEOUS.
729
bia, from whicli latter place he escaped on the 4th day of
November, 1864, and on the iSth day of December of that
year he entered the Union lines at Knoxville, Tennessee,
and was mustered out of the service on the 28th day of
January, 1865. He subsequently published a book of 180
pages, giving an account of his imprisonment and final
escape, one edition of which was exhausted in the first year
of its publication.
On his return to civil life he studied law, was admitted
to the bar in June, 1866, locating and entering upon the prac¬
tice of his profession at Danville, Indiana, and was suc¬
cessful. He was married to Mary J. Hill, March 15, 1865 ;
was elected to the State Senate in 1868, and served in that
body three sessions ; was a delegate to the National Con¬
vention that nominated General Harrison for President in
1888, and was, in the same year, elected as Judge of the
19th Judicial Circuit, which circuit then embraced the city
of Indianapolis.
Charles Edward Coon
Was born in Friendship, Allegany County, New York,
March 15, 1842, being descended from New England Rev¬
olutionary stock. He enlisted immediately after the firing
upon Sumter, in April, 1861, and was mustered into the
service of the United States as a corporal of Company B,
23d New York Volunteer Infantry, May 16, 1861. In Feb¬
ruary, 1863, he was discharged on account of sickness, but
he continued to perform service as chief clerk and deputy
provost marshal, 27th District, New York, until March,
1864. July 24, 1864, he entered the Treasury Department
as a clerk, and served through all the grades. He was en¬
gaged in Europe in funding the national debt, almost con¬
tinuously from 1871 to 1881, both as assistant and as chief
funding agent of the Treasury Department. He became
assistant Secretary of the Treasury in April, 1884, and was
Acting Secretary of the Treasury the greater part of the time
until the close of the Administration of President Arthur.
730
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
November lo, 1885, he resigned. He now resides in -New
York City. He is a member of the Society of the Army
of the Potomac, of the Society of the First Corps, of the
Grand Army of the Republic, and of the Sons of the
Revolution.
E. R. Reed (Co. H, 2d Wisconsin).
Among those who responded to their country's call for
troops to defend its unity, were the ' ' Randall Guards, ' '
recruited at Madison, Wisconsin, by Capt. J." F. Randolph,
early in 1861.
This organization was mustered into the service of the
United States as Company H, 2d Wisconsin Regiment, and
among its members was Private E. R. Reed, who has given
a very graphic description of the services of that regiment at
Gettysburg, together with some very interesting incidents,
from which the following extracts are taken : ' ' On the
morning of the ist of July, 1863, the Iron Brigade, which was
the First Brigade, First Division, First Corps, came in on
the Emmittsburg road with the 2d Wisconsin in the lead.
We soon came to elevated ground, which afforded a long
look ahead ; here information given by citizens by the
roadside indicated that we should soon have some hot work,
as on the day previous Lee and his whole army had been
encamped some six miles to the west of north. We moved
pn in the direction indicated, where we soon came up with
the enemy and became sharply engaged. (This encounter
and its results, casualties, etc., are elsewhere related.)
' 'An incident is here worthy of mention : One R. E.
Davidson, who had been with the regiment through the
first Bull Run, Pope's retreat, Gainesville, the second Bull
Run, South Mountain, Antietam, Chancellorsville, and
several skirmishes, had become surfeited with fighting, and
had sworn that he would never go into another fight if he
could find any honorable way of dodging it. He would not
desert in the face of the enemy, nor do any dishonorable
thing ; but any honorable thing he could do to dodge a fight.
MISCELLANEOUS.
731
he would do. But the color-sergeant was killed at the
first volley from the enemy, that day, and Davidson grasped
the colors from the ground and rushed to the front and kept
ten or fifteen yards in front of the line all the way through the
woods, shouting to us to come on. This struck me as being
a very singular way to "dodge a fight but it shows how
little a man knows of how he is going to act when he goes
into a fight. He was a private soldier, but was made a ser¬
geant there on the field. He continued to carry those colors
through to the end, and brought them home and deposited
them in our Capitol. Many had been killed and wounded
while carrying the flag, biit he seems to have borne a
charmed life.
' ' In the afternoon the enemy came on again, in strong
force, three lines of battle in our front and three on our
left flank, and, after another desperate encounter, we were
forced to fall back.
"In this engagement I was severely wounded in both
legs, and, with many others who were disabled, took refuge
in the Lutheran Theological Seminary. The First Army
Corps swept past, closely followed by the Confederates, on
through the town and up to Cemetery Hill ; then the ene¬
my had possession of the town and we were prisoners.
"We had lost heavily. General Reynolds, our corps
commander, was killed ; Gen. Sol. Meredith, our brigade
commander, was wounded ; our colonel, Lucius Fairchild,
lost his arm and was a prisoner ; Lieutenant Colonel Ste¬
vens was mortally wounded and in the hands of the enemy ;
Major Mansfield was wounded and a prisoner ; Captain
Rollins, of Company H was a prisoner ; the first lieutenant
was a prisoner and the second lieutenant killed, and many
others were killed, wounded and prisoners ; and out of the
thirty-three men of Company H who went into the charge
in the morning, only one man escaped injury, and that
man was Sergt. R. E. Davidson, with his flag.
' ' The 2d went in with 302 men, rank and file ; we had
27 killed, 153 wounded and 53 missing—total, 233; this
732
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
left 69 men in line, less than seven, of all ranks, to the
company. The brigade, out of 1883 men, lost 189 killed,
774 wounded, 249 missing (prisoners), a total of 1212 men.
Thus ended the first day at Gettysburg. The second
day was full of horrors to those of us who were at the
seminary as prisoners ; the surrounding grounds being
elevated, were occupied by about 140 pieces of Confederate
artillery, the music of which, together with the effects of
shots from the Union artillery upon the building and sur¬
rounding grounds, occasioned the most extreme anguish to
us all. The noise, resounding through the building, was
worse than ordinary artillery.
' ' The third day was worse than the second. By the
fourth day the Confederate batteries were silenced, and
only the ' distant and random gun ' of the pickets could be
heard. The morning of the fifth day dawned, beautiful
and bright, and the last Confederate had disappeared. The
wounded prisoners were now all free ; but those not wounded
were marched off to Richmond. My lieutenant, however,
escaped and returned to his company, but Capt. Nat. Rol¬
lins was held for many months before he was released."
Losses in the Hartsuff-Coueter-Tayeor-Baxter
Brigade. *
The following statement is furnished by Capt. George A.
Hussey, of No. 61 Pine Street, New York, late a member
of the 9th Regiment New York State Militia (83d New
York Volunteers) :
* This statement is taken from " Regimental Eosses in the Civil War," by Lieu¬
tenant Colonel Wm. F. Fox :
The losses—killed or died of wounds—of " famous " brigades was as follows :
Iron Brigade (5 regiments), 1131 ; Vermont (6 regiments), 1172; Irish
(5 regiments), 961; Philadelphia (4 regiments), 636; Hartsuß's (7 regi¬
ments), 1099; New Jersey (6 regiments), 900; Excelsior (6 regiments),
S^6■,Iowa Í4 regiments), 443; Heckman's (5 regiments), 686; Siedman's
(10 regiments), 1192; Willich's (9 regiments), 1115; HarkeYs {9 re^ments),
1107 ; Michigan Cavalry (4 regiments), 525.
MIS CELLA NE O US.
733
Killed or Died
REGIMENTS.
of Wounds.
Died of Disease.
Total.
nth Penna. Vols.*
236
181
417
12th Mass. Vols
193
83
276
97th N. Y. Vols,*
181
157
338
83d N. Y. Vols.f
156
88
244
13th Mass. Vols
40
161
88th Penna. Vols. *
72
181
90th Penna. Vols
103
127
230
Total
.... 1099
748
1847
ist N. Hamp. Vols., (3 mos. men)
5
5
12th Indiana Vols., (i year men)..
24
24
i6th Indiana Vols., (i year men)..
15
16
29th Penna. Vols.*
.... 102
85
187
16th Maine Vols
181
259
440
Total
.... 1383
1136
2519
AU these regiments were in this brigade ; J but only the
first seven served in it at a battle, and should be noted as
the "fifth" of those "famous seven," because of excessive
losses.
The following address by the author is here inserted by
request :
A quarter of a century after the desperate conflict on this part
of the field, where the brave troops under the gallant Reynolds,
who surrendered his life here to protect his State and save his coun¬
try from perishing from among the nations of thq earth, were wait¬
ing for night or the Army of the Potomac, the veterans of the two
armies assemble to-day under the same flag that was unfurled at
Bunker Hill, and vouchsafed to us by loyal hands. With solemn
vows we declare our full belief in a united country. The death of
General Reynolds inspired his soldiers with a valor, which was
never excelled on the fields of battle, .and this ridge was not surren¬
dered until the commands of A. P. Hill and Ewell turned the flanks
of the First and Eleventh Corps. So great was the danger on the
left that General Buford threw his cavalry into column, threatening
* These regiments reênlisted.
f This regiment was also known as the '' Ninth New York State Militia," by
which number it was mustered into the United States service.
J The Brigade was in the First Corps during 1862 and 1863, and until March
1864, when it was transferred to the Fifth Corps.
784
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
a charge, thereby compelling the enemy to form squares, which de¬
lay enabled General Robinson to extricate his division on the extreme
right from the maelstrom that heavily threatened his destruction.
These movements made it possible for General Doubleday, the grand
hero who fired the first gun from Sumter to retire the First Corps to
a new position on Cemetery Hill.
The First Corps went into action here at ten o'clock on the ist
of July, with 8200 men, and held its position until four, in an open
field, with a loss of 6,059. ft is not too much to say that but
for the desperate fighting of the First Corps on this field, the posi¬
tion of Cemetery Hill could not have been secured, and the great
battle of Gettysburg would not have been fought. If any one asks
by what magic General Reynolds was possessed that he imbued his
soldiers with such heroism on the field, we answer that he received
it at Monterey, Buena Vista, Peninsular Campaign, second Bull Run,
Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville. This battle was fought greatly
like Chalons, which is considered one of the fifteen important bat¬
tles of the world, and its results are similar. Aetius, the Roman
general, posted his left on a sloping hill which Attila furiously
charged, but like Pickett was repulsed with great loss. He had
robbed his center to reënforce his right, which was then in no con¬
dition to withstand the victorious cavalry of the Visigoths, who
forced back his right wing, and then turned on the center. But the
Hunnish general, like Lee, remained on the field, and apparently
retired at his own pleasure. Meade, like Aetius, permitted Lee to
remain in his front, after he had mastered him along the line.
A standard author says : " It is probable that the crafty Aetius was
unwilling to be too victorious." The same can be said of Meade —
it was a safe victory. The results of that battle were felt for cen¬
turies ; the result of this we fervently hope will continue to the end
of time. The value of the victory of this great battle will never be
fully estimated.
If we had failed here, then the efforts of the Pilgrim Fathers,
who came to this country to establish a government on an equal
basis to all, would have been futile. The battles of the Revolution
would have been fought in vain ; the solid fabric of liberty reared by
the armies of the colonists, and the corner stone of this great Repub¬
lic, planted by them would have been crumbled to dust. The dial hand
of time would have been turned back toward the dark ages ; indi¬
vidual prosperity would have been crushed out ; civilization would
have received a shock, and Christian progress been paralyzed.
From the beginning of time, the history of the .world is filled with
vain attempts to establish a government on an equal basis to
all, and we are egotistical enough to believe ours is the model
MIS CEL LA NE O US.
735
one to stand the test. Edmund Burke said that " The slain in bat¬
tle have been many times greater than the present population of the
whole earth." In my humble judgment, the result of this field has
more significance than any battle of the eighty-eight prominent
military campaigns recorded in history. Does Sparta now enjoy
any of the fruits of Marathon? Did Hannibal at Cannae preserve
Carthage, or Scipio at Zama save the Roman Empire, only for the
time being? Charlemagne established a vast empire on the ruins of
Rome, after a thirty-two years war of great ferocity. He had scarce¬
ly died when it dissolved like the morning mist. The Eastern em¬
pire rose to power and magnificence, only to be destroyed. The
Persian Empire, which received such great impulse under Cyrus the
Great, who conquered and reigned from the .^gean Sea to the Eu¬
phrates, is now a sickly dynasty of no importance,and Herat, where
a million and six hundred thousand lives were sacrificed, is only the
key of the road from Russia to the East Indies. I admire Marlbor¬
ough, at Romilies ; Ferdinand at Minden ; Frederick the Great at
Leuth en ; Joan of Arc at Orleans ; Henry V at Agincourt ; Gustav-
us Adolphus at Lützen, and Prince Eugene at Cassano and Turin—
they won great fame. The generals who fought on this and other
fields of the late war, were struggling to save a nation established
by the people and for the people, where its humblest citizen may be
its chief executive.
On yonder hill, a rail-splitter delivered the most memorable
speech in the history of the nation. It will live in the hearts of the
people, and be respected times innumerable, long after other great
speeches are forgotten. How fully it reveals the fact that his heart
was constantly with the armies that must save the nation, and when
this great battle was fought here, he sought relief in a spontaneous
speech that crowned him prince of orators. Let every hamlet in the
land have Lincoln's statue if desired, but here is the place above all
others to erect one to his memory, where he stood that day. Make
it towering, and let there be clustered around it the statues of the
war governors who so faithfully aided him in his great work. Then
will the picture of this field be complete, with its marble statues,
and not till then.
Organization of the Society of the First Corps,
Army of the Potomac.
HARTFORD, 1881.
President Gen. J. C. Robinson.
Vice President Gen. J. Wm. Hofmann.
Secretary and Treasurer Capt. I. N. Burritt.
736
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
DETROIT, 1882.
President Gen. Edward S. Bragg.
Vice President Col. A. M. Edwards.
Secretary and Treasurer Capt. I. N. Burritt.
WASHINGTON, 1883.
President Col. G. G. Benedict, Burlington, Vt.
First Vice President....Col. Isaac S. Tichenor, Washington, D. C.
Second Vice President Maj. E. P. Haestead, Washington, D. C.
Recording Secretary Capt. I. N. Burritt, Washington, D. C.
Cor. Secretary J. W. KirkeEY, Georgetown, D. C.
Treasurer Thomas M. Exeey, Washington, D. C.
Historian J. H. Stine, Washington, D. C.
BROOKLYN, 1884.
President Gen. Abner DoubeEday, New York City.
First Vice President Gen. Edward B. FoweER-
Second Vice President Capt, Ira N. Burritt.
Corresponding Secretary Jos. W. KirkeEY, Georgetown, D. C.
Recording Secretary Wm. H. RieEY, Brooklyn, N. Y.
Treasurer Thos. M. ExeEy, Washington, D. C.
Historian James H. Stine, Washington, D. C.
Vice President, Society of Army of the Potomac,
representing First Corps Col. Isaac S. Tichenor.
BALTIMORE, 1885.
President Abner Doubeeday, New York City.
Vice President, First Division...Chas. E. Coon, Washington, D. c.
Vice President, Second Divison...chas, E. Pheeps, Baltimore, Md.
Vice President, Third Division Pat'k De Lacy, Scran ton, Pa.
Vice President, Artillery Corps... J. A. Reynoeds, Rochester, N. Y.
Corresponding Secretary...Joseph W. Kirkeey, Georgetown, D. C.
Recording Secretary Wm. H. RieEY, Brooklyn, N. Y.
Treasurer Thos. M. Exeey, Washington, D. C.
Historian .J. H. Stine, Washington, D. C.
Vice Pres., Society Army of Potomac, E. B. FoweER, Brooklyn, N. Y.
SAN FRANCISCO, 1886.
President Abner Doubeeday, New York City.
Vice President, First Division...Chas. B. Coon, Washington, D. C.
Vice President, Second Division...,Chas. E. Pheeps, Baltimore, Md.
Vice President, Third Division Pat'k De Lacy, Scranton, Pa.
Vice President, Artillery Corps....J. A. Reynoeds, Rochester, N. Y.
Corresponding Secretary........Jos. W. KirkeEy, Georgetown, D. C.
Recording Secretary Wm. H. RieEy, Brooklyn, N. Y.
Treasurer Thomas M. ExeEy, Washington, D. C.
GEN. HORATIO C. KING.
MISCELLANEOUS.
737
SARATOGA SPRINGS, 1887.
President Maj. E. P. Halstead.
Vice President, First Division Charles E. Coon.
Vice President, Second Division Charles E. Phelps.
Vice President, Third Division Lieut. Pat'k De Lacy.
Vice President, Artillery Corps Col. Jno. A. Reynolds.
Corresponding Secretary Lieut. Abram Merritt.
Recording Secretary Capt. J. M. Andrews, Jr.
Treasurer Walter J.. Gibson.
Historian J. H. Stine.
GETTYSBURG, 1888.
President Maj. E. P. Halstead.
Vice President, First Division Capt. L. E. Pond.
Vice President, Second Division Sergt. J. W. Kirkly.
Vice President, Third Division Capt. P. DeLacy.
Vice President, Artillery Corps Gen. James A. Hall.
Corresponding Secretary F. Donohue.
Recording Secretary Capt. J. M. Andrews, Jr.
Treasurer Walter J. Gibson.
Historian J. H. Stine.
ORANGE, 1889.
President Gen. R. R. Dawes.
Vice President, First Division Charles E. Coon.
Vice President, Second Division Col. Redfield Proctor.
Vice President, Third Division Charles J. Chatfield.
Vice President, Artillery Corps C. S. Wainright.
Corresponding Secretary Capt. J. M. Andrews, Jr.
Recording Secretary Capt. H. O. Clark.
Treasurer Florence Donohue.
Historian J. H. Stine.
PORTLAND, 1890.
President Col. Redfield Proctor.
Vice President, First Division Capt. C. E. Stubbs.
Vice President, Second Division Maj. D. B. Ricker.
Vice President, Third Division Capt. H. O. Clark.
Vice President, Artillery Corps Capt. J. H. Chase.
Recording Secretary Capt. J. M. Andrews, Jr.
Corresponding Secretary H. O. Clark.
Treasurer A. H. Van Dusen.
Historian .J. H. Stine.
xlvii
738
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
BUFFALO, 1891.
President Ira M. Hedges.
Vice President, First Division E. B. Wright.
Vice President, Second Division W. F. Rogers.
Vice President, Third Division H. O. Clark.
Vice President, Artillery Corps Lieut. Benj. W. Wilber.
Recording Secretary Capt. J. M. Andrews, Jr.
Corresponding Secretary C. F. PiERCE.
Treasurer Capt. A. H. Van Dusen.
Historian J. H. Stine.
Society of the Army of the Potomac.
Officers, 1869 to 1892:
PRESIDENTS.
Lieutenant General Philip H. Sheridan, U. S. A 1869
Major General George G. Meade, U. S. A 1870
Major General Joseph Hooker, U. S. A 1871
Major General Ambrose E. Burnside, U. S. V 1872
Major General Irwin McDowell, U. S. A 1873
Major General Winfield S. Hancock, U. S. A 1874
Major General John F. Hartranpt, U. S. V * 1876
Major General Henry W. Slocum, U. S. A 1877
Major General William B. Franklin, U. S. V 1878
Major General Daniel E. Sickles, U. S. V 1879
Major General Horatio G. Wright, U. S. A 1880
Brevet Major General Charles Devens, Jr 1881
Major General A. A. Humphreys, U. S. A 1882
Brevet Major General John Newton, U. S. A 1883
General Ulysses S. Grant, U. S. A 1884-1885
Brevet Major General Martin T. McMahon, U. S. \ 1886
Major General John C. Robinson, U. S. V 1887
Major General Joshua L. Chamberlain, U. S. V 1888
Major General John G, Parke, U. S. V., (Colonel U. S. A.) 1889
Brigadier General Selden Connor, U. S. V., 1890
Major General Daniel Butterfield, U. S. V 1891
RECORDING SECRETARIES.
Brevet Major General Geo. H. Sharpe, U. S. V 1869-1876
Brevet Colonel Horatio C. King, U. S. V 1877-1891
CORRESPONDING SECRETARIES.
Brevet Lieutenant Colonel William C. Church, U. S. V.. 1869-1876
Brevet Brigadier General T. F. Rodenbough, U. S. A 1877-1878
Brevet Major General Geo. H. Sharpe, U. S. V 1879-1891
*No meeting was held in 1875.
HON. O. P. MORTON.
MIS CELLA NE O US.
739
BIOGRAPHY OF OLIVER PERRY MORTON.
[War Governor of Indiana].
By Coi<oneI/ Hoeeoway, his Private Secretary.
In the little village of Saulsbury, Wayne County, In¬
diana, on the 4th day of August, 1823, Oliver Perry Morton
was born. He was of English descent, his grandfather
having emigrated from England about the beginning of the
Revolutionary war, and settled in New Jersey. His mother
died when he was quite young. After the death of his
mother the most of his boyhood days were spent with his
grandparents in Ohio and with his widowed aunts in Cen-
treville, Ind. His opportunities for education were rather
limited, and at the age of 15 he was put to learn the hat¬
ter's trade with his half-brother, William T, Morton. At
this occupation he worked for years, employing all his
spare time in study. Early in 1843 he entered Miami
University, at Oxford, Ohio. He remained there two
years in hard study. While there he was counted the best
debater in the university, and displayed the powers of pre¬
senting an argument that afterwards made him famous.
On leaving college he entered the office of Hon. John S.
Newman, at Centreville, and began the study of law. He
was then nearly 22 years of age. On the 15th of May,
1845, he married Miss Lucinda M. Burbank, daughter of
Isaac Burbank of that place. This marriage proved a most
happy one, his chosen companion holding and exercising
over him, from their marriage until his death, an influence
that did much to advance his fame.
Mr. Morton was a Democrat in politics in his earlier
years, and always took a deep interest in political affairs.
In 1854, when the Missouri Compromise was repealed, Mr.
Morton was one of the vast army who left the Democratic
party and united to stem the tide of slavery aggression, and
he became the leader of the new party in his section of the
740
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
State. He attended the Pittsburg Convention in 1856, and
actively participated in its discussions: On the ist of May
of that year the new party met at Indianapolis to nominate
a State ticket. Mr. Morton was elected unanimously to
the head of thè ticket. His opponent was Hon. A. P. Wil-
lard, the idol of his party, and who was regarded as the
ablest stump speaker in the State. A joint canvass was ar¬
ranged, and the champion of the new party soon proved
himself more than a match for his opponent in debate. His
strong logical arguments utterly drove his antagonist from
all his defenses. The election resulted in favor of the
Democrats, and Mr. Morton thought his political career
was ended. The Republican party grew very rapidly be¬
tween 1856 and i860. In the latter year he accepted the
second place on the ticket with Hon. Henry S. Lane at its
head. He threw himself, heart and soul, into the canvass,
and was everywhere recognized as the most powerful de¬
bater in either party. This time his party was successful.
The anticipated election of Mr. Lincoln as President
had brought about threats of secession, and his success was
no sooner heralded than South Carolina made haste to take
herself, as she thought, out of the Union. It was a crit¬
ical time. All hearts feared the Union was gone. The
prevailing sentiment seemed to be that there was no rem¬
edy for secession. The Democrats held that there was no'
power to coerce a State, and the leading Republicans were
advocating that the ' ' wayward sister ' ' should be permitted
to depart in peace. There were stormy forebodings on all
sides. The idea of civil war was abhorrent, yet the loyal
people did not like the idea of having the Union dismem¬
bered. In the midst of this general gloom, there came a
lightning flash which electrified the North and startled the
South. On the 22d of November a monster meeting was
held in Indianapolis to ratify the election. The newly-
elected Governor Lane and others spoke. Their speeches
were of a conciliatory nature. At length Lieutenant Gov¬
ernor Morton arose, and in his very first words the vast
M/s CELLA NE O US.
741
audience saw that the man had come with the hour. There
was no uncertainty with him. He announced at the very
outset that if the issue was to be disunion and war, he was for
war. It was a momentous occasion, and he felt that he was
speaking for the Republican party, and not alone for it, but
for the whole loyal element of the country, and his measured
words fell upon the air like the notes of a bugle calling men
to action. He discussed the right of secession, and the right
to coerce, and gave to the acts of South Carolina an inter¬
pretation none before had been cl,ear-sighted enough to see.
In concluding, he struck the keynote of the whole situation
in declaring and emphasizing that we are a nation and not a
combination of States. Upon this point he said :
We must then cling to the idea that we are a nation, one and
indivisible, and that, although subdivided* by State lines for local
and domestic purposes, we are but one people, the citizens of a
common country, having like institutions and manners, and pos¬
sessing a common interest in that inheritance of glory so richly
provided by our fathers. We must, therefore, do no act, we must
tolerate no act, we must concede no idea or theory that looks to or
involves the dismemberment of the nation. * * * Seven years is
but a day in the life of a nation, and I would rather come out of a
struggle at the end of that time, defeated in arms, and conceding
independence to successful revolution, than to purchase present
peace by the concession of a principle that must inevitably explode
this nation into small and dishonored fragments. * * * The
whole question is summed up in this proposition : ' ' Are we one na¬
tion, one people, or thirty-three nations, or thirty-three independ¬
ent and petty States ? " The statement of the proposition furnishes
the answer. If we are one nation, then no State has a right to se¬
cede. Secession can only be the result of successful revolution. I
answer the question for you, and I know that my answer will find
a true response in every true American heart, that we are one peo¬
ple, one nation, undivided and indivisible.
This was the first time that resistance on the part of the
North had been advocated. It touched the popular chord
everywhere. From that time on there was no hesitancy upon
the part of the loyal masses. Mr. Lincoln, when he read
it, said "it covers the whole ground, and declares the
742
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
policy of the Government. ' ' That speech made Mr. Morton
a leader in national politics.
On the 14th day of January, 1861, he took the oath of
office as president of the Senate. Two days afterwards
Governor kane resigned to take his seat in the United
States Senate, and Mr. Morton became Governor of the
State. The history of his administration of the affairs of
the State for six years has become the foundation stone of
his fame. He everywhere became known as the great War
Governor. When the war came in April, as he had been
the first to predict that it would come, and the first to crys¬
tallize the loyal sentiment of the North, so he was the first
to respond to the call of the President for troops. At his
word Indiana sprang to arms, and thousands of her loyal
sons answered the caU of the President for six regiments.
Here was a chance for his wonderful executive ability.
Indiana, like the other Northern States, was unprepared for
war. She had but few men in her borders who were pos¬
sessed of any military training. Volunteers were plenty,
but how to arm and equip them was the trouble. Governor
Morton was equal to the emergency. He grasped the situ¬
ation at a glance, and seemed to be everywhere present,
stirring and animating the citizens, bringing order out of
chaos, and reducing all to system, so that in comparatively
few days Indiana was a vast military camp, and troops were
ready for the field.
An agent was sent to the leading manufacturers of the
East and Canada to purchase arms. He gave but few hours
to sleep in those days, but wore out his secretaries in
continuous labors. During the four years of the war this
intense strain was continued. A large number of people
of his State were opposed to war, and thousands of them
actively sympathized with the rebellion. These things
added to his labors. He was the youngest of all the loyal
governors, but so manifest was his ability, so lofty his
patriotism, so hopeful was he in the darkest hours, that all
turned to him for counsel. President Lincoln and his great
MIS CELL A NE O US.
743
War Secretary trusted him and leaned upon him as they did
upon no one else. He was often consulted by the generals
in the field, especially those in the West, in regard to the
movements of the army, and he was always the first one
appealed to for help and reënforcements. No such appeal
was ever made in vain. Of the high opinion entertained
of him and his labors by the members of Mr. Lincoln's
Cabinet, the following extract from a letter written by Hon.
S. P. Chase to Governor Morton in 1865 will evidence.
Mr. Chase wrote him a letter stating that, in a conversa¬
tion with Secretary Stanton the night before.
We naturally, turning our minds to the past, fell to talking of
you. We agreed that no Governor rendered such services, or dis¬
played such courage or more ability in administration ; and we
agreed that your recent services were most meritorious of all,
because rendered under circumstances of greatest personal risk of
health and life, and which would have been by almost any man
regarded, and by all accepted, as good reasons for total inaction. I
have seldom heard Stanton express himself so warmly.
As we said before, the war found the North unprepared.
In the autumn of 1861 he found that the General Govern¬
ment would be unable to supply the men with overcoats in
time to prevent suffering from the cold. He went to New
York and purchased twenty-nine thousand overcoats for the
use of the Indiana troops. The soldiers were his first care.
To relieve the sick and wounded he organized a sanitary
commission, which afterwards was adopted by the other
States. To show his deep interest in the soldiers, and the
care he took of their interests, it may be mentioned that
during the siege of Vicksburg, when the army hospitals
were full of- sick and wounded, he applied to the Secretary
of War for permission to remove the Indiana sick and
wounded to the North. The Secretary declined to grant
the permission. Governor Morton declared his intention to
take the matter before the President. He did so, and the
result was a general order permitting not only Indiana, but
auy other State to remove the sick and wounded and care
744
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
for them. Under the system of relief inaugurated by him,
Indiana collected and disbursed over ;^6oo,ooo in money
and supplies.
In this short sketch we can do no more than glance at
his work as Governor. In 1863 the Democrats elected a
legislature hostile to the war, and efforts were made to
cripple the Governor in discharge of his duties. They re¬
fused to make appropriations to carry on the State govern¬
ment and to meet the interest on the public debt. Governor
Morton was undismayed. He went to New York, and
through the banking firm of Winslow, Lanier & Cot, and
some of the counties of the State, and a few of the patriotic
citizens, arranged for money for the use of the State. He
established a financial bureau without authority of the law,
and in one year and nine months he raised and paid out over
a million dollars. Every dollar of this was paid out upon
his own check, and not a dollar was lost or misappropriated.
His extraordinary activity was well demonstrated in
1862, during the invasion of Kentucky by Generals Bragg
and Kirby Smith. These two active Confederate generals
had slipped around General Buell and invaded Kentucky,
threatening both Louisville and Cincinnati. On the 17th
of August, late at night, he received a telegram that Ken¬
tucky had been invaded at several points. Before night of
the 18th one regiment was mustered in, armed, and started
for the scene of action. During the night of the i8th four
more regiments were forwarded. On the morning of the
19th some of the patriotic banks and citizens advanced half
a million dollars, and during the day and night four more
regiments were paid and sent forward. By the 31st of
August more than 30,000 troops had been armed and sent
to the relief of Kentucky. All this time the arsenal of the
State was employed day and night in the manufacture of
ammunition, making 300,000 rounds daily, and all the
river towns of the State were occupied by the State militia.
Ohio as well as Kentucky wanted help. Cincinnati was
threatened. Governor Morton was called upon, and Indi-
MISCELLANEO US.
745
ana troops rushed to the defense of her sister State. Am-
mnnition was wanted for the heavy guns placed in position.
The Mayor of Cincinnati and Committee of Defense tele¬
graphed to Columbus for a supply. They were instructed
to make out a requisition in due form and have it approved
by the commanding officer and forward it-, and the ammu¬
nition would be supplied. They then applied to Governor
Morton. No requisition was asked for, but the telegraph
flashed back the answer that in an hour a train would start,
and the train did so, bearing about 4000 rounds of artillery
and 720,000 rounds for small arms. In eight days Indiana
supplied 33,000 rounds for artillery and 3,365,000 for small
arms, the entire amount having been made at the State ar¬
senal. For his services the Cincinnati Common Council
ordered his portrait painted and placed in the City Hall,
which was done with imposing ceremonies.
In 1864, in the midst of a heated presidential canvass,
the exposure came of the organization known as the
Knights of the Golden Circle, or Sons of Liberty. This
organization numbered fifty thousand members in the State,
and an uprising was planned. The Governor had possessed
himself of all their secrets, and before they knew that they
were even suspected, he dealt them a terrible blow and
crushed them. He ordered the arrest of the prominent lead¬
ers of the movement, and so alarmed were the members to
find that their plots were known, and that they were in the
power of a man whose hatred of treason was so intense, and
who was so unrelenting in his efforts to crush all disloyalty,
that dismay seized upon them and they stood bewildered,
not knowing what to expect. The trial and conviction of
the leaders is a part of the general history of the country.
Governor Morton was triumphantly elected to the office
of Governor in 1864, and the people placed a loyal Legisla¬
ture to help him. It was the grandest political triumph
ever achieved in this State.
Oliver P. Morton was twice elected a member of the
United States Senate by the Republicans, his first term
?46 THE ARMY Ó F THE POTOMAC.
commencing on the 4th day of March, 1867, and his second
on the 4th day of March, 1873. The limits of this sketch
forbid anything like an attempt at a history of his senator¬
ial labors. During his ten years of service, he was foremost
in all things—in debates, in party counsels, in labors. It
is not invidious to say of him that in labors he was more
abundant than any other, notwithstanding his physical dis¬
ability. He entered the Senate at a stirring time. The
war was ended, but the South was in a state of chaos.
What was to be done, and how to do it, were the two ques¬
tions uppermost in the minds of all. There was an irrecon¬
cilable quarrel between Congress and the President. At
the very outset of his senatorial career, although it was his
first legislative experience, he was given three important
places. He was made chairman of the Committee on Man¬
ufactures, and a member of the Committee on Foreign Re¬
lations and that of Military Affairs. The first great ques¬
tion in which he took part was that of reconstruction.
He went into the Senate with well-settled views upon this
question. He had held tenaciously to the idea that the
United States was a nation, and he insisted upon that on
all occasions. He looked upon treason as a crime deserv¬
ing punishment. He could not be led to believe that those
who had laid down their arms after a four years' struggle to
overthrow the Government could safely be intrusted with
power until, at least, they had given evidence of having
renewed their allegiance. He was inspired by no hatred of
the people of the South ; it was their treason he hated.
To Senator Morton more than any other man is due the
credit of the adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment. He
was bold and aggressive in his advocacy of this important
measure, designed as it was to secure to the colored man the
right of suffrage. It was opposed by Senator Sumner and
some other Republican members, but Mr. Morton led in the
debate and carried the measure triumphantly through. He
met all arguments, repelled all assaults, and held the friends
of the amendment together until the final vote was taken.
MIS CÈLLANEOUS.
74?
Nor did his labors end with its adoption by Congress. It
had to be ratified by the States. The Democratic members
of the Indiana L/egislature resigned to defeat its ratification.
Senator Morton reached Indianapolis the morning Jhe
resignations were handed in. He sent word to the Repub¬
lican members not to adjourti, but take a recess and meet
him. He then showed them the resignations did not break
a quorum, and demonstrated that they had the power to
ratify the amendment.
They acted in accordan-ce with his wishes, and the work
was done, to the amazement of the Democrats, Still States
were wanted. Senator Morton was equal to the emergency,
A bill was introduced providiug for the reconstruction of
Mississippi, Texas and Virginia, He seized the opportunity,
and offered an amendment providing that before these States
should be admitted to representation in Congress they
should ratify the proposed Fifteenth Amendment, The
amendment was referred to the Committee on Judiciary,
An adverse report was made by Senator Trumbull, chairman
of the committee. Senator Morton still adhered to his
amendment, and, after a debate lasting three days, was suc¬
cessful, This was one of the most remarkable debates of
the Senate, Still another State was wanted, and Senator
Morton led in the work of securing it. He introduced a
bill authorizing the military commander of Georgia to call
the Legislature of that-State together, including the colored
members, who had been expelled the year before, and em¬
powering the Legislature to reconstruct that State, by elect¬
ing two United States Senators after ratifying the Fifteenth
Amendment. Again the Judiciary Committee antagonized
him, but again he triumphed, and the Fifteenth Amendment
became a part of the Constitution, and stands to-day as a
monument of his love of justice and his powers as a leader,
more enduring than brass or marble.
Space will not permit the dwelling upon his labors in
the great Kuklux debates and other similar measures, but
in all he took a leading part, and upon all he left the im-
748
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
press of his lofty and unyielding patriotism. As chairman
of the Committee on Elections and Privileges he rendered
signal service. All questions that came before him were
treated with the utmost fairness, and stern justice ruled in
the decisions of his committee. One notable instance of
this kind was his action in regard to the election of Cald¬
well as Senator from Kansas. It was evident that his elec¬
tion had been procurèd by corrupt means. Senator Morton
held that he should be expelled from the Senate as un¬
worthy a seat in that body. The friends of Caldwell plead
to have the election simply declared void. Mr. Morton
would not listen. His sense of justice had been outraged,
and he felt that American politics needed purifying, and
insisted upon expulsion, and to save himself from that the
Kansas Senator resigned. With fraud, force, or corrup¬
tion, he had no patience, and he would neither listen to the
pleading of friends of the accused, nor pay heed to their
threats- He believed in the right, and had the courage
at all times and under all circumstances to maintain his
beliefs.
In 1873 he delivered a speech in the Senate, which in
the light of later events looks almost like prophecy. The
question under discussion was a resolution instructing the
Committee on Privileges and Elections to report upon the
best and most practicable mode of electing a President and
Vice-President, and providing a tribunal to adjust and de¬
cide all contested elections therewith. Senator Morton took
strong grounds in favor of doing away with the Electoral
College, and electing a President by the direct vote of the
people.
It was Mr. Morton that gave to us the civil rights bill,
which was intended to make good the promises of the nation
to the colored men that they should have equal and exact
justice with all races. That they have since failed is no
fault of his.
In the Senate he left the stamp of his individuality
upon all legislation. He was the moving spirit, the leader,
MISCELLA NE O US.
749
upon whom all relied. There was no question of public
moment too small for his attention ; but his mind grasped
all, his wisdom foresaw all, and as far as possible he
attempted to warn and guide the country, that it might
avoid the danger he foresaw before it. He spoke often in
the Senate, but always with effect, and was listened to with
the utmost attention, for it soon became recognized that
when he summed up the arguments there was little or noth¬
ing left to be said. When defeated, as he sometimes was,
he at once accepted the situation, but never despaired. His
fertility of resource was wonderful, his iudustry was pro¬
digious.
. The last stroke which ended eventually his life, came
while in the discharge of his senatorial duties, and
though not in his place at the Capitol, yet like John
Quincy Adams, he died in the harness.
In 1877 the Senate ordered an investigation into the
case of Senator Grover, of Oregon, who was charged with
having secured his election to the Senate with corrupt
means. This duty devolved upon the Committee on Privi¬
leges and Elections, of which Senator Morton was chair¬
man. It was necessary to go across the continent to Oregon.
Senator Morton, though physically feeble and worn out by
his incessant labors, did not hesitate to take the long and
tiresome journey, in company with Senators Saulsbury of
Delaware, and McMillan of Minnesota.
During the entire trip to San Francisco he was much
prostrated, but the sea voyage to Portland, Oregon, seemed
to do him good. This investigation lasted eighteen days,
during which he labored incessantly, and the sessions of the
committee were sometimes prolonged late into the night.
This labor nearly broke down the other members of the
committee, but it seemed the iron will of Senator Morton
rose above every trial, for, in addition to his work on the
committee, he prepared an elaborate political speech to be
used in the approaching Ohio campaign. At the conclusion
of the investigation he addressed the people at Salem in a
750 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
speech of considerable length, which was pronounced the
ablest speech ever heard in the State.
He arrived in San Francisco upon his return home early
in August, and on the sixth day received his second stroke
of paralysis.
It would not be proper or just to close this short sketch
without referring, at least in a brief way, to the political
services of Morton other than those directly connected with
his labors in the Senate and as Governor of Indiana, and to
touch upon the general characteristics.
Great as was his work in both of the high offices to
which the people elevated him, his labors in the general
field of politics were no less prodigious. From 1856, when
he first entered politics, until death claimed him, his voice
and pen were never idle. In every political contest he was
foremost in the fight, and the downtrodden and oppressed
were always his care. Not only did he engage in the po¬
litical battles of his own State, but in almost every State of
the North he sent forth the bugle-call which rallied the
forces of Republicanism. Few men made more stump
speeches than he, and none ever carried such weight. In
Indiana, during each campaign, he spoke incessantly, and
he always knew how to touch the popular chord of
patriotism.
He not only spoke, but hundreds of editorials from
his pen found their way into the columns of the leading
papers. His political speeches, if collected and published,
would make a political history of the country in its great
struggle, unequaled. He was always ready to answer the
calls of his party. His devotion to his party was witnessed
by his declining the English mission. President Grant was
desirous of concluding a treaty with Great Britain on the
subject of the depredations of the rebel cruisers, and urged
Senator Morton to undertake the mission. He was inclined
to accept it, but the Legislature of Indiana was controlled
by the Democrats, and he declined. President Grant wrote
to him as follows :
MIS CELL A NE O US.
751
Executive Mansion,
Washington, D. C., October 21.
Dear Sir ;—Your letter of the 19th inst., declining the English
mission, with reasons therefor, is received. I fully concur with you
in all the reasons which you give for the course you find it your
duty to pursue in the matter, but regret that the country is not to
have your valuable services at the English Court at this important
juncture. Your course, however, I deem wise, and it will be highly
appreciated by your constituents in Indiana and throughout the
country.
With assurances of my highest regard, I remain, very truly,
your obedient servant, U. S. Grant.
Hon. O. P. Morton, United States Senate.
It is difficult to justly sum up the character of such a
man. He was a born leader, and no sooner did he enter
political life than he took the leadership of his party and
maintained it until his death. He was a man of strong
will, indomitable energy, and untiring industry, and was
possessed of moral and physical courage which approached
the sublime. As a party leader and organizer he has had
no equal. The universal testimony of those who were with
him in the Senate is to the effect that America has never
produced a party leader who could even lay claim to rival
him. He was strong because he was always in earnest ;
because he never forgot a friend ; because he was ever ready
to meet a foe. He always mastered his subject, and never
undertook to discuss it until he had thoroughly mastered
every phase of it. It was this that gave him such great
power with au audience. His mind was of an analytical
turn, and when he spoke his sentences were terse, logical, and
oftentimes eloquent. There was little or no fancy about
him, and he rather despised those fancy flights of oratory by
which some men endeavor to capture their audiences. He
dealt with facts, and dealt with them as living things.
While he was often severe, and even terrible, in his denun¬
ciation or arraignment of his opponents, he never was per¬
sonal, but always calm, dignified, urbane.
Mr. Morton was simple in his tastes ; honest in the
752 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
strictest sense of the word. No taint of corruption ever
lingered near him. He loved his home, his family, his
friends, and they clung to him with a devotion equal to his
love. His nature was kind and sympathetic. The cry of
the suffering or sorrowing always found an echo in his
heart. The State often absorbed him to such a degree that
he forgot himself, his own physical weakness, his own
wants, but never so that he forgot his home or family, and
he always turned to them for rest. When in the bosom of
his family he was as simple as a child.
There was no love of pomp in his nature, and he was
always accessible to the people, the poor equally with the
rich. He gave to the country seventeen years of his life,
and wore himself out and died a poor man, as he had lived.
His last audible words expressed it all, "I am worn out."
Yes, he had worn himself out.
The people of Indiana have raised in the Circle Park of
Indianapolis a bronze statue of the great War Governor and
Senator, but his greatest monument lives in the pages of
the Constitution and laws of his country, and in the doc¬
trines of patriotism he inculcated and enforced.