[Communicated to the Council,
the Members of the League
and the Delegates at the Assembly.]
A. 25. 1925. IX.
Geneva, June 25th, 1925,
LEAGUE OF NATIONS
ARBITRATION, SECURITY
AND REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS
Protocol for the Pacific Settlement
of International Disputes.
I.
CONTENTS.
Action taken by the Council of the League of Nations on the Resolutions
adopted by the flfth assembly
• • • t
II. — Declarations by the Members of the Council made at the Thirty-third
Session of the Council, Geneva (March 1925) :
British Empire
France ...
Italy
Japan ...
Belgium
Brazil
Spain
Sweden
Uruguay
Czechoslovakia
• • • ♦
• • • i
Page
2
4
8
11
12
12
13
14
14
14
15
III. — Declarations or Replies by other Members of the League of Nations (in chrono¬
logical order) :
Finland 17
Canada 18
Ireland 19
Nicaragua 20
India ... 20
3
I.
ACTION TAKEN BY THE COUNCIL OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS
ON THE BESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE FIFTH ASSEMBLY.
ARBITRATION, SECURITY AND THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS.
The discussions of the fifth Assembly on the reduction of armaments, with which question
the Assembly had linked up the questions of arbitration and security, resulted in a certain
number of resolutions, the tenour of which was to recommend to the earnest attention of all
the Members of the League the acceptance of the draft Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of
International Disputes which was drawn up at Geneva on October 2nd, 1924, and to open
immediately this Protocol for signature by those representatives of Members of the League
which were already in a position to sign it, and to hold it open for signature by all other States.
Article 17 of the Protocol is as follows :
!
44 The signatory States undertake to participate in an International Conference
for the Reduction of Armaments which shall be convened by the Council and shall
meet at Geneva on Monday, June 15th, 1925. All other States, whether Members
of the League or not, shall be invited to this Conference.
44 In preparation for the convening of the Conference, the Council shall draw up,
with due regard to the undertakings contained in Articles 11 and 13 of the present
Protocol, a general programme for the reduction and limitation or armaments, which
shall be laid before the Conference and which shall be communicated to the Govern¬
ments at the earliest possible date, and at the latest three months before the Conference
meets.
44 If by May 1st, 1925, ratifications have not been deposited by at least a majority
of the permanent Members of the Council and ten other Members of the League, the
Secretary-General of the League shall immediately consult the Council as to whether
he shall cancel the invitations or merely adjourn the Conference to a subsequent date to
be fixed by the Council so as to permit the necessary number of ratifications to be
obtained. "
The Assembly, considering that the work of the League of Nations as regards the
reduction of armaments was entering upon a period of reorganisation which required the direct
attention of the Council, had already, by a decision taken on September 27th, 1924, entrusted
to the Council the question of the co-ordination of the work of its Commissions for the reduction
of armaments. This decision ended by enumerating the principles which the Assembly re¬
commended to the Council with a view to a reorganisation of the Temporary Mixed Commis¬
sion for the Reduction of Armaments which had been set up in accordance with a decision of
the first Assembly.
The Council, giving immediate effect to this resolution of the fifth Assembly, adopted on
October 3rd, 1924, on the proposal of the representative of Czechoslovakia, the following
resolution :
44 1. With a view to the preparation of the Conference for the reduction of arma¬
ments, the Council decides to form itself into a Committee. The representatives on
the Council who consider that it will not be possible to attend the Committee in
person will, as soon as possible, send to the Secretary-General the names of their
substitutes on this Committee.
44 The Committee will hold its first meeting on November 17th in order to draw
up a general programme of the work connected with the application of Article 12
of the Protocol and with the reduction of armaments.
44 The Governments of the States represented on the Council are requested to
give their representatives on the Committee the necessary instructions in order that
the general lines of the programme may be laid down during its meeting of Novem¬
ber 17th. The Secretary-General will invite the Governments of the States Members
of the League not represented on the Council to forward through him to the Committee
any suggestions which they may think useful with a view to the preparation of this
programme.
44 2. The Secretariat is requested to collect the data necessary for the economic
and financial investigations relative to the application of Article 12 of the Protocol and
is authorised to distribute these data to the competent organs of the League (Economic
and Financial Organisation, Transit Organisation) with a view to the work which
will subsequently be required of them by the Committee.
44 The Secretariat will obtain information from the official documents at the dispo¬
sal of the League or from documents which might, if necessary, be furnished by
the Governments.
S. d. Ñ. 1600 (F) 1450 (A) 8/25. Imp. Réunies S, A., Lausanne.
— t —
44 3. In conformity with the Assembly resolution, and in order to assist the
Committee in co-ordinating the preparatory work for the Conference, the Temporary
Mixed Commission shall be reorganised and shall take the name of the Co-ordination
Commission, which will be composed as follows :
44 (a) The Committee of the Council (ten members), assisted by :
44 (b) The President and one member, or two members of each of the three
organisations, Economic, Financial and Transit (six members) ;
44 (c) Six members appointed by the Permanent Advisory Commission
(six members) ;
44 (d) Two members of the Employers' Group and two members of the
Workers' Group of the Governing Body of the International Labour Office,
appointed by the latter (four members) ;
44 (e) If considered advisable, a certain number of experts, jurists and others
appointed by the Council.
44 The Secretary-General is requested to invite at a suitable moment the above-
mentioned organisations to appoint their representatives. "
During the extraordinary session held by the Council at Brussels at the end of October,
1924, the representative of Czechoslovakia informed the Council that the President of the
Czechoslovak Republic had ratified on October 28th the Protocol for the Pacific Settlement
of International Disputes, and the Acting President of the Council announced that thirteen
States had signed the Protocol1. During the same session, Lord Parmoor, representative of
the British Empire, intimated to his colleagues that it was not desirable for the Committee of
the Council to meet on November 17th, in view of the political situation in Great Britain.
The British Parliament had been dissolved, and new general elections were taking place.
The Council, therefore, decided to postpone the meeting of November 17th, and itself
to undertake at its next ordinary session, which was fixed for December 8th, the work of
preparing for the Conference on the Reduction of Armaments.
On November 15th, 1924, the new British Government notified the Secretary-General
that, owing to its very recent accession to office, it would not be able, for some time, to form
a considered opinion on the terms of the Protocol. It would be equally impossible for the
British Government to furnish, for the next session, proper instructions to its representative
on the Council for the purpose of the preparatory work for the proposed Conference on the
Reduction of Armaments. The British Government was, therefore, obliged to request that this
question should be adjourned to a later session.
The question having been adjourned according to the desire of the British Government,
Mr. Austen Chamberlain, during the session held in March, 1925, opened the discussion on the
question by reading an official statement regarding the inacceptability of the Protocol to
the British Empire, and putting forward various new suggestions. This declaration was
followed by answers and statements, in which the other members of the Council explained
the policy of their Governments as regards the Protocol. The text of these declarations,
as well as the replies received from other Governments, are annexed hereto.
The Council, as a result of the declarations made by its members, adopted on March 13th,
1925, the following resolution :
44 The Council, having heard the statement of the representative of the British
Empire on the Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, and
also the declarations of the other members of the Council ;
44 Considering that the fifth Assembly, by a resolution unanimously adopted
on October 2nd, 1924, decided to recommend to the earnest attention of all the Mem¬
bers of the League the acceptance of the said draft Protocol, and that in the same
resolution it invited the Council to undertake certain preparatory work provided
for in various articles of the draft Protocol ;
44 And considering that the Council decided on October 28th, 1924, to undertake
itself the work of preparing for the Conference in the Reduction of Armaments,
which it had originally asked the Committee of the Council to undertake at a mee¬
ting to be held on November 17th, 1924 ;
44 Decides :
44 (a) To refer to the sixth Assembly the above-mentioned declarations
of the representative of the British Empire and the other members of the Council,
together with any declarations on the same subject which may be communi¬
cated to it by the Governments of the Members of the League, and instructs
the Secretary-General to place this question forthwith upon the agenda of the
sixth Assembly ;
44 (b) To postpone the work of preparation which it had decided to undertake
until the sixth Assembly has given a decision on the question submitted to it.
1 The Protocol has, up to now, been signed by eighteen States :
Albania, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Ghile, Czechoslovakia, Esthonia, Finland, France, Greece, Haïti, Latvia, Para¬
guay, Poland, Portugal, Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Spain and Uruguay,
ít has been ratified by Czechoslovakia.
5
II.
DECLARATIONS BY THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL DURING
ITS THIRTY-THIRD SESSION.
(Geneva, March 1925.)
Mr. Austen Chamberlain (British Empire) :
His Majesty's Government have given the most anxious consideration to the Protocol
which was provisionally accepted last October by the Assembly of the League of Nations and
submitted by the Council to the various States Members of the League. It is unnecessary to
lay stress upon the sympathy felt throughout the British Empire with any effort to improve
the international machinery for maintaining the peace of the world. Arbitration, disarmament
and security are the main themes of the Protocol and on all these great subjects the British
Empire has shown, by deeds as well as words, that it is in the fullest accord with the ideals
which have animated the Fifth Assembly of the League. Successive administrations in Great
Britain, with the full approval of the self-governing Dominions, have not only favoured arbi¬
tration in theory ; they have largely availed themselves of it in practice. They have not
contented themselves with preaching disarmament ; they have disarmed to the limits of national
safety. They have taken their full share in creating and supporting the League of Nations
and the Court of International Justice ; while the immense sacrifices they have been content
to make in the cause of general security are matters of recent history.
If,therefore, His Majesty's present advisers, after discussing the subject with the self-
governing Dominions and India, see insuperable objections to signing and ratifying the Protocol
in its present shape, this is not because they feel themselves out of harmony with the purpose
which it was intended to serve, or are opposed in principle to schemes for clarifying the meaning
of the Covenant or strengthening its provisions. Amendment and interpretation may in
themselves be desirable ; but His Majesty's Government cannot believe that the Protocol
as it stands provides the most suitable method of attempting that task.
II.
The declared object of the Protocol is to facilitate disarmament, and it proposes to attain
this most desirable end : (1) by closing certain gaps in the scheme originally laid down in the
Covenant for peaceably settling international disputes, and (2) by sharpening the " sanctions ",
especially the economic sanctions, by which, under the existing system, aggression is to be
discouraged and aggressors coerced. These two portions of the scheme are intimately connected,
and it may be desirable on the present occasion to consider them together.
It was, of course, well known to the framers of the Covenant that international differences
might conceivably take a form for which their peace-preserving machinery provided no specific
remedy ; nor could they have doubted that this defect, if defect it was, could in theory be cured
by insisting that every dispute should, at some stage or other, be submitted to arbitration. If,
therefore, they rejected this simple method of obtaining systematic completeness, it was pre¬
sumably because they felt, as so many States Members of the League have felt since, that the
objections to universal and compulsory arbitration might easily outweigh its theoretical advan¬
tages. So far as the Court of International Justice is concerned, this view was taken in 1920
by the British Delegation, while the British Delegation of 1924 made a reservation in the same
connection which, so far as Great Britain is concerned, greatly limits the universal application
of the compulsory principle.
Into this branch of the controversy, however, His Majesty's Government do not now
propose to enter. It suffices to say that, so far from their objections to compulsory arbitration
being diminished by the provisions of the Protocol, they have rather been increased, owing
to the weakening of those reservations in clause 15 of the Covenant, which were designed to
prevent any interference by the League in matters of domestic jurisdiction.
His Majesty's Government are now more immediately concerned to enquire how far the
change in the Covenant effected by the Protocol is likely to increase the responsibilities already
undertaken by the States Members of the League. On this there may conceivably be two
opinions. Some have held that, although in the language of the First Committee (p. 7) " there
are numerous fissures in the wall of protection erected by the Covenant round the peace of the
world ", there is in fact but little danger that through these " fissures " any serious assaults
will be attempted. The changes made by the Protocol are, in their judgment, formal rather
than substantial ; they aim at theoretical completeness rather than practical effect. On this
view no material addition is made to responsibilities already incurred under the Covenant,
nor (it must be added) is anything of importance accomplished in the cause of Peace and
Disarmament.
13
But this (it need hardly be said) is not the view of the framers of the Protocol. They
regard themselves as the authors of a " new system " (p. 6) through which alone can be realised
" the great ideal to which humanity aspires " (p. 7). The last thing they contemplate is the
possibility that their proposals will leave things very much as they stand under the Covenant.
And in this His Majesty's Government are entirely of their opinion. How, indeed, can it be
otherwise ? Fresh classes of disputes are to be decided by the League ; fresh possibilities of
defying its decisions are thereby created ; fresh occasions for the application of coercive measures
follow as a matter of course ; and it is therefore not surprising that, quite apart from the pro¬
blem of disarmament, the question of " sanctions " should be treated at length in the clauses
of the Protocol.
III.
It seems necessary to preface the comments called for by this part of the new scheme by
recalling certain historic facts which, though very relevant to the subject, are never referred to
in the documents by which the Protocol is justified and explained.
As all the world is aware, the League of Nations, in its present shape, is not the League
designed by the framers of the Covenant. They 110 doubt contemplated, and, as far as they
could, provided against, the difficulties that might arise from the non-inclusion of a certain
number of States within the circle of League membership. But they never supposed that,
among these States, would be found so many of the most powerful nations in the world ; least
of all did they foresee that one of them would be the United States of America.
It is no doubt true that there are many points of view from which these unfortunate facts
have not proved to be of vital importance. The work of the League goes on, beneficent and
full of promise. Though the United States remains in friendly aloofness, individual Americans
have freely helped both by sympathy and service, while the generosity of the American public
has greatly aided some causes in which the League is deeply interested. Could, therefore,
attention be confined to the present and the past, it might be said with truth that the problems
which even a weakened League has had to face have never overstrained its machinery.
The hope may be justified that this good fortune will continue. But surely it is most
unwise to add to the liabilities already incurred without taking stock of the degree to which
the machinery of the Covenant has been already weakened by the non-membership of certain
great States. For in truth the change, especially as regards the " economic sanctions ",
amounts to a transformation. The " economic sanction ", if simultaneously directed by all
the world against a State which is not itself economically self-sufficing, would be a weapon
of incalculable power. This or something not very different from this was the weapon ori¬
ginally devised by the authors of the Covenant. To them it appeared to be not only bloodless,
but cheap, effective and easy to use, in the most improbable event of its use being necessary.
But all this is changed by the mere existence of powerful economic communities outside the
limits of the League. It might force trade into unaccustomed channels, but it could hardly
stop it ; and, though the offending State would no doubt suffer, there is no presumption that
it would be crushed or even that it would suffer most.
Were this the occasion for entering into a detailed discussion of the subsidiary provisions
of the Protocol, it would be necessary to dwell at length on all those which, in the opinion of
His Majesty's Government, are open to serious objection. But for the purposes of the present
communication the following observations may suffice.
Articles 7 and 8 of the Protocol are designed for the purpose of preventing a State which
has a difference with a neighbour from making any preparations for war between the moment
when a dispute arises and the moment when proceedings for a pacific settlement have been
concluded. The intentions of these provisions are most laudable. But the framers of the
Protocol have not perhaps sufficiently considered that it may embarrass the victim of aggres¬
sion even more than the aggressor. The aggressor is at liberty to select his own date for pick¬
ing a quarrel. Until that date arrives he may distribute his armies as he pleases — provided
only that he neither mobilises them nor adds to them. When the distribution is as favour¬
able to his designs as he can hope to make them, he starts the dispute. Immediately
the military position becomes temporarily unalterable. His troops, which are more or less
in the right position for attack, may (indeed must) be kept there till he wants to use them.
The troops, on the other hand, of his prospective victim are (by supposition) in the wrong
position for defence. But there they must be kept, or the victim may find himself charged
with a breach of the Protocol. Is this a tolerable situation ? Is it one that could possibly
survive the day of trial ?
It may be replied that, if the aggressor attempts to concentrate troops for attack before
the dispute arises, means may be found to stop him. Grant that such means exist, which is
extremely doubtful, how does the Protocol deal with the case where the peace distribution of
the troops belonging to the aggressor is normally more suitable for attack than the peace
distribution of the troops belonging to its opponents is suitable for defence ? If a dispute
were to arise, would the defender be counted as an aggressor solely because he endeavoured to
redress this accidental inequality ?
These are some of the difficulties suggested by Articles 7 and 8 of the Protocol as these
affect forces on land. But these articles raise even more embarrassing problems when applied
to the case of forces at sea. The whole value of a fleet depends on its mobility. Its distribution
is in all probability quite different in time of peace from what it would be under threat of war.
To suggest that, directly a dispute arises which in any way concerns a maritime Power, its
ships are to remain immovably fixed on the stations where the chance conveniences of peace may
7
happen to have placed them, is asking the threatened State to make a surrender of its inalien¬
able right of self-defence, to which it is never likely to submit.
It may be desirable to add that, besides the obvious objections to those clauses already
indicated, their great obscurity, and the inherent impossibility of distinguishing, in any paper
definition, military movements genuinely intended for defence, and only for defence, from
movements with some ulterior aggressive purpose, must always make them a danger to the
unwary rather than a protection to the innocent. They could never be accepted as they stand.
There is one other article in the Protocol which cannot be passed over in complete silence,
namely, Article 15.
This contains two provisions. By the first, the aggressor State is required to pay all the
costs of the war for which it is responsible, and full reparation for all damages, public or private,
which the war has caused. By the second, it is protected from any alteration of its frontiers
and all interference with its internal affairs.
With the sentiments which have dictated these two provisions there will be general sym¬
pathy. His Majesty's Government, at all events, have no desire to relieve the aggressor of
the duty of repairing to the utmost of his ability the damages for which he is responsible ;
they hold strongly to the view that frontiers are neither to be lightly made nor lightly violated ;
and they, of course, accept the broad principle that sovereign States should be left to manage
their own affairs. But they cannot think it wise to embody these generalities in dogmas of
inflexible rigidity, designed to control the actions of the League in all circumstances and for
all time. In the sternest codes of law, mitigating circumstances are allowed to modify the
judgments of the courts ; and His Majesty's Government fail to see why the League of Nations
should deliberately deprive itself of a discretion which all other tribunals are free to exercise.
Moreover, there is a certain want of harmony between the two provisions of the Article,
which in rare and extreme cases (and it is for rare and extreme cases, among others, that we
are asked to legislate) might well shock the conscience of the world. These cases cannot, indeed,
be foreseen, but they may be imagined. Is it impossible (for example) that, in a war arising
out of some very complicated situation involving perhaps a State not a member of the League,
the guilt of the combatants might be fairly matched though only one of them was technically
the aggressor ? In such circumstances, would the League feel no misgivings when they found
themselves compelled to throw all the cost of the war upon one party and none at all upon the
other ? Would not the universal verdict be that, under the first half of Clause 15, the aggressor
had in this case been hardly treated ?
But now consider the second half of Article 15. This protects the aggressor, whatever
his misdeeds, from losing anything under any circumstances but money or the equivalent of
money. Is this quite satisfactory ? The aggression may have been utterly unprovoked ;
it may have been barbarously conducted ; it may be the work of a corrupt and tyrannical
administration ; and it may be the inevitable result of cruel mis-government on the aggressor's
side of an ill-drawn frontier. Are we to lay it down for all time that, in such a case, the League
shall do nothing to prevent a repetition of the offence but ask for money ? This may, indeed,
be all that is possible ; but would it not be wise to let the League itself resolve this problem,
if unhappily the occasion should ever arise ?
There is one general reflection which His Majesty's Government venture to add to the
specific criticisms they have made in the preceding paragraphs. The Protocol purports to be
little more than a completion of the work begun but not perfected by the authors of the Covenant.
But surely this is a very inadequate description of its effects. The additions which it makes
to the original document do something quite different from merely clarifying obscurities and
filling in omissions. They destroy its balance and alter its spirit. The fresh emphasis laid
upon sanctions, the new occasions discovered for their employment, the elaboration of military
procedure, insensibly suggest the idea that the vital business of the League is not so much
to promote friendly co-operation and reasoned harmony in the management of international
affairs as to preserve peace by organising war, and (it may be) war on the largest scale. Now,
it is unhappily true that circumstances may be easily imagined in which war, conducted by
Members of the League, and with its collective assistance and approval, will become a tragic
necessity. But such catastrophes belong to the pathology of international life, not to its normal
condition. It is not wholesome for the ordinary man to be always brooding over the possibility
of some severe surgical operation ; nor is it wise for societies to pursue a similar course. It is
more likely to hasten the dreaded consummation than to hinder it. And it certainly seems to
His Majesty's Government that anything which fosters the idea that the main business of the
League is with war rather than with peace is likely to weaken it in its fundamental task of
diminishing the causes of war without making it in every respect a satisfactory instrument for
organising great military operations should the necessity for them be forced upon the world.
IV.
It may perhaps be urged that these objections to the Protocol, whatever be their value,
are far outweighed by the blessings of the disarmament which would immediately follow its
acceptance. But why should disarmament immediately follow its acceptance ? Why should
the new scheme succeed when the old scheme has so lamentably failed ? It no doubt claims
to have closed some " fissures in the wall of protection erected by the Covenant round the
peace of the world ". But it is not the possibility of an attack through these (alleged) weak
places in the Covenant which haunts the imagination of those who hesitate to disarm. They
do not doubt that the Covenant, if kept, would be sufficient to protect them, at least from
— s —
attack by those who have signed it. What they doubt is whether, when it comes to the point,
the Covenant will be kept. Either some faithless Member of the League will break its pledges
or some predatory nation outside the League will brush Covenant and Protocol ruthlessly
aside, defying all the sanction by which they are protected. Brute force is what they fear, and
only brute force enlisted in their defence can (as they believe) give them the security of which
they feel the need.
His Majesty's Government fail altogether to see how this situation is bettered by the
Protocol. Is it to be supposed that the 44 security " promised by the new system will be so
complete that no armaments capable of being used or improvised for offensive purposes will
remain in being ? If not, is the balance of power between the States which desire peace and
those which are plotting war to be adjusted in favour of the former ? If so, on what principle ?
If not, then how are we advanced ? How will the unscrupulous aggressors be relatively
weakened ? How will their potential victims be rendered more capable of defence ?
And if the particular case of aggressors who are outside the League be considered, is not
the weakness of the Protocol even more manifest ? The aggressors within the League are traitors
in the sight of all mankind. Their moral position in the face of any opposition within their
own borders will be immensely weakened, while in neutral countries they will find none to
plead their cause. However low the practical importance of moral considerations such as these
may be rated, the eagerness of competing propaganda in times of international crisis may
convince the most cynical that a good cause counts at least for something. If so, aggressors
outside the League will have a smaller load of infamy to carry than aggressors within it, and
will be by so much the more formidable. How does the Protocol deal with them ? It requires
them to treat the situation as if they were members of the League, to accept its methods and
conform to its decisions. If they refuse they are counted as aggressors, they become the com¬
mon enemy, and every signatory State is bound to go to war with them. They may be in the
right and have nothing to fear from impartial judges. Yet national pride, in some cases per¬
haps the sense of power, dislike of compulsory arbitration, distrust of the League (to which
presumably they have already refused to belong) — all these motives, or any of them, may
harden their objections to outside interference. If so, the Protocol, designed to ensure uni¬
versal peace, may only extend the area of war — a possibility which, if realised, will not im¬
prove the chances of general disarmament.
V.
It may perhaps be replied that, while every scheme of sanctions is open toTriticism, some
scheme of sanctions is certainly necessary. Without it a League of Nations would be as in¬
secure as a civilised society without magistrates and police. International engagements which
cannot be internationally enforced are little better than a sham. Those, therefore, who object
to the plan proposed in the Protocol are bound to suggest a better.
To this challenge His Majesty's Government might be content to reply that, as between
the Covenant unamended and the Covenant amended by the Protocol, they have already
given reasons for preferring the former. But they are unwilling to conclude their argument
on a purely critical note and, though they cannot believe that 44 security " can be reached
by the route so carefully explored by the First and Third Committees of the League in 1924,
they are willing to consider whether some approach to it may not be made from the side
unsuccessfully attempted in 1923.
They do not agree, indeed, that without 44 sanctions " the League is powerless and treaties
no better than waste paper. Doctrines like these seem to them not only mischievous but
self-contradictory. Every 44 sanction " referred to either in the Covenant or the Protocol
depends on treaties ; and if no treaties are of value, all sanctions must be worthless. Do
what we will, we have no choice but, in the last resort, to depend upon the plighted word.
But this, it must be admitted, does not settle the question whether the sanctions contem¬
plated by the Covenant cannot in certain cases and for certain purposes be supplemented with
advantage to the general scheme of the Covenant itself. That scheme may no doubt be trusted
in ordinary cases to work smoothly and effectively. The mere threat to employ san étions will
commonly suffice. And if, unfortunately, it does not, their effect, when put into operation,
will doutless be speedy and conclusive. But it is easy to imagine extreme cases, about which we
dare not speak with the same assurance ; and it is precisely the possibility of these extreme
cases, remote though that possibility may be, which fosters international suspicion, makes
Governments hesitate to disarm and keeps the world on edge.
His Majesty's Government do not share these alarms, but they recognise their serious
effect, and believe them to be the main obstacles to the complete recovery of our shaken civilisa¬
tion from the disasters of war. How are they to be allayed ?
The first expedient that naturally suggests itself is to strengthen the provisions of the
Covenant. If the Covenant, as it stands, does not supply an adequate machinery for preserv¬
ing peace in all conceivable cases, why not alter it till it does ?
The futility of this plan is, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, abundantly
proved by the Protocol. For whatever else its proposals give us, they do not give us security.
They multiply offences, but do nothing to strengthen remedies. They increase the respon¬
sibilities undertaken by individual Members of the League, but do nothing to readjust their
burden.
What expedient remains ? How is security and, above all, the feeling of security, to
be attained ? In answering this question it is necessary to keep in mind the characteristics
of the 44 extreme cases to which reference has already been made. The brooding fears that
— 9 —
keep huge armaments in being have little relation to the ordinary misunderstandings insepa¬
rable from international (as from social) life — misunderstandings with which the League is
so admirably fitted to deal. They spring from deep-lying causes of hostility which, for historic
or other reasons, divide great and powerful States. These fears may be groundless; but if they
exist they cannot be effectually laid by even the most perfect method of dealing with particular
disputes by the machinery of enquiry and arbitration. For what is feared in such cases is
not injustice but war — war deliberately undertaken for purposes of conquest or revenge. And
if so, can there be a better way of allaying fears like these than by adopting some scheme which
should prove to all the world that such a war would fail ?
Since the general provisions of the Covenant cannot be stiffened with advantage, and since
the " extreme cases " with which the League may have to deal will probably affect certain
nations or groups of nations more nearly than others, His Majesty's Government conclude that
the best way of dealing with the situation is, with the co-operation of the League, to supplement
the Covenant by making special arrangements in order to meet special needs. That these
arrangements should be purely defensive in character, that they should be framed in the spirit
of the Covenant, working in close harmony with the League and under its guidance, is manifest.
And, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, these objects can best be attained by knitting
together the nations most immediately concerned, and whose differences might lead to a renewal
of strife, by means of treaties framed with the sole object of maintaining, as between them¬
selves, an unbroken peace. Within its limits no quicker remedy for our present ills can easily
be found or any surer safeguard against future calamities.
That, gentlemen, is the declaration which His Majesty's Government have instructed me
to make.
His Majesty's Government found it impossible, in the time at their disposal, to confer
personally with the representatives of the Dominions and of India, who are also Members of the
League, but we have been in telegraphic communication with them, from which it appears that
the Governments of the Dominion of Canada, of the Commonwealth of Australia, of New
Zealand, of the Union of South Africa and of India are also unable to accept the Protocol.
Their views will be made known in such a manner as they may think fit either by a communi¬
cation to the Secretariat, or to the Assembly, or otherwise.
I am not yet in possession of the views of the Irish Free State.
M. Briand (France) :
Gentlemen, you cannot have failed to realise that the statement which our President read to
us this morning on behalf of the British Government is of exceptional importance and will
produce a profound impression in every country.
We are passing through a time of crisis. The events in which we are taking part are of
vital importance for history, and after the catastrophe which burst upon us some years ago
we may be sure that when matters of peace and war are under discussion the peoples of the
world are stirred to the depths.
I only became familiar with the contents of the British statement when I heard it read
this morning. It is a lengthy, weighty and well-considered document, and you may perhaps
think me over-bold in venturing to discuss it, if I may say so, at first sight. I ask you to
excuse me for my rashness, convinced as I am that you will grant me all the indulgence that
I need. I must speak now, however, because I must fulfil my mission ; I must speak, the more
so because — whether it is a matter for congratulation or not — I am one of its authors. I was
publicly honoured by being the first to sign the Protocol, without reservation, in the name of
my Government, and for that reason I bear, at any rate, amoral responsibility, and I can hardly
ignore the criticisms which we have heard without attempting to produce at least some kind
of reply.
The document which has been read to us is instinct with a serene aloofness and a gentle
philosophy which I hesitate to affront in the discussion which I am about to initiate. I too,
like yourselves, feel and appreciate the nobility and the gentleness of the spirit of this philo¬
sophy, and I ask myself whether my own philosophy, which is necessarily somewhat more of
this earth, is worthy to place beside it. The general objections raised against the Protocol
this morning are indeed inspired with the noblest spirit. The objection to the Protocol is,
above all, that it speaks much of war. In the document which we have just heard read, it
is considered that the League spirit turns rather towards peace, and it is desired that that watchword
should contain an ideal strong enough to impose itself upon mankind without any need to make
provision for future contingencies. Perhaps so, but, in my view, peace is for all pratical pur¬
poses no more than the absence of war, and when we are trying to ensure peace we cannot but
remember that at certain times there have been wars and that it is just conceivable that there
may arise in future other wars and, after all, an institution which aims at peace must, if it is
determined to maintain peace, explore every avenue and every means best calculated to pre¬
vent war. It was in view of this unfortunate and somewhat humdrum necessity that the
authors of the Protocol felt obliged to speak of war much more often than they would have
wished.
When we are well it is very unpleasant to have to think of illness ; but when someone says
that war is a case of international pathology, and if it is admitted that the disease is not abso¬
lutely incurable, we must also agree that proper physicians and remedies must be found.
That is the secret of the work which the fifth Assembly accomplished. If war is to be
averted, the Protocol must find the means. Has it succeeded ? That is one of the questions
which is raised in the British Government's declaration. At any rate it was earnest and sincere
in its attempt to succeed. We must not forget that the fifth Assembly met in an atmosphere
— 10 —
of exceptional solemnity. The attention of the whole world was focussed on its work. A
peaceful settlement had just been found for certain material questions, all minds were in har¬
mony, all hearts cherished high hopes. It was said : " Now that certain material anxieties
are removed and can no longer give rise to war, we can turn our weapons against war itself ;
we can declare war on war ; we will organise ourselves for that purpose. "
Remember, Gentlemen, that forty-seven nations met at the fifth Assembly at Geneva in
order to study the Protocol with the aid of the most distinguished jurists — and I use the word
" distinguished " without irony, though of course the word " jurist " is usually attached to
the word " distinguished ", because in this case the jurists really were distinguished. They
worked hard for days and weeks ; each of the articles of the Covenant was examined by two
Committees, for the Protocol, we must remember, is simply a development of all the ideas
contained in the Covenant : conciliation, mediation, arbitration, precautionary measures
against war, methods of warfare, economic, financial and military — the germ of all these
exists in the Covenant.
... The fifth Assembly had constantly to take care not to injure the foundations of the
Covenant ; it merely attempted to fill up the gaps, to repair the omissions. But, I repeat, it
adhered throughout strictly to the spirit and letter of the Covenant.
We are told : " Yes, you did all that. Your intentions were quite sincere and nobly
inspired. All your work was laid down for you by two Governments who drew up your pro¬
gramme : the Governments of Great Britain and France ; for these were the two countries
which placed the scheme of work before the fifth Assembly. When the work was completed,
almost indescribable enthusiasm, it is true, prevailed among the forty-seven nations represented
at the Assembly and resulted in unanimity for recommending the Protocol to the various
Governments. These manifestations certainly had a certain i mportance and were nobly
inspired. We appreciate them, but, after all, what is the final result ? Do you think you
have found anything new ? And, if so, is what you have found worth finding ? Surely the
fact that you speak of war so often in almost every article of the Protocol may perhaps itself
provoke war
Putting a lightning conductor on a house does not produce lightning. I have always
regarded a lightning conductor as simply a desirable precaution.
What we attempted to do in the Protocol was to provide lightning conductors on all the
danger-spots of the building — such conductors as we human beings are capable of putting up
to avert the terrible thunderbolt of war. But to say that we have not succeeded is, I think,
going too far. Far be it from me to say that what we have created is perfect or that it protects
the nations against all possibility of war. If we had been able to do so at one stroke
the League future would indeed be black. The League has a very long career in front of it,
and I am sure that it will find many future occasions on which to employ its activities in prevent¬
ing possible wars. But to say that what has been done is negligible is, I submit, hardly true.
What we are attempting to do is to reach the aggressor, to attempt to define him. But,
if this is so, are we not according him an undue advantage ? He will take every step to hide
his misdeed while the victim will shelter behind the security of the Protocol, and when the
aggressor carries his threats into effect the unfortunate victim will be unprepared. That, I
submit, is a small error which might well be amended.
The Protocol deals with the question of legitimate defence. It recognises that an unsus¬
pecting victim should not be left to his fate and that he should employ every possible means of
resistance, so that a State with aggressive designs will be faced by another State which will
be able to utilise all its normal resources of strength. The Protocol even adds all the combined
resources and the mutual aid which the League of Nations can bring — a fact which might
well give pause to any State which intended to commit an act of aggression.
The British document says : " Have you reflected that the League, owing to its very
constitution, has not at its disposal all the forcible means which it might desire ? Remember
that the absence of a great nation like the United States constitutes a weakening of its autho¬
rity
Who among us does not deplore the absence of the United States ? Who among us does
not ardently and wholeheartedly desire to see the United States enter the League of
Nations ?
This absence seriously hampers the work of the League. Must it be regarded as a perma¬
nent factor ? The League possesses an authority and a force which have been very frequently
and most happily proved. This authority has increased. If the League of Nations desires
to expand, it must first of all have confidence in itself as it stands to-day. This confidence
must spur it on to persistent and determined activity, and it is through the extension of this
determined and unrelaxed activity that it will exercise the power of growth and attraction
that will eventually draw all nations within its orbit. It is certain that the absence from the
League of great nations, one of which I have just mentioned — I do not wish to name the others
will always constitute a source of weakness to the League itself. But the greater the confidence
it shows in itself the more will it exercise that pressure upon peoples and Governments which,
little by little, will force them to join those who are already Members. Accordingly, while
associating myself with the regret expressed in the British document at the absence of the
Government of the United States from our midst, I do not cease to hope that, under the
influence of a high ideal, that Government will join us. No country responds more quickly
to the call of an ideal than the United States. Moreover, in entering the League of Nations,
the United States will be acting on a logical interpretation of their own interests. To-day,
gentlemen, the continents are not far removed one from the other, and the peoples too must
come closer together, drawn by an interdependence of interests. The truth of what I say —
the British document has done well to recall this — is proved by the fact that the United
— 11-
States, although not belonging to the League, has often participated unofficially in some of
its work — a cause of rejoicing to us all.
There is therefore in this statement no criticism which I will call " destructive Nothing
must check our progress. Nothing must be allowed to make us hesitate or to paralyse us;
on the contrary, we must get on with our work. .
It is said, however, that this work is prejudicial to the enforcement of certain sanctions.
Economic sanctions, for example, are difficult to apply. They are certainly liable to arouse
resistance. On every occasion, in the event of any conflict, the application of these sanctions
has entailed difficulties and aroused resistance. Finally, however, rules have been drawn up
and even applied, and the desired result has thus been obtained. Why should it not be the
same in the future ? Here, too, I see nothing absolutely discouraging in the situation, the im¬
portance of which I do not, however, overlook, but it must not be allowed to arrest our progress
towards peace.
One of the greatest features in the Protocol is, in the first place, that it does not discriminate
between large, small or middle-sized nations. It regards them all as having the same right
to security. It seeks to give them that security, irrespective of their size or importance, in
order that they may be able to work for peace completely independent and completely
united. It was this feature in the Protocol which was the determining cause of my country's
adherence.
Well, gentlemen, we must not in the future, 011 the pretext that war is a matter of inter¬
national pathology, regard ourselves as reduced to such a point of impotence that we have to
renounce all possibility of obtaining guarantees among the nations against war.
Another important aspect of the Protocol is that it makes war a crime and the party
attempting war a criminal. The Protocol denounces and pursues both and aims by every
means in its power to prevent the recurrence of such crimes.
Is this an impossibility ? No ; the League of Nations, in view of the nature of the tasks which
it has undertaken, and of the time when it has been called upon to undertake them, and
in view of the terrible events which brought it into existence, must not be allowed to say to the
nations of the world : " War is an abomination and a crime. In society, criminals are pro¬
secuted, the courts try them, the police arrest them and they are cast into prison. These are
even means of destroying them, but in the case of war criminals, we are forced to put up with
them ". Such a thing is not possible. Such an undertaking by the League of Nations must
not end in failure ; it must not conclude such a series of attempts with a confession of power-
lessness. It owes it to itself to continue to encourage the peoples to hope, and only then will
war become no longer possible.
That is the simple and plain belief of my Government. The Protocol prepared by the
League of Nations includes a number of precautionary measures which are calculated to
prevent aggression. The nation which attempted aggression would be faced with so many
threats and so many provisions that it would be made to see the danger of such an undertaking.
I could recall in the past — I do not wish to take the most recent case — occasions on which,
if certain nations had known that a combination of other peoples would rise against them,
they might have hesitated. The Protocol embodies this combination of provisions and threats,
which will induce a country nurturing evil designs to renounce them, and in the statement
of our British friends I do not think that there is anything absolutely final and decisive against
the Protocol.
As I am not by nature a pessimist and as I, too, have a little philosophy suited to my
means and my nature, and am, in fact, something of an optimist — I have often been called
a blind optimist — I listened to this document intently. I have read it and re-read it. I may
say that the first pages gave me a rather uncomfortable feeling, qualified, however, by my pleasure
in reading them, for they are good to read. But when all is said and done, I should be wrong
if I did not confess that the substance was somewhat distasteful. I had the impression of
being in the dark, in a sort of tunnel, and of a feeling that I should never see the light again.
As I went on, however, I seemed to see a little light far away. I moved slowly towards it and
I found a kind of timid appeal to hope. We are told that, perhaps, all the same, the Covenant
is not sufficient in itself, that it might have to be amended in certain respects, and that, even
in 1923, a movement in this direction would perhaps have achieved results — might, indeed,
still do so if it were resumed. "
I seem to recognise this reassuring light as coming from a proposal that had been prepared
by two nations — the same two which prepared the Protocol : France and Great Britain. It
constituted a kind of appeal to a procedure of mutual assistance, which in any case is not the
same as absolute powerlessness and absolute negation. My Government, gentlemen — and
I make this statement in its name — remain definitely attached to the Protocol, but it does
not refuse to enter into any discussion for improving it.
The system of covenants and alliances is, moreover, provided for in the Protocols If
it is the best method of ensuring peace, well and good, provided it does not victimise or, by
its egoism, push on one side certain nations which have also the right to protection against
war, provided that the fresh study of the question — if any such study is made — results in
a solution applicable to all and able to give peace to all. This gives a possibility of retaining
our hope.
I hope that no gesture of discouragement will be made, for such a gesture would have a
powerful effect on the nations. I should be glad if they were still allowed to believe in the
League of Nations. The nations have confidence in the League ; they see that when it acts as
an arbitrator the results are often fortunate. It may be said that since it has been in existence
certain questions and disputes which it has settled would possibly have grown and assumed a
much more serious character if it had not been there.
— 12 —
The League of Nations must retain and increase its strength. The nations not only regard
it as an institution capable of settling the petty current disputes of international life ; they
have gone further : they have responded to the appeal of those who have realised peace after
the great war ; they have responded to this appeal in the idea that they were attaining to
higher levels. Were they wrong to regard the League of Nations as the germ of definite peace,
the possibility of organising definite peace ? They place their hopes in the League of Nations.
We must not destroy this hope. It must be kept alive ; we must not abandon the work
which the filth Assembly has set on foot, however much we revise it, whatever new and different
methods we may propose. Now that this work has been begun, it is inadmissible that the
League of Nations should come to the'world and say : " We can do nothing ". There are certain
theoretical considerations upon which we can work and which we can unceasingly proclaim
in the hope that the strength of the ideal that is in them will be sufficient eventually to become
a reality.
But must we therefore abandon any precautionary measure to prevent war ? I think not,
and in saying this I am speaking for my Government.
Here is the declaration which, on behalf of my Government, I am instructed to read :
After having given her adherence to the Treaty of Mutual Assistance, which branded a
war of aggression as an international crime, France, at the Assembly of the League of Nations
in September 1924, co-operated with all her heart in drawing up the Protocol to afford peaceful
solutions for all international disputes.
France thought and still thinks that this work, which was eagerly awaited by the nations,
is merely a development of the ideas contained in the Covenant and that it is the essential
object of the work of the League of Nations. Faithful to the spirit of the Covenant Article 8
of which closely combines the ideas of security and disarmament, and convinced that the nations
cannot be brought to disarm until their security is guaranteed, France feels that, in doing
this work, she was seeking the only really practical and effective solution of the problems raised
by international disputes. She also believes that she is thereby helping to realise the great
ideal which, during the late war, united all the Allies and was the basis of their most solemn
engagements. One of the objects of the Protocol was to introduce as the very centre of inter¬
national law the idea of compulsory arbitration to lead to a secured peace. In this way inter¬
national solidarity would become an accomplished fact and would be at the service of all nations,
both great and small. It would make no distinction between nation and nation but would
open to all an area of peaceful work in the midst of security, independence and dignity.
As a result of long endeavour, the fruits of which must at all costs be preserved for humanity,
on the Franco-British proposal and with the hearty co-operation of all the peoples, a document
has been drawn up.
This document is itself only the application of the system provided in the Covenant of the
League of Nations. It claims to protect the rights of all peoples who will accept it. It there¬
fore has this immense historic importance — namely, that for the first time it gives practical
effect to the conception of international solidarity and to the high principle of arbitration,
upon the application of which the fate of peace among the nations undoubtedly depends. By
extending for the first time the doctrines of private law to public law, it converts a war of aggres¬
sion into a crime which is the equivalent of murder. On behalf of all nations, it organises a
permanent system of international justice, thereby achieving further progress. But it does
not confine itself to these assertions of principle, great as they are. As regards arbitration,
which is in future to provide a solution of conflicts, the Protocol organises it, fixes its procedure,
and takes the necessary measures to ensure that it shall not be a snare for nations of good
faith ; it defines the aggressor and, above all this, it organises preventive action against war.
If, in spite of the precautions which it has taken, there is reason to resort to sanctions,
either economic, financial or military, the Protocol only applies obligations already imposed
upon Members of the League of Nations by Article 16 of the Covenant, which received the
solemn adherence of all the signatory Powers of the Treaty of Versailles. The Protocol there¬
fore imposes no fresh obligations on the States which signed the Covenant : it has simply fixed
the conditions for their application.
France, in order to conclude the work undertaken by the different Assemblies of the League
of Nations, and in order to establish peace on the three associated principles of arbitration,
security and disarmament, has at all times been, and still remains, ready to welcome all sugges¬
tions which may improve such work. Moreover, she admits that the Protocol is capable of
varied applications according to circumstances and geographical considerations. She does
not scout the idea of regional agreements provided for by the Covenant and the Protocol.
Nevertheless, France, convinced that only the adherence of the nations to a common protocol
can induce them to renounce the competition in armaments, and convinced that, if the principles
on which the Protocol rests are abandoned, the nations will gradually revert to their old habits
and to solutions by force, remains faithful to the signature which she was the first to give with
the object of henceforth sparing herself and other nations the horrors of war from which she
suffered so terribly.
M. Scialoja (Italy) :
The great ideals which inspired the Assembly that adopted this Protocol will not be effaced,
either in our memory or in the memory of the other Members of the League which took part
in it, even by the criticisms which the British Government has presented to-day in regard to
several important points of the Protocol. A certain number of these criticisms are concerned
with a fundamental question which I pointed out myself when the Protocol was submitted to
— 13 —
the Assembly. This Protocol was intended to effect a technical improvement in those parts
of the Covenant which seemed indefinite, and it perhaps endeavoured to hasten too much the
historical process by which ideals attain their full development as a result of laborious tests and
experience. To-day we see one of the States which promoted the Protocol pointing out after
mature reflection the defects in something which had been regarded as an improvement. The
too-rigid legal structure of the judicial procedure for the definition of disputes between States
is certainly a defect, for these disputes are not always essentially legal disputes. Other grave
defects are the provisions relating to the execution of judgments ; for their execution can be
easily designed and organised when the disputes arise between States which are subject to a
superior authority possessing forces of its own, but it is much more difficult to organise the
execution in the case of associated States situated in different economic, political and geographi¬
cal circumstances. The difficulties are enormously increased, as has been correctly pointed
out, by the fact that the League does not yet include certain Powers which are among the
greatest in the world.
The remedies against the danger of war, if they are conceived in too legal a sense, can
hardly afford a radical cure for the evils which may be the greatest causes of the greatest wars.
Up to now, no effective remedy has been found for this serious defect in the system defined
in the Protocol, all the more as the points which appeared to certain States to be defects in
the Protocol appeared to other States to be defects in an exactly contrary sense.
I am therefore prepared to admit the force of much, if not of all, of the criticisms made by
the representative of Great Britain. These criticisms, however, relate only to the technical
structure of the Protocol and partly to what may be premature in it. I nevertheless retain
my faith in the principles on which it is founded.
The progress of history, I repeat, should continue gradually within the bounds of reality.
With this in his mind, the representative of Great Britain to-day states that, in his
view, the best possible solution in the present circumstances is, with the co-operation of the
League, to supplement the Covenant by making special arrangements in order to meet special
needs ; that these arrangements should be purely defensive in character ; that they should
be framed in the spirit of the Covenant, working in close harmony with the League and under
its guidance ; that they should knit together the nations most immediately concerned, and whose
differences might lead to renewal of strife, by means of treaties framed with the sole object of
maintaining as between themselves an unbroken peace.
I desire to state that I fully adhere to these ideas, which were upheld by Italian delegates
to the League of Nations when they stated in 1923 that they could not accept such alliances
between groups of nations as might result in causing internal schism within the League and in
perpetuating the old system of rival alliances which in the past created an atmosphere of
distrust and of suspicion injurious to the maintenance of peace.
Obviously, the idea put before the Council to-day must, if it is to be realised in the domain
of politics, be taken up and examined by the various Governments in order to give it practical
form corresponding with the necessities of the situation.
The problem of security is a peace problem/and any effort made to ensure the maintenance
of peace will always meet with the most active support from Italy.
Viscount Ishii (Japan) :
Having listened to the observations of my colleagues, I am not going to enter into the
merits or the force of the Protocol of Geneva. I shall confine myself to advising my colleagues
of the attitude of my Government on the question that is now before us.
The Japanese Government has not yet completed its study and examination of this all-
important question of the pacific solution of international conflicts. It is therefore not yet in
a position to define its attitude one way or another.
On the one hand, the more important an international accord, the more thorough and
exhaustive must be its examination before a definite conclusion can be reached. The Protocol
of Geneva, constituting, as it does, of an international accord of perhaps highest importance,
cannot be too thoroughly examined and does not admit of a hasty decision.
On the other hand, the Japanese Government is next to none in appreciating the noble
and lofty idea which prompted the remarkable achievement of the fifth Assembly of the League
of Nations.
It is therefore with the spirit of cordial sympathy and sincere co-operation that the Japanese
Government will continue its study and examination of the question now under consideration.
M. Hymans (Belgium) :
On behalf of Belgium, I voted for and signed the Protocol, which up to the present, however,
the Belgian Chambers have not been called upon to ratify.
After the London Agreements had given a practical solution to the reparation problem
that had been weighing on Europe and had thus cleared the atmosphere, Mr. MacDonald and
M. Heriiot solemnly appealed to the Assembly of the League of Nations to make a great effort
to solve the problem of security. After three weeks' unremitting labour by the most eminent
jurists and statesmen, the Assembly unanimously adopted a Protocol for the Peaceful Settle¬
ment of International Disputes, which establishes compulsory arbitration supported by collec¬
tive sanctions.
It was hoped that this system would be instrumental in re-establishing a spirit of confi¬
dence and peace and in preventing and checking offensive wars. The Protocol contains a
remarkable innovation — i. e.9 the definition of the aggressor — and provides for regional
agreements. It represents a great political and juridical progress : a considerable advance in
the technical organisation of peace.
14
But, from the outset, I have never deceived myself by thinking that so complex and
delicate a piece of work, completed in a few weeks, however conscientiously it may have been
prepared, could possibly be perfect. I venture to recall the observation which I made in this
connection at the last Assembly. I said it would be a mistake wrongly to give public opinion
the impression that the problem of security had been definitely solved. I shall not discuss
the arguments carefully considered and set forth in detail in the British Government's Note.
It would unduly prolong the discussion and would require careful preparation. But whatever
the ultimate fate of the Protocol may be, I feel convinced that the principles it laid down will
remain in the conscience of the world and that a day will come when the political situation and
a changed mentality will make their full application possible.
The world cannot continue to live in anxiety and in a fever of doubt and uncertainty.
Security is the dominant factor in Belgian public opinion and inspires the foreign policy of
my country, which has no desire but to live honourably and in peace.
The Covenant, however, remains untouched and, as was pointed out last September, its
guarantees must not be under-estimated. But the British Government recognises that in cer¬
tain extreme cases they are not sufficient, especially where certain nations are concerned whose
geographical and political position undoubtedly exposes them to great perils. It recommends
" the making of special agreements to meet special needs ", such agreements to be of a defen¬
sive character in the spirit and within the framework of the League of Nations.
I would point out that this is an idea which, ever since the Armistice, the Belgian Govern¬
ment has constantly advocated. The idea of special agreements was contained in the mutual
assistance scheme drawn up by the Assembly in 1923, and it is found again in the shape of
regional agreements in the Protocol adopted in 1924.
Pending the time when the study of a general security pact can betaken up again, it should
be possible, on the lines thus laid down, to seek concrete and positive solutions which will sta¬
bilise Europe and consolidate peace.
M. de Mello-Franco (Brazil) :
Sir, the statements you have made in the name of the Government of His Britannic
Majesty, whatever effects they may have on the fate of the Geneva Protocol, should not dash
the hopes which the world at large possesses in the active and powerful participation of the
British Empire in the common work of organising a system of which the object is to guarantee
universal peace.
As our distinguished colleague has reminded us, the successive Administrations in Great
Britain, with the full approval of the self-governing Dominions, have not only favoured arbitra¬
tion in theory : they have availed themselves of it in practice. During the session of the Council
at Brussels, we received notable proof of this. Great Britain submitted to the arbitration of
the Council the delicate question of Iraq.
I respectfully bow to the reasons which the British Government has given, with so much
frankness, for its inability to accept, in the detailed and precise form in which it was first of
all drafted, the Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes and the effective
application of sanctions provided as a means for the coercion of States violating the principles
proclaimed by it.
At the basis of all the motives brought forward by the British Government to support
its point of view is to be found the present condition of the League of Nations — the fact that
it is not universal. This position — and no one can deny it — makes it difficult to realise to the
full the great objects of the Covenant.
The application of sanctions, in view of the present constitution of the League, might,
in effect, suffer from the objections which the principle of universal and compulsory arbitration
could not alone avoid.
Besides the precarious position resulting from the composition of the League of Nations,
account must be taken also, when regarding the Protocol, of another problem : that of the
sovereignty of States as delined by the public international law of our time in connection with
the moral and actual authority of the League of Nations. Hence arise the restrictions imposed on the
principle of compulsory arbitration or upon the principle of the extension of the jurisdiction
of the Permanent Court of International Justice to cover all the legal or political disputes
which might arise between States.
Brazil, which has always marched in the vanguard of those States which have not contented
themselves with adopting mere platonic resolutions in regard to arbitration and which has
inserted the principle of compulsory arbitration in its political constitution — a principle which
it has very largely applied in practice — Brazil, I should remind you, Sir, has voted for the
Protocol and has signed it. We were persuaded that, in doing so, and in thus responding to
the desires of the representatives of the great Powers in the Assembly of September last, we
were giving our help to the establishment of a universal system of which the foundation had
already been firmly laid in America.
I should like to remind the Council that sixteen American nations, among which is to be
found the United States, signed in May 1923 a Continental Convention for the peaceful settle¬
ment of any disputes which might arise between American States. Assuredly the resolutions
of the committees of investigation set up by the Convention will not have the value nor the
force of judicial sentences or arbitral awards. They will, however, prove useful in preventing
the outbreak of hostilities and in giving an opportunity, thanks to the calming influence of
time, for reflection to prevail, for peaceful feelings to re-awaken and for conciliatory mea¬
sures to be taken by States with a view to maintaining peace.
In regard to the question of disarmament and security, I reaffirm the statement which
— 15 —
I made in the Assembly in the name of my Government when the Protocol of Geneva was
discussed :
" We are not forgetting what is most essential : the establishment, either with
or without complementary regional treaties, of a treaty of mutual assistance and
guarantee between all nations. This is a condition which is vital for disarmament.
It is, in fact, not enough that this assistance and guarantee should be based entirely
upon Continental assistance. They must be based on a world-wide organisation,
for the right to security — to that real security which should now be the final object
of our endeavour — is the sacred right of all the peoples of the earth. "
Brazil, as a signatory of the Protocol, will never cease to help in the continuous progress
of the idea of arbitration and in the ever-increasing consolidation of the authority of the
Permanent Court of International Justice.
M. Quiñones de León (Spain) :
I shall confine my remarks to reiterating the declarations which I was privileged to make
to the September Assembly, on behalf of the Spanish delegation, respecting the delicate problems
which arose at the time when the Protocol was to be discussed.
Although Spain had no immediate direct interest at stake but was only impelled by con¬
siderations connected with the common interests of Europe and of the world and by a great
feeling of solidarity, she showed from the start her willingess to co-operate in any work repre¬
senting a guarantee of peace, and she was happy to give effective help in solving some of the
difficulties attaching to the definition of aggression by framing a legal formula which secured
general agreement.
My country, which, as shown by its record in the history of political thought and in history
itself, is a convinced advocate of arbitration, was happy that this should be accepted as one
of the fundamental principles of the Protocol.
For all these reasons, and after a careful examination of the international instruments
which the Assembly had unanimously approved, the Spanish Government signed the Proto¬
col, reserving to itself the right to ratify it at the proper moment.
The difficulties which the plan drawn up by the Assembly has since, for various and com¬
plex reasons, encountered, which I shall not stop to examine, have not changed the views nor
the underlying motives which guided Spain on this occasion. To-day, as before, we catego¬
rically declare that the League of Nations will always find us ready to co-operate resolutely
and loyally in any attempt to secure a guarantee for world peace and to promote the welfare
of mankind.
M. Unden (Sweden) :
The Swedish Government has submitted the Geneva Protocol to a thorough examination
by a sub-committee appointed for this purpose. This committee, which was instructed to
study the question both from the legal and political points of view, has not yet finished its work.
My Government, which attaches the greatest importance to the work which was done at Geneva
last autumn, and especially to the introduction of the principle of compulsory arbitration into
the framework of the Covenant, cannot give a final opinion on the Protocol before the report
of the committee has been delivered. My Government, in taking its decision, will, of course,
be obliged to take into account, to a considerable extent, the attitude of the other Powers,
and particularly of those whose adherence to the Protocol would be necessary in order to make
it wholly effective.
In the event of a further discussion of the whole problem during the next Assembly, the
Swedish Government reserves the right to submit such amendments to the Protocol as it may
deem desirable.
M. Guaní (Uruguay) :
I do not think that the Council is being asked to express its views or to take a decision on
the substance of the important statement made at the morning meeting by our distinguished
President, the representative of Great Britain. It will be for the sixth Assembly to resume
this difficult task. I shall accordingly confine myself to a short declaration.
The Government of Uruguay regards the question of the Protocol as one which affects
the establishment of peace in the whole world. Incidentally, I would point out that, for my
country, as for the majority of South American countries, the problem does not arise in its
political aspects, as is the case upon the European Continent, but purely and simply in a moral
aspect. It has been possible to realise a condition of peace among ourselves, thanks to our
historical traditions and to the kinship of the South-American races. This harmony has
enabled us to exclude any germ of hatred from our international relations, but the moral fact
has doubtless contributed most effectively to the creation of the sentiment of peace which
prevails among the States of South America. This sentiment has been further strengthened
and consolidated to a very great extent by the organisation of an international legal system
with a procedure of conciliation and arbitration, which render extremely remote the possibility
of a resort to force in the settlement of any international conflict.
Latin America has co-operated, and will continue to co-operate, with loyality and enthusiasm
in the work of the League of Nations, in the firm hope of seeing the principles of solidarity and
international justice, to which I have just alluded, become universal. Such a hope explains
our adherence to the Protocol which was approved by the fifth Assembly and which contains,
as an essential basis for its various provisions, the principle of compulsory arbitration which
no one in South America to-day would think of questioning.
— 16 —
Whatever may be the modiîications of form or of application which the great European
countries deem it desirable to introduce into the scheme of the fifth Assembly for various
reasons, my Government cannot cease to believe that the idea of settling international conflicts
by means of international justice will sooner or later prevail throughout the world as the only
system calculated to eliminate for ever the wickedness of resorting to war, and, finally, to
consolidate friendship among the nations.
The League of Nations must be the proper instrument to extend and apply these ideas.
As has already been said, it is under the auspices of this great organisation that international
life must develop along the lines of an effective and progressive respect for legal order.
My country was among the first to sign the Arbitration Conventions of The Hague. It
also adhered to the Covenant of the League of Nations, especially in view of the creation of a
new international order, founded on the peaceful co-operation of all nations. Finally, it has
adhered to Article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, thereby
accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. For these reasons, my Government desires
to remain faithful to its traditions and to the sentiments now prevailing in the public opinion
of the country. It desires to declare once more that the Protocol of Geneva, even though its
articles are submitted to modification, represents in its essential principle the most complete
international system of organised peace which will be at the disposal of the peoples in future
to establish their security, effect their material and moral disarmament and thus bring in a new
era of peace and happiness for mankind.
M. Benes (Czechoslovakia) :
Mr. President, allow me first of all to make a declaration on the subject of the Protocol
for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, not as Rapporteur but as the represen¬
tative of Czechoslovakia on the Council of the League.
I had the honour to take an active part in the framing of the Protocol last September.
I did so with enthusiasm, for the foreign policy of my country, for which I have been responsible
since the war, has always been inspired by the great principles incorporated hy the fifth Assembly
in the Protocol. It will continue to be so inspired in the future.
I therefore ask you to excuse me if I affirm once more that the policy of the Czechoslovak
Government remains deeply attached to the ideas of the Protocol, and if I undertake to defend
the Protocol in a few brief and hastily framed remarks.
Like many other delegates, I and the whole Czechoslovak delegation, as you may remember,
and as I repeated before our Parliament at Prague when I gave a report on our work at Geneva,
were in no way unconscious of the fact that there were some rather important imperfections
and shortcomings in the work that had been performed so rapidly in a few short weeks of
feverish labours.
It was quite clear to me that there would be criticism and that it would perhaps be necessary
to discuss and rediscuss the various articles and probably that we should be obliged to re-examine
all these questions and see how the solutions arrived at might be improved ; to consider what
could be done immediately and what could only be done by degrees. In short, we realised
that time would be needed to complete the work we had undertaken and see it applied in practice.
From this point of view, I consider that the declaration and criticisms made by the British
Government have rendered a very great service both to the League and to the idea of the Pro¬
tocol. We indeed undertook a work of tremendous importance — certain critics even think
that this work was beyond our powers — and this work must be considered from every point
of view in order that it should not fail and thereby entail the failure of the League. But, at
the same time, I have the impression that the more the Protocol and its principles are criticised,
the more the ideas and principles it incorporates appear necessary to everyone and display
their moral force, their vitality and their great significance for the political life of human society
after the war. These were my feelings both when listening to Mr. Chamberlain, to M. Briand,
to M. Scialoja, and the other members of the Council.
His Excellency Mr. Chamberlain made some important criticisms of various ideas in the
Protocol. He criticised — I think rightly — certain details of the Protocols on the one hand
and certain general principles in the Protocol on the other. The second class of objections
is evidently of considerable importance, since it is directed at the essentials of the Protocol.
As examples and criticisms of the first class, I shall quote a few :
The provisions of the Protocol requiring parties to a dispute not to take military or naval
measures might react against the victim of aggression and give advantages to the aggressor.
Or another example : The only punishment of an aggressor admitted by the Protocol
is the paying of financial damages for his act of aggression. This appears impossible, insufficient,
disadvantageous and unjust.
We remember, no doubt, that these objections were raised at the last Assembly. There
would certainly be no difficulty whatever in overcoming objections on points of detail of this
sort. The objections of a general nature are infinitely more important, and I shall ask per¬
mission to say a few words on this subject too.
I understood from the President's declaration that he considered the rigid and universal
application of compulsory arbitration to be impossible. This undoubtedly is a serious objection,
since it rests on a very important circumstance — namely, the diversity of social, ethnic, geo¬
graphical and other characteristics of the human groups that would be subject to the procedure
of arbitration.
But I shall take the liberty of putting opposite these important facts certain other facts
which are of no less importance and whose significance seems to me prophetic for the future :
the war destroyed four great empires in Central and Eastern Europe, demolished ancient
— 17 —
frontiers, established some ten new States, upset dynasties, unchained social revolutions, destroyed
communications and financial systems, put down whole ruling classes and so forth, and produced
a most incredible intermingling and incredible cross-currents in the interests of States, nations
and classes. The war set nations against each other in this part of the world and created
problems of hitherto unknown complexity. From Finland in the north through the Baltic
Republics, Poland, Germany, Czechoslovakia and Austria, down the valley of the Danube to
Constantinople and Southern Greece, you have regions where thousands of conflicts may break
out, beginning to-day by the murder of a frontier-guard or the desecration of a flag and easily
ending to-morrow in a terrible war.
To-day all these countries are tired of this state of affairs. They long to be at last deli¬
vered from this intolerable position. They know that they have many problems that are
almost insoluble psychologically through direct negotiations and have wished to find methods
other than violence and direct action to solve these problems. In general, they are small
nations of whom M. Briand yesterday spoke so eloquently ; they want nothing but peace and
security, and that is why the Czechoslovak Government, as one of these nations, insisted so
urgently upon the idea ot arbitration and the policy of the Protocol. If you notice, gentlemen,
it is a striking and extremely symptomatic fact that the majority of the signatories of the Pro¬
tocol belong to the States inhabiting this danger zone of Europe — States which hitherto have
been considered as politically unripe, intolerant and quarrelsome in comparison with Western
Europe. It is these States which to-day ask for compulsory arbitration, put their signature
to such arbitration and wish to make it general.
I repeat that there can be no more striking fact and no fact which can show better how
rapidly nations may ripen and become ready to realise the highest aims and political ideals.
Would anyone have dared to believe this ten years ago ?
I agree that no principle — and a fortiori the principle of arbitration — should be applied
too rigidly. But yesterday we heard the statements of M. Mello-Franco and M. Guani when
they spoke of the way arbitration worked on the American Continent. It seems to me quite
possible to apply it by degrees to the European Continent while taking into consideration
all the special circumstances. I do not despair of the future. Furthermore, we were of the
opinion that arbitration will always constitute a powerful guarantee for all who co-operate
to give security to States that are particularly threatened, since arbitration will prevent their
being drawn lightly into conflicts.
But here we meet one more serious general objection made in the President's statements :
the Covenant is quite capable of settling a certain number of less serious cases, but it could not
prevent the extreme case — that is the case of a deliberate and intentionally provoked war.
For, in the last resort, there is no other guarantee but the plighted word, which is either respected
or not respected. With the Protocol and with arbitration we are in precisely the same position ;
they may settle a certain number of less serious conflicts for which incidentally the Covenant
is sufficient, but they cannot prevent the extreme case of war.
Here, a misunderstanding — or rather an inaccurate interpretation — of the meaning of the
authors of the Protocol has crept into the argument contained in the British statement. This
statement, indeed, maintains :
(1) That the Protocol is in the same position as the Covenant because it cannot settle
conflicts other than those provided for in the Covenant itself ; and
(2) That what the authors of the Protocol were concerned with was not the incompletenes
of the Covenant but the fact that it would not be observed — that is, the question of whether
the signatures affixed to it would be requested or not. Now, if the Covenant is not lived up to,
the Protocol will not be lived up to either. And, since in these circumstances the Protocol
gives us nothing more than the Covenant, it is useless.
I should like to establish the fact — and it may be confirmed by consulting the minutes of
the debates of the Assembly committees last September — that the one concern of the authors
of the Protocol was precisely the incompleteness of the Covenant — that is, the fact that there are
gaps in the Covenant creating special facilities for signatories to escape their obligations and not
to fulfil their duties — gaps which could serve as pretexts for not giving the security and assis¬
tance which would otherwise have to be given.
It was solely for this reason and to make less easy the non-fulfilment of the Covenant
that the latter was completed in the Protocol by technical procedure and special machinery
calculated to remove all pretexts for non-observance and to force the signatories to carry out
their obligation without fail, in order to increase the feeling of security and let it operate in
the direction of pacification and general tranquillity.
Consequently, the Protocol constitutes a real step in advance in the minds of those who
framed it. If, through the Covenant and the system based on it, it will be possible to settle
say, 50 out of 100 disputes, thought the authors of the Protocol, it will be possible to settle
many more through the Protocol and the system of arbitration and perhaps to settle just
those conflicts which would otherwise degenerate into war.
That was our aim ; we knew very well that we could not make the extreme cases — that
is, wars — disappear, but we knew that we could improve the Covenant and, by means of the
Protocol, settle a greater number of disputes ; we knew that the idea could not be carried out
at one blow, but we were convinced that we could at least move a step nearer our distant
goal.
We at least made this attempt — an imperfect attempt certainly, for we did not wish
to embark on a policy of all or nothing and merely note the necessity or the existence of war.
For it is a truism that perfection is not of this world, and it is not possible to realise in three
or four weeks what thousands of years have not been sufficient to accomplish. In short, we
— 18 —
wished to take a step forward, and we were of opinion that, in spite of everything, this step
would constitute a considerable progress and that some day it would be realised that it was
worth the trouble of attempting. I do not lose my faith in this progress.
There is the third objection of principle in the declaration of the British Government.
In its statement, the British Government expresses the belief that in the Protocol the
spirit and balance of the Covenant are destroyed ; the Protocol is too much concerned with
military sanctions and becomes a war machine instead of an instrument of peace.
It would be very difficult for me to share this opinion. It is true that in the Protocol we
have added some details concerning the organisation of military sanctions, but on the other
hand we have also added a whole machinery of arbitration and have thus balanced the two
elements already completely contained in essence in the Covenant.
But I think this objection falls before another argument contained in the statement itself :
at the end, the statement admits that the best methods of avoiding extreme cases — that
is, war — would be to constitute special defensive agreements under the auspices of the League
Covenant — agreements whose logical corollary would eventually be military arrangements for
the defence of peace. If and when a number of such agreements are formed under the auspices
of the League, what would be the difference from this point of view between a system such as
the Protocol, containing the minimum of military organisation, and the Covenant, completed
by a whole system of more or less numerous regional agreements possessing a military side ?
I do not see any difference. But the question of regional agreements raised in the British
Government's statement is undoubtedly extremely fruitful. I am very happy to find it again in
this document, whose importance has surely escaped no one. For five years I have been cham¬
pioning this idea and particularly in the three last Assemblies. And the approval with which it
has been met by M. Scialoja, M. Hymans and other colleagues further confirms my point of
view.
But I have a doubt — or, if you will, I cherish a secret hope — which I will confess to you
immediately : when the idea of a regional agreement placed under the guidance of the League
and of the Covenant comes to be studied seriously, I am almost certain that if it is desired to
build up something lasting, solid, and giving real security, it will inevitably become necessary
to return to the idea of some kind of protocol, a restricted and partial protocol if you will, a
protocol perhaps more elastic than ours and more immediately applicable, but all the same
a system analagous to that of the present Protocol. From the moment the League Covenant
is adopted as a guide, it becomes impossible to escape the inevitable logic of this admirable
document, particularly as this would require the presence of all the Members of the League.
But what is extremely important and gratifying in spite of everything is the fact that
the necessity of re-affirming and completing the Covenant in order really to establish peace
and security is to-day recognised by everyone. I believe that this aim can finally be attained
only by a system containing the principles we have incorporated in the Protocol ; but I do
not in any way exclude any other kind of consideration, and particularly not the considerations
put forward in the British declaration, and I am convinced, as I have said, that criticisms
such as those we have here render invaluable service to our labours and to the League.
We want peace and security, and, as I have already said, I think we shall get it sooner
or later through some system applying in one form or another the leading ideas of the Protocol.
Meanwhile it is perfectly possible to begin by other attempts, for in the end we shall reach
the same result.
The only question that remains is how and when we shall reach it. Ways of attaining the
end may be different, as we have seen in our discussions, and I hope that the debates in the
next Assembly on arbitration will take us a further step forwards our aim.
I am not pessimistic either as to the time when the aim will be realised ; it is obvious that
time is necessary for an undertaking of this sort. We must be patient, but at the same time
work sincerely and devotedly without ceasing, without becoming weary or discouraged.
The Government of my country will continue, as before, to be guided by the ideas that
I have presented here ; it is moved by a profound desire to co-operate in and through the
League with all other nations in order to realise the high ideals of the Protocol and thus bring
its small and modest contribution to the welfare of humanity.
— 19
III.
REPLIES FROM OTHER MEMBERS OF THE LEAGUE.
DECLARATION BY FINLAND.
December 18th, 1924.
At the moment of the signature by Finland of the Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of
International Disputes, which was adopted by the fifth Assembly of the League of Nations
on October 2nd, 1924, the Government of the Republic desires to explain below the manner
in which it interprets, in conformity with the spirit of the Covenant and of the Protocol itself,
cerlain of the provisions of this Protocol.
1. As Article 8 contains no provision to the contrary, a signatory State threatened with
aggression by a non-signatory State which is not a Member of the League of Nations has the
right to lake such military precautions as it may think necessary for its safety, at the same time
as it brings the matter to the notice of the Council.
2. The provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 10 apply to the Members of the League of
Nations which have not signed the Protocol to the same extent as to Members which have
signed in so far as concerns obligations arising under the Covenant.
The provisions of paragraphs 3,4 and 5 of Article 10 are applicable in all respects to States
which have not signed the Protocol and which are not Members of the League of Nations, as
is clearly shown by the general report of the First Committee (" The same principle applies
where one of the parties is a State which is not a signatory of the Protocol and not a Member
of the League ").
3. The " armistice ", which the Council is bound to enjoin upon the belligerents before
even determining the conditions of an armistice, is to be regarded as a simple suspension of
hostilities, and a resumption of hostilities would inevitably involve the responsible party in
the consequences mentioned in paragraph 4 of Article 10, even if the Council, by a two-thirds
majority, or the belligerents, by joint agreement, should fail to fix the terms of a real armis¬
tice. In addition to the cessation of all military activity, the suspension of hostilities will
entail the immediate evacuation by both parties of invaded territories.
4. It is obvious that a signatory State which, relying on its geographical situation or its
special position as regards armaments, declares itself unable to lend armed assistance to the
State attacked would not be justified by such situation •— unless it had absolutely no forces —
in evading the obligation laid down in paragraph 2 of Article 11 to contribute military forces,
within the limits of its means, to maintain the security of the communications of the State
attacked.
5. A State which, in a given situation, unless absolutely compelled by force majeure, has
violated the laws and customs of war will not escape responsibility for such violation. It
is understood that, whether it has been declared an aggressor or not, it will not escape this res¬
ponsibility as recognised in Article 3 of the Convention respecting the laws and customs of war
on land, adopted in 1907.
6. In view of the fact that the International Status adopted for the Aaland Islands by the
Convention of October 20th, 1921, established a demilitarised zone of a special character in
Finland, the provisions of Articles 9 and 10 of the Protocol will be applicable to this zone, without,
however, affecting the rights and obligations arising under that Convention which relate to
measures to be taken for the defence of the neutrality of the zone in question.
REPLY OF CANADA.
(Telegram to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations).
Ottawa, March 10th, 1925.
In response to your communication of October 27th, 1924, enclosing certified true copy
of Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, and noting that it is open
for signature by representatives of all Members of the League, the Government of Canada
desires to state that, after careful examination of the subject, it has come to conclusions which
may be summarised as follows :
(1) that Canada should continue to give whole-hearted support to the League of Nations
and particularly to its work of conciliation, co-operation and publicity.
(2) That we do not consider it in the interests of Canada, of the British Empire or of the
League itself, to recommend to Parliament adherence to the Protocol and particularly to its
rigid provisions for application of economic and military sanctions in practically every future war.
Among the grounds for this conclusion is the consideration of the effect of the non-participation
20
of the United States upon attempts to enforce the sanctions and particularly so in the case of
a contiguous country like Canada.
(3) That, as Canada believes firmly in the submission of international disputes to joint
enquiry or arbitration and has shared in certain notable undertakings in this field, we would be
prepared to consider acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court in
justiciable disputes with certain reservations, and to consider methods of supplementing the
provisions of the Covenant for settlement of non-justiciable issues, including method of joint
investigation, reserving ultimate decision in domestic issues and without undertaking further
obligations to enforce decisions in case of other States.
(4) That Canada would be prepared to take part in any General Conference on Reduction
of Armaments which did not involve prior acceptance of Protocol.
(Signed.) W. L. Mackenzie King,
Prime Minister and Secretary of State
for External Affaires.
STATEMENT MADE IN THE DA IL BY THE MINISTER FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OF THE IRISH FREE STATE ON WEDNESDAY, MAY 13th, 1925.
We have given earnest consideration to the Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of Inter¬
national Disputes drawn up at the fifth Assembly of the League of Nations. We have
approached the subject with due advertence to the admirable intentions which animated the
authors of that document, and with which we are in complete accord — namely, that a basis
should be found which would enable differences arising between nations to be adjusted without
recourse to arms and thus remove from the sphere of international relations the menace of war.
For this country — a small nation, with no aspirations to territorial aggrandisement and
no interests other than the social and economic welfare of our people and the maintenance
of cordial intercourse with all other nations — the attractions of a scheme which has for its
objective the maintenance of international peace are manifest. In so far, therefore, as the
Protocol constitutes a unanimous manifestation by the States Members of the League of their
genuine desire to render recourse to war impossible, we welcome the opportunity which it
has afforded for the study of measures devised for that purpose, and while, on consideration
of its details, we find ourselves unable to recommend its acceptance, we wish to place on record
that we are by no means of opinion that the object of the framers of the Protocol is beyond
the realm of achievement.
The Covenant of the League of Nations, while it marked a notable advance in the direc¬
tion of international peace, cannot be regarded as an instrument capable in all circumstances
of preventing war. Its machinery for dealing with disputes is somewhat unwieldy, and the
preponderance on its Council of the more powerful States tends to diminish its prestige amongst
the smaller nations which have less to gain and more to suffer by international strife. But it
is our opinion that the place of the League of Nations in world civilisation is not to be gauged
by the suitability of its machinery to arbitrate in disputes between nations when they arise
in acute form — rather is it to be measured by the efficacy of the intercourse between States
to which it has given rise in resolving differences before they become acute by harmonious
interchange of ideas and by mutual appreciation of national aspirations and national diffi¬
culties.
The Covenant of the League of Nations makes provisions for certain sanctions in the case
of a State which resorts to war in disregard of its obligations. It has always appeared to us
that the application of these sanctions would present grave difficulties and that the machi¬
nery for effecting them would in practice prove unworkable. It is true that sanctions could
in all probability be effectively enforced against a relatively small State engaging in hostile
operations for purposes of aggrandisement, where the verdict of the world-conscience would
be unanimous in condemnation of the objects for which resort was had to war. But it appears
equally evident that, in the case of aggressive acts by one or other of the greater Powers, and
particularly where world opinion was divided as to the merits of the dispute, the sanctions
could not be enforced. We are, accordingly, forced to the conclusion that, while the sanctions
of the Covenant may prove a useful deterrent in the case of small and turbulent communities,
they are quite powerless to prevent either the oppression by a larger Power of small States
or the occurrence of a war of world magnitude. It may also be observed that the applica¬
tion of sanctions implies the maintenance of armaments rather than their abolition, and in
this respect is scarcely compatible with one of the primary objects of the Protocol — viz. disar¬
mament. The portions of the Covenant, therefore, dealing with the imposition of sanctions
appear to us to be the least valuable for the general purposes of the Covenant, and an extension
of these provisions, such as is contemplated in the Protocol, the least profitable avenue of
exploration towards improvement.
The expressed intention of the framers of the Protocol to exclude from the new system
of pacific settlement any disputes which may arise regarding existing territorial divisions
appears to us to detract considerably from the value of the instrument. Many existing frontiers
were fixed by treaties negotiated before the shadow of the Great War had receded and
— 21 —
before the passions which the War aroused had subsided. The passage of years may prove
these delimitations to be convenient and equitable ; on the other hand, it may in time become
apparent that present boundaries are in some cases unsuitable and provocative of ill-will.
We realise that the stability of the Continent of Europe and the prevention of a renewed inter¬
national race in armaments must depend largely on the extent to which the existing appre¬
hensions of nations, whether well or ill founded, regarding possible interference with their
territorial integrity can be allayed. As long, however, as some of the more powerful States refrain
from participation in the League of Nations, the feeling of uneasiness and distrust will continue.
The continued absence of certain of these States from the councils of the League is in some
degree admittedly attributable to their unwillingness to be called upon to take active measures
to maintain for all time existing frontiers, even though these should prove to have been inequi¬
tably drawn. We fear that the conclusion of an agreement which must to some extent appear to these
nations to partake of the nature of an alliance confined to States Members of the League,emphas¬
ising by implication the immutability of these frontiers and imposing upon Members additional
obligations, particularly by way of participation in disputes and in sanctions, is not calculated
to induce them to accept the responsibilities of membership and is, therefore, likely to hinder
rather than further the progress of world pacification and disarmament.
The Irish Free State, because of its geographical position, because its armed forces have
been reduced to the minimum requisite for the maintenance of internal order, and because
of its Constitution, which provides that, except in case of invasion, it can only be committed
to participation in war with the consent of the Oireachtas, cannot be regarded as a material
factor in the enforcement of sanctions. Consequently, the foregoing observations on the Pro¬
tocol are not affected by any considerations especially affecting the Irish Free State, and are
dictated solely by our genuine desire that the League of Nations should realise the aspirations
of its founders by uniting all nations in the common interest of world peace.
If we might express an opinion upon the measures by which these aspirations may best
be realised—and naturally we do so with the utmost diffidence — we would suggest that the
solution is to be found not in an endeavour to close some of the fissures in the Covenant by
elaborate definition or drastic sanction but rather in an effort to enhance the moral influence
of international conscience. An extension of the principle of arbitration, which serves to
define and enunciate international judgment and which relies in the last resort on the moral
pressure of world opinion and not upon the application of material sanctions, appears to us
to be the most effective feasible means of attaining, at least in a large measure, the objects
which the Protocol has in view.
The League of Nations has justified its existence even if account is taken only of the
immense scheme of social progress which it has initiated. The reconstruction of countries
devastated by the Great War which has been accomplished under it aegis, the succour which
has, through its machinery, been afforded to hundreds of thousands rendered homeless by
international calamity, and the measures which have been adopted for the suppression of
traffic in arms and of vice, are achievements of which it may justly be proud.
It is not without significance that in this section of the activities of the League it has had
the'active co-operation and support of States which have not hitherto found it possible to
accept obligations of membership, and perhaps it may not be too much to hope that the oppor¬
tunities thus afforded for intercourse between Member and non-member States may, by the
further development of these activities, be instrumental in allaying the apprehensions and in
removing the prejudices which hinder the full co-operation of those States in the efforts of the
League for the maintenance of international peace.
REPLY OF NICARAGUA.
(Letter to the Secretary- General of the League of Nations.)
Managua, May 27th, 1925.
We have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letters of April 16th and 20th last,
with copies of the minutes of those sessions at which the Council considered the question of
arbitration, security and the reduction of armaments.
The resolution adopted by the Council on this subject has been examined, and the Govern¬
ment of Nicaragua has approved the Conventions of Washington of February 7th, 1923, which
solve these problems as far as Central America is concerned.
(Signed) J. A. URTECHO,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.
REPLY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.
(Letter to the Secretary- General of the League.)
London, S. W. 1, August 5th, 1925.
With reference to your letter of April 16th, No. C. L. 38. 1925. IX, I am directed by the
Secretary of State for India to communicate, for the information of the Council of the League
of Nations, the views held by the Government of India regarding the Protocol for the Pacific
Settlement of International Disputes, which are as follows.
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So completely are the Government of India in sympathy with the objects of the Protocol
that they approached the examination of its detailed provisions with a strong bias in favour
of its acceptance. Their disappointment is therefore the greater that they have been forced,
on a careful consideration of the provisions, to the conclusion that the Protocol would be
inimical to India's interests.
In particular, India's " geographical position and particular situation as regards arma¬
ments " (Article 11) would, in the peculiar circumstances of Asia, mark her down as the nation
on which the League, under the Protocol, would ordinarily call to apply immediate sanctions
against a recalcitrant State in the East. This would place a heavier burden on her military
and financial resources than she could bear, and might subject some one or other of the many
communities or religions which are comprised in her population to a strain to which it would
be improper to subject them.
(Signed) E. G. TURNER,
Secretary, Economic and Overseas Department.