0 '/ v -
'
J
LABOR
AND THE SHUT-DOWN
OF THE AMOSKEAG
TEXTILE MILLS
••USA-
WORK
PROG R A M
WPA
WORK PROJECTS ADMINISTRATION
NATIONAL RESEARCH PROJECT
WPA NATIONAL RE8KARCH PROJECT
Reports issued to date
(Continued from inside front cover)
Studies in Production, Productivity, and Employment-Continued
Mining
E-2 small-scale Placer Mines as a Source of Gold, Employment, and Livelihood In 1935
(out of print)
E-4 Employment and Related Statistics of Mines and Quarries, 1936: Coal
E-7 Technology, Employment, and Output per Man In Phosphate-Rock Mining, 1800-1937
E-8 Changes in Technology and Labor Requirements In the Crushed-Stone Industry
E-9 Mechanization, Employment, and Output per Man In Bltumlnous-Coal Mining
E-10 Technology, Employment, and Output per Man In Petroleum and Natural-Gas
Production
Agriculture
Changes In Technology and LaOor Requirements In Crop Production:
A-l Sugar Beets
A-4 Potatoes
A-6 Corn
A-7 Cotton
A—10 Wheat and Oats
A-12 Vegetables
A-8 Trends In Size and Production of the Aggregate Farm Enterprise, 1909-36 (outof print)
A-8 Trends In Employment In Agriculture, 1909-36
Studies of Effects of Industrial Change on Labor Markets
P-l Recent Trends In Employment and Unemployment In Philadelphia
P-2 The Labor Force of the Philadelphia Radio Industry in 1936
P—3 Employment and Unemployment In Philadelphia In 1936 and 1937 (out of print)
P-4 Ten Years of Work. Experience of Philadelphia Weavers and Loom Fixers
P-6 Ten Years of Work Experience of Philadelphia Machinists
P-6 Reemployment of Philadelphia Hosiery workers After Shut-downs In 1933-34
P-7 The search for work In Philadelphia, 1932-36
P-8 The Long-Term Unemployed in Philadelphia In 1936
L-l Cigar Makers After the Lay-off
L-2 Decasuallzatlon of Longshore Work In San Francisco
L-3 Employment Experience of Paterson Broad-Silk workers, 1926-36
L-4 Selective Factors In an Expanding Labor Market: Lancaster, Pa.
L-6 Labor and the Shut-down of the Amoskeag Textile Mills
L-6 changes In Machinery and Job Requirements In Minnesota Manufacturing,
1931-36
L-7 Farm-City Migration and Industry's Labor Reserve
Requests for copies of these reports should be addressed to:
Publications Section, Division of Information
Work Projects Administration
Washington, D. C.
WPA NATIONAL RESEARCH PROJECT
Reports Issued to date
General
0-1 Unemployment and Increasing Productivity (out of print)
0-2 The Research Program of the National Research Project
0-3 Summary of Findings to Date, March 1938
0-4 Effects of Current and Prospective Technological Developments
Upon Capital Formation
0-5 Industrial Change and Employment Opportunity A Selected Bibliography
A-3 Selected References on Practices and Use of Labor on Farms (out of print)
Studies in Types and Rates of Technological Change
Manufacture
M-l Industrial Instruments and Changing Technology
M-2 Mechanization in the Brick. Industry
M-3 Mechanization in the Cement Industry (in press)
M-4 Industrial Research and Changing Technology (in press)
B-2 Mechanical Changes In the Cotton-Textile Industry, 1810 to 1838 (Summary)
B-3 Mechanical Changes In the Woolen and Worsted Industries, 1910 to 1838 (Summary)
B-5 Systems of Shop Management in the Cotton-Garment Industry (out of print)
Mining
E-l Technology and the Mineral Industries (out of print)
E-3 Mechanization Trends in Metal and Nonmetal Mining as Indicated by Sales of
Underground Loading Equipment
E-6 Fuel Efficiency in Cement Manufacture, 1908-1836 (out of printt
Mineral Technology and Output per Man Studies:
E-8 Grade of Ore (out of print)
E-il Rock Drilling fin press)
Agriculture
Changes in Farm Power and Equipment:
A-2 Mechanical Cotton Picker
A-9 Tractors, Trucks, and Automobiles
A-ll Field Implements
Studies in production, productivity, and Employment
Manufacture
S-l Production, Employment, and Productivity in 68 Manufacturing Industries, 1919-36
Productivity and Employment In Selected Industries:
N-l Beet Sugar
N-2 Brick and file
B-l Labor Productivity in the Leather Industry (Summary)
B-4 Effects of Mechanization in Cigar Manufacture (Summary)
B-e Labor Productivity In the Boot and Shoe Industry (Summary)
* Mechanization and Productivity of Labor In the Cigar Manufacturing Industry
Productivity of Labor In the Cotton-Garment Industry
(list continued on inside back cover)
'published as Bull. No. 660 of the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
tPubllshed as Bull. No. 662 of the U. 8. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
FEDERAL WORKS AGENCY
WORK PROJECTS ADMINISTRATION
F. C. HARRINGTON CQRRINGTON GILL
Commissioner Assistant Commissioner
NATIONAL RESEARCH PROJECT
on
Reemployment Opportunities and Recent Changes
in Industrial Techniques
DAVID WEINTRAUB
Director
Studies of the Effects of Industrial Change on Labor Markets
Amoskeag Manufacturing Co.
SECTION OF THE AMOSKEAG TEXTILE MILLS AS SEEN FROM THE STARK MILL
LABOR AND THE SHUT-DOWN OF THE AMOSKEAG
TEXTILE MILLS
by
Daniel Creamer
and
Charles W. Coulter
WORK PROJECTS ADMINISTRATION, NATIONAL RESEARCH PROJECT
Report No. L-5
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
November 1939
THE WPA NATIONAL RESEARCH PROJECT
ON REEMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES AND RECENT CHANGES
IN INDUSTRIAL TECHNIQUES
Under the authority grantedby the President In the Execu¬
tive Order which created the Works Progress Administration,
Administrator Harry L. Hopkins authorized the establishment
of a research program for the purpose of collecting and ana¬
lyzing data bearing on problems of employment, unemployment,
and relief. Accordingly, the National Research Program was
established In October 1935 under the supervision or Corrington
Gill, Assistant Administrator of the WPA, who appointed the
directors of the Individual studies or projects.
The Projecton ReemploymentOpportunlties andRecent Changes
In Industrial Techniques was organized In December 1935 to
Inquire,with the cooperation of Industry, labor, and govern-
mentaland private agencies, lntothe extentof recent changes
In Industrial techniques and to evaluate the effects of these
changes on the volume of employment and unemployment. David
Heintraub and Irving Kaplan, members of the research staff
of the Dlvlslonof Research, Statistics, and Flnancewere ap¬
pointed, respectively, Director and Associate Director of the
Project. The task set for them was to assemble and organize
the existing data which bear on the problem and to augment
these data by field surveys and analyses.
To this end, many governmental agencies whlchare the col¬
lectors and reposltorlesof pertinent lnformatlonwere Invited
to cooperate. The cooperating agencies of the United States
Government Include the Department of Agriculture, the Bureau
of Mines of the Department of the Interior, the Bureau of
Labor Statistics of the Department of Labor, the Railroad
Retirement Board, the Social Security Board, the Bureau of
Internal Revenue of the Department of the Treasury, the De¬
partment of Commerce, the Federal Trade Commission, and the
Tariff Commission.
The following private agencies Joined with the National
Research Project in conducting special studies: the Indus¬
trial Research Department of the University of Pennsylvania,
the National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., the Employ¬
ment Stabilization Research Institute of the University of
Minnesota, and the Agricultural Economics Departments In the
Agricultural Experiment Stations of California, Illinois,
Iowa, and New York.
Since September 1, 1939, the Project has been sponsored
by the National Resources Planning Board, Executive Office
of the President, Washington, D. C.
FEDERAL WORKS AGENCY
WORK PROJECTS ADMINISTRATION
1734 NEW YORK AVENUE NW.
WASHINGTON, D- C.
F. C. HARRINGTON
COM MISSIONER OF WOWK PHOJECT»
November 7, 1939
Colonel F. C. Harrington
Commissioner of Work Projects
Sir:
The report transmitted herewith is concerned with
the economic effects of the shut—down of the Amoskeag
textile mills on the workers and the community of
Manchester, New Hampshire. For over a hundred years
the Amoskeag Manufacturing Company had been located
in Manchester, at one time employing more than 16,000
workers. Before their closing in 1935 these mills,
producing both cotton and worsted fabrics, were by
far the most important single source of employment
in the city.
The manufacturing activity of Amoskeag began,
after 1921, to show losses more often than profits.
In April 1935 the decision was made to shut down the
mills; raw-material inventories were processed and in
September the mills closed. In July 1936 the liqui¬
dation of the company was recommended by a special
master of the bankruptcy court. During the next 2
months the entire property was sold.
Amoskeag employed more than 17,000 different
persons during 1935, as many as 11,000 in the week of
peak employment. In a city whose gainfully occupied
persons numbered 35,000 out of a total population of
75,000 in 1930, a shut-down of these proportions was
calamit ous.
There was little to which the displaced workers
could turn. In a field survey conducted late in 1936,
almost one-quarter of the workers could not be lo¬
cated. Most of these had apparently left Manchester
and some of the migrants had probably obtained jobs.
Of those interviewed, only two-fifths of the men and
one-fifth of the women had had any work since their
last Amoskeag job in 1935 and only one-third of the
men and one—sixth of the women were employed at the
time of interview; of the total man-months elapsed
between the last Amoskeag job and October 1936., only
15 percent were spent in employment. Some of the
workers, particularly the more skilled., had obtained
jobs in other mills of the region despite continued
widespread unemployment in these textile centers.
Manchester's shoe factories also accounted for a few
jobs. Some work was obtained in trade, in domestic
and personal service, and in a scattering of other
industries. Two percent of the men interviewed and
18 percent of the women had dropped out of the labor
market, reporting themselves as not seeking work. In
October 1936 two-thirds of the men and women who had
been laid off more than a year earlier were unemployed
and looking for jobs.
Toward the end of 1936 a committee of Manchester
citizens undertook to attract new industries to the
city, but their efforts were attended by relatively
little success. By January 1937 Amoskeag Industries,
Incorporated, purchasers of the Amoskeag properties,
had sold or leased space in the mill buildings to
five new companies employing more than 2,000 workers.
By July there were 14 companies with 3,200 workers,
but although additional concerns were subsequently
attracted, others left the city and the aggregate
employment of the new companies had dropped to 1,600
in September 1938, 2 years after the organization of
Amoskeag Industries. The availability of Amoskeag
machinery and mill space at liquidation prices had
proved to be an inducement, but when the choice equip¬
ment had been picked there remained little to attract
manufacturers to Manchester.
In these circumstances the need for relief meas¬
ures was acute. In 1929 about 4 percent of the Man¬
chester population received poor relief. By 1934,
13 percent of the families in Manchester were re¬
ceiving general assistance (direct relief or local
work relief). By November 1935, 23 percent of the
families were receiving such aid. Of all New England
cities for which information is available, only two -
Boston and Fall River - exceeded the 1935 average for
Manchester. During 1936 an average of 3,500 persons
were employed on the WPA program and 29 percent of
Manchester's families received general assistance
or WPA work. Meantime the Manchester office of the
State Employment Service was flooded with applicants
for work. The scarcity of jobs is indicated by the
fact that the office made a total of only 544 place¬
ments in private employment between April 1935 and
October 1936.
The peak in Federal assistance was in 1936, when
the Government contribution amounted to 70 percent
of the expenditures for general assistance and WPA
wages. It is estimated that Federal grants were the
source of payment for at least a fifth of the sales
of Manchester's food stores in this year.
The continued insufficiency of employment op¬
portunity in Manchester necessitated continuation
of relief measures at high levels. In 1937 about
one-quarter of the Manchester families were receiving
general assistance or WPA work; in 1938 the average
rose once again to the 1936 level of almost 29 per¬
cent. During 1937 and 1938 a higher proportion of
families received general relief in Manchester than
in any other of the 23 New England cities for which
information is available.
Thus Manchester, once a prosperous manufacturing
city, was left stranded when its largest company closed
its mills after a long period of gradual liquidation.
The loss of employment opportunity in 1935 for more
than 11,000 workers raised social and economic prob¬
lems for the entire population which are still unre¬
solved and which only local and Federal relief and the
Works Program have been able to mitigate.
Respectfully yours.
Corri'ngton Gill
Assistant Commissioner
CONTENTS
Chapter Page
PREFACE xix
I. INTRODUCTION 1
Plan of study and character of data 5
II. COMPETITIVE PROBLEMS AT AMOSKEAG AND IN THE
TEXTILE INDUSTRY 8
General trends 8
Excess capacity 8
Competition of substitute textiles 11
The style factor 12
Speculation in raw materials 13
Faulty accounting procedures 13
The relation of foreign trade 14
Amoskeag's competitive position 16
Obsolescence of equipment 16
Cost of new machinery and repairs 24
Management practice 25
The effect of "giantism" 28
The experiment in rayon production 31
Local taxation 33
Summary 36
III. AMOSKEAG'S PROFIT RECORD AND CORPORATE
REORGANIZATIONS 38
The pre-war period, 1906-14 38
The financial reorganization of 1911 43
The war years, 1915-18 45
The post-war years, 1919-25 47
Accumulation of cash reserve 48
Decline in activities 49
The financial reorganization of 1925 51
The financial reorganization of 1927 55
Amoskeag in the depression after 1929 59
Amoskeag under the NRA textile codes 61
IV. EFFECTS OF THE SHUT-DOWN 68
Decline in Manchester's employment opportunities
prior to the shut-down 68
Attitude of Amoskeag workers after
the shut-down 74
Characteristics of Amoskeag workers displaced
by the shut-down 76
Private employment after the shut-down 79
Interval between the shut-down and the
first job 80
Employment status in October 1936 81
ix
X CONTENTS
Chapter Page
Duration of employment status in October 1936 86
Distribution of total time after the shut-down 88
Character of reemployment 88
Location of Jobs 91
The regularly employed and the labor reserve
after the shut-down 91
Emigration after the shut-down 95
Effect of the shut-down on relief rolls 100
Some other considerations 109
V. COMMUNITY EFFORTS TO ATTRACT NEW INDUSTRIES. ... 114
Formation of Amoskeag Industries, Incorporated. . 114
Policies of Amoskeag Industries, Incorporated. . 117
New textile companies and related concerns . . . 120
Nontextile companies 125
Two years of Amoskeag Industries 129
Concluding considerations 134
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 137
Summary 137
General locational considerations 138
Experiences of three other textile cities
in New England 144
Appendix
A. THE EARLY LABOR SUPPLY AND WORKING CONDITIONS. . . 148
Original locational factors 148
The Waltham model 149
The native labor supply 152
Immigration before the Civil War 154
Immigration from 1860 to 1890 155
French-Canadian immigration 155
Northern-European immigration 159
Nationality composition of Manchester's
population in 1890 160
Beginnings of cotton textiles in the South . . . 163
Immigration after 1890 166
Polish immigration 166
Greek immigration 168
Continued French-Canadian immigration 169
B. EMPLOYMENT CONDITIONS, 1911-22 172
The company welfare program 175
Employment conditions prior to and during
the war 181
Post-war adjustments 186
The strike of 1922 195
CONTENTS *i
Appendix Page
C. EMPLOYMENT. CONDITIONS, 1923-32 204
Inception of the Plan of Representation 207
Structural organization of the Plan of
Representation 210
The plan in operation 215
Wage negotiations, 1923-24 215
Wage negotiations, 1925-27 220
Relation of special difficulties to
profitable operations 221
Further cost reduction through speed-up
and wage cuts 222
The bond issue and another wage cut 225
Wage negotiations, 1928-32 229
D. EMPLOYMENT CONDITIONS, 1933-35 248
Before the NRA 248
Trend toward union organization 248
The NRA at Amoskeag 250
E. EFFECT OF AMOSKEAG'S DECLINE ON EMPLOYMENT,
EARNINGS, AND MIGRATION 265
Employment and unemployment 265
Rates of labor turn-over 269
Total weeks of no employment 273
Part-time employment, 1934 276
Incidence of unemployment 278
The labor reserve 282
Size of the labor reserve 282
Composition of the labor reserve 284
Annual earnings at Amoskeag, 1923-34 295
Migration, 1920-34 298
Extent of migration 298
Character of migration 303
Amoskeag emigrants 308
Summary 311
F. SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES 312
G. THE COMPANY PERSONNEL AND INCOME-TAX RECORDS . . . 321
The personnel record 321
The income-tax card 322
Sampling procedure and representativeness
of the sample 323
Periods into which data have been grouped
for analysis 330
The skill classification of occupations 331
Personnel-record schedule 334
Income-tax-record schedule 335
xii CONTENTS
Appendix Page
H. OCCUPATIONAL-HISTORY SCHEDULE AND DEFINITIONS OF
IMPORTANT TERMS 336
Occupational-history schedule 336
Definitions of important terms • 337
I. SOME EVIDENCE ON THE RELIABILITY OF AN EMPLOYMENT
HISTORY BASED ON THE WORKER'S MEMORY 339
CHARTS AND ILLUSTRATIONS
Figure
Section of the Amoskeag textile mills as seen
from the Stark Mill Frontispiece
1. Population of the United States and number of
active spindles in the cotton-textile industry,
1840-1935 10
2. Annual production of cotton and worsted cloth,
1907-35 42
3. Monthly cotton production, 1912-35 42
4. Relative change in net sales and production costs,
for the cotton section, 1906-34 45
5. Net sales and production costs, for the cotton
section, 1906-34 47
6. Annual profits and losses before and after the
payment of bond interest, for the cotton and
worsted sections, 1928-34 60
7. Removing a full lap from a picker 73
0. Repairing break in sliver on a drawing frame ... 78
9. Worker "piecing up" on a slubber 83
10. Percentage distribution of total man-months elapsed
between last Amoskeag job and October 15, 1936,
by employment status, sex, and marital status, . 89
11. Tending a fly frame (doffing) 94
12. Ring spinner 98
13. High-speed beam warper 103
14. Slashers perform the last step in the preparation
of a warp 108
15. Drawer-in entering a new warp
16. Worker operating a machine which automatically
ties the ends of one warp to those of another
that is to replace it
17. Cotton napper 126
18. Wool comber 132
C-l. Centered 12-month moving averages of man-hours
worked and numbers of persons employed, by
section, 1925-34 205
CONTENTS
xiii
CHARTS AND ILLUSTRATIONS-Continued
Figure Page
E-l. Number of persons on pay roll and estimated number
of full-time employees required each week,
1927-35, for the cotton and worsted sections . . 285
TEXT TABLES
Tab le
1. Number of active spindles in the United States,
New England, and southern States, 1870-1935. . . 9
2. Quantity of cotton cloth exported, imported, and
produced in the United States, 1910-33 14
3. Distribution of machinery in place in departments
of the cotton section, August 1934, by date of
manufacture 17
4. Distribution of spinning-frame spindles and looms
in the cotton-goods industry in 1935, by date of
installation 18
5. Percentage increase in output per man-hour of
processing departments of the cotton-textile
industry made possible by mechanical changes,
1910-36 20
6. Average age of spinning-frame spindles in the
cotton section, 1921-34 21
7. Distribution of spinning-frame spindles and looms
scrapped in the cotton section, 1921-34, by year
of scrapping 23
8. Distribution of spinning-frame spindles and looms
scrapped in the cotton section, 1921-34, by age
at time of scrapping 23
9. Number of spindles in the spinning departments of
the various mills in the cotton section,
July 31, 1934 29
10. Percentage taxes are of gross income for Amoskeag
Manufacturing Company and for cotton-textile
corporations in New England and the South,
1926-33 34
11. Assessed valuation of Manchester and Amoskeag
Manufacturing Company, taxes paid by Amoskeag,
and the tax rate, 1910-36 35
12. Annual record of operating profit or loss, divi¬
dends, and surplus or deficit for the cotton and
worsted sections of the Amoskeag Manufacturing
Company, 1906-34 39
13. Annual production of cotton and worsted cloth,
1907-35 41
14. Distribution of Manchester's gainfully occupied
population, by industrial group, 1930 69
xiv CONTENTS
TEXT TABLES-Continued
Table Page
15. Number of wage earners In manufacturing establish¬
ments in New England, Manchester, and Amoskeag,
1899-1935 70
16. Number gainfully occupied in Manchester, by
selected occupational group and sex,
1920 and 71
17. Indexes of monthly employment in the manufacture
of cotton and woolen and worsted textiles in the
United States, 1935 and 1936 72
18. Percentage distribution of those who were
reemployed, by interval between last Amoskeag
job and next Job and by sex SO
19. Percentage distribution of workers, by age, sex,
and marital and employment status as of
October 15, 1936 82
20. Percentage distribution of workers, by degree of
skill of longest Amoskeag job, 1930-34, sex,
and marital and employment status as of
October 15, 1936 84
21. Percentage distribution of workers, by industrial
section, sex, and marital and employment status
as of October 15, 1936 85
22. Percentage distribution of workers, by marital
status and duration of employment status as of
October 15, 1936, and sex 8"
23. Percentage distribution of total man-months elapsed
between last Amoskeag Job and October 15, 1936,
by employment status, sex, and marital status. . 89
24. Industrial distribution of employment after the
shut-down. 90
25. Percentage distribution of a special sample of
workers, by employment status as of October 15,
1936, employment stratum at Amoskeag, sex, and
marital status 92
26. Active file of Manchester workers at New Hampshire
State Employment Service, 1935-38 99
27. Number of persons incases receiving general relief
and amount of relief extended in Manchester,
April 1933-September 1938 107
28. Percentage distribution of population in
Manchester, urban New England, and urban
United States, by age, 1920 and 1930 no
29. Monthly report of the number of new companies
located in the Amoskeag mills and their volume
of employment, January 1937-September 1938 . . . 130
CONTENTS xv
APPENDIX TABLES
Table Page
A—1. Distribution of foreign-born population in eight
New England cities having a population of 50,000
to 185,000 in 1930, 1890-1930 161
B—1. Annual cost of pensions as a percentage of annual
manufacturing costs, 1916-35 178
B-2. Indexes of cost of living in Boston and wage rates
at Amoskeag, 1914-22 189
C-l. Number of docketed complaints, by decision and
nature of complaint 214
C-2. Indexes of cost of living in Boston and annual
earnings at Amoskeag, 1923-34 230
D-l. Comparison of average hourly wage rates for speci¬
fied occupations in cotton-textile manufacturing
in Amoskeag, New England, and southern mills,
1924-33 252
D-2. Relative average hourly wage rates for specified
occupations in cotton-textile manufacturing in
Amoskeag, New England, and southern mills, 1924,
July 1933, and August 1933 254
E-l. Percentage distribution of periods of employment,
by length of period and sex of workers, in the
cotton and worsted sections, 1923-34 267
E—2. Percentage distribution of periods of no employ¬
ment, by length of period and sex of workers, in
the cotton and worsted sections, 1923-34 .... 268
E-3. Labor turn-over rates for Amoskeag and cotton-
textile industry, 1914-34 270
E-4. Percentage distribution of final separations for
specific reasons, by period and sex, 1911-33 . . 272
E-5. Number of weeks of no employment as a percentage
of total number of man-weeks available for
employment in the cotton and worsted sections,
1923-34 274
E—6. Percentage distribution of workers, by total weeks
of no employment and section, 1923-34 275
E-7. Percentage distribution of weeks of employment in
the cotton and worsted sections in 1934, by
number of hours of employment 277
E-8. Percentage distribution of cotton workers, by
total weeks of no employment and degree of skill
at longest occupation, 1923-34 279
E-9. Percentage distribution of women in the cotton and
worsted sections, by total weeks of no employ¬
ment and marital status, 1923-34 280
E-10. Percentage distribution of men in the cotton and
worsted sections, by total weeks of no employ¬
ment and marital status, 1923-34 281
xvi
Table
E-l 1.
E-12.
E-13.
E-14.
E—IS.
E-ie.
E-17.
E-16.
E-19.
E—20.
E-21.
E—22.
E-23.
E—24.
E—25.
F-l.
F—2.
F-3.
CONTENTS
APPENDIX TABLES-Conttnued
Page
Average number of Amoskeag workers actually em¬
ployed as a percentage of the average number
on the pay roll, 1925-34 283
Actual average weekly number of Amoskeag workers
as a percentage of the total number employed
during the year In the cotton and worsted
sections, 1928-34 284
Percentage distribution by age of a special sample
of workers, by employment stratum and sex. . . . 287
Percentage distribution by employment stratum of
a special sample of workers, by age and sex. . . 288
Percentage distribution by length of Amoskeag
attachment of a special sample of workers, by
sex and employment stratum 289
Percentage distribution of married women, by
number of dependents and employment stratum. . . 291
Distribution of gainfully occupied persons 10
years of age or over in New England cities with
populations of 50.000 to 125.000, by sex, 1930. . 293
Percentage distribution of final separations, by
length of Amoskeag attachment, period, and sex. . 294
Distribution of workers by annual earnings and
sex, 1923-34 295
Median annual earnings of workers, by degree of
skill, section, and sex, 1923-34 296
Median annual earnings of regular and intermittent
workers, 1923-34 298
Number of Manchester emigrants over 21 years of
age, by industry attachment and sex, 1920-34 . . 301
Percentage distribution of Manchester's gainfully
occupied population 21 years of age or over,
1930, and of Manchester's emigrants, 1920-34,
by sex and age 305
Percentage distribution of a sample of Manchester
emigrants, by place of immigration, 1920-29 and
1930-34 307
Percentage distribution of Amoskeag emigrants,
1920-34, and final separations, 1933-35, by sex
and degree of skill of last Amoskeag job .... 309
Net sales and production costs in the cotton and
worsted sections of the Amoskeag Manufacturing
Company, 1906 to May 31, 1925 g12
Consolidated profit and loss statement of the
Amoskeag Manufacturing Company, June 1, 1925-
December 24, 1935 313
WPA employment and pay-roll costs for Manchester,
September 1935-October 1938 314
CONTENTS xvii
APPENDIX TABLES-Continued
Table Page
F-4. Comparative case load for general relief in 24
New England cities, 1934-38 315
F-5. Number of men per 100 women at Amoskeag, by
nationality, 1917 and 1929 319
F-6. Percentage of men 45 years of age or over at first
accession and percentage of men at same age
entering skilled occupations, by period 319
F-7. Percentage distribution of final separations, by
age at final separation, period, and sex .... 320
F-8. Percentage distribution of workers by years at
longest occupation, by degree of skill and sex. . 320
G-l. Total hirlngs of all workers and of sample and
percentage of total different persons in sample,
by period, 1927-35 325
G-2. Distribution of all workers and those in sample,
by section, 1935 328
G-3. Distribution of all workers and those in sample,
for the cotton and worsted sections, by depart¬
ment, 1935 327
G—4. Distribution of first accessions of all workers
and of those in sample, 1924-27 328
G-5. Total separations of all workers and of sample and
percentage of total separations included in
sample, by period, 1927-35 329
G-8. Percentage distribution of all workers and of
sample, by important nationalities and period,
1919-29 330
I—1. Number of cases in which total duration of employ¬
ment as reported agreed with, was less than, or
exceeded actual total duration, by reported
tenure group 340
1-2. Comparison of number of actual months of employ¬
ment with the number reported, by reported
tenure group 341
1-3. Comparison of number of jobs reported with the
number actually held, by reported tenure group. . 342
PREFACE
America is dotted with cities and towns that can point to
better days when they were flourishing commercial or industrial
centers. Many a canal and river town lost its locational ad¬
vantage when the railroads drew off its commerce. Many a rural
shopping and marketing center lost most of its trade as automo¬
biles, trucks, and improved roads made larger cities more eas¬
ily accessible. Deserted towns abound in areas where bonanzas
have been exhausted; on the other hand, new discoveries of
mineral deposits and new processes that made the exploitation
of known low-grade deposits feasible have brought new mining
towns into being. Land reclamation and irrigation have brought
millions of new fertile acres under the plow, giving rise to
new agricultural communities and trading centers. The devel¬
opment and application of steam power and electricity have
freed manufacture from dependence on water power and permitted
its spread and concentration in localities that offered other
advantages.
The decline of the New England region as a center of textile
production is a classic example of a locational change of in¬
dustry in this country. In 1880 the manufacture of cotton
goods was concentrated in New England to the extent of about
80 percent of the spindles in the industry. In 1935 its share
was less than 30 percent. The old "water power" manufacturing
cities of Lowell, Lawrence, New Bedford, Fall River, flolyoke,
Nashua, and Manchester declined in employment opportunity and
population as Gastonia, Greensboro, and other southern cities
and rural areas developed. Silk manufacturing migrated from
New England to New York in the i86o's and from there to New
Jersey about 1870. Two decades later the industry began an¬
other shift, this time to the steel and coal towns of Penn¬
sylvania. Only in the manufacture of woolens and worsteds has
New England retained its preeminence, although even here
its relative importance has declined in favor of New York,
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and, to a small extent, the South.
These shifts have sometimes involved transfers of capital
and labor; they have also meant that production facilities
have been permitted to deteriorate in one locality while new
facilities were being erected in others, and that experienced
xix
XX
PREFACE
workers remained idle while new labor reserves were beiag
tapped and a new labor supply was being trained. But whereas
much of the capital accumulated as a result of profitable ac¬
tivity in a particular locale was transferable, the mobility
of labor was highly restricted. Moreover, the decision to
withdraw the profits of one enterprise and to invest them else¬
where could often be followed by a protracted period of planned
activity during which the transfer was gradually accomplished;
the final liquidation of the enterprise, however, usually oc¬
curred with a suddenness that found the workers who looked to
it for employment unprepared with alternative jobs and rarely
with sufficient financial provision for the necessary re¬
adjustments without serious hardships and resort to borrowing
from family and friends or to seeking public assistance.
The shifting concentration of textile production resulted in
relatively few employment dislocations so long as markets were
expanding. The new mills in the new areas were generally addi¬
tions to rather than a displacement of existing capacity. But
eventually every branch of the textile industry became over¬
equipped in relation to the demand for its products. Severe
competition also developed between the various textile fibers:
cotton versus rayon, rayon versus silk, woolens versus worsteds,
and single fibers versus combinations of fibers. Although few
major changes in mechanical equipment have occurred in textile
manufacture since the turn of the century, there has accumu¬
lated a host of minor improvements. These slight changes in
mechanical and operating efficiency seemed unimportant while
markets were expanding, but they became major considerations
when expansion ceased. For a variety of reasons the modern
plants in the newer areas were more easily able to adopt the
innovations. Many of the older plants were closed, converted
to different operations, or partly dismantled and moved. The
new technology with its increased automatization of operations
had reduced the skill requirements of many textile occupations
and accentuated the possibilities for the quick training of
"green" labor in the new low-cost centers.
Numerous communities in New England lost their principal
economic activity. Thousands of skilled textile workers were
left stranded when mills either moved southward or went out
of existence because of either their inability to compete with
PREFACE
southern manufacturers or their unwillingness to continue to
risk their investments in a market that promised to be less
productive of profits than formerly.
The situation described in this study is in most respects
typical of the shut-downs which occurred in New England during
the last two decades. The report represents a case study of
the effects of the shut-down of a single enterprise, the Amos-
keag Manufacturing Company, which had been the economic back¬
bone of a major New England city - Manchester, New Hampshire.
It shows what the owners' decision to withdraw from manufac¬
ture the capital they had accumulated by producing cotton and
woolen goods in Manchester has meant in terms of unemployment,
loss of income, migration, and general disorganization of the
Manchester labor market. It also raises questions concerning
the social responsibility of business. What is an appropriate
basis for a decision to liquidate an enterprise whose employ¬
ment or unemployment largely controls the prosperity of a city?
Over the course of more than a century the people of Manchester
had invested in homes and built a community with schools and
churches and streets and other community enterprises that go
with an American city, yet they had no say in a matter that
affected them so vitally. In the case of railroad operation,
for example, public-utility commissions have gone beyond the
question of profitability to the owners and have given weight
in their decisions on abandonments to the interests of commu¬
nities, to other business interests served, and to the equities
of labor. Their criterion is the public welfare.
The National Research Project is indebted to many individuals
and agencies for assistance in the preparation of this report.
The willingness of the trustees of the Amoskeag Manufacturing
Company to release the company records to the Hamilton Smith
Memorial Library of the University of New Hampshire made pos¬
sible this study with its wealth of intimate detail. The li¬
brary graciously made the material available to the Project.
The office of Manchester's mayor, through its secretary Yvan
Caron, kindly arranged for office space for the field staff in
Manchester's City Hall and in many other ways was most helpful.
The Division of Unemployment Compensation, the Minimum Wage
Division, the Department of Public Assistance, and the central
office as well as the Manchester office of the New Hampshire
xxii
PREFACE
Employment Service, all agencies of the State of New Hampshire,
aided greatly by making available much statistical information.
Similar assistance was given by the Department of Charities of
both the Manchester city and the Hillsborough county govern¬
ments, by the Board of Registrars of Voters in Manchester, and
by the WPA for the State of New Hampshire. Amoskeag Indus¬
tries, Incorporated, was also generous with the information in
its possession, as was the United Textile Workers of America.
The National Research Project is, of course, alone responsible
for the content of the report and for the conclusions reached.
The report was prepared by Daniel Creamer and Charles W.
Coulter under the supervision of Irving Kaplan. Dr- Coulter
obtained for the Project access to the records of the Amoskeag
Manufacturing Company and assembled some of the background
information for the study. Dr. Creamer analyzed the data and
prepared the report. The field work was conducted jointly by
the authors under the administrative supervision of Dr. H. Paul
Douglass. The Bureau of Research and Statistics of the Social
Security Board collaborated in the study by making available
the services of Daniel Creamer. Ida C. Merriam of the Bureau
assisted in planning the field work. Gladys L. Palmer made
a number of suggestions in the organization and writing of the
final draft of the report. The manuscript was edited and pre¬
pared for publication under the supervision of Edmund J. Stone.
David Weintraub
Philadelphia
November 3, 1939
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In the latter part of August 1839> 8 years after the organi¬
zation of the Amoskeag mills at Manchester, New Hampshire,
Thoreau, the essayist, spent a week on the Concord and Merrimack
Rivers. His passage through the Amoskeag canals along the Mer¬
rimack was swift in order to get "out of hearing of the hammer
which was laying the foundation of another Lowell 1,1
Had this boat trip been repeated 97 years later, one doubtless
would have discovered that the Manchester scene still bore
a close resemblance to that of Lowell, but this time the sound
of the hammer would be that of the auctioneer liquidating
mill property. For the Amoskeag Manufacturing Company, which
claimed to be the world's largest textile company, ceased manu¬
facturing operations in September 1935, and in August of the
following year the master in bankruptcy court ordered its
liquidation.
To relate in detail the 105 years of the corporate life of
this company would be, it is safe to say, an enlightening case
study in an important phase of American economic history. Such
a task, however, is not within the province of this report.
This study is concerned with Amoskeag's more recent history,
the period of Amoskeag's decline and dramatic closing and their
effect on the textile workers of Manchester, who constituted
a large fraction of the 75,000 inhabitants of New Hampshire's
Queen City.
A detailed recital of this industrial case history was under¬
taken in the belief that the decline and collapse of the Amoskeag
Manufacturing Company and the concomitant social consequences
Note.- The authors wish to acknowledge their indebtedness to the many members
of the National Research Project staff who have aided In this study. Deserving
of special thanks are Arthur J. Kennedy, Michael E. Ahern, Anthony W. Debskl, and
Norma Mac Rury, who as long-time Amoskeag employees or long-time Manchester resi¬
dents, or both, had acquired a fund of knowledge on the local situation which
they were ever willing to place at our disposal. Only In this manner were we
able to minimize Instances of misinformation on local matters. We are grateful
to Marvel Keller for help in preparing instructions for the transcription, edit¬
ing, and coding or the Amoskeag employment records; to Charles M. Booth and
Harold W. Northrop for supervision of editing and coding of these records; to
Murray P. Pfefferman for supervision of the mechanical tabulations; and to Margaret
Snowden, Henry W. Schultz, and Harold Baron for drafting the charts. To Morris J.
Slonlm and, more particularly, to William F. Barnum, who performed a host of
statistical and other research tasks, special thanks are due.
*Henry D. Thoreau, A Meek on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers (Boston, Mass.-
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1893), p. 323.
1
2
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
may be utilized for the study of urban textile New England in
decline. It is expected that a detailed analysis of Amoskeag
will shed light on the more important considerations that trans¬
formed one of the country's first industrialized regions into
one of its first "depressed areas" of an industrial character-
What were the forces at work to make "a manufacturing town that
shall be the Manchester of America" keep pace, with a certain
lag both in the rise and decline, with the Manchester of the
Old World?8 What types of adjustment do workers make who are
economically stranded in a depressed area, and what adjustments
may they hope to make? What factors does a community have
to take into consideration in attempting to attract new and
expanding industries into an old, specialized manufacturing
center? These are the basic questions to which this inquiry
is addressed.
The same group of Boston financiers who had established tex¬
tile mills at Waltham, Lowell, and Nashua organized the Amoskeag
Manufacturing Company in 1831. Accordingly, its development
throughout most of its corporate existence displayed no unique¬
ness since it was of a piece with the other mill towns in the
Merrimack Valley and adjacent areas of northern New England.3
In its manufacturing aspect, the pattern consisted of the
construction of large integrated mills, combining spinning and
weaving, with sales effected through a single commission house.
The company initiated a paternalistic labor policy, especially
with respect to housing, in order to attract the daughters
of native farmers to the mill. Its control of water power
and its large landholdings transformed the enterprise into
something more than a textile plant. In a very real sense,
New England textile mills were much concerned with real-estate
development and promotion, and in this respect the Amoskeag
Manufacturing Company was no exception.
To this end, the company obtained exclusive control of the
Merrimack water power in this locality and ownership of the
8On June 13, 1810, the legislature of the State of New Hampshire authorize rh.
change of name from Derryfleld to Manchester. Popular tradition give,
Blodget credit for this name. He Is reported to have said, "As the enunrrv
increases In population we must have manufactures, and here, at my canal, will be
a manufacturing town that shall be the Manchester of America.'" Oeoree Waldn
Browne, The Amoskeag Manufacturing Company (Manchester, N. H.: Amoskeag Manu¬
facturing Co., 1915), P- 25.
3For the extent of interlocking directorates among the early New England textile
corporations, see Vera Shlakman, Economic History of a factory Town: A Study
of Chicopee, Massachusetts, "Smith College Studies In History, Vol. XX, Nos. 1-4,
Oct. 1934-July 1935" (Northampton, Mass.: Smith College Council of industrial
Studies), pp. 39-42.
INTRODUCTION
3
farm land on which the growing town of Manchester was to be
built. The company's interest in manufacturing was not solely
in the possibilities of profitable textile operations. Of
equal importance was the fact that the expansion of manufac¬
turing activities created an opportunity for selling machinery
made in Amoskeag's shops and the leasing of water power, while
the additions of new workers to Manchester's population re¬
sulted in appreciation of the value of Amoskeag's landholdings.
Through its control of these essentials the company deter¬
mined the community's industrial development;4 because of its
volume of business, reputation, and stability, both alleged
and real, its voice weighed heavily in city government, cham¬
bers of commerce, city planning, and, on occasion, even in the
legislature of the State. Accordingly, the rise and fall of
Amoskeag's fortunes are reflected in the fortunes of the city.
Nor was the company's corporate structure exceptional. From
the start, along with the other mills that served as its proto¬
type, thecompany possessed all the attributes of "big business",
usually associated with a more recent period in corporation
history. At no time, for example, did Manchester residents
own any considerable portion of Amoskeag stock; from its early
years, the organization was characterized by absentee ownership.
"Control" was exercised by a board of directors or trustees
who not infrequently had but small investments in Amoskeag
securities. With few exceptions, the trustees were prominent
financiers and merchants of the Boston area who had no detailed
familiarity with manufacturing processes and for whom Amoskeag
represented only one of a number of business interests. As
a consequence, the treasurer was the dominant personality in
the company's affairs. The fact that even this post was not
regarded as a full-time job probably explains why his office
was located in Boston during the entire life of the corpora¬
tion. The actual supervision of mill operation was entrusted
to an agent, a salaried official who represented the board
of directors and resided in Manchester. Thus to the problems
of absentee ownership were added those of "remote control."
In all this, it must be emphasized again, Amoskeag and Man¬
chester were typical of most of the other inland mills and
mill towns, especially those north of Boston. The rise of
4For many years, and to some extent until 1935, plants desiring to locate In
Manchester were directly or Indirectly dependent on AmosKeag's approval.
4
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
Manchester from a mere village at the foot of the Amoskeag
Falls to a city of 70,000 to 80,000 persons, in broad outline
at least, did not differ from the often-told story of the de¬
velopment (say) of Lowell.6
It does not follow that the specific reasons for Amoskeag's
decline, which began about 1911, and its adjustments to its
difficulties are identical with those of the other mills for
which it is a type case; the history of Amoskeag does possess
some exceptional features. The most obvious and important
of these is size - it claimed to be the largest textile mill
established at one location.
Its size and absentee ownership and control were not conducive
to timeliness of adjustments in decisions to reequip, to al¬
ter the character of production, or to reorganize marketing
methods. Moreover, when these decisions were made (usually
after much delay), a centralized management militated against
anything but a clumsy prosecution of the decisions since the
entire set-up was lacking in flexibility. The nature of the
separation of the "control" from the management also encouraged
fluctuations in financial policy.
The protection of the interests of investors at the expense,
sometimes, of operating efficiency was encouraged by the pres¬
ence of a large cash surplus, which may be attributed rather
directly to its scale of operations. A very substantial por¬
tion of this surplus was accumulated during the war years. If
Amoskeag had not had its tremendous capacity, it would not have
been able to make such effective use of the short-lived boom.
With a smaller surplus, a policy of gradual liquidation might
have appeared less tempting. In this respect, too, Amoskeag
may be regarded as atypical because of its size.
The same may be said to apply to the social consequences of
the decline and failure of the company. The decline and clos¬
ing of the mills affected more persons than had been affected
by the shut-down of any given textile corporation in the neigh¬
boring textile cities.
It is important to notice, however, that all these deviations
of Amoskeag from what is alleged to be representative behavior
are deviations of degree and not of kind. If this be so, it
5For this reason the rise of Amoskeag and Manchester will not be recounted. Those
Interested in the development of Amoskeag and Manchester will find a chronicle or
their growth In Browne, op. cit.
INTRODUCTION
5
would not be merely making a virtue out of necessity to claim
that for these very reasons this particular case possesses
methodological advantages. It may be properly contended that
a study of extreme manifestations is frequently an effective
method of making "characteristic" behavior understandable.
Although the initial reason for undertaking this inquiry is
the bearing of the material on the development of a depressed
industrial area, the results of the survey indicate that the
material sheds light on still broader problems. It is charac¬
teristic of modern business enterprise to withdraw factors of
production from a declining industry and transfer them to ex¬
panding industries. Cotton manufacturing in New England after
1900 was such an industry, and the Amoskeag trustees attempted
to effect such a transfer. If one assumes complete divisi¬
bility and mobility of all the factors of production, a strong
case may be made that such a transfer would increase the na¬
tional dividend. In the absence of complete mobility of pro¬
duction factors, however, important economic maladjustments
are created. A considerable portion of the Amoskeag capital,
for example, was divisible since it was held as quick assets.
Manchester labor, on the other hand, lacked this divisibility
since it was relatively immobile, in terms both of occupation
and location. In these circumstances, the transfer of capital
was tantamount to the creation of an economically stranded
population.
PLAN OF STUDY AND CHABACTEK OF DATA
To set forth the various factors that made for Amoskeag's
decline within the framework of the considerations outlined
above, it is necessary to review the more important influ¬
ences that have conditioned the industry's recent development,
including the shift of the cotton industry to the southern sea¬
board. The next chapter discusses the more recent difficulties
that have beset the textile industry and analyzes Amoskeag's
handicaps in the competitive struggle.
Chapter III shows how these difficulties, general and spe¬
cific, affected Amoskeag's performance. Performance from the
point of view of the stockholders is measured in terms of
profits and dividends. By means of the company's ledgers and
certified statements prepared for the bondholders' committee,
this record is reconstructed beginning with the year 1906.
6
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
The source of the company's large surplus is explained, as well
as the pressure of the post-war losses that led to changes in
the company's financial policy. The latter is based on the
evidence in a report made by a special master appointed by
the bankruptcy court and from the testimony taken by a Con¬
gressional investigating committee. These sources also provide
information on the subsequent financial involvements that led
to the closing of the mills.
From the workers' point of view performance is measured in
part by the volume of employment. This is indicated by the sta¬
tistical data on production and employment which are introduced
into the financial discussion in order to make clear the inter¬
relations of production, employment, and profits.
The fourth chapter is concerned with the Amoskeag shut-down
and its immediate effects. The major data for this chapter
were obtained in a special survey of a thousand former Amoskeag
workers who were interviewed a year or more after the loss of
their last Amoskeag jobs in 1935. The occupational character¬
istics of the workers displaced by the shut-down and their
success in securing reemployment in Manchester and elsewhere
are described. The effect of the closing of the mills on
Manchester's relief rolls is also considered.
The concluding chapters are concerned with the community's
efforts to attract new and diversified industries to Manchester
and the economic considerations which affect the location of
such industries in this area.
A series of supplementary appendixes presents in considerable
detail the history of the labor supply of the company and the
effects of Ampskeag's decline upon the workers. Specifically,
the character of their employment, their earnings, and general
labor-relations problems are described. The major data are
Company welfare bulletins, reports of trade-union grievances,
minutes of company-union meetings, and personnel and pay-roll
records. In appendix A an attempt is made through analysis of
historical material on the company's labor supply to provide
a broad perspective for viewing Amoskeag's decline. Appendixes
B, C, and D deal with labor relations during distinct periods
in Amoskeag's history after 1911. In appendix E there is a
description in statistical terms of the effects of the decline
on labor turn-over, the pattern and volume of employment and
INTRODUCTION
7
unemployment, annual earnings, and the extent and character of
emigration from Manchester.
Concluding appendixes (F-I) of a technical nature present
supplementary tables and describe the transcribed pay-roll and
income-tax records of the company and the sampling methods used.
Definitions of terms used in a field survey and the reliability
of employment information, as secured from both interviews with
workers and pay-roll information for the same persons, are
also discussed.
CHAPTER II
COMPETITIVE PROBLEMS AT AMOSKEAG
AND IN THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY
GENERAL TRENDS
The locational shift of the cotton-textile industry to the
southern States was due in large part to the availability of
a cheaper labor supply than could be attracted to New England
and it coincided with the introduction of automatic looms in the
industry. The shift created serious industrial maladjustments,
the most important of which was the development of excess
capacity - a problem that has bedeviled the industry for
a long time.
Ei c« i ■ CtM« 111
This was brought about largely because the locational shift
of the industry southward did not involve migration of the
industry in the literal meaning of the word. The New England
■ill owner did not dismantle his plant and ship his equipment
to a southern location, as has so often been the procedure
in the hosiery industry, for instance, in recent years; nor did
he usually establish a southern mill with modern equipment
and close down the New England plant. In either case, excess
capacity would not have become such a serious problem.
That it did reach serious proportions was due to the fact
that the original shift occurred through southern entrepreneurs
organizing textile companies in their own localities. To be
sure, they were assisted by northern capital, but it was not
the capital of the New England textile-mill owners. Rather,
the capital was supplied by the manufacturers of textile
machinery and by the commission houses and converters.1 In
this manner the expansion of the industry in the South ini¬
tially was a net addition to the industry's capacity rather
than the replacement of capacity abandoned or transferred
from elsewhere.
Stephen J. Kennedy, Profits and Losses in Textiles (New York: Harper a Brothers
1986). PP. 6-8.
8
COMPETITIVE PROBLEMS
9
The rapid development of the industry in the South may be
seen in table 1. In 1870 the active spindleage in the South
amounted to only 5.9 percent of the active spindleage in New
England; the percentage was 6.5 in 1880. By 1890, however,
this percentage had increased to 14.4, and 10 years later to
33.2. The shift continued at a rapid rate until in 1905 the
southern States had about half (53.7 percent) as many active
spindles as New England; after the succeeding 5 years they had
two-thirds as many. It is patent that even prior to the
Table 1.- NUMBER OP ACTIVE SPINDLES IN THE UNITED STATES,
NEW ENGLAND. AND SOUTHERN STATES, 1870-1986a
(Thonaaad.)
Year
United
States
New
England
South
South as
percent
of New
England
Year
United
States
New
England
South
South as
percent
of New
England
1870
7,132
5,498
327
5. 9
1908
27,505
15,329
10,201
66.5
1909
28, 018
15,592
10,429
66.9
1880
10, 653
8, 632
561
6.5
1910
28, 267
15,735
10,494
66.7
1883
12,660
n.a.
n.a.
_
1911
29,523
16,511
11,085
67.1
1884
13,300
n. a.
n. a.
-
1912
30,579
17,140
11,583
67.6
1885
13,375
n. a.
ii. a.
-
1913
31,520
17, 311
12.227
70. 6
1886
13,400
n. a*
n. a.
-
1914
32,108
17,408
12,711
73.0
1887
13,500
n. a.
n.a.
-
1915
31,964
17,101
12,956
75.8
1888
13,500
n. a.
n. a.
-
1916
32,806
17,474
13,382
76. 6
1889
14,080
n. a.
n. a.
-
1917
33,889
17, 761
14,156
79.7
1890
14,384
10,935
1, 570
14. 4
1918
34,543
17, 985
14, 529
CO
o
CO
1891
14,640
ii. a.
a. a.
_
1919
34,931
18,066
14,486
80. 2
1892
15,200
u. a.
n.a.
-
1920
35, 481
18,287
15,531
84. 9
1893
15,550
n. a.
n.a.
-
1921
36,047
18,388
15,709
85. 4
1894
15,700
n. a.
n. a.
-
1922
35,708
17, 939
15,906
CO
CO
1895
16,100
n. a •
n.a.
_
1923
36, 260
18, 054
16,310
90.3
1896
16, 650
n. a.
n. a.
-
1924
35,489
17,066
16,944
99.3
1897
17,150
n. a.
n. a.
-
1925
35,032
15,975
1.7, 292
108.2
1898
17,450
a. a.
n. a.
-
1926
34, 750
15,526
17, 574
113.2
1899
18,100
n. a.
n. a.
_
1927
34,410
14,995
17, 694
119.3
1900
19,472
13, 171
4, 368
33. 2
1928
33,570
13,815
18,282
132.3
1901
20,200
n. a.
n.a.
-
1929
32,417
12, 537
18,541
147. 9
1902
21,400
n.a.
n. a.
-
1930
31,245
11, 351
18,586
163. 7
1903
22,000
ii . a •
n. a.
_
1931
28,980
9, 655
17, 953
185.9
1904
22,850
n. a.
n.a.
-
1932
27,272
8,566
17,529
204.6
1905
23,687
14,202
7,631
53. 7
1933
26,895
8, 206
17,829
217. 3
1906
25,250
14,406
8,995
62. 4
1934
27, 742
8,458
18,408
217.6
1907
26,375
14,913
9, 528
63. 9
1935
26.701
7, 763
18,096
233.1
Adapted from Stephen J. Kennedy, Profits and Losses in textiles (New York: Harper &
Brothers, 1938), pp. 235-8. All data are from U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the
Census bulletins on Cotton Production and Distribution. Data represent spindles active
at any time during year ending July 31 for years prior to 1915 and August 31 for years
since 1915.
n.a. Data not available.
10
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
F I f«r• 1.- POPULATI ON OF THE UNITED STATES AND NUMBER OF
ACTIVE SPINDLES IN THE COTTON-TEXT ILE
INDUSTRY, 1840-1916
MILLIONS OF SPINDLES
POPULATION
2 L_
1640 I6S0 1660 1670
SPINDLES
1660 1690 1900
1920
POPUL
1930
1940
MILLIONS
16 C
140
ATION IN
Flgurti on iplnrflot «<3«pt«d fro* - lit lonil Itiiirck Projoet
<1. Profits and
Losses In Textiles («•» fork:
norp.r t 6ro«., 3.936 If Pt>- 2JJ-6-
Flgur** on population on
Census of Population data
outbreak of the World War the locational shift of cotton
textiles to the South had assumed considerable proportions.
In addition, divergencies in the rates of growth of the
industry, population, and consumption of textiles should be
noted. The first two are depicted in figure i. Although
as early as 1870 the rate of increase in active spindleage
exceeded the rate of population growth, this difference was
particularly sharp from 1890 to 1920. After this date there
was a radical reversal in the decennial rates, with the spindle¬
age rate actually becoming negative while population continued
to increase. Unless there had been a substantial increase in
per-capita consumption of cotton textiles, the rate of ex¬
pansion of the industry up to 1920 could result only in surplus
physical capacity. Judging by the few scattered figures
available, no such increase in consumption took place. For
example, per-capita mill consumption of lint cotton in 1911-14
COMPETITIVE PROBLEMS
11
on the average was 12.a kilograms per person compared with 13.8
in 1927 and 12.8 in 1929. Comparable figures for all textile
fibers except jute were 13.5, 15-4, and 14.5.8
This excess capacity created a type of intense competition
that leads to instability, and this characterized the industry
even in the decade preceding the war.
Early in the century Amoskeag officials expressed their fears
of this competition. The earnings record of Amoskeag for these
years as analyzed in the next chapter indicates that it was not
immune to the industry-wide trends and justified the fears
of its officials.
The war prosperity and the intensity of the 1919-20 boom
concealed the presence of the maladjustment of capacity in the
industry. It reappeared, however, with intensified force
in the earlier years of the post-war adjustment, for a part
of the high profits of the war years was reinvested. As a
consequence, the largest number of active spindles in the
entire industry was reported in 1923, although the New England
branch of the industry reached its peak spindleage two years
earlier. In subsequent years the liquidation in New England
was of sufficient volume to more than offset the expansion
of the industry in the South, which continued to 1930, but
it was not of sufficient magnitude to materially reduce excess
capacity in the industry as a whole. To the reappearance
of this basic difficulty in the post-war years must be added
a number of new problems, all of which combined to make the
road of successful competition in cotton textiles a hard one.
Competition of Snbttitnte Textile*
One difficult problem was the competition of other textile
fibers, particularly rayon, which had accounted for only
0.1 percent of the mill consumption of important textile
fibers in the United States in the period 1911-14, but which
represented 5.5 percent in 1934.3 This development was not
achieved by diminishing the share of the textile market served
by the cotton industry. Rather it served only to impede the
p
Computations presented In The Vorld Textile Industry: Economic and Social
Problems, "Studies and Reports: Series b (Social and Economic Conditions) no. 27"
(Geneva, Switzerland: International labour Office, 1937), vol. I, p. 165. (Report
to tne Tripartite Technical Conference held In Washington, D. C., April 1937,)
3u. s. Congress, Senate, Cotton Textile Industry, S. Doc. no. 125, 74th Cong.,
1st sess., 1935, p. 83.
12
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
expansion of the cotton market. Cotton's share remained at
about 74 percent of all important textile fibers throughout the
a^-year period 1911-34.4
Rayon, however, made serious inroads into certain special
markets that usually had been reserved for the cotton industry,
and the latter was able to retain its relative position only by
developing new outlets for its products. The markets in which
encroachments had been made were mainly in wearing apparel.
This was to the disadvantage of the New England mills since
"probably a greater relative proportion of the goods manu¬
factured in New England goes into consumer markets than is the
case with the goods manufactured in the cotton-growing States.
More of the goods manufactured in New England are of the finer
types and it is from this range that the larger amount of
consumer goods originates."5 On the other hand, the expanded
use of cotton in the household and in the industrial and
agricultural fields benefited primarily the southern mills.
The increased dependence on industrial consumption had the
disadvantage of imparting greater instability of operations
to an industry that already was so characterized. This results
from the fact that industrial activity generally undergoes
a greater amplitude of fluctuations than do the activities that
enter directly into consumer markets.
Tk« Style Pee tor
Instability was also promoted by the added importance of the
style factor in the post-war years. The cotton industry was
able to retain a share of the wearing-apparel market only by
competing on a style basis. The inability to style gingham -
which had been Amoskeag's mainstay - because of its rigidity
in design resulted in a tremendous decline in its use. This
disadvantage did not attach to print cloth, which made wide
gains, since it lent itself to new finishing and high styling.
The frequency of fashion changes, which is closely associated
with the seasonal problem, introduced additional risks to the
manufacturers, particularly the larger manufacturers such as
Amoskeag and many others in northern New England who did their
own finishing. When styles change frequently, it is dangerous
4I"fcid., p. 82.
5Ibid., p. 87.
COMPETITIVE PROBLEMS
13
to manufacture for inventory; to manufacture for order makes
for wide fluctuations in activity. Even when a new design or
pattern has been introduced, it is difficult to estimate the
seasonal requirements from its initial reception. And in
a situation of rapid style changes a miscalculation involving a
carry-over of stock is most serious since it can be liquidated
only at a considerable loss which, if it does not endanger
the mill's solvency,- makes for a general price weakness that
affects many mills and converters.
Speculation in Baw Material!
Another source of instability in the industry was the spec¬
ulative situation in the raw-material market, particularly in
the first half of the twenties.
The small cotton crops of 1921, 1922, and 1923 had
gradually forced the price of cotton up from the
depression low of 11.8 cents in March, 1921, to 35.8
cents in December, 1923. This price rise had been
practically continuous over these three years, so
that the mills had been able to profit enormously
from appreciation in value of inventories. The fact
that mill profits during these years were largely
speculative and were due to exceptional conditions
in the cotton-growing area which were bound to be
eventually overcome, does not seem to have made
much impression upon cotton mill management
In other words, the entire period subsequent to the
close of the War, up to 1924, was one of excep¬
tional conditions, beginning with the post-War boom
and then continuing after a brief collapse in the
winter of 1920-21, from which it was rescued by this
progressive price rise of cotton.
It was therefore not until 1925 that the industry
returned to what might be considered a normal op¬
erating basis. It would be expected that under such
conditions there would be a renewal of the decline
in mill earnings which .... was characteristic
of the years immediately preceding the War. This is
precisely what happened.®
Faulty Accounting Procedure!
A factor contributing to the industry's difficulties in these
years was the faulty accounting procedures which had been
practiced in previous years. Of special importance in this
®Kennedy, op. ext., p. 128.
14
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
connection was the general disregard for depreciation reserves.
"It is clear today that in many cases the earnings reported in
earlier years would not have been so classified had proper
depreciation reserves been set up. Otherwise, mills would
not have found themselves with an outdated plant on their
hands and no capital to put it into competitive condition."7
Tke
The expansion of foreign markets, moreover, did not prove to
be an effective alternative to the failure to expand markets
at home. Much the same situation obtained in the foreign
markets as in the domestic ones, at least up to the great de¬
pression; that is, the industry continued to export about the
same fraction of its annual production (6 to 8 percent) up to
1931 as in the pre-war years (table 2).
The difficulties in the way of expanding foreign markets
were several. Probably most important was the manufacture
of cotton textiles by the countries that formerly imported
cotton cloth. This resulted not only in the withdrawal of
the domestic textile markets of these countries from the field
of international competition, but it also served to make
for keener international competition in the remaining markets
since the newer manufacturing centers tend to be areas of
low labor costs. Higher tariffs over a wider area, other
Tskle QUANT ITT OT COTTON CLOTH EXPOBTBD. IMPOITBD.
AMD PBODOCED IN THE DM I TED STATES.
Year
1910-14
(average)
1923
1925
1927
1929
1931
1933
Quantity (square yards)
Exported
39S.574.000
464.520,
543.316,
560,042,
539.355,
360.585,
299,589,
397
851
877
800
679
298
Iaported
52.820, 780
206.146.780
109.580.704
63.562,980
55,763.923
33,554.446
38.853.166
Produced
6.581.500,000
7.247.719.142
6,693.129,462
7.842,036. 580
7,436,326,752
6.331.053,313
7.310.594,300
Exportsa^Taporta as
percent of,percent of
production production
6.1
6.4
8.1
7.1
7.3
5.7
4.1
0.8
2.8
1.6
0.8
0.7
0.5
0.5
aThe export figures for 1910-14 were adapted from Statistical Abstract «f , ,, , ,
1925 (U. S. Dept. Com., Bur. For. and Dom. Com., 1928), p. 618; import arid Drortu?ftt2
for 1910-14, from same for 1919 (1920), p. 438. Figures for 1923-33 were aVr^V i8!?"*®
U. S. Congress, Senate, Oottcn Textile Industry, S. Doc. No. 126, 74th Cong.. 1st «... .!£0*
p. 106. sess., 1936,
7Ibid., p. 130.
COMPETITIVE PROBLEMS
IB
trade restrictions resulting from the desire for national
self-sufficiency, and currency depreciation served the same
end, particularly in the depression years.
Imports into the United States, however, have not only been
negligible during these years but have represented a declining
fraction of domestic production, the highest percentage being
2.8 in 1923. If regard were had for certain types of cloth,
the fraction imported doubtless would be a little higher-
The case given the widest publicity has been the imports
of Japanese print cloth. In 1935 such imports amounted to
only 3 percent of America's domestic production of print cloth,
according to an estimate in the Cabinet Committee's report.8
Its effect, however, very probably has been greater than is
indicated by the smallness of the percentage since, in some
instances, domestic producers were obliged to lower prices
in order to meet this competition.
These, in brief, were the major factors that conditioned
the cotton-textile industry in general in the years following
the war- In summary: "It was the operation of the basic
factor of overexpansion, coupled with style developments
during the twenties, which heightened the competition for
the existing market and forced down mill margins. To this was
added the artificial overcapacity created by the extension of
double-shift operation in the South where profits have
been consistently made during this time, [they] have been
largely products either of specialized machinery or patented
processes, or the products of exceptionally well managed,
efficient mills."9
In this competitive struggle the New England mills were
at a special disadvantage. They not only operated with higher
wage rates than did the mills in the South, but they also had
the additional handicap of the accumulated obsolescence both of
equipment and management practice. Some of these special
handicaps, which represent evidences of failure to solve the
basic problems, can be illustrated by Amoskeag's experience.10
^Cotton Textile Industry, p. 104.
9Kennedy, op. ext., pp. 128-9.
10It is worth noting that the rate of Amoskeag's decline was less rapid than that
of cotton textiles in New England as a whole. Thus, while In 1925 Amoskeag's
cotton section accounted for 3.7 percent of all employment In the cotton-goods
establishments of New England, the percentage steadily increased until it stood
at 5.1 In 1933- The same relationship could be inferred, of course, from the fact
that Amoskeag continued operations throughout all the years during which many
mills in the region were going out of business and were not being replaced by
new mills.
16
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
AMOSKEAO'S COMPETITIVE POSITION
Ob•o1•«c•no* of Equipment
It is generally conceded that among the competitive disadvan¬
tages under which the New England textile mills have operated
has been the factor of obsolescence of equipment. Improvements
in textile machinery, particularly the perfection of the auto¬
matic loom, coincided with the shift of the industry to the
South Atlantic States, with the result of an increase in pro¬
ductive capacity instead of a substitution of newer machinery
for the old equipment. As recently as 1929 the percentage
of automatic plain looms to all plain looms in four southern
States was 60 as compared with 59 percent in four New England
States. In the case of fancy looms the respective percentages
were 67 and 33.11 Little is known, however, about the actual
age of equipment either in place or in use at a given time.
Amoskeag's cotton section, it appears, was no exception to
the New England rule. From the manufacturing point of view ob¬
solescence probably constituted its most serious difficulty.
This is suggested not only in the opinion of company officials
expressed on several occasions but is also clearly indicated
by an inventory of equipment in place taken in August 1939.
There exists a company record which itemizes in detail all
the machinery in place in the cotton section as of August 15,
1939, and the year of manufacture of most of the important
types of these machines.1® These data make it possible to
determine the age of the machinery on the inventory date. For
the more important types of equipment this is shown in table 3.
It is most significant that, of the machinery in place in
August 1939, about one-quarter of the cards, intermediate-frame
spindleage, fly-frame spindleage, and spinning-frame spindleage
had been manufactured between 1881 and 1900; that is, they were
35 59 years old. Almost three-quarters of all spooler
spindleage and more than one-half of all slubber-frame spindle¬
age were of this age. However, much less than 1 percent of all
^Cotton Textile Industry, p. lie.
12The Important types of machines for which there are Insufficient data on the
of manufacture are twisters, warpers, and slashers, in those cases m which fSr
data are otherwise adequate, the following percentages b»ar no date of manuractiir
3.5 percent of all cards, 9.7 of all slubber frames, 12.7 of all intermedial
frames, 2.0 or all fly frames, e.l of all spinning frames, 15.1 of all spoolers
and 2.0 of looms. When the date of manufacture Is unlsnavn, the presumption is that
the machinery Is old. However, In the subsequent analysis no use is made of
this presumption.
Table 8.- DISTRIBUTION OP MACHINERY IN PLACE IN DEPARTMENTS OP THE COTTON SECTION, AUGUST 1984.
BY DATE OF MANUFACTURE*
Department
Total, all years
1881-
-90
1891-1900
1901-
10
1911-20
1921-
30
1931-
34
Num-
and machinery
Num¬
Per¬
Num-
Per¬
Num¬
Pe r-
Num-
Per¬
Num¬
Per¬
Num-
Per¬
Per¬
ber
cent
ber
cent
ber
cent
ber
cent
ber
cent
ber
cent
ber
cent
Carding
Cards
2,063
100.0
237
11.5
239
11. 6
1, 126
54. 6
438
21.2
23
1.1
0
-
Slubber frames
(in spindles)
8,914
100.0
3,064
34.4
1,824
20. 5
1,908
21. 4
1,944
21.8
174
1.9
0
-
Intermediate frames
(in spindles J
40,646
100.0
7, 240
17.8
3,024
7. 4
17,400
42.8
12,984
32.0
0
-
0
-
Fly frames
(in spindles)
57,488
100.0
6,336
11.0
8,960
15.6
33,654
58.6
2, 208
3.8
6, 320
11.0
0
-
Spinning
•
Spinning frames
(in spindles)
465,443
100.0
29,960
6.4
76,619
16.5
245,728
52.8
89,808
19.3
23,328
5.0
0
—
Spooling
Spoolers
10,774
100.0
6,960
64.6
824
7.6
1,680
15.6
1,050
9.8
260
2.4
0
—
Weaving
Looms (in picks
per second)
2,069,358
100.0
0
-
4,472
0.2
367, 216
17.8
1,200,602
58.0
311,980
15.1
185.088
8.9
aBased on an NRP tabulation of company records.
18
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
looms (measured in picks per second) were this old. Moreover,
from 68 to 88 percent of the- important types of machines, with
the exception of looms, had been manufactured by 1910, giving
a minimum age of about 25 years on the inventory date. Of
the looms, only 18 percent had been manufactured by 1910;
more than half of this equipment had been manufactured between
1911 and ig-;o.
These figures may be compared with an estimate of the date of
installation of all spinning-frame spindles and looms in the
cotton-goods industry, given in table 9.
T» b I • 4.- D1 STB 1 BUTIOW OP BPI MM IMG-PBAME SPIMDLK8 AMD LOOMS
IM TBE COTTOM-OOODS IMDtJSTBY 1M ltll,
BY DATE OP INSTALLATION*
Date of inatallatior,
Number
Percent
Spinning-frame spindles
Total
30,500.000
100.0
Before 1900
5,000,000
16.4
1900-09
10.500,000
34.4
1910-19
B.600.000
28.2
1920-34
6.400.000
21.0
Looms
Tota 1
562.063
100.0
1900-04
63, 764
11.3
1905-09
83.150
14.8
1910-14
117,035
20.9
1915-19
93,489
16.6
1920-24
97,209
17. 3
1925-29
76,039
13.5
1930-34
31,397
5.6
1930—34 ai.awv 5-6
*Data oased on A. r. Hlnrlehs, Wages in Cotton-Goods Manufacturing lu s
Labor, Bur. Labor Statistics, Bull. No. 683, Nov. 1936), pp. 49-62 't*1 «ri
mate Is adapted "from unpublished manuscript of Bureau of Labor il
Oeorge Sommarlpa. Source of the estimate confidential, but estimate VrAv,.\ .
reasonable by leaders of the Industry." Mr. Sommarlpa's manuscrlot i«s hSSfa S-
study conducted by the WPA National Research Project In cooperation ,i,k
Bureau of Labor Statistics. Ibid., pp. 48-9. oration with the
The relative newness of the Amoskeag looms is explained by
the fact that the automatic loom was not perfected until
toward the turn of the century. The difference in efficiency
especially in the manufacture of staples, was so large that it
COMPETITIVE PROBLEMS
19
made the older-type loom obsolescent. Another consideration at
Amoskeag was the construction of two new mills, the Coolidge
Mill and the New Bag Mill, between 1911 and 1920. To the
extent that these mills represented additions to productive
capacity, one would expect the installation of new machinery.
After the strike of 1922, negligible amounts of machinery
were purchased, with the exception of looms. About 15 percent
of the looms in place in 1934 were manufactured in 1926;
that is, after the financial reorganization of 1927 (see
chapter III)> the only important addition to equipment was the
964 model X Draper looms purchased new in 1934, which rep¬
resented about 9 percent of all looms in place in that year.13
What this obsolescence meant in terms of operating efficiency
is suggested by a recent study of mechanical changes in the
cotton-textile industry between 1910 and 1936.14 An important
assumption in this study is "that each mill was equipped with
the best machinery available at that time [1910 and 1936] .
This machinery is assumed to have operated at the machine
speeds prevailing in the respective periods. Only such ma¬
chines and equipment as have been proved practical and econ¬
omical are included."15 Ideal conditions in other respects are
also posited, and all differences in productivity due to
factors other than changes in machines have been excluded
from the survey.
From the description of the technological changes, it appears
that there were no radical inventions in this 27-year period
but rather a series of improvements more or less evenly spaced
over the period. Accordingly, the technological level that
obtained in 1934 was probably close to the level of 1936.
The percentage increase in man-hour output in processing
departments between 1910 and 1936 for the products manufactured
by Amoskeag is given in table 5.
From this survey, the smallest potential but nonetheless
substantial increases in man-hour output, ranging from 32 to
13For the period January 1 to November 9. 1934, 91.2 percent of all cotton spindles
In place were active compared with 74.0 percent of all cotton looms, according to a
company record.
14
Boris Stern, Mechanical Changes in the Cotton-Textile Industry, 1910 to 1936
(WPA National Research Project In cooperation with u. S. Bureau of Labor Statis¬
tics, Department of Labor, Report No. B-2, Oct. 1937).
15l6td., p. 2.
20
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
Tablw 6.- PERCENTAGE INCREASE IN OUTPUT PER MAN-HOUR
OP PROCESSING DEPARTMENTS OP THE COTTON-TEXTILE
INDUSTRY MADE POSSIBLE BY MECHANICAL CHANGES.
I»lO-Ma
Percentage increase in mill producing-
Department
Sheeting
Sateen
Planne1
Print
Carding
112.49
81.39
95.92
93.05
Spinning
38.89
32.75
32.54
37.35
Spooling and
warping
169.18
120.00
142.31
159.74
Slashing and
drawing
60.00
42.86
57.13
66.67
Weaving
37.78
47.30
50.56
41.24
Data from Boris 6t«rn, Mec kanica I Changes In the Sot ton-text He Industry,
1910 to 1938 (VfPA National Research project in cooperation with 0. S. Bureau of
Lahor Statistics, Department of Dehor. Report No. B-2, Oct. 1887), p. 6.
50 percent, occurred in the spinning and weaving departments.
The largest relative increases took place in the spooling and
warping department, with the increases in the carding and the
slashing and drawing departments next in order.
This comparison, to repeat, rests on the performance of the
best available machinery in each base year. Even if Amoskeag
had the best available machinery in 1910, its backwardness was
extreme in keeping abreast of changes in machinery subsequent
to that date, as can be seen from table 3. Each of the depart¬
ments represented in the table had less than one-quarter of
its machinery manufactured after 1910, with the exception of
the weaving department, where more than 80 percent of the loom
pickage had been manufactured after this date. In other words,
the weaving department was the only one of the four that
could make any claim to being generally equipped with modern
machines in 1934, and in this instance less than 10 percent
of the looms were of most recent manufacture, while 18 percent
even antedated 1910.
In one respect this understates the extent of Amoskeag's
obsolescence because it assumes that Amoskeag had up-to-date
equipment in 1910.18 As previously mentioned, anywhere from
22 to 72 percent of the machinery in these departments, weaving
1&Thls assumes that the hate of manufacture and date or Installation are Identical-
1. e., that Amoskeag purchased only new machinery. According to a letter to the
authors from Mr. Dumalne's office, the assumption Is generally correct.
COMPETITIVE PROBLEMS
21
again excepted, had been manufactured before 1901. Moreover,
to compute age of machinery as of 1934. despite the small
volume of additions to equipment after 1920, tends to minimize
somewhat the degree of obsolescence because of the advanced age
of the machinery that was being scrapped between 1921 and 1934.
Thus on the inventory date the average age of spinning-frame
spindles was 27.1 years, whereas a year earlier (July 1, 1933)
the average age had been 29.3 (table 6).
Table 6.- AVERAGE AGE OF SPINNING-FRAME SPINDLES
IN THE COTTON SECTION, 1921-34*
Year
Average age
Year
Average age
in years
in years
1921
19.8
1928
24.9
1922
20.8
1929
25.9
1923
21.4
1930
26.7
1924
22.1
1931
27.7
1925
23. 1
1932
28.7
1926
24.1
1933
29.3
1927
25.1
1934
27.1
aBased on an NRP tabulation of company records. The average Is computed from
ungrouped data as of July 1 of each year on the assumption that the date of
manufacture Is as of July 1, The date of scrapping Is known.
In another respect, however, this procedure overstates the
extent of obsolescence in that by addition or interchange
of parts a machine may sometimes be so remodeled that its
efficiency is much greater than on the date of manufacture.
But it is not clear how far this process can be carried. The
major improvements have been such as to increase the speed
of operation and to enable the machinery to carry a larger,
heavier load. These have required, in the main, changes in
the design and construction of the machines rather than the
additions of gadgets. Long-draft spinning, for example, is
an improvement over tape-driven spinning frames which had
previously replaced band-driven frames. Now "tape-driven
frames can be, and are being, adapted to long-draft spinning.
Some band-driven frames have been changed over to long draft,
but the amount of such conversion is believed to be relatively
small and most of it is not believed worth the new investment.
Therefore, spinning equipment that is 25 to 30 years old
22
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
appears to be definitely obsolete for the production of the
cotton yarns most commonly produced.1,17
Be this as it may, to judge by expenditures on repairs and
employment in the mechanical section at Amoskeag, it would seem
that modernization through repairs was not exploited to the
full after 1936.
Since comparable data for individual mills are lacking, it is
impossible to know in any exact manner the extent of Amoskeag's
handicap, if any, in competition with other mills. One can be
certain that its competitors also were not equipped entirely
with the best machines in 1910 or in 1936. However, most of
Amoskeag's competitors were located in the South, and since
these are mills of more recent construction, it is a safe
inference that their machines were of more recent manufacture
than Amoskeag's equipment.
Some idea of the extent of physical liquidation in the post¬
war years can be gleaned from the statistics on spinning
frames and looms scrapped and replaced. From 1931 throu
193* the company scrapped 330,536 spinning-frame spindles
(table 7). These represented 95-5 percent of all spindles
in place on tne inventory date (August 15, 1939).18 It is
significant that the scrapping of 83 percent of all spindles
scrapped occurred after 1937, when the financial reorganiza¬
tions had been completed, and that half of this took place in
the NRA period. During the same 19 years (1921 through 1939)
only 23,338 spindles, or 10 percent of the spindleage scrapped,
were acquired, and these additions were made by 1933. The
median age of scrapped spindleage on the date of scrapping
was 90.6 years, with nearly one-fifth of the spindles 50 to
55 years old (table 8).
There are similar data available on looms. Between 1923 and
1939 the company discarded 15,832 looms, or 119.6 percent of
the number in place at the end of the period. Only one-quarter
of the total scrapped looms were dismantled between 1923 and
1927; two-thirds were scrapped in the succeeding 3 years and
7 percent during the NRA period. Replacement of looms was also
17A. F. Hlnrichs, Mages in Cotton-Goods Manufacturing (u. s. DeDr
Labor Statistics, Bull. No. 603. Nov. 1938), pp. 51-2. Labor* Bur-
lfl
"Total spindles in place Include those whose year of manufacture is unknown
COMPETITIVE PROBLEMS
23
Tib 1e DISTRIBUTION OP SPINNING-PRAME SPINDLES AND LOOMS
SCRAPPED IN THE COTTON SECTION, 1(21-84,
BY YEAR OF SCRAPPING®
Year
Spinning-frame spindles
Looms
Number
Percent
Number
Percent
Total
230,536
100.0
15,832
100.0
1921
25,760
11.2
n.a.
_
1922
0
-
451
2.8
1923
14,616
6.3
448
2.8
1924
344
0.2
173
1.1
1925
0
-
993
6.3
1926
0
_
367
2.3
1927
0
-
1,575
9.9
1928
67,032
29.1
5,700
36.1
1929
0
-
1,785
11.3
1930
17,296
7.5
3,212
20.3
1931
1,024
0.4
0
-
1932
9,888
4.3
0
-
1933
28,672
12.4
604
3.8
1934
65, 904
28.6
524
3.3
aBased on an NRP tabulation of company records,
n.a. Data not available.
Table 8.- DISTRIBUTION OF SPINNING-FRAME SPINDLES AND LOOMS
SCRAPPED IN THE COTTON SECTION, 1921-84,
BY AGE AT TIME OF SCRAPPING4
Spinning-frame spindles
Looms
Number
Percent
Number
Percent
Total"
229,544
100.0
6,586
100.0
10-14.9
0
_
45
0.7
15-19.9
0
-
2,688
40.8
20-24.9
5,712
2.5
802
12.2
25-29.9
6,864
3.0
1,687
25.6
30-34.9
15,840
6.9
1,154
17.5
35-39.9
78,608
34.2
210
3.2
40-44.9
69,576
30.3
0
-
45-49.9
8, 064
3.5
0
-
50-54.9
44,880
19.6
0
-
Median age
40
.6
23.5
aBased on an NRP tabulation of company records.
"Excludes 992 scrapped spindles and 9,246 scrapped looms for which date of
manufacture Is unknown.
24
SHOT-DOWN OP AMOSKEAG
on a larger scale thanthat of spindles. Thus3,55a looms, equal
to 33.9 percent of the looms scrapped, were purchased in this
13-year period, 73 percent prior to 1937, and the remainder in
the year 1939. Unfortunately the date of manufacture is known
for only some 40 percent of the discarded looms. For this
number the median age on the date of scrapping was 33.5 years.
There is presumption in favor of believing that the machinery
of undated manufacture was considerably older. If this is
true, an annual depreciation rate of 5 percent, which was
applied in preparing certain statements, is too high in the
case of spinning frames and looms in terms of the actual life
of these machines. It may not be too high, however, if the
mill were to continue as an effective competitor.
Call of Maw Maeklaatjr >■< Kafiiri
From a statement prepared for the bondholders' protective
committee by certified public accountants it is possible to
show the sums expended for new machines and repairs after
1926. In that year $908,373 were spent for machines and
equipment exclusive of those for the rayon plant. Prom that
date on, except for 1930 when $396,633 were spent, there was
a continuous decline in the expenditures for new machinery
until 1932 when only $15,979 were so expended. With the
purchase of 969 automatic looms in 1939, appreciable sums were
again spent - some $887,000.
The trend in the cost of repairs (materials and labor) is
more striking evidence of plant deterioration. With the age
of machinery increasing because of the curtailed purchases
of new equipment, one would expect more to be spent on repairs
if efficiency were not to be reduced. The contrary, however,
occurred at Amoskeag. In 1936 repairs costing $1,390,000 were
made. Gradual curtailment from that date reduced the cost
by nearly three-quarters to $372,000 in 1933.18 To put the
equipment in a condition to handle the increased volume of
production in 1933 and 1939. annual repairs exceeding $900,000
were necessary.
The obverse side of this record is the effect on employment
in the mechanical and maintenance sections. Man-hour figures
19
■■•"part of the difference would be due to the reduced cost of materials and labor
COMPETITIVE PROBLEMS
25
for the general section, which also includes clerical employ¬
ment in the central office, begin with 1927* and in 1932
totaled 2,184 thousand man-hours. The volume of employment
remained about the same in 1928 as in 1927, but in 1929, a peak
production year, employment was reduced by some 22 percent from
the 1927 level. At the trough of the depression in 1932 the
curtailment amounted to a 57-percent reduction from the aggre¬
gate of man-hours in 1927. There was a partial expansion of
employment in this section in the following two years with the
increase in volume of production and repairs expenditure.
Much the same situation is disclosed by the average number
of workers employed in this section, data for which are avail¬
able beginning in 1925. In that year a weekly average of 1,022
persons was employed. There was an uninterrupted decline until
the average of 386 per week was reached in 1932. By 1934 as
many as 728 persons were employed in the average week.
Management Practice
The company could have utilized the principles of "scientific
management" without investment in new machinery, for in tex¬
tiles "the 'stretch out' which is more accurately designated
as the 'extended labor' or 'multiple loom' system .... as
originally devised and introduced in 1923 was a process of
applying scientific management to automatic weaving which was
quite divorced from the introduction of labor saving machinery,
since automatic looms had long before been widely installed
throughout the cotton manufacturing industry."20
In such circumstances, a stretch-out to be introduced scien-
tifically must involve "the scientific integration of all
the functions of the mill to meet the needs of the looms and
the weavers. This involved a laborious, systematic, and
thoroughgoing study and punctilious adjustment of materials,
methods, and operating conditions in all departments - not
merely the'weaving departments - at the individual mill;
and an equally important exercise of skill and care in the
maintenance of these conditions."21
20
Richmond C. Nyman, Union-Management Cooperation in the "Stretch Out" (New Haven,
Conn,: Yale University Press, 1934), pp. 21-2.
21 Ibid., p. 22.
26
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
Evidence in appendixes B, C, and D shows that from about 1920
on Amoskeag continually increased the work load, that is, made
use of the stretch-out. There is considerable indication,
however, that little or no attention was paid to improving
materials, methods, and operating conditions. As a result the
company failed to realize the full economies of the stretch¬
out, and the operatives failed to achieve the expected volume
of production, which, of course, affected their earnings and
working morale. This is indicated by a number of complaints
that found their way into the company-union minutes.
As early as 19211, for example, the box-loom- f ixers petitioned
that their sections should be reduced to 40 looms because it
was impossible for a loom fixer to keep up his work on account
of poor castings, poor warps, and poor equipment.22 In the
following year, at the first annual dinner conference between
management and employee representatives, an operative reminded
the management that it "had promised some six months ago
improved material or improved product to be passed along from
one operation to the next which would ease the work of the
various operatives. So far as he had been able to observe, the
work of the many departments had been increased but the product
or material passing through the various operations is now as
defective as ever."23
Again, in 1927, the weavers in the Stark Mill "complained
that 32 looms were too much for one weaver to run, with the
quality of warps and filling as they are at present." In this
instance the weavers carried their point, for it was decided
"that the loom sets [should] be changed from 32 to 28 looms at
present and left to the discretion of the overseer if the
weavers can run more looms when the conditions are better."24
Similar conditions obtained in the Bag Mill weaving depart¬
ment as late as 1930. In this instance the weavers complained
about the poor conditions of their warps, their low wages, and
the number of looms they tended. The committee made a first¬
hand investigation and noted that the warps were "crossed soft
sized and soft yarn; tiebacks and lint accumulating in deep
22Mlnutes of the joint Departmental Committee, Docket C4001, 1624.
23Mlnutes of the First Annual convention, April ie. 1925.
24Mlnutes of the joint Departmental committee for Cotton weaving, July ig and
27, 1027 •
COMPETITIVE PROBLEMS
27
wires." It was voted that "in view of the conditions as shown
this committee, the overseer should in his discretion return as
many of the improperly sized, crossed and soft twisted warps
[as well as] ... . those containing too many tiebacks to the
dress room for correction. To turn down warps attempting to
get beyond soft places and tiebacks; and, if necessary, to
employ room girls, back tenders or spare weavers to cover the
back alleys helping out the weavers, by finding broken ends and
piecing up, straightening ends, etc., of those warps which may
not be bad enough to return to the dress rooms, until such time
as the above conditions shall improve."25
This condition, moreover, was not restricted to the weaving
departments. Thus there is a record of the complaint filed by
"the worsted doublers on 60 spindle work that the job as laid
out is too big to handle as the yarn is running poorly." In¬
vestigation supported their contention, and "it was voted that
the operatives [should] run 40 spindles instead of 60 until
yarn conditions [should] return to normal."26 Likewise, when
the beamers at Number 7 Mill complained that they were unable
to earn a satisfactory week's pay, the committee recommended
"that a careful investigation be carried out to insure the yarn
reaching the beamers in better condition and prevent breaking
and tearing which now slows up the beaming."27
A lack of integration among operations was also in evidence
in the reports of other grievances presented by company-union
delegates.28 Nor was there much systematic attempt, to judge
by the workers' complaints, to improve the more personal type
of working conditions, such as lighting, drinking facilities,
dust removal, or the more serious consideration of seniority
rights. The application of the stretch-out under these cir¬
cumstances could have only the result which the operatives
themselves pointed out. At the depth of the great depression
the representatives to the Employees' Council "discussed
circumstances which caused high cost through inferior pro¬
duction due to employees being given too much work. This
causes seconds, remnants and rags."29
Z5Ibid., January 87 and 28, 1930.
26Mlnutes of the joint Departmental Committee, Docket W2007, 1928.
27Ibid., Docket C3009, 1930.
Z8Ibid., Docket C4005, 1925; Docket C4030, 19291 Docket C4034, 1930.
29Mlnutes of the Employees' Council, January 20, 1932.
28
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
Tba Effact of "Gi»»tl»m"
To judge from the character of Amoskeag's growth, the pre¬
sumption is that its very size was a handicap. Its rise to
a position as the world's largest textile plant in one location
was largely by accretions through the purchase of financially
weak mills rather than by the construction of new plants based
on surveys by textile engineers with a view to building up to
optimum capacity.
The presumption, however, cannot be tested empirically. This
would require detailed cost analysis by size of firm, data
which do not exist. Nor are inferences permitted from a
comparison of Amoskeag costs in 1933 and 1934 with the results
of the Federal Trade Commission investigation into costs and
profits of cotton-textile companies in these two years, since
none of the companies included in the commission's survey
carried on the variety of processing operations that was
carried on by Amoskeag.
Certain considerations, however, may be noted. One writer
with textile-mill experience reports:
The general concensus in the trade is that a print
cloth Kill of about sixty thousand spindles attains
the principal economies of size, and that with
further increase there are no proportionate economies
of large-scale management. tor a mill producing
coarser yarn fabrics such as sheetings, maximum
efficiency could be attained in a mill of not much
over thirty thousand spindles. These economies are
largely economies of management and plant layout
rather than strictly due to technical efficiency.
Smaller mills could for practical purposes be con¬
sidered as equally efficient on technical operation
solely.30
If mill opinion is correctly represented in this quotation,
it is applicable to Amoskeag, for with the decline in gingham
production a large percentage of Amoskeag's production was
composed of print cloth and the coarser yarn fabrics. It is of
interest, therefore, not only to have some idea of Amoskeag's
size but also an idea of the size of some of the individual
mills in the cotton section. The number of spindles in the
spinning departments is known as of the summer of 1934.. The
Coolidge Mill with 104,896 spindles was the largest. Three
•^Kennedy, op. cit., p. 186, ftn. 5.
COMPETITIVE PROBLEMS
29
mills had a spindleage varying from 70,000 to 90,000; in three
other mills the number of spindles was between 39,000 and
58,000, and in only one mill was the number less than 30,000
(table 9).
Table 9.- NUMBER OF SPINDLES IN THE SPINNING DEPARTMENTS
OF THE VARIOUS MILLS IN THE COTTON SECTION,
JULY 8 1 , 1 9 8 4 a
Mill designation
Number of spindles
Total
513,376
Coolidge
104,896
No. 4 Central
89,312
Amory
77,904
Stark
70,504
Jefferson
57,600
No. 1 Central
49,348
No. 1 South
39,488
No. 9 Central
24,324
^ased on an NRP tabulation of company records.
Since, it is claimed, the chief economies derived from a mill
with more than 30,000 spindles are economies of management,
there is point in considering all the Amoskeag mills as one,
for many of the managerial functions were performed by the
central office rather than by the office of a given mill. On
this basis Amoskeag had 513,376 spindles. To this number
should be added the net loss of 207,208 spindles between 1921
and 1934. Thus even on the 1934 basis the cotton section of
Amoskeag as a single unit was more than eight times the size
at which economies are thought to cease. No mention, however,
is made at what point diseconomies set in.
That diseconomies very probably do set in is suggested by
the necessity for considerable trucking of cloth in process
both within mills and from one mill to another- Not only is
the additional trucking itself a cost which would not be
incurred by a smaller mill, but because trucking involves
additional handling there is added opportunity for soilage,
waste, and seconds.
It might be argued, perhaps, that such disadvantages were
more than compensated for by the fact that its large capacity
30
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
made it feasible for Amoskeag to have its own dyeing and
finishing plant, thereby gaining the advantages of complete
integration of all manufacturing processes. In the pre-war
period such integration very likely had its advantages. In
more recent years, when frequent style changes have become
an important factor, integration of this character, given Amos-
keag's location, might well have entailed a serious handicap,
that is, the styling takes place in the finishing department,
and a department located almost 300 miles from New York City,
the style center, could not have a sensitive appreciation
of style trends. It is no coincidence that 60 percent of
the jobs in dyeing and finishing textile establishments in
1933 were located within a radius of about 100 miles of New
York City.31 This handicap could not be overcome merely by
having a New York sales office. Obviously, close collaboration
between the sales office and finishing department could not
readily be established over such a distance, or at least it
would be less effective than similar collaboration between the
commission house and converter, which has been the more usual
arrangement.3£
The Amoskeag arrangement could work to advantage only if the
company had its products retailed under its own label, which
can be done with some staple products, such as towels, sheets,
and blankets, or with products manufactured by a special
process, such as Sanforized fabrics. Such adaptations appeared
to be more difficult to make at Amoskeag than elsewhere because
of its size. The Boston News Bureau was of this opinion. In
its judgment, "smaller plants making staple lines have found
it relatively easy to change over their production to fancy
goods, but for the country's largest cotton mill to swing
over to the production of a highly styled line of goods is
revolut ionary.1,33
31Thls statement Is based on the tact that 40,638 wage earners of the total a* uno
employed In the industry In 1933 according to the Census of Manufactures iTrZ
located In Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York. New jersey, and Pennsylvania.
32Thls judgment is supported by the findings of a recent Investigation made bv
Hiram 8. Davis, George W. Taylor, and Others, Vertical Integration in the Tertill
Industries (Phlla., Pa.: Industrial Research Department, unlveraitv orT.Jn
sylvan la, and The Textile Foundation, Inc., 1938). The authors conclude in 11?"
"A review of the way vertical Integration has worked in the textile indu«riii"«
leads to the conelus 1 on that Its success depends upon the attention that is »!»,
to two fundamental policies. They are (1) building an organization around rh2
needs of the current market, with the seat of authority close to the marker.
(2) providing flexibility to meet changing market requirements - most effectives
realized through the use of partial integration." ^
33Quoted In the Manchester Union, July 3, 1926.
COMPETITIVE PROBLEMS
31
In this connection, the limited extent to which Amoskeag
manufactured styled fabrics should be noted. It produced
both cotton and worsted goods, the former being the much
more important branch of the business. Worsted goods were
produced for men's and women's wear for both the spring and
fall seasons. Among the cotton goods, ginghams were the most
important single product for the greater part of the period,
with flannels next in importance and even superseding ginghams
in the last 10 years. Sheetings, towelings, and tickings have
comprised from about 10 to 15 percent of the total cotton-cloth
production. For a brief period, 1926-33. the company also
manufactured rayon textiles. Although the volume of production
from this section was relatively negligible,34 a discussion of
the section's development is merited since it was the one
outstanding attempt on the part of the company to adapt its
production in accordance with current trends before the trus¬
tees decided on further liquidation through the financial
changes of \<)2l <
The Experiment in Bayou Production
Before the rayon unit began production in 1926, preliminary
experimentation had been carried out over a period of 25 years,
according to an announcement in a local newspaper.35 From
testimony before the Sabath Committee there is some basis
for believing that during these 25 years the "men sat around
for a year or so, without anything to do, receiving salaries,
complaining bitterly that the company should manufacture rayon;
that there was a market for it, and nothing was done", although
"there was some difference of opinion about it."36
After the first few months of operation, the agent was able
to report to the Joint Convention of Employee Representatives
that the "rayon department is doing remarkably well and is
producing a much higher grade of rayon than we expected for the
34Statlstlcs on the physical volume of rayon cloth produced are not available, but
figures on annual net sales do exist. Annual net sales of rayon as a percentage
of Amoskeag>s annual total net sales of all cloth In each year from 1986 through
1933 are as follows: o.l, 1.0, 1.1, 1.3, 0.8, 1.7, 3.3, and 0.5. Accordingly,
rayon production may be omitted In the discussion of production trends.
35Manchester Leader, March 87, 1928. cited by Alan R. Sweezy, "The Amoskeag
Manufacturing Company, = Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. LII, No. 3 (May 1938).
P. 502.
3$
U. S. congress. House of Representatives, Investigation of Real Estate Bond¬
holders' Reorganizations, Public Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Select
Committee (Hon. Adolph J. Sabath, chmn.), 74th Cong., 8d sess., Sept. 30 and
Oct. 1 and 8, 1936. Part 18. P. 113. Also quoted by Sweezy, loc. cit.
32
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
time it has been in operation." But even at the outset,
operations were hampered by inadequate investments. Asked
whether the rayon department "will continue to run night and
day indefinitely", the agent responded. "I cannot say. We are
restricted by limited machinery to produce these lines."37
Presumably it was the realization that the initial investment
of Siai.ooo was insufficient that prompted the additional in¬
vestment of almost $i6q,ooo during the course of 1926* Never¬
theless, a small loss after depreciation continued until 1937
when the first profits were realized, amounting to $129,000.
It was probably this showing that encouraged the management to
make a further investment of $i8q,ooo in 1928, a step that was
justified by the profits which were earned each year through
1931. In the following year and in 1933, when liquidation of
the department occurred, small losses were sustained. However,
during the 8 years of the experiment, gross profit on sales
was $378.16s after depreciating all but $33,000 of the entire
investment of $619,000, or an average depreciation rate of
about 13 percent per annum. The annual rate of return on the
total investment over these 8 years was 5.6 percent.
Nonetheless, the trustees decided to liquidate the rayon
department. The treasurer related to the Sabath Committee the
considerations that influenced this decision.
We had got to a place where we were producing about
20,000 pounds of rayon yarn a week, or approximately
1,000,000 pounds a year. The plant had been started
in a vacant building, not well adapted for the busi¬
ness, and the time had come when we had to consider
the question of investing a lot more money for new
machinery and possibly moving the whole outfit into
another building We found - or, rather, 1
should say, they [the contractors] found - that it
would cost as much, or perhaps more, to adapt this
big building to the production of rayon yarn as it
would to start afresh and build a new institution.
The question then came as to the advisability of
spending a large sum of money - and by that I mean
$1,000,000 or $2,000,000 or $3,000,000, perhaps - to
establish the production of rayon yarn in Manchester.
Having in mind that we must compete with such coa'~
cerns as Du Pont, Celanese and Industrial Rayons
we decided not to do it. Our operation [stc] had
begun to be not as efficient as they should be, and,
37Mlsutes of the Joint Convention of Employee Representatives, March 15, loee.
COMPETITIVE PROBLEMS
33
therefore, it was the best judgment on the part of
the management that it was not good wisdom to invest
a large sum of money in that property.38
Possibly if the $26,000,000 which, as the material in the
next chapter indicates, was drained off by the Amoskeag Company
during the years 1925-27 had remained with the Amoskeag Manu¬
facturing Company, the trustees would not have regarded it as
a very risky venture to invest the additional funds needed in
rayon production.
Loca1 Taxation
The competitive difficulties thus far enumerated are mainly
the results of inertia or inability to introduce innovations.
There was, however, a handicap of lesser importance that could
not be so classified - that of local taxation. The fiscal laws
of New Hampshire permitted Manchester to levy a property tax
not only on mills and machinery but also on stock in trade,
that is, on inventories of all kinds. The latter tax is un¬
usual in a State in which manufacturing is important. To that
extent New Hampshire's industry operated under an additional
competitive handicap.
The extent of the tax handicap for Amoskeag compared with
other textile mills in the North and South can be seen from
table 10. Local taxes are expressed as a percentage of gross
income for each year from 1926 to 1933. The data for the four
New England States (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, and
Rhode Island), aswell as for the four Southern States (Alabama,
Georgia, North Carolina, and South Carolina), were adapted
from Federal income-tax returns supplied by the Treasury
Department to the Tariff Commission. From this comparison
it is clear that until 1933 local taxes took a larger per¬
centage of Amoskeag's gross income than of the gross income of
cotton-textile corporations generally in New England or in
the South. In 1933 Amoskeag had the smallest ratio and the
southern mills had the highest ratio, possibly because some
processing taxes were included, although most corporations
reported processing taxes under cost of goods sold.39 The
differences between the Amoskeag and New England ratios are
probably due chiefly to the stock-in-trade tax in New Hampshire.
3 ft
°Investigation of Real Estate Bondholders' Reorganizations, p. 1891 Sweezy,
op. cit., p. 503.
39Cotton Textile Industry, table 59, ftn. 3, p. 149.
34
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
T«bl* 10.- PERCENTAGE TAXES ARE OR GROSS INCOME ROR AMOSKEAO
MANUFACTURING COMPANY AND FOR COTTON-TEXTILE
CORPORATIONS IN NEW ENGLAND AND
THE SOUTH. l#2«-«8a
(Iicomt tuti azcladad)
Ye ar
Amoskeag
New England
South
1926
3. 14
2.06
1. 18
1927
2. 84
1.90
1. 47
1928
2. 57
1. 95
1. 37
1929
2.24
1.77
1.29
1930
3. 12
2.26
1.75
1931
3.06
2. 21
1.98
1932
3.66
3. 12
2. 33
1933
2.61
2.91
4. 33
U. S. congress. Senate, Cotton Ttxtila Industry, S. Doc. no. 126. 74th Cong.,
1st seas.. 1835. p. 149. Figures for both New England and the South represent data
for four States.
Whether this is so or not, it is of interest to find out how
much Amoskeag would have saved had it been taxed at the rates
generally prevailing in New England or in the South. Taxed at
the New England rate, Amoskeag would have saved $i ,1911,1407 from
its gross income in the 8 years 1926-33; at the southern rate
the saving would have been $1,882,521. During the same years
the net operating loss from manufactures without allowance for
depreciation was $4,951,839- Lower taxes, even at the level of
the southern mill villages, would not have eliminated deficits.
It should be apparent, moreover, that the essential community
services supported by Manchester could not have been supported
if its property-tax rate had been as low as that which pre¬
vailed in southern textile towns. It is also noteworthy that
the tax differential between the New England and southern
textile communities, judged by the ratios of local taxes to
gross income, has been narrowed because of the dual action
of lowering taxes in New England and of raising the rate
in the South.
The adjustments made by Manchester in Amoskeag's assessed
values and taxes may be illustrative of the former process
(table 11). From 1910 to 1917 the assessed value of Amoskeag
represented slightly less than one-quarter of the total as¬
sessed valuation of all Manchester. In other words, the rates
of increase in the total valuation of property in Manchester
COMPETITIVE PROBLEMS
35
Table 11.- ASSESSED VALUATION OP MANCHESTER AND AMOSKEAG
MANUFACTURING COMPANY. TAXES PAID BY AMOSKEAG,
AND THE TAX RATE, 1910-86®
Year
Assessed valuation
(thousands
of dollars)
Amoskeag's
valuation
as percent
of
Manchester's
valuation
Tax rate
per $1,000
(dollars)
Local taxes
paid by
Amoskeag6
(thousands
of dollars)
Manchester
Amoskeag
1910
39,881.9
9,850.0
24.7
20.10
198.0
1911
41,451.8
9,850.0
23.8
20. 40
200.9
1912
67,012.5
17,000.0
25.4
15.20
255.0
1913
69,208.3
17,000.0
24.6
15.20
288.4
1914
68,798.1
17,000.0
24.7
15.20
266. 9
1915
71,875.1
17,020.0
23.7
15.20
268.9
1916
74,557.3
17,538.5
23. 5
15, 60
273. 6
1917
79,463.3
18,482.2
23. 3
16.40
319.5
1918
83,151.2
21,337.0
25.7
16.20
360.6
1919
92,977.2
24,213.4
26.0
20.60
498.8
1920
109,454.6
30,541.2
27.9
18. 20
555.8
1921
110,326.8
30,544.4
27. 7
24.50
748. 3
1922
111,632.3
32,308.9
28.9
26.00
840.0
1923
114,597.9
35,497.5
31.0
23.50
834.2
1924
113,703.3
35,490.6
31.5
24.00
851.7
1925
118,869.8
32,732.3
27.5
28.50
784.4
1926
121,275.8
33,399.0
27.5
26.00
868.5
1927
113,214.6
26,000.0
23.0
27.80
694.0
1928
113,440.3
26,000.0
22.9
27.50
685. 2
1929
113,819.2
26,000.0
22.8
25.50
662.0
1930
110,880.8
22,705.2
20.5
27.00
588.6
1931
106,151.9
18,343.6
17. 3
28.00
493.4
1932
96,109.1
13,000.0
13.5
28.75
373.8
1933
93,277.7
13,000.0
13.9
28.00
364.0
1934
95,868.8
16,000.0
16. 7
28.50
432. 7
1935
92,757.5
13,000.0
14.0
32.00
299.4
1936
85,038.1
6,750.0
7.9
41.00
265.7
aComplled from Annual Reports of the City of Manchester, 1910-36, and from records
on rile with the* Board of Assessors, Manchester, N. H.
bTax assessments minus abatements.
and in Amoskeag's valuation were about equal. From 1918 to
1924 Amoskeag's rate of increase was more rapid than the
remainder of Manchester's property which, however, did not
reach its peak valuation until 1926 and thereafter declined
at a slower rate than did Amoskeag's assessed valuation. Thus
36
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
during the great depression Amoskeag's property accounted for
only about 19 percent of Manchester's assessed valuation, which
from the peak of $121,000,000 had been reduced to $96,000,000
in 1932. Since the city's tax revenues were almost exclusively
derived from the property tax, Amoskeag contributed to tax
revenues in about the same proportion as it figured in the
total assessed valuation of the city.
Since Manchester's budget was subject to little flexibility,
as the assessed value of city property declined the tax author¬
ities were obliged to raise the tax rate per $1,000 of property
to insure adequate revenue. The pre-war rate was between
$15.00 and $20.00; at the time of the highest valuation in
1936 the rate was $26.00. Increases were gradual from that
point on, reaching a rate of $32.00 in 1935 and $91.00 in 1936.
For this reason the decline in Amoskeag's tax payments in most
years was not quite so rapid as the decline of its assessed
valuation. Nevertheless, Amoskeag's tax payments in 1932 and
1933 were less than 95 percent of the largest tax payments
made by Amoskeag in 1926.
From these data it appears that as the burden was lifted
from Amoskeag, at least in absolute terms, to approximately the
same extent an additional burden was placed upon other property
in Manchester. If this shift had been made earlier or in
larger amounts, it very probably would have worked out its
effects in terms of higher rents; and this would perhaps have
made it more difficult for Amoskeag to have paid wage rates
over all these years that were less than those paid generally
by other textile mills in New England. That is, the wage and
tax differentials probably tended to have compensating effects.
StJMMABY
These, then, are the more important general problems and
special difficulties which in the course of the post-war ad¬
justments transformed an important cotton-textile center into
a depressed area. Enough of the industry's background has been
presented to show that the basic maladjustment of excess capac¬
ity was clearly in evidence before the World War and would
have forced serious readjustments even if there had been no
war- The war had the dual effect of postponing the day of
reckoning and of accentuating the severity of readjustments.
COMPETITIVE PROBLEMS
37
In addition to some disadvantage in taxation, the Amoskeag
Company's position in competition with southern mills was
adversely affected by obsolescence of equipment, of management
practice, and of marketing organization. Similar handicaps
affected the competitive position of most New England textile
mills. To what extent these were self-imposed it is difficult
to judge. Professor W. E. Freeland, industrial counsellor of
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, in an address to the
Lowell Chamber of Commerce in 1927, attacked "absentee owner¬
ship and trustee control" and laid the blame for chaotic
textile conditions in Lowell at the doors of the millmen who,
he said, "lacked good judgment, are poor managers of their own
plants and failed to keep abreast [of] changing conditions."40
Amoskeag was among the last of the textile mills of the area
to succumb to the trends. To buck the tide would certainly
have meant rough sailing, but to do so would no more have made
failure inevitable than it would have made success assured.
On the other hand, to drift with the tide could only mean being
engulfed by it. Nevertheless, this seemed to be the policy of
the Amoskeag trustees, as suggested by the company's financial
history related in the following chapter.
40»01ves Strong Advice to Lowell Business Men," Textile fiorld, Vol. LXXII, No. 25
(Dec. 17, 1927), P. 36.
CHAPTER III
AMOSKEAG'S PROFIT RECORD AND CORPORATE
REORGANIZATIONS
An account of the financial history of the company must
be related to its earnings record if it is to be meaningful.
This record will serve as more than background out of which the
financial reorganizations of 1911, 1925, and 1927 were devised.
It will show also how the general problems of the industry
and the specific difficulties of Amoskeag were reflected in
its activities.
THE PII-WAR PERIOD. 1I0R-I4
This accounting begins with 1906. In the preceding year
Amoskeag had acquired its worsted section by absorption of the
Manchester Mills and had enlarged its cotton-cloth production
at the same time by the acquisition of the Amory Mills. The
only other additions to productive capacity, aside from the
purchase of the Stark Mill in the course of the 1922 strike,
were the construction of the Coolidge Mill in 1910 and the
New Bag Mill in 1919. Accordingly, Amoskeag may be regarded as
having come of age in 1905, and an examination of its earnings
record would properly begin with the following year (table 12).
The net operating profit earned separately by the cotton and
worsted sections, as well as the dividends paid on outstanding
common and preferred shares of stock, is available from company
records. Since overhead expenses were allocated by Amoskeag to
the cotton and worsted sections in the proportion of two-thirds
to the former section and one-third to the latter section, this
may be taken to represent the relative value of investments in
the two sections. For this reason dividend disbursements were
apportioned in the same manner. From these data it is possible
to determine year by year the amount by which the earnings of
each section either exceeded or fell short of the amount
of dividend payments attributable to the respective sections
This basis of comparison seems more illuminating than earn¬
ings per share. With the mergers in 1905 the capital structure
38
Table 18.- ANNUAL RECORD OP OPERATING PROPIT OR LOSS, DIVIDENDS, AND SURPLUS OR DEFICIT
FOR THE COTTON AND WORSTED SECTIONS OP THE AMOSKEAG MANUFACTURING COMPANY, 1906-84a
(Do liar.)
Total
Cotton section
Worsted section
Ye ar
Total operating
Surplus
Total operating
Dividend
Surplus
Total operating
Dividend
Surplus
profit or loss
Dividend
or deficit
profit or loss
or deficit
profit or Ioss
or deficit
from manufactures
payments
after dividends
from manufactures
payments
after dividends
from manufactures
payments
after dividends
leoe
1.093.664.75
633.451.00
460.213.75
752.625.55
422.300.67
330,324.88
341.039.20
211,150.33
120,888.87
1007
1,444.472.08
1,152.000.00
292,472.08
1.022.173.00
768.000.00
254,173.08
422.206.00
384,000.00
38.299.00
1908
1,070,144.24
691.200.00
378,944.24
562,388.48
460.800.00
101,588.48
507.755.76
230.400.00
277.355.76
1909
800,216.82
691,200.00
109.016.82
504.989.04
460,800.00
44,189.04
295.227.78
230,400. 00
64.827.70
1910
701,310.79
691,200.00
100,110.79
380.688.34
460.800.00
80 ,111.66
410.622.45
230.400.00
180,222.45
1911
1.007,299.05
1.079,325.00
72,025.95
880,538.09
719.550.00
160.088.09
126,760. 96
359.775.00
233,011.01
1912
1,049.513.22
1.035,842.50.
13,670.72
775.047.52
690,561.67
84.485.65
274.465.70
345.280.83
70,815. 13
1913
1.106,332.94
1,036,795.75
69.537.19
719,780.14
691,196.50
28.583.64
386.552.80
345,599.25
40.953.55
1914
1,025,485.27
1.036.800.00
11,311.73
665.135.10
601.200.00
26,061.90
360.350.17
345.000.00
14.750.17
1915
1,129.366.29
1.036.800.00
92.566.29
667.770.69
691.200.00
23,129.31
461.505.00
345,600.00
115.995.60
1916
1,184.354.44
1,036.800. 00
147,554.44
494.756.66
691,200.00
196,113.31
689,597.78
345.600.00
343,997.78
1917
2.255.567.88
1.036.800.00
1,218,767.88
1.422.904.32
691.200.00
731.704.32
832.663.56
345.000.00
487,063.56
1918
7.374,289.63
1.123,200.00
6.251.087.63
5,539.285.06
748.800.00
4.790.483.96
1.835.003.65
374.400.00
1.460.603.05
1919
2,077,219.78
864.000.00
2.113,219.78
2,660.063.72
576,000.00
2,084,963.72
316.256.06
288.000.00
28.256.06
1920
2.655,706.64
2.255.400.00
400,306.64
2.610.272.90
1,503.600.00
1,106,672.90
45.433.74
751.800.00
706,366.26
1921
1.443,323.12
2,523.600.00
I,080,276.88
885.437.28
1.682.400.00
796,962.72
557.885.84
841,200.00
283,311.18
1922
562,255.88
2.005,200.00
2,531 ,155.88
363,183.67
1,336.800.00
1,700,283.67
162,772.21
668,400.00
831,172.21
1923
1.318,525.31
1,486,800.00
168,271.69
1,108,394.21
991,200.00
117,194.21
210.131.10
495,600.00
285.168.90
1924
1 ,111 ,131.10
1.227,600.00
5,172,031.10
2,833,582.25
818,400.00
3,751,982.25
1,310 ,852 . 15
409.200.00
I ,720,052.15
1925
1 ,181 ,110.28
225,000.00
1,709,110.28
2 ,592 ,330.38
150,000.00
2,712.330.39
1,107.890.11
75.000.00
1.032.890.11
1926
1 ,580,608.91
1 ,580,608.91
2,195,517.53
2 , 195 ,5 17.53
614,908.62
614.908.62
1927
1.474.279.50
1,474.279.50
593.534.52
593,534.52
880.744.98
880,744.98
1928
I ,015,727.81
1,015,727.81
909,919.13
909,919.13
105 ,808.11
105,808.11
1920 6
782.260.89
365,077.50
416.283.39
235 ,391.70
243.984.00
179,375 .70
1,017,652.59
121.993.50
895.659.09
1930
2.668,169.11
2,668,169.11
1 , 718,537.82
1,716.537.82
919,931.62
9u9,93 I.62
1931
805 ,310.60
905 ,310.60
633,705.81
633,705.81
271,631.78
271,631.76
1932
1,037,151.73
1 ,037, 15 1 . 73
837,610.57
837,610.57
199,511.16
199,511.16
1933
1 ,081. 15
1 ,081. 15
102,861.90
102 ,861.90
401,780.75
401.780.75
1934
I,523,868.10
I,523,868.10
1,225,538.65
1 ,225,538.65
298 ,329.15
298,329.15
•x)
W
O
T)
)—i
t-3
CO
Z
o
50
w
o
so
o
tsi
•-3
1—1
o
25
CO
CO
CO
*Data ror: leoe to ifey 31, 1936, adapted from Amosheag ledgera; June 1, 1925, to December 31, 1934,
adapted from a report of public auditors to the Bondholders' protective committee. Profits or losses
from Investments are excluded. See table P-2. Italics Indicate loss or deficit.
Dividends paid out In 1930 but declared on the basis of 1929 earnings.
40
SHUT-DOWN OP AMOSKEAG
consisted of only 57,600 shares of common stock with a par
value of $100, all of which were outstanding. That the company
was grossly undercapitalized from that date to the subsequent
reorganization in 1911 was indicated by the fact that the
market price of Amoskeag stock in those years centered around
$335- Hence its dividend rate in that period was 12 percent on
the par value but only 3.65 percent when figured on the market
price.1 For this reason a comparison based on earnings per
share would give a misleading impression of the relative
prosperity of the company in those years. On the other hand,
since the latter rate represents but a very modest return on
an investment and since the dividend rate, though somewhat
enhanced, remained a modest one (5.59 percent) for a number
of years after the reorganization of 1911 which eliminated the
discrepancy between capitalized and market value, a comparison
based on the excess or deficit in earnings after dividend
payments appears more meaningful.8
The earnings (or losses) in question are those derived solely
from manufacturing activity; that is, profits or losses from
investments are excluded.8 In the cotton section, by far the
larger component of Aaoskeag's business, there were sizable
surpluses after dividends in the first two years of the period.
These surpluses were appreciably reduced in each of the follow¬
ing years, 1908 and 1909," in 1910 the cotton section failed
to earn its dividend payments by $80,000. In each of the same
five years (1906-10) the worsted section earned a surplus after
dividends, varying from $227,000 in 1908 to $38,000 in the
preceding year. And in 1910 there was a surplus of $180,000
from worsted operations to more than offset the deficit in
the cotton section. In 1911, however, after the initial
payment of dividends on the preferred shares and an extra
dividend on the common, the worsted section for the first time
since the reorganization of 1905 did not earn its dividend
payments by as much as $233,000. Despite the surplus after
dividends of $160,000 in the cotton section, the combined
1Manchester Union. August 28, 1911.
£After 1911 the dividend on the old Oasis was $18 Instead of *12 Tht«
of 6.51 percent on the market price of $325. ' a return
Amoskeag accounting practices have Been followed throughout. This mvoiv
Important departure from accounting orthodoxy In that Amoskeag made no orovi3,*11
Tor depreciation But charged additions to plant and equipment as an ooerafi
expense. For the period under consideration the net effect has Been to exaa,,. ,
earned surpluses and to minimize deficits. sgerate
PROFITS AND REORGANIZATIONS
41
manufacturing operations of Amoskeag had to draw upon their
accumulated reserve in order to meet dividend obligations
in 1911, although the added dividends did not mean an unduly
high rate of return.
Tab le 18.- ANNUAL PBODUCTION OP COTTON AND WORSTED CLOTH,
1907-85a
(Square yarda)
Year
Total (millions)
Cotton cloth
(millions)
Worsted cloth6
(tens of
thousands)
1907
187.2
172.3
148.7
1908
171.9
159.6
123.0
1909
185.2
171.3
139.0
1910
207. 9
191.7
161.7
1911
219.3
205.1
141.9
1912
236.2
223.7
125.2
1913
231.6
217.5
140. 9
1914
234.9
221.2
137.1
1915
213.9
200.3
135.8
1916
200.5
188.2
122.6
1917
202 .8
188.7
141.0
1918
171.4
159.7
117.0
1919
143.2
136.0
71. 7
1920
159.9
150.0
99.3
1921
147.5
143.6
39.5
1922
132.6
125.4
71.5
1923
116.4
110.2
61.9
1924
138.2
130.4
77.7
1925
89.6
84.5
51.4
1926
128.4
121.7
66.8
1927
124.6
118.3
63.4
1928
125.4
120.2
52.2
1929
114.8
109.4
54.3
1930
108.3
105.6
27.5
1931
88.3
84.8
35.5
1932
86.8
84.0
28.5
1933
88.2
84.2
40.5
1934
114.7
112.3
24.5
1935
n.a.
110.4
n.a.
aBased on fiscal year ending May 31. Data from company records deposited with the
Hamilton Smith Library, University of New Hampshire, Durham, N. H.
bFor 1929 and ensuing years figures are based on calendar instead of fiscal years.
n.a. Data not available.
42
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
The deficit after dividends continued in 1912 in the worsted
section, while the surplus in the cotton section was reduced by
almost one-half. The effects of the pre-war depression were
reflected in the small surpluses in each section in 1913 anc*
a deficit of $26,000 in the cotton section in 1914» which was
not offset by the still smaller surplus of the worsted section.
Perhaps of greater significance in indicating Amoskeag's
position at that time was the decline in physical output that
had set in (table 13). Thus the peak of worsted production
occurred in 1910; that of cotton production, in 1912 (figure 2).
Pilar* ».- AIBUAL P10D0CTI0I OP COTTOI AID W0I8TBD CLOTI,
1107-11
PROFITS AND REORGANIZATIONS
43
From these data it would appear that the fears expressed by
the Amoskeag officials in the first decade of the century had
some foundation in their own business experience. It shows
also that Amoskeag, like the industry in general, was affected
by the decline in profit margins that began about 1907 and
continued up to America's entrance into the war.
The Financial Reotgan i iat i on of 1911
Although the motives that prompted the financial reorgani¬
zation in the latter part of 1911 doubtless were mixed, in
the light of the above information and in view of some of the
terms of the reorganization it would seem that it was partly
motivated by the incipient decline. The formal change in¬
volved the transformation of a New Hampshire corporation into
a New Hampshire trust. According to a financial analyst,
this was undertaken for the purpose of avoiding taxes on
the part of the shareholders,4 and this he considered to be
"the compelling reason." The occasion was used, however, to
alter the capital structure.
The exchange of one share of common stock in the corporation
for two shares of cumulative no-par preferred with an annual
dividend rate of $9..50 and three shares of no-par common stock
in the New Hampshire trust was regarded as merely inflating
the capital structure to fit the capital worth of the company
as measured by the value of its securities.
This is at least superficially correct. It should be re¬
membered, however, as the observer quoted above pointed out
at this time, that
"some might infer that it comes as a result of
unusual prosperity of late. But examination of
the report just issued clearly disproves this,
showing that the Amoskeag Company has suffered
from the prevailing textile depression. In point
of fact, it is solely the achievement of years of
operation "5
4"'An ulterior motive .... appears in the taxation advantages to be gained In
the new form or organization. Indeed, this alone may be regarded as the compelling
reason for the recommended change. The shares or the Amoskeag Manufacturing
Company, the New Hampshire corporation, are largely held in Massachusetts, and
so pronounced Is the trend at present In favor of nontaxables In this State that
some such step was almost unavoidable. Certificates of the voluntary association
will be nontaxable, both In Massachusetts and In other States.'" J. I. Eldredge In
the Bank Journal, quoted by the Manchester Union, October 11, 1911.
5Ibid.
44
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
This statement is amply corroborated by the profit record just
reviewed. Moreover, there is reason for believing that a large
part of the Amoskeag stock before reorganization was owned by
a small group. Thus a Manchester newspaper reporting the rati¬
fication of the reorganization plans by a stockholders' meeting
remarked that "about twenty stockholders were present at the
meeting [They] represented over 53,000 shares of
stock" out of a total number of 57,600.®
With these facts to go on and the assumption that these
ao stockholders believed that the failure to earn all the divi¬
dends in 1911 was not due entirely to the "prevailing textile
depression" but also to the beginning of a secular decline, one
would expect veteran Boston financiers to safeguard their
interests. This was accomplished by creating two classes of
stock, preferred and common shares. By selling the latter
they could recapture their original investment, more or less,
depending on when the original investment was made;7 and by
retaining the preferred stock they would have first claim
to any profits that might be earned, or to considerable sums
in the event the decline became very severe and resulted in
liquidation, since the plant in all probability had not been
overvalued even after the write-up.
These inferences appear justified also by the reasons for the
recommended changes in capital structure as these reasons were
set forth in the Circular to tht Stockholders of the A»osktag
Manufacturing Company under date of August 28, 1911. The
reasons which led to these recommendations are as follows:
1. The preferred shares, considering the amount of
property and the assured earning capacity of the
concern, are likely to be highly regarded as an
investment, the amount of dividends to be paid on
the common shares being more dependent on future
growth and general business conditions.
2. The lower prices at which the new shares will sell
in the market will be an inducement to others to
associate themselves with us in the ownership of
the property among whom it is hoped will be many
of our officials and operatives, who are deterred
from becoming stockholders in the corporations by
the present high price of this stock.8
8Manchester Union, October 14, 1011.
7
Each common share was to receive an annual dividend of $3.00. This amount
capitalized at 6 percent yields a capital value of $60.00. «ount
8Circular to the Stockholders of the inoskeag Manufacturing Company, quoted in th»
Manchester Union, August 28, 1911.
PROFITS AND REORGANIZATIONS
45
The unforeseen profits of the war years rendered superfluous
this effort at self-protection, and the stockholders were not
again faced with the situation of getting out from under until
1925. As will be shown later, the differing circumstances of
that year necessitated a more complicated technique.
THE WAR TEARS, 1816-18
The high profits of the war years constituted an appreciable
portion of the cash surplus which in the post-war depression
became the cynosure of the stockholders. For this reason it
is important to trace the source of these profits and the
accumulation of the surplus.
In 1915 and 1916 the cotton section again failed to earn its
dividend disbursements, the deficit amounting to $196,000 in
the latter year. These deficits, however, were more than off¬
set by the substantial surpluses earned by the worsted section.
The poor showing of the former is explained by reference to
figure 4. Here on a semilogarithmic scale are plotted the
dollar value of net sales, the cost of cotton and coloring
material, and the direct labor costs of cotton manufactures
as entered in the Amoskeag accounting ledgers for the years
1906-34. From the initial year through 1914 all three curves
are closely parallel, indicating that relative changes in each
were about equal. But in 1915 and 1916 the rate of increase
Figure 4.- RELATIVE CHANGE IN NET SALES AND PRODDCTION COSTS.
FOR THE COTTON SECTION, 1906-84
(Retio ecele)
46
SHUT-DOWN OP AMOSKEAG
in the cost of cotton and coloring material, particularly the
latter, exceeded the rate of increase in net sales, that is,
the rate of increase in the price of cotton goods.9 It is t'118
disproportionate increase in material costs that curtailed
earnings below the dividend requirements.
Thereafter, of controlling importance were the major diver¬
gencies in the rates of change of material costs and value
of net sales compared with labor costs. The latter, even
beginning with 1916, increased at a much slower rate than the
other two and continued to lag through 1918. In the following
year the value of materials and of net sales decreased some¬
what, while labor costs continued to increase. Between 1930
and 1931 all three declined, with labor costs lagging also on
the downswing. The rates of decline became equal in 1923 owing
chiefly to the 9-month strike.
Prom this one would expect that in 1917 the lean years were
left behind. Thus the cotton section in this year returned
a surplus after dividends for the first time in 9 years.
It amounted to $731,704, while the surplus from the worsted
section was $487,000. In 1918 the war boom reached its peak,
with the surplus from the cotton division alone amounting to
$4,790,483, more than six and one-half times the surplus of the
previous year. The worsted section only tripled its surplus
of 1917 by showing a surplus after dividends of $1,460,603.
Thus from manufacturing operations solely, Amoskeag reported
for 1918 a surplus after dividends of more than $6,000,000 -
and this after the dividend rate had been increased.
In view of the relationships just outlined, the conclusion is
inescapable that these profits resulted from the skyrocketing
of prices of cloth, while payments to labor were increased
only gradually. It was a clear case of profiting from war prices
and Government orders. The gross-profit margin that these
differential rates of increase made possible is shown in
figure 5 by the area between the curve of net sales and the
curve representing the total production costs including changes
in inventory. Although figures in sufficient detail are not
available for the worsted section, there is no reason to
believe that the relationships were different from those in the
cotton section.
Q
The Increase In the dollar value of net sales may be taken as a conservativ«
Indicator of the increase in the price of cotton goods since physical production
was decreasing during the same years (table 13).
PROFITS AND REORGANIZATIONS
47
Figure 6.- NET SALES AND PRODUCTION COSTS,
FOR THE COTTON SECTION, 1906-34
THE POST-WAR YEARS, 1919-28
The general post-armistice depression affected Amoskeag's
cotton section in 1919 by reducing its surplus after dividends
to $2,084,963, a reduction of more than one-half over the
record surplus of the preceding year. In the worsted section
the curtailment was still more severe, and it exceeded its
dividend payments by only $28,256. In the following year,
1920, the prosperity induced by the transition from clothing
soldiers to clothing ex-soldiers still prevailed in the cotton
section, with earnings about equal to those in 1919. But with
the stock split up 2 to 1, dividend payments were propor¬
tionately increased so that there was only $1,106,000 as a
surplus.10 Adverse conditions, on the other hand, continued
in the worsted section as evidenced by an operating profit of
$45.433> which meant that there was a deficit of $706,366 after
dividends. Depressed conditions, however, caught up with the
cotton section in 1921 when earnings were only slightly more
than half of the dividend requirements; about five-eighths of
In this respect Amoskeag followed a widespread practice. ". . . . the cotton
textile Industry followed other American Industries In Interpreting the United
States Supreme Court decision, Eisner versus Macomber, by which stock: dividends
were held not to be taxable as Income, as an occasion for freely capitalizing
surplus through the Issuing of stock dividends A cursory cheek of cotton
mills which Issued stock dividends during these years [1920 to 1923] gives a list
of 156 firms, representing 11,451,000 spindles, or approximately 30 per cent of
the Industry. The capital stock of these mills was Increased from $215,107,000
to $383,503,000, an average increase of 80 per cent.
"The Justification of such action was presumably the reinvestment of earnings in
the business, especially during the War, when the Excess Profits Tax and the fear
of other taxes and further demands from labor made It desirable to keep dividends
down." Stephen J. Kennedy, Profits and Losses in Textiles (New York: Harper &
Brothers, 1936). p. 131.
48
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
the dividend requirements in the worsted section were earned.
Owing to the 9-month strike in 193a, each section sustained an
operating loss from manufacturing before dividends; these
losses amounted to $363,483 in cotton and $i6a,772 in worsted.
Since no fundamental adjustments after the strike of 1922
were undertaken by Amoskeag, it continued to fail to earn its
dividend requirements. Indeed, in 1924 the combined loss of
both sections before dividends was more than $4,000,000.
Dividends of $1,237,600 were nevertheless paid, although the
dividends on the common stock were omitted in the second half
of the year. For the 6 months ending May 31, 1925. the cotton
section again sustained a heavy operating loss amounting to
$1,219,000, although an operating profit of $643,592 was earned
by the worsted section. Despite the continuance of substantial
losses, there still remained on this date a cash reserve in the
neighborhood of $35,000,000. Because of the importance of this
cash reserve in subsequent developments, it is necessary to
trace its accumulation.
Ace«B«l*tia* 0t C*»k
On December 1, 1911, immediately after the transformation of
the corporation into a trust, the reserve for shareholders was
entered on the books as $11,310,000, presumably representing
the accumulated surplus over 80 years of operation. On May 31
of the following year Saio.ooo was transferred to this reserve
from manufacturing accounts. There were no further entries
until May 1918 when $4,939,399 was added to the reserve and
withdrawn from the wool account with the explanation that
this was done "to make the book value of wool equal 10 cents
per lb." That is, it was a profit on inventories of raw
material due to speculative price increases. An entry of
the same character amounting to $1,285,518 was made in November
of the same year- Thus over $6,000,000 was added to the
reserve for shareholders in 1 year merely from the revaluing
of raw-material inventories. In this manner the reserve for
shareholders was brought up to $17,744,817 on December 2, 1918'
it remained at that figure until May 1925.
To get some idea of the total surplus that existed at this
date, it is necessary to consider, in addition to the re
serve for shareholders, sums contained in at least four other
accounts. One such account was the interest account in which
PROFITS AND REORGANIZATIONS
49
was entered income from investments. From December 1, 1912, to
May 31, 1925, income from this source amounted to $6,912,007.11
Another account is that headed "guarantee", which was created
by setting aside 3 percent of the value of net sales. From
December 1, 1911, to May 31, 1925, there had accumulated in this
account $1,903,483. Profit and loss was another account. On
this terminal date there would have been a loss of $5,020,794
if some $6,300,000 had not been transferred to this account
from the interest account. The highest amount in this account
was a profit of $8,341,000 in May 1920. It was converted to
a loss of the above magnitude by the payment of income and
excess-profits taxes, the shrinkage in the value of its secu¬
rity investments, the purchase of the Stark Mills, and the
payment of dividends in the immediate post-war years in the
face of low earnings or outright manufacturing losses. There
was also $3,000,000 in a suspense account created ad hoc on
November 30, 1918, apparently as an offset against the value
placed on its land, water power, mills, and machinery in the
trial balance of November 29, 1911.
The surplus in May 1925 would be the algebraic sum of the
amounts in these four accounts plus the reserve for share¬
holders. The surplus on this accounting would be $24,539,513.
It is interesting to note that on the same date its invest¬
ments in securities, almost exclusively United States Fourth
Liberty Loan Bonds valued at $85, were carried on the books
at $25,500,000.
Decline in Activltiei
Despite the fact that these were years of rising raw-material
prices, Amoskeag sustained the heavy losses already noted. It
was clearly a period of declining activity. Production in the
cotton section, for example, declined from 188.7 million
square yards in 1917 to 125.4 and 110.2 in 1923 and 1924,
respectively. The decline in the worsted section from the
wartime level was even more severe: from 14.1 million square
yards in 1917 to 6.2 and 7.8 ini923 and 1924, respectively. It
is but natural that the decrease in the weekly average number
11The accounting In this Instance begins with December 1, 1912, rather than with
December 1, 1911, because In the fiscal year 1911-12 the balance In the Interest
account was transferred to the proflt-and-loss account.
50
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
employed by Amoskeag should have been more moderate than the
curtailment in production. Thus the average number employed
during the last 6 months of 1923 was 10,322 compared with
12,515 in 1917 and 11,998 in 1924. In the pre-war years the
average number employed had been about 13.500.
The Amoskeag trustees, of course, were aware of the shrinkage
in operations and the expansion of losses. Their recognition
of this situation, as well as their appreciation of the more
basic difficulties affecting the industry (which have been set
forth previously), prompted them to pass the dividend on common
stock in October 1924, The treasurer of the company in his
report to the stockholders at this time took occasion to state
that prudence and the best interests of the concern
compelled then to omit the dividend upon the common
shares The losses of the past year and the
uncertainty of the cotton industry for the immediate
future makes the passing of the dividend imperative.
The most unfortunate part of it all is, I'm unable
to tell you at this moment anything which might
encourage you as to an improveaent of conditions in
the immediate future.
The situation, however, was not yet critical for
fortunately in the better years gone by, a reasonable
surplus [upwards of $25,000,000] had been retained
for just such times as these which enables a proper
upkeep and has Justified the Board in making a
division [payment of dividend on preferred shares]
which otherwise would not have been possible. They,
[the trustees] trust the owners will agree the
preservation of the property and the maintenance of
its resources [are] of greater Importance.
The reason given for the poor showing was the high cost of
cotton and of manufacturing. "These figures [losses in 1924]
show that the period under discussion offers an excellent
illustration of the restrictive effect of high prices for
cotton and the high cost of manufacturing combined."
Losses in the cotton section, which amounted to twice the
profits in the worsted section, continued in the 6 months end¬
ing May 31, 1925. To meet the problems effectively, it would
have been necessary to shift production from the manufacture
of high-grade staples, particularly ginghams which had been
the Amoskeag mainstay, to the manufacture of styled fabrics
The Amoskeag agent in charge of operations made this much clear
to the workers through their representatives assembled in
PROFITS AND REORGANIZATIONS
51
convention in accordance with the Plan of Representation (see
appendix C). According to the minutes of this meeting, he
commented that "staple gingham, as far as we are concerned,
is hopeless Diversification is what Mr. Straw is
interested in, manufacturing fancy goods such as striped
flannels and rayon."12
To make such a shift would involve "revolutionary changes",
as the Boston News Bureau remarked at this time.13 But it
was the financiers of Boston, not the manufacturers of New
Hampshire, who controlled the destinies of Amoskeag at this
time, as they had throughout its history.14 They knew that the
Amoskeag mills had been operating at a considerable loss and
that the prospects for profitable operations with the same
set-up were poor indeed. They knew also that Amoskeag pos¬
sessed a cash surplus in the neighborhood of $25,000,000. More
than half of this had been accumulated in the war years from
profits obtained chiefly through increased raw-material prices
and from Government orders. The existence of such a large
surplus would have made it possible to improve efficiency by
modernization of plant and equipment and to seek new markets by
experimentation in new designs, constructions, and processes.
At best, however, this would have converted losses into mod¬
erate profits. With much less risk, the financiers knew
how to earn moderate profits for the stockholders from a
surplus of this size by other methods. Plans to accomplish
this purpose were devised and put into operation in the summer
of 1925.
THE FINANCIAL REORGANIZATION OF 1928
The underlying principle was that of budding fission: to
have two companies where before there had been one. The assets
were to be so segregated that one company would own the mill
property and some of the cash surplus, while the other company
would own $18,000,000 of the cash surplus and operate as an
investment trust. Control of both companies, of course, was to
rest with the same group of financiers. The mechanics of the
transaction are not without interest.
12Mlnutes of the Joint Convention of Employee Representatives, September 19, 1925.
13Quoted in the Manchester Union, July 3, 1925. For full quotation see p. 30.
14Alan R. Sweezy, "The Amoskeag Manufacturing Company," Quarterly Journal of
Economics, Vol. LI I, No. 3 (May 1938).
52
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
A new trust was formed on August as, 1935, patterned after
the trust formed in 1911. It was called the Amoskeag Manufac¬
turing Company and was to be an operating trust. The old trust
had its name changed to the Amoskeag Company. The new company
was formed to operate the mill properties and the old company
to manage the investments. The conveyance of property was
accomplished, according to Special Master Arthur Black, by the
appointment of "dummy" trustees who held office only for
one day.16
On the financial side the procedure involved a write-up of
assets. "The fixed assets of each mill," according to Mr.
Black, "were valued by a competent engineer of the highest
standing, on the basis of replacement cost, less depreciation.
There is no question of the accuracy of this valuation." The
plant was set up on the books on the basis approved for Federal
income-tax purposes. On this accounting, mills, machinery,
land, and water power that had been on the books at $3,000,000
were now valued at $37,040,453, with a depreciation allowance
of $13,560,133 against which there was no reserve, making the
net value of the fixed assets equal to $14,480,330. Similarly,
cotton and wool (raw, in process, and finished) which had been
carried much below current market prices were revalued at
current prices. This involved a mark-up from $3,400,000
to $13,600,000. Together with other inventories, the net
write-up16 roughly equaled the depreciation allowance. Almost
$6,000,000 in accounts receivable, as well as $6,000,000 in
cash, were turned over to the new company. Some $40,000,000
in Amoskeag assets were conveyed to the new company.
At the same time, it was decided to merge Amoskeag with the
Parkhill Company with its cotton and worsted mill in Fitchburg,
Massachusetts, and cotton lands in Arkansas. According to
Mr. Black's findings:
No one seems to have taken the matter very seriously
except a shareholder in the Old Trust, who at the
meeting of shareholders, ostensibly called for
the purpose of considering this matter, moved that
the meeting be adjourned for two weeks so that
shareholders could find out what the capacity of the
16Special Master Arthur Black, Report on Objection of Bliea S. Island to Debtor's
Report on Claims, In Re: The Amoskeag Manufacturing Company, Debtor, Corporate
Reorganization Bo. 58,569, District Court of the United States, District of
Massachusetts, 1038, pp. 4-6.
10lt is interesting to note that abcut a month prior to the write-up in assets,
the Manchester Board of Assessors had reduced the assessed valuation of Amoskeag
property by $2,760,000. Boston Reus Bureau, May 22, 1925, p. 16.
PROFITS AND REORGANIZATIONS
53
Parkhi11 mill was, whether it was making money or
losing, and what, if any, interest trustees of the
Old Trust had in the Parkhill property. This motion
was promptly voted down and the plan approved as it
had been developed weeks before. If there was
any advantage to be gained from the ownership of
Parkhill nobody ever tried to prove it.
This plant was immediately closed down after a net loss of
$3,200,000 from the operation and liquidation of the Parkhill
plant and the Delta Land Company. A suspicion that the merger
was one of personal accommodation rather than of economic
advantage to Amoskeag is created by the fact that the Parkhill
specialty was the manufacture of fine ginghams. That is, at
the very time that Amoskeag was painfully aware that there was
a sharply reduced demand for ginghams,17 it added to its
capacity to produce ginghams.
This merger was made, however, only after the Parkhill assets
had also been very considerably marked up. The extent of the
mark-up is not known, but the valuation of the assets trans¬
ferred to the new company was placed1 at almost $5,000,000 after
allowance for depreciation.
The new company, the Amoskeag Manufacturing Company, took
possession of these assets revalued at about $45,000,000,
including $6,000,000 in cash, by issuing 285,000 shares of
preferred and 365,000 shares of common stock, each without par
value. Of this number, 20,280 shares of preferred and 35,000
shares of common stock were received by the former owners of
the Parkhill properties. The remainder of the stock, slightly
more than 90 percent, was received by the old trust, now called
the Amoskeag Company, which had retained $18,000,000 in Liberty
Loan bonds. The mark-ups in assets minimized the seriousness
of the withdrawal of $18,000,000 in working capital, eight-
ninths of which could be regarded as a reserve for depreciation
of plant and equipment.10
17
U. S. Congress, House or Representatives, Investigation of Seal Sstate Bond¬
holders' Reorganizations, Public Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Select
Committee (Hon. Adolph J. sabath, chmn.), 74th Cong., 2d sess., Sept. 30 and Oct. 1
and 2, 1936, Part 18, p. 172.
18
From this analysis, It appears that Judge Black Is In error when he states that
"In the first report to shareholders of the Old Trust there was given an 'opening
trial balance' of the Operating Trust in which the plant was marked down to
$16,500,000" from $36,500,000 ($33,000,000 for Amoskeag and $3,500,000 for
Parkhill). Actually this does not represent a mark-down. The higher figure is the
value of the plant on a reproduction cost new basis; the difference represents
depreciation. Since neither Amoskeag nor Parkhill had depreciation reserves, the
value of the plant turned over to the new company was only $16,500,000. Thus, In
a balance sheet of June 1, 1925, prepared by certified public accountants for the
bondholders' committee, the value of the Manchester plant less depreciation was
entered as $14,480,319 and the value of the Parkhill plant after depreciation as
$1,971,617, which equals Judge Black's total of $16,500,000.
54
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
Within less than a year the trustees were no longer agreed that
"'the preservation of the property and the maintenance of its
resources [are] of greater importance.'" The plant minus
$18,000,000 in cash assets was set "on its own legs to win or
lose." The very withdrawal of this money, of course, greatly
affected its chances to win, but if it should make a profit,
the old Amoskeag Company would benefit by virtue of its stock
ownership.
In Mr. Black's opinion, "this plan was primarily intended
to conserve the cash assets of the Trust from the risk of
manufacturing It was under no obligation to stand idly
by while the cash accumulation of a hundred years was eaten
up in a losing operation." The trustees by these acts had
definitely embarked on a course of liquidation. Thereafter,
their policy, whether deliberately conceived or not, was one
of administering temporary stimulants to keep the company
in operation.19
In addition to sustaining losses in the second half of 1935
equal to those in the first half, the operating loss in the
cotton section in 1936 was almost $2,300,000 as against an
operating profit of $615,000 in the worsted section. Even
the dividends on the preferred shares were omitted in this
year. With the cyclical upswing in 1937, however, both sec¬
tions had operating profits aggregating nearly $1,500,000,
the first since 1923.
A shrinkage in production and employment also persisted in
the interval after 1934. For example, cotton production in
1927 was 118.3 million square yards compared with 130.9 in 1939
and with 89.5 in 1935 which was about equal to the low point
in the great depression. The curtailment in employment was
more regular- In 1927 the average weekly number of persons
employed was 9.195 compared with 11,998 in 1929 and 9,271
in 1925.
These were the results that obtained despite continued
pressure to reduce costs, pressure from which the city and
State governments were not immune. In February 1927 the munic¬
ipality passed a resolution calling on the Board of Assessors,
the State Tax Commission, and the legislators "to encourage
owners and managements of industries 'affording employment
to our people' and to 'recognize the dangers of high valuations
10For a discussion of the application of the stimulants, see appendixes e and D.
PROFITS AND REORGANIZATIONS
55
upon industrial plants.'"20 Two months later the New Hampshire
Legislature considered legislation that would exempt raw
material from taxation and permit the cities and towns to
abate all or portions of manufacturing stock in trade from
municipal taxes.21 In the following month, May, the Manchester
Board of Assessors, realizing that the "depression in the
textile .... industry could not be overlooked any longer",
reduced the valuation of the Amoskeag mills and machinery by
$5,300,357 and stock in trade by $2,037,267.22
A final effort was also made to revive the gingham market.
To this end, Amoskeag contributed $10,038 in 1927 to a gingham
advertising campaign, but apparently without any beneficial
results to itself.23
THE FINANCIAL REORGANIZATION OF 1927
Despite the readjustment downward of specific wage rates, the
lightening of the tax payments, and the improvement in textile
business evident in 1927, the trustees apparently did not feel
justified in revising their estimate of Amoskeag's ability to
survive.
A proposal of liquidation was made by certain New York
interests in the summer of 1927. It called for a 60-day option
to purchase the stock of the Amoskeag Company at $100 a share
for its preferred stock and $90 a share for its common stock
(which was selling at around $60) plus whatever additional
amount might be realized for the common stock after the liqui¬
dation of the quick assets and the payment of expenses and of
a banker's commission. This would have entailed liquidation
of the mill properties of the Amoskeag Manufacturing Company
through the liquidation of the Amoskeag Company, which at this
time was the holding company of the former.
Though the offer was rejected by the trustees of the Amoskeag
Company, nevertheless it served to make a telling point.
The stockholders of the manufacturing company were sustaining
a continuous shrinkage in assets, and, according to the pre¬
dictions of the treasurer, would continue to do so. Why not
then liquidate and enable the stockholders to invest their
20
Boston Bexus Bureau, February 17, 1927, p. 1.
21 Ibid., April 5, 1927, p. 2.
22Ibid., May 26, 1927, p. 4.
23
Report to the Bondholders' Committee, Schedule B-3 (report prepared for the
company by Stewart, Watts, and Bollong, public auditors in Boston).
56
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
cash in "live securities"? Subsequent actions of the trustees
indicate their full agreement with this point of view. Their
objection to this proposal was simply that the terms were not
sufficiently lucrative.24 Among the reasons given by the
trustees at a stockholders' meeting for the rejection of this
offer were the following:
"It has never been their intention to abandon
operations in Manchester and bring to the City the
disasters such a move would entail." "The concern
has existed here ninety-six years. It has always
been favored with a reasonably good management, quite
competent to manage its own affairs, without the
volunteer assistance of outsiders."
"Mi t h your assiitanct and the Community' s support
we propose to stay in business if it is possible to
do it without loss of assets." "Tailing to do so
profitably we will ash your authority to discontinue
in an orderly manner."
"There is no occasion for the owners of this prop¬
erty to pay anyone, or mahe anyone presents for
liquidating their property."
The meeting then passed a vote "authorising the
Trustees, if they deem it wise, to liquidate in their
discretion, the whole, or any part, of the assets of
your company, upon such terms and conditions as they
deem for the best interests of tbe shareholders
The trustees made almost immediate use of this authorization
to liquidate. The plan entailed financial liquidation on terms
that did not involve the immediate physical dismantling of the
mills, but which withdrew further capital from the operating
company. Mr. Black's description of this plan and its effects
is an authoritative statement and accordingly is quoted at some
length:
It [the plan] reached final form at least as early as
November 14th, 1927, when a meeting of the share¬
holders of the Operating Trust was called for November
21st, 1927. Notice of this meeting contained all
the details of the plan which required action by
the Operating Trust.
Plan for Bond Issue
At the first meeting, Mr. F. C. Dumaine, doing
double duty as trustee and treasurer of both Trusts,
24Another objection has been mentioned by Alan R. sweezy {op. cit , p. *87) who
points out that the treasurer was receiving from Amoskeag at that time the nart-
tlme salary of $100,000.
^quoted in Black, loc. cit.
PROFITS AND REORGANIZATIONS
recommended that the Operating Trust buy in its whole
issue of 265,000 shares of preferred stock for
$8,135,076 in cash, plus $14,665,000 in twenty-year
6% bonds and 13,191 additional common shares.
The trustees, subject to the approval of the share¬
holders, unanimously adopted resolutions to amend the
Declaration of Trust, buy in the preferred stock,
issue the bonds and additional common stock, and list
the shares of the Trust on the Boston Stock Exchange.
At the second meeting a certified copy of all these
resolutions, with full detail, was presented to the
shareholders of the Operating Trust at Manchester,
at twelve o'clock noon. By affirmative vote of every
share of both preferred and common stock these res¬
olutions were "in all respects approved, ratified
and confirmed."
Two hours later, at Boston, the trustees of the Old
Trust held the third meeting of the day. Mr. Dumaine,
now acting as treasurer and trustee of the Old Trust,
reported what had transpired at the two previous
meetings. The news was not entirely unexpected,
because the trustees had already prepared a plan for
the voluntary liquidation of the common stock of the
Old Trust. This plan was described in a printed
circular to their shareholders, bearing the same
date. This circular stated the terms on which the
Operating Trust had voted to buy up its preferred
stock and explained an option by which holders of
common stock in the Old Trust might liquidate their
holdings of such stock by accepting for each share
$52 in cash, $40 in the newly issued bonds of the
Operating Trust, and one share of common stock in the
Operating Trust.
Nothing in the foregoing recital is intended to
indicate any impropriety or irregularity. The meet¬
ings appear to have been duly called and carefully
conducted. The records are complete.
Old Trust in Control
It is intended, however, to show that this entire
plan was conceived by the trustees of the Old Trust
and carried through by them to its final consum¬
mation. ....
The circular goes on to say: "Tour trustees have
had two objects in mind: 1. To distribute to such
cotton shareholders as wished their proportion of the
Company's assets, thereby preventing anyone else
ac quiring them below their true value. 2. To secure
the continued operation of the works to Manchester
and Hew Hampshire, without danger of wasteful wreck¬
ing." "The plan places the plant where it should be,
upon its own responsibility, to succeed or fail."
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
"The plan now pr e i«nt ed is the ruu It of long and
cartful consideration and has been adopted by the
Board as being in their Judgment advantag tous for
the shareholders."
The plan is thus frankly acknowledged by the trus¬
tees of the Old Trust as their own scheme for helping
their own shareholders.
There Is no escape from this conclusion. The mill
was losing money. There was no change in sight.
Outside interests had begun to talk liquidation.
Doubtless many stockholders of the Old Trust were
discouraged. It might be better to get something
out of the Operating Trust before it was too late.
The Old Trust owned ninety per cent of the preferred
stock of this losing concern. It was decided to
trade that stock for cash and bonds. Parkhill
interests, which owned the small balance, were glad
to make the same trade.
Purpose of Bond Issue
This plan, sometimes referred to as a recapitaliza¬
tion, was really devised as a hedge. It withdrew
$8,000,000 more from the risks dt manufacturing.
It gave the timid ones a chance to get their money
and quit. It gave the bolder ones a chance to gamble
with greater security. They still controlled the
Operating Trust through its common stock. They could
get the profit from any business improvement through
that medium. If the worst came, they had their
bonds. They had exchanged a proprietory interest for
that of a creditor.
Any claim then or now made that this bond plan was
to assist the Operating Trust is not true. It was
the final step in the safety-first campaign started
two years before when the "segregation" of the manu¬
facturing properties was first made.
No Saving Effected by Bond Issue
It has been claimed in argument that the exchange
of preferred stock for bonds was expected to effect
a large saving to the Operating Trust because the
dividends on $28,000,000 of preferred stock exceeded
the interest on $14,000,000 of bonds. This argument
fails when we consider that there had been no payment
of preferred dividends and probably would be none for
the reason that the company never had earned a penny
and had no good prospects. On the other hand, the
interest charge on the bonds became a fixed charge on
the capital of the Company and was in fact paid out
of capital for about eight years.
Withdrawal of Capital Under Guise of Interest Payments
In reality the bond issue allowed the owners of
this Operating Trust to exchange a portion of their
PROFITS AND REORGANIZATIONS
59
capital or proprietory interest for promissory notes
and then to withdraw, under the guise of interest
payments, nearly fifty per cent of the capital so
represented.26
The purchase of the common shares of the old trust was not
without its benefits in more ways than one. The trustees were
not only assured of continued control, but also under an option
which they offered to themselves they stood to make a good
profit.27
Although the Textile World could say editorially ("Signifi¬
cance of Amoskeag Recapitalization") that the "recapitalization
plan" (stc) involved only the "distribution of the quick assets
that are not essential to the successful operation of the
manufacturing company",28 there can be no doubt that the com¬
petitive position of the manufacturing company was seriously
impaired by these financial transactions. As the special
master pointed out, it lost $8,000,000 in operating capital
without receiving any quid pro quo whatever. On the contrary,
its costs were increased, because where formerly it was only
morally obligated to pay dividends on the preferred stock, now
it was legally obligated to pay some $680,000 as interest on
tfte bonds, which the holding company decided should be issued
by the manufacturing company. Its ultimate liquidation was now
a certainty.
AMOSKEAG IN THE DEPRESSION AFTER 1929
The trustees were probably not surprised that the company
continued to sustain losses. In 1928 both the cotton and the
worsted sections reported operating losses after bond interest.
The aggregate of the losses was more than a million dollars,
of which upwards of 85 percent was due to interest payments.
Even in 1929 the cotton section failed to earn its share of the
interest payments. The worsted section, however, cleared more
than a million dollars after interest disbursements. Upon the
basis of this profit the company paid dividends amounting to
$366,000 for the first time since its reorganization in 1925,
OA
Black, loo. cit.
27
Some Idea of how profitable these transactions were to certain trustees acting
In their own behalf may Be obtained by reference to the following: Black., op. cit.;
Marquis W. Child, "Great Amoskeag Textile Corporation Quits Business With Tragic
Results," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, August 2, 1936, part 8, p. 3J; Investigation
of Seal Estate Bondholders' Reorganizations, p. 82.
28Vol. LXXII, No. 22 (Nov. 26, 1927), p. 39.
60
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
FifBf# ANNUAL PROFITS AND LOSSES BEFORE AND AFTER THE
PAYMENT OF BOND INTEREST. FOB THE COTTON
AND WORSTED SECTIONS.
(Thouitndi of dollan)
Based on tables 12, F-2 *PA -National Research Project
1-46
and a bonus of $356,000 to its operatives. The latter repre¬
sented 9.9 percent of the wage bill of 1929.
The effect of the great depression on Amoskeag is clearly
revealed by a few statistics on corporate earnings and em¬
ployment. In the very next year (1930) the largest loss of
the depression was incurred, more than $1,700,000 for the
cotton section and $999,000 for the worsted after the payment
of $790,000 in bond interest. Losses reported by each section
were somewhat reduced in 1931, the aggregate amounting to
$905,000, of which $750,000 was bond interest. Since the
cash surplus had been syphoned off, these losses could be
paid only out of capital. Inventories of goods in process
and of finished goods on hand declined some $3,200,000 in
the years 1930-31.29
These losses had their counterpart in declines in the volume
of employment. Thus in 1929 the aggregate of man-hours worked
was 21.3 millions. In 1930 the total man-hours were 15.9 mil¬
lions, which increased to 16.7 millions in 1931. In other
89That this was not in any large part due to the lowering of the unit price is
evident from the statistics on physical inventories. Thus on December 31, 1929,
there were 23.7 million square yards of cottons on hand and only 18.0 as of
DecemDer 31, 1931. Worsted dress goods on hand on the former date were 520,943
square yards compared with 497,950 on the latter. Physical Inventories were not
restored to the 1929 level until 1933 and 1934. These statistics were taken from
semiannual accounts in the treasurer's office.
PROFITS AND REORGANIZATIONS
61
words, the volume of employment had been reduced by 28 percent
between 1929 and 1930 and by 22 percent between 1929 and
1931. The shrinkage in the average number of persons employed
was only slightly less.
The depth of the depression in terms of employment was not
reached, however, until June 1932, when in one week only
4,019 persons were employed. Although by the latter part of
this year a decided improvement had occurred, nevertheless
each section sustained losses which totaled more than a million
dollars for the year; three-quarters of this represented bond
interest. The sources of payment appear to have been cash,
investments, and accounts receivable which were reduced by
$1,177,000 during this calendar year.
With wages downtowhat appeared to be an irreducible minimum,
the only hope of relief was in the reduction or elimination of
the fixed burden of the bonded indebtedness. Since the current
market price of the Amoskeag Manufacturing Company's bonds
at this time was between 38 and 4130 and since the Amoskeag
Company retained only $3,600,000 worth of the original issue
of $14,000,000, it involved little sacrifice for the trustees
to offer the bondholders a plan for the conversion of bonds
into cash for 35 percent of their value and into preferred
stock for the balance.31 The bondholders, however, were not
responsive to this idea, and no other similar proposal was
proffered until 3 years later.
AMOSKEAG UNDEB THE NBA .TEXTILE CODES
At about the same time the pre-NRA boom, which Amoskeag
shared with the industry in general, was gaining momentum.
The average weekly number on the pay roll in January 1933 was
6,988, and a gradual expansion took place until in June of
the same year the weekly average was 8,259, an increase of
18 percent. This occurred chiefly in the cotton section. Even
this understates the extent of the upturn, for the percentage
increase in the weekly average of man-hours worked over the
same period was 28.
Whether it was in spite of or because of the NRA textile
codes, which became operative in July, the volume of production
<2A
The Annalist, January 13 ana 20, 1933.
•Z A
"Cotton Mill News," Textile l/orId, Vol. 83, No. 1 (Jan. 1933), p. 95.
62
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
at Amoskeag continued to rise in both the cotton and worsted
sections through the second half of 1933- The volume of pro¬
duction in the worsted section, however, declined through most
of 1934, while production in the cotton section, despite the
national textile strike in September, slightly exceeded the
poundage manufactured in the previous year.
Because of the shortening of the workweek the number employed
increased at a greater rate. The average weekly number em¬
ployed in the cotton section in 1933 was 38 percent larger than
the average in 1933, and in 1934 the average exceeded the
1933 average by 33.5 percent. In the worsted section the 1933
average was some 33 percent larger than the average of the
preceding year, but in 1934 there was a decline of 14.2 percent
from the 1933 average. Those employed in maintenance work,
machinery repairing, and clerical tasks also gradually expanded
in numbers from 540 in July 1933 to a high point of slightly
over 800 in November 1934.
The financial record, for the most part, was not in keeping
with the upturn registered by the production and employment
figures. For example, the cotton section showed an operating
profit of only $60,000 before its share of the interest pay¬
ments. The worsted section, on the other hand, after the
payment of some $333,000 in bond interest, had an operating
profit of more than $400,000. In 1934 this gave way to an
operating loss of about $70,000 before interest payments
because of the decline in production; the loss before interest
payments in the cotton section, however, was upwards of three-
quarters of a million dollars despite the fact that the 1933
level of production had been sustained.
This result is counter to expectations since the general
effect of the Cotton Textile Code was to narrow the wage
differential between the southern and the New England mills,
much to the competitive advantage of the latter; under such
circumstances a rising volume of business would be expected to
yield some profits, as was the case in the worsted section in
1933 before the decline in volume of business in the following
year. The effect of the code wage rates at Amoskeag, however,
was quite the contrary. As is shown in appendix D, the code
wages in cotton textiles tended to widen somewhat the wage
differentials between Amoskeag and the southern mills, to the
PROFITS AND REORGANIZATIONS
63
competitive disadvantage of the former. For this reason, new
orders did not bring Amoskeag out of the red.
It has already been mentioned that in the calendar years of
1931 and 1932, in the absence of a cash surplus and in the
presence of large operating losses, the bond interest was paid
by liquidating inventories and accounts receivable. In 1933
the operating profit from the worsted section was almost
sufficient to meet the interest payments. Nevertheless,
because of the rise in the volume of production and business,
it was necessary for Amoskeag to borrow $1,500,000 from the
bank on unsecured notes to restore its depleted inventories and
accounts receivable to an adequate level.
In the following year an operating loss of about three-
quarters of a million dollars was incurred before interest
payments of the same amount. Accordingly, an additional
$4,000,000 was borrowed in 1934, still on an unsecured note,
from the First National Bank of Boston, of which Mr. Dumaine
was a director. It was used not only to buy supplies and
raw materials and to give credits but also to pay the bond
interest.32
On April 2, 1935, the initial bank loan of $1,500,000 owed
to the National Shawmut Bank was paid off in cash, and the
$4,000,000 owed to the First National Bank was reduced by
$1,000,000 on the same date and a renewal was asked for the
balance. Mr. Dumaine stated: "They said that in view of
the fact that the assets had fallen below the face value
of the bonds they [the bank] would have to have collateral.1,33
Amoskeag agreed to pledge its accounts receivable, and the
note was renewed. In December 1935 when Amoskeag sought
refuge under section 77B of the Federal Bankruptcy Act, all
but $30,000 had been repaid to the bank. According to Mr.
Dumaine's testimony before the Sabath Committee, the decision
to begin liquidations was made at the time of the renewal of
the notes.34 In other words, after withdrawing a cash surplus
of $26,000,000, the structure was brought to the ground by the
gradual withdrawal of circulating capital.
Thus the concessions by the workers in the form of wage cuts
and the stretch-out over a period of years isee appendixes B-D)
32
Investigation of Real Estate Bondholders' Reorganizations, p. 93.
5SIbid., p. 95.
ZiIbid., p. 96.
64
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
were inadequate to maintain mill operations in the face of the
diversion of capital resources, the imposition of unproductive
financial burdens, and the general business depression. Had
this financial policy made for sustained employment before the
shut-down, it might have had more justification. But the
available data show (appendix E) that in addition to continu¬
ously declining wage rates, long hours, and increased job
assignments the post-war period was characterized at Amoskeag
by work for a declining number of persons and by widespread
intermittent employment.
Once the decision to shut down was made, it did not take long
to process inventories on hand. The 1935 peak of employment,
11,014 persons, occurred in the week ending March 8. In the
course of the month about 1,000 were laid off and about double
that number were laid off in April. During May employment was
stabilized around 7,500, but by the end of June this figure
was reduced to 6,400. The invalidation of the NRA at this time
could have no effect on the trend. Under 5,000 were employed
the last week in August and less than 1,000 by September 15,
which may mark the date of the virtual shut-down of the Amoskeag
mills.
Lay-offs of such magnitude could have the effect only of
causing a sharp rise in the Manchester relief load (table F—3) •
So sizable was this increase that it was called to the at¬
tention of the Federal Administrator of Emergency Relief,
who invited the treasurer of the company to Washington early
in September. According to the latter's testimony, "they
wanted to know what could be done. I told them the bondholders
had to be taken care of; the bonds were out."35 The treasurer
was referred to the office of the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation. The latter examined the trial balance of Amoskeag
and decided:
"That is a clean, straight trial balance, but these
bonds are in the way. We can't lend you money except
unde rncsth "t»h©s© bonds* You. ^6t rid of* the bonds
somehow and come back here."36
This offer of the RFC was never accepted. In December 1935
the Amoskeag trustees decided to default on the bond interest.
A bondholders' protective committee friendly to the trustees
35'ibid,.
36Ibid.
PROFITS AND REORGANIZATIONS
65
was established, and the company petitioned for relief under
section 77B of the Federal Bankruptcy Act. This is intended
to facilitate reorganization in lieu of liquidation.
The trustees of the company in a statement to its bond- and
shareholders under date of December 24, 1935, explained that
reorganization was necessary because of the great burden of
bonded indebtedness. Quoting from the petition which had been
filed by the company, they stated: "The existence of the
outstanding bonds [$11,000,000] has required the continued
payment of interest out of capital, has impaired the credit of
the Company, and has resulted, together with other conditions,
in making the Company, in the opinion of the Trustees, insol¬
vent."37 The letter further declared that "reorganization at
the present time will leave the Company with sufficient assets
and ample credit for possible future profitable operations"
which will be carried on "only in that portion of the plant
which can be economically operated, and .... the balance of
the plant or machinery not so needed will be disposed of as
purchasers can be secured. Such anticipated revision of
facilities will not seriously impair the maximum production of
which the plant is now capable."
Not until March 9, 1936, did the company submit a plan for
reorganization to the court. The plan had the approval of both
the bondholders' committee and the committee representing the
stockholders. It was proposed under this plan that general
creditors other than bondholders should be paid in cash the
full amount of their claims, a sum of $67,319. The present
common stockholders were to retain their stock. The bond¬
holders were given a choice between two plans: Plan A, by
which they would receive, in exchange for each $100 of principal
amount of bonds surrendered, one share of 5-percent noncumula-
tive first-preferred stock retirable at call or in liquidation
at 105 and 15 shares of new common stock; or Plan B, by which
they would receive on the same terms $50 in cash and one-half
of a share of 4-percent noncumulative second-preferred stock
retirable at call or in "liquidation at 100.38
37
Letter on file in the Amoskeag Room, Hamilton smith Library, University of
New Hampshire, Durham, New Hampshire.
38
Proceedings lor the Reorganization of a Corporation Ho. 58,599, In re: The
Amoskeag Manufacturing Company, Debtor, District court of the United States,
District of Massachusetts, March 9, 1936.
66
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
Although the bondholders were given the option of withdrawing
their money under Plan B, they were urged to consider seriously
Plan A. Unless 50 percent of the bondholders adopted the first
proposal, the net quick capital would be too greatly reduced
by the cash payment to permit the possibility of reopening
the mills.
On April 6, 1936, the company's counsel reported that holders
of 70 percent of the company's bonds and a majority of the
stockholders had accepted the plan (more than half those
accepting the plan elected Plan B). Included among these
was the Amoskeag Company which owned 31-6 percent of the
bonds and 24.7 percent of the common stock of the Amoskeag
Manufacturing Company.
One month later, on May 4, the bankruptcy court appointed
Arthur Black as special master to determine the feasibility of
the company's reorganization plan. A hearing was scheduled
for June 10. In the meantime the damage to the company's mills
caused by the floods in March was estimated at $2,500,000. To
this sum must be added the $2,300,000 to be paid to bondholders
who had chosen Plan B. These withdrawals would have left
only $4,100,000 in working capital, an insufficient sum.
Accordingly, the company withdrew the plan on June 10.39 A
month later (July 9) the special master recommended liquidation
of the company since $8,000,000 would be necessary to reorganize
the mills and he found that the conditions in the textile
market did not warrant such an expenditure.40
The citizens of Manchester could no longer take refuge in
the hope that the Amoskeag mills would be opened again through
reorganization. Faced with the reality of liquidation, the
Manchester Chamber of Commerce announced (on August 19I its
vigorous opposition to any effort to "junk" the mills.41
This sentiment was crystallized in the incorporation by a
citizens' committee of 17 of an organization known as Amoskeag
Industries, Incorporated, for the purpose of purchasing the
company's property. The members of the organization subscribed
to $500,000 worth of stock, the Public Service Company of
New Hampshire agreed to repurchase the hydroelectric station,
39"Amoskeag's Plan wrecked by Flood," The Hew fork Tines, June 11, 1036, p. 37.
40»Urges Liquidation of Amoskeag Mills," The lew Tork Tines, July 10, 1936, p. 27.
41"Will Fight Junking of Amoskeag Mills," The lew Tork Tines, August 20, 1936,
p. 26.
PROFITS AND REORGANIZATIONS
67
canals, and water wheels of Amoskeag for $2,aSo,ooo, and an
equal amount was loaned by the local banks to complete the
purchase price of $5,000,000.48 The purchase included the
mill units, tenements, goodwill, Merrimack River water rights,
and other holdings in Manchester.43
By September 15, 1936, Amoskeag Industries, Incorporated,
was prepared to announce that it would offer mill space for
lease or sale to any incoming industry that would guarantee to
employ Manchester labor. There is irony in the fact that
after 105 years of operation Amoskeag ended as it began, a
real-estate-development corporation. Now, however, it had a
different purpose. Over 100 years ago its energies had been
directed toward transforming a hamlet into a city; now it was
most earnestly concerned with preserving the economic basis
of that city.44
Ap
It is interesting to note that by virtue of this sale, the Amoskeag Manufacturing
Company had a balance of $13,700,000, sufficient to pay all claims including
$11,379,000 in bonds with accrued Interest as well as liquidation costs.
43
"Utility Aids City in Amoskeag Deal," The New York Tines, September 3, 1936, p. 29.
44
The degree of success that has attended Its first efforts will be described
in chapter V.
CHAPTER IV
EFFECTS OF THE SHUT-DOWN
During the year in which the Amoskeag shut-down occurred more
than 17,000 persons had been employed by the company, although
not more than 11,014 were at work at any one time. Of these,
almost two-thirds were employed in the manufacture of cotton
products, a fourth in the manufacture of worsteds, and the
remainder in clerical and maintenance departments. The work
force was almost equally divided in regard to sex of workers.
Although no data are available on the nationalities represented
in the 1935 work force, there is no reason to believe that they
differed markedly from those prevailing in 1929 when a company
census was taken.1 At that time almost half of the workers
were French-Canadians. Of the remainder, there were about
equal proportions of native-born Americans, Irishmen, Poles,
and other nationalities combined. Most of the workers had the
specialized kind of industrial experience typical of textile
workers throughout the country. Their occupational character¬
istics will be considered in this chapter in relation to the
type of job opportunities that were available in Manchester and
in relation to their reemployment experience after the shut¬
down. Some workers waited for the mills to reopen. Others
migrated to neighboring textile towns. The majority of the
workers displaced by the shut-down were unable to secure other
jobs in the area, and consequently many were later found to be
on public relief rolls.
DECLINE IV kUNCHESTBV'8 EMPLOYMENT OPPOITUNITIES
PSIOE TO THE SHUT-DOWN
The industrial structure of Manchester is apparent from the
United States census taken in 1930 and adapted for Manchester
in table 14. It is rather striking that even after a decade
of declining job opportunity in manufacturing and of increas¬
ing employment in the various services and trade, almost 60
percent of those gainfully occupied reported their occupational
1It may be noted that annual company censuses, 1911-29, show little change In
the proportions that Americans, Irish, and Poles, respectively, were of the
total. Greeks declined from 8.1 percent In 1911 to 4.8 percent in 1929, and French
Canadians Increased from 37,6 to 46.4 percent.
68
EFFECTS OF SHUT-DOWN
69
attachment to be in the manufacturing and mechanical indus¬
tries. The next largest concentration, 12 percent, was in
trade, and the remainder was about equally distributed among
transportation and communication; clerical occupations; and
professional, domestic, and personal services. Clearly, then,
Table 14.- DISTRIBUTION OP MANCHESTER'S GAINFULLY OCCUPIED
POPULATION. BY INDUSTRIAL GROUP. 1980a
Total
Industrial group
Num¬
Per¬
Men
Women
ber
cent
Total
34,446
100.0
22,270
12,176
Agriculture
285
0.8
284
1
Forestry and fishing
70
0.2
70
0
Extraction of minerals
13
0. 1
13
0
Manufacturing and mechanical
20,312
59.0
13,340
6,972
Transportation and communication
1,704
4.9
1,553
151
Trade
4,153
12.1
3,467
686
Public service
718
2.1
709
9
Professional service
2,078
6.0
838
1,240
Domestic and personal service
2,686
7.8
1,074
1,612
Clerical
2,427
7.0
922
1,505
aFifteenth Census of the United States: 1930, "Population" (U. S. Dept. Com.,
Bur. Census, 1933), vol. IV, p. 984.
the fluctuations of employment in manufactures will explain in
a large measure the fluctuations of employment opportunities
in Manchester. These fluctuations are shown in table 15 where
the average number of wage earners employed in manufactures, as
reported to the Census of Manufactures for specified years
between 1899 and 1935, are recorded for Manchester, Amoskeag,
and New England.2
Just before the turn of the present century the number of
wage earners in Manchester's manufacturing establishments was
a little less than 18,000 and reached its peak (to the extent
that this can be revealed by a discontinuous time series) in
1914 when, on the average, almost 26,000 persons were employed.
In the first post-war year, 1919, there was a decline of a
little more than 1 percent from the peak employment in 1914.
2
Figures for Amoskeag wage earners have been adapted from company records and
computed by the census method.
70
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
T»bU It.- NUMBER OP WAOB EARNERS IN MANUFACTURING
ESTABLISHMENTS IN NEW ENGLAND, MANCHESTER,
AND AMOSEEAO, ll»»-l»l»a
Year
Number
of wage earners
Index of wage earners (1914-100)
New
England
Manchester
Nsw
England
Manchester
Total
Amoskeag
Non-
Amoskeag
Percent
Amoskeag
Is of
Manchsster
Total
Amoskeag
Non-
Amoskeag
1899
947,643
17,862
n. a .
11. a.
83.1
69.1
1904
940,752
17,579
n. a.
n. a ,
-
82.5
60.0
-
-
1909
1,101,290
24.735
n. a.
n. t.
-
96.6
95.7
-
-
1914
1.140,233
25,843
13,632
12,211
52.7
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
1919
1,351,389
25.512
12,076
13,436
47.3
118.5
90.7
80.6
110.0
1929
1.098.514
19.166
9,249
9, 919
48.3
96.3
74.2
67.8
81.2
1931
850,132
16.270
7,160
9,110
44.0
74.6
63.0
52.3
74.6
1933
798,282
13,757
7,019
5, 936
56.8
70.0
52.2
57.4
46.6
1935
911.022
12,856
5,575b
7.201
(0)
79.9
49.7
<c)
50.6
for Muiches tsr and New England wage earners are adapted from Census of Manufactures data. Figures for
Amosksat wage earners are based on coapsny records and computed by the census aeUiod.
6Tbe average for the first fl months was 0,331.
cIn new or Astosaeag's final liquidation and shut-down in this year, a percentage would not be meaningful.
b. a. Data not available.
All manufactures in New England, on the other hand, did not
achieve their peak employment until 1919, the peak figure being
some 18 percent above the 1919 employment.
By the close of the "prosperous" twenties, however, employ¬
ment in manufactures in all of New England had declined nearly
19 percent during the decade, while Manchester's employment
showed a decennial decline of about 25 percent. Indeed, so
drastic was the curtailment that Manchester's factories em¬
ployed only 7 percent more persons in 1939 than in 1899,
although its population during this period had increased by
about 35 percent.
It is important to note, moreover, that although Amoskeag
employment accounted for about 50 percent of Manchester's
factory employment, Manchester's decline in employment op¬
portunities reflected more than Amoskeag's gradual liquidation.
Thus, between 1919 and 1929 Manchester's factory employment
other than Amoskeag's sustained a decline of almost 26 percent
compared with 23.5 percent for Amoskeag. In the earlier part
of the general depression, however, non-Amoskeag employment
declined at a less rapid rate than did Amoskeag's, but this
trend was reversed in the latter part of the depression. With
the general business revival, which was in progress from the
middle of 1933 through 1935, non-Amoskeag employment increased
some 23 percent, but it was still about 27 percent under the
EFFECTS OF SHUT-DOWN
71
level of employment that had obtained in 1929 - and this at
the very time that half of the employment opportunities in
Manchester's factories disappeared with the closing of the
Amoskeag mills. Much the same situation characterized the
New England region; that is, an expansion of employment in
manufactures of 14 percent occurred between 1933 and 1935, but
this represented a decline of 17 percent from the 1929 figure.
The full seriousness of the situation at the outset of the
depression can be appreciated only when it is realized that in
the services and in trade there was no employment gain suffi¬
ciently large to offset this loss as in other urban communities
during this decade. There was a decrease in manufacturing
wage jobs of 6,000 in round numbers between 1919 and 1929 and
an increase of only 2,000 (between 1920 and 1930) in the num¬
ber gainfully employed in industries other than manufactures
(table 16).
Table 16.- NUMBER GAINFULLY OCCUPIED IN MANCHESTER,
BY SELECTED OCCUPATIONAL GHOUI»
AND SEX, 1920 AND 1 980a
Occupational group
1920
1930
Total
Men
Women
Total
Men
Women
Total
10,028
5,780
4,248
12,062
7, 010
5,052
Trade
3,277
2,672
605
4,153
3,467
686
Public service
633
632
1
718
709
9
Professional service
1, 573
662
911
2, 078
838
1, 240
Domestic and personal
service
2,107
830
1,277
2,686
1, 074
1,612
Clerical
2,438
984
1,454
2,427
922
1,505
aData for: 1920 from Fourteenth Census of the United States: 1920, "Population"
U. S. Dept. Com., Bur. Census, 1923), vol. IV, p. 292; and 1930 from Fifteenth
ensus of the United States: 1930, "Population" (U. S- Dept. Com., Bur. Census,
1933), vol. IV, p. 985.
From these few salient facts the conclusion seems inescapable
that Manchester's depression antedated 1929. The same facts
serve also to give the setting for the outward migration of
more than 10,000 persons during the decade of the "prosperous"
twenties. The depression could have the effect only of ac¬
celerating the rate of Manchester's decline in employment
opportunities both in manufactures and in the services and
trade. The revival in business, aside from the closing of
72
SHUT-DOWN OP AMOSKEAG
Amoskeag, did not attain the level of 1929 measured in terms of
employment either in Manchester or in the New England region.
Although this was the situation in general at the time of the
shut-down, there were some offsetting considerations. Employ¬
ment in cotton mills in the country as a whole improved during
the latter part of 1935 when the Amoskeag shut-down occurred,
and the improvement was sustained and extended throughout 1936.
Since this certainly was the case for the entire industry,
there is no reason to believe that the neighboring mills in
Massachusetts and Maine did not share in the upswing (table 17).
Table it.- INDEXES OF MONTHLY EMPLOYMENT IN THE MANUFACTUBE
OF COTTON AND WOOLEN AND WOBSTED TEXTILES
IN THE UNITED STATES, 1966 AND 1916*
(19*9-96-100)
Month
Cotton textiles
Woolen and worsted
textiles
1935
1936
1935
1936
January
96.3
91.7
91.8
97.8
February
96.7
91.4
93.9
97.4
March
95.5
91.6
92.4
93.0
April
91.9
90.4
98.0
87.8
May
88.0
90.4
91.1
86.7
June
85.1
90.7
96.7
87.0
July
82.3
93.4
94.4
88.0
August
81.6
96.3
97.3
89.9
September
84.8
97.8
95.9
85.9
October
88.0
97.6
98.5
78.5
November
90.6
99.5
103.1
83.8
December
92.2
101.4
102.4
91.6
'Adapted from Monthly Labor itvitu.h hferch 1986-March 1937.
In fact it is well known that many of the mills in the New
England region during this period instituted a third shift,
and the opinion was widely held that this was possible in large
part because of the availability of skilled workers formerly
employed by Amoskeag, particularly loom fixers. For the latter
part of 1935, much the same situation obtained in the woolen
and worsted industry, but in 1936 employment fell off. To what
extent former Amoskeag operatives were able to take advantage
of the temporary pick-up in textiles will be indicated at
a later point.
EFFECTS OF SHUT-DOWN
73
The manufacture of boots and shoes ranked second in importance
as an employer of Manchester's factory population. The expan¬
sion in this industry in and around Manchester that occurred in
1935-36 served as the only other mitigating industrial factor.3
The Census of Manufactures reported the monthly average em¬
ployment in the boot and shoe industry of New Hampshire as
14,544 in 1929, 11,300 in 1933, and 15,035 in 1935, an all-time
peak for the State. In the latter year, 4,817 of these shoe
jobs, almost one-third, were in Manchester.4
The manufacture of cigars in Manchester had at one time em¬
ployed over 1,200 persons, but at the time of the Amoskeag
shut-down less than half this number was so employed, largely
as the result of the mechanization of the process in 1931 when
more than 600 men hand workers were replaced by some 200 girl
WPA - National Research Project (Sine J
FIGURE 7.- REMOVING A FULL LAP FROM A PICKER
This machine continues the cleaning and fluffing of the raw cotton, begun
on other machines. Equipped with an "evener", it forms a lap (a layer of
cotton fiber) of uniform weight. Another machine splits the lap into thick
strands or "slivers."
^uch the largest part of New Hampshire's shoe Industry Is located In the tier
of lower counties - Hillsborough (which contains Manchester), Rocltlnghain, and
Strafford.
4
The figure for Manchester Is taken from a letter to the National Research Project
from the U. S. Bureau of the Census, June 16, 1937.
74
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
machine operators.8 Consequently, the possibilities of this
industry absorbing Amoskeag workers were extremely limited.
Other industries in Manchester, such as woodworking factories
and foundry and machine shops, involved small-scale operations
which at best would experience only a moderate cyclical im¬
provement in business. They certainly provided no wholesale
opportunities for reemployment. Nor did agriculture offer any
brighter prospects. The stony soil of the surrounding area
did not favor the novice, and even poultry raising, the most
generally pursued form of the agricultural industry in this
section, required a considerable capital outlay. Expansion of
employment opportunities in the services and trade was also not
a hopeful possibility for reasons already set forth.
ATTITUDE OF AMOSKEAG WOBKEES AFTKB THE SHUT-DOW*
That the work had been running out for several months and
that by September 1935 almost all the mills were closed was
recognized by the workers but was viewed as a temporary con¬
dition. To find support for wishful thinking they appealed to
historical precedent. After all, they argued, the company as
such had been operating for 105 years; it was just unbelievable
that it would go out of existence.
Moreover, current happenings could easily be utilized to bol¬
ster this faith in ultimate resurrection. State and municipal
officials, for example, were earnestly seeking for ways and
means of assisting in the reopening of the mills. Local trade-
union officials were ready to offer concessions. Furthermore,
the Amoskeag officials, when they applied to the bankruptcy
court in December 193s, sought permission to reorganize and not
permission to liquidate. Both the bondholders and stockholders
formed protective committees, which from time to time in the
next few months presented plans for reorganization. As re¬
lated in chapter III, a plan agreed upon both by the committees
ami the company was filed with the court on March 9, 1936.
Of no little importance in keeping alive hope for the re¬
opening of the mills was the result of a ballot taken on
March 7, 1936, among former employees of the company whose
names appeared on the 1935 pay rolls. The poll was conducted
8For a discussion of the acMustment made by the displaced workers see Daniel Creamer
and Gladys V. Swackhamer, Cigar Makers — After the Lay-off (WPA National Research
Project, Report No. L-l, Dec. 1937).
EFFECTS OF SHUT-DOWN
75
by the Citizens' Committee of the city of Manchester and the
Manchester Textile Council on the following question: "Are you
willing to work under adjusted wages and conditions which will
permit permanent and peaceful operations on a competitive cost
basis as determined by the management and representatives of
the workers and approved for submission to the workers by the
chairman of the New Hampshire Textile Commission and the chair¬
man of the Citizens' Committee?"6 Of the 6,802 valid ballots,
54 percent were cast in the affirmative.
This display of willingness to make concessions, however, was
not met by an equal willingness on the part of the bondholders.
Accordingly, the court was constrained to order liquidation
of the company's property. The court's order, it should be
remembered, was not made until July 1936; that is, for almost
a year after the shut-down the workers had some basis for hop¬
ing that Amoskeag would reopen the mills. There can be little
doubt that this attitude affected the type of job hunt they
made during the interval.
That such was the attitude, at least in the first few months
after the shut-down, is clearly evident from the report of
a survey of families living in company tenements. This canvass
was undertaken by a representative of the company's personnel
office in November and December of 1935. In that year the
company tenements housed 931 of its employees, with all the
mill departments and nationalities represented. Accordingly,
they may be considered for this purpose a representative sample
of Amoskeag workers. In an interim report under the date of
December 9, 1935, the investigator recorded that "the occupants
of the tenements made the usual inquiries as to when the mills
will reopen; will they be closed all winter? Are the unions
to blame for conditions? When they start, will it be longer
hours, etc.?" In the final report of January 31, 1936, he
estimated that "approximately 80% of those interviewed inquired
as to when the mills would reopen."
While waiting for the mills to resume operations, many used
their enforced leisure to make improvements in their tenements.
Thus "it was noticed that a majority of the houses had been
newly papered and painted. This has been done by the male
6
From copy of ballot in the company's files.
76
SHUT-DOWN OP AMOSKEAG
members of the families at their own expense during the closing
of the mills."7
On the other hand, at this early date "some of the families
were indifferent as to what was in store for the future. My
impression was [that] these persons are in debt and their hope
of ever getting out of the red was forlorn. They appeared to
take the attitude of letting things take their course and drift
along - all ambition in these families appeared to be gone."®
This attitude was doubtless reinforced by the realization that
employment opportunities in the Manchester area had been de¬
clining for some years.
CHARACTERISTICS OF AMOSKEAG WORKERS
DISPLACED BY THE SHUT-DOWN
How well qualified were these former Amoskeag workers to
compete for the limited number of jobs available in private
industry in the area? Age, degree of skill, occupational
habituation, amount of schooling, marital status, and family
responsibilities are some of the factors that could condition
the result. The operatives in the sample studied who were laid
off from the Amoskeag pay roll in 1935 are a representative
cross section of Amoskeag workers at the time of the shut-down.
Accordingly, a description of their characteristics should bear
on the question posed above.
The median age of the men in 193s was 40.5 years. Almost
60 percent were under <45, and as many as 21 percent were over
55. Even under more auspicious conditions most of the latter
group would have had extreme difficulty in finding employment.
The women were younger- Their median age was 37 years; almost
three-quarters of them were under 45 years of age and only
8 percent were 55 or over.
The fact that the Amoskeag workers were predominantly em¬
ployed at semiskilled jobs at the time of the shut-down could
scarcely be considered an advantage to them in the subsequent
job hunt. About half of the men, for example, were semiskilled
operatives, and the other half was about equally divided be¬
tween those having skilled and unskilled jobs. The women were
7From a tenement survey report by a company Investigator, November is, 1935.
•Tenement" Is used In Its more general sense to Indicate dwellings which are rented
or for rent.
aIbid., January 31, 1936-
EFFECTS OF SHUT-DOWN
77
concentrated in semiskilled occupations to an even greater
degree, 85 percent being so classified; 11 percent were skilled
operatives.9
How much occupational mobility the workers possessed would
depend in part on the extent of their occupational habituation.
Some idea of this may be had from data on the number of years
at the longest occupation. For more than one-quarter of the
operatives the longest occupational assignment did not exceed
2 years, and for an additional 31 percent this had lasted from
2! to 7 years. For about one-third the longest occupation
extended over a minimum of 10 years. The degree of occupa¬
tional habituation is rather directly related to age. Thus,
to the disadvantages of age itself in the case of an older
person seeking reemployment must be added the disabilities of
an advanced degree of occupational habituation.10
The amount of formal schooling did not particularly enhance
the occupational mobility of the Amoskeag workers. Upwards
of 7 percent of both the men and the women had no schooling at
all, and about one-quarter had completed from one to six grades.
Only one-third had completed the eight grades of grammar school.
Although one-quarter of the men had some high-school training,
not quite 9 percent had graduated from high school. For the
women the respective percentages were 14 and 4.5.11
Geographical mobility, on the other hand, would be affected
by other considerations, such as years in the community, family
responsibilities, and home ownership. The measurement of the
first factor would provide some idea of the extent of the loca-
tional inertia to be overcome. Almost half of the operatives
reported that they had resided in Manchester for more than
20 years, and an additional one-third reported that they had
lived in this community since birth.
Of the men and women reporting marital status, 70 percent of
the former and 72 percent of the latter were married at the time
of the shut-down. Some 26 percent of the married men reporting
on dependency indicated that they had no dependents, whereas
9Flgures in this and the preceding paragraph are based on Interviews of workers
separated from Amoskeag In 1935. The survey Is described on page 79, and the
findings are subsequently referred to as "NRP field-survey data." The schedule
used was NRP Form 20 (see appendix H).
10Data are for Amoskeag workers separated In 1935, and are based on an NRP tabula¬
tion of a sample of company personnel records (Form 1030 - see appendix 0).
11Except where otherwise specified, data In this and the following two paragraphs
are based on NRP field-survey data.
78
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
• pa -Nttion*! N«««»reh Projtct (Bine)
flSUDE 8.- REPAIRING BREAK IN SLIVER ON A DRAWING FRAME
Four to eight strands of sliver are passed through the four pairs of
drawing rollers of this machine (each roller revolving faster than the
preceding one) to form one thinner and more even strand of sliver.
one-third had three or more. It was reported that one-third of
the married women also had three or more dependents, but only
22 percent had no dependents.12
Home ownership, however, was not so widely prevalent that it
could be regarded as an impediment to emigration for many of
the workers. In a survey of 188 heads of households who had
been employed at Amoskeag it was found that in less than one-
third of the cases, 30.9 percent, was the house owned by the
head of the household or by his wife in those instances where
the husband was the head of the household.18
In view of the job possibilities and the workers' qualifica¬
tions, what adjustments could they make? Adjustments may be
grouped according to two broad classifications: those that
depend entirely upon the private efforts of the individual and
those that depend primarily upon organized community efforts.
Under the latter category, the extent and character of new em¬
ployment resulting from the activity of the Citizens' Committee
12There was undoubtedly some double counting, for it was not uncommon for both
husband and wife to work at Amoskeag (see appendix E, p. 292). Figures ror depend¬
ents are based on company personnel records (Form 1030).
13For additional information regarding the Manchester household survey see ap¬
pendix E, p. 292-
EFFECTS OF SHOT-DOWN
79
in inducing new employers to locate in Manchester will be
discussed in the next chapter. Under the former head, the
unassisted efforts of the workers in finding private employment
either in Manchester or elsewhere will be discussed in the
present chapter. In lieu of finding employment, many workers
found it necessary to secure public relief. This and other
effects of the shut-down are also discussed in subsequent
sections of this chapter.
PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT AFTER THE SHUT-DOWN
For this part of the study a sample of Amoskeag workers who
had become unemployed through the shut-down were interviewed
from 13 to 22 months after the loss of their Amoskeag employ¬
ment.14 The names selected for interview were based on that
part of the 10-percent sample of the personnel files15 in which
the final separation occurred in 1935. This procedure re¬
sults in a close approximation to a 10-percent sample of those
employed at Amoskeag in 1935, and in most respects it is a
representative cross section of Amoskeag operatives in the
year of the closing of the mills.
This survey yielded 1,534 names, of whom 1,114 were inter¬
viewed. All but 46 of the schedules were usable, making a
total sample of 1,068. This may be regarded as a 7-percent
sample of Amoskeag workers in the last year of the company's
operation. With respect to distribution by sex and marital
status, by age, and by degree of skill, the composition of
the 7-percent sample does not differ significantly from the
composition of the 10-percent sample.
Of the 420 employees who were not interviewed, 51, or 3.3
percent of the 10-percent sample, were accounted for either
by death or by removal to a community too far away to make
interviews feasible, or because their employment at Amoskeag
had been of less than a month's duration. Thus 369, or almost
one-quarter of the original sample, could not be located.
Since a diligent search was made for them within Manchester,
it is probable that most of these had left the city. It is
safe to conclude, therefore, that employment other than in
Manchester after the shut-down is grossly understated by the
14
All those separated from the Amoskeag pay roll In 1935 were considered as unem¬
ployed because of the shut-down.
1SFor description of company personnel records see appendix G.
80
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
sample of 1,068 persons interviewed. To evaluate the role of
migration after the shut-down it will be necessary to make use
of other data.
The interviews were begun about the middle of October 1936
and were terminated at the end of January 1937* The employment
status of the workers is measured as of October 15, 1936*1® It
was not until December of this year that the Citizens' Committee
arranged for the first new company to locate in Manchester.
Some of the workers who were reported as unemployed in October
may have secured jobs in the new industries at a later date.
Istaival Ik* 8k«t-dow» n4 t k* Pint Job
The difficulties involved in making a satisfactory economic
adjustment within aa months after the shut-down are apparent
from an examination of the interval that elapsed between the
shut-down and the next job in private industry, including self-
employment. Most revelatory of this is the fact that three-
fifths of the men and four-fifths of the women had no private
Takl* II.- PEICEITAOE DI8TEIBUT I OK OP THOSB WHO WBIB
KEEMPLOTED,* BT INTERVAL BETWEEH LAST
AMOSEEAO JOB ABD NEXT JOB AID BT 8EXb
Duration of interval
Men
Women
in months
Total
Number
213
97
Percent
100.0
100.0
0
24.5
20.5
1- 3
17.4
9.4
4- 6
16.4
16.5
7- 9
13.1
9.3
10-12
14.1
18.5
13-15
10.8
19.6
16-18
2.8
6.2
19-21
0.9
0
aBy October 16. 1936.
bNRP fieId-survey data.
ieAlthough the occupational history of each worker was traced back to laee. prlmry
Interest atta'ches to the period following the Amoskeag shut-down. Accordingly'
material relating to the preceding time period will be utilized only when It
contributes to an understanding of what happened after the closing of the mills
The schedule used for this field survey (Form 20) and an explanation of terms
Is presented In appendix H.
EFFECTS OF SHUT-DOWN
81
employment within this period which may have been as long as
22 months. Of the 40 percent of the men in this group who
found private employment, one-quarter were reemployed within
a month of the shut-down and an additional one-third within
6 months (table 18). As many as 14.5 percent were unemployed
at least a year before employment was obtained.
The women had even greater difficulties in finding work.
Only 20 percent of the women in the sample ever secured em¬
ployment, and only one-fifth of these did so within a month.
An additional 25 percent of those who finally found work were
reabsorbed within the following 6 months, and as many as one-
quarter became employed within the 10 months immediately pre¬
ceding the date of interview.
Employment Stntoi in October 198t
These data, however, overstate the extent of reemployment
that had taken place as of the interview date since by that
time some who had been reemployed were again without employ¬
ment. Their employment status as of October 15, 1936, is shown
in table 19. From this table may be seen some of the factors
that conditioned the competition for the limited number of jobs.
In general, it appears that a larger percentage of the men
than of the women had private employment on the date of inter¬
view; that single persons had more employment than married
persons, especially among the women; and that the younger work¬
ers were favored over the older workers. A closer inspection,
however, of the relationship of marital status to current em¬
ployment status of the men indicates that the true relationship
is concealed by totals. For example, if the single and married
men are compared by age groups, it is found that in each age
group a larger percentage of the married men compared with the
single men was privately employed. This fact is lost in the
comparison of totals because age also influenced reemployment
and the unmarried men constituted a considerably younger group
than did the married men.
Reasons for the difference between married and unmarried
men suggest themselves. On the whole, the former would have
greater financial responsibilities which probably would lead
them to seek more earnestly for employment than would single
men, and this would create a greater willingness to accept
82
SHUT-DOWN OP AMOSKEAG
Tab la IB.- PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF WORKERS, BY AGE, SEX,
AND MARITAL AND EMPLOYMENT 8TATU8
AS OP OCTOBER IB, 1#86®
Marital and
employment status
Age
in years
persons
20 or
under
25-34
35-44
45-54
55 or
over
Men
Single, total
Number
173
91
45
12
12
13
Percent
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Employed
Unemployed
seeking work
Unemployed not
seeking work
35.3
64.7
0
45.1
54.9
0
35.6
64.4
0
16.7
83. 3
0
16.7
83. 3
0
0
100.0
0
Married, total
Number
376
14
62
102
95
103
Percent
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Employed
Unemployed
seeking work
Unemployed not
seeking work
30.6
66.8
2.6
57.1
42.9
0
48. 4
51.6
0
38.2
60.8
1.0
25. 3
72.6
2.1
13.6
79.6
6.8
Women
Single, total
Number
167
76
43
26
9
13
Percent
100.0
100 .0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Employed
Unemployed
seeking work
Unemployed not
seeking work
21.6
73. 1
5.3
28.9
65.8
5. 3
14.0
81. 4
4.6
15.4
80.8
3.8
22.2
66.7
11. 1
15.4
76.9
7.7
Married, total
Number
352
17
77
149
84
25
Percent
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Employed
Unemployed
seeking work
Unemployed not
seeking work
9.7
67.6
22.7
11.8
64.7
23.5
20.8
57. 1
22. 1
7.4
72. 5
20. 1
6.0
65.5
28.5
0
80.0
20.0
aNRP field-survey data.
EFFECTS OF SHUT-DOWN
83
WPA - Nations I Research Project (Hine)
FIGURE 9.- WORKER "PIECING UP" ON A SLUB8ER
The slubber transforms the sliver into roving by stretching it, giving it a
slight twist, and winding it on a bobbin.
stopgap or dead-end employment that a single person might re¬
gard as inferior and unacceptable. In addition, employers,
realizing the difference in financial responsibilities, often
favored married men, other things being equal.
That the opposite relationship prevailed among married and
unmarried women also seems reasonable. The married women, it
has been shown, were typically part of the labor reserve and
when the main source of supplementary employment was eliminated
either did not seek diligently for employment elsewhere or
84
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
Tab1* 20.- PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF WORKERS, BY DEGREE
OF SKILL OF LONGEST AMOSKEAG JOB, 1080-S4, SEX,
AND MARITAL AND EMPLOYMENT STATUS AS OF OCTOBER 16, l»8 6a
Marital and
Semi¬
employment status
Skilled
skilled
Unskilled
Men
Single, total
Number
18
85
70
Percent
100.0
100.0
100.0
Employed
55.8
29.4
37.1
Unemployed seeking work
44.4
70.6
62.9
Unemployed not seeking work
0
0
0
Married, total
Number
124
199
53
Percent
100.0
100.0
100.0
Employed
37. 1
26. 6
30.2
Unemployed seeking work
61. 3
70.4
66.0
Unemployed not seeking work
1.6
3.0
3.8
Women
Single, total
Number
19
146
2
Percent
100.0
100.0
100.0
Employed
31.6
20.5
0
Unemployed seeking work
63.2
74.0
0
Unemployed not seeking work
5.2
5.5
100.0
Married, total
Number
45
305
2
Percent
100.0
100.0
100.0
Employed
11.1
9.2
0
Unemployed seeking work
68.9
67. 5
100.0
Unemployed not seeking work
20.0
23. 3
0
aNRP field-survey data. For classification or occupations by degree of skill,
see appendix G.
EFFECTS OF SHUT-DOWN
85
Table 21.- PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OP WORKERS,
BY INDUSTRIAL SECTION. SEX. AND MARITAL
AND EMPLOYMENT STATUS AS OP OCTOBER It. 198ta
Marital and
Cotton
Worsted
General
employment status
section
section
section13
Men
Single, total
Number
134
24
15
Per dent
100.0
100.0
100.0
Employed
35.8
25.0
46. 7
Unemployed seeking work
64.2
75.0
53.3
Unemployed not seeking work
0
0
0
Married, total
Number
239
90
47
Percent
100.0
100.0
100.0
Employed
28.0
30.0
44.7
Unemployed seeking work
68.6
68. 9
53.2
Unemployed not seeking work
3.4
1.1
2.1
Women
Single, total
Number
88
77
2
Percent
100.0
100.0
100.0
Employed
25.0
16.9
0
Unemployed seeking work
70.5
77.9
100.0
Unemployed not seeking work
4.5
5.2
0
Married, total
Number
221
131
0
Percent
100.0
100.0
—
Employed
10.4
7.6
Unemployed seeking work
68.8
66.4
-
Unemployed not seeking work
20.8
26.0
-
aNRP field-survey data.
bIncludes mechanical, maintenance, and central office (clerical) staffs.
86
SHUT-DOWN OP AMOSKEAG
removed themselves entirely from the labor market. Evidence
of the latter is the fact that from one-fifth to one-fourth
of the married women in each age group were unemployed and not
seeking work, while among all the other categories of workers
the number with this status was negligible. More will be made
of this point later in the discussion.
The degree of skill and the industrial section in which the
worker had been employed (cotton, worsted, or general) seem
to have had some effect on reemployment. The data shown in
tables 30 and ai are based on the occupational group and in¬
dustry of the individual's longest job at Amoskeag between 1930
and 1934. On this basis, among both single and married men
relatively more skilled workers found jobs than did the semi¬
skilled and unskilled. A larger percentage of the unskilled,
however, as compared with the semiskilled persons, was cur¬
rently employed.17 This suggests that the unskilled probably
were both more willing to accept and were better suited for
laboring jobs than were the semiskilled. Among the women also,
the skilled workers were better able to find employment than
were the semiskilled, especially the single women; the per¬
centage difference among the married women is very small and
probably is not meaningful.10
Among the men, regardless of marital status, those whose most
recent training had been in the general section of the plant
(including skilled mechanics and laborers as well as clerical
workers) fared best in the job hunt. The single men and women
from the cotton section had relatively more success in being
reemployed than did those from the worsted section. Among
the married persons there seems to have been no appreciable
difference in this respect.
Daratioa of tap I ojtbo it Slots* is October IM4
Although only 33 percent of all the workers in the sample
were employed in October 1936, even this status had not been
long enjoyed by many of the 33 percent, as might be inferred
from the distribution of the interval between last Amoskeag job
and next job. The duration of the status of October 1936 is
shown in table 33. Of all the men and the single women who
17It should he mentioned that this difference among the married men is not sta¬
tistically significant.
18The number of unskilled women was too small for tabulation.
EFFECTS OP SHUT-DOWN
87
were employed in October 1936, for example, only about one-
quarter had been employed during the entire interval between
loss of Amoskeag employment and the interview date, a maximum
of 22 months. Of the married women with jobs in October 1936,
only about one-tenth had had employment for the entire inter¬
val. An additional 10 percent or so of each group, except the
married women, had been employed at least a year. On the other
Table 22.• PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF WORKERS,
BY MARITAL STATUS AND DURATION OF EMPLOYMENT STATUS
AS OF OCTOBER 15, 1985, AND SEXa
Duration
of
employment
status
in months
Single
Married
Em¬
ployed
Unem¬
ployed
seeking
work
Unem¬
ployed
not
seeking
work
Em¬
ployed
Unem¬
ployed
seeking
work
Unem¬
ployed
not
seeking
work
Men
Total
Number
61
112
0
115
251
10
Percent
100.0
100.0
-
100.0
100.0
100.0
1- 3
19.7
6.3
27.0
4.4
0
4- 8
18.0
5.4
-
10.5
2.8
0
7- S
21.3
1.8
-
7.8
0.4
0
10-12
0.0
0. 9
-
8.7
1.2
10.0
13-15
8.2
0
-
8.7
0.4
0
16-18
1.0
0
-
3.5
0
0
Entire
interval"
24.6
85.6
-
27.8
90.8
90.0
Women
Total
Number
36
122
9
34
238
80
Percent
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
1- 3
27.8
5.8
0
44.1
2.1
1.3
4- 6
22.2
2.5
0
23.5
1.7
0
7- 9
2.8
1.6
0
11.8
0.4
0
10-12
5.5
0.8
0
5.9
0.8
1.2
13-15
11.1
0.8
11.1
0
1. 7
0
16-18
2.8
0
0
2.9
0
0
Entire
interval"
27.8
88.5
88.9
CD
tH
H
93.3
97.5
aNRP field-survey data.
"Entire period (13-22 months) between loss of last AmosKeag Joband October 15, 1936.
88
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
hand, from one-third to two-thirds of the currently employed
had been so engaged for 6 months or less.
The status of those who were unemployed and seeking work in
October 1936 was of even longer standing. Between 86 and 93
percent of these persons had been unemployed and seeking work
during the entire interval since the loss of their Amoskeag
jobs. Even larger percentages of those who were not seeking
work had had this status during the entire interval since the
shut-down; four-fifths of this group, however, were married
women.
Dittribvtloa of Total Tin# Attar tko Sbat-dowa
The extent to which the former Amoskeag workers were eco¬
nomically stranded by the shut-down may also be expressed by
a distribution of the total man-months in the sample which
elapsed between the last Amoskeag job and October 1936. This
distribution is presented in table 23 and figure 10. Of the
total man-months in the sample, 15 percent were months of em¬
ployment, including self-employment which was of negligible
amount; about two-thirds of the months were months of unem¬
ployment seeking work, excluding the 10 percent of the months
represented by emergency Government employment; and the re¬
maining 10 percent were months of time not seeking work. The
differences by sex and marital status are only those which
would be expected from the preceding discussion. That is,
the men had more employment than the women, and the single
women had more employment than the married women. A large
fraction of the time not seeking work was due to the withdrawal
of married women from the labor market.
Chiractar of Boonplor»oit
It cannot be contended that the quality of the employment
secured in any way compensated for the reduced quantity. In
this sample, 298 workers had 319 jobs between the shut-down
and the interview date. Aside from the fact that 73 of the
jobs, almost one-quarter, had been terminated by October 1936,
as many as 15 percent involved only part-time employment.
Only one-quarter of the jobs were in the textile industry,
and of these much the largest proportion was in the cotton
branch (table 24). Some 13 percent found employment in the
EFFECTS OF SHUT-DOWN
89
Table 28.- PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OP TOTAL MAN-MONTHS ELAPSED
BETWEEN LAST AMOSKEAG JOB AND OCTOBER 15, 1885, BY
EMPLOYMENT STATUS, SEX, AND MARITAL STATU8a
Total
Percentage
distribution of total elapsed time
Sex and
marital status
man-months
elapsed
between last
Amoskeag job
and
Oct. 15, 1936
Employed
Unemployed
seeking
wo rk
Emergency
Government
employment6
Unemployed
not seeking
work
Total
16,445
14.8
64. 6
10.8
9.8
Men, total
6,488
21.5
61.1
15. 6
1.8
Single
Married
2,721
5,767
22.7
21.0
62.2
60.6
15.1
15.8
0
2. 6
Women, total
7, 957
7.6
68.4
5.7
18.3
Single
Married
2,521
5,436
14.7
4. 3
72.4
66.5
7. 3
4.9
5.6
24. 3
aNRP field-survey data.
6WPA and otner emergency Works Program Jobs.
Figure 10.- PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL MAN-MONTHS ELAPSED
BETWEEN LAST AMOSKEAG JOB AND OCTOBER 16, 1986, BY
EMPLOYMENT STATUS, SEX, AND MARITAL STATUS
PERCENT
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
BSS8 UNEMPLOYMENT SEEKING WORK V//A EMERGENCY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT
Kim UNEMPLOYMENT NOT SEEKING WORK
Based on table 23 WPA -National Research Project
L-53
90
SHUT-DOWN OP AMOSKEAG
shoe industry, and 7 percent were employed in other manufac¬
turing enterprises. Over half (53.9 percent) were nonmanufac-
turing jobs, mainly the poorer-paying positions in domestic
and personal service and in trade, with a small scattering
of jobs in agriculture and building and construction. There
were 34 miscellaneous jobs, most of them laboring jobs in the
Amoskeag mill yard for maintenance and repair work after the
flood of March 1936.
Tiki* 14.- INDUSTRIAL DISTRIBUTION OP EUPL0TM1IT
APTB1 TEE SBUT-DOWN*
Industry
Number
Percent
of Jobs
of total
Total
310
100.0
Textile manufactures
81
26.4
Cotton
48
16.0
Woolen and worsted
20
8.3
Other textiles
13
4.1
Boot and shoe
42
13.2
Other manufactures
24
7.6
Nonaanufactures
172
53.9
Transportation, communication,
and public utility
16
4.7
Trade
63
16.6
Public service
26
7.8
Domestic and personal service
60
18.5
Building and construction
13
4.1
Agriculture
6
1.0
Other
1
0.3
Srjp flild-turrtj data. Data include all Jobs obtained at any tlaa between loss ot
laat aaoakaag Job and October 16. 1986.
Bven for those who had or bad had jobs the employment could
be considered inferior from still another point of view, namely,
the degree of skill involved.1® Whereas one-quarter of these
workers had had skilled employment at Amoskeag, only 19 percent
of the jobs obtained after the shut-down were skilled. The
respective percentages for the semiskilled were 55.8 and 39.3.
To
These measurements are quite rough since many arbitrary decisions must be made
In classifying a heterogeneous array or Jobs, especially In view of the very brief
description of the task that was available.
EFFECTS OF SHUT-DOWN
91
This could only mean an increase in the number of unskilled
jobs in the 22 months immediately following the shut-down.
There were also more in clerical positions, which in this in¬
stance may be regarded as an improvement of status since the
additions came from those with semiskilled or unskilled jobs
at Amoskeag.
Location of Job«
This reemployment level was attained only by seeking and ac¬
cepting employment outside of Manchester.20 Almost 45 percent
of the total of 319 jobs were located in communities other
than Manchester. Only two jobs were outside of the New England
region, with one-fifth of the employment in New Hampshire out¬
side of Manchester; more than one-fifth were in the remaining
five States of New England, but chiefly in Massachusetts.
Although only 4 of the 81 textile jobs were in Manchester,
all but 5 of the 42 jobs in the shoe industry were obtained
locally; the latter was also true for nearly three-quarters of
the great variety of jobs other than in manufacture.
From the available data, age does not seem to have been the
controlling factor in seeking or obtaining outside employment
since from 50 to 60 percent of the persons in each of five age
groups were reemployed in Manchester. Although relatively more
married persons (44.7 percent) as compared with single persons
'39.5 percent) were employed outside of Manchester, this prob¬
ably was not a significant difference, and the same probably
applies to the fact that the percentage of women having outside
employment was somewhat higher than the percentage of men.
The Regularly Employed and the Labor Reaerve
After the Shut-down
The vicissitudes experienced in this period after the shut¬
down by those who had been regularly employed at Amoskeag and
by those intermittently employed are of special interest. In
the 10-percent sample of the personnel files, 741 workers were
in these two groups (see appendix E). Of this number, occupa¬
tional histories were secured from 548. With respect to sex,
age, and marital status, this smaller sample is representative
Of)
The point made at the outset of the discussion - that the extent of migration
Is understated In the sample - should be recalled.
92
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
Tibli »5.- PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OP A SPECIAL SAMPLE OP
WORKERS, BY EMPLOYMENT STATUS AS OP OCTOBER IS, 1088.
EMPLOYMENT STRATUM AT AMOSKEAO,
SEX, AND MARITAL STATUS4
Employment
stratum,0 sex,
Total
Percentage distribution by
employment status as of
October 15, 1936
and marital
status
persons
Employed
Unemployed
seeking
work
Unemployed
not seeking
work
Regularly employed
Men
Women
214
193
20.1
11.4
77.1
78.2
2.8
10.4
Single
Married
74
119
17.6
7.0
79.7
77.3
2.7
15.1
Labor reserve
Men
Women
40
95
32.0
5.3
63.0
06. 3
4.4
28.4
aWRP field-survey data.
bTbe regularly employed represent those who had at least 39 weeks of work at
Amoskeag In 4 or the 6 years 1928 and 1930-34; the labor reserve represents those
who had less than 39 weeks of work at Amoskeag In 4 of the 6 years. See appendix
E, "Composition of the Labor Reserve" and table E-13.
of the larger one. The employment status of the persons in
these two groups of the subsample is presented in table as.
It invites comparison with the break-down given in table 19.
Of those who had been regularly employed at Amoskeag, one-
fifth of the men were employed in October 193<>f whereas in the
entire sample of men workers interviewed, one-third enjoyed
this status. Among the women of this group the same differ¬
ences resulting from their marital status existed as in the
entire sample of women. The relative numbers employed were
on about the same level, respectively, as in the larger sample
of women. It is significant that as many as 15 percent of the
married women among the regularly employed withdrew from the
labor market upon losing their Amoskeag employment.
The men in the labor reserve had relatively more employment
after Amoskeag than those belonging to the regularly employed
group. The percentage is as high as for the total sample of
men. Could this be explained by the fact that the men in the
EFFECTS OF SHUT-DOWN
93
labor reserve had more experience in looking for jobs than
those who had been always employed by Amoskeag?
Among the women in the labor reserve, a very large fraction
of whom were married, only 5 percent were employed as compared
with 11 percent of the regularly employed women and 13.5 per¬
cent of all the women in the sample. A more noteworthy fact.,
however, is that 28 percent of the women in the reserve had
withdrawn from the labor market, all but one of them at the
time of the shut-down, compared with 15 percent of the married
women in the regularly employed group and with 23 percent of
all the married women in the sample.
This evidence would appear to have some bearing on the gen¬
eral problem of unemployment estimates. It has been widely
observed that the unemployment of one member of a household
frequently forces another from the same household to seek
employment. Consequently, the number seeking work may well
exceed the number who lost employment; that is, unemployment
may create a condition of forced entries into the labor market.
What has not been generally appreciated, however, is the fact
that there are certain situations in which those who become
unemployed withdraw from the labor market. If this is the
case, it would be necessary to estimate the net balance between
forced entries and withdrawals.
The situation resulting from the failure of Amoskeag was in
all probability not unique. When married women, who constitute
a labor reserve to supplement the earnings of the head of the
household, lose their employment, a substantial number of them
very likely withdraw from the labor market. The extent of
withdrawals will depend upon the existence in the same com¬
munity of other industries employing women. Accordingly, any
relative estimates would vary with the industrial composition
of the geographic unit under consideration.
When withdrawals from the labor market of this type occur, it
is quite probable that the same set of circumstances operate to
eliminate or greatly to minimize the number of forced entries
into the labor market, unless one is concerned with a very
large community with highly diversified employment opportu¬
nities for women. The forced entries in the main are married
women who had once been employed. They are also the ones who
withdraw from the labor market. At any rate, in Manchester in
94
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
a F A - National N»«««reh Proj»ct (Hn$)
FlSUNE 11.- TENDING A FLY FRAME (DOFFING)
This machine, like the Intermediate, speeder, and jack frames, continues
the process of drawing out the roving and making it more compact.
the fall of 1936, a year after the Amoskeag shut-down, there
was little evidence of forced entrance to the labor market
as the result of the shut-down. In a supplementary study of
1,000 households, the members of which were interviewed for
employment status in October 1936, there were 1,779 persons who
were either employed or seeking work. Of these persons, 104
reported that they had never been previously employed and at
the time were unemployed and seeking work. That is, they were
EFFECTS OF SHUT-DOWN
95
new entrants into the labor market. None of the 104 were mar¬
ried, and three-quarters were between the ages of is and 19;
all but 2 of the remainder were between the ages of 20 and 24.
With the exception of one daughter aged 28, all were "normal"
entrants, persons who had reached the working age.
EMIGRATION AFTER THE SHUT-DOWN
Unfortunately, it is not possible to determine from the
available data what percentage of the Amoskeag workers left
Manchester. Use of other data can, however, extend somewhat
our knowledge of this form of meeting the unemployment problem
created by the shut-down. Use is made of the emigrants re¬
corded in the files of the Board of Registrars of Voters.21
These persons are the ones who changed their legal residence;
that is, they were probably permanent emigrants. The names
of such persons were available only for 1935 and the first
3 months of 1936.
An analysis of the workers who emigrated, however, must be
supplemented by an analysis of those Amoskeag workers who were
employed in textile mills outside of Manchester but did not
change their legal residence or move their families. They
either commuted daily from Manchester or returned to Manchester
at moderately short intervals. Employment of this sort was
available in the latter part of 1935, all of 1936, and the
early part of 1937. These employment opportunities were pres¬
ent as a result of the fact that mills in the surrounding
territory were running third shifts to take advantage of the
improved outlook in the cotton-textile business. In many of
these communities the local labor supply, especially for cer¬
tain skilled occupations, was inadequate to staff a third
shift, and for this reason their labor reserve was extended
to Manchester. These workers will be referred to as commuters
to distinguish them from the emigrants.
The names of the commuters were obtained in part from lists
prepared by the out-of-town mills for the use of a new mill in
Manchester. Other names were secured from records in the local
office of the United Textile Workers of America. Still others
were supplied by the Manchester office of the United States
21
See appendix E for discussion of these records.
96
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
Employment Service. While there is reason to believe that the
coverage of commuters has been quite extensive for that period,
it has by no means achieved completeness.
Just as the 9-month strike in 1922 added greatly to the out¬
ward migration, so the closing of the Amoskeag mills in 1935
helped swell the volume of emigration from Manchester, which
had already reached considerable proportions. Thus in 1935 the
volume of emigration as measured by voters' records was 52a;
the previous peak had been 457 in 1929 (table E-22). Emigra¬
tion in 193s exceeded by 53 percent the annual average number
of emigrants in the preceding 5 years. The comparable increase
for former Amoskeag workers was 93 percent.
An examination of the characteristics of all the gainfully
occupied emigrants of 193s in the Board of Registrars sample
showed no significant difference from the emigrants of the pre¬
ceding decade and a half, with two exceptions. One difference
was that while in former years those from manufacturing indus¬
tries had constituted about one-third of the total, in 193s
they comprised only one-quarter despite the more rapid increase
in Amoskeag emigrants than in the total. The other difference
consisted in the fact that the women emigrants in 1935 were
somewhat older than those in previous years. There were no
very significant differences in the two periods in the charac¬
teristics of our subsample of former Amoskeag workers. What
is of more interest are the differences between the Amoskeag
emigrants, 1920-35, and the Amoskeag commuters.
In comparing these two groups it would be well to remember
that it is unlikely that all the emigrants left Manchester for
employment elsewhere; probably many emigrated in the hope of
finding employment. On the other hand, we know that the com¬
muters had jobs, however precarious the tenure may have been.
It is this fact that probably explains the difference in the
age distributions; that is, the commuters were considerably
younger. Among men commuters, 69 percent were under 45 years
of age, but among the men emigrants, only 56 percent were in
this age group. The same difference was evident among the
women, the percentages being 89 and 77, respectively, for com¬
muters and emigrants.
Despite the fact that the commuters were younger than the
emigrants, a higher percentage of them were married. This was
EFFECTS OF SHUT-DOWN
97
true for both the men and the women. Among the men commuters,
77 percent were married compared with 68 percent of the male
emigrants and 67 percent of Amoskeag's men employees in 1935-
This is in accord with the results obtained from the work-
history interviews; that is, the married men got relatively
more jobs than the single men. Among the women commuters,
63 percent were married compared with 54 percent of the women
emigrants and 71 percent of the women workers at Amoskeag in
its last year. Apparently the married women operatives could
more easily manage out-of-town employment within commuting dis¬
tance than they could manage emigration. The former situation,
obviously, was tenable when the husband was employed, but it is
improbable that a woman would emigrate under the same circum¬
stances. Nevertheless, it should be noted that even in the
case of commuters the married women were somewhat underrepre-
sented. This would suggest that even in moderately favorable
circumstances a disproportionate number of supplementary work¬
ers withdrew from the labor market. These considerations also
explain why the ratio of women to men was somewhat higher among
the commuters than among the emigrants - 41 percent as compared
with 33 percent.
With respect to the degree of skill of the former Amoskeag
workers, as judged by their last job at Amoskeag, there was
only one important difference between the emigrants and the
commuters. Among the latter there were no office workers. The
overrepresentation of skilled workers among both the men and
women was about the same in the two groups.
Since the commuters, unlike those emigrating prior to 1935,
did not separate from Amoskeag voluntarily, it is but natural
that their length of attachment to the company should have
been somewhat longer than for the emigrants. For example,
two-thirds of the men commuters and three-fifths of the women
commuters had been attached to Amoskeag over a period of at
least 10 years. Only half the emigrants, both among the men
and women, had had attachments of this duration.
It is to be expected also that, if our term "commuters" is
properly applied, their moves would have been within a smaller
radius of Manchester than the moves made by the emigrants.
Accordingly, about half the commuters had employment in Hills¬
borough County other than Manchester, more specifically in
the city of Nashua, some 18 miles down the Merrimack Valley,
98
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
• PA - National R.««*reh Project (Bin*}
Figure 12.- ring spinner
Two strands of slightly twisted roving are transformed into one strand of
tightly spun yarn by this machine which also winds the yarn on bobbins.
compared with 10 percent of the emigrants who moved to communi¬
ties within the county. Another 35 percent of the commuters
went to Massachusetts, mainly to Lowell and Lawrence, still
farther down the Merrimack. The fact that the entire valley
constituted the labor reserve for the textile mills located on
the banks of the river was not a novel situation; this had been
the case for many years. The only new feature in this situa¬
tion after the Amoskeag shut-down was the increased numerical
importance of Manchester's operatives in this labor reserve.
Nearly 10 percent of the commuters found some employment in the
textile mills of Limerick and Biddeford, Maine. Two commuters
located temporary jobs outside of New England.
In view of the fact that most of these jobs involved only
daily commuting, it is not surprising that the French Canadians
and Poles were more than duly represented among the commuters.
This was the reverse of the situation that obtained among the
emigrants and tends to support the explanation advanced in
appendix E; namely, that the degree of ethnic cohesiveness or
clannishness of a group bears an inverse relationship to its
degree of geographic mobility.
EFFECTS OF SHUT-DOWN
99
Enough evidence has been presented to show the dislocations
created by the shut-down. Only 30 percent of the men and 20
percent of the women managed to secure any private employment
in the 22 months that elapsed between the loss of Amoskeag
employment and the date of interview. The short duration of
many of the jobs held at the time of interview is suggested
by the fact that private employment accounted for less than
15 percent of the total time between the last Amoskeag job and
the interview date.
Although emigration and commuting to jobs outside of Manchester
occurred to a greater extent after the shut-down of Amoskeag
than in the years of the general depression, the exact vol¬
ume of this sort of adjustment is not known. That it did not
provide a solution on a wholesale scale to Manchester's un¬
employment problem is plainly indicated by the number of per¬
sons registered for work in the Manchester office of the New
Hampshire State Employment Service.
In April 1935, when the final liquidation was begun, the
active file of this office contained 4,726 names (table 26).
That is, this number of persons made inquiry for employment at
the office at least once in 30 days. Although the mills were
virtually closed down in September of that year, it was not
until March 1936 that the total registration reached 12,195,
Tab la 28.- ACTIVE PILE OP MANCHESTER WORKERS AT NEW HAMPSHIRE
STATE EMPLOYMENT SERVICE. 19S5-88a
Month
1935
1936
1937
1938
January-
n.a.
10,665
10,451
11,121
February
4,560
11,805
9,533
13,375
March
n.a.
12,195
7,234
11,751
April
4, 726
12,181
7, 621
12,447
May
4, 947
12,075
7,663
10,221
June
5,434
9,002
6,465
9,065
July
6, 177
9,544
6,745
10,482
August
6,718
9,876
7,497
8,926
September
6,897
10, 312
6,955
10,447
October
7,227
10,774
6, 058
10,365
November
7, 585
11,038
6,465
11,686
December
8,454
11,005
7, 970
12,978
Average
6, 272
10,873
7, 555
11,072
aActive file of registrants not placed.
n.a. Data not available.
100
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
nearly a threefold increase over the registration of the pre¬
vious April. At the time of interviewing, October 1936, there
were still almost 11,000 persons actively seeking employment,
or nearly one-third of the number reported gainfully occupied
in the 1930 census. Moreover, placements in private employment
from April 1935 through October 1936 numbered only 544, about
6 percent of the monthly average number in the active file.
EFPCCT OF THE SHOT-DOWN ON BELIEF BOLLS
Since the opportunities for emigration and reemployment in
Manchester or in nearby textile centers proved to be decidedly
limited and since the low earnings in previous years precluded
the accumulation of any considerable savings, one would natu¬
rally expect that it was public relief in one form or another
that prevented widespread destitution among the textile workers
of Manchester. A relief organization created to care for those
without employment in the general depression was obliged to
assume the burden of those rendered unemployed by the closing
of the Amoskeag mills. If the shut-down had occurred 4 or 5
years earlier, there would have been no adequate public facili¬
ties for handling the major relief problem that would have been
created. The break with tradition in this respect was as sharp
in Manchester as elsewhere.
Not that Manchester had made no provision for relieving des¬
titution. Both the city and county governments maintained
departments of charities. As the name implies, these offices
were to extend "pauper aid", and under the circumstances usu¬
ally only the ne'er-do-wells would face the disgrace of being
"on the town."
However, there were occasions when destitution resulting
from unemployment was not regarded as a matter of individual
backsliding or moral turpitude and justified the granting of
special assistance. Thus the New Hampshire Commissioner of
Labor in his report issued in 1894 recorded:
In the early fall of 1893 several thousand people
were thrown out of employment by the temporary clos¬
ing of the Amoskeag mills of Manchester, but no
serious distress was experienced from the fact that
a large number of the employes were Canadians, and
they embraced the opportunity to visit their homes
across our northern borders during their enforced
vacation, where many of them remained permanently,
EFFECTS OF SHUT-DOWN
101
and others until such time as their services were
again required
During the winter a loan of $25,000 was authorized
to provide work for the unemployed in Manchester
through the street department, and charitable organi¬
zations did considerable work in furnishing pecuniary
assistance and nourishing food at a nominal price to
the unfortunate poor for a time 22
Except in such spectacular situations, however, the tradition
of paupers' aid remained intact. Despite this stigma, an ever-
increasing number was reduced to seek this aid with the worsen¬
ing of conditions at Amoskeag during the twenties. In 1929
the monthly average number of cases granted general relief
(poor relief) by Manchester was 805, or 4.3 percent of all of
Manchester's families as reported in the 1930 census; expendi¬
tures on this score amounted to $159,444. With the onset of
the great depression, the unemployment situation in Manchester
naturally was accentuated and reflected in the general relief
load. Thus in 1930 more than $188,000 was distributed to 1,171
cases, that is, an increase of 45 percent in the case load
with an 18-percent rise in expenditures. In each of the two
following years the percentage rises in the case load over the
previous year were 38 and 50, respectively, while the percent¬
age increases in expenditures were 24 and 53, respectively.
The effect of the depression may be expressed in another way
by relating the relief situation in 1932 to that which obtained
in 1929. On this basis, the average relief load trebled, and
the annual expenditures more than doubled within this 3-year
period - and all this occurred while assistance was still re¬
garded as poor relief.
Private welfare agencies, moreover, were not in a position
to render much assistance. Societies of this character had
been comparatively underdeveloped in Manchester. In 1929, for
example, there were only three agencies of any importance in
addition to the Salvation Army: Family Welfare, Children's
Aid Society, and the Milk Fund. These four agencies in 1929
expended $21,040, about one-third being contributed by the
Salvation Army; in 1932 these same agencies were able to in¬
crease their expenditures only to $28,543, more than a third
being contributed by the Salvation Army.23
22
"Temporary Aid to Unemployed," Second Annual Report: 1891 (Concord, N. H.:
Bureau of Labor, State of New Hampshire, 1894), pp. 437-8.
^ow much aid may have been extended through church agencies Is not known.
102
SHUT-DOWN OP AMOSKEAG
Amoskeag in its relatively more prosperous days had also
engaged in some welfare activities, but after the 1922 strike
these efforts virtually ceased. Consequently, when many of
their workers needed aid in the winter of 1930-31 because
of wholesale lay-offs and part-time employment, there were no
company facilities or funds at hand and it was necessary to
start anew in organizing a relief fund. In November 1930 the
management agreed to match every dollar contributed by the
workers, but it discontinued its contribution after the workers
had raised $1,800. Nevertheless the workers, in the face of
evident need, continued to contribute their nickels and dimes
through April 1931. Their total contribution was $6,ooo.24
Thus in Manchester as elsewhere the relief facilities were
inadequate to cope with the unemployment of unprecedented mag¬
nitude. Accordingly, assistance from the Federal and State
governments that began to assume a responsibility early in 1933
was most welcome. Along with this awakening to responsibility
went the general realization that the individual was not solely
or even mainly responsible in most instances for his unemploy¬
ment. With this change in attitude the stigma of pauperization
was removed from relief application.
Because of changes in the administrative unit there are no
adequate statistics on relief for Manchester in 1933- From
193a to date, however, the statistical data are satisfactory.
In 1939, when operations at Amoskeag and in the local shoe
factories were well above the depression levels of 193a, the
average case load for general relief was 2,979, or slightly
above the average for 1932.
In 1939, 13.2 percent, on the average, of all families in
Manchester received general relief25 (table F-9I. Of the 18
other New England cities for which comparable percentages can
be computed, only in 6 (Boston, Fall River, Lynn, Springfield,
Brockton, and Worcester ranked in order of the size of the ex¬
cess, beginning with the largest) did the relative burden exceed
Manchester's.25 Thus even before the closing of the Amoskeag
248ee appendix C.
^General relief Includes both direct relief (In cash or in kind) extended by
public relief agencies and wages paid to persons employed on local work-relief
projects. Employment in civil works Administration projects is not included.
26The most Instructive comparisons would be with Lawrence and Lowell, both textile
cities In the Merrimack Valley. Unfortunately, adequate statistics are not avail¬
able for these cities In 1934.
EFFECTS OF SHOT-DOWN
103
WPA -National Research Project (Bine)
FIGURE 13.- HIGH-SPEED BEAM WARPER
This machine, which takes threads from hundreds of spools to form a warp,
stops automatically when a thread breaks.
mills, Manchester's relief burden was already considerably more
onerous than in most of New England's larger cities.27
The peak relief load in Manchester, however, had yet to be
reached. Naturally, the gradual running out of work by the
Amoskeag mills, begun in the early spring of 1935, and their
final closing in September would be reflected in the size of the
relief rolls. Thus in the first quarter of 1935 the average
case load was 2,819 compared with 3,170 in the second quarter.
The definite closing in- September drove many who had been hold¬
ing out in hope of an early reopening of the mills to ask for
assistance. Accordingly, the August relief load of 3,491 cases
was increased to 4,118 in the following month. The all-time
peak in general relief (excluding WPA employment) was reached
in November with a case load of 4,270 involving 16,216 persons.
This meant that 22.8 percent of Manchester's families and
21.2 percent of its population received general assistance
in that month.
£7
If Boston with 20.4 percent of Its families receiving general relief Is excluded
from the total of 18 cities, the average percentage for the remaining 17 cities
Is 11.8 compared with 13.2 for Manchester.
104
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
Manchester's average case load in 1935 was 3,467 or 18.5
percent of all families. This represented an increase of 40
percent over the previous year. Of the other 18 New England
cities, only in Waterbury, Connecticut, where the case load
was comparatively small, was the relative increase larger. And
in only two of these cities (Boston and Fall River) was the
percentage of families on relief higher than in Manchester.28
From our account of employment opportunities in Manchester
during 1936 there was every reason to expect a mounting relief
load above the 1935 level. We know, for example, that a com¬
pany representative in reporting on his survey of the tenants
in the mill houses in December 1935 (see page 75' observed that
"a large number of the occupants have not as yet gone on the
relief rolls, but from statements they make it won't be long
before they will be compelled to seek relief." The only reason
why they were not compelled to seek general relief was the
advent of the WPA program.
Although WPA employment began in Manchester in the fall of
1935, it did not have any appreciable effect upon the relief
rolls until the following February, when 3,752 persons were
employed on WPA projects and 3.160 families, about 1,100 less
than the November peak, received general relief. The average
number given WPA employment in 1936 was 3,513. with some taper¬
ing off in the summer and with additions to the pay roll as
winter approached. As a consequence of this Federal Works
Program the average number of cases receiving general relief
in 1936, including those whose WPA earnings were insufficient
and required supplementation, was 18 percent less than the
average for 1935. The important consideration, however, is the
extent of dependency upon Government aid regardless of its type
and the source of funds. Since WPA employment was limited
to one person in each family, the number so employed, minus
those also receiving general relief as a supplement, when added
to the total number receiving general relief would represent
the total case load dependent upon Government assistance.80
In 1936 the average case load was 5,413; that is, 28.9 percent
of all families in Manchester received Government aid.
28The comparative figures Tor 1936 used in the text exclude persons employed on WPA
projects, which began in September, unless their WPA earnings were supplemented by
general-relief grants, if all WPA workers were Included, the average number of
cases for Manchester In 1936 would have been 3,693. or 19.7 percent of all families.
20These figures do not Include persons employed on Public Works Administration or
emergency Works Program projects other than WPA, In Civilian Conservation corps
camps, or aided through the National Youth Administration programs.
EFFECTS OF SHUT-DOWN
105
With the establishment of new companies in the Amoskeag mills
in 1937, which by July had employed more than 3,000 workers,
there were moderate decreases in the number on the WPA pay roll
as well as in the number receiving general relief. But even
in this year of relative prosperity the joint case load was
of such proportions that one-quarter of the city's families, on
the average, were dependent upon Government assistance. In the
first 9 months of 1938, with the withdrawal of Pacific Mills
and the curtailed employment in the other companies in the
Amoskeag mills, the joint case load was once more at the 1936
level when 28.8 percent of the families received public aid;
during these same months unemployment-compensation claims were
being paid. Clearly, without direct Government aid distress
would have been extreme and in a short time would have envel¬
oped also the commercial activities of the city.
On the basis of general relief only (that is, excluding WPA)
11.6 and 12.6 percent of all families in Manchester received
relief in 1937 and in the first 9 months of 1938, respectively.
In no one of the other 23 New England cities were the respec¬
tive percentages as high as in Manchester. Even in Lowell,
also once an important textile center, the percentages were
only 6.8 and 8.8. Manchester, then, stands out in high relief,
and by New England standards, at least, it must be regarded
since the shut-down as a town on relief.
What this meant to the business community can be readily
appreciated from the sums expended for relief. In 1934 this
expenditure reached $886,648, the Federal contribution amount¬
ing to 35 percent of the total. With the gradual closing of
the Amoskeag mills in 1935, the total for direct relief and WPA
wages was $1,460,041, of which about one-quarter represented
the share of the Federal Government. In the same year food
stores in Manchester reported to the Census of Business sales
of $9,082,000.30 We know from records in the Manchester relief
office that 53.7 percent of the total grants for general relief
was spent on food and household necessities.31 On the as¬
sumption that WPA earnings were spent in the same way, almost
10 percent of the sales in Manchester's food stores may be
Census of Business: 1935, Vol. Ill, "Retail Distribution" (U. S. Dept. Com.,
Bur. Census, Dec. 1936), p. 186.
31
Virtually all relief grants In Manchester are In Iclnd (grocery orders). The
figure 53.7 percent Is based on expenditures In 1937.
106
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
said to have been subsidized by the local, State, and Federal
governments.
The peak in Government assistance was in 1936 (table 27).
The expenditures for general relief and WPA wages then amounted
to $3,282,553, more than double the sum for the previous year.
The contribution of the Federal Government was increased nearly
sevenfold and equaled 70 percent of the total. By our account¬
ing, $1,762,731 was spent on food and household necessities.
If sales in the food stores were equal to the 1935 volume,
which is improbable, the Government subsidy would have been the
source of payment for more than 19 percent of their sales.32
Although the operations of the new companies established in
the Amoskeag mills during 1937 provided $2,200,000 in wages,
the combined expenditures for general relief and WPA pay rolls
were reduced by only $600,000 from the preceding year. Again
the Federal Government contributed more than 70 percent of
the total. If we assume once more that food-store sales in
that year were about equal to those in 1935,33 which is quite
probable, Government funds in a year of prosperity, rela¬
tively speaking, paid for nearly 16 percent of sales in the
food stores.
The evidence is unmistakable, then, that it was Government
assistance that maintained the health and morale of about one-
quarter of Manchester's population and was a real sustaining
force to its entire commercial life. The evidence is equally
strong that some very real material benefits accrued to the
community in general from the emergency Works Program activi¬
ties. Thus, from the inception of the WPA program in September
1935 to May 31, 1938, $5,941,722 was spent in Manchester, in¬
cluding sponsors' contributions. Of this amount 27.3 percent
^It is improbable that food-store sales in 1939 were equal to sales in 1935 since
Amoskeag paid out $4,200,000 In wages In the latter year and nothing In 1839,
whereas relief payments were Increased by only $1,600,000. It Is probable that
there had been some expansion of employment In Manchester's shoe factories In 1936
over 1936 and that some were employed for part of the year at least In textile
factories or neighboring communities. It Is unlikely, however, that the wages
from both sources were equal to the difference of $2,400,000 between the Amoskeag
wage bill and the added relief disbursements. It Is thought that this would be
reflected In food-store sales despite the fact that they deal In necessities. An
offsetting consideration Is the fact that the Index of the average retail cost of
all foods In Manchester In 1936 was 83.0 compared with 80.8 In 1935, according to
Retail Prices, complied by the Retail Price and Cost of Living Divisions of the
U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (Serial No. R. 384, p. 11 and
Serial No. R. 505, p. 14).
33At this writing the 1937 retail-sales figures for Manchester have not been
released by the Census of Business. The Index of the average retail cost of all
foods for Manchester In 1937 was 85.4.
EFFECTS OF SHUT-DOWN
107
Tibli 27.- NUMBER OF PERSONS IN CASES RECEIVING GENERAL
RELIEF AND AMOUNT OF RELIEF EXTENDED IN MANCHESTER,
APRIL I#88-SEPTEMBER 1 98 8a
Year
Total
Amount
Year
Total
Amount
and
number
extended
and
number
extended
monthb
of persons
(dollars)
monthb
of persons
(dollars)
1933
1936
Apr.
17,147
80,495
Jan.
14,154
151,351
May
15,836
81,627
Feb.
11,925
109,150
June
14,988
74,428
Mar.
9,807
94,608
July
n.a.
37,877
Apr.
9, 329
80,603
Aug.
n.a.
38, 529
May
8, 390
72,352
Sept.
n.a.
39,343
June
10,247
80,397
Oct.
n.a.
47,361
July
9,201
66,660
Nov.
10,114
62,019
Aug.
9, 308
65,306
Dec.
8,523
74,497
Sept.
8, 584
63,861
Oct.
9,301
74,270
1934
Nov.
9,061
62.256
Jan.
9,244
61,453
Dec.
8, 624
66,743
Feb.
8, 076
50,347
Mar.
6,775
48,321
1937
Apr.
7,460
65,885
Jan.
8,790
67,735
May
6,481
72.122
Feb.
9,545
56,709
June
6,152
56,954
Mar.
8,462
60,885
July
6,868
53, 702
Apr.
7,728
53,769
Aug.
8,299
61,073
May
7,368
49,219
Sept.
7,041
72,273
June
8,382
49,024
Oct.
9,692
79,191
July
8, 006
46,896
Nov.
8,038
73,730
Aug.
7,630
46,202
Dec.
9,084
76. 949
Sept.
7,854
56,767
Oct.
8,564
58,438
1935
Nov.
9,586
73,814
Jan.
8,899
61,701
Dec.
10,589
85,153
Feb.
9,876
72,669
Mar.
11,142
90,335
1938
Apr.
10,409
82,069
Jan.
10,010
80,497
May
11,173
100,707
Feb.
10,012
78,548
June
11,479
98,843
Mar.
9,312
69,759
July
12,587
102.460
Apr.
8,833
63,421
Aug.
11,824
93,082
May
8,362
57,935
Sept.
15,414
114,303
June
8,862
60,711
Oct.
14,667
146,293
July
8,486
66.798
Nov.
16,216
139,898
Aug.
8,326
77,161
Dec.
14,709
150,231
Sept.
8,629
63,212
Data for April 1933 to December 1936 from a special tabulation made for NRP
by the Federal Emergency Relief Administration for New Hampshire; for January 1937
to September 1938 from the New Hampshire State Board of Welfare and Relief.
^Figures for April 1933 through January 1934 represent all of Hillsborough county,
N. H.
n.a. Data not available.
108
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
was expended for sewage systems; 16,7 percent for the improve¬
ment of highways, roads, and streets; 10.7 percent on recrea¬
tional facilities; 8.a percent on publicly owned and operated
utilities; and a similar proportion on airports and airways.
Of indirect benefit to the community at large was the million
and a half dollars, or 26 percent of the total, devoted to the
sewing project which produced clothes for the relief clients.
WPA -National R«»«»reh Projaet (Bine)
FIGURE 14.- SLASHERS PERFORM THE LAST STEP IN THE
PREPARATION OF A WARP
This machine, occupying a space 3$ x 7 feet, starches and dries the
t hreads of t he warp.
Although the number receiving general relief has remained at
a relatively high level for several years, it would be false
to infer from this that the entire number receiving relief has
constituted a group of chronic unemployed. From March 1937
to June 1938 complete statistics are available on cases closed
and added. This period embraced months of industrial revival
as well as months of recession, the latter being more numerous.
In this 16-month period, 4,431 cases received relief, exclusive
of cases receiving only supplementary relief. Of this number,
1,587 cases, or 35.8 percent of the total, left the relief
rolls because of reemployment in private industry. On the
EFFECTS OF SHUT-DOWN
109
other hand, of the 3,064 cases added to the relief rolls during
this period (exclusive of the supplementary-relief cases),
1,912, or 62.4 percent, were obliged to seek relief because
they had lost their employment in private industry within the
4 months preceding their application for relief. Moreover,
82.8 percent of all cases added (including supplementary-relief
cases) had previously received general relief.34 All these
relationships suggest that even under the adverse circumstances
that prevailed, there was considerable turn-over in the relief
population.
SOME OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
Mention should also be made of other considerations directly
or indirectly affected by the shut-down. They are demographic
and occupational in character and have long-run effects; they
began before the shut-down and have continued after that event.
Among these considerations and of primary importance is the
fact that Manchester's population has been becoming older.
This, of course, has been true of our entire population, es¬
pecially the increasing proportion that is resident in urban
communities (table 28). The increase in age had proceeded
further in the case of the urban population of New England than
in the entire urban population, but not quite so far as in
Manchester. This situation obtained despite the fact that in
Manchester, as well as in all cities of the region, the percent¬
ages of the respective populations represented by persons under
20 years of age were slightly higher than in the total urban
population of the country both in 1920 and 1930. The rate of
the decennial change in the proportion in that age group was
highest for the total urban population. Accordingly, it must
be due to emigration that those between 20 and 44 years of age
constituted a smaller fraction of their respective totals in
Manchester and New England cities than in all cities. The de¬
cennial decrease in this percentage was sharpest in Manchester,
as was the concomitant increase in the percentage aged 45
or over.
This shift in the age composition of Manchester's population
suggests that in the not-so-far-off future Manchester may well
be handicapped in the competition of attracting new industry
^Similar data are not available for WPA workers In Manchester.
110
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
T»b1* «».- PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION IN MANCHESTER,
URBAN NEW ENGLAND, AND URBAN UNITED STATES, BY AOE,
1020 AND l«SOa
Locality
Age In
years
Unknown
Under 20
20-44
45-84
85 or
over
1920
1930
1920
1930
1920
1930
1920
1930
1920
1930
Manchester
37.e
38.7
40.2
37.4
17.5
19.4
4.8
8.4
0.1
0.1
Urban New England
38.3
35.8
40.2
38.5
18.3
19.7
5.1
6.1
.1
.1
Urban United States
35.8
34.6
42.7
42.3
17.0
18.2
4.2
5.1
.2
. 1
Data for; 1820 froa fourteenth Cenaus of the United States: 1920, "Population* (U. 8.
Daft. Com.. Bur. Census. 1823), vol. Ill, p. 928; and 1830 from fifteenth Census of the
United States: 1930, "Population" (U. 8. Dept. Con., Bur, Census, 1933), vol. II, pp. 887,
718, 773.
because of the decline in the absolute number of workers in
the most productive age group. That is, this trend in age com¬
position may be expected to persist in view of the sharp drop
in the fertility rate. Unfortunately, refined measurements
cannot be made in the absence of mortality rates by sex for
specific age groups of Manchester's population. Some crude
measurements, however, have indicative value.
The number of children under 5 years of age per 1,000 women
aged 20 to 44 in Manchester was 49a in 1920 and 399 in 1930,
a decline of nearly one-fifth. The comparable rates for all
communities in the United States with populations between
25.000 and 100,000 were 472 and 393, involving a decline of
about 17 percent.36 Dr. 0. E. Baker has computed fertility
rates (children under 5 years per 1,000 women aged is to 44)
as of 1930 by States and for cities with populations of 25,000
to 100,000. For cities in the New England States the rates
varied from 345 in Massachusetts to 375 in Rhode Island. For
all cities in this size group the rate was 341. In Manchester
the comparable rate was 322.
Moreover, the continuance after 1930 of Manchester's declin¬
ing fertility rate seems clear from the number of births in
subsequent years. Without the requisite mortality rates and
assumptions on the volume of internal migration, fertility
rates cannot be computed for intercensal years. But in the
3®Rates for the United States were adapted from Frank Lorlmer and Frederick Osborn,
Dynamics of Population (New York; The Macmlllan Co., 1934), p. 28.
EFFECTS OF SHUT-DOWN
111
absence of catastrophic acts of God or mass migration, the
absolute decline in the number of women in the childbearing age
cannot be large over a 10-year period. If, therefore, there
should be an appreciable decline in the number of births, it
could not be wholly explained by the smaller number of women of
childbearing age.88
Over the 5-year interval 1925-39, the number of births per
year was 1,64a. In the succeeding 5-year period, 1930-34, the
annual average'of births was 1,389, a decline of 21.5 percent.
For the 4 years following the Amoskeag shut-down, 1935-38,
the births per year numbered 1,209, a further decline of 6.2
percent from the preceding quinquennium. Declines of these
magnitudes cannot be accounted for by the diminution in the
number of women of childbearing age that probably took place
over these same years.
The fewer births occurred despite the increase in the number
of marriages, which itself is contrary to expectation when the
number of women reaching marriageable age (15 years or over)
is declining. For example, the number of marriages per year
between 1925 ana 1929 was 613 and remained at about the same
level (607) during the next 5-year interval. The annual aver¬
age number in the 4 years following the closing of the Amoskeag
mills, however, was 700, an increase of 15 percent over the
average number of the preceding period.87 This provides some
basis for the belief that an increasing percentage of women
regarded marriage as an adjustment to the loss of employment
opportunities. It should not be inferred that this necessarily
means the withdrawal of that number of women from the labor
market, especially if they continue to refrain from raising
large families.30
Another long-run adjustment that deserves mention is the lack
of interest of the younger generation in millwork. This had
come to be of some concern to the Amoskeag personnel officer to
30The number of women in Manchester between the ages of 20 and 44 declined by
7.5 percent between 1920 and 1930. If we are right in assuming a smaller volume of
emigration between 1930 and 1940 than In the preceding decade, this decline should
not be as large during the decade of the 1930*s.
37
It Is not without Interest that In 1926. according to a census of religions taken
by the U. S. Bureau of the Census, so percent of all church members in Manchester
and 60 percent of Its 1920 population were members of the Roman catholic Church.
Statistics adapted trrnThe Vorld Almanac, 1638 (New York: New York world-Telegram,
1938), pp. 260, 266.
lO
For the same periods the deaths per year were 929, 872, and 860, respectively.
This trend Is not usually associated with an aging population. The reduction In
the number of births very probably has an Important effect on total deaths since
Infant mortality rates are still very high.
112
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
WPA - Nat Iona I Research Project (HineJ
FIGURE 15.- DRAWER-!N ENTERING A NEW WARP
judge by his observations in his report of families living in
the mill tenements in December 1935 (see page 75). From that
source we learn that
the tenement occupants show great interest and make
every sacrifice to further the education of their
children. Graduates from grammar schools attend the
high school and in a number of cases are attending
colleges and universities.
The young women have their minds set on training
to be beauty specialists, nurses, school teachers,
musicians, dancers, stenographers, and nuns.
A very small percentage of the heads of families
display any interest in having their children em¬
ployed in the mills permanently.
There are some large families where the older
children of legal [working] age .... obtain em¬
ployment to assist the parents in providing an edu¬
cation for the younger children. I venture that 75%
of the young men and women under 21 years of age
living in Company tenements have no intention or
desire to work in the mills.
A noticeable feature in the attitude of the boys
from sixteen to twenty one years of age is their
lack of interest in any job requiring manual labor.
EFFECTS OF SHUT-DOWN
113
Not even the mechanical trades which were so at¬
tractive a generation ago have any appeal to them.
This attitude is puzzling. If you ask the young man
what he proposes to earn his living at he will shrug
his shoulders and say, "Don't know." Just trying
pot luck that sometime, somewhere, he will get a
break but he does not intend to make much effort to
get the so-called break.
It is evident that not much can be expected in
the way of future textile workers from the families
now occupying tenements. Nearly 30% of the members
[living in company tenements and] employed in gainful
occupations are employed outside the mills.
There is no reason to believe that this was not a character¬
istic development among the mill families residing outside
the company tenements, with the exception of the Portuguese.
Because of the exceptional behavior of this nationality group
the report recommended that
the tenements located in Amoskeag Village would make
an ideal colony for Portuguese families. We have had
harmonious relations with the Portuguese as employees
and my experience with them is they don't want to be
influenced by labor agitators, preferring to work
out their own destinies. These families are usually
large and have no other interest than being a fac¬
tory worker.
The occupational shift described by the personnel officer
would appear to be in the desired direction. If manufactures
will not develop in Manchester to the point of absorbing the
present labor supply, there is no point in training the younger
persons for millwork. Moreover, preparation for jobs in the
services and trade would best fit them for employment in other
localities.
CHAPTER V
COMMUNITY EFFORTS TO ATTRACT NEW INDUSTRIES
FORMATION OF AMOSEEAO INDUSTRIES, INCORPORATED
The difficulties of reemployment of the former Amoskeag
workers a year or so after the shut-down were currently real¬
ized by the leading citizens of Manchester. They appreciated
also that the dismantling of the mills attendant upon liqui¬
dation would have reduced further the already slim chances of
these persons finding local employment. Accordingly, when
the court ordered the liquidation of the company in July 1936,
as previously related (see chapter III), a citizens' committee
of 17 was not slow in organizing a corporation for the purpose
of buying the Amoskeag properties with a view to a gradual and
orderly liquidation through the sale or lease of mill space
and machinery to new companies in contradistinction to sale
for "junking" the mills.
While the idea of attracting new employers to Manchester
achieved added pertinence after the shut-down, it was by no
means a new idea that was being entertained for the first
time by the community. The suggestion had even occurred
to the Amoskeag Board of Trustees after the company's decline
had become plainly evident. Thus we know from a report in the
Boston News Bureau (February 18, 1928, page a) that Amoskeag
officials notified the mayor of Manchester that "they will
lease any unused portions of the mills. Heat, light and power
will be sold to the lessees by the company Negotiations
have been entered into to bring new industries here." Six
months later Amoskeag had completed negotiations for the
lease of Number 12 weave shed to the Apt Shoe Company of
Exeter, New Hampshire,1 and by the end of the year four con¬
cerns had leased unused Amoskeag mills.8
Whether the company induced others to take up space is not
known, but probably it did not. However, after the shut-down
but before the liquidation was ordered, a company building
1Boston News Bureau, July 27, 1828, p. 2.
ZIbid., December 24, 1928, p. 1.
114
EFFORTS TO ATTRACT INDUSTRIES
115
was rented by the J. F. McElwain Company, one of the largest
manufacturers of shoes in New England. Although the Manchester
city government early in 1936 paid $1,500 as moving expenses
to another shoe company to locate in Manchester, it occupied
mill space outside of the Amoskeag mill yard. It would appear
from this evidence, then, that the organization of Amoskeag
Industries, Incorporated, was a more effective method of con¬
tinuing a policy initiated earlier.
The new liquidating corporation could not have secured much
encouragement for its task from the record of new companies
that located in Manchester in the decade and a half preceding
its organization. Between 1921 and the fall of 1936, when
Amoskeag Industries got under way, 62 manufacturing com¬
panies employing 10 or more workers had started operations in
Manchester. More than half, 34 of the 62 companies, had been
engaged in manufacturing either boots and shoes or accessories
of this industry; 6 companies produced some item of clothing;
and 5 processed food products. The remainder, 17, were too
miscellaneous for classification. The predominance of the shoe
companies is more truly revealed by measuring the volume of
new enterprises in terms of wage jobs. Out of a total of
7,657 jobs created by the 62 companies, 6,283 (82 percent) were
in the shoe or related industries. Thus Manchester, already
a shoe-manufacturing center in 1920, succeeded chiefly in
the following 15 years in attracting additional shoe manufac¬
turers. Virtually no progress had been made toward industrial
diversification.3
Little comfort could be derived, either, from the degree of
mortality among the incoming firms. Of the 62 companies that
were established in Manchester between 1921 and the fall of
1936, 37 companies involving 3,973 jobs either failed or moved
from Manchester; 23 of these, accounting for 3,383 jobs, were
shoe manufacturers. To complete the survey it is necessary
to add the failure in this 16-year period of 23 additional
companies, exclusive of Amoskeag, employing 10 or more persons.
These had been established in Manchester prior to 1921. In the
2
The Information on new enterprises and those that have failed or moved out has
been complied from reports on file with the New Hampshire Department of Labor.
A change In ownership has not been considered as a failure of an old company or the
creation of a new enterprise. The number employed Is not an average but merely
the number that happened to be employed on the day the factory inspector called.
116
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
last year of their operations these 33 companies had offered
2,891 jobs.
Those responsible for the formation of Amoskeag Industries
probably reasoned that the existence or nonexistence of the
Amoskeag Manufacturing Company as a going concern would appre¬
ciably affect the possibilities of attracting industry to
Manchester. In the first place, the company, even in the
decade of the twenties, still owned a large portion of the
unimproved land in the city, and since unused factory buildings
were not numerous, an incoming enterprise of any size would
very likely have to deal with Amoskeag. Because of this
situation the company in many instances could directly control
the establishment in the city of any large competitor for
its labor supply. Indirect pressure to the same end could
be exercised by the company through the municipal government
and the chamber of commerce by virtue of its being far and away
the largest taxpayer and employer of labor in the city.
The shoe industry got its start in Manchester by locating on
the outskirts of the city on land that Amoskeag never owned.
Once established, the industry developed its own labor supply
and did not seriously interfere with Amoskeag's. Accordingly,
the only large employers entering Manchester after 1931 while
Amoskeag was operating were shoe manufacturers, and these
represented very little of a net addition but were more in the
nature of new companies replacing those that had failed - a
more or less normal turn-over in the shoe business.
With the liquidation of Amoskeag this sort of pressure was
removed, and nearly 7,000,000 square feet of floor space
were made available. It is obvious that the changed cir¬
cumstances would facilitate the location of new companies
and possibly a more diversified type of industry in Manchester.
The crucial question, however, was whether new companies would
locate in Manchester in sufficient number to compensate for the
loss of employment resulting from the closing of the Amoskeag
mills. In an attempt to answer this query a survey was under¬
taken of the results of the activities of Amoskeag Industries,
Incorporated, in the first 2 years of its operation.4
4Hereafter In this chapter "the industries" rerers to Amoslceag Industries,
Incorporated.
EFFORTS TO ATTRACT INDUSTRIES
117
POLICIES OP AMOSKEAG INDUSTRIES, INCORPORATED
Araoskeag Industries, Incorporated,6 purchased all the prop¬
erties of the Amoskeag Manufacturing Company for $5,000,000.
To appreciate subsequent developments it is necessary to know
the source of the purchase money. It may be recalled from the
concluding discussion of chapter III that Manchester residents
pledged to purchase $500,000 worth of stock: the Public Service
Company of New Hampshire agreed to repurchase the Amoskeag
hydroelectric station, canals, and water wheels for $2,250,000;
and the financial institutions of the city agreed to a loan
of an equal amount.
The entire arrangement for attracting industry possessed
advantages over similar attempts in other New England cities,
such as Lowell, New Bedford, and Fall River. The abandoned
textile mills in any one of these cities had not been owned by
one corporation; as a consequence there were competing units in
liquidation in contrast to the coordinated and integrated plan
which could have been rather easily evolved from the Amoskeag
situation. One large unit could more easily provide services
than a small unit could not afford to supply. The very vital
economic interests of the Manchester banks in the salvaging
possibilities gave to the Industries another advantage - the
possibility of providing an incoming enterprise with credit
more readily than could have been done if the banks had had no
immediate and direct interest in disposing of mill space and
equipment. This was accomplished through the Industries
borrowing from the banks against its total assets and then
lending these same funds to individual enterprises which
probably were not eligible for a loan from the banks.
Since Amoskeag Industries is a liquidating corporation,
it has been primarily interested in disposing of its property
to purchasers rather than to tenants. Sale, moreover, is more
indicative of the potential stability of employment to be
provided by the incoming company than is rental, and the owners
g
According to the statement of Amoskeag Industries as of December 1938, 7 of the
13 directors represent local financial institutions; 4 are local business persons;
1 represents the city's newspaper publisher; and 1 represents the Public Service
Company. However, since the four businessmen, the publisher, and the represen¬
tative of the Public Service Company are all members of at least one financial
Institution located in Manchester, the banks and the public utility may well be
said to have complete control of Amoskeag Industries. Of the 15 directors of the
Public Service Company of New Hampshire, 8 serve on one or more directorates of
Manchester's financial Institutions. The executive officer, called the agent,
Is president of the leading Manchester savings Dank and a member of the board
of directors of the leading national bank and of the Public Service Company.
118
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
of the Industries, as well as the community in general, had
every reason to be interested in this sort of stability.
Accordingly, the terms of sale appear moderately liberal.
The initial investment required is only 25 percent of the
purchase price. Amoskeag Industries will accept a mortgage
for the balance, bearing an interest rate of 5 percent and
amortised over 3 to 10 years depending on their estimate of the
purchaser's financial responsibility and of the volume of
employment to be provided by the enterprise. Similar arrange¬
ments cover the sale of machinery to be used in Manchester,
except that in these instances the rate of interest on the
unpaid balance is 6 percent.
The usual rental lease runs for 5 years. The rental includes
heat and the cost of improvements amortized over the 5 years.
The rental is so calculated as to average 12! cents per square
foot per annum over the 5 years. The tenant, however, has
the option of withdrawing from the lease at the end of the
third year upon payment of the unamortized balance of the costs
incurred for improvements. It is also possible to arrange for
a graduated rental that increases with the passage of the years
so long as it averages 125 cents per square foot per annum over
the period. This really amounts to deferring payment on the
amortized cost of improvements. On occasion, the Industries
has been willing to help an incoming concern get started
by exempting it from rental payments in the first month or two.
In such instances the effective date of the lease begins with
the payment of rent.
Process steam is available from the Industries on a metered
basis. Gas, electric power, and water are available from the
local utilities. The latter is municipally owned and operated.
The mill buildings are provided with railroad sidings and
loading platforms.
Concerns moving in from other locations often have asked
the Industries to pay the moving expenses. This request
has been refused without exception in the belief that if
such assistance is actually needed, the company is not in
a financially sound condition. It is realized also that
someone else could just as easily pay the concern to move
out of the Amoskeag mills.
An enterprise from another locality applying for space under¬
goes a certain amount of investigation. Banking references
EFFORTS TO ATTRACT INDUSTRIES
119
W PA - Nat loria I Research Project (Bine J
FIGURE 16.- WORKER OPERATING A MACHINE WHICH AUTOMATICALLY TIES
THE ENDS OF ONE WARP TO THOSE OF ANOTHER
THAT IS TO REPLACE IT
are checked to establish the degree of financial stability,
and the Industries consults the local chamber of commerce
to ascertain the concern's reputation for fair dealing in
general and with labor in particular. An enterprise that is
just being organized is discouraged from starting actual
operations in Manchester unless it sounds convincing on its
specific and definite plans for marketing its product. A
consideration as obvious as this is often slighted by an
inexperienced manufacturer in his overenthusiasm for being on
his own.
Amoskeag Industries is able to offer incoming concerns expert
advice on plant lay-out and machinery installations. It is
also in a position to lend money to or to contribute to the
capital of a corporation through the purchase of stock, through
the close connection of the Industries with the local banks.
Publicity for the activities of the Industries was readily
available. In the first place, the Amoskeag Manufacturing
Company had enjoyed an enviable reputation in the trade,
and as a consequence its subsequent fate made news in trade and
financial journals and newspapers. The fact of the formal
120
SHUT-DOWN OP AMOSKEAG
organization of the liquidating or promoting corporation as
a citizens' committee possessed a considerable degree of novelty
which also had news value. Moreover, the committee was able
to get off to a quick, strong start. The Industries was not
slow to use these favorable circumstances in a "ballyhoo"
which, with the aid of feature articles in the popular maga¬
zines and Sunday supplements and with a "March of Time" film,
soon reached exaggerated proportions.
Another all-important consideration was the fact that Amoskeag
Industries was launched during a period of recovery. Also of
considerable importance was the fact that the remnants of the
textile workers' union entered into a gentleman's agreement
with the Industries to refrain from any organizing activity
for some months in order not to frighten off timid employers.
On the surface, then, it appeared that all things were
conspiring to make the experiment a success. What considera¬
tions led companies to locate in Manchester and to what extent
were the expectations of the auspicious inaugural fulfilled?
When Amoskeag Industries began its campaign to attract new
concerns to Manchester, the textile industry was once more
undergoing a cyclical upswing. Many of the mills in the
neighboring cities and towns operated with a third shift,
which provided job opportunities for some former Amoskeag
operatives. For some of the mills the actual or prospective
increase in business could be accommodated only by additional
plant capacity. For mills in that condition Manchester had
a decided attraction: there was mill space awaiting occupancy
and machinery ana trained textile workers ready to be put into
use. Those first to arrive on the scene would have the pick
of both the machines and workers.
MEW TEXTILE COMPANIES AMD BELATED COMCEBMS
Pacific Mills was in this expansive state in the fall of
1936. This company was the first to start up in the mill yard.
It leased about 1,200,000 square feet and purchased Amoskeag's
most modern machinery for the manufacture of print cloth which
was finished at its own plant in Lawrence. Despite the fact
that its capital investment in modern machinery was made
at liquidation prices and despite the application of the
principles of scientific management and the payment of only
EFFORTS TO ATTRACT INDUSTRIES
121
the "going wages", the mill was unable to compete with the
southern manufacturers of print cloth. As a consequence,
the company soon found that it was manufacturing for inventory
only. This situation was aggravated, of course, by the re¬
cession in textile business that set in during the summer
of 1937. A year later, and after many months of part-time
operations, the company withdrew from Manchester and moved
the machinery, among Amoskeag's best, to its plant at Dover,
some 40 miles east of Manchester.
Subsequent developments of Pacific Mills are not without
significance for Manchester. In the fall of 1938 there was
another revival in the textile industry, and the Dover plant,
now producing a blended fabric, had to start up a third shift
which was staffed in part by its former employees in Manchester.
Amoskeag Industries, on the other hand, was somewhat handi¬
capped in taking advantage of these improved conditions since
it had lost its best machinery.
Other textile companies that followed close upon Pacific's
entrance into the mill yard also involved the expansion of
going concerns. Thus the Chicopee Manufacturing Company,
producer of gauze and bandages for its parent corporation,
Johnson and Johnson (leading manufacturer of pharmaceutical
supplies), was undergoing an expansion at this time. Its
demand for additional capacity was satisfied by the purchase
of Amoskeag's newest mill along with its machinery. Once again
the attraction was the cheapness of the capital equipment and
the availability of a trained labor supply.
Since the product is not subject to seasonal fluctuation and
the parent organization has well-established markets, the
concern has been able to provide stable employment. Despite
this, the workers are reported to prefer employment elsewhere
because of the lengths to which the speed-up and stretch-out
are reported to have been carried. The experience of this
company also illustrates another difficulty to be faced by the
displaced Manchester workers - that of technological change.
Some 80 slubber tenders, for example, were dismissed when this
task was eliminated through installation of improved machinery
which makes this stage of the process a continuous one.
The expansion of the other textile concerns involved efforts
to achieve a further degree of vertical integration. Thus
122
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
a manufacturer of men's clothing located in Philadelphia had
been weaving about three-quarters of his cloth requirements
some years before the failure of Amoskeag. At that time
the company became interested in producing a substantial
part of its own worsted yarn by the French mule-spinning
process. Amoskeag still retained some mule-spinning frames
of this description although they had not been used for many
years. The original intention of this company had been to
purchase the machinery for use elsewhere, but with mill space
available at a reasonable price the company decided to purchase
space as well as the machinery and establish a unit in the
Amoskeag mill yard. The specialized skills were not to be
found locally since mule spinning of this sort had been dis¬
continued a long time ago. But the requisite number of workers
were induced to leave Woonsocket, Rhode Island, where this type
of spinning is still used. The less specialized skills were
available, of course, in Manchester, and probably at lower wage
rates than in Philadelphia.
A converter of rayon cloth with offices in New York City
was interested in directly controlling a part of his supply.
To this end this company purchased the newest machinery and
inspected factory sites in virtually every seaboard State on
the Atlantic before locating in an Amoskeag mill. A southern
location was rejected because of the burden of transportation
costs, the more or less overt hostility to a northern employer,
and the possibility of costly damage to brand-new machinery
resulting from training workers without any textile experience.
On this showing, a site in the lower part of New England would
be more economical, generally considered, than a site in
the upper part of the region such as Manchester. That is, the
transportation cost would be lower and labor costs about the
same. However, another consideration loomed large - a lease
with flexible provisions since this attempt at integration was
an experimental effort. And Amoskeag Industries was willing
to offer just such a lease - hence the selection of Manchester.
Another Philadelphia concern manufacturing an interlining for
overcoats by a patented process was in the market for second¬
hand worsted machinery at the time of the formation of Amoskeag
Industries. When the representatives of this company visited
Manchester to inspect the machinery, they were made to realize
that mill space could also be had at liquidation prices. Since
EFFORTS TO ATTRACT INDUSTRIES
123
the company was intent upon producing a larger fraction of its
own cloth requirements than previously, it decided to establish
a unit in the mill yard by leasing space with an option to buy.
This option was exercised within a short period.
A third Philadelphia concern also took advantage of the situ¬
ation to engage in integration of a sort. This manufacturer
of knit goods had depended for many years upon Amoskeag for his
supply of knitting yarns, and, with the loss of this source of
supply, no satisfactory substitute had been found. Since the
former Amoskeag overseer in charge of this branch of production
was well known to the Philadelphia company, it decided to
provide him with financial backing sufficient to purchase
Amoskeag machinery and to lease space. After operating about
a year, the company was producing in excess of the requirements
of its Philadelphia sponsor and was seeking outside markets.
The establishment of this unit in Manchester led to the
location there of still another Philadelphia concern - a dyeing
establishment. Its parent branch in Philadelphia had been
doing the dyeing work for the knit-goods manufacturer for
many years, and to maintain the quality of its product, the
latter was anxious that the same dyeing company should provide
this service on its knitting yarns. These, however, must
be dyed in the tops which are purchased from the American
Woolen Company located at Lawrence, Massachusetts. To dye
the tops in Philadelphia would necessitate shipping the tops
to Philadelphia, the dyed tops to Manchester, and the knitting
yarns back to Philadelphia. By establishing a dyeing unit
in Manchester, round-trip shipping costs to Philadelphia were
eliminated. Equipment of the Amoskeag dyeing plant was pur¬
chased, as well as space. The supervisor is from Philadelphia,
and the remaining jobs requiring little or no skill have been
filled by local persons. Its capacity is in excess of that
required for the dyeing work of its Philadelphia customer.
A fourth worsted unit engaged in the warping, dressing, and
weaving processes had been established early in the spring of
1937. A former Amoskeag overseer with financial backing from
Boston residents was the responsible personality. Nothing,
however, is known about its marketing outlets - whether, for
instance, it was able to regain some of the former customers
of Amoskeag or whether it started from scratch. The Amoskeag
mills were selected because of the cheap machinery and space
124
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKBAG
and because the workers were known to the overseer. This has
been a small concern employing fewer than 50 workers.
Not much is known, either, as to why a small manufacturer
of coarse cotton roving which is used in mops and as inside
covering for insulation purposes, formerly operating in Ohio,
located in Manchester. Presumably the availability of machines
and space influenced the decision to locate in Manchester since
for such unskilled work labor could scarcely be considered
a factor. The shift in location did not involve any shift
in customers.
There was another textile outfit operating in September 1938,
which since then has closed down. This company, producing
handkerchiefs, was newly organized with local capital by two
former officials of Amoskeag. The product had to bear the
transportation cost of the purchased warps as well as the
transportation cost of the woven cloth to a finishing plant
in the New York area. For such an arrangement Manchester was
not an economical location.
With the establishment of these textile companies in the mill
yard in units too small for each to maintain its own machine
shop, cover its own rolls, or make its own shuttles, it was
only to be expected that companies would be organized to supply
these ancillary services to the textile industry. Three such
companies were organized, and their development depends on the
development of the textiles in the mill yard. Indeed, the
dyeing company previously discussed might also be included in
this category.
Before considering from the same point of view the new
enterprises that have imparted a degree of diversification
to Manchester's industrial composition, it may be well to
summarize the nature of the location of new textile companies
in Manchester. It was very largely, especially when measured
in terms of employment, an expansion of going concerns and,
in the case of four, expansion in the form of integration.
Expansion was attractive at that time because of the improved
outlook in business in general and textiles in particular.
Expansion in Manchester was attractive because the necessary
capital investment in machinery and plant could be made at
liquidation prices. This was especially true of the machinery
since the volume of expansion was such that there were enough
machines of moderately recent design to satisfy the demand.
EFFORTS TO ATTRACT INDUSTRIES
125
Or, perhaps, this is only another way of saying that the
expansion would have been greater had there been available
a larger quantity of modern equipment at liquidation prices.
Moreover, workers with textile experience were available.
NONTEXTILE COMPANIES
Among the nontextile companies were four that manufactured
subsidiary products for producer-goods industries. The con¬
siderations influencing their location were as specialized
as in the case of the textile companies. One such concern
manufactures cable clips and other metal stampings for elec¬
trical wiring devices. It is an expansion of a "cellar shop"
once located in Waltham, Massachusetts. Having developed
a cable clip that suited the peculiar demands of the Public
Service Company of New Hampshire, the enterprise outgrew the
limits of the cellar. The Public Service Company naturally was
anxious to have manufacturers locate in the Amoskeag yard in
order that it might have customers for power from the Amoskeag
hydroelectric plant that it had purchased. Since the Public
Service Company was also the all-but-exclusive market for this
company, its suggestion to locate in the Amoskeag yard under
these circumstances was likely to be heeded. Moreover, for
a company having its major markets north of Boston, as is the
case with this concern, Manchester is an economical location.
Although some of the Amoskeag machinery could have been
adapted to the use of this company, nevertheless it preferred
to purchase new machinery in order to minimize accidents and
lost time through break-downs. The workers, with the exception
of several keymen, are Manchester residents who had to undergo
a training period of 6 to 12 months.
Another company in the same category is the manufacturer of
electrical-coil measuring instruments. The main cost in its
production is the labor cost of assembly which consists chiefly
of soldering minute springs and wires, winding small coils,
and calibrating. The work requires a very sensitive touch,
excellent eyesight, and a disposition adapted to exacting,
nerve-wracking work. Young women are most adept at this type
of task, and with the closing of Amoskeag there would be many
who would accept such employment at the basic rate of 30 to
40 cents per hour which this company has paid, according
126
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
*#otk#»9 M*nufacturIng Co.
FIGURE 17.- COTTO* NAPPER
This machine has cylinders of fine wire which revolve rapidly to raise the
nap on the cloth.
to records of the New Hampshire Minimum Wage Division. The
shipping costs of the final product would be negligible since
the article is small, light, compact, and of low unit value.
The shipping costs on its raw materials are perhaps somewhat
higher than they would be in Boston, which is an assembly
point for such materials, but very probably this factor is
more than compensated for by the possibility of lower wages
in Manchester.
The third company producing minor articles used by producer-
goods industries is the manufacturer of heat-treated chilled
shot and heat-treated steel grit. Although this is a newly
organized enterprise, the leading personality of the company
had been in this business for many years, as was his father
before him. Manchester was selected for a variety of reasons.
The major consumers were expected to be the granite quarries
located in and around Concord, New Hampshire, and Quincy,
EFFORTS TO ATTRACT INDUSTRIES
127
Massachusetts. Accordingly, a location in northern New England
was desirable. Manchester could qualify in more respects than
this. A lifelong friend of the manufacturer had been in the
securities business in Manchester for many years and by virtue
of this was able to raise capital locally. The Amoskeag
foundry was available and could be occupied with a down payment
of 25 percent of the purchase price. Amoskeag Industries was
ready to turn over scrap iron in the form of junked machinery
in return for notes convertible into stock. The process
requires soft water for which New England streams, including
the Merrimack, are famous. Finally, laborers are available
at lower rates than in the larger centers.
It has turned out, however, that the granite quarries have
not been the main customers of this company; rather, its major
markets have been in the Middle West, especially the auto¬
mobile centers. The company admits that it is at a freight
disadvantage for this business, but it remains in a competitive
position since a midwestern manufacturer would have higher
labor cost and the additional expense of treating the water
supply chemically in order to soften it.
The remaining company, while it did not operate in Manchester
in September 1938, located there shortly afterward. It spe¬
cializes in turned-wood handles for screw drivers, hammers,
and the like. For more than 60 years the company had been
located in Weare, New Hampshire, about 15 miles northwest
of Manchester- When, some 2 years prior to its moving to
Manchester,, railroad service had been discontinued on the spur
line, the company realized that its location was untenable.
Consequently, it utilized the destruction of its plant by
the hurricane and flood in the fall of 1938 as an opportune
occasion to relocate. In the Amoskeag yard, space is available
on short notice, and Manchester's railroad connections to
northern New Hampshire and nearby Canada (the sources of its
wood supply), as well as to all markets, are excellent. Only
about 20 of its working force of 65 decided to remain with
the company in its new location. The remainder were hired in
Manchester. This imposed no serious problem since the training
period is only a matter of weeks. However, it should be made
clear that while the company may be considered an addition to
Manchester's employment opportunities, it cannot be regarded
as a net addition to employment in the Manchester area.
128
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
Among the nontextile concerns producing consumers' goods was
the manufacturer of canned vegetable soups. It is a subsidiary
of a well-known manufacturer of a large variety of canned and
preserved goods located in Montreal and under French-Canadian
ownership. This company had decided to make a bid for the
New England market, relying in part on the loyalty of the
French Canadians residing in all parts of New England. For
this reason a central location in the region such as Worcester,
for example, would be preferred to Manchester. However, in
none of the more centrally located communities was there found
the necessary combination of adequate space and facilities for
buying process steam. Since this venture was conceived as
a cautious experiment, the company was unwilling to invest in
a steam plant at the outset. In the Amoskeag yard both space
and process steam were available as well as workers for the
semi- or unskilled tasks involved. The chef and supervisory
personnel had been transferred from the Montreal branch.
Two of the new companies are merely engaged in distributing:
one is a distributor of rock-wool insulation, and the other is
a depot for an out-of-town linen supply service company. Each
has employed fewer than 20 workers.
A manufacturer of men's clothing is also represented in this
group. This company had carried on its business in Boston where
it was obliged to deal with the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of
America. It attempted to avoid the necessity of collective
bargaining by moving its shop to Concord, New Hampshire. The
union followed the company to its new location where picketing
activities led to litigation which was decided in the company's
favor. This company was generally known to have been a viola¬
tor of the Minimum Wage Act which protects minors and women.
Concord, the seat of the State government, however, did not
have an adequate labor supply for this company. Accordingly,
early in 1937 it leased space from the Industries with the idea
of drawing upon the large number of unemployed young women of
Manchester. In this location, too, the company has been cited
in complaints to the Minimum Wage Division of the State's
Bureau of Labor concerning the number of apprentices or learners
employed and its failure to pay the minimum rate of 35 cents
per hour.
Two other concerns may have come to Manchester because of
labor difficulties elsewhere. A manufacturer of cardboard shoe
EFFORTS TO ATTRACT INDUSTRIES
129
counters located in a nearby town in Massachusetts was under
contract to the union. It attempted to avoid the terms of the
contract before its expiration by establishing a shop in
Manchester and diverting its production there. The union cited
the company to the National Labor Relations Board for engaging
in an unfair labor practice. The union's position was sus¬
tained by the board, and the company was ordered to fill all
orders from production in its Massachusetts plant up to full
capacity before filling orders from its Manchester plant. Its
volume of business, however, was insufficient to warrant the
maintenance of two factories, and as a consequence the one in
the Amoskeag yard was dismantled.
Similarly, a knit-goods concern located in the Boston area
rented space in an Amoskeag mill, presumably in order to divert
production from its unionized shop, although the company claimed
to be interested in manufacturing another type of product.
Before the company could move any machinery into the Manchester
shop, however, the union workers in the Boston shop went out
on strike. Since it was the beginning of the busy season, the
company acceded to the demands of the union that the company
observe the same labor standards (wages and hours) in Manchester
as in Boston. The company then saw no advantage in maintaining
the Manchester unit and sought relief from its lease with
the Industries.
Finally, mention should be made of a small shoe manufacturer
who leased space from one who had purchased a mill building
from Amoskeag Industries, and accordingly the latter had
no control over the location of this company in the mill
yard. The proprietor of the shoe company had been in the same
business three times before in other parts of the State, and
each time had been cited for violations of the State labor laws.
TWO YEARS OP AMOSKEAG INDUSTRIES
Our criterion in judging the success of the Industries is the
extent to which its activities have created new job oppor¬
tunities for the residents of Manchester. Interest is therefore
centered on the extent to which mill space has been occupied by
companies new to Manchester, since there is no addition to
Manchester's job opportunities when a concern moves into the
mill yard from another location in Manchester. The only
130
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
exception to this would be those cases where a concern was
expanding and where the expansion would not have occurred in
Manchester unless additional mill space had been available upon
the terms which actually prevailed. Such expansion had not
taken place to any appreciable extent by the autumn of 1938,
which is the terminal date of our survey. Accordingly, sub¬
sequent statistics are based only on the companies new to
Manchester that have located in the mill yard.
The heart of the matter is revealed by the volume of em¬
ployment provided by these companies as reported to the New
Hampshire Unemployment Compensation Division.® Since the
first new company started operations in December 1936, a survey
of the volume of employment may well begin with January 1937.
In January 1937 four additional companies started operations,
and the five (including the one beginning operations in the
preceding month) employed 2,061 persons. Two of the companies
tikli IB.- MONTHLY BEPOBT OP THE NUMBER OP NEW COMPANIES
LOCATED IN TEE AMOSEEAG MILLS AND THE IB VOLUME OP
EMPLOYMENT. JANUABY 11< 7-SEPTEMBEB 198 8a
1937
1938
Month
Number of
Number
Number of
Number
companies
employed
companies
employed
January
5
2. 061
16
2,463
February
8
2,072
17
2.516
March
8
2,098
17
2, 565
April
11
2,389
18
2,554
May
12
2,479
19
1,916
June
13
3,174
19
1, 527
July
14
3,190
18
1.482
August
15
3,137
19
1. 627
September
15
3.096
17
1. 604
October
15
2,675
-
-
November
16
2,721
-
-
December
16
2.646
-
-
Data are from the records of the New Hampshire Bureau of Labor, Division of
Unemployment Compensation; they cover only companies new to Manchester that have
located In the mill yards.
Each employer must report under the act If "In each of twenty different weeks,
whether or not such weeks are or were consecutive, within either the current or
the preceding calendar year, has or had in employment, four or more Individuals,
Irrespective of whether the same Individuals are or were employed In each such
week.* Public Laws of the State of New Hampshire, 8ectlon l-H of chapter 179-A
as inserted by chapter 178, Laws of 1937.
EFFORTS TO ATTRACT INDUSTRIES
131
accounted for more than 1,800 of the total number. By April
as many as 11 concerns had taken up space in the mill yard,
but they were not large employers, as is evidenced by the fact
that the total number employed was only 2,389- The peak of
employment in this 21-month period was attained in July 1937
when 3,190 persons were employed by 14 companies; nearly
three-quarters of the total were employed by 3 concerns.
The recession in general business which set in about the
autumn of 1937 was not without its effect upon Amoskeag Indus¬
tries. During the balance of 1937 only 2 additional companies
were attracted to the Amoskeag mills, and in the first 9 months
of the following year only 4 new concerns located there, no one
of which employed as many as 30 persons. As an offset to
this slight increase was the discontinuance of the largest
unit, a branch of Pacific Mills, in June. Thus in September
1938, 2 years after the organization of Amoskeag Industries,
Incorporated, 17 companies gave employment to 1,604 workers.
To gain some idea of the extent to which employment in
the new companies was able to replace the employment that
had been provided by the Amoskeag Manufacturing Company, a
comparison has been made between the employment and wages paid
by the latter in 1934, the last full year of operations, and
the employment and wage record of the new companies .in 1937.
Amoskeag in 1934 employed on the average 8,852 persons and
disbursed $6,400,000 in wages. The new companies located
in the mill yard 3 years later employed on the average 2,662
workers who received $2,200,000 in wages. That is, Amoskeag
Industries in its first and best year of operation to date
replaced 30 percent of Amoskeag employment and 34 percent
of its wage bill. Mention has already been made of the with¬
drawal of the branch of Pacific Mills after a year and a
half of operation. This unit had employed from 1,000 to
1,500 operatives and had occupied some 1,200,000 square feet
of mill space. The relative ease of starting and stopping
operations was possible because the space had been leased.
The purchase of mill space for use usually involves longer
attachment to the community than is the case with a short-term
lease. For this reason it becomes pertinent to inquire into
the extent of employment carried out on premises that have
been purchased and on premises that have been leased as of
September 1938.
132
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
The 17 companies reporting 1,604 workers in September 1938
occupied 2,015 ,303 • square feet. Six of these companies,
employing 1,054 workers, or two-thirds of the total, had
purchased 1,494,669 square feet, or about three-fourths of the
total occupied space. After the withdrawal of Pacific Mills,
it is the small employers that give promise of the least
permanent occupancy.
At»o*fc«ag Manufacturing Co.
FIGURE 18.- WOOL C0M8CR
wool tops are combed as they turn In this circular machine built In 190#.
One of the objectives of the Industries was to secure a di¬
versification of industry. After 2 years of effort very little
progress had been made toward the attainment of this goal. Of
the 17 concerns operating in September 1938, 8 were engaged in
the manufacture of textiles and 2 in closely related processes,
such as roll covering and dyeing. These 10 establishments
accounted for more than 80 percent of the employment. One
other concern, a machinery company, may well be considered part
of the textile industry since its main business has been to
install and service the machines used in the mill yard. It
has replaced the machinery section of the old Amoskeag with
much of the personnel recruited from that disbanded section.
Only four of the establishments can be said to contribute to
EFFORTS TO ATTRACT INDUSTRIES
133
diversification of industry: One produces metal stampings and
electrical wiring devices; another manufactures chilled steel
shot and grit; a third turns out electrical-coil measuring
instruments; and the fourth makes men's clothing. The aggre¬
gate employment of all four in September 1938 was only 119.
In this connection mention should also be made, because of its
fair prospects for development, of the soup cannery that was
operating in that month but with less than four persons.
There is some information available on a few of the qual¬
itative aspects of this new employment. For example, in
15 instances the full-time weekly hours are known. In nine
establishments this amounted to a 40-hour week, in eight of
them on a 5-day basis. Five others were on a S^-day schedule
with hours varying from 44 to 50. One other operated on
a 5-day, 4S-hour schedule.7
Some information is also available on hourly wage rates.
Over the first 9 months of 1937 it was necessary to report
to the Unemployment Compensation Division the aggregate number
of man-hours together with wage payments. The division of the
latter by the former would yield an average hourly wage rate
for the entire employer unit without regard to occupations.
It is these rates that are used. Within this 9-month period 15
establishments were operating. Of this number, nine belonged
to the textile industry. For eight of these nine concerns
the average hourly earnings varied from 42 to 51 cents; for one
company devoted to dressing, warping, and weaving worsted
goods - processes involving the better paid occupations - the
average earnings were 62 cents. The comparable average for all
sections of the Amoskeag Manufacturing Company in 1934 was
41 cents.
Of the three companies that provided some degree of indus¬
trial diversification, one, making metal stampings, had an
average of 51 cents per hour, but the other two paid an average
below that of Amoskeag in 1934. These hourly earnings were
37 and 31 cents, with the lower average in the men's clothing
factory and the somewhat higher one in the establishment making
the electrical-coil measuring instruments.
It appears from all this evidence that the results of 2
years' activities on the part of Amoskeag Industries must be
7
This Information has Seen adapted from Inspectors' reports to the Minimum Wage
Division of the New Hampshire Bureau of labor.
134
SHUT-DOWN OP AMOSKEAG
considered as disappointing. It cannot be disputed that the
volume of new employment was a small fraction of the volume
lost by the closing of the Amoskeag mills; or that little
advance had been made toward the diversification of the city's
industry and what advance had been made was with companies
paying wages no better, some a little worse, than the textile
industry - traditionally a low-wage industry.
CONCLUDING CONSIDERATIONS
Efforts to create the belief that prosperity once more pre¬
vailed in Manchester had been carried to such lengths that
southern textile manufacturers cited to their Congressional
representatives the alleged prosperity of Manchester as evi¬
dence of the equitable operation of the wage differentials then
extant and being considered in the Fair Labor Standards Act.
So successful was the Manchester Chamber of Commerce in broad¬
casting this notion that it received letters from workers in
many parts of the country asking for employment in the belief
that the local labor supply had been exhausted. Indeed, one
such inquiry came from a textile worker in Manchester, England,
and this at a time when upwards of 10,000 persons or families
in New Hampshire's Queen City were dependent on public relief.
The realization of the following facts, however, must have
had a sobering influence upon Amoskeag Industries. From
August 1937 to September 1938 only 6 new companies employing
q or more, with an aggregate employment of about 150, located
in the Amoskeag yard as compared with the location of iq com¬
panies in the preceding 8 months with a peak employment of
3,100 persons in July 1937. That is, the rate of increase in
new employers was very appreciably slackened. To aggravate the
situation, there was the withdrawal of the largest employing
unit, Pacific Mills. It was clear to the Industries by the
fall of 1938 that it could not rely on new employers to start
operations of their own in the mill yard; with upwards of
3,000,000 square feet of mill space still available and with
expenses of $1,000 a day, largely for taxes and interest, the
company decided that it must take the initiative in organizing
new industries.
Among the disappointments was the failure of anyone to
operate Amoskeag's worsted section. As has been shown in
EFFORTS TO ATTRACT INDUSTRIES
135
chapter III, the worsted section had made a profit over its last
decade under Amoskeag management, and it could very well
have remained a going concern. For this reason it was expected
that someone would resume operations of this unit even after
a lapse of a year. However, no one with the requisite com¬
bination of capital and courage came forward. That courage was
required may be inferred from the fact that during the period
under consideration the price of raw wool was rising, while
the price of finished goods remained about constant. Amoskeag
Industries was unwilling to assume direct responsibilities
because by the very nature of the process, and especially
in view of the rise in price of wool, the number employed per
dollar of investment would be small.
Consequently, when it became imperative in the late fall
of 1938 to organize new enterprises, Amoskeag Industries
established three companies, each of modest proportions.
Only one was planned to manufacture worsted grey goods; one was
to produce spun rayons; and the third was to spin mohair yarn.
All three were largely financed by the Industries through
stock subscription. A fourth company promoted by out-of-town
interests arranged to purchase some of Amoskeag's finishing
equipment and to establish a unit in the mill yard for finish¬
ing lining cloth used in the manufacture of shoes. All four
expected to go into production sometime during the winter of
1938-39 and hoped to achieve eventually an aggregate employment
of 500 to 600 workers.
The effect of the operation of Amoskeag Industries upon
Manchester's volume of unemployment may be best summarized by
considering the numbers registered with the Manchester office
of the New Hampshire Employment Service. The number in the
active file of this office would reflect, of course, more than
the activities of Amoskeag Industries. For example, employment
fluctuations in the shoe industry also would be represented
there. Nevertheless it is not without interest that the
monthly average of the number registered in 1937 was 7,555
compared with 10,873 in the preceding year, before any of the
new companies had really started up. Although this represented
a decline of 30 percent in the number seeking employment,
it meant that 22 percent of the city's gainfully occupied
population was still seeking employment through the State
136
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
Employment Service. In the first 10 months of the very next
year, 1938, however, for the reasons already related, the
average number registered was 10,820, equal to the number
in 1936. Once more about one-third of the gainfully occupied
population was actively seeking work.
CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
SUMMARY
The basic questions to whic-h this inquiry has been directed
were stated at the outset as: What are the more important
considerations that transformed one of the first industrialized
regions into one of the first "depressed areas" of an indus¬
trial character? What types of adjustment do workers make
who are economically stranded in a depressed area, and what
adjustments may they hope to make?
The major answer to the first question was given in terms
of excess productive capacity resulting initially from the es¬
tablishment of new textile factories in considerable number in
the South. These had been established by local entrepreneurs
to take advantage of cheap labor at a time that coincided with
the introduction of the automatic loom. As a consequence,
the new productive capacity was an addition to rather than
a replacement of the older machinery. The "World War demands
upon the industry served to conceal this excess capacity at the
very time that large profits derived from wartime operations
provided the basis for further expansion of the industry
in subsequent years. Added impetus to the southward shift
of the industry in pursuit of low labor costs came from the
virtual cessation with the World War of the influx of cheap
immigrant labor into New England. Since cheap labor no longer
came to the industry, the industry moved to the cheap labor.
Nor could this major maladjustment in the cotton-textile
industry be mitigated by an expansion of markets. In the face
of the increased competitive strength of substitute textile
fibers, cotton could manage only to retain its relative share
of the textile market. Even this could be accomplished only
by manufacturing to an increasing degree for the producer-
goods industry and by catering to the consumer-goods industry
through increased attention to the style factor. Both policies
tended to impart additional instability to manufacturing
operations and additional risks to profit making.
137
138
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
Against these industry-wide difficulties the New England
mills in general and the Amoskeag mills in particular attempted
to compete despite the handicaps under which they operated.
The latter may be summarized as obsolescence of machinery, of
mill management, and of marketing organization. In addition,
the very size of Amoskeag greatly increased its inflexibility
in meeting changed market conditions. As this report has
attempted to show, as soon as Amoskeag's competitive position
was recognized as marginal, the major owners withdrew capital
funds from the Company in a series of financial reorganizations,
and eventually they liquidated the concern.
The social consequences of the shut-down can be measured in
terms of widespread unemployment of a relatively long duration
and dependency upon emergency Government employment and general
relief. In a sample of more than a thousand Amoskeag workers
made idle by the shut-down in 1935, only two-fifths of the men
and one-fifth of the women were able to find some private
employment within the 22 months following loss of job at the
time of the closing of the mills but before the location of
new companies in the Amoskeag yard.
Most of the new companies attracted to this location started
operations in the first 6 months of 1937, and at peak opera¬
tions in the summer of that year employed more than 3,100
workers. In the subsequent recession about half this number
lost their jobs. During the week of maximum employment in
1935, Amoskeag had provided work for 11,019* Thus the types
of adjustment available to those economically stranded in the
depressed area have been limited reemployment in Manchester
and adjoining communities, restricted emigration, and, as was
usually the case, dependency upon some form of governmental
assistance.
Manchester's economic prospects depend obviously on the
establishment of new companies and the expansion of industries
already operating in Manchester. The latter are now confined
mainly to the boot and shoe industry. Accordingly, the problem
of Manchester, as of other stranded textile centers, may be
considered in terms of the economics of industrial location.
GENEBAL LOCATIONAL CONSIDEBATIONS
The highly specialized character of the locational factors
which attracted new industries to the Amoskeag yard becomes
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
139
evident when they are viewed in the light of general locational
considerations. It should be clear that industries which
are oriented toward raw materials will not be attracted to
Manchester for the simple reason that the Manchester area has
virtually no raw materials, organic or inorganic. A possible
exception to this are the forests in the northern end of the
State and in nearby Canada that have provided the basis for
Manchester's woodworking factories. Since, however, wood¬
working industries in general have been declining for more than
a decade, one would not look for any appreciable expansion
of the industry in the Manchester area, especially since the
nearest forests are not very extensive.
Nor is Manchester so situated that it would have any special
attraction for industries that should be oriented toward
markets, and again for a simple reason. Although Manchester is
probably a good distribution center for northern New England,
this market, whether for consumers' or producers' goods,
is in itself too small to support industries of any appreciable
size. Although Manchester is only about 56 miles from Boston,
a major marketing area, from the viewpoint of transportation
costs a plant location in the southern part of New England
is preferable; such a location would enable a plant to tap
the Boston market, that of southern New England, which has
a considerably higher density than the northern section of the
region, and that of the New York City-Philadelphia area,
whereas a plant location in Manchester, in addition to the
small market of the local area, would be as economical only
for serving the market of the Boston area.
Moreover, to the natural transportation disadvantage due
to distance from major markets there must be added the economic
disadvantage of the low volume of traffic and its uneven
distribution, that is, a larger volume of incoming freight
than of outgoing freight. These considerations are especially
important since they make for a high cost of living in an
area such as Manchester that imports most of its food and
fuel supplies.
There are communities, however, that have developed indus¬
trially despite distance from the major marketing areas and
the absence of raw materials. Buffalo, New York, is a case
in point. Communities of this type are usually located at
natural "breaking points" along important through routes.
140
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
Since this involves the necessity of rehandling, it becomes
economical to "mill in transit." But Manchester, situated
as it is off in the northeastern corner, obviously cannot claim
any such advantage.
On this showing, if capital and labor were perfectly mobile,
there would have located at Manchester only market-oriented
factories that could be supported by the northern New England
market.1 With dependence solely upon this market Manchester
could not have developed into a city of its present size.
Since, however, capital and labor are not perfectly mobile,
Manchester may be the locus of relatively low total costs
for certain industries that do serve a wide market, despite
the aforementioned locational disadvantages. This can only
mean that the combined costs of capital and labor are so much
cheaper here than in alternative localities as to offset
at least other locational disadvantages in its geographic
situation.
One would not expect low-cost capital to be necessarily
inherent in Manchester's location. To the extent to which it
exists, it is due entirely to the accident of the liquidation
of Amoskeag. The latter made available at liquidation prices
more or less unspecializea loft space and cotton and worsted
textile machinery. From a survey of the new companies that
located in the Amoskeag mills in 1937 and 1938, the most potent
factor conditioning location was the low cost of capital equip¬
ment and plant, the former being the more influential of the
two. A pertinent query, then, is the degree of permanency of
this locational influence.
With the exception of the rayon plant, all the other new
textile establishments started operations in Amoskeag because
of the availability of second-hand machinery at a low price,
coupled with the desire on the part of several of the companies
to expand production. Accordingly, as the textile machinery
is disposed of, Manchester has that much less locational
attraction for other textile establishments. By the end
of 1938 there remained insufficient cotton machinery to equip
economically a unit of any appreciable size, although suf¬
ficient machinery remained to equip a worsted unit of moderate
size. Moreover, Amoskeag's specialized equipment, such as the
10f course, these considerations apply only after technological progress had freed
manufacturing development from the Influence of water power at the site.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
141
foundry, dyeing equipment, and part of the finishing equipment,
by that time was already being utilized. Thus within 2 years
the attractive force of low capital costs seems to have spent
itself, despite the fact that more than 3,000,000 square feet
of mill space at modest rentals was still unoccupied. The
latter, however, could scarcely be considered an advantage
peculiar to Manchester; for urban New England, at least,
it probably approaches an ubiquity in view of the extensive
liquidation of textile companies that occurred throughout most
of the region.
If our analysis thus far is valid, the establishment of
new companies in Manchester after 1938 must depend largely
upon the existence of relatively low labor costs compared
with alternative locations. This would not result from the
possibility of drawing upon unemployed workers who are highly
skilled, for the skills that prevail in Manchester are those
used in the textile and shoe industries. In neither case
do the tasks require highly developed skills as evidenced
by the fact that both industries in recent years have been
transplanted into rural areas and made to flourish in a short
time. Accordingly, Manchester would hold no attraction for
industries that must be manned by highly skilled workers such
as machinists, for example.
To the extent, then, that labor-oriented industries would
locate there, it would be those in which labor costs are
a high percentage of total costs owing to considerable process¬
ing by semiskilled and unskilled operatives. Industries of
that description include textile manufactures, knit goods,
shirts, clothing, leather and its manufactures, and assorted
articles used in the novelty trade. Most of these are among
the traditionally "sweated" industries. This would also include
any industry making use of women on an assembly line, such as
the manufacture of the electrical-coil precision instruments
counted among the new establishments located in the Amoskeag
mills. Such enterprises are also characterized by the fact
that they can be housed in mill buildings of general design
and that the total transportation costs of their product
are a small fraction of the wholesale price - important con¬
siderations for an industry if it is to operate successfully
in an area such as Manchester.
142
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
If, then, the controlling locational attraction is to be
relatively low labor costs, it is pertinent to inquire whether
the money wages to be paid will merely equalize real wages of
the Manchester workers with the real wages paid in alternative
locations or whether this would make for inequality of real
wages, with the lower wages in Manchester. While it is money
wages that are figured in business costs and hence influence
location, the economic welfare of the workers depends upon real
wages. Consequently, to answer our query, reference must be
made to comparative cost-of-living data.
A survey of the cost of living in 59 cities, made as of
March 193s,8 was based on a budget of uniform specifications
for a four-person manual worker's family at a maintenance
level. Five New England cities varying in population from
70,000 to 250,000 were included in the survey. The cost
of living in three of these cities, Bridgeport, Portland, and
Fall River, exceeded that in Manchester, while in Providence
the cost of living was the lowest. The maximum difference was
only $51.00 per year, and the difference between Manchester
and Fall River, communities that may be taken to represent
competing localities in the northern and southern sections
of the region, respectively, was only $17.00, or 1.4 percent of
$1,271.51, the total cost in Fall River.3 The major difference
was in the cost of housing, largely owing to the fact that
the rentals in the 700 tenements owned by Amoskeag were about
one-half the market rentals. Even the increased rentals that
came into effect with their transfer to Amoskeag Industries
in August 1936 were still below the market rentals. From these
results it follows that if Manchester workers accept wages much
below the going rate for the given industry or industries
in other cities of the region, it will involve a lowering
of their standard of living. According to the above analysis,
it is primarily on this basis that Manchester will be able to
attract new enterprises.4
2»rgaret Loomls Steelier, Intercity Differences in Costs of Living In March 1935,
59 Cities (Works Progress Administration, Division of Social Research, Research
Monograph No. XII, 1987).
3Ibid., pp. 158-9.
4Interregional comparisons upon the basis of this cost-of-living survey are
difficult because size of city affects cost, especially housing and transportation,
and the composition of the regions In terms of size of cities surveyed varies
considerably from region to region. With respect to certain Items such as food
and fuel, however, size alone would have little effect upon costs. Variations
In cost of these Items would depend mainly on differences in transportation cost.
Since New England must Import most of Its food and fuel supplies from other
regions, It Is not surprising that In this survey the cost of food and fuel [Con.]
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
143
To attract industries through lower wages in the fall of 1938
was not as easy as in earlier years. Since the National Labor
Relations Board has ruled that it is an unfair labor practice
to divert production from a union factory toa nonunion factory,
the precarious employment that might be provided by "run-away"
companies was greatly reduced. Moreover, the Fair Labor
Standards Act tends to reduce the size of the wage differentials
that Manchester employers could conceivably offer. To the same
effect is the general occupational shift away from mill jobs
and the continuous decline in the absolute numbers of persons
in the most productive age groups. WPA employment probably
also served to maintain the wage structure.
The locational considerations relating to new enterprises
that have been discussed also apply to the expansion of con¬
cerns already located in Manchester. The problem may be
reduced to a consideration of the possibilities of expansion
in Manchester's boot and shoe industry. It would appear
that in the near future the industry will not undergo any
large expansion of productive capacity, and, accordingly,
any absolute or relative expansion of the industry in the
Manchester area would be at the expense of some other area.
Indeed, the former had occurred between 1929 and 1935. That
is, the average employment between these years increased
3,9 percent in the boot and shoe industry of New Hampshire,
which is all but exclusively located in the tier of three
lower counties, Hillsborough (which contains Manchester),
Rockingham, and Stafford, while average employment in the
entire industry declined by 1.7 percent over the same period.
The latter occurred between 1935 and 1937 when the biennial
increase in employment in the entire industry was 6.8 percent
compared with 17.8 percent in New Hampshire's share of the
industry.5 And modest expansion in Manchester itself continued
between 1935 and 1938 in the form of two established companies
occupying Amoskeag's mills in order to add to production.
This involved in the neighborhood of 500 workers. When one
considers, however, that only two companies took advantage
of the low-priced mill space that had been available for
3 years, one cannot expect any large-scale expansion of the
4 [Con.] In New England was the highest of the nine regions. The cost of food In the
New England cities was 103.5 percent of the average for all 59 cities, while the
cost of fuel was 132.6 percent of the average. (Ibid., p. 168.)
Percentages are based on figures adapted from the Census of Manufactures for 1929
and 1935 and preliminary census releases for 1937.
144
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
industry that will make a major contribution toward the solu¬
tion of Manchester's unemployment problem. To the extent
that any expansion will take place in the Manchester area,
it will very probably depend on the differential resistance
to unionization offered by the shoe companies in this area
and those in Maine and Massachusetts.
EXPERIENCES OP THREE OTHER TEXTILE CITIES IN NEW ENGLAND
The conclusions with regard to recent industrial prospects
of Manchester may be substantiated by an analysis of the extent
and character of the industrial recovery that has occurred in
other New England cities that were once important textile
centers and which faced problems similar to Manchester's, but
at an earlier date. More specifically, what has happened
since 1929 in such cities as Fall River, New Bedford, and
Lowell? Although no detailed survey is at hand, some of the
available material bears on this question.6
The textile industry in these cities had undergone con¬
siderable decline in the years between 1923 and 1929. In New
Bedford, for example, the average number employed declined by
one-fifth, in Fall River by one-third, and in Lowell by two-
thirds. The decline in average employment at Amoskeag over the
same years was about one-tenth. That this entailed appreciable
liquidation in Fall River and Lowell is suggested by the
fact that in the former city the number of cotton-textile
establishments was reduced from 47 to 34 and in the latter
from 15 to 5. There was no change in the number of establish¬
ments reporting in New Bedford. Since in 1923 employment in
cotton textiles accounted for more than 80 percent of all
employment in manufacturing in Fall River and New Bedford and
47 percent of that in Lowell, it should be evident that the
depressed state, of this industry meant depressed cities.
Consequently, the very problems that beset Manchester in 1935
confronted the Massachusetts cities in 1929.
The latter, in common with Manchester, had an abundant
supply of mill space of general design and semiskilled and
unskilled workers with textile experience, but lacked natural
resources. For reasons previously set forth, the industries
that would probably be attracted to these cities would be
®Data on employment and number of establishments in following paragraphs were
adapted from the Census of Manufactures and Annual Report: Tear trying November 30
1937 of the Department of labor and Industries of the Commonwealth of mssachusetts
(Pub. Doc. 104, pp. 91, 100).
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
145
market-oriented consumer-goods industries in which labor
costs constitute a relatively high percentage of total costs.
It has also been explained that for such industries a location
south of Boston was preferable to one north of that metro¬
politan area if other things are equal, which on our showing
has been the case. According to this analysis, reemployment
in Fall River and New Bedford should have proceeded further
than in Lowell.
This is borne out in a comparison of the monthly average
number of wage earners employed in manufactures other than
cotton textiles for specified years. Between 1923 and 1929,
a period of liquidation in the cotton-textile industry of those
cities, the number of wage jobs in other manufactures increased
2.6 percent in Fall River and 6.2 percent in New Bedford but
decreased 9.9 percent in Lowell. The difference in development
is more striking if the period of revival after the great
depression is compared with the volume of employment in 1929.
Thus, between 1929 and 1936 wage jobs in industries other than
cotton textiles had a rise of 36.2 percent in Fall River and
more than doubled in New Bedford (an increase of 107.6 percent),
while in Lowell the number remained practically stationary.7
Whether Manchester will share the fate of other New England
textile towns located some distance from present marketing
centers is not known. What is known is that a once prosperous
manufacturing city has been left stranded by the decline and
failure of its largest company. That this company was one of
the largest textile mills in the world and had been in exist¬
ence for over a hundred years is not without significance.
Although many factors affected its decline, the most important
was the withdrawal of needed capital funds at a critical point
in the history of the company. The loss of employment oppor¬
tunity for 11,000 or more workers created more social and
economic problems than are visualized in the unemployment
figures alone. This case study illustrates not only the
problems of textile New England in decline but also indicates
the broader problems consequent upon the migration of industry
in the country as a whole.
7
It is noteworthy that In New Bedford, for which there are some detailed statistics,
the bulk of the reemployment was created by the silk and rayon industry - one
that satisfies the specifications suggested by our analysis. Thus the wage
Jobs in manufactures other than cotton textiles numbered 13,136 in 1936, an
Increase of 6,807 over the 1929 figure. Of the total of 13,136 wage Jobs,
5,793 were in the silk and rayon Industry. In 1929 wage Jobs in this Industry
for all of Bristol County, in which both New Bedford and Fall River are located,
totaled 2,234.
APPENDIXES
Appendix Page
A. THE EARLY LABOR SUPPLY AND WORKING CONDITIONS. . . 148
B. EMPLOYMENT CONDITIONS, 1911-22 172
C. EMPLOYMENT CONDITIONS, 1923-32 204
D. EMPLOYMENT CONDITIONS, 1933-35 248
E. EFFECT OF AMOSKEAG'S DECLINE ON EMPLOYMENT,
EARNINGS, AND MIGRATION 265
F SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES 312
G. THE COMPANY PERSONNEL AND INCOME-TAX RECORDS . . . 321
H. OCCUPATIONAL-HISTORY SCHEDULE AND DEFINITIONS
OF IMPORTANT TERMS 336
I. SOME EVIDENCE ON THE RELIABILITY OF AN EMPLOYMENT
HISTORY BASED ON THE WORKER'S MEMORY 339
APPENDIX A
THE EARLY LABOR SUPPLY AND WORKING CONDITIONS
This appendix attempts to provide a broad perspective for
viewing Amoskeag's decline, which had its inception toward the
end of the first decade of this century. This is given in terms
of Amoskeag's early labor supply, the company's dependence on
the flow of immigrant labor to this country, the effect of the
cessation of immigration, and the shift of the cotton-textile
industry to the South.
OKIGINAL LOCATIONAL FACTORS
The considerations that led to the early establishment of
the cotton-textile industry in New England have been related
so often that little more than a mere enumeration of the loca-
tional factors is required here. Among the more important ones
were the abundant water power, the mobile capital accumulated
from overseas trade, a labor supply resident on the marginal
farms of the region, and the well-developed transportation and
marketing facilities of a highly commercialized area. All
these factors were present at the turn of the nineteenth
century, but with the passage of the Non-Intercourse Act of
1809 and of the War of 1812, the conditions favorable to the
development of manufactures became even more auspicious because
of the pressure of capital which was being diverted from the
shipping trade. The invention of the power loom at about the
same time provided an additional stimulus.
The situation has been summarized in brief compass by Professor
Samuel Eliot Morison:
The younger and more far-sighted men put their
money and brains into making Massachusetts a manu¬
facturing state. Embargo and war had acted as a
prohibitive tariff on English manufactures; and
just before the war ended two scions of shipping
families, Francis C. Lowell and Patrick T. Jackson,
prepared against peace by setting up power looms at
Waltham [l813], in the first complete cotton factory.
Against the will of the shipping community, they
obtained a protective tariff in 1816; and within
a generation the manufacturing cities of Lowell,
148
APPENDIX A
149
Lawrence, Chicopee, and Manchester, had been es¬
tablished by capital accumulated through neutral
trading. Every country town with a good-sized brook
or river set up a textile or paper mill or iron
foundry; and a similar expansion in shoemaking al¬
tered the economy of fishing villages. The center
of interest in Massachusetts shifts from wharf to
waterfall; by 1840 she had become predominantly a
manufacturing state.1
THE WALTHAM MODEL
The new technology in the form of the power loom and the
entrance of the financier and merchant prince into the pro¬
motion of manufactures did more than accentuate the shift in
economic enterprise; they provided also a new pattern for manu¬
facturing activity. There was still the dependence on the
rivers for power and transportation, but in all other respects
there was a thoroughgoing change. Formerly, "[the] mills were,
one and all, controlled by men intent upon the process of
production, spinners and mechanics at heart, whose business was
the making of cotton thread or cloth."2
After the war, the development of the industry was
taken up by men with the best business imagination
in the land, unhampered by its traditions, concerned
with making fortunes and building states, not with
manufacturing cotton cloth.
These men relied not on their technical knowledge
of production but on business organization, ex¬
ecutive capacity, and their ability to lure the best
talent in every field. This fact in itself was
one reason for their success, for it left them un¬
concerned with detail and free to organize and plan,
to finance their companies, market their product,
and consider the social as well as the productive
problem involved in their hiring of labor.
The availability of larger amounts of capital and the advent
of the power loom combined also to alter the structure of the
productive organization. Formerly a given stage in production,
such as spinning, composed the productive unit. In the newer
^Ihe Maritime History of Massachusetts, 1783-1860 (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin
Co., 1921), pp. 213-4. See also Victor S. Clark, History of Manufactures in
the United States, 1607-1860 (Washington, D. C.: The Carnegie Institution of
Washington, 1916), p. 545.
2Carollne F. Ware, the Early Hew England Cotton Manufacture (Boston, Mass.:
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1931), p. 60.
3Ibid., pp. 61-2.
150
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
companies, wherever the Waltham model was followed, as in
Manchester,
the unit of organization .... [was] changed from
the small yarn mill to the large, all-process factory.
The tendency to unite all processes In the same
plant was carried even beyond the actual manufacture
of cloth. Mills had their own machine shops, their
own bleaching and dyeing departments, and, when
calico printing became common, their own print shops.
Although all these processes were also carried on
by independently organized concerns, they were now
commonly included in the activities of the typically
American large factory which bought the raw cotton
and sold the finished cloth.*
These changes meant, too, that the factory plant was no
longer limited in size to supplying yarn to the weavers res¬
ident in the neighborhood. To be freed from dependence on
this artisan group, it was necessary to wait upon the intro¬
duction of the power loom and integrated mill operations.
The resulting transformation in its effects on the labor
supply and policy was as radical as was the transformation
in the organizational unit.
Child labor had operated all the early mills. The
new factories were run almost entirely by women
and girls. In contrast to the spinning and carding
machines which could be tended by children, and the
hand looms which were largely worked by men, power
looms could be best operated by women and girls who
ranged in most factories from eighteen to twenty-two
years of age Once these girls had been
brought into the factory, they were tried out on
the carding and spinning machinery and found so
satisfactory that they were soon employed throughout
the plant.®
To combat the prejudice against factory employment prevalent
among the rural population, as well as "to avoid making a
permanent mill village of poor families whose children worked
in the mill and who were entirely dependent on factory labor",
those who originated the Waltham model "devised a scheme of
company boarding houses, supervised by competent matrons,
where the girls lived under regulations strict enough to
satisfy even the puritan Yankee farmers. 6
AIbid., pp. 63-4.
51 bid., p. 64.
6Ibid., pp. 64-6.
APPENDIX A
151
Even the type of product and the method of marketing were
not immune from the sweeping changes of the period.
The old mills had had their yarn woven into stripes
and plaids which required more or less skill in
weaving and which varied in fineness and fashion.
The Waltham company started producing plain, coarse,
white sheeting made from number fourteen yarn which
the power loom could turn out easily and which could
be used for almost all purposes, especially by the
western pioneers It lent itself to mass
production as the more varied output of the earlier
mills had not.7
Moreover,
instead of selling to a variety of small jobbers or
commission merchants scattered all over the country,
a practice which the old mills found both expensive
and risky, the Waltham company disposed of its entire
product through one agent who received a commission
of only one per cent and was wholly responsible for
marketing the mill's output.6
What occurred in Waltham and later in Lowell and Nashua also
came to pass in Manchester beginning with the organization
of the Amoskeag Manufacturing Company in 1831; nor was the
organization of the latter by any means the end of the process.
The high profits of the formative years provided the basis and
incentive for a continuous repetition of the Waltham experiment
until 1846 with only short-lived interruptions. In that year
"the cotton industry .... may be said to have reached a
peak. Dividends had never been so high, expansion never so
rapid as in the years 1844-46.1,9
From about that date further expansion created a highly
competitive situation which could only result in the narrowing
of mill margins. Thus,
only huge sales could bring profits, and the very
size of these sales in turn increased competition
and forced the price lower still. The decline in
cloth prices was practically constant from 1820 on,
except for a slight recovery in the fifties from
the bottom prices of the late forties. It responded
very slightly to fluctuations in the general price
level and at times diverged conspicuously from the
price of cotton. This decline was not forced by
7Ibid., p. 65.
8Ibid., p. 86.
8Ibid., p. 108.
152
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
the competition of foreign goods or cf substitute
products but simply by the crowding of the Industry
from the Inside. It was most conspicuous In those
staple American "domestics" that were never Imported
from abroad. It occurred, moreover, In years of
business prosperity and was not the result of a
general price slump.
In such circumstances there would be a strong pressure to
reduce costs, primarily labor costs since these constituted
then as now about half of the value added by manufacture,
despite the advanced degree of mechanization of the process.
Survival and expansion therefore came to depend in large part
upon the continuous availability of a cheap labor supply. How
this was typically accomplished can be related in terms of the
changing composition of Amoskeag's labor supply.
THE NATIVE LABOB 80PPLT
In keeping with the Waltham model, Amoskeag's first supply
of workers was recruited from the native stock, chiefly the
daughters of neighboring Yankee farmers who had not already
been induced to work in the mills lower down in the Merrimack
Valley. The promise of some cash wages to barter-ridden farm
families toiling in stony fields must have served as the main
inducement, as had been the case with the Lowell operatives.
One of these, Mrs. Harriet H. Robinson, in her later years drew
upon her first-hand observations to describe the conditions
and motives that underlay this migration from the farms to
the boarding houses of the mill villages. Mrs. Robinson's
introduction to mill life coincided with the very beginnings
of Amoskeag.
In 1832 [she writes], Lowell was little more than a
factory village. Five "corporations" were started,
and the cotton mills belonging to them were building.
Help was in great demand and stories were told all
over the country of the new factory place, and the
high wages that were offered to all classes of work¬
people; stories that reached the ears of mechanics'
and farmers' sons and gave new life to lonely and
dependent women in distant towns and farm-houses.
Into this Yankee El Dorado these needy people began
to pour by the various modes of travel known to those
slow old days. The stagecoach and the canal-boat
came every day, always filled with new recruits
iQIbid... pp. 110-1.
APPENDIX A
153
for the army of useful people. The mechanic and
machinist came, each with his home-made chest of
tools and his wife and little ones. The widow came
with her little flock and her scanty housekeeping
goods to open a boarding-house or variety store,
and so provided a home for her fatherless children.
Troops of young girls came from different parts of
New England, and from Canada, and men were employed
to collect them at so much a head, and deliver them
at the factories.
Some of these were daughters of professional men or
teachers, whose mothers, left widows, were struggling
to maintain the younger children. A few were the
daughters of persons in reduced circumstances, who
had left home "on a visit" to send their wages
surreptitiously in aid of the family purse. And some
were the granddaughters of patriots who had fought
at Bunker Hill, and had lost the family means in the
war for independence. There were others who seemed
to have mysterious antecedents, and to be hiding from
something; and strange and distinguished looking men
and women sometimes came to call upon them. Many
farmers' daughters came to earn money to complete
their wedding outfit, or buy the bride's share of
housekeeping articles.
. ... At first only a few came; others followed,
and in a short time the prejudice against factory
labor wore away, and the Lowell mills became filled
with blooming and energetic New England women.
. . . . In 1843 over one-half of the depositors
in the Lowell Institution for Savings were mill-
girls, and over one-third of the whole sum deposited
belonged to them, - in round numbers, $101,992. It
is easy to see how much good such a sum as this would
do in a rural community where money, as a means of
exchange, had been scarce. Into the barren homes
many of them had left, it went like a quiet stream,
carrying with it beauty and refreshment. The mort¬
gage was lifted from the homestead; the farmhouse was
painted; the barn rebuilt; modern improvements were
introduced into the mother's kitchen, and books and
newspapers began to ornament the sitting-room table.
Young men and women who had spent their two or
three years of probation in the Lowell mills, often
returned to the old place, bought land, built their
modest houses, and became new and prosperous heads
of families. Some of the mill-girls helped maintain
widowed mothers, or drunken, incompetent, or invalid
fathers. Many of them educated the younger children
of the family and young men were sent to college
154
SHOT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
with the money furnished by the untiring industry of
their women relatives.11
IMMIQBATIOH BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR
If one of the early Amoskeag operatives had been given to
writing her reminiscences of that period, it is reasonable
to assume that it would have been in a vein similar to Mrs.
Robinson's; nor is it unreasonable to assume tnat the alleged
idyllic character of the early factory scene endured no longer
in Manchester than in Lowell.18 It was dispelled by the
developments related above which tended to force down wages
to a level that no longer exerted a strong attractive pull
among the Yankee farm families. Yet so high was the labor
turn-over among the native group that it was continually
necessary to attract new workers to the mill; these were to be
found among the English and Irish immigrants who, accustomed to
a lower standard of living, considered the reduced wage rate
acceptable.13 Thus within less than a score of years after
the organization of Amoskeag, the native sons and daughters
developed a reluctance to subject themselves to the factory
discipline on terms that were coming to be set more and more
by the new immigrants to Manchester from the British Isles.
By 1850, for example, some 8,800 persons born in Ireland were
enumerated in the State of New Hampshire by the census of that
year,- while those from England numbered 1,469 and immigrants
11The excerpts quoted were taken from Mrs. Robinson's article. "Early factory Labor
in New England," Fourteenth Annual Report: 1883 (Bur. Statistics of Labor,
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 1883), pp. 380-1, 386-7. (She Included this article
in her book. Loon and Spindle or Life Among the Sarly Mill Girls [New York:
Thomas Y. Crowell A Co., 1898J.) She concludes her description with the caution
that "undoubtedly there must have been another side of this picture, but I give
the side I knew best - the bright side!"
The other side, the side that Harriet Martlneau and Charles Dickens also failed to
see, Is discussed by Norman Ware, The Industrial Vorker, 18U0-1860 (Boston, Mass.:
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1984), pp. 71-184. Professor Ware's position on the
particular point raised may be summarized by the following excerpt (p. 78):
"The basis of the Waltham system was the company boarding-house, where the girls
were required to be In at 10 P.M. and generally to live under the somewhat
fictitious supervision of the boarding-house keeper. Upon this basis was erected
a puritanical paternalism originally intended for the welfare of the girls, but
capable - In the hands of agents less hlgh-prlnclpled than the early mill-owners -
of being turned into a very effective and harmful despotism. In addition to the
boarding-houses, the Waltham system Involved the payment of wages In cash, the
'moral police' or community censorship of morals, the requirement that the girls
should attend church, discharge for Immoral conduct, and a thorough understanding
among the corporations as to wages, hours, and the 'blacklist.'"
12with respect to the quality of housing provided by the Amoskeag boarding houses
and tenements, the opinion of Lewis Mum ford is worth noting: "[The] .... depres¬
sion of living quarters was well-nigh universal among the workers In the new
Industrial towns, once the paleotechnlc regime was fully established. Local
conditions sometimes permitted an escape from the extremes of foulness I have
been describing: the housing of the mlllworkers at Manchester, New Hampshire,
were for example of a better order " The Culture of Cities (New York:
Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1938), pp. 166-7.
13The reduction of wage rates Is discussed In N. Ware, op. cit., pp. 108-84.
APPENDIX A
155
from British America (Canada) numbered 2,501. By i860, when
the United States Bureau of the Census for the first time
presented nativity figures for Manchester's population, the
foreign-born numbered 5,480 persons, or 27 percent of the total
population of 20,107.14 There were 3>976 persons from Ireland,
800 from British America, 395 from England, and 153 from
Scotland. The English and the Scotch very probably had had
previous industrial experience, but the others came from rural
areas. Many of the Irish were those who performed the heavy
labor in the construction of the country's canals, mill build¬
ings, and railroads. A lack of industrial experience, however,
has not been a serious handicap in an industry such as textiles
where the bulk of the jobs has been semiskilled, requiring only
a short training period.
IMMIGRATION FROM I860 TO 1890
Ftedch-Can»dI an Immigration
The Civil War could have had the effect only of intensifying
this dependence of the mills upon immigrant labor because
of the drafting of the native population for military purposes.
It was toward the close of these years that the New England
mills encouraged French-Canadian immigration in earnest. Most
historians of this migration, following P. Hamon, distin¬
guish three groups of immigrants: temporary immigrants, a
group composed of indebted farmers who went sometimes for one
or several seasons, sometimes for several years, to work in
the American factories and to return with some small savings;
casual immigrants who worked in one city after another ac¬
cording to their caprice and opportunities for employment and
did not settle anywhere; and finally the permanent immigrants,
much the largest group, composed of those who might or might
not have been once among the other two groups and who disposed
of their property and left with their families for the United
States without any intention of returning.15
A classification of this sort, however, fails to indicate
that much of this exodus had not been initiated by the immi¬
grants but rather had been deliberately and directly stimulated
14
Between 1840 and 1860 there was more than a sixfold Increase in Manchester's
population - from 3,235 to 20,107.
15Adapted from Georges Langlols, Histoire de la population canadienne-francaise
(Montreal, Canada: Documents hlstorlques, Editions Albert Levesque, 1934), p. 173.
(Authors' translation.)
156
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
by others. Thus one of their compatriots in his Histoire
de la prtsse franco-amerxcaine tt dts Canadiens-Francais aux
Etats-Unis contended:
It is necessary to place responsibility for the
departure of a great number of Canadian families
in large measure upon the Canadian agents of the
American manufacturing companies. These paid re¬
cruiters overran the countryside of the districts of
Montreal and Quebec even up to the lower reaches of
the river, and by alluring promises troubled the
spirit of these peaceable children of the soil who
lived if not in luxury, at least in modest ease
and contentment.18
Under such circumstances many of the migrants must have ex¬
perienced keen disappointment. Certainly this was the opinion,
possibly somewhat oversentimentalized, of Alexandre Belisle,
who for many years had been professionally connected with
Le TravaiIleur, a French-language newspaper published in
Worcester, Massachusetts, and widely circulated in New England.
In the Bistoire cited above he comments:
What a sad business was that of the recruiters; how
many cruel deceptions were experienced by thousands
of those who let themselves be taken in by those
beautiful promises and yielded to temptation. How
many times we have seen these poor exiles weep
because they missed their native country where they
used to live modestly but with little money
These poor people have not been, as so many others,
under the necessity of expatriating themselves.
After having sold, often for a pittance, all their
belongings in order to pay for the expenses of trans¬
portation and of settling in a foreign place, these
families generally found themselves poorer than
before and the bread of exile often appeared more
bitter than they had known in the better days on the
land that they had had the foolishness to abandon.
These people, however, would end up by acclimating
themselves in time; the children would grow up and
lend their assistance to support the common house¬
hold. The Canadian parish, implanted in a foreign
land, in the privileged places where this blessing
existed, would recall that of the native country and
would greatly contribute to reconciling the new
arrivals to the new conditions of life. In this
manner these families that had thought of returning
to the country as soon as they had saved up enough
money often lost all idea of returning. Moreover,
18Alexandre Belisle (Worcester, Mass.: L'Opinion publique, Mil), p. 8. (Authors'
translation.)
APPENDIX A
157
the children having grown up in city surroundings
found repugnant the idea of returning to the Canadian
land as farmers, an occupation for which they had no
aptitude after their contact with Industrial life.*'7
Despite disappointments and misgivings, the stream of im¬
migration from French Canada was a steady one for many decades.
While the immigrants soon discovered that New England was not
a land of gold, the hard fact remained that it was a land
of cash wages which were conspicuously absent in the rural
Canadian scene. To this real economic advantage must be
added the constant recruiting by agents - a factor of no
little importance in feeding the stream of migration. Some
fragmentary evidence on this score has come to our attention.
Thus, to quote Belisle once more,
during the last week of April 1609, the trains
passing by St. Albans from Canada transported 2,300
Canadian emigrants. The Americans went to Canada
to engage workers and on May 3 a train brought
back about 600 of them "in locked coaches in or¬
der to avoid any confusion and to make desertion
impossible."18
Obviously, since this was good business for the railroads, it
is not surprising to find that they also served as agents. To
this effect is the testimony of the editor of Le TravaiILeur
before the chief of the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts in 1881. He stated:
I have a letter from an agent of the Boston and
Albany Railroad at Worcester, who says he is ready to •
testify that since two years, no less than one hun¬
dred superintendents or agents of mills have applied
to him for French help, one mill asking for as many
as fifty families at a time. And Mr. K. I. L'HSrault,
justice of the peace at Fall River, could testify
in the same manner.19
Whether or not Amoskeag followed the general practice of the
region by engaging recruiting agents is not known. If it did
deviate from the usual procedure, it would probably have been
because its favored geographic position obviated the necessity.
Manchester was the nearest large industrial town along the
railroad route between Montreal and Boston, and it was only
natural that, once the exodus from Canada began, many would
17
Ibid., pp. 8-9. (Authors' translation.)
18
Ibid., pp. 63-4. (Authors' translation.)
19"The Canadian French In New England," Thirteenth Annual Report: 1882 (Bur. Sta¬
tistics of Labor, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 1882), p. 17.
158
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
stop off in Manchester. French-Canadian immigration began in
considerable numbers about 1865, and on May 20, 1869, La Voix
du peuple counted 1,500 compatriots in Manchester. Two years
later 2,500 French Canadians joined together to form the first
Catholic parish in Manchester, and in 1882 L'Echo des Canadtens
estimated Manchester's French-Canadian population at 9,000.80
The United States census of 1890 reported 12,391 French Canadians
in Manchester; they represented 28.1 percent of the total
population.
Their rate of increase in other New England textile towns
was nearly as high as in Manchester. Their crowding into the
mills in such large numbers was bound to create hard feelings
among the populace at large. On one occasion at least, these
feelings of ill will found their way into an official doc¬
ument.81 Most observers have agreed that the French Canadians
did constitute unusually docile and indefatigable workers.22
One of their compatriots has recently written to the same
effect. "Certain companies," he observed, "saw in the Quebec
type a conscientious worker, able, asking for little, not
Of)
See Wilfred Lessen, Parolsse Salnte-Marie, Manchester, I. i. (Manchester, N. H.:
i®31), p. 97. this history of the parish Is available at the library of the
Canadian-American Association, Manchester, New Hampshire.
21*Unlform Hours of Labor," Twelfth Annua J geport: 1881 (Bur. Statistics of Labor,
Ccmenwealth of Massachusetts, 1BB1), pp. 323, 409-70, and pas si*.
£2The appraisal of Elln L. Anderson, although her remarks are based on her re¬
searches In Burlington, Vermont, applies to most New England mill cities.
•Their migration [she writes] has been a 'peaceful penetration' across an Imaginary
line; Indeed, at first their migration was largely seasonal. Some Burlingtontans
still recall the tralnloads of French Canadians, through with their work on the
fame, who would arrive each fall to work In the lumber yards and mills end after
staying for a short season to earn, as they said, some of the gold and silver that
America had to offer, would return to their poor Canadian farms. On the farms of
Quebec, as In Europe, 'The States' was pictured as a land with streets of gold.
Gradually they began to lengthen their stay here from one season to two, from two
seasons to three; then they came for a period of two or three years, until they
settled permanently. When they did, it was not so much like settling In e new land
as extending the boundaries of the old. The tie with Canada has always remained
strong, partly because the short distance to the home land makes close contact
possible, partly because the continued migration without restriction of French
Canadians has constantly reenforced the Canadian national spirit.
•Although they are French, they differ markedly from the Frenchman of today and
are. In habit of thought and behavior, more elosely akin to his forebears. They
have been separated from France for over 170 years and have known nothing of the
great liberalizing movements, such as the French Revolution, the great literary
revolution, and other upheavals which have so greatly Influenced modern France.
Their way of life In Canada has therefore remained essentially that of a simple
peasant folk whose most vital cultural element has been their religion; as In any
primitive society, the forms of that religion govern every aspect of their lives.
This circumstance has made far more for docility and obedience to rules than It
has for the quality of Individual enterprise and responsibility considered
characteristic of America. They have willingly accepted the leadership of the
parish priest as their forebears did two centuries ago. In the French-Canadian
community around the cotton mill In Burlington, today, the priest is spiritual
guide, lawyer, doctor, friend, and comforter, to his people. Such complete
acceptance of a single cultural force has resulted, in the estimation of many
students, in a lack of interest In other forms or development, a result manifested
In the lack of schools and free libraries In French Canada." ¥e Americans
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1937), pp. 27-8.
APPENDIX A
159
caring to take up with fomenters of strikes and drawing a
certain number after him."83
The fact that these characteristics also made them useful as
strikebreakers very likely explains part of the hostility of
the other textile operatives toward the French Canadians. In
the Fall River strike of 1878, for instance, they were employed
as strikebreakers and earned the nickname of "knobstickers.1,24
Thus, as the continued development of the textile industry
in New England in the decades preceding the Civil War depended
on the Irish and English immigrants, so in the post-Civil War
decades it depended on the immigration of the French Canadians.
The development of the railroad during those years extended
the labor market of the cotton mills from rural New England
to rural Quebec. For the more skilled jobs, however, the mills
still relied upon the immigrants from northern Europe.
Nortfcera-Enropean Immigration
Many of the northern Europeans who finally settled in Manchester
came originally as contract laborers in accordance with the
Federal regulations laid down in "an act to encourage im¬
migration" approved July n, 1864. Amoskeag, for example, in
October 1865 entered into an arrangement with the American
Emigrant Company for the importation of English textile oper¬
atives; and between 1868 and 1870 Amoskeag brought over under
contract several scores of Scottish weaving girls who had
had experience on weaving checked and fancy ginghams. It was
in this manner that Amoskeag established its reputation at
an early date for beautiful, durable ginghams. The terms
included in the following contract were those usually demanded
by Amoskeag:
Glasgow 9th May 1868
This is to certify that I have entered into an
engagement with Susan Cunnion to act as gingham or
check weaver for the Amoskeag Company of Manchester,
New Hampshire, United States of America, (Mr. E. A.
Straw, Agent) for the period of twelve calendar
^Adolphe Robert, "Au New Hampshire," Les Franco-Americains peints par eux-menes
(Montreal, Canada: Editions Albert Levesque, 1936), pp. 221-2.
24
Hugo Adelard Dubuque, Le Guide canadien-francais de fall Siver et notes histo-
riqaes sur les Canadiens de fall Siver (Fall River, Mass.: E. U. & E. F. Lamoureux,
1808), p. 125.
160
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
months to commence and be computed from the fifteenth
dsy of June proximo st the current rate of wages and
hours of working in other factories producing a
similar class of goods, guaranteeing regular work on
full time for the period of the engagement.
I also agree to furnish a steerage passage-ticket
by the Steam Ship "United Kingdom," hence for New
York on the 27th day of May current, the cost of said
tioket to be repaid to me here or to my order in
America, by monthly installments in such sums as may
be agreed on.
George Thomson86
At about the same time the Stark Mill, located in the Amoskeag
mill yard, arranged for the immigration of some Swedish and
German operatives who later formed the nucleus of these nation¬
alities in Manchester's population. The Irish continued to
come to Manchester apparently without any special effort on the
part of the mills.
Nationality Compoiitioa of Maackoatar'a Popalatioa
ia IStO
By 1890 the industrial demands of Manchester had made its
population quite cosmopolitan in terms of nationality com¬
position. The foreign-born constituted 95.5 percent of the
total population of 94,126. As previously noted, the French
Canadians represented the major concentration, the next largest
being the Irish with 4,338. Minor concentrations varying
from 600 to 1,000 were to be found among the German, English,
Scottish, and Swedish peoples. This situation was not peculiar
to Manchester, for much the same nationalities had taken up
their residence in the other textile- and shoe-manufacturing
cities of New England (table A-i).
Despite the fragmentary character of much of our evidence,
enough has been presented to establish the point that even
before the development of the textile industry in the cotton-
growing States had gained momentum, the development of the
industry in New England had been sustained chiefly by the
availability of rural workers. At the outset it was the native
Yankees, followed by the Irish and still later by the French
Canadians, to mention only the more important ethnic groups.
26From photostat on file in Amosteag Room, Hamilton Smith Library, University of
New Hampshire, Durham, New Hampshire.
APPENDIX A
161
Table A-1.- DISTRIBUTION OF FOBS ION-BORN POPULATION
IN EIGHT NEW ENGLAND CITIES HAVING A POPULATION
OF 50,000 TO 125,000 IN 1980,
1890-1980®
Year and nationality
Brockton
Fall River
Lawrence
Lowell
Number
Percent
Number
Percent
Number
Percent
Number
Percent
1890
Total population
Total foreign-born
27,294
100.0
74,398
100.0
44,054
100.0
77.690
100.0
6,274
23.0
37,734
50. 7
20,518
46.6
34,610
44. 5
French Canadians6
Irish
Poles
Greeks
Italians
Other
5.8
8.9
0.1
0
0. 1
8.1
20.3
12.3
0.1
0
0.1
17.9
10.1
17. 5
0
0
0.1
18.9
20.3
10. 2
0
0
0.1
7.9
1900
Total population
40,063
100.0
104,863
100.0
62,559
100.0
94,969
100.0
Total foreign-born
9,484
23. 7
50,042
47. 7
28.577
45. 7
40,974
43. 1
French Canadians
Irish
Poles
Greeks
Italians
Other
1.3
6.7
0.8
0.1
0. 4
14.4
19.2
7.0
0.5
0.1
0. 3
20,6
11.2
11.3
0.7
0.1
1.4
21.0
15.4
12. 8
0. 5
1.3
0.1
13.0
1910
Total population
56,878
100.0
119,295
100.0
85,892
100.0
100,294
100. 0
Total foreign-born
15,425
27. 1
50,874
42. 6
41.319
48.1
43,457
40.9
French Canadians
Irish
Polesc
Greeks
Italians
Other
i. 6
5.1
5. 6
0.3
1.7
12.8
12.6
4.4
1.8
0.1
0.9
22.6
9.0
0.9
5.1
0. 2
7.8
19.1
11.6
9.4
1. 7
3.6
0.2
14.4
1920
Total population
Total foreign-born
66,254
100.0
120,485
100.0
94,270
100.0
112,759
100.0
17,124
25. 8
42,331
35.1
39,063
41.4
38,040
33. 7
French Canadians
Irish
Poles
Greeks
Italians
Other
1. 3
3.7
0.7
0.7
2. 8
16.6
8. 9
2. 7
2.1
0.1
0.8
20.5
6.3
4. 5
2. 7
0. 4
9. 0
16. 5
9.0
6.6
2.0
3.3
0. 4
12. 4
1930
Total population
63.797
100.0
115,274
100.0
85,068
100.0
100,234
100.0
Total foreign-born
14,275
22.4
32,078
27.6
28.633
33.7
26,129
20. 1
French Canadians
Irish
poles
Greeks
Italians
Other
1.1
3.1
1. 1
0.6
3.0
13. 5
7.4
1.8
1.7
0.1
0.7
16.1
6.2
3.5
2.0
0.2
7. 7
14.1
7.7
5.0
1.7
1.9
0.3
9.5
See footnotes at end of tatile.
162
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
TiUt A- 1. - DISTRIBUTION Of FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION
IN EIGHT NEW ENGLAND CITIES HAVING A POPULATION
OF 50,000 TO 115,000 IN 1980,
1590-1980a • Continued
Year and nationality
Lynn
Mew Bedford
Manchester
Pewtucket
Number
Percsnt
Numbe r -
Percsnt
Number
Percent
Number
Percent
1800
Total population
05.727
100.0
40,733
100.0
44,126
100.0
27,633
100.0
Total foreign-born
13,985
25. 1
14,420
35. 4
20,091
45. 5
9.359
33.9
French Canadians6
10.5
10.0
28. 1
5.5
Irish
9.8
7.3
9.9
14.0
Polaa
0. 1
0
0
0
Greeks
0
0
0
0
Italians
0. 1
0. 1
0
0.2
.'the r
4.8
18.0
7. 5
14.2
1900
Total population
86.513
100.0
82.442
100.0
56,987
100.0
39,231
100.0
Total foreign-born
17. 742
25. 9
25.529
40. 9
24,257
42.6
13,087
33.4
French Canadians
1.9
13.7
23.6
6.1
Irish
7.7
4.8
7.4
9.9
Poles
0.4
0.6
0.7
0.1
Greeks
0.1
0.1
0.1
0
Italians
0.4
0.2
0.1
0.5
Othar
10.4
21. 5
10. 7
10.8
1910
Total population
89.338
100. 0
96,862
100.0
70,063
100.0
51.622
100.0
Total foreign-born
27, 344
30-6
42,625
♦i1
29.692
42.4
17.956
34.8
French Canadians
2.6
12.7
19.6
6.5
Irish
5.0
3.9
5.0
6. 7
f-c le sc
4.3
1.6
1.1
0.6
Greeks
1.1
0.2
1.9
0.5
Italians
1.5
1.2
0.1
1.4
Other
15.3
24.3
14. 7
IB. 9
1920
Total population
99.148
100.0
121,217
100.0
78,384
100.0
64.248
100.0
Total foreign-born
27.858
28. 1
46. 669
40. 2
27,516
35. 1
21.024
32.7
French Canadians
2. 2
8. 1
15.7
5.6
Irish
4. 8
1. 7
3.5
4.3
Poles
1. 4
2.4
2. 0
1.4
Oreeks
1.7
0.5
3.8
0.4
Italians
1.9
0. 5
0. 2
1.6
Other
16.3
27.0
9.4
19.2
1930
Total population
102,320
100.0
112,597
100.0
76, 834
100.0
77,149
100. 0
Total foreign-bora
27,091
26. 4
3 7, 333
33. 2
21,944
20. 6
22,218
28.8
French Canadians
2.6
6.8
13.9
6. a
Irish
3. 5
1. 2
2. 5
2. 7
Poles
1. 5
2.0
2.1
1.9
Greeks
1.4
0.3
2. 1
0.3
Italians
2.0
0.5
0.2
1.4
Other
15.2
22.4
7.0
16.2
®Ba*ed en U. 8. Census of Population data.
"includes sll Canadians; break-down not glren for this rear.
cFigures used are those given for Russians.
APPENDIX A
163
If the growth of the New England branch of the industry, even
before southern competition became a factor, had come to depend
on successive waves of immigrants, how much greater would
this dependence become with the development of the industry
in the South?
BEGINNINGS OF COTTON TEXTILES IN THE SOUTH
It was about this time, 1880-90, that the southern branch of
the cotton-textile industry began to achieve importance. The
considerations that had originally conditioned the location of
the industry in New England had by that time lost their effect.
The tremendous advance in the general industrialization of
the country, along with the development and integration of
the commercial and financial institutions, meant that the
ever-increasing capital resources had more mobility than
formerly. The building of the railroads, moreover, had freed
manufactures from their dependence upon the rivers and streams
for power and transportation. In view of these developments
and the availability of a large local labor supply in the
southern seaboard States, as well as the existence there of the
minor requisites of a humid climate and soft water, it is clear
that by the end of the century the New England States had only
the advantage of an early start with respect to cotton textiles.
It was not, however, until some technological changes in
the textile process had occurred that local entrepreneurs in
the South Atlantic States were able to take advantage of the
locational factors that had been altered in their favor. Thus
in 1871 the Sawyer ring spindle and shortly thereafter the
Rabbeth double-spinning ring spindle were perfected. Of more
importance was the Draper automatic loom. The invention of the
latter in 1895 occurred in
a period of "easy" money characterized by the intense
interest of the financial markets in industrial
promotions and consolidations. The result of the
coincidence of these two factors, so far as the cot¬
ton textile industry was concerned, was the greatest
expansion in its history, encouraged primarily by the
prospect of high profits to be obtained in new mills
equipped with the Draper automatic looms. Thus the
installed spindles in the industry increased from
19,472,000 to 28,267,000 during the ten years 1900
to 1910, an increase of 45 per cent. Of this new
164
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
productive capacity, 70 per cent was In the South,
where wage rates were lower than in New England.
The extent of the southward shift over those years is dis¬
cussed in chapter 11. Since the relative shift had proceeded
at such a rapid rate and since it represented almost entirely
a net addition to capacity, whereas demand increased ata lesser
rate, the problem of excess capacity had become a very real one
as early as the first decade of the twentieth century.27
The competition from this newly industrialized area was
not long in making an impression upon a few of the Amoskeag
officials most intimately associated with the company's af¬
fairs. The potentialities and dangers of southern competition
had certainly become a concern to T. Jefferson Coolidge,
treasurer of the Amoskeag Manufacturing Company for many of the
years between 1876 and 1898* according to the observations
that he committed to his diary before the century was many
years old. He noted:
"I lunched with a man named Smythe, who is at the
head of the best mill in the South, I believe, in the
Alleghany foothills in South Carolina. He owns the
whole county, sees to the schooling of the children,
and really regulates the expenditures and taxes.
The employes in the mills are all white, belonging to
that class of Scotch-Irish and highlanders who stood
by us in the Civil War-
"They have never had an opportunity of earning
money and a dollar looks very large. Besides, food,
such as they are accustomed to - chicken, hog and
hominy - is very cheap and the climate mild in the
winter. They receive about 30 per cent less than our
operatives in New Hampshire, whilst coal and cotton
are cheaper.
"This competition must injure New England ex¬
cessively and the only prospect of relief is that the
profits of cotton manufacturing are so enormous that
a vast number of mills will be erected and that will
have a tendency to put up wages. Against that there
are a million able-bodied and intelligent men in the
Alleghanies which stretch nearly a thousand miles
through North and South Carolina, Tennessee, Georgia,
and Alabama, to supply the demand for labor."2®
26Stephen J. Kennedy, Profits and Losses in Textiles (New York: Harper A Brothers,
1636), p. 8. (Italics In the original.)
27For a discussion of this problem see chapter II.
28Quoted by Marquis W. Chllds, "Great, Amoskeag Textile Corporation Quits Business
With Tragic Results," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, August 2, 1636, part 8, p. 3J.
APPENDIX A
165
The same sentiments were expressed in 1905 by Mr. F. C. Dumaine
who became a member of Amoskeag's board of directors in 1904
and treasurer in 1905 - a position he retained until liqui¬
dation was ordered. In the latter year the Legislature of
New Hampshire was considering the enactment of a bill reducing
the workweek from 60 hours to 58. Amoskeag attempted to bring
about its defeat by having pressure brought on the local
legislators from above. To this end Mr. Dumaine wrote to the
Honorable J. H. Gallinger, United States Senator from New
Hampshire, pointing out the difficulties of meeting southern
competition. The letter follows:
February 3, 1905
The Honorable J. H. Gallinger
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.
My dear Senator Gallinger:
I understand a feeling has got abroad in Mew Hampshire
that the mills in Manchester are not particular about
the 00 hour bill, and that you among others had got
the same impression.
I am taking the liberty to address you on this
subject, to controvert that feeling in your mind, and
to assure that the management of the mills are very
strongly of the opinion that it would be a serious
detriment to their interest if N. H. should adopt the
58 hour law.
You will remember, in my conversation with you
yesterday, that I called to your attention the fact
that within five years eight or ten of our large in¬
dustrial concerns in Massachusetts have been obliged
to reorganize, or shut up entirely. I feel strongly,
and Mr. Coolidge agrees, that this is largely due to
the excessive taxation, and increased hardships of
the labor laws which Massachusetts has incorporated
upon her books each year.
You know perfectly well of the growth of the mills
in the Southern States, where the hours of labor are
very much in excess of ours, to say nothing of the
wages and cost of raw materials, and it seems to me
that it behooves us all to do what we can to preserve
in our State the industries that already exist there.
I understand that some of the leaders in N. H. are
not as strong on this measure as might be wished for,
because they have an idea you feel the same way,
and I am writing this that you might say a word to
correct that feeling if you feel so disposed.
166
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
Let me take this opportunity to thank you for the
courtesies you have extended to me, and with kind
regards, believe me,
Very sincerely yours,
29
(signed) P. C. Dumaine.
These opinions, moreover, had some basis in the facts of
Amoskeag's operations, and the major effect of the locational
shift upon the New England branch of the industry after 1890
was that of retarding its rate of expansion.
IMMIGRATION AFTER 1890
Between 1890 and 1910, that is, after the southern coin-
petit ion had become serious, the active spindleage in the
New England States increased by about 50 percent compared with
100 percent in the preceding score of years and compared with a
similar increase in the active spindleage of the United States
as a whole between 1890 and 1910. Even the retarded rate of
expansion in New England was conditioned mainly by its ability
to compete with the South on the basis of a sustained flow of
cheap immigrant labor. To the continued immigration of the
French Canadians must be added the new immigrants from the
southern and eastern countries of Europe. What happened to
Amoskeag's labor supply during these 20 years appears to have
been typical of other textile centers of the region.
Poliih lulinlloi
By the late eighties many Polish people had settled in the
textile towns of Massachusetts, but it was not until 1887 that
the first Polish workers found their way to the textile towns
of New Hampshire. The mills at Suncook, New Hampshire, seem
to have been the first in the State to have employed Polish
immigrants. Although Manchester is only about 10 miles south
of Suncook, it was not until 1889 that the Polish colony
heard of the large mills located there. In that year a young
married couple moved from Suncook to Manchester to seek their
fortune in the mills. They were the first Polish settlers
in Manchester.30
2Q
From private correspondence or F. C. Dumaine on file In Amoskeag Room, Hamilton
anlth Library, University of New Hampshire, Durham, New Hampshire.
30
Information on the Polish settlement In Manchester has been adapted from
a memorandum prepared by Anthony Debslcl, whose mother-in-law was one of the first
two Polish settlers; she was still living at the time the memorandum was written
In December 1930.
APPENDIX A
167
Several months elapsed before the first Polish couple were
given a chance to work - and this in the weaving room of the
Stark Mill. It was not until several years later that any
of their compatriots joined them. Having'had experience in
the textile mills of Suncook and in the mills of Massachusetts,
they had an easier time finding employment in the weaving and
carding departments of the Stark. After the first beginnings
had been made, the colony developed very slowly until 1896
when Amoskeag officials heard of the reputation as hard-working
operatives that the Poles had earned at the Stark and decided
to employ them.31 In the census of 1900, 426 Manchester
residents were reported as born in Poland. In the preceding
year their numbers had been sufficient to justify the appoint¬
ment of a Polish priest by one of the Roman Catholic churches
of Manchester, and in 1902, 850 Polish parishioners joined to
organize their own church and parish.
Many of the additions to the Polish colony had come directly
from Poland to Manchester, usually upon the invitation of a
friend or relative. The local steamship agent was frequently
the intermediary and financier. That is, the agent would
provide the prospective immigrant with a steamship ticket upon
advance payment of half of the fare by the Manchester resident
and upon the latter's giving his guarantee that the immigrant
would pay the balance to the agent before he discharged any
other financial obligations.32 The immigrant usually had to
make payments over a period of 2 years before he could repay
both the steamship agent and his sponsor.
Accustomed to back-breaking work and long hours on the Polish
farms in return for the bare necessities of life, the Polish
peasant regarded a 6o~hour week in the Amoskeag mills and a
biweekly pay of $7.00 to $11.00 a considerable improvement in
his economic status. For the same reasons he developed into
an industrious worker and a valuable employee. It is little
wonder then that by 1920 there were nearly 2,000 foreign-born
Poles in Manchester.
31The depression of the early nineties very likely had something to do with the
slow Increase in their numbers.
32For a description of the economic circumstances of the Polish peasant be¬
fore his emigration, see Wladyslaw S. Reymont's novel, fhe Peasants (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1925), 4 vols. A typical pattern of the settlement of a Polish
group In an Industrial city of the United States Is presented by William I. Thomas
and Florlan Znanleckl, The Polish Peasant in Europe and America, Vol. V, "Organ¬
ization and Disorganization In America" (Boston, Mass.: Richard G. Badger, 1920),
pp. 30-3 in particular and all of chapter II for a general discussion.
168
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
Greek Immigration
Although there had been a large Greek colony in Lowell for
several years, none settled in Manchester until 1890.33 They
found employment at once in the Amoskeag mills. Their numbers
were small, however, until the Greco-Turkish War of 1897 when
many came to Manchester to escape army service, but many
more with the hope of making a few thousand dollars and then
returning to their native country. It was said that by 1900
they numbered 300 in Manchester, but the census of that year
does not bear out that high figure.
In 1903 some Greeks from Massachusetts were brought to
Manchester as strikebreakers in a shoe strike, but late in
April they themselves went out on strike.34 They found it
easier to obtain work at Amoskeag after the settlement of the
strike because neither work experience nor knowledge of the
English language was required of them. By 1905 the Greek
colony was estimated at 500, a number sufficient to support
a Greek Orthodox Church.
The continued immigration of the Greeks to Manchester, often
resulting in the displacement of older residents from their
jobs because of the willingness of the Greeks to accept lower
wages, led to an overt display of hostility among certain
nationalities, especially on the part of the Irish. In the
summer of 1906, for example, there was a riot in one of the
municipal parks, with the Irish on one side and the Greeks on
the other. An antagonism that had developed to such a point
33The material on Oreek immigration, unless otherwise stated, has been adapted rrom
a pamphlet entitled History of the Greek Colony in Manchester, H. H., 1890-1928
by Spyros Cateras (In Oreek) and translated for the National Research Project by
Mary Kourldes of Manchester.
34Manchester Union, April 28, 1903. The following newspaper Item {ibid., Feb¬
ruary 4, 1903, p. 8) is not without Interest:
•Inquiry at the McElwaln shop Tuesday brought the reply that the shop was running,
and that new persons were being hired to replace the strikers. It was said that
about 100 men went to work at the shop Tuesday morning.
•Rumor has It that two Armenians, who were among those recently hired at the shop,
were roughly treated at the hands of some of the workers Monday.
•Philip Darvean, an Armenian employed at Hoyt's shoe shop, called the Union
office Tuesday noon and stated that there are only nine Armenians employed at the
McElwaln shop, and that they, together with four Greeks, were brought from Lynn,
Massachusetts Sunday night and taken to the McElwaln shop In a hack Monday morning
and set to work.
"According to Mr. Darvean's story, an Armenian named Harry Johnson, came to
this city from Lynn on Tuesday and called or. the management of McElwaln shop.
Mr. Johnson, he said, agreed to furnish help for the McElwaln company to take the
place of the strikers. Mr. Darvean asserts that a contract of three months has to
be signed by the management of a shop or Mr. Johnson refuses to furnish any help.
"Mr. Darvean stated that Mr. Johnson not only furnishes Armenians but also Greeks
and Italians. Late In April the Greeks themselves went on strike."
APPENDIX A
169
was bound to persist for many years.36 Nonetheless, immigra¬
tion continued, and by 1910 the census reported 1,330 foreign-
born Greeks in Manchester. Although as many as 200 returned to
their native land during the course of the Balkan War of 1912,
they came back afterward, urging other Greeks to bring their
families and to settle in Manchester. This form of advertising
was not without its effects, and by 1920 the census enumerated
very nearly 3,000 foreign-born Greeks resident in Manchester.
Many Greeks found their way to the United States as victims
of the steamship companies with the aid of some of their
unscrupulous compatriots who had developed the scheme of
the padrone, a form of indentured labor.36 The Greeks in
Manchester deny that any such methods were involved in their
immigration. It was much more spontaneous and unguided. It
is pointed out, for instance, that a Manchester Greek would
go to New York to meet a steamer bringing his wife or other
relatives. On the same boat would be many Greeks who had very
little money and no knowledge of the English language and who
were very much bewildered by the vastness of the country. It
was only logical that they would be more than willing to follow
this man who knew their native tongue and who told them of the
many employment opportunities that Manchester could offer.37
Continued French-Cnnndinn Immigration
Despite the entrance of the European immigrants into Manchester
after 1890, the company nevertheless was still interested, even
as late as 1913, in maintaining the immigration of French
Canadians. The Canadian-American Association, a beneficial
association with headquarters in Manchester, at that time
published biweekly a French-language newspaper that had a wide
circulation among the French Canadians of New England and the
province of Quebec. From October i9t3 to June 1914 this
newspaper carried a series of articles under the title "Manchester
and Its Advantages for Canadians." The copy was prepared by
350ther factors that may have made for friction were the religious differences and
the fact that the Greeks had been used as strikebreakers. Neither of these
considerations applied to the Poles, most of whom were Roman Catholics.
36Por a discussion of Greek Immigration to the United States, covering economic
conditions in rural Greece, methods of recruiting, the padrone system, and problems
of adjustment In the new country, see Henry Pratt Falrchlld, Greek Immigration to
the United States (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1911).
37
Cateras, loc. cit.
170
SHOT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
the Amoskeag personnel office. The tenor of the discussion can
be established by a few quotations'.
More than 15,000 persona work In these mills that
border on both sides of the river. The wages of
these people have permitted them to acquire ease and
all seem to be content with their lot. It Is true
that the large company to which they sell their
labor treats them as Its own children [The
article here proceeds to enumerate the welfare ac¬
tivities of the company.] That Is the reason why the
Amoskeag company has never had any trouble with its
employees. It treats them not as machines, but as
human beings, as brothers who have a right not only
to wages but also to the pleasures of life
Its employees work not only to earn a wage but to
please their employers, who know how to treat them
well and to whom they sell not only the product of
their hand but also the best of their technical
knowledge. It has resolved with Justice to Itself
and its workers the problem of the relations between
capital and labor.36
A statement that recurred frequently was one to the following
effect:
.... a worker finds in the large mills such as
Amoskeag permanent employment. There is no fear of
forced unemployment or of ridiculous wages that too
often have the effect of discouraging the worker, if
not to brutalize him. Nor is there any fear there of
3 Q
strikes and their unhappy consequences.
During these very months the mills on occasion were operating
only part time (see appendix B).
How effective a medium for recruiting workers this may have
been cannot be said. Whatever the reasons may have been, the
number of foreign-born French Canadians in Manchester declined
by about i,qoo between 1910 and 1930.
In summary, then, it can be said that Amoskeag's expansion
coincided with three successive waves of immigration. First
there were the immigrants from Ireland and Great Britain, the
second major influx was that of the French Canadians, and the
arrival of the Poles and the Greeks constituted the third
group. Some of the immigrants had been transplanted by the
company, others came upon solicitation but not under contract,
■ZD
Le Canado-Anericain, lundl, 10 novembre, 1913. (Authors' translation.)
rza
Ibid., lundl, 12 Janvier, 1914. (Authors' translation.)
APPENDIX A
171
and many more merely found their way to Manchester. With the
World War all foreign immigration virtually ceased. In this
connection much the same pattern was discernible in the other
textile cities of the region.40
It seems to be more than a mere coincidence that an acceler¬
ation in the rate of the locational shift of the cotton-textile
industry occurred after foreign immigration had stopped. In
1910, for example, active spindleage in the South amounted
to 66.7 percent of that of New England; by 1914 it amounted
to 73.0 percent. During the war years and those immediately
following, abnormal price relationships and profits relieved
considerably the pressure on costs and wage rates. By 1921,
nevertheless, spindleage in the South comprised 85.4 percent of
that of New England; in this year the number of active spindles
in New England reached a peak of 18,388,000. Thereafter, the
locational shift proceeded more rapidly. By 1925 spindleage
in the South exceeded that of New England, the percentage
standing at 108.2. Five years later the percentage rose to
163.7. In this year, 1930, spindleage in the South attained
a peak of 18,586,000. By 1935 southern spindleage was more
than twice that of New England - 233.1 percent.
It is probable that if New England textile cities had been
able to rely, as they had in the past, on a continuous influx
of impoverished peasants from abroad, who would have been
willing to accept low wages since even that represented an
improvement in their economic position, the southward shift of
the industry would not have assumed the extreme proportions
that it has actually assumed.
40See table A-l. On this showing It would appear that by 1920 In the factory towns
the native Yankees constituted a vanishing group. While some Yankee chauvinists
bemoaned their relative loss of numbers and community Influence, at least one of
them found solace In the fact that "the mixture of many nationalities may produce
the finest generations the world has yet seen. The Immigrants are changing their
language, names, occupations, Ideas and character, yea, even their stature
and facial expressions. They look, talk and act Just like Yankees after two
generations." Everett S. Stackpole, History of Hew Hampshire (New York: The
American Historical Society, 1916), vol. ill, p. 193.
APPENDIX B
EMPLOYMENT CONDITIONS, 1911-22
Evidence of Amoskeag's incipient decline around 1911 was
presented in chapter III. The case rests on the fears ex¬
pressed by some Amoskeag officials, the decline in physical
output, the smallness of profits, and on some of the terms
of the financial reorganization of 1911. Even this showing
was achieved only by a general wage reduction of 10 percent
in 1908. It has been set forth also that the decline was
arrested in the war years, at least in terms of profits, and
was resumed with the 1920-ai depression. It is the purpose
of this appendix to trace the effects of Amoskeag's varying
fortunes over these years on the conditions of employment ex¬
perienced by Amoskeag workers.
The financial reorganization of the Amoskeag Company in 1911
affected more than the company's corporate structure. It was
also the occasion for systematic attempts to reduce costs.
To this end a time-study unit was created, and an employment
office was established in a new building. The latter was
organized in order to centralize the hiring and discharge of
workers through a new system of personnel records. It was also
to be concerned with the promotion of a program of company
welfare, presumably in the hope of reducing labor turn-over,
and to maintain relations with its workers on a cordial,
nonunion basis.
The program by no means meant the initial intrusion of
paternalism in the sense of control over the workers after mill
hours. This had existed from the very establishment of the
company with the organization of the boarding houses and had
continued by virtue of Amoskeag's all but exclusive domination
of the Manchester labor market. In 1911 the company's position
in the labor market, however, had been somewhat weakened by the
growth of the city commercially and industrially in fields
other than textiles as well as by the incipient decline in
Amoskeag's own economic strength.
172
APPENDIX B
173
The welfare program got under way in April 1911 with the
construction of a playground.1 Between this date and further
implementation of the program there occurred in Lawrence,
Massachusetts, an important textile strike which was not with¬
out its repercussions in Manchester.2
The workers in Manchester showed their sympathy for the
Lawrence strikers at an early date. Thus in the "Happenings"
of February 2, 1912, we read the following item:
Three meetings were arranged to take place in this
city last night by local trades unions, the same
to be addressed by sympathizers of the Lawrence
strikers. The Chief of Police forbid the same taking
place and had one of the speakers who persisted in
speaking from the curbing placed under arrest.
Manchester's interest, however,- did not cease with this
incident. We know, for example, that on or about February 17
a number of families in Manchester agreed to take care of 40
children of Lawrence strikers3 and that on February 23 "a large
mass meeting was held .... on Hanover Square [Manchester]
in aid of the Lawrence strikers."4 According to the Manchester
local of the Cigarmakers' International Union of America,
financial as well as moral support was forthcoming. This group
of artisans, the most highly paid in Manchester, is reported
by union sources to have contributed $40,000 to the prosecution
of the strike.
Insulation against the effects of the strike was desired not
only because of the enthusiasm engendered while the strike was
in progress but also because of its successful conclusion
on March 14.
Although the business outlook was not exactly a rosy one,
Amoskeag advanced wages 5 percent on March 11-3 days before
the termination of the Lawrence strike. This increase, how¬
ever, was insufficient to halt a contagion of unrest in the
mills, which took the form of sporadic walk-outs toward the end
of the same month. For example:
1Some of the data concerning Amoskeag's welfare program were secured from a type¬
written record of dally happenings kept by the company until 1928. Hereafter
the citation will appear as "Happenings." The reference In question Is under
the date of April 19, 1911.
p
For a full discussion of the course of the strike's development see Samuel Yellen,
American labor Struggles (1st ed.; New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1936),
PP. 171-204.
3Yellen, op. cit., P. 190.
4"Happenlngs," February 24, 1912.
174
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
The weavers on ©40 looms In No. 3 Upper Weave Boom,
Southern Division, walked out yesterday and today
refusing to weave A. C. A. tickings for the same
price that is paid the weavers on same work in
Jefferson Weave Room.
[They were Joined by] the weavers on 200 loons in
No. 3 Upper Weave Room, Central Division [who] walked
out this afternoon, refusing to weave 19,000 range
for 24.2 cents per cut but demanding 28 cents.
[The idea spread even to some less skilled workers.]
The coiler boys and strippers on the cards in No. 9
Lower Card Room, Central Division, refused to work
this morning on account of dissatisfaction with their
pay, but the matter was adjusted and they resumed
work after a shutdown of two hours.6
The stoppages were short-lived, for the same source discloses
that on April i, 1912, "about all the weavers that left their
work last week returned this morning." But they returned only
after the company had announced the granting of an additional
wage increase of "about 5 percent" to all operatives.® This
restored the 10-percent wage cut of 1908.
Toward the end of April 1912 it was announced by the company
that the initiation of textile courses and practical instruc¬
tion had been decided upon. Later the company instituted
a visiting-nurse service and opened a free dental clinic for
the children of Amoskeag workers. The Amoskeag Textile Club,
in which membership previously had been narrowly restricted
to superintendents, overseers, and others in supervisory
positions, was incorporated, and membership opened to all
Amoskeag employees. Recreational and educational activities
were entrusted to this organization.7
The rapidity with which the welfare program was expanded in
the months following the Lawrence strike makes it difficult to
believe that the program had no connection with the events that
had transpired in Lawrence and Manchester between January and
April of 1912. It appears that the program in part was to be
used to counteract any sympathy for a trade union that might
have been engendered by the successful Lawrence strike. Pre¬
sumably, its efforts were well advised since trade unionism
gained no foothold until 1918.
6,Happenlngs,■ March 28, 1912.
6»Happenlngs," April 2, 1912.
7See "Happenings," April 28, May 6, and June 24, 1912, and January 13, 1913.
APPENDIX B
175
The years that coincide with the World War have come to be
regarded, in retrospect at least, as the halcyon days by some
present-day residents of Manchester who formerly were Amoskeag
workers. The welfare activities, the high nominal wages of the
latter part of the period, and the shortened workweek, as well
as the hardships of the post-war years, have all combined to
create this impression. A more detailed description of the
mill events of these years may, however, modify this impression.
THE COMPANY WELFARE PROGRAM
The welfare program attempted to run the gamut of activities
usually associated with providing health safeguards, including
home building, and offered opportunities for education and
recreation for the workers and their families. The first
function was directly under the control of the management, as
was the granting of pensions, and the remainder of the activi¬
ties was directed by the aforementioned Amoskeag Textile Club.
Until the strike of 1922 the company maintained a small
hospital with a doctor and nurse in attendance during working
hours. There were first-aid rooms in the various mills, and
the physician made a daily round of calls through the mills at
specified hours to save time for the workers as well as for
the management.8
The company also maintained a staff of nine nurses who,
together with a supervisor, made home visits to employees or
their families without charge. If the homemaker was ill,
the company furnished a maid gratis to care for the home during
the illness. In addition to the nursing care, the supervisor
had charge of giving relief to families in need. Tne super¬
visor was empowered to give cloth from the mill to make clothes
for the family, and if the mother was unable to sew, the
clothing was made up for her. Fuel wood from the large tracts
of woodland owned by the company was offered to employees at
a reduced price or given as an outright gift to its needy
workers. The nurses also advised families in planning their
expenditures and otherwise acted as case workers for the
Amoskeag personnel.9
B Amoskeag Bulletin, March 15, 19E0. (Fortnightly bulletin Issued by the company.)
91 bid.
176
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
A free dental clinic with one dentist in attendance was
operated by the company for the children of its employees.
Although figures on the number of visits are not now available,
it is doubtless true that the clinic must have been an impor¬
tant factor in developing preventive care and making more
widespread a knowledge of dental hygiene among a group of
children whose parents could ill afford to pay for such treat¬
ment or whose knowledge would be very much limited because
of their peasant background. It may be noted, however, that
this was a relatively inexpensive service.
Throughout its corporate history Amoskeag had been interested
in the bousing problem. Beginning with 1912, it attempted to
encourage home ownership on the part of its steady employees.
The company offered to sell to workers of 5 years' standing
lots of land 50 x 100 feet on the West Side of Manchester,
under restrictions limiting the house to a two-family structure.
The company took first and second mortgages each for one-half
the purchase price of the land. Each employee could obtain
suitable building plans from Amoskeag without charge. The
mortgage remained without interest if a suitable dwelling was
built and as long as the mortgagor remained in the company's
employ and resided in the house. At the end of 5 years, if the
operative was still with the company and occupied the house,
the second mortgage was surrendered upon payment of $1.00;
the first mortgage was settled by a like payment at the end
of the tenth year if the same conditions had been satisfied.
In case of death, heirs of the holder succeeded to his rights.10
It is not known how many were able or willing to avail them¬
selves of this opportunity and what its effect was on labor
turn-over and the real income of the workers.
The granting of pensions, which was given much publicity, at
least locally, was also inaugurated at this time. As in the
case of other private pension systems, the workers were devoid
of any legal rights. The mill agent at his own discretion
recommended aged workers with a long service record for a
pension grant. These recommendations had to be approved by
the board of trustees of Amoskeag, but once approval was
forthcoming, monthly payments were made until the death of
10Ibid., February 16, 1912.
APPENDIX B
177
the pensioner, although the board could and did alter the
amount of the monthly stipend at will.
Only overseers or those who had direct charge of some depart¬
ment in the plant were considered eligible for pensions at
the inception of the policy in January 1913. Accordingly,
the first to receive this benefit was an overseer in the
company's service for 30 years. The monthly grant was $40.00.
By the end of the year five additional pensions were granted,
and two others were added to the list in 1915. Not until
March 1916 was eligibility extended to include the wage earners
of long service, three of whom were pensioned at $20.00 a month
on that date. This came to be the usual monthly grant for
wage earners.
In the course of the year 1916, the number of pensioners was
increased from 11 to 40, at a monthly cost of $710. Thereafter
the pension list was added to more rapidly. It appears that
the maximum number on the pension list in any one year was 94
in 1922, although it should be noted that the figures for 1920
and 1921 are not available. The maximum annual expenditures
on this account also occurred in 1922 and amounted to $27,280.
After October 1923 only one pensioner was added to the list,
according to the minutes of the board of trustees, but the
monthly payments were continued to those previously on the list
until they were removed by death. Since the service by its
very nature could not be completely terminated in 1922, as was
the remainder of the welfare program, payments were continued
until July 1936 when liquidation was ordered. Fourteen persons
were on the list when payments ceased.
The monthly grant paid to wage earners was reduced from
$20.00 to $18.00 in 1928 and further reduced to $16.20 in 1932.
However, in 1929 a former employee "who had rendered much and
valuable service to Amoskeag" received a monthly pension of
$200. This person, too, sustained several reductions, and the
rate was settled at $50.00 in February 1933.
There can be no doubt that the pensioners were fully deserv¬
ing of the assistance. The Amoskeag trustees had approved
grants for 147 of their workers. Only two pensioners had
been employed with Amoskeag for less than 30 years. Nearly
one-fifth of the total (19.2 percent) had been attached to the
178
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
company for 30 to 39 years and more than a third <35-6 percent)
having a minimum attachment of 50 years.11 Naturally, workers
with such a long service record would be well advanced in
years. The age at time of initial grant is known for the
94 persons accorded pension status after January 1921. More
than half (52.3 percent) were 65 to 74 years of age, and
one-fifth (20.5 percent) were between 75 and 84. Only 2 were
under 55 years of age, and 10 (22.7 percent) were between
55 and 64.
This provides some basis for judging the adequacy of the
pension coverage during the active period 1916-23. During
those years, there were 137 workers with a minimum service rec¬
ord of 30 years who were granted pensions. In the 10-percent
Table B-1.- ANNUAL COST OP PENSIONS AS A PERCENTAGE OP
annual Manufacturing costs.
Year
Cost of pensions
(dollars)
Manufacturing costs
(thousands of
dollars )
Cost of pensions
as percent of
manufacturing
costs
1910
2.750
24,425.2
0.011
1917
10,500
35,497.4
.030
1916
13,360
42,922.7
.031
1919
14.000
35.971.1
.041
1920
n. a.
43,157.1
-
1921
n. a.
27,349.0
-
1922
27,280
11,023.4
.235
1923
25,510
37,900.6
.067
1924
23,800
29,668.6
.080
1925
10,010
32,003.4
.058
1926
16,340
26,041.3
.003
1927
10,735
25,020.4
.067
1928
15,000
25,096.4
.002
1929
12.240
25,969.0
.047
1930
10,976
16,790.2
.065
1931
9,587
14.752.7
.065
1932
7,240
8,832.5
.082
1933
4,642
13,124.1
.035
1934
4.584
15,118.5
.030
1935
4,422
8,818.9
.050
aBased on an NRP tabulation of company records,
n.a. Data not available.
1143.8 percent had been with the company 40 to 49 years at time of pensioning.
APPENDIX B
179
sample of the Amoskeag personnel files,18 during the same
years 29 workers with 30 years or more of Amoskeag service
were separated finally from the pay roll. Thus the actual
coverage of the pension plan was 137 compared with an estimated
potential coverage of 290.
It could not be convincingly urged, moreover, that the
pension costs actually incurred were so onerous that a more
complete coverage would have been financially prohibitive. In
table B-i the annual pension costs are expressed as a percentage
of the annual manufacturing costs. The highest percentage
was eight-hundredths of 1 percent, with the exception of 1922
when the mill was in operation for much less than 6 months.
A cost of this magnitude could scarcely have placed Amoskeag at
a competitive disadvantage.13
The remainder of the company welfare activities was carried
out through the instrumentality of the Amoskeag Textile Club,
the origin of which has already been described. Control by the
company management was assured by the company agent's serving
as president in its formative years. Certainly the club's
program in many respects was closely correlated with the
company's needs and not unrelated to the workers' interests
as they conceived them at the time.
For example, an arrangement was made with the International
Correspondence School of Scranton, Pennsylvania, whereby
courses of study in several technical fields were offered to
employees at especially advantageous terms. Those who received
diplomas from the International Correspondence School for
the textile course were refunded half the cost of the course
3 months after its completion, and the other half was returned
to the employee if he was still with the company at the end
of 6 months. The upper floor of one of the office buildings
was fitted up as a study room, and an instructor was paid by
the company to aid the students. A textile school completely
equipped with the latest machinery was also established for
purposes of practice.14
Instruction in sewing and cooking was given without charge to
any member of the family of an Amoskeag worker. An instructor
12See appendix G for a description of this sample.
13The total costs for pensions over a period of 23 years were $299,411.26 If the
costs In 1920 and 1921 (years for which figures are missing) are assumed to equal
the costs in 1922, the maximum amount on record.
^Anoskeag Bulletin, December 12, 1912.
180
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
was paid by the company, and modern equipment was provided for
cooking and sewing. In the fall of 19m as many as aso persons
were enrolled in these classes.16
By 1915 the curriculum of the Textile Club School included
courses in mechanical drawing, shorthand, typewriting, math¬
ematics, automobile construction, and practical weaving.
For the children a playground with gymnastic apparatus, swim¬
ming pool, running track, and baseball diamond was maintained
under the supervision of a caretaker. In the winter a skating
rink was provided; in the summer free band concerts were
given, and the boys were sent to camp on Amoskeag property.
Boy Scout troups were also organized.1® Gardening by the
children, as well as by the adults, was encouraged in many
ways, particularly during the war years.
For the adults the club had its own recreation field, gun
club, picnic ground, and summer houses for rent at $3.50 per
week. The ATC, as it was locally called, maintained for
its members a reading room with magazines and books of all
kinds; this later became a regular library maintained in the
Textile Club House.17 On the side of the purely social activ¬
ities, the ATC arranged for its members a field day every
summer, a banquet every winter, and sponsored a glee club
and dramatic society. Speakers, as well as musical comedies
and concerts, were presented. In 1916 active members of the
club numbered 1.635.
The club house is said to have been popular among Amoskeag
workers. Many doubtless frequented it for the pleasure to be
derived from its many activities and facilities. The more
ambitious attended, it is claimed by some former Amoskeag
workers, in order to curry the favor of the hierarchy of
Amoskeag bosses.
Two other club activities remain to be mentioned. At the
recommendation of the ATC the treasurer of the company bought
for any employee from 1 to 20 shares of Amoskeag preferred
stock at $75.00 per share on the following terms: The pur¬
chaser was to pay down $5.00 on each share and $1.00 per
1BIbid., September 16, 1914.
1,81 bid., December 12, 1912.
Ibid.
APPENDIX B
181
share on each fortnightly pay day until it was paid for.16
Apparently it was not until the stock split-up in 1920 that any
of the employees took advantage of the offer. From July 1920
to August 1921, according to entries in a ledger, 47s employees
paid $199,069.97 for 2,647 shares of preferred stock. That
is, 3.3 percent of the average number on the pay roll during
1920-21 purchased 1.3 percent of the preferred shares that had
been issued. More than three-quarters of the purchase price
was regarded by Amoskeag as a profit. Thus in the general
ledger we find, under the profit-and-loss account for the
6 months ending May 30, 1921, an entry of $71,697.90 which
is described in the journal as profit from sale of stock
to employees. An entry of similar character to the amount
of $44,383.44 was recorded in the account for the 6 months
ending November 30, 1921. In the following 6 months this
profit amounted to $17,850 and in the succeeding 6 months to
$20,384.11.
The other activity was the fortnightly publication of the
Amoskeag Bulletin, which has been the main source of informa¬
tion on the welfare program. Its purpose was to keep the
workers posted on all the events of the mill and to serve as
a liaison between the workers and the management, although
it probably was not a free forum for discussion.
Obviously, the annual dues of $2.00 were insufficient to
finance this varied program. Much the greater part of the bal¬
ance, however, was not defrayed by the Amoskeag Manufacturing
Company. The funds were derived from the sale of remnants and
imperfect goods which were sold to the Textile Club by Amoskeag
at cost price. The club maintained a store where the public
could purchase these remnants at less than retail price but
at enough of a profit to the club so that the income carried
the activities of the Amoskeag Textile Club. Thus the only
cost to the company was the salaries of about a score of
professional persons.10
EMPLOYMENT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO AND DDRING THE WAR
However large or small may have been the addition of real
income provided by the welfare program, it must have been very
18I6id., February 1, 1913. The price range or the stock between July 1920 and
August 1921 was 70 to 90.
10Thls information was supplied by an erstwhile chairman or the ATC's finance
committee who had been paymaster of the company for many years previous to
liquidation.
182
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
welcome to the workers, especially in the first part of this
period. In 1911, for example, the unweighted average full-time
weekly wage in the 17 most important textile occupations was
$9.53. The 10-percent increase in 1912 brought this average up
to $10.55 in that year. In the succeeding 2 years this wage
amounted to $10.38 and $9.93, respectively.20 This represents
a more favorable situation than actually existed since it is
based on a full-time wage, and, as will be shown presently,
part-time employment was widely prevalent during these years.
Some idea of what this wage involved in terms of real income
may be secured from a company notation that the weekly board
(excluding room) in the company-owned boarding houses in 1912-13
was $3.00 for men and $2.75 for women.
Only two walk-outs occurred between the inauguration of the
welfare activities in 1912 and a strike in the summer of 1918.
On January 8, 1913, it was recorded in the "Happenings" that
"on account of two Greeks being discharged from No. 9 Upper
Spinning, Central Division, for staying out from work, 28
Greeks employed in that department walked out at 6.30 A.M.
this morning." On March 16, 1914, the Amoskeag Bulletin
reported:
An unfortunate misunderstanding occurred with the
weavers in one of the No. 11 mill weave rooms last
Thursday by reason of which they were induced to
make a demonstration that is not in accordance
with Amoskeag traditions and is in violation of the
principles of the employees of the company.
It is regrettable from every standpoint that any
Amoskeag people, without proper notification, and
before all other means had failed, should walk
out from the mills, because it gives a false im¬
pression to those outside of the mills who cannot be
acquainted with the true conditions inside.
That textile-trade conditions were unsettled in this period
has been indicated in other sections of this report. That
Amoskeag did not escape the pre-war depression can be shown
by reference to mill notices and to the statistics based on the
personnel records. The uncertainties were in evidence even
before the outbreak of hostilities in Europe in August 1919.
For example, the entire worsted section (the wool-sorting and
top-making departments excepted) was shut down for 1 week
in mid-October in 1913 and for the first week in November.
20
Adapted from a company record.
APPENDIX B
183
When in January 1914 the law providing for a 55-hour week
superseded the 58-hour law, Amoskeag retained the weekly wages
of the longer week. The company commented on this on January 1,
1914, in the Amoskeag Bulletin, in the following manner:
At this time of nation-wide industrial depression
and uncertainty, when securities of all kinds have
shrunk to the lowest level seen for years, with the
strong probability that the end is not yet, - when
the great industries that give the people employment
see themselves confronted with a lack of orders and
the consequent deplorable necessity of a reduction in
their working forces, the action of the Amoskeag
Manufacturing Company, in keeping the 55-hour weekly
wage the same as the 58-hour weekly wage, stands out
with especial significance.
In the face of a very unsettled gingham and dress
goods market, brought about by the reduction in
tariff rates by the present administration, reasons
were at hand in abundance to keep the hourly rate the
same. It means that $350,000 and $400,000 more money
will be paid to Amoskeag employees each year than
would have been paid, and this amount must be lost by
21
the shareholders.
With the declaration of war by the European powers there was
additional evidence of depressed conditions and the mills were
closed for several weeks in the summer of 1914.
While this action may have forestalled a complete shut¬
down in the winter of 1914-15, it did not prevent part-time
employment in some of the departments in the fall of 1914.
The cotton-weaving departments, for example, beginning with
September 21, had to stop work at Friday noon of each week until
further notice. In September 1915 the entire cotton section
had to stop work each week on Thursdays; that is, a working
schedule of 40 hours per week was put into effect. What
this meant in terms of economic welfare can be surmised when
one learns from a company record that the average hourly
rate in the manufacturing departments for the 2 weeks ending
October 22, 1915, was 18.43 cents, or $7.37 for a 40-hour week.
In the mechanical departments the comparable figures were
24.06 cents and $9.62.
21
The following notice posted on January 5, 1914, Is also significant:
"Straggling of employees from different departments througn the yard and congre¬
gating In the hall and stairways Just before noon and night must be stopped. The
matter Is entirely In the hands of the overseers and may be overcome by a little
attention on their part.
"With the new 55-hour law It becomes more than ever necessary that employees work
and that machines be kept running the full time required by the rules of the
company." ("Happenings," January 5, 1914.)
184
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
The 5-percent advance in wage rate made at the very outset
of 1916 followed similar announcements by the neighboring
factories owned by Pacific Mills.22 On February 3 there was
a return to the full-time schedule (55 hours per week) from the
90-hour schedule for all those employed on draper looms. This
meant increased working time for 1,300 hands. Continued im¬
provement permitted an increased time schedule of 50 hours per
week for all remaining cotton-weaving workers in March, thus
giving 3,000 operatives another day's work.23 Another wage
increase of 5 percent on April 19, 1916, was further evidence
that wartime prosperity was beginning. Textile workers in
Lawrence, however, received a 10-percent advance at that time.
The continuance of the Amoskeag policy of smaller wage-rate
advances than those in the neighboring communities was one of
the factors that helped precipitate the strike 2 years later.
By June 10 the company was working full force with all weaving
on a full-time basis, and by December 9 there was another
wage advance of 75 percent, which on this occasion was only
25 percent less than the increase in the Lawrence mills.24
It should be mentioned at this point that the cost of living
had also begun to increase. This is indicated by the index
of retail food prices for Manchester computed by the United
States Bureau of Labor Statistics. Food in Manchester was
12.9 percent more costly in 1916 than in 1913,25 whereas the
increase in wage rate over the same period was 19.9 percent.
Despite this revival in 1916, the cotton section failed to
earn its dividend payments by $196,000, although the worsted
section earned almost twice its dividend requirements.2®
The deficit of the cotton section has been explained by the
disproportionate increase in the cost of cotton and coloring
material, particularly the latter. This was followed by 2 boom
years, 1917-18, the tremendous profits of which, as described
elsewhere, could be attributed in part to the lagging of wage
increases behind the increases in selling price.27
22
For the Amoskeag announcement see "Happenings," January 3, 1910; the announcement
at Pacific Mills Is taken from a miscellaneous company record.
ZSAuo3keag Bulletin, June 15, 1916.
OA
For wage advances In Lawrence, Massachusetts, between 1916 and 1920 see "Advances
In Lawrence," Textile Vorld., Vol. LVII, No. 21 (May 22, 1920), p. 27.
z^Retail Prices, 1890 to 1928 (U. S. Dept. Labor, Bur. Labor Statistics, Bull.
No. 495, Aug. 1929), p. 30.
2®See table 12, chapter III.
27See chapter III.
APPENDIX B
185
Obviously, it should not be inferred from this statement that,
since these were years of lagging wages and relatively high
profits, there had been no advances in wage rates. On the
contrary, wage-rate increases in the industry were made fre¬
quently in these years throughout the region in an effort to
keep up with the advancing cost of living. Although Amoskeag
was obliged to fall in line it tended to make smaller advances
than its competitors in the Merrimack Valley.
For example, twice in 1917, in May and October, the mills in
Lawrence advanced wage rates 10 percent,28 while at Amoskeag
the increase on each occasion was only 75 percent. It was
this inequality in treatment that provided the basic reason
in the beginning of 1918 for the organization of a trade union
by the United Textile Workers of America, a campaign that had
to be carried on under cover.
In April 1918 Amoskeag matched the regional increase of
10 percent. Although this forestalled any labor trouble at
that time, such difficulties soon appeared. On May 14 the
workmen in the dye house, numbering about 175, went out on
strike when their demands for an average increase, said to have
amounted to 25 percent, were refused.29 This dispute was
settled and other difficulties remained dormant until the next
wage increase was announced on June 17.
This amounted to an increase of 125 percent, although the
advance in Lawrence was only 10 percent. However, six mills,
according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, granted increases
of is percent at this time.30 The reappearance of the differ¬
ential wage increase was realized by the Amoskeag workers, or
at least by the small organized sector which decided to put
a halt to the practice by striking for a raise of 15 percent.
Accordingly, the UTW caused its workers to strike the first
week in July at Amoskeag as well as at other mills in the
region.31 This was the first trade-union strike in Amoskeag
28
"Advances In Lawrence, " Zoc. cit.
29Manchester Union, May 15, 1918.
30
"Employment In Selected Industries In July, 1918," Monthly Labor Review,
Vol. VII, No. 3 (Sept. 1918), p. 296.
31"Strlkes and Lockouts In the United States, July to September, 1918," Monthly
Labor Review, Vol. VII, No. 6 (Dec. 1918), pp. 359-60, reported: "Early In July
several large strikes attracted considerable attention, notably those In the cotton
mills In Rhode Island, Lowell, and Manchester, N. H., In which 35,000 operatives
were concerned "
186
SHOT-DOWN OP AMOSKEAG
since 1886, when the Knights of Labor had waged an unsuc¬
cessful one.
At the time of the strike call the union membership was
small but drawn from strategic positions in the mills. As a
consequence the work was so disorganized that "it was deemed
best to shut down all departments of both concerns" (Amoskeag
and Stark mills).32 Since these mills were working chiefly on
war orders, the Secretary of War immediately dispatched an
arbitrator who granted the strikers' demand of a is-percent
increase in place of the 125-percent advance. In this manner
the strike was settled within 5 days, which was sufficient time
for the union openly to add some 5,000 new members.33 For the
succeeding 4 years the union was a factor in employer-employee
relationships.
It is worthy of emphasis, however, that the union had no more
than a foothold. Ten locals, each representing a craft,
were affiliated with the Manchester Textile Council.34 While
the Amoskeag management met with representatives of the council
and established an adjustment board to meet with the grievance
committees set up by union members in each department, there
was no arrangement for the union check-off of dues or for
a closed or even preferential shop.
P08T-WAR ADJUSTMENTS
It was very soon after the armistice that difficulties in
the way of sustained manufacturing operations set in. Early
in December 1918 (December 2) the Amoskeag Bulletin reported
a shut-down in several worsted rooms and predicted short-time
operations throughout the plant. In February 1919 a nominal
48-hour week was instituted as the full-time week, and it was
remarked that the mills were actually running on a 35-hour week.
Thus it is no coincidence that industrial demobilization set in
with demobilization of the army.
The 48-hour week was a union demand by the UTW as part of
a national campaign. Most of the New England textile mills
adopted the 48-hour week after having fought it bitterly for
^Amoskeag Bulletin, July 15, 1918.
33Manchester Union, July 1, 1918.
34The 10 locals were loom fixers, dresser tenders, ring spinners, weavers, cloth
finishers, wool sorters, carders, winders, twisters, and dyers and bleachers.
APPENDIX B
187
a number of years. An important factor in breaking down oppo¬
sition in Massachusetts was the certainty that the legislature
would eventually pass such legislation. Since there were
no changes in the time or piece rates, this was equivalent to
a reduction of about 7.7 percent in full-time weekly earnings.
Presumably for this reason and because of the ever-mounting
cost of living, the Manchester Textile Council requested
a 15-percent increase on May 14, 1919* to become effective
on June 2.35 Within a week the company acceded to this request,
as did other mills in the region. There was the further stipu¬
lation that the agreement was to remain in effect without
change until the third Monday in April 1920.
Despite this agreement and in concert with other mills in
New England, an additional voluntary advance of 12I percent
was granted on December 1, 1919. The continued increase in
the cost of necessities was doubtless a motivating factor,
particularly in view of the company's having earned more than
$2,000,000 above dividend disbursements in the fiscal year
ending November 30, 1919, although physical production had
declined some 16 percent in the same 12 months.
The last wage increase in the post-war boom occurred toward
the end of May 1920. Within a week, however, there were un¬
mistakable signs of the approaching depression, particularly in
the worsted section. On June 2, for example, the wool-sorting
and top-making departments were put on a 5-day schedule, and
the spinning, drawing, twisting, dressing, weaving, and burling
departments were to operate 35 days per week, with the dyeing
and finishing department on*a 4-day week. Further curtailment
in operations occurred in the following 2 months, and at the
end of July the worsted section was shut down indefinitely
because of "business conditions and the uncertainty of the coal
supply." It remained closed until January 1921 when operations
were resumed on a part-time basis.
By the latter part of October in 1920 the cotton section was
also affected. Thus on October 20 three weaving departments
went on a 3-day schedule, and one spinning department was shut
down. In December the entire cotton section was to run only
35"AdJustments, " Vol. I, May 14, 1919. The management kept a record of Its
transactions with the union In chronological order in loose-leaf form and labeled
It "Adjustments." Hereafter the reference will be as In the above.
188
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
the first 3 days of each week until further notice, although
more than 2 months previous to this Amoskeag had announced
a 335-percent price reduction on ginghams, napped goods,
shirtings, ticking, and denim.
Price reductions failed to prevent short-time operations
and a complete shut-down for 2 weeks ending January 3, 1921,
and they also presaged a wage reduction. When operations were
resumed on that date, it was with a 225-percent reduction in
the wage scale. Similar reductions were announced by a majority
of the New England mills, except those controlled by the
American Woolen Company.38 This action, it should be noted,
was conditioned not by the profit record of the year just
completed but by future prospects, for in the year ending
November 30, 1920, the cotton section had earned $2,610,000
and the worsted division $45,433. Although a 100-percent stock
dividend had been declared in this year with a proportionate
increase in dividend disbursements, a $400,000 surplus remained
after dividends.
An indication of the economic welfare of the workers at this
time is afforded by a comparison of an index showing changes
in wage rates with an index of changes in the cost of living.
Unfortunately, for this period only an index of retail food
prices is available for Manchester, and it is well established
that during these years the cost of food had larger fluctuations
in both directions than had the cost of all items entering into
the cost-of-living index. Accordingly, for the purposes of our
comparison the cost-of-living index for Boston is taken as
representative of the relative changes in Manchester's cost of
living.37 The comparison is set forth in table B-2.
From 1914 through 1918 wage-rate changes tended to keep pace
with the rising cost of living. It was not until 1919 that
the wage-rate index appreciably exceeded the cost-of-living
index. The divergence increased in 1920 and continued to be
considerable in 1921 despite the 225-percent wage reduction
of that year- The resulting index of 203 was some 15 percent
above the cost-of-living index. Concurrent with this putative
increase was the reduction of the workweek from 55 hours to 48.
38"Textlle Wage Reduction Starts," Textile Vorld, Vol. LVIII, No. 25 (Deo. 18,
1920), p. 39.
37It Is of Interest to note that the Index of the retail price of food in Manchester
was higher beginning with 1918 than the analogous index for Boston.
APPENDIX B
189
Table B-2.- INDEXES OF COST OF LIVING IN BOSTON
AND WAGE BATES AT AMOSKEAG, 1914-22
(December 1914=100)
Year and month
Cost of living
in Boston®
Wage rates at
Amoskeagb
1914 (December)
100
100
1915 (December)
101
100
1916 (December)
115
119
1917 (December)
135
137
1918 (December)
165
173
1919 (December)
185
224
1920
196
247
1921
176
203
1922 (February)
165
163
Since the cost ot living rose continuously from December 1914 to June 1920, and
since cost-of-living figures are available only for December of each year from 1914
to 1918, the Index for the period of continuous rise, 1914-19, represents relative
changes from December to December. For the remaining years, years of mixed move¬
ment, averages of available figures are shown. For 1920 the average Is based on
December 1919 and June and December 1920, weighted 1, 2, and 1, respectively. For
1921 the figures for December 1920 and May, September, and December 1921 were
combined Into an unweighted average. The Amoskeag strike was declared In February
1922, and the December 1921 and March 1922 figures were averaged to obtain the
relative cost-of-living level for the first few months of 1922. Figures were
computed from Handbook of Labor Statistics, 1936 Edition (U. S. Dept. Labor, Bur.
Labor Statistics, Bull. No. 616, 1936), p. 82.
bTfie Index of wage-rate changes Is constructed In a manner similar to that of the
cost-of-living Index. That Is, for 1914-19 the figures are for December; for
1920-21 figures represent an average of monthly levels. The figure presented
for 1922 Indicates the level to which rates would have dropped If the 20-percent
decrease announced on February 13 had become effective.
It should be remembered, however, that the index relating to
wages is based on rates and not on actual earnings. Accord¬
ingly, in view of the extent of part-time operations and
complete shut-downs in the post-war years that were reviewed
above, the improvement indicated by these data must have been
more nominal than real.
There is evidence at hand, moreover, to support this conten¬
tion. A company record has survived which lists by departments
the number of workers who earned over $1,000 in 1920. It
was prepared for purposes of income—tax reporting. In this
year, in which the highest wage rates obtained, 5,084 persons
were reported as having earned a minimum of $1,000. This is
only 36 percent of 14,209 employees, the average number on the
Amoskeag pay roll in 1920. The percentage would be consider¬
ably less if it were possible to base it on the number of
different individuals in Amoskeag's employ during the year
instead of on the average number. Even the percentage given is
190
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
somewhat misleading, for 30 percent of the 5,084 who received
$1,000 or more were not textile operatives but workers in the
various mechanical and maintenance departments. Employees
in these latter departments, however, accounted for only
about 14 percent of the total number on the Amoskeag pay
roll at this time. Of the textile operatives on this list,
46 percent were employed in weaving departments, although the
employees of these departments only constituted about one-third
of the entire staff of textile operatives. It seems, then,
that in the year of highest wage rates only about one-third ^
of the workers could earn as much as $1,000, and this opportu¬
nity was restricted by and large to the most skilled employees.
The wage cut, it should be mentioned, was a last rather than
a first resort for reducing labor costs. Some form of the
"speed-up" had constituted the initial attempt. For example,
in March 1920 the management received the following complaint
from Local 793 (dresser tenderst:
At our meeting last Wednesday night (March 24),
it was reported that some warpers run from three to
seven frames per girl and the Local want the girls
to run no more than three, as [on] more than that
they cannot produce good work.38
In September of the same year a piece rate was substituted
for an hourly rate among hand folders.
We (the management] explained to the Grievance
Committee that the proposed change would be no
reduction in wages, and that the prime object of this
change was to increase the production. We further
explained how 25% increase in production would
automatically increase wages by 25%.
(To this explanation the mill agent added a per¬
oration to the effect] that the present method of
limiting production was economically wrong
that this nation could not get ahead if everybody
loafed on the Job, and that the highest degree of
civilization was acknowledged b-y the height of
3 9
production per person.
The imposition of the 22j-percent wage cut, however, did
not put an end to the speed-up at Amoskeag. Indeed, on the
very day that the wage cut went into effect, the adjustment
board announced:
"^"Adjustments," Vol. II, March 27, 1920.
39Ibid., September 13, 1920.
APPENDIX B
191
It is the understanding of the Amoskeag at this time
that the agreement that has heretofore been ....
[in effect] has been automatically discontinued
and that loom fixers will be asked and required to
perform a reasonable day's work, no limit being put
on the number of warps put in by any fixer in any
given length of time.40
When a union official asked the representative of the company
if any more pay would be granted if the loom fixers did more
work, the answer was "Not a cent."41
The continuance of this system was even intimated when in
March 1921 Amoskeag announced a price reduction of its napped
goods from 373- cents a yard to 123 cents a yard. The company
stated: "The reduction [is] made in view of the radically
changed outlook in raw cotton and the prospects of reduced
production costs."42
Later in the year the union reported "that loom fixers
in Worsted were being driven to death."43 In October the
adjustment board met
to determine whether the worsted weavers are jus¬
tified in registering a complaint concerning a six
loom experimental job that is now being conducted in
the Worsted Weave Room.
[According to the summary of this discussion:]
The Worsted Weavers are afraid that the number of
looms per set is likely to be increased and to offset
the possibility of any such action, they wish to have
it known at this time that they will not under any
consideration run more looms than they are running
at the present time. They think that the experiment
at present being conducted is for the purpose of
determining whether the weaver can successfully
run more looms. They have been advised by their
International president to accept no increase in
looms without his sanction.44
Two months later no satisfactory arrangement on this par¬
ticular problem had been reached, and a union representative
advised the adjustment board "that he thought the final so¬
lution of the six loom problem would probably be for the
weavers to hold a meeting and tell the management to go to Hell
as far as the six loom set was concerned.1,45
40I£>id., January 3, 1921.
41Ibid.
iZAnoskeag Bulletin, March 15, 1921.
43"Acljustments," July 21, 1921.
44Ii>id., Vol. Ill, October 26, 1921.
45Ibid., December 13, 1921.
192
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
That the speed-up was not restricted solely to the weaving
department is evidenced by a grievance placed with the ad¬
justment board. It was obliged "to determine why Doffers in
No. 9 Central Spinning should be asked to run more work for
less wages.
"Doffers had been running so sides and receiving $18.21 after
the reduction in wages of January 3, 1921, and that the present
schedule for 56 sides paid a weekly wage of $17-40.1,46
This type of complaint became so general that in November
of this year the adjustment board reported to the company:
It appears to us that [the] Executive Board of the
Textile Council is centering their general com¬
plaint on the point that the operatives feel that a
scientific method of decreasing the wages has been
instituted by increasing the lengths of the cut, and
that the only satisfactory method of remedying this
condition as far as the operatives are concerned, is
to increase the wages on the various operations; not
perhaps, in direct proportions to the increase in
yards, but substantially.47
When the wage cut of 225 percent became effective in January
1921, the electricians and others in the mechanical department
sought through the adjustment board "to determine whether a new
working agreement [would] .... be arranged between the union
and the management."40
Mr. Straw [management] tried to impress upon the
committee [from the mechanical department] the fact
that irresistible [sic] minimum prices had been
established by the Amoskeag, and that this, added
to the fact that raw material had been materially
reduced in price, was the only reason why we could
run the mills at all. He said that he could see
no advantage in entering into another agreement,
no reason for signing anything. He said that no
agreement was signed with slasher men, loom fixers,
grinders, etc., and that he did not intend to renew
the agreement with mechanics. Mr. McCabe [union]
asked if an agreement did not make [for a] better
feeling. Mr. Straw said that we had all the facil¬
ities for meeting grievance committees, and that
we would be glad to have committees come to the
office at any time to discuss matters of common
interest. He said that he rather thought that the
agreement had been a disadvantage for the reason that
461 bid., Vol. II, January 31, 1921.
47 Ibid., Vol. Ill, November 14, 1921.
48Ibid., Vol. II, January 7, 1921.
APPENDIX B
193
it got away from the basic idea of all being in
4 9
the same boat.
According to the remarks of the representative of the elec¬
tricians' union, this made for a tense situation:
. . . . [He] said it would look as though the elec¬
trical workers were forced to take this cut at this
time not through their inability to stop it, but
because he did not want to be the person to set the
match to the already built bonfire that would cause
a condition throughout New England that he would
hardly care to picture.50
This situation seemed to continue throughout all of 1921 and
was to be relieved only by the strikes of the following year.
The same sort of situation could be found among the textile
operatives. Thus, when the inspectors in the napping depart¬
ment signified their intention of withdrawing from the union
"because they feel that they can be of greater service to
the company if they do not belong to the union", the union
sought "to determine whether the company would stand back
of men who elected to withdraw from the union to the extent of
allowing them to work with union men, and whether in the event
of trouble nonunion men would be asked to leave their jobs."51
The company position of neutrality with regard to requiring
union membership was reaffirmed.
There is also evidence of the management's circumventing
union procedure. For example, the union was represented before
the adjustment board as
. . . . very much disturbed because we [management]
had taken occasion to talk with Mr. himself
rather than try to reach a satisfactory settlement
through the Grievance Committee. We assured ....
[the union] that the company would at all times
maintain the right to talk with any of its employees
whether or not they were affiliated with any union,
and that operatives registering a grievance who did
not belong to the union would receive the same
courteous treatment as those affiliated with the
52
union.
The management's antiunion acts occurred with increasing
frequency until the union found it necessary in the latter part
5iIbid., Vol. II, February 3, 1921.
bZIbid., Vol. Ill, October 6, 1921.
194
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
of October to lodge with the adjustment board a complaint
of antiunionism.
The Company is neutral but the Executive Board
[of the Textile Council] say that in expressing their
neutrality the overseers frequently lean toward the
nonunion operative. This, they say, is demonstrated
in the case of overseer P , who, they claim, told
nonunion operators it was not necessary for them to
join the union; that their Jobs were secure and that
the Company would stand behind them at all times.
Mr. P (union) says that overseers do not
like unionism because it does not allow them the
privilege of being Czars as they have been in the
past. Overseers, according to Mr. P , cannot
under unionism [82 percent organized], kick the help
around. Mr. P said that he voiced the opinion of
all the union operators in the plant when he advised
us that the feeling ran that Mr. W. P. Straw, Agent,
c «*
was desirous of breaking up the union organizations.
To complete the picture of the factors that conditioned
employee-employer relationships at this time, it is necessary
to call to mind the company's financial record in 1921. The
cotton section had earned $885,437 and the worsted section
$557,885, but this was insufficient to meet the enhanced
dividend requirements established in the previous year. As
a consequence, more than $1,000,000 were withdrawn from the
surplus to pay dividends. It will thus be readily appreciated
that any frontal attack on the operatives' working conditions
would cause an outright break. The notice posted in the
different departments of Amoskeag on February 2, 1922, was
just such an attack.
NOTICE
"Commencing Monday, Peb. 13, 1922, a reduction of
20 percent will be made in all hour and piece rates
in all departments of the Amoskeag. At the same time
the running time of the mills will be increased from
48 to 54 hours per week, in accordance with the
schedule posted herewith.
W. P. Straw, Agent."64
The explanatory statement issued by the mill agent to accom¬
pany the notice asserted that the wage-and-hour differentials
S3Ibid., October 26, 1921.
64History of Amoskeag Strike During the Year 1922 (Manchester, N. H.: Amoskeag
Manufacturing Co., 1924). P. 1. This complete account of the Amoskeag strike was
written by an anonymous Manchester Journalist. Although It was prepared for and
printed by the company, It has achieved a full measure of Impartiality.
APPENDIX B
195
enjoyed by their southern competitors had forced a decision
of this character upon the northern manufacturers.
. . . They have no control over the prices of
cotton, wool, coal, nor of taxes, nor of any of the
large factors which enter into the total cost of
manufacturing, except the wages paid the employes.
"Realizing the impossibility of successful compe¬
tition with a rival who has not only every advantage
in location, but the extreme advantage of lower wages
and longer hours, the management of the Amoskeag
Manufacturing Company considers the readjustment no¬
tices, of which are today posted, imperative
"Having in mind our full time operation since, and
on account of the reduction one year ago, the Company
now hopes for several months at least of continuous
and full operation."55
This continued to be the main theme with variations in all
subsequent discussions on wage adjustments downward.
THE STRIKE OF 1922
What the wage reductions meant to the Amoskeag worker in 1922
is suggested by data in table B-2. The 20-percent reduction
brought the index of wage-rate changes down to 163 relative
to the wage scale in 1914, while the cost of living in the
first quarter of 1922 compared with December 1914 was 16s.
Thus the gain in the real wage rate during the years 1918-20
was eliminated by two reductions that occurred within a period
of 13 months. The return to the 54-hour week meant that the
workers had a workweek shortened by only 1 hour since 1914.
However the lengthening of the workweek mitigated the severity
of a 20-percent wage reduction since they could work 12! percent
longer in a week. As an offset to this must be mentioned the
increase in the work load. All things considered then, the
Amoskeag worker was fully justified in believing that he was
being returned to his pre-war economic position.
Since this position, as we have seen, was not exactly an
enviable one and since the benefits of higher wages and shorter
hours were a fresh memory, it should occasion no surprise that
the workers elected to resist the readjustment. The Amoskeag
worker was not alone in this decision. Indeed, in January of
that year some 15,000 textile workers in Rhode Island had
551 bid., p. 2.
196
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
gone on strike against the 20-percent wage reduction and the
return of the 54-hour week. At the very time that the Amoskeag
workers were faced with the necessity of making a decision,
the textile millworkers employed in the neighboring towns of
Nashua, Dover, Newmarket, Somersworth, and Suncook, to name the
more important ones, were also confronted with the identical
terms of readjustment. In all New Hampshire some 25,000
textile workers were involved. By March the disaffection had
spread to Lawrence and Lowell and finally involved about
22,000 workers in Massachusetts, although here no attempt was
made to restore the 54-hour week since the 48-hour week for
women and children had been enacted by the State legislature
in 1921. The textile workers of the region then were faced
with a common situation, and in New Hampshire, where about
one-quarter of the workers belonged to unions of the United
Textile Workers of America, leadership was assumed by the
organized workers of Amoskeag.56
Close upon the posting of the notice at Amoskeag, the union
sought the permission of its national office for a strike vote,
and this office delegated James Starr, a UTW vice president, to
take charge of the Manchester situation. On February io, 1922,
Mr. Starr appeared before the Amoskeag Adjustment Board, stating
that the management may be advised of the result
of a referendum vote to strike taken by the various
union operatives in the various crafts throughout
the mills.
. . . . Mr. James Starr said he felt that the
different operatives had voted without being influ¬
enced and that the votes had been tabulated and no
official report made previous to this meeting.
The result of the vote according to Mr. Starr,
showed that over 99# of the votes cast were in favor
of a strike, and that the total number of votes
cast exceeded 12,000.
Mr. W. P. Straw, Agent, told the Grievance Com¬
mittee that he regretted the action taken, but
that the management had made the only decision that
could be made. He said we must insist upon the
reduction in wages and the 54 hour week. To this
Mr- Starr answered "If that is the case, the strike
will go into effect Monday morning next week."
56See Leonard E. Tllden, "New England Textile Strike," Monthly Labor Review, Vol.
XVI, No. 6 (May 1923), pp. 13-6. For date of enactment of the law establishing
a 48-hour workweek for minors and women in Massachusetts, see Labor lows of the
United States Vith Decisions of Courts Relating Thereto (U. S. Dept. Labor, Bur.
Labor Statistics, Bull. No. 370, May 1925), p. 514.
APPENDIX B
197
Mr. Straw was asked by Mr. L [union repre¬
sentative] Just what the necessity was for returning
to a 54 hour week. Mr. Straw answered this by saying
that he did not feel as though it was necessary to
enter into any discussion at this time, as we must
all realize that concerns who wish to operate must
operate economically. Mr. Straw further stated that
he was not prepared at this time to say any more
concerning the 54 hour week.67
In the face of the strike threat the company announced:
" .... we shall open the mill gates on next Monday
morning with the idea of giving work to those who
care to accept the new conditions and who recognize
the futility of delay with its consequent loss
of wages."58
So few operatives passed the picket lines on Monday morning,
February 13, that the company was obliged to close the mills
"until further notice. Advance notice of their reopening will
be duly given."59
A detailed account of the strike is unnecessary since the
course of its development was much the same as that of most
long-drawn-out strikes involving many thousands of workers,
that have taken place before and since the Amoskeag strike.
Possibly the main departure from type was the virtual absence
of violence during the entire 9 months of the strike, although
the slightest evidence of physical intimidation was exploited
to the full by the union's opponents.
The strikers were the first to make any concessions. On
February 28 Thomas F. McMahon, president of the UTW, paid
his first official visit to Manchester and in the course of
addressing a gathering of operatives remarked:
"We stand ready to arbitrate the matter of wages
but we never will arbitrate the hours of labor.
.... In the matter ofwages we recognize a material
thing but in the matter of hours of labor we see a
a rt
human principle which we will not sacrifice." u
The company, however, refused to compromise on either score,
the 20-percent wage reduction or the 5zj.-hour week. In the
57"Adjustments," Vol. Ill, February 10, 1922.
CO
History of Amoskeag Strike, p. 4.
69There Is no evidence whatever for the statement made by Louis Adamlc that
"something very close to a stay-in occurred in the Amoskeag textile mills,
at Manchester, New Hampshire, during a labor difficulty in 1922." My America,
1928-1936 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1938), p. 411.
80
History of Amoskeag Strike, p. 9.
198
SHOT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
succeeding months each side remained adamant despite the
multiplicity of committees that offered their services as
mediators or arbitrators. Among the first to form themselves
into a committee were the members of the local clergy. The
mayors of the strike-affected towns also constituted themselves
a committee, and there was an aldermanic committee as well
as a citizens' committee. The services of the New Hampshire
Commissioner of Labor were duly invoked, but he was powerless
since the company refused to open negotiations on the terms
recommended by him.
In the first month of the strike a solution was sought
through having the legislature enact the 48-hour week. This
path, however, was blocked by the Governor who, citing the op¬
position of the grange to the 48-hour bill, refused to convene
the legislature in an extra session for such a purpose. The
expense of an extra session was also urged by the Governor as
an important consideration, although the Manchester delegation
had agreed to serve without compensation.81
Obviously, time was on the side of the company, which could
afford to draw upon the tremendous cash surplus accumulated
during the war years; it had also the negative assurance of not
losing business to its northern competitors since they too were
closed down by strikes. In addition, it could fill orders for
a month or two from its inventories of finished goods which,
while they were of normal volume, were sizable, amounting to
about 7 million square yards in the cotton section. This was
about 8 percent of the production in the preceding 6 months.
The first break in the strike occurred during the last
week in May in the neighboring city of Nashua. On May 26
the Nashua Manufacturing Company was granted an injunction
"restraining its striking operatives from picketing, in¬
fluencing and terrorizing workers and those who may become
workers" and thereupon decided to open its mills.82 On the
very same day Governor Albert 0. Brown issued an invitation to
the workers, manufacturers, and mayors of the mill towns
involved to attend a conference to be held at the State House
on May 29.
eiIbid., pp. 8-9.
6ZIbid., pp. 72-3.
APPENDIX B
199
There had been no evidence beforehand that either party to
the dispute was ready to recede from its original demands.
Consequently, it was a foregone conclusion that the Governor's
compromise proposal of a 51-hour week and a 10-percent re¬
duction in wages would not be accepted by either group. After
noting this failure, the Governor, in his statement issued
after the conference, went on to say:
"Then it was suggested that the mills open some one
unit of their plant, say a single room or a single
mill, to afford employment to former employes who are
out on account of the strike and who are needy, in
some instances subsisting on charity, and desiring to
work. This suggestion was taken under advisement by
A a
the manufacturers who will reply later."
The manufacturers in general and Amoskeag in particular
had no need to take the matter under advisement for long. The
Governor received Amoskeag's reply within 2 days. The reply
follows:
"The Amoskeag Company appreciated the truth of all
you have said in regard to the business depression in
Manchester, occasioned by the strike, and fully
realizes, too, that much suffering is bound to take
place among the textile workers if the mills remain
closed for a much longer period.
"Although many operatives have already applied for
work, and while we have assurances that many more
desire to work under the conditions posted in our
notices of Feb. 2, yet so completely has our business
been demoralized by the strike, that we have at
present no orders on our books, and so no work to
offer. Indeed, should the entire operating force
report at once we could not start the whole Amoskeag
plant for many weeks to come and the present loss to
Manchester of approximately $4,500,000 in wages will
in all probability be increased to twice this sum
before work can be resumed at all.
"We appreciate, however, that a start towards
resuming operations must be made at some time, and,
with the assurance you make us of protection from
intimidation and violence, if any, for all who desire
to work, we will at your suggestion open the gates of
the Coolidge Mill on Monday morning, June 5. The
running time and the rate of wages will be as posted
on Feb. 2. There can be no compromise nor deviation
from this notice; the provisions incorporated therein
are the most favorable the mills can offer.
63Ibid„ p. 75.
200
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
"If business conditions warrant, and if circum¬
stances are generally satisfactory, other mills
will be opened from time to time in order to give
those people who desire to work the opportunity to
do so. Sufficient notice will be given in advance
in each instance.
"We fully appreciate the motives which underlie
your suggestion that we open some portion of our
plant at the earliest possible moment, and we regret
that this small beginning towards resumption is all
that we can at present make, is more in fact than
business conditions actually warrant."64
On the basis of the above facts the strikers claimed "'that
the calling of the conferences at Concord, Monday, was a
prearranged plan and that the governor seemed to side with
the corporation ",66
The Coolidge Mill was opened on the designated day. On
June 7 the company was granted a temporary injunction with
powers so sweeping that the strikers were enjoined even from
peaceful picketing. When the injunction was made permanent
a month later, it was modified so as to allow two pickets to
each mill gate.66 Some light may be thrown on the relationship
between the company and the police department through the
semiannual accounts made up for the treasurer's office (the
so-called "red books") for the 6 months ending May 20, 1922.
The following entry is recorded in the "Division of Contingent
Account": "Manchester Police Department $2,262.50." In
the 6 months ending December 2, 1922, this payment amounted
to $691.65. Such entries did not appear in any other year.
The mayor of Manchester also cooperated with Amoskeag by making
it increasingly difficult for the workers to collect money for
the relief of the strikers.67
Despite the length of the strike, the workers, while re¬
turning in gradually increasing numbers, did not return in
numbers sufficiently large to obviate the necessity of hiring
strikebreakers. This was admitted by implication by the
company upon the conclusion of the strike when it stated that
those who were employed at the termination of the strike but
not employed at its inception would not be dismissed to make
way for returning strikers.68
6*Ibid., pp. 78-7.
65Ibid., p. 77.
661 bid., pp. 103, 132.
67Ibid., p. 145.
68Ibid., pp. 148-0, 170^1.
APPENDIX B
201
The strike in the Lawrence mills, where the wage scale
was the sole point of contention, was settled on August 23
according to the terms announced by the Citizens' Committee.
The workers were to return at the existing scale, and adjust¬
ments would be made effective October 2, and at that date
retroactive to September 1. In general this would amount to
the restoration of the wage scale in effect previous to the
reduction of March 27.69 This was a real threat to those
mills, including Amoskeag, that were experiencing difficulty
in attracting a sufficient number of skilled operatives.
To aggravate the situation for Amoskeag, nine mills in Maine
with about 8,500 employees announced the restoration, effective
September 11, of a 25-percent pay cut that had been in effect
since February. The 54-hour week was also not an issue here,
having continuously been in effect.70 Amoskeag, accordingly,
had no choice in the matter and on September 10 announced
the restoration of the 20-percent wage cut, to be effective
the following day.71
The general wage increases in the industry at this time
can be explained by the improved outlook for profitable oper¬
ations occasioned by the appreciation of raw-material prices.
This in turn was caused by the short cotton crops in the
two preceding years.72
Since the main point at issue was the 54-hour week, the
strikers felt that the wage concession was an insufficient
reason for terminating the strike and voted for its continuance.
Many, however, regarded the concession as a partial victory and
therefore had no compunction about returning to the mill.
There can be no doubt that the back-to-work movement gained
added momentum at this time. This was realized also by the
strike leaders as evidenced by their redoubled efforts to
achieve a settlement.
To this end the good offices of the Catholic Bishop of
Manchester were used. The terms of his proposed settle¬
ment announced at the end of October were acceptable to the
strikers but were rejected by Amoskeag. The plan proposed a
69Tllden, of>. cit., p. 27.
701 bid., p. 29.
7^History of Amoskeag Strike, p. 150.
72See Stephen J. Kennedy, Profits and Losses in Textiles (New York: Harper &
Brothers, 1936), p. 128.
202
SHOT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
51-hour week until February l, 1923. when "'officials of the
Company shall meet representatives of th£ workers and determine
by agreement whether or not economic conditions or other
circumstances will warrant the restoration of the forty-eight
hour week.1"73 The settlement also stipulated that in the
matter of rehiring, Amoskeag should not exercise any discrim¬
ination against employees now on strike.74
With the failure of this effort, the workers sought to find
out from the company under what conditions the strikers would
be reemployed. Aside from the acceptance of the 54-hour week
the main conditions were as follows:
"Acceptance of the following principles: In regard
to those who may or may not be re-employed, the
Amoskeag Company will not take back those now on
strike to fill the places of those who are now at
work. These workers have been given permanent
employment. Subject to this condition all former
employees are eligible for re-employment as the mills
resume operation without regard to their connection
with outside organizations or their activities during
the strike. To this general statement, however,
there are two exceptions.
"First: Those who may have been guilty of vio¬
lence or intimidation or of inciting to violence
or intimidation.
"Second: Those whose conduct during the strike has
been such as to destroy the possibility of maintain¬
ing the relation of employer and employee with mutual
respect and confidence. There are certain standards
of speech and conduct which must be observed if
this relationship so essential to harmonious oper¬
ation and general contentment is to be continued.
Happily these standards have not often been violated
during this strike and occasions for applying this
exception will be few. The rule must, however,
be recognized and when circumstances warrant it
must be applied. With these exceptions all former
employees are eligible for re-employment as the mills
resume operations."76
The strikers rejected these terms by an overwhelming majority
on November 21, and the strike chiefs outlined plans to carry
the 48-bour-week fight into the legislature. In the midst of
such preparations the strike leader recommended on November 25
that the strike be called off, realizing "'that the real
7ZBiatory of Auosheag Strike, p. 166-
7iIbid.
75Ibid., pp. 174-5.
APPENDIX B
203
and permanent victory for the 48-hour work week is not to
be won in the offices of the textile.corporations but in the
legislative halls of the state house.*"76 Although the terms
were those which had been rejected in the preceding week,
the strikers accepted the recommendations of their strike
leaders. In this manner the strike, which had lasted more
than 9 months, was terminated.
The termination of the strike also involved the termination
of the welfare program. Even before the strike there must have
been a growing realization that the program did not pay.
It certainly failed to prevent the formation of a trade union.
There is even some doubt as to whether it achieved its more
restricted purpose of reducing labor turn-over. This cannot
be answered with finality, not only because of the abnormal
conditions created by the war but also because labor turn-over
figures do not exist for the period prior to the inauguration
of the welfare program. A report made in the last quarter
of 1915 by the employment department claimed that the organ¬
ization of its department had reduced labor turn-over but
made no mention whatever of the welfare program. All of the
evidence points to the existence of a high labor turn-over
(see appendix E)- Whether the turn-over would have been higher
without the welfare program cannot be determined. At, any rate,
tne results were not so striking that the company was willing
to continue the program after the strike.
For the period just passed in review, it is submitted once
more that in broad outline, at least, the effect of Amoskeag's
decline after the war boom upon its workers was similar to
that in other neighboring textile cities. This is suggested
not only by simultaneous changes in wage rates at Amoskeag
and at other mills in the region over these years but also
by reference to overt labor struggles that occurred at the
same time at Amoskeag and at the mills of a number of its
competitors in this area.
76Ibid., p. 176.
APPENDIX C
EMPLOYMENT CONDITIONS, 1923-32
The years 1922-23 represent more than an arbitrary benchmark
in time. Amoskeag's decline set in in earnest with the resump¬
tion of operations after the strike of 1922. Although the
downward movement in both production and employment is inter¬
rupted by short cyclical swings upward, each upswing ends at
a lower peak, with the exception of the preliquidation spurt,
and the downswings tend to exceed the upswings in amplitude.
This is characteristic of cyclical movements imposed upon a
secular decline. This pattern was particularly descriptive of
the cotton section but less apt for the worsted section, as is
disclosed by figure C-i.
Nor, as chapter III showed, did the financial showing differ
from the production and employment record. In this period
a profit from manufacturing operations was earned in only
3 years, 1923, 1927, and 1929. The combined profit in these
3 years was $3,500,000, while the loss in 1924 alone exceeded
$4,000,000. On this basis, too, the cotton section made
a poorer showing than the worsted section.
Many in Manchester have claimed that Amoskeag's subsequent
difficulties date from the 1922 strike because the company
could no longer command the loyalty of its workers. This po¬
sition seems hardly tenable. Amoskeag had experienced com¬
petitive difficulties many years before the strike, and the
difficulties had been postponed as well as intensified by the
abnormalities created by the war. Since there had been no
fundamental change in the structure of the industry during
these years, when peacetime operations were resumed the de¬
cline was also resumed. Even if there had not been a strike
in 1922, the course of subsequent events at Amoskeag in all
probability would therefore have been much the same as those
that actually came to pass.
It is obvious that the relations between the company and the
operatives were not improved by-the strike. What is even more
important is that this relationship was not the determining
204
Figure C-1. - CENTERED 12-MONTH MOVINO AVERAGES OF MAN-HOURS
WORKED AND NUMBERS OF PERSONS EMPLOYED,
BY SECTION, l»lt-M
ALL SECTIONS
COTTON SECTION
WORSTED SECTION
GENERAL SECTION
I 1 1
MAN-HOURS
EMPLOYEES
MAN-HOURS
EMPLOYEES
MAN-HOURS
EMPLOYEES
MAN-HOURS
EMPLOYEES
200
1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930
Based on an NRP tabulation of company
pay-roll records
1931 1932 1933 1934
W PA - National Research Project
L-R8
2,000
2,000
400
300
1,000
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
THOUSANDS OF MAN-HOURS
10,000
9,000
8,000
7,000
6,000
5,000
4,000
3,000
6,000
5,000
4,000
3,0 00
1,000
900
800
700
600
NUMBER OF
EMPLOYEES
10,000
9,000
8,000
7,000
206
SHOT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
factor in the post-strike developments. This should be abun¬
dantly clear from the account of the general and special manu¬
facturing problems that confronted Amoskeag during these years
as well as from the story of its financial policy.1 In this
appendix the main concern is to show how the operation of these
factors affected employment conditions.
It is shown in appendix B that when the company was faced
with adjustments in the depression of 1920-21, its main re¬
liance for cost reduction was upon increasing the work load
and lowering the wage rate. To be sure, attempts were made
to reduce the overhead costs per unit of output by lengthening
the workweek to 54 hours and by curtailing employment in the
machinery division by more than one-third. These latter
efforts by their very nature soon reached a nonextendable
limit, for New Hampshire public opinion would not permit an
increase in hours beyond 54 in any week, and some machinists
had to be retained to make necessary repairs. Accordingly,
when further adjustments were required, the management could
suggest only the continuance of the speed-up and wage cuts.
Such a policy, however, would defeat its own purpose if
it could not be executed without labor strife. Yet it was
painfully evident that the company welfare program did not
guarantee peaceable adjustments; nor could bona-fide trade
unionism in the company's view qualify as a suitable mechanism.
In these circumstances, Amoskeag followed a policy identical
with that of other companies that destroyed their war-born
trade unions at this time; it attempted to satisfy the workers'
demand for collective bargaining and to avoid overt conflicts
by establishing a company union.2
From the records resulting from the operation of the company
union it is possible to trace some of the effects of Amoskeag's
decline and gradual liquidation upon its workers. Although
this is our main interest in the company-union records, it
cannot be followed without revealing many details of the com¬
pany union in operation. Accordingly, this appendix involves
incidentally a partial analysis of this form of collective
bargaining. For this reason, it should be mentioned that the
1See chapters II and III.
2For a discussion of company unions at this time see Characteristics of Company
Onions, 1935 (U. S. Dept. Labor, Bur. Labor Statistics, Bull. No. 634, 1936).
Ch. II, "Developments After the War Period," pp. 19-28.
APPENDIX C
207
Amoskeag company union was not typical of many other company
unions in this period. It differed in that the workers dis¬
cussed fundamental problems, such as wage rates, in a forth¬
right manner. This was due in part to the fact that the more
militant members of the trade union, which had preceded it,
became active in the company union in order to reveal its
shortcomings. The activizing of company unions through the
participation of trade-union members was not widely encoun¬
tered until the NRA period.3
INCEPTION OP THE PLAN OP EEPKESENTATION
The circumstances surrounding the very inception of the Plan
of Representation provide some insight into the character of
the employment conditions in 1923. The company in its local
newspaper publicity tried to convey the impression that the
initial demand for the plan came from the operatives. Thus,
according to the Manchester Union-Leader (September 16, 1923):
On May 4th a committee of 48 met and discussed
a proposition which they felt might result in a
better understanding between the management and
its employees. Officials of the corporation were
consulted and as a direct result, a speaker of
prominence was brought to Manchester to present plans
of employee representation which are already in
successful operation.
Every member of the committee of 48 invited two
friends to attend the gathering. The subject ap¬
pealed to the operatives and immediate steps were
taken to adopt a similar plan for the Amoskeag.
In reality the committee of 48 was rounded up by the manage¬
ment, and the membership was composed of those operatives who
continued to work during the strike and those who were brought
in as strikebreakers. The management then arranged to form
an employees' convention made up of 244 delegates elected by
the operatives according to department.
Minutes begin with the initial meeting of this convention on
May 31, 1923. At this meeting it was proposed by the chairman
and accepted by the convention that it elect a committee of
12 to work in conjunction with an equal number representing
the management in drawing up a plan of representation of the
employees with the management. Even at these preliminary
sIbid., pp. 193-4.
208
SHUT-DOWN OP AMOSKEAG
sessions there was some evidence of dissatisfaction resulting
from the strike settlement. According to the minutes, the
following resolution was introduced:
. . . . to effectually have an organization for
the purposes of closer harmony between employer and
employees, it is fundamental that the replacement of
employees in the former positions be speedily made.
Resolved - that we recommend this action be taken
and this committee of twelve be empowered to carry
out its provisions.4
The convention voted that this resolution be laid on the
table until the next meeting, and no mention was made of
it thereafter.
By mid-July the committee of 12 reported the Plan of Rep¬
resentation to the delegates. It is difficult to understand
why the formulation of the plan required so much time, since,
with minor changes, it was the plan used by the International
Harvester Company. The delegates accepted the plan with one
amendment: "'A decision shall be given on all questions or
complaints within ten days from day said question or complaint
is received by the committee.'"e The amendment failed to gain
the management's acceptance, and the latter persuaded the
delegates to accept a more flexible substitute.6
Acceptance of the plan by the delegates did not necessarily
mean that it would have the approval of the majority of the
operatives in the referendum.7 Apparently the management
realized this and attempted to gain a sympathetic hearing
for the plan by having the chairman appoint a committee of
25 to go to the different departments to explain the plan
to the workers. This motion was lost, and the delegates
decided that they themselves would do the explaining in their
respective departments.0
The inadequacies of this procedure from the management's
viewpoint were soon evident, and within 3 weeks a meeting was
called to make other arrangements to "explain and address
Minutes of the Employees' Convention, June 7, 1922.
6Ibid., July 19, 1922.
a
Ibid., August 2, 1922. Subsequent developments amply Justified the delegates'
fear on this score. Thus at a meeting on July 7, 1926, It was recorded that
"questions were asked regarding the grievance that was sent in from No. 11 Cloth
Room about two years ago.»
7
To submit a company-union plan to the vote of the workers was an unusual pro¬
cedure. See Characteristics of Conpany Unions, 1035, pp. 93-8.
flMlnute8 of the Employees' Convention, August 2, 1923.
APPENDIX C
209
the workers on the workings of the plan, there being a lot of
misunderstanding and propaganda against the plan at present due
to one side of plan only being explained and misconstrued."9
Accordingly, the joint committee of 24 was empowered to select
a list of speakers to explain the plan to the workers. These
electioneers were put through at least two dress rehearsals
on how to speak to the workers.10 There were others, however,
competing for the workers' vote.
. . . . The United Textile Workers of America are
fighting the proposition and organizers of this
international union are urging their members to vote
"no." Meetings of the unions are being held weekly
for the purpose of strengthening the membership and
denouncing the plan.11
If this was the true alignment of the forces, the vote on
the plan was a victory for the United Textile Workers of
America. The cotton section repudiated the plan by a large
majority; only one of the five departments favored the plan.
In the worsted section the plan was rejected by a small ma¬
jority of the total workers, although the three smallest
among the four departments voted for acceptance. Each of
the four departments in the mechanical section, however, voted
in favor of the plan by large majorities, and the plan was
immediately put into operation in this section.12 These
workers had always been outside the jurisdiction of the UTW.
About a week after the election the company announced that
the cotton section, which had been operating only 4 days a week
since mid-July, was shut down indefinitely "on account of
business conditions." It would appear that some workers
regarded this as a punitive measure, for the convention of
delegates was convened in order to hear the agent "explain the
reasons for the shutdown to the representatives there being
a lot of foolish rumors and misunderstanding afloat."13 In
this connection it is interesting to note that at this early
9Ibid., August 23, 1923.
10Ibid., September 17 and 20, 1923.
11Manchester Union-Leader, September 19, 1923.
12The workers at Pacific Mills at this time came under the provisions of a
company-union plan, but It Is not known whether the plan had been submitted to
the vote of the workers. Pacific Mills' new plan of employee representation
provided the employees "with a means of expressing to the management their opinions
on all matters concerning their working conditions" and provided the management
"with a means of consulting with the employes on matters of mutual concern."
("Pacific Mills Plan of Employe Representation," Textile Vorld, Vol. LXIV, No. 13
[Sept. 29, 1923], p. 33.)
13Mlnutes of the Employees* convention, October 5. 1923.
210
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
date the loss of markets for ginghams was given as the main
reason for the shut-down.
This meeting also unanimously voted to allow the worsted
delegates to circulate a petition for a revote on the plan
and agreed to seek the management's consent to have the cotton
delegation remain intact in order to secure a revote. Ap¬
parently, the collection of signatures in the presence of
the overseers and the existence of part-time employment were
sufficient pressures to assure a favorable vote. At any rate,
on the second ballot on October 18 the worsted section ratified
the plan, as did the cotton section in the following January.
This, incidentally, was the technique used throughout the
history of the plan. That is, questions were resubmitted for
vote until a decision favorable to the management was secured.
It is clear from the manner of its inauguration that there
was no widespread sentiment for the company union and that
it was virtually forced upon the workers.
STRUCTURAL ORGANIZATION OP THE PLAN OP BEPRESENTATION
To appreciate the sort of record that would be provided by
the minutes of the company-union meetings, it is necessary to
have some familiarity with the formal purpose and structure of
the plan. The essence of any such plan is to create the sem¬
blance, with or without the reality, of democratic participa¬
tion of the employees in the management of labor relations.
Accordingly, the preamble to the Plan of Representation14
states that its purpose is
to give the Employees of the Company a voice in
regard to the conditions under which they work, and
to provide an orderly and expeditious procedure for
the prevention and adjustment of differences which
may arise This Representation of Employees
. . . . shall in no way abridge or conflict with
the right of Employees to belong to labor unions.
This voice, however, was to be well modulated since
the Committees to be established are for the purpose
of assisting the Management in making its decisions
with due regard to the point of view of the Em¬
ployees. When the policy of the Company as to any
of these matters has been settled, its execution
shall remain with the Management, but the manner of
14lssued by the company In bulletin form, with the rules adopted by the Oeneral
Joint Committee on Routine, Procedure, and Elections, April 1, 1924.
APPENDIX C
211
that execution may at any time be a aubject for the
consideration of the Joint Committees.
Moreover, Rule 19 stated:
A finding of any Joint Committee which is not
consistent with the established practices of the
Company, shall be interpreted only as a recommen¬
dation to the Management, and is not binding unless
approved by the Management.
Among the subjects proscribed for negotiations was shortage
of work. Rule 21 provided:
When there is not sufficient work in any department
to keep the entire force for the full working week,
it is a function of the Management to determine
whether the hours or the force should be reduced
or whether the work should be rotated.
It is the duty and right of the Overseer to make
the necessary changes in such a way as to maintain
the efficiency of the work and he will select for
transfer, lay-off or discharge such employees as he
may consider can best be spared from the job.
Every effort will be made to avoid hardship to the
individual and full consideration will be given to
length of service, private circumstances, etc., but
usually the determining factor must be the permanent
efficiency of the job as determined by those in
charge of the work. In case of reduction in force,
employees have the right to appeal to the Joint
Departmental Committee against the transfer, lay-off
or discharge.
There can be little doubt then that the plan was not calcu¬
lated to give any real power to the operatives. The semblance
of a grant of power was created by the hierarchy of committees,
mainly to handle grievances. All committees were originally
joint committees, meaning that the workers and the management
had equal representation, voice, and voting power in all
matters coming before the committee. The employee repre¬
sentatives (who had to be employed at Amoskeag) were elected
by all the workers, with unimportant exceptions, by secret
ballot, and the employer representatives were appointed by
the management.
The hierarchy in ascending order was composed of joint
departmental committees, joint sectional committees on ad¬
justment (one each in the cotton, worsted, and mechanical
sections), and three general joint committees: one on Routine,
Procedure, and Elections, one on Safety and Health, and one
212
SHUT-DOWN OP AMOSKEAG
on Production Methods and Economy. In addition, a general
joint council composed of representatives to the three joint
sectional committees could be called together at any time by
the management, or at the request of a majority of the employee
representatives on the joint sectional committees, to consider
matters of common interest to all employees of the plant.
In 1930 the general joint council was replaced by a general
employees' council. Provision was also made for the semiannual
meeting of all employee representatives in convention and for
a joint annual banquet. The Employees' Council came to be the
executive committee of the convention. Thus eventually the
plan combined both types of representation, joint committee and
employee committee.15 In accordance with usual company-union
practice of that period, the workers paid no dues and were
compensated for the time devoted to committee work.
In handling grievances, the employee representatives in each
department first referred the matter to the overseer. If the
plaintiff was not satisfied with the overseer's decision, the
plaintiff could ask that it be presented to the joint depart¬
mental committee. Pending the decision of any committee, the
employee had to abide by the instructions he was protesting;
otherwise his right to appeal was forfeited. From the joint
departmental committee, the matter went to the departmental
superintendent, from him to a joint sectional committee on
adjustment, and from there to the agent. The matter was
considered settled if a unanimous decision was given by any
of these committees. A question of a general wage reduction,
however, was laid before the Joint Convention of Employee
Representatives who could call for a referendum of all oper¬
atives. As the evidence will show, the management was not
bound to respect and, indeed, on occasion did not respect
the decisions of the convention or of the referenda.
The limitations of power were not the sole drawbacks to
genuine collective bargaining. Even within the restricted
framework the potentialities of the plan could not be realized
through a procedure of joint committees. The operatives
obviously are not free agents in the presence of their su¬
periors. It requires rare courage to oppose the management
15For a discussion of types or representation see Characteristics of Company
Unions, 1935, pp. 130-2.
APPENDIX C
213
when to do so exposes one, if not to loss of job, at least to
discrimination. It is reported, moreover, that the management
exploited this source of coercion. For example, the management
representatives on the various committees were not appointed
until the operatives had elected their representatives. By
this procedure the management could checkmate the employee
representatives by appointing their respective superiors to the
same committee. For this reason the frankest discussion took
place in the combined convention of all employee represent¬
atives. The plan, of course, gave verbal assurances of pro¬
tection to the operatives; thus the section on "Protection
of Representatives" stated:
The Management and the Employees expect that
each Representative will discharge his duties in an
independent manner without fear that his individual
relations with the Management may be affected in
the least degree by any actions taken by him in
good faith, in his Representative capacity. To
insure each Representative of his right to such
independent action, he may take the question of
whether his relations with the Management have been
adversely affected, on account of his acts in his
Representative capacity, direct to the Agent, and
if the decision of the Agent is not satisfactory
to him, then to have the question settled by an
arbitrator, selected by mutual agreement.
A summary tabulation of grievance cases that were docketed,
that is, came before a joint committee for adjustment, in¬
dicates its limited scope in this respect.16 Over the 9 years
during which the plan was in effect, there are records of only
200 docketed cases. Of this number, 77 cases (38.5 percent)
were decided in favor of the employees and 123 against them.
Table C-i, showing decisions classified according to nature of
complaint, is informative.
From the operatives' point of view, favorable decisions ex¬
ceeded the unfavorable ones only in the relatively unimportant
features of working conditions. Indeed, these accounted for
27 percent of all favorable decisions, while complaints of this
nature represented only 16.5 percent of the total of 200. Only
from one-fourth to one-third of the complaints involving in¬
dividual wage adjustments, alleged discrimination in discharges,
l®How many complaints were settled by the overseer upon presentation by an employee
representative cannot be determined.
214
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
lay-offs, or transfers, or increasing the work load were de¬
cided in the workers' favor- In the light of this, one wonders
whether it was insight into the real workings of the plan or
limited command of the language which caused the French-
Canadian secretary of the Joint Departmental Committee for
Picking and Carding to record in the minutes "that the complaint
be refer back for a better misunderstanding.1,17
Table C-1.- NUMBER OP DOCKETED COMPLAINTS, BT DECISION
AND NATOKE OP COMPLAINT4
Nature of complaint
Total
cases
Number decided -
For
employees
Against
employees
Total
Specific wage rates and hours
Discharges, lay-offs,
and transfers
Stretch-out
Other working conditions
200
77
123
87
49
31
33
32
16
8
21
55
33
23
12
Allocation of a decision In favor of or against employees was based on the
authors' understanding of the complaint and the nature of the ruling. All
complaints, 1928-32, are Included.
Impressive as was the record of decisions for the manage¬
ment, there were still other benefits that it derived from the
plan. Chief among these was securing general wage reductions
and increasing the work load with the minimum of friction
and sometimes even creating the guise of voluntary acceptance.
It is of interest for other reasons, however, to note the
discussion between the management and employee representatives
that centered about the proposals for wage reductions. Each
such proposal may be taken to represent a crisis in Amoskeag's
operations. From the management's remarks at these moments
it is possible to learn what it considered the reasons for
its decline, and from the discussions of the operatives may be
discerned the hopelessness of their position and their reasons
for increasing dissatisfaction and bitterness. All this must
be interpreted against the background of the earnings record
and financial changes.
17Under date of September 22, 1927.
APPENDIX C
215
THE PLAN IK OPEIATIOK
Wage Negotiations, 1923-14
In April 1923 Amoskeag followed the lead of other textile
mills in the region and raised wages by 12I percent.16 Earn¬
ings from manufacturing operations in the fiscal year ending
November 30, 1923, were fair, amounting to some $1,318,000, but
they were nevertheless too little by some $168,000 to meet
dividend disbursements. In the following fiscal year, however,
Amoskeag sustained a loss from manufacturing operations (before
dividend payments) of $4,100,000, the largest loss in 1 year
in its entire history. Dividends of more than $1,200,000
were paid nonetheless, although the usual 75-cent dividend on
common stock payable at the end of the year was omitted. The
pressure to reduce costs was clear. Increase of the work
load, colloquially referred to as "doubling up", had been going
on apace to judge by the remarks of the operatives. Apparently
this alone did not provide the requisite margins, and in
September 1924 the workers, through the Joint Convention of
Employee Representatives, were asked to accept a 20-percent
reduction in wages.
The chairman of the convention "callted] on each member
to give his opinion of the suggestion of Mr. Straw [the agent]
that the employees take a reduction in wages in order to stimu¬
late business and allow the company to compete with other mills
in other sections of the country."19 The representatives were
unanimous in their opposition to a 20-percent reduction. While
some were willing to accept a smaller reduction, most of them
felt that a reduction had already been imposed upon them
by virtue of the increase in their job assignments. That
this position was widely held can be seen from a sampling
of the representatives' remarks.
Loom fixers delegate asks that in view of the fact
that they have been given more work already, why
should they be asked to take a reduction in wages.
Spinning delegate states spinners absolutely
against a cut. Doubled up already.
Card room delegate states workers he represents are
cut already in the form of work being doubled on them;
therefore would refuse any more reduction in wages.
18»Wage Advances by Textile Mills," Textile World, Vol. LXIII, No. 13 (Mar. 31,
1923). P. 35.
i0Mlnutes of the joint Convention of Employee Representatives, September 16,- 1924.
216
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
No. 11 Weave delegate states they would consider
small cut if It is necessary, but would refuse to run
any more looms than at present.
Winders and Twisters delegate states they are
already doubled up on work and refuse to accept
a cut in wages.20
A few of the broader aspects of the proposal were grasped
by some of the representatives. For example:
Delegate [from mechanical section] asks how we
would look to the rest of the workers of New England
States if we accept a cut thereby setting a precedent
which would be followed by other mills who would also
reduce wages in order to compete with the Amoskeag,
the Amoskeag already having the advantage of 54 hour
work week.
Delegate requests that the 48 hour week be brought
into the question with a small cut.81
A delegate from the foundry department realized that the
acceptance of a reduction did not make for a stable situ¬
ation. He
asked if the company was honest with the workers in
view of a previous statement .... that if given a
54 hour working schedule, the company could compete
with any mill, and are now asking for a 20$ reduction
for same reason. Delegate also asked where and when
this cutting to compete with the South and cutting
to compete with the North was to end and what would
be done if in accepting this cut of 20$ the South
came back with another cut in order to compete with
the North and where we would get off.22
Despite open and widespread hostility, the convention voted
to accept a reduction of 5 percent. Upon notification by
a committee, Mr. Straw, the agent,
•
stated that 5% would be useless as it meant less than
g of a cent on a yard of cloth. Mr. Straw suggested
that [a] 20$ reduction would be necessary to get
the best results in the market [He] ex¬
plained that the condition of the market was such
that it was not advisable to produce cloth for future
Z0Ibid.
21Ii>ii. The campaign for the enactment of the 48-hour bill, after the ter¬
mination of the strike, had been unsuccessful. The bill had been passed by the
New Hampshire House but defeated by the Senate. (»N., H. House Passes 48-Hour
Bill," Textile l/or Id, Vol. LXIII, No. 7 [Feb. 17, 1923], p. 43.) In an article
entitled "Protests Against 48-Hour law," Textile Vorld, Vol. LXIII, No. 6 (Feb. 10,
1923), p. 18, It was noted that W. Parker Straw, agent of the Amoskeag Manu¬
facturing Company, had presented a case against the proposed 48-hour law before
the House Labor Committee of the New Hampshire Legislature.
Minutes of the Joint convention of Employee Representatives, September 16, 1924
APPENDIX C
217
orders [However] Mr. Straw would accept
the next offer as the final offer.1:3
The convention thereupon voted to accept a 10-percent re¬
duction, after having unanimously rejected the proposal for
a 15-percent cut. A member of the committee, notifying the
agent of this decision,
mentioned to Mr. Straw what a great thing it would
be to have 14,000 boosters for the company and told
him that if the workers were given a 48 hour week
he would have them boosters as that was their only
real grievance. Mr. Straw stated he could assure
nothing definite on the 48 hour question excepting
that probably something might be done around April
next year.24
Additional evidence of interest in this lost cause was the
motion made to inform the gubernatorial candidates in the
coming election on the position of the Amoskeag workers on
the 48-hour week. The motion, however, was withdrawn "on the
advice that we should not meddle in politics as a body from
here" - doubtless a cardinal principle of company unionism un¬
less the company union was to be a mouthpiece for management's
political views.
The 10-percent reduction, however, was not put into effect at
this time. At the end of October the agent again convened the
Joint Convention of Employee Representatives to explain that
the Company not having reduced prices of their goods
at their recent opening, owing to the rise in price
of raw cotton, .... wanted to be fair and square
with the workers and therefore did not put the
reduction in effect. Mr. Straw stated that at their
recent opening less than 1,000 cases of goods were
sold when it should have been 20,000 cases; our
competitors having gotten the orders owing to their
lower prices; and that since then, cancellations in
orders had been made so that, generally speaking,
the Company did not have an order on hand. He stated
that after talking the situation over with their
big customers and selling agents, it was decided
that the 10% reduction, coupled with the loss the
Company was willing to stand, would be of no use,
and that not another yard of cloth could be sold
at those prices. He stated that the Company is
not out to reduce wages but to get business and
that the 10% reduction if put into effect, coupled
23Ibid.i SeptemDer 17, 1924.
24Iiii.
218
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
with three-quarters of a million dollars which the
officials set as a limit of loss they are willing
to stand and still operate the mills, would not
reduce prices low enough to beat competitors and get
the business. This situation, he stated, had made it
wholly unwise to put the reduction in[to] effect; and
to be fair with the workers it was not put in[to] ef¬
fect. Mr. Straw stated that in order to break even
under present conditions, the expenses of the Company
would have to be reduced 335%, but that the Company
does not intend nor expect the workers to stand
all this reduction; the Company being willing to
stand part of it themselves. Mr. Straw stated he
thought that if the representatives had accepted the
20% reduction requested as being necessary at the
last Convention the mills would now be in reasonably
full operation, but that he does not criticize our
action as it was left to our own decision to settle
our destiny at that time; and that this present
2 fi
situation would be settled again by us.
The representatives, however, refused to be stampeded in¬
to further concessions and again offered to accept only a
10-percent reduction until April 1925 - and this after a
much-heated discussion which indicated that members of the
UTW had succeeded in having themselves elected company-union
representatives. Even the animosities of the Civil War days
were invoked.
A delegate stated that it was known all over the
country that Amoskeag goods were not union made, and
that owing to the strike they were being boycotted.
Stated that we should be allowed to join the unions,
get the union label on the goods and they would sell
and lift the boycott. This would beat the South
as they were before in 1861.
A noisy reception and cheering and shouts of
"eight hours" greeted the remarks of the delegate
above.26
Within a year of its inception, the elected representatives
were questioning the value of the plan. One delegate rose to
ask "what benefits we have gotten under the Plan of Rep¬
resentation; also that for co-operation,- so far we have
received a cut for our end of it and doubling up of work
but nothing in return."27 One delegate made so bold as to
request the resignation of the treasurer and active officer of
26I bid., October 28, 1924.
26Ibid.
27 Ibid.
APPENDIX C
219
Amoskeag, since "he is to blame for present conditions." Such
outspoken sentiments are not usually associated with company
unionism.
The agent accepted the decision of the convention but with
an expression of "sorrow for the action we had taken."
A week prior to the expiration of the agreement on April 1,
1925, the employee representatives again met in convention to
hear the agent on the state of the industry and of Amoskeag.
[He] stated that our past action of co-operating with
the management was commendable, and that unless we
wished to stop things immediately and bring disaster
to the present activity, it is necessary to keep
wages as they are at present .... for the next six
months. He was sorry that his message could not be
a happier one, but that he thought Manchester con¬
ditions were better than many places, and better and
busier times were coming.88
After losing a motion to restore wages to the level prior to
the 10-percent reduction of October 1924, the convention agreed
to a continuance of the cut for another 3 months. This,
the agent said,
could not be considered as the time it takes to get
orders, manufacture them, and deliver them was about
this length. That six months was short enough as it
is to allow the Company to do business. Nine months
would be better.89
The convention thereupon agreed to an extension of the
reduction for another 6 months.30
Better and busier times, however, were more than slow in
putting in an appearance. The trustees of Amoskeag, moreover,
seemingly disagreed with the agent since they believed that
the chances for the return of such times were very slim indeed
and acted on this assumption; for it was at this time that the
trustees and stockholders decided to segregate the cash assets
from the manufacturing assets by the organization of another
corporation. This was the first unequivocal evidence of
a deliberate policy of liquidation.
28Ibid., March 24, 1925.
S9Ibid.
30In the matter of this wage reduction Amoskeag was apparently the Initiator. Not
until July 1925 did the American woolen Company and other Lawrence and New England
woolens announce a 10-percent wage cut. "American Reduces Wages," Textile World,
Vol. LXVIII. No. 4 (July 25, 1925), P. 28.
220
SHUT-DOWN OP AMOSKEAG
Wage Negotiation!, 1 • 2 B-2 7
While the fact of reorganization was known to the Amoskeag
operatives, there is no evidence that they appreciated the
implications of the financial and corporate transactions.
No effort was made to explain the significance of the altered
situation when the agent appeared before the Joint Convention
of Employee Representatives on September 19, 1925. His re¬
marks were restricted to the state of the textile market,
and he suggested that there be "no further reduction in wages
and the agreement continue for another six months ending
April 1, 1926; and would advocate no reduction until all other
resources were exhausted." What was required was "individual
productivity and cooperation with the management in their
policy of putting the Amoskeag Manufacturing Company in the
front as a manufacturing concern - cooperation and enthusiasm
should be the keynote for the coming year." *
The convention acceded to the request of the agent but only
after rejecting by a small majority a motion to ask for the
restoration of the wage scale in effect prior to the 10-percent
cut. In the course of the discussion "one very interesting
point was raised: by the doubling up of work has the operative
received a larger cut than io%?"31 This query went unanswered.
The problem of individual productivity or "doubling up"
doubtless continued to receive attention, but there is much
evidence to indicate that there was no "cooperation or enthu¬
siasm", in large part owing to the frictions engendered by the
company's attempts to increase individual productivity. Time
studies were very often the basis for increasing the work load.
Accordingly, it seemed reasonable to the operatives that an
employee representative should accompany the management repre¬
sentative making time studies. After negotiations with the
management, which extended from October 1925 to August 1926,
this permission was refused, although the company expressed
itself as willing at any time to have a time study made at
the request of an employee representative.32
During these months there appears to have been a particular
lack of the kind of cooperation envisaged by the preamble to the
Plan of Representation. For example, it was reported to the
31Mlnutes of the joint Convention of Employee Representatives, September 21, 1925.
3£tllnutes of the Joint Sectional Committee of the Cotton Section, August 3, 1926.
APPENDIX C
221
Joint Sectional Committee of the Cotton Section that discrimi¬
nation was being carried on against employees who served as
employee representatives in two different departments.88
The adjustment procedure was so cumbersome that it also was a
source of dissatisfaction. Thus, after waiting 4 weeks for
action on a complaint, one weave room in January 1926 walked
out and another weave room stopped work - another unusual
occurrence under a company-union plan. The management settled
directly with the aggrieved weavers instead of referring
the matter to the appropriate committees provided for by
the plan. Two months later the employee representatives of the
cotton section adopted a resolution condemning both sides for
indulging in irregular procedures.84
The agent, committed against further wage reductions until
other possibilities of lowering costs had been exhausted,
apparently was permitted to explore only one possibility,
namely the speed-up. Presumably this possibility had not
yet been exhausted when the agent again met with the Joint
Convention of Employee Representatives 2 weeks prior to the
expiration of the 6 months' agreement. He remarked:
"These conditions cannot go on indefinitely and the
Company must get more goods at the present rate of
wages or reduce the cost of manufacturing. Every
employee must do a good day's work, - yes and a big
day's work. It is not from choice, but the grim
necessity of the moment that the employee has to do
more work. I cannot recommend the present wage scale
to the shareholders of this corporation. I would
advise that the present wage agreement continue until
Oct. 1, 1926."36
This further extension of 6 months was accepted by the con¬
vention with an amendment stating that "if conditions warrant
an increase and other concerns raise wages, the Amoskeag will
do likewise."
Relation of Special Difficulties to Profitable Operations.-
To reduce costs by modernization of equipment was precluded
by the action of the trustees. Thus the agent admitted to
this convention that "'the cotton section is developing some,
but not as much as I would like; as with modern machinery
33Ii>ii., December 1, 1925.
34Ibid., March 2, 1926.
3JVllnutes of the Joint convention of Employee Representatives, March 15, 1926.
222
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
we could do better-1" An order from the Ford Motor Company
was lost because we have not the machinery to make their
new line.'" Nonetheless, "'the trustees cannot recommend
the purchase of new machinery with conditions such as exist
today.'"3e
Serious as this handicap was, the company was to sustain
further impairment of its competitive position through the
deterioration of the existing plant resulting from additional
curtailment in the mechanical section. The agent reported:
"I have not a very bright word for the Mechanical
Section. The curtailment is most unfortunate. We
are simply going to get along without the things
we have always had. The physical condition of
the buildings and plant are [sic] the result of
the skilled help in keeping them so; and from now
on we are not going to do entirely what ought to
be done."®7
For this reason the weekly average number employed in the
mechanical and clerical occupations (general section) was
reduced from 1,022 in 1925 to 903 in 1926, with annual reduc¬
tions thereafter until 1932 when the average was 386.
A new development that added to the difficulties of operation
was mentioned for the first time at this convention. The agent
complained that the merchant '"waits until he really needs the
goods before ordering and we have to rush out the work. If
the goods are not delivered in time, the merchant cancels his
order.'"38 Six months later he observed that "styles change
too rapidly to sell in large quantities or to stock ahead."30
It was these correlative policies on the part of customers
that largely accounted for the intermittent operations. What
this meant in terms of employment and earnings is discussed
in appendix E.
In view of all this, "the company's intention to start
50 to 100 on staple ginghams to try and revive the market"
appears as a pathetic hope that a onetime winner in the past
would repeat its success.
Further Cost Reduction Through Speed-up and Vage Cuts.- On
reconsideration of the situation 6 months later the emphasis
S6Ibid.
37Ibid.
38 Ibid.
3SIbid., September 29, 1926.
APPENDIX C
223
was still on cost reduction through the speed-up and wage cuts.
Although the agent was willing to continue the same rate of
wages, he sought to obtain specific rate reductions through
a scheme of reservation rates, a system used in the shoe
factories of Haverhill, Massachusetts. In the agent's words:
"In case it develops, as it did some years or more
ago, that we have an opportunity to take a large
order at a price below that which we feel we can
afford to sell it for, I propose to state the facts
to the Joint Council [of Employee Representatives],
showing them the exact cost of production, and if
their consent is obtained, to put up to the people
interested the opportunity of producing that partic¬
ular order of goods at a price which will show this
Company no loss. It may involve a decrease in wages
on that special order, or an increase in produc¬
tivity, or a combination of both. If the proposition
is agreed to we will take the order; if it is not
agreed to by a majority of those affected, we will
not take the order."
. . . . The definite rejection of this proposal can
do no good: its acceptance, which to my mind is
already established by precedent, may at some time
be helpful.40
This proposal was twice rejected by the convention. After
voting to demand a 10-percent increase in the wage rate, the
convention extended the current wage scale for another 6 months
on the receipt of information from the agent "that his superi¬
ors would shut down the plant immediately if the 10% increase
was sustained."41
It is interesting to note that there is no longer any mention
of the 8-hour day. Apparently, this was definitely regarded
as a lost cause. That the physical condition of the plant and
equipment was still a problem may be inferred from the agent's
announcement to this convention that "he was preparing a paper
to submit to those higher up, that they were going too far in
economizing in this section "4£
It is little wonder then that Amoskeag, or at least its
cotton section, was still operating at a loss. In the calendar
year of 1926 the cotton section sustained an operating loss
of $2,900,000, while the worsted section earned a profit of
^From a letter from Mr. Straw (under date of September 28, 1926) to the chairman
of the joint Convention of Employee Representatives. Letter was Incorporated In
the minutes of a meeting of this group on September 29, 1926.
41Ibtd.
42Mlnutes of the Joint Convention of Employee Representatives, September 22, 1926.
224
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
$638,000. In this year dividends were not paid on even the
preferred shares. It should be remembered, however, that
the entire textile industry in this year was in the depression
phase of the cycle.
Although recovery was evident in the first few months of the
following year, nevertheless there was a noticeable stiffening
in the management's attitude. The theme remained unchanged:
"Every known economy must be instituted, and it will continue
to be the aim of the management to see that a high state of
individual productivity is maintained, and, when possible,
increased." Changes in specific rates were still sought, but
this time with a difference. The convention was bluntly
informed by the agent that such changes would be made instead
of the convention's being requested to agree to such an ar¬
rangement, which had been the procedure 6 months earlier-
The convention was notified by the agent that
. the management is not contemplating any
general change in the wage rates now in effect, but
it must be recognized as our right to make correc¬
tions where earnings are beyond their class basis,
or where economies can reasonably be made without
injustice to the individuals affected. Happily,
these instances are few, and affect few people.
On the other hand, where people are requested to do
a greater amount of work, additional compensation
will, in some instances where the facts warrant,
be paid. This policy is already in evidence in one
of our mills, if not in more.
"I have outlined to you briefly the general plan
of future operation. It is bound to Involve some
change of work, and in a few Instances, as I have
just said, changes in rates. It is for these rea¬
sons, and in order that there may be no possible
ground for accusation of bad faith on the part of the
management, that a general wage agreement, such as
we have had for the last few years, does not seem
advisable at this time. I suggest that action of any
kind be simply indefinitely postponed."*8
Since the operatives rightly interpreted this procedure as
a repudiation of the plan, the convention voted to have a
committee appointed "to wait on the Agent, inasmuch as they
do not recognize the convention to discontinue the Plan."44
The committee's instructions were later amended to those of
negotiating and referring back to the convention. The occasion
4SIbid., March 30. 1927.
UIbid.
APPENDIX C
225
was used to air their accumulated grievances before the agent.
The minor ones, such as the improvement of drinking-water
conditions, the agent promised to correct. He was also willing
to have the wage agreement continue. In view of these promises
the convention decided to "accept the conditions that exist
at present for another six months."46 This meant, of course,
that there would be specific wage changes. If there were
any operatives who regarded the plan as a genuine agency
for collective bargaining, they must have been completely
disillusioned by this episode. One representative to this
convention voiced a widespread suspicion in his remark that
the management must be getting something out of the plan
if it was willing to pay $200 per month to keep it in oper¬
ation.46 After this, negotiations took on a considerably
more acrimonious tone.
The Bond Issue and Another Wage Cut.- Before the expiration of
this agreement, the stockholders had authorized the trustees,
"' if they deem it wise, to liquidate in their discretion, the
whole, or any part, of the assets of your company, upon such
terms and conditions as they deem for the best interests of
the shareholders'" (chapter III). When the Amoskeag workers
or their representatives met in convention 1 week after the
above-mentioned meeting of the shareholders, they apparently
did not fully appreciate the authorization given to the trus¬
tees of the Amoskeag Company. The agent
spoke on the general condition of the textile in¬
dustry, especially the crisis that the Amoskeag
[Manufacturing] Co. was passing through at the pres¬
ent time, and congratulated the employees of the
Amoskeag for their earnest endeavor to help out the
situation by accepting additional work.
The process of liquidation was gone into by Mr.
Straw, and he ... . cited instances of New England
mills that had liquidated in the last year or so;
the Hamilton, Everett, Lyman and Somersworth
He mentioned Mr. Carrington's offer of 42 million
dollars for the stock of Amoskeag. Liquidating
of the Amoskeag Mills would be a severe blow to the
city of Manchester and the State of New Hampshire,
so something has to be done to keep these mills
running. The reduction of taxes by the city has
A5Ibid., April 13, 1927.
A6Ibid.
226
SHOT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
helped some, but not enough to pay the common stock¬
holders their dividends.47
The convention postponed action on the wage question for 6
months. Before adjournment, however, the chairman of the con¬
vention "gave a very able talk on the recent offer from outside
interests for the Amoskeag Plant" and moved "that we give the
trustees a vote of thanks and confidence for their action in
rejecting the Carrington offer." That the motion was unani¬
mously carried can be explained by the fact that apparently
neither the agent nor the chairman explained that the trustees
had been authorized to liquidate at their discretion.
The trustees deemed it wise to carry liquidation a step
further at once, and to this end $8,000,000 in cash was with¬
drawn from the manufacturing company and the equities rep¬
resented by preferred stock were exchanged for a creditors'
lien represented by 6-percent bonds (see chapter III).
The 10-percent wage cut announced on December 13, 1927,
though not a formal provision of the plan of reorganization,
was a very logical next step. Despite the agreement made
2 months earlier at a regular meeting of the Joint Convention
of Employee Representatives to shelve the wage question for
another 6 months and despite the fact that in the calendar year
1927 the cotton section earned $£143,919 and the worsted section
$862,906, the agent told a special meeting of the convention
that "a reduction in salaries and wages was imperative at
this time."40
The agent went on to explain:
"If the Amoskeag Manufacturing Company is to com¬
pete with other textile concerns the cost of manu¬
facture must be lowered Some months past, a
certain Mr. Carrington made an offer for the Amoskeag
Manufacturing Company which stirred up quite a cry
from the common stockholders to sell the plant.
A plan of reorganization was put into effect whereby
the common stockholders would receive $52.00 in
cash, a $40.00 0% bond and one share of stock in the
Amoskeag Manufacturing Company which is selling at
about $21.00.
"The Amoskeag finds itself today in the position
that it has a definite obligation to meet the inter¬
est charges on the 0% bonds which amount to $880,000
a year and this is the only way to satisfy the
shareholders, and not only that, if the interest is
A7Ibid., October 13, 1927.
40Ibid., December 13, 1927.
APPENDIX C
227
not paid to the bondholders they can recover the
amount of their bonds by having the plant sold."48
To ameliorate the effect of the wage reduction '"we are going
to reduce the rents in the corporation houses and hope that
others in the city will do the same.'"60 In his view, another
offsetting consideration was the speed-up. The agent '"pointed
out that weavers, spinners and card room help were earning
almost as much now as before the reduction in 1924. Weavers
98%, card room help 97.9%, spinners 95.6$.'"51 That is, since
there had been a general wage reduction of 10 percent in 1924,
this was tantamount to saying that the work load had been
increased by about 10 percent. Moreover, the agent promised
a continuation of the management's considerate policy in this
respect, although he was lost for an answer when a delegate
reminded him that even this questionable procedure did not help
those paid on an hourly rate. As to the speed-up, he remarked:
"I am glad that those people have got back so much,
but it is by working harder. The management has put
the work up so as to enable the operative to get so
much back. It is my definite opinion that in time to
come you will be able to gain more back than in the
last four years."52
One delegate observed that "'the 10 per cent reduction in
wages will pay the interest charges on the 6 per cent bond
issue.'" To this the agent only replied, "'It happens that is
so Because this point had already been made, the
agent, when asked by another delegate "if the 10% reduction
would be passed on to the buyers of Amoskeag goods", was forced
into the statement "that there is never any relationship
between reduction in wages and selling prices."53
The treasurer, however, gave a different view when he was
asked this question by the same delegate at the Fourth Annual
Convention in April 1928.
Mr. Dumaine went into considerable detail in
answering and explained the necessity of giving the
shareholders a part of the accumulated earnings in
order that the considerable surplus should cease to
become a target for Wall Street interests, explaining
that so long as the market value of the stock was so
much less than the net quick capital, the New York
i9Ibid.
50Ibid.
61Ibid.
5ZIbid.
53Ibid.
228
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
interests might gain control and force liquidation
at a profit to themselves. But, having distributed
the surplus to the shareholders, retaining only a
proper amount to run the business, it simply meant
that the company having issued bonds to that amount,
were only borrowing from the bondholders rather than
from the banks and on fully as satisfactory terms.
He maintained there was no connection between the
wage reduction and the interest on bonds issued.6*
The specious character of this explanation is apparent
from the above recital of events. Obviously, if the sole
consideration was to prevent control from falling to Wall
Street interests, this could have been prevented merely by the
purchase of stock sufficient to retain control. It did not
require redemption of the preferred shares. Moreover, bank
borrowings are usually used for circulating capital, and since
Mr. Dumaine saw to it that there was "a proper amount to
run the business", there should have been no necessity to
borrow from the banks. Aside from the fact that an adequate
amount of capital did not remain with the business, the money
borrowed from the bondholders was not used by the Amoskeag
Manufacturing Company but was turned over entirely to the
Amoskeag Company and the former owners of the Parkhill Company.
Thus Mr. Dumaine was plainly in error when he insisted that
costs of manufacture were not increased by the amount of
the interest on the bonds.
The management, however, was not to be deterred by embar¬
rassing questions from seeking the wage reduction. It was
evident that the reduction was to go into effect regardless
of the action of the convention. Nevertheless, the convention
voted to '"go on record at this time as being opposed to any
reduction in the wage rate and suggesting a curtailment of
production in line with other New England mills.1"56
Upon being notified, the agent repeated the management's po¬
sition: "'It did not matter what action this convention took;
the wage reduction would go into effect Dec. 24, 1927.'1,58
54Mlnutes of the Fourth Annual Convention, April 21, 1928.
66Hlnutes of the Joint convention of Employee Representatives, Deoemher 14, 1927.
56Ibid., December 15, 1927. It seems that Amoskeag again took the Initiative in
Imposing a wage reduction. At any rate, the Textile Vorld, Vol. LXXII, No. 25
(Dec. 17, 1927), p. 34, reported that New Bedford mill executives were against
any wage cut "either at the present time or in the near future If any
reduction .... takes place .... It will be owing to similar action having
been taken in other large centers " on April 14, 1928, the Textile Vorld
(Vol. LXXIII, No. 15, p. 44) noted that 27 New Bedford mills had announced a
10-percent wage cut (effective April 16), following reductions throughout the rest
of New England In the previous winter. This precipitated a strike which was not
settled until the following October.
APPENDIX C
220
The convention also reaffirmed its action of the previous day.
Again there was "considerable discussion relative to continuing
the Plan of Representation. Many delegates spoke for and
against [continuing] it."57
When it was pressed by a delegate at the Fourth Annual
Convention that "employees not having agreed to a reduction,
the management had no right under the plan to enforce it
. . . .Mr. Straw [the agent] stated he had no such conception
of the plan or the management's obligations under it. The
reduction was imperative He felt sure that in re¬
ducing wages 10% the plan had not been violated."58
Wage Negoti»tloDi, 1928-12
Chastened by the management's repudiation of the convention
in putting into effect the wage cut of December 1927, the
convention continued to see fit to respect the management's
request, that is, to postpone indefinitely any suggestion of
a wage agreement.59
Mr. Dumaine explained that the uncertainties of the market
precluded any agreement.
"If he [the questioner] were running the mills, would
he not want to know what the market was going to
be for the six months period in order that he might
be reasonably sure of disposing of his prodtict at
prices which would enable him to pay the wages? The
Treasurer stated he would not object to a six months
agreement if he could be sure the market would hold
and goods sold at a profit; but if after making an
agreement the market fell off, the mills would have
to stop or suffer serious losses in operation."60
This was the situation until December 1928. In the interim,
the operatives were restricted to protesting speed-ups among
the hand folders and the dressers and to correcting the abuses
of overtime employment at regular rates, with an agreement to
pay time and a half for clearly defined cases of overtime.
They also discussed with the mayor's committee the necessity
of reducing the high cost of living in Manchester.
That the high cost of living had become a real problem by
this time is indicated by a comparison of changes in the
57Mlnutes of the Joint convention of Employee Representatives, December 16, 1927.
58Mlnutes of the Fourth Annual Convention, April 21, 1928-
S9Mlnutes of the Joint Convention of Employee Representatives, April 3, 1928.
0OMlnutes of the Fourth Annual Convention, April 21, 1928.
230
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
cost-of-living index with changes in the index of actual annual
earnings at Amoskeag. As in the previous period, the cost-of-
living index for Boston is assumed to represent the relative
changes in the cost of living in Manchester. The index of
actual annual earnings is based on the median earnings of a
10-percent sample of Amoskeag workers who were employed in
a minimum of 26 weeks in a calendar year; that is, the compu¬
tation is based on those whose earnings very probably came only
from employment at Amoskeag. The comparison is -given in
table C-a. From 1933 through 1938 there was virtually no
change in the cost of living, but annual earnings of regular
Amoskeag workers in 1928 were more than 8 percent below 1923.
Tabic C-2.- INDEXES OP COST OF LIVING IN BOSTON
AND ANNUAL EABNINGS AT AMOSKEAG, 1928-34
(1928-100)
Year
Cost of living
in Bostona
Annual earnings
at Amoskeagb
1923
100
100
1924
100
n.a.
1925
102
n.a.
1926
105
n.a.
1927
103
n. a.
1928
102
92
1929
101
n. a.
1930
100
84
1931
91
80
1932
83
60
1933
79
62
1934
82
71
Computed from Handbook of Labor Statistics, 1936 Sdition (u. S. Dept. Labor, Bur.
Labor Statistics, Bull. No. 616, 1936), P. 82. Figure for 1923 represents an
unweighted average of figures for December 1922 and Marcb, June, September, and
December 1923! figure for 1924 represents a similar average for December 1923
and March, June, September, and December 1924} figures for 1926-34 represent
averages of figures for December of the preceding year and June and December
(November In the case of 1934) of the current year, the monthly figures being
weighted 1, 2, and 1, respectively.
bBased on median earnings from an NRP tabulation of a sample of company earnings
records. For each year, data Include only those workers who had some employment
In each of at least 26 weeks. The number of Individual earnings records upon
which the Index Is based varies from 691 In 1932 to 1,212 In 1923. Median earnings
In the base year were $876.
n.a. Data not available.
In the calendar year of 1928 the cotton section lost $407,000
before interest payments, and the worsted section earned
$140,000. After interest payments, the loss from both sections
APPENDIX C
231
was $1,136,000. In the latter part of the year, however,
there was evidence of increased activity. Moreover, the
settlement of the New Bedford strike in October resulted in
a 5-percent cut instead of the 10-percent reduction which had
been instituted 25 weeks earlier. Upon this announcement
the Fall River mills raised wages s| percent in order to
equalize wage rates with New Bedford.61 In view of these
developments, the employee representatives in their regular
convention on December 6 voted to petition the management
for a 55-percent increase in wages. The agent expressed
himself as appreciative of
the feeling and request that had been made and would
try to convince the delegates that their request
was untimely "It is true that there is
a healthy demand for our products, but the returns to
the company are not so favorable. Business is taken
today in small quantities for immediate delivery,
and that is the kind of orders that are [sic] on
our books today. The high cost of quick delivery
demanded by the trade was eating into the profits.
Short warps and the necessary mechanical changes
which take more time to get the goods out, more
looms had to be put in operation. Two thirds of
the looms in operation today are running cloth for
a 0
immediate delivery."0
After admitting that the Fall River and New Bedford mills
had no competitive advantage over Amoskeag, the agent went
on to say that
"what New Bedford or Fall River does is only an
indication of what we might do, but not an indication
of what we should do. I don't know that the people
of New Bedfqrd or Fall River will be quite as well
off in the next year."63
The agent's remarks apparently carried conviction since the
convention agreed that the wage question should be tabled
indefinitely.
Evidence of the continued worsening of conditions was the
resignation early in 1929 of W. P. Straw, the agent. This
resulted from a disagreement over the continuation of the
61See "New Bedford's 25-Week Strike Comes to End With 5% Wage Cut Compromise,"
Textile Vorld, Vol. LXXIV, No. 15 (Oct. 13, 1928), p. 47, and "Fall River Workers
Get 5#fc Wage Advance," ibid. See also Boston Sews Bureau, December 24, 1928, p. 1,
which attributed Amoskeag's Improved outlook to the facts that It operated at
this time on a 54-hour schedule compared with 48 In Massachusetts and that Its
operatives received 5 percent less In wages than textile workers In Massachusetts.
Minutes of the Joint Convention of Employee Representatives, December 8, 1928.
63Ibid., December 7, 1928.
232
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
policy of drastic curtailment. For three generations a member
of the Straw family had served as agent for Amoskeag. A mill
career in textiles had become a tradition, and it was the
violation of all that seemed sound in this tradition which led
to the withdrawal of the family from the Amoskeag operations.
The new agent was not a "textile" man.64 His training had been
that of an accountant.
After this occurred, more reliance was placed on individual
wage adjustments than on a general wage reduction, which was
not sought until September 1931. This was achieved by several
expedients. The obvious method was the increase in the job
assignment. Another method, already referred to, was compulsory
overtime at straight-time pay. Nine months after an agreement
had been entered into with the management to eliminate this
practice, it was used again. The abrogation of tnis agreement
stirred deep resentment among the operatives - to the point of
their voting for a referendum on the discontinuance of the
plan.66 The convention rescinded this decision when the manage¬
ment again agreed to adhere to the arrangements previously in
force.66 Within 2 months (June 1929). however, "the Cloth
Finishers reported a grievance in the South Division Bleach
House which was termed 'compulsory overtime' at straight time
pay among a certain few. It was moved and seconded that this
convention go on record as being opposed to such procedure",
but to no avail.67 From this point on there was a continual
whittling away of the agreement until it was openly repudiated
at the depth of the depression.
Another device, which merits a fuller description, was the
plan of reservation prices which the operatives had rejected
in September 1926. By this arrangement those employed in
producing a certain type of cloth would be paid at a reduced
rate in order to compete effectively for a given order. The
64«Mr. Borre: Mr. Rauch was not a man versed In operating the mills, was he?
I mean, he was a man who had been familiar with the booKs and then became secretary
of the corporation, but, so far as being a textile man, would you say he actually
Knew the operation of mills, or the Industrial part of mills?
"Mr. Dexter: I would say, before he was moved up to be agent here, he did not
know." See U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Investigation of Real Estate
Bondholders' Reorganizations, Public Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Select
Committee (Hon. Adolph J. Sabath, Chmn.), 74th Cong., 2d sess., Sept. 30 and
Oct. 1 and 2, 1936, Part 18, p. 67.
6SMlnutes of the Joint Convention of Employee Representatives, April 3, 1929.
66Ibid., April 8, 1929.
07Mlnutes of the cotton section, June 4, 1929.
APPENDIX C
230
gamble The order in to run until Sep¬
tember 15, 1931. Asks workers in Worsted Division to
accept a 10# reduction in wages to be applied any
way workers will choose amongst themselves, saying
he took order at a loss to maintain production in
worsted market.
Committee called representatives from all depart¬
ments involved and presented this to them. A vote
was taken and it was decided to approach workers and
ask their sentiment. A secret ballot was taken among
the help which decided 1653 against, 241 for.
The vote put a stop to wage cutting by this method for some
months.
Despite the extensive application of these wage reductions,
the onset of the great depression greatly accentuated Amoskeag's
decline. The largest loss of the depression was sustained in
the very first year, 1930. After payment of bond interest of
$790,000, the aggregate loss from both sections was $2,585,000.
Employment declined some 28 percent between 1929 and 1930,
from 21.3 to 15.4 million man-hours. In terms of average
weekly number employed the shrinkage was only slightly less.
There was a minor improvement in 1932.
A curtailment of this magnitude obviously created a relief
problem. As in many other localities, the municipality was not
in a position to cope with the situation, and the burden had
to be assumed by those workers who still had employment.
As early as November 1930 it was necessary to form the Amoskeag
Employees' Relief Committee, composed of three workers, the
paymaster, and the employment manager. The company agreed
to match every dollar collected from the workers. It under¬
estimated the generosity of the workers, however, and failed
to match more than the first $1,800. Contributions were so¬
licited from the first week in December 1930 to April 11, 1931.
during which time more than $7,800, including the company's
contribution, were received and expended.
The plan adopted by ... . [the] committee in
extending aid to the unemployed was to issue orders
to tradesmen, in all cases where possible favoring
the particular person or store where the recipient
was accustomed to trade. In no case was actual
gifts of money made. All business was done through
orders for groceries, fuel, and other necessary
supplies, the amounts ranging from 3 to 5 dollars at
one time.71
71Mlnutes of the Seventh Annual convention, April 18, 1931.
236
SHUT-DOWN OP AMOSKEAG
Aside from the collection of money, the workers insisted on
relief in the form of sharing the work, or "alternating"
according to local usage. Thus the weave rooms in two dif¬
ferent mills complained in November 1931 that the overseers
were not alternating on the work. The overseers defended
themselves by saying that "if they alternated on weavers and
fixers they would have a lot of seconds which they could not
check up on [since] one would be blaming the other. They had
tried this and percentage of seconds [had] increased."72
Nonetheless the operatives persisted, and at the meeting of the
cotton section the following month, in addition to "much
discussion and debate in regards to unrest among employees
in the yard", there was also much discussion on "the question
of alternating in the mills. Representatives thought the
alternating system was correct."73
Estopped from making specific wage cuts, the management
sought a general wage reduction of 10 percent in the fall
of 1931. The campaign was started by inviting the Employees'
Council, the executive committee of the convention, to lunch¬
eon with the Amoskeag officials, including the treasurer,
Mr. Dumaine. The latter "explained that losses of [the]
Company and competition force[d] him to ask the employees
to accept a 10% reduction all through the plant for a period
of six months. At the end of that time business then would
be discussed He would reduce rents in the Amoskeag
tenements the same percentage.1,74
Although the discrepancy between the indexes of cost of
living and annual earnings (table C-2) was less in 1931 than in
1930 because of the much larger decline in the cost of living,
nevertheless the difference indicated a reduction in real
wages of more than 10 percent from 1923. The reduction in
rental of Amoskeag tenements, however, could do little to
alleviate this condition since the tenements housed only
900 of the Amoskeag workers. It would mean also in the case
of the boarding houses a continued squeezing of the proprietors
despite the fact that the rental reduction would be passed on
to them as well. This appeared to be the situation according
72Mlnutes of the Joint Sectional committee for the cotton Section, November 4, 1931.
7ZIbii., December 7, 1931.
74Mlnutes of the Employees' Council, September 12, 1931.
APPENDIX C
237
to the findings of a joint committee organized to investigate
the boarding houses in September 1931. The committee reported:
• ... no unfair charges are being made for board
or rooms at the corporation houses. The board price
is now $5.00 per week and at some houses the price
for women is 50$ less. The price was formerly $5.50
and those houses which did not reduce the price at
the first 10% reduction in wages are making a similar
reduction now. The prices of furnished rooms range
from $1.25 per week to $3.50 depending on size,
location, furnishings and conveniences In
view of the expense of heat, light, general care
and overhead these prices, the committee feel,
are reasonable.75
Among the pertinent facts brought out at the hearing were the
following: The higher-priced rooms were always full, and the
cheaper rooms were the ones vacant; a loss of about 20 percent
was sustained owing to rooms being vacant; further losses were
sustained by persons leaving the city without paying for board
and room rent; and "many individuals .... [were] carried
over long periods of unemployment by the boarding houses."
Finally, it was brought out, and it was here that the squeezing
occurred, that the
keepers of the boarding houses .... [were] expend¬
ing in many instances from $100 to $300 on interior
repairs in order that their houses .... [might]
be in shape to attract and hold patronage; and the
occupants of these houses freely expressed their
views that they were more interested in the question
of reasonable repairs than in any reduction in the
rental price.76
Be this as it may, in presenting the wage reduction to the
convention the agent made the further stipulation that
"if during any year while such wage adjustments are
operative, the company shows a net profit, one-third
of such profit will be divided among the employees
in direct proportion to their earnings for that year.
It is understood that such distribution will be
impossible this year because of the losses sustained
in the eight months that have already passed."77
It was also indicated that this was an offer and not an ulti¬
matum, but subsequent actions belied this characterization.
75From a special report on prices for room and board In corporation boarding
bouses, by a subcommittee of the Joint convention of Employee Representatives,
September 24, 1931.
78Ibid.
77Mlnutes of the Joint Convention of Employee Representatives, September 14, 1931.
238
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
The convention voted to inform the operatives of the agent's
statement and to hold a referendum. The balloting was nearly
2 to 1 in favor of refusing the reduction: 1,708 voted "Yes"
and 3,127 voted "No." Notified of this result, the agent
addressed the convention as follows:
. ... he told them that he was impressed with the
"yes" vote but did not think the "no" vote was the
true sentiment of the people He did not
believe that the 6,000 workers in the Amoskeag would
want to see this concern go out of business, but if
that is the sentiment of the workers he is absolutely
helpless and there is nothing he can do but order the
running out of work.78
It was this statement that transformed the offer into an
ultimatum.
The convention then proceeded to ballot "on whether we will
go back to the worker for a reconsideration of the vote." This
motion was lost by a margin of two. The agent was "totally
surprised" and asserted "that there was nothing further to be
said"; "or would he compromise on the amount of the reduction.
On the following day the convention received petitions from
the operatives asking for a reconsideration of the previous
vote. The origin of the petitions was under suspicion.
Reports came to Council that some officials started
these petitions in their departments and that some
overseers were approaching their help and asking
them to reconsider their vote. A committee was
appointed to see Mr. Rauch [the agent] to have this
stopped if it is true. He answered that he would
give orders to stop it if anything like this is
going on but stated that overseers have the right to
talk to help that were being sent out as their work
was finished to tell them why and to answer questions
which their help might ask them.79
Regardless of their source, the petitions had the desired
effect not only of forcing the convention to authorize another
referendum of the workers but also to waive the requirement
that the reduction had to be accepted by a two-thirds majority
in order to take effect. This turned out to be a necessary
precaution since the vote was slightly less than a two-thirds
majority in favor of accepting the reduction.
76Ibid., September 15, 1931.
79Minutes of the Employees' Council, September 16, 1931.
APPENDIX C
230
The agent, informed of this result,
was very [much] pleased and expressed his thanks
to everyone and gave his word that he would do
all he could in return. On the strength of this
co-operation he would make repairs in various depart¬
ments which would better conditions. He will have
new clothing put on cards and Morell Rolls in worsted
department and will buy new C 4 K looms at a cost of
$30,000, a new humidifying system and new rails
in rayon department. This will be classed as new
work and will give mechanical department benefit
of more employment.00
These remarks by implication also serve to indicate a policy
of plant deterioration.
The workers were helpless in the face of a real threat of
a shut-down, particularly at a time of a general depression.
The most that they could suggest was to "call to the atten¬
tion of the management the employing of out-of-town help in
preference to local help, and that out-of-town help that
are now employed be discharged."81 There was considerable
justice in this complaint in view of the fact that the Amoskeag
workers had been paying for the relief of their unemployed
fellow workers.
This agreement, however, served in the main to generalize a
level of wages that had come into existence through a series of
individual agreements. The company wanted a still lower rate
and immediately prevailed upon those working on a print-cloth
order to accept an additional 10-percent reduction. Continued
curtailment during the last 3 months of the year, particularly
in the cotton section,82 obliged the agent to press for an
extension of the additional reduction to the entire cotton
section. According to the agent:
All through the country large readjustments are
being made in wages, particularly in the South where
most competition is from. Everything is being done
by the management to reduce cost and can see nothing
further which would help conditions and suggests that
labor on these materials be brought to a print cloth
basis of 10 and 10%.
According to agreement with employees, business
would be discussed about a month before the end
of agreement on April 1st, but stated there was no
60Ibid., September 17, 1931.
81Mlnutes of the Joint Convention of Employee Representatives, September ie, 1931.
82The average weekly man-hours In these 3 months In the cotton section was 158,000
compared with the annual weekly average In 1931 of 192,000.
240
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
need to wait until then as they knew already the
conditions they were faced with. If it was going
to be necessary to liquidate, he did not care to
contract business which would take several months
to fill.83
The Employees' Council nevertheless insisted on the main¬
tenance of its agreement which was not to expire until April 1,
1933* To safeguard against a recurrence of individual agree¬
ments with specific departments, they decided
that if any difference arises where additional work
or any cut in wages to a group of workers in any
department is proposed, the whole cotton convention
be called in. In discussion it was explained that
this may eliminate any case where work would be
offered to any department on conditions that had
been refused by some other group in another mill.84
This procedure was later invalidated on the ground that it
violated the constitution of the plan.
Throughout all these months the speed-up had continued to be
a major complaint. It had reached its highest development
when the weavers in a certain weave room were ordered to
leave their looms running during the noon hour. The management
justified this order on the ground that "it . . . . [was] the
method of production in many other plants, especially through
the South 1,05 This practice was eliminated, however,
as a result of the sustained protest of the weavers.
A month before the expiration of the wage agreement the
cotton section attempted to improve its bargaining position
by going on record for the restoration of the wage rate which
had existed prior to the last reduction on October 3, 1931.
This carried no weight with the management, for toward the end
of the month the agent proposed a complete readjustment "to
bring about a more equalized basis of wages."80 Since the re¬
adjustments involved reductions varying from 10 to 35 percent,
this was equalization but at a lower level.
The agent outlined three possible courses for the operatives:
1. Keep the new rate of wages.
2. Keep the present rate of wages and not take
orders, running out present orders.
83Minutes of the Employees' Council, January 10, 1932.
eiIbid., January 20, 1932.
66Ibid., September 26, 1031.
661 bid., March 25, 1932.
APPENDIX C
241
3. Post notices to the effect thet those who wanted
to work could do so at the new wage rate, but
that the management did not want any trouble with
the workers.®'
The convention called for a referendum on the new wage scale,
which was rejected by a 10 to 1 vote. Since the agent ordered
that "'you will go back to work at the rates you are now
on'",80 the second course was being pursued. Accordingly,
within a week curtailment was announced. In the week ending
April 8, the number employed in the cotton section was 3,674
compared with 4,081 in the preceding week and 3,088 in the
following week. Between April 1 and 15, employment was reduced
by 200 persons in both the worsted and mechanical sections.
Seniority was not to be observed not only because Amoskeag
never had had a seniority plan but also because "the help
retained would be governed by their efficiency in order to be
the most economical to the Company." To give the appearance
of finality, the operatives were not laid off, which was the
usual procedure in such circumstances, but were discharged.
As far as the agent "knew they were done permanently."89
In view of this genuine threat of a shut-down the council
asked for an appointment with Mr. Dumaine. The latter was not
particularly informative since he too "was working under
orders" but that
personally he thought that if this plant ever closed
completely, he doubted if it would be opened again.
If the losses of the Company could be reduced they
would be able to run a number of years at a small
loss. Our taxes and bond interest are the biggest
factors in our losses. If the market prices had
remained as last season, it would not have been
necessary to ask for this adjustment. The proposed
scale of wages were [sic] drawn up as the only rates
under which the Company could continue to operate
QO
under present conditions. u
Both the workers and the treasurer met with the committee of
the chamber of commerce in order to have the cost of living
reduced and to have pressure exerted on the municipal govern¬
ment to reduce taxes. It was soon apparent that this too
was a futile procedure. In the meantime "a petition was
87Mlnutes of the Joint Convention of Employee Representatives, March 29, 1932.
88Ibid., March 31, 1932.
89Mlnutes of the Employees' Council, April 4, 1932.
00Ibid.
242
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
being circulated and pressure brought on employees to sign
it [This] was taken up with the management ....
[which] agreed to warn overseers and second-hands against
this practice."91
The management refused to compromise on the extent of the
readjustment and insisted that the operatives "take a stand
one way or another whether we desired the mills to run or
close down "®8 According to the agent:
"Our assets are gone The new scale of
wages .... is the best arrangement during the
balance of the year. Our losses have been large and
we cannot afford to lose any more money
"You can continue to work for the wages that we
can pay. If this plant closes down, I don't know
where there is work to be had and there is no pos¬
sibility of getting new industry into the city. It
is not a question of bull-dozing you into taking
the reduction."93
Given the past actions of the trustees, it must be admitted,
all followed with relentless inevitability.
It thus remained for the convention to surrender once more
by ordering another referendum. This resulted in a majority
in favor of accepting the reduction, but the vote was still
some 500 short of a two-thirds majority. After much debate
this requirement was again waived, and the readjustment,
involving a reduction of from 10 to 25 percent, went into
effect on April 30 and was to remain in force for the remainder
of the year-
For the plan, however, it was the beginning of the end,
and very likely it would have been the end of Amoskeag as
well if it had not been temporarily rescued by the pre-NRA
boom in textiles. A scheme of readjustment in contrast to
a flat reduction entails extensive reclassification of jobs
and rates. In a plant as large as Amoskeag this was bound to
create dissatisfaction, particularly when the reclassifications
were downward and there was no adequate procedure for handling
grievances. This situation was aggravated by an improvement in
business conditions at a time when these grievances were acute,
which tended to make all the readjustments appear unnecessary.
91Mlnutes of the Joint convention of Employee Representatives, April 21, 1932.
ezIbid.
9ZIbid., April 22, 1932.
APPENDIX C
243
It served also to give rise to charges of discrimination over
the rehiring of those employees previously discharged. In
the last week in June 1933, less than 4,200 workers were
employed in all of Amoskeag= By the middle of August there
were 5,500 at work and at the end of September 6,000, with
a more gradual increase from then on to the end of the year
when 6,800 were employed.
At the end of August it was reported to the Employees'
Council that the "help in the No. 11 Mill are dissatisfied
and awaiting action on rates which they have filed their
objections to. Worsted help are also awaiting action on their
rates."94 The delays, moreover, were scarcely calculated to
promote harmonious relationships. That the opposite prevailed
is evident from the agent's remarks to the chairman of the
council:
[The agent] .... told him [the chairman] that he
wished to create a better feeling between the workers
and the management. He objects to harsh words and
manners at committee meetings.
[The chairman's] .... answer was that he felt
that it was up to Mr. Rauch's subordinates to help
create a better feeling and that there is much
dissatisfaction throughout the plant because of the
drastic reduction and unfairness of classification
which affects the wages since this reduction
There are many cases where adjustments should have
been made so the help could make what they were
supposed to make but they [the adjustments] have not
been made.95
It was also reported at this meeting (September 8)
that there are cases where help has been brought into
departments while help that belong there are still
out of work .... [although] at the time of the
reduction all departments were expected to close
and .... [the agent] agreed that all help would be
hired back as soon as there was work for them.
To aggravate the situation, the management ruled that "if a
person had been laid off he severed connection with the Company
and had no right to appeal to the [adjustment] committee.1,96
Thus the stage was prepared for a blacklist which was soon to
make its appearance.
94Mlnutes of the Employees' Council, August 30, 1932.
95Ibid., Septembers, 1932.
"ibid.
244
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
With the very perceptible improvement in business prospects,
"petitions have been received by the cotton committee from
several departments asking for the restoration of wages in
effect prior to the readjustment."97 The agent inferred from
these petitions that
the employees are not willing to co-operate with the
management any longer He stated that our
agreement was to the end of the year, and orders had
been taken on the expectancy that these rates would
continue to the end of the year
From all business indications he would not be
able to accept business if he felt that employees
were going to insist on the return to their former
schedule of wages. He has been wondering if these
petitions are any indication that this is the senti¬
ment of most of the yard.98
Apparently this was not the prevailing opinion since the
combined convention voted to stand by the agreement with
the management."
The grievances resulting from discriminations in reclassifi¬
cation and rehiring, however, remained outstanding even in
the final month of the agreement. Thus when the council
questioned the agent on
a blacklist which is said to exist, he stated that
in every place of employment there are certain people
who are undesirable and when they are discharged they
will not be rehired. The reason for them not being
rehired has nothing to do with the readjustment, but
refused to give any information as to who they might
be or reasons for being blacklisted. The opinion of
the Council is that such a person should be told why
they will not be rehired and be given a chance to
defend themselves 100
The treasurer upheld the position of the agent with the state¬
ment that "two things entered into each case. Efficiency came
first, and [that] some were undesirable and not wanted."101
It was clear that with the approach of negotiations over
a new wage agreement the plan would again be put to a crucial
test. This was anticipated by the treasurer himself when he
called the council's attention to the fact "that the Plan
of Employee Representation had cost the management $18,000.00
97 Ibid.., September 26, 1932.
96Ibid., September 28, 1982.
"Minutes of the Joint Convention of Employee Representatives, October 6, 1932.
100Mlnutes of the Employees' Council, December 6, 1832.
101Mlnutes of the Joint Convention of Employee Representatives, December 20, 1932.
APPENDIX C
245
in the last year", leaving the inference that it was not worth
it in view of the widespread hostility among the operatives
toward the management. However, in response to a question
from the council, the treasurer "stated he did not desire
to abolish or suspend the Plan of Representation.1,102
In this tense atmosphere the combined convention was informed
by the treasurer that
he was not here to request a reduction in wages,
but felt he could not keep going to the owners
of the mills with a request to keep the mills in
operation with an annual loss of a million dollars.
[He] .... stated that it would take a reduction
in wages throughout the plant of 25% to allow the
management to break even, but that that was up to
the workers themselves, the management having no
proposition to offer.103
The employees responded unanimously by voting to "request
the management to restore the wage scale in effect prior
to October 3, 1931." No immediate answer was forthcoming
owing to the illness of the agent. However, on December 30 the
following communication was received from the management:
"We will be unable to answer the Convention's resolu¬
tion of December 20th or present a definite wage plan
for 1933 until about January 15th.
"Until further notice the present wage scale will
be maintained."104
The wage plan was presented to the combined convention on
January 16 in a letter written by the agent. It is quoted
in full:
To the Combined Convention:
Plan of Representation:
On Saturday, December 17th a conference with your
Council was held as called for in the agreement
of last April ; the management attended and laid
before' the members an exact picture of the exist¬
ing situation.
At the Convention's meeting December 20th the
Council transmitted a report of the meeting.
The Convention's unanimous resolution evidences
utter disregard for a situation commonly conceded
to be the most serious ever known.
Having in mind every possible consequence, the
request is refused.
102lbid.
103Ifeid.
10iIbid., December 30, 1932.
246
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
Unfilled orders now on the books are priced on
a basis well below cost; new business offering is
priced on an even lower basis. Under these circum¬
stances it will be impossible to accept new business,
other than sufficient to run out unsold stock on
hand, until costs and market prices are equalized
assuring a new dollar for an old.
Prevailing wages will continue until current orders
are completed.
Opportunity will be given unemployed workers to
start idle machinery at rates justified by mar¬
ket prices.
Effective Saturday, January 21st, the present Over¬
time and Hours of Labor agreements will be cancelled.
Thereafter all overtime will be paid at straight
rates, except for necessary emergency repairs when
required to be performed upon Sundays or Holidays.
All overtime and Holiday work will be voluntary.
Amoskeag Manufacturing Co.
H. E. Rauch105
The management's position was further elaborated by the
agent in reply to questions asked by a negotiating committee
of the convention:
He would not continue present wage scale until
April 30, 1933.
It was his privilege to start idle machinery at
lower wage scales.
The Council, having [had] conditions explained to
them by Mr. Dumaine, should have prevented the
convention from adopting [the] wage resolution.
He would not discard the Plan of Representation,
and as to procedure, all committees had ripped
procedure to pieces.
He had the right to break agreements if he saw fit
without consulting anyone.106
In reply to this, the committee reminded the agent "of his
former statement of not wanting trouble and disturbances in
the mills but that he was now flirting with trouble."107
The seriousness with which the management regarded the
situation is indicated by its successful attempt to exercise
control over newspaper publicity. Because of this, as well
as because of "several complaints registered by the delegates
on the misleading and wrong accounts given on the radio ....
of actions taken by the Convention, .... the delegates
105Ifcid., January 16, 1933.
1O0Z6id., January 17, 1933.
107I6id.
APPENDIX C
247
felt a publicity committee should be appointed." But the
appointment of a committee was not the sole prerequisite
to securing full publicity. The committee soon learned
that the Union and Leader [the two daily English-
language newspapers in Manchester], could not print
the whole of the wage resolution answer due to the
fact that a promise had been given .... [to the
agent] not to publish certain parts at his request
the previous night.100
The French-language newspaper, L'Avenir national, however,
agreed to print the whole statement.
The delegates again realized that the plan was unable to
serve their interests and voted that unless the agent "sees fit
to change the ultimatum issued to us .... we [should] end
all negotiations with him, and serve ninety-days notice ....
for the dissolution of the Plan of Representation.1,109
On the following day (January a8) there was a final desperate
effort to compromise by "offering the management to go back
to [the] wage scale in effect prior to April 1932." This was
flatly refused by the management, and there remained only
to instruct "the employee members of the Committee on Routine,
Procedure, and Elections to take immediate steps to arrange for
a vote regarding discontinuing of Plan of Representation"110
and to accept another cut in wage rate.
The vote was 5 to 1 in favor of discontinuing the plan,
and little wonder when earnings had been reduced by 40 per¬
cent from 1923 and the cost of living by less than 20 percent
(table C-2). The onus would naturally be placed on the mech¬
anism for accomplishing this loss in real income and not on
the underlying causes.111
l0Blbid.
W0Ibid.
110Ibid., January 1$, 1933.
111Minutes of the Committee on Routine, Procedure, and Elections, April 20, 1933.
APPENDIX D
EMPLOYMENT CONDITIONS, 1933-35
The final phase of Amoskeag's decline was disguised asa boom.
It coincided with the pre-NRA upswing in textiles that was
sustained throughout much of the life of the National Industrial
Recovery Act. Why this should have resulted in the shut-down
has been explained in chapter III. Here it is proposed only
to show how the change in circumstances affected employment
conditions.
BEFORE THE NRA
Just at the time of the formal abrogation of the Plan of
Representation, the pre-NRA boom was gaining momentum. The
average weekly number on the pay roll in January 1933 was 6,988,
and with a gradual expansion, the weekly average reached 8,259
in June of the same year, an increase of 18 percent. This
increase occurred chiefly in the cotton section. Even this
understates the extent of the upturn, for the percentage in¬
crease in the weekly average of man-hours over the same period
was 28- The return of more prosperous conditions doubtlessly
favored the organizing activities among Amoskeag workers by the
representatives of the United Textile Workers of America.
Trend Toward Union O'ltnlutioi
As a result of the abandonment of the Plan of Representation
there was no medium for the airing of grievances at a time when
grievances were many. The new wage cut created additional
dissatisfactions on top of those that had never been satisfied
from the previous wage reduction. Blacklisting continued. For
example, the chairman of the combined convention for several
years preceding the termination of the plan, a man -most forth¬
right in expressing his views, was laid off when the plan was
discontinued. Despite the rehiring of upwards of 1,000 persons,
he was unable to secure employment for about 6 months, and then
it was in the cotton section rather than in the worsted section
where he had been previously employed. Workers were imported
from outside of Manchester when Manchester residents were
248
APPENDIX D
249
refused employment. As a general source of discontent there
existed a condition of low wages and part-time employment
described in appendix E.
There was still another consideration that facilitated
organization. Prior tothe strike of 1922 each of the 10 crafts
had had its own organization with its own meeting place, and
coordination had been sought by a council. Under the plan the
operatives learned that most problems affected all the workers
in the mill yard regardless of craft and could be discussed
most effectively in a combined convention. Accordingly, the
operatives were receptive to the idea of forming a similar
organization under the direction of a group independent of the
management. Moreover, those who had been active in the union
prior to the strike of 1922 had maintained a close contact with
a large number of the operatives by becoming active in the
company union. Thus the chairman of the combined convention
and the chairman of the Employees' Council were active union
people and had entered into the plan with the idea of getting
control and disclosing its shortcomings.
After several months of organizing, the union decided to test
its strength in the latter part of May 1933. The immediate oc¬
casion was a dispute over wages. A notice had been posted that
the mills would close from May 26 to July 31 to all employees
who did not wish to continue on the existing wage scale.
At the same time there was an announcement of a 15-percent
increase in wages to become effective on July 29, but the
operatives wanted the raise to be retroactive to February
when a cut had been taken. The company argued that the orders
then being turned out under the prevailing wage rate would not
be finished until July 29 and that it was impossible to give
the raise sooner if it was to fulfill its contracts. This was
not acceptable to the union, and after several departments had
walked out, the Amoskeag closed down on May 19. The textile
operatives were doubtless encouraged in this step by the
3,000 shoe workers in Manchester who had been out on strike
for almost 2 months seeking wage adjustments.
The Amoskeag treasurer placed much of the blame on the city
government which had asked Amoskeag to add to its pay rolls
in order to reduce relief costs. It was claimed that for this
reason the Amoskeag pay roll had been increased by 6,500 during
250
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
the winter and that to give raises would necessitate laying off
many of the operatives.1 This, however, is flatly contradicted
by the company's own pay-roll records. These show that early
in November 193a the number employed was 6,068. Small weekly
additions to the pay roll brought the number to 7,075, an
increase of 1,000, by January 20, 1933. From this point there
was a gradual decline in the number employed, reaching the low
point of 5,723 on March 3. A subsequent rise brought the
number to 7,728 on May 19, the date of the strike. Thus from
the March low there had been an addition of only 2,000 compared
with the alleged 6,500.
By May 23 there were serious disorders. The militia was
called out - a precaution that had not been necessary in the
prolonged strike of 1922. On the following day 50 arrests were
made. Twoscore were reported hurt by mob violence, and much
damage was done to property. The disturbances were short-lived
as a result of a successful conference on May 25 of mill
officials, the mayor, the Governor, a union organizer, and the
Catholic Bishop of Manchester. By the terms agreed upon at
this conference Amoskeag was to grant the 15-percent increase
in wage rate at once and to reopen the mills on May 31. The
strikers voted 3 to 1 to accept the offer, and the militia
was withdrawn.
The union won more than an advancement of the effective
date of the wage-rate increase; it also won recognition from
the management, the right to be represented by a business
agent, and the establishment of shop committees to handle
grievances. The check-off of dues and a closed shop, however,
were not obtained, but a qualified form of seniority in lay¬
offs was accepted by the company. Six weeks later, with the
promulgation of the textile codes under the National Industrial
Recovery Act, which guaranteed the rights of collective bar¬
gaining, the union was well entrenched but unfortunately not
in a position fully to control its membership.
THE NBA AT AMOSKEAG
The company anticipated some of the provisions of the textile
codes by announcing on June 23 a new policy of two 8-hour
shifts with an $11.00 minimum wage. On July 17 the provisions
1 Manchester Leader, my 20, 1933.
APPENDIX D
201
of the Cotton Textile Code became operative, establishing
a 40-hour week with wages to equal the amount earned in the
54-hour week. Another provision was a minimum wage of $13.00,
with exemptions for cleaners, sweepers, and learners. In the
following week the Worsted Code was also in force with similar
provisions and a $14.00 minimum.
Whether it was in spite of or because of the codes, the
volume of production at Amoskeag continued to rise in both the
cotton and worsted sections through the second half of 1933.
The volume of production in the worsted section, however, de¬
clined through most of 1934. Production in the cotton section,
despite the national textile strike in September, slightly
exceeded the poundage manufactured in the previous year.
Because of the shortening of the workweek the number employed
increased at a greater rate. Thus the average weekly number
employed in the cotton section in 1933 was 38 percent larger
than the average in 1932, and in 1934. the average exceeded the
1933 average by 33.5 percent. In the worsted section the 1933
average was some 33 percent larger than the average of the
preceding year, but in 1934 there was a decline of 14.2 percent
from the 1933 average. Those employed at maintenance work,
machinery repairing, and clerical tasks (comprising the general
section) also gradually expanded in number from 540 in July
1933 to a high point of slightly over 800 in November 1934-
Chapter III showed that the financial record, for the most
part, was not in keeping with the upturn registered by the
production and employment figures. The cotton section, for
example, showed an operating profit of only about $60,000
before its share of the interest payments in 1933* The worsted
section, on the other hand, had an operating profit of more
than $400,000 after the payment of some $233,000 in bond
interest. In 1934 this gave way to an operating loss of
about $70,000 before interest payments because of the decline
in production, while in the cotton section the loss before
interest payments was upwards of three-quarters of a million
dollars despite the fact that the 1933 level of production
had been sustained.
It has been explained also that this result was counter to
expectations since the general effect of the Cotton Textile
Code was to narrow the wage differential between the southern
252
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
and New England mills, much to the competitive advantage
of the latter. Under such circumstances a rising volume of
business would be expected to yield some profits, as was the
case in the worsted section in 1933 before the decline in
volume of business in 1934. The effect of the code wage
rates at Amoskeag, however, was quite the contrary. This can
Table D-1.- COMPARISON OF AVERAGE HOURLY WAGE RATES
FOR SPECIFIED OCCUPATIONS IN COTTON-TEXTILE
MANUFACTURING IN AMOSKEAG. NEW ENGLAND,
AND SODTBERN MILLS, 1924-88®
Occupation
and mill
Average hourly wage rate (dollars)
Percentage
increase,
July 1933-
August 1933
1924
1926
1926
1930®
1932
July
1933
August
1933
Weavers'
Amoskeag
0.464
0.423
0.374
0.351
0.318
0.277
0.478
72.6
New England
.512
.447
.432
.444
.342
.289
.432
49.5
South
.336
.315
.324
.334
.261
.226
.391
73.0
Spinners
Amoskeag
.369
.350
.330
.331
n. a .
.192
.362
88.5
New England
.425
.370
.359
.349
.277
.236
.373
58.1
South
.234
.222
.228
.225
.185
. 162
.322
98.8
Doffers
Amoskeag
.414
.379
.361
.351
n.a.
.234
.420
79.5
New England
.453
.399
.393
.386
.316
.270
.417
54.4
South
.284
.274
.280
.287
.235
.196
.345
7«.0
Spooler tenders
Amoskeag
.400
.369
.310
.315
n. a.
.160
.350
118.8
New England
.390
.318
.307
.292
.252
.223
.364
63.2
South
.221
.206
.209
.227
.188
. 161
.327
103.1
Warpers
Amoskeag
.442
.417
.382
.374
n.a.
.203
.377
85. 7
New England
.443
.404
.377
.360
.298
.284
.392
38.0
South
.298
.273
.271
.266
.229
.194
.290
49.5
Slasher tenders
Amoskeag
.634
.538
.501
.522
n.a.
(c)
(c)
-
New England
.647
.539
.512
.497
.431
(c )
(c)
-
South
.334
.317
.323
.324
.279
(c)
(c )
-
Drawers-in
Amoskeag
.394
.332
.307
.282
n.a.
.192
.362
88.5
New England
.445
.423
.403
.406
.320
.336
.436
29.8
South
.281
.277
.297
.298
.240
.230
.383
66.5
'Figures for New England and the South were adapted froa A, F, Hlnrlchs, •Historical Review of Wage
Rates and Wage Differentials In the Cotton-Teitlle Industry,■ Monthly Labor levlew. Vol, *0, No. 5
(May 1936}, p. 1171. Amoskeag wage rates for the specified occupations were adapted from a company
record complied weekly of the hourly wage rates earned by each occupation In each mill for the
given week. The computed figure for an occupation Is an average of these weekly entries in all
mills without the application of any weights, since the number employed at a given occupation
In a specified mill on a certain date Is not knewn.
"in this year the Amoskeag rate is the average computed from entries for January through April,
'slasher tenders included under •Weavers1 in 1933.
n.a. Data not available.
APPENDIX D
203
be shown by a comparison of average hourly wage rates for
important specified occupations in cotton-textile manufacturing
at Amoskeag, New England, and southern mills for the period
1924-33. This comparison is set forth in table D-i.
The limitations of any such comparison (see table D-i, foot¬
note a) should be apparent. It is improbable that occupations
called by the same name in different regions refer to exactly
the same tasks, and it is the task that largely conditions the
rate. For broad comparisons, however, the dataseem serviceable.
One such comparison discloses that from 1924 to the great
depression the average hourly wage rates received by weavers,
spinners, doffers, slasher tenders (dresser tenders), and
drawers-in at Amoskeag were considerably below the average
rates paid in these occupations throughout New England but
considerably above the comparable rates in the South. With
respect to the two remaining important occupations, spooler
tenders and warpers, the respective average Amoskeag rates
were as high as or higher than the prevailing averages in
New England and, of course, much higher than those in the
South. Doubtless the wage differential between Amoskeag
and the rest of New England, in favor of the former, ac¬
counted for the fact that Amoskeag's decline in this period
was less rapid than the decline of textiles in the New England
region generally.
It is equally clear that the downward pressure on hourly
wage rates during the depression years was more severe at
Amoskeag than was generally the case in the industry, either
in the North or the South (table D-2). Whereas in 1924 the wage
rates in the South for each of the seven occupations were
lower than the respective Amoskeag rates by percentages that
varied from 28 to 47, by July 1933, immediately preceding
the NRA code, the rates for spooler tenders were equal, the
drawers-in received 20 percent more in the South than at
Amoskeag, and in the four other occupations the southern
rates were only from 4 to 18 percent less than the comparable
Amoskeag rates. On the other hand, the differentials between
Amoskeag and other New England mills were widened in each
occupation with the exception of the weavers, a department
that accounts for about half the total direct labor that enters
into the manufacture of cloth.
254
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
T»bl« D-8.- RELATIVE AVERAGE HOURLY WAGE RATES FOR SPECIFIED
OCCUPATIONS IN COTTON-TEXTILE MANUFACTURING IN
AMOSKEAG. NEW ENGLAND, AND SOUTHERN MILLS,
1 924 , JULY 1 988 , AND AUGUST I 9 8 3a
(Amoiketi rate«=10O)
Occupation
1924
July
Au gus t
and mill
1933
1933
Weavers'5
Amoskeag
100. 0
100.0
100.0
New England
110.3
104.3
90.5
South
72.4
81.6
81.8
Spinners
Amoskeag
100.0
100.0
100.0
New England
115. 2
122.9
103.0
South
83.4
84.4
88.9
Doffers
Amoskeag
100.0
100.0
100.0
New England
109. 4
115.4
99. 3
South
68.6
83.8
82.1
Spooler tenders
Amoskeag
100.0
100.0
100.0
New England
97.5
139.4
104.0
South
55.3
100.0
93.4
Warpers
Amoskeag
100.0
100.0
100.0
New England
100.0
139.9
104.0
South
67. 4
95.6
76.9
Slasher tenders
Amoskeag
100.0
(b)
(b)
New England
102. 1
(b)
(b)
South
52. 7
(b)
(b)
Drawers-in
Amoskeag
100.0
100.0
100.0
New England
112.9
175.0
120.4
South
71. 3
119.8
105.8
aBased on table D-i.
b31asher tenders included under "Weavers" in 1933.
It follows from this that the hourly rates under the code
bad the effect not only of greatly narrowing the differentials
between Amoskeag and other New England mills - perhaps even
beyond those which existed in 1924 - but also of widening
APPENDIX D
255
somewhat the differentials between Amoskeag and the southern
mills, to the competitive disadvantage of the former. This
may beseenfrom tables D-i and D-a, where the NRA differentials
for weavers and doffers were recorded as the same as the
pre-NRA differentials, but those for spooler tenders, warpers,
and drawers-in were widened and the differential for spinners
was somewhat diminished. This goes far to explain why despite
the decided increase in the volume of production in Amoskeag's
cotton section it was unable to show an operating profit while
under the NRA code.
The differentials serve also to explain in part the source
of the labor difficulties during this period. The speed-up
reappeared as a major grievance since the payment of wage
rates that had been increased on the average (unweighted) by
87 percent made a reduction in per-unit costs imperative,
and the only feasible method was to increase the work load,
particularly since the installation of new machinery, except
for replacement purposes, was precluded by a code provision.
Another complaint was the wage-rate increase itself. As
sizable as the wage-rate increases were, nevertheless many
of the operatives claimed that other New England mills were
paying higher rates - a comparison made possible by affiliation
with a national labor organization - and therefore pressed
for higher wages at Amoskeag since the code provided for rates
equal to those paid by competitors.
The most numerous grievances, however, had no relationship
to the wage rates. They concerned the application or non-
application of the seniority ruling to lay-offs and discharges.
Seniority was defined as
that quality which is applied to workers accord¬
ing to the number of years that they have been
employed [that is,] in time of slackness
in a department, the oldest person employed from
the point of service has the preference of employ¬
ment providing that that person is conversant and
qualified to do the work that remains in operation.2
Since the overseer remained the judge of competence, the
occasions for protest were numerous. From this it appears that
the types of grievances did not differ greatly from those that
existed while the Plan of Representation was in operation.
2From letter concerning UTW adjustments in company flies.
256
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
As early as August 1933 many departments, believing that
they had received less than they were entitled to under the
code, notified the management that they were dissatisfied with
the rates. They threatened stoppages if their demands were
not satisfied. The management pointed out to the aggrieved
operatives that a pay increase under the code would be given
only upon their demonstration that they were receiving less
than the wages paid for comparable work at competing mills.
Accordingly, on October 10 the slasher tenders, for instance,
submitted data on wages paid in their occupation at neigh¬
boring mills in Maine, Vermont, and Massachusetts and in
Nashua, New Hampshire. Two weeks later,when the slasher
tenders submitted a definite proposition, the management
produced evidence showing that at least seven mills in the
North paid less than Amoskeag for this job.
It was not until early November, however, that a final
decision was made by the management on all wage increases.
The broad terms of the code provided an easy escape. After
mentioning that negotiations had extended over 2 months,
the report went on to make the point that
the bulk of Amoskeag competition comes from Southern
mills. Your committee has presented figures showing
slasher tending rates of certain New England mills
higher than present Amoskeag rates; we have presented
figures showing as many New England mills about the
same or lower than present Amoskeag rates. Only a
very small percentage of our product is competitive
with the New England mills listed in either of
above groups.
Our production consists largely of ginghams, hand¬
kerchiefs, tickings, outing flannels, chambrays,
towelings, and print cloths. With the exception of
print cloths, there isn't a mill of any consequence
left in New England producing fabrics classified
under the above groups. We are obliged to sell our
products at exactly the same price basis as our
Southern competitors, and our costs must be held as
closely in line with the South as possible.
We have secured average wages of slasher tenders
[say] from a group of competitive Southern mills,
and their rate today averages 39.16d per hour, equal
to $15.06 per week. This is five or six dollars
per week under the present Amoskeag wage.
Further increases in rates at this time, widening
the existing differentials between North and South,
APPENDIX D
257
will decrease production, employment and total
payroll payments at Amoskeag.
All that the management could suggest was that
under the provisions of the Cotton Textile Code,
all mills are obliged to furnish the Cotton Textile
Institute with their minimum, maximum and average
rates per hour on all principal operations. Up to
this time we have been unsuccessful in obtaining
Consolidated reports of these wage figures for either
the Northern or Southern sections of the industry.
[We] would therefore suggest that the influence
of your organization be used with the National
Recovery Administration in Washington to have these
Consolidated reports made up and distributed to
members of the industry as well as recognized labor
organizations within the industry. We are sure such
a report would show a much greater spread between
wages by operations, North and South, than the dollar
differential provided for in the Code.4
Here the matter rested for several months until it was turned
over to the National Industrial Relations Board for cotton
textiles. Though the board in May granted increases of 5 to
10 percent in certain classifications, a strike was called
which lasted for 3 days.5
A somewhat different conclusion attended a series of stretch¬
out complaints, as illustrated by what befell the weavers,
battery hands, and room girls in the Bag Mill weaving depart¬
ment. On March 29, 1934, the weavers and ancillary workers
in this department stopped all looms in order to enforce an
adjustment in the work load. Although the management usually
refused to negotiate while machinery was stopped, nevertheless
in this instance the management did not insist on resumption
of work before entering negotiations.
On April 2 the management met with the committee in order
to learn the specific character of the grievances. Two days
later the committee was convened to hear the management's
answer which pointed out that
our agreement with the United Textile Workers of
America provides that:
"Wages and tasks shall in general be based upon
standards maintained by other comparable mills except
3Report made by the management to the slasher tenders, November 6, 1933 (UTW
grievance flies).
416 id.
5"Amoskeag Strike Status," Textile Vorld, Vol. 84. No. 6 (May 1934), P. 124.
258
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
for differences specified in the Textile Industry-
Codes as finally adopted by the Government."
This provision states the limits to which the Company
can go and continue in business.
With the exception of one adjustment sought, the manage¬
ment "regrets we are obliged to decline your requests." The
statement went on to say, however, that
whether our understanding as to tasks in other
comparable mills is correct is a question we are
ready and willing to submit to arbitration.
We are ready to join you or your representatives
in submitting this controversy to the Cotton Tex¬
tile National Industrial Relations Board [of which
Dr. Bruere is chairman] and to co-operate to the
fullest possible extent in bringing about as quick
a decision as possible.®
Upon the rejection of the committee's demands, the business
agent of the union immediately arranged for a meeting with
Dr. Bruere who was then in Manchester.
The meeting with Dr. Bruere and a group of aggrieved em¬
ployees at union headquarters resulted in a promise by the
operatives that they would continue at work pending further
discussion of their case. But on the following day (April 5)
the operatives who had not attended the meeting of the previous
day refused to start their work, with the result that all
operatives in that department went home as soon as they had
been informed of the management's statement. It was only by
the very determined effort of the executive board of the
Textile Council that a complete yard walk-out was prevented.
The impasse was resolved on the following morning on the
terms formulated by the union. Operations in the Bag Mill were
to start up on this day for a 10-day period on the condition
that the tasks on all jobs in the Bag Mill would be studied
by three persons, one each appointed by the employer, the
employees, and the National Industrial Relations Board. A week
later the preliminary findings of the engineer calling for some
reduction in the work load were submitted to the company and
the union and were accepted by both.
This case, taking more than 2 weeks for settlement and
involving a stoppage of work, was really expeditiously handled
®From reply made by the management to the grievance committee of the Bag Mill
(UTW grievance files).
APPENDIX D
259
as compared, for instance, with the speed-up complaints of
the Jefferson Mill weaving department, which were originated in
early October 1933 and did not reach the arbitrator until
the following March.
One other case is worth presenting. It indicates that
Amoskeag attempted to follow the example of many other manu¬
facturers who made increased use of learners since the latter
were exempted from the minimum-wages provision of the code.
Thus the slasher tenders notified the management that at
a meeting on November ai they
voted to request .... [the] Management to remove
all learners from front of machines and place them
in rear of machines for at least six months, learning
in rear with the slasher helper.
Our reasons for requesting this change is that it
has been the custom in the slashing department, up
until the month of October, 1934, that all learners
have been placed at rear of machine. We contend that
any learner coming in slashing department should be
placed on rear of machine with helper to first learn
the fundamental parts of machines and work
Practically every helper is qualified to help in¬
struct a new hand to first learn slashing, instead
of placing a new hand that knows nothing about
slashing in the front with a slasher who has at the
present time all he can do to operate what machines
he has to operate at present.7
The management made concessions at once. The learners were
to be returned to the rear of the machines under the helper's
supervision. It was also agreed that helpers should be given
preference in learning slashing when they qualified.
Apparently the slasher tenders were no longer satisfied
with the concessions they had requested and pressed for the
dismissal of all slashers who had been learning for less than
6 months. The company rejected the demand and explained that
it had been able to increase employment from the low point
of 4,019 in 1932 to the then present level of 10,631 by virtue
of its plan
to steadily increase its production until the volume
allowed the Company to take orders at market price
and insure steady work for its employees. This
entailed the constant training of new hands to take
care of the increased volume.
7From request of the Slasher Tenders' Special Committee to the management,
November 28, 1934 (UTW grievance files).
260
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
This plan was suddenly interrupted when the slasher
tenders made a demand that all learners on the
slashers who have been learning less than 6 months
be immediately discharged.
The Company could not see its way clear to accede
to this demand without interrupting a program that
increases employment in Manchester and reduces cost
for the Company.
As the slasher tenders left their work it was
necessary to close down machinery which put 7500
people out of work.8
A few days later a compromise was entered into that stopped
short of dismissal of learners.
Another instance of the same type was registered by the
battery hands in the Jefferson Mill case mentioned above.
They claimed
that they get a learner put on with battery hand
and then when learner is taught properly they take
the learner off and leave the battery hand alone.
There is the hindrance of teaching and then no relief
after they have taught the learner; believe that
after learner has been taught, learner should be
put to work to relieve their task.8
How this was finally settled is not indicated.
These labor difficulties were not unique with Amoskeag.
Grievances of this character were widely prevalent throughout
the industry and provided the basis for the national textile
strike in September 1934. The demands were formulated by the
national office of the UTW and included (1) a 30-hour week with
the same wages as a 40-hour week; (2) application of the wage
differentials to semiskilled, skilled, and highly skilled
workers; and (3) reduction in the work load.
Though the Amoskeag operatives were apathetic to a gen¬
eral strike at this time, they answered the strike call on
September 4. The local labor leader insisted that the strike
was not against Amoskeag but against all textile companies.
As the company did not attempt to operate, picketing was
unnecessary and no violence occurred. After 3 weeks of idle¬
ness the strike was called off, and the workers returned
without any change in working conditions. It very probably
also had little effect on Amoskeag's competitive position since
it in effect replaced the usual summer shut-down.
Statement made by the management, November 28, 1884 (UTW grievance flies).
0From UTW grievance files (February 26, 1934).
APPENDIX D
261
The labor problems already enumerated, however, were not
in themselves the cardinal problem in the field of labor
relations either from the point of view of the management
or the responsible trade-union leaders. This problem was
the frequent stoppages of the machinery, referred to locally
as "Chinese strikes" or "sit-downs" several years before
the latter expression was incorporated into the national
vocabulary. They began as early as August 1933 and extended
through most of 1934. The initiating causes varied from
forcing a member to pay back dues to exerting pressure for
a readjustment of the work load. In any case, the stoppages
were in violation of the bylaws of the union's constitution,
which provided for a two-thirds vote of all the operatives
and the sanction of the national council before machinery
could be stopped. In April 1934 when a number of cases were
in the process of arbitration, the president of the local
had to issue a request to all members "to be patient and not
participate in any stoppage of work."
The causes underlying this behavior were doubtless many.
It may have been in part a reaction to the pent-up aggravation
that had accumulated over a period of 9 years under the plan.
The interminable delays in settling disputes were a probable
contributing factor. It is likely, too, that there existed
among the active operatives a naive interpretation of the labor
guarantees of the National Industrial Recovery Act. That some
of the business agents of the union were lacking in judgment
or a full sense of responsibility also seems clear.
On the other hand, there is evidence indicating that the
employment department engaged in espionage activities and had
hired certain workers to fraternize with those active in trade-
union affairs. A representative of the employment department
made a survey of families occupying company tenements in the
late fall of 1935. In his concluding report he urged that
hereafter the privilege of renting a company tenement should
be denied to "noncooperative" tenants, those "who have proven
themselves detrimental to the policies of the Company and a
menace to the neighborhood by their constant abuse of neighbors
who do not agree with them on working conditions, agitators,
and active members of the textile organization." To support
his point, the noncooperative activity of each of 28 tenants
262
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
was described. The following are sample descriptions, with
names deleted;
Mr. A can always be found in the midst of the
agitators. Talks loud but his bark is worse than his
bite. Has always been connected with ring-leaders
of the union.
Mr. B is a very excitable fellow who never misses
a meeting of the Loomfixers and when any trouble is
on, Mr. B is not far away.
Mr. C is very active in union affairs - will be
a candidate for business agent of Local 86-A if an
election occurs.
Mr. D is prominent in Loomfixers Union - was
prominent in the Loomfixers' Worsted Organization
in 1912 when the Fixers were allied with the National
Textile Union. Never misses attending the meetings.
For a number of years Mr. D was tame and at times
useful. Since May 1934 he has got back to his
oldtime form.
Mr. E is active union worker, chairman of trans¬
portation when any outside work is going on such
as arranging for flying squadrons.
Miss F occupies the tenement alone. She has
participated in the flying squadrons. Can always be
found doing picket duty when there is trouble and she
is one of the very few women now attending meetings
of Local 80-A. She is the constant companion of
Mr- X whose rating is undesirable.
Mr- G's name does not get into the reports of
union activities but I am reliably informed he is
forever nursing some complaint and foments trouble
without showing his hand.
It is apparent from a confidential memorandum in the files
of the personnel office that the management was thinking of
breaking off relations with the UTW toward the end of 1934
because of the frequency of the "Chinese strikes." With
this in view the treasurer sought the advice of the Amoskeag
personnel office. The observations that follow are excerpts
from this memorandum written by the personnel office under the
date of December 14, 1934.
The personnel office posed the question: "Can the leaders
control certain groups of workers when they are making demands
or requests that cannot be granted?" The answer given was that
"past experience has proven that they cannot and by not having
the control necessary, the experiment of our association with
the U.T.W. has been costly."
APPENDIX D
263
The question then became: "If we wer<- to cease negotiations
with the regularly elected officers of the local union and
negotiate with individuals or groups representing our employees,
would we be any better off?"
The subsequent discussion developed the point that
we [the management] will have to negotiate through
some arrangement. If it is decided to continue as at
present, the advantage is the privilege of calling
into any controversy the negotiating committee
comprised of persons representing various groups in
the mills. The influence and advice they might offer
may be the means of adjusting a group dispute when it
would not be possible for the group affected and the
management to arrive at a solution. If we were to
say that commencing in 1935 we are agreeable to
meeting any employee or group of employees on matters
concerning working conditions, and cease our nego¬
tiations as of present practice, I believe that we
would be starting the year on the wrong foot. There
is no denying but that immediately the loom fixers
who have a separate charter, the wool sorters who
also have a separate charter, and the dressers who
are seeking a separate charter, would insist on
having recognized a committee to negotiate with the
management. The section men and card fixers would
also group. The same may be said of the cloth
finishers, dye house hands, spinners, weavers, and
all along the line. Most any one of the above
mentioned could tie up the plant, if they wished.
This is unfortunate, nevertheless it is so. You
would have the skilled workers remaining with the
U.T.W., and instead of centralizing a medium of
settling disputes it would cause a scattering of the
workers into so many group organizations, each one
depending on themselves, that it would be far more
difficult to reach adjustments than it is at the
present time.
This, incidentally, is an acknowledgment of the advantages of
industrial unionism to the management.
Although the personnel office was satisfied that
70 percent of the employees in the mills would prefer
no organization, being content to work out their
own destinies, .... 70 percent can be compelled
through fear, criticism and persecution to fall
in line with the minority. Therefore, having no
knowledge of what the Federal Government may have
in mind as to the future of the laborer and employer
and knowing that the Company will have to deal with
some form of organized workers under present laws,
I believe we can make as much progress and be as
264
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
sure of uninterrupted production under the U.T.W.
as we can if we would sever our relations and cause
all sorts of groups to contend without any executive
agency to make decisions or rulings.
To improve relations within this framework, the personnel
office suggested that "more friendly relations be established
between the overseer and his employees as well as contacts by
the personnel man, which will have a tendency to bring about
a better understanding and at least should be the means of
preventing a petty matter to grow to the size where it is
beyond control."
Another suggestion was "to make contacts in our city with
the proper persons, keeping them informed as to our labor and
trade problems and in this way make missionary workers for
the interests of the Company and its employees and the general
good of the whole community."
The concluding note of the memorandum stated that "[there is
no] substitute we can make to improve conditions as regards to
labor until such time as a sufficient number of the employees
in the various groups will, of their own volition, offer or
request the Company to sit in with them and devise some plan
that both can profitably, peacefully, and continuously work
under."
The occasion for this memorandum, as well as the memorandum
itself, indicates that the trustees had not yet decided to
close down the mills in order to force a reorganization or
liquidation. It was not until April 1935, as related in
chapter III, when difficulties were encountered in the renewal
of bank loans, that the decision was taken to process inven¬
tories on hand and close down the mills. By September only
about 1,000 workers remained on the pay roll, and in December a
petition for reorganization was filed in the bankruptcy court.
It is somewhat ironical that the best working conditions
enjoyed by the Amoskeag workers in a decade and a half should
have been in the last year or so of the company's existence.
APPENDIX E
EFFECT OF AMOSKEAG'S DECLINE ON EMPLOYMENT,
EARNINGS, AND MIGRATION
The forces operating at Amoskeag made for short cyclical
movements imposed upon a declining secular trend.1 Within a
given year therewere rather extreme month-to-month fluctuations
that were lacking in regularity of occurrence and hence did not
trace out a seasonal pattern. Rather it was a manifestation
of intermittent operations, which were affected, of course, by
the phases of the cycles (see figures 3 and E-i). It is this
degree of intermittent employment that can best be measured
by available statistics, and it is this which most effectively
reveals the effect of Amoskeag's decline on the character of
employment and on earnings.
EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT
The agent's explanation for intermittent operations was
noted in appendix C. Because of the growing importance of the
style factor it was too risky to manufacture for inventory.
For the same reason, customers did not place large orders far
in advance of delivery but resorted with increasing frequency
to a policy of hand-to-mouth buying. This resulted in the
bunching of orders for immediate delivery with the obvious
concomitant of intermittent operations.
Some idea of the degree of intermittent employment may be
had from a distribution of the actual periods of employment
and no employment in certain years.2 Before examining this
distribution, it is well to review the general character
of employment in each of the specified years.
From previous discussion it is clear that in 1923, the
initial year for which employment data are analyzed, Amoskeag's
cotton section was in a depressed condition, particularly
during the latter part of the year, but the worsted section
1The declining secular trend during these years was confined chiefly to the
cotton section.
2Unless otherwise specified, measures of employment and unemployment used in this
appendix are based on the sample of Income-tax records (for description see ap¬
pendix G). Workers were excluded for years In which their first accession or final
separation occurred.
265
266
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
operated at a fairly high and even rate. The year 1928, the
next in the series, was for both sections one of depression,
intervening between the upswings of 1927 and 1929, although the
cotton section was not so hard hit as in 1923. With the onset
of the general business depression in 1930, operations in both
sections went to lower levels; they improved considerably in
the following year, only to give way to a new trough in 1932.
1933> even before the inception of the NRA, recovery had
begun in both sections. It was sustained in the cotton section
throughout most of 1934, but in the worsted section a definite
recession in activities occurred in that year.
It should be noted that this analysis presents weeks of some
Amoskeag employment and weeks of no Amoskeag employment. No
distinction is made between part-time and full-time employment
and no allowance for the possibilities, which appeared to be
limited, of employment other than with Amoskeag.
A relative distribution of periods of employment in weeks
for the period 1923-34 is presented in table E-i. There were
differences between men and women and between the cotton and
worsted sections. Women tended to have a larger percentage
of shorter periods of employment, and both men and women tended
to have shorter periods in the years of recession than in
the years of revival. The difference between the sections
was largely due to the differences in the timing of their
respective cyclical movements.
It is rather striking that about one-fifth of the employment
periods of the men in the cotton section were only 1 to 4 weeks
in duration, while one-quarter to one-third of the periods
of work for the women were in the main of this very short
duration. Equally eloquent of the intermittent character
of employment is the fact that one-half of the employment
periods of the men in the 3 depression years were only from
1 to 12 weeks in duration; in 2 of the other years, from 1 to
16 weeks; and in 1928, from 1 to 20 weeks. For the women
in the 3 depression years, half the employment periods were
between 1 and 8 weeks, and, in the 3 years of upswing, between
1 and 12 weeks long.
To the same effect, for both men and women in the cotton
section, is the relatively negligible number of employment
periods that were as long as 37 to 52 weeks, In only one
APPENDIX E
267
T»bl« E- 1. - PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF PERIODS OF EMPLOYMENT,
BY LENGTH OF PERIOD AND SEX OF WORKERS, IN THE COTTON
AND WORSTED SECTIONS, lttl-14*
Yeer
and
sex
Total
Total
Percentage distribution of periods
weeks)
workera
perloda
Total
1-4
1
a
3
4
5-8
9-12
13-16
17-20
21-24
25-36
37-48
49-52
Cotton
section
1823
Men
Women
449
483
1,375
1,532
100.0
100.0
18.2
23.2
4.3
8.7
4.8
8.2
3.1
5.7
6.0
4.6
24.7
27.3
24.9
24. 4
5.2
6.1
3.6
3.9
3.9
3.4
18.2
12.6
0.8
0.1
0.5
0
1828
Men
Women
352
357
834
957
100.0
100.0
19.3
25.3
6.5
6.6
4.5
5.7
3.5
4.6
4.6
6.4
12.7
15.8
7.4
12.9
5.9
9.2
24.7
18.7
2. 9
3.6
22.7
12. 1
1.4
0.8
3.0
1.6
1930
Men
Women
303
287
747
827
100.0
100.0
23.4
32.9
7.4
10.2
6.1
11.2
5.9
5.8
4.0
5.7
18. 5
20.4
12.8
12.1
14.6
9.7
7.1
6.2
3.8
3.7
11.5
7.8
3. 9
2.0
6.8
4.6
1931
Men
Women
301
275
792
809
100.0
100.0
21.8
30.3
8.3
9.0
7.2
10.6
3.8
5.1
2.3
5.6
14.7
18.2
8.6
11.7
25.0
17.7
3.7
3.6
4.0
5.2
19.7
14.1
0.2
1.0
2.5
0.2
1932
Men
Women
283
259
885
873
100.0
100.0
31.9
43.4
8.3
14.0
10.4
13.7
7.2
9.2
6.0
6. 5
13. 5
17.8
7. 9
8.8
11.9
11.7
18.7
13.2
5.9
3. 1
9.0
3.7
0.3
0.2
0.9
0.3
1934
Men
Women
411
351
1,087
1.071
100.0
100.0
18. 1
28.6
4.9
6.9
4.4
7.8
4.8
7.6
4.0
4.3
13.6
15.2
6.4
9.2
28.1
23.5
2.1
3.7
2.3
3.1
26.6
16.7
0
0
0.8
0
Worsted
section
1923
Men
Women
130
205
322
540
100.0
100.0
11.5
16.6
3.7
4.8
3.1
4.1
2.5
4.6
2.2
3.1
8.1
15.0
6,5
13.7
8.4
9.6
32.3
20.4
2.8
5.6
29.8
19.1
0
0
0.6
0
1928
Men
Women
128
195
323
521
100.0
100.0
18.9
23.6
5.9
6.3
4.8
7.3
2.2
5.0
8.2
5.0
6.8
11. 1
6.5
9.0
5.0
8.0
33.7
24.4
1.8
4.8
22.9
17.9
0.9
0
3.7
1.2
1830
Men
Women
107
192
280
539
100.0
100.0
30.7
33.2
11.4
8.3
5.7
9.1
6.1
7.6
7.5
8.2
18.2
22.8
10. 0
10.0
12.5
9.3
4.7
4.5
3.6
4.7
6.8
7.4
3.9
5.9
9.6
2.2
1831
Men
Women
101
180
218
481
100.0
100.0
24.8
28.2
11.0
11.5
6.0
5.9
6.0
6.5
1.0
4.3
14.7
14.5
6.9
11.3
9.2
10.4
4.1
5.9
4.1
3.5
15.1
11.9
8.7
0.5
12.4
4.8
1932
Men
Women
103
184
364
863
100.0
100.0
34.0
58.2
11.5
31.5
11.3
11.4
7.4
10. 9
3.8
4.4
17.6
13. 1
15.4
10.2
7.7
3.8
10.2
4.8
1.1
1.8
10.2
4.2
0. 5
1.0
3.3
2.3
1934
Men
Women
128
213
375
085
100.0
100.0
30.7
44.8
9.1
28.8
8.8
6.1
9.6
8.1
3.2
3.8
12.0
16.6
12.5
8.6
22.9
15.1
2.9
4.2
3.2
1.5
15.5
9.2
0
0
0.3
0
Wd on ao NRP tabulation of a rawl. of coapaw lnco«-tai r.corde. urato of period la tba nuaoer of consecutive aeeka In •hlcO
the worker bad eome employment.
instance, for men in 1930, did the cases exceed 10 percent,
and in only one other instance, for women in 1930, did they
exceed 5 percent.
Very much the same situation obtained in the worsted section,
though here a somewhat larger percentage of the periods was
of the longest duration, 37 to 52 weeks. However, instances
of such long employment periods still did not account for
a large number.
268
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
Tabls E-2. - PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OP PERIODS OP NO EMPLOYMENT,
BY LENGTH OP PERIOD AND SEX OP WORKERS, IN THE COTTON
AND WORSTED SECTIONS, 10!l-S4a
Year
and
sex
Total
Total
Percentage distribution of periods (weeks)
workers
periods
Total
1
2
3
4
5-8
9-12
13-24
25-51
Cotton
section
1923
Men
Women
449
46 3
1
1
103
309
100.0
100.0
14. 2
16. 2
33. 1
31. 9
6. 3
6. 3
3.6
4.2
24. 6
21.8
6.0
8. 4
7.8
6. 4
4. 4
4.8
1928
Men
Women
352
357
590
758
100.0
100.0
23. 4
29. 4
38. 7
30. 3
3.9
6. 5
4. 2
4. 6
10. 9
7. 7
3. 2
4. 1
8. 1
8. 6
7.6
8.8
1930
Men
Women
303
287
564
725
100. 0
100.0
40. 5
35. 7
15,6
14. 3
5. 5
7. 2
2.3
6.2
10.6
12. 1
6.0
7. 2
9.2
8. 7
10. 3
8.6
1931
Men
Women
301
275
658
787
100.0
100.0
54. 1
16. 4
10.0
10.6
3. 8
6.0
4. 7
5. 2
8.8
14. 6
6.1
10.9
7. 2
23. 5
5.3
12. B
19 32
Men
Women
283
259
748
779
100.0
100.0
31. 3
31. 4
13. 6
12. 4
20. 3
16. 6
5.7
5. 4
10. 3
11. 3
5.9
6.7
7.0
8. 5
5.9
7.7
1934
Men
Women
411
351
796
896
100.0
100. 0
27. 0
30. 8
9. 4
9. 5
41.0
33. 9
3. 5
4.5
8. 4
8. 2
2. 9
4. 1
2.8
4. 0
5.0
5. 0
Worsted
section
1923
Men
Women
138
205
2 31
454
100.0
100.0
58.0
46. 2
11. 3
17.6
4. 3
5. 7
2.6
2. 9
7. 4
8. 4
3.0
6. 0
7. 3
7. 3
6.1
5. 9
1928
Men
Women
126
195
197
405
100.0
100.0
26. 4
27. 9
40. 1
38. 3
5.0
6. 2
2.0
3. 7
10.7
8. 1
4.6
4. 2
4.6
4.7
6.6
6. 9
1930
Men
Women
107
192
225
456
100.0
100.0
38. 2
38. 4
14. 7
15. 6
7.6
7.0
6. 2
5.0
13. 8
10. 5
6. 2
6.6
5. 3
8. 3
8.0
8.6
1931
Men
Women
101
188
177
423
100.0
100.0
40. 7
40. 7
15. 8
15. 6
9.0
6. 2
7. 9
8. 0
10. 2
10. 9
4. 5
4.0
8.5
11. 3
3. 4
3. 3
1932
Men
Women
103
184
245
769
100.0
100.0
35. 9
64.6
17. 2
12. 4
12. 3
5. 3
6. 1
2. 7
10.6
5. 9
6. 1
1. 3
5.7
3.0
6. 1
4.8
1934
Men
Women
128
213
309
777
100.0
100.0
25. 2
47. 6
12. 3
9. 7
26.6
18. 4
7.8
6.7
13.6
7.7
3. 2
3. 5
a 2
a 3
8. 1
3. 1
aBased on an NRP tabulation of a sample of company Income-tai records.
APPENDIX B
269
As might be expected, most of the intervals in weeks of no
employment at Amoskeag were of considerably shorter duration
(table E-2). The percentage of such intervals that lasted
for only 1 week was similar to the percentage of employment
periods that were from 1 to i) weeks in duration. Indeed,
intervals of no employment lasting 1 to 4 weeks comprised
upwards of 60 percent of all these intervals in most of the
years. Intervals of no employment longer than 13 weeks gen¬
erally accounted for only about 15 percent of the cases.
There seems to be no real difference in the duration of the
intervals of no employment experienced by the men and the
women, except in 1931 in the cotton and in the following year
in the worsted section.
Katei of Lobor Tum-oror
With intermittency established as a characteristic pattern,
it is not unexpected to find that the labor turn-over was high.
The records make it possible to measure turn-over on two
different bases: the personnel record presents accessions
and separations from the management's point of view, which
is the usual basis and one which is followed by the United
States Bureau of Labor Statistics; and the income-tax card with
its record of actual spells of employment and unemployment
presents accessions and separations from the workers' point
of view. Both measures are given in table E-3, together with
turn-over rates for cotton textiles generally as computed by
the Bureau of Labor Statistics from 1930 through 1934.
For this 5-year period a comparison between Amoskeag and
the cotton-textile industry in the United States can be made.
The Amoskeag data cover all operations of the company and
have been computed by the method used by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics. With only one exception - the separation rate
in 1932 - Amoskeag's turn-over rates were considerably higher
than those for the industry.
The Amoskeag rates over the 11 years beginning with 1924 tend
to increase as they approach the great depression. How¬
ever, it is of special interest that the highest rates are
for a pre-war depression year, 1914 (ending June 30); these
rates were computed for Amoskeag by Paul F. Brissenden and
270
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
Table E- 8. - LABOR TURN-OVER RATES FOR AMOSKEAG
AND COTTON-TEXTILB INDUSTRY, 1914-14
Amoskeaf rata
Bureau of
Labor
Statistics
Year and
Based on
of employment
aotual periods
and no employment*
Based on
accessions
and sepa¬
rations6
type of rata
Cotton
section
Worsted
■•ction
rats for
cotton
Men
Women
Han
Women
textiles0
1914
Accessions
Separations
n •• s
a . ■ a
n .a.
n.a.
n.a.
n .a.
n .4 a
n .4 a
117.5
123.0
n .a.
n.a.
1923
Accessions
Separations
236.6
245.7
295. 2
282. 7
176.6
167.4
224. 9
221.5
n.a ■
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
1924
Accessions
Separations
a.m.
a.m.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
u .a a
& .4 a
A .4 a
29.5
40.9
n.a.
n.a.
1925
Accessions
Separations
a.m.
a.m.
n.a.
n.a.
n .4.
n .4.
D a 4 a
n .4.
42.1
52.8
n.a.
n.a.
1926
Accessions
Separations
a.m.
a.m.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n .a.
n a 4 .
n.a.
59.6
55.5
n.a.
n.a.
1927
Access Ions
Separations
n.a.
n.a.
n .a.
n.a.
U .4 a
a *• a
n.» a
n.a.
42.9
46.8
n .a .
n.a.
1928
Accessions
Separations
168.2
157.6
218.5
212.3
103.3
150.3
220.5
207.7
76.9
67. 2
n .a ■
n.a.
1929
Accessions
Separations
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n . » •
n . ».
n.a.
n .a.
99. 9
110. 2
n.a.
n .a.
1930
Accessions
Separations
178.9
186.1
246.3
252.6
107.0
210.3
226. 6
237. 5
79.2
88. 6
42.0
66.3
1931
Accessions
Separations
216.3
218.6
273. 5
286. 2
173.3
175.2
223 . 9
225.0
77.0
82. 2
47.4
53.5
1932
Accessions
Separations
288.3
264.3
316.0
300.8
331.1
237. 9
440.8
417.9
78.7
43.8
67.5
62.6
1933
Accessions
Separations
225. 2
287.5
163. 6
363.0
215.3
200.4
281.3
361. 2
110.1
73. 9
83.6
66.5
1934
Accessions
Separations
201.5
193. 7
268.9
255.3
234.0
241.4
387. 8
364.8
91.0
72. 8
63.7
67.4
*Based on an NRP tabulation or a sample or company income-tax recorOe.
"figures ror 1914 are DaaeO on Paul f. Brlaeenoen and Emll r ranlo 1, Labor turnover in Industry jim lorfc
The Macmlllan Co., 1822). pp. 176-7. riguree tor remaining years are baaed on an MRP tabulation or company
personnel records. Accessions and separations resulting rrom temporary lay-orre were not counted.
cAdapted rrom Handbook of Labor Statistics! 1931 Edition 01. 8. Dept. labor. Bur. labor Statistics,
Bull. Mo. 641. Sept. 1931), p. 669. and sandbook of Labor Statistics: 1936 /dIt ton (Bull. No. 616, 1966).
P. 808.
n.a. Data not available.
APPENDIX B
271
Emil Frankel and analyzed in their pioneer work on the subject
of labor turn-over.3
Rates of labor turn-over from the workers' viewpoint were
more than double those from the management's viewpoint since
the latter disregarded temporary lay-offs. Rates upon the
former basis have been computed for the Amoskeag sample by
sections and by sex. Whereas the rates utilizing personnel
records have been based on the average number employed during
the year, the rates using a sample of the income-tax records
are of necessity based on the total number of different persons
employed. This serves to minimize the rate.
The differences in rates between the men and women are clearly
disclosed. In only 1 out of 56 possibilities was the rate for
women less than the rate for men - the accession rate in the
cotton section in 1933. The fact of the higher rates for women
suggests that they must have experienced a larger volume of no
employment in a given year than the men despite the fact that
the duration of intervals of no employment was about the same
for both men and women. It is noteworthy also that for the
last 3 years of the series the women in the worsted section had
higher rates than the women in the cotton section.
Perhaps the most revealing indicator of the change in working
conditions at Amoskeag is the contrast in the reasons for
separations between those that occurred in the period following
the 1922 strike and those that took place in the years that
preceded the strike. When Amoskeag resumed its decline in the
post-strike period after 1922, the percentage of employee
separations decreased continuously and was much below the pre-
strike level. That is, with the continual shrinkage of jobs
at Amoskeag the workers were progressively more reluctant
to leave on their own even for temporary periods. On the
other hand, the percentage separated for employer reasons
increased significantly in these years of Amoskeag's decline
over the percentage in the years before the 1922 strike. The
increase in the depression period was very sharp for the reason
noted. Thus with adverse business conditions and perhaps as
part of wage-negotiation tactics, the management was obliged
with increasing frequency to initiate separations because
of curtailment.
3Labor Turnover in Industry (New York; The mcmlllan Co., 1922), PP. 176-7.
272
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
The changes in types of reasons for final separations did not
differ materially from those for all separations. That is,
employer reasons achieved much greater prominence after the
strike, and in the depression period they accounted for half
the final separations.
The distribution of final separations by specific reasons
is presented in table E-i*. About 15 percent of the final
separations, on the average, were initiated by those leaving
Manchester for any reason. The percentage continued on the
same level through the post-strike period, 1923-26, although
many of the separations in the later period must have taken
place in 1922, the year of the strike, but were recorded as
of 1923. As the industrial decline of Amoskeag and the region
became accentuated in the so-called prosperity period and
after, the percentage separated because of removal from the
T«ble E- 4 • - PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF FINAL SEPARATIONS
FOR SPECIFIC REASONS, BY PERIOD AND SEX,
1911-S8a
Period
and sex
Number
of final
separations
reporting
reason
Percent
due to -
Removal
else¬
where
Other
employ¬
ment
Sickness,
accident,
pregnancy,
etc.
Super¬
annuation
Curtail¬
ment
Other
reasons
Total
Hen
2.890
14.8
11.7
5.0
6.1
8.9
53.5
Women
1, 803
15.4
4.8
16.4
4.8
10.8
47.8
1911-14
Men
714
16.1
5.9
6.9
4.2
2.8
64. 1
Women
370
15. 4
3.2
17.3
5.9
1.9
56.3
1916-18
Men
es2
14.9
14.1
6.1
5.2
3.7
56.0
Women
32s
17.8
3.7
17.8
7.7
3.7
49.3
1919-22
Men
572
15.2
12.8
3.0
6.3
6.3
56.4
Women
400
15.0
6.2
17.8
2.8
6.0
52.2
1923-26
Men
535
16.3
16.8
3.4
8.2
13.1
42.2
Women
366
17.5
4.6
13-9
4.6
14.2
45.2
1927-29
Men
274
11.7
11-3
4.0
9.8
18.2
45.0
Women
177
16.4
7.9
17.0
2.8
17.5
38.4
1930-
June 1933
Men
143
7.7
7.0
5.6
2.8
39.9
37.0
Women
165
6.1
3.6
12.7
3.6
41.2
32.8
aBased on an NRP tabulation of a sample of company personnel records. The NRA period Is omitted because
of the abnormal situation created by the shut-dcwn.
APPENDIX E
273
city declined significantly, reaching about half the pre-
strike level in the depression period. There were no material
differences in the relative numbers between the men and women,
suggesting that there were no sex differences with respect to
geographic mobility among the Amoskeag workers, although this
is not borne out by other data (see page 309).
This was not the case, however, with respect to occupational
mobility as indicated by the percentage who left Amoskeag
for other employment; that is, in the first four periods
reviewed, significantly higher percentages of the men than of
the women separated for this reason. With failing fortunes in
later years, these percentages declined both for men and women.
Since reasons grouped under sickness also include pregnancy
and withdrawal in order to keep house, it is but natural that
relatively more women than men would initiate final separations
for these related reasons. On the average, about 10 percent of
all separations were so caused. Superannuation was reported
as the reason in about 5 percent of the separations. In the
three periods beginning with the post-war period, significantly
higher percentages of men than of women were separated because
of old age. This is in keeping with the fact that the men were
a somewhat more aged group. This increase in the post-strike
and prosperity periods coincides with the management's attempt
to speed up production. Since curtailment accounts for the
bulk of the employer reasons for final separations in the
later years, no additional comment on the general trend is
required here.
Total Waoka of No Employment
Although the intervals of no employment were of quite short
duration, the high turn-over rates suggest that the volume of
weeks of no employment in a given year would be considerable.
This can be shown in several ways. One method consists of
expressing the number of weeks of no employment in a given year
as a percentage of the total number of man-weeks that were
available for employment in that year. The latter is the
product of the total number of persons employed in a given year
and 52, the total number of weeks in a calendar year. These
ratios are presented in table E-5.
274
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
Tab1* E- 6. - NUMBER OK WEEKS OF NO EMPLOYMENT AS A PERCENTAGE
OF TOTAL NUMBER OF MAN-WEEKS AVAILABLE FOR EMPLOYMENT
IN THE COTTON AND WORSTED SECTIONS, 1828-844
Number of weeks
Total man-weeks
of no employment as percent
Year
of total man-weeks
Cotton
Worsted
Cotton
Worsted
sect ion
section
section
section
1923
48,256
18,304
31.1
21.4
1928
37,180
17,368
24.8
20.4
1930
31,980
15,860
31.7
29.5
1931
30,940
15,444
26.3
21.4
1932
28,184
15,288
34.6
28.7
1933
34,112
17,420
25.7
24.6
1934
40,092
18,044
20.8
27.0
aBased on an NRP tabulation of a sample of company Income-tax records.
These computations disclose the fact that in the cotton
section for specified years between 1923 and 1933, from one-
quarter to one-third of the total man-weeks were weeks of
no employment. In 1934 this was reduced to one-fifth. The
ratios for the worsted section were on a somewhat lower level
than for the cotton section, with the exception of 1934.
The consistency of the results suggests that even when the
differences might be due entirely to sampling errors, they are
nonetheless real differences, particularly since they agree
with differences in the respective profit records of the
sections.
Another and more revealing way of making the same point is
to present a percentage distribution of the Amoskeag workers
according to the total number of weeks of no employment at
Amoskeag in each of the specified years. This is shown for
each of the three sections in table E-6.
In the cotton and worsted sections the group whose weeks of
no employment in a year did not exceed 4 (that is, those who
had the most employment) accounted for from 22 to 50 percent
of all the workers, depending upon the phase of the cycle.
The higher percentages obtained, obviously; in the years
of an upswing. The smallest percentage was found in the cotton
APPENDIX B
275
Table E-«. - PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OP WORKERS, BY TOTAL WEEKS
OP NO EMPLOYMENT AND SECTION, 103S-94a
Year and
section6
Total
workers
Percentage
by total weeks
distribution
of no employment
4 or less
5-13
14-26
27 or over
1923
Cotton
917
6.3
52.1
23.9
17.7
Worsted
343
53.4
18.9
11.1
16.6
General
149
63.1
22.8
6.0
8.1
1928
Cotton
703
46.4
22.2
11.9
19.5
Worsted
326
51.9
23.0
10.7
14.4
General
87
75.9
11.5
6.9
5.7
1930
Cotton
605
34.9
17.4
20.6
27.1
Worsted
299
36.1
22.4
16.1
25.4
General
61
80.3
8.2
0
11.5
1931
Cotton
585
42.1
22.9
13.6
21.4
Worsted
291
46.4
24.1
14.4
15.1
General
61
85.3
4.9
4.9
4.9
1932
Cotton
533
21.6
28.5
22.7
27.2
Worsted
288
34.4
26.4
15.6
23.6
General
55
70.9
7.3
9.1
12.7
1933
Cotton
645
38.3
25.7
18.3
17. 7
Worsted
329
31.0
37.4
16.7
14.9
General
66
66.7
7.6
16.6
9.1
1934
Cotton
758
46.4
29.3
11.9
12.4
Worsted
342
27.8
39.8
14.3
18.1
General
74
75.7
23.0
0
1.3
aBased on an NRP tabulation of a sample of company Income-tax records.
6The general section Includes mechanical, maintenance, and central-office staffs.
section4 and the largest in the worsted section. Indeed, in
the first 5 years of the series the percentages in the worsted
section were higher than those in the cotton section.
At the other extreme, as many as 12 to 27 percent of the
workers had 27 weeks or more of no employment in a year.
4But the 6.3 percent in the cotton section in 1923 was clearly very exceptional.
276
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
The higher percentages were associated with the years of a
downswing. In all years of the series except 1934 the worsted
section Had a smaller percentage of its workers falling in this
classification than was the case in the cotton section.
Among the intermediate gfoups, from 17 to 40 percent of
the operatives (except in 1923) had from 5 to 13 weeks of
no employment without any clear relationship to cyclical
fluctuations. The percentages in the remaining class, with
14 to 26 weeks of no employment, varied from 11 to 24, with
the larger percentages coinciding with the depression years.
In the general section, including the mechanical, main¬
tenance, and central-office staffs, the distribution was quite
different since these workers for the most part represented
a fixed overhead cost. Accordingly, from 63 to 85 percent of
these workers had only 4 weeks or less without employment,
and only 1 to 13 percent had more than a half-year without
employment in a year. In the case of the two intermediate
groups, the larger fraction fell in the classification of
5 to 13 weeks of no employment in most years. There were no
clear-cut cyclical variations since employment in this section,
to the extent that it was not part of overhead, was conditioned
by the volume of employment in the other two sections, and
these two sections did not always agree in the timing of their
seasonal or cyclical movements.
Ptrt-Tin* Emp 1 ojrm*nt, 1914
Since the measurements discussed in the preceding paragraphs
have made no allowance for part-time employment, the volume of
unemployment has been minimized thereby. This defect can be
remedied for the year 1934 when the company entered on the
income-tax cards the weekly hours worked as well as the amount
of the weekly earnings. With the working conditions and the
volume of production in this and other years in mind, some
inferences about part-time employment in other years may be
ventured. Among the special considerations applicable to
1934 was the 40-hour week compared with the 54-hour week in
all the other years of our series except during the latter part
of 1933. It should also be remembered that the cotton section
maintained operations at a rather high level in 1934, while the
worsted section was in a moderately depressed condition.
APPENDIX E
277
Another special consideration was the existence in 1934 of
a bona-fide trade union which was better able to carry out the
operatives' demand for the "alternating of work", that is,
for sharing the work - a factor doubtless tending to increase
the extent of part-time employment.
The extent of full- and part-time employment for this year is
set forth in table E-7. While there had been some employment in
four-fifths of the potential man-weeks of employment in the
cotton section in 1934 (table E—5), only a little more than half
of these weeks of employment involved full-time employment. In
more than one-fourth of the weeks there was employment equal to
more than 3 but less than 5 days per week. The remainder of
the weeks of employment, only slightly less than one-fifth
of the total, provided employment equal to 3 days or less
per week.
T«b1e E-7.- PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF WEEKS OF EMPLOYMENT IN
THE COTTON AND WORSTED SECTIONS IN 1984,
BY NUMBER OF HOURS OF EMPLOYMENT*
Section
Total weeks
Percentage distribution
by number of hours of employment
of employment
24 or less
25-39
40 or over
Cotton
Worsted
30,621
12,563
18.7
33.2
27. 5
27. 9
53.8
38.9
aBased on an nrp tabulation of a sample of company income-tax records.
The worsted section, being in a less prosperous condition
than the cotton section in this year, had still less full-time
employment - only 39 percent of all weeks with some employment.
The percentage of weeks that yielded more than 3 but less than
5 days of employment was almost the same as that in the cotton
section, while in as many as one-third of the weeks there was
employment of 3 days or less.
Even this showing, however, very probably represents part-
time employment at a minimum in the 7 years under discussion,
especially if full-time employment in other years is based
on a 54-hour week. This would have to be the standard if our
main interest in measuring partial employment was its effect
on earnings, since the hourly rates were set so as to result
278
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
in the same full-time wage in the 54-hour week as in the
40-hour week.
I>cid«Bc« of Unomp1ojmont
Even an allowance for partial employment does not complete
the refinements that might be made in order to describe the
character and volume of employment that prevailed at Amoskeag
in these years. It is necessary to examine the incidence
of unemployment among the Amoskeag workers within a section.
At first thought one might expect the incidence to vary with
the degree of skill of the worker, the more skilled having less
unemployment. A few observations, however, suggest that this
could not have been the case. One such observation refers
to the fact that Amoskeag was an integrated plant embracing
all the processes of manufacturing and finishing. Therefore
the skills complemented one another, and the production of
a given type of cloth would employ all the skills in a certain
proportion but with definite leads and lags.
Another consideration is the fact that the skilled workers,
who ordinarily would be expected to have less unemployment than
those less skilled, are not so highly skilled in cotton and
worsted textiles that they would be retained during slack
periods in order to obviate the risk of a shortage of skilled
workers on the resumption of operations. This attitude is
confirmed by the remarks of the company agent recorded in the
minutes of a meeting of the representatives of the cotton sec¬
tion on September 7, 1926. There was a "report from Coolidge
weaving delegates that they were called into a meeting with
Agent Straw on Tuesday, September 6, 1926, whereat he notified
them that he was going to shut down the weaving in this mill
for a period of three or four weeks and would possibly start it
up then as it should be started up; also requested the weavers
and loom fixers [who are among the highest skilled workers] not
to leave town." Accordingly, one would expect the incidence
of unemployment in relative terms to be about the same for the
skilled, semiskilled, and unskilled workers, as is borne out
by statistical evidence. (See table E-8.)
The variation in incidence that appeared to be significant
was the variation between the married women workers and all
the others. This is clearly revealed by tables E-9 and E-10,
APPENDIX E
279
Tab1* E- 8. - PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OP COTTON WORKERS,
BY TOTAL WEEKS OP NO EMPLOYMENT AND DEGREE OP SKILL
AT LONGEST OCCUPATION, 1828-84*
Year
Total workers
Percentage
distribution
by weeks of no
employment
and degree of skill
5-13
14-2©
27 or over
1923
917
0
3
52. 1
23.9
17.7
Skilled
320
5
8
57.7
20. 9
15.0
Semiskilled
479
6
0
49. 1
25.3
19.0
Unskilled
112
8
9
49. 1
20.0
15. 2
1928
703
46
4
22. 2
11.9
19. 5
Skilled
194
40
9
19.6
13.4
20. 1
Semiskilled
442
43
4
24. 9
11.8
19. 9
Unskilled
07
64
2
11. 9
9.0
14. 9
1930
605
34
9
17. 4
20.6
27. 1
Skilled
100
32
5
18. 1
24. 7
24.7
Semiskilled
370
34
8
17.0
18. 1
29. 5
Unskilled
63
41
3
14. 3
25.4
19.0
1931
585
42
1
22. 9
13. 6
21. 4
Skilled
162
41
4
20.4
17. 3
20.9
Semiskilled
301
41.
3
24. 1
12.5
22. 1
Unskilled
62
48
4
22. 0
11.3
17.7
1932
533
21.
0
28. 5
22.7
27. 2
Skilled
145
17.
9
29.7
24.0
27.6
Semiskilled
330
22.
1
27.0
21.2
29.7
Unskilled
58
27.
6
34. 5
25. 8
12. 1
1933
645
38.
3
25.7
18. 3
17.7
Skilled
174
40.
8
20.4
16. 7
10. 1
Semiskilled
403
35.
5
25.8
20.0
18. 1
Unskilled
68
48.
6
23. 5
8.8
19. 1
1934
758
46.
4
29. 3
11. 9
12. 4
Skilled
180
49.
5
27. 4
12.4
10.7
Semiskilled
483
44.
1
28. 8
la 2
13.9
Unskilled
89
52.
8
30.0
3.3
7. 9
aBased on an nrp tabulation of a sample of ccmpany income-tax records. For classification or occupations by degree or
skill, see appendix 0.
in which total unemployment is broken down by marital status
of the workers at the time of final accession to the pay roll.5
In table E-9 the annual duration of weeks of no employment of
the married women is contrasted with that of the single women.
Of primary interest are the relative numbers that compose the
extreme classifications. In the cotton section a much larger
percentage of single women than of married women experienced
only 4 weeks or less without employment in a given year. This
was true in each year, although in 1923 both the percentages
and the difference between them were small. Excluding this
sThls procedure Involves some offsetting errors. That Is, presumably some of
those who were married at final accession had been single in the earlier years
of our tabulations, on the other hand, some designated as single at final
accession married before final separation, in view of the high turn-over rates
It is unlikely that a long period would Intervene between final accession and
final separation.
280
SHUT-DOWN OP AMOSKEAG
Tab 1 a E-».- PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF WOMEN IN THE COTTON
AND WORSTED SECTIONS, BY TOTAL WEEKS OF NO EMPLOYMENT
AND MARITAL STATUS, I#28-»4a
Year and
marital
status
Cotton section
Worsted section
Total
women
Percentage distribution
by total weeks
of no employment
Total
women
Percentage distribution
by total weeks
of no employment
4 or
less
5-13
14-26
27 or
over
4 or
less
5-13
14-26
27 or
over
1983
Married
333
2. 40
49.85
23.42
24.33
126
34.92
19.84
19.84
25.40
Single
76
5. 26
53. 95
28.95
11.84
52
57. 69
25.00
7. 69
9.62
1928
Married
261
27. 59
29.50
13.03
29.88
125
33. 60
26. 40
16.00
24.00
Single.
57
49.12
28.07
12. 28
10. 53
45
57.78
20.00
17. 78
4. 44
1930
Married
229
24.02
15. 28
21.83
38. 87
120
24. 17
20.83
18.33
36. 67
Single
48
50.00
16. 67
20.83
12. 50
44
40.91
22. 73
18. 18
18.18
1931
Married
260
31.15
24. 62
18. 85
25.38
116
30.17
25.00
18. 10
26. 73
Single
50
40.00
30.00
12.00
18.00
46
52.17
30. 43
4. 35
13.05
1932
Married
184
8.70
24. 46
25. 54
41.30
108
25.00
24.07
17. 59
33. 34
Single
47
19.15
27.66
29.. 79
23.40
50
40. 00
22. 00
20.00
18.00
1933
Married
224
19. 20
32.14
26. 79
21.87
122
20. 49
33.61
25.41
20.49
Single
51
37.26
21. 57
29. 42
11. 76
58
29. 31
48.28
10.34
12.07
1934
Married
263
31.18
33.46
16.35
19.01
114
16.67
42.10
18.42
22.81
Single
61
39.34
36.07
9.84
14.75
62
30.65
45. 16
9. 68
14. 51
aBased on an KRP tabulation of a saaple of company Income-tax records.
year, the range for the single women was from 19 to 50 percent;
for the married women, from 9 to 33 percent.
At the other extreme, among those whose weeks of no em¬
ployment totaled 27 or more in a given year, the relative
differences were equally large, with the married women having
the larger percentages in each year. From 17 to 40 percent
of the married women and from 10 to 23 percent of the single
women were without work for more than half the year.6 In the
SAs far as the authors have been able to determine from other sources, the company
had no policy of discriminating against married women that might influence
these data.
APPENDIX B
281
intermediate classifications the differences were small and
not consistently in one direction.
The same pattern existed in the worsted section, with the
magnitude of the differences about the same and with complete
consistency in their direction with respect to those with
the fewest weeks of no employment and those with the most
weeks of no employment.
A somewhat different picture is presented by a similar
table for the married and single men (table E-io). With few
exceptions, the differences in the percentage distribution
Table E-10.- PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF MEN IN THE COTTON
AND WORSTED SECTIONS, BY TOTAL WEEKS OF NO EMPLOYMENT
AND MARITAL STATUS, l»2S-»«a
Cotton section
Worsted section
Year and
Percentage distribution
Percentage distribution
by total weeks
by total weeks
marital
status
Total
of
no employment
Total
of
no employment
men
4 or
less
5-13
14-26
27 or
over
men
4 or
less
5-13
14-26
27 or
over
1923
Married
287
7. 67
52.61
22.65
17.07
86
60.46
12.79
11.63
15.12
Single
67
7.46
43.28
31.35
17. 91
15
66. 67
6.67
13.33
13. 33
1926
Married
222
50.45
18. 47
13. 51
17. 57
71
61. 97
19. 72
8.45
9.86
Single
53
60.38
15.09
9.43
15.10
20
50.00
20.00
0
30.00
1930
Married
176
36. 93
19.32
M
CD
H
CD
25. 57
65
30.77
29.23
16. 92
23.08
Single
59
33. 90
13. 56
22.03
30. 51
22
31.82
27. 27
9.09
31.82
1931
Married
177
48.02
20.34
11.30
20.34
61
47.54
21. 32
14. 75
16. 39
Single
57
42.11
28. 07
3. 51
26.31
18
44.44
22. 22
27.78
5.56
1932
Married
167
22.16
32. 93
21. 56
23.35
59
37.29
25. 42
10.17
27.12
Single
50
22.00
32.00
20.00
26.00
19
21.05
42.11
10.53
26.31
1933
Married
211
42.65
22.75
12. 32
22.28
69
33. 34
42.03
13.04
11. 59
Single
67
38.80
20. 90
11. 94
28.36
25
36.00
32.00
12.00
20.00
1934
Married
231
48. 92
25. 97
11.69
13.42
84
30. 95
23. 81
17.86
27. 38
Single
96
56.25
25.00
9.37
9.38
21
23.80
38.10
19.05
19. 05
3Based on an NRP tabulation or a sample or company Income-tax records.
282
SHUT-DOWN OP AMOSKEAG
according to marital status were small and completely lacking
in uniformity in the direction of the differences. The few
large differences, moreover, were not so large that they could
not be due to sampling errors. In view of this evidence and
the absence of any reason for expecting any difference in the
duration of unemployment between married and single men, it may
safely be concluded that no such differences existed.
The Labor Reserve
These relationships call into question the entire problem
of the labor reserve. It needs no elaboration that an industry
or plant subject to cyclical fluctuations must draw upon
a reserve of workers to augment its staff during the period
of expansion from revival to the peak of operations. On
the downswing, it is to industry's advantage to return these
workers to the labor reserve without any financial obligations
upon industry for maintaining their availability and employ-
ability until they are once more offered employment. At
several points it has been mentioned that Amoskeag, like
the textile industry generally, has been subject to the short
cycles and hence had need for such a reserve.
A labor reserve is also necessary, however, to handle the
short, sharp swings upward and downward that occur within
the cyclical movements. In the case of Amoskeag these short
fluctuations were of an intermittent character resulting from
the irregular bunching of orders for immediate delivery. Its
reserve, therefore, was a joint one arising from both the
cyclical and the intermittent demands.
It is highly pertinent to a description of employment condi¬
tions to examine the extent and character of the stratification
among the Amoskeag workers resulting from the necessity of
maintaining a labor reserve.
Size of the Labor Reserve.- The magnitude of the labor
reserve in relative terms can be set forth by several sets
of relationships. One evidence of a labor reserve is the fact
that a considerable number in excess of those actually employed
in a given week were retained without pay on the pay-roll
record. That is, the names of the excess workers were kept on
the pay roll, and such workers were thereby made to feel that
they should be on tap.
APPENDIX E
283
For the 10 years beginning with 1925 there exist weekly
records based on the personnel files of the number on the pay
roll and of the number who actually received some employment.
A weekly average for each month has been computed for each
series, and the average number actually employed has been
expressed as a percentage of the average number on the pay
roll. These percentages are given in table E-11.
Tab 1« E-11.- AVERAGE NUMBER OF AMOSKEAG WORKERS ACTUALLY
EMPLOYED AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE AVERAGE NUMBER
ON THE PAY ROLL, 1926-84a
Year
Jan.
Feb.
Mar.
Apr.
May
June
July
Aug.
Sept.
Oct.
Nov.
Dec.
1925
91. 6
94. 7
100.0
100.0
100.0
94.0
77. 9
88.4
71.0
92.9
94. 5
95.2
1926
88.5
89.3
89.5
88.5
88.9
84.3
79. 9
52. 9
84. 7
88. 4
89. 2
84. 6
1927
88. 9
88. 4
89. 5
88. 7
89. 8
88. 5
87. 2
55. 2
88. 8
90. 7
92. 9
99. 9
1928
89.1
88.5
87.4
89. 4
89. 0
88.7
85. 6
52.3
86.0
89.0
92. 7
93.0
1929
94.0
92.6
95. 2
95.1
94.0
92. 2
87.3
44. 7
86.2
90. 7
88.9
85.7
1930
86.0
82.8
84.2
77.9
74. 4
76.4
74.4
70.2
78.9
74. 1
68. 8
69.5
1931
72. 7
78.8
88. 2
89.7
85.4
83. 6
83. 9
78.4
66. 7
77. 5
74.3
67. 3
1932
64. 9
72. 4
75.7
85.4
77. 2
72.8
75.1
65. 1
82.0
81.0
83.2
86.3
1933
85. 9
94.5
97.0
92. 2
74.8
94.0
92.9
90.0
88. 5
88. 7
80. 6
60.7
1934
83.0
90.8
89.6
87. 2
86. 6
80. 8
76.8
79. 6
44.9
87. 9
87. 5
87.3
aBased 011 an NRP tabulation of miscellaneous company records and represent averages of weekly figures.
Tte number employed Is the number who received some employment during the week.
On the average, Amoskeag employed in the neighborhood of
85 percent of the workers retained on the pay roll with the
percentages ranging between 85 and 95 in slightly more than
half the months. During periods of rising production the
percentage utilization of operatives on the pay roll was
higher, but during periods of depressed activity it tended
to be lower. The extremely low percentages may be explained by
shut-downs either for the summer holiday or because of strikes,
such as the one in September 1934. Thus, in order to ensure
economical operations during the intermittent spurts, the
management deemed it necessary to have in reserve on the
pay roll from 15 to 25 percent in excess of those employed
at the intermittent low points. The reserve available for
cyclical upswings would be reflected in the additions to the
number on the pay roll which, of course, are not disclosed
by these percentages.
Another way of indicating the existence and magnitude of the
reserve .as well as labor turn-over is to relate the actual
average weekly number employed in a given year to the total
284
SHUT-DOWN OP AMOSKEAG
number of different individuals employed in the course of
the same year. A count of the number of income-tax cards
in use for a specific year should closely approximate the
latter figure. This relationship is set forth in table E-12.
I»Ht E-1R. - ACTUAL AVERAGE WEEKLY NUMBER OF AMOSKEAG WORKERS AS
A PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL NUMBER EMPLOYED DURING THE YEAR
IN THE COTTON AND WORSTED SECTIONS, l»tl-S4a
Total number of
Average
weekly
different persons
number of persons
Average
employed during
who received
as percent
Year
the
year
some employment
of total
Cotton
Worsted
Cotton
Worsted
Cotton
Worsted
section
section
section
section
section
section
1928
8,530
5,313
5,348
2,183
82. 7
41.1
1830
9,202
4,283
4,108
1,859
44.6
43.8
1931
8,505
4,279
4,050
2,260
81.7
52.8
1932
5,149
2,743
2,975
1,871
57.8
60.9
1933
8,871
3,218
4,562
2,311
52.6
71.9
1934
7,118
3,486
8,190
1,932
87.0
55.4
Data from Vork and Vages at the Amoskeag Manufacturing Company Mills, 19Z7-S5
(WPA National Research Project in cooperation with Social Security Board, Bureau
of Research and Statistics, Apr. 1837), p. 10.
It appears from this that to have employed a certain weekly
average of textile workers over a year, it was the practice
at Amoskeag, generally speaking, to have given employment
during the course of the year to from one and one-half to two
times the average number.
Further indicators of the labor reserve are represented by
figure E-i and table E-7. The chart shows part-time employment
as evidenced by the difference between the number of persons
on the pay roll and the number of full-time employees required,
as computed by the Amoskeag paymaster for each week in the
years 1927-35. The data in the table throw light on how the
part-time employment was distributed in the year 1934.
Composition of the Labor Reserve .- Although enough evidence
has been presented to indicate that the married women con¬
stituted a large fraction of the labor reserve, this is insuf¬
ficient to identify the reserve adequately. For example, there
remains the important question as to whether its personnel
"(lie E- 1.- NUMBER OF PERSONS ON PAY ROLL AND ESTIMATED NUMBER
OF FULL-TIME EMPLOYEES REQUIRED EACH WEEK, 1927-86,
FOR THE COTTON AND WORSTED SECTIONS
1933
1934
NUMBER
,3.200
2.400
1.600
1935
NUMBER
3,200
WORSTED
1930 1931 1932
2400
A NUMBER ON PAY ROLL
1927
1926
WP* -NATIONAL R£ St ARCH PROJECT
IN COOPERATION WITH
SOCIAL SECURITY BOARD «
L5-3
Equivalent full-time employment was calculated by the Amoskeag paymaster. It is based on the prevailing workweek {5* hours
through July ia, 1933, and 40 hours thereafter), adjusted for holidays. (After June 1934 it apparently was not the practice to
adjust for holidays.)
Each break in the series was verified as a shut-down or strike recorded In notices or other records in the company's files.
(This verification was not possible for 1932.) some men for maintenance, etc., were of course at work during these periods, but
the number was so small that it was not charted even when it was included in the paymaster's records.
The shaded area (a minus B) in the lower portion of each section of the chert indicates the difference between the number of
persons on the pay roll (line a) and the estimated number of full-time employees required (line 8).
Repr Int of chart 3 from Work and Wages at the Amoskeag Manufacturing Company Mills, 1927-35
1 WP A Na t i ona I Research Project In cooperation with Social Security Board, Bureau of Research
and Statistics, Apr. 1 93 7 ).
4
286
SHUT-DOWN OP AMOSKEAG
shifts continuously from year to year or whether there is
evidence of continuity in the reserve group. To determine
whether there had been a stratification of workers, all op¬
eratives in the 10-percent sample of the personnel files whose
weekly employment records were available for 1928 and 1930
through 1934 were constituted a subsample for this inquiry.
This procedure yielded a sample of 821 cases.
From table E-6 it is evident that from one-half to three-
quarters of the operatives in each section - depending on
the phase of the cycle - could count on at least 39 weeks of
Amoskeag employment and 13 weeks without Amoskeag employment in
any year. On this basis, employment for at least three-quarters
of the year may be regarded as the "normal" expectation.
This division forms part of the qualifying conditions for
determining those who were regularly employed and those who
regularly formed the reserve. This count excludes the casual
or "floating" labor reserve. Thus if an operative had had at
least 39 weeks of employment in 4 of the 6 years, he was classi¬
fied as having belonged to the group of regularly employed.
If, however, an operative had been employed fewer than 39 weeks
in 4 of the 6 years, he was considered to have belonged to
the labor reserve. In 80 cases, there were 3 years in which
annual employment amounted to at least 39 weeks and 3 years
in which it was less. These 80 cases were eliminated from
further consideration, leaving a sample of 741. Of this
number, 542 cases composed the regular employees, and 199,
or 27 percent, the intermittent labor reserve.
An examination of the characteristics of each group is
instructive. Whereas the group which was regularly employed
was about equally divided between men and women (the men rep¬
resented 56 percent), more than two-thirds (69 percent) of the
persons in the intermittent reserve were women.
The age distribution by sex for each of the two strata is
revealing. Among the regularly employed men there was a more
or less equal concentration in each of the three 10-year
intervals between ages 35 and 64, with slightly over 70 percent
falling in these rather advanced age groups and only 20 percent
in the intervals under 35 years of age. The women with regular
employment were a decidedly younger group. Almost 63 percent
were between the ages of 25 and 44. Some 28 percent, however,
were aged 45 or over. (Table E-13J This difference in age
APPENDIX E
287
between the men and women operatives of the regularly employed
is in keeping with the difference observed among a much larger
sample of Amoskeag workers over a 35-year period. The women
generally entered the mill at an earlier age than the men and
also separated finally from it at an earlier age.
T«kU E-18-- PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION BY AGE OP A SPECIAL SAMPLE
OP WORKERS, BY EMPLOYMENT STRATUM AND SEXa
Age in years
as of final
Regularly employed
Labor reserve
separation
in 1935
Men
Women
Men
Women
Total
Number11
303
238
01
136
Percent
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
20-24
4.9
8.8
16.4
6.6
25-34
15.2
27.7
18.0
22.1
35-44
23.4
34.9
18.0
41.2
45-54
26.8
20.2
21.3
22.8
55-04
20.8
6.7
19.7
0.6
85 or over
8.9
1.7
6.6
0.7
aBased on an NRP tabulation of company Income-tax and personnel records. Covers
employment during isee and 1960-34. See text for description of sample.
Excludes one man regularly employed and one man and one woman in the labor reserve
whose ages are unknown.
In this respect the intermittent force differs considerably.
The men in the labor reserve were about equally distributed
among five age groups between the years 20 and 64. Forty-one
percent of the women in this classification were concentrated
in the age group of 35 to 44 years. That the women in the
labor reserve were an older group than the women with regular
employment is suggested by the fact that 64 percent of the
former were between the ages 35 and 54 compared with 55 percent
of the regularly employed women. The relative numbers aged
55 or over were about the same.
These differences may be presented in still another way by
showing the percentage distribution between the regularly
employed and the reserve according to the total number of
operatives in each age group (table E-14). This makes it clear
that a smaller proportion of the younger men - particularly
those between 20 and 24 years of age and, to a much lesser
288
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
extent, those between as and 34 - was counted among the reg¬
ularly employed than was the case with the older men.
Tiki# E- 14. - PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION BY EMPLOYMENT STRATUM
OP A SPECIAL SAMPLE OP WORKERS. BY AOE AND SEX*
Sex and
employment stratum
Total
workers
Age in
years
20-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65 or
over
Men, total
Number
364
25
57
82
94
75
31
Percent
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Regularly
employed
Labor reserve
83.2
16.8
60.0
40.0
80.7
19.3
86.6
13.4
86.2
13.8
84.0
16.0
87.1
12.9
Women, total
Number
374
30
96
139
79
25
5
Percent
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Regularly
employed
Labor reserve
63.6
36.4
70.0
30.0
68.7
31.3
59.7
40.3
60.7
39.3
64.0
36.0
80.0
20.0
aSee table E-13, ftns. a and b.
Among the women, however, the opposite prevailed. That is,
in the two younger age groups a larger fraction was among the
regularly employed than was true of the older women. Although
generalization is made difficult by virtue of the smallness
of the numbers, nevertheless it may be significant that a higher
percentage of the women between the ages of 55 and 64 was
among the regularly employed than the comparable percentages
in the two immediately preceding decennial age groups. If this
should be a real difference, it might be explained by the fact
that when the housewife reaches the age of 55 or thereabouts,
the once dependent children have reached maturity and possibly
assumed household responsibilities of their own so that the
housewife is once more free to undertake millwork on a regular
basis.
Other characteristics must be surveyed before each stratum
can be completely identified. One such item i's the length
of attachment to Amoskeag, that is, the interval between
APPENDIX B
289
first accession and final separation. This distribution
is given in table E-15. There can be no doubt that the men in
the group who were regularly employed were old-time Amoskeag
workers. Some 60 percent had been there for a period of 20
years or more and 80 percent for at least 15 years. While the
men in the labor reserve characteristically had attachments of
a much shorter duration, they could not be regarded as new¬
comers since as many as 63 percent had had some Amoskeag
employment over a period of at least 15 years. Very much the
same statement as the latter may be made concerning the women
in either stratum.
Table E-15.- PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION BY LENGTH OP AMOSKEAG
ATTACHMENT OP A SPECIAL SAMPLE OF WORKERS,
BY SEX AND EMPLOYMENT STRATOMa
Sex and
employment stratum
Total
workers
Percentage distribution by
years between first accession
and final separation
5-9
10-14
15-19
20 or
over
Men
Regularly employed
304
6. 9
10.9
21. 4
60.8
Labor reserve
62
25.8
11.3
24. 2
38.7
Women
Regularly employed
238
23.2
13.9
18. 5
44. 4
Labor reserve
137
16. 9
15. 3
27. 1
40. 7
aSee table E-13, ftn. a.
A distribution of the operatives according to the degree
of skill of their longest occupation between 1928 and 1934
discloses no striking differences. For example, from one-fifth
to one-quarter of the men in either stratum were skilled
workers; 50 to 60 percent, semiskilled; and almost one-fifth,
unskilled. This does not differ appreciably from the much
larger sample of men (see chapter IV). The same situation
applied to the women. In each stratum the distribution is about
identical - 9 to 12 percent skilled, 85 percent semiskilled,
and the remainder clerical - and does not differ from the
distribution of skills in the larger sample of women.
With these data as background, the employment and occupa¬
tional records of the 62 men composing part of the labor reserve
290
SHUT-DOWN OP AMOSKEAG
were examined in detail. The fact that a distribution by age
revealed no concentration suggests that this group covered a
heterogeneous assortment of individuals. They may nevertheless
be classified under three heads. One of these refers to those
workers who from the management's point of view were marginal
operatives; that is, their reasons for separation from Amoskeag
showed that they were either inefficient, insubordinate and
irresponsible, or otherwise troublesome. Inefficiency tended
to be associated with advancing age but was not exclusively
confined to the older worker. In times of peak production,
however, it apparently was necessary to draw on such operatives
for short intervals.
Another classification would embrace those who regarded work
at Amoskeag as marginal employment. Other employment, either
in the Manchester area or elsewhere, was regarded by these
persons as preferable to Amoskeag employment. The latter, how¬
ever, was preferable to unemployment. It is clear from their
records that at every opportunity they left Amoskeag to accept
nontextile employment and regarded Amoskeag employment as
a stopgap affair; and Amoskeag employment was available only
during the intermittent spurts. This type of pattern was
chiefly characteristic of the young workers, who were never
interested in a mill career, and of some of those in their
middle years.
The third group of men composing the labor reserve was
recruited mainly from the middle-aged workers with families who
from all evidence were efficient operatives and desirous of
regular employment at Amoskeag; but the volume of production
was not sufficient to absorb them into the regularly-employed
status. For this group there certainly was no mutuality of
interest between the company and the workers in this inter¬
mittent employment; this is in contrast to the second group
which probably considered the arrangement as possessing a fair
degree of mutual advantage.
The women who constituted two-thirds of the reserve may be
best identified by further comparison with the regularly em¬
ployed. It has been pointed out that there were no differences
between the two strata in length of Amoskeag attachment and in
the relative distributions by degree of skill. The only im¬
portant difference thus fardisclosed is that of age: the women
in the labor reserve were on the average older than those with
APPENDIX E
291
regular employment. It is only natural for one to expect that
this age differential had some direct relationship to marital
status and degree of dependency reported.
For example, 35 percent of the women with regular employment
were single, whereas only 9.5 percent of the women in the labor
reserve were single. In the two groups, 97 women reported
their marital status as single. Of this number, 90 were reg¬
ularly employed and. the remainder were in the reserve. In the
matter of number of dependents the evidence confirms the
expected result that the regularly employed women tended to
have fewer dependents than those comprising the labor reserve.
Thus, of the 120 married women in the group of regularly
employed reporting on number of dependents, some 54 percent
had 1 or no dependents compared with 39 percent of the 117
married women in the labor reserve reporting on dependency.
On the other hand, 32 percent of the latter compared with
27 percent of the married women regularly employed had 3 or
more dependents (table E—16)•
Table E-16.- PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OP MARRIED WOMEN,
BY NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS AND EMPLOYMENT STRATUM3
Employment stratum
Total
married
women
Percentage distribution
by number of dependents
0
1
2
3
4
5 or
over
Regularly employed
Labor reserve
120
117
30.0
18. 8
24. 3
20.5
18. 3
29.0
13. 3
12.0
8. 3
9.4
5.8
10. 3
aSee table E-13, ftn. a.
It is clear, therefore, that much the greater part of the
labor reserve, the existence of which was necessary for Amoskeag
under its conditions of intermittent operations, was composed
of older married women whohad family responsibilities. Because
of the low annual earnings frequently received by heads of
households employed by Amoskeag, many of the married women
with families were obliged to seek employment to supplement
these insufficient wages.7 In view of these responsibilities
7For some statistical measurement of the relationship between the level of wages
and proportion of women employed, see Paul H. Douglas, I he Theory of Vages
(New York: The Macmlllan Co., 1S34), ch. XI, pp. 269-94.
292
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
and Amoskeag's production schedule, all that the situation
permitted was partial supplementation of family income through
short-time employment rather than the full supplementation of
regular employment. As in the case of certain groups of men
comprising the labor reserve, there is reason to believe that
this arrangement was reasonably agreeable to both the workers
and the company, assuming the necessity of the surrounding
circumstances; this is indicated by the fact that a high
percentage of the separations of this group was initiated by
the operatives themselves.
The extent to which this intermittent laborforce was Amoskeag's
reserve rather than the general reserve for industry in the
Manchester area is indicated by the paucity of non-Amoskeag
jobs held by these workers. Occupational histories covering
the period 1926-36 were taken for 94 of the 137 women in the
labor reserve.8 Only nine persons, less than one-tenth, had
had any employment outside of Amoskeag between the years 1928
and 1934, and five of these were under 25 years of age (in
1936). For the 62 men in the reserve, 46 occupational histories
were available, and these disclosed that 14 persons (30 percent)
had had 20 different jobs outside of Amoskeag during this
7-year period. All but four of these men were under 40 years
of age. Needless to add, this result was also conditioned by
the volume of non-Amoskeag employment in the Manchester area,
which is more fully discussed elsewhere (see chapter IV).
If further empirical verification is needed on the supple¬
menting of the earnings of heads of households employed at
Amoskeag by other members of the household seeking Amoskeag
employment, recourse may be had to other data. Out of a random
selection of 1,000 households in Manchester (excluding the
best residential district) in 1936, it was found that in
319 households some member was "usually employed" in textile
manufacturing. In 140 of these households the husband was
the head of the household and usually employed at Amoskeag.
In 76 instances, or 54 percent of these households, the wife
was also usually employed and in all but 9 cases also by
Amoskeag. Thus in over half the cases the wife was supple¬
menting the husband's earnings, usually by seeking work from
the husband's employer.
8NRP Form 20 (see appendix H).
APPENDIX E
293
It should be obvious that supplementation of family income
through the employment of the women in the household is not
restricted to Amoskeag or to Manchester. It is customary in
most textile manufacturing centers. Indeed, it exists wherever
the annual earnings of the household head are low and employment
opportunities for women are available. This can be determined
inferentially by reference to the United States census of
persons gainfully occupied. The ratio of females 10 years
of age or over who reported themselves gainfully occupied in
1930 to the gainfully occupied males of the same age group
is of interest in this connection. This ratio, presented in
table E-17, has been computed for Manchester, other manufac¬
turing cities9 of New England with a population between so,000
Table E-17.-DISTRIBUTION OF GAINFULLY OCCUPIED PERSONS 10 YEARS
OF AGE OR OVER IN NEW ENGLAND CITIES WITH POPULATIONS
OF 60,000 TO 126,000. BY SEX. 19S0a
City and State
Number
Women
as percent
of men
Men
Women
Urban New England
1, 914,722
798.553
41.6
Urban United States
21,854,042
7,900,178
36.1
New Bedford, Mass.
33,859
18,485
54.9
Manchester, N. H
22,270
12,176
54.7
Pall River, Mass.
33,066
17,505
52.9
Holyoke, Mass.
16,688
8,551
51.2
Cambridge, Mass.
34,158
17,105
50.1
Lawrence, Mass.
25,606
12,608
49.2
Lowell, Mass.
28,692
13,972
48.7
Brockton, Mass.
20,018
9,379
46.9
Pawtucket, R. I.
23,907
10,474
43.8
Lynn, Mass.
32,230
13.988
43.4
Maiden, Mass.
17,373
7,078
40.7
Somerville, Mass.
31,752
12,516
39.4
Waterbury, Conn.
31,317
10,950
35.0
Medford, Mass.
17,868
6,158
34.5
New Britain, Conn.
20,832
6,967
33.8
Ouincy, Mass.
22,244
6, 966
31.3
aAdapted from Fifteenth Census of the United States: 1930, "Population" (U. S.
Dept. Com., Bur. Census, 1033), vol. IV, pp. 66, 100.
Manufacturing cities are defined as those In which one-third of the gainfully
occupied men were reported In manufactures according to the u. S. census of 1930.
294
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
and 125,000, all urban New England, and urban United States.
The highest ratios tend to be in the textile and shoe centers,
and Manchester, a center for both industries, logically enough
has the second highest ratio of all, 54.7. It is exceeded only
by New Bedford with a ratio of 54.9. It is noteworthy that
the ratio for urban New England, 41.6, is considerably higher
than the ratio for urban United States, 36.1.
The sample of the labor reserve studied by definition did not
constitute the entire labor reserve. To those recognized as
part of the reserve year after year must be added those who may
well be called the casual or "floating" reserve. These may be
identified as workers whose attachment (the interval between
first accession and final separation) to Amoskeag was a half-
year or less. More than one-third of the men (36.3 percent)
and one-quarter of the women (25.S percent) who separated
finally from Amoskeag between 1911 and 1935 had been attached
to Amoskeag a maximum of 6 months (table E-18). Presumably,
it was necessary for Amoskeag to attract these casual workers,
although as the volume of the company's activities declined
T*bl« E-18.- PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OP PINAL SEPARATIONS,
BY LENGTH OP AMOSKEAG ATTACHMENT. PERIOD, AND SEXa
period
la which separated
and sex
Total
final sepa¬
rations
Percent of workers having specified
between first accession and
number of 4-year periods
final separation
Total
0-1
2-4
5-9
10-19
20-39
40-59
00-79
80 or over
Total
8,074
100.0
32.0
15.3
11.7
14.0
10.2
0.5
1.3
1.0
Ken
4,776
100.0
36.3
16.1
11.5
12. 5
13.7
7.3
1.4
1.2
Women
3, 290
100.0
25.8
14.2
12.1
10.2
19.9
10. 2
1.0
0.0
1 011—14
Men
1.046
100.0
59.0
25.7
11.1
2.8
0.9
0.3
0
0.2
Women
544
100.0
50.0
28.5
14.9
4.0
1.1
0.7
0.2
0
1915-18
Men
B45
100.0
45.1
17.3
20.0
14.7
2. 2
0.3
0.3
0.1
Women
410
100.0
38.0
18.3
19.0
19.5
2.0
1.2
1.4
0
1919-22
Men
722
100.0
35.2
14. 1
12.5
25. 1
11.5
0. 7
0.5
0.4
Women
404
100.0
29. 7
12.0
15.5
28.0
11.4
1.3
0.9
0.4
1923-26
Men
049
100.0
29. 6
11.0
15.4
10.3
23.0
2. 3
1. 2
0.0
Women
514
100.0
19.5
12.6
14.2
20. 0
29.0
*. 1
1. *
0
1927-29
Men
326
100.0
27.0
0. 7
5. 2
18.7
31.0
4.3
2.5
3.4
Women
255
100. 0
25.9
9.8
6. 7
12. 5
39.2
3.1
0.8
2.0
1930-June 1933
Men
212
100.0
24. 1
6.0
0.6
9.4
30.7
15. 1
1.9
4.2
Women
259
100.0
17.4
12.7
10.4
11.2
33.0
12.7
0.8
1.2
July 1933-Sept. 1935
Men
974
100.0
15.4
14.5
4.1
7.8
22.0
28.4
4.3
2.9
Women
840
100.0
8. 2
6. 4
5. 9
16.0
29.0
32.0
1.5
1.0
aBaaed on an NRP tabulation of a sample of company personnel record#.
APPENDIX B
205
they formed a decreasing portion of final separations. That
is, to an increasing extent, what may be called the hard core
of the reserve came to represent a larger portion of the
total reserve.
ANNUAL EARNINGS AT AMOSKEAG, 192S-S4
All the evidence concerning the effects of Amoskeag's decline
on its workers probably can be best summarized by a considera¬
tion of the annual wages the Amoskeag workers earned during the
period of decline and liquidation. The annual wages reflect
more than the revision of wage rates, mostly downward, that was
related in appendixes C and D. They are a resultant also of
the cyclical upswings and downswings, the latter increasing in
severity as the period advanced, as well as of the intermittent
employment, which affected mostly those in the labor reserve.
Variations in the extent of part-time employment, of course,
also figured and probably affected about equally the regular
workers and the labor reserve.
Table E-19.- DISTRIBUTION OP WORKERS BY ANNUAL EARNINGS
AND SEXi 1 92 8- 8 4a
Year
Number of
workers, by
annual
earnings (dollars)
Median
and
250 or
251-
501-
751-
1,001-
1,251-
1,501-
1,751-
Over
annual
sex
Total
under
500
750
1,000
1,250
1,500
1,750
2,000
2,000
earnings
1823, total
1,448
116
172
347
412
201
99
61
17
23
805
Hen
753
46
68
123
189
140
87
60
17
23
937
Women
695
70
104
224
223
61
12
1
0
0
695
1928, total
1,173
160
150
307
315
145
74
16
3
3
726
Men
5 76
53
46
106
156
119
74
16
3
3
865
Women
597
107
104
201
159
26
0
0
0
0
610
1930, total
1,013
206
195
249
195
86
58
18
3
3
607
Men
4 82
67
65
99
100
70
57
18
3
3
777
Women
531
139
130
150
95
16
1
0
0
0
495
1931, total
981
151
191
293
164
102
47
21
7
5
628
Men
474
49
62
103
89
91
47
21
7
5
817
Women
507
102
129
190
75
11
0
0
0
0
531
1932, total
917
223
329
211
102
32
11
4
4
1
430
Men
451
71
120
113
95
32
11
4
4
1
578
Women
466
152
209
98
7
0
0
0
0
0
348
1933, total
1,082
181
383
380
99
29
3
2
5
0
486
Men
547
67
129
222
91
28
3
2
5
0
589
Women
535
114
254
158
8
1
0
0
0
0
403
1934, total
1,213
155
301
492
180
66
6
4
2
7
577
Men
628
63
92
236
158
61
6
4
2
6
670
Women
585
92
209
256
22
5
0
0
0
1
491
Based on an NRP tabulation of a sample of company Income-tax records for workers In the cotton, worsted, and
general sections. Data differ fron those published in Work and Wages at the Amoskeag Manufacturing Company
Mills, 1927-35 (WPA National Research Project In cooperation with Social Security Board, Bureau of Research
and Statistics, Apr. 1937), DP- 12-3, in that the data for each year In this table exclude those workers whose
first accession or final separation occurred in that year.
296
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
In the years for which such data are available, the highest
median annual earnings occurred in 1923 before there was a
whittling away of the wage rates (table E-19). This, however,
amounted to only $805 for all workers combined, with 72 percent
of the operatives earning $1,000 or less. The average annual
earnings declined as wage cut followed wage cut and unemployment
became more widespread, until the average earnings in the depth
of the depression were only $430, slightly more than half the
typical amount earned in 1923. During the NRA, when there was
a reversal in direction of changes in both wage rates and the
TabU E- 10. - MEDIAN ANNDAL EARNINGS OP WORKERS, BY DEGREE
OF SKILL. SECTION, AND SEX, 1928-S4&
Year
and sex
Degree of skill
Section
Totalb
Skilled
Semi¬
skilled
Un¬
skilled
Cotton
Worsted
General
1923
Men
Women
$937
895
$1,128
802
$884
651
$813
4
$831
682
$1,021
721
$1,461
4
1928
Men
Women
885
610
985
608
863
608
794
4
837
582
873
640
1,231
4
1930
Men
Women
777
495
859
459
765
493
665
4
710
484
732
498
1,297
4
1931
Men
Women
817
531
866
568
842
519
678
4
725
491
807
568
1,245
4
1932
Men
Women
578
348
638
353
587
341
475
4
549
333
543
362
933
4
1933
Men
Women
589
403
642
421
568
392
565
4
561
391
606
428
810
4
1934
Men
Women
670
491
824
553
638
468
613
4
650
536
592
424
1,028
4
aBased on an nrp tabulation of a sample of company Income-tax records. For each
year, workers whose first accession or final separation occurred In that year are
excluded. For classification of occupations by degree of skill, see appendix 0.
bincludes clerical workers.
'ttsdlan not computed for fewer than 60 workers.
APPENDIX E
297
volume of employment, there was some improvement in annual
earnings.
A cross-sectional view of earnings such as the above presents
the level of annual earnings in the least favorable light
since it combines the skilled with the less skilled, the
cotton operatives with the worsted operatives and maintenance
mechanics, and the regularly employed with the intermittent
workers of the labor reserve. Accordingly, the differences
among some of these groups are indicated in table E-20.
Striking differences between the earnings of the men and
women in the same economic categories can be explained by
the aforementioned fact that the women sustained more un¬
employment than the men. In the case of the totals, the
differences were accentuated by the fact that the total for
women was more heavily weighted with the semiskilled than
was the total for men.
It has been shown that in the main the skilled, semiskilled,
and unskilled experienced about the same amount of unem¬
ployment. The differentials in annual earnings in favor
of the more skilled are primarily the result of wage-rate
differentials. The operatives in the worsted section had higher
annual earnings than the operatives in the cotton section,
except in 1934. With the exception of that year the worsted
section had somewhat less unemployment than the cotton section.
Of special interest are the median annual earnings of the
regularly employed operatives in any year (those whose weeks
of employment equaled at least 39) and the earnings of the
intermittent workers (those whose weeks of employment did
not exceed 38). (See table E-21.)
From this presentation it is clear why the married women were
obliged to seek intermittent employment. It is somewhat ironi¬
cal that the supplementary earnings should have been the least
when they were the most urgently needed. These figures serve
also to indicate why especially extensive Government relief in
Manchester antedates the shut-down of Amoskeag in 1935.10
This last in itself is an appropriate comment on the effect
of Amoskeag's decline upon the workers. There was, how¬
ever, still another type of adjustment sought by the Amoskeag
10For a discussion of the role of public relief In Manchester see chapter iv.
298
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
libit B-81.- MEDIAN ANNUAL EARNINGS OP REGULAR
AND INTERMITTENT WORKERS, 1928-84*
Year
Number of workers
Median annual earnings
(dollars)
Regular
Intermittent
Regular
workers
Intermittent
workers
1923
928
520
946
489
1928
849
324
850
280
1930
582
431
827
277
1931
078
303
758
265
1932
512
405
614
236
1933
714
368
598
266
1934
905
308
648
286
Based on an nrp tabulation of a sample of company income-tax records. In each
year, the regular workers are those who had at least 39 weeks and the Intermittent
workers those who had less than that number of weeks with some employment. Tor
each year, workers whose first accession or final separation occurred in that year
are excluded.
workers and the dependent residents of Manchester during that
period - that of migration. This, too, is a comment on the
seriousness of the decline since most urban areas during the
greater part of this period were receiving migrants instead
of losing population.
MIGRATION, 1920-84
Extent of Miirntion
In Manchester it is of special interest to note that even
in the decade 1910-20 the decennial increase in the city's
population was slightly less than the natural increase (excess
of births over deaths). To what extent this may be taken as
a reaction to Amoskeag's incipient decline or as a result
of wartime dislocations cannot be definitely determined.
The latter influence, however, very probably was the dominant
one since there was a net emigration of 1,044 men and a net
immigration of 885 women, making a total net emigration of
only 159 during this 10-year period.
When Amoskeag's decline was resumed in the next decade,
1920-30, emigration had reached considerable proportions.
Manchester's population declined by 1,550 in the face of
APPENDIX h
299
a natural increase of 9,030 in the 10 years. Thus the net
emigration over the decade was 10,580, or 13,5 percent of the
city's 1920 population. The emigrants were about equally
divided between men and women, 53.9 percent being men.11
The partial evidence on emigration for the intercensal years
of that decade indicates that the strike of 1922 was the
initial impetus to any real force for the outward migration.
It is necessary, however, to know the limitations of this
evidence in order to appreciate its indicative value.
In an attempt to fill this chronic gap in demographic data
(migration in intercensal years) that exists for even larger
political units than a city, use was made of the assessed
polls list maintained by the Manchester Board of Registrars
of Voters.12
There is no record of migrants under 21 years of age, and
it is impossible to determine what percentage of the total
number of emigrants is covered in a given time period since
there is no way of knowing the total. Between census dates one
can compute only net changes. Whether the number of emigrants
disclosed by the assessed polls list is a varying or constant
percentage of the total cannot then be established. This
percentage would depend primarily upon any variation in each
of these years in the relative adequacy with which the post
office sought to collect forwarding addresses.
On the other hand, the fluctuations in the number of emigrants
over certain years agree with expected behavior from other
evidence. From another source, for example, we know that a
considerable number left Manchester during the 1922 strike, and
Loss of population through migration during the decade or the twenties apparently
characterized most of the urban textile centers In New England If one were to judge
by what happened in Massachusetts. »0f the twenty-five cities having more than
30,000 inhabitants In 1920 (in Massachusetts], only ten gained through migration
during the decade. Eight cities actually diminished In total population, and seven
others unable to absorb their own natural increase lost through migration. The
four industrial cities, Fall River, Lawrence, Lowell, and New Bedford, experienced
migration losses amounting to about twenty percent of the 1920 population."
C. Warren Thornthwalte, Internal Migration in the United. States (Philadelphia, Pa.:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1934). P. 36.
12An annual per-caplta tax Is levied on all resident persons over 21 years of age
regardless of citizenship, although It Is called a poll tax. To facilitate the
collection of this tax, as well as to serve as a check, list of qualified voters, an
Index card has been made out for each person liable to the tax. Every year those
who were no longer residents, because of removal by death or emigration, were placed
in the Inactive file. The Index card carried such Information as date of regis¬
tration and age on that date, marital status, occupation, and place of employment.
Annually the office of the registrars of voters would check with the post office
to determine who had moved out of Manchester and to what locality. Occasionally,
a prospective migrant would notify the office of his Intended removal. The fact
of moving, the year of Its occurrence, and the new location, If known, were entered
on the card before It was placed In the Inactive file. This card-Index system
and procedure were begun In 1914.
300
SHUT-DOWN OP AMOSKEAG
the statistics reflect this rise. A net outward migration
of men and a net immigration of women between 1910 and 1920
are also reflected in these data. Net emigration between
1920 and 1930 was about evenly divided between men and women,
and about the same division appears in the data derived from
the polls lists, 97.2 percent being men. This involves the
assumption that gross emigration by sex would occur in the same
proportion as net emigration. The point should be made that
these data concern permanent emigrants from Manchester since
the discussion involves only those who have changed their
legal residence.13
While the guestion of the representativeness of these data
with respect to the volume of emigration is moot, no reason
suggests itself for believing that they contain any bias and
that this procedure does not yield a random sample. If this
is so, an analysis of the characteristics of the emigrants
should result in reliable information on the types of persons
who resorted to migration as an adjustment to the difficulties
created in Manchester by Amoskeag's decline.
Here again, however, there are certain limitations. Data on
marital status were not used, for example, because this was
recorded at the time of the individual's initial registration.
The same sort of limitation applies tothe industry designation,
but the degree of possible error here was considered to be much
less. Some use was therefore made of this information. In the
case of the workers known to have been Amoskeag employees who
left Manchester, information on personal characteristics was
obtained from their personnel folder on file with the company.
According to these data, only 53 persons emigrated from
Manchester in 1920, 21 of whom had been Amoskeag employees.
The emigrants in the following year numbered 96, including
12 employees from the company. In 1922, the year of the 9-month
strike, there were 311 emigrants; as many as 71 of these had
been employed at Amoskeag. The number of emigrants in the next
2 years, during which nothing untoward occurred either at
Amoskeag or in Manchester, was on the level of those in the
years preceding the strike (table E-22).
13Thls Is an advantage over using all out-of-town forwarding addresses left
with the post office since these are bound to Include many temporary changes,
particularly during vacation and holiday seasons.
APPENDIX B
301
Tab la E-22.- NUMBER OP MANCHESTER EMIGRANTS OVER 21 YEARS
OP AGE, BY INDUSTRY ATTACHMENT AND SEX, 1220-24®
Year
Total number
Number attached to Amoskeag
at time of registration
Total
Men
Women
Total
Men
Women
1920
53
34
19
21
14
7
1921
96
48
48
12
9
3
1922
311
154
157
71
49
22
1923
61
34
27
9
8
1
1924
14
8
6
5
4
1
1925
181
104
77
35
28
7
1926
381
196
185
55
39
16
1927
400
198
202
68
49
19
1928
357
186
171
71
49
22
1929
457
224
233
74
46
28
1930
397
188
209
54
27
27
1931
313
136
177
40
26
14
1932
324
152
172
31
21
10
1933
370
180
190
33
21
12
1934
300
153
147
39
20
19
^ata are compiled from records In the office or the Board of Registrars of Voters,
Manchester, N. H. Women registered as "housewife" have been excluded.
This is not the only evidence of the influence of the strike
on migration. In April 1922 a Manchester newspaper reported:
"The first group of French-speaking people is
planning to leave for Ontario next month and will be
followed by others," Canadian officials said. "The
mill workers are going back to the farms until the
strike is over, at least, and probably for good."14
Later in the same month it was announced that "225 French and
Polish families had left the city",16 and the following week a
"Canadian Government Agent said today that his office has
already sent 350 families to Alberta and Saskatchewan, Canada,
and of that number 150 were from Manchester.1,16
Even after the company had resumed partial operations in
the summer months, emigration continued, as indicated by the
following news item:
A cry of "8 hours" went up from over a thousand
Greeks assembled at the Union station in this city
liManchester Leader, April 5, 1922.
X5Ibid., April 14, 1922.
16Ibid., April 21, 1922.
302
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
this morning to bid farewell to about 500 of their
countrymen who left the city for Glens Falls, N. Y.,
where they have been guaranteed employment with
a construction company.1'
It is of interest that among the emigrants of 1922, aside
from concentrations among Amoskeag employees and housewives,
there were concentrations among those from the trades and
services and the professions; these, of course, served the
underlying population, more than half of whom were unemployed
at this time.
After the strike, emigration in general and of Amoskeag
workers in particular was inconsequential until 1925. The
financial reorganization of this year and the decline in
Amoskeag's employment of more than 3,500 persons over the
average in 1924 apparently forced many in Manchester to realize
that the economic base of the community was weakening. There
was a very decided increase in the number of emigrants with
the continued worsening of employment conditions at Amoskeag
during the latter part of the decade, when most other cities
were enjoying more prosperous times. The average annual number
of migrants in the 4 years 1926-29 was 240 percent more than
the annual average of the 6 preceding years. For the Amoskeag
workers who emigrated, the increase was 168 percent.
Although during the course of the general depression there
was a further demoralization of wage rates at Amoskeag and
the level of its employment reached new lows, there was never¬
theless a decline in the volume of emigration over that in the
late twenties. The annual average number of emigrants in
the 5-year period 1930-34 was 15 percent less than the annual
average in the preceding 4 years. For Amoskeag workers the
decline was 42 percent.
These results are reasonable although counter to the popu¬
lation movements in most cities during the depression years.
The latter had been receiving migrants from rural areas in
large numbers during the twenties, and when they became un¬
employed during the depression, many returned to the rural
areas, changing urban migration from net immigration into net
emigration. Manchester, however, as the census figures reveal,
had not received migrants in any appreciable number for at
^Manchester Mirror, July 86, 1982.
APPENDIX E
303
least a decade before the onset of the general depression.
As a consequence, there could not be a large exodus of rural
people to the rural areas; rather the volume of emigration from
Manchester would be conditioned mainly by the relative volume
of employment opportunities in Manchester and other industrial
centers. Since there had been a general shrinkage in the
number of such opportunities both in Manchester and other
industrial centers, it was reasonable to expect a decline in
the number of emigrants from Manchester in these years.
Character of Miftatios
Aside from indicating probable fluctuations in the volume of
emigration, these data can throw some light on how the selective
factors in emigration worked in Manchester. Were the em¬
igrants, for example, chiefly from manufacturing industries?
Was age a factor in the migration? To what localities did the
emigrants go? These are the main considerations that can be
discussed upon the basis of this material.
Since much the larger part of the outward migration occurred
between 1926 and 1934, the statistics of the census of 1930
may be taken as a representative description of the adult
population of Manchester for the period under discussion.
Our interest centers in the gainfully occupied part of the
population. For this reason the women emigrants who had been
recorded as housewives have been eliminated. However, those
who were gainfully occupied at the time of registration and
later became housewives could not be eliminated.
According to the United States census of occupations for
Manchester in 1930, the gainfully occupied men aged 20 years or
more constituted 66.3 percent of the total gainfully occupied
population of this age. Among emigrants the analogous per¬
centage was 66.7- Thus emigration was proportional to the sex
distribution of the gainfully occupied population of Manchester.
With respect to industry, the emigrants were not distributed
in proportion to the industrial division that existed in the
total gainfully occupied population. For instance, 59.9 per¬
cent of the men in Manchester were gainfully occupied in
manufacturing and mechanical industries. For the women the
percentage was 57.3. In the sample of emigrants, on the
304
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
other hand, only one-third of both the men and women had been
employed in manufacturing and mechanical industries.
This is not a surprising result despite the fact that the
number of jobs in Manchester's manufactures declined about
6,000 between 1919 and 1929, with half the loss attributable
to Amoskeag, while the number gainfully occupied in its trade
and services increased by about 2,000 between 1920 and 1930.
It would appear, however, that the expansion of employment
opportunities in the latter fields was to be severely limited.
Further development of trade and services in Manchester would
largely depend on the wages earned by the underlying population
which was employed at manufactures. We have seen already that
the volume of such employment had been declining and what
employment there was yielded but low wages. With the shrinkage
in job opportunities in manufactures, an increasing proportion
of its population would seek employment in nonmanufacturing
industries. Since, for reasons noted, expansion of such
employment in Manchester could occur only at a low rate and
since this type of employment was expanding at a much higher
rate in many other cities, it is only reasonable that a dis¬
proportionately large number of emigrants should have been
from industries other than manufactures.
The relationship, just mentioned, of the level of wages to
the relative development of trade and services finds support
in some statistics from the census of 1930. All New England
cities that had a population between 50,000 and 125,000 and
in which one-third of the gainfully occupied men were engaged
in manufacturing and mechanical industries were selected for
comparison. There were 16 such cities. Eight of these cities
specialized in the manufacture of either textiles or shoes or
both, industries paying relatively low wages.10 These eight
cities were treated as a unit, as were the remaining eight
cities which produced a diversified line of manufactures.19
These two units were compared with each other and with the
metropolitan city of Boston.
In the textile and shoe cities the annual wage per wage
earner in manufactures in 1929 was $1,076; for the other group
of eight cities the annual wage per wage earner was $1,314.
10The eight cities are Brockton, Fall River, Lawrence, Lcwell, Lynn, New Bedford,
Manchester, and Pawtucket.
19The eight cities are Cambridge, Holyoke, Maiden, Medford, New Britain, Qulncy,
8omervllle, and Waterbury.
APPENDIX B
305
and in Boston's manufactures it was $1,394. I" the first
group, 33.0 percent of the gainfully occupied population in
1930 were engaged in trade, professional service, domestic-
and personal-service and clerical occupations. In the second
group the percentage was 46.2, and in Boston 55.7. An <=x-
amination of the 16 cities individually indicates the existence
of a general correlation of the sort shown here.
The evidence of the data on emigrants does not provide
unequivocal support for the thesis that it is predominantly
the youngest that migrate (table E-23). Thus, of all the men
aged 21 or over gainfully occupied in Manchester in 1930,
9.4 percent were 21 to 24 years of age and only 6.2 percent
of the men emigrants were of this age. In the next age group,
25-39 years, this relationship was reversed; that is, 24.8 per¬
cent of the gainfully occupied population of men were in this
age group compared with 32.2 percent in our sample of men
emigrants. While there were no appreciable differences in the
middle-aged groups, differences reappeared in the older groups
Table E-28.- PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF MANCHESTER'S GAINFULLY
OCCUPIED POPULATION 21 YEARS OF AGE OR OVER, 1980,
AND OF MANCHESTER'S EMIGRANTS, 1920-84,
BY SEX AND AGE
Gainfully
occupied
Emigrants,
1920-34b
Age in years
population, 1930
Men
Women
Men
Women
Total
Number
20,248
10,049
1, 977
987
Percent
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
21-24
9.4
18.7
8.2
12.1
25-34
24.8
31.0
32.2
46.3
35-44
20.0
24.7
25.4
20.2
45-54
20.0
14.5
16.9
11.8
55-04
13.8
7.9
9.6
6.8
85 or over
5.8
3.2
9.7
3.0
Adapted from fifteenth Census of the United States: 1930. "Population" (U. S.
Dept. Com., Bur. Census, 1933), vol. IV, p. 907. The census reports those
20-24 years of age as one group. It is assumed that the number at each age In the
5-year Interval Is Identical. The group total accordingly is reduced by one-fifth
to obtain an estimate of those 21-24 years of age and thereby makes the age
composition comparable with that available for our sample of emigrants.
6Data compiled from records in the office of the Board of Registrars of Voters,
Manchester, N. H.
306
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
with less than the proportionate number aged 55-64 years
among the men emigrants but with those over 65 years of age
being relatively more numerous among the latter. Perhaps this
last could have been due either to these very elderly persons
leaving Manchester to pass their remaining years with relatives
living in other localities or to the fact that they were
dependent members of families that emigrated.
Much the same sorts of differences observed among the men
were present among the women. For example, of all the women
aged 21 years or over who were gainfully occupied, 18.7 percent
were 21 to 24 years old and 31.0 percent were 25 to 34 years.
Among the women emigrants, the respective percentages were
12.1 and 46.3. In the remaining age groups the differences in
the relative distribution of the sample and of the population
were negligible.
It appears from this that Manchester's youngest working
people were not the most mobile; indeed they contributed
less than their quota. Of more importance, however, was the
fact that a disproportionately large number of emigrants
were recruited from the most valuable fraction of the working
population - those between 25 and 34 years of age.20 They were
young enough to be at the height of their physical strength
but yet old enough to be experienced. If emigration of this
fraction of the population should reach any considerable
volume, there can be little doubt that it would seriously
impair Manchester's ability to hold and attract industry.
For the most part, the emigration involved short-distance
moves. Between 1920 and 1929 only 24.6 percent of the em¬
igrants moved to localities outside of the New England States
(table E-24). In the next 5 years this percentage was reduced
to 16.8, which suggests that when the general depression set
in there was even less point than before in leaving the region.
It would appear then that just as a sharecropper is quite
mobile within his county, so the New England millworker is
quite mobile within his region.
A closer examination shows, however, that not only were most
of the moves within the region but also that a large number
20Thls did not differ materially from the age of emigrants out of Fall River,
Lawrence, Lowell, and New Bedford from 1920 to 1980. Thus "the emigration affected
population of all ages, Out the greatest numerical and proportional migration
losses were to the males twenty-five to twenty-nine years of age." Thornthwalte,
op. cit., pp. 36-7.
APPENDIX E
307
T»bU E-94.- PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF A SAMPLE OF
MANCHESTER EMIGRANTS, BY PLACE OF IMMIGRATION,
1990-99 AND 1910-14*
Place of immigration
1920-29
1930-34
Total
Number
1. 173
920
Percent
100.0
100. 0
Rest of Hillsborough County, N. H.
11.8
15.4
Rest of New Hampshire
23.7
35.3
Massachusetts
30.5
23.4
Rest of New England
9.4
9. 1
Rest of United States
20.8
12.4
Foreign countries
3.8
4.4
aData compiled from records in the office of the Board of Registrars of Voters,
Manchester, N. H.
of the moves ended initially in that part of New England
nearest to Manchester. Thus in the decade of the twenties,
two-thirds moved either to other parts of New Hampshire or
to Massachusetts, nearly 12 percent of the total remaining
within Hillsborough County, in which Manchester is located.
From 1930 to 1934 the concentration was even greater, almost
three-quarters of the moves having been restricted to the two
States and as many as 15 percent of the total remaining in
Hillsborough County.
The Middle Atlantic States seemed to have had the most
attractive pull for those leaving the New England region;
nearly 60 percent moved to these States, and almost two-thirds
of these found their way to the metropolitan area of New York
City. California was the next point of concentration, 13 per¬
cent of the long-distance migrants locating there.
Unfortunately, nothing is known about the employment status
experienced by the emigrants in the new localities; only the
fact of migration is known.
The role of home ownership in this migration is difficult
to assess. According to the 1930 census, 34.4 percent of the
more than 18,500 families in Manchester owned their own homes.
Our sample of emigrants was checked against the records of
the city's property-tax division to determine whether the
emigrant or, if married, the spouse had owned his home in
308
SHUT-DOWN OP AMOSKEAG
the year preceding emigration. It is difficult, however,
to reduce the available data on emigrants to family units.
A crude approximation is obtained by omitting the housewives
from the total number of emigrants but including those who
owned homes. On this basis 8.1 percent had owned their homes
a year before leaving Manchester. Obviously, one cannot infer
from this that home ownership impedes geographic mobility,
although there is good reason to believe that it does. It may
reflect only the fact that relatively more home owners than
tenants have been able to make and hope to continue to make
a satisfactory living in Manchester.
Amoskeag Emigrants The emigrants who had been former
Amoskeag employees warrant special discussion since more
details are known about them. The Amoskeag emigrants, es¬
pecially the men, were a somewhat older group than the total
sample of emigrants. For example, among the male Amoskeag
workers 45.1 percent were aged 45 years or over compared with
36.2 percent for the men in the entire sample. There is also
some evidence that their moves were somewhat less concentrated.
Thus, during the decade of the twenties, as well as in the
first half of the following decade, 61.9 percent of their moves
were in New Hampshire and Massachusetts. For the entire sample
the respective percentages were 66.0 and 74.1.
One of the additional details known about the Amoskeag
migrant is his marital status. Among the women emigrants
54,1 percent were married; among the men, 67.9 percent. We
know from a 10-percent sample of the personnel files that
at the time of the shut-down 71.1 percent of the women and
61.1 percent of the men were married. The considerable under-
representation of the married women among the emigrants may
have been the result of the fact that many of the married
women were part of Amoskeag's labor reserve and did not seek
employment elsewhere when work was not available at Amoskeag,
especially if the husband was still employed.21
21For evidence on this point see chapter IV.
Much the same situation also obtained In the New England textile village studied
by Carle C. Zimmerman and Merle E. Frampton as related in Panily and Society
(2d printing; New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1037), p. 310: "The wives of
many of the male owners worked while the mill was running, but the family was not
dependent solely upon their earnings in general, the married women were
dismissed before the husbands, a fact which may have discouraged further Job
seeking. For, naturally, a wife would stay In town at least as long as her husband
was working there. And when he was discharged, the burden of job hunting fell on
his shoulders. Thus, a large portion of the married women dropped out of the labor
market Immediately after dismissal. This may seem to Imply that these women [Con.J
APPENDIX B
309
Of greater interest is the degree of skill of Amoskeag
emigrants as measured by their last Amoskeag job (table E-25).
Such information reveals the very appreciable overrepresentation
of the skilled and office workers among the emigrants and
suggests that these workers had a relatively easier time
in finding employment elsewhere than those less skilled.
This probably was not unrelated to the fact that only one-
third of the Amoskeag emigrants were women, although they
accounted for about half of Amoskeag's working force. That
is, apparently skilled workers were most in demand, and the
women at Amoskeag had been typically employed at semiskilled
occupations. Another factor that would contribute to the same
result was the fact that a large number of the women at Amoskeag
were supplementary wage earners and would not be free to migrate
unless the main wage earner in the household was unemployed
or for other reasons was willing to leave the city.
That emigration meant pulling up roots for a large portion
of the Amoskeag migrants seems very clear from a consideration
of the length of time that they had been attached to Amoskeag.
Table E-25.- PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF AMOSKEAG EMIGRANTS.
1920-84, AND FINAL SEPARATIONS, 1988-86, BY SEX
AND DEGREE OF SKILL OF LAST AMOSKEAG J0Ba
Emigrants,
Pinal separations,
Degree of skill
1920-34
1933-3513
Men
Women
Men
Women
Total
Number
397
199
974
846
Percent
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Skilled
45.0
18.0
24. 9
11.2
Semiskilled
27.7
52.8
51.4
85.0
Unskilled
10.4
2.0
23.1
1.2
Clerical
10.3
20.0
0.0
2.6
aBased on an NRP tabulation of a sample of company personnel records. Names of
emigrants were obtained from records in the office of the Board of Registrars
of Voters, Manchester, N. H. For classification of occupations by degree of skill,
see appendix G.
bThe period extends from July 1, 1933, to September 1, 1935.
21[Cort.]had made some other successful adaptation to their problem, but this Is not
necessarily the case. Never looked for work may mean that the women were unable to
leave their families and household to work out of town, that the expense Incurred
in job hunting had better be Invested In the male worker, or that the woman
thought she could not find work. »ny of these women would return to work If the
Klngsvllle mill were to run again."
310
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
This is measured by the length of the interval between first
accession and final separation. Slightly more than half of
the emigrants had been employed at Amoskeag over a period
of at least 10 years and an additional one-quarter from 5 to 10
years. For about 5 percent this interval of attachment was
as brief as a half-year or less. The Amoskeag migrants, then,
were only to a small extent made up of those with casual
attachments to the company.
The nationality composition of the Amoskeag emigrants is also
of some interest. During this period from 45 to 50 percent
of the company's employees were French Canadians; the Americans,
Irish, and miscellaneous nationalities each accounted for about
12 to 14 percent. About 10 percent of the millworkers were
Poles and about 5 percent Greeks (see table G-6). Among the
migrants, not only were the latter two nationalities under-
represented but the French Canadians as well, accounting for
only about 35 percent of the total. Those overrepresented were
the Americans and, to a lesser extent, the Irish; that is, the
less clannish ethnic groups seemed to have had more mobility.
There is some evidence bearing on the converse of this.
There are very few French-Canadian settlements in towns or
cities outside of the New England States, and the French
Canadians, because of their clannishness, would be reluctant
to move to localities having no compatriots. Accordingly, of
all those that emigrated to places outside of New England,
only 18 percent were French Canadians, although they con¬
stituted 35 percent of the sample of emigrants.
A contributing factor in the case of the Americans was the
fact that they comprised the most skilled workers, particularly
in the machinery section where retrenchment had been quite
drastic as early as 1922. Moreover, since the Americans
had the better jobs, their standard of living was higher than
that of other nationalities. The lowering of the standard of
living with the worsening of conditions at Amoskeag, together
with the possibility of greater opportunities for skilled
workers elsewhere, probably created a greater disposition to¬
ward migration among the Americans than among the other workers.
As in the case of the entire sample of emigrants, nothing is
known about the nature of the adjustment that former Amoskeag
workers had to make as a result of their emigration. To
summarize, all that we know is that much the greater part
APPENDIX E
311
of the net loss of population of 10,000 between 1920 and 1930
occurred in the latter half of the decade and that the loss
probably still continued in considerable but somewhat reduced
volume during the first half of the next decade. The relative
number of men and women emigrants was about the same as the
relative number in the gainfully occupied population of the
city. There was, however, a disproportionately large number
of emigrants from industries other than manufactures and from
the most productive age group, 25-34 years. Typically, the
moves were over short distances, with upwards of three-fourths
of the emigrants remaining within the New England States.
As to the former Amoskeag workers who left Manchester,
there was a greater disposition for emigration among the men
workers than among the women workers although men and women
were about equally represented among the mill employees, among
the single women than the married, among the office workers and
skilled operatives than among the semiskilled or unskilled, and
among the Americans and Irish than among the French Canadians.
Upwards of 50 percent had been attached to the company for
at least 10 years. Their moves, too, were characteristically
within the New England States.
SUMMARY
Thus the more important consequences resulting from the
gradual liquidation or decline of the Amoskeag mills may be
summarized as work for a declining number, widespread inter¬
mittent employment, a continuous lowering of wage rates that
were never very high, increased job assignments by means of the
stretch-out, and long hours. The severity of these working
conditions was temporarily relaxed while the NRA textile codes
were in effect. Since the closing of the mills happened to
coincide with the invalidation of the National Industrial
Recovery Act, the brief respite was merely the calm before
the storm.
A direct result of the gradual deterioration in working
conditions at Amoskeag was the net emigration of about 10,000
Manchester residents in the decade of the twenties. In the
first half of the following decade the volume of emigration was
smaller but still appreciable. Among the social consequences,
then, must be included all that is usually entailed in the
severing of community ties of long standing by a large group
of workers.
APPENDIX F
SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES
Table F-1.- NET SALES AND PRODUCTION COSTS IN THE COTTON AND
WORSTED SECTIONS OF THE AMOSKEAG MANUFACTURING COMPANY,
1906 TO MAY 31, 1926®
(Thouaaode o< dollars)
Net sales
Production
costs
Cotton
section
Worsted
section,
total
costs
Year"
Cotton
section
Worsted
section
Total
costs"
Cotton
and
waste
Direct
labor
Color¬
ing
and dye
stuffs
1906
1907
1908
1909
10.742
12.896
11,723
11.784
6,354
5, 660
4. 560
6,252
10,890
11,317
10,941
11,224
5. 357
5,020
4,493
4,630
2. 972
3,208
2,942
2, 785
977
1,050
1,037
1,058
4, 787
5,022
3, 970
5,818
1910
1911
1912
1913
13,601
14,163
15,209
14,787
8, 131
5,626
6,059
6.996
12.788
13.093
14,315
14,034
6,358
6,482
6,851
6,698
3,259
3,502
3,838
3,944
1,128
1, 165
1,244
1,284
7,749
5,305
5,676
6,580
1914
1915
1916
1917
13,164
13,002
16,259
25,220
5,811
5,891
9,143
14,320
12,296
12,202
14,886
22.860
6,080
4, 780
7,697
13.490
3,807
3,566
4, 049
4,482
1,234
1,175
1. 555
1,901
5,363
5, 383
8. 932
12, 944
1918
1919
1920
1921
35,196
28,737
36,930
23,701
19,813
12.115
10,148
8. 233
26.193
24,537
31,599
22,039
16,286
14, 576
15. 303
5,889
5,247
5.725
7,484
6,874
2, 475
1,525
1. 776
1,828
16,198
11,480
9,864
7,020
1922
1923
1924
1925
(through
May 31)
10,173
22,285
18,333
9. 336
3, 147
9,807
9,804
5,530
9,875
24.074
20,470
10,581
2, 297
12,105
8,053
4,544
2,467
6,584
5,284
2. 508
759
1. 944
1,315
749
2,637
12.582
10,157
4, 494
3Based on semiannual accounts of the Amoslceag Manufacturing company.
''Except for the years 1906-6, which cover the calendar year, the data refer to the
fiscal year ending November 30.
"includes, In addition to specified costs, the costs of taxes, new machinery, and
changes In inventory.
312
T»b1« P-2.- CONSOLIDATED PROFIT AND LOSS STATEMENT OF THE AMOSEEAO MANUFACTURING COMPANY,
JUNE 1, 1 9 2 6-DECEMBER 24, l»8(a
June 1 to
December 31,
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
Net sales:
•15,770.322.63
$28,171,617.41
$27,034,575.28
$27,119,206.97
$29,294,528.30
$19,163,226.19
$15,962,245.91
*9,756,521.52
•13.397.014.96
Cottcua
ID. 1U, 333.64
17,292,045.94
17,514,461.67
17,752,000.01
16,073,7GB. 06
12,866,117.36
0.660.783.06
5,915,563.95
8,476,072.0B
Worsteds
5,656,908.79
10,833,063.34
9, 232,468.28
9.066,659.64
10,263.120.56
6.129, 466.52
6,036.609.00
3.520.226.74
4,845.346.25
Rayons
-
45,888.13
207,645.33
297.859.32
357,699.56
147,642.29
264.653.23
320.710.83
74.793.82
Deduct:
Cost of goods sold
17.078.010.22
29,716,456.79
25,031,985.49
27,129,014.50
27,605,108.20
20.754.001.38
16,517,149.30
10,505.517.06
12,837,015.80
Gross profit (loss) on manufactured
goods sold
21,306,987.S9
21,599,639.38
$1,402,609.79
29,807.53
$1,669,420.00
21,590,773.19
25W.903.39
2798,995.59
*539.999.15
Add - profit en purchased yarn sales
-
-
31.150.56
1,099.29
6,591.10
10,925.01
9,100.25
16,046.59
15.616.58
Gross profit floss; on sales
21 .308.987.59
21 .599 ,639.38
$1,433,760.35
28,708.29
$1,696,011.10
21.579,897.38
2595, 793.19
2732,996.95
»75.615.73
Deduct - operating expenses:
General and acfeinistrative expenses
*217,239.77
•161.93B.96
$172,015.09
$191,448.47
$149,557.75
$134,066.35
$123,090.39
$109,901.91
•155.625.72
Selling expenses
146,069.51
316,016.56
376,601.27
420,344.22
452,196.06
441,406.92
423,695.03
301.780.20
327,916.22
Total operating expenses
$363,300.2B
$499,957.52
$548,696.36
$6U, 792.69
$601,754.61
$575,473.27
$546,900.42
$491,682.11
•463,541. 94
Net profit floss; from operations
21.871.795.87
22,099,586.90
$865,063. 99
SC20.500.93
$1,094,256.49
22,155,320.65
21,092,731.56
21,229,629.06
$92,273. 79
Add - other income:
Interest received, purchase
discounts, etc.
•161,775. 21
$319,844.06
$526,422.35
$179,336.54
$135,543.27
$103,701.03
$114,217.50
$195,164.53
$156,995.75
Profit floss; an cotton future
operations
3,871.72
-
-
99,007.00
20,514.07
13,172.19
3B.065.09
76,829.50
217,126. TO
Profit on bonds retired
-
-
-
-
108,454.33
-
332,750.59
266.090.35
125,456.61
Profit on securities sold
-
65.100.00
-
-
-
-
30.791.96
30,76a 16
Other
-
3,734.39
50,130.39
-
-
"
-
19.157.13
31,951.74
Total other Income
*357.003.49
$323,578.45
$643,632.74
$135,329.54
$264,511.07
$90,529.44
$485,033.IB
$441,194.39
$561.291.16
Total income floss;
21,513.992.38
21,721,018.95
$1,528,710.73
2985,171 .39
$1,358,760.16
22,069,791.21
2607,698.38
.a?
$650,564.95
Deduct - other charges:
Interest allowed to customers
$113,292.86
$206,715.68
$222,963.39
$224,184.41
$223,154.07
$179,106.34
$142,971.05
$100,004.95
$120.96a 83
Interest paid
-
34.545.14
-
10,633.33
41,643.71
19,521.59
250.00
_
7,962.63
Bad debts (net)
28,007.00
42.464.69
101.137. 29
75.129.74
76,220.55
255.103.22
37,797.74
57,015.29
33.962.07
Total other charges
*141,299.97
$263.745. 51
$324,133.65
$310,147.46
$341,226. 33
$453,731.15
$181,010.79
$157,620.24
•162.913.53
Net profit floss; before bcxid interest
21.855,292.35
22.009.763 .96
$1,204,506.06
2795.318.87
$1,017,541.83
22,518,522.36
2788.717.17
2991,059.91
$490,651.42
Bond interest6
-
~
869,144.69
055,406.48
789,686.33
74B,119.70
714.042.27
699,295.22
Net profit f loss J after all charges
21,653,282.35
22,009. 763.96
$1,304,596.06
21,669,963.56
$162,135.35
23,308,208.69
2l,596,636.87
21,655,897.18
2208 ,693.80
Add - net profit floss; of subsidiaries:
George A. Sloan 4 Company, Inc.
-
-
-
67,744.12
-
-
-
-
_
Parkhlll Manufacturing Company
399,921.98
739 ,530.88
109 , 750.82
-
-
-
-
_
Delta Land Company
10,200.11
18,982.76
81 ,560.50
59.286.38
89,553.89
11.709.69
15,791.19
1,559.33
3 ,396.79
Net profit floss; transferred to reserve
$1,000,284.76
377,561.51
for shareholders
22,090,019 .22
22,757,777.60
21,656,005 .82
23.319,918.33
21,552,628.06
21,657,951.51
2212,092.SM
1316.408,296.45
12, CB3.950.96
4.384.344.46
16.409.946.52
•56.34& 93
15.729.7?
*74.076. TO
•i52.cB7.aa
369.000.54
•541.106.17
tve? #29.9 r\
•S2.69B.12
IS.000.00
24.482.97
9&.T5
73.261.44
•13S.S3S.66
233 2,993. *>9
•121.991.64
06,604.15
13.732.31
•222.30B.3Oj
SSS3.62i.09
063.747.46
21.237.569.55
11.396.96
aCopy of statement prepared in 1936 by Stewart, watts, and Bollong,
Mass., for the Bondholders* protective committee of the AnosKeag Manufacturing company,
indicate loss.
[•13,000,421.20
9. US. 643.51
4,764,777.69
13, sib. 9M. ae
•3BL.506.2B
5. BBS. 09
•367.971-37
•35B.3flS.0B
406.030.81
•562.015.89
•33.4D.M
2 f 39m.if
9.709.13
•22,632.30
•93.369.87
11,339. m
MB. 630.61
•25S.aiaas
WS.M.4?
<T71.36l.00
21.097,203.9f
3,206.SB
12.0fl.S2
si .yyd.iTc.j® 21.111 .ma.00
b 1 1
Two-thirds of the bond interest was charged axalnat th» ..... .
section. 8 against tn# cotton section and the reminder against U* worstaa
314 SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
T»bl« r-8.- WPA EMPLOYMENT AND PAY-ROLL C08T8 FOR MANCHESTER,
SEPTEMBER 1BSS-OCTOBER 1» 8 8 &
Year and month
Number of persons6
Pay-roll costs (dollars)
Total
0,347,840
1935
September
9
427
October
450
19,350
November
975
42,900
December
1,530
88,740
1930
January
2,721
119,724
February
3,752
108,840
March
3,825
210,375
April
3,785
204,390
May
3. 524
190,290
June
2,995
104,725
July
2,827
158,312
August
3,245
175,230
September
3, 772
211,232
October
4,007
220,385
November
3,988
218,310
December
3, 730
201,420
1937
January
3,585
197,175
February
3,491
192,005
March
3,388
182,952
April
3,339
170,907
May
3,229
174,300
June
3,214
170,770
July
2,835
153,090
August
2,490
137,260
September
2,543
134,779
October
2,057
140,821
November
2,800
148,400
December
3.102
107,748
1938
January
3,004
194,010
February
3,430
188,050
March
3,802
194,044
April
3,093
188,115
May
3,802
189,000
June
3,745
200,070
July
3,539
191,042
August
3,702
203,148
September
3,847
199,210
October
4,100
221,724
aFrom a special tabulation made for NRP by the New Hampshire Works Progress
Administration.
&WPA employment Is permitted to only one person in a case.
APPENDIX F
315
Tab 1* F-4.- COMPABATIVE CASE LOAD FOB OENEBAL RELIEF
IN S4 NEW ENOLAND CITIES. Itl4-Sla
City and year
Ndmber
of families,
1930 census
Average
case loadb
Average case
load as percent
of number
of families
Bridgeport
1934
35,807
3,794
10.6
1935
4,208
11.8
1936
2,022
5.6
1937
1,907
5.3
1938
2,222
6.2
Hartford
1934
40,646
4,362
10.7
1935
5, 500
13.5
1936
2,699
6.6
1937
2,365
5.8
1938
2,331
5.7
New Britain
1934
15,534
n. a.
—
1935
n. a.
-
1936
805
5.2
1937
468
3.0
1938
887
5.7
New Haven
1934
39,554
4, 579
11.6
1935
4,438
11.2
1936
2,627
6.6
1937
1,816
4.6
1938
2,271
5.7
Waterbury
1934
23,078
1, 231
5.3
1935
1,668
7.6
1936
839
3.6
1937
635'
2.8
1938
1,297
5.6
Bangor
1934
6,859
380
5.5
1935
447
6.5
1936
189
2.8
1937
181
2.6
1938
207
3.0
Lewiston
1934
7,974
635
8.0
1935
738
9.3
1936
391
4.9
1937
534
6.7
1938
663
8. 3
See footnotes at end of table.
316
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
Tab U P.4.- COMPARATIVE CASE LOAD POB QENEBAL BELIEF
IN 24 NEW ENQLAND CITIES, 12S4-22a - Continued
City and year
Number
of families,
1930 census
Average
case load6
Average case
load as percent
of number
of families
Portland
1934
17,478
1,616
9.2
1935
2,217
12. 7
1936
1,789
10.2
1937
1,126
6.4
1938
1,094
6.3
Boston
1934
179,200
36,475
20.4
1935
43,203
24.1
1936
18,744
10.5
1937
16,086
9.0
1938
16,574
9.2
Brockton
1934
16,677
2,244
13.5
1935
2,543
15. 2
1936
1, 366
8.2
1937
1,268
7.6
1938
1, 311
7.9
Cambridge
1934
27,448
2, 755
10.0
1935
3,681
13.4
1936
2,587
9.4
1937
1,928
7.0
1938
2, 166
7.9
Pall River
1934
27,001
4,696
17.4
1935
6,482
24.0
1936
2,758
10.2
1937
2,464
9. 1
1938
3,053
11. 3
Lawrence
1934
20,026
n. a.
-
1935
n • & •
-
1936
540
2.7
1937
577
2.9
1938
1,097
5.5
Lowell
1934
23, 726
n. a.
-
1935
n. a.
-
1936
2,084
8.8
1937
1,608
6.8
1938
2,078
8.8
See footnotes at end of table.
APPENDIX P
317
Table F-4.- COMPARATIVE CASE LOAD FOB OBNEBAL BELIEF
IN Si NEW ENGLAND CITIES, 1114-11* - Continued
City and year
Number
of families,
1930 census
Average
case load"
Average case
load as percent
of number
of families
Lynn
1934
25,880
4,242
16.4
1935
4,584
17. 7
1936
2,139
8.3
1937
1,734
6. 7
1938
2,026
7.8
Maiden
1934
14.164
n. a.
-
1935
n. a.
-
1936
1,005
7.1
1937
942
6.7
1938
1,110
7.8
New Bedford
1934
27,920
3,198
11. 5
1935
4,121
14.8
1936
1,517
5.4
1937
1,552
5. 6
1938
2,465
8.8
Newton
1934
15,315
n. a.
-
1935
n. a.
-
1936
696
4.5
1937
636
4.2
1938
730
4.8
Somerville
1934
25,531
2,529
9.9
1935
3,246
12.7
1936
1,509
5.9
1937
1,470
5.8
1938
1,592
6.2
Springfield
1934
38,066
5,756
15. 1
1935
6,928
18.2
1936
2,590
6.8
1937
2,048
5.4
1938
3,070
8.1
Worcester
1934
45,853
6,091
13.3
1935
7,196
15.7
1936
3,819
8.3
1937
3, 154
6.9
1938
4,837
10.5
See footnotes at end of table.
318
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
Ta b 1 • P.4.- COMPARATIVE CASE LOAD FOR GENERAL RELIEF
IN 14 NEW ENGLAND CITIES, 1»»4-Mft - Continued
City and year
Number
of families,
1930 census
Average
case load"
Average case
load as percent
of number
of families
Burlington
1934
8,004
490
8.2
1935
552
9.2
1936
478
8.0
1937
450
7.5
1938
306
5.1
Rutland
1934
4,356
459
10.5
1935
496
11.4
1936
331
7.6
1937
180
4. 1
1938
175
4.0
Manchester
1934
18,748
2,479
13.2
1935
3,467
18.5
1936
2,642
14.1
1937
2, 180
11.6
1938
2,354
12.6
For all cities except Manchester basic data for: January 1934 to December 1935
from Monthly Report of the federal Emergency Relief Administration; January 1936
to March 1937 from General Relief Statistics: for the fifteen-Month Period
January 193S Through March 1937 (Works Progress Administration, Division of
Research, statistics, and Records, Apr. 1938). PP. 34-39; and April 1937 to
October 1938 from a special tabulation made for NRP by the social security Board,
Bureau of Research and Statistics, Division of Public Assistance Research. Figures
for 1938 are based on a 10-month average. Manchester data for: January 1934
to December 1936 from a special tabulation made for MRP by the Federal Emergency
Relief Administration for New Hampshire; and January 1937 to October 1938 from the
New Hampshire State Board of Welfare and Relief. Figures for 1938 are based
on a 9-month average.
''includes direct relief and work relief but excludes CWA and WPA employment,
n.a. Data not available.
APPENDIX F
319
Ta b 1 • F- 6. - NUMBER OF MEN PER 1M WOMEN AT AMOSKEAO.
BY NATIONALITY. l»lf AND l»2#a
Nationality
1917
1929
Total
114.4
90. 9
Americans
203.5
137.0
French Canadians
81.1
75.4
Irish
93.7
89.7
Poles
115. 5
77.2
Greeks
161. 4
100.8
Other
161. 6
137. 5
aBased on the censuses taken by the company of Its entire personnel as of January l
of each year.
Table F-t.- PERCENTAGE OF MEN 46 YEARS OF AGE OR OVER AT FIRST
ACCESSION AND PERCENTAGE OF MEN AT SAME AGE ENTERING
SKILLED OCCUPATIONS, BY PERIOD4
Period
Men 45 years of age or over
at first accession as percent of -
All men at
first accession
All men entering
skilled occupations
at first accession
1911-14
10. 1
13. 5
1915-18
17.4
24. 0
1919-22
13. 3
M
GO
1923-26
11. 4
li. I
1927-29
11.6
55. 3
1930-June 1933
15.4
26. 5
July 1933-Sept. 1935
18. 3
33.3
aBased on an NRP tabulation of a sample of company personnel records. For classi¬
fication of occupations by degree of skill see appendix G.
320
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
T.b I• P- T. - PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OP PINAL SEPARATIONS,
BY AGE AT PINAL SEPARATION, PERIOD, AND 8EXa
Period and sex
Total
final
sepa¬
rations
Number
age
unknown
Number
report¬
ing age
Percent of number reporting age (yeare)
Total
16-19
20-24
26-34
35-44
46-54
55 or
over
Total
8,074
39
8,035
100.0
13. 3
21.3
26.2
17.3
12. 1
9.8
Men
4.776
32
4,744
100.0
12.8
21.2
25.7
16.2
11.9
12.2
Women
3.298
7
3,291
100.0
13.9
21.6
27.1
18.9
12.3
6.3
1911-14
Men
1.048
4
1,044
100.0
19.9
34.1
26.8
10.1
5.6
3.5
Women
544
1
543
100.0
23.4
30.9
24.9
14.0
5. 3
1.5
1915-18
Men
845
5
840
100.0
13. 5
23.4
29.4
16.7
8.5
8.5
Women
416
0
416
100.0
15.4
30.0
26.9
12.3
10.8
4.6
1919-22
Men
722
6
716
100.0
15.5
16.3
29. 1
16.6
12.0
10.5
Women
464
0
464
100.0
14.7
23.7
32.8
14.2
11.0
3.6
1923-26
Men
649
3
646
100.0
11.0
19.8
28.2
13.3
12. 4
15.3
Women
514
1
513
100.0
13.2
23.2
27. 1
16.0
12.9
7.6
1927-29
Men
326
1
325
100.0
12.3
15.0
23.1
18.8
11.1
19.7
Women
255
2
253
100.0
13.4
15.4
33.6
17.0
11. 1
9. 5
1930-June 1933
Men
212
6
206
100.0
4.9
7.8
21.4
21. 3
18.4
26.2
Women
259
1
258
100.0
13.2
13.2
24.8
20.9
15. 5
12.4
July 1933-
Sept. 1935
Men
974
7
967
100.0
5.6
15.0
18.7
21.8
20.4
18.5
Women
846
2
844
100.0
7.5
13.3
24.2
29.6
17.4
8.0
an u MRP ttOulttlao of a staple of coMDaojr pereonnel records.
T.b 1 • P-8.- PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OP WORKERS
BY YEARS AT LONGEST OCCUPATION,
BY DEGREE OF SKILL AND SEXa
Number of 4-year
periods at longest
occupation*
Totalc
Total
Skilled
Semiskilled
Unskilled
Men
Women
Men
Women
Kb a
Women
Men
Women
Total
Number
Percent
8,079
100. 0
4.776
100.0
3. 303
100.0
944
100.0
741
100.0
2,487
100.0
2, 322
100.0
1,286
100.0
115
100.0
Less than 2
41.4
47.5
32.6
30. 7
17.0
51.7
37.2
52.7
40. G
2- 4
20. 5
20.6
20. 5
16.3
20. 2
20.5
20.8
24.0
19. 1
5- 9
14. 3
11.9
17.7
11.7
20.7
11.9
16.7
11.7
17.4
10-14
7.4
6.1
9.3
8.5
10.7
6.0
8.7
4.4
9.6
15-19
4.7
3. 3
6.6
5.1
9.6
2.8
5.9
2.7
4.3
20-24
3.4
2.9
4. 2
5.3
6.2
2.3
3.6
2.0
3.5
25-29
2.3
2.0
2.7
5.3
3.6
1. 5
2. 4
0.5
1.7
30-39
2.7
2.4
3.2
6.9
6.3
1. 5
2. 3
0.8
0
40 or over
3.3
3.3
3.2
10. 2
5.7
1.8
2.4
1.2
3.5
aBased on an NRP tabulation of a sample of company personnel records. For classification or occupations by degree of
skill see appendix 0.
*Not necessarily years of continuous employment. See appendix G.
cincludes clerical workers.
APPENDIX G
THE COMPANY PERSONNEL AND INCOME-TAX RECORDS
THE PERSONNEL RECORD
The system of record-keeping embodied in the Amoskeag per¬
sonnel record was begun in the latter part of 1911 and from
1912 to the end of operations in 1935 was under the direction
of the same individual. This doubtless has made for a greater
uniformity of entries than would otherwise be expected over
a 25-year period.
The character of the information to be had from the personnel
record may be best indicated by describing the procedure of
securing employment and of being separated from the pay roll.
On obtaining employment at Amoskeag for the first time a
personnel folder about 4 inches by 6 inches was made out in
the worker's name. This folder would be filed in alphabetical
order by sex. In the folder would be placed a duplicate
of the employment pass which the worker had to show in order
to gain admittance to the mill. On the employment pass was
recorded information of the following character: Present age,
marital status, number of dependents, occupation and department
to which assigned, location of the job in the mill yard, the
wage rate if paid at an hourly rate, the date employment had
begun, and the pay-roll number. There was also an entry
on previous experience, but usually this was disregarded unless
the worker had been previously employed at Amoskeag. This was
indicated by entering the pay-roll numbers previously assigned
to this person.
Transfer and separation from the pay roll were each recorded
on a separate form and placed in the worker's personnel folder.
The former, however, was recorded only when the new job was
under the jurisdiction of a different overseer. In such
an instance the transfer slip stating the nature of the occupa¬
tional shift and change in wage rate or pay-roll number, if
any, would be forwarded to the employment office. If an
overseer merely transferred a worker to another task within
his department, this would not be recorded in the employment
office unless it involved a change in wage rate or pay-roll
321
322
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
number. Consequently, the extent of transfers as measured
from the personnel record is appreciably understated.
On the separation slip was recorded,in addition to the
occupation and section (cotton, worsted, or general) from
which separated and the effective date, the reason for separa¬
tion and any remarks of the overseer. A worker, however, would
not be separated from the pay roll because of curtailment of
operation if the ensuing period of unemployment was regarded
as temporary . In practice much latitude was used in defining
temporary. As a general rule it was not to exceed 3 months,
but some instances of a longer duration were found. At any
rate, it is clear that the interval between accession and
separation does not necessarily represent employment. Rather,
it represents a period of attachment, from the company's
viewpoint. Actually the interval may include one or more
spells of unemployment. Thus employment as measured from the
personnel record is overstated and unemployment understated.
When an operative was rehired, an employment pass was again
issued and a copy placed in the operative's personnel folder.
The procedure described above would be followed for any other
transfers, separations, or reaccessions to the pay roll. The
number and variety of slips deposited in a given personnel
folder would depend on the turn-over rate of the individual
concerned.
The sample of Amoskeag workers that was utilized in this
report is based on the file of these personnel folders. The
data were transcribed on the personnel-record schedule re¬
produced at the end of this appendix.
THE INCOME-TAX CARD
Since the Federal income-tax law requires an employer to
report incomes of $1,000 or over earned by persons in his
employ, Amoskeag complied by making out a card for each person
on the pay roll, on which was entered the amount of weekly
earnings throughout the course of a calendar year. A blank
entry in a given week signifies a week of unemployment. This
record can be used, therefore, to examine the intervals of
employment and unemployment in a given year as well as for
an analysis of weekly and annual earnings. For the year 1934
the weekly hours worked were also entered, thus making it
APPENDIX G
323
possible to analyze part-time employment for that year. This
record also designates occupation and section at the time
the card was made out.
The cards were made out in February of each year to cover
that calendar year, with cards added later for new workers
as necessary. Accordingly, if an individual did not work
after January in a given year, he would have no income-tax
card. This record is available for the years 1923 and 1928
and continuously from 1930 through 1935. All those in the
sample based on the personnel folders who were employed in
any of these years were matched with the income-tax card
or cards of the respective years. This record was transcribed
on the income-tax-record schedule presented at the end of
this appendix.
SAMPLING PROCEDURE AND REPRESENTATIVENESS OP THE SAMPLE
The personnel records of the Amoskeag Manufacturing Company
were kept in three sets of files, with the records for men and
women separately filed in each set. The records in each set
were filed in alphabetical order without regard to the date of
first accession to the pay roll. One set contained the records
of those who had been employed any time in 1934 and 1935.
Another set was reserved for those who had died, either while
on the pay roll or after final separation from Amoskeag, and
for those regarded by the personnel office as superannuated.
The third set of files included all others who had been em¬
ployed at Amoskeag ever since 1911 for any duration, no matter
how long or short. Every tenth personnel record in each of the
three sets of files was withdrawn to compose the sample.
It is difficult to determine in what respects this 10-percent
sample is representative or nonrepresentative of the 80,800
persons who passed through the Amoskeag gates between 1911 and
1935 since so little is known about the characteristics of
the total population. There is no doubt whatever that the
proper sex ratio has been maintained since the arrangement
of the files dictated this. It is certain also that 10 percent
of those who worked at Amoskeag within the last year of its
existence nave been included in the sample. But here certainty
ends. With respect to certain characteristics, a more or less
informed guess as to the representativeness of the sample may
324
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
be made; with respect to other characteristics, complete
ignorance prevails.
In the former category is the question of whether this
method of sampling yields a 10-percent sample for a given
time period, outside of the years 1934-35. This can be tested
in an approximate manner for three periods - prosperity,
depression, and NRA. It is an approximation in that the
total number of different individuals in the universe must be
estimated upon the basis of an untested assumption. From
a company record that extends from January 1, 1924, to June 30,
1935> it is possible to determine the total number added to the
pay roll in a given period. This total is composed of those
rehired and those hired for the first time (first accessions).
Those in the sample have been classified by their rehiring
rate within a period which permits the calculation of the
number of rehirings contributed by the sample. The number
of first accessions within the sample is also known, as well
as the number of different persons in the sample employed
in a given period.
The basic assumption involved is that the ratio of hirings
in the sample and universe applies to the numbers of individuals
in the sample and universe. Since the number of sample hirings
is based on the minimum of 1,777 persons, the assumption seems
rather well taken. Application of the ratios to the numbers
of different individuals in the sample yields the following
results (table G-i): The sample was 7.9 percent of the universe
in the period of prosperity (1927-29). 8.6 percent in the
depression period (1930-June 1933), and 7-9 percent in the NRA
period (July 1933-35). By a variation of this method the sample
for the years 1924-26 is found to be 13.9 percent.
The years 1924-26 do not correspond exactly to one of our
periods, since the post-strike period extends from 1923 to
1926. Company data were available, however, beginning with
the year 1924. Since the sample rehiring rates were based
on a 4-year period, the number of sample rehirings had to
be adjusted for the 3-year period. It was necessary also
to adjust the number of different individuals in the sample
for the same reason. This was done by subtracting the number
of final separations in the sample for the year 1923 from the
number of persons employed in the period 1923-26.
APPENDIX G
325
Tabl• 0-1.- TOTAL HIKINGS OF ALL WORKERS AND OF SAMPLE
AND PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL DIFFERENT PERSONS
IN SAMPLE, BY PERIOD. 19RT-IS
Item
1927-29
1930-June 1933
July 1933-35
Total hirings
All workers5
22,344
27,963
18,498
Sample6
1,773
2,407
1,307
Rehirings
First accessions
1, 382
391
2,051
350
978
329
Different persons
in sample as
percent of
total different
persons0
7.94
8.61
>3
co
to
aBased on Amoskeag personnel records on deposit at Hamilton Smith Library, Univer¬
sity of New Hampshire, Durham, N. H.
6Based on an NRP tabulation of a sample of company personnel records.
cFigures represent ratios of total hlrlngs In sample to total hlrlngs In universe.
Based on the results for four of the seven periods, it would
appear that the sampling procedure results in subsamples that
are fairly close to 10 percent of all persons ever employed
at Amoskeag within a given period.
An informed guess can also be made on the matter of propor¬
tional distribution of the members of the sample among the
three industrial sections: Cotton, worsted, and general.
Whether the method of sampling results in a sectional distribu¬
tion proportional to the distribution that obtained at Amoskeag
can be tested for at least one set of files, that is, for the
personnel at Amoskeag in the last year or two of its operations.
For the whole of Amoskeag this distribution is known from
a count of all the income-tax cards of 1935* The distribution
for the sample was secured from the tabulation of those who
separated finally from the pay roll in 1935 by the section
in which these people were last employed. Since that was the
year of the shut-down, it involved the entire sample of that
year. The comparison is set forth in table G-2.
It appears that the distribution within the sample conforms
closely to that of the universe, most of the divergences being
explainable by sampling errors. Since all files were arranged
326
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
TabU 0-2.- DISTRIBUTION OF ALL WORKERS AND THOSE IN SAMPLE,
BY SECTION, 1986*
All workers
Sample
Section
Number
Percent
Number
Percent
Total
17,074
100.0
i,ei3b
100.0
Cottonc
10.795
63.2
1,059
85.7
Worsted
4,898
28.7
444
27.5
General
1,363
8. 1
110
8.8
aBased on an NRP tabulation of company Income-tax records.
6If the count or 1 in 10 was made correctly, the sample total for the year
1935 should be 1,70? Instead of 1,813. The difference may be due In part to
inaccuracies In counting. But possibly of more Importance In explaining the
difference Is the fact that the file of Income-tax cards contains some duplicates.
That Is, In some Instances when a worker was transferred from one department
to another or even between sections within a given year, the card was not similarly
transferred, but another card was made out and filed under the new department. How
widely this procedure was followed cannot be determined.
cThe total Includes 125 and the sample 13 workers previously employed In rayon,
whose sectional designation was not changed In the tabulations for the periods
after the liquidation of the rayon section.
in the same order, this may be taken as presumptive evidence
that a fairly good industrial distribution within the sample
was obtained for other years.
When the divisions are broken down into departments (picking
and carding, spinning, weaving, etc.), however, there is
considerably less conformity of the sample with the universe.
This test could also be made for 1935. The count of the
income-tax cards could be arranged by departments for the
cotton and worsted sections. The personnel cards of those
who separated in 193s were tabulated by final section and
occupation, and these were classified by departments. These
results are presented in table G-3.
The proportional representation by departments in cotton
is only fair. However, no use is made of distributions by
departments; rather, workers are grouped by classes of skill:
Clerical, skilled, semiskilled, and unskilled. (The occupa¬
tions included under each class of skill are listed at the
end of this appendix.) It is assumed that the distribution by
classes of skill is related to the distribution by departments;
but by decreasing the number of groupings from six to three,
more adequate numbers are achieved, and possibly a better
APPENDIX G
327
Tmb1« G-8.- DISTRIBUTION OF ALL WORKERS AND THOSE IN SAMPLE,
FOR THE COTTON AND WORSTED SECTIONS,
BY DEPARTMENT,
All
Sample as
Section and department
workers
Sample
percent of
all workers
Cotton, total
10,070
1,046
9.8
Picking and carding
1,835
200
10.9
Spinning
2,854
232
8:1
Dressing, working, and spooling
1,355
191
14.1
Weaving
3,376
317
9.4
Bleaching and dyeing
490
61
12.4
Cloth room
760
45
5.9
Worsted, total
4,896
444
9.1
Wool sorting
240
13
5.4
Carding and drawing
970
36
3.7
Spinning and twisting
1,000
85
8.5
Dressing and warping
266
28
10.5
Weaving
025
81
13.0
Dye house
240
14
5.8
Cloth room and grey burling
1,555
187
12.0
aBased on NRP tabulations or company Income-tax records and of a sample of company
personnel records.
approximation to a proportional representation in terms of
skills is obtained. This applies with greater weight to the
worsted industry since there is still less conformity by
departments between the sample and universe and the number of
cases is still less adequate. Again the 193s data are the
basis of presumptive evidence that the same sort of situation
obtains in other years.
It would be of interest to know whether the sampling pro¬
cedure included 10 percent of all persons hired in a given
year or period. Actually this is all that was determined
by virtue of the method used to find out whether the number
of individuals in the sample is 10 percent of the number
in the universe for a given period. Since the percentages
in the above instance are considered reasonably good, the same
must apply here.
Hirings, however, are composed of rehirings and first ac¬
cessions. The proportional representation of the latter can
328
SHUT-DOWN OP AMOSKEAG
be tested for the years 1924 through 1927 (table G-4). For
each of these years the number of first accessions at Amoskeag,
as well as the number in the sample, is known.
Table G-4.- DISTRIBUTION OP FIRST ACCESSIONS OF ALL WORKERS
AND OF THOSE IN SAMPLE. H24- 276
Year
Number of first
access ions
Percent of total
number of persons
Ac t ua 1
difference
between
percentages
for all
workers
and sample
Difference
expressed
in units
of standard
deviation
All
workers
Sample
All
workers
(N=80.800)
Sample
(N=6,080)
Total
3,483
338
4.3106
4.1832
0.1274
0. 54
1924
722
76
0.8936
0.9406
.0470
0. 42
1925
579
70
0.7166
0.6663
. 1497
1.40
1926
1.281
129
1.5854
1. 5965
. 0111
0.08
1927
901
63
1.1151
0.7797
.3354
3.21
aBased on an NRP tabulation of company personnel records.
If a difference of two standard deviations is considered the
limit of sampling errors, all relative differences between the
sample of first accessions and the total of first accessions,
except for 1927. can be explained by sampling errors. If
accessions over the 4-year period are used, the relative
difference is not significant. If on this showing the first
accessions are considered to be accurately sampled with respect
to numbers, any under- or overstatement of the sample of
hirings must be attributed to an under- or overstatement
of sample rehirings.
The sample of separations from the pay roll in a given period
can be tested by a method somewhat similar to that for all
hirings (table G-i). That is, the sample number employed in
a given period is classified by separation rates, and by apply¬
ing the rates against the number employed, the total number
of separations can be ascertained. Since these rates exclude
final separations, these must be added to the computed figure.
All separations from Amoskeag (final or otherwise) are available
from company records. The comparison is made in table G-s-
The percentage for the years 1924-26, making use of the type
of adjustment described above for this period, is 12.91. Again
APPENDIX G
329
Tabl* Q-t.- TOTAL SEPARATIONS OP ALL WORKERS AND OF SAMPLE
AND PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL SEPARATIONS INCLUDED
IN SAMPLE. BY PERIOD, 1927-8*
Separations
1927-2 9
1930-June 1933
July 1933-35
All workers, total4
23,233
28,578
18.419
Sample6
1,904
2,398
2,400
Final separations
Others
581
1,323
471
1,927
1.813
587
Sample as percent
of all workers
8.20
8.39
13.03
aBased on Amoskeag personnel records on deposit at Hamilton smith Library,
University of New Hampshire, Durham, N. H.
6Based on an NRP tabulation of a sample of company personnel records.
it may be concluded that the sampling procedure at least does
not produce erratic results.
Possibly of more significance than all previous measures for
indicating the random character of the sample is the comparison
of the relative distribution of nationalities within the sample
and all of Amoskeag. Such a comparison is possible for all the
periods included within the interval between 1919 and 1929, for
which years company summaries are available. This comparison
is made in table G-6.
In each period examined, the relative distribution of the
important nationalities in the sample is similar to that
for Amoskeag. The only consistent difference is the French-
Canadian group which is overrepresented in the sample by 5 to
6 points, while sample errors would allow for about 2 points.
This suggests that there may have been more similarity of
family names (leading to some duplication) among the French
Canadians than among the other nationalities.
If there had been an alphabetical concentration of names by
nationalities and if the subsequent analysis should disclose
a high degree of association between a certain type of behavior
and a nationality group, the tabulations doubtless would
be biased. However, all the tests, and particularly the com¬
parison of the relative distribution of nationalities, indicate
the random character of the sample. This is important even
though no attempt has been made in this report to reconstruct
the universe on the basis of the sample.
330
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
Table 0-6.- PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OP ALL WORKERS
AND OP SAMPLE, BY IMPORTANT NATIONALITIES
AMD PERIOD, 1616-16®
1919-
-22
1923-
-26
1927-
-29
Nationality
All
All
All
workers
Sample
workers
Sample
workers
Sample
Total
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
Americana
13. 59
11.80
13.30
11.49
12.42
11.96
French Canadians
39. 16
45. 52
45. 76
52.08
46.05
51.03
Irish
14.54
11.40
12.09
10.39
12. 96
10.64
Poles
10. 24
8. 90
9. 66
9.43
11.11
11.43
Greeks
7.41
8. 28
5.65
4.66
4.68
4.10
Other
15.06
14. 10
13. 54
11. 95
12. 78
10. 84
aBased on the company censuses and a sample of company personnel records.
PERIODS INTO WHICH DATA HAVE BEEN GROUPED POR ANALYSIS
A year-by-year analysis of the 10-percent sample, however,
would not involve a sufficient number of cases to yield rep¬
resentative results with respect to most items. Consequently,
the grouping of years into periods is used. In delimiting
periods, an attempt is made to mark off years that presumably
would have been affected by a similar set of outside influences
or company policies. They do not necessarily coincide with
a cycle of business in general or of Amoskeag in particular-
It is desirable to have as many periods as possible of equal
duration since the magnitude of several items to be analyzed
is dependent on the time period covered.
The ^-year interval from 1911 through 1914. designated as
the pre-war period, was one of slowly declining production.
The war period, 1915-18, was a period of instability with
declining production in the cotton section and in the worsted
section as well, with the exception of 1917 when there was
a sharp increase in output of worsted. Advances in wage rates
were frequent, and the workweek was reduced from 55 to 54 hours
in the last year of the period. In the post-war period,
1919-22, there was also much instability with declining pro¬
duction in both branches. The increases in wage rates and the
reduction of hours in the first half of the period gave way
in the second half to reductions in wage rates and to an
increase in the length of the workweek, culminating in the
APPENDIX G
331
9 months' strike in 192a. These three periods coincide with
the era of company welfare policies.
The post-strike period, 1923-26, was one of continued adjust¬
ment to the war's aftermath and to the intensified competition
of the southern mills. The months at either end of the period
represent the culmination of upswings, the latter part of 1924
representing a trough. The welfare program was abandoned, and
trade unionism was supplanted by a company union. The 3-year
period 1937-29 is termed one of prosperity, for the cyclical
peaks in 1927 and in the first half of 1929 are higher than
the surrounding peaks, and the depression of 1928 does not
descend to the levels of the other depressions of the decade.
And in 1929 the company paid the only earned dividend since
the strike of 1922.
The remainder of Amoskeag's history is divided into two
parts. The first is the depression period extending from 1930
through June 1933. This coincides with the general business
depression and the pre-NRA boom in the spring of 1933. In the
last year of the period the United Textile Workers of America
gained sufficient strength to supersede the company union.
The final period extends from July 1933 to the closing
of the mills which virtually took place in September 1935.
With the exception of the last few months, it is coextensive
with the period covered by the NRA textile code. The activity
in 1935 reflects the company's decision to process all inven¬
tories on hand before pressing for financial reorganization.
It is this that caused the upswing and the sharp decline.
THE SKILL CLASSIFICATION OF OCCUPATIONS1
The occupational information secured from the personnel
records and income-tax cards was grouped for the purposes
of analysis into four classifications - clerical, skilled,
semiskilled, and unskilled - as follows:
Complied by Anthony Debsk.1, a former member of the Amoskeag personnel office.
332
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
Occupation and skill
Occupation and skill
CLERICAL
SEMISKILLED - Continued
Creelers and tie-over girls
SKILLED
Cutters (cloth)
Blacksmiths
Doffers
Card grinders
Filling and warp
Card tenders and millwrights
Yarders
Construction, maintenance,
Drawers-in (girls)
and other mechanical
Drawing-frame tenders
occupations not else¬
Dressers
where classified
Dry-can tenders (cloth)
BeItmen
Dyers (chain beam and top)
Boilermakers
Finishers and dandy
Coremakers
hands (yarn)
Drillers
Firemen (stationary)
Masons
Folders, winders, and
Molders
doublers (cloth)
Painters
Fullers
Plasterers
Graders
Riggers
Harnessmakers
Tinsmiths
Helpers not elsewhere
Water tenders
classified
Welders
Inspectors, trimmers,
Electricians
sorters, and examiners
Engineers
Knot- and warp-tying
Hoisting
operators
Stationary
Machinists' helpers
Foremen and overseers
Menders, darners,
Loom fixers
and speckers
Machine fixers
Oilers
Machinists and automobile
Packers and wrappers
mechanics
Perchers
Plumbers
Picker tenders
Second hands and gang bosses
Piecers
Section hands
Quillers
Stationmen
Reelers and stringers
Weavers
Sewing-machine operators
Wiremen
Sliver tenders and
frame tenders
SEMISKILLED
Slubber hands
Apprentices and learners
Spare hands
Back tenders, warpmen, roll-
Spear hands and nappers
men, and beam changers
Spindle gagers and setters
Battery hands
Spinners
Beamers (chain)
Spoolers
Bleach-house workers
Steamer hands
Bobbin boys and girls
Stretchers and tenter-frame
Calender men and pressmen
tenders
Card strippers
Testers
Card tenders
Truck drivers and chauffeurs
Cloth burlers
Truckers, handlers, etc.
Color mixers
Twisters
Comber tenders
Warpers and beamers
APPENDIX G
333
Occupation and skill
Occupation and skill
SEMISKILLED - Continued
UNSKILLED - Continued
Warp fitters
Elevator hands
Washer tenders (cloth
Filling boys
and wool)
Handy men
Weighers
Laborers, etc.
Winders and doublers (yarn)
Roll-shop workers
Wool scourers
Roving boys
Wool sorters
Scrubbers and Janitors
Others not elsewhere
Sweepers
classified
Watchmen
Yarn boys and girls
UNSKILLED
Balers
Dye-house workers
334
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
PERSONNEL-RECORD SCHEDULE
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APPENDIX
G
335
INCOME-TAX-RECORD SCHEDULE
APPENDIX H
OCCUPATIONAL-HISTORY SCHEDULE AND DEFINITIONS
OF IMPORTANT TERMS
OCCUPATlONAL'HISTOBY SCHEDULE
APPENDIX H
337
DEFINITIONS OF IMPORTANT TERMS
The occupational-history schedule, NRP Form #20, was used to
secure the field-survey data. Certain terms on the schedule
which are not self-explanatory are defined below:
Age is the age on last birthday prior to November 1936.
Years in City were calculated from the beginning date of the
most recent period of continuous residence in the community.
Absences of 6 months or less were not counted.
Employment History: The employment data were divided into
the first job, the longest job, and all jobs between 1926 and
October 15, 1936. This last section called for a chronological
record of changes in employment status, the character of
employment, and the kind of work performed. The information
was entered in this section by beginning with the person's
employment status at the time of the interview and working
back in chronological order to January 1, 1926.
A job was defined as gainful employment lasting for 1 month
or more in an occupation with a single employer. Periods of
employment or unemployment of less than 1 month's duration were
not entered. Unpaid apprenticeships were not considered as
jobs. Self-employment and ownership were distinguished and
included those usually self-employed, or doing contract or
specialized work, or owning the establishment.
The character of employment was determined and classified
into regular or intermittent work in private industry, self-
employment, emergency work, or unemployment. Full time and
part time were also distinguished. Intermittent employment was
applied to the service of persons constituting "spare hands"
or "contingent crews" on call for a particular employer or
extra crews hired to complete orders in the "rush" period in
industries which ordinarily offered regular employment.
Unemployment History: Unemployment, to be recorded, had to
be likewise of a month's duration or more. Unemployment was
divided into unemployment seeking work and unemployment not
seeking work. Employment status was determined according to
whether or not the person had a job on October 15, 1936. If a
man was employed at the time even though he was looking for
another or an additional job, he was not regarded as seeking
work. If the person was not seeking work during any month of
338
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
the period between 1936 and the date of the survey, the reason
for not seeking work was entered. Possible reasons were: Out
on strike, temporarily disabled (sick for over 1 month but
under 1 year without pay), permanently disabled (illness of
1 year or more), retired persons living on income or pension,
persons 6s and over who have not worked in the last 5 years,
and those who consider themselves or are considered by their
relatives as too old to work.
Emergency Work: Emergency work was used as an inclusive term
to cover all forms of government-made work, whether city,
State, or Federal. If it was of more than 1 month's duration,
it was entered, regardless of the number of hours employed
per week. Although emergency work was entered as such, it was
considered as unemployment in the computation of periods
of unemployment.
APPENDIX I
SOME EVIDENCE ON THE RELIABILITY OF AN
EMPLOYMENT HISTORY BASED ON THE WORKER'S MEMORY1
A work history based on the memory of the worker, as recorded
on a schedule by an interviewer, always gives rise to a ques¬
tion concerning the accuracy of the information so obtained.
The materials of this study provide an opportunity to compare
the duration of the work history based on interview with the
duration of the supposedly same work experience derived from
the company pay-roll record.
The work-history schedule provided for recording the chrono¬
logical history of employment and unemployment for the 10-year
period preceding the enumeration, beginning with the most
recent experience. Occupation, industry, name of employer, and
reason for change of status were also given.
A change of status requiring a separate entry on the schedule
was defined as any one of the following situations:
Shift from one employer to another.
Shift from unemployment to employment or vice versa, indi¬
cating in each case whether seeking or not seeking work.
Shift from one occupation to another without changing employer.
Shift from not seeking work to seeking work or vice versa.
The status "not seeking work" includes voluntary removal from
the labor market because of marriage, desire for a vacation, or
household duties; or involuntary removal because of illness,
disability, age, etc. Any status which was maintained for less
than a month was not recorded. Schedules were filled out by
enumerators while interviewing workers in their homes.
For 5 consecutive years (1930-34) of the 10-year period, the
income-tax cards recording weeks of some employment and of no
employment were available.2 Accordingly, the comparison was
undertaken only for that quinquennium and only for employment
at Amoskeag as reported on the income-tax card. That is,
^Adapted from an NRP memorandum prepared by Marvel Keller with the assistance of
Alice Rush, April 1938.
2For a description of this record see appendix G.
339
340
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
employment other than at Amoskeag is regarded as no employment
for the purposes of this appendix. Non-Amoskeag employment,
however, formed only a small fraction of total employment
during this period.
The comparison is based on 227 persons who had been employed
at Amoskeag for some time during the period from 1930 to 1939.
This number with the requisite Amoskeag experience was obtained
by calling at every seventh house in Manchester, the best
residential district being excluded. It would appear to be a
random sample.
A period of employment or of no employment that lasted
for 4 weeks or less according to the income-tax card was
disregarded in order to place the two work histories on a
comparable basis. A record of employment or of no employment
secured through interview is designated as "reported" in
contradistinction to "actual" employment or no employment
recorded on the income-tax card.
The results of the comparison are set forth in table I-i,
according to four tenure groups: Those reporting one job with
continuous employment during the 5 years; those reporting one
job but with one or two periods of no employment; those report¬
ing more than one job with some periods of no employment; and
Tiblt I-l.- NUMBER OP CASES IN WHICH TOTAL DURATION OF
EMPLOYMENT AS REPORTED AGREED WITH, WAS LESS THAN,
OR EXCEEDED ACTUAL TOTAL DURATION,
BY REPORTED TENURE GROUP4
Number
Number
of cases of -
Reported tenure group
of
workers
Agree¬
ment
Under¬
state¬
ment
Over¬
state¬
ment
Total
227
32
37
158
One job, continuous employment
104
20
84
One Job, 1 or 2 periods of no
employment
85
8
28
49
More than one job, 1 period
or more of no employment
34
4
5
25
No employment
4
0
4
-
Based on special tabulation of data from company income-tax records and from
NRP Interview schedules (Form 20). The data cover 1930-341 the reported data
were secured In October 1936. (For definition of Job as used here, see text of
this appendix.)
APPENDIX I
341
those reporting no employment during the 5 years. Among the
striking results is the relatively small number that reported
their duration of Amoskeag employment with complete accuracy.
Thus in only 14.1 percent of the 227 cases did the reported
duration of employment agree with the actual duration. As one
would expect, agreement occurred with relatively more frequency
among those reporting continuous employment, but even in that
group it amounted to only 19.2 percent of the cases. Under¬
statement of employment occurred with about the same frequency
(16.3 percent) as did agreement, whereas more than two-thirds
of the cases involved overstatement.
The extent of the misstatement of the duration of employ¬
ment in terms of man-months, however, was not so extreme as
the above would indicate, although the net exaggeration of
employment duration was still considerable (table I-2). That
is, the reported employment of the 227 persons amounted to
10,161 months, although their actual employment equaled only
8,254.5 months. This is an overstatement of 23.1 percent of
the months of actual employment. Of the first three tenure
groups, those reporting more than one job overstated their
employment duration somewhat more than did those reporting only
one job with or without periods of no employment - an over¬
statement of 29 percent compared to 22 and 23.3, respectively.
Table 1-2.- COMPARISON OF NUMBER OF ACTUAL MONTHS OF
EMPLOYMENT WITH THE NUMBER REPORTED.
BY REPORTED TENURE GROUP&
Number
Total months of
employment
Overstate¬
ment of
employment
as percent
of actual
employment
Reported tenure group
of
workers
Reported
Actual
Total
227
10,161
8.254.5
23.1
One job, continuous
employment
One job, 1 or 2 periods
of no employment
More than one job,
1 period or more
of no employment
No employment
104
85
34
4
6,240
2.517
1,404
0
5,062.5
2,063.5
1,088.5
40.0
23. 3
22.0
29.0
aSee table i-l.
342
SHUT-DOWN OF AMOSKEAG
The latter relationships suggest that those reporting jobs of
longer duration tended to have actual jobs of longer duration
but not so long as reported.
The overstatement of employment was due not merely to the
workers' reporting jobs for a longer duration than actually
held but was due also to their failure to report entire periods
of no employment. This is indirectly disclosed by a com¬
parison of the number of jobs (at Amoskeag) reported and those
actually held (table I-3). Thus those reporting continuous
employment in the 5-year period failed to report nearly two-
thirds of their actual jobs that had been interrupted by
almost 1,200 months of no employment. Even those reporting
more than one job failed to mention almost one-fourth of the
actual number held, and the four persons reporting no jobs
actually held six jobs.
Table 1-8.- COMPARISON OP NUMBER OP JOBS REPORTED WITH THE
NUMBER ACTUALLY HELD, BY REPORTED TENURE GROUP0
Reported tenure group
Number
of
workers
Total number
of jobs
Number of
jobs per
worker
Number of
Jobs re¬
ported as
Re¬
ported
Actual
Re¬
ported
Actual
percent of
number of
actual jobs
Total
227
283
591
1.2
2.0
48.4
One Job, continuous
employment
One Job, 1 or 2 periods
of no employment
More than one Job,
1 period or more
of no employment
No employment
104
65
34
4
104
85
94
0
262
180
123
8
1
1
2.8
0
2. 7
2.1
3.8
1.5
36.9
47.2
78.4
s8ee table I-l.
This evidence suggests that in any industry characterized
by intermittent employment, a work history of the fairly
recent past based on the memory of the worker will tend to
minimize the degree of intermittency by understating the number
of jobs and by overstating the total duration of employment
by appreciable amounts.
WPA NATIONAL lii'M mo M MIO.IKCT
Re por t.s i 1 t.i t>< ■
(Continued from inside front rover)
Studies in Production, Productivity, and Employment-Continued
Mining
E-2 Snail-Scale Placer Mines as a Source of Oold, Employment, and Livelihood In 1930
(out of print)
E-4 Employment and Related statistics of Mines and Quarries, 1936; coal
E-7 Technology, Employment, and output per Man In Phosphate-Pock Mining, 1860-1937
E-8 Changes In Technology and Lahor Requirements In the Crushed-Stone Industry
E-9 Mechanization, Employment, and Output per Man In Bituminous-coal Mining
E-10 Technology, Employment, and Output per Man In Petroleum and Natural-Gat
Pr oduc 11 on
Agriculture
Changes In Technology and Labor Requirements In Crop Production:
A-l Sugar Beets
A-4 Potatoes
A-6 Corn
A-7 Cotton
A-10 Wheat and Oats
A-12 Vegetables
A-6 Trends In Size and Production o f the Aggregate Farm tnterprl se, 19CS-36 (out zf ftnt.
A-8 Trends In Employment In Agriculture, 1909-36
Studies of Effects of Industrial Change on Labor Markets
P-l Recent Trends In Employment and Unemployment In Philadelphia
P-2 The Labor Force of the Philadelphia Radio Industry In 1036
P-3 Employment and Unemployment In Philadelphia In 1936 and 1937 (out of print)
P-4 Ten Years of Work Experience of Philadelphia Weavers and Loom Fixers
P-B Ten Years of Work Experience of Philadelphia Machinists
P-6 Reemployment of Philadelphia Hosiery Workers After Shut-downs In 1933-34
P-7 The Search for work In Philadelphia, 1932-36
P-8 The Long-Term Unemployed In Philadelphia In 1936
L-l Cigar Makers After the Lay-Off
L-2 Decasuallzatlon of Longshore Work in San Francisco
L-3 Employment Experience of Paterson Broad-Silk Workers, 1926-36
L-4 Selective Factors In an Expanding Labor Market: Lancaster, Pa.
L-5 Labor and the Shut-down of the Amoskeag Textile Mills
L-6 Changes In Machinery and Job Requirements In Minnesota Manufacturing,
1931-36
L-7 Farm-City Migration and Industry's Labor Reserve
Requests for copies of these reports should be addressed to:
Publications Section, Oivision of Information
Work Projects Administration
Washington, 0, C.