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RAILWAYS AAI) THEi^wM
•. / ••• • • . .•••'•
FROM THE NEW ENGLANDER FOR OCTOBER, ISÏl,
WITH ADDITIONS,
RAILWAYS AND THE STATE.
The question, What are the powers and duties of the govern¬
ments, state and national, in relation to railway corporations ?
has become one of the most important in the legislation both of
the several States and of the United States. Confining our
view at present to the State, and, for the sake of convenience
to the State of Connecticut, we find the question fast coming to
this. Shall the State control the railways, or shall'.the railway
kings who control the corporations own the State?
Railway corporations are inevitably a liiou'opdly.-.- Theit. cus¬
tomers are at their mercy. On the short-diè'cànces, from slatibii
to station, there can be no competition. WLeii the'ekörbit'ancö
of their prices is such that the old methods of conveyance by
muscular power on highways become cheaper than conveyance
by steam and rail, they find a check on their cupidity, tlie only
check possible without the intervention of government for the
protection of the public. It is only on the long lines between
the seaboard and the interior that the force of competition can
operate even for a season ; and there competition soon ends in
combination. Of the three railways which were built in com¬
petition for the traffic between New York and Albany, two are
already the property of one corporation, and the third is virtually
under the same control. The tendency to combination is
simply irresistible. While the process is going forward, the
people suffer ; when it is finished, they are at the mercy of a
consolidated tyranny.
In Connecticut, the Hartford and New Haven Railroad was
supplemented by a line from Hartford to Springfield in Massa¬
chusetts under another corporation. Those two corporations
were consolidated. Nobody objected. Every consideration of
convenience to the public and of economy in the management
was in favor of the consolidation, and the legislatures of the two
States consented. The New York and New Haven Railroad
at one end of this line, and the great Massachusetts railway at
the other, make a continuous line of transit between the metro¬
polis of New England and the chief commercial emporium of
4
Railways and the State.
[Oct.,
the United States. What next? Another line was proposed
from New Haven to Boston, through Middletown. This would
be competition with the Hartford, New Haven, and Springfield
corporation, and there was of course a strong opposition to the
proposal, ostensibly on the ground that there must be no bridge
over the navigable part of the Connecticut river. Meanwhile a
railway, for local convenience only, was constructed from New
Haven to New London, with a harmless ferry across the Con¬
necticut. Another link, connecting this with Stonington, com¬
pleted a chain of railway from New Haven to Boston by way
of Pro.vidence, broken only by ferries across the Connecticut
and dlie''Thames. Year after }'-ear the State was agitated with
bthe";conflict, about bridging the Connecticut by the "Shore
Linef'i at" Sàjtbrçok; .-and by the "Air Line " at Middletown.
Yéár.after^year the" legislature was besieged by that formidable
' power .uriicneWn in earlier times, the lobby, and all the mysterious
arts of lobby influence were employed on one side and the
other by rival corporations with millions on millions of capital.
At last, the conflict suddenly ceases ; the bridges are conceded ;
and behold the competition of rival railways is at an end. The
New York and New Haven Eailroad has virtually absorbed the
Shore Line by a perpetual lease, and the New Haven and
Springfield Line by an agreement of perpetual copartnership.
Nor is there any room for doubt that as soon as the Air Line
shall be completed, if not earlier, that also will be absorbed.
Henceforth the idea of competition among railway corporations
for the traffic between New York and Boston is as obsolete as
the idea of dividends to stockholders in the Hartford and New
Haven Turnpike Company.
This tendency to combination and ultimate consolidation of
railway companies is not to be suppressed by legislation. Con¬
siderations of economy and efficiency, of public accommodation,
and even of safety, are so urgent in that direction, that such
combinations will be made, if not by open contract and stipulation
according to law, at least by some indirect method of mutual
understanding and agreement in evasion of whatever statute
may have been framed to secure the benefits of competition or
to prevent the indefinite accumulation of capital under one
management. A wise legislation will recognize the fact that
1871.]
Raüwaysiand the Stale.
5
tlic new force wliicli lias already wrought such changes in our
ciyilization cannot be hindered from developing itself into a
system, and that the true method is not to obstruct, but rather
to facilitate, first, the construction of railways whenever and
wherever the needful capital can be provided by voluntary
association, secondly, the union of continuous lines under one
superintendence and administration, and even, thirdly, the com¬
bination of parallel lines. Legislation should watchfully pro¬
vide against fraudulent methods of obtaining capital for railway
enterprises or of expending it, and against the oppression of the
public by exorbitant prices. Under such conditions railways
will be constructed, one after another, by the voluntary associa¬
tion of citizens ; and each, in due time, will have fallen into its
place in a system. It may be doubted whether, if the legisla¬
ture of Connecticut, forty years ago, had undertaken to con¬
struct a system of railways for the purpose of developing the
resources of the State, and had taken counsel of the most sagaci¬
ous engineers, the system thus contrived and constructed could
have been any better than that which has come into being
almost without contrivance, and whicli will soon bring the
thunder of its trains within hearing of almost every farmhouse
in what was once, but in these last days has ceased to be, " the
land of steady habits."
Meanwhile the policy of the State—as of all the States—has
been infected with one great error, the error of special legisla¬
tion. If the first petition for the incorporation of a railroad
company had been granted in the form of a general statute,
authorizing any number of citizens to incorporate themselves
for the purpose of constructing a railway anywhere within the
jurisdiction of the State, under such conditions as should secure
the public again.st abortive or swindling enterprises, and of
course reserving to the State full power for any future legisla¬
tion which experience might show to be necessary to protect
the people against the fraudulent schemes of speculators or the
oppression of great and grasping corporations ; and if no special
privileges or powers had ever been granted to any railroad
company ;—there would have been to-day (we may venture to
affirm) not one mile less of railway than has been constructed
under the policy of special legislation ; nor would the location
6
Raihvays and the State.
Oct.,
or "lay out" of any line have been less convenient to the
coininonwealth. But the unfortunate assumption that the in¬
corporation of a railroad company, the amount of its capital,
the number of its shares, the compacts or coalitions it may form
with other companies of the same sort, the bonds it may issue
on a mortgage of its property, and all its other legal rights and
powers, must be determined in every instance by a special act,
—has brought into the annual sessions not only an overwhelm¬
ing amount of a kind of business with which the average legis¬
lator is not conspicuously competent to grapple, but something
much worse. Since the beginning of this legislation about
railroad corporations, there has been an ever-growing railroad
lobby, with its various operations of canvassing and "button¬
holing," of " log-rolling " and bargaining, of dining and wining,
of railway excursions and junketing, of, distributing fi'ee passes
over "our railroads" for the session or for the year, and of
(why not?) sometimes more secret and with ignoble minds
more potent arguments.
It is this policy of special laws for the convenience of particu¬
lar corporations controlling great masses of capital, which is
bringing the legislation of Connecticut, like that of other States,
under a popular suspicion, vague but grave, of being controlled
by venal influences. This policy, if continued, will ere long
make it as much of a maxim for railway kings in Connecticut
as it has been for some years past in Hew York, that it is
cheaper to buy legislators than to elect them. We do not deny
that in some cases of exceptional difficulty or hardship for in¬
dividuals or of exceptional embarrassment for communities and
corporations, the sovereign power of the State may grant relief
by a special enactment lest the spirit of the law be sacrified to
the letter, and jus become injuria ; but in the matter of railway
enterprises, as formerly in the matter of banking companies,
a policy of special legislation tends to general corruption. If
our legislators are to retain the respect of the people, they must
enact into general statutes such principles of justice and public
expediency as shall be equally applicable to all railway under¬
takings, and must leave the application of those principles and
the ascertainment of disputed facts to the judiciary. Let the
people themselves take care that it does not become as much
1871.]
Railways and the State.
7
of a blot {prima facie) on a man's reputation to bave served
through a sistj or ninety day's session in the legislature as to
have been sentenced for an equal number of days to imprison¬
ment in the county jail.*
* As an iAuatration of how fast Connecticut is becoming like New York in the
government of municipalities as well as of the State, we may take the recent his¬
tory of the contest between New Haven and Hartford for the advantage and
dignity of being the seat of legislation. For nearly two hundred years, the Gen¬
eral Assembly has held its sessions at the two chief towns alternately; and by the
constitution of the State, framed in 1818, it was provided that the ancient usage
should continue. A constitutional amendment is therefore necessary before the
seat of government can be fixed exclusively at either capital. Such an amendment
was to be acted upon by the legislature at the late session, and a two-thirds vote
in each house was required iu order to bring the matter before the people for a
decision by a majority of the electors. It was assumed by the municipal authori¬
ties of New Haven that the interest of their city was adverse to the amendment.
Accordingly a " smart lawyer " of the General Butler sort was sent to oppose the
amendment by action in the lobby, as if New Haven was not already represented
in both houses by men whom a great majority of electors in that city had certified
to be the best that could be sent. The smart lawyer had been himself a legislator,
and was of course well acquainted with the means and methods by which legisla-
tor.s may be enlightened on such questions ; and he was successful. In the Sen¬
ate, the amendment lacked just one vote of the two-thirds necessary to its passage.
But, alas 1 the sequel was a reminder that
"The best-laid schemes of mice and men
Gang oft agley;"
for although the majority could not bring the amendment before the people for a
vote, they could do something else; and there seems to have been some Hartford
smartness in the lobby. They forthwith appropriated half a million of dollars (of
which New Haven tax-payers must pay seventy thousand) to btiüd a new State-
house in Hartford, refusing to do the same tiling for the " sister capital." Nor is
the prospect very promising that a future legislature will do anything better than
to renew more definitely the bafiied proposal for a constitutional amendment.
But notwithstanding this unexpected aspect for the future, the smart lawyer
made an additional exhibition of smartness. He had done just what he undertook
to do; he had made it impossible, this year, for the people to vote on the amend¬
ment to their coustitution. Why should he not be paid ? His little bUl against
the municipal treasury was $25,908.62, and was promptly paid-without any in¬
quiry concerning the particulars; it being well understood that, if the particulars
should come to light, the exhibition might be disagreeable to a fastidious public.
We need not say that the city attorney who had the audacity to demand and
the cunning to obtain nearly $26,000 for the labor and expense of persuading sun¬
dry inember.s of the Conuecticut legislature to vote against a certain measure, did
not honestly earn that money by his personal labor. The resemblance between
this payment for not more than twenty-five days of work iu the lobby of the legis¬
lature at Hartford and the payment for a job of Garvey plastering on the new
8
Railways and the State.
[Oct.,
The question then has become important, How shall the
sturdy old commonwealth be saved from the clutch and grasp
of the railway power? How shall "Brother Jonathan's" own
State, which, for two centuries and a quarter, has realized, more
completely and continuously, perhaps, than any other State
since history began, the idea of "government of the people by
the people and for the people," be rescued from the impending
shame of being governed and virtually owned by some railway
king, the ally, perhaps, or the vicegerent of a railway emperor
in New York? How shall the people expel from their State-
house the swarming lobby whose scent for everything that " has
money in it " is keen as the scent of crows for a carcase, and
whose influence for or against any measure is always to be had
for a sufficient consideration. A few glimpses at the last session
of the Connecticut legislature will sufficiently illustrate the
danger which we refer to and the imminency of it.
Much time, at the beginning of the session, was consumed in
ascertaining who had been elected governor. An outrageous
but fortunately bungling fraud in the returns from one of the
election districts of New Haven, imitating the gigantic villanies
by which the citizens of New York, and indeed the people of
that great State, have been defrauded of their self-government,
was detected and baffled ; and it was not till nearly two weeks
after the appointed time that the government was completely
organized for the ensuing year, so that the proper business of
the session could begin. The governor's message, which ought to
have been communicated on the fourth of May, was dated on
the sixteenth. It touched gently on the fact that " the tendency
of legislation, of late years, has been in a marked degree in the
direction of the consolidation of capital and the granting of
court-house in New Tork, is too obvious and impressive to need pomting out.
Every intelligent citizen knows that, for any Iionest and honorable work, the man
himself, with all his abilities, would be dear at less than half that price. The sig¬
nificance of the affair is twofold. It shows, first, by what sort of influence measures
are supposed to be carried or defeated in the legislature of old Connecticut since the
era of special legislation in the interest of railway corporations was inaugurated;
and, secondly, that the abstraction of large sums from a municipal treasury is as
possible, and is thought to be as safe, in a Connecticut city of less than sixty thou¬
sand inhabitants, as in that fathomless abyss of municipal corruption at the mouth
of the Hudson.
1871.]
Railways and the State.
9
large corporate interests," and suggested that "great danger
may be apprehended " from that tendency " unless some salutary
check be placed upon it." " Consolidation of capital " was well
enough understood to mean the consolidation of great railway
corporations, and should it be said that the governor seemed to
be in a quandary, the answer is obvious that the people were
also in a quandary, alarmed at the progressive consolidation of
railway capital, and uneasily looking for some salutary check,
with not even a definite guess as to what might be possible.
On the next day, the machinery of legislation having been
brought at last into running order, one of the representatives
from Hartford, Mr. Eaton, taking occasion from a proposal to
incorporate a Young Men's Christian Association, "called atten¬
tion to the alarming extent of special grants of corporate powers
when the general laws of the State are ample," and "gave
notice that he should, during the session, oppose special char¬
ters." On the same day, the President of the New York and
New Haven Railroad Company, who had condescended to rep¬
resent the town of Bridgeport for the current year, introduced
a resolution empowering the Committee on Fisheries (he being
chairman of that committee) to appoint one of their number
who should make a journey at his own expense to the head¬
waters of the Androscoggin in Maine, and procure specimens of
speckled trout to be cooked for the members of the legislature,
in order that they might be qualified to decide on the
expediency of introducing that particular variety of trout into
the ponds and brooks of Connecticut. It was understood that
the chairman of the committee, who (having three great rail¬
ways under his control, and being doubtless a " deadhead " on
all other railways) could afford to make the journey without
any allowance for mileage, would be delegated to that service ;
and the resolution passed through the house without serious
opposition. In the Senate two grave gentlemen seemed to think
that the proposal was a joke beneath the dignity of such a body.
One of them "supposed the resolution to have been pa.ssed by
the house to humor Mr. Bishop." But on the other side the
argument was that " stocking our streams and ponds with fish ''
is more than a joke (not remembering that the State has its
"fish commission er,s " for that very purpose);—that "Mr.
Bishop proposed to go to Maine at his own expense, and it
2
10
Railways and the State.
[Oct.
would cost the State nothing except his pay per diem lor a
week or so ; "—and that the indefinite postponement which had
been moved "would he a discov.rtesy to Mr. Bishop.'" Such argu¬
ments prevailed, and the Senate concurred with the house in
passing the resolution. Mr. Bishop's influence in the legislature
was evident. There was no room to doubt that the two houses,
winch for the sake of humoring him, or for the sake of avoiding
what might seem a discourtesy to him, would formally delegate
him to proceed to the head-waters of the Androscoggin and
bring back speckled trout " to be cooked for the members of
the legislature," would do whatever else he might require of
them. That comically absurd resolution, as one of the news¬
papers remarked the next day, "could never have been passed
through both houses of the assembly by any other man."
One day later, the gentleman whose power to carry any meas¬
ure had been so well established, introduced a bill to authorize
the fusion of the Hartford and New Haven Eailroad Company
into one corporation with the New York and New Haven Eail¬
road Company. It was a matter of course that the bill should
be referred to some committee for examination and a report ;
and, as the house had a standing committee on railroads, the
bill would naturally go to that committee in order that the ex¬
pediency of the measure, as related to the railway system of the
State, might be considered and reported on. But the mover
chose to assume that there was no question of expediency or
public policy in the case ; and assuring the house that the only
points to be considered were points of law, he moved a reference
of his bill to the judiciary committee. He was so kind as to
promise that if that committee should "find objectionable
features in the bill "—that is, if the committee whose dutj'"
was to consider, not questions of public policy, but only ques¬
tions of law, should find in the bill some violation of the con¬
stitution or some concession to the new corporation of larger
powers than had already been granted to the two corporations
'severally—" the roads would not press the matter or, as
another newspaper summary of his speech represented him,
" the roads would bring no pressure upon the General Assem¬
bly to secure the passage of the bill."
Accordingly the bill was sent for consideration to the joint
committee on the judiciary. What the mover desired was a
1871.]
Railways and the State.
11
report on the constitutionality and legal bearings of the measure
rather than a report and discussion concerning its expediency
as related to the railïyay system of Connecticut ; and a reference
of it to the committee on railways might have seemed as much
of a " discourtesy to Mr. Bishop " as if the Senate had rejected
his waggish resolution about " speckled trout " and the " head
waters of the Androscoggin."
Thus far, there appeared in the proceedings no indication of
any opposition to the consolidation of the two great corpora¬
tions. It was well known that among the people of Con¬
necticut, more than in some other States, there is a traditional
jealousy of business corporations controlling great masses of
associated capital, and that railway corporations with their
monopoly of transportation are especially obnoxious to that
jealousy. Probably the hope was that by judicious manage¬
ment the measure might be carried, without giving the popular
prejudice against great moneyed corporations any opportunity
of expressing itself in the form of opposition. But on the llth
of June, twenty-six days after the introduction and reference
of the bill —the speckled trout having been in the meantime
procured and "cooked for the members "—a remonstrance was
presented, the forerunner of many. In these remonstrances,
subscribed by hundreds of citizens among whom were some of
the most eminent in the State, it was set forth that the corpora¬
tions to be consolidated were exacting from the public not less
than 3.33 cents per mile for through passengers, and from 4 to
8 and even 10 cents per mile for way passengers, while rail¬
roads in other States, which had been restricted by law to a
charge of 2 cents per mile, for both through and way passengers
were yielding good dividends to their proprietors, and it was
requested that the bill would not pass without some provision
reducing the fares to such rates as would suffice to pay fairly
renumerative dividends on the capital actually paid in. The
remonstrance having been referred by the House to the Judi¬
ciary Committee, was, under the rules, retained till the next
day to be transmitted to the Senate for the concurrent action of
that body. But before it could reach the Committee from the
Senate, that is, on the day following its presentation in the
House of Representatives —■ the bill — although the remon-
12
Railways and the Slate.
[Oct.,
strance was well known to be on its way to the committee—
was by that same committee reported favorably, and was laid
on the table to be printed. Of course the members generally
might be expected to regard it with a friendly feeling, apart from
the feed of speckled trout; for most of them were passing con¬
tinually to and from their homes at the expense of the petition¬
ers, and the chief petitioner—the representative not so much of
Bridgeport as of the New York and New Haven Eailroad
Company and its dependencies—was the most fluent and popular
debater in the house, the shrewdest manager, the only million¬
aire, and a jolly good fellow.
Connecticut has long had its three Eailroad Commissioners, a
board whose eighteenth annual report to the legislature was
presented at the late session. By the laws of the State the
Commissioners must annually call for accurate and full returns
and statistics from each railroad company under the oath of its
president, according to a schedule prescribed by the statute.
They are authorized to summon and examine, under oath, all
directors, oíñcers or agents of said companies, and such other
witnesses as they may think proper ; and the refusal of any
person to appear and testify, when summoned, is punishable by
afine not exceeding a thousand dollars, or by imprisonment for
a term not exceeding a year. The Commissioners had presented
their report, but the returns from the Hartford and New Haven
and the New York and New Haven Eailroad Companies were
not satisfactory to Mr. H. L. Goodwin, one of the repre¬
sentatives from East Hartford. He found on the schedule as
returned by the two corporations then seeking to be consoli¬
dated certain blanks not filled,—^an omission that involved
the withholding of information which the law demanded, and
which he deemed important. He might have alleged that the
Commissioners themselves, in their report, had called attention
to the defectiveness of those returns. Certainly, then, he was
not out of the line of his duty when he moved a resolution
requiring the Eailroad Commissioners to inform the house why
those two corporations had not reported all the required details
concerning their affairs, and whether the neglect had been re¬
ported to the Treasurer of the State, that he might enforce the
law by the exaction of a fine. In response to that motion it
was said by one of the representatives from Hartford " that it
1871.]
Railvaays and the State.
13
■was a reflection on the roads," and the resolution was laid on
the table. Four days afterwards, the mover called up his reso¬
lution, and gave certain reasons why such an inquiry should
be made, one of his reasons being that the Hartford and Hew
Haven Company had reported $1,500,000 " of capital paid in since
last reported," when only half that amount had been actually
paid. The President of the Hew York and Hew Haven Com¬
pany made a reply which, probably, was not very well under¬
stood by the reporters of the debate, and which therefore, as
reported, seems a little wide of the mark, though it may have
answered the purpose of diverting the attention of the house
from the proposed inquiry. He alleged that some items of
information required in the schedule are " impossible " to be
given. He showed that in some instances the neglect was only
a neglect to perforin some simple operation of arithmetic, which
" any man of ordinary intelligence could easily perform for him¬
self." He took pains to deny (what had not been affirmed) that
the continuous line from Hew York to Springfield was con¬
trolled by Mr. Vandcrbilt. He told how fortunate Connecti¬
cut is in that his corporation has a perpetual contract with the
Harlem Railroad Company for the use of that road from
Williamsbridge to Hew York, and expatiated on the two
millions which Mr. Vanderbilt is spending for the terminus
of his railroads in Hew York. He expended some virtuous
indignation on the wickedness of a " lobbyist " by whom, he
said, such insinuations were given out, and who wanted to be
bought off for $500. He proclaimed to an applauding audience
that his " road had no money to pay to the thhrd house." He
paid a well deserved tribute of praise to the railway which he
manages, but he did not say why, in the report subscribed and
sworn to by himself, the amount paid by that Company for the
use of the Harlem track from Williamsbridge was not set down
as required by .statute. When reminded of that omission, he
said, " The reason wc do not report what is paid to the Harlem
road is because what belongs to the Harlem road goes to that
road, and does not come out of our receipts —a statement
which "any man of ordinary intelligence," wlio has ever bought
a passage ticket to Hew York from any station east of Williams-
bridge, knows to be inaccurate and evasive. Ho member of
the house eould give a moment of intelligent thought to the
14
Rcdlivays and the State.
[Oct.,
matter without knowing that what is paid to the Harlem Com¬
pany for the use of its track is paid out of the treasury of Mr.
Bishop's Company, and does come out of its receipts. Yet the
resolution simply calling for information was not passed, but
was again laid on the table. Mr. Bishop so willed, and that
was enough.
On the next day, Mr Goodwin, not at all discouraged by the
accumulating evidence that the President of the Hew York and
New Haven Eailroad Company owned the house and had it
under his control, brought forward three bills for public acts,
which were, of course, referred to the committee on railroads :
—the first, to regulate fares and freights on the line of railroads
from New York to Springfield;—the second, to prohibit the
issue of railway shares for a less sum actually paid in cash than
the par value of the shares according to the charter of the com¬
pany, and providing that when the market value is above par
the shares shall not be issued except to the highest bidder at
public auction ; and the third, requiring railroad corporations
in declaring dividends to show how much per cent is on paid-up
stock and how much on "watered capital."
Meanwhile the remonstrances against the consolidation of the
two great companies were becoming every day more numerous ;
and on the next day after the debate just referred to, the ques¬
tion arose whether those remonstrances should lie on the table
or be referred for consideration and a report, and if referred,
whether to the railroad committee or to the judiciary committee.
Again the representative of the petitioning corporations de¬
nounced the remonstrances as " emanating from one source in
the interest of a certain lobby and again Mr. Goodwin re¬
sponded with a denial that they originated in any lobby, and
avowed his own responsibility for the movement which brought
them. On that occasion the leading representative from Hart¬
ford—a man of marked ability and of great experience in polit¬
ical management—"spoke at some length." He "was not
altogether in favor of consolidation "—" had feared it would be
an injury to his own city by the removal of shops [the work¬
shops of the Hartford & New Haven Company] to New Haven "
—but cared little for the remonstrances because such things
were easily got up. The purport of those observations becomes
t
1871.] Railways and the State. 15
less obscure when it is remembered that the question of appro¬
priating half a million of dollars for building a new State-house
at Hartford and virtually securing, to that city the coveted
advantage of being the one seat of legislation, was to be con¬
sidered the next day, and that the member from Bridgeport
might naturally be expected to favor the interest of New Haven.
The able representative from Hartford might have said, "I have
some influence in this legislation and in the State. I might
throw my influence against the union of these railway corpora¬
tions ; and really I am almost ready to vote against it because
it will remove the workshops with the workmen and their fam¬
ilies—perhaps an aggregate of a thousand inhabitants—from
Hartford to New Haven. But I am open to conviction, and if,
by way of compensation for the loss of the workshops, the
member from Bridgeport should so far forget his local preju¬
dices as to give us that half million, and virtually settle the
question about two capitals, I might on m}^ part forget my
promise to vote against all special charters and my old Jackson
antipathy to great moneyed cimporatious." He did not say all
this. But it is a " remarkable coincidence" that things turned
out just so. The eloquent representative from Bridgeport gave
his whole influence to the appropriation of that half-million,
offering indeed to do the same thing for New Haven, but some¬
how not doing it ; and in the exuberance of his liberality, he
actually pledged himself " in behalf of the railroad corporations
of which he is the head," that, if two new State-houses should
be built, those corporations " would take the greatest pleasure
in transporting all the materials free of expense." The gentle¬
man from Hartford, on the other hand, after the appropriation of
that half million, saw his way clear to assist the great measure
of a consolidated railroad company.
We need not pursue the story in its details. Let it suffice to
say that "the consolidation bill" was the one great measure of
the session, overshadowing every other ; that every proposal to
limit the power of the consolidated company was baffled ; that
the bill to regulate railroad fares, (though some eight hundred
citizens, one of them a former Governor of the state, had peti¬
tioned for it; and though the Railroad Committee had unani-
mou.sly recommended it witli a modification making it applica-
Vfle to all the railroads in the state,) and the other bilks hereto¬
fore referred to, (p. 723,) which were expected by some to be in
16
Railways and the State.
[Oct.,
some sort au offset against that act of special legislation,
fell to the ground, because the legislature as soon as it
had done its work for the great corporation, found itself
so wearied out with its labors that it must needs adjourn with¬
out day; and that the one man who made himself conspicuous
by an active and indefatigable opposition to the policy of sur¬
rendering the State to the dominion of a railroad corporation,
found that he had made himself a martyr almost in vain.
From first to last there seemed to be, in a majority of the mem¬
bers, a consciousness more or less distinct that they were there
to do whatever the great railroad man might require of them—
whether to send him, in the name of the State of Connecticut,
on a piscatorial excursion to the head waters of the Andros-'
coggin, or to create a corporation with fifteen millions of capital
and with an indefinite power of levying taxes on traffic and
travel—whether to snub the intractable representative from East
Hartford, or to remain and vote when they were eager to go home
for their weekly vacation. Nor did the reported debates and
proceedings give any indication that the distinguished repre¬
sentative from Bridgeport was unconscious of his power over
that assembly. We do not mean that on his part there was
an offensive ostentation of power, but he seemed to know that
he owned the legislature almost as completely as he was the
owner of "our roads," and that, though the management of so
large a team was a task for the most dextrous charioteer, he
could direct the General Assembly very much at his pleasure.
What then is the moral of this story ? The story itself is
only an instance—at the worst no worse than an average speci¬
men—of what is going on in every State that knows what it is to
have given a charter to a railway corporation. It is as evident
elsewhere as in Connecticut, that in proportion as a railway
becomes necessary to the commonwealth—that is, to the indus¬
trial prosperity of the people—the railway corporation becomes
a controlling power in the legislature. Nor is the Congress of
the United States beyond the reach of railway rings or railway
kings. A few years hence the owners of the three railways
across the continent that have been chartered and endowed by the
government of the United States, will have got rid of competi¬
tion with each other by compromise ancL combination ; and the
1871.]
Railways and the State.
17
Vanderbilt or Grould of that combination will own Congress
more completely than the modest president of " our roads "
appeared to own the legislature of Connecticut in its late ses¬
sion. When we ask for the moral of the story just recited, the
inquiry which we propose has more than a local importance.
The facts are essentially the same everywhere. In view of the
facts as they are, what conclusions may we form as to the pos¬
sibility of maintaining the sovereignty of the people over the
railway corporations, and of compelling them to be the servitors
and not the lords of the commonwealth.
The question is for the people—not for railroad presidents
and directors, nor only for holders of railroad stock, whether
fortunate or unfortunate. Mr. Bishop, in one of his speeches,
intimated that there are mysteries which ordinary minds can¬
not penetrate, but which are revealed to railroad hierophants.
" The gentleman," said he—meaning one who had put to him
an inconvenient fact—"does not understand railroad matters.
It is not possible for a layman to do it." But Mr. Bishop and
all others of that clerisy may be assured that the inquiry now
proposed is one on which the laity will use their right of pri¬
vate judgment ; and that the more they find of mystery in rail¬
road matters, and the more they are warned that certain ques¬
tions are too high for them, the more earnestly will they in¬
quire how the State is to be rescued from subjection to a rail¬
road heirarchy. We look with a becoming awe on the great
experts in railway management. We do not invade the trans¬
cendental region of their mysteries. , We address the laity,
and we deal only with matters which the people can under¬
stand.
I. In the inquiry how railroads are to be managed and what
are the powers and duties of the State in relation to them, it
must not be forgotten that the problem, to he solved is new. Rail¬
roads are a novelty ; and the part which they are to have in
the progress of civilization is only beginning to appear. A
railroad corporation differs from all other corporations in the
nature and extent of the power entrusted to it ; and therefore,
its relations to the commonwealth and to government, are such
as mo other corporation ever held. Many a tradition of the
lawyers, many a political maxim founded on long experience,
3
18
Raüvjays and the State.
[Oct.
must be set aside in dealing with this problem. Steam naviga¬
tion is changing the commerce of the world ; but, whether on
the oceans or on lakes and rivers, it is only an accelerated navi¬
gation. In its bearings on political and international questions
there is nothing new, its only peculiarity being its rate of speed
and its independence of wind and tide. Transportation of
goods or of passengers in vessels propelled by steam is as
incapable of becoming a monopoly as transportation in vessels
moved by wind._ Combination among owners of steamships is
possible just as far as combination is possible among owners of
cotton-mills or owners of coal-mines, and no farther. But rail¬
ways, as the possibilities of legislation concerning them are
now understood—are in this respect exceptional. The owner¬
ship of them is not like the ownership of canals for naviga¬
tion, nor like the ownership of turnpike roads. When the
corporation chartered by a State has laid down its track and
completed its equipment, it begins to be a new and anomalous
power ; and whatever internal revolutions the corporation
may experience—by whatever methods the original shareholders
may be ousted of their property, while more astute bondholders
or other new owners come into possession—the institution—the
" road "■—continually becomes more powerful. The State will
soon begin to find that, like the successful yet unfortunate
experimenter in the story of Frankenstein, it has created a
monster which it cannot control. . All legislation about rail¬
ways hitherto has been (at least in our country) a series of ex¬
periments working toward the solution of a problem entirely
new. The novelty of the problem was not appreciated at first ;
but it is now manifest.
II. For the present, at least, it is settled that railways are to
be planned, constructed, held, and managed by voluntary asso¬
ciations under charters of incorporation. A few experiments
have been made in another direction, but the result has not
tended to show that either a state or a municipality is compe¬
tent to construct with judicious economy, or to manage wisely,
any considerable line of railway. A new era in what Ameri¬
cans call politics must begin—the miserable doctrine of rota¬
tion in office must be thoroughly exploded, and with it the cor¬
relate doctrine that all public employments are to be distribu-
1871.]
Railways and the State.
19
ted as prizes among political partizans, or as the legitimate
reward of services rendered to the party—before the govern¬
ment either of a state or of a city can safely attempt to man¬
age by its own officials such an institution as a railroad. The
underlying idea of our political institutions is the idea that indi¬
vidual liberty must be guarded ; and therefore we are careful
to limit the functions of government. Socialism would merge
the citizen in the state, and would so organize society as to
leave no room for competition or for individual enterprise.
The American theory of the republic requires that the govern¬
ment shall not undertake the burthen of doing what can be as
well done by the spontaneity of individuals or by citizens vol¬
untarily associated for the purpose. We must have a ■ larger
experience than we have yet had of mischief and disaster from
the mismanagement of railroads, before the American people
WÜ1 believe that railroads can be constructed and managed bet¬
ter by the government, than by corporations responsible to the
government and under its inspection.
III. The tendency of connecting lines to consolidation, of com¬
peting or parallel lines to combination, and of the entire system
of railroads to unity, cannot be resisted. Attempts to legislate
against that tendency are futile. Perhaps what we have
already told about the railway history of Connecticut is enough
on this point ; but some facts we happen to remember which
illustrate the progress of popular intelligence. The time was
when a break in an otherwise continuous line of railway com¬
munication was thought to be a benefit worth contending for.
When it was proposed to make a railroad from Hartford to
Springfield, many citizens of Hartford were alarmed lest it
should be merely an extension of the, road which had recently
been constructed to that point from New Haven, in which case
travelers and freight would pass through their city without pay¬
ing tribute to the hack-drivers and the draymen ; and a public
meeting was held to take measures against so great an evil as the
possibility of running a train of cars all the way from Spring¬
field to New Haven. That, some may say, was long ago ; but
it is not more than twenty-four years since there was, at the
city of Rocliester, a mile of hiatus between tlie railway from the
east and the railway toward the west. At a later period, unless
20
Railways and the State.
[Oct.,
our memory deceives us, it was a point in tire policy of Penn¬
sylvania that certain railroads, meeting in the city of Erie,
should not form any such connection as would permit trains to
pass from one to the other. In all such cases the convenience
of travelers and the exigencies of commerce have overruled
the supposed interests and the selfish opposition of particular
localities. Nobody doubts now, even in Hartford, that a con¬
tinuous railway from Springfield to New Haven is a necessity ;
that a gap of half a mile, or of not more than a rod, would be
an intolerable annoyance ; nor that the unbroken line is much
better managed by one corporation than it could be by two.
As little doubt will there be, a few years hence, on the question
whether the entire line from New York to Springfield ought to
be under one administration. All fears about the greatness of
the corporation and the accumulation of associated capital will
yield everywhere to the inexorable demands of commerce for
more promptitude, more efficiency, and more safety. States¬
manship must look in some other direction for security to the
commonwealth against the pobtical power of capital accumula¬
ted by association in these stupendous masses.
IV. There mitst be an end of special legislation in the interest or
for the convenience of railroad companies. So long as railway
corporations are chartered each by a special act of the legisla¬
tive power, or are dependent on legislatures for special privi¬
leges, they cannot but be a mischievous and corrupting power
in every legislature with which they have to do. We do not
affirm that there was anything like positive bribery in the late
session of the legislature at Hartford—any paying of a definite
price for a vote in the interest of a railroad company. Let us
trust that Connecticut has not yet arrived at that stage of degen¬
eracy. There was no need of buying votes with money, even
if the president of "our roads" had not been so vehemently
virtuous in his denunciations of the lobby. But how many
members of either house were there who had not received a
gift from one or more of the railroad companies in the form of
a pass? Every member who had that little gift—the value of
it being somewhere between $5 and $50, according to the dis¬
tance of his home from Hartford and the frequency of his
trips—carried a bribe in his pocket fr-om the beginning to the
1871.]
Railways and the State.
21
end of the session :—not such a bribe as is paid for votes in the
notoriously venal legislatures of some other States—not the
stipulated consideration for voting yea on a certain question,
but such a bribe as those rich corporations can afford to give
without stipulating that it shall be quid pro quo. It was for
receiving just such bribes, though on a larger scale—compli¬
mentary presents expressive of respect for the office and office¬
bearer—that the illustrious Chancellor of England in the reign
of James 1. was impeached, disgraced, and ruined. He had
never sold a decree or decision for a stipulated price. He had
only accepted gifts, sometimes trifling, sometimes of greater
value, from parties who had suits pending in his court. His
decisions and decrees had been in some instances adverse to the
parties whose gifts he had received. But he had sinned against
that principle in the administration of justice, "A gift blindeth
the wise and preventeth the words of the righteous." Simply
for that sin, he was cast down from his high place, and the
after ages to which he appealed have not reversed the sentence.
Is it a matter of pure philanthropy that these corporations,
aware that the day-wages of a representative or senator in Con¬
necticut are hardly more than the wages of a brakeman on one
of their trains, take pleasure in the gratuitous conveyance of
legislators between their homes and the seat of legislation ? Or
is it because every such corporation is always expecting, either
immediately or at no distant day, some act of special legisla¬
tion in its interest ? A free pass is not a costly bribe, but it
helps to make the unprejudiced receiver feel a little more kindly
toward the giver, and in an emergency—as when a parallel line
from New York to New Haven is to be chartered or defeated,
or when votes are to be gained for or against an air line from
New Haven to Boston—are not other methods of conciliation
pos.sible? ■ Can it be expected of a corporation which wields
fifteen millions of capital, and which annually receives and dis¬
burses some four or five millions of revenue, that it shall have oc¬
casion to ask any act of special legislation, and not be able in one
way or another to command a sufficient number of votes for its
purpose? If special legislation in the intcre.st of such a corjio-
ration is needed and is possible, the tendency to venal legisla¬
tion cannot be resisted.
22
Railways and the Stale.
[Oct.,
We say then that if the people would guard against the
power of a railroad lobby besieging the legislature at every ses¬
sion, they must not put their trust in the incorruptibility of the
men whom they send to tlie State-house in the character of law¬
makers. The chartering of railroad companies, the limitation
or expansion of their capital, the connections and compacts
which they make with each other, must be regulated in some
other way than by a special enactment for each particular
instance. Special legislation on the whole subject must be
abolished by constitutional prohibition. In the mean time,
something might be done by enacting that, whereas the railroad
companies have established a laudable custom of cariying mem¬
bers of the legislature gratuitously, and whereas it is important
to the public welfare that membei's of the General Assembly
should not be dependent in any manner on the favor of these
corporations, therefore a certificate of election to the Senate or
the House of Kepresentatives shall entitle the holder of it to
pass freely on any regular train from any point within the State
to any other during all tlie time (Sundays excepted) between
the day preceding the commencement of a session and the sec¬
ond day after the final adjournment.
V. Competition cannot become a regulative force, in the mat¬
ter of railway freights and fares, without perfect freedom to con¬
struct parallel lines of railway wherever they will he remunerative.
The possibility of a parallel road is more of a check on the
proprietors and managers of any railroad than the existence of
the parallel road would be. We are aware of the paradox in
our statement, but let it be remembered that though there may
be sharp competition between two or more railways parallel to
each other, that competition will inevitably terminate—nobody
knows how soon—in some compromise and combination. A
special charter for a railroad from Derby to New YPrk would
be a valuable franchise to be bought by the owners of the New
York and New Haven railroad, and would be to the grantees a
means of exacting money from that wealthy corporation. The
petition, therefore, for such a charter would require from both
parties a lavish expenditure, without which the legislature could
hardly understand the merits of the question; and it would
probably be defeated, a railroad in esse being more powerful in
1871.]
Railways and the State.
23
argument than a railroad in posse. If, however, such a charter
should be granted and should then pass under the control of
the rival eorporation, it might he worth the cost of it, inas¬
much as it might, by judicious management, be made, for five
and twenty years, an effectual barrier against another attempt
of the same kind. Meanwhile the travel and traffic of the
country would be taxed to pay the full cost of the conflict in
the legislature, and of any subsequent bargaining to get pos¬
session of the new franchise. But if a parallel road could be
constructed without a special charter, whenever the prospect of
its becoming a profitable investment should be sufficiently
attractive to capitalists, that possibility of competition would
always be a regulative force chocking the greed for extrava¬
gant profits.
VI. The assumption thai a railway corporaiion- is simply a
trading company which exists and carries on its business only for
the pecuniary profit of the partners or stockholders, must not he
admitted. Starting from that assumption, the corporation is
organized, and the work for which it has been created is under¬
taken, just as if no interests were to be considered but the in¬
terest on the capital invested—the stipulated interest on the
bonds of the company, and as much as can be made on the
shares. " This road," the directors may be supposed to
say, " is the property of our company, just as if it were an
iron foundry or a cotton mill, and we, as representing the stock¬
holders, have no other duty than to make the property as pro¬
ductive as we can. Of course it cannot be productive without
being serviceable to the public, but our business is to exact
from the public the highest possible price for the least possible
service, the serviceableness being ever subordinate to the pro¬
ductiveness." If a railway corporation is to be considered as
nothing else than a trading concern, sustaining no higher rela¬
tions to the commonwealth and responsible for no higher duties,
such a view of what the directors are to do is entirely cori'cct
The directors of a manufacturing company have an undoubted
right to obtain for the company as much as possible of money
for as little as possible of the manufacture,—provided always
that there is no fraud in their transactions ; for, under those
24
Railways and the State.
[Oct.
laws of nature which regulate the production and distribution
of wealth, the force of competition, the action and reaction oí
demand and supply, will determine the price which they can
get for the commodity Avhicli they offer. The British East
India Company (apart from its monopoly) was at first a trading
company merely, buying in 'one market and selling in another.
At that timé its directors had no other duty than to make large
dividends by all commercially honest methods. But when that
corporation had become the possessor and ruler of an empire,
its directors had other and higher duties, and their duty of
making profit.s for the stockholders became insignificant in
comparison with their duties to the empire which they governed.
They did not appreciate those higher duties. How could they ?
Their chief concern was, not how to make India, with its mil¬
lions of people, prosperous and free, but how to make India
yield the greatest possible amount of income to a trading com¬
pany in England.
How does it happen that the standard of honor and upright¬
ness is higher in a bank parlor than in the directors' room of a
railway corporation ? How does it happen that a railway direc¬
tor, ofperliaps more than average honesty, will participate with¬
out scruple in transactions of a sort which he regards as
dishonorable when acting as a bank director ? That the fact
is so, will hardly be questioned. How does it happen in so
many instances that the business which was undertaken with
the one purpose of making money for the stockholders, begins
ere long to be pumued in the interest chiefly of the directors
and a few favored friends ? That such things do happen in
railway companies, more frequently than in any other trading
corporations, is undeniable. Directors, being stockholders, are
supposed to represent the interest of the stockholders. But how
often docs it happen that the interest which influential directors
have in some transportation company, or in some stock-jobbing
operation, or in contracts for rails or for supplies, is greater
than their interest as stockholders in that railroad company ;
and what is to be expected of human nature in such a case ?
Or perhaps a majority of the directors have invested lai'gely in
the bonds of the company, fl'hen it may come to pass that in
one way or another the stockholders lose the capital they have
1871.]
Railways and the State.
25
been induced to put into tbe enterprise ; the compaii}' is bank¬
rupt ; and the bondholders, foreclosing their mortgage, take
possession of the property, and "make a good thing of it."
The natural consummation of the process is when one or twO'
men grasp the entire business and manage it in their own in¬
terest as individuals.
VIL The people, then, must remember, and must take care
to make their legislators and other public servants remember,
that a railway, under whatever charter, is not a piece of merely
private property, held by associated individuals, and to be man¬
aged in that way in which they can put the most money into
their pockets, but is essentially a public mstiiutiou to he man¬
aged for the public, under a strict responsibility to the State. As
long ago as when railways were a novelty in England, the old
Duke of Wellington—whose greatest talent was the eminence
of his common sense—said in parliament (perhaps not these
words, but to this effect) "My lords, this is the beginning of a
great change, and we must take care that we do not lose the old
English idea of the king's highway." The railroad is, in the
new civilization, and to the American people especially, what
the king's highway was in the civilization which our ancestors
brought from England. Every highway is a public institution
for the public benefit. Eich and poor, lord and peasant, have
equal rights in tbe use of it. A turnpike road is a, highway
with a tax levied on passing vehicles to pay the cost of making-
it and keeping it ;—as a highway it is nobody's private prop¬
erty. The turnpike company was simply entrusted with the
duty of making it and keeping it in repair. It does not own
the road ; and even its right of way it holds only in trust for the
public. It cannot shut up the road which it has once opened ;
and if it pulls down its gates and ceases to collect its tolls, the
right of way remains to the pirblic or lapses to the owners
of the soil. It may be said that a railway is not a highway,
and that therefore a railway company differs essentially from a
turnpike company. We admit this, for we have already
insisted on the fact that railways are a novelty, and railway cor¬
porations an institution heretofore unknown to statesmanship
and altogether unique in its relations to government. But
what makes the difference ? The railroad company differs from
4
26
Railways and the Ríate.
[Oct.,
the tiimpike company in that it holds not only the i-iglit of way
but the vehicle also. It is created by the State for the purpose
of making a road on which only one sort of vehicle can be
used, the road with its iron rails and its rolling stock being all
one great machine constructed for the public. The road itself,
as really as a turnpike road, is public property held in trust by
a corporation for jniblic convenience. The corporation does
not own the land over which it has laid its track ; all that it lias
acquired from the proprietors is sirnjaly the right of way, and it
holds the right of way only in trust for certain uses. Strictly,
its only properly in the institution is the exclusive right of con¬
veying passengers and merchandise on that road—that being
the eonsideration for the capital which it has expended in the
construction of the road-bed and the track, and in the purchase
of the rolling stoclv which is as much a part of the road as the
rails are. Its tenure even of that right is conditioned on its
performance of its duties to the public. It cannot arbitrarily
shut up tlie road, nor can it arbitrarily refuse to convey any
man or any man's merchandise. Such a corporation exists not
for its stockholders merely—still less for its directors or its
president, but for tlie commonwealth. Its I'oad, with all the
needful machinery for the conveyance of freight and of passen¬
gers, is as truly the people's highway as the road on which a
farmer travels to church or to mill, or sends his children to
school. It holds all its powers in trust. It was ci'eated to be
the servant of the State.
We do not imply that the charters of railway corporations
may be arbitrarily repealed or altered, or that the State may at
pleasure repudiate its contract with such a corporation. A rail¬
way franchise is a concession by the State of certain powers and
privileges, on condition of certain services to be rendered in
return. The owners of that franchise have a right to an ample
remuneration for the capital which they have invested in the
enterprise. Ilaving been induced to expend a large amount in
the construction of a public work, they have a right to much
more (if they can get it honestly) than simple interest on the
money which the work has cost them ; for it was by the possi¬
bility of large profits that they were induced to incur the
chances of loss and failure. But, on the other hand, they
1871.]
Railivays and the State.
27
must remember tbat the work which they have constructed
is a public work—public and not private property—and
that as in the construction of it thej were agents for the
State, so in the .management of it they are servants of
the State. Tliey have no right to manage that public work as
if it were a private property of their own. For example, we
find a statement that on the Ilartford and New Flaven Kailroad
" it costs more for freight from Meriden south than it does from
New Britain," the latter city being farther north, but having the
advantage (which Meriden has not) of access to New Haven by
another line of railway. TVe give this statement as we find it
(and might give others of the same sort), simply to say that the
directors of a railway that discriminates in such a fashion, for
such a reason, are managing a public trust as if it were their
private property, and might- reasonably bo called to account.
Such abuse of the trust—for it is nothing less—would be a
sufficient reason for legislative interference. "We may suppose
malfeasance of another and baser description. A railroad com¬
pany may attempt to obtain legislation in its interest by cor¬
rupting influences. It may expend money in putting its officers
or its tools into the legislature. It may fill the lobbies of the
capitol with its emissaries, who lavish its money on members
from the country, conciliating their favor by means of appli¬
ances more costly and more exciting than speckled trout from
the head waters of the Androscoggin—by frequent drinks and
unlimited cigars, by champagne suppers and unmentionable
hospitalities. It may, in some emergency, give thousands of
dollars for votes and thousands more for a veto, It may be¬
come an insufferable nuisance in tlie State. Who shall tell us
that in such a case the sovereign people may not dissolve the
insolent and demoralizing corporation? The people in sucha
case, roused by wrong, may elect legislators who dare not sell
themselves, or who have too much manhood to be bought ; and
so the commonwealth may be saved.
It is a first principle of justice, and is incorporated into our
fundamental law, that private property must not be taken for
public uses without compensation. This implies that private
property may be taken, under any necessity, for public uses, if
it is equitably paid for. Thus it is that the State authorize.s a
corjjoration to lay out its railroad through any man's farm or
28
lïailways arid Lh.e State.
[Oct.,
garden, or over his father's bones in the cemetery, or tlirough
his parlor. By the same light, if it be found that the private
property of that corporation, namely, its exclusive right of con-
veying merchandise and passengers on a certain road, or what¬
ever else it may be, is needed for public use, that property may
be resumed by the State on the payment of an equitable con¬
sideration. Private property may also be forfeited to the public
and taken without compensation. Every fine is simnlv a for¬
feiture of private property. An imperious corporation ma}- be
made to understand,'by the enactment of adequate statutes, tlie
possibility of its forfeiting to the State, not only its charter, but
all its goods and chattels. Legislatures may be bought. Idie
" men inside of politics '' in all parties—the men who arrange
"the slate," and pull the "wires at party conventions—are noto¬
riously venal. But the people, -when roused by some great
danger, cannot be bribed and will not be trifled with. The
sovereign people, when the time shall have come, wdll find a
way, under the constitution and by the laws, to make the
hugest corporation a tractable servant of the commonwealth
and not its master.
VIII. The abolition of special legislation for particular rail¬
roads would bring upon the legislature the duty of enacting
fjeneral laws applicable to all such corporations existing or pro¬
posed. A general railway law is no more an impossibility than
a general banking law, or a general divorce law' ; nor is there
any inevitable necessity for a railroad lobby more than for a bank
lobby, or a divorce lobby. The application and administra¬
tion of laws about railways aud railway corporations should,
of course, be committed to executive ofiicers, few, responsible,
and invested with ample powers ; and from their determina¬
tions the appeal should be never to the legislature, but only to
the courts of justice.
We congratulate the public on the ability and thoroughness
with which two well-known contributors to the ISTorth Ameri¬
can Keview have been, for some time past, discussing various
aspects of what is rapidly becoming one of the most important
of public questions. Nor can we repress the expression of the
satisfaction with wdiich we see, in the fourth generation from
" the elder Adams," an undiminished capability of eminent
statesmanship.