AN EARNEST APPEAL for a Thorough
Official Investigation of the Nicaragua
Canal Project in its Commercial, Mili¬
tary and Engineering Aspects, before
Committing the Government of the
United States to its Construction,
By Joseph Nimmo, Jr.
I desire to invite public attention to the following
statements in regard to the present status of the prop¬
osition to commit the Government of the United States
to the construction of the proposed Nicaragua Canal:
First. The Congress of the United States has never
yet instituted an investigation in regard to the com¬
mercial importance of the proposed canal.
Second. The Congress of the United States has never
yet instituted an investigation in regard to the military
aspects of the proposed canal.
Third. The Congress of the United States has, within
the year last past, caused an investigation to be made
by a'board of eminent civil and military engineers as
to the engineering features of the proposed Nicaragua
Canal. That board has found that the engineering
plans and estimates of the Maritime Canal Company of
Nicaragua are marked by gross misrepresentations,
glaring omissions and other defects which lead to the
conclusion that such plans and estimates constitute an
-T :"- '1$M
I . I -
N ^ i
2
Unreliable basis for legislative action. Accordingly
the Nicaragua Canal Board has recommended a new
and more thorough survey than was possible under the
provisions of law limiting its inquiries.
Fourth. Heretofore, and during the present session
of Congress, the proponents of the Nicaragua Canal have
not only failed to ask any governmental verification of
their statements, but they have strenuously opposed all
propositions in favor of instituting official inquiry as to
the commercial, military or engineering aspects of the
Nicaragua Canal scheme. They have also maligned
the members of the late Nicaragua Canal Board and
others who have advocated the thorough investigation
of their scheme, at the same time strenuously endeavor¬
ing to induce Congress to accept their own representa¬
tions without question.
Firth. The Maritime Canal Company of Nicaragua
is bankrupt. It has besides failed in its strenuous
efforts to raise money both in this country and in
Europe, and for the reason that its proponents and
managers have been unable to convince financiers as to
the feasibility or commercial value of their project. In
the desperation of failure the Canal Company has turned
to the Government of the United States for the repair-
ment of its fortunes and the recoupment of its losses.
These are historic facts and they are undeniable.
A careful study of this subject during the last six¬
teen years convinces me that the proponents of the
Nicaragua Canal scheme, in their efforts to secure
financial aid from the Government, have proceeded upon
the basis of false and misleading assumptions as to its
commercial and military characteristics. In support of
this view I beg leave to invite attention to the follow¬
ing statements :
In the year 1880 I was requested hy the American
Society of Civil Engineers, in my then official capacity
3
as Chief of the Bureau of Statistics of the Treasury De¬
partment, to prepare a statement showing the commer¬
cial possibilities of the proposed Panama Canal. My
report upon the subject, made under the authority of
the Secretary of the Treasury, is dated August 7, 1880.
It is the result of a careful investigation to which I de¬
voted about six months of my time, under exceedingly
favorable conditions as to means of securing informa¬
tion. I did not confine my attention to the Panama
Canal, but reported generally upon the commercial
possibilities of " An American Inter-Oceanic Canal,"
without regard to its location. My conclusions were
therefore quite as applicable to the Nicaragua Canal as
to the Panama Canal. A few years later the Nicaragua
Canal Company published a statement of tonnage,
many times since repeated, in which appears the fol¬
lowing statement :
" Mr. Nimmo's estimate 1,625,000 tons
Mr. Nimmo corrected 8,706,000 tons."
Confident that my own conclusion in regard to the
commercial possibilities of the project is correct, this
unexplained and unsupported denial of the accuracy of
my oflScial report has been exceedingly offensive to me.
A sense of public duty, as well as personal incentive,
has therefore prompted me to seek an authoritative de¬
termination of the question at issue, through an
impartial official investigation. Besides a careful study
of commercial and economic forces and conditions, to
which study my life is largely devoted, has convinced
me that during the last sixteen years the course of
commercial and economic developments has greatly
reduced the probable amount of tonnage which would
pass through an American Inter-Oceanic Canal, if such
a canal were now completed. It is also my firm belief
that as the years go by, the need of such a canal will
decrease, as the result of the construction of transcon-
4
tinental railroads, and the continued cheapening of
transportation over such railroads in the United States,
in Mexico, in Central America and in South America.
My reasons for this belief are set forth at length in a
pamphlet dated Septexnber 30, 1895, which was written
by me, and printed for me by Messrs. Nesbitt & Co.,
of New York, and in an article from my pen in the
Forum for March, 1896. In these articles I have stated
my belief that if the Nicaragua Canal were now com¬
pleted it could not secure much over three hundred
thousand tons of shipping annually, and it is my belief
that a thorough and impartial official investigation
under the authoritj^ of Congress would verify this con¬
clusion. On the other hand, the proponents of the
Nicaragua Canal declare that it could secure from seven
to eight million tons annually. But the fact has been
exposed that their pretensions are based upon absurd
assumptions and an utterly unphilosophical method of
computation. All this would readily appear as the
result of an official investigation, the only safe basis of
legislative action in regard to subjects of this charactex-.
The administrative government of the United States
is fully equipped for inquiries such as that here recom¬
mended. The Bureau of Statistics of the State Depart¬
ment, the Bureau of Statistics and the Bureau of Nav¬
igation of tlie Treasury Department and the Interstate
Commerce Commission can furnish all the information
required for such an investigation. It would be mani¬
festly absurd and utterly indefensible for the govern¬
ment of this great and enlightened nation to engage
in a costly commercial enterprise, such as the Nicaragua
Canal, without first submitting the whole question as
to its feasibility and importance to those offices of its
administrative department which have to do with every
practical view of the question as to its efficiency as an
agency of commerce. Such investigation should, I
5
think, be conducted under the supervision of a com¬
mission especially appointed for that purpose.
The Suez Canal and the transcontinental railroads of
the United States have practically eliminated the once
assumed necessity for an American interoceanic canal.
This I believe would be clearly proved by a careful
official inquiry such as I have suggested.
The attempt to predicate the success of the Nicaragua
Canal upon the success of the Suez Canal is glaringly
absurd. This is evident from the following considera¬
tions: The Suez Canal is a sea level canal, whereas the
Nicaragua Canal would require 220 feet of lockage and
involve heroic engineering problems; the Suez Canal
connects great commercial nations, whereas the possi¬
ble commerce of the Nicaragua Canal is greatly infe¬
rior. The Suez Canal route has excellent and conven¬
iently located coaling facilities along its entire extent,
whereas the broad Pacific affords no such facilities for
the Nicaragua route. But in an economic and com¬
mercial sense, the most important difference between
the Suez and Nicaragua Canal routes consists in the
fact that the Suez Canal has no railroad competitor,
whereas the Nicaragua Canal, when completed, would
have six railroad competitors in this country, each one
of which is only about half the length of the canal
route from the Atlantic to the Pacific seaports of the
United States. These railroads absolutely and for all
time command the carriage of passengers, of bullion,
of the mails, of express goods, and of the higher classed
and perishable freights, leaving to the Nicaragua Canal
competition only the lower classed freights, for the car¬
riage of which the railroads would strenuously compete.
This latter statement is clearlj' illustrated by the fact that
SO per cent, of the canned goods of the Pacific Coast are
now shipped east bv rail, although such freights are
carried not only by the Panama route, but also by tbo
6
Cape Horn route in sailing vessels, a cheaper mode of
transportation than would be supplied by the Nicaragua
Canal. It is also a fact beyond all controversy that
from 95 to 98 per cent, of the products of California
shipped to the States east of the Sieri-a Nevada range
are shipped by rail. The principal part of such ship¬
ments are to points east of the Rockies and west of the
Allegheny Mountains; for be it remembered that the
center of the population of the United States is not far
east of the meridian of Chicago.
The reduction of about one-half in the transportation
charges on the transcontinental railroads during the
last twenty years is due to the competition of commer¬
cial forces, the competition of rival transportation lines,
the improved economies of transportation by rail and
the enormous increase in the volume of transcontinental
traffic, both thi'ough and local. At the same time there
has been a very large falling off in the volume of traffic
by the Panama and Cape Horn routes. A thorough
and impartial investigation would clearly expose the
force of these and other governing conditions.
The attempt to predicate the success of the Nicaragua
Canal upon the growth of commerce upon the great
lakes along our northern border is even more absurd
than that of attempting to predicate its success upon
the results realized on the Suez Canal route. This also
could be clearly established by a thorough commercial
investigation such as I have suggested. At another
time I shall attempt to make this clear.
The idea that the Nicaragua Canal would justify the
cost of its construction by supplying the means of com¬
petition to the transcontinental railroads is a fascinat¬
ing, but fallacious conception. That it would afford
some competitive advantage is admitted, but such com¬
petition would cost very much more than it would be
\vprth. it yyould be easy to point to proposed comrper-
7
cial highways within our own borders which would
afford equal and even superior advantages of compe¬
tition to those afforded by the Nicaragua Canal, but
which if constructed by the Government of the United
States, would in the aggregate involve a national debt
exceeding the debt incurred by the late war besides the
enormously increased taxation required to meet the in¬
terest on the debt incurred and the cost of maintaining
and operating such lines above the receipts from tolls
and freights. It would be the height of folly to em¬
bark our Government in such a ruinous policy.
The whole idea that the commercial and industrial
interests of the Pacific Coast are to be greatly benefited
by Nicaragua Canal competition is in my belief utterly
fallacious, for reasons of a commercial and economic
character, which I have elsewhere explained at length.
Let the people of the Pacific Coast think again upon
this great question, and chink soberly.
I am forced to believe also that the Western and
Northwestern States have been deluded as to the as¬
serted importance of the Nicaragua Canal. Chicago
is the great center of commerce for the products of the
products of the Pacific Coast, and the transcontinental
railroads are the avenues of that commerce. This trade
is very largely with points in the interior of the States
of California, Oregon and Washington. Is it within
the bounds of reason to suppose that Chicago and other
Western cities are to be benefited by lines of trans¬
portation extending from interior points in the Pacific
Coast States to Pacific seaports, thence by sea and
Nicaragua Canal to Atlantic and Gulf ports and thence
to Chicago, St. Louis and other commercial centers in
the Western and Northwestern States ? To the extent
of its efficiency the Nicaragua Canal route would ob¬
viously tend to divert commerce from Chicago and other
gestern cornmercial centers. But that influence would
8
be too small and ineffectual to injure Western cities or to
benefit our Atlantic and Gulf ports. The whole coun¬
try would, however, be burdened with the taxation in¬
volved by the construction of that unnecessary work
and by the enormous cost of maintaining it. All this,
however, is matter for a thorough investigation under
the authority of Congress. The light which such an
inquiry would throw upon the merits of the Nicaragua
Canal project would also be of great value in illumin¬
ating the legislative mind as to the force of commercial
and economic conditions which have been evolved dur¬
ing the last thirty years. One result of such knowledge
would be to convince legislators and the people generally
that the railroad has become the most efficient and the
most important avenue of commerce. One good trans¬
continental railroad is worth half a dozen isthmian
canals.
The absurdity of assuming that the Nicaragua Canal
would be of any military importance in time of war is
indicated by the reported assertion of a member of the
Nicaragua Canal Board that the proper thing to do
with it in case of a foreign war would be to blow up
one of its locks and thus render it useless. This would
be the inevitable alternative to an occupation of the
adjoining territory in Nicaragua and Costa Rica by the
land forces of the United States for the protection of
the Canal, an expedient which is too absurd for serious
consideration. One of the most absurd ideas promul¬
gated by the proponents of the Nicaragua Canal is that
Lake Nicaragua would become a great naval rendez¬
vous. This also would involve military occupation of
the adjacent territory as well as enormous military
works and great fleets at either terminus of the Canal,
for the elementary principles of military science regard¬
ing the location of naval rendezvous or base of supplies
demand, first, absolute protection on the land side, an4
0
second, an impregnable outlet to the sea. It is difficult
to imagine a more senseless waste of military power
than would be involved in a naval rendezvous on Lake
Nicaragua. It is the conception of civilians and not of
military men. Besides it is sustained by no adequate
commercial object to be subserved. It would be a
manifest dereliction of legislative duty and the climax
of folly to commit the Government of the United States
to the construction of the Nicaragua Canal upon the
ground of its assumed military importance in the
absence of a thorough investigation of its military
character by a properly constituted military boa.rd,
especially in view of the fact that the United States
has in its Army and Navy men of the highest ability
who are distinguished for their knowledge of military
affairs.
It would be presumptuous in me to enlarge upon the
importance of a thorough investigation of the engineer¬
ing aspects of the Nicaragua Canal scheme in the light
of the valuable information and distinct recommenda¬
tions of the distinguished Board of Engineers which
has recently reported upon the subject. That this
recommendation will eventually be heeded by Congress
I cannot doubt. The discussion of comm rcial problems
constitutes a large part of the legislative function, but
military and engineering problems are usually of too
scientific and technical a character for legislative dis¬
cussion. They must be left to the decision of technical
tribunals. The attempt to forestall investigations as
to the military and engineering features of the Nica¬
ragua Canal project b}^ the strident utterances of men
unlearned in the military and engineering professions
constitutes one of the most glaring vagaries of the
Nicaragua Canal propaganda.
The question as to whether the Nicaragua Canal
would or would not be available for sailing vessels has
10
been sharply debated. Much has been made of the fact
that in a recent article I quoted only a part of what the
renowned Lieutenant Maury said upon this subject. I
quoted all that, at the time, I had seen of his reference
to the subject. But the controversy is merely one over
words. Lieutenant Maury never said that it is impos¬
sible for a sailing vessel to reach and depart from the
Isthmus of Panama, and I have never said that it is
impossible for a sailing vessel to reach and depart from
either terminus of the Nicaragua Canal without the aid
of a steam vessel. What I have said and steadfastly
maintain, is that, in a commercial sense, it is imprac¬
ticable to navigate sailing vessels through the proposed
Nicaragua Canal. To be more definite, I maintain that
the cost of passing a sailing vessel through the pro¬
posed canal, including the expenses incident to delays
in approaching and leaving its termini and the cost of
towing sailing vessels through it, wouldamount to much
more than the cost of moving a vessel over the longer
open sea route around Cape Horn. As in the case of
the Suez Canal, sailing vessels would, for the reasons
just mentioned, be absolutely shut out from the Nica¬
ragua Canal route. Let it be remember that Lieuten¬
ant Maury wrote upon this subject long before the work
of construction was begun on the Suez Canal or upon
the transcontinental railroads, and that a large amount
of meteorological and nautical information has heen
collected since his day. It will be an easy matter for
Congress to arrive at a clear determination of this
vitally important question through an investigation
conducted hy officers of the Naval Observatory, the
Hydrographie Office of the Navy Department, the
Weather Bureau of the Agricultural Department and
the Bureau of Navigation of the Treasury Department.
To neglect such means of information at hand would
be a clear dereliction of legislative duty.
11
The whole question as to the possible tonnage of the
Nicaragua Canal is subject to a crucial test. The foui-
principal sources of tonnage for the proposed canal are
the Asiatic commerce of the Atlantic and Gulf ports of
the United States, the commerce of the Pacific Coast
States with Europe, the commerce of the Pacific Coast
States with the States east of the Eocky Mountains and
the commerce of the western coast of Central and South
America with countries bordering on the Atlantic
Ocean. During the year ended June 30, 1895, the ton¬
nage engaged in the Asiatic commerce above referred
to amounted to 416,152 tons, of which only 53,719 tons
was steam tonnage, which could have passed through
the Nicaragua Canal. The tonnage of the Pacific Coast
with Europe amounted to 628,735 tons, of which only
5,729 tons consisted of steam vessels available for the
Nicaragua Canal. The tonnage employed on the
Panama route in the trade between the Atlantic and
Pacific ports of the United States during the year 1895
amounted to 184,426 tons, of which not more that 150,-
000 tons could be expected to pursue the Nicaragua
Canal route. An allowance of 100,000 tons for the
commerce of the western coast of Central and South
America is ample, for reasons presented in my official re¬
port of 1880 and in recent statements. The total ton¬
nage from these four sources is therefore approximately
as follows :
Asiatic commerce 54,000 tons.
Commerce of Pacific Coast States
with Europe 6,000 "
Commerce between Atlantic and
Pacific ports of the United
States 150,000 "
Commerce of the western coast
of Central and South America 100,000 "
Total
310,000 "
The cost of transporting wheat from California to
Europe by sailing vessels during the year 1895 was
about five dollars a ton of 2,240 pounds. The expense
of passing vessels through the Nicaragua Canal upon
the basis of 4 per cent, on Col. Ludlow's estimated cost
of S150 000,000 and of 81,400,000 for administration,
operation and maintenance, would be for an estimated
tonnage of 400,000 tons annualh' about 818.50 per ton.
In a word, the cost of the Nicaragua Canal passage alone
would amount to about three times the entire cost of the
transportation of wheat by the Cape Horn route, mak¬
ing due allowance for the numerical difference between
the ship ton and the ton of weight.
Much is predicated by the proponents of the Nicaragua
Canal upon a probable change from sailing to steam
vessels. Making full allowance for such change, it is
beyond the present bounds of probability to assume
that the Canal could secure over 600,000 tons. On the
other hand, there is a constant tendency to a diversion
of transcontinental traffic over the thirteen railroads
completed or in course of construction between Chili
and British North America. Wliilelamof the opinion
that it is unwise to assume that over 400,000 tons of
shipping can be secured for the Nicaragua Canal, I most
sincerely hope that the subject in this and in every
other aspect may be subjected to a rigid and impartial
investigation.
I invoke a rigid scrutiny of all these statements.
The Nicaragua Canal question has never yet been
prepared for public discussion or for legislative discus¬
sion by a precedent official investigation of its govern¬
ing conditions. On the contrary, the promotion of the
scheme has been based largely upon the idea of ignor¬
ing all its governing conditions. The time has come,
however, when the proponents of the Nicaragua Canal
project should abandon the policy of opposing every
18
proposition to investigate the comnaercial, military and
engineering aspects of their undertaking and of at¬
tempting to casting obloquy upon persons who seek to
secure such investigation in the cause of truth and ju¬
dicious legislation. Such opposition constitutes the
strongest presumptive evidence of the unworthiuess of
their scheme.
Again I earnestly plead for a thorough investigation
of the commercial, meteorological, military and engin¬
eering conditions involved in the construction of the
proposed Nicaragua Canal before the Government of
the United States shall embark in its construction. A
refusal to institute such investigation in advance of
appropriating money out of the public treasury, or of
extending the credit of the Government in aid of the
scheme would be an affront to the intelligence of the
age in which we live, and discreditable to this great
and enlightened nation ; and I doubt not that it would
eventuate in a disgraceful national disaster.
JOSEPH NIMMO, Jr.
Huxtingtox, Loxg Islaxd, N. Y., May 27, 1896.