D 522 
 
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 Copy 1 
 
 W SERIES No. 157 
 
 JANUARY 1, 1919 
 
 BULLETIN OF THE STATE 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF IOWA 
 
 SYLLABUS ON THE ISSUES 
 OF THE WAR 
 
 Published by the University, Iowa City, Iowa 
 
 Issued semi-monthly throughout the year. Entered at the post office at Iowa City, 
 
 Iowa, as second class matter. Acceptance for mailing at special rate 
 
 of postage provided for in section 1103, Act of October 3, 
 
 1917, authorized on July 3, 1918. 
 
 Monograph 
 
THE STATE 
 UNIVERSITY OF IOWA 
 
 IOWA CITY 
 
 SYLLABUS ON THE ISSUES 
 OF THE WAR 
 
 Published by the University 
 Iowa City, Iowa 
 

 n. of *. 
 
 MAh 25 1919 
 
SYLLABUS ON THE ISSUES OF THE WAR 
 
 i 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 The course on the issues of the war prescribed by the War 
 Department for members of the Students' Army Training Corps 
 was to be divided into three general topics, (1) the historical 
 and economic problems of the nations involved, (2) their social 
 and governmental conditions, and (3) their philosophies and 
 literatures. Each topic was to be treated during a single term. 
 Very wisely the Committee on Education and Special Training 
 permitted the institutions which maintained units of the Corps 
 some leeway in the evolution of the details of the course. Since 
 the armistice was signed before the close of the first term, only 
 a third of the course was carried out according to the original 
 plans. The officers in charge of the course at the University of 
 Iowa contemplated the publication, for the use of the University 
 and of such other institutions as might desire to employ them, 
 of three sets of syllabi. Only one set was completed, but, while 
 the immediate purpose is no longer to be served, it has seemed 
 advisable to publish this first syllabus as a record of the course 
 and a guide for later study of the great war. The syllabus was 
 compiled by the chairmen of instructional groups and edited by 
 Professor Van der Zee. , 
 
 At the University the course was organized in the College of 
 Liberal Arts under a special committee consisting of the follow- 
 ing persons : Professor C. H. Weller, chairman, Professor N. A. 
 Brisco, Professor F. C. Ensign, Associate Professor Percival 
 Hunt, Professor H. G-. Plum, Dean C. E. Seashore, and Professor 
 B. F. Shambaugh. After its organization the course was admin- 
 istered by the chairman of the committee. 
 
 Under the original plans of the War Department it was ex- 
 pected that members of the S. A. T. C. of twenty years and over 
 should be transferred to officers' training camps at the end of 
 one term. This condition made it seem wise to outline for the 
 
period as comprehensive a course as possible under the first 
 general theme. The committee in charge selected eleven topics, 
 one for each week of the term. Instruction in the several topics 
 was given by groups of two or more members of the University 
 faculty, who should thus be able to confine their attention to a 
 single subject rather than be compelled, less academically, to 
 cover a large series of subjects, some of them quite foreign from 
 the special line of study with which the instructors were technic- 
 ally acquainted. In execution this plan developed entirely suc- 
 cessfully. The names of the instructors of each topic, with their 
 regular departments, are as follows : 
 
 Topic I 
 Professor Gilbert Giddings Benjamin, Chairman History 
 
 Associate Professor Glenn Newton Merry Public Speaking 
 Assistant Professor Joseph Simeon Magnuson Latin 
 
 Topic II 
 
 Professor Frank Edward Horack, Chairman Political Science 
 
 Professor Benjamin Franklin Shambaugh Political Science 
 
 Associate Professor Richard Philip Baker Mathematics 
 
 Assistant Professor Clara May Daley History 
 
 Mr. Aubrey Ward Goodenough English 
 
 Topic III 
 Associate Professor Nathaniel Ruggles Whitney, Chairman 
 
 Economics 
 Assistant Professor Fred Emory Haynes Sociology 
 
 Assistant Professor Clarence Wycliffe Wassam Economics 
 
 Topic IV 
 Professor Charles Leonidas Robbins, Chairman Education 
 
 Associate Professor Elbert Nevius Sebring Thompson English 
 Assistant Professor Ernest James Ashbaugh Extension Division 
 Mrs. Grace Partridge Smith Greek 
 
 Topic V 
 Assistant Professor Jacob Van der Zee, Chairman 
 
 Political Science 
 Associate Professor Edward Henry Lauer German 
 
 Dr. John Ely Briggs Political Science 
 
 Topic VI 
 
 Professor Harry Grant Plum, Chairman History 
 
 Professor Bohumil Shimek Botany 
 
 Assistant Professor Herbert Funk Goodrich Law 
 
Dr. Sudhindra Bose Political Science 
 
 Miss Eva Maria Campbell English 
 
 Topic VII 
 
 Associate Professor Louis Pelzer, Chairman History 
 
 Miss Estella May Boot English 
 
 Miss Chloris Shade History 
 
 Topic VIII 
 
 Professor Abram Owen Thomas, Chairman Geology 
 
 Professor Wilbur John Teeters Pharmacy 
 
 Professor Robert Bradford Wylie Botany 
 
 Mr. Dayton Stoner Zoology 
 
 Topic IX 
 Professor Edwin Diller Starbuck, Chairman Philosophy 
 
 Associate Professor Clarence Marsh Case Sociology 
 
 Topic X 
 Assistant Professor John Hubert Scott, Chairman English 
 Mrs. Grace Partridge Smith Greek 
 
 Topic XI 
 Associate Professor Sam Berkley Sloan, Chairman English 
 
 Professor Charles Bundy Wilson German 
 
 Professor Franklin Hazen Potter Latin 
 
 Assistant Professor Frank Albert Stromsten Animal Biology 
 
 Instruction was given throughout the term to more.frhan 1300 
 men. The course was also made available to women, of whom 
 about 225 elected it. For the men the course was given in forty- 
 four sections, or classes ; for the women, in eleven sections. Ref- 
 erence books in sufficient numbers for use in all study centers 
 were provided by the University. 
 
 Testimony of students and faculty was virtually unanimous as 
 to the value and intrinsic interest of the course. Interruptions 
 due to the exigencies of introducing an unusual regime for the 
 University and to a long quarantine for an epidemic of the 
 influenza made the course less systematic than might have been 
 desired for the men ; the women followed it through with great 
 regularity. That the course served to arouse a keener interest 
 and a finer intelligence as to the issues of the war is indubitable. 
 It also stirred many students — and, it may be added, members 
 of the faculty as well — to the study of the questions involved in 
 the war. The course was distinctly worth while. C. H. "W. 
 
TOPIC I 
 IMMEDIATE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
 Compiled by G. G. Benjamin 
 
 I. THE UNIFICATION OF GERMANY AND THE DI- 
 PLOMACY OF BISMARCK 
 
 1. The means of unification 
 
 a. The development of a strong Prussian army. 
 Bismarck declared: "But Prussia must keep her 
 strength intact for the favorable movement, which 
 is too often missed. Prussia's boundaries are not 
 favorable to the development of a strong body poli- 
 tic. Not through fine speeches and majority reso- 
 lutions will the question of the hour be decided — 
 that was the mistake of 1848 and 1849 — but by 
 Iron and Blood." 
 
 b. The three wars 
 
 (1) War against Denmark (1864) 
 
 (2) Austro-Prussian War (1866) 
 
 (3) Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871) 
 
 2. The results of war 
 
 a. The unification of Germany 
 
 b. The weakening of France 
 
 c. Among Germans a firm belief in the value of 
 militarism 
 
 d. The Alsace-Lorraine question 
 
 3. Diplomatic aims of Bismarck (1871-1890) 
 
 a. Isolation of France 
 
 (1) By means of a division of parties in France 
 
 (2) By the establishment of a French Colonial 
 Empire 
 
 b. Friendship with Austria, Russia, and Great Britain. 
 Cf. The formation of the Three Emperors' League 
 (1872) 
 
c. The Congress of Berlin (1878) 
 
 (1) Purpose 
 
 (2) Results: the formation of an alliance between 
 Germany and Austria owing to Russia's hos- 
 tility to Germany. 
 
 "Bismarck aimed at isolating France in Europe and 
 at encouraging the war of parties .... which 
 would postpone the unity that was the first condition 
 of a sane and healthy recuperation, and of a France 
 valuable to the other allies. Great Britain, absorbed 
 in domestic and colonial problems, was only formidable 
 on the Continent if allied with a strong continental 
 state. The Italian kingdom was struggling with finan- 
 cial chaos, unification, and the hostility of the Vatican. 
 . . . . By encouraging French colonial expansion 
 east of Algiers, a wedge was driven between France and 
 Italy Russia must be also isolated, for iso- 
 lation from other European states meant dependence 
 
 on Berlin With Austria, Bismarck desired 
 
 a reconciliation and an understanding which cut away 
 a Catholic power from Catholic France." — Robertson 
 and Marriott, Evolution of Prussia, 400-403. 
 
 d. The formation of an alliance by Germany, Austria, 
 
 and Italy (1882) 
 
 (1) Purposes of the Triple Alliance 
 
 (a) To establish a great European alliance 
 under the leadership of Germany 
 
 (b) To keep France isolated 
 
 (c) To control the diplomacy of Europe 
 
 (d) To obtain for Germany "a security in 
 foreign affairs" 
 
 " Should the irritation in Russia increase to the 
 point of war, Germany was sure of an ally. Should 
 France yield to her desire for revenge and attack 
 Germany, neutrality was assured ; should France 
 in a war be aided by Russia, Austro-Hungarian as- 
 sistance was pledged." — Holt and Chilton. 
 
 (2) Results 
 
 (a) Military force as a deciding issue in 
 international affairs 
 
(b) The ultimate forming of opposing alli- 
 ances by other powers 
 
 II. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS FROM 1890 TO 1914 
 
 1. The dismissal of Bismarck and the ascendancy of 
 
 William II. 
 
 a. Effect of Bismarck's downfall 
 
 "The one man who possessed the power to separate 
 France and Russia thus disappeared. In Russia the 
 disgrace of Bismarck aroused not merely surprise but 
 dismay." — Seymour, 49, 50. 
 
 b. Diplomatic policies of "William II. 
 
 (1) Maintain German prestige on the Continent 
 "Being deeply imbued with Bismarck's prin- 
 ciples, William II had no illusions on the subject. 
 The very system was in danger, which it was his 
 mission to safeguard. If any one will read over the 
 seven hundred and some odd speeches .... 
 pronounced by the voluble orator who presides 
 over the destinies of the German Empire, a fixed 
 
 idea will be found in them This idea is 
 
 that Germany must maintain the position gained 
 by her victorious war against France." — Tardieu, 
 France and the Alliances, 162. 
 
 (2) Render Russo-French entente harmless 
 
 (3) To achieve world domination by means of 
 
 (a) A strong colonial empire 
 
 (b) Commercial supremacy 
 
 (c) A powerful navy 
 
 2. Steps leading to the Triple Entente 
 
 a. The Dual Entente between France and Russia 
 (1891-1896) 
 
 b. The Entente Cordiale between France and Great 
 Britain (1904-1905) 
 
 c. The Russo-British Treaty or Understanding (1907) 
 "A policy that aims to hem Germany in, to draw around 
 
 us a circle of the Powers for the purpose of isolating us, 
 
would be a very dangerous policy for the peace of Europe. ' ' 
 — Chancellor von Buelow in the Reichstag, Nov. 4, 1906. 
 
 3. a. The Moroccan crises (1905, 1907, 1911) 
 
 (1) The Tangier affair and the Algeciras Confer- 
 ences (1905-1906) 
 
 (2) Casablanca (1907) 
 
 (3) Agadir (1911) 
 
 "Our peace is safeguarded not by such accommoda- 
 tion nor by agreements, but only by our trusty German 
 sword, and at the same time by the feeling, which is 
 probably in the minds of the French .... that 
 we also hope to see to it that there shall be a Govern- 
 ment which is determined not to let that sword rust 
 when the proper time comes. ' ' — Von Hildebrand, Agra- 
 rian Conservative Leaders, Nov. 9, 1911. 
 
 "Germany gained no prestige, but rather emerged 
 crestfallen. Her press was full of severe denunciations. 
 There was as usual the stereotyped complaint that Ger- 
 many could not have her place in the sun ! There was 
 intense bitterness against Russia while Italy was greatly 
 censured." — Bracq, The Provocation of France. 
 
 b. The Bosnian affair (1908) 
 
 c. The Bagdad Railway and the Middle European 
 Project 
 
 d. Tripolitan and Balkan Wars, (1911-1913) and their 
 results 
 
 e. Conflict between German interests and those of Eng- 
 land, France, and Russia 
 
 TOPIC II 
 RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR 
 
 Compiled by F. E. Horack 
 
 THE AUSTRIAN ULTIMATUM AND THE SERBIAN 
 REPLY (JULY 23-25, 1914) 
 
 1. The pretext for the ultimatum 
 
 The murder of the heir to the Austrian throne on June 
 28, 1914, at Sarajevo. Austria had expressed an inten- 
 tion to have a reckoning with Serbia. 
 
 9 
 
2. The formidable character of the ultimatum 
 
 It was intended to provoke war. An acceptance of its 
 provisions would have sacrificed Serbia's sovereignty 
 and independence. Delivered July 23, 1914, it de- 
 manded a reply within forty-eight hours. 
 
 3. The ultimatum known to Germany before it was sent 
 
 to Serbia 
 The "decisive conference" at Potsdam on July 5, 1914. 
 
 4. The attitude of the powers 
 
 England, France, and Russia endeavored to preserve 
 peace. The first attempts at conciliation were repulsed 
 by Germany and Austria. 
 
 5. The Serbian reply 
 
 Serbia accepted without qualification eight of the ten 
 demands made by Austria. Only a qualified acceptance 
 was made of the other two, the unqualified acceptance 
 of which would have rendered Serbia a vassal of 
 Austria. However, Serbia offered to submit the points 
 at issue to the Hague Tribunal or to the Great Powers 
 in case her reply was not considered satisfactory. 
 
 II. AUSTRIA'S REFUSAL TO ACCEPT THE SERBIAN 
 REPLY AND THE DECLARATION OF WAR 
 AGAINST SERBIA (JULY 25-28, 1914) 
 
 1. Scant consideration given the Serbian reply 
 
 The Serbian reply received at 5 :58 P. M. on July 25th, 
 and the Austrian minister left Belgrade with all his 
 staff at 6 :30. 
 
 2. Declaration of the Austrian foreign minister 
 
 The Austrian government could not enter into any dis- 
 cussion of the terms of the Austrian note. 
 
 2. Declaration of war 
 
 In spite of all the efforts of England, France, and 
 Russia for mediation, Austria declared war on Serbia, 
 July 28, 1914. 
 
 10 
 
4. Germany's part in the trouble 
 
 Germany insisted that the conflict should be "local- 
 ized," and that England and France should persuade 
 Russia not to intervene, so that Austria might have a 
 free hand. In this manner Germany endeavored to 
 throw responsibility on the Entente powers, should war 
 break out. 
 
 5. Repulse of two further attempts at conciliation by 
 
 Germany and Austria 
 Both England and Russia admitted that perhaps 
 Austria had some grounds for complaint against 
 Serbia ; but England insisted that under the pretext of 
 humiliating Serbia the humiliation of Russia must not 
 be involved. Russia insisted that the territorial integ- 
 rity of Serbia should be guaranteed, and her rights as 
 a sovereign state be respected. 
 
 a. Sir Edward Grey proposed mediation of the 
 powers not directly concerned (which included 
 Germany) for the purpose of finding a way out. 
 
 b. Russia offered to confer directly with Austria. 
 Germany would not agree to the first proposal 
 nor would Austria consent to the second. 
 
 III. THE FIRST ULTIMATUM OF GERMANY TO RUSSIA 
 (JULY 29-30, 1914) 
 
 1. Negotiations by the Triple Entente and Italy in an 
 
 effort to avert war 
 Germany kept insisting that Austria should not be 
 brought before a European court. Sir Edward Grey 
 proposed that since the German government officials 
 objected to the form of his proposal for a conference 
 they should themselves suggest a workable form. 
 Germany would offer none. 
 
 2. The first ultimatum by German}) to Russia 
 
 The mobilization of the Austrian army on the Russian 
 frontier led to similar military measures on the part of 
 Russia. Russia assured Germany that these military 
 precautions were not directed against Germany. 
 
 11 
 
3. Germany's threat 
 
 Germany informed Russia that if she did not stop her 
 military preparations, the German army would receive 
 orders to mobilize. Notice of German orders to mobil- 
 ize appeared in the Berlin Lokal Anzeiger before Rus- 
 sian mobilization, and was then declared to be false, 
 but Russia had acted on the information and ordered 
 mobilization. 
 
 4. German ultimatum withdrawn 
 
 Germany, doubtful of England's attitude, asked on 
 what conditions Russia would suspend her mobilization 
 and withdrew the ultimatum. 
 
 5. Russia's further pacific proposal rejected by Germany 
 The Czar offered to stop all military preparations if 
 Austria would recognize that the Serbian dispute had 
 assumed the character of a question of European inter- 
 est. Germany declared such a proposition unacceptable 
 to Austria without referring it to her. 
 
 IV. THE DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST RUSSIA 
 AND PRANCE (JULY 31-AUGUST 3, 1914) 
 
 1. The second ultimatum of Germany to Russia 
 Although both Austria and Russia had mobilized, they 
 had agreed that mobilization should not be considered 
 as an act of hostility. Kaiser William sent a threaten- 
 ing telegram to Czar Nicholas complaining of the Rus- 
 sian mobilization. At midnight of July 31st Germany 
 demanded that Russia stop all military preparations 
 against Germany as well as against Austria within 
 twelve hours. 
 
 2. A new formula of compromise accepted by Austria and 
 
 rejected by Germany 
 On August 1st, Austria manifested a willingness "to 
 discuss what settlement would be compatible with the 
 dignity and prestige for which both Empires (Austria 
 and Russia) had equal concern." Austria was now 
 willing to permit the great powers to decide what satis- 
 
 12 
 
faction Serbia should afford Austria. Germany, how- 
 ever, refused to accept any formula and declared that 
 Russia must submit to the demands of Germany. 
 
 3. The declaration of war against Russia 
 
 After the expiration of the time limit on the second 
 German ultimatum the Czar sent a final appeal to 
 Emperor William to continue negotiations. At 7 :10 
 P. M. on August 1st Germany declared war on Russia. 
 Austria did not declare war until five days later. 
 
 4. The declaration of war against France, August 3, 1914 
 France kept her troops six miles from the frontier in 
 order not to provoke an attack while negotiations were 
 still possible. Germany, wishing to crush France and 
 then turn against Russia, struck first and manufactured 
 her reasons afterwards. It was not easy for Germany 
 to find a reason for a declaration of war against France. 
 That French aviators had dropped bombs on German 
 territory and other like charges have been proved 
 absolutely false. 
 
 V. THE VIOLATION OF BELGIAN NEUTRALITY AND 
 THE DECLARATION OF WAR BY ENGLAND 
 AGAINST GERMANY (AUGUST 2-4, 1914) 
 
 1. German belief as to England's attitude 
 
 German statesmen had figured that owing to embit- 
 tered party relations, troubles in Ireland, unrest in 
 India, labor troubles, and military unpreparedness, 
 Great Britain would probably keep out of the struggle. 
 
 2. British diplomacy 
 
 The German White Book itself admitted that Great 
 Britain strove earnestly and energetically for peace. 
 
 3. Grey's announcement 
 
 Sir Edward Grey insisted that England would main- 
 tain her freedom of action, that is, England was "free 
 from engagements." Circumstances and British inter- 
 ests would have to decide what stand England would 
 take. 
 
 13 
 
4. Germany's "Infamous Proposal" 
 
 In return for British neutrality in case of war between 
 Germany and France, Germany would promise not to 
 take any territory of France in Europe. The neutral- 
 ity of Holland would be respected ; but in case Germany 
 was obliged to violate Belgium's neutrality she would 
 evacuate Belgium after the war if Belgium did not 
 side against Germany. Great Britain emphatically re- 
 jected this proposal. 
 
 5. Grey's proposal 
 
 Sir Edward Grey held out the prospect of a league of 
 peace (July 30th) ; but Germany made no reply to the 
 suggestion. The German government, however, in- 
 quired on August 1st if Great Britain would keep out 
 if Germany respected Belgium's neutrality. Great 
 Britain refused to commit herself, but did say that she 
 would not come in if Russia and France rejected any 
 reasonable peace proposals. 
 
 6. Violation of the neutrality of Luxemburg and Belgium 
 
 a. German troops invaded Luxemburg on August 2, 
 1914. 
 
 b. On the same day at 7 P. M. Germany demanded 
 permission to pass through Belgium on the way to 
 France, declaring that should Belgium resist she 
 would be considered an enemy and be treated ac- 
 cordingly. 
 
 c. Belgium refused to grant such permission, declar- 
 ing that to do so would sacrifice the honor of the 
 nation and betray its duty towards Europe. Ger- 
 man forces entered Belgium August 4, 1914, justi- 
 fying their violation of Belgium's neutrality on the 
 grounds of "necessity" — "necessity knows no 
 law." 
 
 7. Great Britain's declaration of war 
 
 The threatened invasion of Belgium brought from the 
 Belgian king an appeal to the king of England for 
 intervention, August 3, 1914. Great Britain thereupon 
 sent an ultimatum to Germany demanding that she 
 
 14 
 
respect the neutrality of Belgium. German invasion 
 proceeded, and Great Britain declared war upon Ger- 
 many about midnight, August 4, 1914. In the parting 
 interviews of the British Ambassador with the German 
 Chancellor, the latter declared Great Britain was mak- 
 ing war upon a kindred nation "just for a word — 
 'neutrality' — just for a scrap of paper." 
 
 VI. PROOF OF GERMANY'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR 
 THE WAR 
 
 1. The decisive conference at Potsdam on July 5, 1914 
 
 a. It was decided that Austria should have a reckon- 
 ing with Serbia and that if war with Russia re- 
 sulted it would not matter. 
 
 b. Germany's knowledge of the ultimatum to Serbia 
 before it was delivered. 
 
 2. Germany's support of Austrian demands 
 Whole-hearted endorsement the moment they became 
 generally known, and unwillingness to assent to a con- 
 ference of ambassadors for fear of diplomatic defeat. 
 
 3. Testimony of Prince Lichnowsky 
 
 The German Ambassador to England declares in his 
 My Mission to London, 1912-1914, that "we insisted 
 on war;" and concludes that "it is no wonder that the 
 whole of the civilized world outside Germany places the 
 entire responsibility for the world-war upon our 
 shoulders. ' ' 
 
 4. Revelations by an ex-director of the Krupp munition 
 
 works 
 
 CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF THE THIRTEEN DAYS. 
 JULY 23 TO AUGUST 4, 1914 
 
 Austria issues ultimatum to Serbia 
 Serbian reply to ultimatum 
 Austria declares war on Serbia 
 Russian partial mobilization 
 July 31 Austrian general mobilization 
 
 15 
 
 July 
 
 23 
 
 July 
 
 25 
 
 July 
 
 28 
 
 July 
 
 29 
 
July 31 Russian general mobilization 
 
 July 31 Germany declares ' ' State of War ' ' 
 
 August 1 Germany declares war on Russia 
 
 August 2 Germany issues ultimatum to Belgium 
 
 August 3 Germany declares war on France 
 
 August 4 England declares war on Germany 
 
 TOPIC III 
 ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL RIVALRY 
 
 Compiled by N. R. Whitney 
 I. EFFECTS OF THE GROWTH OF NATIONALITY 
 
 1. Wars due to conflicts in nationality 
 
 "Nationality" defined as group consciousness or 
 group egotism leads people in a given nation or state to 
 regard themselves as dependent for their well-being 
 solely on themselves, and dependent especially for this 
 well-being on group action against other groups. The 
 spirit is not one of cooperation with other people but 
 rather of antagonism and hostility toward them. 
 
 2. Nationalism, a boomerang to those peoples ivhich 
 
 foster it 
 Its economic results: 
 
 a. Limitation of productivity. 
 
 b. Government supervision and direction of in- 
 dustry. 
 
 c. Lack of economic freedom for individuals. 
 
 d. Special classes of population benefited at the 
 expense of other groups. 
 
 3. The feeling of nationality intensified by economic 
 
 factors 
 
 a. Tariffs — the Zollverein and German nationalism. 
 
 b. Shipping subsidies. 
 
 c. Government supervised trade. 
 
 d. Government support and encouragement for its 
 bankers and investors in foreign lands. 
 
 Germany has been most notable in the use of such 
 devices. 
 
 16 
 
4. Conflicts between nationalities mainly over economic 
 matters 
 
 a. Efforts by nations to extend their political power 
 through economic domination and exploitation of 
 other peoples. 
 
 b. Motive "selfish." Justification "might." 
 
 "The German race is called to bind the earth 
 under its control, to exploit the natural resources 
 and physical powers of man, to use the passive races 
 in subordinate capacity for the development of its 
 Kultur. " — Ludwig Woltmann, Politische Anthro- 
 pologic 
 
 c. Most nations at one time or another have shown 
 
 evidence of such desire, though none so blatantly 
 and brazenly as Germany. 
 
 (1) The old colonial movement — 1492 to early 
 19th century. 
 
 (2) Based upon mercantilism. 
 
 (3) Rivalry between Holland and England in 
 17th century. 
 
 (4) Rivalry between France and England in 18th 
 century. 
 
 (5) Victory of England, 1815. 
 
 (6) Adam Smith and laissez-faire. 
 
 (7) Middle 19th century attitude toward colonies. 
 
 (8) Free trade and anti-colonial movement. 
 
 (9) Cobden and Gladstone opposed to colonial 
 expansion. 
 
 II. THE NEW IMPERIALISM— EUROPEANIZATION OF 
 THE WORLD 
 
 1. New interest in colonies since 1870 
 
 a. Disraeli and the Suez Canal. 
 
 b. Result of industrial revolution and improvement in 
 communication. 
 
 c. Germany's industrial development after 1870 
 changed her foreign policy. 
 
 d. Demand for colonies by England, France, Germany, 
 
 17 
 
Italy, Belgium, Japan, Spain, Portugal, and the 
 United States. 
 e. German Empire, a late-comer in the family of na- 
 tions, found the best regions for colonization and 
 exploitation, especially in the temperate zones, al- 
 ready occupied by others. Force to be used to 
 obtain ''place in the sun." 
 
 "We need a fleet strong enough not only to pro- 
 tect the colonies we now have, but to bring about 
 the acquisition of others." — Manifesto of the Ger- 
 man Navy League. 
 
 "It is only by relying on our good German sword 
 that we can hope to conquer that place in the sun 
 which rightly belongs to us." — German Crown 
 Prince, 1913. 
 
 2. Erroneous notions as to value of colonies 
 
 a. As markets. Keaction against free trade after 
 1870 ; protection and colonial markets ; British col- 
 onies establish protective tariff; movement in Eng- 
 land, led by Chamberlain ; results of preferential 
 trade not great — e. g., compare Canada's trade 
 with both Great Britain and Germany. 
 
 b. As sources of foodstuffs and raw materials. Ad- 
 vantage of importance only in time of war — and 
 then it may be impossible of realization if the op- 
 ponent has a more powerful navy. 
 
 c. As outlet for population. Germany does not need 
 an outlet for population. In recent years there has 
 been immigration to Germany larger than the emi- 
 gration from it. Of those who have emigrated 
 from Germany few have gone to her colonies. Mis- 
 taken belief, also, on part of Germany's rulers that 
 colonies must be owned ; that trade with a people 
 not under her political domination means loss to 
 Germany. This involves misunderstanding as to 
 what constitute the gains of international trade. 
 Result of misunderstanding — theory that trade fol- 
 lows the flag. Truth exactly the reverse of this; 
 the flag follows trade and the business man. 
 
 18 
 
3. Real economic explanation of imperialism 
 
 a. Business interests dominant. 
 
 b. Growth of capital since industrial revolution. 
 
 c. Search for investments — larger returns from colo- 
 nial investments. Concessions; investments in 
 mines, rubber forests, plantations, railroads, etc. 
 
 d. Business men desire vigorous colonial policy; 
 spheres of influence ; exclusive trade rights ; and 
 armament to support these policies. 
 
 e. Investors and concessionaires take the lead and 
 nations follow, e. g., Cecil Rhodes in South Africa ; 
 the Mannesmann Brothers and French investors in 
 Morocco ; English investors in Egypt. 
 
 f. Interests of private individuals confused with in- 
 terests of nation. Every investment in a foreign 
 land an " exposed nerve-end." The success of an 
 English merchant or banker at the expense of a 
 German becomes an affront to Germany, and vice 
 versa. German commerce and banking so closely 
 identified with government that defeat of German 
 traders seems especially like a defeat of the gov- 
 ernment. 
 
 4. " Arenas of friction" 
 
 Industrially backward and politically incompetent re- 
 gions which possess ample resources and cheap labor, 
 but are poor in capital, political experience and defense. 
 Business men in various countries feel "call" to exploit 
 these regions. Cf. Kipling and "the white man's 
 "burden." 
 
 a. The Balkans. 
 
 b. Turkey. 
 
 c. Africa — partition. 
 
 d. China — dismemberment. 
 
 e. Latin America. 
 
 f. Awakening of Japan. 
 
 g. Russian expansion in Asia. 
 
 5. Play for position by rival states 
 
 a. Kaiser's demand for "a place in the sun" — col- 
 
 19 
 
onies, commerce, and international influence. He 
 reverses Bismarck's colonial and naval policy. 
 Government aid to secure foreign markets. 
 
 b. England's colonial position similar to that of indi- 
 vidual who happens to own central business site. 
 
 c. Germany's fear of growing power and influence of 
 France, and of Russian ambitions in Balkans and 
 Near East. 
 
 d. English alarm at growth of Germany's commercial 
 and industrial power from 1895-1905. 
 
 e. Germany's desire to hamper English expansion; 
 Kruger telegram of 1896 and sympathy with Boers. 
 
 f . Two great coalitions formed. 
 
 (1) Triple Alliance — Germany, Austria, Italy. 
 
 (2) Triple Entente — France, Russia, England. 
 
 Germany beaten in Morocco 
 
 a. Small financial interests of German bankers in 
 Morocco; French investors gradually acquire large 
 holdings; Emperor William decides to call a halt; 
 the Tangier visit, 1905. 
 
 b. Algeciras Congress, Spain, 1906 ; France wins. 
 
 c. Another test of strength — the Agadir incident. 
 Germany yields, 1911. War threatened but bankers 
 not ready. Kaiser warns them that he expects 
 them to be ready for war when next called upon. 
 
 d. France, supported by England, declares protec- 
 torate over Morocco, 1912. 
 
 e. Feeling among Germans that successful trade ex- 
 pansion and opportunities for attractive invest- 
 ment depend on maintenance of prestige and re- 
 spect. Fear that Germany would suffer commer- 
 cially and economically because of defeat in 
 Morocco. Determination to re-establish prestige by 
 military force. 
 
 German ambitions in the Orient 
 
 a. Mesopotamia and its possibilities. Germany gains 
 dominant influence over Turkey, and builds the 
 Bagdad Railway to connect Germany with Meso- 
 
 20 
 
potamia. This is regarded as a thrust against Eng- 
 lish interests and is opposed by the British after 
 1899. 
 
 b. German dominance over Balkans necessary for pro- 
 tection of Bagdad Railway. Berlin, Vienna, Bel- 
 grade, Sofia along the "corridor" between the 
 Baltic and the Persian Gulf, Hamburg and Bagdad. 
 
 c. Middle Europe to be Germany's economic empire. 
 
 "The establishment of a sphere of economic in- 
 fluence from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf has 
 been for nearly two decades the silent, unspoken 
 aim of German foreign policy." — Professor Spiet- 
 hoff, in War Cyclopedia, p. 36. 
 
 Are international conflicts over economic matters in- 
 evitable f 
 
 a. Need for proper understanding as to the factors 
 which promote economic well-being. 
 
 b. Need for recognizing that that which advances the 
 interests of a comparatively few individuals does 
 not necessarily benefit the great mass of people. 
 
 c. The interests which sometimes receive most recog- 
 nition are frequently not the most important from 
 the standpoint of the nation ; e. g., what difference 
 did it make to the millions of German citizens 
 whether or not the Mannesmann Brothers made a 
 profit in Morocco? 
 
 d. Does one nation lose what another nation gains in 
 international trade? 
 
 e. Wherein is the gain from international trade? 
 
 ~P re-requisites for harmonious international relations 
 
 a. Abandonment of narrow and selfish ideals of na- 
 tionality. 
 
 b. This involves ultimately the discontinuance of 
 world-wide tariff discriminations — e. g., most- 
 favored-nation tariffs, protective tariffs, etc. 
 
 c. It involves also the removal of various other re- 
 strictions and discriminations which tend to make 
 people of different states hostile to each other. 
 
 21 
 
TOPIC IV 
 
 PAN-GERMANISM AND WORLD 
 DOMINATION 
 
 Compiled by C. L. Bobbins 
 I. MEANING OF "PAN-GERMANISM" 
 
 1. Best sense: an expression of German nationality 
 
 a. National self-preservation. Passion to preserve 
 and strengthen the corporate life of a great 
 people. 
 
 b. A defensive movement against surrounding 
 nations. 
 
 2. Less attractive aspects: "A system of international 
 
 burglary" 
 
 a. An offensive movement against England. 
 
 b. Purpose to absorb lesser peoples of Europe and 
 Asia in a German-dominated confederation; 
 "Hamburg to the Persian Gulf." 
 
 c. To weaken or destroy such nations as cannot be 
 absorbed or included in the confederation. 
 
 d. Finally to Germanize the world, making the Ger- 
 man language and Kultur universal. 
 
 II. BASES OF THE CONCEPTION 
 
 1. Lofty ideals of the mission of the German people 
 
 a. Fichte said that the German was the only pure 
 race in Europe and the only one capable of high 
 culture. 
 
 b. Religious conception : to build up the kingdom of 
 God, one must be a true German and submerge 
 self in German spirit. It is regarded as a re- 
 ligious duty to destroy "declining England, cor- 
 rupt Belgium, licentious France, uncouth Russia" 
 
 22 
 
and to rejuvenate exhausted Europe with a dif- 
 fusion of German blood, 
 c. The conception is carried to the extreme of for- 
 getting the universality of God. 
 
 2. Economic necessity 
 
 a. Population had outrun economic resources — 
 nearly seventy million people in a territory not 
 as large as Texas. 
 
 b. Larger export trade was enjoyed by other nations, 
 particularly England. 
 
 c. Constant fear of England's navy— danger of be- 
 ing cut off from English Channel. 
 
 d. Necessity of conquering lands of adjoining states 
 or to cease to expand. 
 
 3. Plain jealousy and greed 
 
 Highly developed militaristic spirit: mission to be ful- 
 filled only by sword 
 
 4. 
 
 III. PROGRAM OF THE PAN-GERMANISTS 
 
 1. Plan of 1895-98: to unite all European peoples of 
 
 German blood 
 
 a. The Kaiser sought connections with various 
 thrones by marriage. 
 
 b. The conception was enlarged to extend to unre- 
 lated peoples in Asia. 
 
 c. The defeat of Russia encouraged further ex- 
 pansion. 
 
 2. Plan of 1911 
 
 a. Definite plan for vast confederacy in Central 
 Europe, from the Channel to Balkans. 
 
 b. Submission of Balkan states. 
 
 e. Political and military control of Turkey : Turkey 
 to be aided in adding Persia and Egypt to her 
 dominions. 
 
 d. America to be exploited 
 
 (1) South America to be colonized. 
 
 (2) The United States to pay expenses of wars. 
 
 23 
 
e. Directions of proposed expansion summarized: 
 Berlin-Calais ; Berlin-Riga ; Hamburg-Salonika ; 
 Hamburg-Persian Gulf; Germany-North and 
 South America. 
 
 VI. RELATION OF PAN-GERMANISM TO WAR 
 
 1. Germany saw all her development due to war: only 
 war to preserve the empire and add to it 
 
 2. Never willing to consider arbitration 
 
 3. The present war was desired in the interests of greater 
 Germany 
 
 4. Ruthlessness was regarded a virtue 
 
 V. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PAN-GERMANISM 
 
 1. Historical background 
 
 a. Rise of Prussia. ' ' Three centuries ago, Prussia 
 was a tiny state whose many parts were separated 
 from each other by the lands of her neighbors. 
 At the beginning of the seventeenth century, the 
 Hohenzollerns were petty princes, ruling over 
 Brandenburg in the north of Germany; to-day 
 they are the kings of Prussia, which has engulfed 
 more than half the Teutonic territory and ex- 
 tends in one vast sweep from the Memel to the 
 Rhine; they are German Emperors, and as such 
 
 rule from Denmark to the Alps In 
 
 three hundred years the Hohenzollern domains 
 have increased more than thirteen fold." 
 
 b. Prussianization of the German states. History 
 shows that the Prussian character has remained 
 essentially unchanged through the centuries while 
 the character of the Saxons, Bavarians, and other 
 German states has gradually been changed. 
 
 "More important than the immediate political 
 results were the moral effects of the methods em- 
 ployed by Bismarck in the unification of Ger- 
 many The theory of brute strength, 
 
 24 
 
of blood and iron had triumphed 
 
 Having witnessed the failure of the liberal and 
 the success of the Bismarckian method, the Ger- 
 man people conceive thereby a faith in force, a 
 veneration of power and might that has directed 
 in large part the subsequent course of German 
 life and history." 
 
 Characteristic policies of the Hohenzollerns 
 
 a. Governmental. Prussia has always been prac- 
 tically an absolute monarchy. While Germany 
 has a constitution and a two house legislative 
 body, the ministry is responsible to the crown 
 alone and the Reichstag has little real power over 
 the government. 
 
 "The Emperor is no doubt the most potent fac- 
 tor in German foreign and domestic politics, 
 whether he rules personally like William II, or 
 impersonally through a powerful statesman, like 
 William I. This would not necessarily be danger- 
 ous to the world if the crown were always pos- 
 sessed of lofty ideals of ethical and moral 
 responsibility and conduct. Numerous statements 
 of Frederick the Great who is the ideal hero of 
 the present Kaiser show that this has not been 
 the case. On Dec. 6, 1772, Frederick the Great 
 wrote to Voltaire, 'The world is governed only by 
 skill and trickery. ' " 
 
 b. Religious and moral 
 
 "It is necessary to distinguish between public 
 and private morals. For the state, self assertion 
 is the greatest of all commandments; for it, this 
 is absolutely moral." 
 
 c. Greed 
 
 "The German people is so situated in Europe 
 that it needs only run and take whatever it 
 requires. ' ' 
 
 d. Militarism 
 
 "For two hundred and fifty years, since the 
 Great Elector, Prussia has always been propor- 
 
 25 
 
tionately by far the strongest military power in 
 Europe." The Great Elector found an army of 
 1,200, he left one of 30,000 and Frederick the 
 Great left one of 195,000. 
 
 3. The development of Pan-Germanism, 
 
 a. Efforts at expansion. With no colonial posses- 
 sions in 1884, Germany by the year 1911 had 
 secured 1,128,480 square miles of territory in 
 Asia, Africa, and the Pacific Islands. 
 
 b. Government control of: 
 
 (1) Schools and universities. 
 
 "From the earliest times to the present 
 day, the Prussian Government has educated 
 the young to an aggressive military patriot- 
 ism and therefore it may be said that the 
 German elementary school is a branch estab- 
 lishment of the German barracks." 
 
 (2) The press 
 
 "Public opinion! Public opinion!" a 
 member of the German Foreign Office re- 
 peated in a tone which showed that he was 
 honestly perplexed, "Why, we create it!" 
 
 (3) The church 
 
 (4) Industry 
 
 c. Extension of German influence 
 
 (1) In Austria and Turkey through financial 
 assistance 
 
 (2) In Turkey through 
 
 (a) Reorganization of the army 
 
 (b) Assuming a protectorate over Islam 
 
 (c) Construction of railways 
 
 (3) In all foreign countries through an unscru- 
 pulous diplomatic and spy service. 
 
 VI. DANGERS OF PAN-GERMANISM 
 
 1. All solid basis for international life would be swept 
 away — law, respect of treaties, etc. 
 
 "It is absurd to inveigh against wars of conquest; 
 
 26 
 
the sole point of interest is the object of the con- 
 quest." "When a state recognizes that the existing 
 treaties no longer express the actual political condi- 
 tions, and when it cannot persuade the other powers 
 to give way by peaceful negotiations, the moment has 
 come when the nations proceed to the ordeal by 
 battle." 
 
 2. No nation however remote would be safe 
 
 "Not only North America, but the whole of Amer- 
 ica must become a bulwark of Germanic Kultur, per- 
 haps the strongest fortress of the Germanic races." 
 
 3. No security of peace: war a legitimate and desirable 
 phase of national activity and development 
 
 "War is the noblest and holiest expression of 
 human activity." 
 
 "We have already seen that war is both justifiable 
 and moral, and that the ideal of perpetual peace is 
 not only impossible, but immoral as well." 
 
 4. Nullification of all ethical ideas and ideals: conception 
 of the state as superior to morals 
 
 "Whoever cannot prevail upon himself to approve 
 from the bottom of his heart the sinking of the Lusi- 
 tania, whoever cannot conquer his sense of the gi- 
 gantic cruelty to unnumbered perfectly innocent vic- 
 tims .... and give himself up to honest 
 delight at this victorious exploit of German defensive 
 power — him we judge to be no true German." 
 
 VII. CURES FOR PAN-GERMANISM 
 
 1. Military 
 
 A crushing defeat on the western front, or on the 
 eastern front. 
 
 2. Diplomatic 
 
 a. Dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Em- 
 pire. Cheradame holds that "all the racial ele- 
 ments necessary for the destruction of the Pan- 
 German plan exist in Central Europe." 
 
 27 
 
b. Creation of a solid Slavic state in the Balkans.. 
 
 3. Political 
 
 a. A German republic 
 
 b. A league of nations to enforce peace. "When 
 the present great war is over, it will be the duty 
 of America to join with the other nations of the 
 world in some kind of a league for the main- 
 tenance of peace." 
 
 4. Spiritual 
 
 A return to the ideals of Schiller. The truly cultural 
 and spiritual for the material. This applies to all 
 nations. 
 
 TOPIC V 
 
 GERMAN THEORY OF THE STATE AND 
 OF WAR 
 
 Compiled by J. Van deb Zee 
 I. THE STATE'S RELATION TO THE INDIVIDUAL 
 
 1. What is a State? 
 
 It is a political organization and has four elements: 
 territory, population, independent supreme power, 
 and government. 
 
 2. German glorification of the State 
 
 Histories, books of philosophy — indeed, the whole lit- 
 erature of Germany glorifies the State as something 
 mystical and divine, as an end in itself and not as a 
 means to some other end such as the happiness of the 
 individual. 
 
 a. Frederick the Great and Scharnhorst stressed not 
 the rights of individuals but their duties, espe- 
 cially the duty to sacrifice life and property for 
 the State, which is the highest good. They laid 
 the foundation for the German military State. 
 
 b. Fichte believed the German State should be "a 
 contrivance whereby all human virtue is to be 
 realized to the full." 
 
 c. Hegel declared: "The State is God on earth." 
 
 28 
 
d. Bismarck and the emperors had a vision of the 
 paternal State, of State socialism. 
 
 e. Treitschke said: "The State is a being infinitely 
 superior to the individual and exists to realize an 
 ideal beyond and above that of individual happi- 
 ness." "History is a great drama and States are 
 the actors in it." 
 
 3. What is the best government for a State? 
 
 a. The State must unite all power in the hands of a 
 constitutional monarch who holds his position by 
 hereditary, divine right. 
 
 b. The monarch should be supported and assisted by 
 a social aristocracy, a hereditary caste: they to- 
 gether should be the mouthpiece of the State, con- 
 trolling the higher offices, army, and navy. 
 
 c. The masses, indeed, may criticise, but should not 
 originate measures. The democratic ideal of 
 equality is impracticable. The masses had better 
 "toil at the plough, at the forge, at the carpen- 
 ter's bench." 
 
 d. The German imperial government. 
 
 (1) The king of Prussia was Emperor. 
 
 (2) The votes of Prussians appointed by the 
 Emperor dominated the Bundesrath, and in 
 the Reichstag Prussians were numerous 
 enough to control. Junkers ruled Prussia. 
 
 (3) Prussia could prevent amendments to the 
 constitution. The Kaiser and his appointees 
 in the Bundesrath were the final repository 
 of power. 
 
 (4) There was no universal manhood suffrage, 
 but nearly 3,000,000 persons were engaged 
 in Germany's civil service: hence in one 
 sense the people constituted the basis of Ger- 
 many's bureaucracy. 
 
 4. What should the State do? 
 
 (Brief answer: Everything that leads to the power 
 of the State.) 
 
 29 
 
a. Police work: punish transgressors against the law 
 and protect persons and property, and so admin- 
 ister justice. 
 
 b. Promote "Kultur." This "Kultur," so highly 
 praised by the Germans as their great contribution 
 to the world's civilization, consists of many things 
 worth cultivating. 
 
 (1) Education: by means of universities, high 
 schools, technical colleges, and vocational 
 and elementary schools. The State should 
 train all the people for constructive effort of 
 some kind — for efficiency in industry, com- 
 merce, and government. 
 
 (2) Aesthetics: the State should make some pro- 
 vision for the leisure time of the people. 
 
 (3) Glorious history and splendid traditions. 
 
 (4) Brilliant statesmanship : government by an 
 aristocracy and an absolute sovereign. 
 
 (5) The administration of public affairs should 
 be in the hands of a bureaucracy — the best 
 talent available should serve the State. 
 Hence orderliness, finish, and perfection. 
 
 (6) State socialism: the State should be an agen- 
 cy of service in two ways by providing for 
 
 (a) Productive socialism: the State should 
 own the transportation system, tele- 
 graph, telephone, and express systems, 
 mines, and financial and credit agen- 
 cies; study foreign markets; and pro- 
 mote a merchant marine and education. 
 
 (b) Distributive socialism: the State should 
 insure against death, injury, unemploy- 
 ment, and sickness in industrial occu- 
 pations; and provide labor exchanges 
 and other agencies for the physical 
 well-being and conservation of the 
 people. 
 
 (7) Social legislation. Compare the Kaiser's 
 throne speech in 1888: "Introduce the soci- 
 
 30 
 
alistic element into legislation — that is a 
 further development of the modern idea of 
 the State, the result of Christian ethics, ac- 
 cording to which the State should discharge, 
 besides the defensive duty of protecting ex- 
 isting rights, the positive duty of promoting 
 the welfare of all its members, especially 
 those who are weaker and in need of help, 
 by means of judicious institutions and the 
 employment of those resources of the com- 
 munity which are at its disposal." 
 c. Military work: to this the State should give its 
 most solicitous thought. Build up a well-organ- 
 ized army with universal military service. If a 
 State neglects its physical in favor of its intel- 
 lectual energies, it falls into decay. The army 
 produces both character and education. An army 
 brings unity — parliamentary government brings 
 factions within the State. 
 
 What should he the individual's place in the State? 
 
 a. The individual may be likened to a brick in some 
 vast edifice : he exists in and for the State. He 
 should be taught to love the Fatherland, venerate 
 the Hohenzollerns, believe in the empire's destiny, 
 and sacrifice everything for the State. 
 
 b. Since man really wants economic freedom much 
 more than he wants political liberty, the State 
 should give him strength, security, and material 
 advantages, and in this way stunt his political 
 instincts in order to avoid dangerous or revolu- 
 tionary tendencies. 
 
 c. The State should emphasize the individual's duties 
 more than his rights. "Verboten" may well sum 
 up the law of the land; in other words, "Be a 
 soldier, pay your taxes, and keep your mouth 
 shut." Thus, reduce all to a common uniformity 
 and docility, and stamp out individuality. Gen- 
 erations of barrack life have also helped to make 
 the people submissive. Compare the Anglo-Amer- 
 
 31 
 
ican theory that the State should exist for the 
 individual and prohibit the influences which men- 
 ace individuality. 
 
 II. THE STATE'S RELATION TO OTHER STATES 
 
 1. 7s it bound by international law? 
 
 The State may act outside and above the public law of 
 Europe in order to secure its own safety. Expediency 
 is the State's best rule and guide. All international 
 law must bow before the State's absolute sovereignty 
 — that can not be bound. 
 
 2. Are treaties to be binding? 
 
 They should last only so long as it suits contracting 
 States to observe them or rebus sic stantibus. The 
 highest duty of the State is self-preservation: "our 
 interest is our right." 
 
 3. Should States arbitrate their differences? 
 
 No efficient tribunal has been or can be devised to 
 adjudicate between independent States. War alone 
 can settle quarrels: it is the international law-suit. 
 
 4. How should a State conduct foreign relations? 
 
 a. Frederick the Great said : ' ' The world is governed 
 only by skill and trickery." 
 
 b. Treitschke wrote : ' ' The statesman has not the 
 right to warm his hands by the smoking ruins of 
 his country with the comfortable self-praise: 'I 
 have never told a lie'; that is a monk's virtue." 
 
 c. The State can only attain its highest moral aims 
 in competition with other States, and any means 
 are justified, even spying, lying, and bribing. 
 
 5. Anglo-American theory 
 
 a. International public opinion does give force to 
 international law — its judgments are terribly ef- 
 fective, and no State can ignore them with 
 impunity. 
 
 b. Brute force and vicious cunning may be the mak- 
 ing of the German Super-State, but we have a 
 
 32 
 
theory that ' ' right is our supreme interest. ' ' The 
 rule of law won against Stuart kings in the 17th 
 century must be established throughout the world 
 to the immense advantage of international rela- 
 tions. 
 
 III. THE GERMAN THEORY OF WAR 
 
 (Direct outgrowth of the German theory of the State) 
 
 1. German apologists and eulogists of war 
 
 Frederick the Great, Scharnhorst, Fichte, Clausewitz, 
 Hartmann, Bismarck, Roon, Moltke, Treitschke, Bern- 
 hardi, and Emperor William. 
 
 2. Some German sayings about war 
 
 a. Bernhardi: "The Right to Make War," "The 
 Duty to Make War." War gives a biologically 
 just decision. 
 
 b. Treitschke speaks of the moral majesty, the great- 
 ness, the moral magnificence, the sanctity of war 
 "conceived as an ordinance set by God" and as 
 "politics par excellence". 
 
 c. "War is the noblest and holiest expression of 
 human activity .... war is beautiful." 
 
 d. "It is the soldier and the army, not parliamentary 
 majorities and votes, that have welded the German 
 Empire together. My confidence rests upon the 
 army." — Emperor William II. 
 
 3. War versus Peace 
 
 Germans scorn Kant's dream of an ultimate rule of 
 reason and of permanent universal peace. "Mad 
 books" on peace are the work of "weak minds." War 
 is divine and necessary. 
 
 4. How should war be conducted? 
 
 a. "The enemy State must not be spared the want 
 and wretchedness of war; these are particularly 
 useful in shattering its energy and subduing its 
 will." The policy of f rightfulness, ruthlessness. 
 
 33 
 
b. "The law of nations must beware of paralyzing 
 military action by placing fetters upon it." 
 
 5. Ideas inspiring the German theory 
 
 a. War is a necessity for Germany: she must find a 
 place for surplus population and markets for sur- 
 plus merchandise. Colonies are needed. 
 
 b. War is desired by God and nature. 
 
 c. Germany must rule the world : that is Germany 's 
 mission for the greater good of humanity. The 
 expression "Deutschland liber Alles" is the boast- 
 ful but not empty motto of the German State. 
 
 TOPIC VI 
 RUSSIA AND THE ORIENT 
 
 Compiled by H. G. Plum 
 I. THE RUSSIA OF 1914 
 
 1. Introductory : geography, peoples, and resources 
 
 2. Autocratic government 
 
 a. The Executive Power — The Czar. 
 
 b. The bureaucracy. "Russia is the true home of 
 bureaucracy. Its machinery to sustain such a sys- 
 tem of government was necessarily vast in extent. 
 In 1897 there was one official to every 292 inhab- 
 itants, or one to every 89 men. It includes in its 
 personnel no Poles or other 'foreigners' but many 
 Germans. The salaries at the top are very high, 
 those at the bottom so low as to make some form of 
 bribery necessary for the livelihood of the class." 
 
 c. The police system. 
 
 "In all countries, the appearance of police as a 
 special institution, has been coincident with the tri- 
 umph of absolutism." "The Census of 1897 tells us 
 that in that year Russia boasted of 104,500 police. 
 Since 1897 this figure has incessantly increased; in- 
 deed, competent persons assert that it has doubled in 
 the space of 10 years, i. e., one for every 200 men. 
 The system cost Russia $30,000,000.00 per annum in 
 
 34 ' 
 
salaries besides all the bribes and secret payments." 
 "At the beginning of the war, it seemed to liberal 
 Russia and the civilized world that Russian bureau- 
 cracy and autocracy were impregnable." 
 d. The Duma. 
 
 (1) The revolution of 1905 and reforms leading 
 to the establishment of the duma. 
 
 (2) Its powers like those of the Reichstag wholly 
 subsidiary to the ministry. 
 
 3. Why Germany attacked Russia in 1914 
 
 a. Common ties between the two governments. 
 
 (1) Both were strongly imperialistic with mon- 
 archs ruling by "divine right." 
 
 (2) The ruling houses were strongly related by 
 blood ties. 
 
 (3) Germany was the "most favored nation" in 
 trade and commerce. 
 
 b. Causes for the break. 
 
 (1) The Russian desire to secure an ice-free port 
 for her commercial ambitions to the south- 
 east. 
 
 (2) The Pan-Slavic movement in Russia, 
 strengthened by commercial ambitions, men- 
 aced Austria in the development of her ex- 
 pansion policy in the Balkans. 
 
 (3) Industrial development in Russia had 
 clashed with German commercial interests 
 and bespoke the time when German economic 
 influence would wane. 
 
 II. RUSSIA IN THE WAR 
 
 1. Russia's aims and early campaigns 
 
 2. The Russian Revolution 
 
 a. The Kerensky government — its rise and fall. 
 
 b. The Bolsheviki program under Trotsky. 
 
 (1) Basis of power: peace, lands for the peasant, 
 democratic government. 
 
 (2) The Brest-Litovsk Treaty. 
 
 35 
 
(3) Evidence tending to show Bolsheviki work- 
 ing for German interests. 
 
 (4) Failure of the Bolsheviki program. 
 
 c. The Czecho-Slovak movement. 
 
 (1) Basis of the Czecho-Slovak movement. 
 
 (2) Relations with the Allies. 
 
 (3) The program of the Czecho-Slovaks. 
 
 d. The Allies and Revolutionary Russia. 
 
 (1) Recognition of the Czecho-Slovaks. 
 
 (2) The All-Russia Committee and the Allies. 
 
 (3) Effects of the Revolution upon the war and 
 upon peace. 
 
 III. THE WAR AND THE FAR EAST 
 
 1. Japan in the Orient 
 
 2. Why Japan entered the war 
 
 3. America and Japan 
 
 a. Causes for irritation: Japanese immigration, the 
 United States' seizure of the Philippines, com- 
 mercial rivalry. 
 
 b. Japan's Monroe Doctrine for the Orient. 
 
 c. No real cause for quarrel between the two powers. 
 
 TOPIC VII 
 WHY AMERICA ENTERED THE WAR 
 
 Compiled by L. Pelzeb 
 I. GERMAN INTRIGUES AND CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES 
 IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
 1. The German program against American policies 
 
 a. Organization, persuasion, and apology. 
 
 b. Diplomatic protests and negotiations. 
 
 c. Intrigues, plots, and criminal activities. 
 
 2. History of the German Military Information Bureau 
 
 a. Establishment at 60 Wall Street, New York, in the 
 autumn of 1914, under direction of Wolf von Igel ; 
 leased as an " advertising office. ' ' 
 
 36 
 
b. Planning and aiding in criminal activities; viola- 
 tion of the laws of the United States ; destruction of 
 lives and property on merchant vessels ; Irish revo- 
 lutionary plots against England; fomenting of ill- 
 feeling of Mexico against the United States ; main- 
 tenance of the spy system under cover of a 
 commercial bureau stirring up trouble in our muni- 
 tion plants; the bomb industry and related 
 activities. 
 
 c. Exposure of the bureau by the Providence Journal 
 early in 1915. 
 
 d. Discovery and removal of papers by United States 
 secret service agents, April, 1916. 
 
 e. German protest against the seizures; German re- 
 fusal to claim papers and bring on self-accusation. 
 
 f. Publication of portion of the bureau's papers by 
 the United States in September and October, 1917. 
 
 3. History of the chief plotters, intriguers, and criminal 
 agents 
 
 a. Count Johan von Bernstorff, ambassador to the 
 United States attempted to influence Congress, No- 
 vember, 1915; sent a request to Berlin for $50,000 
 to influence Congress, January, 1917 ; implicated in 
 sabotage plots; obtained a propaganda fund of 
 $1,683,500 for Bolo Pasha, the French traitor, who 
 was later executed. 
 
 b. Captain Franz von Papen, military attache, direct- 
 ed criminal activities. 
 
 c. Captain Karl Boy-Ed, naval attache, directed crim- 
 inal activities. Both attaches were recalled in De- 
 cember, 1915, upon President Wilson's demand. 
 
 d. Bernhard Dernburg, German propagandist, de- 
 fended Germany in speeches, magazine articles ; his 
 defense of the "Lusitania" act caused his departure 
 in June, 1915. 
 
 e. Werner Horn attempted to blow up the bridge at 
 Vanceboro, Maine ; he was tried, convicted and sent 
 to the penitentiary. 
 
 37 
 
f. Robert Fay for conspiring to blow up ships by time 
 bombs was sentenced to eight years but escaped. 
 
 g. Carl Ruroede, director of passport frauds, was 
 sentenced to three years' imprisonment. 
 
 h. Franz von Rintelen was convicted of putting five 
 time bombs on the "Kirk Oswald." 
 
 II. THE SUBMARINE POLICY AGAINST THE UNITED 
 STATES 
 
 1. The three stages of submarine warfare 
 
 a. Period of comparatively inactive and legitimate 
 warfare, August, 1914-February 18, 1915. 
 
 b. Policy of restricted naval zone around the British 
 Isles, February 18, 1915-February 1, 1917: to de- 
 stroy every enemy merchant vessel within the zone ; 
 designation of safe routes for neutrals. 
 
 c. Campaign of ruthless, unrestricted submarine war- 
 fare, February 1, 1917, to the present; destruction 
 of all vessels entering the naval zone. 
 
 2. Vessels attacked or sunk without warning 
 
 a. "William P. Frye," March 28, 1915; Chester L. 
 Thrasher, an American, lost his life. 
 
 b. British steamer "Falaba," March 28, 1915. 
 
 c. Attack upon the American vessel "Cushing," 
 April, 1915. 
 
 d. Sinking of the "Lusitania," May 7, 1915; sunk 
 near the Irish coast without warning and with loss 
 of 1152 lives of whom 114 were Americans. 
 
 e. Attack upon steamer "Nebraskan," May 25, 1915. 
 
 f. Attack upon British liner "Orduna," July 9, 1915. 
 
 g. Sinking of American steamer ' ' Leelanaw, ' ' July 25, 
 1915. 
 
 h. Torpedoing of British liner "Arabic," August 19, 
 1915. 
 
 i. Torpedoing of French passenger steamer ' ' Sussex, ' ' 
 March 25, 1916 ; this was not a troop vessel, was not 
 armed and never had been; about 80 passengers, 
 including several Americans, lost their lives. 
 
 38 
 
Summary of correspondence on the "Sussex" case 
 
 a. German note of April 10, 1916 : some other vessel, 
 not the "Sussex," was torpedoed; very likely due 
 to mine explosion. 
 
 b. Secretary Lansing's reply, April 18, 1916 : elaborate 
 statement of evidence and affidavits of 23 Amer- 
 icans; identification of 13 pieces of metal as parts 
 of a German submarine; the torpedo was of Ger- 
 man manufacture and was fired without warning; 
 warning that further sinkings would result in a 
 break. 
 
 c. German answer of May 4, 1916 : promise that there- 
 after merchant vessels would not be sunk without 
 warning or without saving lives of passengers and 
 crew unless escape or resistance is attempted. 
 
 d. Secretary Lansing's reply of May 8, 1916: accep- 
 tance of promise of abandonment of warfare as 
 stated in previous note. 
 
 e. Von Jagow's note of May 8, 1916: full admission 
 that "Sussex" was torpedoed by German sub- 
 marine. 
 
 Conclusions and results of "Sussex" correspondence 
 
 a. A diplomatic victory for President Wilson. 
 
 b. Substantial compliance (for about nine months) of 
 the German government with the promise of May 4 
 1916. 
 
 c. Renunciation of all pledges in the decree of Janu- 
 ary 31, 1917: the decree for unrestricted, ruthless 
 submarine warfare upon all vessels in the zone set 
 forth. 
 
 d. Severance of diplomatic relations, February 3, 1917. 
 
 e. Resumption of submarine warfare against Amer- 
 ican vessels after February 3, 1917. 
 
 f. Declaration of war against Germany, April 6, 1917. 
 
 3!) 
 
TOPIC VIII 
 MOBILIZATION OF AMERICAN RESOURCES 
 
 Compiled by A. O. Thomas 
 I. THE MOBILIZATION OF HUMAN RESOURCES 
 
 1. Fighting men 
 
 a. The American Army and Navy on April 6, 1917. 
 The regular army ; national guard ; marines ; naval 
 men and officers. 
 
 b. Methods for increasing the army and navy. 
 
 (1) The volunteer system: its history and the 
 reasons for its failure in the present war. 
 
 (2) The draft system : evolution of the draft into 
 the selective draft; the democracy of the 
 system; local boards. Ages 21-31 yield in- 
 sufficient effectives. Ages 18-45 provide 
 ample man power. 
 
 c. The new National Army and its training. 
 
 (1) Intensified training and short courses at 
 West Point and at Annapolis. 
 
 (2) The Reserve Officers' Training Camps. 
 
 (3) The Cantonments. 
 
 (4) The Students' Army Training Corps. 
 
 (5) The Conservation of Army Morale: Army 
 Y. M. C. A., K. C, and kindred organiza- 
 tions. Educational program and recreation 
 at the camps. 
 
 2. Labor 
 
 Essential and non-essential industries; industrial re- 
 organization ; the wage problem. 
 
 3. The Medical Staff and Nursing Service 
 
 4. Public opinion 
 
 Need for a healthy public opinion ; four-minute men ; 
 Committee on Public Information. 
 
 40 
 
5. Women 
 
 National League for "Woman's Service; "Women's Land 
 Army of America ; "Woman 's Committee of the Council 
 of National Defense; Army Y. "W. C. A. 
 
 6. Educational institutions 
 
 7. Organizations for war activities at home 
 
 Liberty Loan campaigns ; Loyalty Leagues ; Four Min- 
 ute Men ; advertising experts ; artists ; interpreters and 
 foreign language speakers; censors; motion picture 
 campaigns. 
 
 II. THE MOBILIZATION OF MATERIALS 
 
 Available resources ample; their mobilization for war 
 purposes a vast but imperative undertaking, as shown, for 
 instance, by the housing of the mobilized population in 
 thirty-two camps built in ninety days. 
 
 1. Ordnance and ordnance supplies 
 
 Pre-war supply small ; government control of ordnance 
 plants ; the Browning machine gun ; rapid development 
 of ordnance plants. 
 
 2. Food and food production 
 
 a. The need of surplus food. 
 
 Army a non-producing class; the allies had to be 
 fed; starving Belgium and Poland; depredations 
 of the submarine; Europe's production below nor- 
 mal; Australia, Argentine, etc., too remote. 
 
 b. International and national food control. 
 Regulated prices; prevented hoarding and specu- 
 lation; eliminated waste. The Food Administra- 
 tion. 
 
 c. Cooperation of the U. S. Department of Agricul- 
 ture. The wheat supply; the live-stock and meat 
 situation. 
 
 3. Fuels and fuel distribution 
 
 Extraordinary pre-war demand for fuel. The short- 
 age during the winter of 1917-1918. The coal fields 
 
 41 
 
of the United States and our rank as coal producers. 
 The Fuel Control Act; the coal conservation order; 
 the stimulation of coal production. Fuel Adminis- 
 trator. Oil and gas. 
 
 The iron and steel industry 
 
 Rank of the United States as iron producer. Home 
 and foreign demand for iron and steel. How the 
 United States is controlling and stimulating pro- 
 duction. 
 
 Manufacturing establishments 
 
 a. The War Industries Board : its powers and 
 functions. 
 
 b. Government management of factories and their 
 outputs. 
 
 c. Autos and trucks: standardization of makes and 
 parts; quantity production. 
 
 d. Aeroplanes, balloons and signal corps equipment. 
 
 e. The Liberty Motor. 
 
 Transportation and transportation facilities: the im- 
 perative need for increase and control 
 a. Ships and shipyards. 
 
 (1) Steps inaugurated to increase tonnage. 
 
 (a) Interned ships put into service. 
 
 (b) Neutral ships commandeered. 
 
 (c) The United States Emergency Fleet 
 Corporation : establishment of new 
 shipyards and construction of new 
 types of ships. 
 
 (2) Steps taken to protect tonnage. 
 
 (a) Camouflaged ships. 
 
 (b) Cooperation of the Navy: the convoy 
 system; chasers and destroyers, and 
 anti-submarine devices. 
 
 (3) Some results. 
 
 (a) Challenge of submarine met and 
 worsted. 
 
 (b) An enormous merchant marine — a 
 salvage of the war. 
 
 42 
 
(c) A great impulse to foreign trade. 
 
 (d) The United States destined to hold a 
 commanding place in future shipping 
 circles. 
 
 (e) Tremendous docking facilities in 
 France. 
 
 b. Railways, rolling stock, and express lines : reasons 
 for operation by the government. 
 
 (1) Unified control necessary as a war measure. 
 
 (2) Strikes and labor difficulties forestalled. 
 
 (3) Competition and congestion reduced. 
 
 (4) Railway equipment needed in France for 
 handling troops and supplies ; at present the 
 United States has 600 miles of railroad and 
 250 miles of warehouses in France. 
 
 (5) Merger of the express companies. 
 
 7. Rapid communication 
 
 a. Government operation of telegraph and telephone 
 lines. 
 
 b. The wireless service; cables and cable lines. 
 
 c. Mail to and from France. 
 
 8. Chemicals, drugs, and dyes 
 
 a. High explosive products; development since 1916. 
 
 b. From dye importing to dye exporting. 
 
 c. The production of optical glass. 
 
 III. THE MOBILIZATION OF MONEY 
 
 1. Extraordinary demand for money and credit in war 
 
 time 
 
 a. Army needs food, clothing, shoes, rifles, etc. 
 
 b. Navy needs additional ships, coal, ordnance, etc. 
 
 c. Loans to allies; officers' and privates' pay; in- 
 surance. 
 
 2. Methods of raising money for war expenses 
 
 a. Liberty loans : how authorized ; amounts raised ; 
 number of subscribers. 
 
 b. War savings stamps and certificates. 
 
 43 
 
c. The War Revenue Acts: excise, stamp, and in- 
 heritance taxes; increased postage rates. 
 
 d. Income taxes. 
 
 e. Excess profits tax: some industries profit more 
 than others from the war — they should pay a 
 higher tax. 
 
 f. War Credits Act: short loans by government 
 authorized by Congress; Treasury certificates. 
 
 TOPIC IX 
 AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND IDEALS 
 
 Compiled by E. D. Starbuck 
 
 I. WHAT IS DEMOCRACY? 
 
 1. Democracy means the self -direction of all the people 
 in the pursuit of their common interests. Its ideal is a 
 self-directed community of free personalities. See 
 other definitions. 
 
 2. The one deadly enemy of democracy is selfishness, 
 greed 
 
 3. Four elemental facts underlying political democracy 
 
 a. Certain inviolable rights of man. 
 
 b. The source of political power and authority re- 
 sides in each and all of the members of the state: 
 ' ' popular sovereignty. ' ' 
 
 e. Specialization of duties with relative autonomy 
 
 of groups, 
 d. The invention of representative government. 
 
 4. Four fundamental principles of true democracy 
 
 a. Freedom; individuality; self-direction partici- 
 pated in by all. 
 
 b. Loyalty ; responsibility to the group ; a common 
 united life; duties that bind individuals into a 
 community; universal spirit of good will. 
 
 c. Fair play ; the determination of freedom and loy- 
 alty along the lines of generosity and justice 
 rather than of personal advantage. 
 
 d. Spontaneity ; the transformation of rights and 
 
 44 
 
duties into opportunities; free personality finding 
 its fulfillment through the group ; sportsmanship. 
 
 5. Aspects of the evolution of democracy 
 
 a. National freedom and sovereignty. 
 
 b. Political freedom, i. e., equality of classes and 
 individuals before the law, and universal suffrage. 
 
 c. Social freedom, i. e., abolition of class distinctions, 
 privileges and inequalities of opportunity. 
 
 d. Moral and religious freedom, i. e., full moral self- 
 direction by the individual, and the decline of the 
 coercive aspects of government. 
 
 6. What democracy does not do 
 
 a. Seek artificial equality. 
 
 b. Stand in the way of individual initiative and lead- 
 ership. 
 
 c. Oppose centralized authority. 
 
 d. Encourage personal ideals incompatible with the 
 group welfare; for example, the half truths of 
 license, anarchy, "personal liberty," etc. 
 
 II. ORIGIN OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 
 
 1. Selection, through immigration of the "common 
 
 people" 
 
 2. Our European heritage tending towards individualism 
 
 and freedom from autocracy 
 
 a. The Greek city-states. 
 
 b. The English revolutions. 
 
 c. The Renaissance. 
 
 d. The French Revolution. 
 
 3. Events and conditions in America that have acceler- 
 
 ated freedom of individual, group, and nation 
 
 a. Compact of the Pilgrim Fathers, Nov. 2, 1620. 
 
 b. The American Revolution and the Declaration of 
 Independence, July 4, 1776. 
 
 c. Freedom and individuality of frontier life. 
 
 d. The removal of property qualifications for suf- 
 frage, 1790-1850. 
 
 45 
 
e. The Civil War and the adoption of the 13th, 14th, 
 and 15th amendments, 1861-1870. 
 
 f. "Woman suffrage adopted in western states, 1869 
 to date. 
 
 4. Conditions that have fostered cooperation, organiza- 
 
 tion, good will — a true social body 
 
 a. Industrial — small free holdings of public lands 
 instead of large grants to syndicates. 
 
 b. Economic — unifying effects of canals, railroads, 
 telegraphs, telephone, postal service, banking sys- 
 tem — rendering easy the exchange of goods and 
 ideas. 
 
 c. Educational — the ''common school" system. See 
 the "Ordinance of 1787." 
 
 d. Political — the unifying effect of public discussion 
 and public adjustment of common interests and 
 problems. 
 
 e. Religious — Church Federation, cooperation, and 
 the Social Service movement. 
 
 5. Great prophets and leaders of American democracy 
 Samuel Adams, Thomas Paine, Thomas Jefferson, 
 Andrew Jackson, Abraham Lincoln, Woodrow Wilson. 
 
 6. The message of America to the world An the present 
 
 crisis 
 
 a. Disinterested service. 
 
 b. Morality in international relations. 
 
 c. The recognition of certain inviolable rights of 
 "nations," small and great. 
 
 III. THE TASKS OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 
 
 1. Make our democracy safe and stable 
 
 a. By a general understanding of the excesses of an 
 unconstitutional democracy. 
 
 b. By an adequate system of universal compulsory 
 and free education. 
 
 c. By definite training in citizenship. 
 
 d. By race assimilation. 
 
 46 
 
2. Complete and perfect political democracy in all of its 
 
 aspects 
 
 a. Attempted devices for more direct democracy such 
 as the initiative and referendum, the recall, the 
 short ballot, and commission government. 
 
 b. Universal suffrage within the limits of justice. 
 
 c. Social legislation primarily designed to recom- 
 pense the individual when unavoidably injured by 
 necessary social action. 
 
 (1) Indemnity for detention on a false charge or 
 other legal action. Cf . North Dakota law. 
 
 (2) Rehabilitation of wounded soldiers. 
 
 (3) Social insurance against industrial accident, 
 unemployment, and sickness; old age pen- 
 sions. 
 
 3. Strive for the attainment of true social democracy 
 
 a. By utilizing political democracy, the natural in- 
 strument of social justice, abolishing all private 
 monopoly, unjust privilege, and despotic power in 
 the industrial world. 
 
 b. By eliminating and preventing all hereditary 
 parasitic social classes, and inaugurating a posi- 
 tive social effort to render the unfit fit. 
 
 c. Cultivate a healthy scorn of caste and snobbery in 
 every form. Autocracy rests on caste, favors pro- 
 motion by birth and inheritance and makes in- 
 vidious distinctions between vocations; democracy 
 rests on "open classes," favors promotion for 
 merit only and dignifies every useful vocation. 
 
 4. Foster democratic readjustments in those institutions 
 
 that mould the sympathies and ideals of children 
 
 a. The home, with its autocratic traditions. 
 
 b. The school with its imperialisms. 
 
 5. America's purpose in the world war 
 
 a. To emphasize justice as the enduring basis of 
 peace and good will. 
 
 "Let it be said again that autocracy must first be 
 shown the utter futility of its claims to power or 
 
 47 
 
leadership in the modern world. It is impossible 
 to apply any standard of justice so long as such 
 forces are unchecked and undefeated as the present 
 rulers of Germany command. Not until that has 
 been done can Right be set up as arbiter and peace- 
 maker among the nations. But when that has 
 been done — as, God willing, it assuredly will be — 
 we shall at last be free to do an unprecedented 
 thing, and this is our time to avow our purpose 
 to do it. We shall be free to base peace on gener- 
 osity and justice, to the exclusion of all selfish 
 claims to advantage even on the part of the vic- 
 tors." — President Wilson's Address, December 4, 
 1917. 
 
 b. To secure the self-determination of all nations and 
 of all lesser natural human groups. 
 
 c. To wage the first war against war. 
 
 d. To help organize a society of nations with execu- 
 tive powers, as the only way to disarmament and 
 world peace. 
 
 "If it be indeed and in truth the common object 
 of the governments associated against Germany 
 and of the nations whom they govern, as I believe 
 it to be, to achieve by settlements a secure and last- 
 ing peace, it will be that all who sit down at the 
 peace table shall come ready and willing to pay 
 the price, the only price that will secure it; and 
 ready and willing, also, to create in some virile 
 fashion the only instrumentality by which it can 
 be made certain that the agreement of the peace 
 will be honored and fulfilled. 
 
 ' ' That price is impartial justice in every item of 
 the settlement, no matter whose interest is crossed. 
 That indispensable instrument is a league of na- 
 tions formed under covenants that will be effica- 
 cious. Without such an instrumentality by which 
 the peace of the world can be guaranteed, peace 
 will rest in part upon the word of outlaws and 
 only upon that word. For Germany will have to 
 
 48 
 
redeem her character, not by what happens at the 
 peace table but by what follows. 
 
 "And as I see it, the constitution of that league 
 of nations and the clear definition of the objects 
 must be a part — is in a sense the most essential 
 part — of the peace settlement itself." 
 
 TOPIC X 
 
 OUR ALLIES : WHAT THEY BRING US 
 AND WE THEM 
 
 Compiled by J. H. Scott 
 
 I. INTRODUCTORY: ALLIANCE FOR WAR 
 
 1. Coalitions disturbing the balance of power 
 
 a. 1815, The Holy Alliance. 
 
 b. 1872, The Alliance of the Three Emperors. 
 
 c. 1879, The Dual Alliance. 
 
 d. 1881, The Triple Alliance. 
 
 e. 1898, German-Turkish Understanding. 
 
 2. Counter adjustments to preserve the balance of power 
 
 a. 1891, Franco-Russian Entente. 
 
 b. 1901, Franco-Italian Understanding. 
 
 c. 1902, Anglo-Japanese Treaty. 
 
 d. 1904, Franco-British Entente. 
 
 e. 1905, Anglo-Russian Entente. 
 
 3. Alignments during the present world war 
 
 a. The ' ' Central ' ' group : Austria, Germany, Turkey, 
 and Bulgaria. 
 
 b. The "Allied" group: Serbia, Russia, France, 
 Belgium, Great Britain, Montenegro, Egypt, 
 Japan, Portugal, Italy, San Marino (Italy), Rou- 
 mania, Greece, United States, Cuba, Panama, Siam, 
 Liberia, China, Brazil, Guatemala, Nicaragua, 
 Honduras, Costa Rica, and the Czecho-Slovaks. 
 
 49 
 
II. CHARACTERIZATION OF THE ALLIES' COUN- 
 TRIES 
 
 1. Great Britain 
 
 a. External. A loose aggregation of peoples, center- 
 ing in the Anglo-Saxon-Celtic stock of the British 
 Isles (120,000 square miles; 46,000,000 popula- 
 tion), and embracing in overseas colonies and de- 
 pendencies about one quarter of the area and 
 population of the globe (14,000,000 square miles; 
 450,000,000 population). 
 
 b. Temperamental. 
 
 (1) Isolation — insularity — conservatism. The 
 Anglo-Saxon is highly individualistic, 
 austere, and self-contained. He reveres tra- 
 ditional ways, whatever has been duly con- 
 stituted or established; and shows rare effi- 
 ciency in dealing with new conditions under 
 ancient forms and usages. 
 
 (2) Preference of action to intellection. The 
 Englishman is interested in particulars rath- 
 er than in generalities ; in handling situations 
 rather than constructing theories ; he looks 
 to cases rather than to codes. Abstract and 
 purely intellectual pursuits he has neglected 
 to make a world-wide reputation as sports- 
 man and traveler, as sailor and soldier, and 
 as a colonizer. 
 
 (3) Moral stability: seriousness. His homeland, 
 its liberties, and its local associations and 
 traditions are dear to him ; most intimate ties 
 bind him to his family, and to a few chosen 
 friends. A proneness to criticize himself and 
 his surroundings is supplemented by a bur- 
 dening sense that he must effect reforms. 
 Strictness of conscience, and loyalty to law, 
 order, and justice are his master qualities. 
 
 2. France 
 
 a. External. The premier nation of Europe for a 
 
 50 
 
thousand years, France is inhabited by a compos- 
 ite race which, despite its provincial differentia- 
 tions, is homogeneous and nicely tempered. A 
 population of 40,000,000 occupies something over 
 207,000 square miles (most of it intensively culti- 
 vated in small holdings) and controls colonies, 
 largely African, some 4,500,000 square miles in 
 extent. 
 
 b. Temperamental. 
 
 (1) Long-standing misconception of the French: 
 attributable to centuries of Franco-British 
 conflict; to extreme differences of character; 
 to judgments based superficially on the 
 atypical Parisian type. Excitability, merri- 
 ment, volubility, and enthusiasm, added to a 
 frank fearlessness of change, have given an 
 impression of lightness, shallowness, and gen- 
 eral instability. 
 
 (2) The essential soundness of French character: 
 intellectualists and realists, the French have 
 exalted cool reason, sanity, and practicality 
 above illusion and sentiment. Precision of 
 method and sureness of touch are inborn 
 traits, as also are industry and thrift, re- 
 sourcefulness, and thoroughness. Social be- 
 yond all other peoples, the French are 
 distinguished for catholicity and solidarity. 
 They are tolerant, disciplined, and law- 
 abiding as citizens ; they are marked by con- 
 stant political preoccupation, though in an 
 avocational sense, and by a burning devotion 
 to the beloved homeland, la patrie. 
 
 Belgium 
 
 A people united, though of two contrasted racial 
 types, Gallic and Germanic, numbering some 7,500,000 
 and occupying 11,000 square miles of territory. 
 Famed of old for courage, and for a jealous guarding 
 of their municipal and national prerogatives, the 
 
 51 
 
Belgians have been tempered by centuries of ceaseless 
 struggle against foreign aggression. Since their sep- 
 aration from Holland in 1831 and the guaranteeing of 
 their neutrality in 1839, they have shown, as often 
 before, wonderful recuperative powers in successfully 
 turning their released energies to the arts of peace. 
 Intensive development, pacifism, and a cosmopolitan 
 outlook are outstanding Belgian characteristics. 
 
 4. Italy 
 
 This country, the home of Mazzini and Garibaldi, 
 has a population of about 35,000,000 occupying 110,000 
 square miles, and since 1870 has possessed an autono- 
 mous government and a place among the ' ' Great Pow- 
 ers. " Long committed to an irredentist and imperial- 
 istic policy, these ultra-nationalistic expansionist 
 ambitions have to-day given place to a popular accla- 
 mation of the allied program of self-determination and 
 internationalism for all states, great and small alike. 
 
 5. Servia and her neighbors 
 
 Small monarchies, largely of peasant stock, living in 
 dreams of past national glory, and in hopes of restor- 
 ing the political integrity of the past. The Czecho- 
 slovaks and the Poles deserve special mention. 
 
 6. Portugal 
 
 For over five hundred years a loyal ally of England. 
 A republic since 1912. 
 
 7. The United States 
 
 A "melting pot" 3,000,000 square miles in extent, 
 wonderfully rich in natural resources, and inhabited 
 by 100,000,000 people, on the whole easy-going, free- 
 dom-loving, optimistic, and moral. Dominant traits 
 are inventiveness, energy, delight in competition, and a 
 capacity for the organization and operation of vast 
 enterprises. 
 
 8. Latin America 
 
 Once composed of Spanish colonies, now of republics 
 which in emulation of their northern sister have rap- 
 
 52 
 
idly advanced to positions of dignity and consideration 
 in the world 's family of nations. 
 
 9. Liberia 
 
 An African republic founded by emancipated 
 American negroes. 
 
 10. Russia, Arabia, Japan 
 
 III. THE DEBT OF DEMOCRACY TO THE PRINCIPAL 
 ALLIED NATIONS 
 
 1. To the French Republic: mother of equalities and of 
 
 political philosophies 
 
 a. The ups and downs of French republicanism. 
 
 (1) To 1789— ''The Old Regime." 
 
 (2) 1789-92— Through Assembly to First Re- 
 public. 
 
 (3) 1793-1804— Through Directory and Consul- 
 ate to First Empire. 
 
 (4) 1830 — Bourgeois Monarchy. 
 
 (5) 1848— Second Republic. 
 
 (6) 1851 — Second Empire. 
 
 (7) 1871— Through Commune to Third Republic. 
 
 b. Humanitarian basis of French republicanism: 
 Rousseau; ''Liberty, Equality, Fraternity;" social 
 amelioration; governmental machinery as related 
 to the actual life of France. 
 
 2. To the American Federation: pioneer of independence 
 a. American obligation. 
 
 (1) To England, for the Anglo-Saxon birthright 
 of self-government. 
 
 (2) To France, for ideals and formulas under- 
 lying our political institutions, as well as for 
 material assistance during the first critical 
 years of national existence. 
 
 (3) Important milestones of democratic progress. 
 (a) 1776— The Declaration of Independ- 
 ence : proclaiming the right of one free 
 people to control its own national 
 destinies. 
 
 53 
 
(b) 1823 — Monroe's message to Congress: 
 maintaining the right of all American 
 peoples to the same political oppor- 
 tunity enjoyed by the United States. 
 
 (c) 1863 — Lincoln's memorial address at 
 Gettysburg: reiterating our continued 
 faith in ' ' government of the people, for 
 the people, and by the people." 
 
 (d) 1917 — Wilson's address to the joint 
 session of Congress : announcing the 
 American determination that the whole 
 world "must be made safe for democ- 
 racy; its peace planted upon tested 
 foundations of political liberty." 
 
 (4 Contributions to democratic institutions : 
 
 (a) The federal idea. 
 
 (b) The Constitution. 
 
 (e) Equal electoral suffrage. 
 
 (d) The veto. 
 
 (e) Territorial probation. 
 
 (f) Pan-Americanism. 
 
 (g) The theory of entangling alliances. 
 
 3. To the British Empire: mother of liberty and founder 
 
 of commonwealths 
 
 a. Ancient tradition of self-government : an evolution, 
 centuries long, toward free institutions, and re- 
 sulting in autonomous states dwelling voluntarily 
 in an imperial circle. "The Crowned Republic." 
 
 b. The commonwealth of British nationalities : in the 
 dependencies and crown colonies, self-direction of 
 all domestic matters ; in the protectorates, an ap- 
 prenticeship in free and civilized institutions 
 under a nation most just and peaceable and free. 
 
 c. Tendencies : federalization vs. decentralization. 
 Ireland, India, Canada, South Africa, Australasia. 
 
 4. Conclusion: an alliance for peace 
 
 The larger program of democracy: a "League of 
 Nations" to ensure peace, promote mutual under- 
 standing, and encourage international cooperation. 
 
 54 
 
TOPIC XI 
 
 PEACE TERMS OF THE CENTRAL POWERS 
 AND OF THE ALLIES 
 
 Compiled by S. B. Sloan 
 I. PEACE PROPOSAL OF THE CENTRAL POWERS 
 
 1. Germany's peace note to the neutral powers, December 
 12, 1916 
 
 To the Entente Allies it was rather vague and did 
 not state any terms. The essential point of the note 
 was the following : Germany and her allies did not aim 
 to annihilate their adversaries despite a consciousness 
 of military and economic strength and a readiness to 
 continue the war to the bitter end, but, prompted by a 
 desire to avoid further bloodshed, the four Central 
 Powers proposed to enter into peace negotiations. 
 
 2. Similar note to the Pope on the same date 
 
 Less boastful and threatening, but no terms were 
 stated. 
 
 3. Austria's contemporaneous separate statement 
 
 It claimed to be animated "neither by aggressive 
 purposes nor by designs of conquest, but solely by the 
 bitter necessity of self-defense." 
 
 4. The German Chancellor's speech on the same day be- 
 fore the Reichstag 
 
 He set up self-defense as the cause of the war, and, 
 after boasting of military strength and successes on 
 the battle-field, he denied the charge that the Central 
 Powers "plan to conquer the whole world." 
 
 5. Premier Briand's answer, December 13, 1916 
 
 Before the Chamber of Deputies he declared that 
 the peace proposal of the Central Powers was vague 
 and indefinite and a crude trap. 
 
 55 
 
6. The Russian Duma's answer, December 15 
 
 A categorical refusal to enter into any peace negoti- 
 ations whatever. 
 
 7. Lloyd-George's reply, December 19 
 
 Before the House of Commons he insisted upon resti- 
 tution, reparation, and guarantees from the Central 
 Powers as conditions to peace. 
 
 8. Combined reply of the Entente Allies dated in Paris, 
 December 30 
 
 It characterized the document of the Central Powers 
 as "pretended propositions of peace" and protested 
 against two essential statements: that the Entente Al- 
 lies were responsible for the war and that the Central 
 Powers were victorious. The Entente Allies could see 
 in the overtures made by the Central Powers nothing 
 but an effort to impose a German peace, and they re- 
 fused to consider a proposal which was insincere. 
 
 II. PRESIDENT WILSON'S PEACE SUGGESTIONS 
 
 1. Wilson's note to the belligerent nations, December 18, 
 1916 
 
 The President offered certain suggestions looking to- 
 ward peace which had long been in his mind and had 
 no connection with the recent overtures of the Central 
 Powers, but which might be considered with proposals 
 for peace. The President's suggestions and opinions 
 in brief were : 
 
 a. He thought an early occasion should be sought for 
 a statement and comparison of the views and peace 
 terms of the various nations at war. 
 
 b. He would serve in any way that might be accep- 
 table; would even be willing to take the initiative, 
 if only the great object might be attained. 
 
 c. He assumed that the aims of the belligerents were 
 virtually the same. 
 
 d. He emphasized the fact that the concrete objects 
 for which the war was being waged were never 
 definitely stated. 
 
 56 
 
e. He did not propose peace, not even mediation, but 
 he proposed that soundings be taken. 
 
 2. The German Government's brief reply, December 26, 
 
 1916 
 
 a. An immediate exchange of views seemed appro- 
 priate. 
 
 b. In the sense of its note of December 12th it pro- 
 posed an immediate meeting of delegates of the 
 belligerents at a neutral place. 
 
 c. After the end of the present struggle, it would be 
 ready to collaborate with the United States in the 
 exalted task of preventing future wars. 
 
 3. The Entente Allies answer President Wilson, January 
 
 10, 1917 
 
 a. The Entente Allies thought it was impossible at 
 present to attain a peace that would assure repara- 
 tion, restitution, and the desired guaranties. 
 
 b. The .Entente Allies were pleased that President 
 Wilson's communication was not associated in 
 origin with that of the Central Powers of Decem- 
 ber 12th. 
 
 c. The Entente Allies protested against the assertion 
 that the aims of the two groups of belligerents 
 were similar. 
 
 d. The Entente Allies refused to make known in detail 
 their war aims until the hour of negotiations, but 
 would insist upon the restoration of Belgium, of 
 Servia, and of Montenegro, with indemnities ; evac- 
 uation of the invaded territories of France, of 
 Russia, and of Roumania, with reparation; re- 
 organization of Europe ; the expulsion from Europe 
 of the Ottoman Empire, etc. 
 
 III. POPE BENEDICT'S PLEAS FOR PEACE 
 
 1. Vain appeal on the first anniversary of the war 
 
 2. Second appeal, August 1, 1917 
 
 The Pope asked for an agreement on the following 
 
 57 
 
points, which seemed to him to offer the basis of a just 
 and lasting peace : 
 
 a. The material force of arms must give way to the 
 moral force of right. 
 
 b. Simultaneous and reciprocal decrease of armaments. 
 
 c. Compulsory arbitration. 
 
 d. Freedom and community of the seas. 
 
 e. Entire and reciprocal condonation for damages and 
 cost of the war. 
 
 f. Reciprocal restitution of occupied territory, in- 
 cluding the German colonies. 
 
 g. The aspirations of the population should determine 
 in disputed territories. 
 
 3. Reply of the United States 
 
 "To deal with such a power (the ruthless master of 
 the German people) by way of peace upon the plan 
 proposed by his Holiness the Pope would, so far as we 
 can see, involve a recuperation of his strength and a 
 
 renewal of its policy We can not take the 
 
 word of the present rulers of Germany as a guaranty 
 of anything that is to endure." 
 
 4. Reply of Germany 
 
 ' ' The German people support his Majesty in his keen 
 desire for peace. . . . The Imperial Government will 
 in this respect support every proposal compatible with 
 the vital interest of the German Empire and people." 
 
 5. Reply of Austria 
 
 "We see in the proposals of your Holiness a suitable 
 basis for initiating negotiations with a view to pre- 
 paring a peace just to all and lasting." 
 
 IV. PRESIDENT WILSON'S PEACE TERMS 
 
 1. Address oefore Congress, January 8, 1918 
 
 The President laid down the following essentials for 
 a lasting and honorable peace : 
 
 (1) Open covenants of peace without private inter- 
 national understandings. 
 
 58 
 
(2) Absolute freedom of the seas in peace or war except 
 as they may be closed by international action. 
 
 (3) Removal of all economic barriers and the estab- 
 lishment of an equality of trade conditions among 
 nations consenting to peace and pledging them- 
 selves for its maintenance. 
 
 (4) Guaranties for the reduction of national arma- 
 ments to the lowest point consistent with domestic 
 safety. 
 
 (5) International adjustment of all colonial claims 
 based on the principle that the peoples concerned 
 have equal weight with the claims of the govern- 
 ments involved. 
 
 (6) Evacuation of all Russian territory and a humane 
 settlement of all questions affecting Russia. 
 
 (7) Evacuation and restoration of Belgium without 
 any attempt to limit her sovereignty. 
 
 (8) All French territory to be freed and restored, and 
 the wrong done in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine 
 to be righted. 
 
 (9) Readjustment of Italy's frontiers along clearly 
 recognizable lines of nationality. 
 
 (10) Freest opportunity for autonomous development of 
 the people of Austria-Hungary. 
 
 (11) Evacuation of Roumania, Serbia, and Montenegro, 
 with access to the sea for Serbia, and international 
 guaranties of economic and political independence 
 and territorial integrity of the Balkan states. 
 
 (12) Secure sovereignty for the Turkish portion of the 
 Ottoman Empire, assured security of life and op- 
 portunity of autonomous development of the other 
 nationalities under Turkish rule, and Dardanelles 
 permanently opened to all nations. 
 
 (13) Establishment of an independent Polish state, in- 
 cluding territories inhabited by undisputedly Pol- 
 ish population, with free access to the sea, and 
 political and economic independence and territorial 
 integrity guaranteed by international covenant. 
 
 (14) General association of nations under specific cove- 
 
 59 
 
nants for mutual guaranties of political independ- 
 ence and territorial integrity to large and small 
 states alike. 
 
 2. Address at Mt. Vernon, July 4, 1918 
 
 The President laid stress upon four general principles 
 as follows : 
 
 a. The destruction or reduction of every arbitrary 
 power that can disturb the peace of the world. 
 
 b. The settlement of every question with respect to 
 the rights of the different countries or peoples 
 invaded. 
 
 c. The consent of all nations to be governed in their 
 conduct toward each other by the principles of 
 justice and honor. 
 
 d. The establishment of an organization of peace that 
 will afford a tribunal of opinion to which all must 
 submit. 
 
 3. In an address at New York, September 27, 1918, 
 President Wilson restated many of these ideas, and in 
 addition insisted upon these two things as necessary 
 for real peace: 
 
 a. No special alliances. 
 
 b. No economic boycotts. 
 
 V. AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN PEACE FEELER 
 
 1. The Austro-Hungarian note of September 16 
 
 It was presented to the President by the Swedish 
 Minister at 6 :30 P. M. on September 16, and answered 
 at 6 :45 P. M., and made the following points : 
 
 a. It recalled the former attempt of the Quadruple 
 Alliance to bring about peace negotiations (De- 
 cember 12, 1916). Despite its rejection, it made 
 the ''question of peace the center of discussion in 
 ever-increasing measure." As a result of these 
 discussions, "it can be stated that the distance be- 
 tween the conceptions of the two sides has, on the 
 whole, grown somewhat less." 
 
 b. "President Wilson .... has formulated 
 
 60 
 
principles which have not encountered contradic- 
 tion on the part of his allies, and the far-reaching 
 application of which is likely to meet no objection 
 on the part of the Powers of the Quadruple Alli- 
 ance." It must be remembered, however, that 
 "agreements on general principles are insuffi- 
 cient." Attention must be directed to the prac- 
 tical application. 
 
 c. Fruitful progress can not be made in public dis- 
 cussions of the practical applications for fear of 
 "unfavorably influencing feeling at home so as to 
 endanger the interest of their arms" or of "pre- 
 maturely betraying their own ultimate intentions." 
 
 d. The note, therefore, proposed a confidential and 
 unbinding discussion of the basic principles by 
 authorized delegates from all belligerents. 
 
 2. The accompanying note 
 
 The Austro-Hungarian note was accompanied by ex- 
 planations why Austria hoped that this move would 
 succeed where former attempts had failed. 
 
 3. President Wilson's reply 
 
 "The government of the United States feels that 
 there is only one reply which it can make to the sug- 
 gestion of the Imperial Austro-Hungarian Government. 
 It has repeatedly and with entire candor stated the 
 terms upon which the United States would consider 
 peace and can and will entertain no proposal for a 
 conference upon a matter concerning which it has made 
 its position and purpose so plain." 
 
 VI. GERMAN PEACE EFFORT 
 
 1. Prince Maximilian's note to President Wilson 
 
 The German Chancellor early in October made three 
 main requests: 
 
 a. A peace conference of all the belligerent states 
 should be held. 
 
 b. Wilson's fourteen points should be accepted as a 
 basis for negotiations. 
 
 61 
 
c. An armistice should be declared while peace was 
 under consideration. 
 
 President Wilson's reply, two days later 
 
 The note consisted mainly of these three questions: 
 
 a. Whether Prince Maximilian spoke for the Ger- 
 man government or the German people ? 
 
 b. "Whether Germany would be willing to evacuate 
 all of the territory her soldiers held? 
 
 c. Whether Germany accepted the fourteen points 
 in fact as well as for a basis of negotiations ! 
 
 The German Government's reply 
 
 Assurance was given that Maximilian spoke for the 
 German people, that Germany would evacuate con- 
 quered territory as a preliminary to an armistice, and 
 that President Wilson's fourteen points were accepted 
 in full. President Wilson was asked to bring about 
 the meeting of a mixed commission to make the neces- 
 sary arrangements for evacuation. 
 
 President Wilson's answer of Octooer 14th 
 It laid emphasis on three things: 
 
 a. The process of evacuation and the conditions of 
 an armistice must be left to the military advisers 
 of the Allied Powers. 
 
 b. No armistice could be considered so long as the 
 armed forces of Germany continued their illegal 
 and inhuman practices. 
 
 c. The German people must change their form of 
 government so that the future peace of the world 
 may not be endangered. 
 
 62 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 Following is a list of the principal reference books used in 
 
 the course. 
 
 Alexander, The Prussian Elementary Schools, The Macmillan 
 Co., 1918. 
 
 Angell, The Problems of the War and the Peace, London, William 
 Heinemann, 1918. 
 
 Archer, Gems (?) of German Thought, Doubleday, Page and Co., 
 1917. 
 
 The Thirteen Days, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1915. 
 
 Beard, American Citizenship, The Macmillan Co., 1914. 
 
 Beck, The Evidence in the Case, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1915. 
 
 Brooks, As Others See Us, The Macmillan Co., 1909. 
 
 Cestre, France, England and European Democracy, G. P. Put- 
 nam's Sons, 1918. 
 
 Cheradame, Pan-Germany, The Disease and Cure, Atlantic 
 Monthly Press, Boston, 1917. 
 
 Chitwood, Immediate Causes of the Great War, Thomas Y. 
 Crowell Co., 1917. 
 
 Clark, Hamilton and Moulton, Readings in the Economics of 
 War, University of Chicago Press, 1918. 
 
 Current History of New York Times, The European War, New 
 York Times Co., 1917. 
 
 Davis, The Boots of the War, The Century Co., 1918. 
 
 Gibbons, The New Map of Europe, The Century Co., 1918. 
 
 Griggs, The Soid of Democracy, The Macmillan Co., 1918. 
 
 Guerard, French Civilization in the Nineteenth Century, The 
 Century Co., 1914. 
 
 Hart, America at War, George H. Doran Co., 1918. 
 
 Hayes, A Political and Social History of Modern Europe, The 
 Macmillan Co., 1916. 
 
 Hazen, The Government of Germany, Government Printing Of- 
 fice, Washington, 1918. 
 
 Holt and Chilton, European History, 1862-1914, The Macmillan 
 Co., 1917. 
 
 63 
 
Howe, Socialized Germany, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1915. 
 
 Jastrow, The War and the Bagdad Railway, J. B. Lippincott 
 Co., 1917. 
 
 Kawakami, Japan in World Politics, The Macmillan Co., 1917. 
 
 LeBon, The Psychology of the Great War, T. Fisher Unwin, Ltd., 
 London, 1916. 
 
 Levine, The Russian Revolution, Harper and Brothers Co., 1917. 
 
 Lichnowsky, My Mission to London, George H. Doran Co., 1918. 
 
 Lippmann, The Stakes of Diplomacy, Henry Holt and Co., 1915. 
 
 Mugge, Heinrich von Treitschke, Dodge Publishing Co., New 
 York, 1913. 
 
 Miihlon, Revelations by an Ex-Director of Krupp's, George H. 
 Doran Co., 1918. 
 
 Notestein and Stoll, Conquest and Kultur, Issued by Committee 
 of Public Information, 1918. 
 
 Roosevelt, America and the World War, Charles Scribner's Sons, 
 1915. 
 
 Schapiro, Modern and Contemporary European History, Hough- 
 ton Mifflin Co., 1918. 
 
 Seymour, The Diplomatic Background of the War, Yale Univer- 
 sity Press, 1916. 
 
 Sperry, German Plots and Intrigues, Issued by Committee on 
 Public Information, 1918. 
 
 Talbot, Americanization, The H. W. Urlson Co., 1917. 
 
 Tardieu, France and the Alliances, The Macmillan Co., 1908. 
 
 Usher, Challenge of the Future, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1916. 
 Pan-Germanism, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1913. 
 
 Veblen, Theory of the Leisure Class, The Macmillan Co., 1899. 
 
 War Cyclopedia, Government Printing Office, Washington, 1918. 
 
 Wilson, Addresses, Henry Holt and Co., 1918. 
 
 Zimmern, The Economic Weapon, George H. Doran Co., 1918. 
 
 64 
 
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