■ ■ \aS> I ■ • ■ • ■ ■^ I mV m &" 43! ■ ■ «»4** H I H A STUDENTS' HISTORY OF GREECE THE MACMILLAN COMPANY NEW YORK ■ BOSTON ■ CHICAGO ATLANTA ■ SAN FRANCISCO MACMILLAN & CO., Limited LONDON • BOMBAY ■ CALCUTTA MELBOURNE THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, Ltd. TORONTO A STUDENTS' HISTORY OF GREECE BY J. B. BURY, M.A. HON. LITT.D. (OXON. AND DURHAM); HON. LL.D. (EDINBURGH AND GLASGOW) ; CORRESPONDING MEMBER OF THE IMPERIAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, ST. PETERSBURG; FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE, DUBLIN, AND OF KING'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE; REGIUS PROFESSOR OF MODERN HISTORY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE EDITED AND PREPARED FOR AMERICAN HIGH SCHOOLS AND ACADEMIES BY EVERETT KIMBALL, Ph.D. ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF HISTORY, SMITH COLLEGE SOMETIME ASSISTANT IN HISTORY IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY Ntfo gorfe THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 1907 All rights reserved $ UtsKARY of CONGRESS I wo Cooler Received OCt 30 »*0/ Copynjfhf Entry CLASS 4 XXc, NO. ( Cfa %$** COPY B. Copyright, 1907, By THE MACMILLAN COMPANY. Set up and electrotyped. Published October, 1907. ^) ft *b \» * & NorfajooK $regg J. S. Cushing Co. — Berwick & Smith Co. Norwood, Mass., U.S.A. PREFACE With the consent of Professor J. B. Bury, I have prepared an edition of his " History of Greece for Beginners " which may serve as a text-book for Secondary Schools in this country. In pre- paring this edition, I have confined myself chiefly to excision, although in places a somewhat different arrangement of material has been adopted. No statement of fact has been changed, and as far as possible the author's exact language has been retained. This is especially true in the chapters dealing with Alexander, where, to keep the spirited account of the original, the proportion of this revision may have been sacrificed. I have ventured to add brief paragraphs dealing with some of the more important Greek authors, and to expand the paragraphs on the adornment of Athens ; and have supplied a large number of new maps. To make the book more serviceable in Secondary Schools, a very few of the more important references to supplementary reading which I have found useful have been appended to each chapter ; for those who wish more detailed topical reading, references have been given to "A History Syllabus for Secondary Schools, prepared by a Special Committee of the New England Teachers' Association." I am under deepest obligations to Professor Edward Chan- ning of Harvard University, who has read my manuscript and made many valuable suggestions. Acknowledgment is also due to my friend, Mr. H. B. Hinckley, who has assisted in reading the proof. E. K. Northampton, Massachusetts, August 15, 1907. CONTENTS CHAPTER I The Beginnings of Greek Civilization ART. PAGE 1. Greece and the JEge&n I 2. The Divisions of Greece ......... 2 3. Influence of Geography on History ....... 5 4. Remains of ^Egean Civilization ........ 6 5. Inferences from the Relics of ^Egean Civilization .... 16 CHAPTER II The Greek Conquest and the Homeric Age 1. The Greek Conquest 21 2. Expansion of the Greeks to the Eastern /Egean .... 23 3. The Later Wave of Greek Invasion ....... 27 4. The Dorian Migration ......... 29 5. Homer 31 6. Political and Social Organization of the Early Greeks ... 34 7. Fall of Greek Monarchies and Rise of the Republics • . • 38 8. Phoenician Intercourse with Greece 39 CHAPTER III The Expansion of Greece 1. Causes and Character of Greek Colonization .... 2. Colonies on the Coasts of the Euxine, Propontis, and North .Fgean 3. Colonies in the Western Mediterranean 4. Growth of Trade and Maritime Enterprise 5. Influence of Lydia on Greece .... 6. The Opening of Egypt and Foundation of Cyrene 7. Popular Discontent in Greece .... 42 44 46 54 58 60 60 viii CONTENTS CHAPTER IV Growth of Sparta. Fall of Aristocracies ART. PAGE 1. Sparta and her Constitution 64 2. Spartan Conquest of Messenia 68 3. Internal Development of Sparta and her Institutions . . 71 4. The Supremacy and Decline of Argos. The Olympian Games . 75 5. Changes in Law. Democratic Movements 78 6. Tyrants 79 7. Tyrants at Corinth 81 8. Tyrants of Megara 83 9. Tyrants at Sicyon 84 10. The Sacred War. The Panhellenic Games 85 CHAPTER V The Union of Attica and the Foundation of the Athenian Democracy 1. The Union of Attica 90 2. Foundation of the Athenian Commonwealth . . . . .91 3. The Aristocracy in the Seventh Century 93 4. The Timocracy .......... 94 5. The Conspiracy of Cylon ......... 96 6. The Laws of Dracon 96 7. The Legislation of Solon 97 8. The Constitutional Reforms of Solon, and the Foundations of Democracy 99 9. Effects of the Legislation of Solon 101 CHAPTER VI Growth of Athens in the Sixth Century 1. The Conquest of Salamis ........ 103 2. Athens under Pisistratus 104 3. Growth of Sparta, and the Peloponnesian League .... 109 4. Fall of the Pisistratids and Intervention of Sparta . . . .111 5. Reform of Cleisthenes . . . . . . . . .114 6. First Victories of the Democracy 117 CONTENTS IX ART. I. 2. 3- 4- 5- 6. 7- CHAPTER VII The Advance of Persia to the ^Egean The Rise of Persia and the Fall of the Lydian Kingdom The Persian Conquest of Asiatic Greece, and Egypt The First Years of Darius. Conquest of Thrace The Ionic Revolt against Persia Second and Third Expeditions of Darius The Battle of Marathon. Miltiades Struggle of Athens and ^Egina Growth of the Athenian Democracy Athens becomes a Sea-Power. Themistocles PAGE 119 122 123 126 129 130 134 !35 136 CHAPTER VIII The Perils of Greece. The Persian and Punic Invasions 1. The Preparations and March of Xerxes . . . . . . 139 2. Preparations of Greece . . . . . . . . .140 3. Battle of Artemisium 142 4. Battle of Thermopylae . . . . . . . . .144 5. The Persian Advance. The Capture of Athens .... 146 6. The Battle of Salamis ......... 147 7. Consequences of Salamis . . . . . . . . .150 8. Preparations for Another Campaign . . . . . .150 9. The Battle of Plataea 152 10. The Battle of Mycale and the Capture of Sestos . . . . 153 11. Gelon, Tyrant of Syracuse . . . . . . . .154 12. Syracuse under Hieron 156 CHAPTER IX The Foundation of the Athenian Empire 1. The Position of Sparta and the Career of Pausanias 2. The Confederacy of Delos ..... 3. The 1 Fortification of Athens and the Piraeus 4. Ostracism and Death of Themistocles 5. Successful Campaigns of the Confederacy of Delos . 6. The Confederacy of Delos becomes an Athenian Empire 7. Policy and Ostracism of Cimon . 159 161 163 165 166 167 169 X CONTENTS CHAPTER X The Athenian Empire under the Guidance of Pericles ART. 1. The Completion of the Athenian Democracy, 2. War of Athens with the Peloponnesians 3. War with Egypt .... 4. War in Boeotia .... 5. The Athenian Empire at its Height 6. Conclusion of Peace with Persia 7. Athenian Reverses. The Thirty Years' Peace Pericles 172 x 75 176 177 179 180 181 CHAPTER XI The Imperialism of Pericles 1. Aims of Pericles 183 2. The Restoration of the Temples . . . . . . .185 3. Literature 189 4. Higher Education. The Sophists . . . . . . .190 5. Opposition to Pericles ......... 191 6. The Piraeus. Athenian Commercial Policy . . . . .191 7. The Revolt of Samos 193 CHAPTER XII The War of Athens with the Peloponnesians 1. The Prelude to the War 195 2. Sparta decides upon War . . . . . . . .196 3. The Theban Attack on Plataea 198 4. Spartan Invasions. Athenian Retaliation . . . . . 199 5. The Plague. The Death of Pericles 200 6. The Siege and Capture of Platoea ....... 202 7. Revolt of Mytilene. New Leaders at Athens 203 8. Warfare in Western Greece. Tragic Events in Corcyra . . . 205 9. Nicias and Cleon. Politics at Athens 206 10. The Athenian Capture of Pylos ....... 207 11. Athenian Expedition to Bceotia. Delium ..... 210 12. The War in Thrace. Athens loses Amphipolis. Brasidas . .212 13. Negotiations for Peace 213 CONTENTS XI ART. PAGE 14. Battle of Amphipolis 214 15. The Peace of Nicias 214 CHAPTER XIII The Decline of the Athenian Empire 1. New Political Combinations with Argos 217 2. Renewal of the War. Alcibiades 217 3. First Operations in Sicily 219 4. The Sicilian Expedition 220 5. Treachery of Alcibiades ......... 222 6. The Siege of Syracuse 222 ' 7. Spartan Intervention 223 8. The Defeat of the Athenians 224 9. The Revolt of the Allies 224 CHAPTER XIV The Downfall of the Athenian Empire 1. The Oligarchical Revolution 227 2. Fall of the Four Hundred. The Democracy Restored . . . 228 3. The Restored Democracy. Cyzicus 230 4. Cyrus and Lysander 231 5. Return of Alcibiades. Battles of Notion and the Arginusae Islands . . . . . . . . . . .231 6. The Battle of ^Egospotami ........ 233 7. The Surrender of Athens 234 8. Rule of the Thirty . 236 9. Overthrow of the Thirty. Restoration of the Democracy . . 238 10. Literature of the Period 239 CHAPTER XV The Spartan Supremacy and the Persian War 1. The Spartan Supremacy 241 2. The Rebellion of Cyrus and the March of the Ten Thousand . . 241 3. War of Sparta with Persia. Agesilaus ...... 244 4. Spartan Aggression. Death of Lysander ..... 245 Xll CONTENTS ART. PAGE 5. " The Corinthian War " 246 6. The King's Peace 248 7. High-handed Policy of Sparta 249 8. Alliance of Athens and Thebes 251 9. Theban Reforms. Epaminondas . . . . . . . 253 10. The Second Athenian League ........ 253 11. The Battle of Naxos and the Peace of Callias 254 12. Literature and Art 256 13. Athens under the Restored Democracy 261 CHAPTER XVI The Hegemony of Thebes 1. Jason of Pherse and the Battle of Leuctra 2. Policy of Thebes in Southern Greece, Arcadia, and Messenia 3. Foundation of Messene. Alliance of Athens and Sparta 4. Confusion on the Peloponnesus 5. Policy of Thebes in Northern Greece 6. War between Athens and Thebes . 7. War on the Peloponnesus. Battle of Olympia 8. Battle of Mantinea. The Death of Epaminondas 264 267 269 270 270 271 272 273 CHAPTER XVII / The Syracusan Empire and the Struggle with Carthage 1. Carthaginian Destruction of Selinus and Himera .... 276 2. Rise of Dionysius 277 3. Tyranny of Dionysius 278 4. Punic Wars of Dionysius 279 5. The Empire of Dionysius. His Death 280 6. Dionysius the Younger and Dion 283 7. Timoleon ........... 285 CHAPTER XVIII The Rise of Macedonia 1. Macedonia 2. Early Conquests of Philip II. of Macedonia 287 288 CONTENTS xiii ART. PAGE 3. The Organization of the Macedonian Army 290 4. Mausolus of Caria .......... 291 5. Phocis and the Sacred War 292 6. Intervention of Philip of Macedonia 294 7. Aims of Philip 295 8. Demosthenes 296 9. The Advance of Macedonia. Fall of Olynthus .... 298 10. The Peace of Philocrates 299 11. Philip in Greece .......... 300 12. Interval of Peace and Preparations for War 301 13. March of Philip. Alliance of Athens and Thebes .... 303 14. Battle of Chseronea 304 15. The Congress of the Greeks 305 16. Death of Philip 307 CHAPTER XIX The Conquest of Persia 1. Alexander in Greece and Thrace 310 2. Preparations for Alexander's Persian Expedition. Condition of Persia ............ 313 3. Conquest of Asia Minor 316 4. Battle of Issus 320 5. Conquest of Syria 323 6. Conquest of Egypt 328 7. Battle of Gaugamela, and Conquest of Babylonia .... 329 8. Conquest of Susiana and Persis ....... 333 9. Death of Darius 334 IO. Spirit of Alexander's Policy as Lord of Asia 337 CHAPTER XX The Conquest of the Far East 1. Hyrcania, Areia, Bactria, Sogdiana 339 2. The Conquest of India ......... 347 3. Alexander's Return to Babylon 358 4. Preparations for an Arabian Expedition. Alexander's Death . .361 5. Greece under Macedonia 363 6. The Episode of Harpalus and the Greek Revolt .... 365 ILLUSTRATIONS The Acropolis . . Frontispiece PAGE Coin of Cnossus ........... 7 Lion Gate, Mycenae .......... 9 Troy (Sixth City) !■? Siege Scene on Silver Vessel . . . . . . . . 1 r Gem showing Female Dress 16 Painted Tombstone with Warriors 19 Gold Cup 26 Early Coin of Potidaea 46 Coin of Zancle ........... co Coin of Himera ........... co Coin of Syracuse, Early c ! Coin of Taras, Fifth Century 54 Dipylon Vase \ m # .57 Electron Coin of Lydia eg Coin of Halicarnassus co Coins of Cyrene ........ 60 Early Coin of Caulonia 62 Temple of Hera and Zeus . 76 Coin of Corinth, Sixth-Fifth Century 81 Pillars of an Old Temple at Corinth 83 Athena and Poseidon oj Coin of Athens, Early g. Troops at Athens IO r Athena slaying Giant io 8 Harmodius and Aristogiton i I2 Gold Coin of Sardis I20 Croesus on the Pyre l2l Coin of Gela, Early IC r Coin of Syracuse, Fifth Century I5 6 Helmet dedicated by Hieron T r 7 Coin of Elis, Early l6l xv xvi ILLUSTRATIONS PAGE Portrait Head, perhaps of Cimon 169 Pericles, Copy of Portrait by Cresilas . . . . . . 173 Coin of Thebes . . . . . . . . . . .177 Coin of Cition, Fifth Century . . . . . . . . .180 Athena and Hephaestus . . . . . . . . . .187 Early Coin of Samos .......... 194 Coin of Corcyra, Fifth Century . . . . . . . 195 Athena contemplating a Stele ........ 201 Coin of Selinus, Fifth Century ........ 220 Coin of Cnidus ........... 225 Coin of Eleusis . . . . . . . . . . .231 Coin of Trapezus ........... 244 Daric, Fourth Century . . . . . . . . ... 249 Coin of Chalcidice ........... 250 Portrait Head of Socrates . . . . . . . . . 257 Portrait Head of Isocrates ......... 260 Coin of Messene ........... 269 Coin of Elis ............ 273 Coins of Syracuse and Acragas ........ 276 Alliance Coin of Leontini and Catane ....... 286 Coin of Archelaus I. ......... 288 Coin of Philip II 288 Gold Coin of Philippi 289 Coin of Mausolus 291 Coin of Delphic Amphictiony . . . . . . , 293 Portrait Head of Demosthenes ........ 297 Alexander the Great . . . . . . . . . . 311 Silver Coin of Tarsus .......... 319 Silver Coin of Sidon .......... 324 Silver Coin of Tyre 326 Coin of Cyrene, Zeus Ammon . . . . . . . . 329 Propylea of Xerxes 335 Coin of Alexander 358 MAPS FULL-PAGE PAGE Greece {colored') ........ between I and 2 Physical Features of Greece 4 Area of Mycenaean Civilization {colored) ..... facing 10 *► The Greek Conquests {colored) ...... "22 Greek Settlements in Sicily and Italy 47 Persia 124 Magna Graecia ......... facing 156 f Athenian Empire {colored) ....... facing 166 , The Allies of Athens and Sparta {colored) . . . . "198 Empire of Dionysius .......... 281 Route of Alexander . . . . . . . . . •3 I 7 Bactria and Sogdiana 340 Northwestern India .......... 349 IN TEXT The Peloponnesus ........... 5 The Argive Plain 18 Colonies in the Pontus and the Propontis ...... 44 Greek Colonies in the Northern zEgean . . . ... . 45 Sparta 69 The Sacred War and Delphic Amphictiony 86 Boeotia 88 Attica 92 The Ionic Revolt 128 Battle of Marathon 131 The Persian Wars 141 Thermopylae and Artemisium ......... 145 The Battle of Salamis 148 The Invasion of Xerxes . . . . . . . . . • I 5 I Battle of PI ataea . 152 xvii xviii MAPS PAGE Campaigns in Boeotia . . . . . . * » . .178 Athenian Acropolis . . . . . . . . . 185 Athens and the Piraeus 192 Sieges of Pylos and Sphacteria ........ 208 Campaigns in Bceotia . . . . . . . . . .211 Campaigns of Brasidas . . . . . . . . . .213 The Siege of Syracuse 223 Expedition of Cyrus and Retreat of the Ten Thousand .... 243 Campaigns in Boeotia .......... 246 The Battle of Leuctra 265 Power of Sparta and Thebes in the Peloponnesus ..... 268 Growth of the Power of Macedonia ....... 290 Bceotia 293 Battle of Issus 321 Siege of Tyre 325 A STUDENTS' HISTORY OF GREECE HISTORY OF GREECE CHAPTER I THE BEGINNINGS OF GREEK CIVILIZATION i. Greece and the JEgean. — The most striking feature of con- tinental Greece is the deep gulf which has cleft it asunder into two parts. The southern half ought to have been an island, — as its Greek name, " the island of Pelops," suggests, — but it holds on to the continent by a narrow bridge of land at the eastern extremity of the great cleft. Now this physical feature has the utmost sig- nificance for the history of Greece; and its significance may be viewed in three ways, if we consider the existence of the dividing gulf, the existence of the isthmus, and the fact that the isthmus was at the eastern and not at the western end. (i) The double effect of the gulf itself is clear at once. It let the sea in upon a number of folk who would otherwise have been inland moun- taineers, and increased enormously the length of the seaboard of Greece. Further, the gulf constituted southern Greece a world by itself; so that it could be regarded as a separate land from northern Greece. (2) But if the island of Pelops had been in very truth an island, — if there had been no isthmus, — there would have been from the earliest ages direct and constant intercourse between the coasts which are washed by the iEgean and those which are washed by the Ionian Sea. The eastern and western lands of Greece would have been brought nearer to one another, when the ships of trader or warrior, instead of tediously circum- navigating the Peloponnesus, could sail from the eastern to the western sea through the middle of Greece. The disappearance 2 THE BEGINNINGS OF GREEK CIVILIZATION of the isthmus would have revolutionized the roads of traffic and changed the centers of commerce ; and the wars of Grecian history would have been fought out on other lines. (3) Again, if the bridge which attached the Peloponnesus to the mainland had been at the western end of the gulf, the lands along either shore of the inlet would have been more accessible to the commerce of the iEgean and the Orient; the civilization of northwestern Greece might have been more rapid and intense; and the history of Bceotia and Attica, unhooked from the Peloponnesus, would have run a different course. The character of the ^Egean basin was another determining con- dition of the history of the Greeks. Strewn with countless islands it seems meant to promote the intercourse of folk with folk. The Cyclades pass imperceptibly into the isles which the Asiatic coast throws out, and there is formed a sort of island bridge, inviting ships to pass from Greece to Asia. The western coast of Asia Minor belongs, in truth, more naturally to Europe than to its own continent ; it soon became part of the Greek world ; and the ^Egean might be considered then as the true center of Greece. The west side of Greece, too, was well furnished with good har- bors. It was no long voyage from Corcyra to the heel of Italy, and the inhabitants of western Greece had a whole world open to their enterprise. But that world was barbarous in early times and had no civilizing gifts to offer ; whereas the peoples of the eastern seaboard looked toward Asia and were drawn into contact with the immemorial civilizations of the Orient. The backward condition of western as contrasted with eastern Greece in early ages did not depend on the conformation of the coast, but on the fact that it faced away from Asia; and in later days we find the Ionian Sea a busy scene of commerce and lined with prosperous communities which are fully abreast of Greek civilization. 2. The Divisions of Greece. — The important geographical features and noted places in the peninsula of Greece may be con- veniently considered in three main divisions: (1) Northern THE DIVISIONS OF GREECE . 3 Greece; (2) Central Greece; (3) Southern Greece, "the island of Pelops," or the Peloponnesus. (1) Northern Greece contains the two large districts of Epirus and Thessaly which are separated from Macedonia by the Cam- bunian Mountains. Epirus, on the west coast, is a mountainous district, its people are rude and backward, and it has contributed little to influence Greek history. Almost in the center is Dodona-, one of the oldest and most revered shrines in Greece. Across the Pindus range lies Thessaly, a great fertile plain, drained by the river Peneus which forces its way through the Vale of Tempe. To the north are the Cambunian Mountains from which rises Olympus, the loftiest peak in Greece on whose snow-capped heights the gods were supposed to dwell. On the east the Magnesian range, with the peaks of Ossa and Pelion, runs along the coast. (2) Central Greece contains many small states. To the west are the rude mountainous districts of Acarnania and /Etolia. Nearly in the center, lies Phocis, famous for Mount Parnassus, the home of the Muses, and for Delphi, the most important oracle in Greece. To the east is Bceotia, a fertile plain, with the long river Cephissus flowing into Copais, the one large lake in Greece. In Bceotia are situated Orchomenus, one of the seats of the most ancient civiliza- tion, and Thebes, its great rival. Still farther to the east and separated from Bceotia by the Cithaeron range, the peninsula of Attica projects into the ^Egean. The chief city, Athens, situated on the Acropolis, at an early date asserted its supremacy over the entire district. On the Isthmus of Corinth, which connects central with southern Greece, are the two small states of Megaris and Corinthia. (3) The Peloponnesus contains six divisions of varying size and importance. On the northeast, joined with Corinthia, is Argolis, in whose plain lie the ruins of the ancient cities of Mycenae and Tiryns; and where is situated the city of Argos, the early rival of Sparta. To the south is the district of Laconia whose fertile valley between the Parnon and Taygetus mountains, is drained by the INFLUENCE OF GEOGRAPHY ON HISTORY 5 river Eurotus, on whose banks is situated the city of Sparta. West of Laconia is Messenia, which was subjected to Sparta at an early- date. To the north lies the great inland state of Arcadia, whose lofty valleys are surrounded by still loftier mountains. To the extreme northwest is Elis, a harborless stretch of coast through which flows the Alpheus, one of the longest rivers of Greece. Here is situated Olympia, where every four years were celebrated games in honor of Zeus. Along the northern coast of the Peloponnesus fronting on the Corinthian Gulf lies Achaea. THE PELOPONNESSUS SCALE OF MILES 1 10 20 30 40 50 B0RMAY ENGRAVING CO., N.Y. 3. Influence of Geography on History. — Greece is thus a land of mountains and small valleys ; it has few plains of even moderate 6 THE BEGINNINGS OF GREEK CIVILIZATION size and no considerable rivers. It is therefore well adapted to be a country of separate communities, each protected against its neighbors by hilly barriers; and the history of the Greeks is a story of small independent states. The political history of all countries is in some measure under the influence of geography; but in Greece geography made itself preeminently felt, and fought along with other forces against the accomplishment of national unity. The islands formed states by themselves; but as seas, while like mountains they sever, may also, unlike mountains, unite, it was less difficult to form a sea than a land empire. In the same way, the hills prevented the development of a brisk land traffic, while, as we have seen, the broken character of the coast and the multi- tude of islands facilitated intercourse by water. There is no barrier to break the winds which sweep over the Euxine toward the Greek shores. Hence the Greek climate has a certain severity and bracing quality, which promoted the vigor and energy of the people. Again, Greece is by no means a rich and fruitful country. It has few well-watered plains of large size ; the cultivated valleys do not yield the due crop to be expected from the area; the soil is good for barley, but not rich enough for wheat to grow freely. Thus though the tillers of the earth had hard work, the nature of the land tended to promote maritime enterprise. On one hand, richer lands beyond the seas attracted the adventurous, especially when the growth of the population began to press on the means of support. On the other hand, it ultimately became necessary to supplement home-grown corn by wheat imported from abroad. But if Demeter denied her highest favors, the vine and the olive grew abundantly in most parts of the country, and their cultivation was one of the chief features of ancient Greece. 4. Remains of JEgean. Civilization. — It is in the lands of Thessaly and Epirus that we first dimly descry the Greeks busy at their destined task of creating and shaping the thought and civilization of Europe. The oldest known sanctuary of Zeus, their REMAINS OF ^GEAN CIVILIZATION supreme god, is the oakwood of Dodona in Epirus. But it was specially in Thessaly, where the first Greek settlers were the Achaeans, that this race, living on the plains of Argos and the mountains round about it, fashioned legends which were to sink deep into the imagination of Europe. Here they peopled Olympus, in whose shadow they dwelled, with divine inhabitants, so that it has become forever the heavenly hill in the tongues of men. And here, also, they composed lays in the hexameter verse, that mar- vellous meter which is probably of their invention. But the Achaeans were immigrants in Thessaly, having come from another home in the mountains of Illyria, and their descendants migrated again, before the art of the hexameter was perfected in those lays sung at the banquets of their nobles, which give us in the Homeric literature our earliest picture of those ancient Aryan institutions which are common to ourselves and to the Greeks. Moreover, when the Greek migrants came to the shores of the ^Egean, they found there a white race more advanced in civiliza- tion than themselves. This ^Egean race, as it may be called, which, like the Ligurians in Italy or the Iberians in Spain, preceded the Aryan conqueror, was a race of traders, having intercourse with many lands. We have lately come to know a good deal of its life, from the remains of its civilization, discovered at Troy and in the islands of Amorgos and Melos, and in Crete. (i) Crete. — At the time when the kings of the Twelfth Dynasty were reigning in Egypt, Crete was a land of flourishing communities, and was about to become, if it had not already become, a considerable sea power. It is prob- able that Cnossus was one of the strongest and richest settlements in Crete at the beginning cf the second millennium. The remains of the palace, which in subsequent ages was trans- formed into a grander and more luxurious abode, have recently been dug out of the earth; and its stones, on Coin of Cnossus, Early(Obvekse). Minotaur [Le- gend : KN02] 2778-2565, B.C.(?) 8 THE BEGINNINGS OF GREEK CIVILIZATION which the emblem of a double axe is inscribed, declare that the kings who dwelled therein were devoted to the worship of a great deity whose symbol was the double axe or labrys. It was from this god of the labrys that the Labyrinth of Cretan legend derived its name; and it seems probable that this palace on the hill of Cnossus was the original Labyrinth, afterward converted by myth into the Daedalean maze which sheltered the Minotaur. The palace is unprotected by the massive walls, which charac- terize the ruins of this age, thus showing that its lords were sea- kings, depending for their strength upon their ships. The royal wealth was secured in a series of storerooms built side by side; stone chests for treasure and large jars for storage have been found in abundance. And the kings kept accurate record and account of their possessions, for the art of writing was perfectly familiar in Crete in the days when she played the greatest part she was ever destined to play in the history of the world. Hundreds of written documents have been found in the Cnossian palace. The writing material was small tablets of clay, which were preserved in wooden boxes secured by seals. The writing, which is of linear character, cannot be read; but it has been made out that about seventy signs were in common use. 2000-1000 (2) Tiryns and Mycence. — Tiryns stands on a long, low rock about a mile and a half from the sea, and the land around it was once a marsh. From north to south the hill rises in height; it was shaped by man's hand into three platforms, of which the southern and highest was occupied by the palace of the king. But the whole acropolis was strongly walled round by a structure of massive stones, laid in regular layers but rudely dressed, the crevices being filled with a mortar of clay. This fashion of building has been called Cyclopean from the legend that masons called Cyclopes were invited from Lycia to build the walls of Tiryns. The stronghold of Mycenae, about twelve miles inland, at the northeastern end of the Argive plain, was built on a hill which rises to nine hundred feet above the sea-level. The shape of B.C. 10 THE BEGINNINGS OF GREEK CIVILIZATION the citadel is a triangle, and the greater part of the wall is built in the same " Cyclopean " style as the wall of Tiryns, but of smaller stones. Another fashion of architecture, however, also occurs, and points to a later date than Tiryns. The gates and some of the towers are built of even layers of stones carefully hewn into rectangular shape. On the northeast side, a vaulted stone passage in the wall led by a subterranean path to the foot of the hill, where a cistern was supplied from a perennial spring outside the walls. Thus the garrison was furnished with water in case of a siege. Mycenae had two gates. The lintel of the chief doorway is formed by one huge square block of stone, and the weight of the wall resting on it is lightened by the device of leaving a triangular space. This opening is filled by a sculp- tured stone relief representing two lionesses standing opposite each other on either side of a pillar, on whose pedestal their fore- paws rest. They are, as it were, watchers who ward the castle, and from them the gate is known as the Lion gate. The ruins on the hill of Tiryns enable us to trace the plan of the palace of its kings. One chief principle of the construction of the palaces of this age seems to have been the separation of the dwel- ling-house of the women from that of the men, — a principle which continued to prevail in Greek domestic architecture in his- torical times. The halls of king and queen alike are built on the same general plan as the palace in the old brick city on the hill of Troy and the palaces which are described in the poems of Homer. An altar stood in the men's courtyard (avXrj), which was enclosed by pillared porticoes ; the portico (aWovaa) which faced the gate being the vestibule of the house. Double-leafed doors opened from the vestibule into a preliminary hall (7r/ooSo/>tos), from which one passed through a curtained doorway over a great stone threshold (AaiVo? orSo?) into the men's hall (fxiyapov). In the midst of it was the round hearth — the center of the house — encircled by four wooden pillars which supported the flat roof. The palace of Mycenae crowned the highest part of the hill, and its plan was, in general REMAINS OF ^GEAN CIVILIZATION II conception and in many details, like that of Tiryns. It was cus- tomary to embellish the walls by inlet sculptured friezes and by paintings. A brilliant alabaster frieze, inset with cyanus or paste of blue glass, decorated the vestibule of the hall at Tiryns, and the men's halls in both palaces were adorned with mural pictures. Besides their castle and palace, the burying-places of the kings of Mycenae are their most striking memorials. Close to the western wall, south of the Lion gate, the royal burial circle has been dis- covered, within which six tombs cut vertically into the rock had remained untouched by the hand of man since the last corpses were placed in them. Weapons were buried with the men, some of whose faces were covered with gold masks. The heads of the women were decked with gold diadems ; rich ornaments and things of household use were placed beside them. But a day came when this simple kind of grave was no longer royal enough for the rich princes of Mycenae, and they sought more imposing resting- places; or else, as some believe, they were overthrown by lords of another race, who brought with them a new fashion of sepulcher. Nine sepulchral domes, hewn in the opposite hillside, have been found not far from the acropolis. The largest of them is generally known as the " Treasury of Atreus," a name which rose from a false idea as to its purpose. But besides the stately burying-places of the kings, the humbler tombs of the people have been discovered — square chambers cut into the rock. The town of Mycenae below the citadel consisted of a group of villages, each of which preserved its separate identity; each had its own burying-ground. Thus Mycenae, and probably other towns of the age, represented an intermediate stage between the village and the city — a number of little communities gathered together in one place, and dominated by a fortress. We have seen how in the royal graves on the castle hill treasures of gold, long hidden from the light of day, revealed the wealth of the Mycenaean kingdom. Treasures would perhaps have been found also in some of the great vaulted tombs if they had not been 12 THE BEGINNINGS OF GREEK CIVILIZATION rifled by plunderers in subsequent ages. But for us the works of the potter, and the implements of war and peace fashioned by the bronze-smith, are of more value than the golden ornaments for studying this early civilization ; and things of daily use have been found in the lowlier rock-tombs as well as in the royal sepulchers of hill or plain. From the implements which the people used, and also from the representations which artists wrought, we can win a rough picture of their dress, armor, and ornaments, and form an idea of their capacity in art. (3) Attica and Bceotia. — In Attica there are many relics. On the Athenian Acropolis there are a few stones supposed to belong to a palace of great antiquity, but we can look with more certainty on some of the ancient foundations of the fortress wall. This wall was called Pelargic or Pelasgic by the Athenians; and it seems likely that the word preserves the name of the ancient inhabitants of the place, the Pelasgoi. In Bceotia there are striking memorials. On the western shores of the great Copaic marsh a people dwelled, whose wealth was proverbial; and their city Orchomenus shared with Mycenae the attribute of " golden " in the Homeric poems. One of their kings built a great sepulchral vault under the hill of the citadel, and later generations took it for a treasury It approached, though it did not quite attain to the size of the Treasure-house of Atreus itself. (4) Troy. — Modern research on the hill of Hissarlik, in the northwest corner of Asia Minor, shows that in an earlier period a great city flourished on the hill of Troy. It was built of sun- baked brick, and stood on the ruins of an older city built of stone. The brick city had three gates, and towers protected the angles of its walls. Its inhabitants belonged to the stone and copper age; bronze was still a rarity with them. But the palace, which can be traced, shows the same general ground-plan of a house as that which is described perhaps fifteen hundred years later in the poems of Homer. From an outer gate we pass through a courtyard, in REMAINS OF ^GEAN CIVILIZATION 13 which an altar stood, into a square preliminary chamber; and from it we enter the great hall, in the center of which was the hearth. Long before the Greeks came, the iEgean race were building such houses as Homer tells of. The great brick city was destroyed by fire, probably about 2000 B.C.; and three other cities were reared and perished on that same site. Civilization progressed; bronze superseded stone Troy, Sixth City (view from East Tower). Prehistoric Wall on the Left (Roman Foundations on Right) tools, as tin was brought in more abundance from the west. The new Troy, through whose glory the name of the spot was to become a household word forever throughout all European lands, was built on the levelled ruins of the older towns. The circuit of the new city was far wider, and within a great wall of well-wrought stone, the citadel rose, terrace upon terrace, to a highest point. On that commanding summit, as at Mycenae, we must presume that The sixth (Homeric) city of Troy, 1600-1100 B.C. 14 THE BEGINNINGS OF GREEK CIVILIZATION the king's palace stood. The houses of which the foundations have been disclosed within the walls have the same simple plan that we saw in the older brick city and in the palaces of Mycenae and Tiryns. The wall was pierced by three or four gates, the chief gate being on the southeast side, guarded by a flanking tower. The builders were more skilful than the masons of the ruder walls of the fortresses of Argolis ; and it is a question whether we are to infer that the foundation of Troy belongs to a later age, or that from the beginning the art of building was more advanced among the Trojans. But if Troy shows superior excellence in military masonry, its civilization in other ways seems to have been simpler than that of the Argive plain. It imported, indeed, the glazed Mycenaean wares, and was in contact with ^Egean civilization. But Troy stands, in a measure, apart from the "Mycenaean" world — beside it, in contact with it, yet not quite of it. This was natural; for in speech and race the Trojans stood apart. We know with full certainty who the people of Troy were ; we know that they were a Phrygian folk and spoke a tongue akin to our own. (5) JEgean Civilization. — The civilization of the men whose monuments we have been considering belonged to the age of bronze and copper. Even in its later period, iron was still so rare and costly that it was used only for ornaments — rings, for instance, and possibly for money. The arms with which the men of Mycenae attacked their foes were sword, spear, and bow. Their defensive armor consisted of huge helmets, probably made of leather; shields of ox-hide reaching from the neck almost to the feet — complete towers of defence, but so clumsy that it was the chief part of a military education to manage them. The princes went forth to war in two-horsed war-chariots, which consisted of a board to stand on and a breastwork of wicker. The fragment of a silver vessel (found in one of the rock-tombs of Mycenae) shows us a scene of battle in front of the walls of a mountain city, from whose battlements women, watching the fight, are waving their hands. Men wore long hair, not, however, flowing freely, but tied or REMAINS OF ^EGEAN CIVILIZATION 15 plaited in tresses. In old times they let the beard grow both on lip and chin; but the fashion changed, and in the later period, as we see from their pictures, they shaved the upper lip. Razors have been found in the tombs. Their garments were sim- ple, a loin apron and a cloak fastened by a clasp-pin; in later times, a close-fitting tunic. High-born dames wore tight bodices and wide gown-skirts. Frontlets or bands round the brow were Siege Scene on a Silver Vessel; 8-shaped Shield above in Left Corner (Mycenae) a distinction of their attire, and they wore their hair elaborately curled, or coiled high in rings, letting the ends fall behind. The ornaments which have been found in the royal tombs of Mycenae show that its queens appeared in glittering gold array. The remains at Mycenae, Tiryns, and Cnossus are, taken in their 1 6 THE BEGINNINGS OF GREEK CIVILIZATION entirety, the most impressive of the memorials of a widespread JEge&n civilization. In the Peloponnesus, nowhere except at Tiryns and Mycenae have great fortresses or palaces been found; but some large vaulted hill-tombs, on the same plan as those of the Argive plain, mark the existence of ancient princi- palities. The lords of Amyclae, which was the queen of the Laconian vale before the rise of Greek Sparta, hol- lowed out for themselves a lordly Gem showing Female , , . , ,., ,-, m r dress (Mycen^an) tomb ' whlch > unllke the Treasury of Atreus, was never invaded by robbers. In this vault, among other costly treasures, were found the most precious of all the works of Mycenaean art that have yet been drawn forth from the earth : two golden cups on which a metal- worker of matchless skill has wrought vivid scenes of the snaring and capturing of wild bulls. 5. Inferences from the Relics of JEgean Civilization. — Hav- ing taken a brief survey of the character and range of the "Myce- naean civilization," we come to inquire whether any evidence exists, amid these chronicles of stone and clay, of gold and bronze, for de- termining the periods of its rise, bloom, and fall. In the first place, it belongs to the age of bronze; the iron age had not begun. Iron was still a rare and precious metal in the later part of the period ; it was used for rings, but not yet for weapons. The iron age can hardly have commenced in Greece long before the tenth century; and if we set the beginning of the bronze age at about 2000 B.C., we get roughly the second millennium as a delimitation of the period within which " Mycenaean" culture flourished and de- clined. The art of writing was known to the Cretans, but we can inter- pret neither their signs nor their language. But in Egypt, evidence has been discovered which teaches us in what centuries the potters of the /Egean made their wares and shipped them to distant shores. INFERENCES FROM RELICS OF AEGEAN CIVILIZATION 1 7 In the sixteenth century, men of ^Egean type bearing Mycenaean vases were represented on a wall-painting at Egyptian Thebes. At Gurob, a city which was built in the fifteenth century and destroyed two or three hundred years later, a number of " false- necked " jars imported from the ^Egean have been found; and they belong not to the earlier, but to the later, period of Mycenaean pottery. But Egyptian evidence is found not only on Egyptian soil, but on both sides of the ^Egean. Three pieces of porcelain, one in- scribed with the name, the two others with the " cartouche," of Amenhotep III. of Egypt (before 1400 b.c), and a scarab with the name of his wife, have been found in the chamber-tombs of Mycenae; and a scarab of the same Amenhotep was discovered in the burying-place of Ialysus in Rhodes. It would follow that in the fifteenth century, at latest, the period of the chamber-tombs and the vaulted tombs began. The joint witness of these and other independent pieces of evi- dence proves that the civilization of which Mycenae and Cnossus were principal centers was flourishing from the sixteenth to the thirteenth century. Such was the world which the Greeks had come to share, and soon to transform, on the borders of the ^Egean Sea. It was a world created by folk who belonged to the European race which had been from of old in possession of this corner of the earth. Greek civilization, it is well to repeat, was simply a continuation and supreme development of that more primitive civilization of which we caught glimpses before the bronze age began. There is no reason to suppose that these peoples were designated by any common name; there were, doubtless, many different peoples with different names which are unknown to us. We know that there were Pelasgians inThessaly and in Attica; tradition suggests that the Arcadians were Pelasgians, too. But it is probable that all these peoples, both on the mainland of Greece and in the ^Egean islands, belonged to the same non-Aryan race, — a dark- c i8 THE BEGINNINGS OF GREEK CIVILIZATION haired stock, — which also included the Mysians, the Lydians, the Carians, perhaps the Leleges, on the coast of Asia Minor. There seems little doubt that this prehistoric /Egean world was composed of many small states. Of the relation of these states to one another, of the polit- ical events of the period, we know almost nothing; but the eminent position of " golden " Mycenae her- self seems to be estab- lished. Her comparative wealth is indicated by the treasures of her tombs, which exceed all treasures found elsewhere in the i^gean. But her lords were not only rich ; their power stretched beyond their immediate territory. This fact may be inferred from the road system which connected Mycenae with Corinth, and must have been constructed by one of her kings. Three narrow but stoutly built highways have been traced, the two western joining at Cleonae, the eastern going byTenea. They rest on substructions of "Cyclopean" masonry; streams are bridged and rocks are hewn through; and as they were not wide enough for wagons, the wares of Mycenae were probably carried to the Isthmus on the backs of mules. There was an active sea-trade in the JLgean — a sea-trade (CHonikal?^ ^JUa*i^V>yj*rgOS/.;.-:::.-::-. % (Cheli) UU( HXAION ENGLISH MILES The Argive Plain INFERENCES FROM RELICS OF ^GEAN CIVILIZATION 19 which reached to the Troad and to Egypt ; but there is no proof that Mycenae was a naval power. Everything points to Crete as the queen of the seas in this age, and to Cretan merchants as the carriers of the ^Egean world. The predominance of Crete sur- vived in the memories of Minos, whom tradition exalted as a mighty sea-king who cleared the ^Egean of pirates and founded a mari- time power. Painted Tombstone with Warriors (Mycenae, Lower Town) The discoveries made by excavation on the hill of Cnossus show that this tradition embodied historical fact. The remains of the great palace testify, as we have seen, to a dynasty, lasting for two hundred years, of rich sea-kings. That period of Cnossian power had begun by the commencement of the fifteenth, and endured into the thirteenth century, though perhaps hardly be- yond. It seems at least probable that the destruction of Cnossus occurred before the destruction of Mycenae. 20 THE BEGINNINGS OF GREEK CIVILIZATION Of the power and resources of the ^Egean states, the monuments hardly enable us to form an absolute idea. They were small, as we saw; it was an age When men might cross a kingdom in a day. The kings had slaves to toil for them; the fortresses and the large tombs were assuredly built by the hands of thralls. One fact shows in a striking way how small were these kingdoms, and how slender their means, compared with the powerful realms of Egypt and the Orient. If Babylonian or Egyptian monarchs, with their command of slave-labor, had ruled in Greece, they would assuredly have cut a canal across the Isthmus and promoted facilities for commerce by joining the eastern with the western sea. REFERENCES FOR SUPPLEMENTARY READING (Syllabus, 1 73-74) 1. Geographical Features. Tozer, A. M., Classical Geography, 63-92. Holm, A., History of Greece, I, ii. Curtius, E., History of Greece, I, ii. 2. The People. Bury, J. B., History of Greece, 6-39. Mahaffy, J. P., Survey of Greek Civilization, 22-40. Gardner, P., New Chapters in Greek History, iv. Sources. Herodotus, I, chs. 56, 57, 146. 1 A History Syllabus for Secondary Schools prepared by a Special Committee of the New England History Teachers' Association. D. C. Heath & Co. Boston, 1904. This syllabus contains a good analysis and a list of topics. CHAPTER II THE GREEK CONQUEST AND THE HOMERIC AGE i. The Greek Conquest. — It must not be supposed that the non-Aryan ^Egean population was either exterminated or wholly enthralled by the Aryan Greek invaders. In the first place, the invaders were not wholly Aryan, though they had men of Aryan blood among them, from whom they had taken their institutions, some of their gods, and their tongue. They were all men of Aryan speech, not all of Aryan stock. Secondly, though the older tongues disappeared entirely, that is due to the character of the Greek language, which, as later history shows, was vigorous and master- ful. Wherever the Greeks settled, it became the language of the land. And so, in Greece itself, sometimes the Greeks came in as conquerors, predominant both in numbers and power, sometimes merely as settlers; but everywhere the country was Graecized. In Attica and Arcadia, for example, there was little disturbance of the original inhabitants, and tradition preserved the fact in various myths pointing to the antiquity of the two races (avroxOoves). Thus what took place was not a single irruption, but a gradual infiltration of a new stock into an older one, carrying the intro- duction of a new language. By some cause the Greeks were being pressed southward from their home in the northwest of the Balkan peninsula ; while at the same time — perhaps from a kindred reason — the Phrygians and Trojans, who dwelt in western Mace- donia and southern Thrace, were moving eastward and across the straits into Asia Minor. And this process, so far as the Greeks were concerned, extended on over centuries. The northwestern lands of Epirus, Acarnania, and ^Etolia were certainly lands of 21 22 THE GREEK CONQUEST AND THE HOMERIC AGE Greek speech many years before the conquest of the Peloponnesus. But it need not be supposed that northern Greece was completely overspread by the Greeks before they began to pass into the south- ern peninsula. The first Greek settlers of the Peloponnesus must have crossed by boat from the northwest shore of the Corinthian Gulf; and the countries afterward called Achaea, Elis, andMes- senia, together with the Arcadian highlands, had at least begun to be hellenized sooner than Laconia and Argolis. The Greeks reached Argolis from the eastern side. From Thessaly the new people spread southward along the eastern coast to Eubcea, and the shores of Attica, to the Cyclad islands, and lastly to Argolis. Other settlers penetrated into the fertile mountain-girt country afterward to be called Bceotia. Some of these were perhaps the Minyae, who inhabited Orchomenus in the heroic age, though again this may have been the name of the natives whom the Greeks hellenized. In Attica some of the settlements seem to have been made by a tribe called Iavones or Ionians, and these settled in Argolis also. All this was a long and gradual process. It needed many years for the Greeks to blend with the older inhabitants and hellenize the countries in which they settled. In eastern Greece, where the JEgeari civilization nourished, the influence was reciprocal. While the Greeks gradually imposed their language on the native races, they learned from a civilization which was more advanced than their own. Things shaped themselves differently in different places, according to the number of the Greek settlers and the power and culture of the native people. In some countries, as seemingly in Attica, a small number of Greek strangers leavened the whole population and spread the Greek tongue; thus Attica became Greek, but the greater part of its inhabitants were sprung, not from Greeks, but from the old people who lived there before the Greeks came. In other countries the invaders came in larger numbers, and the inhabitants were forced to make way for them. We may say, at all events, that there was a time for most lands in Greece EXPANSION OF THE GREEKS TO EASTERN ^EGEAN 23 when the Greek strangers and the native people lived side by side, speaking each their own tongue and exercising a mutual influence which was to end in the fusion of blood, out of which the Greeks of history sprang. No reasonable system of chronology can avoid the conclusion that Greeks had already begun to settle in the area of ^Sgean civilization, when the JEgesai civilization of the bronze age was at 1500-1000 its height. Coming by driblets, they fell under its influence in B,c " a way which could not have been the case if they had swept down in mighty hordes, conquered the land by a few swoops, and de- stroyed or enslaved its peoples. It is another question how far the process of assimilation had already advanced when the lords of Mycenae and.Orchomenus and the other royal strongholds built their hill-tombs ; and it is yet another whether any of these lords belonged to the race of the Greek strangers. To these questions we can give no positive answers ; but this much we know : in the twelfth century, if not sooner, the Greeks began to expand in a new direction, eastward beyond the sea; and they bore with them to the coast of Asia the iEgean civilization. That civiliza- tion is what we find described in pictures of the heroic age of Greece. 2. Expansion of the Greeks to the Eastern jEgean. — (1) sEolians. — The first Greeks who sailed across the i^Egean .were the Achaeans and their fellows from the hills and plains of Thessaly and the plain of the Spercheus. Along with the Achaeans there sailed as comrades and allies the Cohans. It was to the northern part of Asia Minor, the island of Lesbos and the opposite shores, that the Achaean and JEolisui adventurers steered their ships, and here they planted the first Hellenic settlements on Asiatic soil. The coast-lands of western Asia Minor are, like Greece itself, suitable for the habitations of a seafaring people. A series of river-valleys are divided by mountain chains which run out into promontories so as to form deep bays; and the promontories are continued in islands. The Greek invaders won the coast-lands 24 THE GREEK CONQUEST AND THE HOMERIC AGE from the Mysian natives, and seized a number of strong places which they could defend, — such as Cyme, ^Egae, Old Smyrna. They pressed up the rivers, and on the Hermus they founded Magnesia under Mount Sipylus. The Greeks made no settlement in the Troad. But in occupying the country south of the Troad, they came into collision with the great Phrygian town of Troy, or Ilios, as it was called from King Ilos, who perhaps was its founder. There were weary wars. Then the mighty fortress fell; and we need not doubt the truth of the legend which records that it fell through Grecian craft or valor. The Phrygian power and the lofty stronghold of " sacred Ilios " made a deep impression on the souls of the Greek invaders; and the strife, on whatever scale it really was, blended by their imagination with the old legends of their gods, inspired the Achaean minstrels with new songs. Through their minstrelsy the struggle between the Phrygians and the Greek settlers assumed the pro- portion of a common expedition of all the peoples of Greece against the town of Troy; and the Trojan war established itself in the belief of the Greeks as the first great episode in the everlasting debate between east and west. It is to be observed that the Greeks and Phrygians in that age do not seem to have felt that they were severed by any great con- trast of race or manners. They were conscious, perhaps, of an affinity in language; and they had the same kind of civilization. This fact comes out in the Homeric poems, where, though some specially Phrygian features are recognized, the Trojans might be a Greek folk and their heroes have Greek names ; 1 and it bears witness to the constant intercourse between the Achaean colonists and their Phrygian neighbors. (2) Ionians. — The Achaean wave of emigration was succeeded by an Ionian wave, flowing mainly from the coasts of Attica and Argolis, and new settlements were planted, south of the elder Achaean settlements. The two-pronged, peninsula between the 1 Paris (Phrygian) = Alexander (Greek) is an instance of a double name. EXPANSION OF THE GREEKS TO EASTERN ^GEAN 25 Hermus and Cayster rivers, with the off-lying isle of Chios, the valleys of the Cayster and Maeander, with Samos and the peninsula south of Mount Latmos, were studded with communities which came to form a group distinct from the older group in the north. Of the foundation of the famous colonies of Ionia, of the order in which they were founded, and of the relations of the settlers with the Lydian natives, we know little. Clazomenae and Teos arose on the north and south sides of the neck of the peninsula which runs out to meet Chios; and Chios, on the east coast of her island, faces Erythrae on the mainland — Erythrae, " the crimson," so called from its purple fisheries, the resort of Tyrian traders. Lebedus and Colophon lie on the coast as it retires eastward from Teos to reach the mouth of the Cayster; and there was founded Ephesus, the city of Artemis. South of Ephesus and on the northern slope of Mount Mycale was the religious gathering-place of the Ionians, the temple of the Heliconian Poseidon, which, when once the Ionians became conscious of themselves as a sort of nation and learned to glory in their common name, served to fos- ter a sense of unity among all their cities, from Phocaea in the north to Miletus in the south. There was one great inland city, Mag- nesia on the Maeander, which must not be confused with the inland iEolian city, Magnesia on the Hermus. The Greek settlers brought with them their poetry and their civilization to the shores of Asia. Their civilization is revealed to us in their poetry, and we find that it resembles in its main features the civilization which has been laid bare in the ruins of Mycenae and other places in elder Greece. The Homeric poems show us, in fact, a later stage of the civilization of the heroic age. The Homeric palace is built on the same general plan as the palaces that have been found at Mycenae and Tiryns, at Troy, and in the Copaic Lake. The blue inlaid frieze in the vestibule of the hall of Tiryns proves that the poet's frieze of cyanus in the hall of Alcinous was not a fancy; and he describes as the cup of Nestor a gold cup with doves perched on the handles, such as one which was found 26 THE GREEK CONQUEST AND THE HOMERIC AGE in a royal tomb at Mycenae. There is, indeed, one striking differ- ence in custom. The Mycenaean tombs reveal no trace of the habit of burning the dead, which the Homeric Greeks invariably prac- ticed; while the poems ignore the practice of burial. In later times both customs existed in Greece side by side. Gold Cup, with Doves (Mycenae) It follows, first, that by the twelfth century the Greeks had assimilated the civilization of the iEgean. Secondly, that what- ever fate befell the Mycenaean civilization in the mother-country, it continued without a break in the new Greece beyond the seas, and developed into that luxurious Ionian civilization which meets THE LATER WAVE OF GREEK INVASION 2J us some centuries later. New elements were added in the mean- time; intercourse with Phrygia and Syria, for example, brought new influences to bear; but the permanent framework was the heritage from the ancient folk of the ^Egean. 3. The Later Wave of Greek Invasion. — The colonization of the Asiatic coasts and islands extended over some hundreds of years, and it was doubtless accelerated and promoted at certain stages of its progress by the changes which were happening in the mother-country. The ultimate cause of these movements, which affected almost the whole of Greece from north to south, was probably the pressure of the Illyrians. (1) JEtolia. — This downward pressure was fatal to ^Etolia. In the Homeric poems we see that "Pleuron by the sea and rocky Calydon " and the other strong cities of that region were abreast of the civilization of the heroic age. But in the later ages of Greek history, we find ^Etolia regarded as a half -barbarous country, the abode of men who spoke, indeed, a Greek tongue, but had lagged ages and ages behind the rest of Greece in science and civilization. We find the neighboring countries in the same case. Epirus sud- denly lapsed into comparative barbarism, and the sanctuary of Dodona remained a lonely outpost. The explanation of this falling away is the irruption and conquest by Illyrian invaders, who swamped Greek civilization instead of assimilating it. This invasion naturally drove some of the Greek inhabitants across the gulf, and ^tolian emigrants made their way to the river Peneus, where they settled, took to themselves the name of Eleans or " Dalesmen," and gradually extended their power to the Alpheus. Their land was a tract of downs with a harborless coast, and they never became a maritime power. (2) Thessaly. — In Epirus the pressure of the Illyrians led to two movements of great consequence, the Thessalian and the Boeotian migration. There is nothing to show decisively that these two movements happened at the same time or were connected with each other. A folk, called Thessaloi, crossed the hills and 28 THE GREEK CONQUEST AND THE HOMERIC AGE settled in the western corner of the land which is bounded by Pelion and Pindus. They gained the upper hand and spread their sway over northern Argos. They drove the Achaeans south- ward into the mountains of Phthia, and henceforward these Achaeans play no part of any note in the history of Greece. The Thessalian name soon spread over the whole country, which is called Thessaly to the present day. Crannon, Pagasae, Larisa, and Pherae became the seats of lords who reared horses and governed the surrounding districts. The conquered people were reduced to serfdom and were known as the Laborers (Penestai) ; they cul- tivated the soil, at their own risk, paying a fixed amount to their lords; and they had certain privileges; they could not be sold abroad or arbitrarily put to death. We know almost nothing of the history of the Thessalian kingdoms ; but in later times we find them combined in a very loose political organization, which lay dormant in times of peace; but through which, to meet any emer- gency of war, they could elect a common captain, with the title of tdgos. (3) Achaa. — But all the folk did not remain to fall under the thraldom imposed by the new lords. A portion of the Achaeans migrated southward to the Peloponnesus, probably accompanied by their neighbors the Hellenes, who lived on the upper waters of the river Spercheus. The Achaeans and Hellenes together founded settlements along the strip of coast which forms the south- ern side of the Corinthian Gulf ; and the whole country was called Achaea. Thus there were two Achaean lands, the old Achaea in the north, now shrunk into the mountains of Phthia, and the new Achaea in the south; while in the land which ought to have been the greatest Achaea of all, — the Asiatic land in which the poetry of Europe took shape, — the Achaean name was merged in the less significant title of /Eolis. (4) Bceotia. — The lands of Helicon and Cithaeron experienced a similar shock to that which unsettled and changed the lands of Olympus and Othrys; they were occupied by the Boeotians. Ac- THE DORIAN MIGRATION 29 cording to the Greek account, the Boeotians lived in Thessaly and moved southward in consequence of the Thessalian conquest. They first occupied places in the west of the land which they were to make their own. From Chaeronea and Coronea they won Thebes, which was held by an old folk called the Cadmeans. Thence they sought to spread their power over the whole land. They spread their name over it, for it was called Bceotia, but they did not succeed in winning full domination as rapidly as the Thes- salians succeeded in Thessaly. The rich lords of Orchomenus preserved their independence for hundreds of years, and it was not till the sixth century that anything like a Boeotian unity was established. The polity of the Boeotian conquerors, who were perhaps comparatively few in number, was unlike that of the Thessalians; the conquered communities were not reduced to serfdom. (5) Phocis and Doris. — West of Bceotia, in the land of the Phocians amid the regions of Mount Parnassus, there were changes of a less simple kind. Hither came the Dorians, who probably belonged to the same " northwestern " group of the Greek race as the Thessalians and Boeotians. But the greater part of them soon went forth to seek fairer abodes in distant places. Yet a few re- mained behind in the small basin-like district between Mount Oeta and Mount Parnassus, where they preserved the illustrious Dorian name throughout the course of Grecian history, in which they never played a part. It would seem that the Dorians also took possession of Delphi, the " rocky threshold " of Apollo, and planted some families there who devoted themselves to the service of the god. 4. The Dorian Migration. — The departure of the Dorians from the regions of Parnassus was probably gradual, and it was accomplished by sea. They built ships — perhaps the name of Naupactus, " the place of the ship-building," is a record of their ventures; and they sailed round the Peloponnesus to the south- eastern parts of Greece. Some sailed to Crete, others to the south- 30 THE GREEK CONQUEST AND THE HOMERIC AGE ern coast of Asia Minor, where, though taking little part in the his- tory of Hellas, they preserved their Hellenic speech. (i) Laconia. — The next conquests of the Dorians were in the Peloponnesus. There were three distinct conquests — the con- quest of Laconia, the conquest of Argolis, the conquest of Corinth. The Dorians took possession of the rich vale of the Eurotas, over- threw the lords of Amyclae, and, keeping their own Dorian stock pure from the mixture of alien blood, reduced all the inhabitants to the condition of subjects. It seems probable that the Dorian invaders who subdued Laconia were more numerous than the Dorian invaders elsewhere. The eminent quality which distin- guished the Dorian from other branches of the Greek race was that which we call" character "; and it was in Laconia that this quality most fully displayed and developed itself, for here the Dorian seems to have remained more purely Dorian. (2) Argolis. — In Argolis the course of things ran otherwise. The invaders, who landed under a king named Temenos, had doubt- less a hard fight; but their conquest took the shape, not of subjec- tion, but of amalgamation. It is to the time of this conquest that the overthrow of Mycenae may best be referred; and here, as in the case of Amyclae, it seems probable that the old native dynasty had already given place to Greek lords. Certain is it that both Mycenae and Tiryns were destroyed suddenly and set on fire. Henceforward Argos under her lofty citadel was to be queen of the Argive plain. (3) Corinth. — Dorian ships were also rowed up the Saronic Gulf. It was the adventure of a prince whom the legend calls Errant, the son of Rider ('AXr/r^s, son of 'l-rnroT-qs) . He landed in the Isthmus and seized the high hill of Acrocorinth, the key of the peninsula. This was the making of Corinth. Here, as in Argolis, there was no subjection, no distinction between the con- querors and the conquered. The geographical position of Cor- inth between her seas determined for her people a career of com- merce, and her history shows that the Dorians had the qualities HOMER 3 I of bold and skilful traders. For a time Corinth seems to have been dependent on Argos, whose power was predominant in the eastern Peloponnesus for more than three hundred years. From Argos the Dorians made two important settlements in the north, on the river Asopus — Sicyon on its lower, and Phlius on its upper, banks. And beyond Mount Geraneia, another Dorian city arose, called Megara, " the Palace," on the commanding hill which looks down upon the western shore of Salamis. The conquest of the eastern Peloponnesus was followed by a second Dorian colonization of the Asiatic coast. The bold prom- ontories below Miletus, the islands of Cos and Rhodes, were oc- cupied by colonists from Argolis, Laconia, Corinth, and Crete. On the mainland Halicarnassus was the most important Dorian settlement, but it was formed in concert with the Carian natives, and was half Carian. As for the chronology of all these movements which went to the making of historical Greece, we must be content with approxi- mate limits: — Achaean colonization Fall of Cnossus Fall of Troy Beginnings of Ionian colonization Thessalian conquest Boeotian conquest Dorian conquest of Crete and islands Dorian conquest of eastern Peloponnesus Colonization of Cyprus . . . .nth century. Continuation of Ionian colonization . ioth century. Dorian colonization of Asia Minor . . ioth century. 5. Homer. — No Greek folk has laid Europe under a greater debt of gratitude than the Achaeans, for the Achaeans originated epic poetry, and the beginning of European literature goes back to them. But their European epic was created on Asiatic soil. They brought with them to Asia old poetic tales which figured the strife of night and day, of winter and summer, and all nature's i3th-ioth centuries. 32 THE GREEK CONQUEST AND THE HOMERIC AGE great processes. And, stimulated by the toils and adventures of settling in a new land, they began to retell these old tales, chang- ing them into historical myths. Achilles may be a sea-god, Agamemnon (who was worshipped as Zeus Agamemnon at Sparta) a god of the sky. Achilles is his foe, as he is also of Memnon, the sun-god, whom he slays. But an event of actual history is intro- duced as the motive of the wrath of Achilles. He is wroth for the sake of Briseis, a Lesbian captive, and the taking of Bresa was an actual event. When legend and, history began to be blended, the element of history triumphed, and the nature-myth dropped out of sight. In the early days the Trojan story seems to have ended with the death of Hector. The original conception was not the tale of a siege which found its consummation in the fall of the fortress; the siege was rather the setting for the strife between Agamemnon and Achilles, between Achilles and Hector. The story of Troy's fall and the wooden horse is a later invention. It was, perhaps, in the eleventh century, at Smyrna or some other i^olian town, that the nucleus of the Iliad was composed, on the basis of those older lays, by a poet whom we may call the first Homer, though it is not probable that he was the poet who truly bore that name. He sang in the Achaean, or as it came to be called the ^Eolian, tongue. His poem was the wrath of Achilles and the death of Hector, and it forms only the smaller part of the Iliad. It was not till the ninth century that the Iliad really came into being. Then a poet of supreme genius arose, and it may be that he was the singer whose name was actually Homer. He composed his poetry in rugged Chios, and he gives us a local touch when he describes the sun as rising over the sea. He took in hand the older poem of the wrath of Achilles and expanded it into the shape and compass of the greater part of the Iliad. He is the poet who created one of the noblest episodes in the whole epic, Priam's ransoming of Hector. Tradition made Homer the author of both the great epics, the Odyssey as well as the Iliad. HOMER 33 This is not probable. It can hardly have been before the eighth century that the old lays of the wandering of Odysseus and the slaying of the suitors were taken in hand and wrought into a large poem. We may suppose, then, that Homer lived at Chios in the ninth century, and was the true author of the Iliad. He did not give it the exact shape in which it was ultimately transmitted; for it received from his successors in the art additions and extensions which were not entirely to its advantage. But it was he, to all seeming, who first conceived and wrought out the idea of a mighty epic. He was no mere stringer together of ancient lays. He took the motives, he caught the spirit, of the older poems; he wove them into the fabric of his own composition; but he was himself as divinely inspired as any of the older minstrels. He was the father of epic poetry, in the sense in which we distinguish an epic poem with a large argument from a short song. He and his succes- sors sang in Ionia, and rewrote the poems in Ionian dialect, though sometimes for the sake of meter they were obliged to keep the iEolian form. But in rewriting they sought to reproduce, not the atmosphere of their own age, but that which was familiar to the original writers of the songs. For example, the weapons and gear described are those of the bronze age; but now and then a slip betrays the later hand. Unwittingly, the poet of the Odyssey allows it to escape that he lived in the iron age, for such a proverb as " the mere gleam of iron lures a man to strife " could not have arisen until iron weapons had been long in use. In the course of time the Trojan War began to assume the shape of a great national enterprise. All the Greeks looked back to it with pride; all desired to have some share in its glory. Conse- quently, a great many stories were invented in various communities for the purpose of bringing their ancestors into connection with the Trojan expedition. And the Iliad was regarded as something of far greater significance than an Ionian poem ; it was accepted as a national epic, and was, from the first, a powerful influence in D 34 THE GREEK CONQUEST AND THE HOMERIC AGE promoting among the Greeks community of feeling and tendencies toward national unity. For two hundred years after its birth the Iliad went on gathering additions ; and the bards were not un- ready to make insertions in order to satisfy the pride of the princely and noble families at whose courts they sang. Finally, in the seventh century, the Catalogue of the Greek host was composed, formulating explicitly the Panhellenic character of the expedition against Troy. The Odyssey, affiliated as it was to the Trojan legend, became a national epic, too. And the interest awakened in Greece by the idea of the Trojan War was displayed by the composition of a series of epic poems, dealing with those events of the siege which hap- pened both before and after the events described in the Iliad, and with the subsequent history of some of the Greek heroes. These poems were anonymous for the most part, and passed under the name of Homer. Along with the Iliad and Odyssey, they formed a chronological series which came to be known as the Epic Cycle. 6. Political and Social Organization of the Early Greeks. — The Homeric poems give us our earliest glimpse of the working of those political institutions which lie at the base of all the constitutions of Europe. They show us the King at the head. But he does not govern wholly of his own will; he is guided by a Council of the chief men of the community whom he consults; and the de- cisions of the council and king deliberating together are brought before the Assembly of the whole people. Out of these three ele- ments — King, Council, and Assembly — the constitutions of Europe have grown ; here are the germs of all the various forms of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. But in the most ancient times this political organization was weak and loose. The true power in primitive society was the family. When we first meet the Greeks, they live together in family communities. Their villages are habitations of a genos; that is, of a clan, or family in a wide sense, — all the members being descended from a common ancestor and bound together by the POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF GREEKS 35 tie of blood. Originally, the chief of the family had the power of life and death over those who belonged to the family; and it was only as the authority of the state grew and asserted itself against the comparative independence of the family, that this power gradually passed away. But the village communities were not isolated and independent; they were part of a larger community which is called the phyle or tribe. The tribe was the whole people of the kingdom, in the kingdom's simplest form; and the territory which the tribe inhabited was called its t deme (8^/xo?). When a king became powerful and won sway over the demes of neighbor- ing kings, a community consisting of more than one tribe would arise. It was usual for several families to group themselves together into a society called a phratra or brotherhood, which had certain common religious usages. The significance of the brotherhood is illustrated by Homer's description of an outcast, as one who has no " brothers " and no hearth. The importance of the family is most vividly shown in the man- ner in which the Greeks possessed the lands which they conquered. The soil did not become the private property of individual free- men, nor yet the public property of the whole community. The king of the tribe or tribes marked out the whole territory into par- cels, according to the number of families in the community; and the families cast lots for the estates. Each family then possessed its own estate; the land belonged to the whole kin, but not to any particular member. The right of property in land seems to have been based, not on the right of conquest, but on a religious senti- ment. Each family buried their dead within their own domain; and it was held that the dead possessed forever and ever the soil where they lay, and that the land round about a sepulcher belonged rightfully to their living kinsfolk, one of whose highest duties was to protect and tend the tombs of their fathers. The king was at once the chief priest, the chief judge, and the supreme leader of the tribe. He belonged to a family which 36 THE GREEK CONQUEST AND THE HOMERIC AGE claimed descent from the gods themselves. His relation to his people was conceived as that of a protecting deity; " he was revered as a god in the deme." The kingship passed from sire to son, but it is probable that the people might refuse to accept a degenerate son who was unequal to the tasks that his father had fulfilled. The sceptered king had various privileges — the seat of honor at feasts, a large and choice share of booty taken in war and of food offered at sacrifices. A special area of land was marked out and set apart for him as a royal domain, distinct from that which his family owned. A king had no power to enforce his will, if it did not meet the approval of the heads of the people. He must always look for the consent and seek the opinion of the deliberative Council of the Elders. Certain families had come to hold a privileged posi- tion above the others — had, in fact, been marked out as noble, and claimed descent from Zeus; and the Council was composed of this nobility. In the puissant authority of this Council of Elders lay the germ of future aristocracy. More important than either king or council for the future growth of Greece was the gathering of the people, out of which democracy was to spring. All the freemen of the tribe — all the freemen of the nation, when more tribes had been united — met together, not at stated times, but whenever the king summoned them, to hear and acclaim what he and his councillors proposed, — ■ to hear and acclaim, but not to debate or propose, themselves. As yet, the gathering of the folk for purposes of policy had not been differentiated from the gathering for the purpose of war. The Assembly was not yet distinguished as an institution from the army; and if Agamemnon summons his host to declare his resolutions in the plain of Troy, such a gathering is the Agora in no figurative sense: it is in the fullest sense the Assembly of the people. Though the monarchy of this primitive form, as we find it re- flected in the Homeric lays, generally passed away, and was POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF GREEKS 37 already passing away when the latest lays were written, it sur- vived in a few outlying regions which lagged behind the rest of the Hellenic world in political development. Thus the Macedonian Greeks in the lower valley of the Axius retained a constitution of the old Homeric type till the latest times — the royal power con- tinually growing. The constitutional fabric of the Greek states was thus simple and loose in the days of Homer. In the later part of the royal period a new movement was setting in, which was to decide the future of Greek history. The city began to emerge and take form and shape out of the loose aggregate of villages. The inhabitants of a plain or valley were induced to leave their scattered villages and make their dwellings side by side in one place, which would gen- erally be under the shadow of the king's fortress. Sometimes the group of villages would be girt by a wall ; sometimes the protection of the castle above would be deemed enough. The movement was promoted by the kings; and it is probable that strong kings often brought it about by compulsion. But in promoting it they were unwittingly undermining the monarchical constitution, and paving the way for their own abolition. A city-state naturally tends to be a republic. In the heroic age, then, and even in the later days when the Homeric poems were composed, the state had not fully emerged from the society. No laws were enacted and maintained by the state. Those ordinances and usages (^c/xto-re?) which guided the individual man in his conduct, and which are necessary for the preservation of any society, were maintained by the sanction of religion. There were certain crimes which the gods punished. But it was for the family, not for the whole community, to deal with the shedder of blood. The justice which the king adminis- tered was really arbitration. A stranger had no right of protec- tion, and might be slain in a foreign community, unless he was bound by the bond of guest friendship with a member of that community, and then he came under the protection of Zeus, the 38 THE GREEK CONQUEST AND THE HOMERIC AGE Hospitable (Xenios). Wealth in these ages consisted of herds and flocks; the value of a suit of armor, for instance, or a slave was expressed in oxen. Piracy was a common trade, as was inevitable in a period when there was no organized maritime power strong enough to put it down. So many practiced this means of liveli- hood that it bore no reproach; and when seamen landed on a strange strand, the natural question to ask them was: " Outlanders, whence come ye ? are ye robbers that rove the seas ? " 7. Fall of Greek Monarchies and Rise of the Republics. — Under their kings the Greeks had conquered the coasts and islands of the yEgean, and had created the city-state. These were the two great contributions of monarchy to Grecian history. Throughout the greater part of Greece in the eighth century, the monarchies were declining and disappearing, and republics were taking their place. It is a transformation of which we can only guess at probable causes ; but we may be sure that the deepest cause of all was the change to city life. In some cases, gross misrule may have led to the violent deposition of a king; in other cases, if the succession to the scepter devolved upon an infant or a paltry man, the nobles may have taken it upon themselves to abolish the monarchy. In some cases, the rights of the king might be strictly limited, in con- sequence of his seeking to usurp undue authority; and the im- position of limitations might go on until the office of king, although maintained in name, became in fact a mere magistracy in a state wherein the real power had passed elsewhere. Of the sur- vival of monarchy in a limited form, we have an example at Sparta; of its survival as a mere magistracy, in the Archon Basileas at Athens. Where the monarchy was abolished, the government passed into the hands of those who had done away with it — the noble families of the state. When the nobles assume the government and become the rulers, an aristocratic republic arises. Sometimes the power was won, not by the whole body of the noble clans, but by the clan to which the king belonged. This was the case at PHCENIC1AN INTERCOURSE WITH GREECE 39 Corinth, where the royal family of the Bacchiads became an oli- garchy of the narrowest form. At this stage of society, birth was the best general test of ex- cellence that could be found, and the rule of the nobles was a true aristocracy, the government of the most excellent. They practiced the craft of ruling; they were trained in it, they handed it down from father to son ; and though no great men arose, — great men are dangerous in an aristocracy, — the government was con- ducted with knowledge and skill. Close aristocracies, like the Corinthian, were apt to become oppressive. But on the whole the Greek republics flourished in the aristocratic stage, and were guided with eminent ability. The two great achievements of the aristocratic age were the planting of Greek cities in lands far beyond the limits of the /Egean Sea, and the elaboration of political machinery. The first of these was simply the continuation of the expansion of the Greeks around the ^Egean itself; it was systematically promoted by the aris- tocracies, and it took a systematic shape. The creation of political machinery carried on the work of consolidation which the kings had begun when they gathered together into cities the loose ele- ments of their states. When royalty was abolished or given, as it were, to a commission, the ruling families of the republic had to substitute magistracies tenable for limited periods, and had to determine how the magistrates were to be appointed, how their functions were to be circumscribed, how the provinces of authority were to be assigned. New machinery had to be created, to re- place that one of the three parts of the constitution which had disappeared. 8. Phoenician Intercourse with Greece. — The Greeks were destined to become a great seafaring people ; ' but sea-trade was a business which it took them many ages to learn. Their occu- pation of the islands was accompanied by a decline of the mari- time supremacy which the ^gean islanders and especially the Cretans enjoyed; and there was a long interval during which the 40 THE GREEK CONQUEST AND THE HOMERIC AGE trade of the /Egean with the east was partly carried on by strangers. The men who took advantage of this opening were the Phoenicians of the city-states of Sidon and Tyre on the Syrian coast, men of that Semitic stock to which Jew, Arab, and Assyrian alike belonged. The Phoenicians, doubtless, had marts here and there on coast or island ; they certainly had a station at Abdera in Thrace. Their ships were ever winding in and out of the ^gean isles from south to north, bearing fair naperies from Syria, fine-wrought bowls and cups from the workshops of Sidonian and Cypriot silversmiths, and all manner of luxuries and ornaments; and this constant commercial intercourse, lasting for two centuries, is amply sufficient to account for all the influence that Phoenicia exerted upon Greece. One inestimable service the Phoenicians are said to have ren- dered to Hellas, and thereby to Europe. It is generally supposed that they gave the Greeks the most useful instrument of civiliza- tion, the art of writing. If this theory is true, it was perhaps at the beginning of the ninth century, hardly later, that the Phoeni- cian alphabet was moulded to the needs of the Greek language. In this adaptation the Greeks showed their genius. The alphabet of the Phoenicians and their Semitic brethren is an alphabet of consonants; the Greeks added the vowels. They took some of the consonantal symbols for which their own language had no corre- sponding sounds, and used these superfluous signs to represent the vowels. We may suppose that the original idea was worked out in Ionia. In Ionia, at all events, writing was introduced at an early period and was perhaps used by poets of the ninth century. Certain it is that the earliest reference to writing is in the Iliad, in the story of Bellerophon, who carries from Argos to Lycia "deadly symbols (o-^ara \vyp6.) in a folded tablet." It seems simpler to suppose that the poet had in his mind a letter written in the Greek alphabet, than that he was thinking of the old pictorial forms of writing which were employed in ancient times. REFERENCES FOR SUPPLEMENTARY READING 4 1 REFERENCES FOR SUPPLEMENTARY READING (Syllabus, 74~7S) 1. The Greek Conquest and Expansion. Bury, History of Greece, 30-65. Holm, History of Greece, I, xii. 2. Homer. Bury, 65-69. Jebb, R. C, Primer of Greek Literature, 31-37. 3. Homeric Civilization and Religion. Bury, 65-69. Holm, I, 122-134. Curtius, I, 61, 65-70. 4. The Trojan War. Jebb, 2-25. Gayley, Classic Myths, 284-392, 313-335. Sources. Homer, Iliad and Odyssey. For an excellent list of topics based on the Homeric poems, see West, Ancient History, 96. CHAPTER III THE EXPANSION OF GREECE i. Causes and Character of Greek Colonization. — The expan- sion of the Greeks beyond Greece proper and the coasts of the JEgea.n, the planting of Greek colonies on the shores of Thrace and the Black Sea, in Italy and Sicily, even in Spain and Gaul, began in the eighth, and reached its completion in the sixth, cen- tury. It was the continuation of the earlier expansion over the JEgesm islands and the coast of Asia Minor, the details of which are unknown to us. The great difference between Greek and Phoenician colonization is that, while the Phoenicians aimed solely at promoting their commerce, and only a few of their settlements, notably Carthage, became more than mere trading-stations or factories, Greek colonization satisfied other needs than desire of commercial profit. It was the expression of the adventurous spirit which has been poetically reflected in the legends of the " Sailing of the Argo " and the " Home-coming of Odysseus " — the same spirit, not to be expressed in any commercial formula, which prompted English colonization. Trade, of course, sometimes paved the way. The merchants of Miletus, who risked themselves in the dangerous waters of the Euxine, observed natural harbors and inviting sites for cities, and when they returned home, organized parties of settlers. The ad- venturous, the discontented, and the needy were always to be found. But in the case of the early colonies at least, it was not overpopu- lation of the land, so much as the nature of the land system, that drove men to emigrate. In various ways, under the family system, which was ill-suited to independent and adventurous spirits, it 42 CAUSES AND CHARACTER OF GREEK COLONIZATION 43 would come about that individual members were excluded from a share in the common estate, and separated from their kin. Again, the political circumstances of most Greek states in the eighth and seventh centuries favored emigration. We have seen that at this time the aristocratic form of government generally prevailed. There were strong inducements for men to leave their native city, where they were of little account, and to join in the foundation of a new polis where they might themselves rule. In fact, political discontent was an immediate cause of Greek colonization. Wherever the Greek went, he retained his customs and language, and made a Greek "polis." It was as if a bit of Greece were set down on the remote shores of the Euxine or in the far west on the wild coasts of Gaul or Iberia. The colony was a private enter- prise, but the bond of kinship with the " mother-city " was care- fully fostered. Intercourse between colonies and the mother-coun- try was specially kept up at the great religious festivals of the year, and various marks of filial respect were shown by the daughter to the mother. When, as frequently befell, the colony determined herself in turn to throw off a new shoot, it was the recognized custom that she should seek the cecist or leader of the colonists from the mother-city. Thus the Megarian colony, Byzan- tium, when it founded its own colony, Mesembria, must have sought an cecist from Megara. The political importance of colo- nization was sanctified by religion, and it was a necessary formality, whenever a settlement was to be made, to ask the approbation of the Delphic god. The most ancient oracular god of Greece was Zeus of Dodona. But the oak-shrine in the highlands of Epirus was too remote to become the chief oracle of Greece, and the cen- tral position of Delphi enabled the astute priests of the Pythian Apollo to exalt the authority of their god as a true prophet to the supreme place in the Greek world. Colonization tended in two ways to promote a feeling of unity among the Greek peoples. By the wide diffusion of their race on the fringe of barbarous lands, it brought home to them more fully 44 THE EXPANSION OF GREECE the contrast between Greek and barbarian, and, by consequence, the community of the Greeks. The Greek dwellers in Asia Minor were naturally impressed with their own unity in a way which was strange to dwellers in Bceotia or Attica, who were surrounded on all sides by Greeks, and were therefore alive chiefly to local differ- ences. In the second place, colonization led to the association of Greeks of different cities. An cecist who decided to organize a party of colonists could not always find in his own city a sufficient number of men willing to take part in the enterprise. He therefore enlisted comrades from other cities; and thus many colonies were joint undertakings and contained a mixture of citizens of various nationalities. 2. Colonies on the Coasts of the Euxine, Propontis, and North JEge&n. — A mist of obscurity hangs about the beginnings of the SS>y y; ■/ P>"l>o "'is . - ' • ENGLISH MILES 50 100 150 200 *-<-■ ' ■ d t I 40' Colonies in the Pontus and Propontis .BORMAY E. CO., N.Y. first Greek cities which arose on the Pontic shores. Here Miletus was the pioneer. Merchants carrying the stuffs which were manu- factured from the wool of Milesian sheep may have established COLONIES ON THE COASTS 45 trading-stations along the southern coast. But the work of colo- nization beyond the gate of the Bosphorus can hardly have fully begun until the gate itself was secured by the enterprise of Megara, which sent out men, in the first part of the seventh century, to 677 b.c. found the towns of Chalcedon and Byzantium. This is the first appearance of the little state of Megara in Greek history; and none of her contemporaries took a step that was destined to lead to greater things than the settlement on the Bosphorus. Westward from Byzantium they also founded Selymbria, on the north coast of the Propontis; eastward they established " Heraclea in Pontus," 553 B.a on the coast of Bithynia. Greek Colonies in the Northern .-Egean The enterprise of the Megarians stimulated Miletus. At the most northerly point of the southern coast a strait-necked cape forms two natural harbors, an attractive site for settlers, and here the Milesians planted the city Sinope. Farther east arose another Milesian colony, Trapezus. At the Bosphorus the Milesians had been anticipated by Megara, but they partly made up for this by planting Abydus on the Hellespont opposite Sestos, and they also 46 THE EXPANSION OF GREECE seized a jutting promontory on the south coast of the Propontis, where a narrow neck, as at Sinope, forms two harbors. The town was named Cyzicus; the tunny-fish on her coins shows what was one of the chief articles of her trade. Lampsacus, at the northern end of the Hellespont, once a Phoenician factory, was colonized by another Ionian city, Phocaea, about the same time. If Miletus and Megara took the most prominent part in extend- ing the borders of the Greek world eastward of the Hellespont, the northwestern corner of the ^Egean was the special domain of Eubcea. The coast of Macedonia, between the rivers Axius and Strymon, runs out into a huge three-pronged promontory. Here Chalcis planted so many towns that the whole promontory was named Chalcidice. Some of the chief cities, however, were founded by other states, notably Corinthian Potidaea Early ~" c and protection of Athens. This was the beginning of a long friendship. When the retreat of Cleomenes left the Athenian army free to check the Boeotians, who had come in over the pass of Cithaeron, and the Chalcidians, who had crossed the Euripus, the Boeotians moved to join the Chalcidian force. But they were Il8 GROWTH OF ATHENS IN THE SIXTH CENTURY intercepted and thoroughly defeated by the Athenians, who then followed the Chalcidians across the strait, and won another victory so crushing that Chalcis was forced to cede the Lelantine plain. The richest part of this plain was divided into lots among two 506 b.c. thousand Athenian citizens who migrated to Eubcea. Thus the democracy had not only defended itself, but won new territory. TOPICS FOR SUPPLEMENTARY READING (Syllabus, 79) 1. The Tyranny of Pisistratus. Bury, 192-202. Holm, I, 405-419. Abbott, Greece, I, 450-476. 2. The Reforms of Cleisthenes. Bury, 211-215. Holm, I, 421-431. Cox, Greek Statesmen, 61-71. Sources. The Pisistratids, Herodotus, I, 59-64. CHAPTER VII THE ADVANCE OF PERSIA TO THE ^EGEAN i . The Rise of Persia and the Fall of the Lydian Kingdom. — While the Greeks were sailing their own seas, and working out in their city-states the institutions of law and freedom, great despotic kingdoms were waxing and waning in the east. In the seventh century the mighty empire of Assyria was verging to its end; the power destined to overthrow it had arisen. Those who destroyed the Assyrian empire, the Medes and Persians, folk of Aryan speech like the Greeks, were marked out by destiny to be the adversaries of the Greeks throughout the two chief centuries of Grecian history. Toward the end of the eighth century the Medes successfully c. 700 b.c. revolted from Assyria, conquered and formed a union with the Persians who lived in the hilly country to the south, and, in a league with Babylonia, overwhelmed Assyria itself. The con- 606 b.c. querors divided the empire. The southwestern portion up to the borders of Eygpt went to Babylonia; Assyria and the lands stretching westward into Asia Minor were annexed to Media. The conquest of Lydia was the next aim in the expansion of the Median power, and a pretext was found for declaring war. In the sixth year of the war, in the midst of a battle, an eclipse of the sun made such an impression on the minds of the combatants that a peace was concluded. Through a fortunate marriage treaty, the kingdom of Lydia was saved for a generation to enjoy the brilliant period of its history. It was during this period that the kings of Lydia attempted to subdue the Greek cities along the coast, and under Croesus succeeded 119 120 THE ADVANCE OF PERSIA TO THE AEGEAN in adding all but Miletus to their empire. The Greek language spread in Lydia ; the Greek gods were revered ; the Greek oracles were consulted. Hence the Greeks never regarded the Lydians as utter barbarians ; and they always cherished a curious indulgence and sympathy for Croesus, though he had en- Gold Coin of Sardis (Middle of slaved and ruled as despot Sixth Century). Obverse: Forf- , ... , . . . „ n t T ~ J .^ t> ittt d^ the cities of Asiatic Hellas. parts of Lion and Bull. Re- verse: Two Incuse Squares The Ionians had marveled at the treasures of golden Gyges, but the untold wealth of Croesus became proverbial. There is no more striking proof of the political importance of the oracle of Delphi at this period than the golden offerings dedicated by Croesus — offerings richer than even the priestly avarice of the Delphians could have dared to hope for. Having extended his sway to the coast, Croesus conceived the idea of making Lydia a sea-power and conquering the islands. But he was diverted from his design by an event of great moment. His brother-in-law Astyages was hurled from the throne of Media by a hero, who was to become one of the world's mightiest con- querors. The usurper was Cyrus the Great, of the Persian family of the Achsemenids. The fall of Astyages was an opportunity for the ambitious Lydian to turn his arms to the east. Desirous of probing the hidden event of the future, he consulted the Delphic oracle. It is said that the answer was that if he crossed the Halys, he would destroy a mighty empire. Croesus, at the head of an army which included a force of Ionian Greeks, crossed the fateful Halys and invaded Cappadocia. But the host of Cyrus seems to have been far superior in numbers, and Croesus retired before him into Lydia. 546 b.c. Under the walls of the capital the invader won a decisive victory, and after a short siege Sardis was stormed and plundered. The life of Croesus was spared. THE RISE OF PERSIA 121 The overthrow of Croesus was the most illustrious example that the Greeks had ever witnessed of their favorite doctrine that the gods visit with jealousy men who enjoy too great prosperity. And never more than for the memory of Croesus did Greece put Crcesus on the Pyre (Attic Vase) forth the power which she possessed in such full measure, of weaving round an event of history tales which have a deep and touching import as lessons for the life of men. Cyrus built a great pyre — so the story is told by Herodotus — 122 THE ADVANCE OF PERSIA TO THE ^EGEAN and placed thereon Crcesus bound in chains, with fourteen Lydian boys. And as Crcesus was standing on the pile, in this extreme pass, there came into his mind a word which Solon had said to him, that no man could be called happy so long as he was alive. For the Athenian statesman had visited the court of Sardis in his travels, — the art of the tale-weaver had no precise regard for the facts of time, — and when he had seen the royal treasures and the greatness of the kingdom, Crcesus asked him whom he deemed the happiest of men. Solon named some obscure Greeks who were dead ; and when the king, unable to hide his wonder and vexation, exclaimed, " Is our royal fortune so poor, O Athenian stranger, that you set private men before me? " the wise Greek had dis- coursed on the uncertainty of life and the jealousy of the gods. And so Crcesus, remembering this, groaned aloud and called thrice on the name of Solon. But Cyrus heard him call, and bade the interpreters ask him on whom he was calling. For a while Crcesus would not speak, then he said, " One whom I would that all tyrants might meet and converse with." Pressed further, he named Solon the Athenian, and repeated the wise man's words. The pyre was already alight, but when Cyrus heard the answer of his prisoner, he reflected that he too was a man, and commanded that the fire should be quenched and the victims set free. The flames were already blazing so strong and high that the men could not quench them. Then Crcesus cried to Apollo for help, and the god sent clouds into the clear sky, and a tempestuous shower of rain extinguished the fire. Such is the tale as we read it in the history of Herodotus. The moral of the tale clearly was, Bring gifts to Delphi; and we can hardly doubt that it originated under Delphic influence. 2. The Persian Conquest of Asiatic Greece, and Egypt. — When the barrier of Lydia was swept away, a new period opened in Grecian history. The Asiatic Greeks were to exchange sub- jection to a lord of Sardis for subjection to a potentate who held his court in Susa, a city so distant that the length of the journey FIRST YEARS OF DARIUS. CONQUEST OF THRACE 1 23 was told by months. The king was obliged to leave his conquests in Asia Minor to the government of his satraps ; and the Greeks were unable to exercise any influence upon him, as they might have done if he had ruled from Sardis or some nearer capital. They were an easy prey. Harpagus, the general of Cyrus, reduced them one after another; tribute was imposed upon them and the burden of serving in the Persian armies, when such service was required; but no restrictions were placed upon the freedom of their commerce. The conqueror of Lydia returned to the east to subdue the mightier power of Babylon. But his conquests lie outside our history. His last enterprise was the subjugation of the Massagetae, a Scythian folk near the Aral lake, and one story says that he was slain in battle against them, and that the savage queen placed his c . 530 b.c. head in a basin of blood. While Cyrus far outpassed the utmost limits of Assyria in some directions, he left unconquered the great kingdom of the south, which had once been part of the Assyrian empire. But his son Cambyses repaired the omission. The conquest of Egypt, which became a Persian satrapy, led to the submission of Greek Cyrene. 3. The First Years of Darius. Conquest of Thrace. — King Cambyses, returning from Egypt to put down a usurper, " found 522 b.c. death by his own hand," as is related. The next heir to the Persian throne was a certain Hystaspes, who had a son named Darius. Hystaspes made no attempt to secure his right, but Darius had different thoughts from his father; and conspiring with six nobles, he killed the usurper and became king himself. Darius divided his whole realm into twenty satrapies. West of the Halys, the old kingdom of Lydia consisted of three provinces, but subject to two satraps : the Ionian and the Lydian under one governor who resided at Sardis; the Phrygian, which included the Greek cities of the Propontis, under a governor whose seat was at Dascylion. These satraps did not interfere in the local affairs of the Greek cities, which were ruled by despots; and the despots 124 FIRST YEARS OF DARIUS. CONQUEST OF THRACE 125 might do much as they pleased, so long as they paid tribute duly and furnished military contingents when required. Commerce was furthered by the monetary reforms of Darius, and the chief piece of Persian gold money was always known in Greece by the name daric. Cyrus had conquered the eastern coasts of the Mediterranean ; Cambyses had completed and secured that conquest on the south side by the subjection of Egypt ; it remained for Darius to complete and secure his empire on the north side by the reduction of Thrace. The Thracian race was warlike and the country is mountainous, so that the Persian enterprise demanded large forces and careful precautions. A large fleet was furnished by the Greek subjects c. 511 b.c of Persia, to sail along the Thracian coast of the Black Sea as far as the mouths of the Danube, and to support and cooperate with the army. The contingents of the various Greek cities were com- manded by their despots, prominent among whom were Histiaeus of Miletus, and Miltiades of the Thracian Chersonesus. No details of the warfare in Thrace are preserved. The Greek fleet sailed up the mouth of the Danube, and a bridge of boats was thrown across. Darius and his army marched over into Scythia. But both the king's purpose and what he did, in this remote corner of the world, are hidden in a cloud of legend. It appears that his communications with the fleet which awaited his return were for some time cut off, and the Greek commanders were tempted to sail away and leave him in the lurch. But the fact is that it would have been entirely contrary to their own interests to inflict a blow on the power which maintained despotism in the Greek cities of Asia Minor. The European expedition of Darius was a distinct success. But it has come down to us in a totally fabulous shape. It is repre- sented by Herodotus as not primarily an expedition against Thrace, but as an attempt to execute the mad project of incor- porating the Scythians of the steppes of southern Russia in the Persian empire. Darius, whose purpose is said to have been to 126 THE ADVANCE OF PERSIA TO THE ^EGEAN take vengeance on the Scythians for their invasion of Media a hundred years before, intended to break down the bridge when he had passed over the Danube and send the ships home; but by the advice of a prudent Greek, he changed his plan. He took a cord, in which he tied sixty knots, and said to the Greek captains: " Untie one of these knots every day, and remain here and guard the bridge till they are all untied. If I have not returned at the end of that time, sail home." The Ionians waited at the river beyond the ordained time, and presently a band of Scythians arrived, urging them to destroy the bridge, so that they might insure the destruction of Darius and gain their own freedom. Miltiades, the tyrant of the Chersonese, strongly advocated the proposal of the Scythians, but the counter-arguments of Histiaeus of Miletus prevailed, for he pointed out that the power of the despots in the cities depended on the Persian domination. Thus Darius, after an ignominious retreat, was saved by the good offices of Histiaeus; whereas, if the advice of Miltiades had been adopted, the subse- quent Persian invasion of Greece might never have taken place. Thus Greek imagination, inspired by Greek prejudice, changed a reasonable and successful enterprise into an insane and disas- trous expedition. 4. The Ionic Revolt against Persia. — For twelve years after the return of Darius from Thrace, nothing happened to bring on the struggle between Asia and Europe. Then political strife in the island of Naxos led indirectly to a revolt of the Ionian Greeks from Persia, in which Athens and other cities played a part, and so brought on an expedition against Greece. Histiaeus, tyrant of Miletus, was detained by Darius at Susa, ostensibly because the king could not do without him — really because he was dangerous. Aristagoras, his son-in-law, governed at Miletus. To the latter came oligarchs from Naxos, exiled by a democratic rising, and asking to be restored. Aristagoras went to Sardis, and suggested to the satrap Artaphernes that, under pretext of restoring these men, first Naxos, and then all the Cy- THE IONIC REVOLT AGAINST PERSIA 1 27 clades, might be conquered for Persia. Artaphernes obtained the consent of Darius, and an expedition of two hundred ships 499 B -c was sent out under Aristagoras and the Persian admiral Mega- bates. The commanders quarreled, Megabates warned Naxos, and the islanders were able to defend themselves. Thus the plan of Aristagoras failed, and finding himself in disfavor with the Persians, he decided to head a rebellion of Ionia. As a revolt could not be led by him as tyrant, for the moving force .of re- bellion must be the natural Greek hatred of the despotic constitu- tions which Persia upheld in Ionia as elsewhere, Aristagoras therefore resigned his position as tyrant in Miletus, and in the other cities, also, the tyrants were removed — mostly without bloodshed. The next step was to obtain help from Greece against the Persian power. Aristagoras undertook this mission. At Sparta, according to the story, King Cleomenes refused even to consider the question when he found that the capital of the " Great King " was a three months' journey from the coast. But at Athens and Eretria he fared better. Both these cities sent aid; Athens twenty ships — ships, says Herodotus, "which were the be- ginning of ills between Greeks and barbarians." The Persians had already laid siege to Miletus, when Aris- tagoras, with his Athenian and Eretrian allies, marched up to Sardis. His object was to force the enemy to raise the siege 498 b.c. of Miletus. The Greeks took Sardis, but they did not take the citadel. While they were there, a fire broke out and the town was burned to the ground. The Greeks left the smoking ruins and marched back to the coast ; but near Ephesus they were met by a Persian force and defeated. The Athenians straightway returned home; and with this battle the part played by Athens in the Ionic revolt comes to an end. The burning of Sardis was important only for its consequences. The story is that Darius, being told that Athenians had helped to burn Sardis, asked, " The Athenians — who are they?" He then called for a bow, and shooting an arrow into the air, invoked heaven that it might be 128 THE ADVANCE OF PERSIA TO THE ^GEAN given to him to punish the Athenians. Moreover, he bade one of his slaves to say to him three times at dinner, " Sire, remember the Athenians." The revolt extended southward to Caria and to Cyprus, north- ward to the Propontis. In Cyprus most of the cities threw off the Persian yoke, and a Phoenician fleet was occupied with the recovery of the island. The Hellespontine towns were also subdued. In Caria the insurgents, after suffering two serious defeats, succeeded in destroying a Persian army. The main and decisive event of the war was the siege of Miletus, on which the Persians at length concentrated all their efforts. The town was blockaded by the squadron of six hundred ships which had just re- duced Cyprus. The Greek fleet was stationed off the island of Lade. It is said to have numbered three hundred and fifty- three ships, but they were ill- organized. In the battle which ensued, the Lesbians and Samians deserted; the men of Chios fought splen- didly, but they were too few. Miletus was then taken by storm. The temple of Apollo at Didyma, one of the chief oracular sanctua- ries of the Greek world, was burned down. The tidings of the fall of Miletus produced at Athens a deep feeling, which found expression when Phrynichus, a tragic poet, made the catastrophe of Miletus the theme of a drama. The Ephesus ^> £?<*$ ^£^C- c'a Rll O MHetu* The Ionic Revolt SECOND AND THIRD EXPEDITIONS OF DARIUS 1 29 Athenians fined him for having recalled to their minds their own misfortunes. But in the meantime there had been won for them, from the Persian, what was destined to become afterward a last- ing possession. Miltiades, the tyrant of the Chersonese, seized the isles of Lemnos and Imbros. When the revolt failed, feeling him- self unsafe in the Chersonese, he fled to Athens, and prof essed that he had conquered Lemnos and Imbros for her. Though these islands seem to have been occupied by the Persians for a time, they passed back under Athenian dominion. 5. Second and Third European Expeditions of Darius. — Having suppressed the rebellion, Darius caused the territories of the Ionian cities to be measured and surveyed, and the tributes regu- lated accordingly. The revolt had taught Persia that the system of tyrannies did not answer; and it was now resolved to make an experiment of the opposite policy. The despots were abolished, and democratic governments were set up. It was a concession to the spirit of the Greeks which reflects credit on the wisdom of Darius. The king's son-in-law, Mardonius, was sent to reassert Persian supremacy in Thrace and Macedonia; and through Macedonia he proposed to advance into Greece, in order to punish the two cities which had helped the Ionian rebels. A fleet sailed along the coast and subdued the island of Thasos on its way. Thrace was reduced, and Macedonia, then under King Alexander, submitted. But the Greek expedition could not be carried out, since the fleet was partly wrecked in a storm off the perilous promontory of Athos. 492 b.c. But Darius was sternly resolved that Athens and Eretria should not escape without chastisement. Their connection with the burn- ing of Sardis had deeply incensed him. Moreover, Hippias, the banished tyrant of Athens, was at the court of Susa, urging an expedition against the city which had cast him out. It was decided that the new expedition should move straight across the /Egean Sea. Heralds were sent to the chief cities of free Greece that were not at war with Persia, requiring the tokens of submission, earth and water. In most cases the tokens were given; and among K 130 THE ADVANCE OF PERSIA TO THE iEGEAN others by ^gina, the enemy of Athens. The command of the army was intrusted to Datis and to Artaphernes, a nephew of Darius ; and they were accompanied by the aged tyrant Hippias, who hoped to rule once more over his native country. The armament — six hundred galleys strong, according to Herodotus — having sailed from isle to isle, subduing the Cyclades, went up the channel between Eubcea and Attica, and, reducing Carystus by the way, reached the territory of Eretria. Within seven days the city was delivered over to the invaders by the treachery of some leading citizens. The inhabitants were enslaved. It now remained to deal with the other city which had defied the king. Crossing over the strait, the Persian generals landed their army in the bay of Marathon. 6. The Battle of Marathon. Miltiades. — The soul of the resist- ance which Athens offered to the invader was Miltiades. He had indeed been a tyrant himself, and the successor of tyrants, and had been accused before the Assembly of oppressive rule in the Cher- sonese. But he had given Lemnos and Imbros to Athens, he was the hereditary foe of the Pisistratids, who had killed his father Cimon, and he probably knew more of the Persians than any man at Athens. He was therefore chosen as the strategos of his tribe. Yet, as Herodotus tells the story, few preparations seem to have been made till the Persians were almost landing. A fast runner was despatched in hot haste to Lacedaemon to bear the news of the fall of Eretria and the jeopardy of Athens. The Lacedaemonians said that they would help Athens, — they were bound to help a member of their league, — but religious scruples forbade them to come at once; they must wait till the full moon had passed. But when the full moon had passed, it was too late. The whole army of the Athenians may have numbered about nine thousand. The commander-in-chief was Callimachus, the polemarch of the year; and, fortunately for Athens, Callimachus seems to have been willing to hearken to the counsels of Miltiades. The enemy had landed near Marathon and clearly intended to ad- BATTLE OF MARATHON. MILTIADES 131 vance on unwalled Athens by land and sea. The question was whether the Athenian army should await their approach and give them battle within sight and reach of the Acropolis, or should more boldly go forth to find them. Miltiades proposed in the As- sembly to march to Marathon, and meet the Persians there. To have proposed and carried this decree is probably the greatest title of Miltiades to his immortal fame. The plain of Marathon, stretching along a sickle-shaped line of coast, is surrounded on all other sides by hills, and on both the northern and southern ends bounded by marshes, while through the center a mountain torrent rushes to the bay. Two roads lead from Athens to Mara- thon. The main road, following the line of the coast, enters the plain from the south; the other, which is somewhat shorter, but more difficult, runs through the hills, and by two paths reaches the plain. Callimachus took the northern road, and encamped in a valley not far from the shrine of Heracles. The choice of this admirable position was more than half the victory. The Athenians were themselves unassailable, except at a great disadvantage; and they commanded not only the mountain road by which they had come, but also the main road and the southern gate of the plain ; for the Persians in attempting to reach that gate would be exposed to their flank attack. The Persians had encamped on the north side of the torrent-bed, and their ships were riding at anchor beside them. SCALE OF ENGLISH MILFS Battle of Marathon 132 THE ADVANCE OF PERSIA TO THE ^GEAN It was to their interest to bring on a pitched battle in the plain as soon as possible. On the other hand, the Athenians had every- thing to gain by waiting in their impregnable position ; if they waited long enough they might hope for help from Sparta. Help from another quarter had already come. When they reached the sanctuary of Heracles, they were joined by a band of one thousand Plataeans, who, in gratitude for the protection of Athens against the Theban yoke, now came to help her in the hour of jeopardy. Some days passed, and then, as the Greeks remained immovable, the Persians would wait no longer. Having embarked a part of the army, including the whole body of their cavalry, they made ready to move upon Athens by land and sea. The land force must follow the main road, and was therefore prepared for battle, in case the Greeks should attack them before they defiled from the plain. Another critical moment had come for the Athenians, but the polemarch decided to attack the enemy as they marched southward. Callimachus showed now a skill in tactics as consummate as the skill in strategy which we have already witnessed. Outnumbered by the foe, if the Athenian line had formed itself in equal depth throughout, it would have swept the Persian center into the sea, but then it would have been caught in a trap, between the sea and ships on one side and the Persian wings, which would have closed in, on the other. Accordingly, Callimachus made his own center long and shallow, so that it would cover the whole Persian center, while his wings of the normal depth would be opposed to the wings of the enemy. Aug. or Sept, The long Persian line crossed the bed of the torrent and advanced 490 ] along the shore. A large portion was detached toward the Greek position, in order either to prevent or to repel a flank attack. With these troops to cover them, the rest of the host might march securely past. The Greek army had perhaps already appeared in the recess of the hills at the mouth of the valley: Callimachus himself led the right wing; the Plataean allies were posted on the BATTLE OF MARATHON. MILTIADES 1 33 extreme left. When the Greeks drew near to the line of the enemy, they were met by volleys of arrows from the eastern archers, and to escape this danger they advanced at a run into close quar- ters. All fell out as had been foreseen. The Athenian center was driven back toward the hills by the enemy's center, where the best troops, including the Persians themselves, were stationed; but the Athenian wings completely routed the wings of their foe. Then, closing in, they turned upon the victorious Persians, who were following the retreating Greek center. Here again they were utterly victorious, breaking up the array of the enemy and pursuing them in confusion to the shore, where all who escaped the sword were picked up by the ships. Only a portion of the Persian army had been engaged; the main body doubtless embarked as soon as they saw the first signs of the disruption of the force on which they had relied to cover them from the enemy. It was not a long battle. The Athenian loss was small — one hundred and ninety-two slain ; and the Persian loss was reckoned at about sixty-four hundred. Datis and Artaphernes had still an immense host, which might retrieve the fortune of the cam- paign; Athens was not yet out of danger. The Persian squadron sailed down the straits and rounded Cape Sunium, while the victorious army, leaving one regiment on the field of their triumph to guard the slain and the spoils, marched back to defend Athens. They halted outside the city on the banks of the Ilisus, and they beheld the fleet of the enemy riding off Phaleron. But it did not put into shore, and presently the whole squadron began to draw out to sea. Datis had abandoned his enterprise. Per- haps when he saw that the army was there, he shrank from an- other conflict with the hoplites. But a Spartan army had set out on the day after the full moon, and it reached Athens soon after the battle. We may guess that tidings of the approach of the Spartans, if not their actual presence, had something to do with the sudden departure of the invaders, who, though they had received an un- looked-for check, had not endured an overwhelming defeat. 134 THE ADVANCE OF PERSIA TO THE .EGEAN The Spartans arrived too late for the battle. They visited the field, desiring to gaze upon the Persian corpses, and departed home praising the exploit of the Athenians. The scene of the battle is still marked by the mound which the Athenians raised over their own dead ; Callimachus was buried there, and Cynegi- rus ( a brother of the poet ^Eschylus), who was said to have seized a Persian galley and held it until his arm was severed by an axe. Legend grew up quickly round the battle. Gods and heroes fought for Athens, ghostly warriors moved among the ranks. The panic terror of the Persians at the Greek charge was ascribed to Pan, and the worship of this god was revived in a cave conse- crated to him under the northwest slope of the Acropolis. The enormous prestige which Athens won by the single-handed victory over the host of the Great King gave her new self-con- fidence and ambition; history seemed to have set a splendid seal on her democracy; she felt that she could trust her constitution, and that she might lift her head as high as any state in Hellas. The Athenians always looked back to Marathon as marking an epoch. It was as if on that day the gods had said to them, Go on and prosper. The great battle immortalized Miltiades ; but his latter end was not good. His fellow-citizens granted him, on his own proposal, a commission to attack the island of Paros, which had furnished a trireme to the armament of Datis. Miltiades besieged the city of Paros for twenty-six days, but without success, and then re- turned home wounded. The failure was imputed to criminal conduct of the general; and he was fined fifty talents, a heavy fine. It is not known what his alleged wrong-doing was ; but after- ward, when the legend grew, it was foolishly said that he per- suaded the Athenians to intrust the fleet to him, promising to take them to a land of gold, and that he deceived them by assailing Paros to gratify a private revenge. He died soon after his con- demnation. 7. Struggle of Athens and JEglna., — At this time /Egina was GROWTH OF THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY 135 the strongest naval power in the ^Egean, and the Athenians had some reason to fear that she would give the Persians not only her good-will, but her active help. Accordingly, the Athenians sought the intervention of Sparta, complaining that /Egina was medizing 1 and betraying Greece out of enmity to Athens. Sparta's prestige had at this time been increased by a victory over her old rival Argos, whom Cleomenes entirely defeated near Tiryns, crippling 494 b.c. the power of Argos for more than twenty years. But Athens ap- pealed to her officially as head of the Peloponnesian League, in which both Athens and T^gina were included. Sparta listened to the complaint, and Cleomenes went to ^Egina, seized ten hostages, and left them at Athens. Thus ^Egina was prevented from help- ing the Persians or hindering the Athenians. After the death of Cleomenes, Tigina demanded the restoration 4 8 7 B - c - of her hostages, but the Athenians refused, and hostilities broke out again. The necessity of protecting Attica from T^ginetan raids, and the hope of reducing ^-Egina to subjection or insignifi- cance, helped to convert Athens into a naval power. 8. Growth of the Athenian Democracy. — Under the scheme of Cleisthenes great power was left to the archons, whom the people elected for their social position or their ability. But the tendency was to weaken the magistrates and strengthen the Bule; and some years after Marathon, a change was made in the manner of appoint- 487 b.c. ment. Five hundred men were elected by the demes, and out of this body the nine archons were chosen by lot. It was therefore five hundred to one against any prominent citizen becoming chief archon, and obviously the importance of the chief archonship dis- appears. Obviously, also, a commander-in-chief could not be elected by such means, and the powers of the polemarch were therefore transferred to the ten strategi who had been hitherto elected, each by his own tribe; but a reform was made by which the whole people elected the generals. A new institution — that of ostracism — transferred the duty 1 Negotiating with the Medes; i.e. Persians. 136 THE ADVANCE OF PERSIA TO THE ^GEAN of protecting the state against the danger of a tyranny from the paternal council of the Areopagus to the sovereign people. The ordinance of the Ostrakismos was that in the sixth prytany of each civil year the question should be laid before the Assembly of the people whether they willed that an ostracism should be held or not. If they voted in the affirmative, then an extraordinary Assembly was summoned in the market-place in the eighth prytany. The citizens were grouped in tribes, and each citizen placed in an urn a potsherd (ostrakori) inscribed with the name of the person whom he desired to be " ostracized." The voting was not valid unless six thousand votes at least were given, and whoever had most ostraka against him was condemned to leave Attica within ten days and not set foot in it again for ten years. He was allowed, however, to retain his property, and remained an Athenian citizen. It is said that Cleisthenes devised the ostracism, and devised it specially to banish a Pisistratid, Hipparchus, son of Charmus. And this Hipparchus was the first man ostracized, though not till 487 b.c. fifteen years later. In the next year Megacles, an Alcmaeonid who had espoused the Pisistratid cause, suffered the same fate. These 486 b.c. decrees were probably brought about by the then leading demo- cratic statesmen, Xanthippus, Aristides, and Themistocles. But when Xanthippus in 484, and Aristides in 482 B.C., were also ostracized, it is clear that the motive was not fear of a tyranny, but to remove the opposition of a statesman to some popular measure — possibly the bold naval policy of Themistocles. An excellent anecdote is told of the ostracism of Aristides " the Just," as he was called. On. the day of the voting an illiterate citizen chanced to be close to Aristides who was unknown to him by sight, and requested him to write down the name " Aristides " on the ostrakon. " Why," said Aristides, doing as he was asked, "do you wish to ostracize him?" "Because," said the fellow, "I am tired of hearing him called the Just." 9. Athens becomes a Sea-Power. Themistocles. — But the greatest statesman of this critical period in the history of Athens ATHENS BECOMES A SEA-POWER 1 37 was Themistocles. It may be said that he contributed more than any other single man to the making of Athens into a great state. In the sixth century the Athenians were a considerable naval power; but the fleet was regarded as subsidiary to the army. The idea of Themistocles was to sacrifice the army to the navy and make Athens a sea-state — the strongest sea-state in Greece. He began the work when he was archon, some two or three years before the battle of Marathon, by carrying a measure through the Assembly for the fortification of the peninsula of Piraeus. Hitherto the wide exposed strand of Phaleron was the harbor where the Athenians kept their triremes, hauled up on the beach, unpro- tected against the surprise of an enemy. It seems strange that they had not before made use of " the Piraeus," the large harbor on the west side of the peninsula of Munychia, which could be supplemented by the two smaller harbors on the east side, Munychia and Zea. But the Piraeus was somewhat farther from the city, and was not within sight of the Acropolis like Phaleron. So long, therefore, as there was no fortified harbor, Phaleron was safer. The plan of Themistocles was to fortify the whole circuit of the peninsula by a wall, and prepare docks in the three harbors for the reception of the warships. The work was begun, but it was interrupted by the Persian invasion. Then a war with iEgina combined with the fear of another Persian invasion, helped The- mistocles to carry to completion another part of his great scheme — the increase of the fleet. A rich bed of silver had been re- cently discovered in the old mining district of Laurion, and had suddenly brought into the public treasury a large sum, perhaps a hundred talents. It was proposed to distribute this among the citizens, but Themistocles persuaded the Assembly to apply it to the purpose of building new ships. Two years later we find Athens with nearly two hundred triremes at her command. The completion of the Piraeus wall was not attempted at this period. 138 THE ADVANCE OF PERSIA TO THE ^GEAN REFERENCES FOR SUPPLEMENTARY READING (Syllabus, 81-82) 1. The Rise and Conquests of Persia in the East. Bury, 219-238. Cox, Greeks and Persians, ch. iii. Sources. Herodotus, I, 26-28, 50-52. (Croesus.) 2. The Ionic Revolt. Bury, 241-247. Holm, II, ch. i. Cox, Greeks and Persians, ch. v. Source. Herodotus, I, 6-18. (Lade.) 3. The Expeditions of Darius ; Marathon and Miltiades. Holm, II, 16-24. Cox, Greeks and Persians, 118-135. Cox, Greek Statesmen, 100-115. Source. Herodotus, VI, 102-117. 4. The Growth of the Athenian Democracy. Themistocles and Aristides. Holm, II, 29-36. Bury, 260-265. Source. The first portions of the lives of Aristides and Themistocles by Plutarch give the traditional account of the relation of these two men. CHAPTER VIII THE PERILS OF GREECE. THE PERSIAN AND PUNIC INVASIONS i . The Preparations and March of Xerxes. — After the unex- pected repulse of his forces at Marathon, Darius had determined to send another expedition. But he died before he could execute 485 b.c. his resolve, and Xerxes, his son by Atossa, succeeded to the throne. The question then arose whether the design should be carried out. It is related that Xerxes was himself undecided, but was over-persuaded by the impetuous counsels of his cousin Mardonius. It was resolved that the expedition should consist of a joint attack by sea and land. Preparations were begun by the difficult enterprise of digging a canal (about a mile and a half long) across 483 b.c. the isthmus of Mount Athos, where a large part of the fleet, under Mardonius, had been wrecked. When it was finished, the workmen proceeded to lay a bridge over the Strymon for the passage of the army, and preparations were made all along the line of route for the feeding of a vast host. It is impossible to suppose that the whole army wintered in Sardis with the king ; it is probable that the place of mustering was at the Hellespont, across which two bridges had been constructed by Phoenician and Egyptian engineers. But a tempest destroyed the bridges, and the wrath of Xerxes at this catastrophe was violent. He not only beheaded the engineers, but commanded that three hundred lashes should be inflicted on the waters of the Hellespont. New bridges were constructed, and, from a marble throne erected on the shore, Xerxes is said to have witnessed the passage of his army, which began at the first moment of sunrise. The troops crossed under the lash, and the crossing was accomplished in two days. 139 140 THE PERILS OF GREECE The army was joined by the fleet at Doriscus in Thrace. Fleet and army were henceforward to act together. In the plain of Doriscus, Xerxes reviewed and numbered his forces. " What na- tion of Asia," asks Herodotus, "did not Xerxes lead against Hellas ? " The Persians themselves, who were under the com- mand of Otanes, wore coats of mail and trousers; they had wicker shields, large bows, and short spears. Then there were Assyrians with brazen helmets, linen cuirasses, clubs, lances, and short swords; Bactrians with cane bows; trousered Sacae with pointed hats, and carrying axes; Indians clad in cotton, Caspians in goat skin; Sarangians wearing dyed garments and high boots; Ethio- pians clad in lion-skins or leopard-skins and armed with primitive stone-pointed arrows; Sagartians with dagger and lasso; Thra- cians with fox-skin caps; Colchians with cow-skin shields. The fleet was furnished by the Phoenicians, Egyptians, Cypriotes, Cilicians, Pamphylians, Lycians, Carians, and subject Greeks. It is said to have consisted of 1207 warships, with 3000 smaller vessels. The whole host is said to have reached to upwards of 5,000,000. It is needless to say that these numbers are wholly fabulous. The land forces may have amounted to 300,000 — hardly more. From Doriscus, Xerxes proceeded to Therma with his fabulous Aug., 480 b.c. host, drinking rivers dry in their march, and there he was joined by his fleet, which had been separated from him while it sailed round Sithonia and Pallene. Most of the incidents which Herodo- tus recounts concerning this march of Xerxes are pleasing stories, designed to characterize the barbarian and the despot, and to en- hance the danger and the glory of Hellas. 2. Preparations of Greece. — In the meantime, Greece was making counter-preparations. Xerxes is said to have despatched from Sardis heralds to all the Greek states, except Athens and Sparta, to demand earth and water. These two cities now joined hands to resist the invasion. They were naturally marked out as the leaders of Greece in Greece's greatest crisis: Sparta by virtue PREPARATIONS OF GREECE 141 of her generally acknowledged headship, Athens by the prestige which she had won at Marathon. They jointly convened an Hel- lenic congress at Corinth on the Isthmus to consult on the measures to be taken for common resistance to the threatened invasion. This is the first instance of anything that can be called a deliberate Panhellenic policy. At this Congress of Corinth over which Sparta presided, thirty-one states bound themselves to- gether in a formal confederation by taking a solemn oath that they Autumn, 481 B.C. mm. u *&> H*M?^ Doriscus Mm ' ^trxejjjeit" CHERSON^SUS AW. IMBROSfi£2>' Athos ^y, LEMNOS^ y^ 1 ■pfopontis .,,'.'€ * fjt !M V %h„ iArtemisium .ft. SftV \%%ff\ Patriotic States Al Tvp(p)dv' oltto Kvnas] at Olympia and Delphi, and he employed the most gifted lyric poets to celebrate these victories in lordly odes. Pindar and Bac- chylides were sometimes set to celebrate the same victory in rival strains. These poets give us an impression of the luxury and magnificence of the royal courts and the generosity of the royal victors. Yet though the Syracusan cities might seem fair, the despotisms were oppressive. Hieron was famous for his system of spies. 158 THE PERILS OF GREECE Theron slaughtered the men of Himera who opposed the rule of his son Thrasydaeus. After Theron's death, Thrasydseus quar- reled with Hieron, fought, and was defeated. In the hour of his reverse, Himera became independent, and Acragas, his greater city, adopted a free constitution. Hieron, likewise, was succeeded by a less able ruler, Thrasybulus, against whom the citizens rose in mass, and drove him out. The overthrow of tyranny at Syra- cuse was followed by a civil war between the old citizens and the new, whom Gelon had imported from all quarters. In the end all the strangers were driven out and the democracy of Syracuse was securely established. The next half -century was a period of prosperity for the Sicilian republics, especially for the greatest among them, Syracuse and Acragas, and for Selinus, now freed from the Phoenician yoke. REFERENCES FOR SUPPLEMENTARY READING (Syllabus, 82-83) 1. The Invasion of Xerxes. Thermopylae and Salamis. Bury, 265-269. Holm, II, ch. iv. Harrison, J. A., Story of Greece, 335-389, contains a vivid and dramatic narrative of the invasions. The Persian invasions are treated in so great detail in the larger histories that it is difficult to assign topics : it is therefore suggested that the teacher make assignments from some of the sources, particularly from Herodotus. Sources. Herodotus, VII, 61-70 (Preparations of Xerxes) ; VII, 207- 213, 223-226 (Thermopylae and Artemisium) ; VIII, 56-64, 78, 79, 87-91 (Salamis). Botsford, 133-134, gives an account of Salamis from The Persians of ^Eschylus. 2. Plataea. Bury, 289-295. Holm, II, iv. Sources. Herodotus, VIII, 140-144. Portions of the lives of Aristides and Themistocles from Plutarch. 3. The Carthaginian Invasion of Sicily. Bury, 296-308. Holm, II, 78-89. Abbott, 439-446. Source. Herodotus, VII, 163-167. CHAPTER IX THE FOUNDATION OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE i. The Position of Sparta and Career of Pausanias. — For the last forty years Sparta had been the predominant power in con- tinental Greece. Her headship in the common resistance to Per- sia was recognized without murmur or dispute. A great national enterprise, conducted under her auspices to a splendid conclusion, should have enabled her to convert leadership into dominion. But Lacedaemon had not the spirit to carry out an effective im- perial policy. For a state which aspired to a truly imperial posi- tion in Greece must inevitably be a sea power. When the world of free Hellenic states once more extended over the JEgean to the skirts of Asia and to Thrace, Sparta might retain her continental position, but her prestige must ultimately be eclipsed and her power menaced by any city which won imperial authority over the islands and coasts of the JEgean. This was what happened. The Spartans were a people unable to adapt themselves to new conditions. Reforms were unwelcome; a man of exceptional ability was regarded with suspicion. The formation of a navy would have seemed to them as unpractical an idea as an expedition against the capital of Persia. And if we follow their conduct of the recent war, we see that their policy was petty and provincial. They had generally acted at the last moment; their view was so limited by the smaller interests of the Peloponnesus that again and again they almost betrayed the national cause. Pausanias, the son of Cleombrotus, had shown, it must be al- lowed, remarkable military ability in conducting the campaign of Plataea. But his talents as a politician were not equal to his i59 l60 FOUNDATION OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE talents as a general. Sparta sent him out, in command of a squad- ron of ships supplied by her allies, to continue the work of eman- 478 b.c. cipating the eastern Greeks. He sailed first to Cyprus and was successful in delivering the greater part of the island from Persian rule. He then proceeded to Byzantium and expelled the Persian garrison. But here he behaved more as a tyrant than as a gen- eral. It was said that he adopted the Persian dress, employed an Asiatic bodyguard in his journey through Thrace, and even offered to enslave his own state and all Hellas to Xerxes, and to seal the compact by marrying his daughter. When this was reported at Sparta, he was recalled to answer the charges. The intrigue, how- ever, could not be proved, and he was only punished for some acts of injury he had done to particular persons. Although he was not sent out again officially, he hired a trireme for himself and returned to the Propontus, where he resumed possession of Byzantium, 477 b.c. and succeeded in capturing Sestos. This was too much for the Athenians, and they sent a squadron under Cimon, the son of 476 b.c Miltiades, which recovered Sestus and drove Pausanias out of Byzantium. The Spartan government again summoned Pausanias home. He obeyed the summons, believing he could secure his acquittal by bribes. The ephors threw him into prison ; but it was difficult to procure evidence of his guilt. He was released, and challenged inquiry. It was suspected that he had not only negotiated with Persia, but had prepared the way for a revolt of the Helots by promising them emancipation. But there were not clear enough proofs to act upon, until a confidential servant turned informer. But before he could be seized, Pausanias took refuge in the temple 471 b.c (?) °f Athena. Unable to arrest him in the sanctuary, the ephors walled up the doors and starved him to death. As he was dying they brought him out, and by the command of the Delphic god he was buried at the entrance of the sacred enclosure. But the star- vation within the precincts was an offense against the goddess, and brought a curse upon the Spartans. The career of Pausanias CONFEDERACY OF DELOS l6l is typical of the Spartan abroad; and it has a parallel in the result of Sparta's attempt to extend her power on land. She cast her eyes upon Thessaly, and sent forth an army under King 476 b.c. Leotychidas, who landed in the Pagasaean bay. But, like many a Spartan general, he could not resist silver and gold; and the Thessalian princes saved their power by bribing the invader. His guilt was evident, and when he returned home he was con- demned to death. He saved himself by fleeing to Athena's sanc- tuary at Tegea. Sparta was soon compelled to fight for her position within the Peloponnesus itself. Argos had now recovered somewhat from the annihilating blow which had been dealt her by King Cleomenes. On the other side, Sparta had to behold the union of the villages of Elis into a city with a democratic constitution, f tSL^HikSU 472 b.c. And even in Arcadia she was constrained reluc- tantly to recognize the new union of the Manti- nean villages. b Coin of Elis, Thus the Persian War left Sparta much where Early (Re- she was before. In the meantime, another city verse). Vic- had been advancing with rapid strides along rL a new path, compassing large enterprises, and gend: FA(keiw)] establishing a large empire. 2. The Confederacy of Delos. — The lukewarmness of Sparta, exhibited in her failure to follow up the battle of Mycale, had in- 478-477 b.c duced the Ionian and other Asiatic Greeks to place themselves under the leadership of Athens. Thus was formed the voluntary confederation out of which an Athenian empire was to rise. The object was not only to protect the rescued cities from reconquest by the barbarian, but also to plunder the country of the Great King. The treasury of the league was established in the sacred Island of Delos, the ancient center of Ionian worship, and it was hence called the Confederacy of Delos. The recapture of Sestos was its first achievement. M 1 62 FOUNDATION OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE The league included the Ionian and ^Eolian cities of Asia; the islands adjacent to the coast from Lesbos to Rhodes ; a large number of towns on the Propontis, and some in Thrace ; most of the Cyclades; and Eubcea except its southern city Carystus. It was a league of sea-states, and therefore the basis of the contract was that each state should furnish ships to the common fleet. But most of the members were small and poor ; many could not equip more than one or two ships; many could do no more than con- tribute a part of the expense to the furnishing of a single galley. To gather together a number of small and scattered contingents at a fixed time and place was always a matter of difficulty: nor was such a miscellaneous armament easily managed. It was therefore arranged that the smaller states, instead of furnishing ships, should pay a yearly sum of money to a common treasury. The valuation of the wealth of the confederate cities and the deter- mination of the " contribution " of each were devolved upon Aristides, whose discretion, and the respect in which he was held, fitted him eminently for the task. His valuation remained in force for more than fifty years. Thus from the very beginning the Confederacy consisted of two kinds of members: those who furnished ships and those who paid an equivalent in money — a phoros, as it was called; and the second class was far the larger. For besides those who could only furnish a ship or two, or even part of a ship, many of the larger cities preferred the system of money payments, which did not oblige their citizens to leave home. The tribute was collected by ten Athenian officers, who bore the title of Hellenotamice, " treasurers of the Greeks." The council of the Confederates met at Delos, where the treasury was, and each member had an equal voice. As leader of the Confed- eracy, Athens had the executive entirely in her hands, and it was of the highest significance that the treasurers were not selected from the whole body of Confederates, but were Athenian citizens. Thus, from the first, Athens held the means of gradually trans- forming the naval union into a naval empire. FORTIFICATION OF ATHENS AND PIILEUS 1 63 While the name of Aristides is connected most closely with the foundation of the Confederacy, there is no doubt that it was due to his rival Themistocles that Athens took the tide of fortune at the flood. Themistocles had made his city a sea power; and this feat approved him the greatest of all her statesmen. He was a man of genius. The most reserved of all historians, Thucydides, turns aside to praise his unusual natural gifts ; his power of divin- ing what was likely to happen, and his capacity for dealing with difficult situations. When Athens undertook the leadership and entered upon the new paths which then opened out before her, she was carrying out a policy of which he had been the clearest and earliest interpreter. And, while the fleet was building an empire in the east, there was work for him to do amid the ruins of Athens. 3. The Fortification of Athens and the Piraeus. — After Plataea, the Athenians brought back their families and goods to their deso- late habitation. Little of the old town wall was still standing, and they proceeded to build a new wall. The work was done in haste; the material of older buildings and even gravestones were used. But this wall of Themistocles — for it was by the advice and under the inspiration of Themistocles that the work was wrought — embraced a larger circuit than the old enclosure. The Lacedae- monians, who looked with jealousy at the rise of the Athenian walls, sent an embassy to urge the Athenians to join Sparta in demolishing all fortifications in Greece, instead of fortifying their own town. But they were not in a position to do more than remonstrate. The fortification of Piraeus was likewise taken in hand. A thick wall was built all round the Munychian peninsula, keeping close to the sea, and was continued along the north side of the harbor, and out to the promontory of Eetionea. The entrances to this £hief harbor and to the two small havens of Munychia and Zea on the east side of the peninsula were fortified by moles. In the course of the next twenty years, the Athenians came to see the disadvantage of the two towns, which ought to have been 1 164 FOUNDATION OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE one. It was borne in upon their statesmen that in the case of an enemy invading Attica with a powerful army, the communi- cations between Athens and the Piraeus might be completely sev- ered, and the folk of the city be cut off from their ships. In order to meet this danger — which would have been most simply met by deserting Athens — a new device was imagined. It was resolved to transform the two towns into a double town, girt by 458 b.c. a continuous line of fortification. Two diverging walls were built to connect Athens with the sea. The northern joined the Piraeus wall near the harbor; the southern ran down to the roadstead of Phaleron. By these Long Walls, costly to build and costly to defend, Athens sought to adapt her topography to her role of mistress of the sea. Her naval power was based upon the only sure foundation — a growing naval commerce. This, in its turn,, depended upon the increase of Attic industries, which may be estimated by the enormous number of resident aliens or metics, who settled in Athens, or Piraeus, for the purpose of manufacture and trade. These metics, who seem to have ultimately approached the number of ten thousand, were liable to the same ordinary burdens as the citizens, and, when a property-tax was imposed in time of war, they were taxed at a higher rate. Themistocles wished to introduce a system by which a certain number of triremes should be added to the fleet every year; but this idea was not adopted; new ships were built from time to time according as they were needed. But a new system of fur- nishing them was introduced. The state supplied only the hull and some of the rigging ; the duty and expense of fitting the galley, launching it completely, and training the oarsmen, were laid upon the most wealthy citizens, each in his turn. This public burden was called the trierarchy. One hundred and seventy oarsmen composed of hired foreigners and slaves, and partly of the poorest class of the citizens, propelled each galley; there was a crew of twenty men (hyperetai), to manage the vessel, including the OSTRACISM AND DEATH OF THEMISTOCLES 1 65 keleustes, who set the time to the oarsmen; and there were, besides, ten soldiers (epibatai). The generals were supreme commanders by land and sea alike. 4. Ostracism and Death of Themistocles. — For some years Themistocles divided the guidance of public affairs with Aris- tides and Xanthippus. But, like most Greek statesmen, he was accessible to bribes, and his vanity betrayed him into commit- ting public indiscretions. He built near his own house a shrine to "Artemis, wisest in Council," on the ground that the counsels which he had offered his country had been wiser than all others. Such things gave opponents a handle for attack. The time and the immediate causes of the banishment of Themistocles are un- certain. He succumbed to a coalition of Aristides and Xanthippus, who appealed to the trial of ostracism. The exiled statesman took up his abode in Argos. When the Persian intrigues of Pau- *• 472 b.c. sanias were disclosed, the Lacedaemonians discovered that Themis- tocles was implicated in the scandal. But though Themistocles held communications with Pausanias, it is not in the least likely that he was really guilty of any design to betray Greece to Persia: it is rather to be presumed that those communications were con- cerned with the schemes of Pausanias against the Spartan con- stitution. He was accused of high treason against his country; 471 b.c. men were sent to arrest him and bring him to trial ; and he fled to Corcyra. The Corcyraeans refused to keep him, and he crossed over to Epirus, pursued by Lacedaemonian and Athenian officers. He was forced to stop at the house of Admetus, king of the Molos- sians, though his previous relations with this king had not been friendly. When the king returned, Themistocles implored his protection. Admetus hospitably refused to give him up to the pursuers, and sent the fugitive overland to Pydna in Macedonia. A vessel carried him to the shores of Ionia. W T hen Xerxes died 4 6 4 1{r - and Artaxerxes came to the throne, he went up to Susa and in- trigued at the Persian court. Thus, circumstances drove him to follow the example of Pausanias; and, by a curious irony, the 1 66 FOUNDATION OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE two men who might be regarded as the saviours of Greece, the hero of Salamis and the hero of Plataea, were perverted into framing plans for undoing their own work and enslaving the country which they had delivered. It may well have been, how- ever, that Themistocles merely intended to compass his own advantage at the expense of the Great King, and had no serious thought of carrying out any designs against Greece. He won high honor in Persia, and was given the government of the dis- trict of Magnesia, where Magnesia itself furnished his table with bread, Lampsacus with wine, andMyus with meat. Themistocles died in Magnesia, and the Magnesians gave him outside their walls the resting-place which was denied him in his own country. 5. Successful Campaigns of the Confederacy of Delos. — The conduct of the war which the Confederacy of Delos was waging against Persia had been intrusted to Cimon, the son of Miltiades. We have seen already how he drove Pausanias out of Sestos 476 b.c. and Byzantium. His next exploit was to capture Eion, a town near the mouth of the Strymon, and the most important strong- hold of the Persians east of the Hellespont. Then he reduced the 474 b.c rocky island of Scyrus, a stronghold of pirates, which was colo- nized by Attic settlers. And here was made a famous discovery. There was a Delphic oracle which bade the Athenians take up the bones of Theseus and keep them in an honorable resting-place ; and, whether by chance or after a search, there was found in Scyrus a grave containing a warrior's corpse of heroic size. It was taken to be the corpse of Theseus; Cimon brought it back to Athens; and perhaps none of his exploits earned him greater popularity. A few years later, Xerxes had equipped a great armament — his last resistance to the triumph of Greek arms. Cimon, who had been busy in the northern ^gean, now sailed south. He delivered both the Greek and the native coast towns of Caria from Persian rule, and compelled the Lycian communities to 468 b.c. enroll themselves in the Confederacy of Delos. Then at the river CONFEDERACY OF DELOS 1 67 Eurymedon in Pamphylia he found the Persian army and the Persian fleet, and overcame them in a double battle by land and sea, destroying two hundred Phoenician ships. This victory sealed the acquisition of southern Asia Minor, from Caria to Pamphylia, for the Athenian federation, delivered any Ionian cities that still paid tribute to Persia, and freed Greece from all danger on the side of the Persian empire. 6. The Confederacy of Delos becomes an Athenian Empire. — The confederate fleet now had other work to do. It had been set to make war upon Greek states, which were unwilling to be- long to the league. Carystus, which, unlike the other cities of 472 b.c. Eubcea, had held aloof from the Confederacy, w r as subjugated, and made, in spite of herself, a member of the league. Naxos 469 b.c. seceded from the league, and the fleet of the allies reduced her by blockade. Each act was defensible, but both acts alike seemed to be acts of tyrannical outrage on the independence of free states, and were an offense to public opinion in Greece. The oppression was all the worse, inasmuch as both Naxos and Carystus were deprived of their autonomy. They became in fact subjects of Athens, who was already forging the fetters with which she would bind her allies. The victory of the Eurymedon left Athens free to pursue this inevitable policy of transforming the Confederacy into an empire. The most powerful confederate state on the Thracian coast was the island city of Thasos. Athens was making new endeavors to plant a settlement on the Strymon, and her interests collided with those of the Thasians, whose prosperity largely depended upon their trade in Thrace. A dispute arose about a gold mine, and the islanders revolte'd. The fleet of the Thasians was de- 463 b.c feated by Cimon, and after a long blockade they capitulated. Their walls were pulled down, their ships were handed over to Athens, they gave up all claim to the mine and the mainland, and agreed to pay whatever tribute was demanded. The instances of these three island cities, Carystus, Naxos, 1 68 FOUNDATION OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE and Thasos, are typical. There were now three classes of mem- bers in the Confederacy of Delos: there were (i) the non-tribu- tary allies which contributed ships; (2) the tributary allies which were independent; and (3) the tributary allies which were sub- ject. It was obviously for the interest of Athens that as many members as possible should contribute money, and as few as pos- sible contribute ships. For the ships which the tribute money furnished out were simply an addition to her own fleet, because they were under her direct control. She consequently aimed at diminishing the members of the first class ; and soon it consisted of only the three large and wealthy islands — Lesbos, Chios, and Samos. Again, it was to the interest of Athens to transfer the members of the second class into the third, and win control over the internal affairs of the cities. As a rule, Athens prescribed to her subjects the general form of their constitutions, and it need hardly be said that these constitutions were always democratic. As the process of turning the alliance into an empire advanced, Athens found herself able to discontinue the meetings of the con- federate assembly in the island of Delos. The formal establish- ment of her empire may be dated ten years after the war with Thasos, when the treasury of the league was transferred from 454 b.c. Delos to Athens. The Confederacy of Delos no longer existed; and, though the term alliance was always officially used, men no longer hesitated to use the word empire in ordinary speech. The Athenian empire embraced the /Egean Sea with its northern and eastern fringes, from Methone in the northwest to Lycian Phaselis in the southeast. The number of cities which belonged to it at its height was considerably more than two hundred. The Athenian empire was dissolved half a century after the transference of the treasury from Delos to Athens. We shall see that it began to decline not many years after it had reached the height of its power. The first principles of the political thought and political life of Greece were opposed to such an union. The sovereign city-state was the basis of the civilized Hellenic world, POLICY AND OSTRACISM OF CIMON 169 and no city-state was ready, if it could help it, to surrender any part of its sovereignty. In the face of a common danger, cities might be ready to combine together in a league, each parting with some of her sovereign powers to a common federal council, but preserving the right of secession; and this was the idea of the Confederacy of Delos in its initial form. But when the motives which induced a city to join a federation became less strong and pressing, every member was anxious to regain its complete inde- pendence. An empire, however disguised, was always considered an injustice. 7. Policy and Ostracism of Cimon. — As the Persian War had brought out more vividly the contrast between Greek and barbarian, so the Confederacy of Delos emphasized a division exist- ing within the Greek race itself, the contrast of Dorian and Ionian. The Dorian federation of the Pelo- ponnesus under the headship of Sparta stood over against the Ionian federation of the ^Egean under the headship of Athens. For some years the antagonism lay dormant. The danger from Persia had not passed away. But the preservation of peace was also due, in some measure, to Aristides and Cimon. The two guiding principles of Cimon 's policy were the prosecution of the war against Persia and the maintenance of good relations with the Lacedaemonians. He upheld the doctrine of dual leadership; Athens should be mistress of the seas, but she should recognize Sparta as the mistress on the continent. But after the death of Aristides, younger statesmen arose and formed a party of opposi- tion against Cimon and the oligarchs who rallied around him. Portrait Head, perhaps of Cimon, on a Gem, en- graved by Dexamenus 170 FOUNDATION OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE The two chief politicians of this democratic party were Ephialtes, and Pericles, the son of Xanthippus, who now began to play a prominent part in the Assembly. Meanwhile, Sparta herself had dealt a blow to Cimon's policy. The Spartan citizens lived over a perpetual danger — the discon- tent of their Periceci and Helots. An earthquake had laid Sparta in ruins, and the moment was chosen by the Messenian serfs 464 b.c. to shake off the yoke. They annihilated in battle a company of three hundred Spartans, but then they were defeated, and sought refuge in the stronghold of Ithome. On that steep hill they held out for a few years. The Spartans were driven to ask the aid of allies. The democratic politicians at Athens lifted up their voices against the sending of any aid. But the people listened to the counsels of Cimon: " We must not leave Hellas lame; we must not allow Athens to lose her yoke-fellow." Cimon took four thousand hop- 462 b.c. Htes to Messenia, but, though the Athenians had a reputation for skill in besieging fortresses, their endeavors to take Ithome failed. Suspecting treachery, Sparta told the Athenians, alone of all the allies who were encamped around the hill, that she required their help no more. This incident exposed the futility of making sacrifices to court Sparta's friendship. When Cimon returned with his policy dis- credited, Ephialtes and his party denounced him as a " Philo- Laconian," and felt that they could safely attempt to ostracize him. An ostracism was held, and Cimon was banished. Soonafter- 461 b.c ward a mysterious crime was committed. Cimon's chief antag- onist Ephialtes was murdered, and no one ever ascertained with surety who the murderers were. The Athenians had presently an opportunity of retaliating on Sparta for her contumely. The blockade of Ithome was con- 459 b.c tinued,and the rebels at last capitulated. They were allowed to leave the Peloponnesus unharmed, on the condition that they should never return. The Athenians who had helped to besiege REFERENCES FOR SUPPLEMENTARY READING 171 them now found them a shelter. They settled the Messenians in a new home at Naupactus, on the Corinthian Gulf, a place where Athens had recently established a naval station. REFERENCES FOR SUPPLEMENTARY READING (Syllabus, 83-84) 1. The Position of Sparta. Pausanias. Holm, II, 92-95. Abbott, Greece, II, 251-263. Source. Thucydides, I, 94-95, 128-134. 2. The Fortification of Athens and the Fall of Themistocles. Holm, II, 89-92, 95-100. Abbott, Greece, II, 267-273, 287-292. Har- rison, 362-387. Sources. Thucydides, I, 90-94, 136-139. Plutarch, Themistocles. 3. The Confederacy of Delos and the Beginnings of the Athenian Empire. Bury, 328-330, 336-342. Holm, II, 101-102, 122-127, 211-222. Abbott, Greece, 344-346. Sources. Thucydides, I, 89, 97-100. Plutarch, Aristides. CHAPTER X THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE UNDER THE GUIDANCE OF PERICLES i. The Completion of the Athenian Democracy. Pericles. — The democratic principle of the people's sovereignty was still further developed at Athens under the guidance of Pericles, for thirty years the most prominent figure in Greece. His father was Xanthippus, the rival of Themistocles and Aristides; his mother, Agariste, was niece of Cleisthenes. He was trained as a soldier, but carefully educated by the best teachers of the day. His political ideas, however, were his own, as was the lucid and persuasive eloquence by which he achieved his ends. In per- sonal traits he was a striking contrast to Cimon, the loose and genial boon companion. He seldom walked abroad; he was strict in the economy of his household; he avoided convivial parties, and jealously maintained the dignity of his reserve. (i) Reform of the Council of the Areopagus. — The most con- servative institution in Athens was the Council of the Areopagus, for it was filled up from the archons, who were taken from the two richest classes in the state. By a measure of Ephialtes the cen- sorial powers which enabled it to inquire into the lives of private citizens had been abolished. Nothing was left to the venerable body but its jurisdiction in homicidal cases. All impeachments for crimes which threatened the public weal were henceforward brought before the Council or the Assembly, and the people tried in their own courts defaulting officials. (2) Pay for Public Service. — About the same time another step was taken on the path of democracy by making the archonship a paid office and open to all classes. The two engines of the 172 COMPLETION OF ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY 173 democratic development were lot and pay. The archons and other lesser officers, and the members of the Council, were taken by lot from a select number of candidates; but these candidates were chosen by de- liberate election. This preliminary election was done away with; and the Council of Five Hun- dred, as well as the archons, were ap- pointed by lot from all the eligible citi- zens. By this means every citizen had an equal chance of hold- ing political office and taking a part in the conduct of pub- lic affairs. It is clear that this system could not work unless the offices were paid ; for the poor citizens would have been unable to give up their time to the service of the state. Accordingly, pay was introduced not only for the archonship, but for the members of the Council. The payment of state offices was the leading feature of the democratic reforms of Pericles; Pericles; Copy of the Portrait by Cresilas 174 ATHENIAN EMPIRE UNDER GUIDANCE OF PERICLES and at the time of the attack on the Areopagus, Pericles carried c. 462 b.c. a measure that the judges should receive a remuneration of either one or two obols a day. The amount of judicial business was growing so enormously that it would have been impossible to find a sufficient number of judges ready to attend day after day in the courts without any compensation. It was now to the interest of every Athenian that there should be as few citizens as possible to participate in the new privileges and profits of citizenship. Accordingly, about ten years later, the rolls of the citizens were stringently revised; and a law was passed that the name of no child should be admitted whose father and mother were not Athenian citizens legitimately wedded. This law would have excluded Themistocles and Cleisthenes, the lawgiver, whose mothers were foreigners. (3) Liturgies. — A feature of the Athenian democracy, not to be lost sight of, is that public burdens were laid upon the rich citizens which did not fall upon the poor, and which might fall to a man's lot only once or twice in his life. We have already seen how trierarchs were taken from the richer classes to equip and man triremes, in which they were themselves obliged to sail, and for which they were entirely responsible. Again, when the city sent solemn deputations on some religious errand, a wealthy citizen was chosen to eke out at his cost the money supplied for the purpose by the public treasury, and to conduct the deputation. But none of the liturgies, as these public burdens were called, was more important or more characteristic of Athenian life than that of providing the choruses for the festivals of Dionysus. Every year each tribe named one of its wealthy tribesmen to be a choregos, and his duties were to furnish and array a chorus and provide a skilled trainer to teach it the dances and songs of the drama which it was to perform. He whose chorus was victorious in the tragic or the comic competition was crowned, and received a bronze tripod. The state's endowment of religion turned out to be an endowment of brilliant genius ; and the rich men who were WAR OF ATHENS WITH THE PELOPONNESIANS 1 75 called upon to spend their time and money in furnishing the dancers did service to the great masters of tragedy and comedy, and thereby served the whole world. 2. War of Athens with the Peloponnesians. — The banish- ment of Cimon was the signal for a complete change in the foreign policy of Athens. She abandoned the alliance with the Lace- daemonians and formed a new alliance with their enemies, Argos and Thessaly. Her naval empire and rapidly growing trade brought her into deadly rivalry with Sparta's allies — the two great trading cities, Corinth and ^gina. And when an Athenian general took Naupactus from the Ozolian Locrians and thus secured a naval station on the Corinthian Gulf, whence Athens could intercept at any time Corinthian fleets sailing for the west, war was certain, and the occasion soon came. The Megarians, on account of a frontier dispute with Corinth, deserted the Peloponnesian league and placed themselves under 459 B -c Athenian protection. Nothing could be more welcome to Athens than the adhesion of Megara. Holding Megara, she had a strong frontier against the Peloponnesus, commanding the Isthmus from Pagae on the Corinthian, to Nisaea on the Saronic, Gulf. Without any delays she set about the building of a double line of wall from the hill of Megara down to the haven of Nisaea, which faces Salamis, and she garrisoned these " Long Walls " with her own troops. Thus the eastern coast-road was under her control, and Attica had a strong bulwark against invasion by land. War soon broke out, but at first Sparta took no active part. But when the Athenians, becoming involved with the ^gina, defeated its fleet and blocked the city, the Spartans were drawn 458 b.c into the conflict. They sent a force of hoplites to help the /Egine- tans; while the Corinthians advanced into theMegarid, expecting that the Athenians would find it impossible to protect Megara and blockade ^gina at the same time. But the citizens who were below and above the regular military age were formed into an ex- traordinary army and marched to the Megarid under the strategos 176 ATHENIAN EMPIRE UNDER GUIDANCE OF PERICLES Myronides. A battle was fought; both sides claimed the victory; but, when the Corinthians withdrew, the Athenians raised a trophy. Urged by the taunts of their fellow-citizens, the Corinthian soldiers returned in twelve days and began to set up a counter-trophy, but as they were at work the Athenians rushed forth from Megara and inflicted a severe defeat. The siege of ^Egina was continued, and, within two years after the battle, the /Eginetans capitulated, and agreed to surrender theif fleet and pay tribute to Athens. Few successes can have 457 b.c. been more welcome or profitable to the Athenians than this. Their rival in commerce, the rich Dorian island which offended their eyes and attracted their desires when they looked forth from their hill across the waters of their bay, was at length powerless in their hands. 3. War in Egypt. — The victory over iEgina was won with only a portion of the Athenian fleet. For, in the very hour when she was about to be brought face to face with the armed opposition of rival Greek powers, she had embarked in an expedition to Egypt — one of the most daring ventures she ever undertook. A fleet of two hundred Athenian and confederate galleys was operating against Persia in Cyprian seas, when it was invited to cross over to Egypt by Inaros, a Libyan potentate, who had stirred up the lands of the lower Nile to revolt against their Persian masters. The invitation was most alluring. It meant that, if Athens delivered Egypt from Persian rule, she would secure the chief control of the foreign trade with the Nile valley and be able to establish a naval station on the coast. The generals of the ^gean fleet accepted the call of the Libyan prince. 459 b.c. The Athenians entered the Nile to find Inaros triumphant, having gained a great victory in the Delta over a Persian army which had been sent to quell him. Sailing up, they won possession of the city of Memphis, except the citadel, the "White Castle," in which the Persian garrison held out. But it was a fatal co- incidence that the power of Athens should have been divided WAR IN BCEOTIA 1 77 at this moment. With her full forces she might have inflicted a crushing blow on the Peloponnesians ; with her full forces she might have prospered in Egypt; but the Persians, supported by a Phoenician fleet, defeated the Greeks, and blockaded them on an island. The Athenians were thus forced to burn their ships, 454 b.c. abandon the enterprise, and to retreat. 4. War in Bceotia. — In the meantime, events in another part of Greece had led the Lacedaemonians themselves to take part in the war. The errand which called them out of the Peloponnesus was an errand of piety, to suc- cor their mother-people, the Dorians of the north, one of whose three little towns had been taken by the Phocians. To force the aggres- sors to restore the place was an easy task for an army which consisted of fifteen hundred CoiN OF Thebes - J . Fifth Century Lacedaemonian hoplites and ten thousand (Reverse). He- troops of the allies. The real work of the racles strang- expedition lay in Bceotia. It was clearly the " NG Snakes \ J ■ J [Legend: ©e- policy of Sparta to raise up here a powerful bai(02)] state to hold Athens in check. Accordingly, Sparta now set up the power of Thebes again, and forced the Boeotian cities to join her league. When the army had done its work in Boeotia its return to the Peloponnesus was beset by difficulties. The Athenians guarded the passes in the Megarid, their ships beset the Corinthian Gulf. In this embarrassment the Spartans seem to have resolved to march straight upon Athens, where the people were now engaged in the building of Long Walls from the city to the harbor. The Peloponnesian army advanced to Tanagra, near the Attic frontier; but be- fore they crossed the borders, the Athenians went forth to meet them, fourteen thousand strong, including one thousand Argives and some Thessalian cavalry. The banished statesman Cimon now came to the Athenian camp, pitched on Boeotian soil, and, being refused leave to defend his country, exhorted his parti- N 178 ATHENIAN EMPIRE UNDER GUIDANCE OF PERICLES sans to fight valiantly. This act of Cimon prepared the way for his recall; in the battle which followed, his friends fought so stubbornly that none of them survived. There was great slaughter on both sides; but the Lacedaemonians gained the victory. But the battle saved Athens, and the victory only enabled the victors to return by the Isthmus. BORMAY .-ENGRAVING. CO., N.Y.; Campaigns in Bceotia Athens now desired to make a truce with Sparta in order to gain time. No man was more fitted to compass this than the exile Cimon. The people, at the instance of Pericles, passed a decree recalling him; but when Cimon had negotiated the truce, he withdrew from Athens. Two months after the battle, the Athenians made an expedi- tion into Bceotia under the command of Myronides. A decisive battle was fought at (Enophyta, and the Athenians became masters of the whole Boeotian land. The Boeotian cities were not enrolled in the maritime Confederacy of Delos, but were obliged to furnish ATHENIAN EMPIRE AT ITS HEIGHT 1 79 contingents to the Athenian armies. At the same time the Pho- cians entered into the alliance of Athens, and the Opuntian Locrians were constrained to acknowledge her supremacy. Such were the consequences of (Enophyta and Tanagra. Athens could now quietly complete the building of her Long Walls. 5. The Athenian Empire at its Height. — Though the Athenians lost ships and treasure in these daring enterprises, their empire was now at the height of its power. They were even able to make the disaster in Egypt a pretext for removing the funds of the league to the Athenian Acropolis, lest the Persian fleet should capture Delos. The empire of Athens now included a continental as well as a maritime dominion. The two countries which marched with her frontiers, Bceotia and Megara, had become her subjects. Beyond Bceotia, her dominion extended over Phocis and Locris to the pass of Thermopylae. In Argos her influence was pre- dominant; iEgina had been added to her ^Egean empire, the ships of JEgina, to her navy. The Saronic bay had almost been converted into an Attic lake. The great commercial city of the Isthmus was the chief and most dangerous enemy of Athens, and the next object of the policy of Pericles was to convert the Corinthian Gulf into an Attic lake, also, and so hem in Corinth on both her seas. The possession of the Megarid and Bceotia, and especially the station at Naupactus, gave Athens control of the northern shores of the gulf from within the gate up to the Isthmus. But the southern seaboard was still entirely Peloponnesian ; and outside the gate, on the Acarnanian coast, there were posts which ought to be secured. The general 455 b.c. Tolmides made a beginning by capturing the Corinthian colony Chalcis, opposite Patrae. Then Pericles himself conducted an expedition to continue the work of Tolmides. Though no mili- 453 B - c - tary success was gained, the expedition seems to have led to the adhesion of the Achaean cities to the Athenian alliance. It is certain, at least, that shortly afterward Achaea was an Athenian 180 ATHENIAN EMPIRE UNDER GUIDANCE OF PERICLES 450 B.C. 448 B.C. dependency; and for a few years Athenian vessels could sail with a sense of dominion in the Corinthian, as well as in the Saronic, bay. 6. Conclusion of Peace with Persia. — The warfare of recent years had been an enormous strain on the resources of Athens. She wanted a relief from the strain, but after the expedition of Pericles three or four years elapsed before peace was concluded. Lacedasmon and Argos first concluded a treaty of peace for thirty years; and then Cimon, who had returned to Athens, negotiated a truce, which was fixed for five years, between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians. Athens and her allies were now free to resume their warfare against Persia, and Cimon was naturally intrusted with the com- mand. He sailed to Cyprus, where the Phoenician fleet, after putting down rebel- lion in Egypt, was busy reestablishing the authority of Artaxerxes. Siege was laid to Cition, and during the blockade Cimon died. But when the siege had to be raised for lack of food, the Greek fleet encountered the Phoenician and Cilician ships off the Cyprian Salamis, and gained a double victory by land and sea. Yet the victory did not encourage Athens to continue the struggle. War with Persia and war with her enemies in Greece could not be carried on effectually together; and she could only secure peace with the Greeks by surrendering her conquests. Pericles was a strong imperialist, but his aim was to spread the Athenian empire and influence within the borders of Greece, and the death of Cimon had removed the chief advocate of war with Persia. Accord- ingly, peace was made. The Great King undertook not to send ships of war into the ^gean ; Athens gave a pledge securing the coasts of the Persian empire from attack. Coin of Cition, Fifth Century (Reverse). Seated Lion ; Ram's Head [Phoenician Legend: I baalmelek] ATHENIAN REVERSES. THE THIRTY YEARS' PEACE l8l The first act in the strife of Greece and Persia thus closed. All the cities of Hellas which had come under barbarian sway, except in Cyprus, had been reunited to the world of free Hellenic states. 7. Athenian Reverses. The Thirty Years' Peace. — The peace with Persia, however, was not followed by further Athenian expansion; on the contrary, some of the most recent acquisitions began to fall away. Orchomenus and Chaeronea and some other towns in western Bceotia were seized by exiled oligarchs; and it was necessary for Athens to intervene promptly. The general Tolmides went forth with a wholly inadequate number of troops. He took and garrisoned Chaeronea, but did not attempt Orcho- menus. On his way home he was set upon by the exiles from Orchomenus and some others, in the neighborhood of Coronea, and defeated. He was himself slain; many of the hoplites were taken 447 b.c. prisoners; and the Athenians, in order to obtain their release, resigned Bceotia. Thus the battle of Coronea undid the work of (Enophyta. The loss of Bceotia was followed by the loss of Phocis and Locris. Still more serious results ensued. Eubcea and Megara revolted at the same moment; here, too, oligarchical parties were at work. Pericles, who was a general, immediately went to Euboea with the regiments of seven of the tribes, while those of the remaining three marched into the Megarid. But he had no sooner reached the island than he was overtaken by the news that the garrison in the city of Megara had been massacred and that a Peloponnesian army was threatening Attica. He promptly returned, and with difficulty managed to unite his forces with the troops in theMegarid. The return of Pericles disconcerted King Pleistoanax, who com- manded the Lacedaemonians, and he withdrew. Pericles was thus set free to carry out the reduction of Eubcea. Histiaea, the city in the north of the island, was most hardly dealt with, prob- ably because her resistance was most obstinate; the people were driven out, their territory annexed to Athens. But peace was 1 82 ATHENIAN EMPIRE UNDER GUIDANCE OF PERICLES felt to be so indispensable that the Athenians resigned themselves to purchasing a durable treaty by considerable concessions. They had lostMegara, but they still held the two ports, Nisaea and Pagae. These, as well as Achsea, they agreed to surrender, and on this basis a peace was concluded for thirty years between the Athe- nians and the Peloponnesians. All the allies of both sides were enumerated in the treaty, and it was stipulated that neither Athens nor Lacedsemon was to admit into her alliance an ally of the other, while neutral states might join whichever alliance they chose. It was a humiliating peace for Athens, and perhaps would not have been concluded but for the alarm which had been caused by the inroad of the Peloponnesians into Attic territory. While the loss of Boeotia and the evacuation of Achsea might be lightly endured, the loss of the Megarid was a serious blow. For, while Athens held the long walls from Nisaea and the passes of Geranea, she had complete immunity from Peloponnesian invasions of her soil. Henceforth Attica was always exposed to such aggressions. REFERENCES FOR SUPPLEMENTARY READING (Syllabus, 24, 25. Sections 24 a, b, 26) 1. Changes in Government. An excellent brief account is in West, Ancient History, 165-174. Bury, 346-352. Holm, II, xvi. Sources. Aristotle, Athenian Constitution, 28, and following. 2. Foreign Policy ; War with Egypt, Cyprus, and Persia. Bury, 354-355. 35 8 ~36i. Holm, II, 145-146, I75"i79- Sources. Thucydides, I, 104, 109, no (Egypt); 112 (Cyprus). 3. The Athenian Empire. Bury, 352-354, 355-357, 358, 363-367. Abbott, Greece, II, 328-334, 340-344. (Longer and more detailed references are to be found in the standard histories, but either the text, or Bury's History of Greece, gives all that is necessary.) Sources. Thucydides, I, 105, 109, 113-118. Plutarch, Life of Pericles. CHAPTER XI THE IMPERIALISM OF PERICLES i. The Aims of Pericles. — The cities of the Athenian alliance might have claimed, when the Persian War was ended, that they should resume their original and rightful freedom. The fair answer to this claim would have been, that peace would endure only so long as a power was maintained strong enough to stand up against the might of Persia. But in any case Athens was in the full career of an ambitious " imperialist " state. The tributes which she imposed on her subjects were probably not oppressive, and were constantly revised. But there was much that was galling in her empire, to communities in which the love of freedom was strongly developed. Pericles had been the guide of the Athenian people in their imperial policy. But that policy had not been unchallenged. There was a strong oligarchical party at Athens which not only disliked the democracy of their city, but arraigned her empire; and there was one man at least who may claim the credit of having honestly espoused the cause of the allied cities against the un- scrupulous selfishness of his own city. This was Thucydides, the son of Melesias. He maintained that the tribute should be reserved exclusively for the purpose for which it was levied, the defense of Greece against Persia, and that Athens had no right to spend it on other things. It was an injustice that the allies should have to defray any part of the costs of an Athenian cam- paign in Bceotia or of a new temple in Athens. This was a just view, but justice is never entirely compatible with the growth 183 ' 1 84 IMPERIALISM OF PERICLES of a country to political greatness, and Pericles was resolved to make his country great at all hazards. Among the measures which Pericles initiated to strengthen the empire of his city, none was more important in its results than the system of settling Athenian citizens abroad. The colonies which were thus sent to different parts of the empire served as garrisons in the lands of subject allies, and they also helped to provide for part of the superfluous population of Athens. The first of these Periclean cleruchies was established in the Thracian Chersonese, under the personal supervision of Pericles himself. Lands were bought from the allied cities of the peninsula, and a thousand Athenian citizens, chiefly of the poor and unemployed, were allotted farms and assigned to the several cities. The pay- ment for the land was made in the shape of a reduction of the tribute. The policy was naturally popular at Athens, since it provided for thousands of unemployed who cumbered the streets. But it was a policy which was highly unpopular among the allies, in whose territories the settlements were made. The imperialism of Pericles was, indeed, of a lofty kind. His aim was to make Athens the queen of Hellas; to spread her sway on the mainland as well as beyond the seas; and to make her political influence felt in those states which it would have been un- wise and perhaps impossible to draw within the borders of her empire. Shortly before the loss of Bceotia through the defeat of Coronea, Athens addressed to Greece an open declaration of her Parihellenic ambition. She invited the Greek states to send representatives to an Hellenic congress at Athens, for the purpose of discussing certain matters of common interest. To restore the temples which had been burned by the Persians, to pay the votive offerings which were due to the gods for the great deliver- ance, and to take common measures for clearing the seas of piracy — this was the programme which Athens proposed to the consider- ation of Greece. If the congress had taken place, it would have RESTORATION OF THE TEMPLES 185 inaugurated an amphictiony of all Hellas, and Athens would have been the center of this vast religious union. It was a sublime project, but it could not be. It was not to be expected that Sparta would fall in with a project which, however noble and pious it sounded, might tempt or help Athens to strike out new and perilous paths of ambition and aggrandizement. The Athenian envoys were rebuffed in the Peloponnesus, and the plan fell through. 2. The Restoration of the Temples. — It remained then for 450-430 b.c. Athens to carry out that part of the programme which concerned jap ,\v>Spriri»'uf.0.1epsydSff ■----■" -"-' ^SpMgufiCJepsjg //Hi III /'//''''llllll liiilV^^,. ' J iii \\ ft////////iiini»ipmrfffffn », _- Approximate m|Site of Odeum J-^^ \of Pericles SCALE OF YARDS 50 Old Temple of Dionysus (Probably Pisistratean)g3Pj] Later Temple of Dionysus (Post-Periclean) WW & BORMAY, N Y The Athenian Acropolis herself. It devolved upon the city, as a religious duty, to make good the injuries which the barbarian had inflicted upon the habi- tations of her gods, and fully to pay her debt of gratitude to heaven for the defeat of the Mede. In this, above all, was the greatness of Pericles displayed, that he discerned the importance of perform- ing this duty on a grand scale. He recognized that the city by ennobling the houses of her gods would ennoble herself; and that 1 86 IMPERIALISM OF PERICLES she could express her own might and her ideals in no worthier way than by the erection of beautiful temples. (i) The Parthenon. — The rebuilding of the sanctuary of the goddess Athena had already been commenced under Themistocles, but was now resumed on entirely different plans drawn by the architect Ictinus. This temple, known as the Hecatompedos, con- tained but two rooms, between which there was no communica- tion, and was built of native Attic marble from the quarries of Pentelicus. In the eastern room was a statue of the goddess; a colossal figure, arrayed in a golden robe, a helmet on her head, her right hand holding a golden victory, and her left resting on her shield, while the snake Erechthonius was coiled at her feet. This statue, designed by Pheidias, was of wood covered with gold and ivory — ivory for the exposed flesh and gold for the raiment — and hence called chryselephantine. Pheidias also designed and executed the sculpture which made the great temple complete. The two pediments, or triangular gables over the porches, he adorned with scenes from the life of the goddess ; in the eastern one was depicted the story of the birth of Athena, who sprang fully armed from the head of Zeus; while in the western pediment the contest and triumph of Athena over Poseidon was portrayed. In the metopes was shown the battles between the Centaurs and the Giants. But with these Pheidias probably had little to do. The subject of the wonderful frieze which encircled the temple from end to end was the most solemn of all the ceremonies which the Athenians performed in honor of their queen. At the great Panathenaic festival, every fourth year, .they went up in long procession to present her with a new robe. The advance of this procession, starting from the western side, and moving simultane- ously along the northern and southern sides, to meet at the eastern entrance, was vividly shown on the frieze of the Parthenon. (2) The Athena Promachos. — Near the west brow of the Acropolis, looking south west ward, a colossal bronze statue of RESTORATION OF THE TEMPLES 187 Athena was constructed. It was about fifty feet high, and the flashes of the sun on the helmet and lance of the goddess were seen by sailors far out at sea. (3) The Temple of Athena Nike. — Still another temple was built for the goddess. On the extreme southwestern summit of the Acropolis, a small but wonderfully perfect temple was erected Athena and Hephaestus, on the Frieze of the Parthenon (British Museum) to Athena as goddess of victory. In the frieze the motive of the temple was clearly shown, for it depicted the Greeks and Persians in conflict — the battle of Plataea. (4) The Propylea. — The approach to the Parthenon, as de- vised by the architect Mnesicles, occupied the whole west side of the hill. In the center, on the brow of the hill and facing west- 1 88 IMPERIALISM OF PERICLES ward, was to be the entrance with five gates, and on either side two vast columned halls — reaching to the north and south brinks of the hill — in which the Athenians could walk sheltered from sun and rain. Thrown out on the projecting cliffs in front of these halls were to be two spacious wings, flanking the ascent to the central gate. This design was never carried out in full. Though the building was begun and portions of it completed, the jealousy of the priests and the danger of approaching war pre- vented its completion. (5) The Erechtheum. — The oldest shrine on the citadel was the Erechtheum, which as it appears to-day was probably the work of an age later than that of Pericles, though showing the same spirit. The building is of irregular shape and constructed after the Ionic style. Toward the Parthenon extends a wonderful porch, the roof of which is supported by six female figures instead of columns. (6) The Olympian Zeus. — In the field of art Athens partly fulfilled the ambition of Pericles, who, when he could not make her the queen, desired that she should be the instructress, of Hellas. When Pheidias had completed the great statue of Athena in gold and ivory, and had seen it set up in the new temple, he went forth, invited by the men of Elis, to make the image for the temple of Zeus at Olympia. For five years in his workshop in the Altis the Athenian sculptor wrought at the " great chryselephan- tine god," and the colossal image which came from his hands was probably the highest creation ever achieved by the plastic art of Greece. The Panhellenic god, seated on a lofty throne, and clad in a golden robe, held a Victory in his right hand, a scepter in his left. He was bearded, and his hair was wreathed with a branch of olive. Many have borne witness to the impression which the serene aspect of this manifest divinity always produced upon the heart of the beholder. " Let a man sick and weary in his soul, who has passed through many distresses and sorrows, whose pillow is un visited by kindly sleep, stand in front of this image; he will, LITERATURE 1 89 I deem, forget all the terrors and troubles of human life." An Athenian had wrought, for one of the two great centers of Hellenic religion, the most sublime expression of the Greek ideal of god- head. 3. Literature. — (1) The Drama. — Greek tragedy originated from the choruses and songs that were sung in honor of Dionysus. The first Athenian to create a genuine drama was Phrynichus, who took contemporary events for his themes and who was fined, as has been seen, for his Capture of Miletus, which reminded the Athenians of their own misfortunes. But tragedy was made a genuine work of art by ^Eschylus, who lived during the era of the Persian Wars. He improved the art of Phrynichus in many ways; he introduced more actors on the stage, provided costumes, and laid greater stress on the dialogue. For his subjects he took, not contemporary events, but myths and legends, and by means of these taught great moral lessons. Some of his most famous tragedies are The Seven against Thebes, Agamemnon, and Prometheus. Sophocles, however, was the great tragedian of the Periclean age. He is said to have composed more than a hundred dramas, of which seven tragedies have been preserved. Among the most famous of these are Antigone and (Edipus Tyrannies. In scenic details he did not surpass ^schylus, but he displayed far more dramatic skill, and presented a clearer picture to the spectators. Instead of taking for subjects myths and legends, he chose some great spiritual conflict; as in Antigone, between the stubbornness of the king and the self-sacrifice of the princess. (2) Philosophy. — During the sixth century the Ionian cities were the homes of a school of philosophers who sought to solve the problems of the universe. Thales, the astronomer, who was the first to predict an eclipse of the sun, believed he could find the origin of all things in water. His idea, of course, was wrong; but in seeking for one basal element he had given to men the idea of unity. Pythagoras of Samos, who later went to Croton, was 190 IMPERIALISM OF PERICLES a mathematician ; he first recognized the circular form of the earth and knew that the motion of the earth around the sun was only apparent. Heraclitus of Ephesus in many respects fore- shadowed the modern doctrine of evolution. He taught that all things were in a state of growth and decay. But at Athens these doctrines made little headway in this era, and the people still devoutly believed in the old gods and in the old religion. (3) History. — In prose writing the era is famous for the production of the history of Herodotus. Although a native of Halicarnassus, originally a Dorian city, Herodotus was deeply influenced by the Ionic culture. So many of his years were spent in travel that he cannot be claimed by any one city; yet the im- portance of his work to Athens, his high estimation of Pericles, and the reward which the city voted him, connect him closely with Athena. His writings cover the era of the Persian Wars, yet in connection with each Persian conquest the conquered country is described, so that an almost universal history of the period is produced. He interweaves description and narrative, combining sober statement of fact with legend and story so that the book becomes one of absorbing interest. 4. Higher Education. The Sophists. — Since the days of Nestor and Odysseus, the art of persuasive speech was held in honor by the Greeks. With the rise of the democratic commonwealths, it became more important. If a man was dragged into a law-court by his enemies, and knew not how to speak, he was like an un- armed civilian attacked by soldiers in panoply. The power of clearly expressing ideas in such a way as to persuade an audience was an art to be learned and taught. The demand was met by teachers who traveled about and gave general instruction in the art of speaking and in the art of reasoning, and, out of their en- cyclopaedic knowledge, lectured on all possible subjects. They received fees for their courses, and were called " sophists," of which OPPOSITION TO PERICLES 191 name perhaps our best equivalent is "professors." The name acquired a slightly unfavorable color — partly owing to the dis- trust felt by the masses toward men who know too much. But this dislike did not imply the idea that the professors were im- postors, who deliberately sought to hoodwink the public by argu- ments in which they did not believe themselves. The sophists did not confine themselves to teaching. They wrote much; they discussed occasional topics, criticised political affairs, diffused ideas. But the greatest of the professors were much more than either teachers or journalists. They not only diffused but set afloat ideas; they enriched the world with con- tributions to knowledge. They were all rationalists, spreaders of enlightenment; but they were very various in their views and doctrines. Gorgias of Leontini, Protagoras of Abdera, Prodicus of Ceos, Hippias of Elis, Socrates of Athens, each had his own strongly marked individuality. 5. Opposition to Pericles. — The imperialism of Pericles and the improvements at Athens required a large outlay of money, and thus gave the political opponents of Pericles a welcome handle against him. Thucydides accused Pericles not merely of squan- dering the resources of the state which ought to be kept as a reserve for war, but of misappropriating the money of the Confed- eracy for purely Athenian purposes. It is certainly true that some money was taken from the treasury of the Hellenotamiae for the new buildings, but this was only a very small part of the cost, which was mainly defrayed by the treasury of Athena and by the public treasury of Athens. But Pericles, with bold sophistry, argued that the allies had no reason to complain, so long as Athens defended them efficiently. Three years after the Thirty Years' Peace, Thucydides asked the people to decide between them. But the people voted for the ostracism of Thucydides, and hence- 442 b.c. forward Pericles had no opponent of influence to thwart his policy or cross his way. 6. The Piraeus. Athenian Commercial Policy. — The Piraeus 192 IMPERIALISM OF PERICLES had grown to be one of the great ports of Greece, and its defenses were improved by the construction of a new long wall, running parallel and close to the northern wall. The southern or Phaleron wall was now allowed to fall into disrepair. Dry docks, new store- houses, and various buildings for the convenience of shipping were constructed round the three harbors. Athens and her harbor in- creased in population ; the total of the inhabitants of Attica seems to have been at this time about two hundred and fifty thousand (twice as large as the Corinthian state). But nearly half of this number were slaves. .v^rr,HEXs-> v, • -,. ^?# i ' : -: : : ; ;V ; : : ':'-'- : -::';;;'-'---v': ; -'V: : .^ 1. Acropolis 2. Areopagus 3. Agora 4. Pnyx 5. Theatre of Dionysius 6. Temple of Olympian Zeus Athens and the Piraeus Attic fame and commerce were spreading in the west. Her standard of coinage was adopted for the currency of Greek cities in Sicily; Rome sent envoys to her to obtain a copy of Solon's code. Yet the more vital interests of Athens were in the east, connected especially with imports of grain from the Euxine. The price of corn fluctuated with every disturbance in these regions, and it was essential to secure this trade route. Her possession of REVOLT OF SAMOS 1 93 the Chersonese, which Pericles had strengthened, controlled the Hellespont; Byzantium and Chalcedon, members of her league, held the Bosphorus. And Pericles himself sailed with an impos- ing squadron into the Pontus to impress the barbarians of those regions with the power of Athens. The Thracian tribes became united under a powerful king, and c. 450 b. Athens needed to keep a watchful eye on this new power. An important port was the Athenian fortress of Eion, at the mouth of the Strymon, near a bridge over which ran all the trade between Thrace and Macedonia, and to which came down the produce of the gold mines in the "hinterland." A new city, founded here at the bridge on the Strymon, was called Amphipolis, and became 436 b.c. quickly the most important place on the coast. 7. The Revolt of Samos. — After the ostracism of Thucydides, Pericles for nearly fifteen years ruled as absolutely as a tyrant. But his position was entirely based on his moral influence over the sovereign people. He had the power of persuading them to do whatever he thought good, and every year for fifteen years after his rival's banishment he was elected one of the generals. Al- though all the ten generals nominally possessed equal powers, yet the man who possessed the supreme political influence was prac- tically chief of the ten, and had the conduct of foreign affairs in his hands. Pericles was not irresponsible; for at the end of any official year the people could decline to reelect him, and call him to account for his actions. When he had once gained the undis- puted mastery, the only forces which he used to maintain it were wisdom and eloquence. The desire of autocratic authority was doubtless part of his nature ; but his spirit was fine enough to feel that it was a greater thing to be leader of freemen whom he must convince by speech, than despot of subjects who must obey his nod. Five years after the Thirty Years' Peace he was called upon to dis- play his generalship. Athens was involved in a war with one of the strongest members of her Confederacy, the island of Samos. 194 IMPERIALISM OF PERICLES The occasion of this war was a dispute which Samos had with another member, Miletus, about the possession of Priene. Athens decided in favor of Miletus, and Pericles sailed with forty-four triremes to Samos, where he overthrew the aristocracy and established a democratic constitution, leaving a garrison to protect it. But the nobles who had fled to the Early Coin of mainland returned one night and captured the Samos (Ob- garrison. Athens received another blow at the verse). Part same ^ me by fa e revolt of Byzantium. Pericles of a Bull j j sailed speedily back to Samos and invested it with a large fleet. At the end of nine months the city surren- dered. The Samians undertook to pull down their walls, and to surrender their ships, and pay a war indemnity, which amounted to fifteen hundred talents or thereabouts. Byzantium also came back to the Confederacy. REFERENCES FOR SUPPLEMENTARY READING (Syllabus, 85-86) 1. Restoration of the Temples: Sculpture. Botsford, 178-184. West, 175-182. Holm, II, 260-274. Tarbell, F. B., History of Greek Art, 78-197 and 184-202, gives a more detailed account, with excellent illustrations, of the subjects treated in the text. 2. Literature. West, 182-188. Holm, II, 160-163, 2 75~ 2 9°- J e bb, R. C, Primer of Greek Literature, 69-109. Sources. Extracts from the poets may be found in Jennings and John- ston, Half -hours with Greek and Latin Authors. 3. Education. West, 188-19 1. See also Pericles, Funeral Oration. Thucydides, II, 34-46. CHAPTER XII THE WAR OF ATHENS WITH THE PELOPONNESIANS (431-421 B.C.) 435 B.C. i . The Prelude of the War. — The incidents which led up to the " Peloponnesian War" are connected with two Corinthian colonies, Corcyra and Potidaea. (1) Party struggles had taken place in Epidamnus, a colony of Corcyra. The popular party asked help from their mother- city; but Corcyra refused, and Epidamnus turned to Corinth, which sent a squadron of seventy-five ships with two thousand hoplites against the Cor- cyraeans. The powerful navy of Corcyra, however, won a complete victory over the Corinthians outside the Ambracian Gulf. Corinth now began to prepare for a greater effort against her powerful and detested colony. The re- port of the preparations she was making so fright- ened the Corcyraeans that they offered to make an alliance with Athens. Envoys from both Corinth and Corcyra appeared at Athens, and, after two debates, the assembly voted to make a defensive alliance with Corcyra. Ten ships were sent to Corcyra with orders not to fight unless Corcyra or some of the places belonging to it were attacked. A 433 B - c - great and tumultuous naval engagement ensued near the islet of Sybota. A Corcyraean fleet of one hundred and ten ships was ranged against a Corinthian of one hundred and fifty — the out- come of two years of preparation. The right wing of the Corcy- i95 Coin of Cor- cyra, Fifth C ent u RY (Obverse). Head of Hera [Le- gend: kop] 196 WAR OF ATHENS WITH PELOPONNESIANS raeans was worsted, and the ten Athenian ships, which had held aloof at first, interfered to prevent its total discomfiture. In the evening the sudden sight of twenty new Athenian ships on the horizon caused the Corinthians to retreat, and the next day they declined battle. (2) The breach with Corinth forced Athens to look to the security of her interests in the Chalcidic peninsula. The city of Potidaea, which occupies and guards the Isthmus of Pallene, was a tribu- tary ally of Athens, but received its annual magistrates from its mother-city, Corinth. Immediately after the battle of Sybota, Athens required the Potidaeans to raze the city-walls on the south side where they were not needed for protection against Macedonia, and to abandon the system of Corinthian magistrates. The Potidaeans refused; they were supported by the promise of Sparta to invade Attica, in case Potidaea were attacked by Athens. But the situation was complicated by the policy of the Macedonian king, Perdiccas, who organized a general revolt of Chalcidice against Athens; and even persuaded the Chalcidians to pull down their cities on the coast and concentrate themselves in the strong inland town of Olynthus. Thus the revolt of Poti- daea forms part of a general movement in that quarter against the Athenian dominion. The Athenians advanced against Potidaea and gained an ad- 432 b.c c vantage over the Corinthian general, Aristeus, who had arrived with some Peloponnesian forces. They then invested the city. So far the Corinthians had acted alone. Now, seeing the danger of Potidaea, they took active steps to incite the Lacedaemonians to declare war against Athens. Pericles knew that war was coming, and he promptly struck. 432 b.c. Megara had assisted Corinth at the battle of Sybota ; the Athenians passed a measure excluding the Megarians from the markets and ports of their empire. The decree spelt economical ruin to Megara, and Megara was an important member of the Peloponnesian league. 2. Sparta decides upon War. — The allies appeared at Sparta SPARTA DECIDES UPON WAR 1 97 and brought formal charges against Athens of having broken the Thirty Years' Peace and committed various acts of injustice. But it was not the Corcyraean incidents, or the siege of Potidaea, or the Megarian decree, that caused the Peloponnesian War, though jointly they hastened its outbreak; it was the fear and jealousy of the Athenian power. The only question was whether it was the right hour to engage in that unavoidable struggle. The Spartan king, Archidamus, advised delay. But the ephors were in favor of war. It was decided that the Athenians were in the wrong, and this decision necessarily led to a declaration of war. Thucydides makes the Corinthian envoys, at the assembly in Sparta, the spokesmen of a famous comparison. " You have never considered, O Lacedaemonians, what manner of men are these Athenians with whom you will have to fight, and how utterly unlike yourselves. They are revolutionary, while you are con- servative. They are bold beyond their strength; whereas it is your nature, though strong, to act feebly. They are impetuous, and you are dilatory; they are always abroad, and you are always at home." On the present occasion, however, the Athenians did not give an example of promptness in action. It was the object of Sparta to gain time ; accordingly, she sent embassies to Athens with trivial demands. She required the Athenians to drive out the "curse of the goddess," which 'rested on the family of the Alcmaeonidae; the point of this lay in the fact that Pericles, on his mother's side, belonged to the accursed family. Athens replied by equally trivial demands. These amenities were followed by an ultimatum. There was a peace party at Athens, but Pericles carried the day. "We must be aware," he said, " that the war will come; and the more willing we are to accept the situation, the less ready will our enemies be to lay hands upon us." The peoples of Greece were parted as follows on the sides of the two chief antagonists. Sparta commanded the whole Pelopon- nesus, except her old enemy Argos, and Achaea; she commanded 198 WAR OF ATHENS WITH PELOPONNESIANS the Isthmus, for she had both Corinth andMegara; in northern Greece she had Boeotia, Phocis, and Locris; in western Greece, Ambracia, Anactorion, and the island of Leucas. In western Greece, Athens commanded the Acarnanians, Corcyra, and Zacyn- thus, as well as the Messenians of Naupactus ; in northern Greece she had Plataea; and these were her only allies beyond her con- federacy. Of that confederacy Lesbos and Chios were now the only two independent states'. In addition to the navies of Lesbos, Chios, and Corcyra, Athens had three hundred ships of her own. 3. The Theban Attack on Plataea. — The declaration of war between the two great states of Greece let loose smaller enmities. 431 b.c. On a dark, moonless night, in the early spring, a band of three hundred Thebans entered Plataea, invited and admitted by a small party in the city. Instead of at once attacking, they took up their post in the agora and made a proclamation, calling upon the Pla- taeans to join the Boeotian league. The Plataeans were surprised, and acceded to the Theban demand, but in the course of the negotiation discovered how few the enemies were. Breaking down the party- walls between their houses, so as not to attract notice by moving in the streets, they concerted a plan of action. When all was arranged, they attacked the enemy before dawn. The Thebans were soon dispersed. A few escaped. But the greater number rushed through the door of a large building, mis- taking it for one of the town-gates, and were thus captured alive by the Plataeans. The three hundred were only the vanguard of a large Theban force which arrived too late. According to the Theban account, the Plataeans definitely promised to restore the prisoners, if the other troops evacuated their territory. But the Plataeans, as soon as they had conveyed all their property into the city, put their prisoners to death, one hundred and eighty in number. A message had been immediately sent to Athens. The Athenians seized all the Boeotians in Attica, and sent a herald to Plataea bidding them not to injure their prisoners; but the herald found the Thebans < X Q 7. f- SPARTAN INVASIONS. ATHENIAN RETALIATION 1 99 dead. The Athenians immediately set Plataea ready for a siege, and sent a garrison of eighty Athenians. The Theban attack on Platasa was a glaring violation of the Thirty Years' Peace, and it hastened the outbreak of the war. 4. Spartan Invasions. Athenian Retaliation. — The key to the war which now began is the fact that it was waged between a state which was mainly continental and one which was mainly maritime. The land power was obliged to direct its attacks chiefly on the continental possessions of the sea power, while the latter had to confine itself to attacking the maritime possessions of the former. The points at which the Peloponnesians could at- tack Athens with their land forces were Attica itself and Thrace. Accordingly, Attica was invaded almost every year, and there was constant warfare in Thrace. On the other hand, the offensive operations of Athens were mainly in the west of Greece, about the islands of the Ionian Sea and near the mouth of the Corin- thian Gulf. That was the region where they had the best pros- pect, by their naval superiority, of detaching members from the Peloponnesian alliance. Thrace, Attica, and the seas of western Greece were therefore the chief and constant scenes of the war. Pericles returned fully to the policy initiated by Themistocles, of concentrating all the energy of Athens on the development of her naval power. "Let us give up lands and houses," he said, " but keep a watch over the city and the sea." The policy of sacrificing Attica was only part of a well-considered system of strategy. Pericles was determined not to court a great battle, for which the land forces of Athens were manifestly insufficient: on land Bceotia alone was a match for her. His object was to wear out the enemy, not to attempt to subjugate or decisively defeat. When the corn was ripe, in the last days of May, King Archida- mus with two-thirds of the Peloponnesian army invaded Attica. 43 1 Bc - The Athenians brought into the city their families and their goods, while their flocks and herds were removed to the island of Eubcea. The influx of the population in the city caused terrible crowding. 200 WAR OF ATHENS WITH PELOPONNESIANS They seized temples and shrines, and even the ancient enclosure of the Pelargicon was occupied, though an oracle forbade its oc- cupation. Archidamus halted under Mount Parnes, whence he could see in the distance the Acropolis of Athens. The proximity of the in- vaders caused great excitement in Athens, and roused furious opposition to Pericles, who would not allow the troops to go forth against them — except a few flying columns of horse in the im- mediate neighborhood of the city. The invader presently advanced northward, between Mounts Parnes and Pentelicus, to Decelea, and proceeded through the territory of Oropus to Bceotia. The Athenians, meanwhile, had sent ioo ships round the Pelo- ponnesus. The important island of Cephallenia was won over and some towns on the Acarnanian coast were taken. More impor- tant was the drastic measure which Athens adopted against her subjects and former rivals, the Dorians of /Egina. She drove out the ^Eginetans and settled the island with a cleruchy of her own citizens. i^Egina thus became, like Salamis, annexed to Attica. When Archidamus left Attica, Pericles organized a reserve. There had been as much as 9700 talents in the treasury, but the expenses of the buildings on the Acropolis and of the war at Potidasa had reduced this to 6000. It was now decreed that 1000 talents of this amount should be reserved, not to be touched unless the enemy were to attack Athens by sea, and that every year 100 triremes should be set apart with the same object. 5. The Plague. The Death of Pericles. — Next year the Peio- ponnesians again invaded Attica. But the Athenians concerned themselves less with this invasion; they had to contend with a more awful enemy within the walls of their city. The plague had broken out. Thucydides, who was stricken down himself, gives a terrible account of its ravages and the demoralization which it produced in Athens. The inexperienced physicians were unable to treat the unknown virulent disease, which was aggra- vated by the overcrowding, in the heat of summer. The dead lay THE PLAGUE. DEATH OF PERICLES 201 unburied, the temples were full of corpses; and the funeral cus- toms were forgotten or violated. The havoc of the pestilence per- manently reduced the population. The total number of Athenians (of both sexes and all ages) was about 80,000 in the first quarter of the fifth century. Prosperity had raised it to 100,000 by the beginning of the war; but the plague brought it down be- low the old level, which it never reached again. As in the year be- fore, an Athenian fleet attacked the Peloponnesus, but it effected nothing. In Thrace, meanwhile, the siege of Potidaea had been prosecuted throughout the year. The inhabitants had been reduced to such straits that they even tasted human flesh, and in the winter they capitulated. Athens soon afterward colo- nized the place. Meanwhile, the Athenians had been cast into such despair by the plague that they made overtures for peace to Sparta. Their overtures were rejected, and they turned the fury of their disappointment upon Athena contemplating a Stele (Acropolis Museum, Athens) 202 WAR OF ATHENS WITH PELOPONNESIANS Pericles. He was suspended from the post of strategos; his accounts were called for and examined by the Council. He was found guilty of "theft" to the trifling amount of five talents ; the verdict was a virtual acquittal, though he had to pay a fine of ten times the amount; and he was presently reelected to the post from which he had been suspended. But Athens was not destined to be guided by him much longer. He had lost his two sons in the plague, and he died about a year later. In his last years he had been afflicted by the indirect attacks of his enemies. Pheidias was accused of embezzling part of the public money devoted to the works on the Acropolis, in which he was engaged, and it was implied that Pericles was cognizant of the dishonesty. Pheidias was condemned. Then the philosopher Anaxagoras, was publicly prosecuted for holding and propagating impious doctrines. Pericles defended his friend, but Anaxagoras was sentenced to pay a fine of five talents, and retired to continue his philosophical studies at Lampsacus. A similar attack was made upon his mistress, Aspasia. The pleading of Pericles procured her acquittal, and in the last year of his life the people passed a decree to legitimize her son. The latest words of Pericles express what to the student of the history of civilization is an important feature of his character — his humanity: "No Athenian ever put on black for an act of mine." 6. The Siege and Capture of Plataea. — In the next summer Archidamus was induced by the Thebans, instead of invading Attica, to march across Cithaeron and lay siege to Plataea. The Plataean land was sacred; and the Spartan king proposed to the Plataeans that they should evacuate their territory until the end of the war; and all should then be restored to them intact. Having consulted Athens, which promised to protect them, the Plataeans refused, and Archidamus began the siege. The Athenians, how- ever, sent no help. By various means the besiegers attempted to batter down the walls, but were defeated by the ingenuity and resolution of the REVOLT OF MYTILENE. NEW LEADERS AT ATHENS 203 besieged. As a last resource they tried to burn out the town. When this device failed, the Peloponnesians saw they would have to blockade Plataea. They built a wall of circumvallation about one hundred yards from the city, and dug two ditches, one inside and one outside this wall. Then Archidamus left part of his army to maintain the blockade during the winter. At the end of an- other year, the Plataeans saw that they had no longer any hope of help from Athens, and their food was running short. They deter- mined to make an attempt to escape. On a dark night amid rain and storm, about half of the garrison boldly sallied out of the city, while their comrades made a diversion on the opposite side. The fugitives succeeded in crossing the ditches and wall and nearly all of them reached Athens in safety. In the following summer, want of food forced the rest to capitulate at discretion to Dec.,428B.c. the Lacedaemonians. Five men were sent from Sparta to decide 427 b.c. their fate. But each prisoner was merely asked, "Have you in the present war done any service to the Lacedaemonians or their allies ?" and it was in vain that the Plataeans implored the Lacedaemonians to look upon the sepulchers of their own fathers buried in Plataean land and honored every year by Plataea with the customary offer- ings. They were put to death, two hundred in number, and twenty-five Athenians. The city was razed to the ground. 7. Revolt of Mytilene. New Leaders at Athens. — Archidamus had invaded Attica for the third time, and had just quitted it, 4 28 B - c « when the news arrived that Mytilene and the rest of Lesbos, with the exception of Methymna, had revolted. The Lesbians had a large fleet; and the Athenians were feeling so severely the effects of the plague and of the war that the rebellion had a good prospect of success, if it had been energetically supported by the Peloponne- sians. Envoys, who were sent to gain their help, pleaded the cause of Lesbos at the Olympian games, which were celebrated this year. Lesbos was admitted into the Peloponnesian league, but no assistance was sent. Meanwhile, the Athenians had blockaded the two harbors of 204 WAR 0F ATHENS WITH PELOPONNESIANS Mytilene, and Paches soon arrived with one thousand hoplites, to complete the investment. Toward the end of the winter, the Spartans sent a general to assure the people of Mytilene that an armament would be despatched to their relief. But the ships never came, and the food ran short. The leaders, in despair, deter- mined to make a sally, and for this purpose armed the mass of the people with shields and spears. But the people, when they got the arms, refused to obey, and demanded that the oligarchs should bring forth the corn, and that all should share it fairly; otherwise, they would surrender the city. This drove the government to capitulate at discretion. The ringleaders of the revolt of Mytilene were sent to Athens. The Assembly met to determine the fate of the prisoners, and de- cided to put to death the whole adult male population, and to enslave the women and children. A trireme was immediately despatched with this terrible command. The fact that the Athenian Assembly was persuaded to press the cruel rights of war so far as to decree the extinction of a whole population shows how deep was the feeling of wrath that prevailed against Mytilene. The revolt had come at a moment when Athens was in dire straits, between the plague and the war; and it was the revolt, not of a subject, but of a free ally. Athens could more easily forgive the rebellion of a subject state which tried to throw off her yoke, than repudiation of her leadership by a nominally independent confederate. For the action of Mytilene was, in truth, an indictment of the whole fabric of the Athenian empire as unjust and undesirable. The calm sense of Pericles was no longer there to guide and en- lighten the Assembly. We now find democratic statesmen of a completely different stamp coming forward to take his place. The Assembly is swayed by men of the people — tradesmen, like Cleon, the leather-merchant, and Hyperbolus, the lamp-maker. These men had not, like Aristides, Cimon, and Pericles, family connec- tions to start and support them; they had no aristocratic tradi- WARFARE IN WESTERN GREECE 205 tions as the background of their democratic policy. They were self-made ; they won their influence in the state by the sheer force of cleverness, eloquence, industry, and audacity. It was under the influence of Cleon that the Assembly vented its indignation against Mytilene by dooming the whole people to slaughter. But when the meeting had dispersed, men began, in a cooler moment, to realize the inhumanity of their action and to question its policy. The envoys of Mytilene, who had been per- mitted to come to Athens to plead her cause, seeing this change of feeling, induced the generals to summon an extraordinary meet- ing of the Assembly for the following morning, to reconsider the decree. Thucydides represents Cleon as openly asserting the prin- ciple that a tyrannical city must use tyrannical methods, and rule by fear. The chief speaker on the other side was a certain Diodo- tus, and he handled the question entirely as a matter of policy- Trie question for Athens to consider, he said, is not what Mytilene deserves, but what it is expedient for Athens to inflict. If the people of Mytilene, who were compelled to join with their oligarchi- cal government in rebelling, are destroyed, the popular party will everywhere be alienated from Athens. The supporters of Diodotus won their motion by a very small majority, and a trireme was despatched in hot haste to annul the previous savage decree. It arrived barely in time; and the in- habitants were saved. The ringleaders of the revolt, however, were tried and executed at Athens. Having taken away the Lesbian fleet and razed the walls of Mytilene, the Athenians divided the island, excluding Methymna, into three thousand lots, of which three hundred were consecrated to the gods. The rest they let to Athenian citizens as cleruchs, and the land was cultivated by the Lesbians, who paid an annual rent. 8. Warfare in Western Greece. Tragic Events in Corcyra. — While the attention of Greece was directed upon the fortunes of Plataca and Mytilene, in the regions of the west the reputation of 206 WAR OF ATHENS WITH PELOPONNESIANS the Athenian navy had, under Phormio, won a brilliant double victory in the Corinthian Gulf, off Naupactus. Corcyra presently became the scene of war in consequence of a bloody revolution. The prisoners taken by Corinth in the Epidamnian War were released on a promise to conspire against Athens; and leaguing themselves with the oligarchs, they slew the leaders of the democrats who favored Athens. Street fighting followed. A Peloponnesian fleet which came up was driven off by the approach of a stronger Athenian armament, and the demo- cratic party now slaughtered the oligarchs wholesale. About six hundred escaped, and establishing themselves on Mount Istone in the northeast of the island, harassed their foes thence for two years, till an Athenian fleet brought help to storm the place. The oligarchs then capitulated on the understanding that Athens was to decide their fate; but, by a trick of the democrats, they were induced to attempt to escape, and were caught, and killed in batches. Thucydides comments on the whole story as a symptom of the terrible rancor which party spirit had generated in the Greek city-states. 9. Nicias and Cleon. Politics at Athens. — At this time Nicias, the son of Niceratus, held the chief place as a military authority at Athens. A wealthy conservative slave-owner, who speculated in the silver mines of Laurion, he was one of the mainstays of that party which was bitterly opposed to the new politicians like Cleon. He would have been an excellent subordinate officer, but he had not the qualities of a leader or a statesman. Yet he possessed a solid and abiding influence at Athens through his impregnable respectability, his superiority to bribes, and his scrupulous super- stition, as well as his acquaintance with the details of military affairs. He understood the political value of gratifying in small ways those prejudices of his fellow-citizens which he shared him- self; and he spared no expense in the religious service of the state. He had an opportunity of displaying his religious devotion and his liberality on the occasion of the purification of the island of ATHENIAN CAPTURE OF PYLOS 207 Delos, which was probably undertaken to induce Apollo to stay the plague. The dead were removed from all the tombs, and it was ordained that henceforth no one should die or give birth to a child on the sacred island. An important feature in the political history of Athens in these years was the divorce of the military command from the leader- ship in the Assembly. The tradesmen who swayed the Assembly had no military training or capacity, and they were always at a disadvantage when opposed by men who spoke with the authority of a strategos on questions of military policy. Until recent years the post of general had been practically confined to men of prop- erty and good family. But a change ensued, perhaps soon after the death of Pericles, and men of the people were elected. Cleon was a man of brains and resolution. He was ambitious to rule the state as Pericles had ruled it; and for this purpose he saw clearly that he must gain triumphs in the field as well as in the Assembly. If he was to exercise a permanent influence on the administration, he must be ready, when a good opportunity offered, to undertake the post of strategos; and, supported by the ex- perience of an able colleague, he need not disgrace himself. Such a colleague he might find in Demosthenes, an enterprising com- mander, who had recently distinguished himself by successful warfare in Ambracia. 10. The Athenian Capture of Pylos. — It was doubtless through the influence of Cleon that Demosthenes, though he received no 425 b.c. official command, was sent to accompany a fleet of forty ships which was ready to start for the west, under Eurymedon and Sophocles. We have already seen this fleet at Corcyra assisting the people against the oligarchical exiles who had established themselves on Mount Istone. Demosthenes had a plan in his head for establishing a military post in the western Peloponnesus; and, arriving off the coast of Messenia, he asked the commanders to put in at Pylos. But they had heard that the Peloponnesian fleet had already reached Corcyra, and demurred at any delay. 208 WAR OF ATHENS WITH PELOPONNESIANS Wall "Camp •.. r^, But chance favored the design of Demosthenes. Stress of weather drove them into the harbor of Pylos, and then Demosthenes pressed them to fortify the place. The commanders ridiculed the idea. But the stormy weather detained the ships ; the soldiers were idle ; and at length, for the sake of something to do, they adopted the project of Demosthenes and fell to the work of fortifying Pylos. The promontory of Pylos was surrounded on three sides by the sea and protected on the harbor side by steep cliffs; only a low sand bar connected it with the mainland. The point was easily defensible; and Demosthenes hastened to fortify the unprotected parts with rude walls. When the Spartans heard of this exploit of the Athe- nians, they sent a detach- ment of hoplites to check Demosthenes, and hastily summoned their fleet from Corcyra. Their object was to blockade Demosthenes and prevent Athenian re- enforcements from land- ing. To accomplish this Sieges of Pylos and Sphacteria they landed a band of four hundred and twenty Spartans, each with his attendant Helot on the island of Sphac- teria, which lies south of the promontory; in the meantime, they redoubled their attack upon Demosthenes. In reply to urgent messages of Demosthenes, an Athenian fleet at last came up; and in a hotly fought action in the harbor defeated the Spartan fleet, and thus transformed the siege of Pylos into the blockade of Sphacteria. The Spartans, fearing that noth- Y 0MARATHONISI "SBl {called the Harbor {TiLfjiyv) J$$4» by Thucydides) ^vQ Spartan Camp Well' a. Prehistoric Wail round the top of Mt.Elias. b. The hollow, p. Point at which the Mess- enians landed to climb into the hollow. d. Probable landing place of (. the Athenians. ATHENIAN CAPTURE OF PYLOS 209 ing could be done for their countrymen on the island, asked a truce in order to send ambassadors to Athens. The Athenians agreed, but demanded the Spartan ships as a pledge of good faith. The Assembly at Athens, under the influence of Cleon, made such high demands — the surrender of the harbors of Megara and several other places which they had lost — that the Spartans re- turned and prepared to renew the action. The Athenians, how- ever, refused to restore the ships, on the pretext of some slight in- fraction of the truce, and the blockade continued. It proved a more difficult matter than the Athenians had hoped. Sphacteria was an exposed and dangerous coast for the fleet ; and the Spartans, stimulating the Helots by offers of freedom, used every means to relieve the garrison. At home the Athenians grew impatient. They were sorry they had declined the overtures of the Spartans, and there was a re- action against Cleon. That leader adopted a bold policy. He attacked the strategos, Nicias, asserting that he ought to sail and capture the island; and added boastfully, " I would do it myself if I were commander." Nicias took him at his word, and Cleon was forced to make good his boast. Cleon, however, took the pre- caution to select Demosthenes as his colleague and to take an over- whelming force of hoplites and a large number of light-armed troops. Landing these one night, he succeeded in driving the Spartans to one end of the island, where they were surrounded and forced to surrender to a man. Cleon had performed his promise ; he brought back the captives within twenty days. The success was of political rather than military importance. The Athenians could indeed ravage Lace- daemonian territory from Pylos, but it was a greater thing that they had in the prisoners a security against future invasions of Attica and a means of making an advantageous peace when they chose. It was the most important success gained in the war. In the following year, Nicias captured the island of Cythera, from which he was able to make descents upon Laconia. The loss of p 210 WAR OF ATHENS WITH PELOPONNESIANS Cythera was in itself more serious for Sparta than the loss of Pylos ; but owing to the attendant circumstances, the earlier event made far greater stir. ii. Athenian Expedition to Bceotia. Delium. — In each of the first seven years of the war, Attica was invaded, except twice; on one occasion the attack on Plataea had taken the place of the incursion into Attica, and, on another, the Peloponnesian army was hindered by earthquakes from advancing beyond the Isthmus. Every year, by way of reply, the Athenians invaded the Megarid twice, in spring and in autumn. The capture of Pylos induced them to undertake a bolder enterprise against Megara. This enterprise was organized by the generals, Demosthenes and Hip- pocrates. They succeeded in capturing the post of Nisaea, and the Long Walls, and they would have taken Megara itself but for the arrival of the Spartan general, Brasidas, with whom they feared to risk an engagement. The recovery of Nisaea, which had been lost by the Thirty Years' Peace, was a solid success, and it seemed to the ambitious hopes of the two generals who had achieved it the first step in the recovery of all the former conquests of their city. Hippocrates and Demosthenes induced Athens to strive to win back Bceotia, which she had lost at Coronea. A triple attack was planned. On the southwest Demosthenes was to make an inroad from the Corinthian Gulf, while Chaeronaea, in the extreme west, was to be seized by domestic conspirators; and on the same day Hippocrates, with an Athenian army, was to enter Bceotia from the northeast, and capture Delium. The design, however, was betrayed, and the Boeotians, checking the landing of Demosthenes, and frustrating the plot at Chaeronaea, made a general levy to oppose the army of Hippocrates. Hippocrates, however, had time to reach and fortify Delium. He had a force of 7000 hoplites and over 20,000 light-armed troops. A trench, with a strong rampart and palisade, was drawn round the temple; and the army then left Delium, to return home. ATHENIAN EXPEDITION TO BCEOTIA. DELIUM 211 But about a mile from Delium, they were suddenly attacked by the Bceotarch Pagondas. His army consisted of 7000 hoplites — ■ the same number as that of the enemy — 1000 cavalry, and over 10,000 light-armed men. The Thebans occupied the right wing in the unique formation of a mass twenty-five shields deep; the other contingents varied in depth. The Athenian line was formed with the uniform and regular depth of eight shields. The extreme parts of the wings never met, for watercourses lay between them. Longitude East, 23 c from Greenwich VTT^ ^''^' RMAY .'ENGRAVING CO., N.YV Campaigns in Bceotia But the rest pushed shield against shield, and fought fiercely. On the right the Athenians were victorious, but on the left they could not sustain the enormous pressure of the massed Theban force. But even the victory on the right was made of no effect through the sudden appearance of a squadron of cavalry, which Pagondas, seeing the situation, had sent unobserved round the hill. The Athenians thought it was the vanguard of another army, and fled. Hippocrates was slain, and the army completely dispersed. 212 WAR OF ATHENS WITH PELOPONNESIANS The battle of Delium confirmed the verdict of Coronea. Athens could not hope to be mistress of Bceotia. 12 . The War in Thrace. Athens loses Amphipolis. Brasidas. — The defeat of Delium eclipsed the prestige of Athens, but did not seriously impair her strength. Yet it was a fatal year; and a much greater blow was dealt her in her Thracian dominion. Perdiccas, the shifty king of Macedonia, played a double game between Athens and Sparta. At one time he helped the Chalcidians against Athens; at another he sided with Athens against her revolted allies. He and the Chalcidians (of Olynthus) feared that the success of Pylos might be followed by an increased activity of the Athenians in Thrace, and they sent an embassy to Sparta, request- ing help, and expressing a wish that Brasidas might be the com- mander of whatever auxiliary force should be sent. No Spartans went, but seven hundred Helots were armed as hoplites. Having obtained some Peloponnesian recruits, and having incidentally, as we have already seen, saved Megara, Brasidas marched north- ward. Brasidas was a Spartan by mistake. He had nothing in com- mon with his fellows, except personal bravery, which was the least of his virtues. He had a restless energy and spirit of enterprise, which received small encouragement from the slow and hesitating authorities of his country. He had an oratorical ability which dis- tinguished him above the Lacedaemonians, who were notoriously unready of speech. He was free from political prejudices, and always showed himself tolerant, just, and moderate in dealing with political questions. Besides this, he was simple and straight- forward; men knew that they could trust his word implicitly. But the quality which most effectually contributed to his brilliant career, and perhaps most strikingly belied his Spartan origin, was his power of winning popularity abroad and making himself personally liked by strangers. His own tact and rapid movements, as well as the influence of Perdiccas, enabled Brasidas to march through Thessaly, which NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE 213 mm SAMOTMRACE CH ' £RSONEs0 ^. >j£ THRACIAX^SEA %Mm Wf Longitude 24 East Pom Greenwich 26 ^rj Campaigns of Brasidas was by no means well disposed to the Lacedaemonians. Hurry- ing through Macedonia he reached the Chalcidice, and having secured Acanthus and the other Greek towns, he made an attempt on Am- phipolis, the most impor- tant of the Athenian pos- sessions in that region. This city, owing to the neglect of the generals Thucydides and Eucles, surrendered to Brasidas, and the command of the peninsula was lost to the Athenians. Having secured the Strymon, Brasidas retraced his steps and subdued the small towns on the high eastern tongue of Chalcidice, and gained possession of Torone, the strongest city of Sithonia. 13. Negotiations for Peace. — In the meantime, the Athenians had taken no measures to check the victorious winter-campaign of Brasidas. The disaster of Delium had disheartened them, and rendered the citizens unwilling to undertake fresh toil in Thrace ; for in Grecian history we must steadfastly keep in view that we are reading about citizen soldiers, not about professional soldiers. Further, the peace party, especially represented by the generals Nicias and Laches, took advantage of this depression to work in the direction of peace. The Lacedaemonians, on their part, were more deliberately set on peace than the Athenians. Their anxiety to recover the Sphacterian captives increased, and on the other hand they desired to put an end to the career of Brasidas in Chalcidice. They wished to take advantage of the considerable successes he had already won, to extort favorable conditions from Athens before any defeat should undo or reverse his triumphs. Nor was the news of his exploits received at Sparta with unmixed feelings of pleasure; they were rather regarded with jealousy and distrust. Accordingly, the two states agreed on a truce for a 214 WAR 0F ATHENS WITH PELOPONNESIANS year, which would give them time to arrange quietly and at leisure the conditions of a permanent peace. But by the end of the year there was a marked change in public feeling at Athens, and the influence of Cleon was again in the ascendant. He adopted the principle of Pericles that Athens must maintain her empire unimpaired, and he saw that this could not be done without energetic opposition to the progress of Brasi- das in Thrace. When the truce expired, Cleon was able to carry a resolution that an expedition should be made to reconquer Amphipolis. 14. Battle of Amphipolis. — Cleon set sail with thirty ships, bearing twelve hundred Athenian hoplites, and three hundred Athenian cavalry, as well as allies. He gained a considerable success at the outset by taking Torone and capturing the Lace- daemonian governor ; Brasidas arrived too late to relieve it. Cleon went on to the mouth of the Strymon and made Eion his head- quarters, intending to wait there until he had augmented his army by reinforcements. Brasidas, meanwhile, was encamped on the other side of the Strymon on a hill above Amphipolis. Cleon, whose men grumbled at inaction, moved on a reconnaissance close to the walls of Am- phipolis, and only then detected the fact that Brasidas, at sight of his movement, had slipped into the city and was preparing to attack. A retreat was ordered, but carelessly carried out; and Brasidas, suddenly charging at the head of one hundred and fifty hoplites, threw the whole column into disorder. Cleon fled with his men, and was shot down in flight. But elsewhere there was re- sistance, and in the confusion Brasidas received his death wound. He only lived long enough to be assured of a victory, which his death had practically converted into a defeat. The people of Amphipolis gave him the honors of a hero. Sacrifices were offered to Brasidas, and yearly games celebrated in his honor. 15. The Peace of Nicias. — The death of Brasidas removed the chief obstacle to peace ; for no man was competent or disposed to REFERENCES FOR SUPPLEMENTARY READING 21 5 resume his large designs in Thrace. The defeat and death of Cleon gave a free hand to Nicias and the peace party. Negotiations were protracted during autumn and winter, and the peace was definitely concluded about the end of March. The peace, of which Nicias 4 21 B - c « and the Spartan king Pleistoanax were the chief authors, was fixed for a term of fifty years. Athens undertook to restore all the posts which she had occupied during the war against the Peloponnesians, including Pylos and Cythera. But she insisted upon retaining Sollion and Anactorion, ports on the Acarnanian seaboard commanding the communications with Corcyra, and the port of Nisaea. The Lacedaemonians engaged to restore Amphip- olis and to relinquish Acanthus and other cities in Thrace. All captives on both sides were to be liberated. When the terms were considered at Sparta by a meeting of deputies of the Peloponnesian allies, Corinth was indignant at the surrender of Sollion and Anactorion; Megara was furious that Nisaea should be abandoned to the enemy; and Bceotia was un- willing to hand over Panacton, a fortress in Mount Cithaeron which she had recently occupied. Yet Athens could hardly have de- manded less. The consequence was that the peace was only partial; those allies which were politically of most consequence refused to accept it, and they were joined by Elis; the diplomacy of Nicias was a complete failure, so far as it aimed at compassing an abiding peace. REFERENCES FOR SUPPLEMENTARY READING (Syllabus, 86, Sections 27 a, b) (References to more extended histories for the topics treated in this and the next chapter are too long and detailed : it is therefore advised that what supplementary reading be done, be from the sources.) Harrison, Greece, 411-429, gives a spirited account of the period, and Holm, II, 306-349, a moderately detailed one. 2l6 WAR OF ATHENS WITH PELOPONNESIANS Sources. Topics from Thucydides. (i) Arguments of Athens and Cor- inth before the Spartan Assembly, I, 68-78. (2) Funeral Oration of Pericles, II, 34-46. (3) The Plague at Athens, II, 47-54. (4) The Affair at Pylos, IV, 5-41. (5) The Debate concerning Mytilene, III, 37-50. CHAPTER XIII THE DECLINE OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE i. New Political Combinations with Argos. — The Peace of Nicias was a complete failure. Not only did the Corinthians and the other chief allies refuse to accede to it, but the signatories found themselves unable to carry out the terms they had agreed upon. The Chalcidians refused to surrender Amphipolis, and the Spartans could not compel them. Athens, therefore, justly de- clined to surrender the Sphacterian prisoners. Sparta, impatient at all costs to recover them, conceived the device of entering into a defensive alliance with their old enemy. This proposal, warmly supported by Nicias, was accepted, and the captives were at length restored, — Athens still retaining Pylos and Cythera. The alli- ance was a mistake for Athens; she gained nothing by it, and sur- rendered the best security she had for the fulfillment of the terms of the peace. This agreement between Sparta and Athens led directly to the dissolution of the Peloponnesian league. Corinth, Mantinea, and Elis not only considered themselves deserted by their leader, Sparta, but apprehended that, secured by her alliance with Athens, she would have a free hand in the Peloponnesus and would exercise her power despotically. Accordingly, at the in- stigation of Corinth, these Peloponnesian states formed an alliance with Argos, who now enters upon the scene. The Chalcidians of Thrace joined; and thus the two great states of Greece stood face to face with a league which refused to recognize the Peace of Nicias. 2. Renewal of the War. Alcibiades. — In the following year, 420 b.c. these unstable political combinations were upset by the advent of a new force at Athens. Alcibiades, son of Cleinias, joined the demo- 217 2l8 THE DECLINE OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE cratic party, to which, as kinsman of Pericles, he was hereditarily bound . Young and rich , he united extraordinary beauty and talents to a love of ostentation and an insolence which shocked his fellow- citizens. His bravery he had shown, fighting at Delium, where his life was saved by his friend Socrates, the philosopher. This celebrated friendship between men, at every point the opposite of each other, save in talent and courage, was of use to the young statesman as an intellectual training. But Alcibiades was a statesman with no belief in the principles of his party. Only, at present, he saw his way to power through war and conquest, and therefore opposed the peace party. Meanwhile, an anti-Athenian war-party had grown at Sparta, and was seeking to bring about an alliance with Argos. To counter- act this, Alcibiades conceived the idea of a league among the de- mocracies, and negotiated an alliance with Argos and her allies, Elis andMantinea, to last for a hundred years. In the following 420 b.c. summer, this alliance contrived to exclude Lacedaemonians from the Olympian games, on the ground that they had violated the sacred truce by an attack on Lepreon: and Alcibiades won the chariot-race. Thus his power and popularity grew, while Athens and Sparta were estranged, though the Peace of Nicias was not formally broken. 419 b.c. In the following spring, Alcibiades induced the Argives to attack the territory of Epidaurus, but he could not induce the Athenians to support her ally in adequate force. Sparta, in retalia- tion, sent an army under Agis into Argos. The Argive troops confronted Agis in the plain nearMemea, and both generals seem to have been uncertain of the result, for instead of fighting, they made a truce for four months. On both sides there was an outcry, and Alcibiades, arriving at Argos with an army under Laches and Nicostratus, persuaded the allies to disregard the truce. 418 b.c. At length, a great battle was fought near Mantinea. The numbers must have approached ten thousand on each side. The Lacedaemonians were victorious, after a moment of uncertainty, FIRST OPERATIONS IN SICILY 219 when one thousand Argives broke through a gap in their line. Both Laches and Nicostratus fell. The victory did much to re- store the prestige of Sparta, which had dwindled since the dis- aster of Sphacteria. It also transformed the situation in the Peloponnesus. The democracy at Argos was replaced by an oli- garchy, and the alliance with Athens was abandoned for an alliance with Sparta. Mantinea, Elis, and the Achaean towns also went over to the victor. Athens was again isolated. 3. First Operations in Sicily. — During the fifth century the eyes of Athenian statesmen often wandered to western Greece beyond the seas. Alliance was formed with Segesta, and subse- quently with Leontini and Rhegium. One general object of Athens was to support the Ionian cities against the Dorian, and especially against Syracuse, the daughter and friend of Corinth. In 427 B.C. Lecntini sent an embassy to Athens appearing for help against Syracuse, who threatened her independence. Nearly all the Dorian cities were with Syracuse, while Leontini was sup- ported by Rhegium, Catane, Naxos, and Camarina. An expedition was sent out under Laches, which induced Messana to join the Athenian league, but effected little else. Another fleet, despatched in 425 B.C. under Eurymedon and Sophocles, was detained by the affairs of Pylos and Corcyra so long that Messana revolted be- fore its arrival. Shortly afterward, however, a sedition in Leon- tini gave an opportunity, and the city was annexed to Syracuse. It became clear that Syracuse merely wanted a free hand for des- potism, and Athens was again asked to intervene, but did not move seriously until she had conquered the island of Melos, which was added to her empire in 416. In that year there arrived at Athens an appeal for help from 416 b.c. Segesta, which was at war with Selinus, and from the Leontine exiles. Athens sent envoys to Sicily, for the purpose of reporting on the resources of Segesta, which had undertaken to provide the expenses of the war. The ambassadors returned with glowing stories of the untold wealth of the people of Segesta.. Nicias wisely 220 THE DECLINE OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE opposed the expedition. The people, however, elated by their recent triumph over Melos, were fascinated by the idea of making new conquests in a distant, unfamiliar world. But having committed the imprudence of not listening to Nicias, the people went on to commit the graver blunder of electing him as a commander of the expedition which he dis- approved. He was appointed as general along with Alcibiades and Lamachus. 4. The Sicilian Expedition. — When the expedition was ready to sail, a mysterious event delayed it. One morning in May it was found that the square stone figures which stood at the entrance of temples and private houses in Athens, and were known as Hermae, had been mutilated. The enemies of Alcibi- ades seized the occasion and tried to impli- cate him in the outrage. Alcibiades demanded the right of clearing himself from the charge, before the fleet started; but his enemies procured the postponement of his trial till his return. The fleet then set sail. Thucydides says that no armament so magnificent had ever before been sent out by a single Greek state. There were 134 triremes, and an immense number of smaller attendant vessels; there were 5100 hoplites; and the total number of combatants was well over 30,000. A halt was made at Rhegium, where disappointments awaited them. Rhegium adopted a reserved attitude which the Athenians did not expect. In the next place, the Athenians had relied on the wealth of Segesta for supporting their expedition, and they now learned that the Segestaeans, collecting all the plate they could get from their own and other cities, had passed the same service from house to house and led the envoys to believe that each of the hosts who sumptuously entertained them possessed a magnificent ser- vice of his own. Coin of Selinus, Fifth Century (Obverse). Riv- er Hypsas sac- rificing at Al- tar ; Snake round the Al- tar; Lake Bird; Leaf of Seli- non [Legend : HY*A2] THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION 221 This discovery was a serious blow, but no one, not even Nicias, seems to have thought of giving up the enterprise. A council of war was held at Rhegium. Nicias proposed to sail about, make some demonstrations, secure anything that could be secured with- out trouble, and give any help to the Leontines that could be given without danger. Alcibiades proposed that active attempts should be made to win over the Sicilian cities by diplomacy, and that then, having so strengthened their position, they should take steps to force Selinus and Syracuse to do right by Segesta and Leontini. But Lamachus regarded the situation from a soldier's point of view. He advised that Syracuse should be attacked at once, while her citizens were still unprepared. Fortunately for Syracuse, Lamachus had no influence or authority except on the field; and, failing to convince his colleagues, he gave his vote to the plan of Alcibiades. Naxos and Catane were won over; the Athenian fleet made a demonstration in the Great Harbor of Syracuse and captured a ship. But nothing more had been done, when a mandate arrived from Athens recalling Alcibiades, to stand his trial for impiety. The people of Athens had reverted to their state of religious agony over the mutilation of the Hermae, and the investigations led to the exposure of other profanations, especially of travesties of the Eleusinian mysteries, in which Alcibiades was involved. The trireme "Salaminia" was sent to summon him to return. He went with the Salaminia as far as Thurii, where he made his es- cape and went into voluntary exile. The Athenians condemned him to death, along with some of his kinsfolk, and confiscated his property. In Sicily, when Alcibiades had gone, the rest of the year was frittered away in a number of small enterprises, which led to nothing. 415 B#c# At length, when winter came, the Syracusan army was lured to Catane for the purpose of making an attack on the Athenian camp, which they were led to believe they would take unawares, while, in the meantime, the Athenian host had gone on board the fleet and 222 THE DECLINE OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE sailed off to the Great Harbor of Syracuse, where Nicias landed. When the Syracusans returned, a battle was fought, the first battle of war, and the Athenians were victorious. A success had been gained, but on the day ensuing, Nicias ordered the whole army to embark and sail back to Catane. He had numbers of excellent reasons — the winter season, the want of cavalry, of money, of allies; and, in the meantime, Syracuse was left to make her prepa- rations. 5. Treachery of Alcibiades. — It seemed, indeed, as if a fatal- ity dogged Athens. Alcibiades and Lamachus, without Nicias, would .probably have captured Syracuse. But, not content with the unhappy appointment of Nicias, she must go on to pluck the whole soul out of the enterprise by depriving it of Alcibiades. That active diplomatist now threw as much energy into the work of ruining the expedition as he had given to the work of organizing it. He went to Sparta, and was present at the Assembly which received a Syracusan embassy, begging for Spartan help. There he urged the Spartans to take two measures: to send at once a Spartan general to Sicily to organize the defense, and to fortify Decelea in Attica, a calamity which the Athenians were always dreading. The speech of this powerful advocate turned the balance at a most critical point in the history of Hellas. The Lacedaemonians were decided by his advice, and appointed an officer named Gylippus to take command of the Syracusan forces. Corinth, too, sent ships to the aid of her daughter-city. 6. The Siege of Syracuse. — The city of Syracuse extended from the island (Ortygia), which had been joined with the mainland, back to the heights (Epipolae) on the north. By a sudden and un- expected movement the Athenians succeeded in capturing, almost without a blow, these heights, and thus held a commanding posi- tion over the city. It was their plan to run two walls from the Epipolae ; one to the north to the Bay of Thapsos, the other south- ward to the Great Harbor, and thus having cut off Syracuse from aid by land to bring their fleet into action and close the Great SPARTAN INTERVENTION 223 Harbor. The Syracusans, in vain attempting to check the build- ing of these walls, at length began to build counterwalls. Fre- quent engagements occurred; and in one of these the Syracusans inflicted an irreparable in- jury on their opponents by killing Lamachus. But the Athenians were able to push their works stead- ily southward until Syra- cuse, despairing of resist- ance, offered to make terms. 7. Spartan Intervention. — But all thoughts of sur- render vanished when it was learned that some Corinthian ships were on their way to aid Syracuse, and with them was coming Gylippus, a Spartan gen- eral. Gylippus landed on the northern side of the island, collected a force at Himera, and, through the carelessness of Nicias, en- tered the city from the north. He now took command and directed the Syracusans to attack the northern Athenian wall, which was as yet unfinished; and to build counterworks to pre- vent the Athenians from carrying their wall to the sea. In this he was successful, and the Athenians were forced to abandon all hope of investing Syracuse. In the meantime, the Spartans had acted on the advice of Alcibiades, and had seized and fortified Decelea; thus giving them a base from which they could ravage Attica. The plan was successful; Attica could not be cultivated, The Siege of Syracuse 224 THE DECLINE OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE and Athens was forced to depend for her supplies upon her fleet. In spite of their dangerous position, the Assembly listened to the pleas of Nicias and sent a second large expedition to Syracuse under Eurymedon and Demosthenes. 8. The Defeat of the Athenians. — When Demosthenes arrived, he saw that his hope lay in capturing the Syracusan wall. In his attempts to do this he was defeated, and advised a retreat. But before this could be accomplished, the Syracusan fleet offered battle in the harbor and won such a decisive victory that they were able to close the harbor mouth. To break their barricade of ships the Athenian fleet and army put forth all their strength. They were unsuccessful; were driven back into the middle of the harbor, and then to the shore. All that remained was to retreat overland, and even this hope was slight, as the Syracusans had fortified the passes. Still the army attempted it, and for over a week the wretched force straggled along. At length, after Demos- thenes had been surrounded and forced to surrender, Nicias, to save, if possible, the lives of his once splendid army, surrendered. The prisoners were most harshly treated. After being confined in the stone quarries for seventy days, they were sold as slaves. The expedition had failed; Syracuse had* not been conquered. But Athens suffered more than loss of mere prestige, for the lives and the treasure she had vainly expended permanently weakened her in her struggle with her great rival Sparta. 9. The Revolt of Allies. — After the Sicilian disaster Athens felt the need of a change in her administration. The Lacedaemo- nian post at Decelea stopped cultivation, and forced the closing of the silver mines at Laurion, thus cutting off a main source of revenue. It was perceived that a smaller and more permanent body than the Council of Five Hundred was needed, and accord- ingly the government was intrusted for the time to a board of Ten, named Probuli. At the same time the tribute levied from allies was abolished, and replaced by a tax of five per cent on all sea-borne exports and imports at the harbors of the Confederacy, THE REVOLT OF ALLIES 225 including Piraeus. Thus Athens put herself on a level with her allies in the matter of taxation. But reforms did not avert danger. All of Greece was eager to spring on Athens, and her subject allies sent to Sparta declaring their willingness to revolt. Thus Sparta was forced into a naval policy, and decided to equip a fleet. Athens also spent the winter in ship-building. At the same time Persia entered again on the stage of Greek history, with the object of regaining the coast cities of Asia Minor, by playing off one Greek power against another. Tissaphernes, satrap of Sardis, and Pharnabazus, satrap of Hel- lespontine Phrygia, sent messengers urging Sparta to action and promising alliance, in order to wrest from Athens her Asiatic dominions. The revolt was begun by Chios, when a few Spartan ships appeared; Miletus, Teos, Lebedus, Mytilene, and others 4 I2B - C - quickly joined. This successful beginning led to the treaty of Miletus between Sparta and Persia. In the hope of humbling to the dust her de- tested rival, the city of Leonidas now sold to the barbarian the freedom of her fellow- Greeks of Asia. Sparta recognized the right of the Great King to all the dominion which belonged to him and his forefathers, and he undertook to supply the pay for the seamen of the Peloponnesian fleet operating on the Asiatic coast, while the war with Athens lasted. The treaty of Miletus opened up a path in Greek politics, which was to lead the Persian king to the position of arbiter of Hellas. Meanwhile, Athens had sent out a fleet which devastated Chios and won back Lesbos. But Cnidus and Rhodes joined the revolt, and by the beginning of 411 she held on the west coast of Asia little but Lesbos, Samos, Cos, and Halicarnassus. Her empire in Thrace and on the Hellespont was intact, but she was opposed by a strong Peloponnesian fleet with a reinforcement from Sicily Q Coin of Cnidus (Obverse). Head of Aphrodite 226 THE DECLINE OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE subsidized by Persia. Yet dissension had arisen between Sparta and the Persians. Alcibiades was intriguing — first at Miletus and then at Sardis — with Tissaphernes. King Agis of Sparta was his enemy, his life was unsafe, and his object was to break the alliance between Persia and the enemies of Athens, and so pave the way for his restoration to his own country. REFERENCES FOR SUPPLEMENTARY READING (Syllabus, 86, Section 27 b, 1) 1. The Sicilian Expedition. Harrison, 444-458. Bury, 466-484. Holm, II, xxvii. Sources. The account in Thucydides is too long to be used in its entirety, but may well be divided and assigned to sections of the class, as suggested in the Syllabus. Plutarch, Life of Nicias; Life of Alcibiades (first part). CHAPTER XIV THE DOWNFALL OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE i. The Oligarchic Revolution. — At Athens in these months there was distress, fear, and discontent. The opportunity for which the oligarchs had waited so long had come at last. There was a fair show of reason for arguing that the foreign policy had been mis- managed by the democracy, and that men of education and knowledge had not a sufficient influence on the conduct of affairs. The chief of those who desired to see the establishment of a moder- ate policy — neither an extreme democracy nor an oligarchy, but partaking of both — was Theramenes. The extreme oligarchs were ready in the first instance to act in concert with the moderate party for the purpose of upsetting the democracy. The soul of the plot was Antiphon, an eloquent orator. Other active con- spirators were Pisander and Phrynichus, who was one of the commanders of the fleet stationed at Samos. The movement was favored by the Probuli and by most of the officers of the fleet. Moreover, Alcibiades had entered into negotiations with the officers at Samos, promising to secure an alliance with Tissa- phernes, but representing the abolition of democracy as a neces- sary condition. It was voted that Pisander and other envoys should be sent to negotiate a treaty with Tissaphernes and arrange matters with Alcibiades. But it appeared at once that Alcibiades had promised more than he could perform. There had, indeed, been a serious rupture between Tissaphernes and Sparta. But when it came to a question of union with Athens, Tissaphernes proposed im- possible conditions to the Athenian envoys, and then made a new treaty with the Spartans. But this failure altered nothing. Men 227 228 THE DOWNFALL OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE were convinced that some change in the constitution was inevitable. The news that Abydus and Lampsacus had revolted may have hastened the final act. A decree was passed that the Probuli and twenty others chosen by the people should form a commis- sion of thirty who should jointly devise proposals for the safety May, 411 b.c. of the state, and lay them before the Assembly on a fixed day. When the day came, a radical change was brought forward and carried. The sovereign Assembly was to consist in future, not of the whole people, but of a body of about Five Thousand, those who were strongest physically and financially. Pay for almost all public offices was to be abolished. To these revolutionary meas- ures a saving clause was attached: they were to remain in force "as long as the war lasts." When the Five Thousand were elected, they chose a commission of one hundred men to draw up a constitution. The commission thus chosen devised a constitution, but they also enacted that the state should be administered by a Council of Four Hundred till the constitution should be established. The Four Hundred were instituted as merely a provisional government, but the entire administration was placed in their hands, the management of the finances, and the appointment of the magistrates. The Five Thou- sand were to meet only when summoned by the Four Hundred, so that the Assembly ceased to have any significance, and the provisional constitution was an unadulterated oligarchy. 2. Fall of the Four Hundred. The Democracy Restored. — For more than three months the Four Hundred governed the city with a high hand, and then they were overthrown. The sailors in the fleet at Samos rose against the oligarchic officers: the chief leaders of this reaction were Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus. The Assembly, which had been abolished at Athens, was called into being at Samos, and the army, repre- senting the Athenian people, deposed the generals and elected others. They hoped still to obtain the alliance of Persia, through the good offices of Alcibiades, whose recall and pardon were FALL OF THE FOUR HUNDRED 229 formally voted. Thrasybulus fetched Alcibiades to Samos, and he was elected a general, but the hoped-for alliance with Persia was not effected. Negotiations were begun with the oligarchs at Athens, and Alcibiades expressed himself satisfied with the As- sembly of Five Thousand, but insisted that the Four Hundred should be abolished. There was a cleavage in the Four Hundred, the extreme oligarchs on one side, led by Antiphon and Phryni- chus, the moderate reformers on the other, led by Theramenes. While the moderates accepted gladly the proposals of the army at Samos, the extreme party looked to the enemy for support and sent envoys to Sparta for the purpose of concluding a peace. In the meantime, they fortified Eetionea, the mole which formed the northern side of the entrance to the Great Harbor of Piraeus. The object was to command the entrance so as to be able either to admit the Lacedaemonians or to exclude the fleet of Samos. When the envoys returned from Sparta without having made terms, the movement against the oligarchs took shape. Phryni- chus was slain by foreign assassins in the market-place. The sol- diers who were employed in building the fort at Eetionea were instigated by Theramenes to declare against the oligarchy, and, after a great tumult at the Piraeus, the walls of the fort were pulled down. When the agitation subsided, peaceable negotiations with the Four Hundred ensued. A day was fixed for an Assembly to discuss a settlement. But on the very day, just as the As- sembly was about to meet, a Lacedaemonian squadron appeared off the coast of Salamis. Euboea was threatened, and the Athenians depended entirely on Euboea, now that they had lost Attica. The Athenians sent thirty-six ships to Eretria, where they were forced Sept., 411 b.c. to fight at once and were utterly defeated. Euboea then revolted. Athens now had no reserve of ships, the army at Samos was hostile ; Euboea, from which she derived her supplies, was lost, and there was feud and sedition in the city. But the Lacedaemonians let the opportunity slip. An Assembly in the Pnyx deposed the Four Hundred, and voted that the government should be placed in the 230 THE DOWNFALL OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE hands of a body consisting of all those who could furnish them- selves with arms, which body should be called the Five Thousand. Legislators (nomotheta) were appointed to draw up the details of the constitution. Most of the oligarchs escaped to Decelea, but Antiphon was executed. 3. The Restored Democracy. Cyzicus. — The chief promoter of the new constitution was Theramenes, who, from the very be- ginning, desired to organize a government, with democracy and oligarchy duly mixed. His acquiescence in a temporary oligarchy was a mere matter of necessity; and the nickname of Cothurnus — the loose buskin that fits either foot — given to him by the oligarchs was not deserved. The Peloponnesians were now vigorously assisted by Pharna- bazus, who was a far more valuable and trustworthy ally than Tissaphernes. In the spring, Mindarus laid siege to Cyzicus, and the satrap supported him with an army. The Athenian fleet of eighty-six ships succeeded in passing the Hellespont unseen, and in three divisions, under Alcibiades, Theramenes, and Thrasy- bulus, took Mindarus by surprise. After a hard-fought battle both by land and sea, the Athenians were entirely victorious, Mindarus was slain, and about sixty triremes were taken or sunk. A laconic despatch, announcing the defeat to the Spartan ephors, was intercepted by the Athenians: " Our success is over; Mindarus is slain; the men are starving ; we know not what to do." Sparta immediately made proposals of peace to Athens, but the over- tures were rejected. The victory of Cyzicus enabled the democratic party at Athens to upset the organization of Theramenes and restore the old con- stitution. The years following the victory were marked by opera- tions in the Propontis and its neighborhood. The Athenians, under the able and strenuous leadership of Alcibiades, slowly gained ground, till Athens once more completely commanded the Bosphorus. Nearer home, Athens lost Nisaea to the Mega- rians; and Pylos was at length recovered by Sparta. CYRUS AND LYSANDER 23 1 4. Cyrus and Lysander. — But the affairs of the west had begun to engage the attention of the Great King, Darius, who, aware that the jealousy of the two satraps hindered an effective policy, sent down his younger son Cyrus to take the place of Tissaphernes at Sardis, with jurisdiction over Cappadocia, Phrygia, and Lydia. The government of Tissaphernes was confined to Caria. The arrival of Cyrus on the scene marks a new turning-point in the 4°7 b.c. progress of the war. Prince Cyrus was zealous, but his zeal might have been of little use, were it not for the simultaneous appointment of a new Spartan admiral. This was Lysander, who was destined to bring the long war to its close. He gained the confidence of his seamen by his care for their interests, and he won much influence over Cyrus by being absolutely proof against the temptation of bribes, — a quality at which an Oriental greatly marveled. In prosecuting the aims of his ambition Lysander was perfectly unscrupulous, and he was a skillful diplomatist as well as an able general. 5. Return of Alcibiades. Battles of Notion and the Arginusae Islands. — While Cyrus and Lysander were negotiating, Alcibiades, after an exile of eight years, had returned to his native city. He had been elected strategos, and had received an enthusiastic welcome. The citi- zens trusted in his capacity as a general, and they thought that by his diplomatic skill they might still be able to come to terms with Persia. So Coin of Eleu- a decree was passed, giving him full powers for SIS ( Reverse )- 1 , r 1 1, , 1 r Pig on Torch; the conduct of the war, and he was solemnly freed pig's Head from the curse which rested upon him as pro- and Ivy Leaf faner of the Eleusinian rites. He had an oppor- BELOW L Le - r , . , . • , , 1. . . f GEND: EAEY2I] tunity of making his peace with the divinities of Eleusis. Ever since the occupation of Decelea, which he had done so much to bring about, the annual procession from Athens along the Sacred Way to the Eleusinian shrine had been sus- pended. Under the auspices of Alcibiades, who protected the 232 THE DOWNFALL OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE procession by an escort of troops, the solemnity was once more celebrated in the usual way. But a slight incident completely changed the current of feeling in Athens. An Athenian fleet was at Notion, keeping guard on Ephesus, and Lysander succeeded in defeating it and capturing fifteen ships. Though Alcibiades was not present at the battle, he was responsible, and he lost his prestige at Athens. New generals were appointed immediately, and Al- cibiades withdrew to a castle on the Hellespont. Conon succeeded him in the chief command of the navy. The Peloponnesians during the following winter organized a fleet of greater strength than they had had for many years — 140 ships; but Lysander had to make place for a new admiral, Cal- licratidas. Conon, who had only 70 ships, was forced into a battle outside Mytilene and lost 30 triremes in the action. The remainder were blockaded in the harbor of Mytilene. The situa- tion was critical, and Athens did not underrate the danger. The gold and silver dedications in the temples of the Acropolis were melted to defray the costs of a new armament ; and at the end of a month Athens and her allies sent a fleet of 150 triremes to relieve Mytilene. Callicratidas, who had now 170 ships, left 50 to main- tain the blockade and sailed with the rest to meet the foe. A great battle was fought near the islets of the Arginusae, south of Lesbos, and the Athenians were victorious. Seventy Spartan ships were sunk or taken, and Callicratidas was slain. The success had not been won without a certain sacrifice ; twenty- five ships had been lost with their crews. It was believed that many of the men, floating about on the wreckage, might have been saved. The generals were suspended from their office, and summoned to render an account of their conduct. Probably there had been criminal negligence somewhere, and the natural emotion of indignation which the people felt betrayed them into committing a crime themselves. The question was judged by the Assembly, and not by the ordinary courts. Two sittings were held, and the eight generals who had been present at Arginusae BATTLE OF .EGOSPOTAMI 233 were condemned to death and confiscation of property. Six, including Thrasyllus and Pericles, son of the great statesman, were executed; the other two had prudently kept out of the way. The victory of Arginusae restored to the Athenians the command of the eastern JEge&n, and induced the Lacedaemonians to repeat their propositions of peace. Through the influence of the dema- gogue Cleophon,who is said to have come into the Assembly drunk, the offer was rejected. Nothing was left for the Spartans but to reorganize their fleet. It was generally felt that if further Persian cooperation was to be secured and the Peloponnesian cause to be restored, the command of the fleet must again be intrusted to Lysander. But there was a law at Sparta that no man could be admiral a second time. On this occasion the law was evaded by sending Lysander out as secretary, but on the understanding that the actual command lay with him and not with the nominal ad- miral. An unlooked-for event gave him still greater power and prestige. King Darius was very ill, his death was expected, and Cyrus was called to his bedside. During his absence, Cyrus in- trusted to his friend Lysander the administration of his satrapy and the tribute. He knew that money was no temptation to this exceptional Spartan, and he feared to trust such power to a Per- sian noble. 6. The Battle of jEgospotami. — With these resources behind him, Lysander speedily proved his ability. He sailed to the Hel- lespont and laid siege to Lampsacus. The Athenian fleet of one hundred and eighty ships reunited and followed him thither, and anchored at vEgospotami, " Goat's River." It was a bad 405 b.c, end position, as all the provisions had to be fetched from Sestus at a distance of about two miles, while the Peloponnesian fleet was in an excellent harbor with a well-supplied town behind. Sailing across the strait, the Athenians found the enemy drawn up for battle, but under orders not to move until they were attacked, and in such a strong position that an attack would have been unwise. They were obliged to return to iEgospotami. For four days the of summer 234 THE DOWNFALL OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE same thing happened. Each day the Athenian fleet sailed across the strait and endeavored to lure Lysander into an engagement; each day its efforts were fruitless. From his castle in the neigh- borhood Alcibiades descried the dangerous position of the Athenians, and riding over to ^gospotami earnestly counseled the generals to move to Sestus. His sound advice was received with coldness, perhaps with insult. When the fleet returned from its daily cruise to Lampsacus, the seamen used to disembark and scatter on the shore. On the fifth day Lysander sent scout ships, which, as soon as the Athenian crews had gone ashore for their meal, were to flash a bright shield as a signal. When the signal was given, the whole Peloponnesian squadron, consisting of about two hundred galleys, rowed rapidly across the strait and found the Athenian fleet defenseless. There was no battle, no resistance. Twenty ships, which were in a condition to fight, escaped ; the remaining one hundred and sixty were captured at once. It was generally believed that there was treachery among the generals. All the Athenians who were taken, to the number of three or four thousand, were put to death. The chief commander, Conon, who was not among the unready, succeeded in getting away. It would have been madness for the responsible commander to return to Athens with the tidings of such a terrible disaster; and Conon, sending home twelve of the twenty triremes which had escaped, sailed himself with the rest to the protection of Evagoras, the king of Salamis, in Cyprus. Never was a decisive victory gained with such small sacrifice as that which Lysander gained at iEgospotami. 7. Surrender of Athens. — The tidings of ruin reached the Piraeus at night, and "on that night not a man slept." They had now to make preparations for sustaining a siege. But the block- ade was deferred by the policy of Lysander. He did not intend to attack Athens, but to starve it into surrender. Having completed the subjugation of the Athenian empire in the Hellespont and Thrace, and ordered affairs in those regions, Lysander sailed at SURRENDER OF ATHENS 235 length into the Saronic Gulf with one hundred and fifty ships, occupied ./Egina, and blockaded the Piraeus. At the same time the Spartan king Pausanias entered Attica, and, joining forces with Agis, encamped in the Academe, west of the city. But the walls were too strong to attack, and at the beginning of winter the army withdrew, while the fleet remained near the Piraeus. As provisions began to fail, the Athenians made a proposal of peace, offering to resign their empire and become allies of Lacedaemon. The ephors refused to receive the envoys unless they brought more acceptable terms, including the demolition of the Long Walls for a length of ten stades. It was folly to resist, yet the Athenians resisted. The demagogue Cleophon, who had twice hindered the conclusion of peace when it might have been made with honor, now hindered it again. But the situation was hopeless. People were dying of famine, and the reaction of feeling had been marked by the execution of Cleophon. Theramenes was sent to Sparta with full powers. It is interesting to find that during these anx- ious months a decree was passed recalling to Athens an illustrious citizen — the historian Thucydides. An assembly of the Peloponnesian allies was called together at Sparta to determine how they should deal with the fallen foe. The general sentiment was that no mercy should be shown; that Athens should be utterly destroyed and the whole people sold into slavery. But Sparta resolutely rejected the barbarous proposal of the confederacy ; she would not blot out a Greek city which had done such noble services to Greece against the Persian invader. The terms of the peace were: the Long Walls and fortifications of the Piraeus were to be destroyed ; the Athenians lost all their foreign possessions, but remained independent, confined to Attica and Sala- mis; their whole fleet was forfeited; all exiles were allowed to return; Athens became the ally of Sparta, pledged to follow her leadership. When the terms were ratified, Lysander sailed into the Piraeus. The demolition of the Long Walls immediately April, 404 b.c. began. The Athenians and their conquerors together pulled them 236 THE DOWNFALL OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE down to the music of flute-players; and the jubilant allies thought that freedom had at length dawned for the Greeks. It is not to be supposed that all Athenians were dejected and wretched at the terrible humiliation which had befallen their native city. There were numerous exiles who owed their return to her calamity; and the extreme oligarchical party rejoiced in the foreign occupation, regarding it as an opportunity for the sub- version of the democracy. Theramenes looked forward to mak- ing a new attempt to introduce his favorite plan of government. Of the exiles, the most prominent and determined was Critias, a pupil of Gorgias and a companion of Socrates, an orator, a poet, and a philosopher. A combination was formed between the exiles and the home oligarchs; a common plan of action was organized; and the chief democratic leaders were presently seized and imprisoned. The intervention of Lysander was then invoked for the establishing of a new constitution, and, awed by his presence, the Assembly passed a measure that a body of Thirty should be nominated, for the purpose of drawing up laws and managing public affairs until the code should be completed. Critias and Theramenes were among the Thirty who were appointed. 8. Rule of the Thirty. — The first measures of the Thirty were to appoint a Council of Five Hundred, consisting of strong sup- porters of oligarchy, invested with the judicial functions which had before belonged to the people. The chief democrats, who on the fall of Athens had opposed the establishment of an oligarchy, were then seized, tried by the Council, and condemned to death for conspiracy. So far there was unanimity; but Theramenes and his party were opposed to the reign of terror which followed. The Thirty had announced as part of their programme that they would purge the city of wrong-doers. They put to death a number of men of bad character; but they presently proceeded to execute, with or without trial, even men of oligarchical views. The man whom perhaps they had most reason to fear, Alcibiades, had fled RULE OF THE THIRTY 237 from his Hellespontine castle to the protection of Pharnabazus. The oligarchs passed a decree of banishment against him, and soon afterward he was murdered, by the order of Pharnabazus, who acted at the suggestion of Lysander, and it was said that Lysander was instigated by the tyrants of Athens. To the motives of fear and revenge was soon added the appetite for plunder; and some men were executed because they were rich. To these judicial murders and this organized system of plunder- ing, Theramenes was unreservedly opposed. The majority of the Council shared his disapprobation; and he would have been able to establish a moderate constitution, but for the ability and strength of Critias. His representations, indeed, induced the Thirty to create a body of three thousand citizens, who had the privilege of bearing arms and the right of being tried by the Council. In the meantime, the exiles whom the oligarchy had driven from Athens were not idle. They had found refuge in those neighboring states — Corinth, Megara, and Thebes — which had been bitter foes of Athens, but were dissatisfied with the high-handed pro- ceedings of Sparta, who would not give them a share in the spoils of the war. These states were not only ready to grant hospitality to Athenian exiles, but to lend some help toward delivering their city from the oppression of the tyrants. The first step was made from Thebes. Thrasybulus and Anytus, with a band of seventy exiles, seized the Attic fortress of Phyle, in the Parnes range, close to the Boeotian frontier, and put into a state of defense the strong stone walls, whose ruins are still there. The oligarchs were now in a dangerous position, menaced with- out by an enemy against whom their attack had failed, menaced within by a strong opposition. They saw that the influence of Theramenes would be thrown into the scale against them, and they resolved to get rid of him. Fearing that he would be acquitted by the Council, Critias struck the name of Theramenes from the list of the Three Thousand, and boldly condemned him to death. After the death of Theramenes, the Thirty succeeded in dis- 238 THE DOWNFALL OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE arming, by means of a stratagem, all the citizens who were not enrolled in the list of the Three Thousand, and expelled them from the city. But with a foe on Attic ground, growing in numbers every day, Critias and his fellows felt themselves so insecure, that they took the step of sending an embassy to Sparta, to ask for a Lacedaemonian garrison. The request was granted, and seven hundred men, under Callibius, were introduced into the Acropolis. 9. Overthrow of the Thirty. Restoration of Democracy. — The Thirty had reason to fear that many of their partisans were wavering. Deciding to secure a place of final refuge in case Athens should become untenable, they seized Eleusis. This measure had hardly been carried out when Thrasybulus de- scended from Phyle and seized the Piraeus. He had now about one thousand men, but the Piraeus, without fortifications, was not an easy place to defend. He drew up his forces on the hill of Muny- chia, at the summit of a steep street. Highest of all stood the darters and slingers, ready to shoot over the heads of the hoplites. Thus posted, Thrasybulus awaited the attack of the Thirty. A shower of darts descended on their heads as they mounted the hill, and, while they wavered for a moment under the missiles, the hoplites rushed down on them, led by a prophet, who had foretold his own May, 403 b.c. death in the battle and was the first to perish. Seventy of the enemy were slain ; among them Critias himself. The oligarchic party now tried a change of constitution, and a meeting of the Three Thousand replaced the Thirty by a new board of Ten, representing the moderate oligarchs. But they could not come to terms with Thrasybulus, who daily gained strength in the Piraeus, and were forced to apply to Sparta. Lysander led an army to Eleusis; but he was now distrusted at Sparta, and the com- mand was transferred from him to King Pausanias. Under the auspices of Pausanias, a reconciliation was effected. There was to be a general pardon, from which were excepted only the Thirty and their successors. Nomothetcz were appointed to revise the constitution, and these lawgivers restored the old democracy of LITERATURE OF THE PERIOD 239 Pericles. Eleusis was still held by the oligarchs as an independent city, but after about two years it was attacked and captured, and Attica was again one state. The amnesty was faithfully observed by the democrats, but for more than three generations no oligar- chical party had a chance of success in Athens. The city did not forget the doings of the Thirty. 10. Literature of the Period. — (1) History. — The historian of the Peloponnesian War was Thucydides. It was his aim to show that the war was the greatest in which Greece had ever engaged, and for this purpose he magnified it as much as possible ; but aside from this rather narrow point of view, his treatment is admirable. He wrote from such careful personal observation and investiga- tion that modern criticism can find little to correct. Unlike Herodotus, Thucydides avoids anecdote, and his sketches of character are nearly always conveyed in speeches which represent not the words of the speakers but the ideas of the historian. Al- though closely connected with the oligarchical party, Thucydides gives the best information concerning the misdeeds of that party at Athens. Xenophon belongs to a later school, influenced and guided by the spirit of Socrates. He was a typical Athenian, keen and alert, interested in politics and philosophy, able to take command of a forlorn hope, as he did in the retreat of the Ten Thousand; and equally able to recount his adventures in the form of an interest- ing and scholarly history. His chief historical writings are the Anabasis and the Hellenica; in addition he wrote the Memorabilia, containing a simple account of the method of instruction and the views of his master Socrates. (2) Drama. — The drama was represented in this age by Eu- ripides and Aristophanes. According to tradition, Euripides was born in the year of the battle of Salamis and lived till 406, and wrote over ninety dramas. Differing from both ^Eschylus and Sophocles, he took his characters from the men of everyday life and sought to convey instruction, not directly but indirectly, by 240 THE DOWNFALL OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE representing life as it is. Among his great works are the Orestes and the Alcestis. Aristophanes was the great writer of comedy, which in Athens filled the place now taken by newspapers and caricatures. He was the spokesman of the dissatisfied, and subjected to ridicule the leaders of the democracy. He was a great poet with wonderful wit and inventive power, but not a reformer nor a man of lofty ideals; his aim was to give amusement and to produce a laugh. The Clouds, the Wasps, the Birds, and the Frogs are among his more important works. REFERENCES FOR SUPPLEMENTARY READING (Syllabus, 87) 1. The Story of the War. A very brief summary in West, 192-196. Bury, 489-507. De- tailed account in Holm, II, 482-508. Source. Plutarch, Alcibiades. 2. Constitutional Changes; Restoration of the Democracy. Bury, 507-514. Holm, III, xxx. 3. Literature. (1) History. Jebb, Primer, 101-109. Holm, II, 435-440; 111,159- 162. (2) Drama. Jebb, 96-101. Holm, 440-452. Sources. Jennings and Johnston, Half-hours with Greek and Latin Authors. CHAPTER XV THE SPARTAN SUPREMACY AND THE PERSIAN WAR i. The Spartan Supremacy. — For thirty years after iEgos- potami, Sparta was engaged in the attempt to maintain and ex- tend her dominion beyond the Peloponnesus. She failed, because neither the Spartan institutions nor the Spartan character were fit to deal with freemen abroad. In each of the cities which had passed from Athenian into Spartan control, a government of ten, called a decarchy, was set up, which derived its authority from a Lacedaemonian harmost with a Lacedaemonian garrison. The cities were thus given over to a twofold oppression. The foreign governors were rapacious, and were practically free from home control; the native oligarchies were generally tyrannical, and got rid of their political opponents by judicial murders ; and both decarchs and harmost played into each other's hands. Meanwhile Lysander, who had established the Spartan empire, was too powerful and too ostentatious to be endured at Sparta. He was recalled from Samos, where he held a sort of royal court, and a letter from Pharnabazus which he brought, proved to be not an encomium, but an accusation. He was allowed to escape into banishment under the plea of a pilgrimage to the temple of Zeus 403 b.c. Ammon in Libya. But the same influences which had ruined him were at work to ruin Sparta. The empire paid a tribute of a thousand talents yearly, to maintain the Spartan power, and this influx of money, in defiance of the Lycurgean discipline, brought the corruption which that discipline was designed to avoid. 2. The Rebellion of Cyrus and the March of the Ten Thousand. — On the death of Darius, his eldest son, Artaxerxes, succeeded to R 241 242 SPARTAN SUPREMACY AND PERSIAN WAR the throne. When Cyrus, the younger son, returned to his satrapy in Asia Minor, he began to form plans for overthrowing his brother and seizing the throne. He relied largely on an army of Greek mercenaries, which he began to enlist. With this contingent, led by Clearchus, a Spartan, he set forth on his march in the spring of 401. The real purpose of the march was at first carefully concealed from all except Clearchus, and a pretext for the expedition was found in the continual border wars which the satrap was forced to wage. Among those who were induced, by the prospect of high pay, to join the expedition was Xenophon, an Athenian knight, who was one of the pupils and companions of the philosopher Socrates. His famous history of the Anabasis, or the Up-going of the Greeks with Cyrus, and their subsequent retreat, enables us to follow step by step a journey through the inner parts of Asia Minor, into the heart of the Persian empire beyond the Euphrates and the Tigris. Setting out from Sardis, Cyrus marched southeast through Phrygia ; thence, after a detour to the north, southeast again through the Cilician gates, a narrow pass at which his army might have been checked, and so to Tarsus. Here the Greek troops mutinied ; but Clearchus regained his control by showing that they must push on, since retreat was impossible. Through the cowardice of the Persian general, the forces of Cyrus were allowed to march through the narrow pass at the Syrian gates, and in twelve days reached Thapsacus and the Euphrates. Crossing the river they continued for thirteen days through the desert, until they reached Cunaxa. Here they encountered the overwhelming army of the Great King. What might have been a victory for Cyrus was turned into a defeat by his own headlong rashness and the narrow-mindedness of Clear- chus. The Greek contingent carried all before it, but everywhere else the rebel army was defeated, and Cyrus himself was slain. The position of the ten thousand Greeks was most precarious. In the center of the Persian empire, surrounded by the innumer- REBELLION OF CYRUS 243 able hosts of the Great King, and their patron Cyrus dead, they might well have been daunted. To add to their misfortunes Tissaphernes seized and slew Clearchus and four of their other generals. But the Greeks resolved to fight their way back to the sea, and elected other generals, among them Xenophon, and be- gan their long march. Marching up the valley of the Tigris, over the Carduchian Mountains, harassed continually by the army of Tissaphernes and attacked by the savage natives, at length they PARASANGS STADIA 10 20 30 4 50 600 1000 150 ENGLISH MILES 50 100 200 300 BORMAY E. CO., N.Y. Expedition of Cyrus and Retreat of the Ten Thousand reached Armenia. Through the snow, weakened by cold and hunger, the army struggled on until at last the welcome shout of "The Sea, the Sea" heralded the sight of the Propontis, the goal which marked the end of the most dangerous part of their long retreat. From Trapezus, on the shore of the Propontis, they continued their retreat, partly by land and partly by sea, until they reached Chalcedon. Here, instead of disbanding, the army, holding together 244 SPARTAN SUPREMACY AND PERSIAN WAR as a unit, was employed first by a Spartan and then by a Thracian general. At length war broke out between Sparta and Persia, and the Lacedaemonians, mindful of the lesson which the march of The Ten Thousand had taught, employed the remaining six thousand to fight against their former enemy. 3. War of Sparta with Persia. Agesilaus. — Cyrus, when bidding for Greek support, had insti- gated the Ionian cities to revolt from their satrap Coin of Tra- Tissaphernes. After the defeat of Cyrus at Cu- pezus (Ob- naxa? Tissaphernes returned to the ^Egean coast verse). Male , . ._,...,_. Head and attempted to recover the Greek cities. Ine Asiatic Greeks sent to Sparta an appeal for her protection. The relations of Sparta to Persia were no longer friendly, for Sparta had sent seven hundred hoplites to Cyrus. The opportunity of plundering the wealthy satrapies of Pharna- bazus and Tissaphernes was a bait for Spartan cupidity; the prospect of gaining signal successes against Persia appealed to Spartan ambition. These considerations induced Sparta to send an army to Asia, and this army was increased, as already stated, by the remains of the famous Ten Thousand. Taking advantage of a misunderstanding between the two satraps, the general Dercyllidas succeeded in getting into his hands the Troad, — or /Eolis, as it was called, — which served the Spartans against the satrapy of Pharnabazus somewhat as Decelea had served them in Attica ; it was a fortified district in the enemy's country. Dercyllidas was now superseded by a new and leading personage in Greek affairs — King Agesilaus, who had become king of Sparta under exceptional circumstances. When King Agis died, Lysan- der, who had returned to Sparta with revolutionary schemes, de- sired a pliant successor. Leotychidas, son of Agis, was reputed to be illegitimate, and by Lysander's influence Agesilaus, the half- brother of Agis, was made king instead. Agesilaus had always shown himself singularly docile and gentle, and had never put him- self forward in any way. Though strong and brave, he was lame, SPARTAN AGGRESSION. DEATH OF LYSANDER 245 and an oracle bade Sparta "beware of a halt reign." But Lysan- der explained away the oracle, in his eagerness to see an apt tool on the throne. He was mistaken in his man. Agesilaus, under the mask of Spartan discipline, covered a proud and ambitious character. It was arranged that Agesilaus should take the place of Dercyl- 396 b.c. lidas; that he should take with him a force of two thousand freedmen, and a military council of thirty Spartans, including Lysander. Lysander expected that the real command in the war would devolve upon himself. But Agesilaus had no intention of being merely a nominal chief, and inflicted deliberate humilia- tions, till Lysander was sent, at his own request, on a separate mission to the Hellespont, where he did useful work for Sparta. Agesilaus himself made a successful inroad into Phrygia, whence he brought much booty to Ephesus. Having organized a force of cavalry during the winter, he took the field in the spring, and gained a victory over Tissaphernes, who was completely discred- 395 b.c. ited. Tithraustes was sent to the coast to succeed him and put him to death. An offer was now made by Tithraustes to Agesilaus, that the Spartans should leave Asia, on condition that the Greek cities should enjoy complete autonomy, paying only their original tribute to Persia. Agesilaus could not agree without consulting his government at home, and an armistice of six months was concluded. But, meanwhile, the Athenian Conon, burning to be revenged upon Sparta, had been furnished by Pharnabazus with a fleet of eighty sail, and had induced Rhodes to revolt. In the following 394 B -c summer, he met and defeated the Spartan fleet off Cnidus. The Greek cities at once expelled the Spartan garrisons and acknowl- edged the overlordship of Persia. The maritime power of Sparta was destroyed, and the unstable foundations of her empire under- mined. 4. Spartan Aggression. Death of Lysander. — At the same time Sparta was suffering serious checks nearer home. While 246 SPARTAN SUPREMACY AND PERSIAN WAR Agesilaus was meditating wonderful schemes against Persia, war had broken out in Greece between Sparta and her allies. After the battle of the Goat's River, Sparta had kept for herself all the fruits of victory. She further exhibited her despotic temper by her proceedings within the Peloponnesus. Elis had given her ground of offense. King Agis invaded and ravaged the country, and imposed severe conditions on the Eleans. The Spartans in- Longitude East, 23° from Greenwich ENGRAVING. CO.', N.Y.; Campaigns in Bceotia dulged another grudge by expelling from Naupactus and Cephal- lenia the residue of the Messenians, who had settled in those places. In Bceotia, also, Sparta found a pretext for aggression, and a double attack by both Lysander and Pausanias was planned. Thus threatened, Thebes turned for aid to her old enemy. Athens had been steadily recovering a measure of her prosperity, and men of all parties alike voted to seize the opportunitv for at- tempting to break free from Spartan rule. Conon was sailing the "THE CORINTHIAN WAR" 247 southeastern seas, Rhodes had revolted, — the moment must not be lost. So alliance was concluded. Lysander and Pausanias had arranged to meet near Haliartus. Lysander arrived first and attacked the town. From their battle- ments the men of Haliartus could descry a band of Thebans com- ing along the road from Thebes, some time before the danger was visible to their assailants; and they suddenly sallied forth from the gates. Taken by surprise and attacked on both sides, Ly- sander's men were driven back, and Lysander was slain. His 395 B - c - death was a loss to Sparta, but no loss to Greece. Pausanias soon arrived, and his first object was to recover the corpse of his dead colleague; but an Athenian army came up at the same moment to the assistance of the Thebans, under the leadership of Thrasybulus, and a burial truce was granted only on condition that the Peloponnesian army should leave Bceotia. Pausanias spent the rest of his life as an exile at Tegea. 5. "The Corinthian War."— The result of this double blow to the Spartans was the conclusion of a league, fomented by Persia, against her by the four most important states. Thebes and Athens were now joined by Corinth and Argos. This alliance was soon increased by the adhesion of other minor states. The allies, when spring came, gathered together their forces at the Isthmus, and it was proposed by one bold Corinthian to march straight on Sparta, and "burn out the wasps in their nest." Though the Spartans, by a victory near Corinth, were able to check 394 B -c this proposed invasion, the control of the Isthmus was left in the hands of the confederates, who were now free to resist an attack from the north. For Agesilaus was now bearing down upon Bceotia. After the battle of Haliartus, he was recalled by the ephors and forced to give up his plan of Persian conquest. Marching overland through Thrace and Macedonia, he came upon the confederate army at Coronea. On the field where the Boeotians had thrown off Athe- nian rule half a century before, Athenians and Boeotians now joined 248 SPARTAN SUPREMACY AND PERSIAN WAR to throw off the domination of Lacedaemon. A hotly contested battle was fought; and although the Spartans were technically 394 b.c. victorious, the real fruits of the victory were with the confederates, for Agesilaus was forced to evacuate Bceotia. For the next years the war centered around Corinth. Sparta was fighting for dominion beyond the Isthmus, her enemies to keep her within the Peloponnesus. In this the confederates were aided by Pharnabazus, who had not forgiven the Spartans for the injuries inflicted by Agesilaus. He accompanied the fleet of Conon and 393 b.c. ravaged the Spartan territory; and after his return, allowed Conon to rebuild the Long Walls of Athens and to fortify the Piraeus. This completely undid the chief result of the Peloponnesian War. The two long, parallel walls connecting Athens with the Piraeus were rebuilt; the port was again made defensible; and the Athenians could feel that they were a free people once more. The war dragged on; the Spartans were continually attempting to gain command of the Isthmus. That the confederates were able to check the Lacedaemonians was largely due to the genius of the Athenian Iphicrates, who with his light-armed mercenaries was able to harry and wear out the heavy-armed hoplites. Thus the most that the Spartans could do was to keep open the gates of the Isthmus. 6. The King's Peace. — We must now turn from the Isthmus of Corinth to the eastern coasts of the yEgean. The most important event of these years was the recovery of Athenian dominion on the Propontis. Thrasybulus, the restorer of the democracy, gained 389 b.c over to the Athenian alliance the islands of Lesbos, Thasos, and Samothrace, the Chersonesus, and the two cities which com- manded the Bosphorus, Byzantium and Chalcedon. But to act with effect it was necessary to raise money, and the Athenian fleet coasted round Asia Minor, levying contributions. At Aspendus in Pamphylia, a riot broke out and Thrasybulus was slain. Conon, the other of the two men to whom, since Pericles, Athens had owed most, was also lost to her. Sent as an envoy to Tiribazus, 388 b.c he was detained, and died in Cyprus. HIGH-HANDED POLICY OF SPARTA 249 To counterbalance the advantage which Athens was gaining in the contest, Sparta now leagued herself with the foes of liberty. She obtained a reenforcement of twenty triremes from Dionysius, tyrant of Syracuse, and she sent the diplomatist Antalcidas..to make proposals at the court of Susa. Antalcidas was able to persuade Artaxerxes to enforce a peace upon Hellas, which obliged Athens to give up what Thrasybulus had won back. The representatives of the belligerents were summoned to Sardis, and Tiribazus read aloud the edict of his master, showing them the royal seal. It was to this effect : — " King Artaxerxes thinks it just that the cities in Asia, and the islands of Clazomenae and Cyprus, shall belong to him. Further, that all the other Greek cities, small and great, shall be autono- mous; except Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyrus, which shall belong to Athens, as aforetime. If any refuse to accept this peace, I shall make war on them, along with those who are of the same pur- pose, both by land and sea, with both ships and money." The King's peace was inscribed on stone tablets, which were set 387-386 b.c. up in the chief sanctuaries of the Greek states. There was a feeling among many that Greece had suffered a humiliation in having to sub- mit to the arbitration of Persia. Both Spartans and Athenians had alike used Persian help when they could get it, but never before had the domestic conflicts daric (Fourth Cen- of Hellas been settled by barbarian die- tury). Obverse: tation and under a barbarian sanction. Kneeling King with . Bow and Spear. Re- It was Sparta s doing. She constituted verse : Incuse herself the minister of the Great King's will in order to save her own position; and the Greeks of Asia were left to endure oriental methods of government. 7. High-handed Policy of Sparta. — Sparta, having the Isth- mus open to her, and being allied to Persia, was free to exercise her power tyrannically, and she did so in various quarters of Greece. 250 SPARTAN SUPREMACY AND PERSIAN WAR 382 B.C. In the north, a Chalcidian league had been formed about the town of Olynthus, comprising the towns of the Sithonian promon- 385 b.c. tory. The Olynthians now conceived the idea of a confederacy which should embrace the whole Chalcidic peninsula and its neighborhood. They proceeded to coerce those cities which re- fused to join, and Acanthus and Apollonia, who stood out, sent for help to Sparta. The expedition against the Chalcidian confederacy led unex- pectedly to an important incident elsewhere. Phcebidas had been ordered to march through Bceotia with troops for Macedo- nia; and a party in Thebes favorable to Sparta plotted a rev- olution. The plot succeeded perfectly; the Cadmea — the citadel of Thebes — was occupied without striking a blow; and a government friendly to Sparta was established. With the fortress of Thebes in her hands, Sparta might regard her supremacy as secured. But her immediate attention was fixed on the necessity of repressing the dangerous league in the north of Greece, and continuing the measures which had been interrupted by the enterprise of Phcebidas in Bceotia. Teleutias, sent to con- duct the war, was defeated and slain in front of the walls of Olyn- 379 b.c thus. Another general, Polybiadas, was more successful. He forced the Olynthians to sue for peace and dissolve their league. About the same time, the Lacedaemonians were making their heavy hand felt in the Peloponnesus. They ordered Mantinea to pull down her walls; when the citizens refused, Sparta besieged and took the city, and broke it up into five villages, destroying its corporate civic life. At Phlius they ordered the recall of certain Coin of Chalcidice. Obverse: Head of Laureate Apollo. Reverse: Lyre Bound with Fillet [Legend: xaakiaeon] ALLIANCE OF ATHENS AND THEBES 25 I exiles and, when disputes arose, declared war on Phlius, and forced it to receive a Spartan garrison till an oligarchic council, nominated by Agesilaus, should have framed a new constitution. Thus the Lacedaemonians, in alliance with the tyrant Dionysius and the barbarian Artaxerxes, tyrannized over the Greeks for a space. Even Xenophon, the friend of Sparta's king, the admirer of Sparta's institutions, is roused to regretful indignation at Sparta's conduct, and recognizes her fall at the hand of Thebes as a just retribution. 8. Alliance of Athens and Thebes. — The government of Leon- tiadas and his party at Thebes, maintained by fifteen hundred Lacedaemonians in the citadel, was despotic and cruel. Fear made the rulers suspicious and oppressive; for they were afraid of the large number of exiles, who had found a refuge at Athens. That city was now showing the same good-will to the fugitives from Thebes which Thebes, when Athens was in a like plight, had shown to Thrasybulus and his fellows. One of the exiles, named Pelopidas, resolved to take his life in his hands, and found six other associates. There were many in Thebes who were bitter foes of the ruling party, such as Epaminondas, the beloved friend of Pelopidas, but most of them deemed the time unripe. Yet a few were found ready to run the risk ; above all, Phyllidas, who was the secretary of the polemarchs, and therefore the most useful of confederates. The day was fixed for the enterprise. On the evening before, Pelopidas and his six comrades crossed Mount Cithaeron in the guise of huntsmen, mixed with the peasants who were returning from the fields, and got them safely within the gates. The secretary Phyllidas had made ready a great banquet for the Winter, 379- following night, to which he had bidden the polemarchs, tempting 37 8 BC - them by the promise of introducing them to some high-born and beautiful women. During the carouse, a messenger came with a letter for Archias, and said that it concerned serious affairs. "Busi- ness to-morrow," said Archias, placing it under his pillow. On the morrow it was found that this letter disclosed the conspiracy. 252 SPARTAN SUPREMACY AND PERSIAN WAR The polemarchs then called for the women, who were waiting in an adjoining room. Phyllidas said that they declined to appear till all the attendants were dismissed. When no one remained in the dining hall but the polemarchs and a few friends, all flushed with wine, the women entered and sat down beside the lords. They were covered with long veils ; and even as they were bidden lift them and reveal their charms, they buried daggers in the bodies of the polemarchs. For they were none other than Pelopidas and his fellows in the guise of women. Then they went and slew in their houses the two other chief leaders of the oligarchs, and set free the political prisoners. When all this was done, Epaminon- das and the other patriots, who were unwilling to initiate such deeds themselves, accepted the revolution with joy. When day dawned, an assembly of the people was held in the Agora, and the conspira- tors were crowned with wreaths. Three of them, including Pelopi- das, were appointed polemarchs, and a democratic constitution was established. The rest of the exiles and a body of Athenian volunteers presently arrived, on the news of the success. The Spartan commander of the Cadmea had sent hastily for reinforcements, but those that came were repelled. Then, in the first flush of success, the patriots resolved to storm the Cadmea, strong as the place was. But the Lacedaemonian harmosts decided to capitulate at once. Two of these commanders were put to death on their return to Sparta, and the third was banished. King Cleombrotus was immediately sent with an army to Bceotia, but accomplished nothing. The presence of his army, however, backed the demand for repa- ration from Athens. Athens and Sparta were formally at peace. But two Athenian strategi had accompanied the volunteers to Thebes, regardless of their official position. They were sentenced, one to death, the other to banishment, and justly. But Sparta did not show the same spirit in a similar case. Sphodrias, the harmost of Thespiae, conceived the plan of seizing Piraeus, as Phcebidas had seized Thebes. He marched into Attica with a THEBAN REFORMS. EPAMINONDAS 253 force, but the raid was so ill-planned that daylight found him only- halfway, and he retreated, plundering as he went. Athens was furious, but Sparta disowned the raid and promised to punish Sphodrias. But Agesilaus intervened to save him, and, as a con- sequence, Athens allied herself with Thebes and declared war on 378 b.c. Sparta. 9. Theban Reforms. Epaminondas. — At Thebes the attention of the government was chiefly bestowed on military affairs. There was formed a new troop of three hundred hoplites, all chosen young men of the noblest families. Each man had his best friend beside him; so that the Sacred Band, as it was called, consisted of one hundred and fifty pairs of friends, prepared to fight and fall to- gether. In battle, it was to stand in front of the other hoplites. Opportunely for Thebes there had arisen, to guide her to success when her chance came, a man of rare ability. This was Epami- nondas, the friend of Pelopidas, a modest, unambitious man. But the revolution stimulated his patriotism and lured him into the field of public affairs, where his eminent capacity, gradually revealing itself, made him, before eight years had passed, the most influential man in his city. He had devoted as much time to musical as to gymnastic training; and he had a genuine interest in philosophical speculation. Silent by habit, when the need demanded his eloquence was extremely impressive. Exceptional in his indifference to the prizes of ambition, he was also exceptional in his indifference to money, and he died poor. Not less remark- able was his lack of that party spirit which led to so many crimes in Greece. We have already seen that his repugnance to domestic bloodshed kept him from taking a part in the fortunate conspiracy of Pelopidas, 10. The Second Athenian League. — Ever since the battle of Cnidus, Athens had been gradually forming bonds of alliance in Thrace, the /Egean, and the coasts of Asia Minor. The breach with Sparta induced her now to gather together these separate connec- tions into a common league. The league, which was purely de- 254 SPARTAN SUPREMACY AND PERSIAN WAR fensive, was constituted in two parts — Athens on one side, her allies on the other. The allies had their own synedrion or congress, which met in Athens, but in which Athens had no part. It was necessary for the members of the league to form a federal fund; their payments were called syntaxeis ("contributions"), and the word phoros (" tribute"), which had odious memories connected with the Confederacy of Delos, was avoided. But the adminis- tration of the federal fund and the leadership of the federal army were in the hands of Athens. Good fortune has preserved to us the original stone, shattered in about twenty pieces, with the decree which founded the confederacy, and we find the purpose of the league definitely declared: "To force the Lacedaemonians to allow the Greeks to enjoy peace in freedom and independence, with their lands un violated." The chief cities which first joined the new league were Chios, Byzantium, Mytilene, Methymna, and Rhodes; then most of the towns of Eubcea joined, and, what was most im- portant and wonderful, Thebes enrolled her name in the list of the confederates, who amounted to about seventy in all. 1 1 . The Battle of Naxos and the Peace of Callias. — Within four years the Boeotian confederacy was extended over all Boeotia, except Chaeronea and Orchomenus, the harmosts being expelled. More- over, Pelopidas and the Sacred Band routed in a narrow pass at Tegyra, between Orchomenus and Locris, a force of Lacedaemonian troops double their own number, and slew both the Spartan gener- als. This victory over Spartans had, as always, a great moral effect. In the meantime, Sparta had been defeated by sea. A fleet of sixty galleys, under the Spartan Pollis, hindered the corn ships from bringing grain from the Euxine to Piraeus, and threatened Athens with famine. Eighty triremes, under Chabrias, were de- spatched by the Athenians to regain command of the sea, and to reduce Naxos, which had revolted from the league. Pollis, coming to the rescue, was defeated in the sound between Paros and Naxos, and lost all but eleven ships. Even these would have been disabled, had not Chabrias, remembering BATTLE OF NAXOS AND PEACE OF CALLIAS 255 Arginusae, abandoned the action to pick up men in danger of drowning. Next year the fleet was sent to sail round the Peloponnesus, un- der Timotheus, son of Conon — an assertion of naval supremacy. Timotheus won over to the alliance the Molossi, some of the Acar- nanians, Cephallenia, and, above all, Corcyra. Negotiations for a peace with Sparta were then concluded, but the peace was at once broken, and Sparta immediately attempted, in vain, to recover Corcyra. The discouragement of Sparta was increased by a series of earthquakes, and she was anxious for peace. Athens, too, was feeling the war a burden, and growing jealous of Thebes. Thebes had attacked the Phocians, allies of Athens; and, because the recently restored town of Plataea was scheming to be annexed to Attica, a Theban force surprised it, and drove all the Platacans out. Many of them took refuge at Athens. After this Athens took steps for peace, and sent to the congress of Lacedaemonian allies three envoys, of whom the chief were Callistratus and Callias. Thebes also sent ambassadors, one of whom was Epaminondas. A general peace, called the Peace of Callias, was concluded, which recognized the autonomy of every Hellenic city. The Athenian and Lacedaemonian confederacies were thus rendered invalid. No compulsion could be exercised on any city to fulfill engagements as members of a league, though cities might cooperate freely as far as they chose. The question immediately arose whether the Boeotian league was condemned by this doctrine of universal autonomy. Sparta and Athens, of course, intended to condemn it. But it might be contended that Bceotia was a geographical unity, like Attica and Laconia, and had a title to political unity, too. Her representative was Epaminondas, and when Agesilaus asked him curtly: "Will you leave each of the Boeotian towns independent?" he retorted: "Will you leave each of the Laconian towns independent?" The name of Thebes was thereupon struck out of the treaty. 256 SPARTAN SUPREMACY AND PERSIAN WAR So far as Athens and Sparta were concerned, this bargain — which is often called the "Peace of Callias" — put an end to a war which was contrary to the best interests of both. But, al- though Athens was financially exhausted, the war had made her once more Sparta's equal. Sparta had lost as much as Athens had gained; the defeat of Naxos, the defeat of Tegyra, the failure at Corcyra, had dimmed her prestige. After the King's Peace, she had begun her second attempt to dominate Greece ; her failure is confessed by the Peace of Callias. 12. Literature and Art. — Pericles, in a famous speech, declared that Athens was the school of Greece ; yet it was hardly till after Athens lost her empire that she began decisively to influence Greek thought. This influence was due largely to the actual schools of Isocrates and Plato, which attracted men from all quarters to Athens ; but also to a change in Athens herself. The city became Hellenic, and almost cosmopolitan, rather than Athenian, as her literature shows. Freedom, combined with the Attic genius, had led to philosophic speculation, and the result had been the growth of what is called "individualism." By this is meant that the in- dividual citizen no longer looks at the outside world through the medium of his own city. He is a citizen of the world, not a citi- zen of Athens. He refuses to hold certain beliefs or perform cer- tain acts of worship merely because the state into which he is born enjoins this religion. And, since his own life has thus become for him something independent of the city, his duty to his country may conflict with his duty to himself as a man. Patriotism ceases to be the highest virtue. Again, the question arises whether the state is made for the individual or the individual for the state. When that question is put, greater demands are made by the citi- zen for his private welfare. A soldier, for example, will seek service where it is most profitable; as Conon, Xenophon, Iphicrates, and others took the pay of foreign powers. (1) Socrates. — Socrates was the first to insist that a man must order his life by the guidance of his own intellect, without any LITERATURE AND ART 257 regard for mandates of external authority or for the impulses of emotion, unless his intellect approves. Socrates was thus a rebel against authority as such; and he shrank from no consequences. He did not hesitate to show his companions that an old man has no title to respect because he is old, unless he is also wise; or that Portrait Head of Socrates an ignorant parent has no claim to obedience on the mere account of the parental relation. Knowledge and truth were the only masters which he admitted. But what is knowledge and what is truth? The solution of Socrates is, briefly, this. When we make a judgment, we com- 258 SPARTAN SUPREMACY AND PERSIAN WAR pare two ideas ; and in order to do so correctly, it is obvious that these ideas must be clear and distinct. Definition was thus the essential point in the Socratic method for arriving at truth. The application of this method to ethics was the chief occupation of Socrates. He was the founder of utilitarianism. He arrived at this doctrine by analyzing the notion of "good " ; the result of his analysis was that "the good is the useful." Closely connected was the principle that virtue is happiness, and this was the basis of the famous Socratic paradox that no man willingly does wrong, but only through ignorance, for there is no man who would not will his own happiness. The sacred name of democracy was not more sheltered than any- thing else from the criticism of Socrates. He railed, for instance, at the system of choosing magistrates by lot, one of the protections of democracy at Athens. Honest democrats of the type of Thra- sybulus and Anytus regarded him as a dangerous freethinker. They might point to the ablest of the young men who had kept company with him, and say: "Look at Alcibiades, his favorite companion, who has done more than any other man to ruin his country. Look at Critias, who inaugurated the reign of terror." However unjust any particular instance might seem, it is easy to understand how considerations of this kind would lead many practical, unspeculative men to look upon Socrates and his ways with little favor. And from their point of view, they were perfectly right. His spirit, and the ideas that he made current, were an insidious menace to the cohesion of the social fabric, in which there was not a stone or a joint that he did not question. In other words, he was the active apostle of individualism, which led in its further development to the subversion of that local patriotism which had inspired the cities of Greece in her days of greatness. Socrates died five years after the fall of the Athenian empire, and the manner of his death set a seal upon his life. Anytus, the honest democratic politician who had been prominent in the res- toration of the democracy, came forward, with some others, as a LITERATURE AND ART 259 champion of the state religion, and accused Socrates of impiety. The accusation ran: "Socrates is guilty of crime, because he does not believe in the gods recognized by the city, but introduces strange supernatural beings; he is also guilty, because he corrupts the youth." The penalty proposed was death; but the accusers had no desire to inflict it; they expected that, when the charge was lodged in the archon's office, Socrates would leave Attica. But Socrates surprised the city by remaining to answer the charge. The trial was heard in a court of five hundred and one judges, the king-archon presiding, and the old philosopher was found guilty by a majority of sixty. According to the practice of Athenian law, it was open to a defendant, when he was condemned, to pro- pose a lighter punishment than that fixed by the accuser, and the judges were required to choose one of the two sentences. Socrates might have saved his life if he had proposed an adequate penalty, but he offered only a small fine, and was consequently condemned, by a much larger majority, to death. He drank the cup of doom a month later, discoursing with his disciples as eagerly as ever till his last hour. (2) Isocrates. — In this period — during the fifty years after the battle of iEgospotami — the art of writing prose was brought to perfection at Athens. It is to the democratic Athenian law- courts that this development was mainly due. The most illus- trious instructor in oratory at this period was Isocrates. But the school of Isocrates had a far wider scope and higher aim than to teach the construction of sentences or the arrangement of topics in a speech. It was a general school of culture, — a discipline in- tended to fit men for public life. Questions of political science were studied, and Isocrates liked to describe his course of studies as " philosophy." But it was to Plato's school in the Academy that the youths of the day went to study " philosophy " in the stricter sense. The discipline of these two rival schools — for there was rivalry between them, though their aims were different — was what corresponded at Athens to our university education. Isocrates 260 SPARTAN SUPREMACY AND PERSIAN WAR discharged, also, the functions of a journalist of the best kind. Naturally nervous and endowed with a poor voice, he did not speak in the Assembly; but when any great question moved him, he would issue a pamphlet, in the form of a speech, for the purpose of influencing public opinion. Portrait Head of Isoc rates (3) Praxiteles. — The form and features of an age are wont to be mirrored in its art; and one effective means of winning a con- crete notion of the spirit of the fourth century is to study the works of Praxiteles and compare them with the sculptures which issued from the workshop of Pheidias. In the fifth century, apart from a few colossal statues like those which Pheidias wrought for Athens and Olympia, the finest works of the sculptor's chisel went to decorate frieze or pediment. In the fourth century, the sculptor ATHENS UNDER THE RESTORED DEMOCRACY 26 1 developed his art more independently of architecture, and all the great works of Praxiteles were complete in themselves and inde- pendent. And, as sculpture was emancipating itself from the old subordination to architecture, so it also emancipated itself from the religious ideal. In the age of Pheidias, the artist who fashioned a god sought to express in human shape the majesty and immutabil- ity of a divine being. In the fourth century, the deities lose their majesty and changelessness ; they are conceived as physically perfect men and women, with human feelings, though without hu- man sorrows ; they are invested with human personalities. Thus, sculpture is marked by " individualism" in a double sense. Each artist is freer to work out an individual path of his own; and the tendency of all artists is to portray the individual man or woman rather than the type, and even the individual phase of emotion rather than the entire character. 13. Athens under the Restored Democracy. — The general spirit of the Athenians in their political life corresponds to this change. Men came more and more to regard the state as a means for administering to the needs of the individual. We might al- most say that they conceived it as a cooperative society for making profits to be divided among the members. They were consequently more disinclined to enter upon foreign undertakings which were not either necessary for the protection and promotion of their commerce or likely to fill their purses. The fourth century was, therefore, for Athens, an age of less ambition and glory, but of greater happiness and freedom, than the fifth. For while Athens lost her empire, she did not lose her com- merce. The population of Attica had declined; plague and war reduced the number of adult male citizens from at least 35,000 to 21,000. But that was not unfortunate, for there were no longer outsettlements to receive the surplus of the population. In the same period began the system of paying citizens to attend the Assembly. The pay, fixed first at a half a drachma, was raised to a drachma and a half for the regular sessions. The rise 262 SPARTAN SUPREMACY AND PERSIAN WAR shows the increase in prices and general prosperity. Another notable feature was the distribution of "spectacle-money." The practice of giving the poor Athenian the price of his theater ticket had been introduced earlier, perhaps by Pericles. But in the fourth century, distributions of "theoric" money, to be spent on religious pageants, became frequent and large. This theoric fund absorbed the state's surplus revenue, and became so important that a special minister of finance was named to manage it. Heavier taxation was thus occasioned, and the comfort of the poorer burghers was provided for at the expense of the wealthier. The theoric fund was an outward embodiment of the principle that the purpose of the state is the comfort and pleasure of its individual members. To conduct her affairs on these lines, Athens needed men of ability. There was no scope for men of genius. None of her statesmen of this period made a mark in history. The art of war became every year more and more an art, and little could be ac- complished except by generals who devoted their life to the military profession. Such were Timotheus, Chabrias, and above all Iphic- rates. Timotheus was a rich man, and he could afford to serve his country, and his country only. But Chabrias and Iphicrates enriched themselves by taking temporary service under foreign masters ; Iphicrates even went so far as to support the Thracian king, whose daughter he had wedded, against Athens. The attitude of the generals to the city became much more independent when the citizens themselves ceased to serve abroad regularly, and hired mercenaries instead. The hiring of the troops and their organiza- tion devolved upon the general, and he was often expected to provide the means for paying them, too. Here we touch on a vice in the constitutional machine. No systematic provision was made that, when the people voted that a certain thing should be done, the adequate moneys should be voted at the same time. Any one might propose a decree, without responsibility for its execu- tion; and at the next meeting of the Assembly the people might REFERENCES FOR SUPPLEMENTARY READING 263 refuse to allow the necessary supplies. In the same way, supplies might be cut off in the middle of a campaign. This defect had not made itself seriously felt in the fifth century, when the leading generals were always statesmen, too, with influence in the Assembly; but it became serious when the generals were professional soldiers whom the statesmen employed. During the ten years after the Peace of Callias, Athens was actively engaged in a multitude of enterprises of foreign aggrandizement; but she achieved little, and the reason is that her armaments were hardly ever adequate. REFERENCES FOR SUPPLEMENTARY READING (Syllabus, 88) An excellent brief summary of this chapter is to be found in West, 197-206. 1. Supremacy of Sparta. Botsford, 256-261. Bury, 514-517. 2. War with Persia. Botsford, 261-263. Bury, 517-539. Holm, III, 1-14. Sources. Xenophon, Anabasis, I, chs. 8-9 (Battle of Cunaxa) ; IV, ch. 5 (Sufferings of the Greeks). Plutarch, Agesilaus, Lysander. 3. Policy of Sparta in Greece. (1) " Corinthian War." Botsford, 263-266. Bury, 539-554. Holm, III, 35-46, 51-60. (2) High-handed Policy of Sparta. Holm, III, 63-70. Bury, 555-561. (3) Revival of Athens. Bury, 561-574. Holm, III, 84-91. 4. Literature and Art. (1) Socrates. Jebb, 124-128. Holm, III, 27-30. Curtius, IV, 148- 164. Source. Plato, Apology. (Jowett's translation.) (2) Praxiteles. Holm, III, 170-171. Tarbell, Greek Art, 214-230. CHAPTER XVI THE HEGEMONY OF THEBES i. Jason of Pherae and the Battle of Leuctra. — The balance of power in Greece had been swayed for a hundred years by the two rivals, Sparta and Athens. But now" new forces had arisen in the north, and two cities had come into dangerous prominence - — Thebes and Pherae. - The Thessalian cities, which were usually in a state of feud, had been united, and Thessaly had consequently become one of the great powers of Greece. This was the doing of one man. There had arisen at Pherae a despot whose ambition ranged beyond the domestic politics of Thessaly. Jason had established his dominion by means of a well-trained body of six thousand mercenaries, and also, doubtless, by able diplomacy, and finally had become leader of an united Thessaly. The power of the despot extended on one side into Epirus, on the other to Macedonia. Sparta was still regarded as holding the highest position in Greece ; and it was the first object of Jason to weaken her and de- throne her from that place. His second immediate object was to gain control of the key of southern Greece — the pass of Ther- mopylae ; and as this was commanded by the Spartan fortress of Heraclea, these two objects were intimately connected. His obvious policy was to ally himself with Sparta's enemy, Thebes; and Thebes, in her isolated position, leapt at his alliance. Ac- cording to the terms of the Peace of Callias, all parties were to recall their armaments from foreign countries and their garrisons from foreign towns. Athens promptly recalled Iphicrates from 264 JASON OF PHER.E. BATTLE OF LEUCTRA 265 Corcyra, but Sparta, on her side, failed to fulfill the contract. King Cleombrotus had, shortly before, led an army to Phocis, and now, instead of disbanding it, he was ordered to march against Thebes and compel that state to set free the Boeotian cities. Cleombrotus, marching on Thebes itself, found the Theban army in position on the height of Leuctra. The numbers of the two hosts are uncertain; the Lace- daemonians, in any case considerably superior, may have been about eleven, the Thebans about six, thousand strong. But the military genius of Epami- nondas made up for the deficiency in strength. In- stead of drawing out the usual long and shallow line, he made his left wing deep. This wedge, fifty shields deep, of irresistible weight, with the Sacred Band, under the captaincy of Pelopidas, in front, was opposed to the Spartans, who, with Cleombrotus himself, were drawn up on the right of the hostile army. It was on his left wing that Epami- nondas relied for victory; the shock between the Spartans and Thebans would decide the battle. The battle began with an engagement of the cavalry. In this arm the Lacedaemonians were notoriously weak; and now their horsemen, easily driven back, carried disorder into the line of foot. Cleombrotus, who was confident of victory, then led his right wing down the slopes — the center and left being probably impeded in their advance by the cavalry; and on his side Epami- The Battle of Leuctra 266 THE HEGEMONY OF THEBES nondas with the Theban left moved down from their hill, deliber- ately keeping back the rest of the line. The novel tactics of Epami- nondas decided the battle. The Spartans, twelve deep, though they fought ever so bravely, could not resist the impact of the Theban wedge led by Pelopidas. King Cleombrotus fell, and after a great carnage on both sides the Thebans drove their enemies up the slopes back to their camp. A thousand Lacedaemonians had fallen, including four hundred Spartans ; and the survivors acknowledged their defeat by demand- ing the customary truce to take up the dead. But the army remained in its intrenchments on the hill of Leuctra, in the expectation of being reenforced by a new army from Sparta and retrieving the misfortune. The remaining forces of the city were hastily got together, and placed under the command of Archida- mus, son of Agesilaus. Meanwhile, Thebes had sent the news to Thessaly. On receiv- ing it, Jason marched forthwith to the scene of action, at the head of his cavalry and mercenaries, flying so rapidly through Phocis that the Phocians, his irreconcilable enemies, did not realize his presence until he had passed. He could not have reached Leuctra until the sixth or seventh day after the battle. The Thebans thought that with the help of his forces they might storm the Lacedaemonian intrenchments. But for the policy of Jason the annihilation of the enemy or any further enhancement of the The- ban success would have been too much. He dissuaded the The- bans from the enterprise, and induced them to grant a truce to the Lacedaemonians, with leave to retire unharmed. Jason returned to Thessaly, dismantling Heraclea on his way. He set himself to make preparation for a great display of his power at the next Pythian festival, when he proposed to usurp the rights of the Amphictionic board, and preside at the games. But one day as he sat to hear petitions, seven young men approached wran- gling, as if to submit their dispute, and stabbed him where he sat. His brothers, who succeeded, were men of no ability. The death POLICY OF THEBES IN SOUTHERN GREECE 267 of Jason decided that Bceotia, not Thessaly, should succeed to the supremacy of Sparta. 2. Policy of Thebes in Southern Greece, Arcadia, and Messenia. — The defeat of a Lacedaemonian army in the open field by an enemy inferior in numbers was made more impressive by the death of King Cleombrotus; a Spartan king had never fallen in battle since Leonidas. The news agitated every state in the Peloponne- sus. The harmosts, whom Sparta had undertaken to withdraw three weeks before, when she signed the Peace, were now expelled from the cities; there was a universal reaction against the local oligarchies. But it was in Arcadia that the most weighty political results followed. The fall of Sparta was the signal for the Man- tineans to rebuild their walls, desert their villages, and resume city life. Mantinea, arisen from her ruins, and the other towns of Arcadia — with the important exceptions of Tegea, Orchomenus, and Heraea — now agreed to form a Pan- Arcadian federal state. Since none of the Arcadian cities was large enough to be a federal capital, and the selection of one would have caused jealousies, it was de- cided to build a new city, in the western of Arcadia's two large plains, near the sacred mount Lycaeon. Its name, Megalopolis, 370 b.c. was justified by the large circuit of its double wall, into which the surrounding village communities were induced to migrate. To check an attack which Sparta made upon the new confederacy, the Arcadians appealed first to Athens and then to Thebes. Thebes, thinking a united Arcadia would be the best check upon Sparta, sent a force under Epaminondas. When Epaminondas arrived at Arcadia, the Spartans had withdrawn, but he was persuaded to adopt the daring design of making an attack upon Laconia itself. The invaders advanced in four divisions by four roads, converg- ing on Sellasia, and met no serious attempt to block their way. Sellasia was burnt, and the united army descended into the plain on the left bank of the Eurotas. The river, which separated them from Sparta, was swollen with winter rains, and this probably 268 THE HEGEMONY OF THEBES saved the city; for the bridge was too strongly guarded to be safely attacked. Epaminondas marched southward a few miles farther, as far as Amyclae, where he crossed the stream by a ford. But Sparta was now saved. On the first alarm of the coming in- vasion, messages had flown to the Peloponnesian cities which were BORMAY ENGRAVING CO., N.Y. Power of Sparta and Thebes in the Peloponnesus still friendly ; and these had promptly sent auxiliary forces. Their coming added such strength to the defense of Sparta that Epami- nondas did not attack it, but contented himself with marching up defiantly to its outskirts. It was, indeed, a sufficient revenge. The consternation of the Spartans at a calamity which, owing to THE FOUNDATION OF MESSENE 269 the immunity of ages, they had never even conceived as possible, can hardly be imagined. The women, disciplined though they were in repressing their feelings when sons or husbands perished in battle, now fell into fits of distress and despair; for, unlike the women of so many other Greek cities, they had never looked upon the face of an enemy before. 3. The Foundation of Messene. Alliance of Athens and Sparta. — Having ravaged southern Laconia, the allies returned to Arcadia. But, though it was mid- winter, their work was not over yet ; a far greater blow was still to be inflicted on Sparta. Epaminondas led them now into another part of the Spartan tern- CoiN OF messene. Obverse: Head of tory, the ancient Messenia. Demeter, Corn-Crowned. Reverse: The serfs, who belonged Zeus with Thunderbolt and Eagle , ,,,, . [Legend: mE22anion] to the old Messeman race, arose at their coming ; and on the slopes of Mount Ithome the foundations of a new Messene were laid by Epaminondas. The 370-369 b.c. ancient heroes and heroines of the race were invited to return to the restored nation ; the ample circuit of the town was marked out, and the first stones placed, to the sound of flutes. Ithome was the citadel, and formed one side of the town, whose walls of well- wrought masonry descended the slopes and met in the plain below. The Messenian exiles who had been wandering over the Greek world had now a home once more. Thus, not only a new strong- hold but a new enemy was erected against Sparta in Sparta's own domain. All western Laconia was subtracted from the Spartan • dominion; all the periceci and helots became the freemen of a hostile state. In her distress Sparta had asked aid from Athens. A force was sent under Iphicrates, and an alliance was formed. Shortly after this, Epaminondas made a second invasion to aid the enemies of 270 THE HEGEMONY OF THEBES Sparta and gained Sicyon and Pellene. He thought it prudent to retire, however, when he heard of the arrival of two thousand mer- cenaries whom the tyrant of Syracuse had sent to the aid of Sparta. The confederation, however, had made itself truly Pan-Arcadian by the conquest of all the towns within the borders of Arcadia, and had even gained some of the territory belonging to Elis. Against these aggressions Sparta was practically helpless; but one action in which she succeeded in repulsing the Arcadians with a heavy loss while not a Spartan fell, she dignified by the title of the " tear- less battle." 4. Confusion on the Peloponnesus. — Attempts were made at the instigation of Persia to bring about a peace, and the Great King sent from Susa a royal order settling the disputes in the main in the favor of Thebes. But Arcadia would not allow this, and formally protested against the leadership of Thebes. In answer to this Epaminondas invaded the Peloponnesus for the third time, and gained the cities of Achaea for Thebes. An oppressive policy, however, was adopted, and the Achaean cities revolted and became partisans of Sparta. In the same year Thebes wrested Oropus from Athens, and thus forced that city to adopt an even more hostile attitude. An alliance was formed between the Arcadian con- federacy and Athens against Thebes, and thus the confusion was complete. 5. Policy of Thebes in Northern Greece. — In the north the king of Macedonia had forced the cities to recognize his power under the pretense of protecting them against the power of Thessaly. The cities attempted to revolt and appealed to Thebes, while dis- cord in the royal family of Macedonia forced the regent to call on Athens for aid. But Thebes, resolved to oust Athenian influence, despatched Pelopidas to the north, compelled the regent to enter her alliance, and to assure his fidelity by furnishing a number of hostages. Among the young Macedonian nobles who were sent as pledges to Thebes was the boy Philip, who was destined to be the maker of Macedonia. WAR BETWEEN ATHENS AND THEBES 27 1 6. War between Athens and Thebes. — Meanwhile, Athens be- gan to act in the eastern JEgean. The opportunity was furnished by the revolt of her friend Ariobarzanes, the satrap of Phrygia. A fleet of thirty galleys and eight thousand troops was sent under her experienced general, Timotheus. He laid siege to Samos, on which Persia had laid hands, contrary to the King's Peace, and took it at the end of ten months. At the same time he lent assistance to 366 b.c. Ariobarzanes ; and as a reward for these services Athens obtained the cession of Sestus. Sestus was of special value, from its position 3 6 5 B - c on the Hellespont, securing to Athens control at this point over the ships which supplied her with corn from the Euxine coasts. But more than this, she now regained a foothold in the Thracian Chersonese. Thus Athens began to revive her old empire, but in Samos she revealed her designs even more clearly. This island was not treated as a subject ally, but outsettlers were sent to occupy it, and thus the system of cleruchies, which had been the most un- popular feature of the first confederacy, and had been expressly guarded against at the formation of the second confederacy, was renewed. Timotheus was likewise successful in the north. He compelled Methone and Pydna to join the Athenian confederacy; and in the Chalcidic peninsula he made himself master of Potidaea and Torone. It was high time for Thebes to interfere. If the successes of 364-362 b.c. Timotheus were allowed to continue, Athens would soon recover Eubcea, and the adhesion of that island was, from its geographical position, of the highest importance to Bceotia. But in order to check the advance of her neighbor, it would be necessary for Thebes to grapple with her on her own element. By the advice of Epami- nondas, it was resolved to create a navy and enter upon the career of a sea power. A hundred triremes were built and manned and 3 6 4 B -c sent to the Propontis under the Bceotarch, Epaminondas. The sailing of this fleet was a blow to Athens, from the support and en- couragement which it gave to those members of the confederacy which were eager to break their bonds. Byzantium openly re- 272 THE HEGEMONY OF THEBES belled; Rhodes and Chios negotiated with Epaminondas ; and even Ceos, close to Attica itself, defied Athens, but was reduced by Chabrias. Meanwhile, a Theban army had marched against the ally of Athens, Alexander of Pherae, whose hand, strengthened by a mercenary force, had been heavy against the Thessalians. Once more, but for the last time, Pelopidas entered Thessaly at the head of an army, and advanced against Pherae itself. Alexander came forth to meet him with a large force, and i^ was a matter of great importance, for the purpose of barring the Theban advance, to occupy the heights known as Cynoscephalae, or the Dog's Heads, on the road from Pharsalus to Pherae. The armies reached the critical spot nearly at the same time, and there was a rush for the crests. Pelopidas, by a combined assault of horse and foot, at length won the summit and forced the enemy to give way. But in the moment of victory the impetuous general espied the hated despot in whose dungeon he had languished, and yielding to a fit of passion, he forgot the duties of a general and rushed against his enemy. Alexander withdrew into the midst of his guards, and Pelopidas, plunging desperately after him, was overwhelmed by numbers. The death of Pelopidas was not fatal to his followers, who routed the enemy with heavy loss ; but it was a sore blow both to his own Thebes and to Thessaly. In the following year, an army was sent against Pherae, and avenged his death. Alexander was obliged to relinquish all his possessions except his own city and submit to the headship of Thebes. 7. War on the Peloponnesus.' Battle of Olympia. — The Arcadian confederacy was threatened with dissolution. Elis, seek- ing to recover her territory, allied herself with Sparta. Arcadia, in revenge, determined that the next Olympian games should not be held under the time-honored presidency of Elis, but revived the ancient claim of Pisa. To support this move, they sent a force which occupied and fortified the Hill of Cronus above Olym- pia, and when the games came round, the whole army of the con- BATTLE OF MANTINEA. DEATH OF EPAMINONDAS 273 federacy, with contingents from Athens and from Argos, arrived to protect the celebration. The horse-race had been run, and the pentathlon, or contest of five-feats — running, wrestling, hurling the javelin, throwing the disc, and leaping — was in progress, when the men of Elis marched up and attacked. A battle ensued and they were driven back, but (t^ff^^f ^ / s64 B,c ' all Greece was outraged by the violence done at the holy time. Sympathy was on the side of Elis from the first, and far more so when CoiN OF Elis (° b * ..... . . verse). Head of the Arcadians began to use the sacred treas- fera ["Legend- ures of Olympia to pay their army. ^ a] Jealousies were already rife in the federa- tion, and Mantinea seized the excuse of this scandal to secede. In the league itself there arose a party which favored alliance with Sparta rather than to endure to be dependent on Thebes. The Boeotians, to maintain their power in the Peloponnesus, sent a fourth invading army under Epaminondas. He advanced to 362 b.c. Tegea while his enemies were gathering at Mantinea, Tegea's rival. 8. Battle of Mantinea. The Death of Epaminondas. — Agesi- laus led his forces to protect Mantinea, thus leaving Sparta open to attack. Learning this, Epaminondas determined to strike another blow at the now unprotected city and with this in view made a night march from Tegea to Sparta. His plans, however, were betrayed to Agesilaus, who hurried back to defend his capi- tal, and Epaminondas was thwarted a second time. But by this movement Agesilaus had left Mantinea unguarded and Epami- nondas sent his cavalry to surprise that city. This surprise also was foiled by the unexpected appearance of some Athenian troops who drove back the Theban force. Thus foiled in his two projects of surprise, Epaminondas was forced to attack the united enemy at Mantinea. He adopted the same tactics by which he had won at Leuctra. On the T 274 THE HEGEMONY OF THEBES left he placed the Boeotian hoplites, under his own immediate command, i in a deep column, destined to break through the right wing of the enemy before the rest of the armies could come to blows. All fell out as he designed. His cavalry routed their cavalry, and the force of his wedge of hoplites, led by himself, broke through the opposing array and put the Lacedaemonians to flight. The men of Achaea and Elis and the rest, when they saw the flight of the Spartans, wavered before they came into collision with their own opponents. It was a great Theban victory, and yet a chance determined that this victory should be the death-blow to the supremacy of Thebes. As he pursued the retreating foe, at the head of his Thebans, Epaminondas received a mortal thrust from a spear. When the news spread through the field, the pursuit was stayed and the effect of the victory was undone; the troops fell back like beaten men. There was no one to take his place. In his dying moments, before the point of the fatal spear was extracted, Epaminondas asked for Iolaidas and Daiphantus, whom he destined as his successors. He was told that they were slain. " Then," he said, "make peace with the enemy." Peace was made on condition that things should remain as they were ; Megalopolis and Messenia were recognized — the abiding results of Theban policy. Great as were the genius, character, and achievements of Epami- nondas, he did not build to last. He did not create what Bceotia needed — an efficient machinery for the conduct of foreign affairs. He did not seriously grapple with the question whether or no Boeotia should attempt to become a maritime power. Above all he did not succeed in welding Bceotia into a real national unity. His work died with him. Epaminondas was a great general — not a great statesman. REFERENCES FOR SUPPLEMENTARY READING 275 REFERENCES FOR SUPPLEMENTARY READING (Syllabus, 89) 1. Rise of Thebes, Leuctra. Holm, III, 93-103. Bury, 591-598. Curtius, IV, 410-420. 2. Policy of Epaminondas in the Peloponnesus. Holm, III, 105-115. Bury, 596-612. 3. End of Theban Leadership ; Mantinea. Holm, III, 118-128. Bury, 619-626. Curtius, IV, 503-510. CHAPTER XVII THE SYRACUSAN EMPIRE AND THE STRUGGLE WITH CARTHAGE I. Carthaginian Destruction of Selinus and Himera. — The victories of Salamis and Himera were practically simultaneous. In the west as in the east, Greece repulsed the barbarian. But when Persia and Carthage, after long quiescence, saw the greatest city of eastern Greece in deadly conflict with the greatest city of western Greece, Carthage, like Persia, again encroached upon the Greek. Coin of Syracuse, engraved by Cimon (Obverse). Head of Are- thusa [Legend: ape©02a; Sig- nature OF KIMI2N ON HEADBAND] Coin of Acragas (Obverse). Eagle tearing Hare; Shell as Symbol of the Seashore [Le- gend: AKPArANTINfiN] 4IO B.C. At Syracuse, as at Athens, victory over the invader was followed by a democratic movement. Hermocrates, the leading citizen, was indeed an oligarch, but during his absence with the fleet sent to help Sparta in the ^gean, he was banished on the motion of his opponent Diodes. At this juncture a new feud between Segesta and Selinus was the pretext for a new invasion. Segesta appealed to Carthage, where one of the two shophets or judges was 276 RISE OF DIONYSIUS 277 Hannibal, grandson of the Hamilcar who was slain at Himera. At his instance a great expedition was sent against Selinus, which was inadequately fortified; the place was sacked and the people slaughtered. Hannibal now proceeded to his real purpose, ven- geance on Himera. The city had time to prepare, and help came from Syracuse under Diocles. But the Carthaginians, by a strata- gem, drew off Diocles with his fleet for three days, and the town was carried by a desperate assault when the returning ships were actually in sight. Hannibal slaughtered three thousand prisoners to appease the shade of his grandfather, and utterly demolished the town. 2. Rise of Dionysius. — Carthage, determined to subdue all Greek Sicily, made ready another great expedition and attacked Acragas, then at the height of its prosperity. The defense was 406 b.c. conducted by the Spartan Dexippus, and soon after the beginning of the siege the invaders, under Hannibal and Himilco, were de- feated outside the walls by a relieving army from Syracuse. The Punic army, short of supplies, was threatened with disaster; but Hannibal intercepted provision ships coming to the town, and re- versed the situation. The mercenary troops deserted the defenders, and the citizens abandoned their city by night. Acragas became a Carthaginian town. At Syracuse men felt the great jeopardy in which Sicily now stood; and there was one man who saw in this jeopardy the opportunity of his own ambition, — Dionysius, — ■ a man of obscure birth, who had been a clerk in a public office. He had marked himself out by his energy and bravery before the walls of Acragas. He saw the incompetence of the democratic government of his city, and he determined to overthrow it. An assembly was held to consider the situation. Dionysius arose, and in a violent harangue accused the generals of treachery. The generals were deposed, and a new board was appointed, of which Dionysius was one. This was only the first step on the road which was to lead to the tyrannis. He soon began to discredit his col- leagues; and spread reports that they were disloyal to Syracuse. 278 SYRACUSAN EMPIRE AND STRUGGLE WITH CARTHAGE Presently he openly accused them, and the people elected him sole general with sovereign powers to meet the instant danger. The next step was to procure a bodyguard. The assembly at Syracuse would certainly not have granted such an instrument of tyranny. But Dionysius ordered the Syracusan army to march to Leontini, which was now a Syracusan dependency. He encamped near the town, and during the night a rumor was spread about that the general's life had been attempted. An assembly was held next day, which, when Dionysius laid bare the designs of his enemies, voted him a bodyguard of six hundred ; and he had won over the mercenaries to his cause. 3. Tyranny of Dionysius. — These were the three steps in the "despot's progress." The democracy, of course, was not formally overthrown ; Dionysius held no office that upset the constitution. Things went on as at Athens under Pisistratus; the assembly met and passed decrees and elected magistrates. 405 b.c. The justification of the power of Dionysius lay in the need of a champion against Carthage. He set out with a great fleet and army to relieve Gela, which was already beleaguered. But a plan of attack failed, by reason of his half-heartedness, and he ordered the people to evacuate the town. On his way back he also ordered the abandonment of Camarina. Syracuse in disgust rose against him, but he forced his way in. A treaty, probably arranged be- forehand, was then concluded with Carthage, confirming Carthage in her conquests, but recognizing Dionysius as ruler of Syracuse. He thus secured Punic aid to build up the town, which he would one day use against Carthage. Under Dionysius Syracuse became the leading European power on the Mediterranean. His tyranny lasted thirty-eight years, till the end of his life. The forms of the constitution were maintained, and he was nomi- nally elected ; but his foreign bodyguard was the prop of his power. Yet he owed his long success, also, to a wise principle of tyranny. He was cruel and oppressive only for political ends, not for per- sonal desires. PUNIC WARS OF DIONYSIUS 279 His first concern was to establish himself in a stronghold. He made the island a fortress barred off by a wall from the mainland, and entered only by passing under five successive gates. The Lesser Harbor, which became the chief naval arsenal, was included in these fortifications: its mouth was closed by a mole with a gate through which only one galiey passed at a time. Further, he made friends for himself by rewarding adherents and by enfran- chising slaves with confiscations from his opponents. Then he proceeded to a career of conquest. The Ionian cities of Naxos and Catane were taken by treachery, their inhabitants were sold, and Naxos destroyed. Leontini submitted, and its inhabitants were transferred to Syracuse. This was an offense to Carthage, and Dionysius provided against the struggle by fortifying his city on a huge scale. The heights of Epipolae were included in the walls, and a great castle was built at the important point of Eurya- los, whose ruins still are a monument of Greek Syracuse at the height of her power. His military preparations were not less notable and original. He first thought out and taught how the heterogeneous parts of a military armament — the army and the navy, the cavalry and the infantry, the heavy and the light troops — might be closely and systematically coordinated so as to act as if they were a sin- gle organic body. He introduced the catapult, invented by his engineers, which revolutionized siege-warfare, and brought a new element into military operations. An engine which hurled a stone of two or three hundredweight for a distance of two or three hundred yards was extremely formidable. 4. Punic Wars of Dionysius. — When his preparations were 398-397 BC - complete, Dionysius went forth to do what no Greek leader in Sicily had ever done before. He went forth not merely to deliver Greek cities from Phoenician rule, but to conquer Phoenician Sicily itself. At the head of eighty thousand foot and three thousand horse, he laid siege to Motya. This city was an island town connected by a causeway with the land, and the inhabitants broke down the 28o SYRACUSAN EMPIRE AND STRUGGLE WITH CARTHAGE causeway. Dionysius set to building a much greater mole from which to work his engines. Towers of six stories high were brought up to the walls, and the battle was waged in mid-air. The town was defended from street to street, till at last a night assault finished the business. Carthage now bestirred herself. Himilco gained Eryx by treach- ery, and recovered Motya. He then turned upon Messena, and razed the place, though the inhabitants escaped into the neigh- boring hills. The Syracusan fleet, under the brother of Dionysius, came against the Carthaginians, but was routed at Catane; and soon Himilco with his victorious fleet sailed into the Great Harbor at Syracuse, while the army encamped along the banks of the Anapus. But the siege was protracted, and the Carthaginian camp, pitched in a swamp in the burning heat, was ravaged by pestilence; and suddenly Dionysius made a joint attack on the fleet and camp. It was wholly successful : the fleet was destroyed ; the forts which protected the camp were taken. The whole ar- mament might have been annihilated like that of Athens, had not Dionysius accepted three hundred talents from Himilco to connive at the escape of all Carthaginian citizens. The tyrant felt that if the Carthaginians vanished from Sicily, his autocracy would be endangered; and he made no effort to drive them from their old station in the western corner of the island. Another Punic War broke out five years later, in which Dionysius won possession of Solus, the most easterly Carthaginian city. The peace which concluded it placed all the Greek cities in Sicily, and also the Sicels, under the power of Syracuse. 5. The Empire of Dionysius. His Death. — Having made him- self master of all Greek Sicily, the lord of Syracuse began to plan the conquest of Greek Italy. Here, as in other things, Dionysius was an innovator; he set the example of enterprises of conquest beyond the sea. He had rebuilt and resettled Messena, and now he attacked Rhegium, opposite it on the strait. But the confederate cities of 28 1 282 SYRACUSAN EMPIRE AND STRUGGLE WITH CARTHAGE the Italian coast came to the rescue, and defeated Dionysius, who declared war on the federation. He besieged Caulonia, and the 389 b.c. federal army came out from Croton to oppose him. Dionysius was victorious, and ten thousand fugitives cut off on a high hill without water were forced to surrender at discretion, and Dionys- ius told them off with a wand as they passed him, each man ex- pecting bondage, if not death. They were let go without even a ransom. This act of mercy produced a great sensation, and its wisdom was soon approved. The communities to which the cap- tives belonged voted him golden crowns and made separate treaties with him. Only Rhegium, Caulonia, and Hipponion stood out; the two smaller towns were taken, and their people transplanted to Syracuse. Rhegium stood a siege of ten months, but was at last reduced, and all its inhabitants who could not find ransoms were sold into slavery. He was now master of both sides of the strait, and held the fortress which was the bulwark of Greek Italy. Eight years later he captured Croton, and his power in Italy reached its greatest height. In the meantime, Dionysius was pushing even farther afield, and planting colonies on both shores of the Adriatic. The Syra- cusan empire now included the greater portion of Sicily and the southern peninsula of Italy. It had remoter dependencies, allies rather than subjects, in Thurii and other Italiot cities north of the Crathis; in Iapygia, on the heel of Italy; in the kingdom of Molos- sia, on the Epirot coast, and in some seaboard parts of Illyria. But the maintenance of this empire forced Dionysius to lay upon the Syracusans a most burdensome taxation. It is little wonder that the tyrant had an evil repute in the mother-country. It was only for a moment that the dominion of the Syracusan 383 b.c. despot reached its extreme limits. He had hardly won the city and lands of Croton, when his borders fell back in the west of his own island. A new war with Carthage had broken out, and a battle was fought at Cronion, near Panormus, and Dionysius was defeated with terrible loss, and compelled to make a disadvan- DIONYSIUS THE YOUNGER AND DION 283 tageous peace. The boundary of Greek against Punic Sicily was withdrawn from the river Mazarus to the river Halycus. This 378 b.c. means that the deliverer of Selinus and Thermae gave back those cities to the mercies of the barbarian. Ten years later Dionysius made war once more upon Carthage, and for the second time he invaded Punic Sicily. He delivered Selinus, and captured Eryx along with its haven Drepanon. But he failed in an attempt upon Lilybaeum, which the Carthaginians had founded to take the place of Motya,and he lost a large part of his fleet. This was the last undertaking of the great " ruler of Sicily." He died before peace was concluded, of a strange cause. He was a dramatic poet, and had frequently competed with his tragedies at Athens, but had never won first prize. Now, to con- sole him for his failures, came the news that his Ransom of Hector had gained first place at the Lenaean festival. In his joy he drank indiscreetly, fever followed, and a narcotic administered to him 367 b.c. brought on the sleep of death. 6. Dionysius the Younger and Dion. — The empire of Dionysius descended to his son, Dionysius, a youth not without amiable qualities, but of the nature that is easily swayed to good or evil. At first he was under the influence of Dion, who had been the most trusted minister of the elder Dionysius in the latter part of his reign, and who might easily have made himself tyrant. But Dion desired to get rid of tyranny. He was the friend of Plato, and his hope was to establish at Syracuse an ideal constitution, such as Plato had sketched. No welcome could have been more honorable and flattering than that which Plato received. He engaged the respect and ad- miration of Dionysius, and the young tyrant was easily brought to regard tyranny as a vile thing and to cherish the plan of building up a new constitution. But Plato insisted on imparting to his pupil a systematic course of philosophical training, and began with the science of geometry. The tyrant took up the study with eager- ness ; his court was absorbed in geometry ; but he presently wearied 284 SYRACUSAN EMPIRE AND STRUGGLE WITH CARTHAGE of it. And then influences which were opposed to the scheme of Dion and Plato began to tell. Those who were entirely adverse to the proposed reforms in- sinuated that the true object of Dion was to secure the tyranny for one of his own nephews, and at last an indiscreet letter of Dion gave them the means of success. Syracuse and Carthage were negotiating peace, and Dion wrote to the Carthaginian judges not to act without first consulting him. The letter was intercepted and was interpreted as treason. Dion was banished from Sicily. Dion betook himself to Old Greece and made Athens his head- quarters. At length Dion, deeming that the time for action had come, landed in southwestern Sicily with a small force. Dionys- ius had departed for Italy with eighty ships. Learning this, Dion marched to Syracuse, picking up reinforcements, both Greek and Sicel, on his way, and entered Syracuse amid general rejoicings. The assembly placed the government in the hands of twenty generals, Dion among them. Dion was not a man who could hold the affections of the people, for he repelled men by his exceeding haughtiness ; a rival appeared on the scene who possessed more popular manners. This was a certain Heraclides with whom he was forced to share the power. In the meantime, Dionysius, whose forces held the island, after making assaults with varying success, resolved to surrender to Dion and withdraw to Locri; thus leaving Dion in a position to become master of Syracuse. Dion professed to have come to give Syracuse freedom. The Syracusan citizens wanted the restoration of their democracy; but he desired to establish an aristocracy, with some democratic limitations, and with a king, or kings, as in Sparta. The Syra- cusans longed to see the fortress of the tyrant demolished; Dion allowed it to remain, and its existence seemed a standing invita- tion to tyranny. His authority was only limited by the joint com- mand of Heraclides, and at last he was brought to consent that his rival should be secretly assassinated. After this he was to all TIMOLEON 285 purposes tyrant, though he might repudiate tyranny with his lips. Finally he was murdered ; and in the next eight years no less 354 b.c. than four different tyrants held Syracuse. Then Dionysius re- 34 6 b.c. gained Ortygia. 7. Timoleon. — The Sicilian Greeks, bent w T ith a plague of tyrannies, and threatened with a new Carthaginian armament, appealed to Corinth. Corinth sent them Timoleon, a man who had first saved his brother's life in battle and then slain that brother 344 b.c. for plotting a tyranny. Timoleon arrived with ten ships, and established himself at the Sicel town of Hadranum. City after city joined him, and presently Dionysius proposed to surrender Ortygia and retire with his private property to Corinth. This was agreed to, and the tyrant ended his life at Corinth in obscurity. The rest of Syracuse was held by Hiketas, tyrant of Leontini, and to help Hiketas came a Punic fleet under Mago. But Mago, sus- pecting treachery among his Greek mercenaries, withdrew, Hike- tas was driven out, and Syracuse was free. The fortress of Dionys- ius was pulled down, and proclamation made recalling banished citizens and inviting settlers. Timoleon went on to do the same work in other Sicilian towns. But Carthage was preparing a great effort. An armament landed at Lilybaeum, having in the host the "Sacred Band" of 339 b.c. 2500 Carthaginian citizens. They decided to march across Sicily, and Timoleon went to meet them with an army of 9000 in all. The armies met at the Crimisus, the Greeks being on a hill above the river. The Punic war-chariots crossed first, and after them the Sacred Band. Timoleon attacked, while the host was divided by the river; his cavalry was driven back by the chariots, but the infantry reached the Sacred Band, and failing to break the shield wall with spears, took to their swords, when skill and quickness told. The Sacred Band was routed; and in the face of the rest of the host came down a tempest of wind-driven rain and hail. In the muddy ground the lighter-armed Greeks had an advantage, and the storm swelled the Crimisus to a furious torrent behind the 286 SYRACUSAN EMPIRE AND STRUGGLE WITH CARTHAGE beaten army. Fifteen thousand prisoners were secured; ten thousand killed in the fight; rich spoils of gold and silver taken. Timoleon had gained a victory which may be set beside Gelon's at Himera. Having now delivered Sicily both from despots and from foreign powers, Timoleon, a man unique in Greek history, laid down the power intrusted to him. The Syracusans gave him a property near Syracuse, and there he dwelt till his death, two years after his crowning victory. Occasionally he visited the city when the folk wished to ask for his counsel, but he had be- come blind, and these visits were rare. He was lamented by all Greek Sicily, and at Syracuse his memory was preserved by a group of public buildings called after him. REFERENCES FOR SUPPLEMENTARY READING (Syllabus, 89) 1. Dionysius I. Botsford, 239-245. Holm, III, 130-142. Bury, 639-669. 2. Timoleon. Botsford, 245-249. Holm, III, 401-409. Bury, 673-679. Sources. Plutarch, Timoleon. Alliance Coin (Hemidrachm, Enlarged) of Leontini and Catane. Obverse: Head of Apollo Wreathed with Bay; Bay Leaf and Berry [Legend: aeon (tow)]- Reverse: Bull (River Sim^ethos) ; Fish below [Legend: katanaion] CHAPTER XVIII THE RISE OF MACEDONIA i . Macedonia. — The death of Epaminondas and collapse of 362 b.c. Thebes left Athens the leading state in Greece, and she would doubtless have formed a new empire but for the growth of two out- lying semi-Hellenic powers, Macedon and Caria. She recovered the Chersonese with the command of the Propontis, and won back Eubcea to her league; it seemed even likely that she would regain 357 b.c. Amphipolis, but this project, bringing her into collision with Macedon, opened a new chapter in Greek history. In their fortress of ^Egae the Macedonian kings had ruled for ages with absolute sway over the lands on the northern and north- western coasts of the Thermaic Gulf, which formed Macedonia in the strictest sense. The Macedonian people and their kings were of Greek stock, as their traditions and the scanty remains of their language combine to testify. They were a military people, and they extended their power westward and northward over the peoples of the hills, so that Macedonia in the wide sense of the name reached to the borders of the Illyrians in the west and of the Paeo- nians in the north. In fact, the Macedonian kingdom consisted of two heterogeneous parts, and the Macedonian kings had two different characters. Over the Greek Macedonians of the coast the king ruled immediately; they were his own people, his own " Companions." Over the Illyric folks of the hills he was only overlord; they were each subject to their own chieftain, and the chieftains were his unruly vassals. Macedonia could never be- come a great power until these vassal peoples had been brought 287 288 THE RISE OF MACEDONIA 365 B.C. 359 B.C. Coin of Archelaus I. (Obverse). Horseman with Two Spears under the direct rule of the kings, and until the Illyrian and Paeo- nian neighbors had been taught a severe lesson. The kings had made some efforts to introduce Greek civilization into their land. Archelaus had succeeded in making his court at Pella a center for famous artists and poets, such as Zeuxis, the painter, and Euripides. But no law bound the Macedonian monarch; his subjects had only one solitary right against him. In the case of a capital charge, the king could not put a Macedonian to death without the authority of a general assembly. Fighting and hunting were the chief occupa- tions of this vigorous people. A Macedo- nian who had not killed his man wore a cord round his waist; and until he had slain a wild boar he could not sit at table with the men. 2. Early Conquests of Philip II. of Macedonia. — The usurping regent Ptolemy had been slain by his ward, the young King Per- diccas. Six years later the Illyrians swooped down upon Macedo- nia, and Perdiccas was slain in battle. It was a critical moment for the kingdom ; the Pseo- nians menaced it in the north, and from the east a Thracian army was advancing to set a pretender on the throne. The rightful heir, Amyntas, the son of the slain king, was a child. But there was one man in the land who was equal to the situa- tion — this child's uncle, Philip; and he took the government and the guardianship of the boy into his own hands. Philip, as one of the hostages carried off to Thebes, had lived there for a few Coin of Philip II. Obverse: Head of Lau- reate Zeus. Reverse: Horse and Jockey; Thunderbolt below [Legend: $iAinnoY] EARLY CONQUESTS OF PHILIP II. 289 years, and had drunk in the military and political wisdom of Epaminondas and Pelopidas. He was now twenty-four years old. His first step was to buy off the Paeonians by a large sum of money, his next to get rid of the pretenders. One of these, Argaeus, was assisted by a strong fleet. Philip defeated him, and did all in his power to come to terms with Athens. He released without ransom the Athenians whom he had made prisoners in the battle ; and he renounced all claim to the possession of Amphipolis. He then turned his forces against the Paeonians and Illyrians, whom he defeated in two decisive battles. With his territory now cleared of invaders, he began to push eastward to gain possession of the rich gold mines in Thrace. But in order to con- trol these he must become master of Amphipolis, which com- manded the Strymon. To disarm the suspicions of the Athenians, he promised to turn over Amphipolis to them in exchange for the free town of Pydna. He broke his word, j .1 -i r .1 • Gold Coin of Philippi. Ob- and they cried out; but their own J ' verse: Head of Heracles. part of the agreement was a shame- reverse: Tripod; Palm ful act of treachery to Pydna, their above; Phrygian Cap [Le- ally. When Philip had taken Am- GEND: «*™on] phipolis, he converted the Thasian settlement of Crenides into a great fortress, which he called after his own name, Philippi. The yield of the gold mines amounted at least to one thousand talents a year. No Greek state was so rich. The old capital, ^Egae, was now definitely abandoned, and the seat of govern- ment was established at Pella. Not long afterward Philip captured Pydna. He then took Potidaea, but instead of keeping it for himself, handed it over to the Olynthians. Thus he dexterously propitiated the Olynthians 356 b.c. — intending to devour them on some future day. With the ex- ception of Methone, the Athenians had no foothold now on the coasts of the Thermaic Gulf, u 290 THE RISE OF MACEDONIA 3. The Organization of the Macedonian Army. — Having es- tablished his mining town, Philip assumed the royal title, setting his nephew aside, and devoted himself during the next few years to the consolidation of his kingdom, and the creation of a national army. It was in these years that he made Macedonia. AegaeiS, '"!/ t JQ'a LC: OlyrithuB -,., 20 40 60 80 100 120 BpJMAY" ENGRAVING CO., N.Y. The Growth of the Power of Macedonia His task was to unite the hill tribes, along with his own Macedo- nians of the coast, into one nation. The means by which he ac- complished this was by military organization. He made the high- landers into professional soldiers, and kept them always under arms. Both infantry and cavalry were indeed organized in ter- ritorial regiments ; but common interests tended to obliterate these distinctions, and they were done away with under Philip's son. The heavy cavalry were called "Companions" of the king. Among the infantry there was one body of " Royal" guards, the silver- shielded Hypaspistce. MAUSOLUS OF CARTA 291 The famous Macedonian phalanx, which Philip drilled, was merely a modified form of the usual battle-line of Greek spearmen. The men in the phalanx stood freer, in a more open array, and used a longer spear; so that the whole line was more easily wielded, and the effect was produced, not merely by sheer pressure, but by the skillful manipulation of weapons. Nor was the phalanx in- tended to decide a battle, like the deep columns of Epaminondas; its function was to keep the front of the foe in play, while the cav- alry, in wedge-like squadrons, rode into the flanks. But Greece paid little heed to the things which Philip was doing. When Philip married Olympias, the daughter of an Epirot prince the event could cause no sensation ; the birth of Alexander a year later stirred no man's heart in Greece ; for who, in his wildest c. Oct., dreams, could have foreseen in the Macedonian infant the greatest 356 B,c * conqueror who had yet been born into the world ? If it had been revealed to men that a new power had started up, they would have turned their eyes, not to Pella, but to Halicarnassus. 4. Mausolus of Caria. — Caria, like Mace- donia, was peopled by a double race, the native Carians and the Greek settlers on the coast. The native Carians were farther removed than the Illyrians from the Greeks. Yet the Carians were in closer touch with Greece than the Greeks of Macedonia. The Carian cities, to all appearance Greek towns, had nominally free assemblies, like Athens under Pisistratus; but they were all subject to one ruler, the "dynast," who was officially recognized as satrap of Persia. Mausolus, second of these native satraps, annexed Lycia, and, aiming at a naval power, changed his capital from inland Mylasa to Halicarnassus on the sea. His spe- cial object was to win the islands of Rhodes, Cos, and Chios, dis- contented members of the Athenian league; and at his insti- gation they revolted jointly, and were joined by Byzantium. Coin of Mauso- lus (Reverse). Zeus Labran- deus with twy- Axe ; Wreath [Legend: may2- 2AAAO] 292 THE RISE OF MACEDONIA Athens immediately sent naval forces to Chios, but failed to regain the island. Soon afterward negotiations were opened with the revolted allies, and a peace was made. Athens recognized the independence of the three islands, Chios, Cos, and Rhodes, and of the city of Byzantium. It was not long before Lesbos also severed itself from the Athenian alliance, which thus lost all its im- portant members in the eastern JEgean ; and in the west Corcyra fell away about the same time. All happened as Mausolus foresaw. He helped the oligarchies to overthrow the popular governments, and then gave them the protection of Carian garrisons. But soon after the success of his policy against Athens, he died, leaving his power to his widow, Artemisia. The expansion of the Carian power, which seemed probable under the active administration of Mausolus, was never fulfilled. A statue of the prince, now in the British Museum, stood, along with that of Artemisia, within the tomb which he probably began, and which she certainly completed. It rose above the harbor at Halicarnassus, adorned with friezes wrought by four of the most illustrious sculptors of the day, of whom Scopas himself was one. From it is derived the word Mausoleum. 5. Phocis and the Sacred War. — In the meantime, another of the states of northern Greece seemed likely to win the position of supremacy. Phocis came forward in her turn. Thebes, how- ever, decided to check her rival through the old Amphictionic league in which Epaminondas had won her an influence; at an Amphictionic assembly, a number of rich and prominent Phocians were condemned to pay large fines for some act of sacrilege. When these sums were not paid within the prescribed time, the Amphic- tions decreed that the lands of the defaulters should be taken from them and consecrated to the Delphian god. The accused determined to resist. Their leader, Philomelus, discerned clearly that mercenaries would be required to defend Phocis against her enemies, — Boeotians, Locrians, PHOCIS AND THE SACRED WAR 293 and Thessalians, — and boldly seized the treasure at Del- phi, which enabled him to hire troops. The next object of 356 b.c. : - -^.^^^^^:^ Longitude East, 23° from Greenwich^ • .BORMAY .-ENGRAVING. CO.; N.Y.;' : Bgeotia He say Philomelus was to enlist Hellenic opinion in his favor, sent envoys to Sparta, to Athens, to Thebes itself, to that in seizing Delphi the Phocians were simply re- suming their rights over the temple, and to declare that they were ready to allow all the treasures to be weighed and numbered, and to be responsible to Greece for their safety. In consequence of these em- bassies, Sparta allied her- self with Phocis, while Athens and some smaller states promised their support. Coin of Delphic Amphictiony (Fourth Century). Obverse: Demeter, with Veil and Crown of Corn. Reverse: Apollo, sitting on Omphalos, lean- ing on Lyre [Legend: am*iktionqn] 294 THE RISE 0F MACEDONIA The Amphictionic assembly met at Thermopylae, and it was decided that an Amphictionic army should rescue Delphi. But by offering large pay, Philomelus assembled an army of ten thousand men, who cared little whence the money came. An indecisive war followed, till at length the Phocians underwent a severe defeat 354 b.c. on the north side of Mount Parnassus, and Philomelus perished. 6. Intervention of Philip of Macedonia. — His successor Onomarchus reorganized the troops, and entered upon a short career of signal successes. He reduced Doris, gained Ther- mopylae, and made an alliance with the tyrants of Pherae. This induced Philip to intervene, and marks a new stage in the course of the Sacred War. But Onomarchus defeated the Macedonian 353 b.c. army in two battles with serious loss, and Philip was compelled to withdraw into Macedonia. At this moment, the power of the Phocians was at its height. Their supremacy reached from the shores of the Corinthian Gulf to the slopes of Olympus. They were masters of the pass of Thermopylae, and they had two important posts in western Bceotia. But Philip of Macedon speedily retrieved the humiliation which he had suffered at the hands of his Phocian foes. In the following year he descended again into Thessaly, and in a decisive battle defeated the Phocian army, and thus became master of Thessaly. He now prepared to march southward for the purpose of delivering the shrine of Apollo from the posses- sion of the Phocians, whom he professed to regard as sacri- legious usurpers. Phocis was now in great need, and her allies — Sparta, Achaea, and Athens — at length determined to give her active help. The Macedonian must not be permitted to pass Thermopylae. The statesman Eubulus, now predominant at Athens, acted promptly on this occasion, and sent a large force to defend the pass. Philip at once recognized that it would be extremely hazardous to at- 352 b.c tempt to force the position, and he retired. Thus Phocis was rescued for the time. AIMS OF PHILIP 295 7. Aims of Philip. — No sooner had Philip returned from Thessaly than he moved against Thrace, and forced the king, Cersobleptes, to submit. His movements were so rapid that Athens had no time to come to the rescue. When the news arrived, there was a panic, and an armament was voted to save the Chersonese. But a new message came that Philip had fallen ill ; then he was reported dead ; and the sending of the armament was postponed. Philip's illness was a fact; it compelled him to desist from further operations, and the Chersonesus was saved. Eight years had not elapsed since Philip had mounted the throne of Macedon ; and he had altered the whole prospect of the Greek world. He had created an army, and a thoroughly adequate revenue; he had made himself lord of almost the whole seaboard of the northern ^gean from the defile of Thermopylae to the shores of the Propontis. The only lands which were still excepted from his direct or indirect sway were the Chersonesus and the territory of the Chalcidian league. He was ambitious to secure a recog- nized hegemony in Greece; to form, in fact, a confederation of allies, which should hold some such dependent relation toward him as the confederates of Delos had held toward Athens. Rumors were already floating about that his ultimate design was to lead a Panhellenic expedition against the Persian king. Though the Greek states regarded Philip as in a certain sense an outsider, it must never be forgotten that Philip desired to identify Macedonia with Greece, and to bring his own country up to the level of the kindred peoples which had so far outstripped it in civilization. Throughout his whole career he regarded Athens with respect, and would have given much for her friendship. He was himself imbued with Greek culture; and if the robust Macedonian en- joyed the society of the somewhat rude boon companions of his own land with whom he could drink deep, he knew how to make himself agreeable to Attic men of letters. He chose Aris- totle of Stagira, who had been educated at Athens, to be the instructor of his son Alexander. 296 THE RISE OF MACEDONIA 8. Demosthenes. — In these years Athens was under the guidance of a cautious statesman, Eubulus. He pursued a peace policy; yet it was he who struck the one effective blow that Athens ever struck at Philip, when she hindered him from passing Thermopylae. The news of Philip's campaign in Thrace may have temporarily weakened his influence ; and his opponents had a fair opportunity to inveigh against an inactive policy. The most prominent among these opponents was Demosthenes. His father was an Athenian manufacturer, who died when Demos- thenes was still a child; his guardians dealt fraudulently with the considerable fortune left him; and when he came of age he resolved to recover it. For this purpose he sat at the feet of the orator Isaeus, and was trained in law and rhetoric. Demosthenes used himself to tell how he struggled to overcome his natural defects of speech and manner until he became the most ap- plauded orator in Athens. The advance of Philip to the Propontis now gave him occasion 351 b.c. for that political harangue, known as the First Philippic, one of his most brilliant and effective speeches, calling upon the Athe- nians to brace themselves vigorously to oppose Philip, " our enemy." He draws a lively picture of the indifference of his countrymen and contrasts it with the energy of Philip, "who is not the man to rest content with what he has subdued, but is always adding to his conquests, and casts his snare around us while we sit at home postponing." Demosthenes proposed a scheme for increasing the military forces of the city; and the most essential part of the scheme was that a force should be sent to Thrace, of which a quarter should consist of citizens, and the officers should be citizens. The orator was applauded, but nothing was done. His ideal was the Athens of Pericles; but he lived in the Athens of Eubulus. The Athenians were quite capable of holding their own among their old friends and enemies, the Spartans and Thebans and the islanders of the ^Egean ; with paid soldiers and generals like Iphicrates and Chares THE ADVANCE OF MACEDONIA 297 they could maintain their position as a first-rate power. Athens was still the great sea power of the iEgean, well able to protect her commerce. But against a large, vigorous land power, with a formidable army, her chances were hopeless ; for, since the fall of Portrait Head of Demosthenes their empire, the whole spirit of the people had tended to peace and not to war. 9. The Advance of Macedonia. Fall of Olynthus. — The next stage in the development of Macedonia was the incorporation of 298 THE RISE OF MACEDONIA Chalcidice. Philip sent a requisition to the Olynthians, demand- ing the surrender of his half-brother, a pretender to the Macedonian throne, to whom they had given shelter. The demand was re- fused, and Philip marched against Chalcidice. One after another the cities of the Olynthian confederacy opened their gates to him; or if they refused, they were captured. In her jeopardy Olynthus sought an alliance with Athens, and it was during the debates on this question that Demosthenes pro- 349 b.c. nounced his Olynthiac orations, which were, in fact, Philippics. At this juncture the Athenians seem to have been awakened to the necessity of action sufficiently to embolden Demosthenes to throw out the unpopular suggestion that the Theoric Fund should be devoted to military purposes; and he repeated his old plea for citizen-soldiers. An alliance was concluded, and mercenaries were despatched to the Chalcidian peninsula. Philip might have been placed in some embarrassment, especially as Cersobleptes, king of Thrace, had rebelled; but he diverted the concern of Athens in another direction. He had long been engaged in in- trigues in Eubcea, and now Eubcea revolted. The division of forces was fatal. Phocion was sent to Eubcea and won a battle, but returned to Athens without having recovered any of the re- bellious cities. The enemy had taken a number of prisoners, for whose ransom Athens had to pay fifty talents; and the indepen- dence of Eubcea was acknowledged. Meanwhile, Philip was pressing Olynthus hard, and urgent ap- peals were sent to Athens. This time Demosthenes had his way, and two thousand citizen-soldiers sailed for the north. But Olynthus was captured before they reached it. The place was destroyed and the inhabitants scattered in various parts of 348 b.c. Macedonia. The other cities of the confederacy were practically incorporated in Macedonia. 10. The Peace of Philocrates. — These military efforts had left Athens without money to pay the judges their daily wage. Peace was a necessity; but the fall of Olynthus, where many Athenians THE PEACE OF PHILOCRATES 299 had been captured, stung Athens, and an embassy was despatched to the Peloponnesus to organize a national resistance of the Greeks to the destroyer of Olynthus. The emissary chosen was the orator y^schines, famous as the antagonist of Demosthenes. He had been first a teacher in a school kept by his father, then a tragic actor, and finally a public clerk. Philip, on his part, desired two things — to make peace with Athens and to become a member of the Amphictionic Council. Thebes now invoked his aid to crush the Phocians; and the Pho- cians, hearing this, sent to Athens and Sparta for help to keep Philip out of Greece. It was granted. But the Phocian com- mander refused to admit either Spartans or Athenians to Ther- mopylae ; and as it was feared that he might surrender it to Philip, the necessity for making peace with Philip grew more imperative. Ten Athenian envoys, and one representative of the Athenian allies, were sent to Pella to negotiate terms of peace with the Macedonian king. Among the envoys were ^Eschines and Demosthenes. The terms to which Philip agreed were that Athens andMacedon should each retain the territories of which they were actually in possession at the time the peace was concluded, and that the peace would be concluded when both sides had sworn to it. Both the allies of Macedonia and those of Athens were to be included, except the Phocians. By these terms, which were perfectly explicit, Athens would surrender her old claim to Amphipolis, and on the other hand, Philip would recognize Athens as mistress of the Chersonese. The exception which Philip made was inevitable; it was an es- sential part of the Macedonian policy to proceed against Phocis. There were a few Thracian forts which Philip was anxious to capture before the peace was made; and while the Athenians debated and finally accepted the proposals, Philip captured the fortresses in Thrace and reduced its king to a vassal. When he returned to Pella, so far as the formal conclusion of the peace went there was no difficulty, but the Athenian ambassadors had re- ceived general powers to negotiate further with Philip on the 300 THE RISE OF MACEDONIA settlement of the Phocian question and northern Greece. If Philip could have had his way, the alliance would have be- come a bond of close friendship and cooperation. Athens might have taken her position now as joint arbitrator with Philip in the settlement of the Amphictionic question. But De- mosthenes opposed such a plan; and desired an alliance with Thebes, so that both Athens and Thebes might oppose the Macedonian advance. ii. Philip in Greece. — Philip, in the meantime, advanced southward. The pass of Thermopylae was opened to him; but before he reached Thermopylae, he addressed two friendly letters to Athens, inviting her to send an army to arrange the affairs of Phocis and Boeotia. But the Athenians listened to the sugges- tions of Demosthenes that Philip would detain their army as hostages. Accordingly, they contented themselves with sending an embassy to convey to Philip an announcement of the decree which they had passed, calling upon the Phocians to surrender Delphi. As it was clear that Philip could not trust Athens, owing to the attitude of Demosthenes, he was constrained to act in conjunction with her enemy, Thebes. The doom of the Phocians was decided by the Amphictionic Council, which was now convoked. The Phocians were deprived of their place in the Amphictionic body; and all their cities (with the exception of Abas) were broken up into villages, so that they might not again be a danger to Delphi. They were obliged to undertake to pay back, by installments of sixty talents a year, the value of the treasures which they had taken from the sanctuary. The place which Phocis vacated in the Council was transferred to Macedonia, in recognition of Philip's services. An occasion offered itself to Philip almost immediately to dis- play publicly to the assembled Greek world the position of leader- ship which he had thus won. It so happened that the celebration of the Pythian games fell in the year of the peace. Athens sulked ; k INTERVAL OF PEACE AND PREPARATIONS FOR WAR 3OI she sent no deputy to the Amphictionic meeting which elected Philip president for the festival, no delegates to the festival itself. A great tide of anti-Macedonian feeling had set in, which made Demosthenes henceforward her most influential counselor. Yet neither Demosthenes nor Eubulus knew the needs of Athens or of Greece. The only man of the day who really grasped the situation was the nonagenarian Isocrates. He explained in an open letter to Philip the futility of perpetuating a number of small sovereign states. The time had come to unite Greece, and to dispose of the superfluous population who went about as roving mercenaries by a great act of colonization. And he called upon Philip to lead forth the hosts of Hellas against the barbarian and win a new world. 12. Interval of Peace and Preparations for War (346-341 B.C.). — Having gained for Macedonia the coveted place in the religious league of Greece, Philip spent the next year or two in improving his small navy, in settling the administration of Thessaly, and in acquiring influence in the Peloponnesus. The Thessalian cities elected the Macedonian king as their archon, and he set four governors over the four great divisions of the country. South of the Corinthian Isthmus, his negotiations gained him the adhesion of Messenia and Megalopolis, Elis, and Argos. Nor did Philip yet despair of achieving his chief aim, the conciliation of Athens. The veteran Eubulus was in favor of friendly relations; so were ^Es- chines and Philocrates ; and so was the incorruptible soldier Pho- cion. This notable person was marked among his contemporaries as an honest man, superior to all temptations of money; and, since the Athenians always prized this superhuman integrity which few of them attempted to practise, they elected him forty-five times as strategos, though in military capacity he was no more than a respectable sergeant. But his strong common-sense, which was impervious to oratory, and his exceptional probity, made him a useful member of his party. There was one man in Athens who was firmlv resolved that the 3'7:- C.C. Oriental huplites (kardakes) tSjZ'- P: D. . Other Asiatic light tro<>ps. 1 Hr S sians were defended by the natural intrenchment of a steep- banked river. The Macedonian columns defiled into the plain at dawn, and when Darius learned that they were approaching, he threw across the river squadrons of cavalry and light troops to cover the rest of the army while it arrayed itself for battle. The whole front was com- posed of hoplites, includ- ing thirty thousand Greek mercenaries; the left wing touched the lower slopes of the mountains and curved round, following the line of the hill, so as to face the flank of the ene- Battle of Issus right wing. When my's the array was formed, the cavalry was recalled to the north of the river, and posted on the right wing, near the sea, where the ground was best adapted for cavalry movements. Alexander advanced, his army drawn up on the usual plan, the phalanx in the center, the hypaspists on the right. In order to meet the danger which threatened the flank and rear of his right wing from the Persian forces on the slope of the mountain, he placed a column of light troops on the extreme right, to form a second front. As in the engagement on the Granicus, the attack was to be made by the heavy cavalry on the left center of the enemy's line. But it was a far more serious and formidable venture, since Darius had thirty thousand Greek mercenaries who knew how to stand and to fight. And if Alexander was defeated, his retreat was cut off. The Persian left did not sustain Alexander's onset at the head of his cavalry. The phalanx followed more slowly, and in crossing Y 322 THE CONQUEST OF PERSIA the stream and climbing the steep bank the line became broken, especially at one spot, and the Greek hoplites pressed them hard on the river-brink. If the phalanx had been driven back, Alexan- der's victorious right wing would have been exposed on the flank and the battle lost; but the phalangites stood their ground obsti- nately, until the hypaspists were free to come to their help by taking their adversaries in the flank. Meanwhile, Alexander's attack had been directed upon the spot where the Great King himself stood in his war-chariot, surrounded by a guard of Persian nobles. There was a furious struggle, in which Alexander was wounded in the leg. Then Darius turned his chariot and fled, and this was the signal for an universal flight on the left. On the sea side the Persian cavalry crossed the river and carried all before them; but in the midst of their success the cry that the king was fleeing made them waver, and they were soon riding wildly back, pursued by the Thessalians. The whole Persian host was now rushing northward toward the passes of Amanus, and thousands fell beneath the swords of their pursuers. Darius did not tarry; he forgot even his mother and his wife, who were in the camp at Issus ; and when he reached the mountain he left his chariot, his shield, and his royal cloak behind him, and mounting a swift mare rode for dear life. Having pursued the Great King till nightfall, Alexander re- turned to the Persian camp. He supped in the tent of Darius, and, hearing the wailing of women from a tent hard by, he learned that it was the mother and wife and children of the fugitive king. They had been told that Alexander had returned with the shield and cloak of Darius, and supposing that their lord was dead, had broken out into lamentation. Alexander sent one of his com- panions to comfort them with the assurance that Darius lived, and that they would receive all the respect due to royal ladies; for Alexander had no personal enmity against Darius. No act of Alexander, perhaps, astonished his contemporaries more than this generous treatment of the family of his royal rival. A city, which still retains the name of Alexander, was built in CONQUEST OF SYRIA 323 commemoration of the battle, at the northern end of the sea-gates. The road was now open into Syria. Just as the small fight on the Granicus had cleared the way for the acquisition of Asia Minor, so the fight on the Pinaros cleared the way for the conquest of Syria and Egypt. The rest of the work would consist in tedious sieges. But the victory of Issus had, beyond its immediate results, immense importance through the prestige which it conferred on the victor. He had defeated an army ten times as great as his own, led by the Great King in person; he had captured the mother of the Great King, and his wife and his children. Darius himself made the first overtures to the conqueror. He wrote a letter, in which he complained that Alexander was an unprovoked aggressor, begged that he would send back the royal captives, and professed willingness to conclude a treaty of friendship and alliance. Such a condescending appeal required a stern reply. "I have overcome in battle," wrote Alexander, "first thy generals and satraps, and now thyself and thine host, and possess thy land, through the grace of the gods. I am lord of all Asia, and there- fore do thou come to me. If thou art afraid of being evilly en- treated, send some of thy friends to receive sufficient guarantees. Thou hast only to come to me to ask and receive thy mother and wife and children, and whatever else thou mayest desire. And for the future, whenever thou sendest, send to me as to the Great King of Asia, and do not write as to an equal, but tell me whatever thy need be, as to one who is lord of all that is thine. But if thou disputest the kingdom, then wait and fight for it again, and do not flee; for I will march against thee wherever thou mayest be." 5. Conquest of Syria. — After Issus, Alexander might have pursued Darius into the heart of Persia, and crushed him before he could collect another army. He showed his greatness by pro- ceeding in a more systematic manner. As Asia Minor had to be subdued before Syria and Egypt could be won, so Syria and Egypt had to be subjugated before he attempted to conquer Mesopotamia. And in Syria his most important objective was the Phoenician towns. 324 THE CONQUEST OF PERSIA Jan. -July, 332 B.C. Silver Coin of Sidon (? 374-62 B.C.). Ob- verse: Galley in Front of City-wall; below Two Lions. Reverse: King and Charioteer in Chariot; below Goat (In- cuse) These cities — Tyre, Sidon, and Aradus — had never stood to- gether, and Sidon, having revolted, was burned by Artaxerxes Ochus. Now Aradus and Byblus, which replaced Sidon, sub- mitted at once to Alexander, while Tyre held out. Alexander ad- vanced southward toward Tyre. But the men of Tyre felt secure on their island rock, which was pro- tected by eighty ships, apart from a squadron which was absent in the ^Egean, and they refused to "receive either Persian or Macedonian into the city." To subdue Tyre was an absolute necessity, as Alexander explained to a council. It was not safe to advance to Egypt, or to pursue Darius, while the Persians were lords of the sea; and the only way of wresting their sea power from them was to capture Tyre, the most important naval station on the coast; once Tyre fell, the Phoenician fleet, which was the most numerous and strongest part of the Persian navy, would come over to Macedon, for the rowers would not row or the men fight when they had no habitations to row or fight for. The reduction of Cyprus and Egypt would then follow without trouble. Alexander grasped and never let go the fact that Tyre was the key to the whole situation. But the siege of Tyre was perhaps the hardest military task that Alexander's genius ever encountered. The city, girt by huge walls, stood on an island across a sound of more than half a mile in width. On the side which faced the mainland were the two harbors: the northern or Sidonian harbor with a narrow mouth, CONQUEST OF SYRIA 325 and the southern or Egyptian. For an enemy, vastly inferior at sea, there was only one way to set about the siege. Those thousand yards of water must be bridged over and the isle annexed to the mainland. Without hesitation Alexander began the building of the causeway. The first part of the work was easy, for the water was shallow; but when the mole approached the island, the strait deepened, and the difficulties of the task began. Triremes issued from the havens to shoot missiles at the workers. To protect them, Alexander erected two towers on the causeway, and mounted engines on the towers to reply to the missiles from the galleys. He attached to these wooden towers curtains of leather to screen both towers and workmen from the projec- tiles which were hurled from the city-walls. But the men of Tyre were in- genious. They constructed a fire-ship filled with dry wood and inflammables, and, choosing a day on which a favorable wind blew, they towed it close to the dam and set it on fire. The device succeeded; the burn- ing vessel soon wrapt the towers and all the engines in flames. Alexander then widened the causeway throughout its whole length, so that it could accommodate more towers and engines, before he attempted to complete it. He saw that it would be needful to support his operations from the causeway by operations from ship- board; and he went to Sidon to bring up a few galleys which were stationed there. But at this moment the squadrons of Aradus and Byblus, which were acting in the i^gean, learning that their cities Siege of Tyre 326 THE CONQUEST OF PERSIA had submitted to Alexander, left the fleet and sailed to Sidon. The kings of Cyprus also joined Alexander, and reenforced the fleet at Sidon by one hundred and twenty ships. With a fleet of about two hundred and fifty triremes at his command, Alexander was now far stronger at sea than the merchants of Tyre. During the siege Alexander received an embassy from the Great King, offering an immense ransom for the captives of the royal house, and the surrender of all the lands west of the Euphrates; propos- ing also that Alexander should marry the daugh- ter of Darius and become his ally. The message was discussed in a coun- cil, and Parmenio said that if he were Alexan- der, he would accept the terms. "And I," said the king, "would accept them if I were Parmenio." From Sidon Alexander bore down upon Tyre with his whole fleet, hoping to entice the Tyrians into an engagement. When the fleet hove in sight, the men of Tyre, seeing that they had no chance against so many, drew up their triremes in close array to block the mouths of their harbors. Alexander set the Cyprian vessels on the north side of the mole to blockade the Sidonian harbor, and the Phoenician on the south side to blockade the Egyptian harbor. It was opposite this harbor, on the mainland, that his own pavilion was placed. The mole had now been carried up to the island, and all was ready for a grand attack on the eastern wall. Some of the engines were placed on the mole, others on transport ships or superannuated galleys. But little impression was made on the wall, which on this side was one hundred and fifty feet high and enormously thick; Silver Coin of Tyre (331 B.C.). Ob- verse: Melkart with Bow on Sea- horse; Waves; Dolphin. Reverse: Owl with Crook and Flail (Egyptian Emblems of Royalty) CONQUEST OF SYRIA 327 and the besieged replied to the attack with volleys of fiery missiles from powerful engines, which were mounted on their lofty battle- ments. All attacks on this wall failed; but in a sally made to surprise the Cyprian squadron, the Tyrians after a moment of success had their fleet completely put out of further action. Finally the efforts of the besiegers were united upon the south side near the Egyptian harbor. Here, at length, a bit of the wall was torn down, and though the Tyrians easily repelled the attack, it showed Alex- ander the weak spot, and two days later he prepared a grand and supreme assault. The vessels with the siege-engines were set to work at the southern wall, while two triremes waited hard by, one filled with hypaspists under Admetus, the other with a phalanx regiment, ready as soon as the wall yielded to hurl their crews into the breach. Ships were stationed in front of the two havens, to force their way in at a favorable moment, and the rest of the fleet, manned with light troops and furnished with engines, were disposed at various points round the island, to embarrass and bewilder the besieged and hinder them from concentrating at the main point of attack. A wide breach was made, the two triremes were rowed up to the spot, the bridges were lowered, and the hypaspists, Admetus at their head, first mounted the wall. Admetus was pierced with a lance, but Alexander took his place, and drove back the Tyrians from the breach. Tower after tower was captured; soon all the southern wall was in the hands of the Macedonians. But the city had already been entered from other points. The chains of both the Sidonian and the Egyptian harbors had been burst by the Cyprian and Phoenician squadrons; the Tyrian ships had been disabled; and the troops had pressed into the town. Eight thou- sand inhabitants are said to have been slain, and the rest, about thirty thousand, were sold into slavery, with the exception of the king, Azemilco. The fall of Tyre gave Alexander Syria and Egypt and the naval supremacy in the eastern Mediterranean. The communities of 328 THE CONQUEST OF PERSIA Syria and Palestine, that had not submitted, like Damascus, after the victory of Issus, submitted now after the capture of Tyre, and he encountered no resistance in his southern march to Egypt, until he came to the great frontier stronghold, Gaza, the city of the Philistines. Gaza had been committed by Darius to the care of Batis, a trusty eunuch, and had been well furnished with provisions for a long siege. Batis refused to surrender, trusting in the strength of the fortifications, but Alexander could not leave such an important post on the line from Damascus to Egypt in the hands of the enemy, Oct.-Nov., and after a siege of several weeks, during which he was wounded in the shoulder by a dart from a catapult, the place was taken and became a Macedonian fortress. 6. Conquest of Egypt. — Egypt was now absolutely cut off from Persia ; Alexander had only to march in. The Persian satrap thought only of making his submission and winning the con- queror's grace. In Memphis, the capital of the Pharaohs, where he was probably proclaimed king, Alexander sacrificed to Apis and the other native gods, and thereby won the good-will of the people. From Memphis he sailed down the river to Canopus, and took a step which, alone, would have made his name memorable for- ever. He chose the ground, east of Rhacotis, between Lake Mare- otis and the sea, as the site of a new city, over against the island of Pharos, famous in Homeric song, and soon to become more famous still as the place of the first lighthouse, one of the seven (?) Jan., « wonders of the world. The king is said to have himself traced out the ground-plan of Alexandria. He joined the mainland with the island by a causeway seven stades (nearly a mile) in length, and thus formed two harbors. The subsequent history of Alexandria, which has held its position as a port for more than two thousand years, proves that its founder had a true eye in choosing the site of the most famous of his new cities. Alexandria was intended to take the place of Tyre as the commercial center of western Asia and the 331 B.C. BATTLE OF GAUGAMELA 329 eastern Mediterranean, throwing the trade of the world into a port where Greeks would encounter no Phoenician rivalry. In the official style of the Egyptian monarchy the Pharaohs were sons of Ammon, and as the successor of the Pharaohs Alexander assumed the same title. It was therefore necessary in order to regu- late his position that an official assurance should be given by Ammon himself that Alexander was his son. To obtain this Alexander undertook a journey to the oracular sanctuary of Am- mon in the oasis of Siwah. And this motive is alone sufficient to explain the expedition. But it may well be that in Alexander's mind there was a vague notion that there was something divine about his own origin. Proceeding along the coast to Paraetonion, he was there met by envoys who conveyed the submission of Cyrene. By this acquisition the western frontier of the Macedonian empire ex- tended to the border of the Carthaginian sphere of rule. Alexander then struck across the desert to visit that Egyptian Coin of Cyrene (Ob- temple which was most famous in the Greek VERSE) ■ H E A D OF r . Zeus Ammon ; Olive world, the temple, as it was always called, spray of Zeus Ammon. It is said that Alexander told no man what he asked the god or what the god replied, save only that the answer pleased him. 7. Battle of Gaugamela, and Conquest of Babylonia. — The new lord of Egypt and Syria returned with the spring to Tyre. The whole coastland was now in his possession, and he controlled the sea; the time had come to advance into the heart of the Persian empire. Having spent some months in the Phoenician city, he set forth at the head of 40,000 infantry and 7000 horse, and reached Thapsacus on the Euphrates at the beginning of August. The objective of Alexander was Babylon. He chose the road across the north of Mesopotamia and down the Tigris on its eastern bank. From some Persian scouts who were captured, it was ascertained 330 THE CONQUEST OF PERSIA that Darius, with a yet larger multitude than that which had suc- cumbed at Issus, was on the other side of the river, determined to contest the passage. Alexander crossed the Tigris, not at Nineveh, the usual place of crossing, but higher up at Bezabde. Sept. 20, On the same night the moon went into eclipse, and men anxiously 331 b.c. sought in the phenomenon a portent. Marching southward for some days, Alexander found Darius encamped in a plain near Gaugamela on the river Bumodus. The numbers of the army were reported at 1,000,000 foot and 40,000 horse. Before the battle the night was spent by the Persians under arms, for their camp was unfortified, and they feared a night attack. And a night attack was recommended by Parmenio, but Alexander preferred to trust the issue to his own generalship and the superior discipline of his troops. He said to Parmenio, "I do not steal victory," and under the gallantry of this reply he concealed, in his usual manner, the prudence and policy of his resolve. A victory over the Persian host, won in the open field in the light of day, would have a far greater effect in establishing his prestige in Asia. The Great King, according to wont, was in the center of the Persian array, surrounded by his kinsfolk and his Persian body- guard. On either side of them were Greek mercenaries, Indian auxiliaries with a few elephants, and Carians whose ancestors had been settled in upper Asia. The center was strengthened and deepened by a second line. On the left were men from Susa, from the Caspian, from Arachosia and Bactria, covered by one hundred scythe-armed chariots and Bactrian and Scythian cavalry. On the right were Hyrcanians and Parthians, the Medes and dwellers in Mesopotamia, with other Caucasian folks. Against this host, of which the cavalry alone is said to have been as numerous as all the infantry of the enemy, Alexander descended the hill in the morning. On his left wing — commanded as usual by Parmenio — were the cavalry of the Thessalian and confederate Greeks ; in the center the six regiments of the phalanx ; BATTLE OF GAUGAMELA 33 1 and on the right, the hypaspists, and the eight squadons of the Companions, the royal squadron of Clitus being at the extreme right. Covering the right wing were some light troops, spear- throwers and archers. The line was far outflanked on both sides by the enemy, and the danger which Alexander had most to fear, as at the battle of Issus, was that of being attacked in rear or flank; only that here both wings were in peril. He sought to meet these contingencies by forming behind each wing a second line, which, by facing round a quarter or half circle, could meet an attack on flank or rear. As he advanced, Alexander and his right wing were opposite the center of the enemy's line, and he was outflanked by the whole length of the enemy's left. He therefore bore obliquely to the right, and, even when the Scythian horsemen, riding forward, came into contact with his own light troops, he continued to move his squadrons of heavy cavalry in the same direction. The Mace- donians were thus moving off the ground, which had been leveled for the scythe-chariots, and Darius ordered a flank charge to check them. Alexander's Greek mercenaries with difficulty held off the Scythian and Bactrian cavalry, and, meanwhile, the scythed cars were loosed upon the Macedonian ranks. But the archers shot down horses and drivers, and the hypaspists, opening their order, let the chariots rattle harmlessly by. The whole Persian line was now advancing to attack, and Alex- ander was waiting for the moment to deliver his cavalry charge. He had to send his mounted pikemen to the help of the light cavalry, who were being hard pressed on the right by the Scythians and Bactrians; and as a counter-check to this reenforcement, squadrons of Persian cavalry were despatched to the assistance of their fellows. By the withdrawal of these squadrons a gap was caused in the left Persian wing, and into this gap Alexander plunged at the head of his cavalry column and split the line in two. Thus the left side of the enemy's center was exposed, and turning obliquely Alexander charged into its ranks. Meanwhile, 332 THE CONQUEST OF PERSIA the bristling phalanx was moving forward and was soon engaged in close combat with another part of the Persian center. The storm of battle burst with wildest fury round the spot where the Persian king was trembling, and what befell at Issus befell again at Gau- gamela. The Great King turned his chariot and fled. His Per- sians fled with him, and swept along in their flight the troops who had been posted in the rear. Meanwhile, Parmenio was hard pressed. The troops of the ex- treme Persian right had attacked his cavalry in the flank or rear. Parmenio sent a messenger entreating aid, and Alexander desisted from the pursuit of his fleeing rival. Riding back with his Com- panions, he encountered a large body of cavalry, Persians, Par- thians, and Indians, in full retreat, but in orderly array. A desperate conflict ensued — perhaps the most fearful in the whole battle. Sixty of the Companions fell, but Alexander was again victorious and rode on to the help of Parmenio. But Parmenio no longer needed his help. Not the least achievement of this day of great deeds was the brilliant fighting of the Thessalian cavalry, who not only sustained the battle against the odds which had wrung from Parmenio the cry for aid, but in the end routed their foemen before Alexander could reach the spot. The battle was won, and the fate of the Persian empire was decided. Alexander lost not a moment in resuming the chase which he had abandoned, and, riding eastward throughout the night on the tracks of the Persian king, he reached Arbela on the morrow. But he did not take the king. Darius fled into the highlands of Media, and Ariobarzanes with a host of the routed army hastened south- ward to Persia. Alexander pursued his way to Babylon. Alexander seems to have expected that the men of Babylon, trusting in their mighty walls, would have offered resistance. He was disappointed. When he approached the city, with his army Oct., 331 b.c. arrayed for action, the gates opened and the Babylonians streamed out, led by their priests and their chief men. The satrap Mazoeus, who had fought bravely in the recent battle, surrendered the city CONQUEST OF SUSIANA AND PERSIS 333 and citadel. In Babylonia, Alexander followed the same policy which he had already followed in Egypt. He appeared as the protector of the national religions which had been depressed and slighted by the Persian fire-worshipers. He rebuilt the Baby- lonian temples which had been destroyed, and above all he com- manded the restoration of the marvelous temple of Bel, standing on its eight towers, on which the rage of Xerxes had vented itself when he returned from the rout of Salamis. The Persian Mazaeus was retained in his post as satrap of Babylonia. • 8. Conquest of Susiana and Persis. — Having rested his army, the conqueror advanced southeastward to Susa, the summer Dec, residence of the Persian court. In the citadel he found enormous 331 B,G * treasures of gold and silver and purple. Among other precious things at Susa was the sculptured group of the tyrant-slayers, Harmodius and Aristogiton, which Xerxes had carried off from Athens; and Alexander had the pleasure of sending back to its home this historical monument, now more precious than ever. Though it was midwinter, Alexander soon left Susa. There were immense treasures still in the palaces of Cyrus and Darius in the heart of the Persian highlands, and these were guarded not only by the difficulties of the mountainous approaches, but by the army which Ariobarzanes had rescued from the overthrow of Gaugamela. It was no easy task. The storming of the " Persian Gates," defended by Ariobarzanes, was one of the most arduous tasks that Alexander ever accomplished, yet the pass was carried by a surprise march through snow-clad mountains. The royal palaces of Persia, to which Alexander now hurried with the utmost speed, stood in the valley of Mervdasht, fertile then, but desolate at the present day, and close to the city of Istachr, which the Persians deemed the oldest city in the world. This cradle of the Persian kingdom, to which, city and palace together, the Greeks gave the name of Persepolis, was "the richest of all the cities under the sun." It is said that one hundred and twenty 334 THE CONQUEST OF PERSIA thousand talents were found in the treasury; an army of mules and camels were required to remove the spoils. But the most famous incident connected with the four months' sojourn at Persepolis is the conflagration of the palace of Xerxes. The story is that one night when Alexander and his companions had drunk deep at a royal festival, Thais, an Attic courtesan, flung out among the tipsy carousers the idea of burning down the house of the malignant foe who had burned the temples of Greece. The mad words of the woman inspired a wild frenzy, and whirled the revelers forth, armed with torches. Alexander hurled the first brand, and the cedar woodwork of the palace was soon in flames. But before the fire had done its work, the king's head was cool, and he commanded the fire to be quenched. 9. Death of Darius. — In the meantime, King Darius remained in Ecbatana, surrounded by the adherents who were faithful to him. Media was defensible; he had a large army from the northern satrapies; and he had Bactria as a retreat, if retreat he must. The spring was advanced when Alexander left Persis for Ecbatana. He made all speed, when the news reached him by the way, that Darius was at Ecbatana with a large army, prepared to fight. But when he drew nigh to the city, he found that Darius had flown eastward. At Ecbatana Alexander paid off theThes- salian troops and the other Greek confederates; but any who chose to enroll themselves anew might stay, and not a few stayed. With the main part of the army Alexander hurried on, merci- less to men and steeds, bent on the capture of Darius. But, mean- while, doom was stealing upon the Persian monarch by another way, His followers were beginning to suspect that ill luck dogged him, and when he proposed to stay and risk another battle in- stead of continuing his retreat to Bactria, none were willing ex- cept the remnant of Greek mercenaries. Bessus, the satrap of Bactria, was a kinsman of the king, and it was felt by many that he might be able to raise up again the Achaemenian house, which Darius had been unable to sustain. Darius was seized in the Propyl^a of Xerxes, at Persepolis 335 336 THE CONQUEST OF PERSIA night, and hurried on as a prisoner along the road to Bactria. This event disbanded his army. The Greek mercenaries went off northward into the Caspian Mountains, and many of the Persians turned back to find pardon and grace with Alexander. When he learned that his old rival was a prisoner and that Bessus was now his antagonist, Alexander resolved on a swift and hot pursuit. Leaving the main body of the army to come slowly after, he set forth at once with his cavalry and some light foot, and sped the whole night through, not resting till next day at noon, and then another evening and night at the same breathless speed. Sun- rise saw him at Thara, where the Great King had been put in chains. It was ascertained that Bessus and his fellows intended to surrender Darius if the pursuit were pressed. The pursuers rode on throughout another night ; men and horses were dropping with fatigue. At noon they came to a village where the pursued had halted the day before, and Alexander learned that they in- tended to force a march in the night. He asked the people if there was no short way, and was told that there was a short way, but it was waterless. Alexander instantly dismounted five hun- dred of his horsemen and gave their steeds to the officers and the strongest men of the infantry who were with him. With these he started in the evening, and having ridden about forty-five miles came up with the enemy at break of day. Bessus and his fellow- conspirators bade their prisoner mount a horse ; and when Darius refused, they stabbed him and left him in his litter. The litter- mules strayed about half a mile from the road down a side valley, where they were found at a spring by a Macedonian who had come to slake his thirst. The Great King was near his last gasp. He had the solace of a cup of water in his supreme moments, and thanked the Macedonian soldier by a sign. Alexander viewed the body, and is related to have thrown his own cloak over it in pity. It was part of his fair luck that he found Darius dead ; for if he had taken him alive, he would not have put him to death, and such a captive would have been a perpetual embarrassment. He SPIRIT OF ALEXANDER'S POLICY AS LORD OF ASIA 337 sent the corpse with all honor to the queen-mother, and the last of the Achaemenian kings was buried with his forefathers at Per- July, 330 b.c. sepolis. 10. Spirit of Alexander's Policy as Lord of Asia. — From the very beginning Alexander had shown to the conquered provinces a tolerance which was not only prompted by generosity, but based on political wisdom. He had permitted each country to retain its national institutions, insisting only on the division of power. Under the Persian kingdom the satrap was usually sole governor, controlling not only the civil administration, but the treasury and the troops. Alexander, in most cases, committed only the internal administration to the governor, and appointed besides him, and independent of his authority, a financial officer and a military commander. This division of authority was a security against rebellion. But the Macedonian king had set forth as a champion of Greeks against mere barbarians, as a leader of Europeans against effeminate Asiatics. All the Greeks and Macedonians who followed him regarded the east as a world to be plun- dered, and the orientals as inferiors meant by nature to be their own slaves. But, as Alexander advanced, his view expanded, and he began to transcend the familiar distinction of Greek and barbarian. He formed the notion of an empire, both European and Asiatic, in which the Asiatics should not be dominated by the European invaders, but Europeans and Asiatics alike should be ruled on an equality by a monarch, indifferent to the distinc- tion of Greek and barbarian, and looked upon as their own king by Persians as well as by Macedonians. The idea begins to show itself after the battle of Gaugamela. Some of the eastern provinces are intrusted to Persian satraps; for example, Babylonia to Mazaeus, and the court of Alexander ceases to be purely European. With oriental courtiers the forms of an oriental court are also gradually introduced; the Asiatics pros- trated themselves before the lord of Asia; and presently 338 THE CONQUEST OF PERSIA Alexander adopted the dress of a Persian king at court cere- monies, in order to appear less a foreigner in the eyes of his eastern subjects. REFERENCES FOR SUPPLEMENTARY READING (Syllabus, 91-92) These last chapters are so detailed that there is little necessity of sup- plementary reading. Should a more extended account be desired, Bury, chs. 17-18, or Wheeler, Alexander, will furnish material. In addition, Grote, XII, 49-66, and Dodge, Alexander, 134-171, have good descriptions of the military system of Alexander. CHAPTER XX THE CONQUEST OF THE FAR EAST i . Hyrcania, Areia, Bactria, Sogdiana. — The murderers of Darius fled — Bessus to Bactria, Nabarzanes to Hyrcania. Alex- ander could not pursue Bessus while Nabarzanes was behind him in the Caspian region, and therefore his first movement was to cross the Elburz chain of mountains, which separate the south Caspian shores from Parthia, and subdue the lands of the Tapuri and Mardi. The Persian officers who had retreated into these regions submitted, and were received with favor; the life of Nabar- zanes was spared. The Greek mercenaries who had found refuge in the Tapurian Mountains capitulated. All who had entered the Persian service, before the Congress of Corinth had pledged Greece to the cause of Macedon, were released; the rest were com- pelled to serve in the Macedonian army. Alexander sent orders to Parmenio to go forth from Ecbatana and take possession of the Cadusian territory on the southwestern side of the Caspian. He himself, having rested a fortnight at Zadracarta and held athletic games, marched eastward to Susia, a town in the north of Areia, and was met there by Satibarzanes, governor of Areia, who was confirmed in his satrapy. Here the news arrived that Bessus had assumed the style of Great King with the name of Artaxerxes, and was wearing his turban "erect." Alexander started at once on the road to Bactria. But he had not gone far when he was overtaken by the news that Satibarzanes had revolted behind him. Hurrying back in forced marches with a part of his army, Alex- ander appeared before Artocoana, the capital of Areia, in two days. There was little resistance, and the conqueror marched 339 34Q HYRCANIA, AREIA, BACTRIA, SOGDIANA 34 1 southward to Drangiana. His road can hardly be doubtful — the road which leads by Herat into Seistan. And it is probable that Herat is the site of the city which Alexander founded to be the capital and stronghold of the new province, Alexandria of the Areians. The submission of Drangiana was made without a blow. At Prophthasia, the capital of the Drangian land, it came to Alexander's ears that Philotas,the son of Parmenio,was conspiring against his life. The king called an assembly of the Macedonians and stated the charges against the general. Philotas admitted that he had known of a plot to murder Alexander and said noth- ing about it ; but this was only one of the charges against him. The Macedonians found Philotas guilty, and he was pierced by their javelins. The son dead, it seemed dangerous to let the father live, whether he was involved or not in the treasonable designs of Philotas. A messenger was despatched with all speed to Media, bearing commands to some of the captains of Parmenio's army to put the old general to death. It was an arbitrary act of precau- tion against merely suspected disloyalty; there seem to have been no proofs against Parmenio, and there was certainly no trial. In the meantime, Alexander, instead of retracing his steps and following the route to Bactria, resolved to fetch a circle. March- ing through Afghanistan, subduing it as he went, he would cross the Hindu-Kush Mountains and descend on the plain of the Oxus from the east. First he advanced southward to secure Seistan and the northwestern regions of Baluchistan, then known as Gedrosia, wintering among the Ariaspae, a peaceful and friendly people whom the Greeks called "Benefactors." A Gedrosian satrapy was constituted with its capital at Pura. When spring came, Alexander pushed northeastward up the valley of the Halmand. 329 b.c. The chief city which he founded in Arachosia was probably on the site of Candahar, which seems to be a corruption of its name, Alexandria. The way led on over the mountains, past Ghazni, into the valley of the upper waters of the Cabul River, and Alex- ander came to the foot of the high range of the Hindu-Kush. The 342 THE CONQUEST OF THE FAR EAST whole massive complex of mountains which diverge from the roof of the world, dividing southern from central, eastern from western, Asia — the Pamirs, the Hindu-Kush, and the Himalayas — were grouped by the Greeks under the general name of Caucasus. But the Hindu-Kush was distinguished by the special name of Paro- panisus, while the Himalayas were called the Imaus. At the foot of the Hindu-Kush he spent the winter, and founded another Alexandria to secure this region, somewhere to the north of Cabul; it was distinguished as Alexandria of the Caucasus. The crossing of the Caucasus, undertaken in the early spring, was an achievement which seems to have fallen little short of Hannibal's passage of the Alps. The soldiers had to content themselves with raw meat and the herb of silphion as a substitute for bread. At length they reached Drapsaca, high up on the northern slope — the frontier fortress of Bactria. Having rested his way-worn army, Alexander went down by the stronghold of Aornus into the plain and marched to Bactra, now Balkh. The pretender, Bessus Artaxerxes, had stripped and wasted eastern Bactria up to the foot of the mountains, for the purpose of checking the progress of the invading army; but he fled across the Oxus when Alexander drew near. Another province was added without a blow to the Macedonian empire. Alexander lost no time in pursuing the fugitive into Sogdiana. This is the country which lies between the streams of the Oxus and the Jaxartes. It was called Sogdiana from the river Sogd, which loses itself in the sands of the desert before it approaches the waters of the Oxus. Bessus had burned his boats, and when Alexander, after a weary march of two or three days through the hot desert, arrived at the banks of the Oxus, he was forced to transport his army by the primitive vehicle of skins, which the natives of central Asia still use. Alexander's soldiers, however, instead of inflating the sheep- skins with air, stuffed them with rushes. They crossed the river at Kilif and advanced to Maracanda, easily recognized as Samar- cand. HYRCANIA, AREIA, BACTRIA, SOGDIANA 343 The Sogdian allies of Bessus, thinking to save their country, sent a message offering to surrender the usurper. The king sent Ptolemy, son of Lagus, with six thousand men to secure Bessus. By Alexander's orders he was placed, naked and fettered, on the right side of the road by which the army was marching. He was then scourged and sent to Bactra to await his doom. But Alexander did not arrest his march; he had made up his mind to annex Sogdiana. Not the Oxus, but the Jaxartes, was to be the northern limit of his empire. Having seized and garrisoned Samarcand, the army pushed on northeastward by the unalter- able road which nature has marked out. The road reaches the Jaxartes where that river issues from the chilly vale of Fergana, and deflects its course to flow through the steppes. It was a point of the highest importance; for Fergana forms the vestibule of the great gate of communication between southwestern Asia and China — the pass over theTian-shan Mountains, which descends on the other side into the land of Kashgar. Here Alexander, with strategic insight, resolved to fix the limit of his empire, and on the 328 b.c. banks of the river he founded a new city, which was known as Alexandria Eschate ( the Ultimate), which is now Khodjend. The conqueror, judging from the ease with which he had come and conquered Arachosia and Bactria, seems not to have conceived that it might be otherwise beyond the Oxus. But as he was design- ing his new city, Alexander received the news that the Sogdians were up inarms behind him, and the garrison of Samarcand was be- sieged in the citadel. A message had gone forth into the western wastes, and the Massagetae and other Scythian tribes were flocking to drive out the intruder. It was a dangerous moment for Alex- ander. He first turned to recover the Sogdian fortresses, and in two days he had taken and burned five of them ; the others capit- ulated, and the dwellers of all these places were led in chains to take part in peopling the new Alexandria. The next task should have been the relief of Samarcand, but Alexander found himself confronted by a new danger. The 344 THE CONQUEST OF THE FAR EAST Scythians were pouring down to the banks of the Jaxartes, ready to cross the stream and harass the Macedonians in the rear. It was impossible to move until they had been repelled and the passage of the river secured. The walls of Alexandria Eschate were hastily constructed of unburnt clay and the place made fit for habitation in the short space of twenty days. Meanwhile, the northern bank was lined by the noisy and jeering hordes of the barbarians, and Alexander determined to cross the river. Bringing up his missile-engines to the shore, he dismayed the shepherds, who, when stones and darts began to fall among them from such a dis- tance and unhorsed one of their champions, retreated some dis- tance from the bank. The army seized the moment to cross; the Scythians were routed, and Alexander, at the head of his cavalry, pursued them far into the steppes. Then, relieving Samar- cand by a forced desert march, the king swept on to Sogdiana, ravaging the land; then marching southwestward to the Oxus, he crossed into western Bactria and spent the winter at Zariaspa. At Zariaspa, Bessus was formally tried for the murder of Darius, and was condemned to have his nose and ears cut off and be taken to Ecbatana to die on the cross. The Greeks, like ourselves, re- garded mutilation as a barbarous punishment, but Alexander saw that he must meet the orientals on their own ground ; he must be- come their king in their own way. The surest means of planting Hellenism in their midst was to begin by taking account sympa- thetically of their prejudices. Alexander, therefore, assumed the state of Great King, surrounded himself with eastern forms and pomp, exacted self-abasement in his presence from oriental sub- jects, and adopted the maxim that the king's person was divine. He was the successor of Darius, and it was therefore an act of deliberate policy that he punished the king-slayer in eastern fashion. The misfortune was that Alexander's assumption of oriental state and the favor which he showed to the Persians were highly unpopular with the Macedonians. Though they were attached to their king, and proud of the conquest^ which they had helped him HYRCANIA, AREIA, BACTRIA, SOGDIANA 345 to achieve, they felt that he was no longer the same to them as when he had led them to victory at the Granicus. His exaltation over obeisant orientals had changed him, and the execution of his trusted general Parmenio was felt to be significant of the change. These feelings of discontent accidentally found a mouthpiece about this time. Rebellious movements in Sogdiana brought Alexander over the Oxus again before the winter was over, and he 327 b.c. spent some time at Samarcand. One of the most unfortunate consequences of the long-protracted sojourn in the regions of the Oxus was the increase of drunkenness in the army. The exces- sively dry atmosphere in summer produces an intolerable and frequent thirst; and it was inevitable that the Macedonians should slake it by wine, if they would not sicken themselves by the bad water of the country. Alexander's potations became deep and habitual from this time forth. One night in the fortress of Samarcand the carouse lasted far into the night. Greek men of letters, who accompanied the army, sang the praises of Alex- ander, exalting him above the Dioscuri, whose feast he was cele- brating on this day. Clitus, his foster-brother, flushed with wine, suddenly sprang up to denounce the blasphemy, and, once he had begun, the current of his feelings swept him on. It was to the Macedonians, he said — to men like Parmenio and Philotas — that Alexander owed his victories: he himself had saved Alex- ander's life at the Granicus. Alexander started to his feet and called in Macedonian for his hypaspists ; none obeyed his drunken orders; Ptolemy and other banqueters forced Clitus out of the hall, while others tried to restrain the king. But presently Clitus made his way back and shouted from the doorway some insulting verses of Euripides, signifying that the army does the work and the general reaps the glory. The king leapt up, snatched a spear from the hand of a guardsman, and transfixed his foster-brother. An agony of remorse followed. For three days the murderer lay in his tent, without sleep or food, cursing himself as the assassin of his friends. 346 THE CONQUEST OF THE FAR EAST There were more hostilities in western Bactria and western Sogdiana, until at last, overawed by Alexander's success, the Scythians, in order to win his favor, slew Spitamenes, their chief leader. It only remained to reduce the rugged southeastern regions of Sogdiana. The Sogdian Rock, which commands the pass into these regions, was occupied by Oxyartes, and a band of Macedonian soldiers captured it by an arduous night-climb. Among the captives was Roxane, the daughter of Oxyartes ; and the love of Alexander was attracted by the beauty and manners of the Sogdian maiden. Notwithstanding the adverse comment which such a condescension would excite among the proud Mace- donians, he resolved to make her his wife, and, on his return to Bactria, he celebrated the nuptials — a union of Asia and Europe. About this time an attempt seems to have been made to render uniform the court ceremonial, and enforce upon the Macedonians the obeisances demanded from Persian nobles. Callisthenes, nephew of Aristotle, who was composing a history of Alexander's campaigns, was prominent in opposing the change, and fell into disfavor. One of his duties was to educate the pages, the noble Macedonian youths who attended on the king's person; and over some of these Callisthenes had great influence. One day at a boar-hunt a page named Hermolaus committed the indiscretion of forestalling the king in slaying the beast; and for this breach of etiquette he was flogged and deprived of his horse. Smarting under the dishonor, Hermolaus plotted with some of his comrades to slay Alexander in his sleep. But the plot was betrayed. The conspirators were arrested, and put to death by the sentence of the whole army. Callisthenes was hanged on the charge of being an accomplice. Before the end of summer, Alexander bade farewell to Bactria and set forth to the conquest of India. In three years since the death of Darius, the western conqueror had subdued Afghanistan, and cast his yoke over the herdsmen of the north as far as the river Jaxartes. He was the first European invader and conqueror THE CONQUEST OF INDIA 347 of the regions beyond the Oxus, anticipating by more than two thousand years Russia's recent conquests. His next enterprise forestalled the English conquest of northwestern India. 2. The Conquest of India. — In returning to Afghanistan, Alexander seems to have followed the main road from Balkh to Cabul, which, if he had not refounded, he had at all events re- named, Nicaea. Here he stayed till the middle of November, preparing for further advance. He had left a large detachment of his army in Bactria, but he had enrolled a still larger force — thirty thousand — of the Asiatics of those regions. The host with which he was now to descend upon India must have been at least twice as numerous as the army with which he had crossed the Helles- pont seven years before. During these years Alexander's camp was his court and capital, the political center of his empire — a vast city rolling along over mountain and river through central Asia. Men of all trades and callings were there: craftsmen of every kind, engineers, physicians, and seers; peddlers and money-changers; literary men, poets, musicians, athletes, jesters; secretaries, clerks, court attendants; a host of women and slaves. A court diary was regularly kept — in imitation of the court journal of Persia — by Eumenes of Cardia, who conducted the king's political correspondence. Alexander had no idea of the shape or extent of the Indian penin- sula, and his notion of the Indian conquest was probably confined to the basins of the Cophen and the Indus. The stories that were told about the wonders of India excited the curiosity of the Greek invaders. It was a land of righteous folks, of strange beasts and plants, of surpassing wealth in gold and gems. It was supposed to be the ultimate country on the eastern side of the world, bounded by Ocean's stream. At this time northwestern India was occupied by a number of 327 b.c small principalities. The northern districts of the land between the Indus and the Hydaspes were ruled by Omphis, whose capital was at Taxila near the Indus. His brother Abisares was the ruler 348 THE CONQUEST OF THE FAR EAST of Hazara and the adjacent parts of Cashmir. Beyond the Hy- daspes was the powerful kingdom of Poms, who held sway as far as the Acesines, which we know as the Chenab, the next of the "Five Rivers." East of the Chenab, in the lands of the Ravee and the Beas, were other small principalities, and also free "kingless" peoples, who owned no master. These states had no tendency to unity or combination. An invader, therefore, had no common resistance to fear; and he could be assured that many would wel- come him out of hatred for their neighbors. The prince of Taxila paid homage to Alexander at Nicaea, and promised his aid in sub- duing India. Alexander's direct road from the high plain of Cabul into the Punjab lay along the right bank of the Cophen or Cabul River, through the great gate of the Khyber Pass. But it was impossible to advance to the Indus without securing his communications, and for this purpose it was needful to subjugate the river-valleys to the left of the Cabul, among the huge western spurs of the Hima- laya Mountains. For the purposes of this campaign Alexander divided his army. Hephasstion advanced by the Khyber Pass, with orders to construct a bridge across the Indus. The king, with the rest of the army, including the light troops, plunged into the difficult country north of the river; and the winter was spent in warfare with the hardy hill-folks in the district of the Kunar, in remote Chitral, and in the Panjkar and Swat valleys. After this severe winter campaign, the army rested on the west bank of the Indus until spring had begun, and then, with the solemnity of games and sacrifices, crossed the river to Taxila, whose prince and other lesser princes met Alex- ander with obsequious pomp. A new satrapy, embracing the lands west of the Indus, was now established and intrusted to Philip, son of Machatas; Macedonian garrisons were placed in Taxila and some other places east of the Indus, and Philip was charged with the general command of these troops. This shows the drift of Alexander's policy. The Indus was to be the eastern 349 350 THE CONQUEST OF THE FAR EAST boundary of his direct sway; beyond the Indus, he purposed to create no new provinces, but only to form a system of protected states. Alexander then marched to the Hydaspes. Prince Porus, hav- ing gathered an army from thirty to forty thousand strong, was encamped on the left bank of the river, to contest the crossing. After a march, which was made slow and toilsome by the heavy tropical rain, the invaders encamped on the right bank of the river, and saw the lines of Porus on the opposite shore, protected by a multitude of elephants. It was useless to think of crossing in the face of this host ; for the horses, which could not endure the smell and noise of the elephants, would certainly have been drowned; and the men would have found it almost impossible to land, amid showers of darts, on the slimy, treacherous edge of the stream. All the fords in the neighborhood were watched. Alexander adopted measures to deceive and puzzle the enemy. Each night the Macedonian camp was in motion as if for crossing; each night the Indians stood long hours in the wind and rain. Alexander, meanwhile, was maturing a plan which he was able to carry out when he had put Porus off his guard. About sixteen miles upward from the camp, the Hydaspes made a bend westward, and opposite the jutting angle a thickly wooded island rose amid the stream, while a dense wood covered the right shore. Here Alexander determined to cross. He caused the boats to be conveyed thither in pieces and remade in the shelter of the wood; he had prepared skins stuffed with straw. When the time came, he led a portion of his troops to the wooded promontory, marching at a considerable distance from the river in order to avoid the observation of the enemy. A sufficient force was left to guard the camp under the command of Craterus. The king arrived at the appointed spot later in the evening, and through- out the wet, stormy night he directed the preparations for passing the swollen stream. Before dawn the passage began. Alexander led the way in a boat of thirty oars, and the island was safely passed ; THE CONQUEST OF INDIA 351 but land was hardly reached before they were descried by Indian scouts. At last the whole force was safely landed on the bank, and Alexander ordered his men for the coming battle — the third of the three great battles of his life. It was to be won without any heavy infantry; he had with him only 6000 hypaspists, about 4000 light foot, 5000 cavalry, including 1000 Scythian archers. Taking all the cavalry with him, he rode rapidly forward toward the camp of Porus. But Porus was advancing with his main army, having left a small force to guard the river-bank against Craterus. When he reached sandy ground, suitable for the movements of his cavalry and war-chariots, he drew up his line of battle. In front of all he arranged 200 elephants at intervals of 100 feet, and at some dis- tance behind them his infantry, who numbered 20,000, if not more. On the wings he placed his cavalry — perhaps 4000. Alexander waited for the hypaspists to come up, and drew them up opposite to the elephants. It was impossible to attack in front, for neither horse nor foot could venture in between these beasts, which stood like towers of defense, the true strength of the Indian army. The only method was to begin by a cavalry attack on the flank; and Seleucus and the other captains of the infantry were bidden not to advance until they saw that both the horse and the foot of the foe were tumbled into confusion by the flank assault. Alexander determined to concentrate his attack on the left wing; perhaps because it was on the river side, and he would be within easier reach of his troops on the other bank. Accordingly, he kept all his cavalry on his right wing. One body was intrusted to Ccenus, who bore well to the right, and was ready to strike in the rear, and to deal with the body of horse stationed upon the enemy's right wing, in case they should come round to assist their comrades on the left. The mounted Scythian archers rode straight against the front of the enemy's cavalry — which was still in column formation, not having had time to open out — and harassed it with showers of arrows; while Alexander himself, with the rest of the heavy 352 THE CONQUEST OF THE FAR EAST cavalry, led the charge upon the flank. Porus — who had com- mitted the fatal mistake of allowing the enemy to take the offen- sive — brought up his remaining squadrons from the right wing as fast as he could. Then Ccenus, who had ridden round close to the river-bank, fell upon them in the rear. The Indians had now to form a double front against the double foe. Alexander seized the moment to press hard upon the adverse squadrons; they swayed backward and sought shelter behind the elephants. Then those elephant riders who were on this side of the army drove the beasts against the Macedonian horses ; and at the same time the Macedonian footmen rushed forward and attacked the animals which were now turned sidewards toward them. But the other elephants of the line were driven into the ranks of the hypaspists, and dealt destruction, trampling down and striking furiously. Heartened by the success of the elephants, the Indian cavalry rallied and charged, but beaten back by the Macedonian horse, who were now formed in a serried mass, they again sought shelter behind the elephantine wall. But many of the beasts were now furious with wounds and beyond control; some had lost their riders; and in the confusion they trampled on friends and foes alike. The Indians suffered most, for they were surrounded and confined to the space in which the animals raged ; while the Mace- donians could attack the animals on side or rear, and then retreat into the open when they turned to charge. At length, when the elephants grew weary and their charges were feebler, Alexander closed in. He gave the order for the hypaspists to advance in close array, shield to shield, while he, reforming his squadrons, dashed in from the side. The enemy's cavalry, already weak- ened and disordered, could not withstand the double shock and was cut to pieces. The hypaspists rolled in upon the enemy's infantry, who soon broke and fled. Meanwhile, the generals on the other side of the river, Craterus and the rest, discovering that fortune was declaring for Alexander, crossed the river without resistance. Porus, who had shown himself a mediocre general, THE CONQUEST OF INDIA 353 but a most valiant soldier, when he saw most of his forces scattered, his elephants lying dead or straying riderless, did not flee, — as Darius had twice fled, — but remained fighting, seated on an elephant of commanding height, until he was wounded in the right shoulder, the only part of his body unprotected by mail. Then he turned round and rode away. Alexander, struck with admiration at his prowess, sent messengers who overtook him and induced him to return. The victor, riding out to meet the old prince, was impressed by his stature and beauty, and asked him how he would fain be treated. " Treat me like a king," said Porus. "For my own sake," said Alexander, "I will do that; ask a boon for thy sake." "That," replied Porus, "containeth all." And Alexander treated his captive royally. He not only gave him back his kingdom, but largely increased its borders. This royal treatment was inspired by deep policy. He could rest the security of his rule beyond the Indus on no better base than the mutual jealousy of two moderately powerful princes. He had made the lord of Taxila as powerful as was safe; the reinstatement of his rival Porus would be the best guarantee for his loyalty. But on either side the Hydaspes, close to the scene of the battle, two cities were founded, which would serve as garrisons in the subject land. On the right hand, the city of Bucephala, named after Alex- ander's steed, which died here; on the left, Nicaea, the city of victory. Leaving Craterus to build the cities, Alexander crossed the Ace- sines, more than a mile and a half broad, into the territory of a namesake and nephew of Porus, who fled eastward. Alexander left Hephaestion to march southward and subdue the land of the younger Porus, as well as the free communities between the two rivers. The news that the Cathaeans, a free and warlike people, were determined to give him battle, diverted Alexander from the pursuit. He stormed their chief town Sangala, and all their land was likewise placed under the lordship of Porus. Thus, of the 2 A 354 THE CONQUEST OF THE FAR EAST four river-bounded tracts which compose the Punjab, the largest, between Indus and Jehlum, belonged to Omphis of Taxila, while the three others, between Jehlum and Beas, were assigned to Porus. Alexander now advanced to the Hyphasis, or Beas, and reached it higher up than the point where it joins the Sutlej. It was destined to be the landmark of his utmost march. He wished to go farther and explore the lands of the Ganges, but an unlooked- for obstacle occurred. The Macedonians were worn out with years of hard campaigning, and weary of this endless rolling on into the unknown. Their numbers had dwindled; the remnant of them were battered and grown old before their time. All yearned to go back to their homeland in the west. On the banks of the Hyphasis the crisis came ; the men resolved to go no farther. At a meeting of the officers which Alexander summoned, Ccenus was the spokesman of the general feeling. The king retired to his tent and for two days refused to see any of his Companions, hoping that their hearts would be softened. But the Macedonians did not relent or go back from their purpose. On the third day, Alexander offered sacrifices preliminary to crossing the river, declaring that he would advance himself; but the victims gave unfavorable signs. Then the king yielded. When his will was made known, the way-worn veterans burst into wild joy ; the more part of them shed tears. They crowded round the royal tent, blessing the unconquered king, that he had permitted himself to be conquered for once, by his Macedonians. On the banks of the Hyphasis, Alexander erected twelve towering altars to the twelve great gods of Olympus, as a thank-offering for having led him safely within reach of the world's end. For in Alexander's conception the Ganges discharged its waters into the ocean which bounded the earth on the east, as the Atlantic bounded it on the west of the world. Alexander is often represented as a madman, impelled by an insatiable lust of conquest for conquest's sake. But if the form THE CONQUEST OF INDIA 355 and feature of the earth were what he pictured it to be, twenty years would have sufficed to make his empire conterminous with its limits. He might have ruled from the eastern to the western ocean, from the ultimate bounds of Scythia to the shores of Libya ; he might have brought to pass in the three continents an uni- versal peace, and dotted the habitable globe with his Greek cities. The advance to the Indus was no mere wanton aggression, but was necessary to establish secure routes for trade with India, which was at the mercy of the wild hill-tribes; and the subjugation of the Punjab was a necessity for securing the Indus frontier. The solid interests of commerce underlay the ambitions of the Mace- donian conqueror. Alexander retraced his steps to the Hydaspes, on his way pick- ing up Hephaestion, who had founded a new city on the banks of the Acesines. On the Hydaspes, Craterus had not only built the two cities at the scene of the great battle, but had also prepared a large fleet of transports, which was to carry part of the army down the river to reach the Indus and the ocean. The fleet was placed under the command of Nearchus; the rest of the army, divided into two parts, marched along either bank, under Hephaestion and Craterus. As they advanced, the only formidable resistance that they encountered was from the free and warlike tribe of the Malli. Having routed a large host of these natives, Alexander pursued them to their chief city, which is possibly to be sought near the site of the modern Multan. Here he met with a grave adventure. The city had been easily taken, and the natives had retreated into the citadel. Two ladders were brought to scale the earthen wall, but it was found hard to place them beneath the shower of missiles from above. Impatient at the delay, Alexander seized a ladder and climbed up under the cover of a shield. Peucestas, who bore the sacred buckler from the temple of Ilion, and Leonnatus followed, and Abreas ascended the other ladder. When the king reached the battlement, he hurled down or slew the Indians who 356 THE CONQUEST OF THE FAR EAST were posted at that spot. The hypaspists, when they saw their king standing upon the wall, a mark for the whole garrison of the fortress, made a rush for the ladders, and both ladders broke under the weight of the crowd. Only those three — Peucestas, Leonnatus, and Abreas — reached the wall before the ladders broke. His friends implored Alexander to leap down; he an- swered their cries by leaping down among the enemy. He alighted on his feet. With his back to the wall he stood alone against the throng of foes, who recognized the Great King. With his sword he cut down their leader and some others who ventured to rush at him; he felled two more with stones; and the rest, not daring to approach, pelted him with missiles. Meanwhile, his three com- panions had cleared the wall of its defenders and leapt down to help their king. Abreas fell slain by a dart. Then Alexander himself received a wound in the breast. For a space he stood and fought, but at last sank on his shield fainting through loss of blood. Peucestas stood over him with the holy shield of Troy, Leonnatus guarded him on the other side, until rescue came. Having no ladders, the Macedonians had driven pegs into the wall, and a few had clambered up as best they could and flung themselves down into the fray. Some of these succeeded in opening one of the gates, and then the fort was taken. No man, woman, or child in the place was spared by the infuriated soldiers, who thought that their king was dead. But, though the wound was grave, Alexander recovered. The rumor of his death reached the camp where the main army was waiting at the junction of the Ravee with the Chenab, and it produced deep consternation and despair. Reas- suring letters were not believed; so Alexander caused himself to be carried to the banks of the Ravee, and conveyed by water down to the camp. When he drew near, the canopy which sheltered his bed in the stern of the vessel was removed. The soldiers, still doubting, thought it was his corpse they saw, until the bark drew close to the bank and he waved his hand. Then the host shouted for joy. When he was carried ashore, he was lifted for a moment THE CONQUEST OF INDIA 357 on horseback, that he might be the better seen of all; and then he walked a few steps for their greater reassurance. This adventure is an extreme case of Alexander's besetting weakness, which has been illustrated in many other of his actions. In the excitement of battle, amid the ring of arms, he was apt to forget his duties as a leader. To have endangered his own safety was a crime against the whole army. The Malli made a complete submission ; and when Alexander had recovered from his wound the fleet sailed downward, and the Indian tribes submitted, presenting to the conqueror the charac- teristic products of India — gems, fine draperies, tame lions, and tigers. At the place where the united stream of the four lesser rivers joins the mighty flow of the Indus, the foundations were laid of a new Alexandria. The next stage of the southward ad- vance was the capital town of the Sogdi, which lay upon the river. Alexander refounded it as a Greek colony, and built wharfs; it was known as the Sogdian Alexandria, and was destined to be the residence of a southern satrapy which was to extend to the sea- coast. It is impossible to identify the sites of these cities, because the face of the Punjab has completely changed, through the altera- tion of the courses of its rivers, since the days of Alexander. The principalities of the rich and populous land of Sind were distinguished from the states of the north by the great political power enjoyed by the Brahmans. Under the influence of this caste, the princes either defied Alexander or, if they submitted at first, speedily rebelled. Thus it was nearly midsummer when the king reached Patala, near the Indian Ocean. On the tidings of an insurrection in Arachosia, he had despatched Craterus with a considerable portion of the army to march through the Bolan Pass into southern Afghanistan and put down the revolt. Alex- ander himself designed to march through Baluchistan, and Cra- terus was ordered to meet him in Kirman, near the entrance of the Persian Gulf. Another division of the host was to go by sea to the mouth of the Tigris. The king fixed upon Patala to be for the 358 THE CONQUEST OF THE FAR EAST Aug. -Oct., 325 B.C. Indian empire what the most famous of his Alexandrias was for Egypt. He charged Hephaestion with the task of fortifying the citadel and building an ample harbor. Then he sailed southward himself to visit the southern ocean. He sacrificed to Poseidon; he poured drink-offerings from a golden cup to the Nereids and Dioscuri, and to Thetis, the mother of his ancestor Achilles, and then hurled the cup into the waves. This ceremony inaugurated his plan of opening a seaway for commerce between the west and the far east. The enterprise of discovering this seaway was intrusted to Nearchus. Alexander started on his land-march in the early autumn, but Nearchus and the fleet were to wait till October, in order to be helped forward by the eastern monsoons. 3 . Alexander's Return to Babylon. — No enterprise of Alexander was so useless, and none so fatal, as the journey through the desert of Gedrosia, the land which is now known as the Mekran. His guiding motive in choosing this route was to make provi- sions for the safety of the fleet, to dig wells and store food at certain places along the coast. The march through the Mekran and the voyage of Nearchus were interdependent parts of the same adventure; and so timid were the mariners of those days that the voyage into unknown waters seemed far more formidable than the journey through the waste. With perhaps thirty thousand men, Alexander passed the mountain wall which protects the Indus delta, and reduced the Oritas to subjection before he descended into the waste of Gedro- sia. The army moved painfully through the desert, where it was often almost impossible to step through the deep sinking sand. Coin of Alexander. Obverse : Head of Her- acles, in Lion's Skin. Reverse: Eagle- bearing Zeus, and Prow of Galley in Field [Legend: aaehanapoy] ALEXANDER'S RETURN TO BABYLON 359 Alexander himself is said to have trudged on foot and shared all the hardships of the way. At length the waste was crossed; the losses of that terrible Gedrosian journey exceeded the losses of all Alexander's campaigns. Having rested at Pura, the king proceeded to Kirman, where he was joined by Craterus, who had suppressed the revolt in Arachosia. Presently news arrived that the fleet had reached the Kirman coast, and soon Nearchus arrived at the camp and relieved Alex- ander's anxiety. They had been weather-bound and had lost three ships; but the king was overjoyed that they had arrived at all. Nearchus was dismissed to complete the voyage by sailing up the Persian Gulf and the Pasitigris River to Susa; Hephaestion was sent to make his way thither along the coast; while Alexander himself marched through the hills by Persepolis and Pasargadae. It was high time for Alexander to return. There was hardly a satrap, Persian or Macedonian, in any land, who had not op- pressed his province by violence and rapacity. Many satraps were deposed or put to death; and one guilty minister fled at Alex- ander's approach. This was the treasurer Harpalus, who had squandered his master's money in riotous living at Babylon, and deemed it prudent to move westward. Taking a large sum of money, he went to Cilicia, and hiring a bodyguard of six thousand mercenaries, he lived in royal state at Tarsus. On Alexander's return he fled to Greece, where we shall meet him presently. Having punished with a stern hand the misrule of his satraps, Macedonian and Persian alike, Alexander began to carry out schemes which he had formed. He had unbarred and unveiled the orient to the knowledge and commerce of the Mediterranean peoples, but his aim was to do much more than this; it was no less than to fuse Asia and Europe into a homogeneous unity. He devised various means for compassing this object. He proposed to transplant Greeks and Macedonians into Asia, and Asiatics into Europe, as permanent settlers. This plan had indeed been partly realized by the foundation of his numerous mixed cities in the far 360 THE CONQUEST OF THE FAR EAST east. The second means was the promotion of intermarriages between Persians and Macedonians, and this policy was inaugu- rated in magnificent fashion at Susa. The king himself espoused Statira, the daughter of Darius; his friend Hephsestion took her sister; and a large number of Macedonian officers wedded the daughters of Persian grandees. Of the general mass of the Mace- donians ten thousand are said to have followed the example of their officers and taken Asiatic wives; all those were liberally re- warded by Alexander. It is to be noticed that Alexander, already wedded to the princess of Sogdiana, adopted the polygamous cus- tom of Persia ; and he even married another royal lady, Parysatis, daughter of Ochus. These marriages were purely dictated by policy; for Alexander never came under the influence of women. But the most effective means for bringing the two races together was the institution of military service on a perfect equality. With this purpose in view, Alexander, not long after the death of Darius, had arranged that in all the eastern provinces the native youth should be drilled and disciplined in Macedonian fashion and taught to use the Macedonian weapons. In fact, Hellenic military schools were established in every province, and at the end of five years an army of thirty thousand Hellenized barbarians was at the Great King's disposition. At his summons this army gathered at Susa, and its arrival created a natural, though unreasonable, feeling of discontent among the Macedonians, who divined that Alexander aimed at making himself independent of their services. His schemes of transforming the character of his army were also in- dicated by the enlistment of Persians and other orientals in the Macedonian cavalry regiments. 324 k.c. Alexander left Susa for Ecbatana in spring. He sailed down the river Pasitigris to the Persian Gulf, surveyed part of the coast, and sailed up the Tigris, removing the weirs which the Persians had constructed to hinder navigation. The army joined him on the way, and he halted at Opis. Here he held an assembly of the Macedonians, and formally discharged all those — about ten PREPARATIONS FOR AN ARABIAN EXPEDITION 36 1 thousand in number — whom old age or wounds had rendered unfit for warfare, promising to make them comfortable for life. The smouldering discontent found a voice now. The cry was raised, " Discharge us all." Alexander leapt down from the platform into the shouting throng; he pointed out thirteen of the most forward rioters, and bade his hypaspists seize them and put them to death. The rest were cowed. Amid a deep silence the king remounted the platform, and in a bitter speech he discharged the whole army. Then he retired into his palace, and on the third day summoned the Persian and Median nobles and appointed them to posts of honor and trust which had hitherto been filled by Macedonians. The names of the Macedonian regiments were transferred to the new barbarian army. When they heard this, the Macedonians, who still lingered in their quarters, miserable and uncertain whether to go or stay, appeared before the gates of the palace. They laid down their arms submissively and implored admission to the king's presence. Alexander came out, and there was a tearful reconcilia- tion, which was sealed by sacrifices and feasts. The summer and early winter were spent at the Median capital. Here a sorrow, the greatest that could befall him, befell Alexander. Hephaestion fell ill, languished for seven days, and died. Alex- ander fasted three days, and the whole empire went into mourning. Alexander set out for Babylon toward the end of the year, and on his way ambassadors from far lands came to his camp. The Bruttians, Lucanians, and Etruscans, the Carthaginians and the Phoenician colonies of Spain, Celts, Scythians of the Black Sea, Libyans, and Ethiopians had all sent envoys to court the friendship of the monarch who seemed already to be lord of half the earth. 4. Preparations for an Arabian Expedition. Alexander's Death. — Ever since the successful voyage of Nearchus, Alex- ander was bent on the circumnavigation and conquest of Arabia. His eastern empire was not complete so long as this peninsula lay outside it. The possession of this country of sand, however, was only an incident in the grand range of his plans. His visit to In- 362 THE CONQUEST OF THE FAR EAST dia and the voyage of Nearchus had given him new ideas ; he had risen to the conception of making the southern ocean another great commercial sea like the Mediterranean. He hoped to establish a regular trade-route from the Indus to the Tigris and Euphrates, and thence to the canals which connected the Nile with the Red Sea. Alexander destined Babylon to be the capital of his empire, and doubtless it was a wise choice. But its char- acter was now to be transformed. It was to become a naval station and a center of maritime commerce. Alexander set about the digging of a great harbor, with room for a thousand keels. All was in readiness, at length, for the expedition to the south. On a day in early June, a royal banquet was given in honor of Ne- archus and his seamen, shortly about to start on their oceanic voyage. Two nights of carousal ended in a fever which held him for six days, while the expedition's departure was postponed for another and yet another day. Then his condition grew worse, and lie was carried back to the palace, where he won a little sleep, but the fever did not abate. When his officers came to him, they found him speechless; the disease became more violent, and a rumor spread among the Macedonian soldiers that Alexander was dead. They rushed clamoring to the door of the palace, and the bodyguards were forced to admit them. One by one they filed past the bed of their young king, but he could not speak to them ; he could only greet each by slightly raising his head and signing with his eyes. Peucestas and some others of the Companions passed the night in the temple of Serapis and asked the god whether they should convey the sick man into the temple, if haply he might be cured there by divine help. A voice warned them not to bring him, but to let him remain where he lay. He died on a 323 B.c. June evening, before the thirty-third year of his age was fully told. • His sudden death was no freak of fate or fortune; it was a nat- ural consequence of his character and his deeds. Into thirteen years he had compressed the energies of many lifetimes. Sparing GREECE UNDER MACEDONIA 363 of himself neither in battle nor at the feast, he was doomed to die young. 5. Greece under Macedonia. — The tide of the world's history swept us away from the shores of Greece ; we could not pause to see what was happening in the little states which were looking with mixed emotions at the spectacle of their own civilization mak- ing its way over the earth. Alexander's victory at the gates of Issus and his ensuing supremacy by sea had taught many of the Greeks the lesson of caution ; the Confederacy of the Isthmus had sent congratulations and a golden crown to the conqueror; and when, a twelvemonth later, the Spartan king Agis renewed the war against Macedonia, he got no help or countenance outside the Peloponnesus. Agis induced the Arcadians, except Megalopolis, 331 b.c the Achaeans, and the Eleians, to join him; and the chief object of the allies was to capture Megalopolis. Antipater, as soon as the situation in Thrace set him free, marched southward to the relief of Megalopolis, and easily crushed the allies in a battle fought hard by. Agis fell fighting, and there was no further resistance. So long as Darius lived, many of the Greeks cherished secret hopes that fortune might yet turn. But on the news of his death such hopes expired, and it was not till Alexander's return from India that anything happened to trouble the peace. For Athens the twelve years between the fall of Thebes and the death of Alexander were an interval of singular well-being. The conduct of public affairs was in the hands of the two most honor- able statesmen of the day, Phocion and Lycurgus; and Demos- thenes was sufficiently clear-sighted not to embarrass, but, when needful, to support, the policy of peace. Phocion probably did not grudge him the signal triumph which he won over his old rival, ^schines; for this triumph had only a personal, and not a political, significance. Ctesiphon had proposed to honor Demos- thenes, both for his general services to the state and especially for his liberality in contributing from his private purse toward the repair of the city-walls, by crowning him publicly in the theater 364 THE CONQUEST OF THE FAR EAST with a crown of gold. The Council passed a resolution to this effect ; but yEschines lodged an accusation against the proposer, on the ground that the motion violated the Graphe Paranomon. In a speech of the highest ability, vEschines reviewed the public career of Demosthenes, to prove that he was a traitor and responsible for all the disasters of Athens. The reply of Demosthenes, a master- piece of splendid oratory, captivated the judges; and ^Eschines, not winning one-fifth part of their votes, left Athens and disap- peared from politics. The Macedonian empire had not yet lasted long enough to turn the traffic of the Mediterranean into new channels, and Athens still enjoyed great commercial prosperity. Although peace was her professed policy, she did not neglect to make provision, in case opportunity should come round, for regaining her sovereignty on sea. Money was spent on the navy, which is said to have been increased to well-nigh four hundred galleys, and on new ship- sheds. The man who was mainly responsible for this naval ex- penditure was Lycurgus. In recent years considerable changes had been made in the constitution of the financial offices. Eubu- lus had administered as the president of the Theoric Fund. But now we find the control of the expenditure in the hands of a minis- ter of the public revenue, who was elected by the people and held office for four years, from one Panathenaic festival to another. Lycurgus held this post. The post practically included the func- tions of a minister of public works, and the ministry of Lycurgus was distinguished by building enterprises. He constructed the Panathenaic stadion on the southern bank of the Ilissus. He rebuilt the Lycean gymnasium, where in these years the philoso- pher Aristotle used to take his morning and evening " walks," teaching his ''peripatetic" disciples. But the most memorable work of Lycurgus was the reconstruction of the theater of Dio- nysus. It was he who built the rows of marble benches, climbing up the steep side of the Acropolis, as we see them to-day. Thus Athens discreetly attended to her material well-being, and EPISODE OF HARP ALUS AND GREEK REVOLT 365 courted the favor of the gods, and the only distress which befell her was a dearth of corn. But on the return of Alexander to Susa, two things happened which imperiled the tranquillity of Greece. Alexander promised the Greek exiles — there were more than twenty thousand of them — to procure their return to their native cities. He sent Nicanor to the great congregation of Hellas at the Olympian festival, to order the states to receive back their 324 b.c. banished citizens. Only two states objected — Athens and ^Etolia ; and they objected because, if the edict were enforced, they would be robbed of ill-gotten gains. The /Etolians had possessed them- selves of (Eniadae and driven out its Acarnanian owners. The position of Athens in Samos was similar; the Samians would now be restored to their own lands, and the Athenian settlers would have to go. Both Athens and /Etolia were prepared to resist. 6. The Episode of Harpalus and the Greek Revolt. — Mean- while, an incident had happened which might induce some of the patriots to hope that Alexander's empire rested on slippery foun- dations. Harpalus had arrived off the coast of Attica with five thousand talents, a body of mercenaries, and thirty ships. He had come to excite a revolt against his master. Refused admission with his force, he came alone to Athens with a sum of about seven hundred talents. After a while messages arrived both from Mace- donia and from Philoxenus, Alexander's financial minister in western Asia, demanding his surrender. The Athenians, on the proposal of Demosthenes, adopted a clever device. They arrested Harpalus, seizing his treasure, and said that they would surrender him to officers expressly sent by Alexander, but declined to give him up to Philoxenus or Antipater. Harpalus escaped, and was shortly afterward murdered by one of his fellow-adventurers. The stolen money was deposited in the Acropolis, under the charge of specially appointed commissioners, of whom Demos- thenes was one. Suddenly it was discovered that only three hun- dred and fifty talents were actually in the Acropolis. Charges immediately circulated against the influential politicians, that the 366 THE CONQUEST OF THE FAR EAST other three hundred and fifty talents had been received in bribes by them before the money was deposited in the citadel. The court of Areopagus satisfied themselves that a number of leading statesmen had received considerable sums. Demosthenes ap- peared in their report as the recipient of twenty talents. He confessed the misdemeanor himself, and sought to excuse it by the subterfuge that he had taken it to repay himself for twenty talents which he had advanced to the Theoric Fund. But why should he repay himself, without any authorization, out of Alex- ander's money, for a debt owed him by the Athenian state ? The charges against Demosthenes were twofold : he had taken money, and he had culpably omitted to report the amount of the deposit and the neglect of those who were set to guard it. He was con- demned to pay a fine of fifty talents. Unable to pay it, he was imprisoned, but presently effected his escape. If Alexander had lived, the Athenians might have persuaded him to let them remain in occupation of Samos ; for he was always disposed to be lenient to Athens. When the tidings of his death came, men almost refused to credit it; the orator Demades for- cibly said, "If he were indeed dead, the whole world would have smelt of his corpse." It did not seem rash to strike for freedom in the unsettled condition of things after his death. Athens re- volted from Macedonia; she was joined by .ZEtolia and many states in northern Greece, and she secured the services of a band of eight thousand discharged mercenaries who had just returned from Alexander's army. One of their captains, the Athenian Leos- thenes, occupied Thermopylae, and near that pass the united Greeks gained a slight advantage over Antipater, who had marched southward as soon as he could gather his troops together. No state in north Greece except Bceotia remained true to Macedonia. The regent shut himself in the strong hill-city of Lamia, which stands over against the pass of Thermopylae under a spur of Othrys; and here he was besieged during the winter by Leosthenes. These successes had gained some adherents to the cause in the EPISODE OF HARPALUS AND GREEK REVOLT 367 Peloponnesus; and, if the Greeks had been stronger at sea, that cause might have triumphed, at least for a while. In spring the arrival of Leonnatus, governor of Hellespontine Phrygia, at the head of an army, raised the siege of Lamia. The Greeks marched into Thessaly to meet the new army before it united with Anti- pater; a battle was fought, in which Leonnatus was wounded to death. Antipater arrived the next day, and, joining forces with the defeated army, withdrew into Macedonia, to await Craterus, who was approaching from the east. When Craterus arrived, they entered Thessaly together, and in an engagement at Crannon, in 3 22 B -c which the losses on both sides were light, the Macedonians had a slight advantage. This battle apparently decided the war, but the true cause which hindered the Greeks from continuing the struggle was not the insignificant defeat at Crannon, but the want of unity among themselves, the want of a leader whom they entirely trusted. They were forced to make terms singly, each state on its own behoof. Athens submitted when Antipater advanced into Bceotia and prepared to invade Attica. She paid dearly for her attempt to win back her power. Antipater, unlike Alexander, had no soft place in his heart for the memories and traditions of Athens. He saw only that, unless strong and stern measures were taken, Macedonia would not be safe against a repetition of the rising which he had suppressed. He therefore imposed three conditions which Phocion and Demades were obliged to accept : that the dem- ocratic constitution should be modified by a property qualification; that a Macedonian garrison should be lodged in Munychia ; and that the agitators, Demosthenes, Hypereides, and their friends, should be surrendered. Demosthenes had exerted eloquence in gaining support for the cause of the allies in the Peloponnesus, and his efforts had been rewarded by his recall to Athens. As soon as the city had sub- mitted, he and the other orators fled. Hypereides with two com- panions sought refuge in the temple of /Eacus at /Egina, whence 368 THE CONQUEST OF THE FAR EAST they were taken to Antipater and put to death. Demosthenes fled to the temple of Poseidon in the island of Calaurea. When the messengers of Antipater appeared and summoned him forth, he swallowed poison, which he had concealed, according to one story, in a pen, and was thus delivered from falling into the hands of the executioner. REFERENCE FOR SUPPLEMENTARY READING i. The Character of Alexander: an Estimate of his Work. Holm, III, 374-391. Wheeler, Alexander, 473-501. Mahaffy, Greek Life and Thought^ 1-38. INDEX Abdera, 40. Abisares, 347. Abydus, 45, 63, 228, 315. Academy, 259. Acanthus, 250. Acarnania, 4, 21, 179. Acastus, 92. Achaea, 5, 22, 28, no, 179, 270. Achaean, colonies in Italy, 53-54, 63; settlements, 23-24; dialect, 32. Achradina, 155. Acragas, 52, 63, 155, 277. Acropolis, at Athens, 4, 90, 96 ; captured by the Persians, 147. Acte, 46. Admetus, king of the Molossians, 165 ; king of the Persians, 327. y£gae, 287, 289. ^Egean, civilization, 6, 14, 16, 22, 23; race, 17, 21. ^Egina, 59, 78, no, 130, 134, 135, 142, 146, 147, 175, 176, 200. /Egospotami, 233, 234. JEoWs, 28, 55 ; settlements, 23, 24 ; dia- lect, 32. ^Eschines, 299, 301, 363, 364. -