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THE ESSENTIALS OF
AN ENDURING VICTORY

WORKS OF
ANDRE CHERADAME

THE ESSENTIALS OF AN ENDURING VICTORY
THE PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED
THE UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

L'EUROPE ET LA QUESTION D'AUTRICHE AU
SEUIL DU XXE SIECLE [1901J

(Czech and Russian translations)

L'ALLEMAGNE, LA FRANCE ET LA QUESTION
D'AUTRICHE [1902]

(An abridgment of the preceding)

LA MACEDOINE, LE CHEMIN DE FER DE BAG-
DAD [1903]

LA COLONISATION ET LES COLONIES ALLE-

MANDES [1905]

LE MONDE ET LA GUERRE RUSSO-JAPONAISE
[1906]

LA CRISE FRANCAISE [1912]

DOUZE ANS DE PROPAGANDE EN FAVEUR DES
PEUPLES BALKANIQUES [1913]

LA PAIX QUE VOUDRAIT L'ALLEMAGNE, 191S

[191s]

(Pamphlet)

LE PLAN PANGERMANISTE DEMASQUE [1916]
(English, Portuguese, Spanish, Italian, Russian,
and Japanese translations)

PAN-GERMANY, THE DISEASE AND THE CURE,
AND A PLAN FOR THE ALLIES [1918]

LES BENEFICES DE GUERRE DE L'ALLEMAGNE
ET LA FORMULE BOCHE " NI ANNEXIONS,
NI INDEMNITES" [1918]
(Pamphlet)

THE ESSENTIALS OF
AN ENDURING VICTORY

BY
ANDRE CHERADAME

AUTHOR OF "the FANGEBMAN PLOT UNMASKED '

WITH MAPS

NEW YORK

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS

1918

Published December, 1918

DEC 12 1918

©CI.A508533

PREFACE

A considerable number of the Allies believe
that the conclusion of the armistice with Ger-
many on November 10th, 1918, signified that
all was over, that we were assured of abso-
lute victory, and that the general demobiliza-
tion could be immediately begun.

As this is an erronous belief, it constitutes
a source of immense danger.

The object of this book is to show this
danger in the strongest light, and to convince
public opinion that it is urgently necessary to
guard against it without delay. I shall show
that our victory may be very seriously com-
promised during the armistice preceding
peace.

Many of my readers may possibly be sur-
prised by this statement, especially those
who as yet know nothing of me; and for this
reason I must first explain why I am partic-
ularly entitled to be heard by the general
public at this crucial moment of the world's
history.

During a period of twenty years before

VI PREFACE

1914, I devoted all my time and all my means
to the defense of peace. In order to avoid
entirely the horrors of this war, I had care-
fully studied the conditions which would cause
it with the view of showing how it could best
be prevented.

Events have shown that the measures I ad-
vanced in my books, published from 1901 to
1914, to prevent the German aggression, were
right. If, therefore, these measures had been
followed, this horrible war would never have
taken place, and millions of men would still
be living. These things justify me in thinking
that I can give some information that will
be especially useful to prevent a recurrence of
the war.

There are other reasons why confidence
may be accorded me:

The two maps given on pages viii and ix
demonstrate that already in 1901 I had clearly
explained in what the Pangerman plan con-
sisted, exactly as it was realized sixteen years
later, in 1917.

In 1912, I declared that the European war
would begin by an attack on Serbia (see La
Defense Nationale, November 30th, 1912), that
the German offensive against France which
would follow would be ''terrific in its na-

PREFACE vii

ture," and "pushed to the verge of frenzy"
(see La Grise frangaise, page 507) .

As the result of four months' investigation
in the Balkans at the beginning of 1914, I
published in the Paris Correspondant (June,
1914) indications which showed that the gov-
ernment of Vienna ''was about to set off an
explosion which should destroy the state of
things beginning to take shape in the Bal-
kans." In August, 1914, I pointed out that
Bulgaria would declare war against the Allies
as soon as they met with a military defeat,
which came to pass after the affair in the
Dardanelles.

In my book. The Pangerman Plot Unmasked,
published at the beginning of 1916 (see page
73), I denounced in advance the series of Ger-
man pacifist manoeuvres, including the one
now in progress — the armistice trick, based
on the evacuation of Belgium and France,
to be followed by a negotiated peace which
finally, in spite of first appearances, would
result in a German victory.

This peril still exists in a much greater de-
gree than is believed, but we can completely
avert it if the Allies take advantage of the
tremendous effect produced by the defeat of
Bulgaria and the revolt of the oppressed

Vlll

PREFACE

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PREFACE

X PREFACE

peoples in Austria-Hungary, who have opened
to the AUies a free, triumphal road from Bel-
grade or Fiume to northern Bohemia; that
is, to a point only 250 kilometres south of
Berlin. These events, which in the single
month of October, 1918, completely trans-
formed the general situation of the Allies,
grew out of the application of a political
strategy on the principles and methods of
which I have not ceased to point out from
the beginning of the war. See U Illustration^
January 2d, 1915; "How to Destroy Panger-
many," Atlantic Monthly, December, 1917;
Pangermany, the Disease and Cure, and a Plan
for the Allies. On page 211 of this book, pub-
lished by the Atlantic Monthly early in 1918,
will be found a formula summarizing the con-
ditions of victory, which, as events have since
shown, were amply carried out by the Allies
in September-October, 1918.

On page 212 of the same book, I said once
more: ''In reality it is enough that the Austro-
German communications should be seriously
disturbed for the situation to become, with
extraordinary swiftness, very difficult both
morally and materially for the armies con-
centrated on the western front by the Ger-
man Staff."

PREFACE xi

I said at the end of this book: "If we en-
courage the Slavs, we shall inevitably bring
about an internal explosion in Pangermany,
and before the close of 1918 complete victory
will be ours."

A long series of events sustain my predic-
tions. Not that I am at all a prophet; I am
only what may be called a good mechanic-
engineer who has studied the very complicated
European machine long and deeply, and, as is
only natural under such circumstances, I can
see much farther into the future than those
who have not undergone the same special
training.

The service which I may now be able to
render lies in pointing out to the general public
the great dangers of the period of armistice,
and the way to avert them.

We must first understand that the armistice
signed by Germany is not identical with an
unconditional surrender. This agreement gives
strong guarantees to the Allies, no doubt, but
none the less it limits their action, as they
are not allowed to occupy the whole territory
of Germany. The German army is not de-
mobilized, it is simply to withdraw beyond a

xii PREFACE

definite zone, and a portion of its material
is still in its possession.

The armistice is therefore an agreement
which assumes, on the one hand, that the Ger-
mans will keep their word, and, on the other,
that the Allies will know how to draw the
most advantages from the securities which
have been given them.

The application of the principle of repara-
tion for damage caused is in particular re-
markably elastic. It may be applied in a way
so inadequate that — as I shall show later on —
the final result would be that France would
in reality completely lose the war — a result
which would have as its consequence the de-
feat of all the AUies.

The armistice is, then, a convention, that is,
a paper, worth just as much as its applica-
tion; and while the armistice is in force the
Germans and those who take their part in
the different Allied countries will surely at-
tempt —

1st. To increase the enormous lessening of
morale which the conclusion of the armistice
has brought about among the Allied troops
by making them think that there can be imme-
diate demobilization.

2d. To modify the conditions of the armi-
stice or to secure their incomplete execution.

PREFACE xiii

3d. To stir up rivalries which may naturally
exist between the greater Allies and between
the peoples to be set free by the Entente in
central and eastern Europe, but which have
hitherto been held in check by the restraints
of the war.

4th. By means of this situation to reach
a negotiated peace.

5th. To obtain much more favorable con-
ditions of peace, on the plea that the Ger-
mans are now republicans.

When one is familiar with the persistency
and power of German propaganda it is clear
that if these modes of action are systematically
applied for several months, at the peace the
Allied victory will be shorn of much of its
greatness.

I state below certain things which have
taken place or became known in the space
of only seventy-two hours before or after the
signature of the armistice by Germany,
November 10th, 1918.

The Evening Post of November 11th an-
nounces that the delegates from the Central
Powers will have preparatory conferences with
the envoys of the Allies. A negotiated peace
in conformity with Boche ideas is, then, in
preparation, which is contrary to the wish
of the immense majority of the American

xiv PREFACE

public, which has clearly pronounced in favor
of a dictated peace.

In New York, on the 10th of November,
4,000 socialists held a meeting at the Star
Casino to protest against the occupation of
German fortresses by the Allies {New York
Tribune, November 11th, 1918).

Even before the armistice had been signed,
on November 8th, Lord Robert Cecil, British
Under-Secretary of State, said: ''A genuine
democratic German government assuredly
would be accorded better peace terms."

On November 11th, Doctor Solf, German
Secretary for Foreign Affairs, begs President
Wilson to persuade the Allies to "mitigate
the fearful conditions of the armistice."

However this may be, if these facts and
this information can be known in three days,
what will be the effect of events of the same
sort which cannot fail to increase from now
to the conclusion of peace ? It is certain that
these results would have the effect of making
the victory of the Allies ''evaporate" to a con-
siderable extent.

This will be better understood if we analyze
the constituents of victory, understanding
clearly what "virtual" victory means, and
what are the conditions to transform it into
"real" victory.

PREFACE XV

The reason which decided Germany to sign
the armistice hes in the fact that the AUies,
having ''virtually" mastered the right to
pass through Austria-Hungary, could attack
Germany on the south. Under these condi-
tions, being no longer able to prevent a mili-
tary defeat on her own soil, Germany had
no interest in the continuance of the struggle.
It is therefore a ''virtual" threat of the Allies
that has brought about for them a victory
which, before the realization of the armistice
and of the conditions of peace, is also in a
virtual state.

The greater number of the Allies believe
that the armistice signed by Germany, being
a written acknowledgment of defeat accepted
in her name, constitutes victory for the Allies;
but this is not true. The armistice in itself
is only one of the probabilities of victory,
since it is worth no more than the application
which is made of its terms and the force which
the Allies can derive from this application
in imposing conditions of peace which assure
them a truly lasting and curative victory.
It is of cardinal importance to remember that
after four years of an extremely complex
struggle, which has overturned Europe in a
manner unprecedented in history, real victory
will not result from the signature of a document^

XVI PREFACE

or even from the recovery of territory once lost,
like Alsace-Lorraine for France, but from a differ-
ence in the whole situation of the victor by com-
parison with that of the vanquished.

Two contestants enter a contest, each with
100; when accounts are settled one is found
to have 60, the other 80; the latter is clearly
the winner. But what may possibly give rise
to serious and even fatal mistakes is the fact
that the difiference in the final state of the
two antagonists in this war, resulting from
the siun of various factors and from accounts
long and very difficult to draw up, will show
themselves only when months or even years
have elapsed after the conclusion of peace.

This is the reason why it is absolutely neces-
sary to insure ourselves against any risk of
error, by means of the most extreme caution
in strictly applying the conditions of the armi-
stice, and in definitely imposing conditions
of peace which have been studied out with
the greatest technical care.

As an illustration, let us take the example
of France to show the imperative nature of
these necessities. The permanent character
of the victory of France is unquestionably

PREFACE xvu

the very condition of the real and definitive
victory of the AUies. It is certain, for instance,
that if, twenty years after the conclusion of
peace, France should succumb as a result of
the remote consequences of the war, Germany
would rule Europe. It would thus be shown
that the AlHes would have been completely
deceived in declaring, as many of them are
doing at this moment, that they were certain
of having brought off a final victory.

France, being the pivot of the coalition which
has just imposed conditions for an armistice
on Germany, is consequently victorious; but
for the present only in the virtual and con-
ditional sense, even after the occupation of
Alsace-Lorraine. Undoubtedly, it is in many
respects a great advantage for France to re-
gain her lost provinces. But, in the first place,
France is only doing this after she has been
deprived of them for forty-seven years, and,
secondly, the advantage resulting from this
restoration will only be a real one for France
if the "peace conditions are such that she can
keep Alsace-Lorraine permanently.

On the signature of the armistice securing
to France the occupation of the lost provinces
France has not the certainty of being able
to keep them permanently, because of the

xviii PREFACE

conditions brought about by the war, first,
in their population, and, secondly, in their
finances, conditions which at the moment of the
signature of the armistice^ in spite of appear-
ances, put France in a clearly unfavorable
situation with respect to Germany.
• Everything is a question of comparison.
The Americans are 100 millions, and their
war losses (about 55,000 dead and 180,000
wounded) are very rightly felt by them.
But the harm done by the war to the French
people assumes proportions infinitely more con-
siderable.

It is a tremendous fact which should be kept
in mind by all those who wish to guarantee the
immediate future of Europe and of peace that
France has lost more men than Germany, not
only in proportion to the population of the
two countries but actually in absolute figures.

As a matter of fact, Germany with its 68,-
000,000 inhabitants in 1914 has had 1,580,000
killed, while France with its scarcely 40,000,000
inhabitants has a total of dead which has not
been oflficially published at the moment of this
writing but which those who are semi-oflBcially
informed know to be greater than the figures
of German deaths just given.

Besides, not to speak of the numberless

PREFACE XIX

wounded who may recover sooner or later,
France has about one miUion cripples and in-
valids, and one milHon and a half coming out
of the war with serious and permanent forms
of illness; say, 4 millions of the physically and
morally best men of France destroyed or re-
duced to the most serious incapacity. (If, in
proportion to its population, the United States
had had losses on the same scale as those of
France, these losses would be about 10 millions
of Americans).

This is not all. At least 2 millions of French
civilians have endured the Boche yoke for
the space of four years, and the health of great
numbers among them has been broken down
by what they have undergone. Thousands
of women and girls have been forced to bear
the worst ineffaceable stain.

The evil effects of the war on the popula-
tion of France will be still more aggravated
by the fact that the French birth-rate is a
third less than that of Germany. It is, there-
fore, certain that Germany will repair her
losses in men much more quickly than France.

This situation of the French population is so
serious that it will make real and definitive vic-
tory for France impossible, unless the conditions
of peace imposed by the Allies shall bring about

XX PREFACE

in Europe such a condition that Germany shall
not be able to profit by her superiority in num-
bers by renewing her attacks on France,

Let us now take up the economic inferiority
in which France finds herself with respect to
Germany at the moment of the signature of
the armistice.

War expenses have been very much heavier
for France than for Germany. A French shell
made with English coal and American steel
is, of course, very much dearer than a German
shell made with metal stolen from Briey and
coal seized from the Belgians; and this is true
not only of nearly all materials of war but
also food, when we compare the expenses of
the two countries during the war.

The richest provinces of France have been
devastated; they cannot be restored under
a very long time, even if Germany pays the
expenses. Germany, on the other hand, is in-
tact, therefore in an infinitely more advan-
tageous position to resume her activities after
the peace.

Any reparation for direct damage done which
Germany makes to France, can only at the
best put things back as they were before
the war. But it must be distinctly under-
stood that this reparation for direct damage

PREFACE xxi

leaves still existing the indirect damage which
has been inflicted upon the whole of France
by the war — indirect damage which is almost
never spoken of, and which in the material
field is infinitely greater than the direct damage
done to the invaded French departments. This
indirect material damage consists in the costs
of the war to France — so great that only to
pay the interest on the loans made and the
pensions to the widows, orphans, and wounded,
the taxes paid by the French, which were 1 bil-
lion of dollars before the war, will be increased
in a nearly permanent form to almost 3 billions
of dollars. Thus, in spite of the optimistic as-
sertions which I sometimes hear, I claim that
in a country of which the population has been
so thoroughly decimated as that of France,
it would be practically impossible to make
the people pay each year for a length of time
three times as much in taxes as before the war.
The word "reparation" only having been
generally understood hitherto as applying to
direct damages, we have as a result that, owing
to the fact of the indirect material damages
which the war has caused France, she finds
herseK at the time of signing the armistice
under a financial burden considerably heavier
than that of Germany.

xxii PREFACE

These things lead us to the inevitable con-
clusion that when the armistice was signed
the losses of all kinds produced by the war
were considerably greater for France, and it
is therefore perfectly fair to say that the con-
clusion of the armistice only assures a virtual
victory to France. In fact, if the conditions
of peace to be imposed on Germany do not
radically abolish in some way the difference
in mutual situation between France and Ger-
many when the armistice was concluded, as
far as actual losses of men and money are con-
cerned, the superiority in the mutual position
which will finally decide the real victory of
France over Germany cannot be realized.
In this case, in a very few years after the con-
clusion of peace, France, to the surprise of
all the world, would appear in a condition of
real and irremediable defeat, after having
been in a condition of virtual victory at the
moment of the signature of the armistice.
It is, therefore, plain that this signature and
even the occupation of Alsace-Lorraine are
by no means sufficient to secure the real and
definitive victory to France. This can only be
settled long after the conclusion of peace,
provided first that the terms of the armistice
are thoroughly applied, and afterward that
the conditions of peace, carefully considered

PREFACE xxiii

in the interest of Europe and the whole world,
assure to France material reparation exten-
sive enough to compensate for the immense
disadvantage from the point of view of in-
debtedness and the state of population, as
explained above, at which she stands with
regard to Germany at the present time.

The whole German pacifist manoeuvre since
the conclusion of the armistice has precisely
in view the prevention of France and her Allies
from accomplishing those results which are
the conditions of real victory. This Boche
manoeuvre in its essence consists in this: To
profit by the words "republic" and "socialism,"
so that the Boche Social Democrats, who are
nearly all tainted with the Pan-Germanist spirit
and have vigorously supported the Kaiser for
four years, may bring about by their connec-
tion with the pacifist Socialists of the Allied
countries, who know nothing of Germany and
easily allow themselves to be taken in by
phrases, that peace shall be negotiated with
the greatest possible speed and concluded with
the approval of the "Internationale." The
success of this manoeuvre will secure for Ger-
many the following results:

1st. Peace will be concluded very quickly

XXIV PREFACE

before an exhaustive study by the AlKes of
the vast and difficult problems which the war
has presented.

2d. The responsibility for the war being
concentrated on Kaiserism, the German people
for the sake of republican fraternity will only
be forced to repair a small part of the damage
they have caused.

These two results will of themselves be suf-
ficient to save Germany from defeat to-day,
and to assure her of victory to-morrow, for
they will leave the following consequences
when but a few years have passed:

The peace being merely a patched-up one,
the anti-Pan-Germanist Slavic states, Bohemia,
Jugo-Slavia, Roumania and Poland, will not
be securely organized. The Germans will keep
on with their intrigues among them all the
more easily because they will have remained
practically the masters of Russia, deprived of
its middle class destroyed by the Bolshevists.

France having to support the burden of
the enormous excess of its war expenses in
comparison with Germany would succumb
financially. The French birth-rate, lower than
that of Germany, and the French losses in men,
greater than those of Germany, would each
year after the war increase the relative weak-

PREFACE XXV

ness of France. Thus a state of things would
be brought about which would enable the
German people to accomplish that of which
Maximilian Harden warned us nearly three
years ago when he said:

''If it is felt in France that peace can be
possible only through the restoration of Alsace-
Lorraine, and if we are forced to sign such a
peace, the 70 millions of Germans will soon
destroy it." (See the Temps, February 9th,
1916).

On the day when this attack is brought about
by the conditions just explained, France — which
has saved the world by giving England time
to arm herself and the United States time to
become convinced of the Pan-Germanist peril
— will go down irretrievably in the midst of
her glory.

This is the result that the Germans are seek-
ing, and that the Allies of France, morally
and materially united, ought to prevent at
any price. What I have said shows that we
are at ^present really in this curious position:
we may have to-day the appearance of victory
and to-morrow the reality of defeat. To avoid
the danger, however, it is enough to see the
Boche manoeuvre clearly and not allow our-
selves to be misled by ideologists.

xxvi PREFACE

It would be a terrible mistake to believe
that a German republic will abandon all war-
like ideas and wishes for revenge. Very prob-
ably a German republic would be extremely
military, particularly if the Allies were so
foolish as not to deprive the Germans of the
means to rebuild their forces; and in any case
no precaution can be too great to avoid a repeti-
tion of the war. I have explained in detail
in this book (see page 70 and following) that
one of the surest ways to prevent another
war for the possession of Alsace-Lorraine would
be to create in central Europe a barrier of
free states, strongly anti-German, and as this
would restrain Germany from fresh outbreaks
in any direction, it should be brought about
in the interest of the entire world.

The essential object of the peace conference
is to assure the reparation by the German
people of the damages they have caused and
to reconstruct Europe, but this reconstruction,
to be durable, must be well done. In order
that the new European machine which is to
be built up from the parts of Pangermany
should work smoothly under normal con-
ditions, it should be very thoroughly put in

PREFACE xxvii

order by skilled mechanics, which is as much
as to say that the rehabilitation of Europe
demands the right solution of very numerous
and difficult problems which require precise
information on ethnography, national psy-
chology, and practical political economy. Such
information was certainly not possessed by
many leaders in the Entente when the armi-
stice was signed. The proof is this:

It was only at the end of the fourth year
of the war that the Entente understood the
importance to the world of the Czecho-Slovak
people, which for twenty-five years at least
the Germans had considered as one of the
greatest obstacles in the way of the Pangerman
plan. It is only at the end of 1918 that
Czecho-Slovaks were recognized by the AUies
as an independent people.

When the armistice was concluded the
Roumanians and the Jugo-Slavs had not yet
been recognized by the Entente with any-
thing like the same formahty as in the case
of the Czecho-Slovaks, though the creation
of Greater Roumania and of a strong Jugo-
slav state is just as necessary to the founda-
tion of peace as the independence of Bohemia.
I will not speak of a crowd of other questions
raised by the war, particularly those relating

xxviii PREFACE

to finance, which are of immense importance,
and have only been touched by the AUies in
the most superficial way. Thus, the vital
fact that the indirect damages made by Ger-
man aggression in France are far larger than
the direct damages, and like them call for
reparation, has not yet been clearly brought
out.

It is under such circumstances that as I
write these lines there is talk of an extremely
early meeting of the peace conference, with
the aim of deciding all these questions on which
for many years the fate of nations will de-
pend.

I hold it as my solemn duty, in no way to
be set aside, to declare openly that if the peace
congress meets without taking the time needed
to obtain in Central Europe informations which
are now still lacking, fatal mistakes will inevi-
tably result, and causes sure to provoke future
conflicts will remain, which will soon bring forth
their evil fruit.

One cannot all at once "patch up" a peace
and reconstitute Europe on a firm basis; the
thing cannot be done.

If the Germans are making the greatest
effort to bring the peace conference together
at the earliest possible moment it is because

PREFACE XXIX

they are well aware that the AUies lack in-
formation, and hope to gain great advantage
thereby.

Public opinion would do well to protest at
once against the hasty conclusion of the peace
conference. The Allied people have spent their
blood and their gold like water, and it is their
right and their duty to insist that the fruit
of so many sacrifices shall not be spoiled by
unnecessary haste.

In order to show the absolute need of avoid-
ing a precipitate decision, I have in this book
taken examples drawn from the war, chosen
in such a way as also to enlighten my readers
on the great events which have just passed
with such extraordinary rapidity that their
vast import is not easy to grasp.

Chapter I reminds us how the Germans
must have constantly deceived us, from the
beginning of the war; for instance, by making
us think that they were starving long before
this famine had become a reality, which hap-
pened in September-October, 1918, when re-
volts in Austria-Hungary and the Allied occu-
pation of the Danube cut communications
between Germany and the East.

XXX PREFACE

This general survey of German methods of
deceit shows us with what distrust we ought
to receive their promises and transformations
during the armistice. Aheady, it is easy to
detect that these transformations are to a great
extent camouflage.

In Chapter II, I show under what terribly
dangerous conditions the Germans made ready
for the armistice trick, which would have per-
haps succeeded if the great success of the Allies
in the Balkans, and the insurrection of op-
pressed peoples in Austria-Hungary, had not —
in October, 1918 — abruptly changed the gen-
eral situation in favor of the Allies.

Chapter III makes clear that it was not
owing to diplomatic discussions but to mili-
tary actions and Slavic insurrections in Sep-
tember-October, 1918 (the downfall of Bul-
garia and of Austria-Hungary), which drove
Germany to conclude an armistice on terms
dictated by the Allies.

Chapter III also shows that on the solution
in favor of the Allies of the effectives problem
depended the events of October, 1918, in central
Europe, for up to that time the superiority
in man-power was on the side of Pangermany.
The same chapter contains an exhaustive

PREFACE xxxi

description of the errors, which in my opinion
are made by the AUies, even at the present
moment, as to German man-power. The
deduction is that if the Alhes can really be
wrong on a subject vitally important, it is
certain that they lack indispensable informa-
tion as to numbers of other questions, on the
proper answers to which depends a firm and
enduring peace.

In the same chapter, I have studied the
sources of military effectives which could pos-
sibly be utilized in Russia by the German
Republicans ( ! ) coquetting with the Russian
Bolshevists. This shows that the Allies should
cut Germany entirely off from Russia by a
series of states organized as strongly as pos-
sible: Poland, Bohemia, a democratic Magyar
state. Greater Roumania, and Jugo-Slavia.

Chapter IV describes the centres of imperial-
ism which led to the formation and establish-
ment of Pangermany, and shows with what
care and in what manner the Allies should
destroy these hotbeds to avert any renewal
of the war.

Finally, the Conclusions present conditions
on the observance of which public opinion
should insist in order to guard against the

xxxii PREFACE

dangers of the armistice period, and thus ar-
rive at a well-founded peace, at an enduring
and complete victory.

New York, November 25, 1918.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PUSTACX - . - w - . . ,

tAM

CHAPTER L
How TRX Gbrmaks Deckxvs Alueo FtTBLic Ofdt-

lOK -

I. The danger of a complacent optimism, and of the
poisoning of Allied public opinion through
biassed news coming from neutral nations, but
of Boche origin.

n. The results of a systematic poisoning of Allied
opinion by the Germans, and the consequent
danger.

ni. The German high command directs pacifist of-
fensives started from Berlin.

CHAPTER n.

How THE Germans, if Thet Secure ak Armistice,
CouKT UPON Carrying off the Victory as a Con-
sequence OF THE Economic Condition Created in
Europe bt Four Years of War - - • - 51

I. Germany's war profits form the chief basis of the
pacifist mancBUvres.

xzxiii

xxxiv TABLE OF CONTENTS

n. The fact that the circulation of paper currency
in Germany is largely measured by the produce
of her gigantic thefts, while, on the other hand,
that of the Allies depends on their complete vic-
tory, constitutes the second base of German
schemes,

in. If circumstances make it feasible, the Alsace-Lor-
raine trick will be tried in order to enter on the
practical realization of German plans by divid-
ing the Allies, and leading France to "peace
talk" before a complete victory.

rV. Why the Germans believe that, if the Allies are led
into "peace talk" before achieving a full grasp
of the European situation which assures their
victory, their financial ruin will ensue. This
without more great battles would be enough to
bring about the final success of Germany.

CHAPTER m.

PAGE

Pangermant's Probable Military Strength, and
Its Weakness at the Outset of the Fifth Year
OF War - - . - - ... - 88

I. The annual military contingent of Germany.

n. Approximate strength of German mobilized forces
in August, 1918.

m. Critical discussion of the figures found to represent
the man-power of Germany.

rV. The probable total forces of Pangermaiiy in Au- •
gust, 1918.

V. How new sources of effectives could have been
used to offset the American numbers, if the Al-
"'-■ lies had not acted in the Balkans and time hajd v
been left to the Germans.

TABLE OF CONTENTS xxxv

VI. How it is the successes of the Allies in the Balkans
that secure the superiority in man-power to the
Entente.

VII. The teachings of the recent past and of the
present prove the immense power of political
strategy, and that for the Allies the Danube-
Central Europe front exerts a decisive influence
on the issue of the war.

CHAPTER IV.

PAGE

Why the Allies of Germany Have Thought It
Was to Their Interest to Act With Her - - 181

I. Why Turkey went with Germany.

II. The advantages which the Bulgarians thought to
gain by siding with Berlin.

in. Reasons for which Austria-Hungary is unavoid-
ably an indispensable base for Pangerman im-
perialism.

rV. The five centres of imperialism must be de-
stroyed.

Conclusions -------- 217

MAPS AND FACSIMILES

PAQE

Ce que serait rAlIemagne agrandie de rAutriche (fac-
simile of a map published ip 1901) ... viii

Pan-Germany at the end of 1917 - - - - - ix

Map of the war or Pan-Germani^» August, 1918 - 14, 15

German offensive and counter offensive of the Allies,

April, 1918, to August 6, 1918 - - - - 29

Alsace-Lorraine and Central Pan-Germany ... 75

Facsimiles of pamphlet published in 1914 - - 116, 117

New sources of possible effectives for the Germans - - 154

The great nationalities in Turkey . . . ^ . 189

The encroachments of the planned Bulgarian hegemony

upon the neighboring states - - - - - 194

The three parts of Austria-Hungary ... - 202

The nationalities in Bosnia-Herzegovina ... 204

The nationalities in Austria ...... 206

The nationalities in Hungary ...... 207

The five centres of Imperialism in Pan-Germany - - 216

The Europe of the Peace - 234

CHAPTER I.

HOW THE GEBMANS DECEIVE ALLIED PUBLIC

OPINION,

I. The danger of a complacent optimism, and of the

poisoning of Allied public opinion through biassed

news coming from neutral nations, but of Boche

origin.

n. The results of a systematic poisoning of Allied opinion

by the Germans, and the consequent danger.
in. The German high command directs pacifist offensives
started from Berlin.

It is my conviction that Allied public
opinion is constantly manipulated by the
Germans, who thus shape it in a manner
favorable to their plans, I know that this
statement will seem surprising; it is never-
theless true, as I hope to show.

Few are aware of a fact of tremendous im-
portance: from the outset of the war, the
government of Berlin has exerted a constant
pressure on the Allies in Europe through a
part of their own press. The fact that the
war was a surprise to the Allies proves that
they had previously no direct and trustworthy

2 AN ENDURING VICTORY

information as to the Central Powers and the
Balkans. In the course of the war, the same
lack of information has been amply proved
by the Entente's mistakes in policy, mistakes
now understood and bitterly regretted. On
the other hand, for the first three years of the
struggle many in France and England allowed
themselves to be complacently optimistic.
Numbers of good people, seeing the huge En-
tente coalition, felt sure of a speedy triumph.
Naturally this systematic optimism caused
many among the Alhes to accept any favor-
able reports as true. The Germans with their
usual cleverness have employed a very simple
method to turn these circumstances to their
own advantage. In neutral papers, partic-
ularly those of Switzerland and Holland, they
constantly published and continue to publish
short extracts from German newspapers, or
despatches, ten or fifteen Unes long, as to the
state of aCFairs in the German Empire, and
from the beginning of the war, the Entente
newspapers of Europe have made use of these
extracts and statements to supply the lack
of exact information about the enemy. The
greater part of the news from Turkey, Bul-
garia, Austria-Hungary, before their collapse,
and Germany appearing in Allied papers has

HOW THE GERMANS DECEIVE 3

been dated from Zurich, Berne, or Amster-
dam. The German Government has kept its
own press, as well as that of the Allies, under
the strictest observation, and every stranger
passing through Pangerman territory has been
closely watched; how, then, was it possible
that information from such sources could be
true? I have made a study for twenty-five
years of the states which have made up Pan-
germany, and being thus in a position to judge
of the worth of these reports, I can state
positively that, during the first four years of
the war, eight out of ten of these items were
false, and made in Berlin.

This biassed information has been arranged
with great ingenuity; it has taken a variety of
forms, and contained just enough falsehood to
be useful to the Boche cause. Allied news-
papers and correspondents in Switzerland and
Holland were frequently taken in, and reprinted
this so-called information. The great number
of these reprints caused the danger, which has
been most serious, for since the beginning of the
war, Germany has succeeded in using them at
any given moment to foster the state of mind
among the Allies necessary to the success of
any serious military operation. For example:

No one now doubts that the junction with

4 AN ENDURING VICTORY

Turkey and Bulgaria was of vital importance
to Germany. Austria-Germany must have
yielded long ago without the help of the
Bulgar-Turks and their eastern resources. It
was therefore necessary to crush Serbia at any
cost, as a condition of this eastern alliance.

From the early part of 1915, the psycholog-
ical foundations for this enterprise were laid
by means of the German papers, all docilely
following instructions from the General Staff
in. Berlin, and dwelling on the idea that "the
decision must come on the west front, which
is all-important, and where alone we must
look for it."

Many organs of the western Allies, being
converted to this theory of the principal front,
which, in fact, allowed Germany to take pos-
session of three-fourths of Europe, have found
in these Boche statements arguments in sup-
port of their ideas, and have reprinted them
with a readiness which must have been de-
lightful to Berlin, for at this time the General
Staff dreaded above everything to see the
Anglo-French send even 150,000 men to the
Danube. These with the 350,000 Serbians
and 700,000 Roumanians, would have made
up a force of 1,200,000 men, amply suflScient
to have kept Austria-Germany from seizing

HOW THE GERMANS DECEIVE 5

the granary of the east, to keep open through
Roumania communication with the Russians^
who were still in Austria, in eastern Galicia^
and to prevent the entrance of Bulgaria and
Turkey into the war, the Balkan campaigns
having stripped them of munitions.

In addition the government of Constan-
tinople as soon as it saw itseK deprived of the
possibility of German help, by the estabhsh-
ment of a firm Allied front on the Danube,
would have been shortly forced to reopen the
Turkish straits.

The interest of the Germans in the destruc-
tion of Serbia was therefore absolutely vital.
Their propaganda having helped to prevent
France and England from understanding the
extraordinary importance of the Danube front
at the beginning of 1915, in October of that
year, they began the invasion.

At that time, most men at the head of west-
ern affairs thought the east could have no
decisive influence on the fate of the war.
There was, nevertheless, a party in France
which wished to send a strong expedition from
Salonika to the help of Serbia, with the ob-
ject of sharply opposing the junction of Ger-
many and the east. At the end of 1915, it
was, therefore, much to the interest of Berlin

6 AN ENDURING VICTORY

to persuade the Franco-English that there
was nothing to be gained by reinforcing Ser-
bia. As a part of Allied opinion was opposed
to the Balkan expedition, this was pressed
into the service of the German plans by means
of a great number of despatches which ap-
peared in the Dutch and Swiss papers, copied
in a simple-minded way by the French and
EngUsh press. These despatches stated that
railroad communications were already re-
opened between Hungary and Bulgaria, via
Serbia. A comparison of the date of these
first despatches as they appeared in the En-
tente press with the truth afterward published,
as to the re-establishment of normal communi-
cation by rail between the Central Empires
and Bulgaria shows a diflFerence of about six
weeks. Now these reports, though nominally
from neutral sources, came really from Ger-
many, and as they anticipated events they
resulted in encouraging those in France and
England who opposed the Salonika expedition.
Their argument had a specious appearance of
truthfulness. They said: *'Let us not strip
our most important front, for it is too late;
we have lost our chance in the Balkans; rail-
road communications are already reopened
between Hungary and Bulgaria." This was

HOW THE GERMANS DECEIVE 7

enough to satisfy Berlin, and this one false
idea disseminated by German propaganda had
incalculable consequences, and for a long time
sufficed to turn the current of the war into
channels desired by Germany.

If the numerous despatches from Boche
sources had not misled Franco-English opin-
ion, and if Serbia had been promptly rein-
forced at the end of 1915 when Roumania
could have come in with great eflFect while
Russia was still fighting bravely, and the Slavs
and Latins of Austria-Hungary were ready for
revolt, the known facts show that the Anglo-
French could have saved the Balkan situation
to a great extent, and could have prevented
the economic and military reorganization of
Turkey and Bulgaria by the Germans. With-
out this eastern alliance, Austria-Germany
would long since have become unable to hold
out against the coalition as is proved by the
terrible blow given to Austria-Germany by the
Allied victory over Bulgaria. These consid-
erations bring home to us the deep injury done
to the Allied cause by the newspaper propa-
ganda of biassed news.

Many similar instances could be cited; in
fact, each important German campaign has
been aided by this inspired information coming

g AN ENDURING VICTORY

through Holland and Switzerland, which is
then reprinted by a part of the Allied Euro-
pean papers with a creduhty hard to under-
stand.

This has happened so often that I believe
there is a department in the General Staff at
Berlin which might be called "Bureau for the
manufacture of blunders to be made by the
Allies." In this bureau are elaborated biassed
news despatches which, when finished, are
sent out through the neutral press.

To show how far it is possible to go in this
direction with the Allied newspapers in Eu-
rope, this BerHn office feels its way by pub-
lishing news as absurd as it is false. Thus,
about two years ago almost the whole Allied
European press copied a neutral despatch
asserting that William II was dying of cancer.
Recently many of our papers have informed
us that Hindenburg had died of an apoplectic
attack brought on by a violent quarrel with
the Emperor; this also purported to be a neu-
tral rumor. If news of this caliber is believed
one can understand how ready are many AUied
papers to reprint less sensational reports, but
some of these are even more dangerous; as
witness the repeated rumors which have led
the Allies to believe that overtures for a sepa-

HOW THE GERMANS DECEIVE

rate peace had come from Austria-Hungary,
Bulgaria, or Turkey, or that a coolness had
arisen between these countries and Berlin.
The facts have proved, however, that only
Bulgaria has tried seriously to negotiate sepa-
rately, and even this only recently.

In fact, the Germans hoodwinked the Allies
just as at a Spanish bull-fight the matador
distracts the attention of the bull so as to take
him at a disadvantage. The bull is ten tiraes
as strong as the man, and can soon make an
end of him by a direct charge. But, as we
know, red is particularly obnoxious to the
bull, and that is why the matador flourishes
a short red cloak. The enraged animal can
see nothing else, and as he makes his furious
charge his enemy's long sword is plunged into
his withers.

The Germans play this identical game witla
the Allies. They know that our united
strength is greater than theirs, and that they
would be quickly beaten if we hit them in
the right place. To avoid this they distract
oiir attentioh froni the weak points of Pan-
germany by niisleading despatches^ which af^
feet us as the matador's red cloak acts on
the bull.

Our complacent optimism inclines us to

10 AN ENDURING VICTORY

believe this manufactured German news; our
minds have been perverted by it, so that we see
things as we wish and not as they are. This
explains how, only a few weeks after the war
began, the Allied pubUc in Europe firmly be-
lieved that the shortage of foodstuflFs in Ger-
many would soon cause her to yield, that sup-
plies for her munitions were lacking, that the
Socialists would force a peace on the Berlin
government, that their reserves were nearly
exhausted, that each German oflFensive was
the last, the sign of the desperation of a people
longing for peace, etc.

Now, after four years, results have shown
the emptiness of these conclusions, but as
they have constantly been repeated for so
long a time, in spite of themselves the Allies
think about Germany much as Berlin would
have them, and this on many important points.
This state of mind favors the unprecedented
eflForts that the Germans make to secure an
armistice before Germany itself should be
completely invaded.

Of course, it is pleasant to find news in the
paper which leads one to think that the war
will soon be over; but war is not a pleasant
thing; it is a grim necessity, which must be
ended as soon as possible by a decisive vie-

HOW THE GERMANS DECEIVE 11

tory. Pleasant tidings when they are untrue
greatly prolong the war, and cause the death
of great numbers of brave men; this encour-
aging information, when inexact, may have the
most sinister consequences.

It is largely because much of our Alhed
press has imbibed false news, that the Entente
with its large forces and resources of all kinds
has not brought them to bear where they would
have won a decision in the quickest and easiest
way. For this reason, we are confronted with
the remarkable fact that there are 68 millions
of Germans, 50 millions subjects of Austria-
Hungary (inadequately prepared from the
military standpoint, and of whom 28 millions
at least are thoroughly anti-German), 5 mil-
lions of Bulgarians, and 20 millions of Turks
lacking proper armament on account of the
Balkan Wars, and of whom at least 14 millions
wished to keep out of this struggle — altogether
a total of 143 million inhabitants of the Central
Empires, who have been able for four years to
conquer or withstand 370 millions of Allies
(France has 40 millions, England 46 millions,
Italy 36 millions, Serbia 5, Roumania 8, Japan
53, and Russia 182 millions). (These figures
do not include the large colonies, which have
rendered such valuable assistance to the Allies.)

U AN ENDURING VICTORY

This situation has made indispensable the entry
of 100 millions of Americans into the war.

II.

The systematic dissemination of biassed
news among the Allies combines with the in-
jBuence of the pacifists and Bolchevist groups
that exist in all the Entente countries who
play the German game — unintentionally per-
haps, but that matters little. A considerable
part of Allied public opinion is so poisoned and
distorted by this double influence that it forms
wrong views on essential points, on points
where a right understanding is vitally neces-
sary. For example, the action especially of
England and America as to the war was de-
cided by their indignation at Germany's viola-
tion of the treaties guaranteeing the neutrality
of Belgium, and of international laws as to
marine warfare. There can be no doubt that
when Germany cynically broke her word, it
so shocked Great Britain and the United States
that they were convinced of the necessity of
the great sacrifices of men and money de-
manded of them.

Since these great countries entered the war,
Germany has broken every law, human and

HOW THE GERMANS DECEIVE 13

divine, in a way never before known in history.
She tortures prisoners, kills the wounded, and
torpedoes hospital-ships; her soldiers resort
to the most treacherous tricks; the German
authorities sent to Bucharest tubes filled with
bacilli to spread infectious diseases. In the
countries they occupy, they have killed thou-
sands of civilians, including women and chil-
dren. They stirred up the Turks to murder
more than a million of Armenians, and hun-
dreds of thousands of Greeks. On the very
morrow of its signature, the government of
Beriin had violated the treaty of Brest-Litovsk,
which it had itself dictated. It is clear now,
therefore, that no right-thinking man can ever
again trust in the German word. It would
indeed be insane to do so. In spite of these
self-evident facts, corroborated by common
sense and the war map, there is actually a
large number of people among the Allies wil-
ling to accept the idea of a negotiated peace,
which would put an end to hostilities by a
treaty in which Germany would pledge her-
self to restitution and future good conduct.
The war into which many of the Allies were
led by their horror at the German violation
of a "scrap of paper" would thus, in spite of
their unheard-of sacrifices in men and money,

AN ENDURING VICTORY

HOW THE GERMANS DECEIVE

16 AN ENDURING VICTORY

be ended for these same Allies by another
"scrap of paper" ! If those among the Allies
who admit this eventuality showed similar
signs of mental aberration in their private af-
fairs, would they not soon be put in a lunatic
asylum?

But there are other reasons which show
yet more strongly how little the real bases of
victory and lasting peace are understood in
Entente countries, even among the most en-
lightened. A great proportion of the Allies
think the war will end by a peace conference
around the green table, between our represen-
tatives and those of the Central Powers. A
glance at the war map (see Pangermany in
August^ 1918, page 14) will prove that this
is practically impossible. The choice is clear.
If the Allies open negotiations with Germany
without having destroyed competely her grip
on Central Europe — the key of the world —
which implies the dismemberment of Austria-
Hungary, the German hegemony will con-
tinue; their position will be so weak that these
negotiations can only end, as did the pseudo-
negotiations at Brest-Litovsk, in complete de-
ception followed by the most irremediable of
catastrophes. But if the Allies, after having
materially destroyed the German hold on

HOW THE GERMANS DECEIVE 17

Central Europe — which is quite possible if,
thanks to extended air transport, they supply
the necessary means of action to the oppressed
peoples of that region — Czecho-SIovaks, Jugo-
slavs, and Roumanians and in reinforcing with
them the AUied army of the Balkans — if they
are willing after such frightful sacrifices to
discuss peace on equal terms with Germany in
a conference, instead of purely and simply
dictating their just conditions as victorious
soldiers, conscious of the right, it will then be
clear that the Allies are completely ignorant
of German psychology, and a peace will be
made which will allow Prussian militarism to
continue to exist, and later to begin it all over
again.

Under the influence of constant Boche-
inspired though pretended-neutral despatches,
many among us think that Germany is ruined
by the war; but the truth is that she is run-
ning over with wealth of every kind stolen
from three-fourths of Europe, as I shall show
in Chapter II.

This German news has also convinced large
numbers that the Teutons can be starved into
submission, but such is not the fact.

Everything is comparative in war. From
the standpoint of food-supply, we need only

18 AN ENDURING VICTORY

ask if conditions in the Central Empires were
better or worse than with us. Let us look
into the situation as it was up to October,
1918, that is up to the collapse of Bulgaria.
The German people, undoubtedly, suffered a
serious lack in foodstuffs, but much of this
suffering came from the severe but far-sighted
prudence of the Prussian administration, which
imposed strict regulations in order to hold out
longer against the Allies. The German dif-
ficulties were less in production than in trans-
portation, owing to the lack of means of
communication between Germany and the
East. These difficulties of transport, how-
ever, diminished with time by the construc-
tion of new lines of railroad, which were being
rapidly built, especially since Germany con-
trolled the whole course of the Danube,
which running from southern Germany to the
Black Sea, north of the Roumanian Dobrudja,
furnished easy transport for Serbia, Bulgaria,
Roumania, and the vast regions belonging to
Turkey and Russia, bordering on the Black
Sea. For these reasons, though Germans may
have suffered sharply from insufficient food,
they could not be starved out. There was
no famine in the Central Empires except in
Slav or Latin districts, where Teutonic cruelty

HOW THE GERMANS DECEIVE 19

used this hideous method to slowly destroy
a hated people. It was stated that Germany
was more in need of food than the Allies, but
how could this be? When you study the war
map (page 14), you realize that England,
France, and Italy were forced to supply them-
selves from Australia and America at ruin-
ously high rates, owing to the increased freight
charges due to submarine warfare.

On the other hand, Germany had easy access
to all the granaries of Europe; Hungary,
Roumania, the Balkans, Asia Minor, southern
Russia were all free to her, and she could plun-
der them as she pleased. She stole everything
she needed, over immense territories. She has
50 millions of slaves. Allied subjects, who raise
her crops without wages, and Christian pop-
ulations in Turkey were forced to intensive
cultivation for her in Asia Minor. Even be-
hind the German lines in the west the unlucky
Belgians and French, with their beasts of bur-
den, work for the Teutons. They even had
to keep a strict account of the eggs, most of
which were reserved for the Germans. All over
the wide Pangermanist territory production
was carefully supervised. Under these circum-
stances, how could Germany be starved into
peace before France, England, or Italy .^ But

20 AN ENDURING VICTORY

if the Allies wish it, famine can become a reality
in Austria-Germany, Now that the Allies are
masters of the Danube, the revictualling of
Austria-Germany is at once imperilled.

The aim of Berlin's biassed news has been to
conceal the great extent of the German gains
in the east, and to concentrate the attention
of the Allies on the western front, so that
they may not view the European situation
as a whole. This aim has been easily reached,
especially since the Allies lost their hold on
the east, enabling Germany to bring all her
available force to bear on the western front,
where by force of circumstances all large mili-
tary operations are now taking place. As we
now no longer had the entire European war
map in view (page 14) a large section of Allied
public opinion was apt to give undue impor-
tance to actions in the west, though these
could not bring about a final decision and real
and complete victory, while the surrender of
Bulgaria has proved by its consequences the
immense importance of the Balkan effort.

I will cite, by way of illustration, the effect
on the Allied public of the loss and recapture
of a part of the salient between Rheims and
Soissons.

On the 27th of May, 1918, as a result of

HOW THE GERMANS DECEIVE 21

the surprise at the Chemin-des-Dames, the
Teutons succeeded in forming a good-sized
salient between these points. A week later,
they advanced to Chateau-Thierry; less than
80 kilometres from Paris, which was there-
fore threatened with severe bombardment in
case of further advance. However, since the
15th of July, General Foch has so ably handled
his forces that, assisted by American reinforce-
ments, they regained up to the 30th of July a
part of the salient, showing a dash and courage
beyond all praise. Laying aside other great
Entente successes which have since occurred,
I select the 30th of July for my illustration.
The Germans were then forced to retire from
Chateau-Thierry to Fere-en-Tardenois, a dis-
tance of about 20 kilometres. What did a
part of the Allied press at once say.^ It de-
clared that Germany had suflFered a decisive
defeat, which would open the eyes of her
people, and deal a terrible blow at Prussian
militarism, etc. Observe that this sort of thing
was encouraged even on the 30th of July by
the Boches, who have a deep interest in making
the Allies count on victory before it is within
their grasp. It is easy to see why, for Germany
wants to "discuss" peace terms while she
holds firmly to the territory she has occupied.

22 AN ENDURING VICTORY

and means to keep. She has, therefore, the
strongest reasons to wish to persuade the AUies
that their successes are great enough to justify
peace talk.

The London Daily Express, followed by sev-
eral other Allied papers, published a despatch
dated Geneva, July 30th, 1918:

*'Za Suisse states that a high neutral official,
who has just arrived at Basle from Berlin,
declares that in spite of all German precau-
tions to hide the defeat in the west, the truth
has penetrated among the masses.

"Such great moral depression has not been
seen before during the war, which it is now
considered is lost whenever Foch chooses his
hour to strike. . . .

"The German losses during the last three
months reach nearly a million. The losses in
the last two oflfensives amounted to 350,000
and these have completely disorganized the
plans of the high command."

Let us consider these despatches and com-
ments coming from this mysterious neutral,
but one so well informed that on the 30th of
July he knew the exact amount of the Ger-
man losses for some weeks previously, though
the BerHn General Staff is not usually very
communicative on such points.

HOW THE GERMANS DECEIVE 23

Let us examine what had taken place when
this despatch was dated, without considering
the great retirements of the Germans, which
have taken place since, yielding to military
pressure and, perhaps, also because of the
political strategy spoken of in Chapter II.
As I desire especially to emphasize, I am
simply proposing by choosing a precise and
limited example to show the necessity, if the
Allies would arrive at a true victory, of under-
standing the importance of military events by
distinguishing carefully between their local
significance and the influence which they may
have upon the European war-field considered
as a whole, which is quite a different thing.

Can it be denied that the operations en-
gaged in by the Allies south of the Soissons-
Rheims sahent after July 15, were chiefly in-
tended to cover Paris, and prevent a bom-
bardment? This local object was completely
attained on the 30th. The operation was skil-
fully conducted by General Foch, and all the
Allies did wonders, including the American
"boys," who proved themselves extraordinarily
fine, working well with the other troops, while
their spirit and freshness were of incalculable
service in putting new life into soldiers, who
had stood the strain of four years of terrible

24 AN ENDURING VICTORY

struggle. The success of the operation was
due mainly to these American reinforcements,
and it is the plain truth to say that America
saved Paris, the heart of France, of which
the Germans thought themselves sure. They
also believed they were about to end the war
by a brilliant and decisive victory. The de-
feat inflicted by the Allies has crushed this
hope. The vast majority of Germans wished
to ruin France completely, and it is certain
that it was with disappointed rage that they
accepted their defeat and deception, and found
themselves obliged to continue the war with
modified plans.

Our successes dating from July 30th were a
great encouragement, and we were fully en-
titled to our joy in them; they were still in-
creasing and showed much improvement in the
conduct of the war. The unity of command
with the help from America have proved their
value and given rise to the highest hopes which
have since been entirely justified. Such events
naturally make us optimistic, and optimism is
necessary to victory, and should be cultivated
whenever it is justified by facts resting upon
a solid basis.

This appears to be a fair estimate of our
recapture of part of the Soissons-Rheims sa-

HOW THE GERMANS DECEIVE 25

lient on July 30th, viewed from the local stand-
point. But in order to show how overcon-
fidence can imperil the real victory of the
Allies, and to demonstrate the biassed char-
acter of the news from the Swiss source quoted
above, let us see how the situation on July
30th, 1918, eliminating, I repeat, all subse-
quent events, could aflFect the evolution of the
war, considered in its whole European aspect.
The whole mihtary situation on the 30th
of July is seen at a glance on the map (page
14). Germany was mistress of three-fourths
of Europe, in control of large sections of Rus-
sia and Asia Minor, while the Allies, pent up
in the west, could only feed themselves through
maritime communications, lengthy and dif-
ficult in the extreme. At Chateau-Thierry,
the Germans were 80 kilometres from Paris,
and when they fell back 20 kilometres on
July 30th, they were still only 100 kilometres
from the heart of France. Our mysterious
neutral assures us that German opinion inter-
preted this retreat as implying the loss of the
war to Germany. I am convinced that such
an opinion, voluntarily accepted at this date
by many of the Allies, would be highly prej-
udicial to a real and complete victory by pro-
ducing dangerous delusions. I think I know

26 AN ENDURING VICTORY

the Germans and the methods of their Gen-
eral Staff well enough to be sure that the
opinion attributed to the German people at
large, on the 30th of July, cannot be the true
one. No doubt it enraged them to be balked
when Paris and the end seemed near; but it
is a far cry from that to the belief that a re-
tirement of 20 kilometres at that date meant
the loss of the war.

Besides, we may be sure that the German
people knew only part of the truth.

Another despatch from Zurich in the New
York Evening Worlds August 12th, says:

"A neutral banker just returned from Ger-
many was interviewed here to-day. 'Events
on the French front depress the educated Ger-
mans, but the masses are ignorant of the real
situation,' he said."

This flatly contradicts the former despatch
above, and may be regarded as true because
it is much more probable. The Berlin General
Staff, by means of absolute authority, exerted
over the German press, could easily make the
people believe that the retirement of 20 kilo-
metres from Chateau-Thierry was a check,
not a serious defeat. Even at that time public
confidence was maintained by sight of the war
map, showing the immense territories held

HOW THE GERMANS DECEIVE 27

by the Germans, and their enormous gains in
consequence; while on such a map a retire-
ment of 20 kilometres looks insignificant. It
is ridiculous, therefore, to believe that the
German people thought the war to be lost
on the 30th of July.

But common sense shows still better that
it could not have been so. Let us suppose
that the Allies had first advanced and then
retired just as the Germans did, and imagine
ourselves liberators of the people enslaved
by Teutonic ambition with three-fourths of
Europe in our power, Germany surrounded
geographically, and the Allied army within
80 kilometres of Berlin. Suppose then the
Germans bringing up their reserves and making
a great effort, admirably carried out. They
would push back the Allies from a distance of
20 kilometres to one of a hundred from Berlin.
Would the Allies after such a blow believe
that the war was lost ? Certainly not. Then,
knowing the tenacity of the Germans, why
should they think themselves vanquished be-
cause they were forced back 20 kilometres on
the 30th of July.?

Looking at the argument from another
angle, the annexed map shows the French
military front before the great German of-

28 AN ENDURING VICTORY

fensive which began seriously in April, 1918,
the extreme Hmits reached by this oflensive,
and the ground retaken by the AUies by Au-
gust 3d, as against that gained by the Ger-
mans.

At the end of March, before the offen-
sive, we did not consider ourselves victorious,
though it was then the general opinion that
the Germans could not advance much on the
western front. They did, however, gain con-
siderable ground in three directions: toward
Armentieres, toward Amiens, and as far as
Chateau-Thierry. By the 3d of July, we had
retaken nearly a fourth of the ground lost
since April, as may be seen on the map. Look-
ing at the whole European theatre of war under
these circumstances, how could we call our-
selves more victorious then than we did be-
fore the German offensive, when they had
less of our territory than on August 3d.'^

It may be said, because the Germans lost
enormously in men and material during their
retreat. Let us look into this question. True,
their losses were so great as first to bring their
offensive to a stand and then to force them
to fall back. But can we seriously believe that
our own losses from April to the end of July
were not practically equal to those of the Ger-

HOW THE GERMANS DECEIVE

GERMAN OFFENSIVE AND COUNTER OFFENSIVE
OF THE ALLIES, APRIL 1918 TO AUGUST 6, 1918.

TWERP

■■•«•«■ Fnot in April, 1918, before the great German offennve

aaaiai* fotieme limit leached by the great offensive in the middle of July, 1918

m i 1 1 1 1 111 Reborn «vuaat«d by the Germans as a result of the eomiter-offeosive of the Allie*

Ttie dbtiM inlietttd In order of the respective «itlidnw*b »nt (l) The Msrne (rant be*
hnr the Veiie: ($) tbr Albeit ttgioa: O) north «t MaatdMicr; vid U) Q«rtb of U Btuec

30 AN ENDURING VICTORY

mans? While their rapid advance lasted up
until the end of July, they took from us many
guns, prisoners, and ammunition. In our
own counter-oflFensive, we have done likewise.
In order to compare the losses on both sides
fairly, we must not look at a short period, but
at the whole operation. We shall have to reck-
on up our losses from April to July 15th, and
those we inflicted on the Germans when we
retook the ground previously given up.

Now, by the 3d of August, we have taken
back a fourth of the ground occupied by the
Germans since April. Have we caused them
greater losses than we ourselves have suffered ?
It is possible of course, but improbable, and
no reports published seem to confirm it. In
military operations, when both sides are act-
ing under nearly the same conditions, the
losses in men and material are about equal,
unless in cases where one army is completely
demoralized, while the other remains intact.
If the Allies exert all the power they possess
throughout Europe, this demoraUzation will
surely come for the German army. The sur-
render of Bulgaria hastens considerably the
moment, but all I wish to prove is that on
August 3d, we had no good reason to believe
that the German losses had been much greater

HOW THE GERMANS DECEIVE 31

than our own, reckoning from the beginning
of their offensive in April, 1918.

On the matter of losses and also on other
questions, just after they took Chateau-Thierry
on the 4th of June, the Frankfort Gazette, pub-
lished the following article, which suggests
some interesting comments:

"Whenever our armies start a new offensive,
the enemy press ascribes some distant objec-
tive to our high command. In this manner,
when our front becomes stabihzed before these
supposed aims are reached, they can say the
operation has failed. When we attack in Flan-
ders, they say our object is Calais. Now that
we are marching on the Marne, they accuse
us of trying for Paris.

''Neither Hindenburg nor Ludendorff wage
a geographical war; their aim is always to
weaken and finally to destroy the enemy's
army. They acted on this principle in the
east, and apply it now on the western front.
They choose a sector and make a surprise at-
tack, supported by superior numbers, and
push forward until the enemy's reserves come
up and restore the balance. During our at-
tack the enemy losses are the greater, but
from this on they tend to be equal. It is, there-
fore, useless to pursue the action, and our

32 AN ENDURING VICTORY

positions become fixed, while we take measures
to deal another blow where our complete prep-
arations or superiority in numbers promise
a fresh victory at little cost.

"We have often dealt in this way with our
enemies, and will do so again. The great battle
lasted seven days, and during that time the
enemy brought his reserves from the Channel
and the Vosges, stripping sectors where we
shall attack the next time, and where we shall
gain another success like that just ended."

These lines, like most German publications
intended to impress opinion at home, con-
tain some truth and some falsehood. As I
have frequently explained, large operations of
the German General Staff are planned to reach
a maximum result, if luck is on their side, and
at worst a minimum. To hide their disap-
pointments the Germans lie when they say
they were not trying to reach Paris or the
Channel. When they attacked in Flanders
and toward Amiens, they meant if they had
the chance to push through to the sea, their
maximum objective in this case. In the same
way, they moved on Chateau-Thierry with
the ultimate hope of seizing Paris. They could
not reach these farthest points, but when we
look at the map (page 29), must we not admit

HOW THE GERMANS DECEIVE 33

that they did accomplish an important part
of the minimum results implied in the article
from the Frankfort Gazette?

The German offensive from April to August
3d, of this year has not been strong enough
to keep all the ground gained; but up to that
date it held most of it. Even if the Germans
were forced to yield all the territory won by
them since April, unless they meet with an
absolutely crushing defeat, their offensive,
looked at as a whole, must have brought them
important gains, if we try to look at the war
from the point of view of the enemy, as we
must if we wish to draw the right conclusions
from the course of events.

In the first place, the Teuton offensive has
forced the Allies to strike back at fixed points,
instead of leaving them free to attack when
and where they choose.

Again, in his advance the enemy has dev-
astated large districts, at the cost of mil-
liards to France, driving hundreds of thou-
sands from their homes, and obliging the
French Government to devise complicated
and expensive defenses for Paris, and to pre-
pare to send away a considerable part of its
population. The German war plan includes
this economic injury to its adversary, increased

34 AN ENDURING VICTORY

by the direction given to each blow; but up to
now, this highly important point has been but
Uttle understood among us.

I shall be told in answer that our own opera-
tions from April to August have caused great
loss to the Germans in men and material. This
question of losses needs careful consideration
and to understand it better we should keep
in mind the general conditions under which
the war proceeds and which we are apt to for-
get.

Many among us talk of the enemy's losses
as if we had discovered a way to make war
without hurting ourselves, but unfortunately
this cannot be. It is hard to realize that in
the great offensives and counter-offensives at
the western front lasting for weeks, even if
the Germans lose 500,000 men and we only
400,000, a difference of 100,000 in our favor,
the former would still be the gainers owing
to the capital factor in the situation which
we leave out of account. We think of the
Allied position as if the western front were
a wall with comparable conditions on each
side. Many of us believe that if the enemy
extends his hue toward the west he gains, while
if we push it eastward in the same proportion
the Allies achieve a success analogous to that

HOW THE GERMANS DECEIVE 35

reached by the Germans. In order to see why
this impression is not the correct one, we must
grasp the great difference made by the fact
that Germany is fighting in France and Bel-
gium, while we make war on our own soil.
Every kilometre that Germany has gained on
the western front has brought her closer into
our vital points, the Channel coasts and Paris.
Meanwhile in their advance her armies reduce
their war expenses by living on the country,
robbing us and enriching themselves at the
same time. On the contrary, in order to re-
gain her invaded provinces, France spends
milliards in projectiles, and with her own
shells tears to pieces French towns and vil-
lages which the Germans had not entirely de-
stroyed.

Are France and Germany, then, in the same
situation.^ The Allies look too much at the
military side of the question, without con-
sidering economic factors which, nevertheless,
are closely connected with the conduct of the
war and will strongly influence the conditions
of peace. The Allies do not realize the differ-
ence made by the fact that the war has not
touched Germany directly, except at the very
first, when the Russians penetrated a small
part of eastern Prussia. On the other hand.

36 AN ENDURING VICTORY

the richest provinces of France have been bled
white, and the economic effect of this alone
would decide in favor of Germany if the
Allied victory should not be so complete as
to insure compensation to France for her im-
mense losses. The situation, therefore, is
not all the same for both sides on the western
front.

There are other reasons yet more conclusive.
In the course of an offensive followed by a
reverse, let us assume that the Germans lose
more men by a fourth than the Allies, but
even this sacrifice may have its military com-
pensations enabling the enemy to keep his
general position nearly the same, with the
difference of a few kilometres, while he oc-
cupies behind his western front a great extent
of country over which he can still fight and
fall back indefinitely, thus weakening his ad-
versary before his own soil can be directly
attacked. An objector to this argument may
urge that "we shall exhaust the Germans if
we continue to kill 100,000 men in excess of
our own loss, and the German retirement of
July 15th shows that they are already short
of reserves." This reasoning would be right
if our calculations as to the German resources
were well founded, but unfortunately events

HOW THE GERMANS DECEIVE 37

have too often falsified them as a natural re-
sult of our mistaken premises, as I prove in
Chapter III. Also, the German retirement
from France and Belgium may be viewed as
a necessary part of the great pacifist move-
ment described in Chapter II, and a conse-
quence of the great Entente success in the
Balkans. Even if the Germans do lack men
on a local front in consequence of their losses
since July, 1918, this can only be a temporary
condition. Before winter they can bring into
the field the class of 1920, a contingent reck-
oned by many Allied papers at 400,000 men.
I consider this question in Chapter III, and
will explain why it seems to me that this class
will amount to much more. Finally the dis-
organization of Russia has opened to Ger-
many sources of new effectives from which
she can probably draw fresh troops. For these
various reasons, we were not justified in aflSrm-
ing in August, 1918, that by a simple excess of
losses inflicted on the Germans in the west
(unless these losses surpass enormously the
total of the Allies, of which we have as yet
no instance) we can bring about a German
defeat adequate to insure a complete Allied
victory.

Many among us do not perceive this ab-

38 AN ENDURING VICTORY

solutely essential point which is, nevertheless,
easy to grasp by looking at the map (page
14) and reading the following chapter.

Even if our military successes had con-
tinued and forced our enemies out of France
and Belgium, if they had been able to keep
control of Austria-Hungary the Germans would
still have been victorious, because the war
would have left them in possession of their ill-
gotten gains and would have given them the
economic monopoly of Central Europe and
Russia, all enormously rich countries, while the
Allies, on the contrary, would have come out
of the struggle triumphant in the west, but
reduced in population, and in such a hopeless
financial position that they could not enforce
conditions of peace. Within very few months
after the signature of such a treaty, the Allies
of western Europe would have become vassals
of Germany. This inadmissible result could
never have been a cause of apprehension if,
instead of concentrating their attention on the
western front, the Allies had kept the war map
— that of Pangermany — ^before their eyes. For
the last four years I have explained in every
possible way that on the eastern side there
were many weak points where the Allies could
injure Germany. With the help of political

HOW THE GERMANS DECEIVE 39

strategy, they could prevail there in a shorter
time, and at much less cost than by exerting
military pressure in the west. We could only
win a complete western victory by annihilating
the German army. If this were possible, it
would entail also the equal destruction of the
Allies by the Germans. A mistake was after
all within the bounds of possibility; it is under-
stood at last that we must insure ourselves,
against it by working on Pangermany's weak-
nesses. This was the only way to destroy her
hold on Austria-Hungary and Russia, a task
as necessary to accomplish as the libera-
tion of France and Belgium. This campaign
against the causes of weakness in Pangermany
could have been prosecuted without slacken-
ing our efforts on the western front. It has
even proved helpful in that region. The defeat
of Bulgaria has besides contributed enormously
to weaken the morale of the German soldiers
fighting on the western front. The insurrec-
tions organized among peoples oppressed in
Austria-Hungary have destroyed the indis-
pensable communications with the east, and
the situation of the German armies in the
west has become materially and morally
untenable. These immense advantages will
have their vast effects on condition that the

40 AN ENDURING VICTORY

Allies act to the end in the most decisive
fashion in central Europe.

The mistaken estimate of facts which I
pointed out is largely produced by German
influence, which has tended to stupefy public
opinion for the last four years. I dwell on
these mistakes because I am convinced that
they form a state of mind in Allied countries
which widens the distance between us and real
victory. Throughout history an exact knowl-
edge of facts has brought success, not illusions,
and these erroneous views expose us at this
moment to these serious dangers.

1. Our misinterpretations play the game of
the pacifist and the Bolshevist parties among
us. To take the most favorable hypothesis,
if the German retirement lasts for weeks, if
France and Belgium are completly evacuated,
a large part of our public will claim the vic-
tory, as, indeed, it has already begun to do,
and the pacifists and Bolshevists will say: ''If
we are the victors, you have no right not to
make peace." What answer is there to their
argument.^ But if we treat with Germany
without taking the most extraordinary pre-

HOW THE GERMANS DECEIVE 41

cautions, it will mean our ruin and leave her
dominant in Russia.

2. Teuton propagandists tell the Allies that
Germany is ruined and starving; that her
man-power is exhausted and that our west-
ern victories are decisive. This produces the
mistaken views of which I speak, raising il-
lusions in the public mind which contribute
to the success of the great pacifist offensive
which Germany continues obstinately, and of
which I shall unmask the reasons in the fol-
lowing chapter. As a preliminary it was need-
ful to show the atmosphere of false ideas
caused by German propaganda, which fur-
nishes the medium in which these dangerous
intrigues can act with success.

III.

For the first time in history war has shown
this most singular characteristic of alternately
prosecuting military and peace offensives, some-
times even both together. We must bear in
mind that the pacifist advances are an in-
tegral part of war technic and as such are all
launched by the German Government. The
Allies have followed the old rules and act on
strategic military lines, but the Berlin General

42 AN ENDURING VICTORY

Staff used political strategy also; this is more
complicated and difficult and demands wide and
precise information, but to succeed it utilizes
all possible factors, especially the enemy's
psychology, his lack of outside information, and
his imperfect comprehension of the nature of
a modern victory where economic consequences
bring about results as far-reaching as miUtary
operations themselves.

We often hear it said among the Allies that
"The invasion of Belgium brought England
into the war, and America entered because of
the sinking of the Lusitania, The German
psychology is all wrong ! "

Certainly, the Germans have committed
psychological faults; I should be the last to
contradict it, for I have had only too much
experience of their lack of tact, but if they
have made blunders of this sort it would be
a mistake to suppose that they are always at
fault.

In truth, the German has a peculiar psy-
chology which has grown out of slow and pa-
tient observation of foreign nations. It is
based on exact information, and from it he
draws immense results. His minute knowledge

HOW THE GERMANS DECEIVE 43

of those best able to act strongly on the Rus-
sian intellectual proletariat led to great con-
sequences. As soon as the revolution broke
out, Lenine was hurried from Switzerland to
Russia in a special train, as the man fitted
to lead the proletariat toward Bolshevist Pan-
germanism. This utilization of Lenine was
undoubtedly good psychology. Germans
understand that some French and EngHsh
socialists are surprisingly ignorant of geo-
graphical, ethnographical, and economic ques-
tions, and that they love fine words and
sonorous phrases. The Boches made dexter-
ous use of this state of mind when they sug-
gested the formula, "Peace without indemni-
ties or annexations," which penetrated to the
Alhed socialists through their Russian brethren.
This formula, voted by the Reichstag, July
19th, 1917, was a psychological manoeuvre, as
we see by an article in the Germania, quoted
by the Paris Temps, April 18th of the same
year. This article says cynically: ''The July
resolution was a question of tactics, which
tends to strengthen the Bolshevist power and
increase the longing for peace in the east.
These tactics are now laid aside, and our pres-
ent object is to reach a victorious peace in
the west by force of arms."

44 AN ENDURING VICTORY

Another prominent psychological manoeuvre
consists in utilizing the bUnd optimism of the
Allies by means of neutral newspaper propa-
ganda. Contrary to their hopes, force of arms
was not enough to impose a German peace in
the west, chiefly owing to the size and value
of the American reinforcements; now, in order
to deceive the AUies and trap them into peace
negotiations without complete victory, we
see the Berlin government resort to an astute
combination embracing many psychological
elements.

Let us admit the truth; the Germans are
capable of the sort of psychology which grows
out of exact information and is adapted to
war aims as they are seen in Berlin. The real
brain of the German General Staff is General
Ludendorff, who inspired and moulded the
pacifist offensives as well as the military cam-
paigns. These offensives proceeded in many
ways; through the German press, which, like
a Prussian soldier, obeys the suggestions of
the high command, or through neutral jour-
nals. Sometimes a man Uke Hertling dropped
a phrase of double meaning, or a word came
through an Austrian intermediary hke Burian
or Czernin. Sometimes agents from Bul-
garia (during a very long period), Turkey,

HOW THE GERMANS DECEIVE 45

or Austria entrapped the Allied emissaries in
Switzerland, or a bait was ofiPered to the Vati-
can, which simply swallowed it.

All these pacifist offensives under any form
start from the General Staff in Berlin. The
part played by this organization in pacifist
plans, which at first sight seem so different
from military offensives, ought not to surprise
us. Those who really understand Germany —
unfortunately too few — ^know well that the
Reichstag has no real power in the empire,
and that the force which guides German policy,
even in time of peace, is this formidable in-
tellectual machine, on which rests the fate
of the HohenzoUerns and of Prussian mili-
tarism.

The oflBcers who compose the General Staff
are carefully selected. They not only control
military affairs, as we know, but there are
among them experts on all questions. These
officers are certainly accomplices in a great
scheme of robbery, but we shall be wide of
the truth if we do not understand that they
are men not only well versed in military sub-
jects, but also in applied sciences; geography,
ethnography, political economy and national
psychology. This stupendous organization is
so old, so well supplied with technical inf orma-

46 AN ENDURING VICTORY

tion brought up-to-date, that the General
StafI of BerUn is able to pursue a political
strategy specially adapted to the conditions
of each region. This strategy often misleads
the Allies because they were even less prepared
for the intellectual conduct of the war than
they were in a material sense.

When one looks at the German General
Staff as a whole, it is easy to see that it initiates
pacifist offensives, and this is still more clearly
realized when we note the strong pressure
these offensives exert on the conduct of the
war, and the many technical objectives of
a particular sort at which they invariably
aim.

The first object of a German pacifist offen-
sive has been to hide the extent of the gigantic
Pangermanist plan from the Allies. To carry
this out, the General Staff knew that it should
conquer its many adversaries in succession,
employing the classical tactics of the Horatii
against the Curiatii, that is to say, beating
them one after the other.

To reach this end it resolved to utilize the
undoubted ignorance of the Pangerman plan
which the Allies had shown in the first years
of the war, so as to persuade them that each
large military operation against Russia, Serbia,

HOW THE GERMANS DECEIVE 47

or Roumania, would be the last. This is why
newspaper articles through Holland and
Switzerland inspired by the Berlin General
Staff frequently gave out that Germany was
exhausted, that she had enough of it, and that
she lacked food or munitions to carry on the
struggle. As these items were credulously
quoted, whenever desired, by many Allied
papers, during the first three years of the war,
a large part of public opinion in France and
England has been convinced that the war
would be over in three months, and this state
of mind has made it easily possible for the
Germans to carry out successive military of-
fensives in due order. The pacifist offensive
is, therefore, a way of pursuing a military
offensive.

Secondly, the German pacifist offensives,
with their suggestion of an early peace, have
made it possible for the General Staff to or-
ganize Central Pangermany, that is to say,
to put Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Tur-
key in a position to support a long war.
Further, these three countries, particularly
Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria, were in every
way the weak strategic points of the Central
Powers. Berlin had therefore a strong motive
to prevent the Allies from acting in these re-

48 AN ENDURING VICTORY

gions. This third object has been attained
for four years by pacifist propaganda, through
agents in Switzerland, who persuaded the Al-
lies that Turkey, Bulgaria, or Austria-Hungary
desired to conclude a separate peace with
them.

Fourthly, the mission of the German pacifist
oflFensives was to act on the pacifist groups in
all Entente countries. These consist often of
good people honestly desirous of putting an
end to the frightful conflict, but these worthy
folks are profoundly ignorant of technical
problems, and know next to nothing about
Germany, Austria-Hungary, or the Balkans,
where most of them have never set foot. The
result is these pacifists seize on the smallest
incident which seems favorable to their cause,
and which is really a Boche pitfall. They say:
'"Peace is possible, we should look into it,
and negotiate." This is what they said in
1917, at the time of the interminable discus-
sions on the Stockholm conference, which con-
tributed greatly to consolidate the Bolsheviks,
and so disintegrate Russia. This they repeated
when in July, 1917, the Reichstag voted for
"Peace without annexations or indemnities,"
a formula hiding the most treacherous ma-
noeuvres, as we have seen in the article from

HOW THE GERMANS DECEIVE 49

Germania above quoted. They said the same
thing when the Emperor of Austria pub-
lished his letters about Alsace-Lorraine at the
very moment that his troops invaded southern
Russia. The effect of this persistent credulity
on the part of the Entente pacifists has been
that for the last two years particularly, the
Allied governments have lost precious time in
discussing incidents which would not have oc-
cupied them five minutes if they had possessed
exact information, as subsequent events have
shown in every case. The general result from
these efforts has been that, dragged in all di-
rections by contradictory opinions, the Allied
governments could not make the best use of
the forces of the Entente, which was exactly
what the Berlin General Staff wished to bring
about by its pacifist offensives.

Now that the war is at last entering on its
decisive phase, now that the number and
bravery of American troops obliges the Ger-
mans to admit that they were wrong as to
the value of help sent from the United States,
and forces them to renounce the hope of a
speedy and brilliant victory, while the pro-
longed struggle has produced an unprecedented
financial condition in the west, of the most se-
rious importance, the great pacifist manoeuvre

50 AN ENDURING VICTORY

has for its first object to stop hostilities before
the invasion of Germany.

In the conduct of the war the German Gen-
eral Staff has already shown a high order of
imagination: asphyxiating gas, for example,
on the material side, Russia destroyed by
pacifism on the intellectual. But the blow
which they sought to make successful ex-
ceeded all the others in audacity, in surprise,
and in psychological ingenuity. They in-
tended to compass the final defeat of the Allies
by means which I shall lay bare in the next
chapter, and they sought to make them ac-
cept this defeat through a well-advised camou-
flage hiding it under an apparent military
victory.

The wide reverberations of the Bulgarian
defeat have come to discredit this plan, but
nevertheless it still has its dangers, for with
the help of the Allied pacifists the Boches are
making persistent efforts to prevent at any
price the invasion of Germany.

CHAPTER II.

HOW THE GERMANS, IF THEY SECURE AN ARMIS-
TICE, COUNT UPON CARRYING OFF THE VIC-
TORY AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE ECONOMIC
CONDITION CREATED IN EUROPE BY FOUR
YEARS OF WAR.

I. Germany's war profits form the chief basis of the pacifist

manoeuvres.
n. The fact that the circulation of paper currency in Ger-
many is largely measured by the produce of her gigan-
tic thefts, while, on the other hand, that of the Allies
depends on their complete victory, constitutes the
second base of German schemes.

in. If circumstances make it feasible, the Alsace-Lorraine
trick will be tried in order to enter on the practical
realization of German plans by dividing the Allies,
and leading France to "peace talk" before a complete
victory.

rV. Why the Germans believe that if the Allies are led into
"peace talk" before achieving a full grasp of the Eu-
ropean situation which assures their victory, their
financial ruin will ensue. This without more great
battles would be enough to bring about the final suc-
cess of Germany.

As Berlin sees it, the economic situation
caused by four years of conflict, will make it
possible for Germany to win the war on the
sole condition that the Allies, even if victorious,
confine their exertions to the western front —

52 AN ENDURING VICTORY

that of France and Belgium — and grant to Ger-
many an armistice not followed by a deep
invasion of her territory.

The economic situation of the Allies, does
indeed differ so materially from that of Ger-
many that the General Staff can try something
quite new in the way of pacifist machinations.
These will be all the more dangerous because
they will gain the advantage of a surprise, as
the close connection between the economic
position of the west of Europe and the Allies'
success in the war is little understood. Ger-
man blows owe most of their effect to surprise;
therefore, if the conditions necessary to the
realization of the policy of Berlin were made
known beforehand to the great Entente public,
it would render much of this policy abortive.

Germany wants to make a western Brest-
Litovsk treaty. This treaty was really an
operation of strategic policy in two acts. First
act. Peace in appearance, which on account of
the nervous tension resulting from an excep-
tionally long and cruel war is enough to shake
the morale of the enemy. Second act. Re-
sumption of hostilities under relatively easy
conditions, the spirit of the adversary being
once broken. We now see clearly that Ger-
many overthrew Russia, without the need of

THE GERMANS AND THE ARMISTICE 53

resorting to large military operations because
the treaty of Brest-Litovsk had destroyed the
Russian armies. Now that they see where
"peace" with Germany has led them many
Russians are in revolt, but the lack of material
means weakens their rebellion, and it is now
certain that the Germans, through the Bolshe-
vists, can act directly on Russia as far as Si-
beria. A step analogous to that at Brest-
Litovsk would enable Germany to gain the war
easily and entirely, even if she were previously
forced out of France and Belgium by military
means. This step could be taken by utilizing
this time the particular economic condition of
western Europe, favored by illusions enter-
tained by a section of the Allied public, as I
have shown in the preceding chapter.

In order to throw into relief the effects of
a western Brest-Litovsk, we will take in turn
the essential constituents of the German
manoeuvre, viz.:

1st. The profits of the war to Germany.

2d. The fact that the circulation of paper
currency in Germany is guaranteed by the
produce of her thefts.

3d. The Alsace-Lorraine trick.

54 AN ENDURING VICTORY

I have already written on the subject of
Germany's profits from the war, but in order
to make her pacifist manoeuvres clear I will
once more show what she has gained by her
aggressions. She has long labored with a view
to keeping the fruit of her gigantic thefts after
the conclusion of peace. In order to hide them
as much as possible, she uses neutral papers
to spread abroad the idea that Germany is
ruined by the war. This is what most of the
Allies believe, as they think, on just grounds.
When they read in the Swiss papers that the
mark has depreciated 45 per cent, and the
franc only 20 per cent, they think this indicates
the proportion in which France and Germany
are touched financially by the war. But such
is not the fact. The German rate falls, first
because a general and well-founded feeling
exists that Germany will be beaten. This can
only come about if the Allies fight to the
end with all the resources at their command,
and if the United States throw their whole
weight into the scale. Secondly, and above
all, it is because Germany is blockaded, and
has no exports, consequently she is paid
nothing from the outside and must settle in

THE GERMANS AND THE ARMISTICE 55

gold for all that comes to her from neutrals.
The result is her foreign credit shrinks and
causes the German rate to fall. But this posi-
tion of Germany on the outside does not at
all affect her credit at home. This we never
hear spoken of, but it is very important and
increased with every new seizure of enemy
territory. Each of these operations yielded
Germany much more than they cost. For
instance, when she laid hands on Belgium after
long premeditation, it was because of the ex-
traordinary wealth of that unhappy country,
from which the Berlin government has drawn
sums much greater than the expense of the
conquest. The same is true of German seizures
in northern France, Serbia, Roumania, Rus-
sia, etc., which were carried out on a paying
basis, according to the best Boche traditions.
It is therefore untrue to say, as the Allies often
do without having really looked into it, that
Germany is ruined by the war. In the jQrst
place, this is contrary to fact, as I shall show,
and again if we believe this we play into the
Boche hands by believing that Germany can
never repair the harm she has done, or restore
the value of all that she has stolen.

The war has been much less costly to Ger-
many than to the Allies, because of her long

56 AN ENDURING VICTORY

preparation and her thefts in all directions,
as well as for the reason that the Teuton armies
live on their enemies' country. On the other
hand, the Allies were obliged to improvise the
enormous material required in great haste,
and they pay their bills honestly.

The proof of this is that in three years of
war the cost to Germany is 1,612 francs per
head, 608 francs less than in France. The
latter has spent 2,220 per head, 38 per cent
more than in Germany. Therefore, if we made
peace according to the formula "Peace with-
out indemnities," it would lead to an unheard-
of injustice. Every peace-loving Frenchman
would have to bear a financial burden a third
heavier than that of a faithful servant of the
Kaiser, who wished for war. If this difference
in war expenditures continues, it will be enough
to ruin France. Clearly, if the Frenchman has
to support a weight 38 per cent heavier, he
will have to yield before the German. The
latter will be saved, while his adversaries suc-
cumb, leaving him to gather in the spoils.

On the whole, at the end of the third year
of the war, the Allies had spent at least 144
milliards of francs more than the Central Em-
pires. During the fourth year this figure has
increased considerably on account of the im-

THE GERMANS AND THE ARMISTICE 57

mense expenditure of the United States, which
in August, 1918, amounted to 50 milHons of
dollars a day.

There are still worse economic consequences
to be feared from the fact that if the existing
situation continues in eastern Europe, Ger-
many will be secure now and in future of huge
profits much greater than her war expenses,
while the Allies will stagger for many years
under crushing financial burdens.

Germany's war-profits, as they appeared he-
fore the victory of the Allies over Bulgaria (Oc-
tober, 1918) were:

1st. The value of plunder in occupied coun-
tries, Serbia, Roumania, Russia, Belgium, and
France (materials of war, foodstuffs, raw ma-
terial, industrial plants, furniture, objects of
art, war contributions, bonds, securities, etc.).

2d. The accomplishment of the Hamburg-
Persian GuK plan, secured by Pangerman
mortgages, loans made by Germany to Aus-
tria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey. These
loans are only made on paper, and have cost
Germany nothing, but they give her the great
advantage of entire economic control over
her Allies, the three Central Powers.

3d. The treaty signed by Turkey at Berlin,
11th of January, 1917, gives Germany a mo-

58 AN ENDURING VICTORY

nopoly in the Turkish Empire, a country enor-
mously rich in agricultural and mineral re-
sources, of which she has begun already to
take advantage.

4th. The realization of economic Panger-
many, in other words, the orderly development
on a large scale of all its productions, mineral,
vegetable, animal, and industrial (see map,
page 14), transported through a network of
canals at the least possible cost. The Ger-
mans could thus pay large wages to their own
workmen, while the cost price would be so
much lowered in all departments of produc-
tion that they could undersell everywhere in
Europe, and perhaps all over the world.

5th. The realization of military Panger-
many. This guarantees the permanence of
economic Pangermany, and through it Berlin
controls all its forces (about 30 millions of
soldiers) occupying Antwerp, Riga, Trieste,
Cattaro, the Ottoman straits, the eastern
Mediterranean, and the Black Sea. Never
before on earth has there been so vast a
strategic whole in the hands of a single power.

6th. The exploiting monopoly in European
and Asiatic Russia, great regions with in-
finitely rich opportunities.

7th. The actual substitution of German

THE GERMANS AND THE ARMISTICE 59

credit for that of the AlHes in Russia and the
east represents tens of milliards.

Now, in four years of war, Germany has
spent about 140 milliards of marks. The sum
of these seven war-profits shows a difference
in her favor of hundreds of milliards, as we
see without difficulty.

The war profits of Germany are therefore
much greater than her war expenses; this is
contrary to the opinion of many among the
Allies, but it is the fact that the war is exceed-
ingly profitable to the Germans, and for this
reason their government directs it particularly
from the economic standpoint. Without
doubt the surrender of Bulgaria has begun
to get back some of the oriental profits of
Germany, but all these may be destroyed.
Also it is necessary for the Allies to complete
thoroughly their victory in the east, which
would have the practical effect of loosening
the hold of Germany on Russia. Besides,
there would remain to the Germans all the
booty that they have stolen, and that it is
our business to make them restore.

The war as waged by the German people
is essentially predatory; it is the largest pirat-
ical enterprise known in history, and has been
carefully planned for years.

60 AN ENDURING VICTORY

Long before the war, the Berlin government
maintained a secret propaganda to convince
the people that if Greater Germany became
an accomplished fact it would materially add
to the prosperity of the working classes. It
was this hope of material and personal ad-
vantages to be gained from economic Pan-
germany that caused the great majority of
the socialists to stand by the Kaiser and his
General Staff. The methods of obtaining
these rich prizes, were clearly thought out
beforehand; as an example read the remark
of Baron von Wangenheim, German ambas-
sador at Constantinople, to M. Morgenthau:
*' Remember that this time we will make war
without mercy. . . . We will carry off to
Berlin all the French art treasures which be-
long to the state." This principle has been
applied wherever possible, and even private
property has not been respected. The booty
brought in by the war has exceeded all expec-
tations, as the Germans themselves admit,
though it is the policy of their government
to conceal the truth as much as possible from
the outside world.

L'Homme Libre of February 16th, 1918,
quotes from the January number of Die Hilfe,
a review by Frederic Naumann, the man of

THE GERMANS AND THE ARMISTICE 61

Mitteleuropa. Here we can read an avowal
which should be known to every Allied citizen:

"The war in general was looked upon as a
piece of good luck, so much so that a business
man in good standing did not hesitate to say
that 'a man who does not make money out
of this war does not deserve it.'"

This particular Boche ought to be satisfied,
for his compatriots have been worthy of the
struggle they provoked, and have enriched
themselves beyond measure according to their
deliberate plans.

The truth which the foregoing facts are
meant to impress on the American mind is
that, since Germany has made enormous war-
profits, the European AUies have undergone
unprecedented losses without any compensa-
tion. Their economic position is therefore
greatly inferior to that of Germany, but un-
fortunately this state of things is but little
known. It must be seriously considered, how-
ever, before laying down the conditions of a
peace which shall bring restoration and jus-
tice to the world.

Great losses for the Allies, great gains for
Germany — this, then, is the situation which
lies at the root of her pacifist plan.

62 AN ENDURING VICTORY

II.

The financial reverberations of this war will
have deep and lasting results to every citizen
of the belligerent countries, without exception.
Each American has therefore a direct personal
interest in understanding a state of things
which will affect him strongly for good or evil.
As we have seen, Germany is so far the only
one of the belligerents whose gains by the
war much exceed her expenditures; this is
the first thing we must grasp if we would
understand the war situation. The second is
that this enrichment of Germany, dishonestly
acquired, but real none the less, has placed
her in so favorable an economic position that,
even if the Allies drive her out of France and
Belgium, she can still discuss peace terms with
advantage. This is hard to understand, but
is elucidated by the following considerations:

It is well known that without exception all
the belligerents have much extended their
fiduciary circulation, at present represented
by a large issue of bank paper and currency.
This extension is so great that the specie re-
serves have not been increased in the same
proportion, so that with each new issue of
paper the gold and silver guaranty shrinks

THE GERMANS AND THE ARMISTICE 63

equally. There are even countries where the
specie reserve is much less than it was in
1914, while paper money has much increased.
The following table, taken from the figures of
the circular of the Schweizerische Kreditanstalt
of Zurich, May 31st, 1918, gives a review
of the situation from the end of June, 1914,
to the end of April, 1918; for Germany in
millions of marks, for Austria-Hungary in
millions of crowns, for France in millions of
francs, and for England in millions of pounds
sterling.

Country

Currency

Specie Reserve

Increase or shrink-
age from end of

June, 1914, to end
of April, 1918

End of
June
1914

End of
April
1918

End of
June
1914

End of
April
1918

Specie

Paper

Germany

Austria-Hungary
France

2,597

2,325
6,051
29.78

19,225
18,440
26,773
287.50

1,631

1,609
4,697
40.08

2,465

382

5,636

89.86

834

-1,227

939

49.78

16,628
16,115
20,682

England

257.72

This table shows that Austria's specie re-
serve has shrunk to the enormous extent of
1,227 millions of crowns in the period that
her paper increased by 16 milliards, and it is
nearly certain that this 1,227 millions of crowns
were handed over to Germany as security for

64 AN ENDURING VICTORY

the heavy loans made by Berlin to Vienna to
carry on the war, an indication of the abso-
lutely dependent condition of the latter.

If the principal ally of Germany is brought
to such a pass as this, it is reasonable to sup-
pose that the state of the currency in Bulgaria
and Turkey and of their finances is even
worse. There can be no doubt these allies
of Germany, considered as states, are ruined
by the war, for the immense inflation of their
paper money added to war expenses and the
huge debts owed to Berlin, weaken them eco-
nomically. But it is well to observe that the
ruin of friendly states does no harm to Ger-
many; on the contrary, if the Allied troops
do not materially reorganize central Europe
on an absolutely new basis, Germany profits
by it, for the poverty of the governments of
Vienna, Sofia, and Constantinople puts them
completely in the power of Berlin, which dic-
tates all the combinations leading to the sup-
port of Pangermany, and dominates central
Europe and the Ottoman Empire.

England has more than doubled her gold
reserve, but her output of paper money and
Bank of England notes, according to the figures
of the Swiss Bank above quoted, have in-
creased in round numbers from 30 to 287 mil-

THE GERMANS AND THE ARMISTICE 65

lions of pounds sterling, that is to say, 9 times
more than at the outbreak of the war.

As for France, as she is the pivot of the coali-
tion, and her richest territory is invaded, the
war has caused her nothing but loss. Her
specie reserve has indeed increased by nearly
a milhard, but of the 5.636 milliards which
made up this reserve in gold and silver at the
end of April, 1918, 2 milliards were set aside
as security for debts contracted in foreign
countries, while the increase at this date of
notes of the Bank of France exceeded 20 mil-
liards.

We can see by the above table that the
bank paper of the European belligerents is
nowhere suflSciently secured by gold reserves;
therefore the value of this paper depends on
victory, which will affect profoundly the credit
of the various states, and, consequently, the
money issued by them. In practice, then,
when peace is concluded it will be then that
the notes and paper money of all the countries
in Europe will show their strength or weak-
ness, and very shortly too, for then the situa-
tion in which each one is left by the war will
stand out clearly.

From now on, we can see a result brought
about by the war, most unjust but none the

66 AN ENDURING VICTORY

less certain: when we come to discuss con-
ditions of peace Germany will be in a much
more advantageous position than the other
belligerents because her fiduciary circulation
will be sounder, consequently her issue of bank-
notes more secure. While France has con-
tracted enormous foreign debts to buy large
amounts of raw material for manufactures
and food necessary to her population, the
Allied blockade, curiously enough, has been
of service to Germany. She could buy nothing
outside, and therefore could not run in debt,
but was forced to supply her needs either by
substitutes or products of Pangermany. These
products, as a rule, cost her nothing because
they were simply stolen from invaded coun-
tries: food, crops, metals, coal, etc. It stands
to reason that a shell made of stolen French
iron, with stolen Belgian coal, costs Germany
less than a shell costs the French Government,
which is made with coal bought in England
and steel from the United States. This ex-
ample might be multiplied indefinitely, but
it serves to explain how Germany makes war
more cheaply than the Allies, and why she
has kept her money at home, while that of
France is sent abroad.

The circulation of bank-notes of the Ger-

THE GERMANS AND THE ARMISTICE 67

man Empire had increased during the war by
16,628 millions of marks at the end of April,
1918. At this date, the specie guarantee of
these notes was 2,465 millions of marks. This
was not enough to secure about 20 milliards
of notes, a figure which includes those issued
before the war; observe, therefore, that for
special reasons this considerable increase in
bank-notes does not cause as great risk and
inconvenience to Germany as to other coun-
tries; this is a point not before touched upon,
but very necessary to consider. In point of
fact, the bank-notes of the empire are not
only secured by the government reserve in
gold and silver but by the material profits
Germany has gained by the war. These are
of different kinds, and consist of money taken
from Belgium, France, Serbia, Roumania, or
Russia, of which the government of Berlin
is careful to say nothing. Other values are
not represented by gold and silver, precisely
because these are a purchasing medium. The
immense war material and the ships which
the Germans took from Russia, the rolling-
stock of railways everywhere seized by them, re-
present milliards. Again, colonial monopolies
cost millions to acquire, which were paid by
great companies hoping to grow rich by de-

68 AN ENDURING VICTORY

veloping such territories. The war has given
to Germany the economic control perhaps of
the Balkans and of the Turkish Empire, but
certainly of Russia, all rich countries which
she is already opening up, and where, if she
can maintain her hold, she can realize a profit
of many milliards on a relatively small out-
lay, for this monopoly cost her only what
she has paid in war expenditures — little com-
pared with the stupendous results obtained.
It is obvious that the value of all this loot is
infinitely greater than the 20 milliards of notes
issued by the German Bank, even if one adds
about 84 milliards of marks borrowed in Ger-
many up to July 1st, 1918. The Germans
have long been led by their government propa-
ganda to look upon war as a ''get-rich-quick"
scheme; they feel, therefore, that the war
gains constitute an additional security for
the credit of the empire. The result is that,
within their own borders, and because Ger-
mans believe firmly that their conquests will
be permanent, particularly those in the east,
government loans and the circulation of paper
currency are thought safer than ever, resting,
as they do, on two firm supports; first, the
specie reserve, and second, the immense wealth
gained by the war. Certainly the most recent

THE GERMANS AND THE ARMISTICE 69

events compel the Germans to give up a
notable part of their gains, but those which
remain are yet so great that Germany is still,
in spite of everything, in an advantageous situ-
ation to discuss peace.

England, Italy, and France have had to
increase their paper money enormously over
peace-times without adding to their security
proportionally; there is necessarily, there-
fore, a wide diflference between the economic
position of Germany and that of the Allies
not understood among us, but which the Ger-
mans comprehend perfectly. L'Homme En-
chaine quotes from an article in the Rhine
and Westphalia Gazette, August 24th, 1917:
"Every milliard extorted from Belgium,
France, or Serbia is just so much gain to us
and loss to the enemy."

Germany tries to draw advantage from
this difference by peace parley and armistice
before the Allies can completely reverse the
situation in central Europe and force her to
disgorge her prey, dishonestly come by, but
valuable as security for her bank issues.
Berlin will endeavor to lead the Allies into
premature peace negotiations, in order that
their swift economic downfall, resulting from
the difference of security of the German bank-

70 AN ENDURING VICTORY

notes and that of the bank-notes of the Euro-
pean Entente Allies may suffice to secure to
Germany a real victory, not by military means,
but by the ruin of her adversaries at the mo-
ment when they believe themselves victorious
on the strength of a brilliant success without
taking into account the economic diversities.

III.

Let us try now to find out how the astute
government of Berlin makes use of differences
in economic conditions which four years of
war have made between her and the Allies.

This difference, as already shown, has two
notable characteristics :

1st. Germany has gained and the Allies lost
largely by the war.

2d. The German circulation of paper money
is safely secured by the booty she has seized,
and her commercial monopolies in the east,
especially in Russia. The security of the
Allies, on the contrary, depends on a victory
thorough enough to force Germany to restore
what she has stolen, and repair the profound
injuries her aggression has wrought on Europe.

The German plan will succeed only if the
Allies are surprised and can be induced to

THE GERMANS AND THE ARMISTICE 71

parley without full comprehension of their
precarious financial position, outlined above.
They must comprehend not the western situa-
tion only, with a view to victory, but all Eu-
rope as the sole method of forcing Germany
to relinquish completely her eastern gains,
which form the chief basis of her war profits.
Berlin counts on the Alsace-Lorraine trick
to bring the Allies into peace negotiations
before the time. I predicted this two years
ago, but since then several Austrian or German
personalities have baited the hook with such
assurances as *'the Alsace-Lorraine question
is the sole obstacle to peace." The letter
written by the Emperor of Austria as to French
rights in Alsace-Lorraine was part of the same
plot, which has been taken up again recently.
According to the paper La Suisse of July 30th,
1918, "'the German people are willing to
cede Alsace-Lorraine, in order to make peace
before it is too late." The mass of the French
nation is ready to thwart this Boche manoeuvre,
but Americans should know that there are
groups of Frenchmen who would let themselves
be deceived in all good faith, and the German
General Staff has learned by experience in
Russia and Caporetto that in countries worn
out by a long and cruel strain one may sue-

72 AN ENDURING VICTORY

ceed by acting on a relatively small number
among civilians or in the army.

There are three groups in France who may
be taken in by the Alsace-Lorraine trick:
First, those who only wish to thrust the in-
vader from the soil of France. These do not
look at the war in Europe as a whole, nor do
they at all understand that France would be
irretrievably ruined if Germany retained con-
trol of central Europe and her eastern war
gains.

The second group is composed of well-mean-
ing people also, but who fix their eyes on
Alsace-Lorraine, forgetting the vital impor-
tance of the money questions raised by the
war. If after four years of exhausting struggle
an undoubted military success should force the
Germans back, and oblige them to restore
Alsace-Lorraine, many among this group would
think us wrong to lose the opportunity to put
an end to such carnage.

Finally the third group, the smallest but
the most dangerous because it makes the
most noise, composed of peace-at-any-price
members and a few very active French Bol-
sheviks. These two sets of people have not
dwelt on the restoration to France of her lost
provinces, but they would eagerly accept sug-

THE GERMANS AND THE ARMISTICE 73

gestions coming from Germany, as they are
in agreement with her action. We cannot
doubt this when we read a demand that "no
peace proposition should be rejected, no matter
what its source" (see Le Temps, June 28th,
1918). This demand was contained in a letter
dated June, 1918, addressed to the French Par-
liament by the Confederation Generale du Tra-
vail, the only large union in France, but which
really represents a small number of French
workers. This state of mind is, moreover, that
of some Socialist deputies, careless of realities
to such a degree that they have even declared
that the war map means nothing.

A part at least of the French population
could be influenced by these pushing groups,
ready to listen to "peace proposals from any-
where," even from Germans, whose word is
worthless, and without waiting till the mili-
tary situation advances far enough to force
Germany to keep her engagements toward
oppressed peoples, and indemnify France for
her stupendous losses.

On the other hand, we should completely
misapprehend the Germans if we supposed
that after their victories and seizures of three-
quarters of Europe and part of Asia they
mean to yield Alsace-Lorraine permanently

74 AN ENDURING VICTORY

to France. They will probably use Alsace-
Lorraine as a bone of contention among the
Allies, to tempt the French to a premature
peace talk, which will destroy their union
and morale. This result obtained, they will
say: "We will not restore Alsace-Lorraine
to you, for you are ruined and unable to take
it." All of German tactics is contained in this
sentence from the Frankfort Gazette, December,
1916, ''Negotiation does not mean renuncia-
tion."

Even if it were true that Germany might
be disposed to return for the moment Alsace-
Lorraine to France, France would be incapable
of holding it if Greater Germany still con-
trolled Austria-Hungary, the Balkans, and
Turkey, a group strong politically and com-
mercially, with 30 millions of soldiers under
the orders of Berlin.

The map here inserted and the accompany-
ing table shows Alsace-Lorraine restored to
France and Central Pangermany, so that
we can see clearly why the former would be
too weak to keep her provinces under such
circumstances. According to the figures of
1914, without counting men killed in the war,
France, including Alsace-Lorraine, could raise
at the outside an army of 8,300,000 men, while

THE GERMANS AND THE ARMISTICE 75

76 AN ENDURING VICTORY

Pangermany would have nearly 22 million
more. France, however, could not keep up
her army on account of the ruin brought her
by the war, while Germany would flourish on
the fruits of her vast robberies. These sup-
positions show that the underlying problem of
the war which touches us all is not the ques-
tion of Alsace-Lorraine, but that of Central
Pangermany, the foundation of Prussian mili-
tarism, which has threatened the entire world.
No, neither France nor the Allies are fighting
for Alsace-Lorraine — ^part of a great whole —
they are fighting for the triumph of peaceful
democracy, and this implies the necessity of
setting free the peoples enslaved by Germany
and her allies. Undoubtedly, Alsace-Lorraine
has a right to freedom; she is a symbol of op-
pressed peoples, but only a symbol, for her
population is a small part of those enslaved.
True, in 1871, 1,500,000 Frenchmen were torn
from their country, against their will; but in
central and eastern Europe, there are now close
to 100 millions of Slavs, Latins, and Semites
who are reduced to a frightful slavery by the
pro-Germans. Their servitude is an obstacle
to the establishment of democracy, and so is
that of Alsace-Lorraine. Our map, then, shows
us that the fate of the latter depends upon

THE GERMANS AND THE ARMISTICE 77

the overthrow of Central Pangermany, which
will put an end to the Prussian military system.
Pangermany can be permanently destroyed
only by the liberation of the people she op-
presses; we can therefore say justly that the
complete freedom of the Poles, Czechs, Jugo-
slavs, Roumanians, etc., is the first and un-
avoidable condition on which Alsace-Lorraine
can be lastingly restored to France.

It is possible that some ill-informed groups
in France may drift toward the Alsace-Lor-
raine snag; we should therefore guard against
it, and we have everything needful to this
end.

The restoration of Alsace-Lorraine depends
on an Allied victory which will reconstruct
Europe on the principle of nationalities; we
must therefore set on foot the necessary propa-
ganda to instruct those in France who have
not yet grasped this fact. America has begun
this propaganda in the most convincing way,
for the spectacle of masses of soldiers from
the United States fighting with enthusiasm
on French soil gives the greatest imaginable
encouragement to war-weary men, and makes
them feel anew that no stop is possible before
the war is brought to a righteous conclusion.
President Wilson has also partly blunted the

78 AN ENDURING VICTORY

edge of the Alsace-Lorraine stroke in advance.
In a speech dehvered July 4th, 1918, he says:
''The settlement must be final. There can
be no compromise. No half-way decision is
conceivable." Again Lansing's note of May,
1918, defines with justice and clarity the atti-
tude of the United States toward the oppressed
Slavs and Latins of Central Europe; thus
the Alsace-Lorraine trick is already checked
in the best way imaginable. But with the
Boches one can never be too sure, and the
more our press insists on the perfidy hidden
under this cloak, the more its success will be
rendered impossible.

IV.

We have explained the situation resulting
from four years of war, and we will now show
how the Germans could exploit it. Let us
assume that the Allies have driven them out
of France and Belgium, that Alsace-Lorraine
is restored, and that peace negotiations are
going on, but that Germany continues to pre-
dominate over central Europe and Russia.

On this hypothesis, how can the bankruptcy
of the Allied European states be brought about,
according to the German design .^^ It is not

THE GERMANS AND THE ARMISTICE 79

necessary in this connection to touch upon
the financial situation of Great Britain and
Italy; it will be sufficient to sketch broadly
the effect of the German aggression in this
respect on France. In the first place, her posi-
tion is particularly striking, for she has borne
the burden and heat of the day. She is the
bulwark of civilization and has made greater
money sacrifices, and endured losses much
heavier than those of her allies. Secondly,
as France is the pivot of the Entente coalition,
it is at her finances that the Germans aim, in
order by reflex action to reach Italy and Great
Britain.

At the opening of hostilities France had
issued 6 milliards of bank-notes, and in July,
1918, this circulation had increased to 29 mil-
liards of francs. In June, 1914, France had
3 milUards in gold and silver, and in July, 1918,
the specie reserve of the Bank of France
amounted in round numbers to 5 milliards, 600
millions, of which 2 millions in gold was abroad
as security for war debts. The French national
debt was 30 milliards before the war; when
this is over, what with huge war expenditures,
reconstruction of railways, etc., it will amount
to 200 milliards of francs. Now prior to 1914,
the entire fortune of France was estimated

80 AN ENDURING VICTORY

by economists at between 250 and 325 mil-
liards. The pensions alone for the wounded
and for the widows of soldiers, with interest
on the war debt, will bring the annual budget
up from the former figure of 5 milliards to at
least 12 milliards of francs, an increase of not
less than 7 milliards which will have to be
raised by permanent taxation.

The German invasion, besides, has ravaged
and pillaged the northeast of France, the chief
industrial region, and so rich that before the
war it paid a fourth of the French taxes.
French citizens also have lost nearly 20 mil-
liards in Russian, Balkan, and Ottoman securi-
ties.

It has been stated, that in the first three
years of war, French imports exceeded exports
by about 25 milliards, and finally France has
borrowed large sums abroad to buy raw ma-
terial and feed her population.

Every intelligent Frenchman therefore un-
derstands that the 29 milliards in paper-money
at the above date, must have for their
security not only 5 milliards in specie (2 of
them abroad), but a victory suflSciently real
to force Germany to make good her thefts,
and progressively repair the injuries she has
caused.

THE GERMANS AND THE ARMISTICE 81

This conforms to the most elementary idea
of justice, and is also the sole economic pos-
sibility. While Germany is gorged with riches
as the fruit of her crimes, how could our brave
French soldiers pay a tax increase of 7 mil-
liards, when they come back from the trenches
after such years, the country torn by the
struggle, while Germany preserves the greater
part of her immense profits ?

We must face the truth and speak it plainly :
only annuities paid by the Germans, for dam-
age inflicted, used to back French national
loans, will enable France to save her people
from taxes that would soon be fatal, and to
keep engagements which she holds sacred.

The French believe firmly that a just peace
will bring restitution, and that is why they
have not lost faith in their paper currency,
which in spite of its increase retains its full
purchasing power. This economic and psy-
chologic position is watched carefully by the
cunning Boches, for they hope to make use
of it through their pacifist manoeuvres.

The Berlin Deutsche OehonomisU May 4th,
1918, says: "The money situation in France
is worse now than at any time during the
World War. The printing-press is the only
source of revenue for M. Klotz, Minister of

82 AN ENDURING VICTORY

Finance, and he makes liberal use of it. . . .
If this goes on, fresh notes will have to be is-
sued in France to pay interest on the national
debt, just as in Russia."

On the other hand, the Boches know well
enough that these difficulties are as naught,
as long as France remains the corner-stone
of the coalition, for the Entente as a whole,
especially since the United States entered the
war, has large financial resources. To succeed,
then, in their scheme, they want to isolate
France, leaving her to cope single-handed
with her money difficulties.

To understand and thwart this Boche plot
we must presuppose a state of things best
adapted to its success, as follows: Seeing the
influx of American troops, the German Govern-
ment will admit that a military decision is not
immediately possible, and will endeavor to
bring about a treaty of Brest-Litovsk suitable
to western conditions. The Berlin General
Staff will then adopt the following tactics.
Their armies will fall back slowly on the
western front, destroying all behind them, so
that the ground regained may cost the Allies
as much as possible. France and Belgium will
be evacuated, while we advance slowly but
continuously. Meanwhile, our papers will be

THE GERMANS AND THE ARMISTICE 83

filled with accounts of victory, and the public
will believe that the German army is con-
quered because it has certainly retired before
the onslaught of the Allies, the German press
will not deny this, it will even offer Alsace-
Lorraine as the price of peace. Our pacifists
and Bolschevists, encouraged by these events
will urge their views more strongly than ever,
and the majority of people in Entente coun-
tries will be so influenced that at last they
will say: "Why accept new sacrifices since
we are now victorious ? We can talk of peace
on our own terms." The Alhed governments
feel the danger of negotiations while Germany
still holds Central Europe and Russia, but on
our hypothesis we will imagine them over-
borne by public opinion. Military operations
would then cease, and parleys would begin.

Nothing would suit the Germans better,
for they would then be sure of the success of
their western Brest-Litovsk. They believe
that the money position of the Allies is such
that peace conversation would be no sooner
begun, than it would give rise to the follow-
ing chain of circumstances:

The Germans argue thus: ''Suppose we
engage the Allies in talk, we are none the less
masters of Central Europe and Russia. Shortly

84 AN ENDURING VICTORY

after the opening of negotiations, the French
will be brought to see that Germany will not
act as she expects, and repair the harm done
by the war. As the purchasing power of the
French notes rests entirely on the public con-
fidence in German restitution, if this confidence
disappears, at the same time, the purchasing
power of the notes will also vanish, while the
cost of living, already high, will rise still
further. This effect is bound to follow since
to buy the same article a larger amount of
paper money will be required continually,
as was the case in Russia. This drop in the
purchasing power of notes of the Bank of
France will cause wide-spread troubles in daily
life over even now invaded districts, which
will soon grow inextricable. The people, worn
by the long nervous strain, will lose their
heads; there will be riots before which the
government will be helpless, because the vitia-
tion of its currency will have undermined the
national credit. Bonds of the National De-
fense and French rents will fall with the same
rapidity, and this, joined to the hardships of
the winter months, will at least destroy the
morale of the French, rendering further mili-
tary resistance out of the question. Under
these circumstances, the British troops and

THE GERMANS AND THE ARMISTICE 85

the two million Americans in France could
be of no use. 'From this moment,' argue the
Germans, 'we have only to repeat the trick
which worked so well in Russia after our nego-
tiations with the Bolshevists had broken the
national spirit. The financial crisis leaving
France at our mercy, having carefully saved
our eflfectives, reinforced by a new class, we
will resume the offensive, this time without
serious resistance, and penetrate to the very
heart of France. We can then control the
material wealth of the hitherto uninvaded
districts, and, with the whole country in our
power, will use it as a base against the United
States according to programme.' "

Such is a bird's-eye view of the plot the
Germans are working at this moment in try-
ing by every means in their power to secure
an armistice which would save them from in-
vasion and would open a period of negotia-
tions. If our lack of foresight allows them
to carry it into effect, the results will be in-
finitely disastrous. The success of this plan
in France would entail the downfall of Eng-
land, and of Italy also, on account of her de-
pendence on France. Berlin has built up this
clever scheme, on which she counts to give
her victory, just at the moment that the Allies

86 AN ENDURING VICTORY

think they have won. She trusts that these
economic methods will prevail, even if she is
driven back in the west, as long as she can
hold the rest of her war booty and retain her
grip on Russia.

From the foregoing, we draw three impor-
tant conclusions:

1st. The Allied credit depends on a true
victory implying restitution from Germany
and the relinquishment of her control of cen-
tral Europe, which implies the dismemberment
of Austria-Hungary.

2d. Four years of war have produced an
unprecedented economic situation; therefore
the purchasing power of the Allied currency
must necessarily diminish if negotiations are
entered on before an economically restorative
and really decisive victory from the European
point of view.

3d. These dangers threaten us only because
the Allies have not argued as they should on
peace as it would affect the extraordinary
state of finance resulting from the war.

This omission in most of our peace pro-
grammes would end, if these programmes were
applied, in a disaster more hopeless than any
military catastrophe. This sword hangs over
our heads because many of us think of the

THE GERMANS AND THE ARMISTICE 87

Germans as impoverished instead of being
enriched by the war. It is, however, easy to
parry this blow and to make its success im-
possible; we must undertake a campaign of
popular education to instruct the whole Allied
public as to the reality and extent of the Ger-
man war projBts. All will then see that the
war must not end till Germany has restored
the fruit of her enormous thefts and repaired
the vast damages which she has caused, not
only by the destruction she has carried out,
but by the war costs, much greater than her
own, which her aggression has forced upon her
adversaries.

CHAPTER III.

PANGERMANY'S PROBABLE MILITARY STRENGTH,
AND ITS WEAKNESS AT THE OUTSET OF THE
FIFTH YEAR OF WAR.

I. The annual military contingent of Germany.
II. Approximate strength of German mobilized forces in
August, 1918.

III. Critical discussion of the figures found to represent the

man-power of Germany.

IV. The probable total forces of Pangermany in August,

1918.

V. How new sources of effectives could have been used to

offset the American numbers, if the Allies had not acted

in the Balkans and time had been left to the Germans.

VI. How it is the successes of the Allies in the Balkans that

secure the superiority in man-power to the Entente.
VII. The teachings of the recent past and of the present
prove the immense power of political strategy, and
that for the Allies the Danube-Central Europe front
exerts a decisive influence on the issue of the war.

The progressive evacuation of France and
of Belgium by the Germans, the surrender of
Bulgaria, of Turkey, of Austria-Hungary, must
not prevent us from studying thoroughly the
military forces of the states which have made
up and may again make up Pangermany.

This study is necessary to avoid, in esti-
mating the German man-power, any error,

PANGERMANY'S MILITARY STRENGTH 89

at the conclusion of peace, which would be
fatal to the cause of democracy. We shall see
in effect that the Germans have still more men
than the Allies generally believe, and that con-
sequently the AUies ought still to be cautious.

The opinion prevailing in Entente coun-
tries is that victory will fall to the group of
beUigerents possessing the greatest man-power,
but this opinion is not altogether in harmony
with the teachings of history. Thanks to
superior strategy. Napoleon often conquered
even with numbers against him, and in the
first four years of the World War, success has
not fallen to the largest numerical group, as
the following table will show:

Entente

Central Powers

"Riiccin . .

Millions of
Inhabitants

182
46
40
36

334

Germanv

Millions of
Inhabitants

Enffland

Austria-Hungary . .
Turkey

l^roripp

Italv

Bulgaria

Roumania

Belgium

Total

Portugal

Serbia

Greece

Total

143

90 AN ENDURING VICTORY

Great Britain certainly was short of men
when the war broke out, but by 1916 she had
raised a considerable army, and it is equally
true that Austria-Hungary was of but little
assistance to Germany, owing to the fact that
the majority of her Slav and Latin popula-
tion — about 28 millions — was averse to the
war. Turkey and Bulgaria also were exhausted
and stripped of their armaments by the Balkan
Wars, so that they did not really come into
line before 1915. As a whole, then, the Entente
had an enormous numerical advantage of 191
millions of inhabitants over the Central Em-
pires, which of course meant reserves of man-
power much greater than those of the Boches,
but in spite of this a glance at the map of Pan-
germany in August, 1918 (page 14), shows
that the latter had the upper hand.

Numbers, then, do not insure victory, which
may rather depend on the strategic use made
of forces covering the whole theatre of war.

It was necessary to show the relative value
of numbers in a campaign, but there should
be no misconception as to the extreme im-
portance of large reserves, for, the strategic
qualities of the contestants being equal, it is
obvious that victory will fall to the share of
the larger armies. The question of effectives

PANGERMANY'S MILITARY STRENGTH 91

is most important to the Allies, and rightly
so, but many of them think erroneously that
since the American reinforcements assure our
superiority in man-power, nothing can over-
throw it. If this is so, it is only by reason of
certain political-strategic conditions in the
east, which I will explain at the end of this
chapter.

During the first three years of the war.
Allied opinion on the question of German
reserves was influenced chiefly by Colonel
Repington, military critic of the London
Times; this paper, however, no longer pub-
lishes his articles. In these fateful three years,
most Allied papers inclined to the views of
the greatest and most devoted to the cause of
the Allies of the British dailies, but Colonel
Repington's premonitions have been falsified
by the events. He announced many times
that, according to his calculations, German
reserves would be soon exhausted. This mis-
take as to the enemy's effectives has done an
infinite amount of harm to our cause, as I
pointed out in an article published by La
Vidoire, Paris, October 28th, 1916. The ar-
ticle is here exactly reproduced:

"'In the London Times of Jan. 10, 1916, we
read :

92 AN ENDURING VICTORY

ccc

Col. Repington estimates the German
losses at 200,000 men a month; if therefore
the struggle continues with the same intensity,
up to a date between May and October, 1916,
Germany will be unable to stop the gaps made
in her lines by the fighting of each day. Be-
fore that date, then, she must try to obtain
a decision, on one front or the other.

"'Four weeks later Col. Repington made
statements not only entirely opposed to the
above, but much more reasonable, and which
showed on what slender grounds his earlier
calculations had been made. This is clear
from his letter to the Times of the 9th of Feb.
1916, in which he asserts that the "Berlin
government now has at its disposal reserve
forces amounting to 2,700,000 men."' (See
L' Information, Paris, February 10th, 1916.)

"A month before, when Colonel Repington
stated that the Germans were losing 200,000
a month, and that sometime between May
and October they would find themselves with-
out reserves, he made a serious mistake. The
extreme carelessness of his judgment appears
yet more clearly when we read a statement in
The Times of April 30th, which ignores his
previous estimate of the number of German
reserves, for he writes exactly as if these re-

PANGERMANY'S MILITARY STRENGTH 93

serves did not exist when he says: 'The Ger-
man armies on the Russian front do not
amount to more than 1,300 men to the mile
. . . and to sum up, the eastern front is a new
wall of China with nothing behind it.' rin-
formation, Paris, May 2, 1916, accepts Rep-
ington's miscalculation copying The Times
article, with the headline, 'The German armies
have no more reserves.'

''By the end of August, 1916, Colonel Rep-
ington decides that Germany is reduced ev-
erywhere to the defensive (Le Journal, Paris,
August 25th, 1916), the lack of reserves ren-
dering it impossible for the Kaiser to make
a serious offensive. A flat contradiction to
this was soon shown when Berlin overthrew
Roumania, with fresh troops which poured in
from Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and
Bulgaria (see Journal de Geneve, 19th of Oc-
tober, 1916, quoting from Uldea Nazionale).

"The contrast between the actual facts in
1916 and Repington's calculations of the Ger-
man reserves alone will prove to the least in-
formed that even if these estimates were
serious, they were quite insufficient to give
so much as an approximate idea of the truth.
"In point of fact, when we speak of German
reserves, we must surely mean to include ef-

94 AN ENDURING VICTORY

fectives contributed by Austria-Hungary, Tur-
key, and Bulgaria, all under orders from Ber-
lin; for as far as we can see, without these
vassals, Germany could not keep up the
struggle. There can be no doubt that the
Bulgars work for the King of Prussia in
Monastir, and the Turks in Galicia and the
Dobrudja. Thus, at the lowest estimate
there must be 1,500,000 Turco-Bulgars to be
subdued by the Allies, just as much as the
Austro-Boches. These 1,500,000 Turco-Bul-
gars deserve particular consideration from
Colonel Repington, for, as we all know, he has
contributed to place them at the service of
William II by his strenuous opposition to
the Allied attempt to preserve the Danube
front; though this was the only operation
which could have prevented the junction of
the Germans, Bulgars and Turks, and, there-
fore, the hold of the Kaiser on this 1,500,000
people. The colonel, however, does not in-
clude them in his calculations, any more than
the 2 millions of prisoners held by the Ger-
mans, who work in their munition factories
or behind the military fronts, thereby setting
free just so many Austro-Boches, who without
these prisoners would have themselves to carry
on these labors indispensable to the army.

PANGERMANY'S MILITARY STRENGTH 95

"Colonel Repington's carelessness and inco-
herence on these points must be clear, then, to
the meanest capacity. His estimates as to the
enemies' effectives are full of mistakes, for he
neglects the essential factors to be considered;
and these mistakes have produced the worst
practical consequences. The great weight at-
tached to The Times, has caused numerous Al-
hed newspapers to quote Repington's articles
in the fullest confidence, and this has filled the
public mind in Entente countries, with the
most dangerous notions about the duration of
the war, and the extent of effort necessary to
defeat the barbarians from beyond the Rhine."

These lines were written at the end of 1916.
Since then the German offensives in different
directions have proved how much Colonel
Repington was mistaken as to the enemy's
reserves, but these errors have contributed
materially to the cruel disappointments of the
Allies and the prolongation of the war, for
his statements fostered the opinion that the
conflict would certainly end in three months,
as Germany was near exhaustion, and that all
that was needful was to push the fight on the
western front until her reserves gave out, when
our victory was sure to follow.

96 AN ENDURING VICTORY

Four years of war and the fact that the pro-
gressive evacuation of France and of Belgium
was decided upon by the Germans only after
the defeat of Bulgaria at the end of September,
1918, demonstrate the depth of these errors,
and as the interest of America is identical
with that of the Allies, she should grasp the
situation clearly that she may avoid the mis-
take made in Europe as to the man-power of
Germany, which has always been greatly
underestimated, so that even to-day, after the
German retreat on the west front, it is placed
at much less than it is in reality.

The Allies were so much surprised at the
numerical superiority of the Germans during
their great offensive on the western front in
April- June, 1918, that in order to account for
it, certain Allies explained that before the war
Germany gave out false reports as to her
population, which was much larger than the
official figures, and now supplied her from
resources greater than had been believed.
The truth is really much simpler, for mistakes
about the German forces arise from superficial
ideas existing among the Allies on many sub-
jects, not only about Austria-Hungary, Bul-
garia, and Turkey, countries difficult to un-
derstand, but about Germany as well.

PANGERMANY'S MILITARY STRENGTH 97

We are apt to think it a sign of weakness
when we see boys of seventeen in the German
army, and from the early days of the war our
press often mentioned this, saying: "Germany
must be in a bad way, if she has to use recruits
only seventeen years old." It is, however,
perfectly natural, and long before the war it
was the law that every German, able to bear
arms should be liable to military service, that
is, he might be obliged to join the colors at
seventeen years of age. In time of peace these
joined at twenty, but the circumstance of
their enlistment during the war at seventeen,
far from being a proof indicative of German
exhaustion, shows, on the contrary, that the
Berlin government resolved long ago to make
war with all the means at its command, and
thus to deal its enemies the deadliest blows.

In July and August, 1918, when our brilliant
counter-offensives forced the Teutons back
from the Soisson-Rheims salient, even as early
as the first day of August, many of the Allies
returned to the opinion that his retirement
was owing to lack of men, and that complete
victory would result automatically from the
destruction of the German army on the west-
ern front. It is now hard to understand such
fixed and definite ideas. On the 16th of Au-

98 AN ENDURING VICTORY

gust many Allied papers estimated the German
losses since July 15tli at 250,000 men, 'a large
number, no doubt; but to judge sanely of the
effect of this on the war we must set against
it the loss the Germans have inflicted on us
since April, a loss certainly not negligible, as
everything in war is a question of comparison
between the two contestants.

The above figure for German losses is not
high enough to allow us to conclude that the
enemy at this period, when the Bulgarian
disaster had not yet taken place, was al-
ready short of reserves, especially as we were
assured that he had about 7 millions of men
on all the western front. This retirement
may, perhaps, be interpreted as part of the
shrewd pacifist manoeuvre of which I have
spoken in the preceding chapter, and which
I had foreseen two years ago (see my pref-
ace).

Color is given to this idea by an extract
from the Stuttgart Neues Taghlatt, dated Au-
gust 19th, 1918, which quotes from the
Schwdbische Tagwacht, a statement that Ger-
many's soldiers are exhausted, and agree with
the civil population in demanding peace at
any price. I do not say this is not true; I
merely state that, given the German censor-

PANGERMANY'S MILITARY STRENGTH 99

ship at this period, an item of this sort could
only have been published on the other side
of the Rhine with permission of the General
Staff, which must certainly have had some
purpose to serve in authorizing the appear-
ance of such a statement. There is at least
ground for suspicion.

However this may be, four years of war
have not justified these opinions held in the
Entente, notably by Colonel Repington, as to
German reserves. The only way of reaching a
fair conclusion on this question, always ex-
tremely important, even at this moment when
the Germans are beginning to evacuate France
and Belgium, is to start fresh, renouncing all
former opinions which stand in need of proof,
and seeking corroboration from reliable sources
as to Germany's man-power and her military
strength at the threshold of this fifth year of
the war, remembering always that this
strength is exerted over the entire war-field
subject to the direction of Berlin.

To approximate as nearly as possible to the
truth, we must study successively the two es-
sential elements of this problem.

1st. What is the annual military contingent
of Germany ?

2d. Making proper deductions, what was

100 AN ENDURING VICTORY

the present state of Germany's mobilized
military forces in August, 1918.

The mistake of the AUies as to German re-
serves arises from an inexact valuation of their
annual military contingent. Many people of
importance put this contingent at about
400,000, and this figure is generally accepted
by the Allies. According to German reports
dating from before the war, these figures are
much below the truth. According to the
best-known German military publication, Loe-
helVs Jahresherichte for 1911, published in the
spring of 1912, the number of recruits for
1910 was 1,245,363, the population of the
empire being then exactly Q5 millions. On
looking at these figures carefully, we see that
they include the class coming up for examina-
tion as well as those adjourned from preceding
classes. Taken in the lump, they can be
analyzed thus:

Excluded on account of criminal conviction 890

Invalided 34,067

Men in advance of their time 39,970

Service deferred (ajournh) 715,952

Men fit for service 454,484

Let us analyze these figures, so as to ascer-

PANGERMANY'S MILITARY STRENGTH 101

tain the annual contingent of Germany if she
had wished to make war in 1910, instead of
merely keeping up her peace establishment.

To keep down expenses before the war,
Germany did not enHst by any means all the
men fit for service, so it is plain that if she
had brought on war in 1910, she would first
have taken into the army the whole number
ready for that year; say 454,484 men. Now
let us examine the list of those whose service
was deferred, 715,952, a very high figure. We
must first understand the conditions under
which men are deferred (or adjourned) from
the German army. This does not happen in
cases of sickness, but where the men are phys-
ically fit, but suffering from some temporary
weakness. It was easy to get an adjournment
before the war, as there were more men fit for
service than the state could afford to enlist.
Moreover, excuse is granted in Germany for
any one of a number of reasons, depending on
family or commercial considerations, so that
men obtain it as —

1st. The necessary support of a family.

2d. The sons of a landed proprietor, farmer,
or manufacturer incapable of work.

3d. Next of kin to soldiers killed, or dead
of wounds in the service.

102 AN ENDURING VICTORY

4th. Having inherited property or land,
which can only be managed by themselves.

5th. Owners of factories or important busi-
ness houses where their presence is indispen-
sable.

6th. Young men preparing for any pro-
fession, study or trade to which interruption
would be prejudicial.

7th. Young men living abroad.

From this it is clear that the men exempted
in peace-time are all physically capable of
bearing arms for the Kaiser, or of work in
the many branches of service in the rear of an
army. Observe also that according to mili-
tary law adjournment lasts only three years,
so that the number, 715,952 men for 1910,
mentioned above includes only three classes
adjourned; consequently, taking a third of this
figure — 238,650, we reach the mean number of
men adjourned in 1910, who would unques-
tionably have entered the army in that year.

In 1910, Germany had also 34,067 reformes
(men invalided), and of course in all the bellig-
erent countries it is much harder to be invalided
in time of war; therefore we can allow a third of
the figure 34,067, say, 11,355, men who would
have been part of the war contingent in 1910.

To sum up, if Germany had begun the war

PANGERMANY'S MILITARY STRENGTH 103

in that year, her war levy would have been
made up of three categories, as follows:

Fit for service in 1910 454,484 men

A third of those adjourned in 1910 238.650 men

A third of those reformis in 1910 11,355 men

Total 704,489 men

Let us say in round numbers 300,000 men
besides the 400,000 generally allowed to be
the regular annual levy.

This total of 700,000 men is probably less
than the present annual war contingent in
Germany, as it pertains to the year 1910, and
according to the Almanack de Gotha, page 531,
in 1910 Germany had exactly 64,925,993 in-
habitants, in 1913 she had 66,835,000; in-
dicating an average increase for each of the
three years of 636,335 inhabitants. On this
basis, without considering effects resulting
from the war, the population of Germany was:

In 1911 65,562,328 inhabitants

In 1912 66,198,663 inhabitants

In 1913 66,835,000 inhabitants

In 1914 67,471,335 inhabitants

In 1915 68,107,670 inhabitants

In 1916 68,744,005 inhabitants

In 1917 69,380,340 inhabitants

In 1918 70,016,675 inhabitants

These figures provide a basis for calculations

104 AN ENDURING VICTORY

of great practical interest because the two
causes which at present diminish these figures —
the German losses and the decline in the birth-
rate caused by the war — certainly do not in-
fluence the increase of the annual military con-
tingent of Germany. Since 1915, those who
have reached the military age of seventeen are
not less in number owing to events now taking
place, because they were born after 1898, that
is, during a period in which the German birth-
rate was steadily rising from year to year;
hence we can fairly consider that the above
figures reflect accurately the size of the popu-
lation from which Germany has drawn recruits
since 1915, but we must bear in mind that on
account of the high birth-rate after 1898 re-
sources in men are considerable, and will con-
tinue for some years to come. Consequently,
from the recruiting point of view, the figures
showing the growth of the German population
from 1911 to 1918 will allow us to estimate as
closely as possible the annual military contin-
gent of Germany for the same period. If this
amounted to 700,000 men in 1910, as against
Q5 millions of inhabitants, that is, about 10.77
for every 1,000, it would have been:

In 1911 706,055 men

In 1912 712,908 men

In.l913 719,761 men

PANGERMANY'S MILITARY STRENGTH 105

In 1914 726,614 men

In 1915 733,467 men

In 1916 740,320 men

In 1917 747,172 men

In 1918 754,025 men

This gives a total of 5,840,322 men for these
eight years. As the Entente usually reckons
the annual German levies at 400,000, in the
light of the facts just presented, based on the
latest German official figures obtainable, their
last eight military contingents would have been
calculated as only 3,200,000 men, making an
underestimate of apparently about 2,600,000.

This showing explains in a striking manner
some of the events of the last four years — up to
the moment when the Bulgarian debacle and
the Allied advance toward the Danube have
compelled the German General Staff abruptly
to shorten the western front to rush to defend
central Europe — particularly:

1st. How Germany has been able, up to the
time of the Bulgarian defeat, to continue her
penetration in Russia, while maintaining de-
fensive pressure in the west.

2d. How the Germans have been able to
keep up their long lines of communication, a
feat rarely mentioned, but which must re-
quire a large personnel.

3d. How for the last four years the Ger-

106 AN ENDURING VICTORY

mans have surprised the AlHes, always op-
posing them with forces superior to their cal-
culations at any critical moment.

II.

The annual military levy of Germany since
1910, being known by means of the foregoing
calculations, let us now estimate her mobilized
forces at the beginning of the fifth year of
war, August, 1918.

In Mr. Gerard's book. My Four Years in
Germany, he says that there were 12 millions
of soldiers mobilized by William II when he
declared war. As Germany had a population
of about 68 millions in 1914, this would mean
17^ per cent of the people. The French ex-
generalissimo. General de Lacroix, estimated
the whole German mobilization at 13 millions
of men, say 19 per cent of the population.
According to law every German is liable to
military service from 17 years to the end of
the 45th year of age. Compare the official
figures of the French census of 1910 showing
that the male population from 17 to 45 inclu-
sive represents 21 in 100 of the French people,
the general average in most countries — we can
therefore reckon the entire German mobiliza-
tion at 20 per cent of the inhabitants, which

PANGERMANY'S MILITARY STRENGTH 107

gives us 13,600,000 men, it being more prudent
to put the German strength at rather more
than less. This figure of 13,600,000 men mo-
bihzed is very conservative, as it relates to the
number of inhabitants in 1914 — 68 millions.
In the last four years the German population
has increased on an average of 636,335 a year,
deducting war losses, of which we will speak
later. These figures are taken from the Al-
manack de Gotha, 1914, page 531, above quoted
(see page 103).

In 1918, then, Germany contained 70,016,675
inhabitants. Hence, taking as a basis the
mobilization of 20 in 100 on the round number
of 68 millions of people in 1914, we are prob-
ably if anything short of the truth.

In this number of 13,600,000 men are in-
cluded, of course, soldiers on the various fronts,
and those in the innumerable service depart-
ments of all kinds of the German army.

This lump sum of 13,600,000 has been modi-
fied in two ways. First, it has been diminished
by war losses. Secondly, these losses have been
partially compensated for by the German
annual recruitment.

Let us consider the value of each of these
factors. According to an authority which I
am bound to hold as particularly trustworthy.

108 AN ENDURING VICTORY

on the 1st of June, 1918, the German loss
may be estimated by the use of the following
data.

Figures carefully collated state their loss
to have been exactly 3,400,000 on April 1st,
1917. Add to this the losses from April to
the 31st of December, 1917. Battles of the
Aisne, Flanders, etc., say 1,100,000 men, which
brings the total on January 1st, 1918, up to
about 4,500,000. By June 1st of this year, the
list was estimated at 300,000 — making 4,800,-
000 men; then we must include the sick and
wounded, a constant figure estimated at about
500,000. Putting all these together, according
to those in a position to know best, we reach
the total of a loss of 5,300,000 men to Ger-
many by the 1st of June, 1918.

We might add subsequent losses incident
to our victorious counter-ojffensive since July
15th, but from the 1st of June to the 1st of
August data are lacking for an exact computa-
tion, and, on the other hand, the problem be-
fore us consists in the attempts to ascertain
the average annual loss of Germany. Relying
on the authoritative sources of information
above mentioned, we have brought our esti-
mates to the 1st of June, 1918, and from this
point we can reach an average for the four

PANGERMANY'S MILITARY STRENGTH 109

years of war within a month, or very nearly
exact.

Now let us see how much the annual levies
of Germany have compensated for her losses.

These annual contingents (see page 105)
amount to about —

733,000 men in 1915

740,000 men in 1916

747,00.0 men in 1917

754,000 men in 1918

a total of 2,974,000 men for the four years of
war.

The mobilized strength of Germany in 1914

was 13,600,000 men

Ascertained losses resulting from the war,

June 1st, 1916 5,300,000 men

reduce this to 8,300,000 men

Four military levies, 1915-1916-1917-1918, in

round numbers 2,900,000 men

brmg this to 11,200,000 men

Eleven millions of men mobilized were,
therefore, at the disposal of Germany at the
opening of the fifth year of war. The modera-
tion and probability of this statement can be
verified by the following reasoning. The Al-
lied High Command and Senator Berenger, of
the Committee on Effectives of the French

110 AN ENDURING VICTORY

Senate, in their figures estimated the num-
ber of Germans on all the western front at
7 millions in June, 1918. From our estimates
that would leave only 4 millions to carry on
all the work in the interior of Germany, to
supply the armies in Russia and Turkey, and
secure extended communication in hostile dis-
tricts. For all these purposes 4 millions is
rather an insufficient number, so our calcula-
tions are probably not too high.

We can now see clearly two causes for the
misapprehension of the Allies as to Germany's
military resources. First mistake: The Ger-
man annual contingent is usually reckoned
at 400,000 men, but according to German
statistics (page 103) it ought to be about
700,000. Second mistake: German losses on
June 1st, 1918, are counted as positively
5,300,000 men, without reflecting that, if this
figure is right with regard to the total popu-
lation of Germany, it is not so when it is
compared with the figures of the initial
mobilization. It is important to remember
that the length of the war feeds the war, that
is, four annual military contingents have filled
up in a great measure the gaps made by losses
in the German army. Our task is to destroy
the men who compose this army faster than

PANGERMANY'S MILITARY STRENGTH 111

they can be replaced by the German people.
It is wrong, then, to speak of the absolute
German loss (5,300,000 on the 1st of June,
1918), for this implies a corresponding dimi-
nution in the mobihzed forces of Germany,
which is not the state of the case. Her strength
being kept up by annual enlistments, her real
losses after four years of war would be: 5,300,-
000 less 2,900,000 recruits, giving 2,400,000
men. Keeping in mind the comparison with the
amount of the initial mobilization, the actual
loss of the German army to August, 1918, was
in round numbers only a fourth of that num-
ber, say 600,000 men a year, a very much
lower figure than is generally allowed.

This number of men annually lost, if ad-
mitted as right, accounts for much that was
obscure in the evolution of the war, and ex-
plains the disappointments of the Allies at
finding superior forces always before them,
contrary to their calculations. These figures
also prove the falsity of Colonel Repington's
theories, for he has always maintained that
Germany can be completely conquered, driven
out in the west, and forced to yield central
and eastern Europe, as well as Turkey. To
this end he would pursue a concentrated war
of attrition on the western front, destroying

112 AN ENDURING VICTORY

successively and surely the German effective
force, and by this means arriving at a complete
victory for the Allies. The weakness of this
conception must be made clear by the fact
that it was the victorious offensive of the Allies
in the Balkans which compelled the German
General Staff to evacuate more quickly France
and Belgium.

If any doubt remains let us remember that
if Germany has lost 600,000 men a year, she
has also reached great results, for this sacri-
fice, combined with her political strategy, has
gained for her the use and control of the wealth
of three-fourths of Europe and a part of Asia.
The Allies, on the other hand, underestimating
the importance of the eastern front, neglected
for four years the great strategic possibilities
of a campaign on the Danube, and thus de-
prived themselves of the resources of Russia
and the Balkans, which they controlled at
the outset. They have been, for this reason,
blockaded in eastern Europe, and obliged to
bring from Australia and America at great
expense most of the food and raw material
of which they stand in need. Again, in pro-
portion to her first mobilized army, Germany
has lost 600,000 men a year, but the war map
(see page 14) shows how nearly she has ap-

PANGERMANY'S MILITARY STRENGTH 113

proached to the Pangermanist standard, and
also that she has inflicted on her adversaries
losses equal to her own. This cannot be
denied, for we know the Russians lost many
more men than the Germans; the French
losses have not been made public, but we
know that in April, 1918, there were more
French prisoners in Germany than there were
Germans in France, which shows at the very
least that the French have certainly lost pro-
portionately more than the Germans. It is
not easy to demonstrate, therefore, that we
can gain the victory through the exhaustion of
Germany's man-power, since it is proved that
the military and political strategy finally
carried out by the Allies in the Balkans has
accomplished in a few days results which four
years of persistent effort on the western front
could not secure.

III.

The figures given by our deductions: 13,600,-
000 for the whole mobilized German army, and
700,000 for its probable war contingent, being
much higher than those generally accepted by
the Entente, are of a nature to cause great
surprise and raise objections. A profound

114 AN ENDURING VICTORY

scrutiny of these figures is therefore not only
needful but indispensable, for if finally it is
well established that they certainly approxi-
mate to the truth it will demonstrate a fact of
great value to the Entente, of which the practi-
cal importance will appear logically at the end
of this verification. In order to go to the root
of the analysis of our figures, I will review my
statements from the beginning, following an en-
tirely different method, by means of which the
results of the first can be checked. First, I will
prove that a grave error has been most certainly
made by the Allies in their calculations of Ger-
man man-power. Second, I will point out the
different objections likely to present themselves
to the mind of my readers, and present the an-
swers which can be given.

1st. The Misapprehension of the Allies
AS TO the Annual German Contingent
IS Certain and Important.

The number of 400,000 men for Germany's
annual contingent is generally accepted by the
Allies. On June 10th, 1918, an article ap-
peared in the Paris Temps by Lieutenant
d'Entraygues, in which, speaking of the Ger-
man class of 1920, which in June, 1918, was in

PANGERMANY'S MILITARY STRENGTH 115

the Kaiser's instruction-camps, he said: "This
class will yield an effective of 400,000 men."
On the 7th of September, 1918, the New York
Times published a despatch by an American
correspondent in Paris, who had evidently
gained his information in France. He says:
"What the American factor now means may
be judged from one fact. During the month
of August 400,000 American soldiers landed in
France. This number is as nearly as possible
equivalent to the whole German 1920 class,
on which there is no doubt that the enemy has
been very largely counting to compensate him
for the enormous cost in man-power which
the Allies are causing him at present."

Now we will show why it is quite impossible
that the German class of 1920 should amount
to only 400,000 men. The figures of LoebeWs
Jahresberichte, on which I have based all my
calculations, are to be found in a pamphlet
called The Military Situation of all Nations,
published in 1914, before the war, by Berger-
Levrault, the foremost French military pub-
lisher, whose technical works are brought out
with the assistance of qualified officers. To
demonstrate that I have made no mistake,
either in the sources or the conclusions drawn
from the figures which formed the starting-point

116 AN ENDURING VICTORY

ALLEMAQNB 7

fls ne le soat g^n^ralement que pour une seule
pferiode Dans la landwehr du 2» ban et dans le
landsturm, il n'est plus fait aucune convocation.

11 importe de remarquer que les diverses regies
qui pr6c6dent hb sont pas absolues ni imperatives; ce
qui caractferise essentieJlement les lois de recrute-
ment enAllemagne, c'est leurgrande 61asticitfe et,en
m6me temps, le souci predominant de rijit6r6t mili-
taire. les ressources: considerables et toujours crois-
santes du recrutement permettent de m6nager, dans
une large mesure, la population civile, tout en n'in-
corporant dans les troupes que des jeunes gens
parfaitement aptes an service anii6.

Aussi I'autorite militaire jouit-elle de la latitude la
plus complete dans Vexamen des cas d'ajoumement,
d^exclusion et de reforme prevus par la loi,

Vajoumemetit peut resulter, en premier lieu,
d*une aptitude physique incomplete ; il ne peut 6tre
prolonge au dela de trois ans. 11 peut aussi etre pro-
nonce, sUr la demande des interesses ou de leur
famUlfe, en faveur ; \? des soutiens indispensables

of my calculations, I will reproduce photograph-
ically the essential passages of this pamphlet,
showing:

1st. That according to German military law
adjournment of service can only last three
years.

2d. That the figures on which I rely are
really taken from LoeheWs Jahresberichte, which
is held to be the most authoritative German
publication.

If, therefore, Germany had declared war in
1910, without counting young men who had
presented themselves in advance, or those she

PANGERMANY'S MILITARY STRENGTH 117

8 fiTAT MILITAIRE DE TOXJTES LES NATIONS

t6s physiques ou morales ; mais les jeunes gens qui
ont cherche a se soustraire a robligatiou du service
par mutilation ou autrement sont vers6s dans les
sections de travailleurs,

(Pour le m6canisme et le fonctionnement du service
de RECRDTEMJENT cu Allcmagne, se reporter d ce mot
dans le corps du Biciionnaire.)

Voici, maintenant, un aperQu des r6sultats du re-
crutement pour Fannie 1910, extraits des LcebeWs
Jahresherichte (pour 1911 : publics an printemps
1912), en rappelant que ces operations embrassent
non seulement les hommes dei la classe incorporable,
tnais encore les nombreux ajourn^s des classes pr6-
c^dentes :

Jeunes gens ayani pris part'^aux operations
du recrutement. .....■.......*«.. 1.245.363

donl:

BxcIms CUnwurdige). ...,». 890

R6form6s (Untaugliche) , ,.. *. , . 34,067

Ajouraes , . . . .• 715.952

Aydflt devancd I'appol. . . . . , 39.960

l)^Clax6sbonSr . . -. . . * .-. . 454.484

could make up out of her reforme list, she
could have utilized in the various branches of
her mobilized army:

1st. Men fit for service 454,484 men

2d. One-third of 715,952. This figure, accord-
ing to German law, can only include
3 classes of adjourned, equal, therefore,
to 238,650 men

Total 693,134 men

If, in 1910, Germany, which then had but
65 millions of inhabitants, could raise a war
contingent of about 693,000 men, how can it

lis AN ENDURING VICTORY

be believed that in 1918, when Germany, from
the recruiting standpoint, has 70 millions of in-
habitants, and forms her classes not at 20 but
at 17 years of age — that is, without having to
take account of the deaths between 17 and 19
inclusive — should have a class of only 400,000
men, that is, about 293,000 less than the war
class of 1910 ? It is impossible that this should
be true.

A serious mistake has therefore been made.
It is hard to explain logically, because, as we
have just seen, the figures which prove it were
published in France, even before the war. The
only explanation of this extraordinary miscon-
ception is that it is of the same nature as those
held by the Entente regarding many other
problems — the Bulgar question, the question
about the King of Greece, the question of Aus-
tria-Hungary, the Bolshevists — all questions on
which for a long time the Allies were misled by
superficial preconceived ideas, lacking proof,
and which events have demonstrated to be as
contrary to facts as to the interests of the
Entente. The problem now is to discuss thor-
oughly the extent of the error committed, and
in what it consists.

PANGERMANY'S MILITARY STRENGTH 119

2d. Objections and Replies.

1st Objection, — ^The man-power of Germany
(70 millions of inhabitants) cannot be greater
than that of the Allies put together (France 40
millions, England 46, Italy 36, United States
100), etc.

Answer, — Certainly this is true, but we must
compare, not the man-power of the Allies only
as against that of Germany, but the number
of Allied soldiers able to serve in Europe, op-
posed to the man-power of all the Central
Powers, as, since the war, they form a group of
forces directed by Berlin, to the advantage of
Germany, who without them must have yielded
long ago. By this comparison alone can be
discerned which are the weak points of the
effectives of Germany's allies, on which the
Entente should consequently bring pressure to
bear. The great successes achieved since the
Entente finally decided to attack Bulgaria, show
the absolute necessity of this method of pro-
cedure.

M Objection,— The figures of 13,600,000 men,
which we found to represent the number of the
entire mobilized German army, and that of

120 AN ENDURING VICTORY

700,000 for the German contingent, are so
much larger than those generally accepted
that they cannot be correct.

Answer. — It is unfortunate not only regard-
ing the German effectives that considerable
errors, reaching 50 per cent, have been made
by the Entente on questions nevertheless of
capital importance for the winning of the war.
For instance, when the war began the opinion
prevailed in dominant circles of western Europe
that Germany had only 50 army corps. Now
it is a fact that she began the fight with 100,
that is with 50 more, the existence of which was
not even suspected. This was clearly recog-
nized, particularly in several articles which
appeared in France about two years ago, there-
fore authorized by the censors. The error,
very serious at that time, was in this case of
50 per cent. Granting the above, it is not im-
possible, a priori, that, instead of estimating
the annual German contingent at about 700,-
000 men, it should have been wrongly placed
at only 400,000.

3d Objection. — It is improbable, a priori,
that Germany's man-power should be esti-
mated at 13,600,000 fighting men.

Answer. — It is absolutely necessary to come

PANGERMANY'S MILITARY STRENGTH 121

to an understanding as to the meaning one
should give to the expression man-power, for it
seems to be imperfectly understood in the
Entente.

Many of the Allies, in fact, imagine that the
man-power of a country consists alone in its
ability to place so many combatants on the
firing-line. This idea of man-power is incom-
plete and gives rise to serious mistakes. An
army is not made up of fighting men only. At
the present day, the mobilized army of a state
comprises innumerable departments; the fight-
ing units, services immediately behind the
front, home services, war factories, working of
mines necessary to the war, sometimes even
agricultural production, and numbers of bu-
reaus. Now, all these services, being indis-
pensable to the working of the army, in
consequence are equally necessary to victory.
Soldiers fighting at the front are therefore only
a part of the man-power required, and their
number is itself the reflex and the result of
the strength of the organizations of non-
combatants in the rear.

If, further, we should attempt to estimate
Germany's man-power by counting simply the
number of fighting men, we should find our-
selves certainly mistaken. On the one hand.

122 AN ENDURING VICTORY

the Allies' information services had to be made
out of the whole cloth since the war, and have
therefore inevitable defects; and on the other,
the Germans are past masters in the art of
dissimulation. The result is that all the iden-
tifications that the Allies can make of German
divisions fighting on the diflPerent fronts, only
reach an approximation, and leave unreckoned
elements of the enemy's strength, which it is
indispensable to take into account.

For all these reasons, the man-power of a
nation is represented by the whole number of
men it is able to mobilize, no matter to what
service these men are attached. I have taken
great care to specify (see page 107) that the
figure of 13,600,000 included, of course, the
fighting men on the various fronts and those
in the innumerable service departments of all
kinds of the German army.

iih Objection. — Ought not the number of
13,600,000 to be reduced by 15 to 20 per cent
to allow for these reformes?

Answer. — In Germany the number of these
reformes must be much less than the above
percentage. The war has been so premedi-
tated and the study of military things by the
General Staflf has gone on for such a length of

PANGERMANY'S MILITARY STRENGTH 123

time that it is only natural that of all the bel-
ligerents Germany should know how to get
the best results out of the men who come up
for mobilization. The system by which mo-
bilized men are utilized in Germany is quite
unlike that which obtained in France, for in-
stance, at least during the two first years of
the war.

In France, through a false notion of equality
and of the modern needs of war, in the begin-
ning, they tried to act on the principle that
each mobilized man should be exposed to the
same danger, no matter what might be his par-
ticular aptitudes. Intellectual power of the
first rank which could have done much toward
a speedy victory, was sacrificed to this idea,
to the great detriment of the common cause.
Thus, for example, Jean Gravier, who was
probably the Frenchman who knew most about
Serbia, because he had long made a special
study of the country on the spot, was recalled
to France by the mobilization, and killed as a
sergeant before Souchez, when he might have
rendered invaluable services in the Balkans.
The forces thus uselessly sacrificed have been
very great, and it was only toward the third
year of the war that France began to remedy
this fatal error.

124 AN ENDURING VICTORY

If Jean Gravier had been a German he
would have been assigned as technical adviser
to the Staff charged to prepare for the inva-
sion of Serbia, because in Germany, from the
outbreak of hostilities, the utilization of mobil-
ized men has been arranged on the principle
that each man should be employed, not neces-
sarily where there are the most risks to be
run, but where his personal aptitudes would
allow him to render the best service with a
view to victory.

The application of this principle explains
why mobilized Germans, 30 years old, strong
and well, have been kept away from the
firing-line and attached at home or abroad to
propaganda service, from which the Berlin
government has derived so much advantage.
Striking examples are the cases of Von Papen
and Boy-Ed, who were the German officers
retained as long as possible in the United
States because Berlin considered that they
were much more useful to the German cause
in this way than if they had been killed on the
western front.

This principle carried out explains why the
Germans make reformes of a relatively small
number of men among those subject to mobil-
ization. It is, in fact, clear that, with the

PANGERMANY'S MILITARY STRENGTH 125

exception of those seriously ill, any man merely
weak or delicate who is employed in civil life
can be used in some sedentary service in one
of the innumerable departments of the Ger-
man army. The number of those reformes
varies according to age, as is shown by the
following table drawn up according to the
official figures of German mortality for 1901
(see page 134).

Out of 100

Number of

Out of 100

Number of

Germans of

Deaths

Germans of

Deaths

1 year

20.23

24 years

0.50

2 years

3.98

0.50

1.49

0.51

0.94

0.52

0.69

0.52

0.53

0.42

0.54

((

0.35

0.55

0.30

0.57

0.26

0.59

0.24

0.62

0.22

0.66

0.21

0.70

0.21

0.74

0.23

0.78

0.27

0.83

0.32

0.88

0.38

0.91

0.43

0.99

0.48

1.05

0.50

1.11

0.50

1.17

0.50

126 AN ENDURING VICTORY

This table is very interesting because it
shows :

1st. That the mortahty is enormous the
first year, and great for the second and third
years.

2d. That at 45 it is 1.17 per cent.

3d. That at 16 it is only 0.27 per cent.

It is therefore evident that those reformes
among men of 45, already worn, and suffering
from serious complaints, are much more nu-
merous than the reformes among young men,
of just 17, who are full of life.

Applying the principles which govern the
German mobilization, which start from the
theory that every man is of some use, except
those seriously ill, we can understand how it
happens that those reformes are relatively
few, even among men of 45, and fewer still
among the youths of 17, who in time of war
constitute each annual German contingent.

To make this plainer still, let us take, for
example, 100,000 young Germans 17 years old
who have come before the examining board to
form the class of 1920. The reason why so
few among these youths are reformes is that,
according to the above figures (see page 125),
from 16 to 17 the death-rate is only 0.27 per
cent; that is, that among 400 young Germans

PANGERMANY'S MILITARY STRENGTH 127

of this age only about one dies, because at 16
or 17 the serious maladies which attack men of
more advanced years naturally do not exist.
On the other hand, a sufficiently large number
of boys of 17 are not yet strong enough physi-
cally to make good fighting men, but even
these are quite able to fill useful places in some
of the numerous branches of the army services,
work which would not be too exacting for boys
of that age. In this way, we see how those
reformes among the youths of 17 who make
up the war contingent should not exceed 5
per cent at the most. Allowing this to be
the probable figure, we will understand how
the Germans make use of the 95,000 boys of
17 remaining from the 100,000 whom we have
supposed as coming before the Kaiser's board
of examination.

Out of these 95,000 probably 70,000 are
strong enough to be sent at once to instruction-
camps and to the front in six months. The
remaining 25,000 fall into two categories: The
first is composed of specialists, workmen:
miners, mechanics, electricians, tailors, etc.
The second is formed of young men who need
to be built up for some months, or perhaps a
year, before they can be made fighting men.

The specialized workmen of 17 are sent to

128 AN ENDURING VICTORY

different departments or to the workrooms of
their trades, where they take the places of older
men who go to the front. As for those who
need strengthening, they are either sent to
camps for physical training or divided among
the different offices where there is sedentary
work, and where they relieve young men of
the preceding year who are now strong enough
to join the fighting force, or older men no
longer necessary behind the lines, who are
sent forward. The result of this system is
that if the 95,000 German soldiers at 17 esti-
mated in our hypothesis do not at once enter
the fighting ranks, their numbers make it pos-
sible to form a rotation from one year to the
next by means of which men able to fight can
be taken out of the various services. In this
way, the military authorities can send to the
front a number of fighting men virtually equal
to that of the annual contingent, which thus
acts as a sort of reservoir, supplying the differ-
ent branches of the German army, which draws
upon it as much as possible, allowing for the
small number reformes.

5th Objection, — If there had been no war the
effect of natural causes would have diminished
the number of men from 17 to 45 years old.

PANGERMANY'S MILITARY STRENGTH 129

We should therefore take into account this
cause of diminution of the German army,
which must have considerably lowered its
numbers during the last four years.

Answer, — Of course deaths from natural
causes, as in time of peace, would occur among
men mobilized from 17 to 45, but practically
the effects of this cause of diminution of the
German army are confounded with losses pro-
duced by the war. If a mobilized German
dies of bronchitis, of pleurisy, or of heart-dis-
ease, he might certainly have succumbed from
such causes without the war, but they might
equally have resulted from it. In any case,
nothing is known about it, and nothing can be
found out, because every mobilized soldier in
the German army, if he falls ill, is sent to a
military hospital. If he dies, from no matter
what cause, his death is included among the
war losses reckoned above, as we have seen,
including a constant figure of 500,000 men in
hospital (see page 108).

6th Objection, — If the German army in-
creased by about 700,000 men each year, we
must reckon also an annual loss of men re-
leased from military service, on reaching the
age of 45 inclusive.

130 AN ENDURING VICTORY

Answer, — ^This would be true in peace-time,
but not in war. In France military service is
obligatory up to the end of the 48th year, but
now mobilized men have been kept with the
colors beyond this age; this is why France has
had soldiers more than 50 years old who have
gone back only recently to civil life. In Ger-
many, also, men have been kept in the service
at more than 45 years of age, and therefore
this cause for the diminution of the German
army, in which many Allies believe, does not
really exist.

7th Objection. — Is not the estimate of 13,600,-
000 men, based on 20 per cent of the popula-
tion, too high a figure.?

Answer, — 1st. There is nothing extraordi-
nary in the mobilization figure of 20 per cent
of the German population. Even little Serbia
with her rudimentary organization mobilized
at 14 per cent of her inhabitants in 1912-13.
The Germans' theory of mobilization enables
them to get the best possible results from their
resources in man-power, their powers of organ-
ization are not to be doubted, and therefore we
ought not to be surprised that they can mobilize
at 20 per cent of their people, dividing the men
among the many branches of their service.

PANGERMANY'S MILITARY STRENGTH 131

2d. This figure only gives a difference of
about 600,000 men, against that stated by
General de Lacroix in an article published in
the Paris Temps nearly two years ago, in which
he studies the numbers yielded by the Ger-
man mobilization. Thus, the amount of
13 millions has been fixed by the ex-generalis-
simo of the French armies, after proper de-
ductions for reformes.

3d. This sum of 13 millions, fixed by Gen-
eral de Lacroix, is drawn from the year 1914,
when the population of Germany was only
68 millions, but in 1918, from the recruiting
point of view, she had 70 million inhabitants.

4th. As we know, men at the close of their
45th year are theoretically free from all mili-
tary obligations, but they have been kept with
the colors during the war, and thus the Ger-
man army has increased beyond the limits
which were at first set.

5th. The statistics of the German Empire
only give the number of German subjects pres-
ent in Germany, and the German effectives
are generally calculated with this number only
in view, forgetting that there are, besides, many
Germans scattered all over the world who are
subjects of the empire, and therefore those
from 17 to the end of the 45th year owe mili-

132 AN ENDURING VICTORY

tary service to Germany. Owing to the Allied
blockade, it is true that nearly all Germans
of this category living in America, Africa, or
Asia have not been able to reach Germany to
perform their military duty, but, per contra,
some German subjects living abroad have cer-
tainly obeyed the order of mobilization since
the beginning of hostilities. These Germans
are those domiciled either in countries allied
to Germany — Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and
Turkey — or in countries occupied by German
troops, such as Serbia, Roumania, Belgium, and
Russia. There are besides those in states in
direct geographic contact with Germany, like
Switzerland, Holland, Denmark, Sweden, and
Norway, or in European countries which were
for a time neutral, like Italy and Spain.

The statistics of the Alldeutscher Atlas, by
Paul Langhans, published in 1900 at Gotha,
by Justus Perthes, enable us to calculate the
number of Germans living abroad under con-
ditions which would certainly have allowed
them to join the German army.

German subjects of the empire resident in —

Austria 103,433

Hungary 6,597

Switzerland 112,342

Luxemburg 10,712

Belgium 47,338

PANGERMANY'S MILITARY STRENGTH 133

HoUand 28,767

Denmark 31,107

Sweden 4,066

Norway 1,471

Russia 60,000

Italy 25,000

Spain 1326

Total 432,659

In round numbers 432,000

These figures, however, date from a period
reaching from 1888 to 1898, on the average
from 1893. From this date till 1918, that is,
for 25 years, this total should be augmented
in proportion to the mean annual increase of
the German population.

In 1910, according to the figures of the
Almanack de Gotha above cited (page 103),
Germany had exactly 64,925,993 inhabitants,
and at this date her population increased by
636,335 = 9.8 per 1,000 inhabitants. There-
fore during 25 years — without even counting
the progressive increase, which gives higher
figures — the augmentation per 1,000 is 245;
say, for 432,000 it would be 105,840, which,
added to 432,000 in 1893, proves that in 1918
there were about 537,840 Germans— 538,000
in round numbers — in foreign countries who
could have joined the German army.

On the other hand, the proportion of males
from 17 to 45 is at least 21 per cent of a whole

134 AN ENDURING VICTORY

population; consequently, the 538,000 Germans
living in neighboring states must have furnished
to the German army 112,980 men — about
113,000 in round numbers.

To sum up, the foregoing five reasons justify
amply the number of 600,000 in excess of 13
million men at which General de Lacroix esti-
mated the yield of the German mobilization.

8ih Objection, — ^The number of births in
Germany in 1901 was £,032,000 — that is, about
1 million of males. The Carlisle insurance
tables state that in 20 years there will remain
only 600,000 men out of this million. If those
in the reformes class are deducted from this
figure, it is therefore impossible that the Ger-
man moyen (average) war contingent could
have reached 700,000 men.

Answer. — ^This objection appears very strong,
but in reality it only shows, on the part of
those who make it, a complete misunderstand-
ing of the nature of an insurance company,
and of the conditions under which should be
accepted the mortality of a country in esti-
mating its man-power.

The Carlisle insurance computations show
that in 1,000,000 of men only 600,000 sub-

PANGERMANY'S MILITARY STRENGTH 135

sisted at the age of 20; this would seem to
mean that the death-rate for the first 20 years
is 40 per cent, but this is a much higher figure
than that of the German death-rate at the age
of 20, as we shall prove by a German authority
of the most conclusive kind, quoted later.

We must be careful also to note that we
cannot trust to tables of mortality drawn up
for insurance to discuss questions of man-
power, and for the following reason : To avoid
risks to which they are exposed, insurance
companies, in making their tables, take ac-
count of special considerations which have
nothing at all to do with fitness for military
service. To know how many youths of a
generation can pass a physical examination,
the only tables we need to consult are those
of the general mortality of the country whose
contingent is in question.

According to the French annual statistics
for 1913 (2d part, page 168) there were in
Germany, in 1901, 2,032,000 births— the fe-
males slightly more numerous than the males —
therefore, in round numbers, 1,000,000 boys.

On the other hand, the general mortality in
Germany from 1901 to 1910 for the male sex
is shown by official figures on page 34 of the
Statistisches Jahrbuch filr das Deutsche Reich,

136 AN ENDURING VICTORY

published by Putkammer & Muhlbrecht, Ber-
lin, 1915.

Of 100,000 births—

At 1 year there are 79,766 survivors and 20,234 deaths

" 76,585
" 75,442
" 74,727
" 74,211
" 73,820
" 73,506
" 73,244
" 73,023
" 72,827
" 72,650
" 72,487
" 72,334
" 72,179
" 72,007

At the end of the —

years

3,181

1,143

715

516

391

314

262

221

196

177

163

153

155

172

16th year there are 71,808 survivors and 199 deaths

17th " " " 71,573 " " 235 "

18th " " " 71,300 " " 273 "

19th " " " 70,989 " " 311 "

As this oflBcial German report gives in the
two first columns of the table ages and sur-
vivors, it is easy to deduce the number of
deaths at each age, according to government
figures.

PANGERMANY'S MILITARY STRENGTH 137

Out of 100 boys born in Germany, at 19
years of age there were —

29.011 per cent deaths
Leaving 70.989 " *' survivors

To be exact, 100.000 per cent

But to make a calculation with an immediate
practical interest we should finally consider
the death-rate at the end of the 16th year, as
it is from boys of just 17 years of age that the
annual German class is formed in war-time.
Thus at the end of the 16th year out of 100
boys born in Germany there are —

28.192 per cent deaths
71.808 " " survivors

Which gives just 100.000 per cent

These figures are the best procurable on
German mortality.

Let us first examine the result with reference
to the number of 754,000 men, which we found
to be (see page 105) that of the theoretic mili-
tary contingent of Germany in 1918. We
assume that this class was composed of young
men of 20, because according to the figures of
the German report on which we based our cal-

138 AN ENDURING VICTORY

culations, the class of 1910 was formed in a
period of peace from young men of 20, and
besides included all young Germans living
abroad who in that year were theoretically
able to return to Germany. Now, in 1901
there were in Germany about 1,000,000 male
births. The mortality at the completion of
the 19th year was 29.011 per cent; therefore,
out of this total 290,011 died, and 709,989
survived. To this we should add the number
of young Germans, sons of German subjects
of the empire living in foreign European coun-
tries (see page 133).

This figure can be verified with sufiicient
accuracy. If the German war contingent was
700,000 in 1910 — a round number which we
reached (see page 103) through German reports
when Germany had only 65 million inhabi-
tants, it follows that 1,000 Germans yield
about 10.76 men to the annual draft. On
this basis the 113,000 Germans abroad, whose
children are so situated geographically that
they are able to feed the German army (see
page 134), furnish to the annual contingent
1,215 men.

We know, therefore, that in 1918 the Ger-
man examining boards had before them 709,989
+ 1,215 = 711,204 young Germans about 19

PANGERMANY'S MILITARY STRENGTH 139

years old. From this we should deduct 5 per
cent for those reformes who for reasons above
indicated (page 127) probably do not exceed
that rate. We must then deduct for those re-
formes 35,560 men, leaving certainly about
675,644— in round numbers, 676,000— boys 20
years old absolutely fit to make up Germany's
war contingent for 1918. We reached (see
page 105) the number of 754,000, which gives
a diflference of 78,000 men, but this difference
can be to a great extent logically explained.

We see by the Alldeutscher Atlas that in 1893
there were of German subjects of the empire:

In America 2,842,744

" Asia 2,366

" Africa 3,877

" Australia 43,861

Total 2,892,848

Out of this number, since 1895, a part of
these German subjects have become natural-
ized citizens of the countries where they live.
It is difficult to arrive at the exact number, but
allowing that it amounts to about a third, say,
964,282 of our total, there remain 1,928,566.
From 1893 to 1918, that is, for 25 years, this
last figure has been augmented in proportion
to the average increase in the German popu-

140 AN ENDURING VICTORY

lation, which is annually 9.8 per 1,000 = say,
18,894 per year, and therefore for 25 years
472,350; consequently, our total in 1893 of
1,928,566, in 1918 becomes 2,400,000 in round
numbers.

In addition, as we have shown (page 104),
that 1,000 Germans furnish about 10.76 men
to the annual German contingent, it follows
that the 2,400,000 German subjects in Amer-
ica, Asia, Africa, and Australia could have
yielded an annual contingent to the empire
amounting to 25,824 men, or 26,000 in round
numbers — if their children of military age
could have reached Germany. We noted
(page 102) that deferred service is permitted
in Germany in favor of young Germans liv-
ing abroad. It is nearly certain, therefore,
that these 26,000 German youths, outside of
Europe, must have been included in the fig-
ure of 238,650 men for deferred service of the
year 1910 (see page 103) and consequently
form part of our total of 754,000 which we
reached for the contingent of 1918, starting
from the figures of Germany's annual report
for 1910.

We should then subtract these 26,000 young
Germans living in America, Asia, Africa, and
Australia from the number of 754,000 men,

PANGERMANY'S MILITARY STRENGTH 141

as, the communication by sea with Germany
being cut, they have certainly not been able
to reach that country and contribute to the
contingent of 1918. This figure 26,000 reduces
by just so much the difference of 78,000 that
we found between the number of 754,000 men
and the estimate of 676,000 we made by means
of the tables of mortality. This difference,
therefore, is not more than 78,000 minus
26,000, or 52,000 men, which one must admit
is a discrepancy, or a mistake if you choose
to call it so, which is very slight for a figure
like 754,000 and a calculation of this sort.

We must furthermore bear in mind that in
reality if all the Germans overseas had been
able to defer their mobilization orders this dif-
ference would probably even then be less than
52,000 men. As a matter of fact, I have esti-
mated at one-third the Germans, subjects of
the Empire in foreign countries, who within
twenty-five years have been naturalized in
their foreign residence without reckoning on
the fact that according to Delbruck's law
naturalized Germans can secretly preserve or
resume their condition as subjects of the Ger-
man Empire and as such become subject to
German military service.

142 AN ENDURING VICTORY

Let us again make use of the mortality tables
to analyze, no longer in theory, but in practice,
the military contingent of Germany in 1918,
remembering that now it is made up of youths,
not of 20 years of age, as in peace-times, but
of boys completing their 16th year — that is,
just 17.

The German death-rate being 28.192 per
cent at the end of the 16th year, out of 1,000,000
boys born in 1901, 281,920 die at 17. The
number of survivors in 1918 is, therefore,
718,080, and to this we must add 1,200 young
Germans contributing to the annual contin-
gent as subjects of the empire living in foreign
European countries (see page 138).

718,080 + 1,200 make 719,280—720,000 in
round numbers, who come up before the Ger-
man examining boards in 1918. Deducting 5
per cent, say, 36,000, for those reformeSy there
remain in 1918 720,000 - 36,000 = 684,000
young Germans who are certainly capable of
service in the various branches of the German
army. This is within 16,000 of the figure of
700,000, which was our estimate for the Ger-
man contingent, in round numbers. This dif-
ference is relatively insignificant, therefore a
thorough scrutiny shows that my figures of
13,600,000 men for the entire mobilized Ger-

PANGERMANY'S MILITARY STRENGTH 143

man army in June, 1918, and 700,000 in round
numbers for the annual contingent of the
same year, are by no means an exaggeration,
but as close as possible to the truth.

One error alone in the preceding calculations
consists in the estimation of the sum of the
four military contingents of 1915-18 at 2,900,-
000 men (see page 109), while at the least in
round numbers they come to 700,000, say,
2,800,000, for the four contingents.

The only effect of this mistake on the num-
ber of absolute losses of Germany, which we
calculated in June, 1918, is tjiat instead of
having been for each of the four years of war
at least 600,000 men annually, they have been
625,000.

But in the general discussion of German
man-power it is well to keep this mistake in
mind. No war can be managed without mis-
takes, and these are of two kinds, the helpful
and the injurious. In order to be sure that we
are not deceived in war-time, we must sys-
tematically try to make only helpful mistakes,
that is, those which tend to overestimate the
enemies' forces, and in this way we are led to
make the most strenuous efforts, which lead
to a more speedy victory. Therefore, if the
minutest calculations show that 100,000 men

144 AN ENDURING VICTORY

are necessary for an operation, it is best to
allow for it 125,000, so as to get the advantage
of the helpful mistake. That is why in discus-
sing the German reserves it is more to the
interest of the Entente to err on the side of
estimating the German losses at 600,000 men
a year, than to believe that they were 625,000.
In a case like this the error is advantageous
to the Allies, while a miscalculation in the
opposite direction might lead to the worst
consequences.

In conclusion, practical proofs can be added
to the results of our calculations to make it
certain that Germany is not yet in so much
need of men as too many among the Allies
believe.

The Temps of August 7th, 1916, quotes the
following intercepted letter from a man in the
76th Landwehr, dated June 16th: "I am still
at Kief," he says; "the people are so hostile
to us that they would make an end of us if
they could, but there are too many German
and Austrian troops here, so they can do
nothing. There are police posts everywhere."

We see by this letter that there were still
many Germans in Russia, and in addition Le
Journal de Geneve — quoted by the Temps on
August 30th, 1918 — summed up various state-

PANGERMANY'S MILITARY STRENGTH 145

ments made by travellers who had recently
made some stay in Germany, as follows:

"Militarily Germany seems to us still very
strong, and in no need of men. Even after the
great Allied offensives, the large cities are full
of men on leave."

Would not this lead any fair-minded, unprej-
udiced person to see that mistakes existed
and are still made among the Allies as to the
numbers of the forces of Germany, and that it
is to the great advantage of the Entente, in
order to avert any surprise and win the war
with speed and certainty, that these mistakes
should be corrected ?

In any case, these different statements lead
to the following practical results:

1st. It was unreasonable, therefore ex-
tremely dangerous, for the Allies to believe that
they could win the war only through the ex-
haustion of the German reserves, reduced by
battles on the western front, a theory of Colonel
Repington's which was shared by many Allies,
who still hold this opinion. This way of think-
ing does not make success impossible, but it
tends to prolong the war enormously, as has
actually happened, for if Repington had been
right the war would have been over long since.

146 AN ENDURING VICTORY

2d. The Allies must be convinced that mili-
tary action should not be limited to the west
front, but that the value of the other war-fields,
those of Italy and Salonika, should also be
thoroughly understood. The far-reaching suc-
cessful effects of the rapid advance of the Allied
army in Serbia, though obtained with rela-
tively small forces, are a striking proof of this.

3d. The Allies must be persuaded that, to
bring victory quickly and with lighter burdens
in men and money, it is absolutely necessary
to have recourse not only to military strategy,
but also to political strategy, which enables
them to act even within the boundaries of Pan-
germany in order for the common good to
work upon the numerous weaknesses there to
be found. That this view is correct is proved
by the insurrection which has already taken
place in Bohemia and is extending in all the
Slav and Latin regions of Austria-Hungary,
greatly facilitating the penetration of Allied
troops into Central Europe.

IV.

In order that Allied public opinion may
appreciate the immense importance of the
complete success of the Entente operations in

PANGERMANY'S MILITARY STRENGTH 147

the Balkans in October, 1918, and may grasp
the absolute necessity of using this situation
to the fullest extent without delay — a course
calculated to hasten in a considerable degree
the complete defeat of Germany — it is neces-
sary to call to mind again what were approxi-
mately the probable mobilized forces of Pan-
germany at the beginning of August, 1918,
the opening of the fifth year of war.

Germany alone could not make head against
the Entente. She has only done so by the
help of Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Tur-
key, whose armies were controlled from Berlin.
The troops of these powers held central Europe,
the Balkans, and southern Russia, thus assur-
ing to Germany the food and material neces-
sary to her war industries, and leaving her
free to concentrate all her energies on the
western front. To know nearly what total
forces were probably at the disposal of the
German General Staff, we must now scrutinize
the strength of Pangermany, that is, the Ger-
man Empire and its allies.

We have seen (page 109) that after four
years of war the actual forces of Germany,
mobilized on the basis of 20 per cent of the
inhabitants, amounted to 11 millions of men.

148 AN ENDURING VICTORY

This is in round numbers, deduction being
made of actual definitive losses up to June
1st, 1918. We come to the conclusion (page
111) that these German war losses — taking
into computation the annual number of re-
cruits — amounted in four years to 2,400,000
men. This represents a diminution of 176 in
1,000 in proportion to the figure for the gen-
eral mobilization of Germany, which we placed
at 13,600,000 men. This valuation will bring
us probably close to the truth, if used as a
basis from which to estimate the military con-
dition of Germany and her allies before the
catastrophe of Bulgaria.

In 1914, the population of Austria-Hungary
was about 50 millions, exclusive of foreigners,
Bulgaria had 5 millions, and Turkey 20; but
the Ottoman mobilization was not extended
to Arabia, for the most part in rebellion,
and the presence of British troops in Bagdad
and Jerusalem hampers the action of the Con-
stantinople authorities; also great numbers of
Greeks and Armenians massacred by the Turks
obviously could not be included in the figures
of the Ottoman mobilization. For these
reasons, and to keep well within the mark,
we will place the mobilization list in Turkey
at half the population, about 10 million men.

PANGERMANY'S MILITARY STRENGTH 149

It is certain that Germany made as great
demands on the man-power of her alHes as
those she accepted for herseK. It is, there-
fore, reasonable to assume that the basis of
mobihzation in Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria,
and Turkey was the same as in Germany, viz. :
20 in 100 inhabitants, hence —

Austria-Hungary would have mobilized 10 million men.
Bulgaria would have mobilized 1 million men.

Turkey would have mobilized 2 million men.

For these three countries the losses from
the war must have been approximately those of
Germany herself. Keeping the true propor-
tion in mind, the Bulgars, up to August, 1918,
were in much the same military condition; the
Austrians have not fought so many battles, but
they have lost many more prisoners, for the
Czechs and the Jugo-Slavs pressed into the
Austrian armies gave themselves up by hun-
dreds of thousands to the Russians and Ser-
bians. Comparing the Turks with the Ger-
mans, fewer have been killed, but their inferior
sanitary organization had led to a high death-
rate from disease, which equalized the losses.

For these different reasons the number of
mobilized effectives of Germany's aUies can
be reduced in the proportion of 176 to 1,000,

150 AN ENDURING VICTORY

which represents the really definitive losses of
the German army at the end of the fourth
year.

Austria-Hungary... 10,000,000 - 1,760,000 = 8,240,000 men.

Bulgaria 1,000,000 - 176,000 = 824,000 men.

Turkey 2,000,000 - 352,000 = 1,648,000 men.

Total 10,712,000 men.

This gives the probable number of mobilized
men at the disposal of Germany's allies, Au-
gust 1st, 1918, including not only fighting
men, but also those attached to all other
branches of the war service, direct or indirect.
We may allow that these together amount to
11 millions, which added to 11 millions already
attributed to Germany gives a total of 22
millions of men marching under the orders of
Berlin. We shall see later on that these 11
millions furnished by Germany's friends were
not entirely a source of strength to the staff
at Berlin, but through thein. Pangermany was
vulnerable in many ways, from the beginning
of the war indeed, if the Entente knew how to
act so as to take advantage of it.

The summary of the new sources of effec-
tives on which Germany could freely draw, if
the Bulgarian collapse had not taken place

PANGERMANY^S MILITARY STRENGTH 151

goes to show (1) how the AlHed successes in
the Balkans, by bringing about the impotence
of Turkey, made it impossible for Germany
from that time on to deal successfully with
the sources of Mussulman eflPectives; (2) the
absolute necessity that the Allies should bring
about such a peace that it should be entirely
impossible for Germany to deal with the Rus-
sian masses, sources of considerable numbers
of effectives, which are still in a great degree
subject to the influence of German recruiting
agents.

The ever-increasing number of Americans
landing in France has forced the Teutons to
modify their plans. We see that they have
been forced to abandon the hope of a rapid
advance on Paris and the Channel coasts,
and thence have been driven to take up the
defensive tactics on the western front, which
has become a much more emphatic retreat
since the Bulgarian disaster has begun to make
its favorable results felt. But if this event
had not taken place Berlin, fertile in re-
sources, would have looked to the east for
means to parry the blow dealt by the United
States. What these means were we may pos-
sibly discover.

152 AN ENDURING VICTORY

Among the many consequences of the mili-
tary disintegration of Russia is the fact that
Germany has been brought into direct contact
with new recruiting-grounds in Europe and
Asia, from which she would have drawn as
largely and quickly as possible, hence the Allies
would have had to face a new and great danger.

Let us first inquire who are the people from
among whom Germany could have recruited
her armies, directly or through the help of Tur-
key, if Central Pangermany had continued to
exist in its entirety. (See map, p. 154.)

In the Christian population of Russia men
or allies would be most readily drawn from —

1. Germans, Russian subjects: about 2,400,000

2. Finns, about 3,100,000

3. Ukrainians, about 30,000,000

Total 35,500,000

Among the Moslem populations in the Eu-
ropean and Asiatic provinces of Russia an
intense Turkish propaganda was going on,
nominally based on the idea of the solidarity
of the Turanian race, but really emanating
from Berlin by way of Constantinople; there-
fore Germany could have drawn men from —

1. The Tartars, about 5,000,000

2. The Caucasians, about 1,600,000

3. The Bashkirs, about 1,800,000

PANGERMANY'S MILITARY STRENGTH 153

4. The Kirghiz, about 6,000,000

5. The Turkomans, about 400,000

6. Turks and other Moslem peoples 3,000,000

Total 17,800,000

In Asia, beyond the Russian frontier, Ger-
many could have secured help from —

1. Persian Mussulmans, about 9,000,000

2. Afghan Mussulmans, about 5,000,000

3. Northern Indian Mussulmans, about. . 66,000,000

4. Chinese Mussulmans, about 30,000,000

Total 110,000,000

There may be, then, 35 + 18 + 110, say 163 mil-
lions of men, in round numbers, among whom —
owing to the suppression of the Russian front
— Germany could have found means of various
kinds to assist her in carrying on the war.

The Germans certainly could not have hoped
to draw effectives from such populations in
proportion to their size; also the military
qualities of these people vary considerably,
and the use that could be made of soldiers
thus recruited would depend much on geo-
graphical situation.

For instance, Persians as a rule do not make
good soldiers, but in Aserbedjan there are
about 400,000 men from whom might be formed
a first-rate army. Afghans are all warlike,
and German influence was so strong among

154

AN ENDURING VICTORY

PANGERMANY'S MILITARY STRENGTH 155

them that the Emir recently sent an ambassa-
dor to Berlin, in sign of friendship. In north-
ern India the Moslems have hitherto been
loyal to England, but the Pan-Islam agitation
as well as the attitude of their Afghan neigh-
bors might have inclined them in a German
direction; also German influence has been at
work for years among the 30 millions of Chi-
nese Mussulmans, with the view of counter-
balancing the part of China which leans
toward the Entente. In central Asia there
are the Bashkirs, Turkomans, Kirghiz, and
Tartars, who could furnish excellent troops,
well-placed geographically to act against the
Trans-Siberian (see map), as their provinces
border on it for nearly its whole length.

For its operations in Europe the Berlin
General Staff could have found soldiers:

1st. Among the 30 millions of Ukrainians —
this was already begun — and a good many
Ukrainian officers are still being instructed in
Germany.

2d. Among the 3 millions of Finns, the ma-
jority of whom are strongly Germanophile, and
above all among the 23^ millions of Germans,
subjects of the former Russian Empire, but as
Pangermanist as the Germans of Berlin them-
selves.

156 AN ENDURING VICTORY

We thus see how the Bolshevist treachery
had opened fresh sources of supphes for Prus-
sian armies, and these recruits would have
helped Germany to consolidate her new pos-
sessions in eastern Europe and Asia. As we
have stated above, Germany's annual loss in
men — ^in proportion to her first mobilization —
was about 600,000, and if she could have
drawn on all the sources of effectives pointed
out above she could have made up her losses
at least in part, thus resolving the problem of
eflfectives once more in her own favor and
finding a way to offset the American forces.
But the strategic success of the Allies in the
Balkans by the taking of Nish and of the
Danube put it almost entirely out of the power
of Turkey to be a dangerous source of new
Mussulman effectives. It only remains to cut
oflF Germany from Russia by creating a Po-
land and a Bohemia so strongly organized
that in the future Germany can no longer
have any dealings with Russian troops.

VI.

Let us now point out how the Allied victory
in the Balkans, if we know how to develop it
quickly in the direction of Vienna-Prague-Ber-

PANGERMANY'S MILITARY STRENGTH 157

lin, will solve the problem of eflfectives def-
initely and peremptorily in favor of the Allies.

The positions heretofore established will al-
low us now to answer this all-important ques-
tion: Would the Entente have been — even
with the help of American troops to the great-
est extent we can imagine in 1919 — certain
to have on the European battle-field forces
superior to those of the Central Powers if she
had been content to fight on the western
front? The greater part of the Allies have
believed this. Their conviction has received
powerful confirmation in the eyes of Ameri-
cans by the statements of General Peyton C.
March, chief of the United States General
Staff, before the House Committee on Mili-
tary Affairs, in Washington. He said: "If
you put 80 divisions of Americans in France
of approximately 45,000 men to a division, you
will give marked superiority in rifle-power, and
we should be able to bring the war to a suc-
cessful conclusion in 1919."

The New York Times, as late as August 30th,
1918, published the following:

"The efforts of the Allied Powers and the
United States," General March said, "would
be confined to actual fighting on the western

158 AN ENDURING VICTORY

front, where the war would be won or lost,
without taking into consideration conditions
in Russia."

Let us see if it was true, as many of us be-
lieved, that the American assistance on the
western front certainly assured man-power and
complete victory to the Entente, without the
need to consider seriously the situation, not of
Russia only, but of the whole of Europe behind
the western front and especially in the Balkans.

In order to reach as close an approximation
to the truth as possible with the aid of suc-
cessive deductions, we will proceed as follows:

We will first estimate at the highest allow-
able figure the mobilized forces of the Entente.
In order to do so we will assume that the Eu-
ropean Allies who were still in control of their
own territory, that is. Great Britain, France,
Italy, Portugal, and Greece, had made as
stupendous efforts as Germany and her allies,
and had mobiUzed on a basis of 20 per cent
of their population. We will allow also that
in four years the Allies have suffered losses
proportionally identical with those of the
Germans. We will take the figures for mobili-
zation obtained from the European Allies, on
the basis of 20 per cent of their population,
and reduce them by 176 in 1,000, a figure

PANGERMANY'S MILITARY STRENGTH 159

which, as we have seen above (page 148), rep-
resents probably the really definitive losses of
the German army after four years of war.
This figure being laid down after compensa-
tion of war losses by the annual military con-
tingents of Germany, the amount of the Allies'
loss that we shall reach will be for them also
the sum of losses taken, not from their popu-
lation, but from their armies alone, these latter
having been fed as in the case of the German
army during the last four years, by four an-
nual levies, which have filled up to a consid-
erable extent gaps made by the war.

By subtracting the actual definitive losses of
each Allied state from the amount of its first
mobilization — which we will suppose at the
maximum, we reach the greatest possible
number of Allied soldiers which would have
been ready to march at the opening of the fifth
year of war.

To make sure of these figures we will not
count colonial contingents of the European
Allies, though they have been of great value.

1st. Because there was no conscription in
Ireland, in spite of the fact that her popula-
tion (4,400,000) is included in that of Great
Britain, on which our estimates of the total
British mobilization are based.

160 AN ENDURING VICTORY

2d. Both France and England were obliged
to maintain large forces in their colonies — this
is especially true of India — and the conse-
quences of these two drawbacks diminish in
'a striking degree the effective assistance ren-
dered by Anglo-French colonials in the Eu-
ropean war-field.

As mobilization in the United States is not
based on population, to the total obtained
of the Allied European forces mobilized at
the threshold of the fifth year of war we must
add 4 millions of Americans as the maximum
number which the United States is pledged
to place in Europe by the end of 1919. On
account of the diflSculties of marine transport
and food-supply, the presence in France in
August, 1918, of 1,500,000 American soldiers
was a remarkable feat, but it will be a new
world's wonder if the United States by July,
1919, succeeds in transporting and victualling
in Europe 4 millions of men, according to
promise. If, then, we include in our present
calculations 4 millions of American soldiers
who cannot land in Europe before July, 1919,
and proceed as we have done in the case of
the European Allies, we are certain to put
at the highest possible figure the man-pov/er
which the Allies would have been able to

PANGERMANY'S MILITARY STRENGTH 161

oppose to the 22 millions of mobilized troops
of the Central Powers; which figure we fixed
as the probable one in August, 1918, and
reached by the foregoing methods (page 150).
Reckoning in the same way, we obtain the
following table:

Population of Entente
countries

Supposed mobiliza-
tion at 20 per cent

Supposed losses, 176
in 1,000, to be de-
ducted from first
mobilization

Total man-pow-
er of Allies in
the fifth year of
the war

Great Britain. .46

France 40

Italy 36

Portugal 6

Greece 4

Americans

9,200,000 -
8,000,000 -
7,200,000 -
1,200,000 -
800,000 -

1,619,200 =

1,408,000 =

1,267,200 =

211,200 =

140,800 =

7,580,800
6,592,000
5,932,800
988,800
659,200
4,000,000

25,753,600

If this were correct, in 1919 the Allies would
have in round numbers 26 millions of mobi-
lized men against 22 millions of the Central
Empires. Hence, under the most favorable
circumstances, the Allies as a whole could
have only 4 million more men altogether than
the Central Powers. That is to say, a num-
ber equal to 118 Allied mobilized against 100 in
the mobilized armies directed from Berlin. It
is already plain that this Allied advantage in
men of 18 per 100 was too small to be held as

162 AN ENDURING VICTORY

an absolute guaranty of victory by weight of
numbers alone. But we will now show that
this numerical superiority of the Allies did not
really exist, for the following reasons:

1st reason. It is well known that in July,
1918, there were many more prisoners of the
European Allies in Germany than there were
Teuton prisoners in AUied hands. This larger
amount of AUied prisoners leads naturally to
the supposition that the losses on our side
have probably been proportionally greater
during four years of war than those of the
Central Powers. If this is so, it follows that
the Allies have in comparison with the Teutons
an excess of losses which does not show in
our table, but which in fact diminished by just
so much the man-power of the Entente.

2d reason. The European Allies certainly
have not mobilized their population on a 20-
per-cent basis. Neither Portugal nor Greece
could go above 10 per cent, and even this has
not been certainly reached.

3d reason. Even if Great Britain, France,
and Italy, like the Central Powers, mobihzed
at the ratio of 20 per cent of their population,
the Entente countries could not draw from
their enlistments an amount of fighting men
proportionally equal to that of Germany.

PANGERMANY'S MILITARY STRENGTH 163

This was so because the scarcity of labor in
Allied countries has driven them to use in their
munition factories a much larger proportion
of their enrolled men than was the case in
the Central Empires. The Germans and their
allies had at least 4 millions of prisoners and
50 millions of Allied subjects held as slaves,
from whom they drew free labor for their war
factories, and which left them at liberty to
send to the firing-line a proportion of their
enrolled men undoubtedly greater than was
possible to the great Allied states.

These three reasons ought to convince us
that the advantage of 18 per cent in man-
power which our table leads us to think we
possessed over the enemy was not founded on
fact. Even if we imagine the 4 millions of
American soldiers were already landed in
Europe, the most favorable estimates could
not assure us that during the fifth year of the
war the Entente could have counted on man-
power in excess of that of the Central Empires,
if Central Pangermany had been able to hold
out. But the Bulgarian defeat brought about
by its consequences the exclusion of Turkey
and of Austria-Hungary. The problem of ef-
fectives was then at once completely solved.
At last directing their attacks on the weak ele-

164 AN ENDURING VICTORY

ments of the effectives marching under the or-
ders of Berlin, the AUies eliminated them from
the conflict and on this head secured a crushing
superiority of numbers. Such is one of the
enormous profits that the Entente derives from
the Balkan operations.

VII.

The great Allied successes in the Balkans,
beginning in October, 1918, show that if the
decisive importance of the Danube front and of
political strategy had been understood in 1915
the war might have been ended long since by
a complete victory.

To convince ourselves of this let us con-
sider first the teachings of the past.

First example. Austro-Germany went into
the struggle with 68 + 50, that is, 118 millions
of inhabitants, against a coalition comprising
273 millions of people: Russia 182 millions of
inhabitants, England 46 millions, France 40,
Serbia 5. The Berlin General StaflF saw at
once that to counterbalance such a dispro-
portion in numbers the help of Bulgaria and
Turkey would be needful. This determina-
tion to solve the man-power problem in Ger-
many's favor was one of the reasons for the

PANGERMANY'S MILITARY STRENGTH 165

destruction of Serbia at the end of 1915, for
it was Serbia which blocked Germany's road
to the sources of eastern man-power in Ger-
manophile countries.

I pointed out the particular object of this
operation at the time it was begun, in an ar-
ticle which appeared October 23d, 1915, in
the Paris Illustration, where I said:

"Let us now suppose the intervention of
the Franco-English Allies via Salonika having
failed, that the Germans can reap the greatest
possible advantage from direct and permanent
communications with Turkey. They can thus
obtain a considerable number of fresh effec-
tives. ... In fact, this Turco-German junc-
tion, besides implying the destruction of
350,000 fine Serbian soldiers-^who, fighting
their own battle at the same time gave
valuable help to the general cause of the Allies
by killing many Austro-Boches — would pro-
duce direct contact with troops of Bulgaria
and Turkey and the large recruiting-grounds
of Turkey-in-Asia and Persia. In this way
at least a million and a half of fresh soldiers,
armed or not — ^but whom the Turks are al-
ready recruiting and training as far as pos-
sible — would be at once at the service of the
Kaiser. Can there he any doubt that, having

166 AN ENDURING VICTORY

solved the vital effective problem in his own favor,
he would hesitate to make use of these new
men on the west front, perhaps before Russia
is again able to resume a strong offensive
along her entire line?"

The weakening followed by the disintegra-
tion of Russia, begun several months after I
wrote these lines (October, 1915), gave Ger-
many the chance to fill up her western lines
with levies of troops drawn from the Russian
front and from Austria-Hungary and left
her Turkish and Bulgarian effectives for her
eastern operations. But it cannot be denied
that when Serbia was crushed it decided the
man-power question in Germany's favor. This
operation gave three results to Berlin:

1st. It has provided the Central Powers up
to now with about 3 millions of new mobilized
Turks and Bulgars, equal to twice the number
I estimated in October, 1915.

2d. It has deprived the Entente of the sup-
port of 350,000 brave Serbian soldiers.

3d. It placed Greece — with about 400,000
possible mobilized men, and Roumania with
about 700,000 who might be enrolled, in a bad
strategic position in case they wished to in-
tervene later, as events have abundantly
proved.

PANGERMANY'S MILITARY STRENGTH 167

It was certainly thanks to these results that
Germany was able to hold out until the Bul-
garian collapse.

Second example. If the Entente had grasped
earlier than Germany the vital importance of
the Danube front, not only would she have
prevented the Austro-Germans from securing
the above advantages, but the Allies would
have settled the great question of man-power
in their own favor even more decisively than
Germany settled it through the destruction of
Serbia.

To understand this, let us suppose that in
the first half of the year 1915, instead of send-
ing 150,000 men to capture the Dardanelles
under conditions which forbade success, the
Entente had sent them to Belgrade on the
Danube. This expedition was materially per-
fectly possible. The Salonika-Belgrade Rail-
road was not at all a wretched little mountain
line, as Colonel Repington wrongly makes out
in the Atlantic Monthly for August, 1918. In
1915, it was a good single-track road, with
double-track passing points about every 20
kilometres; it wanted rolling-stock, but this
could readily have been supplied. If necessary,
the double track could have been extended for
nearly the whole length of the line; the sec-

168 AN ENDURING VICTORY

tions where two tracks could not have been laid
were relatively short and consequently could
not have made the main line impracticable.
Besides, in point of fact, the Germans made
use of much of this railroad from north to
south to organize the whole German-Bulgar
front in Macedonia, a proof, if any were
needed, that the Allies could have made it
equally useful from south to north to trans-
port an army to the Danube. If they had
sent only 150,000 Franco-English men they
would have brought about the following con-
sequences:

1st. The appearance at Belgrade of these
150,000 Franco-English soldiers would have
been a tangible proof to all Greeks, Serbians,
Roumanians, Slavs, and Latins of Austria-
Hungary, amounting to 44 millions of anti-
German people, that France and England
understood that the true aim of the war de-
clared by Germany was the conquest of cen-
tral Europe — the key of the world — and that
the Allies realized that the best way to win
the war was to put that key in their pocket.

2d. The appearance on the Danube of
Anglo-French troops would have reassured
the Balkan Allies of the Entente and the nu-
merous insurrectionist groups in Austria-

PANGERMANY'S MILITARY STRENGTH 169

Hungary; they would have seen in it a pledge
that the great Western Powers would employ
all material necessary for their liberation.

3d. Under these circumstances Greece and
Roumania unquestionably would have joined
the Allies without further delay. In fact,
during the first haK of 1915 popular feeling
in Greece, and especially in Roumania, set so
strongly toward the Entente that it would
have been easy to overcome the opposition
of King Constantine at Athens and the tem-
porizing policy of M. Bratiano at Bucharest.

4th. These various psychological arguments
should convince us that even so small a force
as 150,000 Franco-English on the Danube
would have made a tie strong enough to bind
together the many elements favorable to the
Allies in central Europe and the Balkans.

5th. If 150,000 Franco-Britains had been
sent to the Balkans it would have had for
practical effect the creation of an Entente
army on the Danube and in the Balkans, made
up as follows:

150,000 Franco-English.
350,000 Serbians.
400,000 Greeks.
700,000 Roumanians.

Say, 1,600,000 men.

170 AN ENDURING VICTORY

6th. This army would have siiflSced, on ac-
count of the nature of the country and the
ease with which it can be defended, to form
an insurmountable barrier stretching from
Montenegro on the Adriatic to the mouth of
the Danube on the Black Sea.

7th. The road to the east would have been
closed to Austria-Germany by this barrier.

8th. South of this barrier, Bulgaria, denuded
of munitions by the Balkan Wars of 1912-13,
would have been helpless for the remainder
of the war.

9th. Again, south of this barrier, Turkey,
also lacking armament, and for the same rea-
son, at the end of a very few weeks would
have been forced not only to cease fighting
the Allies, but to reopen the straits to them
of her own accord.

To the north of this barrier, helped, cheered,
and emboldened by the presence of a strong
Allied force on the Danube, the 28 millions of
Slavs and Latins, unwilling subjects of the
Hapsburgs, who were restless from the begin-
ning of the conflict, would have risen as one
man, and the greater number, pressed into
the Austro-Hungarian army, would have de-
serted to the army of the Danube, so that the
Entente would have found in Austria-Hungary

PANGERMANY'S MILITARY STRENGTH 171

itself an unlimited supply of good soldiers.
All this certainly would have happened, for
under much less favorable circumstances Slav
soldiers, subjects of Austria, deserted in Serbia
and Russia by hundreds of thousands and
took service against the Central Empires.
In the summer of 1916 the Czecho-Slovaks,
who were so much admired by the Allies for
their bravery and intelligence in Siberia were
ex-Austro-Hungarian soldiers who surrendered
to the Russians and afterward enlisted in the
armies of the Czar to fight the Austro-Ger-
mans.

From the special point of view of the man-
power question, the presence of only 150,000
Franco-English soldiers would have led to the
following results:

1st. Three millions of Turkish and Bul-
garian mobilized men would have been kept
out of the Austro-Hungarian army.

2d. The Entente would have gained 1,450,-
000 Balkan soldiers, well placed geograph-
ically.

3d. The Entente was so placed as to excite
under the best possible conditions the revolt
of 28 millions of Slavs and Latins in Austria-
Hungary, and this solution of the man-power
problem would have had decisive influence

172 AN ENDURING VICTORY

in favor of the Allies. In 1915, the Russians
were still in the Carpathians, in eastern Aus-
tria; the breakdown of Austria-Hungary re-
sulting from insurrection of its oppressed
peoples would have encircled Germany in a
geographical sense, and the latter, cut off from
her eastern food-supply by the Allied barrier
on the Danube, would have been forced at the
end of a few months to surrender uncondi-
tionally.

These wonderful results would have been
the logical effect produced if only 150,000
Franco-English soldiers had been sent to the
Danube.

We can thus demonstrate the overwhelming
superiority which political strategy sometimes
possesses over that which is simply military.
The sending of 150,000 men to a point, tech-
nically well chosen, may cause these men to
influence the fate of a battle much more than
their number would allow, but the use of polit-
ical strategy can add extraordinarily to this
effect. This is proved when we see by the
preceding explanations that only 150,000
Franco-British sent to the Danube would have
been worth millions of men to the Allies.
Why should this be? Because Belgrade was
just the one exact spot in Europe where the

PANGERMANY'S MILITARY STRENGTH 173

Allies could have utilized all the factors in
the political strategy of the situation as it
was in 1915. The factor of geography, that
is, a barrier region easy to organize and to
defend between the Adriatic and the Black
Sea — the ethnological factor, meaning the Slav
and Latin anti-German groups of central
Europe. The economic factor, which meant
to cut off Austria-Germany from the granaries
of the east, the psychological factor, that is,
the hatred of the oppressed populations of
central Europe for the German-Magyars. The
results from these factors, added one to an-
other, produce the wonderful force of political
strategy.

However this may be, these two instances,
that of the supplementary man-power gained
by Germany through the ruin of Serbia, and
that of the Entente, which failed to under-
stand the tremendous opportunity given by
the Danube front to solve once and for all,
and advantageously, the effective problem,
give proof, supported by facts, that man-
power and even decisive victory can be gained
through political strategy with absolute cer-
tainty.

The events in the Balkans since October,
1918, are a brilliant confirmation of this view.

174 AN ENDURING VICTORY

for in spite of all the faults committed in this
region for four years, the victory of the Allies
over Bulgaria in less than a month made its
consequences felt to the very heart of Germany.
Why is this so? Because at last the Allies
comprehended that it was necessary to attack
on the weak fronts, and above all to shut out
of the fighting the troops of Pangermany
mobilized in spite of themselves by Germany.
It is the view which I have supported for a
very long time, notably in the Atlantic Monthly.

We are now about to grasp the basic reason
of the great victories which the Allies have
won at the end of 1918.

We estimated at about 22 millions (page
150) the mobilized forces of Pangermany at
the outset of the fifth year of war. This figure
represented not only the elements of German
strength, but it contained also large elements
of weakness in the armies of Pangermany. It
is just these weaknesses which gave a great
opportunity to the Allies, for in fact this
amount of 22 millions of soldiers included a
considerable proportion of Latins, Slavs, and
Semitic soldiers forced into the service and
who hate Germans, Magyars, and Turks with
a deadly hatred.

Let us try to find what proportion of anti-

PANGERMANY'S MILITARY STRENGTH 175

Germans were enrolled in German armies
against their will, according to the figures for
1914.
The following table will show:

Total population

Pro-German elements

Anti-German elements

millions

Germany 68

Germans .

....61

Poles, Danes,
Alsace-Lor-
raines 7

Austria-

Slavs and Lat-

Hungary .... 50

Germans .

....12

ins 28

Magyars.

Turkey 10

Turks....

.... 6

Semites 4

Total 128

Reckoning the Turks at only half their
population for reasons given above (see page
148), the proportion of the anti-Germans as
against the pro-Germans, included in the
mobilization ordered from Berlin, is as 39
to 89. That is, among the 22 millions of
soldiers in Pangermany, nearly 7 millions —
6,700,000, to be exact — were determined anti-
Pangermanists. Consequently, even if accord-
ing to the strict provisions of the recent
Austro-German alliance the Slav and Latin
soldiers were already distributed among the
German troops, the Pangerman armies com-

176 AN ENDURING VICTORY

prised at this moment three men out of ten
who served under constraint for a cause which
they detested, for they knew well that the
permanent triumph of Pangermany would have
riveted their chains.

Until the recent offensive of October in the
Balkans, the Allies had drawn no advantage
from this situation, which was so favorable to
them, for two reasons. Firsts they had failed
for too long to see the enormous importance
of the ethnographical character of this war.
It is only at the end of the fourth year of
the struggle that we are beginning to under-
stand the value of the Czecho-Slovak and
Jugo-Slav populations, who with the Poles and
the Roumanians form a group of nearly 60
millions of anti-Germans inhabiting central
Europe. Secondly, the Allies pursued a purely
military strategy, of which the effects were
concentrated on the western front, while the
Germans employed political strategy, which
placed infinite resources at their disposal,
allowing them to dissipate the adverse forces
by other methods than those simply military,
but which in certain cases are more eflScacious
than the latter in arriving at victory. The
results obtained by the Germans by the help
of political strategy have been striking and in-

PANGERMANY'S MILITARY STRENGTH 177

disputable. It was thanks to political strategy
and not by force that the Germans brought
about the military downfall of Russia. It
was their pacifist propaganda which permitted
them to cause the surrender of the Italian
divisions defending Caporetto, and thus to
take possession of mountain regions considered
impregnable to military attacks. If the Ger-
mans were in the Allies' place, is it possible to
believe that they would fail for four years to
play the trump-card in their hand, represented
by 7 millions of anti-German populations of
Poles, Czecho-Slovaks, Jugo-Slavs, and Rou-
manians of central Europe ?

Among the Allies many people have long
thought it was quite natural that the Germans
should carry on intrigues in Ireland, in Mo-
rocco, in China, in India, in Afghanistan, etc.,
but held that it was impossible to act on the
Slav and Latin soldiers incorporated against
their will in the armies of Pangermany. Their
great argument consisted in saying: "These
soldiers are commanded by Germans and Mag-
yars, and therefore they can do nothing." In
the first place, those of the Allies who reasoned
in this way did not know the peoples of central
Europe. In addition, have the Allies ever
tried the effect of political strategy in those

178 AN ENDURING VICTORY

countries during the first four years of the
war? Never. On the contrary, for a very
long time the poHcy of the war was directed
by the AUies so as really to discourage all ac-
tion in their favor on the part of Slav and
Latin soldiers mobilized unwillingly by Ger-
many and her allies. These Slav and Latin
soldiers, nevertheless, did of their own accord
all that was possible to them. At the .out-
break of war, as has been mentioned above,
hundreds of thousands of soldiers included in
the Austro-Hungarian armies gave themselves
up to the Russians and Serbians. In May,
1917, the authorized representatives of the
Poles, Czechs, and Jugo-Slavs declared in
open parliament at Vienna, in the plainest
manner, in favor of the Entente and against
Pangermany. Could they do more.^ And
how were they answered.^ In November,
1917, Mr. Lloyd George under pressure from
the British pacifists, who thought to shorten
the war by eliminating from the Allied peace-
programme the solution of the problem, most
vital of all, that of central Europe, made an
address in which he declared himself a par-
tisan of the maintenance of Austria-Hungary.
The text of this speech was widely reproduced
in Austria-Hungary by the government of

PANGERMANY'S MILITARY STRENGTH 179

Vienna, in order that its Slav and Latin sub-
jects should cease to count on the Entente,
since the latter was no longer interested in
their fate. This propaganda produced among
the Slavs and Latins of central Europe a very
natural period of discouragement. Under these
conditions, how could they be expected to
revolt efficaciously against their oppressors ?

Since this, however, events have immensely
developed. The Allies have realized at last
that a separate peace with Austria-Hungary, if
it was not a terrible piece of trickery, would be
a chimera. The congress of oppressed nation-
alities which met at Rome in April, 1918,
sealed the alliance of Italians and Jugo-Slavs.
Lansing's note came near to approbation of
the hopes of the nationalities of central Eu-
rope, as did also an analogous note of the War
Council at Versailles, which at last turned the
policy of the Entente in the right direction,
bringing the political aims of the war into
harmony with the democratic principles that
she has invoked as justification for her mili-
tary action.

At last the offensive against Bulgaria, after
having been carefully prepared by General
Franchet d'Esperey and General Henrys, who
rendered immense services, was developed in

180 AN ENDURING VICTORY

October, 1918, into a complete success. The
results already assure to the Entente complete
victory on the sole condition that it does not
lose in negotiations the essential fruits of the
strategic-political manoeuvre which has just
taken place in central Europe. But the ex-
planations just made allow us to be convinced
that these results could have been gained much
more easily and with still more decisive con-
sequences at the beginning of 1915 if the fatal
theory of the principal front had not pre-
vented for four years the realization that the
front of the Danube-Middle Europe Allies is
the decisive one.

CHAPTER IV.

WHY THE ALLIES OF GERMANY HAVE THOUGHT
IT WAS TO THEIR INTEREST TO ACT WITH
HER.

I. Why Turkey went with Germany.
II. The advantages which the Bulgarians thought to gain

by siding with Berlin.
in. Reasons for which Austria-Hungary is unavoidably an

indispensable base for Pangerman imperialism.
IV. The five centres of imperialism must be destroyed.

Many of the disappointments suffered by
the AUies arise from the fact that they have
not completely realized the political aspects of
the war in its European extent. The result is
that after four years of war large numbers in
the Entente, seeing only Germany as personi-
fied by her Kaiser, look upon her allies as
participants certainly in the world conflict,
but as partners of quite secondary impor-
tance, as relatively negligible quantities, and
even sometimes as states worthy of a sort of
compassion on account of the crafty violence
which they endured at the hands of Germany
to force them to follow her into the war.
Many among the Allies are really convinced

181

182 AN ENDURING VICTORY

that Turkey, Bulgaria, and Austria-Hungary
have bent against their will under the yoke
which circumstances allow Berlin to impose
upon them.

These two opinions are not correct. In the
first place, these three countries have given
help to Germany which has been most valua-
ble to her for the conduct of the war, and,
secondly, they have done this with good-will,
because these three states have believed that
it was to their interest to take this course.

Too much importance cannot be attached
to these facts. But to grasp the interest
which has led Germany's allies to throw in
their lot with hers, it is necessary to go out-
side of ourselves, or, according to the forcible
expression of my teacher, Albert Sorel, *'we
must get into the enemy's skin," that is to
say, judge the interests of the governments of
Vienna, Budapest, Sofia, and Constantinople,
not with the ideas of people fighting for justice
and democracy, but from the point of view of
the governmental aims of the Austrians, Bul-
gars, or Turks, who have been all aristocratic
or imperialist or both. It is therefore only
from the adversary's standpoint that we can
see the advantage he seeks, and understand
clearly why Constantinople, Sofia, and Vienna

THE ALLIES OF GERMANY 183

have for four years been in close alliance with
Berlin.

The assistance given by the Turks to Ger-
many has been much more valuable than is
generally supposed. From the Ottoman Em-
pire, the Germans have drawn foodstuffs, hides,
fats, and minerals which aid them considerably
in keeping up the war. The co-operation of
the government of Constantinople has placed
at the disposal of the Berlin General Staff
about 2 million men, of whom many have
been employed to cultivate the soil in Asia
Minor, while the rest, fighting, have contrib-
uted strongly to the accomplishment of the
Pangerman plan in the Balkans and the over-
throw of Russia. Besides this, the close ac-
cord of the Commander of the Faithful with
the Kaiser has allowed the latter to profit by
the Pan-Islam agitation, which has been a hin-
drance to the Allies in Africa and India, and
was destined to injure them still more in those
regions, as well as in the Caucasus, southern
Russia, Persia, central Asia, Afghanistan, and
China, if the brilliant victories of the Allies
in the Balkans had not come to render Turkey
powerless.

184 AN ENDURING VICTORY

The close solidarity of the Turkish and Ger-
man Empires was caused for the clearest and
strongest of reasons.

Under the Sultan Abdul-Hamid the in-
terior situation of the Ottoman Empire had
become so intolerable for all its subjects that,
in 1908, the Young Turk revolution took place,
based ostensibly on liberal principles, and
was enthusiastically supported by the Chris-
tian populations. For some months all Eu-
rope believed that the Ottoman Empire would
at last enter on the path of regeneration, but
this illusion was short-lived. From the be-
ginning the Young Turks had seized on the
revolutionary movement, and soon showed
themselves to be inordinately vain, incapable
of any reforms, and such harsh oppressors of
the Christians that Bulgaria, Serbia, and
Greece, in spite of the mutual distrust arising
from their rival ambitions, united to rescue
their coreligionists, the Ottoman Christians of
Macedonia, from the Young Turkish yoke.

These events led to the Balkan Wars of
1912-13, which left the Ottoman Empire in
Europe deprived of all but a small territory
to the northwest of Constantinople. This
disaster showed in a still clearer light the pro-
found incapacity of the Young Turks, so that

THE ALLIES OF GERMANY 185

it was widely believed that the Turkish Em-
pire would shortly crumble as a result of its
internal disintegration. This state of things
might have been predicted for some time, and
particularly since 1910, and perhaps for this
reason Sir Edward Grey, in 1912-13, as
Prince Lichnowsky's memoirs assert, entered
into secret negotiations with Germany for
the division of Turkey in Asia among the
Great Powers. According to the principles
of agreement laid down on this subject, Ger-
many obtained the lion's share as sphere of
influence, that is, all Mesopotamia as far as
Bassorah, the largest and richest district of
Turkey in Asia, which is crossed by the Ham-
burg-Persian Gulf Line, and which from about
1895 had been ardently coveted by the gov-
ernment of Berlin. To the great surprise of
Prince Lichnowsky, German ambassador in
London, if this treaty was negotiated, it was
not definitely concluded, that is, signed by
the German Government. On learning this,
many readers of the Lichnowsky memoirs
asked themselves why Germany did not ratify
this treaty, which was so advantageous to her,
giving her, as it did, the long-desired coun-
try of Mesopotamia. Events since this war
began throw light on the reasons for which

186 AN ENDUKING VICTORY

Germany decided not to ratify the treaty ar-
ranged at London by her ambassador, and
show also why Turkey threw herself with all
her force into the war against the Allies.

At the end of 1913 and the beginning of
1914 the Young Turks found themselves
situated as follows: Having banished or
hanged most of their political enemies, the
Old Turks, among whom were the adherents
of a good understanding with the Western
Powers, the Young Turks just before the war
were undoubtedly sole masters of Turkey,
and all the more because the government of
Constantinople was absolutist and made up
of very few persons, all leaders of the Young
Turk party : Enver Pacha, Talaat Bey, Djavid
Bey, General Djemal Pacha, Doctor Nazim,
etc. As for the Sultan, Mahomet V, the poor
man was so debilitated by the long captivity
inflicted on him by the suspicious Abdul-
Hamid that he had lost all will-power, had
absolutely no influence, and was a mere puppet
in the hands of the Young Turk pro-consuls.
The latter held the reins of power, but they
were confronted by insurmountable difficulties.
Their financial embarrassments were enor-
mous and nearly impossible to overcome.
The Young Turks were detested by all the

THE ALLIES OF GERMANY 187

non-Turkish populations of the empire, whom
they had duped, and they were also deeply
humiliated by the tremendous defeat which
Turkey had suffered under their rule at the
hands of the Balkan States. Lastly, the Young
Turks were much irritated against Russia,
England, and France, for these countries had
come to see that there was nothing to be made
of the Young Turks, and had shown in 1912-
13 sympathy with the Balkan peoples.

These circumstances taken together brought
about a material and psychological situation
particularly favorable to William II, when
he acted so as to decide the Turks to join with
him in the struggle for which he was preparing.

Profiting by the above-mentioned state of
afifairs, it is most probable that at the begin-
ning of 1914 the German Emperor should
have spoken as follows to the Young Turks,
especially to Talaat Bey, and even more to
Enver Pacha — the most ambitious and Ger-
manophile of all the Turks, who is known to
have made a mysterious journey into Ger-
many a few months before the war:

The Kaiser probably said :

*' England wishes to break up the Ottoman
Empire; here are the notes of the treaty on
this subject, drawn up by Sir Edward Grey and

188 AN ENDURINJ3 YICTORY

Prince Lichnowsky in London. I let the Eng-
lish go on, so that I could fathom their whole
intention, but I refused to sign the treaty they
offered me, because I am a sincere friend of the
Ottoman Empire. A great plan is in prepara-
tion, which will put an end to all your troubles.
In a few months Germany will declare war
on her enemies, who are yours also. Let Tur-
key join us with all her might in this conflict,
and not only will I oppose the disruption of
your empire, but I will promise you the fol-
lowing advantages :

"At the present moment, the Young Turk
party can scarcely maintain itself in the Otto-
man Empire, which consists now of only 20
million inhabitants since the disastrous Balkan
War. Confronted with 2 million Levantines
and Jews, with 8 millions of Arabs, of whom
a part hate you, with 2 millions of Greeks,
and 2 of Armenians — ^your irreconcilable en-
emies — ^you have only 6 millions of Turks in
your own empire, and are therefore a minor-
ity faced by numerous and insurmountable
difficulties. [See the annexed map, which
gives a clear view of the great nationalities in
Turkey.] Well ! come into the war with me
and the situation will be radically transformed.

"Aided by the struggle, you can eliminate

THE ALLIES OF GERMANY

189

190 AN ENDURING VICTORY

the Armenians, Greeks, and those of the Arabs
who are in your way. This 'ethnographical
rearrangement' of Turkey will enable you
later to dominate your non-Turkish popula-
tions without difficulty. Enriched by the war,
Germany will advance the sums necessary
to develop the enormous economic resources
latent in your country, and will also furnish
engineers and technicians. In order to in-
crease the number of Moslems in the en-
larged Turkish Empire, victorious Germany
will also restore or acquire the Crimea, the
Turkish parts of the Caucasus, Persia, and
Egypt, which will extend your influence
strongly over all Mussulman Africa. One
of Germany's objects in this war is to destroy
Russia, the age-long enemy of the Turkish
Empire. Following the overthrow of the em-
pire of the Czars, Moslem states will be set
up in the Caucasus and in central Asia, and
these states will be guided from Constan-
tinople, owing to the solidarity of the Tura-
nian races. When all those who would profit
by this plan have well understood its value it
will estabhsh good and permanent relations be-
tween you, the Bulgarians, and the Magyars,
who will form the geographical basis of your
direct understanding with Germany.

THE ALLIES OF GERMANY 191

"When this programme is carried out it will
be as of old and even more; the power of the
Commander of the Faithful will be exerted
not only religiously, as in former days, but
pohtically as well. It will extend over a great
part of the world, reaching from South Africa
to the heart of China."

For any one who knows the imperialist ten-
dencies of the Young Turks and their profound
hatred for the Armenians, the Greeks, and the
Arabs, such words from the German Emperor
early in 1914, when the Ottoman Empire was
tottering to its fall, must have been welcomed
with pleasure and even enthusiasm by the
Young Turk leaders, who knew that not only
Turkey but they themselves were on the verge
of ruin.

Most of these men had long held Germa-
nophile opinions, and it is easy to see the mo-
tives which led the Young Turks and the
empire which was entirely in their hands to
take sides with Germany in the approaching
war.

But the war has lasted too long for an em-
pire in the condition of the Turkish Empire.
Oriental indolence has been irritated at the
length of the work which the Germans have
imposed upon it. Finally, the defeat of Bui-

19^ AN ENDURING VICTORY

garia and the immediate seizure of the Danube
by the AlKes have cut off Turkey from Ger-
many strategically, thus compelling its com-
plete surrender.

II.

The attitude of the Entente toward Bul-
garia has been for a long time wanting in the
clearness which alone makes it possible to
act with the decision needed to win a victory.
After four years of war there were still Allies
with Bulgarophile tendencies, and if that was
so it was because in the Entente, with regard
to Bulgaria, as also on other subjects, people
lived on old ideas, which were well enough
in their day, but were now out of date.

If the aspirations of the Bulgarian author-
ities since 1907, if the violent hatreds of the
entire people, from the Treaty of Bucharest
to the 10th of August, 1913, had been realized
from the beginning of the war, the Allies would
have known that on the first opportunity the
Bulgars would throw in their lot with Berlin.

I cannot be suspected of partiality when
I speak of Bulgaria, for I have visited that
country often in the last twenty-five years,
have been her devoted friend, and labored
for a good understanding between her, Serbia,

THE ALLIES OF GERMANY 193

and Roumania up to June, 1913, that is, until
the Bulgars treacherously attacked their Greek
and Serbian allies. This inexcusable aggres-
sion put an end to my sympathy, and my
estimate of the Bulgars was definitely fixed
when at Sofia in March, 1914, I became pos-
sessed of an oflScial Bulgarian document which
revealed to the fullest extent the imperialist
aims which I had not before suspected. This
document consists of the Bulgarian book
called The Soldier^s Comrade, first published
in 1907 with the authorization and recom-
mendation of the Bulgarian minister of war
(Report No. 25, March 21st, 1907, and No. 31,
March 10th, 1908). Since 1907, this book has
been distributed in all the barracks and mili-
tary schools, thus reaching every inhabitant
of Bulgaria who has passed through these
barracks since that date. On page 56 of the
historical section of this book is a colored
map of *' Greater Bulgaria," which shows the
whole scheme for Bulgarian hegemony in the
Balkan Peninsula. The accompanying draw-
ing, an exact copy of this map, gives a clear
idea of the considerable encroachments con-
templated by this plan on neighboring states.
It is therefore undeniable that the authorities
at Sofia, ever since 1907, that is, seven years

194

AN ENDURING VICTORY

THE ALLIES OF GERMANY 195

prior to the war, have taught the people of
Bulgaria that they should fight to conquer,
not alone the districts of Macedonia settled by
Bulgars, but also extensive regions in Greece,
as well as those inhabited by Serbians, Al-
banians, and the whole Roumanian Dobrudja,
up to the mouths of the Danube. This
idea was spread abroad among the people of
Bulgaria, as the Pangerman scheme was dis-
seminated in Germany, and it has been pur-
sued since 1907, by the Bulgarian Government,
seeking tenaciously to bring it about by means
of successive operations. The plan allows us
to see why the Bulgars were not sincere when,
in 1912, they concluded an alliance merely to
make use of the Serbians and the Greeks in
order to beat the Turks, who were too strong
for them to conquer by themselves. But as
soon as the part of their plan relating to Tur-
key was realized, in order to carry it out, this
time at the expense of Greece and Serbia, Bul-
garia attacked her former allies in June, 1913.
Roumania then intervened against the Bul-
gars, and, the Serbians having won the battle
of the Bregalnitza, Bulgaria was beaten and
forced to sign the Treaty of Bucharest, August
10th, 1913. This treaty did not establish
Bulgarian hegemony; rather the Balkan bal-

196 AN ENDURING VICTORY

ance of power, just the reverse of what Bul-
garia wished; for if the peace had lasted the
Balkan equilibrium would have crystallized,
and the success of the Bulgarian plan in the
future have become impossible. This is why
the Treaty of Bucharest was so deep a disap-
pointment to the Bulgars, and created so much
irritation as to alter their former feelings ab-
ruptly. Having taken from the Turks nearly
as much as was designed in the plan for Greater
Bulgaria, and seeing that it would be more
to their advantage to declare themselves Tu-
ranians than to remain Slavs, the Bulgars
decided to ally themselves with the Turks,
and from that time concentrated their hate
and vindictive qualities, which are enormous,
against their recent conquerors, the Greeks,
and above all the Serbians and Roumanians.
Granting the imperialist aims of the Bul-
gars resulting from their plan of 1907, and
their resentment irrevocably directed against
their neighbors since the end of 1913, it is
plain that they could not satisfy their exag-
gerated ambition and their intense hatreds
except by taking the side of Germany. The
Entente was in no position to help Bulgaria
to lay hands on Roumanian, Serbian, and
Greek territory; and therefore, for these com-

THE ALLIES OF GERMANY 107

Lined reasons, an understanding was easily
reached between Berlin and Sofia, several
months before the war, as certain facts will
convince us.

In 1916, Frederic Naumann, the man of
Middle Europe, pubhshed a pamphlet called
Bulgaria and Central Europe, of which Payot,
the pubhsher at Paris, furnished a translation.
Naumann writes as follows:

"When, about a year ago, in August, 1915,
I wrote my book Mitteleuropa, I could not
then speak of Bulgaria, for at that time in
the eyes of the European pubhc the attitude
of that country was doubtful. Even if the
Czar Ferdinand, and his Minister- President
Radoslavoff had then known exactly what they
wished to do, and even if those in charge of foreign
policy in Germany regarded Sofia with ever-in-
creasing confidence, it would nevertheless have
been impossible to discuss the rapprocjiement
while it was forming. Now everything then
hidden is brought into the light of day. The
aUiance is made, and the success of the war
against Serbia has amply proved that they
were right who labored for the Union of Cen-
tral Europe with Bulgaria."

It is clear that Naumann tells only a part of
the truth, but this part is most interesting, for

198 AN ENDURING VICTORY

it is a proof that in August, 1915 — that is, at
a time when the AUies were still foolish enough
to imagine that the government of Sofia was
hesitating, or, as I have often heard it said,
even that it could be bought — the Czar Ferdi-
nand and his first minister, Radoslavoff, ''knew
exactly what they wished to do,^^ the whole thing
being then a secret. Now, therefore, we are
really justified in believing that the Czar Fer-
dinand and his Radoslavoff, who for a long
time had been among the most notorious Ger-
manophiles of Sofia, knew exactly what they
wanted to do not only in August, 1915, but
long before the war.

In fact, according to information pubhshed
by the Petit Parisien, March 26th, 1916, and
the Temps, April 10th, 1916, M. Radoslavoff
revealed during a suit which took place in
Sofia early in 1916 that the treaties between
Bulgaria, Berlin, and Constantinople were con-
cluded before April, 1914. These treaties were
not made public for excellent reasons. In the
first place, it was necessary to let the Allies
entangle themselves in interminable negotia-
tions, making them think that the Bulgarian
Government had not yet made its choice; then
it was best to wait until military events were
sufficiently advanced to persuade the Bulgar

THE ALLIES OF GERMANY 199

people, some of whom were still Russophiles, to
join Germany. This object was attained after
the defeat of the Allies in the Dardanelles and
the great Russian retreat on the Dunaietz in
May, 1915, and was finished some months
later.

During the first three years of the war the
Bulgars were stalwart Germanophiles. They
have undeniable qualities; they are sober and
economical, but they are born rapacious to an
incredible degree. This last characteristic ac-
counts for the action of this democratic people
— democratic, as it consists entirely of peas-
ants — ^but they have been made imperialists
through the propagation of the plan for Bul-
garian hegemony since 1907, because that
propaganda has developed in the peasants the
passion for the soil, for territorial aggrandize-
ment, to an extent of which nothing can give
an idea. They were greatly pleased, there-
fore, with the acquisitions they made, thanks
to their friendship with Berlin.

In his pamphlet called Bulgaria and Cen-
tral Europe^ published in 1916 and quoted
above, Frederic Naumann describes as follows
a trip he had just made to Bulgaria with ten
other members of the Reichstag.

"Greater Bulgaria is not yet defined; foreign

200 AN ENDURING VICTORY

powers threaten us continually with fresh at-
tacks; but the first and most decisive step has
now been taken; Bulgaria came to us in the
midst of a besieged Central Europe, as the first
addition to the group which we shall form in
the future.

"A description from day to day of our jour-
ney, taken under the thoughtful care of the
former Bulgarian minister at Belgrade, M.
Tchaprachikofif* does not enter into our plan,
and, besides, could hardly be put into words.
One may experience the development of popu-
lar enthusiasm, loyal and simple, but it cannot
be described in one place after another with-
out needless tediousness. It suffices to say
that we, German representatives, having some
experience as critics of assemblies and popular
movements, were impressed afresh each day
by the clamorous wave of people who cheered
joyously and vigorously those who came to
help them to victory. The Bulgars are not
dramatic by nature; they have nothing of the
Latin, and little of the Greek; they do not

* Stephen Tchaprachikoff formerly studied at the School of Polit-
ical Sciences in Paris about 1895, and up to March, 1914, was one
of my personal friends. He was for a long time the private secretary
of King Ferdinand and his confidential agent. Since the war, he has
become such a thorough Germanophile that Naumann and his com-
panions were placed in his care during their journey in Bulgaria.

THE ALLIES OF GERMANY 201

pose as stage heroes, but they are brave and
rough, practical, rather silent and shy.

"It was a nation of peasants who left their
villages in crowds, flocking to the railroad sta-
tions to see us, German representatives. It
was not on our account personally, being as
we were for the most part unknown to them,
but for the sake of the German army, the Ger-
man state and policy of Central Europe, and
for the cause of their own king and country.
We received in this way a popular ovation,
particularly significant and beautiful in the
extreme. While the Bulgarian people spoke
to us by the mouth of its representatives and
magistrates, it felt that the first period of its
national existence was closing: the period ex-
tending from its deliverance by the Russians
to the Second Balkan War, from 1876 to
1914."

But as the extension of Bulgaria was estab-
lished over territories which were not truly
Bulgarian, and as it was artificial and it was
constantly necessary to be in conflict with the
populations ripe for rebellion at the same time
that they had to hold the lines of the Salonika
front, the fourth year of the war was of an
increasing strenuousness, which, never ceasing,
became more intolerable from day to day. In

202

AN ENDURING VICTORY

trying to become bigger than the ox the Bul-
garian frog burst, and when the AUied offen-
sive developed in October, 1918, in a few days
Bulgaria fell.

Ill

Austria-Hungary is not a nation, but a state,
alone of its kind, where everything is organized

THE THREE PARTS OF AUSTRIA - HUNGARY

V^^^5L>' ^

\3 S S /

1 Austria

2 Hnngaiy
8 Bosnia •H«raegoviita

with a special object, which is to make it pos-
sible for the German-Magyar minority to exer-
cise the most complete political domination

THE ALLIES OF GERMANY 203

over the vast majority of the inhabitants, who
are Slavo-Latins.

In order to grasp the truth in its simplest
form as to the organization of Austria-Hun-
gary, it should be remembered that this sin-
gular state is made up of three distinct parts,
as will be seen on the annexed map.

1. Austria, which, with a fragment geograph-
ically detached along the Adriatic (Dalmatia)
constitutes one empire.

2. Hungary, which is a kingdom.

3. Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose constitu-
tional situation in reference to Austria-Hun-
gary is not clearly defined, but which may be
considered as a sort of territory of the empire,
a colony equally dependent on Austria and
Hungary

The three maps below show exactly how the
50 million inhabitants (this figure is taken,
exclusive of foreigners, from the census of
1910, the last given for the dilBFerent nationali-
ties) are divided among the three districts
which together constitute the Austro-Hunga-
rian Empire.

The double lines which define these popula-
tions show the arbitrary nature of their distri-
bution. In spite of themselves, nearly a mil-
lion Italians are cut off from Italy, 5 millions

204 AN ENDURING VICTORY

of Poles separated from Poland, 3,250,000 Rou-
manians kept out of Roumania against their
will. The Jugo-Slavs and the Czecho-Slovaks
are divided between the Empire of Austria and
the Kingdom of Hungary. In Bosnia-Herze-
govina alone is the entire Jugo-Slav popula-
tion homogeneous, but this is again involun-

THENATIONAUTIES
IN BOSNIA - HERZEGOVINA.

4" Serbo - Croats or Yugo • Slavs 2 minions

tary, as she is a kind of colony common to
Austria and Hungary.

The figures which accompany these maps

bring out the fact that altogether there are:

12 millions of Germans (10 in Austria and

2 in Hungary.) 10 millions of Magyars

in Hungary, which makes 22 millions of

THE ALLIES OF GERMANY W5

inhabitants in Austria-Hungary who rule
over:
4 millions of Latins (1 in Austria, 3 in Hun-
gary).
24K millions of Slavs (17 in Austria, 5^ in

Hungary, 2 in Bosnia-Herzegovina).
Say over ^S}4 millions of Slavs and Latins,
who are forced to submit to this domina-
tion. ^^
These figures show a majority of 6^ millions
in favor of the Slav and Latin subjects of the
Hapsburgs. In fact, however, this majority is
much larger, for actually the above figures do
not give the exact truth, as they are those of
the official statistics drawn up by Germans at
Vienna and Magyars at Budapesth, who have
systematically falsified them to serve their own
ends. The Germans and Magyars add to
their numbers and diminish in a large propor-
tion the true figures of the Latins and Slavs.
Nevertheless, in spite of this perversion of the
truth, it is plainly to be seen that, even accord-
ing to the official German and Magyar figures,
Austria-Hungary is run entirely in the interest
of the 22 millions of German-Magyars. The
truth is even more striking, for in relation to
these figures two facts stand out — one relative
to the Germans, the other to the Magyars.

206 AN ENDURING VICTORY

THE NATIONALITIES IN AUSTRIA

. /rOU MANIA

-Cn^e^ro /^'BULGARIA

Note. — The figures in the table below correspond with those used
for the ethnographic regions in the map. The numbers without primes
(for instance, 5) show the ethnographic regions of Hungary correspond-
ing to the nationalities of which the scattered fragments make up the
greater part of Austria.

No. 1' is not found in the table below, because it serves to indicate
in Hungary the Magyars, no group of \V^hich exists in Austria.

No. 3' in Austria designates the Austro-Roumanians who are
separated from Roumania.

No. 4' in Austria designates the Slovenes (1,250,000) and the Serbo-
Croats (750,000) in Dalmatia, these being different names belonging
to the Jugo-Slavic people still distributed in Hungary, Bosnia, and
in Herzegovina or Montenegro or Serbia.

No. 8' indicates the Italians of Istria and the Trentino, separated
from their mother country, Italy.

2'.
3'.
8'.
4'.
5'.
6'.

Germans 10,000,000 Germans, 10 millions.

Roumanians 250,000 1 x i^- -, mt

Italians 750,000 ^ ^^^''^' ^ ^^"^«°-

Jugo-Slavs 2,000,000

Cz?echs 6,500,000

Ruthenes 3,500,000

7'. Poles 5,000,000

Slavs,
Total .

17 millions.
.28 millions.

THE ALLIES OF GERMANY

207

THE NATIONALITIES IN HUNGARY

40 ao 120 160 Miles

1 I ri I I I > I I

^5'

Note. — The figures in the table correspond to those used for the
ethnographic regions in the map.

The figures with a prime (5', for instance) indicate the ethno-
graphic regions of Austria, Bosnia, and Herzegovina, Serbia, and
Roumania, corresponding to the nationalities of which fragments,
arbitrarily distributed, form the majority of the population of Hun-
gary.

The figures given are in round millions.

1. Magyars 10 millions.

2. Germans 2 "

3. Roumanians 3 "

4. Serbo-Croats 3 "

5. Czecho-Slovaks 2 "

6. Ruthenians J^ "

Race of Asiatic origin.
Teutonic race.
Latin race.

(Slavic race,
53^ millions.

20j^ millions.

Out of the 12 millions of Germans 10 mil-
lions are in Austria, of whom about 3 are mixed
with the Bohemian Czechs, in a country which
the Germans formerly wrested from them, and

208 AN ENDURING VICTORY

2 millions of Germans are distributed over
Hungary in small groups, geographically so
far removed from the bulk of the Germans
that one can hardly say that Austria-Hungary
exists for their benefit; this is really true only
of the 10 millions of Germans in Austria.

As for the 10 millions of Magyars, this figure
should be analysed from the standpoints of
differing social interests.

Among 10 millions of Magyars, 8, that is, the
vast majority, are poor agricultural or indus-
trial laborers, who have nothing and are cyni-
cally exploited by only 2 millions of large
landed proprietors, priests, and government
ofiicials, who still enjoy many feudal privileges,
as in the Middle Ages, and want to preserve
them, not only in regard to the 10 millions of
Slavs and Latins under the Magyar rule, but
also as to the 8 millions of the unfortunate
Magyar proletariat. The oppression of the 2
millions of feudal Magyars has a character at
once national and social in the case of the 10
millions of Slavs and Latins incorporated as
unwilling citizens of Hungary; and social as
regards the 8 millions of Magyar working men.
Now, if these last were really free and were
not subjected to the domination of the 2 mil-
lions of Magyars who oppress them socially.

THE ALLIES OF GERMANY 209

they could surely come to an understanding
with their Slav and Latin neighbors, which
would enable these to form the states to which
they are entitled; and for themselves the Mag-
yars, freed from their feudal masters, could
erect in the midst of Poland, Bohemia, Rouma-
nia, and Jugo-Slavia, a democratic Magyar
state which could agree with its neighbors to
form part of the economic territory of southern
central Europe.

Remembering the state of mind and the
social interests of the 8 millions of laboring
Magyars, it is plain that in reality it is not for
the advantage of the 12 millions of Magyars,
but only for the 2 millions of feudal masters
and functionaries of this race that Hungary
really exists.

The two observations just made are ex-
tremely important, for through them we estab-
lish the fact that Austria-Hungary only sub-
sists for the benefit of 10 millions of Germans
in Austria, and 2 millions of feudal Magyars in
Hungary, a total of 12 millions of inhabitants,
against the interests of 38 millions of Slavs,
Latins, and Magyar proletarians.

Austria-Hungary is therefore the empire of
extreme injustice, in a degree even worse than
Germany. In the latter country, among 68

210 AN ENDURING VICTORY

millions of inhabitants in 1914 at least 61 are
Germans, and perfectly willing to be governed
as a single nation; in Austria-Hungary, on the
contrary, 12 millions only of German-Magyars,
with the help of the Hapsburg dynasty, im-
pose their will on 38 millions of Slavs, Latins,
and Magyar laborers. For these causes, if
modern justice does not demand the overthrow
of Germany, at least it should insist inexorably
on that of Austria-Hungary.

This empire is maintained, also, for the ad-
vantage of the Hapsburg dynasty, which is
German, and has a strong interest in the con-
tinuation of the Austro-Hungarian state.

Before 1866, it was an open question if the
Hapsburgs could dominate the Hohenzollerns,
and rule in their stead over the mass of the
German population of central Europe, but
since the defeat of the Hapsburgs at Sadowa
by the Prussians, in 1866, this question has
been so completely settled that the Hapsburgs
have entirely renounced the idea of their
supremacy over the Hohenzollerns.

The alternative from which the former must
choose is explained very clearly in a small
pamphlet which appeared at Berlin in 1895,
Pangermany and Central Europe about 1950
{Gross -Deutschland und Mitteleuropa um das

THE ALLIES OF GERMANY 211

Jahr 1950), which is a pamphlet of remark-
able interest, for it described twenty-three
years ago the Pangerman design exactly as
it has come to pass since 1914.

"Certainly," said our Pangermanist in 1895,
"the successful Germanization of the non-
Germans of Austria-Hungary would not be
possible without the energetic support of the
47 millions of Germans of the empire (figures
of 1895). Naturally, in order to reach this
result the principle of the equal rights of na-
tionalities, and certain existing principles as
to public and private rights, would have to
be abandoned. . . .

"Zn case that the House of Hapsburg should
not be disposed nor well adapted to succeed in the
difficult task of welding together Austria-Hungary
and Germany, its part might be played by some
less important German families " (page 28).

It is, then, twenty-three years, at least, since
a sort of permanent ultimatum was presented
to the Hapsburgs by Berlin, an ultimatum
which, by the way, they long ago accepted.

It is easy to understand how this can be,
when we know the present position of the
Hapsburgs. To-day this house has an alter-
native from which to choose. It must totally
disappear through the triumph of the demo-

212 AN ENDURING VICTORY

cratic aspirations of its Slav and Latin subjects,
who will no longer endure its yoke — and this
triumph can only come by the victory of the
Entente, or it can continue thanks to the sup-
port of the Hohenzollerns, and this implies
that the Hapsburgs must do their utmost to
bring about a victory for Germany. It is
manifest that the latter solution would be
much less disastrous for the Austrian imperial
family, and they have therefore adopted it.
To sum up, the Hapsburgs, the 10 millions of
Germans in Austria, and the 2 millions of
feudal Magyars have dynastic, national, and
social reasons which give them a common
interest in the maintenance of Austria-Hun-
gary.

Under these conditions it is clear that the
continued existence of the empire is of great
advantage to Germany, as this existence is
the geographical condition on which central
Pangermany depends; for the Pangerman
bridge toward the east rests on three piers,
Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria reaching to Hun-
gary, and Turkey. Austria-Hungary is the
main pier of this bridge which unites Germany
to the east. The absolute necessity for the
maintenance of the Austrian Empire by the
Germans is so evident that in the pamphlet

THE ALLIES OF GERMANY £13

above mentioned, Gross-Deutschland und MiU
teleuropa um das Jahr 1950 — Berlin 1895 — it is
stated plainly: ''The present German Em-
pire, especially North Germany, needs Austria
for her eventual defense; this is well under-
stood by all Prussians" (page 23).

Looking at another aspect of the question,
at present the Magyar authorities, in order
to preserve their mediaeval privileges, which
are identically those of the Prussian Junkers,
very deliberately accept the creation of cen-
tral Pangermany. On the 1st of January,
1918, the president of the Hungarian Council
spoke as follows to the parliament at Buda-
pesth:

"Closer relations with Germany, owing to
considerations of the greatest value, are of
capital importance to us. If we wish to form
part of the great movement which will stretch
from the North Sea to the Black Sea, and
from thence into Asia Minor, we must take
measures accordingly."

Finally, the Tagespost, a German paper pub-
lished at Gratz, in Austria, said on May 14th,
1918:

"The strengthening of our alliance with Ger-
many demands an energetic conduct of our for-
eign policy. Germany has a vital interest in

214 AN ENDURING VICTORY

the existence of Austria-Hungary, in the main-
tenance of order within the empire, in the
economic development of its peoples, and the
prospects of the Austrian state."

The whole truth is contained in these lines,
as is well known to those, unfortunately too
few, who have studied on the spot for twenty
years the complicated problem of central Eu-
rope. The recent projects for reorganization
of the Austrian state with autonomy extended
to the Slavs, have been a farce to deceive the
Allies. No experienced politician, either Slav
or Latin, a Hapsburg subject, believes in these
proposals, for the word of a Hapsburg is worth
just about as much as that of a Hohenzollern.
In 1871 the Emperor Francis-Joseph solemnly
promised the Czechs to have himself crowned
King of Bohemia, but he has never since
chosen to keep his word.

Finally, at the moment when I write these
lines, Austria-Hungary begins to yield under
the pressure of her oppressed peoples. This
result has not been brought about without
trouble. A considerable number of Allied
politicians, diplomats, and publicists have
persisted since the beginning of the war in
the idea that Austria-Hungary must be main-
tained. They have thus worked for the King

THE ALLIES OF GERMANY 215

of Prussia, they have played the game of the
Pangermanists, they have deserted the cause
of democracy, they have incredibly prolonged
the war by hindering the attack on Austria,
the weakest point of the Central Empires,
and have contributed to keep in an atrocious
bondage admirable peoples like the Slavs and
Latins of Austria-Hungary, who have been
since the beginning of the struggle determined
allies of the Entente, and for a long time
worthy of unrestricted liberty.

IV.

The annexed map gives a comprehensive
view of the causes which determined the soli-
darity of the Central Powers. This map again
shows that there are five centres of imperial-
ism which rendered possible the formation of
Pangermany. The chief centre is Berlin, and
the four secondary centres, Vienna, Budapest,
Sofia, and Constantinople, have allowed Ger-
man militarism during the war to extend its
methods and its detestable influence as far as
the eastern confines of Turkey. These secon-
dary centres of imperialism, having greatly as-
sisted the propagation of the Pangerman cause,
ought to be completely destroyed.

216

AN ENDURING VICTORY

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CONCLUSIONS 217

Conclusions.

The main object of the war for the Entente
beyond and above all others should consist of
so complete a destruction of German milita-
rism that all other military systems will have
no further reason for existence, and a general
disarmament will ensue.

It is clear, therefore, that an incomplete vic-
tory of the Allies will allow German mihtarism
to continue even in a German republic, a thing
which is quite possible, because the German
socialists are for the most part nationalists,
many are even at bottom Pangermanists, and
they have the military spirit in the very blood
of their race. In this case, the other nations
will be obliged to keep up exhausting arma-
ments. For all the terrible nightmare of mili-
tarism would be prolonged under still more
intolerable conditions than before, the war hav-
ing laid unprecedentedly heavy financial bur-
dens on the people.

To make the world really safe for democracy
and enter into a new era, it is therefore indis-
pensable to bring about the total annihilation
of the German military system.

Let us, then, cherish no illusions; only the
thorough and complete victory of the Allies

218 AN ENDURING VICTORY

can bring about this annihilation, as the effect
of peace conditions carefully studied out to
produce such a result.

This final victory is now, however, relatively
easy to reach if the Allies are unalterably de-
termined to insist to the end on ten essential
conditions. These conditions have this pe-
culiarity that only one is applicable to the
terms of peace to be imposed on the enemy;
the others relate to the tactics and attitude to
be held by the Allies, and this is particularly
important in order to avoid mistakes, such as
it is quite possible may be committed during
the period of the armistice, mistakes which
would suffice to deprive us of the conclusive
success.

First Condition,

Written acceptances by the Germans and
the foundation of the republic in Germany
should not modify in any way the pro-
gramme of guarantees and realizations of all
kinds demanded by the Allies.

This for the reason that —
1st. An assassin is tried. His saying to the
court, "I am a republican," does not diminish

CONCLUSIONS 219

his punishment in any way. The spirit of
justice forbids it.

2d. The German sociahsts have shown them-
selves Pangermanists under the Kaiser; it is
not reasonable to think that they have sud-
denly abandoned their opinions.

3d. The German people is not unhappy be-
cause it has fought an unjust war; it is enraged
for the reason that it is forced to see that the
game will soon be lost.

4th. The Boches are excessively double-
dealing, and all their republican setting has for
its first object to seek to prevent the occupa-
tion of all Germany by the Allied armies. This
occupation, however, must take place to com-
pass a complete victory for the Entente, assure
in Europe the territorial changes necessary to
peace, and the reparation of the damage done,
for this reparation is indispensable to save
from complete ruin the countries invaded by
the Boches. In this direction every generosity
which is shown them will be in reality at the
expense of the French, of the Belgians, etc.,
whom the Boches have robbed and pillaged.

5th. Papers signed by the Germans have no
value whatever. The treaty which guaranteed
the neutrality of Belgium was as clear and pre-
cise as possible, but was of no use. We already

220 AN ENDURING VICTORY

see the Boehe republicans manoeuvring to have
the conditions of the armistice modified.

6th. To beheve that the course of events
may in a few months open the eyes of the Ger-
man people and entirely change them is to
betray complete ignorance of German history
and psychology. The mentality of these peo-
ple, their passion for wars of gain and for pil-
lage, has remained the same ever since it was
described by Tacitus. It does not, then, result
exclusively from the Hohenzollern influence, it
is century-long, which can only be gradually
modified if the Germans, by well-advised mea-
sures, are prevented during a long period from
following their predatory instincts.

Second Condition.

The Allies ought to be thoroughly convinced
that the German people is just as responsible
for the war as the Kaiser himself.

It is easy now that the Kaiser has fallen to
see a tendency in the Allied countries to dis-
tinguish between Kaiserism and the German
people. This tendency is, however, shown
only by those who have been wrong as to the
origin of the war. They say: "The German

CONCLUSIONS 2^1

people have been deceived by the Hohenzol-
lerns. They have renounced their sovereign.
It is a proof of good faith; we may consider
now the responsibihty of the people as greatly
diminished."

I protest with all my force against this ten-
dency and these opinions, for they show on
the part of their advocates a profound igno-
rance of Germany and are very far from the
truth.

I have studied Germany since the year 1894
and all my previsions as to the action of the
German Government and the German people
have been exactly fulfilled by the events, and I
am therefore a qualified witness and have the
right to be heard. I declare boldly that, if
William II was the inventor and stage-man-
ager of the Pangermanist plan, the Pangerman
propaganda which was carried on from 1895 to
1914 throughout the empire was welcomed en-
thusiastically, almost unanimously, by the Ger-
man people, for the Pangerman aims satisfied
their mentality and their ancestral passion for
spoils.

During four years of war, the whole German
population has upheld the Kaiser to the ex-
tent of its power. The laborers have shown
themselves quite as Pangermanist as the other

222 AN ENDURING VICTORY

social classes. To give a proof of this, at the
end of September, 1918, the Christian Associa-
tion of Metal Workers adopted the following
resolution: "The Christian Metal Workers
assembled at Duisburg . . . dwell particularly
on the hope that the coal districts of Longwy-
Briey, conquered by German arms, shall re-
main in the possession of the Empire. . . ."*

These lines show the attitude of mind of the
Boche Pangermanist workman a few weeks be-
fore the armistice, and if since then the Ger-
man people have ceased to express themselves
in the same way, it is because the Bulgarian
disaster has taken place, opening to the Allies
the road to Austria-Hungary, thus seizing cen-
tral Europe, which is for Germany the key of
the world.

It is not at all, then, the remorse they feel
for having waged a wicked war that now tor-
ments the Germans and had put a stop to their
annexationist demands, but solely their intense
anxiety lest the Allies should act so as to bring
about the permanent downfall of that Pan-
german scheme which had just taken form,
and in the accomplishment of which nearly
the entire Boche nation was passionately in-
terested during the last forty years. It is be-

* See Le Temps, September 30, 1918.

CONCLUSIONS 223

sides undeniable that the Germans mobihzed
from the outbreak of the war, have pillaged,
burned, stolen, and committed unheard-of
atrocities, as they were ordered to do. Since
they thus docilely obeyed their leaders when
they were commanded to commit crimes, they
are themselves equally responsible. Never in
the history of the world has any people act-
ing after long reflection been more responsible
for its acts than the German.

Those of the Allies who see only the guilt of
the Kaiser try by that means to shield his
people from their punishment, a thousand
times deserved; but though they may not in-
tend it, this would be a tremendous injustice
to the Allied populations. In fact, to divide
the cause of the German people from that of
their Kaiser would restrict the application of
conditions of reparation to the Emperor and
his immediate surroundings, while the people
of Germany with equal responsibility provide
the only basis broad enough to furnish to the
Allied populations of Europe the indemnities
which are strictly due and must be paid to
save them from complete ruin. It is, there-
fore, highly important to let the German na-
tion bear the full weight of its responsibility;
to relieve it of this would be in the first place

£24 AN ENDURING VICTORY

contrary to justice, and, secondly, in this way
the AUied peoples would not obtain sufficient
to make up the enormous losses they have
suffered through German aggression, and the
Germans, through the effect of the economic
consequences of the war, would finally bear
away the victory.

Third Condition,

Any negotiated peace should be resolutely
and absolutely rejected, as it would make im-
possible a complete victory for the Allies.

During all the period of the armistice the
Germans are going to struggle to arrive at a
negotiated peace. If we concede that the
republican attitude ought not to prevent the
German people from suffering the consequences
of the crimes that they have committed, we
must likewise concede that one of the justifica-
tions of the war lies in the fact that peace
shall be dictated to the German people. More
than that, a negotiated peace would be incon-
sistent with the formula of unconditional sur-
render which expresses so exactly the will of
the practical unanimity of the Allied peoples.

CONCLUSIONS 225

Fourth Condition,

To understand realistically the conditions
of a programme for a lasting peace.

An Allied peace programme, meant to bring
about precisely their ideal, should not be theo-
retic but exclusively practical. It is conse-
quently useless for such a programme to lay
down principles, already many times repeated,
on which we have all agreed for a long time.
But what is of capital importance is that this
programme should contain only, without the
omission of one essential point, the list of facts
and practical changes, the realization of which
on the soil of Europe will automatically assure
respect for the principles for which the Entente
is fighting. The peace programme of the
Allies should be merely technical, something
like a list of repairs which an expert mechanic
draws up after a careful examination of a com-
plicated machine which has suffered serious
injuries.

Europe is, in fact, a huge machine thrown
out of gear, and our common sense tells us
that it can only be put in order by mechanics
who thoroughly understand it.

226 AN ENDUEING VICTORY

The best Parisian architects could not sensi-
bly pretend to come and build a sky-scraper in
the city of New York unless they had pre-
viously carefully studied, with the help of
American architects, the peculiarities and de-
mands of this special form of construction. In
the same way the most intelligent and well-
meaning of the English, Americans, or French
could not make a concrete programme for the
reconstruction of Europe unless the plan had
been long and carefully studied on the spot
with the assistance of those who well under-
stood the complications of European ma-
chinery.

Therefore, and this explains in a great mea-
sure the mistakes as to the political situation
made during the war, there are in the Entente
countries extremely few men in politics who,
before the war, devoted themselves seriously
to the study of these grave foreign questions.
The Allied leaders, in order to be sure of estab-
lishing a just and permanent peace, would find
it to their interest to call to their aid two
groups of experts, for in this way all danger of
technical mistakes would be avoided.

1st. It would be necessary to pay the great-
est attention to the advice of experts in foreign
politics to be found among the Allies, whose

CONCLUSIONS 227

worth has been proved by the course of
events.

For example, in France Messrs. Louis Leger,
Ernest Denis, Haumant, and Auguste Gau-
vain; in England Messrs. Wickham Steed,
Seton-Watson, and Sir Arthur Evans are al-
most the only men who have seriously studied
for a long time, prior to the war, the difficult
problems of central Europe, the right solution
of which will form the firmest foundations of
peace. These men should be called in as tech-
nical advisers of the Inter-Allied commissions
charged to apply practically the peace pro-
gramme.

2d. There is a second group of experts whose
help would be valuable — even indispensable; I
mean the authorized representatives of the
Poles, the Czechs, the Jugo-Slavs, the Rouma-
nians, the Armenians, the Jews, etc., that is, of
all the peoples who are to be liberated from
the yoke of Germany and her allies.

Representatives of these peoples — such men
as Professor Masaryk, Dr. Kramarsh for the
Czecho-Slovaks; Paderewsky, Roman Dmovsky
for the Poles; Trumbich, Savic for the Jugo-
Slavs; Take Jonesco for the Roumanians;
Boghos Nubar Pacha for the Armenians, etc.
— ought they not also to be added to the

^28 AN ENDURING VICTORY

peace commission as technical advisers to aid
in the creation of a new Europe? This co-
operation is absolutely necessary.

We ought clearly to understand that the
entire liberation of oppressed peoples is in
reality the jfirst condition of a durable victory
of the Allies, for, unless the freedom of these
races is firmly established, we cannot build
up in central Europe the strong barrier which
will protect us against the aggressive spirit of
the Teutons.

Fifth Condition.

To realize a concrete programme of peace
conditions having for its object:

1st. To prevent a further outbreak of the
war.

2d. To repair as far as possible the deep in-
juries caused by German aggression.

A detailed technical programme for peace
cannot, in fact, be completely given until the
Allied forces occupy central Europe and the
Allied leaders have been able thus to secure at
its very source the exact and indispensable in-
formation which is certainly even now lacking.
In any case, it is necessary that from now

CONCLUSIONS 229

on public opinion should see clearly, at least
in its large outline, what should be the mini-
mum concrete programme. I shall therefore
attempt to make such a sketch; not that I feel
myself safe from error, but I can say that for
twenty-five years I have thought on the ques-
tions which peace now brings before us, and
that there is not one of them which I have not
studied on the spot, unprejudicedly and care-
fully consulting those best qualified to aid me
in their comprehension.

This concrete peace programme of the Allies
ought, as a whole, to turn into a reality the
excellent formula long ago thought out by Mr.
Lloyd George — ^guarantees, reparations, retri-
butions.

This programme ought to be composed of
very different elements brought together, and
each part studied so that they all may harmo-
niously combine their effects in such a way as
to reach the desired result.

These realizations fall, then, into five groups,
each one indispensable, and consequently all
of them together constitute the minimum
terms to be imposed.

1st. Territorial reorganizations in Europe.

2d. Social reforms which will overthrow the
foundations of German militarism.

230 AN ENDURING VICTORY

3d. The practical measures necessary to pre-
vent the rearmament of Germany.

4th. Measures of reparation for the injuries
caused by the war.

5th. The just restitutions dictated by the
idea of modern law and the moral sense of the
world.

7. Territorial reorganization of Europe,

Colonel Roosevelt and Senator Lodge have
given a programme for the reconstruction of
Europe which is, in my opinion, excellent, and
to which I subscribe. This programme makes
an application, perfectly well understood, of
the high principle which unites the Allies: the
right of self-determination of peoples — a princi-
ple which has been so eloquently and often
declared by President Wilson.

On the whole, these changes in European
territory ought to be undertaken so as to pro-
duce a two-fold result.

1st. To make it forever impossible to re-
constitute Pangermany.

2d. To assure the free development of the
peoples oppressed by Germany and her allies.

The Ottoman Empire, which forms an en-
tirely arbitrary territory, ought to be abolished,
for Turkish sovereignty ought only to exist in

CONCLUSIONS 231

really Turkish regions, that is, in Anatolia; all
the other races, Armenians, Jews, and Arabs,
should be made independent, as far as pos-
sible.

Constantinople being an essentially cosmo-
politan city, where the Turks, contrary to
what is the generally accepted idea, are only a
minority (45 per cent), it should be inter-
nationalized, together with the straits. Its
cosmopolitan character and its geographical
position, in touch with three continents —
Europe, Asia, and Africa, through Egypt —
make Constantinople the ideal place for the
seat of the League of Nations when it shall be
put into a practical shape.

The complete withdrawal of central Europe
from all Pangerman influence will best be ob-
tained —

First, by destroying all efforts of the Bulgars
to attain the hegemony of the Balkans, by
forcing them to give up the territory occupied
by them in the course of the war.

Secondly, as a basic and unavoidable condi-
tion of their victory the Allies should over-
throw the Empire of Austria, and the King-
dom of Hungary, states which are simply
founded on a frightful injustice.

Thirdly, the Poles, Danes, and French who

232 AN ENDURING VICTORY

are now held in subjection by the Germans
should be liberated.

These three rearrangements would lead to
the establishment of five new independent
states, all absolutely essential to the new order
in Europe:

1st. Poland, including Dantzig, as an open-
ing on the Baltic.

2d. The state of the Czecho-Slovaks, or
Bohemia, which must be understood to in-
clude also her strategic mountain frontiers on
the north and west.

3d. A Magyar state democratized in the
manner indicated below.

4th. A Jugo-Slav state, embracing the Jugo-
slav regions of Austria-Hungary, Serbia, and
Montenegro.

5th. Greater Roumania, comprising all the
Roumanian districts in Bukovina, Transyl-
vania, and Bessarabia.

These five states, whose interest will lie in
agreement among themselves and being made
up of anti-German elements only — as will ap-
pear later in the case of a democratic Magyar
state— will form about 60 millions of inhabi-
tants, between the Baltic and Greece.

They will thus provide a first great barrier
which will make a revival of Pangermanism

CONCLUSIONS 233

impossible. Behind this barrier, and with the
help of the Alhes, can be organized federated
Russia and the other states which Colonel
Roosevelt and Senator Lodge mentioned in
their programme.

As for Germany, when she has set free about
7 millions of Poles, Alsatians, Lorrainers, and
Danes, she will still retain 61 millions of in-
habitants. As Austria does not include more
than about 7 millions of Germans, well grouped
geographically, even if these 7 million Ger-
mans wished to unite themselves with Ger-
many, they would together not amount to
more than 68 millions of inhabitants — that is,
the same population as before the war, but
with this difference that Germany would have
lost all the strategic regions (Poland and
Alsace-Lorraine) which facilitated her aggres-
sions, would have had to pay each year for
a very long period an annual instalment of
indemnity which would have prevented her
from arming herself again, and would find
herself surrounded by people vitally interested
to prevent any revival of the former military
system.

The annexed map does not pretend to show
the solution of these problems in detail, but
it gives a general view of the territorial modi-

234

AN ENDURING VICTORY

CONCLUSIONS 235

fications absolutely required. This map has a
history. My studies had long ago convinced
me that the only way to defeat Pangermanism
was to form the five new states above described.

At the end of 1916, 1 wished to publish this
map in the Paris Illustration, but I found my-
self opposed by the veto of the French censor,
who was much alarmed by my map. Even at
this time Allied diplomatists viewed the inde-
pendence of Poland with little confidence, and
one could not speak of the Jugo-Slavs for fear
of vexing the Italians, who then had designs
on Dalmatia. As for the Czecho-Slovaks,
their importance was very vaguely recognized,
and the hope of Allied diplomacy was to make
a separate peace with Austria-Hungary.

Finding my publication interdicted, I tried
to get round the difficulty by saying to my
censors :

"After all, Europe, as I depict it, is only the
result of the principle declared by President
Wilson: 'I propose that every people shall be
free to determine its own policy.' So let me
print my map with this text."

This proposal overcame the scruples of my
critics and at last my map — which was greatly
in advance of the conceptions of Allied diplo-
mats — was allowed to appear in the Illustra-

236 AN ENDURING VICTORY

tion of February 24 th, 1917. Since then pub-
lic opinion has been strongly influenced by
events, and the Entente has become more con-
vinced that this plan gave a very reasonable
idea of what ought to be the state of Europe
after the peace.

I ought strongly to emphasize the fact that
the claim apparently now being renewed by
the Italians to establish themselves in the final
ownership of a considerable part of the Dalma-
tian coast would very seriously imperil that
organization of central Europe which is indis-
pensable to the peace of the world. In reality,
the Jugo-Slav problem can only be perma-
nently solved with the aid of mutual and sin-
cere concessions which the Italians and Jugo-
slavs should make to each other. Let the half
of Istria, with Trieste and Pola, go to Italy,
although the majority of the population of
this territory is incontestably Slavic. Thus
Italy will be assured of control over the Adri-
atic to a permissible extent. But to the east
of the boundary-line of Istria let the Jugo-
slavs be assured of complete liberty. Fiume
is a port indispensable not only to the Jugo-
Slav state but to the democratized Magyar
state and to Bohemia, the products of which
would be able to freely reach the Adriatic

CONCLUSIONS 237

through a transport system which should be
protected by guarantees. It is absolutely
necessary that American public opinion shall
understand at once how inadmissible are the
Italian claims to Dalmatia and bring pressure
to bear on the Jugo-Slavs and Italians to in-
duce them to make as soon as possible the
mutual concessions which both their own in-
terest and that of peace in Europe really
require.

//. Social reforms will lead to the destruction
of the aristocratic foundations of German mili-
tarism,

A. By the abolition of the feudal property-
system in Hungary,

In Hungary, as a matter of fact, the only
real pro-Prussians imbued with imperialist
ideas are the large landed proprietors among
the Magyars, who enjoy feudal privileges, and
in order to preserve them have a personal in-
terest in making common cause with the Prus-
sian Junkers.

The great Magyar landowners have been for
many years actual monopolists. Two thou-
sand only among them hold more than 7 mil-
lions of hectares, that is, more than a third of
all the arable land in Hungary, and, saturated

238 AN ENDURING VICTORY

to the bone as they are with ideas of aristoc-
racy and autocracy, they not only oppress the
10 miUions of Slavs and Latins, who are un-
willing Hungarian subjects, but also 8 millions
of Magyars, industrial but chiefly agricultural
laborers.

If, then, the feudal privileges are abolished
in Hungary, we shall at the same time destroy
the only support of German militarism in
south central Europe and make possible the
liberation of 8 millions of Magyar proleta-
rians.

It is, therefore, highly necessary for the En-
tente to include as soon as possible in its plans
the expropriation of Magyar feudal landlords
and the division of their estates for the benefit
of the working classes organized into agricul-
tural syndicates for purposes of cultivation.

These social reforms and changes, which
indeed are beginning to be made spontane-
ously, so indispensable are they, will have
great consequences; they will give political
power in the Magyar districts of Hungary to
the true Magyar people, who have up to now
been entirely held down by the oppression of
the feudal proprietors. The final result would
be the creation of a democratic state, exclu-
sively Magyar, of about 10 million inhabi-

CONCLUSIONS 239

tants, whose interest it would be, both poHtical
and economic, to ally themselves with their
neighbors, Poland, Bohemia, Roumania, and
Jugo-Slavia, and also to form part of the great
anti-German bulwark.

B. Destruction of Prussian Junkers.

These are at the very base of Prussian mili-
tarism, and as an injurious caste they ought
to be completely abolished. This could be
accomplished legally by employing the follow-
ing method:

All the Junkers are at the same time large
landed proprietors and officers in the German
army; in the latter capacity each one of them
has certainly been guilty during the war of
criminal acts and orders, which by rights
should be severely punished. After our vic-
tory, the Allies should set up legal commissions
before which these crimes could be tried, their
authors indicted, and proper punishment de-
creed. The landed property of the Junkers
should be taken as indemnity and divided,
according to the region, for the benefit of
Prussian or Polish peasants.

Ill, The practical steps to be taken in order
to prevent the rearmament of Germany.

Destruction in the whole German territory

240 AN ENDURING VICTORY

of machinery specially designed for the manu-
facture of war material. (This, of course,
would also apply to Austria-Hungary, Bulga-
ria, and Turkey.)

IV, Measures of reparation for injuries
caused by the war.

1st. Returning by Germany and her allies
to the proper owners of all furniture, ma-
chinery, and property of all kinds stolen from
invaded countries.

2d. Giving to the legitimate owners of Ger-
man furniture, machinery, and other property,
as compensation for stolen goods which cannot
be returned in kind.

3d. The determination and security of the
annuities that Germany should furnish to the
states attacked by her, as compensation for
injuries of all sorts and expenses caused by the
war.

The Germans have stripped the invaded
countries of everything, and the war has been
so much more costly to the Allies than to Ger-
many that if the economic differences result-
ing from this state of things were to last the
military success of the Allies would mean
nothing, especially for France, for in a few
years after the conclusion of peace Germany

CONCLUSIONS 241

would appear victorious, simply through the
economic consequences of the war.

This overwhelming money question is of
such extraordinary importance that if we wish
to avoid terrible financial catastrophes sure
to follow the conclusion of a peace we may
consider satisfactory, but too hastily con-
cluded, America's great business men ought to
insist that money questions should be dealt
with thoroughly by the Allies, studied without
haste, and completely solved.

The attempt to see clearly in the interests
of the future is all the more necessary because
the extreme importance of the financial aspect
of the situation is not as well understood as it
ought to be by many of those who nevertheless
are deeply interested.

This is the case for reasons which follow,
and will be understood, taking France as an
example.

Before the war 6 milliards only of bank bills
were in circulation in France, while up to the
present moment 30 milliards have been issued;
also many people have made enormous profits
in munitions of war, while workmen's wages
have considerably increased. The eflPect of
this apparently satisfactory situation is that
many Frenchmen do not realize to what an

242 AN ENDURING VICTORY

extraordinary extent the war has brought ruin
to France.

The 30 miUiards of paper which now circu-
late so easily produce an illusion of wealth,
but this wealth is partly artificial, and partly
conditional. In fact, the truth is that these
30 milliards of French bank bills are secured by
the consequences of an absolute victory which
will oblige Germany to repair progressively the
immense losses of all kinds caused to France;
this is also equally true of the other countries
which have suffered under German aggression.

Germany is perfectly able to pay, certainly
not all at once, but by annual amounts. If
the credit of the German Empire fails under
the final defeat, the material riches of Ger-
many, which are considerable, will remain.

When the Allies are in a condition to study
German revenues carefully and at leisure on
the spot, when the possession of a fair share
of these revenues is secured, by guarantees as
solid and durable as may be necessary, then
the German people can certainly pay annually
a sum of at least 10 milliards of marks. Let
us suppose that the share of each of the Allied
states who are creditors of Germany is 2 mil-
liards a year. These 2 milliards being guar-
anteed during a very long period, thanks to

CONCLUSIONS 243

modern financial combinations, will be suflS-
cient to allow each Allied state to raise inter-
nal loans, relatively small, and therefore easy
to float, which will enable it to draw in its
budget, enormously increased by the war, sav-
ing its citizens from the taxes which would
crush them to death, but which it would be
impossible to avoid if the Germans were not
made to fear, as far as possible, the burden of
injuries which they have caused.

The annual sums to be paid by the Germans
should not be too heavy; in order to make
these payments absolutely certain, therefore,
these annuities will be spread over a long
period, probably at least fifty years, but, as the
German people had prepared their attacks for
more than forty years, what could be more
natural and just than that they should have
to bear the consequences for a nearly equal
space of time ?

As a further consideration, the reparations
to be made by means of annual payments
spread over a long period will be a powerful
guarantee of peace, for it is certain that Ger-
many could never keep up the immense ma-
terial of war required by modern armies as
long as she will be forced to pay the amount
of her reparations.

244 AN ENDURING VICTORY

V. The retributions required by justice.
The frightful massacres and tortures of the
civil population which have been ordered dur-
ing the war by the Turks, the Bulgars, the
Austrians, the Magyars, and the Germans
would bring disgrace on the Entente if left
unpunished. But the mode of dealing out
justice in these cases can only be settled after
investigations on the spot by the Allies, which
will make plain facts which are now only par-
tially known.

Sixth Condition.

To understand that the presence of Allied
soldiers in Germany and Austria-Hungary is
absolutely indispensable to a thorough and
permanent victory.

Let us face the truth. Without the pres-
ence of Allied troops in the above countries
can it be seriously believed —

1st. That if the Germans are free to pursue
their intrigues in central Europe, Poland,
Bohemia, the democratized Magyar state, the
Jugo-Slavia, and Greater Roumania could
organize themselves on a solid basis, so as to
assure a long peace ?

CONCLUSIONS 245

2d. That the aboHtion of feudal landed
property in Hungary could be accomplished
as thoroughly as is necessary to deprive mili-
tarism of all support in these regions?

3d. That all the Prussian Junkers will be
tried, and their land divided as it certainly
should he?

4th. That the enormous amount of personal
property stolen by the Germans from Allied
citizens, and now scattered all over Germany
can be actually restored to the owners .^^

5th. That throughout the Central Empires
machinery specially intended for the manu-
facture of war material would be destroyed ?

6th. That a long and difficult economic in-
vestigation will be undertaken by the Allies
in every part of Germany, to decide on the
amount to be paid every year as reparation
during a very long period, for damage caused
by her aggression ?

7th. That courts of justice will be instituted
as is most necessary, to try German officers
and soldiers who have been guilty of particu-
larly odious crimes during the war?

8th. That the annuities due from Germany
will be regularly paid?

No fair-minded person can deny that the
only really satisfactory way that can be imag-

^46 AN ENDURING VICTORY

ined to secure the enforcement of these eight
points, each one an essential part of victory,
would consist in the presence of Allied soldiers
wherever they might be needed in Germany
and Austria-Hungary.

All disposable Allied troops ought to be
advanced at once from Belgrade and Fiume
toward the north through Bohemia. Their
presence on the soil of what has been Austria-
Hungary will give a solid foundation to the
new states carved from the fragments of the
Hapsburg monarchy, and will serve in future
as a rampart against Germanism.

Finally, these Allied troops will be in the
right place to make at the proper time the
entrance into Berlin; a satisfaction, also, which
ought not to be refused to those splendid sol-
diers who have fought for four years with ex-
traordinary tenacity, and through the depths of
suffering have gained freedom for the world.

Seventh Condition,

To admit that to enable the Germans to
repair the damage they have caused, they
should not be placed under a general boycott.

Conditions of peace should be logical and
coherent, and as it is of supreme importance

CONCLUSIONS £47

that the Germans should repair the injuries
they have caused, as far as is humanly possi-
ble, they must have the means of payment.

It is plain to the meanest comprehension
that if we prevented the Germans from work-
ing and making money, they could never pay
their debts, and this would certainly be the
result obtained if we followed the numerous
plans published in the Allied press, and put
them under a general boycott. In my opinion
this conception should be abandoned, as di-
rectly contrary to the interests of the victims
of German aggression. The Germans should be
allowed to work and engage in commerce, but
owing to the extraordinary circumstances aris-
ing out of this long war, it will be necessary
that German commerce go on under the control
of inter-Allied commissions. These commis-
sions, however, must avoid vexatious measures,
for the Boche debtor cannot earn the money
to pay what he owes if he is constantly worried.

Eighth Condition,

To consider the League of Nations from a
realistic and not a Utopian standpoint.

The Utopian conditions which obtained be-
fore the war in the states now in alliance.

248 AN ENDURING VICTORY

greatly facilitated the preparations for the
German aggression; and we ought carefully to
avoid a repetition of such fatal blunders. It
is, therefore, urgently necessary to form an
idea of this much-talked-of League of Nations,
which will conform to the interests of peace,
our views on the subject being still vague.

According to the way you understand it, the
League of Nations is either a beautiful concep-
tion to be applied progressively, or a dangerous
absurdity; and the distinction between these
two aspects of the same idea is easy to see.

It is not only right but necessary to resolve
that after the war the actual alliance between
the nations, which now unites three-quarters
of the people on earth, should become a per-
manent league, with an essential object, to
prevent any future war. Logically this League
of Nations itself as soon as peace is concluded
should undertake the following:

1st. The distribution of troops composed of
detachments from Allied forces in disputed
regions of Europe, and also the occupation of
German territory wherever necessary.

2d. To form and decide on the functions of
the inter-Allied commissions sent to study on
the spot the resources of Germany, in order
to fix the amount of the indemnity due to the

CONCLUSIONS 249

victims of her aggressions, and to insure its
payment.

The League of Nations should also act in
the larger interests of peace, as a kind of tri-
bunal which would itself see to the execution
of its decisions, and, thus understood, the
league could not fail to receive the support of
practically the whole world.

There are some incorrigible lunatics who
propose, contrary to common sense, and to
the most elementary ideas of justice, to admit
Germany to the League of Nations as soon as
peace is concluded. Would it not be absurd
to say to the German people, ''We will treat
you as brothers," when they will be forced to
pay an indemnity to the Allies during a long
term of years ?

There are millions of Allied soldiers, broken-
hearted women who mourn husbands, fathers,
and fiances, Slavs and Latins from central
Europe, the Balkans, and Russia, Greeks, and
Armenians, who have all suffered in their ten-
derest affections to the extreme limits of
human agony through the action of German
people. Can we seriously ask of all these to
say to the Germans whose hands are still
stained with the blood of their crimes: "Peo-
ple of Germany, you are our brothers, come

250 AN ENDURING VICTORY

and join with us in the League of Nations"?
If a son was bereaved by a crime, could one
say to the orphan: ''Treat the murderer of
your father as a brother" ? None but a mad-
man could have such a conception of the
League of Nations. At the present time dis-
cussions as to the league are theoretic; the
public generally does not understand clearly
what is intended, but when it is known that
the idea is from this time forth to treat the
Boche assassins as equals and brothers, it will
raise a furious storm of indignation. The up-
shot will be to discredit the plan for a League
of Nations, even in its practical form, of which
the effect would be lasting as well as attrac-
tive and desirable.

Ninth Condition,

To understand that the pacifists are as
dangerous to the establishment of a durable
peace as the Pangermanists.

For a quarter of a century the world has
suffered from two great diseases — ^Pangerman-
ism and pacifism. Both are follies, the second
at least as dangerous as the first. At bottom
the Pangerman plan was an insane dream,
which should never have been allowed to be

CONCLUSIONS 251

realized. Nothing, in fact, was easier during
twenty years than for the countries threatened
by this monstrous plan to render impossible
any attempt at its execution. That this did
not happen was due to a coincidence, which
history must explain. During this period the
different countries of the Entente were ruled
by pacifists, who taught the mass of the peo-
ple that peace was assured, without consider-
ing the striking signification of the increasing
armaments of Germany and the great spread
of Pangermanist doctrines. This is the un-
answerable reason why the pacifists of the
Entente are themselves primarily responsible
for the war, and they also are the cause of its
extreme duration, with all the misery resulting
therefrom.

It is a fact that, instead of wishing to prose-
cute the war with determination, the pacifists
who were able to influence the course of the
Entente, were constantly seeking for peace,
where a strong offensive was needed, which
would long ago have put a stop to the carnage
by an Allied victory.

The pacifist influence is largely responsible
for the fact that during four years, instead of
pushing an offensive campaign against Bul-
garia and Austria-Hungary, which — as is now

252 AN ENDURING VICTORY

strikingly proved — were the extreme weak
points of the Central Empires, we persistently
tried to negotiate with these countries separate
peace treaties which were impossible of attain-
ment. The result was that our whole military
force, from the beginning of the war, has been
concentrated on the western front, exactly the
line where the Germans were strongest. As a
consequence, the abortive peace negotiations
with Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary, which
took place in the first years of the war, have
cost millions of men to the Allies.

If these things have happened before and
during the war, it is because the pacifist is an
ideologist, which implies an extraordinary igno-
rance of the realities, things he does not even
wish to understand.

The chief misfortune is that the public has
not yet been enlightened as to the great dan-
ger that pacifism represents for the peace of
the world, and thus naturally public opinion
extends an undeserved consideration toward
many pacifists. As an instance of this, Sir
Edward Grey is almost unanimously held to
be an idealist who made every imaginable
effort before 1914 to avert war. The truth,
however, is exactly the contrary, not that Sir
Edward Grey lacked good-will, but because he

CONCLUSIONS 253

did not understand the situation; he is, no
doubt, an excellent trout-fisher, but he is an
Englishman with very incomplete ideas on
European questions, in spite of the fact that
he was at the head of the Foreign Office for a
long time.

In 1912-13, as we learn by Prince Lich-
nowsky's memoirs. Sir Edward ceded all Meso-
potamia to Germany as a sphere of influence,
something which he had no sort of right to do,
and, though he did not suspect it, this action
made Germany wish to realize at once the rest
of the Pangerman plan in the Balkans and
central Europe — a plan which was entirely un-
known to Sir Edward Grey. It is true that,
if you give up 20 per cent voluntarily to a
German, he will at once try to take the rest
away from you, but, in his quality of inveter-
ate pacifist, Sir Edward entirely ignored Ger-
man psychology.

For this very reason when, before declaring
war, Germany asked if England would take
part in the struggle. Sir Edward Grey made
no answer, but, if he had understood the Ger-
mans, he would have replied, "Yes," and this
word, resolutely uttered at that moment, might
have moved Germany to give up her aggres-
sion.

254 AN ENDURING VICTORY

Let me add something still more extraordi-
nary which is unknown to the general public.
In September, 1915, the Bulgars were prepar-
ing to invade Serbia, when the Serbian repre-
sentatives in London said to Sir Edward Grey:
"We shall attack Bulgaria, before her concen-
tration is complete, as the only way to pre-
vent an invasion of our country." To which
Sir Edward replied, forbidding absolutely an
attack on the Bulgars, for he thought that
they were mobilizing to join the Entente.

This colossal mistake on the part of Sir
Edward Grey allowed Serbia to be invaded,
and enabled Germany to effect that junction
with the east which so greatly lengthened the
war. It seems evident that since his reply led
to such consequences, a very heavy responsi-
bility for the millions of deaths that resulted
rests upon Sir Edward Grey. When the reck-
oning is made after the war it is highly possi-
ble that the pacifists will be found to have
massacred more men than even the Panger-
mans.

To sum up, a pacifist is an ideologist, en-
tirely indifferent to facts, which he refuses to
understand — an attitude which gives a crimi-
nal character to his ignorance. A pacifist is
always talking about peace, but he is as inca-

CONCLUSIONS ^55

pable of maintaining peace as he is of making
war with resolution and competence, so that
it may be short, and therefore less sanguinary.

A pacifist, then, is entirely unable to grasp
the conditions necessary to a lasting peace
with the Boches, who generally deceive him
like a child.

It is in the highest degree important, there-
fore, to prevent the pacifists — as dangerous
ideologists — ^from exerting their influence on
the conclusion of peace. They would cer-
tainly allow causes of war to remain, which
those who have real knowledge of European
conditions would undoubtedly suppress.

Tenth Condition,

Not to allow ourselves to be deceived as to
the character of the Bolshevist danger.

Those, unfortunately so few, who are really
acquainted with the German character, believe
that Bolshevism in Germany is not of the
same character as in Russia.

In fact, Bolshevism, which served the Ger-
man Great General Staff as a means for de-
stroying Russia, is at present a weapon very
well managed by the Boche Social Democrats,

^5Q AN ENDURING VICTORY

which, if care is not taken, will permit them to
destroy the solidarity of the Entente countries
during the armistice, and so finally save Ger-
many from real defeat under cover of the
general confusion.

To appreciate the whole extent of this dan-
ger one has only to note the results gained
from the Entente by the Bolshevist blackmail
from the 10th of November, 1918, the date of
the signature of the armistice, to the 15th of
November only.

In this very short space of time the Boches
said, on the 12th of November: "We need
definitive peace as soon as possible. If not,
all Germany will be the prey of Bolshevism."
And the Allies visibly appeared to hurry for-
ward the peace conference.

Then, on the 14th of November, the Boches,
men and women, put in their word: "The
terms of the armistice must be softened and
the German people must be fed, for, unless this
is done, Bolshevism," etc., etc. And though
this last demand has not been accepted at the
moment when I write these lines, it is at least
being taken into consideration. But we must
choose. America clearly cannot feed every-
body in Europe. It is certain that the winter
of 1918-19 will be a terrible one. Therefore,

CONCLUSIONS 257

if the Germans are to be fed, we condemn to
death miUions of Slavs and Latins of central
Europe who are Allies of the Entente, who
have strongly contributed to its victory, who
are necessary to form a powerful barrier
against any renewed offensive of Pangerman-
ism, and who for four years have been sys-
tematically reduced to famine by these very
Boches. Has there ever been anything like
this in history ?

The best course for the Allies to pursue to
secure themselves against the Bolshevist dan-
ger, which is only too real, is to act not accord-
ing to the advice of the Boches, but according
to our own good sense. Let us send the Allied
soldiers into Austria-Hungary to organize order
there, to secure the feeding first of all of those
peoples who have been our faithful allies, and
then, if there is anything left, the Boches
themselves. Let us try this way and we shall
see that the Bolshevist peril will disappear in
regions where the Allies are able to act directly.

* *

Such are the different conditions which the
AUies must reaUze if they are really seeking
the end of mihtarism to the fullest extent
possible.

258 AN ENDURING VICTORY

As the German propaganda, aided by all
those in the Entente nations who are working
to save Germany by leading us into incomplete
and hastily made decisions, threatens during
the period of the armistice to seriously com-
promise the victory of the Allies, it is particu-
larly necessary, in order to neutralize this dan-
gerous effort, that American public opinion
shall declare itself clearly, without delay and
with the greatest emphasis, for the following
measures :

1. The presence of Allied soldiers in central
Europe during the reorganization.

2. The rejection of every form of generosity
in material matters which can only be shown
to the Germans at the expense of the Allies.

3. Reparation by the German people, strictly
held responsible for all the damage which they
have caused — and this to the greatest extent
possible.

4. A suflSciently exhaustive examination by
the Peace Conference of the immense prob-
lems which it has to solve.

The carrying out of this programme of
action only requires from public opinion about
six months of effort, clear vision, and persis-
tence; but it is such that it will avoid the
very great dangers of the armistice period and

CONCLUSIONS 259

will secure to the Allies real, complete, and
permanent victory. In my opinion, this exer-
tion of vigilance is absolutely necessary in
order that history may say with certainty:
America saved Europe.

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