'X{*y 
 
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS. 
 
 BTt "i 
 
 Chap. Copyriglit M. 
 
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 
 
Digitized by the Internet Archive 
 in 2011 with funding from 
 The Library of Congress 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/analysisofmoralmOOstev 
 
The Analysis of 
 Moral Man 
 
 An Outline of the Conditions of Human 
 Righteousness 
 
 C. M. STEVANS 
 
 Author of '^ The Morals of the Po'ets" '^^ Immortality and Happiness,' 
 ' ' The Ridiculous and the Sublime.,'" etc., etc. 
 
 CHICAGO 
 
 THE POPULAR PUBLISHING COMPANY 
 
 Publishers 
 
19271 
 
 COPYRIGHT, 1900, 
 BY C. M. STEVAN3 
 
 LC Control Number 
 
 tmp96 025787 
 
Moral Science is, the systematic application 
 of the ultimate Rule of right to all concep- 
 tions of moral conduct. 
 
The Analysis of Moral Man 
 
 SOURCES OF MORAL KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 1. Not in Sensation. 
 
 Sensation is neither an act, nor the knowl- 
 edge of an act, but an involuntary experience 
 consequent on personal relation to a sensitive 
 organism, and to objects capable of making 
 impressions on that organism. 
 
 2. Not in Perception. 
 
 Perception being a simple recognition of 
 fact, can include only such facts as are capa- 
 ble of being known by simple observation, 
 that is, without comparison a.nd inference. 
 
 3. Not in Judgment. 
 
 The knowledge of an action as fact is one 
 thing, the knowledge of that action as right 
 or wrong is another thing. The former in- 
 volves simple perception, the latter is attained 
 only by comparison. 
 
4- The Province of Reason. 
 
 Reason discovers the moral law, without 
 explaining how this discovery has been pro- 
 vided for or on what ultimate basis the law 
 rests. 
 
 5. The Moral Standard. 
 
 History reveals an irregular development 
 of the moral code, largely due to racial and 
 cHmatic conditions, but due also to the sub- 
 jective character of the moral sense. What 
 was right to the Asiatic barbarian was wrong 
 to the Greek. What was right to the slave 
 was wrong to the philosopher. The ethics of 
 the middle ages seem faulty to the modern 
 mind. 
 
 STEPS IN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 1. Perception is the first state or affection 
 of the human mind. By this we gain all our 
 knowledge of the powers and qualities of the 
 material objects about us. The instruments 
 of perception are the five corporeal senses, 
 seeing, feeling, hearing, tasting, and smelhng. 
 
 2. Consciousness, or reflection, is that 
 
notice, which the mind takes of its own opera- 
 tions, and modes of existence. 
 
 3. Abstraction literaHy impHes the separat- 
 ing of one thing from another ; but, as a men- 
 tal operation, it denotes only a partial con- 
 sideration of anything. It is the act of con- 
 sidering one or more of the properties or cir- 
 cumstances of an object, apart from the rest. 
 
 4. Attention expresses the immediate direc- 
 tion of the mind to a subject. The distinct- 
 ness of our notions, the correctness of our 
 judgments, and the improvement of all our in- 
 tellectual powers, depend, in a great degree, 
 on the habitual exercise of this act. 
 
 5. Definitions are usually distinguished into 
 two kinds ; one nominal, or of the name ; the 
 other real, or of the thing. A definition of the 
 name is merely a specification of the object, 
 to which a name is applied. A definition of 
 the thing is properly an analysis of a thing, 
 or an enumeration of its principal attributes. 
 
 6. Analysis deserves a place among the op- 
 erations, by which the elements of knowledge 
 are acquired. Without this, cur perceptive 
 powers would give U3 only confused and im- 
 perfect notions of the objects around us. To 
 
analyze is nothing more, than to distinguish 
 successively the several parts of any com- 
 pound subject. 
 
 Reasoning. 
 
 1. Thorough information. 
 
 2. Systematic demonstration. 
 
 3. Logical adaptation. 
 
 Reasoning is a process, by which unknown 
 truths are inferred from those, which are al- 
 ready known or admitted. The evidence, em- 
 ployed in reasoning, is deductive, and is dis- 
 tinguished into two kinds, which are, moral 
 and demonstrative. Moral evidence is that 
 species of proof, which is employed on sub- 
 jects, directly or indirectly connected with 
 moral conduct. It is not however confined to 
 such subjects; but is extended to all those 
 facts and events, concerning which we do not 
 obtain the evidence of sense, intuition, or 
 demonstration; and to all the general truths, 
 which are deduced from observation and ex- 
 perience. Demonstrative evidence is that, by 
 which we trace the relations, subsisting among 
 things, in their nature immutable, like the 
 subjects of geometry and arithmetic. 
 
 2. Judgment is an act of the mind, uniting 
 
— 9 — 
 
 or separating two objects of thought accord- 
 ing as they are perceived to agree or disagree. 
 The relation between these objects is some- 
 times discovered by barely contemplating 
 them, without reference to anything else; 
 and sometimes by comparing them with other 
 objects to which they have a known relation. 
 The former is simple comparison; the latter 
 is an act of reasoning. The determination of 
 the mind in both cases is denominated judg- 
 ment. Every act of judgment is grounded 
 on some sort of evidence. That, which deter- 
 mines the mind in simple comparison, is called 
 intuitive evidence; and that, which is em- 
 ployed in reasoning deductive. 
 External Conditions. 
 
 1. Observation. 
 
 2. Attention. 
 
 Attention expresses the state of the mind, 
 when it is steadily directed, for some time, 
 whether longer or shorter, to some object of 
 sense or intellect, exclusive of other objects. 
 When we say, that any external object, or any 
 subject of thought, which is purely internal, 
 receives attention, it seems to be the fact, as 
 far as we are able to determine, that the mind 
 
— 10 — 
 
 is occupied with the subject of its attention, 
 whatever it is, for a certain period, and that 
 all other things are, for the time being, shut 
 out. In other words, the grasp, which the 
 mind fixes upon the object of its contempla- 
 tions, is an undivided, an unbroken one. 
 Internal Conditions. 
 
 I. Memory, 
 Reproduction. 
 Recognition. 
 
 Memory is that power or susceptibility of 
 the mind, from which arise those conceptions, 
 which are modified by the relation of past 
 time. It is not a simple, but complex state 
 of the intellectual principle, implying, (i) a 
 conception of the object, (2) the relation of 
 priority in its existence. That is, we not only 
 have a conception of the object, but this con- 
 ception is attended with the conviction, that 
 it underwent the examination of our senses, or 
 was perceived by us at some former period. 
 
 Memory. 
 When good — 
 
 1. Facility in receiving ideas. 
 
 2. Power of retaining ideas. 
 
 3. Readiness in reproducing. 
 
— II — 
 
 Advantages — 
 
 1. Furnishes comparison of ideas, the basis 
 
 of judgment. 
 
 2. Susceptibihty to remembrances is intel- 
 
 lectual and moral. 
 Means of Improving — 
 
 1. Selection of lines of intentional memory. 
 
 2. Correlation of ideas. 
 
 3. Systematize and refer to general prin- 
 
 ciples. 
 
 4. Undivided attention. 
 
 5. Thorough understanding. 
 
 6. Congenial and serviceable exercise. 
 
 7. Use accessories to thorough conception 
 
 and comprehension. 
 Means of improving the memory — 
 
 1. Discrimination for the interesting and 
 
 the useful. 
 
 2. Knowledge classified. 
 
 3. Full acquaintance and understanding. 
 
 4. Exercised on useful subjects. 
 
 5. Explanatory accessories associated. 
 
 6. Writing useful in bringing the subject 
 
 closer to the attention. 
 
 7. Occasional mnemonics. 
 
 The general principles or law of associa- 
 
— 12 — 
 
 tion, which are sometimes called the primary 
 laws, are these, resemblance, contrast, con- 
 tiguity in time and place, and cause and ef- 
 fect. — The secondary laws of association, 
 which give such great variety to the results 
 of the primary principles, are these; — (i) Dif- 
 ferences in the length of time of the Co^ex- 
 istence of the associated feelings at first; — 
 (2) Their greater or less degree of liveli- 
 ness ; — (3) The frequency of their renewal ; — 
 (4) The circumstances of their being more or 
 less recent ; — (5) The degree or extent of their 
 co-existence with other feelings; — (6) Di- 
 versities in temper and disposition ; — (7) The 
 influence of particular professions and pur- 
 suits; — (8) Certain constitutional differences 
 in mental character. 
 
 Ideas, 
 
 Locke, having reference tO' the mode, in 
 which our simple ideas are received into the 
 mind, has divided them into the four follow- 
 ing classes; 
 
 (i) Those, which are received by one sense 
 merely ; 
 
 (2) Those, which are received from more 
 than one sense; 
 
— 13 — 
 
 (3) Those, which are received from reflec- 
 
 tion or the observation of what takes 
 place in our minds; 
 
 (4) Those, which are received by reflection, 
 
 and come into the mind also' at other 
 times, in various ways, by the senses ; 
 or which in some instances are received 
 by sensation and reflection combined, 
 and not separately, as in some occa- 
 sions of the origin of the simple idea 
 of power. 
 Facts may be classified — 
 (i). Original. 
 Sensation. 
 Consciousness. 
 Self-abilities. 
 (2) General. 
 Self-existence. 
 Conscious identity. 
 Self-active abiHties. 
 Reasonable discriminations. 
 Fact, kinds necessary — 
 As two and two are four. 
 Contingent. 
 
 The world exists. 
 Facts in the mind — 
 
— 14 — 
 
 Elemental — activity, intelligence, liberty. 
 
 Universal — Being, diversity, identity, re- 
 semblance. 
 
 Causal — Cause and effect, motion, number, 
 period of time. 
 Substance and quality — 
 
 Vitality. 
 
 Personality. 
 
 Objectivity — Whole and part, measure, 
 space impenetrability. 
 
 Aesthetical — Truth, sublimity, beauty, de- 
 formity, ludicrousness. 
 
 Ethical — Conscience discerns moral differ- 
 ences, sense of obligation, reasonable 
 duty. 
 
 THE WILL. (THE FACULTY OF RESO- 
 LUTION.) 
 
 Volition is the origin of activity only in so 
 far as actions are regulated by our intellectual 
 powers. It is only the intelligent being which 
 can contemplate, devise, and execute a fonii 
 of activity purely subjective in its source. 
 What we originate is achieved, in respect of 
 
— 15 — 
 
 plan, by means of thought ; in respect of force, 
 by means of will. Only such action as owes 
 its form to intellectual as well as volitional 
 power is properly named Self-originated. 
 It starts, fixes, concentrates, clears and 
 
 regulates the mind. 
 It gives to self-determination a positive se- 
 lection and a spontaneous action. 
 It directs — 
 
 1. To a definite object. 
 
 2. To an alternate object. 
 
 3. To the fulfilling of inner desire. 
 It proceeds — 
 
 1. By pre-volitional cognition. 
 
 2. Emotion. 
 
 3. Conscious responsibility. 
 It has power — 
 
 1. To resist constitutional nature. 
 
 2. To us€ the means of environment. 
 
 3. To shape self according to the judg- 
 ment. 
 
 Action is not free but the normal origin of 
 action is free. 
 Differences Between Knowing and Feeling. 
 Feeling is a modification of self, knowing 
 necessitates an outward impression. 
 
— id- 
 Feeling is pleasure or pain, knowing is true 
 or false. 
 Feelings are — 
 
 1. Fugitive. 
 
 2. Variable. 
 
 3. Intricate. 
 Knowing is — 
 
 1. Permanent. 
 
 2. Invariable. 
 
 3. Uniform. 
 
 Intellect is strengthened and feeling weak- 
 ened by familiarity and repetition. 
 Cognitions may be recalled, feeling can not. 
 Intellect can entertain opposite proposi- 
 tions at once, feeling can not experi- 
 ence pain and joy at once. 
 Mind. 
 
 Subjective — conceptions. 
 
 Resolves into judgments. 
 Objective — perceptions. 
 
 Takes cognizance of externals, thus 
 harvesting ideas. 
 
 Responsible. 
 Individual causation is proven by the at- 
 tributes and functions of the intellect, sensi- 
 bilities and will. 
 
— 17^ 
 
 The conceptions of causality, afe in desires, 
 duties, and reasons. 
 
 This causality influences the conceptions. 
 
 It may be classified into simple succession 
 and its causes may be qualified as, mechanical, 
 physical, vital, spontaneous. 
 
 The ground for certainties in causalities 
 are — 
 
 The negative ones of chance and fate. 
 
 The positive necessities. 
 
 1. Individual. 
 
 2. Absolute. 
 
 3. Physical. 
 
 4. Hypothetical. 
 
 The possible and attainable. 
 The criterion of right and wrong as 
 to feeling is — 
 
 1. Pleasure. 
 
 2. Pain. 
 
 As to reason is — ' 
 
 1. Usefulness. 
 
 2. Detriment. 
 As to will — 
 
 1. The possible. 
 
 2. The impossible. 
 As to the ideal — 
 
-— 1« — 
 
 1. Personal perfection. 
 
 2. Universal well-being. 
 The responsible agent — 
 
 As a personal agent, the individual is cre- 
 ated an embodied self-active spirit. 
 
 1. He has motives. 
 For good. 
 
 For gain. 
 For revenge. 
 
 2. He is an arbiter and executor by 
 choice and volition. 
 
 3. His guides are — 
 Prudence. 
 Conscience. 
 Rational ideal. 
 
 4. His moral nature is conscious and 
 constructive. 
 
 As a moral agent, the theorists classify 
 themselves as — experimentalists, intuitional- 
 ists. 
 
 The requisites of responsibility are' — intel- 
 ligence, conscience, free-will. 
 
 Duty is a responsibility that is ethically nec- 
 essary. Morality consists in deliberate self- 
 submission to that necessity. Education in 
 
— 19 — 
 
 moral life to the establishment of character is 
 the most responsible of duties. 
 
 Free agency recognizes — 
 
 Free exercise in full maturity of mind. 
 Mental health. 
 Freedom from habit. 
 
 Free from the necessity of conditions or cir- 
 cumstance. 
 Unbiased action within the limits of mind. 
 
 Man exhibits his spirituality in — 
 Cognizing. 
 Volitionizing. 
 Feeling. 
 Hopefulness for immortality. 
 
 The general facts of responsibility are^ — 
 
 Man exists in relationships responsible ac- 
 cording to his ability to know and to do. 
 
 Through these relationships, the mind de- 
 sires to achieve certain results. 
 
 The dispositions of these desires may vary 
 but the moral obligations due the rela- 
 tionships are invariable. 
 
 The belief in the indestructibility and evo- 
 lution of mind. 
 
 Ideals relating to perfection and happiness. 
 
— 20 — ' 
 
 The determination of rules and means to at- 
 tain ideals. 
 These ideals are constructed in — 
 
 1. Egoism or self-love; that is the greatest 
 attainable surplus of pleasure over pain, 
 pleasure being valued according tO' its 
 pleasantness. 
 
 The impracticability of the egoistic ideal 
 
 is shown in — 
 Transient pleasures cannot satisfy. 
 The analysis and comparison of pleasures 
 
 necessary to a choice is unfavorable to 
 
 pleasure. 
 Error in judging pleasures defeat their 
 
 aim. 
 
 2. Intuitionalism, the ability to see without 
 education the conduct that is right and 
 best. 
 
 3. Education, a careful and balanced train- 
 ing of all the faculties to a just apprecia- 
 tion of the beautiful, the true and good, 
 duty to be discovered by reason. 
 
 Individual Education. 
 Rights of the child — 
 
 1. To be well born. 
 
 2. To be well protected. 
 
— 21 — 
 
 3- To be under wholesome influence, ex- 
 ample and precept. 
 4. To be well reared. 
 Physically 
 Mentally. 
 Socially. 
 Morally. 
 Responsibility of the child^ — 
 
 1. To the extent of its memory, under- 
 standing, and capability. 
 
 2. To the extent of its experience and re- 
 flective faculties. 
 
 3. To the extent of the wisdom inculcated 
 by trusted advisers. 
 
 Fundamentals of its training — 
 
 1. It must be taught — 
 Obedience to authority. 
 Self-discipline. 
 
 Care of health. 
 Senses alert. 
 Wholesome thinking. 
 Righteous conduct. 
 Correct expression. 
 
 Inspiration for progress In moral excel- 
 lence and usefulness. 
 
 2. Its temperament must be understood. 
 
— 22 — 
 
 Excitable or calm. 
 Energetic or dull. 
 
 3. It's disposition must be understood. 
 Sensitive or indifferent. 
 
 Careful or careless. 
 Hopeful or sad. 
 Sympathetic or unsympathetic. 
 Kind or unkind. 
 Leader or follower. 
 Arrogant or respectful. 
 Honest or dishonest. 
 
 4. Is its perception. 
 Quick or slow. 
 Accurate or inaccurate. 
 
 5. Is its memory of words 
 
 (i.) Quick or slow. 
 (2) Clear or confused. 
 Of ideas. 
 
 (i) Distinct or indistinct. 
 (2) Orderly or disorderly. 
 
 6. Is its imagination 
 Strong or weak. 
 Receptive or creative. 
 Intellectual or emotional. 
 Logical or illogical. 
 
 7. Is its attention 
 
— 23 — 
 
 Strong or weak. 
 Voluntary or non-voluntary. 
 
 8. Is its understanding 
 Quick or slow. 
 Permanent or fleeting. 
 Independent or fleeting. 
 
 9. Is its language. 
 Broad or narrow. 
 Exact or inexact. 
 Plain or figurative. 
 
 10. Is its will 
 
 Weak or aggressive. 
 Yielding or obstinate. 
 Fluctuating or firm. 
 
 Practical understanding is the surest means 
 to wise conduct. "Give me an understanding 
 heart" is the most ethical prayer children can 
 be taught to utter. 
 
 The child should never feel the need of re- 
 sort to excuses, equivocations, and prevarica- 
 tions. 
 
 Children should be advised not censured 
 whatever their failures if it is evident they have 
 done the best they were able tO' know and to 
 do. 
 
— 24 — 
 
 The child as a pupil has the right to the 
 best individual constructive training. 
 
 1. Under conditions of — 
 Bodily comfort. 
 Favorable surroundings. 
 At regular times. 
 
 .With sufficient variety to prevent weari- 
 ness and monotony. 
 
 2. Through practical means — • 
 For mental discipline. 
 
 To become expert and efficient. 
 To gain useful information. 
 To attain the art and wisdom of success- 
 ful conduct. 
 
 3. By incentives to study, as in — 
 Gratification of conscience. 
 Desire for self-development. 
 
 (i.) In well-regulated emulation. 
 
 (2.) Curiosity. 
 
 (3.) Love of approbation. 
 
 (4.) To gain honorable position. 
 
 (5.) To become an esteemed citizen. 
 
 (6.) To fulfill the desire for knowledge. 
 
 (7.) For moral culture. 
 
 (8.) Worthy aspiration. 
 
 (9.) To secure success in life. 
 
— 25 — 
 
 4. By the 'development of cHaracter in 
 The desire to learn. 
 
 To have self-reliance. 
 
 Perseverance. 
 
 Attention. 
 
 'Accuracy. 
 
 Patience. 
 
 Inspiring ideals. 
 
 5. By such government as makes clear his 
 
 duty — 
 To himself. 
 To his schoolmates. 
 To school property. 
 To tasks assigned. 
 To the teacher, school officers, visitors, 
 
 the community, and the people at 
 
 large. 
 The pupil should be taught to learu' — 
 
 1. By trying to be interested. 
 
 2. By striving to comprehend. 
 
 3. By reflecting in order to remember. 
 
 4. By giving close attention. 
 
 5. By studying systematically. 
 
 6. By using his knowledge profitably. 
 
 7. By original investigation and thought. 
 He should be enabled to realize the folly of — 
 
— 26 — 
 
 1. Offenses against himself, as — 
 Injuring his own property. 
 
 Losing friendship by rudeness or dis- 
 agreeable manners. 
 Neglecting duties. 
 Uncleanliness. 
 Bad habits. 
 Immorality. 
 
 2. Offenses against companions, as — 
 Destroying their property. 
 Annoying and injuring them. 
 Accusing falsely. 
 
 Slandering. 
 Enticing to wrong. 
 
 3. Offenses against property, as — 
 Destruction by carelessness. 
 Wilful injury. 
 
 Aiding and abetting injury. 
 
 4. Offenses against teachers. 
 Disobedience. 
 Disrespect. 
 Annoyance. 
 Slandering. 
 
 Deceit. 
 Conspiracy. 
 
 5. Offenses against the school. 
 
— 27 — 
 
 Restlessness. 
 Inattention. 
 Laughter. 
 Evil speaking. 
 Insubordination, 
 Neglect of study. 
 Irregular attendance. 
 Irreverence. 
 Distrustfulness. 
 Stubbornness. 
 6. Offenses against society. 
 Disturbing the peace. 
 Trespassing. 
 Boisterousness. 
 Recklessness. 
 Injurious influence. 
 Profanity. 
 Vulgarity. 
 
 Neglect of the opportunities of life. 
 Study is necessary for self-improvement — 
 
 1. Mentally. 
 
 2. Morally. 
 
 3. Socially. 
 
 4. Professionally. 
 
 Study should be pursued with method and 
 system toward a given aim. 
 
— 28 — 
 
 Among the benefits of study are that it — 
 
 1. Awakens thought. 
 
 2. Arouses the affections. 
 
 3. Excites interest. 
 
 4. Makes firm and resolute the under- 
 
 standing and will. 
 
 5. Promotes beneficial pleasure. 
 
 6. Defends virtue. 
 
 7. Disciplines and develops the natural 
 
 powers. 
 
 8. Enlarges and liberates the mind. 
 g. Civilizes the emotions. 
 
 ID. Makes labor and life pleasurable and 
 profitable. 
 Discursive study should be avoided since it — 
 
 1. Debilitates the mind. 
 
 2. Makes opinion inaccurate and uncertain. 
 
 3. Weakens impressions. 
 
 4. Renders knowledge unwieldly. 
 Sedulousness in study includes — 
 
 1. Attention. 
 
 2. Constancy. 
 
 3. Firmness. 
 
 4. Discipline. 
 
 5. Composure. 
 
 6. Success. 
 
— 29 — 
 
 Knowledge derived from study does not In- 
 sure happiness because of the limitations and 
 imperfections of understanding, but it directs 
 to utilitarian and substantial welfare. 
 
 Rules for happiness formulated from inves- 
 tigation, experience, and study may become 
 stimulative and protective under the direction 
 of custom and law. 
 
 Personal Culture. 
 
 The formation of character is the most ex- 
 cellent constructive work of mind. 
 Its groundVi^ork is in realizing — 
 
 1. The value of wisdom. 
 
 2. The need of education. 
 
 3. The fundamental laws of duty. 
 
 4. The value of moral obligation. 
 
 5. The sacredness of human affection. 
 
 6. The excellence of moral sentiment. 
 
 7. The faithfulness of love. 
 
 It's incentive is enlightened self-love as 
 shown — 
 I. In bodily welfare through — 
 Physical sense. 
 
 Exercise. '■ 
 
 Action. 
 
_3o — 
 
 Exhilaration. 
 Dietetics. 
 Hygienics. 
 Cosmetics. 
 Aesthetics. 
 
 The general conservation and extension 
 of physical strength. 
 
 2. In intellectual powers through — 
 The love of novelty. 
 
 The emotions of — 
 
 (i.) Surprise. 
 
 (2.) Wonder. 
 
 (3.) Astonishment. 
 
 (4.) Admiration. 
 The pleasures of — 
 
 (i.) Memory. 
 
 (2.) Genius. 
 
 (3.) Knowledge. 
 
 (4.) Intellectual dominion. 
 
 3. In the desire for — 
 Property. 
 
 Social favor. 
 
 Esteem. 
 
 Power. 
 
 4. In care for moral welfare as found in — 
 Self-knowledge. 
 
— 31 — 
 
 Sanitary science. 
 Social science. 
 
 Self-Culture. 
 
 It succeeds by self-knowing and self-train- 
 ing derived from the receptive and construct- 
 ive ability of mind. 
 It promotes self-possession — 
 
 1. In society. 
 
 2. In danger. 
 
 3. In business. 
 
 4. In desires, 
 
 5. In passions. 
 
 6. In amusements. 
 It educates by — 
 
 1. Practical study. 
 
 2. Comparative observation. 
 
 3. Social reciprocity in useful experience. 
 
 4. Self-control. 
 
 5. Self-direction. 
 
 Its sources of error are in— 
 
 1. Ignorance of facts. 
 
 2. Unenlightened passion. 
 
 3. Heedless habits. 
 
 4. Self-deception. 
 
 5. Unsystematic and desultory work. 
 
— 32 — 
 
 The predominance of theological ideals may 
 become — 
 
 1. Superstition. 
 
 2. Fanaticism. 
 
 3. Heedless enthusiasm. 
 
 4. Bigotry. 
 
 5. Dogmatism. 
 
 6. Persecution. 
 
 It may find in benevolent religious ideals the 
 most consecrated forms of — 
 
 1. Veneration. 
 
 2. DcA^otion. 
 
 3. Gratitude. 
 
 4. Trust. 
 
 5. Moral fear. 
 
 6. Piety. 
 
 7. Faith, hope and love. 
 
 8. Truth. 
 
 Conduct in Relation to Self-Culture. 
 Its origin is in the triple nature and constitu- 
 tion of man — 
 I. Animal (the selfish). 
 Influences from mere animal nature gov- 
 erned by the will. 
 Happiness not worthiness, is its highest 
 law. 
 
— sa- 
 lts motives rest solely in the gratification 
 of appetite regulated by expediency 
 and interest. 
 
 2. Rational. (The selfish and ethical). 
 Discriminations made by reason. 
 Supremacy its chief ambition. 
 Desire amenable only to duty. 
 Recognizes the beautiful and sublime. 
 Capable of knowing self and determin- 
 ing well-being. 
 
 3. Spiritual. (The ethical and religious). 
 Personal righteousness the chief duty, 
 
 manifesting itself in — 
 (i.) Benevolence. 
 (2.) Spiritual exhortation. 
 (3.) Worship. 
 Its motives are — 
 
 1. The instinctive ones of appetite; as — 
 Hunger. 
 
 Thirst. 
 Desire. 
 Love. 
 
 2. Those natural to self ; asi — 
 The evils seen in — 
 
 (i.) Sadness and sorrow. 
 (2.) Grief and anguis'H. 
 
— 34 — 
 
 (3.) Resentment and anger. 
 (4.) Fear and terror. 
 (5.) Dread and despair. 
 (6.) Shame and remorse. 
 (7.) Hatred and revenge. 
 The good known in — 
 
 (i.) Contentment and satisfaction. 
 
 (2.) Gladness and joy. 
 
 (3.) Dehg^ht and desire. 
 
 (4.) Complacency and hope. 
 
 (5.) Gratification and gratitude. 
 
 (6.) Friendship, love and truth. 
 
 (7,) Antipathy against evil and wrong, 
 
 4. In the knowledge that good is valuable 
 
 in itself and therefore a proper motive 
 of choice and action. 
 
 5. In the necessity of choosing the least 
 
 evil and the better good. 
 
 6. In the consciousness of a connection and 
 
 sympathy betv/een the choosing and 
 the chosen. 
 Its motives are most apparent in — 
 I. The appetites; as — 
 Hunger. 
 Thirst. 
 Air. 
 
— 35 — 
 
 Sleep. 
 Passion, 
 
 2. The affections; as^ — 
 Moral indignation. 
 Complacent love. 
 
 3. Benevolence; as — 
 Moral love. 
 Spiritual interest. 
 
 It has forces moving to action from within 
 and from without which the individual can not 
 explain and may not control. The "good and 
 sufficient" reason,^ can never be the criterion 
 of moral conduct, as it is simply the judgment 
 of an individual not responsible in his judg- 
 ments for humanity. 
 It should consider reputation — 
 I. By avoiding — 
 The appearance of evil. 
 The occasion of censure or ridicule. 
 The characteristics of — 
 (i.) Vanity and conceit. 
 (2.) Haughtiness and inordinate pride. 
 (3.) Assurance and arrogance. 
 (4.) Contempt and contumely. 
 (5.) Affectation and hypocrisy. 
 (6.) Censoriousness and envy. 
 
-36- 
 
 2. By practicing — 
 Hjumility and modesty. 
 Honesty and charity. 
 Emulation and ambition. 
 Its interests are served best in the emoluments 
 arising from — 
 Sagacious compensations. 
 Benevolent reciprocity. 
 Patient industry. 
 Ambition in Relation to Self-Culture. 
 The pursuit of wealth is deleterious — 
 
 1. It is a violence of right in its incentives 
 
 of— 
 Force and fraud. 
 Deception and dishonesty. 
 Circumvention and distortion. 
 
 2. It induces servile conduct to obtain 
 
 ends. 
 
 3. It demands a mean compliance in order 
 
 to obtain results. 
 
 4. It fosters false professions. 
 
 5. It necessitates the prominence of self- 
 
 ishness and the neglect of personal 
 culture. 
 The love of power militates against personal 
 culture when it induces — ' 
 
— 37 — 
 
 1. Obstinacy and intolerance. 
 
 2. Waywardness and bigotry. 
 
 3. Churlishness and tyranny. 
 
 . 4. Partisanship and unworthy ambition. 
 Safeguards are found against the perversions 
 
 of ambition in the predominance of the 
 
 affections as shown by — 
 
 1. Sympathy and gratitude. 
 
 2. Patriotism and piety. 
 
 The passions may prevent or ruin personal 
 culture by the natural causes of — 
 Timidity and heedlessness. 
 Cowardice and excessive anxiety. 
 Pessimism and despair. 
 The passions may be emotions leading to self- 
 enlightenment through — 
 Contentment and patience. 
 Resignation and fortitude. 
 Forbearance and forgiveness. 
 Faith, hope and love. 
 The judicial ethics in personal culture are— 
 I. Personal feeling by — 
 Self condemnation. 
 Self respect. 
 Repentance. 
 Humility. 
 
-38- 
 
 Earnest aspiration. 
 2. Social righteousness in — 
 Love of good. 
 Aversion to evil. 
 Moral discernment. 
 Practical righteousness. 
 Divine righteoiusness. 
 Remedial ethics follows judgment through — 
 
 1. Association. 
 
 2. Education. 
 
 3. Theology. 
 
 The chief personal duties 'toward personal 
 culture are — 
 
 1. Honesty. 
 
 2. Industry. 
 
 3. Usefulness. 
 
 Culture indicates a. caste in human life accord- 
 ing to^ — 
 
 1. Cleanliness or uncleanliness. 
 
 2. Aspiration or passivity. 
 
 3. Sense or credulity. 
 
 4. Morality or immorality. 
 
 The chief personal duties toward success in 
 the avocations of life are — 
 
 1. Perseverance and method. 
 
 2. Orig*inality and enterprise. 
 
— 39 — 
 
 3- Prudence and dispatch'. 
 
 4. Attention and justice. 
 
 5. Foresight and veracity. 
 
 6. Moderation and interest. 
 
 The chief personal duties toward pleasure 
 are — 
 
 1. Simplicity. 
 
 2. Chastity. 
 
 3. Temperance. 
 
 Personal Influence. 
 Its general benevolence is found most in the 
 social affections ; as — 
 
 1. Conjugal and parental. 
 
 2. Filial and fraternal. 
 
 3. Domestic and humane. 
 
 4. Local and friendly. 
 
 5. Civic and patriotic. 
 
 6. Constitutional and legislative. 
 
 7. International and racial. 
 
 Its special educative benevolence is found in — 
 
 1. The relations of sex, age and condition. 
 
 2. In economy. 
 Domestic and civil. 
 Political and national. 
 
 Its closest affinities are shown — 
 
 I. In religionary sympathies through — 
 
— 40 — 
 
 SGrfatitude and adoration. 
 Obedience and love. 
 2. In the religious feeling through — 
 Devotion. 
 Fidelity. 
 Sympathy. 
 Faith. 
 Love^ — 
 
 Desire. 
 Peace — 
 
 Trust. 
 Hope. 
 
 (Joy.) 
 
 Cheerfulness — 
 
 (Gladness.) 
 Aspiration — 
 
 (Perfection.) 
 Reverence — 
 (Worship.) 
 Right doing may have any one of many 
 motives. No mystery when prompted by fear, 
 dread of punishment, hope of reward, love of 
 praise, pride, vanity, worldly prudence, con- 
 fusion as to one's own interests, force of con- 
 ventionality, or habit. Only when such mo- 
 tives are wanting do we ascribe goodness. 
 
— 41 — 
 
 Right-doing is outward, and means conduct 
 looking at the well-being of others. Good- 
 ness is inward, and means making the wel- 
 fare of others our interest — ^joy in another's 
 joy, pain in his pain. The springs of our ac- 
 tion come to lie elsewhere than in ourselves. 
 We say in effect : "Thy ill is my ill, thy weal 
 my weal, thy ends are my ends." Goodness 
 amounts to altruism, or otherness, which in 
 turn implies sympathy. 
 The foundations of morality, as given, are — 
 
 Self-interest. 
 
 Utility. 
 
 Laws of nature. 
 
 Laws of country. 
 
 Conscience. 
 The enlightenment from spiritual teachers. — 
 
 The Scriptures. 
 The m'oral motive is given as—' 
 
 Pleasure against displeasure. 
 
 Love against hatred. 
 
 Moral love against passion. 
 
 Happiness against sorrow. 
 Moral love is the main source of faithfulness 
 to duty since it preserves — 
 
 Fidelity and justness. 
 
— 42 — 
 
 Temperateness and courage. 
 Moral love has its force in the recognition ol 
 obligation — 
 Obligation implies— 
 
 1. A law. 
 
 2. An ideal. 
 
 Law and the ideal embody the science of 
 duty. 
 Ethics has its foundation on — . 
 
 Truth, — that is, invariable fact. 
 
 Love, — that is, enlightened help. 
 
 The Psychology of Ethics is completed 
 only by constructing a philosophy of all that 
 belongs to our personality as Moral beings. 
 Each characteristic must be looked at, not 
 only apart, but also in relation to other fea- 
 tures of our Moral Nature. 
 The responsible steps in ethics are — 
 
 Choosing and acting from choice. 
 
 Action must be rational not instinctive. 
 
 Reason and impulse have an object. 
 
 Sensibility is the source of the conception 
 of an object. 
 
 The object and the means of attaining it 
 bring into use man's moral notions. 
 
 Duties and Rights are moral equivalents 
 
— 43 — 
 
 resting equally upon the unchangeable war- 
 rant of moral law as the universal rule of hu- 
 man action. The ground on which any man 
 can claim a right entitled to acknowledgment 
 by others is exactly the ground on which by 
 necessity he must own moral obligation. 
 
 And the conflict of harmony and duty be- 
 gins. 
 Individual ethics requires— 
 
 ,The conservation of abilities and powers. 
 
 The consideration of circumstances and 
 conditions. 
 
 Self-support. 
 
 The best possible use of time and talent. 
 Altruistic ethics are found in — 
 
 Benevolent reciprocity. 
 
 Desire for the well-being of mankind. 
 
 Theistic ethics may be included in the su- 
 preme devotion of mind in a system wholly 
 material or human or Christian. It may be 
 theistic reconstruction or theistic obedience. 
 The chief theories as to the nature of virtuous 
 action are found in — 
 
 Utilitarianism. 
 
 Perfectionism, 
 
 Rectitude. 
 
— .44 — 
 
 Standards of right and wrong — 
 
 Moral sense. 
 Common sense. 
 Understanding. 
 Rule of right. 
 Fitness of things. 
 Law of nature. 
 Law of reason. 
 Justice. 
 Good order. 
 Truth. 
 
 Moral Philosophy is the rational explana- 
 tion of our moral actions, moral nature, and 
 moral relations. It is a science of the knowl- 
 edge of moral distinctions, of the practice of 
 morality, and of the existing moral system, 
 or order in the universe. It is a theory of 
 knowing and of being, but only of such know- 
 ing as is concerned with moral distinctions, 
 and only of being which is capable of pos- 
 sessing and applying such knowledge. 
 The theories of Morality usually given are — 
 
 The theory of right to the exclusion of the 
 ought. 
 
 The theory of alternate right anH ought. 
 
The theory of ought to the exclusion of 
 
 right. 
 The theory of ought and right combined. 
 A question of pleasure or pain. 
 The impulse of desire. 
 The authority of superiors. 
 Ultimiate Moral Rule. 
 Objective theories — 
 
 1. Authority of the state (Hobbes). 
 
 2. Revealed will of God (Descartes and 
 Dymond). 
 
 3. Interest in the nature of things — 
 Fitness (Clarke). 
 
 Truth (Wollaston). 
 Relationship (Waylan'd). 
 Beauty of good will (Edwards). 
 The ultimate right/is immutable. Ultimate 
 truths are not the product of power, but must 
 themselves condition all exertions of power. 
 Power does not make the principles by which 
 all power must be judged. 
 
 The ultimate right is universal. As in rela- 
 tion to all ultimate truth, no one can appropri- 
 ate it and say of it, this isi my truth; but that 
 same truth will also be truth for every mind 
 that looks into the same ground. 
 
-46- 
 
 4- Highest happiness — 
 
 Unrestricted selfishness (Epicurus). 
 Moderation (Aristotle). 
 Religious (Paley). 
 Utility (Malthus). 
 Benevolence (Dwight and Taylor). 
 Subjective theories — 
 
 1. Susceptibility to pride gratified by 
 flattery (Mandeville). 
 
 2. Inner reciprocal sympathy (Adam 
 Smith). 
 
 3. An inner sense of moral distinctions 
 (Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Brown and 
 Schlegel). 
 
 4. Immediate intuition (Cudworth, Kant 
 and Coleridge). 
 
 Ultimate right is immutable and universal. 
 Pure morality consists — 
 Pure mindedness. 
 Independence and decision. 
 The personal duties of self-control and 
 
 self-culture. 
 The relative duties of kindness and re- 
 spect. 
 Pure morality co<ntemplates character and 
 conduct solely in the light of the ultimate 
 
-4;— 
 
 rule of highest worthiness, and approves of 
 only such character and conduct as stands 
 conformed to that rule. This is the highest 
 good and the only motive to right action, and 
 can admit of no other motive in co-action 
 with it. If other than the end of highest 
 worthiness blend in the conduct, the life is 
 not purely virtuous. 
 
 Moral sentiments which are in harmony 
 with Conscience, are by consequence in har- 
 mony with our whole moral nature. Disre- 
 gard of such sentiments, indicates some form 
 of moral disorder. 
 Moral worth is shown in — 
 
 The magnanimity of experience. 
 
 The rational mildness of good breeding 
 and modesty. 
 
 The intellectual judgment giving — 
 
 1. Power. 
 
 2. Worth. 
 
 3. Dignity. 
 Moral expediency is in 
 
 The development of conscience by — 
 
 1. Gratitude. 
 
 2. Sympathy. 
 
 3. Resentment against wrong. 
 
-48- 
 
 4. Shame in wilful error. 
 
 5. Integrity and honor. 
 
 6. Hope and fear. 
 
 7. Joy and aversion. 
 
 8. Hatred and love. 
 
 All moral rights are perfect rights, irre- 
 spective of their being claimed by the person 
 or enforced by society. A moral right rests 
 wholly upon moral law, and must be uniform 
 as that law. Positive law may not attempt to 
 enforce all rights alike, because all rights do 
 not admit of being enforced ; but this does not 
 affect ethical validity of any of the rights of a 
 moral being. 
 
 Moral rights are not self-exacted, nor can 
 they be voluntarily surrendered. They are 
 the necessary accompaniment of obligation 
 under reign of moral law. They are as un- 
 changeable as the nature of moral law itself, 
 and the obligation which it imposes. 
 
 The Philosophy of Morals must be as ap- 
 plicable to the persons by whom I am sur- 
 rounded as to myself, and must be capable of 
 verification by them. But it need not be ap- 
 plicable to other living beings around me, 
 or capable of verification in their experience. 
 
— 49 — 
 
 The virtues show their value in the improve- 
 ment of manhood and womanhood. 
 Intellectual — 
 
 1. In the pursuit of truth ; as 
 Sincerity. 
 Impartiality. 
 Concentration. 
 Accuracy. 
 
 2. In communicating truth ; as 
 Truthfulness. 
 
 Candor. 
 
 Consideration. 
 
 Prudence. 
 
 Wisdom. 
 Moral— 
 ' I. Egoistic; as 
 
 Temperance. 
 
 Self-respect. 
 
 Industry. 
 
 Thrift and honor. 
 2. Altruistic; as 
 
 Courage. 
 
 The benevolence of filial piety. 
 
 Public spirit. 
 
 Patriotism. 
 
 Philanthropy. 
 
— 50 — 
 
 Politeness. 
 Loyalty. 
 Moral consideration may be divided into: 
 Obligations — 
 
 1. Right (Truth in action). 
 
 2. Duty (Justice in conduct). 
 
 The fulfillment of contracts and under- 
 takings. 
 
 The fulfillment of expectations arising 
 out of the natural order of associa- 
 tion and society. 
 Sentiments — 
 
 1. Approbation. 
 
 2. Flattery. 
 
 3. Vindication. 
 Conditions — 
 
 1. Probity. 
 
 2. Usefulness. 
 
 3. Virtue. 
 
 4. Innocence. 
 
 5. Penitence. 
 
 6. Atonement. 
 
 7. Moral excellence. 
 Practice — 
 
 1. Temperance. 
 
 2. Asceticism. 
 
— 51 — 
 
 3- Fasting. 
 
 4. Sobriety. 
 
 5. Purity. 
 
 6. Benevolence (To cultivate affections 
 and confer happiness). 
 
 Moral conduct — 
 
 The sense of obligation comes from the 
 
 consciousness of causation. 
 A responsible action implies power exerted 
 
 with a free will and by intelligence. 
 A moral action supposes a knowledge of 
 effects and their relation to right and 
 wrong. 
 The moral quality of an action depends 
 upon — 
 
 I. The elements of intention as shown in 
 the outward act, the conception of the 
 act, and the effect of its communica- 
 tion, but the design is the moral spirit. 
 All moral actions, being the actions of per- 
 sons, presuppose intelligent observation, and 
 are carried out by personal determination for 
 a definite end. Every moral action, therefore, 
 is capable of being regarded in three relations, 
 according to its origin, progress, and result. 
 .With all these, intelligent self-determination 
 
-"52 — 
 
 is concerned. A moral action, therefore, in- 
 cludes motive, act, and end. As these may be 
 distinguished from each other, they may differ 
 in moral quality. The motive may be right, 
 though the act is wrong. The end is the vol- 
 untary purpose of the agent, which will com- 
 monly harmonize in character with the mo- 
 tive. 
 
 That the moral quality is in the intention, 
 is conceded from the fact that the consensus 
 of man in criticism is a blame or a praise of 
 intention; and, also, because we distinguish 
 between the instrument and the intention. 
 The intention is none the less blameworthy 
 or praiseworthy from -accident or a lack of 
 ability to fulfill. 
 
 2. The intention may not necessarily be 
 wrong, though its successful act is 
 proven to be wrong. 
 
 3. The intention may be wrong though 
 its successful act may be right. 
 
 4. The intention may be a sin though 
 it may never become an act. 
 
 5. Good intention, however, can never be 
 an excuse for evil since the execution. 
 
 6. Successful intention is as cause and 
 
— 53 — 
 
 effect and is subject to the same ax- 
 ioms. 
 
 7. Acts without virtuous intention are, 
 therefore, not in themselves possessed 
 of virtue though they may be good in 
 their effects. 
 
 8. This does not imply that virtue being 
 in the attention, therefo're, is a crea- 
 ture of the mind. Virtue can be ap- 
 plied only in the abstract as a conse- 
 quence of conscience and moral law. 
 
 Imagination is a conspicuous faculty of the 
 mind, and is well known to every human be- 
 ing of sane understanding. We are so con- 
 stituted that we are not confined to mere 
 realities; but we can conjure up a thousand 
 representations and combinations of things 
 which neAT'er had, and never can have, any real 
 existence. This power is the fruitful source 
 of many of our pleasures as well as incon- 
 veniences; and hence its proper cultivation 
 and guidance become of infinite importance 
 to the well-being and happiness of man. 
 
 9. Therefore, as intention is the index of 
 the individual life and imagination is 
 the expression in the mind of desire, 
 
— 54 — 
 
 so, whatever corrupts the imagination 
 or sets up an imperfect ethical ideal 
 for the intention, is not only destruc- 
 tively vicious but may be ranked as 
 the common enemy of human happi- 
 ness and welfare. 
 Personality is the first requisite for philos- 
 ophising. Where there is not self-conscious- 
 ness, or knowledge of self, as possessing 
 power for self-direction, under conditions of 
 intelligence, there cannot be a philosophy 
 either of our own nature, or of any other form 
 of being. 
 
 Personality is the basis of morality. Where 
 there is not knowledge of self, as the intelli- 
 gent source of action, there is no discrimina- 
 tion of motive, act, and end ; and where such 
 discrimination does not exist, there is no 
 morality. 
 The obligations of moral nature provide — 
 
 1. That all wrong is outlawed and furnishes 
 in itself no obligation but rejection. 
 
 2. As man's relationships change, new ob- 
 ligations are formed. 
 
 3. Obligations and relationships may be 
 inseparable, as in parents and children. 
 
— 55 — 
 
 4- Insufficient intellect or conscience or 
 love in no way alters the nature of 
 obligation. 
 
 5. The duty of investigation as to relation 
 and obligation is a part of all responsi- 
 bility. 
 
 6. The feeling of innocence and self- justi- 
 fication is in no way a proof of real inno- 
 cence or justification. 
 
 7. Nothing can affect the nature of an ac- 
 tion or change its inherent right or 
 wrong. 
 
 8. Intellect informs us of relations, con- 
 science of the obligations involved, and 
 love makes the obligations desirable. 
 
 The principles of moral conduct — 
 
 1. Before an action requires decision as to 
 its moral qualities, respects for the doubts 
 of conscience and obedience to the 
 monitions of justice are demanded. 
 
 2. After an action, the only concern is how 
 to make its benefits more complete or 
 to remedy any evil it may have contained 
 or occasioned. The mind should reflect 
 impartially and be thankful for good re- 
 sults. If mixed results are obtained, mo- 
 
-56- 
 
 lives should be analyzed ; and, if the mo- 
 tives or the means were wrong — 
 
 Suffer rebuke. 
 
 Make reasonable amends. 
 
 Fortify self against a repetition of the 
 wrong. 
 
 3. The steps in the consummation of de- 
 sign are — 
 
 The fixation of a definite purpose. 
 The discovery of the means. 
 The use of the means. 
 
 4. Reputation being not only the personal 
 happiness and social capital of the indi- 
 vidual, but also a valuable, if not a nec- 
 essary, condition of success in Hfe, pub- 
 licity should not be given to errors of 
 action without a needful public benefit 
 being in view. 
 
 Bad motives can be proven only cir- 
 cumstantially and are, therefore, not to 
 be charged except under urgent need 
 and for the most wholesome results. 
 
 5. The truth necessitates candor in which 
 there is no wilful untruth by suppression 
 or expression. The unknown is not to 
 
— 57 — 
 
 be uttered as true, and tEe truth must 
 not be falsely conveyed. 
 
 6. Protection of the innocent, charity and 
 mercy must prevail, but charity to be a 
 virtue must proceed from sincere com- 
 passion and its performance must be 
 sympathetic and prudent. 
 
 7. The practice of resentment is — 
 Incompatible with benevolence. 
 Imprudent as to our own happiness. 
 Injurious in all its relations and results. 
 
 8. Forbearance and forgiveness is most 
 wise because — 
 
 Those who are unjust to us inflict harm 
 
 upon themselves, and are fit subjects 
 
 for our compassion. 
 It is a noble and satisfying independence 
 
 that can look with pity and charity 
 
 upon transgression. 
 The primary truth of reciprocal morality 
 
 is to do unto others as we would have 
 
 them do to us. 
 
 9. Promises should be Icept as far as the 
 altruistic principles of right prevail, be- 
 cause — 
 
-58- 
 
 It is agreeable to the fitness of affairs. 
 
 It is conformable to reason and to nature. 
 
 It is essential to truth. 
 
 It is necessary to social faith and public 
 welfare. 
 
 It is the basis of all social contract. 
 
 It is the first principle of personal obli- 
 gation. 
 
 10. The essential personal duties must be 
 jealously preserved, such as — 
 Self-respect. 
 Self-control. 
 Self-defense. 
 
 Personal purity, which may be culti- 
 vated by — 
 
 (i.) Suppressing from the imagination 
 all impure images. 
 
 (2.) Avoiding amusements that sug- 
 gest impure thoughts. 
 
 (3.) Avoiding such literature, pictures 
 and people as afford evil sugges- 
 tions. 
 
 Being busy with the fulfillment of 
 
 ennobling aspirations. 
 The personal devotion needed in 
 
— 59 — 
 
 frugality and industry, and self- 
 culture. 
 II. THe conjugal affections are the most 
 powerful natural influences bearing upon 
 moral conduct- 
 Friendship between the sexes should 
 have no thought not contained in the 
 moral purposes of social welfare. 
 Mutual sympathy, usefulness, and affec- 
 tion form the most potent bonds of 
 marriage. 
 Sincerity of demeanor and honesty of 
 purpose are essential to wholesome re- 
 sults in all social affairs. 
 Intimacies between the sexes in mar- 
 riageable relations should be devoid of 
 all personal familiarities. 
 In conjugal relations there should be an 
 absolute union of — 
 (i.) Affection. 
 (2.) Interest and reputation. 
 (3.) Parental devotion. 
 (4.) Regard for each others relatives 
 
 and friends. 
 (5.) Domestic responsibilities. 
 (6.) Mutual fidelity, chastity, for- 
 
— 6o— 
 
 bearance, and care for the com- 
 mon welfare, 
 
 12. The appearance of evil should be 
 avoided as far as possible in all things 
 with the purity of life and the inspiration 
 of home maintained in all the affairs of 
 life. 
 
 13. Honest conduct has its sources in — 
 \ (i.) Prudent judgment. 
 
 (2.) Careful information. 
 
 (3.) Self knowledge. 
 
 (4.) Conscience honored. 
 
 (5.) The influence of moral love and the 
 mutualities of home. 
 Rewards in — 
 (i.) The increasing merits and enjoyments 
 
 of life. 
 (2.) The admiration, esteem, and friendship 
 
 of those who are honest and honorable. 
 (3.) The fulfillments of practical and 
 
 worthy ambitions. 
 (4.) The satisfactions of an irreproachable 
 
 and symmetrical Hfe. 
 
 A harmonial growth. 
 
 An example devoid of offense. 
 
 An old age of safety and peace. 
 
— 6i — 
 
 14. The misconduct of self should pro- 
 duce — 
 
 Self-reproach. 
 
 Remorse. 
 
 Reform. 
 
 15. The misconduct of others should pro- 
 duce — 
 
 Solicitude and pity. 
 
 Antipathy and protective estrangement. 
 
 Judicious suspicion. 
 
 Jealousy for justice. 
 
 Resentment and anger. 
 
 Never hatred or revenge. 
 
 16. The results of conduct are self-record- 
 ing in memory. 
 
 The evil brings: — 
 
 (i.) A feverish conscience.. 
 
 (2.) Personal debasement. 
 
 (3.) Social condemnation. 
 
 (4.) Loss of prestige. 
 
 (5.) Endangered usefulness of life. 
 The good brings — 
 
 (i.) A pleasing memory. 
 
 (2.) A happy conscience. 
 
 (3.) The evident esteem of good peo- 
 ple. 
 
— 62 — 
 
 (4.) The possession of wise accom- 
 plishments. 
 (5.) The peace of rational reflection. 
 (6.) The satisfaction of life well lived. 
 The building of character. 
 The forces included are — 
 
 1. Exercise and self-effort. 
 
 2. Seriousness and decision. 
 Sympathy by the common use of language, 
 
 implies an interest in the welfare of others, 
 and may be considered in two respects, being 
 an interest in their joy, or an interest in their 
 sorrow. 
 
 3. Sympathy and tact. 
 
 4. Candor and honesty. 
 
 5. SimpHcity and ambition. 
 
 6. Thought control. 
 
 y. Cleanliness and respect. 
 
 8. Self-possession and ease of manner. 
 
 9. Sincerity and sociability. 
 
 10. Promptness and directness. 
 
 11. Earnestness and thoroughness. 
 
 12. Etiquette and self-control. 
 
 13. Kindness and charity. 
 
 14. Refinement and choice companion- 
 ship. 
 
-63- 
 
 15- Politeness and dignity. 
 1 6. Progress and optimism. 
 Tlie forces of the excluded are^ — 
 
 1. Insinuation and flattery. 
 
 2. Slang and profanity. 
 
 3. Sulkiness and obstinacy. 
 
 4. Flippancy and excess. 
 
 5. Low humor and fads. 
 
 6. Envy and revenge. 
 
 7. Excitement and superstition. 
 
 8. Gossip and sarcasm. 
 
 9. Temptation and hasty promises. 
 
 10. Unwholesome influences. 
 Rectitude as a theory of conduct and thought 
 
 is accepted by the general consciousness of 
 mankind as the primary element of virtue. 
 The theories of virtue are involved in meta- 
 physical speculations, but it is agreed that — 
 Virtue is the right, the good and true, as 
 
 vice is the wrong, bad and false. 
 Virtue must conform to truth and justice as 
 
 found in benevolence and wisdom. 
 Virtue must have the approval of con- 
 science and be the emulation of right and 
 pure motives in order to conduce to the 
 useful, profitable and beneficial, and to 
 
-64- 
 
 produce the highest happiness and wel- 
 fare. 
 Virtues may be classified — 
 
 1. As to general truth. 
 Truthfulness and veracity. 
 
 2. As to personal character. 
 Uprightness and righteousness. 
 Integrity and probity. 
 Conscientiousness and honor. 
 Genuineness and consistency. 
 
 3. As to altruistic principles. • 
 Faithfulness and constancy. 
 Frankness and candor. 
 Straightforwardness and good faith. 
 Trustworthiness and incorruptibility. 
 
 4. In a negative sense. 
 Naturalness and innocence. 
 Simplicity and guilelessness. 
 
 5. As to duty. 
 In time — 
 
 (i.) Diligence and promptness. 
 
 (2.) Expeditiousness and punctual- 
 ity. 
 
 Manner and method — 
 
 (i.) Accuracy and correctness, 
 (2.) Exactness and precision. 
 
-65- 
 
 (3.) Strictness and system. 
 (4.) Order and method. 
 Education — 
 Instruction. 
 Culture. 
 Discovery. 
 Justice. 
 
 Generally-^ 
 
 1. Compensation. 
 
 2. Equity. 
 Specifically — 
 
 1. Honesty. 
 
 2. Fairness. 
 
 3. Impartiality. 
 Altruistically — 
 
 1. Obedience and loyalty. 
 
 2. Civility and politeness. 
 
 3. Chivalry and courtesy. 
 
 4. Urbanity and etiquette. 
 As to merit — 
 
 1. Respect and reverence. 
 
 2. Deference and admiration. 
 
 3. Veneration and awe. 
 As to demerit — 
 
 1. Just indignation. 
 
 2. Proper resentment. 
 
— 66 — 
 
 As to the good offices of others — 
 
 1. Gratitude. 
 
 2. Thankfuhiess. 
 Wisdom. 
 
 Generally — 
 
 1. Judgment and discernment. 
 
 2. Acuteness and discrimination. 
 
 3. Acumen and penetration. 
 As to preservation — 
 
 1. Prudence and discretion. 
 
 2. Vigilance and watchfulness. 
 
 3. Forethought and carefulness. 
 
 4. Circumspection and cautiousness. 
 As to providence — 
 
 1. Frugality. 
 
 2. Economy, 
 
 3. Thrift. 
 
 As to education^ — 
 
 1. Observation and attention. 
 
 2. Examination and application. 
 
 3. Study and reflection. 
 
 4. Diligence and industry. 
 
 5. Sedulousness and assiduousness. 
 Benevolence. 
 
 Generally — 
 
 I. Charity and love. 
 
-67- 
 
 2. Kindness and humane feelings. 
 
 3. Disinterestedness and loving kindness. 
 
 4. Self-denial and self-devotion. 
 
 5. Tenderness and self-sacrifice. 
 Altruistically — 
 
 1. Sympathy and compassion. 
 
 2. Pity and kind-heartedness. 
 
 3. Liberality and generosity. 
 As to faults in others — 
 
 1. Forbearance and forgiveness. 
 
 2. Mercifulness and indulgence. 
 
 3. Leniency and clemency. 
 
 4. Peaceablenes'S and peacemaking. 
 As to good in others — 
 
 1. Esteem. 
 
 2. Regard. - 
 Family love^ — 
 
 1. Paternal. 
 
 2. Maternal. 
 
 3. Filial. 
 
 4. Fraternal. 
 
 5. Conjugal. 
 Social love tO' — 
 
 1. Servant and master. 
 
 2. Friends and neighbors. 
 
 3. Fellow citizens and countrymen. 
 
— 68 — 
 
 Personal disposition — 
 
 1. Good will and humor. 
 
 2. Good nature and agreeableness. 
 
 3. Amiability and geniality. 
 
 4. Affability and graciousness. 
 
 5. Obliging and benign. 
 
 6. Complaisant and accommodating. 
 
 7. Thoughtful and considerate. 
 
 8. Suave and accessible. 
 Self-control. 
 
 In regard to desire — 
 
 1. Temperance and decision. 
 
 2. Determination and resolution. 
 
 3. Fixity and tenacity of purpose. 
 
 4. Steadiness and stability. 
 
 5. Unchangeableness and earnestness. 
 
 6. Energy and zeal. 
 
 7. Ardor and fervor. 
 
 8. Enthusiasm and self-conquest. 
 In regard to appetites — 
 
 1. Absteminousness and sobriety. 
 
 2. Moderation and chastity. 
 
 3. Continence and purity. 
 
 4. Cleanliness and modesty. 
 
 5. Reserve and consideration. 
 As to control of emotion — 
 
-69- 
 
 1. Boldness and daring. 
 
 2. Bravery and resolution. 
 
 3. Enterprise and valor. 
 
 4. Undauntedness and intrepidity. 
 
 5. Fortitude and heroism. 
 As to healthy development — 
 
 1. Cheerfulness and hopefulness. 
 
 2. Confidence and self-reliance. 
 
 3. Calmness and endurance. 
 
 4. Collectedness and composedness. 
 As to pride — 
 
 1. Humility and lowliness. 
 
 2. Diffidence and fractableness. 
 
 3. Modesty and docility. 
 
 4. Forbearance and independence. 
 
 5. Nobleness and magnanimity. 
 As to control of animal spirits — 
 
 1. Soberness and quietness. 
 
 2. Sedateness and tranquillity. 
 
 3. Staidness and seriousness. 
 
 4. Solemnity and gravity. 
 
 5. Serenity and suavity. 
 As to development of taste — 
 
 1. Tidiness and neatness. 
 
 2. Decency and decorum. 
 
 3. Propriety and seemliness. 
 
— 70 — 
 
 4- Fitness and suitableness. 
 5. Becoming- and tasteful. 
 As to control of temper — 
 
 1. Gentleness and meekness. 
 
 2. Mildness and tolerance. 
 
 3. Indulgence and long-sufifering. 
 
 4. Forbearance and patience. 
 
 5. Contentment and resignation. 
 Vice. 
 
 Lack of truth — 
 
 1. Generally. 
 
 Lying and falsehood. 
 Misrepresentation and perjury. 
 Inconstancy and untruth. 
 Error and mistake. 
 Exaggeration and incoherence. 
 Incongruity and falsity. 
 
 2. Non-fulfillment ofduty. 
 Unfaithfulness and treachery. 
 Perfidy and procrastination. 
 Dilatory and unpunctual. 
 
 3. As to others — 
 Vilification and reviHng. 
 Calumny and detraction. 
 Aspersion and defamation. 
 Libel and slander. 
 
— 71-- 
 
 Depreciation and disparagement. 
 Scandal and gossip. 
 
 4. In weakness of moral intention — 
 Compromise and temporizing. 
 Trimming and time-serving. 
 Flattery and adulation. 
 Paraside and sycophant. 
 Fawning and servility. 
 
 5. In weakness of character — 
 Prevarication and equivocation. 
 Evasion and ambiguity. 
 Shuffling and quibbling. 
 Cavilling and vagueness. 
 Looseness and laxity. 
 Indefiniteness and indeterminateness. 
 
 6. As to plausibility — 
 Speciousness and sophistry. 
 Superficiality and shallowness, 
 
 7. As to pretense — 
 Double-dealing and hypo'crisy. 
 Insincerity and dissembling. 
 Feigning and disguise. 
 Simulation and hollowness. 
 Dissimulation and affectation. 
 
 8. Involving stealth — 
 Crafty and wily. 
 
— 72 — 
 
 Artful and sly. 
 Deceitful and cunning. 
 Disingenuous and clandestine. 
 Underhand and intrigue. 
 Quiet and concealment. 
 Secrecy and subtlety. 
 9. Involving fraud — 
 Knavery. 
 Imposition. 
 Dishonesty. 
 Lack of justice. 
 
 1. Generally — 
 
 Unfair and unprincipled. 
 Injustice and unreasonableness. 
 
 2. Offenses against right — 
 Affront and indignity. 
 Insult and outrage. 
 Coarseness and roughness. 
 Bluntness and pertness. 
 Rude and cross. 
 Discourteous and uncivil. 
 Impolite and obstructive. 
 Impudence and injury. 
 Interference and ofHciousness. 
 Fussiness and busy-body. 
 Impertinence and formality. 
 
— 73 — 
 
 3- In personal government — 
 
 Arbitrary and tyrannical. 
 
 Despotic and severe. 
 
 Strictness and rigor. 
 
 Threatening and stern. 
 
 Rough and dictatorial. 
 
 Austerity and bribing. 
 4. As to a subject — 
 
 Treachery and sedition. 
 
 Insurrection and insubordination. 
 
 Disloyalty and rebellion. 
 
 Revolution and lawlessness. 
 
 Disobedience and disrespect. 
 
 Unthankfulness and ingratitude. 
 Lack of wisdom. 
 
 1. Defective judgment — 
 Ignorance and infatuation. 
 Injudicious and short-sighted. 
 Eccentricity and foolishness. 
 Senselessness and garrulity. 
 Talkative and loquacious. 
 
 2. Disregard of harm — 
 Negligence and remissness. 
 Imprudence and carelessness. 
 Heedlessness and thoughtlessness. 
 Unwariness and inattention. 
 
— 74 — 
 
 Inconslderation and forgetfulness. 
 3. Disregard of comfort — 
 Improvidence and waste. 
 Squandering and prodigality. 
 Lack of benevolence. 
 
 1. Generally — 
 
 Malice and malevolence. 
 Malignity and cruelty. 
 Selfishness and unkindness. 
 
 2. As to distress and faults. — 
 Insensibility of ruthlessness. 
 Churlishness and illiberality. 
 Sentimentality and implacability. 
 Taciturn and unforgiving. 
 Uncharitable and unrelenting. 
 Harsh and merciless. 
 
 3. As to social relations^ — 
 Inhospitable. 
 Inaccessible. 
 Unsocial. 
 
 4. As to disposition — 
 Ill-nature and ill-will. 
 Annoying and ungracious. 
 Teasing and provoking. - 
 Irritating and exasperating. 
 Tantalizing and vexing. 
 
— 75 — 
 
 Lack of self-control. 
 
 1. As to want of energy — 
 Indifiference and apathy. 
 Coldness and letbargy. 
 Indolence and idleness. 
 Sluggishness and laziness, 
 Listlessness and supineness. 
 
 2. As to misapplied energy. 
 Impulsiveness and caprice. 
 Whim and humor. 
 Restlessness and fickleness. 
 Changeableness and variajbleness. 
 Hesitation and vacillation. 
 Indecision and pliability. 
 Weakness and obsequiousness. 
 Hurry and precipitation. 
 
 3. As to ill-regulated will power — • 
 Waywardness and wilfulness. 
 Pertinacy and obstinacy. 
 Perverseness and contumacy. 
 Unruly and headstrong. 
 Incorrigible and refractory. 
 Unmanageable and obdurate. 
 Callous and doggedness. 
 
 4. As to ruined will power — 
 Declension and degeneration. 
 
Deterioration and disability. 
 
 5. As to appetites — 
 Luxuriousness and voluptuary. 
 Immoderation and intemperance. 
 Sensuality and epicure. 
 Gourmand and gluttony. 
 Licentious and dissolute. 
 Reprobate and profligate. 
 Immodesty and immorality. 
 Uncleanliness and unchastity. 
 Lewdness and wantonness. 
 Lechery and debauchery. 
 
 6. As to mental desires — 
 Avidity and covetousness. 
 Greediness and avarice. 
 Sordid and niggardly. 
 Usary and gambling. 
 
 7. As to the emotions — 
 Audacity and rashness. 
 Termerity and recklessness. 
 Fright and dismay. 
 Shyness and bashfulness. 
 Sneaking and cowardice. 
 Dolefulness and despondency. 
 Melancholy and despair. 
 
 Pride is a consciousness or belief of some 
 
— 77 — 
 
 superiority in ourselves over others, attended 
 with a desire, that others should be sensible of 
 it. 
 
 Self-conceit and arrogance. 
 
 Dogmatism and vanity. 
 
 Prying and presumption. 
 
 Ostentation and boasting. 
 
 Pedantry and foppishness. 
 
 Supercilious and censorious. 
 
 Sneering and overbearing. 
 
 Dictatorial and domineering. 
 
 Ridicule and mockery. 
 
 Jeering and scoffing. 
 Arrogance. This is the ostentatious as- 
 sumption of superior importance, and thus ex- 
 hibits the inflation of self-conceit and implies 
 the contemptuous disparagement of others. 
 Simply as a man, one has no prerogative 
 above another. If moral qualities make one 
 more excellent than another, it can never per- 
 mit the virtuous to display it ostentatiously, 
 and if any adventitious circumstances place 
 one man in a higher position than another, 
 that will never justify arrogance and assumed 
 self-consequence. 
 
 Meanness and paltriness. 
 
-78- 
 
 Shamelessness and baseness. 
 
 Venality and unmanlinesS'. 
 
 Mistrust and jealousy. 
 
 Envy and mockery. 
 8. As to passions- 
 Anger and wrath. 
 
 Resentment and rage. 
 
 Vehemence and violence. 
 
 Boisterous and turbulent. 
 Fear is a simple emotion of pain, caused 
 by an object, which we anticipate will be in- 
 jurious to us, attended with a desire of avoid- 
 ing such object or its injurious effects. 
 
 Sarcasm and satire. 
 
 Irony and abuse. 
 
 Dissension and altercation. 
 
 Quarrelsome and pugnacious. 
 
 Sourness and bitterness. - 
 
 Pique and irritation. 
 
 Discontentment and chagrin. 
 
 Fretfulness and crossness. 
 
 Peevishness and petulance. 
 
 Harshness and asperity. 
 
 Spite and rancor. 
 
 Vituperation and scurrility. 
 
 Insolence and rapacity. 
 
— 79 — 
 
 Sanguinary and' brutlsH. 
 9. As to mental ability. 
 Awkward and clumsy. 
 Unseemly and uncouth. 
 Abrupt and rough. 
 Fastidious and dainty. 
 Squeamish and finicky. 
 
 10. As to animal spirits — 
 Giddiness and volatility. 
 Lightness and flightiness. 
 Levity and inconsideration. 
 
 11, As to desire to comment — 
 The sources of detraction — 
 
 1. Unmerited prosperity. 
 
 2. Idleness and impurity. 
 
 3. Impudence and gossip. 
 
 4. Levity and intemperance. 
 
 5. Efifeminate complaisance. 
 
 6. Caprice and curiosity. 
 
 7. Rash judgment. 
 
 8. Malice and contempt. 
 
 9. Ingratitude and hypocrisy. 
 
 10. Jealousy and blind zeal. 
 
 11. Wrath and revenge. 
 
 The inhumanity of detractors is shown in 
 that — 
 
— 8o — 
 
 1. It is contrary to justice. 
 
 2. It spoils just judgment. 
 
 3. It hurts reputation. 
 
 4. It injures credit. . 
 
 5. It causes hatred and ill-treatment. 
 Conscience is that power of mind by which 
 
 moral law is discovered to each individual for 
 the guidance of his conduct. It is the reason 
 as that discovers to us absolute moral truth — 
 having the authority of sovereign moral law. 
 It is an essential requisite for the direction 
 of an intelligent free-will agent, and affords 
 the basis for moral obligation and responsibil- 
 ity in human life. 
 Conscience in relation to conduct — 
 Kinds^ — 
 
 1. True ajid lax. 
 
 2. Scrupulous and erroneous. 
 
 3. Certain and perplexed. 
 
 4. Clear and doubtful. 
 
 5. Fixed and probable. 
 As a monitor it includes — 
 
 1. An active intelligent belief in right and 
 
 wrong. 
 
 2. A desire for the constant prevailing of 
 
 right. 
 
— 8i — 
 
 3. Peace in die right and unrest in the 
 
 wrong. 
 
 4. A belief in the ultimate profit of right 
 
 ■against the temporary loss of the 
 present. 
 
 5. Personal influence and effort for the 
 
 right and against the wrong. 
 
 6. Delight and faith in the final triumph 
 
 of right. 
 
 In its demands for right it regards^ — 
 
 1. Benevolence and protection as to the 
 
 injurious. 
 
 2. Moral detestation of all wrong. 
 
 3. Pity and consideration for all wrong. 
 
 4. Reasonable means to reclaim the of- 
 
 fender and at the same time to pro- 
 tect society. 
 
 5. Forbearance and forgiveness. 
 
 6. Official justice. 
 
 Its office is — 
 
 1. A discriminating power which may be 
 
 improved by culture and wisdom. 
 
 2. An impulsive power restraining from 
 
 evil and urging the good. 
 
 3. A source of reproval and approval. 
 
— 82 — 
 
 In the culture of conscience these are essen- 
 tial— 
 
 1. Enlightenment as to duty, 
 
 2. Definiteness of purpose. 
 
 3. Attention and discrimination. 
 
 4. Brightened by good and not dulled by 
 
 evil. 
 
 5. Impulses and emotions not mistaken for 
 
 conscience. 
 
 6. Violence should never be done to con- 
 
 science. 
 
 7. It must be obeyed promptly. 
 
 8. Obedience must be determined and per- 
 
 sistent. 
 
 9. Faithful consideration for experience 
 
 and superior v^^isdom. 
 
 10. In every failure must be repentance, 
 
 Testitution and reformation. 
 
 11. Thankfulness for help and gratefulness 
 
 for good. 
 
 12. The sources of enlightenment and cult- 
 
 ure for conscience are in — 
 Reflection. 
 Careful meditation upon the excellent 
 
 thoughts and character of the world. 
 Earnest study of the problems of right 
 
-83- 
 
 and wrong presented in literature, 
 history and the current events of hu- 
 man Hfe. 
 As to the action of conscience it may be — 
 
 1. Prospective. 
 
 2. Retrospective. 
 
 3. Instantaneous. 
 
 As to function, conscience is — 
 
 1. A moral sense. 
 
 2. A moral judgment. 
 
 Conduct and conscience may be affected by — 
 
 The influence of those trusted. 
 
 Circumstances that bias judgment. 
 
 Impulses and emotions that exaggerate the 
 object. 
 
 Bodily conditions of health. 
 
 Character, as distinct from nature, is an es- 
 tablished order of disposition which by de- 
 velopment gradually acquires strength, in ac- 
 cordance with the rules of life most commonly 
 acted upon. Its measure is found in the pre- 
 vailing dispositions ; the standard of measure- 
 ment, in the moral law. Character is, there- 
 fore, good or bad, according as the reigning 
 dispositions are in harmony with conscience, 
 or antagonistic to its authority. 
 
-84- 
 
 Heredity — 
 
 1. Kinds — 
 
 Direct, the child resembhng its parents. 
 Reversional, the child resembling its 
 
 grandparents. 
 Collateral, the child resembling its uncle 
 
 or aunt. 
 Pre-marital, the child resembling former 
 
 associates. 
 Prenatal, the child's disposition affected 
 
 by influences upon it previous to 
 
 birth. 
 
 2. Temperaments — 
 
 1. Phlegmatic. 
 Dull and sluggish. 
 
 2. Sanguine. 
 
 Hopeful and animated. 
 
 3. Choleric. 
 
 Irritable and passionate. 
 
 4. Bilious. 
 
 Morose and energetic. 
 
 5. Melancholic. 
 Dispirited and gloomy. 
 
 6. Lymphatic. 
 Enthusiastic and harsh. 
 
 7. Nervous. 
 
-85- 
 
 Excitable and vigorous. 
 Education in general — 
 In its general idea, it has — 
 
 1. Nature. 
 
 2. Form. 
 
 3. Limits. 
 
 In its special elements, it is — 
 
 1. Intellectual. 
 
 2. Physical. 
 
 3. Moral. 
 
 In its particular systems — 
 I. It is national. 
 
 In the passive state ; as — 
 (i.) The family in China. 
 (2.) Caste in India. 
 (3.) Monks in Thibet. 
 In the active state, as — 
 (i.) MiHtary. in Persia. 
 (2.) Priestly in Egypt. 
 (3.) Industrial in Phoenicia. 
 In the individual state, as — 
 
 (i.) Aesthetic in ancient Greece. 
 (2.) Practical in ancient Rome. 
 (3.) Abstract in Northern Barbar- 
 ians. 
 2. It is theocratic, as — 
 
— 86 — 
 
 With the Jews. 
 
 3. It is humanitarian. 
 
 For special calHngs, as — 
 
 (i.) In piety. 
 
 (2.) Philanthropy. 
 
 (3.) Industry. 
 
 (4.) Ambition. 
 To satisfy public demands, as — 
 
 The pubHc school. 
 For ideal self-culture, as — 
 
 (i.) Ethical societies. 
 
 (2.) Literary clubs. 
 For an enlightened citizenship for the 
 masses of people, as — 
 
 (i.) The Chautauqua. 
 
 (2.) University extension. 
 
 4. It is constructive through — 
 The home. 
 
 School. 
 
 Society. 
 
 Business. 
 
 The impulses of — 
 
 (i.) Theory. 
 
 (2.) Observation. 
 
 (3.) Influence. 
 
 (4.) Experience. 
 
-87- 
 
 Paternal government — 
 The home — 
 
 1. Sovereigns [father and mother.] 
 
 2. Subjects [sons and daughters.] 
 The family — 
 
 1. Its origin in marriage. 
 
 2. Its integrity and honor as conse- 
 
 quential and imperative to its mem- 
 bers as is the national integrity to 
 the nation. 
 The family — 
 Protection — 
 
 1. Encroachments. 
 
 2. Prevention of disease. 
 
 3. Cure of disease. 
 Labor — 
 
 1. Production and supply. 
 
 2. Thrift. 
 Social life. 
 Education. 
 
 3. Marriage. 
 Choice should be — 
 
 (i.) Free. 
 
 (2.) Reciprocal. 
 
 (3.) Considerate. 
 
 (4.) Provident. 
 
(5.) Unalterable. 
 
 The marriage bond is the only a<iequate 
 acknowledgment of the biological and ethical 
 laws appointed to regulate human society. In 
 this alone is there realization ol the truth, 
 that the family is the primary form of society. 
 In accordance with the common obligations 
 imposed by moral law, interpreted and ap- 
 plied to the special relations of husband and 
 wife, marriage impHes a mutual pledge to 
 life-long, consistent endeavor to reach in 
 family history a high standard of attainment 
 in physical, intellectual, moral, and religious 
 life. A lower ideal is unworthy of rational 
 government of the social life. 
 
 The commitment made wisely enough 
 
 to be for life. 
 Official sanction. 
 Social ratification. 
 
 4. Parents — 
 
 Authority of father and mother con- 
 current. 
 
 They must protect, train and maintain 
 their children during minority. 
 
 The right and welfare of children must 
 
-89- 
 
 be the prevailing consideration with 
 parents. 
 . Children — 
 
 Prompt subjection and obedience to 
 parental authority. 
 
 Respect and reverence. 
 
 Tenderness, consideration, and sup- 
 port for parents in their helplessness. 
 
 Disputes between children should find 
 in parents an ever ready arbitration. 
 
 Children chould receive all question- 
 able information concerning life di- 
 rect from parents. 
 
 All personal affairs of children and 
 youths should be under the advisory 
 confidence and care of parents. 
 
 The youth, girl or boy. 
 
 As personal responsibility increases, 
 ideas, conduct and personal welfare 
 should become more distinct, defi- 
 ite, and determined. 
 
 In the progress of thought, observa- 
 tion and experience, there should 
 continue to be more well-directed 
 concentration of effort, economy 
 of means, and conservation of force. 
 
— 90 — 
 
 An understanding of capabilities, 
 value, use and limitations, is of the 
 utmost importance. 
 
 An appreciation of health and charac- 
 ter— 
 
 (i.) No other possessions can ever 
 contain so much safety and value 
 for the individual as those two 
 conditions. 
 
 (2.) They form the only substan- 
 tial basis of happiness and success. 
 
 (3.) They are the only satisfactory 
 foundations of progress and 
 achievement. 
 
 (4.) Character is the solitary genius 
 of every individual imperial over 
 all the environments and every 
 condition possible to life. 
 
 The proper use of vocation and 
 money. 
 
 Devotion to the art and wisdom of pro- 
 ductive labor. 
 
 Discrimination and determination in 
 the functions of love and will. 
 
— 91 — 
 
 General government. 
 
 State exists for the exercise of civil govern- 
 ment. 
 
 State makes the constitution. 
 
 The individual is sovereign within the free- 
 dom allowed by state. 
 
 Service. Every man is bound to render 
 that service to the state which in his circum- 
 stances are legally demanded. He may not 
 shrink from official stations, or military duties 
 when his country calls. He must judge if 
 higher claims clash with the commands of his 
 country and responsibly act accordingly, but 
 in a righteous call of his country to any serv- 
 ice, no citizen may hesitate and delay with- 
 out becoming immoral. No government can 
 last which cannot control the services of its 
 citizens. All disrespect to the state is a dis- 
 grace to the man. 
 
 Pure morality can never be the end of gov- 
 ernmental administration. 
 
 Civil law is the constraint of individual 
 choice, by state sovereignty, for the end 
 of public freedom. 
 
 Civil law to be, the constraint of individual 
 
— 92 — 
 
 choice, by state sovereignty, for the end 
 lof public freedom. 
 Necessity has no obHgation or law. 
 The civil laws are inoperative in the midst 
 
 of war. 
 As political government involves a modified 
 limitation of personal liberties for the purpose 
 'of securing the common good, it is essential 
 to its constitution and procedure, that it be 
 acknowledged that there are liberties which 
 men cannot, consistently with moral law, sur- 
 render, and with which political government 
 cannot interfere without stepping beyond its 
 natural boundaries. If only there be protec- 
 tion for the rights of all, and provision for the 
 common good, there must be unfettered lib- 
 erty of thought, utterance, and action. Politi- 
 cal government becomes the bulwark of civil 
 and religious liberty only by rigid acknowl- 
 edgment of the limits of its own sphere. 
 The nature of man indicates a necessity for 
 
 restrictive and prohibitive government. 
 Without positive law, society could not ex- 
 ist. 
 Sovereignty should not attempt action be- 
 yond its own capacity for governing. 
 
— 93 — 
 
 It should not legislate beyond the subject's 
 
 capacity for obedience. 
 It may not legislate in violation of pure 
 
 morality. 
 The authority of the state. Man must live 
 in civil society, and this cannot be sustained 
 without political regulations. The state, 
 through its constituted authorities, legislates, 
 and to this the citizen is bound in unquestion- 
 ing obedience. 
 
 Punishments must be impartial and only 
 
 upon personal responsibility. 
 Penalty should be reformatory as well as 
 
 deterrent. 
 Pure morality may be protected but not 
 
 directly influenced by legislation. 
 Original rights behind the power of civil 
 authority must not be infringed upon; 
 as — 
 
 1. Equality in freedom. 
 
 2. Unrestrained thought and belief. 
 
 3. Freedom of conscience. 
 
 4. Unrestrained action in all things not 
 subversive .of public freedom or mor- 
 ality. 
 
 5. Innocent until proven guilty. • 
 
— 94 — 
 
 6. Special privileges to none. 
 
 7. No one the privilege to evade law. 
 
 8. The criminal has no right to sympathy 
 against law. 
 
 The rights of government — 
 
 1. It must have sovereign control of all 
 property. 
 
 2. It is the supreme proprietor of the 
 soil. 
 
 3. It must consider the morals and needs 
 of its citizens. 
 
 4. It should prohibit injurious practices. 
 
 5. Sumptuary and sanitary laws are to 
 that extent advisable and irreproach- 
 able. 
 
 6. The helplessly poor must be humanely 
 provided for. 
 
 It must endeavor to promote prosper- 
 ity by inducing the conditions that 
 afford opportunities for individual 
 enterprise. 
 It must eliminate, as far as its rights 
 extend, such conditions as influence 
 immorality and pauperism ; as — 
 Prohibitory laws. Individual choices may 
 demand complete prohibition in many cases, 
 
— 95 — 
 
 on account of their contradiction to the public 
 freedom, and in all such cases the state has the 
 right to enact and enforce prohibitory laws. 
 The very end of state sovereignty is to guard 
 the public freedom against all particular en- 
 croachment, and if it has a right to be, and to 
 do anything, its right to restrain anything 
 which infringes upon the public freedom is 
 manifest. 
 
 (i.) Destruction of the slums. 
 
 (2.) Beggars and tramps sent to institu- 
 tions specially provided to enforce 
 thrift and industry. 
 
 (3.) Vagabonds and idlers not allowed to 
 
 congregate in public places or where 
 
 their vagabondage may be encouraged 
 
 by mutual example. 
 (4.) An end of indiscriminate giving. 
 (5.) Saving the children and bringing 
 
 them up in conditions that stimulate 
 
 self-activity. 
 (6.) Enforcing pauper parasites to be 
 
 self-helpful. 
 (7.) Save the unfortunate and protect 
 
 the innocent. 
 
-96- 
 
 Revolution against government — 
 
 Justifiable when public freedom is im- 
 periled. 
 Revolutionary persons begin the work at 
 their peril. 
 
 Law of nations — 
 
 International regulations must be founded 
 
 upon a basis of reciprocal benefit and 
 
 pure morality. 
 Treaties can not involve immoralities. 
 War is righteous only when in defense of 
 
 public freedom. 
 Ideal law has perfect freedom as its absolute 
 
 end. 
 Ideal justice is that absolute desert should 
 
 be requited. 
 
 Axioms of truth in the determination of right 
 and wrong for the individual, society 
 or the nation must be^ — 
 Clear and precise. 
 Plainly self-evident. 
 Never in conflict with other truth. 
 Supported by universal instinct and the 
 best consensus of reason. 
 
 Human progress. 
 
—57 — 
 
 Moral sense In regard to moral excellence 
 is — 
 
 1. Unconsciously utilitarian. 
 
 2. Instinctively ideal. 
 Universal conscience judges — 
 
 1. Never by the act. 
 
 2. Always by rank of motive. 
 
 Human conduct is the result ol motive 
 conceived in the idea of what is — 
 
 1. Most enjoyable; as. — 
 momentary pleasure. 
 
 2. Most desirable; as — 
 Revenge. 
 
 3. Most conducive to success ; as — 
 Deception. 
 
 4. Wisest and best ; as — 
 
 Benevolence and providence. 
 
 The education of desire culminating in the 
 establishment of character is the supreme 
 moral and social achievement of the in- 
 dividual. 
 
 The education ol the conscience to rule ac- 
 cording to the moral law of absolute 
 truth, is the greatest achievement to be 
 considered in the welfare of the race. 
 
-98 
 
 METAPHYSICS. 
 
 Metaphysics, a name originally applied to 
 those books of Aristotle which followed his 
 "Physics," and which his editors called "the 
 books after the Physics." In modern times the 
 word has been variously applied and seems to 
 assume quite a distinct meaning as employed 
 by different authors. With the Germans, 
 metaphysics is a science purely speculative, 
 which soars beyond the bounds of experience. 
 The objects of this science are supersensual 
 ideas, unattainable by experience, and the dif- 
 ficulty of defining the word lies in the circum- 
 stance that the very knowledge of the ideas 
 sought requires some proficiency in the study. 
 Hence to one altogether unacquainted with 
 speculative philosophy it is almost impossible 
 to explain the meaning of the word "meta- 
 physics" as used in this sense. The very pos- 
 sibility of a science beyond experience has 
 been denied by a great number of philoso- 
 phers, and many works called metaphysical 
 should rather be termed inquiries into the pes- 
 
— 99 — 
 
 sibility of metaphysics. Thus Kant's cele- 
 brated work, the "Kritik der reinen Ver- 
 nunft," is a mere inquiry into the possibility 
 of a theoretical science of things beyond ex- 
 perience, which terminates with a denial of 
 such possibility ; and hence some modern phil- 
 osophers have considered Kant as nO' meta- 
 physician, but as a critic of the mental fac- 
 ulties, whose labors were toJ)e the precursors 
 of a new system of speculation. On the other 
 hand, a work like Spinoza's "Ethics" is purely 
 metaphysical. He assumes the possibility of 
 ^f^his science, and, proceeding from a number of 
 T axioms, speculates accordingly. Those who 
 deny the possibility of metaphysics deny even 
 the right to assume any axioms as applicable 
 to a sphere beyond experience ; and those who 
 did assume them, as Spinoza, Liebnitz, and 
 Wolf, were called by the Kantians dogmatists, 
 in opposition to their own appellation of crit- 
 ics. The great point to be established prior to 
 metaphysical speculation is the identity, or at 
 least the necessary concurrence, of thought 
 and being. This once estabHshed, speculative 
 inquiry may proceed, as the results of logical 
 investigation must in such a case, of course. 
 
— 100 — 
 
 concur with the nature of being itself; but the 
 sceptics always deny the right of assuming 
 such identity or concurrence, while on the 
 other hand different theories have been 
 adopted to prove them, such as those of har- 
 mony between body and spirit, — of the non- 
 being of body altogether, except as an affec- 
 tion of spirit, — of an absolute identity between 
 thought and being,^ &c. It may be as well to 
 observe that the critical philosophy, which as- 
 sumes nothing but the "I" or "ego," and the 
 laws of thought (Fichte deducing even the 
 latter from the axiom, "I am I"), has Des- 
 cartes for its author, whose "Cogito, ergo 
 sum," lies at the basis of most modern sys- 
 tems. 
 
 In England, the word metaphysics is usu- 
 ally applied to denote the philosophy of mind, 
 as distinguished from that of matter. This 
 science treats of the association of ideas, mem- 
 ory, and various phenomena of mind ; and as 
 it consists merely in collecting facts and mak- 
 ing inductions like any other experimental 
 science, its possibility is nO' more questionable 
 than that of chemistry or electricity. How- 
 ever, Locke's "Essay on the Humian Under- 
 
— lOI — 
 
 standing," as a denial of any source of knowl- 
 edge other than experience, may be put at the 
 side of Kant's "Kritik," as containing inqui- 
 ries of similar nature, though the results be 
 different; Berkeley's "Idealism" may be com- 
 pared with the "Wissenschaftslehre" of 
 Fichte and the Common-sense theory of Reid 
 with the views of Jacobi. The philosophy of 
 mind as an experimental science has been 
 chiefly treated by the modern Scotch philoso- 
 phers, among whom the late Sir W. Hamilton 
 holds a high place. 
 
 REASON. 
 
 Reason, according to the common notion, 
 is the highest faculty of the human mind, by 
 which man is distinguished from brutes, and 
 which enables him to contemplate things spir- 
 itual as well as material, to weigh all that can 
 be said or thought for and against them, and 
 hence to draw conclusions, and to act accord- 
 ingly. A man may therefore be said to pos- 
 sess reason in proportion as he actually exer- 
 cises that power, that is, reasons and acts ac- 
 
— 102 — 
 
 cording to the conclusions or results at which 
 he has arrived. In such expressions as "We 
 have reason to believe such an account," or 
 "He has no reason tO' be dissatisfied," the 
 word "reason" does not signify the mental 
 power itself, but the conclusion or result of 
 the process of reasoning, in contradistinction 
 to motives, which are never the results of 
 mental operations, but merely outward cir- 
 cumstances by which our actions are influ- 
 enced. 
 
 Thus far reason is of a purely practical na- 
 ture, and Kant therefore divided reason (if 
 we may venture to translate his word Ver- 
 nunft by the English word reason) into prac- 
 tical and theoretical. The latter, which is also 
 called pure, ideal, or transcendental reason, is, 
 according to him, the mind's power of produc- 
 ing ideas a priori from its own resources, or 
 the power of conceiving things and their at- 
 tributes which lie beyond the sphere of our 
 experience, such as infinity, the absolute, God, 
 the supreme good, &c. How far our knowl- 
 edge of these things can extend is shown in 
 the work of Kant, entitled "Kritik der reinen 
 Vernunft," or "Criticism of Pure Reason." 
 
— 103 — 
 
 Reason, in its practical acceptation, forms 
 ideas a posteriori, in as far as it derives them 
 from a consideration and comparison of the 
 phenomena of the external world, endeavors 
 to discover unity in variety, and trace all phe- 
 nomena to one source, a supreme reason, of 
 which human reason is only a reflex. 
 
 Schelling defines reason to be the identity 
 of the subjective and the objective, that Is, the 
 identity of the power which knows and that 
 which It knows, which includes the knowl- 
 edge of this Identity. As the orig-Inal Identity, 
 says he, exists in God, or is God, reason is a 
 direct knowledge or an Intellectual percep- 
 tion of God, of whom no Indirect knowledge 
 is possiible. Hence God and reason are essen- 
 tially of the same nature; they are identical: 
 God is in reason, and reason is in God. 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 
 That which makes truth evident, or renders 
 it evident to the mind that it is truth. It is 
 generally limited to the proof of propositions 
 as distinguished from axioms or intuitions. 
 
— 104 — 
 
 Evidence Is of two kinds, demonstrative and 
 probable. Demonstrative evidence is of such 
 a character that no person of competent in- 
 tellect can fail to see that the conclusion is 
 necessarily involved in the premises. Mathe- 
 matics rests on demonstrative evidence. All 
 the propositions of Euclid are simply deduc- 
 tions from the definitions, axioms being as- 
 sumed and postulates granted. But In every 
 matter involving the establishment of a con- 
 crete fact bearing on human conduct, dem- 
 onstrative evidence is not obtainable, and the 
 mind must content Itself wilth probable evi- 
 dence. Even in mathematics the premises are 
 not concrete facts but abstract hypotheses. 
 Probable evidence is as If one held a delicate 
 balance In the hand, casting into one scale 
 every atom of evidence making for a proposi- 
 tion, and into the other all that could be ad- 
 duced against It. According as the one or the 
 other scale preponderates the proposition is 
 accepted or rejected. Probable evidence may 
 be of all conceivable degrees, from the faint- 
 est presumption to almost perfect certainty. 
 
 In Law. Proof, either written or unwritten, 
 of allegations In issue between parties. The 
 
— 105 — 
 
 following are the leading rules of procedure, 
 (i) The sole object and end of gvidence being 
 to ascertain the several disputed points or 
 facts in issue, no irrelevant evidence should 
 be admitted. (2) The point in issue is to be 
 proved by the party w^ho asserts the affirm- 
 ative. (3) Hearsay evidence is not admitted. 
 Legal evidence is sometimes divided into di- 
 rect and circumstantial. In courts of law 
 parole evidence, that is, evidence by word of 
 mouth, is that which is adopted, while in in- 
 vestigations in equity written evidence by af- 
 fidavit is required. Another division of evi- 
 dence is into primary and secondary. The 
 production of a letter is primary evidence; the 
 effort to prove what the contents of a lost 
 document were is secondary evidence. (Whar- 
 ton.) 
 
 In Apologetics. The evidence for the genu- 
 ineness and authenticity of Scripture are ex- 
 ternal, internal, and collateral. The external 
 evidences are those which tend to prove, on 
 the testimony of other writers, that the books 
 were written by the persons to whom they are 
 attributed. The internal evidence is the evi- 
 dence afforded by reading the books them- 
 
— io6 — 
 
 selves, and noting to what extent their style, 
 subject-matter, and moral and spiritual tone 
 afford evidence in their own favor. The col- 
 lateral evidences are those brought from va- 
 rious sources to supplement the other two. 
 
 SOPHISTS. 
 
 The race of sophists took its rise in Athens 
 about the 5th century B. C, when Athens was 
 a real democracy. From the necessity every 
 man was under of pleading his own cause be- 
 fore the dicastery, in any case before the 
 court, whether as plaintiff or defendant ; from 
 the political power which every citizen pos- 
 sessed, but could scarcely exercise with effect 
 unless able to speak fluently ; the teaching of 
 rhetoric, or the arts of speaking and arguing 
 logically, came to be in much request. The age 
 was also a sceptical, and therefore an inves- 
 tigating one. But though flourishing in Ath- 
 ens, sophists and their teachings were not con- 
 fined to that city, but extended throughout 
 all the Grecian republics, and occasionally to 
 the courts of tyrants. They went about 
 
— 107 — 
 
 Greece discoursing and debating', and some- 
 times educating the youth of rich and noble 
 families. They were not, strictly speaking, a 
 sect; indeed the name signifying only a wise 
 or clever man, had been so applied from the 
 earliest times of Greece; and Socrates, Plato, 
 and other eminent men were all called soph- 
 ists. 
 
 The disrepute attached to the name arose ap- 
 parently from the facts of the teachers accept- 
 ing payment for their lessons, and thence pro- 
 ceeding to inculcate not the desire for truth, 
 but the means of securing victory by the use 
 of specious fallacies. It was against both these 
 modes that Socrates and Plato contended; 
 and to which Plato and Aristotle affixed the 
 name as a term of reproach for a "man who 
 employs what he knows to be fallacy, for the 
 purpose of deceit and of getting money." But 
 the sophists were able to bear up against the 
 judgment of philosophers, by having become 
 the trainers of men for the active pursuits of 
 life, and their influence oyer the multitude 
 greatly exceeded that of the sages. Nor did 
 they all, though they taught for money, teach 
 fallacies merely; and the representations of 
 
— io8 — 
 
 them in the Dialogues of Plato must not be 
 accepted as the truth with reference to them 
 as a class. Socrates, Protagoras, and Prodi- 
 cus, were stigmatized as sophists, but what we 
 know of their doctrines and practice does not 
 deserve any heavy condemnation. No doubt, 
 in numerous instances the sophists, like the 
 schoolmen of the middle ages, indulged in 
 subtleties and evasions which were dishonest, 
 trivial, and often ridiculous; but, as Ritter 
 says, "It is not to be denied that the sophists 
 contributed greatly to the perfection of prose; 
 which was in itself a great benefit to philos- 
 ophy. The sophists applied themselves to 
 manifold arts of persuasion, and in their at- 
 tacks upon each other, la'Boring to expose and 
 lay bare the delusions O'f appearance, they ac- 
 quired great nicety in the distinction of terms. 
 Prodicus was celebrated for his skill in the dis- 
 tinctions, of synonymou-S terms, as we learn 
 from Plato, who ridicules him for it, but Pro- 
 dicus is honorably mentioned by him. The 
 sophisms turning upon the words 'to learn,' 
 'to understand,' 'to know,' also contributed to 
 the more accurate knowledge of these terms. 
 The very circumstance that their rules were 
 
' — 109 — 
 
 intended to be subservient to the ends of fal- 
 lacy and deception, must have afforded a 
 stronger motive to the philosophical spirit to 
 bring under investigation the true forms of 
 thought and expression which had been neg- 
 lected by earlier philosophers; and accord- 
 ingly we find that they occupied much of the 
 attention of Socrates." 
 
 SOPHISM. 
 
 Sophism, that superficial and incomplete 
 aspect of the truth, which at first sight looks 
 like the truth, but on closer inspection turns 
 out to contain some radical error. This seems 
 the most correct definition, but the word is 
 used loosely. Its general signification, nam'ely, 
 a specious proposition, is perhaps nearest the 
 mark. Truly considered, most errors are soph- 
 isms, for errors are not direct contradictions 
 to the truth, but simply the leaving out of 
 view one or more elements of the truth, and 
 seizing on only one or two elements, and de- 
 claring them to constitute the whole truth.' 
 Victor Cousin defines error to be "One ele- 
 
— no— ' 
 
 ment of thougfht considered exclusively, and 
 taken for the complete thought itself. Error 
 is nothing but an incomplete truth converted 
 into an absolute truth." Spinoza had before 
 defined ''falsity to be that privation of truth 
 which arises from inadequate ideas." It is 
 sometimes a mere confusion of terms; as in 
 the common example of — Bread being better 
 than paradise; because bread is better than 
 nothing, and nothing is better than paradise — 
 the confusion arises from both the "nothings" 
 being used substantively; whereas it is only 
 the first that is so used; the second is affirm- 
 ative, and expresses "there is nothing bet- 
 ter." A sophism is therefore the use of some 
 word in a different sense in the premises from 
 that in the conclusion, and this is the defini- 
 tion of Aristotle: "When the discourse is a 
 demonstration of anything, if it contain any- 
 thing which has no relation tO' the conclusion, 
 there will be no syllogism; and if there appear 
 to be one, it will be a sophism, and not a dem- 
 onstration." 
 
 This confusion o'f words and ideas is the or- 
 igin of all errors and sophisms; but though 
 errors and sophisms are logically constituted 
 
— Ill — 
 
 alike, yet the instinctive sense of mankind 
 marks the difference between incomplete 
 views (error) and wilful perversion (sophism). 
 In all cases a sophism is supposed to be rec- 
 ognized as such by the sophist. It is an en- 
 deavor on his part to "make the worse appear 
 the better reason." It is the consciousness 
 then of the sophist which distinguishes and 
 renders odious his error as a sophism. 
 
 SPINOZISM. 
 
 The monistic system of Baruch Despinosa 
 (or Benedictus de Spinoza), a descendant of 
 Portuguese Jews who had sought refuge in 
 Holland from the cruelties of the Inquisition. 
 He was born at Amsterdam (Nov. 24, 1632), 
 and his father, an honorable, but not very 
 wealthy merchant, intended him for a theo- 
 logical career. His education was superin- 
 tended by the Talmudist Saul Levi Morteira, 
 but unsatisfied doubts kept him from the pro- 
 fession of a Jewish teacher, and his determined 
 and continued refusal to attend the Syna- 
 gogue gave such offence that in 1656 he was 
 
— 112 — 
 
 solemnly excommunicated. For a short time 
 Spinoza became an assistant in a school kept 
 by a physician named Vanden Ende, but he 
 soon resigned this post and afterwards main- 
 tained himself by the art of polishing lenses, 
 which, in accordance with the Jewish custom 
 of teaching every boy some trade or handi- 
 craft, he had learnt in his youth, though this 
 source of income was afterwards increased by 
 a small annuity settled on him by his friend 
 de Vries. After a life of study, abstemious- 
 ness and bodily and mental suffering, Spinoza 
 died at the Hague (Feb, 21, 1677), at the age 
 o>f forty-four. The system of Spinoza has been 
 described as Atheism, as Pantheism, and as 
 the most rigid Monotheism, according as his 
 cardinal teaching — that there is only One 
 Substance, God — has been interpreted. By 
 Substance, however, Spinoza meant the un- 
 derlying reality and ever-living existence^ and 
 he chose for the epigraph of his Ethics the 
 words of St. Paul : "In Him we live, and move, 
 and have our being" (Acts XVH. 28). God is 
 for him the one principle, having Thought 
 and Extension as two eternal and infinite at- 
 tributes constituting its essence, of which at- 
 
— US- 
 tributes Mind and Matter are the necessary 
 manifestations; and thus he solves the prob- 
 lem of the relation of the Finite to the Infi- 
 nite. Everything is a form of the ever-living 
 existence, the Substance, God, which is, and is 
 not. Nature, with which He is no more to be 
 confounded than the fountain with the rivulet 
 or eternity wiith time. God is natura naturans, 
 Nature is natura naturata; the one is the en- 
 ergy, the other is the act. In the same way 
 he explains the union of the soul with the 
 body, Man is but a mode of the Divine Ex- 
 istence ; his mind a spark of the Divine Flame, 
 his body a mode of the Infinite existence. 
 
 SOCRATIC-PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 A term sometimes used to include the de- 
 velopment of Greek philosophy from the time 
 O'f Socrates tO' the rise of the Neoplatonists, 
 because, with the exceptions of the Epicu- 
 reans, the chief philosophical schools up to 
 that period professed to ground their teach- 
 ings on the authority of Socrates. 
 
 The ethics of Socrates, as gathered from 
 
— 114 — 
 
 the writings of Xenophon, Plato, and Aris- 
 totle. It is not known when Socrates com- 
 menced his career as a public teacher, but he 
 first attracted notice as an opponent of the 
 Sophists, and was about forty-six years ol age 
 when Aristophanes introduced him on the 
 stage in The Clouds, strange to say, in the 
 character of a Sophist. All previous philoso- 
 phers had been occupied with the Universe 
 as a whole ; the chief business of Socrates was 
 with man as a moral being. His reforming 
 tendencies made many enemies. In B. C. 
 399 Meletus, a leather-seller, seconded by 
 Anytus, a poet, and Lycon, a rhetor, preferred 
 this indictment against him: "Socrates is 
 guilty oi reviling the gods acknowledged by 
 the State, and of preaching new gods; more- 
 over he is guilty of corrupting the youth." He 
 was tried and condemned to death, and, re- 
 fusing the means of escape provided by his 
 friends, drank the fatal hemlock in the seven- 
 tieth year of his age. Bishop Blomfield 
 (Ency. Metrop., s. v. Socrates) says: "Socra- 
 tes taught that the divine attributes might be 
 inferred from the works of creation. He main- 
 tained the omniscience, ulbiquity, and prov- 
 
— 115 — 
 
 idence of the Deity; and, from the existence 
 of conscience in the human breast, he inferred 
 that man is a moral agent, the object of re- 
 ward and punishment ; and that the great dis- 
 tinction O'f virtue and vice was ordained by 
 the Deity," 
 
 CYNICS. 
 
 Cynics, the name of a sect of Greek philos- 
 ophers who were produced by the school of 
 Socrates, and were so called according to one 
 interpretation of the word from their snarling 
 disposition, though it is possible that the name 
 may have been derived from the gymnasium 
 called Cynosarges, in which Antisthenes, the 
 founder of this school, used tO' lecture. Their 
 doctrines were the exact opposite of those of 
 the Cyrenaics, who were also an offshoot of 
 the Socratic philosophy. They held that vir- 
 tue was not only the highest but the only ob- 
 ject at which men ought to aim, and that most 
 of the sciences and arts, as they do not tend 
 to make men virtuous. But sometimes on the 
 contrary interfere with the attainment of it, 
 
— lie- 
 are unprofitable and pernicious. Tlie true 
 philosopher, according to their notions, was 
 he who could discard all the comforts and 
 charities of hfe and triumph over his bodily 
 wants, so as to he enabled to live only for vir- 
 tue without any interruptions either to the 
 contemplation or the practice of it. The re- 
 sult of these principles was great strictness of 
 morals, and voluntary penances worthy of the 
 fanaticism of an eastern dervise; and as long 
 as these characteristics were coupled with 
 ability in the professors and consistent phil- 
 osophy in what they taught, the sect main- 
 tained its place by the side of other philo- 
 sophical systems, and some members of it, for 
 instance Antisthenes and Diogenes, deserved 
 and o'btained great celebrity. At length, how- 
 ever, the morality of the Cynics degenerated 
 into the most shameless profligacy, and they 
 became so disgusting from their impudence, 
 dirty habits, and begging, that they ceased to 
 be regarded with any respect, and the sect 
 dwindled away into obscurity. Of their spec- 
 ulative opinions we know very little: indeed 
 it does not appear that they had any theories, 
 except on the science of logic. The great 
 
— 117 — 
 
 merit ol the Cynic philosophy was that it 
 paved the way for the estabhshment of Stoic- 
 ism, which succeeded and superseded it, just 
 as the philosophy of Epicurus supplanted that 
 of Aristippus. The connection of this school 
 with the philosophy of Socrates appears to 
 have consisted in their developing the idea 
 of science as applied to morality (to which ob- 
 ject the labors of Socrates were mainly di- 
 rected), but they did so to the exclusion of all 
 those other principles which Socrates ad- 
 mitted as useful adjuncts, and his sneers at the 
 austerity and affected negligence of Antis- 
 thenes may be taken as a proof of the low 
 opinion which he entertained of this narrow 
 application of his doctrines. The classical 
 reader will find in Lucian's ''Cynicus" an at- 
 tempt to justify some of the peculiar views 
 of this school, especially in regard to their 
 neglect of the conveniences of life, though it 
 is not to be supposed that Lucian was inclined 
 to the Cynical philosophy, for he elsewhere 
 ridicules it. 
 
— ii8 — 
 
 CYRENAICS. 
 
 Cyrenaics, a school of philosophers among 
 the Greeks, who derived their name from the 
 birth-place of their founder, Aristippus, Like 
 the Cynics, their doctrines were a partial de- 
 velopment of those of Socrates ; but the view 
 they took of their predecessor's philosophy 
 was quite different from the Cynical. The 
 only particular in which the two sects agreed 
 with the original system and with one another 
 was that they all three made virtue consist 
 in knowledge; in other words they were all 
 three attempts to awaken and develop the 
 idea of science; but while the Cynics con- 
 sidered all sublunary enjoyment and most 
 branches o'f knowledge as impediments to the 
 knowledge, and consequently, according to 
 Socrates, to the practice, of virtue, the Cyre- 
 naics, on the other hand, were not contented 
 with the mere knowledge of the good as a 
 general term, but sought for it in the separate 
 particulars, and deemed him to have per- 
 formed his proper functions most consistently 
 
— 119 — 
 
 with his nature who had succeeded in amass- 
 ing the greatest number of particular good 
 things. In regard to the idea of science, they 
 did not look upon it as a speculative concep- 
 tion, but as a merely empirical result, as the 
 aggregation of successive experiences; in 
 other words, not as an intuition but as a com- 
 bination of perceptions ; and while Plato, and 
 in some measure the Cynics also, placed the 
 -summum bonum in the attainment, by means 
 of dialectics, of the abstract idea of the good, 
 the Cyrenaics placed it in the collection of the 
 greatest number of agreeable perceptions, and 
 the true philosopher, according to them, was 
 one who actively, methodically, and success- 
 fully carried on the pursuit of pleasure. Con- 
 sequently, as agreeable perceptions were con- 
 tinually to be soiight as good and the con- 
 trary to be avoided as bad in themselves, per- 
 ceptions of sensible objects became the cri- 
 terion of all knowledge and the object of all 
 action, and therefore truth both theoretical 
 and practical. The chief successors of Aris- 
 tippus were Theodorus, Hegesias, and Anni- 
 ceris. Theodorus perceived the necessity for 
 s'oin;e principle, in addition to the mere col- 
 
— 120 — 
 
 lection of agreeable sensations; for without 
 some effort of the understanding to determine 
 which of many gratifications was to be pre- 
 ferred, it would be impossible, he thought, to 
 obtain the miaximum ol gratification ; and he 
 therefore set understanding over the senses 
 as a regulating and restraining faculty. He 
 is said to have been banished from Athens for 
 denying the existence of the gods. Hegesias, 
 following in the steps of Theodorus, insisted 
 still more than he did upon the inadequacy 
 of the senses as the criteria of the desirable, 
 and at last even went so far as to assert that 
 nothing was in itself either agreeable or the 
 contrary, and that life and everything in life 
 should be a matter of indifference to the wise 
 man. In this assertion of the principle of in- 
 difference he made an approach to the doc- 
 trines of Epicurus and the Stoics in the point 
 in which these two opposite systems met. 
 Cicero tells us that his book caused so many 
 suicides that he was forbidden by one of the 
 Ptolemies to lecture on the worthlessness of 
 life. In the philosophy of Anniceris and his 
 followers the original principles of the Cyre- 
 naics were quite lost, and though he also, In a 
 
121 
 
 popular way recommended the pursuit of the 
 agreeable, he denied that it depended in any 
 way upon mere sensible impressions, for that 
 the wise man might be happy in spite of all 
 annoyances ; that friendship was to be sought, 
 not for the sake of any immediate advantage 
 to be derived from it, but on account of the 
 good-will which it generateci; and that for 
 a friend's sake a man should encounter even 
 annoyances and troubles. These are the doc- 
 trines of a mere popular morality, and can 
 hardly be ascribed to one school more than to 
 any other. It will be remiarked by every one 
 that the original tenets of this school were 
 very similar to those of Epicurus; indeed, 
 with the exception ol the atomic system 
 which he borrowed from Democritus and 
 Leucippus, the two systems differed only in 
 this : the Cyrenaics placed the great object of 
 man in the positive and active pursuit of the 
 agreeable, while Epicurus made it consist in a 
 perfect rest of mind and in freedom from pain ; 
 for he considered the agreeable as something 
 merely negative, as the pleasing harmony pro- 
 duced by exemption fromi -all passion and ap- 
 petite. The philosophy of Epicurus may 
 
therefore be considered as the successor, in 
 one point of view, of the system of Aristip- 
 pus. 
 
 WORSHIP. 
 
 Whether any savage tribes exist virith no 
 behef in any being higher than man, is doubt- 
 ful. Burton and Sir John Lubbock are of 
 opinion, as was Mr. Darwin, that there have 
 been, and still are such tribes; Dr. Tylor, 
 after explaining away some alleged cases, ex- 
 presses doubt of those remaining. Lubbock 
 thus arranges the first great stages in religious 
 thought: Atheism, understanding by this 
 term, not a denial of the existence of a Deity, 
 but an absence of any definite ideas on the 
 subject. Fetichism, the stage in which man 
 supposes he can force the Deity to comply 
 with his desires. Nature-worship or Totem- 
 ism, in which natural objects, trees, lakes, 
 stones, animals, &c., are worshipped. Sha- 
 manism, in which the superior deities are far 
 more powerful than man, and of a dififerent 
 nature. Their place of abode also is far away, 
 
123 — 
 
 and accessible only to Shamans. Idolatry or 
 Anthropomorphism, in which the gods take 
 still more completely the nature of men, be- 
 ing, however, more powerful. They are still 
 amenable to persuasion; they are a part ol 
 nature, and not creatures. They are repre- 
 sented by images or idols. In the next stage, 
 the Deity is regarded as the author, not 
 merely a part of nature. He becomes for the 
 first time a really supernatural being. The 
 last stage is that in which morahty is asso- 
 ciated with religion. 
 
 FATALISM. 
 
 This term is used to express an article of 
 philosophical religion, and usually signifies 
 that the successive actions of mankind, and 
 even the successive operations of the powers 
 of nature, are under the guidance of some su- 
 perior almighty power, so that these success- 
 ions and the actions themselves are entirely 
 independent of each other. This doctrine has 
 been embodied in all religious systems, 
 though very different names have been given 
 
—^124 — 
 
 to the governing power. The Greeks called 
 it moira or ananke, and the Romans called it 
 fate; their mythology also mentions a Demi- 
 urgus, who had formed the gods. All the 
 ancient religions of Asia recognize a similar 
 fate, something mightier than the gods, to 
 whom it dictates laws; such, for example, as 
 the alternating governments of Ormuzd and 
 Ahrimanes in the Persian mythology, &c. 
 Among the Hebrews the Pharisees were fatal- 
 ists, the Sadducees materialists, and the Es- 
 senes deists. The old Germanic religion of 
 Odin modified this fate, and brought it nearer 
 to the idea of the government of the world by 
 a deity, identifying it with their highest god, 
 whose name was not to be pronounced. From 
 this point fate changes to what is called pre- 
 destination (in opposition to chance), which 
 idea is only a mitigated fate, distinguished, 
 however, from genuine fataHsm in proceeding 
 directly from God, and not from fate. This be- 
 lief in predestination was taught by Moham- 
 med, and his followers have retained it. Ro- 
 man Catholicism has no trace of this doctrine, 
 but it is held by the Calvinists, and to a certain 
 extent at least by the church of England. 
 
— 125 — 
 
 The doctrine of fatalism, as is well known, 
 has been frequently and effectively used by 
 both ancient and modern poets. 
 
 Intimately related to fatalism is the doc- 
 trine of the immediate and direct intervention 
 of Providence in the government of the world. 
 According to this doctrine the consequences 
 of the actions of mankind depend wholly upon 
 the actions themselves ; God, however, is able 
 so to conduct these consequences, that col- 
 lectively they shall result in good, and con- 
 formably to His purpose. To comprehend 
 this working precisely is impossible for man, 
 since his mental powers are not sufficiently 
 extensive, and this dogma must therefore be 
 a matter of faith. This doctrine is held by 
 many Christian sects, and in the Bible there 
 are passages strongly in favor of such special 
 intervention; for example, Matthew X. 29, 
 "Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing? 
 and one of them shall not fall on the ground 
 without your Father." 
 
 The third or deistical interpretation ol this 
 doctrine teaches the complete non-interven- 
 tion of the Deity in the affairs of the world or 
 of mankind : we may also call this doctrine the 
 
126 
 
 doctrine of theological chance, which may 
 still be consistent with that of physical neces- 
 sity, according to Kant. The doctrine of phys- 
 ical necessity was advocated by Hobbes, and 
 served for the foundation ol the charges 
 against him of deism and atheism. 
 
 If we consider these doctrines in a philo- 
 sophical point of view we may come to the fol- 
 lowing results: — The theological theories of 
 fatalism, predestination, the immediate gov- 
 ernment oi God, and his non-intervention, 
 evidently bear an analogical relation to the 
 political systems of despotism, constitutional 
 monarchy, and republicanism. Accordingly 
 as every one may have grounds for being an 
 adherent of one of these political systems, so 
 may he also have grounds for being a follower 
 of one of these theological views. Accord- 
 ing to the ideas and investigations of the au- 
 thor of this article, God may have positively 
 fixed, before any creation of the world, the 
 eternal ideas, or the relation of things to each 
 other within the circle of which nature and 
 human intelligence have to move. These 
 ideas are (i) for nature, self-preservation, or 
 continuance, of which the product is attrac- 
 
127 — 
 
 tion, &c. ; regularity, producing crystalliza- 
 tion, &c. ; and adaptation to purposes, produc- 
 ing organization, &c. ; (2) for human intelli- 
 gence, self-love, beauty, and virtue. In so far 
 as nature and humanity with all their efforts 
 cannot move out of this sphere of ideas, so far 
 fatalism and predestination exist. The efforts 
 of nature to adapt means to ends, and the en- 
 deavors of the wise after virtue (or human 
 happiness) appear to produce an ever increas- 
 ing progression, and in this sense they consti- 
 tute an intervention of Providence — since na- 
 ture being wholly bound, and God absolutely 
 uncontrolled, man stands between both; so 
 that though he is not absolutely free, yet he is 
 free to work his ultimate ends out of himself ; 
 he is free whenever he acts morally, and he is 
 not free whenever he acts immorally (or 
 rather physically), and he may thus arrive at 
 the consciousness that his state in another 
 world entirely depends on himself. With this 
 conviction every species of intervention would 
 appear less harsh towards him, and without 
 these grounds he may be doubtful whether 
 any direct intervention exists with respect to 
 worldly affairs. 
 
128 
 
 NECESSITY. 
 
 Necessity, according to the common defini- 
 tion is that quality of a thing by which it can- 
 not but be, or whereby it cannot be other- 
 wise. When, in a proposition which affirms 
 any thing to be true, there is a fixed invari- 
 able connection between the subject and the 
 predicate, then that thing is understood to 
 be necessary. Necessity is opposed to chance, 
 accident, contingency, and to whatever in- 
 volves the idea of uncertainty and of possible 
 variation. It is usually distinguished into log- 
 ical, physical and moral necessity. Logical 
 necessity consists in the circumstance that the 
 conception of something being different from 
 what it is, implies a contradiction or absurd- 
 ity. In this sense it is necessary that two and 
 two should be four, that converging lines, if 
 produced far enough, should meet; thus also 
 the eternal existence of being generally is nec- 
 essary, as are innumerable other truths. Phys- 
 ical necessity has its origin in the established 
 order and laws of the material universe. The 
 
necessity, In tKis case, differs from that for- 
 merly specified, in that it is only conditional, 
 is a necessity of consequence. Ever5^hing 
 that takes place in the natural world happens 
 by virtue of certain laws: these laws are 
 known by experience to operate regularly and 
 uniformly; and the results of their operation 
 are hence, with reference to them, said to be 
 necessary. When we ascribe anything to 
 chance, we merely state our ignorance of the 
 law or laws to which its existence is to be re- 
 ferred. Physical necessity is founded on the 
 relation of cause and effect. By tracing back 
 this connection, we arrive at the knowledge 
 of a great first cause, that is God, who Is the 
 only Being existing independently and by an 
 absolute necessity. His infinity and other at- 
 tributes are necessary; and it is evident that 
 the purposes and acts of such a Being must 
 also be necessary, being determined by that 
 necessity by which he is what he Is. He must 
 always resolve and act with the most perfect 
 wisdom, justice and goodness. To affirm the 
 contrary would be to afiirm that he is differ- 
 ent from what he Is. Moral necessity has ref- 
 erence to the volitions and actions of rational 
 
— I30 — 
 
 agents, and is intended to express the connec- 
 tion between these vohtions and actions, and 
 certain moral causes, as inclinations, desires, 
 or motives generally. Whether there be any 
 connection which, strictly speaking, may be 
 termed necessary, between such motives, and 
 the resolutions of- the human will, and the 
 consequent actions, or whether, independent 
 of them, the will has a self-determining power, 
 is an inquiry which has largely engaged the 
 attention of both philosophers and theolog- 
 ians. It is one of great interest, and which 
 has an important bearing, on whatever relates 
 to man as the subject of a moral government. 
 The doctrine of a universal necessity, or fa- 
 talism, was maintained by many of the ancient 
 philosophers; and formed the characteristic 
 tenet of the Stoical school. According to it, 
 necessity was to be considered as an inevitable 
 and all comprehending principle, to which 
 gods as well as men were subject. Everything 
 was conceived to exist in a necessary series of 
 causes and effects — the whole constitution of 
 nature — the modes and circumstances of all 
 things without exception — being irresistibly 
 and unchangeably determined. Hence the 
 
— 131 — 
 
 language of Seneca, the elegant expounder of 
 the opinions of this sect, in his treatise "On 
 Providence:" — "The same necessity^ binds 
 both gods and men — Divine as well as human 
 affairs proceed onward in an irresistible 
 stream — one cause depends upon another — 
 effects are produced in an endless series — 
 nothing is the offspring of chance." Democ- 
 ritus held opinions closely resembling 
 the Stoical doctrine of fate; as also Heracli- 
 tus, the founder of the sect that went by his 
 name. In modern times, the doctrine of ne- 
 cessity, especially in regard to the human will, 
 has been defended by Hobbes, Leibnitz, 
 Priestley, Hume, Kaimes, Hartley, and many 
 others. 
 
 FREE WILU. 
 
 The universal language and practice of man- 
 kind imply a belief in a kind of free-will. To 
 deliberate, to choose, to determine, and to act 
 in pursuance of such determination, are ex- 
 pressions in every man's mouth, and things 
 within every man's ordinary experience, both 
 
~ 132 — 
 
 of himself and others. Every man also sup- 
 poses that another will choose and determine 
 pretty much in the same way that he himself 
 would under the same external circumstances ; 
 that is, each man believes that every other 
 man will be governed by motives, or will act 
 according to motives, in the main pretty 
 much as he would himself. When men act dif- 
 ferently under the same external circum- 
 stances, the cause of the difference in conduct 
 is not referred to the circumstances, in which 
 it is here supposed that there is no difference, 
 but to some difference in the persons. We 
 beheve, therefore, that circumstances move 
 men to act, but that we have at least a certain 
 power of weighing these various motives and 
 giving the preponderance to one or another, 
 and that different men possess and exercise 
 this power in different degrees. This may be 
 called, in a sense, a free exercise of the will, 
 and every man, at least who is of sound mind, 
 believes that he has this power, and is sup- 
 posed by others to have it. 
 
 The belief that man possesses this power is 
 the foundation o^f laws which forbid acts under 
 certain penalties. All legislators have be- 
 
— 133 — 
 
 lieved that the knowledge that a certain pun- 
 -ishment will follow a certain act if detected, 
 operates in some degree on those who are 
 disposed to do the forbidden, act ; that the 
 persons who are by any motives led towards 
 such act may, and as a general rule will, de- 
 liberate on the penalty attached to the act 
 before they do it, and will often be prevented 
 from doing it by a comparison of the advant- 
 age which they expect to derive from the act, 
 with the certain penalty attached to it. Many 
 persons do not violate the law because they 
 have been brought up in habits of uniform 
 obedience to it, and therefore the penalties of 
 the law have little or no effect upon their con- 
 duct; but it will hardly be disputed that the 
 fear of punishment has some effect on many 
 men, and is a motive which, operating on the 
 mind and operated upon by the mind, pro- 
 duces self-restraint. The enactment of penal 
 laws supposes a power in men to determine 
 how they will act ; or, in other words, it sup- 
 poses at least that motives can be presented 
 to men which shall in some way and in some 
 degree determine their conduct. 
 
 That men, then, do act under the influence 
 
— 134 — 
 
 oi motives, and that they have also the power 
 of weighing motives, is universally admitted, 
 and for all practical purposes it is immaterial 
 to inquire any further. A man subjects him- 
 self to a certain discipline, he educates his 
 children in a certain method, and legislators 
 forbid men to do a variety of acts, — all acting 
 under the belief that the discipHne, the edu- 
 cation, and the rules of law are so many mo- 
 tives, which, by constantly operating on the 
 mind, will produce on the whole a certain line 
 of conduct in those who are the objects of 
 them. 
 
 But it has been already said, that the ex- 
 ternal circumstances or the motives being the 
 same, two persons will often act differently 
 under them. As the external motives are by 
 the supposition the same, there is some dif- 
 ference in the persons which causes the dif- 
 ference of conduct. Under the same external 
 circumstances, one man will violate the law, 
 and another will not ; one will steal and rob, 
 and commit murder, and another will not. 
 It is generally said that the transgressor of 
 the law is punished on the supposition that 
 his act is voluntary ; that he could, if he chose, 
 
— 135 — 
 
 have acted differently. Practically, he who 
 executes the law will not trouble himself with 
 the question whether a particular individual 
 could have acted differently under the circum- 
 stances : if it is shown that sucE a person pos- 
 sessed the ordinary understanding of man- 
 kind, he will see no reason for remitting the 
 punishment; because he believes that in most 
 cases, if not in all, the penalty attached to a 
 particular act will operate to deter people 
 from doing it. The question of an absolute 
 free-will, then, does not concern a legislator. 
 It is enough for him to present the proper mo- 
 tives for acting or not acting in certain ways, 
 if he believes that such motives will on the 
 whole produce the conduct which he requires. 
 Nor does the question of absolute free-will 
 concern any other person who has to direct 
 or operate upon others. If he believes that 
 he can place such circumstances around per- 
 sons, or present to them such motives, as will 
 cause a determinate course of action, it is un- 
 important whether he believes that the course 
 of action is necessarily determined by these 
 circumstances, or by these concurring with 
 other circumstances, or that the persons who 
 
— 136 — 
 
 are under their influence do in some way or 
 other choose and determine to act as he 
 wishes them to act. 
 
 But if we examine more closely any par- 
 ticular act of a man's life, suppose it to be an 
 act which has about it all the marks of slow 
 deliberation, in what sense can we say that 
 this is an act of absolute free-will? The or- 
 dinary language of mankind assumes the ex- 
 istence of choice, — deliberation, — and yet it 
 does not permit us to maintain that every act 
 is an act of absolute free-will. If it is a vir- 
 tuous act, we do not barely ascribe it to a 
 man's careful consideration of all the motives 
 which at the time operated on him ; we speak 
 of his habits, his education, his character, as 
 the things which would ensure his acting on 
 a given occasion in a determinate way, or, if 
 we so choose to express it, as securing that 
 exercise of the will which is called a proper ex- 
 ercise. And we make the like remarks of a 
 man who has deliberately done a bad act. In 
 both cases we do not attribute the whole con- 
 duct of the man, nor yet the greater part of it, 
 to his then determination. We refer to ante- 
 cedent circumstances as co-operating to this 
 
— 137 — 
 
 determination. This is the language of all 
 mankind; and the language of all mankind, 
 when rightly analyzed, is the true exponent 
 of universal opinion. Confused and perplexed 
 as it often is, it contains within it implicity the 
 elements of all philosophy. Now, when we 
 once refer to antecedent circumstances as 
 affecting our determination under the motives 
 that are presented on any one occasion, we 
 give up the theory oi an absolute free-will, 
 for we make every act of will depend, in some 
 degree at least, on something prior; and that 
 something, again, must by the like reasoning 
 depend on something prior to it; and thus 
 we have an infinite chain of events, and con- 
 sequently we find ourselves engaged in an in- 
 quiry which is beyond the reach of O'ur ca- 
 pacity. Thus, if, as Hartley says, "by free- 
 will be meant a power of beginning motion," 
 no person can, consistently with his own or- 
 dinary language and that of others, maintain 
 this proposition; if he does, he will contra- 
 dict himself almost as often as he speaks. 
 
 Human actions, then,- are, in some degree 
 at least, subject to the same general laws to 
 which other events are subject. Every hu- 
 
-138- 
 
 man action has its antecedents, on which it in 
 some degree depends ; but whether every hu- 
 man action is as necessary, in the sense in 
 which Hume explains the term necessary, as 
 the other phenomena which we see, is pre- 
 cisely the matter in dispute. (Hume, Essays, 
 "Of Liberty and Necessity.") 
 
 When it is said that every event and every 
 human action has its antecedent on which it 
 depends, it must not be understood that it is 
 meant, here at least, to maintain anything else 
 than this. Such antecedents are events which, 
 according to our experience precede the 
 given event uniformly, or at least 
 with sufficient uniformity to generate 
 in our minds the notion of a certain 
 order or continuity ; for though any given an- 
 tecedent event is called the cause of any event 
 which uniformly follows it in our ordinary 
 mode of speech, we here mean to express 
 nothing more than the fact of this uniform 
 sequence. The utmost that we can say is, 
 that the antecedent event is, according to the 
 constitution of the universe as known tO' us, 
 a necessary condition to the subsequent event. 
 Neither heat, nor moisture, nor anything else 
 
— 139 — 
 
 that we can name, is the cause or a cause of a 
 seed vegetating and producing a plant Hke 
 that from which it came. Heat and other 
 things are conditions of vegetation as known 
 to us. The efficient cause can only be one, 
 which must be perpetual, and beyond which 
 we seek for no other. This efficient cause is 
 no law of nature, a term which is incapable 
 of all strict analysis. It is the will of God to 
 those who admit the existence and omnipo- 
 tence of the Deity. To those who do not, if 
 there be such, it is something which has never 
 yet been explained. 
 
 Now all human actions have their ante- 
 cedents, without which, according to our ex- 
 perience, they could not be, it follows that 
 there are certain antecedents of every action 
 which are its conditions, without which such 
 action would never be. This cannot be de- 
 nied. It is the ordinary language of mankind 
 expressed in a different form. But still it is 
 perfectly consistent with this to speak of man 
 exercising his will, that is, operating on the 
 motives which are presented to him. On any 
 given occasion man is subjected to various 
 momenta, and it may be admitted that each 
 
— 140 — 
 
 man will be directed by that which to him at 
 the time is the strongest. But if a power of 
 estimating different motives be admitted to 
 exist in the mind, and to exist in different 
 men in different degrees, the strength of the 
 motive is not its own strength acting on the 
 passive mind; it is the activity of the mind 
 which according to its power comprehends 
 the motive completely or incompletely. 
 
 If the analogy is sound between human ac- 
 tions and other phenomena, and if in other 
 phenomena the antecedents or conditions are 
 not causes, so neither are the antecedents or 
 conditions of human actions to be viewed as 
 their causes. Man is constantly subjected to 
 various momenta, motives, or circumstances, 
 as they are often called, without which he 
 would not act as he does act. These momenta 
 are traced back by an infinite series to the first 
 cause of all, just as in the bare physical phe- 
 nomena, if we trace them far enough, we must 
 ascend to a first cause. If the analogy then is 
 complete between man's acts and other phe- 
 nomena, the operation of all these compli- 
 cated conditions in some way determines the 
 acts of man ; but how it determines them we 
 
— 141 — 
 
 cannot tell. There is no person who main- 
 tains the doctrine of absolute free-will who 
 will contend that man can set his will in oppo- 
 sition to that of God. It is possible to con- 
 ceive that God does will to let man have free 
 action within certain limits, but not further; 
 and all our forms of speech do either expressly 
 or by implication admit that our will is free 
 to a certain extent, which we cannot exactly 
 define, but that it is not absolutely free. It 
 may be objected that to deny an absolute free- 
 will destroys the distinction between actions ; 
 that it represents the Deity as the cause of 
 vice and misery. But even if it should be so, 
 that will not prove a thing to be false which is 
 established by the sound exercise of our un- 
 derstanding. No such consequence, however, 
 does follow. To God we attribute the origin 
 of everything; and consistently with this we 
 must say that he permits vice and misery to 
 exist in the world. It is a consequence of 
 man's nature as he is constituted, and under 
 the circumstances in which he is placed, that 
 he has acted and does act in such a way as to 
 cause misery to himself and others. 
 
 It must therefore be assumed that man is 
 
— 142 — 
 
 so constituted that he does not always act in 
 the way that is most consistent with his own 
 happiness and the happiness of others. The 
 vicious conduct of many men in hfe is an ob- 
 ject of disapprobation to others, and in all 
 societies that conduct which is injurious to the 
 existence O'f such societies is visited with pen- 
 alties. Thus a vast majority of mankind see 
 that certain acts are injurious to the general 
 happiness, and it is one main object of so- 
 ciety to prevent such acts. As God permits 
 society to exist, we m'ay assume that he wills 
 it to exist, and that he wills generally the 
 means by which society attempts to secure 
 its own existence. It is a consequence of this 
 that he disapproves of the conduct of those 
 whose acts endanger the existence of society. 
 We cannot say that he does not will it : it ex- 
 ists, and therefore is consistent with his gen- 
 eral will. We are compelled therefore to ap- 
 ply to him by analogy such terms as are ap- 
 plicable only to our own limited capacities: 
 and we say that he wills generally that all 
 things shall be as they are, but that he disap- 
 proves of some. That he permits man so 
 much liberty of action as to render it neces- 
 
— 143 — 
 
 sary for society to be vigilant against the evil 
 doers who wo'uld disturb its repose, is no more 
 an imputation upon his goodness than that he 
 permits fire, tempest, and war and pestilence 
 and famine to thin the numbers of mankind. 
 So far as concerns those who suffer, it is the 
 same thing whether they suffer from the hand 
 of man, or from causes over which he has no 
 control. It is consistent with all experience to 
 say the Deity has willed that man shall suffer 
 pain both through the agency of matter and 
 through the agency of his fellow-men. Now 
 if we shall assume that God only wills our hap- 
 piness in the sense in which many persons un- 
 derstand it — which would, according to their, 
 notions, exclude all pain and suffering — what- 
 ever misery happens through man's miscon- 
 duct must be against his general will, and can 
 only result from man having an absolute free- 
 will, and sometimes exercising it in a way 
 different from the Deity's wishes. There is 
 no evading this difficulty. An absolute free- 
 will in man or in any other being is inconsist- 
 ent with the omnipotence of the Deity, and it 
 is, as already shown, contradicted by all our 
 observation of the mode in which man is oper- 
 
— 144 — 
 
 ated upon by motives and cifctimstances. 
 But there is nothing which prevents us from 
 attributing to man, as we do' in our daily ex- 
 pressions, a power of determining his acts, 
 under given circumstances, in one direction 
 rather than in another, and in a wrong in pref- 
 erence to a right direction. And it is further 
 admitted by the universal language of man- 
 kind, that the same man who acted wrong un- 
 der one set of motives, might and would have 
 acted right if he had been influenced by other 
 motives; and these motives to right action, 
 it is also admitted, may be and frequently are 
 external circumstances over which he has no 
 control. It is true that a man may so disci- 
 pline himself, that, in any given circumstances 
 which may arise, he may have motives at his 
 command which shall enable him to act in the 
 right direction. But if some men can do this, 
 all cannot; and even in the case of him who 
 can do it, we may always trace the origin of 
 this power to some external circumstances 
 over which he had no control. Man's will 
 then is circumscribed by the constitution of 
 things, of which he is a part. He is placed in 
 circumstances in which he is operated upon 
 
— 145 — 
 
 by various motives to action. If it is said that 
 he must be determined absolutely by that 
 which is the most powerful, this is only an- 
 other mode of saying that of various forces 
 tending to make him move, the strongest will 
 carry him in its own direction. But in truth 
 the words force, motive, and others O'f a like 
 kind, are apt to lead us to false analogies : and 
 these terms require explanation. 
 
 Every man believes at the time when he acts 
 with deliberation that he has a capacity for 
 exercising a free-will. But he also knows 
 that circumstances may prevent deliberation. 
 Thus it is a common case for a man to allege 
 that if he had not been alarmed or hurried, he 
 would have acted differently; or in other 
 words, he would have been enabled to de- 
 liberate and decide better. No man considers 
 it to be a case where the will is properly con- 
 cerned when his action is thus impeded. And 
 there are numerous like cases in life in which 
 in fact there is no choice or deliberation, and 
 consequently no real exercise of the will. The 
 power, then, whatever it may be, to deliberate 
 and act, is often suspended or not exercised. 
 In most cases we act from habit in the gen- 
 
— 146 — 
 
 eral course of life, in other cases from impulse ; 
 and when we act from impulse, there is no 
 deliberation or determinate will. It appears 
 then that our will is not always exercised 
 when we act, but that when it is exercised we 
 are conscious of a capacity to weigh deliber- 
 ately the various motives or grounds of action 
 as presented by our own mental activity. 
 Now if we say that the strongest motive thus 
 presented must prevail and determine to ac- 
 tion, we may, as above observed, be misled 
 by a false analogy. The motive may be called 
 a moving power; and if so, it must have its 
 effect : but to deny the mind all power in itself 
 to resist the motive, is the same thing as to 
 consider it an inert mass operated upon solely 
 by an external force. It is the same thing as 
 to make the mind of man a recipient o^f sensu- 
 ous phenomena without any power to operate 
 on them. The systems of philosophy which 
 view the mind as such a recipient will be con- 
 sistent in making it yield to the strongest 
 motive without an effort of its own. Those 
 systems which assign to the mind a power of 
 operating on impressions may consistently ad- 
 mit a power of determining which of them it 
 will obey. 
 
— 147 
 
 IDEAL. 
 
 Ideal has two uses, philosophical and criti- 
 cal. In the former it sig-nifies, first, whatever 
 belongs or relates to ideas generally. It is in 
 this sense that the word is employed in the 
 phrase "Ideal theory," in the controversy be- 
 tween Reid and Priestley. According to this 
 theory, the understanding does not perceive 
 external objects themselves by means of the 
 sensuous organs, but the organs of sight and 
 touch transmit to the mind certain ideas or 
 images of sensible objects, which it perceives 
 within itself. Locke, who received the term 
 idea from Descartes, seems unconsciously to 
 have adopted, with the use of the word, the 
 scholastic doctrine which it involved. For he 
 expressly declares that our ideas of the pri- 
 mary qualities of bodies are resemblances of 
 them, but that those produced by secondary 
 qualities are no resemblances at all. From 
 this explanation of the means of perception, 
 Locke has, on the one hand, been represented 
 as the origin of modern idealism ; while on the 
 
— 148 — 
 
 other, in consequence of the superior value 
 which he evidently gives to the testimony of 
 sensation, his authority has been claimed by 
 the opposite school of ideology, as founded by 
 the disciples of his French commentator Con- 
 dillac. The second sense of the word is more 
 limited, being confined to a peculiar class of 
 ideas created by and solely subsisting in the 
 imagination. Connected with this especial 
 signification in its usage in the science of criti- 
 cism, or aesthetics. Here ideal signifies a 
 something which, although not existing 
 in the reality of sensible things, subsists actu- 
 ally in thought — the joint creation of the rea- 
 son and the imagination, the archetype and 
 pattern of supreme and perfect beauty. Al- 
 though unreal in nature, this ideal is not un- 
 natural; it is the absolute sum and unity of 
 those scattered beauties which nature, with a 
 lavish but impartial hand, has diffused among 
 her myriad phenomena. 
 
149 
 
 IDEALISM. 
 
 Idealism, the designation of many and dif- 
 ferent systems of philosophy, which only 
 agree in the common principle from which 
 they originate. This principle is the opposi- 
 tion of the ideal and the real, that is, of ideas 
 and things — the contrariety of mind and 
 body, or of spirit and matter. 
 
 I. As the essence of the mental lies in free 
 activity and vital motion, as opposed to the 
 invariable mechanism and inertness of the cor- 
 poreal, the name of Idealism is rightly applied 
 to those systems of physiology which make 
 the primal substance and original of all things 
 to be certain forces invisibly working 
 throughout the universe. To the idealists of 
 this class belong the dynamical philosophers 
 of the Ionian school, Thales, Anaximenes, 
 Diogenes of Apollonia, and Heraclitus. 
 
 The fundamental position of their several 
 doctrines was the assumption of a living 
 energy which as it develops itself undergoes 
 continuous alteration both of form and quality 
 
— I50 — 
 
 — a transmutation which is the cause 'of all 
 generation in nature. For water, the primary 
 substance of Thales, was not the simple ele- 
 ment, but water pregnant with vitality; the 
 infinite air of Anaximenes was an animated 
 and animating energy; and the intellectual 
 primary of Diogenes was not merely the at- 
 mospheric air, but a warm and perfect breath 
 of life which pervades and ensouls the uni- 
 verse. While, however, in these philosophers 
 the philosophical idea is more or less mixed up 
 with divers sensible conceptions, Heraclitus 
 seems clearly conscious of speaking figura- 
 tively of the primary substance. With him a 
 universal and absolute life is the cause of all 
 phenomena, which indeed is most strongly 
 and openly manifested in the vitality of fire 
 and the rational soul, which is like to fire, 
 while in other phenomena it is inherent, al- 
 though not so obvious and immediately cog- 
 nizable. In this class of idealists among mod- 
 erns we must reckon Boscovich and Leibnitz. 
 The former explained matter to be a system of 
 forces; while, according to the latter, all be- 
 ings are of the same nature. Activity and sim- 
 plicity are the essential characters of all, and 
 
— 151 — 
 
 are so many forces or causes which he terms 
 monads. All these monads possess the fac- 
 ulty of perception, or of reflecting within 
 themselves, as in a mirror, the universe. 
 These images, however, of perception cannot 
 become the objects of knowledge, unless in 
 these monads, which possess also what Leib- 
 nitz calls apperception, by which they are en- 
 abled to distinguish and see in themselves 
 these images. It is therefore this faculty of 
 apperception which constitutes the difference 
 between the so-called material and spiritual; 
 and as the faculty itself admits of different 
 degrees, there are corresponding orders of in- 
 telHgences. Lastly, we must include in this 
 class, if anywhere among the idealists, the sys- 
 tem of Spinoza, who asserts the identity of 
 matter and spirit, making them to be but dif- 
 ferent aspects of one and the same substance ; 
 and Schelling, whose philosophy may be re- 
 garded as the complement of that of the Jew- 
 ish philosopher. 
 
 2. Another species of idealism considers the 
 real as simply ideal, and assumes that our rep- 
 resentations of a material world correspond to 
 nothing actually existing, but that by conteni- 
 
— 152 — 
 
 plating these as objective, we transmute the 
 merely ideal into the real. The fundamental 
 axiom of this idealism is the priority of the 
 ideal and the subsequence of the real ("ideale 
 prius, reale posterius"). Accordingly, the real 
 only exists so far as it is necessarily conceived 
 by us, so that the external world is purely a 
 creation of our conceptions, or, in other 
 words, the real is a product of the ideal. To 
 this class is referred the Platonic attempt to 
 account for the existence of the sensible world 
 by his ideas alonejwithout recourse to any 
 other nature alien and foreign to them. By 
 some, even the Aristotelian philosophy is des- 
 ignated as ideal in this sense, at least so far 
 as regards its fundamental principle. This 
 they make to be the assumption of a uni- 
 versal mundane intelligence which, as the 
 principle of all things is a force, self-active, all- 
 perfect, and absolutely free. The manifold 
 manifestations of this entelechy are forms be- 
 fore and beside which matter exists only po- 
 tentially, while the forms are determined and 
 distinguished by privation. But the most per- 
 fect of idealists in this class is Fichte, who 
 derives not merely the form, but also the mat- 
 
— 153 — 
 
 ter, of the conception of external things out 
 of the mind itself, or, in his terminology, out 
 of the ego. 
 
 3. A third system of idealism proceeds to 
 the absolute denial of all material existences. 
 This species of idealism was impossible among 
 the ancients, who did not oppose mind so 
 sharply to matter as to deny the possibility of 
 their interaction, but tacitly supposed their 
 similarity, opposing only corporeity, as com- 
 posite, to incorporeity, as simple. Of this 
 idealism Bishop Berkeley is the author, al- 
 though Descartes gave occasion to it by his 
 position, that nothing extended can enter the 
 unextended soul. Arthur Collier maintained 
 the same theory, by a different line of argu- 
 ment, and Locke afforded, by his doctrine of 
 ideas, the arguments for its support. The sys- 
 tem of Berkeley is briefly this: matter does 
 not exist independently of our sensations, but 
 conceptions of a material world are produced 
 by the operation of the Deity upon our under- 
 standing, and the material world exists only 
 in the divine intellect, who awakes in us cer- 
 tain sensuous conceptions in a definite order, 
 
— 154 — 
 
 which order is what we call the course of na- 
 ture. 
 
 4. The last species of idealism is more phil- 
 osophical, and, without denying or asserting 
 the existence of a material world, is content 
 with confessing an ignorance of its nature. It 
 pretends not to a knowledge of things them- 
 selves, but is content with employing the ideas 
 which the mind forms, according to the laws 
 of its own nature, upon the occasion of the 
 excitement of its sensuous organs, without de- 
 termining whether these ideas correspond or 
 not to the exciting cause or causes, whatever 
 they may be. To this class belong Male- 
 branche and Kant. According to the former, 
 mind and matter cannot act upon each other, 
 and the sensations of the mind are so many 
 occasional causes operating by a constant mir- 
 acle of divine agency. According to the lat- 
 ter, all that we know of outward objects is 
 that they furnish the material part of our con- 
 ceptions, to which the mind furnishes the form 
 agreeably to its original and connatural laws ; 
 while of things themselves, which he calls 
 phenomena, we absolutely know nothing, but 
 
— 155 — 
 
 note only the modes under which they appear 
 to us. 
 
 IdeaHsm in fact forms the antithesis to real- 
 ism, which involves materialism. Sir William 
 Hamilton in his "Lectures on Metaphysics" 
 says — "a philosophical system is often pre- 
 vented from falling into absolute idealism or 
 absolute materialism, and held in a kind of 
 oscillating equilibrium, not in consequence of 
 being based on the fact of consciousness, but 
 from the circumstance that its materialistic 
 tendency in one opinion happens to be coun- 
 teracted by its idealistic tendency in another; 
 two opposite errors in short, co-operating to 
 the same result as one truth. On this ground 
 is to be explained why the philosophy of 
 Locke and Condillac did not more easily slide 
 into materialism." (Lecture xvi.) He also 
 observes that "mankind in general believe 
 that an external world exists, only because 
 they believe that they immediately know it as 
 existent." But of course if this knowledge be 
 disallowed, if the perception be only existent 
 in the mind, the conclusion would be un- 
 founded. 
 
156 ~ 
 
 OPTIMISM. 
 
 The name given to the view propounded in 
 the Theodicee of Leibnitz that this world, as 
 the work of God, must be the best among all 
 possible worlds ; for, were a better world pos- 
 sible than that which actually exists, God's 
 wisdom must have known, His goodness must 
 have willed, and His omnipotence must have 
 created it. Leibnitz maintained that, if there 
 was to be a world, it must consist of finite 
 beings; this is the justification of finiteness 
 and liability to suffering, or metaphysical evil ; 
 that physical evil, or pain, is salutary as pun- 
 ishment, or means of tuition; and that God 
 could not remove moral evil, or wrong, with- 
 out removing the power of self-determination, 
 and, therewith, the possibility of morality it- 
 self. J. S. Mill (Three Essays upon Religion, 
 p. 40) points out that Leibnitz did not main- 
 tain that this is the best of all conceivable, 
 but of all possible, worlds, so that his doctrine 
 (though not that of his caricature, Pangloss) 
 might be held by a "limited" Theist. 
 
157 
 
 UTILITARIANISM. 
 
 A word coined by J. Stuart Mill to denote 
 that system which makes the happiness of 
 mankind the criterion of right. It is thus 
 more extensive than Epicureanism, which 
 constituted personal happiness a criterion for 
 the individual, leaving the happiness of oth- 
 ers out of the question. The system owes its 
 origin to Bentham (1748- 1832), was attacked 
 by Macaulay in the Edinburgh Review, and is 
 thus defined by J. S. Mill : "The creed which 
 accepts, as the foundation of morals, Utility, 
 or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds 
 that actions are right in proportion as they 
 tend to promote happiness, wrong as they 
 tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By 
 happiness is intended pleasure, and the ab- 
 sence of pain ; by unhappiness, pain, and the 
 privation of pleasure. To give a clear view of 
 the moral standard set up by the theory much 
 more requires to be said; in particular what 
 things it includes in the ideas of pain or pleas- 
 ure; and to what extent this is left an open 
 
-158- 
 
 question. But these supplementary explana- 
 tions do not affect the theory of life on which 
 this theory of morality is grounded — namely, 
 that pleasure and freedom from pain are the 
 only things desirable as ends ; and that all de- 
 sirable things (which are as numerous in the 
 utilitarian as in any other scheme) are desir- 
 able either for the pleasure inherent in them- 
 selves, or as means to the promotion of pleas- 
 ure and the prevention of pain," 
 
 NIHILISM. 
 
 A term used in Western Europe to desig- 
 nate the Russian Socialist movement, which 
 began about 1870, and may be divided into 
 two distinct periods: (i) "The going among 
 the peasants." A number of young men and 
 young women of the upper classes voluntarily 
 went to work in the fields and the factories 
 so as personally to carry on a Socialist propa- 
 ganda and distribute Socialist literature. 
 Their organs were the Yperiod (Forward !) of 
 London and the Workman of Geneva. This 
 lasted about six years, during which time 
 
— 159 — 
 
 there were twenty-three political trials of 417 
 persons, half of whom were condemned to ex- 
 ile in Siberia or to hard labor in the mines. 
 (2) In 1878 the struggle with the government 
 commenced. At a congress held at Lipezk, 
 shortly after Soloviefif's attempt on the life of 
 Alexander II., the acquisition of political free- 
 dom was declared to be the first necessity. It 
 was hoped to gain this by the formation of a 
 legislative body, elected by the people, with 
 guarantees for electoral independence, and 
 liberty to agitate for reforms. This was de- 
 manded from Alexander III. shortly after the 
 assassination of the late Emperor as the price 
 of cessation from violence. The Nihilist pro- 
 gramme is an agrarian socialism based on 
 communal property. The discoveries of the 
 police show that Nihilism is widely spread in 
 Russia, not only among the working, but 
 among the well-to-do classes, and even in the 
 army, especially in Petersburg, and in many 
 of the principal cities and towns. 
 
— i6o — 
 
 SOCIALISM. 
 
 The word Socialism is employed in sevcial 
 different senses. Loosely, it includes all 
 schemes for abolishing social inequality, and 
 in this sense it is generally distinguished as 
 Utopian Socialism, under which designation 
 communities like those of the Essenes, the 
 early Christians, and the Shakers in America 
 at the present day, and the ideal common- 
 wealths of Plato, More, and Harrington, are 
 to be classed. St. Simon (1760- 1825), Owen 
 (i 771-1858), and Fourier (1768- 1830) were 
 the leading modern Utopians. Scientific So- 
 cialism is an economic theory which affirms 
 that the materials from which labor produces 
 wealth — i. e., the land — should be the prop- 
 erty of the community, not of the individuals 
 forming a separate class. Socialists also de- 
 mand that the existing capital, having (as they 
 contend) been unjustly appropriated by the 
 landholding class or its assignees, be restored, 
 with the land, to the community. It vests all 
 authority in the hands of delegates elected by 
 the community, and seeks to substitute pttblic 
 co-operation for private enterprise in supply- 
 ing' all social needs. 
 
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