E407 /"\ -.^IK'" ^-^''^^ °'W^-" /\ v-^?^,- V ^* -4:^ '^^ »-•* -^o ,-. "^^O^ o'. V^^'V^"" ^V*^"^'*/ '^^^'*:^'-/'' -o^ *.'. \0^ * ^^J;^:'^ 4 O V *oV. THE WAK WITH MEXICO, SPEECH HON. LEWIS CASS, OF MICHIGAN, IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, JANUARY 3, 1847. On the Bill reported from the Committee on Military Jlffahs to raise, for a limited time, an additional Military Force. Mr. CASS said: Mr. President: This is the first of a series of bills, which the Military Committee is about to present to the Senate. They have commenced with the most important, and will ask the consideration of the others, in succession, till they have discharged the duty intrusted to them. In presenting this bill, I do not propose to touch any of the disputed topics, which divide the two great parties, under the banner of one or the other of which, every citizen of our country is arrayed. I shall leave these, if introduced at all, to be introduced by others. I had hoped, till I heard the incidental dis- cussion, which arose a day or two since, on the question of taking up this bill, that these exciting subjects would be postponed for some future opportunity, and that the pi'opositions now submitted would be considered upon their military merits, taking it for granted, that the propriety of voting the additional ibrQe required, would not be controverted. I was well aware, that we could not escap' a full discussion of the origin of the war, its progress, its objects, and the whr' course of the Administration, connected with it. Nor indeed did I wish to avi it. However severe may be the attack, I trust it will be as earnestly met, a easily repelled, for I considei' the ground, which the Administration occupies perfectly impregnable. I am apprehensive, howev^er, from the remarks, wh fell from some of the honorable Senators the other day, that the whole field of controversy is to be gone over, and that we are to fight this bill, necessary, as I deem its immediate passage to the ])ublic interests, inch by inch, till al! the ?reat party questions of the day are debated and exhausted. If it is to b ^ so, 1 ni ^^!. of course submit; but the fault shall not be mine, nor will I provoke the con- test by introducing any topics, which may properly lead to it. There is one point, sir, where we all can meet, and that is the gallantry and good conduct of our army. This is one of the high places, to which we can come up together, and, laying aside our party dissensions, mingle our congratu- lations that our country has had such sons to go forth to battle, and that they have gathered such a harvest of renown in distant fields. The time has been — and there are those upon this floor who remember it well — when our national flag was said to be but striped bunting, and our armed vessels but fir-built frigates. The feats of our army and navy during our last war with England redeemed us from this reproach, the offspring of foreign jealousy ; and had they not, the events of the present war would have changed these epithets into terras of honor ; for our flag has become a victorious stand- ard, borne by marching columns, over die hills and valleys, and through the cities, and towns, and fields of a powerful nation, in a career of success, of which few examples can fJfe found in ancient or in modeni warfare. Printed at the Congressional Globe Office The movement of our army from Puebla was one of the most romantic and remarkable events, which ever occurred in the mihtary annals of any country. Our troops did not indeed burn their fleet, like the first conquerors of Mexico, for they needed not to gather courage from despair, nor to stimulate their reso- lution, by destroying all hopes of escape. But they voluntarily cut off all means of communication with their own country, by throwing themselves among the armed thousands of another, and advancing with stout hearts, but feeble num- bers, into the midst of a hostile territory The uncertainty which rested on the public mind, and the anxiety everywhere felt, when our gallant little army disappeared from our view, will not be forgotten during the present generation. There was a universal pause of expectation — hoping, but still fearing; and the eyes of twenty millions of people were anxiously fixed upon another country, which a little band of its armed citizens had invaded. A veil concealed them from our view. They were lo^t to us for fifty days, for that period elapsed, from the time when we heard of their departure from Puebla, till accounts reached us of the issue of the movement. The shroud which enveloped them then gave way, and we discovered our glorious flag, waving in the breezes of the capital, and the city itself invested by our army. And similar circumstances marked the very commencement of the war, when the Mexicans first sunounded our troops, and shut them out from all communi- cation with their country. This unexpected attack struck us all with astonish- ment, and we feared, as well we might, that numbers would overcome discipline and valor, which, however they might prolong, could not be expected to succeed in, the contest. And hopeless indeed might'have been the result, had not the honored soldier, who commanded our troops, had confidence in them, and they in him — had he not known how to lead, and they to follow. And well and bravely did they all bear themselves in the critical circumstances, which surround- ed them; and our doubts soon gave way to certainty, and gloomy forebodings to Morious convictions. And the campaign thus commenced was vigorously followed up on the Rio Grande, and victory after victory, till the crowning triumph at Buena Vista, was heralded by every breeze, and became familiar to our ears as household words. During the whole of this war, there has been a series of successes, which has been uninterrupted by a single serious disaster. I hold in my hand a table, \jrepared at the Adjutant General's Office, from the best materials, which can be found there, exhibiting the actions fought with the enemy, and the forces em^a^ed, and the losses sustained by each party. As we have official data, the true losses on our side are stated ; but those on the side of the Mexicans are in some instances entirely omitted, and in others conjecturally estimated. This table shows the whole truth, so far as we are concerned, and but a part of the truth, so far as the enemy is concerned. Still, even under these circumstances, it is one of the proudest trophies, with which any army ever enriched its country.* The Adjutant General remarks, that he cannot vouch for the perfect accuracy of the above statements, as from their nature they must often be estimated. He adds, that the above table, although essentially correct, is not entirely com- plete, for he thinks there are yet wanting some reports, he, of affairs, which have been lost or intercepted, and it may be, that the above statement may hereafter need amendment or correction. If we recorded our history upon stone, as was done in the primitive ages of the world, we should engrave this series of glorious deeds upon tables of marble. But we shall do better ; we shall engrave it upon our hearts, and we shall conimit it to the custody of the press, whose monuments, frail and feeble as they appear, yet from their wonderful power of multiplication, are more endu- * See Table on page 8. ring than brass or marble, than statues or pyramids, or the proudest monuments, erected by human hands. Let it be remembered, sir, that these battles were fought in a great measure by new and undisciplined troops, hastily collected at home, and rapidly marched to the seot of warfare ; by men who had abandoned the duties and comforts of domestic life, and who made war, not a trade as in Europe, but a temporary employment, in order to defend the interest and honor of their country. And even the small regular army, which existed at the commencement of the war, had seen jitde actual service in the field, and that not with a civilized foe, but in murderous conflicts with Indian tribes, where there was much exposure to meet, and little glory to gain. Many of the officers and soldiers, and indeed a great majority of them, and some of the conmianders too, saw the first hostile gun fired in the very field, which they illustrated by their deeds, and moistened with their blood. Honor, then, to the highest and the lowest, to the greatest and the least. Honor to the living and the dead ; to those who survive to enjoy it, and to the memory of those Avho sleep in a soldier's grave, far from the land they loved so welL And, happy am I to see upon this floor, at this moment particularly, one of the gallant officers, who have inscribed their names high upon the military roll of their country ; and there are others like him, in this city, who have returned from the campaign, in which they distinguished themselves, bearing upon their persons inefl^aceable marks of courage and patriotism. A kind Providence has permitted them to come back, and the plaudit of grateful millions, Well done, good and faithfid servants, is the proud welcome which greets them. Let modern philanthropists talk as they please, the instincts of nature are truer than the doctrines they preach. Military renown is one of the great elements of national strength, as it is one of the proudest sources of gratifica- tion to every man, v/ho loves his country, and desires to see her occupy a distin- guished position among the nations of the earth. I should have been proud to have been in Europe during our military operations in Mexico — proud to witness the efiect of the skill and prowess of our army upon the statesmen and politicians and communities of the Old World. During the course of these events, there was no war there to attract the general attention, and to excite, by its uncertainties and vicissitudes, the solicitude of the governments. Our war was the event of the day, and many a steadfast gaze was cast across the Atlantic, to watch the prospects and progress of the pattern Republic, as we are invidiously termed, in the new career into which we had entered. - As we all know, our institutions have friends and foes in the other hemisphere. To both, they are a light shining across the ocean, but inviting some, and warning others, as the impressions our experiment has produced have been favorable or unfavorable. The anti-republican croakers of the Old World, at the commencement of our Government, predicted, that it could rrot long resist the shocks of peace or war. When they found it could do both, and do it successfully, they then denied our power to carry on a war without our own boundaries, should circumstances require such an exertion of national strength. This was our first great trial ; for in the invasion of Canada, during the last war, the operations were so near, that they did not test our strength for distant warfare. The trial has been made, and has succeeded. No one will hereafter call in question our capacity to assert our rights, wherever these may require our interference. If the o-reat experiment had failed, it would have taken ages to recover from the misfortune. But now, wherever the American flag is borne, or the name of American known, and that wherever, is everywhere,~tRe^glorious feats of this war have 4 proclaimed our power, and have announced, that we have taken our position side by side with the mightiest nations of the world. Hereafter, in the wildest dreams of ambition, there will be no dream of conquering us ; nor will any hostile foot pollute our shore, but to escape from it, if it can, as best it may. The present hill provides for raising ten additional regiments of infantry, to serve during the war. The average number of each regiment in the field, is rather less than three-fourths of the legal establishment ; so that this measure, if adopted, will add about seven thousand five hundred men to the army. The organization is precisely that provided in the act, which passed at the last session of Congress for raising an additional force ; and as the details were then fully con- sidered, and are well known to the Senate, I need not recapitulate them here. The reasons, which render this increase of force necessary, are so clearly and forcibly stated in the report of the Secretary of War, that I need do little more than request, that that portion of the document may be read. The following extract from the report of the Secretary of War, was then read by the Secretary: " Our career of success, so disastrous to Mexico ; our conquest of so many of her States and territories ; tiic subjugation and occupation of her capital ; the defeat and disjiersion of her armiesv the capture of most of her inutcr'iel of war, and the annihilation of her former commerce, have not yet brought peace, or the offer of such terms as could be accepted by the United States without national degradation. The war still continues; and it is proper to present some sug- gestions in regard to its further prosecution. In making these suggestions, I pass, without remark, tlie proposition that we should abandon all our acquisitions, and witlidraw our troops from the enemy's country. Such a proposition could only be seriously entertained if we were in reality the vanquished party, and were convinced of our inability to prolong the contest with reasonable hopes of success. *' Our further operations must, in my opinion, be conducted in one of the three following modes : first, to take and hold an indemnity line, to recede from all places and positions now occupied in advance of it, and cease from all aggressive operations beyond that line ; second, to overrun the whole country, and hold all the principal places in it by permanent garrisons ; and, third, to retain what wc now possess, open the lines of communication into the interior, and extend our operations to other important places, as our means and the prospect of advantages shall indicate — keeping a disposable force always ready, within approachable limits, to annoy the enemy, to seize supplies, enforce contributions, and frustrate his efforts to collect means and assemble troops for the purpose of proti-acting the war. " A full discussion of the comparative merits of these modes of conducting our military oper- ations would extend this communication to an unwarrantable length ; I shall, therefore, confine my remarks to a few prominent considerations relative to each. " With reference to a speedy peace, with proper indemnity and security — the only object of the war — the line policy is regarded as objectionable. If our present position cannot command acceptable terms of pacification from iVlexico, retiring to an indemnity line would certainly fail to produce such a result; it would weaken the inducements of the enemy to put an end to lios- thities. Restored, by our voluntary surrender, to the possession of his capital and important departments, and relieved from the pressui-e of our arms, and from all apprehensions of further conquest and annoyance, beyond the limits we might select, he would be lel"t with more abundant resources than he now possesses tc*jirepare, at leisure and in security, to strike an etTectivc blow with concentrated forces at our detached posts. To hold tiicse posts safely, to retain possession of the seaports we now have, (if that should fall within the policy,) and to prevent incursions into the territories which we might choose to appropriate to ourselves, would, in my opinion, require a force as large as would suflice to maintain what we now occupy, and to carry our operations still further in the interior of the enemy's country, and make him feel the calamities of" war in a way best calculated to induce him to seek for peace. But if in this I am mistaken, and the line policy should enable us to reduce the number of our troops, still, it will not, as 1 conceive, thereby effect a reduction of our actual expenditures for the war. " In consequence of the interruption of intercourse between the seaports in our possession and the central parts of Mexico, the collections on imports have hitherto been inconsiderable. If the line policy is adopted, this intercourse will continue to be interrupted, and, consequently, the receipts of revenue from this source will be small. "Under the operation of the line policy, all expectations of lessening the burden of sustaining our troops, by deriving supjilies and contributions from the enemy, would be disappointed. The supplies in the vicinity of our posts would be withdrawn from our reach, as soon as our design to seize and appropriate them was ascertained or suspected. But, were it otherwise, as our posts would be remote from the wealth and resources of the country, the amount which could be obtained would be inconsiderable. "So far from deriving advantage from the line policy, by way of obtaining assistance from the resources of the enemy, towards the support of our troops, we should, I apprehend, confer upon a portion of lire people of Mexico a direct benefit, by opening to them at our posts a market, in which we should become the purchasers of tlicir products at an exorbitant price. These considerations, without bringing into view others, have led me to look to one of the other modes of operation I have mentioned, as preferable to tiiat of occupying an indemnity line. " In regard to the second mode suggested — that of occupying the whole country — the wide extent of territory embraced in the Mexican Republic, the many important points to be garri- soned, and the long lines of communication to be kept open, present difficulties of no ordinary magnitude, if our occupancy is to be of such a character as to supersede the Mexican authority, and recjuire the temporary establishment of civil government. In carrying this plan into effect, it would not be i-easonable to rely upon the favorable disposition, or even neutrality, of any considerable part of tlie Mexican people, until some assurance of the stability of our power was derived from its continuance. Our posts must therefore be strong, and our forces numerous, in order to secure the many and long lines of communication, to disperse and chastise the guerrilla bands which would obstruct them, and to suppress the more powerful aspirings of the people wherever they may be attempted. I cannot safely estimate the force requisite to carry into full effect this plan, at less than seventy thousand men. To ensure the presence of that number in tiie enemy '.s country, and at places where they would be wanted, it would be neces- sary to raise a much larger force. The great expense of raising, organizing, and sending to their remote destination so large a body of troops as soon as needed, to give effect to tliis plan, would, I apprehend, bring a very heavy, and perhaps embarrassing, demand upon the treasury. " The third mode presented is, in my judgment, preferable to the others. Beyond certain limits, it admits of expansion and contraction; but, as a fixed condition, all now held is to be retained, and no part surrendered, but in compliance with treaty stipulations. Tliis plan also contemplates further acquisitions extending to other important points, more or less numerous, as circumstances may warrant. " Notwitlistanding our victories jiave fallen with crushing weight upon the assembled armies of Mexico, most of those who hold in their hands the decision of the question of peace, have stood beyond the range of the physical evils inflicted by the war. By extending the theatre of it, and changing the mode of conducting it, they can be made to feel its pressure. In conse- quence of our liberal and humane policy, we have, as yet, scarcely touched the substance of the wealthy and influential classes in Mexico. ,As the Mexican army has long been to them the instrument of oppression in the hands of their successive rulers, its destruction has not deCf'^ly enlisted their sympathies, or alarmed their fears. Our army has afforded them better protection than their own; and thus, by our ])resence and our forbearance, they have, within certain limits, hitherto escaped exactions from either. But our successes have now opened the way to act upon and influence those who probably can, if they will, put an end to hostilities. By making them sufler the usual calamities of war, they must be made to desire peace. " In addition to the troops required to garrison places to be retained, it is proposed to have in the field a competent force for aggressive operations; to strike the enemy whenever he may present a vulnerable point; to open avenues from the ports in our possession into the enemy's country; and to cover and to subject to our control some of his rich mining districts and produc- tive agricultural regions. It is not deemed proper to point out in more detail the movements and objects contemplated in the further prosecution of the war upon this plan." Assuming that this plan of operations recommended by the Secretary of War is the true one, (and, for myself, I have no doubt upon that subject.) we have then four great objects to be kept in view, in estunating the force to be pro- vided for the future conduct of the war : 1. The continued occupation of the important positions, we now hold. 2. The taking possession of such other commanding points, as experience may show to be proper, and as the circumstances of the war may require. 3. The preservation of the necessary cominunication between our positions, as well from the sea-coast to the capital, as in other portions of the country, which may be brought into subjection to us. 4. A strong force, independent of what is necessary for these purposes, which shall always be kept upon the alert, and ready to move, whenever there may be any appearance of an outbreak on the part of the Mexican peoj)le. The organization and maintenance of a large force may be the means of rendering its employment unnecessary. It is much better to render opposition hopeless, by the display of strength, than to excite it into action, by the exhibi- tion of weakness, and then to be compelled to resort to desperate struggles, to remedy evils, which ordinary prudence would have prevented. It is true humanity also, and we owe it to ourselves, to our army, who have done and suffered so much, to the enemy, and to the world. Remember, sir, that our troops are three thousand miles from home, in the midst of a hostile population of eight or ten millions, and that, by great exertions and unparalleled bravery, 6 they have succeeded In a partial subjugation of the country. But we have no right again to expose them to such perils. There is a vast superiority of physi- cal force opposed to them. All experience shows, that in this condition an invaded people will suddenly break out into insurrections, and sometimes display an energy and courage, which they failed to exhibit upon the battle-field. Who would weigh with a critical balance the amount of opposition we have to apprehend, and the strength necessary to overcome it, and then coolly provide this calculated force, and leave events to take care of themselves? What kind of political arithmetic would that be, which would say, if so many troops have done so much, how many will it require to do so much more ? I trust, that the supplies we may vote, will be given upon a far better principle: upon a prin- ciple, which shall look, indeed, to results, but which shall make the most liberal arrangements for attaining them. The proceedings of this Government are as well known in Mexico as here. They do not indeed travel upon the wings of the wind, but they travel with the power of the press, and are spread through the civilized world. Vigorous and prompt action will produce the happiest etfect upon the state of things in Mexico. Nothing would conduce more to impress upon the people of that country the necessity of a peace, than a unanimous determination in Congress to put forth all the strength of the nation till it is obtained. 1 have caused the following abstract to be prepared from the report of the Adjutant General, exhibiting the entire strength of our present army, including regulars and volunteers : Volunteers — actual force, about 20,000 To complete tiie organization will require 12,500 Twenty-five regiments of regulars — full legal complement, exclusive of officers.. . 28,814 Actual strength 21,533 To complete the organization will require 7,281 During the last year, there were recruited — For the old army 11,018 For the new army 11,162 Forces in the field under General Scott — Regulars 17,101 Volunteers 15,055 Aggregate 32,156 32,156 Deduct the garrisons of Tampico and Vera Cruz - 1,947 Makes, for all the operations between Vera Cruz and Mexico, including garri- sons, together with the sicl: and disabled - 30,209 The returns in the Adjutant General's Office do not show the actual distribution of this force. Under General Taylor, but temnorarily commanded by General Wool — Regulars ', 3.937 Volunteers 2,790 Aggregate 6,727 C,727 Under General Price, in New Mexico — Regulars 255 Volunteers 2,902 Aggregate 3,157 3,157 On the Oregon route, under Lieutenant Colonel Powell, Fort Kearny — Volunteers - 477 In California, under Colonel Mason — Regulars 216 Volunteers .^ 803 Aggregate ... 1,019 1,019 Total land force employed in the prosecution of the war: Regulars 21 ,509 Volunteers 22,027 Aggregate 43,536 It will be seen, that we have in Mexico, under General Scott, besides the garrisons of Tainpico and Vera Cruz, about 29,000 men, rank and file, exclu- ding officers; and in the command of General Taylor, an aggregate of 6,727 men, officers included. From the statements of the Adjutant General, it appears that the actual force kept up is less, by one-fourth, than the legal force authorized by law. The continually renewing casualties of war, and other circumstances, occasion this difference. And it is not probable, that the existing legal establishment could, by any effort, be made to keep in the field a greater numerical strenffth, than is now there. So that if the force of the army is to be materially aug- mented, this must be done by the creation of new corps, and by multiplying the arrangements for procuring recruits and volunteers. I have omitted in this enumeration, some bodies of volunteers, which have been called out, but have not yet joined the- army. They cannot, if full, which it is not probable they will be, exceed 2,200 men, and do not ohange the question before us: if, indeed, they do more than keep up for a time the present number of volunteers in the field. I know nothing more of the proposed plan of the campaign, than is disclosed in that part of the report of the Secretary of War, which has just been read to the Senate. I do not therefore presume to speak authoritatively upon the sub- ject, and indeed it may well be, that no fixed system of operations has been or will be prescribed by the Executive; but that after expressing its general views, the conduct of the war will be left to the discretion of the commander. But it is easy to see, that if the obstinate injustice of the Mexicans drives us to greater exertions, and to a more enlarged sphere of operations, there are a number of positions which, from their importance, military or political, we must seize and hold. These can only be indicated by an exact knowledge of the country, and particularly of its great lines of communication, which must be commanded and guarded. And the mining countries would claim their share of attention, in the efforts we may be called on to make. The rich districts of Zacatecas and San Luis yet contribute their supplies to the reduced treasury of the enemv. 1 have seen within a few days a letter from one of the most gallant and distinguished generals in Mexico, which estimates the revenue now derived from the mines at an amount so much higher than I was prepared to expect, that I am unwilling to state it here, as I am not at liberty to name my authority. But if this infor- mation is correct, or near it, the product is a most important portion of the national resources, which should be diverted from the Mexican treasury to ours. And he also gives it as his decided opinion, that by proper arrangement and exertions, the produce of the taxes of the country may be made to bear the expenses of holding it in our possession. If so, and the same infatuation con- tinues to prevail in the Mexican councils, we can hold on, as indeed we must hold on, and let the enemy pay the cost of a state of things, whose existence is owing to themselves. Without the extinction of their independence, and the annexation of such a vast population to our country, with few sympathies to unite them to us, we can continue to govern them, and govern them with energy and justice, such as are new in their history, till the lessons of adversity shall have taught them to do us right, and till the experience of our sway and its operation around them, shall have brought them to a better state of feelino-. We can then treat with efficient rulers, and after securing the just objects of the war, we can retire, leaving the Mexican people in the enjoyment of their inde- pendence, with a salutary conviction, that it is better to secure our friendship by justice, that to provoke our enmity by insults and aggressions. The returns show that we have less than ^^000 men, rank and file, wliich 8 excludes officers, in the midst of a hostile population, of eight or ten millions, differing from us in race, in language, in religion, in institutions, in prejudices, and indeed in all the characteristics, which constitute national identity, and separate the great families of mankind from one another. This is exclusive of our force upon the Rio Grande, amounting to about 6,000 rank and file, and which is hardly large enough to hold that region in peaceable possession, and to guard against the irruption of the Mexican troops. And it may be that this force will need augmentation with a view to onward operations, either directly upon San Luis, or by the more circuitous but less difficult route of Zacatecas to the central countrifs of Nortiiern Mexico. He who believes that this principal force of 28,000 men, and this auxiliary force of 6,000, including the sick, invalids and disabled, are amply sufficient to hold in subjection the people already reduced to obedience, to carry the war further the longer it is protracted, and to meet its casualties, whether these are found in the battle-field, in the climate, or in popular tumults, may well vote against this bill, and refuse the augmentation it provides. But those, who, like me, believe th^t this Government, founded by all for the good of all, is bound by the most sacred obligations not to expose its citizens to unnecessary peril, nor to push their exertions to the very limit of human endurance, but to make the most liberal arrangements for the prosecution of the war, and to hold the treasure of the nation light as dust, when weighed in the balance with the life- blo. c! of iis suns, will cheerfully vote for this proposition, and hail its passage not only as u necessary measure of policy, but as a tribute to gallantry and patriotism. TABLE referred to on second page. JIffair or bultk ^a^cd. \ Number of kiUed. = 11 Uetaclimem under Captain Thorn- tun, '2il dragoons, in a reconnois- sanc-u on tlie Rio Grande, above Fort Brown, 'r<:xas Dt tucliuient of Captain Walker's Texa> Ranger:?, near Point Isabel, Fort Brown Palo Alto Resaca ile la Palma Monterey San Piisqual, Uppi-r California .... ISnizito, New Alexico lios Aimelos, California IjU Canada, i\ew Mexico Mora, New Mexico ri Knihndo I'uebla lie Taos Rnena Vista Sacramento Vera Cruz (Jcrro Gordo ( 'alal(oso, California, De Russy . . . . ( 'oiitreras Sau Antonio ^. . Chui ubusco ( »n Major Lal!y"s march Molino del Key Cliapultepee Attack on Piiebla nuaniantla General Lane, Puebia Atlisco Total . April 25,1846 April 28 Mav 4 to May 9 . . . May S May 9 Sept. 21,22,23.... Dec. 6 Dec. 25 .Tan. 8, 9,ia!7 Jan. 24 Jan. 24 Jan. 29 Feb. 4 Feb. 22,23 Feb. -28 March U to 29..., April 18 July 12 VAug. 19,20 Aug. 10 to 19 Sept. a Sept. 11, 12,13.... Sept. 13 to Oct. 12, <)ct.9 Oct. 12 Oct. 19 63 .■?() 2,300 1,700 6.645 110 rm rm 350 200 ino 4,000 6,000 6,500 10,000 160 1.220 '600 1,500 500; 700 SOOi 800 4,7.VJ, 20,000 900! 4,000 11,0001 5,,500 8,500 12,000 126 1,500 8,497 1,200 3,251 7,180 1,400 1,780 3,100 1,500 32,000 2,000 14,000 25,000 8,000 4,000 4,000 2,000 10 unknown. 10 unknown 2: unknown 4 36 120 19 1 9 1 6 267 12 8' 15 164 9 201 100 2v. 300 1,.360 \ c ^-o ^'^^•/ ^^,'^r!^\/ V"'^'*/ "^ ..^^\.^^>^. //j^:^v'^o .,^^\.ii^^V c ''^.c^ 'bv' %. *■• « .^c.'^^ ^ ' \* .. -^ •" '^ ^ "■■ <^ •^^^^ v^\. • <^ 'oK -v^O" < V \l* - • - A? J3n fet :989 H . " • * *0 ^ » 1 " ■» "*>v O^ . • " • * !«*:*■ .N*' %